Logic and African Philosophy: Seminal Essays on African Systems of Thought 164889013X, 9781648890130

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LOGIC AND AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY Seminal Essays on African Systems of Thought Edited by

Jonathan O. Chimakonam University of Pretoria, South Africa

Series in Philosophy

Copyright © 2020 by the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Vernon Art and Science Inc. www.vernonpress.com In the Americas: Vernon Press 1000 N West Street, Suite 1200, Wilmington, Delaware 19801 United States

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Series in Philosophy Library of Congress Control Number: 2020931409 ISBN: 978-1-64889-013-0 Also available: 978-1-62273-882-3 [Hardback] Product and company names mentioned in this work are the trademarks of their respective owners. While every care has been taken in preparing this work, neither the authors nor Vernon Art and Science Inc. may be held responsible for any loss or damage caused or alleged to be caused directly or indirectly by the information contained in it. Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition. Cover design by Vernon Press using elements designed by pikisuperstar / Freepik.

Table of Contents List of Figures

vii

Dedication

ix

Acknowledgements

xi

Preface

xiii

General Introduction

xvii

Part 1: Introduction: Logic and Traditional Thought, the Origin of a Controversy

1

Chapter 1 Logic in Africa

5

Meinrad Hebga Yaounde State University, Cameroon

Chapter 2 On Negrohood: Psychology of the African Negro

15

Léopold Sédar Senghor Independent Scholar

Chapter 3 African Traditional Thought and Western Science

27

Robin Horton Independent Scholar

Chapter 4 How Not to Compare African Traditional Thought with Western Thought

71

J.E.Wiredu University of South Florida

Part 2: Introduction: Logic in African Languages and Cultures

81

Chapter 5 Logic and Rationality

85

Godwin Sogolo National Open University of Nigeria, Nigeria

Chapter 6 Uncovering Logic in Igbo Language and Thought

109

Chukwuemeka B. Nze University of Nigeria, Nigeria; Madonna University

Chapter 7 The Logic in Yoruba Proverbs

123

Ademola Kazeem Fayemi University of Lagos, Nigeria

Chapter 8 Universal or Particular Logic and the Question of Logic in Setswana Proverbs

141

Keanu K. Malabane University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Edwin Etieyibo University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Chapter 9 A Justification for an Excavation of a Logic in African Worldview

173

Chris O. Ijiomah University of Calabar, Nigeria

Part 3: Introduction: African Logic, the Debate

185

Chapter 10 The Logic Question in African Philosophy

189

Campbell S. Momoh University of Lagos, Nigeria

Chapter 11 The Possibility of African Logic

207

Udo Etuk University of Uyo, Nigeria

Chapter 12 Can There Be an African Logic? Revisiting the Squall for a Cultural Logic

223

Uduma Oji Uduma National Open University of Nigeria, Nigeria

Chapter 13 Why Can’t There Be (An) African Logic? Clarifying the Squall for a Cultural Logic Jonathan O. Chimakonam University of Pretoria, South Africa

245

Part 4: Introduction: The System builders, Contributions from the Calabar School

259

Chapter 14 Harmonious Monism: A System of a Logic in African Thought

263

Chris O. Ijiomah University of Calabar, Nigeria

Chapter 15 Complementary Logic

273

Innocent I. Asouzu University of Calabar, Nigeria

Chapter 16 Ezumezu as a Formal System

297

Jonathan O. Chimakonam University of Pretoria, South Africa

List of Contributors

321

Index

323

List of Figures Figure 3.1: First Causal Connexions

46

Figure 3.2: Second Causal Connexions

46

Figure 14.1: Principles of contraries

266

Figure 14.2: Diagram of three values

268

Figure 16.1: Showing the Ezumezu three-valued thought model

303

Figure 16.2: Diagram of Conversational Curve

310

Dedication In a continent ravaged by slave trade, colonialism, neo-colonialism, foreign religions, miseducation, bad education and numerous western-orchestrated wars, it is hard to come by people who still think for themselves. This book is dedicated to all Africans who weather the storms of western epistemic hegemony to think for themselves and to nurture the seed of cognitive rebellion in their communities.

Acknowledgements Most chapters of this book have been previously published and are here reprinted under copyright permission of their original sources and authors. The authors and original publishers of those essays are here acknowledged and appreciated. The essays include: 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

Hebga, M. Analysis 1958. Logic in Africa. Philosophy Today, 2.4: 222–229. Senghor, L. S. 1962. The Psychology of the African Negro. H. Kaal Transl. Diogenes, 10.37: 1-15. Horton, R. 1967. African Traditional Thought and Western Science. African Journal of the International African Institute. 37.2: 155-187. Wiredu, J. E. 1976/1997. On How not to compare African Traditional Thought with Western Thought. Transition 75/76, The Anniversary Issue: Selections from Transition, 1961. 320-327. Sogolo, G. 1993. Logic and Rationality. Foundations of African Philosophy: A Definitive Analysis of the Conceptual Issues in African Thought. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. 68-89. Nze, C. B. 1998. Uncovering Logic in Igbo Language and Thought, WAJOPS 1: 131-142. Fayemi, K. A. 2010. Logic in Yoruba Proverbs. Itupale: Online Journal of African Studies 2. 1-14. Ijiomah, C. O. 2006. An Excavation of a Logic in African World-view. African Journal of Religion, Culture and Society 1.1: 29-35. Momoh, C. S. 1989. The Logic Question in African Philosophy. In C. S. Momoh (ed.) The Substance of African Philosophy. Auchi: APP Publications.175-192. Etuk, U. 2002. The Possibility of African Logic. In Olusegun Oladipo (ed.), The Third Way in African Philosophy. Ibadan: Hope Publications. 98-116. Uduma, O. U. 2009. Can There Be An African Logic?. A. F. Uduigwomen (ed). From Footmarks to Landmarks on African Philosophy, 2nd (ed). Lagos: O. O. P. 289- 311. Extensively reworked with title adjusted for this anthology. Chimakonam, J. O. 2011. Why can’t there be (an) African Logic. Journal of Integrative Humanism. 1.2: 143-152. Extensively reworked with title adjusted for this anthology. Ijiomah, C. O. 2014. Application of the Relational Dynamics for the Construction of a Logic in Africa: Harmonious Monism. In Ijiomah, C. O. Harmonious Monism: A Philosophical Logic of Explanation for Ontological Issues in Supernaturalism in African Thought. Calabar: JP Publishers. 123-138. Extensively reworked with title adjusted for this anthology.

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14. Asouzu, I. I. Issues in Logic: The Context of Complementary Logical Reasoning. In Asouzu, I. I. Ibuanyidanda (Complementary Reflection) and some Basic Philosophical Problems in Africa Today. Zurich: Lit Verlag. 90-104. 15. Chimakonam, J. O. 2019. Ezumezu as a Formal System. In J. O. Chimakonam Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Cham: Springer. 131-149. My appreciation also goes to members of The Conversational Society of Philosophy (CSP) in different countries—a forum for developing and promoting African philosophy and intellectual history, for leading a new resurgence in original research in Africa.

Preface Individuals in this world do not accidentally become logical in their speech. Being logical is a conscious act chiefly because it is a necessity. This necessity was imposed on all of us the moment we decided to constitute a community with a handful of norms to regulate our conducts and develop a language of communication. In other words, being logical was not primordially, an involuntary act that occurred naturally; it was a voluntary activity and an exercise of a specific intellectual capacity which the earliest community-person struggled consciously to demonstrate. Nowadays, some philosophers and anthropologists talk about logic, especially in reference to the Greek-born Aristotle as if it were a trophy of the Western mind. Interestingly, and probably unbeknownst to these cultural braggarts, humankind, irrespective of geographical location, was already eminently logical and observing the principles of logic long before wise humans began spotting the coastal town of Ionia. These principles include the ones we have formulated today and the ones we are yet to formulate, Aristotle’s noble contribution, and by no means lean, was in articulating and putting these principles of reasoning down on writing scrolls. It is shocking, if not intellectually shuddering, that in the modern time, several thousands of years since humanity in different locations have been observing the principles of reasoning out of sheer necessity, some people come along to say, perhaps due to the overwhelming influence of the history of slave trade, and a litany of unwitting arguments to defend it, that those who have been victims of the transatlantic slave trade, of all things, are prelogical. Or, that the principles of reasoning which Aristotle merely wrote down are not present in their languages and are not observed in their cultures or that their psychology is different. Ordinarily, such a thing as logic or being logical, which as I explained was primordially a necessity ought not to be in any academic debate. There should be a limit, and there is certainly a limit to academic freedom. Where it is not plausible to doubt or prove the humanity of humans, it is outright racism. As a result, the works of scholars like Georg Hegel, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Lucien Levy-Bruhl, etc., should now be clearly labelled racist. It could make for trivial academic pleasure to argue over such claims that put the humanity of sections of the world in question. Still, the intentions and consequences of such claims remain despicable and opprobrious.

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It is unfortunate that Africans in our age are now forced to prove their humanity by demonstrating the presence of logical principles in their languages, cultures and by showing that the contents of their minds and behaviours are consistent with those of racists who regard themselves as proper humans. In this debasing exercise, the Western iconoclast may have scored a petty victory, but it is humanity as a whole that has been brought to its knees. If a part of humanity in an age, for the reason of being slightly ahead of others in inventions could by dint of such accomplishment pronounce a section of humanity not human enough, then a bad precedence is set. In the future, which always harbours a lot of unknowns, the once deprecated section of humanity might rise to some stellar accomplishment and being full of themselves might reverse the trend and proclaim the inferiority of the other section that once reigned supreme. Part of the reason for this anthology is to put the troubled Africa’s intellectual history of the modern age in perspective specifically as it concerns the themes of logic, language and psychology. Some of the literature collected in this book which contains what was put forward by some Western racists and the fightback from some African thinkers are usually missing in history, sociology, philosophy and cultural studies curriculum in schools in Africa. Where some are spotted, they are hardly put into proper perspective that connects the thoughts back into early modern racism. I have grouped the essays into four parts and provided an introduction for each to link up the essays and bring out their sociological implications. I have also provided a general introduction to give an overview not only of the motivation and focus of each essay and group of essays but to put the essays in proper coherent historical order. Not all the essays that qualify to be included in this project have been included. Various reasons account for the omission of some essays that ordinarily should have been part of this collection. Victor Ocaya’s essay on “Logic in Acholi Language” and Edwin Etieyibo’s essay that focuses on logic in Urhobo proverbs have both been left out because both essays were discussed elaborately by Keanu Koketso Mabalane and Edwin Etieyibo in their contribution on “the Question of Logic in Setswana Proverbs” in part two of the anthology. Gordon Hunnings’ “Logic, language and culture” was omitted because all efforts to secure the copyright permission from the holder yielded no results. But the contributions of Godwin Sogolo, Meinrad Hebga and Uduma O. Uduma who in various ways offered a similar line of arguments more than compensate for this omission. On the whole, this is a project on African intellectual history. It is expected that teachers in schools in Africa will expose their students to these readings to properly streamline their knowledge and understanding of African history and predicament. Some of those students would go on to become teachers, leaders, administrators, policymakers and some would hold executive positions in

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various African countries. Without the knowledge of African intellectual history, it is difficult for such professionals to function in a way that will benefit the continent and liberate its peoples mentally, let alone solve some of the continent’s teeming problems. Pretoria July 7, 2019

General Introduction With the faculty of reason, humans can reason logically, all things being equal. To build a system of logic, however, requires some professional training in the field. This is not to suggest that those who have not acquired any form of training in logic are never able to build systems of logic, after all, Aristotle and George Boole did. But it may require an extra stroke of genius to be able to create something as intricate as a system of logic if one had not received sufficient training in the field. If we approach a culture as university people, where no one has ever built a system of logic, especially in this modern age, it may strike us with surprise, and if care is not taken, we may begin to think quite in error, that folks in that culture have no capacity for logic, especially, if they appear ignorant of the laws of thought and in their daily lives and resolutions, demonstrate complete disregard for some of those laws we have grown to be familiar with. We would be compelled then to ask ourselves, if they do not often reason in line with the laws of thought, what does that portend? It is through thinking in this manner that some Western scholars like Lucien Levy-Bruhl arrived at the conclusion that the primitive people must be prelogical, which literally, by the prefix ‘pre’ could mean, ‘having not attained the capacity for logical reasoning.’ Any adult so described, is equated to an infant. So, by describing the primitive peoples as prelogical, Levy-Bruhl was craftily appealing to Georg Hegel’s description of what he calls “Africa proper” as “…the land of childhood, removed from the light of self-conscious history and wrapped in the dark mantle of night” (1975: 174). So, contrary to general supposition, Levy-Bruhl did not say anything new; he merely called Hegel’s dog by another name. To think that this manoeuvre has eluded many is amusing but what is not amusing is the assumption that because people have not developed a system of logic, then it means they lacked such a capacity; or, to think that people sometimes reason, quite contrary to some of the traditional laws of thought, then it implies that they have no ability for logical reasoning. This assumption, to put it mildly, is foolish and short-sighted. Like many other human endeavours, logical reasoning has many paths. The discovery of one path does not close the door against others. Yes, we would have to summon the courage to say at some point that P is better than Q, but it would be forlorn to wildly conclude that Q does not exist or that a people who have found Q to be more viable for them cannot reason along the principles of P. There is a point at which Levy-Bruhl came around to this fact but dented it when he denies the primitive people of the ability to reason along the lines of Aristotle’s logic and describes his erroneous understanding of their logic in a sub-human way as that of “mystical participation.” It could be admissible to say that P is

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better than Q in matters of context, but such marginal advantage should not inspire vile and sub-human derision. Like I already stated, the point at issue was the absence of any book-based system of logic in Africa at the time the Europeans arrived. But where there is the capacity to reason logically, there also is the capacity to construct systems of logic; it would only be a question of time. Having realised the folly in Levy-Bruhl’s campaign to brand certain peoples as prelogical, neo-Levy-Bruhlians now want to maintain a diluted thesis, that is, yes, African peoples reason logically and the laws of thought are present in their languages and cultures, but the absence of systems of logic in their pristine cultures means that they do not have the capacity to build systems. Unfortunately, this is as spurious as the first thesis. As my people from the Igbo country would say ‘were ogbiri manye ewu, ma obu were ewu manye ogbiri, bu otu ihe’ that is, ‘use the rope to tie the goat or use the goat to tie the rope amount to the same activity.’ What would be proof that people who have the capacity to reason logically lack the ability to build systems of logic? Certainly, there is no proof for that, especially when we observe that it is the same rational capacity that is required for both activities. It is in this manner that some scholars attempt to force African thinkers to a corner, insisting that what it makes sense to talk about is ‘logic in Africa’ and not ‘African logic.’ But if the former gestures at the observance of Aristotelian logic in Africa, the latter simply gestures at logical contributions from Africa in much the same way we comfortably talk about Polish, Chinese and Indian logics as contributions from those cultures. Why do some scholars insist that we cannot creditably talk about African logic? Richard Rorty calls it “cultural politics” (2007: 4). Incidentally, cultural politics of this type is a game of language and psychology. I will first comment on language and later on psychology both of which consist the other two themes of this work connected to the theme of logic. With a perfectly constructed language structure, a people’s accomplishments could be written off, edited out of history and distorted beyond recognition; their inventions could also be stolen and awarded to another people, and their efforts could be thwarted or disrupted. Language, in this way, could be violent. So, it is easy to see the power and the value of language, something which the Enlightenment did not fully realise. Nothing compels action more than ‘word’ in the vagaries of its usage. The courage to use one’s reason is not enough. The daring to communicate the products of reason is essential to the progress of reason itself. It is this daring that the human spirit found at the beginning of the twentieth century resulting in the century witnessing more violence than any other century in the history of the world. Some of the violent manifestations of this newly found language include; the Russian revolutions and many other revolutions and wars in different parts of the world culminating in the First and the Second World Wars. It

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must be noted that what is commonly regarded as violence is nothing but language and war is the full expression of it. Violence is language! It is a language that resists or rebels against epistemic hegemony which is a castle built by absolutising reason. People do not indulge in violence for anything. It is a manner of speech—an expression of reflected thought. It is a powerful language which hitherto the twentieth century was used by a few who were privileged to have discovered its power. This is proof that though reason from the emergence of the wise humans had invested itself in the soils of every human culture, its germination and eventual maturation was disparate. Does it stimulate any ideas as to why the French had their revolution more than one hundred years before the Russians and the Chinese? Or, why the Congo reached the wisdom of sending children to school some six thousand years after ancient Babylonia? Yet, this is a simple matter of time. Simple, in the sense that reason has no ‘reason’ for time. It will make its journey, and it will reach its target irrespective of how long a time it takes. Thus, in this matter of time, we must be cautious not to legislate the ominous dichotomy of superior/inferior. For example, a man who enjoys the privilege of a lot of ‘firsts’ for the reason of having been born thirty years earlier than another, must also surrender the privilege of a lot of ‘lasts’ to the man born thirty years later. If, as common sense approves, all things being equal, the man who enjoys the privilege of having been born first, may not get the privilege of dying last. One thing that matters a lot, especially in these days of intercultural philosophy is not which particular manifestation of reason matures first, but whether each is able to eventually attain maturity. And this is the summary of my thesis: that people, in matters of logical constructions, are late to the party, does not mean they are not fit for the party. From the preceding, we can tease out the theme of psychology in this collection. William Abraham, halfway into the twentieth century published a book with the curious title, The Mind of Africa (1962) where among others, he tried to peer into the reflexive frameworks in African cultures and describe the behaviours inspired by such frameworks. Many an African scholar in different ways have also attempted to describe what could be called the basic ideas undergirding the thinking and behaviours of people in different cultures in Africa before the European invasion. They dwelled on politics, economics, art, socials, archaeology, philosophy, literature and history to name but a few and some of the actors include, Cheikh Anta Diop, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Chinua Achebe, Julius Nyerere, Ngugi wa’ Thiongo, Chinweizu, K. A. Busia, Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, Kwasi Wiredu, T. U. Nwala, Obafemi Awolowo and Ali Mazrui, etc. However, it was Senghor in his Psychology of the African Negro that tried to give a direct account of how the African thinks and how their behaviours are influenced. But Senghor was responding to the positions in literature mainly produced by Westerners and which he felt did not represent the psychology of the African fairly. Unfortunately, some African scholars have found Senghor’s depiction of the

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African mind questionable, if not dubious. That is, however, a subject for another work. In this anthology, I have made selections of seminal papers in African logic which themes also cut across language and psychology, and grouped the essays under four different connected parts. Part one titled “Logic and Traditional Thought, the Origin of a Controversy” brings together essays that inaugurated the controversy whether there is logic in traditional African cultures, the nature of the mind and behaviour of African peoples, how Africans think and describe the world, etc. Contributions from Meinrad Hebga, Leopold Senghor, Robin Horton and J. E. Wiredu make up this group. I have analysed each of these essays with reference to the focus of the group in the introduction to part one. In part two titled “Logic in African Languages and Cultures” and which is necessitated by the discussions in part one, I assembled essays that speak to this theme. The question that unites the essays in this part is: are the laws of thought present in African languages and cultures? Contributors whose essays address this question include Godwin Sogolo, Chukwuemeka Nze, Ademola Fayemi, Keanu Koketso Mabalane and Edwin Etieyibo as well as Chris Ijiomah. Their individual arguments have been discussed in the introduction to part two. Part three titled “African logic, the Debates” collects essays that engaged in a full-scale debate on whether there can be such a thing as African logic. This debate is due to matters arising from the discussions in part two. If it is possible, what would its systems be like? The introduction to part three explains the arguments of each debater in line with the theme of the group. Finally, part four is titled “The System builders: Contributions from the Calabar School.” The three contributions in this group came from members of the Calabar School, an influential Department of Philosophy based at the University of Calabar in eastern Nigeria whose main goal was to pick up the gauntlet thrown in the preceding part three to formulate systems of African logic. The contributors include Chris Ijiomah, Innocent Asouzu and Jonathan Chimakonam. These three developed three similar but different systems of African logic to open a new chapter in African intellectual history. I recommend this book to all students, researchers and teachers in African philosophy and intellectual history, and indeed, to the sundry fields of African studies. The readings assembled here, which are by no means exhaustive, are such that would stimulate one to new levels of thinking. References Abraham, W. 1962. The Mind of Africa. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Hegel, G. W. F. 1975. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Transl. H. B. Nisbet. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rorty, R. 2007. Philosophy as Cultural Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Part 1: Introduction: Logic and Traditional Thought, the Origin of a Controversy In the century following the Enlightenment Age, a problem arose, one that was to degenerate into a controversy in the fields of philosophy and psychology. It was how to determine, on account of cultural and world-view studies of various sub-Saharan African peoples, the nature of their minds, whether they were capable of reasoning along with the tradition of Aristotle or have their own unique logic. The problem with this programme was that it was a two-edged sword. If it can be established that the sub-Saharan African peoples are incapable of following Aristotle’s logical reasoning or that they have their own unique logic, then, either way, it would imply that they are intellectually different from the Europeans. The problem does not lie in the nature of this difference because it could be a difference in terms of degree. The problem lies in the direction of the difference presupposed. It could be a difference in substance which classifies a section of humanity as sub-humans or non-humans. European anthropological research conclusions1 of the early modern time have stratified humanity into superior and inferior races and placed the European stock at the apex. In contrast, the sub-Saharan stock was placed far below the European and only above the Amerindian stock. So, the European is the bar. Thus, if it was established that the sub-Saharan peoples were incapable of following the principles of Aristotelian logic and as a result, their reasoning can be measured with a different standard of logic, whether this logic is openly called inferior or not, the users of such a logic are inferior. Now, as this question of logic is a question of the intellect, it would be easy to conclude straightforwardly that the users of this other standard of logic are inferior to the European stock. In any case, this was what the early modern anthropological research in Europe from Carolus Linnaeus, Governor Pawnall, Abbé de la Croix, John Hunter, Zimmermann, Meiners, Klūgel to Metager, etc., (Blumenbach in Bernasconi and Lott 2000: 29-31) established through the racial classification of humanity.

See Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. 1795. In Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott, Eds. 2000. 27-37. 1

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Based on the preceding, philosophers like Georg Hegel, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, etc., who came after, fortified this racial stratification and apportioned to the African, an intellect that is inferior to that of the European, and crystallising in the first half of the twentieth century in the works of Lucien Levy-Bruhl, the stage was set for a big controversy. Levy-Bruhl had concluded that primitive peoples, and by this, he means all traditional peoples were pre-logical which suggests that they were not incapable of logical reasoning completely except that their logic is of a different standard, something he describes as ‘logic of mystical participation.’ By this logic, primitive peoples contradicted themselves almost all of the time. The first part of this anthology consists of four essays that variously respond to the poser above yielded by the works of the European anthropologists and philosophers already mentioned about the psychology of the African. The first essay by Meinrad Hebga published in 1958 responded robustly to the poser. Hebga demonstrates that the sub-Saharan African peoples are not only capable of following Aristotle’s logical reasoning, he demonstrates that they are also capable of formulating a different but not unique logic to explain certain aspects of thinking which were not covered in the Aristotelian framework. He shows that the new system would be universalisable, ending the speculation that Africans have an inferior type of intellect. With this idea of different systems, Hebga quashed the idea that the Aristotelian model appropriated by the West was the only universal tool. He satirised this supposition as “[T]he dogma of one standard and of one all-embracing prototype for civilisation and culture…” (Hebga 1958: 222). The second essay by Leopold Senghor was published in 1962. In it, Senghor did not admit that the African peoples are incapable of following the principles of Aristotelian logic but, he shows that they are also capable of a different type of reasoning that arises from emotion called ‘intuitive reason’, something he presents as unique to them, or at least, a framework he did not universalise. For failing to universalise this framework, Senghor appears to support the proposal that the sub-Saharan peoples have a unique intellect. For this, many have criticised his work as placing the African in a difficult position. It was this failure to universalise his new framework that Robin Horton in the third essay published in 1967 latched onto, to conclude that Africans follow a different and localised type of reasoning altogether which according to him, Levy-Bruhl had captured succinctly as ‘logic of mystical participation.’ Horton, in his essay, attempted to compare traditional African thought and Western science. He employed data from his anthropological studies to demonstrate that the former was a closed model of thinking that cannot be questioned, and the latter was an open model of thinking that admits of

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criticisms. On the basis of this distinction, he claimed that sub-Saharan peoples were incapable of following Aristotle’s logical formulation because their world-view is closed to critical thinking, the type that admits of the laws of thought. However, in the fourth essay by J. E. Wiredu,2 published in 1976, and which is a rejoinder to Horton (1967), Wiredu shows with examples that the subSaharan African peoples reason logically and in accordance to Aristotle’s model. He debunks the idea of a unique logical framework which Levy-Bruhl alludes to, which Senghor unwittingly subscribed to and which Horton erroneously established. Wiredu faults Horton’s conclusion on some scores: first, he shows that Horton’s comparison of traditional African thought with Western science was a mismatch. Second, he shows that Horton ignored the fact that Europe once was at the stage of traditional thinking, which is dominated by supernaturalism. Third, he shows that thinking is evolutionary and different peoples evolve at different paces. Fourth, he shows that for Horton’s comparison to be accurate, he should have compared, for example, traditional African thought with traditional Western thought. On these scores, Wiredu appears to have countered Horton’s arguments successfully. But the controversy was only just beginning. I invite the reader to savour what for me is a less discussed, less understood and much-misinterpreted aspect of modern African intellectual history. The teacher is expected to take their students through these readings connecting the racist ideas from early modern time down to Levy-Bruhl, and unfolding their implications from the four essays in this part of the anthology. References Blumenbach, J. F. 1795. On the Natural Variety of Mankind. In The Idea of Race. Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott, Eds. 27-37. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Hebga, M. 1958. Logic in Africa. Philosophy Today, 2.4: 222–229.

2 Who

later changed his name to Kwasi Wiredu.

Chapter 1

Logic in Africa Meinrad Hebga Yaounde State University, Cameroon

Abstract This chapter argues that Logic as a science of reasoning which guides and shapes thought is relative. Relative in the sense that different cultures can be sites for alternative systems of logic. The point is that the science of logic as a tool which philosophers appropriate is not exhausted in the Aristotelian tradition. New and different systems that define different ways of explaining reality are not only possible but desirable. Such new systems need not comply strictly with the laws of thought. The chapter shows that there are examples of scenarios in African cultures that demonstrate the implausibility of the law of contradiction in some cases which suggests that a logic of another kind is possible. Keywords: Logic, Africa, Contradiction, Relativism, Civilization 1 Introduction The dogma of one standard and of one all-embracing prototype for civilization and culture is losing its backers right along. If the fact of having arrived at the atom, of having probed nature in its depths and furthermost reaches gives legitimate pride to the discoverers and consecrates the civilizations which have produced them, all this still leaves an important place to the other cultures, embryonic though they may be called, a place which they occupy humbly, but at the same time to the advantage of all. Moreover, it is of interest to note that it is not true men of science but the dilettantes who disparage less developed civilizations and who style themselves ‘the civilized.’ It is the same ones who reproach them for not being rational, that is systematized, codified, and mathematicized. But apart from certain logical disciplines directed toward discovery properly so called, you do not need a system to construct a real civilization, if you understand by system a mental edifice formally built up from an arsenal of signs such as the treatises of occidental logic with their set-up of propositions and algebraic relations. Not

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that you should minimize the great scientific value of such systems from resentment or ignorance. To make such statements as the foregoing it would seem necessary, first of all, to come up with a better theory or at least to plumb to their depths those which exist. But that is not necessary for we are here on purely philosophical ground. And philosophy is judge of all the sciences because it touches all of them in their common denominator, their common formal object, their ratio veri. If forceful thinkers such as Gabriel Marcel have sought independence from any system and if Nietzsche could say, "I am not limited by any system, not even my own,”1 that is an invitation to complete freedom in the search for truth as well as to respect for foreign cultural heritages, however significant they may seem to us. Let us never lose sight of the fact that logic, even when considered as a methodology of knowledge, is not only or even above all didactic. It must also be a positive analysis of the progress of the mind in the search for truth. It must account for what is done, before teaching what ought to be done. 2 Many Logics First of all, there is no normative logic. We are not concerned here with formal logic, which taken as a whole is nothing but a theoretic study of series of propositions, but with intuitional logic whose principles depend upon a consideration of the object. What is truth? The scholastic philosophers define logical truth as the agreement of thought with its object. In this bivalent logic, there is no place except for the true and the false. It excludes all intermediary value such as the ‘not altogether true’ and the ‘not altogether false.’ The basis of this bivalence seems to be the ambiguity of the intermediate value or, rather, the demands of the principle of contradiction which excludes one thing from being true and false at the same time under the same aspect. But you must not attribute the exact application of this principle of contradiction as the monopoly of any particular system. Although it is meta-physical and absolute, it does not keep two diametrically opposed systems from being true at the same time, their fundamental presuppositions being different. Euclidean geometry admits that the sum of the angles of a triangle equal two right angles; for Riemann, it is more than two right angles; for LoBatschewsky, it is less. Even at the interior of a given logical system, we can find propositions true in themselves which do not agree with the totality; or we can find some objectively false that do not harmonize very well with other

1

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Logic in Africa

true propositions. Whence arises the necessity of admitting the existence of polyvalent logics with opposed truths, with intrinsic truths distinct from extrinsic truths which flow from the meeting of a system with empirical data or other systems. A fortiori, it is necessary to admit the existence of opposed logics, structures of thoughts, methods of research, contradictory in their methods or their conclusions. 3 Norms What, you may ask, is the criterion of judgment for the internal coherence of a logical system. Evidently it cannot be another logical system accepted as the norm and measure of human thought. The thesis of contradictory logics is precisely a denial of such intellectual imperialism. Each system will be selfsustaining and will accept nothing as its criterion but first truths and common sense. If it can be reduced to these by successive stages, it is coherent and intrinsically true. Comparing this to Euclidean geometry, that of Riemann is false (extrinsic falsehood) but the Euclidean mathematicians themselves can accept the legitimacy of the principles of Riemann as well as the precision and exactitude with which the theorems and conclusions fit together (intrinsic truth). How is there a place in polyvalent logics for objective truth with certitude? Or since everyone can choose the basis he wants for his system of thought, will not truth depend in final analysis on the will of each one with the result that everything will be true in some way or other? We reply that our thesis has nothing in common with the voluntarist theories of judgment. We reject the pragmatism of James which reduces a judgment to the mental act by which man makes the world useful, so that truth and usefulness coincide. At the same time, we decry the Kantian critique in which the synthetic judgment (the only scientific judgment according to Kant) is the act whereby the mind makes the world intelligible. All these theories have a common fault: born of subjectivism and Cartesian mediatism, they wind up by divorcing truth from reality- all of which precludes objectively certain knowledge. We, on the contrary, distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic truth, rather than separate the two. For a logical system enjoying an internal coherence is not built on air. It is founded in experience through its axioms and first principles and, therefore, it agrees with empirical data in its principles and in all its ramifications, thanks to the precise connection of its propositions. If you make an experimental verification of it, it will only be a general interpretation, a judgment of the whole whose particular conclusions can be contradictory to some particular propositions but not to the entire system. Whenever we come upon two assertions which are contradictory or contrary, each coherent in itself, we can say that they are true, independent of their usefulness or their intelligibility. In such a case we presume that each one reflects only a part of truth. The internal cohesion of the two is even an indication

8

Chapter 1

that the contradiction is perhaps only based on an unwarranted extension of terms, an incomplete alternative disjunction, in a word, on an unjustified universalization. Not that you can arrive theoretically at a complete inventory of the elements of a nature and of the physical and metaphysical possibilities of a being (this has as yet not been demonstrated sufficiently against the philosophy of Auf-klarung. But the danger is rather of affirming too much than too little, too absolutely than too relatively. Let us say right away that if the principle of contradiction does not have an unlimited and absolute application, it does not follow that you should substitute for it an absurd principle of non-contradiction with the result that a double standard of truth is raised to the level of a system. That would lead us to complete relativism and even to agnosticism. 4 Relativism At the same time, we must admit a certain logical relativism. This is recognized by common sense. How often is it said, ‘Such an idea is true- from your point of view.’ Maurice Miller in his acute analysis of the method of behaviorism, according to which we know others only through their time-space actions, makes this pertinent remark: If a lunatic shows joy when tortured, if the conduct of a savage is foreign to that of a civilized person, if the behavior of a child is different from that of an adult, it is because the body of conventions used as the frame of reference is upset by the conduct of the lunatic, the savage and the child. We would say, for example, that the mentality of the primitive is prelogical, that his conduct (the words which he pronounces included) does not fit into the conventional pattern established by civilization or adopted, perhaps arbitrarily, by psychology, that it needs a certain extension of the language primitively adopted …. (Muller 1943)2 You can see from this how wrong it is to try to justify primitive philosophies by reducing them to systematized philosophies or to compare them to a universal norm. Blyden remarks that Europeans, in studying the evolution of the black race, see the Negro as an embryonic European at the first stage of his development. It is generally admitted in our day that the black man is not simply "an entertainer, born for rhythm, deviltry and eroticism, a clown, a court jester" (Blandier 1947).3 We have heard the authoritative voices of writers such as Andre Gide, of philosophers and professors such as Emmanuel Mounier and Jean-Paul 2 3

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Logic in Africa

Sartre proclaim the special value of Negro culture, a culture, which according to them is called upon to enrich its sister cultures of the West. But despite them, and without their knowing it, their apologetic (for it is indeed that) is an ingenious algebraic formula equating the most disparate mentalities. When M. M. Griaule, professor at the Sorbonne, shows that we of Negro culture have abstract ideas, coherent metaphysical principles whose task is to serve as the basis of religious, social and technical life, we agree until he gets to the fatal phrase: "What is to be said if, going further than proving a mentality rational and rich, they (these metaphysical principles) remind the scholars of the West of the system of antiquity” (Griaule 1947).4 We are of the opinion that the Bambara metaphysics is of value independently of their resemblance to the great civilizations of the Far East. 5 Unique Values It is absolutely necessary to react against the dialectical concept of human evolution. Perhaps it comes from the Hegelian mentality which marked the criticism of art since the last century. At any rate, it is fashionable to distinguish in the history of art three periods: the period of halting beginnings where the artists are called primitive, the apogee or classical period and the period of decadence. But even in the theory of hylomorphism which defines the beautiful as the splendor of form and considers art as the effort to recapture the essence dispersed in matter in order to draw it closer to its divine prototype, you can and you must reject the notion of a classical art in the sense of an absolute model, a norm according to which everything must be judged, for every artistic production being but a partial expression of an idea will always be inadequate, approximative and perfectible. But sentimental fashions have a long life, and the guide will explain to you the canvases of the ‘primitive’ Florentines and the ‘primitive’ Sienese, as though the Madonnas of Raphael were a culminating point, beginning with the Byzantine hieratism or the anatomic painting of Messacio. Are you going to conclude from the bas- relief of Istanbul representing Rameses II on his war chariot that the Egyptians, mathematicians and builders of the pyramids, were ignorant of the art of perspective which was discovered much later by the Renaissance Italians? You can only say that the same problem had several solutions, equally valid. Nearer to our own times Henry Matisse, high priest of the famous avant-garde Fauves, and Pablo Picasso, father of cubism, were without a doubt for several decades the masters of modern French painting. But their conceptions of painting were so different that Picasso refused to recognize Matisse as a painter and the latter scorned the vaunted

4

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Chapter 1

work of the other. At the 26th Biennial Exposition at Venice in 1952 neo-realists and neo-abstractionists came together in an epic encounter. You could see the same art critics admiring without reserve the metaphysical canvases of the Fauves while at the same time giving no quarter to the decoratistic school of De Chirico. It is permissible to reject in logic as in esthetics all unwarranted authority. But if we are asked for our precise thought on the matter, that must await a more profound and systematized study. Still, that does not mean we cannot indicate some general directions. 6 Knowledge and Certitude In our logic (that of the Bantu and the Sudan Negroes) internal and external evidence constitute the criterion of certain knowledge. For this, the authoritative testimony of Placide Tempels suffices. The criteriology of the Bantu rests on an external evidence- the authority, wisdom and respected influence of ancestors. At the same time, it is based on an internal evidence -the experience of nature seen as living phenomena. Without doubt you might point out the error in their reasoning, but at the same time it must be admitted that they base their conceptions on reasons and their criteriology and their wisdom on rational knowledge. (Tempels 1959: 52) With this in mind, it must be remarked that we ignore completely the rationalist criticism of Western philosophies which calls into question the very value of knowledge. Not that error, doubt and certitude are unknown concepts among us, but we possess a spontaneous and unruffled confidence in the ability of the senses and the superior cognitive powers to arrive at true knowledge. These latter are called sometimes ‘heart’ and other times ‘head.’ But this concrete symbolization does not at all mean that they are thought to belong to the class of sensible avenues of knowledge. We have no space here to enter into the difficult analysis of the psychology of knowledge in Negro philosophies, even though it has repercussions on logic. Anyone who is the least bit acquainted with our manner of thinking is fully aware that the Cartesian doubt does not bother us, even when a foreign philosophy has profoundly altered our native culture. We identify certitude and objective knowledge. Guided by common sense, we have completely avoided subjectivism and its disastrous consequences. Moreover, since our cultural patrimony forms an indivisible corps of social, moral, juridical and religious truths, we are not disposed to pure speculation or far-fetched theories. This assemblage of truths to which we refer everything else is of great importance in understanding our way of reasoning. It is made up of traditional

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Logic in Africa

wisdom gleaned from history, legend, from social, moral and religious laws, from techniques more or less developed, from customs all of which are based on a metaphysics which gives unity to the whole. We have an original idea of living being. For us, it is not above all a determined immutable essence plus an active force. 7 Living Patterns We do not look upon the living being and the force which animates it as being two separate entities. Being itself is rather a type of vital force, a capacity for active and passive influence, of which the body is simply the exterior covering. It is said, ‘man is on the inside.’ The interplay of reciprocal forces makes up the warp and woof of everyday life and explains such things as birth, sickness, prosperity and death. It is said of a sterile woman, for example, that someone, an enemy or angry ancestor, is exerting an evil influence over her. This influence is exercised by means of gestures which are at the same time symbolic and effective, such as bending one's big toe against the ground, holding the ring finger over the middle finger, or making a knot with straw. But the eye is the chief instrument of good and bad influences. One trembles to see an evil person kiss a child or even smile at it. Here actio in distans is a real possibility. In certain Jeux de nuit men are supposed to battle one another to death even though they live far from one another and are asleep. Unfortunately for those who offer but a knowing smile to these primitive superstitions, authentic cases of real death can be cited subsequent to these Jeux nocturnes. Until the present time, the facts have not fit in with the supposed scientific explanations which some have given them. An important characteristic of the vital forces is that they can increase, diminish and communicate themselves. Since they constitute beings essentially, there follows a certain intercommunicability of individuals. You hear of leopardmen, men able at will to transform themselves externally into leopards; of elephant-men who disguise themselves in this way to tramp down the plantations of their enemies. What should you call such men? All the blows which descend on their doubles strike them also; if the double is killed, they die also. Such is the profound conviction, though among the young it exists in a somewhat repressed fashion. But we dare not force the mutability of beings so far as to acknowledge a variability of essences, for there would no longer be a way of distinguishing genera and species. We do not at all pretend that a man and a leopard are interchangeable. 8 Evaluation The dynamic conception of the living being underlies all of our philosophy, including our logic. Placide Tempels forcefully underlines the unity thus given to thought:

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Chapter 1

The knowledge of the Negroes is not two-pronged. They do not have a criteriology of the philosophy of forces side by side with the rational explanation of the same forces. The philosophy of forces is found in all their ways of knowledge; they have no other way of looking at the world. It is their philosophy which determines their acts and their refraining from acting. All their conscious behavior is conditioned by their knowledge of being as a force. (Tempels 1959: 61) The demonstration of the coherence and critical value of this system surpasses the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that its practical applications harmonize generally with common sense and with first principles. That is why it has been able to serve as the basis for an authentic civilization with its varied degrees of development. You cannot reject it on the pretext that it does not agree with another system or because its metaphysical substratum has not yet been scientifically demonstrated. You must guard against a flagrant begging of the question if by scientific demonstration you understand agreement with another philosophy. As for the fact that our system has not been productive of progress, particularly technical progress, we agree. But it should be noted at the same time that a slight cultural result does not in itself prove the coherence or the critical value of a philosophy. The most you can conclude from such a state of affairs is that the philosophy has not been exploited sufficiently nor with enough method. 9 Illogicalities Actually, it is not so much the validity of our philosophical principles that is questioned, but rather the logic of the conclusions which flow from them. The European colonist whose black domestic says ‘I didn't break the lamp, it broke itself,’ asks disgustedly how anyone can disregard the principle of causality. The servant is not at all denying that an external force caused the lamp to break; he is in a better position than anyone else to admit that. What he is denying is that, that force came from him at a time when he had no evil intention of any kind. He blames the incident on some jealous associate who has caused him this embarrassment so that he might lose his job and the other might take his place. But since the colonist is not acquainted with the theory of the vital force, the domestic says simply that the glass broke itself. Sometimes by means of a deduction logically drawn, the Negro will arrive at a conclusion not warranted by the premises. For example, a young lady will agree that a real marriage is a matter of reciprocal love, that the parties to the marriage must be consulted, and that she was not consulted, does not love this polygamist. ‘It is not a marriage, then, in your case,’ you conclude. ‘Yes, it is,’ she replies. This disconcerting reply flows with faultless logic from the tribal wisdom to which she automatically reverts and prefers to exact reasoning because it is foreign to

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Logic in Africa

the processes of thought she has known from birth.5 There is nothing illogical, much less prelogical. It is simply a spontaneous return to her native way of thinking. Similarly, a Cartesian would be frantic to see the boldness with which the Negro upholds in turn two contradictory sides of a fact. He would be wrong, however, to conclude that the native is illogical or in bad faith, though sometimes such is the case. Most of the time, however, the native is trying to discover what you want to be the truth and then relating it, adapting himself to, foreign wisdom. How many learned ethnological reports are nothing but the hypotheses of their authors confirmed by the studied answers and the patronizing replies of the tribe under study. 10 Language and Custom There remains the complaint of muddled thinking. Confused thinking is the bane of clear-thinking minds. The principal reason for this lack of clarity must be sought in the conflict of cultures. We refer by turn to different frames of reference, to methods of thought which are not reconcilable. It would be difficult, for example, to deduce a moral judgment from unwritten law and from the imperatives of another scale of values at the same time. Why does a witness, who is in the act of giving testimony before the judge, interrupt it all of a sudden to give his family background and to eulogize one of his ancestors? The reason is that in his cultural milieu it is the custom to interrupt one's testimony to call on the undeniable authority of one's ancestors. Were one to give forth with a long list of opinions having nothing to do with the case in hand that would be considered the result of learning. Furthermore, our languages have their own proper genius, which does not always dovetail with the genius of Indo-European languages. We lack many concepts, but at the same time, we have others which even the richest languages do not have. How can you translate into French or English a future which signifies that you will probably not do what you have promised. A slight variation of the verb form without any added modality can add the idea of intensity, of abuse, of beginning, of repetition, etc.6 We like a language of imagery. According to our

5 An analogous instance is that of the Marxist worker who noted that the rulers were going around in expensive automobiles while the common people were poor and in straits. ‘Look,’ he said to one of the natives, ‘there is no equality.’ ‘Of course there is,’ was the reply, ‘some are just more equal than others.’ 6 Semitic languages are very close to our own from the point of view of grammar and the manner of reasoning is similar. ‘Very tall’ is expressed by us by ‘tall-tall.’ In Hebrew it is ‘gadol-gadol.’ In both languages the idea, ‘he is taller than his brother,’ is expressed as ‘he is tall like his brother.’ The teachers in Israel proceed deductively from a premise, concluding a pari, a fortiori, minori.

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Chapter 1

tastes, an elegantly turned phrase is worth as much as a proof. To be sure that is not the way to write a scientific treatise. But, after all, should oral wisdom concern itself with speculative science? The reliance of our language on tradition imposes a peculiar method of reasoning. Very frequently one proposes, at least mentally, a maxim or general principle from which particular applications are drawn. Example is often used as an argument. It might be given under the form of an analogy, an ad hominem proof, or an a fortiori argument. This type of argumentation is very common among people of strong traditions. An example is the rabbinical commentaries of the first centuries. Reasoning from principles is ordinarily very simple; the conclusion is drawn from only one premise, or at the most two, but there is never a long series of syllogisms. It is not impossible that in some group or tribe a more developed technique will demand a more complex argumentation. Njoya, king of the Bamoun in the Cameroon, at the beginning of the century reached a remarkable degree of culture without the help of Occidental or even Egyptian civilization. He built himself a palace, using cement whose formula he alone knew, surrounded the palace with fortifications and a moat. The plans for his property and his palace have been found and indicate some geometric reasoning. Njoya also molded characters to print his alphabet and composed a rudimentary arithmetic which could have been developed. You might say as much for the rich cultures of Dahomey and Ruanda.7 If Ibadan University College of Nigeria continues its investigations which have enriched the British Museum with some very beautiful works of ancient Yoruba art,8 it may someday discover the original hieroglyphics showing the thought of our old sages. References Blandier, G. 1947. Le Noir est un homme. Paris: Presence Africaine. Griaule, M. 1947. L'lnconnue noire. Paris: Presence Africaine. Muller, M. 1943. De Descartes a Marcel Proust: Essais Sur la Theorie Des Essences, Le Positivisme et Les Methodes Dialectique et Reflexive. Neuchatel: Eire et Penser. Tempels, P. 1959. La Philosophie bantpuse. Paris: Presence Africaine.

A Belgian protectorate in Africa. [Present-day countries of Benin Republic and Rwanda - Editor]. 8 Some date from the eighth century. Others, terra cotta, go back to the first centuries of the Christian era. 7

Chapter 2

On Negrohood: Psychology of the African Negro Léopold Sédar Senghor Independent Scholar

Abstract This chapter discusses the mental/logical dispositions of the African towards the interpretation and understanding of the universe. It compares and contrasts the African’s philosophical attitudes to those of a westerner. It further highlights the importance of rhythm, emotion, feeling or intuitive reason which the African demonstrates in their interaction with nature. It argues that abstract reason alone does not suffice in reaching knowledge. Despite the claims in some western literature that the African is uncivilized and lacks the mental capacity of the kind upheld in Aristotle’s logic, evidence to the contrary show that the African is not a barbarian as erroneously supposed. His psychological make-up is shown in this work to be more humane, perceptive and sensitive to the contors of nature and his environment. Keywords: Psychology, Negro, Negrohood, Africa, Reason, Emotion How surprised the psychologists of the French army were when they discovered that Senegalese conscripts were more sensitive to the vicissitudes of the climate, and even to extreme heat, than the soldiers of "metropolitan" France; that they reacted to the least changes in the weather, and even to such barely discernible events as minute inflections of the voice. These warriors who had passed for brutes - these heroes - turned out to have the sensitivity of women. It is often said, and not without reason, that the Negro is a man of Nature. The African negro, whether peasant, fisherman, hunter or herdsman, lives outdoors, both off the earth and with it, on intimate terms with trees and animals and all the elements, and to the rhythm of seasons and days. He keeps his senses open, ready to receive any impulse, and even the very waves of nature, without a screen (which is not to say without relays or transformers) between subject and object. He does, of course, reflect; but what comes first is

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form and color, sound and rhythm, smell and touch. As Aime Cesaire (1939),1 the poet of negrohood, chants: Hail to the royal Kaicedrat! Hail to those who have invented nothing, To those who have explored nothing, To those who have subdued nothing, But abandoned themselves to the grip of the essence of everything, Ignorant of the surface, but gripped by the movement of everything, Not caring to subdue, but to play the game of the world. Truly the elder sons of the world: Open to all the breezes of the world. The brotherly air of all the breezes of the world; A bed without a drain for all the waters of the world, Sparkling with the sacred fire of the world; Flesh of the flesh of the world, palpitating with the very movement of the world. In these often-cited verses, the poet contrasts the Negro with the White, the African with the European. I am well aware that contrast simplifies the problem. But the contrast is significant, as shown by the fact that Jean-Paul Sartre takes it up in Orphee noir, where he contrasts the black peasant with the white engineer (1948: xxxi). It is the attitude towards the object -towards the external world, the Other- which characterizes a people, and thereby their culture. Let us consider first the European White in his attitude towards the object. He is (or at least was from the time of Aristotle to the ‘stupid nineteenth century’) an objective intelligence. As a man of action, warrior, bird of prey, pure vision, he first of all distinguishes himself from the object. He keeps it at a distance, immobilizes it outside time and in some sense outside space, fixes it and slays it. Armed with precision instruments, he dissects it mercilessly so as to arrive at a factual analysis. Learned, but moved by practical considerations, the European White uses the Other, after slaying it, for practical ends: He treats it as a means. And he assimilates it in a centripetal motion; destroys it by feeding on it. ‘The Whites are cannibals,’ a wise old man of my country said to me a few years ago, ‘they do not respect life.’ It is indeed this kind of diet which they call ‘the humanization of nature’ and, more accurately, ‘the domestication of nature.’ ‘But,’ added the wise old man who had seen, heard and thought much, ‘they do not realize, those Whites, that life cannot be domesticated, and especially not God, who is the source of all life and in whom all life resides.’ And he concluded: ‘It is life which humanizes and not death. I am afraid all this will turn out badly.

1

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On Negrohood

17

The Whites, in their destructive folly, are in the end going to bring misfortune upon us.’ Of course, the wise old man used figurative language which I have rendered badly. The African negro is as it were locked up in his black skin. He lives in a primordial night, and does not distinguish himself, to begin with, from the object: from tree or pebble, man or animal, fact of nature or society. He does not keep the object at a distance, does not analyze it. After receiving its impression, he takes the object, all alive, into his hands—like a blind man, anxious not to fix it or to kill it. He turns it over and over in his supple hands, touches it, feels it. The African negro is one of those worms created on the Third Day: a pure sensory field. It is in his subjectivity and at the end of his antennae, like those of an insect, that he discovers the Other. And at this point, he is e-moved*2 to the roots of his belly and carried, in a centrifugal motion, from subject to object on the waves which the Other emits. Contemporary physicists have discovered underneath matter a universal energy: the waves and radiations of matter. This is more than a fantasy. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin has, as is well known, drawn revolutionary conclusions from it, and distinguished between tangential or material, and radial or psychic, energy. I wonder whether the subject does not perceive both forms of energy in the electric waves which agitate the nerve cells. This would partly explain the behavior of the African negro. At any rate, American psychologists have noted that the reflexes of the Negro are more natural and sure, because more in agreement with the object. Hence negroes were employed during the Second World War in industry and in the technical services of the army at a higher percentage than they represented in the population. This means that, by their very physiological makeup (which should not, however, make us lose sight of their psychic heredity and social experience), their behavior is more lived, in the sense that it is a more direct, a more concrete, expression of sensation and stimulation, which come from the object with its original force and quality. The impression is retained in the "living moment" to be transformed into sensation and representation which, in turn, form the basis of behavior with its

2 *The French émotion and its English equivalent (the noun ‘emotion’) may suggest that an emotion is an outward movement. To bring out this suggestion, the author inserts a hyphen between prefix and stem. His é-motion will accordingly be rendered as ‘e-motion.’ While the same suggestion may be carried by the French émouvoir, its English equivalent (the verb ‘to move,’ in the sense in which a person can be moved to tears, joy, etc.) carries at best the suggestion that an emotion is a movement. To suggest the outward direction, the author's émouvoir will be rendered by the artificial ‘to e-move.’ - TR.

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Chapter 2

social background. And thus, the Negro - the African negro, to return to him reacts more faithfully to stimulation by the object: he espouses its rhythm. This carnal sense of rhythm, that of movement, form and color, is one of his specific characteristics. For rhythm is the very essence of energy. It is rhythm which is at the bottom of imitation, which plays such a prominent role in the ‘generative’ or ‘creative’ activities of man: in memory, language and art. Let us pause for a moment to illustrate this proposition about the rhythm of a movement in music and dance. When I see a team in action, at a soccer game, for example, I take part in the game with my entire body. When I listen to a jazz tune or an African negro song, I have to make every effort not to break into song or dance, for I am now a ‘civilized’ person. George Hardy wrote that the most civilized negro, even in a dinner jacket, always stirred at the sound of a tom-tom. He was quite right. The reason for all this is that team play reproduces the gestures natural to man, and that African negro music and dance (which are one, like music and dance in general) reproduce the movements of the human body, which are in turn attuned to the movements of the brain and of the world: to heart-beat, respiration, the rhythms of marching and making love, ebb and flow, the succession of days and seasons, and in general, all the rhythms of the universe. As Pierre Teilhard de Chardin wrote, man is first of all a cosmic phenomenon (1952). It is this cosmic rhythm, with its variations and modulations, which the object emits; this, which makes a pleasurable impression on the nerve cells; this, which our behavior is a response to. When this rhythm is disturbed and the object emits a discordant rhythm, it produces a disagreeable sensation and elicits a defensive reaction. When the rhythm is either missing or unnatural, which is always true of plainsong, and often of European music, the African negro still reacts, but by imposing his own rhythm. After the First World War, we used to ‘jazz up’ the plainsong, to the great indignation of Father Jeuland. ‘Don't act like negroes,’ he chided us. The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the rhythm of the object is certainly transmitted to the body of the subject through his nerve cells, at which point-at the height of emotion-the rhythms of the heart and lungs fall in step with it, as illustrated by music and dance (de Quénétain 1957).3 It has been observed that the rhythm of a movement, in the case of music and dance, is less transformed by the brain than any other rhythm. The reason is probably that it is more in agreement with the physiological rhythms. The brain plays as it were only the role of a relay station. A friend of mine, an African negro poet, confessed to me that every form of beauty hit him in the root of his belly and made a sexual impression on him.

3

Cf. "Physiologie de 1'art," by Tanneguy de Quénétain, Réaltiés, No. 141, Oct. 1957.

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Not only the music, dance and masks of the Negro, but also a painting by Giotto and a Florentine palace. This went even further than might be thought; for the symbolic imagery of High Mass, visual as well as auditory, produced in him the same impression. Above all, let no one decry this as eroticism. Sensuality would be the more accurate term. But spirituality would be better still; for the spirituality of the Negro is rooted in sensuality: in his physiology. Let us stay with the e-motion of the African negro and take up the thread of fantasy. Here, then, is the subject who leaves his I to sym-pathize with the Thou, and to identify himself with it. He dies to himself to be reborn in the Other. He does not assimilate it, but himself. He does not take the Other's life but strengthens his own with its life. For he lives a communal life with the Other, and in sym-biosis with it: He knows [and is thus born with] it.*4 Subject and object are dialectically confronted in the very act of knowledge [and thus of common birth]. It is from a long caress in the night, from the intimacy of two bodies confounded with one another, from the act of love, that the fruit of knowledge is born. ‘I want you to feel me,’ says a Senegalese elector when he wants his deputy to know him well and to distinguish him from others. To greet, in Wolof, is neyu; and a distinguished old man tells me that the word has the same etymology as noyi, ‘to breathe to oneself,’ to feel. "I think, therefore I am”, wrote Descartes,5 who was the European par excellence. The African negro could say, ‘I feel, I dance the Other, I am, Unlike Descartes, he has no need for a 'Verbal utensil’’ (to use a term my teacher, Ferdinand Brunot, invented) to realize his being, but for an objective complement. He has no need to think, but to live the Other by dancing it. In dark Africa, people always dance because they feel, and they always dance to someone or something. Now to dance is to discover and to re-create, to identify oneself with the forces of life, to lead a fuller life, and in short, to be. It is, at any rate, the highest form of knowledge. And thus, the knowledge of the African negro is, at the same time, discovery and creation- re-creation. Some young negro intellectuals, who have read Marx absent-mindedly, and who are only beginning to rid themselves of the inferiority complex with which the colonialists inoculated them, have reproached me for having reduced the knowledge of the African negro to pure emotion, and for having denied that the

4*

The French connaitre (to know) may suggest that knowledge is common birth. To bring out this suggestion, the author writes connaitre (to know) as co-naitre (literally: to be born with). Since there is no English equivalent which would carry this suggestion, the literal and the suggested sense will have to be conveyed by different words. – TR. 5 Senghor did not provide any citation here. He probably assumes that the Cartesian dictum is well-known – Editor.

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African negro is endowed with reason and technical knowledge. They have read me as absent-mindedly as, before me, the ‘scientific socialists.’ All the evidence shows that there are two cultures, that of the European White and that of the African negro. The question is how these differences and the reasons for them are to be explained, and this my critics have not yet done. Let me refer them to their own sources: "Reason has always existed” wrote Marx (1946)6 to Arnold Ruge, "but not in a rational form." Engels, still more explicit, observed in his preparatory notes for Anti-Duhring: "Two kinds of experience, the one external, material, and the other internal; the laws and the forms of thought. The forms of thought, too, are partly transmitted through heredity. A mathematical axiom, for example, is self-evident to a European. But certainly not to a Bushman or an Australian negro" (1946: 4). This could hardly be put better; and this reflection confirms what was said before. Reason is one, in the sense that it is made for the apprehension of the Other, that is, of objective reality. Its nature is governed by its own laws, but its modes of knowledge, its ‘forms of thought,’ are diverse and tied to the psychological and physiological makeup of each race. The vital force of the African negro, that is, his surrender to the Other, is thus inspired by reason. But reason is not, in this case, the visualizing reason of the European White, but a kind of embracing reason which has more in common with logos than with ratio. For ratio is compass, T-square and sextant; it is measure and weight. Logos on the other hand was the living word before Aristotle forged it into a diamond. Being the most typical human expression of a neural and sensory impression, logos does not mold the object (without touching it) into rigid logical categories. The word of the African negro, which becomes flesh as we shall see presently when we come to language, restores objects to their primordial color, and brings out their true grain and veins, their names and odors. It perforates them with its luminous rays so as to make them again transparent, and penetrates their sur-reality, I mean, their subreality*7 in its primeval wetness. The reason of classical Europe is analytic through utilization, the reason of the African negro, intuitive through participation. The phrase ‘the reason of classical Europe’ is deliberate. For we now find the European Whites themselves-artists, philosophers, even scientists-going to the school of participant reason. We are witnessing a true revolution in European epistemology, which has been taking place since the turn of the century. Gaëtan Picon has described this change in his introduction to

6 7

Senghor did not provide the complete citation data – Editor. *That is, their underlying reality. - TR-

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Panorama des idees contemporaines (1968)8 under the title "On the Style of the Contemporary Spirit." The new method, and hence the new theory, of knowledge arose out of the latest scientific discoveries: relativity, wave mechanics, quantum mechanics, non-Euclidian geometries. And also, out of new philosophical theories: phenomenology, existentialism, Teilhardism. It was a response to the need to outgrow the scientific positivism of the nineteenth century and even dialectical materialism. European dialectics (for there is also the dialectics of the African negro) was still too abstract, even in Marx's and Engels's hands, and too close to logic, which it had absorbed, with its concepts and categories, inductions and deductions. It was also determinist. Nowadays, whether we look at science, philosophy or art, we find discontinuity and indeterminism at the bottom of everything, of the mind as well as the real, where they reveal themselves after the most detailed and at the same time the most passionate investigations. All disciplines break up into more specific disciplines. "There are several geometries," writes Gaëtan Picon, "several possible kinds of logic, mentality and irreducible psychological structures" (1968: 11). The mind, as well as the real, manifests itself through varied and conflicting images. Since the object appeared henceforth as "discontinuous and indeterminate reality” (1968: 25). Europeans were led to abandon their method of objectivity which had prevailed among them for two thousand years. As Gaston Bachelard has emphasized in Le nouvel esprit scientifique, a new situation calls for a new method. Gaëtan Picon adds specifically: "Since time immemorial, Western philosophical tradition has insisted on the distance between object and observer; since time immemorial, it has tried to escape the confused struggle in which looks and objects are confounded in their very nature, and to substitute contemplation for embrace” (1968: 25). Similarly, for the scientific tradition, not to mention the artistic one. The new method in science, philosophy and art is at the opposite end from this ‘visual realism.’ We witness a general retreat of the idea of objectivity. Everywhere, we find the researcher implicated in his own researches, and revealing things only by veiling them. The light of knowledge is no longer that unchanging clarity which would light on the object without touching it and being touched by it; it is a troubled flame sparked by their embrace, a lightning produced by contact, a participation, a communion. Modern philosophy

8 Gallimard. Cf. G. Bachelard, 1934 Le nouvel esprit scientifique, P.U.F., and P. Guaydier 1952. Les grandes decouvertes de la physique moderne, Correa. Paris: presses universitaires de France.

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wants to be experience, a living identity of knowledge and the known, of life and thought, of life and reality. The sciences of man are opposed to explanation and comprehension: To grasp the sense of a fact of human nature is to grasp oneself in it, and it in oneself. (Picon 1968: 27) Is it not significant that Gaëtan Picon uses the same words I used a moment ago—the words I underlined; “embrace," "contact," "participation," "communion" and "identity?" The very same words are used by anthropologists in their studies of African and Melanesian cultures, as by Frobenius, Griaule and Leenhardt.9 My friend, the painter Pierre Soulages, confessed after reading my article on the aesthetics of the African negro (1956). ‘This is really the aesthetics of the twentieth century.’ Thus, nowadays, the European White is no longer content to see, dissect, measure and weigh the object he wants to know. He must also touch it, taste it, and penetrate to its core: he must feel it, as the African negro does. To know, for example, a fact of human nature, whether in psychology or in sociology, is no longer to know it at second hand, as Lucien Levy-Bruhl did. No matter how much of a genius one may be, it is no longer enough to examine it from the outside and to 'gather figures about it; one has to live it. To know the Caledonians, Maurice Leenhardt had to live among them; and Marcel Griaule, who lived several months a year among the Dogon, felt the need to have himself initiated so that he would know them. Father Libermann urged his missionaries to ‘becomes negroes among negroes’ as the surest means of getting to know them ‘to win them over to Jesus Christ.’ This method, which consists in living the object, is that of the phenomenologists and existentialists. It is a matter of participating in the object in the act of knowledge; of going beyond concepts and categories, appearances and preconceptions, produced by education, to plunge into the primordial chaos, not shaped as yet by discursive reason. It is, as Kierkegaard wrote in his Journal a matter of "letting one's thoughts appear with the umbilical cord of first love."10 It is the attitude of a wide-eyed child; the attitude of the African negro. Knowledge is then no artificial product of discursive reason made to cover up reality, but discovery through emotion, and not so much discovery as re-discovery. Knowledge coincides here with the being of the object in its originating and original reality, in its discontinuity and indeterminacy: in its life.

Cf. Maurice Leenhardt. 1950, Do Kamo: La Personne et le mythe dans le monde melanesien. Gallimard. 10 Senghor did not provide any details for this citation -Editor. 9

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We are thus led back to the emotion of the African negro - to negrohood, which Jean-Paul Sartre defines as "a certain affective attitude towards the world" (Senghor 1948: xxix). This would be the place to cite other illustrious witnesses, like the Count of Keyserling who speaks of the ‘stormy vitality’ and the ‘great emotional warmth of black Blood.’ But I prefer to go back to my childhood memories of bygone evenings. How many tears were shed for indomitable heroes? And because the listeners saw in this trait the sign of a noble soul. As my mother, who was a fine and sensitive person said, and who cried abundantly at each retelling, ‘It is not human not to cry.’ But here is a scene from daily life; a meeting of two parents, or two friends, who have not seen each other for a long time. The litany of greetings has initially a banal rhythm: Are you at peace? Only at peace. Is your father at peace? Only at peace. Is your mother at peace? Only at peace. Is everyone at home at peace? Only at peace. This is followed by an exchange of news, about parents, friends-, fields and herds. Then old memories are brought up. When certain facts are recalled and dear faces evoked, emotion takes hold of their bodies. They embrace each other and hold hands for a long time. Then the litany of greetings begins again. But this time, the rhythm is more pronounced; it is the very rhythm of a poem. Their breasts are distended, their throats constricted. The emotion is there and makes them burst into sobs and shed heavy tears. What then is an emotion? At first sight, it can be translated into a certain attitude of the body. The classical theories, those of James and Janet, present an emotion with little variation as "a physiological disorder," as "a response less well adapted to the given situation," and as "check-mate behavior"—or better, as "the consciousness of bodily manifestations" (1939: 16-7). It is, of course, true that an emotion is accompanied by bodily manifestations which are perceived from the outside as agitations. But let us examine things more closely. To repeat, the object produces, by way of the sense organs, an excitation which is translated into an impression and produces a muscular reaction—a response. This is the brute, immediate reaction, that of an animal. A human reaction is, as we have seen, rarely such a simple muscular reaction. Thao, who combines phenomenology with dialectical materialism, has discovered the complexity of the problem by analyzing it. After emphasizing the role which experience of the environment plays in behavior, he concludes: "The behavior of joy, fear and anger is defined in such a way that the sense of the sensation is no longer simply experienced in the

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privacy of the inner sense, but appears, like a phantom, as an object that attracts, repels or irritates. An emotion is not the purely subjective movement of a want; it includes the sense of the object as an 'emoving' object" (1951: 259-60). I am well aware, and I have emphasized above, that for the African negro more than for anyone else, an emotion is primarily ‘the subjective movement of a want’— a movement closely connected with his physiology. Hence his sense of rhythm and the spontaneity of his reflexes. But it is also something else. Sartre defines an emotion as "an abrupt fall of consciousness into the world of' magic” (1939: 49). But what is in turn the world of magic? It is the world beyond the visible world of appearances. The latter is rational only because it is visible and measurable. The world of magic is, for the African negro, more real than the visible world: it is sub-real. It is animated by invisible forces which govern the universe and whose specific characteristic is that they are, through sympathy, harmoniously related to one another as well as to visible things, or appearances. As Eliphas Lévy writes, "there is only one dogma of magic, and this is that the visible is a manifestation of the invisible, or in other words, that the perfect word is embodied in measurable and visible things in exact proportion to the things that cannot be measured with our senses or seen with our eyes" (quoted in Breton 1957: 14). Since African negroes are deeply religious, we should for the sake of precision speak in their case of the mystical rather than of magic. Magic (to which we shall return) is only the ashen, desecrated, residue of the mystical view according to which caeli enarrant gloriam Dei. But let us return to the example given a little while ago. Here is a mother who sees her son again after several years. He, a student returning from France, has the emotion of being abruptly thrust backwards, outside the real world of today and into the world prior to the ‘French presence.’ His mother is no longer a civillaw mother who has less rights than a father, but a traditional African mother who, underneath her social obligations, is tied to her son by the umbilical cord of sentiment, which is the life force of the clan. For in black Africa, a child has the blood and belongs to the clan of his mother. "It is the belly which ennobles," says a Serer proverb. The student's mother is, then, overcome by emotion. She touches the face of her son, searching, as if she were blind or as if she wanted to draw nourishment from it. Her body, "immediately enlivened by consciousness" (Sartre 1939: 41) reacts: She cries now and dances the dance of return: the dance of possessing her son who returned. And the maternal uncle, who belongs to the family because he has the same blood as the mother, accompanies the dance by clapping his hands. The mother is no longer part of the world of today, but belongs to the mystical and mythical, world of long ago, which is part of the world of dreams. She believes in that world, for she lives in it now and is possessed by it. As Sartre writes, “In emotion, consciousness is degraded and

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abruptly transforms the determinist world we live in, into a world of magic” (1939: 45). Let us push the analysis further ahead. We shall discover that the tissue of society itself, the relations among men, and above all, the relations between men and nature, consist of magical bonds. This is where, in Alain's words, "the spirit languishes among things."11 Even those structures of European society that are at first glance technical and rational, turn out under analysis to be founded on human, and hence on psychological, relations in which imagination, the daughter of desire, plays an essential part -a part whose importance has been emphasized by surrealists and psychoanalysts alike. Remo Cantoni, an Italian communist, has written in the periodical Espirit12 "Marxism has gained political strength by having turned into a popular millenary and apocalyptic faith for it can absorb the enormous energies of religious faith." We find thus that ‘faith,’ which is known to be connected with magic, underlies a society founded on discursive reason and technology, and in short, on determinism, and gives this society the creative power to produce myths which are the real bread of the masses. This is even truer of African negro society. Technical activities (to which we shall return) are here always tied to cultural and religious activities: to art and magic, if not to the mystical. The latter activities are always given precedence over the former, and especially over productive labor. We have here a society founded essentially on human relations, and perhaps even more on relations between men and ‘gods.’ It is an animistic society, I mean, a society content with the ‘necessities of life,’ and less interested in "terrestrial nourishment" than in spiritual nourishment, or more precisely, a society which does not separate natural from supernatural wants. Here, the facts of nature and especially ‘the facts of society are not things.’13 Concealed behind them are the cosmic forces the forces of life - which govern and animate the appearances, endowing them with color and rhythm, life and sense. It is this meaning which forces itself upon consciousness and elicits an emotion. To be still more precise, an emotion is the seizure of one's entire being-both of consciousness and body- by the world of indeterminism; it is the irruption of the world of the mystical-or of magic-into the world of determinism. What emoves an African negro is not so much the external aspect of an object as its profound reality; its sub-reality, and not so much the sign as its sense. What emoves him in a dancer's mask is, across the ‘image’ and its rhythm, the spontaneous vision of a ‘god’; and what emoves him

Senghor did not provide any details for this citation – Editor. May-June 1948. [Senghor did not provide the page number for this citation - Editor]. 13 This is the title of a work by Jules Monnerot (Gallimard) 11 12

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in water is not that it flows, liquid and blue, but that it cleanses and purifies. To the extent that the sensible aspect, with its individual characteristics, is clearly perceived through the sense organs and nerves, it is only the sign of the sense of the object. Body and consciousness, sign and sense, constitute the same ambivalent reality. But the emphasis lies on the sense. This means that an emotion, under its initial aspect as a fall of consciousness, is on the contrary the rise of consciousness to a higher state of knowledge. It is "consciousness of the world” (Sartre 1939: 29), "a certain way of apprehending the world" (Sartre 1939: 30). It is an integrated consciousness, for "the 'emoved' subject and the 'emoving' object are united in an indissoluble synthesis" (Sartre 1939: 30), and to repeat, in a dance of love, I have said that emotion is a higher form of knowledge. In support, let me quote this reflection by one of the great scientific minds of the twentieth century. "The most beautiful emotion we can experience," wrote Albert Einstein, "is the mystical. This is the source of all art and of true science.”14 It is, at any rate, this gift of emotion which explains negro-hood) which Sartre, to repeat, defines as "a certain affective attitude towards the world," and which I have defined as "the totality of the cultural values" of the African negro. The two definitions do not conflict. It is, in fact, the emotive attitude towards the world which explains all the cultural values of the African negro: religion, social structures, art and literature, and above all, the genius of their languages. References Breton, A. 1957. Art magique. Paris: Club français du livre. Cesaire, A. 1939. Cahier d' un retour au pays natal, Paris : Presence Africaine. de Quénétain, T. 1957. Physiologie de 1'art. Réaltiés. 141. Oct. Leenhardt, M. 1950. Do Kamo: La Personne et le mythe dans le monde melanesien. Paris: Gallimard. Marx, K. and F. Engels. 1946. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels – Selected Works in Two Volumes. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing. Picon, G. 1968. Panorama des idees contemporaines. Paris: Gallimard. Sartre, J. 1939. Esquisse d'une tbéorie des emotions. Paris: Hermann et Cie. Sartre, J. 1948. Preface to the L. S. Senghor. Orphée noir : Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache de langue française. Paris: P.U.F. Senghor, L. S. 1948. Orphée noir: Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache de langue française. Paris: PUF. Senghor, L. S. 1956. African-Negro Aesthetics. Diogenes. 16: 23-38. Thao, T. D. 1951. Phénomenologie et matérialisme dialectique. Paris : Minh Tan.

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Chapter 3

African Traditional Thought and Western Science Robin Horton Independent Scholar

Abstract In Part I of this chapter, I pushed as far as it would go the thesis that important continuities link the religious thinking of traditional Africa and the theoretical thinking of the modern West. I showed how this view helps us to make sense of many otherwise puzzling features of traditional religious thinking. I also showed how it helps us to avoid certain rather troublesome red herrings which lie across the path towards understanding the crucial differences between the traditional and the scientific outlook. In this Part II, I shall concentrate on these differences. I shall start by isolating one which strikes me as the key to all the others, and will then go on to suggest how the latter flow from it. What I take to be the key difference is a very simple one. It is that in traditional cultures there is no developed awareness of alternatives to the established body of theoretical tenets; whereas in scientifically oriented cultures, such an awareness is highly developed. It is this difference we refer to when we say that traditional cultures are ‘closed’ and scientifically oriented cultures ‘open.’ Keywords: Culture, Africa, Traditional, Scientific, Open and Closed Predicaments 1 Part II. The ‘Closed’ and ‘Open’ Predicaments In Part I of this chapter, I pushed as far as it would go the thesis that important continuities link the religious thinking of traditional Africa and the theoretical thinking of the modern West. I showed how this view helps us to make sense of many otherwise puzzling features of traditional religious thinking. I also showed how it helps us to avoid certain rather troublesome red herrings which lie across the path towards understanding the crucial differences between the traditional and the scientific outlook.

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In Part II, I shall concentrate on these differences. I shall start by isolating one which strikes me as the key to all the others, and will then go on to suggest how the latter flow from it. What I take to be the key difference is a very simple one. It is that in traditional cultures there is no developed awareness of alternatives to the established body of theoretical tenets; whereas in scientifically oriented cultures, such an awareness is highly developed. It is this difference we refer to when we say that traditional cultures are ‘closed’ and scientifically oriented cultures ‘open.’1 One important consequence of the lack of awareness of alternatives is very clearly spelled out by Evans-Pritchard in his pioneering work on Azande witchcraft beliefs. Thus he says: I have attempted to show how rhythm, mode of utterance, content of prophecies, and so forth, assist in creating faith in witch-doctors, but these are only some of the ways in which faith is supported, and do not entirely explain belief. Weight of tradition alone can do that…There is no incentive to agnosticism. All their beliefs hang together, and were a Zande to give up faith in witch-doctorhood, he would have to surrender equally his faith in witchcraft and oracles. ... In this web of belief every strand depends upon every other strand, and a Zande cannot get out of its meshes because it is the only world he knows. The web is not an external structure in which he is enclosed. It is the texture of his thought and he cannot think that his thought is wrong. (Evans-Pritchard 1936: 194) And again: And yet Azande do not see that their oracles tell them nothing! Their blindness is not due to stupidity, for they display great ingenuity in explaining away the failures and in-equalities of the poison oracle and experimental keenness in testing it. It is due rather to the fact that their

1Philosophically minded readers will notice here some affinities with Karl Popper, who also makes the transition from a ‘close’ to ‘open predicament crucial for the take-off from tradition to science. For me, however, Popper obscures the issue by packing too many contrasts into his definition of ‘closed’ and ‘open’. Thus, for him, the transition from one predicament to the other implies not just a growth in the awareness of alternatives, but also a transition from communalism to individualism, and from ascribed status to achieved status. But as I hope to show in this essay, it is the awareness of alternatives which is crucial for the take-off into science. Not individualism or achieved status: for there are lots of societies where both of the latter are well developed, but which show no signs whatever of take-off. In the present context, therefore, my own narrower definition of ‘closed’ and ‘open’ seems more appropriate

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intellectual ingenuity and experimental keenness are conditioned by patterns of ritual behavior and mystical belief. Within the limits set by these patterns, they show great intelligence, but it cannot operate beyond these limits. Or, to put it in another way; they reason excellently in the idiom of their beliefs, but they cannot reason outside, or against their beliefs because they have no other idiom in which to express their thoughts. (Evans-Pritchard 1936: 338) Yet again, writing more generally of ‘closed’ societies in a recent book, he says: Everyone has the same sort of religious beliefs and practices, and their generality, or collectivity, gives them an objectivity which places them over and above the psychological experience of any individual, or indeed of all individuals. . .. Apart from positive and negative sanctions, the mere fact that religion is general means, again in a closed society, that it is obligatory, for even if there is no coercion, a man has no option but to accept what everybody gives assent to, because he has no choice, any more than of what language he speaks. Even were he to be a sceptic, he could express his doubts only in terms of the beliefs held by all around him. (Evans-Pritchard 1965: 55) In other words, absence of any awareness of alternatives makes for an absolute acceptance of the established theoretical tenets and removes any possibility of questioning them. In these circumstances, the established tenets invest the believer with a compelling force. It is this force which we refer to when we talk of such tenets as sacred. A second important consequence of lack of awareness of alternatives is vividly illustrated by the reaction of an Ijo man to a missionary who told him to throw away his old gods. He said: ‘Does your God really want us to climb to the top of a tall palm tree, then take off our hands and let ourselves fall?’ Where the established tenets have an absolute and exclusive validity for those who hold them, any challenge to them is a threat of chaos, of the cosmic abyss, and therefore evokes intense anxiety. With developing awareness of alternatives, the established theoretical tenets come to seem less absolute in their validity and lose something of their sacredness. At the same time, a challenge to these tenets is no longer a horrific threat of chaos. For just as the tenets themselves have lost some of their absolute validity, a challenge to them is no longer a threat of absolute calamity. It can now be seen as nothing more threatening than an intimation that new tenets might profitably be tried. Where these conditions begin to prevail, the stage is set for change from a traditional to a scientific outlook.

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Here, then, we have two basic predicaments: the ‘closed’ characterized by lack of awareness of alternatives, sacredness of beliefs, and anxiety about threats to them; and the ‘open’ characterized by awareness of alternatives, diminished sacredness of beliefs, and diminished anxiety about threats to them. Now, as I have said, I believe all the major differences between traditional and scientific outlooks can be understood in terms of these two predicaments. In substantiating this, I should like to divide the differences into two groups: A, those directly connected with the presence or absence of a vision of alternatives; and B, those directly connected with the presence or absence of anxiety about threats to the established beliefs. 2 A. Differences connected with the presence or absence of a vision of alternatives i. Magical versus non-magical attitude to words A central characteristic of nearly all the traditional African world-views we know of is an assumption about the power of words, uttered under appropriate circumstances, to bring into being the events or states they stand for. The most striking examples of this assumption are to be found in creation mythologies where the supreme being is said to have formed the world out of chaos by uttering the names of all things in it. Such mythologies occur most notably in Ancient Egypt and among the peoples of Western Sudan. In the acts of creation which the supreme being has left to man, the mere uttering of words is seldom thought to have the same unconditional efficacy. Thus, so far as we know, there are no traditional cultures which credit man with the ability to create new things just by uttering new words. In most such cultures, nevertheless, the words of men are granted a certain measure of control over the situations they refer to. Often there is a technical process which has to be carried out in order to achieve a certain result; but for success, this has to be completed by a properly framed spell or incantation foreshadowing the result. Such a situation is vividly described by the Guinean novelist Camara Laye. His father was a goldsmith, and in describing the old man at work, he says: Although my father spoke no word aloud, I know very well that he was thinking them from within. I read it from his lips, which were moving while he bent over the vessel. He kept mixing gold and coal with a wooden stick which would blaze up every now and then and constantly had to be replaced. What sort of words were those that my father was silently forming? I don’t know—at least I don’t know exactly.

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Nothing was ever confided to me about that. But what could these words be but incantations? Beside the old man worked a sorcerer: Throughout the whole process his speech became more and more rapid, his rhythms more urgent, and as the ornament took shape, his panegyrics and flatteries increased in vehemence and raised my father’s skill to the heavens. In a peculiar, I would almost say immediate and effective, way the sorcerer did in truth take part in the work. He too was drunk with the joy of creation, and loudly proclaimed his joy: enthusiastically he snatched the strings, became inflamed, as if he himself were the craftsman, as if he himself were my father, as if the ornament were coming from his own hands. (1965, quoted in Jahn 1961: 125)2 In traditional African cultures, to know the name of a being or thing is to have some degree of control over it. In the invocation of spirits, it is essential to call their names correctly; and the control which such correct calling gives is one reason why the true or ‘deep’ names of gods are often withheld from strangers, and their utterance forbidden to all but a few whose business it is to use them in ritual. Similar ideas lie behind the very widespread traditional practice of using euphemisms to refer to such things as dangerous diseases and wild animals: for it is thought that use of the real names might secure their presence. Yet again, it is widely believed that harm can be done to a man by various operations performed on his name for instance, by writing his name on a piece of paper and burning it. This last example carries me on to an observation that at first sight contradicts what we have said so far: the observation that in a great deal of African magic, it is non-verbal symbols rather than words that are thought to have a direct influence over the situations they represent. Bodily movements, bits of plants, organs of animals, stones, earth, water, spittle, domestic utensils, statuettes—a whole host of actions, objects, and artefacts play a vital part in the performances of traditional magic. But as we look deeper, the contradiction seems more apparent than real. For several studies of African magic suggest that its instruments become symbols through being verbally designated as such. In his study of Zande magic, for instance, Evans-Pritchard

2As an attempt to make an inventory of distinctive and universal features of African culture, Jahn’s book seems to me highly tendentious. But its imaginative sketch of the assumptions underlying magical beliefs and practices is one of the most suggestive treatments of the subject I have seen.

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describes how magical medicines made from plants and other natural objects are given direction by the use of verbal spells. Thus: The tall grass bingba, which grows profusely on cultivated ground and has feather-like, branching stems, is known to all as medicine for the oil-bearing plant kpagu. A man throws the grass like a dart and transfixes the broad leaves of the plant. Before throwing it, he says something of this sort: ‘You are melons, you be very fruitful like bingbawith much fruit.’ Or ‘You are bingba; may the melons flourish like bingba. My melons, you be very fruitful. May you not refuse.’ (Evans-Pritchard 1936: 449) My own field-work in Kalabari constantly unearthed similar examples of non-verbal symbols being given direction and significance by verbal spells. My favorite example is taken from the preparation of a medicine designed to bring clients to an unsuccessful spirit medium. One of the important ingredients of this medicine was the beak of the voracious, mud-dredging muscovy duck—an item which the doctor put into the medicine with the succinct comment: ‘Muscovy Duck; you who are always eating.’ Amongst the most important non-verbal magical symbols in Kalabari culture are the statuettes designed to ‘fix’ the various spirits at times of ritual. Of these, several alabari said: ‘They are, as it were, the names of the spirits.’ Explaining their use, one old man said: ‘It is in their names that the spirits stay and come.’ It is by being named that the sculpture comes to represent the spirit and to exert influence over it (Horton 1965). In a recent essay on Malagasy magic, Henri Lavondes (1963) discusses similar examples of the direction of magical objects by verbal spells. He shows how the various ingredients of a compound medicine are severally related by these spells to the various aspects of the end desired. And, following Mauss, he goes on to suggest that the function of the spell is to convert material objects into mots realisésor concrete words. In being given verbal labels, the objects themselves become a form of language. This interpretation, which reduces all forms of African magic to a verbal base, fits the facts rather well. One may still ask, however, why magicians spend so much time choosing objects and actions as surrogate words, when spoken words themselves are believed to have a magical potential. The answer, I would suggest, is that speech is an ephemeral form of words, and one which does not lend itself to a great variety of manipulations. Verbal designation of material objects converts them into a more permanent and more readily manipulable form of words. As Lavondes (1963: 115) puts it:

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Le message verbal est susceptible de davantage de precision que le message figure. Mais le second a sur le premier I'avantage de sa permanence et de sa materialite, qui font qu'il reste toujours disponible et qu’il est possible de s’en penetrer et de le repandre par d’autres voies que celle du langage articule (par absorption, par onction, par aspersion). Considered in this light, magical objects are the preliterate equivalents of the written incantations which are so commonly found as charms and talismans in literate but prescientific cultural milieux. Through a very wide range of traditional African belief and activity, then, it is possible to see an implicit assumption as to the magical power of words. Now if we take into account what I have called the basic predicament of the traditional thinker, we can begin to see why this assumption should be so deeply entrenched in his daily life and thought. Briefly, no man can make contact with reality save through a screen of words. Hence no man can escape the tendency to see a unique and intimate link between words and things. For the traditional thinker, this tendency has an overwhelming power. Since he can imagine no alternatives to his established system of concepts and words, the latter appear bound to reality in an absolute fashion. There is no way at all in which they can be seen as varying independently of the segments of reality they stand for. Hence, they appear so integrally involved with their referents that any manipulation of the one self-evidently affects the other. The scientist’s attitude to words is, of course, quite opposite. He dismisses contemptuously any suggestion that words could have an immediate, magical power over the things they stand for. Indeed, he finds magical notions amongst the most absurd and alien trappings of traditional thought. Though he grants an enormous power to words, it is the indirect one of bringing control over things through the functions of explanation and prediction. Words are tools in the service of these functions—tools which like all others are to be cared for as long as they are useful, but which are to be ruthlessly scrapped as soon as they outlive their usefulness. Why does the scientist reject the magician’s view of words? One easy answer is that he has come to know better: magical behaviour has been found not to produce the results it claims to. Perhaps. But what scientist has ever bothered to put magic to the test? The answer is, none; because there are deeper grounds for rejection grounds which make the idea of testing beside the point. To see what these grounds are, let us return to the scientist’s basic predicament to his awareness of alternative idea-systems whose ways of classifying and interpreting the world are very different from his own. Now this changed awareness gives him two intellectual possibilities. Both are eminently thinkable; but one is intolerable, the other hopeful.

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The first possibility is simply a continuance of the magical world-view. If ideas and words are inextricably bound up with reality, and if indeed they shape it and control it, then, a multiplicity of idea-systems means a multiplicity of realities, and a change of ideas means a change of things. But whereas there is nothing particularly absurd or inconsistent about this view, it is clearly intolerable in the extreme. For it means that the world is in the last analysis dependent on human whim, that the search for order is a folly, and that human beings can expect to find no sort of anchor in reality. The second possibility takes hold as an escape from this horrific prospect. It is based on the faith that while ideas and words change, there must be some anchor, some constant reality. This faith leads to the modern view of words and reality as independent variables. With its advent, words come ‘unstuck from’ reality and are no longer seen as acting magically upon it. Intellectually, this second possibility is neither more nor less respectable than the first. But it has the great advantage of being tolerable whilst the first is horrific. That the outlook behind magic still remains an intellectual possibility in the scientifically oriented cultures of the modern West can be seen from its survival as a nagging undercurrent in the last 300 years of Western philosophy. This undercurrent generally goes under the labels of ‘Idealism’ and ‘Solipsism’ and under these labels it is not immediately recognizable. But a deeper scrutiny reveals that the old outlook is there all right albeit in a strange guise. True, Idealism does not say that words create, sustain, and have power over that which they represent. Rather, it says that material things are ‘in the mind.’ That is, the mind creates, sustains, and has power over matter. But the second view is little more than a post-Cartesian transposition of the first. Let me elaborate. Both in traditional African cosmologies and in European cosmologies before Descartes, the modern distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ does not appear. Although everything in the universe is underpinned by spiritual forces, what moderns would call ‘mental activities’ and ‘material things’ are both part of a single reality, neither material nor immaterial. Thinking, conceiving, saying, etc. are described in terms of organs like heart and brain and actions like the uttering of words. Now when Descartes wrote his philosophical works, he crystallized a half-way phase in the transition from a personal to an impersonal cosmological idiom. Whilst ‘higher’ human activities still remained under the aegis of a personalized theory, physical and biological events were brought under the aegis of impersonal theory. Hence thinking, conceiving, saying, etc. became manifestations of ‘mind’, whilst all other happenings became manifestations of ‘matter.’ Hence, whereas before Descartes we have ‘words over things,’ after him we have ‘mind over matter’ just a new disguise for the old view.

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What I have said about this view being intellectually respectable but emotionally intolerable is borne out by the attitude to it of modern Western philosophers. Since they are duty-bound to explore all the alternative possibilities of thought that lie within the grasp of their imaginations, these philosophers mention, nay even expound, the doctrines of Idealism and Solipsism. Invariably, too, they follow up their expositions with attempts at refutation. But such attempts are, just as invariably, at farce. Their character is summed up in G. E. Moore’s desperate gesture, when challenged to prove the existence of a world outside his mind, of banging his hand with his fist and exclaiming: ‘It is there!’ A gesture of faith rather than of reason, if ever ‘there was one!’ With the change from the ‘closed’ to the ‘open’ predicament, then, the outlook behind magic becomes intolerable; and to escape from its people espouse the view that words vary independently of reality. Smug rationalists who congratulate themselves on their freedom from magical thinking would do well to reflect on the nature of this freedom! ii. Ideas-bound-to-occasions versus ideas-bound-to-ideas Many commentators on the idea-systems of traditional African cultures have stressed that, for members of these cultures, their thought does not appear as something distinct from and opposable to the realities that call it into action. Rather, particular passages of thought are bound to the particular occasions that evoke them. Let us take an example. Someone becomes sick. The sickness proves intractable and the relatives call a diviner. The latter says the sickness is due to an ancestor who has been angered by the patient’s bad behavior toward his kinsmen. The diviner prescribes placatory offerings to the spirit and reconciliation with the kinsmen, and the patient is eventually cured. Now while this emergency is on, both the diviner and the patient’s relatives may justify what they are doing by reference to some general statements about the kinds of circumstance which arouse ancestors to cause sickness. And it is when he is lucky to be around on such occasions that the anthropologist picks up most of his hard-earned information about traditional theories of the world and its working. But theoretical statements of this kind are very much matters of occasion, not likely to be heard out of context or as part of a general discussion of ‘what we believe.’ Indeed, the anthropologist has learned by bitter experience that, in traditional Africa, the generalized, ‘what do you chaps believe?’ approach gets one exactly nowhere.3

3From the piecemeal situation–bound character of traditional idea-systems, some have been

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If ideas in traditional culture are seen as bound to occasions rather than to other ideas, the reason is one that we have already given in our discussion of magic. Since the member of such a culture can imagine no alternatives to his established system of ideas, the latter appear inexorably bound to the portions of reality they stand for. They cannot be seen as in any way opposable to reality. In a scientifically oriented culture such as that of the Western anthropologist, things are very different. The very word ‘idea’ has the connotation of something opposed to reality. Nor is it entirely coincidental that in such a culture the historian of ideas is considered to be the most unrealistic kind of historian. Not only are ideas dissociated in people’s minds from the reality that occasions them: they are bound to other ideas, to form wholes and systems perceived as such. Belief-systems take shape not only as abstractions in the minds of anthropologists, but also as totalities in the minds of believers. Here again, this change can be readily understood in terms of a change from the ‘closed’ to the ‘open’ predicament. A vision of alternative possibilities forces men to the faith that ideas somehow vary whilst reality remains constant. Ideas thus become detached from reality nay, even in a sense opposed to it. Furthermore, such a vision, by giving the thinker an opportunity to ‘get outside’ his own system, offers him a possibility of his coming to see it as a system. iii. Unreflective versus reflective thinking At this stage of the analysis, there is no need for me to insist further on the essential rationality of traditional thought. In Part I, indeed, I have already made it out far too rational for the taste of most social anthropologists. And yet, there is a sense in which this thought includes among its accomplishments neither Logic nor Philosophy. Let me explain this, at first sight, rather shocking statement. It is true that most African traditional world-views are logically elaborated to a high degree. It is also true that, because of their eminently rational character, they are appropriately called ‘philosophies.’ But here I am using ‘Logic’ and ‘Philosophy’ in a more exact sense. By Logic, I mean thinking directed to answering the question: ‘What are

led to infer that anthropologist must analyse them in an equally piecemeal, situational manner, and not as systems. Thus in her recent Purity and Danger (1966), Mary Douglas talks about the error of pinning out entire traditional idea-systems like Lepidoptera, in abstraction from the real-life situations in which their various fragments actually occur. But abstraction is as abstraction does. Provided that comparison of total idea-systems leads to interesting results, it is surely as justifiable as any other kind of comparison. After all, what about the abstraction and comparison of social structures?

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the general rules by which we can distinguish good arguments from bad ones?’ And by Philosophy, I mean thinking directed to answering the question: ‘On what grounds can we ever claim to know anything about the world?’ Now Logic and Philosophy, in these restricted senses, are poorly developed in traditional Africa. Despite its elaborate and often penetrating cosmological, sociological, and psychological speculations, traditional thought has tended to get on with the work of explanation, without pausing for reflection upon the nature or rules of this work. Thinking once more of the ‘closed’ predicament, we can readily see why these second-order intellectual activities should be virtually absent from traditional cultures. Briefly, the traditional thinker, because he is unable to imagine possible alternatives to his established theories and classifications, can never start to formulate generalized norms of reasoning and knowing. For only where there are alternatives can there be choice, and only where there is choice can there be norms governing it. As they are characteristically absent in traditional cultures, so Logic and Philosophy are characteristically present in all scientifically oriented cultures. Just as the ‘closed’ predicament makes it impossible for them to appear, so the ‘open’ predicament makes it inevitable that they must appear. For where the thinker can see the possibility of alternatives to his established idea-system, the question of choice at once arises, and the development of norms governing such choice cannot be far behind.4 iv. Mixed versus segregated motives This contrast is very closely related to the preceding one. As I stressed in Part I of this essay, the goals of explanation and prediction are as powerfully present in traditional African cultures as they are in cultures where science has become institutionalized. In the absence of explicit norms of thought, however, we find them vigorously pursued but not explicitly reflected upon and defined. In these circumstances, there is little thought about their consistency or inconsistency with other goals and motives. Hence wherever we find a theoretical system with explanatory and predictive functions, we find other motives entering in and contributing to its development. Despite their cognitive preoccupations, most African religious systems are powerfully influenced by what are commonly called ‘emotional needs’ i.e. needs for certain kinds of personal relationship. In Africa, as elsewhere, all social systems stimulate in their members a considerable diversity of such needs; but, having stimulated them, they often prove unwilling or unable to allow them full opportunities for satisfaction. In such situations, the spirits

4See

Gellner, 1964, for a similar point exemplified in the Philosophy of Descartes (105).

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function not only as theoretical entities but as surrogate people providing opportunities for the formation of ties forbidden in the purely human social field. The latter function they discharge in two ways. First, by providing nonhuman partners with whom people can take up relationships forbidden with other human beings. Second, through the mechanism of possession, by allowing people to ‘become’ spirits and so to play roles vis-a-vis their fellow men which they are debarred from playing as ordinary human beings. Examples of the first kind occur very commonly in association with the need for dependence created in children by the circumstances of their family upbringing. In some African societies, male children are required to make an abrupt switch from dependence to independence as soon as they reach puberty. A prominent feature of the rites aimed at achieving this switch is the dramatic induction of the candidates into a relation of dependence with a powerful spiritual agency. The latter can be seen as a surrogate for the parents with whom the candidates are no longer allowed to continue their dependent relationships, and hence as a means of freeing the candidates for the exercise of adult independence and responsibility. This appears to be the basic significance of secret society initiations among the peoples of the Congo and the Western Guinea Coast. In other traditional societies, the early relation of dependence on parents is allowed to continue so long as the parents are still alive; and an abrupt switch to independence and responsibility has to be made on their death. Here, it is the dead parent, translated into ancestorhood, who provides for the continuance of a relationship which has had to be abruptly and traumatically discontinued in the purely human social field. This sequence, with its culmination in a highly devout worship of patrilineal ancestors, has been vividly described by Fortes in some of his writings on the Tallensi of Northern Ghana.5 Examples of the second kind occur more commonly in association with the need for dominance. Most societies stimulate this need more widely than they grant it satisfaction. In traditional African societies, women are the most common sufferers from this; and it is no accident that in the numerous spiritpossession cults that flourish up and down the continent women are generally rather more prominent than men. For in the male-authority roles which they tend to assume in possession, they gain access to a whole area of role-playing normally forbidden them. Aesthetic motives, too, play an important part in moulding and sustaining traditional religious systems. This is especially true of West Africa, where

5See,

for instance, Fortes, 1961.

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narrative, poetry, song, dance, music, sculpture, and even architecture use the spirits and their characters as a framework upon which to develop their various forms. These arts in turn influence the direction in which ideas about the spirits develop. In my own field-work on Kalabari religion, I have found a gradual shading of the cognitive into the aesthetic which can at times be most confusing. In oral tradition, for example, serious myths intended to throw light on the part played by the gods in founding social institutions shade into tales which, although their characters are also gods, are told for sheer entertainment. And although Kalabari do make a distinction between serious myth and light tale, there are many pieces which they themselves hesitate to place on one side or the other. Belief shades through half-belief into suspended belief. In ritual, again, dramatic representations of the gods carried out in order to dispose them favorably and secure the benefits which, as cosmic forces, they control, are usually found highly enjoyable in themselves. And they shade off into representations carried out almost solely for their aesthetic appeal. In the Kalabari water-spirit masquerades, for instance, religion seems to have become the servant of art.6 There is little doubt that because the theoretical entities of traditional thought happen to be people, they give particular scope for the working of emotional and aesthetic motives. Here, perhaps, we do have something about the personal idiom in theory that does militate indirectly against the taking up of a scientific attitude; for where there are powerful emotional and aesthetic loadings on a particular theoretical scheme, these must add to the difficulties of abandoning this scheme when cognitive goals press toward doing so. Once again, I should like to stress that the mere fact of switching from a personal to an impersonal idiom does not make anyone a scientist, and that one can be unscientific or scientific in either idiom. In this respect, nevertheless, the personal idiom does seem to present certain difficulties for the scientific attitude which the impersonal idiom does not. Where the possibility of choice has stimulated the development of Logic, Philosophy, and norms of thought generally, the situation undergoes radical change. One theory is judged better than another with explicit reference to its efficacy in explanation and prediction. And as these ends become more clearly defined, it gets increasingly evident that no other ends are compatible with them. People come to see that if ideas are to be used as efficient tools of explanation and prediction, they must not be allowed to become tools of anything else. (This, of course, is the essence of the ideal of objectivity’). Hence there grows up a great watchfulness against seduction by the emotional or 6See

Horton, 1963.

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aesthetic appeal of a theory a watchfulness which in twentieth-century Europe sometimes takes extreme forms such as the suspicion of any research publication not written out in a positively indigestible style. Also, there appears an insistence on the importance of ‘pure’ as opposed to ‘applied’ science. This does not mean that scientists are against practical application of their findings. What it does mean is that they feel there should always be some disjunction between themselves and the people who apply their discoveries. The reasons for this are basically the same as those which lead the scientist to be on his guard against emotional or aesthetic appeals. For one thing, if a scientist is too closely identified with a given set of practical problems, he may become so committed to solving these as to take up any theory that offers solution without giving it adequate testing. Again, those lines of inquiry most closely related to the practical problems of the day are not necessarily those which lead to the most rapid advances in explanation and prediction. Finally, in so far as practical interests involve inter-business and inter-national competition, overidentification with them can lead to a fundamental denial of the scientific ideal by encouraging the observance of rules of secrecy. Since it is a primary canon of the scientific ideal that every new theory be subjected to the widest possible testing and criticism, free circulation of new findings is basic to the code of the scientific community. (See below). Hence, in so far as commercial and international competition leads to the curtailment of such circulation, it is inimical to science. This is why brilliant and dedicated scientists tend to be among the most double-edged weapons in wars either hot or cold. The traditional theoretical scheme, as we have noted, brings forth and nourishes a rich encrustation of cultural growths whose underlying motives have little to do with explanation and prediction. Notable among these are elaborate systems of personal relationships with beings beyond the purely human social order, and all manner of artistic embellishments. As the insistence on segregation of theoretical activity from the influence of all motives but those defined as essential to it gains strength, these various growths are forcibly sloughed off and have to embark on an independent existence. To survive without getting involved in a losing battle with the now-prestigious ‘science,’ they have to eschew loudly all explanatory pretensions, and devote great energy to defining their ‘true’ ends. In doing this, they have often been accused of making a virtue out of the sad necessity of putting a brazen face on what is simply a headlong retreat before science. But their activities in this direction can, I think, also be seen in a more positive way. That is, they too can be seen as a direct outcome of the ‘open’ predicament, and thence of the general tendency to reflect on the nature of thought, to define its aims, and to formulate its norms. Now the conclusion such reflective activity arrives at for Theory-Making also holds for Spiritual Communion and for Art: that is, there

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are several distinct modes of thought; and a particular mode, if it is to fulfil itself completely, must be protected from the influence of all motives except those defined as essential to it. Hence when we hear a Western theologian proclaim loudly the ‘modern discovery’ that the essence of religion has nothing to do with explanation and prediction of worldly events, but is simply communion with God for its own sake, we are only partly right when we sneer at him for trying to disguise retreat as advance. For, in fact, he can claim to be undertaking much the same kind of purifying and refining operation as the scientist. The force of this contention emerges when we come to consider the case of the artist. For when the latter proclaims that his activity is no longer the handmaid of religion, of science, or even of representation, we do in fact grant that this drastic circumscription of aims represents a form of progress akin to that of the scientist purging his subject in the pursuit of objectivity. The rationalist who says that the modern theologian is retreating whilst the modern artist is advancing is thus merely expressing an agnostic prejudice. Both, in fact, are in an important sense caught up in the same currents of thought as those that move the scientist. It will now be clear that the scientist’s quest for ‘objectivity’ is, among other things, a purifying movement. As has happened in many such movements, however, the purifying zeal tends to wander beyond its self-appointed bounds, and even to run to excess within these bounds. Such tendencies are well exemplified in the impact of the quest for objectivity on metaphor. In traditional Africa, speech abounds with metaphor to a degree no longer familiar in the scientifically oriented cultures of the modern West. The function of such metaphor is partly, as anthropologists never tire of saying,7 to allude obliquely to things which cannot be said directly. Much more importantly, perhaps, its function is to underline, emphasize, and give greater impact to things which can be said literally. ‘Proverbs are the palm oil with which words are eaten,’ say the Ibo (Achebe 1957). In this capacity, it is clearly a vital adjunct to rational thought. Often, however, metaphor subtly misleads. The analogy between the things which constitute its literal reference and the things which constitute its oblique reference usually involves only limited aspects of both. But there is always a temptation to extend the analogy unduly, and it can then run its users right off the rails. In sociology, for instance, this has happened with the use of organismic metaphors for thinking about societies and social relations. Organisms and societies do perhaps resemble each other in certain limited ways; but sociologists who have become addicted to organismic metaphor often go beyond these limited 7See

Beattie, 1966.

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resemblances and end up by attributing to societies all sorts of properties possessed only by organisms. These occasional dangers have led the purists to regard metaphor and analogy as one great snare and delusion. No palm-oil with our words, they have decreed with grim satisfaction. The resulting cult of plain, literal speaking, alas, has spread beyond the bounds of strictly scientific activity right through everyday life, taking much of the poetic quality out of ordinary, hum-drum social relations. Not only this. The distrust of metaphor and analogy has in some places gone so far as to threaten intellectual processes which are crucial to the advance of science itself. Thus, the positivist philosophers of science have often denigrated the activity of theoretical model-building. At best, some of them have contended, such model-building is a dubious help to serious scientific thought; and at worst, its reliance on the process of analogy may be extremely misleading. According to this purist school, induction and deduction are the only processes of thought permissible to the scientist. His job is not to elaborate models of a supposed reality lying ‘behind’ the data of experience. It is simply to observe; to make inductive generalizations summarizing the regularities found in observation; to deduce from these generalizations the probable course of further observation; and finally to test this deduction against experience. A then B, A then B, A then B; hence all A’s are followed by B’s; hence if there is an A in the future, it will be followed by a B; check. The trouble about this purist paradigm, of course, is that it condemns the scientist to an eternity of triteness and circularity. It can never account for any of the great leaps in explanatory power which we associate with the advance of science. Only in relation to some model of underlying reality, for instance, can we come to see that A and X, B and Y, so different in the eye of the casual observer, are actually outward manifestations of the same kinds of events. Only in relation to such a model are we suddenly moved to look for a conjunction between X and Y which we would never have noticed otherwise. And only thus can we come to see AB, XY as two instances of a single underlying process or regularity. Finally, so it seems, the only way yet discovered in which scientists can turn out the new models of underlying reality necessary to set such explanatory advance in motion is through the drawing of bold analogies. To sum up on this point: one of the essential features of science is that it is a purifying movement. But like other purifying movements, alas, it provides fertile soil for obsessional personalities. If we can compare the traditional thinker to an easy-going housewife who feels she can get along quite nicely despite a considerable accumulation of dirt and dust on the furniture, we can compare the positivist who is so often a fellow traveler of science to an obsessional housewife who scrubs off the dirt, the paintwork, and finally the handles that make the furniture of use!

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3. B. Differences connected with the Presence or Absence of anxiety about threats to the established body of Theory v. Protective versus destructive attitude towards established theory Both in traditional Africa and in the science-oriented "West, theoretical thought is vitally concerned with the prediction of events. But there are marked differences in reaction to predictive failure. In the theoretical thought of the traditional cultures, there is a notable reluctance to register repeated failures of prediction and to act by attacking the beliefs involved. Instead, other current beliefs are utilized in such a way as to ‘excuse’ each failure as it occurs, and hence to protect the major theoretical assumptions on which prediction is based. This use of ad hoc excuses is a phenomenon which social anthropologists have christened ‘secondary elaboration.’8 The process of secondary elaboration is most readily seen in association with the work of diviners and oracle-operators, who are concerned with discovering the identity of the spiritual forces responsible for particular happenings in the visible, tangible world, and the reasons for their activation. Typically, a sick man goes to a diviner, and is told that a certain spiritual agency is ‘worrying’ him. The diviner points to certain of his past actions as having excited the spirit’s anger, and indicates certain remedial actions which will appease this anger and restore health. Should the client take the recommended remedial action and yet see no improvement, he will be likely to conclude that the diviner was either fraudulent or just incompetent, and to seek out another expert. The new diviner will generally point to another spiritual agency and another set of arousing circumstances as responsible for the man’s condition, and will recommend fresh remedial action. In addition, he will probably provide some explanation of why the previous diviner failed to get at the truth. He may corroborate the client’s suspicions of fraud, or he may say that the spirit involved maliciously ‘hid itself behind’ another in such a way that only the most skilled of diviners would have been able to detect it. If after this the client should still see no improvement in his condition, he will move on to yet another diviner—and so on, perhaps, until his troubles culminate in death.

8The idea of secondary elaboration as a key feature of prescientific thought-systems was put forward with great brilliance and insight by Evans-Pritchard in his Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic. All subsequent discussions, including the present one, are heavily indebted to his lead.

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What is notable in all this is that the client never takes his repeated failures as evidence against the existence of the various spiritual beings named as responsible for his plight, or as evidence against the possibility of making contact with such beings as diviners claim to do. Nor do members of the wider community in which he lives ever try to keep track of the proportion of successes to failures in the remedial actions based on their beliefs, with the aim of questioning these beliefs. At most, they grumble about the dishonesty and wiles of many diviners, whilst maintaining their faith in the existence of some honest, competent practitioners. In these traditional cultures, questioning of the beliefs on which divining is based and weighing up of successes against failures are just not among the paths that thought can take. They are blocked paths because the thinkers involved are victims of the closed predicament. For them, established beliefs have an absolute validity, and any threat to such beliefs is a horrific threat of chaos. Who is going to jump from the cosmic palm-tree when there is no hope of another perch to swing to? Where the scientific outlook has become firmly entrenched, attitudes to established beliefs are very different. Much has been made of the scientist’s essential skepticism toward established beliefs; and one must, I think, agree that this above all is what distinguishes him from the traditional thinker. But one must be careful here. The picture of the scientist in continuous readiness to scrap or demote established theory contains a dangerous exaggeration as well as an important truth. As an outstanding modern historian of the sciences has recently observed, the typical scientist spends most of his time optimistically seeing how far he can push a new theory to cover an everwidening horizon of experience (Kuhn 1962). When he has difficulty in making the theory ‘fit,’ he is more likely to develop it in the ways described in Part I of this essay than to scrap it out of hand. And if it does palpably fail the occasional test, he may even put the failure down to dirty apparatus or mistaken meter-reading rather like the oracle operator! And yet, the spirit behind the scientist’s actions is very different. His pushing of a theory and his reluctance to scrap it are not due to any chilling intuition that if his theory fails him, chaos is at hand. Rather, they are due to the very knowledge that the theory is not something timeless and absolute. Precisely because he knows that the present theory came in at a certain epoch to replace a predecessor, and that its explanatory coverage is far better than that of the predecessor, he is reluctant to throw it away before giving it the benefit of every doubt. But this same knowledge makes for an acceptance of the theory which is far more qualified and far more watchful than that of the traditional thinker. The scientist is, as it were, always keeping account, balancing the successes of a

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theory against its failures. And when the failures start to come thick and fast, defense of the theory switches inexorably to attack on it. If the record of a theory that has fallen under a cloud is poor in all circumstances, it is ruthlessly scrapped. The collective memory of the European scientific community is littered with the wreckage of the various unsatisfactory theories discarded over the last 500 years the earth-centered theory of the universe, the circular theory of planetary motion, the phlogiston theory of chemical combination, the author theory of wave propagation, and perhaps a hundred others. Often, however, it is found that a theoretical model once assumed to have universal validity in fact has a good predictive performance over a limited range of circumstances, but a poor performance outside this range. In such a case, the beliefs in question are still ruthlessly demoted; but instead of being thrown out altogether they are given a lesser status as limiting cases of more embracing generalities—still useful as lower-level models or as guides to experience within restricted areas. This sort of demotion has been the fate of theoretical schemes like Newton’s Laws of Motion (still used as a guide in many mundane affairs, including much of the business of modern rocketry) and the ‘Ball-and-Bond’ theory of chemical combination. This underlying readiness to scrap or demote established theories on the ground of poor predictive performance is perhaps the most important single feature of the scientific attitude. It is, I suggest, a direct outcome of the ‘open’ predicament. Only when the thinker is able to see his established idea-system as one among many alternatives, can he see his established ideas as things of less than absolute value. And only when he sees them thus, can he see the scrapping of them as anything other than a horrific, irretrievable jump into chaos. vi. Divination versus diagnosis Earlier in this essay, I drew certain parallels between the work of the traditional African diviner and the work of the Western diagnostician. In particular, how both of them make much the same use of theoretical ideas: i.e. as means of linking observed effects to causes that lie Beyond the powers of common sense to grasp. I now propose to discuss certain crucial differences between these two kinds of agent. As I noted in the last section, in traditional cultures anxieties about threats to the established theories effectively block many of the paths thought might otherwise take. One path so blocked is the working out of any body of theory which assigns too distinctive an effect to any particular pattern of antecedents. Why this path should be blocked is not hard to see. Suppose that there is a theory X, which makes the following causal connexions:

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Figure 3.1: First Causal Connexions

A

E

B

F

C

G

D

H

Now if situation E is disagreeable, and is unambiguously ascribable to cause A, action will be taken to get rid of E by manipulating A. If it fails, then the most obvious verdict is that A→E is invalid. A similar argument applies, of course, to B→F, C→G, D→H. Suppose, on the other hand, that theory X makes the following connexions: Figure 3.2: Second Causal Connexions

A B

E

C D Now things are very different. If E is ascribed to A, action will still be taken to get rid of E by manipulating A. But if it fails, we are no longer compelled to admit that A→E is invalid. We can now say that perhaps B was present as a complicating factor, and that failure to take account of it was responsible for our disappointment. Or we can say that A was not present at all, but only D. so the theory remains protected. Coming back to concrete terms, we find that traditional African theories of, say, disease approximate to the second of these patterns rather than to the first, and that this is their ultimate protection. In most traditional cultures, diseases are thought to be caused by the anger of several categories of spirits. Each of these categories is aroused by a different kind of situation. Thus in Kalabari thought heroes, ancestors, water-spirits, and medicine spirits are the main unseen bringers of disease. Heroes tend to be activated by offences against ‘town laws’, ancestors by offences against kinsmen, water-spirits by failure to heed certain tangible signs that they wish to form personal attachments with human partners, medicine-spirits by the machinations of enemies with whom one ‘has case.’ Hence there is a fairly clear correlation

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between the kind of activating situation and the kind of spirit brought into play. But although there are the beginnings of a second correlation, between the kind of spirit brought into play and the kind of misfortune inflicted, this has not gone very far. By and large, if a diviner attributes a disease to a certain spirit aroused by certain antecedent circumstances, and if the remedy based on this attribution fails, another diviner can always say that the first attribution was a mistake, and that it was really another spirit, aroused by another set of circumstances, who caused the trouble. Studies like those of Evans-Pritchard (1936) on the Zande, Nadel (1956) on the Nupe,9 and Forde (1958) on the Yakӧsuggest that this particular defensive pattern, based on converging causal sequences, is very widespread. But a theory which postulates converging causal sequences, though selfprotective to a high degree, faces serious problems in its application to everyday life. For the man who visits a diviner with misfortune E does not want to be told that it could be due to any one of four different kinds of spirits, activated by circumstances A, B, C, or D. He wants a definite verdict and a definite remedial prescription. Now given the nature of the theoretical model the diviner operates with, any amount of minute inspection and definition of E will not allow him to give a definite verdict as between A, B, C, or D. Sometimes, he can and does find out from the client whether A, B, C, or D have occurred in his life-history. But the client may well have forgotten the crucial activating circumstance. Indeed, as it is often a guilt-provoking circumstance, he is likely to have forgotten it. Or, the client may remember that happenings answering to both A, B, and C have occurred at various times in his life; and the diviner is still left with the problem of which of these happenings and which category of spirit is actually responsible for the present occurrence of E. We have, then, an apparently insoluble conflict. For the diviner to give a causal verdict which transcends the limited vision of common sense, he must operate with a theory. But for the theory to survive, it must be of the converging-sequence type which makes the giving of a definite causal verdict very difficult. As I see it, the essence of divination is that it is a mechanism for resolving this conflict. Faced with a theory postulating several possible causes for a given event, and no means of inferring the actual cause from observable evidence, divination goes, as it were, ‘over the head of’ such evidence. It elicits a direct sign from the realm of those unobservable entities that govern the

9Nadel,

1956, esp. chap. vi.

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causal linkages it deals with - a sign that enables it to say which of the several sequences indicated by the theory is the one actually involved. Just how it elicits this sign seems immaterial. Indeed, there is a fantastic variety of divination procedures on the African continent. The diviner may enter into a privileged contact with the realm of unobservable entities postulated by his theory, ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ them in a manner beyond the powers of his client. The diviner may force his client to choose from a collection of twigs, each representing one of the various spirits and causal linkages potentially involved in the situation. He may set spiders to chew leaves, and give his verdict on the basis of a series of correlations between patterns of chewing and kinds of causal sequence. He may cause a dead body to be carried by several men, suggest to the body the various possible causes of its death, and obtain from its consequent movements a reply as to which is the cause actually involved. He may administer poison to a series of fowls, put one of the several potential sequences as a question to each fowl, and infer from the life or death of the animal whether this particular sequence is the one actually involved. One might cite up to a hundred more ingenious procedures. All of these divination techniques share two basic features. First, as I have said, they are means of selecting one actual causal sequence from several potential sequences. Secondly, they all carry a subtle aura of fallibility which makes it possible to ‘explain everything away’ when remedial prescriptions based on them turn out not to work. Thus many divination procedures require an esoteric knowledge or faculty which the client does not share with the operator. Hence the client has no direct check on the operator; and in retrospect, there is always the possibility of the latter's dishonesty or sheer incompetence. Again, nearly all of these procedures are thought to be very delicate and easily thrown out of kilter. Among other things, they may be affected by pollution, or by the machinations of those who have a grudge against the client. So, whereas the positive features of the divining process make it possible to arrive at a definite causal verdict despite a converging-sequence theory, the aura of fallibility provides for the self-protecting action of such a theory by making it possible, in the event of a failure, to switch from one potential sequence to another in such a way as to leave the theory as a whole unimpugned. In the last section, we noted that the context of divination provided some of the clearest illustrations of the defense-mechanism known as ‘secondary elaboration.’ Now, I think, we can go further: that is, we can say that divination owes its very existence to the exigencies of this mechanism.

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Where the ‘open’ predicament prevails, anxieties about threats to the established theories decline, and previously blocked thought-paths become clear. We now witness the development of theories that assign distinctive effects to differing causes; and in the face of this development, the type of theory that assumes converging sequences tends to disappear. Nowadays, of course, it is more fashionable to talk of covariation than to talk of cause and effect. But the continuous-covariation formula of the type ds = f. dt, so prominent in modern scientific theory, is in fact an instance of the tendency I am referring to. For, spelled out, the implication of such a formula is that, to an infinite number of values of a cause-variable, there correspond an infinite number of values of an effect-variable. Where this type of theory comes into the ascendant, the diviner gives place to the diagnostician. The latter, whether he is concerned with bodily upsets or with aeroplane disasters, goes to work in a way which differs in important respects from that of his traditional counterpart. Dealing as he does with theories that postulate non-converging causal sequences, he has a task altogether more prosaic than that of the diviner. For, given non-convergence, a complete and accurate observation of effect, plus knowledge of the relevant theory, makes it possible for him to give an unambiguous causal verdict. Once these conditions have been fulfilled, there is no need for the additional operations of the diviner. No need for special mechanisms to elicit signs from the realm of unobservable entities. No need for a way of going ‘over the head of’ observable evidence in order to find out which of several potential causes is the actual one. Modern Western diagnosis, it is true, has not lost all of the aura of fallibility that surrounds traditional divining. Incomplete and inaccurate observation of effect may sometimes provide a plausible defense for failures of diagnosis based on outmoded theory. But such a defense is a poor thing compared with that provided by converging-sequence theory and a divining mechanism characterized as inherently delicate and subject to breakdown. In the modern West, of course, the diagnosticians and remedialists are usually not the same as the people who are actively concerned with the developing and testing of theory. (Hence the division between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ scientists.) Nevertheless, it is often through reports of failure from these men that the developers and testers get their stimulus for the replacement of an old theory with a new one. Thus in medicine, reports from general practitioners about widespread breakdown of well-tried diagnostic and healing procedures have often provided the stimulus for medical researchers to make drastic revisions in the theory of disease. Far from being an integral part of any mechanism for defending theory, then, the diagnostician often contributes his share to the circumstances that lead to the abandonment of old ideas and the adoption of new ones.

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vii. Absence versus presence of experimental method Anyone who has read Part I of this chapter should be in little doubt as to how closely adjusted traditional African theoretical systems often are to the prevailing facts of personality, social organization, and ecology. Indeed, although many of the causal connexions they posit turn out to be red herrings when subjected to scientific scrutiny, others turn out to be very real and vital. Thus an important part of traditional religious theory posits and attempts to explain the connexion between disturbed social relationships and disease - a connexion whose reality and importance Western medical scientists are only just beginning to see. Nevertheless, the adjustments of these systems to changing experience are essentially slow, piecemeal, and reluctant. Nothing must happen to arouse public suspicion that basic theoretical models are being challenged. If changes are to take place, they must take place like movements in the game of Grandmother’s Footsteps: i.e., when Grandma is not looking, and in such a way that whenever she turns round, she sees somebody standing stockstill and in a position not too obviously different from the one he was in when last she looked. The consequence of all this, if the reader will excuse me for mixing my metaphors, is that traditional idea-systems are usually catching up on experience from a position of ‘one jump behind.’ Scientific thought, by contrast, is characteristically ‘one jump ahead’ of experience. It is able to be so because of that distinctive feature of the scientist’s calling: the Experimental Method. This method is nothing more nor less than the positive extension of the ‘open’ attitude to established beliefs and categories which we referred to in Section 5. For the essence of experiment is that the holder of a pet theory does not just wait for events to come along and show whether or not it has a good predictive performance. He bombards it with artificially produced events in such a way that its merits or defects will show up as immediately and as clearly as possible. Often, the artificially produced events involved in an experiment are ones that would take a long time to observe if left to occur of their own accord. Thus a medical research worker who has a theory about the destructive effect of a certain chemical upon pneumonia germs does not wait for the next severe English winter to bring its heavy toll of pneumonia victims. He gets a large batch of monkeys (or, in America sometimes, condemned human volunteers), deliberately infects them with pneumonia, gives some the chemical and others an inert substance, and observes the results. In many cases, the artificially produced events are of a kind which would almost certainly never occur were nature left to take her own course; but the experimentalist sets great store by them because they are expressly designed to provide a more unequivocal test of theory than any naturally occurring conditions. Most laboratory experiments in biology, chemistry, and especially physics are of this kind.

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We can say, then, that whereas in traditional thought there is continual if reluctant adjustment of theories to new experience, in science men spend much of their time deliberately creating new experience in order to evaluate their theories. Whilst in traditional thought it is mostly experience that determines theory, in the world of the experimental scientist there is a sense in which theory usually determines experience. viii. The confession of ignorance The European anthropologist working in a traditional African community often has the experience of soliciting people’s theories on a number of (to him) interesting topics, and of getting the reply ‘we don’t know anything about that’ with the implication ‘we don't really care’. Thus the anthropologist usually comes to Africa with ideas about the wonderful ‘creation myths’ to be found there. Very often, however, he finds that the people he has come to live with are not at all curious about the creation of the world; and apart from acknowledging that it was the work of a supreme being, they are apt to say with a shrug of their shoulders ‘the old people did not tell us anything about it.’ (Often, of course, an equal lack of curiosity on the anthropologist’s part leads him to miss an elaborate body of indigenous explanatory theory covering some area of experience his own lack of interest prevented him from enquiring about.) What the anthropologist almost never finds is a confession of ignorance about the answer to some question which the people themselves consider important. Scarcely ever, for instance, does he come across a common disease or crop failure whose cause and cure people say they just do not know. Given the basic predicament of the traditional thinker, such an admission would indeed be intolerable. For where there are no conceivable alternatives to the established theoretical system, any hint that this system is failing to cope must be a hint of irreparable chaos, and so must rouse extreme anxiety. In the case of the scientist, his readiness to test every theory to destruction makes it inevitable that he will have to confess ignorance whenever a theory crumbles under testing and he has no better one immediately available. Indeed, it is only in a culture where the scientific attitude is firmly institutionalized that one can hope to hear the answer ‘we don't know’ given by an expert questioned on the causes of such a terrible human scourge as cancer. Such willingness to confess ignorance means that the world-view provided by scientists for wider consumption is apt to seem far less comprehensive and embracing than many of the world-views of pre-scientific cultures. In fact, it tends to give the impression of a great expanse of darkness illuminated only at irregular intervals. This impression, of course, is tolerable to scientists precisely because the beliefs

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they hold at a given time are not things of absolute value to which they can imagine no possible alternatives. If current beliefs let in the dark, this does not rule out the possibility of other beliefs which may eventually shut it out. ix. Coincidence, chance, probability Closely related to the development of a capacity to tolerate ignorance is the development of concepts which formally recognize the existence of various kinds of limitation upon the possible completeness of explanation and prediction. Important among such concepts are those of coincidence, chance, and probability. Let us start with the idea of coincidence. In the traditional cultures of Africa, such a concept is poorly developed. The tendency is to give any untoward happening a definite cause. When a rotten branch falls off a tree and kills a man walking underneath it, there has to be a definite explanation of the calamity. Perhaps the man quarreled with a half-brother over some matter of inheritance, and the latter worked the fall of the branch through a sorcerer. Or perhaps he misappropriated lineage property, and the lineage ancestors brought the branch down on his head. The idea that the whole thing could have come about through the accidental convergence of two independent chains of events is inconceivable because it is psychologically intolerable. To entertain it would be to admit that the episode was inexplicable and unpredictable: a glaring confession of ignorance. It is characteristic of the scientist that he is willing to face up to the inexplicability and unpredictability of this type of situation, and that he does not shrink from diagnosing an accidental convergence of different chains of events. This is a consequence of his ability to tolerate ignorance. As with the idea of coincidence, so with that of probability. Where traditional thought is apt to demand definite forecasts of whether something will or will not happen, the scientist is often content to know the probability of its happening - that is, the number of times it will happen in a hypothetical series of, say, a hundred trials. When it was first developed, the probability forecast was seen as a makeshift tool for use in situations where one’s knowledge of the factors operating was incomplete, and where it was assumed that possession of all the relevant data would have made a definite forecast possible. This is still an important context of probability forecasting, and will continue to be so. An example of its use is in prediction of incidence of the mental disease schizophrenia. Psychiatrists have now come to believe that heredity plays a large part in causing the disease; and given a knowledge of the distribution of previous cases in a person’s family history, they are able to calculate the probability of

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his contracting it. Their forecasts only run to probabilities, because they are not yet sure that they know all the other factors which reinforce or inhibit the effect of heredity, and also because they are seldom in a position to observe all those factors they do know to be relevant. Nevertheless, the assumption remains that if all the relevant factors could be known and observed, the probability forecasts could be replaced by unequivocal predictions. In the twentieth century, a yet more drastic step has been taken in acknowledging the limits of explanation and prediction. For physicists now admit that the entities they postulate as the ultimate constituents of all matter—the so-called Elementary Particles—have properties such that, even given all obtainable data about their condition at any instant, it is still impossible to give more than a probability forecast of their condition at any instant in the future. Here, the probability forecast is no longer a makeshift for an unequivocal prediction: it is ultimate and irreducible. From one angle, then, the development of the scientific outlook appears more than anything else as a growth of intellectual humility. Where the prescientific thinker is unable to confess ignorance on any question of vital practical import, the good scientist is always ready to do so. Again, where the prescientific thinker is reluctant to acknowledge any limitation on his power to explain and predict, the scientist not only faces such limitations with equanimity, but devotes a good deal of energy to exploring and charting their extent. This humility, I suggest, is the product of an underlying confidence—the confidence which comes from seeing that one’s currently held beliefs are not the be-all and end-all of the human search for order. Once one has seen this, the difficulty of facing up to their limitations largely dissolves.10 x. Protective versus destructive attitude to the category-system If someone is asked to list typical features of traditional thinking, he is almost certain to mention the phenomenon known as ‘taboo.’ ‘Taboo’ is the anthropological jargon for a reaction of horror and aversion to certain actions or happenings which are seen as monstrous and polluting. It is characteristic of the taboo reaction that people are unable to justify it in terms of ulterior reasons: tabooed events are simply bad in themselves. People take every possible step to prevent tabooed events from happening, and to isolate or expel them when they do occur.

10 Some similar comments on the themes of ignorance and uncertainty in relation to the scientific outlook are made by R. G, Armstrong in a brief but trenchant critique of ‘The Notion of Magic’ by M. and R. Wax (1963).

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Taboo has long been a mystery to anthropologists. Of the many explanations proposed, few have fitted more than a small selection of the instances observed. It is only recently that an anthropologist has placed the phenomenon in a more satisfactory perspective by the observation that in nearly every case of taboo reaction, the events and actions involved are ones which seriously defy the established lines of classification in the culture where they occur.11 Perhaps the most important occasion of taboo reaction in traditional African cultures is the commission of incest. Incest is one of the most flagrant defiances of the established category-system: for he who commits it treats a mother, daughter, or sister like a wife. Another common occasion for taboo reaction is the birth of twins. Here, the category distinction involved is that of human beings versus animals - multiple births being taken as characteristic of animals as opposed to men. Yet another very generally tabooed object is the human corpse, which occupies, as it were, a classificatory no-man’s land between the living and the inanimate. Equally widely tabooed are such human bodily excreta as faeces and menstrual blood, which occupy the same no-man’s-land between the living and the inanimate. Taboo reactions are often given to occurrences that are radically strange or new; for these too (almost by definition) fail to fit into the established category system. A good example is furnished by a Kalabari story of the coming of the Europeans. The first white man, it is said, was seen by a fisherman who had gone down to the mouth of the estuary in his canoe. Panic-stricken, he raced home and told his people what he had seen: whereupon he and the rest of the town set out to purify themselves —that is, to rid themselves of the influence of the strange and monstrous thing that had intruded into their world. A sort of global taboo reaction is often evoked by foreign lands. As the domains of so much that is strange and unassimilable to one’s own categories, such lands are the abode par excellence of the monstrous and the abominable. The most vivid description we have of this attitude is that given for the Lugbara by John Middleton (1960). For this East African people, the foreigner is the inverted perpetrator of all imaginable abominations from incest downwards. The more alien he is, the more abominable. Though the Lugbara

11This observation may well prove to be a mile- stone in our understanding of traditional thought. It was first made some years ago by Mary Douglas, who has developed many of its implications in her recent book Purity and Danger. Though we clearly disagree on certain wider implications, the present discussion is deeply indebted to her insights.

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attitude is extreme, many traditional African cultures would seem to echo it in some degree.12 Just as the central tenets of the traditional theoretical system are defended against adverse experience by an elaborate array of excuses for predictive failure, so too the main classificatory distinctions of the system are defended by taboo avoidance reactions against any event that defies them. Since every system of belief implies a system of categories, and vice versa, secondary elaboration and taboo reaction are really opposite sides of the same coin. From all this it follows that, like secondary elaboration, taboo reaction has no place among the reflexes of the scientist. For him, whatever defies or fails to fit into the established category-system is not something horrifying, to be isolated or expelled. On the contrary, it is an intriguing ‘phenomenon’ - a starting point and a challenge for the invention of new classifications and new theories. It is something every young research worker would like to have cropped up in his field of observation - perhaps the first rung on the ladder of fame. If a -biologist ever came across a child born with the head of a goat, he would be hard put to it to make his compassion cover his elation. And as for social anthropologists, one may guess that their secret dreams are of finding a whole community of men who sleep for preference with their mothers! xi. The passage of time: bad or good? In traditional Africa, methods of time-reckoning vary greatly from culture to culture. Within each culture, again, we find a plurality of time-scales used in different contexts. Thus there may be a major scale which locates events either before, during or after the time of founding of the major institutions of the community: another scale which locates events by correlating them with the life-times of deceased ancestors: yet another which locates events by correlating them with the phases of the seasonal cycle: and yet another which uses phases of the daily cycle. Although these scales are seldom interrelated in any systematic way, they all serve to order events in before-after series. Further, they have the very general characteristic that vis-à-vis ‘after,’ ‘before’ is usually valued positively, sometimes neutrally, and never negatively. Whatever the particular scale involved, then, the passage of time is seen as something deleterious or at best neutral. Perhaps the most widespread, everyday instance of this attitude is the standard justification of so much thought and action; ‘That is what the old-time people told 12 This association of foreign lands with chaos and pollution seems to be a universal of prescientific thought-systems. For this, see Eliade, 1961, esp, chap. i.

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us,’ (It is usually this standard justification which is in the forefront of the anthropologist's mind when he applies the label ‘traditional culture’.) On the major time-scale of the typical traditional culture, things are thought of as having been better in the golden age of the founding heroes than they are today. On an important minor time-scale, the annual one, the end of the year is a time when everything in the cosmos is run-down and sluggish, overcome by an accumulation of defilement and pollution. A corollary of this attitude to time is a rich development of activities designed to negate its passage by a ‘return to the beginning.’ Such activities characteristically depend on the magical premiss that a symbolic statement of some archetypal event can in a sense recreate that event and temporarily obliterate the passage of time which has elapsed since its original occurrence.13 These rites of recreation are to be seen at their most luxuriant in the ancient cultures of Western Sudan—notably in those of the Bambara and Dogon. In such cultures, indeed, a great part of everyday activity is said to have the ulterior significance of recreating archetypal events and acts. Thus the Dogon labouring in the fields recreates in his pattern of cultivation the emergence of the world from the cosmic egg. The builder of a homestead lays it out in a pattern that symbolically recreates the body of the culture-hero Nommo. Even relations between kin symbolize and recreate relations between the primal beings.14 One might well describe the Western Sudanic cultures as obsessed with the annulment of time to a degree unparalleled in Africa as a whole. Yet other, less spectacular, manifestations of the attempt to ‘get back to the beginning’ are widely distributed over the continent. In the West African forest belt, for instance, the richly developed ritual dramas enacted in honour of departed heroes and ancestors have a strong recreative aspect. For by inducing these beings to possess specially selected media and thus, during festivals, to return temporarily to the company of men, such rituals are restoring things as they were in olden times.15

13In

these rites of recreation, traditional African thoughts shows its striking affinities with prescientific thoughts in many other parts of the world. The world-wide occurrence and meaning of such rites was first dealt with by Mirece Eliade in his myth of the external return. A more recent treatment, from which the present analysis has profited greatly, is to be found in the chapter entitled “Le Temps Retriove’ Levi-Strauss 1962. 14See Griaule and Dieterlen 1954, and Griaule 1965. 15For some interesting remarks on this aspect of West African ritual dramas, see Tardits 1962.

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On the minor time-scale provided by the seasonal cycle, we find a similar widespread concern for recreation and renewal. Hence the important rites which mark the end of an old year and the beginning of a new one - rites which attempt to make the new by a thoroughgoing process of purification of accumulated pollutions and defilements. This widespread attempt to annul the passage of time seems closely linked to features of traditional thought which I have already reviewed. As I pointed out earlier, the new and the strange, in so far as they fail to fit into the established system of classification and theory, are intimations of chaos to be avoided as far as possible. Advancing time, with its inevitable element of nonrepetitive change, is the vehicle par excellence of the new and the strange. Hence its effects must be annulled at all costs. Rites of renewal and recreation, then, have much in common with the processes of secondary elaboration and taboo behaviour. Indeed, their kinship with the latter can be seen in the idea that the passage of the year is essentially an accumulation of pollutions, which it is the function of the renewal rites to remove. In short, these rites are the third great defensive reflex of traditional thought.16 When we turn from the traditional thinker to the scientist, we find this whole valuation of temporal process turned upside down. Not for the scientist the idea of a golden age at the beginning of time—an age from which things have been steadily falling away. For him, the past is a bad old past, and the best things lie ahead. The passage of time brings inexorable progress. As C. P. Snow has put it aptly, all scientists have ‘the future in their bones’ (1959: 10). "Where the traditional thinker is busily trying to annul the passage of time, the scientist may almost be said to be trying frantically to hurry time up. For in his, impassioned pursuit of the experimental method, he is striving after the creation of new situations which nature, if left to herself, would bring about slowly if ever at all. Once again, the scientist’s attitude can be understood in terms of the ‘open’ predicament. For him, currently held ideas on a given subject are one possibility amongst many. Hence occurrences which threaten them are not the total, horrific threat that they would be for the traditional thinker. Hence time’s burden of things new and strange does not hold the terrors that it holds for the traditionalist. Furthermore, the scientist’s experience of the way in which successive theories, overthrown after exposure to adverse data, are replaced by ideas of ever greater predictive and explanatory power, leads 16Levi-Strauss, I think, is making much the same point about rites of renewal when he talks of the continuous battle between prescientific classificatory systems and the nonrepetitive changes involved in the passage of time. See Levi-Strauss, 1962.

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almost inevitably to a very positive evaluation of time. Finally, we must remember that the ‘open’ predicament, though it has made people able to tolerate threats to their beliefs, has not been able to supply them with anything comparable to the cosiness of the traditional thinker ensconced amidst his established theories. As an English medical student, newly exposed to the scientific attitude, put it: You seem to be as if when learning to skate, trying to find a nice hard piece of ice which you can stand upright on instead of learning how to move on it. You continue trying to find something, some foundation piece which will not move, whereas everything -will move and you’ve got to learn to skate on it. (Abercrombie 1960: 131) The person who enjoys the moving world of the sciences, then, enjoys the exhilaration of the skater. But for many, this is a nervous, insecure sensation, which they would fain exchange for the womb-like warmth of the traditional theories and their defences. This lingering sense of insecurity gives a powerful attraction to the idea of progress. For by enabling people to cling to some hoped-for future state of perfect knowledge, it helps them live with a realization of the imperfection and transience of present theories. Once formed, indeed, the idea of Progress becomes in itself one of the most powerful supports of the scientific attitude generally. For the faith that, come what may, new experience must lead to better theories, and that better theories must eventually give place to still better ones, provides the strongest possible incentive for a constant readiness to expose oneself to the strange and the disturbing, to scrap current frameworks of ideas, and to cast about for replacements. Like the quest for purity of motive, however, the faith in progress is a doubleedged weapon. For the lingering insecurity which is one of the roots of this faith leads all too often to an excessive fixation of hopes and desires on an imagined Utopian future. People cling to such a future in the same way that men in prescientific cultures cling to the past. And in doing so, they inevitably lose much of the traditionalist’s ability to enjoy and glorify the moment he lives in. Even within the sciences, an excessive faith in progress can be dangerous. In sociology, for instance, it has led to a number of unfruitful theories of social evolution. At this point, I should like to draw attention to a paradox inherent in the presentation of my subject. As a scientist, it is perhaps inevitable that I should at certain points give the impression that traditional African thought is a poor, shackled thing when compared with the thought of the sciences. Yet as a man, here I am living by choice in a still-heavily-traditional Africa rather than in the scientifically oriented Western subculture I was brought up in. Why? Well, there

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may be lots of queer, sinister, unacknowledged reasons. But one certain reason is the discovery of things lost at home. An intensely poetic quality in everyday life and thought, and a vivid enjoyment of the passing moment—both driven out of sophisticated Western life by the quest for purity of motive and the faith in progress. How necessary these are for the advance of science; but what a disaster they are when they run wild beyond their appropriate bounds! Though I largely disagree with the way in which the ‘Negritude’ theorists have characterized the differences between traditional African and modern Western thought, when it gets to this point, I see very clearly what they are after. So much, then, for the salient differences between traditional and scientific thought. There is nothing particularly original about the terms in which I have described the contrast between the two. Indeed, all of my eleven points of difference are to be found mentioned somewhere or other in previous anthropological literature. This literature, however, leaves much to be desired when it comes to interpretation. Thus one author deals with secondary elaboration, another with magic, another with taboo, and so on. A particular explanation covers a particular trait of traditional thought, but seems to have very little relevance to the others. Most social anthropologists would acknowledge that the eleven characteristic traits of traditional thought listed in this essay tend to occur together and vanish together; but so far they have offered no over-all interpretation that does justice to this concomitance. In so far as my chapter makes a fresh contribution, I think this lies precisely in its provision of just such an over-all interpretation. For the concept of the ‘closed’ predicament not only provides a key to the understanding of each one of the eleven salient traits of traditional thought, it also helps us to see why these eleven traits flourish and perish as a set. Where formerly we saw them as an assemblage of miscellaneous exotica, we can now see them as the components of a well-defined and comprehensible syndrome. So far, however, the interpretation, though it breaks new ground, remains largely intellectualist. At this stage, it does not allow us to relate ideational differences to broader sociocultural differences. It does not as yet allow us to suggest answers to such questions as ‘Why did the scientific attitude emerge spontaneously in Europe but not in Africa?’ or, ‘Why, in Europe, did it emerge at particular times and places?’ None the less, I think it does give a valuable clue as to the sort of circumstances we should be looking for: i.e., circumstances tending to promote awareness of alternatives to established theoretical models. Three relevant factors of this kind suggest themselves at once:

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(i) Development of written transmission of beliefs17 Earlier on in this essay, I talked of the paradox of idea-systems whose users see them as static, but which are in fact constantly, albeit slowly, changing. This paradox, as I said, seems to imply something like a game of Grandmother’s Footsteps, with Grandson moving a little at a time when Grandma’s back is turned, but always taking care to be still when Grandma rounds on him. Now it is, above all, the oral transmission of beliefs which makes this intellectual Grandmother’s Footsteps possible. For in each generation, small innovations, together with the processes of selective recall, make for considerable adjustments of belief to current situation. But where they cannot refer back to the ideas of a former generation ‘frozen’ in writing, both those responsible for the adjustments and those who accept them remain virtually unaware that innovation has taken place. In a similar manner, a small and seemingly marginal innovation in belief can occur without anyone realizing that it is part of a cumulative trend which, over several generations, will amount to a very striking change. In these circumstances, everything tends to give the main tenets of theory an absolute and timeless validity. In so doing, it prevents the development of any awareness of alternatives. Oral transmission, then, is clearly one of the basic supports of the ‘closed’ predicament. Where literacy begins to spread widely through a community, the situation changes radically. The beliefs of a particular period become ‘frozen’ in writing. Meanwhile, oral transmission of beliefs goes on, and with it, the continuous small adjustments to changing circumstances typical of preliterate society. As time passes, these adjustments produce an idea-system markedly different from that originally set down in writing. Now in an entirely oral culture, as we have seen, no one has the means of becoming aware of this change. But in a literate culture, the possibility of checking current beliefs against the ‘frozen’ ideas of an earlier era throws the fact of change into sharp relief. In these circumstances, the main tenets of theory can no longer be seen as having an absolute and timeless validity. In the consciousness that one’s own

17The discussion that follows leans heavily upon Goody and Watt 1963. Goody and Watt are, I believe, among the first to have spelled out the probable importance of the transition from oral to written transmission of beliefs for the take-off from tradition into science. I have drawn heavily here upon their characterization of the contrasting predicaments of thinkers in oral and literate cultures; though my argument diverges somewhat from theirs in its later stages.

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people believed other things at other times, we have the germ of a sense of alternatives. The stage is set for the emergence of the ‘open’ predicament. Not only does attention to the question of literacy help us to understand why the ‘open’ predicament developed in Europe but not in Africa. It also helps us to understand why, in Europe, this predicament developed just when and where it did. Thus in their sketch of the history of writing, Goody and Watt (1963: 311-19) point out that pictographic writing developed in the Middle and Far East from the end of the fourth millennium b.c. But the various pictographic systems were so unwieldy and their assimilation so time-consuming that they tended to be the exclusive possessions of specially trained, conservative ruling élites. The interests of such élites in preserving the status quo would naturally counteract the ‘opening’ tendencies of written transmission. It was in sixth-century-B.C. Greece that a convenient, easily learnable phonetic alphabet became in some communities a majority possession; and it was in this same sixth-century Greece that the ‘open’ predicament made its first notable appearance. The subsequent fortunes of literacy in the Mediterranean world seem to correspond rather well with the subsequent fortunes of the ' open ' predicament. Thus what we term the ‘Dark Ages’ was at once a period which saw the restriction of literacy to small, conservative ruling élites and at the same time a period in which the ‘closed’ predicament reasserted itself in full force. And in the reawakening of the twelfth-seventeenth centuries, a great expansion and democratization of literacy was the precursor of the final, enduring reappearance of the open predicament and the scientific outlook. Notable during the early part of this period was the rediscovery, via Arab sources, of the ' lost' writings of the great Greek philosopher-scientists. Since in early Medieval times current theoretical tenets were taught very much in the ' this is what the ancients handed down to us ' spirit of the closed society, the sudden forced confrontation with the very different reality of what these ancestral heroes actually did believe must have had an effect which powerfully supplemented that due to the growth of literacy generally. (ii) Development of culturally heterogeneous communities There is one obvious, almost platitudinous answer to the question: what gives members of a community an awareness of alternative possibilities of interpreting their world? The answer, of course, is: meeting other people who do in fact interpret the world differently. But there are meetings and meetings; and it is clear that whilst some make very little difference to the outlooks of those involved, others are crucial for the rise of the ‘open’ predicament. Now neither traditional Africa nor early Europe lacked encounters between bearers of radically different cultures. So our aim must be to show why, in

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Africa, such encounters did little to promote the ‘open’ predicament, when in Europe they did so much. My own very tentative answer goes something like this. Traditional African communities were as a rule fairly homogeneous as regards their internal culture, and their relations with culturally alien neighbours tended to be restricted to the context of trade. Now such restricted relations did not make for mutual encounter of a very searching kind. In extreme cases, indeed, they were carried on without actual face-to-face contact: take, for instance, the notorious ‘silent trade’ between North African merchants and certain peoples of Western Sudan—an exercise in which the partners neither met nor spoke. Much trade between bearers of radically different cultures was, of course, carried out under conditions far less extreme than these; and it was even common for members of a given community to speak the languages of the culturally alien peoples they traded with. Yet culturally contrasted trading partners remained basically rooted in different communities, from which they set out before trade, and to which they returned after it. Under these limitations, confrontation with alien world-views remained very partial. The trader encountered the thought of his alien partners at the level of common sense but not usually at the level of theory. Since common-sense worlds, in general, differ very little in comparison with theoretical worlds, such encounters did not suffice to stimulate a strong sense of alternatives.18 Even where the member of a traditional community did make contact with his alien neighbours at the level of theory, the content of theory was such that it still presented an obstacle to the development of a real sense of alternatives. As I pointed out in Part I of this chapter, the bulk of traditional theory was concerned with its users' own particular community. There was an implicit premiss that the world worked one way within one's own community, and another way outside it. Hence if one's neighbours believed some very strange and different things, this was in no way surprising or disturbing in terms of

18This point, I think, is relevant to an argument advanced against my analysis of magic. (John Beattie, personal communication.) The argument is that once a person learns another language, he becomes aware of alternative possibilities of dividing up the world by words and, on my premisses, must inevitably adopt a non-magical outlook. In rebuttal, I would say that where a person learns another people’s language and thought only at the common-sense level, he is not exposed to a radically different way of dividing up the world by words. Indeed, he is liable to see most of the common-sense words and concept of the alien language as having equivalents in his own. They are ‘the same words’ and ‘the same thoughts.’ It is only when he learns the alien language and thought at the theoretical level that he becomes aware of a radically different way of dividing the world.

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one's own beliefs. In such circumstances, radically contrasting belief-systems could seldom be seen as genuine alternatives. When we turn from Africa to Europe, it is important to note just when and where the ‘open’ predicament came to prevail. Its first home, historians seem to agree, was in certain parts of sixth-century-B.C. Greece. Not in such centrally placed, culturally homogeneous states as Sparta, whose self-contained agricultural society remained rigidly ‘closed’ but in the small, cosmopolitan trading communities on the frontiers of the Greek world—old established Ionian cities like Miletus and Ephesus, and more recently established colonies like Abdera and Syracuse.19 After declining in this area, the fortunes of the ‘open' predicament flourished for several centuries in Alexandria. Later, they waxed briefly in the cities of the Arab world. Thence, in late Medieval times, the current passed to the cities of the Iberian Peninsula and coastal Italy. Finally, it passed to the cities of north-western Europe. What was it about the communities that lay along this devious path that made them such excellent centres for the development of the ' open ' predicament? First and foremost, perhaps, it was the conditions of contact between the bearers of different cultures. Whereas in Africa intercultural boundaries tended to coincide with intercommunity boundaries, in these Mediterranean and European cities they cut right through the middle of the community. In these centres, people of diverse origins and cultures were packed together within single urban communities. And although the ‘sons of the soil’ were frequently the only people who had full citizenship rights, most of the inhabitants had feelings of common community membership and common interests vis-à-vis such outsiders as territorial rulers, the lords of the local countryside, other cities, and so on. Under these conditions, relations between bearers of different cultures were much broader in scope than the purely commercial relations which typically linked such people over much of traditional Africa. And a broader context of social relationship made for a deeper and more searching intellectual encounter. Here, the encounter was not merely at the level of common sense where differences were negligible. It was also at the level of basic theory where differences were striking. Much of the ‘open’ temper of late and Medieval and Renaissance times,

19For a brilliant sketch of the beginnings of the ‘open’ predicament in the Greek citystates, see Popper, 1945. Although, as I said earlier, Popper’s definition of ‘closed’ and ‘open’ differs somewhat from my own, much of what he says is relevant to my argument and has indeed provided inspiration for it.

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for instance, can probably be traced to the confrontation of the basic tenets of the Christian, Islamic, and Jewish thought-traditions in the twelfth-century cities of Spain and coastal Italy.20 Another factor making for more searching encounter was the actual content of the theories involved. The various traditions of thought making up the intellectual inheritance of these Mediterranean and European cities were the products of peoples who had long been living in communities far more integrally linked to the wider world than was usual in traditional Africa. As such, they were more universalistic in their content. So here, when a confrontation took place, it was no longer possible to rest content with saying: ‘My theory works for my little world, and his works for his.’ My theory and his theory were now patently about the same world, and awareness of them as alternatives became inescapable. (iii) Development of the trade-travel-exploration complex So much for encounter between bearers of different cultures within a single community. A second important kind of encounter arises from voyages of travel and exploration in which members of one community go to live temporarily amongst members of a culturally alien community, with the express aim of intellectual and emotional contact at all levels from the most superficial to the deepest. Now although individual members of many traditional African cultures must have made such voyages from time to time, these, so far as we know, have never become a dominant theme of life in any of the traditional cultures. But in sixththird-century b.c. Greece, in the medieval Arab world, and finally in fifteenthseventeenth-century western Europe—all crucial centres for the development of the ‘open’ predicament —these voyages were such important features of social life that they coloured everyone’s outlook on the world. The evidence we have from ancient Greece indicates that many of the great independent thinkers such as Thales, Anaximander, Democritus, Herodotus, and Xenophanes probably made extensive exploratory voyages themselves. And in some of their writings, the connexion between first-hand experience of a variety of alien ways of looking at the world and an ‘open’ sceptical tenor of thought becomes explicit.21 Again in fifteenth-eighteenth-century western

20For the importance of the confrontation between these three thought-traditions, see Heer 1962. 21Take, for instance, the following passage from Xenophanes, quoted in Toulmin 1961: “Mortals consider that the gods are begotten as they are, and have clothes and voices

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Europe, exotic world-views personified in figures like the Noble Savage, the Wise Egyptian, and the Chinese Sage haunt the pages of many of the sceptical writings of the times; and here too the link between confrontation with alien world-views and ‘open’ thinking is often explicit.22 It is, of course, possible to argue that these voyages and these confrontations were a consequence and not a cause of the ‘open’ predicament; that ‘openminded’ people embarked on them with the idea of putting parochial views to the deliberate test of wider horizons of experience. This may have been true once the voyages had become a dominant feature of the life of the times. But I believe the beginnings of the eras of exploration can still be best understood in terms of the aims and interests of essentially ‘closed-minded’ societies. One’s suspicions on this score are aroused in the first instance by the fact that in both of the great eras of exploration, many of the voyages were encouraged if not directed by the pillars of tradition: in early Greece by the Delphic Oracle, and in western Europe by the Pope’s. Again, it is clear that the motive forces behind the voyages included the aim of reducing population pressure by overseas settlement and that of extending commerce to include new items to be found only in faraway lands. The detailed probings of alien world-views can thus be understood as intelligence operations directed toward solving the problems of human coexistence involved in overseas settlement and commerce. There was probably little ‘open-mindedness’ in the intentions which originally lay behind them. Perhaps the most interesting example of the essentially ‘closed’ motivations behind activities which were to make a great contribution to the development of the ‘open’ predicament is provided by the operations of Christian missionaries in the fifteenth-eighteenth centuries. The fanaticism with which the missionaries worked to convert distant peoples of alien faith can, I think, be understood as a product of the ‘closed’ society’s determination to protect itself from the possibility of being disturbed by confrontation with alien world-views—a possibility which loomed large in this era of exploration. But the more intelligent missionaries saw that effective evangelization required a prior understanding of the faiths of those to be converted; and they set themselves, however reluctantly, to acquire such an understanding. The result was a body of records of alien and figures like theirs. The Ethiopians make their gods black and had hands, and snubnosed; the Thracians say theirs have blue eyes and red hair. Yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and could paint with their hands, and produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the gods with shapes like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several kinds”. 22For this see Hazard 1964. (Especially chap. 4).

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world-views that came to colour much of the thought of the times, and that was undoubtedly one of the important contributions to the genesis of the open thinking of the seventeenth century. The eras of exploration encouraged the growth of the ‘open’ predicament in a second way. This was through the rich material fruits of the voyages. In traditional cultures, as we have seen, distant lands tend to epitomize all that is new and strange, all that fails to fit into the established system of categories, all that is tabooed, fearful, and abominable. Hence, whether among the Lugbara of East Africa or among Dark Age Europeans, we find them peopled with abominations and monsters. In the eras of exploration, however, reports came back not of monsters but of delights and riches. Slowly, these pleasant associations of the Great Beyond extended themselves to new and strange experience generally. The quest for such experience came to be seen not as something dangerous and fool-hardy, but as something richly rewarding and pleasantly exciting. This relation between the fruits of exploration and the new attitudes to the strange and category-defying is portrayed very clearly in some of the metaphors of these eras. Take, for instance, Joseph Glanvill’s notion of ‘An America of Secrets and an Unknown Peru of Nature,’ waiting to overthrow old scholastic ideas and force men to replace them with something better.23 Not only, then, did the events of these eras undermine the feeling that one’s established beliefs were the only defence against chaos and the void. They gave a less horrifying, nay benign, face to chaos itself. In naming these three factors as crucial for the development of the ‘open’ predicament, I am not implying that wherever they occur, there is a sort of painless, automatic, and complete transition from ‘closed’ to ‘open’ thinking. On the contrary, the transition seems inevitable to be painful, violent, and partial. Even in ancient Greece, the independent thinking of the great pre-socratic philosophers evoked strong and anxious reactions.24 In late Medieval times, a few decades of confrontation with alien world-views and ‘open’ sceptical thinking tended to be succeeded by decades of persecution of those responsible for disturbing established orthodoxy and by a general ‘closing-up’ of thought.25 In present-day Nigeria, we seem to be seeing yet another example of the atrocious birth-pangs of the ‘open’ society.

23Quoted

from The Vanity of Dogmatizing in Willey 1962. 168. Popper, 1945, for some of these reactions to pre-socratic ‘open’ thinking 25See Heer, 1962, for a vivid picture of the way in which the Medieval world oscillated crazily between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ attitudes. 24See

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Why should the transition be so painful? Well, a theme of this chapter has been the way in which a developing awareness of alternative world-views erodes attitudes which attach an absolute validity to the established outlook. But this is a process that works over time—indeed over generations. Throughout the process, there are bound to be many people on whom the confrontation has not yet worked its magic. These people still retain the old sense of the absolute validity of their belief-systems, with all the attendant anxieties about threats to them. For these people, the confrontation is still a threat of chaos of the most horrific kind—a threat which demands the most drastic measures. They respond in one of two ways: either by trying to blot out those responsible for the confrontation, often down to the last unborn child; or by trying to convert them to their own beliefs through fanatical missionary activity. Again, as I said earlier, the moving, shifting thought-world produced by the ‘open’ predicament creates its own sense of insecurity. Many people find this shifting world intolerable. Some adjust to their fears by developing an inordinate faith in progress toward a future in which ‘the Truth’ will be finally known. But others long nostalgically for the fixed, unquestionable beliefs of the ‘closed’ culture. They call for authoritarian establishment and control of dogma, and for persecution of those who have managed to be at ease in a world of ever-shifting ideas. Clearly, the ‘open’ predicament is a precarious, fragile thing. In modern Western Europe and America, it is true, the ‘open’ predicament seems to have escaped from this precariousness through public acknowledgement of the practical utility of the sciences. It has achieved a secure foothold in the culture because its results maximize values shared by ‘closed-’ and ‘open-’ minded alike. Even here, however, the ‘open’ predicament has nothing like a universal sway. On the contrary, it is almost a minority phenomenon. Outside the various academic disciplines in which it has been institutionalized, its hold is pitifully less than those who describe Western culture as ‘science-oriented’ often like to think. It is true that in modern Western culture, the theoretical models propounded by the professional scientists do, to some extent, become the intellectual furnishings of a very large sector of the population. The moderately educated layman typically shares with the scientist a general predilection for impersonal ‘it’ theory and a proper contempt for ‘thou-’ theory Garbled and watered-down though it may be, the atomic theory of matter is one of his standard possessions. But the layman’s ground for accepting the models propounded by the scientist is often no different from the young African villager’s ground for accepting the models propounded by one of his elders. In both cases, the propounders are deferred to as the accredited agents of tradition. As for the rules which guide scientists themselves in the acceptance or rejection of models, these seldom become part of the intellectual equipment of members of the wider population.

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For all the apparent up-to-dateness of the content of his world-view, the modern Western layman is rarely more ‘open’ or scientific in his outlook than is the traditional African villager. This takes me back to a general point about the layout of this paper. If I spent the whole of Part I labouring the thesis that differences in the content of theories do more to hide continuities than reveal genuine contrasts, this was not, as some readers may have imagined, through a determination to ignore the contrasts. Rather, it was precisely to warn them away from the trap which the Western layman characteristically falls into—the trap which makes him feel he is keeping up with the scientists when in fact he is no nearer to them than the African peasant. References Abercrombie, J. M. L. 1960. The Anatomy of Judgement. London: Basic Books. Achebe, C. 1957. Things fall Apart. London: Heinemann. Beattie, J. 1966. Ritual and social change. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute1:1. Douglas, M.1966. Purity and Danger. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul. Eliade, M.1954. Myth of the 'eternal return.’ New York: Pantheon Books. Eliade, M. 1961. The Sacred and the profane. New York: Harper and Row. Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1936. Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1965. Theories of primitive religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Forde, D. 1958. Spirits, witches and sorcerers in the supernatural economy of the Yako. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. Ixxxviii. 2. Fortes, M. 1961. Pietas in ancestor worship. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, xii. 2. Gellner, E. 1964. Thought and change. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Goody, J., and I. Watt. 1963. The Consequences of literacy. In Comparative Studies in Society and History. v. 3. Griaule, M. 1965. Conversations with Ogotemmili. (Trans. Dieu d'Eau). London: Oxford University Press. Griaule, M. and G. Dieterlen. 1954. The Dogon. IN African Worlds, ed. D. Forde. London: Oxford University Press. Hazard, P. 1964. The European mind 1680-I7l5. London: Meridian Books. Heer, F. 1962. The Mediaeval World. London: World Publishing. Horton, R. 1963. The Kalabari Ekine Society: A Borderland of Religion and Art. Africa. xxxiii: 2-965. Jahn, J. 1961. Muntu: An outline of neo-African culture. London: Dusseldorf. Kuhn, T. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lavondes, H. 1963. Magie et langage. L'Homme. iii: 3.

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Laye, C. A. 1965. The Dark Child. London: Ferrar, Straus and Giroux. Levi-Strauss, C. 1962. La pensee sauvage. Paris: Librairie Plon. Middleton, J. 1960. Lugbara Religion. London: Oxford University Press. Nadel, S. F. 1956. Nupe Religion. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Popper, Karl. 1945. The open society and its enemies. London: Routledge. Snow, C. P. 1959. The two cultures and the scientific revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tardits, C. 1962. Religion, Epic, History: Notes on the Underlying Functions of Cults in Benin Civilisations. Diogenes. 37. Toulmin, S. 1961. The Fabric of the Heavens. London: Penguin. Wax, M. and R. 1963. The Notion of Magic. Current Anthropology, December. Willey, B. 1962. The Seventeenth Century Background. London: Penguin.

Chapter 4

How Not to Compare African Traditional Thought with Western Thought J.E.Wiredu1 University of South Florida

Abstract Many Westerners have been puzzled by the virtual ubiquity of gods and spirits in traditional African explanations of things. Robin Horton (1967), the Western anthropologist, has suggested that this failure of understanding is partly attributable to the fact that many Western anthropologists "have been unfamiliar with the theoretical thinking of their own culture." I would like to suggest that a much more significant reason is that they have also been unfamiliar with the folk thought of their own culture. Keywords: Africa, Traditional thought, West, Western thought, Comparison Many Westerners have been puzzled by the virtual ubiquity of gods and spirits in traditional African explanations of things. Robin Horton (1967), the Western anthropologist, has suggested that this failure of understanding is partly attributable to the fact that many Western anthropologists "have been unfamiliar with the theoretical thinking of their own culture." I would like to suggest that a much more significant reason is that they have also been unfamiliar with the folk thought of their own culture. Western societies, too, have passed through a stage of addiction to spiritistic explanations of phenomena. What is more, significant residues of this tradition remain a basic part of the mental makeup of a large mass of the less sophisticated sections of Western populations. More importantly still, elements of the spiritistic outlook are, in fact, deeply embedded in the philosophical thought of many contemporary Westerners: philosophers and even scientists.

1Later

changed his name to Kwasi Wiredu

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Obviously, it is a matter of first-rate philosophical importance to distinguish between traditional, that is, pre-scientific, spiritistic thought and modern scientific thought by means of clearly articulated criteria. It is also of anthropological and psychological interest to try to understand how traditional modes of thought function in the total context of life in a traditional society. Since African societies are among the closest approximations in the modern world to societies in the pre-scientific stage of intellectual development, the interest anthropologists have shown in African thought is understandable. Unfortunately, instead of seeing the non-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought as typifying traditional thought in general, Westerners have tended to take them as defining a peculiarly African way of thinking. The ill effects of this mistake have been considerable. It is the basic non-scientific, spiritistic tendencies of African thought, rather than its genuinely distinctive features, that have been taken as a basis for contrasting Africans with Western peoples. One consequence is that many Westerners have gone about with an exaggerated notion of the differences between Africans and the peoples of the West. I do not imply that this has necessarily led to anti-African racism. Nevertheless, since traditional thought is inferior to modern science-oriented thought in some obvious and important respects, some Western liberals have apparently had to think hard in order to protect themselves against conceiving of Africans as intellectually inferior. Another ill effect relates to the self-images of Africans themselves. Partly through the influence of Western anthropology and partly through insufficient critical reflection on the contemporary African situation, many Africans are apt to identify African thought with traditional African thought. The result has not been beneficial to the movement for modernization, usually championed by the very same Africans. These Africans have been in the habit of calling loudly, even stridently, for the cultivation of an African authenticity or personality. True, when such a call is not merely a political slogan, it is motivated by a genuine desire to preserve the indigenous culture of peoples whose confidence in themselves has been undermined by colonialism. But the traditional and nonliterate character of this culture enabled sparse groups of Europeans to subjugate large masses of African populations and keep them in colonial subjection for many long years; even now, it makes them a prey to neocolonialism. Unanalyzed exhortations to Africans to preserve their indigenous culture are, therefore, not particularly useful; indeed, they can be counter-productive. There is an urgent need in Africa today for the kind of analysis that would identify and separate the backward aspects of our culture - I speak as an anxious Africanfrom those aspects that are worth keeping. That such desirable aspects exist is

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beyond question, and undoubtedly many African political and intellectual leaders are deeply impregnated by this consideration. Yet the analytical dimension seems to be lacking in their enthusiasm. So we have, among other distressing things, the frequent spectacle of otherwise enlightened Africans assiduously participating in the pouring of libations to the spirits of our ancestors on ceremonial occasions under the impression that in so doing they are demonstrating their faith in African culture. In fact, many traditional African institutions and cultural practices like the one just mentioned are based on superstition. By ‘superstition’ I mean a belief, lacking rational support, in entities of any sort. The attribute of being superstitious attaches not to the content of a belief but to its mode of entertainment. Purely in respect of content, the belief in abstract entities common among many Western logicians is not any more brainy than the traditional African belief in ancestor spirits. But logicians are given to arguing for their ontology. I happen to think their arguments for abstract entities wrong-headed (1973),2 but it is not open to me to accuse them of superstition. When, however, we come to the traditional African belief in ancestor spirits and this, I would contend, applies to traditional spiritistic beliefs everywhere our position is different. That our departed ancestors continue to hover around in some rarefied form ready now and then to take a sip of the ceremonial schnapps is a proposition that I have never known to be rationally defended. Indeed, if one were to ask a traditional elder, ‘unspoiled’ by the scientific orientation, for the rational justification of such a belief, one's curiosity would be quickly put down to intellectual arrogance acquired through Western education. Yet the principle that one is not entitled to accept a proposition as true without evidential support is not Western in any but an episodic sense. The Western world happens to be the place where, as of now, this principle has received its most sustained and successful application in certain spheres of thought, notably in the natural and mathematical sciences. But even in the Western world, there are some important areas of belief where the principle does not hold sway. In the West, just as anywhere else, the realms of religion, morals, and politics remain strongholds of irrationality. It is not uncommon, for example, to see a Western scientist, fully apprised of the universal reign of law in natural phenomena, praying to God, a spirit, to grant rain and a good harvest and other things besides. Those who are tempted to see in such a thing as witchcraft the key to specifically African thought ought to be reminded that there are numbers of white men in today's London who proudly proclaim

2My

reasons for this remark will be found in my series of articles on "Logic and Ontology" in Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy.

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themselves to be witches. Moreover, if they would but read, for example, TrevorRoper's historical essay on "Witches and Witchcraft" (1967) they might conceivably come to doubt whether witchcraft in Africa has ever attained the heights it reached in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It should be noted, conversely, that the principle of rational evidence is not entirely inoperative in the thinking of the traditional African. Indeed, no society could survive for any length of time without conducting a large part of its daily activities by the principle of belief according to the evidence. You cannot farm without some rationally based knowledge of soils and seeds and of meteorology, and no society can achieve any reasonable degree of harmony in human relations without a basic tendency to assess claims and allegations by the method of objective investigation. The truth, then, is that rational knowledge is not the preserve of the modern West, nor is superstition a peculiarity of the African peoples. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Africa lags behind the West in the cultivation of rational inquiry. One illuminating (because fundamental) way of approaching the concept of "development" is to measure it by the degree to which rational methods have penetrated thought habits. In this sense, of course, one cannot compare the development of peoples in absolute terms. The Western world is ‘developed,’ but only relatively. Technological sophistication is only an aspect of development. The conquest of the religious, moral, and political spheres by the spirit of rational inquiry remains a thing of the future, even in the West. From this point of view, the West may be said to be still underdeveloped. The quest for development, then, should be viewed as a continuing world-historical process in which all peoples, Western and non-Western alike, are engaged. There are at least two important advantages in looking at development in this way. The first is that it becomes possible to see modernization in Africa not as a process in which Africans are unthinkingly jettisoning their own heritage in the pursuit of Western ways of life, but rather as one in which Africans, in common with all other peoples, seek to attain a specifically human destiny. Modernization, properly understood, is the application of the results of modern science for the improvement of human life. People should link the modernization of the conditions of their lives with the modernization of all aspects of their thinking. It is just the failure to do this that is responsible for the more unlovable features of life in the West, a failure that also bedevils attempts at development in Africa. Rulers and leaders of opinion in Africa have tended to think of development in terms of the visible aspects of modernization- large buildings and complex machines to the relative neglect of the more intellectual foundations of modernity. It is true that African nations spend huge sums of money on institutional education every year. But it has not been appreciated that education ought to lead

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to the cultivation of a rational3 outlook on the world on the part of the educated and, through them, in the people at large. To develop in any serious sense, we in Africa must break with our old uncritical habits of thought; that is to say, we must advance past the stage of traditional thinking. Lest these remarks appear rather abstract, let us consider a concrete situation: the institution of funerals in Ghana. Owing to all sorts of superstitions about the supposed career of the spirits of departed relatives, the mourning of the dead takes the form of elaborate and consequently expensive and timeconsuming ceremonies. When a person dies there has first to be a burial ceremony on the third day; then, on the eighth day, there is a funeral celebration in which customary rites are performed; then, forty days afterward, there is a fortieth-day celebration (adad-uanan). Then there are such occasions as the eightieth-day and first anniversary celebrations. All these involve large, alcohol-quaffing gatherings. Contrary to what one might be tempted to think, the embracing of Christianity by large sections of the Ghanaian population has not simplified funeral celebrations; on the contrary, it has brought new complications. Christianity, too, teaches of a whole hierarchy of spirits, from the Supreme Threefold Spirit down to the angels, both good and refractory, down further to the lesser spirits of deceased mortals. Besides, conversion to Christianity in our lands has generally not meant the exchange of the indigenous religion for the new one, but rather the amalgamation of both, which is made the more possible by their common spiritistic orientation. Thus, in addition to all the traditional celebrations, there is nowadays the neo-Christian Memorial Service, replete with church services and extended refreshments, a particularly expensive phase of the funeral process. The upshot is that if a close relation of a man - say, his father dies, then, unless he happens to be rich, he is in for very hard financial times indeed. He has to take several days off work, and borrow respectable sums of money to defray the inevitable expenses. The extent of the havoc that these funeral habits have wrought on the national economy of Ghana has not been exactly calculated, but it has become obvious to public leaders that it is enormous and that something urgently

3I

am aware that my insistence on the overriding value of rationality will be found jarring by those Westerners who feel that the claims of rationality have been pushed too far in their countries, and that the time is overdue for a return to ‘Nature’ and the exultation in feeling, intuition, and immediacy. No doubt the harsh individualism of Western living might seem to lend support to this point of view. But, in my opinion, the trouble is due to too little, rather than too much, rationality in social organization. This, however, is too large a topic to enter into here.

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needs to be done about it. However, the best that these leaders have seemed capable of doing so far has been to exhort the people to reform their traditional institutions in general, and cut down on funeral expenses in particular. These appeals have gone unheeded, which is not surprising, if one recalls that these leaders themselves are often to be seen ostentatiously taking part in ceremonies, such as the pouring of libations, which are based on the same sort of beliefs as those that lie behind the funeral practices. It has apparently been lost upon our influential men that, as long as the underlying beliefs retain their hold, such verbal appeals are wasted on the populace. The ideal way to reform backward customs in Africa must, surely, be to undermine their superstitious belief foundations by fostering in the people at all events, in the new generation of educated Africans the spirit of rational inquiry in all spheres of thought and belief. Even if the backward beliefs in question were peculiarly African, it would be necessary to work for their eradication. But my point is that they are not African in any intrinsic, inseparable sense; and the least that African philosophers and foreign well-wishers can do in this connection is to refrain, in this day and age, from serving up the usual congeries of unargued conceptions about gods, ghosts, and witches in the name of African philosophy. Such a description is highly unfortunate. If at all deserving of the name ‘philosophy,’ these ideas should be regarded not as a part of African philosophy simply, but rather as a part of traditional philosophy in Africa. The habit of talking about African philosophy as if all African philosophy is traditional carries the implication, probably not always intended, that modern Africans have not been trying or worse still, ought not to try to philosophize in a manner that takes account of present-day developments in human knowledge: logical, mathematical, scientific, literary, and so on. Various causes have combined to motivate this attitude. African nationalists in search of an African identity, Afro-Americans in search of their African roots, and Western foreigners in search of exotic diversion all demand an African philosophy that is fundamentally different from Western philosophy, even if it means the familiar witches' brew. Obviously, the work of contemporary African philosophers trying to grapple with the modern philosophical situation cannot satisfy such a demand. Unfortunately, African philosophers writing today have no tradition of written philosophy in their continent to draw upon.4 Where written sources are available, folk philosophy tends not to be made much of. It remains in the

4Ethiopia

and the Arab parts of Africa are, of course, exceptions.

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background as a sort of diffused, immanent component of community thought habits. Such a fund of community thought is not the work of any specifiable set of philosophers; it is the common property of all and sundry, thinker and non-thinker alike. As a rule, folk thought consists of bald assertions without argumentation, but philosophy requires argument and clarification. Of course, folk thought can be comprehensive and interesting on its own account. For example, on the conception of the person found among the Akan of Ghana, a person is constituted by nipadua (a body), as well as a combination of several entities conceived as "spiritual" substances: okra, whose departure means death, sunsum, which gives rise to character, ntoro, the basis of inherited characteristics, passed on from the father, and, finally, mogya, something passed on from the mother which determines clan identity and, at death, becomes the saman (ghost).5 All this sounds more interesting, and certainly more imaginative, than the thesis of some Western philosophers that a person consists of a soul and body. But the crucial difference is that the Western philosopher tries to argue for his thesis, clarifying his meaning and answering objections, while the transmitter of folk conceptions merely says: ‘This is what our ancestors said.’ For this reason, folk conceptions tend not to develop with time. This is as true in the West as it is in Africa. In the absence of a written African tradition in philosophy, anthropologists have fastened on our folk worldviews and elevated them to the status of a continental philosophy. They have then compared this "philosophy" with Western (written) philosophy. In other, better placed, parts of the world, if you want to know the philosophy of the given people, you do not go to aged peasants or fetish priests or court personalities; you go to the individual thinkers, in the flesh, if possible, and in print. Invariably you would find a variety of doctrines, since any set of individuals trying to think for themselves are bound to differ among themselves. Since it is only the former type of informant that anthropologists seem to have been able to find, it is not surprising that their comparisons between African traditional thought and Western scientific thought have been misleading. My contention, which I have earlier hinted at, is that African traditional thought should in the first place only be compared with Western folk thought. For this purpose, of course, Western anthropologists will first have to learn in detail about the folk thought of their own peoples. African folk thought may be compared with Western philosophy only in the same spirit in which Western folk thought may be compared with Western philosophy, that is, only in order to find out how to distinguish folk thought in general from individualized philosophizing. Then, 5See,

for example, W. E. Abraham, The Mind of Africa (1962).

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if there be any who are anxious to compare African philosophy with Western philosophy, they will have to look at the philosophy that Africans are producing today. Present-day African philosophers have been trained in the Western tradition, in the Continental or Anglo-American style, depending on their colonial history. Their thinking, therefore, is unlikely to hold many peculiarly African novelties for anyone knowledgeable in Western philosophy. For this very same reason, African militants and our Afro-American brothers are often disappointed with the sort of philosophy syllabus that is taught at a typical modern department of philosophy in Africa. ‘Why,’ they ask, ‘should Africans be so engrossed in the philosophy of their erstwhile colonial oppressors?’6 African philosophers, however, have no choice but to conduct their philosophical inquiries in relation to the philosophical writings of other peoples; for their own ancestors left them no heritage of philosophical writings. They need not be sure, they must not restrict themselves to the philosophical works of their particular former colonial oppressors, but they must study the written philosophies of other lands, because it would be extremely injudicious for them to try to philosophize in self-imposed isolation from all modern currents of thought. Ideally, they must acquaint themselves with the philosophies of all the peoples of the world: compare, contrast, assess them critically and make use of whatever of value they may find in them. In this way, it can be

6The

African philosopher cannot take the sort of cultural pride in the philosophical achievements of Aristotle or Hume or Kant or Hegel or Marx or Frege or Husserl in which the Western student of philosophy may indulge himself. Indeed, an African needs a certain levelheadedness to touch some of these thinkers at all. Hume, for example, had absolutely no respect for black men: he was able to say, in his essay on "National Characters": "I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion nor ever any individual, eminent either in action or speculation.... In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely that he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words plainly" Nor was Marx, to give another example, particularly progressive in this respect: he is known once, in a burst of personal abuse of Lassalle in a letter to Engels, to have animadverted: "This combination of Jewry and Germany with a fundamental Negro streak…. The fellow's self-assertiveness is Negro, too." It is sometimes understandable for a man to chide his own origins, but to condemn a downtrodden people like this is more serious. Would that black men everywhere had more of the self-assertiveness that Marx here deprecates! The Akan of Ghana have a proverb, which says: "If the truth happens to lie in the most private part of your own mother’s anatomy, it is no sin to extract it with your corresponding organ." African enthusiasts of Marx (or of Hume, for that matter) may perhaps console themselves with the following less delicate adaptation of this proverb. "If the truth happens to lie in the mouth of your racial traducer, it is no pusillanimity to take it from there."

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hoped that a tradition of philosophy as a discursive discipline will eventually come to be established in Africa which future Africans and others, too, can utilize. In practice, contemporary African philosophers will find that it is the philosophies of the West that will occupy them most, for it is in that part of the world that modern developments in human knowledge have gone farthest and where, consequently, philosophy is in closest touch with the conditions of the modernization that Africans desire for their continent. In my opinion, the march of modernization is destined to lead to the universalization of philosophy everywhere in the world. Nevertheless, the African philosopher has good reason to study African folk thought. Africans are a much oppressed and disparaged people; some foreigners have not even conceded that Africans, as a traditional people, were capable of a coherent worldview. Many colonial anthropologists sought to render the actions and attitudes of our forefathers intelligible to their colonial rulers so as to facilitate governance. While some brilliant insights resulted, there were misinterpretations and factual errors as well. Africans cannot leave the task of correction to foreign researchers alone. Moreover, there are, particularly in the field of morality, conceptions not based on superstition; the Westerner may well have something to learn from them. The exposition of these aspects of African traditional thought especially befits the contemporary African philosopher. But African philosophers should approach this material critically: all peoples who have made any breakthrough in the quest for modernization have done so by going beyond folk thinking. Sifting through the elements of our traditional thought and culture will require a good measure of analytical circumspection. Otherwise, we might exchange the good as well as the bad in our traditional ways of life for dubious cultural imports. References Abraham, W. 1962. The mind of Africa. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Horton, R. 1967. African traditional thought and western science. Reprinted in Rationality, ed. Bryan Wilson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Africa 37: 1-2. Trevor-Roper, H. 1967. Witches and Witchcraft. Encounter 28: 5-6. Wiredu, K. J. E. 1973. Logic and Ontology. Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy 2: 1-2.

Part 2: Introduction: Logic in African Languages and Cultures The main question that unites the essays in this part is: are the laws of thought present in African languages and cultures? Robin Horton (1977) instigated this question to home in on his suggestion in his earlier essay (1967) which is, that an inferior type of logic, (something which Lucien LevyBruhl calls ‘logic of mystical participation’) undergirds the thinking of Africans. This logic, whatever it is, does not uphold the laws of thought. He (1977: 65) goes on to argue that “logic (with epistemology) lies at the core of philosophy and their demonstrable absence in traditional Africa reinforces the obvious absence of philosophy in African traditional thought system.” Even though Horton admits that other processes of inference known to the modern world are deployed in African traditional thought, he insists that they are deployed in an unreflective manner. For him, African peoples do not employ intuitions and ideas, but what he describes as “a rich proliferation of the sort of thinking called magical.” On this basis, he concludes that traditional African peoples “do not stop to ask what are the irreducibly basic processes of inference, or how they can be justified. Situations which would provide such question simply do not arise” (1977: 65). The essays in this part in one way or the other were composed to answer this Hortonian claim. Godwin Sogolo seeks to clear the air by showing that logic and rational ability are pride possession of all human races without exception. What this means is that the insinuation by some that a section of humanity may not have logical principles deployed in their cultures and languages is not only unfounded but utterly nonsensical. As he put it, “[L]ogic is one of the core areas of philosophy. Over the years, it has been assumed that the ability to reason logically and to draw valid inferences is an essential characteristic of all human races” (1993: 68). Sogolo goes on to establish that the laws of thought are present in all human languages. He objected to the erroneous conclusion of some Western scholars like Levy-Bruhl, which suggested that African peoples are not logical in the same sense as other humans. In other words, to use Levy-Bruhl’s controversial term, that they are prelogical. According to Sogolo, Levy-Bruhl describes a prelogical thought as one that is unscientific, uncritical and contains evident contradictions. But Sogolo draws from Peter Winch’s ‘forms of life’ and the inherent logic of the Azande to discount all suggestions that African cultures and languages are not eminently logical.

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Following from the above, Chukwuemeka Nze, Ademola Fayemi and Koketso Mabalane and Edwin Etieyibo, in their own essays swung into action to demonstrate the presence of the laws of thought and the inferential rules in some African cultures and languages. Nze focuses his analysis on the Igbo language and culture and with examples shows that the principles of logic are observed by the traditional Igbo person contrary to the claims of Levy-Bruhl and Horton. Fayemi also did the same thing using the paradigm of the Yoruba culture and language. Mabalane and Etieyibo conduct a broader exercise in that they not only demonstrate the presence of the principles of logic in Setswana language, they discuss earlier works by Victor Ocaya (2007) and Etieyibo (2016) on the Acholi and Urhobo languages and cultures respectively. Thus, if anyone needed to be convinced of the spurious nature of the Western anthropological conclusion about African languages and cultures, these three essays that followed Sogolo’s ground-clearing exercise delivered the knock-out punch creditably. But the evening was not going to be over until Chris Ijiomah adds the icing on the cake. If Sogolo’s essay was the foundation of part two, Ijiomah’s essay would be the roof. Ijiomah was not so concerned about clearing the ground with preliminary arguments or demonstrating specific occurrences of principles of logic in any African language and culture; his concern was to provide justification for both exercises. He started by providing insight into the nature of African worldview and ontology and shows that the conception of reality in African cultures is communal and interdependent. He explains that African cultures and languages are logical but that the principles of logic observed in the West are not adequate to map all the contours of thinking in Africa given the communalist orientation of their worldview. On the basis of this, he contrives that another, perhaps, more comprehensive logic would be required to understand the gamut of reasoning in Africa. Ijiomah audaciously went ahead to offer some elementary ideas on such a logic that could be called African, something more comprehensive; he calls it ‘harmonious monism.’ His essay in part four provides more details about the system of harmonious monism. However, Ijiomah’s conclusion set up a new problem: is a system of African logic possible? If it is, should it be unique and peculiar to African cultures? These questions will be the focus of the essays in part three. I invite the reader to critically assess the arguments marshalled by the authors in part two. The teacher should guide the students in reading and examining the connections among the essays, the consistencies in the arguments, and how each essay responded to the lead question of part two.

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References Etieyibo, E. 2016. African Philosophy and Proverbs: The Logic in Urhobo Proverbs. Philosophia Africana, 18.1: 21-39. DOI: 10.5840/philafricana20161813. Horton, R. 1967. African Traditional Thought and Western Science. African Journal of the International African Institute. 37.2. April, 155-187. Horton, R. 1977.Traditional, Thought and the Emerging African Philosophy De partment: A Comment on the Current Debate. In Second Order: An African Jo urnal of Philosophy 3(1). Ocaya, V. 2007. Logic in the Acholi Language. In A Companion to African Philosophy, edited by Kwesi Wiredu, 285-293. Oxford: Blackwell. Sogolo, G. 1993. Logic and Rationality. Foundations of African Philosophy: A Definitive Alalysis of the Conceptual Issues in African Thought. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.

Chapter 5

Logic and Rationality Godwin Sogolo National Open University of Nigeria, Nigeria

Abstract This chapter discusses the substance of logic and rationality with particular focus on African thought. There are several philosophical conceptions of man. One of such conceptions which remain vague is that man is a rational being. And it points to a basic quality which all humans are thought to share in common. Not only are they all assumed to be rational, it is believed that their thought processes are essentially governed by the same principles. It is further believed that in some cultures these principles have been well systematized and expressly stated; that the individuals internalize them and that a few even preoccupy themselves with the business of thinking about these thought processes themselves. Keywords: Logic, Rationality, Laws of Thought, Cultures 1 Logic and Rationality There are several philosophical conceptions of man. One of such conceptions which remain vague is that man is a rational being. And it points to a basic quality which all humans are thought to share in common. Not only are they all assumed to be rational, it is believed that their thought processes are essentially governed by the same principles. It is further believed that in some cultures these principles have been well systematized and expressly stated; that the individuals internalize them and that a few even preoccupy themselves with the business of thinking about these thought processes themselves. Logic is one of the core areas of philosophy. Over the years it has been assumed that the ability to reason logically and to draw valid inferences is an essential characteristic of all human races. Philosophers, ancient and modern, have always worked along this presumption and in the comparative study of cultures the main aim of the student is to satisfy himself that all cultures operate within the framework of these logical principles. When confronted

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with a belief or some aspect of a people’s thought, the student is expected to test whether or not such cultural items conform with the canons of logic. Aristotle (1975) was the first philosopher to systematize all forms of positive thinking about thought the result of which was the invention of formal logic. Since then, formal logic has had no rival except the introduction of dialectic logic in the Western Europe of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. Even then, with this challenge and the radical idea that there are two forms of thought the general belief remains that formal logic is indispensable for correct thinking; some would say it is the only way to correct thinking. Formal logic has thus been described as the systematic formulation of the instinctive logic of commonsense. There are three inter-related fundamental laws in formal logic. The first and most important of them is the law of identity which simply states that a thing is always equal to or identical with itself (A equals A). The second law of formal logic is the law of contradiction which strictly speaking is a negative formulation of the first law. The law of contradiction states that a thing cannot be unequal to or different from itself (A is not non-A). The third law referred to as the law of the excluded middle combines the first and second. The law of the excluded middle states if a thing is equal to itself it cannot be unequal to or different from itself (if A equals A it cannot be equal to non-A). By their formulations, these laws imply absolute difference and absolute identity in which things are mutually exclusive. A thing cannot be two different and mutually exclusive things at one and the same time. The example which Aristotle used in illustrating the principles of formal logic is of great relevance to our discussion. According to him (Aristotle quoted in Novack 1975: 158), “A man cannot simultaneously apprehend first, that man is essentially animal, i.e. cannot be other than animal, and secondly, that man is not essentially animal, that is, that he is other than animal. That is to say; a man is essentially a man and can never be or is thought of as not being a man” (qtd in Novack 1975: 21). The reasoning seems self-evident and that indeed is the essence of formal logic. For thousands of years, mankind has thought and acted in obedience to these laws even before they were systematically formulated. The reason is that they fit readily into our perception of the inter-relationship of things in the universe. Our conceptual experience compels us to accept the law of identity that definite objects and traits of things persist, that they maintain recognizable similarities despite the phenomenon of change. Commonsense experience, tells us that essential continuity exists in nature and that the human mind has no choice but to reckon with this perceived continuity. The significance of formalizing our reasoning process is clear from what Novack says of the law of identity.

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The law of identity directs us to recognize likeness amidst diversity, performance amidst changes, to single out the basic similarities between separated and apparently different instances and entities, to uncover the real bonds of unity between them, to trace the connections between different and consecutive phases of the same phenomena. That is why the discovery and the amplification of this law was so epoch-making in the history of scientific thought and why we continue to honour Aristotle for grasping its extraordinary significance. That is also why mankind continues to act and to think in accordance with this basic law of formal logic. (Novack 1975: 24-25) The appeal of formal logic to commonsense has been so overwhelming that for a long time it was thought that logical principles were prior to all experience and that they constituted ‘the prior order of the universe’. It should now be clear why scholars of different ages and orientation have always felt the inclination to insist that for any form of thought or action to be judged intelligible or rational it has to conform to the rules of logic. Contemporary literature on human societies abounds with theories whose basic assumption is that there are these ineluctable logical rules by which all human experience must be assessed. In particular, the works of classical anthropologists dating back to the intellectualist school pioneered by Taylor and sociologists such as Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim are clear manifestations of this assumption. For them, there is only one way of judging the intelligibility of any thought system and that is to see whether or not it conforms to the rules of formal logic. Levy-Bruhl seems to be more heavily dosed with this idea than his contemporaries in his general classification of human societies into two categories, those with a “primitive mentality” and those with a “civilized mentality” Africans by this broad division fall into the former. But what is Levy-Bruhl’s conception, that distinguishes the “primitive” from the “civilized”? The answer, according to him, is that the former is characterized by a prelogical mode of thought while the latter is marked by logical thought. Levy-Bruhl describes a prelogical thought as one that is unscientific, uncritical and contains evident contradictions. People with such thought differ not in degree but in quality from those with logical minds. It is not too clear what Levy-Bruhl means by “prelogical” He is quoted to have denied the equation of prelogical either with alogical or with anti-logical. “Prelogical does not mean alogical or anti-logical. Prelogical applied to primitive mentality, means simply that it does not go out of its way as we do, to avoid contradiction. It does not always present the same logical requirements” (Levy-Bruhl 1923: 21). By this, Levy-Bruhl seems to grant that these thoughts have their own logical principles, albeit of a different sort-what he calls the

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laws of “mystical participation”. He does not seem to insist too on the qualitative peculiarities of these modes of thought. One possible interpretation is that the logic or reason Levy-Bruhl finds in these thought systems is still in its rudimentary form, still infantile, so to speak. Note that Levy-Bruhl was writing in an era when the notion of evolution had its strongest grip on the minds of intellectuals-when almost everything, animal, man, and even thought, was placed in some position within the evolutionary hierarchy. Levy-Bruhl possibly saw his comparative analysis of societies and their modes of thought as parallel to Darwin’s theory of organic matter. The other possible reason why Levy-Bruhl had to concede that there is some rudimentary form of logic among traditional people might be that he entertained some doubt about how a people totally devoid of reason or who perpetually live in a “dream world” could have survived for so long. However, no matter what concessions or modifications Levy-Bruhl made, the fact is that he studied traditional thought purely as a formal logician. It is from this viewpoint that he finds contradictions in assertions such as when the Nuer says ‘twins are birds’ or ‘crocodiles are spirits.’ As Evans-Pritchard (1976) explains, the Nuer is not saying that twins are like birds, but that they are birds; he is not saying that crocodiles symbolize spirits but that they are spirits. From Levy-Bruhl’s point of view, this is a clear violation of the rules of logic which do not permit a thing to be itself and yet another thing. The Nuer is therefore involved in contradiction by saying that a twin is a twin (A is A) and at the same time that a twin is a bird (A is non-A). Now Levy-Bruhl’s suggestion is that such thought is intelligible only to a mind that applies the law of mystical participation. One is tempted to ignore Levy-Bruhl as an obsolete thinker or simply as unhelpful in our bid to understand traditional modes of thought. But unfortunately, his notion of the law of mystical participation has been strongly echoed by Senghor, one of the greatest thinkers Africa has produced. For Senghor, the traditional man does not differentiate between the organic and the inorganic, between the subject and the object, between himself and the land he inhabits. Like Levy-Bruhl, Senghor attributes some form of reason to the traditional man. Both insist that the traditional man’s reasoning is of a different sort because it is determined by mystical representations. So, what Levy-Bruhl calls the “logic of sentiments” Senghor describes as “intuitive reason”. There is not much to hang on to from these argued bold assertions of LevyBruhl and Senghor. They, however, provide us with a very significant lead by insisting that the peculiar features of traditional thought which they talk about are not biologically or psychologically imposed but socially acquired. They are an inherent part of the social milieu into which individuals are born and which they leave behind when they die. To say that these modes of

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thought are superimposed on the minds of the individuals is to evade our main concern which is with the structure of the mind that entertains such thoughts. However, recognizing the potency of society in moulding the mind of the individual, one is inclined to look at the matter via the social structure involved. A number of attempts have been made to free traditional thought from the charge of irrationality. Of these, the most forceful is the argument that different forms of life call for different paradigms of discourse. Following Wittgenstein’s claim that the logic of our reasoning resides in the language we speak, Winch rejects any attempt to assess the rationality of traditional modes of thought with the logic of science. Science, according to him, operates with its own concept of reality which is determined by a set of paradigms. In a different form of life, such a language of discourse is inapplicable. Winch thus rejects Evans-Pritchard’s view in which reality is seen as an independent standard of measure. Holding to this relativist position, Winch also rejects the claim by Levy-Bruhl that there are some universal principles of reasoning by which any given thought system can be judged to be logical or illogical. In Winch’s view, there are different forms of life and each has its own criteria of assessing what is logically intelligible and what is not. He defines a form of life as a set of linguistic rules and practices with specific procedures for judging the validity or otherwise of given claims. In direct opposition to LevyBruhl, Winch states his position that: Criteria of logic are not a direct gift of God, but arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context of, ways of living or modes of social life. It follows that one cannot apply criteria of logic to modes of social life as such. For instance, science is one such mode and religion is another, and each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to itself. So within science or religious actions can be logical or illogical: In science, for example, it would be illogical to refuse to be bound by the results of a properly carried out experiment; in religion it would be illogical to suppose that one could pit one’s own strength against God’s; and so on. But we cannot sensibly say that either the practice of science itself or that of religion is either illogical or logical; but are non-logical. (Winch 1958: 100-101) Here, Winch is speaking strictly about two forms of life, that of science and that of religion and he is challenging the idea that the paradigm of the former is applicable to the latter. He does not also see any independent universe of discourse which can be applied in assessing the two forms of life. In addition to traditional thought, Winch thinks that claims involving magic and witchcraft cannot be assessed in terms of either scientific conceptions or

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scientific standards of rationality. All such magico-religious beliefs have their own language of discourse and they can only be said to be intelligible or unintelligible when analyzed in the context in which they are held. Also, these claims are not to be seen as truth-propositions since they do not attempt to provide some quasi-scientific understanding of the world. In other words, the Western scientist and the Azande witch-doctor, for instance, are not making truth-claims vis-a-vis the same notion of reality. This way of contrasting forms of life could be misleading, particularly when used as a means of differentiating between two cultures. Although from Evans-Pritchard’s account, we are inclined to see the Azande system as typifying a magico-religious form of life, the truth is that the Azande, indeed all traditional systems, also have a non-magico-religious form. They provide descriptions of objects and explanations of events in theoretical categories not tied to magical or religious beliefs. The Azande have principles and beliefs about how to grow crops and how to hunt for animals. They know the kind of soil that will produce harvest and the place where, or season when hunting is most successful. They have knowledge of nutritional techniques, the food that nourishes and that which does not, that which is poisonous and that which is not. It would, therefore, be a mistake to suggest that in each of these areas of their daily activities, the Azande always resort to magical or religious explanations. The point is often made that the principles they apply are not always expressly articulated in theoretical forms. But the same may be said of Western societies-most Westerners go about their daily life applying principles which they do not consciously articulate. The point being established is not merely that traditional cultures have more than one form of life and, therefore, more than one paradigm of discourse. It is that all cultures do. The so-called scientific cultures of the world have their own share of the forms that exist in traditional societies. This point has been emphasised by Wiredu: Even Western scientists, fully convinced of the universal reign of law in natural phenomenon, may pray to a supernatural being for rain and a good harvest. Those who are tempted to see in such a thing as witchcraft the key to specifically African thought – there is no lack of such people elsewhere as well as in Africa – ought to be reminded that there are numbers of white men in London today who proudly proclaim themselves to be witches. (Wiredu 1980: 42) It is thus clear that in every society, people employ both scientific and nonscientific explanatory models in accounting for their world of common sense. Whatever contradictions there may be in the models applied should be seen as internal contradictions within a given culture rather than features for

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distinguishing between one culture and another. This is not to suggest that it is unenlightening to embark on cross-cultural comparison. It is simply that whatever can be derived from such an exercise can also be got from comparing modes of thought within one given culture. At whatever level the comparison is done, Winch’s insistence on the incommensurability of different forms of life still holds. His position is that the magico-religious form predominantly associated with traditional cultures has its own universe of discourse, its own conception of reality and criteria of rationality, all different from those of the scientific form of life. Winch sees each as a distinct form of social life whose practices and beliefs are intelligible only in the context in which they are held. This position has been criticized on several grounds, one of which is that it is too relativistic and that it makes impossible any kind of communication across cultures. Some of these issues will be examined in our discussion of cross-cultural rationality. However, whatever the weaknesses of Winch’s thesis may be, it is enough caution to those neo-Levy-Bruhleans and followers of Senghor in Africa who with eagerness are seeking to revive the idea that the mind of the African is so intellectually malstructured that it does not accord with some presumed universal principles of reasoning. Such principles do not exist. The mind of the African is not structurally different from that of the Westerner. Also, the contextual contrast between Western thought and traditional African thought, which considers only the former as a suitable material for philosophical reflection, rests on false premises. The truth is that both are similarly marked by the same basic features of the human species. The difference lies in the ways the two societies conceive of reality and explain objects and events. This is so because they live different forms of life. And it is for this reason alone that an intelligible analysis of African thought demands the application of its own universe of discourse, its own logic and its own criteria of rationality. The primary task of the African philosophers is to fashion out these unique working tools with which to unearth the complexities of the social form that confronts him. The analysis of the ontological status of claims in traditional African thought involves matters of logic and forms of reasoning. Some philosophers argue, just as they do for truth and reality, that all men, no matter their cultural differences, share in common certain minimum criteria of logic and that in their reasoning they find such criteria compelling. Steven Lukes and Martin

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Hollis belong to this class of philosophers.1 They argue for the universality of certain logical rules and methods of drawing inference. For instance, they think that all rational men should recognize and follow the law of identity and non-contradiction-that nobody can afford not to see that “the truth of P excludes the truth of its denial”. This involves the principle of noncontradiction in which two contradictory propositions cannot both be true. As we argued earlier in our discussion of the limitations of formal logic, this is mistaken. In recent times, logicians have argued for a many-valued logic that recognizes more than two values. More important, it is clear from the familiar locations we adopt in our ordinary discourse that these formal logical rules are freely violated while the intelligibility of our meaning remains unassaulted. Don’t we normally say in answer to a question, “yes and no”; don’t we say that “the statement is both true and not true”; that “one statement is nearer the truth than another”; or that “one proof is better than another”? Surely, when all these are put in the context of our discussion, the meanings remain consistent and coherent such that no serious charge of logic contradiction can be raised. However, Hollis’ claim concerning inference goes beyond the simple violation of formal rules. His position is that there are certain patterns of inference which all rational men do, of necessity, follow. Hollis instantiates his point by using the logical form, “If p and if p implies q, then q”. In his view, this modus ponens with (p.(‫ ݍ → )ݍ → ݌‬has a compelling force on all reasoning minds. It is one of the patterns of inference which is not context-dependent and as such, all men are disposed to follow it whether or not they are able to articulate or provide an exposition of the principles involved. Not only is it claimed that these basic patterns of logical inference are shared in common by mankind, it is expected that whenever their premises are presented in a syllogistic form of argument all men must, of necessity, accept the conclusion that follows. By the nature of the logical rules, the steps involved in arriving at the conclusion have no alternatives. Take the following: When you have “‫ ”ݍ → ݌‬and “‫ ”݌‬you must conclude “‫”ݍ‬. The point Hollis is making that given “‫ ”ݍ → ݌‬and “‫ ”݌‬every rational man is compelled to conclude “‫”ݍ‬. He thinks that in studying the beliefs of an alien culture, the student and members of the community being studied do follow this pattern of inference since if they do not, cross-cultural understanding would be impossible.

See for example, Steven Lukes. (1970). “Some Problems about Rationality.” 208-213 and Martin Hollis. (1970).

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In the context of Hollis’ argument, these compelling rules of logic and universal modes of inference are enough grounds for rejecting Winch’s theory of relativism. He is postulating a common game whose rules are context-free and which all men play. Two important questions seem to arise from this. How did these rules come about? What happens if one of the parties involved refuses to obey the rules of the game? It is implicit from Hollis universalist position that he would not concede the suggestion that his so-called universal rules of logic were socially acquired since that would open the possibility that men in some cultures simply did not acquire them. The only alternative left for Hollis is to suggest that men adhere to the rules because it is part of their nature to do so; that men are biologically constituted in such a way that their brain is structured to follow given logical rules and patterns of inference. It is obvious that Hollis would not dare this suggestion for the simple reason that there is no way of establishing if it is right or wrong. Besides, it has not been possible for scientists, natural or social, to present a clear taxonomy of which of our qualities are biologically acquired and which are socially learned. The issue of what happens if we refuse to follow the suggested rules of inference does not even arise considering the general problems that result from the justification of deduction. In Lewis Carroll’s “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” (1895) the compelling force of modus ponens, which Hollis uses as an example, turns out to be questionable. In Carroll’s analysis, Achilles presented the tortoise with premises of the form “‫ ”ݍ → ݌‬and “p” but the tortoise refused to conclude “q”. Instead, the tortoise turned the table against Achilles’ rule. Of course, Achilles could not provide an acceptable answer since he found himself justifying his rule by applying the very rule he was asked to justify. The point, as Barnes and Bloor (1982: 41) put it, is that “justifications of deduction themselves presuppose deduction. They are circular because they appeal to the very principles of inference that are in question,” a pattern of reasoning that is accepted as intelligible. However, logical rules, like other conventional rules, are drawn up for those who wish to play the logician’s game to learn and apply. Since they do govern most of our experimental world, as we tried to argue earlier, they cannot have a compelling force on all men. In fact, logical concepts and terms have assigned meanings and roles different from their usage in ordinary discourse. Logical connectives such as “and”, “or” and terms such as “if”, “then” “entailment”, “implication”, etc., are assigned technical meanings which deviate from their ordinary usage. To that extent: it is right to define logic as “a learned body of scholarly lores...a mass of conventional routines, decisions, expedient restrictions, dicta, maxims, and ad hoc rules” (Barnes and Bloor 1982: 41). There can be nothing universal about any drawn up rules intended for reasoning in a given pattern; such rules and modes of reasoning seems to be

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the relics of the traditional efforts by rationalists to justify faith in what they believe to be the supremacy of reason. 2 Epistemological Issues: Knowledge and Belief In ordinary discourse, whether in traditional societies or in modern scienceoriented ones, we normally make claims applying “know” and “believe” without paying attention to any possible epistemological difference that may exist between the two concepts. So, if you ask a traditional African why he thinks that witches exist, you are likely to get two answers purported to be conveying the same meaning: either “because I know that witches exist” or “because I believe that witches exist”. His “or” is an inclusive injunction, suggesting that he is either prepared to substitute one of the answers for the other or to hold both together without any change in meaning. The traditional African is, therefore claiming to know and to believe the same thing at the same time. But this is not in accord with the epistemological doctrine which claims that we cannot know and believe the same thing at the same time. If I know p is q., I cannot at the same time believe that p is q and if I believe it, I cannot at the same time know it. The only possibility, according to this view, is that we can believe something at one time and know it at another time – that is to say that we move progressively from belief to knowledge. It would appear, therefore, that our traditional African who simultaneously claims to know and to believe that witches exist, has either not critically reflected on the matter to see that having moved to the point of knowledge his belief claim stands redundant or that his peculiar state of mind or the nature of his object of reference allows for both knowledge and belief to be simultaneously entertained. Note how viciously circular the answers are. In the strict sense the question, ‘why do you think X?’ is not satisfactorily answered by ‘Because I know X’ or ‘Because I believe X. Such an answer would be considered inadequate in the normal English linguistic convention. It is true that every linguistic convention has a way of accommodating vagaries of this sort. Still it is possible that the problem we now associate with knowing and believing the same thing at the same time is one that is peculiar to the conventional rules of the English language and, therefore, nonexistent in other linguistic conventions. In Western Philosophical tradition, one of the dominant views, which in fact derives from common usage, is that knowledge is justified by belief. An English therefore who receives the answer from the traditional African that witches exist because he knows/believes that they exist is inclined to regard it as lax, if not muddled. The ground upon which in normal English usage belief is held to be distinct from knowledge is that the former lacks the element of certitude associated

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with the latter. But Pritchard denies that the difference is one of degree. They are, according to him, different kinds of activity. Knowing and believing differ in kind... To know is not to have a belief of a special kind, differing from beliefs of other kinds; and no improvement in a belief and no increase in the feeling of conviction which it applies will convert it into knowledge. (Pritchard 1967: 2) Despite his claim of categorical difference between believing and knowing, Pritchard still grants that “believing presupposes knowing” and that “believing is a stage we sometimes reach in the endeavour to attain knowledge”. He, however, makes the important point that truth or falsity should not be the criterion for distinguishing between knowledge and belief since truth and falsity only apply to belief and not knowledge. His second point for holding to the distinction between belief and knowledge is that we recognize whichever one we entertain whenever it is entertained. When we know something we...know that our condition is one of knowing that thing, while when we believe something we.... know that our condition is one of believing and not of knowing, so we cannot mistake belief for knowledge or vice versa. (Pritchard 1967: 63) (Pritchard intends the italicized “know” to mean consciously recognize). Even when Pritchard’s distinction is restricted to the English linguistic convention his arguments are difficult to sustain: outside that convention they seem to fall flat. To say that no improvement in a belief can convert it into knowledge is to presuppose that no belief ever turns out to be true. This assaults the very concept of belief, namely, that it is either true or false. Without implying that “belief” is of the same genre as “knowledge”, it is obvious that each of the two species belongs to different levels marked off by varying degrees of conviction. Take the following propositions expressing different degrees of belief and knowledge. (1) I think I believe X (2) I am almost sure I believe X (3) I surely believe X (4) I think I know X (5) I am almost sure I know X (6) I surely know X Pritchard seems to think that no amount of pull can connect the surest belief, ‘I surely believe X’ with the least certain knowledge, ‘I think I know X.’ And this is where he goes wrong.

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The factors that improve the certainty of my belief from (1) to (3) may, although not necessarily, be the same or similar to those that improve on my knowledge from (4) to (6). Where the factors are the same or similar, it is possible to improve on the surest level of belief (3) and elevate it, at least, to the level of the least sure knowledge (4). Or to reverse the argument, it should be possible, where the influencing factors are the same or similar, to relegate (where the factors backing a knowledge claim are weak) the least sure knowledge (4) to the surest level of belief (3). Briefly, the point is that once the grounds upon which we move from one level to another are the same in the two spectra, the same grounds should break the boundary Between the two: it should be possible to move from (3) to (4), from belief to knowledge and vice versa. That possibility, it may be argued, depends on the influencing factors, whether they are ever the same in matters of belief and knowledge. There are a variety of factors that sustain credulity or even strengthen our knowledge claims and beliefs. For this, numerous considerations are taken into account. In some cases, the belief we hold or the knowledge we claim to have is expected to be supported by our perceptual experience. In others, all that is needed is that the believer or knower has sufficiently good reasons for whatever he claims to believe or know. Here ‘good reason’ may simply mean empirical evidence (direct or through testimony) or even some a priori logically deduced inference. In all, the main presupposition is that the belief or knowledge is rational or true. The point Evans-Pritchard seems to ignore in his distinction between belief and truth is that the considerations that support our belief could also be the same that lend support to our knowledge. One thing that is clear about the relationship between knowledge and belief is that the former entails the later. A man cannot without absurdity claim to disbelieve what he knows to be true. The converse of this may not be straight forward but there is an important sense in which belief is accompanied by some form of knowledge although the belief itself is not construed as knowledge, Price’s analysis of belief itself is not construed as knowledge. Price’s analysis of belief clearly illustrates this. ‘Believing P’, according to Price, means: (1) Entertaining p together with one or more alternative propositions q and r. (2) Knowing a fact (or set of facts) F, which is relevant to p, q and r. (3) Knowing that F makes p more likely than q or r, i.e., having more evidence for p than q or r. (4) Assenting to p; which in turn includes; (a) The preference of p to q and r. (b) The feeling of a certain degree of confidence with regard to p. (Price 1967: 47)

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Here, our believing p derives from our knowledge of some facts F, which we consider to lend more support to p than q and r. Although F is not enough to convert p to knowledge, the situation is conceivable where F1 F2 F3 F4 are overwhelming enough for p to be considered knowledge. The sense in which we can justifiably claim to know rather than merely believe p is that there is overwhelming evidence for our claim. Pritchard’s second claim is more problematic. He thinks that we can distinguish between knowledge and belief by consciously identifying which is which. When we know something, “we can know that our knowing that thing” and when we believe something, “we can know that our condition is one of believing and not of knowing”. It is true that we do regard certain conditions as those of knowing and others as those of believing but we are never sure of the correctness of our classification. If we were, the question of degrees of conviction and the doubt we entertain as to whether we truly believe what we claim to believe or whether we truly know what we claim to know, would not arise. One crucial objection to Pritchard’s claim is that we hold to certain beliefs which we never formulate to ourselves or even bring to consciousness. The critical examination or concepts such as belief, knowledge, truth, etc., is only done under peculiar circumstances such as when we embark on the kind of philosophical enterprise we are now doing. Normally, men have a great amount of unquestioning attitude to the norms, beliefs and the principles they live by. We may grant that this general lack of scrutiny of concepts and notions varies from culture to culture but that it is a basic human trait is beyond doubt. The impression therefore that through some form of continuous introspective reflection we always know whether our attitude is one of knowledge or of mere belief is mistaken. Besides, even if it were true, as Pritchard suggests, that men always undertake this kind of second-order thought, the process is susceptible to the error of taking belief for knowledge or knowledge for belief. Price (1967: 51) provides an illustration of this possibility by citing the knowledge claim of the Middle Ages about the earth being flat. Going by Pritchard’s view, this knowledge claim was expected to be accompanied by the conscious recognition by men of the Middle Ages that what they entertained was knowledge and not belief. But it has since been proved that, as a matter of fact, the earth is not flat, it is clear, therefore, that people in the Middle Ages did not know that the earth was flat. They merely believed that it was flat, but they mistook this belief for knowledge. For them to have known that the earth was flat, it has to be true that the earth was flat. This example establishes several points: that we cannot through introspection distinguish between knowledge and belief; that it could lead to the error of

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taking belief for knowledge and vice versa. More importantly, the example shows the limitations of our knowledge claims-that most of what we claim to know may turn out to be mere belief. In saying this, of course, we may exclude certain kinds of knowledge, knowledge by immediate sense perception and their images, knowledge of our mental processes and perhaps also knowledge of mathematical and logical truths. The rest of our knowledge, it would seem, is liable to the kind of problem faced by the claim by men of the Middle Ages about the earth being flat. However, if this stretches the example beyond an acceptable limit, it undoubtedly shows that the distance between knowledge and belief is not as wide as is sometimes presented. It also shows that the traditional African who interchangeably uses knowledge and belief or simultaneously adopts both in his claims is not as muddled as he appears. There are important reasons why the distinction between knowledge and belief need not be pursued further here. As hinted earlier, it may simply be a peculiar feature of the English linguistic convention. And more importantly, the distinction does not seem to be pressed in the context of African thought. For the African, the most important concern seems to be whether a statement (be it knowledge claim or belief claim) is true or false. There was a surface brush on this in our discussion of the possibility of cross-cultural rationality. Although the issue of rationality is a matter of validity and logical inference, not of truth and falsity of propositions, Winch’s theory of relativism spreads through both areas. Under what conditions can we say of a statement or claim that it is true or false? In traditional epistemological discourse, answers to this question would involve stating a variety of theories of knowledge, each depending on what we take truth to mean. I.C. Jarvie summarizes Winch’s thesis on truth as follows: Whether a statement is true or false will depend upon what it means. What it means in Winch’s view, will depend upon how it is being used, how it functions as part of the form of life it belongs to. The notion then, of translating one form of life into the terms, concepts, preconceptions of another, does not make much sense. The way belief operates in a form of life is peculiar to that form of life. In particular, there is no reason to suppose that a statement true-to-them is translatable into a statement true-to-us; but if it is translatable into a statement true-to-us that does not show that it is false-to-them. One way or another it makes no sense to talk of true or false tout court. (Jarvie 1972: 44) This is the form of relativism in which what is true or false is culturedependent, one in which what is real or unreal depends on the paradigms and the linguistic convention of the culture in which the concepts are used. In

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other words, Winch is denying the concept of truth or falsity which is extralinguistic and universal. This is what he regards as the “senselessness” of trying to translate the truth propositions of one culture from the stand point of another. The most common example often used to illustrate Winch’s doctrine is the Azande claim that witches exist. Whether or not this claim is true, says Winch, the proof can only be established within the context of the Azande culture, applying their conception of truth and what the people mean when they say of a statement that it is true. According to him, it would be an error for an English-speaking investigator on the matter to analyze such a statement applying the English conception of truth and what it means in the English linguistic convention to say that a statement is true. This is what Winch means by saying that “it makes no sense to talk of true or false tout court”. There are no independent standards or criteria of truth applicable to all cultures. Winch is not saying that the Azande do not apply any standards; he is merely claiming that their standards are non-comparable. In arguing for this position, Winch points to the difficulties that would arise if the truth or falsity of Azande statements were to be analyzed from the point of view of scientific paradigms. To start with, our first assumption will be that Azande claims, like the claims of science, can be established to be true or false by scientific methods; that through experimentation and the logic of scientific reasoning they can be shown to be true or false. This, according to Winch, is an erroneous assumption since the Azande claims are neither scientific hypotheses nor parasitic on scientific principles. They are therefore not verifiable or refutable by scientific methods. Azande magic and claims about witchcraft are metaphysical and metaphysical claims are irrefutable by science.2 Furthermore, Winch sees Azande beliefs as being tied to a whole form of life and, as such, they cannot be disputed in isolation of the totality of the form of which they are an integral part. It is not certain whether Winch is right on this point. It should be possible to appraise any part of a given form of life in so far as we understand its relations to the other parts and to the whole. At least, this is done within the realm of science. Known scientific principles are used in ascertaining the validity or otherwise of novel claims. But Winch would be right if all they meant is that we cannot declare part of a people’s way of life false, without relating it to other parts or its totality. His main emphasis is that

2 See Femi Otubanjo’s Rationality and Irrationality in Anthropological Theories of Religion. 1983: 99-112.

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the appraisal of whatever we do should not be conducted by applying part of an-alien form of life. So, if part of the Azande form of life is to be judged true or false, it can only be done from the culture itself. It is the culture that is to appraise the truth or falsity of its own parts. Anthropological literature, until recently, has given the impression that this process of internal assessment is absent in traditional thought; but on the contrary, a lot of it goes on. Evans-Pritchard claims that traditional people show no theoretical interest in exposing and extirpating inconsistencies in their beliefs. But his own report on the Azande shows that the people make conscious efforts at resolving conflicting claims. Although we said earlier that these claims are not scientific hypotheses to be proved true or false, EvansPritchard’s account shows that when Azande pronouncements turn out to be false they embark on elaborate measures to explain why. The failure of their benge is followed by series of ad hoc explanations, either that the substance used was bad, that the operator failed to follow the procedure or that the whole ritual had been influenced by sorcery. It is not therefore correct to say that there is a total absence of theoretical interest or that traditional people do not make efforts to resolve inconsistencies. Note that the adoption of ad hoc devices for explaining failures and contradictions is common even in scienceoriented cultures. However, Winch’s relativist theory about the incommensurability of truth claims and reality across cultures has been strongly criticized from different standpoints. Jarvie (1972: 46-54), who gives Winch’s ideas the most lucid exposition and who even claims to have developed on them, thinks that the ideas have major unacceptable implications. First, Jarvie argues that Winch is wrong in his claim that there are no universal standards both of rationality and of truth claims. In his view, there are such standards and every culture (including traditional ones) possesses and applies such universal standards. Secondly, Jarvie objects to Winch’s view that a culture can successfully appraise itself internally. In his view, the best interpretation of a culture is most likely to be given from outside that culture. One of the major objections Jarvie seems to have against Winch is the latter’s claim that Azande magic is core to Azande form of life and therefore not parasitic on some other principles by which it can be appraised. In Winch’s argument, religion in the West is parasitic on science so that the former can be judged by the principles of the latter. He does not see this kind of relationship among the Azande. But Jarvie thinks that if Winch had looked closely enough the relationship he found in the English culture would have been seen among the Azande. The Azande, according to Jarvie, have magic but they do also have technology (which he equates with Western science) and it could be said (just as we say of Western religion) that Azande magic is parasitic on Azande

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technology. And although Jarvie thinks that there is a conceptual problem about some principles being regarded as parasitic on others, his main point is that we can use the standards of Azande technology in appraising Azande magic. That, it seems, would be acceptable to Winch since the appraisal is still done within the Azande context. But, Jarvie’s final point would be that there is no essential difference between the principles of Azande technology and those of science so that if the former can be used in appraising Azande magic, the latter also stands appropriate. He does not therefore see any reason why Winch should think that Azande magic cannot be analyzed applying the principles of science. Jarvie reinforces his disagreement with Winch on the same point with another argument. To say that traditional beliefs cannot be analyzed with scientific concepts, argues Jarvie, is to imply that there is no empirical content to traditional beliefs, and this is false. Here, Jarvie (1972: 53) betrays a certain preconception to realism by claiming that “the reality of the world is extralinguistic”, for “if reality (or the world) shows itself in the sense that language has, then there is no such thing as a truth independent of the ideas and wishes of men”. It is clear from this that Jarvie accepts the correspondence theory of truth. But more specifically, what he is saying is that traditional men, like men elsewhere, make factual claims which are intended to reflect the actual world of existing things and that they believe that their claims can be true or false in the same sense in which statements are true or false outside their culture. “Truth and consistency”, says Jarvie (1972: 53), “are qualities we attribute to statements apropos their relationship to this ‘external world’… true statements are true of this world; false statements are false of this world.” For Jarvie, therefore, concepts such as truth, falsity, reality, etc., have universal standards of measure and they are not culture-bound as Winch claims. Some of Winch’s critics are more moderate. Steven Lukes (1970: 208-213), for instance, concedes that certain criteria for appraising the truth of belief claims are context-dependent. He however thinks that there are others which are universal. Lukes thus makes the distinction between “criteria 1”, which he describes as universal and “criteria 2”, those that are culture-bound. On the former, Lukes’ argument is that the existence of a common reality is a precondition for the understanding of any alien language. By this, he means that any statement of truth in that language is translatable into ours and ours into theirs. Lukes points out that a culture must have the distinction between truth and falsity if we are to understand its language. Without this distinction, we would not even be able to agree on the definition of our immediate objects of perception. Lukes supports this universal conception of reality by pointing out that any culture that engages in prediction must presuppose a given reality. He thinks that all cultures do predict and more importantly that

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traditional men and modern people “predict in roughly the same way”. It is for this reason that they can learn each other’s language because they share the same concept of reality. And in doing so, says Lukes, the criteria used must correspond to this independent reality. Following almost a similar argument, Martin Hollis (1970: 221-239) in his “Reason and Ritual” supports Lukes’s universal conception of truth and reality. Across cultures, argues Hollis, there is what he calls a “common core” or “rational bridgehead” the existence of which must be assumed a priori if communication between cultures is to be made possible. He describes this core or bridgehead as the basic assumption that in simple perspective situations, people of different cultures perceive the same reality. From this, they adopt standard meanings which make trans-cultural understanding possible. And like Lukes’ “criteria 2” Hollis allows for ambiguous situations which may lie outside the bridgehead situations in which supernatural, metaphysical or ritual beliefs are expressed. But he thinks that the bridgehead even provides for some limited understanding and clarification of these ambiguous situations. Lukes thus tends more to Winch than Hollis. His “criteria 2” refers to situations in which beliefs held may be such that they violate the laws of logic. He describes such beliefs as “mysterious” but admits the possibility of their having context-dependent criteria of truth. Lukes uses the example of the Nuer statement that “twins are birds” and asks what criteria we can possibly apply in appraising the truth status of such a statement. His answer is that the criteria to be applied are different from those of his “criteria 1”, because the statement does not correspond to any reality. The criteria to be used “are in principle neither directly verifiable nor directly falsifiable by empirical means. (They may, of course, be said to relate to “reality” in another sense; alternatively, they may be analyzed in terms of the coherent or pragmatist theories of truth)” (Lukes 1970: 211). So, Lukes accepts that there are contextually given criteria by which beliefs (not only in traditional societies but in all societies) can be classified as ‘true’ or ‘false.’ But note the caution with which Lukes uses true and false in quotes in his ‘criteria 2.’ All in all, the various critics of Winch seem to conclude to him as much as they reject in his thesis. One thing, however, stands obvious, namely: that Winch’s most violent critics are adherents of the correspondence theory of truth, the view that conceives of truth as “the perceived and assured correspondence of thought to a reality independent of that thought”. This is no place to examine the merit of this theory. All that needs to be said is that it is no longer as compelling in philosophical circles as it was when it first appeared. In fact, one major reason why we need not discuss the correspondence theory of truth here

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is that it is parasitic on some preconceived notion of reality as understood in the context of Western philosophy. But whether we judge Winch to be right and his opponents wrong or vice versa, the question of the truth or falsity of beliefs in traditional societies remains an internal problem, internal, that is to say, to the traditional man who lives by and confronts his world guided by these beliefs. Earlier, we conceded the possibility that traditional men may not engage in a constant reflection to see whether or not their beliefs truly reflect reality. That, as we said, is not peculiar to traditional men. Human beings generally do not engage in this kind of reflection as a matter of routine. They do so only when the need arises. But it might immediately be pointed out that there is always the need for such conscious reflection to avoid the danger of living by false beliefs. The obvious answer is that all men no matter their level of intellectual sophistication still hold to certain false beliefs. It is true that some false beliefs are destructive to life while others are merely harmless. Any wise man ought to minimize those beliefs that are dangerous. This is not to suggest that traditional beliefs are false but harmless. It is merely to speculate that if these beliefs were false and destructive to life, most traditional societies would not have survived for so long. Now, the nature of the belief we hold is mainly determined by its source of origin which incorporates the kind of evidence that sustains it. Epistemologists have identified four of such basic sources: perception, self-consciousness, memory and testimony. The first three are first-hand sources while the last is second-hand. By far, most of the beliefs that attract the greatest doubt and scepticism are those based on testimony. It happens to be the case that the bulk of traditional African beliefs whose rationality and truth status are disputed derive from testimony. It has been argued earlier that there are beliefs derived from second-hand testimony whose credibility ranks even higher than those of first-hand sources. That it is so depends on several factors: the nature of the belief, the kind of evidence that is required to justify it, and what Price (1967: 4849) describes as “volitional and emotional factors.” In relation to traditional thought, the beliefs in questions are mainly metaphysical and as we pointed out, there are problems with the kind of evidence that is required to justify them. The important thing about the volitional and emotional factors of our beliefs is that they sometimes lead to a certain kind of attitude which throws overboard issues of evidence and justification. This attitude takes the form of unquestioning acceptance in which, according to Price (1967: 47-48), “we are not aware of the possibility that we may be mistaken” about the belief we entertain a state of mind describable in several phrases, as “taking for granted or acceptance”, “being under an impression that” or “thinking without

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question.” Price labels this attitude “acceptance” and thinks that although it is a genre of belief, it is distinct from belief proper. In “acceptance” we do not feel any doubt and we entertain the attitude without questioning. We just surrender ourselves to the proposition in a childlike and effortless way. Accordingly, we are unaware of the fact that the proposition may after all not be true. And if it turns out false, we feel a particularly disconcerting and painful shock quite different from the mild surprise and disappointment which results from the unmasking of an ordinary false belief. It is like the shock of being suddenly waked from a dream. (Price 1967: 47-48) The basis of the distinction between acceptance and belief, according to Price, is that the former is conceived as unreasoned absence of dissent while the latter is reasoned assent to an entertained proposition. “There is deciding to act as if P was true, and there is the merely acting as if P was true from habit or possibly from instinct” (Price 1967: 50). Now acting from habit or instinct is not distinct from acting according to tradition or the acquired norms of society. The attitude involved in all this is such that the concept of evidence or justification seems to play very little role. Surely, there could be some sense in which one may call for evidence in the genre of belief called ‘acceptance’ but the kind of evidence involved is different from that usually given for a reasoned belief. Our perceptive experience may lead to the acceptance that p is true. But, as Price argues, we may not recognize that it is the experience that makes us accept p to be true. According to him, where this recognition is present and although we also recognize that p may be false, our attitude is one of belief. Thus it is not true that in acceptance (or taking for granted) we have no evidence for what we accept; though we could have it, if we aroused ourselves from our unquestioning state of mind and consider critically what we are already conscious of. (Price 1967: 50) The central proposition here is that beliefs in traditional cultures are predominantly of the kind Price calls acceptance. Their main sources are custom and tradition which the believers assimilate and adopt unquestionably and some of which his personal experience may have to reinforce. If the traditional man is pressed for evidence or justification, he may conjecture some possible reasons why his society has held to these beliefs but which, normally, are not regarded as a satisfactory explanation. Or he may simply point to the fact that they are part of his culture over which he has no choice but to adopt. Beyond that, there seems to be no other way of justifying these kinds of belief.

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It is perhaps important to stress that this category of belief is not peculiar to traditional cultures although we may accept their greater predominance in these cultures. In science-oriented cultures, as Mounce (1973) points out, similar kinds of belief are entertained. Mounce’s explanation of how such beliefs may be acquired is more psychological than social, akin to the way traditional men pick up similar beliefs through personal experience. Mounce illustrates this with two examples. The first is based on the general belief among the English people that the loss of a wedding ring is a bad omen for a married couple. This belief, says Mounce, is seen by some as absurd. But he makes us imagine a situation in which a couple has just lost a wedding ring. We should suppose, according to him, that soon after the loss the couple begins to experience unusual events which subsequently lead to the breakup of their marriage. Mounce thinks that the couple will find it difficult to resist the feeling of acceptance that the loss of a wedding ring is a bad sign. The second example used by Mounce is a belief that is usually associated with traditional men, the belief that one could harm his enemy through what he does to his image or likeness. Mounce imagines an instance in which a modern science-oriented man could sincerely accept this belief which normally he would consider false. Mounce supposes a situation in which a person is asked to stick a pin on a sheet of paper with an excellent portrait of his mother. The person does so aiming at the right eye. Let us suppose, according to Mounce, that soon after this, the person is informed that his mother developed affliction on the right eye exactly at the time the person did the sticking. In Mounce’s view, that person would find it difficult to resist the feeling of acceptance that there is a connection between his sticking a pin on the portrait and the actual affliction in the eye. The crux of the matter here is that in both examples, the belief adopted or reinforced may not be rational; it may not even be true that the loss of a wedding ring leads to the breakup of marriages nor does sticking a pin on a portrait cause physical injury. Yet we are led into accepting the connections because that is the way our minds work. Human beings are endowed with the emotional attitude which allows for the unquestioning acceptance of certain kinds of belief which are either assimilated from their cultures or based on the association of ideas. This acceptance is normally reinforced by the individual’s psychological reaction to his personal experiences. This is not to be taken as a psychological deficiency. It is part of what makes us human. To come back to traditional African thought, it should be realized that when beliefs of this sort are picked from one’s culture or acquired through personal experience, what counts as evidence or justification becomes difficult to determine. Take the Yoruba adage: “There was the cry of the witch yesterday: and the child died this morning; who does not know that the witch caused the

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death of the child” implied in this adage is the belief that a witch can cause the death of a child. If one were to demand from a Yoruba person the evidence for this belief, his answer would possibly be that in his culture, the cry of a witch is associated with imminent misfortune. Inquiring further from him why he must adopt this belief is like asking him why he must accept the Yoruba culture to which he belongs. Or possibly, like Mounce’s example of the person who stuck a pin on the mother’s portrait, the Yoruba man might cite possible personal experiences which he has had and how they reinforced the belief that witches can cause people’s death. Now, anybody who understood the source and emotional content of this kind of belief would hesitate to press for further evidence. Finally, it is clear how complex the question of the truth or falsity of beliefs is, particularly across cultures. In any culture, people do believe not just what is mistaken or foolish but even what is absurd and unintelligible. For this reason, the tempting inclination is to abandon all questions about the possibility of any universal criteria for the truth of people’s beliefs. But this can only be done at great cost. There is the necessity for communication between cultures and this in turn calls for some standards, no matter how loose, by which people of one culture can understand people of another culture. It is for this reason that in recent times some thinkers have appealed to the so-called Principle of Charity. What this means is that in judging the truthstatus of beliefs outside one’s culture, one should be maximally charitable. One should assume that a belief-claim coming from a culture we do not understand accords with the standards of one’s culture and one should assume further that it is consistent and correct. Davidson even thinks that we have no choice but to make these assumptions in our attempt to understand the beliefs of other cultures. The Principle of Charity is “forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must recount them right in most matters” (Davidson quoted in Lukes and Hollis 1982: 263). Note that this principle has a normative character which tends to weaken its intellectual merit. We would want to understand the truth of claims in cultures other than ours but many would insist that we can only be charitable on the truth of beliefclaims when an initial foundation for confidence and trust has been built. There is charity in accepting novel claims in science because we are able to count on previous claims. Where no such foundation has been laid, there could be danger in applying the Principle of Charity. Besides, we can only be charitable in accepting the truth of a man’s claim if it is logically possible thereafter to investigate further whether what the man claims is truly so. But since we must accept the possibility of Winch’s claim that we are never in a

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position to conduct such an investigation, the point of granting initial charity no longer arises. References Aristotle. 1975. Posterior Analytics. Book 1, quoted in Novack, G. An Introduction to the Logic of Marxism. New York: Pathfinder Press. Barnes, B. and D. Bloor. 1982. Relativism, Rationalism, Sociology of Knowledge. In Rationality and Relativism, ed. M. Hollis and S. Lukes. Oxford: Blackwell. Carroll, L. 1895. What the Tortoise said to Achilles. Mind. 4. 14: 278-280. Davidson, D. 1982. On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. Quoted in S. Lukes, Relativism in its Place. In Rationality and Relativism, ed. M. Hollis and S. Lukes. Oxford: Blackwell. Hollis, M. 1970. Reason and Rituals. In Rationality, ed. B. R. Wilson. 231-234. Oxford: Blackwell. Jarvie, I. C. 1972. Concepts and Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1923. La M’entalite Primitive translation. London: Allen and Unwin. Lukes, S. 1970. Some Problems about Rationality. In Rationality, ed. B. R. Wilson. 208-213. Oxford: Blackwell. Mounce, H. O. 1973. Understanding a Primitive Society. Philosophy 48. 186: 147-162. Otubanjo, F. 1983. Rationality and Irrationality in Anthropological Theories of Religion. Ibadan: Journal of Humanistic Studies. 3: 99-112. Price, H. H. 1967. Some Considerations about Belief. In Knowledge and Belief, ed, A. P. Griffiths. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pritchard, H. A. 1967. Knowledge and Believing. In Knowledge and Belief, ed. A. P. Griffiths. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winch, P. 1958. The Idea of Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Wiredu, K. 1980. Philosophy and an African culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 6

Uncovering Logic in Igbo Language and Thought Chukwuemeka B. Nze University of Nigeria, Nigeria; Madonna University Abstract This chapter seeks to demonstrate the presence of logic in Igbo language and thought. The Igbo of Africa have a sense and practice of observation. They observe things that are, that is, realities that exist, their natures or essences. They form concepts and have ideas of what is. Their knowledge of what is, for example, a palm tree, “lies in its properties alone” Things do exist for them singly and separated because of divergence in their properties or exist united because of sameness or unitary essence. The Igbo, therefore, recognize essential relations in and between things and they make judgments. Whether or not all agree and accept the judgment is a different matter; clarificatory and or justificatory debate mgbagha may be entered into which may strengthen or even weaken view-points. Mgbagha-Argumentation which because of its dynamism, exposes or clarifies view-points, weak or strong. It exposes as well people’s freedom of speech which is inherent in the communal system of life of the Igbo people. It must be said with Lienhardt therefore that, “It is not true... that (African) people are less practical and logical than the (Europeans) in the ordinary course of their daily lives.” Keywords: Logic, Africa, Culture, Igbo, Language and Thought 1 Introduction The Igbo of Africa have a sense and practice of observation. They observe things that are, that is, realities that exist, their natures or essences. They form concepts and have ideas of what is. Their knowledge of what is, for example, a palm tree, “lies in its properties alone” (Hegel 1996: 119). Things do exist for them singly and separated because of divergence in their properties or exist united because of sameness or unitary essence. The Igbo, therefore, recognize essential relations in and between things and they make judgments. Whether or not all agree and accept the judgment is a different matter; clarificatory and

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or justificatory debate mgbagha may be entered into which may strengthen or even weaken view-points. Mgbagha-Argumentation which because of its dynamism, exposes or clarifies view-points, weak or strong. It exposes as well people’s freedom of speech which is inherent in the communal system of life of the Igbo people. It must be said with Lienhardt therefore that, “It is not true... that (African) people are less practical and logical than the (Europeans) in the ordinary course of their daily lives” (quoted in Radin 1957: xxvii). Indeed, before the establishment of Colleges and Universities, and the organized teachings conducted in them, Europeans reasoned but did not study logic. Many of them still do without subjecting themselves to the rigours of studying logic. Surely the Igbo as human beings did not learn what people call applied logic which is natural to man from Aristotle. No; they reason in their own way as they talk in their own way. Among them exist thinkers and non-thinkers alike just like among any other groups. In this regard, therefore, Radin’s broad-minded tenet, is more plausible: There can be little doubt that every human group, no matter how small, has from time immemorial contained individuals who were constrained by their individual temperaments and interests to occupy themselves with the basic problems of what we customarily term philosophy. It is equally evident that at no time could that number of such individuals have been very large. (quoted in Radin 1957: xxi) In further vindication of the thinking power of the traditional people Radin went on to say that: On the face of things, then, there is nothing in primitive civilizations that prevents philosophical formulations from being attempted. Individuals with a philosophical temperament are present, the languages are adequate, the structure of their societies places no obstacles in the way. (quoted in Radin 1957: xxviii) By way of emphasis, we recognize “... the efforts of thoughtful men to understand the ways of the world in which they live, and to enrich their daily lives...” (Hegel 1966: 348), by importing individual enhancements and perfections. The Igbo can bite with their teeth which are strong and which function properly without studying dentistry or becoming dentists; they can see with their eyes without any ocular studies, they digest their food although they are not anatomists; without being physiologists they move their bodies. They can as well think and reason without studying logic which is the science of learning how to think (Wayne 1991: 63). The Igbo do not lack the idea of measure in which inheres the idea of essence. ‘Apanegom mmiri pane aja we mata nke ka aro. (I have carried water and carried sand to know which of them is heavier).’

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The Igbo African people argued before there was a science called the science of reasoning or logic just as they counted before the invention of arithmetic. My cow which I tied to that fig tree must have been untied, there is no sign of breakage, (there are human footprints), and taken to that compound because its footprints point to that direction. Concerning the earlier analogy, it is of course taken for granted that water and sand are carried one after the other, in a container of a given capacity or in two separate containers of equal capacities for the empirical determination of their respective weighing behaviours. The Igbo use elements of nature because they know nature; they know that: Ukwu na eje walawala na anya na ele walawala n’afu ya. (Simply put this says that fast moving legs are seen by fast moving eyes). No doubt, it sounds healthy to observe the presence of commaturality between the feet and the eye; the fastness of the feet is matched with the fastness of the eye that observes it. This work is not intended to be apologetic; it is not going to be so much an assembly of proofs of the capacity of the Igbo to reason, or that they have reason as an illustration of how they reason. But if this accords with how other humans think and reason, then can it be regarded as a proof of their (Igbo) capacity to reason, in which case we can say that they do what logicians do. 2 Definition It is only when logic is understood to mean no more than a collection of technical rules, mnemonics fashioned out by the elite of a given group and culture to help the mind in its operations that certain people of a different culture who do not possess such sets of rules are erroneously identified and isolated as existing without logic, as possessing no logic. There are innumerable systems of logic, indeed, as many as were offered to the eager readers as objective interpretations of man’s method of thinking. The fact of the matter is that man’s brain power deeply involving the whole physiological body. As Baruch Spinoza stated in his Ethics, Body and Mind are one and the same thing, observed under two different attributes. It is easy to observe average man’s reaction to certain given phenomena. In practical matters, for example, burnt children will shun the fire in China as well as in Timbuktu. In fact, the astonishing similarity of proverbs and other practical statements all over the globe, in primitive as well as modern times is prima facie evidence that men think alike-in matters of practical occurrences. (Dagobert 1972: 104)

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Human beings, simply because they are humans, think and reason, differences between cultures notwithstanding. It is not necessarily a sign of inferiority that people differ in customs from each other. The Igbo know that if their deity-Ajana-demands (8x2) asato ji nabo eight yams in two placessixteen yams and there are two villages of four kindreds each, each of them will contribute two yams. Everybody knows this; after all nobody according to them, puts his food in his nose-Onweghi onye na etinye nri n’imi. Since logic is essentially connected with metaphysical and epistemology, and since as thought, it has objective validity and existence, the argument that: All men are mortal Socrates is a man Therefore, Socrates is mortal. The argument has the same validity for them as it had for Aristotle. Logic is the underpin of the sciences and of discourse in general because “Logical investigation explores the nature of all things” “or rather, of the linguistic forms by means of which we talk of things” we experience things, we know (Martin 1969: 3). It takes its rise... from an urge to understand the basis, or essence of everything empirical...We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand. (Martin 1969: 3) “Logic is not then primarily a tool of discovery, but rather an aid to understanding and clarification” (Carroll 1971: 240). Evidently, in the clarification and understanding of nature, the language of each people is employed in the analysis of their experiences. The difference in language does not stop in how different language groups “build their sentences but also in how they breakdown nature to secure the elements to put in those sentences” (Mellone 1902: 6). As soon as we have an idea, there is an irresistible urge to sheath it in a word. Our thought is purely inward and in a sense abstract; the word has an external existence as a symbol, and of course, is a thing of sense. This is what the Igbo mean when they say: Onweghi onye ma uche/echiche nwanne ya ma ochesiro gwaya. (Nobody knows the thought or mind or heart of a brother unless he, the brother bares it to him). “Logic”, according to Sydney Mellone, “has to consider language; but only so far as differences of expression in language are the embodiment of differences of type in the process of thought” (quoted in Joyce 1908: 2). “It treats of the way in which the mind represents things and thus shows us what are those general conditions of right thinking, which must be observed whatever be the subject which occupies

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us” (Carroll 1971: 235). The natural way of behaviour of every healthy mind of every people is that speech or word which is an expression of our thoughts follows a given pattern approved or accepted tacitly by people of a given mother tongue. “Facts”, it is said, “are unlike to speakers whose language background provides for unlike formulation of them” (Carroll 1971: 239). Each language group or mother tongue agrees even on the placement of words to make a sentence; it agrees on the meaning of the sentence. Stringing of words in a certain order to convey a certain meaning in one language group may not be the same for or in another language group. There are unseen laws which guide the members of a language group in the use of words or expressions rising from thought. Let us examine these expressions: Bevico chocolate beverage is food-drink for all; It is nice and bodybuilding (English). Bevico, boisson de chocolate, cést une boisson pour tous; elle est bonne et rafraichaisante (French). Ohun mimu Pataki. Fun gbogbo enia Bevico chocolate beverage je nkan minu aladun Bevico kun fun awon nkan eroji to on se ara loge. O dara fun omode at fun agbalagba apincin shag a kowa wan a ni Bevico chocolate sai, made dadi wonde ikebaa jikin da dadi (Yoruba). Nri oṅuṅu onye obula nke a bu Bevico chocolate beverage. Omara nma n’edozikwa aru (Igbo). Each language group expresses its thoughts in its own peculiar way the words are so arranged that the euphony becomes acceptable to the members of the group. It is clear from the above that “thinking is a matter of different tongues” (Ubesie 1974: 22). Ideas which are formed by different people are expressed by them in their different tongues. Un homme blanch (French) A white man (English). Nwoke ocha (Igbo). It appears, therefore, that whether, for example, an adjective is placed after or before a noun is a matter of what the language group accepts tacitly. Listening to their argument, they are able to know when an argument is reasonable and when it is not reasonable, when it is coherent and when it is not. They know also that reasoning or thought comes from the brain, the head. Isi ezughi nwoke a ezu (This man’s head is not complete)

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This can be a remark where, “inter alia”, incoherency is detected in an argument, or where there is a failure to draw a right conclusion from an argument (Morse 1959: 5667). Uburu ya wee gbakeriwe ala, na-acho uzo o ga-eji jide oke ebule na mpi. (He beat his brains to find out how he could hold the ram by the horns). Although people have their natural language, some people have, because of their experiences and the need to communicate optimally, gone on to expand, or modify their language, or tone up or down. They have employed their language to dialogue and to convey the results of discussions. Nku di na mba na esiri mba ite. (People of a locality cook their food with fire-wood collected from the locality). So long as we hold that logic is from the Greek Logos which means “word”, “speech”, “reason”, “the science dealing with the principles of valid reasoning and argument” (Momoh 1989: 167), we inevitably, and without fear, hold that the Igbo have a logic. This is more so when we hang our claim on the firm belief that there is natural logic as against “artificial logic” (Locke 1968: 265). 3 Igbo Logic In what follows we are going to exhibit in and with a series of proverbs that there is logic, natural logic in Igbo language and this is because: God, having designed (Igbo) man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument and common tie of society. (Martin 1969: 4) When one looks around the Igbo country or when one participates in the social, economic or religious life of the Igbo, one will develop and have a firm conviction that the Igbo people, although they do not sit down and study what they do when they indulge in thinking, nevertheless, think and form ideas in their own language. Who will say there is no sense or reason in calling: A motor cycle – Ogba tim tim, named after the sound made by early motor cycles; a motor car – Ugbo ani – land boat; a boat – Ugbo mmiri – water boat; an aeroplane – Ugbo Ufe – flying boat. The Igbo make natural efforts to apply their metaphysics, nay, their logic, in resolving problems of the day; their understanding corresponds with their

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experience. They, like Plato, “ever (make) it the aim of (their) knowledge that it should issue in actions”. Reason informs their putting up some shelter over their heads; reason is present in the fabrication of their climbing ropes; the measured notches on palm-trees etc., are clear evidence of the presence of reason; the formation of hooks or other carved tools for plucking fruits does not lack thought. These and others are some of the logic which the Igbo know and use, “... a logica utens, rough and ready, good enough for the purpose at hand” (Locke 1968: 265). We affirm, in the words of Locke, that God “has given “the Igbo man” a mind that can reason without being instructed in methods of syllogizing; the understanding is not taught to reason by these rules; it has a native faculty to perceive the coherence of its ideas and can range them right without any such perplexing repetitions” (Ubesie 1974: iii). The Igbo know and reason quite naturally, that: Ichowa ijide oke ehi, chowa oke mmadu, Ichowa irata oke nkita, chowa okpukpu anu Ichowa imata oke, tinyere ya azu n’onya Ichowa irata azu no na mmiri tinyere ya idide n’ukpoo Ichowa ikporo aturu juru ula, inwuru nwa ya o sowe gi Ichowa kwanu igbo mbe sunye ya na mmiri oku. If you want to catch a strong cow, look for a strong person, If you want to invite a strong dog, look for a piece of bone, If you want to ensnare a rat, use a piece of fish on the trap, If you want to ensnare some fish, fasten worms to your hook If you want to lead a stubborn sheep home, take its young and it follows you home, If, however, you want to kill a tortoise dip it completely into hot water, Clarity of expression follows strictly from clarity of reasoning. The Igbo never set about expressing their thoughts in an artificially syllogistic pattern; and indeed nobody does but yet, they convey their thoughts in a clear, concise manner. There is sequence no doubt, in their expressions; there is logic or reasoning in their discussions. Instead of the Aristotelian syllogism, later called “Barbara”. If A is predicated of all B and B is predicated of all C, then A is predicated of all C.1

1 Symbolizing that the individual does not hide on his body any neutralizing force. *Names were purposely withheld.

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Which is the authentic Aristotelian syllogism without concrete terms, and which is scientific, the Igbo “verbal logic” which is more often than not implicative or suggestive approximates to a modern example of an Aristotelian syllogism, namely: If all men are mortal and all Presidents are men, then all President Are Mortal. This is implicative, suggestive and inferential but so is: Were ile gi guo eze gi onu. (Use your tongue to count your teeth) Okwa tinyere isi na akwara weputa si na ihea di ka ihe aroru aro. (A patride put its head and withdrew it from a fabrication saying that it looked like a trap). Culturally, the Igbo will justify a case and allow the listener or an opponent to draw a conclusion. Atuoru amara omara;atuora ofeke ofebara ohia. (Say it to a wise man in a proverb and he will understand but say it to an imbecile and he will begin to beat about in the bush). Once there was an incident in the rational life of an Igbo community. The significance of the incident lies in its transparent portrayal of a proof by the use of an inductive/deductive reasoning. The inductive, clarificatory argument was aimed at disqualifying an opponent’s stand, at insisting that justice be done, at resisting double-standard. Before the argument, the background is as follows: when it was rumoured that EO was responsible for the death of IKW, EO waved the story aside. The rumour gained momentum and three people, including EO’s arch enemy, were dispatched to Okija to consult a diviner there. As everything was in silhouettes in the basin of water and the mirror which the diviner produced, the delegates with the exception of EO’s arch enemy, U, could not identify anybody from the figures that appeared on the basin of water before them. By juxtaposing EO’s characteristics with some manifestations which one of the figures in the basin had, U was able, through this interpolation, to artfully manipulate his colleagues into accepting one of the figures as EO. They returned home and announced that EO was responsible for the death of IKW. The community decided to get rid of EO but enlightened people in the community doubted the entire episode and refused to go along with the decision. On the day EO and his home were to be attacked one of the people who rejected the decision removed EO to his mother-land. Law enforcement agents waded in but not before EO lost his kitchen. EO was ostracized while the case went on. In the second year, U, who wanted to remove a cyst from his

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waist has a serious complication. Fear of death drove him to confess his role in EO’s case. Although his story was hushed up, it succeeded in changing the stand and minds of the community on the whole case. The community wanted a face-saving device to abandon a case that had suddenly become a bad one. EO was then asked, as a condition to rejoin the community, to find an alusi, a goddess and swear an oath. He accepted to take an oath but discovered a snag, namely, that if he were to take an oath and survive using the alusi which he brought there would remain some doubt as to the genuineness of the oath. What he brought might not be an alusi after all. The argument: EO made frantic efforts to prove his innocence and as well, save his reputation. He went down the memory lane and chose precedents that happened within the memory of men. He went on: “Edo was accused of the death of...”. Was it Edo who was asked to bring an alusi for his oath? No; the community brought an alusi for him. Ana was accused of the death of ... was Ana asked to bring an alusi for his oath? No; the community produced an alusi for his oath. Ya was accused of the death of... Was Ya the person who produced an alusi for his Oath? No; the community did. Was Die asked to find an alusi to take Oath when he was accused of the death of...? Not at all; the community produced an alusi for his Oath. My countrymen, may my case not be treated differently. Bring any alusi for me and, standing naked2 before it, I will make my Oath. A history of logics must manifest a multiplicity of logics, Asian, Western, Igbo/African etc. Each with his own nature and purpose, EO relied on the fact of a communal life where experiences were shared, to prove his case. He could have failed if he and others did not have this common knowledge. EO, no doubt must be saying and did actually say in effect: From my experience as a person of a mature age in the community, it has always been that whenever there is a community-alleged case of murder, the community has always introduced the alusi for the Oath administration. My case is a communityalleged case of murder; therefore, I expect that the community should be responsible for the production of alusi for my Oath taking. In other words, in every case of death where the community attributes the responsibility for the death to one of its members, the responsibility to produce the Oath-taking instrument has always fallen on the community. (Vx), [(Dx →Gx)→Ox]

2 CF. Organic Logic by Archie J. Bahm in Dialogos Numero 40 November, 1982. Puerto Rico 00931.

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Where D stands for death, G for death alleged by community to be brought about by its member and O for community production of Oath-taking instrument, the above will be an acceptable formalization of EO’s argument which can be, no doubt, tested for its validity. EO’s argument cannot be dismissed for want of Syllogism; it cannot be said to be lacking in validity simply because it was not put in strictly Aristotelian syllogistic manner. What is true of the Aristotelian logic is true of this “logic of classes” (Ubesie 1974: 55) which is what EO’s argument has dissolved in. Without logic-schools where logic is taught and learnt formerly, Igbo/Africans engage in such mental activities that can be said to be logical. Exercises in argumentation are a form of mental training, and a well-trained mind is useful for learning about the world and for living well. It will not be surprising then if logic has a different purpose for people; it may be regarded as a tool (organon) of philosophy and science, a means for making unknown things known through premises. It can equally be an organon of teaching morals and imparting knowledge. And, certainly, it may be said that its ethical, epistemological and metaphysical role is what concerns the Igbo. Nwata obu ero gburu nne ya gbuo nna ya, otolite riwe ero, ya jiri aka ya waa ili ya, makana osiri ihe mere nna ya na nne ya mee ya. (Opata1987: 51-57) (A child whose parents died from fungus, if he grows up and starts to eat fungus should dig his grave by himself because he has decided that what happened to his father and mother should happen to him). This is logically unassailable; how close is it to Aristotle’s logic of nature: All men are mortal? To teach morals and mould manners and characters acceptable in and by the community requires some subtle handling in order not to assault the person of a member of the community. Therefore, to resort to this style of argument may not primarily be to establish knowledge but to introduce caution, introspection and avoidance of recklessness. The Igbo elder who makes the above remark wants reason to be followed as the leading light and that he should come forth with this unsolicited soothing and paradoxical advice follows from the metaethical and metaphysical life pattern of the Igbo. Again, the logic of classes outlined above makes its appeal to people who live in a community who live a communal life, it makes sense to them because they understand it. However, the proverb/argument raises some problems. There is the problem of the type of ero-fungus eaten; is it all kinds of ero-fungus or a particular type which the parents ate. Was this brand of ero-fungus eaten at the same time in the same meal by mother and father or as seems to be the case, at different times. The mother ate this X fungus and

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died; the fathers subsequently ate the x-fungus and equally died. Their child now grown prepares fungus to eat. The timely advice is that he should first of all prepare his own grave. The whole advice pretends that the child is aware of the fate of his parents, then, he should know what his end will be should he embark on eating x-fungus. Although the argument in the proverb took a lot for granted, it is nevertheless solid and firm as it is true to itself, a logic of nature. A logic of nature forms a true basis of knowledge as it furnishes stability and capability of precise definition. It is deducible that-fungus by its nature, implies death at its consumption; if X is, D must be; if X-fungus is eaten then death must follow. Agba mbu agba na ogwe agba abua agba na ogwe obuzi ogwe ka apiri aku? (The first shot struck the trunk the second shot struck the trunk was the arrow meant for the trunk)? This argument by repetition neutralises or eschews pleading ignorance or mistake. The agent ought to know nature or familiarize himself with “containers” and their respective “lids”. Ignorance where knowledge ought to be is disappointing. One should know according to the Igbo that: Akpu adighi agbakata wo oji. (The cotton tree cannot, by growing very tall and huge, turn into an iroko tree).3 To know a thing is, of course, to know its nature and a wise man uses “words only as an attempt to impose legislation, control on nature” (Ubesie 1974: 24). Onye huru Ebenebe ka ona amu mma naraya mma ka oghara ibu mgbe Ebenebe gburu asi na Ebenebe egbue. (Anybody who sees Ebenebe4 sharpening his knife should remove it from him in order not to cry when Ebenebe kills/strikes). This argument which is informed by a tripartite knowledge namely, knowledge of the new, of the past and of the future is aimed at stemming some hazard that may occur in the future because experience has taught that it happened in the past and that the now or the present is similar to the past. The argument aimed therefore at controlling behaviour, at nipping in the bud impending catastrophe. To stop a disaster from happening portends an act of sincerity while to lament and condemn only after an event or an act which one could have prevented is insincerity.

3 4

See W. K. C. Guthrie. The Sophists, UK: Cambridge at the University Press. 1971. P. 204. *Editor’s note: Ebenebe = Tragedy

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Discourse or speech it is believed is an art and is difficult. It is not everybody that can speak well and the Igbo are not unaware of the difficulty which this art can present to certain people. They are therefore, quick to advise their audience in cases where their utterances are found objectionable to disregard their words but not their persons. Tufue okwum ma gi atufukwanam. Often issues are debated, arguments are employed to establish positions; claims are sustained by use of arguments; in all, language is used. There is, therefore, no such thing as logic aside from a language system. In fact, logic has to consider language, but only so far as differences of expression in language are the embodiment of differences of type in the process of thought. Language is a conveyer of thought; and as its vehicle or transporter, it can slow down thought or help its progress. 4 Conclusion In this exercise, I have not started by asking whether or not there is an African logic; I have not asked about the possibility of an African logic. To ask such a question or questions can even escalate or degenerate into other such questions as to whether the Africans can breathe, whether they have sights and do not see with their eyes or whether it is possible that the African can masticate food? The methodological preference has been simply to face, logic in Igbo/African thought, language and reason. To detail this, therefore, isolates the above questions or at least makes them redundant or takes them and their answers for granted. It is often thought that Igbo proverbs or beliefs have no logic, and are presumably beyond rational categories. Without sayings that all have or have not our interest is that the Igbo urge inductively from the particular to the general and deductively from the general to the particular. Induction is like small, small streams that collect together and crystallize into a river and deduction on its part is like this river which can divide at its source into streams and brooks. When the Igbo come across a new species of fungus whose edibility is in doubt, they feed its preparation to a dog which if it survives after eating it, confirms the non-poisonous nature of the fungus. The fungus is said then to be good for human consumption. By this, the Igbo show their great regard for experimental procedures and therefore loudly proclaim induction, the inverse process of deduction. In their argumentation-mgbagha-whether inductive or deductive, inconsistencies are avoided; experimentations lead to the knowledge of nature which is vital in the sharing processes that go on in the society, in making distinctions.

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Oru huru ka eji mbazu were eli oru ibeya mara nsa obu etu oga adi mbosi nke ya. (A slave that watches the corpse of another slave being buried with a wooden digger should know that the same will be his lot). Ewu adighi ata agbara sowe nke na-ata agbara, obido ita agbara.5 (If a goat that does not eat agbara accompanies that which does it will begin to eat agbara). Onye nara nwata ihe ye weenie aka elu, mgbe aka jiwereya owetua aka ya nwata ewerekwa ihe ya. (If you take a child’s property and raise up your hand, when your hand hurts you and you eventually bring down your hand, the child will regain possession of his property). Chi ga ejiriri ta (The evening will ultimately come. After the day comes the night). Ihe nwere mbido nwere njedebe. (What has a beginning has an end). These arguments based on the knowledge and influences of nature are prevalent and pervading and “they” are indicative of the differentiations in mental behaviour imposed on the people by their circumstances and surroundings. For some, two parallel and exclusive senses of the term logic are detected and demarcated. Thus, (i) logos is rationality or the ability to reason; that is, a mental process which includes activities like sorting out and comparing alternatives as well as making references. (ii) Logic is also the normative study of reasoning. It deals with standards for correct reasoning and with methods for verifying truth by using logical patterns of argument For others, however, this principle of parallelism is not acceptable; there is no exclusion of one sense from the other. The distinction is sinefundamento in re Logos means “word”, “speech”, “reason” and in this sense, it is difficult to exclude the Igbo/Africans from the class of logicians and this is the justification of other methodology namely-a demonstration of how the Igbo reason.

5

See Wayne E. Alt. Loc. Cit.

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References Bahm, A. J. 1982. Organic Logic. Dialogos Numero, 40, Puerto Rico 00931. Carroll, J. B. ed. 1971. Language Thought and Reality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Dagobert, R. D. 1972. Handbook of Reason. New York: Philosophical Library. Guthrie, W. K. C. 1971. The Sophists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hegel, G. 1996. Science of Logic. II. Trans. W. H. Johnston & L. G. Struthers. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Joyce, G. H. 1908. Principles of Logic. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Locke, J. 1968. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II. London: Everyman’s Library. Martin, R. H. 1969. Existence and Meaning. New York: New York University Press. Mellone, S. H. 1902. An Introductory Textbook of Logic. London: William Blackwood & Sons. Momoh, C. S. ed. 1989. The Substance of African philosophy, Auchi: African Philosophy Projects Publications. Morse, J. L. ed. 1959. Funk & Wagnalis Encyclopedia. New York: Standard Reference Works Publishing Co. Opata, D. U. 1987. Lore and Language. 6/7: 51-57. Radin, P. 1957. Primitive Man as Philosopher. New York: Dover publications Inc. Ubesie, T. 1974. Mmiri Oku Eji Egbu Mbe. Nigeria: Longmans Nigeria Ltd. Wayne, V. 1991. Logic and Language in the Chuing Tzu. In Asian Philosophy. 1. 1. 61-76.

Chapter 7

The Logic in Yoruba Proverbs Ademola Kazeem Fayemi University of Lagos, Nigeria

Abstract This chapter examines the question of logic in African philosophy through a systematic exploration of Yoruba proverbs as a useful cultural resource. Its basis is to strengthen the defence of logicality of traditional unlettered YorubaAfricans. It argues, with illustrative examples, that proverbs are the axiomatic regimentation of formal logic in African philosophy. The chapter establishes a close nexus between logic and language. Using the Yoruba language as an example, the chapter shows that there are some elements of formal logical inferential rules and principles embedded in Yoruba proverbial thought. As a matter of universal application, these logical principles are conventionally used in Yoruba cultural milieu to evaluate discourse, reasoning and thoughts. In addition, this chapter identifies the critical challenges and difficulties that are confronted in the course of exploring the logic in Yoruba proverbs. To overcome these challenges, future studies need to construct indigenous logical symbolism indicative of logical discourse in contemporary African philosophy. Keywords: Logic; Rationality; Proverbs; Language; Yoruba 1 Introduction The flurry of debate that has permeated the philosophical atmosphere in Africa for the past four decades has succeeded in addressing the question of whether there is an African philosophy or not. Today there is overwhelming evidence that African philosophy has come of age. Discourse in the field has reached a significant stage in the areas of metaphysics, religion, social and political philosophy, ethics and epistemology, among others. However, despite this intellectual feat in African philosophical discourse it is a concern that less attention has been paid to certain aspects of logical studies in African philosophy (Fayemi 2007a). This situation is further complicated by a lack of forward vision in the field. On the one hand, there is scepticism in constructing what can be called African logic. On the other, there is the question of how to

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explore the various types of logic (formal, informal, quantificational, modal, dialectical, etc.) in African philosophy. The dearth of scholastic interests and coinciding literature in these two aspects has not helped matters. One major contributing factor that has impeded the silencing of the above scepticism is that early Western anthropological speculations (and some contemporary literature) portray the mindset of Africans as structurally different, in terms of rationality, from that of Western minds. For example, Levy-Bruhl (1967: 21) described the African as a “primitive” being with a “prelogical” mind, at ease in mysticism and magic, and governed by the law of participation rather than by logical canons. Horton (1977: 65) declared that “traditional cultures never felt the need to develop logic as a formal discipline,” concerned with questions about the nature and justification of human inference. In a similar vein, Wiredu (1980) points out that our traditional culture was somewhat wanting in this aspect of logic, and this lack is largely responsible for the weakness of traditional technology and warfare, architecture and medicine in modern-day Africa. A number of commendable attempts have been made by some prominent African scholars (Winch 1972; Evans-Pritchard 1980; Bello 1993, 2002; Sogolo 1993; Irele 1997; Isaac 2001, among others) to free traditional Africans from the charge of pre-logicality and illogicality. However, these attempts amount to mere denial of the initial allegations. For this reason, an analysis of the existence of logic in traditional African societies is necessary. The present chapter bridges this fundamental gap. Campbell Momoh (1989) sees the logical question in African philosophy more of a challenge than a problem. According to him, it is a challenge to African philosophers to develop a formal logic that will capture the spirit and metaphysics of African philosophy. Momoh (1989), in his own attempt to resolve the problem, makes a distinction between logic in natural language and logic in artificial language. By the former he means critical, discriminating, rational and reasonable discussion and discourse in natural language. “Logic here involves clarity of expression, the avoidance of fallacies, vagueness, ambiguity and contradiction in natural language” (1989: 174). Momoh also tells us that there are individuals in every culture who are logical in this sense, and African culture is no exception. His second sense of logic underscores the formal skill of a trained logician. Logic in artificial language is the setting up of constraints, variables, sentence connectives, deductions and transformation rules for deriving the formal validity of arguments. Even in this sense of logic, Momoh argues that African philosophy can be logical. Patterns of reasoning inferences and discourse in African philosophy can also be formalised and tested for formal validity or invalidity, using known techniques of modern formal logic.

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Makinde (1989) and Oruka (1984) argue that one can think logically without understanding the rules, nature and scope of formal logic. Oruka, citing Modus Ponens1 as an example of a valid principle of inference, argues that such a rule, together with other logical principles (including the three fundamental laws of thought) can be recognised in any African thought system (1984: 386-387). Makinde, on his part, further linked language with logic when he wrote, “We cannot rule out in advance the possibility of a development of logical systems in any language or culture, even if no logical systems have yet been built in that language” (1989: 116). In a similar vein, Omoregbe (1985) argues that “The ability to reason logically and coherently is an integral part of man’s rationality. The power of logic is identical with the power of rationality. It is therefore false to say that African people cannot think logically or reason coherently, unless they employ Aristotle’s or Russell’s forms of logic or even the Western type of argumentation” (Omoregbe 1985: 4-5). At this point, we are in agreement with Momoh (1989), Makinde (1989), Oruka (1984) and Omoregbe (1985) in that all men are capable of logical reasoning. However, whether or not their logic is systematised is another question. These African philosophers believe that African logical thinking can be systematised. However, such systematisation would be in line with formal logic as known in Western philosophy. Logic, to them (with the exception of Momoh 1989), is a theoretical and universal discipline, to be treated along the same lines as mathematics, music, chemistry and physics. The argument is that if philosophy has no boundaries, then a fortiori, logic has no boundaries either. The implication of this is that there is logic in Africa but there is no such thing as African logic. This chapter moves beyond the conclusions of Oruka (1984), Omoregbe (1985), Momoh (1989) and Makinde (1989). It provides a systematic exploration of proverbs, in order to strengthen the defence of logicality in traditional unlettered Africans. Given the multi-ethnic and linguistic structure of Africa, it is impossible in a paper of this nature to examine formal logic in all African proverbs. For this reason, the Yoruba proverbial structure is used as an illustrative example. In order to place our illustrations and positions on sound theoretical footing, a proper understanding of the nexus between logic and language is imperative to our argument, and will be discussed next.

1 A Modus Ponens, also known as affirming the antecedent, is a valid inference drawn from a hypothetical or conditional proposition.

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2 Logic and language Logic and language are two fundamental features of all human societies. The cultural experiences of any human group are couched in a language. Language, in this sense, can be viewed as a system of communication that relates what is to be communicated with something that communicates. For example, a message is communicated via a set of symbols conventionally accepted and understood by a social group (Palmer 1976). It is the medium through which human beings communicate, exchange thoughts, and express feelings and actions with one another. As a system, language is composed of signs and words, the meanings of which are socially determined. It is in this sense that language is essentially a social product that provides a framework for thought, and which also communicates thought. All human languages perform these functions. To the extent that people do not have the same capacity for language, people do not have the same measure of cognitive capacity, whether within the same culture or different cultures. While linguistic proficiency is not the sole basis of all thought, it must be noted that as much as being a good orator is a function of a better thinker, a poor or average speaker is not necessarily a bad thinker. Logic is the branch of philosophy that studies methods and principles used to assess the evidential link between the premises and conclusions of arguments (Oke & Amodu 2006). It is the scientific and artistic study of the methods or principles of distinguishing correct/incorrect reasoning and valid/invalid reasoning. There can be no logic without language because language is what makes logic possible (Ogbinaka 2002). Thus, the existence of culture presupposes the existence of logic, and presumably, the existence of language presupposes the existence of culture. Thought, which is prior to language, is expressed through language and it is an instrument of logical study. Logic, in dealing with any judgment or studying the principle involved in the process of reasoning, states all that is implicitly contained in the thought. Language, according to Uduma (1998) is a primary tool of reasoning. It enables us to fixate, describe and organise our manifold experiences, and to profit from the experiences of others. Granted that reasoning is carried on in language, and logic is the study of inferences, a study of logic involves a study of language. The upshot of the above discussion is that both logic and language are fundamental to human experience. With language, we organise our various experiences in the world. Our ability to organise these experiences systematically, and produce valid and correct inferences, demonstrates a logical ability. Without language, logic would be impossible, and without logic, language would be unintelligible. Man’s ability to use language meaningfully presupposes a fundamental logical disposition. No human group that has language (no matter the level of development or whether written or unwritten) can be said to be pre-

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logical. The assumption that some cultures, especially traditional African societies, are devoid of logic is incorrect. This is supported by Bello’s (2002: 243) observation that “At the base of every language lies the process of classification, for example, of food and poisons, or of animals, plants and minerals. These classifications take the logical principles of identity and non-contradiction (two of the so-called laws of thought) for granted. No human group can ignore the distinction between foods and poisons and survive.” Bello argues that there is logic in every human society. For example, logic is generally known to operate with human thoughts, propositions and symbols. Symbolism in logic is used for precision, space and time-saving. Clarity of expressions, the avoidance of fallacies, and contradictions, all central to logic, are conducted in natural language. Momoh’s (1989) earlier distinction between natural logic and artificial logic can further foster our understanding about the nexus between logic and language. As he observes, while natural logic involves a critical and rational discussion in natural language, artificial logic deals with the use of symbolism in the evaluation of arguments, language and reasoning. What is of immediate interest to us in Momoh’s (1989) distinction is that language is central to the discourse of logic. Propositions expressed in ordinary (natural) language can be analysed by the same method as an artificial language when symbolised in formal logic. Both senses of logic are present in all human cultures. Logic is a language in the artificial sense of the word. This is because it has its own vocabulary, symbols, technical notations and rules, which an intending user has to learn and master in order to efficiently evaluate natural language in the light of its strengths and weaknesses. Logic is an instrument that improves ordinary language through detection, and avoids errors in thinking and language use across all varieties. We now turn to discuss the Yoruba proverb as an example of African logic. 3 The logical basis of proverbs in African culture: A Yoruba example The pertinent question now is whether there is any material in the cultural worldview of the Yoruba that can be symbolically regimented using the techniques of formal logic. In this regard, we find proverbs very useful, as they are axiomatically symbolic of formal logic in an African culture. Proverbs are an essential oral tradition that Africans use in storing and retrieving any aspect of their cultural worldview. For an African, what is not in proverbs is not real. More specifically, proverbs express reality. They are also a tool to provide evidence against ethnocentric arguments of Western scholarship that painted unlettered traditional Africans as pre-logical and irrational, given that proverbs are ancient indigenous creations of Africans. Western anthropologists such as Levy-Bruhl (1967) have claimed that traditional Africans were pre-logical, magical, and primitive in their cultural mode of living. One quite specific reason for drawing this conclusion is that

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Aristotle’s laws of thought do not appear to be observed in African language (Hunnings 1975). While the laws of thought, as formulated by Aristotle, have been criticised on many grounds, it is interesting to note that they can still be observed in African language, and extracted from Yoruba African proverbs. The first of the Aristotelian canon on laws of thought is the law of identity. It states that if a proposition is true, then it is true. In other words, if something is A, then it is A. One proverb that reflects this law among the Yoruba is set out in Example (1): (1) Eni to jale lekan, to da aran bori, aso ole loda bo ra Somebody who steals once, and covers himself with a royal garment, is still covered by the stain of the theft

(Yoruba) (English)

The metaphoric and literal meaning of this proverb is that pretences of class do not detract from an essentially bad character. More specifically, the class of thief will always be a thief, irrespective of any pretence to the contrary. That is, something that is A is A. The second law of thought is the law of contradiction. This law asserts that no proposition can be both true and false. At the same time, this implies that nothing can be both A and not A. This idea is expressed in the following Yoruba proverb (Ajibola 1977: 3) shown in (2): (2) Bi oba maa jo osaka ki o jo osaka, bi oba maa jo osoko ki ojo osoko, o saka nsoko, ko ye omo enia.

(Yoruba)

If you want to dance to the osaka drum, dance to it; if you want to dance to the osoko drum, dance to it; to dance to both drums at the same time does not benefit a human person.

(English)

This proverb is a warning against involving oneself in actions that are obviously contradictory. It illustrates the Yoruba’s awareness of the law of contradiction, and their loathing for a person who acts or behaves in contradictory terms. The last law of thought is the law of excluded middle. It states that something is either true or false. That is, anything must be either A or not A, as shown in Example (3): (3) Meji ni ilekun, bi ko si sinu, a sisi ode; bi ko ti sinu, a ti sode. It is one of two ways with a door: it opens either inward or outward; it shuts either inward or outward.

(Yoruba)

(English)

The meaning in (3) describes two ways to an element. It follows that a proposition must be either true or false. An element must either exist or not

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exist. While this Aristotelian law of excluded middle is not applicable to every event, it is important to note that it forecloses the possibility of a third element, option or value. Let us examine further the logical implications of Yoruba proverbs by considering the rules of inference and their placement in the African cultural worldview. Rules of inferences are logical methods of inferential deductions used in proving the validity of arguments. They are rules because any argument that is capable of being reduced to their form (i.e. their correct substitution instance) is intuitively and automatically taken as valid. This validity is based on proven internal validity structure. Below are the rules of inference and their proverbial structural equivalence in Yoruba proverbial heritage: MODUS PONENS (MP): The rule holds that: If P then Q P

P›Q P

Therefore, Q

/:.Q (Ali 2003: 103)

An example of the MP rule in a Yoruba African proverb is shown in (4): (4) B’elejo ba m’ejoo re lebi, ko nipe lori ikunl. If one agrees that one is guilty in a case, then one will not stay long on his knees.2

(Yoruba) (English)

Now stated in MP the rule takes the following form: Premise 1:

B’elejo ba m’ejoo re lebi, ko nipe lori ikunle. If one agrees that one is guilty in a case, then one will not stay long on his knees. P›Q

Premise 2:

Elejo mo ejo re lebi. One agrees that one is guilty in a case.

Conclusion:

P

Latara idi eyi, eleje ko pe lori ikunle Therefore, one will not stay long on his knees.

/:.Q

Our next rule of inference concerns the form of disjunctive syllogism, as observed in Yoruba proverbs.

The meaning of this proverb is that admission of guilt hastens the resolution of contentious issues. For example, an accused person who has pleaded guilty does not have to go through a prolonged trial.

2

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DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM (DS): This is an inference of the form: Either

P or Q

PvQ

Not P

-P

Therefore, Q

/:.Q

The DS rule is expressed in the Yoruba proverb shown in Example (5): (5) Yala komo o jo sokoto, tabi kojo kijipa. Either a child resembles trousers, or she resembles kijipa.3

(Yoruba) (English)

The Yoruba structure is as follows: Premise 1:

Yala komo o jo sokoto, tabi kojo kijipa. Either a child resembles trousers, or she resembles kijipa. PvQ

Premise 2:

Omo kojo sokoto. A child does not resemble the father.

Conclusion:

-P

Latari idi eyi, omo yoo jo kijipa. Therefore, she will resemble the mother.

/:.Q

We now examine a conditional statement represented by hypothetical syllogism. HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM (HS): The HS rule holds that two premises and the conclusion must be a material conditional statement. The consequence of the first premise becomes the antecedent of the second, while the antecedent of the first premise serves as the antecedent of the conclusion. The consequence of the second premise serves as the consequence of the conclusion (Achilike 1999). The HS rule takes the schematic form: If P then Q

P›Q

If Q then R

Q›R

∴ if P then R

/:.P›R

Kijipa is a kind of woman’s wrapper and represents the mother. The trousers (sokoto) represent the father.

3

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The Yoruba proverb that captures the HS rule is shown in Example (6): (6) B’o koo ba r’okun, to ba rosa, yoo fi ori f ’e leebute. (Yoruba) If a boat goes to the sea and to the lagoon, it will still come to the shore. (English) In symbolic logical terms, the components of the proverb can be represented as: Bokoo ba r’okun Bokoo ba r’osa Yoo f ’ori fe leebute

(If a boat goes to the sea) (If a boat goes to the lagoon) (It will still come to the shore)

P Q R

The hypothetical syllogistic argument in (6) can be represented as: If a boat goes to the sea, then it can go to the lagoon. If a boat can go to the lagoon, then it will still come to the shore. /:. If a boat goes to the sea then it will still come to the shore.

P›Q Q›R /:.P›R

The rules of inference examined in Examples (4-6) represent simple arguments. We now turn to examine other rules of inferences with complex argument compositions, known as the dilemma. THE DILEMMA: The dilemma is a form of mediate inference. According to Ali (1995), it does not introduce a new logical principle into formal logic. Rather, it serves as a useful convention in combining hypothetical, conjunctive and disjunctive propositions in various ways to yield a complex argument (Ali 1995). According to Ali, there are various kinds of dilemma (i.e., simple constructive dilemma (SCD), simple destructive dilemma (SDD), complex constructive dilemma (CCD) and complex destructive dilemma (CDD). For our immediate purposes, we shall illustrate that Yoruba Africans are capable of dilemmatic reasoning. To this end, the two complex dilemmas (constructive and destructive) shall be exemplified. COMPLEX CONSTRUCTIVE DILEMMA (CCD) has the standard statement form: (If P then Q) and (If R then S)

(P›Q) (R›S)

P or R

PvR

Therefore, Q or S

/:.Q v S (Ali 2003, p.104)

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Such a form is explicit in the Yoruba proverb shown in (7): (7) Bi eniyan n gun ‘yan bo ‘luu, yoo lotaa, bi osin n’so’ko s’oja, yoo loree tire. If one is pounding yams to feed the whole town, one will have enemies, and if one is throwing stones into the market, one will have one’s own friends.

(Yoruba)

(English)

The proverb shown in (7) has four variables represented as: Eniyan n gun ‘yan bo ‘luu (one pounds yam to feed the whole P town) Eniyan yoo lotaa (one will have enemies) Q Eniyan n’so’ko soja (one throws stones into the market) R Eniyan yoo loree tire (one will have one’s own friends) S To formulate the variables of CCD into an argument we have: Premise 1:

Bi eniyan n gun ‘yan bo’luu, yoo lotaa, bi o si n so’ko s’oja, yoo loree tire. (If one is pounding yam to feed the whole town, one will have enemies, and if one is throwing stones into the market, one will have one’s own (P›Q) and (R›S) friends).

Premise 2:

Boya eniyan n gun ‘yan bo’luu, tabi eniyan nsoko soja. (Either one pounds yam to feed the whole town or one throws stones into the market). PvR

Conclusion: Latara idi eyi, eniyan yoo lotaa tabi koo ni ore tire. (Therefore, one will either have enemies or have one’s own friends). /:. Q v S We now move to examine proverbs that express the complex destructive dilemma. COMPLEX DESTRUCTIVE DILEMMA (CDD): This rule is schematically represented as: (If P then Q) and (If R then S) Not Q or not S Therefore, not P or not R

(P›Q) (R›S) -Q v -S /:.-P v -R

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A Yoruba proverb that captures this rule is shown in Example (8): (8) Bi omode ba subu, yoo wo iwaju bi agba ba subu yoo w’eyin.

(Yoruba)

If a child falls he looks forward, but if the elder falls, he looks backward.

(English)

This proverb shown in (8) is a conjunctive assertion of two conditional statements with four variables: Omode subu (a child falls) Omode wo iwaju (a child looks forward) Agbalagba subu (an elder falls) Agbalagba we’yin (an elder looks backward)

P Q R S

We formulate those variables in complex destructive dilemma form as shown: Premise 1:

Bi omode ba subu, odidandan pe ko wo iwaju,, bi agba ba subu, odidandan pe yoo we’yin. (If a child falls, then he looks forward, and if the (P›Q) • (R›S) elder falls, he looks backward).

Premise 2:

Ninu k’omode ma woo iwaju tabi ki agbalagba maa w’eyin. (Either it is not the case that a child looks forward or it is not the case that an elder looks backward). -Q v -S

Conclusion: Latara idi eyi, yala k’omode ma suubu tabi k’agbalagba ma suubu. (Therefore, either it is not the case that a child falls or it is not the case that an elder falls). /:.-P v -R To sum up this section on dilemma in Yoruba proverbs, we have shown that Yoruba language is capable of expressing not only simple logical rules and arguments, but also complex mediate inferences. In order to further show the logic in Yoruba proverbs, we shall now examine the logical rules of addition, conjunction and commutation. ADDITION: An addition is a rule of inference which states that given a simple or compound statement as one’s only premise, one can validly conclude with an alternation statement of ‘either ... or’ by adding a new statement to the initial premise. The rule of addition has the statement form of:

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P,

P

Therefore, either P or Q

/:.P v Q

In Yoruba proverbial logical terms, we have the example of an addition in Example (9): (9) Aparo kan ko ga ju okan lo, ayafi eyi to ta gun ori ebe. No partridge is taller than another unless one stands on a mound.

(Yoruba) (English)

The premise that emerges from (9) is as follows: Premise 1:

Aparo kan ko ga ju okan lo (No partridge is taller than another). (P) is the only premise.

Conclusion: Ayafi4 eyi to ba gun ori ebe (unless one stands on the heap). (Q) is added alternatively to the only premise. Let us now consider the rule of conjunction and its observation in Yoruba proverbs. CONJUNCTION: The law of conjunction states that, given two independent propositions, it is valid when both premises are conjoined. Thus, we have the statement form of: P

P

Q

Q

Therefore, P and Q

/:.P.Q

Traditional Yoruba Africans argue in strict accordance with this deductive rule of inference that exists in modern propositional logic. This rule is explicit in Example (10): (10) Ijebu oda, Ijesha oo sun won leyan; oni wooni Ijebu-Ijesha. The Ijebu is not good a person, the Ijesha is worse off; you now claim to be an Ijebu-Ijesha).5

4 The

(Yoruba)

(English)

word ayafi (unless) indicates the addition. It is a stylistic variant of ‘either/or.’

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When interpreted in propositional logical terms the premise is shown as: Premise 1:

P: Ijebu oda (Ijebu is not good)

Premise 2:

Q: Ijesha oo sun won leyan (Ijesha is worse off as a person)

Conclusion:

P.Q: Iwoni Ijebu-Ijesha (You claimed to be Ijebu-Ijesha, that is, you are bad and worse off)

The proverb in Example (10) presupposes that the conjunct is cumulative, and the point of the proverb is an application of the rule of conjunction to a moral prescription. The point that emerges from Examples (1-10) is that Yoruba proverbs provide evidence that traditional Africans were never pre-logical; they had the knowledge of logical rules of inference even before contact with the Western world. In addition to the rules of inference, there are other logical rules of deduction used to test the validity of arguments. These rules are known as the rules of replacement. Rules of replacement are determined by logical equivalent formulas used to prove the validity of extended arguments. It is interesting to note that such rules are also not alien to the Yoruba. To illustrate this point, let us consider the principle of commutation, the last logical rule under consideration. COMMUTATION: The law of commutation states that the arrangement of variables in conjunctional and alternation statements does not in any way affect the truth-value of such compound statements. It has the statement form of: (P v Q) ≡ (Q v P) (P. Q) ≡ (Q. P) The proverb shown in Example (11) captures the commutation rule: (11) Ka loso modii, ka lodii maso, ki idi saa ma ti gbofo. Wrap a cloth round the waist; wrap the waist around the cloth; just ensure that the waist is not naked.

(Yoruba)

(English)

5 This proverb is similar to saying person ‘A’s character is bad and person ‘B’s character is worse and person ‘C’ claims to be ‘A’ and ‘B’ personified (Fayemi 2007b: 150).

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This proverb can be reformulated in sentential structure as: Ka loso modii ati ka lo dii maso, (P.Q) (Wrap a cloth round the waist and wrap the waist around the cloth) se dede (is equivalent to) ≡ kalo di maso ati kaloso modii (Q.P) (Wrap the waist around the cloth and wrap a cloth round the waist) The most important point from Example (11) is that the truth value does not change, irrespective of how one swaps the conjunction. 4 Discussion On the basis of our above analysis, we argue that Yoruba proverbs are symbolic of formal logic in the African thought system. The logical structures explicit in all the above proverbs should not suggest a discovery or development of a unique Yoruba-African logic. Rather, they entail an application of a universal logic that expresses experiences and the cultural mode of the Yoruba. The proverbs show that logic, which constitutes one of the paradigms of rationality, is as much in evidence in Yoruba proverbs as in Aristotelian texts and other Western literature. The logical basis of Yoruba proverbs can be affirmed in the quadruple functions the proverbs perform. One, they explain the structural relationship that exists between premises and the conclusion of an argument. Second, they provide techniques for the appraisal of thought in terms of language precision, consistency and coherency in oratory. Thirdly, proverbs are employed in the daily discourse of the Yoruba. They offer prescriptions for life and serve as guides in shaping attitudes, behaviour and interaction with fellow men. The proverbs identify with cultural priorities and values. An understanding of the logical entailment of these proverbs is therefore important, it encourages people to think systematically in their daily discourse, as well as enhance the judicious, consistent and valid usage of proverbs in both written and spoken expressions. Such logical understanding enhances metaphoric meanings of Yoruba proverbs. Their use as an oral logical tool, employed by Africans to promote deeper thought, rightly interprets proverbs in the specific context of use. A proverb is both a linguistic and logical test of knowing whether one has the cognitive capacity to correctly associate the content of the proverb with its meaning. Proverbs also serve as canons for evaluating beliefs and values to avoid a repetition of earlier mistakes committed by others. Logic functions in much the same way. Proverbs in Yoruba culture, as we have shown, respect some of the universal canons of logic. In Yoruba culture, as well as other African societies, logical principles and techniques are employed in both formal and informal

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discourses, evaluation of thoughts, human judgments and reasoning validation. The traditional Yoruba never formally set out universal logical rules of inference and validity techniques as we have in Western culture (due to the lack of early written culture). Nor do they have a proven body of unique logic with its internal logical criteria. However, they, like their traditional Western counterparts, were able to make valid deductions, think critically, and comprehend intelligibly happening events in their natural world. 5 Conclusion The African proverb is a veritable datum for philosophical speculation and analysis in African philosophy. Proverbs have shown that traditional Africans were rational and used logical canons of reasoning. We have described the logic of Yoruba proverbs in this chapter through a philosophical analysis of the surface and structural forms of such proverbs. It should be stressed, however, that there are still other logical rules that have not been explored when considering logic in Yoruba oral tradition. For example, some difficulties were encountered in the course of acquiring a valid and accurate proverbial structural form that correlated with certain rules of inferences and rules of replacement. We believe these challenges are not insurmountable, and call on African philosophers to devote more research interest into this aspect of African philosophy. We are also of the strong view that a systematised African logical notation can be developed out of African indigenous linguistic and symbolic systems. Such research efforts in the area of African logical notations will not constitute a unique Yoruba logic. However, they will facilitate the conscious design and development of unique African logical symbolisms across different types of sets (e.g., formal logic, quantificational logic, modal logic, Boolean logic, etc.). The intensification of research efforts in the development of an African logical symbolism is imperative to the development of an urgently needed technical language for African science and software applications in indigenous languages. Our discovery of logic in Yoruba proverbs holds a profound implication for education in 21st century Africa. The language of communication in the production and dissemination of knowledge, ideas and research findings, need not necessarily be in foreign (that is English or French) languages alone. Our analysis of some of the universal rules of logic and their applications in Yoruba proverbs shows that the Yoruba language is not inferior to other technically developed languages. In fact, language is capable of expressing not only old, but also new and emerging ideas and concepts in other languages and intellectual traditions. Our inability to explore the elasticity and richness of indigenous African languages in the teaching and researching of ideas, values, knowledge and information in contemporary Africa is as much due to

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ignorance as well as the overbearing effects of colonial languages on the thought and language patterns of contemporary Africans. While we are not calling for a radical break with such languages (that is, English and French that are lingua franca in Anglophone and Francophone African states respectively), our position is that African states should begin to address the active use of African indigenous languages in the teaching of subjects in African educational systems. This call should not be limited to the humanities-oriented subjects, but extended to the social sciences, natural sciences and other technical subjects. A rational and balanced integration of indigenous languages with existing colonial languages in 21st century African educational systems will be both a conservational and transformative venture. Conservational in the sense of preserving indigenous cultural heritage through educational processes and practices, and transformative in the sense of placing Yoruba thought and language on a par with trends, issues, theories and best practice expressed in other global educational systems. References Achilike, J. C. ed. 1999. Fundamentals of logic. Ibadan: Ben-El Books. Ajibola, J. O. 1977. Owe Yoruba. London: Oxford University Press. Ali, S. A. 1995. Inferential knowledge and logical reasoning. In Introduction to philosophy and logic, eds. Samuel Ade Ali and Ayo Fadahunsi, 13-35. Ibadan: Paper Back Publishers Limited. Ali, S. A. 2003. Logic made easy. Ijebu-Ode: Vicoo Publishing House. Bello, A. G. 1993. Rationality, myth and philosophy in Africa. Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies. 6: 80-90. Bello, A. G. 2002. On the concepts of rationality and communalism in African scholarship. In The third way in African philosophy: Essays in honour of Kwasi Wiredu, ed. O. Oladipo, 235-251. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1980. Theories of primitive religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fayemi, A. K. 2007a. The rational basis and logical implications of proverbs in an African culture: The Yoruba example. Unpublished M.A Dissertation in the Department of Philosophy, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria. Fayemi, A. K. 2007b. Proverbism and the question of rationality in traditional African culture. Essence: Interdisciplinary-International Journal of Philosophy. 4: 141-153. Horton, R. 1977. African traditional thought and the emerging African philosophy department: A comment on the current debate. Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy. VII.1: 63-75. Hunnings, G. 1975. Logic, language and culture. Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy. IV. 1: 1-13.

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Irele, D. 1997. Essentially contested concepts and the question of rationality in traditional African thought. Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies. 4: 126-130. Isaac, U. 2001. Rationality and the dark side of modernity: A humanistic reaction. Journal of Philosophy and Development. 7. 1 & 2: 120-130. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1967. La Mentalité primitive. London: Allen & Unwin. Makinde, M. A. 1989. Philosophy in Africa. In Substance of African philosophy, ed. C. S. Momoh, 103-129. Auchi: African Philosophy Projects Publication. Momoh, C. S. 1989. The logic question in African philosophy. In Substance of African philosophy, ed. C. S. Momoh, 175-192. Auchi: African Philosophy Projects Publication. Ogbinaka, O. 2002. Logic: Its nature and scope. In Philosophy and logic: A student companion, ed. E. K. Ogundowole, 189-203. Lagos: Dmodus Publishers. Oke, M. and J. Amodu 2006. Logic and critical thinking. Ibadan: Hope publications. Omoregbe, J. O. 1985. African philosophy: Yesterday and today. In Philosophy in Africa: Trends and perspectives, ed. P. O. Bodunrin, 1-14. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press. Oruka, H. O. 1984. Sagacity in African philosophy. International Philosophical Quarterly. 23. 4:383-396. Palmer, F. R. 1976. Semantics: A new outline. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sogolo, G. 1993. Foundation of African philosophy: Definitive analysis of conceptual issues in African thought. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Uduma, U. 1998. Logic as an element of culture. In Metaphysics, phenomenology and African philosophy, ed. Jim Unah, 374-387. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Winch, P. 1972. Understanding a primitive society in ethics and action. London: Routledge. Wiredu, K. 1980. Philosophy and an African culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 8

Universal or Particular Logic and the Question of Logic in Setswana Proverbs Keanu K. Mabalane University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Edwin Etieyibo University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Abstract This chapter is primarily concerned with advancing on some of the claims made in some recent research on the relationship between logic and African languages, namely, the Acholi language (by Victor Ocaya) and the Urhobo language (by Edwin Etieyibo). In general, we aim to show that logic can be gleaned and retrieved from African languages, and, in particular, that proverbs in the Tswana language carry certain resources that are suitable for logical assessment. Such logical resources and the logic in Setswana, we argue, are consistent with classical or formal logic, specifically, the classical laws of thought and rules of inference. In advancing and defending this claim we, at the same time, wade both directly and indirectly into the debate involving the particularists and universalists on the question of rationality and the issue of culturally specific, context-sensitive, disparate logic or universal epistemologies and logic. Keywords: Acholi, African philosophy, language, logic (classical, formal), particularism, proverbs, rationality, Setswana, universalism, Urhobo 1 Introduction There have been a number of critical explorations aimed at demonstrating the extent that logic, logical concepts and rules can be gleaned and retrieved from African languages. Some of the investigations show that philosophy, in general, and logic, in particular, can be extracted from some African languages (See Eboh 1983 & 1999; Momoh 2000a & 2000b; Sogolo 2004; Ocaya, 2007;

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Fayemi 2010; Etieyibo, 2016). In other words, in more recent time, African philosophers such as Campbell Momoh (2000a & 2000b), Victor Ocaya (2007), Fayemi Ademola Kazeem (2010), and Edwin Etieyibo (2016) have tried to demonstrate that logic can be gleaned from African languages. These attempts were a direct response to the concern about whether African thought systems are logical or not, or whether they possess some logic or a logical system. The contribution by Momoh and Ocaya focus on the Uchi and Acholi languages, while those of Fayemi and Etieyibo focus on the Yoruba and Urhobo languages, respectively. They demonstrate that logic, as a medium of thought and expression, does get instantiated by various languages and cultures. In all of this though it seems to us that little critical exploration has been directed toward coming up with a method that could be used to assess African languages for some logical system that is disparate to that of classical (Western) logic. Classical logic denotes a period starting from Aristotelian times to the modern age around 1930 and also denotes a system of logic in analytic philosophy developed and standardised within that time (Sogolo 2004: 244). In this chapter, our objective is to investigate the extent that logic (i.e. the classical laws of thought and rules of inference) can be found in and abstracted from Setswana proverbs in the context of discourses on the universality and particularity of logic.1 More generally, proverbs are taken to represent social and cultural idealisations of society, its people and constituents, and the relationships between these constituents (Campbell 1972: 121-122). And as Momoh (2000a & 2000b) and Etieyibo (2016) have argued they (proverbs) are also, within the African cultural milieu, a vehicle for philosophy and philosophical ideas and concepts. Although proverbs embed the beliefs, values and philosophy of a people, they need to be analysed in order to bring out the beliefs, values and philosophy. Analysing the proverbs for the beliefs, values and philosophy that they embed may involve also translating the meanings embedded in the proverbs, which is an active process. And as it concerns our project in this chapter, we will be analysing proverbs in Setswana, meaning that we will be engaged at the same time in translating them into some logical system of thought. On this, the constructivist may object to our broader project concerning the assessment of African (Setswana) language for the purpose of bringing out its implicit logic. This objection forms part of a wider concern about the question of methodology, some of which we deal with in sections five and six of this chapter.

1We

provide some discussion of the Setswana people later on in the chapter.

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This is how we will proceed. In section 1, we briefly look at logic in the context of universalism and particularism. Section 2 consists of an examination of the interpretative exercises used by Etieyibo (2016) and Ocaya (2007) to establish the relationship between the African languages of Urhobo and Acholi and the classical principles of logic (classical or formal logic). We undertake, in section 3, a hermeneutic study of the Tswana language by examining the extent to which Setswana proverbs conform to the classical or formal logic. In section 4 and from various discussions about cultural particularism/relativism and epistemic methodologies, we attempt to formulate a semantically non-intrusive method of assessing the proverbs for their logical expression. That is, we undertake a discussion of contextual methodologies as it relates to regression of classical logical concepts in some proverbs in Setswana. Finally, in section 5, we raise and respond to a number of possible objections to our approach. 2. Logic, Universalism and Particularism Broadly speaking, logic is a systematic idealisation about thought and reasoning. That is, logic refers to a set of paradigmatic assumptions that define what it consists in for beliefs, concepts, their meanings and the processes of their rational justification to be valid and coherent (Sogolo 2004: 248; See Etieyibo 2016). In this sense, logic can be considered as an critical assessment of ideas for their rationality that employs a set of methodological axioms as tools of analysis. It is partly owing to this that one may refer to the assessment as characteristic of analytic philosophical practice; illustrating an apriorist philosophical analysis of these ideas, so to speak (Hospers 1997:5). Along this line, we will use logic in this chapter to refer to a system of logical canons of thought and reasoning concerning propositions and arguments. The central principles which concern the logic of propositions are the three classical laws of identity, contradiction and the law of excluded middle. A proposition is defined as an expression or claim whose truth-value can be known. And the concepts of logic that pertain to arguments are the rules of inference and syllogisms (where rules of inference refer to a logical function according to which certain premises, are analysed for their syntax in order to yield some conclusions(s) and a syllogism refers to an argument form or form of reasoning whereby a conclusion is inferred from two propositions (premises). To elaborate this counterfactually, if logic is a method and a system of thought and reasoning, then its object are concepts, words and their meanings, and these are expressed through the instrument of language. Yet, as the postmodernists will remind us, logic is a socially constructed idealisation, which makes prescriptions about thought, as it pertains to its truth value content, how it ought to be considered, used and understood. The link between logic and language resides in the very fact of thought as being

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expressed through language. The postmodernist idea of a socially constructed logic introduces the notions of universalism and particularism. Given the connection between logic and language and the idea about logic being expressed through language, African philosophers have tried to establish the relationship between logic and language variously. On the one end of the spectrum, some scholars take interest in the cultural and historical contexts in which languages, their beliefs and concepts exist and determine one another. These scholars may be considered as taking a relativist or particularist position about rationality and/or cognitivism as being culturally specific (Sogolo 2004, 248). On the other end of the spectrum are the universalists who argue for the position that rationality is culturally universal and so all peoples, despite their localised world-views, epistemologies and ethics, share the common feature true to humanity in general, and that is the feature of rationality. And so for them, African culture can be analysed in terms of classical logic and such related methodologies of thought. The latter group of scholars are the primary target of our contribution. There may exist some connections among the postmodernist posture, fuzzy logic and the debate between the particularist and universalist, where fuzzy logic designates the modern period commencing with Brouwer’s postulate of intuitionism and Lukasiewicz’s many-valued logic (Haack 1996: 66, 256). For example, Haack (1996: 256) states that Brouwer’s and Lukasiewicz’s postulates challenged, although for different reasons, the plausibility of the central canons of classical logic, in particular, the law of excluded middle. On this conception, we can understand fuzzy logic then broadly as the study consisting of alternative systems of logic that are distinguishable from classical logic (Haack 1996: 1-2). The proposition of fuzzy logic may be used here for asserting the possibility of having deviant and variant logical systems. More significantly such an assertion seems to support, in some way, the particularist or relativist position regarding the nature of situated or culturally specific logic and rationality as we find among scholars like Sogolo (1993), Mudimbe (1988), and as implied by Ocaya (2007). However, if such disparate logics are implicit in a language and one wishes to uncover these as we do, then we argue that first, one needs to limit their appeal to concepts that necessarily determine some other logic, which may have the unintended consequence of precluding the possibility to uncover a logic that may be true within the limits of our specified language. Secondly, in doing this one may instead develop and appeal to a self-reflexive method of examination which is intended to be paradigm-neutral as much as possible.

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3 An explorative analysis of logic in Urhobo and the Acholi languages Etieyibo in the article “African Philosophy and Proverbs: The Logic in Urhobo Proverbs” (2016) demonstrates the consistency of proverbs of the Urhobo language in their application to the rules and principles of logic. Etieyibo's move consists mainly in arguing that if logical principles are accepted as true and good as far as they are useful toward safeguarding valuations on coherence, rationality and meaningfulness, then these principles are applicable to Urhobo proverbs, as expressions of thought. Significant to his project is the conclusion that no inconsistency arises from taking Urhobo proverbs as logical or in considering them as consistent with the rules and laws of classical logic. Noteworthy to Etieyibo’s project is that he argues for the consistency of Urhobo expressions under the presumption of classical logic. He demonstrates this through interpretive and explorative work on Urhobo proverbs (2016: 21, 39). First, he interprets some proverbs in terms of the classical laws of thought. The laws of thought outline the structure of meanings expressed by sentences and outline what it consists in to make not only meaningful but also reasonably agreeable statements. For example, Etieyibo analyses the Urhobo proverb for its meaning expressed in terms of the law of identity and its normative prescription: Eghwughwe̖ sajo̖ro̖ ye̖re̖ omivwenio̖phiero̖yededenao̖de̖ ye̖ o vwo̖ de̖ ogbe̖e̖ (Urhobo). The chameleon can crawl and change its colours but it does not become a tortoise (English). (2016: 24). In accordance with the law of identity, ascribing a certain identity relationship to something, be it an abstract or physical entity, with some property(s) is to assert a relationship between the subject and the property stated in the predicate as identifying something. And so whatever property can be ascribed to one thing (x) happens to also be said of the other thing (y) are thought to be identical or the tokens of the same kind of thing and hence expressed in the form of an identity relationship represented as x. The implication of the law of identity is in its converse or negative formulation, which states that anything which is different with respect to some property in the comparison to another thing results in a non-identity relationship where the two things are taken to be tokens of different kinds of terms and therefore are not identical to one another by classification. Presupposing such an understanding of the law of identity as a classical law of thought Etieyibo analyses the proverb’s logical assertion, against the law of identity. This is done by an interpretative work on two levels. First, he understands the proverb as a statement about the nature or characterisation of a thing, namely, a thing that is identified literally as a chameleon. The literal

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interpretation of the proverb here identifies the chameleon as being such a thing such that it is not the same kind of a thing as a tortoise on the basis that they share one common property, i.e. that of crawling. On the second level of interpretation, Etieyibo draws a further line of understanding relating the proverb as a symbolic or figurative representation of the law of identity. He correlates the meaning of the proverbs as being extrapolated to the same meaning expressed in the law of identity. In this way, Etieyibo uses the Urhobo proverb, not as a token proposition in the language which applies the law of identity, but rather as a token proposition expressing some thought on the nature of identity relationships which bears resemblance to the classical law in question. This same interpretative function of Urhobo proverbs is carried out in the analysis of the law of non-contradiction and law of excluded middle as guiding principles of thought that the Urhobo proverbs evidently express implicitly in some of their assertions limited to the proverbs: 1.

2.

3. 4.

Law of Identity: x and y are identical if what is said of x is or can be said of y, i.e. share similar properties z. And they are not if it is the case that they share different properties. Explicit assertion of Urhobo proverb: A chameleon is x and a tortoise is y. Both share the same property of crawling but they do not share some other properties. By this, one can infer that they are not the same kind of thing with respect to their differences in some essential property(ies). Implicit assertion: what is said of the chameleon cannot be said of the tortoise so, they are not identical. The implicit assertion of the Urhobo proverb is similar to the explicit assertion of the classical law of identity.

The second phase of Etieyibo’s work is the explorative phase. Here, he uses the rules of inference and the syllogistic arguments as logical concepts through which he explored the function of Urhobo proverbs in the formulation of valid arguments. These concepts prescribe the formal structure of valid arguments such that the truth of the conclusion would be determined by the truth of the premises if they are of the form specified by the rule of inference or syllogistic arguments. This is to say that syllogisms and rules of inference have their function in providing the formal structure of arguments according to which these are to be qualified as valid. Together with this assumption about the function of classical rules Etieyibo, in the exploration of consistency between logical principles and the nature of the Urhobo language, uses proverbs in Urhobo as constituent premises from which a conclusion will be drawn to form an argument.

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To illustrate, Etieyibo (2016: 32) assumes the form of a disjunctive syllogism and applies it to the following Urhobo proverb: Wo̖ sa yen obohwereye̖re̖ obore re idjerhena (Urhobo). You can walk left of the road or right of the road (English). Etieyibo goes on to use the proverb as a disjunctive statement and constructs an argument which denies or affirms one of the disjuncts using the inference rule. The disjunctive rule states that when a disjunction is affirmed as a premise, one of the disjuncts can either be affirmed or denied as a conclusion. Furthermore, the disjunctive premise is preceded by a second premise which either denies or affirms the other disjunct respectively. Hence, if one disjunct is denied in the second premise, then it follows as a conclusion that the other alternative disjuncts stated in the disjunction is affirmed or is the case. For instance, the Urhobo proverb states that either one walks on the left side of the road or one walks right of the road. Based on the syntax of the literal interpretation in English, the proverb is taken to be representative of the disjunctive proposition. Etieyibo then proceeds to make further explorative insertions by adding a hypothetical affirmation of one of the disjuncts, the premise that asserts that one walks left of the road. This allows him to draw the conclusion that it is not the case that one walks on the right side of the road. Etieyibo explains that given that the claim, “walking on the left side of the road” can be taken to be asserting one disjunct such assertion is simply one that logically excludes the other disjunct.2 The method used in this explorative phase consists in Etieyibo taking the Urhobo proverb as a premise around which an argument is constructed. In this illustrative construction of an argument using Urhobo proverbs, Etieyibo explores the various ways in which propositions of the language can be used to extract various interpretations that could be validated as meaningful and logical. In “Logic in the Acholi Language” (2007: 292-293), Ocaya also provides an examination of logical concepts in the Acholi language of the Luo peoples. Ocaya’s examination predates the survey conducted by Etieyibo (2016). However, both illustrations share some resemblances in the methods employed for analysis. Both assume paradigmatic concepts of logic found in analytic philosophy such as the laws of identity, contradiction, excluded

An exclusive disjunction makes certain presumptions about the nature of thought, the nature of things in virtue of its specifying characterisations, which are universal. That is, for an exclusive disjunction something cannot be about two different things simultaneously. This is a metaphysical claim, which may be problematic in that it may be appealing to a particular metaphysics that diverges from other metaphysical worldviews. 2

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middle, and rules of inference such as disjunctive syllogisms. However, Ocaya differs by extending the scope of his analysis as being inclusive of the concepts of formal logic. In this sense, Ocaya uses concepts of connectives in propositions and examines the Acholi language for these concepts by translating their equivalents in the Acholi language. A further point of divergence in Ocaya’s examination consists in his observation on the limits of application to the Acholi language. In his analysis of the law of excluded middle, Ocaya uses the proverb and states that on translation the term rather does not sufficiently and accurately express the meaning connoted by the Acholi term “Iyet-Iyet” (2007, 289). Thus, conclusively entailing that within the Acholi language, the principle of excluded middle may be at odds, and thus contravened as a logical principle within the cultural context of the language. To assert that a logic or logical system does not capture the notion that a proposition is exclusively either true or false but rather can be contemporaneously true and false, implies that it may be at variance with a particular logic of the sort we find with the law of excluded middle. This observation brings forth a couple of implications. First, from Ocaya’s examination, it could be concluded that the examination presents some variance in the logic implicit in the Acholi language. Such an assertion allows for the inference of a possibility of there being numerous and disparate types of logics as also argued for in the conception of fuzzy logic (Ocaya 2007: 289-290). A second implication is that the variance in the logic extrapolated in the Urhobo language against that of the Acholi language as found respectively by Etieyibo and Ocaya highlights the difference in the syntax of African languages. This to some extent goes a long way in providing some counter-evidence to the notion of a monolithic cultural structure and the homogeneity of languages indigenous to the African continent. These implications seem significant in that they provide some ground on which further and deeper analysis of African languages, as mediums of particularised and situated thought, should be done, whether with regard to the Acholi, Urhobo languages or any other African language. 4 A discussion of logic and Setswana proverbs In this section, we focus on Setswana proverbs. Most Tswana speaking peoples are located in the Southern region of Africa. Setswana is one of the official languages of South Africa spoken by about 3 million people. It is also the official language of Botswana with a population of over 1 million most of which speak Setswana (McCormack 2006: 1; “Tswana” 2017). The nature of the communities that existed in the mid-twentieth century and those that exist today are of a different kind. The proverbs that are discussed here are not specific to a particular time or period, or

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to a particular thinker. They concern statements about community and life within the Batswana societies spanning decades of use. The proverbs that we will be analysing are done as a way of exploring the nature of logic that is implicit and explicit in the Setswana language or implicated in the semantic expressions of members of the Batswana community regarding their values, beliefs and worldviews. The proverbs address varying themes concerning custom, duties and social roles fulfilled by members of a society. These themes consist of concepts relating to parenthood, childhood, motherhood, authority and societal organisation in general (Campbell 1972: 122). The formal structure of the proverbs takes on the form of atomic-complex sentences. None of them come in the form of a paragraph in which the meaning of a thought is expanded and clarified, where significantly the process of thought would be elucidated to guide both the interpretation and translation process. This then provides a restriction and a cause for considering the methodology to be used in interpreting and translating the proverbs. A proverb that is simple and atomic in structure or devoid of any additional accompanying statements enables more ambiguity and vagueness in interpretation. In other words, various interpretations may be made as to the distinct meaning which was meant to be expressed. Thus, a translator making interpretations of the proverbs out of the particular lexicon and semantic context in which these would be used runs the risk of assigning arbitrary translations that conform to his or her context and its lexicon. This is a problematic risk if what concerns us is the logical basis and nature of reasoning or conceptualisation that is taken to be expressed implicitly in the language and its propositions. That is the concern of this analysis. If an analysis of the nature of a logic does not formulate a method that aims at safeguarding one from such a risk, then the analysis may likely be skewed toward some confirmation bias. Where confirmation bias refers to an unintentional implicit affirmation of one paradigm, in our analysis, and this would be instantiated in unintentionally affirming classical concepts in logic while intending to seek and uncover a different, independent and disparate logic. This would undermine the very explorative aspect of our analysis. Hence, two significant considerations will be made here on the structural nature of the proverbs. First, the proverbs will be translated into predicate logic and not propositional logic. Predicate logic is a translation which functions to substantiate the predicate and subject relations, relating the kind of properties satisfied by some object (Martin 2004: 152). A second factor toward the method of analysis will concern oscillating between making explicit use of logical concepts on the initial step of analysis with each concept of classical logic.

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Symbolic logic: translation from natural language to formal logic Symbolic logic, whether it be propositional or predicate quantified logic, is the system of representing statements into symbols. The symbols in logic are used as representations of propositions where the latter are represented through alphabetic symbols. The propositions can either be atomic or complex. This classification assists in determining the main conjunctions (which in logic are referred to as connectives), which function as markers of conjoined sentences. The classification functions as follows: an atomic sentence is the basic unit of sentence characterised by the absence of a connective and would be represented as p. The complex sentence consists of atomic sentences, which are conjoined by connectives which represent the root of the complex sentence and are used to evaluate the truth value of the sentence depending on the type of connective used. The connectives in a complex proposition include: and, or, negation, if then, and if and only if, all of which are respectively represented by various symbols. The symbolic representation is used in the process of translating propositions from natural language to symbolic representation. Translation of natural language into the symbolic form of propositions is important in any logical analysis, as we attempt to do in this work. The logical rules and principles against which Setswana propositions are to be analysed are formally represented in their axiomatic symbolisation. It is on this basis that an explication of important concepts that concern translation of natural language into symbolic form as assumed here is to be explicated. Natural languages display the function of transmitting meaningful information allowing for shared communication. Although languages generally serve the same function, they, however, are distinguishable in the way they fulfil this function. This is based primarily on the understanding of meanings within a language being particularly stipulated in an arbitrary fashion by the community that constructs and uses it (Hospers 1997: 15). This arbitrary stipulation of meaning is noted in how the lexicons of one language do not map onto the lexicon of another language. Hence, Quine (1960: 37-40) argues that this informs the basis of the problems of translation between languages. In the following section, we will engage with some translations, the first will be between the natural languages of Setswana and English and the second between each natural language into a symbolic representation. Some problems concerning meaning will be considered at the end of the section. Logical connectives The first connective outlined is the conjunction. This connective conjoins at least two or more propositions (conjuncts separate atomic propositions that make up a complex conjunction) as being contemporaneously affirmed by

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the symbol of the ampersand “&” used for its representation into formal logic (Martin 2004: 18). The conjunctive complex proposition is assigned truth value and is dependent on the values assigned to the conjuncts. This is to say that the truth value of the complex conjunction is determined based on what truth values the conjuncts have. Significantly, a conjunction is considered true only when both conjuncts are true not to the exclusion of the other (Martin 2004: 61). And in the case of quantified logic, two or more properties are said to be true of the subject in the proposition. In Setswana, various terms take the function of expressing a connective that conjoins clauses as independent clauses or referents to form one complex proposition. These words are “le” and “e nale”3. However, these terms are not used synonymously; in other words, they cannot be used as terms that are substitutable for one another in the sense that they are stipulated with a said meaning depending on the context of application that implies the arbitrariness but also the vagueness of terms in the language. Another connective is the disjunction identified by the word-type “or” symbolised as “V” (Martin 2004: 20). In Setswana, the type-word kgotsa is used to express the equivalent of “or” in English. The disjunctive connective (or) indicates options between alternative propositions (smaller aggregate sentences that make up the complex disjunction are referred to as disjuncts) to which at least one or both can be affirmed. The connective stipulates conditions on which the disjunctive complex proposition is to be assigned some truth-value and so a complex proposition is true in the case that one of the disjuncts is true (Martin 2004: 17). In Setswana, “kgotsa” is used as follows in a sentence: “A o batla kuku kgotsa dibisikitsi?” It is translated into English as “Do you want a cake or biscuits?” Material conditional is a connective whose use results in an if-then conditional statement formally symbolised as “→” (Martin 2004: 21). The connective indicates a dependency relation between one fact following on the assertion or affirmation of another. It is on these grounds that the proposition, which stipulates the condition on which the other is to follow, is called the antecedent and the other the consequent. The material condition is truth-functional in as far

See McCormack (2006). These varying forms of conjunction connectives are identified as “mme”, “ya” and “e nale” as taken from the online Setswana dictionary. We suggest that what is taken in natural language by some to express a conjunction here i.e. “mme” is conflated with the more approximate meaning and employed as a conditional if-then statement instead. This is an important clarification to make considering the precise exposition of connectives given in this chapter, the class of which distinguishes between a conjunction and material conditional complex sentences.

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as its insertion in a proposition specifies the conditions under which the complex proposition is to be considered true. In the Setswana lexicon, the words “mme”, “fa” denotes (as the most approximate translation) and equivalent, in the English lexicon, of the word ‘if’ and the meaning and function assigned to it.4 The word is used to express conditional statements and in this use, the word is placed in a sentence as an indicator word to introduce the conditional assertion or the antecedent that specifies conditions under which some consequent proposition is to follow. For instance, in addition to mme, the phrase "go raya gore” is often used to indicate the consequent proposition, which together with fa - the antecedent indicator construct the complete conditional statement. The fourth and final connective is the negation. The function of negation connective in a proposition is that it is used to deny or negate any proposition, be it a negative or affirmative claim (Martin 2004: 23). The negation is also truthfunctional such that affirming the negation extends to the meaning of the proposition as being false. Simply put, the addition of the connective modifies the truth value of the proposition as the opposite of what the given negation has excluded. The connective is symbolized as “¬” in formal logic. In Setswana, a negation is approximately best translated by the term "ga" which is directly translated as a denial of whatever clause follows in the proposition. For example, the proposition “ga a bine le bone" is translated as "not he/she danced with them". Supposing that the sentential structure of the proverbs specifies a subject and predicate structure, predicate logic instead of propositional logic will provide a more accurate mapping of the logical form of the selected sentences to undergo analysis. Predicate logic in the context of this study of Setswana proverbs is important for elucidating logic as it functions at the word, phrase or grammar level of meaning, instead of giving concern to the higher sentence level of meaning as it is with propositional logic. Thus, we will not be using propositional logic in the formal translations of analysis that is to follow below. Classical laws or principles of thought In our examination, the Setswana proverbs are used to explain the sense in which it can be said that they are compatible to and consistent with the presuppositions of classical laws of thought. The first of the logical principles relating to the classical laws of thought that we will consider is the law of

4 “Mme” often denotes different meanings, which are determined in the context of application or utterance of the sentence.

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identity. This is a logical principle which stipulates that a thing (a) is identical to itself (a) (Sogolo 2004: 244; Etieyibo 2016: 24). The converse proposition entailed by such a proposition is that a thing is not identical to another thing when it is the case that the same set of properties that are said of one thing (a) cannot be said of the other (b). So, when a speaker asserts something, it is assumed (as a logical principle) that they assert that and not some other disparate sort of thing. To reiterate, according to the law of identity, a thing is identical to itself and is not some other distinct sort of thing (Hospers 1997: 55-56). This law is symbolised as a = a. In the sample of Setswana proverbs, one which closely instantiates the form of the principle of identity is; a) “kgosi ke kgosi kaatswetswe”. A direct translation of which would be this: “A chief is a chief as it/he is born”. The translation of this sentence in accordance with the law of identity would require separating the subject clause (from the remainder of the predicate clause). This would result in a sentence of the following syntax or composition; “kgosi ke kgosi”, translated into English as “A chief is chief” and which can be translated into its predicate symbolic form as ∃(x)(Cx = Cx), where ∃(x)(Cx = Cx) means “there exists something that is a chief and it is identical to itself.” In this formulation, the proverb reads as there being such a thing, such that it is a kgosi and it is identical to that which is a kgosi by some set of qualities or properties. On this interpretation, a line of similarity can be drawn in the formal or grammatical structure of the proverb to the formal structure of the law of identity. The law of identity expressed as a=a, and the proverb clause similarly symbolised in a grammatical syntax instantiated in the formula ∃(x)(Cx = Cx). But a similarity is drawn also between the meanings expressed by the law concerning the designation of identity and the proverb. Kgosi ke kgosi expresses the sense that a thing is just that thing. In this utterance, the speaker cannot be referring or designating something other than a kgosi in using the term kgosi. In its full form, the proverb expresses the sense of what it consists in to be a kgosi, as a type-word or category. In other words, by stipulating the property of being ‘born’ in the predicate, the proverb takes on an extended sense which now establishes a necessary condition to ascribing anything as a kgosi. The second classical law, the law of non-contradiction states that it cannot be the case that a proposition (p) is both true and false at the same time (Hospers 1997: 56-57). To assert that P and –P is to make contradictory assertion, and this is denied in logic, as a principle. The law of noncontradiction stipulates a negative claim on what cannot be said of one proposition, i.e. that it cannot be both true and false in the same respect or sense. This is symbolised as ¬ (p & ¬p). Among the Setswana proverbs that we examined, none seems to directly resemble the formal structure of the law of non-contradiction. However, on closer examination, one proverb can be

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argued to exemplify the principle found in the law of non-contradiction. And this is: b) “Ngaka esasweng yaeta,” which can be translated into the English language as, “A doctor that is not dead visits, ”where N: “x is a doctor” (ke ngaka), D: “x is dead” and V: “x visits y”. This sentence can be symbolically represented as (∃x)(Nx& (-Dx → Vx). This sentence can be translated into propositional logic to elucidate the meaning with which our examination of the classical law is concerned with. In propositional logic, the sentence can be interpretatively broken down into D: “The doctor(ngaka) is dead”, and V: “the doctor (ngaka) visits his or her patients,” which are represented as the complex proposition, (D & V). In this symbolisation, the meaning of the proverb expresses a contradiction, and this is found in the notion that the doctor both lives and is dead. Or that he or she functions and does not function simultaneously in service to his or her clients. The law of noncontradiction as a negative claim is admitted or implied in this proverb insofar as the proverb denies the plausibility of simultaneously satisfying both descriptive properties of death and the act of visiting. This is explained in that such a state of affairs, that is those relating to the conjunction of the following: (a) visiting one's patients (functioning as a doctor) and (b) being dead (incapacitated and unable to function as a doctor); would be understood as a contradiction of terms by a Setswana speaker in some context. The third classical law of thought is the law of excluded middle, which states that, at a minimum, a statement can only be either true or false according to which either is affirmed or denied (Hospers 1997: 57-58). In addition to this positive claim, however, the stronger claim inferred from the law of thought is that a thought, proposition p cannot be neither true nor false but at minimum and mostly one or the other in the sense of an exclusive disjunction. Since the law is stated in the form of a disjunction, which is true when one of the disjuncts is true and the other false the symbolization of the statement precludes a situation where both disjuncts are true and false at the same time. Formally, the law is symbolised as p ˅ ¬ p. The same Setswana proverb, c) “ngaka esasweng yaeta” can be analysed as representing the law of excluded middle. The proverb is translated as asserting that a doctor who is not dead (incapacitated), visits his or her clients (fulfills his function as a doctor). This translation can be further interpreted in accordance with the form and expression of the law of excluded middle as a disjunctive statement in variety of ways. For brevity, one interpretation consists in asserting that a healer/doctor then is either dead or she/he visits (her/his patients, for a grammatically complete sentence). Yet, still interesting to note that the term referring to death here, needs qualification in the context it is used, and that the speaker intends to suggest something about physical or spiritual death for instance are ideas admissible to the Batswana. The former interpretation

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hence exemplifies or satisfies a token sentence of the type identified by the law of excluded middle (p ˅ ¬ p). The proverb expresses the meaning that it would not be expected of a doctor (ngaka) to visit her patients if it is also the case that he or she is dead. The sense implies that one of these properties needs to be exclusively satisfied by a doctor. The Rules of inference/argument forms The classical laws of thought have their object in the logical coherence in the assertion of statements and what these assertions commit us to. The logical coherence does begin with the fundamental laws that a speaker and the hearer would both presuppose as conventions in using the language. Logic understood as a system of reasoning functions by virtue of normative stipulations about how propositions and their assertion are to follow in formulating valid arguments. Given their primacy in logical conception and analysis, they are adopted as defining a prescriptive framework of processing thoughts to achieve valid reasoning. In following these argument forms one ought to reach some valid conclusion from particular premise(s). To deny or contravene these concepts is to either be ignorant of them or opt out of the paradigm of orthodox logic and perhaps appeal to some other disparate logical system of reasoning. In this section, we examine the rules of inference, as part of the fundamentals of classical formal logic. The central rule of logic is that of modus ponens. This rule of inference states that the major premise is a conditional statement and the minor premise is an affirmation of the antecedent. According to modus ponens, the valid conclusion that is inferred from these premises is the affirmation of the consequent (Martin 2004: 69). Any argument which takes this form is a valid argument independent of the actual truth of the premises. In other words, the validity is guaranteed and granted from evaluating the structural form of the argument not in corroborating the truth of the premises. A Setswana proverb that gives us the form of modus ponens is a) “ketlaja gasekejele, kejele keyoomompeng.” The complete proverb translates into the explicit assertion that to intend to eat is not to have eaten. And to have eaten is to refer to that which is in the stomach. Taking this as the most approximate translation and meaning of the proverb one can take the proverb as a form of a complex conjunctive proposition. The first proposition, “ketlaja gasekejele” will be our focus of analysis. The proposition expresses a logical relation of events which will be argued can be prima facie understood in terms of modus ponens. Where T symbolizes Ketlaja and translated as “x will eat”, and J: Kejele translated as “x has eaten”. Given ga as the equivalent term for negation, then gasekejele translates into ¬ J. It would follow that if modus ponens is represented as (P → Q), P, ∴ Q. And, the proverb states that “x will eat/ x has

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not eaten,” then the proverb can be interpreted in terms of modus ponens as the argument that if one will eat, then it is not the case that they have eaten. So, as according to modus ponens, if one will eat, then it can be inferred as a conclusion that the consequent is stipulated that it is not the case that one has eaten. This argument is represented as; 1. 2. 3.

Tx → ¬ Jx Tx ∴, ¬ Jx

Modus tollens is the converse formulation of modus ponens. Here, the major premise is also a conditional statement, P → Q; however, the minor premise asserts the negation of the consequent, ¬Q. These premises together entail the negation of the antecedent. Similarly, an argument that takes the same form is a valid argument. Thus, this would guarantee the truth of the conclusion if the premises are in fact true. Nevertheless, in the case that the premises are false then, the argument is valid, yet it is not sound which in this event is irrelevant to our analysis. The same proverb, a) “ketlaja gasekejele, kejeleke yoomompeng” can be examined for modus tollens. This comes from the reasoning that the only distinguishing feature of modus tollens from modus ponens begins with the change in the minor premise. According to the rule of modus tollens, the minor premise is the negation of consequent asserted as part of the major premise. So, in application to the proverb, the major premise translated into a conditional statement would read as follows: “If one will eat, then it is not the case that one asserts that one has eaten.” The consequent to be denied is that it is not the case that one has eaten. Regarding the prescription of the rule of inference, from this pair of premises, the valid inference of the negation of the assertion that one will eat can be made. For modus tollens, Tx will be taken to represent Ketlaja and which translates to “x will eat”. And ¬Jx: Gasekejele “x has not eaten” where the term ga is translated and used as a negation ¬. 1. 2. 3.

Tx → ¬ Jx ¬¬ Jx ∴, ¬ Tx

One of the two classical syllogistic arguments that we will be analysing in to relation to Setswana proverbs is the conjunctive syllogism. A conjunctive syllogism is a rule of inference, which outlines an argument form constituting a conjunctive statement as the major premise of the argument (Martin 2004: 62, 63; Wittgenstein 2001: xvii). The minor premise of this argument is the

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assertion of one of either of the conjuncts included in the conjunctive statement. This proverb a) “ketlaja gasekejele, kejeleke yoomompeng” is a complex proposition. In accordance with our system of connectives, however, the comma in the sentence will be, for a more accurate or approximate meaning, translated as a conjunction (&). To translate the proverb; one that wills to eat has not eaten (Tx → ¬ Jx) and equally having eaten is to speak of that which is in the stomach (Jx → Mxy). That proposition would be the major premise of the syllogistic argument and the minor premise would exclusively be either one of the conjuncts. Say if we affirm that kejeleke yoomompeng/ to have eaten is to have that in your stomach (Jx → Mx), then by the inference rule of conjunctive syllogism the other conjunct, ketlaja gasekejele / to desire to eat is not to have eaten (Tx → ¬Jx) would be inferred as the valid conclusion that follows from the premises. Subsequently, where Tx: ketlaja symbolically translated as “x will eat,” Jx: kejele translates as “x has eaten,” and Myx: “y is being digested in x’s stomach”. The symbolic translation of the argument is as follows: 1. 2. 3.

(Tx → ¬ Jx) & (Jx → Myx) (Jx → Myx) ∴, (Tx → ¬ Jx)

Another of the two classical syllogistic arguments is the disjunctive syllogism, which consists in a disjunctive statement as the major premise (Wittgenstein, 2001: xvii). The minor premise is the negation of one of the disjuncts included in the major premise. According to conjunctive syllogism, the valid inference to follow from these premises is the conclusion which is an affirmation of the alternative disjunct asserted in the disjunctive statement (Martin 2004: 75-76). In the proverbs that we looked at, there is none that directly lends itself to the use of the connective kgotsa (or). Hence, the proverbs must be interpreted implicitly, not explicitly, by making use of a disjunctive statement to allow for a form of disjunctive syllogism. The Setswana proverb, b) “Garelebe motho, releba molato” is one that relates to customary impartial attitude with which council members are to approach disputes at the tribal court counsels referred to in Setswana as lekgotla. The proverb translates as the assertion that “we do not examine the person, we examine the fault.” This expression can be translated in terms of a disjunctive type proposition. For instance, b) “Garelebe motho, releba molato” can be taken to be a normative claim about how the courts are to operate by not examining the person but rather the fault. Interpreting the sentence into a disjunction will result in a sentence specified as the major premise of a disjunctive syllogism. The proverb b) could

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be reformulated into a disjunctive statement as follows; b*) “Relebal motho, kgotsa releba molato” (We examine the person or we examine their fault), where Tx: “x examines the person”, and Lx: “x examines the fault.” Both sentences combine to form a compound disjunctive sentence that we will interpret as the major premise translated as; “we either examine the person or the fault”. This interpretation allows for the retention of the meaning of the proverb which is a normative expression affirming the proposition that it is not customary to examine the person over the fault. Hence, the disjunctive syllogistic argument can best be utilised for its requirement of a disjunct that is negated. Thus, to express this disjunctive syllogistic sense of the proverb, the proposition that one ought to examine the person, when considering matters of court, will be negated (¬Tx), as the proverb implies. The syllogism would be formally symbolised as follows: 1. 2. 3.

Tx ˅ Lx ¬Tx ∴, Lx

In the given proverbs and their logical formulation, it follows that Setswana proverbs are not strange to logical rules of inference. However, the consistency of these expressions of thought is the result of an interpretive exercise carried out by us (and which anyone versed in the proverbs and logic can do). On our analysis, the proverbs, when properly formulated, bring out some rich aspects in Setswana language in terms of general sentence structure and suitability to the formal inferential principles of logic. The rules and classical principles fundamentally function in defining what constitute coherent, logical and reasonable beliefs. And they also provide a procedural methodology for deriving rationally plausible, logical and valid inferences. A significant point to raise from our examination is that any analysis of Setswana proverbs into logical rules involves actively transfixing the language expressions of thought into the predetermined tools that organise thought. For a proper analysis, understanding and validation of the meanings expressed in the proverbs, the analyst has to have some grasp of the Setswana language or its syntax. But also, the speaker has to be proficient in the concepts and meanings that are implicit in the logical rules. The exercise of translating the meanings embedded in the proverbs into the logical system of thought is an active process in this way. 5 Contextual methodologies of the concepts of classical logic in Setswana proverbs In this section, we aim to provide some ground regarding the extent of what we know about the nature of the logic embedded in Setswana proverbs (even though

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we have made a case that they are consistent with classical logic). That is, we are going to be looking at a group of proverbs in terms of compatibility criterion. We say more in a moment what this criterion entails. The motivation for doing this is the claim by Ocaya (2007: 293) and the work by Hallen and Sodipo’s (1997: 30) in the Yoruba language. Ocaya claims that logic is implicit in the expressions of thought as found in the sentences of a particular language and the work by Hallen and Sodipo provides evidence of discrepancies in meaning between languages, allowing for the inference about languages and their cultural location as disparate and different. If we juxtapose this with Sogolo’s (1993: 74) appeal for the professional scholar to utilise methodologies that are specific to the social context to which a culture is prominent, then our examination of the nature of the logic embedded in Setswana proverbs will have to be sensitive to context and culture. The larger point that should be taken from Sogolo is that the African philosopher ought not to employ “alien” methodologies, but rather should use culturally specific and situated techniques and concepts on the understanding that the ontological feature of rationality is universal. The ways of conceptually configuring and perceiving the world and one’s reality are all determined and differentiated significantly by the social structure the individual finds himself or herself in. To vindicate the kind of assessment that considers contextual and relativist concerns, we want to draw on some points made by Thomas H. Kuhn as part of his broader argument for the development of science. Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) is a sociological and historiographical account of the development of science, as a discipline of study. His account explicates the nature of science, as a discipline that is contrary to common belief does not show a cumulative progression of its fundamental canons (1970: 2). Instead, Kuhn argues that at different periods a normal science is established only after the resolution of a crisis within a preceding theoretical paradigm. A crisis may lead to an anomaly and the resolution can come either as a modification of theoretical cannons within a paradigm as slight articulation based on some modifications (1970: 52-53). Here, an anomaly is the recognition (importantly by most intellectuals within the discipline) that nature does not fit the paradigm specific conceptions and thus leads to a suspension of their preconceived systems of thought or assumed canons of logic. This period provides ground for new and previously incredible beliefs or conceptions that provide better explanation for reality or nature as it is observed. Kuhn further postulates that significant to these paradigms is that they are incommensurable and thus explains how these incommensurable theories about some observable facts are not cumulative but arbitrary and disparate. Operating out of one paradigm amounts to “loosening the rules of normal research” (1970: 82). While Kuhn’s thesis focuses on science as a field with a particular structure of thought, it is the implications of his assessment for the broader understanding of

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that which we call a field of study or discipline that is of interests to us. His postulate about the progression of disciplines through the rejection of previously established theoretical axioms and rules of thought or rationality within a paradigm introduces the idea of taking context into account for any discipline including logic. The notion of the contextual dimension of logic is made stronger when we consider Kuhn’s idea about science along with some of the ideas about contextual epistemologies and methodologies espoused by Sogolo and Fricker. That is, Sogolo’s (1993) claim about unbiased methodologies and Fricker’s (2007) point about the moral epistemic necessity of the scholar (in this case the African scholar) to have recourse to unbiased methods of critical assessment (to the authoritative and dominant power within the social structure) in terms of situated epistemologies. To understand a discipline first and foremost as noncumulative in its theoretical postulates (as Kuhn speaks about science) requires a reflective assessment in time, and the conditions under which new paradigms in thought arise through the emergence of an anomaly in preceding conceptual schemes and the nature of its progression of its canonical thought system. In affirming the notion of contextual methodologies and epistemologies, what we do in the remaining part of the section differs decidedly and markedly from what we did in the previous section. What follows is an explorative assessment of a sample of Setswana proverbs as a set of beliefs. These proverbs are taken to be axioms where they are assumed as self-evident statements. This is justified by the fact that the proverbs serve as idealisations about the society and its function. Thus, these axioms concern metaphysical, ontological and ethical propositions situated within the Batswana community. The proverbs are not explicated or coupled with justificatory arguments for their assertions and truth value rather they are (1) organised and analysed in terms of their word-types in the subject and or predicate clauses for their propositional postulate; and (2) categorised according to the referents identified in the sentences such as “kgosi”, “mme”, “ngwana” to name a few. This classification process of organising data into categories is employed to set up a system consisting of propositions of a certain type. For instance, propositions expressing meanings concerning the type of a thing denoted or designated by the term Mme (mother) are categorised under this type-word as token-propositions. It is presupposed that the token proposition, however, expresses variant type propositions. This is to say that the classification process involves grouping sentences that express different meanings, hence variant typepropositions. However, the different propositions all share one common theme. Themes are identified in type-words, which for the limits of this discussion will only include categorisation in identifying the referring terms. The propositions under a category are used as a closed set of axioms (self-evident beliefs) each which expresses token-meanings which may or may not be similar.

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This classification is followed by an assessment of the nature of the logic expressed in these propositions. The aim of this classification is to test the set of thematic propositions for the relation of their meanings as a set of axioms. The logical relationship between these expressions tested for is the criterion of compatibility. Or simply, whether they exhibit some contradiction, namely, a logical criterion to ascertain or establish the extent to which one proposition contradicts another. A contradiction here refers to a case where a proposition is asserted and denied within a category, and between categories. These are used as meta-concepts on which the proverbs are evaluated for their relationship as meaningful expressions. These concepts are taken to be the logical concepts that least interfere with meaning such that by utilising these concepts as measures of logic we are presenting a lesser kind of intrusive concepts, namely, an analysis that does not begin by imposing a particular system (that is taken to be universal) to a localised language. This is different from what we did in the previous sections where for example, the rules of inference and syllogisms as logical concepts are imposed and taken to be the case and true for all system of thoughts including the Setswana. Logical concepts or logic of the kind that is intrusive yields to Gyekye’s (1995: 9) claim for a universality of reason to all peoples across cultural disparities. The notion of culturally universal concepts means that methods of reason are true for all peoples and in or of all culture. Although Gyekye (1995: 7) speaks of culturally universal concepts or reason it is the logical law of noncontradiction that he seems to think is culturally universal. Subsequent to these considerations, the method of assessment followed here will differ accordingly, where the law of non-contradiction along with the criterion of compatibility (it is possible to affirm both logically independent propositions p & q) will be used as meta-evaluative concepts to the logical assessment of the propositions within specified categories. The first category to assess is the “kgosi” type-word category: 1. The Chief is Chief by birth.

Kgosi kekgosikaatsetswe.

2. The Chief is Chief only on account of the Tribe.

Kgosi kekgosi kamorafe.

3. Assertive translation: The dassie when it eventually went to the Chief lost a tail. Implicative interpretation: The chief is an agent of justice.

Pela erile ge yeKgosing, yatlhoka mogatla.

4. Implicative interpretation: The chief places the interests of her/his community first and her/his own interests come last.

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All four propositions in this category do not contradict one another. That is, they do not present us a relationship of incompatibility. A chief being chief by birth implicatively means that under ordinary circumstances a chief is necessarily determined by his lineage or descent. The second expresses the function or purpose of a chief identified or determined by his tribe. To say that these propositions do not contradict one another is to say that, for the Setswana speaker, as a member of the Batswana community, he or she will accept them as coexisting together. The first proverb is not a denial of the second proverb and neither is the second proverb about the chief’s acknowledgement and his/her duties to a community a denial of the necessary condition of his/her lineage as impacting on the chief’s right to undertake such duties in the first place. The assertion that the chief prioritises the concerns of this community over his own interests is different to asserting that he/she is a symbol of the community's justice and authority. For further qualification, it could be argued that all four propositions in the kgosi category are compatible with one another. This is to say that in some possible world the propositions being affirmed can all be true. The second category is the mma (mother) type-word category consisting of the following proverbs. 1. The mother does not fear to seize the knife at its sharpest edge.

Mmangwana keyootswarang thipa kakwabogaleng.

2. An illegitimate child belongs in its mother’s home. Ngwana wadikgoro kwagammaagwe. The assertion that the mother does not fear to seize the knife at its sharpest edge is a direct admonition and is different from the assertion that a mother’s home is the kind of thing to which an illegitimate child belongs to. Both assertions express propositions that relate to different senses of responsibility ascribed to the mother. According to the second proverb, a mother’s home represents a home for the illegitimate child, and according to the other proverb a mother is also capable of being a strict disciplinarian, thus showing the relation between a mother and that which she nurtures. These propositions are not at odds with the meanings that they individually express; they are compatible in so far as it is possible to imagine a community in which both idealisations about the mother’s role can be simultaneously true. Additionally, the compatibility and contradiction criteria apply across categories. Where the proverbs and their expressions concern the terms “mother” and “chief”, one could say that they are not at odds with one another. To elaborate, being the kind of thing that provides care for one and being a disciplinarian to a child is not to be the kind of thing that is at odds with the concept of another distinct thing — a thing of the sort ascribed as

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being responsible for and accountable to a community. Furthermore, it is not to be at odds with something that is determined by the nature of its birth as to whether it ought to be the sort of thing that is given a particular set of duties as it relates to the community. These interpretations of the propositions are significant in drawing out two important inferences about the nature of the logic that may be said to be embedded in these expressions. First, is the conclusion that as far as the categories are concerned and in the context of the non-contradiction criterion these propositions do not contradict. Thus, besides serving as an indicator of the logical system, it can be thought of as an indicator of the possible disparate logic embedded in the particular culture without presupposing a culturally universal logical system or structure. If the compatibility or compatibility criterion functions or works as they are intended and expected to, then it follows that some logic besides the one presupposed is possible given that the compatibility criterion is intended to help us determine the nature of the logical system which may be at odds with the canon of classical logic. The second inference is that if the meta-criteria are borrowed from the classical system of logic and subsequently their application to any analysis is meant to evaluate the extent to which the classical logic system conform (implicitly or explicitly) to these other culturally contextual and salient expressions, then classical canons of logic can function beyond just being an evaluative tool or method. In both inferences, the presupposition will be that the concepts of classical logic as meta-evaluative criteria may be taken to be reliable in measuring the extent to which some other disparate logic can be uncovered if it is true of the language and its cultural metaphysics. 6 Some worries There are some worries that may be raised against our project. The worries basically are methodological worries. That is, they are worries raised against our method of investigation of logic in Setswana proverbs. The first worry is that our method is problematic. Its problematic lies in several areas: one, it utilises concepts or criteria belonging to classical logic to test for a distinct and possibly variant logic and thus endorsing the position that classical logic is superior to other logics.5 Simply, that our methodology of using logic as a

Adapted from Mudimbe’s (1988, 157) relativist thesis whose concern is with the cultural introjections that inform the scholar’s methods and conceptual approach to their study. We cash out his thesis as one that makes a call for a search into a logic that could be authentically African. And as it relates to our project a logic that is localised to the Setswana culture, if it so happens that such logic is embedded in thought and their linguistic expressions.

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meta-concept (logical concept for evaluating other logics) for assessing other different and indigenous logics expressed in the Setswana language is problematic since it positions classical logic as the ultimate logic. Two, the method of investigation presupposes the nature of a logic, which may or may not be monolithic or universal. The third area is that we may be subject to confirmation bias in our explorative exercise. Our initial response is given that of our goal in trying to show that though there may be variations in logics, there seem to be some underlying similarities, and the use of classical or formal logic to begin the evaluation appears appropriate, particularly given that it is a useful and well-developed logic system. Our assumption is that the Setswana language consists of the same linguistic taxonomy as that found in classical or formal logic only in so far as the language is assumed to have words that function similarly as what are taken to be pronouns, adverbs, adjective and conjunctions (or connectives) function in cognate languages. Let us briefly say something about the issue of confirmation bias before making one final point about the misguidedness of the general worry about endorsing the superiority of classical logic and utilising concepts or criteria belonging to classical logic to evaluate other possible distinct and variant logic. It may be that by interpreting Setswana proverbs through classical logic constitute an ad hoc methodological feature of our analysis,6 which introduces some bias insofar as we do not assume a neutral position in our analysis. In other words, because we do not utilise a neutral method, we cannot anticipate findings in our analysis which are neutral to or may counter the logical system that we have utilised.7 The issue of confirmation bias is one that we think does not really arise in our project. This is so because our project has a somewhat narrow focus — that of showing whether there is some consistency between classical or formal logic and Setswana proverbs and whether Etieyibo and Ocaya’s findings in the context of the Urhobo and Acholi languages is the case with the Setswana language. So, of course, our

See Hountondji (1983: 189). We apply the interpretive free play device that prescribes how the scholar has to follow through on methods of analysis. Such that to take Hountondji’s claim implies mapping out a systemic, reliable and neutral methodology, which enables an inquiry to be more accurate and authentic in virtue of delimiting the introduction of factors that may be biased. 7 This is a position advocated for by Sogolo (1993: 73) who argues for the representation of culturally relative African philosophical methodologies and theories. His admonition is that the contemporary scholar ought to be aware of other methods of inquiry and take them as existing with and alongside Western analytic philosophy. 6

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analysis may be driven by this narrow focus and may have shown that some African languages, as media of expression, have a logic that is consistent with classical or formal logic thus corroborating the idea of the universality of rationality. In any case, we should pay heed to Momoh’s (2000b) point that an examination of proverbs as sources of knowledge does not entail the denial of the credibility of indigenous local epistemologies or there being a rational system of thought on which traditional African communities are wedded to. We now come to the misguidedness of the general worry, which must be pointed out, is centred on the understanding that utilising the concepts of a particular logic to determine the nature of another is to give a privileged position to the former as a universally valid concept along with its embedded metaphysical, logical and epistemic concepts. This worry, we claim, is wrongheaded. The objection is one that relies on the particularist and relativist position, as argued for by scholars like Okere (1983: 64) and Sogolo (1993), according to which the philosopher is admonished to adopt methodologies that are specific and suited to the cultural context in question. It is misguided because its force or plausibility depends on whether the particularist has the upper hand in the debate between particularism and universalism. But as we know the jury is still out on this. And to string a worry on an issue that is beyond resolution is to miss the point about the substance of the debate and issue in the first place. Yet, and in any case, is not clear to us that the scholar is able to carry out an examination that is paradigm neutral in accord with Kuhnian postdate about an a priori conceptual scheme. The point is that the phenomenological world the professional philosopher lives constitutes part of the framework and elements with which she or he organises his or her reality.8 The social context of the scholar, as a constraint precludes the professional philosopher from occupying a theory-neutral approach in their analysis as proponents of strong particularists and relativists such as Okere and Sogolo may argue for. As Thomas Nagel (1989) has reminded us, there is no view from nowhere. Contemporary context is a particular landscape, which will have bearings on the kinds of facts we can know about such that traditional logic may or may not have been true of some African languages. The constructivism of language and its indeterminacy of translation make it a particular object through which

Kuhn (1970: 85) takes the change of theoretical canons of a paradigm as a change in worldview of the scholar. He argues however, that prior to any agreement about a new hypothesis, the scholar needs to suspend her judgement as consisting of the preceding conceptual framework through which she interpreted reality and has certain expectations concerning it.

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we cannot expect to exhaustively express traditional and modern logics (Hallen & Sodipo 1997: 16). Consider, for example, Ocaya’s (2007) observation that the Acholi language does not accommodate nor conform to the law of excluded middle. Ocaya’s observation may be attributed to the lexicon of the Acholi language, as refuting some aspects of the classical law of thoughts. The refutation of concepts of classical logic expressed through language propositions as Ocaya demonstrated may show some evidence of a particularised logical system. Yet, such instances will not only be rare. But they are also of insignificant value to the grand project of explicating or providing knowledge into the nature of indigenous logics (whether designated as pre-colonial or pre-modern) that correspond to particular epistemologies and metaphysics of respective African cultures.9 Stated differently, instances, where concepts of classical logical are not conformed to through some linguistic expressions, cannot be mistaken as informing one of the exhaustive nature, character nor content of a disparate logic of a particular culture or worldview. However, these instances of anomaly or discrepancy measured by logical concepts provide insight into some logical canon that characteristically opposes the classical concept of contradiction or compatibility. These anomalies, then, prove to be either stipulated and explained by the speakers of the language about some aspect of their shared reality, or they are the result of a conceptual lacuna independently inherent in the lexicon and the taxonomy of the language in question. For sure, conceiving or imagining an agent who can suspend judgment absolutely is possible. However, even if we assume that there can be a view from nowhere, there is a difference between conceiving of an agent who can suspend judgment absolutely and actually in fact suspending all judgement. Although we accept the view that we can imagine a hypothetical scenario in which the logic true of Setswana is something other than classical or formal logic; however, we reject the view that in actual fact we can show that, it is as analysed in this chapter, other than or different from classical or formal logic. In so saying this, we claim that in fact, we cannot know of any other disparate indigenous or traditional logic nor its complete nature or content even if we are to suspend our judgements as they are informed by the canons of classical or formal logic. Any attempt to demonstrate this will require further assessment of the concepts of logic with respect to the Setswana language in the context of 9 Okere (1983: 9) argues that the supposed link between the language of a culture and its thought are not as clear and well understood as we would ordinarily think. He thus signals the need to be cautious in the relations we draw between the two in the logical assessments of languages.

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different sets of proverbs than the ones we have analysed. We are not aware of the existence of proverbs different from the ones that we have studied, which will provide some framework for a different kind of logic or a non-cumulative and non-exhaustively-traditional kind of a logic that may diverge from classical or formal logic. Another worry is that our examination of proverbs places us as validating ethnophilosophy. This worry arises from the consideration that the semianthropological method of observing peoples and their cultures as merely descriptive communal world-views is not a study whose object is to be equated with that of philosophy (Deacon 2004: 111). Stated differently, the point is that ethnophilosophy and its content are not philosophical in as far as they are considered to be axiomatic beliefs that present no basis in reasoning or their justification. Such a method would, as described by some advocates of analytic philosophy, be at odd with what is constitutive of the discipline of philosophy.10 A number of scholars have made a case for the relevance of ethnophilosophy to African philosophy (See Chimakonam; Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy and Etieyibo, Unpublished Manuscript) so we would not be rehashing their arguments here. What we want to add is that the position that Gyekye (1995), Oruka (1984), Etieyibo (2016) and Ocaya (2007) defended in respective projects concerns the nature and substance of logic, as a system of reasoning, and its positive relationship to the particular cultures located in the African continent. By such project, these scholars demonstrate that the content of ethnophilosophy can be philosophical insofar as it is logical. Call this the internal justification for ethnophilosophy. In addition, the scholars also do what may be called an external justification for ethnophilosophy insofar as in addition to taking note and cognisance of the relative cultures of Africa they also take on an active and critical study of the beliefs and thought, as expressed in the languages or proverbs. That is, they do not merely present, what Momoh calls, a descriptive account of the metaphysical and cultural views (Momoh 2000b: 272-373). A final worry is that which concerns the extent to which our analysis can be considered a reliable source of validation of the meaning of the proverbs in the Setswana culture that we examined. The more general worry here is that our project may be such that the meanings that are particular to the Setswana language are lost in the process of our analysis. Let us call this objection the These would include scholars such as Hountondji (1983: 34, 38) who describe ethnophilosophy as a study in the colonial and post-colonial era, where the oral culture of African societies was documented as per semi-anthropological studies. Thus, such methods of analysis are dubbed world-view descriptions of cultural beliefs.

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semantic-intrusion objection against our method of analysis of Setswana proverbs and language. The assessment of logic in the Setswana proverbs presupposes that the language as an instrument of communication is also a medium through which some logic is expressed. Our response to this worry will be very short but before then we will like to say a bit more about the worry. In the main, the worry is an objection about our explorative and interpretative work. The objection raises the question of whether we are not misusing or have not misused the Setswana language and its semantics. In other words, by using propositions expressed in a particular language and exploring its meaning in terms of some foreign logic x, would it not be the case that we stand the risk of distorting the actual meanings of these proverbs as they were traditionally intended to be used or embedded in the Setswana culture? In which case our survey will only highlight and illustrate the arbitrariness of language and its meanings and point to the untranslability between natural languages (the Setswana and the English languages), on the one hand, and between language and formal logical concepts, on the other hand.11 Although one may worry whether the objection does not overstate and misunderstand the nature of our interpretive exercises, the objection seems to arise from the particularist or relativist position about indigenous knowledge, beliefs and methods of reasoning. That is, the critic here questions whether the interpretative exercise does not displace the meanings as found in the language. In particular, the objection, as some relativists such as Sogolo (1993: xv-xvi) and Mudimbe (1988: 23) may be disposed to argue, points to the notion of latching on to a cumulatively broader end of a historical account of the development of meanings as belonging to a particular culture. The particularist or relativist move is all in the pursuit, not for the mere purpose of retaining traditional beliefs, but for the purpose of some broader scope of knowledge, which includes traditional beliefs. The objection pushes us towards the need to examine the social context of knowledge production as a prelude to providing an analysis of logic within the Tswana language. That the philosopher in this context functions as both a translator and significantly, an interpreter makes the scholar an important social agent of some sort. Her or his role is important in understanding the nature of a logic that may be implicit in a particular language. For sure, the concern about interpretation is significant in the post-modernist and social constructionist theoretical insertions about our place in history. To 11 In their research in the Yoruba language, Hallen and Sodipo (1997) infer that some language propositions are untranslatable and thus by implication show the relative limits of meaning as expressed by language.

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give a brief exegesis of this sort of thinking consider the ideas of Miranda Fricker (2007). Fricker (2007: 148) explicates a theory of hermeneutic injustice (as epistemic injustice) which focuses on the unfairness or skewedness of the distribution of resources of interpretation available for the interpretation of one’s particular experience. Fricker claims that the injustice follows from the fact that one is disadvantaged because the group one belongs to is marginalized or excluded (historically speaking) from generating the kinds of knowledge that consider and have a significant bearing on one/the group’s understanding and experience of itself. Knowledge production is a social activity or product where concepts relating to peoples are generated within formal establishments of society, such as the academic arena, political institutions such as law (2007: 152). Fricker, of course, focuses on feminist studies, however, her analysis is relevant to our present discussion insofar as we are concerned with racially marginalised societies, which includes groups identified as those of African descent. The unequal qualification of certain experiences and the interpretations offered by structural or systematic institutions in authoritative positions in the social structure may be such that other experiences and their agential powers may be rendered as unintelligible and obscure. However, given the current socialpolitical context, this unequal hermeneutic participation is no longer a fact corresponding to the reality of our social structure. But as is also understood by Fricker, equal hermeneutic participation does not entail equality in hermeneutic resources available, for instance, when a particular paradigm, takes on a dominant dogmatic form that still marginalises the cultures and logical methods of certain peoples as Mudimbe (1988: 4) points out. The above discussion suggests that it is important to reflect on the social context and implications of our ideas. In the case of the assessments of Etieyibo (2016) and Ocaya (2007), their object was to contribute to an understanding of the extent to which some formal and classical principles of reason are present in an African language (Etieyibo 2016: 38), or not present in another African language (Ocaya 2007: 293). If one takes the case of the Acholi language, as presented by Ocaya, and concludes that just because it is different, it is not logic or not logical; one may in Fricker’s terminology, be committing epistemic injustice. That is, one may be guilty of hermeneutic injustice in the sense that one’s denial of logic to the Acholi language perpetuates the denigration of African cultures (Momoh 2000a: 180,186; Sogolo 2004: 245) just in case that what is presented in the Acholi language is logic, albeit a different kind of logic (from say that of classical or formal logic). Were one to take the African speakers’ experience (in the case of the native Acholi) about their beliefs to be inconsistent or strange, one will be creating a hermeneutic disadvantage and injustice for them. The hermeneutic disadvantage and injustice also applies to other constituent members of the society to which the belief and experience are

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located,12 and as the particularist or relativist reminds us that at a minimal, this disadvantage and injustice needs to be acknowledged by the African scholar and others. However, it is important to place our inquiry into context. While the assessment that we have done provides grounds to claim that Setswana proverbs are consistent with the canons of classical or formal logic, the assessment does not go as far as making a case for the completeness or richness of a logic that is implicit or explicit in the expression of thought in the Tswana language. Precisely, we do not claim that the analysis is such that it precludes any further investigation and analysis that will or may show the incompleteness of our conclusions, even though we believe that any further analyses of existing proverbs will support the conclusions that we have drawn or inferred. 7 Conclusion Similar to the project of Etieyibo (2016) and Ocaya (2007), we have argued that logic can be extracted from the Tswana language via proverbs. Although their study focused on different languages, a similar argument runs through all the three studies. The basic idea to take away from what we have done in this chapter is that Setswana, as a token African language, can be interpreted in ways that are consistent with classical or formal logic, that is as sharing features of the classical laws of thought and rules of inference, as central features of analytic philosophy. Though our inquiry does not provide us with a peek into the complete nature of what a disparate logic may look like in the Setswana culture and language, it is a useful and valuable inquiry insofar as it helps us to pierce into the nature of logic and its possible expression through the language. As we should remark, the premise of the adaptability and change of language along with the changes in its social context shows the constructivist nature of language, as Chomsky’s theory of language states (as cited in Masolo 2004: 559). This has significant bearing on how we come to think of our present use of language, say Setswana, and its capacity to retain and express any imbedded logics. To state this in hypothetical counterfactual form, if changes to a language co-vary with the worldviews and beliefs held within a society. Then, if the changes in the worldview and associated beliefs occur in a society this will invariably determine changes in the logical concepts ascribed

12 Miranda Fricker (2007) postulates that hermeneutic disadvantage, does not necessarily entail an instance of hermeneutic injustice, although the particularist or relativist may want to argue for such entailment.

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to the language. In this case, we cannot simply expect the language to implicitly express all the possible logical commitments true of the historical use of the language. The point is that the meanings associated with the language or the expressions of thought and the correspondent reality with which they have been established will change in the progression of time. In this way, any African language cannot fully express the logical concepts true of its culture. As well, it cannot absolutely point to a specific point in its history and past traditions. This particularly applies to the modern context of a globalised world (and with the establishment of the cosmopolitan age in African societies) where the distinction between cultures and their epistemologies are slowly disappearing (Masolo 2004: 570-571) or gradually being diminished. References Campbell, A. C. 1972. 100 Tswana Proverbs. Botswana Notes and Records, 4: 121-132. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40979320. Chimakonam, J. N.d. History of African Philosophy. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/afric-hi/. Deacon, M. 2004. The Status of Father Tempels and Ethnophilosophy in the Discourse of African philosophy. In Philosophy from Africa, ed. P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux, 97-111. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Eboh, M. P. B. 1983. The Structure of Igbo Logic as Shown in Dispute Settlement in Igboland, with Special References to Nzerem Town. Rome: Gregorian University. Eboh, M. P. B. 1999. The Concept of Igbo Logic. Journal of African Philosophy and Studies, 2.3: 31-43. Etieyibo, E. 2016. African Philosophy and Proverbs: The Logic in Urhobo Proverbs. Philosophia Africana. 18. 1: 21-39. DOI: 10.5840/philafricana20161813. Etieyibo, Edwin. (Unpublished Manuscript). Ethnophilosophy, African Culture and African Philosophy. Fayemi, K. A. 2010. Logic in Yoruba Proverbs. Itupale: Online Journal of African Studies 2: 1-14. Fricker, M. 2007. Hermeneutical Injustice. In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, 148-175. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gyekye, K. 1995. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Haack, S. 1996. Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond the Formalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hallen, B. and J. O. Sodipo. 1997. Indeterminacy and the Translation of Alien Behaviour. In Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft Analytic Experiments in African Philosophy, 15-39. California: Stanford University Press. Hospers, J. 1997. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 4th Edition. London: Simon & Schuster.

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Hountondji, P. 1983. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, 2nd ed. Trans H. Evans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kuhn, T. H. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Martin, M. R. 2004. Introducing Symbolic Logic. Peterborough: Broadview Press. Masolo, D. A. 2004. Rethinking Communities in a Global Context. In Philosophy from Africa, ed. P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux, 558-573. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. McCormack, A. 2006. A Further Look at Conjunctive and Disjunctive Forms in Setswana. ZAS Papers in Linguistics 43: 123-141. Retrieved from, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.630.5149&rep=r ep1&type=pdf. Momoh, C. 2000a. The Logic Question in African Philosophy. In The Substance of African Philosophy, 2nd ed. C. S. Momoh. 175-192. Auchi: African Philosophy Project’s Publication. Momoh, C. 2000b. Philosophy in African Proverbs. In The Substance of African Philosophy, 2nd ed. C. S. Momoh. 359-376. Auchi: African Philosophy Project’s Publication. Mudimbe, V. Y. 1988. The Intervention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Nagel, T. 1989. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ocaya, V. 2007. Logic in the Acholi Language. In A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 285-293. Oxford: Blackwell. Okere, T. 1983. African Philosophy: A Historico- Hermeneutical Investigation of Conditions of its Possibility. Landham, MD: University Press of America. Oruka, H. O. 1984. “Sagacity in African Philosophy,” International Philosophical Quarterly 23.4: 383-393. DOI:10.5840/ipq198323448. Quine, W. V. O. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Sogolo, G. S. 1993. Foundations of African Philosophy: A Definitive Analysis of Conceptual Issues in African Thought. Ibadan, Nigeria: University of Ibadan Press. Sogolo, G. S. 2004. Logic and Rationality. In Philosophy from Africa, ed. P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux, 244-286. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. South African History Online. 2017. Tswana. Accessed October 28. http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/tswana. Wittgenstein, L. 2001. Tractus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. New York: Routledge.

Chapter 9

A Justification for an Excavation of a Logic in African Worldview Chris O. Ijiomah University of Calabar, Nigeria

Abstract According to an etymological definition, philosophy makes a claim to wisdom and knowledge, and it thus promises to generally better the condition of humans by enriching their lives in a manner that is different from and above the material and practical imperatives. But has philosophy been able to meet up with the above philosophical claim in Africa? I will explore this question in the light of the demand for a logic that can explain realities as pictured in African worldviews. My aim would be to offer a justification for the existence and utility of what can be called an African logic. Keywords: Logic, Africa, Philosophy, African logic, Reality 1 Introduction The answer to the question is that the promise has been delayed because of certain problems Africa has faced and is perhaps still facing. Some of those problems include the historical slave trade which devastated the continent, poverty and colonization. The summation of the effects of the problems can be described as a psychological trauma which has conditioned Africans to a second fiddle position; hence many Africans look up to the whites as superior beings. This trauma yet leads many Africans to a stage where they cannot exercise original and autonomous thoughts for development. Consequently, African problems got zeroed down to a lack of initiative in introducing development in different areas of their lives. This characterization of many African people encouraged some scholars in the West like David Hume, Emmanuel Kant, George W. F. Hegel and LevyBruhl to mention but a few, to suggest that Africans had no mind nor logic.

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To make philosophy relevant, that is a tool to overcome these problems, Africans have to practically and theoretically accept that every culture is rational from its perspective (Barnes 1965). Thus every culture can build its philosophy and produce its logics and epistemologies and other branches of philosophy. This orientation can restore hope and upliftment to the embattled Africans. This is the background for excavating a logic in African world-view. From what has been said earlier, the impression of the whites about the cognitive status of Africans at the advent of the Europeans was that Africans had no logic, (Levy-Bruhl 1923). Though there has been a withdrawing attitude from such a position, yet, some historical premises in African philosophy still generate such a conclusion. For example, C. B. Okolo states that: In the modern time, in Anglophone Africa, for example, it is certainly after the Second World War. In other parts of Africa, the historical origins of African philosophy, if any, are traceable to the same period of literate tradition after people had attained some degree of leisure and material satisfaction. (1987: 27) From the above quotation, one would help Okolo to conclude that philosophy in Africa is a phenomenon of the 1940s. One can also satirically argue that if such is the case and logic is a constituent part of philosophy, then Africa had no logic at a time in history. Perhaps because of the arguments like the one above, Meinrad Hebga (1958) takes an apologist position on the existence of African logic. This chapter would not be complacent on the level of a mere apology. It would rather as a response to Etuk's clarion call (2002) concern itself with an attempt to constructing a logic that can be termed African. Before we get into this, we would like to talk about what we mean by logic. This will help to make clear the objective of our discussion and hence give us a direction to how this exercise can be carried out. 2 What is Logic? Logic, for some people, is regarded as the study of valid arguments (Carney and Sheer 1980). Some others define it as a study that distinguishes valid arguments from invalid ones (Shoenfield 1967; Copi 1972; Cohen and Nagel 1978; Putill 1979). In all these definitions, argumentation and reasoning seem to be clearly spelt out as major pillars of logic as a study. But, if we go further down to the foundation of these pillars, we would agree that every reasoning and argumentation tries to bring together statements with an eye on their unique connectivity and this connectivity gives rise to or implies a final position. This connectivity which is a relational concept is the foundation on which logical inference is built. This is why Cohen and Nagel (1978) say that evidence has compelled them to recognize that the foundational task of logical science is

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the study of relations. To buttress this position, we may consider an overflogged sample of a logical format: 1) All men are mortal 2) Socrates is a man 3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal Our claim, judgment or conclusion is not about the truth or falsity of any of these three statements. Our claim is a relational one, that is, if (1) and (2) are accepted, then (3) necessarily must be claimed. Thus, logic considers language (statements) from a standpoint or relation. According to P. Coffey (1914), the standpoint from where a material object is considered depicts the formal object of its associated science and hence, the nature of the science. Therefore, we can say that logic is a science of relations. From what we have said in terms of language, logic deals with statements or assertions. An assertion is a vehicle for stating what things are or what things are not (Newton-Smith 1990). Assertions, therefore, are ontologically directional. For this reason, only assertions or indicative sentences are categorically used in logic. Connecting this fact to the point we made earlier (that logic's main object is relations), it means that there must be an assumed ontological precedence for the idea of relations to take place. This implies that statements are representations of realities. Therefore, it will not be out of place to say that logic deals with the relationship between and among realities. One of the theses of this chapter, therefore, is that the study of logic is inextricably connected with the study of realities. Perhaps, this is why Michael Dummett says that: When logic is taken in the broad sense in which it comprises the theory of meaning understood as a branch of philosophy, the idea of logic that has no metaphysical, that is, no ontological component is a delusion. There cannot be an aseptic logic that merely informs us how language functions and what is the structure of thought which is expressed without committing itself to anything concerning reality, since reality is what we speak about... and an account of language demands an account of how what we say is about reality and is rendered true or false by how things are in reality. (1965: 431-432) What Dummett is saying is that logic is primarily a dependent variable cast on the nature of reality, in that the conception a person has about reality (ontology) suggests the nature of the relationship that does exist between two or more realities. This is why J. Zeleny (1980) in his presentation of Marxian logic supports the idea that there cannot be a logic that is independent of reality. Since logic has been conceived as a variable dependent on the conception of reality, it has been maintained by some philosophers that human beings'

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comprehensive conceptions of reality (world-view) is a fundamental standpoint from where everything that can be known is explained (Halverson 1976). Christian missionaries and apologetics additionally contend that worldviews vary from one culture to another. No wonder then at the turn of the twentieth century, especially at the instance of the resurgence of relativism many thinkers did credit to each different cultural world-view, its validity and integrity. What is emerging from this discussion is the observation of Alexander Goldenweiser that every ontology including “supernaturalism” has its rationality or logic (Barnes 1965: 41). Since logic is a dependable variable on the conception of reality which varies from one culture to another, one of the tasks I have set before myself is to delineate a conception of African world-view in relation to which everything else we discuss about Africa can be known. This work will thus, use it as a source of articulating an African logic. This articulation will be done by sieving out possible relational principles from the African world-view and hence coordinate the principles into a system. The system will stand as the logic this work has in view. 3 African World-view or Reality In our presentation of African world-view or reality, we will attempt to incorporate the views of the following areas in Africa. Placid Tempels (1959) represents the Bantu of east and central Africa, while Henri Maurier's interest will be in the entire black Africa (1985); Kwame Gyekye (1984) will labor in Akan, (Ghanaian) ontology, J. Ayoade (1984) and Emmanuel Edeh (1985) will be coming from a Nigerian point of view. Some others will be representing other regional areas in Africa. In Africa, there are three intimately related cosmological areas which form the abode of realities. These areas include the sky where God - Chukwu or Chineke, major divinities and angels reside. The second area is the earth where man, animals, natural resources, some devils and some observable physical realities abide. The third area is the underworld where ancestors and some bad spirits live (Elemi 1980; Ejizu1985; Mbiti 1970). An ancestral world of reality to an African is very important that the description of the African world of reality cannot be complete without regard to the ancestral presence and ancestral power (Ikenga-Metuh 1985). This is why T. H. Mbuy representing the interest of Cameroon (West Africa) refers to "human, ancestor and God" as the representatives of the realities of these worlds (1992: 9). African ontology, therefore, refers to the speculations about and articulations of the nature of these three levels of realities within which African existence can be made meaningful and intellectually supportable. All the realities of the earth, the under-world and the sky are categorized into

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two, the physical and the spiritual realities. Batholomew Abanuka (1994) confirms this position by saying that reality from a traditional African point of view includes things that are material or immaterial, their connections, effects and ultimate support or source as they are given in the consciousness of the traditional African when he experiences the universe. Thus, in conceptualizing reality in traditional Africa, there must be a complete transverse summing up the reality from one world with the ones in the other two. An omission of, or stoppage at one world renders African reality incomplete. Irrespective of this categorization, each reality is characterized by vital force (Tempels 1959). Maurier (1985) adds that in whichever world realities exist, the fundamental thing about them is that they relate to each other. This relationship or interaction is made possible by the fact that every existent being has a spirit or force inhabiting it. This belief accounts partly for the veneration of things and this prompted foreigners who visited Yoruba land or Africa in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to describe the religion of Africa as animism (Iroegbu 1995). Thus, in African view, every reality has both the physical and spiritual elements. What qualifies a reality as spiritual or physical is its prominent feature through which the reality exercises its force. This feature can be sensuous or non-sensuous. Even God is conceived as having both physical and spiritual attributes. This is why he is able to create the different worlds; one cannot give what one has not. This conception of God is expressed in Igbo asphorism "Chineke bu muo na madu1,” God is both spirit and flesh. It is this partial naturalized mode of the Divine that made Ikenga-Metuh to say that God is no stranger in an African community (1985). We can bring more credence to this assertion by echoing an Akan proverb which says that if one wants to complain to God, he can equally tell it to the wind. According to K.O.K. Onyioha this composite but complementary nature of God brings Him from heaven and places Him near man (1980). 4 The Nature of Relationships among Realities in the African World-view For the Africans, each reality, whether spiritual or physical, appears and disappears into and takes the nature of the opposite reality. With this phenomenal interpenetration of realities, the Akan people believe that realities relate to themselves in a manner that gives rise to a fundamental or harmonious relation. Iroegbu uses "internal relational law and dynamics" to describe this harmonious relation (1995: 287). Thus, the process of relations between and among realities in African world-view involves a dovetailing of realities into one another. It is in this type of relationship that equilibrium is maintained in the universe of things. In an attempt to normalize this balance, man resorts to

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charms, sacrifices, libation and ritual symbols. Olusegun Oladipo succinctly presents this type of relationship among reality in Yoruba cosmology thus: In spite of its supernatural underpinning, it is essentially naturalistic.., Thus, nature for the Yoruba is an integrated whole in which all forces and powers, human and nonhuman, physical and quasi-physicalinteract in mutually reinforcing manner. There is thus in Yoruba worldview, like that of many other African people, a sense of order and continuity of experience. It is this sense which underpins the peoples' idea that everything is ultimately explicable in both animate and inanimate realm. (2002: 157) All these are meant to illustrate African idea that reality is cyclic. The spiritual appears as a physical reality and goes back to the spiritual world, and the cycle continues. This means that the physical has an inbuilt spirituality, and the spiritual has an inbuilt physicality. The acceptance of the two harmonious worlds is reflected in the prayer life of the Igbo people. In prayer (Ibochi), for example, Africans try to normalize the relationships among the three worlds. In a type of "Ibochi,” libation is made to both the living and God through the ancestors. The act of libation attests to the people's firm belief in the presence of the invisible beings who are ready to have communion with the visible ones through the agency of the ancestors. This harmonious (dialectical) relationship is further explained by Edeh in what he calls occult phenomenon. Accordingly, to this belief, people of special initiation meet with spiritual agents for matters affecting their interests. This brings out the idea of duality not dualism in African thought. Thus, Edeh says: For the Africans, the world is dual in nature. Beyond and over the visible, tactile physical world, there is a non-visible, non-tactile world which envelopes the former. It is simultaneously within and outside of the earth and sea. (1985: 74) Edeh re-affirms this harmonious monism by what he calls Igbo theory of duality. According to the theory, all beings exist in a dual interrelated fashion. The sensible are not wholly sensible. They exist as phenomena of visible and invisible realities. This dual but interwoven existence is recognized in farming, harvesting, marriages, professional "choice-making" and any other aspect of African life which involves rituals. Thus, the African view of reality is summarized at the point of union between the physical and the spiritual. According to Edeh, Adesanya said that Janheinz Jahn had used this African frame of mind to support the thesis that African world-view is that of extraordinary harmony (Edeh 1985: 114). Accordingly, Adesanya states that this view serves as a basic criterion with which everything in Africa can be

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measured and articulated. Adesanya described this principle thus: "to be human, one must be at one-to-one correspondent" (Edeh 1985: 116). 5 An Excavation of a Logic in the African World-view Now that we have outlined the world-view of a cross-section of Africa and the relation of its realities, we would attempt to travel through personal reflection on the relationship. Theophilus Okere (1983) calls this personal inquiry, the correct route to African philosophy (logic). This logical route would mean for us an individual questioning, rethinking and coordination of the relationships in the world-view. The first thing that comes to mind as we subject African world-view to questioning is, what are the underlining principles on which the relations between and among African realities operate? Since this relation depicts realities as fluid and dovetailing, one can assume that the principles of their relationship are those of inter-communicability, complementarity and cyclic archetype. From African world-view, therefore, the logic we are articulating is not monolithic. Instead, it accepts the coexistence of seemingly opposing realities which however complement each other. This is what is expressed in the proverb, ‘wherever something stands, something also will stand beside it.’ It means that nothing can realize itself without what it is not. This, thus, denies absolutism or "Ego solus". Instead, it suggests that everything actualizes itself only when it absorbs what it is not. In this sense, the relation we are articulating disallows contradiction for what is true or real in this logic emerges only when the whole members of the continuum of reality, (physical, and spiritual) are united together. But the law of contradiction which is a principle from a different world-view maintains that if there is an 'X', that 'X', cannot combine with (-X) to produce truth. African science of relation accepts that everything in the world including 'X' has a missing link. For X, this missing link is something other than "X', it is not X, that is -X. Naturally, X yearns and struggles to capture this missing ‘link;’ it is only at the time of "complement" with this not X (-X) that X realizes itself. At this completion moment, X has itself and something other than itself. Thus, the actuality of X is "X" and something other than "X" i.e. (-X). This is why Innocent Asouzu emphasizes from the African point of view that in the context of the “missing link,” reality's aim is integration into a system where no being excludes the other but leads to a perfect integration (2004: 91). This missing link is borne in mind as an African conducts syllogism in African logic. For example, using Etuk's syllogism of status: (1) If anyone cuts another person's palm fruits, he will pay fine. (2) S has cut another person’s palm fruits.

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(Given the two premises, in the western world-view it does follow that S should pay this fine). However, in the world-view we have articulated if S is a grandchild of the "other person's" community, meaning that S and the "other person" are different arms of the same community then (3) "S will not pay any fine" (Etuk 2002: 98-116). This is because S and not-S (which is the other person) equals the element in the same community. Emphasis on the nature of this logic can yet be expressed by the proverb, "Out Osisi anaghi eme oke ohia" (one tree does not make a forest). This is expressive of the extended family system. No person is "ego solus", one must exist effectively only at the services of many others. If one is short, he cannot be tall; if one is a woman, she cannot be a man, and so on. Then for one to actually realize himself, he requires the complement of opposites. However, in this logic, every reality's function is unique and hence has its merit. And on the basis of uniqueness, all functions on the two sides of the complementary relations are equivalent, This logic has something to do with traditional African polygamy. I had a conversation with Mazi Chijioke Enwere. At the time of the interview, he was one of the oldest men in Ngwu village in Uzuakoli in Abia State, Nigeria. My question to him, which sparked off the conversation was "how correct do you think that economic status is a reason for traditional African polygamous life?" Instead of going straight to the question, he decided to rephrase it. He said that a better way to put the question is this, "what are the reasons for polygamous life in traditional African setup?" when he said that, I nodded in acceptance and he went on to answer the question in its amended form. According to Mazi Chijioke Enwere, he who goes for more than a wife goes with the principle "ejikota aka gbuda ulo muo anaghi enye ya ewu' (literally, it means that if people join hands in pulling down the spirit's house, a fine of a goat cannot be incurred). The explanation to this is that there is power in the unity of diverse potentialities. In other words, he is saying that if one marries more than one wife, he does it with the hope that he will have many children. Every child has his or her own talent and the summations of these different talents must always produce a force for any enviable operation. The difference between harmonious monism (as I would like to christen this African logic) and the logic of the West as exemplified in the logics of Hegel and Marx is that the latter (Hegel and Marx) do not allow extremes (materialism and spiritualism) to meet. It is only in African logic that such is possible. In this African logic, none of the extremes is forced on the other. Opposites are always harmoniously in monism. Neither of the opposite is inferior nor superior to the other. The only language that is heard in such a logic is the language of reciprocity of talents. In this situation, there is no need to force oneself out of one's area of comparative advantage since everyone is

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recognized for what one is. And everyone at each time complements and is being complemented. Another difference between our logic and the logic of the West is not only that our logic derives from our world-view. Ours also is characterized by duality or what Animalu (1990) terms reciprocity curve, a curve that terminates only at a point of complementarity; whereas the classical Western logic derives from the classical Western world-view and is epitomized in Descartes dualistic worldview. This world-view is presented by Anscombe (1976), namely, that there are two distinct substances or realities, the spiritual or corporeal, the mind or body or the intellectual and the empirical. These opposites, according to Descartes, logic can neither tangentially nor conceptually meet. And any attempt to place them on the same logical order results in a contradiction. Also, the classical Western logic falls into two categories, either into pure dualism as Aristotelian subject-predicate logic shows or into monism. We shall discuss only the Western monism which some people can easily confuse with our articulation of African harmonious monism. Western monism has several strands; these are in the modern or contemporary time represented by Hegelian, Marxian or Fregean logics. Hegelian and Marxian dialectics are logics of nihilism. Either everything is reduced to the ideas (spirit) of Hegel or there is a reduction of all things to the material things of Marx. In these logics, freedom is given only to one of the opposites. In the case of Hegel, the triangle of reality is turned upside down, while Marx stands it on its toes. To place the triangle of reality on its head as Hegel did is to give priority or freedom to idea, spirit or concept and to place the triangle of reality on its toes is to give priority or freedom to matter as Marx did. African logic places the side of the triangle on the floor. It is only in this position that the extremes of reality can complement themselves freely and hence have equal freedom. In our articulation, H S M A

= Hegelean logic = Spirit = Materialism = Harmonious monism of Africa

In H, matter falls into the spirit, concept or idea and gets absorbed. While in M, spirit falls into the matter and is absorbed. It is only in A that both matter and spirit have their rights, independence and freedom. In the case of Frege, his logic is an attempt to unite all realities in such a way that they lose all their attributes except those of logic. Accordingly, all realities are what they are or have meanings only from a definite reality point of view. It has much in common with Hegel's logic in that the two are always in search of the absolute "one". But they differ in that for Hegel, the individuals are

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moments or parts in the absolute. But Frege considers the individuals "Platonically". In Western monism, therefore, what actually goes on is a reduction of one or more things to a "one". This is why we brand such a logic "subsumptive monism". But in our type of African logic, monism does not imply a reduction of one reality to another. It is a unification of two or more things that complementarily realize themselves. The implication of this logic is that the poor, rich, cobbler, engineer, physicist and artisan are at different moments, working toward the same goal but from their functional or best area of comparative advantage. In this, all opposites form one living “unitary and inseparable reality" (Ruch and Anyanwu 1984: 87). What the West calls contradiction, (M + S) f R, where M = material phenomenon and S is spiritual phenomenon and R = reality, the Africans call complementarity (M ∪ S) = R. Bearing in mind the roles the principles of inter-communicability and complementarity in our study of the relationship between our modes of reality, we can summarize the principles of our science of relation thus: (1) R or I represents reality or universe of discourse (2) M and S represent material and spiritual phenomena, respectively, and these are contraries that can however harmoniously unite. They are not opposites that result in contradictions because, in our world of reality, both physical and none-physical unite. (3) U represents the reciprocity bond or union (4) C represents circles that empty into themselves as inner curves of reciprocity. (5) Thus (a) (MUS) = R or I (b) M = R - S (c) S=R-M In this logic, two things are said to be equal, not because they are ontological modes of the same thing, but because they have the same complementing abilities in the same universe of discourse. For example, using M and S as contrary phenomena (material and spiritual) M = S because for M or S to realize itself in the universe of our discourse, each needs the complement of the other. It is so because they have the same complementary strength. Regardless of the fact that M has a "peculiarity function" different from that of S, their strengths are the same. Thus, when the two (function) get into union (M∪S) a stable whole is realized. This means that equality for this logic consists in the maintenance of peculiarity functions that are complementary in strength. In this understanding, if 'M or S’ abandons its peculiarity function and assumes the function of the contrary, the sum of their complementary strength loses its equilibrium. Thus, in this logic,

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equality is neither possible in an "identical sense" nor in "a modal sense". It is only possible in a complementary sense. 6 Conclusion This chapter started by advancing a position that the task of philosophy is not that of practical engineering or applied science. Its claim is to generally better the condition of man by enriching and polishing the ideas of man's mind. It further claims that this task is different prior to and better than material imperatives at least, from the perspective of foundationalism. In Africa, however, this work discovered that philosophy has not been able to deliver its claim. The reason is that the African man has been choked with societal problems which got zeroed down to being a man in confluence. This made many Africans look up to the White for directives. For this reason, the Westerners came up with the idea that Africa has no logic. In order to overcome this problem through philosophy, the work not only encouraged Africans to develop their minds through a logic that is relevant to their environment; the work developed a logic from an African world-view, a logic that is different from the Western bivalent logic. This logic is expected to help Africans to reason through the problems they encounter in their environment. References Abanuka, B. 1994. A New Essay on African Philosophy. Nsukka: Spiritan Publications. Animalu, A. O. E. 1990. Ucheakonam: A Way of Life in Modern Scientific Age. Owerri: Government Press. Anscombe, E. 1976. Descartes Philosophical Writings. Nelsons: The Open University. Asouzu, I. I. 2004. The Method and Principles Complementary Reflection in and Beyond African Philosophy. Calabar: University of Calabar. Ayoade, J. 1984. Time in Yoruba Thought. In African Philosophy: An Introduction. 3rd edn. Wright, R.A. (ed.), Lanham: University Press of America. pp. 93–111. Barnes, H. 1965. An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World. 1. New York: Dover Publications. Carney, J. and R. Sheer. 1980. Fundamentals of Logic. London: Macmillan. Coffey, P. 1914. Ontology or Theory of Being: An Introduction to General Metaphysics. London: Longman and Green Co. Cohen, R. M. and E. Nagel. 1978. An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, 3rd ed. London: Routledge and Kegan. Copi, I. 1972. Introduction to Logic. New York: Macmillan Publishing.

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Dummett, M. 1965. The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Edeh, E. 1985. Towards Igbo Metaphysics. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Ejizu, C. 1985. Continuity and Discontinuity in Igbo Traditional Religion. In The Gods in retreat: Continuity and Change in African Religions. ed. E. IkengaMetuh. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers. Elemi, M. E. 1980. Introduction to Traditional African and World Religions. Ogoja: Ushie Printers. Etuk, U. 2002. The Possibility of African Logic. In The Third Way in African Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Kwasi Wiredu, ed. Olusegun Oladipo. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Gyekye, K. 1984. Akan Concept of a Person. In African philosophy: An Introduction, 3rd edn. R. A. Wright, ed, 199–212. Lanham: University Press of America. Halverson, W. H. 1976.A Concise Introduction to Philosophy. New York: Random House. Hebga, M. 1958. Logic in Africa. Philosophy Today, 11.4/4: 222–229. Ikenga-Metuh, E ed.1985. The Gods in retreat: Continuity and Change in African Religions. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers. Iroegbu, P. 1995.Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy. Owerri: International University Press. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1923. Primitive Mentality. Trans. L. A. Clare. New York: The Macmillan Company. Maurier, H. 1985. Philosophy de L’Afrique Notre. Augustine: Antropps Institute. Mbiti, J. S. 1970. African Philosophy and Religions. London: Heinemann. Mbuy, T. H. 1992. Understanding Witchcraft Problems in the Life of an African: A Case of Cameroon. Owerri: High Speed Printers. Newton-Smith, W. 1990. Logic: An Introductory Course. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Okere, T. 1983. African philosophy: A historico-hermeneutical investigation of the conditions of its possibility. New York: University Press of America. Okolo, B. C. 1987. What is African Philosophy: A Short Introduction. Enugu: Freeman. Oladipo, O. ed. 2002. The Third way in African Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Kawsi Wiredu. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Onyioha, K. O. K. 1980. African Godianism: A Revolutionary Religion for Mankind through direct connection with God. Owerri: Conch Magazine Limited. Putill, R. 1979. Logic, Argument, Refutation and Proof. New York: Harper and Row. Ruch, E. A. and K. C. Anyanwu. 1984. African Philosophy. Rome: Catholic Book Agency. Shoenfield, J. 1967. Mathematical Logic. California: Addison-Wesley Publishers. Tempels, P. 1959. Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine. Zeleny, J. 1980. The Logic of Marx. Transl. and ed. Terrel Caver. Oxford: Blackwell.

Part 3: Introduction: African Logic, the Debate In this part, authors confront two prominent questions which were inspired by the discussions in part two. They are: is a system of African logic possible? If it is, should it be unique and peculiar to African cultures or universalisable? Essays in this part herald the beginning of a formal debate on whether there is or could be such a thing as African logic or not. Campbell Momoh was unequivocal that there can be such a thing as African logic. According to him, it already exists informally; what is needed is for African logicians to pick up the gauntlet of formulating it in an artificial language. On the part of Udo Etuk, the idea of African logic may be possible but there are obstacles which caution practitioners to be careful. However, Uduma O. Uduma boldly rejects the possibility of African logic and describes efforts at constructing one as not only misguided but tendentious. He weaves his objection in the satirical question: can there be (an) African logic? But Jonathan Chimakonam in matching his audacity retorts, why can’t there be (an) African logic? Chimakonam moves to dismantle Uduma’s arguments against the possibility of African logic and dismisses them as inspired by subliminal brainwash of Western tutelage. He accuses Uduma above all else, of being mischievous and too pessimistic. Specifically, Momoh who raises ‘the logic question’ in African philosophy is convinced that at some point, African philosophers would have to face that question since there are elements from the Western bloc that are making bold and insidious claims regarding the African’s capacity for logical reasoning. But he cautions that those who would confront the Western iconoclasts and those who would support them should, as a minimum, observe the distinction “between two senses of logic—natural logic by which is meant critical, discrimination, rational and reasonable discussion and discourse in natural language, and artificial logic by which is meant the setting up of constants, variables, sentence connectives, and deduction and transformation rules for deriving the formal validity of arguments in symbolic logic” (Momoh 2000: 175). According to Momoh (Momoh 2000: 175), “[I]t is obvious that a discussion of the logic question in African philosophy must consider these two senses—natural logic and artificial logic.” Momoh (Momoh 2000: 175) argues that the “competent individual in any society is logical in the first sense. As regards the second sense, it is very well known that an individual whether competent or incompetent, is logical if and only if such an individual is a logician trained in the techniques of modern symbolic and deductive logic.” Thus, for Momoh, these two sets of individuals exist in any society

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whether Western or African, and as such, he thinks that the arguments by some Western detractors like Levy-Bruhl and Horton are misplaced. He objects to their conclusion that principles of logic are not present in African languages and culture. He appeals to examples in the African lifeworld including, the logic in the Azande jurisprudential system to discount such submissions as erroneous. For Momoh therefore, the logic question in African philosophy is not whether Africans have the capacity for logic because all humans do; it is rather whether there can be such a thing as African logic, developed by Africans as a system of formal reasoning. Momoh’s daring question sets up the debate proper by spurring scholars to take sides. Etuk who took out time to weigh the arguments of those on both sides decided to tread cautiously by asking the innocuous, yet provocative question: is African logic possible? Etuk cleverly avoided answering his own poser. He would rather show the strength of the arguments on both sides. One gets a sense that at some point, Etuk wanted to be read as objective and noncommittal but he quickly comes around at the concluding part of the paper, like a kite-making a swooping dive at a wandering chick whose mother is distracted to betray his sentiments. He even proposed a name for the possible African logic. Uduma belonging to the universalist school and obviously provoked by what seems like Etuk’s guile at appearing non-committal early on in his discussion suspects it was a strategy, perhaps to win the mind of his readers before showing his inclination later on. But what do you expect in a debate? Representing those that object to the possibility of African logic, Uduma marshalled arguments employing analogies to put down the enthusiasm. For him, logic is a universal tool that necessarily has to be topic-neutral. It does not matter which part of the world one is; it is the same principles of logic that govern human reasoning. He warns those Africans who are tempted to follow Momoh, Etuk and Ijiomah that they are cultural jingoists who are unwittingly falling into the trap set by Western racists. If Africa were to have a separate logic because of the claim that they think differently, it would be direct confirmation of the views of racists that Africans are not completely human. Uduma admits that what the Western irredentists who question the African’s capacity for logic are doing is not only incorrect but wrong. But he claims that such discriminatory pronouncements may have had a toll on the African scholars who now see it as a battle to reclaim Africa’s identity. Uduma says that this effort would be over-shooting the runway if it is geared towards formulating a peculiar logic to show that Africans think differently from the rest of humanity. However, Jonathan Chimakonam comes in to halt Uduma on those tracks. He claims that Uduma misses the point of those who canvass for the

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possibility of African logic. For him, Uduma fails to distinguish the two camps in the relativist school, namely; the system builders and the culture-bound camps. He explains that Uduma’s criticisms might apply creditably to the later where actors like Leopold Senghor and Ijiomah dictate the vision but certainly not to the former where you have the likes of Meinrad Hebga, Momoh and Chimakonam himself. While the culture-bound camp advocates a separate logic peculiar to Africa as a way of proving a point to the Western opponents, the system builders are interested in developing new systems of logic from the cultural inspiration of Africa as Africa’s own contribution to world intellectual history. Such a system would not be peculiar to Africa or uphold the claim that Africans think differently from the rest of humanity because it would be a universalisable system. Chimakonam’s essay sets up the challenge of formulating such a universalisable system of African logic which will be the focus of the essays in part four. The four essays I selected for this section are not the only works in this debate, but they are strategic. The reader and the student of African philosophy and studies are encouraged to research the field and read other debaters. The teacher is expected to guide the students through the readings in this section to help them understand the inspiration, direction, connections and intellectual implications of the arguments in the essays. Reference Momoh, C. S. 1989/ rev. edn. 2000. The Logic Question in African Philosophy. 175-192. In C. S. Momoh (ed.) The Substance of African Philosophy. Auchi: APP Publications.

Chapter 10

The Logic Question in African Philosophy Campbell S. Momoh University of Lagos, Nigeria

Abstract The argument that there is logic in African philosophy will be pegged on a distinction between two senses of logic—natural logic by which is meant critical, discrimination, rational and reasonable discussion and discourse in natural language, and artificial logic by which is meant the setting up of constants, variables, sentence connectives, and deduction and transformation rules for deriving the formal validity of arguments in symbolic logic. For the moment, it is important to note that even though symbolic logic deals with the structure and form of propositions and arguments on a very general level its traditional concern and, at any rate, one of its very important applications is to arguments and propositions in natural language. Keywords: Logic, Africa, Logic question, African philosophy 1 Introduction The argument that there is logic in African philosophy will be pegged on a distinction between two senses of logic—natural logic by which is meant critical, discrimination, rational and reasonable discussion and discourse in natural language, and artificial logic by which is meant the setting up of constants, variables, sentence connectives, and deduction and transformation rules for deriving the formal validity of arguments in symbolic logic. For the moment, it is important to note that even though symbolic logic deals with the structure and form of propositions and arguments on a very general level its traditional concern and, at any rate, one of its very important applications is to arguments and propositions in natural language. It is obvious that a discussion of the logic question in African philosophy must consider these two senses-natural logic and artificial logic. It will be argued in this chapter that the competent individual in any society is logical in the first sense. As regards the second sense, it is very well known that an individual whether competent or incompetent, is logical if and only if such an

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individual is a logician trained in the techniques of modern symbolic and deductive logic. One disquieting implication of this second sense is that many professional philosophers are in fact not logical since they may not have mastered the techniques of modern deductive and symbolic logic! 2 Logical Neo-positivism in African philosophy A brief discussion, under this head, of logical positivism1 is relevant for some reasons. First, there are the views for Professor Robin Horton around which a lot of matters will revolve. These views culminated in Professor Horton’s denial of the existence of African philosophy. Horton is a logical positivist. Secondly, Professor Horton introduced, even if unplannedly and unconsciously, a new dimension regarding the question of whether or not African philosophy exists. It often happened that a prevalent tendency amongst scholars involved in this controversy is the proclivity towards a blanket and gross assertion or denial of the existence of African philosophy. When, for instance, the non-existence of African philosophyis indiscriminately affirmed, the engulfing commitment is that logical, epistemological, ethical and metaphysical issues cannot be investigated in African philosophy since these four areas traditionally constituted philosophy as a career discipline. Professor Horton would seem to be saying that this approach is too crude; the first method would be to prove or disprove the existence, one at a time and after the other, of logic, epistemology, ethics or metaphysics in African philosophy. The present writer endorses this new Hortonian approach as very appropriate. The third relevance which is really a concomitant extension of the first reason, of a discussion of logical positivism is the highlighting of two facts. The first is the fact that scholars affirming the non-existence of African philosophy enter the disputation field wearing Kantian spectacles; the visual field of perception cannot but reflects the colour of the lenses. After all, a logical positivist denies the existence of philosophy even as it is traditionally understood in the West. The second is the fact that many of these scholars did not acquire any interest in African philosophy in their dissertation days but the feeling seems to be that in anything African one view is as good as the other.

1 There are two other strands of interest in positivism. These are the linguistic strand and the physicalist strand. The linguistic strand concentrated on the analysis of words, concepts and expressions in natural language. The physicalist strand in positivism is more or less a metaphysical commitment to the effect that philosophy is either done in the manner of the physical sciences or NEVER.

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The logical positivists and their immediate intellectual fathers had a negative attitude towards traditional philosophy because of their admiration for, or upbringing and maturity in other domains of study. These were in the areas of theoretical science, applied science, mathematics, and logic.2 The progress and development of these sciences—natural and formal—account for both the positive and negative theses of the logical positivists. The positive thesis was that all knowledge is ultimately based on observation and sense experience which science, aided by formal language, is able to provide. The negative thesis was an evaluation of traditional philosophy in the light of the positive thesis by which it was logical to conclude that metaphysicians and speculative philosophers indulged in activities that were neither literally significant nor cognitively informative. Many logical positivists ignored the history of philosophy. “It is indifferent to me”, Wittgenstein announced with an authoritative air, “whether what I have thought has already been thought by another” (Wittgenstein 1922). That the positivists ignored the history of philosophy does not argue that such a defect produces unenlig htening insights. But a concern for the history of philosophy would have revealed, first, that what they indulged in was a pre-occupation and not a novelty and second, that traditional philosophers do not shy away from “speculating” and making their views known on the problems and realities of the age. In this latter regard, the Ancient Greek philosophers are seen by Barker to be united in postulating for the citizens of their ideal cities, abundant leisure for high things. They admitted and justified slavery as the necessary basis for that leisure (Barker 1970: 33). The point here is not meant to prove that the Ancient Greek philosophers were right in their justification of slavery. But slavery was a fact of Greek history and it is to the credit of the Ancient Greek philosophers that they did not shy away from expressing their views about the institution of slavery. Slavery, slave trade, and colonialism were also facts of British history, and, to my mind, it is not to the credit of the British adherents of the new movement that they did not express their views on colonialism and the institution of slavery.3

2 Honestly one can sympathize with the plight of a Bertrand Russell who, after having matured in mathematics where proofs are conclusively established, came to acquire an interest in an area where elaborate argumentation seemed endless and inconclusive. Bertrand Russell was a serial monogamist; he married four times in his life time, and with each new wife, he changed his philosophy! Or the plight of a Wittgenstein who has been conditioned to see “concretes” in anything but was now asked to grapple with voluminous tracts of Hegelian Absolutes and Spirit. In such situations, it is natural that a first rate mind should seek to impose his own categories. 3 On its ethical plane logical positivism dismisses moral judgments- an assertion, for instance, that p is good or that p is bad (that slave trade is good or that slave trade is bad) – as

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The Ancients made concrete attempts to apply their metaphysical theories in solving problems of the day. Plato, like his teacher Socrates, made it the aim of his knowledge that it should issue in actions. He even attempted to translate his philosophy into action himself, and to induce a tyrant to realize the hopes of the Republic. Aristotle’s politics too was meant to guide the legislator and statesman and “to help either to make, or to improve, or at any rate, to preserve the status with which they have to deal” (Barker 1970: 11). It is well known that the social and political theories of the ancients often were an outgrowth of their metaphysics. And to the extent that a theory ultimately goes practical, the imposition of a rigid line to demarcate a metaphysical from a scientific theory will have to be based on considerations other than that one is speculative and the other observational. A familiarity with the history of science shows that even its practitioners are by no means agreed that science is a mere recording and observation of atomic facts. On the contrary, a respectable view of science is that a scientific theory is a pure invention of active intelligence. As Carl G. Hempel puts it, “the whole system floats, as it were, above the plane of observation” (Clark 1969: 108). It might, of course, still be argued that a scientific theory is a network of hypotheses which has to be endorsed by the observation of atomic facts, the impression here being that otherwise it has to be abandoned. This, again, the history of science has not conclusively proved. If anything, it is the mark of the average scientist to abandon a theory at the first appearance of a falsifying atomic fact. The eminent and matured scientist begins by first reflecting and speculating on what is or should be the nature of the universe. On the basis of his reflection he arrives at a rotational principle which he expects the facts to fit and so much will they be the worse for it, if they do not. This was why, according to Asimov, Einstein remained outside the mainstream of physics

sententiousness. Instead with G. E. Moore at the forefront (principia ethical) the focus was shifted to defining the word “good” out of time, space, history, culture and context. The business of ethics was now taken to be an anatomical display of the atomistic components of ethical proposition. Any philosopher interested in examining things further could do so but such a philosopher simply has to note that he was now on the fringes of emotions, subjectivism, exclamations, ejaculations and the expressions of mere opinions. In other words, a question regarding the judgment as to the goodness or badness of the slave trade is not an ethical question but an emotional one. By this curious doctrine, Britain was spared the unpleasant task of confronting large questions regarding its imperial history. It is no wonder that logical positivism became the British official philosophy. Its foremost exponents – Moore and Ayer – were even knighted! Meanwhile, unsuspecting colonial students who were destined and at any rate slated to assume the mantle of the administrative, intellectual and political leadership of their countries were imbibing the doctrine as the divine truth.

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when he could not bring himself to accept W. K. Heinsenberg’s Principle of Indeterminacy (Asimov 1979: 82). Nor is Popper’s thesis of falsifiability of any consolation here. If a single aberrant instance can falsify a hypothesis, what happens to the legion other instances that had confirmed the hypothesis? It is obvious that one aberrant instance cannot be allowed to hold this much sway because to do that will not only destroy a hypothesis which, for all we know, may have been a beautiful one but it will also amount to saying that what had been incontrovertible facts are no longer so since as a matter of fact some facts had confirmed the hypothesis and their factuality is called into question if the hypothesis they had confirmed is now falsified. Professor Robin Horton denies, on the one hand, African science and, on the other hand, the existence of African philosophy. Perhaps, it might be wondered how a logicalist would deny science. The answer lies partly in empirical behaviourism. Gustav Bergman (1968: 483) points out that “all logical positivists ... are behaviourists” who define all meaningful expressions in terms of what the scientist immediately observes. In this way, an atomic fact is thought to be what it obviously displays itself to be. And because Robin Horton, like Evans-Pritchard before him, often observed the practising metaphysician4 constantly chanting in his preparation and dispensation of medicines, it was analogical to think him a magician. This inclination to think that the practising metaphysician is a magician because of the resembling behavioural characteristics is understandable. For one thing, the practising metaphysician’s chanting and incantations can be unintelligible. For another thing, even if the chantings and incantations are intelligible, there is nothing in them to convey any impression of a metaphysical

4 The word “practising metaphysician” was coined by Dr. D. E. Idoniboye to capture the essence of the rational principle underlying the operations of the native African who is a philosopher, scientist, psychologist and moralist rolled into one. He had hitherto been referred to in the literature variously as the witch-doctor, the native doctor, the herbalist, the diviner or the juju man. This rational principle, in its constructive dimension, is a conjunction of two theses: “Nature is ONE, and the soul, mind or spirit, and the parts or constituents of things in the universe are harnessable for the good of man”. In other words, man can use the elements or the spirit and parts or things from the human and non-human world for his own good, well-being and progress. On a familiar plane this principle seems trivial. Thus man cultivates food on land, and with the aid of air and water, he expects the food to grow and be harvested, cooked and eaten in order to keep his body and soul together. On a professional and technical plane, the practising metaphysician who wants a cat’s heart to make an acrobat soft and lightweight is working with the same rational principle.

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and rational principle underlying their operations. The other part of the answer lies in the fact that Horton is a verificationist. He found the mode of verifying African science unsatisfactory and dismisses it on that basis. In part 1 of his chapter on, “African Traditional Thought and Western Science,” Horton lamented the fact that many anthropologists “have been unfamiliar with the theoretical thinking of their own culture” (Horton 1977: 50). He admitted that his training had been in Chemistry, Biology and Philosophy of Science but it turned out that as a ‘philosopher’ his idea of theoretical thinking was logical empiricism. He argued that we grasp what he presented as the intellectual function of the gods after which we will find that “many of the puzzles posed by ‘mystical thinking’ disappear” (Horton 1977: 52). In his comparison, Professor Horton pointed out what he took to be the key difference between the science of African traditional cultures and scientifically developed cultures. The system is “closed” in one and in the other, it is open (Horton 1977: 155). What this difference boils down to is the difference between science as a “local” enterprise and science as an “international” enterprise. Resistance to rival theories is a feature in both even though it is stronger in the first. However, the existence of avenues for an allogamy and cross-evaluation of ideas is an enviable feature of the second. Concerning philosophy, Horton’s initial position would seem to have been that logic is a separate discipline from philosophy which he defined in an epistemological vein, and as a second-order activity. His view of logic, then, in 1967, was “thinking directed to answering the question: what are the general rules by which we can distinguish good arguments from bad ones?” (Horton 1967: 162). By philosophy he meant “thinking directed to answering the question: On what grounds can we even claim to know anything about the world?” In these two senses of the words, Horton held that logic and philosophy are poorly developed in traditional Africa (Horton 1967: 162).5 Ten years later Professor Horton stretches this contention into the conclusion that traditional thought by which, in this instance, he expressly means all thought before Descartes, was non-philosophical in character (Horton 1977: 64). And as a logical positivist his yardstick for measuring traditional thought, by which he should mean ancient African philosophy, is well known. Logic and epistemology are now said by Horton to constitute philosophy. He defined logic as the asking of questions about the nature-and 5 See also Ayer’s Definition of Philosophy: “The thread which is emerging is that philosophy has to do with criteria. It is concerned with standards which cover our use of concepts, our assessment of conduct, our methods of reasoning, our evaluations of evidence”. Central questions in philosophy, (1973: 2).

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justification of the fundamental forms of human inference (Horton 1977: 65). In other words, he now defined logic, in contrast to his first position which construed logic as a study of the forms of valid reasoning, as a philosophy of logic where the emphasis is no more on a study of the forms and structures of valid reasoning but is a query about their nature and justification. Both conceptions are, of course, legitimate even though inconsistent and are a proper outgrowth of the second conjunct of the principle of atomicity. Professor Horton characterized epistemology as the investigation of how language relates to reality. The fact that an investigation of reality itself could be a formidable task did not seem to bother him. The way Horton characterized logic and epistemology, the shift in his position in respect of the former notwithstanding, is, however, consistent with the thesis of his paper that while there is no African philosophy, there is a philosophy of African traditional thought. But the expression “African Traditional Thought”, is in fact an umbrella word covering the metaphysics, morality, economics, politics, logic, epistemology science and law of traditional Africa. What, consequently, Horton should be understood as saying when he talks of a philosophy of traditional African thought is a “philosophy of X” where X is, say, logic, epistemology or law. Horton’s contention that logic and epistemology constitute philosophy rules out, in the logical positivists’ fashion, morality and metaphysics as they are traditionally understood. But it is also his considered opinion that one of the most important tasks of philosophy “is setting limits to the legitimate application of scientific thought and technique” (Horton 1977: 72). What Horton is saying, put in his own terms, is that logic and epistemology which constitute philosophy should assume the task of setting limits to the legitimate application of scientific thought and technique. It is difficult to see how epistemology can perform this task-at least when it is defined as the study of the relation of language to reality, and the nature of reality is left unclarified. Nor is the task made easier for logic on Horton’s characterization of it. For one wonders how a study that concerns itself with the nature and justification of the fundamental forms of symbolic logic can set limits to the application of scientific thought and technique. It is obvious that this task can be effectively performed only by policy-makers. But in performing this task, they will not be guided by epistemology and logic in Horton’s sense of these two terms but by the morality and social values, and perhaps, the metaphysics of a people in the sense in which traditional

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philosophy understands them.6 The upshot of all this is that metaphysics and morality remain legitimate and solid components of philosophy. Horton held that “traditional cultures, though eminently logical, have never felt the need to develop logic” (Horton 1977: 65). In the first place; it simply is not in the place of cultures to be logical. It is the individuals in a culture, and not the culture itself, that can be said to be logical. If there is any institution in a culture where things seem to hang together logically it should have been some individuals in that way. It is the individuals in the culture who feel the need to develop logic either in thought, action and indeed, or in relation to institutional arrangements. Secondly, since African traditional cultures were not, at any rate, literate it is difficult to see how they could have developed logic, even if the need was felt, where logic is understood in the sense of the second conjunct of the principle of atomicity. Besides and I am here relying on Professor Brand Blanshard, it is really absurd to speak of Euclid’s geometry or the logic of the Greeks as if these are the sort of things admitting of proprietorship (Blanshard 1973: 61). Logic, in its first sense, is concerned with clarity of fallacies, vagueness, ambiguity, and contradiction in natural language, and many logic texts devote a part to a treatment of topics of this sort. In everyday usage of natural language, we talk of a person as being logical if he is reasonable, sensible and intelligible; if he can unemotionally and critically evaluate evidence or a situation; if he can avoid contradiction, inconsistency and incoherence, or if he can hold a point of view, argue for and from it, summon counter-examples and answer objections. There are individuals in every culture who are logical in this sense and African culture is no exception. But the ability to finalize and

6 A pertinent illustration of this point is the attitude of Americans to the intervention of the neutron bomb and its contemplated deployment on European soil or the citing of nuclear plants in the United States. The Americans did not see anything outrageous in inventing and deploying a bomb that can annihilate humans by radiation while leaving physical structures intact. This attitude is quite consistent with the materialism of the American society. Concerning the citing of nuclear plants, an American would support it in so far as it is not cited within the vicinity of this ambience. This attitude is quite consistent with the individualism pervading the American society. The materialistic and individualistic attitude of the American has nothing to do either with the American’s idea of the relations of language to reality or his study of the fundamental canons of symbolic logic. Rather this individualistic and materialistic attitude stems from the metaphysics and morality of the American culture. When the policy-maker, the politician, and the policy executioners think of what exactly to do with the neutron bomb or where to site a nuclear plant, they are guided in their deliberations by what they know to be the American cultural personality which has been shaped by their morality and metaphysics.

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transform expressions of natural language and study the rules of inferences for validating argument forms is a technique which can only be acquired through formal education.7 Attention should, therefore, shift to the sense of “logic” as it is understood in everyday usage of natural language. Logic in natural language is an attribute of any competent individual. Logic as artificial language is an attribute only of a trained logician. The relevant question in this latter respect is whether there is any material in the thought, deed or action of the traditional Africans that can be symbolically regimented using the techniques of artificial language. The last “logical case” in this chapter is meant to illustrate that there is in fact such material. 3 Natural logic in African Philosophy In the course of my fieldwork among the Uchi people (Bendel State, Nigeria), Saliu Ikharo-an Uchi elder-told me a story of how an animal and bird were arguing over who was the oldest individual on earth. The animal was the chameleon and the bird was “ugbogbo” – a type of bird with a padded head. Before the argument could degenerate into a brawl, other elders in the community invited them to appear in the village court. The chameleon said he was clearly the oldest individual because at the time he was born, the ground was so soft he had to tread on it with care so that it would not sink. The bird based his claim of seniority on the fact that when his parents died there was no earth, much less a soft one for him to bury them in. Everywhere was void. After a fruitless search for land, he had to bury his parents on his head. Saliu Ikharo said this was the story passed down by the elders, and he actually believed that the chameleon and the bird might really have had the disagreement. My interest in this story lies in the fact that Ikharo was critical of the claims of both parties to the disagreement. From our claims, you can see that some animals and some birds can be as stupid as some of us human. The chameleon claimed that at the time he was

The development and mastery of a formal language has proved to have many potentials of applicability. Thus we have now not only two-valued logic but deviant logic, modal logic, tense logic, event logic, praxiology, deontic logic, etc: see Martin Logic, Language and Metaphysics, Chapter one. Susan Haack by, in fact, titling her book Philosophy of Logics gives notice that it is no longer appropriate to talk of Philosophy of Logic. Formal logic has even been found applicable to the question whether African colonial experience is a blessing or a curse, and African social order and relations: see the discussion on formal logic and colonial liberation in Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism, Chapter five, and “The Bovine Idiom and Formal Logic” by Andreas and Watrand Kronenberg in Essays in Sudan Ethnography, Ed. I. Connison. 7

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created, the earth, on which all other things stand, was fresh, soft and not dry. As a result, he had to tread softly on the earth so that he would not sink. But at the time the chameleon was making his claims trees, elephants and human beings were living, working, walking on a hard and dry earth. Yet the chameleon itself was still treading softly on earth. One would think that if this was not the nature of the chameleon he would have, by then and now, learnt to walk normally. The claim of the bird to have buried his dead parents on his head because everywhere was void is even more untenable. In this regard, the chameleon’s story is more plausible. For if the chameleon is asked how he survived in a world where nothing could stand on earth, he can sensibly say that he survived on earthworms. But the bird cannot give such an answer if indeed he can give any sensible answer at all. Furthermore, the bird would have to explain what his own parents survived on. Nor is he entitled to say that they died because they had nothing to eat. If he says this, he still has to account for how the parents survived long enough to beget him, tend him to adulthood such that he was sensible enough to know that one should bury one’s parents. The claims of the bird and the chameleon are both untenable but that of the bird is more unbelievable. Ikharo did not say how the elders settled the disagreement, nor is that of any particular interest. The impressive thing is that Ikharo demonstrated a critical sense, an ability to evaluate evidence. I am able to say this of an Uchi elder only in the comforts of a paper’s context and without his knowledge. That an Uchi elder, and for that matter any other normal African elder, has critical sense and can evaluate evidence is so well known that Uchi people will be curious about the mental state of someone who asserts such a platitude. But this is a view within. For a long time, the view without had been that Africans without any exception have a dark mind which is “not enlightened even by a ray of superstition”. This opinion of Sir Samuel Baker and others like it is the background against which Benjamin Ray reports the following encounter between David Livingstone and a practising metaphysician. The “rain-doctor” said to Livingstone (Ray 1976: 5). I use my medicine, and you employ yours, we are both doctors, and doctors are not deceivers. You give a patient medicine. Sometimes God is pleased to heal him by means of your medicine, sometimes not-he dies. When he is cured, you take the credit of what God does. I do the same. Sometimes God grants us rain, sometimes not. When sometimes he does, we take the credit of the charm. When a patient dies, you don’t give up trust in your medicine, neither do I when rain fails. If you wish me to leave off my medicines, why continue your own. The “rain-doctor” is among the class of “primitives” Levy-Bruhl referred to as the “medicine man of the wizard” but found that members in this category are “usually the most intelligent in the group”. Levy-Bruhl is correct at least in

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this respect.8 Members of this class know what it is to hold a point of view, argue for and from it, summon counter-examples, and answer objections. And from Dr. Hallen’s account, we can see that they are also good psychologists (Hallen 1977: 84-85). It is the power of medicine. When you prepare your medicine and you say it is your orisa which told you to give to people, if the medicine should cure that type of illness to which it is applied, they (people) will regard your orisa as powerful and will think that it is (the orisa’s) power that you use to do whatever you do, not knowing that it is your medicine. For example, there are some people who have prepared a medicine inside a tin; when they open the tin, it will cause people around to sneeze. If this person (who placed the medicine in the tin) is the worshipper of an orisa, they will say that it is the power of the orisa, which make the presence of that person (the herbalist) felt there. There are some people who eat very strong medicines which will make them light (in terms of weight) and they will be able to perform many acrobatic dances. If the person is attached to a certain orisa, people will believe it is the power of the orisa that he uses to perform his acrobatic dances. For example, if there is a person who is an expert in a certain thing, if he should come to boast that he could do the thing without

And only in this respect. In his substantive doctrine—the theory of collective representations Levy-Bruhl account is dense, inadequate and parochial. Levy-Bruhl did not seem to realize that, in reality, the theory of collective representations is the theoretical presuppositions of either an individual or a group of individuals. As applied to the “civilized” mentality Lucien Levy-Bruhl says: “our daily activities, even in their minutest details, imply calm and complete confidence in the immutability of natural laws” primitive mentality, (1923: 35). By “our” Levy-Bruhl does not mean the gross adult population of the Caucasian race. In his book first published in (1910: 2), How The Natives Think, he seemed well aware that the notion of collective representation as applied to the Caucasian race is restricted to the scientific community composed of knowledgeable individuals. In the same vein Levy-Bruhl recognized that among the primitives there are “the medicineman or the wizard, usually the most intelligent in the group and the most conversant with all its tradition...” (1966: 19). One would have expected Levy-Bruhl, then, to compare the mentality of the scientist at different levels of intellectualism. In other words, what LevyBruhl actual did was ascribe, correctly, a civilized mentality to the scientific community in the white society, but ascribe, inconsistently, a primitive mentality to the ignorant community in the African society. There are two aspects to Levy-Bruhl’s theory of collective representation as it applies to the primitives: its mystical participation aspect, and its prelogical aspect. The mystical, or as he would put it in other contexts, the occult participation aspect is actually the natives’ theory explaining the presence or absence of evil in the world. The pre-logical doctrine of collective representations is the natives,’ metaphysical theory of Being. For more information on these issues see “Modern African Philosophy” in Momoh, An African Concept of Being, PP. 74-82.

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the power of Olorun, if other people should know of his boast they will not allow the thing to be possible. This is because they are not pleased by his pride in removing the name of Olorun from his power. People would not respect the power (of the babalawo alone) and they would regard the orisa as nothing... If a person comes and complains of a certain disease, he will enter into the shrine and remove medicine and tell the patient that “My orisa asked me to give you this medicine” ... since the medicine can cure the kind of disease which he applied it to, they will agree that the orisa is powerful. When we ask someone to go and worship Ogun so that a certain disease should leave him, the person knows inside himself that there had been some bad behaviour which he has indulged in. For example, if they (Babalawo)9 ask a barren woman to make sacrifice to an Orisa, people will advise her privately to desist from having sexual relations with many people. After she had made the sacrifice to the Orisa, there are certain medicines which they will give her. They will advise the lady that the orisa will not listen to her prayer if she does not behave well towards her husband. If they are trying to cure a disease in a person, they may ask him to go and worship a certain orisa and tell him that the orisa asks him not to go to the farm for seven days. They might say the orisa has asked him not to cross a river. (All) this would be to keep him at home for a rest. Hallen’s account of a babalawo’s explanation of the tricks of his profession shows that it is in fact possible to separate the much-flaunted occultism of African science from its objectivity. The modern medical doctor has his own orisa-stethoscope, immaculate attire, a dazzling bevy of nurses, imposing physical structures, gadgetry, machines and equipment-all of which go to reinforce the patients’ confidence in the medical doctor. But we all know that in the last analysis, the efficacy of the prescription and administration of a drug is something entirely separate and independent of the aura surrounding the treatment of a patient. It might be objected going by the “logical cases” discussed so far, that the exclusive focus has in fact been on professional natives. But relying on an account documented by Jahn, it will be discovered that the average native, on his part, is also eminently logical. Janheinz Jahn reports what was the standard and typical practice of the missionaries in their effort to evangelize

The Babalawo, according to Professor Wande Abimbola, is the custodian of the Ifa Cult. Ifa, is the Yoruba god of Science, Philosophy and wisdom both in the sense of existence and as a system of divination. See IFA: An Exposition of Literary Corpus. Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1976: 106. In our sense the babalawo is simply a practising metaphysician.

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to the natives; the technological and educational development of Europe was presented to the natives as an immutable consequence of the acceptance of a Christian God.10 The Dutch missionaries encountered some Ghanaians (people of the then Gold Coast) and were presenting a case for the acceptance of a Christian God in their usual manner. The natives wondered, on being told that the Dutch owed everything they had to God, why the same God did not bestow on them such things as linen cloth, ironware, basins or copperware as owned by the Dutch (Jahn 1961: 123). The Dutch replied that God had not entirely forgotten them, hence they owned minerals, domesticated animals, and agricultural produce. With this reply, the natives saw the full force of the missionaries’ contention, and were amazed at such reasoning. The gold they possessed, the natives said, they prospected for it. Their agricultural produce they sowed at the right time and harvested at the right time. Their fresh fruits they plucked from the trees which they had themselves planted and the young domesticated animals “did come from the old ones”. Such things, the natives told the Dutch, did not come from God, “but were brought forth from the earth and from the water and were gained by their labour” (Jahn 1961: 124). The preceding “logical case” was in 1603. And it is doubtful if any native African would, now, argue otherwise. But the interesting and important point is that the natives understood the contention of the Dutch, clarified and thrashed out the issues point by point and refused, quite consistently with the logic of their presentation, to be won over to the opponent’s point of view. In the sense of the everyday acceptation of the term in natural language, this is the essence of being logical. 4 Artificial logic in African philosophy: The logic of Zande Oracle A final “logical case” of interest is that concerning the logic of the Zande Oracle. Evans-Pritchard, in his study of the Azande, emphasized what he took to be the mystical aspects11 of Zande beliefs. Their mystical notions are

10 In these centuries of evangelization, the missionaries were not alone in subscribing to such doctrines. Max Weber would argue in a similar vein. See his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Trans., Talcott Parsons. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958. 11 Mystical beliefs die hard and seem a feature of people in every age and time. Cindy Williams, a prominent American actress, was a guest on Johnny Carson’s show of November 30th 1978. She claimed that the mystical powers of the pyramid helped her. She always had an acute headache but when she started sleeping under the pyramid

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eminently coherent, he said, “being inter-related by a network of logical ties, and are so ordered that they never too crudely contradict sensory experience but, instead, experience seems to justify them...( Evans-Pritchard 1976: 150). An exclusive focus on the form of the oracle divination shows that the Zande recognize contradictions and it is on this basis that statements are validated or invalidated depending on how they were framed originally. The Zande administer poison to a fowl, then put a statement to the oracle. If the fowl dies, the statement is taken to be true or untrue and if the fowl survives the statement is also taken to be true or untrue depending on how it was originally put. The meaning of the expression “poison oracle” is not very clear. But Evans-Pritchard could only mean two things by the expression: it addresses the poison, the liquid preparation from the bark of a certain tree, which will be administered to the fowl, and the process itself which is oracular. In other words, the result of administering the liquid preparation to the fowl will be accepted as final. The Zande carry out more than one test for corroborative purposes (Evans-Pritchard 1976: 139). A If X has committed adultery poison oracle kill the fowl. If DX is innocent poison oracle spare the fowl. Fowl dies. Second Test: The poison oracle has declared X guilty of adultery by slaying the fowl. If its declaration is true let it spare this second fowl. The fowl survives.

First Test:

B If X has committed adultery poison oracle kill the fowl. If X is innocent poison oracle spare the fowl. The fowl lives. Second Test: The poison oracle has declared X innocent of adultery by sparing the fowl. If its declaration is true let it slay the second fowl. The fowl dies. First Test:

she did not feel the headache again. One day, because of weak batteries, the pyramid could not function and her acute headache recurred. In fact, mounting evidence indicates that it is the civilized Western mind that is most gripped with “superstitions” and mystical beliefs. Thus Dr. Christian Barnard, the famous heart surgeon, claimed to have seen a dead woman’s spirit float out of a window: National Enquirer, July 24th, 1979, P. 40. And Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, creator of Sherlock Holmes, claimed he spoke with eleven dead relatives: National Enquirer, July 25th, 1978, P. 4. These are the sort of claims that have earned Africans the epithets: primitive and superstitious natives.

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C

If X has committed adultery poison oracle kill the fowl. If X is innocent poison oracle spare the fowl. The fowl dies. Second test: The poison oracle has declared X guilty of adultery by slaying the fowl. If its declaration is true let it spare the fowl. The fowl dies. The verdict is contradictory and therefore, invalid. Result:

First test:

D

If X has committed adultery poison oracle kill the fowl. If X is innocent poison oracle spare the fowl. The fowl survives. Second test: The poison oracle has declared X innocent of adultery by sparing the fowl. If its declaration is true let it slay the second fowl. The fowl survives.

First test:

Result:

The verdict is contradictory and therefore, invalid.

The reasoning involved in these tests is highly complex and sophisticated. Even though the sentences do not all have the canonical forms called for in either traditional logic or the extensional propositional logic, it is plain what principles of logical inference are highlighted here. Let us consider just the first test. The first sentence “if X has committed adultery, poison oracle kill the fowl,” (where X is a proper name) is not a conditional sentence made up from an indicative protasis and an indicative apodosis. While the protasis is indicative, the apodosis is imperative. Corresponding to it, however, is the conditional “If X has committed adultery, the poison oracle will kill the fowl” and indeed there is precisely such a conditional that the diviner would use in explaining the proceedings. The first test containing in fact two “arguments”, therefore, corresponds to the following formalized re-arrangement: a. b.

If X has committed adultery, then the poison oracle kills the fowl. X has committed adultery. Therefore, the poison oracle kills the fowl. If X has not committed adultery, then the poison oracle will not kill the fowl. X has not committed adultery. Therefore, the poison oracle will not kill the fowl.

Where the consequent in a hypothetical statement (if... “then the poison oracle will not kill the fowl) fails to hold the basis for the truth of the conditional statement is not there and so it becomes false. The rule of interference of modus ponens validates “arguments” a and b: a:

p p q

q

b:

~p ~p ~q

q

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That arguments in natural language can be formalized and tested for validity by established rules of inference needs repeating only in African Philosophy because it is the logic question in African Philosophy that is in question. In non-African Philosophy contexts, the point will not need flogging at all. As it so often happens with things in “traditional thought” many lessons can be drawn from an item, event or issue depending on the interest of the investigator. Consequently, it is possible to see other cases than the logical in the Zande oracle. The scientist, the metaphysician, and even the jurisprudentialist have interesting material here. The scientist would see that the administration of the oracle poison, the preliminary tests and corroborative tests are conducted in a logical and open fashion. This should go quite far to show that the “natives”, far from being prelogical, irrational and thoughtless, carryout empirical tests which are logically consistent and agreeable with scientific procedures. The metaphysicists would see that there is hardly any important event or issue in the life of the native where other things in the native’s ontological universe do not participate fully—addressing a liquid concoction prepared from the bark of a tree to harm or not to harm a fowl. The first exemplifies the belief of the native that things do not have to possess ears to hear and that the parent tree from which the bark was cut ostensibly has a spirit or mind which permeates all parts of its body. The characteristics of such an attribute can be exhibited independently as a unit. For the jurisprudentialist, it would be obvious that the natives, long before Hans Kelsen, have succeeded in depersonifying the legal process. The depersonification of the legal process here is so thorough and complete that even the judge itself-the poison oracle-was also subjected to a test using the yardstick of its own criterion. This was the purpose of the Second Tests under each section. We have already made the point that there are now all sorts of logics and formal logical systems. One of the latest entries, according to Professor T. A. I. Akeju, in his 1989 University of Lagos Inaugural Lectures, is Fuzzy Logic. If fuzzy logic is not out of place, and Professor Akeju says so, in an area such as Structural Engineering where things are supposed to be band together precisely and structurally, then developments in formal logic and the scope and potentialities of their applications are really yet to be fully explored and completed. In fact, developments in formal logic may never be complete. What is likely to happen is that a new system equally related to thinking and reasoning will be discovered and developed and this will make existing formal logics of historical interests only. Logic, whether in natural or artificial language, has to take into consideration the peculiarities and world-views, of the universe from which it emanates or which it is meant to serve. This means that logic in African Philosophy has to be

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Communal and Co-operative Logic as opposed to the prevailing tendency in Western Philosophy where logic is imperialistic in the sense in which one main connective or symbol (⊃, ⋁, ߀? , ߉? , ‫ݎ݋‬, ~) dominates a proposition and situates its valuation. In African world-views elements or constituents co-operate in a community and “connectives” are dynamic not static, spiritual not material, moral not imperialistic, and these peculiarities must show in an authentic logic in African Philosophy. In other words, even though it is possible to use existing formal logics and rules of inference to evaluate discourse, reasoning and thoughts in African cultures and world-views the authentic African logic in artificial language is yet to be developed. African professional Philosophers have this gauntlet to pick up. References Abimbola, W. 1976. IFA: An Exposition of Literary Corpus. Ibadan: Oxford University Press. Asimov, I. 1979. Albert Einstein: A Centennial Interpretation of His Work. Science Digest. Ayer, J. 1973. Central Questions in Philosophy. Worthing: Littlehampton Book Services Ltd. Barker, E. 1970. Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. Bergman, G. 1968. Semantics. In A History of Philosophical Systems, ed. Vegilius Ferm. New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co. Blanshard, B. 1973. Reason and Analysis. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company. Clark, J. T. 1969. The Philosophy of Science and the History of Science. In Critical Problems in the History of Science, ed. Marshall C. Pagett. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1976. Witchcraft, Oracle and Magic among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hallen, B. 1977. Robin Horton on Critical Philosophy and Traditional Thought, Second Order. 1. 1: 84-85. Horton, R. 1967. African Traditional Thought and Western Science. In Africa: Journal of the International African Institute. 37. 2: 155-187. Horton, R. 1977. African Traditional Thought and the Emerging African Philosophy Department: A Comment on the Current Debate. Second order. 2. 1. Jahn, J. 1961. Muntu: An Outline of the New African culture. Trans. Marjorie Greene. New York: Grove Press, Inc. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1966. The Soul of the Primitives. Trans. Lilian A. Clare. New York: Frederick A. Prager. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1923. Primitive Mentality. Trans. Lilien A. Clare. New York: The Macmillan Company. Ray, Benjamin C. 1976. African Religions: Symbol, Ritual and Community. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.

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Weber, M. 1958. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. Talcott Parsons. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Wittgenstein, L. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul.

Chapter 11

The Possibility of African Logic Udo Etuk University of Uyo, Nigeria

The Duke of She addressed Confucius saying: We have an upright man in our country. His father stole a sheep and the son bore witness against him. In our country, Confucius replied, uprightness is something different from this. A father hides the guilt of his son, and a son hides the guilt of his father. It is in such conduct that true uprightness is to be found. ‒BERTRAND RUSSELL ON CHINESE MORALS Abstract This chapter discusses the possibility or otherwise of an African logic. Since the debate on whether African philosophy exists or not has died down with a seeming affirmation that it does exist, this chapter seeks to inquire about the possibility of an African logic. It engages with actors and literature to assess the weight of the arguments on both sides before concluding that Affective logic might be an appropriate name for such a system of logic that highlights among others, the significance of emotional reason. Keywords: African logic, philosophy, debate, African philosophy, culture 1 Introduction While urging African philosophers not to succumb to superficial calls for immediate relevance, Professor Kwasi Wiredu (1980) in the essay “What can Philosophy do for Africa?” recommended that what the African philosopher can do for his society cannot be different in principle from what philosophers in other cultures can do for their cultures. This opinion forms part of the incentive for this essay. Some years ago, there was a long debate over the status of African philosophy (where the emphasis rests on the word “African”), whether it was real or a mere

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myth. The lines in this debate appeared to have been drawn between those whom we shall call the purists –a few professional philosophers in Africa, who appeared to set themselves up as gate-keepers to maintain the purity and integrity of philosophy and guard them against being compromised-and a much larger number of scholars, including equally professional philosophers, who thought the gate should be left wide open for many more different enterprises to qualify as philosophical. The purists called this second group “ethno-philosophers”.1 By now, both the purists and the ethno-philosophers seem to have settled down to applying the analytical tools of the philosophical discipline to issues and concerns which are peculiarly African. This has produced a healthy body of work which can justifiably and proudly be considered African philosophy.2 It has been said that time spent doing something and time spent talking about the something varies inversely. When we were arguing over whether or not there was anything in the African past (or present) that could be dignified with the name of Philosophy, we were not actually producing philosophy. But once we started applying our philosophical apparatuses gathered from home and abroad to a better understanding of ourselves as a people, the results have been amazing. In proposing “The Possibility of African Logic”, this chapter is clearly riding on the crest of what I take to be the success story in African philosophy. African philosophy has come to stay, if not come of age. It has attained respectability. There may be a few purists who are still holding out, not yet ready to be impressed by what is happening on the African philosophical scene. But with time, such pockets of resistance will give way and African philosophy will define its role and assert itself as part of the universal pool of philosophy. For if the recognition accorded to Indian, and Chinese, and

1 For a review of the major contentions in that debate, the reader is referred to the following works: Kwasi Wiredu, Philosophy and an African Culture (Cambridge 1980); Pauling J. Hountondji, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality trans. Henri Evans (London: Hutchison, 1983); P. O. Bodunrin, “The Question of African Philosophy”, Philosophy: Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. 56 (1981;) U. Etuk, “Philosophy in a Developing Country”, Philosophy: Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy Vol. 62 (1987); Olusegun Oladipo, The Idea of African Philosophy 3rd ed. (Ibadan: Hope Publications, 2000). 2 The following works are specimens falling under this category: T. Nzodimna Nwala, Igbo Philosophy (Lagos: Lantern Books, 1985); C. S. Momoh (ed.), The Substance of African Philosophy (Auchi: African Philosophy Projects Publications, 1989); B. Hallen & J. Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft Analytic Experiments in African philosophy (London, 1986): B. Okolo. What is African Philosophy? (Enugu, 1987): Udo Etuk, The Riches of Philosophy (Uyo, 2000).

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Europe and American philosophy has neither trivialised nor compromised philosophy, there is no reason why African philosophy should be any less acceptable or respectable. This chapter is also flying a kite. Let me try to explain. Here we are barely settling the skirmish over whether or not there is any such thing as African philosophy. And before that is settled, someone has to stir the hornet’s nest by raising a more exacting question, namely, the possibility of African logic. Philosophers know the centrality of the role of logic in the study of philosophy, and that logic is the most exacting thing and rigorous of the philosophical disciplines. Indeed, some scholars are prepared to say that only logic and epistemology constitute philosophy properly speaking. Are we now going to suggest that there could possibly be logic in superstitions and myths and folk-tales and oral traditions and religious rituals which are common features of Africa? Perhaps not exactly in that crude sense, but then that is the reason why this chapter is flying a kite. For it is my desire to stimulate the thinking of African philosophers (by which I mean philosophers of African origin, rather than scholars who specialise in African philosophy) along the lines of whether or not there is African logic. If anything like that exists, what are its distinguishing characteristics? And if there is no such thing then why is there no such thing? Is it the sort of thing that could be created; or would any such attempt regionalise what is a universal discipline and, therefore, debase it? These are some of the questions I intend to discuss in this chapter. To begin, I shall re-visit the issue of the universal nature of philosophy and, a fortiori, logic; and I shall argue that there are good reasons and many precedents for regionalising – or, if you like, domesticating and acculturating-philosophy. The implication of this position will be that there has to be African logic, if there is African philosophy. Finally, I shall speculate a little bit on what the nature of this logic is, to my thinking; and whether it needs to be either discovered or invented, or even created. 2 Philosophy as a Multi-Faceted Enterprise Those analytic philosophers who insist that philosophy is nothing other than epistemology and logic, and that it must be treated as a purely theoretic discipline along the lines of Physics and Pure Mathematics, for instance, do not seem to be fair to the areas which are coming newly into the field of philosophy. They seem to want to change the rules of the game mid-way into the game. Olusegun Oladipo (2000: 50) has done well to remind them that after all the Western tradition in philosophy, of which we are so enamoured, is actually a pot-pourri of different literary expressions, ranging from dialogues and conversations, through meditations, to serious treatises. It must not be

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forgotten, too, that whatever the form in which it was expressed, philosophy always grew out of a people’s concern to understand their world, their lives, so as to be guided thereby. After all, what is wisdom for if not for living? John Dewey (1957: 19), who himself was a champion of the problem-solving approach-what he called instrumentalism in education-made a point which could stand being repeated, namely, that Plato and Aristotle in their philosophy reflected the meaning of Greek culture and tradition; and he concluded with the observation. “Without Greek religion, Greek art, Greek civic life, their philosophy would have been impossible”. Here is where Oladipo (1995: 5) assimilates Wiredu to Dewey, both of whom see the connection between philosophical inquiries and practical issues in human life. Religion, art, civic life-what is that put together but a people’s culture. In line with this thinking, Professor Chukwudum Okolo had observed that: The materials of culture are objects or materials for philosophic reflections. The philosopher cannot think, interpret and find meaning in a vacuum. This he does through his particular culture... African philosophy... emerges out of the culture as the African philosopher critically reflects on the language, region, history, works of art, folklore, idioms, collective beliefs, etc, of the African people. (Okolo 1987: 47) Right from the period of the inception of Western philosophy (if we will for a moment ignore the so-called, much-vaunted “Greek miracle”, which supposedly is the spontaneous, inexplicable generation of philosophic thought among the Ancient Greeks, a generation which they owed to no external influences or foreign roots whatsoever), it will be seen that philosophy in every era was always responding to the challenges and problems created by the peculiarities and exigencies of the different era. This is true, whether we are talking about the sophists and the destabilizing foreign influence they brought to bear on settled Greek conventions; or of Socrates himself who rose to the occasion to take on the sophists; right down to the mediaeval thinkers, the most eminent among whom were doing nothing more than producing apologetics to the crisis of faith and reason. In an earlier discourse, I had attempted to defend my submission that philosophy is invariably bound to the culture of a people (Etuk 1987: 62-63). Today, this position does not seem to be arguable any longer. A logician, C. O. Ijiomah (1995: 11), in a very recent work on logic says: “If logic is a part of philosophy, and it is generally agreed that philosophy is culture bound, if follows necessarily that logic is culture bound.” To say that philosophy is culture bound, according to Hountondji (1983: 47), may be using, “Philosophy” in the popular or ideological sense, which sounds vulgar to him. But then he has not convinced us that when we use such expressions as British philosophy, or American philosophy, or Chinese philosophy, and so on, that such usages are

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ideological or vulgar. The purist who insists that philosophy is a purely theoretical discipline, which should be treated along the same lines as Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics or any of the other pure sciences is, in fact, unconsciously trying to sell an ideology-the positivist ideology which extols analysis as the only worthwhile enterprise for philosophy. The point is important and seems so very obvious, yet so many miss it. Philosophy is a universal discipline only in the sense that the quest for the understanding of life is something that every human group undertakes. But how they undertake the quest, and what solutions they come up with are bound to differ from people to people. C. Nze (1990: 22) misses this point when, in his assessment of the work of William Amo, the celebrated 18th-century Ghanaian philosopher, he writes: “Amo was an African but there was nothing exclusively African in his syllogism, language and criticism except Amo the African philosopher. In other words, philosophy like music has no boundaries”. Philosophy is, like music, a universal activity; but then every culture has its own music as beautiful or bad, and its expert musicians too. In other words, African music has its own distinctive features and characteristics, which distinguish it from, say, European music, or Indian music. And, even in Africa, Nigerians who dig high-life music or juju music would not dig Ethiopian music; it would leave them cold. When the blacks were transported to the Americans to provide slave labour on the American plantations, they carried their peculiar rhythm with them; and it was from that peculiar rhythm that American jazz developed. As for William Amo, his philosophic roots and nourishment were to be found in 18th century Germany, not in Ghana. Besides, he had left home (Africa) as a mere boy. Certainly, he must have been an outstanding character to be able to overcome the prejudices of his time to attain eminence in scholarship and civic affairs in his host country. Now, since he was clearly fond of referring to himself in his published works as “An African from Guinea”, we may surmise that if he had been exposed to the problems plaguing Africa in his days, he would have dealt with them in the same vein in which he tackled the problems of ideas, sense perception, cognition, definition and doubt-problems which were widely discussed in 18th century Europe. As it is, there is nothing African, but everything 18th century European, about his philosophy. If one were to go through his works and systematically remove his name and the salutations, and replace same with the name of Immanuel Kant, his contemporary, no one would know the difference. And for that matter, except in very recent times when African philosophers felt driven by the same “ideology” to look for their antecedents, no one would have included the works of William Amo in the African philosophic corpus. So, philosophy, through a universal quest, had boundaries. This is convincingly shown by the existence of Chinese, Indian, Islamic, British, European and other

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particular philosophies. Since this is so of philosophy, what about logic which forms an essential part of philosophy? Either we are prepared to say that whatever is true of philosophy as a whole is also true of logic, as Ijiomah apparently thinks; or we must say that logic is an exception. Logic, indeed, could be an exception. And here the universalists would have their triumph card. On the surface, it appears that logic fits the bill for insisting on the universal nature of philosophy. As we know it, logic is a science of pure form, an abstraction which pays no attention to either truth as such, or the other matter of declarative sentences; or to the language in which they are expressed or the substantive issues over which men argue. Take, for instance, our understanding of the content of a declarative sentence, such as, “It is raining” in English. The French man says the same thing, when he says, “II Pleut”, the Ibibio, “Edim edep”. The Igbo, “Mmiri na-ezo” and the Yoruba, “Ojo nro”. We call this same piece of information which each of these linguistic entities is expressing a proposition. W. V. O. Quine (1987: 2ff ) is supposed to have attacked and destroyed the proposition; but he merely succeeded in replacing it with “objective information”. Nevertheless, logic, whether it is concerned with propositions, statements, or objective information, remains a study of form, and its central question, that of the validity or invalidity of arguments is determined solely on the basis of the forms of the arguments with which it deals; forms which hold impartially and indifferently regardless of the language, mode of thought, or culture in which they are given expression. Indeed, African philosophers have striven to show that the rules of inference and other fundamental rules of logic, such as the so-called Laws of Thought, would be apprehended in any African thought system.3 But actually no African, learned or unlearned, should be flattered by being told that he can apprehend the laws of thought. If he did not, he would not be rational, and would not belong to the species homo sapiens. The same applies to all other peoples. I am prepared to challenge any American man or woman who has not been to college to explain what the Modus Tollens principle is; or what we mean by the propositional calculus or quantifier logic. These, clearly, are technical matters which are available only to those who are aptly tutored in them. The inventors of formal logic, going back to its rudiments in Wilhelm Leibniz, have always dreamt of establishing its universal characteristics; so that in the event of a dispute in any language, it would be possible to sit down See, for instance, M. A. Makinde’s “Philosophy in Africa”, in C. S. Momoh (ed.), The Substance of African Philosophy and C. S. Momoh, “The Logic Question in an African Philosophy”, Kiabara, Vol. 5, N0. 2 (1982).

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with paper and pencil, and to say, as Leibniz hope, “Let’s calculate!” This dream was brought to fulfillment in the eminent logical work of Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead.4 For some reasons, and to my mind, the Poles appeared to have done more work in refining the techniques of symbolic logic than any other ethnic group. Who knows whether, perhaps, their love for formalisation and abstraction may be a rational characteristic. This study of pure form and abstraction might have started, as in Aristotle, out of the desire to classify types of valid inferences. But now the forms have themselves become the measuring rods against which we determine what kinds of reasoning are valid, and what are not. Gradually the study of form in logic seems to have become an end in itself, quite dissociated from the realities of thought and language, and leading to what one Polish logician, Roman Murawski (1989), has construed as a mania for symbols. A clear case in point is the strange consequence, which results when an ordinary categorical proposition is given a Boolen translation in quantifier logic – thanks to the efforts of George Boole in subjecting logic to algebraic treatment. Thus, from the straight assertion: 1.

All men are mortal,

We end up with 2.

(x) (x is a man ⊃ x is mortal); read as “For any x, if x is a man, then x is mortal”.

From the straight declaration in (1), we have ended up with a conditional statement in (2). Not only that, when this quantified conditional is applied to all four traditional categorical propositions, it will be discovered that in the event that there are no men, for instance, the universal, affirmative proposition: 1.

All men are mortal;

And the universal negative proposition 2.

No men are mortal

Will be true together; thus abrogating the relation of contrariety which common sense and ordinary language recognise as existing between those two categorical propositions. Western logicians note this as odd or curious; but they continue to teach it all the same.

4 The 3-volume work, Principia Mathematica, is quite intimidating, but it is a veritable compendium of modern symbolic logic.

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This brings us to the central question of this essay: Is this formalized and abstract logic all that there is to logic? Surely, this is very universalisable, very much like Mathematics; and given this, it would be just as still to suggest that there can be African logic as it would be to urge that there should be British or Indian Mathematics. But then – and it is a big BUT -, if one looks into the history of logic, one finds a good deal of space devoted to Chinese logic: or to Indian logic; or to Arabic logic; for example, to my mind, if it is possible to have Chinese logic, for instance, then there is nothing to rule the possibility of African logic out of court even before the discussion has gone underway; or to make it sound preposterous, if not ridiculous. We learn that the history of Indian logic extends over a period of at least twenty-three centuries. This is just as old as or possibly older than Aristotelian logic in the West. Chinese logic, on its part, was apparently not concerned with the development and refinement of pure form; rather it seems to have been concerned with matters of practical import; such as how to deduce the legal requirement to execute robbers from the general Chinese philosophic principle of love for all men, some Chinese logicians maintained that although a robber is a man, killing robbers is not killing men.16 While some saw this as a piece of sophistry, the Chinese logicians sought ways to refine their argument by insisting that although a robber is a man, loving robbers is not the same as loving men; nor is not loving robbers the same as not loving men. Hence killing robbers is not killing men. Certainly, this cannot be all that kept Chinese logicians busy for over twentyfive or so centuries. But this is sufficient to establish the point: for morality, law, and habit. It is not a formal discipline, rigid, sterile and artificial in its functions. Should this not remind us of the idea of the propadeutic in Aristotle, or of the Organon of Francis Bacon? 3 What May “African” Logic Be Like”? If my argument so far is tenable, then my insistence that the idea of African logic need not be laughed out of court will be seen to follow logically. Some years ago, a manuscript titled “Logic for African Students” which this writer submitted to a publisher was turned down; and part of the reason was, according to the assessor, that African students do not learn a different brand of logic from, say, British students. This is true, in terms of the Western formal logic which we learn in schools. But if we had been colonised by the Chinese-assuming we Africans had to be colonised if not by the West then by the East-then in all likelihood we would have been studying Chinese and Buddhist logic. The problem for us, therefore, has to start with challenging the view that the methods of discovery and the methods of doing things which we have

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inherited from the West are the only legitimate ways of discovery and of doing. As Paul Feyerabend (1975: 52), the Anarchist epistemologist says, “Knowledge is obtained from a proliferation of views rather than from the determined application of a preferred ideology”. If logic is a method of knowing, then certainly the “proliferation of views” that Feyerabend is calling for must mean the recognition that method of knowing other than those expressed in western categories are possible. Feyerabend (1975: 27) is worth referring to again. He says, speaking of method, “it is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or a fixed theory of rationality, rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings.” The reason for questioning the idea of a fixed method is simply the recognition that “all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits” (Feyerabend1975: 12). Incidentally, Feyerabend also makes reference to China, where the inroads of Western science and medicine edged out traditional Chinese herbal medicine, acupuncture and moxibustion, but now it is being realised that there are effects and means of diagnosis in the Chinese system, which modern medicine cannot repeat and for which it has no explanation. It takes a lot of courage for a Westerner to discard the typical posture we have always known; namely, that the Western method, science, logic and so on are the best, if not the only ones acceptable. It also takes a lot of courage for persons who have been cowed by centuries of this ethnocentrism to begin to re-assert themselves-in all areas of culture. For what Feyerabend is doing here is to question the monolithic claims of Western science and even reason. We recognize that there have always been alternative views and approaches which were regarded as “errors” or “deviations”. But according to him (and he is worth quoting at some length here) These deviations, these errors and preconditions of progress. They permit knowledge to survive in the complex and difficult world which we inhibit; they permit us to remain free and happy agents. Without “chaos,” no knowledge. Without a frequent dismissal of reason, no progress. Ideas which today form the very basis of science exist only because there were such things as prejudice, conceit, passion: because these things opposed reason: and because they were permitted to have their way... (Feyerabend 1975: 179-180) Green science, reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be excluded... science is not sacrosanct... There are myths, there are the dogmas of theology, there is metaphysics, and there are many other ways of constructing a world-view. What this means specifically in the area of logic is, again, that there is a strong possibility of African logic, of African ways of cognizing reality, and of

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African ways of discovery. It is true that thought and reason are universal human characteristics, but thought itself is never about nothing, it is always about something. And since human beings always think and reason about particulars (except the few blessed ones who dwell in the Socratic world), particular human experiences, problems and challenges are bound to shape the way they think and reason. A relevant lesson might be learned from the anecdote inscribed at the beginning of this work concerning the dialogue between the Duke of She and Confucius. Apparently both the Duke and Confucius knew and appreciated the value of uprightness. But whether or not a son testifying against his father would be an upright thing to do would depend on the local perception of uprightness. Now before we venture to propose what form the possibility of African logic might take, there are some difficulties which we should recognise. Scholars have objected that real philosophy goes with literacy. What is written down can be returned to, analyzed, criticized and so on; and these activities yield philosophy. In short, a pre-literate culture such as traditional African cultures were, for the most part, could not possibly boast of philosophy and, a fortiori could not have had logic. This is a standard argument. I do not know why African cultures did not develop systems of writing. Even the Egyptian hieroglyphics are said today to have been “pictographs”, which are not as useful as “ideographs” in recording ideas. To my mind, there is nothing to gain in crying over this deficiency. There are literate cultures, and there are oral cultures in this world, and one may make the best out of even a bad situation. Like the Ugandan scholar, Sango Mwanahewa (1992: 52-53), had said, both the literate and the oral cultures stand to learn and benefit from each other. Specifically, on the objection, it should be pointed out that in proposing the possibility of African logic, our concern is not with traditional Africa. Although today’s African is the child of the Africa of yesterday-very much so, in spite of the much-vaunted development and modernization built mostly along Western patterns-if there is anything like African logic, it would be neither traditional nor contemporary, but African. The second answer to the objection is that literacy is good; but clearly it is not everything. Thought and reason are part of the furniture of the objective world; and there is no way a human group could have existed for any length of time without the ability to think and reason. The purist may not like it, but there is strong evidence that there is logic even in predominantly oral cultures. Good enough that even Professor Wiredu appears to admit this much. In his “introduction” to a selection of Essays by Wiredu, Oladipo says that he (Wiredu) attaches a great importance to the fact that among the traditional peoples of Africa uninfluenced by modern education, there are genuine philosophers.

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These people are capable of fundamental reflection on man, society and nature. They do not merely recite the folk philosophies of their communities, they are able to subject these philosophies “to criticism and modification”, More than this, they support their views or ideas with reasons or arguments.... (Oladipo 1995: 9) The second difficulty-and a much more serious one-is that in proposing the possibility of African logic, we appear not to recognize the fact that Africa is a large continent containing many different ethnic groups, and that if our reasoning hitherto is valid, it is not possible to propose one logic for all Africa. This is the thinking behind Momoh’s preference for “An African Philosophy” rather than “African Philosophy” (Momoh 1982: 30). This argument, however, is not very convincing. Europe is a very large conglomerate of nations, peoples and languages, yet there is European philosophy. The term “West” refers to anywhere from Europe to America, yet, there is Western logic. If we can identify something that other African scholars can recognise as valid for their cultural or linguistic group, that would be well and good. If the proposal does no more than challenge them to look for an analogous system in their different contexts, that would be well, too. There is nothing to fault, ab initio, the possibility of systems of logic, after all. With these two difficulties out of the way, we may deal with the form of African logic which we have in mind. In submitting this proposal, it would be well to remind ourselves that there is no substance to logic as such. Whether we are dealing with the so-called informal logic, or with propositional logic or with predicate logic, or with quantifier logic, deontic logic, the logic of preference or modal logic, all that we are interested in are forms-forms of words, propositions, and arguments, and the central concern of logicians is always what information can be validly inferred from any given information. Now I shall isolate two factors which appear to me to invariably impinge on not only the way we reason and argue, in short, on our inferences; but also on our perception. Both factors will, I hope, be easily recognized by African readers. What names to give to the form of logic which they generate, we may leave to the end or leave to those who are better gifted at coining names to provide. The first factor is TIME, or is related to the African perception and conception of time. The Westerner introduced what he calls “African time” as a term of pejoration to describe the African who never seems to be able to keep time. But is the problem really that the African is too lazy to pull himself up to do things punctually? Let us consider this piece of dialogue taken from a work of fiction, The Radiance of The King, by Camara Laye. It is a conversation between a white man called Clarence and an African:

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“Will the king be here soon? Asked Clarence”, “He will be here at the appointed time”, answered the black man, “What time will that be?” asked Clarence, “I’ve just told you: at the appointed time”. “Yes I know. But exactly what time will that be?” “The King knows!” replied the black man. (1954: 10) To the white man, the appointed time had to be an exact time on the clock, but to the African the appointed time was determined by the event and by its principal actor, in this case, the King. To the white man, the African must have seemed irrational or daft for his failure to understand that there can be time, and times, and exact time. Other writers have noted this discrepancy in temporal perception which may obfuscate meaningful human dialogue between the African and the Westerner. Rowland Etok Akpan (1991: 1), a training consultant, relates how an agriculturist from a donor country who was working in a Third World country, asked his trainee farmers after the fields had been planted, to forecast how much yield they expected from their plots. The trainee farmers responded with anger, feeling insulted: for they regarded anyone who tried to look into the future as slightly insane. Etok Akpan concludes his discussion of the different perceptions of time between the industrial West and our traditional culture by saying: Industrial cultures lay out future segments of time for specific events: they schedule time into discrete periods like segments of a ribbon, useable in future for starting and completing respective events.... In traditional societies, the starting time of a future event is imprecise and the duration is indeterminate.... the event is imprecise and the duration is indeterminate... the event will begin only when, after an indulgent wait by those that have turned up, it is obvious that business can start without the absentees, unless the absence of some among them is fatal to the success of the business. Business begins at the discretion of the elder or elders present, who surmise the situation as auspicious to commence. (Etok-Akpan 1991: 8) Clearly, there is a difference which is shown by these illustrations. The African is not indolent or lazy, nor is it true to say that it cannot bring himself to do things on schedule. The difference lies rather in that while the Westerner feels himself controlled by time, and is literally enslaved by his chronometers, the African gives the impression that time was made for man. Planting time, weeding time, harvest time or fishing time, as the case may be, are all duly recognized and attended to; and, of course, things do get done. It is the Western perception of man as driven by industrial time which creates the distortion for the African, and the discrepancy in the way others see the African.

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Before we attempt to draw out the implication of this for the possibility of African logic, we shall consider the second factor which seems to strongly suggest a different kind of logic for Africans. For want of a better word, I shall call this factor the status factor. If someone, for instance, commits an offence against a community, the African thing to do is to, first of all, determine the status or relationship which the offender has or stands to the offended community. If the offender is an in-law or a grand-child (not necessarily understood as a blood grand-child, but rather as the child of any daughter who belongs by birth to that community), the penalty may be waived altogether or greatly tempered. Let us suppose that we put the reasoning behind such behaviour in the following syllogism: If anyone cut another person’s palm fruits, then he will pay this fine. S has cut another person’s palm fruits. But given the two premises, it does not follow that: S must pay this fine; Because the status of the person intervenes: But S is a grandchild of this community. Therefore, S will not pay this fine. This is a very common sort of occurrence among the Ibibio people of Nigeria, for instance. The matter is not trivial at all. Rather its consequences for reasoning and praxis are tremendous. The Ibibio people of Nigeria, for example, have an adage which says, “Ekop Usen eyen-obog aniehe iko. Owo ikoppo usen ebiereke!” (Literally, people hear when the son of the Chief has palaver, but no one hears when it is settled). Or again when there is a matter which is likely to be troublesome, one is advised: “Se ke enyin akwa owo” (Look at it with the eyes of a mature person!) whether we are dealing with a problem needing settlement, or with an amount of goods to be distributed, or with justice to be dispensed, there is hardly any such thing as following it to a logical conclusion in the Western sense. There is always some special consideration given to status or relationships. The effects of this on our moral system, on our judicial and political systems, and on the way, we plan and implement our social services will better be imagined; but they cannot be dismissed by any seriousminded African. Chief Etok-Akpan, in the work cited a short while ago, discusses this factor of status as it affects certain contemporary demands, for example, the merit system and the queue culture, which we have been trying unsuccessfully to imbibe since War Against Indiscipline (WAI) was introduced in Nigeria. He says:

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The traditional cultural requirement to establishing a person’s status in a crowd had questioned the queuing culture of the Western World. A person voluntarily gives up his position in the queue to a late arrival in an obvious acknowledgement of the late arrival’s status, vis-a-vis his own. Alternatively, behind-the-counter activities arise to ensure timely service to a person considered to deserve preferential treatment; that is, while the revered individual is respectfully seated away from the queue, arrangements go on behind the counter to attend to him. (1991: 18) Now this is something we all recognise. We may feel outraged when this African arrangement works to our disadvantage. But there is no African of some status who has not relished this type of recognition and preferential treatment, when, for instance, banks and fuel stations get crowded. Etok Akpan also says, and I believe correctly, that the African arrangement of seniority and status works against the merit system of the Western culture, and we are only just trying resentfully to adopt the merit system because we think that meritocracy will push us forward along with other industrial societies. However, anyone who doubts what is asserted here only needs to be reminded of the Nigerian Federal Quota system, as against the merit system. Some years ago, a Nigerian scholar made a daring proposal concerning African systems of thought. It was daring in that it might have been considered outrageous to suggest that Africa has a different system or systems of thought from the rest of the world. But the proposal was considered serious enough by the prestigious National Institute for policy and Strategic Studies in Kuru to sponsor and host a three-day conference on the topic. Unfortunately, the findings of that conference have not been made available to the academic world till-now. But the possibility of a system of thought and a logic, whether peculiarly or characteristically African, must be given serious consideration by African philosophers. For now, and for want of a better name, we propose to call this logic affective logic. References Bodunrin, P. O. 1981. The Question of African Philosophy. Philosophy: Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy. 56. Dewey, J. 1957. Reconstruction of Philosophy. Boston: Beacon Press. Etok-Akpan, R. A. U. 1991. Non-verbal Language in Cross-Cultural! Behaviour. Unpublished paper presented at Friends of Sophia Forum. Etuk, U. 1987. Philosophy in a Developing Country. Philosophy: Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy. 62. Etuk, U. 2000. The Riches of Philosophy. Uyo: Printers. Feyerabend, P. 1975. Against Method. London: Verso.

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Hallen, B and O. J. Sodipo. 1986. Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft Analytic Experiments in African philosophy. London: Ethnographica Publishers. Hountondji, P. J. 1983. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, trans. Henri Evans. London: Hutchison. Ijiomah. C. O. 1995. Modern Logic. Owerri: A. P. Publications. Laye, C. 1954. The Radiance of The King. New York: New York Review of Books. Makinde, M. A. 1989. Philosophy in Africa. In The Substance of African Philosophy. ed. C. S. Momoh. Auchi: African Philosophy Projects Publications. Momoh, C. S. 1982. The Logic Question in an African Philosophy. Kiabara. 5. 2. Momoh, C. S. ed. 1989. The Substance of African Philosophy. Auchi: African Philosophy Projects Publications. Murawski, R. 1989. The Development of Symbolism in Logic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. LXXXIX. Nwala, T. U. 1985. Igbo Philosophy. Lagos: Lantern Books. Nwanahewa, S. 1992. African Logical Heritage and Contemporary Life. In Foundation of Social Life: Ugandan Philosophical Studies, ed. G. F. Mclean. Washington D. C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Nze, C. 1990. Amo on Logic, Language and Criticism. In Anton William Amo’s Trestise on the art of philosophising soberly and accurately, ed. T. U. Nwala. Enugu: SNAAP Printers. Okolo, C. B. 1987. What is African Philosophy? Enugu: Freeman’s Press. Oladipo, O. 1995. Introduction. In Kwasi Wiredu, Conceptual Decolonization in African Philosophy: 4 Essays. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Oladipo, O. 2000. The Idea of African Philosophy 3rd ed. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Quine: W. V. O. 1987. Philosophy of Logic. New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India. Wiredu, K. 1980. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 12

Can There Be an African Logic? Revisiting the Squall for a Cultural Logic1 Uduma Oji Uduma National Open University of Nigeria, Nigeria

Abstract The question: Can there be an African Logic? is wont to elicit two reactions. First, is the suspicion that it is a vestige, or more appositely, a surreptitious reawakening of the somewhat moribund question of the existence of African philosophy. Second, yet somewhat connected to the first, but in a more nuanced sense quite distinct from it, is the question of the existence of a peculiar African logic. This means that the question: can there be an African logic? is connected to the more encompassing question of the existence of African philosophy and in some deep sense implies the repudiation of universalism. This chapter discusses the arguments and implications of the debate about the possibility of African logic. Keywords: African logic, culture, African philosophy, Cultural logic 1 Introduction The question: Can there be an African Logic? Is likely to elicit two reactions. First, is the suspicion that it is a vestige, or more appropriately, a surreptitious reawakening of the somewhat moribund question of the existence of African philosophy. Second, somewhat connected to the first, but in a more nuanced sense quite distinct from it, is the question of the existence of a peculiar African logic. This means that the question of whether there can be an African logic is connected to the more encompassing inquiry of the existence of

1 This essay is a revised and improved version of my earlier paper “Can there be an African Logic” which was published in Uduigwomen, Andrew (ed.) From Footmarks to Landmarks on African Philosophy 2nd edition Lagos – Nigeria: Obaroh & Ogbinaka Publishers Ltd, 2007 pp. 280 - 289

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African philosophy, which in some deep sense implies the repudiation of universalism. It is, however, no moot point that the quest for a distinctive African logic as indeed the more encompassing question of African philosophy has been more or less a quest for African identity. This is brought to a prominent relief in Udo Etuk’s proposal for enculturation of logic. According to him: In proposing ‘The Possibility of African Logic’ this chapter is clearly riding on the crest of what I take to be the success story in African philosophy. African Philosophy has come to stay, if not come of age. It has attained respectability…. Here we are barely settling the skirmish over whether or not there is any such thing as African Philosophy. And before that is settled, someone wants to stir the hornet’s nest by raising a more exacting question, namely the possibility of African logic. Philosophers know the centrality of the role of logic in the study of philosophy, and that logic is the most exacting and rigorous of the philosophical disciplines. Indeed, some scholars are prepared to say that only logic and epistemology constitute philosophy properly speaking. (Etuk 2002: 99 – 100) Etuk’s sentiments above would be adequately appreciated against the backdrop Robin Horton’s (1977:65) argument that logic (with epistemology) lies at the core of philosophy and their demonstrable absence in traditional Africa reinforces the obvious absence of philosophy in the African traditional thought system. However, today, the question of African Philosophy is obviously no longer that of whether it exists or not; even for those who would ordinarily hesitate to acknowledge its existence. It has gradually dawned on all that at least the robust debate as to the existence or non-existence of African philosophy in a rather undeniable sense created African philosophy. It is also evident that in many respects, the responses to the question of African philosophy actually helped to determine the subject matter, nature, approach and, perhaps, goals of African philosophy (Uduma 2009 (a): 122). For Etuk, therefore, after such a success story, it amounts to sheer mischief to contemplate, much more raising the question of whether or not there is African logic. For him, perhaps once we have settled the question of African philosophy, it follows that there is African logic; the ‘‘implicate’’ of domesticating and enculturating philosophy ‘‘will be that there has to be an African logic, if there is African philosophy” (Etuk 2002: 100). This is echoed by Ijiomah (1995:11): ‘‘if logic is a part of philosophy and philosophy is culture bound, it follows necessarily that logic is culture bound.’’ The possibility of African logic here is the off-shoot of the existence of African philosophy, and a clear understanding of Etuk and his talk of the success story and stirring the

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hornet’s nest brings to a prominent relief the identity problem that inspired the discussion and subsequent emergence of African philosophy. The tragedy, however, is that African philosophy and with it, the quest for African logic is not inspired, like the origin of philosophy in intellectual history, by curiosity; it is inspired by frustration. This chapter, going beyond the leveraged consensus of the existence of African Philosophy, explores the motivation for a peculiar African (regional) logic. While accepting that there are peculiar socio-cultural African experiences, it nevertheless seeks to demonstrate the need to rise above cultural identity and frustration to realize that logic is universal; that there is no cultural or regional logic and that the call for African logic is thus only tendentious. It canvasses that, for sure, the ideals and goals of the African cultural identity are legitimate, and there is a need to highlight what we perceive to be our unique logical heritage. Still, all these do not and cannot support the repudiation of universal thought (logical) processes. 2 The Challenge of an African Identity What is known as ‘African philosophy’ today largely emerged as a reaction to the absolutist paradigm of Western philosophy. Assuring the universalization of Eurocentrism, this not only created a truncated view of reality but disparaged the African as “mentally inferior,” “backward,” “uncivilised,” “barbarian” and a “savage”. Uduma (2014:128 -129) elaborating on how the universalization of Eurocentrism inspired African philosophy points out that the “humanity” of Africans, unlike that of any other race, is “a contested humanity” (See also Asiegbu and Agbakoba 2008, 9-10). The point is that there was a deliberate attempt to rationalize Africans out of humanity. Uduma (2015), discussing these attempts, begins with Richard Hakluyt’s Principal Navigation (1589) where the portrait of Africans is depicted as follows: it is to be understood that the people which now inhabit the region of the coast of Guinea … were in old times called Aethiopes and Nigritae, which we now call Moores, Moorens, or negroes, a people of beastly living, without a God, laws, religion or common wealth, and so scorched and vexed by the Sunne that in many places, they curse it when it riseth. This kind of description of Africa made many Europeans who never visited the continent to have even more bizarre picture of the African man. One of them Thomax Dixon said “An African left to his own will roam at night and sleeps in the day, [his] speech has no word of love” another said “the life of an African is simple.

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He rolls on the ground like a log of wood, wakes up the following morning looking for what to eat or what would eat him” (Lasisi, 2011: 18). As if these comments are not sufficiently disparaging, it is further reported of Africans that: “coloured people are quite frequently liable to sudden fits of madness brought about by excessive sexual indulgence or by abuse of narcotics” (Lasisi, 1994:8). In fact, the usual status of the black person in Europe was that of a slave, the domestic servant or the itinerant beggar. Europeans naturally tended to suspect the intellectual capabilities of the African. All sorts of theories were propounded, including what was known as phrenology; a quasi-scientific idea that sought to relate the size and shape of the skull to the level of intelligence among the races. Needless to say, the Europeans concluded that the rather low position of the black man’s forehead was clear evidence of defective intellect. The belief was very well known in the 18th century, and William Blake (1789) was clearly referring to this racist invention when he wrote “O African! Black African! (go, winged thought, widen his forehead)”. However, the most outrageous opinion on the subject of intelligence came from an otherwise famous and respected philosopher, David Hume. In a clearly racist footnote in his essay, “Of National Characters,” (1753), Hume writes: I am apt to suspect the Negroes and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negroe slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of which none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; tho’ low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA indeed they talk of one Negro as a man of parts and learning; but ‘tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly. It is indeed remarkable that during the last years of his life, Hume worked at correcting his works for a final and definitive edition which was published posthumously in 1777. In doing this, there is little doubt that Hume was stung by his critics (including Beattie) and he responded by revising the first two

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sentences of the footnote. Hume’s editors, Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose failed to include the revision. The missing revision, which has recently been discovered and published, makes a significant difference in the attitude conveyed by Hume’s statement. Although the rest of the footnote remained unchanged from the original, Hume revised the opening two lines: “I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, or even any individual eminent either in action or speculation.” For sure, the fact that Hume even revised the footnote proves that Hume did seriously reconsider the racist implications of his position. But his response was to abandon a polygenetic position and focus his attack solely on blacks, singling them out as an inferior group within the human family. Efforts, however, to dismiss Hume’s comments on black people as an aberrant instance of his short-sightedness that has nothing to do with his overall philosophy have been woeful. This is primarily because his racial law contributed to the subtext which justified the idea of a human as a slave. His racial views were inextricably related to two of the major events of eighteenth-century European history: the enslavement of Africans, and the subjugation and extermination of the people who occupied the overseas lands coveted by Europeans. With the introduction of race-based slavery in 1650 and the gradual colonization of the New World, many European thinkers became systematically racist towards the people of the continent of Africa; as well as the inhabitants of the New World. The expansionist rhetoric of many European thinkers included rampant racial theories of Caucasian, Aryan, or Anglo-Saxon destiny. They adopted various racial theories of human nature which fit the historical exegeses. For them, there were two options: both Africans and Indians were civilized and not subject to enslavement and genocidal treatment by civilized Christians, or they were uncivilized, and their lands were terra nullius and terra incognita, without local government and claimed by no one. The desire to exploit other people and continents inclined European thinkers to accept the idea that some men are by nature slaves; especially since the concept was acceptable to a man as important as David Hume. The development of racism based on skin colour occurred, or at least intensified, simultaneously with the increasing importance of the New World colonies and the twin policies of the enslavement of black Africans and the extermination of Native Americans. Sardonically, there were four major racialist theories concocted to meet the eighteenth-century European conditions of a people who had emerged as colonizing, conquering “nations on a worldwide quest for wealth and power.” The first was that the mental and moral capacities of non-whites, especially Indians

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and Africans, differed significantly from those of whites (Hume 1854; Linnaeus 1806). The second view held that being non-white was an essential defect: the normal, natural condition of man is whiteness, but due to unfortunate environmental factors, some people have lost their whiteness and with it, part of their human nature (Blumenbach, 1969). A third theory was that some beings that look human are not really so, but are lower on the chain of being and represent a link between humans and apes (Long 1970). And the fourth theory held that there are several theses, biblical and Darwinian, which separate human lines of creation and/or evolution, with Caucasian being the best. It is interesting to note that while Immanuel Kant assigns to the white race the capacity for rational character or moral dignity, non-whites are denied the same ability or at best assigned minimal (i.e. pseudo-rational-moral) abilities. The inferiority of non-whites derives from the presence of “phlogiston” in their blood, the simple fact that they are either black or coloured. Indeed, “while the black person is denied humanity and is therefore uncivilized, humanity accrues only to the superior European civilization which depicts humanity per excellence” (Eze, 1997: 121). And if black or coloured means non-humanity, it equally implies that the Negro lacks talent, that is, where talent is understood as an “essential natural ingredient for aptitude in higher rational and moral achievement” (Eze 1997: 126). To buttress his position, Kant quotes verbatim from David Hume’s “Essays on National Character”. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite a simple example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality; even among the whites some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the world. So fundamental is the difference between the two races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in colour. (Kant, 1978) This is short of saying that the Negro or Black is subhuman. To substantiate this latter point, Kant drew up a hierarchical chart of the superior to the inferior hues of the skin as follows: STEM GENUS: white brunette First race, very blond (northern Europe), of damp cold. Second race, Copper-Red (America), of dry cold. Third race, Black (Senegambia), of dry heat. Fourth race, Olive-Yellow (Indians), of dry heat (Kant 1978: 23).

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The hierarchization of the races is done with the belief that “white brunette” or “white” is the ideal colour or skin. All others are superior or inferior as they approximate whiteness. In fact, all other colours are simply degenerative development from the white original. In a sense, the Critique of Pure Reason is meant to demonstrate the transcendental, and therefore, the metaphysical and biological superiority of white over black. This might explain one of the essential reasons why Kant had to worship “reason” over “imagination”. Thus, the recoil from delineating the Transcendental object X (which Kant refers to as the unknown root) and the theory of noumena (which Kant dismisses as complete emptiness), would have taken him away from eulogizing the Enlightenment spirit which he so much cherished and stoutly defended (See Kant 1964). In other words, the break into pure ontological analysis would have taken Kant away from the pettiness and prejudices of anthropologism (in this instance race analytic). But he rather chose to extol and propagate the supposedly white supremacy thesis. His choice, it is highly argued, must have been informed by the European colonization of the rest of the world and perhaps, the enslavement of the Negroid race through the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. In his archetype classification of race, by which Kant means the “prefixed humanity inevitably inherited by nature, that is, that which is a priori, transcendentally grounded and immutable” talent, rationality, humanity proper, and therefore, history are embodied in European life or more precisely, in the European male. On the other hand, the “so-called sub-human, primitive, and characterological inferiority of the American Indian, the African, and the Asian is biologically and metaphysically inherited archetype” (Kant 1978: 124-25). An equally famous pronouncement on the moral and intellectual faculties of the black man came from Thomas Jefferson, one of the better known founding fathers of the United States of America. In chapters 14 and 18 of his Notes on the State of Virginia (1787), Jefferson examined the whole system of slavery and put down his observations on the African slaves. Even though he was professed as a liberalist, his views further strengthened the foundation of racism in America. He said that the blacks and red races of America “have never yet been viewed by us as subjects of natural history”. Perhaps, they are for him, subjects of laboratory or zoological analysis. Even so Jefferson, albeit prima facie hesitantly, declares: I advance it therefore as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites in the endowments both of body and mind. It is not against experience to suppose, that different species of the same genus, or varieties of the same species, may possess different qualification. (1787: 192)

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It is not surprising, therefore, that notwithstanding his touting of antislavery sentiments, he could not imagine an American society with a population of free black people. He thus proffers: This unfortunate difference of colour and perhaps of faculty is a powerful obstacle to the emancipation of these people. Among the Romans the emancipation required but one effort. The slaves, when free, can mix with, without staining the blood of his master. But with us a second is necessary, unknown to history. When freed, he is to be removed beyond the reach of mixture. (1787: 193) This was an idea that the English adopted which led to the establishment of the black colony of Freetown in 1798. The Americans made a belated attempt to translate Jefferson’s vision into reality, and it was not until 1870 that the Republic of Liberia was founded for free Negro slaves. Ladies and gentlemen, it is one of those human ironies that in spite of his fear of miscegenation, Jefferson left a brood of mulattoes, who were only recently accorded recognition as his descendants. This racist prejudice is extended by Hegel, for whom, if, perchance, the African has any iota of rationality to exhibit it certainly derives from the Asiatic or European world. This conclusion follows from the basic premise that Africa could not boast of any history, development, or any progress. According to Hegel, the “civilised {European} nation is conscious that the rights of barbarians {Africans} are unequal to its own and treats their autonomy as only a formality” (Hegel 1773: 213-351). It is not surprising that Buckner H. Payne gave credence directly or indirectly, to the view that Africans are sub-human and inferior when compared with the Caucasian race (Oguejiofor 2005: 86-93). Hiding under the pseudonym Ariel, Buckner H. Payne in 1867 argued that the Negro is neither a descendant of Adam nor have a soul. The import of this is that Africans are not among the class of human beings created by the Judeo-Christian God, and perhaps, the God of Islam. Charles de Montesquieu puts it more pungently when he avers that to regard the African as a human being implied that we (the Caucasians) are not Christians (1952: 259). This perception of Africans flourished as: “some great universities in Europe and America competed among themselves in propounding theories that would prove that they (Africans) were not human” (Odey 2005: 34). The explicit consolidation of this perception of Africans into Western education infested most recipients of Western education with an erroneous conception of Africa/ns. In this regard, E. W. Blyden brazenly asserts: The Negro of the ordinary traveler or missionary—and perhaps, of two thirds of the Christian world—is a purely fictitious being, constructed

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out of the traditions of slave – traders and slave-holders, who have circulated all sorts of absurd stories and also prejudice inherited from ancestors, who were taught to regard them as a legitimate object of traffic. (1967: 58) Here, the point on prominent relief is that the Eurocentric derogative description and vilification of Africans actually inspired the search for identity in Africa, and subsequently the enculturation squall. This is understandable; it is bad enough for the heinous Eurocentric perception and presentation of Africans as sub-humans to be woven, almost unabatedly reinforced, and consolidated by centuries of perverse Western supremacist philosophy, anthropology and education, but it would be inexcusable if after over four centuries there is no serious intellectual challenge or persuasive protestation to the Eurocentric peddling of their racist views about Africa. Regrettably, the Trans Atlantic slave trade and the colonization of African and in addition, as I. C. Onyewuenyi (1993) points out, colonization of the means of information dissemination and formal education by the West had frustrated, if not impede, this challenge. In this connection, it is notable that the colonization of Africa by the West led to the introduction of Western education as the official formal education in Africa. The incorporation of the Eurocentric vilification of Africa/ns into Western education introduced to Africa made most Africans “automatically uphold and habitually employ the colonizers’ viewpoint in all matters in the strange belief that their racist, imperialist, anti-African interest is in the universal humanist interest, and in the strange belief that the view defined by their ruthless greed is the rational, civilized view” (Chinweizu 1978: xiv). Walter Rodney buttresses the veracity of this point when he, among other things, describes Western education as education for “the creation of mental confusion” (2009: 293). Western education alienated Africans from their culture, incarcerated our best minds and made most of them to accept the distorted Eurocentric view about Africa/ns as sacrosanct. As J. O. Oguejiofor asserts: The level of education the African acquired was a seal of his cultural alienation. Left in a state of uncertainty, with horrendous contempt of his own traditional heritage, and hamstringed in his patent undersized coat of modern education, he became a sorry sight both to himself and his observers. (2001: 43) Though there were some voices of dissent in the 19th century against the Eurocentric perception of Africans, it was however in mid 20th century when most African countries had regained their political freedom, and African scholars vigorously challenged the view. The reason for this is not far-fetched; one needs political power to be able to assert his/her dignity and identity properly. It was, therefore, at the dawn of political independence that African

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intelligentsias “joined issues with one another with vigour and determination to salvage the tarnished image and dignity of the African” (Asiegbu 2009: 59). The immediate goal of African intelligentsias at the dawn of political independence was to achieve, on an intellectual plane, what African militants, political activists and revolutionaries had accomplished—the deconstruction of the battered image of Africa/ns, and ipso-facto demonstrate the humanity, rationality and nobility of the African (Asiegbu and Agbakoba 2008: 9; Achebe 2012: 52-3). Kwasi Wiredu concurs with this view when he opines that: “The principal driving force in post-colonial African philosophy has been a quest for self- definition” (2004: 1). From the preceding, one is sure to appreciate why the African question is a question of an authentic definition of the African. An authentic definition of the African will not only substantiate their humanity but will also restore their dignity. This is because the Eurocentric definition of the African buttresses the position that Africans were originally “sub-human” and as such were incapable of logical thoughts and moral acts before their contact with the Caucasians (Hegel 2001: 109-112). The result of this is that traditionally, Africans lack the ability to philosophize; hence to talk of African philosophy is abnormal. This is because any being that cannot think can neither philosophize nor have a philosophy. In a sense, the motivation for the attachment of the adjective ‘African’ to philosophy is emotively, rather than philosophically, inspired. Afrocentrists like Alexis Kagame, Leopold Sedar Senghor had canvassed the position that there was (or at least there ought to be) a peculiar way of philosophizing common to all Africans (Onah 2002: 67). For sure, this was a tremendous route to the issue of African identity (Olela 1998: 48 – 49). To establish African philosophy meant both the taking of a stand ‘‘for or against’’ the horrifying events and ideologies inflicted on Africa by its violent encounter with the West (Wamba-Dia-Wamba 1991: 246) and a guise intended for achieving intellectually what some African states sought to achieve by warfare (Serequeberhan 1991: 11 -14). Negritude as a philosophy derives its roots from such a counter-discourse about the African. Not only was there the urgency to liberate Africans themselves from European domination, Africans also fought to define that identity, to establish themselves as Africans. Both as a quest for freedom and an attempt to define their identity as Africans does the philosophical task of the pioneer African philosophers arise (Asiegbu 2008:39). Indeed, the problem of identity continues to determine all philosophizing about Africa. In this regard, the major preoccupation of African philosophers devolves around a single task: searching out answers to, and devising ways of attaining, the purposed goals of African people.

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3 The Motivation for Enculturating Logic Logic both historically and conventionally is one of the core specialisms of philosophy, as such the existence of an African philosophy is supposed to dovetail the existence of an African logic. So, even if we cannot currently present one, the possibility exists. After all, African philosophy itself is relatively very recent and for it to overcome the tension that governed its emergence, its corollary African Logic should be accepted even if it is only conceptually. Indeed, African philosophy is an issue of identity with widespread ramifications. Thus, when African philosophy addresses the issue of African identity the issue of an African logic is wont to feature and in this context, the remark by Robin Horton, already highlighted above, exasperates the need for the desire to argue for an African logic as a way of showing that Africans are capable of exacting and rigourous intellectual display. Horton (1977:65) had rather equivocatively argued that although all the main processes of inference known to modern man are deployed in African traditional thought either in the maintenance of the established world view … or in its elaboration or modification … such processes are deployed in an essentially unreflective manner. According to him, in Africa instead of employing intuition and ideas, we have a rich proliferation of the sort of thinking called magical. He thus concludes that in traditional Africa “people do not stop to ask what are the irreducibly basic processes of inference, or how they can be justified. Situations which would provide such question simply do not arise”(Horton 1977: 65). Indeed, for Horton (1967: 50 - 71), there is only one reality, and so there can only be one rationality as well. Societies that do not use the modern Western scientific method are ‘closed’ societies because they cannot imagine alternatives to their views of the world, and also because there is no real distinction between words and reality. Words are not reality in the modern society, and Horton argues that this allows the words to take on explanatory rather than magical characteristics. Kwasi Wiredu and D. A. Masolo agree with Horton’s commitment to the universality of reason, although both would argue that it is a mistake to compare Western science and traditional African thought. Horton’s position in stigmatizing traditional African thought as magical when canvassing a commitment to universality, was in a sense an invitation to particularity; African philosophy was challenged to go into its culture to assure its logical structure. Thus, the denigration of African traditional thought was only used to elicit some jingoistic passion from some African philosophers; particularly when it became clear that even the irredentists and sceptics could no longer reasonably sustain the denial of African philosophy. To square up to the need to establish an identity in an

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irredentist culture, from the assertion that there exists African philosophy, it became necessary that there is a peculiar African logic. To immediately dismiss this sentiment is to fail to recognize the uneven and asymmetrical development of world cultures, and that people need to cultivate a specific sense of belongingness in order to survive and enhance their positive identity and self-esteem. We recognize in this context that particularization is a locally-oriented process which produces cultural meanings from local perspectives and concrete life experiences. Peter Winch (Winch 1964: 307 – 324), however, takes the position that reason is inextricably linked to language and culture, and therefore (following Wittgenstein) it is possible to consider separate systems to be rational yet incommensurable. This sentiment seems implied in Helen Verran’s recent Science and an African Logic when she suggests: If we are to be convincing in asserting that mathematical objects have been constructed by people as they went about their living as social beings, more than the conditions of their production must be demonstrated. We must be able to show what people have used to accomplish the construction of these objects in their interactions with each other and the material world, and how they have used them. (2001: 260, fn. 2) The point is that culture situates a philosopher, limiting him to a specifically designed group and experience, problems, difficulties and presuppositions of a particular people. In addition, culture gives an orientation to his philosophy in so far as he seeks to provide ultimate answers to questions, and solutions to problems of a people of a particular culture. Since all philosophical discourse involves seeking answers to problems and issues, which a culture raises, then a culture is determinative of philosophy. As different and varied as cultures are, so also are the questions, answers and philosophies they generate (Asiegbu 2008: 42). Culture, however significant it is, remains limited to a specific region. The European culture is different from African, American, or Asiatic cultures, for instance. The geographical particularity of a culture raises the issue of relativism of a philosophy tied to a particular culture. The different cultures, into which philosophies are inserted, imbue the various philosophies with a relativistic character. These cultures individualise those philosophies. A creative work in any philosophy, especially African philosophy, implies a solid grasp of the (African) culture. It entails a mastery of its lore of knowledge, symbols and symbolism, artefacts, legends and language, laws and customs, poetry and pastimes, celebrations and funerals and religion, etc. Only through this way can African philosophers give meaning ultimately to African identity.

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In essence, it is only through a particularist logic, enriched and determinative by its culture, that African philosophy can avoid another European-generated approach to human understanding that focuses, in such an emphatic manner, on elements that were said to be universal to the topic because of concerns that such an overview could underrate, or ignore, elements of African cognition that were distinctive or perhaps even somehow unique. This essay rejects this position not because the motivation is ill-founded, but because logic as a discipline is concerned with the structures or principles of thought; these structures of thought have no continental boundaries. We, for sure, can apply the principles of logic to different socio-cultural situations, but we have no peculiar regional thought processes. The point here is that in deducing the enculturation of logic from the enculturation of philosophy, we must realize that the enculturation of philosophy does not reduce philosophy to culture. Indeed, while enculturation emphasizes the particularity of philosophy, attention is drawn to the universality of philosophy: the different cultures, into which philosophies are inserted, imbue the various philosophies with a relativistic character. These cultures individualise those philosophies. But the “unity of human nature” stipulates “the universality of philosophy” (Okere 1976: 11). Although Okere’s (and other African universalists like Wiredu’s) position appears to anchor our position on the universality of logic, we are only committed to it to the extent that it shows that the enculturation of philosophy does not amount to the reduction of philosophy to culture. We are indeed hesitant to accept a universalist approach to philosophy. This is because unless it is underscored that African cultures may be different from those of the West in important ways that deserve to be highlighted, that would, therefore, be misrepresented by beginning from a presumption that cognition in Africa and the West are essentially the same. In fact, as Hallen (2003) points out ‘‘if the issue is cognition, of course the key question becomes just how different it has to be in order to be rated as qualitatively distinct’’. Again, there is the further consideration that, in the past, supposed ‘differences’ in African cognition were sometimes used as evidence that Africa’s indigenous intellectual heritage was thereby inferior to or less advanced than that of the West. This is one important reason, Hallen (2003) again points out, why African analytic and hermeneutic philosophers of a relativist persuasion have devoted so much time and effort to clarifying what they believe to be the accurate depiction of cognition in the African context. Further, unless we develop a coherent system of African philosophy, Africa would have nothing that is distinctively African and yet has inter-cultural significance. This hesitance, it must be made clear, does not apply to logic. Albeit that logic is conventionally contrived as a branch of philosophy, in its true essence, it is a tool (an organon, to use Aristotle’s terminology), a propaedeutic to philosophy.

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What this means is that logic is an essential facility of inquiry and as such lies at the head of a ramified hierarchy of knowledge; it is like a laser, a tool whose best use is not illumination, but rather focus. A laser may not provide light for your home, but, like logic, its great power resides in its precision (Uduma 2008:42). The import here is that the philosopher uses the tool of logic to organize reality and render it intelligible. This explains why logic and mathematics work so well together: they are both independent of reality, and both are tools that are used to help people make sense of the world. Logic’s location in philosophy is thus because it is a method for comprehending the underlying structure of reason. Indeed, Aristotle invented logic as a method for comprehending the underlying structure of reason, which he saw as the motor that propelled human attempts to understand the universe in the widest possible terms. Thus, philosophy relies on logic to help provide explanations for what we see. The significance of this explanation is that logic by its propaedeutic role is not native to philosophy alone; indeed, all the various specialized disciplines rely on and do indeed apply logic for their research objectives, assumptions, proceedings, and conclusions (Uduma 2004: ix). This explains why we said that logic deals with the structures of thought. 4 The Universality of Logic Etymologically, the English word logic comes from the Greek word "logos" usually translated as "word", but with the implication of an underlying structure or purpose; hence its use as a synonym for God in the New Testament Gospel of John. This etymological consideration does not, strictly speaking, illumine the nature and subject matter of logic. It, however, gives some rough insight into why logic is often defined as the principles of correct reasoning. One thing to note, however, about logic roughly seen as the principles of correct reasoning is that studying the correct principles of reasoning is not the same as studying the psychology of reasoning. Logic as a discipline deals with the former; it tells us how we ought to reason if we want to reason correctly. Whether people actually follow these rules of correct reasoning is an empirical matter, something that is not the concern of logic (Uduma 2008: 2). The psychology of reasoning, on the other hand, is an empirical science. It tells us about the actual reasoning habits of people, including their mistakes. A psychologist studying reasoning might be interested in how people's ability to reason varies with age. But such empirical facts are of no concern to the logician. One might ask, so what are these principles of reasoning that are part of logic? There are many such principles, but the main (not the only) thing that we study in logic are the principles governing the validity of arguments - whether certain

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conclusions follow from some given assumptions. For example, consider the following three arguments: If Nnanna is a philosopher, then Nnanna is a great thinker. Nnanna is a philosopher. Therefore, Nnanna is a great thinker If Nnanna is taller than Onyeka, Nnanna is taller than Enyinnaya. Nnanna is taller than Onyeka. Therefore, Nnanna is taller than Enyinnaya. If Nigeria wins Mali, then Nigeria will not be eliminated at the preliminary stages. Nigeria wins Mali. Therefore, Nigeria will not be eliminated at preliminary stages. These three arguments are obviously well contended in the sense that their conclusions follow from the assumptions. If the assumptions of the argument are true, the conclusion of the argument must also be true. Two features about the rules of reasoning in logic are illustrated in the above arguments. The first feature is its topic-neutrality. As indicated in the arguments, the same principle of logic can be used in reasoning about diverse topics. This is true of all the principles of reasoning in logic. The laws of biology might be true only of living creatures, and the laws of economics are only applicable to collections of agents that engage in financial transactions. But the principles of logic are universal principles which are more general than biology and economics. This is in part what is implied in the following definitions of logic by two very famous logicians Gottlob Frege and Alfred Tarski: to discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth. ... I assign to logic the task of discovering the laws of truth, not of assertion or thought."(Frege The Thought 65). "Logic" ... [is] ... the name of a discipline which analyzes the meaning of the concepts common to all the sciences, and establishes the general laws governing the concepts. (Tarski 1963: xi). A second feature of the principles of logic is that they are non-contingent, in the sense that they do not depend on any particular accidental features of the world. Physics and the other empirical sciences investigate the way the world actually is. Physicists might tell us that no signal can travel faster than the speed of light, but if the laws of physics have been different, then perhaps this would not have been true. Similarly, biologists might study how dolphins communicate with each other, but if the course of evolution had been different, then perhaps dolphins might not have existed. So the theories in the empirical sciences are contingent in the sense that they could have been

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otherwise. The principles of logic, on the other hand, are derived using reasoning only, and their validity does not depend on any contingent features of the world. For example, logic tells us that any statement of the form "If P then P." is necessarily true. This is a principle of the second kind that logicians study. This principle tells us that a statement such as "if it is raining, then it is raining" must be true. We can easily see that this is indeed the case, whether or not it is actually raining. Furthermore, even if the laws of physics or weather patterns were to change, this statement will remain true. Thus we say that scientific truths (mathematics aside) are contingent whereas logical truths are necessary. Again this shows how logic is different from the empirical sciences like physics, chemistry or biology. Logic, as we can see, is a concern with correctness of argumentation. Once we identify the subject matter of logic as arguments, it becomes clear that logic lies at the heart of human existence; human life is directed by argumentation. This applies to the African as it applies to all cultures. Arguments thus mean reasoning and the African’s ability to conduct his daily affairs ordinarily means that he is eminently logical. Even the most irredentist of those who deny the existence of African philosophy, more precisely the existence of African logic, were tendentious enough to submit that all the main processes of inference known to modern man are deployed in African traditional thought; either in the maintenance of the established world view or in its elaboration or modification—only adding that such processes are deployed in an essentially unreflective manner. The universality of logic is thus admitted even by the irredentists. Horton does not deny that traditional people do not reason and do not use logic … He does insist that they do so in non-reflective, non-critical manner. Which would mean that such societies generally are not conscious … of the logical structures, qua logical structures underlying their discourse. (Hallen 1977: 81 - 82) And like Hallen, one cannot but ask: what is the transition that must be undergone in order for a process of thought to be regarded as critical or reflective? One notices here that Horton’s qualification is forced, it is a deliberate introduction to sustain, as it were, the distinction between the ‘‘civilized’’ and ‘‘uncivilized’’, the ‘‘superiority’’ of Europe and ‘‘inferiority’’ of Africa. After all, it takes only some sort of training for one to be conscious of logical structure qua structure. Even among the so-called superior race, only those trained in logic can claim consciousness of logical structure qua structure. Horton’s distinction is thus vacuous or at best superfluous.

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The universality of logic means that logic is a fundamental dimension of the human personality. When we assert this, all we are saying is that all human experiences are organized, analyzed and sustained by certain intrinsic constitutive element. This element has a logical nature since it guarantees a homogeneous systematic and ordered conception of reality. It is the logical element which co-ordinates and transforms fragmentary perceptions, concepts, words, emotions, judgement, etc., into a recognizable human act. This is why it is said that logic is a disposition to fundamental ordered action, hence a characteristic of a self-conscious and responsible human endowed with reason. It is in this sense that Momoh submits that the competent individual in any society is logical (Momoh 2000:186 – 192). 5 Against Cultural Logic When we say that logic is universal, we are committed to the view that logic is an element in and of culture (See Uduma 2009(b):167 – 190). In saying this, what is meant is that the cultural experiences of a people cannot be meaningful unless they are organized or coordinated in language, an activity which itself presupposes a logical ability. Logic and language are fundamental or central to organizing reality and thus a characteristic of all human societies. In other words, the cultural experiences of a people are embedded in human language, and language itself is the immediate translation of the logical world of the individual in a manner concretely recognizable. That is, logic is what makes language possible; the existence of culture presupposes the existence of logic. The assertion as to the existence of logic in all cultures does not, however, mean that logic is cultural in the sense that there are regional or cultural logic(s). Yet it is by defending a cultural logic that Etuk and Ijiomah, as already highlighted, argue for a peculiar African logic. For example, for Ijiomah (1995:11) “… if logic is a part of philosophy and… philosophy is culture bound, it follows necessarily that logic is culture bound” and for Etuk the ‘‘implicate’’ of domesticating and enculturating philosophy ‘‘will be that there has to be an African logic, if there is African philosophy (Etuk, 2002: 100). Etuk, it is clear was reacting to Horton’s assertion that Africans, instead of employing intuition and ideas, have a rich proliferation of the sort of thinking called magical. From which he concludes that in traditional Africa “people do not stop to ask what are the irreducibly basic processes of inference, or how they can be justified”. Etuk submits that “philosophers know the centrality of the role of logic in the study of philosophy” and went further by asking whether we are “now going to suggest that there could possibly be logic in superstition and myths and folk-tales and oral traditions and religious rituals which are common features of Africa?” (Etuk 2002: 100). He, of course, admits

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that while not accepting this in the “crude sense” but then that is the reason why he canvasses for a peculiar African logic (Etuk 2002: 100). While paying due sympathy, indeed positive considerations, to the exigencies that prompted cultural identity, we nevertheless canvass for a transcending of jingoism in arguing for a particularistic logic. It is the failure to do this that forces Etuk, and all those who canvas for the regionalization of logic, to confuse the socio-cultural application of the principles of logic with the nature and structure of logic. Thus, in talking of whether or not there can be African logic in the sense of a peculiar African structure of logic, it is our position that there is none. This is so because logic is universal with no continental boundaries. We, for sure, can apply the principles of logic to different socio-cultural situations, but we have no peculiar regional thought processes. Yes, we talk of Chinese, Buddhist, and Polish logic, etc. but these qualifications only indicate a kind of logical studies which are developed in China, by Buddha, and in Poland. They do not denote logic in China or Poland, just as Aristotelian logic does not indicate a logical structure peculiar to Aristotle. Of course, we do not talk of American logic, German Logic, British logic as we talk of American philosophy, German philosophy and British philosophy. We, therefore, should instead be concerned with what to contribute to the world growth of logic than dissipating energy arguing for a peculiar African logic. It is, thus, not surprising that Chukwuemeka Nze in his assessment of William Amo (Nze 1990: 22) argues that “Amo was an African but there was nothing African in his syllogism, language and criticism except Amo the African philosopher”. For Nze, and plausibly so, the application of the principles of logic does not regionalize logic. In illustrating the universality of the principles of logic, the claim that the "Law of Excluded Middle”, also called ‘either-or' logic, is exclusively Western logic while Eastern philosophy uses something called the 'both-and' logic which has been shown to be misleading and patently wrong. In Proven Western Logic Vs. Flawed Eastern Logic the story is told of a Christian apologist, author, and native of India, Ravi Zacharias who travels the world giving evidence for the Christian faith. Following a presentation on an American campus regarding the uniqueness of Christ, Ravi was assailed by one of the university’s professors for not understanding Eastern logic. During the Q&A period the professor charged, “Dr. Zacharias, your presentation about Christ claiming and proving to be the only way to salvation is wrong for people in India because you’re using ‘either-or’ logic. In the East, we don’t use ‘either-or’ logic—that’s Western. In the East, we use 'both-and’ logic. Ravi in rebutting the rather confused but insistent professor had asked, “Are you saying that when I’m in India, I must use either the ‘both-and logic’ or nothing else? (Alleywayzalwayz Canadian Content 2009)”

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Ravi added, “even in India we look both ways before we cross the street because it is either me or the bus, not both of us!” Indeed, the either-or does seem to emerge. Although the point of illustration is that ‘‘everyone who tries to argue against the first principles of logic wind up sawing off the very limb upon which they sit,’’ that one cannot deny the law of contradiction without running into difficulty. It makes the compelling point that structures of thought are not regionalized; they are rather universal. This is made unarguable by saying ‘‘Imagine if the professor had said, “Ravi, your math calculations are wrong in India because you’re using Western math rather than Eastern math.” Or suppose he had declared, “Ravi, your physics calculations don’t apply to India because you’re using Western gravity rather than Eastern gravity.” We would immediately see the folly of the professor’s reasoning’’ (AlleywayzalwayzCanadian Content 2009). The stress thus is that notwithstanding the lure of particularism things work in the East just like they work everywhere else. In India, just like in the West, buses hurt when they hit you, 2+2=4, and the same gravity keeps everyone on the ground. The structures of thought are the same for the West, the East and Africa. For sure, there could be peculiar cultural African experiences where the principles of logic can be applied. The argument that the Igbo aphorism “ahu nze ebie okwu” (See Umezinwa 2005: 246 – 259) reflects a peculiar African logical structure is patently wrongheaded. Etuk (2002: 112) in discussing status factor as a peculiarly African logical structure tries to insinuate that Modus Ponens does not hold in African application of logical structures; this is not true. What it admits at best is that Africans accept that contradiction does not have the meaning of absurdity. In this sense, Africans are more inclined to the dialectical conception of logic where everything is mediated, and therefore everything is itself and at the same time not itself. This suggests that dialectical logic is one area where African cultural experiences will contribute to the world growth of logic. Africans must not bother themselves about formulating artificially regulated logistic languages. Logic is not exhausted in formal logic; indeed, formal logic is only a tiny aspect of logic. The over-emphasis on this tiny aspect of logic, there is no doubt, is where the problem lies. We thus need to be reminded that the world over we do not know of people who subject thinking to the regulated language of symbolic logic before knowing when someone is logical. There is indeed, no peculiar African logical structure. Thus, although Etuk talks of affective logic being peculiarly African, one only appreciates it as both an extrusion and extension of Leopold Sedar Senghor’s idea that African system of thought was different but equal to that of Europeans, and consisted of emotion rather than abstract reason. This is to say that affective motor is peculiarly African; for sure Africans can work on developing Affective logic, that would not make it a peculiarly African category any less that deontic logic is not

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peculiarly European. Even if it is called African logic that does not make it the logic in Africa, but only a kind of logical studies which is mainly developed in Africa. Likewise, we already pointed out, the expression Polish logic has never been used to denote logic in Poland, but a kind of logical studies which are mainly developed in Poland. We are thus reminded to note that to argue for a peculiar African logic is to unwittingly argue, and this would be monstrous, that Africa has a different or peculiar system or systems of thought from the rest of the world. References Achebe C. 2012. There was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra. London: Penguin Books. Alleywayzalwayz. 2009. Proven Western Logic Vs Flawed Eastern Logic. In Canadian Content. http://forums.canadiancontent.net/showthread.php?t=83977 Asiegbu, M. 2008. African Philosophy: Problems, Debates, Approaches, and Challenges. In Flash: Journal of Philosophy and Religion. 2. Blake, W. 1789. O African! Black African! In A Song of Liberty: Marriage of Heaven and Hell. (c 1790-93). Blumenbach, J. F. 1969. On the Natural Varieties of Mankind. Reprint of 1858 English Translation. New York: Bergman Publishers. Blyden, E. 1967. Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press. Chinweizu, I. 1978. The West and the Rest of Us. Lagos: NOKS Publishers. de Montesquieu, C. Philosophie Politque – Montesquieu. Paris: Sirey. Etuk, U.2002. The Possibility of African Logic. In The Third Way in African Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Kwasi Wiredu. ed. O. Oladipo. Ibadan: Hope Publication. Eze, E.C. 1997. The Colour of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology. In Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, ed. E. C. Eze, Cambridge Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc. Frege, G. 1956. The Thought: A Logical Inquiry. In Mind. 65. 259: 289-311. Hakluyt, R. 1589. Principal Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation. https://www.britainica.com>topic. Hallen, B. 1977. Robin Horton on Critical Philosophy and Traditional Thought. In Second Order African Journal of Philosophy, III. 1 Hallen, B. 2003 Not a House Divided. In Journal of African Philosophy Issue 2. Hallen, B. and J. O. Sodipo. 1997. Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft: Analytic Experiments in African Philosophy Palo Alto, C. A. Stanford University Press. Hegel, G. W. F. 1973. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Trans. T. M. Knox, Oxford: University Press. Horton, R. 1967. African Traditional Religion and Western Science. In Africa. 37. 1 and 2

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Horton, R. 1977. Traditional, Thought and the Emerging African Philosophy Department: A Comment on the Current Debate. In Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy. III. 1. Hume, D. 1854. Of National Characters. In The Philosophical Works of David Hume. Cited in E. Morton 2002. Race and Racism in the Works of David Hume. Journal on African Philosophy. 1. 1. Ijimoah, C. O. 1995. Modern Logic Owerri: A. P. Publications. Jefferson, T. 1787. Notes on the State of Virginia. Reprinted in 1965. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, I. 1964. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn. London: Library. Kant, I 1978 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. M.J. Gregora &V. L Dowdell. Southern Illinois: University Press. Lasisi, R. O. 1994. Racism, Imperialism and League of Nations Mandates System in Africa 1919-1939. In Nigeria Forum. Institute of International Affairs. Lagos: 24. 1-2: 1-8. Lasisi, R. O. 2011. The Image of Africa: Rhetoric and Reality of Afro-European Relations. The 96th Inaugural Lecture Delivered on Thursday, August 4th at the University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria. Linnaeus. 1806. A General et al and Minerals. London: Lackinton. Allen and Company. 1. 37. Long, E. 1970. History of Jamaica; or General Survey of the Ancient and Modern State of that Island: With Reflection on its Situations, Settlements, Inhabitants, climate, Products, Commerce, Laws and Government. New ed. Introduction by G. Metcalf. 3. London: F. Cass. Momoh, C.S. 2000. The Logic Question in African Philosophy. In The Substance of African Philosophy, ed. C.S. Momoh. Auchi: African Philosophy Projects Publications. Nze, C. 1990. Amo on Logic, Language and Criticism. In Anton William Amo’s Treatise on the Art of Philosophizing Soberly and Accurately. ed. T. U. Nwala. Enugu: Odey, J. O. 2005. Democracy and the Ripples of Executive Rascality. Abakiliki: Press. Oguejiofor, J. O. 2001. Philosophy and the African Predicament. Ibadan: Hope. Oguejiofor, J. O. 2005. Ethnophilosophy and Hermeneutics: Reviewing Okere’s Critique of Traditional African Philosophy. In African Philosophy and the Hermeneutics of Culture: Essays in Honour of Theophilus Okere, ed. J. O. Oguejiofor and G. I. Onah. Munster: Lit. Verlag. Okere, T. 1976. The Relation Between Culture and Philosophy. In Uche. 2. Olela, H. 1998. The African Foundations of Greek Philosophy. In African Philosophy: An Anthology ed. E. C. Eze. London: Blackwell. Onah, G. I. 2002. The Universal and the Particular in Wiredu’s Philosophy of Human Nature. In The Third Way in African Philosophy, Essays in Honour of Kwasi Wiredu. ed O. Oladipo. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Onyewuenyi, I. C. 1993. The African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism. Enugu: SNAAP.

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Payne, B. H. (Ariel). 1867. The Negro: What is his ethnological Status? Is He the Progeny of Ham? Is He a Descendant of Adam and Eve?... What is His Relation to the What Race. 2nd ed. https://openlibrary.org> Rodney, W. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Introduction by Vincent Harding. Abuja: Panaf. Serequeberhan, T. ed. 1991. African Philosophy: The Essential Readings. New York: Paragon House. Tarski, A. 1963. Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences Oxford: University Press. Uduma, U. O. 2004. Modern Symbolic Logic Enugu: Pan Afric Publishers. Uduma, U. O. 2008. Logic and Critical Thinking: A Study of Impediments to Good Reasoning and Guide to Sound Argumentation Abakaliki: Willy Rose and Appleseed. Uduma, U. O. 2009. The New Challenge facing the Existence of African Philosophy. In African Journal of Social Policy and Administration. 2. 2 Uduma, U. O. 2014. The Question of the “African” in African Philosophy: In Search of a Criterion for the Africanness of a Philosophy. In Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions. 3. 1: 127 – 146. Uduma, U. O. 2015. Beyond Irredentism and Jingoism: Reflections on the Nature of Logic and the Quest for (an) African Logic. 7th Inaugural Lecture of Ebonyi State University Abakaliki delivered on Thursday May 28. Umezinwa, C. 2005. Proverbs as Sources of African Philosophy. In African Philosophy and the Hermeneutics of Culture: Essays in Honour of Theophilus Okere, eds. J. O. Oguejiofor & G. I. Onah, Berlin-Hamburg-Münster: LIT Verlag. Verran, H. 2001. Science and an African Logic. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press Wamba-Dia-Wamba, E. 1991. Philosophy in Africa: Challenges of the African Philosopher. In African Philosophy: The Essential Readings. ed. Tsenay Serequeberhan. New York: Paragon House. Winch, P. 1964. Understanding a Primitive Society. In American Philosophical Quarterly 1. Wiredu, K. 2001. Democracy by Consensus: Some Conceptual Considerations. Socialism and Democracy. 30. 3: 227-244.

Chapter 13

Why Can’t There Be (An) African Logic? Clarifying the Squall for a Cultural Logic Jonathan O. Chimakonam University of Pretoria, South Africa

Abstract In this chapter, I investigate the possibility for the existence or non-existence of African logic and announce a debate formally to this end. I respond to Uduma O. Uduma who had earlier objected to Udo Etuk’s position that there might be such a possibility. I clarify what Uduma calls the squall for a cultural logic and show that Uduma was mistaken in assuming all calls for African logic to be the same, that is, calls for peculiar, regional, culture-bound constructions that repudiate the universality of logic. I distinguish the two main groups in the relativist school namely; the indigenizing or culture-bound and the system-building camps and show that while Uduma’s criticisms apply to the culture-bound camp, they do not apply to the system-building camp that subscribes to the raising of the African logic tradition and making contributions to the extant corpus on logic with universal applicability. I contend that an alternative system of logic developed in Africa is not only possible but desirable. Keywords: Logic, Uduma Oji, Culture, Africa, African thought 1 Introduction I investigate the possibility for the existence or non-existence of African logic and announce formally a debate to this end. I respond to Uduma O. Uduma who had earlier objected to Udo Etuk’s position that there might be such a possibility. I clarify what Uduma calls the squall for a cultural logic and show that Uduma was mistaken in assuming all calls for African logic to be the same, that is, calls for peculiar, regional, culture-bound constructions that repudiate the universality of logic. I distinguish the two main groups in the relativist school, namely the indigenizing or culture-bound and the system-building camps. I show that while Uduma’s criticisms apply to the culture-bound camp, they do not apply to the system-building camp that subscribes to the raising of

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the African logic tradition and making contributions to the extant corpus on logic with universal applicability. I contend that an alternative system of logic developed in Africa is not only possible but desirable. Why can’t there be (an) African logic? I do not intend to call this another debate in the post-colonial African intellectual history, but I am afraid, that is what it has become! Following the tumultuous debate on the existence or otherwise of African philosophy tradition, scholarships aimed at redefining and grounding Africa’s various knowledge infrastructure in a non-phallo-logocentric framework attracted antithetical challenge from those that are opposed to such ideas. Thus, divided into the relativists and the universalists schools, a foremost debate broke out on the possibility or otherwise of (an) Africa-inspired alternative logic system(s). While the universalists are those that see logic as a universal tool of reason without cultural alternatives, the relativists are those that think that alternative systems of logic that are at once context-generated but universally applicable are possible. However, the relativist school can be divided into two camps, namely, the culture-inspired and the culture-bound. Whereas the former holds that alternative systems of logic can be culture-inspired but universally applicable, the latter holds that alternative systems of logic are culture-bound and border-sensitive. Those in the latter camp like Chris Ijiomah see it as a piece of cultural pride to construct systems that protect a given culture’s uniqueness. Unlike Ijiomah, I favor the former position, but Uduma does not seem to notice the existence of two camps to this debate, shortsightedness I will seek to clarify later on. Riding on the crest of the works of some African thinkers (Hebga 1958; Senghor 1962; Omoregbe1985; Momoh 1989) who felt that there was a need to ground Africa’s knowledge formation in some frameworks other than the Aristotelian classical logic, the relativists (See: Omoregbe 1985; Momoh 1989; Etuk 2002; Ijiomah 2006) initiated discussions on a possible alternative logic from Africa. Those who are opposed to the idea of a system of alternative logic that is African disputed this (See: Horton 1967; Uduma 2009). In this work, I will confine myself to the arguments by Uduma that objected to Udo Etuk’s paper “The Possibility of African Logic” which raised series of questions some of which suggested that there was nothing incorrect about the idea of a logic developed in African intellectual tradition. Uduma, in a reply titled “Can there be an African Logic? Revisiting the Squall for a Cultural Logic” flawed Etuk’s arguments on the grounds that the idea of African logic is anathema because it suggests culture-bound unique and peculiar systems. Here I wade into this discussion and pronounce the formal beginning to a debate on the possibility or otherwise of (an) African logic. In this rejoinder which will focus specifically on answering Uduma’s objections to Etuk, I will clarify what Uduma calls the squall of a cultural logic. I will argue

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that contrary to Uduma’s assumption that the relativists are not all agreed that a system of an alternative logic is necessarily culture-bound. I will show that there is a camp in the relativist school that, call them the culture-inspired that sees new systems of alternative logic as structures that can be culture-inspired although universally applicable. I will discuss the pre-colonial and colonial backgrounds that motivated discussions on the need for an alternative system of logic as the basis for scholarship in Africa. I will show how discussions on the idea of (an) African logic have crystallized into a full debate in the post-colonial era and specifically, in the contemporary period of African philosophy history. I will argue on the side of the relativists and claim that (a) system of logic from the African philosophy tradition is not only possible but attractive. I will propose that one name such an alternative system might be called is Ezumezu logic, derived from Igbo language and which gestures at a triadic structure, the third of which would be obtained through the complementation of the other two. I, therefore, suggest, following the communitarian orientation of extant African world-view that the system of an alternative logic that would be developed in Africa and by African thinkers could be trivalent in structure. 2 Pre-colonial and Colonial Backgrounds From the pre-colonial to the colonial times, a host of Eurocentric thinkers like Georg Hegel, David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Lucien Levy-Bruhl, etc., have arrived at different erroneous conclusions concerning the humanity and rationality of the African. These claims though variously established to be spurious and hollow nowadays, motivated institutional structures of education and social orientation that created what is called the évolués out of many Africans. The notion of the évolués, without a shred of doubt, was the mainstay of mental colonization. The subject of mental colonization was a dominant part of Aime Cesaire’s advocacy that crystallized in his famous notion of negritude. In his Return to My Native Land, he demonstrates negritude as a movement championing a psycho-social return to African values and epistemic formation. Negritude for him becomes a “doctrine which asserts the black man as a man with his own culture, his own civilization and his own original contributions. At one time or other all the black peoples of Africa or of African origin have been subjected to a system which denies them their cultural and intellectual achievements” (1969: 20). The claim that Africa has no culture, and the inculcation of this falsehood in the processes that educate the African, has led to the production of generations of guinea pigs in the colonial and post-colonial Africa who, agonizingly, have come to believe the lie. Steve Biko, the South African anti-apartheid campaigner, describes a situation in which native South Africans were badly treated that they began to see themselves as sub-humans, precisely as their

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European lords see them. His idea of the Black Consciousness Movement was supposed to be a strategy for re-valorization of their color and race. As he put it: I think basically Black Consciousness refers itself to the black man and to his situation, and I think the black man is subjected to two forces in this country. He is first of all oppressed by an external world through institutionalised machinery, through laws that restrict him from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions, through poor pay, through very difficult living conditions, through poor education, these are all external to him, and secondly, and this we regard as the most important, the black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation, he rejects himself, precisely because he attaches the meaning white to all that is good, in other words he associates good and he equates good with white. This arises out of his living and it arises out of his development from childhood. (2005: 100) It is people like this who have been torn apart from their cultural roots as Africans and are in a futile struggle to ape the European; he is no longer African and is nowhere near the goal of becoming a European. He is isolated in the middle but frustrated by his failure, which he has refused to accept that he almost always strives in desperation to show off his tangled European mane. This leads him to take difficult positions, most times like the insistence by the universalists, that the idea of an alternative logic system developed in Africa and by Africans is anathema. This preceding view commits them to saying that the job of creating systems of logic is the exclusive preserve of the European mind. These are the people that are called the évolués. In African philosophy, the majority of them belong to the so-called universalist school. Thus, when the évolués kick against African culture as a viable spring-board for a philosophy, they unwittingly play into the hands of the colonialist whose derogatory opinion it was that Africa had no viable culture before the arrival of the Europeans. Members of the universalist school in African philosophy are jinxed anyway you look at it. They carry the heavy burden of their indoctrination. These unfortunate Africans have been variously described as “assimilados”—natives who have been assimilated into colonial culture (Cesaire 1956/69: 18); “évolués”—those who have passed out of the traditional ways of life and thought of their own ethnic group and have taken over those of the West (Tempels 1959/2006: 13); “déracinés” or the deracinated—those who have been torn away from their ethnic roots: and who, belonging nowhere, are very liable as a result of their insecurity to all kinds of unstable behavior (Tempels 1959/2006: 17); “skokian”—those who are hardly Africans or Europeans but are rather a corrupt mixture of both (Malinowski 1945-7: 157); black souls in a white world—those Africans who merely ape the European ways as a result of

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European cultural imperialism; “black Europeans”—those Africans who due to their Western education strive to abandon their native African culture and adopt the European culture but who could not become real Europeans and are no longer real Africans (Jahn 1961: 16); “Oyibo-oji”—Those Africans who adopt European culture and by their actions disrespect African ways as bush or primitive (Chuku 2013: 13); Westernized individuals—Those Africans who have been “westernized” through the instrument of religion and education (Mudimbe 1988: 52-53). These people pose a serious challenge to the authentic African intellectual re-birth. They often take the front burner in postcolonial Africa. They highlight their Western education and a strong inclination toward Western culture and proudly demonstrate their disdain for the African culture. In philosophy, they have pulled themselves together as members of the universalist or modernist school. The edifice of African philosophy for them must be erected on the foundation of Western cultural dynamics they had been taught and which they had assimilated as not only superior but absolute. For this myopism, the brilliant C. S. Momoh has caricatured their school as “African logical neo-positivism” (1985: 14-16). The universalist, or the modernist school in African philosophy, therefore, represents a collection of brainwashed African intelligence who are mentally deluded into inferring cultural superiority and absoluteness from their Western indoctrination. These évolués often speak with great confidence. Their publications sometimes bear the tone of unearthly falsetto, thundering ignorance to silence delicate truth about Africa. It is, however, not that they are aware of their ignorance or their sheepish service to the racist colonial goal—in truth, they are not. Ungodly indoctrination by the colonialist and the neo-colonialist sometimes take, an irreversible toll on their mindsets. This explains why most members of this school joined Hountondji (1983/1996: vii) to caricature the initial efforts at constructing African philosophy as “ethnophilosophy”. It is for this set of jinxed African scholars that Aime Cesaire talks about the necessity for the great African return (1967); The West Indian Marcus Garvey started what he called ‘Back to Africa Movement.’ It is also in the same light that Ngugi wa Thiong’o spoke of decolonizing the African mind (1986)1 and Amilcar Cabral the Guinean nationalist recommended what he called “return

1 See Ngugi wa Thiong’O, Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature, (London: J. Curry and Portsmouth, N. H: Heinemann, 1986); Penpoints, Gunpoints, and Dreams: Toward a Critical Theory of the Arts and the State in Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1998.

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to the source (1969)”2—a sort of re-africanization of the colonized people of Africa through philosophical re-education. This re-education is necessary for the recovery and re-integration of African intelligence brainwashed through the colonial education, or one should say, mis-education to borrow the favored concept of Ivan Illich expressed in his Deschooling the Society (1971).3 These évolués or the deracinated ones who today in African philosophy masquerade as members of the universalist or modernist school have been at the forefront of Africa’s stunted intellectual growth and neglect by other races of the world. Yet because they sometimes occupy, positions of importance like the school teacher, the University lecturer, the government policymaker or implementer, etc., their presence, actions and inactions pose a daunting challenge to those who crusade for an authentic African renaissance. For the loss of this native African creative originality, many tutored Africans could not theorize neither could they invent. This is because the Western thought system which they adopted was not genial to them. This, to their great undoing, gives them a terrible critical mind toward anything that is naturally African but robs them of any creative originality. A verifiable fact of this claim is that no member of the universalist school has been able to erect theoretic structures to replace the ones they deconstructed. It is not only that they could not create new ideas in African philosophy; they now stand against those who attempt to do so. It is this gauntlet mounted by the presence of the évolués that we must now valiantly confront and destroy, and the field of African logic is now the last frontier. 3 Why Can’t there be (an) African Logic? Clarifying the Squall for a Cultural Logic Uduma’s chapter which connected the logic debate to the contemporary history of African philosophy was in response to Etuk who had argued for the possibility of African logic. Uduma belongs to the universalist school in the African logic debate and the main thrust of his criticism against the possibility of African logic centres around his erroneous assumption that the call for African logic is advocacy for a culture-bound programme that has no universal applicability. I show this objection in three different quotes from his work which was first published in 2009 and revised for this collection. My response was first published in 2011 and is here revised accordingly.

2 See Cabral Amilcar, Revolution in Guinea: An African People’s Struggle (London: Stage 1, 1969). 3 See Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1971).

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1. African logic implies the repudiation of universalism: Quote: The question whether there can there be an African Logic is likely to elicit two reactions. First, is the suspicion that it is a vestige, or more appropriately, a surreptitious reawakening of the somewhat moribund question of the existence of African Philosophy. Second, somewhat connected to the first, but in a more nuanced sense quite distinct from it, is the question of the existence of a peculiar African logic. This means that the question of whether there can be an African logic is connected to the more encompassing inquiry of the existence of African philosophy, which in some deep sense implies the repudiation of universalism. My response: There are two prominent ideas out there in the relativist school. The first is promoted by thinkers like B. N. Eboh (1983), I. B. Francis (1992), O. I. Francis (1997) and its contemporary champion Ijiomah (2006 and 2014). It is the position that since philosophy springs from culture, logic, which undergirds it, should, therefore, be regional and culture-bound. I have described this camp earlier as the culture-bound relativists or indigenizing camp. The second is initiated and promoted by thinkers like Hebga (1958) and Momoh (1989) and carried on in the contemporary time by the present writer (Chimakonam 2015, 2017 and 2018). This idea roughly states that African thinkers can contribute to the intellectual history of humanity and find new ways of extending the frontiers of human knowledge by developing alternative systems of logic. I have earlier described this camp as the culture-inspired relativists. Uduma’s objection may apply to the first group but certainly not to the second. If we describe the goal of the first camp as geared toward indigenization, we will describe the goal of the second group as that of system-building. From their names, one can see that their objectives are not the same, and it will be improper to marshal the same criticism against them as Uduma has done. The goal of the first group is to establish that what is called logic today is nothing but Western cultural logic which either does not or should not apply in non-Western cultures like Africa. As a result, the non-Westerners are at liberty to formulate their cultural logics with which to axiomatize and explain their realities. The culture-bound relativists are upset that the West has imposed its cultural particular on Africa by forcing Africans to think in accordance with an alien logic. It becomes their commitment not only to expose this lie but to displace it with a proper African cultural logic. I grant that the goal of this group is radical and may be mistaken. For the second group, their goal is to formulate new systems of an alternative logic to the existing ones and as their own (African) contributions to the intellectual advancement of humanity. What the culture-inspired school wishes to do is not different from what the Polish or the Australian logic traditions are doing. It is to make original contributions from the African

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philosophical place. So, in a way, it is about raising African logic tradition. It is both a question of identity affirmation and the assertion of own intellectual pedigree. But it is not, and this point needs to be emphasized, a question of repudiating the universalism of logic. 2. The call for a peculiar, regional African logic is tendentious and arose out of frustration: Quote: The tragedy, however, is that African philosophy and with it, the quest for African logic is not inspired, like the origin of philosophy in intellectual history, by curiosity; it is inspired by frustration. This chapter, going beyond the leveraged consensus on the existence of African Philosophy, explores the motivation for a peculiar African (regional) logic. While accepting that there are peculiar socio-cultural African experiences, it nevertheless seeks to demonstrate the need to rise above cultural identity and frustration to the realization that logic is universal; that there is no cultural or regional logic and that the call for African logic is thus only tendentious. It canvasses that, for sure, the ideals and goals of the African cultural identity are legitimate, and there is a need to highlight what we perceive to be our unique logical heritage. Still, all these do not and cannot support the repudiation of universal thought (logical) processes. My response: It is important to clarify that the call of the culture-inspired camp is not for a peculiar, regional African logic; it is not tendentious; and certainly, does not arise out of frustration. From what I explained in the first objection, the culture-inspired camp must be separated from the culturebound camp. They do not aim at formulating a peculiar or regional logic that would displace the idea of logic with universal applicability, and they are not upset or frustrated like the culture-bound camp who think that the West stifles African originality by imposing its own cultural particular. To further understand the project of the culture-inspired camp, we must distinguish two broad concepts of logic, namely; conventional and alternative logics. While the conventional logic is bivalent and complies with the three traditional laws of thought, alternative logics range from trivalent to infinite valuation and constitute alternative ways of analyzing the relationships among realities. Systems such Kleene’s three-valued logic, Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic, Graham Priest’s Relevance logic, etc., are examples of alternative logics. The idea of African logic propagated by the system-building school is in line with this; it does not subscribe to the peculiar, regional and culture-bound proposal; it only aims at making a contribution from the African place. The predicate African is used to identify the origin of the contributions in order to designate the new tradition of logic as a mark of cultural pride and not as a boundary stone.

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3. The idea of African logic promotes enculturation of logic: Quote: This essay rejects this position not because the motivation is ill-founded, but because logic as a discipline is concerned with the structures or principles of thought; these structures of thought have no continental boundaries. We, for sure, can apply the principles of logic to different socio-cultural situations, but we have no peculiar regional thought processes. The point here is that in deducing the enculturation of logic from the enculturation of philosophy, we must realize that enculturation of philosophy does not reduce philosophy to culture. Indeed, while enculturation emphasizes the particularity of philosophy, attention is drawn to the universality of philosophy: the different cultures, into which philosophies are inserted, imbue the various philosophies with a relativistic character. These cultures individualise those philosophies. My response: It is obvious that Uduma’s objection to the idea of enculturation of logic applies to the position of the culture-bound school. It does not in any way vitiate the position of the culture-inspired camp. I uphold the viability of the program of the culture-inspired camp and think that it is an idea that is worth promoting. My hunch is to show that Uduma failed to understand that there are two competing positions in the relativist school of African logic. I have no doubt that had he observed the demarcation I made between the culture-inspired camp and the culture-bound camp, his criticisms would have been properly directed, and his conclusions in the paper would have been different. Thus, I do not find any objections in Uduma’s paper that can truly vitiate the idea of African logic or why there can’t be (an) African logic in line with the position of the culture-inspired camp. It is clear that arguments of the type marshaled by Uduma are inspired by subliminal brainwash of Western teaching, and I think that Uduma above all else, is being mischievous and too pessimistic. Like the Polish, the Chinese and the Indians, the African can make a veritable contribution to the field of logic by developing new systems. 4 What may (an) ‘African Logic’ be called? One of the strong arguments Uduma employed to undermine credibility in the call for African logic is his analogy that we cannot have regional mathematics or physics or even such laws of nature as gravity. He went further to say, “[O]f course, we do not talk of American logic, German Logic, British logic as we talk of American philosophy, German philosophy and British philosophy.” But we talk of Polish logic, Chinese logic, Buddhist logic, Indian logic etc. And this is the point that flattens Uduma’s objection. Humbly, he tends to admit it when he observes, “[Y]es we talk of Chinese logic, Buddhist logic, Polish logic, etc., but these qualifications only indicate a kind of logical studies which are developed in China, by Buddha and in Poland; they do not denote logic in China or Poland,

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just as Aristotelian logic does not denote a logical structure peculiar to Aristotle.” Finally, it appears Uduma has come around our point of view in the excerpt above. The camp of the relativist school which I have designated as the system-building camp does not think of African logic as logic in Africa, by which Uduma means a programme constructed for Africans alone, no! Our idea of African logic indicates a system or systems developed in Africa, by African thinkers as part of their contribution to the universal project on logic. This is the programme I adjudge to be not only possible, but desirable. And in this understanding of African logic, it is fair to say that Hebga, Momoh, myself and even Etuk are at one. Assuming therefore that we achieve a consensus that a program of African logic tradition is not only possible but desirable, what can a prototype of such a system be called? This is not an easy question because the name such an alternative logic is called is central to its justification. Levy-Bruhl (1947) had sarcastically insinuated that Africa has a peculiar logic which could be described as the logic of mystical participation. But I have shown in the preceding that this assumption is false and imposed. African thinkers want to develop African logic systems as individual thinkers and not as a collective mind or consciousness. These thinkers want to speak for themselves and not for their tribes. So, any thinker that wants to formulate such a logic would be working like Aristotle, Buddha or Lukasiewicz and would shoulder the responsibility of naming their system. In this section, I attempt to find a befitting name for a logic that may be called African in origin because the Aristotelian logic is not the only system of logic we can have. Etuk has raised a nagging question: “is this formalized and abstract logic all that there is to logic?” (2002: 105). And Uduma avidly accepted that logic is not exhausted in “formal logic” (2009: 289). This important concession places Uduma’s views at contradictory paths for if he accepted thus far, why deny the possibility of African logic which could in the very least, be informal? Although Uduma seems to be arguing against the possibility of an African logic with a complete set of symbols and a peculiar form and linguistic structure, if the preceding is what his closing paragraph emphasizes, then he failed to make it clear from the onset. Yet his argument would still be misdirected, for the promoters of African logic do not insist on a style that would model that of the West. They are rather seeking to map an alternative system and doing this may require them to formulate a system of an alternative logic. If this becomes necessary, the question is, what might such a system be called? I find the name Ezumezu relevant in this context. According to Igbo folklore, Ezumezu is what a pot of charm is called if it contains all possible charms. This system of logic also has to be trivalent in that it would be three-valued in

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keeping with the communitarian ontology that characterizes metaphysical thinking in much of the sub-Saharan African cultural world-views. One may then choose to designate the system as Ezumezu with upper case ‘E’ and the third value which represents the complementation of the other two extreme values from which the system derives its name as ezumezu with a lower case ‘e’. Ezumezu, therefore, can be conceived as an alternative logic that is threevalued and complementary. It is important to note first that this variant of three–valued logic may be described as African, not in terms of race but tradition. It describes the thought system of much of Africa, where it has been established in learned research that basic similarities exist (Tempels 1959/2006; Mbiti 1969; Abraham 1962; Jahn 1961). The basic differences between this proposal and say the Lukasiewicz’s model is as expected in the third value, which lies in-between two extremes. In Lukasiewicz it is called the undetermined read as neither true nor false (truth-value gap) whereas in my proposal it is called ezumezu meaning the complemented and interpreted as both true and false (truth-value glut). It is from this that the variant of threevalued logic we are proposing here derived its name. Again, the two principal values Truth and Falsity are treated as contradictories in Lukasiewicz. Hence, in a truth table definition of the conditional P ⊃ Q, T, U will yield U; U, F will yield U, the undetermined from this reading is understood to mean it might be true or false though it is not known which (Jacquette 2000: 116; Lukasiewicz 1970: 87-88). This is the semantic effect of the contradictory status of the two standard values which are supposed to necessitate the third value jointly. The curious point, however, is found in the conditional definition where both the antecedent and the consequent in the truth table are undetermined. Lukasiewicz reads it as U, U will yield T given the classical truth table definition of the conditial. Kleene 1952 would rather read it as U, U = U (Jacquette 2000: 116) in the strict observation of the semantic content of the two undetermined values thus ignoring the truth table definition of the conditional as false only when the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Lukasiewicz on his part did not ignore this, and the fall-out can be seen in their different interpretations above. But why would Lukasiewicz do this? Why would he jump from a supposedly three-valued reading back to a two-valued reading of the undetermined much like from a possible truth-value glut back to truth-value gap? He must have noticed that a consistent truth-glut reading obviously would be implausible because his two standard values were contradictories. As a result, it makes no sense to expect U, U (two unknowns) to yield any other value besides T given the classical definition of conditional. Thus, Lukasiewicz never really left bivalence and never truly escaped determinism. Some have criticized the undetermined and correctly so as not being a distinct value in itself. Michael Glanzberg for example, argues that truth-gaps are poorly motivated and that it

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is mysterious how they can be compatible with some attractive general principles and that they are useless any way you look at it (Glanzberg 2004: 1-2). Simply put, if you wanted a three-valued system, then the intermediate value had better be a proper value and not some hanging undetermined thing that runs into a brick wall. Ezumezu, as an African proposal in keeping with the communitarian orientation of the African world-view, would most likely present the third value as a truth-value in itself. This is because the two standard values in the Ezumezu system would not be contradictories; they would be sub contraries which allows both to hold at the same time. 5 Conclusion Uduma’s paper “Can There Be An African Logic? Revisiting the Squall for a Cultural Logic” was a response to Udo Etuk’s paper, “The Possibility of African Logic”. Here, I responded to Uduma’s paper showing that his objections were misdirected. I showed that he failed to demarcate the two competing positions in the debate on African logic and as a result, could not understand clearly, why one of such positions—system-building — is possible. I made a general effort in explaining the possibility and the desirability of what could be called an African logic. This paper is also a call to logicians of African origin to lend their voices in this worthwhile debate. So that if we end up formulating some systems of alternative logics, then it would be a great intellectual achievement for Africa in the post-colonial era. Such a contribution would importantly mark the beginning of Africa’s return to history. The witch has cried the previous night that Africans have no philosophy; not to engage in this debate I am afraid, may lead to the witch crying another night, this time that Africans are incapable of formulating theories and principles of logic. I am, therefore, convinced that there is no reason why there can’t be an African logic tradition. References Abraham, W. 1962. The Mind of Africa. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Cesaire, A. 1969. Return to My Native Land. Middlesex: Penguin. Chimakonam, O. J. 2015. The criteria question in African philosophy: Escape from the horns of jingoism and Afrocentrism. In Atuolu omalu: Some unanswered questions in contemporary African philosophy, ed. Jonathan O. Chimakonam, 101-123. Lanham: University Press of America. Chimakonam, O. J. 2017. The Question of African Logic: Beyond Apologia and Polemics. A. Afolayan and T. Falola (eds.). The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy. New York: Palgrave. Chimakonam, O. J. 2018. The Philosophy of African Logic: A Consideration of Ezumezu Paradigm. In Philosophical perceptions on logic and order, ed. Jeremy Horne, 96-121. Hershey PA: IGI Global.

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Chuku, G. ed. 2013. The Igbo Intellectual Tradition: Creative Conflict in African and African Diasporic Thought. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Eboh, P. 1983. The Structure of Igbo Logic as shown in Dispute Settlement in Igboland with Special Reference to Nzerem Town. Rome: Pontificis Universitas Gregoriana. Etuk, U. 2002. The Possibility of African Logic. In The Third Way in African Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Kwasi Wiredu, ed. O. Oladipo, 98-116. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Francis, B.I. 1992. Logic Among the Efiks. Unpublished B.A. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Nigeria. Francis, O.I. 1997. The Ibibio Logic. Unpublished B.A. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Nigeria. Glanzberg, M. 2004. Against Truth-Value Gaps. Liar and Headps: New Essays on Paaradox, ed. J. C. Beall. 1-46. New York: OUP. Hebga, M. 1958. Logic in Africa. In Philosophy Today, 4.4: 222-229. Horton, R. 1967. African Traditional Thought and Western Science. In Africa. 37.2: 155-187. Hountondji, P. 1983, 1996. African Philosophy, Myth and Reality. In African Philosophy: Myth Reality, Second Edition. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. Ijiomah, C. O. 2006. An Excavation of Logic in African Worldview. African Journal of Religion, Culture and Society. 1.1: 29-35. Ijiomah, C. O. 2014. Harmonious Monism: A Philosophical Logic of Explanation for Ontological Issues in Supernaturalism in African Thought, Calabar: Jochrisam Publishers. Jacquette, D. 2000. An Internal Determinacy Metatheorem for Lukasiewicz’s Aussagenkalkuls. Bulletin of the Section of Logic. 29.3: 115-124. Jahn, J. 1961. Muntu: The New African Culture. Germany: Dusseldorf. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1947. Primitive Mentality. Paris: University of France Press. Lukasciewicz, J. 1970. Jan Lukasciewicz: Selected Works: Studies in Logic and Foundations of Mathematics. ed. L. Borkowski. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. Malinowski, B. 1945-7. The Dynamic of Cultural Change. London: New Haven. Mbiti, J. S. 1969. African Religion and Philosophy. London: Heinemann. Momoh, C. S. 1985. Canons of African Philosophy. A Paper Presented at the 6th Congress of Nigerian Philosophical Association Conference, University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University). July 31 – August 3. Momoh, C. S. 1989. The Logic Question in African Philosophy. In The Substance of African Philosophy, ed. C. S. Momoh, 175-192. Auchi: African Philosophy Project Publications. Mudimbe, V. Y. 1988. The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. Omoregbe, J. I. 1985. African Philosophy: Yesterday and Today. Philosophy in Africa: Trends and Perspectives. ed. Peter O. Bodunrin, 1-14. Ile-Ife: University of Ife.

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Senghor, L. S. 1962. Negrohood: Psychology of the African Negro. Diogenes. 37: 1-15. Tempels, P. 1959. Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine. Uduma, U. O. 2009. Can there be an African Logic? From Footmarks to Landmarks on African Philosophy, 2nd ed. A. F. Uduigwomen, 280-290. Lagos: O. O. P.

Part 4: Introduction: The System builders, Contributions from the Calabar School In the preceding part 3, actors who engaged in the debate whether there can be such a thing as African logic ended with a divided opinion. While Udo Etuk was not clearly for or against, Uduma was vehemently opposed to the possibility of such an idea. It falls to those who think that a system of African logic is possible to construct it. Campbell Momoh who led this camp signed off by pushing that responsibility to younger African logicians. Incidentally, the gauntlet to construct African logic as a formal system was thrown out at the same time in the new millennium when a robust school of African philosophy was emerging on the horizon. Made up of a collection of creative, original but radical thinkers who are not afraid to dare and venture, and originally operating at the Department of Philosophy in the University of Calabar as a small tight circle of like-minds but expanding eventually to different universities on the continent and beyond. Taking a new name, this group now known as the Conversational School of Philosophy sometimes referred to as the Calabar School of Philosophy picked up the gauntlet. In less than two decades, there were three different theories of logic, Asouzu’s “complementary logic” (2004, 2013), Ijiomah’s “harmonious monism” (2006, 2014) and Chimakonam’s “Ezumezu logic” (2012, 2014, 2018, 2019). The nature and differences of these three systems would be my focus momentarily. Ijiomah’s theory of harmonious monism is a system of three-valued logic consisting of what he calls quasi truth and quasi false as two extreme but fragmentary and indeterminate values. The central value, which is the point of harmony or the region of truth is where the two fragmentary and indeterminate values converge to achieve completeness. Ijiomah spells out some rules in discussing the universe of discourse of his system. He demonstrates how his system rests on the African background ontology, which recognises two dimensions of existence, namely, the physical and the non-physical. His claim, arising from this African ontological structure is that the combination or the relationship between these two dimensions of reality is what creates being in its wholeness. Harmonious monism, therefore, is constructed to explain this type of inference. As audacious as Ijiomah’s system is, it throws up a few issues. First, he claims it is an African culture-bound system which makes it peculiar and resourceful only to Africans and in an African context. This makes his system susceptible to Uduma’s criticisms highlighted in part three of this anthology. Second, Ijiomah’s three-pronged schema makes room for quasi truth, quasi

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false and complete truth; one wonders if there is no room for complete falsehood in his system? Third, by the formulation of the region of truth which is the intermediate value and the processes that yield this value, Ijiomah decrees the non-viability and non-veracity of the three traditional laws of thought yet fails to promulgate alternatives that undergird his system. All these are issues that beg for attention in his system. For Asouzu, his complementary logic is multivalued favouring principles that uphold conjunctive inferences and opposing those that promote disjunctive inferences. He puts it up as the appropriate logic for all kinds of social and political relationships in our world because it abhors all programmes that dichotomise and polarise humanity and society. He declares that this system is the logic that supports his ontological theory of complementary reflection. But this also means that he discounts the law of excluded middle which marshals all inferences of ‘either or’ structure and discounts the law of contradiction which entails that opposites contradict rather than complement. Asouzu, however, fails to formulate new laws of thought that justify his mode of complementary reasoning. This leaves a yawning hole in his system and calls for more work. The third system of logic to emerge from the Conversational School is Chimakonam’s Ezumezu logic. Like Ijiomah’s system, it is three-valued, but unlike it, it is universalisable. Unlike Ijiomah’s and Asouzu’s systems, it recognises the viability and veracity of the three traditional laws of thought except that it deems them inadequate to cover some contexts of reasonings in African lifeworld thereby necessitating three supplementary laws to make up for this lacuna. The intermediate value is a point of convergence of independent values of truth and falsehood, but unlike the Hegelian dialectics, these two extreme values do not lose their identities at the point of complementation, and for this, his system is an arumaristical, meaning that a synthesis is not expected. The agents in interaction are nwa-nsa, nwa-nju and nwa-izugbe, and the process of interaction that leads to nwa-izugbe is a creative struggle of autonomous variables. Inferences in Ezumezu logic could be arumaristic or ohakaristic upholding both conjunctive and disjunctive motions across two principal modes of inference, namely; the contextual and the complementary modes. Whereas truth and falsehood are deemed to be context-based judgements, truth-value gluts such as the intermediate value are points where the contexts converge or complement. And this intermediate is not indeterminate; it is perfectly determinate but transitory—a point of exception where two opposed values are possible. This point of exception and all the inferences it guarantees are justified and upheld by the three supplementary laws called Njikoka, Nmekoka and Onona-etiti. No doubt, Chimakonam’s programme might not be a perfect system yet, but it looks a bit tight more than the other two systems.

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I invite the readers to study and further examine these three systems of logic. Teachers can lead their students in understanding the basic principles of the systems and establishing their weaknesses, strengths and expressive powers. Implications of these logical developments in Africa’s intellectual history can also be studied. Happy reading. References Asouzu, I. I. 2004. The method and principles of complementary reflection in and beyond African philosophy. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. Asouzu, I. I. 2013. Ibuanyidanda (complementary reflection) and some basic philosophical problems in Africa today: Sense experience, “ihe mkpuchi anya” and the supermaxim. Zurich: Lit Verlag GmbH and Co. Kg Wien. Chimakonam, O. J. 2012. Introducing African science: Systematic and philosophical approach. Bloomington, Indiana: Authorhouse. Chimakonam, O. J. 2014. Ezumezu (African) logic as an algorithm for scientific research in Africa. In Philosophy, science and human development: International conference papers 2011, ed. Ogbozo, C. N. and Asogwa, C. I., 58-77. Enugu: Snaap Press. Chimakonam, O. J. 2018. The Philosophy of African Logic: A Consideration of Ezumezu Paradigm. In Philosophical perceptions on logic and order, ed. Jeremy Horne, 96-121. Hershey PA: IGI Global. Chimakonam, O. J. 2019. Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Cham: Springer. Ijiomah, C. 2006. An excavation of a logic in African world-view. African Journal of Religion, Culture and Society 1:1 29-35. Ijiomah, C. 2014. Harmonious monism: A philosophical logic of explanation for ontological issues in supernaturalism in African thought. Calabar: Jochrisam Publishers.

Chapter 14

Harmonious Monism: A System of a Logic in African Thought Chris O. Ijiomah University of Calabar, Nigeria

Abstract In this work, I attempt to articulate a system of logic called Harmonious Monism. I also formulate a principle called the Structural Analogy and logical functionalism (SAALF) which will be used to explain the structure of the theory of Harmonious Monism. SAALF states that there is an analogy between the structures of the prevalent ontology of any culture and the structures of the prevalent logic of the same culture. Keywords: African logic, Harmonious monism, Culture, SAALF. 1. Introduction In this work, I attempt to articulate a system of logic called Harmonious Monism. I also formulate a principle called the Structural Analogy and logical functionalism (SAALF) which will be used to explain the structure of the theory of Harmonious Monism. SAALF states that there is an analogy between the structures of the prevalent ontology of any culture and the structures of the prevalent logic of the same culture. Does this imply that logic presupposes reality or vice versa? It is perhaps to answer such a question that made Lizzie Susan Stebbing in 1930 to submit that any person who intends to read or study and hence understand Western ontology should avail himself of the knowledge of Aristotle's logic (1961: xii). By this, Stebbing is saying that ontology is a dependent variable on logic. On the contrary, Henry Babock Veatch (1952) asked, how could a knowledge of ontology presuppose the knowledge of logic when it is only through logic that one comes to know ontology in the first place. His position from this argument is that logic presupposes ontology and justifies itself only as a tool for ontology (1952: 18). In this case, he is saying that logic is dependent on ontology. Since the arguments of Stebbing (1961) and Veatch (1952) are equally convincing what they imply is that there is a correlation

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between the two disciplines. The expression is symbolized as (L⊃ O) •(O⊃ L) where L represents logic while ‘O’ represents ontology. This relationship can be explained in the context of (SAALF), structural analogy and logical functionalism which has been a model for explanations since the Greek period. Plato (1941) did draw an analogy between, on one side, the structural elements of human's ontology which consists of the rational or thinking component; the feeling or spirited component and the appetitive or vegetative component, and, on another side, the individual’s various functions which consist of the ruling, soldiering and the technical functions. In the late nineteenth century, a French anthropologist, Claude Levis-Strauss (1963), very likely, bearing in mind Plato's model, went into diverse cultural studies and came up with the ideas that cultural items should be viewed as a system, in that the items interlock themselves in a structural nexus. Because of that, he (Levis-Strauss) came up with a structural theory, that cultural items are understood from the structural relations of their fellow elements. He, therefore, stated that structural similarities underlie all items in the same culture and that an analysis of the structures of cultural units (including their arts, epistemology, logic ontology etc.,), could provide an insight into the inner structures of the people's thought (Levis-Strauss 1963). One of the implications and lessons that can be drawn from the above articulation, in relation to our research, is that since logic and ontology are included in the cultural units of a people, the structure of a unit be it either a logic or an ontology of a people explains at least structurally or functionally, other units in the cultural experiences of the same people. This means that the cause and effect relationship can start from any of the items; hence the biconditional relationship expressed earlier between logic and ontology. It is for this reason that a dualistic understanding of a prevalent Western ontology gives a dualistic model of explanation for a prevalent Western logic. In the same mindset, a structural (Trinitarian) understanding of the prevalent African ontology poses no contradiction if it models a prevalent African logic that is Trinitarian in form or structure. The ‘how’ of constructing any logic, therefore, should take a cue or a signal from the SAALF theory. This gives a justification for the derivation of a particular Trinitarian logic which stems from African ontology and which will constitute my concern in this work. 2. African Ontology For the Africans, each reality, whether spiritual or physical depending on the role it plays, assumes a physical or a spiritual characteristic. With this conception of realities, the Akan people believe that realities relate to themselves in a manner that gives rise to a fundamental or harmonious relationship. Iroegbu uses "internal relational law and dynamics" to describe this harmonious relationship (1995: 287). Thus, the process of the relationship between and among realities in

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African worldview involves a dovetailing of realities into one another. It is through this type of relationship that equilibrium is maintained in the universe of things. In an attempt to aid this balance, an African man resorts to charms, sacrifices, libation and ritual symbols. Oladipo (2002) alludes to this type of relationship among realities in Yoruba ontology when he talks about reality, thus, in spite of its supernatural underpinning, it is essentially naturalistic. Nature for the Yoruba is an integrated whole in which all forces and power, human and nonhuman, physical and quasi-physical interact in a mutually reinforcing manner. There is thus in Yoruba worldview, like that of many other African people, a sense of order and continuity of experience. It is this sense which underpins the peoples understanding of "being" that everything is ultimately explicable in both the animate and inanimate realms (2002: 157). All these are meant to illustrate the African idea that reality is cyclic. The spiritual appears as a physical reality and goes back to the spiritual world, and the cycle continues. This means that the physical has an inbuilt spirituality, and the spiritual has an inbuilt physicality. The acceptance of these two harmonious categories is reflected in the prayer life of the Igbo people. In the prayer (Ibochi), for example, the Igbo of Africa try to normalize the relationship among the three worlds. In a kind of "Ibochi", libation is offered to both the living and God through the ancestors. The act of libation attests to the people's firm belief in the presence of the invisible beings who are ready to have communion with the visible ones through the agency of the ancestors. This harmonious but dialectic relationship is further explained by Emmanuel Edeh in what he calls the occult phenomenon. According to this belief, people of special initiation meet with spiritual agents for matters affecting their interests. This brings out the idea of duality not dualism in African thought. In Edeh's view: The African world is dual in nature. Beyond and over above the visible, tactile and physical world there is a non-visible, non-tactile and physical world which envelopes the former. It is simultaneously within and outside of the earth and sea. (1983: 74) Edeh re-affirms this harmonious monism by what he calls Igbo theory of duality. According to the theory, all beings exist in a dual interrelated fashion. The sensible are not wholly sensible. They exist as phenomena of visible and invisible realities exercising logically contrary relationship. This dual but interwoven existence is recognized in farming, harvesting, marriages, professional ‘choice making’ and any other aspect of African life which involves rituals. Thus, the African view of reality is summarized at the point of union between the physical and the spiritual.

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According to Edeh, Adesanya says that Janheinz Jahn has used this African frame of mind to support the thesis that the African world-view is that of extraordinary harmony. As a result, Adesanya explains that this view serves as a basic criterion with which everything in Africa can be measured and articulated (Edeh 1983: 114 -116). In this work, I seek to construct a system of African logic that not only takes into consideration this idea of mutual relationship but its presence in the worldview of African cultures. 3 Harmonious monism as a logic in Africa Now that we have outlined the worldview of a cross-section of Africa and the relationship its realities enjoy, we can attempt to go through personal reflection on this relationship. Okere calls this type of reflection the “correct route to African philosophy” (1983: 22). This philosophical or logical route would mean for us an individual questioning, rethinking and coordinating of the relationships in the worldview. The first thing that comes to mind as this work subjects the African worldview to questioning is, "what are the underlining principles on which the relationship between and among African realities operate? One of the elements in the set of African root paradigm is the principle of contrariety. What is this principle? There are two major ontological characteristics of realities, namely quantity and quality. In terms of quality, a reality may be positive or negative while in terms of quantity, a reality may be all or some. When two realities in reference differ both in quantity and quality, they are said to be in contradiction. But when the realities differ in one of the characteristics and agree in the other, they are said to be contraries and thus can complement themselves. The diagram below illustrates the principles of contraries. Figure 14.1: Principles of contraries

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In the diagram, A and O on one part and E and I on another, respectively differ in both quantity and quality. They are in contradiction. In the same diagram A and E, I and O, A and I and O and E are contraries. They can lend properties to each other and hence complement each other to form a continuum. Since this relationship depicts realities as fluid and dovetailing, one can presume that their principles of relationship are those of inter-communicability, complementarity and hyperbolic archetype, represented with the symbol "∪", union, and not "∩" intersection. The rule of union of complementarity says that all complements can unite without multiplying any item. Other logical principles adopted by harmonious monism include the principles of class calculus or algebra of classes. These principles involve universe of discourse, denoted as "I", a null class represented with 0. Other logical connectives that are employed include an intersection (∩), and dot (.) etc. Of course, negation (-) as a sign, represents non-ontological presence and is also adopted for the calculation of the elements in the logic. It is important to remember that SAALF is also a principle of harmonious monism. With the above, we can contrive a way of stating the fact that for any two ontological entities (classes), there is a third one which may be the sum, product difference or the quotient of the two classes. Thus, with the help of logical connectives, a holistic expression of the entities can be affirmed in the logic. When such is done in a symbolic form, a generalized expression of an algebra (logic of the ontology is constructed (Boole 1947). From such fundamental basic principles of ontology, a system of harmonious monism which is a logic of explanation for ontological issues and supernaturalism in Africa can be formulated, and it contains a systematic statement of what is true, not true or indeterminate for the combination of any number of contraries. Though harmonious monism uses some principles and procedures of logic of number, it is not an algebra or logic of number, it is rather a logic of ontology of contraries in different configurations. In addition to those principles and functors, the logic has "a" and -a representing entities. With the logical symbols mentioned above, an establishment of equations of the solution of problems of logical ontology by method of genuine algebra can be reached. Initial postulates are: M representing matter, and S representing spirit: In union, all elements are brought together without duplicating anyone. In intersection, only the elements that are found in all the classes are allowed a passage over the equation. The postulates are interpreted thus: U = Int. as class conjunction n = Int. as class disjunction = = Int. as identical with

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M = Material substance which can complement or be complemented by spirit (s) to give I. S = Spiritual substance which can complement or be complemented by m (material substance) to produce 1. The simple function of denoting the realities in our worldview is not enough. We need to say something about the combination process of the realities with their various interrelationships. We will deal with two symbols or concepts: the concept of union (∪) and the concept of intersection (∩). Given two realities M and S: Union: M∪S = M+S = MVS Intersection:M∩S = MxS = M.S = MS Thus, in union, all elements of M and S are listed on the other side of an equation without duplicating any element. For example, if M has the elements (a, s ) and the elements of S are (a, s, t) then the combination will yield (a, s, t). However, if we are using intersection only, the common elements of M and S will be listed across the equation. For example, if M as above has the elements (a, b,) and S has the elements (a, b, t) on the other side of the equation, we will have (a, b) only. What of the concept of I, the universe of discourse? Note that because M and S are contraries, they complement themselves to yield the content of the universe. Thus, M∪S = 1, while M∩S = 0 or an empty set. The whole principles can be summarized in the diagram below: M = matter, S = spirit Figure 14.2: Diagram of three values

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In the above diagram, the two circles, “M" and "S" interlock, producing three apartments, #1, #2and #3. Apartment one which contains "M" alone is said to be quasi false or indeterminate, because under the principle of complementarity the content of the apartment dangles and looks for what could complement it, and since it has not yet found such a complement, but has the potentiality to do so, it is described as indeterminate. Apartment two is said to be true, stable, in equilibrium or determinate, because under the words, no stability or truth can be realized. This means that in this logic, any reality that is not complemented by what it is not cannot be an actual reality. From African worldview, therefore, the logic that is being articulated is not monolithic. Instead, it admits the coexistence of seemingly opposing realities that are contraries, which complement each other. This is what is expressed in the Igbo proverbs, ‘wherever something stands, something else will also stand beside it.’ It means that nothing can realize itself without what it is not. This, therefore, denies absolutism or ‘Ego solus.’ This suggests that everything actualizes itself only when it absorbs or combines with what it is not. Translated into an epistemology, one can only know when he knows what is not. In this sense, the relationship being discussed does not speak of contradiction but of contrariety, for what is true or real or stable in this logic emerges only when all the members of the continuum of realities (physical, and spiritual), are united together to form a continuum. But the law of contradiction, which is a principle from the Western world maintains that if there is an "X", that "X", cannot combine with “-X" to produce truth. The African science of relationship accepts that everything in the world, including "X", has a missing link and the missing link is the contrary. When the missing links come together with the realities that are missing in them, a unity is formed. Because of the inherent force in these beings, X and -X, or M and S, they yearn and strive to capture their seeming opposites, which are missing links and hence, complement themselves. It is only at the point of "complement" that "-X" and "X" realize themselves. At this complementation moment, M has itself and something other than itself. This disagrees with the principle of non-contradiction. If components are spirit and matter, the result becomes a continuum of spirit/matter. Thus, the aim of the conception of realities in Africa is to reach integration, where no being excludes the other, but rather, each seeks integration and hence, stability. This missing link is borne in mind as an African conducts inferences, for example, using Etuk's "syllogism of status" (2002: 98-116): (1) If anyone "A" cuts "B's" palm fruits, he will pay a fine. (2) "S" has cut "B's" palm fruits. (Given the two premises 1 and 2, in the Western worldview, it does follow that "S" should pay a fine). However, in an African worldview if "S" is a grandchild of "B", "S" is not just anyone to "B" but a part of "B", that is a missing link, thus, "S" is an element in the continuum of "B + S" which is I. (3) Therefore, "S" will not pay any fine.

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(3) This type of logic uses rule-guided reasoning rather than the rulegoverned reasoning. Rule-guided reasoning is a humanizing reasoning, while the rule-governed reasoning in formalistic. Emphasis on the nature of this logic can yet be expressed by the proverb, ‘Otu osisi anaghi eme oke ohia’ (one tree does not make a forest). This is expressive of the extended family system. Members of any extended family in African tradition, irrespective of their differences, are treated as a whole or a continuum. In other words, all members of a family system complement themselves. Thus, for one to actually realize himself, he requires the complement of other people. Thus, contradiction is not implied by opposites. What it implies in this logic is a complement. This is why John Mbiti (1969) says that, I am because we are. The difference between the logics of the West and Harmonious Monism is that the logics of the West do not allow extremes, materialism and spiritualism to meet. It is only in African logic (harmonious monism) that such is possible. In the African logic, none of the extremes super-imposes itself on the other. Since they are contraries, they are always in harmony with themselves. Neither of the contraries is inferior nor superior to the other. The only language that is heard in such a logic is the language of reciprocity of talents. In this situation, there is no need to force oneself out of one's area of comparative advantage, since everyone is recognized for what one is. And everyone at each time complements and is being complemented. Another fundamental difference between African logic and the logic of the West is that African logic is derived from its worldview, and that of the West derives from Western worldview, or their conceived configuration of reality which is epitomized in Plato's, Aquinas’, Descartes', Kant's, etc., dualistic ontologies. Their positions are presented by Anscombe (1976) namely; that there are distinct substances or realities, the spiritual and corporeal, the mind or body or the intellectual and the empirical. These opposites according to Western logic as represented by Anscombe can neither tangentially nor conceptually converge. Therefore, for him, any attempt to place them on the same logical order results in a contradiction. Again, the classical logic falls into two categories, either into pure dualism as Aristotelian subject-predicate logic shows or into monism. We shall discuss only the Western monism which some people can easily confuse with our articulation of an African logic. Western monism has several strands. These are in the modern or contemporary times represented by Hegelian, Marxian or Fregean logics. Hegelian and Marxian dialectics are logics of nihilism. Either everything is reduced to the idea (spirit) of Hegel or there is a reduction of all things to the matter of Marx. In these logics, freedom is given only to one of the opposites. In the case of Hegel, the triangle of reality is turned upside down, while Marx stands it on its toes. To place the triangle of reality on its head as Hegel did is to give priority to freedom of ideas, spirit or

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concepts. And to place the triangle of reality on its toes is to give priority or freedom to matter, as Marx did. Africa places the side of the triangle on the floor. It is only in this position that the extremes of reality can complement themselves freely and, hence, have equal freedom. In this African logic, two things are equal, not because they are ontological modes of the same thing, but because they have the equivalent complementing abilities in the same universe of discourse. For example, using M and S as contrary phenomena (material and spiritual). M=S because for M or S to realize itself in a universe of discourse, each needs the complement of the other. What this means is that two contrary realities can unite without producing a contradiction. This is so because they have equivalent and complementing strength or functions. Thus, when the two elements or phenomena unite (MUS), a stable whole is realized. This means that equality for this logic consists in the maintenance of peculiarity functions that are complementary in strength. In this understanding, if "M or/and S" abandon their peculiarity functions and assume the function of the contrary, they run into instability and, hence, the sum of their union loses its equilibrium. Thus, in this logic, equality is neither possible in an “identical sense" nor in "a modal sense". It is only possible in a complementary sense. 4 Conclusion The work starts by introducing SAALF theory which says that every culture is a system of elements and these elements are analogical structurally. Because of this, one can read up the structures of all other elements from a known structure of a particular element. Stebbing (1961) supported this by saying that he who wants to understand the structure of the prevalent ontology of the Western system can do that through a good understanding of the prevalent logic of the West, which is Aristotelian. From this, Stebbing (1961) argues brilliantly that an ontology of every culture produces its logic (L=O). However, Veatch (1952) also argues brilliantly too that logic produces ontology; this work summarizes the relation between logic and ontology in a bi-conditional way hence, (L=O) • (O=L). The work argues that the above analogical argument that leads to functionalism is found in the history of philosophy through the work of Plato in the Republic. Levy-Strauss capitalizes on the above analogy in his study of cultural anthropology and comes up with the position that cultural items are understood from structural relation of their fellow elements. The implication and lesson that could be learnt from the above structural analogies are; (1) That the western prevalent logic obeys this order of relation (2) That any other prevalent logic, like African type will obey that law of relation since African ontology is prevalently conceived as Trinitarian. The prevalent African ontology poses no contradiction if it models a prevalent African logic that is Trinitarian in form or structure. Therefore, the how of constructing any logic therefore

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should take cue or signal from the ‘SAALF’ theory. This gives a justification for the derivation of a particular Trinitarian logic which stems from African ontology. From the above framework, the work went into the study of African worldview and discovered that there are three levels or domiciliary areas of realities in African conception of reality; namely; the sky, the earth and underneath the earth. These realities relate to themselves as contraries which can combine without contradictions. From this understanding, the paper goes into the type of relations that are involved. The work worked out the principles that are involved in the relationship between the realities in African worldview. The principles include complementarity, intercommunicability and hyperbolic archetype principles. Equally, the principles of union and contraries are involved in this logic. The logic so produced is what is called the logic of harmonious monism. Though the logic uses some principles and procedures of the logic of number, it is not an algebra or logic of number. It is rather a logic of ontology, of contraries in different configurations. References Anscombe, E. 1976. Descartes Philosophical Writings: Nelson’s Understanding Paperback. The Open University. Boole, G. 1947.Mathematical Analysis of Logic being an Essay Towards the calculus of Deductive Reasoning. London: Macmillan. Edeh, E. 1983. Towards Igbo Metaphysics. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Etuk, U. 2002. The Possibility of African Logic. In The Third Way in African Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Kwasi Wiredu, ed. O. Oladipo, 98-116. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Ireogbu, P. 1995. Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy. Owerri: International University Press. Levis-Strauss, C. 1963. Structural Anthropology. (Trans. C. Jacobson and B. G. Schoepf ). New York: Basic Books. Mbiti, J. S. 1969.African Philosophy and Religions. London: Heinemann. Okere, T. 1983.African philosophy: A historico-hermeneutical investigation of the conditions of its possibility. New York: University Press of America. Oladipo, O. ed. 2002. The Third way in African Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Kawsi Wiredu. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Plato. 1941. The Republic. London: Oxford University. Stebbing, L. S.1961. Modern Elementary Logic. London: Methuen and Co. Veatch, H. 1952. Intentional Logic: A Logic Based on Philosophical Realism. New Heaven: Yale University Press.

Chapter 15

Complementary Logic Innocent I. Asouzu University of Calabar, Nigeria

Abstract This chapter seeks to discuss the nature of complementary logical reasoning. When we affirm that anything that exists serves a missing link of reality, one may be inclined to conclude that all missing links of reality are unequivocally mutually complementing and reinforcing. This can hardly be the case if we remember the constraints to which our experience of the world can be subjected. The very mechanisms and phenomena constraining our perception and judgement of the world equally impact on the way we reason and relate to the laws guiding correct reasoning. This is why it is important to address all matters of logic and logical reasoning bearing in mind these constraints. Keywords: Logic, Complementary reflection, Africa, Disjunctive and Conjunctive reasoning 1 The Context of Complementary Logical Reasoning When we affirm that anything that exists serves a missing link of reality, one may be inclined to conclude that all missing links of reality are unequivocally mutually complementing and reinforcing. This can hardly be the case if we remember the constraints to which our experience of the world can be subjected. The very mechanisms and phenomena constraining our perception and judgement of the world equally impact on the way we reason and relate to the laws guiding correct reasoning. This is why it is important to address all matters of logic and logical reasoning bearing in mind these constraints. Cognisant of this fact, ibuanyidanda logical reasoning is very much aware of the character of those things that serve a missing link in a negative way; and which stay impede our efforts to steer a complementary course. These are those negative missing links that are equally constitutive of our world, just like the positive missing links. Although they serve a negative missing link, they nevertheless contribute in improving the way we relate to the totality of reality if only indirectly. This fact can be seen more clearly in the way our conjunctive

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and disjunctive faculties relate to each other. We sense the tension to which our consciousness is subjected to very intensively in this relationship. Whereas our conjunctive faculty helps us to be more accommodating, our disjunctive reasoning tends to resist the same; and thus contributes in restricting the way we relate to the world. Whereas our conjunctive faculty impels us to reach out to the world in the mode of ‘not only this but that thing’ or in the mode of ‘this as well as that thing’; our disjunctive faculty pegs or restricts us to ‘either this or that thing.’ In the same way, our disjunctive faculty impels us to make choices of ‘either this or that.’ It is in this way that both faculties share deeply in the ambivalence that characterises our being, since both often tend to operate in near opposite directions. In the same measure, they reflect diverse logical planes in human consciousness that represent this ambivalence. Whereas our conjunctive experience of the world seeks complementation, our disjunctive experience tends towards disharmony. Addressing the difficulties presented by the tension generated by these faculties in their relationship to each other is not always easy. Such tensions are bound to persist if we remember how insufficient the human subject is. Even if this tension is an important dimension of all relative historical experiences, it can be resolved completely by an authentic experience of being. This is that experience of being that does not admit of any contradictions (See Asouzu 2004: 280, 319-327; 2005: 288, 327-334). Such an experience remains the very ideal of an ibuanyidanda logical reasoning. At all given moments, Ibuanyidanda strives towards this ideal mindful of the limitations to which all human existential conditions are subjected. Therefore, within all existential contexts that are ambivalent, what it takes to be conjunctive may be what is needed to subvert the disjunctive mode of our reasoning and vice versa. Ibuanyidanda, through its method and principles; and most especially through its noetic propaedeutic, always seeks viable ways of addressing such difficulties credibly. It does this in view of guaranteeing the effectiveness of correct and valid reasoning, the unity of being and consciousness, and some measure of harmony in human interpersonal relationship. Hence, the quality and character of our reasoning very much depends on what we undertake to mediate and equilibrate the tension inherent in the way these two faculties relate to each other. Such is hardly achievable where we do not strive to uphold some measure of harmony in the way we reason. Striving this path of harmony beyond arbitrariness is something ibuanyidanda seeks to achieve through commitment to the rules guiding the transcendent complementary circle. It foresees the applicability of the same rules for all types of logical operations, be this inductive, deductive, synthetic, dialectical, symbolic, mathematical, formal, informal, primitive, progressive, conservative, etc. Hence the rules guiding ibuanyidanda logical reasoning seeks to serve as a guarantor for the validity of all forms of logic of discourse by ensuring that they

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comply with the demands of the transcendent complementary circle. One of its major concerns is exploring credible ways of addressing an arbitrary imposition of any of our logical faculties on the way we relate to the world. This is mostly the case with the mode of operation of our disjunctive faculty. In addressing such difficulties, we see immediately how the logic of ibuanyidanda philosophy is very much dependent on its method. This is precisely why I understand the method as that disposition needed to instilling a harmonised type of reasoning needed to embrace missing links in the comprehensiveness of their interrelatedness. This is the very method we seek to inculcate and appropriate in the whole process of noetic propaedeutic. Since it is something that is foundational to the way we reason and act, we can then understand why such a method is co-intended, both formally and materially, as the action of the same human subject that is a priori predisposed towards the totality of reality in a complementary comprehensive future related mode. Hence, by recourse to ibuanyidanda logical reasoning we aspire towards validating all actions seeking authenticity both materially and formally. This we do, the moment we comply to the demands of that method that sustains all acts of intending, willing, judging and knowing. What this indicates is that logic, either as an act of the mind or as a discipline, can hardly achieve its set objectives if it fails to comply with the demands of a transcendent ibuanyidanda circle that incorporates all the tools needed to achieve an authentic ibuanyidanda disposition. Hence, for any type of logic to achieve the type of correctness, validity and truth expected of it, there is need for it to comply fully to the principle of integration1 of ibuanyidanda and other allied tools of this reflection. Due to the way it is structured, our disjunctive faculty often tends to deceive us into assuming that there is only one unilateral absolute way of resolving difficulties. By following the dictates of our disjunctive faculty, we tend to see the world in a disjointed mode where only one of two given alternatives is admissible. We encounter this for example within those contexts where, in the face of alternatives, stakeholders are constrained to make radical choices, but such that have the capacity to negate all other known alternatives due to selfishness. This is precisely the type of commitment that can easily narrow our perspective about the world, about our choices and the quality of our judgements. Relating to the world in this arbitrary disjunctive mode can make stakeholders oversensitive concerning differences and otherness. They can thereby mistake differences for absolute differences and focus more on those things that divide without bothering much to have contraries duly harmonised. 1The

principle of integration states: anything that exists serves a missing link of reality.

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It is due to this character that disjunctive logical reasoning can easily focus more on relative historical conditions; and can lead to elevating world-immanence and fragmentation to absolute categories. This is why approaching reality only from a disjunctive logical perspective has the capacity to blur our vision and perspectives concerning the true nature of reality; and most especially with regard to all the options at our disposal. Approaching reality in this disjunctive mode is one of the major causes of lack of circumspection; and such that can mislead the mind into mistaking contraries as contradictory opposites in a way that can make harmony of differences impossible. Furthermore, disjunctive logical reasoning tends to heighten the urge for arbitrariness, and dogmatic modes of selection in situations of conflict. One can then say that, the moment disjunctive logical reasoning holds sway that is the moment also we are inclined to see deep-rooted differences and thereby seek to negate complementation. That is the moment we are more likely also to focus only on one side of our ambivalent interests imagining that this is the only viable and commanded choice open to us. This is precisely why also in such situations our passion for discrimination, for unhealthy competition, and all manners of antisocial acts can get a boost. In seeking to address the difficulties presented by a unilateral reliance on disjunctive logical reasoning, ibuanyidanda sees the need to highlight some of the benefits a harmonised approach to reality provides as this is sustained by recourse to conjunctive logical reasoning. A conjunctive type of reasoning makes it possible for missing links to be grasped creditably within a mutually related complementary framework. This is why an approach of this type offers itself as a viable option in mediating effectively between contending alternatives; between the universal and the particular, between the absolute and the relative, between the necessary and the contingent, the essential and the accidental, the consequential and inconsequential, between mine and dine, between the community and the individual, between indigenes and strangers, between lords and slaves etc. Conjunctive logical reasoning provides human consciousness with the means to steer a more liberal, mediating and more accommodating course; and one that makes room for the coexistence of opposites. It is an approach that enhances the chances for arbitration, beyond arbitrariness, impositions and dogmatic tendencies. One can then say that whereas a disjunctive logical reasoning has an inherent dimension of absolutism and arbitrariness, this cannot be said completely of conjunctive logical reasoning that constitutes a very important dimension of ibuanyidanda logic. 2 Meaning beyond the Logic of Geographical Categorisation Generally, human actions are determined by specific interests that indicate the type of differences characterising our experiences of the world. Our disjunctive faculty often suggests that these differences are irreconcilable differences. One

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of the commonest forms of expression of such disjunctive judgements is in what I call ‘the logic of geographical categorisation.’ This type of logic focuses more on geographical differences; and sees this as the major valid reason for building arguments and drawing conclusions. The logic of geographical categorisation has an inherent dimension of exclusivist ethnocentric character. Based on logic of geographical categorisation, human consciousness is determined by interests of geographical kind as to be conditioned to relate to the world often in such categories as: “Western Science”, “African Science”, “Chinese Medicine”, “American Medicine”, “Indian Conceptual Schemes”, “Arabic Conceptual Schemes, “Western Logic”, “Eastern Logic”, “Northern Logic”, “Southern Logic”, “Arabic Logic”, “Chinese Logic” “African Logic”, “Igbo Logic”, “Zulu Logic”, “Bantu Logic”, “Hausa Logic”, “Yoruba Logic” etc. Within such contexts, the impression is evoked that there is no way thinking, thoughts, and most cognitive and volitional acts, can be consummated except in tune with geographical considerations. Conditioning of this type is foundational to acting after the super-maxim of the nearer the better and the safer.2 Admittedly, human beings live at different locations, and are different in many ways, however, if we always focus on geographical differences to get at what makes us special we would run the risk of narrowing our perspectives. Most especially, the type of globalisation we are experiencing today serves to expose the weakness of most restricting types of logic of geographical categorisation. Recourse to geographical categorisations presents some special difficulties to logic. Where we always focus on geographical differences to grasp at the specific, we would always be faced with the dilemma of how we can apply the same categories to all genera constituting an entity within given localities, bearing in mind their specific differences. The same is applicable when we concentrate only on, cultural, ethnic, tribal and racial differences. In the case of logic, we may be compelled to assume, ad infinitum, that there are different types of logic for different types of genera as these become known. Therefore, to concentrate only on collective categorisations, most especially of a geographic ethnocentric type, to denote differences, in most things human, is bound to make us always vulnerable to the fallacy of over-generalisation, to reductio ad

2The

super maxim of ibuanyidanda philosophy states: “the nearer the better and the safer”. Adhering to this super maxim actors instinctively assume – but erroneously that those nearest to them are better and safer always. For this reason, they strive to develop near-inviolable sense of duty and obligation towards one another as to assume that demands of the super-maxim are apodictic true statement always. They thereby forget that such statements are merely hypothetical injunctions devoid of any form of categorical command. A super maxim thus summarises what all hypothetical injunctions that are mistaken for categorical commands seek to express.

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absurdum and to argumentum ad infinitum. This is why the logic of geographical categorisation is one of the things that fuel all sorts of ethnocentric reduction; and one that easily leads to the fallacy that because all share the same geographical location, they are likely to possess the same qualities and attributes in the same measure. It is the same hollow assumption that people within given geographical locations reason alike, act alike, share the same values unequivocally due to spatiotemporal necessities. Definitely, all geographical locations are subject to variations bestowed by changing historical conditions and other variables. In the case of philosophy, just as philosophers are products of their environments, they are still reformers of those contexts from which they draw their inspirations. Philosophy, just like many other sciences benefits immensely from the critical insight of its practitioners. This is why philosophers should always aspire to live above the general worldviews of their communities. Not in the sense of despising these or seeking to conserve them uncritically. On the contrary, the philosopher has to approach his or her raw primary cognitive ambience with some measure of critical distance. In all cases, philosophy has the duty to liberate human consciousness from impositions of all kinds and most especially those connected with slavish adherence to tradition, to worldviews and all modes of thinking suggestive of modes of spatiotemporal predetermination. Unreserved submission to the logic of geographical predetermination makes accession to ibuanyidanda or complementarity difficult if not impossible. Whereas the logic of geographical pre-determination has the capacity to undermine creativity, the logic of ibuanyidanda expedites and energises creativity. It does so because it seeks to grasp at all missing links beyond the limits imposed by geographical considerations. This is why philosophy, within an era of globalisation, thrives best in an atmosphere of mutual complementary dependence of all stakeholders irrespective of their geographical locations. Even if such a philosophy of complementation subscribes to the benefits of differences, it is not unmindful of some of the dangers the same can pose. Hence, nuances in the way human being attend to the world is bound to persist; something that derives from their individuality; and based on which they can mismanage differences all the same. This is why ibuanyidanda recognises that within given geographical locations variations in the ways stakeholders relate to worldviews are bound to persist; and in tune with diverse character types and endowments. Such existential realities speak for a philosophy of complementation, and do not diminish its scope; just as it serves as a critic of ideology beyond what given geographical locations have to offer us. Hence, the ability to deal adequately with those differences we perceive, within and outside - both intra and inter – will always play a decisive role in determining the character of the logic guiding our action. Definitely, a geographical predeterministic mode of reasoning is hardly adequate in handling such

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difficulties. Yet, we can handle matters of differences more creditably if human consciousness has a way of addressing such issues in a harmonious mutually related way, without bifurcation and without exclusive tendencies. This is why ibuanyidanda insists, with its principle of integration, that to be is to be in mutual complementary relationship with all missing links of reality. It is this type of commitment that justifies the usage of geographical categorisations to denote differences while expressing meaning. This is the very ontological commitment based on which ibuanyidanda logical reasoning tries to supersede the constraining insinuations of the logic of geographical categorisation. Therefore, the ability to grapple successfully with the difficulties presented by differences, and such that make mutual complementary harmony impossible is one of the veritable tests for the validity of any logical operations that seek to transcend mere geography. Such is not necessarily dependent on the fact of a logical calculus being modelled after certain rules, or serving certain thought systems or complying with the demands of the insights deriving form given geographical, cultural, ethnic, tribal, and racial or group categories. This is why, also, that act is validated which has the capacity to be inherently harmonised and complemented, within the subject itself and with the totality of reality. We can then understand why it is important that any logic seeking validity has to be grounded on that all encompassing complementing and harmonising logical structure that sustains and legitimises missing links as they seek authentication. 3 The Mode of Ibuanyidanda Logical Operation Since ibuanyidanda logical reasoning seeks to supersede all forms of artificial divides that impede harmonious action, its philosophy cannot be rightly said to be synonymous with the philosophy of any geographical, cultural, ethnic, tribal, racial regions, as to claim to be “African philosophy” or “Igbo philosophy” without qualification. Even if Igbo culture and an African heritage are some of the material and raw primary cognitive ambiences of ibuanyidanda logic, it seeks to supersede these. Within this context, I understand culture as something constituted of all the actors and factors that enter into generating those values and ideas from which culture itself emerge. This being the case, philosophers are always inquirers of heterogeneous backgrounds whose ideas are determined by the actors and factors that enter into the constitution of their ideas. We are thinking here of an interminable number of relations that constitute such actors and factors. These are the types of things that constitute our consciousness even without our knowing and willing it completely. These facts determine the mode of operation of ibuanyidanda logical reasoning and give it its personal stamp. As a philosophy that seeks to transcend all forms of reduction, the conclusions of ibuanyidanda philosophy while deriving from personal critical insight, draws its inspiration from all possible relations that enter into its constitution. While it’s formal and

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material scope spans all missing links of reality, its mode of operation seeks to supersede the type of logic of valuation that can delimit our knowledge and judgement of the world. As a philosophy that depends on a conjunctive logical reasoning, it explores a method pluralism that admits of the mutual complementation of all forms of logic that abhor exclusivist, absolutist tendencies. It is by embracing this course that it seeks to supersede the lack of differentiation that would arise were we to view reality as one indivisible entity (Parmenides), as something in a continuous state of flux (Heraclitus), or even, as contradictory opposites only. Such unilateral, monistic, indeterminate, exclusivist modes and approaches negate the possibility of upholding differences, permanence, diversities and complementation. Since these approaches are bound to narrow down our perspective and limit our options, they are not methodological options directly open to an ibuanyidanda logical reasoning. Such restricting approaches have the capacity to infringe on the self-expressiveness of missing links that are oriented towards the future in a complementary comprehensive mode. Hence, as an aspect of a transcendent complementary comprehensive inquiry, the logic of ibuanyidanda, in its method pluralism, seeks to supersede all forms of method monism that have the capacity to make worldimmanence self-constituting. This mode of its operation is neither single valued, double valued, triple valued, quadruple valued etc. It is something that is constituted in complementary comprehensive future-related mode. It is by reason of this complementary comprehensive future-related outreach that it has the capacity to supersede the type of monism that derives, for example, from Parmenides’ insight that being is one and indivisible. This is why ibuanyidanda affirms being as missing links of reality whose unity can be upheld only in diversity. It is precisely for reasons of this kind that in all instances, Ibuanyidanda logic seeks to permeate all forms of logical operations in view of upholding diversities. In doing so, it seeks to provide the enabling context or condition for all units to affirm themselves as missing links in mutual complementary harmony with each; something that derives from its principle of integration. It is this type of commitment that brings to the fore that foundational constitution of ibuanyidanda logic that is geared towards the positive side of our ambivalent interests. This is a mode of its operation it shares with all forms of logic that consider the harmony of differences a priority. Ibuanyidanda plays this role as the integrative logic of mutual complementary interrelatedness, which seeks to integrate firmly into its operational calculus all other logics that advocate and enhance harmony of differences. One can therefore say that ibuanyidanda logic subsists in a transcendent complementary rational approach to reality which seeks to direct missing links in the comprehensiveness of their interrelatedness. Complementary logical reasoning seeks to emancipate human consciousness and reason, which can be entrapped through recourse to those types of disjunctive, defensive, confrontational logical reasoning that focus exclusively on

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differences. In all given situations, ibuanyidanda logic seeks to reconcile, to integrate and mediate, in the most natural way, concerning the way we reason, judge, will, act and relate to the world. 4 Logic of Discourse and the Primacy of Noetic Propaedeutic3 As the logic of geographical categorisation reveals, the way we do logic can very much reveal the way we understand the human person. Many assume that the human person is basically a rational being. For this reason, we are also tempted to assume that human action is fundamentally driven by reason alone. Furthermore, we assume that human beings are more likely to resolve conflicts by recourse to rational means. Assumptions of this kind are some of the major reasons many tend to ascribe much importance to dialogue, arguments and other forms of discourse-based methods of conflict resolution. Such discourse-based approaches do actually enjoy acceptability as viable methodological alternatives in matters of conflict resolution in practical philosophy. Typical examples are constructivism which emphasise rational arguments as a way of resolving conflicts of interests. The same is applicable to those brands of intercultural philosophy that lay much emphasis on dialogue and polylog as methodological options in matters dealing with cultural differences. Constructivism offers a more clearly worked out approach. It foresees the reduction of all humanistic and social scientific inquiries to one cultural science that concerns itself with inquiry into the nature of norms and norm systems. It does so with the intention of offering a method of argumentation based on which conflicts of norms and systems can be resolved rationally; and how our decisions in contexts of discourse can be validated rationally (Schwemmer 1979; Lorenzen and Schwemmer 1975). This is why one of the major aims of constructive philosophy of science is to found authentic practical philosophy on the basis of well-constructed rational arguments; and such that can impact on the way we relate to matters of decision-making in the most rational way possible. For constructivism, therefore, conflicts of interest, and those about norms, are best resolved if stakeholders have the capacity to present their views as an aspect of well-constructed rational arguments that can be mutually validated within the context of discourse (Kambartel 1974). Constructivism believes that by proffering reasons and counter reasons, arguments and

3Noetic propaedeutic (pre-education of the mind) is the effort the ego makes towards self-enlightenment concerning the inherently complementary character of all existent realities. In other words it is a type of self-imposed act of vicarious conscious experience of existent realities as missing links.

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counter-arguments, that can be mutually validated insightfully by contending parties, they are more likely to arrive at a more workable consensus. Such insightful agreements are made possible by way of mutual reconstruction of the wishes and desires of contenders, as facilitated by discourse situations that are sustained by a form of logical propaedeutic. Such contexts provide the conditions for enlightened arguments ensuing from mutual dependence of stakeholders in the reconstruction of their needs and desires based on which acceptable solutions can be found. This procedure has the advantage that it lays much emphasis on upholding the purity of rational character of the objectives guiding action. Such objectives constitute the bulk of what is considered the reconstructed needs and desires of those participating in arguments. Over and above all, this procedure lays much emphasis on the need for all matters of discourse to be as trans-subjectively rational as possible. If the logic of discourse favoured by constructivism emphasises the role of rational arguments, the major proponents of intercultural philosophy focus on dialogue (Kimmerle 2008; n.d) or polylog (Wimmer 1996) as methodological option for the resolution of such conflicts of interests ensuing from cultural differences. As laudable as attempts of these kinds may seem, their understanding of the human person as a rational being that is interested in resolving conflicts by way of discourse presents some difficulties. Such difficulties ensue because many assume that the resolution of conflicts by recourse to rational argument and dialogue is the very direct opposite of attending to the same by recourse to violence and force. Where we think this way, we easily forget that rational arguments and dialogue, at the service of reason, are not always neutral instruments. There is hardly an ideal dialogue and rational discourse conditions. For this reason, one can easily overrate what is achievable by recourse to rational arguments and dialogue. This is all the more the case if we remember the constraints to which human consciousness is subjected to in all situations of life that are ambivalent. In the pursuance of their most cherished interests, most especially in asymmetrical situations of power imbalance, stakeholders have the inherent urge to throw caution to the winds in view of getting what they want. This is why some of the very things that have the apparent character of rational arguments can very easily be unmasked as mere stealth mechanisms of manipulation, control and domination. The same is applicable to dialogue which can very easily be manipulated into enforcing privately motivated interests. Within such contexts, where any of the contending parties do not have commensurate possibilities of threat, he or she may not also have adequate bargaining powers to enforce fair and transparent consensus. This is why the more possibilities of threat an entity possesses, the more its bargaining powers are enhanced. Likewise, the weaker an entity is, and the fewer the alternatives available to it are, the more its possibilities of threat diminish and the more prone it is to accept what is presented as arguments in

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dialogue. Since lack of possibilities of threat diminishes bargaining powers, most means employed to achieve ones most cherished interests can easily be mistaken for rational argument, fair and constructive dialogue. Such difficulties are bound to persist if we continue to believe that because human beings are rational, they are more likely to resolve conflicts creditably by recourse to rational arguments and dialogue. To forestall misuse of arguments and dialogue, ibuanyidanda emphasises the need for the primacy of noetic propaedeutic as the conditions of possibility for all logics of discourse. It is such a propaedeutic that has the capacity to provide the guide needed to conduct discourse in a way that does not infringe on the rights and individuality of stakeholders. Such a propaedeutic has the capacity also to remind us of the character of the human person that is very complex beyond the assumption that rational argumentative adequacy is the only thing that bestows credibility on discourse and dialogues. Definitely, the human person is not purely as rational as we suppose. It is also a being subject to all the impositions arising from the constraints of our tension-laden ambivalent existential situations and ihemkpuchianya (phenomenon of concealment). These are those factors that can invalidate recourse to rational arguments and dialogue as methodological options in the resolution of conflict. Therefore, to approach matters of logic more creditably, there is need to supersede always a fragmented conception of the human person and such that concentrates only on the faculty of reason. Any attempt to construct logic based only on one aspect of the human faculty is bound to create insurmountable difficulties. Here, the strife between our conjunctive and disjunctive faculties has to be borne in mind always. In all given situations, ibuanyidanda logical reasoning seeks to address the human person in the comprehensiveness of its constitution as a being of very complex nature; and one whose logical faculties can be in a ceaseless state of strife. Creating such awareness is the very context and form of ibuanyidanda logic which aims at creating the conditions for the protection of interests of all stakeholders in all conflict situations. For ibuanyidanda, the human person is a being that is as complex as it is unpredictable (Asouzu 1984: 96-98, 106-133). This is why it is subject to those challenges that have the capacity to invalidate any logic that is founded purely on reason alone. We can then understand why seeking to resolve conflicts of interests in such charged situations as we have these in heterogeneous, multiracial, multicultural and multiethnic contexts is hardly attainable where stakeholders assume that such are guided by an overarching logical law of reason always. This notwithstanding, a harmonised conception of the human person, presupposes some measure of harmony within the subject itself and the world. This is why in spite of their differences; all human acts are still subject to those laws that guarantee the unity of being and consciousness without which a harmonised idea of the human person is hardly achievable. Here, ibuanyidanda logic seeks to address

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such difficulties by recourse to its commitment to the binding force of the first principles and most especially of the principle of non-contradiction. It considers these the very guarantors of the unity of being and consciousness, and such that can help stakeholders overcome the type of artificial divide we sense between the subject and the world generally, between our conjunctive and disjunctive faculties. These are the very laws upon which the transcendent ibuanyidanda circle is grounded as it seeks to legitimise all rules of discourse aimed at resolving conflicts of interest. 5 The First Principles and the Ontological Boomerang Effect of Ibuanyidanda Logic As a philosophy of complementation that is firmly founded on the applicability of the first principles, ibuanyidanda logical reasoning strives to enlighten concerning the retrogressive character of all endemic acts of selfishness. These are the types of acts that negate the first principle and the law of non-contradiction. These laws derive their strength from the fact that they legitimise across board, both to the inside and to the outside, and in a way that makes them the very foundation for all logics of discourse. Failure to adhere to the demands of these laws always evokes what I call “the ontological boomerang effect” of ibuanyidanda philosophy (This is expressed in Igbo language as: “ọbiaraegbu m gbukwaa onweya”). This ontological boomerang effect stipulates that: Within any framework of action and interaction, what any of the units constituting the whole undertakes to hinder the realisation of the interests of other component units, makes the realisation of the interests of the offending unit difficult if not impossible. On account of this ontological boomerang effect, those whose interests remain unattended to, within any framework of action and interaction, would always strive to get what they want, through other means open to them, and in the process, they are bound to make it difficult, if not impossible, for all stakeholders constituting the whole to operate optimally. This goes to demonstrate the contradictory character of all acts geared towards subverting the inherent mutual complementary interrelatedness between missing links within any given framework. This ontological boomerang effect is again captured in the Igbo aphorism: egbe bere ugo bere nke si ibeya ebena nku kwaa ya (let the kite perch, let the eagle perch, whichever denies the other the same rights let its wings break). The danger of subverting the interests of others is always given, since, in asymmetrical situations of power imbalance, human subjects often tend to exploit the advantages bestowed by circumstances to achieve their selfish ends at the expense of those they consider weak and conquerable. Under such asymmetrical conditions, some of the most severe implications of this ontological

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boomerang effect may be forgotten very easily due to feeling of invincibility which our advantaged positions might simulate. This notwithstanding, all acts of selfishness are almost always reciprocated, if only indirectly. On account of this ontological boomerang effect, the initial intention of offending stakeholders almost always remains contradicted: With our selfish actions, we intend to live near-unchallenged, contented, happy life. However, the ontological boomerang effect makes such difficult, if not impossible, because others whose interests remain unattended to would often seek ways of getting what they want. By so doing, they always pose some threats that make optimal attainment of our objectives difficult if not impossible. Hence, wherever the vicious circle of mutual exploitation is not contained, mutual coexistence becomes difficult if not impossible. This ontological boomerang effect shows very transparently the type of foolishness enshrined in those acts of selfishness that would invariably undermine the intentions of the egoist. In other words, wherever endemic selfishness holds sway, it is always difficult, if not impossible, to attain some measure of peace, security and contentment. Through commitment to an ibuanyidanda logical reasoning, chances are that stakeholders come to realise fully that if the vicious circle of mutual ceaseless exploitation is not contained, all run the risk of forfeiting their rights and privileges. This is another way of saying that through the enlightenment ensuing from the noetic propaedeutic, basic to all forms of ibuanyidanda acts, stakeholders have the chances of realising fully that consistent self-interest is commensurate to anti-self-interest; and is as such a contradictory act. What this demonstrates is that all acts of selfishness enshrine deep moments of self-contradiction. It is precisely for this reason that such acts negate the first principles and infringe on the unity of being and consciousness. In this way, they vitiate the applicability of the logic of ibuanyidanda, which is ontologically constituted and firmly founded on the first principles. With this, Ibuanyidanda logic is strictly committed to the applicability of the first principles; and most especially to the principle of non-contradiction. Hence, commitment to the logic of ibuanyidanda sharpens our perception concerning contradictory and self-contradictory acts; a disposition that equally makes us very much aware why certain ills and vices enshrine deep moments of self-contradiction; and as such, they should be avoided. This is especially the case with such ills and vices that target the common good, where the individual can easily exploit the anonymity of public property and the common good for personal enrichment only. The moment an ibuanyidanda logical reasoning is operative, stakeholders immediately recognize such ills and vices not only as antisocial acts, but as those ills and vices capable of undermining even the welfare of perpetrators themselves. This is why embracing an ibuanyidanda logical reasoning and mindset can become a formidable bulwark against all those retrogressive

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forces that work against our overall development; against peace, progress and against nature itself. Generally, one can say that embracing ibuanyidanda logic is synonymous with embracing a logic of development, both of the individual and the community generally. It is a logic aimed at transforming the parochial-minded individual into a being with a more cosmopolitan outlook; a being capable of defining its interests within a wider framework of relations. This is precisely why I find it useful that all forms of logic need to be permeated with the type of consciousness bestowed by an ibuanyidanda logical reasoning. The ultimate aim of an ibuanyidanda logical reasoning is to inculcate into human consciousness the fact that besides playing particular roles, and besides being defined in particular ways, there is still a higher form of legitimisation to which we are subject, and because of which our lives as human beings can be judged authentic and true. This higher form of legitimisation ensues from the joy of being which stakeholders sense in the state of transcendent complementary unity of consciousness with all existent realities. This is the transcendent complementary state that is the only necessary condition for determining the rationality and meaningfulness of an action. This higher form of legitimisation becomes evident the moment stakeholders are able to affirm insightfully, in concrete situations of life - and in a bid to fully realise their beings and accomplish any task - that all missing links are mutually dependent in service. Here, the highest moment of expression of this missing link of reality is the human community, most especially as we encounter it in our day-to-day actions and interactions. Fortunately, the interconnection offered by globalisation offers us ample opportunities to affirm the veracity of this experience. This is why an everyday encounter with missing links and most especially with human beings remains one of the concrete contexts where the validity of ibuanyidanda logical reasoning can be tested. Hence, it is only in our relativity and fragility that we seek full meaning in a complementary harmonious manner devoid of all pretensions of pure rationality. This type of complementary comprehensive disposition is one that considers reality in the most differentiated varied manner possible. This logical mindset finds full expression in the ability of the individual to face facts and recognise things not only for what they stand for here and now, but to approach them in a universal, total and comprehensive future referential manner. Under the guidance of an ibuanyidanda type of logical reasoning, stakeholders come to the full realisation that our positions in life notwithstanding, we are human beings with all the advantages and disadvantages associated with our mortality and fragility. Complementary conjunctive logical reasoning entails therefore some sort of honesty and open-mindedness with regard to our persons and our positions in the world.

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This honesty helps us realise more fully who we are, what our limitations are, and what should be expected of us. Living from this honesty is one of the surest means of coming to terms with our life situations. 6 Issues in Truth and Authenticity Legitimisation of the Logic of Human Interest through Ontological Logic As diverse and varied as human interests are, so diverse and varied are the logical foundations sustaining them. The more human interests are opposed to each other, and the more the logics sustaining them are at variance with each other, the more they are removed from the truth. Hence, the way we relate to human interest can very much help in determining our attitude to truth and authenticity. Due to the inherent tendency to defend our interests always at the cost of those of others, all human interests are in ceaseless need of authentication. Ibuanyidanda philosophy recognises this fact. It seeks to address this issue by recourse to its truth and authenticity criterion; and within which context the ontological logic guiding all interests can be articulated. This is the same logic that legitimises our actions beyond their putative characters within the domain of our raw primary cognitive ambiences. Remove the validating role of this ontological logic, the logic of human interest is completely lost in the tension posed by differences. In itself, the logic of human interest is not completely a negative type of logic, it is that logical structure on account of which otherness can become perceptible as something enriching and rewarding. However, due to the impact of our tension-laden ambivalent situations and the phenomenon of concealment (ihe mkpuchi anya),4 the ego always seeks to interpret some of these benefits as things designed to serve purely our egoistic interests. The major challenge would always be how to widen the scope of applicability of the logic of human interest, such that in the accomplishment of its task, it considers the interests of all. The ontological logic plays this vital role of directing the logic of human interest. It always seeks to direct its activities in a way that is universal. While serving this function, both logical acts – the logic of human interest and the ontological logic - are tangentially related to each as extensions of the type of relationship existing between our conjunctive and disjunctive faculties. Remove the legitimising role of this ontological logic, the logic of human

4“Ihe

mkpuchi anya” or “phenomenon of concealment” is an existential condition that militates against the capacity to reason soundly, judge correctly and imaginatively; most especially in matters dealing directly with our most cherished interests. In this way it conceals from actors the true nature of the world and reality generally.

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interest easily turns to an unbearable burden. Since the logic of human interest is still that act by reason of which differences and diversities are recognised and can become enriching, its validation is not something that occurs in an arbitrary mode. On the contrary, it is something that can be realised only with compliance of the logic of human interest. Here, the human subject has all the potentialities for such free and unconstrained act. Even if the human subject is the centre of the tension to which it is subjected, is assailable by ihemkpuchianya (phenomenon of concealment), the same human subject is equally imbued with the potentials of overcoming these challenges. In this way, we see how the character of the logic of human interest and the ontological logic are deeply connected with those innate transcendent categories of unity of consciousness that can be rendered inactive by our tension laden existential situations and ihemkpuchianya (phenomenon of concealment). In other words, for the logic of human interest to attain the type of truth and authenticity expected of it, all human acts should be able to operate beyond all forms of arbitrariness and impositions. This can occur only through that self-imposed noetic propaedeutic act in the process of which the subject has the chances of regaining the type of freedom that it can call its own. This is the type of freedom that restores the type of insight that leads to authentic circumspection in view of being in control of the challenges posed by its constraining situations. Hence, for the logic of human interest to attain the level of legitimisation expected of it, human action has to conform insightfully to all the expectations connected with the demands of the transcendent complementary circle of ibuanyidanda philosophy. Since the human subject relies on the ontological logic to accomplish this task of reactivating these innate categories, this suggests that the domain of this logic is not completely located within individual subjective lives. On the contrary, this ontological logic is situated outside the subject and has a future referential dimension. One can therefore say that the ontological logic has both an internal and external dimension by reason of which it has the capacity to reconstitute the condition of the subject positively. It has much to do with the internal state of the subject, since it is an aspect of those innate transcendent categories of unity of consciousness that are subject to full actualisation. By reason of its future referential dimension, assumes the character of that active agent that energises all acts tending to perfection. In this way, the ontological logic shares much with the first principles as these legitimise and sustain all acts that seek to be true and authentic. This is that ontological context that provides the conditions for the execution of all those acts that are free, unhindered, devoid of contradiction and destined towards absolute determination. One can therefore say that fundamentally the logic of human interest and the ontological logic complement themselves since they are

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needed for the execution of any action that is truly human. Hence, without a logic of human interest that is freely constituted, the legitimising role of the ontological logic would become ineffective. For this reason, the human subject has to submit itself freely and insightfully to the type of validation provided by the ontological logic. Failure to do this is a sign of deep-seated division in human consciousness and indication insensitivity to its ambivalent tension-laden situations. In other words, the ontological logic build on the free operation of the logic of human interest as it legitimises and directs it. This freedom ensues the moment stakeholders are disposed to get the enlightenment provided by those transcendent complementary categories of unity of consciousness embedded in their being. In other words, both modes of logical operation are needed for human existence to be guaranteed as something worthwhile. All matters dealing with truth and authenticity can therefore be articulated creditably within the context of these two logics, which offer the foundation for articulating credibly matters dealing with truth and authenticity. Therefore, a complementary notion of truth deals basically with what it takes to have the logic of human interest and the ontological logic duly harmonised. This is such truth that guarantees the type of harmony we sense in human consciousness; and one that ensues the moment thinking, perceiving, willing and judging can be said to flow from the instigations of those innate categories based on which all authentic actions can be performed. We can then say that truth is the capacity to uphold a balance within the subject as it responds to those innate categories that guarantee harmony with all existent realities in a complementary comprehensive future related mode. Where truth is perceived in this mode, stakeholders are immediately conscious of the truth and authenticity criterion of ibuanyidanda when it demands: ‘Never elevate a world-immanent missing link to an absolute instance.’ It is an injunction always to avoid all that can negate mutual complementary harmony within the subject itself and in its relationship to all missing links of reality. Whereas the logic of human interest concerns itself with diversities and differences, the ontological logic provides genuine reasons why diversity and differences are desirable beyond the instigations of the ego. Besides, the ontological logic is that on account of which differences and diversity become desirable; and on account of which also our rights to these can be guaranteed. It is the very thing that legitimises human society as it offers the authentic foundation for building genuine and lasting relationships. It is on account of the type of guarantee which this ontological logical foundation provides that we can distinguish between good and evil, commendable and bad conducts. It is based on the type of insight it provides that we can reward achievements and sanction misdeeds. Without the guarantee deriving from this ontological logic, differences would immediately assume the character of absolute

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differences and become self-legitimising. These are such situations where everyone feels and seeks to act as he or she pleases; and where everyone feels bound to the demands of his or her own logic of human interest. These are those moments when acting after the super-maxim of the nearer, the better and the safer becomes very attractive in the event of which the ontological boomerang effect sets in. Situations of this type are a sure indication of the type of strife existing in human consciousness and which the subject strives to project into the world. What this indicates is that in the total absence of the legitimising role of an ontological logic, a contented human existence would remain a mirage due to the type of inherent contradictions that would characterise matter of coexistence. It is for this very reason that ibuanyidanda sees it appropriate always to create the awareness that it is impossible for the logic of human interest to be valid where the ontological logic is negated. The same is applicable to the ontological logic itself which cannot be effective where actors have not come to appreciate its usefulness. In all contentious situations of life, the task would always be how to equilibrate the mode of operation of both logical planes such that human action can be truly human; and in the process of which the mind comes to apprehend truth ultimately and comprehensively. The inherent moment of divisiveness in the logic of human interest shows its limits as an authentic guide for human striving towards comprehensive and ultimate grasping of truth. Due to the fragmented and varied character of our interests, there is bound to be diverse faces to truth in the way we relate to the world. Interestingly, our diversities and differences notwithstanding, there is often that noticeable similarity, and at times even, identity in the way we present the truth. This is a clear pointer to the fact that there is something basic about truth, which cannot be ignored, and because of which diverse faces of truth remain in ceaseless tension with each other. If no face of truth is as true as the other, it all then means that for human existence to enjoy the type of legitimacy that gives it its true character, there is need to equilibrate any tensions arising from differences should such not invalidate what it means to be constituted for truth. What this means is that in all contentious matters concerning truth, there is always a question that remains unanswered, and here philosophy always strives to help in providing the framework for seeking credible answer to such questions. This framework is the guide towards grasping what is intended in all cases. Providing such a framework should not in any way be mistaken with providing truth itself. This is why ibuanyidanda maintains that if there is any function that philosophy performs so well, it is that of preparing us to hear those truths we do not like to hear and to like those truths we are not capable of hearing or perceiving. These are those truths that do not contradict themselves either formally or materially, but which take the relative nature of all human existential

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situations into account. Such truths have their foundation in an ontology that does not handle substance and accidents as discrete quantities, as if they do not belong to the same region of being. This is the character of that truth in which the harmony establishing the logic of human interest and the ontological logic is located. One thing stands out clearly now, it is the fact that in order that the issue presented by truth in its diverse forms can be discussed meaningfully, this has to be done in view of the nature of the foundation from which it takes its rise. This foundation is a tension-laden one, in which all subjects striving towards it find themselves. As this matter relates to philosophy, it shows that no philosophy is worth its name that is not tolerant and broadminded enough, as to make provision in its paradigm for the coexistence of all forms of truths including the insight that all truths have a common foundation. It is because of this type of broad-mindedness that philosophy has very good reasons to pride itself as that science that interests itself, among other things, for the foundation of unity of all truths, as it seeks to create the framework of the harmonisation of differences. 7 Truth in Mutual Complementary Comprehensive Interrelatedness As an ultimate inquiry beyond all forms of subjective truths, the noble philosophical task has often eluded many, because of that tendency to equate truth with opinions of individuals and groups. In this case, it is assumed that there are as many truths as there are individuals and groups contending for primacy. This is the dogma of relativism with which is very widespread today as the case of most philosophies dealing with culture has to testify. On the other side is the dogma of absolutism that equates truth with one absolute truth. In the face of the tension to which human consciousness is subjected, we tend to be aware immediately of some of the dangers presented by absolutism, but fail to notice that dimension of the absolute that is also inherent in all positions that are relative. This is the reason, I consider the dogma of relativism more worrisome since it is one whose dimension of absoluteness, dogmatism and arbitrary impositions is not always obvious. It seems to me that this is one of the many reasons relativism remains for many an attractive alternative due to its seeming liberal attitude in most matters. As human beings, our lives are often guided by common sense experience, which shares much with a relativist approach to reality. Here, a relativist position shares much with most of the difficulties associated with an empiricist notion of truth. One of the greatest difficulties presented in matters of this kind, is the lack of care in assuming that all that is knowable is what is presented to us by the senses. This is the foundation of errors of transposition, of picture type fallacies and of the fallacy of over-simplification

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and complication;5 something that has much to do with impositions arising from ihemkpuchianya (phenomenon of concealment) and our tension-laden ambivalent experience of reality. It is therefore on account of these constraining phenomena and mechanisms that we easily assume that only those things are true, certain and authentic which are in tune with the way we see, touch, taste, and perceive them, day in, day out. In this case, we assume that only those things are true and certain, which we can co-join empirically out of habit. For this reason, we tend to hold as true and valid only the evidence of pure sensation. In disputing the idea of a necessary cause, David Hume makes reference to the illusion created by habit based on which he contests that the reality of such a necessary cause is a matter of illusion. This being the case, the type of certainty ever attainable is the type that is dependent on matters of experience. We are grateful to the insight of David Hume in this matter (Hume 1972). On the other hand, if the idea of a necessary cause that is firmly grounded beyond experience eludes us, as Hume contests there isn’t such, then all matters of truth and certainty are nothing other than affairs of habit. In this case, our tension ladenambivalent existential situations and ihemkpuchianya (phenomenon of concealment) are the surest context for articulating questions of truth and certainty. How we align ourselves to these opinions can go a long way in determining our understanding of truth and certainty. One thing is evident however, a thoroughgoing empiricist canon that makes matters of sense experience, habits, likes, dislikes, mood and mere opinions, the very foundation of truth and certainty, is bound to complicate the type of answers needed to respond adequately to issues of this kind. Such is also bound to present near-insurmountable difficulties in handling basic issues of life and mutual coexistence. There are innumerable cases of such issues. A typical case that stares us in the face is the issue of violence and extremist tendencies today. Many are often misled into believing that peace; security and mutual coexistence are more likely to be threatened where nations and individuals actually arm themselves and make recourse to visible violent means to resolve conflicts. We thereby underestimate the very dangers posed

5An

error of transposition ensues the moment we transpose contents, from one context to the other quite arbitrarily and thereby assume that they uphold identical meaning within the new context. Picture-type fallacy results when we erroneously assume that the impression we have of an object within any given context is all that can ever be known and said about it. An example is when we assume that because someone is a native and scantily clad, he or she would be incapable of very sophisticated types of behaviour and reasoning. Fallacies of oversimplification and complication are equally experience-based and ensue from uncritical observation of human actions, and uncritical application of rules governing human conduct.

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by many latent seeming non-violent means devised by individuals and groups to uphold privately motivated interests and perpetrate the worst types of violence. What this shows is that where the dogma of empiricism is prevalent, human consciousness has the tendency to be unduly impressionable, and can be manipulated. In this way, stakeholders can misappropriate and misapply basic concepts in tune with prevalent moods, expectations, likes, dislikes and ideological inclinations. This presents some difficulties in the way we relate to concepts and meaning. We have such difficulties given in dealing with most concepts that are relevant towards upholding some measure of stability in the relationship of peoples and nations. This is the case with such concepts and ideas as human rights, intercultural communication, multiracial encounter, sovereignty, citizenship, terrorism, tolerance, justice, democracy, humanity, differences, similarities etc. Many tend to understand and apply these concepts in keeping with those impressions that guide their interests in the event of which what is actually intended to be communicated gets lost in the interest guiding action. This is one of the major reasons that in the world today many of those who preach peace, democracy, human rights, brotherhood, love, God, tolerance are often some of the worst offenders in matters of this kind. Since the dogma of relativism raises the false hope that all human problems can be resolved through a straightforward liberal way based on common sense experience, its unbounded optimism can stifle creativity. A situation where relativity becomes self-constituting and serves as a magic wand for the resolution of most problems, it immediately assumes an absolute character. If now the dogma of empiricism insists on the need to mediate all matters of truth in the most relative way possible, it immediately assumes the character of the dogma of absolute certainty. In this case, what is mediated assumes the form of the unmediated absolute. With this, we find ourselves at the very precincts of the dogma of absolute certainty, for which truth and certainty are beyond experience and are matters drawing from the insights of an absolute ego. Since the human subject always strives to know the whole truth and nothing but the truth, we can then see that the major weakness of both the dogma of empiricism and dogma of absolute certainty is their inability to submit to the necessity for mutual complementary harmony among all possible relations in view of grasping what truth actually is. This inflexibility can stifle the notion of truth and make it prone to arbitrary impositions. What this indicates is that whenever any of the dogmas of empiricism or rationalism holds sway, the issue of truth and certainty is bound to elude us all the more. Where we insist on taking hold of truth by way of any of these positions, we would immediately be lost in the tension created by the very divide that conceals the comprehensive character of truth from both. In all matters needing full authentication, there is always the need to address this tension in view of grasping truth. Hence, if there

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is anything that philosophy does, it is to point out that the question of truth and authenticity has a complementary comprehensive whole dimension that takes all possible relations into account. This is why for ibuanyidanda, the matter of truth and authenticity can be handled within that context where all existent realities can affirm themselves insightfully as missing links beyond all forms of arbitrariness, impositions and exclusivist tendencies. This is why philosophy as the science and art geared towards ultimate nature of truth always seeks to offer the framework for perceiving missing links as entities well harmonised and equilibrated. It does this in its commitment to absoluteness”, relativity”, historicity, fragmentation or world-immanent predetermination, universality, comprehensiveness, unity, totality, and future reference, the very transcendent categories that sustain any authentic Ibuanyidanda act. In this way, philosophy strives to offer the framework for grasping at units, in their otherness, but within the framework provided by the whole, as the very condition for arriving at truth and authenticity. References Aristotle. 1926. Metaphysica. Trans by W. D. Ross and M. A. Hon. L L. D Edin. Oxford. Vol. VIII, 2nd ed. Second Edition, Oxford at the Clarendon Press. Online Edition. Asouzu, I. I. 1984. Kritische Betrachtung der konstruktiven Wissenschaftstheorie. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: Georg Olms Verlag. Asouzu I. I. 2004. The Method and Principles of Complementary. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. Asouzu, I. I. 2005. The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection in and Beyond African Philosophy. Münster: Lit Verlag. Hume, D. 1972. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In Basic Problems of Philosophy, ed. D. J. Bronstein, Y. H. Krikorian and P. P. Wienner, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Kambartel, F. 1974. Wie ist praktische Philosophie konstruktive möglich? Über einige Missverständnisse eines methodischen Verständnisses praktischer Diskurse”, in: Praktische Philosophie und konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie. Hrsg. Von Friedrich Kambartel. Frankfurt am Main: Surkamp Verlag. Kant, I. 1976. The Metaphysical Foundation of Morals. In The Enduring Questions. Main Problems of Philosophy, arranged by Melvin Rader, Holt, Rinehart and Winston. New York. Kimmerle, H. nd. Principles of Dialogues. http://home.conceptsict.nl/~kimmerle/principleopt.jpg Kimmerle, H. 2008. Die schwere Last der Komplementarität. Antwort auf Innocent I. Asouzus Kritik an der interkulturellen Philosophie. In: Polylog. Zeitschrift für Interkulturelles Philosophieren. 19. Lorenzen, P. and O. Schwemmer, 1975. Konstruktive Logik, Ethik und Wissenschaftstheorie. Bibliographisches Institut Mannheim-Wien-Zürich: B.I.- Wissenschaftsverlag.

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Schwemmer, O. 1979. Theorie der rationalen Erklärung. Zu den methodischen Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaften. München: Verlag C. H. Beck. Stebbing, L. S. 1933. A Modern Introduction to Logic. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. Wimmer, F. 1996. Is Intercultural Philosophy a new Branch or a new Orientation in Philosophy? Published at: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/franz.martin.wimmer/intpheng95.pdf cf. First Published in Interculturality of Philosophy and Religion, ed. D. Souza, Gregory, 45-57. Bangalore.

Chapter 16

Ezumezu as a Formal System Jonathan O. Chimakonam University of Pretoria, South Africa

Abstract A system of logic is a formal theory equipped with laws and elementary syntactic and semantic definitions specifying ways of applying those laws in reasoning and revising assumptions out of which certain conclusions could be drawn from certain premises. Here, I shall discuss the universe of discourse to a variant of three-valued logic called Ezumezu, and show that the traditional laws of thought are inadequate hence, I will discuss the three new supplementary laws of thought which were introduced in chapter six. Having already formulated some of its syntactic and semantic rules in the previous chapters, I will show that in logic, Ezumezu system is comparable to systems developed by the likes of Lukasiewicz, Graham Priest, Stephen Read and other alternative logics. I will discuss two important theses namely, ontological and logical theses that enable us further understand the three pillars of Ezumezu logic namely, nwa-nsa, nwa-nju and nwa-izugbe already discussed in the preceding chapter. Finally, I will demonstrate the formal structure of Ezumezu logic using its two argument types called arumaristic and ohakaristic to show how conclusions could be drawn from premises. Keywords: Ezumezu, Logic, Africa, Formal System, Arumaristic, Ohakaristic 1 Introduction A system of logic is a formal theory equipped with laws and elementary syntactic and semantic definitions specifying ways of applying those laws in reasoning or revising assumptions out of which certain conclusions could be drawn from certain premises. It is perfectly possible to have different systems of formal logic dealing with the same set of laws of thought. The difference between them would be in the degrees of tightening and relaxing of those laws. In formulating Ezumezu, I am going to loosen the three traditional laws of thought in order to formulate three additional laws to supplement them. This is something which other workers in alternative logic like the Calabar School of

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Philosophy duo of Innocent Asouzu and Chris Ijiomah did not take into consideration and so ended up proposing systems in which some or all of the traditional laws of thought are comatose. I will return to this in a later section. In Western logic governed exclusively by the traditional laws of thought, deductive and inductive reasonings characterises the formal procedure for drawing conclusions from sets of premises. In Ezumezu logic, the supplementary laws of thought will govern the two alternative formal procedures called arumaristics and ohakaristics for drawing conclusions from a set of premises. The system of Ezumezu logic will dilute the deterministic property in contradiction and extend bivalence into trivalence. Two opposed variables only seem to be contradictory in some modes of inference; in other modes, they may not strictly be so. This is because, the A and O or the E and I propositions in the square of opposition are sub-contraries in Ezumezu system and two sub-contrary positions could both hold depicting the character of truth-value glut as against truth-value gap of Lukasiewicz’s threevalued system. The Polish logician Jan Lukasiewicz was said to have rejected the bivalent system of Aristotelian tradition on the basis of its commitment to determinism (Betti 2001; Kachi 1996). This is not an outlandish claim given Lukasiewicz’s arguments in the 1918 and 1922 works (1970: 110-128). The thesis of determinism can be formulated as saying “every statement is either necessary or impossible”. We can easily see the connection between this and the thesis of bivalence which states that “every statement is either true or false”. Bivalence seems a bit innocuous until you interpret it in the light of determinism. To bring out the seriousness of logical determinism inherent in the two-valued system, Lukasiewicz had to appeal to the problem of future contingents. The future contingent statements are those propositions of future events which given the limitations imposed by the present cannot outrightly be evaluated in light of the bivalence principle. This ultimately brought out the constraints of two-valued system. The Lukasiewicz’s three-valued system apparently aimed at accommodating the future contingents by admitting the intermediate value. His reading of this third value is neither true nor false, otherwise called the undetermined. But did this escape determinism? I would say no, and that constitutes the main reason why I am abandoning ship with Lukasiewicz’s three-valued system to construct an alternative system I call Ezumezu. Given the contingent statement “Jonathan Goodluck will contest the 2019 presidential election in Nigeria”; according to Lukasiewicz’s system and which we can reduce to determinism: it is impossible for this statement to be either true or false at the moment and on the other hand necessary for it to be undetermined. So the undetermined in Lukasiewicz was pre-determined.

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Here, I shall discuss the universe of discourse to a variant of three-valued logic called Ezumezu,1and show that the traditional laws of thought are inadequate hence, I will discuss the three new supplementary laws of thought. I have already formulated some of its syntactic and semantic rules elsewhere (Chimakonam 2018). I will then show that in logic, this system is comparable to systems developed by the likes of Lukasiewicz, Graham Priest, Stephen Read and other alternative logics. I will discuss two important theses, namely, ontological and logical theses that enable us further understand the three pillars of Ezumezu logic namely, nwa-nsa, nwa-nju and nwa-izugbe. I will demonstrate the formal structure of Ezumezu logic using its two-argument types called arumaristic and ohakaristic, to show how conclusions could be drawn from premises. Finally, I will contrast Ezumezu project with the projects of harmonious monism and complementary logic advanced by fellow elements of the Calabar School of Philosophy, Ijiomah and Asouzu respectively. 2 The Universe of Discourse in Ezumezu Logic To clarify some issues of language or the syntax of Ezumezu, it is important that I define the universe of discourse in Ezumezu logic. Definition of Universe of Discourse: This is the domain consisting of sets of statements (TFC), the relations of variables and the formal treatments of statements can range over the parameters of the governing laws of thought in Ezumezu system. This universe of discourse contains the following types of statements: 1. 2. 3.

The T-set {all statements that affirm} The F-set {all statements that deny} The C-set {some statements that affirm and some statements that deny}

The domain of all statements that affirm and those that deny are contextual modes of interpretation (cmi1) while the domain of some statements that affirm and some statements that deny is a complementary mode of interpretation (cmi2). This universe of discourse is upheld by the three supplementary laws of thought in ways that preserve the consistency of systems in African logic and recognise the consistency of systems in other logic traditions. There are three primary goals I wish to outline for any logic tradition: 1) the first is to avoid inconsistency of its statements. 2) The second is to avoid the

I designate the system as Ezumezu with upper case E, and the third value from which the system derives its name as ezumezu with a lower case e.

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contradiction of its statements. 3) And the third is to avoid making its principles absolute. While goal 1 makes logical statements in a logic tradition intelligible, goal 3 limits the expressive power of a logic system or tradition such that statements of all logic traditions are ‘context-specific’ which means that they may apply only in ‘relevant contexts’ globally. This is also what the ‘universalness’ of a system of logic means. A scenario in which statements of all logic traditions apply in ‘all contexts’ globally or are ‘context-non-specific’ is what I mean by a logic system or tradition being absolute. Without this limitation, goal 2 cannot be achieved, and statements of all logic traditions would be absolute, i.e. they would apply in all contexts globally which is anathema because systems of logic are supposed to be universal not absolute. Being universal allows room for the determination of truth and false statements, valid, invalid and sound arguments, it enables us to separate the consistent from the inconsistent, the contradictory from the non-contradictory propositions, and most importantly, it enables us to distinguish correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning. These aims of logic are set in light of the laws that govern each system. Such laws of thought make prescriptions that discriminate between what is legal and what is not within any system of logic. If we built our systems to be absolute and thereby overlooked this important discrimination, we would have scored a petty victory over thought in general but one which would destroy our purpose completely and render to noughts the human intelligence. For this, it is imperative that our systems of logic be universal but limited in their scopes to relevant contexts. A situation in which a statement of formal logic can apply in all contexts globally, such a statement would have gone beyond being universal and has become absolute. I am able to come to this point of understanding as a result of the important place which my system of Ezumezu allocates to contexts or contextualisation. The above is consistent with the prescriptions of the three traditional laws of thought. For example, if we say that Peter Obi is the running mate to Atiku Abubakar in Nigeria’s 2019 presidential election, then it cannot be the case that Peter Obi is the running mate to Muhammadu Buhari in the same election. The laws of identity, contradiction and excluded middle impose a limitation to the claim and truth-value of the first statement. If we simulate this election anywhere in the world, we would observe that candidate B cannot be a running mate to A and C at the same time; that candidate B can only be a running mate to A or to C; and that if candidate B is a running mate to A, then it is a running mate to A. Going forward, it is also because of the three goals enunciated above that the universality of systems of any properly formulated logic tradition is preserved. This is necessary because different logic traditions operate with a set of laws or supplementary laws obtained by relaxing or tightening the three traditional laws

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of thought. These supplementary laws, like the ones I formulated for African logic, are not strictly opposed to the three traditional laws such that may make systems in different logic traditions irreconcilable. What the additional laws warrant are nuances to the legal parameters that make statements in each tradition consistent or inconsistent, contradictory or non-contradictory, universal or absolute. But since statements of formal logic are supposed to be consistent, non-contradictory and above all, universal and not absolute, I formulate herewith, what can be called 1st and 2nd universalness theorems in logic. 1st Universalness Theorem: ‘Any system of logic S is universal U if and only if its elementary formal statements F are context-specific X,’ Us iffXf 2nd Universalness Theorem ‘If the elementary formal statements of a system of logic Sf are context-nonspecific ∼Xf, then the system is absolute As,’ Sf Λ ∼Xf│→ As Thus, the first and second universalness theorems show that universal systems are consistent, and if a system is universal and consistent, then it cannot be absolute. This is because every universal system obeys primarily the traditional laws of thought which includes the law of contradiction and depending on the expanse of its expressive power may also have to be governed by a set of supplementary laws of thought. In Ezumezu system, this would include the law of nmekoka. 3 Some Elementary Syntactic and Semantic mappings in Ezumezu Logic Ezumezu is an African logic that is three-valued, arumaristic and valuecomplementary. The basic differences between this and say the Lukasiewicz’s model is as expected in the third value which lies in-between two extremes. In Lukasiewicz, it is called the undetermined read as neither true nor false (truthvalue, gap) whereas, in my system, it is called ezumezu meaning the contingent and interpreted as both true and false (truth-value glut). It is from this that the variant of three-valued logic we seek to develop here derived its name. Again, the two principal values Truth and Falsity are treated as contradictories in Lukasiewicz hence in a truth table definition of the conditional P ⊃ Q, T, U will yield U; U, F will yield U, the undetermined from this reading is understood to mean it might be true or false though it is not known which (Jacquette 2000: 116; Lukasiewicz 1970: 87-88). This is the semantic effect of the contradictory

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status of the two standard values which are supposed to jointly necessitate the third value. The interesting thing, however, is found in the conditional definition where both the antecedent and the consequent in the truth table are undetermined. Lukasiewicz reads it as U, U will yield T given the traditional truth table definition of the conditional. Kleene (1952) would rather read it as U, U = U in the strict observation of the semantic content of the two undetermined values thus ignoring the truth table definition of the conditional as false only when the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Lukasiewicz on his part did not ignore this, and the fall-out can be seen in their different interpretations above. But why would Lukasiewicz hold this position? Why would he jump from a supposedly three-valued reading back to a two-valued reading of the undetermined much like from a possible truth-value glut back to truth-value gap? He must have noticed that a consistent truth-glut reading obviously would be implausible because his two standard values are contradictories as a result it makes no sense to expect U, U (two unknowns) to yield any other value besides T given the traditional definition of conditional. Thus, Lukasiewicz never really left bivalence and never truly escaped determinism. Some have criticised the undetermined and correctly so as not being a distinct value in itself. Michael Glanzberg for example, argues that truth-gaps are poorly motivated and that it is mysterious how they can be compatible with some attractive general principles and that they are useless any way you look at it (Glanzberg 2004). Simply put, if you wanted a three-valued system, then the intermediate value had better be a proper value and not some undetermined thing that runs into a brick wall. In Ezumezu model where the two standard values are treated as subcontraries rather than contradictories, the Lukasiewicz’s reading of the conditional would become obviously implausible. This is because the ezumezu is a distinct value in itself where the two standard values converge and complement. Hans Reichenbach (1944) clearly endorsed the idea of complementarity of logical values when he employed Neil Bohr’s complementary principle to describe the functionality of three-valued logic where two seemingly opposed variables complement.2 Its interpretation is ‘it is known that it could be both true and false’. It is strictly true or false when ezumezu is disintegrated once more into contextual modes. One readily questions the realistic status of ezumezu that could be both true and false. Semantic evaluations as earlier mentioned in African thought are read

Hans Reichenbach in his magnum Opus The philosophic foundations of quantum mechanics. [1944, 22 & 139-165] showed the inadequacy of two-valued logic in axiomatising quantum theory and opted instead for three-valued logic as a viable option.

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contextually similar to situation semantics where statements of formal systems are interpreted as true or false relative to situations. In contextual semantics, that which is true, is true only in a context, it could be false in another. This is a realist rather than an epistemic reading of the three-valued thought model. However, in Ezumezu logic, we do not talk about truth table definition of the conditional P ⊃ Q, we talk about truth table definition of the complement P |⊃ Q. It must be clarified at this point that our use of ‘complement’ in Ezumezu logic is not the same as its use in set theory. In set theory, Ac or A’ is a complement and is read as ‘all the objects that do not belong to set A.’ In Ezumezu logic, P |⊃ Q is read as ‘P complements Q’ or ‘P and Q complement each other.’ Usually, when two variables complement in Ezumezu logic, a third but tentative variable symbolised as ‘C’ is formed. Under this reading, the truth table definitions of P |⊃ Q would be T, T = T; T, F = C; F, T = C where C replaces U and stands for the contingent or complemented value; F, F = F. Another basic demarcating point is with recourse to the principle of ex falso quadlibet. This is a rule that permits the inference of any formula whatsoever from a contradiction (that is, from a formula and its negation) (Cook, 2009:110). It could be symbolised as A, ~A therefore B. In Lukasiewicz and strongly in Kleene, there are obvious ways in which ex falso quadlibet could be valid in that from the annihilation which proceeds from A and ~A, any formula could easily be inferred given the internal bivalence. But in Ezumezu model which is trivalent it is not a valid rule of inference because from A, ~A, one can easily infer (A |⊃ ~A) which is a contingent. We may therefore produce the structure of Ezumezu three-values as follows: Figure 16.1: Showing the Ezumezu three-valued thought model

C

→ T

↔

← F

Source: Chimakonam, O. Jonathan. 2014. Ezumezu: A variant of three-valued logic. Paper presented at the Philosophical Society of the Southern Africa PSSA. Free State University, Bloemfontein, South Africa, Jan. 20-22.

The diagram above simply shows two standard values of truth and falsity labeled conventionally as T and F which necessarily complement each other in the third value called ezumezu labeled C. The arrows in the boxes show the movement of the values or variables as the case may be from a contextual mode to a central platform or complementary mode where they achieve

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complementation. This is against the principle of bivalence which entrenches the place of contradiction in Western logic. What this means, however, is that the reasoning pattern in Ezumezu is non-bivalent or trivalent. The traditional laws of thought (identity, contradiction and excluded-middle), for example, are insufficient in Ezumezu system and in their complement are the three supplementary laws of thought namely; Njikọka, Nmekọka and Ọnọna-etiti. 4 Discussion of the three Supplementary Laws of Thought What I want to do here is provide a brief discussion on the three supplementary laws. It is easy to see with the study of Western systems that the main problem it has with African thought system is that it regards it as non-existent or at best a collection of mystical and pre-logical traditions lacking in rationality. This is because the principles of reasoning in the Western logic, i.e. the laws of thought do not sufficiently cover the gamut of human reasoning as a whole. Unsure what to make of this discovery, the French Anthropologist Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1967) declares that primitive societies which includes traditional Africa are governed by an inferior type of logic he describes as the “logic of mystical participation.” Thus, in light of Aristotelian logic, such peoples for him, are prelogical. When the question is asked: What does Levy-Bruhl mean when he claimed that primitive cultures are pre-logical, and how did he arrive at such a conclusion?” Gordon Hunnings explains the answer provided by Robin Horton thus: One quite specific reason is because Aristotle’s Laws of Thought are not formulated and do not appear to be observed in Africa languages. According to Western logic, these laws are the supreme principles of logical truth and any system of ideas expressed in a language in which these principles are not observed can only be described as pre-logical. Furthermore, as these logical principles represent the Laws of Thought their absence is not only a defect of language but of the mentality of the users of the language. (Hunnings 1975: 4) On this ground, Hunnings replies: It was by reasoning along these lines that Levy-Bruhl felt entitled to draw far-reaching conclusions about the mind and even the soul of African peoples. It has often been observed that whereas the truths of philosophy turn out to be trivial tautologies, it is the errors of philosophy that are intrusive. This particular thesis seems to me not only to be an error, but a particularly intrusive one. Most of Levy-Bruhl’s critics have contented themselves with a general refutation of his thesis on the ground that he exaggerated the difference between African and Western cultures. This is certainly true, but the philosophical errors involved in Levy Bruhl’s thesis are far more subtle than that. (Hunnings 1975: 4)

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It is in this light that I here discuss the three supplementary laws of thought as principles undergirding the variant of three-valued logic I am formulating. It is probably full of contradictions when assessed with Western system but so are the Aristotelian and the Russellian systems when viewed in light of the Ezumezu system here formulated. It is not that the three traditional laws of thought do not hold in Ezumezu system or that the supplementary laws cannot hold in Western system but that they do not consistently hold in each system. To the extent they can hold in the opposite system defines their complementarity.3 The standard laws are identity, contradiction and excluded-middle. Identity states that a thing is always equal to itself (A equals A); contradiction which is a negative formulation of identity states that a thing cannot be unequal to or different from itself (A is not non-A); and excluded middle which is the combination of the two above states that if a thing is equal to itself it cannot be unequal to or different from itself (if A equals A it cannot equal non-A). In line with their structures, these laws imply absolute difference and absolute identity in which things are mutually exclusive (Sogolo 1993). This means that a thing cannot be two different and mutually exclusive things at the same time. In the extended reasoning frameworks like the case of future contingents, this deterministic property becomes a telling weakness for the two-valued system. I add three new laws to the above, namely, njikoka, nmekoka and onona-etiti in lieu of the fact that the ideas of absolute identity, absolute difference and mutual exclusivity which the three standard laws project in addition to serving a purpose of consistency in reasoning, actually undermine dynamism and shortchange other facets of human reasoning by being overtly deterministic. While identity and contradiction imply absolute identity in which things are mutually exclusive, excluded-middle imply absolute difference. In the same vein, njikoka and onona-etiti mitigate absolute identity in which things are mutually exclusive by implying relative identity in which things are mutually inclusive instead. Nmekoka, on the other hand, mitigate absolute difference by implying relative difference in which things are mutually inclusive. Thus, this sort of thinking that recognises the intermediate value eschews absolutism/exclusivity and promotes relativity/inclusivity is not covered in the mappings of two-valued logic. It is this sort of reasoning entertained by many people in the universe and found prominently in some climes, notably the East and Africa that Ezumezu logic covers. By these three additional laws,

3

Further research is required to fully exploit this possibility.

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Ezumezu gears up to surpass the efficacy of two-valued logic. The mathematical precision and consistency of two-valued logic means that dynamism is lost entirely, and that makes it a logic for robots. Because humans are both emotive and rational entities, they are therefore dynamic, and a better reasoning algorithm would be a logic that recognises this human plasticity. A strict adherence to the Western logic has turned Europeans into machines without hearts that feel, or, to borrow the words of Franz Fanon (Fanon 1963), Europe has become morally sterile. In the supplementary laws, njikoka maintains that because things exist in a network, every existence forms a necessary link of reality and nothing that exists, stands alone. Yet this is not a form of synthesis because everything in the network retains its identity despite being in a relationship with other things. Nmekoka, on the other hand, maintains that things exist in a complementary network where things complement themselves. For this, everything serves a missing link of reality. Complementation in this regard is brought about by arumaristic reasoning and not the dialectic reasoning of Hegel or Marx, and as such a synthesis is not expected because things do not lose their individual identities, they only join to create the new complemented identity. For onona-etiti, everything that exists serves different functions from context to context. Through it, Ezumezu logic seeks to form the third epistemic value called nwa-izugbe from the interaction of nwa-nju and nwansa. Arumaristics is different from Marxist and Hegelian dialectics because thesis (nwa-nsa) and anti-thesis (nwa-nju) are not contradictories but subcontraries in Ezumezu logic. And what is called nwa-izugbe in Ezumezu is structurally different from what Hegel or Marx designates as synthesis in their dialectical reasoning. In the latter, thesis and anti-thesis lose themselves in the synthesis. But in the former, nwa-nsa and nwa-nju merely complement themselves in nwa-izugbe. The Law of Njikọka: Integrativity is a near equivalence of the Igbo concept Njikọka which means universal value or meaning is derived from variables when they come together. The emphasis of the law of Njikọka is on universal identity rather than on individual identity. The human society, for example, is communitarian, which means the individual does not exist in isolation, he exists in a group (Menkiti 1984). It is the group that gives identity, as for example, an individual citizen of Nigeria is a Nigerian, an African and a member of the human race. On its own, the individual is capable of pursuing its own ideal although highly limited. In a group its potentialities are increased to fullness. In the law of Njikọka, the individuals are not subsumed or lost in the group because they are

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autonomous, but they come together to create a more powerful centre. Through the combined efforts of members of the set, the group forges a stronger identity. Njikoka states: (T) A ↕ (T) A│→ (T) (A ∧ B) This law reads as A is true if and only if A is true wedge-implies A and B is true. Here, the variable A is said to be true only in the company of another or other variables. The argument is that A primarily holds because it has a group to which it belongs. The emphasis here is not that A cannot hold outside the group but that within the group, the identity of A is secondary to that of the group. Law of Nmekọka: The term complementarity comes nearest to explaining the concept of Nmekọka. Literarily, Nmekọka means that individual strength or power is enhanced in the group. The difference between the law of Nmekọka and that of Njikọka is that while the former centres on the enhanced group power or identity made possible by the combination of individual identities, the latter focuses on the enhanced individual identity within the group. In the metatheoretic formulation of Nmekọka, the variable C is said to be contingent or in a complementary mode of thought. Nmekoka states: (T|⊃F) = C which reads, C is or equals a complement of T and F. Further, let us note the value attached to C in the meta-theoretic formulation which is (T|⊃F), this is different from (T) ∧ (F) or (T) ∧ ~ (T) because the conjunction which is present in the latter formulae suggests admission or inclusion, (T) includes (F) or ~ (T) admits (T). In “C” we say that the two values (T) (F) are mutually complementary, each giving itself to the centre as Fig. 1. shows. In “C” the individual (T) or (F) have come together to produce “C” but it is this coming together that enhances the identities of T and F, hence (T|⊃F) = C. Law of Ọnọna-etiti: If we say as the traditional law of excluded middle posits that either a thing is or it is not, we have as the name goes excluded the middle position which is the possibility of a thing being and not being at the same time. What is excluded by the traditional law of excluded middle is what onona-etiti includes hence, included-middle. The difference markers in the two laws are their operators. While excluded middle goes with disjunction “∨” Ọnọna-etiti or if you like included middle goes with conjunction “∧”. Thus, as disjunction polarises and bifurcates in mutually exclusive absolute difference, conjunction unifies and centralises in mutually inclusive relative difference. Included middle, therefore, becomes a term which, closely interprets the Igbo concept Ọnọna-etiti meaning “between others, that which comes to the middle.”

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Onona-etiti states: (T) A ∧ (T) ~ A or (T) A ∧ (F) A which reads A is both true and false (both and). This law alone summarises everything which Asouzu puts forward in his theory of complementary logic. But I still find his system inadequate as I shall show later because a system of logic requires more than a single law to stand. Going forward, when some people, for example, reason, they do not reason solely and strictly that either a thing is or it is not or neither this nor that in mutually exclusive absolute difference within a given contextual mode of interpretation but also that a thing could be and not be at the same time within a mutually inclusive relative difference in an integrated mode of interpretation. We, therefore, can see another difference between African logic and Western logic. While Ezumezu logic admits of modes of interpretation of variables namely contextual, contingent or complementary, Western logic does not admit of the complementary. So, the meta-theoretic formulation of Ọnọna-etiti (T) A ∧ (T) ~ A or (T) A ∧ (F) A, can be expressed literarily as A could be both true and false or if a thing is equal to itself it can be unequal to or different from itself depending on context. This idea of trivalence in African thought is also corroborated by Chris Ijiomah (2006), Etuk (2002), Hebga (1958), Laye (1954), etc., with examples drawn from African idea of time, truth, and jurisprudence in his different account of an African variant of three-valued logic. 5 The Two Theses in Ezumezu Logic Ezumezu has two prominent theses, namely; the ontological thesis and the logical thesis. It is from the spectra of these two that the methods of African philosophy can be understood. Briefly, the ontological thesis states that: realities exist not only as independent units at the periphery of the circle of existents but also as entities capable of coming together to the centre of the circle of existents, in a network for an interdependent relationship. Conceived in this way, African philosophers of diverse persuasions think of reality as one big network of variables, some of which are opposed to some others, yet, they are interconnected. This accounts for why in the conversational curve which is an apparatus that explains how diverse variables relate in African ontology, even opposed variables that are in a disjunctive motion apart from each other come to discover the necessity of mutual interaction and enter the

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path of conjunctive motion once again.4 So, there is a limit to how far apart the disjunctive motion could take the opposed variables before they begin to exhibit strong complementary pull—that limit is known as the complementary bar or the concessional bridge. However, despite the possibility of binary complementation, there is also a limit to how close the opposed variables can relate—that limit is called the benoke point. This concept is derived from a collection of Igbo words: Bere which means ‘reaching’ and n’oke which means ‘the limit or terminal point’. Put together ‘berenoke’ or ‘benoke’ for short means ‘reaching the limit or terminal point’. This is the point beyond which opposed variables cannot get further close due to the absence of synthesis in Ezumezu logic. One could, therefore, see that despite their similarity, there is a difference between relationship of the types called arumaristics and ohakaristics and Hegelian dialectical relationship. Below is the diagram of conversational curve that can enable us to measure the relationships of seemingly opposed variables in African ontology. Definition: Conversational Curve is a graphic representation of the arumaristic and ohakaristic relationship between opposed variables, call them nwa-nsa and its nemesis nwa-nju. It is drawn with the motions of conversation on vertical axis and the conversationalists or the variables themselves on horizontal axis. In the diagram below, one can observe the dotted disjunctive v-shaped lines which demonstrate how variables move apart and diminish their contact and interaction (ohakaristics); and the conjunctive lines which demonstrate how seemingly opposed variables come close to interact (arumaristics). One can also observe concessional bridge defined as a mechanism for determining when complementation has become necessary and has begun to take place between two opposed variables which have decided to make concessions; and complementary turn defined as a mechanism for determining when conjunctive force has toppled disjunctive force and variables have entered the path of complementation. On top is the benoke point where the conjunctive lines could not meet and which is a point beyond which opposed variables cannot get further close. Finally, there is one called tension of incommensurables defined as

4Disjunctive

motion symbolised with the constant ‘V’ refers to the conversational track that leads to the differentiation of opinions as opposed variables diverge while conjunctive motion symbolised with the constant ‘Λ’ refers to the conversational track that leads to the homogenisation of opinions as opposed variables converge.

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a mechanism for determining when complementary relationship has collapsed and disjunctive force has once again toppled conjunctive force. Figure 16.2: Diagram of Conversational Curve Tension of Incommensurables

Benoke point Complementary turn Concessional bridge Motion Disjunctive motion Conjunctive motion Conversationalists Source: Chimakonam, Jonathan O. 2017. “Conversationalism as an Emerging Method of Thinking in and Beyond African Philosophy,” Acta-Academica, pp11-33, Vol 2. p19.

On the whole, ontological thesis enables us to understand the three pillars of Ezumezu logic, namely, nwa-nsa, nwa-nju and nwa-izugbe. While nwa-nsa and nwa-nju are independent variables at the periphery or contextual mode, nwa-izugbe is the centre where they converge, the complementary mode. The second is the logical thesis which states that: values are to be allocated to propositions not on the bases of the facts such propositions assert but on the bases of the contexts in which those propositions are asserted. In this regard, one can see that context upsets fact. It is from this logical thesis that I articulate the principle of Context-dependence of Values (CdV). What can immediately be gleaned from this thesis is that in Ezumezu logic, we look at truth as something somewhat less rigid as the Aristotelian logical formulation as well as the Boolean algebraic equation would rather have us believe. The condensed idea and which is the statement of the principle of Context-dependence of Value is: ‘truth value of propositions varies from context to context.’ Thus the methods of African philosophy like Afro-communitarianism, Complementary reflection and Conversational thinking which are grounded

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in Ezumezu logic aim at a non-synthetic outcome, i.e. they do not broach the transculturality of truth; they are rather, arumaristic. What the logical thesis does is the affirmation of what can be called the ‘intercommunication of truth’ which means that truths emanating from different contexts can recognise and confirm one another, but that is how much we can expect. Thus, at contextual levels, truths have a life of their own but somehow connected. One truth may confirm the other even though they may carry different values for the same set of facts—a practical solidarity of truths, if you will. For example, the proposition ‘one needs water to stay alive’ when contextualised in the Sahara desert where one is dehydrating and in the River Niger where one is drowning, respectively; they will carry different values even though they contain the same set of facts. However, despite the difference in values, one confirms the other. Water could save your life in the desert but the same water could kill you in the river. These truths are in solidarity, each enables one to understand the other better, and I think this is supposed to be the drive behind all genuine efforts geared towards intercultural philosophy. Conversational thinking epitomises this mechanism through a process known as creative struggle—a continuous arumaristics without synthesis. This method is a perpetual process and a critical continuum by which the African philosopher or any philosopher for that matter can assess the relationships of diverse but interconnected entities, cultures and peoples, etc. The reshuffling of nwa-nsa and nwa-nju is a revision of some sort in which each set manifests a higher level of discourse called nwa-izugbe. On the whole, Ezumezu logic through its fundamental notion of nmeko points to the idea of logical relationships among interdependent, interrelated and interconnected realities existing in a network whose peculiar truth conditions can more accurately and broadly be determined within specific contexts. This relationship exists even between opposed variables propelled and regulated by the conjunctive and the disjunctive mechanisms that seek to preserve diversity while enhancing inclusion and focusing on the progress of thought. 6 The Formal Structure of Ezumezu Logic Formal reasoning in Ezumezu has two main procedures, namely, arumaristics and ohakaristics which can be employed in drawing conclusions from sets of premises. There are elementary definitions that are necessary for us to proceed: Centre and peripheries: In Ezumezu logic, we conceive universal and particular propositions or statements as centre and peripheries. This is due to the Afrocommunitarian idea of coming together or communion. Communion presupposes relationship and relationship involves different variables coming together from different corners to form a unity at the centre. These variables, therefore, stand individually at the periphery, which is an imaginary circle. The

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different points at the periphery represent diverse contexts or the contextual modes while the centre where the variables converge is the complementary mode. Peripheral and Central Claims: In an arumaristic argument, there are three main propositions; the first premise is called a peripheral claim because it is a particular statement in a contextual mode. The second premise is called the context of the claim because it gives justification to the peripheral claim. The third, which is the conclusion is called the central claim because it is a universal statement with complementary value. A standard form argument in African logic is called categorical arumaristicism or categorical ohakaristicism. So, there are two types of categorical arguments in African logic, each consisting of three propositions known as categorical propositions or two premises and one conclusion. The analysis of terms, moods and figures are quite the same as in Western logic except that as explained before, the universal proposition contains what is called the central claim while the particular propositions contain what are called the peripheral claims. Example of an arumaristic argument: Premise 1: Momoh is immortal Premise 2: Momoh is an African Conclusion: Therefore, all Africans are immortal The mood and figure of the above argument is IIA -3 which is invalid in Western logic because that Momoh is immortal and an African do not constitute sufficient ground to infer that all Africans are immortal. The property of immortality seems, in this case, to be something peculiar to one individual named Momoh. It would be unreasonable to make such an inductive leap and generalise that property. There is no sufficient cause for such an effect. In African logic, however, the argument of the structure IIA-3 would be valid because of the permissibility principle.5 This principle allows one to infer a conclusion through a relevant context. The context through which the universal conclusion could be inferred from two particular premises is that of African ontology where being is transcendent and time is cyclical. On the one hand, being for the African is not only spatio-temporal; it is transcendental. It is both physical and non-physical or has both physical and non-physical dimensions. So, even when humans, for example, pass on, they

5This principle helps to indicate which context a logician’s inference is tied to since context is vital in African logical inferences. See Chimakonam 2018

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are not dead and finished; they have only unrobed their physical aspect and begun another journey in the afterlife with their non-physical aspect.6 Time, on the other hand, is cyclical7 and not linear. Those who are said to have journeyed into afterlife descend to the land of the ancestors or the spirit world from where they either maintain contact, participate in the activities of the living or their non-physical aspects are recycled and sent back to the world through re-incarnation that their journey in life may begin anew. Now, if all Africans are said to be immortal, it is the context of re-incarnation8 that warrants such a categorical proposition. It matters very little that such a universal conclusion was arrived at from two particular premises. The traditional law of contradiction has a limitation in this context where the law of nmekoka is active. Re-incarnation and the cyclic nature of time apply to all in African world-view, it does not matter if one case is reported. In Western logic, there are about 256 categorical syllogisms which going by the permutation of terms, moods and figures, only 24 are valid. Out of the 24, only 15 are unconditionally valid while 9 are conditionally valid. The study that will map out all possible argument structures in both arumaristic and ohakaristic arguments is yet to be carried out in African logic, and I here throw the challenge to the feet of the young African logicians. I come now to the ohakaristic argument. Like the arumaristic version, it also has three statements. But more like the deductive argument of Western logic, its inference moves from the centre to the periphery much like from universal to particular. This similarity can be explained on the basis of the applicability of the traditional laws of thought in African world-view. Ezumezu does not reject or doubt that the three old or traditional laws apply in African thought. What Ezumezu emphasises is that they are limited to spheres of experiences where the traditional laws are upheld. For example, in African thought, there is left and right, a moving object can only occupy one space at a time. There is also up and down, when an object is tossed up under certain physical conditions, it can only occupy one of the two spaces at a time. Ezumezu simply recognises the limitation, not the applicability of the three traditional laws of thought. My father is my father, and I cannot have any other father biologically, no doubt, but I can have several other fathers in an Afro-communitarian sense. It is when inferences move from such biological

6See

Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984) for a rich discussion of afterlife John Mbiti (1969) 8See discussions on re-incarnation in Innocent Onyewuenyi (1996) and Mesembe Edet (2016). 7See

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conditions to Afro-communitarian conditions that Ezumezu logic begins to take over from Western logic. An example of ohakaristic argument would be: Premise 1: All Africans are immortal Premise 2: Momoh is an African Conclusion: Therefore, Momoh is immortal The above example looks very much like a deductive argument except that there are some nuances in interpretation. The movement of inferences in ohakaristic argument is not thought of as from universal to particular propositions but from the centre to the peripheries. This is in keeping with the Afro-communitarian orientation of communion or relationship of variables. Again, while premise 1 is a central claim, premise 2 is the context that justifies the claim in premise 1. The conclusion then becomes a peripheral claim. So, more than the deductive argument, ohakaristic is the opposite of arumaristic. One of the main significances of ohakaristic argument is being able to contrast arumaristic argument with another type of argument in Ezumezu logic. Another significance is that it proves that the traditional laws of thought, namely; identity, contradiction and excluded middle apply in African language even though it has certain limitations. On the whole, it is important to note that Ezumezu is not the only system developed in African philosophy so far. There are two other systems called harmonious monism and complementary logic by Ijiomah and Asouzu, respectively. To summarise their basic tenets, I would say that harmonious monism is three-valued and based on the notion of relationship inherent in African world-view. In it, the two extreme values are contraries designated as quasi truth and quasi false. The intermediate value, which represents the combination of the two fragmented values is the region of complete truth. For complementary logic, it is many-valued, recognises each value as a missing link and views the combination of all values as the truth. Inferences in this logic are governed by two principles, namely; the conjunctive and the disjunctive principles. Of the two, the system sanctions the former and rejects the latter as the correct way to reason. On a positive note, these two systems of logic by Ijiomah and Asouzu do well in modelling African world-view or tapping from some of its viable ideas to design algorithms capable of mediating conflicts of interest. The problem they have are, for harmonious monism, there is no room for the value of falsehood, only quasi falsehood and the implication of such a model for the society can be scary. For complementary logic, the negation of truth is not an ideal worth pursuing. Both systems also negate in various degrees, the three traditional laws of thought but fail to promulgate alternatives. While not dismissing them outright, it may be rewarding to suggest further work on the systems.

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7 Conclusion: Insights and Controversies African scholars like C. S. Momoh, Godwin Sogolo, Leopold Senghor, Joseph Omoregbe, Meinrad Hebga, Hunnings Gordon, Udo Etuk and the present author to name a few have been concerned. They have variously mooted the idea of a logic that can interpret a mapping of sections of the human system of thought not covered in the traditional Aristotelian system. The challenge which has confronted this noble idea and of course, projects, over the last thirty or forty years is the confusion concerning the location and the crises of the thought patterns not covered. Some African scholars, like Chris Ijiomah (2006),9 take the radical but easily misunderstood or misplaced ambition. Either they make a claim for a logic that is uniquely African, or they emphasise a unique thought system upon which they erect the edifice of a peculiar African logic. This sort of logical radicalism was heralded by Leopold Senghor (1962) who differentiated between Western and African reasoning — the one being rational and the other being chiefly emotive.10 Others like Hebga and Hunnings pointed to the lacuna in Western logic which needs to be filled. Momoh and Omoregbe affirmed this need and speculated on a possible logical construction of cultural orientation. This is the sort of orientation which has led to the talk on Indian and Chinese logics i.e. cultural location of logics which implies universal dislocation of the instrument of logic is, in itself, a great error. I believe that the contributions which the Indian, Chinese, Western and African logics bring to the logical discourse are extensional rather than genetic. No logic is truly genetic even though the Western writers from the ancient time have commented on logic as if it were a pride collection of the Western mind (See Horton 1993; Hegel 1975; Levy-Brhul 1947).11 This cultural location has sparked off a nostalgic force in other minds of the twentieth century down to label any further logical development from their horizon with cultural bias. To condone this would be to upturn the character of topic-

9Ijiomah envisages a logic called harmonious monism which is a direct reflection of a peculiar African thought system. I have clarified that this sort of thinking is misplaced even though it is original. 10 Senghor may have been misunderstood. His emphasis on emotions can be more accurately read as a claim for relevance in the logical reflections of Africans much more like the claim in the Australian tradition. Not being a professional logician, he could not finely articulate this in line with logical standards but he made a strong point which I believe is vital in developing the African tradition in Logic. 11 This idea is strongly suggested by the much criticised French Anthropologist Lucien LevyBruhl, The German Idealist philosopher Georg Hegel and much later Robin Horton.

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neutrality and universal instrumentality of logic. To dismiss further logical developments from other traditions as nonsensical, irrational, anti-rational or inadmissible; or to treat historicity of logic as exclusive or preclusive is also a monumental error. It is another way of cultural location of logic. To tie the goat with the rope and to tie the rope with the goat as the Igbo would say translate to the same activity but with nuances. Logic would continue to grow. What we witness as the edifice of logic is chiefly the contributions from the Western traditions, namely, Greek, German, British, American, Polish, Australian, etc. The contributions from the Chinese and the Indian traditions are beginning to be acknowledged while the contributions from the African tradition are being worked out since the twentieth century, some of them though from an erroneous precipice — one we have explained its cause. The two errors which resulted in the cultural location and universal dislocation of the instrument of logic are to be demobilised. Logic is to be one unindividuated principle of intelligibility with various traditions. The culturally ethnicised predicates as Western, Chinese, Indian, African, etc., which are exclusivist alter and bastardise the meaning of the subject. Logic can only be qualified within itself or with such predicates to reflect the various traditions e.g. polish logic, Igbo logic, American logic and to reflect the various orientations such as propositional logic, relevance logic, Ezumezu logic, etc. The predicates Western, Chinese, Indian, African etc., must strictly be used to categorise various bigger umbrella traditions and not to differentiate or racialise various unique types of logic that are culturally exclusive. Another gauntlet has to do with the system of thought which is viewed by some as the metaphysical foundation of logic. Promoters of a unique African logic, for instance, take a cue from this to agitate that Africa has a unique thought system which engenders unique African logic. Thought system is defined as the aggregate of a people’s basic beliefs which determine their norms, laws and judgments on what is acceptable and unacceptable within their society following established order (Chimakonam 2012; 2013). However, thought system is something that evolves with the development of human intellect. The intellectual development of all humanity and all societies are not at par, and as such, the evolution of human thought system in different environments cannot be at par or even channeled towards the same direction. But one central factor that undergirds them all is rationality driven by circumstance. In this way, the circumstances of people in Europe may engender rational progress in one direction and lack of progress in another where Africa may have thrived given her circumstances. The inclination to reason following certain patterns and not another which is seamlessly due to circumstance has been erroneously described by the promoters of unique cultural logics as variegated or extremist relative thought systems. The

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acceptance of this inexorably leads to the enthronement of relative logics in the sense of exclusive cultural variations. When we talk about say African logic, we mean it as a tradition in the overall edifice of logic. Here, I call my system Ezumezu logic. Such logic, therefore, could only be an extension of the conventional landscape of logic. So, in essence, it is not a new or unique logic different from logic as it is conventionally known. Just as different traditions such as relevance, para-consistent, threevalued, four-valued, multi-valued logics etc., have come to be developed as extensions of the big umbrella of logic whose main differences are in the expansion or loosening of the laws which guide reasoning within them, Ezumezu joins that league as a variant of three-valued logic. As has been observed, any shift in the three traditional laws of thought constitutes an alternative system of logic. So, the question does African logic exist as a bordersensitive structure does not arise. This question alone is capable of generating academic controversies that might last a century or more but as it is said, “without arguments and clarifications, there is strictly no philosophy” (Wiredu 1980: 47). The importance of the project on Ezumezu logic is accounted for in the insights that could be derived from it as demonstrating the viability of African logic as a tradition. Whether it comes hidden in the critical denials or as an obvious outright acknowledgment of its merits, there must be something that engages the academic by threatening orthodoxy or by exposing his ignorance. There is always a difference between what we know for sure to be incorrect and what we merely presume should be incorrect based on our earlier assumptions and biases, which are more likely to be faulty than valid. In the face of the latter, we are admonished to give some chance to our little controversies! The developments in the theory of quanta where the two-valued logic could not suffice and where J. Bochenski believes that the Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic suffices is a strong case in point. Where the Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logic is thought to be insufficient, Ezumezu might, therefore, suffice. Since the growth of logic has been continuous, the development of Ezumezu as a formal system sustains the momentum. References Betti, A. 2011. The incomplete story of Lukasiewicz and bivalence. Paper presented at the Logica Conference. Chimakonam, O. J. 2012. Building African logic as an algorithm for Africa’s development. Paper presented at The University of Georgia, USA, African Studies Institute Conference, Nov. 8-10. Chimakonam, O. J. 2013. Metric system in Igbo thought long before the arrival of the Europeans: A systematization. Paper presented at The 11th Annual Conference of the Igbo Studies Association on Ohaka: The Community is Supreme, Held at Modotel, Enugu, Nigeria June 27-29.

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Chimakonam, O. J. 2017. Conversationalism as an emerging method of thinking in and beyond African philosophy. Acta Academica. 47:2 11-33. Chimakonam, O. J. 2018. The Philosophy of African Logic: A Consideration of Ezumezu Paradigm. In Philosophical perceptions on logic and order, ed. Jeremy Horne, 96-121. Hershey PA: IGI Global. Cook, R. 2009. A Dictionary of philosophical logic. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Edet, I. M. 2016. Innocent Onyewuenyi’s philosophical re-appraisal of the African belief in reincarnation: A conversational study. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 5:1 76-99, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ft.v5i1.6 Etuk, U. 2002. The possibility of African logic. In The third way in African philosophy, ed. Olusegun Oladipo, 98-116.Ibadan: Hope Publications. Fanon, F. 1963.Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. Hegel, W. F. G. 1975. Lectures on the philosophy of world history. Trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Horton, R. 1993. Patterns of thought in Africa and the West: Essays on magic, religion and science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hunnings, G. 1975. Logic, language and culture. Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy 4:1 3-13. Glanzberg, M. 2004. Against truth-value gaps. In Liar and heaps: New essays on paradox,ed. J. C. Beall, 151-193. New York: OUP. Ijiomah, C. 2006. An excavation of a logic in African world-view. African Journal of Religion, Culture and Society 1:1 29-35. Jacquette, D. 2000. An internal determinacy metatheorem for Lukasiewicz’s Aussagenkalkuls. Bulletin of the Section of Logic. 29:3 115-124. Kachi, D. 1996. Was Lukasiewicz wrong? Three-valued logic and determinism.” Paper presented at Lukasiewicz in Dublin – An international conference on the works of Jan Lukasiewicz, July 7. Kleene, C. S. 1952. Introduction to metamathematics. Amsterdam: North Holland. Laye, C. 1954. The Radiance of The King. New York: New York Review of Books. Levy-Bruhl, L. 1947. Primitive mentality. Paris: University of France Press. Łukasiewicz, J. 1970. On three-valued logic. In Selected works by Jan Łukasiewicz, ed. L. Borkowski, 87-88. North–Holland, Amsterdam. Łukasiewicz, J. 1970. On determinism. In Selected works by Jan Łukasiewicz, ed. L. Borkowski, 110-128. North–Holland, Amsterdam. Łukasiewicz, J. 1970. Farewell lecture by Professor Jan Lukasiewcz delivered in the Warsaw University Lecture Hall on March 7, 1918. In Selected works by Jan Łukasiewicz, ed. L. Borkowski, 84-86. North–Holland, Amsterdam. Mbiti, J. 1969. African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann. Menkiti, I. 1984. Person and community in African traditional thought. In African philosophy: An introduction, 3rd edn., R. Wright, 41–55. Lanham: University Press of America. Onyewuenyi, C. I. 1996. African Belief in reincarnation: A philosophical reappraisal. Snaap Press: Enugu.

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Reichenbach, H.1944. The philosophic foundations of quantum mechanics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Senghor, S. L. 1964. Liberte I: Negritude et humanisme. Paris: Editions du Seuil. Senghor, Leopold Sedar. 1962. The Psychology of the African Negro. H. Kaal Transl. Diogenes 10.37: 1-15. Sogolo, S. G. 1993. Foundations of African philosophy: A definitive Analysis of conceptual issues in African thought. Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press. Wiredu, K. 1980. Philosophy and an African culture. New York: Cambridge University Press.

List of Contributors 1.

Ademola Kazeem Fayemi is a lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, University of Lagos.

2.

Late Campbell Shittu Momoh was a professor of African philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, University of Lagos.

3.

Chris O. Ijiomah is a retired professor of logic and foundations of mathematics at the University of Calabar.

4.

Chukwuemeka B. Nze is a retired professor of philosophy at the University of Nigeria and currently with Madonna University.

5.

Edwin Etieyibo is a professor of philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand.

6.

Godwin Sogolo is a retired professor of philosophy at the University of Ibadan and currently with the National Open University of Nigeria.

7.

Innocent I. Asouzu is a professor of philosophy at the University of Calabar.

8.

J. E. Wiredu, later Kwasi Wiredu is a distinguished professor at the University of South Florida. He was formerly a professor of philosophy at the University of Ghana.

9.

Jonathan O. Chimakonam is a senior lecturer at the University of Pretoria. He was formerly with the University of Calabar. He is the convener of the Conversational School of Philosophy, formerly The Calabar School of Philosophy.

10. Keanu Koketso Mabalane is a postgraduate student at the Department of Philosophy, University of the Witwatersrand. 11. Late Leopold Sedar Senghor was a poet, philosopher and statesman. He was the first President of Senegal. 12. Meinrad Hebga was a Cameroonian Catholic Priest, anthropologist, theologian and philosopher. He was a professor of philosophy at the Yaounde State University. 13. Late Robin Horton was a professor of social anthropology and philosophy in a long career that saw him teach at the Universities of Ibadan, Ife and Port Harcourt.

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14. Udo Etuk is an emeritus professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Uyo. 15. Uduma, O. Uduma is a professor at the National Open University of Nigeria. He was formerly a professor of logic and African philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, Ebonyi State University.

Index

A Absolute 6, 8-9, 29, 44, 67, 86, 181182, 249, 276, 289-291, 300-310, 305 Absolutism 179, 269, 276, 291 Acholi xiv, 82, 141-143, 147-148, 166, 169 language xiv, 82, 141-142, 145146, 148 Affective logic 207, 221, 241 affective attitude 23, 26 Africa xvii-xviii, xix, 27, 37, 41, 55, 59, 61, 63, 173, 183, 231, 242 African xix, xx, 2-3, 17-18, 20, 22, 31, 46, 72, 76, 120, 124, 174, 176, 193, 195, 217, 225, 232, 246-247, 249, 272, 279, 316 African cultures 5, 15, 31, 35, 54, 64, 82, 127, 205, 216, 235 African logic xx, 123, 125, 127, 173, 176, 180, 182, 185-187, 209, 214, 216, 223-224, 245-246, 250251, 253, 270, 300-301 African languages xx, 82, 137, 141-142, 148, 165, 186 African logicians 185, 259, 313 African philosophy 76, 124, 174, 190, 208, 224, 232-233 African thought 58, 72-73, 85, 106, 125, 136, 195, 212, 304, 308, 314 Amo, William 211, 240 Aristotle xiii, xvii, 86, 128, 210, 214, 236, 254 Artificial 114, 124, 127, 185, 189, 201, 204

Arumaristics 298, 306, 309, 311 Asouzu, Innocent. I. xx, 179, 260, 298, 308, 314 Azande 28, 81, 90, 99-100, 101, 186, 201

B Bambara 9, 56 Benoke point 309, 310 Bivalence 6, 255, 298, 302-303

C Calabar School of Philosophy 259, 299 Central claim 312, 314 Cesaire, Aime 16, 248, 249 Chimakonam, Jonathan O. xx, 167, 185, 187, 245, 297, 304, 310 Chinese logic 214, 253, 277, 315 Civilization 7, 9, 12, 247 Classical logic 142, 144-145, 158159, 163-164, 166, 246 Closed predicament 27, 37, 44, 59, 61 Colonialism 72, 191 Colonization 173, 227, 229, 231, 247 Complementarity 181-182, 267, 278, 302, 305 Principle of, 269, 272, 307 Complementary logic 259-260, 273-274, 299, 308, 314 Complementary mode 260, 299, 303, 307, 310, 312 Complemented 181, 255, 268-269, 270, 279, 303, 306

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Index

Confucius 207, 216 Conjunction 42, 133-134, 135-136, 150-151, 157, 164, 267, 307 Context xviii, 48, 63, 92-93, 98-99, 103, 141, 143, 151, 159-160, 260, 274, 280, 283, 292, 300- 301, 310, 312, Contextual mode 299, 302-303, 308, 310, 312 Conversational curve 308-309, 310 Conversational School of Philosophy 259, 321 de Chardin, Pierre Teilhard 17, 18

Eurocentrism 225 European xviii, xix, 1-2, 12, 16, 1921, 59, 64, 110, 174, 201, 211, 217, 226-227, 248-249, 306 Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 28, 31, 43, 47, 88, 90, 96, 100, 193, 201-202 Évolués 247-248, 249-250 Excluded-middle 304-305 Ezumezu 254-255, 298-299, 301, 303, 305, 313, 317 Logic of, 247, 259-260, 298-299, 301, 303, 306, 308-309, 310-311, 314

D

F

Deductive logic 185, 190 Descartes, Rene 19, 34-35, 181, 194, 270 Determinism 21, 25, 255, 298, 302 Disjunctive faculty 274-275, 276 Disjunctive logical reasoning 276 Disjunctive motion 260, 308-309, 310 Disjunctive Syllogism 129-130, 147-148, 157 Diviner 35, 44-45, 47-48, 49, 116, 193, 203 Dogma 2, 5, 24, 67, 215, 291, 293 Dogon 22, 56

Fayemi, Ademola K. xx, 82, 123, 142, 321 Feyerabend, Paul 215 Formal logic 6, 86-87, 92, 123-125, 127, 136, 143, 150, 164, 166, 197, 204, 301 Frege, Gottlob 78, 181-182, 237 Functionalism 263, 271

E

Hallen, Barry 159, 168, 208, 235, 238 Harmonious monism 82, 178, 180, 259, 263, 266-267, 270, 314-315 Hebga, Meinrad 2, 5, 174, 251, 315 Hegel, Georg 2, 78, 110, 180-181, 230, 270, 306 Horton, Robin 2-3, 27, 71, 81-82, 124, 186, 190, 193-195, 233, 238, 304, 315

Edeh, Emmanuel 176, 178-179, 265-266 Egyptian 14, 65, 216 Enlightenment xviii, 1, 229, 281, 285, 289 Epistemology 20, 112, 123, 190, 194-195, 209, 224, 264 Etuk, Udo 185-186, 207-208, 224, 239, 241, 246, 250, 254, 259, 315

G Greece 61, 63-64, 65-66

H

325

Index

Hume, David 78, 173, 226-227, 228, 247, 292

I Ibochi 178, 265, Ibuanyidanda 274-275, 278, 280, 284-286, 294 Logical reasoning of, 273, 274275, 279-280, 283, 285 Igbo xviii, 82, 109-110, 111, 114116, 120, 178, 241, 247, 254, 265, 279, 306, 309, 316 Ijiomah, Chris xx, 82, 173, 187, 210, 212, 224, 239, 246, 251, 259-260, 263, 298, 315 Ikharo, Saliu 197 Indian logic xviii, 214, 253, Intercommunication of truth 311

J Jahn, Janheinz 31, 178, 200-201, 266

K Kalabari 32, 39, 46, 54 Kant, Immanuel 2, 7, 78, 211, 228229

L Laws of Thought xvii, xx, 81, 125, 128, 142, 145, 152, 155, 212, 260, 297-299, 300-301, 304 Levy-Bruhl, Lucien xiii, xvii-xviii, 2, 22, 81, 87-88, 91, 124, 174, 198-199, 254, 304, 315 Logical thesis 308, 310-311 Lukasiewicz, Jan 254-255, 297-298, 301-302

M Momoh, S. Campbell 124-125, 142, 169, 185, 239, 249, 259, 315 Njikọka, Law of, 261, 304-305, 306307 Nmekọka, Law of, 261, 304-305, 307, 313 Magic 24-25, 30, 32, 35, 62, 90, 100-101 Marx, Karl 20, 78, 180-181, 270, 306 Mbiti, John 176, 255, 270 Methodology 6, 121, 142, 149, 158, 163-164 Missing link 179, 269, 273, 275, 279, 280, 286, 289, 294, 306, 314

N Nmeko 311 Nwa-izugbe 260, 297, 299, 306, 310-311 Nwa-nju 260, 297, 299, 306, 309310, 312 Nwa-nsa 260, 297, 299, 306, 309, 310-311 Nze, Chukwuemeka xx, 82, 109, 211, 240-241

O Ocaya, Victor 82, 141-142, 144, 148, 159, 169 Ohakaristics 298, 309, 311 Ohakaristicism 312 Oladipo, Olusegun 178, 209-210, 216, 265 Ọnọna-etiti, Law of, 260, 304-305, 307-308 Ontological thesis 308, 310

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Index

Open predicament 27-28, 35-36, 37, 40, 45, 49, 61, 63, 66-67 Orisa 199-200

P Particularists 141, 165 Peripheral claim 312, 314 Peripheries 311, 314 Polish logic 213, 240, 242, 253, 298, 316 Popper, Karl 28, 63 Prelogical xiii, xvii-xviii, 8, 13, 81, 87, 124, 204, 304 Primitive xvii, 2, 8-9, 87, 124, 198199, 229, 304 Proverbs xiii, 114, 120, 123, 126127, 133, 136-137, 141-143, 145, 148-149, 152, 157-158, 162, 170, 269

Sub-contraries 298 System builders xx, 187, 259

T Taboo 53-54, 55, 59, 66 Tempels, Placide 10, 12, 176-177, 248 Tension of incommensurables 309, 310 The principle of ContextDependence of Value (CdV) 310 The Three Supplementary Laws of Thought 299, 304-305 Trivalence 247, 254, 298, 303, 308 Truth-glut 255, 302

U

Racism xiii-xiv, 72, 227, 229 Rationality 36, 75, 85, 89, 91, 98, 121, 124-125, 136, 144, 247, 304 Relationship 38, 86, 136, 141, 145, 175, 177-178, 179, 219, 264-265, 287, 289, 306, 309-311, 314

Uduma, Uduma O. xiv, 126, 185, 186-187, 223, 225, 245-246, 253, 259 Universalist school 186, 248, 250 Universalness theorem 301 Universe of discourse 89, 91, 182, 259, 267-268, 271, 297, 299 University of Calabar xx, 173, 259 Urhobo xiv, 82, 142, 145-146, 147 Vital force 11-12, 20, 177

S

W

R

Senghor, Leopold xix, 2, 15, 88, 187, 232, 315 Setswana xiv, 82, 141-142, 143, 148, 151-152, 154, 158, 164, 168, 171 Sogolo, Godwin 81, 85, 142, 159160

Winch, Peter 89, 91, 99-100, 101, 234 Wiredu, Kwasi 90, 207, 210, 216, 232, 317 Witchcraft 28, 43, 73-74, 99