Living politics after war: Ex-combatants and veterans coming home 9781526144904

Citation preview

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

LIVING POLITICS AFTER WA R

New Approaches to Conflict Analysis Series editors: Peter Lawler (School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester – United Kingdom) and Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet (Centre for Conflict, Liberty and Security, CCLS, Paris – France)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Until recently, the study of conflict and conflict resolution remained comparatively immune to broad developments in social and political theory. When the changing nature and locus of large-scale conflict in the post-Cold War era is also taken into account, the case for a reconsideration of the fundamentals of conflict analysis and conflict resolution becomes all the more stark. New Approaches to Conflict Analysis promotes the development of new theoretical insights and their application to concrete cases of large-scale conflict, broadly defined. The series intends not to ignore established approaches to conflict analysis and conflict resolution, but to contribute to the reconstruction of the field through a dialogue between orthodoxy and its contemporary critics. Equally, the series reflects the contemporary porosity of intellectual borderlines rather than simply perpetuating rigid boundaries around the study of conflict and peace. New Approaches to Conflict Analysis seeks to uphold the normative commitment of the field’s founders yet also recognises that the moral impulse to research is properly part of its subject matter. To these ends, the series is comprised of the highest quality work of scholars drawn from throughout the international academic community, and from a wide range of disciplines within the social sciences.

PUBLISHED

Christine Agius Neutrality, sovereignty and identity: the social construction of Swedish neutrality Tim Aistrope Conspiracy theory and American foreign policy: American foreign policy and the politics of legitimacy Eşref Aksu The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change Michelle Bentley Syria and the chemical weapons taboo: exploiting the forbidden M. Anne Brown Human rights and the borders of suffering: the promotion of human rights in international politics Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald (eds) Critical security in the Asia-Pacific Ilan Danjoux Political cartoons and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman (eds) Forces for good: cosmopolitan militaries in the twenty-first century Clara Eroukhmanoff The securitisation of Islam: covert racism and affect in the United States post-9/11 Greg Fry and Tarcisius Kabutaulaka (eds) Intervention and state-building in the Pacific: the legitimacy of ‘cooperative intervention’ Naomi Head Justifying violence: communicative ethics and the use of force in Kosovo

Charlotte Heath-Kelly Death and security: memory and mortality at the bombsite Richard Jackson Writing the war on terrorism: language, politics and counter-terrorism Tami Amanda Jacoby and Brent Sasley (eds) Redefining security in the Middle East Matt Killingsworth, Matthew Sussex and Jan Pakulski (eds) Violence and the state Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher (eds) Potentials of disorder Matthias Leese and Stef Wittendorp (eds) Security/Mobility: politics and movement David Bruce MacDonald Balkan holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia Adrian Millar Socio-ideological fantasy and the Northern Ireland conflict: the other side Jennifer Milliken The social construction of the Korean War Ami Pedahzur The Israeli response to Jewish extremism and violence: defending democracy Maria Stern Naming insecurity – constructing identity: ‘Mayan-women’ in Guatemala on the eve of ‘peace’ Virginia Tilley The one state solution: a breakthrough for peace in the Israeli–Palestinian deadlock

Living politics after war Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Ex-combatants and veterans coming home

JOHANNA SÖDERSTRÖM

Manchester University Press

Copyright © Johanna Söderström 2020 The right of Johanna Söderström to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN  978 1526 1448 9 8  hardback First published 2020 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Front cover: Théodore Géricault, Studies of nude men in combat, 1812–14 (The J. Paul Getty Museum/Getty Open Content) Typeset by New Best-set Typesetters Ltd

CO N TEN T S

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

List of figures—vi Acknowledgments—vii Introduction—1 1 Diverse wars and combatants

25

2 Coming home and living peace?

56

3 “Veteran” as a political identity

83

4 Veteran networks throughout a lifetime

113

5 Paths of mobilization

143 Conclusion—177

List of personal interviews—188 References—190 Index—205

v

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

FIGURES

1 2 3 4 5 6

Political life path of Political life path of Political life path of Political life path of Political life path of Political life path of

Estella (C8), removed type Jaime (C11), resilient type Charles (U7), resilient type Jairus (N6), resilient type Emilio (C14), remobilized type Dennis (U8), remobilized type

vi

page 147 149 151 151 154 155

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

AC K N OW LED G M E NT S

This work was supported by the European Institutes for Advanced Study Fellowship Programme and the European Commission (Marie-Sklodowska-Curie Actions, COFUND Program, FP7), at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), the Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders’ Fellowship Fund Program at Uppsala University, and the Varieties of Peace research program (Riksbankens Jubileumsfond M16–0297:1). Data collection was made possible through stipends from Borbos Erik Hansson, Atmerstiftelsen, and Sederholms, and the Skytte Foundation generously funded a manuscript workshop. I am very grateful for the many people who have discussed and commented on my work in its various stages: Abbey Steele, Anna Ida Rock, Anna Jarstad, Ben Oppenheim, Enzo Nussio, Gyda Marås Sindre, Ingrid Samset, Jan Willem Duyvendak, Jaremey McMullin, Jason Klocek, Jenny Jansson, Joanna Britton, John Spall, Julia Jennstål, Katrin Uba, Kim Wale, Kristin Ljungkvist, Lalli Metsola, Lennart Bolliger, Li Bennich-Björkman, Maartje Abbenhuis, Malin Åkebo, Markus Holdo, Matthew Hoye, Moa Mårtensson, Nikkie Wiegink, Nina Wilén, Preeti Chopra, Ralph Sprenkels, Remco Raben, Roxane Farmanfarmaian, Sandra Håkansson, Steven Wilkinson, Teije Hidde Donker and Zoe Marks. It is wonderful to be part of such a generous and incisive research community; thank you for sharing and thinking with me. The work benefited greatly from discussions within the Folke Bernadotte Academy Research Working Group, at the Peace and Conflict Studies in Anthropology meeting in Amsterdam, and at NIAS, also in Amsterdam. In particular, I want to stress how important my time at NIAS, the cohort and support staff, were to the completion of this manuscript. I miss you all! I also want to thank Enzo Nussio, Stefan Quiroga Fajardo, Maria Camila Perez Bonila, Usdin Leonardo Martínez Orellanos, Natalia Gutiérrez Trujillo, Arlene B. Tickner, Patricia Bohórquez and Ana Maria Rodriguez Alfonso for their help in Colombia, and to Johannes Shekeni, Sylvia Shimaneni, Dula Tulimevava and Julia Heimo for their help in Namibia. Finally, I am clearly indebted and grateful to all those who were willing to share their life after war with me.

vii

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

Independently of the path that each one of us decided to follow, or the different actions we took during the militant period, our way of thinking and acting has a trace of the times when we were militants. Joaquin, C6, a former M-19 guerilla

L

ife after war is intrinsically political for former combatants. As wars end,

societies and individuals face a period of transition, and former combatants in particular are a crucial part of this transition to peace. Wars politicize combatants in a number of different ways, either explicitly or inadvertently. This book is about understanding how former combatants come home after war and live politics. It captures the challenges and opportunities for political mobilization among former combatants as they come home from three very different wars. Depicting their political life histories after war sheds light on how former combatants’ identities and war experiences shape their political involvement long after the war has ended. This book is not about peacebuilding in the sense of interventions. Rather, it examines peace as a process through studying the lived experiences of individuals. By focusing on the long-term political mobilization of former combatants after disarmament, the book displays how the dynamics between political mobilization, identity, and networks vary across time in the lives of fifty former combatants as they move toward peace and coming home. “Coming home” is not a clear-cut experience, and is one that needs to be unpacked. The book demonstrates how the process of coming home shapes their political commitment and identity, and how the legacy of war is a powerful reminder in the lives of these former combatants long after the end of war. Depicting the process of coming home for various former combatants, and how this process is made sense of by the former combatants themselves, thus contributes to an understanding of one part of the politics of peace. Using self-constructed life histories, the book draws out the similarities (and dissimilarities) across three different wars and types of former combatants from 1

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war Colombia (civil war), Namibia (war of independence), and the United States (interstate war). Interviews were conducted with independence fighters from the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)/South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) who participated in the Namibian War of Independence (1966–90);1 with guerrillas from Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) who joined the ongoing guerilla warfare conducted against the Colombian state (1974–90); and with veterans from the United States who participated in the Vietnam War (1955–75). The M-19 guerillas joined the struggle with a deep leftist commitment politically, but what happened after demobilization? The SWAPO veterans are often described in Namibia as the liberators of the nation. What legacy do they have today as keepers of the nation, and what happened to their political commitment after national independence was achieved? Vietnam veterans were often politicized by others and upon their return home, but for what and how do they mobilize now? These are the types of questions that this book asks. The armed combat itself and combatants’ relationship with their particular armed group may produce ties to, and ways of engaging in, politics which endure beyond disarmament. The war and participation in the conflict represents an important historical and generational event for these groups. The person’s identification with the group, whether it is as a Vietnam veteran, or as a former guerilla, is likely to remain a lens through which politics after disarmament is interpreted. Overall, this raises questions about how former combatants are politicized, and how political their lives are after disarmament. This is the concern of this book. Previous work and the way forward A huge literature that stretches across both time and space demonstrates the extensive political involvement of veterans and former combatants after war as well as the challenges and determinants of their life after war (see, among others, Alfieri 2016; Brooks 2004; Christensen and Utas 2008; Edele 2006, 2008; Erikson and Stoker 2011; Grossman et al. 2015; Jennings and Markus 1977; Jha and Wilkinson 2012; Kowalsky 2007; Leimgruber 2010; Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Mettler 2005; Mitton 2008; Ortiz 2010; Prost 1992; Schreiber 1979; Söderström 2011a, 2013a, 2015, 2016a; Teigen 2006; Ugarriza and Craig 2013; Utas and Christensen 2016). This book builds on and departs from previous work in four main ways. Firstly, a central contribution of this book is that it crosses global boundaries in the study of life after war among former combatants. Most of the existing work on this topic tends to focus on certain geographical areas and specific wars, and does not approach it as a global phenomenon. At present, the literature on former combatants is largely divided between the Global South and the Global North, and the authors of these literatures rarely seem to talk with or read each other. One example of this is the terminology used to refer to former 2

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction combatants. “Veterans” in the Global North have often been described as defenders or creators of the nation, as they typically form part of regular armies. The returning veteran has often been celebrated, alongside the dramatic value of the tragic life stories which infuse our ideas of who the veteran is and their life after coming home. In contrast, the “ex-combatant” is more often seen as an amoral character who is a threat to society, and this negative image tends to infuse our ideas of combatants returning home after war in the Global South. This dichotomy in language belies a commonality: for whatever we call them – former combatants, veterans, ex-combatants, ex-front soldiers, former insurgents, former guerillas, freedom fighters, ex-servicemen, and so on – the process of returning from war is one that occurs across all these divides. One of the research participants, a former guerilla from Colombia, notes that From the moment of the agreements, however you want to call us – ex-combatants, ex-military, demobilized – they are words that lead you to immobilization, to get stuck, to say to people that the only future remaining for us is that of the war veterans, that you have to sit and wait for death. (Felipe, C16)

The term “veteran” is often used as shorthand for this experience in the Global North, and “ex-combatant” for the same experience in the Global South. Yet these terms often morph and vary in each specific case, and the choice of terminology is often a political struggle and process in itself. In this book I have opted for the more neutral term “former combatant” when I discuss the overall phenomenon, while adopting the language used by the research participants themselves where I feel their grounded experience calls for more specific terminology. I also use the term “veteran” across all three cases to signify instances when the experience of being a former combatant has become a political identity. However, the artificial division between Global North and South goes deeper than the question of terminology. This division is often taken for granted, yet the empirical data paints a different picture. The notable continuities across these different empirical fields of research pertaining to life after war highlight the importance of making comparisons across boundaries that are taken for granted. The division in the existing literature is not only limiting in an empirical sense (as it fails to give a full depiction of a global phenomenon) but it also carries normative implications, as ex-combatants in the Global South are often seen as less political, or overly political as extremists, less worthy and treated in a more simplistic fashion (either as victims or as guilty parties), whereas the depiction of veterans in the Global North is often more nuanced. This division also suggests a colonial legacy within this literature, dividing the world into separate categories in this manner. Ultimately, this division in the literature has consequences for policies. There are many reasons for the importance of empirical comparisons across this divide. Kestnbaum also noticed this bias, arguing that interstate wars and 3

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war civil wars cannot be fully understood in isolation from one another (2009, p. 236). Similarly, Kriger argues that the division between types of war can often be quite arbitrary (2003, p. 13). Different types of war in fact share many similarities, and we can learn more about the nature of war from studying them together. Indeed, former combatants themselves often compare and contrast across various divides (types of war, across time and space) (see e.g. Kriger 2003, p. 187; Mann 2006, p. 10). This uncomfortable division between different types of former combatants has resulted in calls for more comparative research (see e.g. McMullin 2013a, 2013b; Schafer 2007; Sindre and Söderström 2016; Söderström 2011b, 2015); McMullin’s critical history of reintegration has been a particularly important source of inspiration for this book (2013a, pp. 45–77). McMullin holds up a critical mirror to the practices and literatures around former combatants, spanning both history and disciplinary boundaries, showing “that there is very little that is new about today’s ex-combatants, and nothing that proves their DNA is fundamentally distinct from their veteran ancestors and contemporaries” (2013a, p. 76). Even wars which are transnational are not always studied in a transnational fashion. The First World War, for example, has tended to be studied in a national and not a comparative way, yet this was a global war. Most wars are indeed transnational in character even if they are often perceived as solely national affairs (Kitchen et al. 2011, pp. xix–xliii). This transnational character can be gleaned from more recent wars as well (see e.g. Christensen 2017). Despite these calls, very few single studies exist that actually make empirical comparisons across this divide.2 This book studies the experiences of different types of former combatants from different wars, from around the world, in order to bridge this divide. Naturally, despite the many and surprising commonalities between the experiences of former combatants around the world, there are large differences between wars as well as across generations and locations. Wars differ in their goals, in their experience, and in how they cast shadows on societies after their conclusion, as attested to by current and past research, including the cases studied in this book. Even within the same war, among combatants on the same side, we need to recognize and disaggregate differences between groups. This book does not deny such differences, or hide them. Indeed, such differences and cleavages within the group of former combatants also need scholarly attention, and have in fact been given a lot; for instance, several studies have shown the differentiated effects on trust and satisfaction with reintegration programs (see e.g. Nussio and Oppenheim 2014; Oppenheim and Söderström 2018; see also Kriger 2003, p. 32). Life after war clearly entails a diversity of experiences. The task at hand in this book, however, is to bring out the shared experiences across these divides when they exist, as former combatants face similar challenges irrespective of context. This book unravels the experience and meaning of coming home after 4

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction war, and the degree to which this is shared across different wars and across different lives. Offering an insider’s perspective on the process of coming home and life after war is a second central aspect of this book. The book is largely concerned with capturing how former combatants themselves understand and portray their own political mobilization across their lifetimes; how they make meaning of this process and the legacy of the war in their political life paths. Kestnbaum argues that past work on war and military service has not focused enough on the meaning-making: What is marginalized here is the host of ideational processes – cognitive, evaluative, and even emotional – that get at how individuals make sense of themselves and the world in which they live and the variety of ways these efforts at sense making may shape and be shaped by warfare. (Kestnbaum 2009, p. 238)

Similarly, Bräuchler argues that meaning-making “has not yet been consistently adopted in peace and conflict studies” (2018, p. 27). Others have stressed the importance of paying attention to how individuals’ personal experience shapes and feeds into larger processes of transition after war (albeit not specifically limited to combatants, but also including refugees and civilians who stayed home) (Long and Oxfeld 2004, p. 3). It is important for things such as mental health and overcoming trauma as we know these are affected by how meaning is assigned and processed in relation to the war experience (see e.g. Aldwin et al. 1994, pp. 40–41; MacLean and Elder 2007, p. 183; Schok et al. 2008, p. 361). For instance, it has been shown that combat veterans from the Second World War and Korea who assigned more positive meaning to their war experience suffered less from post-traumatic stress disorder (Aldwin et al. 1994). However, an understanding of the individual experience of former combatants is also important because it shapes larger processes as well; it is constitutive of the conditions for peace, as well as for specific peace agreements (Bräuchler 2018, p. 31; Burgess et al. 2007; Sacipa et al. 2006), or for how support programs should be designed to counteract negative outcomes of this transition for the individuals themselves (Binks and Cambridge 2018). Indeed, taken to the extremes, a mismanagement of the post-war experience of individuals can even play a role in instigating darker political processes, as most famously seen in Germany after the First World War when the meaning-making surrounding that conflict was hugely important for understanding the rise of Nazism (Diehl 1993, p. 26). Further back, another example of a “veteran” identity which was infused with meaning, and which changed over time, is seen in the case of the American War of Independence. Resch’s work demonstrates how malleable the legacy of, and the treatment by society of, revolutionary war veterans can be. These men were romanticized in the early 1800s in part to help recruit more combatants for the war with England in 1812–15. Resch describes the process of how these 5

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war veterans are remade, and especially how the image of the “suffering soldier” is brought to the fore: instead of being despised and looked down upon, the veterans “became the principal symbols of the spirit of ’76 and models of national character” (1999, p. 66). In the long run, the meaning-making associated with these former combatants contributed to the making of the state in the United States. In general, ideas of the soldier and their traits become closely associated with the traits of the specific nation or state; similarly, traits of the state are projected on the idea of the combatant (see e.g. Edele 2008; Metsola 2006; Resch 1999, p. 201). An insider’s perspective on this process helps us understand how these processes matter for the individual, but also how such perspective interacts with larger political processes. This book therefore pays attention to this perspective and details what meaning-making has occurred; this has informed the data collection decisions, particularly the choice of using life histories in this book. Thirdly, in addition to bridging the literature gap between the Global North and Global South, and exploring an insider perspective on coming home from war, this book also approaches transition in the lives of former combatants in a different way than previous literature. Transition, naturally, is a key aspect of the lived experience of those who come home from war – not solely the macro-level transition from war to peace but also how that transition is experienced in the lives of individual combatants. The experience and memory of the war carries on, even when armed hostilities end, even when arms are handed in, and even when veterans’ pensions are paid out. This book attempts to show how this transition finds expression in the lives of former combatants. Some literature has focused on the supposed degree of “success” of veterans’ transition, through employing different measures of reintegration and ultimately problematizing such measures (see, among others, Colletta et al. 1996; Gleichmann et al. 2004; Humphreys and Weinstein 2007; Knight and Özerdem 2004; Nilsson 2005; Özerdem 2012; Pugel 2009; Söderström 2015). This book argues that it is not very useful to focus on judging whether a transition is “successful” because, as Kriger argued, such criteria can be both subjective and arbitrary (2003, p. 9). This book therefore does not seek to judge whether transition is successful or not. Rather, this book attempts to understand how the legacy of war lives on. Peace is a long-term process which underlines change, and moreover the notion of transition is not linear, nor dichotomous; understanding transition means understanding how elements of both war and peace are present at the same time, and how they meld together, and sometimes also create something entirely new. In several of the interviews for this book it was clear that the legacy of war lives on in both good and bad ways in the lives of these former combatants. Studying this phenomenon through the eyes of the individual, we can gain a deeper understanding of how such transitions unfold. Indeed, the transition in the lives of former combatants is far more complex and more interesting than a simple question of the extent to which these individuals 6

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction “reintegrate”. The former combatant is often seen as a liminal figure, filled with ambiguity, posed on the threshold of different boundaries: between war and peace; between the individual’s own experience and how they are perceived; as creators or destroyers of social order. For instance, Leed notes that the veteran is defined by “the fact that he has crossed the boundaries of disjunctive social worlds, from peace to war, and back. He has been reshaped by his voyage along the margins of civilization” (1979, p. 194). This liminality creates unease for the returning society, as veterans are seen as embodying both the violence of the war and the aspirations of society (Leed 1979, pp. 195–196). Some even note that former combatants can become lost between worlds (Demers 2013, 2011). How former combatants themselves make sense of this in-betweenness is therefore especially interesting, and the participants in this book offer a unique insight into this. The ambiguity of the figure of the former combatant was also highlighted by Gerber, who described the division within American society at the end of the Second World War as one which “both honored the veteran and feared his potential to disrupt society” (Gerber 1994, p. 545). Despite this ambiguity, the idea of former combatants as inherently violent seems to be a most persistent idea. Protests of former combatants are often interpreted through this frame, and seen as confirmations of veterans being uncontrollable and out of bounds (Leed 1979, p. 200). This liminality is sometimes also recognized by the former combatants themselves (see e.g. Christensen 2017). No doubt, some former combatants exhibit traits which can be disruptive to society, and certainly some mobilize in ways which are anti-democratic. Yet this book is not about explaining when and how this happens; rather it offers an inside understanding of how former combatants relate to their own veteran status, to other veterans, and mechanisms of mobilization. Ultimately, in these personal transitions, liminality is present. The task of this book is to understand the process of leaving war, and coming home, and how they live peace. This entails understanding the legacy of the war for their politics, their in-between-ness, how they relate to and make sense of their liminality, how they make sense of leaving war and living peace. This means studying the process of coming home from war. The fourth and final essential element of this book is the aspiration, for perhaps the first time in an in-depth comparative study on former combatants, to take a “long view” of the transition from war to peace. Much of the work on former combatants (particularly in the Global South) and their relationship with politics has a limited temporal scope (see e.g. Blattman 2009; Christensen and Utas 2008; Denissen 2010; Hauge 2008; Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Mitton 2008; Porto et al. 2007; Ucko 2009). This limited time span makes sense given the focus on overcoming war in the immediate post-war years from a societal perspective, and in terms of data collection from a research perspective. In relation 7

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war to older wars, such as the world wars, some work has been done from a longer-term perspective (see e.g. Allport 2009; Elder and Clipp 1988; MacLean and Elder 2007; Mettler 2005). We have good reasons to expect different dynamics during different periods of the former combatant’s life, as the discussion below will demonstrate. For this reason, this book takes on a longer time frame in order to fully understand the political lives of these former combatants. One key reason to take a long-term view of the homecoming process is that we know that family life in general tends to compete with a political life, at least in the short term where social and economic concerns take precedence (Stoker and Jennings 1995). After disarmament, former combatants have to cope with family demands, completing school, and/or establishing themselves in a profession. Participation in an armed conflict represents a disruption in the typical sequencing and availability of certain life events, meaning these issues compete for attention after disarmament. Regarding employment, there are tendencies of cyclical or reciprocal patterns of interaction between social structures and the agency of the individual, creating vicious or virtuous cycles in turn (Shanahan 2000, p. 682). Aspects such as continued education, variations in sequencing, degree, and composition of family events, and employment opportunities (Jennings 1979; Nie et al. 1974; Shanahan 2000), are likely to shape the room for politics. The temporal element is, therefore, a central perspective throughout all the chapters. Various work on former combatants also points to the need for an extended time perspective in order to understand their homecoming experience (see, among others, Brooks 2004, p. 12). For instance, Mann’s work on West African veterans and their relationship with the state of France explored a context where experiences and events from both world wars still inform the debate in the twenty-first century (Mann 2006). Additionally, more recent work on the networks of former combatants also suggest that processes and constellations peculiar to these networks are extended in time (Nussio and Oppenheim 2014, p. 1017). Work on life trajectories and the role of military service have also used a more extended time perspective in order to understand when and how behavioral continuity and discontinuity is possible. This research tries to understand whether or not war creates major shifts in life trajectories (Elder 1986, p. 244) and, as such, highlights the importance of trying to understand the individual situated in and across time; thus, by default, an extended time perspective is obligatory. Moreover, if we look outside the field of former combatants, research on the life course underlines the added value in taking a long view. By cultivating “an appreciation for ‘the long way’ of thinking about human personality and its social pathways in changing societies” in relation to former combatants, we can gain “an informed awareness of individuals as choice makers and agents of their own lives” (Elder 1994, p. 4). In life course research, historical transitions are also often connected with personal transitions. Coming home, adjusting to new conditions, experiencing peace, filling peace with meaning, and handling the 8

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction remains of the transition from war to peace is a long-term process. Thus, situating life paths in the midst of the transition to peace requires an extended time perspective. This book moves beyond a limited temporal perspective on veterans and ex-combatants by using life history interviews with groups that disarmed several decades ago. The book thus also forms part of the recent biographical turn in the social sciences (see e.g. Chamberlayne et al. 2000; Rustin 2008). The book takes the long view of life seriously; it also tries to make sense of transitions. These two elements are essential to the biographical turn and work within that tradition. Prioritizing the insider perspective is also central in the book, but not as essential in the biographical turn in general. The aim of this book is to understand the personal transition from war to peace, principally in terms of the political life histories that ensue after coming home. The central research question for this book is, therefore: how do former combatants make sense of their war legacy for their continued life of politics? As such, this book gives insight into how the legacy of the war matters for individual combatants and their political life paths after coming home. Peace is not accomplished on the backs of former combatants alone. The displaced, the refugees, the opposing combatants, the victims, the survivors of war also share in this process. However, this book focuses only on one side, namely the former combatants. It does not look for or bring out voices from those with other roles, experiences, and positions during the wars. This part of the process of peace is not a part of this book. In addition, of course, not everyone comes home. Some die, either as combatants or as civilians. Others shed their former combatant identities fully and leave their wartime identities behind, or are reluctant to talk about their experiences. These histories are not a part of this book either. Nonetheless, fifty individuals were interviewed about their experiences of coming home and living politics after war, and this book is first and foremost about their personal transitions from war to peace. The goal of the book is to focus on the reoccurring, the commonalities, and the similarities across time and space, and across individuals as they come home from war. The book does not answer how different combatants are from non-combatants, but rather how similar combatants from one war are to combatants from another war. The book, therefore, sets out to understand the consequences for the individual combatant and their life – how the life of the returning former combatant is infused with politics, and how the transition from war to peace plays out on the personal level. Through understanding these transitional life paths, we can come closer to understanding how societies leave war behind and journey toward peace. Conceptualizing political life after war There is a wealth of work that highlights the political consequences of war in a number of different (indirect) ways (even if this literature may be tilted toward 9

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war paying attention to interstate wars in the Global North). A vast amount of work has been devoted to understanding the political repercussions of the two world wars, particularly in terms of how veterans organize as veterans, how they position themselves in relation to the state, and how they express demands on the state (see, among others, Brooks 2004; Edele 2006, 2008; Jha and Wilkinson 2012; Kowalsky 2007; Leimgruber 2010; Mettler 2005; Ortiz 2010; Prost 1992). Several studies (most often on American veterans) also use survey data to study how draft risk, military service, and/or combat experience influence voter turnout, attitudes toward war and conflict resolution, party choice, party identification, and policy positions (see in particular Erikson and Stoker 2011; Jennings and Markus 1977; Schreiber 1979; Teigen 2006; but see also Grossman et al. 2015 and their work on Israeli soldiers; and Blattman 2009 on child soldiers in Uganda).3 There is some evidence that voter turnout increases, for instance. Overall, however, the effects are not uniform, and there are differences in the longevity and strength of the effects. Literature dealing with former combatants in the Global South typically focuses on what kinds of different roles in politics these individuals take after war using more qualitative methods. Factors such as electoral mobilization, campaign activities, engagement with political elites, and relationship with political parties are often studied (see e.g. Alfieri 2016; Christensen and Utas 2008; Ishiyama 2016; Mitton 2008; Söderström 2016a; Utas and Christensen 2016). But this literature has also taken on questions such as the role of and attachment to ideology (Ugarriza and Craig 2013), the degree to which former combatants adhere to ideals of pluralism (Söderström 2011a), electoral legitimacy (Söderström 2013a), and political values and degree of participation more generally (Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Söderström 2015). Overall, this literature demonstrates an interest in and a tendency to participate in politics, even if it is not always accentuated by democratic values. This literature also shows that the interaction with the institutional environment is important for shaping how this participation unfolds. This book focuses on understanding the former combatants’ own perspective on the process of coming home and their sense of political voice after disarmament. Not only has this perspective been underestimated, it is central to understanding not just the peace but also the conditions for politics and democracy more generally. The long view of peace requires that we pay attention to emic understandings of peace. Below, the framework for how political life after war is studied in this book is explained. When studying the political life of former combatants, this book pays particular attention to meaning-making, process, and transition, as well as its long-term dynamics. Three key issues were central in the former combatants’ political narratives, when understanding the legacy of the war and how being a former combatant have shaped their political life: identity, networks, and activity. Together these 10

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction three components make up political life, and reciprocally feed into each other. At the same time these elements of former combatants’ political lives are in dialogue with layers of their war and homecoming experiences. These experiences provide sounding boards, and they color the three core elements of former combatants’ political lives through the meaning that is attached to these experiences. Political life is situated in their experiences of war and returning, and these events and processes become continually reinterpreted throughout their lives. This framework is not focused on explanation. The political voice of former combatants is shaped by experiences both before and during war, as well as the institutional environment, specific peacebuilding policies, like Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), truth and reconciliation commissions, and the path and behavior of associated group organizations and elite leaders within them (see e.g. Blattman 2009; Erikson and Stoker 2011; Grossman et al. 2015; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; McMullin 2013a; Sindre 2016; Söderström 2011b, pp. 252–331, 2013a, 2013b, 2015). Rather than focusing on any specific policy, this framework tries to capture how former combatants’ relationship with politics is informed by the legacy of the war and of coming home as a whole. A key concept underpinning this framework is meaning-making, here conceptualized as how individuals attach valence and significance to, and understand their experiences and how these experiences are placed in relation to their narrative about themselves, and at times how this interpretation in turn calls for action and behavior (see e.g. Binks and Cambridge 2018; Bräuchler 2018; Burgess et al. 2007; Schok et al. 2008). This is in part related to the local turn or what is sometimes referred to as the everyday (see e.g. Autesserre 2014; Bräuchler 2018; Buckley-Zistel 2006; Mac Ginty 2014; Nordstrom 2004).4 Thus, the meaning-making surrounding life after war deals with how these individuals understand and interpret this process, and how this process is socially and emotionally embedded. This book studies the valence attached to specific experiences, as well as how events are seen as important to one’s present political life and also how these events fit in the narrative of one’s political history and personality. This book wants to portray an insider’s view of the lived experience of coming home from war and how this relates to political behavior, the practice of political life. How former combatants make sense of these processes informs their political life paths. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the experiences of former combatants’ war and their coming home, so that we can follow how these experiences become important sounding boards for their political lives. There is a lot of literature which looks at homecoming as a theme related to former combatants, often focusing on the challenges involved and the transitional trait of this process (see e.g. Basham 2008; Binks and Cambridge 2018; Cohen 2001; Glantz 2009; Schuetz 1945; Shay 2003; De Vries and Wiegink 2011; Wiegink 2013). Homecoming is thus 11

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war not a new theme in any way. The idea of coming home, and the process of coming home, is in part metaphorical. Over the course of war, home is often transformed and it may be impossible or undesirable to return to the same community, or the same life as before the war. This is not a new experience, and as demonstrated by this observation concerning the First World War, “‘home’ became more alien than any enemy” (Leed 1979, p. 213); in fact, soldiers returning from the Second World War felt like “alienated outsiders” as home had not changed at all, when the soldiers had (Diehl 1993, p. 232; for another take on the blurred boundaries of home, also see Shapiro 2011). The former combatants and their former homes are often transformed over the course of the war, and the boundaries between war and home can also be fluid. In that sense, the definition of “coming home” is an open question, and something which the former combatant shapes as well. What is defined and seen as home is a negotiated experience, and is often filled with tension. As shown by the lives of the former combatants interviewed for this book, the understanding and definition of the community they come home to also evoke questions related to belonging, and to some degree this may bring out conflicts of belonging as the community constructed between combatants may have become like a second family during the war. As such, this book tries to understand how this negotiation takes places, and thereby understand how societies come to peace. This long view on coming home, which is seen as a social and cultural process, resonates with what is sometimes referred to as home-making practices; this view focuses on the everyday practices and meaning-making which individuals engage in, in order to feel at home (see e.g. Boccagni 2014, pp. 280–281; Dudley 2011, p. 743; Duyvendak 2011; Rosales 2010, p. 520; Walsh 2011; Zingmark et al. 1995, p. 47). Again, I define political life as made up of identity, networks, and activity. Throughout the interviews with the research participants for this book, the political life they narrated focused on political (de)mobilization, which is defined as a shift in political participation, or activity, and political interest. Political activity and political interest are therefore crucial, and these concepts were used during the interviews to ask questions about the former combatants’ political life paths. The book adopts a broad definition of what can be considered “political”, and thus includes regular representational channels of political participation such as voting, campaigning, and running for office, alongside broader engagement through community involvement and social movements, in order to get a sense of the totality of the former combatants’ political engagement with their surrounding societies, the extent of their political voice (Söderström 2011b, p. 59, 2015, p. 14). My conceptualization of political mobilization thus overlaps with some aspects of both political reintegration as well as social reintegration within the literature on reintegration after recent civil wars (see e.g. Kaplan and Nussio 2018a, p. 2; Özerdem 2012). This take on political mobilization is thus concerned 12

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction with how the participants’ political participation and interest shifted over the years, in terms of both intensity and arenas, and how the former combatants themselves understand this path. These political paths are described in Chapter 5 along with how various narratives (especially related to the war, homecoming, identity, and networks) become part of their mobilization or demobilization. As such, this chapter connects all the previous chapters in the book. An important element of political life is the construction of the political self, and this is studied in Chapter 3. This chapter thus moves from talking about former combatants to veterans, stressing how their group identity operates as a political identity. The ways in which this identity expresses itself for the various former combatants is important for understanding how their identity construction in turn shapes their political mobilization and their engagement with the network of other former combatants. Political identities matter for “how people perceive the social world and act on and in it” (Simon and Klandermans 2001, p. 327). Across a lifetime it becomes particularly obvious how identity and mobilization take turns feeding into each other (see also Huddy 2003, p. 526). And we know that if such an identity is salient for the individual, it will shape their political mobilization to a higher degree, particularly if there is some clear grievance connected with the identity and if it has a clear counterpart or opponent (see e.g. Huddy 2003, pp. 514, 520–521; Simon and Klandermans 2001, pp. 320, 324–325; Tajfel 1974). Thus, when examining how identity is constructed by the former combatants, it is vital to see how grievances play into the identity construction, as well as who is considered to be the “other”. This identity construction is key to capturing an insider’s perspective of how former combatants understand and depict their own political mobilization across their lifetimes. Studying how this concept is filled with meaning by the former combatants entails paying attention to what values and roles they associated with being a “veteran”, and how they see this structuring their life path and life choices. How does this construction contain impetus for political action? Finally, it means paying attention to the varying relationships the former combatants had with the state during and after the war in each of the three cases. A final element of political life is social embeddedness, and this is studied in Chapter 4. Much literature has noted that social networks play an important and determining role for political participation (McClurg 2003; Siegel 2009; Tajfel 1974). In fact, networks are an important part of all social behavior, as salient group membership (collective identity) is a crucial determinant of social and political behavior (Simon and Klandermans 2001, p. 320). The experience of, and political meaning attached to, coming home from war and being a veteran are all mediated through the social networks in which they are embedded. These ties are central as they shape political mobilization. Research on social movements and political mobilization show that networks facilitate mobilization, as they provide opportunities to spread information as well as invitations to join 13

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war (McAdam and Paulsen 1993, p. 644). As such, they can be a vehicle for the rights of the group itself, or for broader political issues and political capital. McAdam and Paulsen also claim that a network on its own does not generate political or social mobilization, rather it needs to be combined with a strong sense of identification (1993, p. 659). Networks serve several functions, and enabling and constraining political mobilization is only one of them. Networks are also imbued with meaning, which can contribute to the identities of their members and guide political mobilization (Passy 2003, p. 23). Hence, both identity and mobilization sustain and in turn are fed by the network. In addition to shaping political mobilization – or perhaps because of this – social networks of former combatants are often seen as a threat to peace and security. Themnér has demonstrated how such networks, and especially mid-level commanders, play an important broker role in remobilizing for renewed violence (2011, 2015). This concern has not been limited to recent wars – it has been voiced in relation to many different communities of returned soldiers across time (see e.g. Bessel and Englander 1981; Mann 2006; Prost 1992; Resch 1999; Walter 2004). In particular, continued networks among veterans were a problem in Germany after the First World War, which contributed to the failure of the Weimar Republic, and this heavily influenced American attempts to limit the ability of veteran organizations to form after the Second World War (Diehl 1993, pp. 4, 30, 52). Given the assumed/potential threat of communities of former combatants, many contemporary reintegration programs also aim to dismantle the network and connections between the demobilized (Kaplan and Nussio 2018a, p. 2; Nussio and Oppenheim 2014, p. 1018; Söderström 2013b; De Vries and Wiegink 2011). While there is no doubt that communities of former combatants can undermine peace, it is not a given that they always do (see e.g. Friðriksdóttir 2018; De Vries and Wiegink 2011, p. 47). Former combatants often engage in security-related activities after war (Christensen 2017; Utas and Christensen 2016), but not always solely in conflict-generating behavior (see e.g. Bøås 2010, p. 270; Kantor and Persson 2010, p. 26; McMullin 2013a, pp. 209, 222). Across political life, the role of these networks is not limited in time, as past work has demonstrated the longevity of the social ties that develop among former combatants after war (see, among others, Brooks 2004; Diehl 1993; Kriger 2003; Mann 2006; Schafer 2007). Research pertaining to American veterans from the Second World War and the Korean War notes that enduring ties within the group after war are more likely among those that have experienced heavy combat: “it is war trauma and especially the loss of significant others during war, both comrades and friends, that intensify and maintain postwar relationships” (Elder and Clipp 1988, p. 177). At the same time, Elder and Clipp have shown that these networks play an important role in overcoming such war trauma and stress (1988). Although these networks seem to play an important role through the 14

Introduction

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

support they offer, we actually know very little about post-war friendships across the life span (Elder and Clipp 1988, p. 183; but see Marks 2019). When are they sustained? How are they sustained? Thus, approaching such networks from the viewpoint of several decades after they were initially formed is particularly relevant in order to understand the totality of political life. Ultimately, Chapter 4 examines what meaning is attached to the network of other veterans and what role the network plays and has played in their lives as understood by the former combatants themselves. Comparing life histories from three different cases A study of a global phenomenon requires a comparative approach. Included in this study are cases where a significant amount of time (twenty-five years or more) has elapsed since the rank and file demobilized, to capture the long-term developments of their political lives. However, naturally, there are limits to how old the cases can be due to the death of individual rank-and-file members as they age. In addition, the book focuses on diverse cases situated on both sides of the Global South–Global North divide. The three cases included in this study are independence fighters from Namibia (SWAPO), guerillas from Colombia (M-19), and Vietnam veterans in the United States. Despite large variations between these cases, the research demonstrates that similar patterns of political engagement can be located in the political lives of the individuals within these groups. These wars and armed groups are different in numerous ways. The wars had different goals and were of different types (civil war, war of independence, interstate war), and the process of recruitment and the reasons for joining for each combatant differ as a result. All three wars were politically driven, albeit in very different ways. In addition, the groups of combatants in each case were also different in their demographics, although most tended to be young men. Finally, the way each society received each group after the war was also very different in the three cases, as well as the formal support offered through reintegration programs or veterans’ programs. Given the large differences between the cases, this book tries to hone in on the shared experiences across these cases. Hence, the political legacy of the war and the political meaning associated with being a former combatant of these wars are especially interesting for understanding the process of coming home. More detail about these three cases will be given in the next chapter, but below is a brief introduction to and overview of the cases and their differences. The first is M-19 in Colombia. This guerilla movement originated around 1974 among “urban middle-class progressive activists, intellectuals, communist youths, disgruntled members from Alianza Nacional Popular” with a clear nationalist and socialist agenda (García Durán et al. 2008; Guáqueta 2007, pp. 421, 425). The combatants eventually demobilized after the peace negotiations in 1989–90, 15

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war and some participated in a formal and national reintegration program targeting M-19 and other groups of former guerillas demobilizing at the same time. M-19 transformed into the political party M-19 Democratic Alliance (AD/M-19). The group was rather small (between 791 and 2,000 individuals), but the associated network of supporters and helpers was larger (as was also the case in Namibia below). As a party, this group achieved rather large electoral success initially, resulting in an important role during the rewriting of the constitution, even if their presence had already started to fade by 1994 (Boudon 2001; Guáqueta 2007). The second case is SWAPO in Namibia, an independence movement originating in 1960. PLAN was the military wing of SWAPO. The group has been the dominant political party since independence in 1990, calling itself the SWAPO Party. Since the first free elections in 1989 the party has received about 76 per cent of the votes in each election. SWAPO consisted of somewhere between twenty thousand and fifty thousand combatants. The government has continually extended compensation to former SWAPO veterans and provided employment with government agencies, especially following organized protests by these veterans. However, the government’s and party’s methods of dealing with former SWAPO veterans have often been in contrast with how they dealt with other warring factions, underlining the patronage tendencies within the party (see e.g. Metsola 2006, 2010). The narrative of SWAPO has been built up around the centrality of their veterans. The third case study in this book is Vietnam veterans in the United States, a completely different veteran experience. The Vietnam War (1955–75) represents a different type of conflict from the civil war in Colombia and the Namibian War of Independence. The veteran population in the United States is extensive: in September 2015 the total stood at 20,783,555, of whom 6,459,836 were Vietnam veterans (VA 2017). There were already programs in place in the United States to support returning combatants, and while these have developed over the years, they were also extended to Vietnam veterans. While the first two cases of Colombia and Namibia represent contexts where the armed conflict and participation signified a deep political commitment, in Vietnam the United States drew on both volunteers and draftees. The Vietnam veteran in the United States faced a society that politicized their engagement independent of any individual’s own understanding of their original participation. Often the public discourse surrounding these veterans has been described as one of neglect and scorn, portraying the Vietnam veteran as particularly troubled, but this depiction of both the Vietnam veterans and the public debate about the Vietnam veteran has also been questioned (Dean 1992). The cases studied in this book are indeed diverse in many different ways. For instance, the collectives vary in terms of strength and coherence as a political group or movement: SWAPO is a dominant political force in Namibia whereas 16

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction the Vietnam veterans in the United States at most represent a “simple” veterans’ organization. The relationships of the veterans with the state also vary: while SWAPO is almost one and the same with the state, M-19 “came home” to an at least initially grateful nation, whereas the Vietnam veterans largely faced an ungrateful nation. Further details are discussed in Chapter 1, where the diversity of these cases is presented more fully. While these three cases are diverse in many ways, they of course cannot represent the full breadth of diversity between wars, not least because they all belong to a specific time period and Cold War context. Yet there are interesting and pertinent differences between these wars which can help us understand life after war as a more general phenomenon. Despite their differences, the fifty life stories in this book share much that speaks beyond the individuals and cases themselves. The research methodology of this book prioritized meaning-making alongside seeking long-term and holistic understandings of the political lives of former combatants. To this end, life history interviews were used, centering on the question of how these individuals interpret and understand the process of coming home, and what role politics play in their lives and their life choices after returning home. A central advantage of life history interviews is that they allow the researcher to see the interactions between different parts of a life and the individual as a complete entity (see e.g. Bertaux 2003, pp. 39–40; Bertaux and Kohli 1984; Clandinin 2007; Järvinen 2004; Jones 2004; Miller et al. 2003; Pamphilon 1999; Plummer 2001; Runyan 1982; Thomson 1998). This type of interview is particularly concerned with understanding specific life paths, and transitions between trajectories and different life stages. Life histories have often been used to understand so-called global watershed moments, such as the Great Depression, the Holocaust, and the fall of the Berlin Wall, through collecting several voices and experiences around one specific phenomenon. Life histories can also be used for other important sociopolitical processes which happen at a macro level, even if they cannot be termed global watershed moments (see e.g. Andrews 1991; Bennich-Björkman 2016, 2017; Hayward 2013; Passy and Giugni 2000; Rabow-Edling 2015; Schielke 2015). The life history interviews in this book were used to map shifts in political interest and political participation over the entire course of the participants’ lives. Their interpretation of events and these processes were paramount during the interviews as well as in completing this book. The interviews were relatively open, and the structure of the book grew out of the interviews themselves. Life histories help us see how an individual understands the totality of their life, how different events are connected, where a person has been and where they are going – all of which ultimately impact their political behavior (Patterson and Renwick Monroe 1998). Such interviews are thus particularly adept at producing an insider perspective, and, as shown in this book, help us gain access to how former combatants understand, portray, and make sense of their own political 17

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war mobilization across their lifetimes. Life histories demonstrate how individuals make meaning of their own lives, and it is their interpretation of their political life paths which are at the core of this book. Conducting these interviews was a great privilege as the participants shared their life with me, including their hardships, failures, and dreams. These were deeply personal encounters that required openness from both parties. While my own willingness to share was important for this, it was important to ensure that this did not detract from the focal point of the interview. Undoubtedly, however, these interviews were the result of a joint production between me and those interviewed. People in general live by very strong autobiographical narratives, yet rarely get a chance to talk and formulate them. The way these interviews were conducted focused on bringing out these narratives. Thus, the interviews focused on how they make meaning of their lives, how they perceive their own stories. While the interviews were largely an open reflection about their lives (albeit with a focus on politics), the themes and structure of the book – coming home, identity, network, mobilization – grew out of how they talked about their political life after war, and my questions. In conducting these interviews, I developed an interview technique using life diagrams (Söderström 2016b, 2020). I was inspired by the use of diagrams within research on life satisfaction (see e.g. Gergen and Gergen 1987; Runyan 1979, 1980), a technique which I realized could potentially yield valuable results in interviews about politics. This method meant that alongside asking participants to talk about their life, I asked them to draw a political timeline of their lives. The diagram included a horizontal timeline (from birth or age 15 to the present) upon which the participants could draw levels of political activity (in black) and political interest (in red) across their lives, moving between low and high on the vertical axis. Thus, the participants could identify turning points and general trends in their political mobilization, as well as gaps between the two lines. The diagrams therefore became a codification of the life story told in the interview. We started each interview with an overview of the participant’s life as a whole, noting some major events and then returning to different periods and discussing those in more detail. Often the peak of their political mobilization was identified and used as a reference point for describing other parts of the diagram. The interviews were therefore structured around the temporal perspective and focus of the participant, and as a result of this they were not necessarily chronological. The diagram enabled me to keep track of what parts were yet to be covered, especially when the life history was not told in a chronological fashion. The most obvious advantage of a participant in a life history interview drawing a life diagram is that points of inflection and transitions become clear to both parties during the interview: the diagram expresses the temporal position of the person being interviewed. In the interviews for this book it also stimulated reflection on the temporal development of the participant’s political mobilization or removal 18

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction from politics and the role played by their guerrilla or veteran identity in that process. Most importantly, these life diagrams visualize experienced change, which allows the analysis to focus on transition and different types of trajectories after coming home. A person’s current position filters and conditions the way they understand their past (see e.g. Andrews 1991, p. 65; Järvinen 2004; Thomson 1998, pp. 585–586); the life diagram therefore helped the participants to see their own journeys and understand that their own position had changed and may change again. This invited further reflection on how their present situation influenced the story they told about their past. Most participants expressed satisfaction with the life diagram and being able to tell their full story, to give a holistic account of their life, not just their armed mobilization or their struggles at demobilization. The life diagram can also be a source of empowerment for the research participant – their interpretation and position of authority become clearer and more tangible when they are telling their history, as the interpretation of their life story through the estimation of the line itself (high or low) is literally in their hands. As always, interpreting and appreciating the meaning expressed in an interview is a negotiation and joint endeavor between the researcher and the participants. The life diagram also became a way during interviews to directly test reflections and interpretations; it provided an immediate forum for further questions and reflections, allowing us to contrast different parts of a life and enrich their account of why such contrasts are there. The life diagram thus enabled a discussion of things which were only partially expressed during the interview. As an interview with a life diagram can focus on the points where the line alters and also allows a direct interrogation concerning both clarifications and a more holistic understanding of the life story, it helped each respondent’s interpretation of their life to take precedence. Locating individuals to interview was facilitated through working with veteran organizations, well-known elite members of the groups, other formal entry points into each group, as well as more informal entry points, particularly in order to find those who had distanced themselves from the network. Formal veterans’ organizations were most important in the case of the United States. There I started in three different geographical areas (California, Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C.), and contacted eleven local chapters of the Vietnam Veterans of America. Not all chapters responded, but some of them emailed my request to all their members. In all cases, I received more positive responses than I was able to interview during each stay. In each case I also strived to diversify the sample further. In both Namibia and Colombia, I was able to find more diverse entry points (seven in each case) into the groups, some more formal, others more informal. Secondary sampling was done via the people interviewed, in order to find peers who served together with those interviewed but who have distanced themselves from their veteran identity and associated formal networks. Despite attempting 19

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war to diversify the participants in this manner (negative sampling to find individuals more removed from the group), the networks themselves were important for the sampling process, so it is not surprising that these networks were relevant and active for many participants. Those who are still reachable via the network related to their veteran status and are therefore likely to have a more salient veteran identity. McAdam and Paulsen note that most studies of social movements tend to have this problem (1993, p. 641). This is a key limitation and will be further addressed throughout the book. Data collection was carried out in Colombia in 2012 and 2014, in the United States during 2016, and Namibia during 2017. On average the former combatants from Colombia had been home for twenty-four years when they were interviewed, the Namibian ones for twenty-eight years, and the American ones for forty-two years. Twenty-three were interviewed in Colombia, fourteen in the United States, and thirteen in Namibia; a complete list of the interviews is provided at the end of the book. Compared to many other works focusing on an insider’s perspective of coming home, this book is based on a rather large number of life histories; in total fifty interviews form the basis of this book. In Namibia and Colombia, I worked with research assistants who were also able to translate when necessary. In Colombia the interviews were conducted in Spanish, with an interpreter, and transcribed and translated into English, whereas in Namibia some of the interviews were in English and some in Oshivambo, or a mix of the two languages. A number of different choices have been made when analyzing and presenting these life histories. All the names used in the book are pseudonyms, and names of other individuals, locations, and so forth have been removed if they endanger the anonymity of the participant. Well-known politicians and leaders within the group are identified with their proper names when they are discussed by the research participants. In the book some research participants are more prominent than others, and this is for several reasons. Firstly, not all interviews were equally rewarding and insightful; as the research participants steered the conversations to a large degree themselves, the resulting life histories vary in depth and breadth. Secondly, while more interviews were conducted with former M-19 combatants, they do not feature more prominently in the book. The interviews with the former M-19 combatants were more disparate and explorative before the focus of the project became more narrowed down. The asymmetry in terms of number of interviews across the three cases is thus largely a result of this aspect of the research process. Thirdly, it would be impossible for the reader to keep track of fifty individual characters; hence, a few main characters have been given more space in order to allow the reader to connect more with some of the individuals. In particular, Alba, Jaime, Alfonso, and Angela are four of the main M-19 characters, Francis, Charles, Dennis, and Thomas are four of the main Vietnam veterans, and finally, Ngenokesho, Jairus, Peter, and Ndahafa are the main SWAPO veterans.5 20

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction In general, quotes have been selected because they communicate a position or understanding that was common across the interviews in a particularly succinct way. At times individuals are quoted at length, and my hope here is to help the reader get a sense of the narratives produced by the research participants themselves. When and if the perspective offered in a quote is unusual, this is noted in the text. Allowing space for these direct narratives was especially important, as the book is not structured around specific life histories, but rather the chapters are thematically organized so the reader can more easily make comparative observations. In preparing the text, the transcripts were read both as complete interviews but also across interviews focusing on specific topics. During this process it was important to remember that the interviews are not symmetrical across individuals, as certain topics were more developed and covered in some interviews than others due to the specifics of each interview. This should also be kept in mind when reading the book. Similarly, the transcripts reflect the life told, not necessarily the life lived. The book is not trying to assess their experiences for historical accuracy. The use of secondary sources in this book thus serves to help understand and contextualize the insider perspective of these individuals, but it is not meant as a corrective. The book also contains samples of the life diagrams produced in these interviews, and these diagrams also formed part of the analytical stage of the research process. These diagrams are a reminder of the respondent’s interpretation and the shape and trajectories in them form part of the analysis. It became clear that the life diagram represented the respondent’s revised overall interpretation of their life; it evolved continually during the interview as the interviewee added layers and details, and adjusted lines. As such, the respondents’ interpretations of their lives become an important counterpoint to my interpretations. Naturally, both the voice and diagram are the individual respondent’s account of their life. Yet contrasts between the two accounts can occur. Thus, it was important to contrast the two accounts in the analytical stage, to see if there were incongruities. Such incongruities were rare, but when this happened it is crucial to consider why one interpretation takes precedence over another (for more on this, see Söderström 2020, p. 13). There was often a search for the life lived and the best way for the respondents to make sense of their experiences, thus early responses during the interview were often only a starting point and not necessarily the final word; this was often the reason for such incongruities. In the last substantive chapter (Chapter 5) I present a typology of life paths, and this is also where some examples of the life diagrams are included.6 Working with life histories and life course research, the issue of types of trajectories and transitions looms large (see e.g. Bagnoli 2012; Bagnoli and Ketokivi 2009; George 1993, p. 358; Gergen and Gergen 1987). The resulting typology in my work is largely a function of the diagrams themselves, which were scrutinized for patterns 21

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war and trend similarities, in combination with the transcripts of the interviews. I consider the totality of a diagram as the trajectory of a life, and this in turn is built up by several inflection points, points of transition, tracks of stability, and resulting valleys and peaks. The shape and curve of the diagram is, therefore, a large part of what we mean by trajectory. I was interested in shared meaning within each trajectory, and thus opted to present the material in reduced form as types of stories and paths in Chapter 5. The former combatants interviewed for this study can never do justice to the full experience of life after war for everyone within each case. However, the book hopes to do justice to the experience of coming home for the individuals interviewed for this book. These life histories are a joint production, they were created in the meeting between me and the people interviewed. As such they reflect my questions as well as their questions. Needless to say, the book would not exist without their engagement and willingness to share their lives. Overview of the book The book consists of five central chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 1, “Diverse wars and combatants”, situates the three cases and demonstrates the diversity both between and within these cases. This diversity is important, as any ensuing similarities in the political lives of these former combatants will be particularly striking. This diversity pertains to the wars in general and policies following each war, as well as the specific experiences of the individuals interviewed for this book, in terms of joining the armed group, their war experiences and reception upon return. This chapter is important not only in terms of the research design of the book but also as these war experiences are reinterpreted and reimagined over the course of their lives, therefore becoming sounding boards for the next chapters. The themes for the following four chapters emerged quite naturally over the course of data collection and analysis, and the universality of these themes between the three post-war contexts is quite striking. Chapter 2 situates the experience of coming home across the three cases (again this becomes a sounding board for the following chapters). This chapter is entitled “Coming home and living peace?” and it considers the question of how coming home is experienced and understood. The former combatants describe the hardships they felt and experienced as they came home. The chapter also explores how they think of peace, and what meaning-making is attached to this concept, as a way to understand the transition these individuals embarked upon. What is clear is that while coming home is a watershed moment, it is also extended in time and is an ongoing process several decades after the end of the war. This combination of a rupture and an ongoing process is important for the way in which the life of politics is formulated for these former combatants. 22

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction Chapter 3, “‘Veteran’ as a political identity”, examines how the veteran identity is constructed by the former combatants themselves, how central it is to their identity overall, as well as whether this identity is politicized or not. As such, this chapter tries to address the following question: how is the veteran identity politically understood and internalized? The chapter demonstrates how the veteran identity is linked to the (new) regime and state and notions of citizenship in general. What values and roles are associated with the veteran, and what does that imply for the life path and choices of the returning combatant? This chapter shows how claims of recognition are formulated and how they are directed at the state, society, and other veterans, and the centrality of a culture of heroes among all three groups. Their culture of heroes and recognition claims are important drivers for how former combatants formulate their own involvement in politics, their own conceptualization of themselves as engaged citizens. Chapter 4, “Veteran networks throughout a lifetime”, focuses instead on the role and meaning attached to other veterans in their lives. It considers what meaning is attached to the network of other veterans and what roles the network plays in their lives both now and in the past. This chapter explores how social ties between former combatants translate into social support and vehicles for political mobilization (e.g., in veterans’ organizations and political parties) and how these connections are sustained over time. The longevity of these networks is especially striking; some have been sustained for forty-seven years after the war. Different functions and constellations of these networks overlay each other and members move in and out of them. The formal networks help sustain the informal ones, while shared history, a sense of friendship, and affective ties, as well as financial ones, help sustain the networks overall. Largely, reciprocal responsibility is a dominant trait of these networks, alongside their layered character, which again provides impetus for both political action as well as former combatants’ own political role conception. The chapter also discusses the cracks and cement in these networks, particularly highlighting the role of emotions and homosociality in these processes. Chapter 5, “Paths of mobilization”, turns the focus instead to the post-war political activity of these former combatants, asking what paths of political mobilization they have embarked on after the war. In particular, the chapter tries to capture how political mobilization waxes and wanes over the years, and what role veteran identities as well as veteran networks play in this dynamic. This chapter also features examples of the life diagrams drawn by the participants, and divides the different former combatants into different types of mobilization paths, namely the resilient, the remobilized, and the removed. This typology of mobilization paths shows how former combatants from diverse cases follow similar paths. In particular the chapter highlights how the war experience and the homecoming experience, as well as how their identity as a veteran and their 23

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war networks are understood as crucial in shaping these political paths, through both encouraging and depressing their political mobilization. In the concluding chapter, the main similarities of the experiences of the former combatants in the three cases are discussed in an effort to help us see the traits and challenges of this global phenomenon. Through the eyes and lives of former combatants in Colombia, Namibia, and the United States, this book shows how the transition from war to peace occurs at the individual level; in particular, how questions of identity, the network of other former combatants, and political mobilization feed into each other is discussed. Despite large variations between these cases, similar patterns of political engagement can be located in the political lives of the individuals within these groups. In this way, the personal lived experiences of coming home from war are also connected to universal and comparative questions related to this process. A central aspect of this is that the lifelong perspective taken on in this book has allowed us to see how these experiences and relationships become reenacted several times during the course of their lives; ultimately, coming home is not an experience limited in time. This helps us understand why the legacy of war for these combatants is so extended in time. Through displaying and engaging in how fifty former combatants navigate politics, how living politics is socially and emotionally embedded, we start to understand how they move toward peace and coming home from war. Notes 1 PLAN is the military branch of SWAPO. In the text SWAPO and PLAN are used interchangeably. 2 There are some exceptions, however: Ardener et al.’s edited volume looks at the gendered experience of war for both former combatants and non-combatants (2016), and Mann studies the same veterans’ (West African combatants deployed during the world wars) relation with both the Global South and Global North (2006). 3 There is also a clear parallel with literature that is concerned with the political consequences of exposure to violence in general. This literature is concerned with the exposure to different forms of violence, irrespective of combatant/civilian status (see e.g. Beber et al. 2014; Bauer et al. 2013; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014; Ishiyama et al. 2016; Mironova and Whitt 2018; Rohner et al. 2013; Söderström 2018). 4 An interesting example of work that takes on an insider’s perspective on the combatant and veteran experience is Sherman (2011). This work focuses exclusively on American soldiers. 5 Specific interviews are referred to using a letter indicating the case, followed by a numeral. Hence, all of the M-19 combatant interviews begin with the letter C, whereas all the Namibian interviews begin with N, and the American veterans begin with a U; again, see list of interviews at the end of the book. 6 The diagrams, as such, matter less in the chapters which deal with identity and networks (chapters 3 and 4). That is not to say that the telling of the life, and the drawing of the life, during the interview was irrelevant for these chapters; drawing the diagram helped to provide a context for how the network reappeared in their lives, or how their identity at various times in their lives was filled with content, and how continuity was either sustained or broken.

24

1

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants

B

1816 and 2001 the world experienced 462 wars (298 of which were civil wars) in addition to two world wars (Wimmer and Min 2009). As the interviews in this chapter will show, wars come in many different forms. Past research has tried to categorize and construct various typologies of wars, sorting them into types based on their location, which actors are involved, how long they last, which means of warfare are used, their aims, who is involved in combat, how destructive they are, the total (battle) death count,1 and when they were waged, among other things. Some typologies focus on the actors’ position within the international state system (the Correlates of War), whereas others focus on the aims of the warring parties (Wimmer and Min 2009), or the type of actors involved (the Uppsala Conflict Database Program, see Allansson et al. 2017). While the three cases examined in this book are wars that were all waged at a similar time, in the context of the Cold War, they are otherwise quite diverse. This diversity provides an important backdrop to the rest of the book, particularly in relation to any similarities in the political lives of the former combatants. First, Namibia. The conflict and war there were long. After the First World War, Namibia (then South West Africa) had been administered by South Africa, and then after the Second World War South Africa implemented apartheid rule in Namibia. There was resistance to South African rule, due in part to the system of migrant labor, and in April 1960 exiled resistance leaders (including Sam Nujoma) established SWAPO (for more on the origins of SWAPO, see Vigne 1987). In 1966, attempts to take South Africa’s administration before the International Court of Justice failed and SWAPO declared war on South Africa. From 1966 to 1989, PLAN (the armed wing of SWAPO) fought various South African forces for independence. During the war it is estimated that between twenty thousand and twenty-five thousand people died.2 As early as 1976 the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed a resolution in favor of Namibian independence. In the end, Cold War politics shaped the possibilities for reaching a peace agreement. etween

25

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was only implemented for one year, from 1989 to 1990, although it had been authorized as early as 1978. The UN mission focused on overseeing elections in an independent Namibia, and it was one of the first multi-dimensional UN missions (Dzinesa 2004, pp. 650–652). Before the election, about forty-three thousand combatants and refugees were repatriated together through the UN Refugee Agency, causing the bureaucratic lines between combatants and refugees to become blurred (Colletta et al. 1996, pp. 131–132). The second case focuses on the conflict between M-19 and the Colombian government beginning in 1970 (the group became a publicly known entity in 1974) and ending in 1990. This conflict, however, is part of a larger conflict complex, involving many different armed groups, largely right-wing progovernment and government forces opposing left-wing guerrilla groups; these conflicts started earlier and still continue for some groups. The impetus for the formation of M-19 was the presidential election of 1970, which was perceived as fraudulent. Starting in August 1978, M-19 declared war on the government and launched multiple attacks. During the war, M-19 often focused on symbolic events and attacks, some of which have been described as “catastrophic” and “shady” (Sanin 2003, p. 7). M-19 often criticized other leftist guerilla groups in Colombia while also trying to create more unity among them. M-19 was more centrist than the other guerrilla groups, and incorporated more nationalist imagery in their struggle, as well as appealing more to the urban middle class (Bell et al. 2015; Florez-Morris 2007, 2010; García Durán et al. 2008; Sanin 2003). According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, there were an estimated 1,130 battle deaths directly resulting from the conflict between the Colombian government and M-19 between 1972 and 1988. The number of deaths resulting from the overall conflict between the government and the various guerilla groups is much higher.3 The internal armed conflict was largely focused on political reform, never secession. Peace talks with M-19 began during the early 1980s, and in March 1990 a peace agreement was signed, immediately followed by similar agreements with five other guerilla groups (the last being in 1994),4 and constitutional reform in Colombia. The Vietnam War is the earliest case, starting in 1955 when Vietnam gained independence from France and was split into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North) and the Republic of Vietnam (South). The war became an extension of the Cold War, as the United States and other anti-communist countries supported and intervened on the side of South Vietnam against the North Vietnamese who were supported by China and the Soviet Union, among others. The war between 1955 and 1964 is categorized as an internal war, and as an interstate war between 1965 and 1975 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; see also Gleditsch 2004, pp. 245–246). The conflicts in Vietnam also had a much longer trajectory, both before and after US involvement. In total, about 2.6 million American military personnel were 26

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants deployed to Vietnam during the war (the bulk between 1965 and 1972) (Kane 2004), and these are the veterans from this war that this book focuses on. Eventually, American public support for the war diminished and the United States started to withdraw their troops. The war ended in 1975 when the North won and the country was unified. In total some 58,220 American military personnel died during the war (National Archives 2013), while the total number of battle deaths in the Vietnam War is estimated at 2,097,705 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005, p. 154). The Vietnam War is by far the deadliest conflict the world saw between 1946 and 2002, in part explained by the extremely large number of bombs dropped on Vietnam. The Vietnam War was a much more internationalized war than the other two cases in this book, even if Cold War interests also mattered for all three. M-19 operated from within Colombia, whereas SWAPO was largely based outside of Namibian territory. The combatants in these three cases have very different relationships with the state given their role and the incompatibilities involved in each war. In addition, the wars ended very differently: SWAPO delivered independence to Namibia and ultimately became the ruling party; M-19 signed a peace agreement and became one of many political parties in Colombia; whereas the United States lost the war in Vietnam. The rest of this chapter introduces the three cases, in particular the various experiences of the former combatants who were interviewed, telling their stories from joining armed groups and their war experience to the reception they received when they came home. This chapter thus introduces the larger differences between the cases and those interviewed. Recruitment and war experiences Former combatants’ stories lead us to ask: what kinds of combatants are there? And how do they end up fighting? We see that individuals can be conscripted, they can volunteer, they can be hired, it may be a career choice, or they may be forcibly recruited, or they join for political reasons or personal safety. Historically, the development of mass armies, through the expansion of conscription, was also linked to the expansion of franchise and democratization (for more on this, see, among others, Diehl 1993, p. 9; Levi 1998, 1999). The use of volunteers and private security companies has further changed the dynamic between combatants and citizenship, pointing at new global inequalities (see e.g. Christensen 2017; Eichler 2014). But this relationship has always been changing, as demonstrated by the historically extensive use of buying out of conscription (Levi 1998), and use of mercenaries (Adams 1999; Luraghi 2006). Less than one-third of the world’s countries were reported to use conscription to recruit for their armed forces in 2014 (Eichler 2014, p. 601). Recruitment during civil wars is, similarly, a combination of many different motives of individuals and the strategies of the armed groups (see e.g. Barrett 2011; Bosi and Della Porta 2012; Collier 27

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

and Hoeffler 2004; Eck 2010; Florez-Morris 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Muldoon et al. 2008; Podder 2011; Ulvin 2007; White 2007). Recruitment patterns and war experiences in the three cases are discussed below; the abrupt and extended exile experienced by SWAPO is contrasted with the gradual, secretive recruitment process of M-19, as well as the apolitical short tours conducted by American combatants in Vietnam. As these different recruitment patterns and combat experiences are contrasted, some of the main individuals throughout the book are also introduced. Extended exile for SWAPO SWAPO was an independence movement originating in 1960. Those who joined SWAPO were largely motivated by resistance to the South African regime. Interviewees explained how they committed to the cause after witnessing violence against their neighbors and family, and through listening to the radio and attending SWAPO rallies. Most kept their involvement secret from their families for as long as possible, as their participation in SWAPO put the family at risk. Some people joined very young, often together with their entire school, in which case it is less clear how voluntary or political the decision was. Sackaria (N12) was one example of this. I met Sackaria at his present home, an illegal settlement in Windhoek. He was only 9 years old when he left Namibia, and was one of those recruited through his school. Another interviewee, Memory (N3), said she was only 16 when she left for exile. She had heard about others joining to fight for freedom. Her parents were political and pro-independence, but they did not want her to leave, so she left without telling them, together with a group of other kids. She was very excited about joining SWAPO. Similarly, Mukwanambwa did not tell her parents when she left, but crossed the border with some friends. She was the only one of her mother’s children who joined SWAPO. Her description of the process of joining SWAPO indicates both her ambiguity and naivety at the time: I was not scared at all. I was just happy that I was going to SWAPO and I never knew there were people who were killing each other like at a battle field where people meet and kill each other … I never cared about that. I didn’t even want to go to school, all I wanted was just to go to the frontline and kill. (N7)

Most interviewees report a sense of political purpose behind the struggle and their reason for joining SWAPO. Peter was clearly politically driven before he sought out and joined SWAPO. He noted, sardonically, “I didn’t notice that I became a terrorist, an anti-government terrorist” (N10). Ndahafa (N13) had been a member of SWAPO for a long period before joining PLAN in exile (in Angola) at the age of 23 in 1981. After experiencing violence in the country, and trying to organize and protest within the country, she heard about PLAN people being killed in exile and felt she had to go help. Jairus came from a political 28

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants family who would listen to the radio in secret. Several of his siblings also joined PLAN, and when he was 19 years old Jairus and the rest of his school were woken up in the middle of the night by PLAN fighters, who asked them to join: “With the help of PLAN fighters, we crossed the borders in Angola, the whole school, and we were 150 more or less” (N6). Gomen (N1) was somewhat older (24) when he joined; he and four others walked to Angola to join SWAPO. Gomen’s story shows that he too was politically motivated, in part through talking with his uncle about independence, but also through listening to the radio. In 1974 he went into exile, eventually spending fifteen years at war. Hilma (N9) was a very quiet and careful individual during our interview; she became a member of SWAPO in 1974 after hearing the call to join on the radio. After some of her family members had been taken prisoner by South African forces, she felt committed to liberating Namibia. Experience of war for SWAPO combatants often entailed military training, even if SWAPO also pursued the struggle on non-military fronts. Most members lived in exile; their families would know nothing about them for years after they left and combatants had no way of knowing for how long they would be away. Time spent in camps in the bush in Angola and Zambia was described as tough. Time in exile was not just spent in Angola and Zambia but also further afield in the Soviet Union, Cuba, or in India where members typically were sent for training. Several SWAPO interviewees also had children during the war, often with other SWAPO members, similar to the experiences of those reported by M-19 former combatants. The armed activities of SWAPO were primarily focused on attacking South African security forces, but due to their presence in Angola they also sometimes got caught up in the conflict there. Like M-19, SWAPO combatants were part of a non-regular armed group, but it was different in the sense that the SWAPO combatants left their homes for extended periods of time, and time in exile often became much longer than anticipated. Ngenokesho (N2) left in 1972 and ended up spending nineteen years abroad, while another interviewee, Gerson, explains how he joined SWAPO in Angola with a group of one hundred others: “We thought we would only be here for a year to fight and go back to school, but I ended up spending fifteen years in the battle” (N5). Within SWAPO some also took on non-combat roles; these individuals were seen as preparing for the time when Namibia would be independent, and thus their main task was getting an education. Some of those I interviewed, however, had more combat-intensive and violent war experiences, particularly Memory, Amon, Ngenokesho, and Gomen. Memory managed to see some of her siblings during the war, but she was the only one to survive. Having left for exile when she was 16, she formally joined PLAN at 21: “when you are big you do not go for education, they just take you for training … and then we were sent to the front line, there I was happy since I was even given a gun” (N3). When I met 29

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Ngenokesho he was wearing a camouflage outfit and sitting beneath a Che Guevara poster. He read a lot during the war, as part of his job was to politically motivate the troops. During the war he lost family members and he was himself wounded. He commented stoically on the loss of life during the war: “Either you survive or you are killed or you will be wounded. Personally, I am wounded” (N2). He did not admit to having doubts any time during his nineteen years at war: Well, I describe myself as [a] lucky man because my first level was to be trained as a military person or a security person … and it made me feel very proud of myself and therefore there was no time that I felt maybe why am I here or why am I doing this? (N2)

Gomen was more open about finding the war difficult, not only because of the violence but the lack of food and water at times. After extensive training in camps and abroad he eventually became a commander at a training center. Despite the heavy fighting, there were also happy times during the war reported by some interviewees. Mukwanambwa largely felt happy; during the war she got married in a traditional ceremony and had children, as well as attending festivals abroad. In fact, she noted, “When we were in exile it was much easier than when we came to Namibia” (N7). Ndahafa and Peter also received training and saw combat, but during the war they, and many others, were accused of spying for South Africa or Rhodesia, and as a result they were kept in what were often called “the Dungeons”, a SWAPO detention center in Lubango, Angola.5 Both described extended periods of torture. Despite having a non-combat role, similar to others who took on such work, Fanuel (N8) was still exposed to warfare and threats as his job mainly focused on mobilizing and encouraging fighters. Fanuel described coming close to death and violence, when he was under attack or people stepped on mines, adding, “You feel that pain that we were together last night and now they are gone, you feel it” (N8). Sackaria, on the other hand, was so young when he joined that he was only given training and sent to school. Life in the camps was difficult for him, having no contact with his family and losing family members when Cassinga was bombed. Sackaria was disappointed when he was assigned to go to school: In 1976 I was just 9 years old when I left the country, so my whole life was just abroad. … We were struggling and there was no food, one day you can get food and water but sometimes you don’t get anything. So it was very difficult then. … We have to go in the bush for a long time, maybe for two months in the bush then later will come back to school. … I was very disappointed. You know at [a] young age you just want to go and fight – you don’t think about death, you don’t fear it. So I was even crying to go to the war. (N12)

Despite Sackaria’s lack of direct combat experience he self-identified as a former combatant, and indeed when he returned from war he held the rank of private 30

Diverse wars and combatants

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

soldier. Jairus was also assigned to focus on education, but was sent abroad to train to become a teacher, spending time in sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and in Canada: “Yes, I got to see the world and I got to get an education, which is a privilege many of my comrades did not get” (N6).6 He also received military training, however, and was assigned guard duty. In addition, he also spent time in Cassinga before it was bombed by the South Africans: From April to August 1977 I was in Cassinga and I just left it in August, going to Zambia. In May 1978 that settlement was attacked, so I could have been there if I didn’t move. … One of my sisters who was in exile, she was in the settlement in Cassinga. On 4 May 1978 it was attacked and she was one of the people who were captured by the South Africans, but fortunately she managed to escape. She was there, she was unharmed, and you know more than a thousand people died there and she came out without a scratch. (N6)

Estimates of how many died at Cassinga vary, but it was a defining moment in the war, and is still commemorated in Namibia today.7 Gradual and secretive recruitment to M-19 M-19 was largely an urban guerilla organization which mainly recruited from the middle class. Estimates suggest M-19 members numbered around two thousand during its peak in the 1980s. Joining M-19 was typically seen as a political step by those recruited; it was sometimes done to help themselves, but was never a career choice. Most of those interviewed were politically active before they joined M-19. Joining M-19 was often a gradual process, particularly as members would often continue to live at home while having clandestine involvement in the group.8 The clandestine character of both recruitment and membership is a big difference between M-19 and the other two cases. As in most cases, individual motivations and pathways for joining an armed group often consisted of several conditions combined. One interviewee, Alba (C9), was very animated and caught up in telling her story; so much so that the interview was conducted over a number of different sittings. Before joining M-19 at age 27, she had clearly been politically active (working with unions and organizing people, as well as participating in study groups where they read Marx and Lenin). She had deliberately gone out looking for M-19 members to help her to join the group, believing it was necessary to fight for democracy with weapons. She underwent military training in other militant groups, but decided to follow a friend and join M-19 because she disagreed with the goals and strategies of the first militant group that she had been a member of. Julio (C7) was also active in another armed group before joining M-19. In his interview, Julio described how he wanted to fight injustice and poverty, and before joining any armed group he had already participated in street fights with the police. Julio was first a member of another guerilla group, but left when a 31

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war friend of his died. He was then introduced to M-19 by an acquaintance at the age of 23. Eduardo joined when he was young, as several of his family members were already part of M-19; his brother had participated in a big attack and the resultant pressure exerted on the family by M-19’s adversaries made Eduardo feel obliged to join the cause too: “They start chasing us, watching us, threatening us so then we have to run to the mountains … Just like that, because we had to defend the family, my brother” (C15). Emilio (C14) joined M-19 at 22 as he wanted to reform society. Before joining, Emilio was part of a student movement, and he noted that he felt very afraid when he first joined M-19. Gregorio (C13), Felipe (C16), Joaquin (C6), and Juan (C3) also joined via their university experience and student activism, all being politically motivated before they joined M-19. Juan had participated in student protests and described himself as a street gangster, having already been in prison by the age of 15. Jaime (C11) also described himself as a hooligan. I met Jaime at his office where he still worked with and for other M-19 members. His activities began when he was around 13 years old. Among other things, he robbed a bank to give money to the guerillas. Eventually, he and his friends were asked if they wanted to join M-19. At that point he began to read newspapers and discuss politics more. His membership in M-19 was very gradual: he was given a succession of tasks to prove himself, and thoroughly enjoyed this, even if his military training with M-19 sometimes even included punishments when he failed tests. Amadeo (C22) was an unusual case, as he was already in the military when he was recruited into M-19. He read books and texts with another military man who was also a member of the Communist Party and this gradually contributed to his political education and orientation. Mario (C5) and Camila (C4), a couple, arrived late to our interview in their home because they had forgotten about the appointment; when they arrived, Mario was wearing a t-shirt with M-19 insignia. They were motivated to join M-19 by personal troubles, particularly their lack of access to housing and land; they joined protests to get access to water and sewage. Camila was the driving force behind their involvement; overall, it was a gradual process, whereby they deepened their involvement and types of activities over time. However, not everyone joined M-19 for political reasons. In the early 2000s Angela tried to distance herself from the M-19 network. She joined M-19 in the early 1980s, through what were called “peace camps” but which were in fact sites of military training and political mobilization, and became heavily involved in a rather short period of time.9 She notes: You hang out with the boys – I was a girl and I hung out with the boys. And I started to get involved in some things because I was curious, besides I had nothing else to do. … In those times there were the peace camps, which were done in the neighborhoods. I began to get involved and I stayed. I stayed living in the camp, and I never left until [year]. I was one of the last ones to demobilize. (C23)

32

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants Catalina was very young when she joined M-19, and in her case it was not a considered decision: “My political interest was born, born at the moment when I decided to join the M-19” (C18). Similarly, Celestina was not political before she joined M-19, and in her case she followed a man she was in love with: “I met my son’s father and for love I arrived there. A lot of us arrived for love, not for a political conviction” (C20). The war experience of the M-19 combatants was equally secretive, as they waged guerilla warfare in their home locations. This meant that they often ended up putting their families in danger. Leading a double life was often described as quite difficult. So difficult, in fact, that Jaime expressed relief when his mother died because he no longer had to balance his guerilla activities with his private life. Combatants’ involvement with M-19 also meant furthering their education (reading and discussing politics), as well as trying to mobilize others to join or support M-19. They also received military training, and some spent time abroad as part of their education or to help other armed movements. Their strategies often involved taking various sites, or resources, either to grab public attention or to procure food or money to support M-19 itself or to support their associated communities. One of the more contentious attacks by M-19 was the siege of the Palace of Justice in Bogotá in 1985; it was met with brute force by the military, and left M-19 severely weakened. Combatants also kidnapped people and confronted police and military. A number of M-19 members were jailed, often tortured, and many of them also lost family and friends during the conflict, and several of the leaders died. Those interviewed had different tasks and roles within the group, including logistics, training, mobilization, recruitment, intelligence, and combat. Alba participated in capturing newspaper offices, taking trucks, stealing money, highjacking buses, and kidnappings among other things. While her activities were initially clandestine, she had to be even more careful after spending time in jail as she was then known to the state. Some people distanced themselves from her after this, while others helped her more. At one point she had to leave Bogotá because she felt threatened and feared that the state would “disappear” her, just as it had done to friends. When she became a mother during the conflict, she also had to adjust her behavior. Emilio was also sent to jail, in fact just a few months after he had joined M-19: I was sent to jail for ten months. When I was there, I got in touch with everybody and they convinced me. I was already convinced but there is a big change, you become more committed. (C14)

As for many others, Emilio’s time in jail increased his commitment to the cause, even if his participation came at a high cost for his family and for himself. José had a similar experience – security forces came to his house and took both him 33

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war and his family: “When I got back to my place, my family was gone, the family unit was broken” (C10). During the conflict he lost many friends, but he seems to have repeatedly chosen to continue: “I sacrificed all of this because I wanted to be in the project and it was a decision” (C10). In addition to the military aspects of his war experience, he also recruited others as well as involving himself in community activities such as housing projects. Most combatants’ involvement with M-19 combined political work and armed activities. Some took on a leading role in mobilizing others, whereas others, like Alfonso, were more on the receiving end of political education during the conflict. Alfonso, however, noted that he too had to inspire his own troops. When Amadeo described his war experiences, it included study groups as well as burning cars, assaulting police officers, kidnapping people, obtaining weapons, and hiding. He also had a role in mobilizing others: “We had to win over other partners, attract more people into the movement” (C22). The people they kidnapped were put on “revolutionary trial” and some were executed. Commenting on one specific revolutionary trial, Amadeo expresses some hesitations: With [name of well-known individual], the revolutionary trial said that we had to kill him, and we executed him. This was because people had to believe in the things that we said. That was more tactical, and I remember that inside the organization there were a lot of questions surrounding the killing of [him]. (C22)

The clandestine form of combat also meant that it was hard for individuals within M-19 to know who else was involved. Moreover, people’s membership and involvement in M-19 was also quite varied: some were heavily and systematically active and others less so, meaning the boundaries of membership were somewhat blurred. Discussing how many had died during the conflict, Dante notes: How many died during the sixteen years of armed struggle? You have to differentiate between serious members and others. It is really hard; maybe three hundred is a good approximation. Because there were times in the guerrilla when some combatants died in Caquetá and in Cauca, some important casualties but nobody remembered them, now nobody knows who they were. Most of them we don’t know where they were buried. So I think that maybe three hundred or maybe five hundred people who were M-19 members died. (C17)

Apolitical short tours in Vietnam Recruitment into the US military changed during the Vietnam War. In the beginning, the military was largely a volunteer force, and recruitment practices differed across the country, not the least in terms of varying deferment practices. As conscription was extended during the war, draft resistance also grew. Early in the war a number of different deferments were possible (fatherhood and going to college, for example), but as the war progressed these options were removed. 34

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants In March 1969 Nixon introduced a national lottery system for draft vulnerability as a way of dealing with some of the challenges of the previous system. As a result, new draftees from 1970 onward “were increasingly sent to combat duty and casualty rates were high” (Erikson and Stoker 2011, pp. 221–223). The peak of personnel in Vietnam came in 1961 with 537,000 troops deployed (Kane 2004, pp. 3–4). By the end of the war the United States had shifted from conscription to an all-volunteer military. Of the 2.6 million American military personnel stationed in Vietnam during the war, only a few thousand were women, most of whom served as nurses.10 Unfortunately, no women Vietnam veterans were interviewed for this book. Participants in this study cited a variety of reasons for going to Vietnam. Some, particularly pilots, saw it as a career path; others tried to defer their participation and ultimately failed, and others simply did not know what to do with their life and saw joining the military as a good way to do something. Many thought they were going to be drafted imminently and so volunteered to get somewhat better conditions. Most of them knew very little about Vietnam and the war when they joined. Jacob notes, “I mean, nobody knew about Vietnam, who the hell knew what Vietnam was?” (U4). At the age of 20 he did not know what to do with his life, and as his family suggested the military he went with that option; it was a career solution and not at all political, even if he signed up in 1974. Joining the military was seen as normal, nothing out of the ordinary, either because sons were following their fathers or because most of their classmates at school also signed up: “Military service didn’t alarm me, because my father was US Army, and some of my uncles were US Navy” (Ford, U13). On average, the interviewees were 21 years old when they joined the military. In contrast to the M-19 and SWAPO combatants, the American combatants’ decision to join was clearly apolitical. Dick and Ben signed up as a way to finance their college degrees. Dick joined the air force academy directly after high school, simply because he wanted a free education: “let me try this out and if I don’t like it, I could leave. That of course was not true [laughs]” (U14). In fact, his college degree meant that he incurred a ten-year commitment to the military. Ben also joined the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) for educational purposes as this was the only way he could afford a college degree. When he started, the prospect of an actual war was quite removed: Well, you know my father and my uncles all served in the Second World War, they were patriotic, it was the kind of thing that you do … ROTC was mandatory the first couple of years that I was in college, everybody went, and then you could continue or not. And you know it had a certain macho aspect to it, which appealed to me, and the money – I figured I could serve my country, make some money … plus I would get out, I would do six months’ active duty, go into the reserves, maybe go to Germany or something like that, it would be interesting, nothing very big would

35

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

really be required. There were no wars; there was one but I didn’t know about it. (U11)

However, during college he became involved in the anti-war movement, and so he considered going into exile in Canada to avoid the draft.11 As he was already commissioned, the question was not if but when he would go to Vietnam. He finally went on active duty two months after he graduated. Others signed up because they dreamed of becoming pilots, and not much else figured in their decision. For instance, Robert (U12), who was also in the ROTC program, just wanted to fly. Thomas, however, enlisted directly after high school, simply because he wanted to leave home: “Oh, I wanted to get away, far and fast” (U10). He joined the navy in part in opposition to his father’s career in the air force. At Thomas’s high school most did not continue to college but joined the military, and he figured it was better to opt in than wait for the draft, and so he made a deal with the state: There’s always a phrase at the bottom of the contract … the needs of the military come first … yeah, we promised you this, but … we need ammunition handlers, so, guess what? … Yeah, sorry [laughs]. (U10)

Others like Gary, Ford, Dennis, John, and Ralph volunteered to avoid the draft. Although Charles came to our interview wearing a veteran’s cap, he had actually tried to avoid the draft for as long as he could, seeking deferments while he went to college, and then because he worked as a teacher for a year. When he ran out of deferment options he volunteered: I volunteered because it eliminated one year from my enlistment … Plus it gave me an opportunity to choose when I would go in and I decided that I would enjoy the summer and then go in at the end of the summer. (U7)

Charles felt it was his time to serve his country, and at that point he had no political awareness about the war. The Vietnam veterans also had varying degrees of combat exposure, dependent on their job description as well as placement. The veterans interviewed had different ranks and belonged to different branches of the military (army, air force, marine corps, and navy). Again, some were wounded, and others not. In contrast with the SWAPO veterans, they may have been separated from their families but not for very long periods, and communication was still possible. Some of those interviewed described access to drugs (particularly marijuana) during their tour in Vietnam. All but one (Bob, U3) served in Vietnam. Lee was a corpsman (medic) on the ground in Vietnam for one year in 1968, after having already served several years. After Vietnam he continued to serve, and ended up having a twenty-four-year career in the military. As the interview with Lee progressed, it was clear that the topic was emotional, and that he had spent a lot of time considering the ethical questions that arise around war and 36

Diverse wars and combatants war participation. When he was in Vietnam, however, he did not question the war: “I don’t know why they [his pre-war friends] reached these conclusions before I did. They thought we didn’t belong there and … of course I was believing what I was hearing about the communist threat” (U5). When Saigon fell in 1975, he felt as if they had let the Vietnamese down:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

That was a big concern of mine and so then and I lost confidence in my own government and I felt really betrayed because … you know, I thought we had a duty, we had an obligation, we had a commitment. (U5)

He also experienced racism toward the Vietnamese when he was there. Lee began to drink while he was still in the navy, and by 1975 he was diagnosed as an alcoholic, but got help from the military. Ralph had a long military career that started with Vietnam, where he focused on intelligence work. His tour in Vietnam meant exposure to combat and shelling, although he did not lose any close friends. However, Ralph felt “exploited by the national government, that communism crusade” (U9), and believed that if they had ended the war earlier, fewer Americans would have died. Ford described how the one thing on his mind during the war was whether or not he was going to be lucky and be among the troops pulled out or not, and “sitting in the jungle, our concern was whether you were going to be alive the next day” (U13). Dick, who was in the air force and was wounded during his tour, eventually came to believe that the war was a bad idea, but he was advised by friends to keep his opinions quiet. However, not all interviewees had a negative experience of their tour. Robert, who was also in the air force, and who had long dreamed of becoming a pilot, really enjoyed his tour because he got to fly a lot, even if it was a cargo plane: “Believe it or not, it was the best flying I ever did, the most fun I ever did” (U12). During his year of flying in Vietnam Robert was close to being shot down a few times, although he recalls that may not have been the worst aspect: the friends I made in the military, in pilot training, I still have today. Believe me, getting through pilot training was more stressful than getting through Vietnam! (U12)

He did not enjoy later postings as much as his tour in Vietnam. His flying in Vietnam also earned him the Distinguished Flying Cross, and he still meets up with others who are part of the Distinguished Flying Cross Society. Also touching on the special bonds formed through experience in the military and the war, Dick notes that “It’s a family … They support each other, and everybody has a job to do” (U12). Gary also felt fortunate that he did not have a bad tour, as he was never wounded: “I can count on one hand the number of times I got shot at … Wasn’t wounded, I never saw anybody wounded right in front of me” (U6). His tour was also cut short due to troop withdrawal and he left in July 1969. Overall, he 37

Living politics after war felt as though he did his job, nothing exceptional. Ben spent a lot of time on the ground in Vietnam, but since he was not assigned a combat task, he also described it as a good tour:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

I was not a combat person. I didn’t have a bad time in Vietnam, I had a very few negative experiences, I would say I was only in danger a small number of times, you know. I never shot at anybody and nobody shot at me, and being in [a medical unit]. … As you can tell, this was more M*A*S*H than, you know, Platoon. (U11)

For the most part, Ben’s tour was uneventful. He got to travel a lot, got to know the people, and even had a pet cat. However, he also described some segregation and racism within the US military. Some of those interviewed for the book had more combat-heavy tours in Vietnam though (particularly Thomas, Charles, Dennis, and Francis). Thomas worked as a radio man on a destroyer and described the extended periods of stress he experienced, particularly as a result of talking to other soldiers in need of support fire: The guy at the other end is me. And, who I’m talking to, if they’re getting overrun and that, chances are it’s not a lieutenant, or a sergeant, maybe not even a corporal, those guys are already dead. … I’m talking to a scared private … who’s screaming in my ear. And so he tells me what he wants, I send one shot, looks at it, adjusts it if he has to, or doesn’t, and then, … then he says, you know, fire for effect and then, my next word to him is “shot”, and then all hell comes down on him … an awful lot of times, that’s the last thing he’ll ever hear because he’s bringing it down on himself, because if they get past him it’s gonna hit the next unit … Sometimes I don’t hear anything, sometimes I hear static afterwards, only takes about five or seven minutes … And, worst of all, sometimes I hear Vietnamese, you know, which means we haven’t got them all, so we start shooting some more … And those are the tough ones. (U10)

Being the last contact for a dying soldier was tough, and Thomas also described the sense of dependency among the crew on the ship, not only because everyone’s work was critical to the success of operations but also because it was hard work. Thomas had wanted to leave home, and as he worked on four ships in total, traveling the world, he felt he got what he asked for in that sense. Being at war and at sea was exciting, which meant coming home in contrast was very boring. He expressed the feeling that war is about being lucky. In the end, he felt that signing up with the navy had been the right thing for him: I’m glad I did it, it was the right thing for me to do at the time. Was exactly what I needed to do. I knew … if I’d gone to college … I wasn’t mature enough … I would have dropped out the first, it would have been party time … I’d have been gone, you know. And then there would have been the draft looming … I would have been eligible and probably snatched up. So … I could have ended up on a hill, with a … rifle in my hands, and being the guy that called the ship. … So, no, no regrets on that score. … I regret my country let me down. (U10)

38

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants Charles also saw a lot of combat during his tour. Overall, Charles’s depiction of his war experience focused on its ugliness: from corruption and his lack of trust in his senior and junior officers, to how he felt cheated by his government, to the violence and baseness he witnessed. Like others, he developed a very tight bond with the others in his squad, “because those are the people you are with every day and those were the people that were the most important to you”, but tragically, “one of those guys was killed” (U7). In fact, Charles lost several friends during the war. Similarly, Dennis also saw a lot of combat during his thirteen months in Vietnam. During his tour he became convinced that American troops did not belong there, and voiced his doubts and critique, as their actions did not seem to help those he believed he was there to help. As a result, he believes that some of his senior officers treated him badly: So he beat the hell out of me and said, “Go back in the field and never come back unless you are in a body bag or going home.” So I was basically out on the front for most of my tour. … They’d be either mortaring us or shooting at us and my buddies had to come and say, you know, take cover or whatever. I got to a point where I didn’t care whether I get shot or not, and you kind of feel invincible in a way, because I should have gotten killed. (U8)

Dennis described his tour as being quite traumatic, and was clearly heavily impacted by his experiences. When I interviewed Francis in his home, he showed me his office, which was filled with books about the war and Vietnam. Francis had been drafted a couple of days into his honeymoon in June 1967, and retired at the end of 1972. Francis believed in the war then and continues to do so now: I believed in the reason that we were given for Vietnam. It’s actually such a wider view than today; I mean it played such a significant but little known part in the Cold War, you know, it tied down so [many] assets from the Communist bloc and, yeah, I didn’t realize much of that then. (U2)

He received extensive training and was worried the war would end before he got a chance to go. When he finally went, Francis felt he was more prepared than most. During his time in Vietnam he also became a father. Many men served under him and he enjoyed taking responsibility for them, and motivating them. Francis saw a lot of combat, and experienced both the loss of fellow combatants and seeing many others being wounded, as was he: I was in the blast, burned off all my exposed hair … knocked me out for a short period of time … when I got my senses I was bleeding out of my ears, my eyes, you know corner of my eyes and my nose. It was a traumatic brain injury, back then it was just a concussion. (U2)

Despite his injury, Francis advanced fast, and enjoyed being in the military very much: “I liked the military; I wanted to make it a career” (U2). He felt that for 39

Living politics after war someone like him, with no college degree, it gave him a chance to really do something and lead others. Commenting on the overall experience, he notes: It was the greatest experience of my life. The worst, of course, is seeing your guys dead, or wounded … but we desensitized a bit to that. … But as far as lifetime experiences, this is the best of my life, yeah, and so it certainly informed who I am. (U2)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Bob, the only interviewee who did not serve overseas, was stationed at a naval base not far from home. He was rather disappointed by this: I wanted any cruiser, frigate, or tin-can destroyer in the Pacific Ocean. Home ports I put down as far away from [home] as I could get … So where did I get stationed? On a naval air station [in his hometown]. (U3)

*  *  * As seen in this section, there are marked differences between the recruitment paths and war experiences in the three cases, but within each case there are also some very diverse experiences. Some former combatants interviewed for this book were at war for a long time and others for a much shorter period. Among former combatants from Colombia, on average they were at war for ten years; the shortest war experience was three years (Juan, C3), and the longest was nineteen years (Eduardo, C15). Among the Vietnam veterans, the average time spent in the military was seven years; the shortest duration of service in Vietnam was only a year (Dennis, U8), while the longest time spent in the military was twenty-eight years (Ralph, U9). Typically, a tour in Vietnam lasted for about one year. For Namibian PLAN fighters, the average time they were at war was thirteen years; the shortest time was five years (Fanuel, N8), and the longest was thirty years (Bwilu, N11). Among the interviewees in each case there was also diversity in terms of rank, combat exposure, and tasks. One key distinction is the apolitical recruitment among the American cohort, in contrast with the other two groups who were largely politically motivated when joining. There were also differences in the type of warfare in question, particularly as M-19 engaged in more clandestine, targeted, and symbolic activities, and both M-19 and SWAPO used guerilla tactics. Both SWAPO and Vietnam combatants were disconnected and away from their families, even if the SWAPO combatants had a much more absolute and lengthy disconnection. In contrast, the M-19 members had to keep things secret from their family, and both M-19 and SWAPO combatants clearly put their own family members at risk by participating in war. When combatants demobilized, their war experiences also shaped their homecoming. Coming home from these wars meant a geographical relocation in some but not all cases. Many SWAPO combatants had been in exile, for instance in Angola. Most Vietnam veterans served overseas in Vietnam. In contrast, M-19 40

Diverse wars and combatants

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

were an urban-based guerilla group, hence combatants would often be engaged in combat in the community where they lived. Some of the M-19 combatants also went overseas (for training, recruitment, and to offer help to other similar groups). Hence, coming home sometimes meant leaving one country for another, and at other times their lives continued in the same town as before. These differences between the cases are also reflected among the former combatants interviewed for this book. Reception from state and society When war is over society is also faced with the issue of how former combatants should be dealt with, and this is a centuries-old question. Former combatants around the world are targeted by UN programs aimed at facilitating their reintegration into society, and questions about how to deal with the return of the veteran are also the subject of both public debate and government policy. As they come home, former combatants are met with a range of possible policies: pensions, retraining, memorialization, decorations, prosecution, amnesty, transition assistance, therapy, deradicalization programs, disability benefits, the list goes on. This book does not focus on any specific veteran or reintegration policy, but rather tries to understand how former combatants’ relationships with politics are shaped by the legacy of the war and their homecoming experiences. Naturally, part of that experience is their encounters with the state and their (or other) programs. Across the literature on both the Global North and Global South, combatants’ relationship with the state is an important consideration, even if it has received somewhat more attention in the literature on the Global North. One way that the relationship between the state and former combatants is actualized is when the state offers benefits, pensions, or compensation for what happened during war. This creates interest groups who act to shape the disbursal and type of benefits. As a result, the state’s way of receiving and treating returning veterans often becomes the object of mobilization: who should be rewarded after the war, who should be punished, who made contributions above and beyond for the good of the state and society? Who is responsible for suffering endured during the war? These questions play into the design of benefits and programs targeting former combatants after war, and these are not short-term issues. In many cases, we see how these remain ongoing political questions many decades after the end of war (see e.g. Edele 2008; Kriger 1991; Mann 2006; Metsola 2015; Mettler 2002; Mettler and Welch 2004; Preston 1997; Resch 1999; Schafer 2007; Sprenkels 2018; Wiegink 2015). Material benefits, either in the form of pensions or reintegration programs, also form part of larger questions of recognition. And thus, the value of such policies is not only material, but most often also symbolic. As a result, debates over these policies shape the meaning of the state as well as the peace. 41

Living politics after war The role played by the state for returning combatants has historically been caught up in issues surrounding recognition and sacrifice. The idea of sacrifice and ensuing debt has sometimes been described as follows:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The citizen-soldier has always been a central figure in what might be called an “economy of social guilt” and public sacrifice. He is the holder of a blood-debt upon the society he has defended and can demand restitution for his “sacrifice of himself ” as well as for that of his comrades who have died. (Leed 1979, p. 204)

Veteran pensions and benefits are thus paid out as compensation for what was achieved through the war and/or what happened to the individual during the war. Veterans’ programs in the Global North are therefore more concerned with recognition, suggesting the state should fix what it broke in the first place. The idea of debt is either connected to a society or community which was defended, or the state which sent the combatants to war. This logic is thus only partially applicable after civil wars, even if some combatants may be recognized in this manner. However, many societies are not concerned with who was the hero of the war, but who was the perpetrator. Veteran pensions are a way to both honor and compensate lives destroyed by obeying the orders of the state. In both historical and more recent times, questions of eligibility and levels of compensation have been difficult and often bureaucratized. Of course, pensions also become tools of patronage, and a way to reinforce society’s hierarchy (see e.g. Diehl 1993, p. 12; Mann 2006, pp. 98, 122; Moradi 2017; Resch 1999, p. 5; for a general discussion about patronage and clientelism, see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Resch’s work here is particularly interesting, as it demonstrates how American soldiers were remade decades after the War of Independence; this was linked to demands for pensions and pension reform, as well as being linked to the idea of societal and state debt (Resch 1999; see also Skocpol 1992). Reintegration programs after civil wars have an entirely different rationale, one which is concerned with creating peace.12 After civil wars, the state does not have the same relationship with former combatants, particularly with those that fought against it. In addition, reintegration programs are most often not state-run, but rather are part of interventions by the international community via the UN. These programs only offer a transitional solution, with stipends during a return to formal education or living allowances during vocational training. After these “readjustment” programs finish, there is no longer a reason for continued support. That is because such programs are not built out of a sense of debt and recognition, but rather from a security rationale of making former combatants productive and unthreatening members of society. As tools of war, there is a fear that former combatants are unwilling and unable to leave the modus of war behind, and are therefore likely to undermine peace. Hence, contemporary DDR programs are first and foremost motivated by peacebuilding concerns (see 42

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants also McMullin 2013a, pp. 20–24). Of course, combatant communities may see things differently, and thus it is not a given that the conversation about debt, sacrifice, and the right to compensation ends with these reintegration programs. Yet turning to examine the logic and setup of DDR programs since 1990 more closely, it becomes even more obvious that ideas about returning combatants have remained fairly stable over time and place. The UN DDR Resource Centre (2005) offers a good example of how these programs are codified. Many current practices, ideas, and problem formulations have long been part of the philosophy of programs targeting former combatants. Among the older notions are: the use of DDR cards; the idea that rural communities can quickly and easily absorb returning combatants; calling it “reintegration” or “integration”; former combatants creating insecurity upon their return home (especially as some have violent norms and behavior); what is home?; the “problem” of former combatants who want to return to somewhere other than their pre-war home; staggering payments based on partial completion of the program; fear that if demobilization and reintegration do not happen fast enough frustration will build up and the community of combatants will become dangerous; cash allowances used for things other than those intended by the program; program benefits disrupting social relations with family and elders (see descriptions of post-First World War experiences by Mann 2006, pp. 74–79, 82–84, 99, 106, 112; but also see descriptions of the Napoleonic wars by Kriger 2003, p. 21; and discussions by McMullin 2013a). A particularly telling example of the reintegration policy thinking after the First World War, here concerned in particular with West African veterans, is worth quoting in detail: the second half would be paid by his local commandant on arrival. Eventually the entire bonus would be paid locally by the commandant. The new practice would speed the process of demobilization, breaking up potential bands of trouble makers and returning the ex-soldiers to the command of the civilian administration and the chiefs. (Mann 2006, p. 115)

The idea of dismantling former combatants’ networks is still very strong within early twenty-first-century DDR programming standards. In general, reintegration problems and expectations are far from new. Historical problem formulations and ideas about how such issues should be resolved resonate with current DDR practices. It should be emphasized that the concept of reintegration is an old one, and it is not limited to the Global South or even civil war contexts. The idea of reintegration has been applied to regular soldiers returning home from interstate wars too. While reintegration programs are not a given, they have become increasingly common, and also standardized, through the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS, UN DDR Resource Centre 2005). The bodies of literature on both the 43

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war Global North and Global South contain work on the political consequences of these reintegration programs or veteran benefits. For instance, Mettler has shown how war, but particularly the G.I. Bill targeting former combatants upon their return, shaped Second World War veterans in America in terms of increasing their predisposition to political participation (Mettler 2002, 2005; Mettler and Welch 2004). In contrast, Humphreys and Weinstein show that participation in DDR programs in Sierra Leone did not lead to what the authors call “preference for democracy” (2007).13 My own work on Liberia demonstrates how some reintegration programs can accentuate democratic ideals (e.g., participation and inclusion), while others emphasize more conflictual and antagonistic political practices, through their program design (Söderström 2011b, 2013b). State interaction with returning combatants largely occurs through the lens of reintegration programs. This is a topic to which later chapters, especially Chapter 3, will return, but there now follows an overview of the reception given to former combatants from the state as well as society overall for each case. Multiple rounds of programs in Namibia While the UN mission in Namibia was well planned, the reintegration program for former combatants was more ad hoc. The demobilization of forces was part of the UNTAG mission, but reintegration did not form part of this mission because it was originally not seen as necessary. Over the years, reintegration programs were incrementally developed and expanded by the Namibian government in response to demands from the veteran communities. The rationale behind reintegration efforts was largely motivated by security concerns (Metsola 2010, p. 592). And as noted by Preston, there was an assumption among the combatant community that the state would take “indefinite responsibility for their welfare and employment” (1997, p. 465; see also Colletta et al. 1996, pp. 139, 156–157). In total, twenty-five thousand combatants of the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) and Koevoet and up to fifty thousand PLAN combatants were demobilized at the end of the war.14 The number of PLAN combatants is particularly difficult to estimate as demobilization was not part of a larger scheme for returning combatants, and demobilized combatants and civilians were repatriated together. Repatriation support included blankets, food, temporary shelter, and transport. An estimated one-third of the PLAN combatants were women. The PLAN combatants were also the least educated among the demobilized combatants. Former combatants remain a salient category in Namibian society and make up about 5 per cent of the population (Colletta et al. 1996, pp. 133–138; McMullin 2013a, pp. 64, 78–115; Metsola 2006, pp. 1120, 1122; cf. Murray-Hudson 1983; Preston 1997, p. 455). The ensuing policies targeting former combatants were not carried out in a uniform manner; overall, this can be seen as a compartmentalized approach as 44

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants no single program was meant to target everyone. Over the years, the programs have been plagued by a lack of information about the number of combatants as well as their demographic situation. These information deficiencies also meant that the programs did not always target the correct people, and there was room for corruption and nepotism for granting access. The programs and policies included an initial small demobilization bonus, although that was not paid out until March 1991 and it most likely did not reach everyone it was supposed to. Various training programs, especially within agriculture and construction were also put in place, targeting about eighteen thousand former combatants. One program called the Development Brigade faced various difficulties, particularly access to land. But this program has also been criticized for its design, as it kept former combatants living in war-like conditions (Colletta et al. 1996, pp. 127–213; Preston 1997, pp. 464–467; see also LeBeau 2005). Over the years, the state has treated the various groups of veterans differently. SWAPO veterans, in contrast to former SWATF and Koevoet paramilitary police, for example, have come to embody the notion of a hero rather than just a security threat or someone in need. Those fighting against SWAPO have instead been framed solely as occupiers (McMullin 2013a, p. 103; Metsola 2015, pp. 189–248). Namibia was fortunate enough to be in a position to handle reintegration programs and demands independently, due to a strong state and economy, and as such this policy area became entwined with state formation in the country. Equally, however, it has become entwined with the making of SWAPO. The SWAPO veterans I interviewed had been home for twenty-eight years on average, and most had been in their early thirties when they came home (average age 33). Several noted that when they came home, they did receive help with housing and access to employment. Ngenokesho was satisfied with the help, but expressed concerns about the costs for medication and for sending children to school, and associated this with the reintegration program offered to former combatants. Fanuel discussed reintegration programs and veterans’ benefits in Namibia, but did not have a clear picture of what the programs were and what benefits had been offered. The multiple rounds created some confusion, and Fanuel expressed dissatisfaction with the amount of help offered to fellow combatants. Others had participated in security sector reform, and had joined the new military and police (Gerson, Gomen, Amon, Mukwanambwa, and Hilma). In total, between eight thousand and ten thousand combatants joined the new military or police (Preston 1997, p. 463). Gomen, however, was critical of the policy, believing that too many people were accepted into the army, as some of them were too old to serve at that point. There were also difficulties associated with the creation of the new military, due to training, order, discipline, and deciding who to admit into the new force (Colletta et al. 1996, p. 149; Preston 1997, p. 460). Others had already received benefits during the war, as they had access to education 45

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war through their engagement with SWAPO (Jairus, Peter, and Sackaria), as did about one-third of those in exile (Preston 1997, p. 457). The multiple rounds and different help programs targeting former combatants were discussed in several of the interviews. For instance, there were new project initiatives in 2005 and 2006, around fifteen years after most combatants came home. However, as some noted, these programs requested project plans before granting money. This practice was disliked: “When you say ‘I need a project’, they say ‘what type of project?’ They ask you lots of questions” (Gomen, N1). Today Gomen is disappointed and wants more money. Similarly, Mukwanambwa (N7) applied for project funding but at the time of writing was still waiting to have it approved. Ngenokesho (N2) discussed challenges related to the various rounds of reintegration programs, but he also recognized that there was a tradeoff involved, as not only former combatants from exile needed help after the war but also those who had stayed in Namibia. In Namibia it was particularly noticeable how rumors flourished about programs and benefits in other countries (such as Liberia, Angola, and Zimbabwe). Former PLAN combatants used these reference points for comparison with their own situation, ultimately feeling they had not received what they deserved. In their mind, the state as well as the international community had failed them. For some (particularly Mukwanambwa, Peter, and Sackaria) it was clear that the UN had cheated them: either the funds had been misused or something else had happened to them. As a result, several were organizing protests and discussions, as well as writing letters to the UN (in particular local representatives of the UN Development Programme). Thus, reintegration programs and their perceived failure was an ongoing issue in Namibia: “The UN has given money to the veterans around the world but in Namibia we didn’t get our veteran money” (Mukwanambwa, N7). Sackaria develops this position: some of them are now just mad since they were in the war so they have to be rehabilitated, and to rehabilitate someone you first have to resettle them and give him land or something that his life can go forward. So nothing was done and now people are just there. You will find a person who liberated the country and now they are just like a mad person. People are there in the camp still in the defense force and they are even retiring and they don’t have anything. … People are very angry and [many] are still in the army … so if you don’t give people anything people respond and things can go out of hand because people are suffering, so it is better to come out and tell people that there is something or there was nothing, just to let people know. (N12)

Thus, reintegration policies and programs are still politically charged, twenty-eight years after the end of the war. In some ways, former PLAN combatants had an easier reception from society upon their return because they were hailed as heroes and their achievement during the war was identified with the achievement of independence. Hence, 46

Diverse wars and combatants most described a positive response and sense of being welcomed back by society in general. Of course, not everyone who fought on the South African side left the country, and so there was some animosity and stereotyping across this divide. Gomen described how this initially caused some conflict and resentment on both sides:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Some, they say … you are monkey, you eat whatever, you are not eating food, you are not a human anymore because [of training] … it was very difficult. (N1)

But with time, Gomen’s overall depiction of society’s reception of former PLAN members still suggests he felt welcomed. A package deal for several guerilla groups in Colombia In total, about five thousand former guerrillas demobilized in Colombia in the early 1990s. Among these, 791 were former M-19 who took part in the formal demobilization process.15 Compared to other guerrilla groups in Colombia, M-19 had a relatively large portion of female combatants, both in the rank and file and among the leadership. When M-19 signed the peace agreement, a package of various policies and reforms was offered to the former combatants. In addition to the typical benefits such as economic support, education and health care, the agreement also had legal and political components, for instance pardoning crimes committed by combatants during the war, and electoral and constitutional reform. The socioeconomic aspects of the program were initially run by the Oficina Nacional para la Reinserción (National Office for Reintegration); the program, however, developed over the years with new policies and agencies of the state becoming involved, particularly when new groups signed peace agreements. The reintegration program contained monthly stipends in the transition phase, but also support over a four-year period to help former combatants start microenterprises, land access to those with agricultural projects, and job placement. Many businesses failed due to the poor timing of this support. The educational component was more limited, and only allowed for support over an eighteen-month period. In general the political discussions and reforms were given more attention while the design of socioeconomic support to demobilizing combatants was less successful (Florez-Morris 2005; García Durán et al. 2008; Guáqueta 2007; Sarrias and Armando 2006). The former combatants from Colombia had disarmed on average twenty-four years prior to when I interviewed them, and when they demobilized most were in their early thirties or late twenties (average age 33). Many discussed the reintegration programs and how these offered help with housing, educational opportunities, or help starting a small business. The educational opportunities in particular were deemed important. Thus, appreciation for the program was expressed as it helped some of them to survive the initial transition, but also as 47

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war they (particularly José, Jaime, Felipe, and Alfonso) saw the program as jointly designed between M-19 leaders and the government. More M-19 former combatants (including some who had appreciated the programs) expressed concerns about both corruption and nepotism within the programs. Not everyone had access to the program benefits, as you needed to be on the official list of those demobilized. Sometimes people avoided registering for fear of repercussions, and in other cases people were dependent on their commander allowing them to join the list. There was a sense that benefits and access to programs were unevenly distributed. Others also described how the benefits were attractive to non-combatants and that some managed to cheat their way into the program. There was an underlying sense that the programs were too limited and that this introduced a sense of competition between beneficiaries. There was, however, also a deep-seated criticism of the principles informing the logic of the program in general. Some believed there are limits to how much help you should give, at the risk of creating a mentality of dependency: I expressed my discontent with that, it is not a way to win over a former combatant; you can’t win over people with bread. … I disagree with solving the problems of the guerrilla fighter. The guerrilla fighter has to solve his own problems. (Amadeo, C22)

Estella, who was interviewed in her home, surrounded by a lot of art pieces, similarly recognized that it is a complex process, and that it is difficult to design a functioning program, especially as it is problematic to think that everyone can start their own business. Her sense was that most such projects failed, and created an even less functional economy for each individual (she herself amassed debts). She expressed the feeling that the word “reinserted” is stigmatizing and problematic, as she disagrees with the idea that this group was removed from society and needed to be put back in: I don’t share the concept because it’s like if I had gotten out of society and then came back. And ever since we conceived the revolutionary struggle, we were part of society, so I don’t like it. (C8)

As the M-19 combatants also lived and operated clandestinely within Colombian society, it is easy to see where her critique comes from. The reception in society overall was more mixed in Colombia than Namibia. Most interviewees described sensing admiration and being welcomed with open arms after the war. Sometimes they were approached for help and support by non-combatants when they demobilized. They felt as if society met them with a sense of sympathy. However, others like Emilio recognized that their status as ex-guerillas sometimes implied a stigma in society and that not everyone was happy to welcome them: There are some things that you can’t get for having that mark on you. … There are people that accept you and others that don’t accept you. … In some places that opens doors, but not always – in other places that closes doors. (C14)

48

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants This was also related (compared and sometimes likened) to the reception since the 2016 ceasefire of Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), who are often demonized, as well as the M-19 former combatants’ own childhood experiences of other guerillas. It was clear that they felt a demonized view of the group creates difficulties when people disarm, as does a perceived gap between the political ideals of the armed group and society overall. As M-19 transformed into a political party (AD/M-19) when they disarmed, and met with electoral success in the early years, this also colored their experience of society’s reception.16 G.I. Bill in the United States After Vietnam there were already programs in place in the United States to support returning combatants; this system had been reformed in particular after the Second World War. Veteran benefits in the United States over the years have included transition assistance, educational opportunities, home loans, disability compensations, health care, pensions, as well as burial, and as such are more wide-ranging than in the other two cases. The educational component fell under the G.I. Bill, and the program for Vietnam veterans covered all those who served between February 1955 and December 1976, although the program was not enacted until 1966.17 This program supported veterans if they chose to go back to school, giving them a monthly stipend for up to three years. However, the program was less generous compared to earlier programs for Second World War veterans and those who had served in the Korean War (Card and Lemieux 2001, p. 101; Mattila 1978, pp. 535, 544). Yet there are disagreements as to whether the Vietnam veterans received a better or worse program than their predecessors. For instance, Dean notes that 64 per cent of Vietnam veterans made use of the G.I. Bill compared to 55 per cent of veterans after the Second World War, and only 43 per cent of Korean War veterans (1992, p. 64). There certainly were some problems related to the integration of returning soldiers, particularly when a huge number of combatants returned at the same time. In 1970 about one million soldiers demobilized; while unemployment rates during this period were particularly high among Vietnam veterans, Dean notes that by 1973 their rate of unemployment was equivalent to that among the general population (1992, p. 62). The Vietnam veterans were in their late twenties when they came home (average age 28), and at the time of interview had been home for about forty-two years. The Vietnam veterans interviewed for this book made use of many of the benefits available to them, particularly for education, but also for things such as medical care and home loans. The usage of health care benefits is something which has increased later in their lives. Bob was the only interviewee who definitively noted that while he wanted to use the G.I. Bill, he was never able to. 49

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war They also expressed strong criticism of the state support offered to Vietnam veterans. There was a clear sense that the quality of the program had deteriorated compared to the programs offered to the Second World War generation. They argued that the level of compensation had reduced, putting some colleges financially out of reach; in some cases, some trade schools were not included, as they have been for the veterans of later wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ford clearly expressed the idea that the government was in some way punishing them, and that the differential treatment of different generations of veterans was intentional: “Yeah, we know we’re not gonna get any help from the VA [Veteran Administration]. … Me and the government have successfully separated” (U13). Francis and Dennis are examples of individuals who filed for benefits later in life, and Dennis then received 90 per cent disability, in part because of posttraumatic stress. Francis had refrained from asking for help during the first thirty years after the war and took pride in this, but by the time of the interview had begun receiving post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) therapy. Similarly, Thomas did not make use of these benefits in the early years after demobilization, but later decided to receive state help and was positively surprised by its quality. Recounting a story of a fellow veteran who has since passed away, Charles depicts the frustration and desperation associated with getting help from the VA: even though it was related to Agent Orange, the medical community didn’t recognize it either, so it wasn’t the VA’s responsibility … He went there again, this time he brought a pistol with him. And he talked to the clerk, and he said “Look,” he pulled out his gun, … “I want some medical coverage, and if you don’t endorse my medical coverage, I am going to kill you.” (U7)

The homecoming of Vietnam veterans has been particularly ripe for various mythmaking; competing stories about the war as well as about veterans abound. Vietnam veterans became seen as particularly troubled and abandoned by society although some researchers have questioned this depiction of their homecoming (Dean 1992). The homecoming is argued to be problematic both because the veteran as such is thought to be troubled (unemployed, on drugs, violent, and overcome by guilt and mentally unstable), and also because civilians, particularly peace activists, were said to treat them with contempt, hatred, and even violence. In some ways the homecoming has been more central to the identity and narrative surrounding these individuals than the war itself, especially compared to veterans of earlier conflicts involving the United States (Lyons 1998, p. 195). Homecoming has been depicted as a problematic experience, and one where they were “never … properly welcomed home”, and Dean argues that this later led to excessive attempts to welcome them home, again and again (1992, p. 65). The myth of scorned Vietnam veterans was reinforced by many of the movies made about the war and those who fought in it (Lembcke 1999). Yet, when asked about this 50

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants reception, most veterans note that they were met with silence and a lack of attention rather than spite or aggression (Lyons 1998, pp. 193, 197). Both Lyons and Dean argue that the homecoming of the Vietnam veteran can be termed typical in the American setting (Dean 1992, p. 60; Lyons 1998, p. 199). The Vietnam veterans interviewed for this book largely depicted coming home to a hostile society, where they were looked down upon and even blamed for the war. The lack of respect and even mistreatment experienced when coming home was exemplified by the lack of parades (as compared to other generations of veterans), and not being officially welcomed home. The idea of never being properly welcomed home, as noted by Dean (1992, p. 65), was certainly embraced by those interviewed in this book. They felt they were treated badly in comparison to other veterans. For example, John’s depiction of this underlines a sense of differential recognition: I am proud of what I did. … I feel good about it now. … the veterans that are coming home from the new wars, I think they have it somewhat easier. … when the first Iraqi vets came home … I was thinking these guys had a pretty good deal, getting a parade coming home, it was a far cry from what we had coming home. (U1)

Similarly, Thomas feels that when people thank him for his service today, it is too late: “Where were you? I didn’t see you when I went out the gate with my discharge. I didn’t see any parade” (U10). Whether or not this welcome happened overall or for specific individuals, it is clear that this issue has struck a very strong chord among them. Charles explains: the expression “welcome home”. It’s so important about empowering Vietnam veterans because there was such an unwelcome … I remember the first time I was wearing a hat, the other guy was wearing one and he came up to me and he said “Welcome home,” and I was kind of shocked … It was the first time I heard that, and I said “Yeah, welcome home.” So, that is the greeting I use all the time now – it’s important and it makes an emotional connection … because it’s the kind of support that I think all veterans really need. (U7)

As a response to the lack of welcoming home, some veterans engaged in “welcome home” events in later years. For instance, Ben has organized such events, and his political commitment has been motivated by this failure on the part of the state and society. According to Ben, society should care for those who have made sacrifices for them and been asked to do horrible things: killing … you know, doing things that you are asked to do that are … outside the norm … as a country we never really wanted to deal with it, then we go onto more military adventures and who are the ones who are being most affected by it? It’s the people who serve, and so anyway, that is where my politics is coming from right now. (U11)

Many of the Vietnam veterans highlighted the importance of being thanked for their service; starting in the 1990s, there seems to have been a shift in the national 51

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war mood and more people came up to them to offer such thanks. These were often important encounters. Several also talked about veterans being spat on when they first came home, although none of the interviewees experienced it themselves. However, it became a clear symbol of their sense of mistreatment and lack of respect when they came home; just as the lack of formal welcoming home took on symbolic value. For instance, the scornful reception entered the imagination of John – while he did not experience it directly, it did silence his own experience. John believes he and his peers could have received more help from the government when they came back, similar to current practices in the United States: “I think it is really necessary. To learn to be a civilian again after what we’ve gone through” (U1). Similarly, Charles remarks, “Yeah, I mean, I was never spat on, but I know a lot of my fellow soldiers were spat on” (U7), and Thomas explains: “People would spit on you. If you were in uniform … This didn’t happen to me because our ship came … into a navy base” (U10). The general experience of being spat on is made into a personal experience when they talk about it. Another component of the mistreatment and disdain veterans experienced when they came home, they connected to popular culture, and in particular how the Vietnam veteran was depicted on film (for more on this, see Lembcke 1999). For instance, Thomas, fighting against the depiction of Vietnam veterans as monsters, remarks that they “had a really bad rep because of the Rambo [movies]” (U10), claiming that this was an unfair representation of what the Vietnam veteran had done during the war. Similarly, Robert notes: “people have stereotypical views of what a Vietnam vet was … the anti-war movies and everything else. We were crazy, yadda yadda” (U12); he went on to stress that the regular Vietnam veteran is instead a hero, who did not want to go to war but nevertheless did his duty for the country. According to those interviewed, societal responses to Vietnam veterans have partially shifted since the 1990s, as noted, with a sense of guilt sometimes coloring interactions due to the way veterans were initially received when they came home. *  *  * All three cases reflect a clear critique of the reception offered to former combatants upon their return home. State involvement in reception and reintegration programs is clear in all three cases, even if the specifics of the programs and how extensive they were varied across the cases. Interestingly, in both the US and Namibian cases, critique of veteran support programs was often phrased in comparison with similar programs for veterans elsewhere. The reception from society differed more clearly across the three cases: while the Vietnam veterans struggled with a negative reception on their immediate return, the SWAPO veterans came back as heroes. The M-19 veterans had a more ambiguous position in society. The 52

Diverse wars and combatants next chapter will deepen our understanding of how coming home was experienced by the former combatants interviewed for this book.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

War as a combination of diverse experiences War is a combination of experiences. It cannot be rendered down to one specific experience; rather it is a multitude of experiences even among former combatants. It is not solely a question of direct combat and violence. For the individual combatant war is a holistic experience, where many different events, encounters, processes, and emotions become tangled up in each other. This chapter has demonstrated the layered experiences of former combatants in each of the three cases, as well as the diversity both within and across them. The three wars were different in their origins, means, and intensity. The recruitment and the war experiences in themselves were also very different between the M-19, SWAPO, and Vietnam combatants. People had different reasons for joining, and different pathways into joining, their respective armed groups. The apolitical stance among the Vietnam veterans is particularly noticeable, even if this was also the case for a few among the other two groups. The tactics and types of activities carried out during these wars also differed, and the manner of removal from their families was also different. The reception from state and society following the end of war in each of the three cases also demonstrate large differences. All groups expressed critique against the programs for former combatants. In Namibia the reintegration programs were not uniform and ended up being completed in a piecemeal and compartmentalized fashion. As a result, there was both a fair amount of confusion about the programs and a sense of dissatisfaction as many former combatants were unsure if they had received what they were entitled to. The SWAPO veterans engaged in global comparisons concerning the programs they received, and this continues to be an ongoing debate, decades after the end of hostilities. Similarly, the American veterans are still debating the support they received from the state. Over the course of the several decades they have been home, their engagement as well as the degree of support both from the state and society has shifted. Of the three cases, it was clear that the M-19 combatants were the most satisfied with the DDR program they received, even if they also expressed criticism against their program. As returning combatants these three groups were also met with very different receptions from the public. The SWAPO veterans were generally hailed as heroes, whereas the M-19 veterans were both vilified and praised. In contrast, most of the Vietnam veterans never felt welcomed home, and had to deal with societal perceptions of them as anti-heroes. The armed combat itself and former combatants’ relationships with their particular armed group may produce ties to, and ways of engaging in, politics 53

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

which endure beyond disarmament. The war and participation in the conflict represent an important historical and generational event for these groups. The person’s identification with the group, whether as a “Vietnam veteran”, or as a “former guerilla”, remains a lens through which they interpret politics after disarmament. Despite the large differences between the cases, the rest of this book is concerned with the similarities in how former combatants’ relationship with politics, and their political behavior, may shift as a result of both the war and their homecoming.

Notes 1 Importantly, not all violence qualifies as war. Typically, the number of battle deaths (one thousand in one calendar year) is used to determine when something has escalated into a war, and not just armed conflict or riots (see e.g. Themnér and Wallensteen 2013). 2 A low estimate of battle deaths is ten thousand and a high estimate is twenty-five thousand, according to the Battle Deaths Dataset version 3.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). 3 Battle-related deaths attributed to the conflict between the government of Colombia and various guerilla groups (FARC, Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) and M-19) between 1964 and 2016 amount to 24,597 according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Another dataset notes that the best estimate for battle deaths is 3,198 during the period when M-19 is part of the coding (1978–88), and that the overall best estimate for battle deaths for this conflict in Colombia is 39,768 (1964–2008) (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). 4 In addition to M-19, the following groups signed peace agreements: EPL, the Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame, the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores, and the Corriente de Renovación Socialista, including in total about five thousand combatants (Guáqueta 2007, p. 418). 5 For more on Lubango, see McConnell (2000); Saul and Leys (2003). 6 For more on SWAPO’s education front, see Williams (2017). 7 For more on how the events at Cassinga have been discussed after the war, see Baines (2014). 8 For more on the process of joining M-19, see Florez-Morris (2007). 9 For more on the M-19 “peace camps”, see Lamb (2010, pp. 86–104). 10 Estimates cannot be confirmed, but range from five thousand to eleven thousand (Vietnam Women’s Memorial 2019). 11 For more on draft resistance, see Maxwell (2015). 12 These reintegration programs are extensive. In recent decades the UN has made DDR programs an integral part of their peacebuilding practices; roughly 1.4 million excombatants were involved in twenty-four programs around the globe between 2005 and 2008. While the total costs of such programs are difficult to estimate, during 2007 the bill was somewhere between USD  630  million and USD  1,599  million, most of which was spent on the reintegration component. At least sixty DDR programs were conducted between 1989 and 2008 (Banholzer 2014; Caramés and Sanz 2008a, 2008b; Kaplan and Shay 2017). 13 This is measured by contrasting confidence in the electoral system as opposed to preferring protests, contacting NGOs, contacting traditional leaders, and taking up arms to fight as ways to affect change (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007, p. 541).

54

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Diverse wars and combatants 14 SWATF formed part of the South African Defense Force; while they were led by white South West Africans, the force also included other ethnic groups. Koevoet was a paramilitary police organization, also on the South African side, sometimes termed a “special operations unit”, or a “counter-revolutionary unit”, which committed many human rights abuses during the war. Finally, there are other estimates that point to a much smaller number of PLAN combatants, around twenty thousand (see Preston 1997, p. 455; cf. Colletta et al. 1996, pp. 131–132). 15 Not all M-19 combatants took part in this process. 16 For more on M-19’s transformation into a political party, see Boudon (2001); García Durán et al. (2008); Guáqueta (2007); Rampf and Chavarro (2014). 17 The cost of these program in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s is estimated to be in excess of USD 40 billion, reaching at least fourteen million veterans (Mattila 1978, p. 535).

55

2

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Coming home and living peace?

T

his chapter depicts how the process of

coming home from war is understood and experienced among the various former combatants interviewed for this book. The idea of coming home, and the process of coming home, are in part metaphorical, as not everyone moves physically when they return home. This process also needs to be unpacked and problematized as the division between war and peace in individual lives is not clear-cut. This chapter is a starting point for such a discussion. Coming home can also be marked by a particular moment which is key in the larger transition from war to peace. For some it may be something longed for, fought for, while for others it is a time for new losses, rejection, and strange encounters, as well as disappointments. Often, home is not the same as before or during the war, irrespective of geographical relocation; depicting people’s homecoming is about describing the landscape of their lives at this point in time. It is a landscape of in-between-ness. How the former combatants make sense of this in-between-ness will resonate throughout the rest of the book. We will see that this is a landscape filled with tension, negotiation, and conflicts of belonging. The literature focusing on the overall challenges of coming home pertaining to the Global North is large (see, among others, Ahern et al. 2015; Allport 2009; Bergman et al. 2014; Binks and Cambridge 2018; Card 1983; Cohen 2001; Dale 2010; Demers 2011, 2013; Glantz 2009; Karsten 1978; Linker 2011; Scott 2012; Shay 2003; Waller 1944). This literature is matched by literature on the Global South, yet here this is largely categorized under the question of reintegration. Interestingly, this reflects a subtle but interesting difference between these literatures. In the Global South, the former combatant is a risk or problem that needs to be addressed. Focusing on their homecoming suggests a willingness to understand this process from the perspective of the former combatant. This suggests that the former combatant is more of a policy problem in the literature on the Global South. Policy choices, or depicting the former combatant as a policy problem, are not absent from the literature on the Global North, but the 56

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Coming home and living peace? breadth of how the coming home is studied is more varied. Similarly, there are also some studies which take on the perspective of the former combatant in the literature on the Global South (see e.g. Hardgrove 2017; Nussio 2011a; Schafer 2007; Utas 2003, 2008). This chapter situates this transition in relation to each of the three cases on a more personal level, building on the context and background outlined in the last chapter for both the three wars and the various policies targeting, and public reception of, former combatants. Together, the war, veteran policies, and the public reception, as well as the former combatants’ personal homecomings, constitute the background for their political life paths. Thus, this chapter is concerned with the totality of their lives rather than the strictly political aspects of coming home. It tries to offer an everyday depiction of what coming home from war has meant for these individuals. In the following sections it becomes clear how certain issues and themes are relevant across the cases despite the large contextual differences between them. The chapter first focuses on the overall experience of coming home and how that transition is depicted, before focusing on the struggles associated with being home. Thirdly, the chapter addresses how the various former combatants make sense of the peace individually and at the societal level. Time is a key element in all of these sections, whether immediate or drawn out. This chapter encompasses this duality of time perspectives reflecting both the immediate experience of coming home and coming home as a protracted experience. Transition The former combatant interviewees describe the moment of transition, or coming home, as rather abrupt, a change from one day to the next. In the case of the Vietnam veterans, it may have been expected and planned in advance, yet the experience was still radical. In the Namibian case, many had been at war and in exile for a long time, and some had given up hope that they would come home any time soon. So when the war was over, they were taken by surprise and it was experienced as a very abrupt event. This sense of abruptness was also experienced by some in Colombia. Across all three groups, coming home is associated with a number of different emotional responses, such as excitement, happiness, gratefulness, and hope. Having survived the war, finding family again, and discovering that their family were also alive and well, as well as a sense of pride in their achievements during the war, often fueled these emotions. Former combatants from M-19 and SWAPO in particular noted that the transition was a beautiful and inspiring time, where anything was seen as possible; for SWAPO this was the time when Namibia became independent, while in Colombia the conflict was continuing with other armed groups even though the constitution had been rewritten. The teacher 57

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war and SWAPO veteran Jairus (N6) described his sense of elation when he came home; yet his happiness was contrasted with the loss others around him experienced, ultimately reinforcing his own sense of being lucky. Coming home was also a time of great sadness, because the former combatants had the opportunity to process loss and grieve those who had died, both in the armed group (leaders as well as fellow combatants) and in their families. Ben, who was stationed at an army hospital when he returned to the United States, expresses how his sense of loss and sadness grew at this time: “I just thought it was a huge waste of … treasure, lives” (U11). Having both lost close friends and witnessed suffering in general fueled his anti-war sentiments and engagement further. Thomas explains that he had only joined the military as a way to leave home and at the end of the war, he still did not want to go home: “I didn’t know why but I didn’t wanna go home. … You know, I wanted just to … I needed more decompression, whatever” (U10). He initially did not want to return to the United States from Vietnam, and was then similarly reluctant to leave his military base back in his home country. In fact, instead of returning to his hometown, he worked for a while outside his military base before returning home months later. At the same time, others were also wary of the change and what this new situation would mean for them, both personally and for their country as a whole. This made coming home a moment of trepidation. Ngenokesho, who had been in exile for nineteen years, described his sense of excitement but soon turned toward his concerns and fears about coming home. His concerns reflect a wide array of issues: Now the fear was also … what is the situation going to look like, socially, economically, politically? … when we were in exile we were living like birds, I mean like children. So, the international community were feeding us through our organization SWAPO of Namibia, so we had enough food … If we [return] to Namibia, what is the life going to look like? Are we going to have our own houses, or are we going to live the way we are living and where are we going to go back to? (N2)

Similarly, Jairus notes that uncertainty dominated his concerns: we were kind of risking ourselves personally – you don’t know what would happen. In exile, when I went back to the camp, I had that gun that I could always get, … it gave me a certain level of security, now here you know that you are coming back. So it was a little bit scary but it was also a moment which, one has to take a risk, and if you don’t take risks then nothing can actually happen … and then what? (N6)

Some had joined the Namibian War of Independence even though they were not Namibian to begin with, and so when the war ended, they were faced with the difficult choice of where they should they go. Fanuel (N8) had a particularly stark choice to make: return to his home country where a civil war was raging, or accept citizenship in a new country. In the end, Fanuel decided to settle in the new country. 58

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Coming home and living peace? The end of war is usually a time of political uncertainty; this was certainly the experience of some former M-19 and SWAPO combatants. They describe a sense of disillusionment, and concern, as well as disappointment with leaders and elite members who in the moment of coming home forgot about their fellow combatants. In the Colombian case, disappointment was also fueled by losing a number of key leaders in the transition period, and because conflicts were still ongoing between the government and other guerilla groups. The disappointment and lack of political clarity among the Vietnam veterans was more associated with questioning the war they had been a part of, and the government responsible for it. When trying to depict what this change meant and what kind of transition was implied in this moment of coming home, some interviewees described a change where completely new rules and a new frame of mind were required. Joaquin notes, describing the adjustment to not operating in a clandestine fashion and using violence, “There is a change of roles that requires time” (C6). Many continued to relate to each other as if they were still in the same military hierarchy. Some found it much harder to be appreciated for their non-military activities compared to their military skills and work. Being in the military was easier than being at home; now they had to take on roles in life in which they felt less capable. Some also felt they lost some of the respect they had during the war, as civilians were completely unaware of the distinctions between military ranks: “The hardest thing was being invisible. I liked the idea in the army that as a commissioned officer of any rank you are not invisible … people respect you – you get treated just a little different” (Francis, U2). Just the absence of the weapons themselves was seen as very symbolic and difficult to cope with: “I know people who didn’t feel complete without a gun. The gun turns into a life anchor” (Estella, C8). For others, being in the military had given them a sense of protection and they felt more vulnerable and alone on leaving the military. Coming home was thus often associated with a sense of vulnerability. José from Colombia, whose family unit was broken during the war, explains: many of the combatants are used to a life in which they have everything, in a minimal sense, but everything. When you demobilize and go out to the civilian life, you don’t have anything. You have no idea of what to do. (C10)

They felt that responsibility for being successful rested entirely on their shoulders, and that in order to make it you had to adapt quickly. José believed that with just a minimal amount of help, each former combatant could become useful for society. Without help, that person will not be able to start [a new life], she or he won’t be able, because the burden of inferiority that you have to carry in front of the rest is very fucked up. It’s very hard to know that everyone else is advancing but you. (C10)

59

Living politics after war In his case he felt less useful to society because the help he received was inefficient and not purposeful. As a result, he was struggling to catch up with his own life. Similarly, Alba felt left behind when she came home after the war:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Yes, each one of us had to see how we were going to live, where we were going to live. … Instead, the political goes in that way and the socioeconomic through this other, so “I do the political, and it’s your problem how you eat or how you do it”. (C9)

The war had shifted the division of responsibility, and on coming home several felt forced to take on more responsibility for their own lives than during the war. Some former combatants explained that initially they had been directed and told what to do, but that this guidance soon disappeared. In fact, some also noted that during the war they stopped planning for the future beyond conflict – their lives were put on hold. Angela, who became involved in M-19 through the peace camps, describes how her life had been paused, and that one of the challenges of coming home was to make decisions for herself: because it is easier to learn how to do war than learning how to live … I mean, when you are at war you don’t care about tomorrow, right? When you start … then … you need to start thinking [about tomorrow], I need to pay the rent, I need to survive … I have to work, to do other things, because no one is going to help me. (C23)

Experiencing the war, coming home and taking on life after war, could in other cases be a very empowering experience for some of those interviewed, particularly among the M-19 and SWAPO veterans. Meeting and overcoming challenges reinforced their sense of agency. Overcoming obstacles, fending for themselves, they managed to find their own path in life. Alba is particularly vocal about this sense of agency and empowerment: I am a woman who bets on what she is capable of doing and here I am. … I am still the one who defends a position of justice, of equality, towards all of that … that is my life. So I had to do that. … I didn’t think that I had to fight this battle, but I already fought it, I already won it, I am her, and … I demonstrated that I could sustain myself, I can do all of this. (C9)

Similarly, Catalina expresses a clear sense of agency and pride in the moment of transition, framing the decision to come home and disarm as her own: When I decided to take arms, and in 1990 I decided to lay down my arms, I felt like a responsible human being. … I had a clear sense of it being worth it and I have to do it, and we have to make the decision to defend the people. In 1990 a huge political event occurs, the demobilization process. … this is when we start a political life in front of the reality, not with weapons but with the job opportunities and academic opportunities to burst into that new life. (C18)

Catalina expresses a sense of taking responsibility for choices made, both during war and after; as a result, coming home was not something which happened to 60

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Coming home and living peace? her, but reflective of an active decision on her part. This reinforced her sense of agency. This sense of agency was also connected to her ideas about differences in paths, of having your own specific life path and being true to that path. This does not mean that these former combatants made it on their own. They recognized that other people and opportunities given to them had been instrumental in their transition, but that their effort and willingness to take such opportunities mattered. Life after war was often framed as another battle, where you need to defend and fight for yourself. Some also found this sense of agency through having survived injuries during the war. Being able to survive gave them a sense of renewed opportunities and empowerment. Alfonso notes that he was “wounded, but … for me … it is natural in war. … This also strengthens me. … I was left mute, dead. I am like Christ, I resurrected” (C19). Describing the very moment of coming home, many of the Vietnam and SWAPO veterans note how extraordinarily ordinary the event was, even though it felt unreal. Arriving back in Namibia after years in exile, Bwilu was not met by anyone in his family, and it was only months later when he was visiting the cemetery in his hometown that he connected fully with the experience: I walked around the cemetery and I was reading tombstones and I started recognizing the names of the people that I used to know and then it brought back the reality that this is somebody who is dead and this is somebody I used to know. So that’s how I broke the whole long dream that almost brought me to thinking that I was almost dead and that I was not really in Namibia. (N11)

Ndahafa (N13), who had been imprisoned at the time independence was confirmed, also stressed some of the more mundane aspects of her return, such as where to sleep the first night. On being released she was told what to do and to keep quiet. Together with others who were in “the Dungeons”, she asked for and received help from the Red Cross. Both Peter (N10) and Ndahafa have worked to bring the events of torture and imprisonment they experienced into the public light. While these events have been discussed after the war in Namibia, the leadership within SWAPO has been reluctant to embrace an open airing of what happened, even claiming that those wanting to discuss this are “opposed to the process of reconciliation in Namibia” (McConnell 2000, p. 52). For both Peter and Ndahafa, this war experience naturally impacted on their homecoming after the conflict; it has shaped how they relate to SWAPO and their veteran status, as well as shaping their political mobilization (as later chapters will reveal). This banality of coming home was also associated with the boredom of being home in contrast with life during the war. Even if they had only been away for a short time it was difficult to adjust: Life was on the edge. It was certainly an adrenaline rush a lot of the time out there and just adjusting to, it was almost boring, just going to work every day, not having

61

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

that adrenaline going. So that was maybe my biggest adjustment, was settling down, trying to be normal again. (John, U1)

Robert (U12) stayed in the military after he came home from Vietnam, but felt that his new tasks were mindless and boring, lacking the sense of action Vietnam had offered. Bob (U3) described how his homecoming was rather seamless, due in part to the fact that he had served his time in the military at an American base, and thus in some way he had never really left. Similarly, Dick (U14) and Ford (U13), who both continued military careers when they came home, also did not experience an abrupt change. Yet when Dick left the military many years later, “it was a bit of a change. It was a different world, different values” (U14). However, he joined a company which employed a lot of former military personnel and this helped him feel at ease. Many Vietnam veterans were stationed at a home base for a short period before returning to their hometown, which meant that their homecoming was more gradual. Others simply noted that the experience was transformative: “I came back a changed person” (John, U1). Not everyone experienced this kind of fundamental change, especially not at a personal level, instead noting that they have not changed: “I didn’t change at all, I am just the way I was before” (Mukwanambwa, N7). Or they stress that the experience of war and being in the military prepared them for the life that came after (Jacob, U4). Some of the Vietnam veterans also described how they wanted to mark a big break with the war upon their return. For instance, Charles, who had been wounded, was classified as inactive upon his return, which allowed him to break his six-year commitment with the military early. At this point he threw away his uniforms and broke all contact with the military: “I didn’t want anything to do with it” (U7). In all three groups the longevity of the transition was highlighted. With hindsight, many see this as a process that is still ongoing: “It never ends, no! It stays with you” (U1). The idea that the transition indeed takes a long time, or can be delayed, suggests in fact that some get stuck. Angela was hesitant when describing some individuals’ ability to take on a new life path at disarmament, noting that some have been unable to move on, to transition, and instead they have become stuck in that moment of coming home. In contrast she believes that she herself has moved on and made other choices compared to the bulk of other former M-19 members: “many of them got stuck there. So I have created my own path” (C23). The question of transition is personal, but it is also entangled with societal transition. Indeed, some suggested that it will only be complete when the generation at war has disappeared: “maybe the changes will come when liberation struggle people have died” (Fanuel, N8).

62

Coming home and living peace?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The moment of coming home is both an event as well as a process for these former combatants. It is commonly described as emotional, transformative and uncertain. Different individuals respond very differently to this process: some with feelings of vulnerability, and some with an increased sense of agency, while others tried to continue on the same path they had been following during the war. The next sections continue to unpack this experience.

Home as the new war? Coming home is described as a time of challenges and difficulties in former combatants’ lives. The various hardships relate to finding employment, going back to school, family relations, mental and physical health, trust, and security. The challenges brought forward in these interviews resonate with challenges noted elsewhere (see e.g. Ahern et al. 2015; Allport 2009; Ashcroft 2012; Binks and Cambridge 2018; Burgess et al. 2007; Cohen 2001; Dale 2010; Glantz 2009; Hardgrove 2017; Nussio 2011a; Scott 2012; Schafer 2007; Shay 2003; Utas 2003). For a number of the former combatants, upon coming home they faced financial difficulties; while many found their way out of this, not everyone did. Across all three cases, the moment of coming home is described as a time when former combatants had nothing, and they had to figure out what their lives were meant to be about. Former M-19 combatant Angela describes this particularly eloquently: Okay, it was hard because somehow. It’s like if you were here and they take away the floor from you – what do you do then? They take it away and you stay there in the air. So you have to begin from zero … It was really difficult for me, because I had to start looking for a job to sustain myself, because my family was not going to sustain me. They didn’t have the resources, because we have always been poor, we have never had the resources. So I had to start working. That left me in the middle of nothing. In one moment, I thought that we [M-19] had made a mistake … Some other times I wanted to leave, to go back, I knew that some people were still in the mountains and I wanted to do it as well. I even remember that I kept a gun with me until [19]96, thinking about the fact that I was going to live, as a combatant, I didn’t care, and that I was getting there with a gun. In [19]97 I got rid of it, but it was hard. I felt alone. Generally, in a certain moment, the movement turns into a family, but after the demobilization, each one returned home, you remain there alone. This was a period with a lot of dilemmas for me, thinking about staying, about moving forward. Nevertheless, I started to study, and that filled up the emptiness of not knowing what to do. It was like starting to build up the sense of life. … you get stuck with what you thought was the sense of your existence, they take it away, and you have to construct it again. So that’s what happened in [19]92, and it took until 2000 before I managed to reach myself. (C23)

63

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war Angela’s sense of loneliness and emptiness when coming home was so severe that she even contemplated returning to war, which in the Colombian case was a real option given the ongoing conflict in the country. The personal challenges associated with coming home preoccupied many, and they often saw their post-homecoming activities as making up for lost time: “I ‘lost’ ten years, twelve years with a strong experience. But after that I study and I am doing fine, that is part of the process” (Emilio, C14). But many of the former combatants struggled to make up for missed opportunities. Central life events occurred out of order, as the typical sequencing of life events was upset by the war. Ben (U11) described the strange feeling he had when he came home and discovered that everyone else had just continued with their lives. In addition to feeling that he needed to catch up with them, he also felt disconnected from their general outlook on things. Across all three cases a central challenge many faced when coming home was finding new ways to sustain themselves. Jairus (N6) was trained as a teacher during the war and while it did not happen immediately, he soon found a job after the war. In contrast, it took Mukwanambwa (N7) nine years after she came home to find a steady job with the Namibian police; in the end, she got this job through connections from the war. Even if former combatants were able to find work, it was not always easy to support themselves and their families; for instance, while Sackaria (N12) found a job, the salary was barely adequate to meet his and his family’s needs. Similarly, Gary expresses his frustration about finding work when he came home: “I had a degree in [subject] and I’d been a captain, and all that meant zero on the job market” (U6). Ford describes how unpleasant he found looking for jobs was when he came home, as he felt that his Vietnam background worked against him: “they would ask me where I was for this four-year period and … I was better off saying I was in prison than saying I was in Vietnam. Because if I said that I was in Vietnam, I knew I would not get the job” (U13). In contrast, a few of the Vietnam veterans described how they found it relatively easy to find a job when they returned, in part thanks to their military experience. Others had fewer options, like Amon, who only had training and skills related to the war, and thus he eventually went into the new Namibian army: “that’s the only thing I know, what I knew … was just a gun because from that time I was just a rifle man, an artillerist” (N4). Memory was deemed too old to join the new military in Namibia, and as a result she struggled to find employment after the war. In the end, she found work as a cleaner. Yet in the beginning she was engaging in behavior that for many in Namibia turned out to be successful: “we had to fight again to get the job, when we came in the country we were fighting to get the jobs, which we got after fighting so hard, sleeping outside, protesting so we get jobs” (N3, emphasis added). Depictions of life after war often contained war language. 64

Coming home and living peace? Others initially believed the reintegration programs offered to them would help them in making a living for themselves. Estella started a small business in Bogotá as part of the reintegration program, but it failed and she put herself, her family, and others in debt, and had trouble supporting herself and her daughter:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

In a personal sense, it was the toughest financial moment for me … I felt that the charge was on us, being responsible … It was a really critical situation in my personal life, and with my daughter, it was a critical situation … very fucked up. (C8)

Catalina also describes how she has continually struggled to take care of her family, and how this is still an ongoing issue: “on a work level I have not gotten what I need, that is work stability to fulfill my commitments with them [her children]. At this moment I have anxiety because I don’t have work stability” (C18). The economically weak position of some returning combatants also meant that they were politically vulnerable. For instance, Camila (C4) described how she voted for candidates who promised to help her with housing. In all three cases, some former combatants went back to school to complete a degree. For some this took longer than normal, because they had to work full time in conjunction with their studies. Again, they were making up for lost time, trying to catch up with life: “Once the demobilization arrived, we began to recover time, study and work. … I had not had the opportunity because I joined [M-19] when I was very young” (Emilio, C14). Some individuals had an opportunity to complete their education through reintegration programs, or because the military offered continued educational opportunities. Several of the Vietnam veterans who went to college also faced the war in a new way when they returned, either being confronted with anti-war protests on campuses or hearing announcements of former students who had been killed in Vietnam. Dennis, whose short tour in Vietnam had been filled with combat and trauma, was unemployed when a social worker helped him apply for college utilizing the G.I. Bill. He clearly suffered mental health issues upon his return from Vietnam, but studying helped him get through and have something to focus on, ultimately changing his life: I gotta figure out how I’m going to go forward. And college kind of gave me some incentive to wanna do something. But even after I graduated, we couldn’t get jobs, it was very difficult for veterans, nobody wanted [us] – we were kinda like crazy people. … I just had no desire to go to college, so me going to college was kind of an accident, but like I said there’s certain events that just happened and they changed my life. Had I not gone to college, who knows? I could have become a bum, or gone in another deep depression, or … shot myself. I don’t know, when I was in those depressions I didn’t care. (U8)

After his degree, Dennis was hired by a company that focused on employing veterans, and he seems to have approached work as a new war: “we treated 65

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war everything like we were going to battle” (U8). He eventually became a workaholic, and colleagues often covered for him when he drank too much or spiraled out of control. Others, like Alfonso (C19), did not manage to return to school. Alfonso had joined M-19 at a young age and lacked a high-school education. He wanted to return to education and initially thought the reintegration program would allow him to do that, but still he could not afford it. Despite coming home to three very different societies, not least in terms of the institutional and economic infrastructure, in the realm of work and pursuing education the experiences across the three cases are in fact quite similar. Due to participation in the war, former combatants experience many life events in the wrong order, and they feel a need to catch up. They can no longer rely on their armed group for sustenance and employment, and thus they are forced to find new ways of supporting themselves (and their families). Accessing programs in order to educate themselves or finding ways to support themselves were common experiences across the three cases. Another key element of coming home was reconnecting with families. This was not always an easy or happy experience. Here the length of the war made a difference across the cases for the type of problems experienced in their families. But what is clear is that family relations suffered and posed a challenge when former combatants came home. The challenge consisted of overcoming the disconnection that had developed over the war, or even dealing with a sense of indebtedness to their families. In the case of the SWAPO former combatants, many of them had been separated from their families for long periods of time, especially as many had participated in the war from abroad (what often was termed exile). Coming home often meant they were dealing with their own or their families’ inability to recognize one another. Sometimes their family had relocated to a new home. However, most described the importance of being welcomed back, and the support their family gave them. Some also had other family members who had participated in the war and struggled more with their return. The situation among former members of M-19 was somewhat different, as many of them stayed in the same town as their families during the conflict, where their activities were carried out in a clandestine manner. This meant many, if not all, had been able to keep some kind of connection with their families during the war. Reconnecting with their families, however, sometimes also entailed overcoming differences in politics in a way that was not the case in Namibia. It was not a given that former M-19 guerrillas were seen as heroes by their families, while for some female combatants, coming home sometimes also meant that they had no choice but to return to their father’s house and take on a more subservient position than they had held during the war. But as in Namibia, the family was also an important provider of support, financially as well as emotionally. 66

Coming home and living peace? In some cases, the emotional and moral support, as well as recognition, only came later:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

in a public speech three months ago surprisingly she [daughter] told me “I understood why you liked M-19 and if by any chance I would need to take arms, I would take them because I understand your motives.” [She] asked me to forgive her for not discussing this issue with me before, but she told me that she identified with the political project and today this is one of my happiest moments. (José, C10)

Vietnam veterans described reconnecting with their family in other terms. In general they had not been away for lengthy periods of time, but of course they had been overseas and separated from their families. Some married just before the war, during the war, or shortly after their return, but the war clearly put a strain on their marriages due to their absence and combat experience. Most described an inability to talk about their war experience with their families. For instance, John notes that “after Vietnam … I couldn’t really talk to my family too much about how I had changed” (U1). They described how they had a different perspective on the war compared to their parents’ generation, and this made it difficult to talk about what they had been through. Dennis was frustrated with this lack of understanding from his family and society: “everybody trusted the government, so when we were speaking out they didn’t get it and I’d be pleading with them – I said ‘I was there, you know’, but they couldn’t do it. Until years later” (U8). This sense of disconnection with their families prompted some to avoid going home and not share their full experience with family members, as in the case of Dennis and Thomas (U10). Thomas saw his family briefly in June when he left Vietnam, but it took him until Christmas that year to feel ready to see them properly; even then, it was largely his employment situation which made him return to his hometown. Thomas met his wife when he was in his forties, and it took twenty years into their marriage (when she encouraged him to seek therapeutic help) before they started talking more seriously about his Vietnam experience. Similarly, Dennis eventually started talking with his second wife about his Vietnam experiences: “We were not aware that I was still suffering from post-traumatic stress, so some of those manifested in our marriage too” (U8). She has helped him overcome some of these challenges, and it has improved both their marriage and his relationship with his grandchildren. Reconnecting and forming a family after the war posed challenges for some interviewees in all three cases. Some former combatants in all three cases expressed a sense of distrust in their family when they came home – they did not know how their families had aligned themselves during the war. Memory retells her experience in Namibia: your family members are the ones that come fetch you, when we left from the exile … you can’t even trust anyone, not even your family members … because of war, you don’t know anymore which group your family members are, so [I was] really

67

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

scared that I might just go home and they might do something to me. We were scared to go home. (N3)

The former combatants described a lack of connection and recognition from their family due to the long separation. Some had lost (parts of) their family during the war, while others were uncomfortable starting a family after the war: “I was afraid of having children. To be honest, I didn’t take the risk and I was afraid because I never want my kids to live the same way as I did” (Angela, C23). Angela added that she also found it hard to feel comfortable in a relationship, and as a result she instead focused on taking care of older and sick family members. Other former combatants described being happy in their own situation yet recount the stories of other families who were less fortunate, or where former combatants were rejected by their family when they came home. In addition to trying to have a family life when they came back from the war, many SWAPO and M-19 former combatants also felt that they had a debt to their families due to events during the war. Their families had suffered during the war, either because of their absence or because their participation in the war had made their families a target for retaliation. José clearly felt this debt: each day you accumulate and accumulate a debt with home, so you reach the point at which you don’t have a home, you don’t have anything! So I dedicated myself to getting a house, reinforcing my children’s studies, studying myself, preparing myself, searching for a way of defending myself economically within life. … personally, I have a historical debt with all of my family, since when I separated from them I couldn’t help them out financially anymore, there was never the possibility, so they remained without studying, most of them. (C10)

Repaying this debt was difficult when he came home: I dedicated myself to recreating everything that I had left, and because when we got to the highest point of the demobilization we were in zeros, I didn’t have a life project, I didn’t have anything. Fortunately, the demobilization began and that allowed us to get some oxygen and think about more advanced stuff. … I started to study and to strengthen my family life and I consolidated that. (C10)

Eventually José was able to help his family and his children, and he is relieved that many of them managed to complete a degree even if it happened later in life. Maria describes how her involvement with M-19 had put her family in harm’s way: I was a danger for them. They didn’t like that I went to visit them, they saw that it was dangerous. My brother felt persecuted. They suffered because I was an M-19 militant. (C21)

If nothing else, former combatants’ families lived with fear and worry for them during the war. But as Alba (C9) noted, while her parents had to deal with many difficulties because of her wartime activities, at least she came back, whereas other parents lost their children. 68

Coming home and living peace?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

In all three cases, some interviewees described how they were afraid to be open about their status as former combatants, and either withdrew from their communities or hid their identity completely for up to twenty years. John describes an encounter just after he left the military: we were sitting in a bar … with our uniforms on and some older fella came over to us and bought us a drink and I thought well that is quite nice, because I had heard stories about getting spit on, and so forth. … I didn’t have that kind of problem but as soon as I got home, I put my uniform away and tried not to think about it again. … And I didn’t admit [to having served in Vietnam], probably for twenty years. (U1)

Having grown older and changed over the course of the war, not all former combatants were instantly recognized by their family and friends. As a result, they did not feel welcomed. There was a lingering sense of being different and distrusted. In Namibia some talked about a divide between those in exile and those who stayed in the country due to the different experiences and conditions that had shaped the respective groups during the war. Those in exile are sometimes depicted as more acutely aware of material things, and prioritizing wealth and financial opportunities, thus invoking a sense of class difference with those who stayed behind. Gerson describes the mistrust on both sides, where for instance the training received in exile is sometimes demeaned, adding “it can still be felt even today. You will still find those that will advance the agenda, that those that came from exile’s time is up or they are incompetent” (N5). Gerson also noted that racial and ethnic awareness differed between the two communities, and other SWAPO former combatants focused on trust difficulties across black and white communities at the end of the war, for instance when the new National Defense Force was created. Sometimes, just the fact of having been a combatant was enough to create a feeling of disconnection and stigmatization: From the moment of the agreements, however you want to call us: ex-combatants, ex-military, demobilized, they are words that lead you to the immobilization, to get stuck, to say to people that the only future remaining for us is that of the war veterans, that you have to sit and wait for death. (Felipe, C16)

Absence, in time and space make a difference here. Rejection was a bigger concern in Colombia, as the war was more divisive, and more political positions were possible. In Namibia, independence is not seen as something you fight against: the war was more of a shared experience across society, thus the gulf between family and the former combatant was smaller. In the United States, meanwhile, returning combatants often did not feel as if their families had the same perspective on the war, and thus found it hard to share their experiences. Across all cases the importance of family is clear, as it is a source of strength and support, even when family relations are challenging. 69

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war Coming home also eroded former combatants’ own sense of security and trust in their communities. The context of Colombia offered a less secure environment to many of the returning M-19 combatants. In fact, it has been noted that about 700 demobilized combatants from different leftist guerilla groups were killed in the early 1990s (Sarrias and Armando 2006), and that 160 former M-19 combatants were killed between 1989 and 2005 (García Durán et al. 2008, p. 35).1 As a result, many former combatants felt unsafe and persecuted, and they describe experiences of family members being blackmailed, threatened, or even kidnapped. This sense of fear subsided faster in Namibia, given the dominant position of SWAPO. But early in the process, just in the moment of coming home, some expressed concerns and fears for their safety. For those who had been accused during the war of spying for South Africa, this fear and experience of persecution continued. Peter notes: “There was a lot of hostility. The SWAPO government … came after me especially and said that [I was] a South African spy. There were so many attempts to get me killed but by the grace of God I survived” (N10). Ndahafa explains how her experience of torture and imprisonment affected her when she came home: some of us were very afraid after the experience we had and we didn’t trust people. I didn’t really join any party up to today … sometimes you are caught up in political discussions but I [avoid such discussions] because sometimes it just causes pain … today I feel comfortable of what I am saying in the presence of freedom fighters … If you want to say there were wrong things done, fine. If you want to keep quiet, fine, it’s your choice. So that is now how I see things. (N13)

SWAPO has been accused of torturing and killing innocent people at Lubango, but so far there has been no public scrutiny of the misdeeds during the struggle akin to the truth and reconciliation process in South Africa (Metsola 2015, p. 238; see also Dobell 1997; Kössler 2007). Moreover, the SWAPO Party has been adamant about repressing internal conflict. Over the years, advocacy groups, activists, and reports have tried to discuss and raise this issue. Issues related to mental and physical health presented another challenge across all three cases. The Vietnam veterans were more explicit about the physical and mental health problems they had dealt with and were dealing with after their return from the war. This may be due to the accessibility of help in relation to these problems as well as a societal habit of voicing these kinds of issues. The fact that the Vietnam veterans are slightly older may also have exacerbated the gravity of some of their concerns. Yet it was clear that former combatants from all three wars faced health challenges. Physical health issues came in a wide range. Some manifested directly during and upon their return, whereas others have developed slowly over the years, becoming increasingly more problematic. Loss of hearing, loss of sight, traumatic brain injury, and problems caused years later by pieces of shrapnel left in bodies 70

Coming home and living peace?

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

were common. Several of the Vietnam veterans were also concerned with the more hidden impact of their exposure to the military herbicide Agent Orange, as well as its potential impact on their children. Many also described fellow combatants who were wounded or developed symptoms later in life, and feel that their life span has been shortened by their war experience either way. Ford notes: virtually all of us had some form of something. … That’s why so many haven’t survived as long as we have. … But most of us, we are not going to survive, we are not going to live to 80, 90 … We all know that we have a handful of years left and that’s it. (U13)

Another challenge for many of the former combatants when they came home was mental health. Psychosocial problems manifested in different ways: in some cases they kept quiet and did not seek help; some succumbed to drinking, nightmares, and various types of asocial behavior which negatively affected their lives and relationships. PTSD was most often named by the Vietnam veterans; they often had periods later in their lives when this resurfaced (triggered by the Gulf War or 9/11, for instance).2 A rare few also noted suicidal tendencies. Drinking was often understood as a way of self-medicating. At the time of interview, some felt that they had overcome these problems, whereas others were still dealing with them. Most noted their own difficulties and/or recall those of close fellow combatants. Ngenokesho describes the problems in the veteran community and also admits that “even myself sometimes I still dream about helicopters … or I am in the battle” (N2). Angela also experienced difficulties with alcohol after coming home: I drank, a lot. I think I drank everything that I had to drink. I was always busy, so if I didn’t have a job, I seek what to do, but I kept myself busy. I lasted six months without a job and it was very tough. I was very, very depressed. (C23)

Summarizing his health problems, Thomas sardonically remarks, “Well, of course something’s wrong with me, I’ve been in combat” (U10). Thomas was 22 years old when he came home, but his PTSD was only diagnosed when he was in his sixties. Around 2004 he filed with the VA and received 10 per cent disability for hearing loss, and 50 per cent for PTSD. He finds it difficult to explain his condition to outsiders, preferring to talk to other veterans about it. Since opening up he has received treatment and help (he meets weekly with his PTSD group), and sleeps much better. Yet he still suffers, and always feels the need to be on ready alert: I mean, you’ve been to sea, you have a knife, I’ve got a knife in my pocket now. All my life … I thought it would have gotten softer as I got older, you know … but boom! You’re up, you know, the hand is like instant, and it’s just … it’s into you. When it triggers it, you just, fight like you train, train like you fight. … And it’s just, boom, it’s there, instantly. (U10)

71

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Charles (U7) and Dennis (U8) also described how this had been a long-term problem in their lives. Charles noted that some of the violent events he participated in during Vietnam had already made him numb during the war, and it is clear that many areas of his life have been affected by his mental health problems. Dennis had drinking problems when he returned from Vietnam, and notes that if they had tried to send him back, “I would have shot myself just dead, I would never go back” (U8). His behavior did get him a meeting with a health professional in the military, but he was simply dismissed and refused help: Shrink talked to me for ten minutes and opened a book, read me a paragraph and he says, “That’s what an alcoholic is, you are an alcoholic and we don’t treat alcoholics.” (U8)

While things have improved somewhat for Dennis, “It’s still a process every day” (U8). Some of those who experienced these difficulties also noted how this helped them understand their fathers in a different way, if their father had also been at war or in the military, as he may have displayed similar problems. Lee talked about how his father, who had served in the Second World War, had cautioned him that taking another life would have a profound effect on him, and Lee felt that may have contributed to his father’s lifelong issues with alcohol. After his own experience of combat, he feels more compassion toward his father. Others were less forthcoming about such personal problems, but touched on their experience of guilt about events during the war, and their sense of failure. For some individuals in all three cases, it was easier to point to difficulties faced by suffering fellow combatants than themselves. In their own lives they felt fortunate and believed they had been capable of handling the challenges of life after war. Yet when describing the condition of fellow former combatants, they talked about poverty, an inability to find work and a lack of protection. Fellow combatants are talked about with compassion and with expressions of a desire to help. Discussions were also tinted with a sense of chance, the feeling that circumstances outside of their control made the difference between being okay and not. For some, this developed into a responsibility to help, as there was a clear sense that what had happened to their fellow combatants could have happened to them. In recognition of the many different outcomes that accompanied life after war, Felipe notes that some of his fellow combatants “turned from warriors into really vulnerable … people, so it was not the same thing for all of us” (C16). Both those that felt fortunate and those who recounted many struggles when coming home often described a sense that some of these challenges faced after war are universal responses to having been at war. For instance, commenting on the war and PTSD, Thomas notes that “we call it a human condition, and this is what [war] does to humans … put in that situation,” (U10); or as observed by Dennis: “being in a war … you’re going to carry that … you’ll never be the 72

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Coming home and living peace? same. You’ll never be the same person and some people it affects more than others and nobody else understands” (U8). Others, while they may have experienced the same difficulties as other former combatants, did not identify these difficulties as a particular hardship, rather expressing a sense of acceptance of these outcomes, seeing them as part of who they are and the path they took in life. Whatever hardships they faced, they feel it was worth it. This was particularly the case for some SWAPO and M-19 interviewees (all very politically driven, with the exception of Hilma who was very religious). They also recognized that other life paths and choices come with their own difficulties, and so choosing a different path may not have been easier. These challenges were ones they chose openly, and in some way have continued to carry with pride. Alba describes this sentiment most clearly: this is the life that I wanted, this is the one that I want, this is the one that I made. And this is the one that fills me up with personal satisfactions, because I can say that I have done things for this country, and I have done it with all the pleasure and I am proud of whom I am. … So I ask myself, would I like to be another woman? I am happy to be who I am. (C9)

Removing these challenges would also mean taking away the experience of war, which would strip them of who they are and what they believe in. Felipe adds: “I would not know what to tell to my grandchildren … if I had not been to the M-19. I feel the M-19, for those who were fortunate to be there, it was our life … the only thing I gained was this: life. Having belonged to the M-19 is the best thing that happened in my life” (C16). However, the sense of agency expressed here, linked to these larger societal processes, was rare. In all three cases, the former combatants faced several challenges, from work opportunities, to reconnecting with their families, their degree of trust in their communities and their own health. While contextual differences between the cases exist, the individuals’ perspectives on coming home and what they had to deal with resonate clearly across the M-19, SWAPO, and Vietnam veterans. Making sense of the peace The issue of peace also came up in many of the interviews with former combatants. The literature on peace and conflict has only since around 2010 started to pay attention to how people make sense of peace (see e.g. Bräuchler 2018; Burgess et al. 2007; Sacipa et al. 2006), but it is clear that this is an important facet of the transition these former combatants faced. This experience differed between the three cases in some ways, as the ends of the three conflicts were very different. In Namibia the war was over and SWAPO were the heroes of the peace and soon took office. While M-19 signed a peace agreement, several other groups were 73

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war still at war with the Colombian government, and a peace agreement was only signed with FARC in 2016 (peace negotiations are ongoing with ELN at the time of writing). Of course, in the United States, the moment of return for each individual was not associated with the end of the war in Vietnam; Robert (U12) was the last of the interview cohort to come home, returning in 1973, two years before the war ended. The different takes on peace range from being at peace in a personal sense, the timing of the peace, and attempts to make themselves the protagonists of the peace, to how reconciliation, compromise, and social transformation are central aspects of how peace is configured. The immediate and personal experience of peace was one key element of how the former combatants described coming home. The idea of a personal peace is the type of peace experience former combatants talked about the most. The first and immediate experience of peace for Jairus was focused on basic everyday things and sensory experiences: “The guns were silenced and nobody really was trying to attack the other. Just knowing that you could sleep at night and could wake up in the morning” (N6). For others like Hilma, the immediate experience of peace was family orientated: “as soon as I came home, when I meet my parents I was at peace” (N9). For some it took years to feel at peace. Among the Vietnam veterans, many noted that it took them a long time to reach the point where they were at peace with the war they participated in, and some still have not. A Namibian veteran, Ngenokesho (N2), explained that it took until the second election after the war before he trusted the peace and felt the situation was more stable. For Ngenokesho, being at peace is also marked by feeling “normal”. Ndahafa, who was tortured and imprisoned by her fellow SWAPO combatants as the war was concluding, also described a long road to a personal sense of peace. When talking about her experiences initially she used to be very emotional and would cry a lot. However, in 2000 she started working with other former combatants with counseling and reconciliation, and after some years, things transformed: “2006, ’07, ’08, maybe around there. It decreased and it appeared that I [could] sit and talk about it without getting angry or getting emotional or whatever” (N13). An important part of her process was realizing that she was not alone with her experience: “then you know that your story was just a story of the liberation struggle” (N13). Fanuel also believed it took years before the country was at peace; he focused on the tensions he felt between the different communities in Namibia: They could not accommodate each other and so I cannot say that peace came immediately after independence. It took a while for people to figure it out … Immediately after independence there was a spirit of fear, and hatred was still there but as time went by this diffused … and we became people of one country. (N8)

Others described how they were stuck in the frame of mind mentioned by Fanuel, and found it hard to change their perspective. Maria (C21) saw peace as a betrayal, 74

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Coming home and living peace? as it was not true to the cause and the other groups who were still at war with the government. The weight of peace was thus felt by several; in fact, peace was often seen as more difficult than war: “it’s easier to live within the war than in the real life” (Angela, C23). Amon (N4) admitted that he wanted more war after independence, simply because that was his life. It was how he lived, and he found it hard to see alternatives. This transition thus required courage and effort. Some of the former combatants still do not feel at peace, such as Mukwanambwa who expressed dissatisfaction, comparing her situation to that of veterans in Zimbabwe: we heard about other countries that were liberated and they were given their share, but as for us in Namibia we didn’t get our proper share. For instance, in Zimbabwe the war veterans don’t do anything, they only report themselves if they are alive and then they receive their money. (N7)

She identifies peace with being compensated and materially well off, which is not her current situation. When Catalina (C18) describes her peace experience, she notes how she is now less emotional, has less fear and takes more responsibility (for herself and others), and that she focuses more on her own life than communal or collective issues. For her, peace was hard work, particularly as she lost many family members due to the war. She sees overcoming violence as a sign of her maturity and how far she has come in life: I understand what violence is and that we are all touched by it. We live in a world in conflict and, unfortunately, sooner or later if we don’t stop this situation, we are going to be victims. That is not a movie, it is real life. There are some frustrations that I feel, not with God or with life, I am in peace with God, and I am at peace with the people that did that to my brothers – God forgive them. I am not God, but I heal my heart, I heal my body because this was hurting me directly. (C18)

She also notes that her experience with loss has made her focus her commitment to the family members who are still alive. Maria (C21) identifies strongly with her armed past and the issues they fought for; she hopes for a peace connected with a different way of doing politics, one that is less attached to specific positions and more open to compromise. Amadeo, reflecting on his different frame of mind during the war, notes: “That was my romantic era, when we had the revolution in our skin. … we had a lot of pain and you think that your pain is going to go away by killing them, but no” (C22), and that in order to move on forgetting is essential. Many of those interviewed expressed hesitations about the timing of the transition to peace. This was particularly apparent in the case of M-19 former combatants, as other groups in the country had either signed peace agreements earlier or continued with their war against the state. As several of the M-19 75

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war leaders had been killed, this tested the commitment to the peace option. It was clear that the group was not fully united behind the decision to sign the peace agreement, and some did not believe it was the right moment for peace. Dante remarks: “I didn’t believe much in peace back then. I didn’t believe that at that time it was the perfect timing for peace” (C17). While Amadeo explicitly disagreed with the peace agreement at the time, he noted that following orders was important to him, so he went along with the peace for that reason. Yet he was not convinced that M-19 would reach their goals through the peace agreement: “We were warriors. We wanted to achieve the goal through the weapons. Nowadays, thinking that way is impossible” (C22). It was clear that the decision to go for peace was made by Carlos Pizarro, then leader of M-19, and the movement followed him. But in fact, in October 1989 the group held a vote on whether or not to give up arms, and 227 voted in favor for doing so out of 230 delegates (García Durán et al. 2008, p. 27). But even in Namibia some were uncertain about the longevity of the peace. Bwilu (N11) was particularly concerned in that he worried about what South Africa would do and whether or not they would respect the peace. Thus, for him, peace was something fragile and requiring vigilance. Others, particularly among the M-19 and SWAPO former combatants, were more convinced when their wars concluded that it had been time to embark on a course of peace. This was particularly underlined by a sense of weariness about the violence, and the harm that the war had caused. Ngenokesho explains, “We are tired of bloodshed because we fought for many years and, therefore, we are saying enough is enough” (N2). At a certain point the costs of war were no longer worth it, and there seemed to be more sensible ways of achieving their goals rather than continuing hostilities. Their commitment to the peace was contingent on seeing alternative ways to reach their goals. Believing in peace at the time when a peace agreement was signed did not mean that combatants reversed their thinking about the war; many still saw the war as justified. For them, believing in peace was not associated with giving up on the cause they fought for. Angela (C23) is someone who believed it was the right time for peace when M-19 ceased military operations, because she saw no other options at that point. Yet she expressed sadness for the people who had already died, as in some way they had died in vain, because to her at the time peace meant giving up on the original cause. Angela’s position highlights how the loss of friends and fellow combatants can push people to stay committed to war rather than opting for peace. However, had they continued to pursue the original goals of the war, she thinks that would have been terrible too: I think we did our best, because anyways we would never have gotten the triumph of revolution, that would never have happened, and if it had, it would have been terrible. Even if it wouldn’t have lasted. (C23)

76

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Coming home and living peace? An argument made particularly among M-19 former combatants relates to their position in the war and after. It is clear that many of the M-19 interviewees tried to be protagonists of peace. They framed this as an active decision to choose peace in a particular moment. There is a sense of honor connected to being the one who strove for peace, the designers of the peace. In this way, peace becomes an achievement in itself. This framing of the peace also has repercussions for former combatants’ understanding of themselves, as individuals who are futureminded and capable. Examples of how this was expressed include: “Who organized this? The members of the M-19, the promoters of the peace, the protagonists, not just anyone” (Alfonso, C19); “M-19 always promoted the peace flag” (Maria, C21); “the peace is one of our contributions, one of the benefits, and one of the biggest legacies. M-19 was the first, and always has been fighting for peace” (Emilio, C14). In fact, their willingness to participate in peace negotiations has also been noted as contributing to the legitimacy and success of the group as a political party (Guáqueta 2007, p. 424). This positioning of course makes sense in the context of Colombia. In Namibia, the final moment of peace and independence was dependent on external events, such as the end of the Cold War. This difference between the various former combatants highlights the difference between a victor’s peace versus a negotiated peace. This positive self-image would not have been possible had the peace been imposed on them. Of course, for the Vietnam veterans, homecoming was not associated with peace or defeat in Vietnam, it was simply the end of their tour, the end of their personal experience of war. Yet some of the Vietnam veterans became engaged in the anti-war movement, and thus a few of them (Charles, Dennis, Ben and Ford) felt they had in fact contributed to stopping the war and ensuring peace in Vietnam. Lee and Thomas disagreed with the war protesters and wrote them off as cowards at the time, but later changed their minds and came to see this differently. Several interviewees from all three cases explained how a central aspect of peace, and achieving peace, was reconciliation and compromise. Rebuilding trust between different segments of society, being able to live together and respecting others’ as well as their opinions was stressed as central for the continued development of peace in both Colombia and Namibia. Peace in this sense is seen as healing wounds. This issue was experienced on a personal level, with specific individuals, but also in terms of the greater vision for society and reconciling those visions across different constituencies.3 A mixed economy was identified as an example of this kind of reconciliation and compromise. For Ngenokesho, stability and reconciliation go hand in hand. He stressed the importance of solving things together, working together. Meeting an opponent with this kind of attitude also made it easier for them to change their ways and mindset. For Ngenokesho, recognizing different opinions was important; he came to appreciate that even those you disagree with can have 77

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war good intentions and also help contribute to a solution to the problem, ultimately making the solutions better. To him, a tolerant public debate is central for peace: “we need peace and we can only maintain peace when we don’t insult one another” (N2). Fanuel (N8) also stressed the importance of working together with the enemy. To him, rewriting the constitution together was a prime example of this. He expressed the belief that it is important not to turn completely against your enemy, but instead ensure that there is space for them as well. Only then can you create a new community, and to him this is central to achieving peace. A few Vietnam veterans talked about reconciliation, noting their engagement with Vietnam after the war (either through visiting the country or paying attention to political developments there, or engaging with the Vietnamese community in the United States). Yet most of the Vietnam veterans hardly mentioned Vietnam in their narratives. Ford was one of the exceptions, talking about meeting Vietnamese people both in and outside of Vietnam, and how these meetings have not been easy but nonetheless beneficial: “it’s been helpful … to meet people that you spent 18 months trying to destroy”; describing one particular encounter, he recalls meeting a woman “in her fifties, you know, and we’ve more or less made peace” (U13). Forgiveness is also seen as a part of peace, albeit something that is difficult to achieve. Catalina stressed forgiveness as being central to peace and reconciliation, which for her involved letting go of her anger toward family members who she felt had gotten themselves killed: “you must remain committed to peace. I think that the option is peace and we have to do anything in our hands to achieve peace” (C18). For her, overcoming this anger is also important; she feels that she needs to set an example for her nieces and nephews, so that they will also continue to choose peace (particularly in a country where armed conflict is still ongoing): Those men that we are raising can contribute to the peace in this country. That is my main concern with the older son of [name], my disappeared brother. Because when he has clarity of what happened to my brother, we [must not] let him take the wrong path, he has to be a big man for this society. (C18)

For some, peace has also meant needing to stay quiet about some things. Ndahafa noted that even limited acceptance of guilt and compensation without an apology can help achieve reconciliation. For her it is understandable that some individuals are angry about the injuries they suffered during the war; she believes that whether people are able to come to terms with and accept their situation or if it becomes a lingering trauma depends a lot on personal mindset. Ndahafa has found it important to stand up for herself and be honest about what happened to her, as this helps her let go of her anger and grief. Ndahafa also recognizes that sometimes you need to stay quiet, as speaking her truth in every situation may not always be helpful: “I will not say ‘Dungeons’ just to bring it 78

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Coming home and living peace? up like that. I can talk about it when it is necessary, but I will not really want to disturb the peace” (N13). One’s own pain is not an isolated event or experience; seeing it as part of a larger process and as a societal experience also makes it easier to let go of it. Similarly, Camila (C4) also recognized that sometimes for the sake of reconciliation you have to avoid confronting people, and decide to set aside the conflict. Peace was also made sense of through the actual issues behind the conflict, and identified with social transformation among the M-19 and SWAPO former combatants. The causes for which SWAPO and M-19 fought also became closely identified with the peace. Hence, in cases where these issues are left unresolved, for many this points to an unfinished peace. The issues behind the conflict are constitutive of former combatants’ understanding of peace. The Namibian combatants tended to stress land reform and socialism, as well as the independence of their country, whereas the Colombian combatants stressed democracy more. But common for all of them was the importance of social and political reform, achieving a better life and eradicating socioeconomic inequalities. For them, peace means social and political transformation. Alba stresses social reform and democracy in her conceptualization of peace, yet she notes how M-19 used their guns to force a democratic dialogue: war was an instrument of social transformation … So we thought our struggle was a struggle for democracy and it must be armed in order for them to listen to us. … We were not interested in killing half of humanity, no, and that was not our interest. Our interest was to make them listen to us … there are people who just listen when there are shots. We had to shoot in order for them to listen to us. (C9)

Fanuel stresses the importance of a country where everyone enjoys personal freedoms in his conception of peace: “We were not fighting the color of their skin, we were fighting the system where we were denied, denied access to our country” (N8). In addition, he underlines the importance of democracy and especially the importance of accepting different opinions: we have to live with different opinions, and people in the country expressing different views and whatever, and that is good. It is not [the case that] because I fought, I will be a dictator and say “We fought for this country, we are the only ones” … We should be [a] democracy because that’s where we get our salvation as a nation. (N8)

Similarly, Alfonso commented on the democratic shortcomings in Colombia against which he and M-19 fought. To him, this fight (particularly the treatment of the indigenous community) was also what motivated the peace agreement: Our indigenous couldn’t have universal rights, global rights, they were not recognized for anything at all. They were treated as minors in political issues. … And the political constitution must be reformed, the old one. … the government was willing to give those steps … And that’s why the peace process was signed. (C19)

79

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Several of the SWAPO veterans expressed that they do not feel fully at peace, and even many years after the end of the war do not believe peace has been fully achieved. They identified the existence of injustices in their society such as poverty, lack of food, lack of land reform, and not having access to welfare as signs of an imperfect peace, clearly formulating their understanding of peace along the lines of positive peace (mirroring other findings of peace conceptualization long after the end of the war, see Firchow and Mac Ginty 2017, pp. 7–8). Peter, a PLAN former combatant, notes: I don’t feel at peace in this country … You could have come early this morning, you could have seen a lot of people sitting here because injustice is still here. If you go to [township in Windhoek] we have more than three thousand children living as modern slaves between the ages of 10 and 18 from Angola but we pretend like it is not happening. How can you feel at peace or what peace are we talking about? (N10)

What peace is, who owns it, if it is achieved, and what reaching it requires, personally and socially, are questions which inform the way peace is made sense of by former combatants together with the rest of their societies. As such, peace forms part of their understanding of what coming home entails. Here, M-19 and SWAPO former combatants clearly differed from the Vietnam veterans, as social transformation at home was more closely identified with peace for them, for instance. Peace was also discussed more widely by the M-19 and SWAPO former combatants than by the Vietnam veterans. How people made sense of peace on a more personal level, however, was more similar across the three groups. “It stays with you” Coming home was a watershed moment in the lives of these former combatants; it represents time lost too, while also amounting to a long-term transition and process. In turn this also means that the division between war and peace in individual lives is not particularly clear-cut. This could be seen in the conceptions of coming home explored in this chapter, and in how this experience is understood by those interviewed in the three cases. The chapter has unpacked how coming home and its associated hardships were lived through, including the reception from both the state and society at large, and how ideas of peace have figured in former combatants’ lives since coming home. For some, coming home is a war in itself. But there was a lot of variation here within each case; for some, coming home is associated with a greater degree of agency and empowerment, whereas others felt subjugated and alone, and found coming home was a struggle. Questions of how to take responsibility and power over your own life were clearly central issues in the homecoming process. Overall, however, the type of problems and challenges faced upon coming home are very similar across the three cases. This 80

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Coming home and living peace? is quite notable, given the differences in war experiences, and capacities of their receiving societies. The moment of coming home was often abrupt and emotional. It was a moment of both happiness and trepidation (socially, economically, and politically). For many interviewees, this societal shift also required a personal shift in their frame of mind; in addition, many felt transformed by the war experience itself. Thus, they did not come home as the same people they had been before the war. Home was alien to some degree, as has been suggested by others as well (Diehl 1993, p. 232; Leed 1979, p. 213; for another take on the blurred boundaries of home, also see Shapiro 2011). While coming home can be a fundamental point of inflection in life, the war is also carried over, and is carried with them across their lives. In this sense, it has become clear in this chapter that the experience of homecoming is actually quite similar, irrespective of the war fought. The struggle with “home” often related to issues of employment, making up for lost time, a lack of trust in both close family members and people in general, mental health issues, and a sense of disconnection from their families, as well as feeling the weight of a debt that needed to be repaid. It was clear that the Vietnam veterans were in general facing more health issues than the M-19 or SWAPO former combatants, issues they felt had been exacerbated by their military service but which had resurfaced due to their advancing age. This alienness, or disconnection, also means that former combatants become lumped together, both by themselves and their surrounding communities, reinforcing their identity as veterans as well as their network. Later chapters will further explore the resonance and ramifications of the homecoming of former combatants, in particular the next chapter which focuses on the interviewees’ identity as veterans, former independence fighters, and ex-guerrillas. This chapter has already made clear how issues of responsibility, dependency, sacrifice, and preferential treatment are central to this conversation. As the former combatants position themselves vis-à-vis the state, their political path after coming home starts to form. If we are to understand the personal transition of coming home, we also need to take into account former combatants’ understanding and positioning in relation to the peace. SWAPO won the peace, and M-19 decided to sign a peace deal, whereas the Vietnam veterans came home in a piecemeal fashion, and ultimately “lost the war”. This becomes part of their own narrative of coming home, and they have to position themselves in relation to their “peace”. The former combatants try to make sense of the peace by discussing its timing, positioning their own ownership of it, as well as through discussing their own personal and immediate experience of peace. In this chapter it became clear that issues of reconciliation and forgiveness, as well as how conflict issues have been resolved are central to their construction of peace. Peace is seen as a social transformation, and for some the peace is yet to be achieved. However, positioning 81

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war themselves as peace protagonists often became a part of how these former combatants viewed themselves. This chapter has shown how coming home is extended in time for these former combatants. The M-19 combatants had been home for on average twentyfour years when they were interviewed, the SWAPO combatants for twenty-eight years, and the Vietnam combatants forty-two years. All were in their late twenties or early thirties when they came home from the war, and this process has to a large degree colored their life after this point. So, while coming home was experienced as a watershed moment, it is also extended in time. This temporal extension occurs both in terms of “coming home” in itself but also as the legacies of this experience influence their political life paths after the war. As former combatants come home, they carry with them the goals of the war, policies of the state upon their return, and how society receives them – all of this colors them politically. How the war and homecoming experiences color their political identity is the topic of the next chapter. Notes 1 Some estimates suggest even more former guerrillas were killed during this period, Guáqueta pointing to a number in excess of one thousand in total (2007, p. 418). Irrespective of the exact amount, given that the total number of demobilized guerrillas was about five thousand, it is clear that a substantial portion were targeted and killed (for more on security experiences of demobilized combatants in Colombia, see Dudouet et al. 2012; Le Blanc 2013; Nussio 2011b). 2 Interestingly, the speech pattern of those former combatants who confirmed they had PTSD was notably different. They tended to continue talking and respond instantly after a question had been posed. This instant response tendency has been demonstrated elsewhere as well (Fragkaki et al. 2017; Hagenaars 2016). 3 The centrality of trust and recognition for peace at different levels of analysis has been stressed elsewhere too. For more on this, see Söderström et al. (2020).

82

3

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity

W

hat does it signify to these former combatants to be a “veteran”? How

is it filled with meaning and how is it understood politically? This chapter shows how people’s experience as former combatants is turned into a veteran identity; the way that veteran identity is formulated contains an impetus for political action. The chapter goes on to examine how this identity is constructed by the former combatants themselves. This is central to capturing an insider’s perspective of how these former combatants understand and depict their own political mobilization across their lifetimes. By examining what values and roles they associate with being a veteran, we can disentangle what that implies for their life paths and political choices (Simon and Klandermans 2001, p. 327). These identity expressions shape the various former combatants’ individual political mobilization and engagement with the network of other former combatants, respectively the topics of the next two chapters. This chapter shows how these former combatants have been made (and make themselves) political at different stages, and how the war itself and also coming home influence this process. The veteran identity is salient for almost everyone, and, as they tell us, the importance of this identity has increased over time. For most, the war experience is inescapable, not least because war is something which society positions itself in relation to, as well as against. Aspects of this veteran identity imply political engagement: for instance, “duty”, “responsibility”, and “service to others” are named as common traits by participants from all three cases, as obligation during war translates to an obligation to be engaged with society in peacetime. A culture of heroes also plays a role in shaping this identity, whether through ideologues or other veterans (often fathers), or the failure to be a hero. For many this translates into a preference for veteran politicians and an obligation to engage with their community. These identity traits connect to ideals that accompanied their wartime activities, while other aspects are more closely tied to their experiences of coming home. One central element of this identity relates to how veterans position themselves as worthy, and deserving of recognition, which in turn gives them political capital 83

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war or political influence in their respective societies. Many former combatants position themselves as neglected and forgotten, and deserving of preferential treatment due to their war experience and achievement (or treatment after the war). These claims for recognition are connected to the overall war legacy, how the war as a whole is understood, and what it was seen as achieving or delivering. Here there are large differences between the three cases. The war in Namibia led to independence, and in Colombia to constitutional reform (among other things), whereas the Vietnam War was generally perceived as a defeat for the US forces, and a politically controversial and morally unjust war at that. This resulted in protests against the war around the country (and even globally). Yet, as WagnerPacifici and Schwartz also argue, questions of “courage, self-sacrifice and honor” infuse the Vietnam War like other wars (1991, p. 376). Thus, the Vietnam veterans in particular were constrained in relation to the question of what was achieved, and ultimately had to resort to other kinds of arguments to substantiate their claim to recognition. For all former combatants, the war and the experience of coming home become refracting lenses which either reinforce their political identity, or transform it. The way in which they recreate a meaningful past contributes to their identity, as well as providing a path for the future. In this chapter it becomes obvious that this meaning-making applies to individuals just as much as previous research has demonstrated that it applies to states (see Friedman 1992, p. 194). While shifts have occurred, the main observation is one of the continued – or reinforced – salience of the veteran label across their lifetimes. Most of those interviewed strongly identified with their armed group and their combat experience. It is clear that many conceive of their life as largely determined by their war experience, and that without it they would be someone else. Simply put, being a veteran is important to who they are. This identity builds on the war experience and the experience of coming home as a veteran. Both of these experiences are key processes for the constitution of this identity. This chapter will show how this identity in turn becomes a political identity. Most of the SWAPO veterans strongly identified with their war experience. Some typical responses here include: “even if I don’t have a gun, I am still a fighter” (Memory, N3); “the struggle was my classroom. … I think who I am today has more to do with my being in the struggle” (Jairus, N6); or as Fanuel notes, placing more emphasis on the specific group they belonged to during the war, for me as far as SWAPO is concerned, I considered it to be as my parent, it’s like that is my house. If they beat me, kick me wherever I go is SWAPO that is where I consider it. … I claimed it loud and I said it bold, I am a veteran. There is no one who would come and say you don’t deserve it. (N8)

Among the SWAPO veterans, two had a less clear relationship with this identity. Peter and Ndahafa had been accused of spying during the war, and suffered from 84

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity imprisonment and torture as a result. Even if Ndahafa had parted ways with SWAPO, she still clearly identifies as a veteran: “I feel like it’s my choice, I will go and register myself, I am a veteran, man!” (N13). Peter, in contrast, identifies more clearly with SWAPO, despite being considered as an enemy within SWAPO ranks: “right now I feel at last I was vindicated and that is where I belong in any event and that’s who I am” (N10). Their identity as former M-19 guerillas was just as important to the former combatants in Colombia. For some of the M-19 former combatants the trajectory of their political identity started prior to the war, as they often conceived of their participation in the conflict as the outcome of their political motivations. Thus here, the centrality of the veteran identity and its importance in their life is even more colored by these ideological beginnings. Their descriptions of this identity also included parental metaphors (as in the SWAPO case) and a sense of destiny. Examples include: “The M-19 identity is always with you, it never leaves” (Juan, C3); “It is a part of my life. It determines every activity I engage in. … I never stopped being a part of M-19” (Julio, C7); “we were militants, our lives were no longer work or home: our life was revolution. Our life is the revolution” (Jaime, C11); “Having belonged to the M-19 is the best thing that happened in my life” (Felipe, C16). Others, like Maria (C21), recognized that perhaps M-19 had not completely defined everything, but had still governed most of their life and life outcomes, such as where they had lived, who they had married, as well as their political choices. Nonetheless, Maria described her commitment to M-19 as a bond, where she tied herself to the group and its cause irrevocably, detailing sacrifices made to serve M-19 (for instance, not being able to live with her children at times). There are also some individuals who, over time, separated themselves more from this identity and the network of fellow combatants. Estella (C8) and Angela (C23) argued that this identity was the basis of who they are, but that they managed to take a different path many years after leaving the group. M-19 does not form an active part of their lives today, yet they are very cognizant of their history within M-19, noting that they still respect and identify with it. Angela, who found coming home from the war very challenging, describes M-19 as “the family which sustained me for so many years” (C23). Among the Vietnam veterans, it was also clear that their identity as veterans was central. Commenting on how much of his life was determined by his veteran identity, Lee says, “It’s everything”, adding that he “never really wanted it to be like that” (U5). Similarly, others described it as the core part of their identity, explaining how without it they too would have been someone completely different. The experience had changed their view of the world and life. It was also clear that for several interviewees their degree of identification as veterans had increased over time since coming home. And while challenges, sadness, and other difficult life experiences were connected with this, this identity was also filled with positive 85

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war associations. For example, Francis, sitting in an office filled with books about Vietnam, notes that in terms of lifetime experiences, Vietnam was in fact the best of his life: “it certainly informed who I am. … I am a much better man because of it, you know, I believe that and … the military too [laughs]” (U2). Clearly, the veteran identity is central and salient in all three cases. Given the ways that the participants were recruited to participate in an interview, the label’s salience is unsurprising. The more important question is how this identity is filled with meaning, and how it has been molded by the experience of the war and of coming home. The next section describes what being a “veteran” entails and the meaning-making that surrounds this veteran identity. After that, the chapter discusses how claims for recognition shape their political identity as veterans, before shifting to how the war and the experience of coming home have continually reinforced or transformed their political identity. Culture of heroes The meaning associated with being a veteran was very similar across the three cases despite the large differences between these wars. The relative emphasis on certain traits varies somewhat between the three cases, but for all three groups of former combatants, a culture of heroes (ideologues, veterans, fathers) was very important in defining who they are themselves. These heroes were often depicted by the notions of “taking responsibility”, “service”, and “duty”, and thus this also informed ideas of who a veteran is, even if the group toward whom service and duty are directed varied. All of these aspects of how the veteran identity is formulated contain seeds for political impetus. Below we see how this happens across the three cases. Among the M-19 members, the iconography of former combatants, heroes, ideologues who had passed away, was incredibly important when they tried to define who they had been and who they are. These historical heroes form the M-19 culture of heroes. Many of their recollections of the war, and also their mobilization into politics and the process of joining M-19, were littered with references to specific individuals, heroes, socialists, Marxists, communists, nationalists, and so on, both from Colombia and many other countries; the fact that a number of the heroes had died only reinforced the M-19 former combatants’ commitment to them.1 The M-19 heroes (and former leaders) provided moral guidance: The nuns at school made us pray for the death of Fidel Castro. So I started to have a political position, I saw the nuns as the wrong ones and the bearded men from Cuba as the right ones. I realized that there were social injustices and there were rich people and poor people. (Maria, C21) We cried when those leaders were killed, they would be great men in this country because they were great men with a lot of knowledge. I make them a bow because they had a lot of knowledge, they were formed in Russia. (Celestina, C20)

86

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity The prominent position of these ideologues as heroes goes hand in hand with ideology being an important determinant of how former M-19 combatants define themselves. The centrality of ideology comes through in their expression of specific ideals; ideals they fought for during the war, and ideals they continue to fight for after the war, in their political as well as professional life. The M-19 former combatants display a large degree of continuity in adhering to these ideals throughout their lives, using many different key words to describe them (as it may not have been an entirely coherent ideology): progressive; leftist; “fighting for the people”; liberal; nationalist; for democracy; housing rights; women’s rights. Even the idea of an ideology is seen as something which keeps the former members of M-19 together, and why so many continued with politics after the war. As a result, many of the M-19 former combatants also identified with the political parties, particularly AD/M-19 and the Progresistas, which grew out of the same network and ideology as the original M-19 group. When new politicians were perceived as echoing the ideology of M-19 years after the war, this remobilized some to return to politics (see Chapter 5). However, irrespective of their particular political party choice and partisan identity, for many of the research participants, it was clear that being political, or being an activist, were important aspects of the M-19 identity. Some of the SWAPO veterans also linked their veteran identity with ideals and ideology, such as socialism, participation in or resistance to the Cold War, and the importance of development. But in general, compared to the M-19 interviewees, they spent less time on the political content of their identity. Several also saw themselves as partisans of SWAPO, and only a few (Hilma, N9, Sackaria, N12, and Ndahafa, N13) clearly placed themselves outside of that category today. Here we also see the centrality of heroes, both national (SWAPO leaders) and international ones such as Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King, Che Guevara, and Fidel Castro, who are all regarded as examples of how to live one’s life. For instance, for Fanuel, who was born outside of Namibia, Che Guevara showed how one should live: I saw it as a global issue and as I said, you know, Che Guevara, who went to fight for the independence of Cuba, is not a Cuban, he is from Argentina and he met Fidel Castro and his brothers then he took that war and it became his life. So, that really enlightens some of us who have to do the same thing – you should leave your country and go somewhere. So for me that is it, I felt that I should do it. (N8)

Among the Vietnam veterans, in contrast, veteran identity was not linked to one specific political partisanship. Instead, the Vietnam veterans’ political affiliations were spread across the Democrats, Republicans (pro-Trump and antiTrump), and independents. This lack of a single shared partisan link among all former combatants does not mean, however, that the veterans’ identity was 87

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war apolitical; most were clearly politically passionate and involved. Other forms of ideologies and values underscored their participation in the war and what it meant to be a veteran. The Vietnam veterans often talked about the values and character connected with being a veteran. Rather than ideologues, it was other veterans who were the heroes to the Vietnam former combatants. Thus, here too we see a culture of heroes. For this group, a veteran is morally courageous, someone who supports, protects, and defends, and does service for others not themselves. They take responsibility for their actions. Their responsibility and duty were often directed at other combatants or veterans, either during war or peace. The camaraderie and strong sense of responsibility for each other, which has carried over to the present, comes through in this quote from Charles, who was wounded in Vietnam: It’s us against them, and it’s not so much about our officers or commanders, it’s about the guys we’re with. We have to work together and we’re trying to keep each other alive and at the same time we want to make sure that if [there is] anybody that’s a danger to us, we gotta kill ’em. That’s all there is to it. (U7)

The role of duty and service, for country and countrymen, borders on an ideology for the Vietnam veterans. For a few, the ideology was more explicit: fighting communism and defending South Vietnam was part of their idea of protecting their own country, and its position in the world. Francis notes: “I always believed that we help our allies … Vietnam was trying to be a democracy and the Communists were trying to take the country away … I believed in the purpose” (U2). And Bob observes that “Ever since the 1920s, communism has been a real threat in this country” (U3). Thomas (U10), in contrast, confirmed that this ideology was part of the decision to go to war but that he himself did not reflect upon it all that much. Many of the Vietnam veterans also linked their military service and veteran status to their fathers’ service (often during the Second World War), and this meant their decision to join or be recruited was less of a choice – they were simply doing their duty. Karner has noted how the fathers of many Vietnam veterans represented an ideal of masculinity, and how soldiers’ participation in the Second World War and the reception when they came home is contrasted with that of the Vietnam generation: their fathers came home to parades and a grateful nation, while the Vietnam veterans’ history of coming home falls short in comparison (Karner 1996). This contrast and ideal were reflected in the interviews for this book as well. In fact, I would argue that the Second World War fathers become part of the Vietnam veterans’ culture of heroes. Charles describes the appeal and how he felt he was following in the footsteps of this older generation: I grew up in the shadow of Second World War veterans and I had heard a lot of stories. Clearly, the allied forces were able to defeat Nazi regime, fairly effectively, they

88

“Veteran” as a political identity

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

were able to destroy the Japanese war machine. … I had relatives that were involved in that, so I kind of grew up thinking that, well, gee … This is what we do. And as I get older, I suppose I might have that responsibility or opportunity, and I thought, well, it’s my opportunity to serve my country. (U7)

Similarly, Ben notes: “my father and my uncles all served in the Second World War. They were patriotic, it was the kind of thing that you do. … it had a certain macho aspect to it which appealed to me” (U11). The fathers who had served in the Second World War rarely talked about their experience, but after the Vietnam veterans came home some discovered more about the difficulties their fathers had faced (similar mental health problems, PTSD, drinking, etc.). Lee (U5) noted that not just their fathers but also their mothers had contributed significantly to the war effort. It was clear that the legacy of this generation – the Greatest Generation – weighed heavily on the shoulders of Vietnam veterans. Although previous generations’ military service in earlier conflicts seemed to play a big role for Vietnam veterans, a few of the SWAPO and M-19 veterans noted that other family members (older generations) participating in the same war were also part of their motivation. Many more, of course, noted the difficulties their parents and grandparents had lived through as part of their motivation for joining their armed group. Their own war participation therefore became central to their family history. For former combatants in all three cases, the notions of service and duty were central to their conceptions of their war participation; these colored their ideas of how to participate in politics after war, and ultimately what it means to be a veteran. The SWAPO veterans stressed their responsibility and duty to the political party, while among Vietnam veterans this duty was primarily directed at their country and other veterans. In contrast, duty and responsibility among M-19 veterans was directed at the people, and in particular the poorer members of society. For instance, Gregorio notes that “You are always at the service of the poorest one and the less fortunate” (C13). Meanwhile, Emilio stresses “that is like a lesson from the parents, it is like a family legacy. You have to serve people, do things that are going to be useful for people and also help to build things” (C14). It is clear that in the Colombian context particularly, the former combatants sense they have a duty beyond themselves, and with this comes an obligation to continue into the future with their commitment; in some cases this extends beyond themselves to an expectation placed on their children as well. But it is clear that the people − the public − are their main counterpart (to whom they owe service). The focus on duty and being responsible is not only how they want to portray themselves to the public; it is also how they conceive of themselves across all three cases. Being a veteran is associated with being orderly, disciplined, honest, and trustworthy. Doing your duty also means following orders, which for the 89

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war Vietnam veterans means they felt they were not responsible for the war itself. For Robert it was clear that the veterans themselves cannot be judged for the war: “The people that are in the military just follow the orders; they don’t get a choice in the matter. … Politicians are the ones that made those decisions” (U12). Soldiers, in contrast with others who stayed home, did their duty. For some veterans, the real hero is the person who goes even when they do not want to. Situating their veteran identity in this way makes it easier to be proud, or at least come to terms with having participated in a controversial war like Vietnam; for some, stressing duty is a way to absolve themselves of some of the guilt they may carry in relation to the conflict. Having done your duty in the past, however, also entails an ongoing desire to do your duty in the present. The SWAPO veteran Jairus, who trained as a teacher during the war, notes that the experience of the war itself gave him access to education, developed his skills, and gave him experiences abroad, and thus he feels a duty to pay back this debt: “Those of us who were fortunate enough to have gone [into exile] … should actually just assist other countrymen and women” (N6). For him, the experience of war has given him privileges and propelled him forward in life; after coming home this has given him a moral responsibility to help others and the country further. The idea of duty is noticeable in the way in which veterans stress how they are upstanding citizens who contribute to society. Here the function of duty is to offer some resistance to the trope of former combatants as violent, crazy, and criminal. This was especially pronounced among the Vietnam veterans who faced negative portrayals in films and other media, but the issue was present among the other groups as well. Charles struggles with this and asks: “Was I a baby killer? … was I involved in massacres? No, I was just a soldier” (U7). Across all groups, the idea of duty and idolizing the veteran often translated into a preference for politicians who are also veterans. A veteran past was deemed as a shortcut for identifying politicians with what they saw as being the right values and right priorities, as well as finding politicians who are more like themselves (i.e., more able to represent them). Non-veteran politicians are often seen as opportunistic in comparison to veteran politicians. Many of them believe politics would be well-served if more politicians were veterans due to their sense of civic duty. Among the Vietnam veterans it was also the case that a politician’s veteran status could trump party loyalty, and lead them to vote for the party they usually would not support. For instance, Lee (who considers himself a Democrat) saw John McCain as a hero, simply because McCain was a navy guy like me and so I supported him unconditionally … in my mind he was a hero … I know now he was an opportunist politically and so forth, but nonetheless, he was a shipmate and so I supported him. (U5)

90

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity Across the three cases, being a veteran was also associated with military traits, and an emphasis on combat experience and skills. In the case of the SWAPO veterans and the Vietnam veterans, this was clearly linked to being part of a regular state-sanctioned military (either during or after the war). Their military identity was associated with following orders, efficiency, and dedication. For Charles, it was important that the veteran paraphernalia he wears today indicates that he was a combat veteran. This military identification was a combination of their war experience within the military and also coming home and continuing on that path. This was particularly the case among the veterans who had a continued military (or police) career. For the SWAPO and Vietnam veterans, a professional military identity excludes being politically active. As long as you are in the military, you need to be apolitical and private about your political position. You can be a party member in secret, but you do not talk loudly about it or participate in rallies and so forth. The M-19 former combatants who stressed this part of their identity, tended simply to use militarized terms to describe themselves, for example stressing their combat skills, military skills, being a rebel, or that they in some ways followed the military tradition of their fathers. But for them this was not incompatible with being political. The idea of the veteran is filled with meaning in the three different contexts, and this identity is a central element of how former combatants define themselves. This is not to say other experiences or traits were unimportant for the participants’ identity. However, only a few clearly saw their veteran identity in conflict with other elements of their identity. The conflict was mainly centered on their family life and their roles as father, mother, wife, or husband, or the idea of having a family life at all. This occurred for both men and women, but the female former combatants alluded to it somewhat more often.2 One Vietnam veteran was particularly uncomfortable with all labels, and did not voice an identity conflict, but simultaneously expressed a multitude of possible identities while not wanting to associate with any of them himself (Jacob, U4). To summarize, duty and service to others are the most common traits associated with veteran identity, and in most cases various heroes form part of how the veteran role is defined. However, there is a clear difference between M-19 and SWAPO veterans and Vietnam veterans. The M-19 and SWAPO veterans had ideological heroes whereas the American veterans saw other veterans as heroes. All these heroes, however, were individuals whose choices and life deeds inspired the participants’ own life paths, how they wished to see themselves, and what path they should take in the future. Claims for recognition – achievements and grievances As well as being inspired by past heroes, claims for recognition were part of the participants’ identity construction.3 The question of who recognizes you, and 91

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war for what reason, was important for many of the former combatants. The state is one of several reference points from which recognition was sought or received. Previous research has shown how war and its associated achievements and adversities have become part of such claims for recognition (see e.g. Brooks 2004, p. 5; Christensen 2017, p. 25; Eichler 2014, p. 605; Kriger 2003, p. 187); here we also see how the reception when coming home (and associated hardships) forms part of what former combatants feel should be recognized by the state, by society overall, but also by their children, history, by other veterans, and by themselves. It is clear that while many respondents had experienced some degree of recognition from these sources, longing for recognition dominates their narrative. Seeking recognition is also intrinsically linked to seeking space and voice in a polity (see e.g. Hobson 2003; Hobson et al. 2007, p. 444; Phillips 2003). These demands for recognition become part of the public debate, partly as material demands in relation to policy, but also as such demands shape the way the history of the war is viewed. Moreover, the ways in which these demands become part of the public debate shape who is deemed to belong to society. They also form the bedrock for how former combatants understand their place in society and their reasoning behind their choices to mobilize or not, and for what causes. In all three cases the research participants attempted to justify their participation in the war. However, it was not pressed as much among the SWAPO veterans as their achievement was a given, and less porous, having created a new and independent state. In contrast, the M-19 and Vietnam veterans actively positioned their achievement (or grievance) in order to become deserving of recognition. The M-19 fought against the state as one of many guerrilla groups, and thus they stressed their contribution to the democratization and reform of Colombia, arguing that the war they participated in made the country better for poorer people. In contrast, the Vietnam veterans emphasized their duty and sacrifice as grounds for their recognition, accepting that the war itself and its outcome cannot be claimed as a merit in itself. The former combatants also expressed pride in their past. Veterans across all three cases recognized their own achievements, but this was done in different ways depending on the war. The SWAPO and M-19 former combatants focused on how they had served their country and society, and the resulting change in their respective nations. This issue was particularly stressed among the M-19 interviewees, in part because the achievement of the SWAPO former combatants could almost be taken as a given, whereas the M-19 had to make their achievement more explicit. The M-19 former combatants, as they continue to strive for credit, described their involvement in the war, and their armed group as worthy of recognition. They see themselves as examples worthy of imitating; as such, they self-identify as heroes. For instance, Alba, who explicitly sought out M-19

92

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity in order to join, expresses pride and a sense of achievement when discussing her participation in M-19, and the war: “I can say that I have done things for this country, and I have done it with all the pleasure and I am proud of who I am” (C9). Similarly, José notes that he “was part of the solution … I realized that everything I did was for the country, for the nation” (C10). At the same time this achievement and pride can be tainted with guilt, as with Camila (C4), whose son was killed. She felt her achievements and life goals within M-19 had inspired and encouraged him to be politically active which, in turn, put him in harm’s way. Some of the Vietnam veterans also expressed a sense of pride and personal achievement. However, they focused on specific and personal achievements during the war, and the manner in which they served (often referring to medals earned) rather than the outcome of the war. For instance, Bob notes that “it was my honor and privilege to be able to serve my country. I am so proud of my military service” (U3). Francis (U2), meanwhile, was particularly proud of the rank he had achieved during the war. On the other hand, Dennis, who has struggled with PTSD and drinking since coming home, described a sense of conflict, and how for a long time he did not feel proud. After the Memorial Wall was built, this shifted somewhat for him: I never told anybody I got medals, I never told anybody anything, and then I finally went up in the attic and pulled them out and looked and said wow, you know … instead of thinking I did something wrong it made me feel good that I did stand up and serve my country, even though what we did I think was horrible. (U8)

Dennis thus separates his own achievement from that of the war overall. The Vietnam veterans were sensitive to what is claimed, specifically what each person did and did not do during the war. Bob was keen to stress that he did not serve overseas, noting how important it is not to overstate your achievements: “I don’t claim to be something I am not” (U3). They see it as necessary to guard these limits, continually demarcating who is “deserving”, who is a real veteran, a real hero. Asking for recognition also means they have to be open about their identity, exposing them to stigma and social exclusion, lack of job opportunities, and sometimes even security risks. As a result, many were careful of who they shared their veteran identity with. This dilemma was experienced by former combatants in all three cases, even if the potential costs varied between the cases. It was most problematic in Colombia, as former guerillas were often the target of violence there, particularly during the 1990s, and the least problematic in Namibia. The Vietnam veterans often hid their identity in the early years (in contrast with veterans of other generations), but as the social stigma lessened, they became increasingly open about their participation in the war (particularly after the

93

Living politics after war construction of the Vietnam Memorial Wall). Early on, however, their veteran identity was associated with a lot of guilt and shame over participating in the war and the things they did during the conflict. Dennis, who had kept his medals a secret, notes:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

you are not going to open up and tell the things that you’re living with to anybody. … All of us, we weren’t gonna tell anybody that we were burning down villages and … I mean, just the act of war, it’s horrible, you can’t imagine. (U8)

This dilemma was not equally pronounced for everyone, or over time. For some, being a veteran opened various different doors (careers as well as political opportunities). However, this experience had to be actively made into an asset. The following sections demonstrate how the former combatants try to transform their identity into an asset, and something deserving of recognition. Being seen in society The importance of the recognition of the country at large, of society in general, was clear for all three groups, even if the degree to which this was attained, and deemed reasonable, varied. These claims were directed toward society overall, and also to specific segments. When seeking recognition from their children and “history”, the former combatants tended to focus on their achievements and making their legacy and experience known. Recognition from society is not accorded automatically, but needs to be sought out. As we saw in Chapter 1, the degree of recognition has also shifted over time in each of the three cases: in the United States the recognition of the Vietnam veterans was initially poor but has improved; in Namibia the veterans were treated as heroes to begin with and today they are faced with more questions; while in Colombia their recognition has become slightly more positive over time. The M-19 veterans clearly aspired to recognition from ordinary people. This societal recognition took many forms: admiration, love, attention, medals, trust, votes, or to be seen as potential leaders (politically or professionally). Some of these desires were achieved, while other things were more longed for: “this country loved us”; “because we were the more recognized and so the people followed us”; “to the combatants of the M-19, you already accomplished your mission, stay sitting, … waiting for the attention and the medal” (Felipe, C16). The SWAPO veterans’ quest for societal recognition was a more politicized issue and a point of contention in Namibia. Exactly how much recognition and additional respect should be accorded to the veterans? Sackaria, for example, feels disrespected in society, particularly as he sees the liberation as a personal achievement: “I liberated this country and now people are treating me like this, why?” (N12). Similarly, Memory accepts that some people feel the veterans are getting too much recognition from the state, even if she disagrees: “There are 94

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity some that are saying that the government is just looking at us but that is not true, no one is looking at us” (N3). Gomen (N1) was also unhappy, claiming that younger generations did not recognize their veteran identity and even showed them disrespect; ultimately, he felt unseen by them, as if he had no identity at all. Overall, these former combatants feel as if they are not recognized enough, and the lack of material benefits afforded them is seen as indicative of this. The differential recognition among veterans in Namibia is based on which side an individual fought, what they did during the war, or simply having the right connections. As the war records are incomplete, differential recognition and negotiation are made possible. Among the Vietnam veterans the differential recognition was primarily intergenerational. The Vietnam veterans were the most displeased with the recognition accorded them. They saw this as a mistreatment in itself, which made them even more deserving of recognition later. Losing the war and how it was waged reflected on them as individuals, and caused a general loss of respect for the military in American society in the immediate aftermath of the conflict (see also Diehl 1993, p. 13). Dennis feels blamed for the outcome of the war and that he was denied the same hero status as other veterans in the country’s military history: They won … the Great War, they came home, they saved the war, everybody loved them. When we went, we didn’t win and it was a dirty war and it was political. … we were the killers, the baby killers … you know, and we weren’t. I mean, we did, but … we were trying to serve our country … I guess we were easy targets from the Second World War vets because we weren’t heroes. (U8)

Dennis’s dissatisfaction has channeled his commitment to veteran organizations. In fact, this sentiment is also reflected in the motto of the Vietnam Veterans of America (see later in this chapter and the next chapter). Many veterans struggle with the sense of a lack of achievement (due to losing the war) and thus some stressed that they as individuals are and continue to be dutiful and productive citizens. While Lee (U5) felt the lack of recognition from society had shifted as time passed, Robert still felt neglected by society, believing his voice should have been more important and listened to, both at the time of homecoming and in later years: “nobody gave a damn about our opinions, about anything … Nobody gives a shit about us, to be honest” (U12). They have been unable to take on the role of heroes and its associated traits. They object to not being seen, and also to their experience of explicit negative treatment when they came home. For some, the lack of recognition they experienced was directly linked to those who protested against the war. The war resistance while the conflict was ongoing was interpreted by some as resistance to them as soldiers, whereby they as veterans embodied the guilt of the war. Thus, the anti-war movement became linked to how they were treated by society overall when they came home: “I’ve 95

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war always felt that the anti-war people were against those that were in the military” (Robert, U12). The degree to which these protests have affected them has been tempered over time. The lack of parades when they came home (as compared to other generations of veterans), and the fact that they were not officially welcomed home, as discussed in Chapter 1, also exemplified for them the lack of recognition from society. Similarly, depictions of Vietnam veterans in popular culture, in particular in films (again see Chapter 1), were also seen as tell-tale signs of this disdain in society. Once the Memorial Wall was built, many Vietnam veterans experienced a change in the mood of the country, ultimately feeling more recognized (as will be discussed later in this chapter). A few Vietnam veterans (Francis, Ben and Dick) did feel properly recognized by society at the time of the interviews. Dick, for instance, shows clear awareness of the political capital inherent in his identity: Well, it gave me credibility. I mean not just with other veterans, but with the general public. Veterans are one of the highest regarded groups. If you’ve got a phone bank calling on behalf of Kerry and you say “I’m calling on behalf of John Kerry”, you may or may not get anyone to listen, but if you call someone saying “I’m a Vietnam veteran and I’m calling on behalf of John Kerry”, people tend to listen to you. (U14)

Thus, for Dick, being a veteran has given him more access and recognition from the public. Across all groups, in fact, a few recognized that the status of being a veteran and former combatant was accompanied with political capital and a position from which to be heard. Broken pacts and being made by the state One central strand of the research on how former combatants relate to politics, concerns their relationship with the state. Combatants in general have a fundamental relationship with the state through military service, conscription, and the use of violence, and thus often form part of statebuilding processes (Davis and Pereira 2003; Kestnbaum 2009, p. 241). Tilly’s (1985) argument about how war-making and state-making are connected is also related to the experience of individuals and their relationship with the state (see e.g. Diehl 1993, p. 32; Edele 2008, p. 11; Eichler 2014; Leed 1979, p. 207; Mann 2006, p. 212; Weber 2014). The experience of the veteran mediates this process: as veterans narrate how the state has made them, and how they in turn have made the state, it becomes clear how being a veteran connects people to politics. The very notion of the state – and thus who constitutes the polity – has often been colored by the myths surrounding those that fought for it (see e.g. Resch 1999 on the American War of Independence; Glantz 2009 on US veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan; Edele 2008 on Soviet veterans; Kriger 2003 on veterans in Zimbabwe).

96

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity Across different wars, the state has had to consider its relationship with the combatants at the conclusion of hostilities. Across the three cases, what the state is varies greatly, in part because the state is already an amalgamation of various encounters in each case. Irrespective of whether they felt as if the state had accorded them appropriate recognition for their wartime service, the state was very important as a counterpart for the recognition sought by SWAPO and Vietnam veterans; this was not the case for the M-19 former combatants. In fact, the state is noticeably absent in the M-19 former combatants’ discussions of recognition; they tend to emphasize other sources of recognition instead (such as society and other members of their armed group). Just as in Zimbabwe (see e.g. Kriger 2003, p. 15), the war and the liberation of the country has become central to SWAPO’s own legitimacy, and thereby has also empowered the SWAPO veteran. The legacy of SWAPO as a party is closely entwined with the notion of them as the liberators of the nation. It is therefore not surprising that the state has treated various groups of veterans differently. In particular, in contrast to former SWATF members and Koevoet paramilitary police, SWAPO veterans have embodied the notion of the veteran as a hero rather than just a security threat or someone in need (Bolliger 2018; Kössler 2007; McMullin 2013a, p. 103; Metsola 2015, pp. 189–248). Thus, differential recognition among former combatants in Namibia is evident even if being a veteran there always implies access to some political capital. This is in part a result of the reintegration policies and processes, but also of a larger debate about liberationist history in Namibia, which is often linked to other issues such as land, jobs, and education; in fact, Metsola has described “participation in liberationist history as a criterion of full membership in the political community” (2015, p. 248). For the SWAPO veterans, the ultimate achievement of the war is the main reason the state should recognize them. It is clear that they see the state itself as something that they have built. The achievement of independence is pivotal and they see themselves as the parents of this independence, and in their eyes this achievement makes them worthy of recognition. The former SWAPO combatants feel that people who chose to go into exile clearly contributed to independence, whereas the contribution of those who stayed in Namibia is less clear. Thus, the veteran identity in this sense in Namibia has blurred boundaries which are continually being negotiated. For most of the Namibian veterans, recognizing this achievement is intrinsically linked with material benefits; in their eyes, that is how recognition is communicated. The responsibility of providing these benefits falls to the state, which would not even exist if not for these fighters. This is seen as an ongoing issue which is yet to be resolved, and most participants expressed disappointment with the amount of material recognition to date.

97

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

One veteran, Ngenokesho (N2), saw the recognition of veterans’ organizations and reintegration projects as a way for the state to say to its veterans that they have done something important for the country. Fanuel argued that several different groups, and not just the typical PLAN combatant in exile, had contributed to the war effort, ultimately making the struggle for independence successful. They all made contributions which should be recognized: In principle, what I am trying to say is that the veterans are not only those ones who were in exile. We had difficult times … but there are also those who went through atrocities inside the country. Let them be recognized, that’s how I see it. (N8)

Sackaria’s (N12) experience speaks to how many SWAPO veterans felt. Sackaria feels forgotten by the state. His desire for recognition is linked to limited actions such as providing identity cards, as well as more substantial forms of recognition involving financial help and support, and access to work. He expressed a desire to be recognized more, and compared his situation to that of veterans in other countries, who he believed received much greater material support. Losing faith in the state’s ability to help, Sackaria made claims directed at the UN instead. In large measures the state in Namibia has already responded to claims by the SWAPO veterans, which in turn only seems to have emboldened the veterans to ask for more, and again. The veterans can claim to have built the state, and undoubtedly, this argument has been a very forceful one in Namibian politics over the years. Ndahafa’s (N13) disappointment is less typical. She was left waiting for an admission, apologies, and compensation for the torture and false accusations she and several others suffered during the war; she finds herself waiting for the state and SWAPO to heal the pact that was broken by these traumatic wartime experiences. In contrast with the SWAPO veterans, who saw the outcome of the war as the basis for their recognition, the Vietnam veterans stressed their duty. Although a few of the Vietnam veterans also felt that the state had done its part, the dominant discourse among them was, however, one of failure, and therefore those who stressed their satisfaction also positioned it against this more negative discourse. The idea of a pact with the state was entertained by individuals on both sides of this argument. Jacob described a sense of mutual recognition between him and the state, feeling like both did their parts, and fulfilled their duties toward each other: “I mean, it’s a very nice thing that I served my country and my country served me” (U4). Bob, who did not go overseas when he served during the Vietnam War, notes that “every serviceman or woman, when they sign on the dotted line, they are issuing a blank check to Uncle Sam – ‘Do what you will with my life’” (U3). He stressed his willingness to go to Vietnam, but in fact it was not his choice in the end – the military decided that for him. His sense of guilt or sadness at not having gone overseas thus chiefly rests on the 98

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity shoulders of the state. Bob also stressed that the state and politicians are sometimes required to lie in the interest of the state (countering what he knows is a dominant discourse among the dissatisfied). For him, lying is acceptable, even expected, and does not discredit the state. Francis (U2), as one of few Vietnam veterans who saw the conflict in a more positive light, stressed the achievement of the war in the fight against communism, and felt that he contributed to that. Thus, for him, the state did not fail him, as he saw the cause of the war as just and motivated. The idea of the state making combatants, and combatants making the state, came through in these interviews; when the state is absent it undermines the former combatants’ position and identity as veterans. It was the feeling of many research participants in all three groups that the state is indebted to the veterans as it has not fully recognized them. The pact with the state was broken either during the war or when the combatants came home, with distrust following in the wake of the broken pact. For the Vietnam veterans, the events of the war, or the war itself, became filters through which they perceived the pact with the state as broken. Failing to see the justifications for the war, and discovering lies concerning the war and its mismanagement, caused disillusionment with the government and politicians. Discussing events in Vietnam, Lee describes how his war experience affected his relationship with the state: “I lost confidence in my own government and I felt really betrayed because … I thought we had a duty, we had an obligation, we had a commitment” (U5). Charles, too, notes that he “was very naive; I kind of believed in the government” (U7). This feeling of betrayal was not unique. During an anti-war protest on April 23, 1971, about seven hundred veterans discarded their medals, throwing them at the Capitol. Ben (U11) was one of those veterans. It was a clear rejection of the recognition then accorded them by the US government. Another reason for experiencing a broken pact with the state was the perception that fallen fellow soldiers were disrespected by various officials of the state. Consequently, Charles’s allegiance to his fellow veterans increased (a theme the next chapter will return to): That is why that whole tribal identity just blossomed within me, and I think in all the other guys just as a natural occurrence. We’re here to take care of each other and one of us gets killed, well, it’s bad, but at least we’ll remember, the big guys don’t really care. (U7)

Most, however, were more focused on the lack of recognition after they came home from the war; hence, for them, their homecoming is their main filter for how they see the state, and themselves. For some of the Vietnam veterans, their assessment of their experience of state recognition is centered on the benefits awarded to veterans due to their personal sacrifice (mental and physical) during 99

Living politics after war the war. While Thomas is pleased with the care offered by the state in later years, he nonetheless feels the state broke the pact it made with him when he signed up – he did his duty, while the state failed him:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

once I raised my hand and swore an oath, I’ve got no control over the rest of my life … You raised your hand, you swore to defend the country, and the country sent us, we didn’t send ourselves, we didn’t … cut our own orders. … when I came home … they didn’t hold up their part of the deal. I mean, I swore, … so that soured me on the government. (U10)

The Vietnam veterans interviewed for this study expressed the feeling that they are getting less benefits and care from the state than other veterans (other generations and in other countries), and that the state is actively limiting their access. Comments included: The new legislation they are coming up with on veteran issues and so forth, they’re very cleverly excluding us. (Ford, U13) They’re [veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan] getting full, ten, everything they should be getting, but for us it was an unpopular war, and they took it out on the warrior, not on the politicians or the people who sent us. We just did what you told us to do. (Thomas, U10) We were ignored, you know, like we weren’t there, and treated badly. The only ones that appreciated a Vietnam vet was another Vietnam vet. You know, they wanted us to just kinda disappear and go away. (Robert, U12)

They felt as if they were being punished for the outcome of the war. Because the Vietnam veterans disturbed people’s image of their country and its success, the veterans themselves believe they have subsequently been ignored by the state and society. This has engendered anger, resentment, even distrust, as well as political mobilization. In a few instances, M-19 veterans also made claims on the state. As a group they fought against the state, so they do not see the state as directly indebted to them. Nonetheless, José believes the state has a responsibility toward the demobilized, particularly in ensuring they can support themselves: You go to a company and they are like “let me see your CV” and then “no, it’s useless”, so then you are obliged to die politically and as a citizen … because there are no alternatives if you don’t have that possibility [to earn a living]. And the government will also fail if it doesn’t [provide adequate support], because there is no other way. (C10)

José thus hints at a mutual relationship between former guerillas and the state. The state is called upon, not due to an idea of a pact or because the armed group is credited with actually creating the state, but because it is in the interests of the state to help. Amadeo also sees the peace agreement as an indication of the promises made by the state, promises which were broken as the state did not keep the guerillas safe after demobilization: “It was a pact between the state and 100

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity M-19. And the state broke the pact. … During the first phase of the amnesty process, some people from M-19 disappeared” (C22). In all three cases, but particularly for the SWAPO and Vietnam veterans, the former combatants’ relationship with the state was central to how they position themselves as veterans. As the SWAPO leadership runs the state, making claims on the state (or government) is the same as directing claims at the leaders of the armed group they once belonged to. As M-19 leaders cannot provide the same access to the state, the state is less present for the M-19 veterans as they make calls for further recognition. However, both groups expressed a sense that their leaders had forgotten them. The Vietnam veterans also voiced disappointment with the lack of recognition accorded them in the context of how the state deceived them during the war and treated them after the war. There are various layers of interpretation of state actions, such as benefits, payback, and support; the former combatants politicize these issues and question what really is being done – and has been done – for them. Bonds between fellow veterans Across all three cases, a central target of recognition claims was the armed group itself, or other veterans. These claims were directed either at the leadership within the group, or the veteran community at large. The M-19 veterans expressed a clear sense of being recognized by their fellow combatants, particularly during the war itself. Even after the war the close-knit network of former combatants was a significant source of recognition. Some, however, expected more material benefits from their work for M-19 and directed these claims at M-19 leaders. And many female combatants felt they were not accorded the same degree of support and recognition as their male counterparts within the network. For instance, Alba wants to be recognized as someone who knows about and can represent M-19, being allowed to talk, particularly in public. She expressed frustration with peacetime practices as she wants women to be recognized for their political work after the war: It is the recognition of the men towards us as women in the political arena. … So in general, they quote each other, “Navarro said, Petro said…” Right? But us … politically, that is another story. … the recognition that we are political actors as well. … But for political participation, there are very few people who ask [women] about that, because when they ask about politics, they ask them [men]. (C9)

Being recognized by male leaders in the group was so extraordinarily important for Alba that she was clearly elated when she found out an elite male member of M-19 had suggested her as an interviewee. The SWAPO veterans also felt forgotten by their leaders (in 2006, for instance, there was resistance within the leadership to veteran support, see Kössler 2007, 101

Living politics after war p. 382). The lack of recognition within the SWAPO ranks was seen as the result of the leaders’ tendency to only see some as relevant, connected, or revolutionary enough to be given attention. Fanuel remarks:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

sometimes you cannot claim any heroism yourself, but I hope one day among the leaders one would pick it up and say, “Man, this guy, he is a veteran and claimed the veteran part, but let his name be among the heroes.” (N8)

Again, the culture of heroes comes through. When the Vietnam veterans came home, many felt ignored and rejected by older generations of veterans, particularly those from the Second World War and Korea. Yet the former combatants from the Vietnam War themselves feel a great sense of community with other veterans, both from other generations as well as from other countries (e.g., Russian veterans who served in Afghanistan). This sense of community is based on sharing an experience which the population at large does not share (a topic covered in more detail in Chapter 4). Thus, in the interviews they tended to stress the universality of war. Veterans from later conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan are more appreciative, which is greatly valued by the Vietnam veterans. As a result, the feeling of not being recognized by other generations of veterans, particularly those from the Second World War (their fathers’ generation), was so strong that it shaped their veterans’ organizations’ motto: The Second World War vets didn’t want anything to do with us, you know … Vietnam Veterans of America. They started back around then too, so there were a lot of other veterans that felt like I did – that we got screwed – and our published motto is “Never again will one generation of veterans abandon another”. (Dennis, U8)

As a result, Vietnam veterans have made additional efforts to reach out to veterans of their own generation as well as those from later wars. Dennis stresses how important the veteran identity is in terms of reaching out: “Vets can talk to vets, just because nobody else really understands. It’s hard to open up to a shrink who has never been there” (U8). Or, as Bob observes, “if veterans don’t watch out for one another, who will?” (U3). The role of the network of other veterans, and the affective ties associated with this network, are important and form the topic of the next chapter. Overall, the veterans claim recognition for the deed of the war itself or because the war broke them in some way. By being willing to sacrifice themselves, they claim to have earned respect. But the homecoming itself should also be compensated if they had been received poorly at the time. The achievement is more central to SWAPO and M-19 veterans, while grievance and duty are at the center of the Vietnam veterans’ claims to recognition. Nonetheless, the narratives of all three cases contain elements of both positive and negative claims. The state, the general public, and other veterans are important counterparts for their pursuit of recognition. A sense of abandonment and lack of recognition underpin this 102

“Veteran” as a political identity narrative as well, and in this way, veterans try to establish the idea that the state or society is indebted to them. The other is formulated as a counterpart, not an opponent, as a way to create a relationship with privileges, and thereby recognition.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

A refracted, lifelong identity Whether veterans’ life histories reflect continuity or a transformation of the veteran identity is not a clear divide, and individuals often experienced both continuity and transformation of their identity over the course of their lives. It is no surprise that several of the M-19 and SWAPO veterans expressed a sense of continuity in their identity as a veteran of their particular armed groups. People tend to “maintain continuity with their past” (Yates and Youniss 1998, p. 509), and so there is a general tendency for people to bias their life history to communicate temporal continuity. This tendency is naturally also likely to have been present among those interviewed for this book, and situates the expressions of continuity seen below. Strikingly, however, only two Vietnam veterans – Ben (U11) and Francis (U2), who had both also been quite political prior to the war – depicted their identity with continuity. The M-19 former combatants described a lifelong commitment to changing society which often predated the war, linking a sense of destiny to their M-19 engagement. For instance, Jaime followed the various parties which grew out of M-19, and describes a sense of long-term continuity in his political identity: “We have not ceased to be part of M-19, even when M-19 as such disappeared, but we keep the concept, the behavior, we continue to vindicate” (C11). Or, as Gregorio notes, “I haven’t changed … I remain in the same line … I remain the same” (C13). Maria describes her lifelong political passion: My political ideals, my political sensitivity has always been high since I was a child. I was born with the stigma of always being a political militant. I have always been interested in politics and I loved the M-19 cause. Not only political ideas but also the heart, affection, love made me stay long with the ideals of M-19. (C21)

The M-19 veterans thus expressed a sense of continuity in the ideals that guided them before, during, and after the war. And while their means and specific interpretations of how to act on their ideals have evolved over time, there is a sense of total commitment and of being political animals in a way that is inescapable. For many, this sense of continuity clearly predates their armed combat, and this continued attachment and commitment to the ideals and original motivation for joining M-19 translates into political support for political candidates originating from the group. Similarly, several of the SWAPO veterans described continuity in their ideals, and the degree to which they identify with SWAPO, its cause and goals. This 103

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war ideological continuity often predated the war experience as such. Jairus (N6) described the continuity as a question of improving the conditions of the citizens in the country. Peter (N10) similarly described a continued fight against the same injustices and problems in contemporary society as when he joined SWAPO. He sees racism and injustice as constant problems which take on different forms over time, explaining that “as long as we live, we have to fight … injustice” (N10). Disappointment with the leadership of SWAPO did not undermine continued identification with the ideals and other members of SWAPO. Across both SWAPO and M-19, various war experiences also reinforced the veterans’ commitment to this identity. In particular, their commitment was reinforced by the loss of fellow combatants and sometimes family members during the war. They expressed the need to honor those who died, which in turn required a continuation of the struggle, deepening their emotional connection with the cause: “I am always willing to pay tribute to and live up the memory of the mates who died. … So it was up to us, as a challenge, to take the flags and keep moving forward” (José, C10). Camilo’s (C12) commitment to those who died made it hard for him to connect with his new life in a new country. Eventually, he went back to Colombia, unable to break the bond with his fallen fellow combatants, and reengaged in politics. Other hardships, like imprisonment and torture during the war, led to a similar increase in commitment and identification. Emilio (C14) described his imprisonment, where both the hardship as well as the intensification of contacts and discussions with others within the armed group made him more committed to the cause. For others, the war was where they learned about politics, and where their political identity was shaped. Angela became caught up in the war and discovered new perspectives on the world through her fellow combatants. Yet she does not feel that she has to continue that legacy together with other combatants, or through the political parties that grew out of M-19: “I believe that you can do your struggle from anywhere you stand … It doesn’t matter if you are in a political party, in the church, it doesn’t matter” (C23). Felipe (C16) depicted a sense of nostalgia for the war, which seems to reinforce his commitment to the cause. To him, the war was the time when he was most happy and felt the most complete as a human; if he had died during the war he would have been satisfied with his life. He still feels an obligation to continue and complete the project and aims of that era, and he is waiting for another chance for M-19 greatness. While he is disappointed with the way M-19 developed as a political party, it remains a central reference point for him. Continuity is thus a large part of the identity expressions seen here. And given the political origins of the SWAPO and M-19 former combatants’ decision to join, this display of continuity within these two groups is not surprising. Many, however, also noted how their political identity has transformed throughout their lives after returning from war. For some, this transformation entailed an 104

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity increase in commitment, whereas for others it represented a new direction for their political identity and veteran identity. Most Vietnam veterans also experienced transformation. Their political identity before the war was weak, and rarely connected to their participation in the war. For them, the war represented a new event and path in their life, shifting their understanding of their country, politics, and themselves. In contrast, for many of the SWAPO and M-19 former combatants, their participation in the war and the war itself were largely a continuation of a political path chosen before the war, hence the homecoming itself was a more significant point of inflection. Their various war experiences changed the participants’ identity and led them on new paths. Among the SWAPO veterans, some individuals’ experience of the war shifted their perspective on politics and themselves. For Ngenokesho (N2), it developed his skills and ways of understanding the world, and as a result it shifted his identity. Similarly, the Vietnam veteran Francis (U2) noted how the war and the military allowed him to develop his abilities, and helped him understand he was gifted. This led to a transformation of his identity and enabled him to realize his potential, making him feel he was able to take a new path in life. Some among both the SWAPO and M-19 veterans simply acknowledged that the war was a central event which drastically shaped and changed their lives. Amon explains: “What can I say? It is the one that has molded the life trajectory, the path of my profile … even now” (N4). For Ndahafa (N13), who was accused of spying, her war experience made her part ways with SWAPO and partisan politics. Some M-19 former combatants saw the war itself as the beginning of their political dedication, as they had not joined for overly political reasons despite political recruitment being more typical of that group. For instance, Catalina notes that her “political interest was born at the moment when I decided to join M-19” (C18). In contrast, Celestina joined M-19 because she was in love with someone. This relationship, in combination with the experience of the war, changed and politicized her; it transformed her political identity: A lot of us arrived for love, not for a political conviction. … women arrived through someone [they loved and who convinced them to join], and we wanted to share it with them. … I was divorced and I saw that I wasn’t someone’s partner. Instead, I was another human being … Since I was a little girl, I was restless … those ideals started there. But the base for politics came up through my partner. (C20)

Among the Vietnam veterans, similarly, the war put them on a new path. Many of them became more politically active after the war, as their understanding of the conflict spilled over into their understanding of politics and their relation with the state and politicians. Most shifted in the sense that they became more liberal, politically further to the left, or anti-establishment (questioning politics, policies, and politicians). For instance, Lee (U5) holds the government accountable for the war, and his disappointment has caused him to be more cynical, and 105

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war more liberal in his politics. Similarly, Charles (U7) developed an anti-war identity, which meant that when the war was over, he disconnected from the veteran network in the first two decades of being home. This was, however, combined with a real sense of connection with other veterans, which he has acted out more since that initial period of disconnection. The lack of respect for fellow soldiers who died during the war, lack of justification for the war, the misbehavior and lies by politicians, all continued to feed into his anti-war position and protests. On the other hand, Bob’s (U3) political identity became more conservative after the war. And others like John became less interested in politics altogether. John’s political participation decreased due to his loss of respect for politicians: “my viewpoint changed when I saw what was going on in Vietnam. And I have since not been as active in politics. … I think Vietnam did it. … I kind of lost my respect for leadership in Vietnam and kind of changed my thinking” (U1). For veterans in all three contexts, the experience of coming home was a significant point of inflection in their identity. For Amon, the war entailed a political education, and meant that he more strongly identified as a socialist and dreamed of a free Namibia with a system like that of Cuba. The war thus shifted and reinforced his political identity. Upon coming home, he had to face a different reality compared to the ideas propagated during the war: “it was very tough, so really we just had to adapt to the situation” (N4). For Vietnam veteran Thomas (U10), the experience of coming home also transformed his identity, as it became clear that the state had broken its pact with him, and thus shifted his relation with the state. Several of the Vietnam veterans also experienced a shift later in life, where their degree of identification with other Vietnam veterans increased. At a certain age, and also around the time of the building of Memorial Wall, their connection with the veteran network was reanimated.4 Indeed, many of the Vietnam veterans noted how important the Vietnam Memorial Wall was for their sense of recognition by the public. They saw the memorial as a sign that public opinion had softened – such a tribute would not have been possible otherwise – and that its acting out and the public response to it contributed to a further shift in attitudes toward them. The wall became an important physical manifestation of public recognition, and put an end to the ignoring of Vietnam veterans. For Thomas this occasion was enormously significant: It was like recognition … of the sacrifice … look, there’s fifty-eight thousand plus [names of war casualties on the Memorial Wall], fifty-eight thousand. When you see it, listed … that’s when it hits people. Oh my God, you know, you hear the number and it’s a number … but then you see it, name by name by individual name, and whammo, it hits you right in the head. (U10)

The wall signaled pride and being seen by the public. It represented recognition of the veterans’ suffering during the war, but also their suffering after the war. 106

“Veteran” as a political identity

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

This perceived shift in public opinion made it easier for them to be open about their own experiences and veteran identity, and helped them come to terms with their experience of the war. For Dennis, the wall, along with later events like 9/11, made him feel as if his veteran identity was a choice, and he regained a sense of agency at this point: I started a healing process but it never really went away. I was so angry at our country, what they did to us. September 11 came along … And then this whole war [in Iraq] just started … so I was vocal against the war … but I didn’t get involved in anything. … it wasn’t until Bush and Cheney that I had to decide who I was. And I became very anti-them, became involved in the Democrats but … I’m very left-wing. … The anger I had was all back. … discovering who I am because I had to make a choice … what I stood for. (U8)

There were also other experiences and events that caused a shift in identity, particularly among the M-19 veterans. For some, the time in exile after the war transformed their identities. For others, the party behavior of the armed group had disappointed them and caused them to shift away from the group. Hence, the formal expression of the veteran network shaped their identity. Celestina described herself as less radical after the war, and while she has been part of the political parties which grew out of M-19, she noted that at the time of the interview she did not “feel out or inside either political party”, continuing: But I don’t know at this moment where I belong; the only thing I have in mind is that I am not going to work for a rightist group. For me it is not possible to stay still, to stay quiet, and not to react against something, to settle. Your mind has changed in life and I am going to die this way. I am thinking about contributing every single day of my life. (C20)

For some, their education or family life shifted things after coming home, mainly tempering the way they sought change in society rather than directly changing their political goals. New family connections and new networks and opportunities through education gave veterans alternative points of reference from which to formulate their politics. A particularly interesting and telling example here is Angela (C23) in Colombia. Angela experienced large shifts in her identity, in part because her commitment to M-19 had been very extreme to begin with. Demobilization and coming home were difficult experiences, and for a long time she missed the war. As a result, her M-19 identity, network, and activities were intact for a long time. Eventually, her education – she got a degree in the 2000s – meant she discovered other groups of people and other ways of doing things, and she parted ways with M-19: In [year] I finished a [degree] in [subject] and that opened many doors for me since I was with people who had nothing to do with M-19 … So I have been getting involved in things with other people. This teaches you that anywhere you are, there are wonderful people who are with you, and you don’t need to stay in the same ghetto. What is it that has made me go away from the people of M-19? I still have the same

107

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

affection and gratitude for everything, but it’s like when you grow up and leave home. That’s what happened to me. I grew up and I left home. I did that and I met other relatives. This doesn’t mean that the family which sustained me for so many years, is not important, that I don’t visit them, that I don’t contact them … This root will never break, but I already grew and I am somewhere else. (C23)

For Angela, one of the central ideas of M-19 was the value of change, and reappraising your goals and your means, and so she believes even with her own change she has followed an M-19 path. Women’s rights are still important to her, but she has shifted in the way she thinks about them. Her party loyalty is no longer there: “I want to be a militant of life instead of a party, so I work toward things which are important for me” (C23). While she no longer believes in political parties, she still sees M-19 as her origin: There are things that cannot be taken away. M-19 was the one that gave birth to me politically, and you can never renounce your mother, the one who gave birth to you. M-19 gave birth to me politically. Hence, I don’t renounce it because I’m deeply grateful, everything which I have lived, they made me who I am today, and I really like it. I am very happy about myself. … If I had not been from M-19, I would be a woman with lots of children, who-knows-who’s [wife], without studying, without anything, without reflecting, without learning things in this path, it was the school for me. I believe that that has built up my identity today, I mean, my identity base is M-19. The thing is that sometimes we get stuck, but M-19 was very spiritual, the people were very spiritual. They didn’t believe in a church, but they were spiritual. Today I identify people from M-19 as very spiritual people, very open, life lovers too. So I think that what I did was following the M-19 path. (C23)

The war experience, as well as their homecoming experience, refracted the participants’ veteran identity, and their understanding of themselves and their role in society. It is not particularly strange that the Vietnam veterans overall experienced a transformation in identity, whereas many among the SWAPO and M-19 veterans experienced more continuity across their lifetimes. Yet continuity and transformation are not completely separate categories, as some experienced smaller shifts in the practice of their identity – a topic which Chapter 5 will return to. Political impetus Being a veteran was a central part of the research participants’ identity, and its formulation contains seeds for political impetus. For most, coming home after the war meant their veteran identity gradually increased in salience, either as a result of their processing and understanding the war, or in relation to the experience of coming home and the reception and recognition they faced or longed for. They formulate their identity through the depiction of heroes, duty, and service. For the M-19 and SWAPO veterans it is the ideological heroes who stand out as particularly important, whereas for the Vietnam veterans, other veterans 108

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity (fellows, fathers, current politicians) have become the heroes instead. This culture of heroes appears in all three cases. But building a personal identity through the use of these heroes also builds in expectations of public recognition and being seen, as well as expectations on the veteran to act out their continued duty, and with expectations the opportunity for disappointment follows. The salience of their veteran identity may be connected to the timing of these experiences. War was mostly a part of their lives when they were relatively young, and previous work has also shown how experiences at a young age often become landmark events, with lifelong consequences for identity development (see e.g. McAdam 1988, 1989; Oakes 2011; Yates and Youniss 1998). Indeed, trauma associated with war, particularly the loss of fellow combatants, also increased the investment (and sense of duty) of the former combatants in their veteran identity. But it also becomes clear that a central determinant of this identity is that the experience is not limited in time; instead, it makes itself known at multiple instances throughout their life. Moreover, it is an experience which is politicized, as the veteran is positioned vis-à-vis society and state. Political developments over the years which connect back to the war in some way therefore become important reminders of their war experience and thus their identity. In Chapter 5 the role of symbolic events later in life will be further discussed as well as how they reinforce and trigger this linkage. The war and the homecoming experience refract veterans’ identity, often numerous times, sometimes leading to reinforcement and sometimes to shifts. The Vietnam War was a more transformative experience for the former combatants’ identity, particularly because they had such an apolitical starting point prior to enlistment, and because the war became so politicized by the home audience (as well as by a global audience). For the M-19 former combatants, the experiences of the war as well as the homecoming seem rather to have led to a big reinforcement of their identity. Among the SWAPO veterans, there is a strong sense of continuity within the SWAPO tradition, but also disappointment with their leaders, causing both political apathy and an antagonistic relationship with the leadership. Overall, the former combatants who had joined up for political reasons often saw their identity strengthened, whereas those who had joined for other reasons had a more transformative experience. Another element which runs through all three cases is the veterans’ sense of being deserving and worthy of recognition. Demands and expectations of recognition, and associated disappointments when this does not come, form an important part of how they conceive of themselves and their position in society. The experience of the war and the experience of coming home are important filters for reinforcing the participants’ identity as veterans, and for politicizing them in general. They feel that either the achievement of the war or the associated duty and hardship made them more deserving of this special recognition from the state, the country, or other veterans. Alternately, it could be said that the 109

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war grievances associated with coming home made the veterans deserving. M-19 former combatants also turned to the population to ask for recognition but also as the body politic they have a duty toward. Thus, the demos, rather than the abstract idea of the state, becomes their main counterpart. For the M-19 veterans the war itself was the most important filter, as they could stress the achievements associated with the war, and because they cannot claim the state as a supporter during the war. In contrast, the Vietnam veterans pointed to the state and held it accountable for a “bad” war, and its failure to care for them when they came home. The state’s failure to recognize their sacrifice impacted how the Vietnam veterans positioned themselves politically. The SWAPO veterans represent a mid-point, emphasizing the achievement of the war along with the grievances associated with their homecoming when constructing their veteran identity. Thus, in each of the three cases a position of preferential status is narrated, and upheld over time. This narrative contains elements of achievement, grievance, and duty. The achievement is more central to the former combatants from SWAPO and M-19, whereas grievance and duty are more central for the Vietnam veterans’ claims to recognition. The state, the general public, and other veterans are important counterparts for their pursuit of recognition. But, in particular, this continued sacrifice and service create claims on the state. Across the three cases the degree to which veterans claim a pact with the state varies greatly (as seen in Chapter 1), yet it is clear that they all have a sense of making the state through their making of war and being a veteran. As such, they claim a right to have the state acknowledge and thus make them as citizens. It is not only the experience of the war itself which is part of this process, but also the ensuing homecoming experience. This relationship begs a number of questions. Firstly, does a sense of a broken pact with the state relegate veterans away from an engaged citizenship? For some, yes. But many also feel called to mend and affirm the relationship with the state. The remainder of the book will further scrutinize the veterans’ political choices, and life paths, in order to properly answer this question. Secondly, when does this preferential position in society – and the political capital associated with being a veteran – become problematic? It is very clear that the veterans in Namibia and the United States have a great deal of political capital, whereas in Colombia this is less true. This is far from unusual, of course, as combatants return from war, and in the rest of the book we will follow how this political capital and agency come to expression. Through positioning the state as something the veterans have either created or upheld and by stressing duty and service as central traits of their identity, a vision of engaged citizenship and a strong sense of agency is formulated. Indeed, many former combatants feel as if their actions made a difference in the world. They invested their agency in the war they participated in, and staked their positions as citizens on the outcome of the war. Many relinquished some control 110

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

“Veteran” as a political identity over their lives to the state or their armed group during the war. Not all of the former combatants felt as if they regained their agency upon coming home; in other cases, the outcome of the war remains unclear and morally problematic for them, as we have seen in this chapter. Naturally, there are large differences between the cases and the individual former combatants as well. In particular, female combatants struggle more with competing identities as well as the lack of recognition among their own ranks within each group. The veteran identity is typically entrenched in masculinity, and while gender roles are less fixed during war, they often reassert themselves after the end of hostilities (see e.g. Åse and Wendt 2018; Eriksson Baaz and Utas 2012; Karner 1996; Kestnbaum 2009, p. 248; Moran 2010). The gendered social practices were not identical across all three groups, but this fault line was accentuated in all three. It is perhaps also telling that none of the heroes identified by either group were female. However, in all three cases, a lot of the former combatants note that their position as a veteran, as someone worthy of recognition, is negotiated and struggled over. Who is seen as a “true” veteran was problematized among the SWAPO veterans, in part because of the unclear registration procedures at the end of the war. As a result, there is a sense of fluidity around who belongs and has the right to be recognized. Many of the Vietnam veterans were very insistent on being specific about what they did and did not do during the war, as a way of claiming a superior position within the group but also as a way of avoiding being accused of stealing someone else’s honor. In addition, this scrutiny of individual combatants’ worthiness is also translated to the level of politicians and elite veterans (see also Wiegink et al. 2019). It has been argued that a group identity is more likely to form if the identity can be associated with high status and positive valence (Huddy 2003, pp. 519, 536). Indeed, this is something the veterans in this study struggle with. Are they a high-status group or not? Those who emphasize their achievements and deserving nature would like to make it so, but some of the veterans’ encounters with society after war tell a different story, and so they have to deal with this conflict of status. Acting out their membership in the group of other veterans helps the former combatants reinforce their status. Here, the issue of being able to be proud of something also becomes important. If they cannot be proud of the outcome of the war, they resort to other layers of meaning, such as doing their duty to fellow combatants. This is part of veterans’ political homecoming, where they formulate contributions to society in order to lessen their personal obstacles as they come home. Finally, the sense of shared destiny and fellowship with other veterans is also obvious in this chapter. The idea of a shared destiny is based on both symbolic concerns, but at times also on similar material issues and concerns (work opportunities and health, for instance), the balance of which shifted over time, but which overall created political cohesion (see also Huddy 2003, pp. 516, 529). 111

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war Hence, it is not strange that both duty and service to fellow former combatants are important traits, as well as the wish to be recognized among their peers. That the network of other veterans is important becomes clear when you note that some even talk of their armed group as “home”, or as their “parents”. Breaking the pact with other veterans is, therefore, even more difficult (and unlikely) than breaking the pact with the state. The role of the network of former combatants is the topic of the next chapter. In all three cases, there are examples of a sense of connection across time and space with various veterans and their experiences. The veteran identity has connections across these boundaries and is global and timeless, even to the veterans themselves. Notes 1 For a discussion of the importance of heroes, charismatic leaders, or other identity carriers for shaping collective action in the labor movement, see Jansson (2020), pp. 67–71; see also Weisdorf and Sørensen (2019) for a discussion of heroism and former combatants in Sri Lanka. 2 For more on gendered role conflicts, see Bjarnegård (2018). 3 Parts of this chapter, particularly this section on recognition, have previously been published as an article entitled “Seeking recognition, becoming citizens – achievements and grievances among former combatants from three wars” (see Söderström 2019). 4 The Vietnam Memorial Wall was designed by Maya Ying Lin, and inaugurated in 1982. It depicts in chronological order the 58,318 names of all military personnel who died during the Vietnam War. It is located in Washington D.C. in the Constitution Gardens. For more about the Memorial Wall, see e.g. Barnett et al. (1992), p. 376; Diehl (1993), p. 233; Mosse (1990), pp. 224–225; Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz (1991).

112

4

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime

T

scrutinizes the role played by fellow former combatants in the lives of the research participants after coming home from war. The experiences, as well as the political meaning, of coming home and being a veteran (in the sense of a political identity) are all mediated through the social networks which surround them. This chapter demonstrates what meaning is attached to the network of other veterans and what role these networks play and have played in their lives as understood by the former combatants themselves. These networks transform and are recreated across a lifetime, and in this sense they are not stable entities. Yet these networks manage to reproduce themselves, and this chapter shows how this reproduction and recreation happens. The chapter is not about the networks in and of themselves, but the experience of these networks from the viewpoint of the individual former combatants. In the previous chapter we saw how veteran identity retained a similar strength and there were shared connotations across the groups of former combatants. Before we consider their paths of political mobilization in Chapter 5, we will first consider how this identity – and the resulting mobilization – is sustained by the veteran networks, and how these networks in turn feed into their identity and mobilization. Networks serve several functions, and enabling and constraining political mobilization is only one of them. In general, the meaning imbued in networks contributes to the identities of their members and guide political mobilization (Passy 2003, p. 23). Thus, in order to understand these networks, it is important to explore the meaning attached to them by the former combatants themselves. This chapter first looks at the social, economic, and political functions of these networks for the former combatants, before turning more directly to the meaning-making around them. These networks are sources of support and opportunities, as well as vehicles for political mobilization for veterans’ issues and other social causes, as well as party politics. Many decades after the end of their war, many of the former combatants are still in contact with others from his chapter

113

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war their armed group. The longevity of these networks is quite remarkable and is sustained in several different ways. The affection and reciprocal responsibility embedded in these networks, as well as their multiple functions and layered character, contribute to their continuation. These affective ties are central to how experiences of coming home are mediated for former combatants. The networks also contribute to sustaining their members’ identity as veterans, for instance by also underlining such issues as duty, responsibility, and recognition (also see Chapter 3), and they also perform a mobilizing function (providing opportunities for participation and through creating a sense of a shared destiny). As such, these networks are intrinsic to politics after war, but also to how the veteran position is sustained across entire lifetimes. Sources of support In all three cases, the group of other former combatants formed an important part of the social lives of many of those interviewed. In particular, other former combatants were part of informal, social, and economic networks which have lasted a long time after demobilization. As this chapter will show, these networks are described in terms of the friendship and communal bond they offer, as well as their function in terms of support and patronage. Only the SWAPO veteran Hilma and the Vietnam veteran Jacob fully and clearly disassociated themselves from other veterans. It was clear that other former combatants were a source of friendship across all three groups. This is not to say that the research participants’ friends came exclusively from their former armed groups, but that decades after the end of the war, many of the relationships formed with other combatants during and after the war were an important element of their lives. Moreover, this connection could also be extended to individuals who they had not known during the war, but who entered their lives at a later stage and who shared the same war experience, or the same veteran identity. There were variations exhibited among the former combatants in terms of how central the network is in their social life. Some have a mixed social group with some friends who are veterans and some who are not. For others, former combatants form the basis of their social world. And for some, the armed group was literally their family, as many close relatives had also joined up too. For instance, Catalina’s (C18) brother and husband were also in M-19. Many of the Vietnam veterans also had fathers or grandfathers who had served, thus for them joining the military was interpreted as joining a family tradition. And in the interviews, fellow combatants were often talked about as family, as brothers or sisters. Amon describes how the lack of other veterans in his current workplace made him feel: “in this environment there are no ex-combatants here. I don’t have any connection [with workmates], that is why here I feel isolated, you 114

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime know”; but when he goes to places and contexts with other veterans he feels more connected and at ease: “yeah, that is where my life is” (N4). Similarly, the Vietnam veteran Dennis, who after finishing his degree was hired by a company that focused on hiring veterans, feels more comfortable with other veterans because they understand each other, and notes that “the other friends I have are mostly my wife’s friends [and] they don’t get it. I go out and have lunch with them but, you know … Vets can talk to vets, just because nobody else really understands. It’s hard to open up to [someone] who has never been there” (U8). The former combatants found it easy to connect with one another as they were able to understand and trust each other. These networks provided an immediate sense of acceptance and belonging. Across all groups, the networks of other former combatants provided and continue to provide support (and even patronage) in several ways including financially, socially, morally, mentally, and politically. Some SWAPO veterans, such as Peter, describe how other former combatants seek them out to get advice and help: “we are very good friends. … they come here and I advise them what to do because they want to claim repatriation money they feel like they have been cheated [out of]” (N10). His relationship with other veterans is caring yet at the same time detached, as he is mainly asked to provide support to others. Others also described how they help fellow former combatants, like former M-19 member Camilo (C12) who helped fellow combatants to access education upon coming home. In several instances, the friendship bond is interspersed with dependence and patronage, as well as help between friends. Many also described how the network of other combatants provided opportunities for work and education. Juan (C3) worked for AD/M-19 until they disappeared as a political party. Alfonso (C19), who was unable to return to education after the war, also found work as a security guard via the network. José describes some of the economic difficulties he found himself in after demobilizing from M-19: Those critical moments of my life, especially from the economic point of view, have hit me, yes, but I was very fortunate because I have always had in that friend network and the movement network people that have given me their hand. … I have always had a job. (C10)

Through Jaime’s work for the network, in different reincarnations, he has continued to be connected to various parts of the community of M-19 former combatants and met new fellows. Since he demobilized, he has provided security for the political party incarnation of the network: I was always involved in security issues for my bosses. I looked after all the bosses from M-19. That has allowed me to meet more people and be known more. When M-19 demobilized, a security structure for the leaders was created, and I was part of that structure. It’s part of my job today – I am part of the security of the mayor of Bogotá. I am always in the security plan of the leaders. (C11)

115

Living politics after war In the United States, Dennis also found work through the veteran network, and ended up in a job where he was mostly surrounded by other veterans who mean a great deal to him:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

I had episodes at work but, you know, they were all other veterans there and they knew it … every day I thank God for that because when I look back at how I struggled and … how I was, thank God I was around other veterans. (U8)

When the veterans left the company, and new people and management came in, it changed the workplace environment, and he felt less at home and less supported. Others tended to describe the support of their network in different terms, namely how it helped them make sense of who they are and where they have been. For instance, Lee notes that the veterans “reconnect and we sort of re-hash things” (U5). Talking with others in the network allows them to make sense of what happened to them and others they knew during the war. In this way, the network helps them to formulate their own past, and thus their identity. Social support and help in relation to mental health issues was also stressed to a large degree among the Vietnam veterans. Mental health problems in general were more extensively discussed by the Vietnam veterans than the other cases (see Chapter 2), so it is perhaps no surprise that they were also the only veterans in this study to explicitly discuss the role of the network in relation to this. Thomas (U10), who had been adamant about leaving home when he joined the military, described how he lived with other veterans directly after the war when he was going to college. They rented a place from a Second World War veteran, which became an important community of support, or “underground veteran community” as Thomas describes it, for Thomas and also for others as the household would take in other veterans if they needed shelter or help finding work. For Robert, for instance, the network was an important social sphere, particularly as he was unmarried. Throughout the interview he often talked about the veteran network as his family. In 2015 he became ill, and other veterans supported him during this difficult period: “They were all very supportive. I had six months of chemo and so forth, so a few of them drove me when I wasn’t able to drive and so forth” (U12). Other veterans became the first point of contact when the former combatants needed someone. This is in part because fellow veterans are seen as individuals who understand their situation in a way that other members of society do not, and also because other veterans were able to provide guidance when it came to dealing with the state and veterans’ benefits. Hence, the network helps the individual find help, by encouraging each other to seek official help, sharing knowledge of how benefits can be obtained, or by helping to deal with the attendant bureaucracy. Dennis described his own process in these terms. Initially, the network 116

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

reached out to him, encouraging him to get help and seek benefits. He expressed anger about the lack of state support that veterans receive, and how this motivated him to reach out and help others himself. Now veterans find him and ask for help in a similar way. He describes how one former combatant from his unit, who had experienced a violent episode and had physically assaulted somebody, found him: The guy who put that query out on the Internet looking for me, told another guy in my group who told another guy in my group and that guy called me up out of nowhere and said “I hear you’re working with vets”. He said, “I almost killed somebody yesterday” … [but] he finally filed a claim [for veteran benefits]. This was two years ago … so it’s funny how those things happen, you know, but there are still a lot of Vietnam vets that haven’t dealt with the fact. (U8)

Interestingly, across the three groups many of the veterans described having sought out or created workplaces dominated by other veterans, irrespective of whether or not the work is linked with the war or their armed group in some way. They simply feel good hanging out with each other as the understanding and potential support is there. Clustering together both creates a shelter from the rest of society as well as allowing veterans to have those who understand them close by, in line with their clear desire to be with others like themselves. These networks are clearly expressions of what is often termed homosociality – the preference for similarity – and while this is typically gendered, largely male in the case of the former combatants, other aspects of similarity may also contribute (see e.g. Bird 1996; Bjarnegård 2018). Homosociality is key to the reproduction of these networks, as will be discussed further in this chapter. It is clear that the former combatants have many reasons to turn to the network, and being in contact with the network for one reason often leads to interaction in another area of their life as well. The veterans also reported that offering each other patronage, help, support, and so forth had become easier over time, as with age many have become more established in society. Over time, the network has gained access to resources (positions, money, etc.) that enable them to do more for each other. Thus, as they achieve positions of power, they often use their new status to offer help and support in substantial ways to other parts of the network. These informal networks play an important role in the lives of the former combatants across all three groups; they provide friendship, social support, financial support, work opportunities, and navigation of veteran benefits and reintegration programs, as well as engendering a form of dependency through the patronage offered. The type of support and patronage offered by the network touches a number of different areas of their lives, and ultimately results in the individual former combatant’s life being deeply enmeshed in the network socially and even financially, and it is within this broader context that the political significance of the networks should be seen. 117

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Vehicles for political mobilization These veteran networks also functioned as vehicles for political mobilization. This is no surprise as social ties in general are important for political mobilization (see e.g. McAdam and Paulsen 1993; McClurg 2003; Siegel 2009; Simon and Klandermans 2001). The veteran networks in question were at times transformed into, or connected with, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and political parties. The manifestations of these networks as NGOs were dominated by veterans’ issues and rights. In the case of Colombia, however, these networks also mobilized around social housing, as this had been part of how M-19 had started as an armed group, while among the Vietnam veterans the peace movement was another way that these networks became a vehicle for political mobilization. Finally, both M-19 and SWAPO transformed into political parties in their own right, thus clearly becoming vehicles for mobilizing both former combatants and others.

Veterans’ rights Issues pertaining to their veteran status and situation motivated many of the research participants to associate with other veterans, and formally organize and mobilize to pursue changes and support. The framework for this work differed in the three cases, due to the specifics of the available state programs and the general political and conflict situations, but this function of the networks was nevertheless detectable in each case. The US cohort of research participants for this book were recruited largely through the organization Vietnam Veterans of America, which naturally means that the majority of them have been active in this organization at some point. This organization began in 1979 under the name of the Council of Vietnam Veterans. At the time of the interviews they had over 80,000 members, organized in over 650 local chapters, all across the United States. The organization’s founding principles focused on helping the returning veteran face the challenges of a demobilized life, as well as making sure that those who had served in the military received “the care and respect they have earned”, under the motto “Never again will one generation of veterans abandon another”. This organization often lobbies and raises awareness surrounding program issues and benefits related to veterans. As we saw in Chapter 1, both Namibia and Colombia have witnessed the development and extension of reintegration programs; more and more groups in Colombia have disarmed and the ambition of these programs has increased over time, while in Namibia the state has made continual concessions to former SWAPO veterans, particularly in the form of public sector jobs, when faced with organized pressure. In Colombia, many of the research participants described how they had been actively working with fellow former combatants and addressing issues with reintegration programs. Alba (C9), for instance, has a leading role in an organization 118

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime for demobilized women from M-19 and also other armed groups. Thanks to her family’s help at home, she is able to devote herself to this organization. Catalina has also worked with former combatants since her own demobilization, and in the future she envisaged helping FARC members, who at the time of the interview had not yet demobilized: “This foundation was born in order to help the socialization process and reinsertion into civil life, not just with former combatants from M-19 but with former combatants from other groups” (C18). A big part of Catalina’s work is helping former combatants get an education, but ultimately her goal is “to teach them that there were other ways of doing politics, there were other ways to fight for equality, and there were other ways of being a rights advocate” (C18). Similarly, in the United States all but one of the participants (Jacob, U4) had been active in veterans’ organizations, even if the involvement was not immediately upon their return home from the war. For example, John (U1) was involved in outreach programs in schools, telling high-school children about his experience in the Vietnam War. In his private life, however, he has remained fairly quiet about his time at war, except for publishing a small book based on his personal experiences. The 1990s, when he was most active within the network, was also the time he dealt the most with the trauma he experienced. However, he has lost the connection with his network of veterans due to moving to another state and a smaller town, and in the interview he expressed uncertainty as to how much he will focus on veterans’ issues in the future. Yet his need to make sense of his experience together with other veterans is still there: I didn’t deal with it really at all until in the early 1990s when our group got together, in [name of town]. So that brought everything up and I thought, well, I have done that for a year or so, and it is all over [laughs]. But … it never ends. (U1)

Lee (U5) described his engagement with the formal network as something he was inadvertently pulled into. Initially, he had stayed away from formal involvement, but after a veterans’ organization gave his son a scholarship to help support him in college, Lee felt obligated to say yes. In the end he became chair of several organizations and sat on different committees working with veterans’ issues, both locally and state-wide. His involvement mushroomed, especially after he retired and had more time. However, he later became less involved, as “they began to take so much of my time and it was particularly taking me away from some of the things I really wanted to do when I first retired”. Jokingly, he describes the pull of the network as like “being a member of the mob over there” (U5). Most of the Vietnam veterans described how they were recruited by a friend to join the veteran organization, or external events such as the unveiling of the Memorial Wall triggered them to join. In many cases they had been active in more than one veteran organization and their engagement grew incrementally over the years. Most of them had been active during the twenty-five years prior 119

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war to the interviews for this book, even if for some their involvement in a veteran organization began with their involvement in the peace movement (see below). The motivation to be involved in these organizations includes social events, searching for company, lobbying for their rights and benefits, and raising awareness. For instance, Francis (U2) originally joined to socially reconnect with other veterans, but this led him to discover that many of them needed help, which motivated him to get involved more actively in various veteran organizations and to lobby for veteran rights. This was a rather typical path, where the original purpose of being in the organization was mainly social before becoming more political over time. All the former combatants see veterans’ organizations as a way of helping and supporting each other, something which feels gratifying and enriches their own lives. In all three cases, this blend between the social and the political was visible throughout the networks. In Namibia, several of the former combatants had been working for veteran issues in some way or another. In fact, in all three cases there were a number of different formal organizations focusing on veterans’ issues. For instance, several of the SWAPO former combatants were participating in discussions with local UN representatives in order to seek more clarity regarding the use of funds that were meant for their reintegration program. When they heard how the UN was supporting other reintegration programs relating to other conflicts since the Namibian War of Independence, a few believed they were being cheated. Peter (N10) was one such individual; he questioned whether the resettlement and reintegration segments were carried out properly, as he could see many of his fellow combatants suffering. Sackaria (N12) described their lobbying for veterans’ issues as apolitical, as they were only asking for their rights and for money. These veterans’ desire to formally organize was motivated by their belief that veterans are treated badly in Namibia and face difficult living conditions. Ngenokesho (N2) feels they have been forgotten by the state. Gomen, while describing his motivation, also makes global comparisons: Europe the same, if you go to Germany you will find those Nazis treated well and if you go to France the same. Those who were fighting Napoleon … [the] sons of the war veterans they are also treated well. Here I don’t know why, I don’t know why. But our fathers were also fighting against the Germans, they were there, including comrade Andimba Toivo ya Toivo [co-founder of SWAPO]. They were together with our fathers there and now they are not being treated well and have you heard that people are receiving their money for fighting those Nazis? (N1)

Clearly, in his mind the experience of war is a universal one. Others made similar connections, for instance Ngenokesho (N2) expressed the belief that veterans in Namibia could learn from the experiences of veterans and their organizations in other countries, and argued that the creation of a veterans’ organization for SWAPO former combatants was overdue. An example

120

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime of someone who had organized and worked with former combatants, focusing on reintegration issues, was Ndahafa (N13), a female SWAPO veteran. She stressed the importance of former combatants supporting each other, in part because they know and understand each other in a way that others do not. Her identification with the group was central to her motivation for this work. Quite brutally, she noted that they help each other because no one else will. They act as a family for each other when the “real” family does not: “there were people who were rejected by their families, we held each other and we took those people in our houses” (N13). Over time her work turned toward peace issues more broadly instead of singularly focusing on veterans. Jairus, a veteran-turned-teacher, at the time of the interview was not a member of a veterans’ organization. However, he described this as procrastination on his part, believing he would join one day for both political and social reasons. The main reason he gave that may prompt him to join eventually was the importance of helping others navigate the state and potential benefits related to their veteran status. Hence his end goals were access to benefits as well as recognition, and he sees the advantage of trying to accomplish this together with other veterans: “when you add your voice to any other people’s voices, you can advise, you can advocate whatever you need to advance” (N6). Among the SWAPO veterans (similar to the other two groups) the motivations for working with veterans’ organizations had multiple origins, but at the heart of them was the sense of shared grievances and the need to improve their current living conditions. They also expressed a belief that such organizations could communicate with the state in an efficient manner. Social housing and peace In Colombia, a few of the former combatants also worked with social housing, in part because this was a part of how they joined M-19 to begin with. José sees this community work as political work and it has helped him sustain his family: if I had stayed in the [program name] learning how to be a baker, or how to work with brass or be a mechanic, that is what the [program name] does, I would have never gotten where I did. So this political alternative was what allowed my family not to get stuck along with hundreds of families. And in the construction and meeting with so many people I started to build a chain of affection. That makes you immortal. (C10)

Jaime expressed disappointment with the work of the political party that had grown out of M-19: “In 1993, as a result of the failures, we said ‘No more’. I personally decided ‘No more, I am not willing to watch doors, these guys are making shit out of everything’” (C11). And so he began to work with social housing projects instead. Jaime eventually also became politically active again

121

Living politics after war (particularly with the political party Polo Democrático Independiente, PDI), and for him the community work and the political work go together:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

It is our political scenario; we combined the social practice with electoral politics in order to become a real power, not just a social organization. … There was no stop: while we were building houses, we were doing politics. (C11)

In addition to social housing, there are other examples of former combatants organizing together to form NGOs. For instance, after demobilization in 1991, Juan (C3) formed part of an NGO started by several of his friends who were other demobilized M-19 combatants. Juan continued to work with this organization throughout the 1990s. Dante (C17) similarly describes how many former M-19 members are active in peace-work activities today in some way or another. Meanwhile, in Namibia, Peter (N10) too is engaged in human rights work. Among the Vietnam veterans, several (Charles, Dennis, Ben, and Ford) had become involved in the peace movement while the war in Vietnam was still going on. They questioned the reasons for the war as well as the way it was run. Dennis describes marches organized in Washington D.C. at the Memorial Wall: it was a protest, marching in the street, we took over that whole Mall. I don’t know if you’ve been down to D.C. … where the monument is. We just camped out and we were there, we were there for a week and our mission was to talk to every congressman or senator or so, our mission was the Connecticut delegation, and when we went, we were dressed up in our fatigues, and we had fake M16s and nobody screwed around with us, … they were gonna listen. (U8)

Dennis’s description of these marches also plays on the trope of veterans as violent and using military strategies during peace. He noted that veterans protesting the war were seen as more credible than civilians, which thus gave more weight to the protests. Ben (U11) also participated in the peace movement; in fact, he had become active in it even before he went overseas, and his disillusionment with the war only grew greater during his time in Vietnam. Ben was one of the veterans who threw their medals at the Capitol with future Secretary of State John Kerry. After the protest he was called in for a meeting with a union representative (his union was pro-war) and was told it was not “career-enhancing” to be active in the peace movement. He then decided to be more discreet with his political views and activities. For those former combatants who became involved with the peace movement, their engagement dissipated when the war ended, yet for some this position of questioning the military campaigns of the US government returned when the war in Iraq began. The peace movement did not engender a positive response from all veterans. Robert (U12), for instance, felt that the movement, and John Kerry in particular, gave veterans a bad name through their protests. Robert felt he was accused of things he did not do in Vietnam, believing John Kerry’s testimony to Congress made Vietnam veterans appear worse than they were. He was hence very much 122

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime against Kerry’s presidential campaign. Dick, in turn, felt deeply affected by what he saw as a conflict between veterans, when Kerry’s war record was being questioned during his presidential campaign:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Well it was rather nasty. My view was that if you can question Kerry’s purple heart and silver star then you can question my purple heart and silver star. That’s not your call and it’s not appropriate to be doing that. So, it got pretty tough. (U14)

This serves as an example of how a conflict about the veterans’ hero position became entangled in this presidential campaign. Participation in this peace movement of veterans sent ripples across time, continuing to influence political developments years later. In short, many of the participants in all three cases are or have been engaged in campaigning on veterans’ issues, peace, and social housing. Many worked with some form of NGO that was connected with, or grew out of, their network of other former combatants, and some of these groups also grew to become more formal entities. Political parties Some of these networks also became vehicles for party work. The opportunities for former combatants to become active in political parties is perhaps greater in Namibia and Colombia as these armed groups transformed into political parties themselves, but both the Republican and the Democratic parties in the United States also have veterans’ sections, and participants were active on both sides. In Namibia, PLAN and SWAPO became the SWAPO Party, which has dominated Namibian politics since the end of the war. In Colombia, M-19 formed an alliance with other groups immediately after the peace agreement and ran for election under the name AD/M-19. Particularly in Colombia, most of the participants have been very active in party politics, and this is not unexpected given the political motivation for joining the armed group to begin with. AD/M-19 was initially very successful at the polls, but by the mid-1990s the party had disappeared.1 Instead, various individuals and networks from M-19 became part of or started other political parties, such as PDI (2003), Polo Democrático Alternativo (2005); Partido Verde Colombiano (2005); Movimiento Progresistas (2011).2 In particular, the Progresistas, led by Gustavo Petro (a former M-19 member and the mayor of Bogotá at the time of the interviews), were central in the political mobilization of the former M-19 combatants interviewed in this project. Some participants were clear about supporting all incarnations of M-19 as a political party. For instance, Camila (C4) always supported and voted for M-19 candidates (before joining M-19 she had never voted), particularly those who focused on social housing policies. Just after demobilization, most of the M-19 former combatants supported and/or 123

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

worked for AD/M-19. For instance, Juan (C3) worked for AD/M-19 from the time he demobilized until 1994, at which point he turned toward community work with non-combatants. Alba (C9) wanted to run for office under the banner of AD/M-19, but was not placed high enough on the party list to be elected. By 1993, Estella had left the political movement originating from M-19, and focused on her job in order to provide for her daughter, although this job also had a political and environmental focus. Estella says she continues to offer electoral support, even if she is no longer a member of the political party: I am close to some of the people of M-19, to Petro himself in that moment of campaign, but I am not part of Progresistas or any other groups where there have been people from M-19. In the Polo, I wasn’t a member. I’ve always supported and voted in favor of the left wing, and I kind of support some stuff. I support Polo’s campaigns, but I haven’t signed in as a member. I have been independent, but always supporting and being close to the campaigns. (C8)

In the Namibian case, the former combatants either actively support the SWAPO Party, or are silent supporters. This is not particularly unexpected given the dominant position of SWAPO in the Namibian party system. Even Peter (N10), Sackaria (N12), Ndahafa (N13), and Hilma (N9), who had distanced themselves the most from the party, still voted for the party from time to time. Amon (N4) advises the SWAPO Party via a think tank. Others, like Jairus (N6) and Memory (N3), work for the party during elections, helping with campaign work and organizing the electoral effort. Over the years, Fanuel has seen a continued development of the agenda of the party as they slowly shift their focus. During the war he was part of the effort to mobilize others in support of SWAPO, and the party is very important to him: I considered SWAPO as my mother and my father, that is where I have a family and if it wasn’t for them then I could be isolated because at the very beginning immediately after independence, those who were kicked out could not see me with the good eye. … as I told you, the brotherhood is very strong and SWAPO people who have been in the struggle will never let you pass without saying hi. They always remember that this one is one of us and that is it. So, in SWAPO is where I really have my feet on the ground, and the day we lose elections here [as Namibia is a democracy], that is where I will still be because it is where I belong. (N8)

Despite this great sense of loyalty and sense of belonging, Fanuel also expressed some critique of the party. He recognizes that for the sake of democracy in the country the party cannot become too dominant, and he believes the existence of smaller oppositional parties is important. The Vietnam veterans’ political positions spanned from the extreme left to the extreme right. While there was no clear connection between their armed group and a specific party, it was obvious that, for many, their engagement with the veteran network through a veterans’ organization had connected them with party politics as well (this was particularly the case for Bob, Charles, Dennis, 124

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime Ben, and Ford), whether in favor of the Democrats or Republicans, as well as other parties. The veteran organizations thus acted as stepping stones into party politics. Bob describes his motivation for engaging with politicians and political parties: “we have to constantly reeducate the politicians as to the plight of our veterans” (U3). Some Vietnam veterans had already been politically active when they were younger and used their existing leverage within parties to help fellow veterans. Dennis (U8) was recruited into working with the Democratic Party through Ben (U11). Ben, on the other hand, had a long history of being politically active before joining the Democrats. His activities with the Democrats have grown incrementally over the years, and he sees this as a platform from which he can advocate on behalf of veterans: Well, there are other issues, but I think I can be more effective wearing the veteran hat and the veteran uniform. There are plenty of progressive people from all kinds of places, but I think it’s important to promote this from the veteran [perspective]. (U11)

*  *  * A surprising number of the participants had engaged in formal networks, both in NGO as well as political party work, which are based on the networks of other former combatants. In most of these instances, their work was a continuation of their armed groups and networks of other former combatants. In some cases, it was channeled through social movements (like veterans’ organizations), while in others it was through political parties. In the case of M-19, this was not entirely smooth, as over the years the armed group reincarnated into several different parties, with different leaders. Many of the former combatants experienced a disconnection from the leadership within their group, which tempered their fervor at being mobilized. However, the advent of the Progresistas and Gustavo Petro remobilized many of the former M-19 combatants. While most of the former SWAPO combatants still in some way support the SWAPO Party, it does not seem to energize them quite as forcefully across the board, in part due to limited (party) choice and SWAPO’s dominant position. Among the Vietnam veterans, engagement in veteran organizations often opened doors into party politics as well. Across all three groups, the networks of former combatants became vehicles for political mobilization even if the degree to which their networks could be equated with the formal expression (as an NGO or political party) varied. Some of the fragmentation and conflict within these networks has also become visible, and this will be discussed later in this chapter. Networks of affection and reciprocal responsibility The narratives of how these veteran networks function as sources of support and as vehicles for political mobilization were also colored by meaning-making. 125

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war This meaning-making gives us some clues to why these networks continue and operate in the way that they do, and what the glue is that holds them together. The basis of these ties and networks is often a shared history, a communal bond that was formed during the war (and training) and sustained at the end of it. This was clear across all three groups. Some former combatants focused on the achievements of their armed group, and here the pride in these achievements created an expectation or even a need to continue this legacy. For others, the source of connection was their common ideology, the beliefs that fueled the origins of the armed group to begin with. Gomen (N1) claimed that within SWAPO the veterans all know each other, and the sense of a shared history and experiencing similar problems reinforce their sense of friendship. The interesting claim here is not how many veterans he knows, but the fact that he knows them by virtue of being in SWAPO. SWAPO became a melting pot for various different ethnic groups and languages, and for Gerson, overcoming such differences is a point of nostalgia and also something he incorporates in his vision for a future Namibia: “When we were in exile, we created one language or tribe. Maybe even as a country, we need to go back to one language. We bonded so well and we still have good relations with some of those people we were with in exile” (N5). Julio (C7) from M-19 also describes how a sense of fraternity developed during the war, in part because combatants’ lives depended on their “brothers in arms”; this feeling was reproduced after demobilization, and at times also extended to individuals who had not directly fought with them. Similarly, Vietnam veteran Lee notes that during the war, he and his fellow combatants “became like brothers; we became very close” (U5). Thus, for many, the shared experience of the war changed them, and both positive and negative experiences matter for creating this sense of a shared history, a communal bond. Another source of this communal bond was the ultimate sacrifice made by fellow combatants, and some felt that if the bond was not upheld, they would be failing those who had died in combat. This resonates with previous work on former combatants, which has noted that “obligations to the dead entail pledges to the living” (Elder and Clipp 1988, p. 181; see also Schok et al. 2008, p. 361). The loss of these close fellow combatants also reminded veterans of their own vulnerability, and the fact that it could easily have been them instead: because those are the people you are with every day and those were the people that were the most important to you, so anyway, one of those guys was killed … I care about it because they are like me … That is why that whole tribal identity just blossomed within me. (U7)

In fact, losing fellow combatants both then and now seems to create the same reaction: And now, … Agent Orange is taking a toll on the guys you see. … We’re losing about forty crew members [from Thomas’s ship] already … but you know, boy, the bonds

126

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

are so tight, they’re tighter than family. … I mean, these guys saved my life, I saved their lives. (U10)

Having depended on each other for survival during the war, this sense of a shared destiny and responsibility for each other continues to echo throughout veterans’ lives. Sometimes this sense of a communal bond developed due to shared experiences and grievances during the phase of demobilization. For instance, Emilio (C14) described a period in Colombia where former guerillas were persecuted and harassed by the state, but that this strengthened the bonds within the network as they continued to look out for and care for each other. The idea of shared suffering in the past is closely linked to shared suffering in the present as well as in the future. For instance, Ford (U13) remarked that a bond is created due to the difficulties other veterans have endured, and how they will die together as their life span is likely to be reduced due to their war experience. This creates a sense of shared destiny within the group, pulling the network together. The sense of being responsible for each other started during the war, and continued after the war, pulling former combatants into the network. This communal bond also implies a current duty to fellow former combatants, in fact a reciprocal responsibility across all three groups. Ben discusses the age difference between those he served with and himself (as he was of a somewhat higher rank, he had younger men serving under him): one of my mechanics said to me what his aspirations were when he got to be my age … He was 19, I was 26 … I remember that really, really strongly. I think that was the first impetus for my involvement in veteran stuff because I really felt like, you know, Jesus, I am responsible for these kids … for somebody’s children. That was a very sobering thought. (U11)

Thus, continuing to fight for each other after the war comes naturally and feels deeply gratifying for many veterans. Charles, who avoided the draft for as long as he could, notes that “it’s about the guys we’re with and we have to work together and we’re trying to keep each other alive” (U7). This sense of reciprocal responsibility is also underlined by the sense that no one else is there to help them. This pushes them further together as a community. A central tenet of these networks, at least when fellow combatants were mentioned, is the affective ties, seeing the network as “family”. This was apparent in all three cases. This revolved around caring for each other, as well as their love for the cause; the description of the network was couched in terms such as unity, love, affection, family, and home. Catalina, despite her disappointment with the network, notes: But I love my partners so much. I love them. I don’t say to everybody that I am from M-19, or I don’t carry the flag – you have it here, you have it here in your heart. That is part of your own life project. (C18)

127

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war Celestina emphasizes the familial nature of the network: “But there were peculiar issues like sharing food, we turned almost into a commune and we share activities among us, we were almost a family, we loved each other, we love each other a lot” (C20). Similarly, in Namibia, Memory (N3) talked about the bonds between various veterans and how her social world is mainly populated with other veterans, providing each other friendship, support, and love, even if she is disappointed by some who do not do more to help others. Mukwanambwa makes similar observations: “We had a strong bond and we still have that bond of love” (N7). This affection also raises expectations of care within and for the network. The Vietnam veterans tended to express this with slightly different emphasis, highlighting the family metaphor for their community of veterans but not talking so much about love and home. Some had even been introduced to the concept of veteran communities at an early age; for instance, Thomas’s (U10) uncle had taken him to a veterans’ meeting when he was a child. The war also affected Thomas’s relationship with his Second World War veteran father because of their shared experience of the horrors of combat, shooting and being shot at. Yet this veteran and his father had never discussed his father’s war experiences in any detail. Other veterans, meanwhile, were talked about as kin. Robert (U12), for example, stressed his lack of family when commenting on his involvement with the veteran community and saw the network as an alternative family. Across all three groups the sense of community was expressed and recreated through being able to signal that sense of belonging, displaying it both to each other and those outside of the group. Individuals also used such signals as they sought to recognize whether others were fellow members of their group. Hence, hats, t-shirts, medals, veteran cards, license plates, and so on were mentioned as ways of connecting with fellow combatants, or to signal their identity to the outside world. These objects allowed veterans to find each other, and connect with former combatants they did not already know. Different individuals chose to wear them on different occasions, depending on how comfortable they were with openly identifying themselves as part of the network. Sometimes these were also used to signal individual status within the network as a whole, for instance Charles wanted to distinguish himself “as a combat veteran, as opposed to a guy that fits trucks” (U7). Or as Thomas expressed it, the objects allowed others to understand without talking, to know what shared history they may have with each other: “they saw my medals, and … they knew what this means … you can look and you know where you been and everything, instantly” (U10). There were, however, other ways of being able to locate others with the same experience. Ford describes how fast he scans others to see if they have the same experience: You use a key phrase … and you would ask them questions like “When were you in country?” … And if they understood that term, you’d basically sit down, and I’d be on a train or a plane and whoever got off first we’d talk till we got there. (U13)

128

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime Ford goes on to explain how when he was in college, he was able to detect who was a veteran among the other students: “We discovered each other because we stood out … So, basically, you can look across the group of a hundred students and pick the other guys out instantaneously” (U13). Among SWAPO veterans this signaling was often connected to a specific way of talking. This signaling both served to connect them with each other, but it could also create high walls in relation to other parts of society, sometimes causing those in the network to keep more to themselves. In all three groups, this communal bond based on a sense of shared history and future was sometimes also extended to other groups, and generations, of former combatants, suggesting that the bond can have a universal character. Here too, signaling using medals, hats, clothes, and so forth connected veterans with each other. Among the Vietnam veterans it was easier to talk about older and younger generations of veterans as such examples are more readily available in the United States. There was a sense of taking turns caring for the community of veterans between generations. So through caring for the next generation from wars such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the Vietnam veterans now see how that generation will continue that responsibility with those who participate in future wars. Because they themselves feel this bond with younger generations, they were particularly hurt by what they perceived as abandonment by the Second World War generation (as noted in Chapter 3). Similarly, some of the M-19 former combatants also expressed sympathy and affection for the coming generation of future demobilized FARC combatants. This bond also crossed space, as veterans often expressed a sense of shared experience with former combatants in other parts of the world. According to SWAPO veteran Ngenokesho, “we have been cooked in the same pot and our experiences are one” (N2). Ford, a Vietnam veteran, talks about meeting some Russian veterans from the war in Afghanistan: “we’d just go out drinking because we have a lot in common. … A lot of them, we didn’t have to talk about it, we just knew” (U13). Francis (U2), a Vietnam veteran who had many under his command during the war, felt emotional as young soldiers were going to war after 9/11, as he felt they were going to experience what he had experienced. Among the Vietnam and SWAPO veterans there were some that acknowledged that this was a bond they also shared with their enemy during the war. The sense of shared grievances in peacetime can also pull together former combatants from opposing sides, as seen in research on Liberia (Söderström 2015, pp. 157–172). These strong social, even affective, ties are thus not limited to the same armed group. The tangibility of such bonds lessened with distance, but the bond and sense of shared experience and destiny translated to solidarity. These networks are seen as family and home, underlining the continuance of the network. This formulation of a universal experience comes through in all 129

Living politics after war three groups, and signals how for many veterans, a shared past entails a shared future.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Cracks and cement It is clear thus far that the bonds between veterans form significant networks, raising the question of how such networks come into being, and continue to function. In this section the modus operandi of these networks is scrutinized further, considering how the former combatants have a continual connection with the networks, how veterans recreate and reconnect with networks, as well as how they experience fragmentation and dissolution. These issues could be termed the “cracks and cement” of veteran network experiences. Overall, the dominant experience was a tendency toward continued contact between veterans, leading to the networks being retriggered. Again, the way these participants were recruited makes this finding unsurprising. Given this continuity, the depiction of the tensions within the networks and how such tensions are overcome is more interesting. Various participants expressed an acceptance of difference among others within their network in terms of perspectives, attitudes, life choices, and political paths. Others experienced a sense of abandonment by their network, symbolically or literally. This sadness and disappointment are intrinsically linked to the high expectations of affection associated with these networks, as being abandoned by your family is seen as the ultimate betrayal. Veterans’ perception that the networks are made up of others like themselves underlines the central role of homosociality within them, which is part of the cement of these networks. Continued connection with the networks was most obvious in the cases of M-19 and SWAPO; among the Vietnam veterans, many originally became disconnected with the network when they returned home and only reconnected with it with full force between ten and fifteen years later. For most, the network of other former combatants is something that was relevant and something they had continued contact with over the years. In many of the interviews, participants described recent social gatherings, and weekly and yearly reunions: “We talk a lot. Not long ago, we gathered here in my house” (Gerson, N5). Others depicted a detached but social and warm relationship with fellow combatants; Dante, for example, describes his connection with former M-19 fellows: We concur in work spaces. Most of us are in the search for peace so we work in peace issues – that keeps us united to some degree. We meet with each other once or twice a year; we have dinner, we drink wine, we laugh, and that is the network we had – we keep depending on each other. But there is no organizational network that binds us together. (C17)

Similarly, Catalina noted that the network of this former armed group continues to exist despite its failure as a political party. For her, the continued effort of 130

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime fellow combatants makes her feel as if the network and its struggle and goals continue:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

One feels that the leaders are there, one feels that Navarro is there, one feels that Petro is there. Every one of us is [making] an effort wherever we are, that is the important thing. … You see your partners and they are consistent with what we fought for and dreamed about. You see your partners doing their work with honesty, fighting for the people, being transparent, zero corruption. Some are with Uribe and that is part of their decision. You can’t judge them due to the situation. … sometimes we gather, like twenty or thirty people, and we have beautiful meetings. (C18)

Ford (U13) described how he talks to other Vietnam veterans more often than he talks to his actual brothers and sisters. In addition, many of the former combatants, like Charles (U7), meet other veterans in public due to the fact that they signal their belonging in the network with the clothes they wear. The multiple functions of the network also mean that it is easier for the network to keep its relevance in their lives. Some of the M-19 veterans also experienced reinventions of the networks, as the end of the AD/M-19 political party was followed by various new incarnations and configurations. Many of the M-19 members followed as well. For instance, Jaime was active in PDI, then later turned to the Progresistas and Gustavo Petro. Over the years, he has also been elected to local office. Commenting on his political commitment, he notes: We have not stopped; it has not stopped. Surely there have been some failures, but we maintain the activity. … All the M-19, we mobilize people. … this activity is always present. (C11)

Some of the M-19 former combatants (Camila, C4, and Mario, C5) even went so far as to say that they would join a renewal of the armed struggle if former commanders asked them to. Others reject armed remobilization and opt instead for political remobilization. They believe in a non-violent continuation of the struggle, a future version of the movement. Dante notes that “there are a lot of people that want to reactivate things of the M-19. Some people are thinking that M-19 should revive and they are organizing regional conferences. … But there are some people, former militants, that are thinking of reviving M-19 as a political group, but former militants of a middle-rank, not national leaders” (C17). Alfonso is perhaps the person that provided the most detailed plans for reviving the group as a political party: Our people are very serious and responsible in all the senses, even though the programs didn’t work. We know what happened, we are rebellious but patient, and we know what to do, where we are going. We still have hopes to keep fighting, keep proposing … But those who didn’t leave our dream, the history, they always remember, we always talk, and I am the person who is going to gather everyone for reuniting them and drinking a whiskey together. But it is not going to be just a whiskey; it is possible that the M-19 movement revives, in terms of politics. What has to be done? Picking

131

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

up signatures, and we are going to do it, something like that, this is how things are. A very serious project is being undertaken, very serious and big. … The people of M-19 are the ones who have a clear politics, to say something. And we are here. (C19)

His sense of pride over the achievements of the group reinforces his beliefs and connection with the network, but reigniting the group would also mean regaining some of his old status. Many Vietnam veterans had rather limited contact with other veterans after they returned home, but have experienced a revival particularly since the millennium. At this point they reconnected with their old networks, as well as recreating a network with new additions. As such, it is clear that being a veteran is an experience and identity that remains salient throughout life, and which can be left and then reactivated at a later stage. For instance, Bob states that eventually you miss the feeling of dependency on your other fellow combatants, and so you return to the network to regain that feeling: When you get out of the service for a while, you just want to get away from it. But then, you start coming back to it and particularly, those Vietnam veterans of my age – I’m 69 – … a lot of guys are looking. They retire, and there’s something missing from their lives … And they come back. (U3)

Charles described several shifts in his engagement with the network. He noted how after his involvement with the peace movement it took him a while to become active again: “I find that it’s nice to be connected, although for twenty years maybe because of the anti-war sentiment toward Vietnam soldiers, I didn’t really identify myself ” (U7). When he had small children, he was also less able to be active, yet he continued to socially interact with other veterans during this period. Ben had a similar pattern – he states how, at first, “I really wanted to put it behind me. I did attempt to” (U11), but one of the people he served with eventually convinced him to join a veterans’ organization, and his engagement grew from there. So Ben, like most others, reengaged with the network ten to fifteen years after coming home. At this point in their lives, veterans were either trying to make sense of what they had been through, who they were, or had found various mental health problems were catching up with them, and they reached out to the community of other veterans to talk about this. For Vietnam veterans, as seen in other chapters, the building of the Memorial Wall also triggered reengagement with the network. Dennis notes: we started all coming out of the woodwork. I started talking to other veterans, we started meeting down at the Mall. Even on Veterans Day, you know, I go in a parade, we put on our old fatigues. So I still do that once a year. (U8)

The Memorial Wall has allowed many veterans to find each other, and reenact their community with the living as well as the dead many times over. As noted earlier, many signal their belonging through wearing hats, clothes, and other 132

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime markers. Thomas does not always feel comfortable wearing such markers in every context, but is clear about certain occasions when he would wear them: “Maybe on Veterans Day. Absolutely Memorial Day, which is the day we honor the dead” (U10). There were also forces that pulled veterans away, causing cracks in the networks in all three cases. Some point at issues that have prohibited them from meeting up with fellow combatants as much as they would like, such as travel costs. In such cases, a meeting had to be more purposeful: “how stupid are you to call somebody from Zambezi region to come here only for a meeting, and after meeting you don’t give him something?” (Gomen, N1). With retirement, Gerson’s (N5) connectivity has lessened as people have moved to the countryside. For some, the network was important on many different levels, but their focus slowly turned toward other things, and thus their attachment with it lessened over the years. Emilio still feels a strong, continuing attachment to the group and network, but explains how the demands of life and work, as well as the lack of fair and coordinated support during demobilization, pulled the network apart: Precisely in that group there was a big issue that was the politics of love. Love was above a lot of things, and that still exists. That group spread out because there is no serious leadership … Everybody is by himself or herself but their actions have principles. People are doing stuff, they are working in order to survive … but they have not been able to do it and that is the reason why people, and we, are not in one block. It didn’t persist over time, there was no good philosophy in order to find the benefits and consolidate the benefits, and there are some people that are foxy that generated some benefits for themselves and those benefits [should have been] for all of us. There is dissatisfaction. (C14)

Some also explained how they lost their connection with the networks when their main point of contact died, causing irreparable cracks. Others described how they chose to part ways with the group early on. Hilma (N9) chose God over the network at the end of the war, and has since devoted her life to her church. John (U1), meanwhile, lost touch with the network of other veterans for a variety of reasons, partly due to moving away from the area where a group had been active, but also due to personnel changes within a veteran outreach program in which he participated. Ralph (U9), another Vietnam veteran, sought out the network for friendship, but found it hard to relate to the other veterans he met there. His inability to connect with the network on a more personal level was, in his view, rooted in the lack of shared war experiences, as he felt his personal war experience had been so different from the others. Finally, there is also the seemingly rare example of M-19 former combatant Amadeo (C22), who was kicked out of the group before the peace agreement was signed. As a result of this expulsion, he associated himself with other armed groups in Colombia. Amadeo was the only research participant to have left a network in this manner. 133

Living politics after war A good example of both the experiences of cement and cracks within the M-19 network is Angela’s story. Angela describes how in the beginning after the war the network provided everything for her:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

In finding a job, I worked with demobilized people until 2000. From here to here, I was sticking around. And in the social life because I didn’t have any more friends, even my boyfriends I [met] there. I had nothing else, it was my only network. It was very important. (C23)

The network thus played an important part socially, workwise, and politically. She summarizes: For me M-19 has always been the best thing that has ever happened to me. I am what I am today thanks to my parents, who had me and gave me life, and to what I lived, to my experience, the people I have met, good or bad, have made me what I am. So, they were my family for many years, and somehow they still are, so there is a very deep respect and love towards the people of M-19, to all its history and to everything that we have given to each other. (C23)

Here the patronage offered by the network thus played an important role in sustaining the longevity of the network. As long as Angela had no other choice in where to turn for support, for opportunities in life, she stayed within the network, but as soon as she had other options, she also made other choices, as she did in the early 2000s. At that time, she had just finished a university degree which made her more independent, and she described this process as growing up and leaving home. Thus, for her, M-19 and the continued network after the war was a large determinant of her life. However, things changed – while she continues to meet up with former M-19 members, she mainly devotes herself to her job as a social worker: I have more friends [now] who didn’t belong to M-19 … What happens is that everyone took their own path. But there are still many companions who still think that M-19 is a political option, and I respect that. In fact, they keep going to meetings. I don’t go to those meetings because I believe I’m doing well with what I do. (C23)

In all three groups there are some that felt abandoned by their network. The work opportunities eventually disappeared. Help and advantages (such as reintegration programs, reinsertion money, or veterans’ pensions) failed to materialize. Mario (C5), for instance, feels forgotten by the M-19 network. In his case, his closest commander was killed, and he suspects this is why he has not received the support and patronage he believes he deserves. His relationship with the network is a mix of dependency, affection, and a cry for material benefits. Despite feeling forgotten, he is unwavering in his loyalty to the group. Another M-19 former combatant who feels betrayed is José (C10); he described how one commander managed to manipulate reintegration support in favor of their friends, and to José’s disadvantage. While José is critical of this behavior, he does not blame the entirety of the network, just one bad individual. Thus, depending on 134

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

an individual’s position within the network, brokers may be extremely important for their continued engagement with the network overall.3 Alfonso, who struggled with work and school when he came home, clearly expressed (in relation to the larger network) this mixture of love, feelings of abandonment, and wanting help, support, and work. As seen in other cases, his stature and access to help was dependent on a connection with specific individuals, and when they disappeared or failed to live up to expectations, Alfonso found himself rather alone: I was very beloved by Carlos, by the commandant. I was a troop chief. He invited me to [come] here to Bogotá. … He told us … he was not going to abandon us … But what happened in that moment, after a little time, in a few days, Carlos was murdered and that affected the thing and it became hard for us. I mean, the other commanders didn’t give us the attention, such as Antonio Navarro Wolff. That’s why I don’t like Antonio Navarro … Carlos had a plan, they had already offered us some money, he met us, he told us that he already had a project for us, “be prepared”, and so we were waiting for money: “There are already contacts with Cuba, the money is going to get here at any moment.” In those days, they killed Carlitos, and then the program was over. Antonio Navarro got the money and he spent it himself, with the family and stuff … that’s why we have pain, we don’t like him. That is an internal issue … But on a political level, we like each other, I campaigned for him recently. (C19)

The sense of abandonment was particularly linked to the leaders within the armed group among the M-19 and SWAPO former combatants. Federico (C2), for instance, expressed disappointment with AD/M-19 because it had failed to carry on the legacy of M-19, and because the leaders of the political party failed to communicate and speak to the base within the group. Similarly, Alfonso blamed the failure of M-19 as a political party on the leaders: In the end, it was over because they [their own politicians] were not coherent. … But they were not serious and instead, they returned to normal and natural bad habits. And that’s why we are like we are now, there is almost nothing. There is a lot of corruption. (C19)

Celestina was clearly frustrated and saddened by what she perceives as a break in the reciprocal responsibility from the leaders within the network: One produces a lot of things in order to generate the confidence in those people, and that people can vote for those leaders that sometimes turn against you, that is the sadness one feels because they are thinking of other things and you think that they are like you. (C20)

Some of the SWAPO former combatants described problems within the political party, yet were adamant about their continued support. For instance, Memory, a regular campaign worker who at the time of the interview was living in a shanty town in Windhoek and working part-time as a cleaner, notes: “I would never not support SWAPO, I will never join other parties, no matter how much I am suffering, because SWAPO fought for this country’s freedom” (N3). In particular 135

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war she described her frustration with selfish leaders and the lack of patronage from them, yet her loyalty and bond with the party is clear: “I joined SWAPO when I was a child, I breastfed from politics” (N3). And while she may have complaints about the party, she recognizes that leaving them would leave her in a more vulnerable position: “I can’t leave SWAPO, I would just suffer” (N3). While SWAPO had enjoyed success as a party, the former combatants gave the impression that the party was not as unified at the time of the interview as it had been in the past. Of course, once independence was achieved, SWAPO had to reconfigure itself more than M-19 as it was confronted with a broader range of political goals. Jairus laments this lack of unity: I think we are looking at each other in a different way now. We are trying to sometimes confront each other, not as party members, we sometimes confront ourselves as the same kind of confrontation that you [expect to see from] an opposition party. … I think some kind of unity that was there during the struggle years and that strength is not the same kind. (N6)

Fanuel described the fragmentation and friction he experienced within SWAPO just after independence, as the group was trying to figure out what else it stood for beyond the liberation of Namibia. However, he believed that this was unavoidable, and even to some extent good for the party. Nonetheless, he continues to worry about corruption, and the corrupting influence of power over time: They will start thinking only of themselves and that is not because of SWAPO, because of the struggle, no. People have changed, and the people that they were, some of those who got good positions don’t even want to see you. I have got friends who are ministers and they would say, “Who is that one [Fanuel indicates himself]? What does he want?” (N8)

Fanuel saw these friends-turned-ministers as far less accessible than they used to be, believing they assumed that Fanuel would only be attempting to contact them if he had a problem or request. The tendency for differences within the network to develop over time is also met with acceptance in all three cases. For some participants, political differences within the network in the present are more clearly accepted and tolerated than for other participants. For them, the bond within the network is still intact, as loyalty to the original cause can be expressed without agreeing on everything. When Alfonso is asked if he is disappointed with other members of M-19 because they have not been as politically committed as he has been, he notes: “No, everyone [has] the right to think, we have the right to organize as the vision allows us”, finishing with a message of general support for democratic pluralism: “but everything that is organized in matter of the legal, healthy and democratic processes, that is okay” (C19). He also demonstrates an understanding of those that have gone a different way, and left the fold of the group: “Each one of us took their own path, their destiny” (C19). 136

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime The SWAPO veteran Fanuel also notes that those with different opinions are still respected, and in fact welcomed if they want to come back: “there is still that attitude of brotherhood to say, ‘eh, brother and sister, come back to the party’, but when they express the feeling of leaving, they leave, they can leave” (N8). Similarly, Vietnam veteran Lee describes a sense of acceptance from his fellow combatants, despite him being more liberal than the others: “I have always been different than the rest of them … But yeah, they expected me to be different … and so they came to accept the fact that I am different” (U5). Charles (U7) avoids talking politics with other veterans so as to avoid conflict with them. Ben, who has become engaged with the Democrats and is very leftist, comments on how he feels more tolerant toward veterans with other opinions: I don’t know how tolerant I am politically overall, but when I look at people I know who are veterans who have different perspective I … have a better appreciation for them … at least coming from them I have a better appreciation than I do for I guess for some other people. (U11)

Strikingly, Ndahafa describes how she can understand the people who tortured her during the war: “I am not angry at them, I am a military trained person, if you are told to do something you have to do it. It was the military … they have to do what they are commanded to do so I am not really angry at them” (N13). The previous chapter demonstrated how the veteran identity is formulated among former combatants, and it became clear that there was a hierarchy of identities. The competition for full status, both in relation to external actors as well as within the network, was present in each case. And this differentiation between parts of the network was also experienced among some of those interviewed. It seems gendered fragmentation within the networks was particularly present, especially among some of the M-19 former combatants. However, one Vietnam veteran, who did not belong to the hegemonic masculinity among the Vietnam veterans, stood out here as well as he did not identify as heterosexual, and he has not kept in contact with other former combatants: “there were a few people that I wrote to, but then … life moves in a different direction and [you lose contact]” (U4). Among the M-19 former combatants, three women (Maria, Alba, and Estella) particularly read the fragmentation and their lack of support from the network as an issue of gender. They noted that they have not and would not receive the same backing and support for their political plans as male counterparts within the network, and they expressed frustration with this difference. Maria (C21) is particularly frustrated with the other women within M-19 who have failed to support other women, and instead have supported the men within the group, thereby reflecting a patriarchal bias. When discussing why she chose not to pursue a specific political plan, Alba compares herself to a male M-19 member who did, noting: “He has a different image and also he is a man. And that makes a big difference” (C9). This gendered fragmentation within 137

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war these networks is no surprise, given the many mechanisms behind gendered power differentials within social and political networks in general (Bjarnegård 2018). However, this gendered differentiation is also connected to something which contributes to the longevity of these networks. There is an assumption of a certain type of identity, a shared masculinity within these networks. The networks build on a specific identity, a shared past, and expressed expectations of reciprocal responsibility, as well as a belief that they share ideals, and that others within the network are like them. This is the basis of homosociality, and this homosociality is central to the trust and loyalty which sustain these networks.4 Continued contact between veterans and the relevance of the network have been obvious in all three cases. The cement keeping these networks together has several ingredients. The struggle continues, albeit in different ways, and for different reasons. Either the ideals that originally motivated the war continue to stay relevant, or the loss of fellow combatants during the war propel veterans’ continued investment in the cause and the group. Or simply, veterans realize that the shared experience during the war – and the struggles they have faced coming back from war – is something that does not go away. This sense of shared destiny, in war and in peace, means that shared grievances (imagined and real) have kept pulling them together. As such, these networks continue in part based on affective ties that bind the members to the group, sometimes even after death. In the interviews, some veterans also expressed how continuing in the network means that you have people who understand you; demonstrating how through creating meaning the longevity of the network is also ensured. Of course, there are also examples of cracks in these networks, when these ties are loosened or undone completely, either due to restraints in current life, like lack of money, or because they have engaged in new life choices which occupy their time. In a few cases, the ties are only abstract, as veterans parted ways directly after the end of the war. Many individuals also described frustration and disappointment with the network as a whole or between individuals within the network. Different individuals cope with this frustration in different ways; some remain with the network and others branch out to other groups. Shared past, shared future This chapter has demonstrated the longevity of veteran networks, and the fact that the ties between former combatants serve multiple functions. While they may vary in terms of their formalization and degree of politicization, these ties are present, and have been sustained even forty-seven years after some veterans demobilized. In most cases, the time of the interviews marked around thirty years since the end of their wars. It must be remembered that the sampling strategies in this study made finding long-term commitment within a network 138

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime more likely, and overall not all former combatants will be part of these long-term networks. Thus, the sampling strategies allowed for a deeper understanding of those in the network and their relation with the networks, and to a lesser degree, explored the experiences of those outside the network (this is particularly the case in the United States). However, the depth and number of contacts within the networks studied here is still striking; it is clear that they form a community. In addition, in many cases, these networks were shunned for a period of time, and in later years some of the former combatants reconnected and become fairly deeply embedded. The participants’ connection with the network is a key trait of the journey from war to peace across all three groups. Simply put, even after war is over, combatants seek each other out. The different functions and structures of these networks often overlay each other, and participants move in and out of the informal and formal network configurations. The formal networks help sustain the informal ones and vice versa, and overall, the networks are sustained by a shared history (and future), a sense of friendship, and affective ties as well as financial ones. The affective ties, this emotional connectedness, come with strong claims of dependency, support, and patronage. Maintaining such ties can often be a way to survive (see also Bolten 2012, pp. 5–8, 248; Söderström 2011b, pp. 320–326, 2015, pp. 6, 163–164). This is evident in the way that these social networks are sustained among former combatants from all three cases. These are ties that bind over extended periods of time, which are hard to abandon – in fact they create expectations of explicit care. Just as you can temporarily leave your family, this act does not negate the fact that you continue to belong to it. The exclusivity of a community during a war provides fertile ground for such networks to form, as many are removed from their home community (or keep their main activities secret from them) and are totally dependent on other fellow combatants; the networks continue to be fostered through veterans facing similar challenges upon returning home. Their reciprocal responsibility for each other lives on and this duty to their fellows is a pact which it is hard to break free from. One additional reason these affective ties are particularly strong is related to the experience of loss. While the experience of death and loss is not limited to former combatants, it is an experience which is particularly common here and which permeates war. As such, this is something which in part is peculiar to networks of former combatants. During war, combatants rely on each other for their survival and often fight for each other, and this experience resonates more than the abstract political ideas that may accompany a war (such as independence, democracy, or “against communism” or “for one’s country”). Ultimately, as noted by Elder and Clipp: “Each death intensifies the bonds among survivors” (1988, p. 181), thus producing enduring ties with fellow combatants. However, another recurring feature of these networks is the disappointment and frustration with parts of them, resulting in cracks in the network in all three 139

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war groups. This is related to the sense of a lack of unity in the present, but also to historical points of divergence during the war and after. Some of these differences are respected while others are perceived as more serious, causing individuals to proceed on a different path than the bulk of the network or the leadership. Thus, these networks are not conflict free. This is especially visible in the case of M-19, but the lack of unity across generations of veterans is also a salient experience among the Vietnam veterans. And even those that were most critical of the decisions and behavior of the original group still expressed a strong bond and a sense of care and shared belonging. Such divisions can of course give rise to episodes of both internal violence and factionalism. However, in the three cases, these fault lines were only prone to this to a limited extent: within both M-19 and SWAPO new groupings formed, which in some cases resulted in engagement in different political parties or NGOs. The social networks of former combatants are often seen as a threat to peace, after both old and new conflicts (Bessel and Englander 1981; Diehl 1993, pp. 4, 30; Mann 2006; Prost 1992; Resch 1999; Themnér 2011, 2015; Walter 2004), and thus often interventions are made to try to dismantle them (Kaplan and Nussio 2018a, p. 133; Nussio and Oppenheim 2014, p. 1018; Söderström 2013b; De Vries and Wiegink 2011). What is clear from this chapter is that these networks also perform many other positive functions for the veteran and society, and any attempt at dismantling them needs to consider this as well. What is the cost to the veteran if such networks are broken down, and given the centripetal forces of these networks as seen in this chapter, how reasonable is it to think they can be effectively dismantled? This chapter also demonstrated the importance of homosociality within these networks, and the tendency for them to be gendered. The gendered character of former combatant experiences and the centrality of particular ideas of masculinity are nothing new in the study of former combatants (see e.g. Eriksson Baaz and Utas 2012; Hearn 2012; Karner 1996; Moran 2010; Reilly et al. 2004; Wilson 2019). In this chapter these mechanisms contribute to both the cracks and the cement in these networks. For those who do not conform, it can push them away from the network as they do not experience the same kind of support as other members of the network do. But this hierarchy of status, and preference for similarity, also contributes to cementing these networks. The sense of feeling at ease, being completely understood by other members – due to a perceived, and believed, similarity in experience, ideals, motivations, and future trajectories – creates a basis for these networks to continue. But it also invests these networks with other resources which make them particularly apt for turning political. The networks are formalized mainly through NGOs working on veterans’ issues, but also through political parties growing out of the original armed group.

140

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Veteran networks throughout a lifetime The role of these networks for political mobilization is explored further in Chapter 5. As much of the interaction within the network is related to political mobilization (for themselves or for a version of the cause they fought for originally), the veteran identity becomes a politicized collective identity in all three cases (see Simon and Klandermans 2001, for a discussion of this concept). As seen in previous chapters, the special position of veterans in relation to the state (as creators of, antagonists of, and obedient tools of it) heighten the possibilities for this identity to be politicized, as the group has a special connection with the state. Having this privileged relation with the state, and its associated disappointments, is a strong force for politicization. This may also be one of the features which set veteran networks apart compared to other political networks. These networks help fill their veteran identity with meaning, in part because the other nodes in the network can help answer the question “who am I?” The veterans mirror themselves in the network, and whether it is the achievement of the armed group, or a story of abandonment by society that is being emphasized, this process helps veterans construct stories about themselves as well. The sense of reciprocal responsibility within each group is also underlined by the sense that there is no one else to help them. This in turn pushes veterans further together as a community. As the networks perform other functions, providing work opportunities, support for political careers, friendship, a way to process the past, and recognition, they have become a central part of the lives of former combatants after coming home.5 These networks thus provide many key resources to their members, and while changes occur over time, the real and symbolic sacrifice visible through such networks is a source of motivation and legitimacy. This continued contact and the relevance of the network reinforce the participants’ veteran identities. These networks are both family and a home in and of themselves, and they are central to how homecoming experiences are mediated. The networks sustain their members’ veteran identity and mobilize the former combatants through providing opportunities for participation and creating a sense of a shared destiny. These networks are central to veterans’ homecoming, hence it would be unwise to ignore the longevity of these networks, and the many incentives these individuals have for seeking each other out at wars’ end. Notes 1 In 1990, AD/M-19 gained 12.5 per cent of the presidential ballot, and became the second largest party in the National Constituent Assembly with nineteen of seventy seats, and in 1991 they had a central role in rewriting the constitution. 2 The list of parties with links to M-19 is not exhaustive, neither does it imply that these parties are solely made up of members of M-19, but former M-19 members have been important for these parties. For more on M-19 in general, see Florez-Morris (2005); Le Blanc (2013), pp. 103–167; for more on the political party development, see e.g. Boudon

141

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

(2001); García Durán et al. (2008); Osterling (1989); Rampf and Chavarro (2014), pp. 300–307; Söderström (2016a). 3 For more on brokers and leaders within networks, see Diani (2003), p. 118; Themnér (2012). 4 For more on homosociality and trust, see Bjarnegård (2013, 2018); Kenny and Verge (2016). 5 For more on the multifunctionality of networks, see Passy (2003); and related to networks of former combatants in particular, see Wiegink (2015).

142

5

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization

T

his chapter turns to the political activity the former combatants have engaged in after war. Their political mobilization has waxed and waned over the years, and their veteran identity as well as veteran networks play a role in this dynamic. As such, the chapter tries to display how former combatants connect their experience of war, and of coming home, to their subsequent political mobilization. The chapter shows how experiences covered in the earlier chapters – such as coming home, questions of identity, relationship with the state, and networks – interact with the former combatants’ choice to participate in politics or not. This political (de)mobilization can be defined as a shift in the degree of a person’s political participation, or activity, and political interest. The book adopts a broad definition of political participation, in order to get a sense of the totality of former combatants’ political engagement with their surrounding societies and the extent of their political voice (Söderström 2011b, p. 59, 2015, p. 14). This broad definition allows us to take in shifts over time as well as between arenas of political activity. Crucially, what is at stake here is their everyday politics, how acting out political preferences, positions, and values fits in their everyday lives. This in turn also shapes the wider political impact of veterans as a group. The chapter tracks the cyclical developments of former combatants’ political engagement: when and how it grows and in turn when it dissipates. The longer time span of this study allows these cyclical mobilization patterns to become apparent. This is particularly obvious among the Vietnam veterans who, given their longer spell at home since the end of the war, have had more time and thus opportunity to move in and out of political activity multiple times. In a similar fashion, it is not unlikely that some of those who were either mobilized or inactive in politics in Colombia and Namibia at the time of interview may still shift their level of activity in the future. Some of the inflection points in their political life paths are connected to larger generational and national events. Given the findings discussed so far in this book, it should come as no surprise that when governments build memorials, or take decisions to initiate new wars or end ongoing ones, or

143

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war if well-known veteran politicians enjoy electoral success, or events such as 9/11 occur, these often represent shared inflection points in veterans’ political lives. This chapter builds not only on the interviews conducted for the book but also the life diagrams drawn by the participants during the interviews. In these diagrams, interviewees were asked to plot their levels of political interest and political activity across their lifetimes, and examples of some of these diagrams will feature in this chapter. The larger issue at stake in this chapter is how the war experience and coming home from war is part of how former combatants make sense of these shifts, and part of their ability to withstand demobilization pressures (particularly among the resilient type, defined below). These shifts intersect with the wider political context but also their private life. Work opportunities, family life (marriage, children, divorce, etc.), education, (mental) health issues, and so forth interact with the legacy of war and directly shape former combatants’ political life paths. This chapter focuses on how the veterans experience the interaction between these spheres, and the themes brought out in earlier chapters. The chapter is structured around the three types of political paths defined in the following section, and a few individual examples are discussed at length to illustrate each path. After that, the chapter shifts to the mobilizing and demobilizing narratives, which push the former combatants in all the types in or out of politics. Types of paths: resilient, remobilized, and removed The political life paths taken by the veterans after disarmament can be categorized as belonging to one of three types: resilient (twenty-two individual former combatants), remobilized (fifteen), and removed (twelve).1 This typology was first developed in my work on M-19 (Söderström 2016a), and is based on the paths and trajectories of political mobilization noted in the interviews. Within each type, a number of different push and pull experiences are associated with political mobilization, and it is the combination of experiences which determine the overall path type. The typology is descriptive with different causes leading to the same life path. The typology centers on developments in the former combatants’ post-war life. Within each of the three types of mobilization path there are individuals from each of the three case studies. One distinction is that more women belong to the removed than the resilient type, and no women are found among the remobilizers, suggesting that once they leave a political life, women are unlikely to return for whatever reason. A few specific former combatants’ life paths will be detailed under each type, in order to give a sense of the layers or aspects which shaped these paths, as well as how all areas of an individual’s life influence the path they end up following. The temporal approach allows us to see how Vietnam veterans’ life paths often had their peak after the war, whereas SWAPO and M-19 veterans often had their peak just before the end of their wars. 144

Paths of mobilization

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Removed The removed life path is defined by a decrease in political mobilization sometime after disarmament, lasting until the present. The interviewees who fell into this category recounted how they either removed themselves, or feel they were removed by external events and actors. The decrease varied from some reduction to ending their political involvement completely. The central trait of this type is that their political engagement experienced a clear removal or decrease at some point after the war. Individuals from all three cases fit into this type, but female veterans outnumber male veterans in this group. The reasons for removing themselves, and the extent of their disengagement vary: some left politics altogether (whether they had previously been working for, campaigning for, or just a member of a political party) but still felt politically aware, while others were removed but also noted that if their old connections called on them to remobilize, they would. Others displayed more of a struggle, and while their involvement was reduced, it was not inexistent. Within this group as well, several made space for their political convictions in their chosen careers. In some ways, this type represents a reserve force that is potentially ripe for political (re)mobilization, because everyone within this type, except Hilma (N9), identified strongly with their veteran identity. One example is John, born in 1946, who went to Vietnam in 1968 when he was 22 years old. This is an example of someone who removed himself from politics directly after returning from Vietnam. While he is a regular voter and has been involved in some community work with other veterans, he “pretty much lost interest in the politics, part of it, after Vietnam and … I just quieted down politically” (U1). He returned to a community where his identity as a Vietnam veteran was problematized and difficult to be open about. At the time of the interview, in a similar fashion, he remained uncomfortable sharing his political opinions (as a Democrat) with his immediate (Republican) surroundings. Ndahafa was born in Namibia in 1958, and joined PLAN in 1981, aged 23. She was politically very motivated at the time. After witnessing violence and discrimination as a child and eventually becoming a student activist, she began participating in and even organizing various protests. In the end, she joined PLAN in exile as she felt guilty about remaining in the country when others had already joined up; staying in the country made her feel like a puppet of the regime. While in exile, her children were born, and one of them was still but a newborn when she was accused of being a spy and subsequently tortured by SWAPO. Her time in the Dungeons, combined with the behavior of SWAPO concerning the torture upon achieving independence, caused her to move away from SWAPO directly after the war and thus she no longer considers herself a SWAPO partisan. The experience of torture and of being treated thus by the group for which she was risking her life changed her and she has carried this 145

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war trauma for many years. This broken pact with her group made her disillusioned by politics at large – she sees it as deceitful and self-serving. So, while she votes (sometimes even for SWAPO candidates), she tends to avoid discussing politics as it feels like a waste of her time and causes her stress: “I have decided, politics, let’s not go there, let’s not talk about it. That is now the style that I am doing. … I would rather not be involved in politics, no! I don’t enjoy it, and what I am seeing of politics, firstly it’s a lie” (N13). Instead she has shifted her attention to work with NGOs focusing on reconciliation and trauma. Her war experiences have shaped her work choices and general life path; she has often found herself providing care and support to other trauma survivors. Her identity as a veteran is very clear, and she does not hesitate to attend meetings with other veterans. Another example of the removed political life path is provided by Estella, who joined M-19 in 1986 when she was 26 years old. Her life diagram can be seen in Figure 1. For her, going to university was in itself an act of rebellion, particularly against her father. Violence on campus and the M-19 siege of the embassy of the Dominican Republic were important turning points leading her to join M-19 in the mid-1980s. During the war she spent time in the Soviet Union, meeting people from all over the world, and feels this contributed to her political education and mobilized her further. When she demobilized from M-19, she felt as if she had to work for her own survival rather than a common cause. She had a tough time supporting herself and her daughter immediately after the war, and was disappointed with the M-19 political leadership, as she found that hierarchies from the war continued in peacetime within AD/M-19. In concert, these factors made her turn away from political mobilization. In particular she was disappointed with the lack of support given to her and other female combatants from the M-19 group, and this resulted in her removing herself from formal politics altogether instead of finding alternative political parties. While she decreased her involvement, she did turn toward working with environmental issues, both as a way to support herself and as a way to channel her political commitment: “My combatant spirit, transformative and questioning the status quo, has persisted. I have done it in different places, when I worked with peasant women, indigenous, or with the environment” (C8). Thus, her political engagement is far from zero, even if she has become more removed from formal politics, across her life.2 She believes the socioeconomic difficulties she and others faced right after disarmament made political mobilization hard: “it leads to individual frustrations and the falling of a political movement” (C8). Estella believes the leadership’s failure to integrate the voices of the rank-and-file combatants, and present a clear political vision, led both the party and her own mobilization to falter: For me the great shortcoming in M-19’s leadership is that there is no clear political vision … That’s why when you say a party, M-19 never became one – it is the big failure of M-19 as a political option. … it wasn’t a movement that formed their people politically. For example, the entire base was fucked up. Peasants who didn’t know

146

Paths of mobilization

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

what to do and the reinsertion wasn’t a project that included people in politically or economically sustainable projects. … There was a huge demoralization and the moment is lost; it fell apart because of its own structure. (C8)

The reasons for, and timing of, pulling away from political participation varied significantly, with some veterans removing themselves directly after the war while others had remained engaged until just a few years prior the interviews. For some, their removal coincided with the moment of coming home, or due to work later in life, whereas for others it was linked with the failure of their party (AD/M-19), or experiences they already had during the war. Feeling let down by their own network, or losing their connection with the network was, however, a central aspect of their removal from politics. The palpability of veteran identity is less pronounced among the removed than the other types, even if it remains relevant. Resilient The resilient life path is defined by having sustained or increased political mobilization post-disarmament. People of this type often have an ability to shift their participation between arenas as well as between parties, alongside an ability to find different outlets for their political engagement. Some of the notable shifters within this group moved toward social housing, working with former combatants,

Figure 1  Political life path of Estella (C8), removed type

147

Living politics after war or human rights and other social issues, or used their work as a platform for pursuing their politics. Gerardo expresses this resilience and continuity:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

We who have lived the war, the line never changed. Because what we were doing during the war, at demobilization, now, is to fight for the same principles – the same social injustices that motivated us at the beginning. Fought for the same thing, but in different ways. (C1)

As such, the resilient life stories demonstrate great adaptability and flexibility, shifting arenas and sometimes also agendas. Some even continually deepen and expand their engagement. This group of individuals displayed engagement, despite experiencing pressures toward demobilization. Most of the Vietnam veterans were not political prior to the war, but afterward formed a clear political perspective and became increasingly more engaged. Among the resilient M-19 or SWAPO former combatants, some have remained within their networks, while others shifted away from their political origins, even if their veteran identity has remained intact. Thus, this type can be further divided between those who remain with their group/party (resilient stayers) and those who go beyond their group/party (resilient leavers), but in both cases they show a remarkable continual political engagement across their lifetime. Jaime was 23 years old when he officially joined M-19 in 1979, but his activity had already begun when he was 13: “Since I was a little boy, I was a rebel. And I put all my rebellion to the test for politics” (C11). Jaime, whose life diagram can be seen in Figure 2, is an example of someone immersed in the group; despite challenges around disarmament, his level of political participation has remained high over the years, and at the time he was interviewed he was working in the mayor’s office. Jaime would thus qualify as a resilient stayer. He describes his continued mobilization: Most of the people from M-19 have not ceased to be part of M-19, even when M-19 as such disappeared; we keep the concept, the behavior, we continue to vindicate. … We have not stopped; it has not stopped. Surely there have been some failures, but we maintain the activity. … this activity is always present. (C11)

Jaime explains how experiences of torture, personal achievements, and political education during the war have been important both for his own definition of his identity as well as his commitment to political mobilization. After disarmament he found employment through the M-19 network. Then, when the party failed, he turned toward NGO activities, sustained by the same network of people. For him it is a given that his work, his social engagement, and his political work go hand in hand. Eventually he took on leading positions within some of the new political parties which formed from the same network. Jaime followed the organizational structure and people that grew out of M-19, and to some degree his continued mobilization was dependent on the patronage of certain individuals, as well as the inspiration of Gustavo Petro. His life course changed due to party 148

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization

Figure 2  Political life path of Jaime (C11), resilient type

developments, even if the failure of the political party AD/M-19 had no real adverse effects on his political mobilization. He sees the party’s failure as a result of the political system itself, rather than evidence of an internal failure, even if he also questions how well the party delivered on its political ideals: It was an electoral alliance and it was successful. … But four years later none of them managed to be congressmen. It is a contagion from the practice of politics in Colombia, clearly bureaucratized, parliamentarian. (C11)

Jaime felt great pride in his achievements during the war, and this continually drew him toward greater commitment. It was also clear that both the ideals and affection he associated with the network shaped his behavior, and he did not see the group or the party as the one failing; he in fact tended to point to himself: “So I wouldn’t say that there is a failure, I am the one who fails” (C11). In contrast with Jaime, there are also resilient leavers within M-19, who chose different channels to be active in politics (other political parties or other arenas). Those who turned most definitely away from the M-19 network were often female former combatants who expressed fatigue with the macho culture within the group and party. They also expressed disappointment with the party organization itself, feeling they did not receive enough support from the party 149

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war when they ran for office. An example of this is Alba who, while initially immersing herself in party politics, later turned toward civil society when her disappointment grew too large: “We had a duty to do something new. We had a duty to build the discourses in a different way. We had a duty to build the party in a new way. But we took the model of the traditional parties” (C9). Alba’s shift was unconnected to the failure of AD/M-19, and her M-19 identity remains intact. A striking expression of her sense of continuity is how since the mid-1990s, after completing a university course, she stood as a candidate for local councils and the chamber of representatives, maintaining her M-19 ideals: “I think that the commitment with M-19 is the one that has defined my whole life” (C9). An example of a resilient Vietnam veteran is Charles, who was 22 when he went to war in 1967. His life diagram can be seen in Figure 3. Charles grew up in a rather apolitical family, and his political interest was awakened by the Vietnam War. When he returned home, he became active in the anti-war movement. The Kent State massacre, when on May 4, 1970 a number of students were shot by the Ohio National Guard during a protest at the university, was an incredibly symbolic event for him, and convinced him to become further engaged. His political ideals largely formed during his time in Vietnam and in the subsequent years when he was protesting against the war. Since then his political perspective and engagement have been rather continuous, and if anything, have followed an upward curve. While there have been small fluctuations, often related to periods when his family and work were more demanding, he has also been drawn into regular politics, campaigning for the Democrats, for example. In later years, an important part of his increased mobilization has been his opposition to the US stance on new wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the 1970s Charles has been involved in various veteran organizations and his commitment and engagement with this network is fueled by a sense of duty and responsibility, as well as a sense of community. He sees this as connected to his “tribal experience” during the war, where his “sense of purpose became firmly entrenched”, adding that four decades after Vietnam he feels “more of a drive to participate and to give back, with my life” (U7). Throughout his life he has largely been able to act out his political interest. Jairus qualifies as resilient as his political mobilization has been gradually increasing across his life, whenever he has been able to act out his political interest. He was inspired by liberation movements outside of Namibia, and joined PLAN with his entire school in 1977 when he was 19. His life diagram can be seen in Figure 4. The political motivation he had before the war continued, and while it may have transformed and become modified over the years he still continues on the same path with the same overall mission: what SWAPO stood for from the beginning is a noble thing, because it looks at helping this country to be better, the citizens of this country to be in a better environment economically and socially, so it’s a good thing to look for and fight for, and we will

150

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization

Figure 3  Political life path of Charles (U7), resilient type

Figure 4  Political life path of Jairus (N6), resilient type

151

Living politics after war continue. … I feel that mission, that this is what we are here for, and that is what we are doing … but we are fulfilling something that we set ourselves to do THEN. … so that we take our country to a different level, so that our country becomes developed … we are just continuing that mission. (N6)

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

For Jairus, these ideals, combined with a sense of responsibility toward the country and the party, have drawn him toward continued mobilization. He is a clear SWAPO partisan, a resilient stayer, in part because he has a sense of obligation due to the opportunities offered to him by SWAPO: they have invested in me, to educate me, to create opportunities for me to be educated, with a mission to be useful today, and [by] today I mean from independence up to the day I am able to work. … I think it is a moral obligation I have, as part of this society, to make my contribution, so who else will do it if I just give up? Will I give it up to other people and do what? In fact, what I want for my own children, I want it also for other people’s children. (N6)

After independence, he worked with SWAPO during elections (including election monitoring) and campaigns. He is active at the branch level of the party (low level), but has never run for office. He is not active with a veterans’ organization, and in some sense the party seems to come before other veterans for him. Indeed, SWAPO as a political party is the most dominant organized form of the previous armed group in Namibia, even if other formal networks also developed among SWAPO former combatants. While Jairus envisions engaging with a veteran organization eventually, his sense of unity with those he fought alongside has decreased. Remobilized The remobilized life path is characterized by a decrease in political participation at some point after disarmament followed by one or multiple moments of political remobilization. The number of drops and peaks varies within this category. Some come back once, others come back multiple times (particularly Sackaria, N12, Francis, U2, Gary, U6, Dennis, U8, and Ford, U13). Often personal developments and events push them out of politics, but when they are able to they return. For instance, several veterans in this type left politics in order to pursue a military career, or due to the challenges of homecoming. For some of the M-19 former combatants, their drop in mobilization was linked to the electoral failure of their party. Their strong sense of M-19 identity then meant that Gustavo Petro was an important figure in remobilizing them. M-19 veterans in this type often moved between arenas, and channeled their political engagement through the opportunities given or made available to them. During the periods when they were not politically active, it was clear that their identity as former combatants remained a strong undercurrent in their life. Notably, no women are found within this 152

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization type, suggesting that they are less able to return if they leave politics at any point. Sackaria is an example of someone who has remobilized. He was only 10 years old when he joined SWAPO, and he demobilized when he was 19. He described his time in exile with the group as a time when he was very interested and motivated to fight and liberate the country. During this period he had a feeling of unity, but when he returned home after independence, things changed: “when I started with politics it was fine, we understood each other well, people were united. When we returned from exile, politics is no longer good” (N12). As a result of experiencing SWAPO leaders as selfish, his political engagement dropped after independence. He believes that the leaders failed their ideals and did not defend what they had defended during the struggle: “The aspect that discouraged me is that our leaders are not working like they used to when we were in exile. … They are not serving the public” (N12). He continues: when we came [to] Namibia our leaders forgot us. They forget us, that they were with us, and they are now fighting for themselves, for their families, and forget about us. (N12)

And then he experienced a further drop in political mobilization. Around 2000 he stopped attending SWAPO meetings as he no longer perceived any direct benefits from participating: “why do I have to go to the meetings if I am not gaining anything?” (N12). Yet he described how he is mobilized around veterans’ issues, and has joined groups who advocate for veterans’ rights and benefits, attempting to rectify what he sees as a broken pact on behalf of the state, SWAPO, and the UN at the end of the war. Sackaria was living in an illegal settlement in Windhoek when I interviewed him, and having been unemployed for long periods of time, material benefits were important for both his life choices and political choices. Emilio joined M-19 in 1979, and when he stopped fighting ten years later his disarmament and demobilization experiences challenged his political mobilization. His activity dropped between 1990 and 2011, followed by an increase, particularly in political interest. His life diagram can be seen in Figure 5. His complete withdrawal from political activity was partly due to his return to private life after disarmament, and the challenges he faced upon coming home. However, he described being more politically engaged at the time of the interview than during the 1990s: “I am a new political militant with better convictions and contributing in my tasks to the city development … talking about the peace process, and engaging” (C14). His (and his sister’s) participation in the armed group had severe consequences for his family. These sacrifices and the torture he experienced further underlined his commitment. The failure to realize the ideology and live up to M-19 ideals, especially among the leadership, made him disappointed with the party. In his mind the movement has not completely failed, 153

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war

Figure 5  Political life path of Emilio (C14), remobilized type

as individuals within it are still trying to achieve things. Emilio was not impervious to the failure of the party, but the impact was dependent on other life events occurring simultaneously. Dennis, whose life diagram can be seen in Figure 6, is another example of a remobilizer, indeed one who has remobilized multiple times. Dennis was 21 years old when he went to Vietnam in 1968. He has voted for both Republican and Democratic candidates, but at the time of the interview he was serving on several committees for the Democrats, and engaging in many forms of political participation, such as campaigning, voter registration, donating money, and canvassing. He has had two large peaks in his political life. The first was during his involvement in Vietnam Veterans Against the War, a group formed in 1967 who organized several protests with the aim of changing US policy on Vietnam. His second peak was ongoing at the time of the interview. During periods of absence from political engagement his political interest still remained high. When he returned from Vietnam he was motivated to mobilize against the war, and participated in peace protests. His participation in the week-long veterans’ march in Washington D.C. gave him a clear sense of efficacy and reinforced his sense of agency: we took over that whole Mall. … Nobody could argue with us. And it woke Congress up and eventually that helped end the war. But it didn’t happen right away and then I went into another deep dive and a deep depression, and my mother thought I was going to kill myself. (U8)

154

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization

Figure 6  Political life path of Dennis (U8), remobilized type

Dennis’ mental health deteriorated due to his experiences during the war and ultimately curtailed his political mobilization, and even made it difficult for him to meet other veterans. Ultimately, however, the veteran network around him became an important part of his recovery. He was then inspired into mobilization by the erection of the Memorial Wall: “for me and most Vietnam veterans, [it] was … symbolic, the country finally cares” (U8). This shifted and increased his engagement with other veterans, and he became more open about his war experiences. He still feels the state broke its pact with him, and this has drawn him into further political mobilization. Every year he participates in commemoration activities in relation to the Memorial Wall as part of Rolling Thunder, a veterans’ organization focusing on prisoners of war and those missing in action: It’s a lot of our protest, we … still kind of want to stick our finger up to the country … but in a very productive way … so it’s not just angry vets … we’re a community amongst ourselves, especially now that we are aging, in that I’ll see somebody and I know he’s a vet, we go over and talk. (U8)

Another remobilizing pressure for Dennis has been the US government’s repeated decision to go to war since the 1990s, which has reawakened his resistance to armed conflict. Similarly, 9/11 was another important event that reminded him of the anger he was still carrying around after Vietnam, and he became 155

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

more entrenched as a Democrat. During this period his life improved, and he also received health care and medication, allowing him to overcome both physical and mental traumas he suffered during the war. Since retirement he has been able to become even more involved both in party politics and with veterans’ causes. This has also allowed him to connect party candidates with the veteran community during election campaigns. Commenting on the 2016 presidential election campaign, when Dennis supported Bernie Sanders in the race to become the Democratic Party candidate, his mobilization shows a notable continuity: Well, I’ll be in the streets, I’m with Bernie, you know, we’re gonna get in the streets again and I will be with the young people … that’s what I did when I came back from Vietnam and I will do it again. (U8)

He finds his work with veterans’ organizations rewarding, politically as well as personally: this veterans’ thing here really turned my life around because I can relate to the young vets and it’s a one-on-one experience and I can really give back. I know I am giving back because they look up to me because I was a marine and I went through it. (U8)

Overall, his political life path has had several big drops and peaks, and this pattern has been directly connected to his experiences of war and coming home, as well as his identity and network of veterans. *  *  * Irrespective of the type of life path these former combatants belong to, their veteran identity and experience carry long-term implications for who they are and the life choices they make, politically and non-politically. The significant and universal legacy of war and of being a veteran was identifiable in every interview (with the exception of Jacob, U4), and was captured particularly well by Joaquin: We all have a big heritage from M-19, independently of the path that each one of us decided to follow, or the different actions we took during the militant period. Our way of thinking and acting has a trace of the times when we were militants. (C6)

The distribution across the three identified types does appear to be gendered. As noted, no women combatants are found in the remobilized type, while the removed type is more typically female dominated; the resilient identity, meanwhile, is more evenly distributed. This suggests that female combatants’ political engagement is more vulnerable. The different paths of political activity taken by these former combatants after disarmament are colored in multiple ways, both by their war experience itself and their homecoming. The former combatants’ understanding of their veteran identity and the network of other combatants has also shaped these paths in forceful ways. In the next section, these narratives are 156

Paths of mobilization scrutinized in detail to show how they play into shifts toward more or less political mobilization.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Mobilizing narratives All the path types included both mobilizing and demobilizing narratives. For some the path is one of resilience, as the mobilizing push outweighs the demobilizing one, while others are removed from politics as the demobilizing narratives dominate, or they have remobilized after a time of decreased engagement as different experiences take turns in leading them in or out of politics. The subsections that follow will first focus on how the former combatants’ war experience, coming home, their veteran identity, and network issues become part of their political mobilization. The final section of the chapter considers how these experiences steer them away from political engagement. The costs and gains of war The war experience mattered in a number of different ways for the former combatants’ political mobilization. For many, participation in war created life opportunities: opportunities for education and travel, new contacts with events and new people, all of which shaped their outlook on life and politics. It led some to new relationships (and marriages) as well as new religious choices. Some of these opportunities also provided the former combatants with opportunities for connections and jobs, which also propelled them further politically. For some this meant the war was a busy and exciting time, making them feel very capable and able to influence society, thus heightening their efficacy. The war experience also offered further political education for some of the veterans (among the M-19 and SWAPO former combatants this often meant formal political education). This refinement of their ideology and political values occurred in part through meetings with others and the resulting discussions, but also because concerted efforts were made on behalf of the armed groups to politically educate their members. For instance, Ngenokesho (N2) joined SWAPO to fight colonialism and to free his country, but became a socialist over the course of the war. Several of the M-19 and SWAPO combatants were sent to the Soviet Union for training, where they also received explicit political education. For Gerson it meant that he started to see the fight for Namibian independence as part of the wider Cold War, and he connected more with socialism and communism: “We realized that it wasn’t just about our issues back home because we were part of the Cold War” (N5). But the war experience mattered politically for them in other ways too. For Vietnam veterans the war offered a different kind of political education as some saw questions of concern back home (such as segregation) refracted through 157

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war their experience in the military. For Vietnam veterans in particular, their experience increased their interest in political life, as they saw the war as a product of politics, a development in which they got caught up. The war experience provided many different insights: it changed their view of the world, as well as of home, and their own government, and this awoke their political interest in general as well as shaping their position toward the war itself. The personal experience of the war (for instance, having friends who flew nuclear-capable airplanes) made Cold War politics more real for them, which in turn mobilized them politically. A number of war-related experiences, including violence, torture, and trauma, also continued to lead former combatants toward political mobilization long after the war ended, and this was especially clear among the former members of M-19. Trauma became a source of inspiration at the same time as it was recognized as being painful. Federico (C2) felt that surviving the torture he was subjected to during the war was, in some way, his own win against the army, and that these wounds (physical as well as emotional) from both his own torture and the fact that his sister was killed in the conflict strengthened his bonds and commitment to M-19 and their political cause. A number of symbolic events during the war – for example, when the sword of Simón Bolívar was stolen from a museum in 1974, or the siege of the embassy of the Dominican Republic in 1980, and the siege of the Palace of Justice in 1985 – also continued to be a source of inspiration for political mobilization. In her interview, Alba proclaimed: “We have been talking about this action for thirty years. The Palace of Justice is the action that defines the path” (C9). Ultimately, these experiences contribute both to the research participants’ sense of achievement connected to the war, and to the costs of the war. This sense of achievement arising from the war was a continual source of inspiration long after the war had ended. Again, this was particularly the case among the former M-19 combatants: having been able to change the country’s constitution was inspiring. Celestina describes this achievement: “Since [18]86 such a large reform of the national constitution has not been made. For us it is a fundamental issue. That is our two cents that we were able to contribute to the democracy in Colombia’s history” (C20). This legacy of the war pressed some people to continue mobilizing. Alfonso (C19) felt that they had a “duty to do something” in the wake of the war. Sometimes the sense of achievement was of a more personal nature, and it was these accomplishments – whether wartime instances of brave or competent behavior or personal trauma – that pushed them to continue. Having invested in the struggle, there was a sense of sunken costs, and past investment in the war thus led to continued investment long after the fighting had ended; not doing so they felt would invalidate the sacrifices of the past. Finally, for all groups, their own experience with war also made many of them opinionated about more contemporary decisions regarding war (and peace) 158

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization and reinvigorated their political mobilization. Thus, when the United States entered into the Gulf War, this acted as a wake-up call for Charles to remobilize, and he reengaged in protests: “I was very, very much questioning the need to go into Iraq and I did demonstrate on several occasions to not support even the concept of our involvement in Iraq” (U7). Charles then continued to protest and respond to additional wars the United States engaged in. Former combatants’ own past gave them a feeling of expertise on how to do war, but also on why and when not to go to war. While new conflicts triggered something for them, it was not always something they were able to immediately act out, as Dennis notes: “the first Iraq War was when I really started getting political again in terms of ‘this is wrong’ … but I was still struggling with my problems” (U8). As noted, another event that caused the Vietnam veterans to reconnect with their own war experience was 9/11. They reacted with fear, but it also triggered feelings of responsibility and anger. For some it even retriggered their PTSD. It caused a spike in political interest and engagement and, for some, a reconnection with old networks of veterans. For instance, Francis notes: Oh, it’s terrible, that’s when the PTSD started coming back again, and I wanted to help. I couldn’t believe our country was being attacked, wow. I mean, I wanted to help, I wanted to be involved somehow. I was too old … knowing that we have a whole new generation of young soldiers now that’s going to be going through what my generation did and it’s really upsetting, you know. My blood pressure shot through the roof, I couldn’t sleep, ended up having a heart attack … and everything just really came to a head and that is when I started to realize that I had to make some changes, really had to. (U2)

This event, and other periods in US political history when new wars were contemplated or enacted, caused Vietnam veterans to reconnect with their own understanding and feelings about their country going to war. For those with a sense of abandonment after Vietnam, it reconnected them with that; for those who saw their participation differently, a different connection was made. Overall, such moments throw them back into what it was like when they themselves were sent overseas, and often lead to a reconnection with the community of other veterans, and a reengagement with their network. The war experience was a source of mobilization across all three cases in a number of ways. War created life opportunities and a sense of agency, political education (directly and indirectly), and shaped people’s opinions on war (as well as peace, as we will see in the next subsection), which all led former combatants toward political mobilization. For the M-19, in addition, the costs and gains of the war also inspired and led them to remain politically mobilized in order not to invalidate wartime sacrifices. These issues were particularly present among the resilient and remobilized former combatants, whereas former combatants in the removed type only commented on how the war created opportunities for political education. 159

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Positions on peace and veteran policies A number of the events and issues which became actualized as the former combatants came home from war have also been central to their political mobilization. Thus, war protests, veteran policies, and other events which reconnected them with the war (such as monuments or new war events) form part of how their homecoming led them into politics. Among the Vietnam veterans, participating in anti-war protests after their tours created a sense of agency and efficacy, especially as the war was ending. But when the war finished, this form of mobilization was no longer needed and some fell away at that point. For some, and eventually for others, their energies became rechanneled into veteran organizations and activities in general. Ben (U11) had already participated in anti-war protests before he went to Vietnam, and had even considered going into exile in Canada to avoid the draft. In contrast, Francis had participated in counter-protests against the anti-war movement before he went to Vietnam: I was angry at them [the anti-war protesters]. … There used to be marches through [town]. … I was part of the crowd that stood on the rooftops of the buildings on [street] in [town] and threw tomatoes on them [laughs] so I had a different take. (U2)

Irrespective of which side they took, these experiences surrounding the war created a sense of agency, and veterans often reconnected with it later in life. Similarly, some M-19 veterans cast themselves as peace protagonists as they felt they had decided to sign the peace agreement, and they also continued to mobilize in this role of peace protagonist. It was a badge of honor which compelled them to further action. Meanwhile, the peace negotiations with FARC mobilized several of them into political participation. A number of coming-home issues also mobilized these former combatants in relation to specific policies across all three cases. For some, simply access to various veteran benefits such as health care and medication improved their lives and allowed them to be active in the way they wanted. But largely, this was associated with their interest in lobbying for specific policies targeted at veterans, improving access to benefits, design of veteran programs, or simply holding politicians accountable on veterans’ issues. Such moves are clearly motivated by self-interest, but also by concern for the wider veteran community, and the need to fight for those within the group who cannot fight for themselves. For instance, Dennis notes: “my big motivator is the vets, you know, and that’s what makes me angry and that’s what makes me wanna get involved” (U8). Amadeo argues that the Colombian state had already broken the pact with them, and that the design of the programs was hardly enough to mend this pact: there was a program that was house, car, and scholarship. I wrote a text where I expressed my discontent with that, that it is not a way to win over a former combatant – you can’t win over people with bread. (C22)

160

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization Connection with the network of other veterans often led to mobilization for veteran issues extending beyond their own community of veterans, together with others in the network. Engagement in this area was also connected to peacebuilding activities. Some felt a need to retell the history of the war, as related to the homecoming reception they received, and particularly their disagreement with the cultural depiction of the war and the veteran. Some veterans thus engaged in visiting schools to “tell the truth about the war” (Francis, U2), to express their opinions on who was the real hero and who was not. Moments when veterans’ war or homecoming experiences were publicly recognized opened the door into politics for several of them. The clearest example here is the creation of the Memorial Wall for the Vietnam veterans. But Ngenokesho (N2) had a similar experience when SWAPO finally recognized and supported the creation of a veterans’ organization. These events proved to be critical turning points, catapulting the former combatants into new arenas of political mobilization. Importantly, for some Vietnam veterans, commemoration at the Memorial Wall has become an annual event. These public forms of recognition allowed the community of other former combatants to become more visible, which in turn allowed them to connect with new individuals within the network. Across all groups the policies targeting former combatants provided both an arena and issue for mobilization. The Vietnam veterans and former M-19 combatants who positioned themselves as peace protagonists at the end of the war often carried the seeds for continued long-term mobilization. Finally, asking for recognition in the wake of such public and symbolic recognition of the war or what they had lived through, also moved some to mobilize, particularly SWAPO and Vietnam veterans. Identity continuity and culture of heroes Former combatants’ identity as veterans or as former members of armed groups was an important facet of their political mobilization. Acting in line with their identity conceptions (political mobilization) gave them a sense of satisfaction. Similarly, experiencing recognition from their community as a result of their veteran identity also mobilized them. But overall, the veteran identity was part and parcel of research participants’ life conceptions; it was central to who they have been and who they are, as well as who they will be. For the M-19 former combatants in particular, this entailed feeling like politics is at the core of who they are. An example of this is Gerardo, who in the interview quoted a song “In Praise of the Fighters” from Bertolt Brecht’s play The Mother: There are men who struggle for a day, and they are good. There are others who struggle for a year, and they are better. There are some who struggle many years, and they are better still. But there are those who struggle all their lives, and these are the indispensable ones. (C1)

161

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war Gerardo saw his whole life as part of the same struggle expressed through different means (arms or peaceful politics). Similarly, Joaquin describes how his whole life is infused with the cause: “There is a strong connection between the M-19 identity and my social and political life. There is a connection between my ideology and my job and hobbies” (C6). The veteran or armed group identity was visible across all three political life path types (even if it was more pronounced among the resilient and remobilized) and all three country cases. Admitting to this identity also meant that the former combatants sometimes had to accept other people’s claims on them, and in an effort to live up to this identity they mobilized politically. The culture of heroes was also important to narratives on mobilization across all three groups, both through close relations like their fathers and uncles (who fought in earlier wars or also supported the struggle), or more remote ideological heroes. But there were examples of fathers who played a political role in other ways, for instance Gary notes that his “dad was part of the group [within the unions] that kicked the Communists out” (C6). The role of these figures was particularly important early in life, and for people’s decision to join an armed group or the military, but the “heroes” often continued to be a source of inspiration later in life. For Fanuel (N8), the heroes he mentions (in particular Che Guevara) still set an example for how to live life, and thus seem to play an ongoing role in his political mobilization. Celestina (C20), on the other hand, seems to be inspired and encouraged to participate more through being treated as a hero by her community, while José wants to be a hero for his children and friends, and as a result he commits himself further to his political mobilization: I was capable of developing processes that they couldn’t and I started to feel that I was really good at organizing and leading. So this made me move forward, it gave me confidence and I felt like being an example for my kids. It is like the ultimate target, for my daughters, for my friends. (C10)

The heroic legacy continues to be something to live up to, often reinforced by the sacrifices made by themselves and others. For many research participants, ideals which began to form when they were young and which motivated their participation in war, often continue to matter and lead them into political action even decades after the war ended. This is, of course, particularly the case for the SWAPO and M-19 former combatants (among those that joined for political reasons). These ideals, or causes, were often reinforced and developed during war, along with their commitment to these ideals. Often losses endured over the course of the war underlined this process further, as one way former combatants had of justifying the death of people close to them was the righteousness of these ideals to begin with. These ideals tend to move them toward continued political mobilization. Peter notes: “Apartheid has not really died here. Poverty and injustices continue as if we have no constitution in here. 162

Paths of mobilization This is why I need to continue doing what I can” (N10). Ben, who protested against as well as serving in the Vietnam War, displayed a similar sense of continuity, but on a completely different topic:

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

I guess I haven’t changed in fifty years. I mean, the motivation was we shouldn’t be going into wars we’re not gonna win in places we don’t belong. (U11)

Amadeo makes a similar point: “the goal is clear since the [19]50s and it is the well-being of the people from the countryside” (C22). Thus, whether the issue is poverty, discrimination, inequality, foreign policy, or the desire to change society, these ideals led the former combatants into war, or they discovered them during the war, and this has continued to mobilize them in the decades following their disarmament. For all groups, these ideals are connected to that part of their identity which underlined duty and sense of service to others. Duty was narrated as a part of who they are, and often translated into the need for further engagement, doing things for others, for the poor, for the country. Another important element that mobilized many former combatants in all groups was when other veterans ran for office, as discussed in Chapter 3. This preference, either for veterans in general, or for former combatants from their own armed group, was clear across all three cases. It mattered for their willingness to vote, and their decision concerning who to vote for, as well as willingness to campaign for a party, and in some cases for bringing veterans back into politics. They had a sense that former combatants turned politicians were able to represent them as they embodied a sense of duty, and thus the research participants expressed and enacted a preference for them. Among the Vietnam veterans it was clear that sometimes the veteran status of a specific politician even made people vote for a party that they normally did not vote for. Dick explains how he feels that being a veteran signals important things about the person running for office, namely that they are doing it for the right reasons, selfless reasons: I think it’s important because you learn to focus on the mission, and getting something done rather than focusing on yourself. And I think that that’s the thing I like – some sort of coherent rationale beyond “I want to be a senator”. (U14)

Among the M-19 former combatants, some, particularly among the remobilized, saw the rebirth of the M-19 legacy in the form of the Progresistas party and their leader, former M-19 man Gustavo Petro. While his leadership was important, it was his character and political style in particular which reminded them of the old M-19 agenda; his personification of M-19 ideals resonated with the self-image of the former guerillas. For some, this resonance meant a return to (party) politics. Several became active with the Progresistas party due to this newfound enthusiasm. For instance, Alfonso was very invested in the M-19 struggle and highly dependent upon the network, and remobilized due to his identification with Petro, as did many others. 163

Living politics after war The significance of an identity as a former combatant was a forceful mobilizing narrative across all three groups. Emulating their heroes, life conceptions and ideals that developed and became entrenched during the war continue to lead them toward political mobilization.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Network affection and reciprocal responsibility The network of other former combatants shaped and encouraged political mobilization in a number of different ways. Mobilizing for the network provides a sense of community and personal satisfaction. But the network also offers recruitment opportunities, patronage, and a sense of duty which together propel the former combatants toward political mobilization. The multiple functions of these networks create these opportunities for mobilization. Overall, the network was more important for mobilizing the M-19 and Vietnam veterans than the SWAPO former combatants. Several veterans noted the satisfaction and personal peace that came from devoting themselves to fellow former combatants and their needs. Feelings of responsibility often developed during the war, and enacting that sense of community later in life creates meaning and encourages further mobilization. However, a sense of indebtedness and affection for the network as a whole also inspired and led former combatants across all three groups toward political activity. Emotion, in general, has also been shown to be important for political mobilization (see e.g. Costalli and Ruggeri 2017; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Nussio 2017; Rudolph et al. 2000; Summers-Effler 2002) and a central part of politics (see e.g. Ahmed 2004; Mihai 2014; Mouffe 2000); indeed, the affection for the network meant former combatants were pulled in to defend and mobilize on behalf of other veterans. They had a sense that they were indebted to their fellows within the network, particularly those who had died, and this engaged a sense of reciprocal responsibility, leading them toward political mobilization, and a feeling that they need to help those who are still alive, or continue the fight of those who died. As Maria remarks, “a lot of partners that I knew were killed during the struggle so I feel committed with them” (C21). Camilo expresses a similarly deep commitment stemming from the sacrifice of other members in the group, which made him return to politics in Colombia: my former experience here [in Colombia] was with people that had been killed, who had put their heart and their minds in this project of the M-19, was too strong, I believe it like that. So for me, it’s not like saying “no more” and I will forget my past, no. (C12)

Missing affection and friendship within the network also drew them toward continued engagement with the network and political action. 164

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization Across all three groups, the network also provided opportunities for recruitment: people asking the former combatants to join causes, events, and parties, as well as run for office. The multiple functions of these networks (such as friendship, support, stipends, and work opportunities) created occasions for acquaintances to recruit the former combatants into political action. Ben describes how he was recruited to Vietnam Veterans of America: “Walking down the street I saw David. And whenever we had this conversation … whatever I wanted didn’t happen, but he got me to join” (U11). Camila (C4) and Mario (C5) spoke about their link with a specific node in their network, and how their trust and affection for this person (Gerardo, C1) would lead them to instantly remobilize if he asked them. Across all three cases, networks also provided both influence and access which encouraged the former combatants toward political mobilization. Over the years, these networks managed to recruit for higher and higher positions within veteran organizations. These positions, as well as the connections provided by the networks, gave members a certain gravitas which accorded them access to as well as influence with both politicians and veteran communities. Many positioned themselves between these groups, and provided a link between them, thereby gaining influence. Of course, SWAPO and M-19 networks were also associated with political parties beyond the veteran organization activities. In both cases, patronage from the network mattered, as it translated into political action and engagement. There was a sense that members needed to pay something back for this patronage, from their group or party. For instance, Memory notes that she would have a lack of options if she were to abandon her party: “where will I go? I just have to stay in my party” (N3). Her connection and position with SWAPO provide her with crucial material protection, which goes some way to explaining her motivation to be a SWAPO leader in her community. Many of the SWAPO veterans expressed such a sense of duty to their party, which they acted out by mobilizing during campaigns and elections, for example, and also through other life choices. For instance, Ngenokesho (N2) felt such a responsibility toward the party, as they had helped him so much, that when they asked him not to run for office but instead to take on other chores within the party, he did not feel he could say no. His sense of duty to them dictated his choices. Similarly, Amon describes how this duty and responsiveness to the party was engrained in him during the war: “I grew up in that environment … so anything the party is doing … I will just support, because we were trained also not to be rebels” (N4). Duty to the party is also invoked when they try to mobilize others: I always vote, and tell people to vote, since now I am leader. When I come, I tell people to vote so that our country doesn’t get colonized [again], we should vote SWAPO, our political party, because they freed our country. (Memory, N3)

165

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war These veterans have a clear sense of being indebted to SWAPO, thus when the party calls, they respond and comply. The past achievement of the armed group enforces loyalty in the present. For a number of former M-19 combatants, mobilization followed the various ebbs and flows of M-19 as a party, both its success and its failure, as well as its various reincarnations. For some of these individuals, the armed group and party were the main vehicle for political mobilization. For others, difficulties at the party level translated into small variations in their own participation, with momentary downward drops followed by readjustments, or finding other outlets for their mobilization. In Celestina’s (C20) case, she eventually became frustrated with the sense of fragmentation within the group and this led her toward other political parties. For Angela (C23) and Catalina (C18), the initial success of the party was important for their own mobilization. For the resilient among them, the role played by the electoral successes and failures of the party was minimal – it was instead the lack of direct support from the party that led some individuals to find other political homes. The more the new party or parties mirrored the perceived ideals of the armed group, the stronger the pull toward mobilization they exerted on the former combatants. Across all three cases and in all types of life paths, the network played an essential role for political mobilization, particularly when it continued to mirror the ideals of the armed group. The networks created opportunities for recruitment into political activity, but also feelings of affection and duty (to their own identity, to fellow former combatants, and the larger cause they originally fought for), opportunities of patronage, which led them into mobilization. Demobilizing narratives There were aspects of their war experience and veteran status which led former combatants to move away from politics. This section discusses the narratives surrounding political demobilization, following the same order as the previous section where the initial focus is war and homecoming experiences before moving on to identity and networks. Overall, however, the mobilizing narratives were more dominant in the interviews. War pushed them out The war experiences of some of the former combatants pushed them away from political activity. In a few cases, they described how they were even pushed out by their own group, as they were excluded from specific military operations or accused of being spies. For instance, Peter (N10) became what can be termed a resilient leaver, as he remains very politically active even though his connection with SWAPO was severed due to accusations of spying. Another example is 166

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization Amadeo (C22), a remobilizer whose first removal from politics was unusual in that it happened prior to the group’s disarmament. He was told not to participate in one military operation, despite a long track record of missions; subsequently he felt betrayed and left the group. Some of the Vietnam veterans believed that the war was fought in the wrong way, for the wrong reasons, and was fueled by lies; this caused them to experience a broken pact with the state. This broken pact entailed distrust of the state and led them away from political mobilization. For others, the war experience in itself pushed them out of politics. In Robert’s (U12) case, the war decreased his sense of agency and efficacy. During the war he had no control over his life, while politicians far away were making life-and-death decisions which would impact him directly. This experience stayed with him, and seems to have colored later experiences of disempowerment. Other consequences of the war stayed with some former combatants across their life. Mental health (PTSD and depression) or family crises due to the war led some away from politics. For instance, Dennis notes that it was difficult for him to spend time with other veterans in the beginning, as it would activate his depression and PTSD: “It just brought on depression. I couldn’t take it; I would be shaking” (U8). Thus, some of their political agency was lost in the wake of the war.

Homecoming: keeping busy or feeling abandoned When they came home, other aspects of former combatants’ lives would come to the fore, and often cause a lack of space and time for political activities – as they tried to catch up with their lives, politics received less attention. Across all three cases, the need to focus on work, education, and family often shifted attention away from politics. For some it was experienced as a severe conflict, as they needed to work for their own survival and thus lost the ability to focus on politics, at least for a while. But there were also other aspects of coming home which stood in the way of politics, or that pushed former combatants out of politics. For instance, Alfonso reveals some of the difficulties he felt in adjusting to a political life after war: It was hard for us, because I was not a politician of certain level… because you have to have a skill for achieving at the political level, with the political proposals. During this period, it was really hard for me. … because for that you need to have the experience, the knowledge, the words, you have to have proposals, you have to have voice! … That was hard, it was hard adapting to that environment, not because you didn’t want to, but in terms of the skills, concrete skills with the people, for going to a meeting, for an assembly. You have to be prepared, you have to have basic knowledge about the processes, the laws, and of course you have to express at that level your political proposals. (C19)

167

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

For others, it was more the sense of a broken pact – broken by the state, by their leaders, by society when the war was over – which caused disappointment and subsequent disillusionment with politics. This broken pact was related to the feeling of being abandoned when they came home, for instance due to insufficient attention in reintegration programs, or a sense that they had failed to achieve the aims set out during the war. The blame for this was either placed on specific leaders, politicians, the state, or society overall. For instance, Gomen notes: Because now, our government is not looking out for us now anymore, they are looking out for their own pocket. They are looking at their own pocket. … I say now, we are having a problem. (N1)

Finally, some former combatants (particularly those from M-19) experienced threats to their own security when they came home, which caused them to remove themselves from politics, or they saw loved ones killed as a result of their political engagement, such as the son of Camila (C4) and Mario (C5). As a result, they lost their motivation to continue with politics. For members of all groups it was quite common to experience their political mobilization being crowded out by the more immediate concerns which took over their life when they came home (for another example of this kind of displacement, see Stoker and Jennings 1995). At the same time, feelings of abandonment (by various actors) also led many away from politics. Security problems, while rarer, were also serious depressors of their mobilization. Professional identities and failed ideals Identity issues led former combatants away from politics in two main ways: either they took on a professional identity, usually as a result of a military career, which forced them out of politics, or they were disappointed by politicians mistreating or misrepresenting their veteran identity. For the former, their military career was associated with being apolitical. Their professional identity took over, and made it impossible to be openly political at the same time: “When I came from exile, I was a commander so I didn’t participate in politics because a commander will never participate in politics” (Gomen, N1). As a result, this group, particularly SWAPO and Vietnam veterans, removed themselves from active engagement in politics. This removal lasted for varying periods of time depending on the length of their career. Some, like the Vietnam veteran Ralph (U9), found it hard to reconnect when they retired from the military, having been out of politics for the majority of their life, even though they had a clear interest in politics. There was also the rare example of former M-19 member José (C10), who worked for the state for a period and thus felt that in that capacity his professional identity meant that he needed to avoid politics. 168

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization Across all three groups, the veteran status and experience shaped how some saw and judged politicians with a veteran background, and this too contained seeds for political demobilization. Among the removers there were some that opted to move away from parties and candidates because they disagreed with how these veteran politicians had handled themselves in the war and in relation to the war after coming home. For instance, Robert (U12) felt animosity toward politicians who failed to live up to their veteran identity, believing they should have been better and delivered more. Similarly, in Colombia, Celestina’s (C20) disappointment with specific individuals was a large part of her removal from M-19-dominated activities. She expressed an extreme attachment to specific individuals within the group and thus when they failed to live up to her expectations it exerted a lot of influence on her. Vietnam veteran Gary (U6) discussed at length the importance of specific veteran politicians, and his disappointment with them. Encounters with such politicians colored their relationship with politics overall, and pushed them away from mobilizing. Lack of network support and party failure Some aspects of the way the network developed also led research participants away from politics. Dissatisfaction with the amount of patronage offered by their group or political party meant some did not feel like participating in the network or its political activities as they were not getting anything from it; this lack of material benefits led them to perceive that the pact with the group was broken. Network connections of former combatants from M-19 and SWAPO were particularly vulnerable to the disappearance of individuals within the leadership, or mid-level commanders. When specific individuals were killed (i.e., assassinated post-disarmament) this cut some of them off from potential employment and decreased motivation and mobilization opportunities. A few of the M-19 veterans described how the death of some of their leaders was demoralizing and even made them feel like giving up. However, patronage from the group was not only visible in terms of employment opportunities but also through receiving care and attention. The ability to be seen, and listened to by others within the network, was sought after, and sorely missed when absent. The feeling of being seen was not limited to personal connections but could also be related to a more distant feeling of recognition, and not being recognized by someone higher up in the group’s hierarchy stymied mobilization in general. SWAPO and M-19 veterans in particular expressed disappointment with politicians whose self-interest was perceived to have taken over, and this contrasted with the duty perspective and the sense of togetherness which was engrained in them during the war. Veterans expect these heroes and former leaders to continue and complete the struggle. It is clear that the former combatants have big expectations, based either on explicit promises made during the war, or because 169

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war they feel their heroes fail to live up to the ideals embedded in the hero status. Overall, there is a sense that leaders from the armed group have stopped listening and that have failed to deliver on the reciprocal responsibility created during the war, allowing for their political demobilization in turn. Access to the network also meant access to party resources, which often were deemed important in order to win elections; thus, when this was not available, some were dissuaded from entering into political office themselves. An extension of this was the lack of support for their candidacies noted by women interviewees in particular, many of whom felt abandoned and left to their own devices: “we were orphans in the political sense, the party didn’t support us” (Maria, C21). Similarly, Alba (C9) felt a lack of support for her candidacy from the party and the network, and while she was very disappointed with this and it initially led her toward political demobilization, she soon turned to other arenas of politics instead. This lack of support for women within the M-19 network originated with both male and female group members. Alba describes how she felt gender discrimination was an issue during her time in the armed group, but also once she disarmed: “also now in the political life the gender discrimination is huge, so you become repetitive, you demand, you cry, you fight, that also stops us from opening spaces” (C9). It was clear that the hierarchy of belonging within the network was gendered. In the specific case of M-19 there was also a sense that their project as a political party had failed, and this led some toward political demobilization. Some members were able to find other arenas and outlets for their political involvement, but others were not. Several felt as if the various incarnations of M-19 as a political party after AD/M-19 did not stay true to the original ideals of the group, which often meant that they stopped actively campaigning for them even if they continued to vote for them. Estella (C8) described how it felt like the leaders were frozen in the past, and they stopped inspiring her. Alfonso (C19), in contrast with many others, lacked higher education and M-19 was the main vehicle for his advancement in life in general, which made him vulnerable to the failure of the party. Hence, during times when the party was less able to provide opportunities for him and other low-ranking combatants, or was less successful in elections, it also depressed their political activities. One unusual case where a network allowed for political demobilization was Vietnam veteran Ben (U11). As he got older, Ben’s trust in the veteran community allowed him to feel as if he could step down and decrease his own engagement, while still relying on others within the network to carry on the work. He explained that he experienced a kind of shared responsibility within his network, trusting that the next generation of veterans was able to take over after him. In contrast to Ben’s experience, when the networks failed to provide support and affection, or were perceived as not fulfilling the pact of reciprocal responsibility, this exerted

170

Paths of mobilization a demobilizing pressure across all three cases, and in particular for those who followed the removed and remobilized life paths.

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Personal tradeoffs Other life events are also relevant, of course, and across all three cases it was clear how family events, relationships, and work shifted veterans’ political engagement. Sometimes it was a question of replacement, and other times they experienced a tradeoff. For instance, some felt they had to focus on their education and consequently had no time for politics. Several described how during parts of their lives their work had kept them too busy to have time for politics. Joaquin (C6) replaced his political engagement with focusing on his family and work when he felt he was pushed away from politics. Meanwhile, Angela’s focus started to shift in 2000, and her political activities started to reduce. In particular she shifted the arena for her commitment, and began working with children at risk, ultimately making her work her main focus in life instead: somehow, we are always searching for something, we are in a quest. I believe that when I got involved with M-19 and I heard everything and those things that somehow caught me, was the capacity of doing good things for people. Each one of us does it in its own way. I discovered that the best way of doing it is … me being better every day. And I believe that you can do your struggle from anywhere you stand … It doesn’t matter if you are in a political party, in the church, it doesn’t matter. … I think that we always thought of M-19 as something beautiful from which we could help people. That was its essence, and I believe that I will keep working from there but with new ideas, it’s from there. (C23)

Several expressed how difficult times in their private life – divorce, illness or death of family members, suicide attempts – limited their ability and interest in being active in politics. For most it led to a drop in their engagement, even if some managed to continue despite such challenges. However, positive family developments also sometimes lessened their political mobilization, such as when people had small children, or when they felt they had to prioritize a new marriage (as previous ones had failed when politics was given priority). Charles describes how his young family took precedence: “Well, when the kids were on, I devoted most of my energy to them. I belonged to the veteran organizations in name only” (U7), and Camilo similarly notes that “now I want to become the father of my children. So I was building my relationship with my children” (C12). Camilo took a break from politics as he moved abroad with his family to focus on them instead, even if it was a difficult step to take: “Yes, for me it was like a feeling of sadness somehow in the sense [of leaving] all this that is part of my life, it is behind me, and I don’t want to live it more like that” (C12). Finally, retirement, old age, and deteriorating health meant a

171

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war need for some former combatants to slow down with everything, including politics. Some also expressed a sense that retirement signaled a time to prioritize their family after a long life of political dedication. These personal concerns often interacted with each other as well as with the other demobilizing experiences discussed in this chapter. Particularly, however, the presence and experience of several of these experiences is usually what led to actual political demobilization in the end, rather than just exerting a demobilizing pressure on these individuals. As each individual may also have experienced multiple pushes toward mobilization, it is the final combination of this crossfire of experiences which shaped their political path. Diverse and common paths Access to political participation and channels which are seen as efficacious is important for the larger functioning of democracy and peace (see, among others, Walter 2004). The literature on former combatants in the Global South shows that former combatants often participate in politics, but that the interaction with the institutional environment is important for shaping how this participation unfolds (see e.g. Alfieri 2016; Blattman 2009; Christensen and Utas 2008; Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Mitton 2008; Söderström 2011a, 2013a, 2015, 2016a; Ugarriza and Craig 2013; Utas and Christensen 2016). The literature on the Global North, particularly on American veterans, provides some evidence of increased political participation, even if there are differences in the longevity and strength of the effects (see, in particular, Erikson and Stoker 2011; Grossman et al. 2015; Jennings and Markus 1977; Schreiber 1979; Teigen 2006). At the same time, the political involvement of the veteran in post-war politics has also been colored by fear and concern. This chapter has detailed how the political life paths of the former combatants have been shaped by their war experience and their experience of coming home as former combatants. Across the three groups people mobilized for different causes and issues, but there is a lot of common ground, as questions concerning veteran policies and decisions on war and peace were central to the mobilizing of members of all groups. Similarly, across all groups people were very willing to mobilize for and with other former combatants running for office. We have seen how the different political life paths taken across these three cases fall into three types: resilient, remobilized, and removed. The resilient withstood pressures to politically demobilize, and exhibited sustained or increasing political mobilization post-disarmament. In contrast, the removed experienced a decrease in political mobilization sometime after disarmament lasting in perpetuity. The remobilizers had one or several periods of removal from political mobilization followed by stretches of high levels of political mobilization; they ultimately moved in and out of politics a number of times. 172

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization The remobilized and resilient often shift arenas and channels used for expressing their politics. Notably, even when they shifted arenas in this way, they often followed or were joined by other former combatants from their group. Many of the M-19 former combatants in particular made several large shifts in this manner, and thus when needed or wanted, they could part ways with the political party and its incarnations which grew out of the armed group and instead move into other arenas of politics. Of course, this is dependent on other arenas being open to them in the first place. In the context of Namibia there were fewer options for former combatants outside of SWAPO. It is easy to imagine post-war societies where former combatants are less welcome in new communities and arenas, and where as a result they would be locked into a political project they do not fully support or where their only other recourse is to remove themselves from politics altogether. A few M-19 and SWAPO former combatants would have had fewer links or ways to sustain themselves had they abandoned the political party that grew out of their armed groups, and thus resigned themselves to staying within these groups instead. The main issues covered in the earlier chapters shaped former combatants’ political life paths: war experience, homecoming experience, as well as identity as a veteran and their network of fellow former combatants were key in leading them both in and out of political mobilization. The resulting type is dependent on this crossfire of narratives, and often several narratives built upon each other. No one individual story tells the same journey as another, yet many research participants described similar pressures to continue in, move into, or remove themselves from politics. As these pressures were depicted from the viewpoint of the individual former combatant, it is not surprising that the removed tended to focus on the issues which pushed them out of mobilization (as well as a tendency to blame external circumstances rather than internal motivations) rather than describing aspects which led them toward greater political mobilization. Overall, however, the enduring legacy of the war and homecoming from war is multiple pressures to mobilize into politics, throughout the totality of these veterans’ lives. The balance between experiences and narratives vary somewhat across the types of life paths but, overall, very similar mechanisms mobilizing these former combatants were visible in all types and cases. Some of these mechanisms will resonate with mechanisms for mobilizing citizens in general, of course, but their origins and configurations are decidedly post-war and post-disarmament. Finally, these pressures for political mobilization and demobilization do not occur in a vacuum: personal concerns and contextual as well as institutional conditions also shape and interact with these pressures. The costs and gains of war led toward political mobilization in a number of ways. Overall, the war shaped how the former combatants view politics, both by creating life opportunities and through direct and indirect political education. Long after the end of war their own war experience still leads them to become 173

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war particularly vocal about war and peace choices in their respective countries. Symbolic events during the war but also new triggers continued to underline their war experience and encourage them toward mobilization. For the M-19 former combatants in particular, it was clear that their conflict had not ended (not the least because the state was still in conflict with other guerilla groups at the time of the interviews), and here their previous investment (particularly their own traumas and the deaths of fellow combatants) in the conflict continued to lead them to try to achieve the goals of their war. It is easy to see how this tendency toward further entrenchment along the conflict identities can become a severe obstacle in other peacebuilding contexts, as conflict identities become difficult to abandon for much the same reasons. For the SWAPO and Vietnam veterans the war and conflict had ended more decidedly, yet even here ideals voiced during and before the war tended to live on. In a few instances the war pushed them out of politics, while severe mental health problems after the war often made political participation difficult. Vietnam veterans in particular experienced the war itself as a broken pact, and this created disillusionment with the state as well as politics. Coming home also shaped how former combatants viewed politics, and if policies they care about were enacted at this time (particularly policies targeting them) this again led them toward politics. Veterans’ positions on both peace and veteran policies thus became both the source and object of their mobilization. While the (primarily) state-run veterans’ programs principally offered material benefits, they also took on symbolic importance. Other acts of symbolic recognition similarly became a source and object of mobilization. Mobilization thus occurs for these programs or acts, and once they are in place, these programs in turn push for continued mobilization either because reform is called for or because they become a meeting place (physically or mentally) for the network of former combatants. The experience of coming home in itself also often contained inherent demobilizing pressures. The most obvious pressure was the need to catch up with key life events that they missed due to their absence during the war; whether education, work or family concerns, there were numerous parts of life which demanded attention and thus reduced the room for politics. For some, coming home was also a time when they felt abandoned, many felt quite alone in trying to catch up with their life and believed that the help offered to them was far from sufficient. However, although the homecoming experience initially underlined the pressure to politically demobilize, as veterans discovered others who felt similarly it amounted to calls for reforming such policies. The armed group or veteran identity was another important source of mobilization pressure. Their narrative about themselves, who they are, also guided how they should behave and their interests. Their combatant role – and particularly for the M-19 and SWAPO veterans the goals of the war – became ingrained in 174

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Paths of mobilization them. Thus, ideals embedded in their life story about their participation in the war continued to shape their politics after the war. But across all three groups, questions of duty and service were central to how they defined themselves, and this obligation to act thus pushed them into politics as well. Embracing a culture of heroes also meant they were exposed to strong narratives which they could emulate. Their own identity also made them respond to politicians seeking office if they played on the same identity. Research participants often had a sense that these veteran politicians were able to represent them, and thus expressed and enacted a preference for them. Equally, if politicians failed to live up to the ideals ascribed to their veteran identity, this could have demobilizing repercussions for the former combatants. Finally, networks of other former combatants played many important roles for mobilization. The most obvious reason of course is that these networks provided opportunities for recruitment by connecting different individuals and events with each other (within the network but also social spheres outside the immediate network). But perhaps more importantly, the reason why these networks were so efficient in mobilizing the former combatants is the sense of reciprocal responsibility embedded in them. This reciprocal responsibility encompassed not only present and future generations of veterans but also incorporated those lost during war. It is unsurprising that material patronage and ensuing demands for mobilization formed part of these networks. But the personal satisfaction and affection experienced through these networks were more important motivations for engaging in and with the network. The mirror of this of course is when some nodes in a network fail to deliver on these expectations. This tended to happen either because particular individuals disappeared (died, moved away, or failed for other reasons), or because they simply did not live up to the (high) expectations embedded in the notion of reciprocal responsibility. Thus, when former leaders of an armed group were perceived as focusing on their own interests rather than acting for the benefit of the group this was demoralizing (and demobilizing). The gendered difference noted across the types of political life paths seems to be largely rooted in two experiences: firstly, the veteran identity and the heroes tended to be masculinized; and secondly, when networks failed to support and encourage it was largely female former combatants who bore the brunt of this. Together, this made the hierarchy of belonging gendered, and thus when female veterans experienced demobilizing narratives they had less to fall back on, and once they were removed from politics it was harder for them to remobilize. The experiences of war and of coming home thus contain multiple seeds for continued political mobilization; not only are these related to the war itself and the immediate experience of homecoming but they also help form people’s veteran identity and shape how networks develop, which in turn is key for mobilization. The very acute risks and sacrifices, as well as trauma associated 175

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war with war, is what triggers these bonds both between combatants and also with the state. Such bonds surface multiple times across former combatants’ lives, and in multiple places, either through encounters with fellow veterans of longstanding acquaintance, or new connections, with the state, through the reception from society, or during times when there are new political developments linked to their war (e.g., protests, reports related to the war, memorials, other peace agreements, new political candidates, new acts of war and violence, or new bills targeting former combatants). These bonds are often strengthened by a feeling of disconnection from society, and this is not just an experience in the early days after returning home, but one that reappears across former combatants’ lives. The sacrifice and costs associated with war are also factors which explain why these mobilizing pressures are felt so long after the end of war. These sunken costs often require further attention or additional investment, and over time it is no longer feasible to stop mobilizing. In this chapter the very long repercussions for political mobilization have become obvious across all three cases, as well as the fact that the mobilization of former combatants in turn also feeds back into sustaining networks and reaffirming their identity. Politics becomes thoroughly embedded in their lives as a whole. Notes 1 The former combatants who followed the removed life path were C4, C5, C8, C21, C23, N1, N7, N9, N13, U1, U9, and U12. The resilient path was followed by C1, C2, C3, C9, C11, C15, C16, C17, C18, C20, N2, N3, N6, N8, N10, N11, U3, U5, U7, U10, U11, and U14. Finally, the former combatants who displayed the characteristics of the remobilized life path were C6, C7, C10, C12, C13, C14, C19, C22, N4, N5, N12, U2, U6, U8, and U13. One individual interviewed for the book (Jacob, U4) falls outside of this typology. His political mobilization was rather unrelated to his war and veteran experience, and his life path was rather unmobilized before, during, and after the war (very minimal level of engagement, regular voter, but not much more than that). It is no surprise that this is a Vietnam veteran, as this is the only case where recruitment due to drafting could be completely apolitical. 2 Estella’s account is an example where she interpreted her life path in different ways during the interview, and categorizing her as either removed or resilient was not always self-evident. From her life diagram we can see three lines as we approach the present – the top line indicating her interest in politics, the bottom line indicating her political activity in line with M-19 network, and the middle line indicating her political activity in relation to environmental causes. Irrespective of which line we focus on, however, we see a clear tendency to move away from politics, compared to when she peaked during the 1990s, even if it is clear that she is still very politically engaged.

176

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion

W

a multitude of personal consequences, but they also have societal consequences as a result of the political lives that develop in their wake. Just as the war and coming home shape the politics of these former combatants in multiple ways, these former combatants shape larger processes of maintaining peace, politics, statebuilding, welfare systems, and democracy. This book sought to depict an insider’s understanding of the experience of living politics after war, and how this process is understood by individual former combatants across the Global North and Global South divide, as such experience has significant personal and societal consequences. Literature on former combatants in the Global South and literature on veterans in the Global North have for too long been divided, and hopefully through bringing these three cases together, this book contributes to bridging this gap. In much of the literature to date, the big question has been whether or not former combatants are democratic or peaceful (see e.g. Alfieri 2016; Blattman 2009; Christensen and Utas 2008; Erikson and Stoker 2011; Grossman et al. 2015; Hill et al. 2008; Jennings and Markus 1977; Kaplan and Nussio 2018b; Mitton 2008; Phayal et al. 2015; Schreiber 1979; Söderström 2011a, 2013a; Teigen 2006; Themnér 2011; Utas and Christensen 2016). In this book, my concern has rather been to understand how former combatants are (made) political, and how they themselves make sense of this process, using an approach which is not intervention-focused but rather subject-centered. To this end, I have embraced an everyday perspective on living politics (see also Autesserre 2014, pp. 20–57; Harrison 2008, pp. xxi–xlvi; Randazzo 2016, p. 1355). The everyday can be approached in several ways, and in this book I stress the social and emotional embeddedness of life lived after war, the narratives told by the former combatants themselves about their lives, and individual and personal perspectives on larger macro-phenomena. The book also investigated how these expressions of meaningmaking in turn call for action and behavior, and ultimately, as a whole, how commonalities emerge in terms of practices across lives and cases. Situating life ars have

177

Living politics after war

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

paths in the midst of the transition from war to peace also required an extended time perspective in this study. Ultimately, placing the research participants’ life histories center stage in the data collection allowed their agency, insider perspective, and subjectivity to be foregrounded in this book. The experience of coming home is far from uniform, yet the task of this book was to unravel the shared experience and meaning of living politics after war. Shared experiences Much of the political lives of these former combatants from the United States, Colombia, and Namibia is a shared experience. It involves similar mechanisms and processes, despite large structural, historical, and contextual variations (not the least in terms of the type of war) across the three cases. Given the differences across these cases, the similar individual mechanisms which came to light are remarkable. In this way, the findings here also speak beyond this book. In fact, even the former combatants themselves agree on this commonality, and they often point to the experiences of former combatants outside their own group when they reflect upon the legacy of war and what coming home from war has meant for their political choices and orientation in life. The book does not want to deny that differences exist within and between groups of former combatants (in this book and elsewhere). Indeed, such differences deserve attention in their own right. Yet this book demonstrates that there are important and substantial empirical similarities across these divides, and hopefully they will enhance the degree to which literature on former combatants in different contexts interact. My hope is that the approach taken in this book has helped open a way for more such studies. Focusing on the process of transition, rather than whether such transition is successful or not, meant that this book sought to pay attention to how this transition finds expression in the lives of the former combatants and how the legacy of the war lives on. This meant uncovering how these former combatants relate to their own veteran status, to other veterans and mechanisms of mobilization, and how they themselves make sense of the process of their homecoming across entire lifetimes. This book shows how the war experience and the immediate homecoming are continually resummoned in each of the three components of a political life (identity, networks, and activity). Chapter 1, “Diverse wars and combatants”, took a closer look at how veterans and ex-combatants in different contexts are talked about and understood. More importantly, it depicted the three cases and their diversity. The cases are diverse in terms of both the war in general and policies at the end of the war, and the specific experiences of the individuals interviewed for this book are also diverse, in terms of how they joined the armed groups, their war experiences, and their reception upon return. This diversity both between and within these cases 178

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion underlines the weight of any commonalities demonstrated in the remainder of the book. Chapter 2, “Coming home and living peace?”, portrayed the former combatants’ understanding of their process of coming home. The three groups of former combatants had been home for on average twenty-four years (M-19), twenty-eight years (SWAPO), and forty-two years (Vietnam veterans in the United States), respectively. While the moment of coming home was often filled with both positive and negative emotions, and coming home was seen as a transformative moment in former combatants’ lives, it also became clear that this is not a process which is limited in time. Rather, for many this is seen as an ongoing process, and some even express a sense of being stuck in that process many years later. Life is not cut in two; rather, the war and the time after war are experiences which carry over, and are not always easily separated. Many reveal a range of challenges which faced them when they came home, as they were trying to catch up with their own lives (completing their education and/or finding work). But they also faced family relations in need of mending, mental and physical health issues, and concerns about their own security. Some of these challenges, particularly health concerns, became even more exacerbated over time. For the few who did not feel challenged in their own lives, it was clear that they were nonetheless aware of their fellow combatants’ difficulties. The reception given by the state in the form of reintegration and assistance programs varied between the three cases. In Namibia, veterans’ programs were not planned, and the services on offer developed over time and were delivered in a compartmentalized and piecemeal fashion. In Colombia, M-19 was one of several small guerilla groups which demobilized in 1990, and the DDR package included economic, educational, and health as well as legal and political components. In the United States support was offered following a longer tradition of state support after war, and largely used templates from earlier conflicts. In all three cases, the veterans expressed criticism against these programs. The SWAPO veterans also noted that they felt like heroes upon their return, whereas the M-19 veterans faced both demonizing and heroic narratives after the war. The Vietnam veterans largely felt that they had not been welcomed home after the war, either by the state or society. Another central aspect of coming home was the positioning and ownership of peace. Here too we saw large differences between the cases, as the end of the war and resulting peace in each case was very different. Yet as part of their homecoming all combatants expressed the need to find a way of relating to “their peace”. Coming home is not only a watershed moment but also a process which extends in time. It is not just the war which makes the veteran, coming home is an equally integral part of that process. Thus, the experiences detailed in chapters 3 and 4 were important as they resonate throughout the political life of these former combatants, as was shown in the ensuing chapters. Hence, in this book “coming home” refers not only to the 179

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war immediate process following war but also this drawn-out process of continually reinterpreting these experiences throughout their lives. In Chapter 3, “‘Veteran’ as a political identity”, it became clear how important the veteran identity was to the former combatants who participated in this study. Across all cases, this identity has a clear salience and is something they feel has defined large parts of their lives. Some of the traits stressed when they try to depict what it means to be a veteran relate to a culture of heroes. These heroes – ideologues, political leaders, fathers, or other veterans – provide moral and political guidance. Another principal element stressed in all three groups was the centrality of duty and service. The culture of heroes and the centrality of service color how to participate in society after war, but also how the research participants evaluate other parts of the veteran and political community. This chapter also demonstrated how claims of recognition are formulated within this group. These claims are directed at the state, society, and history, as well as other veterans. Their achievements during the war (the outcome of the war or their personal achievement) as well as their grievances associated with the war or their homecoming form the basis for their recognition claims. In relation to this, many expressed a sense of a broken pact with the state; they thus sought more extensive recognition from the state, and ended up being pulled into politics. They largely expressed a continuity of their identity across their lifetime, and their own and others’ investment in the war make continuing the “struggle” non-negotiable. For those who experienced a transformation of their identity during their lives, among the Vietnam veterans the war itself was often the main reason, whereas for the M-19 and SWAPO veterans their homecoming and associated developments mattered more. In Chapter 4, “Veteran networks throughout a lifetime”, the many different functions of the veteran network became clear. This overlap between functions, combined with affective ties within the group, is a crucial determinant for the longevity of veteran networks. These informal networks provide friendship, financial support, and opportunities for work, and help former combatants navigate their surroundings. But these networks also find more formalized expressions, through veterans’ organizations and political parties. Naturally, both of these developments shape the political mobilization of the former combatants. These networks are layered, and infuse the lives of these former combatants in multiple ways. The layered and multifunctional character of these networks feed into their longevity. Former combatants seek each other out, as they prefer and enjoy each other’s company – and they describe how this preference is based on a sense of being able to understand one another. By engaging in these networks, their shared past becomes a shared future. These communities are brought together by a number of things. Former combatants experience a universal bond, which is not limited to their own category of former combatants. Their experiences of loss during the war, and feelings of responsibility for each other, incite the 180

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion community of former combatants to continue to care for each other. A reciprocal responsibility thus permeates these networks, or becomes the standard against which members evaluate each other. The role of the networks turned out to be very similar across the three cases, even if there were differences in how the networks formally developed and how the former combatants related to them. In Chapter 5, “Paths of mobilization”, it became clear that war and homecoming experiences have left many traces on the former combatants’ political lives. These experiences, as well as the network and identity, shape their political engagement, both positively and negatively, and all together they make up their political life. As a result, some former combatants end up in what I have categorized as a removed political path, where they leave politics. Others are resilient and have either sustained or increased their political engagement over the totality of their lives. Finally, others remobilize, falling in and out of politics often multiple times throughout their lives. Notably, individuals from all three cases are present in all three types. The distribution of individuals across these types, however, did seem to be gendered, as none of the women interviewed remobilized once they left politics. The legacy of the combatant status and war and homecoming experience is extensive, but these elements make up the crossfire that push former combatants both in and out of political activity. The ways in which these pressures originate and reappear across their lives help us understand why former combatants, not only in these three cases, are often involved in long-term political mobilization. The push toward a life of politics is clear as their mobilization and activity also feed back into upholding both the network and their identity as former combatants, and the experience of war and coming home continue to be part of their lives. War and homecoming become layered experiences which not only happened in the past, but which are resummoned, recollected, and also become part of the present for these individuals. They become central reference points for the research participants’ lives as a whole. The war and their lived experiences of leaving war color their identity, their networks, and their patterns of political activity, which in turn all feed into each other. Many of the experiences and processes at play in each of these three cases resonate across these geographical and temporal boundaries, and point to the universal aspects of political life after war. The longevity of these relations is also closely linked to the way such networks are constituted. All research participants expressed a clear desire to be with their own, irrespective of how hostile their surrounding society was. Home is alien, and they feel separate. And as the network feels like home, like family, a place where they can be completely understood, it is no surprise that they turn to each other. The importance of homosociality has been shown in other contexts as well, and it was clear that this formed a kind of cement within these networks. This logic was especially forceful in cases where the recruitment or joining their armed group was in part also done in opposition to their families. Overall, there 181

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war was a sense that members of these networks had a shared past, and thus would also have a shared future. Despite this, these networks were not conflict free – indeed, debates about degrees of belonging and of being deserving within the group were often part of these discussions, and the female combatants particularly struggled with this. Yet any idea that the pact within the network could be broken was very remote. In contrast, experiencing a broken pact with the state was both common and in part expected, but it did not necessarily relegate the former combatants away from engaging in politics; in fact, for some this meant they felt called to mend and affirm the relationship with the state. Particularly in the chapters on identity, networks, and political mobilization, the gendered nature of this experience was clear. The veteran identity and the culture of heroes tended to be masculinized, and a lack of support and encouragement from their respective networks was largely observed by the female former combatants. This resulted in a gendered hierarchy of belonging, which may in part explain why the women who experienced demobilizing narratives had less to fall back on, and once they were removed from politics it was harder for them to remobilize. Again, the diverse comparisons which make up this book underline the import of these gendered observations. The political life paths of the former combatants form part of a dialogue with the state as it develops after the war. Wars are political and former combatants are also made political by this process, and in turn they also exert pressure and shape the state. It is relatively easy for these combatants to make the state indebted or beholden to them. They all have a sense of forging the state through their making of war. As such, they expect the state to also engage with them, making and acknowledging them as worthy citizens. In return, the state can make the combatant in several ways: it can send them to war, selecting who goes and who does not; it can train them for war, care for them after the war, or even prosecute them. The state can also be the enemy of the combatants at the beginning of the war, as in the case of M-19 and SWAPO; here the state becomes the “other” that helps define who they are. But it is clear that after war, material as well as symbolic recognition and power were sought in the relationship with the state. The former combatants in turn make the state in several ways: they can ask or demand for policies; they form part of the imagining of the state as well as being the actual rewriters of the constitution; they can become voters and supporters of those in or out of office; and in some cases they can claim to be the actual creators, or guardians, of the state. Former combatants can thus have one of several different types of relationship with the state. We are familiar with the hero, the partner of the state, and we are also familiar with the former combatant as troublemaker, the offender who is in opposition with both the state and society. But there is also the reject, the misfit, or the broken, who may or may not be in opposition to the state, but who

182

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion is dependent on the state. Then there are also former combatants who become critics of the state, and engage in a lifelong political conversation with the state and society. None of the individuals interviewed for this book belonged solely to one of these categories; there was always some degree of in-between-ness, and shifting between roles over their lifetimes. Yet the state always had a presence in their lives. The lived experience of coming home and peace, and how former combatants make sense of this process also helps us understand why they respond as they do to both policies and programs, as well as how they in turn shape societal developments in relation to the transition from war to peace through their own political involvement. But this personal transition also speaks to how the overall conditions for peace and societal transition unfold after war. In addition, we know that such meaning-making practices can further impact how trauma is overcome for instance. Of course, this book has not dealt with the response from the state in reaction to such claims – and this is an avenue that should be studied more. Non-combatants ultimately also form part of this dialogue in each instance. The long-term political and peace developments after war ultimately also need to take into account these audiences and actors. However, thanks to the privileged relationship with the state which these veterans are often able to develop, this sets them up with a good deal of political capital and potential influence. This influence can of course contribute to statebuilding, peace, and democracy, but it can also detract from these processes. Former combatants can certainly become a “political problem” if this political capital is overused to demand too much of the state, and thus create democratic dilemmas (also see discussion by Edele 2008, p. 6), or if the specifics of their politics are not seen as legitimate. Attempts to depoliticize, or deradicalize, former combatants emerge from this kind of perspective. In part, this book has shown how veterans become so powerful and develop into a potential political problem. Questions of war crimes, guilt, and responsibility also form part of such conversations (but did not figure prominently in the interviews conducted for this book). In the conversations for this book it became clear that having something to be proud of helps in the personal journey of overcoming war. Yet this is hard for those who have committed atrocities during the war or for those who carry guilt about their war participation. And it is a difficult process not only for the individual themselves but also for the society of which they are a part. Finding the balance between reconciliation, transitional justice, and processes of personal journeys toward “coming home from war” is challenging. This discussion also demonstrates how intertwined individual transitions and life journeys are with larger societal transitions and processes (see also Aldwin et al. 1994, pp. 40–41; Binks and Cambridge 2018; Diehl 1993, p. 26; MacLean and Elder 2007, p. 183; Schok et al. 2008, p. 361).

183

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war Former combatants shape political processes in other ways too. They can be committed to social transformation, or they can become protagonists of (a certain) peace. These last two positions or tendencies are of course Janus-faced, as their outcome depends on what values and issues are pursued. Radical social transformation can be anti-democratic, and it is not a given that former combatants’ position on peace, or what peace they feel motivated by, or that they have internalized, would lead former combatants to solely promote peace. In some instances, the conditions on the ground could in fact lead former combatants to prefer continued war, rather than the potential specific peace that is within their grasp. Another implication of this book is an understanding of how the process by which protracted conflict comes about. Many former combatants described how their war experience entailed many different personal sunken costs. Separating themselves from the goals of the conflict would thereby entail invalidating these costs and personal sacrifices, and admitting that the lives lost were lost in vain. Such a move is undoubtedly difficult on a personal level, and this could also be coupled with feelings of betrayal. In turn, at the individual level, this process – in other contexts – leads to the intractability of conflict identities and potentially of the conflicts themselves. Convincing someone to disavow the goals of a war they fought in is thus difficult, and the actions and statements of role models (particularly those who are seen as undoubtable heroes within the group) can help at this stage. Another aspect of overcoming war relates to how open or closed the communities of former combatants, and their receiving communities, are. Is society open enough to receive former combatants as active political agents, or are former combatants limited to their own circles? If they cannot change political arenas when they wish to, this can have serious consequences. It can lead to the removal from politics of the individual former combatant, or it can mean that they and others are locked in political projects they may not fully support, and thus push politics overall in a more polarized direction. Similarly, for those former combatants who want to leave their networks behind, it is clearly vital to create alternatives, ensuring that they have access to social support systems. Forcing people to leave established networks is not a productive path given what we have seen of these dynamics in the book. Rather, ensuring that those who want to leave can do so by providing alternatives to their dependency on the network may be a more sustainable policy in the long run; we should ask ourselves how we can open up more alternative spaces, and how we can help decrease dependency. The themes brought out by the research participants themselves resonated across the cases and indeed informed the structure of the book as a whole. The long view of peace entailed paying attention to emic understandings of peace and of leaving war behind, thus understanding how this legacy lives on in various lives. How these processes are understood by the former combatants themselves 184

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion shapes both how trauma is dealt with and how these processes become political and thus interact with the surrounding societies. One central aspect of this book has thus been exploring the lived experience of politics and how this has been informed by former combatants’ experiences of war and their homecoming. The approach to transition in this book is not evaluative, and the aim is not to decide whether or not these post-war processes can be called successful or not but rather to offer a deeper understanding of this process, and problematize it. As these former combatants told the story of (and drew) their political life histories, they shared the autobiographical narratives they live by. The process of conducting these interviews also allowed the structure of the book to slowly emerge, as it became increasingly clear how the former combatants’ experience of coming home, their identity and network, and choices to mobilize or not, were central to their political life histories after war. The fact that the structure of the book was able to grow out of the interviews themselves, and be organized thematically as it has been, also highlights how much of the research participants’ political lives after disarmament is actually shared across these diverse cases. By using life history interviews, and asking the participants to draw a life diagram of their political involvement, I sought to capture the human faces of these former combatants, but also to gain access to the participants’ narratives and their understanding of their own agency within these processes. How to do justice to such accounts is more problematic. Other writers might have chosen to stay within one case at a time, or to make individual life stories the central organizing principle of the book, but I have chosen to present the work thematically, crossing between and comparing the cases throughout. No doubt, some things are lost through this choice, but my hope has been to showcase the universal aspects through this thematic approach and I trust that the personal stories and individual diversity nevertheless come through. Within the thematic approach, I have also tried to display the lifelong developments within each chapter, contrasting the short term with the more long-term aspects. The interviews and data created through these encounters reflect the life told, and not necessarily the life lived, as they are told at a specific moment in time. Had the interviews been conducted ten years earlier, for instance, the salience of some topics and the focus during the interviews is likely to have been different for some individuals. Most lives can be told in several ways, and how different lives resonate with others is also multifaceted. These life histories are a joint production between me and the research participants, not only during the interview, but also in later stages of the research process. While the life diagrams were an important tool to ensure more ownership for the research participants (for more on this, see Söderström 2020; see also Harding 2006; Maines 2001; Turnbull 2000), there are still limits. The final say on how to present these interviews lay with 185

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Living politics after war me, and as such the research participants lost some power over how their stories are told. Certainly, this book does not do justice to all of these nuances. Yet I have tried to treat the life stories entrusted to me with respect and care, while also making the most of these accounts in relation to the research task at hand. This book has taken on a global phenomenon with individual differences. Through the eyes and lives of former combatants in Colombia, Namibia, and the United States, this book has shown how the transition from war to peace occurs on an individual level. Large variations between these cases were located alongside similar patterns of political engagement and mechanisms for how the wars and coming home shape these processes. The diversity of cases included in this book still has limits; for instance, one could argue that the three cases are too similar – all three conflicts took place in the Cold War era, and in one way or another formed part of this exchange. And what about life after peaceenforcing missions or the political life path of former combatants from the defeated side after civil war? These and many other lives after war are missing from this book. This book crossed some boundaries – geographical (Colombia, Namibia, United States), disciplinary (political science, anthropology, sociology), and as a result theoretical (perspectives on former combatants) and methodological (norms of comparative designs) – but other boundaries still need to be explored. Not all such endeavors will be productive, but such curiosity is an important element of the way forward. Ultimately, this book is first and foremost about the fifty individuals who shared their life paths with me. Clearly, there were large differences between these individuals, and this heterogeneity should not be forgotten. These are intricate, messy, long, and important processes, and they are not inherently good or bad. But it is clear that the presence of former combatants will continue to shape such things as post-war policies, the political future of veteran politicians, and much more, for as long as these generations are with us. The extended time perspective of this book helped both to see and understand the longevity of these dynamics. The various former combatants interviewed for the book had all been back home for several decades at least, and this allowed the book to capture the dynamic relationship between their identity, their networks, and their political activities. But we also saw how the war and immediate homecoming as experiences linger on and are retriggered throughout their lives. Across their lifetimes, various events and behaviors of other actors, such as the state or society, or other veterans, trigger their connection with the past. Hence, the legacy of the war and coming home from the war is not constant and overtly present in their lives, but is continuously available for political positioning later on in life. Examples of such events of reenactment include the Vietnam Memorial Wall in Washington D.C., the Heroes’ Acre in Windhoek, peace movements, or new decisions to begin or end wars, specific election campaigns 186

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion featuring well-known veteran politician candidates such as Gustavo Petro or John Kerry, or even 9/11. These events often become shared inflection points in the political lives of former combatants as they reshape how they see politics, themselves (as individuals and as a group) and their future political engagement. They send ripples across time, continuing to influence the political choices of these veterans for many years. My hope is that the approach taken in this book will open up the possibility for more studies exploring and analyzing lives of politics, and lives after war, and how such lives are situated in a larger political landscape.

187

PER SO NA L I N TERV I E W S

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Here follows a list of the former combatants who participated in the research for this book, including the date and location of interview. M-19 former combatants C1. C2. C3. C4. C5. C6. C7. C8. C9. C10. C11. C12. C13. C14. C15. C16. C17. C18. C19. C20. C21. C22. C23.

Gerardo, born 1960, male – October 16, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. Federico, born 1957, male – October 19, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. Juan, born 1967, male – October 24, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. Camila, born 1945, female – October 25, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. Mario, born 1941, male – October 25, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. Joaquin, born 1965, male – October 26, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. Julio, born 1958, male – October 27, 2012, Bogotá, Colombia. Estella, born 1961, female – November 17, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Alba, born 1950, female – November 18 and 21, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. José, born 1949, male – November 18, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Jaime, born 1956, male – November 19, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Camilo, born 1964, male – November 20, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Gregorio, born 1958, male – November 21, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Emilio, born 1957, male – November 23, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Eduardo, born 1954, male – November 24, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Felipe, born 1963, male – November 24, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Dante, born 1953, male – November 24, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Catalina, born 1964, female – November 26, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Alfonso, born 1961, male – November 26, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Celestina, born 1960, female – November 27, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Maria, born 1952, female – November 27, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Amadeo, born 1955, male – November 28, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. Angela, born 1966, male – November 28, 2014, Bogotá, Colombia. US former combatants from the Vietnam War

U1. John, born 1946, male – March 21, 2016, [small town], Oregon, USA. U2. Francis, born 1947, male – March 23, 2016, Newcastle, California, USA. U3. Bob, born 1946, male – March 29, 2016, Oakland, California, USA. U4. Jacob, born 1954, male – August 30, 2016, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. 188

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

List of personal interviews U5. Lee, born 1940, male – August 30, 2016, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. U6. Gary, born 1945, male – August 31, 2016, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. U7. Charles, born 1945, male – August 31, 2016, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. U8. Dennis, born 1947, male – December 2, 2016, Fairfax, Virginia, USA. U9. Ralph, born 1945, male – December 2, 2016, Fairfax, Virginia, USA. U10. Thomas, born 1947, male – December 6, 2016, Washington D.C., USA. U11. Ben, born 1942, male – December 9, 2016, Fairfax, Virginia, USA. U12. Robert, born 1942, male – January 27, 2017, Greenbelt, Maryland, USA. U13. Ford, born 1949, male – January 30, 2017, Europe. U14. Dick, born 1940, male – February 3, 2017, Arlington, Virginia, USA. PLAN former combatants N1. N2. N3. N4. N5. N6. N7. N8. N9. N10. N11. N12. N13.

Gomen, born 1950, male – March 10, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Ngenokesho, born 1972, male – March 10, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Memory, born 1959, female – March 11, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Amon, born 1962, male – March 11, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Gerson, born 1955, male – March 12, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Jairus, born 1958, male – March 13, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Mukwanambwa, born 1963, female – March 14, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Fanuel, born 1953, male – March 14, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Hilma, born 1956, female – March 15, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Peter, born 1954, male – March 15, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Bwilu, born 1939, male – March 16, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Sackaria, born 1976, male – March 17, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia. Ndahafa, born 1958, female – March 17, 2017, Windhoek, Namibia.

189

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

R E FER EN C E S

Adams, Thomas K. 1999. “The new mercenaries and the privatization of conflict.” Parameters 29(2): 103. Ahern, Jennifer, Miranda Worthen, Jackson Masters, Sheri A Lippman, Emily J. Ozer, and Rudolf Moos. 2015. “The challenges of Afghanistan and Iraq veterans’ transition from military to civilian life and approaches to reconnection.” PLOS ONE 10(7): 1–13. Ahmed, Sara. 2004. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Aldwin, Carolyn M., Michael R. Levenson, and Avron Spiro. 1994. “Vulnerability and resilience to combat exposure: can stress have lifelong effects?” Psychology and Aging 9(1): 34–44. Alfieri, Valeria. 2016. “Political parties and citizen political involvement in post-conflict Burundi: between democratic claims and authoritarian tendencies.” Civil Wars 18(2): 234–253. Allansson, Marie, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themnér. 2017. “Organized violence, 1989–2016.” Journal of Peace Research 54(4): 574–587. Allport, Alan. 2009. Demobbed: Coming Home after the Second World War. New Haven: Yale University Press. Andrews, Molly. 1991. Lifetimes of Commitment: Aging, Politics, Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ardener, Shirley, Fiona Armitage-Woodward, and Lidia Dina Sciama, eds. 2016. War and Women across Continents: Autobiographical and Biographical Experiences. New York: Berghahn. Åse, Cecilia, and Maria Wendt. 2018. “Gendering the new hero narratives: military death in Denmark and Sweden.” Cooperation and Conflict 53(1): 23–41. Ashcroft, Michael. 2012. The Armed Forces and Society: the Military in Britain through the Eyes of Service Personnel, Employers and the Public. London: n.p. Autesserre, Severine. 2014. Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bagnoli, Anna. 2012. “Making sense of mixed method narratives: young people’s identities, life-plans and time orientations.” In Innovations in Youth Research, eds. S. Heath and C. Walker, pp. 77–100. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bagnoli, Anna, and Kaisa Ketokivi. 2009. “At a crossroads: contemporary lives between fate and choice.” European Societies 11(3): 315–324. Baines, Gary. 2014. “Conflicting memories, competing narratives and complicating histories: revisiting the Cassinga controversy.” Journal of Namibian Studies: History Politics Culture 6: 7–26. Banholzer, Lilli. 2014. “When Do Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes Succeed?” German Development Institute, discussion paper no. 8/2014. Barnett, Arnold, Timothy Stanley, and Michael Shore. 1992. “America’s Vietnam casualties: victims of a class war?” Operations Research 40(5): 856–866.

190

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Barrett, Robert S. 2011. “Interviews with killers: six types of combatants and their motivations for joining deadly groups.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34(10): 749–764. Basham, Kathryn. 2008. “Homecoming as safe haven or the new front: attachment and detachment in military couples.” Clinical Social Work Journal 36(1): 83–96. Bauer, Michal, Alessandra Cassar, Julie Chytilova, and Joseph Henrich. 2013. “War’s enduring effects on the development of egalitarian motivations and in-group biases.” Psychological Science 25(1): 47–57. Beber, Bernd, Philip Roessler, and Alexandra Scacco. 2014. “Intergroup violence and political attitudes: evidence from a dividing Sudan.” Journal of Politics 76(3): 649–665. Bell, Christine, Catherine O’Rourke, and Sissela Matzner. 2015. “A Chronology of Colombian Peace Processes and Peace Agreements.” Political Settlements Research Programme, Briefing Paper 01. Bennich-Björkman, Li. 2016. “Life interrupted but mended: trauma and the remembering self among Estonian and Bosnian émigrés.” In Life Stories and Cultural Trauma, eds. E. Kõresaar and K. Jõesalu, pp. 183–210. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press. ———. 2017. Sörja ett liv, leva ett annat: om flyktingens mörker och ljus. Stockholm: Appell Förlag. Bergman, Beverly P., Howard J. Burdett, and Neil Greenberg. 2014. “Service life and beyond – institution or culture?” RUSI Journal 159(5): 60–68. Bertaux, Daniel. 2003. “The usefulness of life stories for a realist and meaningful sociology.” In Biographical Research in Eastern Europe, eds. R. Miller, R. Humphrey and E. Zdravomyslova, pp. 39–52. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate. Bertaux, Daniel, and Martin Kohli. 1984. “The life story approach: a continental view.” Annual Review of Sociology 10: 215–237. Bessel, Richard, and David Englander. 1981. “Review article: Up from the trenches: some recent writing on the soldiers of the Great War.” European History Quarterly 11(3): 387–395. Binks, Eve, and Siobhan Cambridge. 2018. “The transition experiences of British military veterans.” Political Psychology 39(1): 125–142. Bird, Sharon R. 1996. “Welcome to the Men’s Club: homosociality and the maintenance of hegemonic masculinity.” Gender and Society 10(2): 120–132. Bjarnegård, Elin. 2013. Gender and Politics: Explaining Male Dominance in Parliamentary Representation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2018. “Men’s political representation.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, ed. W. R. Thompson, pp. 1–23. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blattman, Christopher. 2009. “From violence to voting: war and political participation in Uganda.” American Political Science Review 103(2): 231–247. Bøås, Morten. 2010. “Liberia 2010 – på vei mot en ny æra, eller bara litt mindre av det samme?” Internasjonal Politikk 68(2): 261–273. Boccagni, Paolo. 2014. “What’s in a (migrant) house? Changing domestic spaces, the negotiation of belonging and home-making in Ecuadorian migration.” Housing, Theory and Society 31(3): 277–293. Bolliger, Lennart. 2018. “Chiefs, terror, and propaganda: the motivations of Namibian loyalists to fight in South Africa’s security forces, 1975–1989.” South African Historical Journal 70(1): 124–151.

191

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Bolten, Catherine E. 2012. I Did It to Save My Life: Love and Survival in Sierra Leone. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bosi, Lorenzo, and Donatella Della Porta. 2012. “Micro-mobilization into armed groups: ideological, instrumental and solidaristic paths.” Qualitative Sociology 35(4): 361-383. Boudon, Lawrence. 2001. “Colombia’s M-19 Democratic Alliance: a case study in new-party self-destruction.” Latin American Perspectives 28(1): 73–92. Bräuchler, Birgit. 2018. “The cultural turn in peace research: prospects and challenges.” Peacebuilding 6(1): 17–33. Brooks, Jennifer E. 2004. Defining the Peace: World War II Veterans, Race, and the Remaking of Southern Political Tradition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Buckley-Zistel, Susanne. 2006. “In-between war and peace: identities, boundaries and change after violent conflict.” Millennium 35(1): 3–21. Burgess, Mark, Neil Ferguson, and Ian Hollywood. 2007. “Rebels’ perspectives of the legacy of past violence and of the current peace in post-agreement Northern Ireland: an interpretative phenomenological analysis.” Political Psychology 28(1): 69–88. Caramés, Albert, and Eneko Sanz. 2008a. “DDR 2008. Análisis de los programas e DDR existentes en el mundo durante 2007.” Report. Bellaterra: Escola de cultura de pau. ———. 2008b. “DDR 2008. Analysis of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes in the world during 2007.” Report. Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace. Card, D., and T. Lemieux. 2001. “Going to college to avoid the draft: the unintended legacy of the Vietnam War.” American Economic Review 91(2): 97–102. Card, Josefina J. 1983. Lives after Vietnam: The Personal Impact of Military Service. Lexington: Lexington Books. Chamberlayne, Prue, Joanna Bornat, and Tom Wengraf. 2000. The Turn to Biographical Methods in Social Science: Comparative Issues and Examples. London: Routledge. Christensen, Maya Mynster. 2017. “Shadow soldiering: shifting constellations and permeable boundaries in ‘private’ security contracting.” Conflict and Society 3(1): 24–41. Christensen, Maya Mynster, and Mats Utas. 2008. “Mercenaries of democracy: the ‘politricks’ of remobilized combatants in the 2007 general elections, Sierra Leone.” African Affairs 107(429): 515–539. Clandinin, D. Jean. 2007. Handbook of Narrative Inquiry: Mapping a Methodology. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Cohen, Deborah. 2001. The War Come Home: Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany, 1914–1939. Berkeley: University of California Press. Colletta, Nat J., Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer. 1996. Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. Washington D.C.: World Bank Group. Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and grievance in civil war.” Oxford Economic Papers 56(4): 563–595. Costalli, Stefano, and Andrea Ruggeri. 2017. “Politics symposium: emotions, ideologies, and violent political mobilization.” PS: Political Science and Politics 50(4): 923–927. Dale, Robert. 2010. “Re-adjusting to Life After War: The Demobilization of Red Army Veterans in Leningrad and the Leningrad Region 1944–1950.” PhD thesis, Queen Mary University of London.

192

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Davis, Diane E., and Anthony W. Pereira. 2003. Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dean, Eric T. 1992. “The myth of the troubled and scorned Vietnam veteran.” Journal of American Studies 26(1): 59–74. Demers, Anne L. 2011. “When veterans return: the role of community in reintegration.” Journal of Loss and Trauma 16(2): 160–179. ———. 2013. “From death to life female veterans, identity negotiation, and reintegration into society.” Journal of Humanistic Psychology 53(4): 489–515. Denissen, Marieke. 2010. “Reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life: the case of the paramilitaries in Colombia.” Peace and Change 35(2): 328–352. Diani, Mario. 2003. “Leaders’ or brokers? Positions and influence in social movement networks.” In Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, eds. M. Diani and D. McAdam, pp. 105–122. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Diehl, James M. 1993. The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Dobell, Lauren. 1997. “Silence in context: truth and/or reconciliation in Namibia.” Journal of Southern African Studies 23(2): 371–382. Dudley, Sandra. 2011. “Feeling at home: producing and consuming things in Karenni refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border.” Population, Space and Place 17(6): 742–755. Dudouet, Véronique, Hans J Giessmann, and Katrin Planta. 2012. “From combatants to peacebuilders: a case for inclusive, participatory and holistic security transitions.” Policy report. Berlin: Berghof Foundation. Duyvendak, Jan Willem. 2011. The Politics of Home: Belonging and Nostalgia in Western Europe and the United States. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Dzinesa, Gwinyayi Albert. 2004. “A comparative perspective of UN peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia.” International Peacekeeping 11(4): 644–663. Eck, Kristine. 2010. “Raising Rebels: Participation and Recruitment in Civil War.” PhD thesis, Department of Peace and Conflict, Uppsala University. Edele, Mark. 2006. “Soviet veterans as an entitlement group, 1945–1955.” Slavic Review 65(1): 111–137. ———. 2008. Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society 1941–1991. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eichler, Maya. 2014. “Citizenship and the contracting out of military work: from national conscription to globalized recruitment.” Citizenship Studies 18(6–7): 600–614. Elder, G. H. 1986. “Military times and turning points in men’s lives.” Developmental Psychology 22(2): 233–245. ———. 1994. “Time, human agency, and social change: perspectives on the life course.” Social Psychology Quarterly 57(1): 4–15. Elder, G. H., and E. C. Clipp. 1988. “Wartime losses and social bonding – influences across 40 years in mens lives.” Psychiatry-Interpersonal and Biological Processes 51(2): 177–198. Erikson, Robert S., and Laura Stoker. 2011. “Caught in the draft: the effects of Vietnam draft lottery status on political attitudes.” American Political Science Review 105(2): 221–237. Eriksson Baaz, Maria, and Mats Utas, eds. 2012. Beyond “Gender and Stir”: Reflections on Gender and SSR in the Aftermath of African Conflicts. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

193

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Firchow, Pamina, and Roger Mac Ginty. 2017. “Measuring peace: comparability, commensurability, and complementarity using bottom-up indicators.” International Studies Review 19(1): 6–27. Florez-Morris, Mauricio. 2005. “Reinsert Life Stories: a Description of the Colombian Ex-Guerrillas’ Life-Course from a Sociological Perspective.” PhD thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Maryland. ———. 2007. “Joining guerrilla groups in Colombia: individual motivations and processes for entering a violent organization.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30(7): 615–634. ———. 2010. “Why some Colombian guerrilla members stayed in the movement until demobilization: a micro-sociological case study of factors that influenced members’ commitment to three former rebel organizations: M-19, EPL, and CRS.” Terrorism and Political Violence 22(2): 216–241. Fragkaki, Iro, Karin Roelofs, John Stins, Ruud A. Jongedijk, and Muriel A. Hagenaars. 2017. “Reduced freezing in posttraumatic stress disorder patients while watching affective pictures.” Frontiers in Psychiatry 8(39): 1–9. Friðriksdóttir, Guðrún Sif. 2018. “Ex-combatants as social activists: war, peace and ideology in Burundi.” Conflict, Security and Development 18(1): 1–16. Friedman, Jonathan. 1992. “Myth, history, and political identity.” Cultural Anthropology 7(2): 194–210. García Durán, Mauricio, Vera Grabe Loewenherz, and Otty Patiño Hormaza. 2008. “The M-19’s journey from armed struggle to democratic politics.” Berghof Transitions Series no. 1. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management. George, Linda K. 1993. “Sociological perspectives on life transitions.” Annual Review of Sociology 19: 353–373. Gerber, David A. 1994. “Heroes and misfits: the troubled social reintegration of disabled veterans in ‘The Best Years of Our Lives’.” American Quarterly 46(4): 545–574. Gergen, Kenneth J., and Mary J. Gergen. 1987. “The self in temporal perspective.” In Life-Span Perspectives and Social Psychology, ed. R. P. Abeles, pp. 121–138. Hillsdale: L. Erlbaum. Getmansky, Anna, and Thomas Zeitzoff. 2014. “Terrorism and voting: the effect of rocket threat on voting in Israeli elections.” American Political Science Review 108(3): 588–604. Glantz, Aaron. 2009. The War Comes Home: Washington’s Battle against America’s Veterans. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gleditsch, Kristian. 2004. “A revised list of wars between and within independent states, 1816–2002.” International Interactions 30(3): 231–262. Gleditsch, N. P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, and H. Strand. 2002. “Armed conflict 1946–2001: a new dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 615–637. Gleichmann, Colin, Michael Odenwald, Kees Steenken, and Adrian Wilkinson. 2004. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Stockholm: Swedish National Defense College. Groenendyk, Eric W., and Antoine J. Banks. 2014. “Emotional rescue: how affect helps partisans overcome collective action problems.” Political Psychology 35(3): 359–378. Grossman, Guy, Devorah Manekin, and Dan Miodownik. 2015. “The political legacies of combat: attitudes toward war and peace among Israeli ex-combatants.” International Organization 69(4): 981–1009.

194

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Guáqueta, Alexandra. 2007. “The way back in: reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now.” Conflict, Security and Development 7(3): 417–456. Hagenaars, Muriel A. 2016. “Tonic immobility and PTSD in a large community sample.” Journal of Experimental Psychopathology 7(2): 246–260. Hardgrove, Abby. 2017. Life after Guns: Reciprocity and Respect among Young Men in Liberia: Rutgers University Press. Harding, Jennifer. 2006. “Questioning the subject in biographical interviewing.” Sociological Research Online 11(3). Harrison, Barbara, ed. 2008. Life Story Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Hauge, Wenche. 2008. “Group identity – a neglected asset: determinants of social and political participation among female ex-fighters in Guatemala.” Conflict, Security and Development 8(3): 295–316. Hayward, Clarissa Rile. 2013. How Americans Make Race: Stories, Institutions, Spaces. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hearn, Jeff. 2012. “Men/masculinities: war/militarism – searching for the obvious connections?” In Making Gender, Making War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping Practices, eds. A. Kronsell and E. Svedberg, pp. 35–48. New York: Routledge. Hill, Richard, Gwendolyn Taylor, and Jonathan Temin. 2008. “Would you fight again? Understanding Liberian ex-combatant reintegration.” Special report no. 211. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. Hobson, Barbara Meil. 2003. Recognition Struggles and Social Movements: Contested Identities, Agency and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hobson, Barbara, Marcus Carson, and Rebecca Lawrence. 2007. “Recognition struggles in trans-national arenas: negotiating identities and framing citizenship.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 10(4): 443–470. Huddy, Leonie. 2003. “Group identity and political cohesion.” In Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. D. O. Sears, L. Huddy and R. Jervis, pp. 511–558. New York: Oxford University Press. Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2006. “Handling and manhandling civilians in civil war.” American Political Science Review 100(3): 429–447. ———. 2007. “Demobilization and reintegration.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(4): 531–567. ———. 2008. “Who fights? The determinants of participation in civil war.” American Journal of Political Science 52(2): 436–455. Ishiyama, John. 2016. “Introduction to the special issue ‘From bullets to ballots: the transformation of rebel groups into political parties’.” Democratization 23(6): 969–971. Ishiyama, John, Amalia Pulido Gomez, and Brandon Stewart. 2016. “Does conflict lead to ethnic particularism? Electoral violence and ethnicity in Kenya 2005–2008.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 22(3): 300–321. Jansson, Jenny. 2020. Crafting the Movement: Identity Entrepreneures in the Swedish Trade Union Movement, 1920–1940. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Järvinen, Margaretha. 2004. “Life histories and the perspective of the present.” Narrative Inquiry 14(1): 45–68. Jennings, M. Kent. 1979. “Another look at the life-cycle and political participation.” American Journal of Political Science 23(4): 755–771.

195

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Jennings, M. Kent, and Gregory Markus. 1977. “The effect of military service on political attitudes: a panel study.” American Political Science Review 71(1): 131–147. Jha, Saumitra, and Steven Wilkinson. 2012. “Does combat experience foster organizational skill? Evidence from ethnic cleansing during the partition of South Asia.” American Political Science Review 106(4): 883–907. Jones, Rebecca. 2004. “Blended voices: crafting a narrative from oral history interviews.” Oral History Review 31(1): 23–42. Kane, Tim. 2004. “Global U.S. troop deployment, 1950–2003.” Report CDA04–11. Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation. Available online at http://s3.amazonaws.com/ thf_media/2004/pdf/cda04-11.pdf (accessed November 24, 2017). Kantor, Ana, and Mariam Persson. 2010. “Understanding vigilantism: informal security providers and security sector reform in Liberia.” Report. Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy. Kaplan, Oliver, and Enzo Nussio. 2018a. “Community counts: the social reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(2): 132–153. ———. 2018b. “Explaining recidivism of ex-combatants in Colombia.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(1): 64–93. Kaplan, Oliver, and Christopher Shay. 2017. “Cross-national Data Collection on DDR Programs.” Paper presented at FBA Research Working Group on DDR, IAWG DDR Workshop Research Side-Event, 20 October 2017, Stockholm. Karner, Tracy. 1996. “Fathers, sons, and Vietnam: masculinity and betrayal in the life narratives of Vietnam veterans with post traumatic stress disorder.” American Studies 37(1): 63–94. Karsten, Peter. 1978. Soldiers and Society: the Effects of Military Service and War on American Life. Westport: Greenwood Press. Kenny, Meryl, and Tània Verge. 2016. “Opening up the black box: gender and candidate selection in a new era.” Government and Opposition 51(3): 351–369. Kestnbaum, Meyer. 2009. “The sociology of war and the military.” Annual Review of Sociology 35: 235–254. Kitchen, James E., Laura Rowe, and Alisa Miller. 2011. Other Combatants, Other Fronts: Competing Histories of the First World War. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven Wilkinson, eds. 2007. Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Knight, Mark, and Alpaslan Özerdem. 2004. “Guns, camps and cash: disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion of former combatants in transitions from war to peace.” Journal of Peace Research 41(4): 499–516. Kössler, Reinhart. 2007. “Facing a fragmented past: memory, culture and politics in Namibia.” Journal of Southern African Studies 33(2): 361–382. Kowalsky, Meaghan. 2007. “‘This honourable obligation’: the King’s National Roll scheme for disabled ex-servicemen 1915–1944.” European Review of History: Revue europeenne d’histoire 14(4): 567–584. Kriger, Norma J. 1991. Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

196

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References ———. 2003. Guerrilla Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980–1987. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lacina, Bethany, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2005. “Monitoring trends in global combat: a new dataset of battle deaths.” European Journal of Population/Revue européenne de Démographie 21(2): 145–166. Lamb, Robert Dale. 2010. “Microdynamics of Illegitimacy and Complex Urban Violence in Medellín, Colombia.” PhD thesis, University of Maryland. Le Blanc, Jörg. 2013. Political Violence in Latin America: A Cross-case Comparison of the Urban Insurgency Campaigns of Montoneros, M-19 and FSLN in a Historical Perspective. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. LeBeau, Debie. 2005. “An investigation into the lives of Namibian ex-fighters fifteen years after independence.” Report. Windhoek: Peace Centre. Available onlnie at www.academia.edu/169873/An_Investigation_into_Namibian_Ex-fighters_Fifteen_ Years_after_Independence_2005 (accessed November 22, 2016). Leed, Eric J. 1979. No Man’s Land: Combat and Identity in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leimgruber, Matthieu. 2010. “Protecting soldiers, not mothers: soldiers’ income compensation in Switzerland during World War II.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society 17(1): 53–79. Lembcke, Jerry. 1999. “From oral history to movie script: the Vietnam veteran interviews for ‘Coming Home’.” Oral History Review 26(2): 65–86. Levi, Margaret. 1998. “Conscription: the price of citizenship.” In Analytic Narratives, eds. R. H. Bates, A. Grief, M. Levi, J.-L. Rosenthal, and B. R. Weingast, pp. 109–147. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 1999. “Death and taxes: extractive equality and the development of democratic institutions.” In Democracy’s Value, eds. I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordón, pp. 112–131. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Linker, Beth. 2011. War’s Waste: Rehabilitation in World War I America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Long, Lynellyn, and Ellen Oxfeld, eds. 2004. Coming Home? Refugees, Migrants, and Those Who Stayed Behind. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Luraghi, Nino. 2006. “Traders, pirates, warriors: the proto-history of Greek mercenary soldiers in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Phoenix 60(1/2): 21–47. Lyons, Paul. 1998. “Toward a revised story of the homecoming of Vietnam Veterans.” Peace and Change 23(2): 193–200. Mac Ginty, Roger. 2014. “Everyday peace: bottom-up and local agency in conflict-affected societies.” Security Dialogue 45(6): 548–564. Maclay, Christopher, and Alpaslan Özerdem. 2010. “‘Use’ them or ‘lose’ them: engaging Liberia’s disconnected youth through socio-political integration.” International Peacekeeping 17(3): 343–360. MacLean, Alair, and Glen H. Elder. 2007. “Military service in the life course.” Annual Review of Sociology 33(1): 175–196. Maines, David R. 2001. “Writing the self versus writing the other: comparing autobiographical and life history data.” Symbolic Interaction 24(1): 105–111.

197

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Mann, Gregory. 2006. Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. Marks, Zoe. 2019. “Gender, social networks and conflict processes.” feminists@law 9(1): 1–33. Mattila, J. P. 1978. “G.I. Bill benefits and enrollments – how did Vietnam veterans fare.” Social Science Quarterly 59(3): 535–545. Maxwell, Donald W. 2015. “‘These are the things you gain if you make our country your country’: U.S.–Vietnam War draft resisters and military deserters and the meaning of citizenship in North America in the 1970s.” Peace and Change 40(4): 437–461. McAdam, Doug. 1988. Freedom Summer. New York: Oxford University Press. ———. 1989. “The biographical consequences of activism.” American Sociological Review 54(5): 744–760. McAdam, Doug, and Ronnelle Paulsen. 1993. “Specifying the relationship between social ties and activism.” American Journal of Sociology 99(3): 640–667. McClurg, Scott D. 2003. “Social networks and political participation: the role of social interaction in explaining political participation.” Political Research Quarterly 56(4): 449–464. McConnell, Tristan. 2000. “Personal narratives of political history: social memory and silence in Namibia.” Dialectical Anthropology 25(1): 27–59. McMullin, Jaremey R. 2013a. Ex-combatants and the Post-conflict State: Challenges of Reintegration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2013b. “Integration or separation? The stigmatisation of ex-combatants after war.” Review of International Studies 39(2): 385–414. Metsola, Lalli. 2006. “‘Reintegration’ of ex-combatants and former fighters: a lens into state formation and citizenship in Namibia.” Third World Quarterly 27(6): 1119–1135. ———. 2010. “The struggle continues? The spectre of liberation, memory politics and ‘war veterans’ in Namibia.” Development and Change 41(4): 589–613. ———. 2015. “Reintegration as Recognition. Ex-combatant and Veteran Politics in Namibia.” PhD thesis, Department of Political and Economic Studies (Development Studies), University of Helsinki. Mettler, Suzanne. 2002. “Bringing the state back in to civic engagement: policy feedback effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II veterans.” American Political Science Review 96(2): 351–365. ———. 2005. Soldiers to Citizens: the G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mettler, Suzanne, and Eric Welch. 2004. “Civic generation: policy feedback effects of the G.I. Bill on political involvement over the life course.” British Journal of Political Science 34(3): 497–518. Mihai, Mihaela. 2014. “Theorizing agonistic emotions.” Parallax 20(2): 31–48. Miller, Robert, Robin Humphrey, and Elena A. Zdravomyslova. 2003. Biographical Research in Eastern Europe: Altered Lives and Broken Biographies. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate. Mironova, Vera, and Sam Whitt. 2018. “Social norms after conflict exposure and victimization by violence: experimental evidence from Kosovo.” British Journal of Political Science 48(3): 749–765.

198

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Mitton, Kieran. 2008. “Engaging disengagement: the political reintegration of Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front.” Conflict, Security and Development 8(2): 193–222. Moradi, Ahmad. 2017. “The Syrian Civil War and the Possibility of Citizenship Claims for Afghan Refugees in Iran.” Paper presented at “The Making of Peace, Conflict and Security Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion”, the 6th Bi-annual Peace and Conflict Studies in Anthropology meeting (PACSA), August 28–30, 2017, Amsterdam. Moran, Mary H. 2010. “Gender, militarism, and peace-building: projects of the postconflict moment.” Annual Review of Anthropology 39: 261–274. Mosse, George L. 1990. Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. New York: Oxford University Press. Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. “Politics and passions: the stakes of democracy.” Ethical Perspectives 7(2–3): 146–150. Muldoon, Orla T., Katrina McLaughlin, Nathalie Rougier, and Karen Trew. 2008. “Adolescents’ explanations for paramilitary involvement.” Journal of Peace Research 45(5): 681–695. Murray-Hudson, Anne. 1983. “SWAPO: solidarity with our sisters.” Review of African Political Economy 10(27–28): 120–125. National Archives. 2013. “Statistical information about casualties of the Vietnam War.” Available online at www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualtystatistics.html (accessed November 24, 2017). Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and Kim Jae-on. 1974. “Political participation and the life cycle.” Comparative Politics 6(3): 319–340. Nilsson, R. Anders. 2005. Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Post-conflict Societies. Stockholm: SIDA. Nordstrom, Carolyn. 2004. Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century. Berkeley: University of California Press. Nussio, Enzo. 2011a. “Understanding Ex-combatants: Central Themes in the Lives of Former Paramilitaries in Colombia.” PhD thesis, Graduate School of Business Administration, Economics, Law and Social Sciences (HSG), University of St. Gallen. ———. 2011b. “How ex-combatants talk about personal security: narratives of former paramilitaries in Colombia.” Conflict, Security and Development 11(5): 579–606. ———. 2017. “How ideology channels indeterminate emotions into armed mobilization.” PS: Political Science and Politics 50(4): 928–931. Nussio, Enzo, and Ben Oppenheim. 2014. “Anti-social capital in former members of non-state armed groups: a case study of Colombia.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37(12): 999–1023. Oakes, Margaret. 2011. “Formation of identity in wartime El Salvador: protective and harmful factors.” Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 21(8): 926–947. Oppenheim, Ben, and Johanna Söderström. 2018. “Citizens by design? Explaining excombatant satisfaction with reintegration programming.” Journal of Development Studies 54(1): 133–152. Ortiz, Stephen R. 2010. Beyond the Bonus March and G.I. Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era. New York: New York University Press. Osterling, Jorge P. 1989. Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare. New Brunswick: Transaction.

199

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Özerdem, Alpaslan. 2012. “A re-conceptualisation of ex-combatant reintegration: ‘social reintegration’ approach.” Conflict, Security and Development 12(1): 51–73. Pamphilon, Barbara. 1999. “The Zoom Model: a dynamic framework for the analysis of life histories.” Qualitative Inquiry 5(3): 393–410. Passy, Florence. 2003. “Social networks matter. But how?” In Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, eds. M. Diani and D. McAdam, pp. 21–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Passy, Florence, and Marco Giugni. 2000. “Life-spheres, networks, and sustained participation in social movements: a phenomenological approach to political commitment.” Sociological Forum 15(1): 117–144. Patterson, Molly, and Kristen Renwick Monroe. 1998. “Narrative in political science.” Annual Review of Political Science 1(1): 315–331. Phayal, Anup, Prabin Khadka, and Clayton L. Thyne. 2015. “What makes an ex-combatant happy? A micro analysis of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in South Sudan.” International Studies Quarterly 59(4): 654–668. Phillips, Anne. 2003. “Recognition and the struggle for political voice.” In Recognition Struggles and Social Movements: Contested Identities, Agency and Power, ed. B. M. Hobson, pp. 263–273. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Plummer, Ken. 2001. “The call of life stories in ethnographic research.” In Handbook of Ethnography, eds. P. Atkinson, A. Coffey, S. Delamont, J. Lofland, and L. Lofland, pp. 395–406. London: Sage Publications. Podder, Sukanya. 2011. “Child soldier recruitment in the Liberian civil wars: individual motivations and rebel group tactics.” In Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration, eds. A. Özerdem and S. Podder, pp. 50–75. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Porto, J. Gomes, Imogen Parsons, and Chris Alden. 2007. From Soldiers to Citizens: the Social, Economic and Political Reintegration of UNITA Ex-Combatants. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Preston, Rosemary. 1997. “Integrating fighters after war: reflections on the Namibian experience, 1989–1993.” Journal of Southern African Studies 23(3): 453–472. Prost, Antoine. 1992. In the Wake of War: ‘les Anciens Combattants’ and French Society. Providence: Berg. Pugel, James. 2009. “Measuring reintegration in Liberia: assessing the gap between outputs and outcomes.” In Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War, ed. R. Muggah, pp. 70–102. London and New York: Routledge. Rabow-Edling, Susanna. 2015. Married to the Empire: Three Governors’ Wives in Russian America 1829–1864. Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press. Rampf, David, and Diana Chavarro. 2014. “Entering the Political Stage – an Analysis of Former Guerilla’s Experiences in Colombian Politics.” Inclusive Political Settlements, paper no. 2. Berlin: Berghof Foundation. Randazzo, Elisa. 2016. “The paradoxes of the ‘everyday’: scrutinising the local turn in peace building.” Third World Quarterly 37(8): 1351–1370. Reilly, Jacqueline, Orla T. Muldoon, and Clare Byrne. 2004. “Young men as victims and perpetrators of violence in Northern Ireland: a qualitative analysis.” Journal of Social Issues 60(3): 469–484.

200

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Resch, John Phillips. 1999. Suffering Soldiers: Revolutionary War Veterans, Moral Sentiment, and Political Culture in the Early Republic. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Rohner, Dominic, Mathias Thoenig, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2013. “Seeds of distrust: conflict in Uganda.” Journal of Economic Growth 18(3): 217–252. Rosales, Marta Vilar. 2010. “The domestic work of consumption: materiality, migration and home-making.” Etnográfica 14(3): 507–525. Rudolph, Thomas J., Amy Gangl, and Dan Stevens. 2000. “The effects of efficacy and emotions on campaign involvement.” Journal of Politics 62(04): 1189–1197. Runyan, William M. 1979. “Perceived determinants of highs and lows in life satisfaction.” Developmental Psychology 15(3): 331–333. ———. 1980. “The life satisfaction chart – perceptions of the course of subjective experience.” International Journal of Aging and Human Development 11(1): 45–64. ———. 1982. Life Histories and Psychobiography: Explorations in Theory and Method. New York: Oxford University Press. Rustin, Michael. 2008. “Reflections on the biographical turn in social science.” In Life Story Research, ed. B. Harrison, pp. 153–172. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Sacipa, Stella, Blanca Patricia Ballesteros, Juanita Cardozo, Mónica M. Novoa, and Claudia Tovar. 2006. “Understanding peace through the lens of Colombian youth and adults.” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 12(2): 157. Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez. 2003. “Criminal rebels? A discussion of war and criminality from the Colombian experience.” Working paper no. 27. London: Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre, London School of Economics. Sarrias, Cárdenas, and José Armando. 2006. “Los Renegados de Antaño y Hogaño: Desmovilización de Excombatientes Irregulares en Colombia.” Unpublished thesis, Fundación Universitaria Los Libertadores. Saul, John S., and Colin Leys. 2003. “Lubango and after: ‘forgotten history’ as politics in contemporary Namibia.” Journal of Southern African Studies 29(2): 333–353. Schafer, Jessica. 2007. Soldiers at Peace: Veterans and Society after the Civil War in Mozambique. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Schielke, Joska Samuli. 2015. Egypt in the Future Tense: Hope, Frustration, and Ambivalence before and after 2011. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Schok, Michaela L., Rolf J. Kleber, Martin Elands, and Jos M. P. Weerts. 2008. “Meaning as a mission: a review of empirical studies on appraisals of war and peacekeeping experiences.” Clinical Psychology Review 28(3): 357–365. Schreiber, E. M. 1979. “Enduring effects of military service? Opinion differences between U.S. veterans and nonveterans.” Social Forces 57(3): 824–839. Schuetz, Alfred. 1945. “The homecomer.” American Journal of Sociology 50(5): 369–376. Scott, Wilbur J. 2012. The Politics of Readjustment: Vietnam Veterans since the War. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Shanahan, Michael J. 2000. “Pathways to adulthood in changing societies: variability and mechanisms in life course perspective.” Annual Review of Sociology 26: 667–692. Shapiro, Michael J. 2011. “The presence of war: ‘here and elsewhere’.” International Political Sociology 5(2): 109–125. Shay, Jonathan. 2003. Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming. New York: Scribner.

201

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Sherman, Nancy. 2011. The Untold War: Inside the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of Our Soldiers. New York: W. W. Norton. Siegel, David A. 2009. “Social networks and collective action.” American Journal of Political Science 53(1): 122–138. Simon, Bernd, and Bert Klandermans. 2001. “Politicized collective identity: a social psychological analysis.” American Psychologist 56(4): 319–331. Sindre, Gyda Marås. 2016. “In whose interests? Party politics and ex-combatant interest group mobilization.” Civil Wars 18(2): 192–213. Sindre, Gyda Marås, and Johanna Söderström. 2016. “Understanding armed groups and party politics.” Civil Wars 18(2): 109–117. Skocpol, Theda. 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: the Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States. Cambridge, M.A.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Söderström, Johanna. 2011a. “Dissent and opposition among ex-combatants in Liberia.” Democratization 18(5): 1146–1167. ———. 2011b. “Politics of Affection: Ex-combatants, Political Engagement and Reintegration Programs in Liberia.” PhD thesis, Department of Government, Uppsala University. ———. 2013a. “Second time around: ex-combatants at the polls in Liberia.” Journal of Modern African Studies 51(3): 409–433. ———. 2013b. “The political consequences of reintegration programmes in current peace-building: a framework for analysis.” Conflict, Security and Development 13(1): 87–116. ———. 2015. Peacebuilding and Ex-combatants: Political Reintegration in Liberia. London and New York: Routledge. ———. 2016a. “The resilient, the remobilized and the removed: party mobilization among former M19 combatants.” Civil Wars 18(2): 214–233. ———. 2016b. “Livsberättelser: att leva och förstå politik efter krig.” In Introduktion till Politisk etnografi – metoder för statsvetare, eds. M.-T. Gustafsson and L. Johannesson, pp. 83–103. Malmö: Gleerups. ———. 2018. “Fear of electoral violence and its impact on political knowledge in subSaharan Africa.” Political Studies 66(4): 869–886. ———. 2019. “Seeking recognition, becoming citizens – achievements and grievances among former combatants from three wars.” Conflict and Society: Advances in Research 5: 168–185. ———. 2020. “Life diagrams: a methodological and analytical tool for accessing life histories.” Qualitative Research 20(1): 3–21. Söderström, Johanna, Malin Åkebo, and Anna Jarstad. (2020). “Friends, fellows and foes: a new framework for studying relational peace.” International Studies Review. Sprenkels, Ralph. 2018. After Insurgency: Revolution and Electoral Politics in El Salvador. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Stoker, Laura, and M. Kent Jennings. 1995. “Life-cycle transitions and political participation: the case of marriage.” American Political Science Review 89(2): 421–433. Summers-Effler, Erika. 2002. “The micro potential for social change: emotion, consciousness, and social movement formation.” Sociological Theory 20(1): 41–60. Tajfel, Henri. 1974. “Social identity and intergroup behaviour.” Social Science Information Sur Les Sciences Sociales 13(2): 65–93.

202

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Teigen, Jeremy M. 2006. “Enduring effects of the uniform: previous military experience and voting turnout.” Political Research Quarterly 59(4): 601–607. Themnér, Anders. 2011. Violence in Post-conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilizers and Relationships. Abingdon: Routledge. ———. 2012. “Former mid-level commanders in Big Man networks.” In African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks, ed. M. Utas, pp. 205–223. London: Zed Books. ———. 2015. “Former military networks and the micro-politics of violence and statebuilding in Liberia.” Comparative Politics 47(3): 334–353. Themnér, Lotta, and Peter Wallensteen. 2013. “Armed conflicts, 1946–2012.” Journal of Peace Research 50(4): 509–521. Thomson, Alistair. 1998. “Fifty years on: an international perspective on oral history.” Journal of American History 85(2): 581–595. Tilly, Charles. 1985. “War making and state making as organized crime.” In Bringing the State Back In, eds. P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, pp. 169–191. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Turnbull, Annmarie. 2000. “Collaboration and censorship in the oral history interview.” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 3(1): 15–34. Ucko, David H. 2009. “Militias, tribes and insurgents: the challenge of political reintegration in Iraq.” In Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict: Politics, violence and transition, eds. M. R. Berdal and D. H. Ucko, pp. 89–118. London and New York: Routledge. Ugarriza, Juan E., and M. J. Craig. 2013. “The relevance of ideology to contemporary armed conflicts: a quantitative analysis of former combatants in Colombia.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(3): 445–477. Ulvin, Peter. 2007. “Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why they joined, why they left, how they fared.” Working paper no. 3. Washington D.C.: MDRP, World Bank. UN DDR Resource Centre. 2005. “Integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards (IDDRS).” Report. Utas, Mats. 2003. “Sweet Battlefields: Youth and the Liberian Civil War.” Phd thesis, Department of Cultural Anthropology, Uppsala University. ———. 2008. “Abject heroes: marginalised youth, modernity and violent pathways of the Liberian Civil War.” In Years of Conflict: Adolescence, Political Violence and Displacement, ed. J. Hart, pp. 111–138. New York and Oxford: Berghahn. Utas, Mats, and Maya Mynster Christensen. 2016. “The gift of violence: ex-militias and ambiguous debt relations during post-war elections in Sierra Leone.” African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 6(2): 23–47. VA. 2017. “Veteran Population Projection Model 2016 (VetPop2016).” Washington D.C.: Department of Veterans Affairs: Office of the Actuary. Wagner-Pacifici, Robin, and Barry Schwartz. 1991. “The Vietnam veterans’ memorial: commemorating a difficult past.” American Journal of Sociology 97(2): 376–420. Waller, Willard. 1944. The Veteran Comes Back. New York: The Dryden Press. Walter, Barbara F. 2004. “Does conflict beget conflict? Explaining recurring civil war.” Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 371–388. Weber, Cynthia. 2014. “Encountering violence: terrorism and horrorism in war and citizenship.” International Political Sociology 8(3): 237–255.

203

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References Weisdorf, Matti, and Birgitte Refslund Sørensen. 2019. “To be or not to be a hero: recognition and citizenship among disabled veterans of the Sri Lankan Army.” Conflict and Society 5(1): 96–114. White, Robert W. 2007. “‘I’m not too sure what I told you the last time’: methological notes on accounts from high-risk activists in the Irish republican movement.” Mobilization 12(3): 287–305. Wiegink, Nikkie. 2013. “Why did the soldiers not go home? Demobilized combatants, family life, and witchcraft in post-war Mozambique.” Anthropological Quarterly 86(1): 107–132. ———. 2015. “‘It will be our time to eat’: former Renamo combatants and big-man dynamics in Central Mozambique.” Journal of Southern African Studies 41(4): 869–885. Wiegink, Nikkie, Ralph Sprenkels, and Birgette Refslund Sørensen. 2019. “Introduction: War veterans and the construction of citizenship categories.” Conflict and Society 5(1): 72–78. Vietnam Women’s Memorial Foundation. 2019. “Vietnam Women’s Memorial.” Available online at www.vietnamwomensmemorial.org/vwmf.php (accessed May 29, 2019). Vigne, Randolph. 1987. “SWAPO of Namibia: a movement in exile.” Third World Quarterly 9(1): 85–107. de Vries, Hugo, and Nikkie Wiegink. 2011. “Breaking up and going home? Contesting two assumptions in the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.” International Peacekeeping 18(1): 38–51. Walsh, Katie. 2011. “Migrant masculinities and domestic space: British home-making practices in Dubai.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 36(4): 516–529. Williams, Christian A. 2017. “Education in exile: international scholarships, Cold War politics, and conflicts among SWAPO members in Tanzania, 1961–1968.” Journal of Southern African Studies 43(1): 125–141. Wilson, Alice. 2019. “Invisible veterans: defeated militants and enduring revolutionary social values in Dhufar, Oman.” Conflict and Society 5(1): 132–149. Wimmer, Andreas, and Brian Min. 2009. “The location and purpose of wars around the world: a new global dataset, 1816–2001.” International Interactions 35(4): 390–417. Yates, Miranda, and James Youniss. 1998. “Community service and political identity development in adolescence.” Journal of Social Issues 54(3): 495–512. Zingmark, Karin, Astrid Norberg, and Per-Olof Sandman. 1995. “The experience of being at home throughout the life span: investigation of persons aged from 2 to 102.” International Journal of Aging and Human Development 41(1): 47–62.

204

INDEX

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

9/11 71, 107, 129, 144, 155, 159, 187 abandonment 50, 102, 118, 129–130, 134–135, 139, 141, 159, 165, 167–168, 170, 173–174 acceptance 73, 78, 115, 130, 136–137 achievement 46, 57, 77, 84, 91–95, 97, 99, 102, 109–112, 126, 132, 141, 148–149, 158, 166, 180 affect 23, 33, 94–95, 102–103, 105, 108, 114, 121, 125, 127–130, 133–135, 138–139, 149, 164–166, 168, 170, 175, 180 see also emotion Afghanistan 50, 96, 100, 102, 129, 150 agency 8, 60, 61, 63, 73, 80, 107, 110–111, 154, 159–160, 167, 178, 185 Agent Orange 50, 71, 126 alcohol 37, 71–72, 89, 93, 129–131 American War of Independence 5, 42, 96 Angola 28–30, 40, 46, 80 anti-war 36, 52, 58, 65, 77, 95–96, 99, 106, 132, 150, 160 see also peace movement apartheid 25, 162 Argentina 87 battle deaths 25–27, 54 belonging 12, 56, 115, 124, 128, 131–132, 140, 170, 175, 182 betrayal 17, 74, 99, 130, 134, 167, 184 blame 51, 95, 134, 135, 168, 173 Bogotá 33, 65, 115, 123, 135 bonds 37, 39, 85, 101–103, 104, 114–115, 126–130, 136, 139–140, 158, 176, 180 see also network Bush, George W. 107 campaign 10, 12, 123–124, 135, 145, 150, 152, 154, 156, 163, 165, 170, 186

Canada 31, 36, 160 Capitol Hill (Washington D.C.) 99, 122 Cassinga (Angola) 30–31, 54 Castro, Fidel 86–87 Cheney, Dick 107 children 28–30, 45, 49, 58, 65, 67–68, 71, 73, 80, 85, 89, 92, 94, 103, 108, 119, 127–128, 132, 136, 144–145, 152, 162, 171 see also family citizenship 23, 27, 42, 58, 90, 95, 100, 104, 110, 112, 150, 173, 182 Cold War 17, 25–27, 39, 77, 87, 157–158, 186 Colombia 2–3, 15–16, 19–20, 24, 26–27, 40, 47–49, 54, 57, 59, 64, 69–70, 74, 77, 79, 82, 84–86, 89, 92–94, 104, 107, 110, 118, 121, 123, 127, 133, 143, 149, 158, 160, 164, 169, 178–179, 186 Colombia civil war 2, 15–16, 26 communism 15, 26, 32, 37, 39, 86, 88, 99, 139, 157, 162 conscription 27, 34–35, 96 constitution 16, 26, 47, 57, 78–79, 84, 112, 141, 158, 162, 182 continuity 8, 24, 87, 103–104, 108– 109, 130, 148, 150, 156, 161, 163, 180 see also longevity Corriente de Renovación Socialista (CRS) 54 corruption 39, 45, 47, 131, 135–136 Council of Vietnam Veterans see Vietnam Veterans of America Cuba 29, 86–87, 106, 135 death 3, 14–15, 25–27, 30–35, 37–40, 42, 54, 56–58, 61–62, 65, 69, 72, 75–76, 86, 93, 104, 106, 109, 112, 126, 132, 135, 138–139, 158, 162, 164, 167–169, 171, 174–175, 180

205

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index debt 42–43, 48, 65–66, 68, 81, 90, 99–100, 103, 164, 166, 182 democracy 10, 31, 44, 79, 87–88, 124, 139, 158, 172, 177, 183 Democrat 87, 90, 107, 123, 125, 136–137, 145, 150, 154, 156 dependency 38, 48, 81, 117, 132, 134, 139, 184 see also patronage deserving 46, 83–84, 92–95, 109–111, 134, 178, 182 destiny 85, 103, 111, 114, 127, 129, 136, 138, 141 disappointment 30, 40, 46, 56, 59, 97–98, 101, 104–105, 107, 109, 121, 127–128, 130, 135–136, 138–139, 141, 146, 149–150, 153, 168–170 divorce 105, 144, 171 disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 11, 42–44, 53–54, 56, 179 see also reintegration programs; veteran policies draft 10, 16, 34–36, 38–39, 54, 127, 160, 176 Dungeons 30, 61, 78–9, 145 see also Lubango duty 31, 35–36, 52, 83, 86, 88–92, 95, 98–100, 102, 108–112, 114, 127, 139, 150, 158, 163–166, 169, 175, 180 see also service education 8, 29, 31–35, 42, 45, 47, 49, 54, 65–66, 90, 97, 106–107, 115, 119, 144, 146, 148, 157, 159, 167, 170–171, 174, 179 see also university efficacy 154, 157, 160, 167, 172 Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) 54, 74 Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) 54 election 16, 26, 73, 123–124, 152, 156, 165, 170, 186 emotion 5, 11, 23–24, 36, 51, 53, 57, 63, 66–67, 74–75, 81, 96, 98–100, 102, 104, 126, 129, 132, 134–135, 137, 139–140,

147, 149, 152, 158–159, 161, 164, 166–169, 171, 176–177, 179–180, 184 see also affect anger 46, 74, 78, 100, 107, 117, 137, 155, 159–160 fear 7, 30, 32–33, 42–43, 48, 58, 68–70, 74–75, 159, 172 guilt 3, 42, 50, 52, 72, 78, 90, 93–95, 98, 145, 183 happiness 28–30, 48, 57–58, 66, 68, 73, 81, 104, 108 hatred 50, 74 pride 30, 50, 51, 57, 60, 73, 90–92, 93, 106, 111, 126, 132, 149, 183 sadness 58, 76, 85, 98, 130, 135, 171 employment 8, 16, 30, 36–38, 44–45, 47, 49–50, 60, 62–67, 71, 73, 81, 93, 97, 111, 115–118, 124, 134, 141, 144, 148, 153, 157, 162, 165, 169 everyday perspective 11, 57, 72, 143, 177 exile 25, 28–31, 36, 40, 46, 57–58, 61, 66–67, 69, 90, 97–98, 107, 126, 145, 153, 159, 168 expectations 43, 89, 109, 126, 128, 130, 135, 138–139, 169, 175 family 8, 12, 28–30, 32–35, 37, 40, 43, 57, 59, 61, 63–70, 74–75, 78, 81, 85, 89, 91, 104, 107–108, 114, 116, 119, 121, 124, 127–130, 134–135, 139, 141, 144, 150, 153, 167, 171–172, 174, 179, 181 see also children; network; partner brother 32, 68, 75, 78, 87, 114, 124, 126, 131, 137 daughter 65, 67, 124, 146, 162 father 33–36, 39, 66, 72, 83, 86, 88–89, 91, 102, 109, 114, 120, 124, 128, 146, 162, 171, 180 husband 91, 114 marriage 67, 144, 157, 171 mother 28, 33, 89, 91, 108, 124, 154 parent 28, 67–68, 74–75, 84–85, 89, 97, 112, 134

206

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index sister 31, 114, 131, 137, 153, 158 son 33, 35, 78, 93, 119–120, 168 uncle 29, 35, 89, 98, 128, 162 wife 67, 91, 108, 115 forgotten 32, 84, 98, 101, 120, 134, 186 friendship 15, 23, 114–115, 117, 126, 128, 133, 139, 141, 164–165, 180 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) 49, 54, 74, 119, 129, 160 G.I. Bill 44, 49, 65 see also disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); reintegration programs; veteran policies gender 24, 91, 101, 111–112, 117, 137–138, 140, 144, 146, 152–153, 156, 170, 175, 181–182 see also homosociality macho 35, 89, 149 masculinity 88, 111, 137–138, 140, 175, 182 women’s rights 87, 108 generation 2, 4, 50–51, 54, 62, 67, 88–89, 93, 95–96, 100, 102, 118, 129, 140, 143, 159, 170, 175, 186 Germany 5, 14, 35, 120 Global North 2–3, 6, 10, 15, 24, 41–42, 44, 56, 172, 177 Global South 2–3, 6–7, 10, 15, 24, 41, 43–44, 56–57, 172, 177 goals 4, 9, 15, 31, 76, 82, 93, 103, 107–108, 119, 121, 131, 136, 163, 174, 184 grievance 13, 91–92, 102, 110, 112, 121, 127, 129, 138, 180 Guevara, Che 30, 87, 162 Gulf War 71, 159 health 47, 49, 63, 70–73, 81, 111, 156, 160, 171, 179 mental health 5, 65, 70–72, 81, 89, 116, 132, 144, 155, 167, 174 see also post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)

heroes 46, 52–53, 66, 73, 86–92, 94–95, 102, 108–109, 111–112, 162, 164, 169–170, 175, 179–180, 184, 186 culture of heroes 23, 83, 86–91, 102, 109, 161–164, 175, 180, 182 hierarchy 42, 59, 137, 140, 146, 169, 170, 175, 182 homosociality 23, 117, 130, 138, 140, 142, 181 see also gender honor 7, 42, 77, 83, 93, 104, 111, 132, 160 ideals 10, 44, 49, 83, 87, 103–105, 138, 140, 149–150, 152–153, 162–164, 166, 168, 170, 174–175 identity collective identity 13, 141 group identity 13, 111, 162 identification 2, 10, 14, 54, 85, 91, 104, 106, 121, 163 political identity 3, 13, 23, 82–86, 103–107, 113, 180 signaling 106, 128–132, 163 veteran identity 5, 19–20, 23, 83, 85–87, 90–91, 93–95, 97, 102–103, 105, 107–114, 117, 141, 143, 145, 147–148, 156–157, 161, 168–169, 174–175, 180, 182 traits 6, 83, 86, 91, 95, 110, 112, 180 see also heroes ideology 10, 83, 85–88, 91, 104, 108, 126, 153, 157, 162, 180 independence 2, 5, 15–16, 25–29, 42, 46, 58, 61, 69, 74, 77, 79, 81, 84, 87, 96–98, 120, 124, 136, 139, 145, 152–153, 157 see also liberation injustice 31, 80, 86, 104, 148, 162 insider’s perspective 5–6, 9, 11, 13, 17, 20–21, 24, 83, 177–178 Iraq War 50, 107, 122, 129, 150, 159 Iraqi veterans 50–51, 96, 100, 102, 129 Japan 89

207

Index

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Kent State Massacre 150 Kerry, John 96, 122–123, 187 Koevoet 44–45, 55, 97 Korean War 5, 14, 49 leaders 11, 20, 25, 33, 47–48, 54, 58–59, 61, 76, 86–87, 94, 101–102, 104, 106, 109, 112, 115, 125, 131, 133, 135–136, 140, 142, 146, 153, 163, 165, 168–170, 175, 180 see also politicians legacy 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, 15, 24, 41, 84, 89, 94, 97, 104, 126, 135, 144, 156, 158, 162–163, 173, 178, 181, 184, 186 liberation 2, 29, 31, 46, 62, 74–75, 94, 97, 136, 150, 153 see also independence Liberia 44, 46, 129 life diagrams 18–19, 21, 23, 144, 146, 148, 150, 153–154, 176, 185 life history interviews 1, 6, 9, 15, 17–18, 20–22, 103, 178, 185 long-term perspective 1, 6, 8–9, 15, 17, 72, 80, 103, 138–139, 156, 161, 181, 183, 185 see also longevity longevity 10, 14, 23, 62, 76, 114, 134, 138, 141, 180–181, 186 see also continuity; long-term perspective; time loyalty 90, 108, 124, 134, 136, 138, 166 Lubango (Angola) 30, 54, 70 see also Dungeons M-19 Democratic Alliance (AD/M-19) 16, 49, 87, 115, 123–124, 131, 135, 141, 146–147, 149–150, 170 McCain, John 90 meaning-making 5–6, 10–12, 17–18, 22, 73, 84, 86, 113, 125–126, 183 military service 5, 8, 10, 35, 81, 88–89, 93, 96 morality 3, 67, 84, 86, 88, 90, 111, 115, 147, 152, 169, 175, 180

Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19) 2, 15–17, 26–29, 31–34, 40–41, 47–49, 54–55, 70, 73, 76, 81, 87, 92, 123, 125, 141–142, 146, 163, 179 Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (MAQL) 54 Movimiento Progresistas 87, 123–125, 131, 163 Namibia 2, 15–16, 19–20, 24–31, 40, 44–46, 48, 52–53, 57–58, 61, 64, 66–67, 69, 70, 73–77, 79, 84, 87, 93–95, 97–98, 106, 110, 118, 120, 122–124, 126, 128, 136, 143, 145, 150, 152–153, 157, 173, 178–179, 186 Namibian War of Independence 2, 15–16, 58, 120 narrative 10, 11, 13, 16, 18, 21, 50, 78, 81, 92, 102–103, 110, 125, 144, 156–175, 177, 179, 182, 185 National Defense Force (NDF) 69 nationalism 15, 26, 86–87 Navarro Wolff, Antonio 101, 131, 135 network fellow combatants/ veterans 39, 45, 50, 52, 58–59, 71–72, 74, 76, 85, 99, 101, 104, 106, 109, 111–116, 118, 120, 125–128, 130–133, 137–139, 164, 166, 173–174, 176, 179 fragmentation 23, 125, 130, 133– 134, 136–140, 166 functions 14, 23, 113–114, 118, 125, 131, 138–142, 164–165, 180 shared 4–5, 15, 22–23, 69, 87, 111, 113–114, 121, 126–130, 133, 138–141, 144, 170, 178, 180, 182, 185, 187 social ties 13–14, 23, 102, 114, 118, 126–127, 129, 138–139, 180 see also bonds vehicle for political mobilization 14, 23, 113, 118–125, 166 see also family; partner; reciprocal responsibility Nixon, Richard 35 Nujoma, Sam 25

208

Index

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Oficina Nacional para la Reinserción (National Office for Reintegration) 47 pact 96, 98–101, 106, 110, 112, 139, 146, 153, 155, 160, 167–170, 174, 180, 182 Palace of Justice (Bogotá) 33, 158 parade 51, 88, 96, 132 Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) 54 Partido Verde Colombiano 123 partisan 87, 105, 145, 152 partner 34, 105, 127, 131, 164, 182 see also family; network patronage 16, 42, 114–115, 117, 134, 136, 139, 148, 164–166, 169, 175 see also dependency peace agreement 5, 25–27, 47, 54, 73–76, 79, 100, 123, 133, 160, 176 peace camps 32, 54, 60 peace movement/anti-war movement 118, 120–123, 130, 132, 154, 186 see also anti-war; Vietnam Veterans Against the War peace protagonist 82, 160, 161 peace, making sense of 73–82 pension 6, 41–42, 49, 134 see also retirement the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) 24–25, 28–29, 40, 44, 46–47, 55, 98, 123, 145, 150 Petro, Gustavo 101, 123–125, 131, 148, 152, 163, 187 Pizarro, Carlos 76, 135 political candidates 65, 103, 123, 146, 150, 154, 156, 169, 176, 187 see also politicians political capital 14, 83, 96–97, 110, 183 political mobilization arena 13, 101, 143, 147–149, 152, 161, 170–171, 173, 184 channel 12, 95, 125, 146, 149, 152, 160, 172–173

inflection point 18, 22, 81, 105–106, 143, 144, 187 political activity 12–13, 18, 23, 83, 143–144, 153, 156, 162, 164–166, 176, 181 political interest 12, 17–18, 33, 105, 143–144, 150–151, 154, 158–159 political mobilization, types of paths remobilized 23, 87, 125, 144, 152–157, 159, 162–163, 171–173, 176, 181 removed 23, 144–147, 156–157, 159, 168, 171–173, 175–176, 181–182 resilient 23, 144, 147–152, 156, 159, 162, 166, 172–173, 176, 181 political participation 12–13, 17, 44, 101, 106, 143, 147–148, 152, 154, 160, 172–173 political party 10, 16, 23, 27, 49, 55, 77, 87, 89, 104, 107–108, 115, 118, 121–125, 130–131, 135, 140–141, 145–146, 148–149, 152, 165–166, 169–171, 173, 180 politicians 20, 83, 87, 90, 99–100, 105–106, 109, 111, 125, 135, 144, 160, 163, 165, 167–169, 175, 186–187 see also leaders; political candidates Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) 123–124 Polo Democrático Independiente (PDI) 122, 124 post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 50, 67, 71–72, 82, 89, 93, 159, 167 see also health Progresistas see Movimiento Progresistas protests 7, 16, 28, 32, 46, 54, 64–65, 77, 84, 95–96, 99, 106, 122, 145, 150, 154–155, 159–160, 163, 176 reciprocal responsibility 23, 114, 125, 127, 135, 138–139, 141, 164–166, 170, 175, 181 see also network

209

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index recognition 23, 41–42, 51, 67–68, 72, 82–85, 91–99, 101–103, 106, 108–112, 114, 121, 141, 161, 169, 174, 180, 182 reconciliation 11, 61, 70, 74, 77–79, 81, 146, 183 recruitment 27–28, 31, 33–34, 40–41, 53, 105, 164–166, 175–176, 181 reintegration programs 4, 14–16, 41–47, 52–54, 65–66, 117–118, 120, 134, 168 see also Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR); veteran policies Republican 87, 123, 125, 145, 154 the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) 35–36 respect 51, 52, 59, 76–77, 85, 94–95, 99, 102, 106, 118, 134, 137, 140, 186 retirement 39, 119, 132–133, 156, 168, 171–172 revolution 5, 34, 48, 55, 75–76, 85, 102 Rhodesia 30 see also Zimbabwe Rolling Thunder 155 Russia 86, 102, 129 see also Soviet Union sacrifice 34, 42–43, 51, 81, 84–85, 92, 99, 102, 106, 110, 126, 141, 153, 158–159, 162, 164, 175–176, 184 Sanders, Bernie 156 service 3–4, 8, 10, 35, 40, 51, 81, 83, 86, 88–89, 91, 93, 96–98, 108, 110, 112, 132, 163, 175, 179, 180 see also duty siege of the Dominican Republic’s embassy 146, 158 social housing 118, 121–123, 147 socialism 15, 54, 79, 86–87, 106, 157 South Africa 25, 28–31, 47, 55, 70, 76 the South African Defense Force (SADF) 55 the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) 2, 15–17,

24–25, 27–31, 40, 45–46, 54, 57, 61, 70, 73, 81, 97–98, 101, 104, 118, 120, 123–125, 136 SWAPO party 16, 70, 123–125 the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) 44–45, 55, 97 Soviet Union 26, 29, 146, 157 stigma 48–69, 93, 103 suffering 5–6, 41, 46, 58, 65–68, 71–72, 78, 84, 98, 106, 120, 127, 135–136, 156 sword of Simón Bolívar 158 symbolic 6, 26, 40–41, 52, 59, 109, 111, 130, 141, 150, 155, 158, 161, 174, 182 time future 3, 60, 69, 77, 84, 89, 91, 119, 126–127, 129–131, 138–140, 143, 175, 180, 182, 186–187 past 19, 23, 75, 84–85, 88–92, 103, 116, 125–127, 130–131, 134, 136, 138–139, 141, 158–159, 161, 164, 166, 170, 175, 180–182, 186 present 11, 19, 28, 88, 90, 127, 131, 136, 140, 145, 148, 152, 166, 175, 181, 186 temporal 7–9, 18, 82, 103, 144, 181 see also longevity torture 30, 33, 61, 70, 74, 85, 98, 104, 137, 145, 148, 153, 158 trajectory 8, 17, 19, 21–22, 85, 105, 140, 144 transformation 55, 62–63, 74, 79–81, 103–105, 108–109, 146, 179–180, 184 transition 1, 5–11, 17–19, 21–22, 24, 47, 56–63, 73, 75, 80–81, 178, 183, 185–186 trauma 5, 14, 39, 65, 70, 78, 98, 109, 119, 146, 156, 158, 174–175, 183, 185 Trump, Donald 87 trust 4, 39, 63, 67, 69–71, 74, 77, 81–82, 89, 94, 99–100, 115, 138, 142, 165, 167, 170, 185–186

210

Downloaded from manchesterhive.com © Copyright protected it is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index United Nations (UN) 25–26, 42–44, 46, 54, 120, 153 the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 26, 44 United States 2, 6, 15–17, 19–20, 24, 26–27, 35, 48–50, 52, 58, 69, 74, 78, 94, 110, 116, 118–119, 123, 129, 139, 159, 178–179, 186 universal 22, 24, 72, 79, 102, 120, 129, 156, 180–181, 185 university 32, 134, 146, 150 see also education Uribe, Álvaro 131 values 10, 13, 23, 62, 83, 88, 90, 143, 157, 184 the Veteran Administration (VA) 50, 71 veteran benefits 44–45, 49, 116–117, 160 veteran organization 14, 17, 19, 23, 95, 98, 102, 119–121, 124–125, 132, 150, 152, 155–156, 160–161, 165, 171, 180 veteran policies/programs 4–5, 11, 14–16, 41–50, 52–57, 65–66, 82, 97, 117–118, 120–121, 134–135, 160–161, 168, 172, 174, 178–179, 182–183, 186 see also disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); G.I. Bill; reintegration programs veteran rights 118–121, 153 Vietnam 2, 16, 26–28, 35–40, 62, 64–65, 72, 74, 77–78, 84, 86, 88, 90, 98–99, 106, 154

Vietnam Memorial Wall 93–94, 96, 106, 112, 119, 122, 132–133, 155, 161, 186 Vietnam Veterans against the War 154 Vietnam Veterans of America 19, 95, 102, 118, 165 Vietnam War 2, 16, 26–27, 34, 84, 98, 102, 109, 112, 119, 150, 163 violence 7, 14, 24, 28–30, 34, 39, 43, 50, 51, 53–54, 59, 70, 75–76, 78–79, 82, 86, 88, 90, 93, 95–96, 99, 117, 122, 126, 135, 140, 145–146, 150, 154, 158, 176 voting 10, 12, 65, 76, 90, 94, 123–124, 135, 145–146, 154, 163, 165, 170–171, 176, 182 Washington D.C. 19, 112, 122, 154, 186 Windhoek 28, 80, 135, 153, 186 work see employment World War, First 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 24–25, 43 World War, Second 8, 10, 12, 14, 24–25, 35, 44, 49–50, 72, 88–89, 95, 102, 116, 128, 129 worthy 3, 83, 92, 97, 109, 111, 182 ya Toivo, Herman Andimba Toivo 120 Zambia 29, 31 Zimbabwe 46, 75, 96, 97 see also Rhodesia

211