Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe: Livelihoods, Conservation, War and Covid-19 (Springer Geography) 3031321944, 9783031321948

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Springer Geography

Nedson Pophiwa Joshua Matanzima Kirk Helliker   Editors

Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe Livelihoods, Conservation, War and Covid-19

Springer Geography Advisory Editors Mitja Brilly, Faculty of Civil and Geodetic Engineering, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia Richard A. Davis, Department of Geology, School of Geosciences, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA Nancy Hoalst-Pullen, Department of Geography and Anthropology, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA, USA Michael Leitner, Department of Geography and Anthropology, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA Mark W. Patterson, Department of Geography and Anthropology, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA, USA Márton Veress, Department of Physical Geography, University of West Hungary, Szombathely, Hungary

The Springer Geography series seeks to publish a broad portfolio of scientific books, aiming at researchers, students, and everyone interested in geographical research. The series includes peer-reviewed monographs, edited volumes, textbooks, and conference proceedings. It covers the major topics in geography and geographical sciences including, but not limited to; Economic Geography, Landscape and Urban Planning, Urban Geography, Physical Geography and Environmental Geography. Springer Geography — now indexed in Scopus

Nedson Pophiwa · Joshua Matanzima · Kirk Helliker Editors

Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe Livelihoods, Conservation, War and Covid-19

Editors Nedson Pophiwa Wits School of Governance University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg, South Africa

Joshua Matanzima The University of Queensland Brisbane, QLD, Australia

Kirk Helliker Department of Sociology Rhodes University Makhanda, Eastern Cape, South Africa

ISSN 2194-315X ISSN 2194-3168 (electronic) Springer Geography ISBN 978-3-031-32194-8 ISBN 978-3-031-32195-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This is the seventh book in an ongoing series of books published under the auspices of the Unit of Zimbabwean Studies, Department of Sociology at Rhodes University (South Africa). The first book published is titled The Political Economy of Livelihoods in Contemporary Zimbabwe (2018). Two others appeared in 2021: Fast Track Land Occupations in Zimbabwe—In the Context of the Zvimurenga, and Everyday Crisis-Living in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Two volumes were also published in 2022: Capital Penetration and the Peasantry in Southern and Eastern Africa: Neoliberal Restructuring; and Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe. The sixth book is titled Tonga Livelihoods in Rural Zimbabwe (2023). The Unit was formed in 2015 and seeks to contribute to the development of emerging, early-career, and mid-career Zimbabwean (and other) scholars. Kirk Helliker Research Professor Head, Unit of Zimbabwean Studies

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Contents

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Borders, Borderlands and Borderlanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joshua Matanzima, Kirk Helliker, and Nedson Pophiwa

Part I 2

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Livelihoods of Borderlanders

Accumulation and Livelihoods Strategies of the Hlengwe Peasantry in Mahenye, Along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emmanuel Ndhlovu Benefits of Informal Cross-Border Trade Across the Kariba Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joshua Matanzima and Nedson Pophiwa Land Rights, Displacements, and Rural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe’s South-Eastern Borderlands: The Case of the Chisumbanje Ethanol Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perseverence Madhuku and Joseph Mujere Borders, Boundaries, and Livelihoods in Western and North-Western Zimbabwe, 1890–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Robert K. Hitchcock and Melinda C. Kelly

Part II

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Wildlife, Conservation and War

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Park-People Relationships and Local Community Perceptions on Wildlife Conservation in the Sengwe Area, Chiredzi District . . . . 103 Itai Dhliwayo, Never Muboko, Clayton Mashapa, Chiedza N. Mutanga, and Edson Gandiwa

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Understanding the Complexities of Human Conflict Over Wildlife in Kariba Border Town . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Ivan Marowa and Joshua Matanzima

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Entangled Borderlands: Effects of the 1977–1992 Mozambican Civil War on Border Communities in Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Joshua Chakawa and Owen Mangiza

Part III Borders, COVID-19, and Health 9

Unfolding Realities of Urbanism at the Margins: Beitbridge (Zimbabwe) and Musina (South Africa) Border Towns as a Single Urban Frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Anusa Daimon

10 “Across the Border, You Are Treated Well, They Care”: Patients and Therapeutic (Im)mobilities in the Honde Valley and Zambezi Borderlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 Nicholas Nyachega and Joshua Matanzima 11 The COVID-19 Pandemic and Tourism in Kariba Town . . . . . . . . . . 181 Joshua Matanzima and Tamuka Nhiwatiwa 12 The Health-Seeking Practices of Borderland Communities: The San People of Tsholotsho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Keith Phiri, Thulani Dube, and Sibonokuhle Ndlovu

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Nedson Pophiwa is a senior lecturer in Monitoring and Evaluation at the University of the Witwatersrand’s School of Governance in South Africa. He holds a Ph.D. in Economic History from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His research interests are in governance, public service delivery, cross-border shopping, and informal crossborder trade. Joshua Matanzima is a Research Officer at the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (Sustainable Minerals Institute) at the University of Queensland in Australia. He carries out research on development and mining-induced displacements, anthropology of landscapes, human-wildlife conflicts, social aspects of energy transition, indigenous land-return processes, livelihoods and marginalisation, and borderlands economies. He is co-editor of Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe (2022) and Tonga Livelihoods in Rural Zimbabwe (2023). Kirk Helliker is an Emeritus Research Professor in the Department of Sociology at Rhodes University in South Africa where he also heads the Unit of Zimbabwean Studies. He publishes widely on Zimbabwean history, politics, and society and has supervised a significant number of Ph.D. and Master students. His most recent co-edited books are: Capital Penetration and the Peasantry in Southern and Eastern Africa: Neoliberal Restructuring and Livelihoods of Ethnic Minorities in Rural Zimbabwe (both published in 2022), Tonga Livelihoods in Rural Zimbabwe (2023).

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Contributors Joshua Chakawa Department of Historical Studies, National University of Lesotho, P.O. 180, Roma, Maseru, Lesotho; Maseru, Lesotho Anusa Daimon International Studies Group, University of Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa Itai Dhliwayo Chinhoyi University of Technology, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe Thulani Dube Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Development Studies, Lupane State University, Lupane, Zimbabwe Edson Gandiwa Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, Harare, Zimbabwe Kirk Helliker Department of Sociology, Rhodes University, Makhanda, Eastern Cape, South Africa Robert K. Hitchcock University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA Melinda C. Kelly Kalahari Peoples Fund, Albuquerque, NM, USA Perseverence Madhuku Department of African History, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany Owen Mangiza Department of History, Heritage and International Studies, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe Ivan Marowa Department of History Heritage and Knowledge Systems, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Clayton Mashapa School of Wildlife and Environmental Sciences, Chinhoyi University of Technology, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe Joshua Matanzima Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia Never Muboko School of Wildlife and Environmental Sciences, Chinhoyi University of Technology, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe Joseph Mujere Department of Modern History, University of York, York, UK Chiedza N. Mutanga School of Hospitality and Tourism, Chinhoyi University of Technology, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe Emmanuel Ndhlovu Department of Tourism and Integrated Communication, Vaal University of Technology, Vanderbijlpark, South Africa Sibonokuhle Ndlovu Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Development Studies, Lupane State University, Lupane, Zimbabwe

Editors and Contributors

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Tamuka Nhiwatiwa Department of Biological Sciences and Ecology, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe Nicholas Nyachega Department of History, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA Keith Phiri Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Development Studies, Lupane State University, Lupane, Zimbabwe Nedson Pophiwa Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

Chapter 1

Borders, Borderlands and Borderlanders Joshua Matanzima , Kirk Helliker , and Nedson Pophiwa

Abstract This chapter sets out the analytical and thematic context for the ensuing chapters in this volume on the lived experiences of borderland communities in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe borders five countries in Southern Africa, and the lives and livelihoods of borderland communities (or borderlanders) are central to understanding past and present Zimbabwe. The national borders of Zimbabwe, like all borders, do not fix territorial space in a static and complete way, and the regular cross-border movement of borderlanders demonstrates the porosity of its borders. At the same time, the borders and borderlands of Zimbabwe and the lives of borderlanders are variegated across space and time, and hence the importance of the specific case studies in this volume in illustrating the diverse and dynamic practices existing in Zimbabwe’s borderlands. This volume contributes to the increasing recognition that national borders, as processes, are configured in part through the ongoing practices of borderlanders and, further, that viewing the nation-state ‘from the margins’ offers fresh perspectives on Zimbabwean history and society. The various contributions to this volume, including themes on livelihoods, conservation, war and Covid-19, bring this to the fore. Keywords Borders · Borderlands · Borderlanders · Zimbabwe · Crisis · Livelihoods

J. Matanzima (B) Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia e-mail: [email protected] K. Helliker Department of Sociology, Rhodes University, Makhanda, Eastern Cape, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] N. Pophiwa Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_1

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Introduction A significant amount of literature exists about borders and borderlands in Africa, including with respect to Zimbabwe specifically. However, to date, there is no single publication which brings together a diverse range of scholars researching on Zimbabwe’s national borders and borderlands, as this volume does. There is one earlier pertinent publication, dating back 25 years, which examined Zimbabwe’s borders (excluding the Zambia-Zimbabwe border) (Nkiwane 1997). But, this is now quite dated, particularly given that it relates to the period prior to the emergence of the systemic crisis in Zimbabwe in the early years of this century. This volume, drawing upon the fieldwork-based research of both emerging and established scholars, is primarily about the lives and livelihoods (i.e. lived experiences) of borderland communities in Zimbabwe, and it highlights the relevance of Zimbabwe’s national borders for those residing along borders (i.e. borderlanders). Many of the chapters discuss the different forms of cross-border mobility of borderlanders during times of both war and peace, including before Zimbabwe’s systemic crisis arose. Overall, the book tells stories of survival, hunger, entrepreneurship, conflict, trade, migration, wildlife, smuggling, opportunism, violence and other issues embedded in the everyday lives of borderlanders, as they navigate their lives along Zimbabwe’s national territorial boundaries. This opening chapter frames the following eleven chapters by detailing some of the key conceptual and contextual issues relevant to understanding lives in Zimbabwe’s borderlands. The lives of borderlanders, situated seemingly along the edges or margins of the state and nation (at least spatially), at first sight may not appear central and necessary to understanding Zimbabwe’s political economy. This volume seeks to counter such a claim, and we start off this chapter by highlighting the importance of studying borders and borderlands, in Zimbabwe and elsewhere. We refer to Zimbabwe’s systemic crisis and the recent Covid-19 pandemic lockdowns to illustrate key points in this regard.

Covid-19 and Crisis: Thinking About Zimbabwe’s Borders and Borderlands Topographical metaphors such as the ‘centre-periphery’ tend to distract attention away from national borders and borderlands in Africa and beyond, as if the lifeblood of the nation-state emanates from a centralised seat of state power and flows downwards and outwards, and borders and borderlands are marginal to the configuration and vitality of the national political economy. Undoubtedly, in spatial terms, the presence, power and practices of the state are dispersed unevenly within territorial boundaries, and hubs of economic activity may not exist along national borders. However, the significance of borders and borderlands, as well as the ways in which borderlanders (and others) bring this significance to the fore in and through their daily lives, should not be underestimated. Further, the centrality of national borders

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and the central state’s extended reach into borderlands might intensify during ‘states of exception’ (such as war and conflict). But, the heightened relevance of borderlands often exists on a more continuous, unexceptional and normalised basis. This is evident in the case of the borders and borderlands of Zimbabwe, as demonstrated with reference to the recent Covid-19 lockdowns and what has become known over time as the Zimbabwean Crisis. The Southern African region’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic involved the fortification of national territorial boundaries. In March 2020, Zimbabwe and its neighbours (South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique and Namibia) instituted lockdowns as part of preventive measures to curb and manage the transmission of Covid-19. Like elsewhere, border closures in particular were among the more radical measures introduced to minimise the spread of the virus, especially during the acute and protracted phases of the pandemic. The immediate effect of the closures was a drastic decline in volumes of traffic across designated national crossing points and border posts. One news report, citing the International Organisation for Migration, stated that, before Covid-19, “about 5 500 people from Zimbabwe crossed into Botswana each day, but the number has since dropped to 500 a day” (Mail and Guardian 2021). Simultaneously, though, borderlanders continued to engage in their pre-pandemic cross-border activities (including for trade, health and family reasons) by traversing the border through undesignated crossing points, thus perpetuating the very mobility which states sought to restrict. For instance, those living in Beitbridge (Zimbabwe) along the South African border resorted to crossing the Limpopo River when the official border post closed. Consistent with the reconfiguration of state practices in border-spaces more generally, these pandemic-related closures gave rise to alternative mobilities and even new economic activities seeking to facilitate and ensure cross-border mobility. One such activity during the lockdowns involved the mushrooming of fake Covid-19 PCR certificates. Official certificates were issued by the Zimbabwean government and these became a precondition for being able to formally cross the territorial border once lockdowns were relaxed. The purchase of fake certificates was a less expensive and more viable option for ordinary Zimbabweans, particularly given the latter’s precarious livelihoods. According to one report, syndicates producing fake Covid19 test certificates were operating at most official Zimbabwean border posts. They charged about US$20 for a fake certificate for a traveller wanting to cross into neighbouring countries, as opposed to a genuine one which cost up to US$85 (Independent Online 2020). Cross-border mobility, or the constant movement of bodies across seemingly porous borders, remained a key dimension of the lives of borderlanders and others, which hard territorial lockdowns could not prevent. By way of the lockdowns during this ‘state of exception’, the Zimbabwean state intensified its presence at the official border posts and enacted new control practices or revitalised existing ones in the process. But, its lockdown-based fixation with national borders did not fix the borders. As in the past, through their own sets of fluid daily practices, borderlanders continued to imagine, depict and treat Zimbabwe’s borders as unfixed, by tracing and embedding the lines of the border in their everyday lives. Because of this, the Zimbabwean state alone did not reshape the border during the

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time of Covid-19, as borderlanders were also central to the social reconstruction of border landscapes. Similar processes occur during the long-entrenched Zimbabwean Crisis, which the pandemic only deepened. Writing about the economic and political crisis, which has now become an unexceptional condition of normality in Zimbabwe, Raftopoulos (2009: 202) details its political dimensions: [C]onfrontations over the land and property rights; contestations over the history and meanings of nationalism and citizenship; the emergence of critical civil society groupings campaigning around trade union, human rights and constitutional questions; [and] the restructuring of the state in more authoritarian forms.

Economic collapse is also central to this long-term chronic crisis, including declines in agricultural and industrial production, hyperinflation, informalisation of labour, massive unemployment, commodity supply shortages, and the steady erosion of urban and rural livelihoods (Raftopoulos 2009; Bolt 2011; Musoni 2012; Chiumbu and Musemwa 2012). The crisis pushed many Zimbabweans into migrating permanently (including to South Africa), while a vast number of Zimbabweans have been compelled to enter the informal economy. Opportunistic economics have become the order of the day, including trading illegally in foreign currency and selling scarce commodities on the black market, in what is described as kukiya-kiya (zig-zagging) practices (Jones 2010). Even the Zimbabwean Reserve Bank Governor spoke about the existence of a “casino economy” (Gono 2009). In addition to this, and linked to the pervasive and precarious informal economy activities, cross-border trade in neighbouring countries developed increasingly as a crucial livelihood strategy. In a special edition of the Journal of Southern African Studies, Hammar et al. (2010) discuss the relevance of this for Zimbabwe and its surrounding territories: Flourishing new economies have emerged on Zimbabwe’s borders, serviced by state agents, cadres of transport operators, currency dealers, sex workers, people traffickers, and thieves. Supermarkets, farms and other commercial enterprises in South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and elsewhere have profited from the surge in business and abundant cheap labour as Zimbabweans seek the goods and jobs no longer available in their country. A multitude of new transnational regional links have been created as families, and economic and political networks, now stretch and beyond the region’s borders. (Hammar et al. 2010: 264)

Like the Covid-19 lockdowns, the crisis led to a restructuring of the character of Zimbabwe’s territorial boundaries. While the Zimbabwean state has performed a key role in this, restructuring is not reducible to changes in the state’s presence and practices, as also highlighted with respect to the pandemic. A multiplicity of agents has contributed to what Hammar et al. (2010) describe, including ordinary borderlanders going about their daily lives. In this sense, any reconfiguring of Zimbabwe’s borders and borderlands involves decentralised processes of vernacularisation. The case of Zimbabwe provides a unique perspective as to what happens in times of perpetual crisis, as borders and borderlands take centre-stage in becoming conduits for migration and arbitrage, and cross-border mobility and commerce

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become increasingly important to the lives of borderlanders (and, significantly, for others from the hinterlands of Zimbabwe). This volume does not focus exclusively on the post-2000 crisis (or on the Covid-19 pandemic), though there are chapters about both. Rather, it presents a more diverse array of case studies about Zimbabwe’s borders and borderlands. In doing so, it seeks to show that concentrating on the lives and livelihoods of borderlanders is central— and not peripheral—to an understanding of Zimbabwean history and society.

Borders and Borderlands Defining ‘border’ is not an easy task as it is used widely in a variety of ways in disciplines found in the social sciences, humanities and arts. It refers not only to the bordering of territorial spaces, but also at times to the bordering and containment of human bodies via social identities and other systems of human classification, as in the claim by Goeman (2009: 171) about the “bounded space and bodies constructed during colonialism”, or in what Smith et al. (2015: 259) refer to as “territorialisations of the body”. There are not two totally distinct sets of literature on borders and borderlands (one on space and one on bodies), as analyses of the complex interrelationships between bordered spaces and bordered bodies prevail (Kasstan 2021; Gieseking 2016). In large part, this is influenced by the work of Gloria Anzaldua (1987), leading to ‘border thinking’ and claims about the disruptive possibilities embedded in borderlands (Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006; Tlostanova et al. 2016). Importantly, and consistent with the thoughts in this volume, Anzaldua’s arguments about the liminality of borderlands tend to “recast the relationship between the centre and the margins, and to reverse it ….by making the border – the most marginal space – the centre… This position permits a return to forgotten histories” (Nassar 2021: 31). Even when understood territorially, as a line demarcated in space, ‘border’ remains subject to analytical contestations, including in the case of the territorial-spatial boundaries of the nation-state (i.e. the national borders) which are the focus of this volume. Indeed, there is a burgeoning body of literature which seeks to retheorise borders and their shifting character, including in relation to state power. This has led to a bewildering array of new concepts, such as polymorphic borders (Burridge et al. 2017) and penumbral borders (Passi and Zimmerbauer 2015), and to questions around the topographical or topological constitution of borders and state power (Laine 2016; Allen and Cochrane 2010). It has also resulted in identifying and examining the current ways in which national borders are being shifted externally and internally (along with the presence of the state) in the face of large movements of bodies (refugees) around the world, with “migration control functions … detached from a fixed territorial location” (Shachar and Mahmood 2021: 127). Territorial borders exist at different scalar levels (such as international, national and local) and they involve social, cultural and political demarcations and identifications of places and people (Alvarez 1995), with borders thus generally entailing

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“socio-spatially constructed differences” (van Houtum 2005: 672). There are several alternative terms used to convey the idea of a socio-spatial ‘border’, and these include ‘frontier’, ‘margin’ and ‘boundary’ (Brunet-Jailly 2010; Lossifova 2013). These terms are not necessarily equivalent, and using them interchangeably further complicates the conceptual ambiguity of ‘border’. As well, the same term may have different meanings in different social contexts—for example, in French, a “frontière” is a borderland or border region whereas, in terms of the history of the United States, a “frontier” is imaged as a moving zone of settlement (Brunet-Jailly 2010). This volume uses border in the former and not the latter sense. National borderlines in Africa emerged historically, including through brutal conquest, and they are set arbitrarily in this sense. But they also are often characterised by significant natural-geographical features (e.g. mountain ranges and rivers) which condition local borderland activities (such as livelihoods and mobilities), though these borders are no less arbitrary (Strayer et al. 2003). For example, Muguti (2023), McGregor (2009) and Matanzima and Helliker (2023) have all reported on how the Zambezi River (marking the Zimbabwe-Zambia border) affects the ways in which people interact along the border, both socially and economically. Further, focusing on the ‘agency’ of natural landscapes (or of non-human ‘stuff’) in enabling, constraining and shaping human activities is now prevalent within anthropology in particular, and this has been demonstrated in relation to the agential properties and powers of borders marked by natural features (Abbott et al. 2007; Coplan 2001; Soi and Nugent 2017; Fontein 2006, 2011, 2015; Ingold 1992, 2007). At the same time, ‘stuff’ only condition (rather than strictly determining) human-practices along borders. For example, certain natural features in pre-colonial Africa (mountains and lakes, for example) inhibited human movements, but those residing nearby did not necessarily consider them as impermeable boundaries. The Zambezi River was regarded as a fixed border by colonial settlers; however, indigenous inhabitants who lived along it did not view it as such (Colson 1971; Matanzima 2018; McGregor 2009; Scudder 1962). In this sense, “any border’s delineation is subjective, contrived, negotiated, and contested” (Diener and Hagen 2010: 3). It is now widely acknowledged that, although national borders seem static, ‘they are moving’, to use Pophiwa’s (2006) phrase. As Mol and Law (2005) argue, geographical boundaries, whether at the national level or another scalar level, are never fixed, as they shift and change form as well as become subject to contestations. Baud and Van Schendel (1997: 211) highlight this, and related points, at length: National borders are political constructs, imagined projections of territorial power. Although they appear on maps in deceptively precise forms, they reflect, at least initially, merely the mental images of politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals. Their practical consequences are often quite different. No matter how clearly borders are drawn on official maps, how many customs officials are appointed, or how many watchtowers are built, people will ignore borders whenever it suits them. In doing so they challenge the political status quo of which borders are the ultimate symbol. People also take advantage of borders in ways that are not intended or anticipated by their creators.

In the case of the nation-state, as Baud and Van Schendel (1997) note, the state’s presence along national borders, in terms of the exercise of its sovereign powers, is

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aspirational, fluid and variegated. As a result, at times, national borders (as a line on a map) may be characterised—‘on-the-ground’—more by state absence than by state presence, at least with reference to specific state practices. Theorising about national borders would seem to entail going beyond an institutional conception of the state and recognising its fluid and fluctuating dimension (spatially and temporally) as constituted by state practices (Boone 2012; Painter 2006; Bierschenk and Oliver de Sardan 2014). As well, though the state constructs and reconstructs national boundaries by enacting its powers, it does not act alone. The everyday practices of borderlanders are also performative in actualising and deactivating borders. As they go about their daily lives, borderlanders and others might simply disregard the official borders that separate them, not recognising them as boundaries as such—or, at least, visualising them as lines for crossing and not for dividing. They may develop their own experientially-based understandings of borders and conceptualise boundaries in a matter-of-fact way, acting out their lives on this basis. Perkins and Rumford (2013: 270) thus speak of the “vernacularisation of borders”, highlighting that “bordering [as a process] can exist as a political resource for citizens who are able to both contest nation state bordering practices and institute their own bordering practices”. These everyday border practices are not necessarily subjected to the disciplinary or sovereign power of the state, as they may have diverse relationships to the state’s own practices, including existing as “a locus for the negotiation [with the state] … of spatial claims” (Anjarai 2011: 58). This involves examining borders as ongoing processes (i.e. bordering) which are subject to multiple forms of reconfigurations (Scott 2020). The people who reside near or around borders exist within borderlands (Adejuyigbe 1989). Borderlands (like borders) are now examined in large part from a cross-border or network perspective, whereby borderlands on both sides of a national boundary are considered jointly as constituting a key unit of analysis. However, cross-border interactions between borderlands differ in depth, frequency and intensity. Momoh (1989), for example, distinguishes between maximal, minimal and zero borderlands, respectively, where cross-border ethnic-cultural affinities exist, where such affinities do not exist, and where there are ideological-political tensions across borders. The spatial expansiveness of borderlands declines from maximal to minimal through to zero borderlands. The character of any particular borderland though is not static and changes during times of both war and peace. Additionally, borderlands are not reducible to the lives and livelihoods of borderlanders alone. Inward and outward migrants from afar, as well as cross-border traders from the hinterlands (Moyo 2017), pass through borderlands and across borders. Cross-border migrants, traders and travellers may suffer harassment, hate and discrimination from customs and immigrant officers and borderlanders themselves (Matanzima 2021; Moyo and Nshimbi 2019; Muzvidziwa 2001, 2015). Cross-border practices such as smuggling, taking refuge and seeking asylum, as well as the state’s guarding of borders, would not exist were it not for the dynamics and significance of borderlands (Zartman 2010). As demonstrated in the ensuing chapters, borderlanders extract different types of resources from borders, including

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“immaterial resources such as social relations (across the border)” (Feyissa and Hoehne 2010: 1). At times, the capacity to do this arises because border regions have a certain measure of autonomy from the central state or, more specifically, there is a minimal state presence. This autonomy facilitates the subverting of the state’s crossborder laws and regulations regarding the movement of people and commodities (Raeymaekers 2013; Roitman 2006). As Raeymaekers (2013) writes: Because of their frequent tendency towards transgression – either by ignoring, contesting or subverting state power – border regions also implicitly and explicitly call into question the legitimacy of states and their pretences to control an illusionary cartography of territory and population, and the legitimate use of violence therein. (Raeymaekers 2013: 5)

Everyday border practices and interactions show that state territoriality is never a linear and unproblematic social space, as borderlanders (including migrants and petty traders) and even state agencies and officials in borderlands generate their own sets of discourses, norms and conventions which may co-exist or run contrary to the central state’s sovereign claims over space, bodies and borders (Raeymaekers 2013). It may be tempting to interpret the practices of borderlanders as entailing acts of resistance against the state, but Korf and Raeymaekers (2013: 7) caution us in this respect, as any refusal by borderlanders “to abide by the geographical framings of the nation-state” does not fit neatly into a domination-resistance dualism.

Borders and Borderlands in Africa For colonialists, the African state-borders drawn and consolidated at the Berlin Conference of 1884 served different purposes. Importantly, by demarcating the colonial territories of the European powers, borders were meant to minimise territorial conflicts between European powers. As well, the arbitrary national borders established by colonialists significantly shaped Africa’s post-colonial affairs and futures. For instance, the idea and presence of majority and minority ethnicities in post-colonial states were a result of artificial boundaries that cut across indigenous communities, placing them in different nation-states, where many became minorities numerically and in terms of socio-economic marginalisation (Helliker et al. 2022; Umbanaso and Korieh 2010). The transboundary resource management problems and conflicts prevailing in Africa today also emerged from the boundary-drawing by colonialists (Katerere et al. 2001; Turton et al. 2006). To redress these and other challenges and conflicts, different claimants have proposed the redrawing of colonial boundaries. For instance, perhaps fancifully, the Tonga of Zimbabwe previously thought of blowing up the Kariba Dam so that they could reunite more easily with their Zambian kinspeople (McGregor 2009). Likewise, there have been long-standing secessionist movements within Zimbabwe, mainly based in Matabeleland. Instead thought of redrawing national borders, so that these are more

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consistent with the “demographic and ethnographic structure of the continent” (Herbst 1989: 673), post-colonial African states have maintained them. There is significant literature on borders and borderlands in Africa covering diverse themes (Abbott et al. 2007; Kork and Raeymaekers 2013; Lesser and MoiséLeeman 2009; Moyo 2022; Muguti 2023; Musoni 2012, 2020; Laine et al. 2020; Soi and Nugent 2017). The abundance of research on Africa’s borderlands over the past decade in part reflects their centrality in regional systems of trade and the proliferation and growth of border settlements (Soi and Nugent 2017). African scholars are preoccupied with understanding the convoluted histories and shifting complexities surrounding current borders and borderlands on the continent, concentrating on topical issues such as war, climate change (under) development, violence, epidemics and displacements. The entanglement between (under) development, borders and borderlands is a notable theme (Husken 2017; Korf and Raeymaekers 2013; Muguti 2023; Nshimbi and Moyo 2017). Communities in borderlands may in fact facilitate development in their own peculiar ways: through, for example, actively engaging in cross-border trade via smuggling. Though these activities are labelled as illegal, they contribute immensely to localised borderland economies and even supply commodities to hinterland communities. A general survey of sub-Saharan Africa indicates that informal cross-border trade constitutes an important part of developing economies (Lesser and Moisé-Leeman 2009). At the same time, corporation- and state-driven infrastructural development in borderlands, including large-scale development projects, internally displace communities, a feature of African borderlands from colonial days. Under colonialism, as borderlands’ infrastructure (such as bridges, railroads and waterways) was constructed connecting one region to the other and also one country to the other, borderlanders were subjected to forced removals. This is the case with the Tonga of Zimbabwe and Zambia, who were displaced by the construction of the Victoria Falls Bridge and Kariba Dam Wall (McGregor 2003, 2009; Matanzima and Saidi 2020). Research shows that such internal displacements have grave socio-economic consequences: socially, families, kinship networks and communities disintegrate; and, economically, livelihoods and sources of income are undercut. Out-migration following resettlement, whether to towns or other rural areas, results in desperate searches for alternative ways of living (Matanzima 2022). War and conflict are central to literature on borders in Africa. It is quite common for borderlanders in particular to be victims of wars occurring in adjoining countries, with processes of diffusion of civil wars rampant between the period from 1989 to 2010 (Ansorg 2014). Such wars, at least in part, are a colonial legacy and remain linked to ongoing processes of nation-building on the continent. The frequent inability of the state to effectively protect borderlanders and contain these spill-over effects results in borderland spaces becoming unsafe spaces which, in turn, undercuts the prospects for socio-economic development. Additionally, and linked to this, there are numerous studies about refugees crossing national borders throughout the continent (Blavo 1999; Dedering 2006), and these address complex questions about who is crossing borders, and how and why. Such studies indicate that those suffering persecution (mainly minorities and vulnerable

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people such as women and children) traverse borders in search of peace, security and protection in neighbouring countries or even overseas. The existence of refugees is understandable given the following: The post-independence era is marred by conflicts emanating from ethnic upheavals suppressed during colonial rule, border disputes over artificial boundaries created during the partitioning of the continent, confrontations between opposing political parties, and human rights abuses. (Blavo 1999: 1)

Within the literature on refugees, borderscapes are identified as sources of origin, liminal spaces and refugee destinations (Laine 2018). In many cases, the relevant jurisdictions securitise their national borders in different ways to minimise the refugee ‘problem’ (Zaragoza-Cristiani 2017). Refugee camps in most parts of the world (including Africa) are located in borderland regions (Dedering 2006; Merkx 2002) largely because, when refugees enter a neighbouring country, they first settle in its borderlands. They normally want to maintain close contact with their home country, and thus, the borderlands of a destination country become convenient. As well, sometimes refugees avoid settling in the hinterlands of refuge nations where they may experience hate, racism and xenophobia from their hosts. Connected to the movement of refugees and other travellers is the challenge of epidemics. Movements of people across borders for whatever reason tend to intensify the transmission of diseases and corresponding morbidities and mortalities, with the Covid-19 virus exemplifying this (Chutel and Dahir 2020; Moyo 2022; Renzaho 2020). As well, cross-border cholera outbreaks are a major public health problem in sub-Saharan Africa contributing to the high annual reported cholera cases and associated deaths. These outbreaks affect all categories of people and are difficult to prevent and control, as demonstrated in the past in the case of cross-border cholera outbreaks in eastern and southern Africa, including at the Uganda-Democratic Republic of Congo and Malawi-Mozambique borders (Bwire et al. 2016; Naidoo and Patric 2002). However, not only humans are affected by these diseases, as animals are as well, including the spread of trypanosomiasis in sub-Saharan Africa as animals from different countries come into contact with each other along porous borders (Namangala and Odongo 2014). Another related theme widely studied is the securitisation of borders in Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018; Magidimisha et al. 2018; Muguti 2023; Nshimbi et al. 2018). There are many reasons why borders (and migration) become entangled in processes of securitisation. Historically, states have securitised because of the fear of terrorist attacks or armed conflict in the region spilling over their border, as well as to curtail the proliferation of illegal cross-border activities including human trafficking (Adepoju 2005). In many instances, states also limit the sheer volume of immigrants and refugees (fleeing their country of origin for economic or political reasons) to minimise pressure on infrastructural and service provision for an expanding and deprived home population. In recent years, as a result of Covid-19, states enforced stricter border controls across Africa and elsewhere as a form of securitisation, as discussed earlier (Kirk and McDonald 2021; Liu and Bennett 2020).

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Finally, scholars have also flagged inter-nation conflicts over boundaries as central to security concerns (Muguti 2023; Oduntan 2015; Okumu 2010). Most national boundaries in Africa have been at some time sites of contestations in different ways, highlighting their significance for constructing and defending state sovereignty (Raeymaekers 2013). Escalating transboundary resource disputes is a longitudinal legacy of colonial boundary-making errors (as indicated earlier), undefined and unmarked borders, and deficient or absent border management (Okumu 2010: 279). Conflicts over national borders between states affect borderland communities significantly, with borderlanders at risk of threats (including smuggling, people trafficking and military skirmishes) associated with these state-boundary conflicts. Rising nationalism and environmental pressures means that the range of disputes is likely to expand. Currently, there are scores of active border disputes existing across the continent. Oduntan (2015) provides a catalogue of boundary conflicts on the African continent, including conflict over the Ilemi Triangle between Sudan and Kenya, and land and maritime disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria. Southern Africa has its own set of disputes as well. For instance, the contestation between Namibia and South Africa over the Orange River is one of the oldest boundary disputes in the world.

Zimbabwe’s Borders, Borderlands and Borderlanders Current movements, exchanges and interactions across Zimbabwe’s borders and through its borderlands are not new phenomena, as colonial history shows. We make no attempt to offer a temporal overview of these colonial cross-border mobilities, but cite only a couple of key moments. For example, the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in the late 1800s led to a regional labour recruitment frontier that spanned as far afield as the territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) and cut through colonial Zimbabwe. The ensuing development of settler mining and agriculture in colonial Zimbabwe intensified the regional competition for migrant labour, with Mozambique and Malawi supplying a significant portion of labour for white farms and other parts of the settler economy (Daimon 2022; Groves 2020; Nyachega and Sagonda 2022; Helliker et al. 2021a). In addition to cross-border studies, important borderland studies also exist, including along the Zambian border (McGregor 2009) and the Mozambican border (Dube 2020; MacGonagle 2007). The immediate post-independence period (in the 1980s) witnessed many Zimbabweans beginning to participate in cross-border movements for informal trade in neighbouring countries. In particular, the minimal opportunities for women to participate in the emerging post-colonial formal economy partly led to the rise in crossborder trade and shopping in countries just beyond Zimbabwe’s borders. As Cheater (1998: 202) notes:

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J. Matanzima et al. Informal cross-border trade (initially to Botswana and more recently to South Africa) dates from the mid-1980s and is firmly in female hands. It is part of a larger, composite network of women traders in the region, but is not, apparently, linked to male-dominated crossborder smuggling of restricted or prohibited goods, including ivory, rhino horns, gemstones, weapons, stolen luxury vehicles and drugs. (Cheater 1998: 202)

Gaidzanwa (1998) likewise refers to the increased participation of women in crossborder activities and highlights that the trade routes which these women initiated in the 1980s sowed the seeds for future cross-border trade and migration to adjoining countries. In the following decade, in the context of a globally-imposed structural adjustment programme from the early 1990s, Zimbabwe’s borderlands began to witness dramatic increases in mobility and exchange. Certainly, though, the post-2000 crisis led to a far greater proliferation in borderland economic activities as Zimbabweans crossed borders regularly (including daily) to take advantage of arbitrage and other crossborder economic activities (Pophiwa 2018). However, it was not just borderlanders who intensified their cross-border activities, as others who lived far from borders did as well, including those in the capital city of Harare. Borders and borderlands as fields of study are well established in Zimbabwean scholarly work (Araia 2009; Matanzima 2021; Matanzima and Marowa 2023; Muguti 2023; McGregor 2009; Moyo 2016; Mutopo 2010; Msindo and Nyachega 2019; Kachena and Spiegel 2019; Pophiwa 2010, 2017). Anthropologists, sociologists, developmentalists and historians among others have written about Zimbabwe’s five borders with its neighbouring countries (i.e. Zambia, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana), drawing from and leaning on different theoretical framings and methodologies. In pursuing this, certain border regions have received wider attention than others. In particular, the Zimbabwe-South Africa border has been a major focus of study compared to any other border, if only because South Africa has been a recipient of large numbers of Zimbabwean illegal immigrants, traders and asylum seekers (Araia 2009; Kriger 2010; Laher 2010; Moyo 2016; Tshabalala 2019). Furthermore, the Zimbabwe-South Africa border post in Beitbridge and the Harare-Beitbridge highway are the busiest in southern Africa. A number of important studies have also focused on, for both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe, borderlands along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border (Daimon 2016; Lubkeman 2000; Pophiwa 2010; Duri 2010; Nyachega 2017; Nyachega and Sagonda 2022; Spiegel et al. 2022). There is very minimal literature on the Namibia-Zimbabwe border, which is exceedingly short in length. A multiplicity of themes has been covered in the Zimbabwean literature. This includes literature on war, and specifically Zimbabwe’s borders during the liberation war in the 1970s, another key moment in cross-border mobility in the colonial era. Here, scholars focus on the volatility of borderlands as battlegrounds, guerrilla recruitment regions and areas where guerrillas obtained support from peasant villagers, including being offered food and temporary shelter on route to bases in and out of adjoining countries—notably Zambia (Alexander and McGregor 2004; Matanzima 2018, 2022; McGregor 2009) and Mozambique (Chakawa 2021;

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Nyachega 2017; West 2003). However, Nyachega (2017) and Msindo and Nyachega (2019) also show the other side of the coin by highlighting the everyday life of borderlanders in Honde Valley and the ways in which they persevered despite their sufferings. The war resulted in short- and long-term consequences, including the displacement of borderland communities (Matanzima 2022). Later (post-1980), episodes of war and violence in Zimbabwe, notably the FRELIMO-RENAMO Civil War in Mozambique, also show their turbulent effects on borderlanders. Deaths, injuries and prolonged illegalities are the orders of the day in borderlands during such crises, including rape of women and girls, human-smuggling and drug trafficking. Research has shown that, more often than not, it is the state’s security forces (such as the army, police and central intelligence) which are implicated in these illegalities in Africa in general, thereby normalising state illegalities (Husken 2017; Matanzima 2021; McGregor 2008): ‘Illegalities become licit,’ to use Janet Roitman’s (2006) phrase. Another strand of the borderlands literature on Zimbabwe focuses on crossborder trade and smuggling along the: Zimbabwe-Zambia border (Matanzima 2021; McGregor 2008); Zimbabwe-Mozambique border (Daimon 2016; Pophiwa 2010; Duri 2010; Mutsagondo et al. 2016); Zimbabwe-South Africa border (Moyo 2017); and Zimbabwe-Botswana border (Moyo 2017). Other scholars have written on the same topic without focusing on a single border interface (Chani 2008; Chiliya et al. 2012; Peberdy 2000). The historical development of state regulation of cross-border trade has been documented as well (Bamu 2017; Mlambo 2017). These aforementioned studies concentrate on borderland communities specifically, but there is also growing literature on cross-border trade and smuggling by people living in the hinterlands of Zimbabwe such as in Masvingo (Muzvidziwa 2001, 2015) and Gweru (Chikanda and Tawodzera 2017; Manjokoto and Ranga 2017). Cross-border trade engaged in by those who occupy the borderlands is complex and variegated, as shown in this volume. Though communities in the borderlands and hinterlands of Zimbabwe may benefit differently from cross-border trade, studies show that it reduces poverty, provides employment for both men and women, and ensures a supply of commodities unavailable or in short supply in Zimbabwe. Further, it empowers female traders who reside in deeply patriarchal communities (Chani 2008; Chiliya et al. 2012; Daimon 2016; Dzingirai et al. 2021; Matanzima 2021; Matanzima and Marowa 2023; McGregor 2008). Ultimately, as studies of crisis-ridden Zimbabwe show, cross-border trade (including smuggling) is a survivalist strategy for borderlanders residing in a country bedevilled by cash crises, food shortages, and high inflation and unemployment rates (Gukurume 2018; Matanzima and Saidi 2022). While state regulations and security forces regard these activities as, in large part, informal and illegal, some studies argue against the blanket use of the term ‘smuggling’ to define cross-border trade as it criminalises livelihoods (Pophiwa 2017). Besides socio-economic benefits from cross-border trade for borderlanders, there may be other sources of benefits such as tourism, as is the case with regard to the Zambian border, in particular because of the presence of the internationally-acclaimed Victoria Falls. In these same spaces, human-wildlife conflict is a common occurrence as wild animals are in proximity with human settlements (Jani 2022; Matanzima et al. 2022;

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Matanzima and Marowa 2022). Indeed, borderland communities in Zimbabwe are considered as hotspots of human-wildlife conflicts, in part because most protected areas are located within borderlands. Examples include Matusadonha National Parks and Chizarira Safari area (Zimbabwe-Zambia border), and Gonarezhou and Save National Parks (Zimbabwe-South Africa border). In these regions, national parks’ authorities often enter into conflict with communities in relation to the protection and management of wildlife. Communities are regarded as poachers by the parks’ authorities; in turn, communities are frustrated and express anger against authorities as they feel that the latter prioritise animals more than them. Normally, animals are not put to death even if they attack humans, causing injuries and deaths. In response to this, communities engage in retaliatory killings of wildlife (Gandiwa et al. 2013; Marowa et al. 2021; Matanzima et al. 2022; Matseketsa et al. 2019). Finally, there are studies focusing on the migration of Zimbabweans to other countries including, but not limited to, South Africa, Botswana and the United Kingdom (McGregor 2007; McGregor and Pasura 2010; Tombindo and Gukurume 2021; Crush and Tevera 2010). The major driver of this mass exodus has been the crisis in Zimbabwe experienced since the turn of the century, brought upon in the main by the state’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) (Helliker et al. 2021a, 2021b). Trends show that those who have migrated the most are those living in the borderlands, as it is easier and more convenient for them to cross the border with or without travelling documents.

Volume Outline All the ensuing eleven chapters in this volume focus on Zimbabwe’s borders, borderlands and borderlanders. There are two points worth noting in this regard. First, there is some unevenness in terms of the coverage of each of Zimbabwe’s five borders. Eight of the chapters focus on the borders with Mozambique and Zambia, and there is no chapter on the tiny Zimbabwe-Namibia border. There is only one chapter on the border which receives by far the most attention in the prevailing literature, namely the Zimbabwe-South Africa border. There are two chapters on the ZimbabweBotswana border. This unevenness simply reflects the availability of contributors for this volume. Second, in this opening chapter, we have emphasised the cross-border movement of borderlanders in Zimbabwe (and elsewhere). Most of the chapters in this volume (seven) highlight the diverse forms of cross-border movement taking place, both in and out of Zimbabwe, and thus the connections existing between cross-border borderlands. Four of the chapters though focus on dimensions of the lived experiences of borderland communities which relate to their location along a national border of Zimbabwe, without the need for any significant consideration of cross-border mobilities or (im)mobilities. The book is divided into three parts. The first part is about the Livelihoods of Borderlanders and has four chapters. In Chap. 2, Ndhlovu examines Hlengwe households in Mahenye in south-eastern Zimbabwe along the Mozambican border, where

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they own large herds and flocks of livestock and enjoy diverse livelihood strategies. Available studies link this relative wealth and livelihood strategies to the households’ proximity to the Gonarezhou National Park and the Save River which boost tourism activities in the area and from which they also harvest plentiful natural resources illegally. Studies which explore how the Hlengwe utilise their strategic location along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border as an accumulation and livelihoods strategy are lacking. This chapter shows that, in responding to the unfolding broad-based socio-economic and political crisis which Zimbabwe is currently experiencing, the borderlanders of Mahenye have adopted diverse accumulation and livelihoods strategies, most of which entail cross-border networks and are influenced by their border proximity. The chapter shows that cross-border movements boost livestock and crop production, seasonal employment and trade opportunities for the Hlengwe in Mahenye. It would seem, therefore, that the Hlengwe in Mahenye have harnessed and mastered their geographical location and relations to boost their accumulation regimes and also sustain their livelihood strategies. In Chap. 3, Matanzima and Pophiwa examine informal cross-border trading along the Zambian border. Over the years, informal trading has been an important livelihood option in Zimbabwe, particularly given the worsening economic problems such as chronic unemployment, high inflation rates and cash shortages. In this context, this chapter examines the importance of cross-border trade as a livelihood strategy in the border town of Kariba, near the Zambian border. Kariba traders cross the border almost daily with assorted products to sell in the nearby town of Siavonga (Zambia), and they often also return with commodities in short supply in Zimbabwe, to sell or consume in Kariba. Social networks are crucial to the activities of these traders, including networks among themselves, with border post officials, and with Zambians in Siavonga. These networks facilitate their cross-border trade while also minimising possible challenges, including market access. Though cross-border trade is not a highly profitable venture for Kariba traders, it does have key benefits in terms of reducing levels of poverty and enhancing household consumption. In Chap. 4, Madhuku and Mujere examine the displacement of peasant communities by the Chisumbanje ethanol project in Chipinge district in eastern Zimbabwe, which triggered controversies on whether the Zimbabwean government was sincere in implementing a pro-peasant land reform programme. It also generated debates about the impact of large-scale land investment projects on rural livelihoods in the country, including for seemingly tenure-secure communal area villagers. Conflicts were generated by the displacement of peasants from their ancestral lands to pave way for this large-scale ethanol land investment project. The chapter discusses the many and varied ways marginalised communities in the south-eastern borderlands have experienced state-regulated land displacements. Overall, it highlights the dual and simultaneous challenges of borderland communities—being marginalised as borderland communities and being displaced to pave way for a large-scale land project. However, it also brings to the fore the agency of the Chisumbanje villagers regarding their responses to displacement. The responses of affected villagers were largely framed by the fact that, as borderland communities, they had historical and

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kinship cross-border ties they could use to migrate across the border temporarily or even possibly find new forms of livelihoods on the other side of the border. In Chap. 5, Hitchcock and Kelly focus on the Botswana-Zimbabwe border historically. They argue that, far from being open borders, including under globalisation, the borders of Zimbabwe have become increasingly defined over time. This is true in the case of the Botswana-Zimbabwe border of western and north-western Zimbabwe, which has seen a transformation from a relatively porous frontier zone in the late nineteenth century to one that is now witnessing new border posts and border fences being established to control international movements of people and goods. This border zone between Zimbabwe and Botswana has long been an arena of complex social interactions among a variety of different socio-political groups, including hunter-gatherers, agropastoralists, small-scale agriculturalists, commercial farmers and livestock producers. Focusing on the area stretching from Plumtree in the south to Victoria Falls in the north, this chapter examines the issues of group boundaries, territorial borders and livelihoods of Tshwa San, Kalanga, Nambya, Ndebele, white farmers and others during the period from 1890 to 2021. Various groups have competed for grazing, livestock, cattle posts, high value resources including timber and minerals, and people who they could exploit for their labour. Part II has three chapters and discusses borderlanders in relation to Wildlife, Conservation and War. In Chap. 6, Dhliwayo, Muboko, Mashapa, Mutanga and Gandiwa assess park-people relationships and local community perceptions regarding wildlife conservation in the Sengwe area, a community within the Great Limpopo Trans Frontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA), in Chiredzi District, near the Mozambican border in southeast Zimbabwe. The study identifies and examines the existence of perceived and actual conflicts between local communities and conservation (protected) area management, with these conflicts mostly arising from an unshared vision of protected areas and lack of effective community engagement in conservation projects. Most Sengwe villagers report that they were denied access to, and control of, local resources and were sidelined from wildlife projects, including employment opportunities and tourism promotion. This was also the case with the state-driven Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) projects. Villagers thus believe that the land in the protected area should be for agricultural production as land-based wildlife conservation is failing to enhance their livelihoods. Lack of participation is a key concern resulting in the local community having negative perceptions towards wildlife conservation, and this has caused encroachment of people into the park. In Chap. 7, Marowa and Matanzima concentrate on tourism in Kariba near Zambia. For many decades now, dating back to colonial times, Kariba border town has been a tourist destination, including for international visitors, with the Kariba dam waterscape and wildlife central to Kariba’s attraction. This has come at a cost in terms of a widening range of wildlife-human conflicts and human conflicts around wildlife. This chapter discusses the complex human conflicts over wildlife occurring in and around the game parks and corridors of the border town of Kariba. These conflicts around wildlife take on a multiplicity of shifting forms, sometimes involving squabbles between different categories of Kariba residents, and sometimes involving tension

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between state authorities and residents, including residents as poachers or illegal meat traders. They are grounded as well in different discursive constructions of wildlife and in different value orientations towards nature conservation, with diverging material interests and lifestyles contributing to configuring these discourses and orientations. In the end, if left unresolved, these conflicts are disadvantageous to both humans and wildlife, and undercut the long-term prospects of animal conservation in the Kariba area. In Chap. 8, Chakawa and Mangiza highlight that borders and borderlands occupy a contested space in the shared history of Mozambique and Zimbabwe because they are central to an understanding of everyday lives, mobility, conflict and resistance. Their chapter seeks to understand the ways in which borderland communities in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique were affected by the 1977–1992 Mozambican Civil War and how they also reconfigured the borderlands during the long years of strife. The specific focus is on communities in the Chipinge, Chiredzi, Chimanimani, Mutare and Nyanga areas of Zimbabwe as well as specific communities in Mozambique. Findings show that the Mozambique Civil War left traumatic marks on borderland communities, with tales of unbearable violence and atrocities. What is particularly striking, as part of a longer history of the border, is the ongoing movement across the border during the war, in both directions, by both armed fighters and civilians. The traversing of the border during times of both peace and war speaks to the entangled and mobile lives of borderland communities. Part III has four chapters and examines Borders, Covid-19 and Health. In Chap. 9, Daimon offers an analysis of the Zimbabwe-South Africa border. Though separated by a perennial Limpopo River and a busy border post, the towns of Beitbridge (Zimbabwe) and Musina (South Africa) have grown to become a single urban frontier, sharing cross-cutting socio-cultural and economic paraphernalia and synergies. Operating in artificial hybrid (transition) spaces (borderlands), which are largely neglected as fragment zones on the margins of nation-state, residents of both towns have reacted to their marginality through the production of alternative meanings and narratives as dictated by their border spatial circumstances and their natural and selective convictions of border artificiality, exploiting various spaces of agentic possibilities, power and resources within the borderlands. They share diverse influences, with the affluent Musina in South Africa largely becoming the provider of numerous goods and services to the poorer Beitbridge in Zimbabwe. In the process, Musina has turned into a sort of Central Business District and industrial zone, with Beitbridge being the periphery of the border cityscape, heavily reliant on the centre while simultaneously detached from the general national decay in Zimbabwe. These unfolding realities of urbanism at the geographical margins, particularly in the case of the Zimbabwe-South Africa border, have not been explicitly captured in regional border and borderland historiographies. In Chap. 10, Nyachega and Matanzima consider the question of health care and, in doing so, they examine both the Zambian and Mozambican borders. Patients cross various kinds of physical, socio-economic and political borders in their quest for health therapy. In southern Africa, patients’ therapeutic mobilities and (im)mobilities have become an important part of people’s social histories. This chapter contributes to

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debates on health and healing practices in southern Africa by examining the changing patterns of therapeutic (im)mobilities and choices in Zimbabwe’s borderlands. By using two case studies of the Honde and Zambezi valleys (along the Mozambican and Zambian borders, respectively), it considers the continuities and reversals in the patterns of cross-border access to health care. While Zimbabwe has historically received more patients from neighbouring Zambia and Mozambique compared to Zimbabweans seeking health care in these two countries, this pattern has changed over time. A significant number of Zimbabweans are now seeking healthcare services in adjacent countries mainly due to the country’s deteriorating economic and political circumstances that affect healthcare service deliveries. In the Honde and Zambezi valleys, quests for healing, therapeutic choices and (im)mobilities are configured by diverse social, economic and cultural processes, including kinship networks and the character and cost of health services in the region. In Chap. 11, Matanzima and Nhiwatiwa discuss tourism in Kariba in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic undeniably impacted tourism across the globe but not in a monolithic and undifferentiated way. In examining pandemic-related shutdowns, curfews and other lockdown measures, this chapter thus demonstrates the specificities of tourism-impacts with reference to the border town of Kariba. It does so by delving into the problematic image of Kariba as a tourist destination, the downsized operations of tourism businesses such as hotels and lodges, and the troubled lives of curio vendors and tourism employees. The tourism crisis arising from the pandemic became embedded in the long-standing crises characterising the political economy of Zimbabwe, serving to deepen the precarity of a diverse range of tourism stakeholders in Kariba. Considering the pervasive and systemic character of the socio-economic and political crises in Zimbabwe, the chapter shows that it will prove difficult for the tourism stakeholders in Kariba to recuperate from the negative effects of the pandemic. This is especially the case given that the Zimbabwean government has not engaged in any serious project to revive Kariba as a premier tourist destination, concentrating rather on Victoria Falls. In the final chapter (Chap. 12), Phiri, Dube and Ndlovu examine the San population of Tsholotsho as a borderland community (along the Botswana border) and their health seeking practices. The San have been subjected to historical marginalisation and they are currently largely ignored by the Zimbabwean government in relation to creating a conducive environment for them to access health services. The San are thus beset by a plethora of challenges which affect their health seeking behaviour. In the face of various diseases like diarrhoea, tuberculosis and HIV, they are not receiving the medical attention they expect from the government. The hindrances include long distances to clinics, lack of transport (ambulances), inadequate medical personnel, unavailability of medication and unaffordable medical fees. At times, the San feel that they are overtly discriminated against by the government and neighbouring ethnic groups, namely the Kalanga and Ndebele. On account of this, they might resort to traditional medicines and herbalists to deal with their diseases and ailments, or rely upon churches to obtain healing. The San people argue that they want an improved and strengthened healthcare system which is closer to their villages, and they highlight the need to have more health staff, equipment and transport for effective health service delivery.

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Part I

Livelihoods of Borderlanders

Chapter 2

Accumulation and Livelihoods Strategies of the Hlengwe Peasantry in Mahenye, Along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique Border Emmanuel Ndhlovu Abstract The majority of Hlengwe households in Mahenye in south-eastern Zimbabwe along the Mozambican border own large herds and flocks of livestock, and they also enjoy diverse livelihood strategies. Available studies link this wealth and livelihood strategies to the people’s proximity to the Gonarezhou National Park and the Save River which boost tourism activities in the area and from which they also harvest plentiful natural resources illegally. Studies which explore how the Hlengwe utilise their strategic location along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border as an accumulation and livelihoods strategy are lacking. This chapter shows that, in responding to the unfolding broad-based socio-economic and political crisis which Zimbabwe is currently experiencing, the borderlanders of Mahenye have adopted diverse accumulation and livelihoods strategies, most of which entail cross-border networks and are influenced by their close proximity to the border. Utilising an ethnography methodology augmented by a review of secondary sources, it shows that cross-border movements boost livestock and crop production, seasonal employment, and trade opportunities for the Hlengwe in Mahenye. It would seem, therefore, that the Hlengwe in Mahenye have harnessed and mastered their geographical location and relations to boost their accumulation regimes and also sustain their livelihood strategies. Keywords Accumulation · Borderlands · Hlengwe · Livelihoods · Peasantry · Zimbabwe

Introduction The literature on the peasantry in Zimbabwe has blind spots in relation to how peasants in borderlands pursue and diversify their livelihood strategies. Despite the peasantry featuring in land reform literature and also receiving recognition and support E. Ndhlovu (B) Department of Tourism and Integrated Communication, Vaal University of Technology, Vanderbijlpark, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_2

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by the Zimbabwean state culminating in significant land redistribution from the year 2000, available literature is lacking when it comes to the interrogation of peasant accumulation and livelihoods strategies in borderlands, particularly in the context of the current broad-based economic crisis in Zimbabwe. The crisis is roughly linked to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of the 2000s—a land redistribution programme in which about 15 million hectares of land, which were in the hands of about only 6,000 whites in 1980, by 2009 had been in large part redistributed to more than 150,000 peasant households under the A1 (small-scale farming) model, as well as establishing A2 medium-size capitalist farms (Moyo 2011). The FTLRP triggered capital flight, plummeting agricultural production, waning investor confidence, international boycotts, deepening unemployment, and declining livelihoods opportunities (Mhlanga and Ndhlovu 2021). The programme was accompanied by basic commodity price hikes (Bird and Shepherd 2003) and a hyperinflation rate that soared from 32% in 1998 to 1,600% by 2007 (Samaita 2019). Zimbabwe has not been able to meaningfully recover from the crisis since then. When analysed from the International Poverty Line of US$1.90 per person per day by 2011, about 72.3% of the population was classified as poor (Mhlanga and Ndhlovu 2021). This number increased slightly to 74% in 2018 (World Bank 2019) and approached 84% at the end of 2019 (Quinn 2019). The number of people who are categorised as living under extreme poverty, i.e. those who are very far away from the poverty line, also increased from 29% in 2018 to 34% in 2019 (World Bank 2019). About 47% of the population is reported to be undernourished, resulting in human migration as Zimbabweans try to escape hunger and underdevelopment (World Food Programme 2019). The crisis has disrupted livelihood activities across nearly all social classes, fractions of classes, and sub-classes in the country. The response mechanisms to the major livelihoods shocks post-2000 have been diverse: increased cross-border mobility, small-scale farming and gardening, abandonment of meagrely paid jobs in pursuit of re-peasantisation, illegal mining, poaching, and petty commodity informal trade, among others (Chaumba 2006; Chaumba et al. 2003; Ndhlovu 2020a). However, while this has obtained at the national level, communities located close to international borders, some of which did not even receive land under the FTLRP, operated differently—socially and economically—from urban areas and their surrounding hinterlands. One such borderland has been Mahenye in south-eastern Zimbabwe where the country shares a border with Mozambique. This chapter explores the peasant accumulation and livelihoods strategies of the Hlengwe people in Mahenye along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique borderland. It is based on an ethnography methodology augmented by a review of secondary sources. The utilised secondary sources were obtained from both academic and grey literature databases, using borderlands economies, borderlands livelihoods, borderlands accumulation strategies, and cross-border mobility as key search terms. The chapter begins with a brief history of the Mahenye border as well as various perspectives on borders and borderlands. This is followed by a discussion about the emergence of borders and borderlands, including their trends and realities, in Africa. After a description of the Mahenye communal area as the borderland case study, the chapter

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then examines the accumulation and livelihood strategies of the Hlengwe people in this borderland.

The Mahenye Border and Borderland The Mahenye community is located at the southern tip of Chipinge District in Manicaland Province which is bordered by Gonarezhou National Park to the south-west. To the east, it shares a border with Mozambique, and nearby communities across the Mozambican border include Zambareja. In the last population census of 2012, Mahenye had a total population of 3,671 people with 707 households (Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency 2012), mainly Hlengwe people. Mahenye is in Region V according to the agro-ecological classifications of Zimbabwe, such that the area is characterised by low rainfall, poor soils with low agricultural potential, and high temperatures (Mugandani et al. 2012), entailing a tropical savannah climate. The average monthly maximum temperatures are 25.9 °C in July and 36 °C in January while minimum temperatures range between 9 °C in June and 24 °C in January (Mudzengi et al. 2021). Annual average rainfall is from 400 to 600 mm. The major livelihood source for the Mahenye residents is subsistence crop and livestock production which, however, is heavily constrained by the aridity of the environment. The main crops cultivated are sorghum and maize, with livestock including cattle, goats, donkeys, sheep, and poultry (Mudzengi et al. 2021). The Zimbabwe-Mozambique border was established through the 1891 AngloPortuguese treaty to demarcate European spheres of influence between the Portuguese and the British. While it has potentially involved cutting people of common origin, religion, ethnicity, language, marriage, and blood off from one another (Dube 2009), the border has remained artificial. The border runs through the communities of the ‘Shangane’ people who are now found on either side of the border in the two countries and, for most of them, either side of the border is home. The common language and identity have sustained the unity of these people and made movements across the borders easy and mandatory. There are currently no strict ports of entry and exit to regulate movement across the border. Besides, there are plentiful bush paths that people use to cross this border and where nobody would be able to restrict their travel (Dube 2009). Thus, this border remains porous even after serious efforts to regulate human movement. For those living in Mahenye, the formalisation of national borders at Berlin in 1884–1885 and the resultant separation of people did not end migration between communities now living on each side of the border, with socio-economic and political interactions continuing. This is the case up until now. Indeed, considering the broad-based economic and political post-2000 crisis in Zimbabwe, these interactions have become important livelihoods and accumulation strategies in the region. This reality confirms the broader finding by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2020) that colonial borders did not match well with pre-existing ethnic, linguistic, social, and political boundaries in Africa, where over 40% of the 80,000

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km of the land-border network is comprised of parallels, meridians, and equidistant lines—purely geographical constructs. Hence, the accumulation and livelihoods strategies of borderland dwellers are, more often than not, woven into cross-border dynamics of trade and mobility. Migration and mobility between the Mahenye community and other communities to the east (in Mozambique) have always been there historically as people grappled with their everyday socio-economic and political challenges. In fact, the entire Hlengwe clan in Zimbabwe traces its origin to Zari who migrated from Mozambique to Zimbabwe around 1,600 (Bannerman 1980) and whose sons founded the Hlengwe dynasties located to the north of the Gonarezhou National Park, namely the Chisa, Mahenye, and Tshovani dynasties. The Sengwe dynasty of the Hlengwe, which is located to the south of the Runde River, was founded by Mantsena, the grandfather of Zari. Zari had also other siblings which founded the Hlengwe dynasties in Mozambique located around Zambareja, Masenjeni and the Save areas just to the east of Mahenye. As a result, there are strong bonds between the Hlengwe clan in Zimbabwe and its cousins in Mozambique. Migration and interactions have, therefore, continued unabated in this borderland. For instance, Zimbabweans migrated to Mozambique during the liberation struggle of the 1960s and 1970s while Mozambicans also migrated to Zimbabwe during the Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) and Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) civil war since 1975 (Hlongwana 2021; Nyati 2020). In addition, with the current socio-economic crisis in Zimbabwe, many people cross the border into Mozambique to access basic services, including education and health, as well as employment opportunities (Kachena and Spiegel 2019). Cross-border mobility has been made easier due to the lack of prohibitive geographical barriers along the routes, such as large rivers, fences or insurmountable terrain (Asiwaju 1977; Daimon 2016; Mangiza and Chakawa 2020). In some places along the border, border demarcations are not clearly established, to the extent that the border does not seem to exist. It is mostly those who live very close to it who are able to identify the border using certain features of the landscape. The interaction between the borderlands’ inhabitants in south-eastern Zimbabwe and their counterparts in Mozambique has created a region that operates differently from the country’s urban areas and surrounding hinterlands in terms of accumulation and livelihoods strategies. The movement is reciprocal. In Mozambique, socioeconomic and political challenges emerged as the result of the liberation struggle against Portuguese rule as well as, as noted, the subsequent civil war from 1975 until 1985. This resulted in many Mozambicans crossing into Zimbabwe where they were accommodated as refugees at refugee camps such as Tongogara and Chambuta in Chipangayi and Chiredzi, respectively. Some of them are still found in these camps as displaced Mozambican nationals (Mangiza and Chakawa 2020). Likewise, following the FTLRP and increasing political polarisation in Zimbabwe, particularly since the violent 2008 national elections, some political victims in Zimbabwe crossed into Mozambique. Some farm workers who worked in the various farms that were acquired under the FTLRP also migrated to Mozambique—some permanently while others temporarily, in pursuit of livelihood opportunities, including provision

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of seasonal labour, subsistence farming, and trade (Hlongwana 2021). This chapter, however, focuses on the accumulation and livelihoods strategies of borderlanders on the Zimbabwe side, specifically, the Mahenye community.

Borders, Borderlands Trends and Realities in Africa A border or boundary functions, in international law, to mark the edge of one state and the beginning of the other (UNDP 2020). For Kristof (1959), borders are legal institutions to promote global political order. Pre-colonial Africa had its own boundaries which separated one sphere of influence from another in terms of kingdoms and chieftainships, but not in the manner of boundaries as introduced by colonial imperialists. Pre-colonial Africa had low population and technology levels which did not warrant strong political systems and clear territorial demarcations (Englebert and Tarango 2002). In 1884–1885, European colonial powers gathered at Berlin and partitioned Africa among themselves so as establish colonies which they would exploit economically. Territorial boundaries were formed due to the mutual competition of these colonial powers, including capturing the people, territories and resources of Africa. For European colonialists, boundaries would confine and restrict trade and movement of people across the inter-colonial borders so as to endorse activities like taxation, road construction and resource extraction (Horstmann 2018). Overall, the colonial process greatly disfigured and distorted borderlands to meet the needs of the colonial primitive accumulation project. As a result, colonial operations in borderlands influenced these areas socially, culturally, politically and economically (Jabeen and Sultan 2020). The characteristics of particular borderlands are largely influenced by their historical development, and not all borderlands are the same. The specific decisions made by colonial regimes have had enduring consequences in these regions, notably with regard to the location of development infrastructure which eventually created development-path dependencies. The imposition of colonial borders also entrenched national identities in borderland regions, or at least sought to do so. Borders have had huge implications in terms of emergent accumulation and livelihoods strategies in Africa, particularly for peasants who, sometimes, even had their fields separated from their homesteads by colonial boundaries. Due to the importance of interactions between communities on both sides of borders, for livelihoods and other purposes, borderlands inhabitants have always made efforts to negotiate cross-border movement and even circumvent any restrictions. For example, when the Nigerian government established a fulltime customs post at the Okpara River between Nigeria and Benin in 1990, as soon as the first team of officials arrived, local elders of the Yoruba-speaking Shabe region initiated a meeting with them to negotiate a working agreement between the officials and locals (Flynn 1997). A ‘free-trade’ agreement was reached, with the understanding that borderland inhabitants would not interfere with the officials’ role in monitoring long-distance trade as long as local petty traders were allowed the freedom to freely across the border

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in pursuit of their livelihoods strategies without the completion of paperwork. At the Busia border between Kenya and Uganda, a similar deal was reached. Borderland inhabitants of both Busia, Kenya, and Busia, Uganda, are allowed to cross the border in pursuit of their livelihoods activities without having to produce any documentation (Allen 2012). The same kind of arrangement exists at the Mahenye-Zambareja crossing point between Zimbabwe and Mozambique where the major identification marker of a local citizen of the borderland is the ability to speak Hlengwe. Just like at the Busia border, at the Mahenye-Zambareja crossing point, for foreigners (non-residents of the borderland zone), the requirement to cross has been a note from Chief Mahenye’s secretary or his counterpart in Mozambique, particularly if the journey is simply for purchasing groceries, visiting family members or for health reasons. At the Busia border, the requirements for non-residents of the borderland vary depending on the migration official on duty and, in many instances, the pattern has been simply to leave one’s passport at the border crossing if the visit is for less than one day (Allen 2012). Analogous arrangements also exist on the Ethiopia-Sudan border where border market and border cooperation agreements between Sudan and Ethiopia permit the holding of joint market days, and a crossborder agreement allows trucks and drivers from both sides of the border to pass without the need to carry passports or obtain a visa (UNDP 2020). This allows most livelihoods activities to continue with minimum disruption. United by their access to both sides of the border, the accumulation strategies and daily economic lives of borderlands inhabitants rely on the opportunity to cross the border with little restrictions. In Angola and Namibia, for instance, a dense commercial network thrives between the Kunene River and Okavango River. This commercial network is encouraged by the differences in the regulatory system of the two countries, demographic characteristics, and the geographical landscape on both sides of the border (Brambilla 2007). Borderland residents on the Angolan side cross the border to sell livestock, especially cattle at various bush markets located on the Namibian side. After earning Namibian currency, they do not take the money back to the Angolan side where goods are scarce; instead, they purchase basics, such as farm equipment, inputs, medicines for people and livestock, as well as food and clothing in Namibia. Their Namibian counterparts, on the other hand, due to a higher population density, usually cross the border into Angola with their cattle for grazing (Brambilla 2007). On the Kenya-Uganda border, at Busia, Allen (2012) also reveals that borderland inhabitants on the Ugandan side preferred to buy commodities, such as cooking oil and paraffin, on the Kenyan side where they were much cheaper, while residents on the Kenyan side would buy maize in Uganda, as it was not only cheap but of higher quality. At the Ethiopia-Sudan border of Metema and Gallabat, Ethiopians are allowed to cross into Sudan to purchase manufactured goods, most of which are cheaper than they are in Ethiopia (UNDP 2020). Both Sudanese and Ethiopian nationals are allowed to cross the border and spend the whole day (8:30 a.m.– 5:50 p.m.) in the other country in pursuit of their livelihoods activities. Similarly, in the case of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border and Mahenye and Zambareja in particular, Mahenye residents prefer to buy basic commodities in Mozambique where

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they are cheaper (Mangiza and Chakawa 2020). In addition, multiple communal arrangements exist to allow for human movement to sell and to harvest natural goods such as wild fruits as well as fish and reeds (in the Save River) used for upholstery, without conflicts arising over the harvesting of these resources. Residents on the Mozambican side cross to Mahenye to access grinding mills and also sell goods. According to the UNDP (2020), the localised cross-border provisions that are used by inhabitants of many borderland zones in Africa have created multiple accumulation and livelihoods opportunities for residents, but the inhabitants have also been faced with challenges (Asiwaju 1977; Daimon 2016; Mangiza and Chakawa 2020). For instance, border officials may sometimes disregard the arrangements, thereby pushing residents to use unofficial border routes, like what obtained between Zimbabwe and South Africa during the COVID-19 lockdowns in 2020—where Zimbabweans crossed illegally into South Africa in pursuit of livelihoods activities while South Africans crossed into Zimbabwe to purchase liquor and cigarettes which had been banned under levels 4 and 5 of the national lockdown (Mitchley 2020). Furthermore, border officials may sometimes ask for bribes from local residents transporting goods across the border. In most borderland zones, border officials are quite comfortable exercising flexibility, depending on the circumstances and the reason for travel. This allows residents to maintain most of their livelihoods and accumulation activities. However, officials are also known to exercise aggressive seizures of goods particularly livestock. Where this obtains, livelihoods activities come under duress. In this context, borderlands inhabitants often deploy their intimate knowledge of borderland zones and draw upon local arrangements with borderland officials. For example, at the Busia border crossing where both Ugandan and Kenyan border officials tax goods being transported in trucks in large quantities, residents have taken advantage of the arrangement allowing them to cross the border freely to assist truckers circumvent this taxation. They do this by serving as informal transporters delivering small amounts of the goods using bicycles or motorcycles, travelling over either the official crossing or the multiple, unpoliced routes (Allen 2012). These types of activities, illegal as they may be, have become strong livelihoods and accumulation strategies for many borderlanders in Africa who, in the face of limited productive industry and infrastructure for job creation in the formal sector in borderlands, depend on cross-border movements to develop their own livelihoods. What emerges poignantly in border and borderlands literature is that local arrangements, particularly those allowing borderlands residents to cross the border freely, often address the need to balance livelihoods activities (trade, exchange, employment, kinship networks, among others) and the interests of the state (security and revenue collection) (Allen 2012; Asiwaju 1977; Dube 2009; Hlongwana 2018). Considering the conditions of most borderlands, in terms of lack of development infrastructure and formal job opportunities, accessibility to both sides (i.e. the two countries sharing the border) becomes an important survival strategy itself. This is particularly true for peasant households which need to engage in off-farm activities to augment what they obtain through farming. One community whose livelihoods and accumulation strategies are embedded in cross-border mobility is Mahenye.

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Accumulation and Livelihoods in Mahenye Mobility for accumulation and for livelihoods opportunities takes place in both directions at the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border in Mahenye. As a result, the border demarcates interdependent borderlands whereby adjacent communities engage in mutual trade and cross-border interactions (Martinez 1994). The interrelations across Zimbabwe-Mozambique in the Mahenye borderland are ongoing, with the border marked by insignificant levels of restrictions as the crossing point is not manned most days. Even when manned, as noted, speaking Hlengwe is the most common requirement to cross to either side of the border. Sharing a similar history of socio-economic and political challenges, the adjacent borderlands exist in mutual interdependence, thereby facilitating heightened economic and social relations. While the civil war in Mozambique had severe costs for Mozambique’s economy and agricultural productivity, and it has rendered the country one of the poorest in the world (World Bank 2017), contemporary Mozambique presents a number of opportunities for accumulation and livelihoods. The availability of basic commodities and agricultural inputs in shops, the existence of vast tracks of arable land for agricultural activities, and the opportunities to engage in trading activities (without interruption by political activities) in Mozambican communities adjacent to Mahenye are central in this regard. In contrast, Mahenye is characterised by insecure land tenure, threats of eviction due to encroaching finance capital, political persecution for some community members (especially those associated with the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change), basic commodity shortages, and hyperinflation (Mudzengi et al. 2021). As a result, Mahenye has become culturally and economically oriented towards Mozambican communities, where Mahenye villagers now obtain most of their basic household and farming requirements, such as farm inputs, groceries, clothing, and animal chemicals. Overall, located in a harsh physical and economic environment, borderland inhabitants in the south-eastern community of Mahenye make a living in diverse ways, most of which are influenced by their close proximity to the border. With the unfolding broad-based socio-economic political crisis in Zimbabwe, accumulation and livelihood strategies in Mahenye have, more than ever, significantly shifted to be inexorably linked to border activities. These strategies are dynamic, varied, and differentiated based on factors such as acquired assets, livestock, mobility abilities, age, and gender. In this section, I detail agricultural activities, labour mobility, and informal cross-border trade as some of the major accumulation and livelihood strategies employed by borderlanders in this community.

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Agriculture Accumulation and livelihoods strategies in Mahenye are steeped in a subsistencebased mixed economy which revolves around agriculture and related activities. While this is the result of the harsh climatic conditions in Mahenye, the adoption of a mixed economy also arises from the community’s borderland relations because, in nearby Mozambique, accumulation and livelihoods strategies are steeped in smallscale cropping, livestock and flocks rearing, fishing, hunting, and gathering of fruit and plants (Mudzengi et al. 2021). Average landholdings in Mahenye are about 2.3 hectares per household (Chigonda 2017). Mahenye borderlanders, like the Hlengwe more generally in the south-east, are strategic crop producers specialising mainly in drought resistant crops, such as sorghum, cassava, and millet varieties that are common in Mozambique, such as mahuvu and mpowo. They, however, also grow maize, sweet potatoes, and groundnuts. They have sought to adapt to the extremely hot weather and low annual precipitation that characterises the area. Adaptation measures include crop rotation on dry lands, production of small grains which requires little moisture, and practising irrigated riverbed farming (Tavuyanago 2016). Many of the crop varieties and animal breeds in Mahenye are traditionally grown in Mozambique where the natural environment and soil quality seem to be more favourable for them. A good example is a cucumber type that is called kulumuku or bondasi which is now popular in the south-eastern borderlands. This cucumber type has characteristics of a pawpaw (carica papaya). It is not common in hinterland communities, but is popular in borderlands such as Mundanda, Munepasi, and Mahenye where community members transact farm inputs with their Mozambican counterparts. With agriculture as a key accumulation and livelihoods source for borderlanders on both sides of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, communities also take turns to enact rituals, whether for rainfall, against pestilence or for appreciation before crop harvests. While it is not easy to quantify the effectiveness of these rituals on agricultural production, what is poignant is that these activities have promoted and strengthened collaboration among communities in the borderland as they interact to make the rituals a success. As well, borderlanders collaborate on farming activities (amadhava) mostly for ploughing, planting, and weeding. This enables households to cultivate larger pieces of land and, thus, sustain their households and the larger community through farming activities. This form of cooperation is facilitated by the fact that some men in Mahenye have two homesteads: one in Mozambique and one in Zimbabwe. Thus, relatives and neighbours in both homesteads offer their support, increasing farm labour. In this respect, the cohesion and cooperation challenges existing between the Hlengwe and Karanga on the Sangwe and Fair Range FTLRP farms in the hinterland (Ndhlovu 2020b), for instance, are very different from what obtains in the Mahenye borderland where livelihoods activities are rallying points for households. Mahenye is, though, dominated by the Hlengwe, and, therefore, ethnic relations seem to be a major boost for local cohesion and cooperation.

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There is a general land shortage in Mahenye. Colonial and post-colonial land policies have been a major source of land inadequacy and even landlessness (Mudzengi et al. 2021). In 1934, the Gonarezhou in which the Hlengwe lived was declared a Game Reserve. Between 1957 and 1959, the people were eventually evacuated away from their ancestral lands in Gonarezhou. This became the beginning of land challenges for the Hlengwe of the Mahenye dynasty who responded by resettling in Mozambique, though others resettled along the border in Mahenye despite land insufficiency.1 This was exacerbated further by the aridity and poor fertility of the soils in the absence of modern fertilisers. Those who resettled along the border in Zimbabwe were fully aware that the available land was not enough for household food production. In addition, farm equipment and livestock for draught power had been lost during the hostile removals from the Gonarezhou as well as during the liberation struggle of the 1970s. Because of this, the people initiated farming across the border as a livelihood strategy. Unlike in areas such as Mapungwana, Mt Selinda, Zona, Emerald, Dimire, Jersey, Gwenzi, Smalldeal, Muzite, Beaconhill, Mundanda, and Munepasi where the Ndau people from Zimbabwe who cross the border for farming continue to experience hostility by their Mozambican cousins (Hlongwana 2021), the Hlengwe in Mahenye are accommodated reasonably well in Zambareja. There are a number of factors which motivate farming across the border in southeastern Zimbabwe. One of the reasons is that people who cross the border to farm also do so to maintain contact with their ancestral lands from which they were displaced by the FRELIMO-RENAMO civil wars and to which they are reluctant to return and settle permanently due to certain social and economic opportunities in Zimbabwe which they still want to access (Hlongwana and Van Eeden 2016). As observed by Hlongwana (2021), the Zimbabwean side of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border is better developed in terms of infrastructure although the services have deteriorated in recent years. The availability of essential services in Chipinge District encourages several borderlanders to maintain ties with Zimbabwe by establishing settlements along the border. In this way, in the Mahenye region, the international boundary is in effect disregarded as Hlengwe people go about their daily lives. For most households, Mahenye has become a dormitory settlement where households cross into Mozambique for farming activities during the day and return to Zimbabwe at the close of the day. Farming has been critical to the survival of Mahenye— ethnicity, familial relations, and the general availability of space in Mozambique afford Mahenye inhabitants the opportunity to practice farming across the border. There has been an increase in cash-cropping in hinterland Zimbabwe in recent years. Cash crop varieties include sunflower and sesame, but mainly cotton. These crops require the use of chemicals, such as Aldicarb, Thiamax, and Carbaryl, which are very dangerous when consumed by livestock. In Mahenye, the Hlengwe have moved their livestock either in the proximity of the border or they have moved livestock into Mozambique to ensure safety from agri-chemicals (Dube 2009). Furthermore, during the dry season, when pastures are depleted in Mahenye, herd boys drive livestock into Mozambique where they camp for the entire duration (matanga) of 1

Day-to-day discussions with community members.

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the season for pastures and water for livestock. Adjacent areas in Mozambique are sparsely populated and are, therefore, capable of sustaining livestock for the entire dry season (Coelho 2002). Drawn together by common accumulation and livelihoods strategies, as well as ethnicity, there is significant cooperation on animal health care between the Hlengwe and their cousins in Mozambique in the utilisation of resources. Common animal diseases and pests, such as ticks, have resulted in cordial arrangements which permit livestock from Zimbabwe to access dip tanks in Mozambique. Cross-border livestock owners reciprocate by making financial contributions towards the purchase of the required chemicals. This kind of arrangement also has been observed between the Ndau communities in Chipinge and their Mozambican counterparts (Hlongwana 2018) as well as between the Barwee in Choa Highlands (near Mutare) and the Ndau in Mozambique (Virtanen 2001). This enables borderlanders to safeguard livestock, which is a crucial livelihoods source and also a sign and source of wealth, particularly in the case of the Hlengwe (Ndhlovu 2020b). The other accumulation and livelihoods challenge which encourages Mahenye residents to cross the border into Mozambique for farming is the destruction of crops and livestock by wildlife. This situation is acute because the area is close to the Gonarezhou National Park. There is currently no fence to separate the Mahenye community from the nearby national park, which is the main source of wildlife for ecotourism and sport hunting activities in the area (Chigonda 2017). There is also no fence separating particular fields or homesteads from the wildlife designated areas. The major problem-animals identified in the destruction of their crops are elephants, monkeys and baboons, bush pigs, bush bucks, hippos, and porcupines, while lions, leopards, crocodiles, and hyenas attacked livestock. Studies elsewhere have identified livestock predation by wildlife as a major livelihood concern for communities living close to protected areas or along the border, especially where the two states assume no responsibility of wildlife care (Bulte and Rondeau 2007; Maclennan et al. 2009). The continuous mixing of livestock with wild animals in fact is increasing disease transmission to livestock in Mahenye. Common diseases include foot and mouth, anthrax, and rabies. The transmission of diseases from wildlife to livestock is a major challenge for many borderland communities close to wildlife conservancies, and the problem is compounded by the long distance from the state authorities capable of making the necessary interventions (Chaminuka et al. 2014). In Mahenye, animal diseases have led to huge livelihood losses for livestock-dependent households through direct mortality, reduced draught power (when livestock are sick), or decreased market sales (Chigonda 2017). As a result, some households in Mahenye keep part of their livestock herd across the border in Zambareja where their relatives look after them to avoid massive losses in cases of disease outbreaks and wildlife predation. As indicated earlier, some families have two homesteads, one in Mahenye and another in Mozambique. The Mahenye homestead is reserved mainly for infrastructure accessibility, such as schools and clinics, while the Mozambique one is maintained for accumulation and livelihoods reasons.

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Labour Mobility Outside of the ecotourism establishments in Mahenye (Zimbabwe Sun Hotel and the Chilo Lodge) and the two public schools (primary and secondary), the area lacks formal infrastructure to initiate development and the possibility of employment in the formal sector. Thus, the search for livelihood opportunities encourages residents to cross the border as wage labour in fields, looking after livestock, or other cashearning opportunities that are generally not available locally. Thus, while Zimbabwe is experiencing deep economic challenges with extremely high poverty levels (as cited earlier), borderlanders in Mahenye have somehow managed to sustain their livelihoods because of their engagement in cross-border labour mobility (and trade, see below) in Mozambique.2 The occurrence of cross-border labour activities is mostly seasonal. Wage-work mobility into Mozambique is attuned to the farm cycle, with mobility mostly taking place in the farming season (which, for many crops, is between planting in October– November and harvesting in February–April) and also during cotton, sunflower, and sesame harvests between May and July. During the planting season, it is mostly men who migrate with their own cattle to offer ox-draught services as this is considered a masculine job. Some Mozambican households cultivating large fields of cotton, sesame, sunflower, and grains require these services. Zimbabweans who offer these services are either paid in cash or are given a piece of land which they can cultivate for that particular season. One Mahenye resident mentioned that he hires out his ox-draught power to peasants with large fields in Mozambique who pay him well compared to Zimbabwe farmers. He also noted that he exchanges this service for an opportunity to grow his own crops on the Mozambican side and that the local chiefs had no problems with such arrangements.3 Unlike ploughing, weeding is considered ‘women’s work’ in the community. Thus, as soon as planting is completed, most men leave as women then arrive to offer their services. Mahenye women highlight that they provide weeding and harvesting services to Mozambican farmers due to the absence of wildlife which destroys crops, unlike in Mahenye. This might entail as well the clearing of fields, such as cutting down and burning cotton and sunflower stalks or preparing new land patches. Young boys as well are in demand in Mozambique during the planting and harvesting season, to look after livestock so that they do not stray into planted fields.4 It is revealed that young boys have the choice to offer labour either for wages or for livestock. Where they choose to serve for livestock, the arrangement is that the boy looks after a cattle kraal for an entire year and then receives a cow as payment at the end of the year. It is also reported that, with the recommendation of relatives of a particular boy, the boy can combine several kraals and subsequently get a cow for each kraal. This cross-border mobility exercise enables males to accumulate wealth through cattle while they are still young. 2

Day-to-day discussions with community members. Day-to-day discussions with community members. 4 Day-to-day discussions with community members. 3

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Livestock (specifically, cattle) is considered, as noted, a sign of wealth among the ‘Shangane’ (Chaumba 2006; Ndhlovu 2022) as it can be used for draught power, marriage negotiations, and traditional functions, among others (Ndhlovu 2020b). One senior Mahenye resident insisted that Cattle ownership increases a man’s status in the Hlengwe community since such a man is able to acquire more land for farming using cattle and is able to pay lobola [bridewealth] for many wives.5

According to him, cattle enables a man to have a large family which assists in accumulation, including through the production of surplus food for the family and the larger community. This senior resident also claimed that “a man who does not own cattle is as good as [being] a woman”. However, social capital is very important for finding jobs where cattle can be acquired, as “relatives play key roles for the acquisition of such jobs”.6 As an extension of the importance of social capital, another resident revealed that Mahenye residents who crossed to Zambareja to offer labour services also made use of their kinship networks to enhance hiring prospects, usually by joining with their relatives in Mozambique who themselves offered wage labour. Migrants team up with relatives across the border in Mozambique, engaging in activities such as bricklaying, especially by women, and house construction and carpentry, among others, mostly by men. Additionally, the provision of seasonal labour in this borderland is reciprocal. Mozambicans also provide labour to some farmers and livestock owners in Mahenye, that is, those with big fields, and large herds of livestock and flocks, and who require the services of other peasants. The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, presented some challenges as the Zimbabwean government deployed soldiers to man the main route into Mozambique. As a result, movement became somehow restricted although borderlanders soon made use of other points which are unknown to the soldiers. The impact of movement restrictions was also captured by Mangiza and Chakawa (2020) who posit that, while the COVID-19 measures introduced by the government of Zimbabwe were meant to protect public health and human welfare, they generated deep problems for most border communities. They argue that the communities in Chipinge District, whose lives were and are still dependent on trans-border activities, were being greatly affected by the pandemic since, although they survive primarily through farming, they supplement their income by trading with communities in neighbouring Mozambique.

5 6

Day-to-day discussions with community members. Day-to-day discussions with community members.

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Cross-Border Trade Cross-border mobility for the purposes of trade is another crucial accumulation and livelihoods strategy in Mahenye, and its takes place in both directions. While the Hlengwe in Zimbabwe lost much of their lands during the establishment of the Gonarezhou National Park (Ndhlovu 2020b; Tavuyanago 2016), their cousins in Mozambique continue to enjoy vast expanses of land on which to grow a variety of crops and raise poultry, livestock and flocks both for own consumption and for sale (Gohori 2020). The communities along the border on the Zimbabwe side, therefore, constitute a flourishing market for agricultural products coming from Mozambique. Agricultural products sold in Zimbabwe by Mozambicans include grains, different varieties of peas, and chickens. They also sell processed wild fruits, such as hwakwa (that is, pounded Makwakwa (Strychnos spinosa) fruits). Since the early 2000s, however, Zimbabweans have crossed increasingly into Mozambique as well to engage in exchanges (for consumption and trading purposes), as they seek to deal with the multiple challenges they face, including commodity shortages, hyperinflation, plummeting agricultural production, unemployment, and collapsing social services (Matanzima 2021; Mhlanga and Ndhlovu 2021). Zimbabweans now cross the border to buy basic commodities such as grains, soap, salt, and sugar for “personal consumption and also for resale to raise much needed cash”.7 They also sell goods in Mozambique at the same time. The markets, on both sides of the border, are informal and often characterised by “negotiations on the prices of products”.8 Thus, the Hlengwe in Mahenye transport items such as mats made of reeds which they sell to Mozambican communities which are far from the Save River where reeds for mats can be obtained. Some women in Mozambique brew potent alcoholic beverages such as Kachasu, Vuchema (palm beer), and Vukanyi (Marula beer) which they trade across the border. Informal cross-border traders from Zimbabwe buy this beer and resale it at higher prices in Zimbabwe due to its high demand, although the beer is illegal. Informal cross-border traders also smuggle marijuana and game meat from Mozambique for sale in the hinterland where they fetch high profits. Marijuana gardens are abundant in Mozambique’s borderlands where they remain unpoliced and are a source of livelihoods (Hlongwana 2021). Cross-border drug smugglers and traders are not easy to apprehend because they network with relatives and acquaintances on both sides of the border (Amali 2014). Most Mahenye households have managed to survive the economic crisis through these illicit activities.9 In Mahenye, ethnic relations are important as they smoothen the concealed transportation of these products to various lucrative markets. In this respect, Wilson and Donnan (1998: 14) describe borderland populations as follows:

7

Day-to-day discussions with community members. Day-to-day discussions with community members. 9 Day-to-day discussions with community members. 8

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In terms of their ethnic identities, at least three main types of border populations can be identified: (i) those which share ethnic ties across the border, as well as with those residing at their own state’s geographical core; (ii) those who are differentiated by cross-border ethnic bonds from other residents of their state; and (iii) those who are members of the national majority in their state and have no ethnic ties across the state’s borders.

The Mahenye-Zambareja borderland population could easily qualify in the second type of border population described above. Ethnic identity in this borderland plays a crucial role in cross-border interaction. This is particularly the case in the exchanges of outlawed products, such as game meat, marijuana, and minerals. Game meat is not sold randomly, nor is it sold openly, to avoid arrests. It is dried and carried in bags by traders who advertise clothes instead of meat. The local people know this advertising practice and they in fact assist the traders to advertise and inform them whether it is safe to trade. Since most of the state’s anti-poaching personnel in Mahenye are Shona, the ability to speak fluent Hlengwe is an incentive that facilitates and masks business dealings. Hlengwe is the business language in the region. As a result, some people from other ethnic groups (which are not part of any of the ‘Shangane’ dialects) disguise themselves as ‘Shangane’ so as to ensure ease of passage at the border and secure wage-work, and engage in business without suspicion, as well as attract favourable treatment by borderlanders who normally try to establish kinship through totemic recitals. The importance of ethnicity and identity confirms the observation by Alvarez and Collier (1994: 607) that “ambiguities of identity in borderlands can also be strategically played upon to forge, reformulate and even mobilise ethnic identity to advantage”. In this borderland, being ‘Shangane’ is not only a sign of community belonging, as the identity can also be tactically deployed in social and economic negotiations along the border, and it is particularly crucial when people seek wage labour or trade in forbidden products to survive the current crisis in Zimbabwe. This situation confirms the argument by Duri (2012) that international borders are very porous and irrelevant during times of crises—as people easily rally behind a common interest, particularly identity, to devise means to survive, whether legal or illegal. In the Mahenye region, transnational ethnic relations are an accumulation and livelihoods strategy source on their own. Intriguingly, some borderlanders in Mahenye have mastered the skill of middleman-ship and they buy agricultural and non-agricultural products at low prices from Mozambican traders and resale them at higher prices to Zimbabwean buyers. For instance, they buy reed-mats made by Mozambicans who live along the Save River, and sell them to buyers who come from as far away as Chiredzi town—these, in turn, resale the mats in Chiredzi or transport them to cities where they are used for house ceilings.10 As well, the middlemen buy groceries and resale them to the same buyers at a profit. Most of the products in demand from Mozambique are rice, cooking oil, flour, spaghetti, detergents, paraffin, and even fuel for vehicles (Mangiza and Chakawa 2020). Bales of second-hand clothes are also imported from Mozambique and resold in Zimbabwe (Nyati 2020). During the summer in Mozambique, 10

Day-to-day discussions with community members.

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there is an abundance of fresh and dried fish which communities in Zimbabwe buy to resale. The fish named bakayawe is the most popular during summer. The interactions among the Hlengwe people from both sides of the border in this region have generated a robust cross-border sociocultural and economic system and enable accumulation for both sides. There is, though, tight security measures on livestock movement across the border, with these measures deployed by communities themselves and also by the soldiers who from time to time patrol the border. Valid documentation from a police station is required for livestock. However, a letter from the chief or village head (Sabhuku) may suffice. Further, there are now heavy restrictions on cotton and sesame transportation from Zimbabwe into Mozambique as farmers turn to Mozambican markets for better prices.11

Conclusion This chapter discussed the accumulation and livelihoods strategies of the Hlengwe people of Mahanye, along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. This was motivated by the fact that available studies mostly link the accumulation and livelihoods of the Hlengwe in Mahenye to their proximity to the Gonarezhou National Park and the Save River where they provide tourist guide services and also harvest natural resources legally or illegally. As a result, there has been no attempt to explore how this community exploits its proximity to Mozambique to boost accumulation and sustain livelihoods. The chapter shows that, in responding to the unfolding broadbased socio-economic and political crisis which Zimbabwe is currently experiencing, the borderlanders of Mahenye have adopted diverse accumulation and livelihoods strategies, most of which entail cross-border networks and are influenced by their close proximity to the border. These strategies can be placed into three broad categories, namely agriculture, labour mobility, and informal cross-border trade. The strategies are dynamic, varied, and differentiated based on diverse factors such as mobility and gender. The chapter concludes that cross-border agriculture is one of the most important accumulation and livelihoods strategies for the Hlengwe in Mahenye. Agriculture has resulted in the emergence of accumulating peasants, that is, those who now have large heads of livestock and other farm equipment. There are, however, also poor peasants who continue to offer their labour as a livelihood strategy. The findings in this study also contradict studies which associate the accumulation regimes and livelihood strategies of the Hlengwe of Mahenye with illegal activities, such as poaching in the Gonarezhou National Park. The findings show that, although some of the activities in this borderland are illicit, they are not necessarily illegal, including cross-border movements for trade and employment. Instead of censoring and prohibiting the cross-border interactions of the people along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border in Mahanye, protection and support should 11

Day-to-day discussions with community members.

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instead be provided by the state for these informal activities which have already proven to be effective not only as significant livelihood strategies, but also as accumulation pathways.

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Gohori O (2020) Towards a tourism and community development framework: an African perspective. PhD thesis, North-West University, South Africa Hlongwana J (2018) Old habits die hard: Restensia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO) propensity for military confrontation against its professed embracement of peaceful conflict resolution, 1976–2017. Afr J Polit Sci Int Relat 12(5):63–68 Hlongwana J (2021) Borderless boundary? Historical and geopolitical significance of the Mozambique/Zimbabwe border to the Ndau People. PhD thesis, North-West University, South Africa Hlongwana J, Van Eeden ES (2016) Neither here nor there: The landless Ndau who have turned a ‘no man’s land’ between Mozambique and Zimbabwe into a home. Paper presented at a Symposium on Border Regions in Sub-Saharan Africa, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu Campus, Finland, 7–9 Sept 2016 Horstmann A (2018) Incorporation and resistance: borderlands, transnational communities and social change in Southeast Asia. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.452. 197&rep=rep1&type=pdf Jabeen T, Sultan S (2020) Evolution of borders and borderlands: a historical overview. Pak Soc Sci Rev 4(3):951–959 Kachena L, Spiegel SJ (2019) Borderland migration, mining and trans-frontier conservation: question of belonging along Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. GeoJournal 84:1021–1040 Kristof L (1959) The nature of frontiers and boundaries. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 49(3):269–282 Maclennan SD, Groom RJ, Macdonald DW, Frank LG (2009) Evaluation of a compensation scheme to bring about pastoralist tolerance of lions. Biol Cons 142:2419–2427 Mangiza O, Chakawa J (2020) The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on border communities: the case of Chipinge–Zimbabwe. Policy and Practice Brief. The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes Martinez OJ (1994) Border and people: life and society in the US-Mexico borderlands. University of Arizona Press, Tucson Matanzima J (2021) Lived experiences of cross border traders: the case of Kariba. In: Helliker K, Bhatasara S, Chiweshe MK (eds) Everyday crisis-living in contemporary Zimbabwe. Routledge, London, pp 143–154 Mhlanga D, Ndhlovu E (2021) Socio-economic and political challenges in Zimbabwe and the development implications for southern Africa. J Afr Foreign Aff 8(2):77–100 Mitchley A (2020) Cele: Illicit cigarettes, alcohol existed long before the lockdown. News24, 22 May 2020 Moyo S (2011) Changing agrarian relations after redistributive land reform in Zimbabwe. J Peasant Stud 38(5):939–966 Mudzengi BK, Gandiwa E, Muboko N, Mutanga CN, Chiutsi S (2021) Ecotourism resilience: the case of Mahenye community project, Chipinge District, Zimbabwe. Afr J Hospitality Tourism Leisure 10(2):459–471 Mugandani MW, Makarau A, Chipindu B (2012) Re-classification of agro-ecological regions of Zimbabwe in conformity with climate variability and change. Afr Crop Sci J 20(s2):361–369 Ndhlovu E (2020a) The migration-livelihoods nexus: emerging opportunities, emerging challenges in rural Zimbabwe. Yonsei J Int Stud 12(2):24–40 Ndhlovu E (2020b) Land acquisitions and relocations of the Shangane in Zimbabwe: disintegratory or transformative? Afr Insight 49(4):55–71 Ndhlovu E (2022) Political economy of Chisa Livelihoods in Rural Zimbabwe. In: Helliker K, Matanzima J, Chadambuka P (eds) Livelihoods of ethnic minorities in Rural Zimbabwe. Springer International Publishing, pp 123–139 Nyati K (2020) Desperate traders risk virus spread to smuggle bales into Zimbabwe. The East African, May 11. Available from: https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Traders-risk-virusspread-tosmuggle-bales-into-Zimbabwe/2560-5547164jqgps0/index.html. Accessed 22 Sept 2021

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Quinn LA (2019) Causes of poverty in Zimbabwe. The Borgen Project. www.borgenproject.org/ causes-of-poverty-in-zimbabwe/. Accessed 18 Nov 2019 Samaita K (2019) Zimbabwe on the brink as inflation nears 100%. Business Day, June 17. www. businesslive.co.za. Accessed 13 Nov 2019 Tavuyanago B (2016) Living on the fringes of a protected area: Gonarezhou National Park (GNP) and the indigenous communities of south-east Zimbabwe. PhD thesis, University of Pretoria UNDP (2020) Borderlands in Africa: literature overview and key terms. United Nations Development Programme Virtanen P (2001) Evolving institutional framework for community-based natural resource management in Mozambique: a case study from the Choa Highlands. Afr Stud Quart 5(3):139–154 Wilson TM, Donnan H (1998) Border identities: nation and state at international frontiers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge World Bank (2017) Mozambique—country partnership framework for the period FY2017–FY2021. Washington, DC. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/540001493517702 187/Mozambique-Country-partnership-framework-for-the-period-FY17FY21 World Bank (2019) World Bank report on poverty in Zimbabwe. The World Bank Group World Food Programme (2019) UN boosts humanitarian appeal to help tackle Zimbabwe’s worstever hunger crisis. UN News Zimbabwe National Statistical Agency (2012) Census 2012 preliminary report. ZimStat, Harare, Zimbabwe

Chapter 3

Benefits of Informal Cross-Border Trade Across the Kariba Border Joshua Matanzima

and Nedson Pophiwa

Abstract Informal cross-border trading has over the years been an important livelihood option in Zimbabwe, particularly given the worsening economic problems such as chronic unemployment, high inflation rates, and cash shortages. In this context, this chapter examines the importance of cross-border trade as a livelihood strategy in the border town of Kariba, along the Zimbabwe-Zambia border. Kariba traders cross the border almost daily with assorted products to sell in the nearby town of Siavonga (Zambia), and they often also return with commodities in short supply in Zimbabwe, to sell or consume in Kariba. Social networks are crucial to the activities of these traders, including networks amongst themselves, with border post officials and with Zambians in Siavonga. These networks facilitate their cross-border trade while also minimising possible challenges, including market access. Though cross-border trade is not a highly profitable venture for Kariba traders, it does have key benefits in terms of reducing levels of poverty and enhancing household consumption. This is the case for male traders and for female traders who are increasingly becoming central to trade across the Zambian-Zimbabwean border. Keywords Cross-border · Smuggling · Trade · Challenges · Kariba · Zimbabwe

Introduction Informal cross-border trade on the African continent is driven by borderland communities which exploit and manipulate arbitrage opportunities emanating from the arbitrariness and porosity of borders. Many of the continent’s official borders and unofficial crossing points are hives of activity as commodities flow in several directions to ensure the survival of communities that live astride them. In this context, J. Matanzima (B) Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] N. Pophiwa University of the Witwatersrand’s School of Governance, Johannesburg, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_3

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the surge in informal cross-border trade (ICBT) by Zimbabweans in the southern African region since the post-2000 crisis period has attracted significant scholarly attention (Dhliwayo 2017; Garatidye 2014; Jamela 2013; Mupedziswa and Gumbo 1998; Moyo 2017; Nshimbi and Moyo 2017; Pophiwa 2010a). A common trend in these studies is to cluster around the corridors of informal cross-border trade which are the busiest in terms of the volumes of traffic and trade taking place, particularly the Zimbabwe-South Africa border post at Beitbridge (Muzvidziwa 1998, 2001; Moyo 2017; Mutopo 2010; Pophiwa 2017). In the case of the Zambia-Zimbabwe border, the focus tends to be on the busy Chirundu One-Stop border post (Chagonda 2016; Curtis 2009). The clustering of research on relatively busier border posts only tells a part of the story. Regrettably, less attention is paid to other border areas, including the Kariba-Siavonga border which straddles Zimbabwe and Zambia and which forms the basis for this chapter. In particular, the focus is on the everyday experiences of Kariba-Siavonga informal cross-border traders and the benefits and challenges which arise from ICBT. The chapter builds on the scant studies on crossborder activities about the Zimbabwe-Zambia border including Chipere-Ngazimbi (2020, 2021), Matanzima (2021), Muguti (2023), and McGregor (2008). Kariba is a town in the north-western part of Zimbabwe located at the shores of Lake Kariba with its dam wall forming a border with neighbouring Zambia. Kariba’s population in the 2012 census stood at 26,451 and, considering an annual growth rate of 2.5%, the estimated population of the municipality in 2017 was 29,928 (Municipality of Kariba 2019). The major industries in the town are formal ones, especially fishing, tourism, electricity generation, and crocodile farming. A parallel informal economy exists, comprising quarry stone mining, curio and sculpture, and home industries (iron craft, etc.). Kariba’s location permits easy crossing of Zimbabweans into the Zambian side of the border for trade and shopping. Both men and women in Kariba engage in everyday informal cross-border trade as a basis to hopefully escape poverty given the ongoing economic crisis in Zimbabwe characterised by currency devaluation, unemployment, and cash shortages. These residents cross the Kariba border post daily with assorted products to sell in Siavonga (Zambia). Though there are many challenges in engaging in ICBT in Kariba, and the trade is mainly survivalist in character, there are benefits such as social networking, self-employment, income generation, and earning of foreign currency.

Defining Informal Cross-Border Trade Informal cross-border trade is often defined “as trade in processed or non-processed merchandise which may be legal imports or exports on one side of the border and illicit on the other side and vice-versa, on account of not having been subjected to statutory border formalities such as customs clearance” (Afrika and Ajumbo 2012: 41). One of the contentious matters in defining ICBT relates to the supposed illicitness or illegality of the goods traded (e.g. drugs and unregistered firearms) as well as the methods used to cross borders (for instance, crossing through unauthorised crossing points to

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avoid detection and smuggling at official border posts). Most ICBTs also avoid, or try to avoid, paying excise duties for their goods through ‘under-invoicing’, ‘misdeclaration’, and misclassification of goods and their countries of origin when reporting to customs officials at border posts (Ackello-Ogutu 1996; Lesser and Moisé-Leeman 2009; Alusala 2010). Because of this, ICBT is “viewed [by the state] as a threat needing control rather than a genuine economic activity” (Makombe 2011: 44). The extent to which informal traders carry illicit goods is open to significant variation, as is the degree to which they use official or unofficial border posts. In the case of Kariba-Siavonga, traders negotiate their way across the border carrying both licit and illicit goods.

Crisis in Zimbabwe and ICBT There is an abundance of literature on the post-2000 crisis in Zimbabwe which we make no attempt to review (Jones 2010b; Kairiza 2009; Muzondidya 2009, Raftopoulos 2009). Regardless of the proliferation of scholarly writing on the crisis, there is still much to be written about the ways in which the protracted crisis has affected consumption and livelihoods amongst ordinary Zimbabweans. In particular, there is a gap in our understanding of how shortages of basic commodities, which became a major marker of the so-called Zimbabwean Crisis, shaped the lives of Zimbabweans as consumers (rather than as workers or citizens), as individuals began crossing borders to source scarce consumer goods (for self-consumption and trade). A number of government initiatives aimed at regime survival also brought about assaults on Zimbabwean consumers in the form of price controls and the regulation of quantities of particular goods that consumers could purchase. The empty shelves of Zimbabwean supermarkets became a talking point for ordinary Zimbabweans because their existence was a sign of failure by the Zimbabwean government to ensure food and livelihood security. On the eve of independence in 1980, it is argued that over 90% of goods in the supermarkets were locally made (Shubin 2013: 45) yet, by 2007, the shops were empty and even when the economy recovered after 2009, much of the stock was imported. Precarity, deprivation and desperate conditions in which ordinary Zimbabweans found themselves after 2000 led to a significant increase in informal economic activities (Hammar 2013; Hammar and Rogers 2008; Matanzima and Saidi 2022). The post-2000 period became characterised by all sorts of informal economic strategies as “nothing became straight” and citizens engaged in kukiya-kiya (Jones 2010a: 286). Opportunistic economics became the order of the day, whether in vegetable vending, trading foreign currency or selling scarce commodities on the black market (Mawowa and Mutongo 2010). Zimbabweans of all classes participated in the informal economy either as entrepreneurs trying to make a profit or as consumers trying to source goods needed for their daily consumption. Informal cross-border trade proliferated in this context. For example, in a study of the livelihoods of urban women traders in Harare’s informal traders’ market called Magaba, South Africa was the

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main country from which durable goods were sourced, but other countries included Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana (Chirau 2014). In the literature, ICBT appears as a survival and livelihood strategy for Zimbabweans in the face of economic hardships (Chiliya et al. 2012; Kachere 2017; Manjokoto and Ranga 2017; Moyo 2017; Mutopo 2010; Muqayi and Manyeruke 2015; Muzvidziwa 1998, 2001; Pophiwa 2017) as “it contributes to the reduction of poverty” (Nshimbi and Moyo 2017: 194). Findings from three surveys conducted by Kachere in 2009, 2012, and 2015 in Zimbabwe indicate that the monthly average incomes from ‘informal’ cross-border trade were in fact above the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) (Kachere 2017). Overall, though, cross-border traders face many challenges, with women traders particularly vulnerable to these: crime, harassment, xenophobia, accommodation, extortion, and bribery by immigration officers and municipal officials, delays at the border post during peak hours, and being suspected of prostitution and smuggling (Chiliya et al. 2012). Despite all this, cross-border traders show significant resilience and continue with their trading activities (Zata 2016), viewing constraints as an inherent part of ICBT (Kachere 2017). Cross-border traders often concoct solutions to these problems, sometimes venturing into illicit activities as a result. For instance, continued harassment by immigration officials and customs staff results in traders smuggling their goods (Moyo 2017; Pophiwa 2010a, b, 2017). Other times, traders simply keep abreast of happenings at the border as well as clandestine routes that avoid the police (Daimon 2016).

Research Methodology This chapter is based on a rapid ethnographic study conducted from January to June 2019. The research involved participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and informal interviews with cross-border traders (both men and women) in Kariba. A total of 30 traders were interviewed: 20 females and 10 males. Purposive sampling was used as a sampling technique in selecting informants. Some of the respondents were identified through snowballing, especially those who were known to have been trading for much longer and were doing relatively well. The semi-structured interviews involved questions regarding the nature of cross-border trade, as well as the challenges and benefits experienced by the traders. Informal interviews with crossborder traders were also helpful as a source of information. These mainly occurred in the homesteads of the informants or at the shopping places (such as shopping centres, bakeries, and the shore of Lake Kariba) during the time when traders are buying commodities for sale. These informal interviews often took place during short periods of participant observation. But observation also took place during brief visits across the border to Siavonga (the trading town), to witness first-hand how trade occurs. The times at which the visits to such places occurred differed. For example, the lakeshore was visited in the mornings, the time at which fishers’ boats reach the harbours. Finally, focus group discussions were also conducted. Two focus group discussions (FGDs) with cross-border traders were conducted in Kariba: on

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17 March (in Nyamhunga suburb) and on 14 April (in Mahombekombe suburb) in 2019. The one in Nyamhunga comprised 8 women, while in Mahombekombe it had 9 people (3 males and 6 females).

Key Dimensions of Informal Cross-Border Trade at the Kariba Border Oral interviews conducted with Kariba traders indicate that many people joined ICBT at various temporal phases of economic hardships that have been occurring since the year 2000 in Zimbabwe. Formal employment in Kariba is largely in the tourism sector, which has experienced a down-turn in fortunes. Hotels, lodges, and house boats laid-off workers leading to high levels of unemployment in Kariba (Nhiwatiwa and Matanzima 2022; Matanzima and Nhiwatiwa 2022; Matanzima 2021). Most of the workers retrenched were men, with many joining the cross-border trade sector dominated by women at the time. Traders buy foodstuffs in Zimbabwe and sell these in Zambia where they obtain higher profits and, when returning, they bring back foodstuffs for resale that are unavailable or very expensive in Zimbabwean supermarkets. Traders thus assist in supplying commodities that are in high demand in Zimbabwe. This was particularly pronounced during the 2008 food crisis (Matanzima 2021).

Buying and Selling Goods The types of goods which traders cross the Kariba border post to sell in Siavonga town, on a daily basis, are agricultural goods and other foodstuffs. Siavonga’s proximity to the border makes it a market of preference, as one respondent noted: Most people engage in trade in Siavonga because of its proximity to Kariba. People want to minimise travelling costs incurred when travelling to very far towns in Zambia, like Lusaka, and thereby increasing their profits. If we travel to far towns, the business becomes unprofitable. (Interviewed 15 June 2019)

Female traders mentioned that they prefer Siavonga because it is closer to home. For them, they can return home quickly in case of emergency such as sickness or death and daily return home to spend time with their children (FGD, 17 March 2019). The other reason for trading in Siavonga is that they sell perishables such as fish and vegetables which would be spoiled on route to distant towns. A daily sighting in Siavonga town is Zimbabweans mostly from Kariba who have transformed the town into what can be termed as ‘trading landscapes’ (Pophiwa 2017: 160). Their stalls for selling a variety of goods are a common sight in the town. The interviewees spoke of fish, bananas, bread, peanut butter, oranges, tomatoes, onions, chickens, and sona (soap) as the most traded products in Siavonga. These are

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in high demand in Zambia and the most profitable products in which to trade there. Due to this high demand, they sometimes become scarce in Kariba. For instance, when local Kariba traders buy fish from fishermen, they compete with other fish buyers from other regions of Zimbabwe and this raises prices significantly. Before crossing the border, fish traders often spend days trying to acquire fish to sell in Siavonga. One trader hence stated that: Though selling fish in Zambia is more profitable, the problem is we do not obtain fish every day due to their high demand here in Kariba. There is a scramble over fish boats when they come out of the Lake [onto the shore] every morning. Some buyers get into the water when boats are still far from the shore for them to be the first buyers, and they risk being attacked by crocodiles, hippos and snakes. People [buyers] fight for fish. Sometimes I do not obtain fish to go and sell and hence I do not go to Zambia. Thus, I end up spending my previous profits during the days I will be at home. (Interview 10 June 2019)

Bread is another lucrative commodity that traders sell but, again, they cannot sell it daily because supplies run out due to demand, thereby undercutting the continuity in sales. One trader indicated during an interview that, “I did not go to Zambia today because I have no bread to sell there. Many people are supplying bread in Zambia and thus it is high demand” (Informal discussion 13 June 2019). In the case of bread, the researchers observed that there is often competition for supplies between the local Kariba market for consumption and the export one for resale across the border via informal cross-border trade. The scarcity of certain goods like bread in Kariba because of the exporting of these commodities to Zambia is similar to what McGregor identifies and explains as the politics of scarcity of commodities in her study of Binga (along the Zimbabwe-Zambia border). She observed: Zambians were particularly quick to respond to the rampant inflation in Zimbabwe and disparity between official and black-market exchange rates, which created a profitable market in Zambia for Zimbabwean manufactured goods, and made the relatively stable Zambian Kwacha instantly desirable. The grocery stores in the camps and villages along the Binga lakeshore had been built to serve local Zimbabwean needs, but in 2001 their shelves were empty as Zambians were crossing the lake and buying up the entire stock. (McGregor 2008: 877)

Despite the shortages that would occur, the traders indicated that they profiteered whenever they managed to cross the border with commodities to sell in Siavonga. Crossing with goods into Zambia attracts excise duty. Traders narrated that most of the goods with which they cross are permitted at the border, but they pay customs duty for these goods to the officers at the Zambian side of the border post. These charges dent their profit margins, such that they all wish to be exempted from duty. As at June 2019, the time at which the research was being undertaken, one bucket of fish was charged duty worth 5 Zambian Kwacha (= USD $2.50). Since they are not allowed to pay duty in Zimbabwean currency, the traders find this charge to be excessive as they source their goods in Zimbabwean currency. While across the border, most traders sell their wares at a designated market place in Siavonga. Thus, Zambians requiring Zimbabwean products come and buy them at that particular market place. However, some traders with regular clients simply

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deliver their products without the need to sell at the market, and these traders typically return to Zimbabwe earlier than others. One respondent said that: I am blessed because I have regular customers for my fish. I just deliver them and buy eggs and return in time. I am doing my business in a very easy way;… this give me time to come back and cook for my children before they return from school in the afternoon. (Interviewed 20 April 2019)

When they return home, the traders bring commodities from Zambia which they resell. Bamu (2017: 15) observed that “typically, cross-border traders export goods from Zimbabwe for sale in other countries and/or import goods from other countries for sale in Zimbabwe. While in many cases traders specialise in either export or import only, it is not uncommon for some to be involved in both the import and export of goods into and from their home countries” (Bamu, 2017: 125). Some of the Zambian products which traders sell back home include eggs, soya mince, and any other foodstuffs which they deem reasonably priced. These products are more affordable in Zambia and the traders supply them to Zimbabwean small-scale retailers and individuals at higher but competitive prices.

Daily Trips Across the Border The traders depart early in the morning and return to Zimbabwe in the evening. Depending on the proximity of where they live to the border post, traders either walk on foot, especially residents of Mahombekombe, while others use public transport. The latter are usually traders from Nyamhunga township who need to use transport from a local bus terminus to the border 12 kms away. From the border post, all traders use public transport to Siavonga town, a distance of approximately 10 kms. This adds an extra operational cost to cross-border trading for the traders from Nyamhunga. Sometimes traders do not return home on the same day as they might need to spend a number of days in Siavonga if they have not managed to sell all their stock. It is common to see Zimbabwean traders sleeping on verandas of local stores overnight. One female trader narrated why she spent two days in Siavonga in early June 2019, highlighting that: I had not sold most of my stuff. So, it did not make sense for me to come back to Zimbabwe and go back tomorrow given the transport costs. Plus, some of my stuff was perishable so I had to sell them till late in the evening so that I obtain some profits. So, I slept at a veranda at a local store with other women. I then successfully sold all the remaining stuff the next day and I came back. I was worried as my kids were alone at home. Their father is in a rural home. (Interview 5 June 2019)

From this, we note that women risk their lives for survival, spending nights sleeping in the open where they have limited security and safety. The Kariba border does not operate 24 h a day, as it opens at 6 a.m. and closes at 8 p.m.; thus, the traders are restricted to travelling to and from Siavonga within certain hours. The Kariba traders indicated to us that the times are normally convenient for

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them, because they cross the border daily with only sufficient stock to sell within a day, continuing their business the next day. They cross the border using passports or Temporary Travel Documents (TTDs). For those traders who use their passports to cross the border, they negotiate with the immigration officers to stamp their passports with as many entry and exit stamps as possible on one page, utilising any available space in the process. Doing so ensures that their passports do not quickly run out of pages, therefore requiring applying for a new passport. Traders who have no official documents illegally cross the border through the facilitation of the immigration staff at the border posts on both the Zambian and Zimbabwean sides. Illegal traders pay the immigration officers for letting them cross. There are also traders who cross the border illegally through Lake Kariba or the Zambezi River (i.e. by not going through an official border post), usually when they want to smuggle illicit goods (such as beer) which are not permitted to cross the border. This is similar to many borders on the African continent where a border becomes an obstruction to the easy passage of commodities (Pophiwa 2010a) or where immigration officials abuse their power by demanding bribes from traders crossing the border (for, for instance, exceeding the permissible quantities of goods) (Daimon 2016). Crossing the border through undesignated points is risky, especially for those who cross through the Zambezi River in dugout canoes. Stories are told of dugout canoes capsized by hippos and crocodiles, and the injury and death of many smugglers. Not only is there a risk in crossing the Zambezi, but also in travelling on foot to the Zambezi through thick bush and wild animal infested areas, given the high number of reports of incidences between humans and wildlife in the Kariba area (Marowa and Matanzima 2019). Lions, elephants, and buffaloes in particular are known to sometimes attack people.

Social Capital of Traders Social capital, for our purposes, can be defined as mutual and reciprocal relationships or networks established between two or more people, with the aim of maximising personal utility (Mutopo 2010). Some cross-border traders at times give their merchandise to other traders in Kariba to sell for them, especially when they are unable to cross the border for business in Zambia due to social problems and responsibilities, and they might ask them to buy other goods on their behalf for resell in Zimbabwe. One man explained to us how this occurs in the following words: We traders in Kariba trust each other so much. As we travel back and forth together over time, we create good relations and bonds. It is because of this trust that sometimes when one of us is facing serious problems, we can look for friends who can go and sell our goods and buy other commodities for resale on our behalf… It’s like we do business for each other. (Interview 23 June 2019)

Such networks are predicated on trust, which is cultivated over time amongst the traders. In the context of economic hardships, this is crucial for many traders,

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especially those who might have little capital to start a business. One interviewee confirmed this by saying: When one has few goods to trade with low profits, they find it better to entrust their goods with others [with more goods to sell] so they can sell for them… They will then start crossing the border on their own when they obtain more money maybe through sending others. (Interview 23 June 2019)

By pooling resources, aspiring traders will be able to gain a foot in the business, something they would not have been able to do on their own. This is similar to an observation made of cross-border traders who would carry with them goods on behalf of their network members from home, to sell in Johannesburg and Cape Town (Peberdy 2000). Social capital also helps many traders establish regular clients of their products and existing clients can act as well as referees for new clients (Muzvidziwa 2001). One male trader explained that “social networking is important to me because I do not spend much time in Zambia; I just deliver my products to my Zambian friends and clients and then return to Zimbabwe in a few hours” (Interview 14 June 2019). This has been observed likewise in the case of Zimbabwean cross-border traders in South Africa, whose marketing networks include family relationships and friendships (Mutopo 2010). Additionally, some traders (at Kariba) have been able to expand their networks to include immigrations officials, with these officials assisting traders to smuggle their illegal goods through the border post.

Benefits of Cross-Border Trading This section discusses the diverse benefits of ICBT to Kariba traders and residents. It demonstrates how trade exists as a survival strategy in the face of economic hardships, if only by reducing the hunger and poverty experienced in Kariba.

Profitability of the Trade Though traders operate at a small-scale, they obtain profits from their sales. The profits accrued from trading are higher than those obtained from local trading largely because the Zambian Kwacha (ZK) (currency) is stable and more valuable than the Zimbabwean RTGS$, at the time of the research. The RTGS$ is characterised by high inflation rates, devaluation, and cash shortages, all having a bearing on the profitability of trade. As shown in Table 3.1, numerous products sold in Siavonga generate significant profit margins, with such commodities as bread, sugar, soap, and fish having profits of above 50%, as at February 2019. These profits accrued through a stable currency attract many Kariba people in terms of venturing into cross-border trade. As a way to hedge against Zimbabwean

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Table 3.1 Profit of commodities traded in Siavonga by Kariba traders (February 2019) Item

Quantity

Buying price in RTGS$

Selling price in ZK

Selling price converted to RTGS$

Profit in %

Bread

1 loaf

1.45

10

2.50

72

Sugar

2 kgs

4.00

23

6.00

50

Sona (soap)

1 bar

1.00

8

2.00

100

Peanut Butter

1 bottle

2.30

15

3.50

43

Fish

1 kg

4.00

23

6.00

50

Table 3.2 Changes in buying and selling prices of fish in 2019

Month

Buying price per kg in RTGS$

Selling price per kg in ZK

Selling price when converted to RTGS$

February

4.00

23

6.00

June

8.00

20

12.00

currency devaluation, it is also often a way to convert their profits from ZK to USD. The challenge faced by traders is that the consumption needs of their households in Kariba inhibit their capacity to reinvest profits into purchasing stocks for reselling in Zambia, thereby eroding their capital. They have to balance reinvesting their profits and purchasing household goods. Nevertheless, the traders still find cross-border trade a viable livelihood strategy. Because of a high inflation rate, alongside devaluation of RTGS$ and changes in exchange rates occurring in Zimbabwe, the buying and selling prices of commodities also change over time. Table 3.2 illustrates how fish has been marked by fluctuations in both buying and selling prices over a four-month period in 2019. The ongoing changes in buying and selling prices as well as in exchange rates bring a degree of uncertainty to ICBT, but the traders keep their monies in foreign currency (namely, the Zambian Kwacha, which is stable). They only change their money to RTGS$ when they want to purchase commodities to trade in Siavonga.

Employment and Income Generation ICBT is a form of employment in its own right (self-employment) and is particularly important in Zimbabwe given the low levels of employment in the formal economy. In the Kariba context, the way in which most of the traders traverse the border early morning and return home in the evening bears resemblance to the working day within formal employment. In previous years, cross-border trade was associated with the less-educated citizens but, currently, educated Kariba residents also venture

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into this trade. This resonates with a study by Chikanda and Tawodzera (2017) of cross-border traders from Harare, with 66% of their sample holding a high school diploma, and 14% having post-secondary educational qualifications. We interviewed numerous young men with diplomas and university degrees engaging in cross-border trade and mainly focusing on trading fish. One graduate from Chinhoyi University of Technology said that: I started going to Zambia at the end of May. The reason why I started going is because things were no longer viable in the graphic and design business I was into. I used to design company and school uniform logos. I also designed receipt and quotation books. High inflation rates affected my business. I have a wife and one child that I take care of. As a breadwinner I had to look for other sources of funds. Then I decided to join cross-border trade. (Interview 15 June 2019)

Furthermore, some women with a minimum pass in their General Certificate in Education or Ordinary Levels engage in cross-border trade. They had no funds for tertiary education at the time they completed secondary school. One of them remarked that “I have secondary school education; had it not been for the current hardships, I would be enrolled in colleges. But, I hope to enrol when the economy improves”. As well, informal cross-border traders open opportunities for other Kariba residents, creating a kind of ‘multiplier effect’ (Gumbo 2012). Some female traders employ temporary maids when they are in Zambia and pay them in Zambian Kwacha. Thus, the everyday patterns of ICBT provide opportunities for others who benefit indirectly from ICBT such as housemaids and commuter drivers. Housemaids are paid for taking care of children and carrying out house chores. Commuter drivers benefit from the bus fare paid by the cross-border traders. Further, this ‘multiplier effect’ does not occur in Zimbabwe only but also in Zambia. There are some Zambian citizens who sell fish in Siavonga on behalf of Zimbabweans and they add their own mark-up price. Explaining how this occurs, one women said that: There are some Zambians who are clever who come to us at the market in Siavonga, and liaise with us so that they sell our fish for us (on our behalf) in areas where we are not allowed to go by the Siavonga town police. They add their mark-up price to the price that we would have told them. And they make money out of nothing. They return with our monies at the end of the day. (Interview 27 April 2019)

But, this is risky as these Zambian traders may not return with the Zimbabwean traders’ money.

Food Security and Access to Scarce Good ICBT is a significant means of stabilising food security at household level, particularly given that traders mentioned that they bring foodstuff for consumption back home. A trader narrated that each time she goes to Siavonga she comes back with foodstuffs like soya mince, beans, and cabbage. She went on to say that Zambian foods are tasteless as compared to Zimbabwean foods, but “we just buy these foods

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because they are affordable” (Interview 27 June 2019). Food items are expensive locally (in Kariba), such that purchasing goods from Zambia is another means of maximising their profits. Furthermore, in the Kariba context, as traders cross the border daily, this makes it convenient and possible for them to purchase each food item they need at home whenever and only when there is a need, a benefit which would otherwise be impossible to those who cross the border three or four times a month. Moyo (2017) indicates that cross-border trading activities increases food security in Zimbabwe. This is true for Kariba, given the rising of prices of local foodstuffs, and even the unavailability of cash to purchase food. Returning from Siavonga with foodstuffs for home consumption thus minimises the prospects of hunger and starvation. Interviews conducted by researchers of cross-border traders in different parts of Zimbabwe such as Masvingo (Mupoto 2010; Muzvidziwa 2001) and Plumtree (Moyo 2017) demonstrate that food security at household level is improved as a result of ICBT as traders are able to buy food from the proceeds of their trade. It emerged from our interviews in Kariba that informal cross-border trade also assists in bringing in products such as electrical gadgets and motor vehicle spare parts which are unavailable or very expensive in Kariba. Most Kariba residents are impoverished and importing affordable goods is an advantage for traders for own consumption, but they also sell these in Kariba. One trader explained that: Our cross-border activities are very important to us. There are a lot of benefits we obtain from cross-border trade. When we go to Zambia we buy phones, motor parts, construction parts that are not available in Kariba. Buying them from Zambia is cheaper that buying them from Harare or South Africa because it’s expensive to go to Harare. (Interview 23 June 2019)

Living in the borderlands is advantageous in this way, as it facilitates access to a range of commodities which are not easily available for Zimbabweans living far from the borders.

Gender Dynamics of ICBT There are a number of gender dynamics embedded in informal cross-border trade. Over time, with the loss of formal employment (particularly by men) or the decline in real wages in the formal economy because of hyperinflation, the significance of husbands’ incomes for the household economy has declined in Zimbabwe. Many wives in Kariba began to work informally to supplement household incomes through ICBT. Female traders interviewed highlighted, as did their male counterparts, that cross-border trade enabled them to contribute financially to their households’ streams of income. One mentioned that “since I started engaging in this trade I have saved more money than my husband brings home… I also bring foodstuffs such as soya mince, eggs and clothes from Zambia for my children. I significantly assist at home” (Interview 18 June 2019). Their husbands of course also consume the foodstuffs they bring from Zambia.

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But challenges arise for women in this context. For instance, the shifting roles of women as breadwinners have sometimes led to gender-based violence (GBV) as males feel emasculated. One female Kariba trader narrated that she is always fighting with her husband over her proceeds from cross-border trading. The husband is jealous because of the profits and food she brings to the household that overrides his salary in importance. Some days the husband deters the wife from going to Siavonga and verbally abuses her by calling her a prostitute if she comes back late from Siavonga (Interview 17 April 2019). Research elsewhere shows that monetary proceeds from cross-border trading activities often precipitate conflictual relations between husbands and wives as the former struggle to reassert their threatened hegemonic masculinities. Symbolic violence has increased as men in matrimonial relations attempt to override the wives’ ‘economic muscles’ (Muruviwa and Dube 2016; Muzvidziwa 2001). Spending nights in Zambia thus puts women’s marriages at risk if they are suspected of engaging in prostitution by their husbands. Even the earnings they generate from sales in Siavonga may be interpreted by husbands as a result of selling their bodies. It is indeed very common for female cross-border traders from Zimbabwe to be “stigmatised as prostitutes” (Chiliya et al. 2012: 564). This labelling of female cross-border traders as prostitutes is the creation of an imposed immoral identity on them as they are often referred to as ‘mahure’ (a Shona term for prostitutes) (Muzvidziwa 2001). The fact that some women cross the border every day increases the suspicion as they are believed to be spending more time with their ‘boyfriends’ in Zambia and less time in Zimbabwe with their husbands. Sex work evidently does occur, as some women date Zambian men and they use vending or trading as a cover. We were told this by interviewees, but did not seek to verify its truth. Other studies speak about transactional sexual relations arising between female traders and truck drivers in exchange for free transport or other services (Gumbo 2012). Female traders in Kariba also indicated that they were viewed as being prostitutes especially if their businesses were doing well and they had several men in their social network who they could ask for assistance during their trips to Siavonga.

Conclusion Informal cross-border trading has over the years been an important livelihood option in Zimbabwe, particularly given the worsening economic problems such as chronic unemployment, high inflation rates, and cash shortages. In this context, this chapter examined the importance of cross-border trade as a livelihood strategy in the border town of Kariba, along the Zambian border. Kariba traders cross the border almost daily with assorted products to sell in the nearby town of Siavonga (Zambia), and they often also return with commodities in short supply in Zimbabwe, to sell or consume in Kariba. Social networks are crucial to the activities of these traders, including networks amongst themselves, with border post officials and with Zambians in Siavonga. These networks facilitate their cross-border trade while also minimising

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possible challenges, including market access. Though cross-border trade is not a highly profitable venture for Kariba traders, it does have key benefits in terms of reducing levels of poverty and enhancing household consumption. This is the case for male traders and for female traders who are increasingly becoming central to trade across the Zambian-Zimbabwean border. As elsewhere in Zimbabwe and beyond, residents of Kariba town living in the immediate vicinity of a borderline make use of the border to their own advantage. In this regard, they have not been mere passive recipients and victims of the prevailing systemic crisis in Zimbabwe, as they enact agency through cross-border activities on an ongoing basis. In doing so, they face numerous obstacles and continue to live precarious lives as they seek to navigate their way through the changing dynamics of the crisis. Thus, Kariba residents are not fixed on the present only, as they look as well to the future in reconfiguring their lives and livelihoods, even though within the confines of a seemingly never-ending crisis. The border remains central to both their present and future.

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Chapter 4

Land Rights, Displacements, and Rural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe’s South-Eastern Borderlands: The Case of the Chisumbanje Ethanol Project Perseverence Madhuku

and Joseph Mujere

Abstract The displacement of peasant communities by the Chisumbanje ethanol project in Chipinge district in Zimbabwe triggered controversies on whether the Zimbabwean government was sincere in implementing a pro-peasant land reform programme. This also generated debates about the impact of large-scale land investment projects on rural livelihoods in the country, including for seemingly tenuresecure communal area villagers. Conflicts were generated by the displacement of peasants from their ancestral lands to pave way for this large-scale ethanol land investment project. Using ethnographic data collected from displaced communities, the chapter discusses the many and varied ways marginalised communities in the south-eastern borderlands have experienced state-regulated land displacements. Overall, the chapter highlights the dual and simultaneous challenges of borderland communities—being marginalised as borderland communities and being displaced to pave way for a large-scale land investment project. However, it also brings to the fore the agency of the Chisumbanje villagers regarding their responses to displacement. The reflexive responses of affected villagers were largely framed by the fact that, as borderland communities, they had historical and kinship cross-border ties they could use to migrate across the border temporarily or even possibly find new forms of livelihoods on the other side of the border. Keywords Involuntary resettlement · Peasants · Large-scale investments · Chisumbanje · Borderlands · Zimbabwe

P. Madhuku (B) Department of African History, University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany e-mail: [email protected] J. Mujere Department of Modern History, University of York, York, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_4

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Introduction In November 2018, a decade after the establishment of a sugar cane plantation for an ethanol project in Chisumbanje (in Manicaland Province) close to Zimbabwe’s border with Mozambique by Green Fuel Investments Private Limited company, a local village elder bitterly complained about the imminent threat of eviction that his community faced to pave way for further expansion of the project. He equated his community’s situation to that of tiny ants (zvitsunzi) trampled on by elephants (Bus Stop TV Documentary 2021). His narrative captured the vulnerability of rural communities when dealing with private investors with strong government backing. Over the past decade, villagers’ efforts to reclaim lost lands or obtain appropriate compensation from the company have not yielded results. Their everyday lives have been not only characterised by the loss of agricultural and pastoral lands but by the foetid air of the chemicals from the ethanol plant, loss of livestock, communal conflicts, and transnational migration. In this chapter, we use the case of Green Fuel’s Chisumbanje ethanol project as a lens to examine the nexus of land rights, displacements, and the livelihoods of borderland communities in Zimbabwe. We argue that Chisumbanje villagers’ responses to displacements were largely framed by their proximity to the border between Zimbabwe and Mozambique and their historical interactions with communities across the border. The case of Chisumbanje raises important questions about the current scholarship on land redistribution in Zimbabwe. Scholarship on land redistribution in Zimbabwe has now moved beyond the earlier works that viewed the Fast Track Land Reform Programme as either a chaotic attempt by the government to manipulate the land hungry masses (Hammar et al. 2003; Alexander 2006) or a social revolution that completely altered land reform and access in favour of the landless (Moyo and Yeros 2005, 2007; Scoones et al. 2010). Of great importance in this growing scholarship are attempts to recover the experiences of farmworkers (Rutherford 2016) and the centrality of restitution in land discourses (Fontein 2009; Mujere 2011). However, large-scale land investment projects-induced displacements in communal lands have received little attention in current debates on land. It is within this context that the chapter explores the intersection between large-scale land investment projects, land rights of local communities, and livelihoods of people living along borderlands. It argues that communities in Chisumbanje have been affected by large-scale land investment projects since colonial times and they often responded by either fighting against their displacement, negotiating for farmland across the border in Mozambique, or using their linguistic and ethnic connections to permanently migrate to Mozambique. The chapter is based on ethnographic data collected in Chisumbanje among displaced peasants in 2014. In addition, we examined newspaper reports and parliamentary debates on the displacements of peasants in paving way for expanding the sugar cane plantations and the ethanol project.

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Background: Land Grabs, Land Rights and Rural Livelihoods There has recently been an upsurge in scholarship on biofuels and the associated ‘land grabs’ in the Global South (Borras et al. 2010; De Schutter 2011; Fairhead et al. 2012; Hall 2011; Cotula 2012). Using various case studies across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, scholars have analysed the impact of large-scale land deals on livelihoods, societal relations, and development trajectories. On the one hand, proponents of biofuels have hailed the investor rush arguing that biofuel projects bring new livelihood opportunities for the rural poor and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to governments of the Global South (Oxfam 2008). On the other hand, several studies have demonstrated that these large-scale land investments have resulted in widespread peasant displacement and disruption of rural livelihoods in developing countries (Hall et al. 2015; White et al. 2012; McMichael 2012; Cotula 2013; Delang et al. 2012; McAllister 2015). Large-scale land deals have often resulted in conflicts between affected communities and investors. Such disputes have become common in rural Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The assumption that peasants resist large-scale land investment projects is ingrained in the politics of social movements, for example, the activities of La Via Campensina (LVC) and the Landless Workers Movement (MST) especially in Brazil. One of the challenges to this narrative is that it fails to adequately account for the wide range of ‘responses from below’. In addition, there is a tendency to fall into the dualist trap of the resistance or non-resistance paradigm. Besides, the focus on cases where organised social movements exist ignores other instances in which there are no known organised movements. With the works of Scott (1985), research on peasant agency took a significant shift. In Weapons of the Weak (Scott 1985) and later Hidden Transcripts (Scott 1990), it is emphasised that attention should be paid to hidden transcripts—the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups. Describing and analysing everyday forms of resistance and struggle engendered debates about daily interactions between subordinate groups on the one hand and state power on the other, across the globe. At the same time, the idea of a unified peasant class (and of subordinate classes in general) which at all times and places resists in the same manner overlooks important everyday realities. Arguably, there is a possibility that peasants’ actions seek to advance individual interests rather than class interests. In most cases, when large-scale land investment projects commence, the investors interact with various social groups that are differentiated and have specific expectations and aspirations (Hall et al. 2015; Hall and Paradza 2012). A key point worth noting is that resistance is highly contextual based on a complex set of experiences (Baird 2017; Borras and Franco 2013). In a Special Issue of the Journal of Peasant Studies, Hall et al. (2015) acknowledged the complexity and diversity of resistance. They preferred the term “political reactions from below” and emphasised that resistance to land deals is “vastly more varied and complex than is usually assumed” (Hall et al. 2015: 467). Most importantly, they drew attention to a spectrum of reactions to land deals that extend beyond resistance. For instance,

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in Ukraine, now home to some of the largest farms in the world, Mamonova (2015: 607), in the same collection, shows how “politics of dispossessed groups depend on the terms of inclusion”. These findings present another fascinating dimension of peasant agency, and much can be gained from analysing the impact of political trajectories, personal interests, and other variables on peasant agency. Even more nuanced are the studies on borders, borderland communities and everyday lives. The vast scholarship on borderlands has opened exciting new avenues of inquiry, allowing us to see the complex nature of borders—as spaces of alliances, resistance, subversion, and cooperation at different levels (Nugent and Asiwaju 1996; Weitzberg 2017; Zartman 2010; Musoni 2016; Pophiwa 2010a, 2010b). Seen in this way, borderlands are spaces where states, local leadership, and communities interact or compete to develop ways of accommodating each other’s interests. Scholars working on borderlands in Southern Africa have gone beyond state-centric narratives to look at the everyday livelihoods of communities and the practicalities of how people defend their livelihoods in the borderlands. The result has been more refined perspectives on mundane borderland activities such as smuggling, bribery, prostitution, tax evasion, among other activities. Pophiwa’s works, for instance, demonstrate how smuggling along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border is a form of livelihood for communities involved. Instead of using terms such as smuggling with their criminalising connotations, it is more rewarding to view these activities as ‘second economies’ or ‘underground economies’ (Pophiwa 2010b: 292). Such reflections enrich our understanding of borderland communities in relation to mobility, informality, and migration. Few scholars working on land issues have taken the initiative to use the border as a critical lens to understand rural livelihoods. The link between land displacements and the utility of borderlands in times of precarity has not received much attention. An exception is Turner’s work on the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands which examines how communities navigate, rework, and contest state modernising projects (Turner et al 2015). Similarly, Kachena and Spiegel (2019) explore the Zimbabwean government’s transboundary projects on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique borderlands and how belonging is negotiated among various groups. Meanwhile, MacGonagle (2007) and Marta (2011) place more emphasis on social connections embedded in local histories of borderland communities and how these shape exchanges among borderland communities. Marta’s study on the Zimbabwean-Mozambique borderlands concludes that the border allows and fosters continuing flows between the two sides. In fact, communities have maintained old bonds and connections despite the existence of an official boundary (Marta 2011).

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Land, Displacements, and Livelihoods in the Borderlands South-eastern Zimbabwe is one of the regions in the country that has historically suffered from land displacements. In the early decades of colonialism, the region attracted the attention of the colonial state as it sought to establish wildlife conservation areas. This drastically affected the communities whose livelihoods were primarily based on a combination of agriculture and hunting. Wildlife conservation became a major developmental trajectory for the region, leading to what Brockington and Igoe (2006) call ‘eviction for conservation’. The establishment of parks such as the Gonarezhou National Park emerged from this way of seeing the landscape as a wilderness area unfit for any form of human settlement (Wolmer 2007). However, in the 1960s, there was a dramatic shift in how the colonial government viewed this region. While earlier development trajectories conceptualised the region as a wilderness to be conserved, it came to be seen as an asset to be exploited productively and sustainably by the commercial sector. This conception of the region coincided with the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Rhodesian white minority government. The economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations following the UDI forced the Rhodesian government to develop the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), formerly Native Reserves, and turn them from taxpaying reservoirs of labour into productive areas. At the fifth conference of Southern African Surveyors held in Salisbury, delegates agreed that the future of the European in Rhodesia was extremely limited unless the TTLs were developed (The Rhodesia Herald, 9 April 1974). In that context, the Sabi Limpopo Authority was established in 1965 with the mandate to exploit, conserve and utilise the water resources of the Sabi Limpopo River to promote and expedite national economic development interests. Chisumbanje had the advantage of being surrounded by fertile black basalt soil known by the locals as ndowoyo. In line with this, the government authorised the establishment of the Chisumbanje irrigation scheme covering 6,000 hectares of land. Nonetheless, the financial and human resources limited the amount of irrigated land and, in 1966, the project commenced with only 486 hectares of land. In 1970, the Tribal Trust Lands Development Corporation (TILCOR) took over the Chisumbanje project from the Sabi Limpopo Authority. By 1972, the area under irrigation had expanded to 1,372 hectares and TILCOR projected further expansion. Several families were displaced to pave the way for the establishment of the Chisumbanje estate. Initially, the state planned to resettle the displaced Africans in new areas, but this never materialised. While some displaced families relocated to new places, most of them crossed the border into Mozambique, where they settled as refugees. Against this background, the histories of displacement in this region have been constantly reshaped and re-imagined by various actors. In 2007, the government of Zimbabwe represented by the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) signed a 20-year joint venture agreement with Billy Rautenbach’s Green Fuel Investments to lease over 40,000 hectares of land of ARDA

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Chisumbanje Estate to Green Fuel to start sugar cane production for ethanol production. The 40,000 hectares represented a significant expansion of the initial estate boundaries. The finer details of this land deal remain unclear. However, ARDA provided the land and received a ten per cent stake in this deal, while Green Fuel Investments invested capital and held a ninety per cent stake. Rautenbach, a controversial business mogul, was instrumental in mobilising funds towards the construction of the Chisumbanje ethanol plant. During this time, he used his political networks to occupy Middle Sabi Estate and Nuanetsi Range both in the Lowveld region (Legislative Assembly Debate, May 2009). The plant is the largest in Africa and is modelled along the lines of Brazil’s biofuel industry. But the project was marred by contradictions within both government and local leadership from its inception. When the project began, it coincided with the formation of the Government of National Unity, following the much-disputed elections in 2008. Within the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANUPF) party, a section of politicians felt that they were not properly consulted; hence, they withdrew their support from the project. In addition, some politicians from the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), felt that the whole project was in fact a ZANU-PF project that did not consider national interests. Apart from these simmering tensions, it appears the government was anxious to broker joint ventures with private investors and revive rural agricultural productivity. However, these joint ventures and ‘sub-letting’ arrangements increasingly became a source of elite capture. As of 2020, twenty-four ARDA-owned estate farms were turned into commercial ventures with a variety of investors, most of whom were connected to political elites. The way in which this project was implemented ignored the concerns of the local communities and their land rights. Even the much-heralded indigenisation policies of the Zimbabwean government seemed to have been selectively implemented, invoking De Schutter’s (2016) notion of ‘tainted lands’ in which both institutional corruption and transactional corruption allow investors to control vast lands. Such investors become ‘untouchables’ who can displace rural communities with the support of the state and state institutions (Hobbes 2016). In official reports, the project was publicised as a US600 million-dollar scheme, but the project’s financial benefits did not trickle down to communities. Certainly, local communities were not consulted, and most did not receive any compensation. Villagers were surprised to find their crops destroyed as the company dug irrigation canals and prepared the land for sugar cane cultivation. As one villager narrated: There was no consultation at all; it was this time of the year [harvesting] when we saw tractors in the fields ploughing down our crops. We did not receive any compensation for the crops destroyed by the company. Local leadership could not clearly explain to us what was happening. The company officials told us that this was a government directive. (Interview with Makwarise, 23 July 2014)

This resonates with Matondi’s (2011) argument that the politics of biofuels is a power game where elites decide for rural smallholder farmers who cannot easily voice their concerns.

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The signing of the land deal between the Zimbabwean government and Green Fuel reflects the ambiguity of property regimes in communal areas and the ensuing competing land claims. When the Chisumbanje joint venture was signed in 2007, ARDA was to provide 40,000 hectares of its Chisumbanje estate. Yet, villagers in Chisumbanje disputed this fact, arguing that, historically, ARDA owned 5,112 hectares of land only and that the government was taking advantage of the project to encroach into their ancestral lands and displace them. This background of long historical attachment to the land led local communities to contest the land deal. In contrast, ARDA officials argue that the parastatal owned the land, but for years the company could not utilise the land; as a result, local communities invaded the land and ignored official warnings to vacate. ARDA’s claims to the land occupied by villagers developed in the early 1980s when the then ARDA Board Chairman, Patrick Chinamasa, reported that: A feasibility report is being prepared for the implementation of the first phase of the Greater Chisumbanje Development Scheme. This scheme will, at completion, entail the construction of a major dam on the Sabi River and the development of a net irrigation area exceeding 37 000 hectares. (ARDA Report 1983/1984)

The feasibility report that Chinamasa was alluding to was conducted by Atkins Consulting Engineers (UK) in 1983. The report recommended the expansion of the Chisumbanje irrigation scheme (Atkins Land and Water Management 1983). The implementation of this recommendation was planned to start in 1986. It is probably at this point that ARDA also pegged the adjacent land area, “in anticipation of further development in the near future” (Makombe 2013: 2). However, the recommendations of the Atkins Report were never implemented. In a letter addressing the allegations of displacement, Green Fuel reiterated ARDA’s claim that ARDA legally expropriated the land claimed by villagers in the 1960s. The company argued that “all the land the company occupies cannot be classified as the land of the ancestors, but the land has been set aside for agricultural purposes since the 1960s” (Green Fuel Social Corporate Responsibility Office, 30 May 2014). Thus, Green Fuel dismissed the community’s autochthonous claims to land on the basis that the land had been alienated in the 1960s. As Vermeulen and Cotula (2010: 913) note in the case of Tanzania and Mozambique, ancestral autochthony alone does not provide necessary bargaining power for indigenous communities, and, due to this inherent weakness, communities are locked in unfavourable “negotiation and development pathways”. While community elders use autochthony as a key marker of belonging, the government uses legal tools, particularly the post-1980 Communal Land Act, to displace communities and pave way for large-scale investment projects. Some of these legislations, with roots in the colonial period, have been conveniently used by the government to forge ahead with land grabs despite the protests by affected communities who communally own, or at least possess, the land. In rural Zimbabwe, peasants have usufruct rights to use the land and benefit from it, but the government can displace communities when deemed necessary. Wily (2013: 13) is right to argue that this legal denial of the right to own land turns rural households into “tenants of

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the state”. The implication is that even this lawful occupancy of land is restricted to dwelling and farm plots. One Tanzanian judge observed in 1994 that the reality for millions of rural Africans is that they are “little or more than squatters on their land” (quoted in Wily 2013: 13). Consequently, this affects their livelihoods as they do not have secure tenure on the land.

Land Struggles and Livelihoods Among Borderland Communities When the government signed the Green Fuel land agreement to establish a sugar cane plantation and ethanol production on ARDA-owned Chisumbanje Estate, the land was argued to be arid and idle, making it ideal for biofuel production. This definition of land as marginal and idle in rural Africa has led to misleading representations of actual land rights. The notion of ‘underutilised’, ‘marginalised’, ‘idle’ or ‘unproductive’ land is a myth. In such narratives, people deriving their livelihoods from the land are made invisible. Yet, the so-called ‘ownerless’ and ‘unused’ land is at times the source of subsistence for rural peasants. Headman Chinyamukwakwa, in an interview, highlighted that: Was this place without people? How can they [Green Fuel] say this land was empty? It was called Chisumbanje because it had people. We have been living and farming here from time immemorial. (Interview with Headman Chinyamukwakwa, 28 July 2014)

Prior to the displacements, cotton was the main source of income for many communal area households. They pursued this not only because of the monetary returns but also due to the extensive support cotton growers got from companies such as Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (COTTCO) through loans, fertilisers, pesticides, and seeds. Many used large pieces of land for cotton farming. The place of cotton in people’s livelihoods prior to the establishment of the ethanol project can be summarised by sayings such as ‘tonje ndiro chairo’ (‘cotton is the one’) or ‘you can never go wrong with cotton’ (Mombeshora et al. 2001). Several villagers were able to build decent houses, educate their children, and improve their livelihoods significantly. Not only do conflicts such as around the ethanol project reflect the contested meanings of development in communal lands, but they also highlight the top-down state-imposed character of rural development. What the state deemed idle land was a source of livelihood for many communal area dwellers. The major wave of evictions to pave way for Green Fuel sugar cane production saw the displacement of about 1,733 households (Chipinge Rural District Council 2013). The figure of displaced people was certainly higher given that numerous displaced were never officially recorded. Of the officially recognised displaced households, only 172 were compensated with only 0.5 acres (18 lines) of irrigated land (Mutopo and Chiweshe 2014). Additionally, the allocated plots were in unproductive areas with inconsistent water supply. The 18 lines of sugar cane allocated to villagers on estate land were insufficient for their needs, particularly those with large families. A

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case in point is the story of Mr. William Mhlanga, a villager in Chinyamukwakwa area who had 58 children from a polygamous marriage and 600 cattle, 70 goats, and 24 sheep (Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Lands and Agriculture, Public Hearing on Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant, 11 July 2014). Before his displacement, he ‘owned’ 30 hectares of land. However, he lost all his land to the sugar cane plantation. The establishment of the ethanol project not only deprived him of his rights to cropping lands but also grazing lands. Mhlanga appealed unsuccessfully to the District Administrator to be given a bigger portion of land. The allocation of the plots—left in the hands of local chiefs and headmen—was prone to manipulation and corruption, exacerbating unequal access to land. Many women, who depended on land as a source of income, did not receive compensation for their lost lands. In fact, sextortion—sexual favours in exchange for land, jobs, and food—manifested at different levels, further diminishing women’s access to land. First, chiefs responsible for allocating plots demanded sex favours from younger women in exchange for land. Due to desperation, some women accepted these terms to access land. Secondly, women’s access to manual jobs at the Green Fuel company was also tied to sexual favours (The Standard, 1 May 2016). Villagers who refused to take the allocated small plots and continued to contest the company’s claims to the land were at a loss. Using the mantra, ‘no development is imposed’, villagers rejected what they saw as exploitation and demanded more land. While villagers’ refusal to accept small plots for irrigation was a useful strategy intended to force the investor to give back expropriated lands, it had inherent weaknesses. Villagers risked losing both their land and the small new plots leaving them more vulnerable. This strategy also unintentionally divided solidarities and undermined the prospects of collective mobilisation against dispossession among the villagers. Once the villagers were deprived of their land, their livelihoods were left anchored on livestock. Chisumbanje had a thriving cattle economy dating back to the colonial period. The sparse grazing veldt in the Save valley and proximity to the ZimbabweMozambique border allowed families to expand their herds. This thriving cattle culture was severely disrupted by the sugar cane plantation. Apart from the displacement of locals from land and the disruption of their livelihoods, Green Fuel’s operations contaminated water sources that livestock and villagers depended on. Harmful underground water polluted the Jerawachera stream, a Save River tributary and the primary water source for the greater part of Chisumbanje. It is not clear whether Environmental Impact Assessments were carried out before the project began, despite Green Fuel officials’ claims. The Environmental Management Agency (EMA) director, for example, revealed that the company was working without an environmental impact certificate (The Sunday Mail, 5 October 2014; The Herald, 31 May 2012). Contaminated water killed several livestock as well as aquatic life. The effects of contaminated water were limited to not only animals but also included villagers, who either consumed or came into contact with it. For instance, it was reported that a villager by the name, Robert Chivaura, developed a rare skin disorder from either drinking or coming into contact with water contaminated by chemicals used in the production of ethanol, but never got support for medical treatment from

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the investor (Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 2014). Consequently, many residents of Chisumbanje transferred their cattle to Mozambique, where some of them resorted to marrying Mozambican women to get land and secure their livestock. More importantly, the company pushed many able-bodied men into wage labour, leaving the elderly to herd the livestock. While the contamination of water sources presented a great risk for villagers living on the margins of the ethanol production facilities, the grabbing of common grazing lands worsened an already precarious situation for villagers. Cattle that ‘strayed’ into Green Fuel ‘lands’ could only be returned to the owner after the payment of a USD4 fine for each herd. In many instances, owners were forced to sell some of their beasts for a pittance to the same company to raise cash for fines (Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 2014). Those who failed to pay the fines were forced to work in the company’s sugar plantations to raise money to pay the fines for leaving their cattle to stray onto the sugar cane plantations. The confiscation of cattle that strayed into company property thus forced some villagers into selling their labour to the company to reclaim their cattle. If no one turned up to claim the stray cattle, the company organised auctions to dispose of the beasts. However, to avoid the constant conflicts with the company, some villagers used their kinship ties across the border in Mozambique to transfer their livestock there. The company’s presence generated new dynamics of accumulation at the local level, intensifying inequalities and local conflicts. In Chisumbanje, like other rural communities, social differentiation has existed over time. The impact of the land deals on and within local communities is likewise differentiated. As a result, resistance has not been a uniform process; it invokes the caution that we need to “rethink resistance because not everyone in the community is interested in the complete overhaul of the project” (Hall et al. 2015: 483). It is not only that different classes or sub-classes of people are affected differently; rather, people perceive and interpret the experience differently based on a range of variables (Borras and Franco 2013). Local chiefs and headmen who benefitted from the land deal have been at the forefront of condemning those demanding their land back. For instance, in contrast to the protesting villagers, Headman Chinyamukwakwa praised the government for implementing the project while condemning the protesting villagers: No one in government is seeing what is happening here, and as community leaders, we are sending out (dis)stress signals. This project rescued us from drought-induced perennial hunger through irrigation development. Now, these thugs are being funded by opportunistic political formations to totally derail the true narrative of this project and paint a bad picture. (The Herald, 1 October 2015)

Meanwhile, most of the villagers complained about corruption among the chiefs, accusing them of accepting bribes from both the company and the government to support the large-scale land investment. For instance, the company constructed a house for the local chief (Garahwa) as well as offering him a vehicle and other monetary benefits. However, such benefits were not offered to sub-chiefs and headmen, thereby engendering conflicts even in the local traditional leadership. Interestingly, villagers who previously lacked access to land but benefitted from the small plots

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provided by the estate had a different view of the project. For instance, Ketina Makanya, a landless widow, and a beneficiary of the smallholder irrigation scheme, applauded Green Fuel for providing her with a plot and integrating her into the smallholder sugar cane production scheme. For her, owning a piece of land after so many years of renting from others was a life-changing opportunity. Access to land altered her livelihood in many ways: I can now grow three rotational crops per year and sell the surplus to community members and vendors at Checheche growth point. Since we resettled in this area, we have been leasing farmland from other families, and sometimes individuals increased land prices making it difficult for us to access land. (Interview with Ketina Makanya, 27 July 2014)

One of the selling points for the Chisumbanje ethanol project was the alleged employment creation. The government of Zimbabwe had stated that when in full operation, the Green Fuel ethanol project would employ 8,000 workers, and most of these workers would be recruited from the affected villagers. Following the displacements, villagers anticipated employment opportunities in the Green Fuel company. However, communities complained about discrimination as most job opportunities for vana vemuganga (locals/autochthons) were limited to short-term contracts for sugar cane planting, harvesting, and cleaning, while permanent positions were reserved for maduma (outsiders). This was partly because of the demand for unskilled labour during the construction phase. Once the ethanol plant was completed, demand for more skilled labour, with experience in working in distilleries, increased and unskilled labour was laid off. This did not go down well with locals, who became disillusioned with their exclusion from jobs and displacement from their ancestral lands. Villagers labelled any outsider offered a job at the company a muduma, denoting a person who originated from Masvingo Province even when they came from other parts of the country. A muduma was, thus, a term that was deployed by the autochthons to refer to the ‘strangers’ or ‘outsiders’ employed by the company. This local-stranger dialectic was generated by the sense of grievance that locals had against the company for displacing them from their ancestral lands and for employing non-locals. Although Green Fuel’s plant was protected by state security, villagers occasionally engaged in violent protests against the company. The involvement of the government with its strong security apparatus had the effect of limiting the bargaining power of local communities. For instance, in 2013, when violence erupted as villagers demanded their land, Green Fuel received support from the local police, and leaders of the protests were arrested. In many cases, riot police and the army have been instrumental in silencing protesting villagers (Nehanda Radio, 10 January 2013). In October 2013, the villagers launched a wave of attacks against the company targeting irrigation infrastructure, agricultural machinery, and Green Fuel employees, especially those on patrols. Also, every rainy season, villagers would till the alienated land disregarding the boundaries set by the company, often leading to violent clashes between villagers and the company. Angry villagers argued that,

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Despite the community anger against the company and the government, senior government officials continued to publicly support the project and downplay its negative impact on rural livelihoods. The then Minister of Provincial Affairs in Manicaland, Mandi Chimene, for instance, once threatened villagers when she said: “We will command these people, we will teach them. This is a national project and anything that comes in its way, we will deal with it” (The Herald, 28 May 2013). Such utterances tend to embolden large-scale land investment companies to continue to displace villagers. While officials view protests merely as acts of lawless peasants fighting against progress, villagers see this as a struggle for their land rights and livelihoods.

Continued Struggles and Unfinished Business of Land Reform in Communal Areas As a result of the simmering tensions in Chisumbanje, a Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Lands and Agriculture visited the area in July 2014 to gather facts on the experiences of the displaced villagers. At a meeting with the committee delegation, local communities could not hide their feelings about the project. Angry villagers complained to the delegation about their expropriated land and demanded a complete overhaul of the project. Villagers were chanting slogans and holding placards highlighting their grievances. Some of the emotive messages on the placards include: hatidi neminda yedu! (‘we don’t want with our land!’), ivhu roenda kuvachena takarwirei? (‘our land is taken by white men, why did we fight?’), and varungu vaya vapetuka (‘whites are back’) (Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 2014). Most villagers felt that displacement and being dispossessed of their land by a single white person was a reversal of the land reform programme. Villagers in Chisumbanje argue that the deal, in a way, was a betrayal of what the government promised. Instead of negotiating a deal that would leave villagers secure in terms of land access, the government threatened the livelihoods of the Chisumbanje community. One informant narrated: I wonder why the government decided to treat us like this, we spent years in the forests fighting for this land, but today we are objects of ridicule; everywhere in the bars we are a laughing stock. I blame my father for wasting his time fighting the war of liberation; thirtysix years later, I am still fighting to take back my land. The government allowed one-white foreigner [Rautenbach] to displace close to 30,000 villagers. (Interview with Muyambo, 1 August 2014)

An angry liberation war veteran Julius Musademba added: “We went to war for this land but how come we are evicted from the land that we fought for? If it remains

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like this, then we can return to war. We will not stand by and watch this white man abuse our people and take our land for free” (The Zimbabwe, 22 December 2016). Local communities also filed several court cases against the company. At a public meeting held on 10 April 2015, villagers unanimously agreed to involve the courts, arguing that only legal processes would resolve the boundary conflict. There have, however, been several unsuccessful court cases since 2015. In 2018, the villagers dragged Green Fuel to court for continued invasion of their land without fulfilling the promise of transforming communal lands (Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights 2018). Further, local communities sought an order restraining Green Fuel from depriving them of access to their land and destroying their crops. While the High Court agreed on the merit of the matter, it disagreed about the urgency of the matter, arguing that the matter had been ongoing since 2009. By resorting to approaching the courts, villagers were invoking a strategy that resonates with what O’Brien (2013) calls rightful resistance: acts of challenging the state when rights promised are not delivered. Kerkvliet (2014: 51) expands on what this means, indicating that it takes place when “ordinary people with similar grievances in the same locality use legal means to beseech high authorities to make local officials stop mistreating them and do as the law stipulates and as the government has promised”. In all these Green Fuel court cases, communities raised pertinent issues related to unfulfilled promises. Yet, the involvement of the government in the project explains the failure of these efforts. Besides the fact that the project offers an opportunity for corruption, the government considers it a national project; hence, fighting the project is equally fighting the government and the nation. Out-grower community members owning plots of land within the estate have also raised demands pertinent to their group. Also known as settlers, there are 116 locals who were allowed to remain on the estate land as part of its community development agenda. Before the advent of the ethanol project, these farmers grew sugarcane which they sold to ARDA at a profit. However, Green Fuel operates in a different manner, as it prepares the land, and harvests the cane, and out-growers receive some profit from this. At first, out-growers, like other villagers, wanted their land back; however, they now demand better terms of incorporation in the land deal. They prefer a model where they are provided with inputs to grow sugarcane and sell to the company. They feel that this model allows them to exert more control over the agricultural processes: During the ARDA era, we were better off. Green Fuel does not allow us to grow sugarcane. We want to grow sugarcane on our own and sell it to the company. Right now, the company grows, processes and sells sugar cane; [it] only exploits us. There is nothing special about growing cane; it’s all farming which is familiar to everyone. They should allow us to be out-growers so that there is development. (Interview with Mrs. Khosa, 24 July 2014)

As a result of pressure from both the local communities and some government officials, the company started some community projects to alleviate challenges brought about by the presence of the company. Nutrition gardens, infrastructural developments, and village markets are attempts at soliciting local support for the venture. However, these developments are piecemeal and meant to facilitate the smooth extraction of resources. For instance, the refurbishment of Chiredzi-Tanganda road resulted

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from the desire to ferry sugarcane from particular points without infrastructural challenges. While these are examples of good corporate deeds, the same company undercuts the livelihoods of local peasants. As Villiers (2008: 90) argues, companies sometimes use Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a mask to distract locals from the devastating impacts the companies caused. Certainly, most of the CSR projects launched by Green Fuel took place without local consultation and based on assumptions of what the communities needed. Ultimately, Green Fuel’s CSR projects have more to do with protecting the company’s image against public opinion than helping the affected communities.

Beyond Land and Agriculture: Forging New Livelihoods in Frontier Zones Migration into Mozambique by communities in Chisumbanje has several historical precedents that date back to forced land removals during colonialism that pushed many families from Chisumbanje to relocate to Mozambique, with similar movements taking place later during the 1970s’ liberation struggle. But few could have imagined being forced to relocate in independent Zimbabwe. One of the displaced people interviewed by Makombe (2013) pointed to the increasing migration of displaced villagers into neighbouring Mozambique: As we speak a lot of people are in Mozambique – there are no more people – they have all relocated to Chingove and Dhokiredhuna in Mozambique. Families like Chaibva and Bandakata – I know – all went to Mozambique. If you go there and ask them to show the place where Zimbabweans are, you will be shocked to see that … aaah … this has become another Zimbabwe. The leaders in Mozambique even saw that we simply have no option but to accommodate these people. (quoted in Makombe 2013: 11)

Such movement is also aided partly by the shared cultural heritage that the Ndau, Gowa, Hlengwe and Bunji communities of Chisumbanje share with those across the nearby Mozambique border. Cross-border identities continue to be reinforced by the fact that communities on either side of the border speak ChiNdau. The longstanding ties between communities in Mozambique and the Ndau in Zimbabwe make this transnational migration a viable option for the displaced villagers. Hlongwana (2021) demonstrates the centrality of kinship ties in the cooperation between borderland communities astride the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. Borderland communities have maintained kinship ties and, with the loss of land, many villagers on the Zimbabwean side of the border used these historical kinship ties to secure land and pastures across the border in Mozambique and venture into new economic activities (The Standard, 18 July 2021). Some people oscillate between Zimbabwe and Mozambique depending on shifting opportunities on either side of the border. This practice predated the displacements induced by the ethanol project. However, several displaced villagers entered into tenancy arrangements with other villagers within Zimbabwe as neighbouring villages not yet affected by the Green

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Fuel operations lease their lands to displaced community members for a fee. In most cases, these would be short-term agreements depending on the landowner. Although the prices for renting a plot of land for a season tend to range between R400 and R500, some individuals may demand more. The only acceptable currency is the South African Rand, known as maranda in the local lingua. Due to the proximity to South Africa and the long history of migration to South Africa from the Chisumbanje area, the Rand is the preferred currency compared to the US dollar. With the increased pressure and demand for land, prices for renting a plot of land have become exorbitant in recent years. While in previous decades, migrants from other districts could pay in kind or enter labour contracts to access land, landowners have increasingly demanded cash payments. According to Mbuya Mudyaratanga, “these days renting land is so expensive. We used to pay a few maranda for huge pieces of land. Sometimes we could pick cotton for the owner of the land. Since this “white man” [Jeremy Doig] came into our area, everyone now demands a lot of money” (Interview with Mbuya Mudyaratanga, 1 August 2014). For many, cash tenancy arrangements diminished land access for poor households. In the villages, Jeremy Doig (the estate manager of the Green Fuel company) became a symbol of white exploitation and plunder. He was blamed for the disappearance of labour tenancy, which allowed poor households to access land. Nevertheless, the existence of a porous border allows displaced households to cross to the other side in search of better livelihoods. Mabee, the official border post, approximately thirty kilometres from Chisumbanje, is a makeshift crossing point manned by a few government security agents. In most cases, villagers use ‘crosscountry paths’ all over the borderline. Although they might own official documents, to some, it is faster, easier, and closer to use these paths than going through an official border post. In most cases, villagers avoid the crossing point and use Murongwei River to cross to the Mozambican side. The border does not exist for many communities in these areas. The idea of a border is also absent in their vocabulary. In ChiNdau, mugano (border) denotes a limit or end used to designate a territorial limit and not a specific state limit (Patricio 2012); as a result, the idea and existence of two different political units appear quite inconsequential in such circumstances. In her studies of Ndau communities, MacGonagle (2007) also found that many Ndau elders in both countries do not cite any form of boundaries and have a sense of an unbounded Ndau territory. Seen in this way, the border for these communities is just an imaginary line more relevant to central governments than the communities involved. While, for some, new livelihoods have been forged around access to land and grazing pastures through kinship ties, those villagers without strong kinship ties on the other side of the border (in Mozambique) venture into other lucrative businesses. Trading in second-hand clothing and footwear became an essential livelihood option for displaced communities. Although not limited to this community, the smuggling of bales of second-hand clothes has increased in recent years. The target consumers were the workers of the Green Fuel company and the expanding Checheche Growth Point. Workers prefer second-hand clothes as they are affordable compared to prices in boutiques and retail shops (Hlongwana 2021). Further, since most of these traders are community members, customers have the privilege of negotiating the prices or

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terms of payment. For those who secured agricultural plots in the estate, bartering farm produce for clothes became a common practice. Sugar beans were the main crop exchanged through a system known in the local lingua as kupimisa, denoting barter trading. For example, a pair of second-hand trousers could be exchanged for two kilogrammes of beans. In most instances, equivalences in the barter trade were determined by the item of clothing and the type of crop being exchanged. Apart from a thriving second-hand clothing industry, trading in basic commodities such as sugar, mealie-meal, washing powders, among other commodities, was another pathway to secure livelihoods. Individuals established networks of couriers (marunner) who would cross the border to South Africa to buy basic commodities and electronic gadgets for a fee. Typically, these couriers charged between twenty to thirty per cent of the total value of goods ordered. For electrical goods, the charge was increased slightly. Most of these runners relied on connections with bus drivers who also depend on their networks at the border. The bus drivers charged them a fee for their services, still considerably less than the import duties. At every corner at Checheche growth point—the major Growth Point in this area—a vendor sells basic commodities at relatively lower prices than in supermarkets (Manica Post, 13 September 2019). As a result, supermarket owners who felt threatened and outcompeted by the increase in vendors and informal traders complained to local authorities. For instance, on several occasions, the N-Richard Group Wholesalers at Checheche Growth Point invited the police to deal with the ‘problem’ of vendors (The Manica Post, 2 February 2020). Since women were among the most affected by the displacement and the subsequent inequalities in employment opportunities, this could be one of the reasons why they formed the largest group involved in this business. Women pooled financial resources together in groups akin to stokvel or cooperative arrangements (mikando/marounds), to jumpstart their businesses and support each other.

Conclusion As a sugar cane plantation and ethanol production investment project which led to significant levels of displacement, Chisumbanje Ethanol Project was pursued despite the redistributive thrust of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. Because of this, it generated debates on whether the government was backsliding on its redistributive land reform policy which sought first and foremost to redistribute land to landless peasants. This chapter used the case of the Chisumbanje ethanol project to contribute to the broader debates on land, land rights, and rural livelihoods in Zimbabwe. It has demonstrated that there were contradictions within Zimbabwe’s redistributive land reform programme engendered by the government’s lack of clear policy on largescale land investment projects. The case of Chisumbanje ethanol project demonstrates the effects of large-scale land investment projects on borderland communities and peasants.

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Villagers in Chisumbanje were displaced from their ancestral lands and lost their farming and grazing lands. In addition, they had to live in the shadow of a large-scale agricultural investment project that contaminated their environment and exploited them. Although the government and a few individuals who benefitted from the project hailed it as an important investment project, most of the villagers were negatively affected by the project. Consequently, they turned to a combination of protests, use of the courts and migration to Mozambique to mitigate the situation. Overall, the chapter has highlighted the dual and simultaneous challenges of borderland communities— being marginalised as borderland communities and being displaced to pave the way for a large-scale land investment project. The reflexive responses of affected villagers were largely framed by the fact that, as borderland communities, they had historical and kinship cross-border ties they could use to migrate across the border temporarily or even possibly find new forms of livelihoods on the other side of the border.

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Personal Interview with Mbuya Mudyaratanga, 1 August 2014. Chipinge Rural District Council, 2013. Green Fuel Social Corporate Responsibility Office, 30 May2014. Legislative Assembly Debates, 12 May 2009. National Archives Zimbabwe, S/AG055: Agriculture and Rural Development Authority Annual, 1983/1984. Parliamentary Portfolio Committee (2014) Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Lands and Agriculture, Public Hearing on Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant, 11 July 2014. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, 2018.

Chapter 5

Borders, Boundaries, and Livelihoods in Western and North-Western Zimbabwe, 1890–2021 Robert K. Hitchcock and Melinda C. Kelly

Abstract Far from being open borders, including under globalisation, the borders of Zimbabwe have become increasingly defined over time. This is true in the case of the Botswana-Zimbabwe border of western and north-western Zimbabwe, which has seen a transformation from a relatively porous frontier zone in the late nineteenth century to one that is now seeing new border posts and border fences being established to control international movements of people and goods. This border zone between Zimbabwe and Botswana has long been an arena of complex social interactions among a variety of different socio-political groups, including huntergatherers, agropastoralists, small-scale agriculturalists, commercial farmers, and livestock producers. Focusing on the area stretching from Plumtree in the south to Victoria Falls in the north, this chapter examines the issues of group boundaries, territorial borders, and livelihoods of Tshwa San, Kalanga, Nambya, Ndebele, white farmers, and others during the period from 1890 to 2021. Western Zimbabwe has been described as a ‘shatter zone’, a term used to describe politically unstable regions which play a strategic role between two nation-states. Various groups have competed for grazing, livestock, cattle posts, high value resources including timber and minerals, and people who they could exploit for their labour. Keywords Border · Violence · Migration · Livelihoods · Zimbabwe-Botswana · Ethnicity

Introduction Like many countries in Africa, Zimbabwe has had serious concerns about its borders. Far from being an open border or ‘vanishing border’ due to globalisation (French R. K. Hitchcock (B) University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA e-mail: [email protected] M. C. Kelly Kalahari Peoples Fund, Albuquerque, NM, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_5

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2000; Ganster and Lorey 2004), the borders of Zimbabwe have become increasingly defined over time. This is true in the case of the Botswana-Zimbabwe border of western and north-western Zimbabwe, which has seen a transformation from a relatively porous frontier zone in the late nineteenth century to one that is now seeing new border posts and border fences being established to control international movements of people and goods. Drivers of border and boundary-marking include the desire of the Zimbabwean state to enhance its own political and economic security and to prevent cross-border movements which potentially could cause social disruptions and the spread of livestock and human disease. In this chapter, we address issues that have arisen along the Zimbabwe-Botswana border, beginning with the Pioneer Column of 1890, which led to the establishment of British colonial power in what is now Zimbabwe. We focus our attention on two districts in two different provinces of Zimbabwe, Tsholotsho in Matabeleland North and Bulilima Mangwe in Matabeleland South. We examine the history of these two districts over the period from 1890 to 2021, focusing on key processes and events that affected the populations in this borderland region. Borderlands between countries and regions are sometimes characterised as shatter zones where different ethnic groups interact in complicated ways and where crossborder movements occur, some of them related to engaging in activities such as trading (Ethridge and Shuck-Hall 2009; Braun and Kienitz 2022). Shatter zones are also localities of resistance to, and refuge from, some of the more destructive effects of state-making and state-rule (Scott 2009). Borderlands and shatter zones, thus, are often disputed territories between groups and nation-states, leading to a degree of political instability. While they may seem peripheral or of only minimal significance to some people, shatter zones and borderlands are often places of serious contention. Today, there are some 20 different ethnic groups in Zimbabwe, each with its own language, culture, and traditions (Owomoyela 2002). The current population of Zimbabwe is estimated to be 15,121,004 according to the World Factbook. The largest of the groups in western Zimbabwe are the Ndebele, who number between 1.5 and 1.8 million (Kuper et al. 1954; Msindo 2012). The second largest group in western Zimbabwe are the Kalanga, who number some 700,000 and who are located on both sides of the Zimbabwe-Botswana border (Dube 2020). The Nambya, who are also found on both sides of the Zimbabwe-Botswana border (e.g. at Wankie and Pandamatenga), number some 100,000. The smallest ethnic group is the Tshwa San, who number some 2,800 in Zimbabwe and 7,800 in north-eastern Botswana. The balance of this chapter discusses these groups and addresses what happened to them over time from 1890 to 2021.

Environmental and Political Contexts The political administration of the western Zimbabwe region has changed over time. What began as a remote area occupied by scattered groups of hunter-gatherers and small villages of agropastoralists evolved into a region in which various

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companies, kingdoms, and state government institutions were involved in conflicts and competition over land and resources. Settlement by whites, mainly English speakers, in what is now western Zimbabwe began in the 1850s as hunters, travellers, and traders moved into the area in search of resources and trading opportunities. Most of these visits were short-term and had impacts primarily on the wildlife populations in the region and the people who utilised them. Local hunters, including Tshwa, Kalanga, and Ndebele, were employed as hunting guides, and they were able to obtain guns in exchange for ivory and other wildlife products. Trading stations were developed on what came to be known as the Hunters’ Road which stretched along the Zimbabwe-Botswana border. One of these was Pandamatenga on the Botswana side of the border, where George Westbeech had a store and trading post which purchased wildlife products and provided food, cloth, and in some cases guns to people who frequented the area (Tabler 1963, 1966). The discovery of gold in Mashonaland in 1862 and Francistown in Bechuanaland in 1867 led to serious European in-migration over the next fifty years. The British South Africa Company (BSAC), founded by Cecil Rhodes in 1871, sent a column of pioneers to invade and occupy in 1890 what became Zimbabwe after King Lobengula of the Ndebele refused to grant land and mining concessions to the company. The Pioneer Column consisted of some 117 wagons and 186 white, English-speaking people along with 350 Ngwato labourers and some servants and supporters—it came into Ndebele Country on 1 July 1890, having travelled from Kimberley in South Africa. The Pioneer Column, supported by Cecil John Rhodes, could be described as one of the more important efforts of the British South Africa Company to use militaristic pressure tactics to intimidate the Ndebele King, Lobengula. In the 1890s, the BSAC attempted to push the administrative border of Matabeleland south and west into what Khama III of the Bamangwato claimed as his territory. In August 1894, the BSAC Police arrested a party of Tshwa San hunters working for the Bamangwato in Bechuanaland. While eventually the Tshwa were released, the tensions between the BSAC and the Bamangwato continued. Both the Ndebele and the Bamangwato sought to have a buffer zone between themselves in order to reduce conflicts. The presence of the BSAC, however, was a complicating factor, as the Ndebele and Bamangwato tended to operate by their own rules (Chirenje 1977). By 1893, King Lobengula of the Ndebele and his forces were defeated by the BSAC and its supporters at Bulawayo. An uprising (called Chimurenga) in 1896– 1897 was mounted by the Ndebele to try to force a relatively weak BSAC out of the country. The high costs of dealing with the Chimurenga ensured that Rhodes eventually had to negotiate with the Ndebele. His task was made even more complicated because of the Shona uprising, also in 1896–1897 (Dawson 2011). Another event that occurred in the 1890s was the 1896–1897 Rinderpest outbreak which saw precipitous drops in the numbers of wildlife and livestock on both sides of the border as a result of the disease. One of the responses to the spread of rinderpest in both Zimbabwe and Botswana was to establish cordon fences aimed at reducing livestock movements. Efforts were also made to shoot wild animals that were moving into livestock areas. This was done to prevent the spread of diseases from wild

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animals such as trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) and other livestock diseases as well, including Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) and East Coast Fever. In 1899, the British authorities and the Bamangwato, somewhat to the chagrin of the Ndebele and the British South Africa Company, engaged in a boundary delimitation effort. Surveys were done along the border between Bechuanaland (now Botswana) and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and markers were erected. This only exacerbated the tensions between the two countries, one (Bechuanaland) a British protectorate and the other a country that for a while, until 1923, was dominated by a private company, the BSAC. The Ndebele could be characterised as a kingdom in the past, or as a complex chiefdom consisting of several socio-political layers, including chiefs, councillors, commoners, and clients. The Ndebele had terms for the various groups making up the chiefdom: the Zansi, the people from down-country, that is Zululand in what is now KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa (descendants of the original people who came north with Mzilikazi); the Enhla (the people from up-country, the Highlands, many of whom were originally of Sotho stock); and the Holi (groups who were incorporated into the Ndebele once they were in Rhodesia, including Kalanga, Shona, and Nambya) (Kuper et al. 1954). A sizable number of Tshwa had patron-client relationships with Ndebele and Kalanga, working for them as cattle and goat herders and as domestic workers. Very few Tshwa had cattle or other domestic animals of their own, but they did have gardens. Their efforts to gain de jure rights to land from the Rhodesian government or from Ndebele and Kalanga headmen were largely unsuccessful, leaving them in complex positions where they could be forced off communal land.

Land Dispossession The most important process affecting the people of western Zimbabwe in the period between the 1890s and the 1930s was land dispossession. Land, as Moyana (1994) noted, was the thorniest issue in Rhodesian politics during the colonial period. African land dispossession was done through a series of declarations and proclamations made by the British South Africa Company and the Rhodesian government to gain access to lands of Tshwa, Kalanga, and Ndebele. These proclamations covered land, mineral resources, forest resources, commercial farming areas, and game reserves. As indicated by Kwashirai (2008), the state adopted universal land use planning categories which served as an instrument of state control. A series of Land Ordinances were passed in 1894 and 1898 which established Native Reserves and Native Forest Reserves, two of which were in Matabeleland: the Gwai Native Reserve (GNR) and the Shangani Native Reserve (SNR). These two reserves were rich in timber resources, particularly Baikea plurija (Zambezi teak). At the same time, they were located on what was deemed to be largely marginal and agriculturally unproductive land, which was the intent of the BSAC. The country was to be divided between white-owned areas and Native Reserves, which were

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held under communal property regimes. The more productive land was reserved for whites, and the less productive land, often arid and with poor soil quality, was reserved for blacks. Most of the Native Reserve land was far from the railway lines, which were laid from Bulawayo to Victoria Falls by 1903. White commercial farms were created in many parts of Rhodesia, some of them along the rail lines. The early 1900s saw the economic decline affecting the Ndebele and other black residents of Matabeleland continuing. Resistance to the BSAC land policies also continued. Some residents of Matabeleland voted with their feet, as it were, crossing into Bechuanaland. Several dozen Tshwa families crossed into Bechuanaland in 1908 (Botswana National Archives [BNA] S.35/5). One of the major reasons this was done was to avoid paying tax (such as hut tax) and to get away from state control. The state control included restricted access to land and enforcement of discriminatory laws. A sizable portion of the Ndebele and Kalanga populations in Matabeleland was required to move to Gwai reserve south of Wankie in around 1910. Some of the Kalanga moved into Bechuanaland and established themselves around Tutume and Nkange in an area that came to be known as Bokalaka. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 defined and limited black property ownership to specific areas of the country. This act limited black ownership of land to the so-called Native Purchase Areas (NPA) (Floyd 1962). These areas were often the least productive and most marginal portions of Zimbabwe, and they generally lacked access to the railway system. Further acts were passed to protect white agriculturalists from black competition in crop production as well as from the formation of black labour unions. The Rhodesian government, convinced that the reasons for declining agricultural harvests and livestock losses in dry periods in the Native Reserves were a result of poor farming methods on the part of local people, enacted the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) in 1951. The objectives of this act, as noted in the preamble of the NLHA, were as follows: “To provide for the control of the utilisation and allocation of land occupied by natives and to ensure its efficient use for agricultural purposes; to require natives to perform labour for conserving natural resources, and for promoting good husbandry” (Southern Rhodesia, Native Land Husbandry Act, Act No. 52 1951: 893). One purpose of the act was to reduce the mobility of black peasant farmers in Rhodesia on the assumption that permanent residence in the Reserves was beneficial to agricultural productivity. The Land Husbandry Act of 1951, which was seen as having been drafted to further protect and expand the white settler economy, served to abolish the traditional system of land tenure in African areas. Tribal land that had been in the hands of Africans (blacks) therefore became available for individual ownership for whites. One reason this was done was to ensure that commercial agriculture by whites could be fully established, while the denial of land to blacks ensured that there was a labour pool for the white farms. Sizable numbers of black farmers ended up moving into towns and cities. Attempts to establish a white-dominated Central African Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, coupled with the Land Husbandry Act of 1951, resulted in strong black resistance and a powerful nationalist movement that ultimately challenged white political control of Rhodesia (Machingaidze 1991).

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Wildlife-Related Issues in Western Zimbabwe In the period between 1890 and 1923, the Department of Agriculture of Rhodesia oversaw the administration of wildlife. The first full-time officer with responsibility for overseeing game management was appointed in 1928. The Game and Fish Preservation Act of 1929 saw the establishment of several game reserves, one of which was Wankie (now Hwange), which had been slated to become a game reserve in the mid-1920s (Davison 1977). Wankie Game Reserve was about the same size as Belgium (14,150 km2 ) and supported an estimated 107 species of mammals, including sizable numbers of elephants (an estimated 14,000), and 410 species of birds (Wilson 1975; Greaves 1996; Steyn 2008). In the 1930s, fences were built along the southern boundary of the game reserve in order to separate wildlife and livestock; this fence, however, was relatively flimsy and was broken down in some areas by wild animals (Davison 1977). Wankie Game Reserve was one of the first protected areas in Southern Africa that saw the resident populations, the majority of whom were Tshwa San, relocated to places outside of the reserve. This process began in the late 1920s and took several years; it was carried out by the game reserve superintendent, Ted Davison and game scouts (Davison 1977, 1983; Bromwich 2014; Haynes 2013). Patrols were mounted in the game reserve to locate people who were living in the area. Davison (1977) notes that some Bushmen from Botswana migrated into the reserve in the early dry season, with a reverse migration back into Botswana when the rains set in. There were also hunter-gatherers in the reserve who visited some of the several thousand pans in order to hunt and obtain wild plant resources such as tswii (Nymphaea nouchali, subspecies caerulea) (Davison 1977). Some of the Tshwa also engaged in fishing in the pans when they had water in them. They also sought bullfrogs (Pyxicephalus adspersus and P. edalis) for food. In spite of the fact that patrols were carried out in the reserve and people were told to leave, or in some cases were escorted out, a few Tshwa families sought to move into the remotest parts of the reserve in order to continue their foraging activities. Some of these groups, who can be described today as voluntary isolated indigenous people (VIIPs), did their utmost to avoid detection, even erasing their tracks so as not to alert the patrols. By the mid-1930s, however, the vast majority of Tshwa had been forced to leave Wankie Game Reserve. Most of the Tshwa who were in Wankie were removed to what is now Tsholotsho District, just to the south of Wankie. Tsholotsho District is 7,884 km2 in size and includes the Wankie Game Reserve. A portion of the Tshwa moved north to the area around Robins Camp. Some Tshwa went to Hwange to work in the coal mines. There were also a few dozen Tshwa who remained in the park and worked for the wildlife department (Haynes 2013; Gary Haynes, personal communication 2022). Today, Tsholotsho District has residents who include Nambya, Kalanga, Ndebele, and Tshwa San, among other groups. The Ndebele were the dominant group in the region, but Nambya and Kalanga were also important numerically. All three groups had Tshwa San as clients and workers. Tshwa land access was restricted by

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other groups and by the establishment of the Wankie Game Reserve (later, Hwange National Park) in 1928. Most of the Ndebele, Nambya, Kalanga, and Tshwa lived in scattered rural areas, but there were also some in nearby towns which contain large and diverse populations, including Bulawayo and Wankie (both of which have administrative offices and numerous businesses). Some Tshwa, approximately 1,000, moved into Bulilima and Mangwe districts in Matabeleland South Province, which has Plumtree as a local capital. Matabeleland South Province is 54,172 km2 in size, about a third of which is made up of the two districts. In the 1940s, a series of changes occurred in population distribution and land use patterns in the north-eastern Kalahari region. In 1943, two cadet fliers from the Royal Air Force air base at Kumalo near Bulawayo disappeared. After some investigations, it was thought that the two fliers may have been murdered by a group of Ganade Tshwa from Gum//gabi, a pan northwest of the Nata River in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (Hitchcock 1991; Hitchcock et al. 2017). The reverberating effects of a trial held of the Tshwa at the High Court in Lobatse in 1944, which saw the Tshwa acquitted of murder, included the forced removal of Tshwa from the Crown Lands of northern Bechuanaland. Government authorities in Rhodesia along with the Ngwato Tribe and the Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration pushed for disarming of the Tshwa in the Northern Crown Lands and resettlement of hundreds of Tshwa south of the Nata River in Bechuanaland. Several dozen Tshwa families moved across the border into what was then Rhodesia to escape what they felt was repression by the Ngwato and Kalanga south of the Nata, who attempted to press Tshwa into herding labour and domestic servitude. The construction of a veterinary cordon fence from the Botswana-Zimbabwe border to Dukwe and south along the side of Sua Pan in 1954 in order to prevent the spread of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) had several significant impacts. It restricted the movements of eland, wildebeest, zebra, and other mobile species, some of which died along the fence. When FMD broke out among livestock herds in northern Botswana, as it did in 1958, people were stopped from taking meat and other goods such as baskets made from palm leaves to the Kalanga area to the east of Nata and north into Rhodesia. This resulted in hardship for people since they were not able to earn income through trade. It also meant that people could not move their cattle from cattle posts to the villages, thus restricting access to milk and draught power. Some Tshwa went to Francistown in Bechuanaland or to Bulawayo and Hwange in Rhodesia to find work. In the mid-l950s, the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) cattle ranching operations at Nata and Pandamatenga were abandoned, and most of the ranches were allowed to fall into disuse. Those Tshwa who had become dependent on cash wages and payments in kind for their work for the CDC were forced to find alternative ways to make a living. Some of the Tshwa men went to the coal mine at Hwange or to white-owned farms in Rhodesia. The women and children who remained behind had difficulties in getting sufficient labour to plough fields, and some of them said that they suffered severe privation because of the lack of food. The only source of protein for some was the meat they were able to scavenge from animals killed by safari hunters who continued to visit the area.

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During the liberation struggle in Rhodesia (1965–1980), there were periodic cross-border raids by Rhodesian forces in pursuit of Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) guerillas in Botswana. The border was porous for Rhodesian security forces who crossed it easily. The border was largely unpatrolled, and it was remote, far from administrative centres in Rhodesia. There were rumours that motion-detection equipment and airplanes were used by the Rhodesian military along the border to identify potential incursions. Some of the border was taken up by the western boundary of the Hwange National Park, and animals such as elephants and antelopes crossed the border back and forth between Botswana and Rhodesia. The most serious of the cross-border raids consisted of an ambush of Botswana Defense Force soldiers at Lesoma in Botswana on 27 February 1978 which resulted in the killings of 15 soldiers, a youth from Lesoma, and a ZIPRA combatant at the hands of Rhodesian forces who mounted an ambush (Magala and Fisher 2009). This raid was the most devastating of the engagements involving Rhodesian and Botswana forces to occur during the liberation struggle. In June 1980, soon after Zimbabwe’s independence, an incident occurred that resulted in increased concern on the part of both the Zimbabwe and Botswana governments about wildlife and human rights issues. Several Tshwa and Kalanga from Botswana were hunting illegally inside Hwange National Park and were detected by game scouts who found the men near animals they had killed. Reinforcements were called in, and a firefight erupted in which several Zimbabwe game scouts were killed along with some of the poachers. Subsequently, a number of the people who were involved in the incident were hunted down and killed inside Botswana, according to testimony provided by some of the people involved. In the early 1980s, there were also reports of people from Zimbabwe who went into Botswana for purposes of collecting firewood and other resources being shot by Botswana Defense Force personnel and police. Tshwa and Kalanga who lost family members said that at least some of the people who had crossed the border and been shot were women and children and that they were not involved in illegal wildlife procurement activities but, instead, were seeking employment or getting water. The Tshwa in both Botswana and Zimbabwe said that they were concerned with what they saw as ‘coercive conservation’ in which people’s human rights were being violated in the name of wildlife conservation (Hitchcock 1995). The militarisation of conservation characterised the 1990s (Duffy 2000) and the period up to the present in both Zimbabwe and Botswana. In some cases, conservation tactics include efforts to ‘shoot-to-kill’ people suspected of being involved in illegal wildlife procurement. There was widespread fear among people in Zimbabwe that if they crossed the border they might be shot, a factor which affected the number of border crossings.

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1980s and 1990s in Western Zimbabwe In the early 1980s, tensions continued to be felt in Matabeleland Province, where one of the major groups of freedom fighters, the ZIPRA, the military wing of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), had its primary base of support. Some of the former guerrillas felt that they had not been treated appropriately by the new government under Robert Mugabe, and tensions erupted into conflict in late 1980 and early 1981. Some of the former guerrillas returned to the bush and began what turned into a low-level insurgency. Beginning in 1982 and continuing into the mid-1980s, the Zimbabwean government carried out counter-insurgency operations against what they termed “dissidents”, with the operation coming to be known as Gukurahundi. These operations included military attacks on villagers, kidnappings of suspected terrorists, torture and murder of detainees, committing of a wide range of atrocities against the civilian population, and restriction of the movement of food and medicines into the area. Before it was over, as many as 20,000 people were killed or disappeared, and their bodies dumped into old mines which dotted the area (Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice in Zimbabwe 2008; Eppel 2014, 2015). Movements out of the region increased in response to the repression that occurred during Gukurahundi, and people sought refuge in neighbouring Botswana, with some also going to South Africa and Zambia. By the late 1980s, the atmosphere had improved considerably, and a peace accord was signed (Ranger 1988). However, tensions continued to be felt in Matabeleland, in part because of what residents saw as continued discrimination against them and inequitable land distribution on the part of the Zimbabwean government (Alexander 1991). There were also calls in Matabeleland for the erection of monuments to honour the victims of what the Ndebele, Kalanga, and Tshwa considered to be a genocide. In addition, there has been pressure in Matabeleland and the Midlands for formal investigations into Gukurahundi. One of the major differences between the Tshwa and the Ndebele in Matabeleland is that the former were largely non-cattle owners while the Ndebele generally had cattle. In the 1990s, there were pressures in Matabeleland to provide grazing land for people. While some of the land in Matabeleland had been in the hands of white settlers, there were farms that had been taken over by Ndebele and Kalanga as well as by government officials. Commercial farm allocation by the state tended to favour those who were cattle owners and exclude non-cattle owners such as the Tshwa. Some of the people who were able to obtain freehold farmland were Ndebele and Kalanga who had officially recognised headmen and headwomen, something that was not true for the Tshwa until 2018 (Davy Ndlovu, personal communication 2019). The lack of government-recognised traditional authorities left Tshwa at a competitive disadvantage, which was one of the reasons for greater cross-border mobility on the part of the Tshwa.

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CBNRM in Zimbabwe In 1989, efforts began to be made to promote community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and rural social and economic development in the Tsholotsho and Bulilima-Mangwe Districts and other parts of Zimbabwe. Under the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975, the Tsholotsho and Bulalima-Mangwe District Councils began to devolve authority over benefits from wildlife to communities under the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) (Martin 1986). This programme was aimed at increasing conservation while at the same time ensuring greater economic benefits to local people. The basic principle behind CAMPFIRE was the re-empowerment of local communities through providing them with access to, control over, and responsibility for natural resources. A second principle was that local communities should have the right to make decisions regarding those natural resources and any activities that affect them. A third principle was that communities should receive the benefits from the exploitation of natural resources. The best way to achieve the objectives of the CAMPFIRE programme was to obtain the voluntary participation of the communities in a flexible programme that incorporated long-term solutions to resource problems. It was important that there be culturally appropriate institutions in place under which resources could be managed and exploited by the communities for their own direct benefit. An assessment of the districts which have initiated CAMPFIRE programmes in Zimbabwe, including those in western Zimbabwe in which the United States Agency for International Development had a regional natural resource management project (NRMP) in the 1990s, revealed that some progress was being made towards the empowerment of local communities and the provision of direct benefits, but that greater efforts needed to be made to devolve benefits and decision-making power to the community level (Patel 1998). Beginning in 1991, the districts in which Tshwa reside, Tsholotsho and Bulilima Mangwe, became part of the country’s CAMPFIRE. Under these CAMPFIRE projects, people in these districts, like elsewhere, received the authority to manage the wildlife and benefit from revenues that are produced through wildlife-related activities such as hunting and tourism. Although theoretically the Tshwa and their neighbours in western Zimbabwe have rights to the benefits from wildlife in their areas, most of the revenues went to the district councils and were distributed as benefits to local people. Some of the district council projects funded by wildlife revenues have included road-building and clinic construction. Local people, though, have called for greater access to the wildlife revenues at the community level. There were a few examples of productive CAMPFIRE-related programmes in Matabeleland. One of these was the establishment of Ngamo Camelthorn Safari Lodge in 2003 in cooperation with Imvelo Safaris and the Tsholotsho Rural District Council. Local Tshwa and Ndebele were employed as safari guides, and some of them worked in the lodge and served as cooks, cleaners, and domestic workers. A few of them served as safari guides, for which they were reasonably well paid.

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However, Tshwa in the CAMPFIRE areas of Tsholotsho said in interviews in 2013 and 2019 that they felt that the CAMPFIRE programme generally did not provide them with any benefits in terms of income or access to wild animal resources. Hwange National Park, for its part, had at least 60 boreholes drilled and these were used to supply water for wild animals (Haynes 2013). One of the complaints of the people in Tsholotsho was that there were no boreholes drilled for local people by the Tsholotsho Rural Development Council or Matabeleland North Province, and water scarcity was cited as a major problem by Tsholotsho and Bulilima-Mangwe residents. Water insecurity was felt particularly during severe droughts, which occurred in the early 1960s, 1973, the mid-1980s, and 1992–1993. One of the ways that local Zimbabweans used to cope with drought was mobility, while another was diversification of their livelihoods (Marquette 1997; Kinsey et al. 1998). Cross-border movements for purposes of purchasing goods were difficult in the 1990s and early part of the 2000s because of government restrictions on the import and export of foodstuffs (Takuva 2022). One of the concerns of wildlife officers in Hwange related to the use of poison by people who came into the park in search of animals, especially elephants. There were serious incidents involving the use of cyanide poison to kill elephants in Hwange and areas to the south in 2013 (Muboko et al. 2014, 2016). Blame was placed on local people, some of whom were arrested and jailed. There were rumours that some of the cyanide was provided by poaching gangs who had connections to international ivory buyers, a number of whom had links to China and Vietnam. Unfortunately, as a result of the cyanide poisonings, the Zimbabwean government told Tshwa who were residing on the southern border of Hwange National Park that they would have to relocate. It is important to note that the Ndebele who were living on the southern boundary were not told that they had to move (Hitchcock et al., field data 2013, 2018). Elephant deaths in Hwange and the surrounding area occurred a number of times in the twenty-first century. Some of these deaths were due to the elephants being shot or killed with cyanide; but there are also indications that some of the elephants may have died naturally as a result of cyanobacteria in the water of the pans where they drank (for a comparable case of elephant deaths due to cyanobacterial blooms in the Okavango Delta region of Botswana, see Veerman et al. 2022). An incident that occurred which brought unfavourable attention to the safari hunting industry in Zimbabwe was the killing of a renowned lion by the name of Cecil in July 2015 by an American safari hunting client of a company known as Bushman Safaris. The lion, which was collared, was shot with an arrow and died as a result of a second shooting over a day later; who did the final killing is unclear (Somerville 2017). The killing led to an international outcry which had important implications for issues involving conservation and development not only in Zimbabwe, but internationally (Lindsey et al. 2016; Macdonald et al. 2016; Clemens 2017; Mkono 2018). The killing of the lion had some negative impacts on tourism in Zimbabwe, according to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM). After 2018, tourism numbers began to increase in Zimbabwe in 2020, but then the numbers declined precipitously due to the declaration of lockdowns because of

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COVID-19 (Koro 2020). The numbers of tourists began to increase again in 2022. The lockdowns and movement restrictions had serious effects on the well-being of Zimbabwean communities that had a high degree of dependency on ecotourism and safari tourism.

Conclusion The Zimbabwe-Botswana border can be characterised as a shatter zone because of the complex interactions among groups and states that occurred along its 834 km-span over an extended period. These interactions ranged from cooperation and symbiosis to competition and conflict, and they contributed to shaping the identities of people residing in these borderlands. Crossing the border was seen as a means of avoiding state control and seeking employment in Botswana, which was often more prosperous economically than was Zimbabwe. This was especially true after 2008. These external migratory cross-border moves expanded and contracted in some cases because of changes brought about by land reform programmes, including the implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme beginning in 2000 (Scoones et al. 2010). Movements of Zimbabweans into neighbouring countries expanded mainly because of the economic downturn in the country over the past three decades as well as the repression in Zimbabwe on the part of the government (Bond and Manyanya 2002; Human Rights Watch 2007). Tensions continued along the Botswana-Zimbabwe border, and the Botswana government began building an electrified fence along the border in 2003, ostensibly to prevent the movement of cattle with Foot-and-Mouth Disease into Botswana, but also likely to dissuade Zimbabweans from crossing the border into Botswana. As some residents of Zimbabwe noted in interviews, ‘Fences do not always make good neighbours’. Clearly, cross-border movements have been important in the western Zimbabwe borderlands. They provided for instance means by which groups seeking to resist some of the policies of local chiefdoms, private companies, and the government of both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe could find relief. They also enabled people in the borderlands to seek employment and income in other countries. During the liberation struggle and again during the Gukurahundi period in the 1980s, Zimbabweans used Botswana as a place of refuge and as a place to launch military operations. It should be noted, however, that unlike many African borderlands, such as those between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan, and Botswana and Namibia at various points in time, there were no permanent military facilities arrayed along the Zimbabwe-Botswana border. Recently, the diversification of economic activities, including mines, tourist operations, and land development schemes in Zimbabwe have served in some ways to reduce the desire of some people to opt to move away from Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, the perception that life might be better on the other side of the border continues to be a factor in cross-border migrations, many of which were aimed at ensuring more secure livelihoods for families and individuals and a degree of political autonomy.

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Acknowledgements This study was funded by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) (Grant No. 2098) and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) (Grant No. 2650). We thank the editors of this volume, Nedson Phopiwa, Joshua Matanzima, and Kirk Helliker for their useful editorial comments. We also wish to thank Dan Acheson-Brown, Arthur Albertson, Ben Begbie-Clench, Vernon Booth, Magdalena Broermann, Marieka Brower Burg, Mark Butcher, Judy Catherine Cameron, Campbell, Colin Campbell, Niall Campbell, Elizabeth Cashdan, Rock Chasko, David Coulson, Aron Crowell, David Cumming, Meg Cumming, Delme Cupido, Derek De La Harpe, Patricia Draper, Thembani Dube, Jim Ebert, Dave Forsythe, Judy Frost, Gary Haynes, John Holm, Tom Huffman, Tshekedi Khama, Jane Lancaster, John Ledger, Mike Main, Christian John Magala, Simon Makuvasa, Kabelo Matshetshe, Mike Mentis, Keikabile Mogodu, Masego Nkelekang Mogodu, Fred Morton, Ashton Murwira, Davy Ndlovu, Alan Osborn, Neil Parsons, Lee Pratchett, Maria Sapignoli, Allan Savory, Elizabeth Self, Anne Stoll, Richard Taylor, Axel Thoma, Sam Totten, Helga Vierich, Diana Vinding, Nick Walker, Dick Werbner, Jeffrey Wills, Elizabeth Alden Wily, the late Alec Campbell, the late Graham Child, the late John Cooke, the late Paul Hebinck, the late Leapetswe Khama, the late Ignatius Mberengwa, the late Gakemodimo M. Mosi, the late Marshall Murphree, the late Fanuel Nangati, and the late Nkelekang Tsmeru, for their very useful information, suggestions, and recommendations.

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French H (2000) Vanishing borders: protecting the planet in an age of globalization. WW. Norton and Company, New York Ganster P, Lorey DE (eds) (2004). Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland Government of Southern Rhodesia (1951) Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951. Salisbury: Government of Southern Rhodesia Greaves N (1996) Hwange: retreat of the elephants. Southern Book Publishers, Cape Town Haynes G (2013) The forest with a desert heart: Hwange National Park, Zimbabwe. Hwange Research Trust, Bulawayo Haynes G (2022) Personal communication August 15 2022 Hitchcock RK (1991) Kuakaka: an early case of ethnoarchaeology in the northern Kalahari. Botswana Notes Rec 23:223–233 Hitchcock RK (1995) Centralization, resource depletion, and coercive conservation among the Tshwa of the northeastern Kalahari. Hum Ecol 23(2):169–198 Hitchcock RK, Benjamin B-C, Davy N (2013) Zimbabwe. In: The Indigenous World 2013, Caecelie M. ed. Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, pp 433–437 Hitchcock, RK, Ben B-C, Davy N, Ashton M, Ignatius M (2018) Land, Livelihoods, and Empowerment Among the San of Western Zimbabwe. In: Research and Activism Among the Kalahari San Today: Ideals, Challenges, and Debates, R. Fleming Puckett and Kazunobu I, eds. Senri Ethnological Studies 99. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, Japan, pp 251–282 Hitchcock RK, Acheson-Brown D, Self E, Kelly MC (2017) Disappearance and displacement: the San, the Bamangwato, and the British in the Bechuanaland protectorate, 1943–1945. S Afr Hist J 69(4):548–567 Human Rights Watch (2007) Bashing dissent: escalating violence and state repression in Zimbabwe. Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC Kinsey B, Burger K, Gunning JW (1998) Coping with drought in Zimbabwe: survey evidence on responses of rural households to risk. World Dev 26(1):89–110 Koro E (2020) COVID-19 plunges Zimbabwe into wildlife management crisis. Chronicle, 9 July 2020 Kuper H, Hughes AJB, van Velsen J (1954) The Shona and Ndebele of southern Rhodesia. International African Institute, London Kwashirai VC (2008) Poverty in the Gwai Forest Reserve, Zimbabwe: 1880–1953. Glob Environ 1:146–175 Lindsey PA, Balme GA, Funston PJ, Henschel PH, Hunter LTB (2016) Life after Cecil: channeling global outrage into funding for conservation in Africa. Conserv Lett 9(4):296–301 Magala CJ, Fisher ML (2009) The impact of Zimbabwe liberation struggle on Botswana: the case of the Lesoma Ambush, 1978. New Contree 57:1–21 Machingaidze VEM (1991) Agrarian change from above: the southern Rhodesia native land husbandry act and African response. Int J Afr Histor Stud 24(3):557–588 Macdonald DK, Jacobsen D, Burnham PJ, Loveridge A (2016) Cecil: a moment or a movement? analysis of media coverage of the death of a lion Panthera Leo. Animals 6(26):1–13 Mkono M (2018) The age of digital activism in tourism: evaluating the legacy and limitations of the Cecil anti-trophy hunting movement. J Sustain Tour 26(9):1608–1624 Moyana HV (1994) The political economy of land in Zimbabwe. Mambo Press, Gweru, Zimbabwe Marquette CM (1997) Current poverty, structural adjustment, and drought in Zimbabwe. World Dev 25(7):1141–1149 Martin RB (1986) Communal areas management programme for indigenous resources (CAMPFIRE). Branch of Terrestrial Ecology, Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM), Harare, Zimbabwe Msindo E (2012) Ethnicity in Zimbabwe: transformations in Kalanga and Ndebele societies, 1860– 1990. University of Rochester Press, Rochester Muboko N, Gandiwa E, Muposhi V, Tarakini T (2016) Illegal hunting and protected areas: tourist perceptions on wild animal poisoning in Hwange National Park, Zimbabwe. Tour Manage 52:170–172

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Muboko N, Muphoshi V, Tarakini T, Gandiwa E, Vengesayi S, Makuwe E (2014) Cyanide poisoning and African elephant mortality in Hwange National Park, Zimbabwe: a preliminary assessment. Pachyderm 55:92–94 Ndlovu D (2019) My Culture, My Pride: Reclaiming the Tjwa Cultural Identity. Bulawayo: Tsoroo-tso San Development Trust Ndlovu, D, Benjamin B-C, Robert KH, Melinda CK (2022) The Tshwa San of Zimbabwe: Land, Livelihoods, and Ethnicity. In: Livelihoods and Ethnicity in Zimbabwe, Kirk H, Joshua M, and Patience Chadambuka, eds. London and Cham: Springer, pp 31–50 Owomoyela O (2002) Culture and customs of Zimbabwe. Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut Patel H (1998) Sustainable utilization and African wildlife policy: the case of Zimbabwe’s communal areas management program for indigenous resources (CAMPFIRE). Indigenous Environmental Policy Center, Boston, Massachusetts Ranger TO (1988) War, violence, and healing in Zimbabwe. J South Afr Stud 18(3):698–707 Scoones I, Marongwe N, Mavedzenge B, Mahenehene J, Muriimbara F, Sukume C (2010) Zimbabwe’s land reform: myths and realities. James Currey and Jacana, London and Cape Town Scott JC (2009) The art of not being governed: an anarchist history of upland southeast Asia. Yale University Press, New Haven Somerville K (2017) Cecil the lion in the British media: the pride and prejudice of the press. Journal of African Media Studies 9(3):473–485 Steyn JH (2008) Wildlife of Hwange National Park. Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, Harare Tabler EC (1963) Trade and travel in early Barotseland: the diaries of George Westbeech, 1883–1885 and Captain Norman MacLeod, 1875–1876. University of California Press, Berkeley Tabler EC (1966) Pioneers of Rhodesia. C. Struik, Cape Town Takuva T (2022) A social, environmental and political history of drought in Zimbabwe, 1911 to 1992. Ph.D. Dissertation, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa Veerman J, Kumar A, Mishra (2022) Exceptional landscape-wide cyanobacteria bloom in Okavango Delta, Botswana in 2020 coincided with a mass elephant die-off event. Harmful Algae 111.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hal.2021.102145 Wilson V (1975) Mammals of the Wankie National Park, Rhodesia. Museum Memoir No. 5. Trustees of the National Museums and Monuments of Rhodesia, Salisbury

Part II

Wildlife, Conservation and War

Chapter 6

Park-People Relationships and Local Community Perceptions on Wildlife Conservation in the Sengwe Area, Chiredzi District Itai Dhliwayo , Never Muboko , Clayton Mashapa , Chiedza N. Mutanga , and Edson Gandiwa Abstract This study assesses park-people relationships and local community perceptions regarding wildlife conservation in the Sengwe area, a community within the Great Limpopo Trans Frontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA), Chiredzi District, near the Mozambican border in southeast Zimbabwe. The study identifies and examines the existence of perceived and actual conflicts between local communities and conservation (protected) area management, with these conflicts mostly arising from an unshared vision of protected areas and lack of effective community engagement in conservation projects. Most Sengwe villagers report that they were denied access to, and control of, local resources, and were sidelined from wildlife projects, including employment opportunities and tourism promotion. This was also the case with the state-driven Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) projects. Villagers thus believe that the land in the protected area should be for agricultural production as land-based wildlife conservation is failing to enhance their livelihoods. Lack of participation is a key concern resulting in the local community having negative perceptions towards wildlife conservation, and this has caused encroachment of people into the park. We recommend that local community participation and engagement in conservation-based projects and decision-making

I. Dhliwayo (B) Chinhoyi University of Technology, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] N. Muboko · C. Mashapa School of Wildlife and Environmental Sciences, Chinhoyi University of Technology, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe C. N. Mutanga School of Hospitality and Tourism, Chinhoyi University of Technology, Chinhoyi, Zimbabwe E. Gandiwa Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, Harare, Zimbabwe

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_6

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processes be promoted and enhanced in rural Zimbabwe through involvement of local people. Keywords Biodiversity · Chiredzi · Conservation · Zimbabwe · Wildlife-human conflict

Introduction According to the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), parks covered 11.5% of the earth’s land surface by 2005, compared to 3% in 1962 (IUCN 2005). This indicates a significant increase in protected area land and seascape across the globe. In addition, national parks have become the centre-piece of international conservation strategies, especially in developing countries (Mombeshora and Le Bel 2009). Over the last few decades, the establishment of protected areas has constituted the principal system supporting conservation strategies (Ruiz-Labourdette et al. 2010). The eastern and southern African region in particular is one of the world’s most biodiversity-rich areas consisting of many protected and conserved areas managed by a wide range of stakeholders, such as governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local communities, the private sector, and partnerships among these entities (ESARO 2020). In Zimbabwe, 13.7% of the total area of the country is set aside as state-protected areas for wildlife. These areas are administered by the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority (ZPWLMA) and include National Parks (53.1%) of the total protected area, Safari Areas (37.2%), Recreational Parks (6.9%), Sanctuaries (2.6%), and Botanical Reserves and Gardens (0.2%) (Monks 2008). However, in many countries, park authorities have often directly displaced rural communities and curtailed their access to natural resources from which they traditionally used to sustain themselves (Schulz and Skonhoft 1996; Skonhoft 2007). For example, the Shangane people of Chiredzi, Zimbabwe, where this study took place, have experienced repeated shocks to their lives because of land acquisitions and removals arising from conservation projects (Chaumba 2006). Since the colonial era, these people have had their citizenry compromised and their livelihoods disrupted through imposed conservation initiatives and forced relocations (Ndhlovu 2022). In this context, protected areas might exist alongside people through fractious, uneasy, and conflict-ridden relationships, especially in cases where the establishment of the protected area alienated wildlife from the people, hence transforming a valuable natural commodity into a threat and a nuisance to the local people (Nagendra et al. 2010; Johannesen 2005). To better understand the relationships between protected areas and local communities, it is important to obtain knowledge on protected area management and local peoples’ experiences and perceptions about that relationship (Jalilova and Vacik 2012; Gandiwa et al. 2014a, b). Though conversation areas or Protected Areas (PAs) are mostly viewed in biological or ecological terms, their relationship to local communities is crucial including with reference to human welfare (Tomicevic et al.

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2010). We examine this through a case study of Sengwe in Chiredzi District, a community within the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA).

Context The livelihoods of most rural people in southern Africa are dependent on the use of natural resources and ecosystem-centred goods and services (Lucrezi et al. 2019; Everard and Everard 2020). It is therefore difficult to separate park resources from people and people from parks, especially in situations where the adjacent local communities were displaced to pave way for the establishment of a PA (Katerere et al. 2001; Smith et al. 2021). The relationship between PA management and local communities, including in Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs), is shaped by many factors including local community views about their environment (Gandiwa et al. 2014a, b; Mutanga et al. 2021). These views are informed by several issues which include the history of the PA, the level of community engagement, participation in conservation decision-making, and nature-based economic projects (Mutanga et al. 2015a, b; Mudzengi et al. 2021; Gordon -Cumming and Mearns 2021). It is well documented that most PA developments entail displacements, dispossession, and subsequent lack or loss of access to resources for local communities (Cumming 2017; Mandudzo 2019; Schmidt and Vengesai 2021). Displaced people are exposed to a variety of impoverishment risks and this stokes up animosity towards PAs, particularly where the people concerned strongly feel that they should be part of it. While the expansion in the network of PAs has enabled conservation of biodiversity and habitats, the establishment of most of these PAs has often ignored the interests of local and displaced communities (Mombeshora 2006; Ndhlovu 2022). The character and siting of PA boundaries can have embedded ecological, social, and economic impacts (Stone and Nyaupane 2018; Mathevet et al. 2016; Andrade and Rhodes 2012). These impacts include issues relating to human-wildlife conflict, competing claims for resources, the flow of ecosystem goods and services, the dynamics of source sink systems, and a full range of rural development and health issues (Cumming 2017). Conflicts are particularly inevitable and common near protected area boundaries because of societal and ecological needs that diverge and converge (Rechci´nski et al. 2019; Thapa 2010; Pérez and Pacheco 2006). The divergent social and ecological goals of the land and conservation sectors result in competition if not conflicts, which often lead to delays in the process of resolving land and resource issues (Kepe et al. 2005; Hoole and Berkes 2010). Conflicts, such as humanwildlife conflict, affect relations between park management and communities, and this has even negatively influenced local community perceptions towards PAs and TFCAs (Ramutsindela 2009). Consideration of perceptions and local communityPA interfaces thus becomes more important as conservation activities increasingly depend on the actions of interested groups of people (Mutanga et al. 2017; de Groot and de Groot 2009).

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Concerns over the place of people in PAs have been the main source of conservation conflicts. There have been growing concerns mainly regarding four major issues. Firstly, when the unilateral establishment of such PAs takes place, they will be often associated with forceful evictions of indigenous people from their traditional lands (Neumann 2002; Walpole et al. 2001; Bobo and Weladji 2011). Secondly, there exists the denial of access to resources in such PAs (land, wildlife, and forest products) upon which local communities depend for subsistence needs, as well as criminalisation of their practices when accessing such resources (Bobo and Weladji 2011; Thapa 2010). Thirdly, there is wildlife damage such as crop damage or costs inflicted by crop raiders and dangerous wild animals, and wildlife attacks on livestock and humans (Kepe et al. 2001; Madden 2004). The fourth point relates to the unknown ‘place’ of people in those PAs (Adams and Hutton 2007). More specifically, it is not entirely clear whether and how local people should be involved in the governance of PAs, and hence, their so-called place in conservation remains unclear if not unknown (Bobo and Weladji 2011; Thapa 2010). Such concerns lead to thoughts on how to build and sustain conducive relationships with local communities, particularly those living adjacent to protected areas while also addressing their concerns over PAs. The developing consensus is that, while PAs are recognised as essential for maintaining biodiversity, their survival, particularly in the global South, depends on whether they address these human needs and concerns (Tian et al. 2019; Madden and McQuinn 2014; Hammill and Brown 2006). To address these, the conservation and socio-economic activities currently promoted by PAs and the TFCA concept encourage the formation of alliances between different stakeholders (e.g. governments, the private sector, local communities, and non-governmental organisations) as a means of developing a fuller consensus and harnessing social capital to promote sustainable land use, enhancing biodiversity conservation, alleviating poverty in rural areas, and minimising conflicts (Muntali 2007). Although studies on park-people relationships and community perceptions on wildlife are well documented (Bhatasara et al. 2013; Matseketsa et al. 2018; Allendorf et al. 2019), these relationships and perceptions differ from place to place as they are area-specific and shaped by prevailing circumstances. This is the case with the Sengwe community where there is a dearth of information on the type of relationships existing between parks and adjacent community members and on local community perceptions of wildlife conservation. Previous studies in the area regarding wildlife covered issues focusing on economic benefits, tourism, and wildlife conservation (Chiutsi and Saarinen 2017; Whande and Suich 2012; Chirozva 2016). In this light, the objectives of the study were to: (i) determine the nature of parkpeople relationships in Ward 15 Sengwe Communal Lands, which forms part of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA), and (ii) assess local community perceptions of wildlife conservation within the TFCA framework.

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Study Area The area of study, Sengwe ward 15, is located in Chiredzi District in southeast Zimbabwe and forms part of the GLTFCA. This area is found at relatively low altitude, that is, below 900 m above sea level for the greater part, with a few areas ranging between 400 and 600 m above sea level (Gandiwa and Kativu 2009). It is characterised by a hot climate and experiences mean annual temperatures averaging between 25 and 32 °C, and rarely do temperatures drop below freezing point even in winter (Anderson et al. 2013). The landscape is generally dry with a short rainy season spanning from November to March, with mean annual rainfall being about 500 mm per annum (Tagutanazvo and Bowora 2019). The study area is located adjacent to the Gonarezhou National Park, the second largest park after Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe. There are no longer barriers separating the protected areas from the adjacent communal land as veterinary fences previously erected along some sections of the national park for foot and mouth disease control are now extensively damaged by wildlife and humans (Anderson et al. 2013). From the last human population and housing census of 2022, ward 15 had 55 villages with a population of 9,458 people with a total number of households of 2,064 (ZimStat 2022). The people in the study area who are predominantly Shangane became strategic crop producers specialising mainly in drought-resistant crops, such as sorghum (mabele), millet varieties (such as mahuvu and mpowo), and cassava. They, however, also excel in maize (xifake), sweet potatoes (muhlate), and groundnuts (timanga) production which they adapted to the extremely hot weather and low annual precipitation (Tavuyanago 2017).

Study Design A stratified random design was adopted, with the ward 15 community divided into five strata based on direction (north, south, east, west, and central). Stratified random design is a method of sampling that involves the division of a population into smaller sub-groups known as strata. The strata are formed based on members’ shared attributes or characteristics, such as income or education attainment (Hayes 2021). The method gives a sample population that best represents the entire population being studied. Stratified random design is a widely used sampling technique for approximate query processing and provides the flexibility to emphasise some strata over others by controlling the allocation of sample sizes (Nguyen et al. 2021). The method was used in this study so as to ensure that there was wide coverage of the ward, which makes it acceptable to generalise findings for the entire ward. The ward centre (community hall) was used to determine direction, given that it is the central point in the ward. There are 55 villages in the ward and each stratum had an average of 11 villages. From each stratum, one village was selected through a simple random sampling method. This was used so that all villages have an equal chance of being selected. Permission was sought from the Chiredzi Rural District

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Council (which is the responsible authority) to carry out a survey in ward 15. Further, permission was sought from traditional leaders to carry out a survey in their respective villages.

Data Collection A mixed method data collection method involving both qualitative and quantitative techniques was adopted. In this study, three methods were used to collect data. Firstly, five (5) focus group discussions were held with community members in five villages with a total of 65 community members (37 females and 28 males) participating in the discussions (see Table 6.1). The participants were selected through the convenient sampling method and participation was voluntary. Under this method, the researcher includes those participants who are easy or convenient to approach and the technique is useful where the target population is defined in terms of very broad categories (Alvi 2016). This sampling method was used also because it saves time and is an affordable way of gathering data (Taherdoost 2016). The community leaders assisted the researchers in organising and mobilising people to attend the focus group discussions. One of the researchers facilitated conversation during the focus group discussions and this helped in ensuring that all members in all the focus group discussions were given equal opportunities to participate. During focus group discussions, some questions asked related to: the people’s views regarding wildlife conservation, the benefits they get from wildlife conservation, the challenges they face in relation to wildlife conservation, and recommendations about what needs to be done to address the challenges. In two villages, the services of a local interpreter were sought because most people spoke the Shangaan language while Shona (the language of the researchers) was spoken in the other villages. The interpreter helped in translating responses by the locals who were responding in their local Shangaan language (Llewellyn-Jones and Lee 2014). Table 6.1 Composition of focus group discussants Village

Participants Traditional leaders (Village Heads)

Mugiviza

1

Total Village Development Committee (VIDCO) Members 3

Ordinary community members 9

13

Gwaivhi

1

2

9

11

Samu

1

4

7

12

Chishinya

1

3

10

14

Chigalo

1

2

12

15

Total

5

14

47

65

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Secondly, semi-structured interviews were held with 76 community members (30 males and 46 females) who were selected through the convenient sampling method. Convenient sampling for interviews was used in this study after considering a number of logistical factors which included accessibility, the geographical proximity of respondents, their availability at a given time, and also their willingness to participate in the study, following Etikan et al. (2016). The researchers held semi-structured interviews with participants who were readily available and willing to participate. The participants were met in their homesteads. Semi-structured interviews were advantageous as they ensured a high rate of response and helped in probing respondents for more information. An average of 15 minutes was taken for each interview session. Table 6.2 shows the demographics (sex, age range, and education level) of the interviewees. Thirdly, key informant interviews were held with 11 key informants (3 males and 8 females) drawn from Malipati Development Trust, Gonarezhou National Park, Chiredzi Rural District Council, Ministry of Lands, Agriculture, Water, Climate and Rural Resettlement, Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing, and safari operators. The key informants were purposively selected, and an interview guide was used for data collection. Purposive sampling is a form of nonprobability sampling in which decisions concerning the individuals to be included in the sample are taken by the researcher, based upon a variety of criteria which may include specialist knowledge of the research issue, or capacity and willingness to participate in the research (Jupp 2006). The key informants were selected based on their knowledge, work experience, and position held in the place of employment. Table 6.2 Socio-demographic profiles of the interviewees

Variable

Description

Sex

Male

30 (39)

Female

46 (61)

Age (years)

Education

20–29

5 (7)

30–39

11 (14)

40–49

28 (37)

50–59

22 (29)

60 +

10 (13)

None Primary ZJC Ordinary

9 (12) 27 (35) 4 (5) 26 (34)

Advanced

0 (0)

Vocational

4 (5)

Tertiary Total (Participants)

Number (%)

6 (9) 76 (100)

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Data Analysis Descriptive statistics and thematic content analysis were used to analyse data. Thematic content analysis provides a descriptive presentation of qualitative data and portrays the thematic content in interview transcripts (or other texts) by identifying common themes in the texts provided for analysis (Anderson 2007). To determine the nature of people-park relationships in ward 15, each of the responses from semistructured interviews regarding the participants’ relationship with Parks Management was recorded under one of the five categories: very bad, bad, fair, good, and very good. Microsoft Excel was used to compute the responses per category. Data were summarised using descriptive statistics, where frequencies were used to determine the scores in each category. Thematic content analysis was used as well to establish the nature of park-people relationships based on the focus group discussions and key informant interviews. In the case of focus group discussions, negative and positive perceptions and relations for community members were identified. Negative perceptions/experiences refer to those views against the idea of wildlife conservation, while positive perceptions/experiences involve desirable views, outcomes, and benefits regarding wildlife conservation for community members. Responses from key informants were analysed using thematic content analysis and were placed in two categories: positive and negative.

People-Park Relationships in the GLTFCA About 51% (n = 39) of the 76 interviewed respondents rated their relationship with the Parks Management as bad, 24% (n = 18) rated the relationship as very bad, while 15% (n = 12) rated their relationship as fair. Only 7% (n = 5) of the respondents rated the relationship as good, while just 3% (n = 2) rated the relationship as very good. From the results shown above, it is clear that most people regard their relationship with parks management in a negative way. In focus group discussions, most participants also viewed their relationship with parks management negatively. During a focus group discussion, one of the traditional leaders said the following: (Respondent 1) We do not harvest anything from our fields because elephants destroy our crops. We have suffered too much, and we do not have food because elephants destroy our crop. There is no peace here.

Only a very small minority of the respondents, including key informants, viewed their relationship with Parks Management to be positive. One of the key informants said, (Respondent 2) We have a good working relationship with the parks management. It’s unfortunate that our local community members do not appreciate the efforts of parks management.

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Local Community Perceptions of Wildlife Conservation The villagers developed significant contempt towards the park and its management. The communities have encroached into the park clearing vegetation for settlement and land preparation. There is a broken-down fence as domesticated animals cross into the park searching for pastures. Generally, the community members had negative perceptions towards wildlife conservation and these were categorised into five themes: limited participation, loss of livelihoods, loss of productive land, elitism, and no employment quota. About 88% (n = 124) of the interviewed and focus group participants reported that they were not allowed to participate in any issues concerning wildlife conservation. One of the participants pointed out this during the interview: (Interviewee 1) We are not involved in planning and decision making. We are not told anything and no one listens to us. We do not have a platform to raise our concerns.

In relation to loss of productive land, the majority (90%; n = 127) of these participants pointed out that they viewed wildlife conservation in a negative way as they think it is waste of productive land. One of the interviewees said, (Interviewee 2) This land being used for wildlife conservation could have been used for growing crops. Look, we have small pieces of land and the bigger pieces of land are being used for wildlife conservation. How can they prioritise animals over human beings?

Elitism is one of the negative perceptions expressed by participants. In this study, 70% (n = 99) pointed out that wildlife conservation only benefited the elite (i.e. that only powerful people benefit, and ordinary people are sidelined). One of the community members said the following: (Interviewee 3) We do not benefit anything from wildlife conservancy. It only benefits the owners of the wildlife conservancy.

Another participant said, (Interviewee 4) This [wildlife conservation] is for the rich; we are sidelined. They don’t regard us as equal human beings.

Related to responses on positive perceptions, four themes were identified: promotion of tourism, cultural diversity, employment creation, and CAMPFIRE projects. In relation to employment creation, only 18% (n = 14) of the interviewed community participants mentioned that wildlife conservancy creates employment for local people. However, 64% (n = 7) of the key informants pointed out that employment creation is one of the benefits of wildlife conservancy. It was found though that there is no quota system in relation to employment of local people in the Gonarezhou Conservation Trust. Gonarezhou National Park is now called Gonarezhou Conservation Trust after a public–private partnership was established. Further, the results show that the community in ward 15 Sengwe area had some positive perceptions on Gonarezhou Conservation Trust (GCT) initiatives, with the promotion of tourism being the most important at 70% (n = 99). During a focus group discussion, one of the community members said,

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(Respondent 3) What we can only see as a benefit of this [wildlife conservancy] is the idea of tourism. We always see white people visiting this area and I think it’s good to have visitors coming to our area. Some of the tourists buy some local products, and they pay in United States Dollars.

In relation to tourism, it was also found that cultural sharing is one of the benefits of wildlife conservation. The Sengwe people, through a community initiative programme called Community Conservation Development Initiative (CCDI), usually host cultural exchange festivals with their counterparts (also located within the GLTFCA) from neighbouring Mozambique and South Africa. They exchange notes and experiences, sharing transboundary challenges and success stories of living on the boundaries of Protected Areas. Having local CAMPFIRE projects was one of the benefits of wildlife conservation, and it was mentioned by 28% (n = 21) of the community members during interviews. CAMPFIRE, or the Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme, is a long-term programmatic approach to rural development anchored on the assumption that involving local people in economic benefits and management of wildlife will help ensure the sustainability of wildlife resources and their habitat and, in turn, enhance rural livelihoods. CAMPFIRE projects have greatly assisted in educating communities and have also helped in the management of human-wildlife conflict (Taylor 2009; Shereni and Saarinen 2021). A community member during the interview stated that CAMPFIRE projects’ construction of classroom blocks and clinics benefited the local community members. However, this community member pointed out that, although CAMPFIRE projects are good, there is a lack of transparency. The community member said, (Interviewee 5) When CAMPFIRE projects started in this area, it was really good, and everything was transparent. As community members, we were involved in all the stages, but this is no longer the same situation. We do not know how much is allocated to our area. Everything is controlled by people in authority.

This has been a common criticism of CAMPFIRE projects in the study area.

Challenges Facing Protected Areas This study established that the relationship between local communities and park management was generally bad. This was because local communities perceived that they were sidelined and did not benefit from the wildlife conservancy. Communities were displaced from the park to pave way for the creation of wildlife conservation (Chirozva 2016). The creation of Protected Areas (such as Gonarezhou National Park) since the 1930s resulted in the displacement of Shangaan communities who were at the time located in some parts of the park’s area (Musakwa et al. 2020). Conflicts in Sengwe arise when communities search for scarce resources in the protected areas. Some of the resources include food, grazing pastures, water, and wildlife. Elephants (Loxodonta africana) have a tendency of moving from the park

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to villages raiding crops grown by communities on the edges of the park. Tavuyanago (2017) likewise reports a sour relationship between the community members and the Parks Management which is detrimental to the success of conservation and other initiatives like the GLTFCA. Livestock rearing has also been made difficult by the prevalence of carnivores such as lions, leopards, and hyenas that frequently roam adjacent villages (Matanzima and Marowa 2022). The local community perceptions towards wildlife conservation have become so negative that just a few key informants were able to speak of the positive impacts of wildlife conservation in ward 15 in any meaningful way. Their positive conceptions go contrary to the daily experiences of villagers, which affects perceptions of Gonarezhou Conservation Trust by locals in the Sengwe area (Anderson et al. 2013). Any benefits of living on the edge of the protected area in Sengwe ward 15 are simply outweighed by the costs of human and wildlife conflict, the spread of livestock diseases, and the making of a zone of competing claims and opportunities (Cumming et al. 2017). Human-wildlife conflict in the area has worsened in the contemporary period as a result of the growing human population and the increase in numbers of wild animals (Gandiwa et al. 2013; Matanzima and Marowa 2022). Conflict is often at the heart of protected area and local community establishment. In part, this is because of clumsy top-down approaches by states that fail to appreciate, or work with, local practices and interests (Walpole et al. 2001; West et al. 2006). Inclusive participation is increasingly seen as a mechanism to promote integration of protected areas and local stakeholders, minimising existing conflicts and negative impacts (Mannigel 2008; Cumming et al. 2017). As Stankey and Shindler (2006) point out, the people-PA relationship is critical to achieve conservation objectives because the future of Protected Areas depends on the cooperation and support of local communities. As such, building and sustaining good relationships with local communities has become an important consideration for Protected Areas management. In this regard, if the objectives of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Areas are to be attained, the Parks Management should strive to ensure that the community members are regarded as one of the key stakeholders. Our findings about the bad relationship between the park and communities in ward 15 echo well with the findings of others. For instance, the study by Ramutsindela (2009) shows that local communities do not have direct access to Protected Area resources, and it calls for a deeper understanding of relationships between local communities and TFCAs and the outcomes of those relationships, beyond statistical assessment of revenue from ecotourism in TFCAs. Further, our study findings resonate fully with the conclusion of Mutanga et al. (2015a, b) that participatory approaches and collaboration between protected area staff and communities promote positive Protected Areas-community relationships. Our results also corroborate those of Bennet and Dearden (2013) who carried out an almost similar study in Thailand which captures park-people relationships. Bennet and Dearden (2013) concluded that the relationship between parks management and local communities was fractured and that this would undermine the success of conservation initiatives in transboundary conservation areas. This is consistent with previous research on PAs in southern Africa (Cumming et al. 2017). It is clear therefore that, at least in

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theory, understanding the perceptions of local communities can help predict their likely responses to a new policy or conservation programme before it is implemented (Gelcich and Okeeffe 2005), so as to ensure more conducive and mutually-beneficial relationships between parks and people.

Conclusion The majority of people in Ward 15 Sengwe Communal Lands regard their relationship with parks management in a negative way as they see no strong justifiable reasons for coexistence with protected areas. A minority of the respondents including some key informants and those specifically in leadership positions viewed their relationship with parks management to be positive. Lack of participation was recorded as a key driver that resulted in the local community members having negative perceptions towards wildlife conservation and this has caused the encroachment of people into the park leading to conservation-centred conflicts. As well, few local people are employed in the Park, CAMPFIRE projects benefit a limited number of local elites, and Sengwe people view wildlife conservation as a wastage of land that could have been utilised for crop cultivation for human consumption. While conflictual relationships between the local community and protected area management exist, coexistence of not harmonious relationships are possible. In this context, this study recommends the following: (i) enhanced involvement and consistent engagement of local communities in establishing and managing wildlife conservation projects so as to improve their livelihoods and promote conservation within the edges of protected areas and (ii) the development of strategic multi-sectoral partnerships between protected areas and communities for sustainable biodiversity and effective management of wildlife by all stakeholders. Acknowledgements We want to thank the following institutions that supported and/or gave permission for this study; the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, Chiredzi Rural District Council, Gaza Trust (Community Conservation Development Initiative), Malipati Development Trust, Community Initiatives for Sustainable Development (CIFOSUDE), and CAMPFIRE Committees in Chiredzi. We are also grateful to Chief Sengwe, Hebert Pikela, Khesani Matatise, and Blessing Bhaiseni for the support. We also thank Joseph Antipas for taking the photos during our research. Finally, we acknowledge the funding that was received from the Malilangwe Trust.

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Chapter 7

Understanding the Complexities of Human Conflict Over Wildlife in Kariba Border Town Ivan Marowa

and Joshua Matanzima

Abstract For many decades now, dating back to colonial times, Kariba border town has been a tourist destination, including for international visitors, with the Kariba dam waterscape and wildlife central to Kariba’s attraction. This has come at a cost in terms of a growing range of wildlife-human conflicts and human conflicts around wildlife. This chapter examines the complex human conflicts over wildlife occurring in and around the game parks and corridors of the border town of Kariba along the Zimbabwe and Zambia border. These conflicts around wildlife take on a multiplicity of shifting forms, sometimes involving squabbles between different categories of Kariba residents, and sometimes involving tension between state authorities and residents, including residents as poachers or illegal meat traders. They are grounded as well in different discursive constructions of wildlife and in different value orientations towards nature conservation, with diverging material interests and lifestyles contributing to configuring these discourses and orientations. In the end, if left unresolved, these conflicts are disadvantageous to both humans and wildlife, and undercut the long-term prospects of animal conservation in the Kariba area. Keywords Human-wildlife conflict · Conservation · Borderlands · Kariba · Zimbabwe

Introduction For many decades now, dating back to colonial times, Kariba town in Zimbabwe has been a tourist destination, including for international visitors, with the Kariba I. Marowa (B) Department of History Heritage and Knowledge Systems, University of Zimbabwe, Mt. Pleasant, P.O. Box MP167, Harare, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] J. Matanzima Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining Sustainable Minerals Institute, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_7

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dam waterscape and wildlife central to Kariba’s attraction. This has come at a cost in terms of a growing range of wildlife-human conflicts and human conflicts around wildlife. This chapter is chiefly concerned with the complexities that surround human conflicts over wild animals and how and why these conflicts are generated as well as perceived and acted upon by different groups of people in the border town of Kariba. We advance the argument that human conflicts about wildlife are very complex as a repertoire of factors engenders them, they take on different forms, and different species of animals are involved in varied conflicts at different times. Some conflicts over wildlife directly engender human–human conflicts while others indirectly cause it. The conflicting parties involved in these conflicts in Kariba often belong to different social classes (between the haves and the have-nots) as they have divergent perspectives about the presence of wildlife and experience the effects of this presence in different ways. For instance, local richer residents tend to become involved in tourism and view protecting wildlife as the noblest of acts, while poorer residents have a contrary view owing to the destruction of their gardens and property by wildlife. Additionally, though, some local residents or stakeholders might agree about the presence and importance of wildlife when it comes to one issue, but they might adopt conflicting stances around other wildlife-related issues. Because of this, human conflicts over wildlife in Kariba are not homogeneous but highly variegated and dynamic. These conflicts, therefore, must be examined with sensitivity to particularity, differentiating between various causes, forms, and consequences of these conflicts. In this respect, the Kariba case is a microcosm of the intrinsic complexities of human conflicts over wildlife prevailing among people residing near conservancies, ranches, game parks, and safaris in Zimbabwe and the African continent more broadly. The chapter thus examines the character and extent to which human-wildlife and human–human conflicts around wildlife occur in the town of Kariba, given its proximity to national parks and game reserves along the Zimbabwe-Zambia border. Contact and conflicts with wild animals are variedly perceived and tolerated by different groups of actors in the border area of Kariba. As such, human conflict over wild animals is related to local people’s attitudes, awareness, and perceptions towards wildlife. As Hariohay et al. (2018) highlight, there is a close interrelationship between attitudes and perceptions towards wildlife and the occurrence of human antagonisms over animal protection or elimination. The main source of antagonistic relations between people and stakeholders in Kariba is their polarised interests over wildlife. In this way, “knowledge of different symbolic meanings of wild animals, their social importance, and how different groups use a particular species or wildlife construction to define or articulate an environmental problem is fundamental to understanding conflicts around wildlife” (Hill 2015: 229). Conflict in Kariba emerges from differences relating to targeted wildlife goals between diverse stakeholders and varied regimes of authority. For instance, conflict between National Parks authorities and local communities emanates from the former’s conservation goals that are interrupted by the latter’s illegal hunting activities and retaliatory killings of wildlife. Conflict transpires within the context of differences in value orientations and social constructions of wildlife, with diverging material interests performing a role in the

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emergence and consolidation of these value orientations and social constructions. Ultimately, human conflicts over wildlife represent a threat to wildlife conservation (Madden 2004, 2008; Massé 2016), such that it becomes important to find methods of mitigating human–human conflicts over wildlife to promote animal conservation in Kariba. The chapter commences with a discussion of the social constructionist and value orientations approaches and the concept of “human conflicts over wildlife” in the context of human-wildlife conflicts. It then describes the methods and techniques utilised in data collection, presentation, and analysis. The chapter then goes on to examine in detail the diverse human controversies over animals among different stakeholders in the border town of Kariba.

Social Constructionist and Value Orientations Approaches to Wildlife The social construction of nature (Greider and Garkovich 1994) and the value orientations about nature approaches (Manfredo et al. 2003) are crucial in identifying stakeholder meanings and perceptions regarding wild animals in Kariba. This is due to the fact that the social—discursive—constructions of different animal species “reflect diverging agendas, priorities, values and feelings [among different stakeholders] that contribute to human conflict over wildlife” (Fraser-Celin et al. 2018: 2). According to Hill (2015), culturally-constructed and symbolic meanings of animals feed into discourses around “conflicts” over conservation. In Kariba, people’s complex sociocultural constructions of wildlife are driven by different factors (ideational and material) and these generate different types of conflicts over wildlife. Value orientations are an expression of basic values and are revealed through the pattern and direction of basic norms and beliefs held by an individual or group (Fulton et al. 1996) which, in turn, guide individual and group behaviour (Manfredo et al. 2003). In part, value orientations arise in and through particular social constructions of nature and wildlife specifically. However, there is a plethora of factors which shape and configure particular value orientations, including geographic, political, economic, social, institutional, financial, and cultural factors (Manfredo et al. 2003). There are two wildlife value orientation dimensions, one labelled on a “protectionuse” (orientation) scale, and the other orientation relating to a scale (or degree) of “wildlife appreciation” (Fulton et al. 1996). People who fall within the “use” end of the protection-use continuum believe that wildlife should be managed and used to benefit humans and are positive towards hunting and fishing. Those on the “protection” end of the scale think wildlife should have rights similar to those of humans and they oppose hunting and fishing. People who score high on the wildlife appreciation orientation tend to hold beliefs that emphasise the importance of wildlife education, wildlife-related recreation such as viewing, and wildlife protection for future generations; those who score low do not hold such beliefs.

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We analyse our findings based on the claims of these two approaches. We believe that conflicts among different groups of people occur due to their different cultural, social, and economic discourses and values about wildlife.

Human Conflicts Over Wildlife Messmer (2009: 10) defines human-wildlife conflict (HWC) as “situations that involve any negative interactions between humans and wildlife. These conflicts can be real or perceived, economic or aesthetic, social or political.” They include dimensions and impacts that may result from federal, state, or local wildlife legislation, regulations, or policies that are designed to protect or conserve wildlife and individual property rights as well as guarantee the public good (Messmer 2009). Human-wildlife conflict is one of the main threats to the continued survival of many species in many parts of the world and is also a significant threat to many local human populations (Fisher 2016; Madden 2008; Marowa et al. 2021; Matanzima et al. 2022; Svotwa et al. 2007). Wildlife attacks on humans often result in injuries and loss of lives and precarious livelihoods (Matanzima and Marowa 2022). This exacerbates the impoverishment of communities residing nearer to (or with) animals. However, other scholars have questioned the meaning and implications surrounding the concept of “HWC” suggesting that this phrase may be misleading (Fisher 2016; Hill 2015; Madden 2008; Peterson et al. 2010; Vaske and Manfredo 2012). The concept embraces interactions that are direct and indirect, and intended and unintended, and it implicitly suggests that both sides are seeking to interfere in the life of the other and that the various conflicts arising are amenable to a single, universal resolution (Fisher 2016). Terms like human-wildlife conflict obscure the nature of, and appropriate responses to, such conflicts because they do not fully appreciate the human dimensions embroiled in HWC (Dayer et al. 2017; Fraser-Celin et al. 2018). In this light, Hill (2015) argues that the HWC label creates a problem by masking the complex and dynamic nature of the underlying “conflicts” that stem from differential values, needs, priorities, and power relations between the human groups concerned. Human-wildlife conflict (HWC) can be understood better in terms of conflict between humans over wildlife (Fraser-Celin et al. 2018). Human–human conflicts are inextricably entangled in the prevalence of HWC in many game areas and corridors around the world (Nyhus 2016). For example, Massé (2016) has emphasised that HWC and its negative impacts are not natural phenomena, but are the result of socio-political-economic decisions to create conservation landscapes which impinge on human lives. If local people feel that their rights are infringed (and those of the animals are prioritised more) by these conservation decisions, “they vent their fury towards animals at least partially because they feel unable to direct their anger and frustration at the real causes of conflict” [i.e. other people and agencies such as wildlife authorities, researchers, and conservationists] (Hill 2015: 5).

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Henceforth, if authorities of protected areas fail to address the needs of the local people or to work with them to address HWC adequately, the conflict expands and intensifies—becoming a conflict not only between humans and wildlife, but between humans about wildlife (Madden 2004). Thus, viewing HWC as conflict between humans and animals, instead of conflict between humans, masks the reality of the broader HWC systemic drivers (Fraser-Celin et al. 2018). As noted by Fisher (2016: 377), many of the so-called conflicts between people and wildlife are actually conflicts “between conservation and other human activities, particularly those associated with livelihoods,” and that therefore “we should distinguish between humanwildlife impacts and human–human conflicts and be explicit about the different interests involved in conflict.” Research demonstrates that wildlife management and conservation efforts and practices often result in human–human conflict over wildlife among various stakeholders and regimes of authority (Dickman 2010; Fraser-Celin et al. 2018; Madden 2008). These human conflicts can prove more complicated than direct conflicts between humans and wildlife (Dickman 2010), and they play out in arenas from court rooms to public lands as well as social media platforms such as WhatsApp groups, Facebook, and Twitter. Human conflicts over wildlife have serious negative consequences. Firstly, they are a threat to wildlife conservation. The prevalence of human conflict over wildlife negatively impacts on HWC mitigation efforts, and this explains why most HWC mitigation recommendations have failed to achieve the desired long-term results (Dickman 2010; Hill 2015) culminating in the perpetuation of HWC. Secondly, human contestations about wildlife also result in the death of either conservationists or illegal hunters/poachers, with live ammunition confrontations even taking place in forest areas. Results presented in this study are a microcosm of the broader controversies between people from various socio-economic backgrounds over wildlife common throughout Africa (Hill 2015; Fraser-Celin et al. 2018; Madden 2004, 2008; Sifuna 2011). Fraser-Celin et al. (2018), for example, explored the tensions manifesting between individuals involved in the agricultural, conservation, and tourism sectors in Botswana concerning endangered African wild dogs. Another case involves the controversies between farmers and Kwandu Conservancy staff in Namibia (Khumalo and Yung 2015). Khumalo and Yung (2015) have documented the residents’ resistance to the zonation plan drafted by the conservancy staff, Namibian Nature Foundation, and the Ministry of Agriculture which would have resulted in their forced relocation. The relocation was regarded as a mechanism to resolve HWC near the conservancy. A study of the Sundarbans in India (Hill 2015) demonstrates how different discursive representations of tigers, both locally and globally, are associated with power relations and tensions between the various social actors with a stake in the matter. Likewise, Madden (2008) found increased animosity between Parks authorities and people living in and around Bwindi Gorilla Park in Uganda due to the reluctance of Parks authorities to attend to the gorilla problem. Thus, human conflict over wildlife can be influenced by deep-rooted social, economic, legal, cultural, political, land-use, and bureaucratic factors in each situation/case.

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Study Area and Research Methods The fieldwork for this chapter entailed the collection of qualitative data from six suburbs in the border town of Kariba in north-western Zimbabwe, which are Kariba Heights, Mahombekombe, Baobab, Nyamhunga, Quarry, and Charara. As a border town, Kariba spreads for approximately 20 kms along the Lake Kariba shoreline with its western boundary on the Zambezi River. It is bordered by Hurungwe Safari to the north, Charara Safari area to the east, and the lakeshore to the south and south-east (Mhlanga 2001). Wildlife resources in the national park (near Kariba) are managed by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM). The border town, therefore, is situated in an area endowed with varied animal species such as elephants, leopards, buffaloes, lions, baboons, elands, and impala. In fact, most of the land (on both the plateau and the environs around the shoreline) as well as other habitable areas in Kariba town were developed into residential and commercial properties. This took up wildlife habitat space and closed game corridors, thus literally preventing wild animals from directly accessing the Lake for water and grazing along the shoreline. The transformation of the area of Kariba has led to a number of conflicts between humans and wildlife around the use of natural resources like water, trees, and habitat (Svotwa et al. 2007). Qualitative data were obtained from semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and focus group discussions between December 2018 and March 2020. The qualitative research methods were important in capturing the complexities and nuances that are often overlooked through the use of quantitative data collection techniques in studying nature conservation (Goldman et al. 2010). Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 40 local residents, who were purposively selected (Walliman 2011). In-depth interviews were also undertaken with stakeholders, that is, four workers from non-government organisations (NGOs), one official from the Mineral, Flora and Fauna Unit (MFFU), and four National Parks officials. The MFFU is a department under the Zimbabwe Police Service that deals with minerals and animal offences. All the interview sessions were conducted in the ChiShona (indigenous) language (the dominant language spoken in Kariba). In relation to participant observation, we visited numerous human-wildlife hotspots in Kariba such as dumping sites in Nyamhunga and Mahombekombe, the lakeshore and homesteads. Sometimes, conflicts between local people and baboons occurred in our presence during the fieldwork. Two focus group discussions (FGDs), one in Charara with women and one in Quarry with men, were held (in ChiShona). During these sessions, informants openly revealed their frustrations with National Parks authorities and other conservationists over their failure to reduce HWC, as residents were suffering both “hidden” and “visible” impacts of HWC, to use Khumalo and Yung’s (2015) terminology. In terms of data analysis, thematic analysis was used. We evaluated our raw data in transcribed and translated form to identify relevant and common themes. This facilitated the identification of the many groups and stakeholders involved in conflicts over wildlife as well as the key issues of conflict in Kariba. These themes involve conflicts

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between the following: high-income and low-income suburb residents; conservationists and HWC victims; and National Parks and poachers (including the MFFU, and illegal hunters and ivory traders). These forms of conflict are discussed in the next section.

Human-Wildlife Conflicts in Kariba There are diverse animal species in Kariba, but those entering into conflict with humans are elephants, baboons, hippos, lions, leopards, buffaloes, crocodiles, and wild pigs (Marowa et al. 2021; Mhlanga 2001; Svotwa et al. 2007). Elephants and baboons often destroy or damage people’s houses, roof sheets, and property as well as trample their gardens, while lions, leopards, hippos, and buffaloes attack people and cause injuries and deaths. Crocodiles cause both minor and serious injuries, and significantly impact on the livelihoods of the fishing communities (Matanzima et al. 2022). The multi-faceted character of HWC, involving a range of species, is quite common more broadly, as observed by Manfredo and Dayer (2004). A range of factors, such as geographic, economic, social, cultural, and historical, tend to make each conflict-situation unique (Hill 2004). The occurrence of HWC in Kariba is also varied as people from different socio-economic backgrounds such as age, sex, gender, income, and location are differently exposed to varied wild animal species. For example, men rarely conflict with baboons in Kariba; rather, because of their particular homestead duties, women and children are subjected to attacks by baboons (Mhlanga 2001). Such situations might lead to competing social constructions of species, whereby the same animal can be simultaneously a hated and vilified “pest” for some people, and a much-loved and highly-valued species for others, to the extent of being afforded the highest degree of legal protection (Hill 2004)—as we will demonstrate in some of the cases discussed later. Thus, not all conflicts over wildlife relate to HWC, as they entail human–human conflicts. Conflicts around wildlife must be approached with caution in order to understand the dimensions of their occurrence because they are not monolithic.

High-Income Versus Low-Income Residents Conflicting social constructions of wildlife among different social groupings of people in Kariba are influenced by socio-economic and political factors. The two groupings considered here hold very different discursive constructions of wildlife. On the one hand, there are high-income residents living in the low-density suburbs of Kariba such as Baobab Ridge, Kariba Heights, and Camp Hill, while others reside in the commercial and tourism industries dotted along the lake shore. On the other hand, low-income residents occupy the high-density areas like Nyamhunga, Mahombekombe, Quarry, and Charara, as well as residing in compounds located

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in the immediate vicinity of their workplaces along the lake shore. Wildlife-related contestations transpiring between low-density and high-density suburb dwellers are deeply rooted in the complex repertoires of attitudes, feelings, and perceptions towards wild animals. Fraser-Celin et al. (2018) thus argue that attitudes towards wild animals best explain the underlying tensions between human groups over wildlife. We discovered that the high-income residents have positive attitudes, feelings, and perceptions towards wild animals, in large part because they rarely have conflicts with them. This is due to their homesteads being surrounded by electric fence, which prohibits the destruction of their gardens and properties by elephants, baboons, and hippos. They also own vehicles and use them for travelling locally, thus limiting faceto-face contact and confrontations with wild animals. It could also be that they want to appear enlightened (in terms of nature conservation) in line with their societal status. Perhaps more importantly, an economic motive prevails. Most high-income residents in Kariba areas have significant levels of formal education and engage in touristrelated businesses such as running lodges, safaris, and houseboats which further generate positive attitudes towards animals. Their businesses deal with tourists, who are interested in wild animals, fishing, and boat cruises, on a day-to-day basis. As such, they exhibit an appreciation of, and are protective of, wildlife. Studies elsewhere observe that people with higher levels of education and wealth show more support for wild animal conservation (Hariohay et al. 2018) but, in addition, the high-income Kariba residents have lives anchored in nature conservation. By contrast, for low-income residents, their homesteads are not typically electric fenced. They are often in conflict with baboons and elephants that encroach onto their homesteads and destroy their properties and vegetable gardens. Hence, for these residents, there is a tension between the security of their lives and the drive for conservation. They also travel long distances on foot to and from their workplaces, sometimes encroaching on portions of small game corridors and, hence, they are bound to come into contact with animals more often. Such everyday experiences lead them to develop bitterness and offensive positions against what they label as problem wild animals, though they would argue that they are merely defending their well-being. Under normal and ideal circumstances, problem animals are reported to the National Parks offices at Peterspoint and Nyanyana (located in Kariba town). However, local people from the high-density areas complain that Parks and Wildlife authorities delay responding or do not respond at all to the reported cases. Because of this, they resort to teaming up as residents to protect their suburb against problem animals. Due to the threats caused by wild animals, the residents from low-income suburbs in Kariba have responded to HWC in ways that give protection to their lives and assets. Some have even gone to the extent of poisoning baboons as they are labelled as the most troublesome in causing disorder in Kariba (Mhlanga 2001). Generally, these Kariba residents attack problem animals using different “illegal” means such as stoning, trapping, and snaring. When home gardens have vegetables and fruits, residents put snares in place because they are not always at home to chase away animals from invading their gardens. As such, pre-planning is done before people leave their homes for the shops, church or work. Nevertheless, conflict with

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wild animals often takes place unexpectedly, and hence, the response is often abrupt and immediate, including stoning. Differences in attitudes and feelings towards animals generate conflicts between the high-income and low-income residents. While the former call for problem animals to be relocated, the latter want National Parks to kill such animals. High-income dwellers calculate the value (economic and otherwise) of animals whereas the lowincome ones consider the “hidden” and “visible” costs engendered by problem animals in their communities (Khumalo and Yung 2015). They are deeply irritated by the lack of compensation for damaged property and injuries suffered because of wild animals. These losses are exacerbated by the general economic crisis in Zimbabwe. They are simply unable to recover from the caused damage (by replenishing their assets), nor can they afford medical or hospital bills for sustained injuries from animal attacks. Thus, for them, retaliation regarding problem animals is an immediate solution. These conflicts between low-income and high-income resident play themselves out in different locations in the border town. For example, at the National Heritage Lodges area in Charara, a problem elephant encroached daily on this low-income suburb destroying houses and ravaging foodstuffs. Charara residents called on the National Parks rangers to kill the elephant, but the owner of the lodge refused. The lodge owner considered the significance of elephant tourism; hence, he opposed the use of lethal solutions. The lodge owner’s material interests became a source of conflict with Charara residents. Residents bemoaned the damage they endured and were infuriated that the lodge owner was unconcerned about their welfare and security. One woman remarked that “he is only concerned with our labour and not our safety and wellbeing” (FGD Charara 28 December 2018). Another case occurred in a different low-income suburb, namely Mahombekombe. A well-off woman who resides along the shore of Lake Kariba was frustrated by the fact that young school boys trespassed onto her residential and commercial area throwing petrol bombs at elephants and buffaloes. Her concern was that the elephants “access the lakeside for water and they hardly get into their homesteads, but these boys come to provoke the elephants at the lake shore.” One day she tried stopping the boys from provoking the elephants, but they insulted her calling her “a white person who was supposed to go back to Europe … [They said] … ‘These animals are not yours; they belong to blacks’” (Interview 10 December 2018). These were sentiments expressing the racial contestations not only over wildlife in Kariba, but probably premised more broadly on the sentiments that emerged due to Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform in 2000. History tells that Africans did not consider nature to be “out there” and animals were treated with cultural respect. It is the modern conservationist drive and environmental regulations that have created a wedge between human societies and animals thereby causing antagonistic relations among people of different social statuses. Animals were not a major problem for African people in pre-colonial Zimbabwe as they devised ways of relating to them in sustainable ways. Colonial conservation policies separated people from animals, impacting on the cultural-spiritual connections

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which people had with animals and disrupting local cultural/traditional conservation practices. This exacerbated conflict between humans and animals, and between humans. Colonial conservation displacements also situated people in places where they could not effectively protect themselves from wildlife attacks (Matanzima and Marowa 2022). These trends continue in post-colonial Zimbabwe.

Conservationists Versus HWC Victims There are notable tensions between conservationists (such as National Parks and wildlife-related NGOs such as Kariba Animal Welfare Fund Trust [KAWFT]) and HWC victims in Kariba. Residents from high-density suburbs stated that conflicts emanate from, as indicated above, the failure or delay by National Parks to respond to problem animal reports, failure by National Parks to resolve HWC, and the absence of compensation for loss of property and injuries caused by problem animals. National Parks officials often point to insufficient resources such as fuel as their limiting factor to swiftly respond to reported problem animal cases. NGOs surrounding Kariba reiterated the same point, since they often work in collaboration with the Department of National Parks. For instance, KAWFT directors narrated that they assist Parks authorities with logistics for their operations in Kariba (Personal communication, 30 January 2019), as their NGO is motivated by the desire to protect wildlife. Local people’s frustrations towards conservationists are seen as a threat to animal conservation (Nyhus 2016; Sifuna 2011) as “they reduce residents’ willingness and incentive to conserve wildlife” (Khumalo and Yung 2015: 233). Wildlife is then targeted because frustrations cannot be directed successfully at the government, wildlife authorities, and conservation agencies. Wildlife becomes a scapegoat for anger, resentment, and feelings of powerlessness (Fraser-Celin et al. 2018), with people resorting to using lethal measures to kill wild animals to minimise the possibility of HWC taking place (Sifuna 2011). During field research, there were numerous cases of disgruntlement by participants in relation to the damage caused by wildlife and the delayed responses by DNPWM in Kariba. For example, residents in Nyamhunga close to Lunar Lodge complained that DNPWM did not prioritise their welfare. This emerged because residents were living in fear of a leopard and its cubs that were residing at a stream close to their homesteads. National Parks reacted five days after the report had been lodged. Therefore, residents from low-income suburbs feel ignored by the DNPWM. One informant remarked that “Parks do not care about the safety of the people; they are only concerned with protecting animals from the people … We are living in fear that our children might be attacked on their way to and from school” (Interview, 19 December 2018). Residents’ perceptions emphasise how the management of HWC in Kariba by National Parks favours animals instead of human life. Indeed, the priority of National Parks and some NGOs operating along the Zambezi River seems to point to their concern with animals’ welfare rather than people’s welfare. Residents now, and in the past,

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believe that authorities protect wildlife at the expense of people’s lives and property (Mhlanga 2001). One research participant lamented that “we are regarded [by conservationists] as the ones who came to live in the game area; … thus, we are not important, but animals are because they are in their own place” (Interview, 20 January 2019). This thinking by conservationists, if true, is misplaced as the area was once inhabited by the Tonga and Korekore people before the emergence of Kariba town, and these people once interacted with wild animals in the Zambezi Valley in constructive ways (Colson 1960; Scudder 1962). The prioritisation of animals over humans is, in the end, a serious threat to wildlife conservation and a source of human–human conflict over wildlife. As Madden (2008: 190) argues, “people may also retaliate against or reduce cooperation with conservation authorities if they feel that their own needs are being subordinated to those of wildlife, or that conservation authorities exclude them from decisions that affect their interests.” Residents at Quarry Mine compound, a periurban suburb, also have been disgruntled with the operations of Parks’ rangers, with the compound exposed to the wanderings of wild animals. In November 2017, an old man was attacked by an elephant at night, but DNPWM officials only visited the site the next morning (FDG, 24 December 2018). People reside at Quarry Mine on a temporary basis and are bitter because they feel that their concerns and complaints around problem animals are ignored by National Parks. They perceive their temporary residency status as the reason why National Parks favour animals over them. In spite of the defence by the DNPWM that they are under-resourced, Quarry Mine residents still hold that they are neglected and vulnerable. On the Wildlife and Parks Update WhatsApp platform, accusations are thrown at each other between National Parks and HWC victims. This WhatsApp group has 246 members and eight administrators, with the administrators being from the National Parks department, NGOs, and other stakeholders. We have been members of the group since December 2015 because of our long-term research in the Kariba area, and we soon discovered that National Parks and Kariba residents have verbal conflicts nearly every day over wildlife. It is a “war of words” to use Scott’s phrase (Scott 1985), in which residents blame Parks officials for failure to curb the perpetuation of HWC in Kariba and National Parks countering such contentions (e.g. Parks and Wildlife Update WhatsApp Group, 13 January 2019). Sometimes these officials would claim on the WhatsApp platform that they had deployed rangers to areas with problem animals, but later residents would complain that they did not see them in their suburbs. A message posted by a resident on 2 February 2018 (at 10:23 a.m.) read: “Parks yazotirasa zvayo panyaya dzemhuka idzi chokwadi” (“National Parks has let us down regarding wild animals”). This is cultivating deeper levels of bitterness among in particular the low-income residents of Kariba, which then culminates in the use of illegal means to deal with the animals. While such malicious and retaliatory responses are undesirable, they are being used increasingly by the people in their war against wildlife depredation and wildlife authorities, who they accuse of valuing animals more than people. Despite these tensions between conservationists and HWC-affected communities regarding wildlife, this study found that sometimes these contending groups speak the

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same language against the Municipality of Kariba (MoK). The MoK is mandated to offer residential and commercial stands in Kariba and, since 2000, it has been offering stands in game corridors—that is, in areas previously reserved for animals to access the lake. This development has brought humans and wild animals into increasing conflict as the latter now encroach on people’s homesteads, causing damages enroute to and from the lake shore. One resident complained that: We wonder why the municipality is blocking all the game corridors; they allocated Tamarind Lodge a stand in a game corridor, now they are allocating people stands at Garikayi and Kasese which are also game corridors. This has caused elephants and baboons to encroach onto our homesteads and to destroy our roof sheets…. They do not even compensate us for the damages and injuries caused by wild animals. Many people have been attacked by animals in their homesteads. (Interview, 23 December 2018)

Similarly, National Parks authorities and NGOs have had numerous tensions with MoK over the barricading of game corridors. They argue that blocking the wellestablished corridors affects the well-being of many animal species as wildlife would have no or limited access to water. This has a ripple effect as it means that crocodiles would have less prey, thereby leading them to prey on humans engaging in different activities on Lake Kariba, resulting in increased human-crocodile conflict (Personal communication, 30 December 2018). As a possible solution, DNPWM has recommended the relocation of people residing in the game corridors. However, it seems that the MoK is not paying attention to the diverse complaints and suggestions, therefore adding further complexity to the HWC characterising life in and around Kariba.

National Parks Officials Versus Poachers Our ethnographic research unearthed another strand of human–human conflict over wildlife in Kariba. This involved hostilities between National Parks officials and poachers (both local and outsiders). Currently, there are increased numbers of poaching cases, not only in Kariba, but throughout Zimbabwe. One woman explained that “this is due to unemployment, hunger and poverty especially among the ablebodied because of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe” (Informal discussion, 14 January 2018). The more the economic hardships deepen, the more the illegal hunting activities take place which, in turn, engenders more conflicts between DNPWM officials and poachers. Poaching in Kariba is a dangerous but lucrative activity that gives people income and meat for their dietary needs, becoming a source of livelihood for both poachers and consumers of wild animal meat. Nonetheless, such rampant poaching activities have also contributed to the increased occurrence of HWC (Gore and Kahler 2012). People engage in retaliatory killing and illegal hunting of wild animals due to disgruntlement over damages and absence of compensation schemes for losses incurred by wild animals—or, at least, the “retaliatory killing” discourse is often used by local people to explain poaching activities. McGregor (2005) also notes that some poachers along the Zambezi Valley regard wildlife and fisheries resources

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as theirs by virtue of the fact that it is their ancestral land and home. Some poachers use this to justify their activities which are deemed illegal by law. The economic value of wildlife from the perspective of poachers is contradictory to the economic value given to wildlife by National Parks authorities. For poachers, poaching wildlife is a survival strategy whereas, for Parks authorities and their NGO allies, protecting wildlife is crucial for conservation and for the maintenance and expansion of tourism-related ventures in Kariba. There is compelling evidence to substantiate the prevalence of antagonism between National Parks and poachers. Through logistics assistance received from KAWFT and many other NGOs, National Parks often deploy rangers to remove snares in the game areas and corridors. National Parks rangers working together with the Minerals, Flora and Fauna Unit apprehend the poachers and confiscate their poaching tools and spoils. However, as a supposedly good deed, this effort has been tainted in that game rangers end up selling the confiscated game meat, or, alternatively, they are bribed by the poachers not to confiscate their meat nor arrest them. Those who should be safeguarding wildlife and promoting conservation are allegedly engaging in illegal activities including poaching. In this sense, chasing down and possibly apprehending poachers becomes a self-serving act on the part of rangers, thereby serving to exacerbate the conflict between National Parks and Kariba residents. Nevertheless, there are also cases of professionalism undertaken by National Parks officials. For example, on 2 February 2019, a poacher was shot in the collarbone by game rangers in a hostile confrontation at Gatshe-Gatshe fishing camp. This action was unavoidable since the poachers themselves were armed. In such circumstances, some people raise the human rights issue against the DNPWM officials, as again it tends to imply that wildlife is more valuable than human life and deepens the antagonism against National Parks. At the same time, there are residents of Kariba who support such activities by the Parks’ rangers, and who go behind the backs of others involved in poaching and report them to Parks authorities. This so-called sellingout practice points to the deep-rooted social tensions arising from the variegated character of the residential suburbs of Kariba. In protecting the security and rights of natural resources, the MFFU collaborates with National Parks and its officers operate in civilian clothes. The unit investigates wildlife-related crimes such as poaching and illegal game meat and ivory trading (Personal communication, 28 December 2018), often detaining poachers and taking them to court. Its officers’ engagements with poachers and illegal traders may arise along roads or in homesteads or forests, with escaping or wanted poachers or illegal traders being tracked down and apprehended by MFFU and National Parks officials. The MFFU keeps records of offences at the district police station in Kariba, and these include cases of ivory traders sentenced to nine years in prison and game meat traders sentenced to sixty days in prison or a fine of US$100. The illegal hunters and game meat traders do acknowledge the need to protect and conserve wildlife, but they argue that circumstances (i.e. the economic crisis) force them to engage in illicit practices. At the same time, the crisis has negatively affected the operations of MFFU (as it has the National Parks), with MFFU officials mentioning inadequate resources such as personnel, vehicles, and fuel as their major challenges. The offences recorded at

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the police station in Kariba only represent part of the problem, with many instances going unpunished as they are undetected due to the challenges experienced by MFFU and Parks (Personal communication, 28 December 2018).

Conclusion This chapter has assessed the complex human conflicts over wildlife occurring in the border town of Kariba in Zimbabwe. These conflicts around wildlife take on a multiplicity of shifting forms, sometimes involving squabbles between different categories of Kariba residents, and sometimes involving tension between state authorities and residents, including residents as poachers or illegal meat traders. These conflicts are grounded in different discursive constructions of wildlife and in different value orientations towards nature conservation, with diverging material interests and lifestyles contributing to configuring these discourses and orientations. In the end, if left unresolved, these conflicts are disadvantageous to both humans and wildlife, and undercut the long-term prospects of animal conservation in the Kariba area. Presently, then, despite any possible claims to the contrary by the tourism industry, the nature-human balance in Kariba in terms of a symbiotic and mutually beneficial relationship between wildlife and residents remains problematic, particularly for lower-income residents whose property and security are constantly under threat. Acknowledgements The research was approved by the University of Zimbabwe Kariba Research Institute. Research participants gave their consent before agreeing to participate in the study and also consented to anonymous use of the information for publication purposes.

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Chapter 8

Entangled Borderlands: Effects of the 1977–1992 Mozambican Civil War on Border Communities in Zimbabwe Joshua Chakawa and Owen Mangiza

Abstract Borders and borderlands occupy a contested space in the shared history of Mozambique and Zimbabwe because they are central to our understanding of everyday lives, mobility, conflict, and resistance. This chapter seeks to understand the ways in which borderland communities in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique were affected by the 1977–1992 Mozambican civil war and how conflict reconfigured the borderlands during the long years of strife. The specific focus is on communities in the Chipinge, Chiredzi, Chimanimani, Mutare, and Nyanga areas of Zimbabwe as well as specific communities in Mozambique. Findings show that the Mozambique civil war left traumatic marks on borderland communities, with tales of unbearable violence and atrocities. What is particularly striking, as part of a longer history of the border, was the unregulated movement across the border during the war, in both directions, by both armed fighters and civilians. The traversing of the border during times of both peace and war means that the idea of a border as strictly fixed needs to be revised to allow for a more dynamic and fluid understanding of borders and of the entangled and mobile lives of borderland communities. Keywords Borderlands · Armed conflict · Marginalisation · Mozambique · Zimbabwe

J. Chakawa (B) Department of Historical Studies, National University of Lesotho, P.O. 180, Roma, Maseru, Lesotho e-mail: [email protected] O. Mangiza Department of History, Heritage and International Studies, Midlands State University, P. Bag 9055, Senga Road, Gweru, Zimbabwe J. Chakawa Maseru, Lesotho © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_8

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Introduction The Mozambique civil war (1977–1992) between the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the opposition forces of the Resistancia National Mocambicana (RENAMO), and their supporters, is undoubtedly one of the bloodiest civil wars in independent Africa. An estimated 600,000 people are thought to have died as a result of this conflict (Human Rights Watch 1992), though Mwatwara (2020) puts the figure at about 1 million dead. Human Rights Watch (1992) shows that hundreds of thousands of people were turned into refugees or displaced inside Mozambique while a number of rural communities were reduced to abject poverty without trade, access to manufactured goods, or education and health services. Despite the fact that the war started in Mozambique, it spilled over Mozambique’s borders, mainly affecting neighbouring Zimbabwe. It was mostly the borderland communities along Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands which felt the greatest wrath of the armed conflict as compared to communities living further away from the border. Thus, tales of human rights abuses, ranging from forced conscriptions into RENAMO armies, use of child soldiers, the laying of land mines, torture, killings, mutilations, and infrastructure destruction, were characteristic of the civil war on both sides of the border. This has left a legacy of trauma and injuries among civilians, destruction of the environment, displacements, and general poverty as a result of the great loss of human life and resources. It is the longevity of the Mozambique civil war and the high level of destruction it caused among certain borderland communities along Zimbabwe’s eastern border that forms the backdrop to this chapter and its examination of the war. In order to fully appreciate the impact of the war beyond Mozambique’s borders, an understanding of the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border and borderlands from the colonial period is imperative. The study of borderlands in Zimbabwe is central to this study, as the armed conflict’s effects on ordinary people living along the border remain a grey area in academic enquiries. In this context, the current study focuses on the borderland communities of Chiredzi and Chipinge and, to a lesser extent, Chimanimani, Mutare, and Nyanga. The everyday use and imagination of the border and the borderlands by the residents as well as the RENAMO fighters have led to more questions than answers as to the meaning of the border, which this chapter also interrogates. We begin with a brief contextual discussion about border studies (including with reference to Zimbabwe) and a history of the Zimbabwe/Mozambique border, followed by an examination of how armed conflicts have greatly altered the relevance, operations, and meaning of this border. As we show, this in turn has yielded complex interpretations of the border despite the end of the civil war in 1992.

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Contextualising the Study Our study relies on the de-bordering/re-bordering theoretical framework, which is a constructivist approach to border studies (Liao 2016). Using this constructivist approach, the border is imagined not merely as physical and material (such as fences, mountains, and rivers), but as a series of social practices and discourses by which boundaries are produced, reproduced, and configured (Sendhardt 2013). Kolosov (2013) thus questions the idea of borderlands as fixed spaces and borders as static lines, because the world is largely defined by relational networks which transcend bordered territories. De-bordering refers to transgressions of national spaces and territorial borders, which may lead to cross-border identities with reference to the movements of people, while re-bordering includes tightening of borders, an increase in border controls and re-territorialisation of space (Sendhardt 2013). The choice of this analytical approach emanates from the way borders in Africa function in people’s everyday lives. Communities living in most border areas are not constrained by the existence of a border as a physical barrier, and they may even live out their lives as if the border does not exist. As shown in this study, in both war and peace times, the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border has been crossed, both legally and illegally. A number of studies have been conducted on the history of borders, borderlands, and their experiences. This chapter aims at adding a layer of evidence to the already existing literature on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, and the borderlands along it. The chapter corroborates the work of others with regard to the ways in which colonial, now post-colonial, borders are often breached and lose their significance in the process (Patricio 2012; Pophiwa 2009; Nyachega 2017; Mwatwara 2020; Mukonza 2016). Colonial Europeans created borders on the African continent to establish their spheres of influence over their respective spaces and subjects, thereby partitioning people and places in containerised fashion (Pophiwa 2010) insofar as the borders acted as barriers to the free movement of people and goods. For those living in borderlands, however, there has always been a level of disdain for borders, leading to a high level of porosity along the borders, including through people illegally crossing territorial boundaries and smuggling goods as well. Thus, in many instances, borders have been viewed over time by ordinary people mostly as artificial, such that they imagine themselves living in a borderless world. Studies show that borders and borderlands exist often within war zones, and these territories have been variously described as blood lands, hot spots, and battle fields (Nyachega 2017; Pophiwa 2009). In worst-case scenarios, borders and borderlands have become infiltration routes during the wars of liberation and civil wars in Africa (Nyachega 2017), and this is of particular relevance to this study. Wars fought on either side of a particular territorial border have spill-over effects, configuring the lives of the occupants of borderlands as demonstrated by the Mozambique civil war of 1977–1992. In the context of war, borders are not a serious impediment to those fleeing the ravages of war, including refugees. The civil war in Mozambique presented a complicated and even dangerous situation for borderland communities in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe, leading at times to border-landers aligning themselves,

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or being labelled as aligning themselves, with RENAMO or the Zimbabwean security forces (Mwatwara 2020). Father Fidelis Mukonori (2017) showed, for instance, that refugees from Mozambique gave food and other essentials donated to them by aid organisations to RENAMO. Overall, the civil war unleashed unprecedented levels of violence on ordinary civilians. This current study offers an analysis of the civil war through the prism of borderlands. In particular, this chapter shows that the everyday effects of the Mozambique civil war from 1977 to 1992 were partly shaped by the ease of movement with which RENAMO fighters crossed the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, which made it possible for them to infiltrate most borderlands along it. The porous borders also facilitated the movement of refugees mostly from Mozambique into Zimbabwe. These unregulated movements, of fighters and civilians, bring to the fore the character of the Mozambican-Zimbabwean borderlands during the period of the civil war.

The Zimbabwe-Mozambique Colonial Border The Zimbabwe-Mozambique border is a colonial establishment, just like almost all borders on the African continent. The border was primarily created to separate the sphere of influence of the Portuguese from that of the British, and this was done through the 1891 Anglo-Portuguese treaty (Dube 2009; Pophiwa 2010). The drawing up of the boundary was intended to ensure that Africans from either side of the border were confined to their area in order to facilitate colonial administration. Pophiwa (2010) points out that, at this inception phase, the border was divided into four sections, namely from Zambezi to Mazoe, Mazoe to Honde, Honde to Save and Save to Limpopo. Chipinge and Chiredzi, which are the main places examined in this study, lie in the Honde to Save and Save to Limpopo areas, respectively. This creation of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border entailed the separation from each other of people who were closely related through common origin, religion, ethnicity, language, marriage, and blood. Africans though had their own boundaries prior to colonialism which differed from those drawn by the new white arrivals. Colonialists simply did not respect these traditional boundaries, such that even people with close kinship ties found themselves located on different sides of the border. However, a strict and fixed separation was problematic and difficult since Africans continued to maintain their social connections in the borderlands and across the colonial border. Throughout the colonial period, the Rhodesian government sought to restrict crossborder movement for different reasons. For instance, when the liberation struggle intensified in the late 1970s, the Rhodesian government under Ian Smith deployed security forces to seal the border in an effort to regulate and inhibit people’s movement (Pophiwa 2009). This had no meaningful and permanent effect since the border existed in name only. On the ground, it was characterised by numerous and secret bush paths which Africans continued to use unperturbed. In fact, the border has remained porous up until today (Muti-Seda 2015).

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Cross-border movements have been made easier and possible along the vast stretch of land from the Zambezi Valley in the north to the Limpopo River in the south because the long boundary is simply impossible to police. The demarcations of the border on the ground were made mostly by natural features such as rivers, mountain escarpments, and peaks, as well as manmade pillars (Pophiwa 2010). In some parts of the border, demarcations were not clearly established even to this day, to the extent that travellers may wonder at times whether they are in Zimbabwe or Mozambique. It is mostly those who live very close to the border who are able to identify the presence of the border and determine on what side they are on, based on certain features known locally. Such a situation created almost a single trans-border society around and over the border which was merely separated by the lines on an official map. As such, national dimensions and definitions of the border represent aspirations and visions of state authorities which on the ground are not necessarily recognised or respected by borderland communities. Cross-border migrations along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border have long been the order of the day as people respond to various economic, political, and social forces in the two countries. Since the communities around the border were culturally and ethnically homogeneous, most of the people crossed the border from either side to visit their relatives on the other side. Moving across the border became the norm, rather than the exception. Since the enactment of the colonial border, countless numbers of people from Mozambique crossed the border into colonial Zimbabwe in order to access services such as schools, clinics, grinding mills, and markets, as well as to work on cultivated land (Muti-Seda 2015), seek employment in cash crop plantations and estates, or simply gather firewood. This was necessitated by minimal employment and livelihood opportunities for Africans in Mozambique during Portuguese rule (Kachena and Spiegel 2019). Over many decades now, there also has been a massive infrastructure deficit in Mozambique—because of the blunt character of the Portuguese form of colonialism in Mozambique (Costa 2011), as well as the 15 or so years of civil war that destroyed infrastructure, especially in the rural areas (Chao and Kostermons 1999). Some people engaged, and continue to engage, in illegal cross-border trade in certain vital commodities, particularly foodstuffs not available in their areas (Mwatwara 2020). This movement led to the emergence of migratory families crisscrossing the border. The era of decolonisation, from the 1970s, in colonial Mozambique and Zimbabwe witnessed significant movement across the border. Notably, with guerrilla camps established in Mozambique, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) combatants crossed in and out of Zimbabwe from Mozambique to wage war, and tens of thousands of civilians crossed into Mozambique to train for the liberation war or as refugees from the war. Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)’s guerrilla fighters were allowed bases in Mozambique to train for the war (Hanlon 2010). This marked another era of cross-border actions on the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border which appeared “normal” at that time. Thus, the liberation war for Zimbabwe was fought amidst guerrillas and civilians moving in and out of Mozambique for the purpose of liberating the country from minority rule. In this regard, the well-established bush paths facilitated the movement of people. A different, but comparable process

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took place during the 1977–1992 Mozambique civil war, with the border not being respected by RENAMO forces and civilians alike. We now turn more fully to the civil war in the context of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique borderlands.

The Civil War The Mozambique civil war of 1977–1992 broke out in the country soon after the attainment of independence from Portuguese colonial rule. The war was fought between the Marxist ruling party, FRELIMO, and the anti-communist insurgent forces of RENAMO (Mwatwara 2020). While the civil war had local dynamics, like any other civil war, it also had the influence of external forces, especially those embroiled in the Cold War, among others. RENAMO and its supporters opposed FRELIMO’s attempts to establish a socialist one-party state and were heavily backed by the anti-communist governments in Rhodesia, South Africa, and the United States (Stephanie 2010). The Cold War, which raged on in the 1970s and 1980s, saw much of southern Africa (from Angola to Mozambique) entangled in the politics of the Soviet Union and the United States. This, as others view it, contributed to the longevity and ferocity of the Mozambique civil war (Emerson 2019). RENAMO itself owed its creation to the white minority government of Ian Smith in Rhodesia which wanted to discredit and undermine the newly-established FRELIMO government in part because it allowed the stationing of ZANLA combatants in Mozambique (Hanlon 2010; Mukonori 2017). The South African government also supported RENAMO, which they used as a tool for destabilising Mozambique. This was a counter attack against Samora Machel’s Mozambique for the support it rendered to the African National Congress (ANC). The whole idea behind South Africa’s involvement in the conflict was to disable Mozambique’s infrastructure and economy in a bid to bring FRELIMO to the negotiating table. The end game would be to overthrow the FRELIMO government and replace it with a more moderate and pliable government (Human Rights Watch 1992). Thus, the Mozambique civil war was a complicated web with several players who had different interests. On the ground, in Mozambique, both RENAMO and FRELIMO aimed at establishing firm control and support of the civilian population as much as possible. Each warring movement intended to block the other from accessing vital supplies from Mozambican civilians, as well as to gain resources such as labour and relief food which was meant for the civilians (Human Rights Watch 1992). The result was the creation of two major opposing camps, which engulfed the whole country in more than a decade of armed conflict. The first RENAMO operations were in Manica and Sofala before spreading to the rest of the country. RENAMO’s targets in these areas included cutting off regional transport routes that linked the interior and the Indian Ocean. FRELIMO-controlled zones, especially party buildings, schools, and health posts, were also targeted by RENAMO. By 1990, the government reported that the RENAMO forces had destroyed 2,773 primary schools and secondary schools, and 1,000 health centres in Mozambique (Human Rights Watch 1992). Ultimately, the

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country underwent a process of almost self-destruction especially with the damage caused to the country’s economic growth. This has led to the civil war in Mozambique being labelled as “development in reverse” (Domingues and Barre 2013). In Mozambique itself, the war involved widespread violence against civilians. In many instances, violence was unleashed on civilians to force them to join and support RENAMO (Nyachega 2017). RENAMO became well known for its practice of mutilating civilians, including children, by cutting ears, noses, lips, and sexual organs. In this regard, we interviewed one man who was a victim of the civil war through displacement from Espungabeira in Mozambique to Zimbabwe. He testified that many civilians in the border town of Espungabeira lost their ears and mouths at the hands of RENAMO. His father lost both ears and had to cross the border to Mt. Selinda hospital in Chipinge, where he received treatment (Interview with Jokonyo 2022). This is just one testimony of many such cases experienced by civilians in Mozambique. RENAMO pursued this as a way of intimidating potential opponents as well as to advertise the strength that it wielded in a bid to weaken its opponents. The war resulted in up to 1 million deaths, while 1,7 million people fled to neighbouring countries and another 4.3 million people became internally displaced persons (Mwatwara 2020).

Effects of the War on Zimbabwe’s Borderlands When FRELIMO and RENAMO were fighting in Mozambique, they did not confine their war within the country. Countries sharing borders with Mozambique were also affected. In Zimbabwe, the Eastern Highlands suffered most as compared to other borderlands along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. Chipinge was the hardest hit mainly because of its nearness to the district of Gorongosa, which was the main base of RENAMO (Mukonza 2016). Thus, the civil war in Mozambique was exported to Zimbabwe’s eastern border with all its ferocity, resulting in lasting implications, both physical and psychological, for borderland communities. This compelled the Zimbabwean government to take action to protect the civilians, properties, and infrastructure. The government deployed the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and military intelligence to patrol and continuously scan the border area in the country’s Eastern Highlands (ZW News 2016; Mukonori 2017). The troops also asked communities along the border to create a buffer zone by moving inland 500 m from the border (Muchanyuka 2021). This was meant to ensure that people maintained a reasonable distance from the border for their own safety. The government at times introduced forced resettlements whereby some villagers along the border were relocated to safer places such as schools (Nyachega 2017). In a bid to free the border of unnecessary human traffic, the army rounded up thousands of Mozambicans along the border who were running away from the war into Zimbabwe. These were either put into refugee camps in Zimbabwe or were forced back across the border (Human Rights Watch 1992).

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For a long time, life in the borderland communities along Zimbabwe’s eastern border was characterised by fear and uncertainty because of the attacks by RENAMO on civilians. One of the reasons for the attacks was retaliation by RENAMO against Zimbabwe for its military involvement in Mozambique which threatened the movement (Human Rights Watch 1992; Mukonori 2017). During their incursions into Zimbabwe, RENAMO fighters promised that they were going to continue with their attacks on Zimbabwe because Robert Mugabe had indicated that he was determined to eradicate the banditry of RENAMO in Mozambique (Nyachega 2017). In addition, RENAMO forces entered and attacked civilians in Zimbabwe along the border to get supplies such as food, money, and clothes. This was facilitated by various means, including looting and burning of homesteads and sometimes through trading. The process resulted in some civilians being tortured and killed, while others were forced to carry the booty to RENAMO bases in Mozambique. In some cases, the attacks on Zimbabwean civilians were undertaken in order to recover goods which they had given to these civilians to sell on their behalf, but who had absconded with these goods. In the process, RENAMO would inflict violence not only on these civilians but on their families and anyone else who tried to block them from punishing the culprits (Nyachega 2017). Typically, RENAMO operations in Zimbabwe were conducted at night, with the armed men operating in units of between 10 and 20 fighters. The fighters would normally disappear before dawn (Alao 2012). This made it difficult for the targeted civilians to escape or to receive assistance from neighbouring civilians or the Zimbabwean army. In Chipinge district, several acts of savagery occurred, which included mutilations, killings, cutting of noses, ears and mouths, abductions, and robberies. RENAMO would destroy agricultural plantations, schools, and clinics and terrorise the local people. At the peak of the civil war, in 1987, RENAMO forces attacked Jersey Tea Estate plantation school in Chipinge and killed 5 children, cutting off the ears and noses of another 9, and kidnapping them into Mozambique. They also ushered warnings that more violence would follow if Zimbabwe continued to intervene in Mozambique’s civil war (Nehanda Radio 2012; Interview with Marara 2022). Such barbaric acts were carried out in a variety of areas, including the burning of a Windmill bus around Muzite, and the looting and burning of shops at Mundanda Township. They also attacked Zona Tea Estate and destroyed a significant amount of property. It was often in such tea plantations where people had taken refuge. RENAMO soldiers looted small rural tuck shops and took foodstuffs with them (Interview with Njokoto 2022). This left the borderland communities in Chipinge traumatised and in great fear for a long period of time. Matsanga, as RENAMO were also popularly known, invaded health institutions to forcibly procure medicines to use in their bases for the treatment of their fighters and key supporters either injured in battle or suffering from some ailments. Nurses at the mission hospitals of Mt. Selinda and Chikore in Chipinge were directly affected by the RENAMO incursions. In 1984, RENAMO attacked the two hospitals for both personnel and medication. In the process, they confiscated medicines, bandages, and foodstuffs to use in their bases. This happened alongside the abuse of their

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victims, including physical harassment (Mukonza 2016). Frequent raids for foodstuffs were conducted into those communities closest to the border in Chipinge, such as Gwenzi, Muzite, and Mugondi. These communities lost most of their assets and wealth to RENAMO. Confiscation of food items in particular led to starvation among borderland community members (Interview with Simango 2022). During the late 1970s up to the 1980s, many people in some communities spent many nights sleeping in the bush for fear of RENAMO attacks at their homes. This was the case in one village in Chipinge called Mahenye, situated in the southerly part of the district. One villager testified about their experiences: “It’s too dangerous. After dark we civilians sleep in the bush” (The Washington Post 1989). The informant also alluded to the fact that, due to the continuous attacks by RENAMO fighters, the village experienced long periods of starvation as they had no freedom to work in their fields. As a result, there were many cases of children fainting at school. He thus expressed, “The people are too scared to get out very far in the maize field” (The Washington Post 1989). Outlying border areas such as Mariya and Matikwa in the Save valley in Chipinge were not spared by the RENAMO incursions. Most of the people in these areas were displaced by the war and were forced to migrate to areas such as Mutema, Checheche, Rimbi, and Manzvire which were far away from the border and safer supposedly from RENAMO attacks. Civilians in these communities associate the civil war with the burning of their houses and slaughter of their livestock (Mukonza 2016; Interview with Raki 2022). The forced movement away from the border in the first instance was a disruption on its own, as it culminated in family disintegration as people were detached from their clansmen, some of them across the border. It meant as well that the people moved far away from graves of their deceased relatives buried in the areas from which they were forced to vacate. In the case of Chipinge, the Tongogara refugee camp bears overall witness to the sufferings of displaced persons from both Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as it was created originally to cater for such war victims in the 1980s (World Vision 2020). Besides Chipinge, one other area grossly affected by the RENAMO incursions in Zimbabwe is that of Chiredzi. In 1987, RENAMO fighters raided the south-eastern part of Zimbabwe (that is, Chiredzi) and killed several civilians at Chikombedzi Mission (Interview with Nyandoro 2021). They also targeted livestock for meat and other food items for their sustenance. This attack was part of a broader strategy to sabotage the intended construction of the Limpopo railway line which would link Harare to Maputo and make it much easier for Zimbabwe to access fuel from the Maputo port (The Independent 1987). The situation eased somewhat when the Zimbabwean government moved in to protect the civilians through military means by placing security forces in the area. Poaching activities by RENAMO fighters were reported in the Gonarezhou area of Chiredzi. The fighters relied on the smuggling of ivory, rhino horns, and precious stones as a source of funding for their anti-government rebellion in Mozambique. They used Gonarezhou National Park as a rear base with an adequate water supply as they launched attacks on the pylons carrying power lines from Cabora Bassa. This resulted in a drastic decrease in the number of elephants in the game park

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(Mozambique History Net 1989). Reports are that, in the skirmishes that ensued with park rangers, RENAMO killed 2 park rangers and kidnapped a third one on 7 September 1987 (The Independent 1987). Six civilians were also killed over the same period. In the long run, this led to the closure of the park together with other parks along the border for security reasons (Alao 2012). The closure negatively affected the economy of Zimbabwe since the parks generated revenue for the country. Additionally, the attacks unsettled the communities in the area who lived in fear and uncertainty during these times of war. Chimanimani communities fell prey to the RENAMO attacks in the 1970s as a result of the closeness of the area to the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border. RENAMO in fact threatened war against the civilians in the area if its demands were not met. A female villager in the Muchadziya village of the Rusitu valley in Chimanimani indicated that she and others were victims of constant raids by RENAMO who frequently visited the village in search of food and recruits (Nehanda Radio 2012). Due to these attacks, the local leaders in the area warned the people against the indiscriminate employment of Mozambicans as domestic servants for fear of infiltration by RENAMO. This was mainly because the domestic servants, who were usually identified later as linked to Matsanga, would come and cause terror in the village either to settle old grudges or they would want to stop the Zimbabwean government from supporting FRELIMO in Mozambique (Nehanda Radio 2012). Reports showed that RENAMO fighters would leave their base and camp along the border destroying crops and stealing cattle, causing several incursions in a single day. This affected the holiday bookings for Chimanimani Hotel which was forced to advertise its status of availability when people were failing to book. An advert appearing in the Washington Post read, “Chimanimani Hotel is still open…for all those who had cancelled their bookings, come and see for yourself” (The Washington Post 1988). In this sense, the civil war resulted in economic disturbances among some border communities in Zimbabwe. However, the physical trauma occurring was just as troublesome. Hence, one of our informants reported that a man was kidnapped by the RENAMO fighters in Ndieme village of Chimaninani and taken to Mozambique from where he never came back. Efforts to recover him proved fruitless (Interview with Rokwe 2022). Chimanimani was like a hunting ground for RENAMO, with people in the area living in the constant shadow of violence and uncertainty. Some incidences of RENAMO attacks were experienced as well in Zimbabwe’s main eastern border town of Mutare. Cross-border RENAMO raids took place around Mutare as the RENAMO fighters aimed at taking control of the Mutare-Beira and Nyamapanda-Zobue trade routes. This prompted the Zimbabwean government to intervene to secure the route (Nehanda Radio 2012). In another incident in Mutare, a man recounted how he lost a daughter, son-in-law, and 4 grandchildren in the 1987 RENAMO attack that marked the beginning of the border wars. The man reported that, after shooting the victims to death, the fighters proceeded to chop their faces with machetes. The incident was followed by the burning of huts in the surrounding areas. RENAMO reportedly left a letter which read, “If Mugabe interferes with us, we will interfere with Mugabe” (Washington Post 1988). Thus, in one way, civilians

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paid the prize for Zimbabwean government’s involvement in Mozambique’s internal affairs. In Nyanga, RENAMO insurgents also caused havoc in this small border town and surrounding areas. In the late 1980s, they attacked a B & C bus and robbed the passengers of their belongings, including cash of Z$966. They then proceeded to rob Mopani Store in Ruangwe (Mwatwara 2020). Such attacks were extended to Nyamaropa, Nyamhanda, Troutbeck, and Nyakomba, among other nearby places. The violent attacks they carried out in Nyakomba are summarised by Headman Chatindo’s wife in 2016, when she was responding to the rumour that the Matsanga were going to carry out fresh attacks in the area. She expressed the following view: We are never safe from RENAMO. The threat is real and government should take precautionary measures. The guerillas have supporters across the river and can strike any time. People should not be allowed to freely move across the border without being monitored. (Sunday Mail 2016)

This is one clear testimony that, during the Mozambique civil war of the 1970s and into the 1980s, all was not well for the people of Nyanga—as with other parts of Manicaland as well. The war therefore remains fresh in people’s minds as demonstrated by that testimony. As with other parts of Manicaland Province, RENAMO stressed that Nyanga belonged to them, and they vowed that they would literally take over the border areas one day (Mukonza 2016, Interview with Saunyama 2022). In a way, the fighters tried to manipulate and distort the border to their advantage, claiming that their zone of authority extended as far as the Sabi River. Such threats and claims led to deep concerns amongst the civilians, considering their awareness and experience of the brutality of the rebels. Indeed, from the time RENAMO launched its first attacks on border communities in June 1987 to April 1989 alone, it killed 335 civilians and wounded 280 more. It also abducted 667 people, while 446 people were still missing by mid-1989 (Alao 2012). By the time the war ended in 1992, the figures had drastically increased. This also implies that the war left behind some disturbing legacies and scars, including refugees, disabled people, graves, landmines, deserted homes, damaged infrastructure, poverty, and to some extent, unwanted children. These continue to be reminders among borderland communities of the violent Mozambique civil war.

Conclusion Findings from this study show that the Mozambique civil war of 1977–1992 left undesirable marks on borderland communities, not only in Mozambique, but also in neighbouring Zimbabwe. Tales of unpleasant experiences linger in the minds of many border-landers, with expressions by many of not wanting to re-live the times of war. Most communities along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border were exposed

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to unbearable violence as RENAMO fighters demanded countless provisions and services from them. The war resulted in forced conscriptions into RENAMO army units, beatings, cutting of ears, mouths, and noses and, ultimately, the killing of unarmed innocent civilians. Many civilians were displaced, while others had their homes destroyed. With the resurfacing of RENAMO-FRELIMO conflicts in 2016 and the current eruption of Islamic insurgencies in parts of Mozambique, borderland communities are starkly reminded about their past experiences during the Mozambique civil war. Thus, a legacy of fear, trauma, and uncertainty still hangs above most of these border communities. With respect to borderland studies, important points can be brought to the fore. Young men and women who went to join the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe during the 1970s disregarded the border and used it as a conduit. Similarly, RENAMO fighters had scant respect for the border which they crisscrossed at will. More broadly, as part of their daily lives, communities in these borderlands (on both sides) have always embarked on their activities without reference to the physical border. The traversing of the border at these various times in both peace and war means that the idea of a boundary as strictly fixed needs to be revised to allow for a more dynamic and fluid understanding of borders and of the entangled and mobile lives of borderland communities. Borders may mark territories, but they do no not contain and confine border-landers.

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Muti-Seda FL (2015) Border governance in Mozambique: the intersection of international border controls, regional integration and cross-border regions. PhD Thesis, University of Rotterdam Mukonori F (2017) Man in the middle: a memoir. House of Books, Harare Mukonza P (2016). Impact and legacy of the Matsanga movement on the Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe: a case study of Chipinge district, 1976–1992, MSU Mwatwara W (2020) The logic of Renamo Civil War violence: transborder communities and Renamo incursions in Eastern Zimbabwe, 1980s–1992. South J Contemp Stud Hist 45(1):145– 170 Nehanda Radio (2012, December 22) Nyachega N (2017). Beyond war, violence and suffering: everyday life in the Honde Valley borderland communities during Zimbabwe’s Liberation War and the RENAMO insurgency, 1966–2016. MA Thesis, Department of History, Rhodes University Patricio M (2012). Ndau identity in Mozambique-Zimbabwe borderland, CentrodeEstudosAfricanos (CEA): 15 CTE-IUL-Lisbon University Institute Pophiwa N (2009) The Zimbabwe-Mozambique border: from demarcation to 1980, Paper prepared for the African borderlands research network conference on “How is Africa transforming border studies?” Johannesburg, 10–12 September Pophiwa N (2010), Mobile livelihoods—the players involved in smuggling on the ZimbabweMozambique border. J Borderland Stud 65–76 Sendhardt B (2013) Border types and bordering processes: a theoretical approach to EU/PolishUkranian border as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. In: Lechevalier A and Wielgohs J (eds), Borders and boarder regions in Europe: changes, challenges and chances Stephanie S (2010) Youth and post conflict reconstruction: agents of change. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, pp 34–38 Sunday Mail (2016, March 5) The Independent (1987, September 16) The Washington Post (1988, January 3) The Washington Post (1989, June 5) World Vision Zimbabwe Report (2020, June 1). https://www.wvi.org/stories/zimbabwe/world-vis ion-assists-covid-19-preparedness-at-tongogara-refugee-camp-chipinge ZW News (2016, June 8)

Interviews Jokonyo Fanwell, victim, Chipinge (2022, January 20) Marara Solomon, witness, Chipinge (2022, January 7) Njokoto Febie, witness, Chipinge (2022, January 1) Nyandoro Liberty, witness, Chiredzi (2021, December 15) Raki Samson, witness, Chipinge (2022, January 5) Rokwe Mildred, witness, Chimanimani (2022, January 18) Saunyama Noah, witness, Mutare (2022, January 15) Simango Chipo, witness, Chipinge (2022, January 10)

Part III

Borders, COVID-19, and Health

Chapter 9

Unfolding Realities of Urbanism at the Margins: Beitbridge (Zimbabwe) and Musina (South Africa) Border Towns as a Single Urban Frontier Anusa Daimon Abstract Though separated by a perennial Limpopo River and a busy border post, the towns of Beitbridge (Zimbabwe) and Musina (South Africa) have grown to become a single urban frontier, sharing cross-cutting socio-cultural and economic paraphernalia and synergies. Operating in artificial hybrid (transition) spaces (borderlands), which are largely neglected as fragment zones on the margins of nation-state, residents of both towns have reacted to their marginality through the production of alternative meanings and narratives as dictated by their border spatial circumstances and their natural and selective convictions of border artificiality, exploiting various spaces of agentic possibilities, power and resources within the borderlands. They share diverse influences, with the affluent Musina in South Africa largely becoming the provider of numerous goods and services to the poorer Beitbridge in Zimbabwe. In the process, Musina has turned into a sort of Central Business District and industrial zone, with Beitbridge being the periphery of the border cityscape, heavily reliant on the centre while simultaneously detached from the general national decay in Zimbabwe. These unfolding realities of urbanism at the geographical margins, particularly in the case of the Zimbabwe-South Africa border have not been explicitly captured in regional border and borderland historiographies. Keywords Cross-border towns · Urbanism · Geographical margins · Single frontier · Zimbabwe · South Africa

Introduction Studies of the African city, informed in large part by the realities of demographic expansion and projections about the future of Africa’s urbanisation, have been on a significant rise in the last decade. The focus has been in large part directed towards capital cities and increasingly towards mega-cities whose emergence is A. Daimon (B) International Studies Group, University of Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_9

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confidently predicted. What urban studies has not done sufficiently is to engage with the unfolding realities of urbanism at the geographical margins. A number of Africa’s capital cities and projected mega-cities are located on, or close to, international borders. These include Bangui, Brazzaville, Bujumbura, Gaborone, Kinshasa, Lomé, Maseru, Mbabane, Ndjamena, Porto Novo, and Lagos. The continent has about 635 cross-border cities that are less than 40 kms from another urban agglomeration in a neighbouring country. There are 47 cross-border cities less than ten kilometres from one another as is the case of Kinshasa (in the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Brazzaville, the capital of Congo. Connections and interactions between cities are usually stronger the closer they are, and most African cities/towns in close proximity are often located across the border from one another. The bulk of these cross-border urban agglomerations are at the margins of the state and, due to their closeness, they tend to influence and shape one another through socio-cultural and economic symbiotic synergies. With cross-border trade and investment in longdistance transport corridors on the rise, Africa’s border towns are some of the smaller but fastest-growing urban areas on the continent. Despite this, border towns and cities have not been centred in African historiography. Urbanism at the margins, which is a curiously neglected topic, has largely remained at the peripheries of border studies. Such neglect is informed by the general disinterest towards the fragmented margins/peripheries of the nation-state prevalent in the national discourse and dialogue and, until recently, within the academic fraternity. With large swatches of southern Africa having only a few and smaller crossborder cities/towns, this chapter focuses on the twin cross-border urban agglomerations of Musina (South Africa) and Beitbridge (Zimbabwe). It chronicles how the two fraternal towns have evolved into a single urban frontier, sharing cross-cutting socio-cultural and economic characteristics and synergies. Operating in artificial hybrid (transition) spaces (borderlands), which are largely treated by the state as obsolete fragment zones on the margins of the nation-state, borderland communities usually exploit the unique opportunities presented by the borderland landscapes for their own benefit. With the Zimbabwean economy in a spiralling collapse since 2000, Beitbridge has gradually become detached from the general national decay. For example, it has informally adopted the South Africa monetary unit (Rand), as well as economic (goods and services/shopping), communication (omalayitsha transport, mobile networks) and socio-cultural traits (music, dress, diets) anchored in interactive cross-border mobilities and activities. As a result, Beitbridge has turned into a fraternal urban extension of Musina, with the presence of the state along the border being treated mainly by Beitbridge residents as part of the everyday artificial nuisances in a typical urban space. These unfolding realities of urbanism at the geographical margins, particularly in the case of the Zimbabwe-South Africa border, have not been explicitly captured in regional border and borderland historiographies. This chapter therefore speaks to these intricate dynamics, showcasing how the two cross-border urban agglomerations have metamorphosised into a borderless urban frontier over time.

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Urbanism at the Margins: Fragments in Artificial Hybrid Spaces The notion of ‘urbanism at the margins’ involves an eclectic spectrum of thematic concerns that seek to shed light on the ways in which the border-setting shapes urban forms, livelihoods and aesthetics, and the manner in which urban connectivity shapes the borderlands as lived spaces. The concept enables us to appreciate geospatial urbanisation on the peripheries of the nation-state. Aspects such as the size of border urbanism, border cultures, border crossings, integration/linkages, infrastructure, mobility and livelihoods can be unpacked and examined, showcasing the unique trajectories and characteristics that border cities and towns assume owing to their location and existence within borderland environments. I therefore underscore that, due to their traditional placement and location at the margins of the state, border cities/towns are treated by the metropole as fragments of the nation-state. Fragmentation, which is a keyword in the history of critical urban thought, produces residues/clusters (i.e. fragments) which inherently tend to receive less attention by those in power (McFarlane 2018). As such, the borderland communities and urban zones (as outer-fragments of the state) have historically been treated as outlets and equally seen as less-important by the centre in the grand-scheme of things. As areas in close proximity to an international boundary, borderlands are usually structurally-disadvantaged areas in terms of their location as the farthest point, politically if not spatially, from the metropole (Newman 2011; Asiwaju 1993). Yet, despite being politicised as fragments at the margins, such cities and towns play a critical role in the well-being/survival of the centre. As outlets, they essentially connect the metropole to the outer world through trade. Because they are fragments, they also tend to assume unique characteristics, behaviours and trajectories that are sometimes totally detached from the centre/metropole. The marginalised (fragmented) border communities and towns are thus largely not dependent on the metropole because they exist in a transition zone or hybrid space, known as borderlands. In this frontier, authority, loyalties and affiliations are not clear-cut and are largely dictated or shaped by the border. Hansen (1981) sees borderlands as subnational areas whose economic and social life is directly and significantly affected by proximity to an international boundary. Wilson and Donnan (1994) describe them as physical frontiers of varying widths, in which people have recognisable configurations of special relationships to people inside that zone, on both sides of the borderline. Because of this, borderlands as part of the fragmented frontiers/spaces at the geographical margins of the state present unique opportunities for the people inhabiting them. Indeed, borders and borderlands, as observed by O’Dowd (2003), are essentially places of economic and political opportunities for nations as well as other legal or illegal interest groups, agencies and borderland communities, most of whom are transnational people or border-landers. Martinez (1994) defines these transnational border-landers as individuals or communities who maintain significant ties with the neighbouring nation; they seek to overcome obstacles that impede such contact and

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they take advantage of every opportunity to visit, shop, work, study, or live intermittently on the other side. Thus, their lifestyles strongly reflect foreign influences. For some transnational border-landers, such influences are modest, but for those who are seriously immersed in trans-border interaction, foreign links govern central parts of their lives. Armed with an inherent or selective disregard of the border demarcation, the border-landers exploit the age-old colonial artificial boundary discourse, where they deliberately choose to ignore the existence of the border for their aggrandisement and benefit (Daimon 2016; Asiwaju 1984). Therefore, as shall be showcased herein, cross-border cities/towns such as Musina and Beitbridge, as well as their inhabitants (the urban border-landers), exist as fragments of the state within a hybrid space (the borderland) and tend to adopt socio-economic cultures prevalent within the borderland frontiers and of dominant neighbouring states. Accordingly, border urbanites are inclined to respond to their marginality through the production of alternative narratives and meanings of their lives as conditioned by their border spatial circumstances and their intrinsic and selective convictions of border artificiality. They carve out symbolic space and manipulate the numerous spaces of agentic possibilities as they engage in manifold practices that connect and entangle their marginalised position with spaces of power and resources within borderlands (Aceska et al. 2019). Hence, being at the margins does not limit the capacities of border cities/towns and their dwellers to expand their horizons beyond the confines of the nation-state as they establish synergies with adjacent twin-urban landscapes, and adopt cultures across national borders embedded in homogenous ideologies. Border-landers in less-privileged nations largely tend to deliberately overlook the so-called arbitrary border control paraphernalia/mechanisms as they commute to the neighbouring towns for various amenities. In a way, they follow the dictates of the open border theory which contends that freedom of movement across borders enables the less fortunate to pursue their goals of better lives, and thus, equality is achieved by means of free mobility (Carens 1995).

Musina and Beitbridge as Fraternal Twins: A Historical Rejoinder The Musina-Beitbridge borderland consists of approximately 10 kms of land frontier between the two border towns, between which the mighty crocodile- and hippoinfested perennial Limpopo River flows, and it incorporates one of the busiest border posts in southern Africa and the continent. Musina and Beitbridge are fraternal twins who share the same geographic spatial frontier, as well as a largely homogenous trans-border ethno-linguistic populace. The Zimbabwean town of Beitbridge is the country’s southernmost main urban gateway or port of entry into South Africa. Seated on the northern banks of the Limpopo River, the town is connected to South Africa by the Beit Bridge, named after its British financier and founder of the De Beers diamond mining company, Alfred Beit, from which the town also derives its nomenclature.

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The town was established in 1929 and, as of 2012, had a population of about 41,767 of predominantly the Venda and Ndebele ethnic minorities, which has grown to an estimated 60,000 people in the present. Beitbridge has traditionally acted as a staging post, or what Pophiwa (2018) views as a ‘trampoline’ into lucrative South Africa, for different categories of border crossers, be they smugglers, traffickers, unaccompanied minors, cross-border shoppers, migrants, transport operators or Zimbabwean state officials (police, revenue officers, soldiers and immigration officials). Historically, the town was largely a terminus of the South African railway from Pretoria, until a route-anchor or rail connection from Beitbridge was built in 1974 (at a more central position to access South Africa and Mozambique) at Rutenga in inland southern Zimbabwe. Thus, three railway lines meet at Beitbridge: the South African Spoornet line to Polokwane, the National Railways of Zimbabwe line to Gweru via Rutenga and the Beitbridge-Bulawayo Railway. Beitbridge was also a colonial trading centre for cattle and agricultural crops. Currently, Beitbridge is a sprawling border town, consisting of an estimated 2,570 houses in formal settlements (primarily for government officials and mid-level private sector staff) and 3,000 in informal settlements, as well as various recreational facilities consisting largely of bars, lodges and soccer pitches. The associated Beitbridge border post is the busiest inland/road border post in southern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Over 2,500 vehicles and close to 20,000 people cross to and from Zimbabwe and South Africa on a daily basis. As result, freight, retail, construction, customs and the police are the major sources of local formal employment. The rest of the town’s inhabitants are involved in informal sector borderland activities mainly sex work, vending and cross-border trading with Musina and the rest of South Africa. Beitbridge’s fraternal cross-border agglomeration twin of Musina, which until 2002 was referred to as Messina, was founded in 1904. The growth of Musina was somewhat different from Beitbridge. Emerging from a farm (Berkenrode) that turned to flourishing copper mining activities under a British Lieutenant Colonel John Pascoe Grenfell, the town developed around the copper mining industry in the area and gained town status in 1957 (Pophiwa 2018). Musina not only became an employment zone, but was historically a transit zone for the droves of regional labour migrants who ‘settled in motion’ (Daimon 2021) in pursuit of worthwhile employment opportunities on the South African rand and diamond mining belts. As noted by Pophiwa (2018), the town did not have high levels of dependency on the border post as expected of border towns until the post-2000 period, with the town gradually transforming from being a mere border town during the Apartheid years to become a prominent border town. Musina’s economy is currently anchored on diamond mining, farming and crossborder trade. There are many game farms and tourist attraction sites, including the Kruger National Park, the Big Tree, Musina Nature Reserve and Mapungubwe National Park. Musina is known for being the region of Baobab trees and impala lilies, which are both protected species. Cross-border trade is an active aspect of the local economy. With its current population at about 132,000, the Musina municipal area has multi-ethnic groups including Venda, Northern Sotho, Tsonga, English, Afrikaners, Shona, Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistan, Chinese and Somali-speaking people. Because

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of its location as an entry point into the promised land of South Africa, there is a massive influx of foreign nationals, some of them undocumented, who have found sanctuary in the border town of Musina and the nearby rural villages and white commercial farms. As a major South African gateway to the rest of the continent, Musina has over the years evolved into a busy cross-border agglomeration connected more to the border and borderland landscape and livelihoods than the centre. Its development has mirrored the demands of the borderland and has been largely influenced or oriented towards the demands of the regional border traffic and users.

Beitbridge and Musina Border Towns as a Single Urban Frontier The end of Apartheid in 1994 and the subsequent emergence of the Zimbabwe crisis in 2000 saw a gradual transformation of the geospatial relations and characteristics of the two cross-border agglomerations of Musina and Beitbridge. The most conspicuous characteristic between the two has been the contrasting development trajectories and rates/pace. While Musina has steadily grown into a prominent border town founded on a sound South African economy and relatively good governance after 1994, Beitbridge has been in a steady decline reflective of the general national decay of the Zimbabwean political economy in the new millennium. Currently, Musina is working on attaining city status and Beitbridge is still to get municipality status. Musina’s infrastructure is better, with world-standard roads and shopping malls. Dusty and pot-holed streets and roads are a common feature in Beitbridge. Musina and Beitbridge fortunes and misfortunes, respectively, are reflective of the disparities in wealth and power that characterise most border towns, where “towns stand as symbols for other kinds of unequal relationships” between states (Pophiwa 2018: 109). Despite it being a revenue cash-cow for the Zimbabwean government and a key South African outlet to African trade networks, many regional countries are now avoiding the Beitbridge border post due to the unavailability of basic border services, coupled with the deplorable state of key infrastructure and costly delays and rates on the Zimbabwean side. With the successful May 2021 completion of the Kazungula rail and road bridge on the Zambia-Botswana-Zimbabwe-Namibia Zambezi River quadripoint, most countries have resorted to using the more efficient and shorter Mafikeng-Botswana and Kazungula route, which redirects the flow of traffic from the busy, congested, expensive and poor infrastructure Beitbridge border post directly through Botswana and Zambia. These tangent urban developmental fortunes have, in urban terminology, seen Musina turning into a sort of Central Business District (CBD) and industrial zone (centre/metropole) for Beitbridge, with the latter being the periphery/outskirts of the border cityscape, heavily reliant on the centre. The more affluent Musina in South Africa has largely become the provider of numerous goods and services to her poorer counterpart, Beitbridge in Zimbabwe. Resultantly, Beitbridge has been

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drawn towards the Musina-South African political economy with its borderland residents becoming largely disconnected from Zimbabwean malaise by, for example, adopting the South Africa currency (Rand) and goods, as well as socio-cultural traits (music, diets, dress codes). Beitbridge has turned into a fraternal urban extension of Musina, with the presence of the state along the border being treated mainly by Beitbridge residents as part of the daily nuisances in a typical urban space. Added to this are complex formal and informal transport (omalayitsha), cross-border trade and commuting practices, as well as communication networks that link both towns daily, with Beitbridge town dwellers, for instance, preferring to use the cheaper South African mobile networks providers and unrestricted social media platforms. As part of an intricate trans-border community, residents of Musina and Beitbridge have over the years shared diverse influences and traits, anchored in homogenous ethnic socio-cultural traits and borderland environments. This homogeneity has been critical in the seamless interaction and fusion of the fraternal border towns as a single urban frontier over time. Despite the distance, and their natural separation by the Limpopo River and a busy border post, both towns lie within a borderland with much more in common than differences. Musina-Beitbridge lie in the Limpopo Valley, a semi-arid borderland landscape with a mean annual rainfall of between 300 and 600 mm and sedimentary-granitic alluvial sandy soils (Matsa 2019). Vegetation varies from the savanna on deep fertile soils to shrub savanna on shallower ones. Common trees in this region include mopani, which is prevalent on salt-rich soils, baobab, marula and various species of combretum and acacia. Farmers are generally sedentary pastoralists who practice dry land farming which concentrates on droughttolerant small grains like sorghum, millet and rapoko. They traditionally keep large heads of the indigenous thuli cattle and other breeds as well as large flocks of sheep and goats. The valley has a semi-homogenous population of marginalised minority farming communities which include the Venda, Shangani and Sotho. Because the inhabitants/residents of the valley were separated from their kith and kin by the colonial border, they therefore share similar cultural and linguistic traits. Residents are transnational as they are well-versed with languages spoken in the borderland. Asiwaju (1985) states that, though border regions or borderlands are a coherent area split into two or more separate jurisdiction spheres, the immediate neighbours of border-landers are usually under a foreign jurisdiction. Thus, border communities are usually localities populated by people who share a common sense of place and have cross-border links with communities on the other side of neighbouring countries’ borders (Hawley 2005). These cross-border environmental, ethno-linguistic and cultural tapestries and similarities are critical in grounding the mutual ambiance and connections existing in the Musina-Beitbridge urban frontier. The busy Beitbridge border post itself is strategically crucial in the broader politics of the single urban frontier matrix at two levels. Firstly, it has become a placenta connecting the socio-political and economic outlook of the two border towns, with such interaction playing out at bi-lateral levels. Several mutual agreements forged between the South African and Zimbabwean governments have promoted the single urban zone nexus. Both towns lie on the critical African Union’s North–South

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Corridor. They have a twining agreement dating back to 1996 with mutual arrangements on a host of service delivery areas including addressing housing, water and sanitation, health and economic development. There are also exchange programmes and events such as the 42.2-km annual Zimbabwe-South Africa joint marathon which starts in Beitbridge and ends in Musina. They share critical infrastructure connecting their respective border posts particularly their joint ownership of the New Limpopo Bridge from 2014. Added to this are the mooted plans to establish a One Stop Border Post (OSBP) at Beitbridge, a key border modernisation initiative aimed at improving border movement by reducing time for processing of imports and exports by enabling goods, people, and vehicles to stop in a single facility in which they undergo necessary controls following applicable regional and national laws to exit one state and enter the adjoining state. The envisaged Beitbridge OSBP thus not only stands to buttress relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa, but also cement the geo-spatial singularity and connectivity of the two fraternal cross-border urban agglomerations. Secondly, the border post has had a ubiquitous influence on the political economy of the Musina and Beitbridge landscape culminating in a shared border experience that has universal impact on the interactive activities between the two towns. A thriving informal economy has emerged around the border post run by Beitbridge and Musina borderland residents as they try to live-off the border as vendors, transporters (omalayitsha), touts and dealers. Cross-border vendors have become a permanent feature of the border post selling various wares ranging from travel documents, paraphernalia, airtime, drinks, fruits and food. Numerous vendors operate within the border post zone juggling the authorities daily. A bigger menace comes in the form of smuggling syndicates and touts who assist undocumented immigrants and contraband to illegally cross the border through unsanctioned points across the crocodileand hippo-infested Limpopo River. Commonly known as kujamba bhodha (border jumping) and fuelled by the touts known as maguma-guma (hustlers or swindlers) or impisi (hyenas) (Tshabalala 2019), and with its inherent disregard of border regulatory controls and authorities, smuggling further blurs the existing boundary between Beitbridge and Musina and enhances the single urban frontier perspective. Likewise, the prevalence of formal and informal cross-border transport actors within the borderland further distorts the border demarcation and promotes harmony between the two towns. Generally known as the omalayitsha, these transporters and touts commute between Musina and Beitbridge ferrying passengers and goods across the border (Nyamunda 2014). In many cases, the transporters usually ferry passengers from the Zimbabwean side to Musina and wait for them to shop and then return with them to the border post. However, there is also a mutual coexistence amongst the cross-border transporters. For instance, in 2012, the Beitbridge-based Zimbabwean Cross-border Transport Association (ZCTA) and South Africa’s Beitbridge Taxi Association (BTA) agreed that the ZCTA carries only goods, leaving passengers to South Africa’s BTA operators who earn R20 or more a trip per passenger. Though not always binding and strictly followed, reneging on the agreement leads to fines (ranging from $US70 to $US200) and sometimes route wars (Interview with

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Trevor Nhanga, Cross-border Transporter, Beitbridge, 21 March 2022). The omalayitsa facilitate daily commuting and shopping for Beitbridge trans-border residents into the Musina CBD where basic commodities are always found in abundance and comparatively cheaper than on the Zimbabwean side. The transport networks are also at the core of a broader and mutually interactive cross-border shopping economy where Musina businesses are heavily reliant on Beitbridge residents and cross-border traders. As aforementioned, South Africa’s Musina, as the centre (CBD) of the borderland urban landscape, has well-developed shopping complexes that sell usually scarce and expensive basic commodities/goods not found in Zimbabwe and beyond such as foodstuffs, building material, clothes and fuel. The relationship between Musina businesses and Beitbridge shoppers is reciprocal and mutual. The survival of the former is largely dependent on the latter, with the increased economic misfortunes of Zimbabwe being gainful for Musina business enterprises. Likewise, Musina’s proximity immensely cushions Beitbridge residents from Zimbabwe’s decay, which makes them more inclined to identify and connect with the more stable South African economy. Disturbances to this symbiotic economic ecology usually culminate in violent protests by the urban borderland dwellers. For example, on 1 July 2016, a belligerent Zimbabwean government enacted Statutory Instrument 64 of 2016 which banned the importation of basic commodities in a futile bid to stop the influx of foreign goods and protect tottering local manufacturing industries. This regulation affected the thriving cross-border trade and immediately led to violent protests by Beitbridge residents and Musina shop owners who in solidarity blocked the busy border post. As a result, business came to a standstill and the border was closed on 1 July 2016 (Interview with Trevor Nhanga, Cross-border Transporter, Beitbridge, 21 March 2022). Recurrent fuel shortages and exorbitant fuel prices that have characterised Zimbabwe’s collapse in the new millennium further draws Beitbridge economic life towards Musina. Zimbabweans have on several occasions endured a chronic fuel crisis sometimes caused by sporadic supplies, hyperinflation, forex shortages, and price and quality distortions. But because of their closeness to Musina, Beitbridge residents have not been caught in this vortex over the years. A thriving informal fuel trade economy has always emerged during fuel crises in Zimbabwe, with fuel porters on bicycles and foot smuggling fuel from Musina in plastic containers. Secondary fuel trade industries sprout around the fuel economy as vendors hoard and sell fuel containers, with plastic containers lucratively costing R60 (or $US5, at the March 2022 exchange rate) and Jerry cans (R400/$US35) (Interview with Trevor Nhanga, Cross-border Transporter, Beitbridge, 21 March 2022). Private vehicle owners also cross the border daily to refill their cars with the unblended or unleaded high-quality South African fuel for use and re-sell in Beitbridge. A Shell fuel service station is strategically located a few metres from the border post on the South Africa side and frequently realises brisk business from Zimbabwean motorists and fuel porters during such fuel crises. Of late, Musina’s urban frontier and infrastructure have been growing towards the border, with the 10km space between the border and the town increasingly becoming occupied by medium-to-commercial scale business enterprises. Numerous

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car sale lots, trucking companies and fuel depots have over the years mushroomed in the area. Dotted along the N1 highway from the border into the Musina town centre, Indian-Pakistani-owned car sale lots for Japanese pre-owned vehicles, by law not for resale to South Africans, are — like the Shell fuel station — strategically located near the border, offering a ready market for cross-border customers, mainly from Zimbabwe. Established ex-Japanese car dealerships include Toyama Auto, Nafay Motors, Mafzaal Trading and KDG Auto (Telephonic interview with Tonderai Masakwa, car customs clearance agent, Beitbridge, 21 March 2022). Zimbabwe’s motor assembling industry has all but collapsed. Nearly all the vehicles on its roads are refurbished imports, mostly from Japan. Some Zimbabwean citizens import directly through online agents or simply travel to Beitbridge and physically buy from the aforementioned car dealers in Musina. The Indian-Pakistan dealerships have numerous advantages as opposed to individual direct importers from Japan. As a car customs clearance agent at Beitbridge highlighted, potential buyers get to physically see and inspect the vehicle and negotiate the price down as well as not wait to get their car (Telephonic interview with Tonderai Masakwa, car customs clearance agent, Beitbridge, 21 March 2022). Business is usually brisk. Figures from the Beitbridge border post show that up to 200 pre-owned vehicles from Japan pass through the border daily into the Zimbabwean market (Samaita 2020). Other than further connecting the economic veins of the two towns through vehicle trade, the car importation business has created massive informal and formal employment for many Beitbridge residents. Numerous car dealers and agents assist prospective vehicle buyers of ex-Japanese cars with purchase and customs clearing consultancy, using their links and experience to negotiate lesser duty costs with the Zimbabwe border customs authorities for a fee. Mobile networks do not respect national boundaries and in many ways also connect cross-border agglomerations into a single frontier. As a result, borderland communities and cross-border towns tend to benefit from the multilateral international mobile network communication services, with the more powerful mobile networks transcending/infiltrating further into the borderlands of neighbouring countries. Such network osmosis sees mobile coverage spreading from a region of higher concentration to a lower one. Along the Limpopo Valley borderland, the main South African mobile networks such as Vodacom, MTN, Telkom and Cell C are more advanced, well equipped and thus powerful. With sophisticated base stations located in Musina, Vodacom and MTN network coverage spills and stretches into the Beitbridge and Zimbabwe frontier for at least 10 kms. In contrast, Zimbabwe’s networks of Econet, Netone and Telecel are a reflection of the national decay and their intermittent coverage abruptly ends on the South African side of the border post roughly a kilometre away from the boundary. Living on the margins of the cross-border urban frontier, the majority of Beitbridge residents prefer using the cheaper, more efficient and unrestricted South African networks especially for social media access (WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter) (Telephonic interview with Tonderai Masakwa, car customs clearance agent, Beitbridge, 21 March 2022). These trans-border communicative platforms are occasionally critical as tools of defiance during periods of Zimbabwean political turmoil, with Beitbridge residents resorting to South African

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network systems in times of government network blackouts such as during the January 2019 political protests. Related to the mobile network osmosis are issues of acculturation and adoption of cultural tastes of hegemonic neighbours. Such integration is entrenched by the character of borderland peoples who in most cases are homogenous in ethnic and cultural orientation. As a result, Beitbridge dwellers have easily identified themselves with South African dress codes, evolving street lingo and music in particular. The South African musical industry has global influence and is ever-evolving with popular genres such as amapiano currently entertaining audiences globally, including those in adjacent borderlands like Beitbridge. The domination of South African cultural paraphernalia amongst Beitbridge residents is also driven by the absence and presence of a vibrant television industry in Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively. With only one Zimbabwean state-controlled television station since independence in 1980, Beitbridge residents have naturally been attracted to the diverse South African television networks, most of which they access freely due to their proximity to the border. In March 2022, the controversial South African Home Affairs Minister, Aaron Motsoaledi, sensationally claimed that 70% of women giving birth at Musina Hospital were Zimbabwean nationals (Newsdzezimbabwe 2022). Though the figures are debatable, desperate Zimbabwean women and other sick patients cross into South Africa for medical assistance as their local health facilities have fallen apart with inadequate equipment and drugs, and costs are beyond their reach. Beitbridge residents and other borderland communities within the Limpopo Valley frequently besiege Musina medical facilities (clinics, hospitals and pharmacies) for affordable health care which reinforces the single urban frontier dynamics. Zartman (2010) asserts that since borders run across land and through people, affected residents typically choose to receive their primary or emergency care in the neighbouring countries due to service availability and proximity or distance. Because of their closeness to Musina, these residents have the privilege of commuting to Musina, whenever necessary, for health care as opposed to those from afar. They have the choice and luxury to even use the omalayitsha transporters and couriers to fetch cheaper medication in pharmacies in Musina for them. Such activities are a distinct trait of urbanism at the geographical margins where borderland populations overlook the existence of the border to uniquely exploit their geographical circumstances to access critical amenities from neighbouring frontiers.

Conclusion Reflectively, this chapter brings urban and border studies into closer dialogue, with the aspiration being to advance the debate within two sub-fields that tend to revolve in different orbits. It has showcased how two cross-border urban agglomerations (Beitbridge and Musina) have metamorphosised into a borderless urban frontier over time. I underscored that border cities/towns and related borderland communities

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naturally connect more with foreign frontiers adjacent to the border. Because they are geographically located on the margins as fragments of the state, disadvantaged border cities/towns usually assume the socio-economic cosmologies and cultures of their more prominent cross-border neighbours, with the resultant inter-twined interactions expanding and connecting the cross-border urban frontier into a single fraternal zone. At the centre of this fusion are the urban border-landers who react to their marginality through the production of alternative meanings and narratives as dictated by their border spatial circumstances and their natural and selective convictions of border artificiality within a hybrid (transition) space. They carve out symbolic space and exploit the numerous spaces of agentic possibilities as they engage in manifold practices that connect and entangle their marginalised position with spaces of power and resources within borderlands. Being at the margins does not, therefore, limit the capacities of border cities/towns and their dwellers to expand their horizons beyond the confines of the nation-state as they establish synergies with twin-urban landscapes and adopt cultures across national borders embedded in ethno-socio-cultural homogeneity. As exhibited, the Beitbridge-Musina case suitably qualifies and fits in this narrative where, because of political and economic circumstances, the less-privileged Beitbridge has turned into a fraternal urban extension of a more advanced Musina, with the former’s residents daily flocking/commuting to the latter for scarce and cheaper socio-economic amenities, ranging from food, hardware, fuel and medical facilities. The foregoing analysis thus centres these unfolding realities of urbanism at the geographical margins within studies of the African city and African borderland historiographies, and it further complements ongoing efforts to capture and expand our understanding of smaller border cities/towns in Africa as opposed to orthodox capital cities or mega-cities.

References Aceska A, Heer B, Kaiser-Grolimund A (2019) Doing the city from the margins: critical perspectives on urban marginality. Anthropol Forum 29(1):1–11 Asiwaju IA (1984) Artificial boundaries. University of Lagos Press, Lagos Asiwaju IA (ed) (1985). C. Hurst & Co., London Asiwaju AI (1993) Preface and welcome address. In Asiwaju I (ed) Development of border regions. University of Lagos Press, Lagos Carens J (1995) Aliens and citizens: the case for open border. In R Beiner (ed) Theorizing citizenship. State University of New York Press, Albany, NY Daimon A (2016) Commuter migration across artificial frontiers: the case of partitioned communities along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. J Borderl Stud 31(4):463–479 Daimon A (2021) Settling in motion as consciousness: Nyasa (Malawian) informal transit across Southern Rhodesia towards South Africa from the 1910s to the 1950s. Afr Stud 80(1):1–20 Hansen N (1981) The border economy: regional development in the southwest. University of Texas Press, Austin Hawley C (2005) In Altar, teeming with transients, small town shares Arizona’s conflicts over impact of illegal immigration. The Arizona Republic (Phoenix) Al, A20 Martinez O (1994) The dynamics of border interaction: new approaches to border analysis. In Schofield C (ed) Global boundaries. World boundaries. Routledge, London

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Matsa M (2019) Beitbridge minority farmer communities and climate change: prospects for sustainability. In: Hussain S (ed) Climate change and agriculture. IntechOpen, London McFarlane C (2018) Fragment urbanism: politics on the margins of the city. Environ Plan Soc Space 36(6):1007–1025 Newman D (2011) Contemporary research agendas in border studies: an overview. In Wastl-Walter D (ed) The ashgate research companion to border studies. Ashgate, Farnham Newsdzezimbabwe (2022) SA hospitals hit foreigners with fee hikes, 21 April 2002. http://www. newsdzezimbabwe.co.uk/2022/04/sa-hospitals-hit-foreigners-with-fee.html Nyamunda T (2014) Cross-border couriers as symbols of regional grievance? The Malayitsha remittance system in Matabeleland. Afr Diasp 7(1):38–62 O’Dowd L (2003) The changing significance of European borders. In: O’Dowd L, Anderson J, Wilson T (eds) New borders for a new Europe. Taylor and Francis, pp 13–36 Pophiwa N (2018) Cross-border shopping by Zimbabweans in Musina: Meanings, modalities and encounters (c.2000 to 2016), University of Witwatersrand Samaita K (2020) Zimbabwe orders all vehicles imports from Japan to undergo radiation inspection. Businesslive. https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2020-12-09-zimbabwe-ord ers-all-vehicles-imports-from-japan-to-undergo-radiation-inspection/ Tshabalala X (2019) Hyenas of the Limpopo: illicit labour recruiting, assisted border crossings, and the social politics of movement across South Africa’s border with Zimbabwe. J Borderl Stud 34(3):433–450 Wilson T, Donnan H (1994) Border approaches: anthropological perspectives on frontiers. University Press of America, Lanham Zartman W (2010) Identity, movement and response. In Zartman WI (ed) Understanding life in the borderlands: boundaries in depth and in motion. University of Georgia Press, Athens, GA

Chapter 10

“Across the Border, You Are Treated Well, They Care”: Patients and Therapeutic (Im)mobilities in the Honde Valley and Zambezi Borderlands Nicholas Nyachega and Joshua Matanzima Abstract Patients cross various kinds of physical, socio-economic and political borders in their quest for therapy. In southern Africa, patients’ therapeutic mobilities and immobilities have become an important part of people’s social histories. This chapter contributes to debates on health and healing practices in southern Africa by examining the changing patterns of therapeutic (im)mobilities and choices in Zimbabwe’s borderlands. By using two case studies of the Honde and Zambezi valleys (along the Mozambican and Zambian borders, respectively), it considers the continuities and reversals in the patterns of cross-border access to health care. While Zimbabwe has historically received more patients from neighbouring Zambia and Mozambique compared to Zimbabweans seeking health care in these two countries, this pattern has changed over time. A significant number of Zimbabweans are now seeking healthcare services in adjacent countries mainly due to the country’s deteriorating economic and political circumstances that affect healthcare service deliveries. In the Honde and Zambezi valleys, quests for healing, therapeutic choices and (im)mobilities are configured by diverse social, economic and cultural processes, including kinship networks and the character and cost of health services in the region. Keywords Honde Valley · Zambezi Valley · Borderlands · Patients · (Im)mobilities · Zimbabwe

N. Nyachega (B) Department of History, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA e-mail: [email protected] J. Matanzima Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_10

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Introduction Patients cross various kinds of physical, socio-economic and political borders in their quest for therapy. In southern Africa, patients’ therapeutic mobilities and immobilities ((im)mobilities for short) have over time become an important part of people’s social histories. Patients’ health migrations and cross-border access to health services are conditioned by various kinds of local and international socio-economic forces. This chapter contributes to debates on health and healing practices in the region of southern Africa by examining the changing patterns of therapeutic (im)mobilities and choices in Zimbabwe’s borderlands. By using two case studies of the Honde and Zambezi valleys (along the Mozambican and Zambian borders, respectively), it considers the continuities and reversals in the patterns of cross-border access to health care. It also considers why individuals make and practice therapeutic choices and (im)mobilities across state borders. While Zimbabwe has historically received more patients from neighbouring Zambia and Mozambique compared to Zimbabweans seeking health care in these two countries, this pattern has changed over time. This chapter shows that a significant number of Zimbabweans are now seeking healthcare services in adjacent countries mainly due to the country’s deteriorating economic and political circumstances that affect healthcare service deliveries. We highlight that Zimbabwean patients’ therapeutic (im)mobilities are shaped by specific kinds of vulnerabilities and precarities as well as the yearning for hope to be healed, among other factors. We underscore how, in both the Honde and Zambezi valleys, quests for healing, therapeutic choices and (im)mobilities are configured by diverse social, economic and cultural processes, including kinship networks and the character and cost of health services in the region.

Borders and Healthcare Access Border conditions or borderland circumstances provide corridors of opportunities for patients. For example, as revealed by anthropologist Miller-Thayer (2010), the United States-Mexico border offers unique opportunities for health care as the lower cost of procedures and medications in Mexico makes it an attractive alternative for low-income populations in the United States. Trends of healthcare movements in the context of the globalisation of health care have created various “frontiers of health services management” as well as “market-driven medical tourism” (Gray and Poland 2008). Understanding how local and transnational connections come together to shape people’s quest for therapies is important to the historiography of health and healing in Africa. As Feierman (1985) aptly argues, the study of African therapeutics must consider the forces which shape local networks (that is, forces that shape the community and domestic organisations) because the history of health care and healing is

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inseparable from the broader history of communal, political and economic organisations. African therapeutics take on forms that are quite specific to the context and, additionally, are subject to change. Many social-cultural determinants influence healthcare access in Africa. Scholars of Africa, particularly social historians and a successive generation of anthropologists, have explored the social-cultural determinants of health and healing in Africa (Feierman 1985; Turshen 1977; Janzen 1978; Vaughan 1991). John Janzen (1978) employs the concept of “medical pluralism” in his study of colonial Zaire, a concept that Feierman (1985) later called “alternative therapies” to understand how African medical systems were socially and culturally constructed and conditioned. Janzen argues that the boundaries of African therapeutics in Zaire were influenced by consultations between “laymen” and “specialists” in ways that highlight the centrality of lay therapy systems (non-biomedical) and “broad cultural premises about illness and health” (Janzen 1978: 8). Patients’ quest for therapy, and the management of illness, involves “therapy managing groups”—a set of kin groups which explore multiple therapeutic alternatives available to them in their quest for healing (Janzen 1978). As this study shows, individuals make choices to travel abroad or simply cross borders to access health care for a variety of reasons, mainly because of the care they receive and the costs of healthcare services. Countries that offer free or cheaper healthcare services usually attract what anthropologist Miller-Thayer (2010) terms “transnational medical consumers”. Gray and Poland (2008) have used the term ‘medical tourist’ to refer to patients who seek health services across state borders. Following public health scholar Jarman’s (2014) concept of the entrepreneurial state, this chapter demonstrates that Zimbabwe’s governance of health services and state borders creates unstable cross-border health markets and uncertainties for patients. This is part of a broader regional dynamic, as southern African states such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique are always limited in governing people’s crossborder access to social services such as clinics due to their dismal failure to provide quality affordable healthcare services. In addition, these states’ efforts to control borderland people’s movements are seriously undermined due to individuals’ socioeconomic circumstances that shape their decisions to travel across state boundaries in their quest for healing. Travelling abroad for health care, as noted by Gray and Poland (2008), has a long history. Various reasons motivate patients to seek medical services in neighbouring countries and, certainly, cross-border health care widens healthcare options in terms of the quality and cost of this care. In East Africa, particularly in Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya, the physical accessibility of health services, acceptability of health services and affordability of the health services all influence patients’ decisions to cross borders to seek services including child immunisation and HIV treatment. In southern Africa, thousands of patients from countries in the region travel to South Africa in search of medical treatment for procedures that are not offered in their own countries (Chikanda and Crush 2019).

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Study Sites and Methodological Note This chapter is a result of individual fieldworks in the Honde and Zambezi valleys carried out by the authors. The Honde Valley is in Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands, along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border. The Honde Valley region, until very recently, has had no official border crossing point like the Kariba and Chirundu border posts along the Zimbabwe-Zambia border. As well, despite the recent “officialisation” of a crossing point at Chinaka border health post, vast stretches of forests and mountain ranges remain uncontrolled by the Zimbabwean state, with individuals crossing the border into and out of Mozambique using any point they desire. Ethnically, the Honde Valley people are mostly Manyika and Barwe, who reside in either the Mutasa or Inyanga districts. In the Zambezi region of Kariba, the Gwembe Tonga are the dominant ethnic group. Populations residing along the Zimbabwe-Zambia border include the Shangwe, Tonga and Korekore, but other ethnicities from other parts of Zimbabwe (as far as Midlands and Matabeleland provinces) seek healthcare services in neighbouring Zambia. The Honde Valley region’s nearest Mozambican districts are Honde, Villa Catandica and Manica. Honde Valley residents have historically visited these areas for various reasons including daily shopping, visiting their relatives or to access medical facilities. The Zambezi Valley communities on the Zimbabwean side of the border access health facilities in Zambia. Patients from areas such as Kariba town and rural Nyaminyami Rural District regularly visit Mutendere hospital in the Chirundu area on the Zambian side of the border. The main district hospital is in Kariba, yet patients regularly cross the border to Chirundu town to access health services which are either unavailable or inaccessible in Zimbabwe. To access Chirundu town, people need to travel via Makuti, a route that is over 150 kms. While most of the oral and archival data for this chapter was gathered in 2021 and 2022, our journeys in previous doctoral dissertation fieldworks have motivated us to tell the story about cross-border health access in the two regions of Zimbabwe bordering Mozambique in Honde Valley and Zambia in the Zambezi Valley. Using our positions as residents of the two areas, with Nicholas Nyachega coming from Honde Valley and Joshua Matanzima from Kariba, our lengthy visits back home also enabled us to observe and hear stories about people travelling to neighbouring towns or crossing borders to access health services. During field visits to the Musampakaruma, Mola and Kariba town areas (in the Zambezi region), it was observed that most people diagnosed with chronic diseases (such as diabetes, cancer and hypertension) visit Zambia hospitals rather than local ones. Qualitative data about the cross-border health patients of the Honde and Zambezi valley inhabitants were gathered through extended ethnographic research. Information regarding the cross-border movements commenced in 2019. In both areas, our research derived from semi-structured interviews, informal conversations and participant observations, incorporating people of different generations including young adults and the elderly. While we try to include the voices of both men and women, we find the stories of women particularly useful in revealing the multiple socio-economic

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patterns of cross-border therapeutic (im)mobilities in the Kariba and Honde valley borderlands. Their voices shape the arguments we make in this chapter, and we remain very grateful for their time in co-creating oral histories. Semi-structured interviews were carried out in people’s homesteads or in their workplaces. People interviewed included those who had been to Mutendere Mission Hospital in Zambia and Catandica Hospital in Mozambique, as well as the Chinaka Health Border Post (under the Development Aid from People to People [DAPP]), and the Chisuko and Chavhanga clinics on the Zimbabwean side of the border. We visited and undertook observation at these hospitals and clinics, and interviewed nurses in some of the clinics, immigration officers, local security officials, teachers and ordinary members of the respective communities. We used ChiShona, CiTonga, ChiManyika and ChiBarwe languages for co-creating oral histories. We have anonymised some of our research participants in the text, giving them pseudonyms.

Zimbabwe’s Borders and Healthcare Access In Zimbabwe, cross-border access to health services is embedded in the complex historical connections and disconnections created by various socio-economic and political circumstances in the region. The Zambezi and Honde valleys’ people’s therapeutic mobilities prevail in contexts of political and economic crisis, which have prompted individuals to reconfigure or remap their healing (im)mobilities across space and time. While emphasising that the contemporary cross-border therapeutic (im)mobilities are not entirely new in Zimbabwe’s borderlands, we reveal that the contemporary Zimbabwean crises have adversely impacted local health systems. The crises significantly shape patients’ choices and therapeutic (im)mobilities in the marginalised borderland communities of the Zambezi and Honde valleys. Africans’ quest for therapy has historically involved travelling in search of traditional healing plants in vast forests, as well as distributing herbs and medicines across various geographies of traditional medicine (Osseo-Asare 2014). In these searches and distributions, individuals crossed various socio-economic and political boundaries. However, colonial conditions created various rigid health borders and health complexities (as well as the increasing commercialisation of herbs), which continue to be experienced in contemporary times. While colonial conditions and associated regimes of governance including the drawing of artificial boundaries created various constraints for Africans, patients always disregarded these boundaries and illegally crossed them in search of herbs in neighbouring colonial states (Dube 2009, 2020; Matanzima 2019; Nugent 2019). For instance, despite the creation of the ZimbabweZambia border in 1963 along the Zambezi River by the British, the Tonga people still crossed it for traditional and religious purposes. African elders from Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) continued to visit their kinspeople in Zambia in search of medicine for snake bites, injuries and so forth (Matanzima 2019). Therefore, Zimbabweans in

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both the Zambezi and Honde valleys crossing the border for medicinal and healing purposes is a well-established trend. The physical and medical boundaries created during the colonial period and the introduction of Western science medicines continuously threatened African indigenous healing practices, yet the latter outlived colonial histories. While intrusive colonial public health measures were pervasive, they simply were not always effective (Dube 2009). However, colonialism did affect local health institutions. Writing in the context of the Manica Province in Mozambique, Dube (2009) argues that the formation of the border hindered the effectiveness of colonial public health measures. The epidemiology of the Manica region was fundamentally affected by cross-border movements, which not only spread infections but altered disease ecologies, complicating disease control efforts. Colonial efforts to monitor movements led to the disruption of life and caused much hardship to villagers and town folks. During the late colonial period, in particular, at the time of Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, Msindo and Nyachega (2019) and Nyachega (2017) argue that people continued visiting Mozambique for several social and health reasons. As remembered by Chazanewako Dzinduwa, a Honde Valley villager, and aid to the guerrillas (mujibha): Although we had some trained first-aid people who lived with us in Tangwena mountain during the war, we had no proper medical facilities outside of the protected villages. Chavhanga and Sagambe clinics were all closed because of the war. Hauna Hospital was not yet there. People would get too sick. Some would consult traditional healers, and we also had a lot of herbs to use since we were living in the bush. But serious war injuries would force us to go as far as Honde and others to Chimoio in Mozambique. I remember helping comrade Fakeson who had been injured in a landmine explosion near Rwera River. We took him to Honde in Mozambique from where he was transported to Chimoio hospital. (Interview with Chazanewako Dzinduwa, 26 August 2021, 4 January 2022)

In post-colonial Zimbabwe, several socio-economic and political challenges have had significant and prolonged impacts on the health system. As this chapter shows, the Zimbabwean crises, particularly from 2005 to the present, have caused what we term reverse mobilities. By this, we mean that, while it was mostly people from Zambia and Mozambique seeking superior health services in Zimbabwe (from the 1980s to the early 2000s), these trends have since reversed. The Zimbabwe crisis, among many other things, has affected healthcare service delivery in Zimbabwe, pushing patients to cross borders in their quest for therapy. For instance, Honde Valley locals suggest that it was very rare for Zimbabweans in the past to visit Mozambique in search of social services like schools and clinics because of their deficiencies (Interview with Mwadiwa and Mujangu, 10 September 2021), and the cross-border movements for these purposes were in the opposite direction. Now, it is very common, including for shopping purposes as well. In the case of Zambia, the Zambezi Valley communities on the Zimbabwean side of the border access health facilities (in Zambia) mostly at the Mutendere Mission Hospital, a mission hospital belonging to the Zambian Catholic Diocese of Monze. The hospital is a non-profit making organisation and started as a rural health centre in 1964. The church runs the hospital from the funds obtained from donors, auto-financing activities and fees from patients.

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Because regions such as the Zambezi and Honde valleys lack basic health infrastructure, adequate (or available) medication and experienced personnel, patients’ choices and access to health services are always constrained. As Dube (2013) argue, low-quality levels in terms of health data and service delivery, mainly due to under-qualified staff and a dilapidated information management infrastructure, affect patients’ access to health services in border regions. Our study suggests that the Zambezi and Honde valley border regions, urban and rural, often lack adequate health infrastructures partly because of their marginalisation and government neglect. The government of Zimbabwe has struggled to provide its citizens with basic sustainable health facilities due to the sheer unavailability of resources. The increasing shortages of qualified personnel have significantly impacted the Zimbabwean health services sector. Many qualified and competent health workers left the country because of the unfavourable political environment. The recent COVID-19 pandemic yet again tested the efficacy of Zimbabwe’s border governance regimes and healthcare service deliveries. As observed by Kudejira (2020), the nexus between borders and health is apparent in the spreading of diseases across borders as well as border closures as part of the measures to contain the spread of diseases. While borders have become more visible technologies of state power profoundly affecting human (im)mobilities across the world in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, various contestations have emerged. In some cases, states’ efforts to restrict human mobilities out of and into COVID-19 “hotspots” or confining those already within their state borders have been seriously undermined by people’s everyday (im)mobilities, choices, changing goals and desires. Communities living along borders, and those visiting border zones in transit to somewhere else, regularly manipulate and navigate the changing border conditions, sometimes taking even dangerous actions. Zimbabweans in the Zambezi Valley and Honde Valley continued to access health facilities in neighbouring countries despite the COVID-19 restrictions.

Zimbabwe’s Contemporary Crisis and Health Delivery In contemporary Zimbabwe, ensuring high-quality health care is an ongoing challenge. Low levels of provider effort, high rates of absenteeism in health institutions, poor governance, limited financial resources, and shortages in equipment, drugs and medical supplies have been identified as key constraints in low and middle-income countries when it comes to effective health delivery systems (Fichera et al. 2021). In Zimbabwe, these challenges are heightened by the current politico-economic crises. As Claborn (2020) argues, the collapse of a country’s economy can have significant impacts on the health and healthcare infrastructure of the country. Since the turn of the century, Zimbabwe has undergone a multifaceted and deepseated crisis whose immediate disruptive event was the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in the early 2000s. The early post-fast track years were not a temporary aberration, as Zimbabwe is now in perpetual crisis (Helliker et al. 2021). The

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economic crisis is characterised by a cash crisis, shortage of basic commodities, high inflation rates and high unemployment rates (Gukurume 2015, 2019; Matanzima and Saidi 2020), and this crisis reverberates across other institutions in the country, including education and health. The effects on the health sector are profound and acute. For example, the cash crisis and high inflation rates have affected Zimbabweans’ capability to meet health costs such as medical and hospital bills. With the current estimates of an over 90% unemployment rate, most people lack the financial resources to access public health facilities, let alone private hospitals. While government hospitals are certainly cheaper than private ones, they are dilapidated. Against this background, we examine the changing patterns of cross-border access to health care, underscoring the reversals and continuities of patients’ (im)mobilities. By exploring why individuals make therapeutic choices and practice (im)mobilities across state borders, we underscore how limited resource opportunities in the context of socio-political and economic crises engender people’s cross-border therapeutic (im)mobilities. Based on the two case studies of the Zambezi Valley and Honde Valley borderlands, we argue that the Zimbabwe crises have seriously affected people’s access to health services both inside and across state borders.

Accessing Health Services in the Honde and Zambezi Valleys When accessing health services across national borders from the Honde and Zambezi valleys, people carefully consider the accessibility and affordability of the services in neighbouring countries. People’s kinships in these regions influence how individuals access services across the border as patients identify and plan how their relatives can facilitate their travels and registrations to access clinics and hospitals. The Zambezi and Honde valleys have, since the colonial period, remained marginalised when it comes to the development of social services such as clinics, schools and roads. State marginalisation and the deep rural location of both the mid-Zambezi Valley and Honde Valley have created health vulnerabilities for local villagers. Poor health systems and inadequate social facilities in Zimbabwe’s Zambezi Valley and Honde Valley shape how people make decisions about questions of access to healthcare services. In both regions, the government of Zimbabwe has perpetuated a “system of neglect” when it comes to development and a “system of criminalisation” when it comes to governing these border regions. The marginalisation of border regions such as the Zambezi and Honde began during the colonial period because the Rhodesian colonial government considered the development of the Zambezi Valley communities, for example, as an unnecessary expense. Contrastingly, the administrators in colonial Zambia often provided better health, road and water development programmes on the northern bank of the Zambezi River. Thus, there was movement into Zambia, by the Zambezi Valley inhabitants, for healthcare purposes. However, this pattern changed, for instance, from the 1980s to the late 1990s, as Zimbabwe received more patients from Zambia and Mozambique due to its superior healthcare services.

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Like the Zambezi Valley, the Honde Valley was neglected during the colonial period as it was considered inaccessible and only suitable for colonial agriculture. The area witnessed the establishment of the first Mission clinic, the Honde Mission, in the late 1940s. By 1952, 58 babies had been delivered in the Honde Mission maternity sections, while the hospital treated 3,771 outpatients and 249 inpatients (Menzies 1953). The huge traffic of patients at Honde Mission was caused by the absence of health facilities in other parts of Honde Valley, as colonial administrators frequently noted. In 1957, for example, the Native Commissioner of Umtali expressed the need to develop Honde Valley, reporting to the Chief Native Commissioner that Holdenby Reserve (now Honde Valley), north of the Pungwe River, was roadless, hilly, covered with tropical vegetation and particularly unknown to state officials (NAZ, s2827/2/2/5/2, Internal Affairs, Annual District Reports, 1957). Despite significant changes following Zimbabwe’s attainment of political independence in 1980, with more clinics and schools built in the Honde Valley, the area still has road access problems as well as poor health facilities compared to other areas in Zimbabwe. Un-development has been perpetuated in the region. The situation in most of the mid-Zambezi Valley is more serious compared to the other parts of the country (Helliker and Matanzima 2022; Matanzima and Helliker 2022). The Zimbabwean portion of the mid-Zambezi has very poor and inadequate health facilities with larger chiefdoms (such as Mola and Musampakaruma) served only by one clinic (Matanzima 2021; McGregor 2009). In Honde Valley, there are more than 10 clinics along the border plus a General Hospital in Hauna. Despite the numerical strength of clinics in Honde Valley compared to Kariba, the clinics in both regions lack basic services such as constant water supply and are also understaffed. The government of Zimbabwe currently justifies the understaffing of rural health personnel, highlighting that fiscal challenges prevent it from placing more nurses in rural areas.

Why Patients Cross Borders Healthcare costs, nurses’ attitudes towards patients and the changing socio-political conditions in border regions influence peoples’ decisions to become cross-border healthcare seekers or not. In the Zambezi borderlands, the negative attitude of nurses towards patients, believed to be caused by the fact that their salaries are very low, is a serious factor that impacts on people’s desire to visit local clinics and hospitals. Nurses redirect their rage against the government towards the patients. There are cases in which doctors and nurses strike due to poor working conditions and very low remuneration. Sometimes, nurses—just like many other civil servants—‘goslow’ and engage in ‘stay-ins’ where they do not attend to patients in time, resulting in long queuing, which further affects the seriously ill. In the absence of health care on the Zimbabwean side of the border, people visit the Mutendere hospital in Zambia where they receive a ‘good’ reception with enough health personnel attending to them.

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At Mutendere, people are treated urgently and with care because there are many health personnel at the hospital. For instance, within a day, a patient can go to Mutendere, get attended to by the doctors and have several medical tests taken at a very low cost, and return to Kariba town. However, in Zimbabwe, getting treatment and care can be a very stressful process as nurses are sometimes not on duty. Even when others report to work, they simply do not care about providing the services largely because they are underpaid. Some nurses decide to run “side projects” in order to get more money to care for their families. This happens throughout the breadth of Zimbabwe, including along the eastern border. In Honde Valley, one resident thus narrated: There are doctors and nurses at Hauna hospital who now run business and banana projects due to economic hardships. You hardly find them at work. They are usually in their banana fields, and others even have some small maize fields and gardens. Others have become crossborder traders, who go to Mozambique via the Katiyo border to get second-hand shoes and clothes as well as groceries. On Wednesdays and Fridays, they cross the border, we see them, we know them. It is not safe to mention their names. (Interview with Nyamutsaka, 28 August 2021)

In other cases, the healthcare services which patients seek are simply not available on the Zimbabwean side of the border. This is so because the hospitals and clinics do not have the required infrastructure or equipment to use. For instance, the local state-run Kariba and Siakobvu hospitals, on the Zimbabwean side of the Zambian border, do not run medical tests. Tests are run by a private laboratory called Inter Africa located in Mahombekombe in Kariba. In Honde Valley, the Hauna Hospital is reported to have been plagued by a shortage of medical equipment including X-ray machines (The Manica Post, 2019). As a result, people are transferred to Nyanga, Bonda and Mutare hospitals, some distance from their homes. Patients in Honde Valley seeking surgical work prefer to visit Mozambique because its services are affordable and the nurses are “more professional, they care more”, as stated by the local Honde Valley soccer team Mboni Stars staff member. One of the technical staff for the team stated that: When our player was badly injured in 2021, we were worried. We looked for healthcare options and decided together with his family to send him to Mozambique. We knew that the Hauna Hospital would require us to pay US Dollars, and we could not afford that. I phoned my relative who lives in Mozambique’s Catandica town, and they advised us to come to their home with the patient to facilitate his access to the hospital. The travels to Catandica were painful and complicated, sometimes using donkeys and motorbikes until we arrived. The processes there were quite smooth, and they didn’t ask as a lot about health insurance, passports, and so on. We had a letter from the coach of a Mozambican soccer team as well as our relatives’ support. He was treated well and now has a plaster on his leg. Our player is recovering, and we hope he can play again. (Interview with Peter, 5 September 2021)

The story of Mboni Stars’ player, Knowledge, reveals the socio-economic conditions that shape patients’ (im)mobilities across state borders to access health services. Relationships across state borders as well as health costs influenced Knowledge’s decision to get healthcare service in Mozambique. While his coach had mentioned the smoothness of the process in Mozambique and Knowledge’s being treated well, his

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story is not without complications. In a conversation with Knowledge, he mentioned that it has taken longer than expected for him to recover. He is still with a plaster on his leg since 2021. He is currently considering getting medical help to review his leg injury in Zimbabwe, citing Nyanga and Mutare Hospitals as options despite the higher costs to get treated (Interview with Knowledge, 2 February 2022). Patients also cross borders because of the solid reputation of hospitals and clinics in neighbouring countries, such as the Mutendere Mission Hospital. Local villagers use the statement “KuMutendere vanogona kurapa” (“at Mutendere they treat you well”). There are many people who are said to be misdiagnosed in Zimbabwean clinics and hospitals and are sometimes given wrong medication. But when they go to Mutendere, they are diagnosed with different diseases and given different treatments. As revealed by Nyamanjerere, a Zimbabwean resident in Kariba: I was diagnosed with blood pressure in 2016, here in Kariba town. My father then took me to Mutendere mission hospital and I had tests run again, but the high blood pressure was not detected. Had I not gone to Mutendere for a second opinion, I could be on hypertension medication now. (Interview with Nyamanjerere, 12 December 2019)

Another Zambezi Valley resident, Barny, narrated that he was disappointed with the local doctors and nurses in Kariba town. He said that: They wasted my sick father’s time and contributed to his death. They were giving my father the wrong medication for the ailments that he did not have. We then took him to Mutendere mission, and that is when we were told that he had prostate disorders. But, when he started taking prostate medication it was too late, in no time he died. Since my father’s death, I do not trust Zimbabwe’s health providers at all. Each time I am sick, or any family member is sick, we take them to Mutendere. (Interview with Barny, 11 December 2019)

Barny’s case reveals the nexus between health-seeking behaviour and mistrust among the Zambezi Valley communities. Such incidents cause Zambezi Valley people to question the integrity of Zimbabwe’s health systems, including frequently questioning and doubting the professionalism and competency of the local nurses and doctors. Resultantly, when a person gets sick, their families make choices to cross the border to Zambia because, locally, nurses ‘will waste your time’. People no longer have faith in their local nurses and doctors, blaming them for the deaths and health complications that happen to many patients. In Honde Valley, people who decide to travel long distances to Mozambique seeking healthcare services cite the good attitude and care of nurses, as well as their professionalism as key determinants of their therapeutic mobilities. Coupled with lower healthcare costs in Mozambique, patients revealed that “Zimbabwean nurses are rough, and they treat you so badly that you would never like to return to their clinic again” (Interview with Mwadiwa, 10 September 2021). In the Chavhanga area of Honde Valley, for example, cases have been brought to the traditional leaders regarding nurses’ attitude at Chavhanga Community Clinic, resulting in disciplinary measures or transfers from the clinic. As a Chavhanga community member, Mwadiwa, revealed:

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We have dealt with cases of rough nurses at our clinic since the 1990s. Both the clinic and school belong to the community. Our village heads, together with members of the community, have the power to take disciplinary actions against such people. We want better services for our people. We write even to the District Administrator [DA] to get them removed from here. And because we have a history of taking actions against bad nurses, most of the people appointed to work at our clinics and schools do well with the community. In the end, you have many people, women, and children mostly, crossing the Rwera river border to get treated at our clinic. This is what we want. Good services and care for our people. (Interview with Mwadiwa, 10 September 2021)

In this instance, local action enhanced the quality of health care in Honde Valley, perhaps limiting cross-border movement. In Honde Valley, transportation also affects patients’ access to healthcare services. One of the co-authors of this chapter (Nicholas Nyachega) recalls a personal experience in 2019. He witnessed an incident where a woman experiencing labour pains waited for more than 4 hours to get transportation (an ambulance) to Hauna General Hospital from the Chinaka Health Border Post Clinic at Mandeya. Nicholas and a colleague had to use their van to transport the woman to Hauna. In Kariba, despite the longer distance and higher travelling costs between Kariba (and Nyaminyami rural district) to Mutendere in Zambia, people prefer to visit Mutendere. It takes 2–3 hours to travel from Kariba to Mutendere by road. People sacrifice their time, travelling long distances, because they are assured of better treatment in Zambia than in Zimbabwe. The Mutendere hospital has an excellent reputation among the Zimbabwean communities, as it is a one-stop medical centre where consultations, tests and medicines are found at the same place, at the same time. However, there are people who continue to seek medical attention in local Zimbabwean hospitals and clinics, despite their bad reputation. In the Honde Valley, while others prefer to visit hospitals in Mozambique such as Villa Catandica, some patients prefer to visit clinics on the Zimbabwean side of the border. Those seeking routine check-ups and services such as child immunisation, mostly women, prefer to visit Zimbabwean clinics to avoid the long distances and dangerous travels to Mozambique. As revealed by Mrs. Muchabveyo, a nurse at Chinaka Border Health Post in Mandeya area, women from Mozambican villages such as Nanhanga visit the Chinaka clinic because: It’s the closest and we offer free services. As an NGO run clinic, we present our patients with quality healthcare services. The case could be very different with government-run clinics. (Interview with Muchabeyo, 20 September 2019)

The shifting political and economic conditions in Zimbabwe and its neighbouring countries, over time, shape peoples’ choices when seeking healthcare services, influencing whether they seek services internally or across the border (with the direction of border crossing subject to change). For example, in Honde Valley during the 1970s, ZANLA guerrillas closed down schools and clinics, and began to run clinics themselves (Nyachega 2017; Interview with Zindi, 6 January 2022). In addition, as Nyachega and Mwatwara (2021) argue, the cross-border nature of the war in Mozambique between the FRELIMO government and RENAMO army (which began in the 1970s) reconfigured people’s everyday interactions across the international border,

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including access to health care. RENAMO’s war strategy centred on destroying and raiding facilities like clinics to access medicine, thereby changing the healthcare access choices for patients in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe’s Honde Valley borderlands. With facilities destroyed in Mozambique, residents preferred to cross the border to the Zimbabwean side where healthcare-seeking travellers would feel more secure. Following the renewed RENAMO attacks between 2017 and 2019, patients from Mozambican villages such as Nanhanga crossed to the Chinaka Border Heath Post and Chisuko clinics. As revealed by Mrs. Muchabeyo, Most people who crossed were malaria patients and women seeking child-immunisation services which the Chinaka Border Health Post offers. Some of the services these people look for are basic and cannot be offered in Mozambique because RENAMO units have caused insecurity issues mostly for women from Mozambican villages. With the help of non-governmental organisations [NGOs], we also give them food supplements for their children, including porridge. And that is why they visit our clinics on the Zimbabwean side. (Interview with Mrs. Muchabeyo, 20 September 2019)

In Kariba, some people still decide to use Zimbabwean clinics and hospitals despite their bad reputation. This is usually caused by unavailability of funds to travel to Mutendere Mission. Poverty in the Zambezi Valley engenders people to access poor health facilities even when they doubt the kind of treatment they are receiving. There are some people who died with plans to go to Mutendere but could not go because of a lack of resources. The following case of a Kariba woman who had desired to visit Mutendere but could not, supports this view: Mrs. M who died of suspected liver problems in June 2021 had plans to visit Mutendere. Due to lack of resources, she never went to Mutendere. She had 6 children, some in Mozambique and others in South Africa and none of her children supported her. They never sent her money for medication. She never went for tests at Mutendere [or at the local Kariba laboratory] to see what really her problem was. Local doctors just suspected liver problems from her symptoms. Even before she died, when she was admitted to the local hospital, she did not pay admission fees due to poverty. (Interview with Mrs. M’s daughter, 15 June 2021)

Patients’ economic statuses thus condition their choices and (im)mobilities in their quest for therapy. In an economically crippled state, citizens are unable to seek medical attention in health institutions of their choice because of poverty. In Kariba, Rujaina, a local resident, explained: A young man, in his early twenties, has a hernia problem and suffers from a back pain. The back pain developed when he was 10 years old after having been beaten up by his mother with a cooking stick. Although he plans to go to the Mutendere mission, he says he has limited funds. He is employed, … [but] his salary is very low. (Interview with Rujaina, 11 November 2021)

The stories of patients’ cross-border access to health services reveal both the opportunities and challenges they face when crossing borders. Borders both enable and constrain communities living along the borders. Many encounter barriers in their quest to access healthcare services in neighbouring countries. When people from the Zambezi Valley in Zimbabwe seek medical attention in Zambia, they mostly make

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use of the Chirundu border post—a ‘one-stop’ border as compared to the Kariba border post. A one-stop border reduces the time taken to process documents, unlike in the case of Kariba where the traveller must pass through two border posts, one for Zimbabwe and the other for Zambia (Matanzima 2021). This is highly inconvenient, especially for the seriously ill. There are also cases of corruption at border posts, and undocumented patients must “bribe their way across the border”. The undocumented sick bribe their way through immigration officers to cross the border. As one immigration officer remarked: “No one is returned home at the border because they do not have a passport. One must liaise with the immigration officers, simple”. Those who pay bribes receive the best treatment when crossing the border. To deal with these challenges, patients prefer using the Chirundu border post because lower bribery charges are paid at the one-stop border where one deals with all immigration officers from both nations at one desk, rather than negotiating with different immigration officers at two different desks in two different countries. Furthermore, people coming from rural Zambezi find it convenient to cross the border through the Chirundu area. Crossing via the Chirundu border post is shorter than going via Kariba. Due to the economic crises bedevilling Zimbabwe, patients opt to minimise costs by making use of the shortest distance at the most minimal price.

Conclusion Historical cross-border interactions and the socio-economic and political crises prevailing in Zimbabwe have shaped patients’ everyday therapeutic (im)mobilities occurring in the Zambezi and Honde valley borderlands. Our comparative analysis of access to healthcare services across state boundaries in these regions reveals how both geo-historical interactions across state borders in these regions and politico-economic crises have continued to influence patients’ therapeutic choices and (im)mobilities across space and time, sometimes causing what we have termed reverse mobilities. Although the cross-border travels to neighbouring countries are recent and mostly about Zimbabweans accessing health care in adjacent countries, their neighbours from Mozambique and Zambia also skip the border to seek healthcare services available in Zimbabwe such as routine check-ups and child immunisations. The long histories of travel and Africans’ everyday mobilities in these regions, dating to precolonial times, have continued to shape the networks and choices people draw upon and make in their quest for healing. We argue that, despite the constraints that state borders continue to impose on individuals and their communities, border residents in the Honde and Zambezi valleys have continuously exploited the limits of these borders, utilising various opportunities of healthcare access across them. Episodes of socio-political disruptions, caused by wars such as the Mozambican Civil War, have also changed patients’ therapeutic (im)mobilities, as individuals prefer to access services in places where their cross-border travels would not seem too risky. While Zimbabwe formerly

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received many patients from Zambia and Mozambique seeking superior medical services (notably from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s), Zimbabwe’s more recent crises have engendered the reverse movements of patients. Since the early 2000s, many patients from Zimbabwe have crossed borders to neighbouring countries for health reasons. Aside from the socio-political and economic crises experienced in Zimbabwe, development-centred marginalisation of borderland communities such as those in the Honde and Zambezi valleys continues to create and worsen the precarity of patients. Owing to this systemic marginalisation, most border residents in these regions struggle to get health care in Zimbabwe. As a result, when making choices in their quest for therapy, border people think and act beyond their national borders, becoming transnational medical consumers.

References Chikanda A, Crush J (2019) South-South cross-border patient travel to South Africa. Global Public Health 14(3):326–339. https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2017.1414288 Claborn DM (2020) A narrative review of the role of economic crisis on health and healthcare infrastructure in three disparate national environments. Int J Environ Res Public Health 17(4):1252. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17041252 David R, Dube A (2013) An assessment of health information management infrastructures for communication in the Matabeleland South region border-line health institutions in Zimbabwe. J Health Inform Afr 1(1). https://doi.org/10.12856/JHIA-2013-v1-i1-36 Dube F (2009) Colonialism, cross-border movements, and epidemiology: a history of public health in the Manica region of central Mozambique and eastern Zimbabwe and the African response, 1890-1980. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Iowa Dube F (2020) Public health at the border of Zimbabwe and Zimbabwe, 1890–1940. Macmillan, Palgrave Feierman S (1985) Struggles for control: the social roots of health and healing in modern Africa. Afr Stud Rev 28(2/3):73–147 Fichera E, Anselmi L, Gwati G, Brown G, Kovacs R, Borghi J (2021) Can results-based financing improve health outcomes in resource poor settings? Evidence from Zimbabwe. Soc Sci Med. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.113959 Gray HH, Poland SC (2008) Medical tourism: crossing borders to access health care. Kennedy Inst Ethics J 18(2):193–201. https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.0.0006 Gukurume S (2015) Livelihood resilience in a hyperinflatory environment: experiences of people engaging in money burning (kubhena mari) Transactions in Harare. Soc Dyn 41(2):219–234 Gukurume S (2019) Navigating the crisis: University of Zimbabwe students’ campus experiences during the Zimbabwe’s multi-layered crisis. Afr Identities 17(3–4):277–297 Helliker K, Matanzima J (2022) Tonga livelihoods in rural Zimbabwe. Routledge, London Helliker K, Chiweshe MK, Bhatasara S, Mwonzora G (2021) Everyday crisis living in Zimbabwe. In: Helliker K, Chiweshe MK, Bhatasara S (eds), Everyday crisis-living in contemporary Zimbabwe. Routledge, London, pp 1–20 Janzen JM (1978) The quest for therapy in lower Zaire. Comparative studies of health systems and medical care. University of California Press, Berkeley Jarman H (2014) Healthcare, borders, and boundaries: crossborder health markets and the entrepreneurial state. Policy Soc 33(1):1–11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2014.04.002 Kudejira D (2020) COVID-19 and the plight of informal cross-border traders in Zimbabwe. Working Paper

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Matanzima J (2019) Changes and continuities over time in the cultural significance of the Nyaminyami, water spirit, among the BaTonga people of North-western Zimbabwe. Unpublished Master thesis, Rhodes University Matanzima J (2021) Lived experiences of cross-border traders: the case of Kariba. In: Helliker K, Bhatasara S, Chiweshe MK (eds) Everyday crisis-living in contemporary Zimbabwe. Routledge, London, pp 143–154 Matanzima J, Saidi U (2020) Religious rituals and socio-economic change: the impact of the Zimbabwe ‘cash crisis’ on the BaTonga Masabe (alien spirits) ceremony. Afr Identities. https:// doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2020.1811637 Matanzima J, Helliker K (2022) Contextualising Tonga lives and livelihoods in Zimbabwe. In: Helliker K, Matanzima J (eds) Tonga livelihoods in rural Zimbabwe. Routledge, London, pp 1–22 McGregor J (2009) Crossing the Zambezi: the politics of the landscape on a Central African frontier. Weaver Press, Harare Menzies W (1953) An African Samuel Smiles. Glasgow Miller-Thayer J (2010) Health migration: crossing borders for affordable health care. Field Actions Sci Rep 2:1–7 Msindo E, Nyachega N (2019) Zimbabwe’s liberation war and the everyday in Honde Valley, 1975 to 1979. S Afr Hist J 71(1):70–93 Nyachega N (2017) Beyond war, violence, and suffering: everyday life in the Honde valley borderland communities during Zimbabwe’s liberation war and the RENAMO insurgency, c.1960–2016. MA Thesis. Rhodes University Nyachega N, Mwatwara W (2021) On Renamo ‘war’, entrepreneurial synergies and everyday life in the Honde Valley Borderlands, c. 1980s–2020. J South Afr Stud 47(6):973–991 Nugent P (2019) Boundaries, communities and state-making in West Africa. Cambridge University Press Osseo-Asare AD (2014) Bitter roots: the search for healing plants in Africa. University of Chicago Press, London Turshen M (1977) The impact of colonialism on health and health services in Tanzania. Int J Health Serv 7(1):7–35 Vaughan M (1991) Curing their Ills: colonial power and African illness. Stanford University Press, Stanford

Archives and Newspaper Reports National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ), s2827/2/2/5/2, Internal Affairs, Annual District Reports, 1957 NAZ, Rhodesia Herald, 1976 The Manica Post, “Hauna Hospital in dire straits”, Fungai Munyoro. 14 June 2019

Chapter 11

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Tourism in Kariba Town Joshua Matanzima

and Tamuka Nhiwatiwa

Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic undeniably impacted tourism across the globe but not in a monolithic and undifferentiated way. In examining pandemic-related shutdowns, curfews and other lockdown measures, this chapter demonstrates the specificities of tourism-impacts with reference to the border town of Kariba. It does so by delving into the problematic image of Kariba as a tourist destination, the downsized operations of tourism businesses such as hotels and lodges, and the troubled lives of curio vendors and tourism employees. The tourism crisis arising from the pandemic became embedded in the long-standing crises characterising the political economy of Zimbabwe, serving to deepen the precarity of a diverse range of tourism stakeholders in Kariba. Considering the pervasive and systemic character of the socio-economic and political crises in Zimbabwe, the chapter shows that it will prove difficult for the tourism stakeholders in Kariba to recuperate from the negative effects of the pandemic. This is especially the case given that the Zimbabwean government has not engaged in any serious project to revive Kariba as a premier tourist destination, concentrating rather on Victoria Falls. Keywords Coronavirus · Tourism · Border closures · Lockdowns · Kariba · Zimbabwe

Introduction Globally, the proper functioning of diverse economic sectors was severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns, and tourism was no exception. Many studies show the wide-ranging effects of the pandemic on various aspects of tourism, including the food and beverages industry, accommodation services, J. Matanzima (B) Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] T. Nhiwatiwa Department of Biological Sciences and Ecology, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_11

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travel and recreation (Aiello et al. 2022; Dube et al. 2023; Higgins-Desbiolles 2020; Nhamo et al. 2020; Matanzima and Nhiwatiwa 2022; Quang et al. 2022). Studies about the nexus between COVID-19 and tourism in Zimbabwe specifically are also appearing, but empirically-rich case studies focusing on particular tourism destinations are still required. The impacts of COVID-19 on tourism are variegated and context-specific, with each and every tourist destination having its own specificities. In this context, and through an empirical case study of Kariba town along the Zambian border, this chapter extends the prevailing research on the intersections between the pandemic and tourism, and with specific reference to a border town.

COVID-19, Crisis and Tourism in Zimbabwe In Zimbabwe, several hard lockdowns were imposed whenever there was a surge in COVID-19 cases. The national hard lockdowns took place from March to April 2020, July to August 2020, January to February 2021 and June to August 2021. In the intervening periods, measures were relaxed as the surge would have receded. In 2021, at times certain parts of the country entered lockdowns if local cases increased significantly, and this occurred in relation to Kariba. It was during the national lockdowns and the local lockdown that tourism in Kariba town suffered its greatest declines. In addition to border closures and their implications for international tourists, intercity travel bans and dusk-to-dawn curfews were imposed and led to a drop in even domestic tourism. Several studies have documented the nexus between the COVID-19 pandemic and tourism in Zimbabwe, and different themes emerge from these studies (Chigora and Katsade 2021; Matanzima and Nhiwatiwa 2022; Matura 2021; Ncube et al. 2021; Woyo 2021). In the main, scholars have documented the general and specific impacts of COVID-19 on Zimbabwean tourism, including the overall downsizing of the tourism sector, the inadequate supply of basic commodities and household income for tourism traders (Makoni and Tichaawa 2021), strained relationships between hotel frontline workers and customers (Musawenkosi and Musavengane 2021), the precarity of stakeholders in the tourism industry (Matanzima and Nhiwatiwa 2022) and the laying off of employees in the tourism sector because of closures and downsizing (Musavengane et al. 2021). Little is known about tourism in Kariba. The state of Kariba tourism is typically a footnote in most scientific studies about Lake Kariba. However, one existing study about tourism in Kariba considered the interconnections between tourism and climate change (Dube and Nhamo 2020). It revealed that nature-based tourism in Kariba is under threat from increased and intense droughts, likely resulting from climate change. Extreme temperatures and droughts, it is reported, are critical threats to biodiversity and water levels in Lake Kariba, and they undermine certain tourist activities and destination attractiveness. The study by Dube and Nhamo (2020) thus brings to the fore the precariousness of tourism in Kariba in the context of climate

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change. This chapter examines Kariba tourism in the face of another growing global challenge, namely health-related pandemics. Indeed, tourism and public health crises are closely related, and understanding their relationship is likely key to developing effective health safety practices in an increasingly global age (Burkle 2006). Health-related crises, particularly epidemics that spread through travel flows, make the tourism sector extremely difficult to manage and sustain (Schroeder and Pennington-Gray 2015). The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on tourism are unquestionable and have been dramatic (Aiello et al. 2022), almost paralysing the tourism and hospitality industry because of movement restrictions in attempts to reduce and control the pandemic (Marco-Lajara et al. 2021; UNWTO 2020; Akhtar et al. 2021). Both international tourism and domestic tourism have suffered an unimaginable downturn (Higgins-Desbiolles 2020), which has surpassed the losses suffered by this sector of the economy following earlier major events, including the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks of 2001, the Indian Ocean tsunami that occurred in 2005, swine flu of 2009, Ebola that occurred in 2014 and other crises in the twenty-first century (Hall et al. 2020; Higgins-Desbiolles 2020). Global trends in the plummeting of tourism do not tell the full story of the relationship between the pandemic and tourism, as tourist destinations were impacted differently and to varying degrees. For instance, proportionally, some tourist destinations experienced larger drops in employment (in the tourist sector) than other destinations (Baum et al. 2020; Filimonau et al. 2020). Furthermore, developed regions with access to higher levels of virtual technologies resorted to virtual tourism, but this did not obtain for developing regions. Given the impacts of COVID-19 on tourism, including in the case of Zimbabwe, scholars have put forth arguments about how to reactivate the tourism industry (Li et al. 2022), such as focusing on domestic tourism as a post-COVID-19 recovery strategy for the industry (Matura 2021; Woyo 2021), or the utilisation of virtual tourism as an alternative or complementary tourist format (Chirisa et al. 2020). In the meantime, with the development of vaccines, tourist destinations slowly began to open up in the first quarter of 2022 under what has been described as the new normal. In the case of Zimbabwe, though, the tourism crisis arising around the pandemic took place in the context of an already crises-laden nation, both politically and economically. In this regard, COVID-19 intersects with the pre-existing Zimbabwe crises (Gukurume 2018; Matanzima and Saidi 2020). At the turn of the twentyfirst century, a multi-faceted and deep-seated crisis arose in Zimbabwe, with the Fast Track Land Reform Programme as the immediate disruptive event. Over twenty years later, at a national level, the country remains in crisis. In this sense, the early post-fast track years were not a temporary aberration, as Zimbabwe is now in perpetual crisis (Helliker et al. 2021). The economic crises, characterised by high unemployment, cash shortages and inflation, complicate and indeed worsen the impact of COVID-19 on tourism. As Chiumbu and Musemwa (2012) also argue, there are a multiplicity of mutually-reinforcing crises associated with resource scarcities, namely: water crisis, health crisis, monetary/cash crisis, fuel crisis, energy/electricity crisis, food crisis and cholera crisis.

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The COVID-19 pandemic emerged in the context of these pre-existing conditions, and its effects on tourism were configured and compounded by them. In a sense, when the pandemic arose, the tourism sector was almost on its knees due to the sheer longevity of the economic crises in Zimbabwe. Thus, when the pandemic hit, cash shortages, the unavailability of United States Dollars and unstable exchange rates eroded the capacity of accommodation and boating service providers in Kariba town to weather the storm. Despite the introduction of bond notes in Zimbabwe, the cash crisis persists (Matanzima and Saidi 2020).1 Though some scholars focusing on the Zimbabwean crisis rightly emphasise the many coping strategies that ordinary Zimbabweans have resorted to, such as migration (Muzondidya 2008), it must be emphasised that such coping strategies were minimal during COVID-19. As argued below in the case of Kariba, for instance, opportunities for workers as well as alternative livelihoods were exceedingly limited if not completely unavailable. After discussing the research site and methodology, the chapter proceeds to examine the effects of the pandemic on Kariba as a border town, on the tourist industry operators and workers, and on some of those involved in the informal tourist sector (specifically, curio vendors).

Research Methodology and Site Qualitative research for this study was conducted in Kariba town, with a population of about 27,000. Before discussing the methodology, there are several aspects about the study site which require mentioning. Kariba town is located in the north-western part of Zimbabwe along the Zambian border. It is in the immediate vicinity of the Kariba Dam Wall and Lake Kariba, which are the main tourist attractions of the town. Kariba town is a settlement that developed in the 1950s during the construction phase of the dam wall for one of the world’s largest human-made inland lakes. Bordering Zimbabwe and Zambia, the Lake is 223 kms long and 40 kms wide. Tourist activities in and around Lake Kariba include boating, cruising, fishing, canoeing, trophy hunting, wild safari and tiger fishing. Significant drawcards of the resort town include the annual tiger fishing tournament and the opening of the floodgates which occurs in years of high rainfall (Dube and Nhamo 2020). Religious-cultural tourist attractions at Kariba include village tours to Tonga villages as well as the famous story of the river serpent Nyaminyami, which formed part of the Tonga religious and spiritual constellation (Matanzima 2022; Tombindo 2016). Employment in Kariba town is dominated by work in tourism establishments, the fishing industry and the Kariba hydropower station. Tourism and fishing are the mainstays of the town as it is surrounded by national parks and game reserves, with no farming activities in the area (Dube and Nhamo 2020). During the COVID-19 pandemic, the international border post (of which the Kariba dam wall forms part) was closed, including at the time of our fieldwork. 1

The Bond note is a surrogate currency to the US dollar used in Zimbabwe.

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The qualitative data were obtained through semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders in the tourism industry of Kariba, collected in August and September 2021. A total of 30 research participants were interviewed, including: boat owners, curio vendors, lodge managers and employees, traditional leaders and local politicians including the Mayor, Member of Parliament (MP) and councillors. The duration of the interviews was approximately 60 to 90 min, and interview sessions were conducted in the workplaces or residence of the research participants. Interviews were carried out in both English and Shona languages. Shona is the local language spoken mainly in Kariba town, though the area has some Tonga-speaking people. All interview sessions were audio-recorded and transcribed by the first author. The interview questions focused on analysing the tourism situation before COVID19, the impact of COVID-19 on tourism and prospects for tourism recovery in Kariba town. Thematic analysis was utilised in analysing the data.

Effects of the Pandemic on Kariba Tourism This section focuses on the effects of the pandemic on Kariba as a tourist destination, including the impact on Kariba’s image. It highlights the changes in the tourist arrival trends that were engendered by the pandemic and the ways in which tourism to Kariba was harmed by it. An immediate noticeable impact of COVID-19 was the drop in international tourists and the rise, at least proportionally, in domestic tourists. Before the pandemic, Kariba attracted huge numbers of international tourists as compared to local tourists. Foreign tourists arrived from such places as South Africa, Zambia, United Kingdom and Australia. Records of visitors in Kariba during the pandemic, in hotels and lodges as well as of transporters, indicate that most visitors arrived from areas such as Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare, Masvingo, Karoi and Chinhoyi. Before the pandemic, more than 80% of tourists to Kariba were foreign tourists (Interview with former Kariba publicity association officer, 11 August 2021). The number of international tourists dwindled due to ongoing border (airport) closures, travel bans and quarantine rules. During COVID-19, hotel quarantining was common globally for foreign visitors and Zimbabwe was no exception. Initially, the duration of quarantine in Zimbabwe was 21 days, which meant that people were required to spend more time quarantining than they would spend holidaying. Meeting both holidaying and quarantining costs became extremely expensive for international arrivals. To some extent, domestic tourism sustained Kariba tourism during the COVID19 period. Prior to the pandemic, Zimbabweans did not take holidaying seriously (Interview with a member of the Kariba business indaba, 11 August 2021). But, due to confinement for long periods in their homes because of the pandemic, many Zimbabweans became motivated to visit tourist destinations when lockdowns and curfews were relaxed. Domestic tourists, though, do not generate as much income for local businesses as international tourists. For instance, when holidaying, domestic tourists sometimes have the option of staying in the homes of family and friends in

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order to minimise their trip costs. Therefore, in such scenarios, hotels and lodges experience significant challenges because of vacancies. The evidence for Kariba indicates that a downsizing in the number of staff and salary cuts took place in tourist accommodation. Domestic tourists also tend to negotiate prices for tourist attractions in Kariba, whereas wealthier international tourists are not inclined to do so. The ongoing economic crisis in Zimbabwe also ensured that domestic tourists spent their resources conservatively, and this included avoiding recreational activities which were deemed as astronomically priced (Interview with a boat owner, 11 August 2021). Many recreational activities requiring significant amounts of money were simply avoided. For example, many domestic tourists opted for sunset cruises where they paid US$25 or less per person, rather than houseboats where they would pay more than US$1,000 per night. A further pandemic-related issue affected Kariba tourism detrimentally, namely its classification as a COVID-19 hotspot. This classification happened following a surge in new virus cases in mid-June 2021, with Kariba and Hurungwe recording over 40 cases within three days. Those living outside of Hurungwe and Kariba districts were prohibited from visiting the two districts (Africa, 12/06/21), including both international and local tourists. This meant that domestic tourism, which was sustaining Kariba tourism at the time, was negatively affected in the short term. The government in fact put roadblocks at the Makuti and Quarry mine areas in Kariba to monitor the movement of people and detect any possible trespassers into the area. People were somewhat surprised about the labelling of Kariba town as a hotspot and the lockdown given that the caseload did not appear as particularly high. It was later rumoured that Kariba was locked down because the opposition party leader Nelson Chamisa was planning to hold a party meeting in Kariba town. Though this claim was never verified, it does shed light on the intersections between rumour, COVID-19 and politics in Zimbabwe. There were many instances nationally of ZANU-PF politicising COVID-19, which disregarded the lives and livelihoods of ordinary Zimbabweans (Nhiwatiwa and Matanzima 2022). The people of Kariba and Hurungwe were urged to be vaccinated to minimise the spread of the virus. However, due to vaccine resistance and hesitancy, the vaccine rate was very low, and this prolonged the lockdown up to September 2021. The Kariba Mayor mentioned that, by August 2021, around 20%–30% of the Kariba adult population had received the vaccination, and he emphasised the need to reach at least 50% (Interview, 20/08/21). The extended lockdown had serious implications for local industries such as fisheries and tourism. As one female boat owner complained: If the people do not take the vaccination serious, we are all gonna end up going out of business. You see people who have tested positive roaming around Kariba. I reported one to the police who had tested positive and who was not in isolation. People fear that if, one is vaccinated, you will have side effects over a space of two years, which is not correct. (Interview, 13/08/21)

The people of Kariba only started to take the vaccine seriously during the fall of the year 2021 when the government announced a vaccine mandate to all civil servants. Even when the COVID-19 cases dropped in Kariba, people were still hesitant to come to Kariba, as stated by our participants. The reputation of Kariba as a tourist

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destination of choice had been damaged, and it took time to recover. This diverted tourists’ interests from Kariba to other local destinations such as Victoria Falls, Inyanga, Great Zimbabwe and Chinhoyi Caves. A lodge manager lamented that: When Kariba was declared a hotspot we lost business. … People were afraid to come; our friends did not come. Mashonaland West was almost closed. Indians used to come from Zambia, but now they no longer come. Houseboats were stopped for almost 3 months. (Interview, 17/08/21)

The other challenge related to COVID-19 that has seriously and negatively affected the tourism image of Kariba is the deficient marketing of Kariba. Marketing tourism destinations in Zimbabwe during the pandemic was one of the priorities of the government and in particular the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority. However, the marketing of local destinations has been biased it seems. Tourism stakeholders in Kariba complain that ‘destination Kariba’ has not been marketed on par with other tourism destinations such as Victoria Falls and Mana Pools. The partiality in the Zimbabwean government’s efforts to market international tourism has engendered asymmetries in the performance of tourism in different destinations in Zimbabwe. The Kariba tourism stakeholders and politicians claim that this is the case because senior government officials have business interests in Victoria Falls and Mana Pools (and not in Kariba town). In further elaborating on this belief, the Kariba town Mayor argued that: People in Kariba are not marketing their Kariba sufficiently. There is serious bad publicity about Kariba even spread by some locals. People must learn to market their product because the government is not marketing it for them. Victoria Falls is marketed by the government even on Zimbabwean television, but Kariba is not. Kariba town is not well supported by the government. Victoria Falls was given a city status. Army generals and other senior government officials run lodges and other tourism services in Victoria Falls, that is why they support Victoria Falls more than Kariba. (Interview, 20/08/2021)

Indeed, destination Victoria Falls is performing much better as compared to Kariba. The airport in Victoria Falls receives numerous international tourist arrivals whereas the Kariba airport does not. Notably, Air Zimbabwe has not been flying from Harare to Kariba for many years. Beyond the politics of tourism in Zimbabwe, the status of Victoria Falls as one of the Seven Wonders of the world no doubt draws international tourists to Victory Falls town. Overall, the successive lockdowns and curfews imposed in Zimbabwe throughout the pandemic had a significant impact on tourism and travel to Kariba town. Lockdowns and curfews saw police and the army imposing roadblocks in Kariba town. Some tourists, mainly domestic, who were able to visit Kariba, complained about the troubling behaviour of the security forces at roadblocks. Our interviewees told us that sometimes tourists were forced to park for extended periods at roadblocks that lacked ablution blocks. They were also forced to bribe the police in order to pass through the roadblock especially when they were found guilty of breaking COVID19 regulations like masking up, social distancing and abiding by curfews. Kariba suffered reputational damage and the number of tourists dwindled.

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Impact on Tourism Business Operators Tourism business operators in Kariba own or run lodges, hotels, boats, and safari and conservancy areas. The pandemic’s successive lockdowns, from March 2020 to mid-2021, undercut the operations of tourism businesses, both accommodation services and recreational activities. This had major knock-on effects for the local economy of Kariba, including supermarkets and other trading shops. During the pandemic lockdowns, the ongoing payment of worker salaries and maintenance of tourism-related equipment such as boats became extremely difficult. Even one of the larger boats, the Zambezi Trader, went for auction because of the downturn in tourism. When measures were relaxed, most hoteliers and boat owners dropped their prices in competing for clients, which had a strong bearing on profits—almost reducing the tourism business to a survivalist ‘hand-to-mouth’ enterprise. One of the boat owners interviewed in August 2021 was at pains to tell us that: My boat has gone out once this month. In the last two months [June and July] it didn’t go out…; and, you know,… I have dropped my prices so much that l am not even making anything out of it. All I am doing is paying government all the bloody fees: lake navigation, national parks, and radio licenses, you know, and I still got to pay salaries and I still got to do maintenance of boats – it is just a nightmare. The government has to lower their prices. Its prices are very high, really, it is pathetic.

The various government departments continued demanding service charges from the tourism business operators even when business was low. As the boat owner intimates, operators paid different operating fees to, for instance, Zimbabwe National Parks and Wildlife Management Authority, Lake Navigation and Zimbabwe Tourism Authority. The tourist businesses were not cushioned by the government during the pandemic as compared to other small-to-medium enterprises. There were large numbers of cancellations of tourist bookings during the pandemic, especially in 2020. International border closures, lockdowns and travel restrictions rendered booking cancellations inevitable. The Kariba tourism industry, like elsewhere, became precarious as travellers and tourists were unsure when they would be able to travel to different destinations across the globe. In Zimbabwe, unexpected lockdowns were introduced one after another, creating major uncertainties in the tourism industry. Most of the bookings that were cancelled in 2020 were carried over into 2021. One boat owner highlighted that: I am not making anything out of tourism. My boats are sitting, I am carrying over bookings from 2020… When the pandemic started, there were tourists who had paid already. (Interview, 9/08/ 2021)

Though payments in advance took place and may have enhanced tourist enterprises’ immediate cash-flow situation, inflation impacted on bookings that were carried over from 2020, leaving operators in the tourism industry with little or no profits when

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the pre-paid tourists arrived. Zimbabwe at the time had a significant inflation rate2 and unstable exchange rates also impacted on the profit margins of tourist businesses during the pandemic. As well, for those local and international tourists who were able to come to Kariba, business owners were met with pandemic-induced cost increases regarding their expenditure lines. Well-established and registered tourism business operators (including those offering boat, accommodation and transport services) bemoaned the proliferation of unlawful operators in Kariba tourism. These bogus agents are based in both Kariba and Harare. They proliferated during the COVID-19 era largely because of higher levels of unemployment brought about by the pandemic and the general politico-economic crises in Zimbabwe. Many formal operators complained that the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority was not acting against these illegal operators and thereby protecting the registered ones. Their resentment arose because they were forced to pay operating licenses and taxes, and yet they compete for clients with bogus agents who do not have these costs. Further, these latter agents falsely market ‘destination Kariba’ promising clients a range of services (some of which are simply not available) for which they charge very high prices. They then transfer ‘their’ clients to registered tourism operators in Kariba at negotiated charges. The huge sums of foreign currency they receive is unaccounted for. One registered tourist agent brought all this to the fore: When many tourists come here they will be thinking that they will see lions roaming around everywhere in Kariba, yet that is not the case. The illegal agents tell people lies, promise them extraordinary services, even heaven, that Kariba does not offer. They charge clients exorbitant prices and then transfer them to us at very, very low negotiated prices. (Interviewed on 11/ 08/2021)

The operating ethics of the bogus agents is indeed a threat to tourism in Kariba in particular, and Zimbabwe in general. During the pandemic, Kariba tourism was impacted by the inconsistency in the implementation and relaxation of restrictions by the Zimbabwean government. Regarding the 2021 lockdowns, tourism stakeholders complained of the confusion that prevailed. At times, the tourism industry would be open but, simultaneously, the movement of people curtailed by the Ministry of Transport. In such a case, boating services could not be undertaken as they fall under the transport ministry. These inconsistences reveal the lack of effective communication and dialogue between the ministries of transport and tourism.

2

When the pandemic started, the inflation rate was estimated to be over 500%. https://tradingec onomics.com/zimbabwe/inflation-cpi#:~:text=Zimbabwe’s%20annual%20consumer%20price% 20inflation,96.4%25%20in%20the%20prior%20month.

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Impact on Employees in the Tourism Industry Employees in the tourism industry involve those working in facilities such as lodges, hotels and boats. During the pandemic, many people lost their employment in the formal economy in Zimbabwe due to closures and downsizing, including those in the tourist industry in Kariba. When tourism declined because of the dwindling number of tourists due to border closures and lockdowns, redundancies became an option for many tourism business operators. They had to cut costs, and scaling down the number of workers in their lodges, hotels and boats was one way of doing so. One hotel manager explained that: Last year in March 2020, learning for the first time about COVID-19, the entire world was locked down. Things were really bad. There was no tourism, no salaries, no jobs – people were struggling. (Interview, 12/08/2021)

In many instances, as Musavengane et al. (2021) discovered, those employees on short-term contracts were the most affected, as they were the first to be laid off. Redundancy was not an overnight act by most operators, as it was done gradually as the COVID-19 situation unfolded. Losing jobs at this time, when many companies and industries were closed, coupled with limited alternative opportunities and livelihood strategies, rendered these employees precarious. Cross-border trade was a livelihood option for many of the unemployed in Kariba town before the pandemic (Matanzima 2021), but it declined because of international border closures between Zimbabwe and Zambia. Turning to artisanal fishing was also a problematic undertaking during the pandemic. The national parks officials, the army and the police controlled the movements of people in and around Lake Kariba which significantly impacted fishing as a livelihood activity. Those who practised fishing at this time did so clandestinely and on a survivalist basis only (Nhiwatiwa and Matanzima 2022). Most of those in the tourist industry in Kariba who lost their jobs or had their salaries reduced were household breadwinners. Life became exceedingly difficult for them as they still had to fend for their families including paying schoolchildren’s fees. One employee at a tourist lodge who had his salary cut by his employer stressed the following: Because clients are not coming, there is no work. We are receiving very low salaries here. I have two children that I need to take to school when schools open in September. I do not live with them anymore. Ndakavaendesa kumusha, kuti vanodzidza ikoko kwakachipa zvikoro [I transferred them to a rural school which is cheap]. They are now in Magunje. We cannot stay with our children now, because things are bad. (Interview, 17/08/2021)

Thus, some employees remained in their jobs, but with reduced benefits. The lockdowns were a time of intense precarity, where workers opted to stay at a low-paying job (with salary cuts) rather than staying at home without money. One employee at a lodge in Charara lamented that:

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COVID affected tourism. Before COVID, we had access to United States Dollars. We had good salaries, we received tips from our clients and we were also given leftovers from their trips. We used to be paid USD 280, but now we are given peanuts. There are no longer salary increments. (Interview, 17/08/2021)

The increasing number of unemployed youths and low-paid workers exposed Kariba town to serious levels of social banditry. As the Kariba Publicity Association Officer narrated, “when people are unemployed, they end up getting into illegal activities, Like nowadays, people are stealing. Crimes are increasing” (Interview, 24/08/2021). In this way, the pandemic and lockdowns had a ripple effect throughout Kariba’s economy and society.

Decline in Curio Sales During the Pandemic This is evident as well in relation to curio vending, as part of the informal economy in Kariba. Central to the local tourist industry, curio traders sell cultural artefacts in Kariba town, including traditional cloth, Nyaminyami crafts and Tonga stools. The curio vendors in Kariba town are predominantly women and their sites of trading are stationed strategically at different locations in town, notably where there is significant movement of tourists—such as Winsor (which is a turn-off to Marineland), Carribea Bay Hotel, Kariba View Point and Dam Wall Tea Room. Most of these vendors have been engaged in curio trading for over 30 years, and curio sales have sustained many local families. One old woman narrated that: I have 34 years of selling Tonga cultural artefacts. I used to have a shop at Shell service station. That area has since closed. I now have a table here [at Dam Wall Tea Room]. I have schooled my children with money from this business. My husband died a long time ago. I also buy food and pay rent with proceedings from this business. If tourists are coming, we make money, but if they are not coming, we do not make money. (Interview, 23/08/2021)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the benefits these women enjoy from the curio vending business were disrupted. Due to border closures, they were not receiving international tourist arrivals who are their major clients. Because of the lockdowns they had no access to their selling points, let alone customers to buy their products. Curfew rules also required them to leave these selling points earlier in the day. Women complained that border closures seriously impacted their business, such that they spent weeks if not months during the lockdowns without money. One of the female curio vendors thus declared: Currently borders are closed. If borders are opened, our business will go on well. White people come from other countries to buy our products. Some clients come with white people from the Zambezi. (Interview, 23/08/2021)

In bemoaning the effects of the pandemic, another trader highlighted: This job used to give us money to take children to school and pay rentals. But nowadays, we are not getting anything out of it. We are no longer able to pay for rentals and bills. Clients

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are not coming. There are no tourists coming. Most of us are widows. Out of these 11 tables you see, only two women have husbands, plus their husbands are not gainfully employed. (Interview, 23/08/2021)

These women lacked any meaningful solutions to their problems under the prevailing circumstances. They had neither the resources nor skills to market their business and sell their products virtually, which means that the prospects of virtual tourism would likely by-pass these women. Despite the border closures, tourism destinations and products were marketed digitally during the successive pandemic lockdowns across the globe (Ketter and Avraham 2021). Such media platforms as YouTube, Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter were used. As a general tendency, the female curio vendors in Kariba town are unfamiliar with these social media platforms, thus disadvantaging them.

Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic undeniably impacted tourism across the globe but not in a monolithic and undifferentiated way. This chapter demonstrates the specificities of tourism-impacts with reference to the border town of Kariba, delving into the image of the destination, the operations of tourism businesses and the lives of curio vendors and tourism employees. The tourism crisis arising from the pandemic became embedded in the long-standing crises characterising the political economy of Zimbabwe, serving to deepen the precarity of a diverse range of tourism stakeholders in Kariba. Considering the pervasive and systemic character of the socio-economic and political crises in Zimbabwe, it will prove difficult for the tourism stakeholders to recuperate from the negative effects of the pandemic. There are local efforts though to redress the ills of the pandemic, including by associations such as the Kariba Business and Tourism Indaba (KTBI) and the Kariba Publicity Association (KPA) which seek to lobby the relevant state ministries for necessary support. Despite these efforts and the noticeable detrimental effects of COVID-19 on tourism in Kariba, the Zimbabwean government has not engaged in any serious project to revive Kariba as a premier tourist destination, concentrating rather on Victoria Falls.

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Chapter 12

The Health-Seeking Practices of Borderland Communities: The San People of Tsholotsho Keith Phiri , Thulani Dube , and Sibonokuhle Ndlovu

Abstract The chapter examines the San population of Tsholotsho as a borderland community and their health-seeking practices. The San have been subjected to historical marginalisation and they are currently largely ignored by the Zimbabwean government in relation to creating a conducive environment for them to access health services. The San are thus beset by a plethora of challenges which affect their healthseeking behaviour. In the face of various diseases like diarrhoea, tuberculosis and HIV, they are not receiving the medical attention they expect from the government. The hindrances include long distances to clinics, lack of transport (ambulances), inadequate medical personnel, unavailability of medication and unaffordable medical fees. At times, the San feel that they are overtly discriminated against by the government and neighbouring ethnic groups, namely the Kalanga and Ndebele. On account of this, they might resort to traditional medicines and herbalists to deal with their diseases and ailments, or rely upon churches to obtain healing. The San people argue that they want an improved and strengthened health care system which is closer to their villages, and they highlight the need to have more health staff, equipment and transport for effective health service delivery. Keywords Health · Border communities · San · Tsholotsho · Marginality · Zimbabwe

Introduction It is argued that most developing countries do not have “accurate, systematic and routine measurements and monitoring of demographic indicators or health trends and statuses of different population groups” (Fraser et al. 2018: 121). The absence of knowledge about health trends is certainly the case with regard to the San community in the southern African region, as there is limited data on the health of its members. K. Phiri (B) · T. Dube · S. Ndlovu Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Development Studies, Lupane State University, Victoria Falls Rd, P. O Box 170, Lupane, Zimbabwe e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 N. Pophiwa et al. (eds.), Lived Experiences of Borderland Communities in Zimbabwe, Springer Geography, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-32195-5_12

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Historically, the San had “very low serum cholesterol, low blood pressures that did not increase with age and little in the way of heart disease” (Hitchcock 2001: 152). This was due to their active lifestyle of hunting and gathering. At the same time, the community had one of the world’s slowest rates of population growth and this was due to high infant mortality rates. There is also evidence of a strong link currently between the health status of the San and poverty, marginalisation and discrimination (Ohenjo et al. 2006), as is the case with indigenous groups elsewhere (Baah et al. 2019). In Zimbabwe in particular, accurate data about the health status of the San population are difficult to obtain, and there are no records of morbidity and mortality data. Hitchcock (2001) observes that the health statuses of many people had improved due to effective health programmes in many of the areas in which the San live. But, the Department of Health among other government agencies has ignored, for an extended period, the welfare of indigenous minority groups such as the San community. Among the San community in Zimbabwe, there is a high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and malaria, poor nutrition levels and high alcohol intake levels and, combined, these factors have led to a high number of orphans and vulnerable children (Hitchcock et al. 2016; Ohenjo et al. 2006). There is limited coverage with respect to antiretroviral (ARV) drugs for San people living with HIV and AIDS. Causes cited for the increased alcohol intake refer to its use as a substitute for handling stress arising from loss of their land, culture and traditions (Hitchcock et al. 2016; Ohenjo et al. 2006). Alcohol abuse has promoted domestic violence, higher rates of mental illnesses, depression and conflicts among neighbours with many women and children suffering physical and emotional injuries. However, little is known about the San community’s perceptions of gender-based domestic violence and how sexual practices contribute to sexually-transmitted infections. There is, therefore, a need to look at the wider social determinants of health and find ways to address them so as to improve the well-being of the San community. At present, the San community in Zimbabwe is faced with numerous challenges with regard to availability and access to health services, including the long distance of health services from village homesteads as well as the absence of proper homesteadbased sanitation facilities. In this context, this chapter identifies and examines the perceptions, experiences and practices of San people with respect to health access, including with broader reference to their ongoing marginalisation when compared to health access by local Ndebele and Kalanga people.

Marginalisation of the San in Zimbabwe Marginalisation is a process through which individuals or groups are peripheralised or excluded based on their identities, associations, experiences and environment (Kealy and Ogrodniczuk 2010; Hall et al. 1994). It relegates a select grouping of persons to the fringes and sidelines of societies who are, simultaneously, subject to the will of more powerful groups, thereby leading to structural and social inequalities

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(Cleary et al. 2014; Díaz-Venegas et al. 2016; Krohn et al. 2011; Gerlach 2015). This sometimes takes place on an ethnic basis, as has happened in the case of colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe with reference to the San people. Of significance for this chapter is that political, economic and cultural exclusion and subordination typically lead to health and health care deficiencies for marginalised communities, including the San (Atake 2018; Bloom et al. 2018). Globally, the health of poor (and marginalised) people is considered an important development agenda, with Sustainable Development Goal Number 3 (SDG 3) calling for national governments to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all peoples (Guégan et al. 2018; Meurs et al. 2019; Angus and Tortora 2015; Evaezi 2013). In Zimbabwe, health and well-being is a key national priority area of the National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1) (Government of Zimbabwe 2021). As well, the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that “the state must take all practical measures to ensure the provision of basic, accessible, and adequate health services throughout Zimbabwe” (Government of Zimbabwe 2013). Availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality are essential elements of the right to health, whether in Zimbabwe or elsewhere. Regrettably, for years now, Zimbabwe has had a dysfunctional health delivery system with deficiencies in terms of human resources, medical products, vaccines, technology, infrastructure, health financing, health information, service delivery, leadership and governance. The available literature on the San in Zimbabwe demonstrates their ethnic marginalisation and the effects this has had on their lives. The San community is widely recognised in fact as the most impoverished, disempowered and stigmatised ethnic group in southern Africa more broadly (Sylvian 2002). This inhibits their participation in development and policy processes. A study by Hitchcock et al. (2016) for instance found out that participation in political matters by the San community is very limited, with their presence often not acknowledged by political and administrative agencies (Dube et al. 2021). Many San people (adults and children) do not have birth certificates and national identification cards, thus hindering them from voting or seeking to be elected to public office. Lack of access to education and low literacy levels (Suzman 2001; Phiri et al. 2020) only compound the San community’s exclusion from development and policymaking processes. Another barrier is lack of official recognition by governments in the region that the San constitute an indigenous people. This is often noticeable in national laws and government policies that are not sensitive to the San people’s needs, in violation of international human rights laws and statutes that obligate equal treatment by governments of all people within their political jurisdictions (Colchester 2003). For example, the Botswana government has rejected the San peoples’ rights to traditional lands and culture. Their voices are not heard typically, and suggested initiatives by the San are not taken into consideration by governments as these are considered out of sync with modern developmental practices (Corpuz 2005).

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Research Site and Methods It is estimated that there are about 2,500 San people in Zimbabwe dotted around the western borders of Zimbabwe (Suzman, 2001; Phiri et al. 2020). The exact number of San people in the study area (Tsholotsho) remains unknown because they are mostly undocumented. The study for this chapter was undertaken in 2019 in five wards in Tsholotsho District (Thula, Nemane, Mtshina, Sithembile and Sakhile), in particular in nine villages where San communities are predominantly found to coexist with Ndebele and Kalanga people. The study blended quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. This entailed the use of three major data collection instruments, namely a survey questionnaire, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. In relation to the survey questionnaire, the online Raosoft sample size calculator was used to calculate the sample size. With a sampling frame of 1,000 households in the study area, a sample of 200 households gave a confidence level of 94% and a margin of error of 6%, which were deemed to be within an acceptable range. Therefore, a total of 200 questionnaires were distributed to households in the nine villages in the five wards. The study engaged a stratified systematic random sampling technique. Although San community households were proportionally fewer when compared to their Kalanga and Ndebele neighbours (only 10%), a 25% distribution target was deliberately pursued for San households in order to reach enough households for statistical generalisation (hence, 50 San households were part of the survey). Key informant in-depth interviews were used to collect primary data from targeted stakeholders within Tsholotsho District. The key informants, which were purposively sampled, included the San traditional leadership, selected Ward Councilors, Village Health Workers, District Health Officials and local clinic officials. A total of twenty focus group discussions (FGDs) were also conducted in the five wards. Five FGDs were held with San community members in areas dominated by the San. The Kalanga and Ndebele FGDs were mixed. Subsequent to this, a short ethnography was pursued. The ethnographicimmersion component of the research was necessary based on the stark realisation that most studies of the San people have been undertaken from an outsider’s perspective, often leading to a misinterpretation of their lives and worldviews. Hence, a team of five researchers became embedded in the San community, each living with a particular San household for three weeks and seeking to understand their experiences from the inside (using a combination of interviews and observation techniques).

Common Diseases Among the San Community San households were asked about the most significant health problems in their village or ward. A number of common communicable and non-communicable diseases were mentioned by respondents in all the sampled villages, wards and/or households. The

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most common communicable diseases in the district as perceived by the San community are as follows: HIV and AIDS (mentioned 30 times), malaria (24 times), diarrhoea (15), headaches (13) and tuberculosis (TB) (6). HIV and AIDS was highlighted as a major problem among the San because of the prevalence of unprotected sex, generally risky sexual practices, lack of knowledge and limited access to condoms. The following quotations from FGDs highlight this: HIV and AIDS and syphilis are caused by unprotected sex and unfaithfulness and ignorance on the use of condoms. (San Boys and Girls Youth FGD, Gariaya 1) For adults, most of the communicable diseases and associated health problems were a result of unprotected sex, lack of access to clean water and poor sanitation facilities. (San Male FGD, Sithembile Village)

Children (especially of school going age), however, reported that headaches, stomach aches (diarrhoea) and malaria affected them most (Girls FGDs, Pelandaba and Nemane Primary Schools). Headaches among youths or children were said to be caused by exposure to the sun’s heat while walking long distances to and from school. Diseases such as diarrhoea and kwashiorkor were reportedly caused by unhygienic drinking water, poor diets and lack of sanitation facilities. The children’s FGDs mentioned that: We use forests [as our toilet] but the Ministry of Health said we should use [proper] toilets. Our parents cannot afford to construct toilets. (Pelandaba Primary School, San Children FGD)

Young ones also spoke of backaches: Isihlabo [backache] is caused by working extra hard as we carry heavy loads of water and firewood. The other thing is we have one well which is far and when we carry heavy loads isihlabo [sharp body aches] affect us. (San Boys and Girls Youth FGD, Gariaya 1)

Women raised a similar problem. Lack of access to clean water and travelling long distances to the nearest available water points (as well as to collect firewood) were reportedly affecting the health and well-being of women who mostly complained of swollen legs and backaches (Female FGD, Nemane Village). Of interest is that men were aware that women complain significantly about backaches but attributed this to “imisebenzi yemacansini” (sexual activities) and poor diet or dieting itself (Male FGD, Nemane Village). Malaria was a common disease because of mosquitoes and lack of protective mosquito nets for most households. With regard to non-communicable diseases, cancer was mentioned in a number of interviews in all villages sampled. A majority of respondents were knowledgeable about the fact that cancer can be hereditary and that it can also be caused by poor eating habits or diet. Although the number is negligible, it was also noted that some people believed that cancer was caused by witchcraft (a respondent in a Male FGD, Nemane Village). It is important to highlight, however, that the community’s perceptions of the most common communicable diseases differ slightly from officially available statistics for the two major health care service centres in the San community, as shown in Table 12.1.

200 Table 12.1 Official representation of common diseases in the San Community

K. Phiri et al. Disease

Health centre Pumula hospital

Sikente clinic

Diarrhoea

192

199

Malaria

70 (Suspected cases)

228 (Suspected cases)

Skin diseases

200

123

HIV (People on ART)

909

766

TB

7

13

Source Tabulated from Tsholotsho District Hospital Records, 2019

The Ministry of Health and Child Welfare records do agree with the community’s perceptions of HIV as the most common disease. Officially, HIV is followed by various forms of skin diseases and diarrhoea due to poor water and sanitation facilities. The discrepancy between the perceived prevalence of malaria by the community (which is quite high) and official records could be attributed to under-reporting by the community and/or preference by villagers for traditional medicine as opposed to visiting a health care centre when they suspect themselves to be suffering from malaria.

Determinants of Health and Well-Being In this section, we consider the determinants of health and well-being of San people by focusing on the factors which disable their health enhancement. We start by examining the challenges they face with regard to the availability and access to health services, followed by perceptions and experiences of local health care services, and cultural dispositions among the San.

Availability and Access to Health Services The San community are faced with numerous challenges with regard to availability and access to health services. A number of respondents, in all the sampled villages, reported that health services were far away from their homesteads. Quite a number of respondents travel approximately 15 kms, whereas others argue that they sometimes travel for almost half a day to get to the nearest clinic or hospital. To shed more light on this issue, male and female participants from FGDs within the San community indicated that:

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We go to clinics and hospitals; however, they are very far. Sikente is in ward 10, Pumula is in ward 7 yet we are in ward 8. Pumula Clinic is 35 to 39 kilometres away from our village. The clinic provides baby clinic services once a month after attending to all urgent medical needs. (Male FGD, Sakhile San community) The clinic [Madlagombe] is an hour away for us. For others it is further away in Nemane, as they have to walk for about 2 hours. The hospital is located at Tsholotsho centre which is very far [23 kilometres]. (Female FGD, Nemane San community)

Table 12.2 shows the distance to the nearest health service centre by village. Of all the 9 villages sampled from the 5 wards, only two (Thula and Nemane) did not have households which travel for over 3 h to get to the nearest health care centre. Only seven households, existing in Sakhile (3), Sithembile (3) and Sibambene (1), reported that they travel less than 15 min to the nearest health care centre. About 148 households, out of a total of 198 households surveyed (approximately 76%), indicated that they travel more than an hour to get to the nearest centre. The following clinics and hospitals service the villages sampled: Chitachawa clinic, Sikente clinic, Mpilo clinic and Madlagombe clinic, and Pumula Mission Hospital and Tsholotsho District Hospital. The clinics offer basic primary health care such as pre- and post-natal services and for minor illnesses. Major or critical illnesses are referred to either Pumula Mission Hospital or Tsholotsho Hospital. Tsholotsho Hospital is the biggest referral health care centre which is located at the Tsholotsho Business Centre. Almost all the clinics are said to be poorly resourced in terms of both staff and medication. Distance, under-staffing, lack of adequate medical equipment and medicine are key barriers to accessing quality health services among the San community. This has had major negative implications on health-seeking behaviours by the San community. A number of respondents, for instance, highlighted that long distance to health care services was a major reason for non-adherence to Anti-retroviral Treatment (ART). One of the respondents highlighted that: I get stressed by this long distance I would have to travel. I often feel it’s not worth it at times. (Male FGD, Sakhile San community)

Of all the health care centres in the sampled wards, only Pumula Mission Hospital had an ambulance. The ambulance services nearby clinics as well as carrying critical patients to Tsholotsho District hospital. In some instances, patients are expected to contribute a fee of $1US towards the ambulance service: We are required to contribute $1US per household for the ambulance diesel in case of an emergency but we don’t have that money. (Male FGD, Gariya San community)

Respondents decried the lack of ambulance services for households, even when it comes to critical health cases, as they end up resorting to scotch carts. In particular, community members wished that ambulance services could be extended to include transporting pregnant mothers, who normally experience difficulties travelling long distances during their final trimester and/or during normal check-ups. This has led to increased rates of home deliveries under the care of untrained birth attenders, a situation that increases the risk of complications for both mothers and their unborn children. As stated in a female FGD:

0 0

0

Mtshina

2

1

Sibambene

7

0

Thabisa

1

0

3

Nemane

Sithembile

3

0

Sifulasengwe

14

0

3

3

2

0

3

Mpilo

Sakhile

0

0

0

Muzimunye

0

15–30 minutes

Thula

0

Gariya

Source Survey Data, 2019

Total

Village

15 minutes or less

15

0

3

3

4

2

0

1

0

1

1

0

31–45 minutes

14

0

0

2

3

0

0

0

4

2

1

2

46–50 minutes

Time taken to travel to the nearest health facility

Table 12.2 Distance to nearest health service centre by village

10

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

8

0

1

1–3 hours

19

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

12

2

2

1

Above 2 hours but less than 3 hours

81

1

8

12

0

2

3

5

8

0

12

30

Above 3 hours but less than half a day

38

3

3

3

0

0

2

2

5

0

3

17

Above half a day but less than a full day

198

5

18

26

8

7

10

9

30

13

21

51

Total

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Pumula has an ambulance which they use to transfer us to Tsholotsho hospital when one is extremely sick but Sikente does not have any. We look for our own transport. (Female FGD, Gariya San community)

It is important to highlight that health officials in a number of clinics have made it a punishable offence for women to give birth at home. Home deliveries in fact attract a $50US fine. Health officials argue that this fine is appropriate and necessary as it has significantly reduced home deliveries and deaths associated with home deliveries (Interview with Sister in Charge, Sikente). The San community, however, complains about the monetary-based fine given that most of them are not in formal employment, and those that work as labourers for the Ndebele and Kalanga neighbouring ethnic communities are paid in food tokens. Some feel strongly that the $50US fine is illegal and a form of extortion, but they see themselves as powerless to challenge this policy. As a result, as indicated, most people use or hire non-motorised transport such as a scotch carts, and even bicycles, in order to access health care services. Despite the inappropriateness of scotch carts as a mode of transport to ferry the ill, there is no alternative transport at their disposal. Even this alternative form of transport also comes at a cost. Commenting on this matter, one female participant from a FGD noted that: We use different methods of payments in the form of chickens and goats to the scotch cart owners who then ferry us to the clinics. (Female FGD, Sikente San community)

Villagers are unable to participate in HIV and AIDS preventive programmes such as the promotion of condom use because of long distances involved in accessing the training services. HIV and AIDS education awareness meetings in villages and local schools are occasionally conducted but suffer from low attendance due to long distances to the meeting point. In particular, this was cited as one of the main reasons why both adults and young people indulge in unprotected sex, which increases the risk of exposure to HIV and sexually-transmitted diseases. For instance, women in Mtshina village stated that they wanted to protect themselves from the HIV virus, but were not able to do so because condoms were not locally available. One of the respondents argued poignantly that, “I wouldn’t travel that long distance [30 kms] just for a mere condom” (Female FGD, Mtshina San community). Failure to adhere to the antiretroviral therapy regime because of the long distance people travel to and from health care centres was a major problem among women. To substantiate the challenges faced by the San population on this matter, a key informant highlighted that: Some of the women do not come for re-supply of Nevirapine in those 6 weeks and we send village health workers...When HIV symptoms manifest that is when they come to the hospital and ask for medical assistance but most of the times it will be too late. They don’t come back after 72 hours for nevirapine and cotrimoxazole. (KII, Tsholotsho District Hospital)

Further, user-fees were identified as a factor that hinders the San community from accessing health services. The exorbitant user-fees resulted in many people opting to stay home and hope for a ‘natural’ healing process rather than seek professional health care. In elaborating on this, one of the respondents from a male FGD commented that:

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I fractured my leg in February and when I went to the hospital, I was told to go and purchase the plaster. Where will I get that as you can see I can hardly walk? I am still trying to source for some funds to go back to the hospital as I am in constant pain. (Male FGD, Gariya San community)

Of interest to note is that health officials did not consider some of these factors like distance as major problems hindering access to health care by the San community. Instead, health officials argue that the San people generally do not like mingling with other ethnic communities. As a result, they do not attend health promotion programmes that are held at the clinics, and would rather have health care services brought to their ‘door steps’. This ‘stereotyping’ of the San people as ‘separationists’ was not sensitive in any way to the structural drivers of lack of availability and access to health care services. In order to address the challenges of availability and access to health care services by rural communities in general, the Zimbabwean government introduced villagebased health workers in the 1980s whose work is important in linking communities and health services. Many respondents including among the San people acknowledged the important role the Village Health Workers (VHWs) played in their communities, such as undertaking home visits for the sick, promoting maternal and child health as well as family planning health issues, and coordinating environmental sanitation and health promotion programmes. The VHWs also assisted the San villagers by giving them relevant Ministry of Health information on health-related issues. Detailing this, participants in a male FGD stated that: Besides the hospital, we have a very hard working Village Health Worker who is very supportive of us and she often advises us on what to do whenever we are not well. We get our medication from the VHWs and I have been healthy for some time due to the medication they gave me. (Male FGD, Sithembile San community)

Nevertheless, it was observed that the VHWs were constrained by a lack of resources to perform their work and there were some wards that did not have VHWs at all. The major challenges faced by VHWs are lack of adequate medication and transport to move easily across the breadth of the communities. To validate this information, three participants from male and female FGDs remarked that: We get help from local health workers. [But] they give us only pain killers and condoms to prevent HIV. (Female FGD, Mtshina San community) I sometimes don’t have the paracetamol to give to the people when they complain of pain and as such I can’t help them at all. (Ndebele Village Health Worker, Mtshina Village) There is a short supply of drugs from the Village Health Workers in the area. (Male FGD, Sithembile San community)

In terms of San community preferences for health care service providers, just under half of the respondents (40%) mentioned clinics, while 14% spoke of hospitals; the balance referred to traditional healers (44%) and others (2%).

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Perceptions and Experiences of Health Services Many studies (Atake 2018; Bloom et al. 2018; Baah et al. 2019) demonstrate that patients’ experiences and perceptions of health workers and services influence healthseeking behaviour. Hence, we explored the San people’s experiences and perceptions of the quality of health services that they receive, and how and why this may influence their health-seeking practices. Though touched upon in the preceding section, we provide a more focused discussion here. Many respondents stated that they have had good experiences at health care centres, noting the professionalism of staff. Some of them noted that: No complaints at all, the services are good. Problem is that we now have debts because we don’t have cash to pay for these services. (Male FGD, Sanqinyane Ndebele community) The services are generally good. The increased debts hinder us [though] from seeking medical services. (Male FGD, Sakhile Kalanga community) The clinic does well and we are well taken care of. The services are good generally as we are treated for free … . The clinic now allows for payment plans. We do not go to the prophets and inyangas because there is a certain fee we have to pay for which we cannot afford, whereas in hospitals it is free of charge. (Female FGD, Mtshina Ndebele community) The staff workers don’t discriminate [against] us; they treat us with fairness regardless of age or gender. About 8 wards require health services in that clinic so sometimes the workers are overwhelmed. As a result of accommodating 8 wards, there are long queues sometimes. (Female FGD, Sakhile Kalanga community)

While these do consist of complimentary comments, clearly problems are experienced. Women often complain of harsh treatment by nurses especially when it comes to pre- and post-natal care treatment, and the $50US charge fee for home deliveries. The exorbitant user-fees, for a range of services, hinder San community members from accessing health services. The overall survey also shows that those respondents with negative experiences and perceptions of health care services were mainly from the San communitydominated wards, while Ndebele and Kalanga villagers were more satisfied with the quality of health care service delivery. This is not to suggest that San-speaking patients are institutionally discriminated against. There was no evident relationship between these negative experiences and perceptions of health services and ethnic identity, in particular with being a San. Women from Mtshina and Gariya villages (with a sizeable number of Sanspeaking households) felt that health care staff members were too negative, judgmental, lacked empathy and often ill-treated them. Many felt that they were not being listened to and were treated harshly, and complained that they were not attended to when they were in labour (with some claiming that they were physically abused). To elucidate on this, female participants from FGDs remarked that: Our nurses are very rough; sometimes we get to the clinic at 6am and get attended to at around 11am. They are very bad at handling patients; maybe it’s because they are very young nurses. (Female and Male FGD, Gariya San community)

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Sometimes, the nurses do not look after the patients, particularly those who arrive at the clinic already in labour. (Female FGD, Mtshina San community) There is a woman who experienced labour pains on her way to the hospital. When she arrived, the nurses hit her on her thighs using a plank. They then retreated to their offices. I had to monitor and look after her. (Female FGD, Gariya San community)

Most of these negative experiences were reported by women attending the maternal clinic. Generally, though, San respondents complained that clinics opened very late, some staff members took long to attend to them and clinics were understaffed, thus delaying service delivery. Further, as noted earlier, the shortage of essential medicines is a big challenge for most health care centres in the country. A number of respondents spoke about being asked by health officials to go and buy medication at the pharmacy which is located some distance at the Tsholotsho Business Centre. To explain further, male and female FGD participants claimed that: The services are good but medication is not available, so we are referred to chemists that are very far and this becomes a challenge to the sick. (Male FGD, Nemane Ndebele community) The clinic serves many people yet it has [only] a few workers. It currently has 3 nurses and 1 nurse aid… The clinic serves 7 to 8 wards so, at the end of the day, if any nurse is not on duty we spend the entire day at the clinic unattended to … If the clinic does not have any pills, one is forced to go to the hospital which is also far. If the hospital doesn’t have any, we are directed to go and buy from the pharmacy. However, most of us do not have money so we prefer going back home without the pills. (Female FGD, Nemane Ndebele community)

Despite the accessibility challenges, and the experiences of poor quality health care services at some of the clinics, this has not dramatically influenced health-seeking behaviours among the San. A slight majority of San villagers (about 54%) use official health centres.

Cultural Dispositions and Determinants This research also identified cultural determinants of health and well-being among the San community. At one level, this seemed to be quite straightforward, with the example of sanitation being instructive in this regard. For instance, households of the San population (98%) use the bush to relieve themselves, which is rooted in their culture. Evidence was collected for non-sanitary facility usage by village. In this regard, Gariya and Mtshina show the highest level of bush defecation usage, and these have sizeable numbers of San-speaking households. With the exception of defecation done by children within the yard, the majority of faeces (in the bush areas) is not buried. Campaigns by health officials for people to use the ‘cat system’ of defecation and waste disposal have yielded little results because of the stigma, embarrassment and loss of privacy associated with carrying a hoe each time one goes to defecate. Only one village (Mtshina) recorded the use of the ‘cat system’ of defecation, and

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even in this case, its usage is very negligible. Men from Gariya village commented concerning the ‘cat system’ of defecation as follows: When people see you carrying a hoe and getting into the bush, it signals the business you are about to go and do, thus they find it embarrassing to their peers... People need to be smart in the community but it is very difficult. Village Health Workers encourage us to carry hoes to the bush when relieving ourselves and that is very difficult because it means the whole community now knows you are going to the bush when carrying a hoe. (Male FGD, Gariya San community)

Health officials have campaigned as well to have each household erect a handwashing facility by the homestead gate so that people can wash their hands upon relieving themselves in the bush. Only a few of these hand-washing facilities were functional in most households visited. Most households argued that either children destroyed these facilities or there was no water to continuously replenish them. Referring to the situation of toilets, all categories of research participants seemed to recognise that the lack of blair toilets was a health hazard. As some participants put it: We also have a shortage of toilets. They require us to build [them] using cement yet it is too expensive for us. We further fear that our children will fall into these toilets which are 3 metres deep. This shortage of toilets is giving rise to diseases especially diarrhoea. (Village Head, Sithembile Village) Only a few households have toilets, the rest are involved in open space defecation. This is problematic because those flies that come from the veld and forests are the ones that infiltrate into the houses and compromise the health of the entire community. (Male FGD, Mtshina Ndebele community) The absence of toilets causes diarrhoea and other health problems. About 5 out of the 107 households have toilets. We need to be smart and build toilets because it is of no use to get treatment in the clinic and come back home to a dirty house. (Nurse, Sikente Clinic)

Unsurprisingly, there was widespread concern and complaints around the problem of flies, with the recognition that unhygienic practices contribute to the spread of diseases such as diarrhoea. Hence, lack of sanitation facilities and poor personal hygiene practices (with cultural dispositions seemingly underpinning these problems), compounded by lack of access to clean water sources, condition the health and well-being of the San communities. The example of sanitation does tend to simplify matters though. The question of cultural dispositions and practices among the San is in fact a complicated issue. Most San respondents were quick to point out that several cultural practices and norms among the San community were either extinct or significant cross-cultural pollination with either Christian values or cultural practices of the dominant Ndebele and Kalanga ethnic groups rendered it difficult to attribute particular health-seeking behaviours and illnesses to San cultural practices. Several respondents from both male and female FGDs insisted that: Culture has been abandoned, it’s no longer preserved and respected as before. (Female FGD, Gariya San community)

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There is now a mixture of different ethnics groups and it’s difficult to come up with [a distinct] culture when it’s like that. (Male FGD, Gariya Kalanga community) Most people are not conducting cultural rituals due to numerous churches in our area. Christians have abandoned infant rituals like ukwetheswa abantwana. We no longer go to Daka and Njelele for rainmaking ceremonies; now we pray to God. (Female FGD, Nemane Ndebele community) Education and religion have positive effects on health. There is no use for tradition and traditional medicine. The SDA [Seventh Day Adventist church] is dominating the area. (Male FGD, Nemane Ndebele community)

The communities in general believe strongly in the faith and healing power enshrined in Judo-Christian values. This takes place in particular in churchdominated communities, such as the Seventh Day Adventist Church-dominated Nemane village, where a majority of San people abhor traditional healers. The turning to churches was evident in the strong belief in spiritual healings, prayed-for water bottles and anointed oils. Researchers observed in Gariya village, for instance, worshippers being given prayed-for water bottles and anointing oils which they drank and administered to their children with a strong belief that it protected them from evil forces that cause illness. There were testimonies of alleged healing as a result of anointed oils. However, it is important to note that none of the Christian churches (Seventh Day Adventist and Brethren in Christ Church) in the surveyed wards of Tsholotsho discouraged modern medicine. Indeed, there were reported health promotion programmes even in churches, as people were encouraged to combine prayers and prescribed medication. There were many households, nevertheless, that still believed in long-established cultural practices, including seeking health solutions from traditional healers. For instance, some households still tie woollen threads (expertly prepared by traditional healers) around the waists of infants for purposes of protecting and promoting their well-being, specifically the infant’s fontanelle. Traditional birth attendants also play an important role within the San community although home deliveries are on the decrease largely because of the Ministry of Health’s awareness campaigns about associated risks and the ‘punishment fee’ (i.e. of $50US or a goat) that health officials levied against women who fail to register on time at the maternal clinic. As one female put it: We used to have midwives who helped expecting women in giving birth. They are now afraid to help even if one is in labour because they have been banned and they can be arrested or fined 50 dollars. If we give birth at home we also pay a fine. A woman experienced labour and when she got to the clinic, she gave birth at the gate. She was fined a goat despite the fact that she was already at the clinic. (Female FGD, Gariya)

The belief in the effectiveness of traditional medicine is quite strong in many San households, and the Ndebele and Kalanga ethnic groups strongly believed that the San people have exceptional knowledge of traditional medicine. In the context of shortages and unaffordability of medicine in health care service centres, as well as long distances from health services, traditional concoctions have become cheaper and easier to get as alternatives. Common incidences of snake bites and minor health

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problems like headaches and stomach aches receive attention first from local herbalists, before referral to modern health care centres if the situation deteriorates. The respondents from the FGDs noted the complex situation prevailing regarding the use of indigenous and modern medicine: With herbalists they treat us nicely as they know we pay them and they want to keep us happy as their customers. (Female FGD, Mtshina Ndebele community) We use different herbs to cure us of different illnesses; they are locally available compared to the modern medicine. (Mixed FGDs, Sithembile and Sibambene) African traditional medicine co-exists with modern medicine but we prefer to go to clinics. (Female FGD, Sanqinyane Ndebele community) In the past, our forefathers used to drink isigubhu so that they strengthen their backs but we have noticed that isigubhu encourages the incoming of diseases such as HIV. Our forefathers would just take a herb [called usindo] and use it to get rid of nyongo [malaria],but nowadays we no longer use African medicine because we prioritise going to the clinics because we realised that there are some diseases that cannot be cured using African herbs. (Mixed FGD, Mtshina)

Consulting traditional healers was reported to be an option when the cause of the illness was a suspected act of witchcraft. However, others consulted traditional healers to avoid shame and embarrassment over sexually-transmitted diseases such as syphilis or to get treatment for male health problems like infertility or erectile dysfunction. As indicated in one FGD: Those who suffer from syphilis go to old people [who are not necessarily the traditional healers] who give them herbs to cure the disease and we have noticed that syphilis cannot be cured but it resurfaces especially when seasons change … People get help from herbalists and traditional healers especially when they get stung or bitten by snakes; they can’t treat diseases such as malaria. These herbalists or traditional healers also help us in fighting cases of infertility as they can treat that. (Mixed FGDs, Sithembile and Sibambene)

At the same time, the belief in traditional herbalists was reported to have negative effects on the health and well-being of some people. Although it was difficult to measure the severity of the problem, respondents were very critical of traditional herbalists and self-proclaimed prophets who misled people by diagnosing common illnesses like HIV/AIDS as being caused by witchcraft and claims that they could heal HIV/AIDS. Women participants at an FGD mentioned that: From other people’s experience, prophets do not help the community because they are liars and inexperienced. They also go to the hospitals and clinics. Prophets and traditional healers are not able to help people suffering from TB [tuberculosis] thus people opt for hospitals and clinics. Prophets also create enmity and fights amongst people in the community as they pinpoint neighbours as the ones bewitching the sick even if people are HIV positive. This has also led to a lot of people dying without knowing they are positive because they do not go to hospitals and just believe they are bewitched. (Female FGD, Nemane Ndebele community)

Further, the San community, like all other communities in rural Zimbabwe, still has strong patriarchal cultural norms and values. With the exception of female- and childheaded households existing due to deaths or migration, men are generally the head

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of the household. The unequal power dynamics and decision-making between sexes were reported by some respondents to be contributing to gender-based violence to the point of becoming an acceptable norm and practice. During focus group discussions, many children indicated that their fathers were physically abusive towards mothers. Many women and young girls also spoke about failing to negotiate condom use with their husbands and boyfriends, respectively. To elaborate on the issue, female respondents from FGDs pointed out that: My husband complains that sex is too cold for him with a condom on. (Female FGD, Gariya San community) Mine [my husband] says that a condom makes him sick. (Female FGD, Sanqinyane Ndebele community) People especially males tend not to listen to any teaching on HIV/AIDS, particularly issues on protection. (Women FGD, Sithembile and Sibambene)

The unequal power dynamics and decision-making with regard to sexual and reproductive rights expose women and girls to the risk of contracting and spreading HIV and other sexually-transmitted diseases. Young girls, in particular, reported being physically abused by their boyfriends if they insisted on using a condom or if they suggested going for an HIV test. Young women revealed that they failed to open up to their partners or their parents about sexual issues that affected them. The researchers observed that lack of openness among young women was due to socialisation and the patriarchal nature of society which encourages men’s sexual power over women. In explaining their predicament, young people from FGDs remarked that: Adults don’t see anything wrong if young men are beating up their girlfriends. (Young people, Sithembile and Sibambene FGD) It’s difficult to ask your boyfriend to go for an HIV test; he will ask you why and what is the problem? What do I say? (Young people FGD, Mtshina) How do I tell him that we need to be safe and use a condom? That calls for a heavy beating from him I tell you. (Young people FGD, Sanqinyane)

Socialised and Institutionalised Perceptions of the San During interviews and FGDs, it was evident that the San people believed that they were being discriminated against with regard to development projects. It was equally evident that people of different ethnicities (Ndebele and Kalanga) held particular stereotypes about the San people. Of particular interest is that socialised and institutionalised perceptions of the San people were used to explain their lack of participation in health promotion programmes and unwillingness and inability to seek professional medical help when ill. The San people were conceptualised by many Kalanga and Ndebele respondents as having strong mistrust towards outsiders. A local headmaster expressed it this way:

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Since I came … [here], I have seen and heard one [health] campaign since 2013. It was an HIV/AIDS campaign which taught about prevention but only a few attended. Also, we had a circumcision promotion to which the elders did not agree, so most male children were left hanging [did not become involved]. (Acting Headmaster, Pelandaba Primary School)

Health officials argued that as a result of their exclusivist tendencies, the San people are not keen to attend health promotion programmes at various health care centres where they mix and mingle with the Kalanga and Ndebele ethnic groups. We use the story as told by the Sister in Charge of Sikente to illustrate the wider view of the San people and their health care practices. She starts off by arguing that: They have a negative attitude towards someone that they are not used to. They have specific people that they respond to and interact with… If they are not used to you they will run away and hide in the bushes ... They don’t disclose information to medical practitioners whom they are not used to. It took time for them to accept that HIV and TB exist and are real; they thought it’s witchcraft. (KII with Sister in Charge, Sikente Clinic)

It is believed that the San people prefer to have door-to-door health care services delivery than to visit clinics and hospitals. This, the nurses explained, was because the San people like to live in isolation way from other ethnic communities. As a result, the San people missed opportunities to have their children vaccinated and also failed to access crucial health information only available through clinics and hospitals. As this Sister in Charge of Sikente put it: The San want their own clinic and doctors because they don’t want to mix with other ethnic groups. They don’t come for National Vaccination Day’s vaccination and immunisation because they believe the medical practitioners should go to their community and offer these services. We have had cases where they are admitted to the clinic because they are due for delivery and they run away because there are Kalanga people in the ward. (KII with Sister in Charge, Sikente Clinic)

It was revealed that a strategy to supposedly lure the San people to attend public meetings and health promotion workshops was to entice them with food hampers: We go to their community to offer medical facilities and, when we go there, we buy them food because they don’t attend meetings without food. In these trips to their community, we tell them to bring baby cards and that’s when we discover that some of their 12 month old babies haven’t been immunised. (KII with Sister in Charge, Sikente Clinic)

Health care providers further highlighted that it was difficult to refer the San patients to hospitals as many do not feel comfortable to travel alone in an ambulance with medical personnel that are strangers to them: Referring the San to the Tsholotsho hospital is a challenge because they start asking many questions that prove they don’t want the referral. Some ask, “Where will I sleep? What will I eat? Who will assist me? When I die there how will my body be sent back home?” Most of the San people resist getting into the ambulance when referred. They give excuses always on what they will eat and how they will be treated. Some of them we hire cars for them for free and when it’s time for them to leave, they give excuses like “Let me go home and tell my husband that I am leaving for Tsholotsho Hospital”. (KII with Sister in Charge, Sikente Clinic)

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The argument that San people resist health care events is not true. The argument does not consider one major constraining factor that emerged in our engagement with the San people: that is, most health care centres are located far away from the wards that are mostly populated by the San. The use of mobile clinics and local village health workers has ameliorated the health information gap. San people also believe that they were deliberately being discriminated against by other ethnic groups, hence their reluctance to mingle with other people. However, self-conceptions of victimhood by the San did not appear to play a significant role in influencing their health, well-being and health-seeking practices. Instead, what comes out glaringly is that health care services are located far away from their communities. Similarly, while existing stereotypes about the San people are prevalent among neighbouring ethnic communities and health officials, there was no evidence of overt tribalism (ethnic discrimination) in health care service delivery. In fact, the San community enjoy a user-fee waiver that has been extended to them by the Ministry of Health, especially for maternal health.

Conclusion The chapter highlighted that the San people of Tsholotsho, as a borderland people, have been subjected to historical marginalisation and they are currently largely ignored by the Zimbabwean government in relation to creating a conducive environment for them to access decent and appropriate health care services. The San are thus beset by a plethora of challenges which affect their health-seeking behaviour and practices. In the face of various diseases like diarrhoea, kwashiorkor, malaria, tuberculosis and HIV, they are not receiving the medical attention they expect from the government. The hindrances include long distances to clinics and hospitals, lack of transport (ambulances), inadequate medical personnel who are often harsh, unavailability of medication and unaffordable medical fees. At times, the San feel that they are overtly discriminated against by the government and other nearby ethnic groups, namely the Kalanga and Ndebele. On account of this, they resort to traditional medicines and herbalists to deal with their diseases and ailments, or rely upon churches to obtain healing. Broadly, the San people argue that they want an improved and strengthened health care system which is closer to their villages, and they highlight the need to have more health staff, equipment and transport (including ambulances) for effective health service delivery.

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