Linguistics and Formulas in Homer: Scalarity and Description of the Particle per 9027220573, 9789027220578

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER Scalarity and the description of the particle per

by

EGBERT J. BAKKER

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA 1988

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Bakker, Egbert J. Linguistics and formulas in Homer: scalarity and the description of the particle per / by Egbert J. Bakker. p. cm. Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 1. Homer -- Language - Grammar. 2. Greek language — Particles. 3. Per (The Greek word). 4. Oral-formulaic analysis. I. Title. PA4201.B35 1988 883'.01-dc l9 88-10110 ISBN 90 272 2057 3 (Eur.) / ISBN 1-55619-046-8 (US) (hb. ; alk. paper) CIP ® Copyright 1988 - John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface 1 INTRODUCTION 1.0 Aims of the investigation 1.1 Per in Homer and after 1.2 Facts from the data-base 1.3 Per in Greek linguistics 1.3.1 Emphasis 1.3.2 Concession and strengthening 1.3.3 Fraenkel: "per heisst 'auch'" 1.3.4 Etymology and diachrony 1.4 Categories and prototypes 1.5 Linguistics and formulas in Homer

ix 1 1 1 3 7 7 9 11 12 14 19

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

23

2 THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARTTY 27 2.0 Introduction 27 2.1 Scales 28 2.1.1 Scalarity: introductory 28 2.1.2 Superlatives: scalar and attributive 30 2.1.3 The non-referentiality of scalar superlatives 31 2.1.4 Irrealis modality 32 2.2 Scalarity and referentiality 36 2.2.1 Attributive and referential superlatives 36 2.2.2 Intension and extension 37 2.2.3 Scalarity and extensional terms 39 2.3 Focus particles and focus contexts 40 2.3.1 Even as a focus particle 40 2.3.1.1 Conventional implicature and the meaning of even . .40 2.3.1.2 Elocution and the use of even 43 2.3.1.3 Focus and scope 44 2.3.1.4 Scope dependence and scope independence 45 2.3.1.5 Scope ambiguity 46 2.3.1.6 Even if: concession and concessive conditionals . . . .48

vi

CONTENTS

2.3.2 Types of focus context 2.4 Negative and positive polarity 2.4.1 Positive polarity items 2.4.2 Negative polarity items and scale reversal NOTES TO CHAPTER2

49 52 52 54 57

3SCΑLΑRITΎΑΝDΤΗΕ ΡΑRTICLE PER 3.0 Introduction 3.1 Intensional terms 3.1.1 Scalar superlatives 3.1.2 Scalar superlatives and the etymology of per 3.1.3 Epic te and generic modality 3.1.4 A remark on diachrony 3.2 Extensional terms 3.2.1 The intension of focus constituents 3.2.2 Superlativeness, comparativeness and the illocution of even 3.2.3 The concessive relative clause 3.2.4 Scalar expressions and the Homeric narrator 3.3 Scalarity and comparatives 3.4 Negative polar scalarity 3.4.1 Declarative sentences 3.4.2 Non-assertive contexts and negative polarity 3.4.3 Scalar superlatives and negative polarity 3.4.4 The strengthening of negation 3.5 Scalarity in wishes and commands 3.5.1 Imperative and optative sentences 3.5.2 Inclusiveness and exclusiveness 3.5.3 Scales of desirability and acceptability 3.5.4 Per,geand exclusion 3.5.5 The diachronic aspect of per in wishes 3.6 Some unclassifiable instances NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

67 67 68 68 71 72 73 75 76 . 77 80 81 83 85 85 86 87 89 90 90 91 94 97 98 98 101

4 PARTICIPLES I: LINGUISTICS 4.0 Introduction 4.1 On participles 4.1.1 Kinds of adverbial relation 4.1.2 Syntactic independence and modal autonomy 4.2 From scalarity to concession

107 107 108 108 110 113

CONTENTS 4.2.1 The intension of circumstances 4.2.2 Diachronic aspects of kai hôs 4.2.3 Syntactic intermezzo: correlation and apposition 4.3 The concessive participial phrase 4.3.1 The prototypical properties of participle + per' 4.3.2 Loss of superlativeness 4.3.3 Dependent participles 4.3.4 Modally embedded participles 4.4 From linguistics to the formula 4.4.1'Participle + pef and generic modality 4.4.2 Kai, mala and strengthening NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 5 PARTICIPLES II: FORMULAS AND METRICS 5.0 Introduction 5.1 Onformulas 5.1.1 Formular language and ordinary language 5.1.2 Formula and metre 5.1.3 Types of recurrence 5.2 Formulas and form: the localization of formulas 5.2.1 The dactylic hexameter 5.2.2 The localization of' participle + pef 5.3 Formulas and meaning: the integration of formulas 5.3.1 Levels of integration 5.3.2 Prototypicality and the semantic integration of formulas .

vii 113 116 117 120 120 124 131 133 137 137 140 143 151 151 152 154 158 159 164 165 171 186 187 . 189

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

197

6 CONCESSIVE CONDITIONALS 6.0 Introduction 6.1 Concessives, conditionals and concessive conditionals 6.2 Kinds of concessive conditional 6.3 Concessive conditionals in Homer 6.3.1 Per in concessive conditionals 6.3.2 Kai in concessive conditionals 6.3.3 Ei per and kai ei in a diachronic perspective 6.4 Concessive and non-concessive conditionals 6.4.1 Two kinds of neutralization 6.4.2 The two senses of ei per: 'even if and 'if really' 6.4.3 From concessive to non-concessive eiper

205 205 206 207 209 209 219 224 227 227 229 230

Viii

CONTENTS

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 7 PERIPHERAL INSTANCES 7.0 Introduction 7.1 Linguistic irregularity in Homer 7.1.1 Unclassifiable vs. divergent instances 7.1.2 The explanation of peripheral instances in Homer 7.2 Semantic integration of formulas again 7.2.1 Formular or linguistic irregularity? 7.3 Divergence: changes in form and meaning 7.3.1 Changes in meaning 7.3.2 Changes in form 7.3.3 From prototype to periphery 7.4 Per and inclusive focus particles 7.5 At the outer periphery 7.6 From Homeric to Attic per NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

233 239 239 239 239 240 243 246 249 249 252 256 257 259 262 267

8 OVERVIEW

271

APPENDIX

277

REFERENCES

281

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

293

INDEX OFNAMES

305

PREFACE

This study was submitted as a doctoral thesis to the Faculty of Arts of the University of Leiden. Originally, the description of the use of the particle per in Homer was undertaken as part of a larger project, the description of the diachronic development of per from Homeric to Attic Greek. After some preliminary research, however, it appeared that, owing to the specific problems the descriptive linguist is faced with in Homer, there were reasons to give the description of the Homeric material a thematic unity of its own. Accordingly, the present study has to be viewed as a pubhcation in its ownright,rather than as a piece of subsidiary research. Professor C.M.J. Sicking, the supervisor of the project, has followed the progress of my work from the beginning. Many of the adjustments which I have made in the presentation of the argument are due to his often penetrating criticism. I wish to thank Professor R.S.P. Beekes also for a number of useful comments and suggestions. Professor C.J. Ruijgh read the whole manuscript in an early stage. Not only did he save me from a number of factual errors; he also influenced the spirit of the work, by making me attentive to the fact that a toorigidapproach to the facts of language may impair the effectiveness of studies like the present one. I am indebted to the Foundation of Linguistic Research of the Nether­ lands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z. W.O) for a grant which enabled me to carry out all the preliminary investigations and to write the first draft. The Greek text in this book is presented in italics. The motivation for this practice, with which some readers may be unaccustomed, is the desire not to set up an unnecessary barrier for many readers who have primarily or exclusive­ ly a linguistic interest and whose judgment I value highly. The Greek word ac-

χ

PREFACE

cent was lost in the process, too, owing to a deficiency in the computer charac­ ter set which was at my disposal. But for those who have swallowed thefirstin­ convenience this will not be an unsurmountable problem either. Leiderdorp, april 1988

1 INTRODUCTION

1.0 Aims of the investigation The purpose of the present study is to provide a description of the Greek particle per as it occurs in the text of Homer. As such it is a contribution to the study of Ancient Greek in general, and of the 'Greek particles' in particular. But there are some circumstances on account of which the present work trans­ gresses the boundaries of 'Greek linguistics' proper. Firstly,perappears to be what may be called a 'scalar particle', and the framework which I have devised for its description in terms of 'scalarity' cannot help contributing to the discus­ sion of scalar phenomena in general in language. Secondly, the study of per (as well as of many other linguistic items) in Homer cannot ignore the many problems and complications that are posed by this author. 'Homer' is (i) a metrical text and has (ii) an oral-formulaic origin. These two properties determine to a high degree the linguistic form of the Iliad and the Odyssey. Thus, as a description of a linguistic feature in Homer, the present study is also an essay in the relation between linguistics on the one hand and formulas and metre on the other. 1.1 Per in Homer and after The particle per is one of the salient linguistic features of Greek epic, i.e. Homeric, poetry. Its salience is partly due to the fact that the meaning and use ofper in Homer is markedly different from the meaning of the particle in postHomeric Greek. Per belongs to the linguistic items which mark the peculiar and deviant nature of Greek epic language. An easily observable difference between per as it occurs in Homer and per as it occurs in later Greek is its distribution: in Homer the distribution of per is very free; the particle can be attached, as an encUtic, to words belonging to

2

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

very diverse categories: adjectives, participles, pronouns, substantives, and ad­ verbs, as well as relatives and subordinating conjunctions. In later Greek, on the other hand, the only productive expression-type in which per occurs is the fixed combination of the particle with relatives and subordinating conjunctions (subordinators), the most frequent combinations being 'relative + pef (hos per) and 'conditional subordinator + per9 (eiper). Now the statement of bare distributional facts is in itself of little avail as long as it cannot be shown how the distribution of a linguistic item is related to its meaning and its function on sentence-level and in discourse. So a mere dis­ tinction between a 'free' and a 'fixed' distribution of per is in itself insufficient to account for the difference between the Homeric and the post-Homeric use of the particle. There must be a difference in meaning as well. The first thing we observe in thefieldof 'meaning' is that in Homer many expressions in which per occurs have a concessive adverbial function in the sentence (see 1.3.2 below). In post-Homeric Greek, on the other hand, 'concession' applies only to a limited group of instances, and these instances may be seen as the con­ tinuation of Homeric usage. It is possible, then, to divide, provisionally and intuitively, the total sum of instances of per in a binary way, into 'concessive' and 'non-concessive' in­ stances. But this distinction only partially agrees with the distributional distinc­ tion mentioned above: all instances of post-Homeric 'subordinator + pef are non-concessive, but the converse does not hold: not all instances of per in Homer are concessive. The asymmetry is due to the fact that the non-conces­ sive use of 'subordinator + pef is not confined to post-Homeric Greek: it oc­ curs in Homer as well. Thus, when we want to refer to 'concessive' per as 'Homeric' per (as I do in the present study), we have to realize that this term does not apply to all the instances of the particle in the Iliad and Odyssey: out of the total number of 534 instances of per in Homer, 385 are to be called 'Homeric'; the rest are instances of the non-concessive 'subordinator + pef. In the present study only 'Homeric'perwill be dealt with. The useofper in subclauses (adhering to the subordinator: hos per, ei per) will be discussed only in so far as it is relevant for the study of Homeric per. That is, of the in­ stances of 'subordinator + pef only those will be discussed that yield a conces­ sive subordinate clause (relative or conditional, see exx. (3) and (11) in 1.2 below). The discussion of the post-Homeric and non-concessive use of per in subclauses will find its proper place in a study on relative and conditional clauses in Attic Greek which I am currently preparing (Bakker: in prep.).

INTRODUCTION

3

The decision to treat Homeric and post-Homericper;separately may seem arbitrary, since it is made on the basis of a semantic distinction ('concessive' vs. 'non-concessive') which was called above 'provisional and intuitive'. But when we assign 'concession' its proper place and describe it within a diachronic perspective as the consequence of the proper meaning of per rather than that meaning itself, our bipartition in the material will appear to be better founded. In the course of the argument (see 3.2.3 and 4.2.1) I will show that 'concession' is a natural consequence of what will be referred to as 'scalarity' (see ch. 2). And once we speak in terms of 'scalarity', the term 'Homeric per' turns out to cover a coherent set of linguistic phenomena. This is not to say, however, that there are no connections between Homeric (scalar) and post-Homeric (non-scalar) per. It is possible in the synchronic dimension to devise a semantic framework in which both scalar and non-scalar per have their place and which, accordingly, reveals the common denominator of both kinds. This framework will be presented in section 2.3.2 below. 1.2 Facts from the data-base The particle is the central part of a number of more or less regular ex­ pression-types. In the present section I present the most important of these, each time giving a highly characteristic ('prototypical', see 1.4 below) example, to which a brief descriptional commentary has been added. The order of the examples reflects the order in which the various uses will be discussed in chap­ ters 3-7. The last two examples, (15) and (16), will not be discussed in the present study; they are instances of post-Homeric, non-scalar per. Throughout this study the translations of the examples have been taken from Rieu (1946, 1950). Whenever a more literal or explicit rendering than Rieu's was more ap­ propriate, this has been added, in square brackets. ( 1)

tô de Phobos philos huios hama krateros kai atarbês hespeto, hos t'ephobêse talaphrona per polemistên. "(Ares the Killer and his son), the fierce and indomitable Panic-maker, before whom the staunchest warrior turns tail". (Π. 13,300).

(2)

smerdale' eurôenta, ta te stugeousi theoi per. (The Netherworld): "The hateful Chambers of Decay that fill even the gods with horror". (R 20,65).

4

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

In (2) per adheres as an encUtic to the substantive theoi ('gods') and in (1) to the adjective talaphrôn ('brave'). Both collocations occur in a non-restrictive ('digressive') relative clause whose relative subordinator is modified by the par­ ticle te. This particle imposes digeneric modality on the relative clause. In 3.11 will show that to recognize this modality as such is important for the descrip­ tion of per as it is used in (1)-(2). (3)

kai d'Akhileus toutôi ge makhêi eni kudianeirêi errig' antïbolêsai, ho per seo pollon ameinôn. "Even Achilles fears to meet this man in the field of honour, who is a better man than you by far" [even though he is..] (77. 7,113-4).

Here it is per that modifies a non-restrictive relative clause, not te. Per adheres to the relative pronoun (ho(s)per). The relative clause has as its head noun the proper name Achilles which is preceded by the particle kai ('even'). It is impor­ tant to notice that the relative clause may be interpreted as concessive ('though he is a far better man than you'). The expression-type exemplified by (3) will be discussed in 3.2. (4)

speusomen ai ke nekun per Akhillêï propherômen gumnon: atar ta ge teukhe' ekhei koruthaiolos Hektôr. "We might at least save the body for Achilles, naked though it is. The armour at any rate is in the hands of Hector with the Glancing Helm". (. 17,121).

(5)

alla se per proetô. "Let him at least allow you to take the field". (II. 11,796).

In these examples the addition of per to nekun ('corpse') and se ('you') resp. has approximately the same effect as at least in English. For a full understanding of the function ofper in the expression-type exemplified by (4) and (5) we have to notice that (4) and (5) are adhortations/commands. See further 3.5. (6)

all' oud' hôs hetarous errusato, hiemenos per. "But he failed to save his comrades [even so he did not save...'], in spite of all his efforts". (Od. 1, 6).

Here per is attached to a participle. The combination 'participle + per is similar to the relative clause in (3), in that both combinations are attached to a constituent which is modified by even;3 in (3) this constituent is a proper name; in (6) it is a demonstrative pronoun (hôs). But the similarity between (3)

INTRODUCTION

5

and (6) is not limited to syntax. Semantically, too, they have a common element: just like the relative clause in (3), the participial phrase in (6) allows of a con­ cessive interpretation. The expression-type will be further discussed in 4.2. (7)

alla ta men protetukhthai easomen, akhnumenoi per. "However, what is done is better left alone, though we resent it still". (. 18,112).

(8)

hoi de kai akhnumenoi per ep ' autôi hêdu gelassan "The rest, disgruntled though they were, had a hearty laugh at his expense" ( 2,270).

(9) Aineia, khalepon se kai iphthimon per eonta pantôn anthrôpôn sbessai menos. "Aeneas, powerful as you are, you can hardly expect to put everyone who meets you out of action". (II. 16,620). (10) Here, mê dê pantas emous epielpeo muthous eidêsein: khalepoi toi esont' alokhôi per eousêi "Here, (the father of men and gods replied) do not expect to learn all my decisions. You would find the knowledge hard to bear, although you are my Consort". (. 1,546). These four examples differ from (6) in that the constituent which is modified by even (oud'hôs) is absent. They belong to the most common expression-type, which will be referred to as 'participle + pef. In this expression-type per ad­ heres to a circumstantial participle. The combination has a concessive adver­ bial function in the clause. The four examples may be differentiated in various ways. In (7) and (8) the participial phrase is a simple (middle) participle; in (9) and (10), on the other hand, it consists of a nominal element (modified by per) and a participial form of be. The first kind of participial phrase ('participle alone') I call synthetic and the other ('nominal + participle of be') analytic. Within the analytic kind, moreover, a further differentiation is possible: the nominal modified by per may be either an adjective (as in (9): iphthimos, 'strong'), or a substantive (as in (10): alokhos, 'wife'). For the distinction be­ tween adjective and substantive and the implications of this distinction for the study ofper see 4.3 below. The last criterion on the basis of which (7)-(10) may be differentiated is the presence or absence of the particle kai: in (8) and (9) the participial phrase opens with kai; in (7) and (10) it does not. The pattern in

6

LINGUISTICS

AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

the distribution of kai will be discussed in 4.5 and 5.3 below (see also 1.3.2 and 1.5 in the present chapter). ( 11) steuto gar eukhomenos nikêsemen, ei per an autai Mousai aeidoien, kourai Dios aigiokhoio. "(Thamyris) had boasted that he would win in a singing-match even if the Muses themselves would be his competitors" (77. 2,597). This is an instance of the typically Homeric use of per in conditional clauses. The kind of ei per which means 'even if, exemplified by (11), does not occur after Homer. Extensive discussion of the 'concessive conditional' will be presented in chapter 6. (12) oikade per sun nêusi neômetha. "Let us sail home with our ships." (77. 2,236). (13) ho de peisetai eis agathon per "He ( = Achilles) will Hsten to you to his own advantage". (II. 11, 789). (14) kreissôn eis emethen kaipherteros ouk oligon per / enkhei. "You are a stronger man than I and not a little better with the spear." (77.19,217). The meaning of per in these examples is far less identifiable than in the other examples. It might even be asked whetherperhere has any meaning at all other than a vague sense of 'emphasis'. The present investigation will show that it is false to treat examples like (12)-(14) as representative instances of Homeric per. Chapter 7 deals with them. (15) ta gar phroneeis ha t' ego per. "For you have the opinion that I have". (77. 4, 361). (16) Arêtê d'onom'estin epônumon, ek de tokêôn ton autôn hoi per tekan Alìdnoon basilêa. "Her name is Arete and she comes from the same family as Alcinous the King". (Od 7,54-5). These are Homeric instances of 'post-Homeric'per (see 1.1). They will not be discussed for their own sake in the present study (but see 2.3.2 below) and have been included merely to complete the picture. Full discussion of per in 'the same as-contexts' in Bakker (1986, in prep.).

INTRODUCTON

7

1.3 Per in Greek linguistics Per has been the subject of a number of discussions which can mostly be found in larger handbooks. I mention Chantraine (1953: 320-1), Denniston (21954:481 ff.), Kühner-Gerth (1904:168 ff.), Monro (21891:320-1) and Mon­ teil (1963:160 ff.). Fraenkel's (1925:6-13) account is an article in its own right. These discussions can hardly be called successful descriptions ofper in Homer. They are inadequately adjusted to the data-base in question, the range of phenomena which is covered by them being either too narrow or too wide. In the present section I briefly discuss them. I shall assess them as to their ability to answer the preliminary questions that should, in my opinion, be asked. 1.3.1 Emphasis A number of proposals can be taken together under the general heading 'emphasis'. Owing to its relatively free distribution, per has been said to 'highlight' individual constituents in the sentence, or to emphasize their impor­ tance in a particular context. Possible candidates for an analysis in these terms are exx. (1)-(2), (4)-(5) and (12)-(14) above. The general term 'emphasis' may be further specified. According to Momo ( 1891:320), for example,per is 'intensive', "denoting that the word to which it is subjoined is true in a high degree." Closely related to this approach is the 'intensive' use of Denniston (1954:482), on which see more below (1.3.4). Denniston distinguishes more uses, of which the 'determinative' use is at the moment the most important. Denniston differentiates the determinative from the intensive use in the following way: "The particle denotes, not that some­ thing is increased in measure, but that the speaker concentrates on it to the ex­ clusion of other things." Thus, we find two distinct 'values' of per in the accounts which advocate the emphasis approach: intensification (of the mean­ ing of a word), or highlighting (of the role/importance of a word in a particular context). The trouble with this kind of approach is twofold. First, the notion of 'emphasis' gives rise to considerable demarcation problems, particularly with regard to the particle ge, which, likewise, is said to have an emphasizing func­ tion. In other words, the range of the description in terms of 'emphasis' may well comprise more examples than is desirable. Second, the concept of 'emphasis' is in itself problematic, both from a definitory and from a linguistic point of view. The following citation from Kühner-Gerth (1904:168) may serve as an illustration of both problems:

8

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER (17) "Per stimmt mit ge darin überein, dass es, wie dieses, eine Mehrung ausdrückt; weicht aber darinvonge ab, dass es die Mehrung extensiv (also das Mass, die Grösse, den Umfang des Begriffes), ge dagegen die Mehrung intensiv (also den Grad, die innere Stärke eines Begriffes, so stark er ist) bezeichnet. Per dient also eigentlich dazu, einen Begriff seinem Umfange nach hervorzuheben, sodann auch überhaupt einen Begriff hervorzuheben",

The gist of this unclear passage seems to be that an original meaning of per, in whichpersomehow reflects some property of the 'thing' ("Begriff') referred to, has evolved into an emphasizing ('highlighting') one. This distinction seems to be similar to Denniston's distinction between an intensive and a determinative use of the particle. But whether we speak of the emphasis which is lent by per and ge to a given constituent 'X' in terms of a certain property of the referent of 'X', or in terms of the importance of 'X' in the sentence (which are, obvious­ ly, two very different things), we do not throw any light on the demarcation of both particles. Kühner-Gerth's differentation of per and ge cannot be called successful, as it is very hard to operationalize it. I doubt whether there exists a contrastive pair 'Xper and 'Xge' in which the addition of pernbunequivocally at­ tributed to the size of X and the additionofge to its 'degree'. Besides, a lot of linguistic problems are involved in Kühner-Gerth's idea of "Mehrung". For ex­ ample, are we to assume that the addition ofper to a constituent is the expres­ sion of an objective property of the referent of 'X', or is it dependent on what the speaker wants to express? In the second case we essentially take the thoughts of the language user about what he says (or the way he envisages the things he refers to) as the explanation of how he expresses his thoughts in lan­ guage. But the only way to know these thoughts is to look at how they are ex­ pressed. Clearly, there is a dangerous core of circular reasoning in this approach. But in the case of the kind of emphasis which is connected with the im­ portance of a given constituent in a given sentence, it is not easy either to dif­ ferentiateperfromge within the framework suppUed by the authors mentioned above. According to Monro (21891:320), for example, the differentiation runs as follows: "Ge is used, like per, to emphasize a particular word or phrase. It does not however intensify the meaning, or insist on the fact as true, but only calls attention to the word or fact, distinguishing it from others." What is described here as the difference between per and ge is exactly the difference between Denniston's intensive and determinative usesofper. Consequently, it may be asked what the difference is betweenge and this determinative use (or Monteil's central meaning of per, see note 5). As long as the vague term Q

INTRODUCTION

9

'emphasis' is not further specified than 'intensification' or 'highlighting', it is unlikely that a satisfactory answer to this question can be attained. 1.3.2 Concession and strengthening The second major approach to Homeric per can be dealt with under the heading 'concession'. Concession is commonly considered to be the central meaning of per; this is understandable, for the great majority of the instances of Homeric per occurs in circumstantial participial phrases which have a con­ cessive adverbial function in the sentence, see exx. (6)-(10) in 1.2 above. The combination of per with a participle is the most frequent and conspicuous ex­ pression-type ofperin Homer. But 'concession' appUes to other, less frequent, but no less characteristic, uses of per as well, notably to the use of per in nonrestrictive relative clauses (see ex. (3) above) and in conditionals (see ex. (11)). The kind of problem connected with the term 'emphasis' does not occur in the case of 'concession': the application of the term is reasonably clear. 'Concession' does not pose the kind of demarcation problems that are con­ nected with 'emphasis' either: the instances to which it applies form a welldefined group; there is no risk of including instances of ge. However, other questions arise. In itself the statement that 'participle + per' is a concessive ad­ verbial element may be considered uncontroversial, but (i) what is exactly the contribution ofper to the concession, and (ii) how are the concessive instances of per related to the substantial minority of seemingly non-concessive instan­ ces (for instance (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) above)? In regard to the first question, the position commonly held may be described as follows. Between a circumstantial participle and the clause to which it is attached a number of semantic ('logical') relations may be distin­ guished, one of which is 'concession'. A concessive relation between a par­ ticiple and a clause can be strengthened by particles, one of which is per. Thus, to say that per is concessive means essentially that per strengthens the conces­ sive relation between a participle and a main clause. This kind of description, in which the logico-semantic relation of 'concession' is considered to be 'prior' to per and its function, is especially characteristic of French literature: Chantraine (1953: 320-1) discusses per in connection with concessive participles, implying that a concessive participle may or may not be accompaniedbyper. Likewise, Oguse (1962:133-143) dis­ cusses concessive participles in the first place, the presence or absence of per apparently being immaterial for the concession. Monteil's (1963: 163) posi-

10

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

tion, finally, is the most explicit: "Une nuance logique est ainsi tout au plus souligné par per; elle n'est pas exprimé lexicalement par la particule." However, this account of the concession in 'participle + per9 is contest­ able, not only from the point of view ofper and its description (as we shall see), but also from the point of view of the description of the circumstantial par­ ticiple in Ancient Greek. To posit that a particular logico-semantic relation be­ tween a participle and a main clause is expressed by the participle is questionable, since participles, unlike adverbial subclauses, simply have no means to express a given relation lexically and overtly. The crucial feature of participles is precisely that they are unspecified as to their relation with the main clause (as well as their dependence on the main clause), see further 4.1. Thus the function ofper in partiicipial phrases has to be reexamined. If the participle does not by itself express the concessive relation, the description of per in the participial phrase as a strengthener loses its point too. An investiga­ tion of the division of labor within the participial phrase involves, furthermore, an account of a second particle: kai (see exx. (8)-(9) in 1.2 above). When kai is present, it usually precedes the participle, while per follows it. Some authors treat kai in these situations as a more or less meaningless strengthener (the strengthened element being per), while others attribute to per and kai distinct meanings/functions. The demarcation problems which are inherent in this situation require a systematic description of the respective roles ofper and kai in the participial phrase. The instances of per to which 'concession' applies are the most frequent in the data-base, but there is a substantial minority of instances of Homeric per that do not occur in a concessive adverbial phrase (participle or subclause). This leads to the second question mentioned above: how are the concessive in­ stances related to the other instances? If this question cannot be satisfactorily answered, the approach to per in terms of 'concession' will turn out to yield a description with a too narrow scope: it applies only to a part of the material, leaving in the dark what the instances belonging to this part have in common with the remaining instances. But also when one considers concession as a separate 'sense' of per (see Denniston 1954:484), rather than as its central meaning, one has to state what this 'sense' has in common with the other senses, for the very point of a division in 'senses' is that there is one property which all the senses have in common. This common property, however, is not provided by Denniston.16

INTRODUCTION

11

In fact, the two questions considered in this section are interrelated. A lack of precision in the determination of what per contributes to the concession may easily lead to an account of per in which the relation between the conces­ sive and the non-concessive instances is neglected. In general, we may say that most accounts of per fail to bring unity and coherence anyway into the descrip­ tion of the wide array of uses of Homeric per as presented in 1.2. In (not) doing this, they do no justice to what seems to me, generally, an important methodological principle in descriptive linguistics, viz. unification, the assump­ tion that linguistic items, as long as the contrary has not been proved, have one basic meaning, which is the common denominator of all the different senses or uses of the item. In the course of this study, I shall argue (and show) that a sys­ tematic description ofper has the unifying effect which is lacking in the accounts mentioned. 133 Fraenkel: "per heisst 'auch"' One account of per deserves to be discussed in its own right, rather than under a general heading. This is Fraenkel (1925). Despite some dubious as­ sumptions and questionable steps in the argument, Fraenkel's account is the only one in which per is discussed, albeit implicitly, as what it actually is, viz. a focus particle (see 2.3). Fraenkel straightforwardly equates per with German 'auch' ('also'): "per heisst 'auch'". This equation leads him to assert that the concession is a consequence of the presenceofper, rather than a separate sense oftheparticle(1925:7): (18) "Der Inhalt des Partizips steht im Gegensatz zu dem übrigen Satze, und das per besagt ausdrücklich, dass 'auch' unter diesen Umständen die Sache so ist oder geschah. So bekommt das ganze Gefüge einen Konzessiven Sinn, und da es zum habituellen Schema wurde, konnte diese Bedeutung sich fest darin einwurzeln. An ihr erhielt nun auch das Wort per seinen Anteil, und erwarb so die Fähigkeit, konzessive Farbe leicht anzunehmen, obwohl sie ihm von Haus aus nicht eignet."

The advantages of this approach are considerable. Not only is the role ofper in the expression-type participle + per' better described this way (both from a synchronic and from a diachronic point of view); the description of the conces­ sion as the standardized consequence of auch has also an immediate unifying effect. A number of instances for which the other descriptions have no better solution than the emphasis approach (see 1.3.1), such as (1) and (2) in 1.2, are better accounted for when we conceive of per as 'auch'.

12

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

However, Fraenkel's approach raises considerable problems as well. For one thing, the apodictic equation of per with auch may suggest that both par­ ticles have the same semantics and distributional properties. But this is not so. A given instance of 'auch X' is not without more ado equivalent to 'Xper' The equivalence is conditional; it depends on a number of factors. And only when we have determined these factors are we on our way towards a real description. When viewed this way, Fraenkel's account is not a description at all, but a 'pretheoretical' equation ofper with a word which simply happens to fit many pas­ sages well in a translation. The second problem one encounters when dealing with Fraenkel's ac­ count is connected with the first one; it concerns, again, the delimitation oiper with regard to the particle kai. When per is 'auch', what are we to do with kai, which is, after all, the normal Greek expression of 'auch'? That both particles have the same value is for Fraenkel beyond dispute. Rather, he contends that it is the frequent collocation of both particles that should be accounted for (1925:12): ( 19) "iWie kann per, wenn, es 'auch' bedeutet, so oft neben dem gleichbedeutenden kai stehn? Nun, doppelter Ausdruck desselben Begriffes oder derselben Vorstellung ist stets im Sprachleben üblich. Die Wörter haben wie die Münzen nicht nur ein Stempel und Sinn, sondern auch ein Gewicht; und wenn sie abgegriffen sind, werden sie leichter. So muss man, wenn man voll zahlen oder reichlich zahlen will, oft noch zulegen." (Emphasis added).

On the basis of the assumption that per and kai have the same meaning, Fraenkel asserts that their frequent collocation has to be accounted for in terms of strengthening. Admittedly, the notion of 'strengthening' covers a set of phenomena in actual language use which cannot be ignored. And it applies to many collocations oiper and kai, for example, (8) and (9) in 1.2.18 But a closer look at the data-base reveals that the relations between per and kai are much more subtle and diverse than Fraenkel claims. There are many cases in which per and kai have functions that clearly differ from one another, for instance exx. (3) and (6) above. To recognize these cases as such and distinguish them from the cases where mere strengthening obtains and/or where per and kai are in­ terchangeable is one of the main tasks with which the investigation of per is faced. 1.3.4 Etymology and diachrony Among all the uncertainty and disagreement about the meaning of per, there is one uncontroversial point: the particle has a clear etymology. But this

INTRODUCTION

13

raises new problems, for the meaning associated with this etymology cannot easily be exemplified, according to some authors (Fraenkel, Denniston), on the basis of the instances ofper as we find them in Homer. In itself a disconnection between the actual use and the original (etymological) meaning of a given lin­ guistic sign need not be a problem for the descriptive linguist.19 But the point in the present case is that there is no apparent disconnection. In itself the etymology oiper may be considered perspicuous. It is general­ ly accepted that per is cognate to perì. The preposition peri normally means 'all round'. It is often used adverbially in Homer (see Monro 21891:172) with the meaning 'exceedingly'.21 As a preverb peri most often means 'around', but it may have the 'intensive' sense as well: peri-einai, peri-gignomai - 'be supe­ rior', 'surpass'). The 'intensive' meaning may be attributed toper- as a prefix in Latin: permagnus, perclarus ('very big, clear'). Accordingly, the original meaning of the particleperis supposed to be in the superlative sphere, too. The instances of per which allegedly best reflect this 'original' use are grouped by Denniston (1954: 481) together under the heading 'intensive use' (on which see also 1.3.1). Denniston's intensive examples (one of which is (14) above) form a very limited group which stands more or less isolated among the other uses he dis­ tinguishes. He therefore posits a diachronic gap between the original, etymological use on the one hand and the extant, observable uses on the other, thereby implicitly treating his 'intensive' instances as relicts of the earlier, ex­ tinct use: "The use of the particle which best supports this etymology, its inten­ sifying use with adjectives and adverbs, is in fact the most difficult of all to exemplify. The primary use must have been metamorphosed before the time of the earliest extant Greek literature" (p. 481). Similarly, Fraenkel disconnects the extant Homeric uses from the com­ monly accepted etymology: "die Zusammenstellung mit perì 'sehr' versagt ja hoffnungslos gegenüber den wirklichen Gebrauchsweisen vonper" (p. 12). Evi­ dently, an intensifying ("urgierend") use oiper is  compatible with Fraenkel's equation oiper with auch. He therefore dismisses it altogether, positing instead that the meaning 'auch' is semantically derived from 'darüber hinaus' ('beyond') as a separate senseofperi. This solution is ingenious, but gratuite in so far as it depends on 'auch' as the meaning oiper. Now we may say, as a general principle, that claims about the diachrony of a given item have to be based on synchronic research. Diachronic claims presuppose synchronic claims, not vice versa. When we cannot state what two items have in common in the synchronic dimension, we cannot do so either in

14

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

the diachronic dimension. Accordingly, when we say that Denniston's and Fraenkel's claim about the etymology and diachronic development of per is dubious, this amounts to saying that they have not described the extant uses of the particle in a satisfactory way. In the present study I will show that it is pos­ sible to reconcile Fraenkel's thesis (viz. that the meaning of per has to be described in connection with 'focus particles' like 'auch') with the original in­ tensifying meaning which is suggested by etymology. In other words, the central synchronic meaning of per in Homer combines elements from the kind of par­ ticle to which 'auch' belongs and from 'superlativeness' and 'intensification'. The description of the expression-type to which exx. (1) and (2) in 1.2 belong will occupy a central place in this reconciliation. As for Denniston's 'intensive' instances, given that the majority of the in­ stances of per can be described in such a way that no conflict with the apparent etymology arises, this group loses its justification as a separate category. Ac­ tually, some of Denniston's intensive cases can be easily accounted for within the framework presented in the present study, while others (like (14) above) are highly atypical. In ch. 7 below I will argue that they are not 'old' at all, let alone relicts of an extinct meaning. Thus there is no need to assume a lost original meaning, because the ex­ amples by which it is allegedly exemplified can be accounted for otherwise. But this does not mean that the instances of Homeric per are, as regards diachrony, a homogeneous mass. Actually, there are clear diachronic relations between, and developments within, the various uses of per, 'Concession', for example, cannot be properly discussed outside the diachronic dimension, because it is in the first place the result of something (viz. scalarity). That the authors dealing with per (with the notable exception of Fraenkel, see (18) above) have not been able to recognize this diachronic development is due, again, to their unsatis­ factory accounts in the synchronic dimension. 1.4 Categories and prototypes In the present section I introduce a principle which is indispensable in lin­ guistic investigations like the present one, viz. the notionofprototypicality. This notion involves a distinction between the central, characteristic (prototypical) instances of a given linguistic item and the less characteristic, peripheral ones. When speaking in terms of prototypicality, we conceive of 'having a certain meaning or function' as a matter of 'more or less' rather than as a matter of 'yes or no'. Prototypicality (or 'Prototype Theory') originates from cognitive psychology, where the insight has been developed that human categorization

INTRODUCTION

15

(i.e. the grouping together, as a matter of cognitive economy, of a range of separate phenomena under one label) does not yield discrete, but continuous and overlapping categories (see Rosch 1973,1978). The introduction of 'prototypicality' in linguistic studies may have a pure­ ly practical motivation. When we study the use of a given item in a given cor­ pus of text(s) and devise a framework within which the instances of that item can be described or classified, we will often, if not always, discover that there are instances to which the description does not, or not fully, apply, or which defy clear-cut classification. These instances may be seen as a 'residue', which is left after all the clear and easily classifiable instances have been dealt with. There are three things we can do when we have to deal with such a residue. First, we can do no less than reject our entire descriptional apparatus. But this is, all other things being equal, a very drastic thing to do, for the apparatus was devised not for nothing: it does after all fully apply to the majority of the in­ stances in question. As a second possibility we might try to explain the residue away or discard it as irrelevant. But this is not attractive either, for the very reason that we have chosen to study the actual use ( = all the instances, not a selection) of the item in the corpus. The third solution lies in taking the ex­ istence of the residue for granted, thereby accepting what Givón (1984:12) ex­ presses as follows: (20) "Categories conform to their basic definition in the majority of cases, and rules obey their strict description more likely than not. But there is always a certain amount of messy residue left, one that does not seem to fit into the category/rule in the strictest sense of their definition."

The third solution is therightone when one is prepared to take the data-base as seriously as possible. It involves positing a continuimi ('scale') along which the instances of the item under study can be ordered by degree of decreasing prototypicality. Prototypicality in linguistic studies involves, I think, two concepts, gradience and neutralization. These two concepts are interrelated, but they should be kept distinct. 'Gradience' applies to the internal structure of categories and to the semantic fields of linguistic items, while 'neutralization' may be used when we view the relations between linguistic categories in the light of Prototype Theory. I start with 'gradience'. In the traditional, logic-based theories of categorization, membership of a category is a matter of 'yes or no'. The properties which determine inclusion in a given category are stated in terms of a 'checklist', to the effect that, given four properties a, b, c and d, and a category X, any candidate member of 'X'

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

16

has to possess all four properties if it is to be called a member of 'X'.27 In Prototype Theory, on the other hand, there is no place for checklists. Instead, membership of a category has to be stated here in terms of intersections: given four properties, a, b, c and d, and a category X, any member of 'X' may have any one of the four properties in isolation, two of them, three or all four. This account of the internal constituency of categories automatically leads to gradience, because the members of a category can be ordered by the number of prototypical properties which they possess. Schematically (borrowed from Givón 1984: 14): (21)

The dark area is the focal area, where the prototypical instances of the category have to be located. These instances have all the prototypical properties. The instances that have only one property, by contrast, are peripheral;28 they form the residue meant in (20) above.

INTRODUCTION

17

To speak in terms of Prototype Theory does not only affect our account of the internal structure of categories. It also has consequences for how we con­ ceive of the relation between two categories. Since categories are known by their prototypical instances, we may say that to distinguish category 'A' from category 'B' is to distinguish the prototypical instances of 'A' from those of 'B'. This is unproblematic. But how are we to conceive of the relation between the peripheral instances of both categories? In the original field of appHcation of Prototype Theory, cognitive psychology, it is customary to speak in terms of overlap here: two categories may display a certain amount of overlap, to the ef­ fect that they are not only internally continuous, but also externally, with regard to each other. For this conception there is prima facie evidence, in the exist­ ence of, for example, peripheral instances of the category 'chair' which may be characterized as peripheral instances of the category 'table' as well. In other words, in such cases there might arise controversy as to which category a given object belongs. In the case of linguistic categories, on the other hand, matters are dif­ ferent. Members belonging to linguistic categories can be ordered by degree of decreasing prototypicality in the same way as members of 'perceived world categories'. But the important thing is that this gradience cannot be perceived: as to theirform all instances of linguistic categories are similar. In the categories 'Verb' and 'Noun', for example, all instances are morphosyntactically marked as verbs and nouns, no matter how peripheral they are. Likewise, in lexical semantics, the most peripheral instance of a given lexeme is as to its form iden­ tical to the prototypical instances. It follows that 'overlap' as the characteriza­ tion of the relation between two categories has much less application in linguistics than in cognitive psychology. For in linguistics the peripheral instan­ ces are just as different from one another as the prototypical ones. There is no question of an instance of a linguistic category being indistinguishable from in­ stances of other categories. Instead of 'overlap', neutralization seems to be the appropriate concept to deal with the border-line area between two linguistic categories. Two peripheral instances of two neighboring categories are never indistinguishable, but we may say that in these instances the difference that exists between the prototypical cases of their respective categories is neutralized, or in any case

18

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

minimized. Thus, peripheral instances of neighboring categories may be sub­ stituted for one another without essential differences in meaning, at least to a far higher degree than their prototypical counterparts. This is reflected in speakers' varying opinions as to whether 'A' or 'B' is the right expression in a given context. It is not difficult to apply the prototypicality framework to the study ofper already at the present stage in the exposition of the argument. In 1.31 have ar­ gued that per has not satisfactorily been described. In the Ught of Prototype Theory, this means that the prototypical properties ofper have not been recog­ nized as such. It is easy to see that this has serious consequences. When we are unable to distinguish the prototypical instances from the peripheral ones, our description lacks conviction and runs the risk of losing all sense of direction. The demarcation problems connected with the 'emphasis'-approach which I have mentioned (see 1.3.1) are highly typical in this connection. For demarca­ tion problems typically arise when we mistake the peripheral instances for the prototypical ones. Thus it is not the existence of demarcation problems as such that should be objected to, for the existence of the borderline cases that cause these problems is undeniable, see exx. (12)-(14) above, as well as the examples in ch. 7. The point is that the demarcation problems need not, and should not, arise in the delimitation ofper as a whole. For this delimitation is made on the basis of the prototypical instances, which are maximally distinct from the prototypi­ cal instances of the neighboring ge and kai. The business of describing the meaningofper amounts thus to describing the prototypical instances of the par­ ticle. In the process of this description, which will occupy the greater part of this study (chapters 2-6), a number of essential properties will emerge, which will serve as a set of prototypical features by which the degree of peripherality of the remaining cases (the 'residue') may be determined (see chapter 7). Ex­ amples like (12)-(14) will thus appear to be a great deal less prototypical than examples like (1)-(2).32 1.5 Linguistics and formulas in Homer Prototype Theory predicts that no description of a given linguistic item can ever be expected to cover all the instances of the item (in the case of a textcorpus as data-base) or all possible instances (in the case of 'living' linguistic material), simply because not all members of a category are prototypical. This applies toper too. But in the case ofper there are some complications, because the nature of the data-base ('Homer') is such that it is likely to have effects

INTRODUCTION

19

upon the nature and composition of the residue, the group of less than prototypical instances. The complicating nature of 'Homer' as a data-base for linguistic research is the subject of the present section. The Iliad and Odyssey are oral-formulaic texts. Despite some complicat­ ing factors, such as the degree of sophistication in plot and characterization dis­ played by the poems, this statement may be considered fairly uncontroversial (at least in the Anglo-Saxon world). The formularity of the Homeric poems is, equally uncontroversially, the consequence of the fact that they are the product and very probably the culmination of a tradition of oral poetry. The oral provenance of Homer has important consequences for the linguistic form of the Iliad and the Odyssey, not only on the level of the phrase (word group), the level where most of the acknowledged 'formulas' have to be situated, but also on lower levels (the word) and higher levels (the verse, sentence, paragraph, theme, etc.). In the present study I am, as regards oral poetry phenomena, primarily interested in the level of the phrase (formula) and of the verse. On the phrase/formula-level the implications, for linguistic studies, of the oral-formulaic provenance of Homer may be stated as follows. A given phrase, which has a function as a formula in the diction, may at times be used by a poet, under formular pressure in oral performance, under semantic and syntactic cir­ cumstances for which it was not devised originally. In those cases, the less than optimal well-formedness of the resulting expression has to be discussed, strict­ ly speaking, in terms of the use of formulas in epic diction, rather than in terms of ordinary syntax and semantics. I refer to the use of a formula in a context for which it was not originally devised as the 'imperfect semantic integration' of that formula (see further 5.2, 6.3.1.4 and 7.1). Imperfect semantic integration is a useful concept in the linguistic study of (Greek) epic poetry, but it must be added at this stage already that it is very difficult to determine its exact role. Any alleged case of bad semantic integra­ tion of a formula may in principle always be a peripheral, less than prototypi­ cal instance of the phrase in question. And it is often impossible, to determine whether 'irregularity' in epic poetry is due to the 'jeu de formules' in the oral performance or to theflexibilitywhich is inherent anyway in language. It seems to be a good policy, then, to treat '(bad) semantic integration' as a factor in the discussion of 'irregular' instances, which may operate simultaneously with prototypicality. It is dangerous to treat it as a separate explanatory label. Be­ sides, there is the more reason to do so because the concept of 'formula' is in itself a definitely gradient phenomenon. 'Being a formula' and 'not being a

20

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

formula' are not mutually exclusive affairs, but the two extremes of an exten­ sive scale. On the more formal level of metrics and the verse, the basically oral na­ ture of Homeric poetry is an important factor too. The dactylic hexameter is not an easy verse-type for the Greek language. And the oral poet, in addi­ tion, is under constant time pressure: in oral composition the metrical space has to be rapidly filled without interruption. This may give rise to the existence of 'stop-gaps' of various kinds, words or phrases whose use or length is metri­ cally motivated. In 5.3.21 will show that the particle kai may be used as such a word. The distribution of kai in participial phrases with per (see exx. (8)-(9)) can be explained within the framework of the set of rules and tendencies that constitute the dactylic hexameter. But it does by no means follow that we are entitled to say that a given word whose occurrence is metrically motivated would not have been used outside metrical space. Metrically motivated words are often redundant: they do not contribute anything essential to the (meaning of the) context in which they occur. But then words in ordinary, non-formulaic language are often redun­ dant, too. Redundance is a typical property of instances belonging to the peripheral area of semantic fields, and it is the common denominator of many strengthening phenomena in language. Thus, it seems to be, again, a good policy to avoid treating a given peripheral and 'redundant' instance {of per or kai or any other particle or word) as exclusively due to the dactylic hexameter and its exigencies. Beside formulas and metrics there is a third important factor in the lin­ guistic study of Homer. Homeric poetry tends to display the co-existence of old and young elements to a higher extent than non-formular language. The typi­ cally epic projection of the diachronic dimension onto synchronic space has in the last resort an oral-formulaic motivation: an element or expression-type belonging to older diachronic strata of the language may be preserved in the diction (especially when it is an old formula) because a contemporaneous equivalent (metrically and/or semantically) expression which can replace it has not yet been found. But 'archaism' may also become an end in itself, originat­ ing from a desire of poets to lend dignity to their diction. The diachronic aspect of the Homeric language is an important subject in the present study, because it is unlikely that the wide array of uses of per has been synchronically productive in the ordinary language at one and the same time. The knowledge that 'diachrony' is all-pervasive in the Homeric language may be seen as a useful and even necessary background for the description of

INTRODUCTION

21

per, in that it is conducive to the assumption that there are diachronic relations between, and developments within, the various uses. But 'epic diachrony' remains a mere foil for this assumption; I will not discuss it for its own sake, leaving aside the many intricacies which it possesses.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1) The 'concessive' instances ofper in post-Homeric Greek are atypical in that they are not instances of 'subordinator +per';they have the form 'kaţper + participle' (functioning as a concessive adverbial element: even though). 2) See for this and other numerical facts the Appendix at the end of this book. 3) Oude in (6) is equivalent to kai in a negative context: not even. This is more accurate than saying that oude is the negative counterpart of kai, see 2.4.1 below. 4) It is fair to note that the authors cited in this part of the doxography (with the excep­ tion of Monteil, see the following note) do not commit themselves entirely to the 'emphasis' ap­ proach: they distinguish other usesofper as well, notably the concessive one, see below, 1.3.2). 5) See also Monteil (1963:163-4): "Per est un moyen à la fois lexical et économique d'attirer sur un mot l'attention, d'en faire un point d'orgue. (...) Ainsi compris, per est une sorte de signe diacritique oral; il n'intensifie pas l'idée d'une qualité ou d'un procès, mais signale avec insis­ tence l'importance, dans l'enchaînement des faits, d'une notion, quelle qu'elle soit." And Ruijgh (1971:444): "Homère emploie parfois la particule (...) pour souligner un mot (ou un groupe de mots) dans le cadre de la phrase." 6) The first value ('intensification') is the one which is associated with the etymology of per. See 1.3.4 below. 7) Notice that Kühner-Gerth in this passage explicitly deny per the characterization 'intensive', attributing it instead to ge. This is very strange, for just before the passage cited they say: "Die Grundbedeutung vonper ist: durch und durch, durchaus, aber nicht in Beziehung auf den Raum, sondern auf den Grad {durchaus, sehr) und die Umstände {jedenfalls)" To my mind this passage flatly contradicts the one cited in the text, where "Raum" ("Grosse") is attributed to per and "Grad" (and, consequently, an 'intensive' meaning) to ge. 8) But Denniston does not posit a diachronic relationship between the two uses. 9) 'Participle + ge' is not a well-defined andfixedexpression-type. And incidental instan­ ces of 'participle + ge' do not by themselves have a concessive meaning. 10) See Goodwin (1889: 336), Kühner-Gerth (1904: 77). 11) See also Oguse (1968). 12) The idea that participles express the various semantic relationships is deeply ingrained in many accounts of the Greek participle. Goodwin (1889:336) goes even as far as to call con­ cession a separate sense of the participle. For 'sense' and the implications of the use of this term, see below. 13) E.g. Kühner-Gerth 1904:170 and Fraenkel (1925:13). 14) Denniston (21954: 486): "Often the participial clause opens with kai. Kai.per then means 'even though', kai marking the climax and per the concession", and Chantraine (1953: 320-1), more explicitly: "Les deux particules sont disjointes: kai marque la progression et per l'opposition." Notice, incidentally, that distinct functions need not necessarily preclude strengthening: 'even though' in English is 'stronger' than 'though', even though 'even' and 'though' have a different meaning.

24

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

15) Of course, it is in principle always possible that two alleged senses simply have noth­ ing in common. In that case we have to speak in terms of homonymy. However, the decision to call two words homonymous (i.e. lexically entirely distinct) has to be postponed as long as pos­ sible. As long as there is the slightest similarity, we should speak in terms of polysemy, the pos­ session by one lexeme of two or more related senses. In practice it is often hard to determine whether two identical words are homonyms or two related sense of one lexeme. Often diachronic factors are involved. See Ruijgh (1971:102), Lyons (1977: 550 ff.) and in general Cruse (1986: 68 ff.). 16) Kühner-Gerth implicitly provide a common property, in that they assert that concessiveper emphasizes oppositions ("Zuweilen dient es ( = per) dazu, Gegensätze hervorzuheben"). But this solution suffers heavily, of course, from the opacity of the term 'Hervorhebung', see above, 1.3.1. 17) My principle of 'unification' has much in common with one of the two types of diagram­ matic iconicity in language distinguished by Haiman (1983:115-6), viz. isomorphism, the ten­ dency for there to be a one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning of the linguistic sign. Haiman's isomorphism is a reformulation of the classical Saussurean account of the lin­ guistic sign. For a discussion of Haiman's isomorphism in the light of a modern branch of Saus­ surean linguistics (viz. the 'Columbia School', or 'Form-Content analysis', see the articles in Klein-Andrieu, ed. (1983)) see Kirsner (1985). 18) But mere 'strengthening' is not sufficient to fully account for the distribution of kai in the expression-type 'participle + pef in Homer. See 5.3.2 below. 19) The etymological connections of a given item need not have any bearing on the actual use of that item, and in the case of particles etymology can often be dismissed. This is why the discussions of particles in Schwyzer-Debrunner (1950: for per. 553 ff.) is of no much use. These authors are more interested in the etymology and Indo-European connections of the Greek par­ ticles than in their actual use. Similarly, the subdivisions of the class of particles in BrugmannThumb (1913: 607 ff.) are entirely etymologically motivated. 20) See Frisk (1960-72: s.v.), Chantraine (1968 ff: s.v.), Brugman-Thumb (1913: 629) and many other authors. In Aeolic as well as in other dialects perì appearsasper. This form is com­ monly described as a derivation of peri (by way of apocope, see Buck (1955: 81)), but it may in principle be a genuine old element. 21) It is not difficult to state what these two 'senses' have in common: "Die Vorstellung dass etwas rings umher geschieht und keine Richtung ausgeschlossen ist, ergab den Begriff der Vollstandigkeit oder des hohen Grades." (Brugmann-Thumb 1913: 513). 22) Momo (1891:172) citis boulêiperiidmenai allôn ('knowing in council beyond others'). 23) Cf.lsoparumper,paulisper ('a (very?) short while'). For a discussion of the possible connections between these forms and Greek minuntha per, see 7.1.1 below. 24) Exactly the same applies to Monro's (1891:320) collection of intensive instances. Some of these are normal cases, and others highly uncharacteristic (i.e. lacking most of the important properties of per). Denniston's and Monro's collection of intensive instances are, incidentally, by no means identical. This fact alone should raise doubts as to the reality of this category. 25) One might ask how uses that have to be assigned to different diachronic strata come to be used side by side in one and the same text. This question will be briefly discussed in 1.5 below.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

25

26) The typical escape from this problem in Transformational Grammar is the com­ petence-performance- distinction. In this theory the 'fuzzy' and unclassifiable linguisticc phenomena exist only on the level of 'performance' and are as such of no importance, since on this level language is merely real and therefore imperfect. What really matters in this concep­ tion is 'competence', viz. language seen as a set of exceptionless rules in the brain of the ideal speaker. Criticism of the competence-performance distinction (and related theorems) in Givón (1979: ch. 1) and in Baker & Hacker (1984: 281 ff.). In Givón (1982) it is shown that logically based explanations of and approaches to natural language facts tend to apply only to the most extreme (prototypical) cases. But the phenomena that are not amenable to logical analysis are very numerous in any language and cannot be ignored. 27) This checklist constitutes, in logical terms, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. For a discussion of 'checklist' theories of meaning and prototypicality see Fillmore (1975). 28) The four properties that determine the category may, of course, be hierarchically or­ dered, to the effect that a member possessing property 'a' may have a higher degree of prototypicality than a member possessing 'b'. 29) Givón (1984: 14-7) describes prototypicality as a compromise between two extreme theories of categorization. On the one hand there is what he calls the 'Platonic' point of view, in which all the members of a category have all the criterial properties of that category. The other extreme is the 'Wittgensteinian' point of view (characterizable in terms of 'family resemblance'), in which often none of the members possess all properties, as in the case of a category with the following members: ABC, BCD, CDE, DEF, etc. In Prototype Theory some of the members have all the properties, the others being peripheral. 30) For prototypicality and the categories 'Verb' and 'Noun' see Hopper & Thompson (1985). 31) Sometimes (e.g. König 1986) the concepts of 'overlap' and 'neutralization' are used indiscriminately. In the light of the above argument, this usage turns out to be imprecise. 32) Notice that prototypicality does not only apply to the semantic field ofper as a whole, but also to specific expression-types in which the particle occurs. It will be possible, for example, to define the prototypical features of 'participle + pef and to set off the prototypical instances of that expression-type against the less prototypical ones (see 4.3). 33) The work of Milman Parry was pioneering here: Parry (1928a) explores and proves the existence of formulas in Homer, and Parry (1930,1932) explains the existence of formulas by ascribing them to the oral nature of 'Homer'. 34) Note that this idea is in itself by no means a new one: from the preface of Chantraine (1953): "L'Iliade et I'Odyssée sont (..) des oeuvres littéraires qui se sont développés par les procédés d'un style oral, au moyen de la technique des formules épiques. H en résulte que telle formule, employée en un passage donné, peut être transférée ailleurs où elle convient moins bien." 35) This is one of the reasons why there is still no definitory agreement on the concept of 'formula'. See 5.1 below. 36) Throughout this study my approach to hexameter metrics will be synchronic and not diachronic. Consequently, I will refrain from the vexed question concerning the origin and the Indo-European connections of this verse-type.

26

LINGmSTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

37) We may say that, as a general rule, an element whose function it is to strengthen another element, like kai in participial phrases, is a peripheral instance of its category. 38) The diachronic aspect of Greek epic diction is a very complicated affair, which is in­ timately connected with the various dialectal stages (Mycenaean, Aeolic, Ionic) through which the epic tradition has gone, 'Diachrony' affects all the domains of the language system: syntax and semantics, morphology and phonology. For a seminal discussion see Parry (1932). See also Chantraine (1948: 89 ff.) and Ruijgh (1957). In Bakker (1988b) I discuss some phonological phenomena in the light of epic diachrony.

2 THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

2.0 Introduction In the present chapter I present the theoretical background for the dis­ cussion of per as a scalar particle. The notion of scalarity appears to be the key semantic concept in the study ofHomericper. To recognize it has a strong unify­ ing effect on the description; it provides the link between the numerous con­ cessive instances of the particle and a number of other instances which are unrelated atfirstblush (see for 'unification' 1.3.2 above). 'Scalarity' is the single most important prototypical feature (see 1.4) of per, instances of per that are not scalar are definitely more peripheral than instances that lack other, less im­ portant, prototypical features. The scalar backgroimd of the description ofper involves, among other things, an account of the particle even in English. The semantics of even are to some extent cognate to that of per, and a number of expression-types to which per belongs cannot be properly discussed without reference to even and its semantics, simply because the particle kai, the Greek equivalent of even, plays a role in them. Furthermore, an account of the semantics of the scalar particle even is necessary for the delimitation ofper and kai. As a preliminary to this delimita­ tion, I introduce in the present chapter (2.2.2) the distinction between 'intension' and 'extension'. As will be shown, this distinction lies at the basis of the difference between even and the so-called 'scalar superlative' (see 2.1.2). This difference, in its turn, points the way to the delimitation ofper and kai in chapters 3 and 4.

28

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

2.1 Scales 2.1.1 Scalarity: introductory Consider, as a start, the following example ( = ex. (2) in 1.2 above): (1) smerdale' eurôenta, ta te stugeousi theoi per. (The Netherworld): "The hateful Chambers of Decay that fill the (very) gods with horror." (iZ. 20, 65). Onfirstsight we have here a simple statement about the Netherworld: it is as­ serted, in a non-restrictive ('digressive') relative clause, that Hades is feared by the gods, just as we might say about Mt. Olympus that it is inhabited by the gods. However, the statement of this simple fact is clearly not the intended meaning of (1). The point is not the mere fact that the Netherworld is feared by the gods, but that it is so dreadful that it is feared even by the gods. The constituent 'the gods' {theoi) is used in (1) in a way which is highly characteristic of Homeric, or, generally, Archaic Greek thought: the gods are not referred to for their own sake; they are mentioned in relation to 'man'. In Homer, 'god' and 'man' may be seen as a binary pair whose contrast is con­ stituted by the presence or absence of immortality. As immortality is natural­ ly associated with 'strength' and 'courage', it is not surprising that 'god' repeatedly implies 'stronger than man'. Consequently, someone who commits himself to the truth of 'The gods are scared of x' will a fortiori commit himself to the truth of 'Men are scared of x'. This piece of the Homeric world view has an interesting linguistic implica­ tion, in that it partly determines the way the substantives 'gods' and 'men' may be used in the language. Gods and men can be conceived of as items on a scale in which 'gods' represents the high point and 'men' its low point, or, better, a lower point. Thus we may say that 'the gods' in (1) does not refer to the gods qua gods, but to the gods qua (highest) item on the following scale: (2)

Scalarity is a semantic notion which applies when entities or properties can be ordered on a scale, like gods, men. We may say that between 'gods' and 'men' a scalar relationship obtains. Gods have strength, power and immortality and these properties are frequently measured against the weakness and mor­ tality of man. Accordingly, the items on the scale in (2) can be ordered by de­ gree of decreasing strength. Scalarity and scalar relationships can be encoded

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

29

in language by a number of 'scalarity markers'. It is with one such a marker which is peculiar to Homeric Greek that the present study is concerned.2 Scalar relationships are a kindofparadigmatic relation; they involve the relation between a given item and the item(s) that may be substituted for it. (Of course, when we say that two or more items may be substituted for one another, we allow for differences in meaning between those items.) Paradig­ matic relations may be opposed to syntagmatic relations, which obtain between items belonging to one and the same structure (sentence, noun phrase etc.). Thus between 'Greek' in 'the Greek language' and 'Latin' a paradigmatic rela­ tion is contracted, whereas between 'Greek' and 'language' we have a syntag­ matic relationship. Sometimes it suffices for a paradigmatic relation between two items to exist that both items are of the same grammatical category. In the case of scalar paradigmatic relationships, however, there is a constraint on substitutability in that the substituting item has to share, in addition, a semantic feature with the item substituted for, so that they can be placed on one and the same scale. This semantic feature they have in common is precisely that which is measured in the scale. The notion of substitution is important and will recur later on (see 2.3.1.3 below). The term 'scale' can be dealt with in linguistics in various ways. First, in Prototype Theory as discussed in 1.4, 'scale' may be used in the sense of a con­ tinuum between two extremes. The difference between this kind of scale and the one exemplified by (2) is that in (2) there is only one extreme, all other values being merely 'lower'. Second, we can make use of 'scales' in connection with the notion of 'implicature'. In this approach, which is not practiced in the present study (but see 2.3.1.1 below), the notions of scale and substitution are used to account for certain aspects of (co-operative) language-behavior. Third, scalarity may be used when one is dealing with 'at least' and 'at most9 meanings. Language is often scalar in the sense that a given item 'q', which oc­ cupies an intermediate position on a scale , q, r may allow of the readings 'at least q' ('q, if not p') or 'at most q' ('r in any case, but perhaps q') beside the literal, 'non-scalar' reading ('q'). This kind of scalarity may involve the study of particles like only, but, merely and their equivalents in the various languages. In the present study particles of this class will be called focus particles (see fur­ ther 2.3 below). These three senses/uses of the word 'scale' are concerned with a scale as a whole; in using 'scale' in one of the three senses one is equally interested in the extreme value of the scale and in the lower values. Sometimes one even as-

30

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

sumes two extremes. When using 'scale' as I do in the present chapter, on the other hand, we are only interested in the high point of a scale, all the other values having no identity other than beinglower'.6The scales we are concerned with are imequivocally structured and oriented; they run downwards in one direction from 'strong' to 'weak', or generally: from an extreme, a superlative value to lower values. Just as the scales associated with at least and at most meanings, the 'uni­ que high point scale' can be discussed in connection with particles. These are the kind of particles that are typically concerned with the high point of the scale. The kind of particles that is associated with scales like (2) I will call scalarpar­ ticles (as opposed to merefocus particles). The obvious example of a scalar par­ ticle is even and its equivalents in other languages. 2.1.2 Superlatives: scalar and attributive One of the essential properties of scales as I have defined them is superlativeness. The high point of a scale has, by definition, superlative value. It func­ tions as the high point by virtue of that very value. In English, a typical way to mark scalarity is by means of superlatives. Consider: (3) He could solve the most complex problem. (4) He couldn't solve the simplest problem. Ex. (3) could be taken to mean that the person in question was able, at a par­ ticular occasion, to solve a particular problem, which was more complex than any other problem in the context referred to. Likewise, (4) could be taken to mean literally that the person referred to was able, in a particular context, to solve all the problems present, except the simplest one. In this reading of (3)(4), in which the propositions are taken to refer to a particular state of affairs8 in the past, the superlatives function as simple, referential noun phrases. They refer to a particular problem, which is (perhaps accidentally) either the most complex or the simplest one in the situation in question.9 A more natural reading of (3)-(4), however, is the one in which scalarity is involved. In this reading (3) is taken to mean that the person in question is so clever as to be able to solve any problem presented to him, and (4) that he is so stupid as to be unable to solve any problem. In this reading, the superla­ tive refers, by virtue of its superlative value, to the high point of a scale. As a result, it has implicative force: someone who can solve the most complex problem can solve, by implication, all less complex problems. Likewise, some-

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

31

one to whom (4) applies might provoke the following judgment: 'he can't solve the simplest problem, let alone more complex, ones'. ° Constituents like the most complex (problem) and the simplest (problem) in the reading exx. (3)(-(4) just mentioned I will call henceforth 'scalar superlatives'. In 3.1.1 it will appear that the notion of scalar superlative is the appropriate concept in the description of a small but central group of instan­ ces of Homeric per. It is worth pointing out already at this juncture that scalar superlatives naturally occur, from a pragmatic point of view, in sentences that are used to assert a surprising, extreme, or generally superlative fact. Ex. (3) may be naturally interpreted as an argument for the fact that the person in ques­ tion is exceedingly clever. Thus we may say that scalar superlativeness is in function of the assertion of attributive superlativeness: what the speaker of (3) wants to assert is a superlative property of the person in question, and this su­ perlative property is expressed as an attributive superlative in the proposition for which (3) is an argument ('He is very clever'). 2.1.3 The non-referentiality of scalar superlatives In this and the following subsections I briefly discuss two properties of scalar superlatives which will turn out to be important. First, scalar superlatives are by definition non-referential. In the preferred scalar reading of (3)-(4) above, the speaker does not intend to refer to any particular exceedingly dif­ ficult or easy problem. And, conversely, when he does intend to refer to such a problem, the scalar reading of the superlative irrevocably disappears. We may say that scalar superlatives are categorially non-referential. The scalarity of a superlative is not a gradient phenomenon, to the effect that some scalar superlatives are more scalar than others, and hence more non-referen­ tial. For once we have to speak in terms of sufficient conditionality: all scalar superlatives are non-referential, or, alternatively, whenever a superlative func­ tions as a scalar superlative, it cannot be referential. In other words, nonreferentiality is not a prototypical property of scalar superlatives, but a necessary property. Another property of scalar superlatives, which is related to their nonreferentiality, is their similarity to the quantifier any in English. The scalar superlatives in (3)-(4), for example, behave like the quantifier any. The two su­ perlatives are reflections of what are commonly seen as the two functions of any:12 'the most complex (problem)' in (3) is equivalent to any as a universal quantifier, the person in question being able to solve all problems, and 'the

32

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

simplest (problem)' in (4) is equivalent to any as an existential quantifier, the existence of problems the person in question is able to solve being negated. The similarity of scalar superlatives and any is in itself not very important for the purposes of the present study. It is, however, useful in a discussion of the peculiar behavior of scalar superlatives with regard to negation. In section 2.4 below I will present this discussion (see also 3.4. below). Not only grammatical (morphosyntactic) superlatives allow of a scalar ('quantified') reading. Pragmatic' superlatives may occur in scalar statements, too (cf. Fauconnier 1975a: 353), as appears from (5)

Kasparov couldn't win this position.

(6)

Paul Getty would refuse to buy this painting.

In the preferred reading these examples are not simple assertions about the persons referred to. 'Kasparov' and 'Getty' are not meant to be referential terms here; they are meant to represent the high points of the scales of chess players and millionaires, respectively. Consequently, (5)-(6) are not in the first place propositions conveying information that is important for its own sake. In their scalar reading they are uttered to support (viz. function as an argument for) another, unexpressed, proposition which refers to a 'superlative' state of affairs (see 2.1.2 above), for example: (5)' This position is impossible to win: no one could win it. (6)' This painting is intolerably expensive: anyone would refuse to buy it. 2.1.4 Irrealis modality In the present subsection I discuss another important property of scalar superlatives. The distribution of scalar superlatives is constrained in a remark­ able way: just as superlatives when used as scalar superlatives cannot be referential, so they cannot occur in sentences with what is commonly called specific temporal reference. It will appear that both properties are related. The distributional constraint is not, as is often the case in linguistics, a general ten­ dency (see 1.4 above), but an exceptionless rule. The constraint upon the distribution of scalar superlatives can be best dis­ cussed in terms of the modality of the predicate of the sentence in which the superlative occurs. In this text I will use 'modality' in the broad sense the term is given in the work of Givón (e.g 1973, 1979, 1984). In this sense modality is

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

33

the axis along which propositions are factual or non-factual. In thefirstcase we may speak of realis modality and in the second case of irrealis modality. Realis modality is concomitant with specific temporal reference: the proposition in question refers to an actually obtaining ('existing') state of affairs which is bounded in time and space. In the case of irrealis modality, on the other hand, specific temporal reference is absent. The state of affairs to which the proposi­ tion refers either has no (clear) boundaries along the time-axis or it does not obtain. It will be clear that 'modality' in this sense differs from the term as it is used in the logical tradition. In logic and in logic-based linguistics 'modal' is frequently opposed to 'non-modal', the former being characterized by concepts such as 'necessity' and 'possibility' and the latter by the absence of these no­ tions. In the present study, on the other hand, modality is not conceived of in this binary way, in which the 'modal' is marked with respect to the 'non-modal'. All verbal words, regardless of whether they are morphosyntactically marked for 'mood', are equally regarded as 'modal', some of them being factual and others non-factual. This strategy has considerable advantages in descriptive lin­ guistics. Modality is intimately bound up with the tense-marking of the verbal word. Factual sentences tend to have predicates with present or past tensemarking, whereas future predications are typically non-factual. The ontological basis of this tendency is clear: what is actually happening, or what actually happened can be naturally conceived of as 'real', 'factual' ; what has not yet hap­ pened, on the other hand, is as yet 'irreal'. Future states of affairs do not (yet) exist, by definition. Consequently, their typical modal character is non-fac­ tual.17 Beside sentences with overt future tense marking irrealis modality can be marked in many ways. Many cases of irrealis modality have the same ontological basis as the future in that the state of affairs expressed by the proposition does not yet exist factually and undeniably. In this connection we have to men­ tion the non-indicative verbal moods (expressing uncertainty or probability rather than certainty), deontic modal verbs and the complements of verbs like 'want', 'plan', 'try', 'strive', etc.20 Of special interest for the present study (see 3.1.1, 3.1.2 below) is the modal character of the generic (or 'habitual') present tense. The generic present is a present tense, and qua verb form with present tense marking it may be used for factual statements; the state of affairs to which a generic proposi-

34

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

tion refers exists either permanently (c.q. during a considerable stretch of time) or intermittently. Consider the following examples: (7) Apollo scares the bravest warrior. (8) Whenever I visit John, he is reading a book These sentences are clear, straightforward, assertions of fact. But this observa­ tion does not exhaust their semantic properties. The states of affairs to which (7)-(8) refer have no real boundaries along the time-axis; their truth does not depend on any particular circumstances. This is different in: (9) Apollo scared the brave warrior by hisfierceappearance. (10) When I visited John last night, he was reading a book. The difference between these sentences and (7)-(8) Ues in the specificness of the temporal reference. Exx. (9)-(10) refer to a particular state of affairs; this is why we call them factual. Exx. (7)-(8), on the other hand, have a mixed status with regard to modality: they are factual in so far as the state of affairs to which they refer actually exists, but to the extent that they lack specific temporal reference they are non-factual. On account of its non-specific character, the generic present may often be conveniently ranked among the irrealis phenomena, in spite of its being the statement of a fact. This treatment yields a number of insights that cannot be arrived at when we conceive of the generic present as a purely factual affair. In the present study I discuss the advantages for the description of scalar phenomena; elsewhere (Bakker 1988a) I have tried to make the insight of the generic present as an irrealis phenomenon productive for the unified descrip­ tion of the subjunctive conditional in Ancient Greek. There is a systematic connection between the modality of the predicate and the referentiality of the nouns or noun phrases that function as its argu­ ments. In other words: spatial reference is closely connected with temporal reference. The most straightforward and common example of this phenomenon is the referentiality of indefinite noun phrases.23 These noun phrases tend to have a referential understanding when they function as argu­ ments of a verb which is marked for realis modality. When they are under the scope of an irrealis modality, on the other hand, they are ambiguous ('referen­ tially opaque'), though preferably understood non-referentially. For illustra­ tion of this, look at the indefinite noun phrase a book in (8) and (10). In (10), a realis environment, it refers to a specific, particular book (the speaker may

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

35

or may not know its title), whereas in the case of (8) it is preferably under­ stood as not referring to any particular book. The reading of (8) in which John is always reading one and the same particular book when the speaker enters is somewhat strained. We now return to the non-referentiality of scalar superlatives, which was discussed in 2.1.3. Here, too, the connection between referentiality and modality obtains. We just saw that indefinite noun phrases may be referential or non-referential, according to the modality of the sentence in which they occur. Scalar superlatives, on the other hand, are necessarily, categorially nonreferential. We may now add that it follows from this that they are distributionally confined to irrealis environments. See, for instance, exx. (3)-(4) above. On account of the modal verb (could) these sentences are non-factual environ­ ments where specific temporal reference is absent. The same applies to (5)(6): the scalar possibilities of the proper names 'Kasparov' and 'Getty' come into play by virtue of the non-factual environment. They disappear when an un­ equivocally factual predicate is introduced (viz. when the modal verbs could/would are deleted). Scalar superlatives are, In English, not overtly marked as such; they ap­ pear as morphosyntactic superlatives. Thus we have to say that when their nonfactual environment is turned into a factual one, their scalar meaning disappears, whereas their form remains. Similarly, an indefinite noun phrase is turned from a non-referential into a referential one when the sentence in which it occurs is turned from an irrealis environment into a realis environment. In Homeric Greek, on the other hand, scalar superlatives are overtly marked as such, by per as we shall see (3.1.1). It follows from this that irrealis modality puts a constraint on the distribution of per when it functions to mark a scalar superlative. Thus, whereas in English non-factual modality is a necessary con­ dition for the scalar reading of a superlative, in Homeric Greek it is a neces­ sary condition for the occurrence at all of a scalar superlative. In fact the constraint put upon scalar (readings of) superlatives by modality can be gauged from the similarity of scalar superlatives and the English quantifier any (see 2.1.3 above).Any as an 'existential' quantifier is distributionally restricted to negated propositions, conditional clauses and yes/no questions. The non-factual (non-declarative) nature of all these contexts, which are often called 'polarity contexts' (see 2.4.2 below) is apparent. Negation may, under certain conditions, be treated as a non-fact modality. Conditionals, too, are a typical case of non-fact modality, on account of their hypothetical character. Likewise, 'universal' any occurs in non-factual environments

36

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

without specific temporal reference: contexts containing modal verbs {can, could, will, would, see exx. (3)-(6) above),28 the generic present and impera­ tives.29 2.2 Scalarity and referentiality In the previous section we saw that grammatical (morphosyntactic) and pragmatic superlatives may allow of a scalar reading. We also saw that there is an important distributional constraint upon this phenomenon, which is due to irrealis modality. But scalarity is by no means confined to scalar superlatives. There are other markers of scalarity, whose distribution is not constrained like that of scalar superlatives. One such a marker is the particle even in English. The present section (2.2) provides the link between scalar superlatives (2.1) and the discussion of the semantics of even (2.3). Its subject matter provides the appropriate context for the introduction of a distinction which plays a central role in the present study: the distinction between 'extension' and 'intension', to be discussed in 2.2.2. 2.2.1 Attributive and referential superlatives The superlatives discussed in the previous section allow of a scalar read­ ing by virtue of their very meaning, that is, simply, by virtue of their being a su­ perlative. Let us pursue the consequences of this observation. 'Superlativeness' is, morphosyntactically, a category exclusively applying to the adjectival word. From the point of view of ontology, only properties of entities ('things', persons) can be subjected to superlativeness, degree and com­ parison, not the entities themselves. And it is properties that are typically en­ coded in languages by means of adjectives.30 Like all other adjectives and terms with descriptive content, superlatives can be used to ascribe (attribute) some property to some entity. In using the superlative, one may assert that a given property applies to a given person or thing to the highest degree in the context of utterance: (11) Bill is Peter's best friend. This example may be interpreted as an 'ascriptive sentence' (see Lyons (1977: 148, 185)) in which a certain property, expressed as a non-verbal predicate, is attributed to the referent of some subject-term. In (11) it is the property of being 'Peter's best friend' that is attributed to Bill; accordingly, the (noun) phrase to which the superlative belongs is interpreted as non-referential.31 It

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

37

has, in saying something about , an ascriptive, or descriptive ('attributive') role. 32 Now Teter's best friend', which is used attributively in (11), may be used referentially, especially when it functions as subject: (12) Peter's best friend died last week. (That's why Peter is so distraught.) Given the fact that Peter's best friend is (was) in fact Bill (on the strength of (11)), the proper name Bill may be substituted for Peter's bestfriendin (12) with the truth-conditions of that sentence remaining unchanged: (12) remains a statement about the same person. (This is called 'Leibniz's principle of sub­ stitution of co-extensive terms salva veritate'. However, although this substitu­ tion does not turn (12) into a false sentence, it does very probably turn (12) into an inappropriate (or infelicitous) one. The point of (12) as it stands is to provide an explanation of Peter's afflicted appearance. In referring to Bill the way he does, the speaker of (12) assumes that his addressee is not acquaintained with the truth of (11). And as being Teter's best friend' is the crucial attribute of Bill in the context of utterance of (12), the speaker refers to Bill in that way. 2.2.2 Intension and extension33 The simple, obvious, yet fundamental insight to be gained from (11)-(12) is that things or persons may be referred to in various ways, according to the circumstances in the context of utterance (e.g. the pragmatic knowledge the addressee supposedly has, or lacks). Thus, whereas Peter's best friend in (11) in the ascriptive reading is only attributive (property ascribing), in (12) it has two functions: it refers to (picks out from the multitude of possible referents) the required person, but at the same time it supplies the relevant A r tdesGegeben­ seins (Frege 1892).34 More than one description may be true of one and the same object and any object can be referred to in more than one way. Let us for the moment dis­ pose of the pragmatic implications of this observation and focus on the mere fact that Peter's bestfriendin (12) has a double function. The two functions are a reflection of two aspects of noun phrases. Noun phrases may have a 'pointer function': they point to the person or thing a given language user wants to refer to. This person or thing may be called the extension of the noun phrase. In (12) the extension of Peter's best friend is the person named 'Bill'. But at the same time noun phrases may be descriptive. This is called their intensional aspect. The intension of referential noun phrases is what they 'say' about their

38

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

As we saw, the intension, i.e. the choice of a particular aspect of the referent, is often, if not always, determined by pragmatic factors. The distinction between intension and extension is an old one in philosophy; it has been dealt with in various terminologies, and it has obvious implications for logical theory.38 In the present text, the distinction will be mainly used as a basis for the construction of a continuum along which noun phrases can be ordered by degree of intensionality (descriptive content). This continuum involves a scale of the type that is used in Prototype Theory (see 1.4), one with two extremes, with continuous space in between. On the one extreme of the scale we place terms with a maximum amount of extensionality and a minimum amount of intensionality, the terms that have most clearly a 'pointer function'. The obvious candidates for location at this end of the scale are proper names as well as demonstrative pronouns and other deictic elements. Proper names are essentially mere 'labels' for their referents. Speakers normally do (need) not say anything about a person whom he refers to with a proper name. At the other extreme of the scale we find opposite phenomena, terms with a minimum amount of extensionality and a maximum amount of intensionality, the terms that are preferably used to describe (characterize) a person or thing, rather than refer to him/her/it. The example that presents itself here is the kind of noun phrase on which superlativeness operates, viz. the adjective. The prototypical adjective is purely descriptive, property ascribing; it does not refer itself. In between the extremes we have to locate, with as many gradations as one is prepared to make, noun phrases like 'Peter's best friend' in (12), in short: all ordinary simple nouns and composite noun phrases. The continuum from extensional to intensional is one of descriptive con­ tent, viz. an inherent, context-independent property of noun phrases. Conse­ quently, the distinction between 'intensional' and 'extensional' is different from the distinction between 'referential' and 'non-referential'. For referentiality of noun phrases is not an inherent property; it is a matter of how they are used. Intensional terms with a high degree of descriptive content can be perfectly used to refer to something ('Which one do you want? - The red one'). And, conversely, extensional terms with a low degree of descriptive content can be used to describe/characterize someone, rather than refer to him/her. Some young and very promising chess player, for example, may be said to be 'a Kasparov', or 'a new Kasparov'. And by the same token extensional terms can be used as scalar superlatives (see (5)-(6) above).

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

39

Notice,finally,that there is a clear relationship between intensionality and predicates: the terms that are likely to function as (time-stable) predicates have to be located on the intensional part of the scale. Thus we may say 'Mary is beautiful' but not 'Mary is Suzan', unless we are engaged in a plot of mistaken identity. But then we are equating, not predicating. 2.2.3 Scalarity and extensional terms We now return to scalarity and consider it against the background of the intension-extension distinction. In section 2.1.1 and 2.1.21 stated that superla­ tives may allow of a scalar reading. When they do, they are (meant to be) nonreferential, just Hke nouns or noun phrases modified by the quantifier any. They allow of their scalar reading by virtue of their meaning, that is, by virtue of their being a superlative. We can now characterize 'superlativeness' as a wholly in­ tensional affair. In other words, scalar superlatives have to be located at the in­ tensional extreme of the intension-extension continuum. But scalarity is not confined to intensional terms. Extensional terms, too, may be used in a scalar way. However, as extensional terms are devoid of descriptive content, they are unable to do so on their own. Someone who wants to make a scalar statement in uttering (13) below very probably will not make clear his communicative intentions: (13) Paul liked the excursion. 'Paul' is a purely extensional term without descriptive content, whereas scalarity as a paradigmatic relation between two items (see 2.1.1) presupposes some property by degree of which the two items can be ordered. Thus, when meant as a scalar assertion, (13) may well be a communicative failure. It will normally be understood as a simple, non-scalar, statement about Paul. If a speaker is to express his scalar intentions in a clear, unambiguous way, he has to modify the extensional term by the scalar particle even: (14) Even Paul liked the excursion, thereby communicating that Paul was the least likely person to approve of the excursion in question. Thus the element conveying scalarity, which is potential­ ly present in any intensional term, has to be expHcitly added in the case of ex­ tensional terms in the form of a scalar particle. It is to this kind of particle, and the way it can be described, that we must now pay attention.

40

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

2.3. Focus particles and focus contexts The particle even, which may be used as a marker of 'extensional scalarity' (scalar relations between terms without descriptional content), may be said to belong to the classoffocus particles. Sometimes (e.g. König 1981), this class of particles is called 'scalar particles'. Yet I prefer 'focus particles' because 'scalar' suggests a connection between the class as a whole and the scalar phenomena discussed in the previous section. But this connection exists only in the case of even. Thus even may be called a 'scalar focus particle', the scalar particles being a subclass of the focus particles. Focus particles, whether scalar or not, are always accompanied by a con­ stituent which may be called their focus constituent (see 2.3.1.3). The focus con­ stituent contracts a paradigmatic relation with the alternatives which may be substituted for it. Furthermore, focus constituents always attract the main stress of the sentence. In subsection 2.3.1 I discuss the particle even as a focus par­ ticle, with due attention to the scalar properties of the particle. In 2.3.2 I will discuss focus particles in a wider perspective, in connection with the concept of 'focus context'. 2.3.1 Even as a focus particle 2.3.1.1 Conventional implicature and the meaning of even Much has been written on the subject of the contribution of even to the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs. In spite of many differences in method and outlook, most authors seem to agree that the nature of this con­ tribution cannot be characterized as 'truth-conditional'.40 In other words, they agree that the 'truth-conditions' of a sentence containing even (or any other focus particle) are identical to those of the same sentence without the particle. Thus exx. (13) and (14) above are said to refer to one and the same state of af­ fairs. But if the meaning of even is not truth-conditional, how are we to account for it? In older literature (e.g. Horn 1969), the meaning of even, also/too, and only is dealt with in termsofpresupposition: in uttering ex. (14) above we assert the fact that Paul liked the excursion (i.e. the truth-conditional part), and we presuppose that others did so too. Apart from the fact that in uttering (14) we convey just a little more (viz. that Paul was the least likely person to like the excursion in question, see below), it remains to be seen whether the non-truth-conditional part of the meaning of (14), i.e. the meaning of even, has to be dealt with in terms of 'presupposition'. The term 'presupposition' may be used to refer to what is 'given', 'old' infor-

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

41

mation in a proposition that is part of a coherent discourse (e.g. in Givón 1979). And in a more technical sense the term is used in Fregean/Strawsonian logical semantics to designate what is considered in this approach an inherent property of propositions and definite noun phrases. However, the term 'presupposition' gradually became overburdened. As Karttunen & Peters (1979: 2) put it, "a wide range of different things have been lumped together under this single label and this fact is, more than anything else, responsible for the continuing controversy about how to analyze presuppositions." Karttunen & Peters suggest that non-truth-conditional phenomena be treated under more than one label. The appropriate label for the meaning of even (and similar elements), they argue, is the notion of conventional implicature. In thepresent section I follow this approach, partly in want of a better al­ ternative. Karttunen & Peter's analysis has influenced the important discussion of focus ('scalar') particles in König(1981). The notion of 'implicature' stems from Grice (1975). By 'implicature' Grice means anything that is 'implicated' by a speaker by uttering a sentence or a constituent. We implicate something when we allow our hearer or addres­ see to infer something from our utterance over and above what we have actual­ ly, literally, said. Implicatures may either conventional or non-conventional. Non-conventional (or 'conversational' in Gricean terms) implicatures are en­ tirely bound up with a particular context or situation. They are ultimately con­ nected with what Grice calls the 'cooperative principle': what is actually said in a particular situation will normally be interpreted by a hearer as uttered with a cooperative intention. The interplay of what is said with what is expected on the part of the hearer on the basis of the cooperative principle gives rise to im­ plicatures. Conventional impHcatures, on the other hand, are connected with the con­ ventional meanings of words and other elements of the language system. A cer­ tain word or phrase or construction may implicate something by its very meaning. The kind of meaning connected with this conventional implicature has to be kept separate from the literal ('truth-conditional') meaning of the sentence in which the implicature arises. Now what is the conventional implicature even gives rise to? In Karttunen & Peters (1979:12) it is stated that someone uttering a sentence of the type (14) Even Paul liked the excursion commits himself to the truth (I would say 'relevance') of three propositions:

42

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER (15) A. Paul liked the excursion. B. Other people in addition to Paul liked the excursion. C. Of the people under consideration, viz. the participants of the excursion, Paul was the least likely to like the excursion.

These three propositions do not have one and the same status, as Karttunen & Peters point out. (15)A is what the speaker of (14) actually says with so many words; it represents the 'truth-conditional' part of the meaning of (14), or, al­ ternatively, the propositional content of (14). (15)B and C, on the other hand, are not actually asserted by the speaker of (14); these propositions are conven­ tional implicatures arising from the presence of even in (14). These implicatures do not arise involuntarily; they are closely connected with the communicative intentions of the speaker of (14). If the speaker of (14) did not want to commit himself to the truth of (15)B-C, he would not have used even when uttering (14). Karttunen & Peters (followed by König 1981) argue that there are two ways in which the difference between 'truth-conditional' (asserted) and impli­ cated meaning can be brought out. The first way consists in embedding ex. (14) under a factive predicate: (16) I noticed that even Paul liked the excursion. What the speaker noticed, Karttunen & Peters argue, is the truth of (15)A, the fact that Paul liked the excursion (i.e. the truth-conditional part of the mean­ ing of (14), not the fact that there were other people who did so or the fact that Paul was the least likely person to do so, i.e. the implicated part of the mean­ ing of (14). (However, this account does not do full justice to the meaning of (16), see the following subsection.) Karttunen & Peters' second way to bring out the difference consists in bringing (14) under the scope of if, i.e. in treating (14) as a conditional: (17) If even Paul liked the excursion, then it was a very interesting one. Here the truth-conditions of (14) are suspended, just as in the case of all hypothesized propositions. (Note that conditionals are, in the terms of section 2.1.4 above, a typical non-factual (irrealis) environment. ) Consequently, a speaker who commits himself to the truth of (17), i.e. to the validity of the im­ plication expressed by it, will not (normally) commit himself to the truth of (15) A. However, he does commit himself to the truth of (15)B-C. His doing so is even the very point of the main clause of (17). In other words, the implica-

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

43

tures arising from the presence of even in (14) remain intact; they are not suspended by the hypothesis. 2.3.1.2 Elocution and the use of even Thus we see that there are some grounds for distinguishing between the 'truth-conditional' part of the meaning of a sentence like (14) and the specific contribution of even to that meaning. However, the descriptionofeven and the sentences in which it occurs is notfinishedwith this distinction. In being ex­ clusively concerned with the (context-independent) meaning of sentences,48 it does no justice to the intention which speakers have when uttering a sentence in which even occurs. This neglect of the pragmatic component of the use of even may be considered a serious shortcoming of Karttunen & Peters' account (as well as of that of other authors). It was stated that a speaker uttering a sentence Hke (14) above commits himself to three propositions. But this commitment is not the reason for his ut­ tering (14): if he wanted to assert the truth of (15)A, he did not have to use even, and if he wanted to assert (15)B or (15)C, he simply could have asserted these propositions, instead of implicating them by even. In that case, even need not have been used either. The point is that even with its conventional implicatures is used as an in­ direct assertion or as an illustration of some remarkable and superlative fact. The point of uttering (14) may be the assertion, in an indirect way, of the fact that the excursion in question was a very interesting one, given the fact that it was enjoyed by the least likely person to approve of it. And in (16) the 'super­ lative fact' is what the speaker really noticed. Thus the communicative potential of sentences with even is similar to those containing scalar superlatives (see 2.1.2). What is expressed in the case of scalar superlatives by the descriptive content of the superlative, is expressed in the present case by the meaning (implicature) of even. Both scalar superla­ tives and even may be used for the assertion of superlative facts. On account of this use we may say that both even and the scalar superlative determine to some extent the illocutionary potential of the sentence in which they occur. By 'illocution' we simply mean what is actually done with a given sentence in a given situation, the kind of speech-act that is performed with it.51 Sentences containing scalar expressions usually have an illocutionary force which does not coincide with the simple assertion of the 'truth-conditional' part. Thus the im­ plicature of even is not something to which one commits oneself for its own

44

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

sake; it is ultimately subservient to the illocution of the sentence in which even occurs. The notion of 'superlative fact' will be used in this study as a technical term, to designate, in connection with the notions of speaker intention and illocution, the reason for, and the explanation of, the presence of a given scalar expression in a given sentence. In section 3.2.21 will further discuss the typical illocution of sentences containing even. 2.3.1.3 Focus and scope Every scalar particle is associated in the sentence with a constituent that can be called the focus constituent of the particle.52 The focus constituent ('Paul' in (14)) always attracts the main stress of the sentence.53 In connection with the notion of 'focus', the first implicature of even ( = (15)B) can now be formulated as follows. Even implicates that the sentence in which it occurs is also xrue of entities other than the referent of the focus constituent. In other words, it is implicated that there are alternative values for the focus constituent. Between these alternative values and the focus constituent a paradigmatic rela­ tion is contracted (see 2.1.1). On this account, even (just as also and too) ranks as an inclusive focus particle. A particle like only, on the other hand, is an ex­ clusive focus particle: it implicates that the sentence in which it occurs is true of no one or nothing other than the referent of its focus constituent, alterna­ tive values being excluded. For further discussion and application of the dis­ tinction between inclusive and exclusive focus particles see 3.5.2 below. The distinction between 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' focus particles can also be stated in terms of substitution. In the case of inclusive focus particles, alter­ native values may be substituted for the focus constituent, without the 'truthconditions' of the sentence changing. In the case of exclusive focus particles, on the other hand, this is impossible. The idea of substitution leads to the second important notion in connection with focus particles, their scope. 'Scope' we define (again following Karttunen & Peters 1979) as an open sentence with a variable in the place of the focus constituent of the particle. We can get the scope of a given particle by deleting the particle and replacing its focus con­ stituent by the variable. Thus, the scope of even in ex. (14) is: (18) X liked the excursion. The scope sentence of an inclusive focus particle is the open sentence which is 'true' of the focus constituent as well as of the alternative values for the focus constituent. Thus the meaning (impHcature) of even depends both on the focus

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

45

and on the scope of the particle. The scope puts constraints on the alternatives of the focus term. For example, in (14), when Bill was not a participant of the excursion in question, he is ruled out as an alternative for the focus constituent. Even has inclusiveness in common with abo and too. But there is also an important difference. Unlike also and too, even imposes an ordering upon the focus term and its alternatives: this ordering is one of increasing likelihood. The focus constituent of even typically represents the high point on a scale, all alternative values representing points that are lower on the same scale. Just as in the case of scalar superlatives, the scale associated with even is the kind of scale of which only the high point matters. The extensions (see 2.2.2) of the possible alternatives for the focus constituent of even are more likely to con­ form to the truth of the scope sentence, and in representing a non-superlative value they are less important than the focus constituent itself. We are here dealing, of course, with the second implicature associated with even (ex. (15C above), which Karttunen & Peters rightly call 'scalar'. Even not only implicates that there exist alternatives for its focus constituent, but also that those alternatives are less extreme cases than the extension of the focus constituent. The scope sentence determines with respect to what they are less extreme. 2.3.1.4 Scope dependence and scope independence The ordering of the focus constituent and its alternatives, in other words, the scale whose validity is implicated by a scalar focus particle, may be either dependent or independent of the scope sentence of the particle (König 1981: 119). This distinction should be studied in close connection with the distinction between 'intension' and 'extension' (section 2.2.2 above). A scale whose high point is represented by an intensional term is scope- (i.e. context-) inde­ pendent, whereas scales whose high point is represented by an extensional term are usually dependent on their scope ('context'). Accordingly, scales associated with scalar superlatives are scope-independent: the scale exists by virtue of the meaning of the superlative. For example, it is clear a prion that anyone who can solve 'the most complex problem' will a fortiori be able to solve less complex problems, for 'the most complex' implies 'less complex' independently of scope and context, all complex things being by definition less complex than what is 'the most complex'. In (14), on the other hand, it does by no means follow from the meaning of the word 'Paul' (if an extensional term has any meaning at all) that this person was the least likely to enjoy the excursion. Accordingly, the

46

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

scale whose high point 'Paul' represents is dependent on the scope sentence and of the context. To convey (viz. implicate) the existence of a scale of which an extensional term represents the high point, the particle even has to be introduced, in English. Thus, when even takes an extensional term as its focus constituent, it can be called a scope dependent focus particle (which is shorthand for 'focus particle whose implicated scale is scope-dependent'). However, as English is a language with very few scalar particles, even has to perform a multitude of func­ tions. It has to do the job of scope-independent particles as well, for example: (19) Even elementary Greek grammar is too difficult for him (let alone advanced reading). The scale on which knowledge of elementary grammatical facts and ability to read any text in a language are situated is scope independent. In languages which are richer in scalar particles than English, e.g. German and Dutch, even in (19) may be translated by another particle than even in (14). Scope-depend­ ent even in (14) is equivalent with sogar/selbst (German) and zelfs (Dutch). Scope-independent even in (19), on the other hand, is equivalent with schon (German) and nog (placed after the focus constituent) or alleen al in Dutch. We shall see that in Greek, too, a distinction may be made between scope-de­ pendence and scope-independence: the combination of the conceptual pair 'in­ tension-extension' with scope dependence and will prove useful for the discussion of per and kai in chapter 3. 2.3.1.5 Scope ambiguity Even in EngUsh is an overworked particle; this situation givesriseto am­ biguities which do not exist in German and Dutch, because these languages have more scalar particles, and. hence, a better division of labour.57 Even may be ambiguous as to its scope. This situation occurs when even is found in a type of context which may be exemplified as follows: (20) I don't think that he understands even Homer. (21) If he can read even Homer, we will praise him. These sentences are ambiguous as to the scopeofeven: in (20), this scope will be preferably understood as 1 don't think that he understands X. On this read­ ing, which we call 'wide scope', the intended meaning of (20) is that Homer is easy to understand (Karttunen & Peters (1979: 27)): if we don't think that

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

47

someone understands even Homer ( = 'if we don't even think someone under­ stands Homer'), we will consider this person even less capable of understanding other (i.e. more difficult) authors. However, there is another reading, in which (20) implicates just the opposite (viz. that Homer is difficult to understand). This is the narrow scope reading of (20), in which the scope sentence of even coincides with the embedded sentence He understands X. Notice that the am­ biguity is due to the negation: when we delete don't, the ambiguity disappears and only the narrow scope reading remains. Exactly the same applies to (21). In the narrow scope reading, the scope of even is he can readX, that is, the sentence that functions as the conditional in (21). In the wide scope reading of (21), on the other hand, the scope sen­ tence of even comprises the conditional expression as a whole, that is, the con­ ditional plus its main clause: If he can read X, we will praise him. In the narrow scope reading the following paraphrase is possible: 'If < it is true that > [he can read x], then < it is true that >...'. In other words, the scope sentence (in square brackets) is part of a conditional construction; it fills the slot 'p' in If p, then q. In this reading, the clause functioning as conditional ('p') may be seen as a proposition in its own right. In the wide scope reading, on the other hand, the conditional and its main clause together form one complex sentence, the conditional stating the circumstances under which the person in question will be praised.61 In (21), too, the scope-difference is connected with a difference in implicature. On the narrow scope reading we implicate that Homer is a a difficult author, whereas on the wide scope reading he is implicated to be very easy to understand. This difference in implicature arises because the wide scope sen­ tence and the narrow scope sentence are associated with two qualitatively dif­ ferent scales. In the scale associated with narrow scope, 'Homer' represents a high point with a positive superlative value. This is the kind of scale which has been discussed hitherto. In the scale associated with wide scope, on the other hand, 'Homer' represents an extreme point with negative (or 'inverted') super­ lative value. The distinction between 'positive' and 'negative' is not confined to even. It occurs, too, in the case of the quantifier any and scalar superlatives. In section 2.4.2 below I will discuss the phenomenon in its ownright,in con­ nection with the notion of 'negative polarity'. It is worth pointing out that the scope ambiguity in examples like (20) and (21) cannot arise in Dutch and German. These languages use different particles for different scopes, and hence for different implicatures: auch nur (G.) and ook maar (D.) translate wide scope even, whereas narrow scope even is

48

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

equivalent to sogar/zelfs. However, the EngUsh language partly compensates for the lack of variety in its array of scalar (focus) particles: often special nega­ tive (inverted) superlatives like (the) slightest do the job of the Dutch and Ger­ man wide scope particles. See further 2.4.2 as well as 3.4.3 below. 2.3.1.6 Even if: concession and concessive conditionals In the previous subsection I have discussed the conditional clause in con­ nection with the scope of even. We saw that a conditional clause may function as the scope of even or as part of it. But it may equally function as the focus of the particle. In that case we have the even //"-conditional, which is often referred to as the 'concessive conditional.'62 Chapter 6 will be devoted to this kind of conditional; the present subsection points ahead to that discussion. The linguistic description of even if amounts to the intersection of the description of if and that of even.63 Consequently, even if has to be accounted for in the scalar terms which we have by now become familiar with: the presence of even implicates that the circumstances specified by the conditional are the least likely for the state of affairs of the main clause to obtain. Just as in the case of 'simple' even, the illocution (see 2.3.1.2) of an utterance containing even if is the assertion of a superlative fact. The alternative for the focus constituent, and, hence, a lower value on the scale in question may often be conceived of as the negation of the sentence functioning as focus constituent. Consider: (22) He will come even if it is raining. Focus: if it is raining Scope: He will come ifX Scale:

if itisbraining if it is not raining

But other kinds of alternative are possible as well, especially when one of the constituents of the conditional has by itself scalar force, as in He will come even if there is a snowstorm. On account of their paradigmatic (scalar) relation with alternatives, evenif-conditionals,unlike normal conditionals, always imply the truth of their main clauses. The superlative nature of that 'truth' is indeed the very reason for the uttering of the even //-clause. The state of affairs referred to in the main clause may be characterized as superlative ('remarkable') be­ cause it is normally ill compatible with the circumstances specified by the con-

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

49

ditional. In other words, in the case of even if the following statement holds (see König 1986: 233): (23) In a situation in which it is relevant to say 'Even if p, then q', it is equally relevant to say 'If p, then normally not-q'.64 On account of this reduced compatibility between the main clause and the sub­ ordinate clause, the even if-clause may be rightly called the concessive condi­ tional. See further ch. 6. The notion of 'concession' is one of the central concepts in the study of scalarity. Concession is always present, whether actual or potential, in scalar expressions {even or scalar superlatives), because there is always a conflict, overt or covert, between a scalar expression and its scope. In the course of the present study it will appear that concession plays a major role in the descrip­ tion of per in Homer; it will come into the picture at various points (see 3.2.2; 4.3; ch.6). But to speak about per (or any other item) in terms of concession (see 1.3.2) is not very useful as long as the scalar roots of the concept, both synchronic and diachronic, are not taken into account. It is with these roots that the present chapter is concerned. 2.3.2 Types of focus context We may say that focus particles create a focus context. Their focus con­ stituent always attracts the main stress of the sentence. It has this property in common with scalar superlatives. Scalar superlatives, too, whether grammati­ cal or 'pragmatic', typically alter the intonation contour of the sentence in which they occur. But focus particles are not the only expressions in which a con­ stituent 'structurally' carries emphasis: the class of focus contexts comprises some more expression-types, notably comparatives and what may be called 'the same ay-contexts'. In the present subsection I briefly discuss these two expres­ sion-types, with special attention to the semantic properties they have in com­ mon with focus particles. 2.3.2.1 Comparatives The comparative may be described as equivalent to a two-place predi­ cate;65 their second (object-) argument attracts main stress:

50

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

The stress on 'Anatoly' is explained by the fact that the second argument of the comparative may be conceived of as an elliptic clause, whose subject is con­ trasted (and indeed compared) with the first (subject-) argument of the com­ parative.67 'Anatoly' in (24) is the only element by which the 'comparative clause' differs from the 'main clause': (24') Garry is a chess player. Anatoly is a chess player. The element by which the two clauses differ, in the present example the sub­ ject term of the comparative clause, is highlighted ('emphasized'), for obvious cognitive and perceptual reasons: what is different is perceptually more salient than what is identical, the different element standing out asafigureagainst the (background formed by the non-differing material.68 Another, closely related, property of the comparative (clause) is that it does not admit negation'. '*John plays better chess than Peter does not' is nonsense. Comparison and degree presuppose positive properties. The absence of aproperty has no degree;69 it is absolute, and perceptually entirely non-salient.70 The behavior of comparatives with regard to negation is characteristic of focus contexts in general. Focus particles do not (normally) allow negation either. In 2.41 will discuss the topic of negation for its own sake, in connection with scalar expressions. And in 3.31 will discuss the comparative in connection with scalarity. 23.2.2 The same as and related expressions The second type of focus context discussed here can be exemplified on the basis of the following expression-type: (25) Peter has the same car as JOHN. The expression the same as has the same properties as the comparative: its com­ plement is the subject (or object) of an elliptic clause which is contrasted to the parallel term in the 'higher' clause. The 'argument' of the same as is highlighted, and is as such a focus context. Here, too, negation cannot occur. Expressions containing the same as do not stand alone; they belong to a larger group of expressions which have in common that a main clause is iden­ tical to a subclause except for one element, for example: (26) I said to Peter what JOHN had said to Peter. (27) If you can beat Kasparov, you can beat Karpov.

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

51

Expressions as these are highly relevant in connection with the study of focus particles. The focus context created by them may be naturally conceived of as the focus constituent of the inclusive, non-scalar focus particle also or too. Consider, for example: (26)' I said to Peter what JOHN had said to Peter too. Here 'John', which is a focus term anyway, serves as the focus constituent of too. The only alternative value for the focus constituent of too has already been expressed as the subject of the main clause (T), that is, the term to which the focus constituent is contrasted. This is a peculiar use of also/too, which is con­ fined to subordinate clauses. Normally, also/too has the simple existential implicature, which is expressed in (15)B above. For example, in (28) John has said this to Peter too, the implicature of too is that there are other people in addition to John who said this particular thing to Peter. (Of course there is no scale in the sense that John was the least Ukely person to say this thing to Peter.) In (26) and (26)', on the other hand, the inclusive nature of the focus term ('Peter') is not so much implicated by too ; rather it springs from the nature of the expression as a whole, too in (26)' being after all optional and redundant.71 2.3.2.3 Focus contexts and the study of per The discussion of the same as and related expressions as focus contexts, and, hence, the treatment of these expressions as a semantic phenomenon which is cognate to even and scalarity, appears to be higly relevant for the study of the particle per in its totality. It provides the basis for the unifying descrip­ tion of the particle. Per is the most salient item in the Greek equivalents of exx. (25)-(27) above, that is, in the the same as-type of focus context discussed in the previous section. Per here is used as an enclitic adhering to the subordinate of the (sub)clause in which the focus term occurs. This use of per is prominent in Classical (Attic) Greek, but it occurs as early as Homer. It will not be discussed in the present study. In the present study we are exclusively concerned with what was called in 1.1 'Homeric'per; post-Homeric (Attic) per we reserve for another study (Bakker: in prep.) The study of 'Homeric' per involves the scalar conceptual framework presented in the present chapter. 'Attic'per, on the other hand, has to be described as a nonscalar inclusive focus particle whose distribution is confined to subordinate clauses.

52

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

Scalarity is the specific difference between Homeric and Atticper. But the notion of focus context is their common denominator. Before we can start the description of per as a scalar (focus) particle in Greek epic, we have to discuss first one last aspect of scalar expressions and focus particles alike. This invol­ ves the notion of polarity. 2.4 Negative and positive polarity In the fourth and last section of this chapter I discuss scalar expressions and focus particles from the point of view of negation. We saw that the focus contexts discussed in 2.3.2 did not allow negation. In the case of scalar expres­ sions and focus particles, negation does not come as a matter of course either. When negation is discussed in connection with scalarity and scalar expressions, the notions of polarityandpolarity item have to be introduced. Polarity items are lexical items or idioms that are distributionally confined to polar contexts. Polar contexts are environments that are either commanded by a negation or, conversely, do not admit negation; accordingly, we divide the polarity items into negative' or 'positive': negative polarity items (NPFs) and positive polarity items (PPFs). NPFs are distributionally confined to negative environments; they may be, diachronically, characterized as 'strengtheners of the negation (Horn 1978a: 148-9). PPFs, on the other hand, are normally con­ fined to affirmative (positive) environments. The difference between negative and positive contexts is somewhat more complicated than the simple presence or absence of negatives or negative elements, as we shall see. In the two fol­ lowing subsections I will discuss positive polarity items and negative polarity items, subsequently. 2.4.1 Positive polarity items Positive polarity items include a wide range of lexically and categorically disparate elements, for example: already, still, relatively, surely, each, swarm with, some. All these items normally refuse to stand inside the scope of nega­ tion, for example: (29) The Trojans have already won the battle. This sentence does not readily allow negation. The only way for negation to occur at all in a sentence like (29) is as an outright denial (see Seuren (1985:233)), in a situation where (29) has been uttered just before:

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

53

(30) The Trojans have NOT already won the battle (i.e. Your saying "The Trojans have already won the battle" is unwarranted). This is the so-called 'radical' or 'external' negation, which takes a sentence as a whole in its scope. It has to be distinguished from 'normal' or 'internal' nega­ tion, which is sentence-internal. External negation plays only a very marginal role in language. Now, focus particles belong to the class of the PPI's; they refuse to stand inside the scope of normal negation. It is true that this contention seems to be immediately refuted by examples like the following: (31) A. Only PAUL didn't like the excursion. B. PAUL didn't like the excursion either.  Not even PAUL liked the excursion. But the exception is only apparent. The negation does not have the particle in its scope. It is the other way around: the negation belongs to the scope sentence (see 2.3.1.3) of the particle, which is in all the three cases: (32) X did not like the excursion. In the farther discussion of polarity phenomena we will dismiss the class of focus particles as a whole to deal exclusively with even. From the examples in (31) it is clear that the difference between positive and negative polar contexts is not simply the presence or absence of negation. In (31) we have, in spite of the presence of a negation, a positive polar context, created by the focus particle. The same applies to sentences containing scalar superlatives. Here, too, a negation may very well occur: (33) The most complex problem doesn't pose difficulties for him. The negation here simply is not 'negative', the example being equivalent to He can solve the most complex problem (see ex. (3) in 2.1.2 above). The analysis of even and other scalar expressions in terms of positive polarity will prove to be relevant later on for the discussion of per and kai in connection with negation (see 3.2; 4.2.2; 4.3). For the moment, however, the insight that negation may occur in contexts of the PPI even (viz. in its scope) is important in connection with the notionoFscale reversal. In the work of Faucon­ nier on scalarity it is repeatedly stated that when we compare sentences like (34) The simplest problem poses difficulties for him

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

to (33) above (see also (3)-(4) in 2.1.2), we have to say that the negation in the one sentence reverses the scale of the other. Thus the scale associated with (34), with the simplest problem as its high point would appear in (33) in reversed form, with the most complex problem as highest value. It is true that negation may have, from a logical point of view, a truth-value reversing effect (the negative sentence being false when its affirmative counterpart is true, and vice versa), but Fauconnier's contention seems to me basically incorrect. In (33) and (34) we do not have one and the same scale which is reversed accord­ ing to the presence or absence of negation. Rather, we have to say that there are two different scales, associated with two different scope sentences, the one containing a negation and the other not. The scale associated with the negated sentence is the scale of the complexity of problems, while the one associated with the affirmative sentence is the scale of the simplicity of problems. As regards the nature of the scale, there is no difference, and scale reversal does not occur. Both scales are positive in nature and have only one high point. The presence of negation in the scope sentence of one of them is immaterial. The question as to whether a scale is the reversed form of another may seem mere hairsplitting at first sight. However, this objection disappears when we turn to negative polarity. Here a phenomenon occurs which may rightly be called scale reversal, and it is quite different from the alleged reversal in (33)(34). 2.4.2 Negative polarity items and scale reversal The particle even in English differs from its Dutch and German equivalents zelfs and sogar among other things in that an account purely in terms of positive polarity does not exhaust its possibilities: even may also occur in negative contexts (under the scope of negation), unlike zelfs and sogar. But if it does, a curious phenomenon may be observed, which may be called scale reversal. This phenomenon should be discussed in connection with negative polarity and negative polarity items (NPFs), and it is closely related with the notion of wide scope of the particle even (see 2.3.1.5).80 NPFs require a negative or a negative context, on pain of ungrammaticality. NPFs in English include ever, at all, any, anymore, in weeks, in the least, mind that etc. These and other NPFs may occur in contexts commanded by an overt negative, but also in contexts with a covert or implied one. The lat­ ter include questions (especially rhetorical ones), conditionals {If anyone..), and elements which expHcitly exclude something, like superlatives ('that's the

THE LINGUISTIC BACKGROUND: SCALARITY

55

greatest one I ever saw'), only,first,until (punctual), as well as inherently nega­ tive predicates like refuse, prevent etc. Of particular interest for my present purpose are those expressions among the NPI's which denote a minimal quantity or notion: the slightest, (not) a bit, soul etc., lift afinger,give a damn etc. These expressions cannot occur without negation; they serve indeed as negation strengtheners, often enhancing the emotional impact of negation (for negation strengthening see 3.4.4 below). The negative polar expressions in question have to be discussed in con­ nection with scalarity and even. It is obvious why this is so: if even the smal­ lest possible portion or quantity is not the case, then any greater portion or quantity will, a fortiori, not be the case either. Thus these expressions are in­ timately related to superlativeness and scalarity. The NPI the slightest is even morphosyntactically a superlative; it may be described as a scalar superlative which is distributionally confined to negative polar contexts. The occurrence of scalarity in negative polar contexts has an important consequence for the scale involved. It is here that the notionofscale reversal is in its proper place: the scales associated with scalar expressions in a negative polar context have no positive extreme value, a high point, but a negative ex­ treme value, a low point, so to speak. A scalar expression in a negative en­ vironment represents the extreme, minimal, value on a scale; all other values imaginable are higher on the scale, but because the scale is a reversed one, they are implied by, and hence, less salient than the low point. Reversed, negative polar scales are marked with regard to 'normal', posi­ tive polar ones. This can be gauged from the fact that in the case of negative scalar expressions a lexical constraint obtains which does not exist in the case of positive scalar expressions: negative scalarity and reversed scales can only be expressed by terms which denote lexically a mimimum quantity or quality: beside pragmatically inverse superlatives like lift afinger,bat an eyelid we may mention slightest, tiniest, remotest, faintest. This is a lexically homogeneous class, of which the slightest is the member which is most widely and regularly used as a NPI. In the case of positive polar scalarity, on the other hand, there is no lexi­ cal constraint. Here any superlative may occur, regardless of its lexical mean­ ing. Both biggest and smallest may be used as positive scalar superlatives. Each has its own scale, and both are the positive high point of it, not simultaneously the high point and the low point of one and the same scale. The notion of scale reversal has to be reserved for the qualitative difference between positive polar and negative polar scales.

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

We now return to the particle even. English differs from other languages in that it does not use its scalar focus particle exclusively as a PPL Even may also be used in negative polar contexts. But if it does, the mechanism of scale reversal is put into practice: the focus constituent of even represents the low point of a scale, instead of the high point. The notion of scale reversal should be seen in connection with the fact that in exx. (20)-(21) in 2.3.1.5 even in the wide scope reading implicates the opposite of even in the narrow scope read­ ing: the positive scale of which Homer as the most difficult author is the high point is reversed into a negative scale of which Homer as the least difficult author is the low point. Even in negative contexts is the extensional counter­ part of elements like the slightest. German and Dutch differ from English in that there is a separate expres­ sion for scalarity in a negative context: auch nur and ook maar. In section 2.3.1.5 above, I discussed these particle combinations as wide scope particles. We may now go a step further and analyze them in connection with the notion of scale reversal: the first element (auch/ook) expresses the scalarity (implica­ tion), while the addition of nur/maar denotes the minimum quantity or quality, and hence the reversal. Negative polar scalarity is of less practical importance for the description ofper in Homer than positive polar scalarity. There exists, however, a number of examples to which the above discussion neatly appUes, see 3.4.3 below.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 1) In this connection it is interesting to point to the fact that theos may be modified by the suffix -teros (theôteros). This suffix, which later became the normal comparative suffix in Greek, originally marked binary oppositions and was distributionally restricted, according to Benveniste ([1948] 1975:117) to the marked term of such oppositions. Thus the existence of theôteros (e.g. Od. 13, 111) but not of *anthrôpoteros would seem to be an index of the marked status of theos in the opposition. I owe the content of this note to prof. CJ. Ruijgh (p.c.). 2) For a pertinent discussion of the distinction between encoding devices (viz. (morpho)syntactic phenomena) and encoded phenomena (semantic) see Tomlin (1983: 416-7). Similarly, Traugott (1985: 290 ff.) distinguishes between a semantic, abstract notion of 'conditionality' and the markers encoding it. 3) For elementary exposition on paradigmatic and syntagmatic) relationships see Lyons (1977: 240-41). 4) See Horn (1972), Gazdar (1979), Levinson (1983: 132 ff.). Within the framework of 'conversational implicature', scales are used as follows. They consist of items which can be ar­ ranged by degree of informativeness or semantic strength, for example all, some. A speaker using a weaker (rightwards) item on such a scale conversationally implicates that more stronger (leftwards) items do not apply. And his addressee, assuming co-operation on the part of the speaker, infers that the stronger item does indeed not obtain, in spite of the fact that the speaker has not explicitly said so. Thus in this type of scalar theory the highest item but one (or more) is the thing that matters, whereas in the scalar theory used in the present study we are exclusively concerned with the highest item. 5) See Van der Auwera (1983,1985), Ducrot (1980), Horn (1972). The study of particles in this connection is mostly concerned with German (Altmann (1976), König (1981), Jacobs(1983)) and Dutch (see for example Van der Auwera & Vandeweghe, eds. (1984)). For English see Taglicht (1984). 6) Notice that this account of scales like (2) agrees well with the marked status of 'god' in the binary opposition with 'man' (see fn. 1). 7) See Fauconnier (1975a, 1975b, 1979). For particles ( = even) in this connection see Karttunen & Peters (1979) and König (1981). See 2.3.1 for more literature on even. 8) 'State of affairs' I use in the present study as that to whichaproposition refers. A state of affairs consists of a certain relation between a number of entities. The nature of this relation is expressed by the predicate of the sentence by which the proposition is uttered. The arguments of the predicate are the terms referring to the items in the state of affairs in question. Thus the proposition (or predication) expressed by John gave the book to Peter refers to a particular state of affairs consisting in the event characterized by 'John's' giving a particular book to 'Peter'. The predicate 'give' is three-place because it obligatorily has three arguments. The notions just given can be found in a number of linguistic schools and theories which have in common their treat­ ment of the predicate as the central part of the sentence. See for instance Dik's (1978: 25-31) notion of 'nuclear predication' ( = predicate + argument(s)). For a general survey see Mat­ thews (1981:121 ff.).

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9) Notice that a literal reading of (3)-(4) is easier when we take 'problem' in the plural: He couldn't solve the simplestproblems might then well mean that the person in question was not able to solve, on a particular occasion, problems that could be characterized as Very simple'. But this reading does not exclude his actually having solved a very difficult one. 10) Notice that 'the simplest problem' and 'the most complex problem' are the high point of two different scales. At first sight one would assign the two superlatives to the extremes of one and the same scale, rangingfrom'difficult' to 'simple'. This is, however, impossible. As has been said, scales must be unequivocal in orientation. A scale which has at the same time two potential high points cannot exist in the scalar framework presented here. See Horn (1972:39) for the im­ possibility to rank hot/warm and cool/cold on one and the same scale. Scales of the type under study do not tolerate the conflation of two dimensions/orientations. See further 2.4 and 3.4.3 below. 11) See Fauconnier (1975a) for a detailed account of this similarity. Fauconnier shows that the distribution of scalar superlatives is that of quantifiers, and not of normal definite descriptions. 12) See Horn (1972), Davison (1980). 13) Notice that when meant as a scalar statement, (5)-(6) as utterances have an entirely different intonation pattern from the literal meaning: 'Kasparov' and 'Getty' attract the main stress of the sentence. 14) What classicists commonly call 'irrealis' is in logic and general linguistics usually referred to as 'counterfactual' (conditional). 15) In a sentence like The bravest man would have been afraid (on that occasion) there is specific temporal reference in an indirect way, because a particular situation is meant. Yet the sentence has to be ranked among the irrealis phenomena, since there is no question of a specific state of affairs in which a particular brave man was actually afraid. 16) No item of the triad 'tense-aspect-modality' can be fruitfully discussed and studied in isolation from the other two. See the studies in Hopper, ed. (1982), especially Wallace (1982), as well as Givón (1984: ch. 8). 17) This is not to say that future statements cannot possibly be factual. In fact they often are. But it is never by virtue of the future tense marking that they are factual. The factuality of future sentences is due to other factors, such as when a future predicate is embedded under a factive predicate (in the sense of Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1968) like 'know*. Sometimes future state­ ments are factual on the level of the intention of the speaker uttering them (this involves the no­ tion of illocution, see 2.3.1.2 below): when a future occurs in an appointment ('I'll be there at eight'), or a threat or a warning, its factuality is bound up with the felicity of the speech-act in question, to the effect that when there is doubt as to the factuality of the utterance, the speech act may be considered unsuccessful. But by their very meaning, futures belong to the realm of irrealis. See the discussions in Fleischman (1982). 18) In the case of meaning differences along the axis 'certain-uncertain' we may speak of epistemic modality (see for instance Lyons (1977:793 ff.), Palmer (1986: ch. 2)). A typically un­ certainty mood (and hence a case of irrealis modality) is the Greek optative. For a discussion of epistemic modality as a typical main clause phenomenon see 4.1 below). 19) A state of affairs that has to obtain does not, by definition, obtain already. There is a strong semantic and ontological connection between deontic modals and the future. Sometimes

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

59

future tense paradigms evolve diachronically from deontic modals, as is the case in Romance (see Fleischman 1982). 20) These verbs are called non-implicative modality verbs' (Givón 1973a: 98-101; 1973b, 1984:117-9): commitment to the truth of the predicate itself does not imply commitment to the truth of the clause embedded under it. The truth of 'Peter wanted to leave' does not entail that Peter actually left. The complemeent of implicative modality verbs, on the other hand, is facial­ ly modalized: the truth of' Peter managed to arrive in time' does imply that Peter actually arrived in time. Notice that just as in the case of deontic modals (see the previous note) there is an in­ timate bond between non-implicative modality verbs and the future. In some languages (e.g. Modern Greek) the future evolves diachronically from 'want'. In Ancient Greek, too, the future is often conceived of as the offspring of an earlier 'desiderative' mood. See in general Fleischman (1982). 21) See Givón (1973:109-110; 1984: 285). 22) Here non-fact modality appears as the crucial common property of future and generic present sentences. In Greek the subjunctive conditional (ean 4- subj.) is distributionally restricted to main clauses with future or generic present predicates. 23) See in detail Givón (1973a; 1984:285,391 ff.). 24) Sometimes (e.g. Hawkins 1978) the term 'specific' is used to designate referential noun phrases whose referent is not assumed to be known to both participants in a conversation. 25) As a parallel phenomenon beside the connection between realis modality and referentiality we may mention the connection between telic aspect of the verb and the individuation of the object: verbs denoting actions with an inherent end-point tend to have more fully in­ dividuated and referential objects than verbs with atelic aspect. Both realis modality and telic aspect may be seen as an index of the clausal property of 'transitivity', the degree to which an action is 'carried over' from an agens to a patiens. For transitivity as a property (allowing of de­ gree) of clauses in discourse, see the seminal discussion in Hopper & Thompson (1980). 26) Polarity contexts are contexts in which 'negative polarity items' may occur. Existential any belongs to these, just as ever, at all and predicates like 'give a damn'. 27) Notice that indefinite noun phrases in negated and 'hypothesized' sentences tend to have a non-referential understanding. See Givón (1973a; 1979:93 ff.). 28) But not the deontic modals must and have to in commands and adhortations (i.e. in directive speech acts, see 3.2.2): *'Anyone must leave'. 29) The only way for universal any to occur in factual contexts (progressive present, past tenses) is when it is modified by a restrictive relative clause: *'He bought anything' is unaccep­ table, but 'He bought anything he could get' is not. In other words, any in irrealis contexts may stand on its own, whereas in realis contexts it needs restriction. For more details on the distribu­ tion of any see Horn (1972:131 ff.) and Davison (1980:11-15). 30) We may say that it is the prototypical adjective that encodes properties, whereas it is the prototypical verb that encodes actions and the prototypical noun that encodes permanent states. The notion of prototypicality implies that adjectives may as to their meaning be more 'noun-like' (i.e. to a higher degree denoting a 'state') as well as more Verb-like' than the prototype, depending on the 'time-stability' of the entity that they denote. See further 4.3.2 below.

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31) It should be noted, however, that 'Peter's best friend' in (11) as it stands allows of a referential understanding as well. In that case, (11) may be read as an equative sentence, in which the identity of two entities is asserted, just as in mathematical equations (see Lyons 1977:185, 471-2). In Bakker (1986; in prep.) I make the distinction between equative and ascriptive sen­ tences productive for the study ofper in Attic Greek. 32) See Strawson (1950: 320-1), Givón (1984: 91,396). 33) It should be mentioned at the outset of this subsection that in discussing such topics as reference, intension and extension my purpose is purely expository. Consequently, the dis­ cussion is, and is meant to be, informal. The very numerous philosophical controversies and sub­ tleties connected with reference, proper names, de dicto and de re interpretations of definite descriptions etc. are, on the whole, irrelevant for my purpose. They are indeed irrelevant for many linguistic purposes when one is concerned with concrete facts of language. 34) Notice that philosophers are, on the whole, impervious to notions like relevance, ap­ propriateness and felicity, in short, the pragmatic component of reference. They tend to stick to the truth-conditional substitution principle. A case in point is Donellan ([1966] 1971), who rigorously distinguishes between a referential use of definite noun phrases on the one hand, and an attributive use on the other: "In the referential use the definite description is merely one tool for doing a certain job - calling attention to a person or thing - and in general any other device for doing the same job, another description or name would do as well. In the attributive use, the attribute of being the so-and-so is all important, while it is not in the referential use" ([1966] 1971: 102). Some things are kept apart here which had better be taken together. For more on these matters see Schoorl (1980), Bakker (in prep. ch. 3). I am aware that any critique of the rigidity inherent in the philosophical approaches to reference is stating the obvious in the eyes of those linguists who are concerned with reference and definiteness in the wider context of com­ munication and discourse. But as the terminological apparatus I am using is common to both philosophers and linguists, some elementary points have to be made. 35) It is perhaps superfluous to state that this person or thing need not actually exist in the real world. Reference in language is intimately connected with the intentions of speakers; as such it involves a universe of discourse, rather than the 'real world'. See Givón (1981; 1984:38890). 36) Notice that I conceive of 'reference' as an activity of speakers. Extension, on the other hand, I treat treat as an inherent property of noun phrases. See further below. 37) Normal English usage: 'sense' (intension) and 'reference' (extension). In Frege (1892) 'Sinn' and 'Bedeutung'. Also used are 'connotation' and 'denotation' (first in Mill 1843). See in general Lyons (1977: ch. 7) and Haack (1978:246). Already in Antiquity, the Stoics were aware of something in between the name itself (semainon) and the thing referred to (semainomenon); they called it lekton (see Kneale & Kneale (962:140)). 38) Notably in the form of the distinction between 'extensional' and 'intensional' contexts. Extensional contexts are environments in which substitution of co-extensive terms has no truthconditional consequences (it does have appropriateness-conditional consequences, but that is irrelevant in logic). In intensional contexts, substitution of co-extensive terms is impossible without changing the truth-conditions. Acknowledged examples are contexts under the scope of modal operators ('necessarily....') and the complement of predicates expressing a thought ('think', 'know', 'believe': 'John knows that Bill died last week' does not have the same 'truthconditions' as 'John knows that Peter's best friend died last week'. The direct object of a predi-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

61

cate like 'kill', on the other hand, creates an extensional context. See Frege (1892), Quine (1953). Critique and reassessment in Seuren (1985: ch.5). 39) A non-exhaustive Hst: Horn (1969), Fraser (1971), Fauconnier (1975a, 1975b), Kempson (1975:200-2), Karttunen & Peters (1979), König (1981), Bennett (1982), Jacobs (1983: 144 ff.), Seuren (1985:310-313). 40) As often, a different view is adopted in Seuren (1985). Seuren argues that the mean­ ing of even and also/too is truth-conditional. 41) In later publications Givón discusses these discourse-presuppositional phenomena in terms of topic continuity, see Givón, ed. (1983). 42) For example, 'the x' presupposes that '' actually exists ('existential presupposition'). Another 'presupposition-trigger' is the group of factive verbs (see Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1968): 'He regretted drinking much' presupposes that he drunk much. This kind of presupposition (often called semantic presupposition) is characterized by the so-called 'constancy under negation': the negation of the sentence in which they occur does not affect them. For elemen­ tary exposition see Levinson (1983:ch.4). See also Horn (1972), Kempson (1975). 43) Much research in focus particles and polarity phenomena (see 2.4 below) is essential­ ly semantic, non-functional and formal. Karttunen & Peters' discussion of even and other cases of 'conventional implicature', for example, is accompanied by an unnecessary formal(istic) analysis within the framework of Montague Grammar. Yet in spite of Givón's (1982:85) verdict, I believe that Karttunen & Peters' discussion has its merits. Especially the concepts of 'focus' and 'scope' are valuable in the study of focus particles. 44) Grice (1975) is a partial publication of Grice's William James Lectures, delivered at Harvard University in 1967. 45) The cooperative principle can be subdivided into four categories, Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner (Grice 1975:45). The four categories are related with certain 'maxims of conversation'. A simple example, taken from Grice (1975: 51): a person who says to someone who is out of petrol 'There is a garage round the corner' conversationally implicates that the garage in question is open (at least in his opinion) and actually has petrol to sell. The person who is in need of petrol normally will understand the utterance as such, assuming that his con­ versation partner conforms to the maxim of relevance, as it is a wholly uncooperative and ir­ relevant thing to mention a garage which one knows is closed at the moment. Notice, however, that conversational implicatures are always so loosely attached to an utterance as to be easily cancellable. There is no inconsistency when one says, in the above situation, 'There is a garage round the corner, but that one is closed today'. See further, apart from Grice (1975), Karttunen & Peters (1979:2, n.3), Levinson (1983:ch.3). 46) Notice, thus, that conventional implicatures are not cancellable in the same way as conversational implicatures (see the previous note). A speaker denying (15)B-C after uttering (14) is self-contradictory. 47) Except when they are used inferentially, viz. when an inference is drawn from a proposi­ tion whose truth has already been ascertained earlier in the discourse or conversation ('A is the case'. 'Oh, if A is the case, then  is (also) the case'). See Bakker (1988a: n. 21), and in more detail Bakker (in prep. ch. 7). 48) See Baker & Hacker (1984: ch. 5) for severe criticism of truth-conditional semantics.

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49) In this connection the use of the term 'pragmatic' may give rise to terminological con­ fusion, as in certain linguistic circles it is customary to use the term 'pragmatics' for all non-truthconditional aspects of the meaning of sentences (including implicatures) and 'semantics' for truth-conditional phenomena. I prefer to use the term 'pragmatic' for the use that is made of sentences in speech situations and in coherent discourse (see Givón 1984:30-1). For a general discussion of the delimitation of 'pragmatics' with regard to 'semantics' see Levinson 1983:5-35. 50) Notice, in this connection, that even and scalar superlatives can co-occur, the scalar superlative being the 'focus constituent' (see 2.3.1.3) of even: 'He could solve even the most dif­ ficult problem'. In that case even is, strictly speaking, redundant, and hence a peripheral instance of its kind (see 1.4); the combination of even with a scalar superlative has to be discussed in terms of 'strengthening'. 51) See Lyons (1977:725 ff.); Bolkestein (1980:31). 52) See Karttunen & Peters (1979:15). 53) This is not to say, of course, that other constituents of the sentence cannot or do not carry emphasis. 54) 'Focus constituent' is a semantic notion. The syntactic entity associated with particles like even is called in König (1981:109) 'sister constituent'. Normally, the focus constituent will coincide with the sister constituent. Sometimes, however, there is a difference. biEven his easiest books are difficult to understand the sister constituent of even is 'his easiest books'; the focus con­ stituent, attracting main stress, is 'easiest'. Sometimes (e.g. Bennett 1982) what is called here 'focus' (constituent) is referred to as 'scope'. This is an unusual practice. 55) This is not to say, however, that zelfs is unacceptable as a translation of even in (19). My point is merely that Dutch has a choice here, and English not. 56) The whole scalar 'correlation' is even.let alone; schon...geschweigedenn (German); alleen allnog.laat staan (Dutch). Thus we see that complex expressions, the meaning of whose constitutive parts has no independent importance, may function as genuine scalar particles with their own focus constituent. 57) See section 3.3 below for yet another case in which English has to use even where other languages have another particle at their disposal: the second argument of a comparative predi­ cate as the focus constituent of even ('even taller than x'. 58) See Karttunen & Peters (1979:25), König (1981:122), Fauconnier (1975b: 190). 59) Notice that this type of ambiguity is not confined to scope sentences of even; it occurs also when a main clause to which a causal subclause is attached is negated, for example: 'I will not go to the party(,) because I feel sick'. See also the ambiguity in (21). 60) This is what I call elsewhere (Bakker 1988a) a 'non-embedded conditional. In the case of non-embedded conditionals, two propositions which are in themselves complete stand in an implicative relationship to one another: 'if proposition ρ is true, then proposition q is true', or 'p implies q'. 61) The determination of the circumstances under which a given state of affairs obtains is a phenomenon which is typical of irrealis modality and the absence of specific temporal reference (see 2.1.4). In the case of realis modality this determination is unnecessary, on account of the specific temporal reference of the predicate. Conditionals with a restrictive function may be called 'embedded' syntactically (see Bakker 1988a). To my mind embedded conditionals have

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

63

no propositional characteristics of their own. The embedded conditional appears in Greek as 'ean + subjunctive'. My distinction between embedded and non-embedded conditionals is reminiscent of Van der Auwera's (1983, 1985: 209-10 distinction between 'contingency conditionals' and 'indeterminacy conditionals.' 62) See Haiman (1974: 351 ff.); König (1986). 63) Accounts which try to describe even if as an idiomatic collocation run into difficulties. For an account in terms of if and even separately see Bennett (1982). 64) See also Thompson & Longacre (1985:197). 65) Sometimes comparatives are one-place on first sight, but this is contextually condi­ tioned: utterances like 'John is taller' can be used only when the length of someone else is the topic of discourse or conversation. See ex. (26) in 3.3 above. 66) Unless, of course, there is a contextually conditioned stress on other constituents of the sentence. 67) See extensively Quirk et al. (1972:765-77). For 'ellipsis' in comparative clauses: 1972: 768-9. The comparative construction has attracted a great deal of attention in generative syntax and formal semantics. See Von Stechow (1984) and the various reactions to it in vol. 3 of the Journal ofSemantics. In Hoeksema (1983; 1984), it is argued that what are considered in the text to be two sides of one and the same phenomenon (viz. the second argument of the comparative as subject of the elliptic comparative clause) are actually two different comparative construc­ tions: 'Bill is taller thanMary'vs. 'He is bigger than we are'. This counterintuitive idea (no func­ tional explanation is offered) has met with little consent, as far as I can see, even in the kind of linguistic circles where one is not interested in functional explanations. 68) A whole body of literature dealing with the linguistic implications of this insight, and based on the distinction from cognitive psychology between 'figure' and 'ground', begins to develop. For example Hopper (1979), Wallace (1982) (where psychological references are provided), and especially the work of Givón. 69) For more about the positive nature of comparativeness and superlativeness see ex. (25) with discussion in 4.3.2.1 below. 70) See the illuminating discussions of Givón on the 'ontology' of negation (1979: ch. 3; 1984: ch. 9). 71) For more discussion about the semantics and pragmatics of the same as and the other expressions in question as well as of the distribution of too and also in these contexts see Bak­ ker (1986; in prep.). 72) The difference between the Homeric and the Attic usage is that in Homer per (often) adheres directly to the focus term (e.g. I say what YOU (per) say), while in Attic the particle al­ ways adheres to the subordinator (I say what (per) YOU say, I say the same that (per) YOU say). See exx. (15)-(16) in 1.2 above for an illustration of the two possible placesofper in this expres­ sion-type. 73) In other words, Greek has a separate particle to express the use of too in (26)'. But per also occurs in sentences like (25), where English does not use a focus particle (see ex. (16) in 1.2 above). 74) More than any other subject touched upon in this chapter, the notion of polarity is the domain of formal semanticists. Especially the distinction between 'downward entailing' and 'up-

64

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ward entailing' contexts (not to be further discussed here, see Ladusaw (1979), Hoeksema (1983) and Zwarts (1984)), which is adduced in this field as the explanation of the distribution of nega­ tive polarity items, seems to be entirely logic-bound and dysfunctional. 75) See Horn (1978a: 154) and especially Seuren (1985: 233). 76) The notion of external negation is most at home in the works of philosophers and for­ mally oriented linguists. It has played a role in the discussion about the presuppositions of definite descriptions. See Russell (1905) and Strawson (1950). More exposition and discussion in Kempson (1975: 95-100; 1977:145 ff.), Levinson (1983:171-72), Seuren (1985: 238). 77) For a discussion of sogar in terms of positive polarity see Jacobs (1983: 211 ff.). 78) Notice that not may be treated, paradoxically, as a PPI (see Seuren 1985:233,261). 79) Fauconnier (1975a: 362; 1975b; 1979: 290-91). 80) We may say that the capability of even to occur both in negative polar and in positive polar contexts is closely connected with its being ambiguous as to its scope. Sogar and Zelfs, by contrast, seem to allow only of narrow scope readings (see 2.3.1.5). Hence they can only be as­ sociated with positive polarity. 81) See Seuren (1985:232). NPI's form a just as disparate group as the PPI's. They include adverbs, predicates, and quantifiers. 82) See Horn (1978a: 151-52). The application of the notion 'negative environment' is not a sharp-cut one, and the question as to whether a given NPI is used 'correct!/ or not is often a matter of subjective judgment. 83) See Horn (1978a: 149), Fauconnier (1975:196), Schmerling (1971). 84) Fauconnier always treats the extreme value of scales in terms of 'low point'. I preferi to speak in terms of 'high point' and to reserve the term 'low point' for negative polar scalarity, so as to bring out the difference between the two 'poles'. 85) Negatives are marked with respect to the corresponding affirmatives in many ways. For example, from a pragmatic point of view, theypresuppose more than affirmatives: a sentence like Givón's (1979: 103) My wife isn't pregnant presupposes more situational background knowledge than its corresponding affirmative version: in being negative it removes information. But for information to be removed it must simply be there. Positive information may be more easily introduced without implicit assumptions. Furthermore, it is easy to see that negatives have also morphologically a marked status. 86) For some discussion of the distribution of ook maar, see Hoeksema (1983:406 ff.) and Paardekoper (1979). 87) On their own nur and maar are exclusive focus particles; like only they exclude alter­ natives for their focus constituent. And wherever something is excluded, there is an implicit nega­ tion. For a discussion of nur (and erst) in German see König (1981:119) and of {alleen) maar in Dutch Van der Auwera (1984). 88) The use of even seems to be similar to that of any. Usually two kinds of any are recog­ nized, an existential and a universal kind (see 2.1.3 above). The latter is sometimes called 'freechoice any'- Sometimes every connection between the two any's is denied, with the result that any is thought to be ambiguous (or polysemous), see Horn (1972), Carlson (1981)). Or an analysis is proposed in which any is treated as either of the two logical quantifiers, existential or univer­ sal (see Davison (1980) for such an analysis and for discussion of others). Now 'existential' any

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

65

exclusively occurs in negative contexts and is thus a NPI (If anyone..., Does anyone...? etc.). 'Universal' any, on the other hand, seems to be a PPI, a fact which is not often recognized. On the basis of polarity and the kind of symmetry that is implies, it seems to me possible to describe any in a unified way, in a manner which is parallel to the notion of scale reversal discussed here. To do this, however, falls outside the scope of the present study.

3 SCALARITY AND THE PARTICLE PER

3.0 Introduction The present chapter contains the appHcation of the theoretical apparatus presented in the previous chapter. Examples will be discussed in which per has to be described as a scalar particle. The distinctions between intension and ex­ tension (see 2.2.2) and between scope dependence and scope independence (see 2.3.1.4), will turn out to be useful tools for the description of the central uses ofper, as well as for the delimitation of the particle with regard to kai In section3.11 will deal with ex. (1)-(2) of 1.2 above and similar examples. It will appear that the combination, in a non-factual context, (see 2.1.4) of per with an intensional term (adjective) functions as a scalar superlative. In section 3.2, example (3) of 1.2 and the expression-type to which it belongs will be dis­ cussed. Here I will deal with what happenswhenper is used in connection with a scalar relationship between extensional terms, viz. proper names. Section 3.3 contains the use ofper in scalar comparative expressions. In 3.4 some examples will be discussed to which the concepts of wide scope, scale reversal and nega­ tive polarity (see 2.3.1.5 and 2.4.2) apply. Something which resembles scale reversal in non-factual contexts will play an important role in section 3.5 also. Here the group of instances of which ex. (4) and (5) of 1.2 above are members will be discussed. This last use is the only one whose discussion has not been prepared in the previous chapter. This is because the semantics of even cannot be straightforwardly applied to it. In 3.6,finally,some less easily classifiable in­ stances will be presented. The scalar instances of per to be discussed in the present chapter repre­ sent only a relatively limited part of the total material involved. For example, out of a total of more than 500 instances ofper in the Iliad and the Odyssey, only 8 are of the type represented by ex. (1)-(2) of 1.2 (see the Appendix). Yet in spite of their small numbers, the scalar instances occupy a central place in the

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description because the much more frequent concessive uses of the particle, especially the expression-type 'participle + per'. are intimately related to them, both from a synchronic and from a diachronic point of view. 3.1 Intensional terms 3.1.1 Scalar superlatives Consider the following examples. Per here accompanies an intensional term, viz. an adjective. The examples conform to a pattern which may be charac­ terized as follows. Per and the intensional term occur in a non-restrictive ('digressive') relative clause. The relative clause is modified by the particle te (on which see further 3.1.3 below), which immediately follows the relative (or anaphoric) pronoun. (1)

toi de Phobos philos huios, hama krateros hai atarbês, hespeto, hos t' ephobêse talaphrona per polemistên. (Ares the Killer and his son,) "the fierce and indomitable Panic-maker, before whom the staunchest warrior turns tail." (II. 13,300).

(2)

enth ' eni men philotês, en d' himeros en d' oaristus parphasis, hê t' eklepse noon puka per phroneontôn (The girdle of Aphrodite: it contains) "Love and Desire and the sweet bewitching words that turn a wise man into a fool [Ht: that steal away the mind of the wisest people]." (Π. 14,217).

(3)

hai kholos, hos V epheêke poluphrona per khalepênai "Anger, that makes the wisest man flare up." (II. 18,108).

(4) gê phusizoos, hê te krateron per erukei "the fruitful Earth ( = the Netherworld), who holds the strongest man down." (II. 21, 63). (5)

oinos gar anôgei, êleos, hos t'epheêke poluphrona per mal1 aeisai "This is the effect of your wine - for wine is a crazy thing. It makes the wisest man sing." (Od. 14, 464).

What the relative clauses in these examples tell about the extension (see 2.2.2) of their head noun is, in being something remarkable, a superlative attribute: Phobos' in (1), for example, is extremely fearsome and the effect of wine is

SCALARITY AND THE PARTICLE PER

69

said in (5) to be wholly irresistible. Each of (1)-(5) is the expression of a super­ lative fact (for this term see 2.3.1.2 above). In 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 above we saw that scalar superlatives naturally occur in sentences functioning to ascribe some superlative attribute to a person or a thing (e.g. extreme cleverness in the case of He could solve the most complex problem). In other words, scalar superlativeness is used in service of the expres­ sion of attributive superlativeness. Now it is impossible to escape the con­ clusion that this is exactly what happens in (1)-(5). The adjectives function as scalar superlatives in sentences that ascribe some superlative attribute to some­ one or something. In English, the scalar function of an adjective is marked by morphosyntactic means: the adjective appears in the superlative mode. Consequently, there is in EngUsh no formal difference between scalar superlatives on the one hand, and attributive or referential superlatives on the other. In (Homeric) Greek, on the other hand, there is a different strategy. Here the scalarity of the adjective is marked by the particleper,the adjective itself remaining in the nor­ mal positive mode. Per as it functions in (1)-(5) is a curious way to express scalar superlativeness. In terms of the previous chapter, we may describe it as a scalar particle which takes as its focus constituent an intensional term that represents the high point of a scope-independent scale. In exx. (1)-(5) extensionality is completely absent, the focus constituents of per being adjectives, and as such entirely intensional. The following ex­ ample, on the other hand is different, in spite of its similarity in form, in that the term preceding per is a substantive: (6) smerdale' eurôenta, ta te stugeousi theoi per (The Netherworld:) "The hateful Chambers of Decay that fill even the gods with horror." (77. 20, 65) On account of the translation ('even the gods') it might seem on first sight that we have here a statement in the format of ex. (14) of chapter 2: Even Paul liked the excursion. However, to attach too much importance to the translation of (6) would be to obscure two essential differences between (6) and ordinary evensentences. First, unlike 'Paul', theoi ('gods') in (6) is not purely extensional: beside an extension, it has intension as well. This appears from the fact that 'god' forms a binary pair with 'man' (see 2.1.1). In this binary opposition 'gods' is the marked term, which yields the intension ' + immortality' (as opposed to 'immortality' for 'man'). That theos is not a prototypical extensional term can

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

be gauged from the fact that it may be modified by the suffix -teros, which is otherwise confined to the adjectival word. 'Paul' (or any other proper name), on the other hand, has no such meaning. The second important difference between (6) and the even-sentence Even Paul liked the excursion is that the latter is factually modalized, whereas (6) is an instance of non-fact (irrealis) modality (see 2.1.4). Even Paul liked the excur­ sion is a proposition referring to a particular, existing state of affairs. Ex. (6), on the other hand, is generic; it does not refer to any specific state of affairs in which the gods are or were afraid of Tartarus. It follows from this that (6) belongs to the expression-type exemplified by (l)-(5); it possesses most of the characteristic properties of the scalar superla­ tive: intensionality, non-factual modality, and scope-independence of the scale in question. It is possible, on account of the not fully intensional character of theoi, to assign (6) a less than prototypical (see 1.4) status, but this is a minor point, for the properties which the example does possess are highly prototypi­ cal for the expression-type in question. All of exx. (1)-(6) are similar as to their form in that the scalar combina­ tion occurs in the typically generic (see 3.1.3) hos te-clause. But the combina­ tion 'adjective +per functioning as a scalar superlative is by no means confined to this particular environment. It may occur elsewhere, provided that non-fact modality obtains: (7)

(The hero Diomedes jumps down from his chariot in order to fight. This is a terrible sight:) hupo ken talasiphrona per deos heilen "The stoutest heart might well have been dismayed." (II. 4,421).

(8)

(There is a fierce battle around the corpse of Sarpedon, king of the Lycians:) oud' an eti phradmôn per anêr Sarpêdona dion egnô, epei beleessi kai haimati, kai koniêisin ek kephalês eiluto diamperes es podas akrous "The sharpest eye would now have failed to recognize the admirable Sarpedon, completely covered as he was from head to foot with weapons blood and dust." (II. 16, 638).

These examples have all the pertinent properties in common with (1)-(6). Their non-factual modality is not due to genericness, but to 'potentiality': (7)-(8) are concerned with what might have happened on some particular occasion (see further 3.1.3). Their function in the discourse is similar to that of (1)-(6), too:

SCALARITY AND THE PARTICLE PER

71

they are used for the statement of a superlative fact. In (7), Diomedes' jump­ ing from his chariot is presented as something in the extreme, and in (8) the battle around the corpse of Sarpedon is not negligeable either. 3.1.2 Scalar superlatives and the etymology of per The examples presented above, especially ex. (6), lend themselves easily for an analysis in which per is equated with a focus particle in a modern Western language. Accordingly, they are the paradigm cases in Fraenkel's (1925) ac­ count of per, in which per is equated with auch (see 1.3.3). As I said, there is much that is good in this approach, its most important merit being that it intro­ duces the semantics of focus phenomena into the study of per. But the direct equation of per and auch is clearly not the ultimate description of per in (1)(8). Among other things, it totally ignores the intensional character of the focus constituent of per. One of the immediate consequences of Fraenkel's account, in which he exclusively focuses on per, ignoring the properties of the contexts in which it occurs, was that it made him reject the traditional etymology ofper (see 1.3.4), in which the original meaning of per is considered to lie in the intensifying ('superlative') sphere. I think that the description of (1)-(8) which I have presented above makes the conflict between the alleged original meaning and Fraenkel's central synchronic meaning less flagrant. This is due to the introduction of intensionality into the discussion of scalarity and focus phenomena. The correct ac­ count of the scalar superlative involves precisely the intersection of intensionality and scalarity. It combines the adjectival property of superlativeness with the semantics of focus and scalar phenomena. From this double nature it follows that (1)-(8) and the use ofper therein can be approached from two directions: one can focus either on the adjective or onper. In the former case the result is an analysis in terms of intensification, and in the latter case it is difficult to escape Fraenkel's equation, or something similar to it. The two accounts are conflicting, according, to Fraenkel, but theyy are conflicting because they are incomplete. The conflict disappears when the adjectival, intensifying aspect and the scalar aspect are seen as complementary. They are the two inherent properties of the scalar superlative as this phenomenon is discussed in the previous chapter.

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

3.1.3 Epic te and generic modality As has been stated (2.1.4), intensional scalarity involving scalar superla­ tives is distributionally confined to irrealis modal contexts. In ex. (7) and (8), the non-factual modality is due to the particle ken or an, which, in combination with a verb with past indicative tense-modality marking, denotes what might have occurred in some situation, in other words, a possibility in the past (see Kühner-Gerth i: 212). The non-factuality lies in the fact that Diomedes jump­ ing from his chariot being feared by someone and Sarpedon being recognized by someone uninvolved in the fighting remains a mere possibility. In (1)-(6), on the other hand, we have to do with facts. But the facts in­ volved are independent of actual times and circumstances. The generic modality resulting from this independence is overtly expressed by a curious lin­ guistic phenomenon, which is, just as the use of per under study, confined to early epic, viz. the adverbial ('modal') use of the particle te. Te is etymologically connected with Indo-European kwe (cf. Latin -que); as such its function is primarily connective (A Bte, 'A and B'). However, in Homeric Greek it has yet another function. Here it may signal, as a sentential adverb, what Ruijgh (1971) calls a 'permanent fact' ('fait permanent'). Clauses in which this 'epic' te occurs are statements about 'permanent' (generic) facts of the world as the poet and his audience know it. Such permanent, generic, truths are not likely to make an essential contribution to the flow of discourse or narrative. Timeless truths are more suitable to function as a 'digression', as a backgrounded statement, which may serve as a 'background' against which what is narrated may be understood or assessed. Consequently, the natural en­ vironment for adverbial te is the non-restrictive ('digressive') relative clause (Ruijgh 1971:2). This kind of clause typically contains backgrounded informa­ tion, which is not essential for the identification of the extension (see 2.2.2) of the (head) noun to which the relative clause is attached.8 The backgrounded, digressive information expressed in the relative clause introduced by the combination 'relative + te' (hos te) may be less essential from the point of discourse, but from the point of view of ontology or biology it ascribes an essential property to the extension of the head noun. What is said in the te-clause is often so essential and conspicuous a property of something that it is the most characteristic thing that can be said about it. The te-clause expresses the very nature of the referent. An example: (9)

all' agorêtai esthloi, tettigessin eoikotes, hoi te kath'hulên

SCALARITY AND THE PARTICLE PER

73

dendreôi ephezomenoi opa leirioessan ieisi (The elder Trojans: "but they were excellent speakers, Hke cicadas, which, sitting on a tree in the woods sing delightfully"). Anyone who has been in a Mediterranean wood in summer knows that the rela­ tive clause in (9) says something very essential and characteristic about cicadas. The essential character Ues in the fact that thete-clauseis not true of some par­ ticular group of cicadas, but of all (kinds of) cicadas, of the cicada as species. What a cicada does qua cicada is sit on aa tree and chirp continuously. Thus the head noun of thete-clauseexemplified by (9) refers to types (species, classes, concepts), rather than to tokens (individuals, particular instances). Now what is true of a type is of necessity true independently of particular circumstances. From the point of view of human perception and cognition, the attributes and properties of species, classes and concepts are entirely unchang­ ing and stable. They axe generic properties in the full sense of the term. Accord­ ingly, the propositions in which these generic/essential properties are expressed are, too, generic in the fullest sense: they involve the complete ab­ sence of temporal reference (see Lyons 1977: 194). Propositions in which properties are ascribed to types are true of all times. Thus thete-clauseinvol­ ves the strongest form of generic modahty, viz. timelessness. Notice that less strong cases of genericness (see 2.1.4 above) consist in the absence of specific temporal reference rather than in the absence of temporal reference as such.10 The hoste-clauseprovides a very suitable environment for scalar super­ latives. As stated above (3.1.1), most instances by far of the combination 'ad­ jective + per' functioning as a scalar superlative occur in a hoste-clause.A scalar superlative may occur in the hoste-clausesimply when the essential, characteristic property happens to be something in the extreme. Thus in (1)(6) timelessness and superlativeness go hand in hand. The 'timelessness' is an essential property of the entity to which the head noun refers. The Earth, the Netherworld, anger, wine, Phobos (hypostatized panic) are entities belonging to all times. And if they are timeless by their very nature, so are the essential properties ascribed to them. 3.1.4 A remark on diachrony The digression on epic te has yet another justification beside the fact that the scalar combination 'adjective + per' has a marked affinity with the hos teclause. The systematic co-occurrence of the use ofper in question with 'epic' te

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

allows us to make some inferences about the diachronic status of the scalar combination 'adjective + per'. Per and te as they are used in exx. (1)-(6) are peculiarities of early (Homeric) Greek. Admittedly, epic te expressing a 'permanent fact' does occur after Homer (see Ruijgh 1971: ch. 30-2). But in these cases we have an overt poetic ( = 'epicizing') language use which plainly differs from contem­ poraneous ordinary language. As for per, the use exemplified by (1)-(8) simp­ ly does not occur after Homer. In section 1.5 above it was stated that the stage in the development of the Greek language represented by Homer is by no means synchronically homogeneous. On account of the preserving influence of formulas, many lin­ guistic phenomena that have long disappeared from the ordinary language keep playing an important role in the epic, oral-formulaic diction. But this preserving tendency does not preclude a continuous process of renovation, a constant influx of contemporary linguistic data. From the point of view of phonology and morphology, this process has been extensively documented (see Janko 1982). But the typically epic diachrony applies to semantic phenomena as well. The formulaic preservance of obsolete meanings of words or phrases, together with the admission into the diction of more recent uses may lead to an un­ natural, typically epic, co-occurrence of diachronically heterogeneous uses, a phenomenon which deserves of as much attention as the epic co-existence in the case of morphological and phonological items. The particle te is an acknowledged case in point. To all appearances, the use of te in sentences ascribing some essential (generic) property to a class or concept is in Homer's time not a synchronically productive idiom anymore. Its meaning has been subject to attrition, to the effect that a number of instances can be found in which te has no recognizable meaning. These examples can be seen as 'the final stage of a process' in which the adverbial ('modal') use of the particle gradually faded (see Hoekstra 1981: 14; cf. Ruijgh 1971: 12). Te robbed of its meaning came to be used for merely metrical and/or formulaic purposes. It seems now a plausible step to apply the diachrony of te to the use of per in question. We saw that the distribution of the scalar combination 'adjective + per' is almost entirely confined to the 'digressive' hos te-clause. Now when the typically timeless hos te-clause can be shown to belong to a stage in the development of the language prior to the poet's own, it is likely that this is also true of an expression that is more or less systematically connected with the hos

SCALARITY AND THE PARTICLE PER

75

te-clause. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that per as it is used in (1)(8) does not occur after Homer. The diachronic development of both particles appears to be parallel to some extent. That te can indeed be seen as a sort of index of the diachronic status of instances of per is shown by the following example, in which an in­ stance of an unequivocally recent use of per (viz. per in 'the same as-contexts', see 2.3.2.2 above) co-occurs with an evidently meaningless (and hence recent) case of te. The example is wholly equivalent to exx. (15)-(16) of 1.2: (10) toios eon hoios essi, tatephroneôn ha t' ego per "being as you are and thinking those things that I < think >." (Od. 7,312). The second use of te here is totally irregular.15 Being devoid of meaning, it seems to be inserted merely for metrical purposes. The extent of the deviance from the original use can, moreover, be gauged from the fact that in occurring in a restrictive relative clause te is dissociated from its natural locus, the nonrestrictive relative clause. Thus the distribution ofte and per seems to conform to a consistent pattern: old co-occurs with old, and recent with recent. 3.2 Extensional terms In the present section we deal with the group of instances which is ex­ emplified by ex. (3) in 1.2 above. Per is here an organic part of a non-restric­ tive relative clause; it occupies, just as te in the hos te-clause, the position immediately after the relative pronoun: hos per. This use, in whichper,instead of having a proper focus constituent, modifies a whole subordinate clause, is not particularly what one would associate with a scalar particle. Yet the ex­ amples in question are closely connected with scalarity, in that the head noun of the relative clause introduced by hos per is the focus constituent of the scalar particle kai (or oude), the Greek equivalent of even. This is why the examples in question have to be discussed in connection with 'scalarity', rather than from the point of view of the relative clause. As stated in 1.1, the use of per in sub­ ordinate clauses will not be discussed for its own sake. In the present study I will deal exclusively with per in scalar(-concessive) relative and conditional clauses. The expression-type in question conforms to the general pattern 'kai + focus constituent + hos per9. It provides a link between the use ofper discussed in the previous section and the use ofper with participles. This link will be fur-

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ther documented in 4.2.2, where I will discuss an expression-type in which 'par­ ticiple + per' comes in the place of the hos per-clause. 3.2.1 The intension offocus constituents In section 2.2.1 above I argued that the distinction between the referen­ tial and the attributive use of noun phrases should not be maintained in the rigid form given to it by philosophers (e.g. Donellan 1966). Noun phrases nor­ mally perform two functions at once; they point to the referent to which a speaker wants to refer, and they say about that referent the relevant thing to say in the particular context or situation. In other words, most nouns or noun phrases have both an intensional and an extensional aspect. There are some noun phrases, however, that have to be placed at the extensional extreme of the scale, viz. proper names. This kind of nouns typically possesses a minimum amount of descriptive content. Proper names are indeed the most neutral way to refer to someone. In being the most neutral way to refer, proper names are also the most context-dependent way to do so. A speaker referring to someone with a proper name usually supposes his addressee to have so much situational knowledge as to be able to identify the person meant without description ('intension'). This neutral, intension-less and context-dependent reference has consequences for the scalar use of proper names. When a proper name functions as the focus constituent of even, the scale whose high point it represents is clearly scope (context) dependent (see 2.3.1.4 above). Nothing in the meaning or content of the focus constituent and its alternatives explains why they have the position they have on the scale in question. Now there is a difference between the simple use of proper names (Paul Hked the excursion') and the use of proper names as the focus constituent of even ('Even Paul Hked the excursion'). In the first case, simple situational knowledge of the referent of the name (knowing who Paul is) suffices to make sense of the utterance in which the name occurs. In the second case, on the other hand, something more is involved. Paul can only be used as the focus con­ stituent of even by virtue of some superlative property or attribute of Paul. And the addressee, beside knowing who is meant by Paul, has to know this proper­ ty if he is to make sense of the utterance in which Paul occurs, or, more exact­ ly, if he is to make sense of the scalar implicature (see 2.3.1.1) of even. Thus, in the case of the scalar use of extensional terms like proper names, some inten­ sional aspect does exist, which need not, however, be overtly expressed. In many cases it is understood in the context of utterance.

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A pragmatic account of reference involves both reference proper and at­ tribution, both extension and intension. In many cases just knowing which par­ ticular referent is referred to is not enough; the question is often, if not always, qua what it is referred to. This applies to an even greater degree to the referen­ tial focus constituents of even. The 'qua what' is here all-important. It involves the (relevant) superlative property of the referent, the very reason why the focus constituent can function as focus constituent. This principle equally applies to the most neutral kind of reference, the use of purely extensional terms, viz. proper names. Reference with proper names usually suppresses the 'qua what'. However, when a proper name func­ tions as the focus constituent of even, the 'qua what', the relevant superlative property of the referent becomes a factor determining the appropriateness, or even the truth, of the utterance in which the proper name occurs. In 'Even Paul liked the excursion', Paul is not (neutrally) referred to qua Paul, but qua 'the least likely person to appreciate the excursion in question', for whatever reason. This is due, as we have seen (2.3.1.1) to the conventional scalar implicatureofeven. When the addressee knows, and is supposed to know, that this particular superlative attribute can be ascribed to Paul, nothing is amiss. But when the addressee does not know the relevant 'qua what' of Paul in the particular situa­ tion, or may be supposed to miss it, the utterance as it stands may be considered infelicitous. If it is to be a wholly meaningful (viz. appropriate) utterance, the reference to Paul must be completed. In other words, the superlative intension, by virtue of which Paul can be used as the focus constituent of even has to be provided. The hos per-clauses to be discussed in the present section have precisely this function. They complete the reference of a focus constituent of even, thereby explaining the scalar implicature of the particle. 3.2.2 Superlativeness, comparativeness and the illocution of even The raison d'être of the following relative clauses introduced by hos per is the fact that their head noun is a proper name which functions as the focus con­ stituent of kai or oude ('(not) even'. The relative clause each time provides the relevant intension of the head noun, the superlative property by virtue of which the head noun functions as focus constituent: (11) (The Trojan Helenus contends that Diomedes is the most redoutable of the Greeks for the Trojans:) oud' Akhilêa poth hôde g' edeidimen, orkhamon andrôn,

78

LINGmSTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER hon per phasi theas ex emmenai. "We never were so terrified even of Achilles, leader of men, who is said to be a goddess' son." (II. 6,1000). (12) (Achilles speaking: death is wholly inescapable.) oude gar oude biê Hêraklêos phuge Kêra, hos per philtatos eske Dii Kroniôni anakti. "Even the mighty Heracles did not escape his doom, dearest as he was [who was dearest] to Zeus the royal son of Cronos." (II.18,118) (13) No one and nothing has the power to resist Atê ('Blinding'): kai gar dê nu pote Zên' osato, ton per ariston andrôn êde theôn phas' emmenai. "Why, even Zeus was blinded by her once, and he is said [who is said] to stand above all men and gods." (iZ. 19,95).18 (14) (Achilles's horse speaking:) noi de kai ken hama pnoiêi Zephuroio theoimen, hen per elaphrotatên phas' emmenai "We may run even with the West Wind's speed - and there is nothing faster [which is the fastest thing] known on Earth" (- but we will not be able to prevent your death). (II. 19, 416).

Each of these examples serves in its appropriate context, from a communica­ tive ('rhetorical') point of view, as an argument for some superlative or, what is in practice equivalent, inescapable fact. As we have seen (2.3.1.2), this is com­ pletely in line with the illocutionary potential of sentences containing even: those sentences are typically uttered not for their own sake, but to state, in a more or less indirect way, a superlative fact. In the context of (11), this fact is the extreme fear of the Trojans of Diomedes, in (12) the utter impossibility to escape Kêr, the god of death, in (13) the irresistible power ofAtê, and in (14) the inevitable death of Achilles. The extensions of the focus constituents of kai and oude are highly suited to this argument, as the relative clauses explain. The superlative property is in (12)-(14) expressed by genuine, morphosyntactic superlatives (philtatos, oristos, elaphrotatên, 'dearest', 'best' and 'swiftest' resp.) and in (11) the attribute of being a goddess' son may be considered a 'pragmatic superlative.'20 The su­ perlatives may be seen as in index of the typical function of the hos Per-clauses in (11)-(14).

SCALARITY TO THE

PARTICLE

PER

79

Sometimes the hos per-clause provides a property of the person to which the head noun refers which lies in the comparative, rather than in the superla­ tive, sphere. In these cases, a morphosyntactic comparative will occur in the relative clause. This different content is connected with a different communica­ tive (rhetorical) function of the sentence in which the head noun occurs as focus constituent. Here we have not so much the assertion of a superlative fact as a persuasive or dissuasive utterance. An utterance in which an even-phrase occurs may very well be used in an attempt to influence the behavior of an addressee. In terms of speech act theory, it may have a directive illocutionary force. Since an utterance of the type 'Even Paul did it' is a less straightforward way of manipulating the behavior of an addressee than a simple imperative ('Do it'), it may be called an indirect directive speech act. We may speak of 'indirect speech act' when a sentence has an illocutionary force which does not agree with the sentence-type to which it belongs. In the example 'Even Paul did if we have a declarative sentence with a directive illocutionary force, which makes an indirect speech act. Now when we supply the relevant intension of the focus constituent of even in a directive speech act, this intension tends to be in the comparative, rather than in the superlative sphere, and we get a clear case of a fortiori ar­ gumentation, which conforms to the following pattern: "Even X...; and X is more likely to...than you. So you have to..." The following instances of hos per are straightforward examples of the speech act in question and its concomitant argumentation. The relevant intension of the head noun/focus constituent (again invariably a proper name) provided by the hos per-clause explains how the a fortiori works: (15) (Agamemnon to Menelaus: 'Withdraw, don't fight Hector!':) kai d' Akhileus toutôi ge makhêi eni kudianeirêi errig' antibolêsai, ho per seo pollon ameinôn. "Even Achilles fears to meet him in the field of honour, and Achilles is [who is] a better man than you by far." (/7. 7,114). (16) (Apollo to Patroclus:) khazeo, Diogenes Patrokleis: ou nu toi aisa soi hupo douri polin perthai Trôôn agerôkhôn, oud' hup'Akhillêos, hos per seo pollon ameinôn. "Back, my lord Patroclus! The city of the lordly Trojans is not destined to be captured by your spear, nor even by Achilles, who is a better man than you." (II. 16,709).

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER (17) (Achilles to Lycaon: 'You certainly must die'.) katthane kai Patroklos, ho per seo pollon ameinôn. "Even Patroclus died, who was a better man than you by far." (II. 21, 107). (18) (Achilles to Priam: 'You must eat now, in spite of your grief:) kai gar t' êukomos Niobê emnêsato sitou, têi per dôdekapaides eni megaroisin olonto. "Even the lady Niobe was not forgetful of her food, though she had seen a dozen children [whose children] done to death in her house." (IL 24, 603).25

In (15), (16) and (17) the a fortiori is explained by a comparative (ameinôn). The hos per-clause obviously conforms to a formulaic pattern; it constitutes a formula filling the second half of the line, after the main caesura. In (18) the a fortiori is numerical; someone who has lost just one beloved child has no ex­ cuse to refuse food in view of the fact that it is possible to take care of oneself when one has lost twelve children at once. 3.2.3 The concessive relative clause It is an obvious and acknowledged fact that the relative clauses introduced by hos per discussed in the previous section allow of a concessive interpreta­ tion, both in the case of the superlative and in the case of the comparative in­ tension. The concession may be rendered in English by translating the relative clause as a concessive subclause. See, for example, the translation of ex. (18). In 1.3.2 we saw that the concession has been treated by some authors as a pos­ sible sense ofper, which may or may not be appUcable in a particular instance (see 1.3.2). In the present study an apparatus has been developed which enables us to deal with per and concession in a more satisfactory way. The possible conces­ sive force of the relative clauses in (11)-(18) can be completely accounted for in scalar terms. The focus constituent of even and the sentence in which it oc­ curs (viz. the scope sentence, see 2.3.1.3) can always be described as opposites. The opposition is due, of course, to the scalar implicature of even, which says that the focus constituent is the least likely value to be substituted for the open variable. For example: (19) X is afraid of Hector. (X = Achilles) Achilles is very brave.

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The predicate of the scope sentence ('be afraid') and the relevant inten­ sion of the strongest item substitutable for the variable (Very brave') may be seen as opposites. The opposition is always present; it can be made visible by the addition of a constituent which explains why the focus constituent is the least likely value substitutable. Whenever this explicatory constituent is added, it acquires the semantic value of a concessive adverbial element. Thus we see that the often noticed concessive meaning of per is not a separate 'sense' of the particle, of which it may be asked whether it has any­ thing in common with other senses. 'Concession' is the immediate consequence of the superlative intension of the focus constituent. And as per is the particle of intensional scalarity, it is clear that the connection between scalarity and con­ cession is at the very core of the meaning of per. In the following chapter (4.3) I will show that the semantic connection between scalarity and concession may turn into a transition: the meaning of per has been subject to a diachronic development in which scalarity gradually disappeared and in which concession became a factor in its own right. 3.2.4 Scalar expressions and the Homeric narrator In the present (3.2) and the previous (3.1) section we have seen that per plays an essential role in two scalar expression-types which express a superla­ tive fact. Per either explicitly marks an adjective as a scalar superlative, or it marks the appropriate and relevant intension of an extensional term which is used for scalar purposes. In itself the distinction between intensional and ex­ tensional scalarity is clear enough. But it does not reveal why in a given context the intensional scalar expression is preferred to the extensional one. In other words, it does not explain the relative distribution of the two scalar expressions. In the present subsection I suggest an explanation for this distribution in the text of Homer. It is a matter of simple observable fact that all of the examples (11)-(18) cited in 3.2.2 occur in passages consisting of interactive speech. In the case of comparative intension ((15)-(18)) this observation has already been made ex­ plicitly. A directive speech act, which is meant to influence the behavior of an addressee (or, for that matter, any speech act), must of necessity occur in in­ teractive speech. But the examples in which superlative intension is involved ((11)-(14)), too, occur in exchanges between personages. The scalar superla­ tives cited in 3.1.1 (exx. (1)-(8)), on the other hand, invariably occur in narra­ tive passages. This exceptionless assignment to two clearly differentiated (con)text-types seems to be in accordance with the nature of the two expres-

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sion-types in question, and it provides a clue as to the explanation of their rela­ tive distribution in the text of Homer Someone who uses an utterance in which 'even x' occurs as an argument for ( = as an indirect way of asserting) a superlative fact, for example, (20) Hector is extremely redoubtable: even Achilles fears to meet him, normally commits himself to some belief or opinion, viz. that the extension of the focus constituent, Achilles, is in fact the least likely person to fear Hector. This commitment is nothing but the conventional scalar impUcature which is inherent in the use of even (see 2.3.1.1 above). In the case of intensional scalarity, on the other hand, such a commitment is absent: (21) Hector is extremely redoubtable: the bravest warrior would fear to meet him. Here the scalar phrase is non-referential, like any scalar superlative. There is simply no person a belief about whom can be implicated at all. Consequently, the argument in (21) for Hector's supreme skill in combat is, on acount of the absence of the implicature, much more neutral than in (20). Now neutrality in the sense of not expressing (by whatever means) one's beliefs or convictions about persons is, in general, a characteristic property of the narrator in the Homeric poems. From the point of view of narratology, the story of the Iliad and the Odyssey is told by an omniscient narrator, who does not himself play any role in the action he reports. Yet in spite of his omnis­ cience he does not normally impart to his hearer his opinions and beliefs about the elements of his story (persons, events) in any direct way. He purports to report the chain of events of which his story consists neutrally and objectively. His narrative aims may be said to consist in showing rather than in telling,29 by speaking as little as possible in his own voice. The obvious method to achieve this aim is to present things happening not from the point of view of the narrator, but from the point of view of the charac­ ters in the story, that is, to introduce large amounts of direct speech.31 In direct speech the narrator is not telling what happened: he presents things as they ap­ pear in the perception of one of the characters;3 what is said is put on account of the one who is speaking, not on that of the narrator. The nature of Homer's narrative technique is a priori likely to have lin­ guistic implications on discourse level. The language use of the Homeric nar­ rator obviously differs considerably from the language use of the characters in the story. In the two scalar expression-types under study so far in this chapter,

SCALARITY AND THE PARTICLE PER

83

exemplified by (20) and (21), we have now an example of a linguistic phenomenon whose distribution in the text seems to be determined by the nar­ rative technique employed. The scalar implicature of even, which involves the commitment to a belief or an assumption about the referent of the focus con­ stituent, is ill compatible with the external and detached persona of the Homeric narrator. Consequently, we find it only in speeches. Intensional scalarity, on the other hand, does not, and cannot, involve a commitment to a beUef about a referent. This seems to explain its absence from the speech seg­ ments of the Homeric text and its exclusive use by the Homeric narrator. 3.3 Scalarity and comparatives In the present section I discuss comparative expressions in which the second argument of the comparative predicate (see 2.3.2.1) is the focus con­ stituent of even. A simple example of such a sentence is: (22) Paul is even more clever than BILL. Sentences like (22) are eminently suited for the assertion of superlative facts* the normal meaning of even and that of the comparative work together here. It is asserted that the person named Paul has some property (cleverness) to a higher degree than someone who has this property already to a very high de­ gree: in (22) it is implicated by even that  is the least likely person to be less clever than someone else. Yet he is less clever than Paul, and it is this remarkable fact that is stated in (22). The focus constituent of even here is 'Bill', the second argument of the comparative predicate, or, alternatively, the sub­ ject of the comparative sentence (see 2.3.2.1). And the scope sentence of even in (22) is (23) Paul is more clever than x. Now this analysis of (22), in which there is a direct relation between even and Bill, which has to be stated in terms of focus constituent, is not yet the full description of the scalarity of (22). 'Bill' is an extensional term; and like all extensional terms it has to be marked for scalarity by the insertion of even, as we have seen (2.2.3). But the attribute of 'being more clever than B i l l ' isofcourse an intensional affair; it denotes a property, rather than an actual person or thing. And on account of even the predicate denoting this property is a scalar term no less than the focus constituent 'Bill' is one: 'being even more clever than Bill' implies 'being more clever than persons other than Bill'.

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Thus the scalar statement (22) yields two separate scales. The one is extensional and scope-dependent (see 2.3.1.4). It is the scale of the probability of being less clever than someone else. Its high point is represented by 'Bill'. The other scale is the opposite: it is intensional and scope-independent; its high point is the property of being more clever than Bill, the one who is least likely to be less clever than anyone else. And the person to whom this superlative property applies is Paul, and not Bill. This double scalarity seems to be con­ firmed by the fact that in sentences like (22) there is not one stressed con­ stituent ('Bill', the focus constituent of even), but two: the comparative itself (i.e. the adjective) tends to attract emphasis too. The analysis of sentences like (22) presented here, in which two scales operate simultaneously, seems to provide the right explanation for the use of per in the following examples. Kai here is used in the same way as even in (22): it marks an extensional term which is the compared argument of a compara­ tive sentence, like 'Bill' in (22). Per, on the other hand, is attached to the com­ parative particle ê ('than'). It is used to express the scalar properties of the comparative attribute, and to mark the second, intensional, scale: (24) (Nestor to the quarreling Agamemnon and Achilles:) alla pithesth': amphô de neôterô eston emeio: êdê gar pot'egôkai areiosinêper humin andrasin hômilêsa, kai ou pote m ' hoi g' atherizon. "Listen to me. You are both my juniors. And what is more, I have mixed in the past with even better men than you and never failed to carry weight with them." (II 1,260). (25) (Penelope: 'my son, who is still so young and unexperienced, has sailed away:) tou dê egô kai mallon oduromai ê per ekeinou. "And for him I grieve even more than for his father." (Od. 4, 819). This use of per, which is not very common in Homer (see the Appendix), was already correctly characterized in Ebeling (1880: 163),36 albeit not in scalar terms. It should be noted that not all instancesofê per (orêper) are scalar like (24)-(25). But these exceptions do not detract anything from the description presented here. They will be discussed in 7.3.1. We close this section with a unique example of per, which may be called a context-dependent comparative:

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85

(26) (Priam is in the tent of Achilles, emploring Achilles for the corpse of Hector:) all' aideio theous, Akhilleu, auton t' eleêson, mnêsamenos sou patros: ego d' eleeinoteros per "Achilles, fear the gods, and be merciful to me, remembering your own father. But I am even more entitled to compassion." (II.24,504). Here the second argument of the comparative predicate is omitted, there being only a subject term. When a comparative has only a subject term and the com­ parative clause is absent, this is always contextually motivated: the extent to which someone other than the referent of the subject term has the property in question is presupposed (knowledge shared by speaker and addressee) in the context of utterance. When Priam is speaking in (26), the topic of conversation is the misery of Achilles' old father; accordingly, the comparison need not be expHcitly uttered. Ex. (26) shows that when a 'context-dependent' comparative is scalar (in (27) it functions as an a fortiori argument), per is attached to the comparative adjective. Ex. (26) belongs to the examples which are cited by Denniston ( 1954: 482) as the relicts of the original 'intensive' meaning of per. But this special treatment is unnecessary, just as in the case of the other instances of Denniston's 'intensive use' (see 1.3.4). The example can be completely accounted for within the scalar framework. Notice that Denniston's rendering ('far more to be pitied than he' - emphasis added) is unhappy anyway because it does no jus­ tice to the scalar properties of the phrase. 3.4 Negative polar scalarity 3.4.1 Declarative sentences The instances of per discussed in the previous sections (3.1, 3.2 and 3.3) occur in what may be called declarative sentences. The term 'declarative' ap­ plies to a sentence-type and may be opposed to interrogative and imperative.37 Speaking in terms of modality (see 2.1.4), declarative sentences may be either factual or non-factual. Factual declaratives are normal indicative statements. An example of a non-factual declarative in which even occurs is (27) Even Paul would have liked the excursion. The difference between this sentence and its factual counterpart 'Even Paul liked the excursion' is that in the latter it is implied that Paul actually par­ ticipated in the excursion, while in (27) it is not.39 But this (modal) difference

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is immaterial for the declarative status of both sentences as well as for their illocutionary force (i.e. the use of even). In both sentences the same superlative fact is stated: the excursion in question was very interesting. Thus the distinc­ tion between 'factual' and 'non-factual' does not entail the distinction between declaratives and non-declaratives. There are non-factual declaratives. The kind of scalarity that may occur in declarative sentences was discussed in 2.4.1 as positive polar scalarity. The high point of the kind of scale involved here is a positive extreme ('maximum'). We saw that negation in connection with positive scalarity is immaterial; it just may or may not occur. And in Greek, whether kai or oude is used does not make any difference for the kind of scalarity involved. When negation occurs, the scalar expression stands outside its scope, and the scope sentence is equivalent to an affirmative. This is dif­ ferent in the contexts we are about to discuss in the next subsection. Here nega­ tion is a commanding factor which alters the nature of the scale involved. 3.4.2 Non-assertive contexts and negative polarity In declarative sentences something is asserted. Assertions may be posi­ tive or negative. In negative assertions information is removed, rather than positively introduced. Here negation may be seen as a non-fact modality. In fact negation as a sentential property is so important that negative assertions form a distinct group within the class of declarative sentences. The status of these negative assertions is mixed: on the one hand they are complete and dec­ larative sentences (used for negative assertions), but on the other hand they share an important property with some contexts which are syntactically and semantically the opposite of declaratives. This property of negative sentences concerns their readily admitting negative polarity items. Negative polarity items (NPI's, see 2.4.2 above) occur, roughly speaking, either in main clauses in which negation is a commanding feature or in a num­ ber of dependent subclauses. These subclauses include conditionals and restrictive relative clauses. The common denominator of this kind of subclauses is that they do not have, as declarative sentences do, the properties of complete and independent propositions. In other words, they do not on their own refer to a state of affairs and they do not belong to one of the sentence-types decla­ rative, interrogative or imperative. The subclauses in question may be called 'non-assertive'. Their non-asser­ tive character has to be viewed together with their dependent nature. They as­ sert something only in combination with the main clause to which they belong. The non-assertiveness of these subclauses can, within the framework of the

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present study, be related to the notions of wide scope and scale reversal dis­ cussed above (2.3.1.5 and 2.4.2). The wide scope of a scalar expression is simp­ ly the consequence of the fact that the subclause in which the scalar expression occurs cannot on its own function as a sentence, and consequently not as a scope sentence either. 3.4.3 Scalar superlatives and negative polarity In positive polarity contexts (see 2.4.1) per may modify an adjective so as to make it a scalar superlative. Scalar expressions occurring in assertive, posi­ tive polarity contexts belonging to the declarative sentence-type represent the high point (maximum) of a positive scale. In negative polarity contexts, on the other hand, the situation is reversed. Here the high point (or better: low point) denotes a negative, minimum quantity or quality. Now, it is an important property of positive scales that the lexical value of scalar superlatives in positive polarity contexts is unimportant. The intensional scalarity of scalar superlatives in positive contexts works independently of the nature of the property denoted by the adjective. What matters is the positive superlativeness, which can be expressed by morphosyntactic means. Whether we are dealing with negative or positive properties ('clever' vs. 'stupid', 'big' vs. 'small') is unimportant. In the case of 'smallest', for example, we are simply ex­ pressing the maximum amount of a negative property, smallness. The scale in question is simply downward implicative: what is 'smallest' is by definition smaller than what is less small. In the case of intensional scalarity in negative polarity contexts, on the other hand, there is a lexical constraint on scalar superlatives, in that only ad­ jectives denoting negative properties are allowed. Adjectives denoting positive properties cannot yield scalar readings in negative environments. The sentence 'John does not understand the most difficult author', for example, does not imply that 'John' does not understand less difficult authors. In fact he may very well understand these. On the other hand, 'John does not understand the least difficult author' implies John's not understanding any other (i.e. more difficult) author. The lexical constraint on scalar superlatives in negative contexts can be understood as the combined operation of scalarity and negation. When even the smallest quantity/amount is not the case, then it is clear a fortiori that any larger quantity/amount will not be the case either. Thus in the case of scalarity in negative contexts we are dealing with minimum amounts of negative proper­ ties. Consequently, we may say that the scale associated with this kind of scalar

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expressions is reversed with respect to the corresponding expressions in posi­ tive contexts. We now apply this negative polarity/scalarity apparatus to Homeric per. The basic meaning of the particle emerged so far can be stated in terms of in­ tensional scalarity. On the basis of this fact we are in a position to predict that when per occurs in a negative polar context, its intensional focus constituent must be an adjective denoting something negative. This prediction is borne out by the facts. These facts are not numerous -per occurs no more than three times in a negative polar context, with wide scope - but they are sufficient. Each time per modifies oligos ('small', 'little'): (28) (Diomedes to Paris: 'You are a weakling and your shot did me no harm'.) ê t' alios hup' emeio, kai ei k' oligon per epaurêi, oksu belos peletai, kai akêrion aipsa tithêsi. "My weapons have a better edge. One touch of them and a man is dead [Ut: even if they touch a man ever so little]." (Π. 11, 391).44 (29) anti kasignêtou kseinos th ' hïketês te tetuktai aneri, hos t' oligon per epipsauêi prapidessin. "To any man with the slightest claim to common sense, a stranger and a suppliant is as good as a brother." (Od, 8,547). (30) (Aeolus, the king of the winds, lends Odysseus a helping hand. He has emprisoned the energy of all the winds in a big leather bag:) nêi d' eni glaphurêi katedei mermithi phaeinêi argureêi, hina mê ti parapneusei' oligon per. "This pouch he stowed in the hold of my ship, securing it with a silver wire so as to prevent the slightest leakage." (Od. 10,24). These examples present three different negative polarity contexts. In (28) we have a conditional and in (29) the kind of restrictive relative clause which is sometimes called 'conditional', because it allows of the paraphrase by a con­ ditional ('if someone'). Both clauses are dependent on their main clauses; they do not on their own express a complete proposition. Clausal dependence is expHcitly marked in Greek by the subjunctive, the subclause-mood par ex­ cellence. And it is the subjunctive that we see appear in (28) and (29). In (30), the negative polarity is due to negation in a final subclause. Negated final sub­ clauses are as regards the acceptance of negative polarity items equivalent to

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the complement of negation-implying verbs like fail, refuseandprevent. See the translation of (30). Just as in the case of scalar superlatives in positive, assertive, contexts, EngUsh is instructive in that it has a means other than an expression with even or other scalar particles to express the scalarity, viz. the morphosyntax of the superlative. The slightestismorphosyntactically the superlative of slight. Semantically and distributionally, however, it is a negative polarity item, expressing scalar superlativeness in contexts where a constraint on the lexical value of the superlative obtains. The same appHes to oligon per. The adjective is marked by per for scalarity, just as any adjective may be marked so. The rest of the job is done by the lexical value of oligos, on account of which oligon per can occur as a scalar superlative in a negative polar context and as such be equivalent to a negative polarity item. 3.4.4 The strengthening of negation Negative polarity items may be discussed in terms of negation strengthen­ ing (see Horn 1978a: 148 ff.). In (30), for example, the expression containing oligon per ('so as to prevent the slightest leakage' is stronger than 'so as to prevent leakage'. One special group of negation strengtheners consists of ex­ pressions like (not) at all, (pas) du tout (French), helemaal (niet) (Dutch). A special place in this group occupies German gar (nicht). This strengthened negation may be analyzed as a scalar particle which takes the negative element as its focus constituent. The use of the scalar particle gar as a negation strengthener seems to be the appropriate background for the assessment of the following examples, in which the addition of per to the negative particle has a strengthening effect on the latter: (31) (Aias has struck Hector with a stone:) hôs d' hoth ' hupo plègês potros Dios ekseripêi drus prorrizos, deinê de theeiou gignetai odmê eks autês, ton d' ou per ekhei thrasos hos ken idêtai eggus eôn, khalepos de Dios megaloio keraunos. "(Thus Hector in his gallantry was brought down in the dust) by as sudden a stroke as that of Father Zeus when he uproots an oak; it gives off an appalling reek of sulphur and he who is seeing it from nearby is scared [has no confidence at all], for terrible is the lightning of Zeus." (II. 14,416).

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER (32) (Odysseus to the Phaeacians in the Games: Ί will not challenge my host Laodamas' ton d' allônou per tin anainomai oud' atherizô, all' ethelô idmen kai peirêthêmenai antên. "But of the rest of you there is really no one [no one at all] I'm too proud to take on; in fact I am ready to meet and match myself against all comers." (Od. 8,212).

These examples belong, just like ex. (26) above, to what Denniston ( 21954:482) has called the intensive use ofper, which allegedly stands apart from the other uses. But (31) and (32) can be perfectly dealt with in the negative polarity area of the scalar framework. A special treatment is unnecessary. Notice that per used as in (31)-(32) does not occur after Homer. Later Greek uses compounds of the type oud-(h)amos ('not in any way') for the strengthening of negation. 3.5 Scalarity in wishes and commands 3.5.1 Imperative and optative sentences We have now dealt with per in positive polarity (assertive) and negative polarity (non-assertive) contexts. The former belong to the declarative sen­ tence-type, whereas the latter do not belong to any sentence-type at all, be­ cause they are syntactically dependent. We now go on to discuss the use ofper in another sentence-type, viz. the imperative sentence. This sentence-type has a predicate in the imperative mood; it is, accordingly, very suited for the ut­ terance of commands. It will appear in the present section that as regards the use of per there is no difference between commands and wishes. The expres­ sion-type in question, then, involves both the imperative and what may be called the optative sentence-type. Optative and imperative sentences are non-factually modalized. Their non-factuality is closely connected with the modality inherent in the future tense paradigm: when we utter a wish or a command, we are saying something which is related to a state of affairs that does not (yet) obtain. It is the same kind of non-fact modality as in the complement of verbs like want, strive etc. (see note 20 of ch. 2). The difference between non-fact modality in negative polar contexts and non-fact modality in optative and imperative sentences Hes in the fact that the latter may be conceived of as the modification of a complete proposition. A complete proposition (or predication) may be defined49 as a predicate with all its argument-slots filled by the appropriate terms. The three-place predicate

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give, for example, needs three noun phrases to form a complete proposi­ tion/predication (Agamemnon gives Achilles a woman). This predication may then be modalized according to the tense or mood marking of the predicate: factual modality obtains in the case of present or past indicative tense-mood marking, and non-fact modality in the case of future indicative, optative or im­ perative tense-mood marking. Non-fact modality may be expressed by morphosyntactic means or by auxiliaries or both. In negative polar contexts, on the other hand, the non-fact modality is not due to the tense-(aspect-)modality marking of the predicate, but to negation (whether overt or covert). The difference between optative/imperative irrealis contexts and negative polar contexts appears from the fact that negative polarity items are distributionally excluded from optative and imperative sen­ tences, as a simple test will show. Negative polarity contexts have their own kind of scale, which is a reversed version of the 'normal' scales associated with assertive contexts and the decla­ rative sentence-type, as we have seen. Optative and imperative sentences, too, have their own kind of scale. This kind of scale, which is closely associated with the specific non-fact modality of optative and imperative sentences, I will call the desirability scale. Desirability scales mark a number of items by degree of desirability in a given context. Now, it is a simple fact that what one desires in a given situation is often more than what is actually possible. As will appear, this common-place observation is the clue to the description and explanation of per as a scalar particle in the optative and imperative sentence-types. 3.5.2 Inclusiveness and exclusiveness The instances ofper under study here form a well-defined group. They are exemplified by exx. (4) and (5) of 1.2 above. Consider: (33) (Achilles to his mother Thetis:) mêter, epei m ' etekes ge minunthadion per eonta, timen per moi ophellen Olumpios eggualiksai, Zeus hupsibremetes, nun d' oude me tutthon eteisen. "Mother, since you, a goddess, gave me life, if only for alittlewhile, surely Olympian Zeus owes me at least honour. But as it is, he gives me none." (. 1, 353). Thefirstinstanceοfper in this example (minunthadionper)we pass in silence, so as not to complicate matters more than is necessary. It will be discussed in 4.3.3 below. What matters here is timen per. The next example, the end of a

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prayer of Agamemnon to Zeus, contains no less than two instances of per of the kind in question: (34) alLa Zeu, tode per moi epikrêênon eeldôr: autous dê per eason hupekphugeein kai aluksai, mêd'houtô Trôessin ea damnasthai Akhaious. "Ah, Zeus, grant me this prayer at least. Let us escape with our lives, if nothing else, and do not let the Trojans overwhelm us like this." ( 8,242-3). Other examples: (35) (Odysseus, member of the Embassy to Achilles speaking:) ei de toi Atreidês men apêkhtheto kêrothi matton, autos kai tou dora, su d' allous per Panakhaious teiromenous eleaire kata straton, hoi se theon hos teisousi. "But if your hatred of Atreides, gifts and all, outweighs every other consideration, do have at least some pity on the rest of the united Achaeans, lying dead-beat in their camp. They will honour you like a god." (IL 9,301). (36) Nestor to Patroclus: 'Maybe Achilles has some compelling reason not to fight':) alla se per proetô, hama d' allos laos hepesthô Murmidonôn, ai ken ti phoôs Danaoisi genêai. "But let him at least allow you to take the field with the Myrmidonian force at your back, and so perhaps bring salvation to the Danaans." (. 11,796 (cf. ex. (5) in 1.2 above). (37) (Hypnos, the god of Sleep to Poseidon:) prophrôn nun Danaoisi, Poseidaon, epamune, kai sphin kudos opaze minuntha per, ophr' eti heudei Zeus. "Poseidon, you may help the Danaans with all your heart and give them the upper hand, if only for a short time, as long as Zeus is sleeping." ( 14,358).52 (38) (Menelaus rebukes Eteoneus for leaving strangers waiting outside:) ê men dê noi kseinêïa polla phagonte allôn anthrôpôn deur' hikometh', ai ke pothi Zeus

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eksopisô per pausêi oïzuos. "Think of all the hospitality that you and I enjoyed from strangers before we reached our homes in the hope that Zeus would spare us at least in the future such pressing need." {Od. 4,35). In each of these examples, the speaker utters what may be called a modest wish. What he wishes is a kind of compromise, the most desirable thing to be wished for in the context of utterance being left out of account. At first sight, this property implies a considerable difference between (33)-(38) and the ex­ amples discussed earlier in this chapter. The meaning of per in sections 3.1 through 3.4 above has very much to do with superlativeness, and it has to be dealt with in connection with even. In exx. (33)-(38), on the other hand, per seems to be different: in accordance with the modest nature of the wish in ques­ tion, it seems to exclude those alternatives for the focus constituent which denote a higher value on the scale. In (38), for instance, the 'present' seems to be excluded. Likewise, in the other examples exclusion seems to obtain: 'honor (and not a long life)' in (33); 'the other Greeks (and not Agamemnon)' in (35); 'you (and not Achilles)' in (36) etc. The distinction between inclusive and exclusive focus particles (see 2.3.1.3 above) may be used for the delimitation of scalar phenomena in language. All scalar particles are inclusive by their very nature: their focus constituent rep­ resents the highest value, and as such it implies (includes) all other (lower) values. Exclusive particles, on the other hand, are not scalar. 'Exclusion' as a property of a focus particle precludes scalarity, because the focus constituent of the particle either does not represent the high point on the scale, if there is one, or it does represent the highest value, but it excludes the lower (i.e. more likely) ones.55 In either case scalar relations between the focus constituent and its alternatives are impossible. Thus to say that per in (33)-(38) is exclusive has important consequences, since it implies a serious disconnection in the array of uses of per. Per would turn out to be at the same time a scalar and a non-scalar particle, and the senserelation between (33)-(38) and the instances discussed earlier in the present chapter would turn out to be one of homonymy, rather than one of polysemy, there being no relevant common denominator (see note 15 of ch. 1). But a dis­ connection of this kind can only be acceptable when we have fully applied the principle of unification (see 1.3.2), viz. when we have made sure that there is in fact no common property. In the present case this means that we have to look for a scalar reading of per in (33)-(38) as long as possible. The present section is concerned with this search.

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3.5.3 Scales of desirability and acceptability Per in (33)-(38) can be appropriately rendered by at least in English, as appears from the translations of the examples. For a correct understanding of per in (33)-(38), we have to realize that the meaning of at least differs accord­ ing to the modal context in which it is used: in factual contexts ('John has at least three dogs') it is not scalar in the sense used in the present study. In nonfactual contexts (viz. wishes and commands), on the other hand, it certainly is scalar. The description of the scalarity of at least in wishes and commands runs parallel with that of per in (33)-(38), for here, too, the wish/command charac­ ter is a commanding feature. You can't always get what you want. And it is often useless to wish what is beyond the reasonably possible. This platitude may be reformulated as fol­ lows in more appropriate terminology. The maximum fulfilment of one's wishes in a particular situation may be impossible, blocked, as it were, by reality and factuality. In such a situation the non-factual space within which wishes and commands make sense is narrowed down, and one has to resort to the second best alternative, as a kind of compromise, so to speak. This second best alter­ native may be encoded linguistically as the focus constituent of a focus particle. Now the phrase 'the second best alternative' is clearly suggestive of a scale. But how are we to account of the scalarity and how are we to conceive of the scale involved? As a first try, we might construe a desirability scale, in which the items are ordered by degree of decreasing desirability in a given context, the high point of this scale being the most desirable item. But on this scale the second best alternative represents the highest item but one, and it has, as such, exclusive value. Presented schematically:

The phrase which has as its focus constituent a term which represents the value "B" on this scale cannot possibly be called 'scalar' in the sense of the present study. For one thing, "B" is not the high point, and for another thing,

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it has no implicative force: if someone wishes  (Abeing impossible and, hence, excluded), it does by no means follow that he abo in the sense οf αfortiori wishes the less desirable  through F. Consequently, if (39) were the appropriate scale for the use ofper in (33)-(38), we would have to conclude that per is not scalar here. However, per and at least in (33)-(38) do have a scalar meaning. But the desirability scale (39) is not the appropriate way to bring this out. To describe at leastandper in wishes as a scalar particle, we have to conceive of a scale of which the second best alternative "B" of scale (39) is the high point. Such a scale can indeed be construed, and it is closer to the pragmatics of wishes than appears on first sight. In this scale the items are ordered not by degree of desirability, as in (39), but by degree οf acceptability or satisfactoriness. Here the high point does not represent the most desirable item in a given context of ut­ terance, but the least desirable item which is still acceptable for the speaker, which still satisfies his wish, albeit in a suboptimal way. This scale is a modifica­ tion of the higher area of the desirability scale (39): (40)

 least desirable but still acceptable A most desirable

This scale is implicative, and its high point "B" is scalar and, hence, in­ clusive. For if one contents oneself with "B" as the fulfilment of one's wish, one will a fortiori do so with "A", the most desirable item. This acceptability scale is wholly comparable to the scales of positive polarity contexts discussed ear­ lier, since superlativeness plays, again, an important role in it. Its connection with the better known scalar phenomena discussed earlier in this chapter as well as in chapter 2 can be brought out in English when the specific character of the wish or command is expressed not in an optative or imperative, but in a declarative sentence; even then appears: (41) Even B, a suboptimal fulfilment of my wish, will do. Even in EngUsh cannot, as far as I can see, occur in the overt expression of the wish or command. At least has to be used instead. This combination, which functions as a scalar focus particle, overtly (morphosyntactically) expres­ ses the superlative position of its focus constituent on the scale: least desirable yet still acceptable. Homeric Greek, on the other hand, appears to use per for the encoding of the satisfactoriness scale (40), as is shown by (33)-(38). In each of these ex­ amples, the focus constituent of per denotes the least desirable realization of

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the speaker's wish/command that is still acceptable. In (33) the best thing one can wish, and especially Achilles, is a long life plus honor and fame. But Achil­ les has had to choose, and he has chosen honor (timê).Since he has been denied longevity, mere honor is the best thing he can hope for in this life. But at the same time honor is the least thing that still satisfies his desires. In (34) the best thing a Greek on campaign against Troy could wish is return home safely with a lot of booty after the intended sack of Troy. But as it is in the context of ut­ terance of (34), in which the Trojans are clearly victorious and the sack of Troy is farther off than ever before, it is more realistic for a Greek to tune down his wishes, and, accordingly, his prayers to the gods, and content himself with the mere saving of his life. In (33) and (34) the relation between the items wished for may be called additive, the maximum of desirability being the sum of two items: 'A + B'. Since 'A + B' is unrealizable ('A' being impossible),'Balone' is the second best item and the least desirable item that is still acceptable. The relation between the desired items may also be substitutive: the items are not related to each other by way of number ('A +  + ' being more desirable than 'A + B'), but by way of strength ('A' being more desirable than B'). Of course, the scales con­ nected with superlativeness discussed earlier in this chapter, as well as in chap­ ter 2, are all 'substitutive'. Examples of substitutive scalarity in connection with wishes and com­ mands are (36) and (37). The focus constituent of per here denotes a 'least desirable but still acceptable' item which is related to the most desirable item not by way of number, but by way of strength (quality or quantity). But there is also a difference between the two. In (36) the substitutive desirability scale is context-dependent in the way mentioned above (2.3.1.4): the focus constituent of per is a personal pronoun, and as such an extensional term. Nothing in its meaning explains why 'Patroclus' is the least desirable item that still satisfies the speaker's wish. In (37), on the other hand, the desirability scale is scope-in­ dependent, and, accordingly, the focus constituentofperisintensional: if only a short time will do, it is clear that any longer period will do a fortiori. Thus we see that the distribution ofper in wishes and commands is insen­ sitive to the distinction between intension and extension,asper in wishes and commands may have both an extensional and an intensional term as its focus constituent. We saw that the distinction between intension and extension was indispensable for the correct delimitationofper with regard to kai in declara­ tive sentences and positive polarity contexts, kai being the particle of exten­ sional, andperthe particle of intensional scalarity. But just as even, kai cannot

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be used for the scalarity in wishes and commands. Consequently, it does not play any role in the delimitation of per in these environments. 3.5.4 Per, ge and exclusion There remains, however, a particle with regard to which per in wishes and commands has to be delimited. This is ge. The specific difference on the basis of which the delimitation may be made Hes in the distinction between fact and non-fact, between statement and wish or command. We saw that in (33)-(38) the one who utters the wish or command has to resort to a compromise because the realization of the highest valued item is impossible. Now this impossibility is a matter of fact and it is the expression of this fact that may involve exclusiveness ('limitation'). It is in the expression of the fact which impedes the wish of the speaker that the particle ge may be used. Ge functions as an exclusive focus particle which does not impose an ordering on its focus constituent and the alternatives for it. When it is used in connection with scalar wishes, it takes as its focus con­ stituent one of the components of the highest item on an additive desirability scale. The resulting expression-type conforms to the following pattern: '"A + B' is the most desirable item. As a matter of fact 'A (ge)' is impossible. Then I wish that at least 'B (per)' will happen." Two examples of this expression-type: (42) (Menelaus to Aias, fighting over the body of Patroclus:) speusomen ai ke nekun per Akhillêï propherômen gumnon: atar ta ge teukhe' ekhei koruthaiolos Hektor. "We might at least save the body for Achilles, naked though it is. The armour at any rate is in the hands of Hector with the glancing Helm." (II. 17,121). (43) khaire pater  kseine: genoito toi es per opissô olbos: atar men nun ge kakois ekheai poleessi. "Your health, my ancient friend! You are under the weather now, but here's to your future happiness! [May you be happy at least in the future. For at the moment you are in big trouble]." (Od. 18,122 ( = Od. 20,199)). Per and ge in these examples are clearly and unequivocally differentiated:per is inclusive, ge is exclusive, and per is non-fact; ge is fact. The accounts of exx. (33)-(38) and (42)-(43) in the descriptive literature on per are unsatisfactory and incomplete precisely in these two respects: they do not discuss the notions

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of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' in connection with scales and scalarity, and they underestimate (or even ignore) the linguistic relevance of the cognitive notions 'fact' and 'non-fact'.57 3.5.5 The diachronic aspect of per in wishes The description presented here shows that per in wishes and commands does not impair the coherence of per as a linguistic sign and the unity of its description. Butperin wishes and commands is nonetheless an expression-type which stands apart from the other uses. From a synchronic point of view this appears from the fact that its focus constituent in wishes may be an extensional term, whereas in all other uses discussed in the present chapter per may be characterized as the particle of intensional scalarity. Thus when we consider the instances of per in the synchronic dimension in the light of Prototype Theory, the instances of per in wishes and commands are less than prototypi­ cal in that they lack the prototypical property of intensionality. From a diachronic point of view, too, the use of per in wishes and com­ mands stands apart from the other uses. The uses of per in scalar superlatives (see 3.1) and in scalar relative clauses (see 3.2) stand in what may be called the diachronic main stream of the particle, the gradual conversion of intensional scalarity into concession. In the following chapter I will describe this process in detail (see 4.3.1). Per in wishes and commands, on the other hand, seems to be, speaking in terms of main streams, a by-path. It is not diachronically related to any other use, and it has left no traces in post-Homeric Greek. The diachronic statusofper in wishes and commands seems to be reflected by the quantitative aspect of this expression-type. Out of the 24 instances oiper in wishes and commands (see the statistics in the Appendix) which we find in Homer, only 4 occur in the Odyssey. This remarkable distribution may of course be due to a difference in style between two poets, but it is tempting to assume a diachronic development here, in the course of which per in wishes and com­ mands gradually disappeared. The much lower frequency in the Odyssey is at any rate in line with the lower frequency in general of old items in this poem. 59 But the frequency argument does not stand alone. In 7.2 I will present cases which point to the possibility that the typical scalar use of per in wishes and commands was not fully understood anymore in the poet's time. 3.6 Some unclassifiable instances The examples discussed in the previous sections belong expression-types that are as to their form more or less clearly defined. But natural language facts

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often do not let themselves be classified so easily. This means, in the present connection, that per may have a scalar meaning outside the expression-types discussed in 3.1 through 3.5. In the present section I present those 'unclass­ ifiable' instances. One might call them 'peripheral' in the sense that they do not conform to the classification into various expression-types (see further 7.1.1). But as to their meaning they are not peripheral at all. Per in (44)-(47) below per functions on its own as a scalar particle. In the examples to be discussed in ch. 7, on the other hand, per is either not scalar at all, or, if it is scalar, is redun­ dant with regard to the scalar particle oude (see 7.3.2 and 7.3.3). (44) (Aias to Menelaus in the battle over Patroclus' body:) ô pepon, ô Menelae diotrephes, ouketi nôї elpomai auto per nostêsemen ek polemoio. "My friend, Menelaos nursling of Zeus; I am beginning to think that you and I will never get home safely from this fight (let alone the corpse).[I do not expect anymore that we can get even ourselves out of here]"(II. 17,239). This example is similar to the examples discussed in 3.4.3 in that per and its focus constituent occur in a negative environment. Auto per represents the high point of a reversed scale; a minimal quantity is involved. The difference lies in the fact that unlike oligon per, auto per cannot be described as an inverse scalar superlative.Autô is not a purely intensional term; accordingly, the scale in ques­ tion is scope-dependent, rather than scope-independent. (45) (Zeus to Here and Athene, quarelling over the battle:) sphôïn de prin per tromos ellabe phaidima guia, prin polemon te idein, polemoio te mermera erga. "But you two were trembling before you even saw the battlefield and its horrors." (II. 8, 452). (46) (Antilochus is on the run for Hector:) αll ho g' ar' etresethêrikakon rheksanti eoikôs, hos te  kteinas ê boukolon amphi boessi pheugei prin per homilon aollisthêmenai andrôn "He turned tail like a wild beast that has committed the enormity of killing a dog or the man in charge of the cattle, and takes to his heels (even) before a crowd collects to chase him." (R 15,588).

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In these examples per marks a temporal adverbial element for scalarity: even before. Notice that in (45) the scalarity is more pointed and functional than in (46): the former is more in line with the characteristic illocution of sentences containing a scalar expression. (47) (Menelaus to Telemachus about his former comrades in the Trojan war:) hôn ophelon tritatên per ekhôn en domasi moiran naiein, hoi d' andres sooi emmenai, hoi tot' olonto Troiêi en eureiêi, hekas Argeos hippobotoio. "How happy I could be, here in my house, with even a third of my former estate, if those friends of mine were still alive who died long ago on the broad plains of Troy, so far from Argos where the horses graze!" (Od. 4,97). At first sight we have here another instance of the use ofper in wishes and com­ mands. But in fact the example is different. Menelaus does not utter a com­ promise, thereby expressing as the focus constituent of per the least desirable item that still satisfies his wish. Instead he says: Ί love my old comrades so much that I would have renounced the greater part of my fortune for their Uves'. Per specifies this 'greater part', marking it for scalarity: 'even two thirds'. Viewed thus, tritatên per can be interpreted as a normal case of scalarity in a declara­ tive sentence.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 1) Notice the particle () ('very') in ex. (5). The meaning of this particle is of course highly compatible with superlativeness. However, 'meaning' is not the only factor in the presence of mala here. See 5.2.2 below. 2) This is not to say, of course, that the insertion of even is cannot occur. The use of even with scalar superlatives is a typical case of 'strengthening", even being 'redundant' and not an es­ sential part of the expression-type. In Dutch, on the other hand, zelfs is obligatory with scalar superlatives. 3) As the discussion of scalar superlativeness in the present study is in function of the description of per, I have not investigated the strategies in later Greek to express scalar super­ lativeness. Nor have I investigated whether there exist 'morphosyntactic' scalar superlatives in Homer or in other Greek texts. 4) In ex. (2)per is preceded by an adverb (puka), but the combinationofpuka (lit. 'thickly', 'solidly') with the participle phroneôn ('thinking') is equivalent to an adjective ('wise', 'clever'). 5) This suffix originally encodes the marked term of binary oppositions (Benveniste ([1948] 1975:117). Later it became the regular suffix for the comparative. 6) "Die Zusammenstellung mit peri 'sehr' versagt ja hoffnungslos gegenüber den wirklichen Gebrauchsweisen vonper"(1925:12). 7) E.g. Ruijgh (1971:2,97). I do not go into the problem of the relations (synchronic and diachronic) between connective and adverbial ('epic') te. This topic belongs to the unified description of te, not to thatofper. See Ruijgh (1971:15-18). 8) For the distinction between 'foreground' and 'background' see Hopper (1979) and Hopper & Thompson (1980). In Wallace (1982) the cognitive/perceptual basis of the distinction is discussed (see also 2.3.2.1 above, with note 68). It is sometimes straightforwardly assumed (cf. the publications mentioned above as well as Givón (1979: ch. 2; 1984:314 ff.) that there is a clear correlation between backgrounding and subordinate clauses just as there is one between foregrounding and main clauses. In Givón, ed. (1983: 23-4) this statement is, rightly, mitigated, there being subclauses that do report 'foregrounded' events. Furthermore, a distinction should be made between initial and final subclauses. The most recent literature makes up for these deficiencies: Thompson (1987) investigates the specific functions of 'foregrounded' subclauses, and Ramsey (1987) deals, in terms of discourse functions, with the position of subclauses with regard to their main clauses. Bolkestein (1987) is a general discussion of the problem, as well as a statistical study of some phenomena in Latin whose distribution is allegedly sensitive to the main clause - subclause distinction (viz. tense and voice). 9) But names referring to 'permanent beings'(likeZeus, oxPhobos in (1)) can be the head noun of the hos tø-clause, too. Ruijgh (1971:360-72; 454-57) cites all the examples of 'te digressif-permanent'. Not all te-clauses, however, express a 'permanent fact', see 3.1.4 below. 10) In Givón (1984:273) 'habitual' tense/modality ('always') is defined as either at all times or unspecifiedfor time. The first possibility applies to propositions like the te-clause, in which an essential property is ascribed to a type or a class. Propositions that are 'unspecified for time', on

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the other hand, may be used to ascribe some context-independent property to individuals (e.g. traits of character or patterns of behavior). 11) But attributive superlatives are by no means excluded from the hos fe-clause, for ex­ ample: II 17, 674-5: aietos, hon rha te phasin oxutaton derkesthai hupouraniôn peteênôn ('the eagle, which has, as they say, the sharpest eye of all birds'). 12) For example, as Ruijgh (1971:1001) notes, of the 18 instances of hos te in Aeschylus (tragedy, 5th century) only 3 occur in normal spoken text. The other examples (15) occur in lyri­ cal (choral) and anapaestic passages where the deviance from the ordinary language of the poet's time is greatest and where epicisms tend to cluster. 13) The examples are cited in Ruijgh (1971: 405 ff.). 14) It might be objected here that the frequent occurrence of 'adjective + pef in the hos te-clause has no diachronic impHcations, on the grounds that the hos te-clause is one of the few opportunities for the poet to use scalar superlatives at all. On this account, scalar superlatives occur so often in hos te-clauses simply because they cannot easily occur elsewhere. This may be true, but to use 'adjective + per' in a hos te-clause presupposes knowledge of the non-factual (timeless) nature of that clause, and there we are back again to diachrony. 15) Cf. Ruijgh (1971: 421,423). The first instance of te in the example, on the other hand, can be interpreted as connexive. 16) We might say, with König (1981:117), that even creates an intensional context, i.e. an environment in which the substitution of co-extensive terms has truth-conditional consequen­ ces. See above, 2.2.2 with note 38. 17) For even and negation see 2.4.1. Notice that even in English is a so-called optional 'neg(ation)-raiser', just as predicates like 'think', 'believe': 'Even Paul did not like the excursion' is equivalent to 'Not even Paul liked the excursion'. In Greek, on the other hand, even (kai) is an obligatory neg-raiser: the expression of even in a negative scope-sentence has acquired a lexical status which is different from even in an affirmative scope sentence: oude vs. kai. On even as a neg-raiser see Seuren (1985:312-13). On neg-raising in general see Horn (1978b), Seuren (1985: 166-72). 18) Notice that kai in this example, as well as oude in (12), is separated from its focus con­ stituent (see also ex. (18) below). In later Greek kai gar may function as a fixed collocation which means 'for it is also true that..', whereby kai takes a whole sentence as its focus constituent. This use does not yet occur in Homer. 19) See also Ducrot (1980:16). 20) See 2.1.3 on the superlative nature of proper names like 'Kasparov' and 'Getty'. 21) See Lyons (1977: 745-6), Bolkestein (1980: 31), Leech (1983:106). 22) See Searle (1975), Lyons (1977: 785), Bolkestein (1980: 30-1). 23) The distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' illocutionary force is but one of the various (sometimes overlapping) distinctions used for classification in this field. See for an over­ view Bolkestein (1980: 28-35). 24) But a superlative intension is by no means excluded in directive even-sentences. 25) Notice that this example is the only one of the group in which the intension of the focus constituent does not involve a time-stable property: the relative clause says what happened to Niobe at some particular moment. In (11)-(17), on the other hand, the superlative or compara-

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tive intension is unspecified for time. In practice, as most superlative or comparative intensions denote time-stable properties, but (18) shows that this is not necessarily the case. What really matters is, of course, the superlativeness or comparativeness. 26) Two alternate morphs for the expression of the relative subordinator in Greek - hos, the relative pronoun, and ho, an anaphoric demonstrative pronoun, functioning in Attic as the definite article - provide the flexibility which is necessary for a formula which has the main caesura as one of its boundaries. The relative clause introduced by hos per (metrically, before a c o n s o n a n t : - - ) occurs when the caesura is realized as (P)enthemimeres and may be called, in the notation of Hoekstra (1965), a P2-formula. The relative clause introduced by ho per (metri­ cally: U - ) , on the other hand, occurs when the main caesura is realized as T (trochaic caesura). It is a T2-formula. See further on these matters (i.e. the interaction between wording and metrics) 5.2 below. 27) Cf. Kühner-Gerth (1904:170-1). 28) In standing outside the story he tells, Homer is, in the intellectualistic terminology of Genette (1972: 255-6) a 'heterodiegetic' narrator ('narrateur hétérodiégétique'). At the same time he is 'extradiegetic' ('extradiégétique'): he is not, qua narrator, situated within the framework of a larger story. Odysseus in the court of Alcinous as the narrator of his own adven­ tures (books 9-12 of the Odyssey) is in two ways the opposite of 'Homer': his story falls within a wider story and he himself plays a major role in it. Thus qua narrator he is 'intradiégétiquehomodiégétique'. 29) These terms came into use in connection with the new narrative methods and aims practiced by Henry James. See Booth (1961: 23, 93); Genette (1972:185). The distinction be­ tween 'showing' and 'telling' is useful merely to state the degree to which a narrator is 'neutral' in the sense used here. In itself the notion of 'showing' in connection with language and litera­ ture (in Aristotelian terms: mimesis) is in the last resort illusory. Language-tokens do not, by their very nature, imitate the things to which they refer. Any act of reference, whether to ficti­ cious or real-world entities, involves a deliberate choice and selection on the part of the lan­ guage user. Thus when we say that Homer's aim is to 'show', rather than to 'tell', this does not preclude that Homer imparts opinions and beliefs to his hearers. We merely say that his means are more implicit than those of a typically 'telling' author. See Booth (1961:5-6). 30) Sometimes the Homeric narrator unexpectedly breaks this 'rule', for example in the following passage, which occurs at a crucial point in the narrative: Hôs phato lissomenos, mega nêpios, ê gar emellen hoi autôi thanaton te kakon kai kêra litesthai ("So Patroclus made his appeal. But how simple he was! Had he but known it, he was pray­ ing for his own doom and an evil death."), . 16,46-7. In this passage the particle ê occurs, which is otherwise confined to direct discourse. (I owe the content of this note to prof. .J. Ruijgh.) 31) On account of the massive occurrence of direct speech Aristotle (Poetics 1448 35-36, 1460 a 5-ll) considered Homer to have made the best out of the epic, narrative genre, coming nearest as possible to the best, mimetic, poetry, viz. drama. 32) Genette (1972: 203 ff.) argues that in narratology a systematic distinction should be made between 'narration' ('qui raconte') and 'perception' ('qui voit'). The aspects of narration pertaining to perception and point of view he calls 'focalisation'. Discussion and critique of Genette's 'focalisation' in Bal (1978:22-9); a short exposition of focalization and an application to Homer in De Jong (1987).

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33) It is sometimes stated (e.g. Bennett 1981) that even in sentences like (22) is different from even in non-comparative sentences, on the grounds that other languages (e.g. French) do not use even (or better: its equivalent) here. But this is nonsense, of course. The distribution of a given item in the one language cannot possibly explain the distribution of the corresponding item in the other. 34) It is interesting to notice that scalar comparatives are in many languages expressed by a 'continuative' propositional particle (still', encore, nog); the comparison tends to be seen in tem­ poral terms (cf. the use of already in the text). In Dutch, the difference between the scalar and the propositional particle in scalar comparatives seems to have pragmatic significance. In 'Hij is nog slimmer dan Paul' ('He is 'still' more clever than Paul') Paul's cleverness has been the topic of conversation before the moment of utterance (or the addressee knows anyway that Paul is very clever), to the effect that the comparative object 'dan Paul' may be omitted ('Hij is nog slimmer' - see ex. (26) below). In 'Hij is zelfs (nog) slimmer dan Paul' ('He is even more clever than Paul'), on the other hand, Paul's cleverness seems to be introduced as a conversational topic for the first time. 35) Notice, incidentally, that when the subject term is the focus constituent of even ('Even Paul is more clever than Bill'), the sentence turns into an argument for the stupidity of Bill, in­ stead of an argument for the cleverness of Paul. 36) "Ut sit maius quam alterum quod ipsum magnum est." 37) I follow Lyons (1977: 745) in distinguishing 'sentence-type' as a grammatical notion from 'utterance'. The former denotes a property of a sentence which it has independently of ac­ tual communicative circumstances, whereas the latter applies to a given speech act with a given illocution. Thus 'declarative (sentence)' may be opposed to 'statement/assertion', 'interrogative' to 'question', 'imperative' to 'command' and 'optative' to 'wish' The distinction is useful in that utterances frequently have an illocution which is at variance with the sentence-type of which they are a token. Declarative sentences, for example, may be used for persuasive purposes, see exx. (15)-(18) in 3.2.2 above. 38) In the usual terminology and in the binary conception of modality these sentences are treated as non-modal. See further on modality 2.1.4 above as well as 4.1.2 below. 39) Unless (27) serves as main clause to a counterfactual conditional: 'Even Paul would have liked the excursion, if he had not been so sick'. 40) Unless the declarative sentence is used to perform an indirect speech act such as per­ suasion. See 3.2.2 above. 41) See Givón (1984: 321ff.). Givón points out that the referential behavior of indefinite descriptions is altered under negation, just as in the case of other non-fact modalities (see 2.1.4): a job in 'I don't have a job' is non-referential, while in its affirmative counterpart it cannot be but referential. 42) Givón (1979:ch.3; 1984:323ff.) treats negation as a separate speech act, that of denial or contradiction. 43) 'Small' forms with'big'one of the many antonymic pairs of adjectives which are present in any language. In such pairs one member is always 'positive' and the other 'negative'. The posi­ tive member is the unmarked one in that it has the widest distribution and gives its name to the neutral, measurable property (for example, the property denoted by the antonymic pair 'high'-

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'low' is 'height', not *'lowness', and of the pair 'long'-'short' it is 'length', not *'shortness'). See Givón (1970; 1979:132-4); Hoffmann (1987:149 ff.). 44) In this example the scalar term occurs in a concessive conditional, which is introduced by kai. The example will be presented again in 63.2.1, in connection with the use of kai in con­ cessive conditionals. 45) See Goodwin (1889:199 ff.). For the paraphrase and the conditions under which it is possible see Lehmann (1984: 330 ff.) and Bakker (1988a). 46) See also auch nur and ook maar in German and Dutch respectively (mentioned in 2.4.2 above). 47) For an analysisofgar and for a comparison of its scope properties with those fo sogar and auch nur see König (1981:122-26). 48) The second part of these compounds is homos, an archaic form of the indefinite pronoun which is derived from the root sem ('one'). It functions as a negative polarity item in being solely (apart from isolated expressions like hamos ge pôs ('in some way or other')) used in combination with oude. 49) Cf. Dik (1978:15 ff.). See also note 8 of chapter 2. 50) In Dik's Functional Grammar these terms (which are obligatory constituents, i.e. es­ sential for the completeness of the predication) can be assigned various functions: syntactic (Subject, Object etc.), semantic (Agent, Goal) and pragmatic (Topic, Focus). See Dik (1978). 51) See Horn (1972:131 ff.), Davison (1980:11-15). 52) There are some more instances of minuntha per, occurring both in wishes/commands and elsewhere. For a discussion see 7.2.1 below. 53) The example, together with (34), is explicitly listed by Denniston (21954: 483) under 'limitative' per. 54) But there are inclusive focus particles that are not scalar. The obvious example is also/too. In other words, the scalar particles are a subgroup of the inclusive focus particles, their specific property being that they impose an ordering upon the alternatives for the focus con­ stituent (viz. a scale), while normal inclusive particles do not (see König 1981:117). 55) As a possible example of an exclusive focus particle whose focus constituent repre­ sents the high point of a scale, ausgerechnet in German (uitgerekend in Dutch) may be mentioned. In English the combination of all persons (moments etc.) is more or less equivalent. 56) However, in other accounts (see Van der Auwera 1983:302; 1985:205) at least in this use is considered to be scalar. In this approach the term'scalartity'applies to the phenomenon of 'at least' and 'at most' readings in language. See the discussion of the various senses and uses of the word 'scale' in 2.1.1 above. 57) Denniston ( 1954:483) deals with the examples discussed in the present section part­ ly in terms of 'limitation' and partly in terms of 'contrast'. Ex. (42), (43) as well as (33) are cited under 'contrast', whereas per in (34) and (38) is said to be 'limitative'. This treatment not only fails to connect the use ofper in question externally to other uses ofper, it also fails to bring unity in what is a coherent and well-defined phenomenon, per (and hence scalarity) in wishes. 58) Sometimes the frequency of linguistic items in Homer is determined by the frequen­ cy of the expression(-type) in which the item occurs. For example, epicte,denoting a 'permanent fact' is disproportionately more frequent in the Iliad than in the Odyssey: of the 147 instances of

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AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

hos te as a. digressive relative clause expressing a permanent fact (see Ruijgh 1971:360), no less than 98 occur in the Iliad and 49 in the Odyssey. But this preference of the Iliad is simply due to the fact that the Iliad has much more epic similes than the Odyssey; 'digressive' te has a marked affinity to timeless and,fromthe point of view of discourse, backgrounded, similes. 59) See Janko (1982). This study shows on the basis of quantitative research that the process of gradual linguistic innovation is in a more advanced stage in the Odyssey than in the Iliad in that older morphs are, on the whole, more frequent in the Iliad than in the Odyssey. Con­ versely, more recent noun endings appear to have a greaterfrequencyin the Odyssey.

4 PARTICIPLES I: LINGUISTICS

4.0 Introduction We have now discussed per in connection with a number of aspects of scalarity, viz. superlativeness, high points of scales and the intension of focus constituents. These elements of the scalarity theory presented in the present study will now be used as a background for the description of the most con­ spicuous and frequent use of per inHomer,perwith participles. The expres­ sion-type 'participle + per9 is such a many-sided subject that two chapters have to be devoted to it. The present chapter deals with 'participle + per9 from a lin­ guistic point of view; in chapter 5 the formulaic and metrical aspects of the ex­ pression-type will be discussed. The expression-type 'participle +per'provides an essential insight in the diachronic development ofper,the transition from scalarity to concession. We saw in 3.2.3 that relative clauses marked by per (hos per) which provide the relevant (superlative or comparative) intension of a focus constituent of kai, allow of a concessive interpretation. The notion of a scalar constituent having a concessive meaning will form the starting-point of the discussion of 'participle + per9. It will appear in 4.2.1 that there are participles with exactly the same meaning and function as the relative clauses of 3.2.3. But in the case of participles, 'concession' is much more important than in the case of the scalar-concessive relative clause. We shall see that in the semantics of 'participle + per9 concession is an important factor in its own right, not just a by-product of scalarity. Concession is synchronically the most impor­ tant aspect of the meaning of 'participle + per' in Homer. Yet scalarity (or, better, the core of the semantics of intensional scalarity: superlativeness) is not entirely devoid of interest in the synchronic description: it allows us to make elucidating distinctions in the material. It will appear that some of the instan­ ces of the concessive participial phrase are superlative, while others are not.

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On this basis, I will argue that the transition from scalarity to concession is a gradient rather than a discontinuous affair, some of the concessive participial phrases being nearer to the scalar prototype than others. The discussion of 'participle + per' within the scalar-concessive framework forms the central part of the chapter (sections 4.2 and 4.3). It is is sandwiched between an introductory section (4.1), in which some of the syn­ tactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of the participle in Ancient Greek are discussed, and a closing section (4.4). Here I will discuss, among other things, the occurrence of the particle kai in the participial phrase. The section may serve as a transition to the next chapter, since the distribution of kai in the participial phrase is only to a limited extent semantically motivated. The real explanation of the distribution lies in the metrical-formulaic sphere. 4.1 On participles The Greek language is very fond of participles. Participles occur everywhere, in any period and in any author or text-type. As to their function in the sentence, participles may be either 'predicative' or 'attributive'. When attributive, participles play a role in the determination of the reference of nouns, just as adjectives or restrictive relative clauses.1 It is the predicative participle that constitutes the specific character of Greek participial usage. Predicative participles may perform a number of func­ tions. To begin, they may play a role in the complementation of certain classes of verbs. Just as attributive participles have to be discussed in connection with adjectives and relative clauses, so 'complementary' participles have to be com­ pared to the second major type of subclause, the complement clause. The com­ plementary participle will not be discussed in the present text.3 For the discussion of 'participle + per', only those predicative participles are of impor­ tance that may be compared to the third kind of subclause, the adverbial clause. These participles are commonly referred to as circumstantial participles 4.1.1 Kinds of adverbial relation From a semantic point of view, circumstantial participles may be said to define the circumstances under which the action of their verb takes place (cf. Goodwin 1889: 333). As such they have a function that may be compared to that of adverbial subclauses. This similarity in function has to a great extent determined the treatment of the circumstantial participle in Greek linguistics. It has been customary to state that circumstantial participles may express a

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number of relations (temporal, conditional, causal, concessive, etc.) in the same way as adverbial subclauses. This treatment, however, calls for some comment. In the case of adverbial subclauses, the nature of the relation between the action ('state of affairs') referred to by the subclause and that referred to by the main clause is overtly expressed by the lexical meaning of the subordinator (conjunction) which introduces the subclause. A language user who wants to convey that the relation is temporal, for example, has a temporal subordinator at his disposal, in Greek and in many other languages even more than one. Likewise, there are conditional, causal and concessive subordinators, and, ac­ cordingly, the concomitant types of adverbial subclause. When using a non-sentential adverbial constituent like the circumstantial participle, on the other hand, a language user may express any given set of cir­ cumstances, but in itself the participle does not express the nature of the rela­ tion between these circumstances and the state of affairs denoted by the main predicate. Consider, for example: (1)

a. Being rich, he spends much money on outdoor eating. b. Being poor, I would never spend money on outdoor eating.

The participles here do not by themselves express that the adverbial relation is causal or conditional, respectively. The nature of the relation has to be deduced from the context. Being a non-sentential constituent, the circumstantial participle has no means to overtly express Condition, Cause, Manner, or whatever other cir­ cumstances. We may say that (Greek) participles are not meant to express these relations at all. The specific function of the circumstantial participle and its delimitation with regard to the function of adverbial subclauses is an impor­ tant field of research, in which pragmatic approaches (the study of sentences in discourse) are likely to be more fruitful than semantic ones. However, this research falls outside the scope of the present study. What matters here is that the usual practice of classifying the circumstantial participle in Greek into con­ ditional, causal, concessive, etc. is highly questionable, as it is ultimately based upon the nature of the adverbial subclause by which we have to render the par­ ticiple in a translation (see also 1.3.2 above). The question of whether Greek participles express by themselves the ad­ verbial relation to the main clause, has obvious implications for the study of 'participle + per'. In the traditional approach, in which participles are described as expressing the relation by themselves (and thus as virtually synonymous with adverbial subclauses), the function of per in participial

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phrases can easily be described as strengthening what is already there, viz. the concessive force of the participle. A particularly apposite citation in this respect: "The participle expressing opposition, limitation or concession is often strengthened by kaiper or kai" (Goodwin 1889: 341, emphasis added). In this account,per is, qua strengthening element, conceived of as optional: it just may or may not be there, there being no essential difference for the concession.10 This account can be challenged both from the point of view of per and from the point of view of the participle. First, when we study the adverbial rela­ tion of concession in connection with scalarity, per appears to be the central element in the participial phrase, not just a strengthener. Second, the conse­ quence of the account of participles presented above is that there is an essen­ tial difference between unmarked participles on the one hand and participles that are overtly marked for a certain adverbial relation, like 'participle + per' on the other. In the case of the former, the specific adverbial relation is a mat­ ter of context and interpretation, whereas in the case of the latter, it is overtly expressed. Accordingly, I describe 'participle + per' as a concessive adverbial element which is expressed as a participle, rather than as a participle with a concessive meaning. 4.1.2 Syntactic independence and modal autonomy Beside adverbial semantic relations, there is a second point of view from which circumstantial participles may be discussed and classified. This is the de­ gree to which they are dependent on, or autonomous with regard to, the predication to which they are attached. The variability of the Greek participle in this respect is the subject of a well-known monograph in Greek linguistics, Oguse (1962). In this study, the variability is discussed in terms of the modality of the main predicate: according to Oguse, some participles may be described as lying outside the modal sphere of the main predicate (which Oguse calls "autonomie modale"), and some participles are lying within this modal sphere ("association étroite" - 'close association')11. When circumstantial participles are 'modally autonomous', according to Oguse, they express a factual cir­ cumstance, whereas their main clause is 'modal', viz. not or not straightforward­ ly expressing a fact. 'Closely associated' participles, on the other hand, are just as non-factual as their main clauses. Of each kind an example: (2)

(The dying Hector to Achilles:) êmati tôi hote ken se Paris kai Phoibos Apollon esthlon eont' olesôsin eni skaiêisipulêisi.

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"When your turn comes and you will be brought down at the Scaean Gate in all your glory by Paris and Apollo." (II. 22,359-60). (3)

apagou ten gunaika kai tous paidas mêden autôn katatheis. "Take away your wife and your children without paying ransom for them." (Xen. Cyr. iii, 1,37).

Ex. (2) is an instance of "autonomie modale": the addressee being esthlos ('brave') is a fact which is independent of the prophesied death. The example is cited in Oguse (1962:138). Ex. (3) is Oguse's introductory example (1962:2) of "association étroite". The participle is an integral part of the command. The addressee is not requested to take away his wife and children tout court; he has to do so in this particular way. Consequently, the participle Ues in the modal sphere of the imperative verb of the main clause; the circumstance which it denotes has not yet occurred, just as the action denoted by an imperative sen­ tence has not yet occurred. Now Oguse uses "modalité" in the epistemic or attitudinal sense. When using 'modality' in this sense, we may oppose simple realis assertions (pure statements of fact) to sentences which contain some modal marker (expressing voUtion, uncertainty or doubt, for example). In this opposition the former are conceived of as entirely devoid of modality while the latter are conceived of as modalized.13 Modahty in this sense is more or less compatible with the notion of 'modahty' in the logical tradition. It is to participles that are attached to this kind of modalized sentence that Oguse's distinction between modally autonomous and 'modally embedded' participles applies. Only when a sen­ tence is modalized can we say that a participle is either autonomous with respect to the modahty or not. In the present study, however, the term 'modahty' is used (see 2.1.4) in a much broader and non-binary sense, so as to comprise both the factual (realis) and the non-factual (irrealis). In this conception, the opposition between modalized and unmodalized sentences is not all-important anymore, because every sentence is characterized for modahty. The practical consequence of this different conception of modahty for Oguse's account of the participle is that what he describes as the modal autonomy of participles turns out to be part of a wider phenomenon. Many circumstantial participles have exactly the same properties as Oguse's modally autonomous participles. Yet they are not recog­ nized as modally autonomous, simply because the sentence to which they are attached is factual, rather than 'modalized'. Consider as an example: (4)

apeikhonto kerdôn, aiskhra nomizontes einai.

112

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER "They avoided those means of making money, considering them disgraceful" (Xen. Mem. i, 2,22)

The factuality of the circumstance denoted by the participle in this example is not due to the main clause being factual. Rather, we have to say that the par­ ticiple is factual anyway, because it has a syntactically detached status with regard to its main clause. The factuality is not changed when we modalize the main clause in some epistemic or attidudinal way ('They may have avoided making money in that way').15 Thus 'modal autonomy' as a characterization of a certain class of circumstantial participles turns out to be part of the wider phenomenon of syntactic independence. When we view the participles in terms of syntactic independence, we bring out what Oguse's modally autonomous participles really have in common with a large number of other participles. Now the dependency of adverbial constituents (adverbial subclauses and circumstantial participles) is a subject which deserves of an investigation in its own right. This research will not (cannot) be carried out in the present study. In a rather intuitive way, I will speak of the dependency of circumstantial par­ ticiples in terms of the degree to which they are optional in a given sentence or context. The deletion of a syntactically independent participle or subclause does not affect the integrity of the main clause so much as the deletion of a more dependent adverbial constituent. Compare, in this respect, the two par­ ticiples in (2) and (3): the modally autonomous participle is optional to a higher degree than the 'closely associated' one. This may be considered an index of the dependency of both participles. The insight that the modally autonomous participles are actually a sub­ class of the syntactically independent participles has an obvious consequence for Oguse's class of 'closely associated' participles. This category of participles, whose distinctive property can be termed 'modal embeddedness' (position in the modal scope of the main clause), is unspecified for syntactic dependency. Some of the 'closely associated' participles have to be opposed to the wider class of syntactically independent participles mentioned above. These par­ ticiples (of which (3) above is an example) are syntactically dependent. They are less optional with regard to their main clause than participles like (2) or (4). Their modally embedded status is a mere consequence of this dependent nature. Other 'closely associated' participles, by contrast, are syntactically inde­ pendent in the same way as the participles in (2) and (4). In those cases we have to say that the modality covers the combination 'main clause + participle' rather than the main clause alone. But this Svide scope' of the modality has no

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effect upon the syntactic status of the participle; it is independent as if it were 'modally autonomous'. In the argument of the present chapter I will use both notions under study here. As we shall see, the distinctions 'independent vs. dependent' and 'modal­ ly autonomous vs. modally embedded' are both important for the description of 'participle + pef. They provide a framework within which the degree of prototypicality (see 1.4) of instances of that expression-type may be deter­ mined. I shall argue that the prototypical instance of 'participle + pef is modal­ ly autonomous (and hence syntactically independent). This property is a direct consequence of the scalar origins of 'participle + pef (see 4.3.1 below). The two distinctions enable us to recognize the instances of 'participle + pef that are either dependent or modally embedded as such and characterize them as less than prototypical instances of the expression-type in question. 4.2 From scalarity to concession 4.2.1 The intension of circumstances In the present section I deal with the expression-type exemplified by ex. (6) in the preliminary survey of the data-base in 1.2 above. This expression-type is equivalent to the use of per in scalar-concessive relative clauses (see 3.2.2) in that the combination 'participle + per' is attached to a term which functions as the focus constituent of even (kai). In the case of the scalar-concessive rela­ tive clause, this term is a proper name; in the case of 'participle + pef, on the other hand, it is another kind of extensional term, a demonstrative pronoun. We have seen (2.1.2; 2.3.1.2; 3.2.2) that scalar superlatives and even part­ ly determine the illocutionary potential of the sentence in which they occur: the sentence may be used for the assertion (in an indirect way) of a superlative fact. The remarkable nature of the fact is due to a superlative property of the person whose name functions as the focus constituent of even. But the remarkable nature of a fact denoted by a sentence in which even occurs need not always be due to a (superlative) property of one of the 'actants' in the state of affairs referred to. It may be due also to the circumstances under which the state of affairs in question obtained. When this is the case, the typi­ cal focus constituent of even is not one of the arguments of the predicate, but a demonstrative, anaphoric, pronominal element which points as an exten­ sional term to a set of circumstances: even so (kai hôs in Greek). Semantically, this demonstrative pronoun, in referring to the circumstan­ ces under which the state of affairs as a whole obtains or obtained, is an ad20

verbial element which modifies the sentence as a whole. The consequence of

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this is that when the adverbial is the focus constituent of even, the scope sen­ tence of even does not coincide with the sentence referring to the state of af­ fairs in question, as is the case in (5)

Even ACHILLES fears Hector. Scope: X fears Hector.

Instead, the scope sentence contains the nuclear predication as a whole. In a slightly formalized presentation we might say that it performs the syntactic function Subject within the scope sentence: (6)

Even SO ( = under those circumstances) Achilles feared Hector. Scope: Under circumstances X [Achilles feared Hector] obtained.

What is subject to scalarity, then, is not one of the items in the state of affairs in question, but the circumstances under which the state of affairs obtained. Now, to the demonstrative pronoun a circumstantial participial phrase containingper may be attached, which defines the set of circumstances referred to which the pronoun points. The participial phrase presents the circumstan­ ces in such a way as to bring out their specific character, on account of which the state of affairs is something remarkable. The participial phrase provides what may be called in now usual terms the relevant superlative intension of the circumstances referred to by the pronominal adverb. It explains why these cir­ cumstances have been made subject to scalarity. In other words, it explains what is conventionally implicated by even so. The parallelism, both in meaning and in form, between this expressiontype and the expression-type discussed in 3.2.2 (per in scalar-concessive rela­ tive clauses) is obvious. In 3.2.2 the extensional focus constituent is a proper name; here it is a pronominal element. And in 3.2.2 the relevant superlative in­ tension is expressed by a relative clause modified by per; here it is expressed by a participle (or participial phrase) modified hyper. As I said, the demonstra­ tive pronoun functioning as the focus constituent of kai is hôs, which in later Greek is usually replaced by houtôs.21 Consider now: (7)

(Nestor is boasting of the exploits of his youth: his father Neleus, thinking he was too young to join battle, hid his horses from him:) alla kai hôs hippeusi meteprepon hêmeteroisi, kai pezos per eôn, epei hôs age neikos Athênê. "But even so I excelled among our horsemen, although I went on foot. For so Athena arranged the affair." (77. 11, 721).

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(8)

kai rh ' ethelen rhêksai stikhas andrôn peirêtizôn, hêi dê pleiston homïlon hora kai teukhe' arista: all' oud' hôs dunato rhëteai, mala per meneainôn. "Hector's aim was to break the enemy line, and wherever he saw the greatest numbers and the best-armed men he made the attempt. But even so he failed to break through, for the all the ferocity of his assault." (IL 15, 617).

(9)

(From the prooem of the Odyssey:) polla d' ho g' en pontôi pathen algea hon kata thumon, arnumenos hên te psukhên kai noston hetairôn. αll' oud' hôs hetarous errusato, hiemenos per. "He suffered many hardships on the high seas in his struggles to preserve his life and bring his comrades home. But even so he failed to save those comrades, in spite of all his efforts." (Od 1, 6).

(10) (Odysseus is being wrecked:) opse de dê rh' anedu, stomatos d' ehseptusen halmên pikrên, hê hoipollêapo kratos kelaruzen. αll' oud' hôs skhediês epelêtheto, teiromenos per. "But at last he reached the air and spat out the bitter brine that kept streaming down his face. But even so he did not forget his boat, exhausted though he was." (Od. 5,324). (11) (Odysseus is summoning souls from the Netherworld. The soul of his mother comes up:) tên men ego dakrusa idôn eleêsa te thumôi: αll' oud' hôs eiôn proterên, pukinon per akheuôn, haimatos asson imen, prin Teiresiao puthesthai. "My eyes filled with tears when I saw her, and I was stirred to compassion. Yet even so, deeply moved though I was, I would not allow her to approach the blood out of turn, before I had had speech with Teiresias." (Od. 11, 88). In each of these examples, the circumstances under which the state of affairs referred to by the main clause obtained are anaphorically referred to as hôs ('so'). What these circumstances exactly are has already been expressed in the immediately preceding context of each of the examples. The participial phrase in which per occurs presents the circumstances in their scalar form, just as the relativehosper-clause discussed in 3.2.2 provides the superlative proper-

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ty of a referent, to which the scalarity is due. In both expression-types,per can­ not be said to be a scalar particle proper, as neither the relative nor the par­ ticiple is a genuine focus constituent. Rather,per as it occurs in (7)-(11) and in the scalar-concessive relative clause has to be described as a marker of (intensional) scalarity. The real focus constituent in the expression-type is hôs. Like all focus con­ stituents of even (kai), it refers to what is extreme, maximally unlikely in a given situation. Accordingly, what is meant in (7)-( 11) (viz. conventionally impUcated by even) is that the state of affairs referred to by the nuclear predication ob­ tained under the maximally unfavorable circumstances referred to as hôs. For example, the state of affairs proper in (10), the fact that Odysseus kept kling­ ing to his raft, is made truly remarkable by the statement that it obtained under extreme, maximally unfavorable circumstances. The participial phrase attached to hôs very naturally allows of a conces­ sive interpretation. Just as in the case of the concessive reading of the relative clauses in 3.2.2, the concession of the participles in (7)-(11) may be accounted for in terms of scalarity. When we subject the circumstances under which a given state of affairs obtains or obtained to scalarity, we thereby conventional­ ly impUcate that those circumstances are the least likely ones under which the state of affairs may obtain at all.23 This implies always an implicit opposition between those unfavorable circumstances and the nuclear predication. Whenever this opposition is made visible by an explicatory constituent which defines the circumstances, this constituent automatically acquires the status of a concessive adverbial element. It follows from this scalar analysis that it I reject the kind of approach to (7)-(11) in which the participial phrase is assigned a concessive meaning which is subsequently strengthened by kai hôs (see 4.2.2). In this approach there is, wrongly, made no distinction between the expression-type I have just discussed and the much more frequent use of 'participle + per' as an 'ordinary' conces­ sive phrase (see 4.3). It is important to point out that concession is, when viewed in the proper diachronic framework, the natural by-product of scalarity, rather than a factor in its own right. 4.2.2 Diachronic aspects of kai hôs The saUent feature of the discussion of exx. (7)-(11) just presented is that the participle is described as a constituent whose function it is to explain the presence of kai/oude and its focus constituent. Thus this discussion starts with kai hôs, describes it as a scalar expression, and proceeds from there to the par-

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ticiple. Now this method amounts to a reversal of the usual way in which (7)(11) and similar examples have been described in Greek linguistics. The nor­ mal way is to start with the participle, attribute to it the usual concessive 'sense' of per 24 and treat kai hôs as an adverb which strengthens the concession, just as other concessive adverbs (notably homôs and empês, see below, 4.2.3) might do. This practice has obviously been instigated by the fact that kai hôs, as a fixed idiomatic collocation, often functions as an adverbial element express­ ing concession in the same way as English nevertheless, all the same or still. In itself the attribution of the concessive value of nevertheless to kai hôs is not unwarranted. But we have to give a diachronic dimension to this claim. Scalarity and concession are intimately related diachronically, to the effect that concessive meanings tend to evolve from scalar ones (see especially 4.3.1 below). Consequently, to say that kai hôs has a concessive meaning does not exclude the possibility that this meaning has once been a scalar one. The examples (7)-(11) are best characterized as instances oîkai hôs in its original, scalar function. Kai hôs here simply means what it means decompositionally: kai + hôs. There is no need to assume that kai hôs has here an idiomatic meaning. In 4.2.3 below I will show that there is a syntactic difference between (7)-(11) and more recent examples where kai hôs does have the func­ tion of nevertheless in English. That kai hôs in (7)-(11) has to be described in scalar, rather than in con­ cessive terms is confirmed by the fact that (7)-(11) do not stand alone; they are intimately related to other uses ofper which show an identical division of labor of per and kai, whereby kai expresses the extensional and per the intensional side of the scalarity (see 3.2.2 and 3.3). Thus, conforming to the main thrust of the present study, in which we start with the notion of scalarity and proceed from there to uses of per that can be derived from it, we take kai hôs as a scalar expression and proceed from it to the participial phrase and its concessive meaning. 4.2.3 Syntactic intermezzo: correlation and apposition When we describe the relation between kai hôs and the participial phrase in terms of 'strengthening', we have in the end to conclude that this relation is, in syntactic terms, one of correlation. 'Correlation' may be defined in syntactic terms as a relation of interdependence between a main clause and a peripheral element (most often a subclause), in which the peripheral element is repre­ sented within the main clause by a demonstrative element. Correlation is a frequent phenomenon in Greek and Latin, where the demonstrative element

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and the subordinator of the correlated subclause often form morphologically 28

cognate pairs. Now the notion of strengthening in the present case could imply that kai hôs as the concessive demonstrative adverbial element represents the conces­ sive participial phrase in the main clause, whereby a relation of mutual depend­ ence between the two would obtain. We would then have a concessive correlative construction in the format of 'Still/nevertheless, ...although'. However, a number of arguments can be presented against this account. First, the scalar approach advocated above is incompatible with the analysis in terms of correlation. For the syntactic consequence of the scalar approach to (7)-(11) is that the relation between kai hôs and the participial phrase has to be stated in terms of apposition, rather than in terms of correlation. 'Apposition' may be treated as a loose syntactic relation; the deletion of the apposed constituent has no syntactic and semantic consequences. The dis­ course-pragmatic motivation for apposition seems to be the expUcation of the meaning or reference of a given constituent. For instance, by way of apposition we may identify the referent of that constituent. In exx. (7)-(11), the typical function of the apposed participial phrase is to explain why hôs is the focus con­ stituent of kai. In providing additional information or 'afterthoughts',30 ap­ posed constituents are typically backgrounded in discourse.31 The apposed status of the participial phrases in (7)-(11) is brought out, furthermore, by the similarity, both in form and in function, of these participles and the relative clauses (hos per) discussed in 3.2.2. The syntactic relation be­ tween a proper name and the non-restrictive relative clause attached to it can be stated in terms of apposition;32 'correlation' has no possible application here. Given this fact, it is only natural to speak about the relation between kai hôs and the participial phrase in terms of apposition, too. The second argument is that the meaning of hôs precludes a treatment of (7)-(11) in terms of correlation. In (7)-(11), the participial phrase is invariably placed after the main clause (the nuclear predication), and hence after kai hôs. Accordingly, when we are to assume a correlative relation between the two, by which the one is dependent on the other, we have to treat (kai) hôs as pointing ahead to the participial phrase, i.e. as a cataphoric element. But hôs and mor­ phologically cognate demonstratives are usually anaphoric, viz. referring back­ ward to what precedes.33 This is the case, too, in (7)-(11). The surprising circumstances under which the state of affairs obtains, are always described in the immediately preceding context, and hôs refers back to them. When this fact is not recognized, we do

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no justice to the discourse function of kai hôs in (7)-(11). The participial phrase, in its turn, in presenting the circumstances in their scalar form, refers back to hôs. Matters would be entirely different when the participial phrase preceded the nuclear predication and kai hôs. Then the case for correlation would be much stronger, hôs referring back to the participle, and the participle, conver­ sely, pointing ahead to hôs. Concessive correlative constructions in which 'participle + per' precedes the nuclear predication, do not occur in Homer. They only appear in later times, when 'participle + per' has long become a modifier which is in itself conces­ sive, rather than scalar (see 4.3.1). Below, two examples of the post-Homeric concessive correlation are presented. In (12) the participial phrase (in its final, post-Homeric form: 'kai per + participle') uncharacteristically (from the point of view of Homeric usage)precedes the nuclear predication. Instead of kai hôs, the nuclear predication contains the concessive adverbial homos, with which the participle is interrelated, homôs pointing backwards to the participle, and the latter pointing forwards to homôs: (12) hoi de hate Perìandrou eonta paida, kaiper deimainontes, hornos edekonto. "And because he was the son of Periander, they still received him, although they were scared." (Hdt. iii, 51,3). In (13) below the participle is not modified by per, but it equally precedes the nuclear predication. The latter does contain kai (oud') hôs. But here the adver­ bial has its final concessive function, which differs both semantically and syn­ tactically from the original scalar function of which (7)-(11) above are examples: (13) es to auto ksunelthontes, oud' hôs edunêthêsan ksumbênai. "And though they met together again afterwards, they nevertheless did not come nearer to reaching an agreement." (Thuc. v, 55,2). But with these examples we are long past the transition from scalarity to con­ cession. This applies to per in (12) as well as to oud' hôs in (13). Both the par­ ticipial phrase (whether or not modified by per) and the adverbial element (whether homôs or kai hôs) have a function which is altogether differrent from what we have seen in (7)-(11)36

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4.3 The concessive participial phrase We now arrive at the discussion of the use of 'participle + per*, as an or­ dinary concessive, the single most conspicuous and frequent use of per in Homer.37 Concession has here become a factor in its own right. But scalarity is still an important concept. It gives relief to the mass of instances, in enabling us to draw distinctions in the material which remain otherwise unperceived. To recognize the scalar origin of 'participle + per' is to have an open eye for the variability which is present in the material, both in diachronic and in synchronic space. And to recognize this variability is necessary for the description of the expression-type in question. The insight that scalarity is the origin of concession, or, alternatively, that concession is the 'product' of scalarity, greatly favors the unified description of per. In 1.3.2 I argued that to deal with 'concession' as a possible sense ofper is unsatisfactory in that the relation between this sense and other senses remains in the dark. But when we conceive of 'concession' as one pole of the axis 'scalarity-concession', the relation between the concessive and the non-conces­ sive is can be better accounted for. Notice, incidentally, that the easy transition (in diachronic space) and close connection (in synchronic space) is a phenomenon which is not confined to Ancient Greek. In Dutch, for instance, the concessive subordinator hoewel must have a scalar origin ('hoe-wel' 'however much'). 4.3.1 The prototypical properties of 'participle + per' The dividing-line between 'participle + per3 as used in exx. (7)-(11), viz. as an apposed scalar phrase, and the use of 'participle + per' as a concessive is not a clear-cut one. The instances of 'participle + per' differ from one another as to the degree to which they have the properties of the scalar participial phrase. Some instances of 'participle + per' are definitely nearer to their scalar 'roots' than others. In other words, we may speak in terms of a continuum in which instances of 'participle + per' can be ordered by degree of decreasing affinity with scalarity. This means that the scalar(-concessive) participle ex­ emplified by (7)-(11) may be conceived of as the prototype (see 1.4), and all the concessive participles as less than prototypical, in various degrees.39 The prototypical features of the scalar participial phrase, then, on the basis of which the instances of 'participle + per' can be classified and localized in the continuum, may be described as follows. 1) Superlativeness. The prototypical scalar participle denotes something superlative, since the very point of asserting sentences like (7)-(11) above was

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that the circumstances under which the state of affairs in question obtained (or did not obtain) were maximally (un)favorable. The introduction of 'superlativeness' as a factor in the description leads to a useful differentiation in the material. When using the concept we perceive that in the case of analytic participial phrases (type 'predicate + per + eon ('being')'), there is a dif­ ference between adjectival and substantival predicates. Analytic participial phrases which contain a substantival predicate are less prototypical as regards scalarity than analytic participles with an adjectival predicate, because superlativeness cannot apply to them (see further 4.3.2.2). But not all analytic par­ ticiples with an adjectival predicate are prototypical, because not all adjectives denote properties which allow of degree and comparison (see 4.3.2.1). In the case of synthetic participles, the introduction of superlativeness as aLeitmotivmakes us perceive that participles denoting state-like, time-stable properties (such as akhnumenos ('grieved'), hiemenos, memoôs ('eager')) have to be distinguished from participles denoting more time-unstable, event-like (kinetic) phenomena (such as pinôn ('drinking')). The latter are clearly less prototypical as regards scalarity than the former, again, because they do not allow of superlativeness. See further 4.3.2.3. 2) Independence. This second prototypical property is a consequence of the explicatory function of the participles in (7)-(11). Being an apposed ele­ ment, its deletion does not affect the syntactic integrity of the sentence to which it is apposed. Participial phrases withpercan only be dependent (i.e. contribut­ ing essentially to the completeness of their main clause, see 4.1.2) when they are disconnected from scalarity. See further 4.3.3. 3) Modal autonomy. The prototypical (scalar) participial phrase is not only independent, but also 'modally autonomous' in the sense of Oguse (1962). It stands outside the scope of the propositional modalities of the main clause: the prototypical instance of 'participle + pef is factual, irrespectively of its main clause being factual or non-factual. The specific scalar variant of 'modal autonomy' which we find in the case of 'participle + pef is due to the seman­ tics of even. We saw above (2.4.1) that even has to be analyzed as a positive polarity item which refuses to stand inside the scope of negation (except when it occurs in a negative polar context, see 2.4.2 and 3.4.3). The 'autonomy' of even with regard to negation (as well as to other sentential modalities) is im­ parted to what is related to its focus constituent by way of apposition. The criterium of modal autonomy enables us to recognize those instances of 'par­ ticiple + pef that are 'modally embedded', and to attribute to them a less than prototypical status.

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We now go on to discuss 'participle + per' within the framework of these three prototypical features. The examples cited below possess the three proper­ ties; accordingly, they are minimally removed from scalarity: (14) (Odysseus has just given the braggart Thersites a good beating:) hoi de kai akhnumenoi per ep' autôi hêdu gelassan. "The rest, disgruntled though they were, had a hearty laugh at his expense." (7Z. 2,270). (15) (Hector, who is away from the battle for a while, to Helen:) mê me kathiz', Helenê, phileousa per, oude me peiseis. "Helen, you are kind, but do not ask me to sit down [however much you care for me...]." (. 6,360). (16) (Poseidon urges the Greeks:) iomen: autor egôn hêgêsomai, oud' eti phêmi Hektora Priamidên meneein mala per memaôta "I myself will take command, and I do not think Prince Hector will stand up to us long, for all his fury." (7Z. 14,375). (17) (Antilochus joins Menelaus in his fight with Aeneas:) Aineias d'ou meine, thoos per eôn polemistês, hôs eiden duo phôte par' allêloisimenonte. "And when Aeneas saw the two men making this united stand, he felt unable to face them, for all the daring he had shown before." (IL 5, 571). (18) (Amphion and Zethus:) hoi prôtoi Thêbês hedos ektisan heptapuloio purgôsan t' epei ou men apurgôton g' edunanto naiemen eurukhoron Thêbên, kraterô per eonte. "The founders of Thebes of the Seven Gates, who first fortified its site with towers, since for all their prowess they could not establish themselves in the open lands of Thebes without a wall to their city." (Od 11,265). (19) (Hephaestus about his wife Aphrodite and Ares, who have just been caught in bed together:) ou men spheas et' eolpa minuntha ge keiemen houtô, kai mala per phileonte.

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"Yet I have an idea that they won't be eager to prolong that embrace, no, not for a moment, not for all their love." (Od. 8,316). The participial phrases in these examples possess all the three prototypi­ cal properties discussed above. Ah of them denote a state or property that al­ lows of degree and comparison. Hence superlativeness is involved. Secondly, all of (14)-(19) are independent, their main clause being complete without them. In (17), for example, the bare main clause 'Aeneas did not stay' is in it­ self a meaningful contribution to theflowof narration; it does not need the par­ ticipial phrase to achieve that status. Thirdly, the participles are not affected by the modality involved. In (16), (17), (18) and (19), this modality is a simple negation. In (15) we have a negative command; the participle stands outside the scope of both the negation and the command: 'Don't...., (and I ask you this) in spite of...'.42 Yet exx. (14)-(19) are one step removed from scalarity: the absence of kailoud' hôs makes a considerable difference. In the discussion of exx. (7)-(11), I stated that the point in these examples is the assertion not so much of the state of affairs envisaged in the nuclear predication as of the fact that this state of af­ fairs obtained under maximally unfavorable circumstances (or, conversely, did not obtain under maximally favorable circumstances). Thus, conforming to the semantics of even (see 2.3.1.2), exx. (7)-(11) are normal statements of superla­ tive facts. The very point of uttering (7)-(11) is the statemment that the nuclear predication obtained under the circumstances referred to as kai hôs. This is the superlative fact. In (14)-(19), on the other hand, kai hôs is absent. Consequent­ ly, these examples have a different illocution and discourse function. They are not uttered as an argument for some superlative fact. Rather, we have to say that the nuclear predication here is uttered for its own sake. The participial phrase has been added as a normal concessive adverbial constituent, rather than as an apposed constituent with an explicatory function. Of course, the par­ ticipial phrase lends salience to the nuclear predication. In (14), for example, the Greeks' laughing while they are akhnumenoi is more remarkable than when they are not. But this is the normal salience conveyed to a main clause by any concessive adverbial constituent. The salience does not make of the nuclear predication the statement of a superlative fact. Thus we may say that exx. (7)(11) are related to (14)-(19) in the same way as 'Even Paul liked the excursion' is related to the simple Paul liked the excursion'. The former functions as an argument for a superlative fact; the latter does not, irrespectively of its being salient or not.

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Notice that when we insert kailoud' hôs in (14)-(19), there is nothing in the preceding discourse to which hôs as the focus constituent of kai could refer anaphorically. If kailoud' hôs occurred in examples like (14)-(19), its only pos­ sible function would be to point ahead to the participial phrase. But kai hôs does not occur in examples like (14)-(19), and this corroborates the arguments put forward in 4.2.3 above: hôs cannot be cataphoric (i.e. pointing ahead to the participle). If it could, it would sometimes occur in examples like (14)-(19). But it never does. We now go on to show that the 'process' of becoming an ordinary conces­ sive extends beyond the kind of instance exemplified by (14)-(19). In other words, we are going to proceed from the prototypical instances of 'participle + pef to the less than prototypical ones. These instances have only one or two of the prototypical properties mentioned above, not all the three of them. Most common are those examples that lack the first property, superlativeness. The non-superlative participial phrase is disconnected from scalarity in an essen­ tial respect, but nothing precludes its use as a concessive adverbial element. Instances that lack the second and third prototypical properties, on the other hand, are much less common. This is not surprising when we realize that independence and modal autonomy are prototypical properties of concessives in general, irrespectively of their having a scalar origin. Thus, in contrast with the loss of superlativeness, the lack of either of the other two properties is at variance with the central synchronic meaning of 'participle + per as a conces­ sive. In other words, dependent and/or modally embedded instances of 'par­ ticiple + pef (which will be discussed in 4.3.3 and 4.3.4) are less than prototypical anyway, whether we conceive of the prototype as scalar (involving superlativeness) or not. Consequently, the prototypical properties 2) and 3) differ from 1) in that they apply both in the diachronic and in the synchronic dimension. Indepen­ dent and/or modally embedded instances of 'participle + per' are peripheral both from a synchronic and from a diachronic point of view. Prototypical property 1), on the other hand, exclusively applies in the diachronic dimension, since synchronically, a non-superlative instance can make a perfect (prototypi­ cal) concessive phrase. 4.3.2 Loss of superlativeness Superlativeness is the key semantic concept in intensional scalarity. We might say that the superlativeness of an instance of 'participle + per' is a neces­ sary condition for its being a scalar expression: if it is not superlative, it cannot

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be scalar either. Now, superlativeness puts lexical and categorial constraints on the participial phrase. If the participial phrase is analytic (type 'predicate + per + eon9), the predicate has to be (i) an adjective, substantives being qua category excluded from superlativeness, and (ii) an adjective that may allow of superla­ tive marking at all. In other words, it must be an adjective which denotes a property that may be measured and compared. It is this type of adjective, of course, that may also appear as a scalar superlative in a non-factual environ­ ment. For example, the participial phrase in (18)(kraterôper eonte) contains an adjective (krateros, 'strong') which may appear in the superlative mode, and which, accordingly, may function as a scalar superlative, see for example ex. (4) in 3.1.1 above. If, on the other hand, the participle is synthetic, it has to possess the fea­ tures of real adjectives; it has to denote a property rather than an event. Good examples of participial phrases with such a participle are akhnumenos, hiemenos, teiromenos per) ('grieved, eager, exhausted as/though he was'), as well as mala per meneainônlmemaôta ('furious as/though he was') and phileousa per ('however much she loved'). Now given this characterization of the superlative participial phrase, the loss/lack of superlativeness opens up a number of possibilities. In the case of analytic participles, the predicate is either an adjective that does not allow of superlativeness or it is a substantive, and in the case of synthetic participles, the participle denotes a more time-unstable, kinetic entity than the 'adjectival' par­ ticiple. These possibilities will now be dealt with in the following subsections. 4.3.2.1 Non-superlative adjectives It is possible to construct a continuous space in which predicates are lo­ calized by degree of thetime-stabilityof the entity which they denote. On the one extreme of this continuum, we have verbs which denote phenomena with a minimum of time-stability, viz. events. On the other extreme we have sub­ stantival, category-ascribing predicates with a maximum of time-stability. Qua predicates, adjectives are situated somewhere in between.44 The properties denoted by adjectives are situated midway on the time-stability scale. Now it is precisely these properties that may be measured and compared. The possibility of measurement is reflected in language by the morphosyntax of the 'degrees of comparison'. However, not all adjectives can appear in the superlative mode. This ap­ plies in particular to adjectives that verge on the substantival, for example, ad­ jectives denoting materials. Something either is made of gold, or it is not; there

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are no degrees possible to which this is the case. And yet this kind of adjective may be combined with per in a participial phrase. The resulting concessive is disconnected from scalarity: (20) (From the description of the new shield for Achilles. A ploughing scene is depicted:) hê de melainet' opisthen, arêromenêi de eôikei, khruseiê per eousa. "The field, though it was made of gold, grew black behind them, as a field does when it is being ploughed." (II. 18,549). Similar is the following example, though lithos ('stone') is properly speaking a substantive: (21) (Niobe has been punished by the gods. She stands petrified in the hills of Siphylus:) entha, lithos per eousa, theôn ek kêdea pessei. "There Niobe, though in marble, broods on the desolation that the gods dealt out to her." (II. 24,617). Other adjectives are equally near-substantival. In Greek there is no for­ mal difference between 'foreign' and 'a foreigner': (22) (The Trojans hear the news that Sarpedon, the king of the Lycians is dead:) Trôos de kata krêthen labe penthos askheton, ouk epideikton, epei sphisin herma poleos eske, kai allodapos per eoa "The Trojans were heart-broken at the news: it was intolerable. Sarpedon, though a foreigner, had been a butress of their city." (II.. 16,550). In other cases, the non-superlativeness is due to other factors than the (near)-substantival status of the adjective and the time-stability of the proper­ ty which it denotes. For example, 'being on one's own' is not a particularly timestable affair. Yet it does not allow of measurement. A warrior is or is not on his own; there is no room for degree. So a participial phrase containing this at­ tribute cannot be but purely concessive: (23) Tudeidês d' autos per eôn promakhoisin emikhthê.

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"Although he was left to his own resources, Diomedes drove up to the point of attack." (R. 8,99). In the following example, the absence of superlativeness is due, paradoxically, to the fact that the adjective appears in the superlative mode: (24) (A comment on Hephaestus having caught Ares in a net while the latter is making love to Aphrodite:) ouk aretâi kaka erga: kikhanei toi bradus ôkun, hos kai nun Hêphaistos eôn bradus heilen Area ôkutaton per eonta theôn hoi Olumpon ekhousii "Bad deeds don't prosper. The tortoise catches up the hare. See how our slow-moving Hephaestus has caught Ares, though he is the fastest of the gods who dwell on Olympus." (Od. 8,331). 'Fast' can be measured, but 'fastest' cannot: you are either the fastest or you are not. There is no room for degree. The following example is similar to (24) in that the participial phrase con­ tains an adjective that in itself can be perfectly subjected to superlativeness. In (24) it is superlativeness that neutralizes the superlativeness; in (25) it is nega­ tion: (25) (The embassy to Achilles has failed. Aias to Odysseus just before they leave:) apaggeilai de takhista khrê muthon Danaoisi kai ouk agathon per eonta "We must at once report the news to the Danaans, though it is not good news." (R 9,627). A negation in a per-phrase, both in Homer and in later Greek, is a very rare thing. The negation resolutely destroys the superlative potential of agathos, for the absence of a property is absolute: it cannot be subjected to comparison and superlativeness. The negation in (25) straightforwardly shows that this ex­ ample belongs to the group of instances in which the connection with scalarity has disappeared, and where per has lost its original meaning. The participial phrase has become an ordinary concessive. Sometimes a synthetic participle is equivalent to a non-superlative adjec­ tive. The best examples are perfect participles meaning 'dead' or 'born out/from'. Consider: (26) (Hector offers a reward in the struggle over Patroclus' body:)

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER hos de ke Patroklon kai tethnêôta per empês Trôas es hippodamous erusêi, eiksêi de hoi Aias, hêmisu toi enarôn apodassomai, hêmisu d'autos. "To the man who forces Aias back and brings Patroclus, dead though he is, into the Trojan lines, I will give half the spoils, keeping half for myself." (IL 17,231). (27) (Achilles to Asteropaeus, whom he has just slain:) keis'houtô: khalepon toi eristheneos Kroniônos paisin erìzemenai, potamoio per ekgegaôti. "Lie there, and learn how difficult it is for you, even though you are a child of a River-god, to fight the scions of almighty Zeus." (. 21, 185).

4.3.2.2 Substantival predicates It is clear that what appUes to adjectives verging on the substantival ap­ plies to substantives themselves too. Substantival predicates are, all other things being equal, non-superlative, because the entities they denote are too time-stable to allow of measurement. In the scalar framework within which per has been discussed in chapter 3, we may predict that the combination ofper with a substantive, viz. a term which is not (purely) intensional, does not normally occur. Yet in exx. (28)-(30) the combination does occur, as a consequence of the fact that the participial phrase is simply concessive, rather than scalar. (28) (Eurylochus has accused Odysseus of risking his comrades' life for the sake of his own recklessness:) hôs ephat', autor ego ge meta phresi mermêrìksa, spassamenos tanuêkes aor pakheos para mêrou, toi hoi apotmêksas kephalên oudasde pelassai, kai pêôi per eonti "Now when Eurylochus said that, I had half a mind, though he was a close kinsman of my own, to draw the long sword from my side and lop his head off to roll in the dust." (Od. 10,441). (29) (An encouragement of Agamemnon:) Teukre, philê kephalê, Telamônie, koirane laôn, ball' houtôs ai ken ti phoôs Danaoisi genêai patri te soi Telamoni, hos s'etrephe tutthon eonta,

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kai se nothon per eonta komissato hôi eni oikôi. "Teucer, son of Telamon, my beloved prince, shoot as you are doing now, and you may well bring salvation to the Danaans and fame to your father Telamon, who took you under his roof and reared you though a bastard child." (II. 8,284). (30) (Hermes reassures Priam: his son's body is still in Achilles' tent and it is not in decay:) hôs toi kêdontai makares theoi huios heêos kai nekuos per eontos, epei sphi philos peri kêri. "Which shows what pains the blessed gods are taking in your son's behalf though he is nothing but a corpse, because they love him dearly." (II. 24,423) 47 In these examples, the substantive cannot be described as the (extensional) focus constituent of the scalar particle per. Rather, we have to say that per, as a kind of propositional particle, marks as concessive a participial phrase of which a substantive is the predicate. 4.3.2.3 Adjectival and verbal participles In the two previous subsections we saw that when we construct a con­ tinuum of time-stability of predicates, and move from the middle towards the area of more time-stability, where the substantival predicates have to be lo­ cated, we reach a point where superlativeness is not possible anymore. Now, the same happens when we move in the opposite direction. Typically time-un­ stable phenomena like actions and events do not allow of degree and com­ parison. Consequently, the morphosyntax of the 'degrees of comparison' does not apply to the verbal word, just as it does not apply to the category on the other extreme of the scale, the substantive. It is with this phenomenon that the present subsection is concerned. Nominal (i.e. adjectival or substantival) predicates differ from verbal ones in that they are aspectless. This applies to the analytic participial phrase too, obviously because it contains a nominal predicate. The typical aspectless state­ ment is the ascriptive (or attributive) sentence (see Lyons (1977: 185,417)) of the general form 'S(ubject) is P(redicate)'. In such a sentence, one either ascribes a property to a subject, or one assigns a subject to a given category. Any analytic participial phrase may be reduced to such a sentence, whereby the participial form of 'be' functions as the copula. The participial phrase in (29), for instance, is attached to one of the arguments of the nuclear predication in

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such a way as to reflect a simple subject-predicate expression: 'Teucer is a bas­ tard (child)'. Synthetic participles, too, may be aspectless. The aspectless synthetic par­ ticiple with adjectival properties yields many instances of 'participle + per': akhnumenos, hiemenos, teiromenos per, mala per meneainôn/memaôta). These participles belong without exception to the superlative kind and as such they are prototypical with regard to scalarity. However, not all synthetic participles are of the adjectival, state-denoting kind. In fact, most synthetic participles denote phenomena with considerably less time-stability than akhnumenos and meneainôn. These participles tend to report, in the manner offiniteverbs, what a subject is doing in a particular situa­ tion, while participles like akhnumenos and meneainôn tell what a subject is. Activity/event-denoting participles are definitely non-adjectival in nature. In the case of these participles, there is no connection with simple ascriptive sentences in which a copula is involved. They are characterized for two of the morphosyntactic categories of the verbal word, aspect (fluctuation between aorist and present forms) and 'diathesis' (active, middle and passive forms). These morphosyntactic possibilities are a direct reflection of the nature of the phenomena denoted. Unlike states, activities and events may be presented as ongoing or completed, and this is encoded in the language by the morphosyn­ tactic opposition between aorist and present. Secondly, actions may be reported in discourse as something done by an agent, or as something under­ gone by a patient. Here the morphosyntax of 'diathesis' has its role. Once the morphosyntax of aspect and diathesis has entered the picture, we have left the area on the time-stability scale where superlativeness is a fac­ tor. And this has, of course, a clear ontological basis: 'what you are' can be measured; it is a matter of degree. 'What you are doing', on the other hand, is absolute: you either do something or you do it not.52 It follows from this that when per is attached to an activity-denoting participle, we get a concessive par­ ticipial phrase which is entirely dissociated from the scalar origins of 'participle +per', superlativeness being neutralized. There are very few instances of 'ac­ tivity-denoting participle + per'; I have found only three. Two of these are presented below; the third one will be discussed in 4.3.4 below, in connection with 'modal embeddedness'. (31) (Aias to Teucer in a very difficult situation:) mê man aspoudei ge damassamenoi per heloien neos eusselmous.

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"I bet it will not be without an effort that the Trojans will capture the well-found ships, though they have beaten us already." (II. 15, 476). (32) Nestora d' ouk elathen iakhê pinonta per empês. "The din did not escape the ears of Nestor, though he sat drinking in his tent."(II. 14,1). In (31) the participle is aorist and in (32) present. In (31) the action denoted by the participle is completed - and this is an essential part of the meaning of the participle - whereas in (32) the action is presented as ongoing. In neither case superlativeness is a possible factor. 4.3.3 Dependent participles In 4.3.1 I stated that in its original use as an apposed constituent, 'par­ ticiple + pef is independent (prototypical property no 2). 'participle + per' is a typically 'backgrounded' constituent; it does not contribute essentially to the sentence to which it is attached. This property of the scalar participial phrase is retained in the transition from 'scalar' to 'concessive' to a far higher degree than superlativeness. 'Independence' remains an important feature of the con­ cessive participial phrase that is the result of the gradual fading of the scalarity of per. The reason is, of course, that syntactic independence may be considered a property of the concessives in general, whether they have a scalar origin or not. I have found only one instance of 'participle + pef functioning as a de­ pendent participial phrase. Consider: (33) (Achilles prays to his mother Thetis:) meter, epei m' etekes ge minunthadion per eonta, timen per moi opheïlen Olumpios eggualïksai Zeus hupsibremetês, nun d' oude me tutthon eteisen. "Mother, since you gave me life, if only for a little while, surely Olympian Zeus the Thunderer owes me at least honor. But as it is he pays me none!" (7Z. 1,352). The second per in this passage (timên per) has already been discussed; it is an instance of scalarity in wishes (see 3.5.3 above). We are now dealing with the first one. The participial phrase in (33) is one of the better known in Homer; it has repeatedly been mentioned separately. Kühner-Gerth (1904:169) seem to suggest that per here means 'very' ('sehr'). This would imply that the par-

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ticipial phrase in (33) is not properly concessive but an instance of what Denniston calls the 'intensive use', the alleged original intensifying use of per (see 1.3.4 above). However, this treatment is unwarranted, because (i) 'intensifying pef is an unnecessary concept in the description, and (ii) the example can (has to) be accounted for otherwise. The participle must be assigned its usual concessive function, as Denniston (21954:482) rightly remarks. But the example is not less remarkable at that. The concession in (33), and hence the proper meaning of the participial phrase, must be in the opposition between being a goddess' son and being short-lived. If the participle had been attached to a normal main clause, there would be nothing strange: the participial phrase would have been a normal independent one (Ί am a goddess' son, short-Uved though I am'). But the sentence to which the participial phrase is attached is not uttered for its own sake; being a causal subordinate clause, it leads up to ('sets the scene' for) the following discourse. And it is with respect to the following discourse that minunthadion per is a necessary constituent, without which the causal subordinate clause is incom­ plete. After saying 'You gave me life' to his mother, Achilles goes on to utter what was called above (3.5.3) a 'compromise wish'. Here the second instance of per {timên per) plays a major role. The highest item on Achilles' desirability scale (an additive one, see 3.5.3) is honor plus longevity. But since longevity has been denied him, he has to content himself with a compromise: honor alone, the second best item on the desirability scale and the least item that still satis­ fies his wish. The participial phrase of the preceding subclause is indispensable in the context of (33), because in telling that Achilles is short-Uved, it provides the very reason why Achilles has to resort to the compromise at all. Achilles does not want to say 'Zeus has to grant me at least honor since you gave me life'. His point is 'Zeus has to grant me at least honor since I am short-lived'. In a high­ ly unusual way (from the point of view of Homeric per, that is), the participial phrase is the most salient item in the causal subclause. It contributes essential­ ly to the realization of Achilles' communicative intentions. The concessive function which the participial phrase has qua instance of 'participle + pef is strictly speaking unnecessary in the discourse. But then Achilles is not deHvering a tightly organized speech. At first, minunthadionper seems to be in the usual way concessive with respect to what precedes. But when the discourse goes on, the participle turns out to have a causal function with

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respect to what follows. On account of the causal use to which it is eventually put, the participial phrase is clearly a less than prototypical instance of its kind. 4.3.4 Modally embedded participles We now arrive at the discussion of the third prototypical property men­ tioned above (4.3.1), modal autonomy. I have argued that the prototypical scalar instance of 'participle + per' stands outside the scope of the sentential modalities of the predication to which it is attached. This has to be viewed in connection with the semanticsofeven, as we have seen. But 'modal autonomy' applies to the majority of the concessive participial phrases as well. There are, however, some significant exceptions. Consider first: (34) (Athena is abusing Ares for wanting to fight. If he does it, Zeus will be very angry:) ê etheleis autos men anaplesas kaka polla aps' imen Oulumponde kai akhnumenos per anankêi, autor toh alloisi kakon mega posi phuteusai; "Or do you wish to get a thrashing for yourself and to be chased back to Olympus, grieved as you are, while the rest of us reap the whirlwind you have sown?" (77. 15,133). The participial phrase here is attached to an infinitival clause which is the com­ plement of the verb 'want' (etheleis). The complement of this verb always creates a non-factual environment (see 2.1.4). The participle is under the scope of this modality: the overall construction of (34) is not 'Or do you want, grieved as you are, that...', but 'Or do you want that grieved as you are ...'. Ares' being akhnumenos is not an independent fact; it depends on what he wants. In being what I call 'modally embedded', rather than modally autonomous, the par­ ticipial phrase in (34) is in a conspicuous way a less than prototypical instance of its kind.55 The following three instances have received relatively much attention in the accounts of per. This is understandable, for the modally embedded status of the participle makes the concession a great deal less conspicuous than we might want or expect. Consider: (35) (Agamemnon, when Achilles has said that he (Ag.) will receive ample compensation for the loss of Chryseis:) mêdêhoutôs, agathos per eôn, theoeikel' Akhilleu, klepte noôi, epei ou pareleuseai oude me peiseis.

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMERR "You are a great man, Achilles, but do not imagine you can trick me into that. I am not going to be outwitted or cajoled by you." (. 1, 131). (36) mê m'eti nun kateruke, lilaiomenon per hodoio "I am eager to be on my way; please do not detain me now." (Od. 1, 315). (37) (Telemachus to his mother Penelope:) meter emê, mê moi goon ornuthi mêde moi êtor en stêthessin orine phugonti per aipun olethron. "Mother, please do not reduce me to tears or play on my emotions when I have just escaped such a deadly fate." (Od. 17,47).

These examples have been dealt with in three different ways, two of which are the consequence of the fact that the concession of 'participle + pef here is not as straightforward as one might expect. The first method to explain the alleged absence of concession in (35)-(37) is the approach which crops up from time to time in the study of per, the 'original meaning-approach' (see 1.3.4), which has also been applied to (33) above. One of the commentators on II. 1,131 ( = ex. (35)): "Per seems here to have merely its original force of 'very', rather than of 'though', which indeed belongs properly to the participle." (Leaf 1900-2 i, 14). But once more the assignment of an instance of per to the 'original' 'intensive' use turns out to be unnecessary and unwarranted. The participial phrases can perfectly be accounted for in the synchronic dimension. Besides, how are we to account for 'intensification' in the case of (37)? The participle here denotes an event, rather than a property. Hence 'intensification' cannot possibly apply to it (see 4.3.2.3 above). The second approach is practiced in an older Homeric lexicon (Ebeling 1885: ii 162B s.v.per). It is stated here that the participial phrase in (35)-(37) is causal, rather than concessive. Indeed, when we stick (consciously or not) to the independent and modally autonomous status of all the instances of 'par­ ticiple + pef, and interpret the participles in (35)-(37) in the same way as phileousa per in (15) above, it is hard, if not impossible, to conceive of the par­ ticiples as concessive. In the case of (35), for example, the paraphrase which brings out the alleged independent and modally autonomous status of the par­ ticiple ('Don't cheat, Achilles, and I ask you this although you are a great man') does not make much sense: we expect something Hke because instead of al­ though. Likewise, it is more natural to read (36) as 'Do not detain me now because I am eager to be on my way'.58

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But being forced to say that the participial phrases in (35)-(37) are causal rather than concessive is a very high price to pay for the account of it as a nor­ mal independent and modally autonomous participle. To describe the par­ ticiples in (35)-(37) as causal is ruinous for the unifying description of per, for how are we to account for causal adverbial constituents in the scalar-conces­ sive framework? If the unifying, scalar-concessive framework has any value, we have to reject the causal interpretation. The best policy, then, is to stick, con­ forming to the principle of unification (see 1.3.2), to concession as long as pos­ sible, and accept the consequences of that decision. These consequences involve giving up the modally autonomous status, and hence the scalar connec­ tion of the participles. But then modal autonomy is merely a prototypical property of 'participle + per', whereas giving up concession is to deny its very essence. The third approach to (35)-(37), advocated by Denniston,59 recognizes the modal embeddedness of the participial phrase. It is, basically, therightone. Discussing 'participle + per' in connection with negation, Denniston states: "Either the participial clause is contrasted with the negation of the idea (...), or it is contrasted with the idea which is negatived, as regarded by itself positive­ ly." (Denniston 1951: 485). It is not difficult to recognize in the first alterna­ tive the independent, modally autonomous instances of 'participle + per' that stand outside the scope of negation. The second alternative is a cumbrous way of saying that 'participle + per' may be under the scope of negation. Denniston gives (35)-(37) as examples of his second alternative. Above (4.1.2 and 4.3.1) I characterized a modally autonomous participle as a participle that is factual irrespectively of the modality of the main predi­ cate. By contrast, a modally embedded participle would then be non-factual, as it is in the modal sphere of a non-factual main predicate. However, matters are not that simple. The participle in ex (3) of section 4.1.2 above, as well as akhnumenos per in (34) are non-factual in the way just mentioned. But the par­ ticiples in (35)-(37) are not. In none of these examples is there any doubt as to the factuality of the participial phrase. But this does not detract anything from their modally embedded status. The point here is that the predicate to which the participles in (35)-(37) are attached is factual, in spite of its appearing in the imperative mood. Imperative predicates may denote a factual state of affairs, namely when someone is requested to stop doing something. Ancient Greek has a charac­ teristic way of expressing such commands: the prohibitive-negative particle mê plus a present imperative. Commands of this type are feUcitous speech-acts

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either when the addressee is about to perform the action in question, or when he is performing it already. In the latter case the action is factual on the mo­ ment of utterance.60 This is precisely what happens in (35)-(37): the negative present imperative is used to request the addressee to stop cheating the speaker, detaining him and working on his emotions, respectively. To recognize (35)-(37) as requests to stop an ongoing activity is impor­ tant, because it explains (i) why the participial phrases are factual, and (ii) why 'participle + per' is used here at all. As for the first point, when the activity in question is actually taking place, then the circumstances under which it takes place, expressed by the participle, are factual, too. Compare the reverse situaa tion in ex. (3) in 4.1.2 above: here the modally embedded participle is non-fac­ tual, just because the action requested has not yet taken place. From factuality we may naturally proceed to the second point: when a speaker requests an addressee to stop doing a certain activity, the reality and importance of this activity is likely to be foremost in the speaker's mind: 'You are V-ing. Please, stop it. The 'you are V-ing' is so important to the speaker that he may attach a concessive participial phrase to it ('You are V-ing, although you are...') as if it is a statement in itself. But there is no statement, and the result is that in the actual wording of the request the participial phrase acquires a modally embedded status. The concession works 'inside' the request, so to speak. It is clear that instances of 'participle + per' that are used as such an em­ bedded concessive differ in an important respect from the prototypical scalar instances, for it is in the very nature of the scalar participial phrase to be en­ tirely detached and modally autonomous. When used in commands, the prototypical instance of 'participle + per' is concessive with respect to the com­ mand as a whole, in the same way as ex. (15) above.61 If the participles in (35)(37) are anything with respect to the command as a whole, it is causal, and this is the best expression I can think of for the fact that they are clearly less than prototypical instances of their kind. Entirely comparable to (35)-(37) is the following example, although it does not involve a negative present command: (38) (Telemachus says that the beggar has to look after himself:) erne d'ou pôs estin hapantas anthrôpous anekhesthai, ekhonta per algea thumôi "I myself cannot possibly cope with all and sundry: I have too many troubles on my mind." (0d. 17,13).

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Again, the participial phrase is not concessive with respect to the statement as a whole. It may be understood 'psychologically': 'As for the beggar, he has to look after himself. I wish I could help such people, in spite of my sorrows. But it is just not possible/ When that to which the participle is attached is embedded under 'it is not possible' (ou pôs estin 62), as in (38), it is obvious that the par­ ticiple, too, gets embedded in the process. The approach in terms of modal embeddedness to 'participle + per' in (35)-(38) presented here is, I think, the best that one can make in linguistic terms of the participles as they stand. However, I do not believe that it can go all the way to a complete explanation. For a full account of the participles, we have to realize that they may also be described as formulas in the epic diction. Beside, and complementary to, modal embeddedness, there is a second factor in the less than prototypical status of the participles. This is the concept that was introduced in 1.5 above as imperfect semantic integration of formulas. The consequences of the participles in (35)-(38) being viewed as imperfectly in­ tegrated formulas, rather than as less than prototypical instances of the scalar participial phrase will be pursued in the following chapter (5.3). 4.4 From linguistics to the formula 4.4.1 'Participle + per' and generic modality It is a peculiarity of Ancient Greek that active verbs may have a totally un­ specified (generic) subject or object which is left unexpressed. An example is the following relative clause: (39) arksamenoi tou khôrou, hothen te per oinokhoeuei "beginning from the corner where the wine is poured" (lit: "where he [unspec] pours the wine") (Od. 21,142). The effect of the subjectlessness of the predicate in (39) is that all temporal reference disappears: the corner in question is identified as the place where the one in charge pours the wine, irrespectively of any particular circumstan­ ces.63 To this kind of generic predicate, a circumstantial participle may be at­ tached, just as in the case of predicates with fully specified and/or referential arguments. Consider: (40) αll hote tosson apên, hosson te gegône boêsas. "But when he had come within call of the shore" (lit: "When he had come so near to the shore as he [unspec: a 'shouter'] can make himself audible by crying.") (Od. 5,400).

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At first sight, the participle boêsas could be analyzed as the non-referen­ tial subject of gegône. But in view of examples like (39), which are not unfrequent in Homer and in later Greek, boêsas in (40) had better be described as a circumstantial participle. Now, 'participle + per' may be used in the same way as boêsas in (40), that is, as a circumstantial participle to a predicate with (an) unexpressed argu­ ment(s) in a non-factual (generic) context. There are four examples of this use: (41) (When Achilles has declared that he renounces his feud, the assembled Achaeans are shouting for joy. Agamemnon, beginning his speech, cannot make himself audible:) ô philoi, hêrôes Danavi, therapontes Arêos. hestaotos men kalon akouein, oude eoike hubballein: khalepon gar epistamenôi per eonti "Friends, Danaan men-at-arms, servants of Ares. When a man stands up to speak, it is only courteous to give him a hearing and not interrupt. The best of orators could hardly cope with such disorder." (lit: "it is difficult [for someone], however trained he is as an orator"). (IL 19, 80). (42) (From the same passage:) andrôn d'en pollôi homadôi pôs ken tis akousai ê eipoi? blabetai de ligus per eôn agorêtês "How can one talk or hear when everyone is making enough din to drown the loudest voice?" (Ht: "[he] is frustrated, even though he is a clear speaker"). (. 19, 82). (43) (Penelope to her servant, who has just told her that her husband Odysseus has returned and is in the house:) maia phïlê, margên se theoi thesan, hoi te dunantai aphronapoiêsai kai epiphrona per mal' eonta "My dear nurse, the gods have made you daft. It's easy for them to rob the wisest of their wits." (Ht: "they are able to make [someone] senseless, however clever he is"). (Od, 23,12). (44) (The place where Odysseus meets Nausicaa:) enth' êtoi plunoi êsan epêetanoi polu d'hudôr kalon hupekprorheei mala per rhupoônta kathêrai. "Where there was enough clear water always bubbling up and swirling by to clean the dirtiest clothes." (Od. 6, 87).

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From the point of view of the scalarity of 'participle + per' these examples are clear and prototypical. They all involve superlativeness: the three analytic par­ ticipial phrases in (41)-(43) contain an adjective denoting a property allowing of degree and comparison, and the synthetic participle of (44) is clearly of the time-stable, adjectival kind (see 4.3.2.3 above). However, the generic modality makes an essential difference between (41)-(44) and the other examples discussed in this chapter. This difference can be best formulated as follows: in the examples cited earlier in this chapter, 'par­ ticiple + per' is an expression in its ownright,in the sense that no other ex­ pression with the same or approximately the same meaning could have been used. In the case of (41)-(44), on the other hand, this is not so. On account of the generic modality in these examples, there is an alternative expression which could have been used, viz. the scalar superlative, which was discussed in 2.1.1 and 3.1.1. It is easy to see that the semantic difference between the circumstan­ tial participles in (41)-(44) and expressions involving a scalar superlative is min­ imal. Compare the following pair: (45) a.blabetai ligus per eôn agorêtês.'Oneis frustrated, however clear ('shrill') one can speak'). b.blabetai ligus per agorêtês. 'The clearest speaker is frustrated'. Notice, furthermore, that the participial phrase in (43) occurs in a digressive hoste-clause,which was shown in 3.1.1 to be the favorite environment of scalar superlatives. And in (44),finally,the distinction between the scalar-concessive participle and the scalar superlative is even entirely gratuite, simply because mala per rhupoônta may be analyzed as both. Now, it might be interesting to investigate whether there are semantic or discourse-pragmatic reasons for the choice of either expression. This would in­ volve the determination of the conditions under which, given a generic modal environment, the one expression is preferred to the other. This investigation could be interesting, but the point is that it is unnecessary in the present case, since the reason why the participial expressions in (41)-(44) have been preferred to the scalar superlatives should not be sought in the semantic or pragmatic sphere. It is the fact that the participial phrases in (41)-(44) are formulas conform­ ing to a consistent localization-pattern that determines the choice. The phrase ligus per eôn agorêtês in (42), for instance, is a formula which recurs elsewhere, always in the same place in theline.The phrase fills the second part of the line in such a useful way for the poet that there is no question of there being any vi-

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able alternative. By viewing the participial phrases as formulas, rather than as semantic or pragmatic alternatives for the scalar superlative, we have made the step from linguistics to the other explanatory domain in the study of 'participle + per9, Homeric formulas and metrics. This field will be the object of study in the following chapter. 4.4.2 Kai, mala and strengthening Hitherto I have ignored the occurrence of other particles than per in the participial phrase. These particles are kai and mala. These particles appear fre­ quently in the participial phrase, but by no means always. When we study the distribution of kai, it quickly appears that this distribution is totally insensitive to the distinctions I have made in the material on the basis of the prototypical properties of the scalar-concessive participial phrase. It is easily observable that kai just may or may not occur, irrespectively of the participial phrase being su­ perlative or not, modally autonomous or modally embedded. The appropriate approach to the optional and, strictly speaking, redun­ dant use of kai and mala in the participial phrase is strengthening. Being an ele­ ment which strengthens the concession of 'participle + per', kai may be compared to even in even though.69 In being non-essential and from a strictly logical point of view 'superfluous', strengtheners like kai may be described, in terms of Prototype Theory (see 1.4), as peripheral instances of their kind. Kai as a strengthener in kai akhnumenos per does not have an independent func­ tion, as it has elsewhere. As I will argue in 7.3.3 above, when a particle like kai is used as a 'redundant' strengthener, it is less easily predictable than the more prototypi­ cal instances of its kind. Given the fact that strengtheners just may or may not occur in a given expression-type, their distribution is more difficult to explain than the distribution of independently expressed instances.70 This lesser pre­ dictability is in line with the fact that kai is insensitive to the distinctions dis­ cussed in 4.3. Now one might want, in spite of the difficulties just mentioned, to justify incidental instances of kai, by showing that the participial phrase in which it oc­ curs has a 'stronger' concessive meaning than an instance of 'participle + per' without kai. This operation would yield, however, no positive result whatever, for in most cases by far the poet had no choice. Contrary to what may be ex­ pected on the basis of the lesser predictabiHty of kai as a strengthening phenomenon, the distribution of kai (as well as that of mala) appears to be heavily constrained by metrical factors: in most cases the presence (or absence,

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for that matter) of kai is mandatory on metrical grounds. The rules and tenden­ cies of the dactylic hexameter simply take precedence over the considerations by which one might add or omit kai as a strengthener In the following chapter (5.2.2) I shall show in detail how the distributionofkai in the participial phrase is indissolubly bound up with the localization-pattern of 'articiple + per' as a word- (formula-)type in the metrical space of the dactylic hexameter.

NOTESTOCHAPTER 4 1) It should be noted that the term 'attributive' may be used to refer to two different sets of phenomena. In the present paragraph I use the term to refer to participles that either modify a noun (like an adjective) or are substantivized. In 2.2.1 above, on the other hand, I used the term 'attributive' in a different way, to refer to nominal predicates ('Peter's best friend' being the (one-place) predicate in 'Bill is Peter's best friend'). 'Attributive' in the first sense may be opposed to 'predicative', while in the second use it may be opposed to 'referential' (cf. Donellan's (1966) distinction between the referential and the attributive use of definite descriptions, see also 2.2.2). 2) In Kühner-Gerth (1904) the term 'Adjektivsatz' is used. 3) For 'complementary participles' see Goodwin (1889:347 ff.), Kühner-Gerth (1904:4767), Rijksbaron (1984:114-119). In Greek, as well as in other languages, the verbs which take participles as a complement (i.e. as an argument, an obligatory constituent) belong to what may be called (see Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1968; Givón 1973b, 1984:117-9) 'factive cognition verbs' (know, be aware of, realize, regret, notice etc.) as well as to the 'implicative modality verbs' (manage, continue, begin, succeed, remember etc.). These verbs have in common that they either presuppose or imply the truth of the sentence, infinitive or participial construction embedded under them as a complement. Notice that Ancient Greek possesses in the choice between par­ ticiple or infinitive as the complement of the above mentioned verbs a means to overtly express either factivity (partic.) or non-factivity (inf.) by one and the same verbal lexeme. Other lan­ guages have to resort to different lexemes in those cases. Forexamplephainomai + participle: 'appear'; phainomai + inf: 'seem'. See Goodwin (1889: 357-9), Kühner-Gerth (1904: 68-76), Rijksbaron (1984:119). 4) See Goodwin (1889:333), Kühner-Gerth (1904:77). 5) Exceptions are the subordinators hôs and epei, which may have either a causal or a tem­ poral understanding. 6) As regards the relation Time the situation is somewhat more complicated. The Greek participle displays an aspectual fluctuation (present vs. aorist stem) which corresponds to two possible temporal relations between the participle and the main clause: anteriority and simul­ taneity. See also 4.3.2.3 below. 7) There are some exceptions to this general statement. Greek participles can be morphosyntactically marked as 'future' with regard to their main clause ('relative future'), in which case the nature of the circumstance expressed tends to be intentional or volitional, according to one of the normal uses to which the future tense paradigm can be put (see Fleischman (1982: 88)). Secondly, participles may be accompanied by the modal particle an. These participles ex­ plicitly have either a counterfactual or potential reading, just asfiniteverb forms (indicative or optative, respectively) accompanied by an. See Goodwin (1889: 70 ff.). The third exception is that participles may be accompanied by a 'participial adverb' which marks them for one of the adverbial relations. See further below. 8) For a discussion of the discourse function of participles in Greek see Fox (1983); for participles in written English see Thompson (1983). These studies are useful, but much more research is needed.

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9) Another example (beside the ones mentioned in note 5 above) of the classification is Chantraine (1948: ii, 319 ff.). For critique on this kind of reasoning, in which translation problems interfere with the description of the translated items (viz. the participles), see Sicking (1971: 956). 10) Consequently, per in participial phrases tends to be discussed not for its own sake, but within the context of a discussion of (concessive) participles, e.g. Chantraine (1953: 320). See also 1.3.2 above. 11) E.g. Oguse (1962: 2,211). 12) Beside the two kinds under study here, Oguse (1962) recognizes a third kind of cir­ cumstantial participle, which he calls "solidarité modale". This kind of participle occurs in im­ perative sentences (see 3.5.1). Here the participle should not be compared to an adverbial subclause, but to an imperative which is co-ordinated with the imperative predicate of the predication to which the participle is attached. Oguse's example is: apelthontes... haireisthe "Go away and choose [lit: after you have left, choose]" (Xen. An. 3, 1, 46). I would say that the 'solidarity of the participle in such cases has to be stated in terms of sentence-type (see 3.4.1 and 3.5.1), rather than in terms of mood. 13) See Lyons (1977:797), Palmer (1986:26,51). Realis assertions are treated as unmodalized when we conceive of modality as an epistemic system. But it does not follow that the dec­ larative sentence-type (see Lyons 1977:745) is non-modal anyway. See 2.1.4 and 3.4.1. 14) To cite a from a discussion of modality within a logical framework (Rescher 1968): "A proposition is presented by a complete, self-contained statement which, taken as a whole, will be true or false. (...). When such a proposition is itself made subject to some further qualifica­ tion of such a kind that the entire resulting complex is itself once again a proposition, then this qualification is said to represent a modality to which the original proposition is subjected." 15) Professor Ruijgh points out to me that the 'autonomy* of the participle in (4) is fur­ ther enhanced by the fact that it may, in addition, be interpreted as expressing absolute tense (i.e. tense not relative to the tense-marking of the mam clause, but to the moment of speak­ ing/writing): 'because they think those means of making money disgraceful'. A participle which is meant to express absolute tense obviously possesses the maximum amount of autonomy and detachment with regard to its main clause. 16) Both semantic and discourse-pragmatic factors, beside syntactic ones, are likely to be important in the dependency of adverbial constituents. 17) The semantic and syntactic contrast between the 'nucleus' of a sentence (the predi­ cate with its obligatory arguments), where complementation obtains, on the one hand, and the 'periphery' of a sentence on the other, appears in many linguistic theories and is dealt with in many different terminologies. For a survey of the various possibihties as well as of the criteria used for distinguishing 'peripheral' constituents from 'nuclear' ones, see Matthews (1981:ch.6). 18) I use even so in this study as the standard rendering of kai hôs. Accordingly, I do not want to make any assertion about the actual use of even so as an adverbial element in English. 19) Or: may/can/will obtain. In other words, the predication may be subjected to any 'epistemic' modality (see 4.1.2 above); for the adverbial element there is no difference. 20) Adverbs or adverbial expressions can be differentiated on the basis of various criteria. One of these is scope. Wide scope (sentential) adverbials may be opposed to narrow scope ad-

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verbials, which modify only the predicate ('manner adverbials'). For the various types of adver­ bials see Givón (1984: 77-9), Pinkster (1972: ch.4). 21) Just as the Homeric demonstrative ho (later serving as the definite article) has been replaced by houtos. Notice that the gradual replacement of hos by houtôs leaves kai hôs un­ touched. In other words, in later Greek, kai hôs is a fixed expression. This is reflected in its semantics; see 4.2.2 below. 22) In (7) hôs could in principle refer to the previous line, in which the argumentation of Neleus for hiding the horses is stated (ou gar pô ti m' ephê idmen polemêïa erga - "For he said that I did not yet know the practice of war"). Kai hôs then has the concessive sense which is nor­ mal in later times (see 4.2.2): 'And yet... (in spite of what my father said,..)'. However, I find it more probable that hôs refers to the circumstance that Nestor's horses were hidden from him. 23) Of course, the least likely circumstances turn into the most favorable circumstances when the nuclear predication is negated, as in the case of (8), (9), (10) and (11) above. From the point of view of scalarity there is no difference. See 2.4.1 above. 24) Or one treats per as an element which emphasizes or strengthens the concessive rela­ tion expressed already by the

participle (see 1.3.2 and 4.1.1). 25) See Kühner-Gerth (1904: 85), Chantraine (1948:321). 26) The fixed character of kai hôs appears also from the fact that hôs ha not been replaced by the more recent houtôs, see note 21 above. 27) See Matthews (1981: 236-39), Lehmann (1984:147) and Bakker (in prep: ch. 4). 28) Lat: qualis - talis, quantus - tantus; Gr: hoios - toios (toioutos), hosos - tosos (tosoutos) etc. 29) See Bakker (1986; in prep: ch. 3). 30) The pragmatic function 'Tail' in Functional Grammar, which is described in terms of 'afterthought' (see Dik 1978:153) involves apposition. 31) As a concept, 'apposition' is rather elusive; it is the most undifferentiated syntactic relation possible between constituents. So the discussion of apposition in Matthews (1981:22436) is mainly concerned with the demarcation of apposition with regard to other syntactic rela­ tions. 32) See Matthews (1981: 229). The non-restrictive relative clause is often called 'appositive', see Lehmann (1984: 261). 33) Hôs points ahead only very occasionally, for example Il 17,420: hôs de tis...audêsaskon "One of the Trojans spoke as follows." But this is an odd and isolated example. See Leaf (1900-2) ad loc. 34) In Indo-European diachronic syntax, correlations in which the demonstrative element is anaphoric (as in Latin qualis...talis) are considered to be primary ('older') with regard to the reversed forms, in which the demonstrative is cataphoric (talis...qualis). The latter are described in Haudry (1973) as a modification of the former. The basic anaphoric nature of hôs fits in well with this development. In later (Attic) Greek, on the other hand, the descendant of hôs, houtôs can be cataphoric, and hence, yield correlations of the latter type.

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35) In Kühner-Gerth (1904: 85) hornôs in connection with 'participle +per'is treated on a par with kai hôs. This is correct from a synchronic (5th and 4th century Attic), but incorrect from a diachronic point of view. 36) Notice that there is a third concessive adverbial element which may occur in main clauses to which 'participle + per' is attached. This is empês.In the present study I do not dis­ cuss empês for its own sake, as the meaning of this particle does not have any bearing upon the descriptionofper. However, empêsdoes play a role in the form of formulas in whichper·occurs. As such it will be discussed in 5.2.2 below. 37) There are 117 instances in the Iliad (more than 38% of the total number of instances of per here,'post-Homeric' per (see 1.1) included), and 76 in the Odyssey (35%). See the Ap­ pendix. 38) Concessive expressions like howevermuch;hoewel,hoe zeer ook (Dutch) and quam­ quam (Lat.) consist of the combination of superlativeness with indeterminacy. See further 6.2 and 6.3.3 below. Another source of (factual) concessive subordinators are concessive condition­ al and temporal subclauses (viz. subclauses functioning as the sentential focus constituent of even): even though', quand même (French); et-si (Latin) etc. See König (1986:240). For the rela­ tion between concessive conditionals and 'concessives' see 6.1 below. 39) This means that a diachronic component is involved in this continuum, because in diachronic space scalarity precedes concession. But it does make sense to discuss the scalar par­ ticipial phrase as a prototype, because the diachronic change does not yield a new expressiontype, a scalar expression-type metamorphosing into a concessive one. Rather, the change is quantitative: the scalar expression loses (some of) its characteristic properties, thereby becom­ ing concessive. A scalar-concessive participle as in (7)-(11)maybeanalyzed as a concessive par­ ticiple plus some extra features. This is in line with Prototype Theory, where it is held that the more prototypical an instance is, the more prototypical properties it possesses (see 1.4). Note, furthermore, that in the case of Homer, the mapping of an essentially diachronic distinction onto synchronic space is fully warranted anyway, because the co-existence of diachronically disparate elements is a frequent phenomenon here (see 1.5). Two items between which a diachronic rela­ tion has to be assumed can perfectly exist side by side in Homer, and it is often impossible to determine whether they co-existed synchronically in Homer's time or not. For instance, it is a priori impossible to maintain that exx. (7)-(11), in which kai hôs occurs in its original scalar func­ tion, cannot have coexisted in the ordinary language of Homer's time with purely concessive ex­ pressions. 40) The negation in oude has to be analyzed as the raised negation of the nuclear predica­ tion, see note 17 of ch. 3. Occasionally, oude combines with a second negation in the nuclear predication. For examples of this phenomenon see Oguse (1968). In this case the two negations do not neutralize each other, as one might expect from a logical point of view. We may say that an overt negation in the nuclear predication idiomatically triggers oude as the scalar expression, while from a strictly logical point of view kai would be possible. There are a number of excep­ tions to this rule (kai being used instead of oude in an overtly negated scope sentence), for ex­ ample: hippos eugenês,kanêigerôn,en toisi deinois thumon ouk apôlesen."Awell-bred horse, even if it is old, does not lose its head in the hour of danger." (Soph. O.C. 25). But here the nega­ tion amounts to the expression of a positive quality ('not losing its head' being equivalent to 'stay­ ing brave').

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41) But notice that in (16) and (19) the participial phrase stands, in addition, outside the complement of a modality verb (see Givón 1984:120):phêmi ('I say' ('claim', 'think') and eolpa ('I assume', 'expect')). In (16) Poseidon does not mean 'I do not think that it is in spite of his fury that Hector will not make his stand'. He means: 'I don't think that Hector will make his stand. And I think so in spite of his fury' In other words, the participial phrase does not belong to what Poseidon claims. The same analysis applies to (19). 42) For negative commands (of this type, in which one is requested to stop what one is currently doing) see further 4.3.4 below. 43) In (17), for example, the fact referred to by the nuclear predication (Aeneas' withdrawal) is in itself not very remarkable; it is even plausible, in view of the fact that his op­ ponent receives considerable support. Likewise, in (16), Hector's envisaged withdrawal is not remarkable in the eyes of Poseidon: he himself is helping the Greeks. 44) See Givón (1979:14, 320 ff.). See also notes 21 and 30 of chapter 2. Notice that the three categories are gradient themselves and that there is overlap possible (see Givón 1985:211): the most time-unstable adjective in a language may be more time-unstable than the least timeunstable verb. 45) The distance in the continuum between substantives of the type lithos and adjectives like khruseios is minimal, if there is any distance at all (see note 44). Notice that the latter are often derived from the substantive denoting the material. In English (and Dutch), the adjective cannot occur predicatively; the substantive has then to be used instead: 'This table is made of wood' vs. 'a wooden table'. 46) See also the discussion in Bakker (in prep.) of the absence of negation in Attic rela­ tive and conditional clauses modified hy per. 47) Other substantival predicates in the participial phrase: Il.1, 546; 10, 548; 16, 617; 21, 483; 24,35; 24,423; 24,570; 24,609; Od. 18,21. 48) In the former case, the predicate of the ascriptive sentence is an adjective and in the latter case a substantive. 49) In the case of meneainôn/memaôta there is an aspectual fluctuation: present vs. per­ fect. This fluctuation, however, is devoid of semantic or pragmatic interest. See further 5.2.2 below (sub I.B1)). 50) Of course, sentences of the type 'Peter is drinking' are of a different type. These sen­ tences are by no means aspectiess; they are characterized for the typically English progressive aspect. 'Is' is not a copula and 'drinking' is non-adjectival. 51) See Kühner-Gerth (1904), Goodwin (1889: 47-9), Rijksbaron (1984: 114), Ruijgh (1985:13-14). However, the aspectual fluctuation of (circumstantial) participles deserves an in­ vestigation in its own right, in which notions like 'discourse (function)', 'backgrounding' and 'foregrounding' are likely to be important. (See for these notions note 8 of chapter 3.) 52) Actually, matters are somewhat more complicated here. The absence of degree and measurability on the time-unstable part of the scale is itself a gradient affair (see note 44 above). The prototypical time-unstable predicate (e.g. 'arrive') is wholly devoid of degree and superlativeness, but ongoing activities can sometimes be compared to each other ('Peter worked har­ der than John'). The point is, however, that 'having a certain property to a higher degree than someone else' is a property itself, whereas 'doing something to a higher degree than someone else' is not an activity/event.

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53) It would be if the intended meaning of (32) is that Nestor was drunk (adjectival predi­ cate). But this is not the case (see Willcock 1984: 226). 54) For 'setting the scene' as the discourse-pragmatic function of preposed subordinate clauses, see further 6.3.1.1 above. 55) Ex. (34) is cited by Oguse (1962:135) as an instance of "association étroite" (see 4.1.2 above). But we recall that Oguse's class of 'closely associated' participles is unspecified for syn­ tactic dependency and modal embeddedness. 56) Satis insolite simpliciter de causa: quoniam ("Rather unusually (per is) simply about the cause: 'since"'). 57) It is interesting to note that the causal approach to (35)-(37), or something similar to it, may be traced to remote Antiquity. In a scholion on the Hellenistic poet Apollonius Rhodius (on i, 299, see Wendel 1935:34) it is stated that the Alexandrian scholar Aristarchus interpreted per in the participial phrases in (77.1,131 ( = ex. (35)) and (Od. 17,47 ( = ex. (37)) as similar to the 'evidential' particle de. 58) See also Sicking (1971: 97). 59) See also Chantraine (1948:320). 60) It is here not the appropriate place to go into the intricacies of the aspectual opposi­ tion in the Greek imperative mood. Suffice it to say that present imperatives are used when the requested action is not 'new' in the context of utterance, whereas aorist imperatives introduce new information in the discourse. Thus, aorist imperatives are typically used after introductions of the type 'What you must do is the following:...'. For more on Greek aspect and imperatives (in other terminology than I would have it), see (W.F.) Bakker (1966: 31 ff.) and Ruijgh (1985: 29-38). 61) Entirely comparable to (15) is Il. 18,126: mê de m'eruke makhês, phileousa per, oude me peiseis. ("Do not detain ( = stop detaining me) from the battle, however much you love me. For you will not persuade me.") Here the participle is not concessive with respect to the ongo­ ing activity, but with the request as a whole. With respect to the ongoing activity, the participle may be compared to a causal subclause: you are detaining me because you love me. Thus, as regards the respective functions of cause and concession, this example is a complete reversal of (35)-(37). 62) In later Greek this is expressed as ouk estin hopôs (lit: 'there is no way how'). 63) Notice that subjectless predicates may also be used when the agent of an activity either is unknown or totally unimportant in the context. An example of the latter alternative is the tem­ poral subclause epei esalpinxe ("when the trompet sounded" - lit. "when he [unspec] sounded the trompet") Xen. An. 1,2,17. Here the activity is specific: someone sounded the trompet at a particular moment, but the identity of this person is unimportant. 64) Moreover, as professor Ruijgh points out to me, substantivized participles occur in Homer nearly always with the definite article: ta eonta ('the (now) existing things'). 65) In (41) the participial phrase contains, instead of an adjective, a synthetic participle of the adjectival kind (epistamenos). 66)InIl.2,246 and Od. 20,274. The phrase conforms to a pattern itself. Ligus and agorêtês may be substituted for: thoo sper eôn polemistês ('quick warrior as he is'), see ex, (17) above.

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67) Notice, however, that after Homer kai is always present in the participial phrase, form­ ing with per the petrified collocation kaiper. 68) Notice that the situation with mala is different: conforming to its meaning ('very'), this particle occurs only with superlative participles (mala per memaôtalrhupoônta etc.). 69) Or ook in ook al in Dutch. 70) By this I do not mean that the distribution of stengtheners cannot be explained anyway. In fact, subtle discourse-pragmatic factors may be at work in the distribution of strengtheners. But these factors are more 'fuzzy' and less straightforward than the factors determining the dis­ tribution of prototypical instances. In addition, the characteristics of the personal 'style' of a speaker or writer are likely to be more apparent in the peripheral instances of a given item than in the more 'objective' prototypical instances.

5 PARTICIPLES Π: FORMULAS AND METRICS

5.0 Introduction After the linguistic analysis of 'participle + per' in the previous chapter, we are now concerned with the remaining features of this expression-type. In the present chapter I will discuss 'participle +per'in connection with two major characteristics of the Homeric text, its metrical form and its oral-formulaic na­ ture. These two features determine to a high degree the linguistic form of the Iliad and Odyssey and they will appear to have important implications for the study of 'participle + per', too. The chapter consists of three parts. The introductory part (5.1) is a discus­ sion of the 'Homeric formula'. The point of view adopted for this discussion will be primarily linguistic. I will treat formulas as normal ordinary language expressions which have a specific function in the oral-formulaic diction. I will argue that an account of the Homeric formula in terms of function has an ad­ vantage over the accounts in which the formula is treated as a phenomenon sui generis, for which a special explanation and definition has to be sought. In 5.2 I discuss the instances of 'participle + per9 as to their (metrical) form. I will show that the form of 'participle + per9 may be adapted by the poet to the exigencies of the hexameter line: the metrical word-type to which a given instance of 'participle + per' belongs may be altered in systematic ways by the addition of certain particles and other elements whose meaning is subservient to their metrical-extending function. I will show that the rationale behind this addition lies in the usefulness of 'participle + per' for easy and smooth ver­ sification. The expression-type forms a formular system which is essential for the rapid and automatic processing of rhythmically and linguistically accept­ able hexameters. In section 5.3I deal with the meaningandfunction of 'participle + per9 in the formulaic diction of Greek epic. In this section, I will introduce the notion

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of 'integration of formulas'. It is a typical consequence of formulaic language use that phrases may be less integrated' in their context, precisely because they are used as formulas, viz. as ready-made phrases which facilitate the poet's automatic filling the metrical space of the hexameter line with words and phrases. Formular (non-)integration may occur at various levels', ranging from phonetics to the content of whole passages. The level which is relevant for the study of 'participle + per' in this connection is semantics. 5.1 On formulas Since the Parryan revolution in Homeric studies, most discussions of Homeric language and stylemaybegrouped around two central issues: (i) how is the concept of 'formula' to be defined, and (ii) does formularity entail orality, or, in other words, is the presence of formulas in the Homeric text to be regarded as an index of the oral composition of that text? Milman Parry was the first to raise these issues, which have been vexed questions ever since his publications. In his first French thesis (1928a), Parry proved that the wellknown noun-epithet expressions in Homer form a formular system which is traditional, rather than the invention of a single poet. Later (1930, 1932), he made an important step further, by contending that Greek epic poetry is not merely 'traditional', but also that Homer as we have it is orally composed. Homer's orality, he argued, can be deduced from his formularity. Now, it is important to realize that Parry's conception of Homer's orality is intimately connected with what we consider to be a formula and what not. In other words, the second question mentioned above heavily depends on the first: if we take it as a premiss that formularity entails orality, then the broader the definition of 'formula' we accept, the higher the degree of formularity in Homer, and the stronger the case for Homer as an orally composed text. Ac­ cordingly, when Parry made the step from 'traditional' to 'oral' poetry, he had to considerably extend his definition of 'formula'. Out of the original definition grew a rather fuzzy notion which was more and more extended by Parry's fol­ lowers, all for the sake of proving Homer's orality (see further below, 5.1.3).2 Parry's well-known definition of 'formula' runs as follows (1971: 272 = 1930: 80): "a group of words which is regularly used under the same metrical conditions, to express a given essential idea."3 There are both 'extensional' and 'intensional' problems with this definition. Extensional problems arise when we try to delimit the formular from the non-formular. There are a great many acknowledged, prototypical formulas, but there are many peripheral cases as well, to which the above definition does not or not fully apply. In any case, Parry

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and his followers have called some phrases a formula which satisfy none or few of the conditions of the definition.4 The intensional problems arise when we try to define what it means for a given phrase to be a formula. The question which arises here is not how useful Parry's definition is when applied to the doubtful and peripheral instances of formula', but how appropriate it is as a characterization of the prototypical cases. The lack of agreement about the definition and the continuing confusion about the concept of formula in general has been one of the most salient fea­ tures of oral poetry studies. As Austin (1975: 14) has put it, "The scientists, from whose vocabulary we have borrowed the concept of formula, might be astonished to find Homeric scholars exercising ideosyncracy at the level of primary axiom and yet reaching unanimity at the level of general theory." Nobody denies that Homer is full of formulas, but on the question as to how full there is no agreement. The trouble with the approach to orality instigated by Parry is that it in­ duces a 'structural', context-independent account of the formula: when the presence of formulas in a text is considered to be an index of the oral composi­ tion of that text,5 then it is of the highest importance to know how to recognize formulas as such, in other words, to know what a formula is. Very often, the classification (whether or not controversially) of a certain phrase as a formula has implied that the phrase was considered a formula in itself, an entity that can, by some inherent property, be differentiated from non-formular phrases. The method by which one starts with (a definition of) the formula and proceeds from there to conclusions about oral composition, typically reflects the cogni­ tive development of the researcher, who observes some phenomena (i.e. for­ mulas in Homer), tries to conceptualize them and subsequently explain them and/or draw conclusions about them. But the point is that formulas are not a phenomenon sui generis. Formulas are not there just for their own sake; their presence is motivated by the exigen­ cies of oral composition and performance. Accordingly, afunctional approach to the Homeric formula seems to be more promising thanastructural approach. It is not the case that certain phrases are formulas; rather, they are used as for­ mulas. This approach differs from the approach of Parry in that we start with orality and proceed from there to the formula. In this approach, we take the oral composition of a text as a hypothesis and see whether it has left any traces in the text. Such traces may be formulas of the prototypical kind, but also phenomena that need not, or cannot, be discussed in terms of 'formula'. The

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advantage of this approach is that the heavy pressure on the definition of formula' disappears, as there is much less that depends on it. In the following subsections, I will try to give a functional account of the Homeric formula which points ahead to the discussion of the peculiarities of 'participle + per' in the oral-formulaic diction. In5.1.1Iwill discuss the mean­ ing of formulas, on the basis of Parry's notion of an "essential idea" which is expressed by a formula (see the definition above). In 5.1.2 the metrical dimen­ sion of formulas will be dealt with, and in 5.1.3 the recurrence aspect. 5.1.1 Formular language and ordinary language In a primarily semantic study it is apposite to start the discussion with the part of Parry's definition that is concerned with meaning: according to Parry, a formula is used to express a given essential idea. From a semantic point of view, the term 'idea' is unsatisfactory.7 But it is more important to focus on the semantic implications of Parry's definition. Parry explains 'essential idea' as follows (1971: 13): "What is essential in an idea is what remains after all stylistic superfluity has been removed." Thus, in the example which Parry provides, the noun-epithet formula polutlas dios Odysseus ('much suffering, godlike Odysseus'), the essential idea is 'Odysseus'. Likewise, the essential idea of the formular line (1) êmosd'êrigeneiaphanêrhododaktulos Eos "As soon as Dawn with her rose-tinted hands had lit the East." is 'when day broke'. The implication of Parry's distinction between formulas and the 'essen­ tial idea' expressed by them is that formulas and language use involving for­ mulas is qualitatively different from non-formular, normal language use. Parry's distinction amounts to the equation of the essential idea of a formula with what the formula actually means in terms of ordinary language.8 The es­ sential feature of the formular language as Parry defines it, in which formulas express 'essential ideas' is that form (expressions, formulas) is separated from meaning (essential ideas) to a much higher degree than in non-formular lan­ guage. Parry's account of 'formula' must be considered against the background of the way the Homeric language and diction was viewed in the first decades of the century. In Witte (1913) and Meister (1921), the language of the Homeric poems is considered to be, and systematically described as, a language in its own right which is not created by any one poet, but by the medium in which he

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composes, viz. the epic verse. This hexametric language was considered a real language, a Kunstsprache which is distinct from ordinary Greek. The Kunstsprache is characterized by a large number of archaic, dialectal and even wholly artificial elements, whose presence may be justified by the poet's con­ stant need to adapt the expression ('form') of his thought to the complicated ex­ igencies of the hexameter line. Parry added a new and essential dimension to this approach, in arguing, and proving, that the deviations from ordinary language are not there merely for the sake of metre and the Kunstsprache. Parry showed that these deviations have their motivation in the fact that the Homeric diction is, or in any case was originally, designed, over many generations of epic poets, to facilitate oral com­ position. For all its artificiality, the Homeric dictionisfunctional in the first place. Parry discovered the pragmatics of the Kunstsprache, so to speak. One of the most conspicuous features of this Kunstsprache is the system of noun (name)-epithet formulas. Parry proved that these formulas play an im­ portant role in the oral-formulaic diction in that they enable the poet to refer to a hero or a god in an entirely systematized way. The epithets are chosen and grouped in accordance with the case form in which the noun/name is to appear and the metrical position it is to occupy. It is precisely this kind of formula to which therigorousdistinction between'form'(ulila)and 'essential idea' best ap­ plies. The distinction between 'formula' and 'essential idea' has important con­ sequences for the semantics of the formula as Parry defines it. Owing to the presence of ornamental, purely formal material, the meaning of the formula can be conceived of in dualist terms. It can be defined without reference to the form(ula) itself. It is important to realize that this is different in ordinary lan­ guage. In ordinary language, form and meaning are distinct too, of course, but they cannot be so easily separated as Parry does with his formulas in the Kunstsprache. Very often, the 'idea' which a given expression expresses, whether it is essential or not, is not separable from that expression itself. Ac­ cordingly, the meaning of a given expression cannot easily be defined without reference to the form of that expression. Now, it might seem that Parry's distinction between 'meaning' and 'form', which is absent in the ordinary language, at least to that high degree, constitutes the delimitation of the formula with regard to what is non-formular. However, this is not so. The separation of form and meaning applies by no means to all the phrases that have been called 'formulas', by Parry himself and others. This means that Parry's definition of 'formula' does not apply to all the cases to which

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it is meant to apply. The implication, in a wider perspective, of this is that we may ask whether the Kunstsprache to which the noun-epithet formula belongs, is really so all-pervasive a feature of Homeric poetry as we are led to believe. Beside the noun-epithet formula polutlas dios Odysseus and cases like ex. (1) above, Parry gives another example of a formula and its essential idea (1971: 14): (2)

ton d' aute proseeipe "and to him spoke."

According to Parry, the essential idea of this formula is 'said to him', just as 'Odysseus' is the essential idea of polutlas dios Odysseus. But there is a dif­ ference between the two. We cannot possibly explain the formular status of ex. (2) on the basis of its being the expression of an 'essential idea', for in doing this, we characterize in the last resort everything as a formula. The essential idea of (2) is (2) itself. Like any other natural language expression, (2) cannot be dissociated from its 'essential idea', viz. its meaning. Yet, in spite of its being different from noun-epithet formulas like polutlas dios Odysseus in that its meaning cannot be separated from its form, (2) is no less a formula than a noun-epithet expression. Together with a noun-epithet formula, it forms wholly stereotyped, formulaic Hnes: being a so-called T1-formula (a phrase filling the first half of the line, before the trochaic caesura), it can be complemented (both in a metrical and in a syntactic sense) by phrases like polutlas dios Odysseus, which belong to the T2-formulas, filling the slot be­ tween the trochaic caesura and the end of the line. It follows, then, that as regards semantics we may distinguish two kinds of formula: the formula whose meaning is distinct from its form and the formula 12

whose meaning is not. Parry's definition is primarily based upon the first kind, of which the noun-epithet formulas are the prototypical examples. The noun (name)-epithet formula is characterized by what will be called henceforth redundant semantics: the element that constitutes the divergence of form and meaning, viz. the epithet, is redundant from a semantic and pragmatic point of view in that it is unnecessary for the identification of the hero in question.13 In 5.2 I will deal with phenomena that should be studied in connection with the redundant semantics of the noun-epithet formula. Noun-epithet expressions are the best examples of what is commonly known as the Homeric formula. But it is important to emphasize that their for­ mular status is not due to some inherent property: the mere addition of an epithet to a name does not yield a formula. The addition must also be function-

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ally motivated. The functionality of noun-epithet formulas is that they conform to a consistent pattern which greatly facilitates oral composition and perfor­ mance. This applies equally to the second kind of formula, which is not charac­ terized by the redundant semantics of the noun-epithet formula. Thus, when it comes to defining the concept of formula, the account in terms of an "essen­ tial idea", which is left "after all stylistic superfluity" has been removed, loses its determinative force. Parry was the first to discover the functional motivation for the presence of formulas in Homer. Yet he did not carry this discovery to its logical con­ clusion. In treating phrases as formulas because of what they are or mean, Parry (and those working in the line of research he instigated) missed a chance to arrive at an account of the formular use of language which is plausible from a linguistic point of view. Instead of being qualitatively different (by some in­ herent property) from ordinary language phrases, formulas are what they are because of the way in which they are used. Thus I adoptafunctional framework for the study of formulas; in Parry's approach, on the other hand, the notion of formula is a category, rather than a function.15 The relation between formular language (or language containing for­ mulas) and ordinary language,16 has received much less attention than the other aspects of the formula, viz. its metrical dimension and its being a repeated phrase (see the following subsections). The reason of this seems to be that the formula has been mostly studied, within an exclusively oral-formulaic framework, as a phenomenon sui generis which has to be accounted for. The question as to what a formula is has amounted in practice to the problem how to define the formula qua most characteristic feature of the diction. Accord­ ingly, the question whether the oral formula has any connections with what is outside the formulaic diction, viz. with ordinary language, has not often been asked.17 In the present chapter I shall try to illustrate on the basis of the expres­ sion-type 'participle + per9 what it means for an expression to function as a 'formula'. In other words, I shall discuss the consequences of the fact that 'par­ ticiple + per' as a modally autonomous, syntactically independent, and hence optional constituent, is useful for the poet as a formula. This opens the way for a different approach to the Homeric formula: to start from ordinary language and see in what ways an ordinary language expression can be useful in the for­ mulaic diction.

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5.1.2 Formula and metre We now turn to the metrical dimension of formulas. The metrical aspect of Homeric formulas is connected with the subject of the next (5.1.3) subsec­ tion, recurrence. According to Parry's definition, a formula is "an expression which is regularly used under the same metrical conditions." The 'sameness' of the 'metrical conditions' obviously implies recurrence. Apart from this, metre is in itself a kind of recurrence. But the subject of the present subsection is in­ timately connected with the previous subsection, too, since the distinction be­ tween formulas whose meaning is distinct from their form and formulas whose meaning is not, has a metrical implication. When one works within the framework of the Kunstsprache, the metrical dimension of formulas comes as a matter of course. The presence of many ar­ tificial and dialectal forms is ultimately due to the influence of the verse, as Witte (1913) and Meister (1921) and others before them have shown. In the case of the noun-epithet formulas, we may say that metrical form is often the identity of the formula, in that it motivates the addition of the epithet: an epithet is added to a noun or name so as to fill a given slot in the hexameter; if the name of a particular god or hero is to occupy another slot and/or is to ap­ pear in another case form, another epithet is selected accordingly. Thus, in the choice of the epithet, the semantically redundant element, the poet is heavily constrained by the metrical structure of the verse. In the case of the second kind of formula distinguished in 5.1.1, where form and meaning are not so distinct (see ex. (2)), metre is an important fac­ tor, too. But here it is not so much a factor by which the poet is constrained in the addition or omission of semantically redundant material. Rather, we have to conceive of the rhythmical form of a phraselike(2) as a necessary condition for its being used in the metrical space of the dactylic hexameter. The phrase in (2) can be used as a formula on account of its metrical form; it has an ap­ propriate length and the kind of rhythmical characteristics that make it a use­ ful phrase for the dactylic hexameter. But it does not contain elements whose existence is solely due to the influence of the verse. There is no question of its being adapted to the exigencies of the verse in any way; it merely satisfies those exigencies. Necessary conditions are always negative. When we say that an ap­ propriate rhythmical shape is a necessary condition for the use of a given phrase in the metrical space of the dactylic hexameter, this means that that phrase could not possibly have been used in the hexameter (whether or not function­ ing as a formula) if it did not have the appropriate rhythmical shape. But rhyth-

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mical appropriateness does not in itself entail formularity; in other words, it is by no means a sufficient condition for formularity. The participial phrase akhnumenos (teiromenos, hiemenos) per, for example, has a very apt rhythmi­ cal form: it can be conveniently used to fill the slot between the so-called 'bucolic diaeresis' (see 5.2.1.1 below) and the end of the line, functioning as a closing cadence (clausula).19 But this fact alone does not make of akhnumenos per a formula. Again, we have to discard a context-independent property of a given phrase as the reason why the phrase is formular. In the previous section, this was 'meaning'; in the present one it is the metrical form of a phrase and the place it occupies in the verse. Metre is not an active structuring principle, deter­ mining the actual form of phrases and formulas. Rather, we have to say that the poet constantly adjusts his choice of words and phrases to the metrical pos­ sibilities. Even in the case of the noun-epithet formulas, where it is metre that seems to determine which epithet has to be used, it is the poet who adapts the phrase to the metrical possibilities. His choice of the epithet is constrained in systematic ways, and this is precisely the basis of the functionality of the nounepithet formular system.20 5.1.3 Types of recurrence 'Repetition' is an important aspect of the Homeric style, and it has played a major role in the controversies about how to define the formula. There is more than one kind of repetition. Repetition may involve the exact, verbatim recurrence of a given phrase, but it may also involve the recurrence of a rhyth­ mical pattern. These two possibilities may be seen as the extremes of a con­ tinuum, in which repetitions may be ordered by degree of linguistic sameness. This continuum ranges from minimal linguistic sameness (mere metrical repetition) to maximal linguistic sameness (verbatim repetition). In between, we may localize repetitions with linguistic sameness on the level of category ('parts of speech'). From the discussion of the metrical aspect of formulas in the previous subsection, it follows that mere metrical repetition, the recurrence of rhythmical patterns, cannot, and should not be considered the specific property of for­ mularity. If mere metrical repetition is considered to be formulaic, then every­ thing, both in Homer and in later hexameter poets is a formula, simply because in these poets everything is metrical. Metrical repetition without reference to formulas has been the subject of a well-known study in Greek hexameter metrics, O'Neill (1942). O'Neill showed that there are severe constraints on

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the placing of words (regardless of their meaning and seen purely as metrical word-types), especially the longer ones, in the metrical space of the Greek hexameter. O'Neill's data reveal that often there are only one or two pos­ sibilities to localize' a given word in the verse. As O'Neill was exclusively con­ cerned with the presentation of the data involved, it was left to others (e.g. Beekes 1972) to 'interpret' and explain his data. Further on (5.2.1), I will discuss O'Neill's findings in metrical localization in more detail. For the moment, I am more concerned with the kind of repeti­ tion that involves linguistic sameness. When one starts the discussion of for­ mulas with verbatim repeated phrases and allows the definition of 'formula' to cover more than those phrases, one has to introduce the notion of substitution. In this approach, one part of a phrase, filling a given metrical slot, is seen as a variable whereas the rest of the phrase is treated as a constant. This was the step taken by Parry after his two principal French theses. The classic example of substitution (1971:313) is aphrase filling the metrical space after the bucolic diaeresis (a so-called 'bucolic clausula'): (3) alge' ethêke: - ⋃ ⋃ - ⋃ ("brought sorrows") Here we may substitute for the noun (alge(a)) another noun of the same metri­ cal form and take the verb as a constant: (4)

kudos ethêke ("brought renown")

Or we may, conversely, take the verb as variable and substitute another verb for it: (5)

alge'edôke ("gave sorrows")

This substitution system can be characterized as the combination of verbatim repetition (the constant) with repetition on the level of category (the variable). Parry limited his conception of 'formula' to this level of linguistic sameness. But he showed the way for a more general treatment, in stating (1971: 313), among other things, that teukhe kunessi, a bucoUc clausula from one of the opening lines of the Iliad, is "like" dôken hetairôi. This amounted to allowing substitution with two variables and repetition wholly on the level of category. But Parry went another step further, in contending that "often one finds the

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same verse-pattern where the words are different" (1971: 313). Parry did not actually call the following two lines two instances of one and the same formula, (6)

nouson ana straton orse kakên, olekonto de laoi "He inflicted a deadly plague on the army, and the men died" (Il. 1, 10). paida d' emoi lusaitephilên, ta d' apoina dekhesthai "Release my daughter and accept this ransom" (. 1, 20),

but he is near to it. The repetition in (6) approaches the level of minimal lin­ guistic sameness and I find it difficult to conceive of any functional motiva­ tion for it. Just as in the case of the two lines in (6), Parry did not go as far as to call teukhe kunessi and dôken hetairôi two instances of one and the same formula. This step was left for others to make. Once it was made, the concept of 'struc­ tural formula' came into being (Russo 1963, 1966), in which the border-line between the formulaic and the non-formulaic in the continuum between mere metrical repetition and verbatim repetition was situated at the point where we may speak of repetition (and hence identity) in category. Thus the phrases in (3)-(5) would be instances of the following structural formula (N = 'noun', V = Verb'): (7)

N V 12 - ⋃ | ⋃ - -,

whereas Parry's pair teukhe kunessi and dôken hetairôi would be two instances of a structural formula in which the two parts of speech are reversed: (8)

V N 12 -⋃| ⋃ —

Another structural formula which Russo identified was a word-pattern consisting of a middle participle placed at the beginning of the line, filling the first foot and a half. According to Russo (1963:242), this is the ultimate, unify­ ing, reality behind cases like (9) oulomenên, he muri'Akhaiois alge' ethêke "the fatal (wrath) which brought the Achaeans many sorrows" (Il.1, 2) 24 akhnumenos: meneos de mega phrenes amphi melainai "(Agamemnon leapt up.) His heart was seething with black passion" (Il.. 1,103)

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This conception of the formula, where the essence of 'formula'liesin the simul­ taneous recurrence both on the level of metrics and on the level of category, has provoked considerable reaction (see Hainsworth 1964, Minton 1965, Hoekstra 1965:14-6). There were two main objections to the concept. First, in the conceptionof'structuralformula', the definition of formula, it was thought, is watered down to the point of vacuoussness: how are we to distinguish be­ tween the formulaic and the non-formulaic when we allow such a large amount of unpredictable variability?25 Second, the kind of phrase-patterns to which the concept of structural formula applies are not so much characteristic of Homeric poetry specifically, as of Greek hexametric poetry in general. Thus, on Russo's account of the formula, we would be unable to differentiate between Homeric poetry and unequivocally literate poetry, whereas such a differentiation should have the very concept of formula as its basis. This controversy is obviously relevant for the present study. Instances of the expression-type 'participle + pef placed at the end of the verse clearly have all the characteristics of what Russo calls a structural formula: they involve recurrence both on the level of metrics ('bucoHc clausula') and on the level of category ('participle + pef). As regards localization and 'structural formularity', the scalar-concessive akhnumenos per as a clausula at the end of the line can without more ado be compared to the non-scalar akhnumenos functioning as an instance of Russo's choriambic (word-type - u u - ) middle participle placed at the beginning of the line (see (9) above. Hoekstra (1965:15,25) argued that single words are not to be called for­ mulas, on the grounds that if they are, the concept of formula loses all its ap­ plicability. If this ban upon the one-word formula is justified, then akhnumenos per is not to be called a formula. In Hoekstra's account it is simply the product of metrical localization, and as such wholly devoid of formular interest. The same would apply to the scalar-concessive participial phrases of other metrical shapes; we would have to do with word-types, not with formulas. In the next two sections (5.2 and 5.3) I shall argue that Hoekstra's fear of the one-word formula is, generally speaking, unnecessary. To my mind, the number of words, one, two or more, of which a phrase consists, is immaterial for that phrase being or not being a formula. Formularity does not depend on such a formal, context-independent property. And participles of one and the same word-type (whether or not accompaniedbyper)that are placed in a fixed slot of the hexameter are, in Homer, definitely more than just a case of localiza­ tion.

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But this does not mean that Russo's concept of 'structural formula' is heal­ thy and free of problems. It seems to me that the objections against Russo's concept were entirely justified in so far as Russo contended (1963: 240) that his localized word-category-types are in themselves formulaic. In doing this, he weakened his position considerably, for what is in itself formulaic is no less formulaic when a Hellenistic pen poet writes it than when the supposedly oral Homer uses it. The inherently formulaic is in the last resort formulaic independently of the medium for which it makes sense to speak in terms of formulas at all, viz. oral-formulaic poetry. Clearly, Russo's structural formula is an extension of the kind of approach in which formulas, or what are considered to be formulas, are studied as to their frequency and recurrence, in an entirely non-functional, mechanical way. Parry himself had instigated this kind of approach, in his wellknown formulaic analysis of the first 25 lines of the Iliad and the Odyssey (1971: 301 ff.), in which he studied the recurrence of formulas and formulaic phrases on various levels, see (3)-(6) above. In the previous subsections I argued that it is not the case that formulas are formulas solely because of their meaning or their metrical form. This claim may now be repeated in connection with recurrence and Russo's structural for­ mula. A participle like akhnumenos placed at the beginning of the Une or akhnumenos per placed at the end is not a formula solely by virtue of the fact that it is a participle conforming to a consistent localization pattern. It is a for­ mula because it is used as a formula. The recurrence and the localization are 28

simply consequences of that use; they do not in themselves constitute it. In considering certain phrase-patterns as in themselves formulaic, Russo studied the phenomenon from the outside, so to speak. If a phrase is to be called formulaic ór a formula, its repetition has to be functional. The repetition of a phrase or phrase-pattern can only be conceived of as an index of the formularity of that phrase(-pattern) when we may speak of a recurrent and systematized use which facilitates, and is in function of, the rapid and easyfillingof the metri­ cal space of the hexameter with words and phrases which are meant to perform a narrative function.29 Russo's structural formulas should be assessed on the basis of the functionality criterium, and denied formular status if they do not serve this end in any unequivocal and perceivable way. In the previous subsections (5.1.1 and 5.1.2) I made a distinction between formulas whose meaning is characterized by 'redundant semantics' and whose form is an adaptation on the part of the poet to the exigencies of the hexameter, on the one hand, and formulas which do not in themselves differ from ordinary

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language expression, on the other hand. The structural formula as discussed by Russo obviously belongs to the second kind. The analysis in terms of substitu­ tion in one or more variable slots, on which the concept of structural formula rests, can be applied, too, to ordinary language. In ordinary language we may conceive of, for example, the subject position in a sentence or the focus con­ stituent of a scalar particle as a variable for which, within a given set of selec­ tion restrictions, alternatives may be substituted. This mechanism differs not qualitatively from substitution in a structural formula, as exemplified by exx. (3)-(5).30 Recurrence is the common denominator of both kinds of formula. And in both cases it is a consequence and an index of the usefulness of a given phrase as a formula. In the following two sections, I discuss 'participle + per' in con­ nection with the two kinds, respectively. In 5.2 I discuss 'participle + pef in connection with 'redundant semantics' and the noun-epithet formula. Here we will have an instance of an expression whose form is adapted by the poet in sys­ tematic ways to the exigencies of the hexameter. And in 5.31 discuss 'participle + pef as an ordinary language expression. Here we will deal with what may happen when an ordinary language expression(-type) is useful as a formula. 5.2 Formulas and form: the localization of formulas In this section I discuss the rhythmical form of the various instances of 'participle + per', and the place which they occupy in the verse. This discus­ sion involves a digression into metrics. Its upshot will be the explanation of the distribution of kai and other particles in the participial phrase, as well as an in­ sight in Homeric versification and the role of 'participle + pef therein. Speaking in terms of types of recurrence (see 5.1.3 above), the kind of repetition which is involved in the case of 'participle + per' is repetition on the level of category. The great majority of the instances of 'participle + pef can be divided into a number of 'structural formulas', in which per is the constant and the participle (or, in the case of analytic participles: the adjective) the vari­ able. The discussion of 'participle + pef in connection with metrics is a confir­ mation of the statement that if repetition is to be functional (viz. have formular interest), it should not involve too less linguistic sameness (i.e. be too abstract). In 5.2.2 below, I shall show that the instances of 'participle + pef form what might be called a formular system. The functionality of this system in the dic­ tion depends on the linguistic identity of the phrases that constitute the system. A given instance of 'participle + pef, which fills a rhythmically salient part of

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the verse in a standardized manner, may have the same rhythmical properties as an instance of an entirely different expression-type, but this does not mean that the two phrases are to be called one and the same formula (see also 5.1.2). Nor do the two phrases belong to one and the same formula-system. Mere metrical similarity is not enough for formular similarity. Formular sameness is always concomitant with some kind of linguistic sameness. The usefulness of the formula-system 'participle + per' for easy and smooth versification is greatly enhanced by the linguistic properties of 'par­ ticiple + per9. The syntactically detached status of 'participle + per' (consider the prototypical properties of independence and modal autonomy), leads to a very flexible formula-system, because 'participle + per9 is always optional. Any instance can be easily suppressed whenever the metrical space is preferably to be filled with other words. Conversely, 'participle + per9 can be without dif­ ficulties added to a given sentence even when this addition is unnecessary and strictly speaking 'redundant'. In the following section (5.3), I will discuss the semantic aspects of the redundance which is the consequence of automatic formular use (see 5.3.2). In the present one I am concerned with the metrical and rhythmical aspects of the formular use of 'participle + per9. But before these aspects can be discussed, it is useful to provide their metrical background. 5.2.1 The dactylic hexameter In O'Neill (1942: 105), a distinction is made between the 'outer metric' and the 'inner metric' of the dactylic hexameter. The outer metrical features of the hexameter are that it consists of six feet. The dactyHc foot consists of three syllables: 'long + double short'. The alternative realization of the foot is the spondee, in which the double short element is replaced by a long element (two syllables: 'long + long'). Thus the distribution of spondees over the verse is an outer metrical affair. The 'outer metrical' facts of the hexameter constitute what may be called the metric profile of the verse (see van Raalte 1986: 29). Inner metric, on the other hand, involves the words in the verse and the ways in which the metrical space is filled by the word-types of which the words are instances. Here we are in the domain of caesuras (places where word end is obligatory or desired) and 'bridges' (places where word end is forbidden or avoided). The 'inner metric' of the hexameter is what may be called the rhyth­ mical structure of the verse. In the present study we are concerned with the rhythmical structure of the hexameter and the rules and tendencies obtaining there.

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AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

In studying a representative sample of hexameter lines of poets from Homer down to the Alexandrians, O'Neill (1942) showed that throughout the history of the Greek hexameter there are severe constraints upon the localiza­ tion of word-types, especially the longer ones, in the metrical space. In order to unequivocally tabulate the quantitative data associated with his research, O'Neill devised a reference system (which has become standard), in which each metrical position is assigned a number. This system yields the following scheme of the metric profile of the hexameter: (10) 1 1.5 2 3 3.5 4 5 5.5 6 7 7.5 8 9 9.5 10 11 12 -⋃ ⋃ -⋃ ⋃ -⋃ ⋃ -⋃ ⋃ -⋃ ⋃ - ⋃

Using this scheme as a point of reference, we can present the localization of, for example, the word-type⋃-⋃⋃-as follows (see O'Neill's table 20, 1942: 146): it occurs ( = ends in) in the Iliad 28.3% in position 5, and 67.5% in pos. 9. For the Odyssey thesefiguresare even complementary (23.5% and 76.5%, respectively), the word-type occurring nowhere else in the sample. O'Neills quantitative research yieldsfigureswhich are in themselves valu­ able and important, but it suffers from two major deficiencies. First, as he him­ self admits (1942:106), O'Neill does notexplain his data, and second, the notion of 'word', the ultimate object of localization, is more elusive than appears from O'Neill's treatment. Both deficiencies are of importance for the discussion of the localization of 'participle + per' presented below (5.2.2); the two follow­ ing subsections (5.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2) deal with them. 5.2.1.1 Rules and tendencies O'Neill's localizationfiguresacquire real significance only when they are seen as the consequence of the rules and tendencies that constitute the rhyth­ mical structure of the hexameter. In Beekes (1972), these rules and tendencies have been described. This description has yielded an interpretation of O'Neill's data, thereby providing what seems an adequate explanation of the localization of word-types in the metrical space of the hexameter. Beekes argues that all word-types are localized according to a limited set of metrical rules and tendencies. He presented these rules as follows: (11) 1) Word end is (near-)obUgatory at either 5 or 5.5 (main caesura: 'penthemimeres' (henceforth: 'P') and trochaic caesura ('P')). 2) Word end is desired at 8 (bucoHc diaeresis). 3) Word end is forbidden at 7.5 (Hermann's bridge).

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4) Word end is avoided at 3.5 and 4 after a long final syllable (Meyer's First Law). 5) Word end after a long final syllable in 8 is strongly avoided and forbidden after a longfinalsyllable in 10. 6) Word end is avoided at 11. On the basis of these rules we may now present the scheme of the rhythmical structure of the hexameter (whereby '|' denotes obligatory word end (caesura), '|' denotes desired word end, and'∩' denotes forbidden or avoided word end (bridge): (12) The obligatory word end at either 5 or 5.5 (rule 1) is the caesura, the most im­ portant structuring element in the verse. The rationale behind the caesura seems to be that a verse of the length of the dactylic hexameter is too long to be perceived (and composed) at a stretch. The caesura structurally divides the verse into two, in such a way that (i) the second half of the verse is somewhat larger than the first, (ii) the caesura does not fall between two feet (metra) but within a foot (the third one), and (iii) the rhythmical beginnings of the two cola are different: the first colon begins in a falling manner (beginning with a metrically marked element), whereas the second colon begins in a rising man­ ner (see Van Raalte (1986: 70)). This threefold asymmetry contributes to the unity and coherence of the verse as a whole. In the case of rule 2, we are dealing with what is commonly called the b' uli diaeresis'. This phenomenon may be described as a desired (rather than obligatory) word end at 8 (i.e. after the fourth foot, which is realized as a dactyl). Beekes (1972: 4) argues that the bucolic diaeresis must be seen as a tendency resulting from the desire to end the verse in a truly dactylic manner. The coincidence of foot end with word end is avoided throughout the verse for metrical reasons (except at the beginning and the end of the verse: pos. 2 and 10), but at 8 it is desired for the same reasons. It produces a rhythmically pleas­ ing closing cadence, which was termed above (5.1.2) the  clausula'. The bridges at 3.5 and 7.5 (rules 3 and 4) may be explained in close con­ nection with the diaeresis. Word end at 3.5 was avoided because it would in­ volve in many cases a repetition of the clausula (-uu-u) of the line before, which would produce a monotonous and unaesthetic effect. As for Hermann's bridge, word end at 7.5 is ill compatible with the diaeresis: word end both at 7.5 and at 8 necessitates the occurrence of a monosyllable in 8, which is not

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easily realizable. And when the diaeresis is absent, word end at 7.5 would sug­ gest, as Beekes notes, a 'false start' at the end of the verse (in comparison with the right new start of the diaeresis). Moreover, as Van Raalte (1986: 98) notes, word end at 7.5 would involve the close (and hence unattractive) repetition of the rhythmical effect of the trochaic caesura in the third foot:⋃-⋃|5.5⋃- ⋃7.5. The rationale behind rule 5 seems to be the desire to avoid the suggestion of verse end. Any word end after a spondaic (bisyllabic) foot produces a verse end effect, which becomes stronger, and hence more to be avoided, near the end of the verse. This explains that word end at 10 is downright forbidden, whereas at 8 it is merely strongly avoided (see also van Raalte 1986: 99,102). Rule 6 means in practice that a verse preferably does not end with a monosyllabic word. This minor (in comparison with rules 1-5) rule is not without importance for the present studyasper is often placed at the end of the line. More discussion of this is better in place in the following subsection (5.2.1.2). A full picture of the bridges and preferred or obligatory word ends in the hexameter comprises mention of the frequent word end at position 2, and espe­ cially at 3 and 7. These word ends have no place in Beekes' set of rules, because, according to Beekes, they have no direct rhythmical significance. Beekes (1972: 3) contends that the fact that often 7 (and 3) are the place of syntactic breaks in the verse does not imply that these places have a structuring function from a metrical point of view. However, they are not wholly devoid of metrical in­ terest. When the main caesura is absent, or only realized in a 'suboptimal' way, word end at 3 and 7 tends to gain in significance, both from a rhythmical and from a syntactic point of view. See further below. 5.2.1.2 On the notion of 'word-type' The above account of the structure of the hexameter may suffice to cope with the first deficiency of O'Neill's approach, the lack of an explanatory foun­ dation. We now go on to discuss a second disadvantage of his method. In quantifying the occurrence and localization of word-types, it is useful to have maximum clarity on the notion of 'word'; in other words, we have to know what it is that we are counting. There are two points at which this ques­ tion becomes urgent, one of which is formulaic in nature and the other linguis­ tic. The latter is recognized by O'Neill, the former is not. To begin with the former, sometimes a particular word is so firmly em­ bedded in a stereotyped word-group ('formula') that the word-type to which it belongs has little importance in comparison with the 'word-type' formed by the

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formula as a whole. The result is that the localization of this particular wordtoken may differ sharply from the localization of the word-type found by O'Neill. Hoekstra (1965:22-4) gives some examples of this phenomenon. The word isotheos ('godlike') occurs exclusively at 11, thereby violating Beekes' rule 6, whereas the preferred positions of the metrical word-type to which it belongs (-⋃⋃-) are at 3 (verse-initial position) and 5 (before the penthemimeral caesura). The explanation of the divergence is that isotheos exclusively occurs in collocation with phôs ('man') to form a formula which is exclusively local­ ized at 12 (isotheos phôs making a bucolic clausula). The localization of the word-string (formula) as a whole evidently takes precedence over the localiza­ tion of its constitutive parts (the - u u - - word-type occurs in 12 and nowhere else). 34 Thus, in O'Neill's approach the distributional constraints upon particular words which are due to formular language use are left out of account. The metrical word-types studied by O'Neill may comprise more than one word. Once this is recognized, the localizational pattern of word-types in the hexameter will turn out to be even more exceptionless than appears from O'Neill's tables.36 The second respect in which words may not be what they seem to be in­ volves the presence of enclitic, phonetically less discrete words which may be mentioned under the general heading 'prepositives and postpositives'. Here O'Neill does have a declared policy, but it turns out to be the wrong one. O'Neill invariably treats postpositives as metrically separate from the words to which they adhere. This decision is made on the strength of lines as the following (1942: 109): (13) oikad' ion sun nêusi te sêis kai sois hetaroisi "Going home with your ships and your comrades." (. 1,179). (14) êdê gar kai deuro pot' êluthe dios Odusseus "For once Odysseus has been here." (Il.3,205). The enclitics here {te in (13) andpot'(e) in (14)), when they are taken together with the preceding word, form a dactylic word ( -⋃⋃)which fills the third foot. As this word-type is never localized this way (i.e. occurring in 6 and thus bridg­ ing the caesura), O'Neill concludes that te and pote, and hence postpositive encUtics in general, have to be treated as phonetically discrete and rhythmical­ ly independent words. However, (13) and (14) are by no means equivalent, and, hence, the class of enclitics is not uniform.

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O'Neill's policy seems to be right in the case of (14) and similar examples. To treat deûo and pot'(e) as two separate words, thereby recognizing a realiza­ tion of the T-caesura (albeit a 'sub-optimal' one), is a plausible account. In (13), on the other hand, the situation is different. The bond, both semantic and prosodic, between te and the preceding word is much stronger than in the case ofpoteand other particles (cf. Lat. -que). Accordingly, I have no difficulty with denying (13) a caesura, or with admitting only a very weakly realized one. The absence of the caesura in (13) is not so exceptional as O'Neill claims. Actually, this verse conforms to a pattern which O'Neill does not recognize as such. When the caesura is either absent or weakly realized, word end at 3 and 7 tends to gain in rhythmical significance, yielding three rhythmical cola of in­ creasing length. These cola tend to coincide with the syntactic cola of which the verse consists. This is what happens in the case of (13): this verse has a tripar­ tite syntactic structure ('going home | with your ships | and your comrades') which coincides with a tripartite rhythmical structure: (15) - ⋃ ⋃ -

|⋃⋃-⋃⋃-

|⋃⋃-⋃⋃--

Hexameters of this type are called in Kirk (1985:20) 'rising threefolders'. They play some role in the localization-pattern of 'participle + per'. Further discus­ sion below (5.2.2 sub Π Bl)). Thus we see that the notion of 'word' within the framework of the inner metric of the Homeric hexameter is elusive in two respects. Metrical wordtypes as the correct object of study and quantification may consist of more than one 'word', both in the case of stereotyped word-groups and in the case of postpositives. This critique of O'Neill's method is highly relevant for the present study, for per is an enclitic and 'participle + per' is used as a formula consisting of two or more 'words'. The bond between per and the preceding participle or adjective is so strong that 'participle + per' should without more ado be considered one word. Once this decision is made, it is obvious that the divergence from O'Neill's findings will be striking, for 'participle + pef makes a word-type which is entirely different from 'participle alone'. The participle akhnumenos provides adequate illustration of this point. Akhnumenos is an instance of word-type - u u - , which, according to O'Neill's table 15 (1942: 144) is preferably placed, in the Iliad, in position 3 (42%) or 5 (37%). 18% of the cases is located in position 9 and only 13 % in position 11. 40 Now, there are 27 instances of akhnumenos and its inflected forms in the Iliad. Of these only 3 ( = 11%) occur in position 3; 5 ( = 18.5%) occur in position 5, whereas 6 instances ( = 22%) occur in position 9 and no less than 13 instances

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( = 48%) occur in 1141. Thus, where akhnumenos should be frequent accord­ ing to O'Neill's table it is relatively infrequent, and, conversely, where it should be infrequent it is very frequent. The reason of this divergence, which is reminiscent of Hoekstra's examples (see above), is that most instances of akhnumenos should not be quantified under word-type - u u - but under another word-type, on account of the scalar-concessive combination akhnumenos per. 5.2.2 The localization of 'participle + per' The main factor deternining the place which a given word occupies in the metrical space of the hexameter is the metrical word-type to which it belongs. This factor is a negative, rather than a positive one. Word-type merely deter­ mines where a word cannot occur, so that the localization behavior of the word amounts to the sum of the remaining possibilities. When we move to more con­ crete levels of repetition, in which the degree of linguistic sameness is higher (for instance repetion on the level of category, as in the case of the structural formula, see 5.1.3 above), localization may be due to positive factors. For ex­ ample, a (single) participle of the form -⋃⋃ - may be preferably placed at the beginning of the line (position 3) precisely because it is a participle. Word-type as a negative localizational factor is not confined to Homeric oral-formulaic poetry; it is indeed a characteristic of all poetry composed in a verse with a demanding structure. In Homer, the localization of formulas is often (negatively) determined by the word-type to which the formula as a whole belongs. These are the formulas that do not differ from ordinary linguistic ex­ pressions and whose rhythmical form is not adapted in any way to the exigen­ cies of the hexameter line (see 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 above). However, the Homeric poet is not wholly at the mercy of the word-types he uses. He may at times actively change the word-type to which a given for­ mula belongs, in order to use the formula in more than one position in the verse. Here the word-type factor may be seen as a positive rather than a nega­ tive one. The poet deliberately alters the word-type of a given formula so as to make it fit into a desired slot in the verse. Accordingly, the resulting new 'metri­ cal word' is localized the way it is because of the word-type to which it belongs. The deliberate altering of the word-type to which a given formula belongs involves addition and deletion of word-type-changing material. As the object of modification is the form of the formula in question and not its meaning, the material added or deleted should leave the meaning or content of the formula unchanged as far as possible. This involves the concept of 'redundant

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semantics'. As has been stated, the best-known and best described example here is the noun-epithet formula. Odysseus, for instance, is called 'noble', 'many-counselled', 'much-suffering' and 'sprung from Zeus' purely in accord­ ance with the metrical position which the name is to occupy (see Parry 1971: 39). The descriptive content of the epithets is subservient to localization pur­ poses.43 We now go on to discuss the localization of 'participle + per' in the hexameter. The issue at stake here is, among other things, the distribution of the particles kai and, to a somewhat lesser degree, mala and empêsin the par­ ticipial phrase. I will show that these particles are very consistently used in order to (i) adapt the form of participial phrases to the exigencies of the hexameter, and (ii) make rhythmically untractable combinations of 'participle/adjective + pef fit into the metric profile of the verse. Kai, mala and empês thus constitute an important case of the typically formular 'redundant semantics'. Just as the epithet in noun-epithet formulas, their use is in service of automatic and smooth versification. This means that the proper meaning of the particles in the language is subservient to this purpose. Thus, in many cases it does not make sense to look for a justification of a given instance of kai in the usual terms of 'strengthening', for the occurrence or non-occurrence of the particle is decided on entirely different grounds. I shall have occasion to show that what applies to kai, mala and empês applies to less regularly occurring elements in the par­ ticipial phrase as well. The meaning of epithets in noun-epithet formular systems has to be in ac­ cordance with the character of the hero in question. Otherwise the epithet can­ not properly perform its automatic, word-type changing function. The same applies to the particles in the participial phrase when we view them from the point of view of 'redundant semantics'. Their meaning has to be 'compatible' with that ofper if they are to perform their versifying function with any success. Since in ordinary language the occurrence of the particles in question in par­ ticipial phrases has to be stated in terms of strengthening, this 'compatibility' comes as a matter of course. Kai is an inclusive focus particle ('also', 'even'), whose affinities with scalarity and concession need no further comment anymore. And mala ('very') is in ordinary language a very natural strengthener of the superlativeness of the scalar-concessive 'participle + per' Thus, we may say that in using kai and mala for versifying, word-type changing purposes, epic diction aptly exploits the normal semantic possibilities of these particles. As for empês ('anyway'), this particle properly belongs to the main clause, rather than to the participial phrase. Its occurrence has somewhat more semantic conse-

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quences than that of kai and mala, and in ordinary language its use cannot be characterized in terms of strengthening. See further below (sub I.B1), I.B2)). In the presentation below of the localization of 'participle + per', the word-type of the participle or adjective/substantive in question is taken as the starting-point each time. The basic word-type is normally automatically ex­ tended with a short syllable ( = per) in the case of 'participle' (i.e. synthetic par­ ticiples), and with ⋃⋃- (per eon) or⋃⋃-⋃(per eontos l-ti etc.) in the case of 'adjective' or 'substantive' (i.e. analytic participles). I start with the first group. I. Synthetic participles A. Middle participles Middle participles are always inflected as o-stem nouns. Consequently, inflection here does not result in a change in the word-type formed by the phrase as a whole.45 Al) Word-type-⋃⋃- . The most common localization here is at verse end, as a bucolic clausula. This is the formular use of 'participle + per9 recognized by Parry (1971: 311-12): (16) -⋃⋃-⋃⋃-⋃⋃-⋃⋃8akhnumenos per hiemenos per outamenoi per teiromenos per kêdomenon per ollumenoi per essumenos per khôomenos per When the participle has an initial vowel, it is never preceded by kai. This constraint on the distribution of kai has an easy metrical explanation, just as the positive occurrence of the particle elsewhere: kai, being shortened by the initial vowel ('epic correption'), extends the metrical length of the participial phrase by a short syllable. The word-type which would result from this lengthening (⋃-⋃⋃- - ) cannot be placed at the end of the verse, because it would result in word end in 7.5, i.e. violation of Hermann's Law (see rule 3 in (11) above). Kai before a consonant, on the other hand, is unobjectionable; it yields the word-type — ⋃ ⋃ — (for example, kai kêdomenon per), which can be conveniently placed after 7.

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The localization of word-type -⋃⋃- - at the end of the verse allows, in­ terestingly, for the substitution of a monosyllabic substantive, kêr ('heart') for per. This substitution occurs in the case of the two participles in the Hst of (16) which denote emotions, akhnumenos ('grieved') and khôomenos ('angry'). Kêr functions as a semantically redundant 'accusative of respect' ('grieved/angry in his heart'). 46 It is obvious that this substitution possibility greatly augments the formular usefulness of the localization of akhnumenos/khôomenos (..) at verse end: whenever a scalar-concessive reading is out of place, one simply uses akhnumenos kêr, thereby eliminating the meaning of per but retaining its sound. The second common localization of the akhnumenos per word-and for­ mula-type is at 9.5: (17) -⋃⋃-⋃⋃-⋃|⋃ 6akhnumenos per9.5⋃ — essumenos per outamenoi per There are 13 instances of this localization-type (8 times akhnumenos per), all of which begin, significantly, with a vowel. Of these 13 instances, no less than 12 are preceded by kai. Within the metrical framework, this constant occur­ rence explains itself: akhnumenos per as localized in (17) leaves a short syllable after the trochaic caesura. This short syllable can be very conveniently occupied by kai, which in lengthening the basic word-type to⋃-⋃⋃- yields the wordtype which is discussed under A2) below (⋃-⋃⋃-⋃). Thus, just as the inser­ tion of kai before akhnumenos per in 12 is forbidden on metrical grounds, so it is highly preferable, if not mandatory, in case of the localization in 9.5, equal­ ly on metrical grounds. The composite word-type exemplified by kai akhnumenos per localized in 9.5 leaves open⋃— as metrical space at the end of the line. This space is often, characteristically, occupied by a word which may be conceived of as an argu­ ment of the participle seen as a predicate (in 4.3.2.3 we saw that adjectival cir­ cumstantial participles like akhnumenos may be seen as equivalent to the predicate of an ascriptive sentence). Good examples of this phenomenon are kai akhnumenos per hetairou ('though grieved about his comrade'),48 and in the case of essumenos per. kai essumenos per hodoio/Arêos ('though eager for the road/battle'). Another formular and stereotyped filling of the⋃— final slot is anagkei ('perforce'). This adverbial element,50 which syntactically belongs to the main clause, is compatible with the scalar-concessive meaning

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of the participle: one has to do something while being forced by the circumstan­ ces. So one does the thing, grieved as one is. An example: (18) - ⋃ ⋃ Argeioi de kai akhnumenoi per anankêi nêôn êmunonto. "And grieved though they were, the Argives were compelled to fight for their very ships." (Il. 12,178). Cf. . 14,128; 15,133. Only in two cases, interestingly in close proximity of one another (Od. 4, 549,553), is the slot between 9.5 and 12 occupied by a verbal form which con­ tinues the syntax of the sentence. The reason for the preferred filling of the final ⋃— slot is obvious: by filling it with anagkêi or a stereotyped argument of the participle, one acquires one long scalar-concessive phrase running from the trochaic caesura to the end of the line. Such a phrase is highly convenient in a formulaic diction in that it makes a useful T2-expression. The poet localizing akhnumenos per in 9.5 need not worry about the remaining open metrical space at the end of the line. The third possible localization of akhnumenos per and its type is in 5.5, just before the trochaic caesura: (19) - ⋃⋃ 2akhnumenos per5.5 ⋃-⋃⋃-⋃⋃ - teiromenoi per essumenon per Here there is, for once, no compelling metrical reason for either the presence or the absence of kai before an initial vowel: word end ( = word beginning) in 2 is slightly preferred to word end in 1.5, but the difference is not significant. Consequently, kai just may or may not occur in this case of localization. More important and more interesting in the present connection, however, is the fol­ lowing. Localization in 5.5 leaves the metrical space of a dactyl ( - u u ) open at the beginning of the line. This is exactly the space needed for the collocation of kai and mala. Before an initial consonant this collocation may be convenient­ ly inserted. This is what happens in the following example: (20) hêmeis men Danaoisi makhesometh', authi menontes kai mala teiromenoi per, anagkaiê gar epeigel "We will stand our ground and fight the Danaans here, exhausted as we are - we have no choice in the matter." (Il. 6, 85). We have here a fine example of deliberate localization and redundant seman­ tics: out of the ordinary language expression teiromenoiper,which is preferab-

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ly used as a bucolic clausula, is made, by means of the combination kai mala, an entire Τι-expression which fills the first part of the line.51 But the epic poet can go even further. Consider: (21) (Odysseus to his host Alcinous: 'please let me eat my supper, for nothing is so shameful as a man's stomach:)' -⋃⋃hê ekeleusen heo mnêsasthai anagkêi kai mala teiromenon, kai eni phresi penthos ekhonta "(However afflicted he may be and sick at heart), it calls for attention so loudly that he is bound to obey it." {Od 7,218). The mini-scale distributional pattern of per in (20) and (21) can be explained within the framework of localization. The participial phrase without per in (21) has the same meaning as the participial phrase with per in (20). The difference is formular and localizational. In composing the line Od, 7,218, the phrase kai mala teiromenon per as a pre-caesural (T1-) expression was of no avail to the poet, as the caesura in the verse in question was to be realized as P. So he simp­ ly skipped per, changing a Τι-phrase into a Pi-phrase. We have here the ul­ timate example of the extent of the influence of localization and versification: the central semantic element in the whole, per, is made subservient to the fluc­ tuation between Ρ and Τ caesuras, which is, in its turn, frequently put to for­ mular ends.52 Thus we see that by a process of systematic deletion and addition of particles, a poet may make a Τι-formula out of a bucolic clausula, and a Piformula out of a Τι-formula. Even per itself is made subservient to the phenomenon of redundant semantics. A2) Word-type ⋃-⋃⋃-. This is the second basic word-type we discuss. Localization in 12 is impossible, because of Hermann's Bridge (see rule 3 in (11) above), the same reason why kai was impossible in (16). So the remaining localizations are 9.5 and 5.5: (22) - ⋃ ⋃ - ⋃ ⋃ - ⋃ | 5.5sepeigomenos p9.5⋃ — lilaiomenon per oïomenos per himeiromenos per (23)) - ⋃ 1.5epeigomenên per5.5 |⋃-⋃⋃-⋃⋃ — This word-type and localization-pattern does not, and need not, involve the use of word-type changing particles. The present word-type localized in 9.5 is in all respects equivalent to akhnumenos per and its type localized in 9.5 and

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preceded by kai (see (17) above). Epeigomenos occupies the metrical slot to which (kai) essumenos has been adapted. In the case of essumenos, too, the remaining slot (⋃--) at the end of the Hne is filled by either anankêi or argu­ ments of the participle. Epeigomenos per (hodoio/Arêos) and kai essumenos per (hodoio/Arêos) are simply the prosodic complements of one another, the one beginning with a vowel and the other with a consonant. The lexical difference is subordinate to the formular use which is made of the phrases. A3) Word-types⋃⋃- uu and--⋃⋃.These word-types, which are formed by middle perfect participles, are different from the two previous ones ( -⋃⋃and⋃-⋃⋃- ) in that they end in a pendant (dactylic) manner, i.e. on a double short, metrically unmarked element. This has consequences for the use of per in connection with this participial word-type, for per cannot be placed after the participle: its initial consonant would cause the final syllable of the participle to be long by position. This is impossible, for single-short sequences ('cretics': -⋃- ) cannot occur in the hexameter. So per has to be placed before the par­ ticiple. But per, as an enclitic, has to stand after something. Here mala has its role; it serves as a phonetic substrate for per. This results in the following localizations (either in 8 or in 10): (24) - ⋃⋃ - 3mala per kekholômenons - ⋃⋃ - kekhrêmenos (25) -⋃⋃-⋃⋃- smala per kekholômenoso - In the case of (24), kai may be added ad libitum, yielding a rhythmically con­ venient congestion of particles (kai mala per), see Od. 14,155. This collocation is once (Il. 1, 217) separated from the participle by a semantically empty sub­ stantive (thumôi 'in his heart') which is equivalent in meaning and function to kêr in akhnumenos kêr (see above). The result is an extended participial phrase running from the beginning of the line to the bucolic diaeresis: (26) kai mala per thumôi kekholômenon 8 - ⋃ ⋃ - "However much you are angry in your heart." In the case of (25), which occurs only once, the remaining final slot after 10 (-) is filled by an intensifying adverb, ainôs ('terribly'), which makes out of the localization in 10 a P2-expression.55

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. Active participles B1) Word-type or This is by far the most common wordtype in the case of active synthetic participles. In the case of a short final syll­ able the participle stands in an oblique case or it is a plural form or a nominative feminine (khateousa, memaôtal-ti, phileonte). In the case of a long final syllable the participle is a nominative masculine {meneainôn, skopiazôn). In the second case per cannot be placed after the participle, for this would yield the sequence ('antispast'), which is impossible in the metric profile of the hexameter. The metrical solution which is called for is, just as in the case of A3) just above, the insertion of mala per before the par­ ticiple. This yields a 100% localization in 12:56 (27)

7malaper

skopiazôn12 meneainôn

In the first case ( u u - u ) , on the other hand, there are two strategies: a) Mala per before the participle, just as in (27). This yields the localiza­ tion possibilities 12 (as in (27)) and 9.5: (28)

7mala

per

memaôta12 memaôti memaôtas khateousa

(29)

5mala

per

memaotas.5 memaôti rhupoônta khateousi

In the case of (29), the final open slot is reminiscent of type A2) above (word-type in 9.5). Here, too, it is filled by material which remains within the scope of the participial phrase,57yielding one long participial phrase running from the P-caesura to the end of the line. Compare the perfect forms of memaôta/-ti/-tas in (28) with meneainôn in (27). The aspectual difference is obviously made subservient to the flection of the participial phrase within one and the same metrical slot. There is a third possible localization of the type in question. The insertion of kai before mala per, resulting in a collocation which is familiar by now (see (26) above), makes a T1-formula:

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179

(30) kai mala per phileonte5.5 b) The second strategy to handle the word-type consists in 'per + empês' after the participle instead of mala per before it. Localization is 100% in 12: (31)

7pinonta

per empês12 khateonti khateousi

The memaôta-forms of (28) do not occur here. The forms of khateô ('need'), on the other hand, occur in both localization patterns. The fact that two metri­ cally and prosodically equivalent phrases (mala perkhateontin12and khateonti per empê 1 2 ) exist side by side, as well as the fact that memaôti can only be sub­ stituted in the first case, may be explained by the fact that there is a semantic difference between mala and empês. Mala is superlative and is, accordingly, ill compatible with participles which do not allow of superlativeness. Empês, on the other hand, is concessive. Furthermore, mala properly belongs to the par­ ticipial phrase, whereas empês belongs to the main clause, just like anankêi above. This difference in meaning seems to adequately account for the exist­ ence of two rhythmically and semantically equivalent formulas at the same time. 60 B2) Word-type...] i.e. word-types ending as the previous one, but longer (beginning earlier in the verse). Here per empês after the participle is the standard. The result of localization in 12 is always a T2 or P2-expression. Sometimes kai is inserted to fill the remaining space between the beginning of the participial phrase and the P-caesura: (32)

5.5epikrateousi per empês apekhthomenoisi 5oligêpeleousa 5kai tethnêôta

II. Analytic participles Classification here is based upon the word-type of the adjective or sub­ stantive. The treatment per basic word-type has to be divided into two, accord­ ing to the case ending of the participle eon: in the case of nominative singular we have a rhythmical sequence ending on...] (...]per eon), and in the case of all other cases we have...] (...] per eontos etc.). The latter is potential-

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

ly ideal for localization in 12 or 5.5 before the T-caesura, whereas the former is not. A) Adjectives of word-type A1) per eon). Localization of analytic participles of this word-type in 7 ( = beginning in 3.5) would involve a violation of Meyer's First Law (see rule 4 in (11) above) and is therefore precluded. Hence localization either in 5 or 9: (33) (34)

1.5geron

per eon 5.5ligus per eon9 thoos gerôn

Notice that in these localization patterns the word endafterper occurs in a posi­ tion where it is normally avoided: 3.5 in (33) (Meyer's First Law) and 7.5 in (34) (Hermann's Bridge). That these metrical rules are consistently violated is an index of the coherence of the participial phrase: apparently the participle eon was not felt as a phonetically discrete word. Thus word end in 3.5 and 7.5 at the boundary of the participial phrase is consistently avoided, while within the participial phrase it is consistently allowed. Localization in 9, as in (34), leaves open at the end of the line. This slot is invariably occupied by a substantive belonging to the participial phrase, turning the adjective from an adjectival predicate into an adjective modifying a substantival predicate. In the caseofligus,we haveliguspereôn agorêtês ('shrill speaker') and in the case of thoos and gerôn we have thoos/gerôn per eon polemistês ('nimble/ old warrior').64 The substantival extension yields a participial phrase with the convenient length of a T2-expression. A2) per eontos). Localization at verse end (12) is metrical­ ly objectionable as the participial phrase would begin in 7.5, thereby violating Hermann's bridge (see rule 3 above). Hence localization in 5.5 and 9.5, analogously to the non-oblique version in la). Notice that there is the same seeming violation of a metrical rule as in (33) and (34) (word end in 3.5 and 7.5): (35)

1.5lithos per ernen per eousan nothon per eonta

eousa5.5

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181

megan per philon (36)

neon per eonta nekun per

Participial phrases of the basic word-type are never preceded by kai. The reason is clear: in case of localization in 9/9.5 the phrase begins at the trochaic caesura, which simply precludes kai, and in the case of localization in 5/5.5 km can only occur before an initial vowel (otherwise a hexametrically impossible 'cretic' would result: ). But the adjectives in (33) and (35) begin with a consonant (except emên in (35)). The eon/eontos-fluctuation does not result in two separate localizations of the phrase, as both 5/5.5 and 9/9.5 are normal places for word end. This is different in the following word-types. B) Adjectives of word-type B1) per eon). The most common localization by far is in 7, the phrase starting in 3: (37)

3athos per gumnosl-on khlôros zôos krateros eurus kuneos autos kseinos

eôn7

This localization-type, which divides the verse into three, should be discussed in connection with the tripartite hexameter discussed above (see (15) in 5.2.1.2 above), the participial phrase occupying the second colon bridging the caesura. Now I do not want to suggest that the hexameters exemplified by (37) do not have a caesura at all; actually they have one, between per and eon. But we have just seen (in (33)-(36)) that 'word-boundary' between per and eon is not very strong. Accordingly, the caesura in the cases exemplified by (37) is certainly not strong ('prototypical') either. Furthermore, the combined rhythmical and syntactic importance of positions 3 and 7 in the hexameters exemplified by (37) is strongly reminiscent of the 'rising threefolder' The rising three-fold struc­ ture seems to be the right (rhythmical) explanation for the near absence of kai

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

before the participial phrases exemplified by (37): the addition of kai makes a dactylic ( = falling) beginning of the participial phrase which spoils the rising rhythmical movement. There are two instances of localization of the adjectival word-type in 5. It goes almost without saying that the remaining open position at the beginning of the Une is filled by kai: (38) kai krateros per eons pezos B2) per eontos). This is the inflected pendant of the word-type just discussed. It cannot begin in 3, as in (37): its end would fall in 7.5 with a serious violation of Hermann's Law. The preferred localization is 12, after 7: (39)

7alokhôi

per kranaes polees pollôn deinon pleonas kraterô pinutê

eousêi -ses eontes -ton -ta -tas -te eousa

Kai never precedes here, no doubt because it would leave too little open space between the caesura and the beginning of the phrase to be workable from the point of view of versification (see also the localization of C2) below). However, in the case of the second localization possibility of the type in ques­ tion, 5.5, before T, kai invariably precedes, making out of the phrases ex­ emplified in (39) a Τι-expression (for this principle compare (28) and (30) above): g(40) kai nekuos per eontos5.5.5 hiketên -ta pêôi -ti khalepon -ta polioi -tes

PARTICIPLES Π: FORMULAS AND METRICS

183

Note that the instances exemplified by (40) may also be treated as the in­ flected form of the cases under (38): the eôn/eontos-alternance neatly exploits the fluctuation between the P- and Τ caesura (see also (20) and (21) above). C) Adjectives of word-type C1) (41)

per eôn). Localization in 7, always: 2allodapos per kheiroteros hoploteros

eôn7

Kai just may or may not precede here, as there is no compelling reason why the phrase should begin in 2 rather than in 1.5 or vice versa (see also on (19), the localization of akhnumenos per in 5.5). C2) per eontos). Localization either in 5.5 or in 12. In the first case the phrase is a ready-made T1-expression: (42) pauroterous per eontass.5 khruseiê eousa toksophorôi -sêi ôkutaton eonta In the second case (localization at verse end), the poet only needs to put kai before an initial vowel to get a T2-expression; kai always occurs: (43)

5.5kai iphthimôi per eonti -mon -ta orkhêstên ouk agathon

D) Adjectives of longer word-types: Dl) (44)

and

per eôn). Localization in 7: 1smesaipolios

per

eôn7

D2) per eontos). Localization always in 12, yield­ ing either a T2- or a P2-expression: (45)

5.5epistamenôpereonti minunthadion -ta

184

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER sdouriktetenper eousan

Kai naturally does not occur here; the caesura precludes any expansion of the phrase. E) Adjectives of word-type

and

These word-types can be taken together. They differ sharply from the pre­ vious ones A) through D). They either are or end dactylic, ending on a metri­ cally non-marked element, while the word-types just discussed and ) end on a metrically marked element. In the case of these word-types, the direct additionofpereônleontos guarantees a smooth rhythmi­ cal continuation. In the case of and on the other hand, it does not: it would yield a sequence of no less than four short syllables, which is impos­ sible in the hexameter. The solution is the insertion of mal'(a) between per and eonta, which makes of per a syllable which is metrically long by position:per mal' eonta. Only oblique forms occur; localization is always in 12: (46)

eurea per mal' eonta

(47)

epiphrona per mal' eonta apênea

Kai may do much good here: in (46) it is virtually obligatory, as the metrical space between the beginning of the phrase and the caesura is too insignificant to be used for anything else. In the case of (47), we have a ready-made T2-expression. The addition of kai may, if need be, enlarge the phrase to the length of a P2-expression. This is the case in ex. (43) in 4.4.1 {kai epiphrona per maV eonta). Notice that the insertion ofper mal' before an adjective is sometimes, too, the apposite strategy in the case of scalar superlatives in a non-factual context (see 3.1.1), for example poluphrona per mal' aeisai (Od. 14,464). The final slot ( ) which is occupied by eontos/-ta in (46)-(47) is here occupied by another element which continues the syntax of the sentence. We may say that from the point of view of the versification of scalar superlatives, the participial form eon­ tosl-ta is an element belonging to the formular system: when there is no final word of the form available, the poet can always resort to eontosl-ta, there­ by turning his scalar superlative into a circumstantial participial phrase with the form of a T2-expression. In 4.4.1 above I have shown that this is linguistically possible.

PARTICIPLES II: FORMULAS AND METRICS

185

F) Adjectives of word-type This word-type ends in a trochaic manner. Just as in the case of the pre­ vious word-type, per eontos cannot be added without more ado; this time it would result in the sequence of three short syllables (tribrachys). The strategy of the previous word-type is metrically objectionable, as per mal' eontos after would lengthen the final short syllable of the adjective, with the result 12. This word-end in 8 after a spondaic fourth foot is awkward and should be avoided (see rule 5 in (11) above). A rhythmically much more pleasant solution is mala per before the adjective: (48)

- mala per polumuthon eonta poluidrin eousan

The result is a ready-made P2-expression with an internal structure like that of mala per memaôta (makhesthai), see I.B1) a) above with ex. (29). We have now arrived at the end of the discussion of the regular and analogically productive strategies in the localization of 'participle + per9. A few cases remain, which are isolated and/or irregular. They do not conform to a productive pattern. An isolated but recurrent case is the formula kaka per paskhontes localized in 9.5, to be discussed in 5.3.2 below. Comparable are ekhonti per algea thumôi and phugonti per aipun olethron, discussed in 4.3.4. The isolated and unique cases are the following. They are characterized either by manipulation with kai or by a substantive in the phrase, which serves as an argument of the participle: (49) kai per polla pathonta5.5 (Od. 7, 224) (50) skai polla per athlêsanta(Il.15, 30) (51) 5kai kêdea perpepathuiêi (Od. 17, 555) (52) kai tethnéota pers (. 24, 20) (53) 5.5kai en thanatoio per aisêi (Il. 24, 428) (54) spotamoio per ekgegaôti (. 21,185) (55)

1.5kai

ergomenê mala

pr7

Il.

17,571)

Ex. (49) is the only instance of the direct collocation of kai + per in Homer. After Homer it has become the normal expression.

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

The above discussion of the localization of 'participle + per9 has proved that the distribution of kai, mala and empês in participial phrases can be ex­ plained within the framework of the formular system constituted by 'participle + per'. By way of summary, we may distinguish three factors, one for each par­ ticle: 1) A participial phrase may leave open metrical space between its begin­ ning and the caesura or the beginning of the line or another desired word end. Here kai (once in combination with mala: see exx. (20)-(21)) is inserted. Its function is backward extension of the participial phrase. 2) A participial phrase may leave open metrical space between its end and the end of the Hne; it needs forward extension. Here empês comes into the pic­ ture, along with some semantically compatible and/or innocuous substantives (anagkêi, hetairou). 3) A basic word-type, either of an adjective or of a synthetic participle, together with per (eontos) may yield a sequence which does not fit into the metric profile of the verse. Here mala has its job; together with per it forms configurations {mala per, per mal*) which make the use of the word-type in question as the basis of a participial phrase possible. As for exx. (49)-(55), these cases are irregular as to their form and inter­ nal structure. As to their meaning they are normal instances of the concessive participial phrase. In being isolated cases which do not conform to any pattern, formulaic or linguistic, they seem to be ad hoc solutions for versification problems encountered by the poet. 5.3 Formulas and meaning: the integration of formulas One of the characteristic features of the formular use of language is that often the need under given circumstances to use a particular phrase (formula), takes precedence over factors that are, in a non-formular context, less favorable to that use. The poet's need to use the phrase is a direct consequence of the usefulness of the phrase as a formula, viz. as a standardized 'buiding-block'. The degree to which a formula fits into its context I state in terms of integra­ tion. When dealing with the integration of a formula, or the degree to which it is integrated, we compare fully integrated instances of the formula to imper­ fectly integrated ones. Accordingly, in terms of the levels of recurrence dis­ cussed in 5.1.3 above, we are concerned here with the verbatim repetition of formulas.

PARTICIPLES Π: FORMULAS AND METRICS

187

5.3.1 Levels of integration The integration of formulas has a number of different aspects. In other words, a formula may be less than perfectly integrated in more than one way, on various levels. One of these levels is phonetics and prosody. Here, too, Parry has done pioneering work. In his second French thesis (1928b), he showed that hiatus in Homer (the direct contact between word-final and word-initial vowels, which is avoided in all Greek poetry and cultivated prose) as well as other metrical irregularities, are not due to some set of 'rules', on account of which the irregularity was allowed in some places of the hexameter and 'illicit' in others. Nor did hiatus occur because it was allowed anyway in Homer, in con­ trast with later authors. Parry showed that hiatus and brevis in longo (a prosodically short syllable in a metrically long position) was due to, and a consequence of, the modifica­ tion and juxtaposition of formulas.68 'Modification' is an internal change in the formula,flexion,for instance, which may cause hiatus. It is with 'juxtaposition' that we are here mainly concerned. Juxtaposition may cause a case of hiatus or brevis in longo between two formulas. Juxtaposition thus involves the use which is made of formulas within a given context, and it should, accordingly, be discussed in connection with the degree of integration of a formula in its con­ text. Two examples are sufficient to illustrate the less than perfect phonetic in­ tegration of a formula in its context (both are given by Parry, 1971: 203; 215): (56) entha kathezet' epeita Odussêos philos huios "And there the son of Odysseus sat down." (Od. 16,48). There is hiatus between the final vowel of epeita and the initial vowel of Odussêos. This is because Odussêos philos huios, a standard T2-formula for Telemachus (its natural locus being between the trochaic caesura of the third foot and the end of the line, see 5.2.1.1) is used in a phonetic context in which it does not reallyfit.It occurs in a context which is ideally suited for a formula of the same metrical shape but beginning with a consonant. Such a formula oc­ curs in (57) entha kathezet' epeita polutlas dios Odusseus. "And there the noble and stalwart Odysseus sat down" (Od. 19,102). Here the noun-epithet formula isfitting,and the phonetic continuity of the verse ('synhaphea') is not interrupted, as in (56).

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

In the second example there is brevis in longo before a P2-formula (locus between the penthemimeral caesura and the end of the Une, see 5.2.1.1). The formula has already been cited, in 4.4.1: (58) tosson apo ptolios hosson te gegône boêsas "Within call of the city" [lit: "so far away from the city as he [unspec] can make himself audible by crying"]. (Od. 6,294). The hosson te gegôneboêsas-formulahas to be preceded by a naturally long syll­ able if it is to be fuUy integrated from the point of view of phonetics and prosody. This is the case in (59) all' hote tosson apên hosson te gegône boêsas "But when he had come within caU of the shore." (Od. 5,400). The metrical and prosodical irregularities in (56) and (58) should not be treated as legitimate' in any way. Rather, they are inevitable. The poet com­ posing ex. (56) or (58) did not, in allowing the metrical irregularity, exploit some license or suffer from a sudden lapse of concentration; his need to use this par­ ticular P2/T2-formula in this particular context simply took precedence over his constant desire to avoid hiatus and brevis in longo and to produce metrically and prosodically perfect hexameters. The result is a formula which is not fully integrated in its metrical and prosodic environment. But in oral performance and composition this is a thing one has to live with. An entirely different kind of integration involves the appropriateness of a phrase in a given context as to its content. Here metrics and prosody do not play a role in the less than perfect integration. What matters is that what the formula says is not (entirely) in accordance with the context. The context here is not to be conceived of as a phonetic continuum in which a phonetic discon­ tinuity ('hiatus') has to be aUowed, but as a stretch of discourse in which what is said is adequate and relevant. Imperfect integration on this level involves in­ formation that is less appropriate in the context, but which is nonetheless given because it is part of a formula. The phenomenon has been caUed in Combellack (1965) the 'formular illogicaUty'. Combellack's best example of the phenomenon (1965: 53) is the one cited here. In book 11 of the Odyssey, the everlasting punishment of Tantalus is described. Tantalus stands in a pond with the water to his lips. Whenever he stoops to drink, the water recedes and vanishes in the ground. Over his head fruit is hanging, which is blown away whenever he reaches for it. The fruit is described as follows:

PARTICIPLES Π: FORMULAS AND METRICS

189

(60) onkhnai kai rhoiai kai mêleai aglaokarpoi sukeai te glukerai kai elaiai têlethoôsai "Pears and pomegranates, glossy apples, sweet figs and flourishing olives." {Od. 11, 589-90). One might want to argue that Homer did not know that olives on the tree are unedible, just as one might want to argue that hiatus is allowed in Greek epic poetry. But a better way to account for the olives, which are irrelevant in the context of (60), is treating the two hexameters as a standard formular enumera­ tion of 'fruit', whose integration in the context is less than perfect because one of the kinds of fruit is out of place in the context. The same enumeration can be found elsewhere in the Odyssey (7, 115-6), where the description of a gar­ den provides a suitable environment. The need to use this standard formular enumeration of fruit trees has proved stronger than the desire to achieve fac­ tual correctness. 5.3.2 Prototypicality and the semantic integration of formulas In the previous subsection I discussed two possible consequences of the formular use of a phrase. On the level of phonetics and prosody, the less than perfect integration of a formula results in a discontinuity of the 'synhaphea' (phonetic continuity) of the verse. On the level of content, it results in a less relevant piece of information in a given context. In the present subsection, we are concerned with the level of integration that Hes in between, the level of semantics. In 5.11 proposed a functional approach to the Homeric formula. I argued that phrases function as formulas when they are conducive to the poet's filling the metrical space of the hexameter in a systematic way. Phrases are not to be called formulas because of what they are but because of what their function is. Accordingly, there is no qualitative difference between formular and non-formular language use. The implication of this account of the formula is that the degree of semantic integration of a formula has to be stated in normal linguis­ tic terms. It is Prototype Theory, introduced in 1.4, that provides the terminol­ ogy here. When a formula is used under the conditions (pragmatic and/or syntactico-semantic) for which it was originally devised, we may say that it is a per­ fectly integrated formula. In linguistic terms, this means that it is a prototypical instance of the phrase in question. A fully integrated formula is a phrase which is used in accordance with the semantic potential it possesses. And a phrase

190

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

that is used in accordance with its semantic potential has all the prototypical properties of the expression-type to which it belongs. Now, in Homer, phrases may be less than prototypical (or even peripheral), precisely because they are used as formulas. The usefulness of a given phrase as a standard building-block in the versification may imply its being used under semantically less than op­ timal circumstances. The formular approach to less than prototypical instances of a given expression-type focuses on how the phrase in question comes to be used, whereas in the linguistic approach we merely describe it by confronting it with the more prototypical instances. The joint operation of prototypicality/peripherality and semantic for­ mular integration seems to be the right approach to a number of less than prototypical instances of 'participle + per'. In the following two examples, the analysis of Hiemenosper in a formular framework accounts for the less than prototypical status of the phrase. In being only implicitly concessive, the par­ ticipial phrases are reminiscent of exx. (35)-(37) in 4.3.4 above: (61) (The Trojan Cleitus is shot by Teucer:) takha d'autôi êlthe kakon, to hoi ou tis erukaken hiemenôn per "His punishment was swift, and one from which no zealous friend could save him." (Il.. 15,450 = 17,292). (62) (A formular line from the Odyssey:) αll' Oduseus kateruke kai eskhethen hiemenô/ên/on/ous per "But Odysseus held them/her/us back and checked their/her/our impetuous movement." (Od. 4,284; 16,430; 21,129; 22,409). The participial phrases in these examples are far from prototypical. In (61), the participial phrase has to be taken as a so-called 'partitive genitive' to ou tis: 'no one out of those who were zealous (could save him)'. The usual concessive mean­ ing of the participle is, of course, not far away, as appears from the paraphrase 'His friends could not save him, however much they wanted to do so'. This paraphrase will have had considerable 'psychological' reality (see 4.3.4) in the poet's mind. But the actual wording, in which 'participle + pef plays, like all partitive constituents, a restrictive role, is very unusual. The restrictive parti­ tive function is very different from the normal detached status of 'participle + per'. The participial phrase in (62) is equally peripheral from the point of view of the semantics of 'participle + pef. The concession Hes, of course, in the fact that the people in question, who are held back by Odysseus, are unable to per-

PARTICIPLES Π: FORMULAS AND METRICS

191

form some action in spite of their eagerness. However, the participial phrase can only have its normal scalar-concessive function when the main clause to which it is attached is expressed as a passive sentence without an overt agent: 'They were restrained in their movement, in spite of their eagerness'. But the main clause as it is expressed in (62) is transitive; it refers to a state of affairs with a clear agent: 'Odysseus held them back'. And with respect to this active sentence, the concessive participial phrase cannot have its usual detached status: the paraphrase 'Odysseus held them back and checked them, (and he did so) in spite of their eagerness' is not the intended meaning of (62). Now one could stop the discussion here, at the point were we can say that the concession in (61)-(62) is only implicit, (61)-(62) simply being peripheral instances of their kind. But it is possible, I think, to go further and explain why the participles in (61)-(62) are used at all. Hiemenos per placed at the end of the line, as a 'bucolic clausula' (see 5.2.1.1), conforms to the very common localization pattern discussed in 5.2.2 sub LA1. This pattern clearly has for­ mular (functional) interest, as it enables the poet to fill a rhythmically sig­ nificant part of the hexameter in an automatic way. The usefulness of 'participle + pef is further enhanced by the fact that, as an optional constituent, it may be omitted without more ado, when the metrical space after the bucolic diaeresis is to be filled with other linguistic material. The formular usefulness sufficiently accounts for the less than prototypi­ cal status of the participles in (61)-(62). In these examples, it was more impor­ tant for the poet to use hiemenosperanyway than to use it in its proper function, as an instance of 'participle + per', viz. to add salience to the main clause. Hiemenos per in (61)-(62) does not add salience to its main clause. The suffi­ cient condition for its use is its usefulness as a formula, and the necessary con­ dition is the fact that there is after all concession present in the context, albeit implicit and 'psychological'. I conclude the discussion of (61)-(62) with two examples in which the reasons to use hiemenos per as a formula coincide with the reasons to use it as an instance of 'participle + per', Consequently, both instances are perfectly in­ tegrated formulas and at the same time prototypical instances of their expres­ sion-type: (63) (From the proem to the Odyssey:) all' oud' hôs hetarous errusato, hiemenos per "But he failed to save his comrades, in spite of all his efforts." (Od. 1,6).

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER (64) (From the description of the battle over Patroclus' body:) ôsan deproteroi Trôes helikôpas Akhaious nekron de prolipontes, hupetresan,, oude tin' autôn Trôes huperthumoi helon egkhesin hiemenoi per. "At first the Trojans flung back the bright-eyed Achaeans, who abandoned the corpse and gave ground before them. Even so the haughty Trojans did not succeed in killing any of them with their spears, for all the pains they took." (R 17, 276).

As the second example of the imperfect semantic integration of formulas, I give one of the examples of modal embeddedness that was already discussed in 4.3.4 above: (65) mê de houtôs, agathos per eên, theoeikel'Akhilleu klepte noôi, epei ou pareleuseai oude me peiseis "Do not imagine, although you are a great man, that you can trick me into that. I am not going to be cajoled by you." (Il..1,131). The description of this and similar examples as less than prototypical instances of the expression-type 'participle + per' was presented in 4.3.4 above. We now discuss the phrase as a less than perfectly integrated formula. For a full under­ standing of (65), we have to notice that agathos per eon occurs elsewhere in book 1 of the Iliad and that the whole line occurs in book 19. Consider: (66) (Nestor to Agamemnon:) mête su tond', agathos per eôn apohaireo kourên all' ea, hôs hoi prôta dosan geras huies Akhaiôn. "Agamemnon, forget the privilege of your rank, and do not rob him of the girl." (R. 1,275). (67) (Odysseus to Achilles, when the latter has shown too much eagerness for fighting:) mê de houtôs, agathos per eôn, theoeikel'Akhilleu nêstias otrune protiIlihuias Akhaiôn Trôsi makhêsomenous. "Most worshipful Achilles, the men have not breakfasted, and gallant as your are yourself, you must not order them to march on Troy and fling them like this at the enemy." (R. 19,155). These two examples have in common with (65) that they are dissuasions.72 They differ, however, from (65) in the felicity conditions of the dissuasive speech

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act.73 In (66) and (67), the dissuaded activity is something which is exclusively attainable for men of high rank, and the addressees clearly belong to this rank. In (65), on the other hand, the addressee does belong to to the high rank, but the activity in question is not particularly something for which one has to be powerful. Everyone is able to cheat, regardless of power and esteem. Now, this difference in speech act situation corresponds with a difference in the concession of 'participle + per'. In (66) and (67), the opposition Hes be­ tween the power of the addressee to perform the dissuaded act and the dis­ suasion itself. As commander-in-chief, Agamemnon has, of all persons, the power to deprive Achilles of his girl. And his being commander-in-chief is in­ timately connected with his being agathos. Thus, we may say that qua agathos he has the power to take away the girl. This is reflected in the request, in which the qualification agathos appears as a concessive modifier: 'do not, in spite of your being agathos, take away the girl. Likewise, in (67) the dissuasion is addressed to someone who is in a posi­ tion to do what is dissuaded. Being the best warrior of the Greeks, Achilles, too, is agathos par excellence, and he has a right to urge the Greeks on to fight under any circumstances. Accordingly, in the request to Achilles not to with­ hold the soldiers their breakfast, the being agathos occurs as a concessive ele­ ment. In (65), on the other hand, the opposition, which is the basis for a concessive element, is not between the power of the addressee to perform the dissuaded act and the dissuasion itself, but between the nature of the dissuaded act and the moral and social stature of the addressee, which is something very different. Within the scalar-concessive framework of the previous chapter, agathos pereôn as it is used in (66)-(67) is prototypical. It is an analytic participial phrase with an adjective allowing of superlativeness (see 4.3.2.1); furthermore, in being concessive with respect to the request as a whole, it is syntactically inde­ pendent and modally autonomous. To this characterization, we may now add that agathos per eon as used in (66)-(67) is a perfectly integrated formula. We may even say that it is a formula in two senses of the word. First, agathos per eon conforms to a consistent and functional localization pattern. The localiza­ tion of the phrase between positions 3 and 7 and the concomitant tri-partite structure of the verse (see 5.2.1.2 and 5.2.2 sub Π. B1)) provide a sufficient rhythmical basis for the functioning of agathos per eôn as a formula. But at the same time, agathos per eôn in (66)-(67) is a formula in a less technical sense of the word. It is used as a stereotyped politeness formula which typically occurs in requests to people of high rank.76 Scalarleper'has its full force

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

in this formula. It underlines the remarkable nature of the request: to dissuade an illustrious person from something which Hes in his power does not come as a matter of course. All this is very different in (65). The command here is not a polite request, but an angry reaction to Achilles' immediately preceding words ("Admittedly, there can be no immediate compensation for the loss of the girl, but we will compensate you fourfold in the future"). This is an entire­ ly different speech act, one in which poHteness formulas are out of place. My conclusion is that agathos per eon in (65) is a less than perfectly in­ tegrated formula. Being devised originaHy as a poHteness formula, it is less fitting when there is no question of poHteness. The formular usefulness of the stereotyped introduction of requests directed to persons of high rank has been a sufficient condition for the use of agathos per eon in the context of (65). But the less than perfect integration does not imply that agathos per eon is mean­ ingless or not in accordance with the context. The meaning of phrases is just as gradient an affair as the integration of the formulas they constitute. And the less than perfectly integrated status of agathosper eôn as a formula corresponds with a less than prototypical status of the phrase as an instance of the expres­ sion-type 'participle + per'. I give one other example of semantic formular integration. In Odysseus' narrative to the Phaeaceans of his adventures (books 9-12 of the Odyssey), the phrase kaka per paskhontes ('though suffering hardships') occurs six times. It is three times complemented in metrical space by hetairoi ('comrades'). The P2-formula  per paskhontes hetairoi is typically used when Odysseus ad­ dresses his men, in combination with the P1-formula keklute meu muthôn ('listen to my words'). The specific rhetorical function of the concessive participial phrase in the address is to convey that what wffl be said is unpleasant for the men in their sorry state, but that it has nevertheless to be said. This is the case in the following example: (68) (Odysseus and his men have just escaped the horrors of Scylla and Charybdis. They are now in sight of the island of Hyperion the Son-god. Odysseus then remembers the urgent advice of the seer Teiresias to avoid this island. So he has to dissuade his men from disembarking. He addresses them as follows:) keklute meu muthôn, kaka per paskhontes hetairoi "Friends, Hsten to my words, in spite of your hardships." (Od. 12, 271).

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195

The formula kaka per paskhontes may be characterized as fully integrated; its concessive meaning is appropriate, in view of the fact that what Odysseus has to say is very unpleasant, for the men are very eager to disembark. The opposi­ tion which Ues at the basis of the use of per is thus between the sorry state of the addressees and the request itself. Now the same line recurs somewhat later in the narrative (Od 12, 340). In the meantime the men, disregarding Odysseus' advice, have disembarked. They have promised not to touch the cattle of HeHos. However, a storm prevents them from sailing further. When they are running out of supplies, Eurylochus, disregarding the warnings, urges his friends to slaughter some of the sacred cows, addressing his friends in the manner of (68). In this address, the kaka per paskhontes-formula is semantically less integrated, for what is said is not something unpleasant, which has nevertheless to be said, in spite of the men being in a sorry state. Instead, the opposition Hes between the men's present troubles and the content of the adhortation: Ί know that you are in bad shape, but now listen to my words, for I have a solution.' This difference in speech act situation seems to be connected with a difference in integration of the kaka per paskhontes hetairoi as a formula, and hence, with a difference in prototypicaHty of the phrase as an instance of 'participle + per.79

NOTESTOCHAPTER 5 1) Parry (1928a; 1928b). Henceforth I will refer to the collected work (Parry 1971). 2) For an overview of the development of Parry's thought, see Hoekstra (1965: 9-15) as well as Visser (1987: 5 ff.). 3) In this definition, "a group of words" replaces the term "an expression" of an earlier version (Parry 1971: 13 = 1928a: 15). This replacement has been approved of by some (cf. Hoekstra 1965:12,25 ("single words are not be called formulae")), but to my mind it is not neces­ sarily an advantage. I see no reason why single words should not be called formulas. See further below, 5.1.3. 4) See for instance ex. (6) in 5.1.3 below. 5) This involves using formulas as one of the criteria of orality tests. Another criterion is the relative absence of enjambment. For orality tests, see Lord (1960), Peabody (1975: 1-9). There has been much critique on the straightforward connection between formularity and orality. See for example Kirk (1966b: 174) and Russo (1976:38-39). The point of these authors is that formularity and literacy are not mutually exclusive. When a text contains formulas, its author evidently has used in some cases one and the same phrase for one and the same purpose, but this need not imply that he is as an oral poet dependent on the recurrence. 6) Of course, this statement comes near to being a platitude. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that in spite of the unanimity on the functionality of formulas in oral poetry, this has had lit­ tle or no impact on the definition of formulas. See further 5.1.1 below. 7) Parry is inconsistent in his use of the term 'idea'. Sometimes the term seems to apply to the meaning of phrases/sentences, but often he uses it to refer to the phrases/sentences them­ selves. 8) Cf. Lord (1960: 65): "From the point of view of usefulness in composition, the formula means its essential idea; that is to say, a noun-epithet formula has the essential idea of its noun." 9) All diachronic and dialectal divergences (see 1.5) from the contemporary linguistic norm could be shown to be functional in that they yield metrically different doublets which great­ ly enhance the fluidity and smoothness of oral composition. 10) That is, the epithet is in function of, and conducive to, the formular system: "the poet was guided in his choice by considerations of versification and in no way by the sense", Parry (1971:149). See also 1971: 305: "The fixed epithet in Homer is purely ornamental. It has been used with its noun until it has become fused with it into what is no more than another metrical form of the name." 11) In general, we may say that the meaning of language can only be conceived of in terms of language. As such 'meaning' is a recursive affair. See Haas (1962) for a philosophical account of this aspect of semantics (p. 212: "What an expression means cannot be found as a separate entity beside the expression."). 12) Almost needless to say, this distinction does not yield two discrete kinds of formula. Again, we have to allow for gradience in the continuum between the kind of formula that differs

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most from ordinary language as regards the form-content dichotomy, and the kind of formula that differs least in this respect. 13) This is not to say that epithets are meaningless. Rather, we have to say that their mean­ ing is subservient to metrical-formulaic purposes. See further 5.2.2 below. 14) 1971: 304: "It is the nature of an expression which makes of it a formula" (emphasis added). 15) See on functions and categories Dik (1978:12-13). Parry uses '(being a) formula' as a one-place predicate: it ascribes an intrinsic, context-independent property to a given phrase. In my approach 'formula' is two-place; it tells something about the relation between a phrase and the context in which it occurs. To my mind, the very reason why there is controversy over the definition of 'formula' is that 'formula' is a function, rather than a category. A definition of a lin­ guistic function should not contain any reference to the expressions that may in principle per­ form that function. 16) Notice that this distinction should not be confused with the distinction between literary (poetical) and ordinary language. Homeric language of course differs sharply from ordinary lan­ guage, but then so does the language of Pindar or Aeschylus. In treating Homeric language as poetic language, we have not yet paid due attention to the specific element which distinguishes it from other poetic language, viz. the formula. 17) A notable exception is Kiparsky (1976). Kiparsky sees the oral formula as the analogon of the bound phrases ('idioms') in ordinary language. Bound phrases are arbitrary collocations of lexemes, whose semantics is 'non-compositional', i.e. the meaning of the collocation cannot be explained on the basis of the meaning of the constitutive parts. Syntactically, bound phrases are either free orfixed.Working on the basis of the distinction of Hainsworth (1968) between flexible and fixed formulas, Kiparsky compares theflexibleformula with the syntactically free collocation and thefixedformula, which can appear only in one single form, with the syntacti­ callyfixedcollocation. On this basis, Kiparsky contends that formular language differs quantita­ tively (more bound phrases) and not qualitatively from ordinary language (1976: 88). This is a very interesting approach, but it fails to explain the specific function of formulas in an oral-for­ mulaic diction. Working in a generativeframework,Kiparsky is characteristically more inter­ ested in 'rules' than in 'function'. 18) See also Visser (1987), where noun-epithet formulas (as well as other formulas and formula-systems) are described as a complex consisting of a constant (the name/noun) and a variable (the epithet). The variable is the element of the formula by which it is adapted to the metrical exigencies at hand. Visser (1987) is an interesting study which came too late to my at­ tention to be of any use in the preparation of this chapter. Visser's approach to the formula, in which 'formula' as a discrete notion (in the Parryan sense of 'ready-made building block') is rejected in favor of an approach in which a distinction is made between the semantic/metrical nucleus of the formula on the one hand and more redundant materialfillingthe surrounding metrical space on the other,is highly congenial with my treatment of 'participle + per' in 5.2.2 below. 19) This was already stated by Parry himself (1971:311-2, in a passage where he provides formulaic parallels for the phrases in thefirstlines of the Odyssey). See further 5.2.2 below. 20) Notice that Parry's definition ("a phrase which is regularly used under the same metrical conditions") has raised the question as to whether it is essential for a given 'formula' to al-

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ways occur in one and the same place in the verse. Elsewhere (1971: 309-10), Parry recognizes the fact that a formula may be placed in more than one place in the hexameter, though he con­ siders it a rare phenomenon. In Ingalls (1979: 89), on the other hand, it is stated that we may speak of one and the same formula in the case of any collocation of words which regularly recurs, regardless of its metrical shape and its position in the hexameter. To my mind, the discussion about whether formulas are metrically 'free' or 'flexible' is bound up with the structuralcategorial approach to the Homeric formula. When one considers it important to delimit 'the formula' with regard to what is not formular, it is also important to know whether or not two identical phrases which are localized in different positions in the verse are instances of one and the same formula. But once we have adopted a functional approach to the formula, the ques­ tion has to be reformulated: is it useful for the poet to have more than one localization for one and the same phrase at his disposal? The multiple localization is formular only when its functionality can be shown. 21) Of course, the repetition in both verses involves the recurrence of an adjective just after the trochaic caesura. As the two lines are only 10 lines apart, there may be 'short-range association' at work in the recurrence of this 'verse-pattern'. 22) In the formular analysis of Homeric passages, Parry, followed by Lord (1960), adopted the practice to mark the verbatim repeated phrases with a solid line, and the repetitions involv­ ing less linguistic sameness with a broken line (1971:301). But later on (1971: 313), just before mentioning ex. (6) as well as the pair teukhe kunessin and dôken hetairôi, he contended that "one could make no greater mistake than to limit the formulaic element to what is underlined." 23) See Russo (1963: 243-5). Many more phrase-patterns have been treated as two-vari­ able formulas functioning as bucolic clausulas, for instance the type constituted by 'adjective + noun': oinopa ponton, aglaa tekna, pioni demôi etc. See also Russo (1966: 239), Notopoulos (1962:356-7). 24) Notice that oulomenên is a participle as to its form; as to its meaning, it is an adjec­ tive. 25) In Hainsworth's often cited words (1964:157): "The vice of the term 'formula' to cover structural features in the epic diction is that unless it is hedged about by more conditions than are visible in the practice of present-day Homeric scholarship the statement that the epics are nine-tenths formulae is likely to be vacuously, and so uselessly, true." 26) Minton (1965:245ff.) has analyzed thefirst1000 lines oftheArgonautica of Apollonius Rhodius (3th century ) in the same way as Russo did with the first 1000 lines of the Iliad (that is, the same sample as O'Neill (1942) had used for his metrical quantifications in both poems), and he claims that theArgonautica "reveals a distribution that is close to, and in some cases al­ most identical with those indicated for Homer." Packard (1976) has probed the Posthomerica of Quintus of Smyrna (Late Antiquity: 5th (?) century AD) for 'structural formulas' and con­ cludes that here, too, there is no clear difference with the Homeric usage of phrase-patterns. To this kind of objection Russo (1963:223-4; 1976:33-4) replied that the practice of literary poets maybe seen as imitation of the early Greek hexameter. Kiparsky (1976:89), however, contends that localization of word-category-types is a tendency of metrical verse in general. 27) See also 1966:227, where the choriambic participle placed at the beginning of the line (see (9) in the text) is characterized as "in itself formulaic, because it plays such a frequent part in the poet's style."

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28) Notice that Parry, too, did not consider mere repetition the essence of the Homeric formula. But he used this fact to argue in a direction which totally differs from my argument (1971:304): "It is the nature of an expression which makes of it a formula, whereas its use a second time in Homer depends largely upon the hazard which led a poet, or a group of poets, to use it more than once in two given poems of a limited length." (Emphasis added). 29) This is, of course, a formulation which is firmly embedded in the Parry-Lord way of thought. It seems to me, however, that this kind of functionalism gradually receded to the back­ ground in Parry's formular analysis of the opening lines of the Iliad and the Odyssey (1971:301 ff.). Here the concept of mere repetition has replaced usefulness and functionality. For instance, the similarity of teukhe kunessi and dôken hetairôi seems to me wholly devoid of functional, and hence, formulaic interest. Notice that Lord (1960:291) called teukhe kunessi 'nonformulaic', and that Russo (1963: 245) had to admit that this structural formula (see (8) in the text) is not very common. 30) Here we have, incidentally, another reason why Russo's structural formula is an un­ satisfactory concept: it fails to differentiate the formula both from what is within and from what is outside the diction. 31) Notice that' | ' in the scheme are alternatives. A verse cannot have at the same time a penthemimeral and a trochaic main caesura. 32) This has the effect that in the bipartition of the verse neither the ratio 2:1 nor the ratio 1:2 can occur. 33) Beekes' decision to deny position 3 and 7 metrical significance implies a rejection of an influential way of thought in hexameter metrics, the 'four-colon theory'. Devised by Fraenkel (1926), modified by Porter (1951), discussed by Kirk (1966) and advocated by Ingalls (1970, 1976), this theory assumes the existence of no less than three caesuras, which yields the concep­ tion of a quadripartite hexameter. In Fraenkel's original theory, the first caesura falls at 1,1.5, 2 or 3, the second at 5 or 5.5 and the third at either 7 or 8. Beekes refutes this theory, showing that the alleged first caesura has no structural/metrical significance, whereas the struc­ tural/metrical significance of word end at 8 can and should be accounted for in other than caesural terms. The four-colon theory amounts to a conflation of the actual words and phrases filling the hexameter with the underlying rhythmical structure. Apart from this, the four-colon theory is unnecessary, as Beekes (1972:4) states, in that O'Neill's data can easily be accounted for without assuming the existence of caesuras other than Ρ or T. 34) Another of Hoekstra's examples is antitheos, which is both lexically and metrically wholly equivalent to isotheos. Just as isotheos it does not conform to O'Neill's pattern: its preferred position is 9 rather than 11. This is due to the formular system 'antitheos + proper name' localized at verse end, for instance antitheos Thrasumêdês. An example comparable to isotheosphôs is hômeteron do ("our house." For 'heav/ monosyllables placed at the end of the line (violating rule 6) above), see Van Raalte (1986:88-9). 35) The apparent violation of the rule forbidding word and at 11 (see Beekes' rule 6) is considerably mitigated when we recognize this. 36) The frequent divergence of words from O'Neill's figures for the word-type to which the word belongs pomts to the fact that the linguistic (lexical) identity of words cannot possibly be eliminated as a factor in the localization.

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37) O'Neill's policy amounts to discarding the factor of gradience in the phonetic discrete­ ness of words. Between the prototypically discrete word and the prototypically non-discrete word a continuum may be construed. 38) According to Porter (1951:59) this happens, in Homer, in 1.2% of the cases. See also Van Raalte (1986: 80-1). 39) Often proper names are involved here, for example: ê Aias | ê Idomeneus \ ê dios Odysseus (Il 1,145). 40) Of course, localization in 7 is negligeable because in that case the word would bridge the caesura). 41) These data can be easily gathered from Prendergast ([1875] 1962). 42) He may even deliberately change the word-type of single words. In doing this he creates the artificial forms which are the trademark of Witte and Meister's notion ofKunstsprache.Thus, as regards versification, we may say that what artificial morphology is on the level of the word, redundant semantics is on the level of the formula. 43) This is not to say that the epithet is meaningless in Homer. But the meaningfulness or appropriateness of a particular epithet in a given situation or context depends on the quality and ingenuity of the poet in question; the appropriateness is not inherent in the formular system. A good poet can make a highly significant use of names and epithets (see Edwards (1987:120-123) on 'word-play and significant names' as well as Hoekstra (1981: 57 ff.)). To stress the poetic quality of the epithets in Homer tends to become more and more popular in Homeric criticism (e.g. Vivante (1982)), undoubtedly in reaction to the way the epithet was dealt with in Parryan criticism. But significance and 'redundant semantics' need not exclude each other. They are in­ deed incomparable magnitudes. 44) For a similar approach to formulaic phenomena in Homer see Visser (1987). 45) Some case-endings constitute an exception to this rule: -oisi (plural dative) and -oio (genitive singular, a variant of.-ou). 46) Notice that akhnumenos kêr is a violation of rule 6) in (11) above. But the word end in pos. 11 is considerably mitigated when we conceive of akhnumenos kêr as a composite rhyth­ mical word which plays a role in the formular system of 'participle + pef. 47) Akhnumenos kêr. Il. 7, 428, 431; 19, 57; 23,165, 284, 443; 24, 773. Od. 10,67; 12,153, 250, 270; 22, 188; 24, 420. Khôomenos kêr. . 1, 44; 9, 555; 23, 37. Od. 12, 376. Notice that akhnumenos kêr has a naturally long final syllable (word-type -⋃⋃--). So it has a 100% localization in 12. Akhnumenos per, on the other hand, has a final syllable which is long only at verse end. Accordingly, it has more than one localization possibility, see below. 48) See//. 8,125,317; 15,651; 17,459. 49) The argument/complement function is once performed by a verb: kai essumenon per alukhsai ('though eager to escape'), Od. 4,416. 50) Morphologically, anagkêi is dative to anagkê ('necessity'). 51) Consider, too, the post-caesural part of the line, where the characteristic expression of 'force' and 'necessity' (see (18) above) is extended from the ⋃-- final slot to the range of an entire half-line. The whole line is wholly and thoroughly characterized by redundant seman­ tics.

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52) The metrical fluctuation between Ρ and Τ is often exploited for the declension of precaesural formulas ending on a consonant-stem noun or participle. Cf. the pattern cassoni aïssontos/-ti etc. See Hoekstra (1981: 46). The distribution of per in (20)-(21) is a fine example of the highly desirable situation for an epic poet to be able to use a P1/P2-formula as a T1/T2-formula or vice versa. See Hoekstra (1965) for many examples of the permutation of P2 and T 2 formulas. 53) Notice that the second half of the line in Od. 7,218 ( = ex. (21)) adds nothing new to the content of the sentence as a whole. The P2-part of the line is one of the many 'sorrowformulas' which are often used to the point of semantic vacuoussness. 54) The unique damassamenoi per, which was discussed in 4.3.2.3 above belongs to this localization, too. We may now say that apart from its semantic strangeness, it is also unusual from the point of view of formular versification in that in the remaining open space at the end of the verse the syntax of the sentence is continued. 55) Compare with (25): Od. 15, 214: mala gar kekholôsetai empês. Here the participle is replaced by a finite verb, and pef by a propositional particle (gar); the remaining open metrical space at the end of the line is occupied by empês (see below, B.l)b). As regards meaning, there is of course an essential difference between this finite verbal form and the scalar-concessive par­ ticiple in (25). As regards form and localization, however, both phrases conform to a similar pat­ tern. 56) According to O'Neill's table 16 (1942:145) participle) has a 100% localization in 12.

(i.e. the basic word-type of the

57) For instance, an infinitival argument of the participle: mala per memaôta makhesthai ("however much he was eager tofight",. 13,317), or a semantically redundant infinitive: mala per khateousi helesthai ("however much we needed it (to take)", Od. 13,280). The unique phrase mala per nostoio khatizôn ("however much he is longing to return", Od. 11,350) is a reversal in this type, the participle filling the final slot and the argument occupying the place of the par­ ticiple. 58) This kind of phenomenon was already described by Witte (1912). Often the fluctua­ tion in Homer between forms of one and the same verb belonging to different tense/aspect stems as well as between middle and active forms of one and the same verb is entirely devoid of seman­ tic implications; it is subordinate to formula-flection. In the present case, meneainôn is simply the nominative form of the memaôta-paradigm. But notice that here, too, the principles of the language are not violated: in the case of stative/durative verbs the difference between the present participle and the perfect participle is minimal anyway, because the oldest Greek perfect denotes states rather than (past) actions. In being stative, the participles meneainônlmemaôta yield prototypical instances of 'participle + per' (see the discussions of time-stability in 4.3.2). 59) The difference between mala and empês in participial phrases is often neutralized in the way differences between peripheral instances of different categories are neutralized (see 1.4). Sometimes, however, there is a difference, for example: nêos eüsselmous halad' helkemen, ophr' eti mallon Trôsi men eukta genêtai, epikrateousi per empês. "To drag our ships into the sea, and put the Trojans, who have beaten us anyway, in an even better position." (7/. 14,98).

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203

 a translation in line with the scalar-concessive mala per ('however much') is less suitable. This seems to be due to the presence of  matton ('still more'). Empês seems to be used here in accordance with its etymology ('in all cases', 'in any case'). The example properly belongs to the word-type (see ex. (32)). 60) Notice Parry's (1928a) insistence on the economy of formular systems. In the nounepithet formulas, 'doublets' are rare. 61) As well as, occasionally, elided forms: per eont'. 62) Notice that esti of which eôn is the participle is an enclitic. See 5.2.1.2 above. 63) It is interesting to note that O'Neills table for the word-type . to which eôn belongs (1946:140, table 4) reveals a 12.9% localization in 5 (in the Iliad. Odyssey-. 10.1%) and a localiza­ tion of no more than 1.5% in 9 (in the Iliad. Odyssey: 0%). These extremely low figures are due of course to the fact that word end at 4.5 and 7.5 is consistently avoided. Thus we have here another example of the divergence from O'Neill'sfigureswhich can be explained when we con­ ceive of the word-type of a single word as subordinate to the word-group of which it is a part (see 5.2.1.2 above). The localization of eôn in 5 and 9 in (33) and (34) is subordinate to the localization of the whole word-type in 5 and 9. 64) For ligus per eôn agorêtês see ex. (42) in 4.4.1 above. 65) Two exceptions (out of 15 cases): Il 16,624; 24,609. 66) Only once does kai not precede: Il. 24,53. 67) Of course, the idea that 'irregularity' (of whatever kind) may be due to formular lan­ guage use is in itself not new. Apart from the work of Parry, an early statement is Chantraine (1953: preface): "L'Iliade et 1'Odyssée sont (..) des oeuvres littéraires qui se sont développés par les procédés d'un style oral, au moyen de la technique des formules épiques. Il en résulte que telle formule, employée en un passage donné, peut être transférée ailleurs où elle convient moins bien." 68) Modification and flexion of formulas: 1971:197-201; juxtaposition: 1971: 202-221. In the case of flexion of formulas, Parry could make use of the observations and explanations of earlier scholars. Witte (1913:2223), for example, already noted that the brevis in longoinmeropes. anthrôpoi is due to the flexion of meropôn anthrôpôn. After Parry, the subject of modification of formulas was extensively explored, in a diachronic perspective, by Hoekstra (1965). 69) See Bakker (1988b) for a discussion of hiatus after diphthongs and long vowels in Homer in terms of the flexion and juxtaposition of formulas. 70) Qua functionality, this pattern is equivalent to Russo's structural formula (see 5.1.3) consisting of a choriambic participle placed at the beginning of the line. 71) Compare Od. 10,246; 14,142. 72) Furthermore, in the three examples, we have a 'negative present command' (see 4.3.4): the addressee is requested either to stop doing what he is already doing (in (65) and (67)), or to refrain from doing what he is about to do (in (66)). 73) Notice that agathos per eôn exclusively occurs in interactive speech and not in narra­ tive passages. This is in line with the narrative technique of Homer: to call somebody agathos in­ volves a moral, objective judgment about that person, and this is precisely something from which the Homeric narrator refrains. See further 3.2.4 above.

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74) Cf. Adkins (1960:37). For another view see Sicking (1972:448). Here agathospereôn in (66)isinterpreted as non-concessive. 75) Compare ex. (15) in 4.3.1 above. 76) This characterization ofagathospereôn occurs already in Fraenkel's (1925) discus­ sionofper. However, Fraenkel does not perceive the essential difference between (66)-(67) and (65). As another example of 'participle +per'as a politeness formula, Fraenkel mentions pinutê per eousa in Od. 20,131; 21,103. 77) Or, in view of the repetition in ex. (67), we should perhaps say 'a less than fully in­ tegrated formular line, which makes no essential difference. The concept of semantic integra­ tion of formulas seems to be the solution of what Denniston (1951:486), speaking about agathos pereôn,calls the "awkwardness of giving different interpretations to a word in identical lines in different contexts." 78) And three times by hikoisthe ('you may reach'), in a line meaning 'You may reach Ithaca, though not without suffering hardships', see Od. 11,104, 111; 12,138. 79) The third occurrence of kakaperpaskhonteshetairoi is Od. 10,189. This formula is, like (68), perfectly integrated, for Odysseus' words are unpleasant. It is important to notice that in both cases the first line after Odysseus' speech is hôs ephamên, toisin de kateklasthê philon êtor ("So I spoke, and their heart broke"). Thefirstline after Eurylochus' speech, on the other hand, is hôs ephat'Eurulokhos, epi d'êineonalloi hetairoi ('Those were Eurylochus' words, and the other men approved of them'). Thus the difference in function between the perfectly in­ tegrated instancesofkaka per paskhontes hetairoi and the less than perfect integrated instance seems to be reflected in the reaction of the addressees.

6 CONCESSIVE CONDITIONALS

6.0 Introduction In the present chapter I discuss the use ofper and kai in concessive conditionals. The subject of conditionals in connection with scalarity and even was already touched on earlier in this study, see 2.3.1.5-6 and 3.4.3. When used together with conditionals, the scalar particle even can be used in two different ways. It may occur within the sentence that functions as the conditional. This sentence then functions as the scope sentence of the particle. (We recall that the scope sentence of a focus particle is the sentence which has a variable in the place of the focus constituent of the particle, see 2.3.1.3.) But even may also be part of the main clause. In that case we have to say that the entire con­ ditional subclause is the (sentential) focus constituent of the particle. In the second case we speak of 'concessive conditionals', The concessive conditional in general and its occurrence in Homer in particular is the subject of the present chapter. The concessive conditional may be expressed in Homer in various ways: by placingperafter the conditional subordinator (eiper) as well as by kai, which is placed either before the subordinator (kai ei) or after (ei kai). Thus it ap­ pears that once more kai intrudes in the discussionofper. There are obvious­ ly demarcation problems to be solved: is there any difference between ei per and kai ei, and if so, of what nature is that difference? The study of eiperand kaieionce more shows that the relation between per and kai in Homeric Greek is complicated. After the discussion of the ex­ amples in which kaiandper each have their own separate identity and function, kai functioning as the marker of extensional scalarity and per of intensional scalarity (see 3.2.2 and 4.2.1), and of the examples in which the distribution of kai in connection with per is determined by formular and rhythmical factors (5.2.2), we now come to a third type of relation between the two particles. We

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shall see that there is a clear difference between the concessive conditionals with per and those with kai, in that ei per and ei kai belong to different types of concessive conditional (see 6.2). Unexpectedly, in view of the picture ofperand kai that has emerged so far, the ei kai conditional is nearer to superlativeness and scalarity than eiper.This surprising fact will have to be accounted for in a diachronic, rather than in a synchronic framework (see 6.3.3). 6.1 Concessives, conditionals and concessive conditionals In chapter 4,I discussed the expression-type 'participle + per' as a con­ cessive adverbial constituent (4.3). One of the most important characteristics of 'participle + per' appeared to be the fact that it is a syntactically independent constituent which is modally autonomous with respect to its main clause (nuclear predication). The resulting property which is relevant in the present connection is that 'participle + pef is factual irrespectively of the modality of the main clause (see 4.3.1). This characteristic of 'participle + pef reflects an important property of concessive constituents in general. Concessives tend to create a factual environ­ ment. In terms of modality (see 2.1.4), concessive adverbial constituents are typically realis contexts. This is different in the case of concessive condition­ als. The even if-conditional merely expresses, conforming to the meaning of even, that the state of affairs referred to by the main clause is something remarkable or unexpected (a 'superlative fact'). But to perform this function it need not be factual. In other words, factuality is not a distinctive (prototypical) property of the concessive conditional. A concessive conditional just may or may not be factual. For example, in uttering (1)

Even if Achilles resumes fighting, we will win the war,

the speaker asserts that the side to which he belongs will win the war; Achilles' resuming fighting is preferably taken as one of a number of possibilities, rather than as a fact. It represents, owing to the scalar meaning of even, the least favorable condition under which the war may be won. In (2)

Even though Achilles is resuming fighting, we will win the war

on the other hand, the concessive element has the same scalar meaning, in rep­ resenting the most unfavorable possibility, but here it is factual. In the context of uttering of (2), Achilles is supposed to be actually resuming fighting, and it is asserted that despite this fact the war will be won.

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Thus, concessive conditionals differ from concessives as regards factuality. Concessives are typically f actual whereas concessive conditionals are not. Now concessive conditionals may be opposed to yet another expression-type, the simple conditional. The basis for differentiation here is not the factuality of the adverbial element (subclause), but the factuality of the main clause. The specific difference between the concessive conditional and the simple condi­ tional is that the main clause of the former is typically factual, albeit remarkable/unexpected, as in (1)-(2), whereas the main clause of the latter is not. Someone uttering a statement in the format of 'If p, then q' does not normally assert the actual truth of the main clause 'q' (as in the case of concessive con­ ditionals), and he does not assert (or presuppose) the truth of the conditional 'p', either. Now, as is argued in König (1986), the three expression-types in question have to be seen as prototypical cases, rather than as distinct species. The seman­ tic space between them is continuous, to the effect that the formal differences may be neutralized. As regards the relation between concessives and conces­ sive conditionals, the neutralization lies in the fact that less prototypical con­ cessive conditionals may be factual. And as for the neutralization of the difference between simple conditionals and concessive conditionals, there exist some simple conditionals that allow of a concessive interpretation (see König 1986: 238-39).8 In section 6.3, I discuss the Homeric concessive conditionals from the point of view of, among other things, their being factual or not, and in 6.4 we will look at conditionals (mostly ei per) from the point of view of their being concessive or not. But first we have to introduce an important piece of typol­ ogy in the field of concessive conditionals. 62 Kinds of concessive conditional König (1986: 231) distinguishes three kinds of concessive conditional, which may be exemplified as follows: (3)

Even if Agamemnon apologizes, Achilles won't fight.

(4)

However much you try to persuade Achilles, he won't fight.

(5)

Whether you bring Achilles presents or not, he won't fight.

Ex. (3) exemplifies the kind of concessive conditional that functions as the sen­ tential focus constituent of even in English. The proposition functioning as con­ ditional ('Agamemnon apologizes') denotes a state of affairs which is highly

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unfavorable for the realization (or, as in (3), highly favorable for the nonrealization) of the state of affairs denoted by the main clause. This is of course expressed by even, whose conventional scalar impHcature (see 2.3.1.1 above) is that its focus constituent (sentential or not) represents the high point of a scale. This kind of concessive conditional will henceforth be called the 'even //-type'. Ex. (4) exemplifies a different kind, which I will call the 'however muchtype'. Here even (as it is used in English, that is) does not occur. The type ex­ emplified by (4) has two inherent characteristics, superlativeness and indeterminacy. Languages may differ as to which of these characteristics they formally encode in their version of the type in question. English opts for in­ determinacy: in the English version of the expression-type, the suffix -ever is used, which, when placed after a 'wh-word', has a universalizing function. In the German and Dutch versions of the expression-type, on the other hand, a focus particle is combined with a superlative expression following the 'whword' {wie sehr auch, hoe zeer ook). We shall see below that Homeric Greek explicitly encodes the superlativeness, while Classical Greek opts for indeter­ minacy (behaving exactly like EngUsh). The expression-type exemplified by (4) obviously has much in common with the scalar-concessive participle discussed in 4.3. above. In both superla­ tiveness plays a role and both are associated with a gradient, scope-independent scale. As 'participle + per' has to be discussed in terms of the semantics of in­ tensional scalarity (see 2.1, 3.1 and 4.2), we may say that ex. (4) is connected with the scalar superlative, the starting-point of the discussion of scalarity in the present study. The conditional in (3), on the other hand, has to be discussed in connection with extensional scalarity (see 2.2 and 3.2). The scale involved here is non-gradient and scope-independent, just as in the case of even with an extensional term as focus constituent (see 2.2.3). Thus, we may say that the two expression-types exemplified by (3) and (4) are related to one another in the same way as scalar superlatives are related to extensional scalar expressions {even + extensional focus constituent). The concession in (5), finally, is based on a disjunction. The conditional here is related to yes/no-questions, in the same way as (4) is related to wh-questions. In terms of morphology, there is a clear, language-independent connec­ tion between the expression-type exemplified by (5) and the conditional subordinator: the 'conditional disjunction' is often expressed by means of the conditional subordinator (Greek: eite...eite; Latin: sive...sive; Dutch: of...of).10 The semantic value of (5) is that the main clause is true irrespectively of the

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truth-value (either t rue or false) of the proposition 'You bring Achilles presents'. In the present chapter we are exclusively concerned with (3) and (4). Ex. (5) is irrelevant for the phenomena to be described. In the following section I will discuss per and kai in concessive conditionals. Both ei per (6.3.1) and kai ei (6.3.2) will be discussed with reference to the difference between (3) and (4) above as well as to the distinction between factual and non-factual. The discus­ sion of eiperand kai ei in terms of the typology of (3) and (4) will yield the high­ ly unexpected result that ei per-conditionals (when they are concessive, see 6.4) are exclusively of the type represented by (3), while the kai ei-conditional yields instances belonging to (3) as well as instances belonging to (4). This is strange, for it amounts to a complete reversal of what we know of per by now: per has been firmly established as the particle of intensional scalarity. Hence we do not expect it to be consistently used in an expression-type that is connected with extensional scalarity, while the extensional scalar particle kai is used in an ex­ pression-type that is connected with intensional scalarity. In 6.3.31 will suggest a diachronic explanation for this reversal. 6.3 Concessive conditionals in Homer 6.3.1 Per in concessive conditionals The instances of eiperare either non-concessive or concessive condition­ als. Non-concessive eiperwill be discussed in 6.4; in the present section we are concerned with the concessive instances of ei per. These are of the 'even iftype'exemplified by (3) above. As stated, this type can be characterized as a clause functioning as the focus constituent of even. The conditional may con­ tain scalar terms, but this need not be the case. In the following subsections I discuss various aspects of concessive eiper. The division into subsections does not correspond to any systematic division in the material. Rather, I discuss instances which may, for some reason or other, be set off against the other instances. 6.3.1.1 The discourse function of ei per One of the salient properties of the expression-type 'participle + per' is that it is never placed before the nuclear predication to which it is attached. It is preferably placed behind. This feature should be seen as the consequence of the proper elucidating function of 'participle + per': originally, 'participle + per' must have functioned as an apposed constituent which explains the super-

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lative intension of a preceding demonstrative (kai hôs, see 4.2.1). In the ex­ amples to be presented in the present subsection, which represent the most characteristic and frequent use oieiper, on the other hand, the per-constituent (ei per-clause) is invariably placed before its main clause. This is the first dif­ ference between eiper and the other uses of per discussed earlier in this study. More will follow. In the examples in question, the propositional connector gar ('for') has been added to eiper (eipergar). It signals that the ei per-clause, together with its main clause, serves as an argument for, or an elucidation or explanation of, the immediately preceding discourse. As such the discourse function of the ei per gar-instances is the same as that of any statement in which gar occurs. (6)

(Hector to Polydamas: 'You have no reason to fear the fighting, for the following reason':) ei per gar t'alloigeperikteinômetha pantes nêusin ep'Argeiôn, soi d'ou deos est' apolesthai: ou gar toi kradiê menedêïos oude makhêmôn. "Even if the rest of us are slaughtered wholesale by the Argive ships, you need have no fear for your own safety - you are not the man to stand and fight it out." (Il. 12,245)

(7)

(Agamemnon to Menelaus: 'The Trojans broke the truce. But they will pay for if:) ei per gar te kai autik' Olumpios ouk etelessen, ek te kai opse telei, sun te megalôi apeteisan, sun sphêisi kephalêm gunaUcsi te kai tekeessi. "For even if the Olympian postpones the penalty, he exacts it in the end, and the transgressors pay a heavy price, they pay with their Uves, and with their women and their children too." (. 4,160).

(8)

(Thetis to Achilles: 'You need not worry about the body of Patroclus':) ên11 per gar keitai ge telesphoron eh eniauton, aei tôid' estai khrôs empedos, ê kai areiôn. "He could lie there through all the seasons of a year and still his flesh would be preserved; indeed it might be fresher than now [Even if he Ues there..]." (Il 19,32)

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Often the main clause opens with the adversative particle alla. This seems to be a typical rendering of the opposition which is present in any concessive conditional: (9)

(The seer Calchas: Ί am afraid to offend Agamemnon':) kreissôn gar basileus hote khôsetai andri kherêi: ei per gar te kholon ge kai autêmar katapepsêi, alla te kai metopisthen ekhei koton, ophra telessêi, en stêthessin heoisi "For a commoner is no match for a king whom he offends: even if the king swallows his anger for the moment, he will nurse his grievance till the day when he can settle the account." (Il. 1, 81).

(10) (Odysseus to Achilles: 'A man cannot fight without breakfast':) ei per gar thumôi ge menoinaâi polemizein alla te lathrêi guia barunetai, êde kikhanei dipsa te kai limos. "His heart may be set on fighting ([for even if his heart..]), but exhaustion takes him unawares, he is attacked by thirst and hunger, and his legs give under him." (Il. 19,164). (11) (A simile: a leopardess faces a huntsman without fear:) ei per gar phthamenos min ê outasêi êe balêisin, alla te kai perì dourì peparmenê, ouk apolêgei alkes, prin g'êksumblêmenaiêdamênai. "Even if the man gets in first with a cast or lunge and she is pierced by a javelin, her courage does not fail her and she grapples with him or dies in the attempt." (Il. 21,576). 13 Like any other normal conditional which precedes its main clause, the ei perr-clause in (6)-(11) provides the 'domain' within which the main clause is as­ serted and interpreted. The proposition functioning as conditional is not as­ serted in its own right; it sets the scene for the main clause, so to speak.14 The specific function of per is to indicate that this 'scene' is a highly unfavorable one for the main clause to make sense in. Normally, it does not make sense for the main clause to be uttered under the conditions specified by the conditional. But this is of course the very point of ei per as a concessive conditional. The main clause of (6)-(11)is not an assertion in its own right which makes an independent contribution to the discourse. Rather, it serves, together with its conditional, as an extra argument for, or an elucidation of, some previously

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uttered statement. To signal this is the function of the particle gar. The func­ tion of the conditional is to add salience to the argument, by indicating a domain within which the state of affairs denoted by the main clause is highly unlikely to obtain. In the context of utterance of (10), for example, the leading topic of conversation is the need to have a decent breakfast before you are going to fight. The statement that otherwise you will become tired is meant as an extra argument. The typical contribution of the conditional is to lend support to this argument, by signalling that it applies under circumstances where it does not normally apply, viz. when a person who has missed his breakfast is very eager to fight and, accordingly, likely to forget his tiredness. Notice that some of the examples above are generic: (9), (10) and (11). In (11), the genericness is due to the fact that the conditional with its apodosis occurs in the extension of a simile (i.e. the digressive part of a simile, which is syntactically detached, see also 6.3.3 below). The same applies to (12) and (19) below. Homeric similes are by their very nature concerned with types and (animal) species, rather than with tokens and individuals. Concomitant with the generic modality is the particle te (see 3.1.3). Te as it occurs in the above ex­ amples yields instances of the combination gar te, in which te does not modify a non-restrictive relative clause, as it does in other cases (hos te), but a 'digressive' main clause which is connected to the preceding discourse by the causal connector gar.17 Beside ei per gar, there are more instances of concessive ei per that are placed before their main clause. In these examples, the relation with the preceding discourse is not one of elucidation, as in the case of the eiper gar-in­ stances. Instead, the connecting particle is de. Two examples: (12) (Simile: a fawn is chased by a hound:) ton d' ei per te lathêisi kataptêksas hupo thamnôi, alla t'anikhneuôn theei empedon, ophra ken heurêi. "And even when it takes cover in a thicket, the hound runs on, picks up the scent and finds his quarry." (Il. 22,191) (13) (The dying Patroclus to Hector: 'It is Zeus and Apollo who have slain me, not you':) toioutoi d' ei per moi eeikosin antebolêsan, pantes ' autoth' olonto emôi hupo douri damentes. "Even if twenty Hectors had confronted me, they would all have fallen to my spear." (Il. 16, 847).

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The particle de is commonly described as a co-ordinating particle which marks either a continuative or an adversative relation between two sentences. As the equivalent of and or but in English it is opposed to gar in the same way as these particles may be opposed to for.18 Note that unlike gar in (6)-(11), de does not occur within the conditional; instead, it is placed after a term which is extracted from the conditional (ton de, toioutoi de). A partial explanation of this practice can be given in terms of the meaning of concessive conditionals. The relation between an even if-conditional and the immediately preceding discourse cannot without more ado be characterized in terms of simple continuation. The even ¿/-conditional is typi­ cally directed to what immediately follows (viz. its main clause), not to what immediately precedes. The reason of this is that the main clause of a conces­ sive conditional is typically uttered as a superlative fact (see 2.3.1.2), and not as the simple continuation of what precedes in the discourse. This is why ei per de does not occur and why it is difficult to find an appropriate discourse-con­ text for and even if.19 When there is a continuative relation with the preceding discourse, as in (12) and (13), this is not a relation between the main clause as a whole and the preceding discourse. Rather, it runs via apart of the sentence which functions as conditional, viz. its topic. It is in combination with this constituent that de signals the relation with the preceding discourse. 6.3.1.2 Eiper and afortioriargumentation In the present subsection I present an example in which ei per occurs in a dissuasion. From the fact that a concessive conditional denotes the least favorable circumstance under which the state of affairs referred to by its main clause may obtain, it follows that the truth of the proposition functioning as concessive conditional ('p') normally implies the falsity of the main clause ('q'). In less logical and more functional terms, concessive conditionals owe their ef­ fect to the fact that when it is a reasonable and useful thing to say that 'p' is the case, it is normally not reasonable and useful to say that 'q' is the case.21 Given this concessive relation between 'p' and 'q', when the truth of 'p' implies (is compatible with) the falsity of 'q', it follows that this applies even more to the falsity of p. For the falsity of ρ is may be seen as the alternative lower value on the scale associated with even if. Now on account of these semantics, the even if-conditional of the type rep­ resented by (3) above has clear rhetorical possibilities: it has an illocutionary potential which makes it suited for the performance of directive speech acts, that

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is, speech acts that are meant to influence the behavior of an addressee. This is of course not surprising: even alone has the same illocutionary potential, as was shown in 2.3.1.2 and 3.2.2 above. And evenifhas to be described decompositionally, viz. as the intersection of the meaning of even and //separately. The account of even if in terms of directive illocutionary force seems to be the right approach to the following example: (14) (Polydamas, a Trojan with mantic qualities, tries to dissuade his fellowmen from attacking the Greek wall:) hôs hêmeis, ei per te pulas kai teikhos Akhaiôn rhêksometha stheneï megalôi, eïksôsi d'Akhaioi, ou kosmôi para nauphin eleusometh' auta keleutha: pollous gar Trôôn kataleipsomen, hous ken Akhaioi khalkôi dêiôsôsinamunomenoiperi nêôn. "Even if by a great effort we succeed in breaking down the Achaean gate and wall, and the enemy give way, our retirement from the ships will prove disastrous. The Achaeans will be fighting for their ships. They will kill numbers of our men." (Il. 12,223).22 This is a piece of a fortiori argumentation: 'we will suffer considerable losses (even) when we succeed in breaking down the gate. It follows that this is the more so when (which is more likely) we do not succeed in breaking down the gate. So let us forget the whole thing'. This a fortiori rhetorical mechanism is entirely in line with the scalarity of even. But in the case of conditionals, where the focus constituent of even is sentential constituent, there is an important ad­ ditional property. When a concessive conditional has a discourse function as in (14), the practical consequence is that it denotes a state of affairs which is presented as unlikely to occur, or, in other words, towards the fulfilment of which the speaker has a sceptic attitude. In normal concessive conditionals that are not used to perform a directive speech act, the speaker is normally neutral as to the fulfilment of the state of affairs denoted by the conditional. That state of affairs is merely presented as the most unfavorable circumstance for the state of affairs denoted by the main clause to occur. The point of such a conditional is to add salience to the asser­ tion of the main clause. In concessive conditionals that are used for directive purposes, on the other hand, the conventional scalar implicature of even creates what may be called an epistemic modality in the conditional: '(Even) if ρ (which I do not ex­ pect), then q. So a fortiori if not-p, then q'. Notice, incidentally, that the scep-

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tic tone is equally present in (6) and (8) above. But then these examples serve a directive purpose also. In 6.4 below I will show that the 'sceptic tone' plays an important role in the development of the meaning of eiper, both in Homer and after. 6.3.1.3 Eiper and factuality The example to be discussed in the present section differs semantically from the ones discussed so far. It is the only instance of its kind in the data­ base. The instances of ei per discussed in the previous two subsections are equivalent to the even if-conditional exemplified by (1) and (3) above, in that they are non-factual. The non-factual character of the concessive condition­ al could be shown to be the specific difference between concessive condition­ als and normal concessives, which are factual, see 6.1 above. But as was already stated, this difference is a difference between prototypical cases. Given the ex­ istence of less than prototypical cases, it can easily be neutralized. This appears from the simple fact that there exist concessive conditionals of the even if-type that do have the properties of the normal factual concessive. In other words, the state of affairs denoted by the conditional is presented as a fact, in spite of which the state of affairs denoted by the main clause obtains. Among the in­ stances of eiperin Homer there is only one case of the factual concessive con­ ditional: (15) (Agamemnon to Menelaus: 'Don't fight Hector; he is too strong for you. We will find another warrior to fight him':) ei per adeiês t' esti kai ei mothou est' akorêtos, phêmi min aspasiôs gonu kampsein, ai ke phugêisi dêïou ekpolemou kai ainês dêiotêtos. "He may be fearless and eager for his fill of trouble [even ifH, but I think that even Hector will be glad to take it easy, if he comes away alive from the stern ordeal he has asked for." (Il7.7,117). In 6.3.2.1-2 below we will see that the normal factual concessive condi­ tional in Homer is ei kai. 6.3.1.4 Scalar terms in the conditional Propositions functioning as even if-conditionals need not contain expres­ sions that are in themselves scalar, since the scalar (concessive) function of the clause as a whole is expressed anyway by even, as whose focus constituent the

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clause functions. In such cases, when there is no term with scalar potential, there is only one alternative value on the scale of which the sentential focus constituent represents the high point: the negation of the clause in question (see also ex. (22) in 2.3.1.6 above). When the even if-conditional does contain a scalar expression or an ex­ pression with scalar potential, the proposition functioning as conditional has by itself scalar properties, and there are as many alternative values as there are alternatives substitutable for the scalar expression. König (1986:232) gives the following example: (16) Even if you drink just a little, your boss will fire you. This example is wholly comparable with ex. (22) in 6.3.2.1 below ( = ex. (28) in 3.4.3 ), in which the scalar expression is oligon per and the concessive condi­ tional is realized as ei kai. Wide scope of the scalar expression (oligon per, 'just a little') and negative polarity is involved (see 2.3.1.5, 2.4.2 and 3.4.2-3. There is one instance of ei per in Homer that is equivalent to (16) above and (22) below: (17) (Deiphobus is urging Aeneas to help:) Aineia, Trôôn boulêphore, nun se mala khrê gambrôi amunemenai, ei per ti se kêdos hikanei. "Aeneas, councellor of the Trojans, you are badly needed for the rescue of your brother-in-law, if you have any ('the slightest') feeling for your family." (Il. 13,464).24 In this example, the addition of per to the conditional subordinator forces a scalar interpretation onft',which is, accordingly, in this example equivalent to a negative polarity item. Notice that (17) has yet another property that distin­ guishes it from the examples discussed so far: the concessive conditional is placed after the main clause, instead of before. This it has in common with the examples to be discussed in the following subsection. 6.3.1.5 Ei per and the semantic integration of formulas The following example contains in Mousai ('Muses') a term with scalar potential. The difference with the examples of the previous subsection, however, is that no negative polarity is involved: (18) steuto gar eukhomenos nikêsemen, ei per an autai Mousai aeidoien, kouraiDios aigiokhoio.

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"(Thamyris) had boasted that he would win in a singing-match even if the Muses themselves, the daughters of Aegis bearing Zeus, would be his competitors." (Il. 2, 597). Unlike the instances of ei per discussed earlier in this section, this example has some characteristics which are in line with expression-types of per that have been discussed in earUer chapters. The conditional has scalar properties by itself: Mousai may function as the high point of a scale (especially a scale which is associated to a scope sentence in which singing is involved), and autos ('himself) is potentially scalar. Accordingly, the conditional as a whole may in principle be conceived of as some pragmatic superlative (see 2.1.3): Ί will win under the most unfavorablecircumstances'being equivalent to Ί could beat the strongest competitors'. The typical irrealis environment, in which specific temporal reference is lacking and on account of which we may speak in terms of scalar superlatives at all (see 2.1 and 3.1.1), is formed by nikêsemen, a future infinitive. In spite of this difference, (18) remains a genuine instance of ei per in that it is an instance of the 'even if-type' of the concessive conditional represented by (3) above. But there is something more to be said about (18). The example is odd from the point of view of grammar, because the modal particle an oc­ curs in the conditional..An (or its Aeolic counterpart ke(n)) is the norm in con­ ditionals in which the subjunctive mood occurs. But an in an optative conditional occurs only once in Homer, in Il. 2, 597 ( = ex. (18)). Admittedly, in itself an in optative conditionals is not impossible or odd in Greek. But (18) is not a genuine example of this usage. Instead of describ­ ing the conditional clause purelyy in terms of the semantics ofan, I want to propose a different solution. The oddity of an in (18) seems to be due to the fact that the phrase ei peran autai in (18), a bucoUc clausula, constitutes a case of less than perfect (not to say bad) semantic formular integration (see for the concept 5.3.2 above). The phrase appears to be a formula which occurs else­ where. In each occurrence, the conditional has subjunctive, rather than opta­ tive mood marking, and an is semantically perfectly in place. Here is an example: (19) (A simile: a lion finds a stag:) -⋃⋃- mala gar te katesthiei ei per an auton seuôntai takhees tekanesthaleroi t'aizêoi "..and devours it greedily in spite of all the efforts of the sturdy huntsmen and the nimble hounds to drive him off." (Il. 3,25).

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In the third example of the bucoUc clausula in question, autos is replaced by a form which has a different meaning, but a very similar form and sound: (20) (Aeneas: 'My horses are very swift':) tô kai nôi polinde saôseton, ei per an aute Zeus epi Tudeidêi Diomêdeï kudos oreksêi "We can rely on them to get us safely into Troy, even if Zeus gives Diomedes son of Tydeus yet another victory." (Il. 5,224)29 Of course, the meaningofaute ('again') is different from that oí autos. But from the point of view of formulas and versification ei per an aute is similar to ei per an autai/-on in (18)-(19). Thus it appears that the linguistically irregular presence of an in the con­ ditional in (18) can be given an account in formular terms. The rhythmically pleasing phrase ei per an autoslaute is used, as a formula, under various seman­ tic circumstances.31 It should be noted that the less than perfect integration of ei per an autai in (18) has more serious semantic consequences than the less than perfect integration of the formula agathos per eon (see 5.3.2). The latter has its paraüels, and it may be perfectly described in purely linguistic terms (see 4.3.4), whereas eiper an autai in (18) involves a linguistically irregular and un­ paralleled use of an. Notice that there is an important difference between (18)-(20) and the in­ stances of ei per discussed earlier in this section: in (18)-(20) the conditional is placed after its main clause, while in the examples discussed earlier it is placed before. This order is of course in line with the normal use of 'participle + per', which as an optional constituent is preferably placed after its main clause. Ac­ cordingly, the concessive conditionals in (18)-(20) seem to have the same func­ tion as 'participle + per': they function as scalar-concessive constituents which contribute to the salience of their main clauses, by signalling that the latter is true in spite of something highly unfavorable. The difference with 'participle + per9 Hes, of course, in their non-factuality. The instances of ei per discussed earlier in the present section are clearly different. Here the sentence-initial eiper-clause is much more like a real con­ ditional which functions as the topic ('theme') about (within) which the main clause asserts something. In (18)-(20), on the other hand, nothing is asserted in the main clause about the conditional. Rather, it is the other way around, the conditional asserting something about the main clause, in the typical manner of scalar-concessive constituents.

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6.3.2 Kai in concessive conditionals Despite a number of differences, in discourse function and in metrical localization, the instances of ei per discussed in the previous section form a homogeneous group in that they all belong to the 'even if-type' of concessive conditional. Now, since I endorse a decompositional analysis of even if, in terms of even and if separately, it is interesting to study the use of kai, the normal and unequivocal Greek expression of even, in concessive conditionals. In the present subsection I discuss kai ei (ei kai) within the framework developed so far for the concessive conditional. The instances of kai ei in Homer may be divided in two ways. First, unlike ei per, the kai ei-conditional is not exclusively used for the expression of con­ cessive conditionals of the 'even if-type'; there are also instances of kai ei that are of the 'however much-type'. Second, there are factual as well as non-factual instances of kai ei. It will appear that kai ei is more often factual than eiper. In the following subsection (6.3.2.1) I discuss kai ei-instances of the even if-type, and in 6.3.2.2 instances of the however much-type. The distinction between factual and non-factual will be dealt with in passing.33 6.3.2.1 Kai ei: 'even if' Just as in the case of ei per, the kai ei-conditional normally does not con­ tain elements or terms that are in themselves scalar as kai takes care of the scalarity and, hence, concession. But just as in the case of ei per, exceptions are possible. Consider: (21) (Athena to Odysseus:) kerdaleos k' eie kai epiklopos, hos separelthoi en pantessi doloisi, kai ei theos antiaseie. "What a cunning knave it would take to beat you at your tricks. Even a god would be hard to put it." (Od. 13,292). (22) (Diomedes to Paris: 'You are a weakling and your shot did me no harm':) e t' alios hup'emeio, kai ei k' oligon per epaurêi, oksu belos pelettai, kai akêrion aipsa tithêsi. "My weapons have a better edge. Even if they touch a man ever so little, he is dead." (Il. 11,391). Ex. (21) is semantically compatible with (18) above. A term with scalar poten­ tial (theos, 'god') is used in a concessive conditional which is expUcitly marked

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as such. In (22) negative polarity is involved. See also exx. (16) and (17) in 6.3.1.4 above. The following two instances do not contain scalar terms. But as regards the concession they are wholly compatible with (21) and (22): (23) (Athena and Odysseus before the palace of Alcinous:) su d'esô kie mêde ti thumôi tarbei: tharsaleos gar anêr en pâsin ameinôn ergoisin telethei, eikaipothen allothen elthoi "Go straight in and have no qualms. For it is the bold man who every time does best, even if he is abroad." {Od. 7, 52). (24) (Odysseus (in disguise) to Telemachus: 'are you willingly undergoing this outrageous conduct of the Suitors?':) ê ti kasignêtois epimempheai,hoisiper anêr marnamenoìsi pepoithe, kai ei mega neikos oretai. "Or is it your brothers who cannot be trusted to stand by as they should through thick and thin (litt, even if a great quarrel arises)." (Od. 16, 98). The four examples above are instances of the non-factual concessive con­ ditional of the 'even if-type'. In two cases, (23) and (24), the proposition functioning as conditional is non-factual anyway, irrespectively of its function­ ing as a conditional, because generic modality is involved (see 2.1.4 and 3.1.3 above). Their main clauses are statements about the generic bold man and the generic brother, respectively; there is no specific temporal or spatial reference. However, it is perfectly normal for kai ei to express a factual concessive conditional with specific temporal reference. Of ei per there was only one such an instance in the data-base; kai ei yields more cases: out of 11 instances of kai eilei kai (of the 'even if-type') in Homer, 4 are factual. Consider: (25) (Poseidon, in the shape of Calchas the seer to both Aiantes: 'It is here that you have to make your stand, for here Hector is leading the attack:') to ke kai essumenon per erôêsait' apo neon ôkuporôn, ei kai min Olumpios autos egeirei. "You might fend him off from the gallant ships, for all his fury and the encouragement he getsfromthe Olympian himself." (IÏ. 13,58). (26) (Hector urges the Trojans not to fear Achilles too much:)

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tou d' ego antios eimi, kai eipuri kheiras eoiken, ei puri kheiras eoike, menos d'aithôni sidêrôi. "And I am going to meet him, though his hands are like fire, yes, though his hands are like fire and his heart like burnished steel." (Il. 20,371). 35 Ex. (26) shows, together with the factual ei per-instance (15) above, that when a concessive conditional of the 'even if-type' is repeated, as in (26), or when a second one is coordinated, as in (15), the second conditional can do without the focus particle. Ex. (25) is interesting in that a factual case of ei kai is coordinated (by the sense) with an instance of participle + per' We may say that Hector is essumenos ('eager', 'furious') because Zeus arouses him. 6.3.2.2 Kai ei: 'however much' Kai ei differs from eiperin that it yields instances of the second type of the concessive conditional as well, the 'however much-type', in which superlativeness is involved (see (4) in 6.2 above). In the present subsection I present the examples; in 6.3.3 below I will discuss the surprising situation that it is kai ei, and not ei per that is used for the expression of superlative concessive condi­ tionals, whereas it is per, and not kai, that has a direct connection with superlativeness and intensional scalarity. The instances of kai ei which represent the 'however much-type' of the concessive conditional contain without exception the particle mala (Very') which is followed by an adjective or an element with adjectival properties.36 The meaning of this particle is of course in line with the superlative character of the type of concessive conditional in question: something is asserted to be the case, in spite of the high degree to which some unfavorable circumstance is the case. Some examples: (27) (Odysseus has thrown off his beggar's disguise, and aims an arrow at the suitor Antinous. The latter is completely unprepared:) tis k' oioito met' andrasi daitumonessi mounon enipleonessi, kai ei mala karteros eie, hoi teuksein thanaton te kakon kai kera melainan? "For who could guess, there in that festive company, that one man, however powerful he might be, would bring calamity and death to him against such odds?" (Od. 22,13). 37 (28) (Nausicaa to Odysseus: 'Go to the palace and acts as follows':)

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER ton parameipsamenos mêtros perì gounasi kheiras ballein hêmeterês, hina nostimon êmar idêai khairôn karpalimôs, ei kai mala têlothen essi "Slip past my father and clasp my mother's knees if you wish to make certain of an early and happy return to your home, however far you may have strayed." (Od. 6,312).38

These concessive conditionals (as well as their repetitions) are non-factual in terms of the distinction made in 6.1 above. But there is a difference between the two as regards the nature of the non-factuality. In (27) the non-factuality is due to non-referentiality: mounon ('one man') does not refer to any particular person; the point in (27) is the opposition between one man (whoever he is and however strong he is) and many feasting Suitors. In (28), on the other hand, the eikai/-clauseoccurs in a stretch of interactive speech; its subject is the addres­ see. And, conforming to the typical non-factual character of the (concessive) conditional, the ei kai-clause does not say that the addressee (Odysseus) has actually strayed far from home. It is clear that, on account of the presence of superlativeness, as well as on account of their position with regard to the main clause (postposed), conces­ sive conditionals of the 'however much-type', like (27)-(28) above, have much more in common with scalar concessives of the type 'participle + per' than even if-conditionals like the ei per-instances (6)-(15) above. In one case per actually occurs in the eikai-clause, confirming this semantic similarity: (29) (Odysseus finds a shelter after his shipwreck:) phullôn gar eên khusis elithapollê, hosson t'  duoêtreis andras erusthai hôrêi kheimeriêi, ei kai mala per khalepainoi. "There was an abundance of dead leaves, enough to provide covering for two or three men in the hardest winter weather." (Od. 5, 485). Per here forms a collocation with mala which is localized as in the case of par­ ticiples of the word-type uu - - (see 5.2.2 sub I.B1)). Just as in the case of (27), the conditional occurs in a non-factual environment, where both spatial and temporal reference is absent. Accordingly, this conditional has semantic af­ finity with a scalar superlative. Just as kai ei-clauses of the 'even if-type', so kai ei-clauses of the 'however much-type9 can be factual. Here are two examples:

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(30) (Alcinous, when Odysseus has finished his story:) ô Odusseu, epei hikeu emonpoti khalkobates dô, hupserephes, tô s' outipalimplankhthenta g' oiô aps' aponostêsein, ei kai mala polla peponthas. "Odysseus, now that you have set foot on the bronze floor of my great house I feel assured that you will reach your home without any wanderings from your course, however much you have suffered." (Od. 13, 6). (31) (Dione to Aphrodite, who has just been wounded by Diomedes:) to nun Tudeidês, ei kai mala karteros esti phrazesthô, mê tis hoi ameinôn seio makhêtai. "So let Tydeides, strong man as he is, take care that no one more formidable than you comes out to fight him." (Il. 5,410). Notice that (31) is rather unspecified as to the type to which it belongs. It can equally be conceived of as an even if-conditional and as a however muchconditional, which shows that the types of the typology of 6.2 are continuous, rather than discrete. Here, too, differences may be neutralized. Now given that, firstly, the ei kai mala-clauses in question have semantically much in common with 'participle + per9, and, secondly, that the specific difference between concessive conditionals and concessives has to be stated in terms of the distinction between factual and non-factual, we may say that in the case of (30) and (31), where the conditional is factual, the difference is neutral­ ized. There is no semantic difference between these conditionals (especially (30)) and participial expressionswithper, and the poet could as well have used a participial expression with per filling the P2-part of the line. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the difference between (superlative) concessives and (superlative) concessive conditionals may also be neutralized in the opposite direction, to the effect that not the conditional be­ comes factual, but the concessive non-factual. This happens once in Homer: (32) (Nestor speaking to Agamemnon, Diomedes and Odysseus, when they are looking at the ongoing battle:) oud' an etignoiês mala per skopiazôn hoppoterôthen Akhaioi orinomenoi kloneontai, hôs epirmks kteinontai, aütê d' ouranon hikei. "You cannot tell, however hard you look, whether the Achaeans are being chased and harried from the front or from the rear. So confused is the slaughter, so overwhelming the din." (. 14, 58).

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The participial phrase in this example is semantically equivalent to nonfactual concessive conditionals of the 'however much-type'. In terms of Oguse (1962), the participle lies in the modal sphere of the main clause (see also 4.1.2). 6.3.2.3 Kai ei or ei kai? In the section on kai in concessive conditionals, I have treated kai ei and ei kai indiscriminately. Strictly speaking, however, there must be a difference between the two. Kai ei is the straightforward formal equivalent of even if (en­ tire conditional as the focus constituent of kai), whereas ei kai seems to be properly used when the focus constituent of kai is one single word within the conditional. Something of this difference is clear when we compare ex. (25) to (26): in (25), a term in the conditional, Olympios autos ('the Olympian himself, is a reasonable candidate for focus constituent of kai (see note 25 above for 'self and scalarity), whereas in (26) the focus constituent is clearly the conditional as a whole. The investigation of the difference between kai ei and ei kai, however, is seriously hampered by the fact that the choice of either one in preference to the other is in practice determined by other factors. Just as in the case of kai in participial phrases, the order of ei and kai, and hence the question as to what is the focus constituent of kai, is made subservient to metrics and versification. With two exceptions, all of the instances of concessive conditionals with kai are placed just after the main caesura. Now when the main caesura is realized as Τ (trochaic caesura, see 5.2.1.1 above), and the post-caesural formula is, ac­ cordingly, a T2-expression, we find kai ei ( u - ) . And, conversely, when the caesura is P(enthemimeres), we find ei kai ( - - ). The difference between the two expressions is subordinate to their function as the introduction of a T2- and a P2-phrase, respectively. Thus, the fluctuation between ei kai and kai ei ap­ pears to be another adaptation of linguistic form to the exigencies of the verse. 42 6.3.3 Ei per and kai ei in a diachronic perspective The problem which is the subject of the present section may be stated as follows. There are two concessive conditionals in Homer, ei per and kai ei. The former is exclusively used for the expression of conditionals of the even if-type, that is, concessive conditionals in which no superlativeness is involved, and whose scale is, accordingly, scope-dependent and non-gradient (see 6.2). Kai ei may express this type, too, but at the same time it may appear as a condition-

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al of the 'however much-type' in which superlativeness is the salient characteris­ tic. This situation is strange, for one would expect the reverse situation, eiper expressing the 'however much-type' and kai ei the 'even if-type'. This would be in accordance with the meaning and function of the two particles that has emerged so far in this study. Per has close connections with superlativeness, in many of its central uses, while kai isaparticlewhich is equivalent to the English scalar particle even, at least even as it is used in even if. The two particles may be differentiated on the basis of the distinction between intension and exten­ sion (see 2.2.2), per being the particle of intensional scalarity and scalar super­ lativeness and kai the particle of extensional scalarity. The solution to the problem posed by the unexpected distribution of ei per and kai ei over the two types of the concessive conditional has to be sought not so much in the meaning of per as in the change of that meaning. That is, in a diachronic framework. The relevant aspect of the diachrony of per, which seems to be crucial for the assessment of the ei per-clauses in 6.3.1, may be termed 'disappearance of superlativeness and scalarity'. We have met with this diachronic phenomenon before, in the case of the loss of superlativeness in participial clauses (see 4.3.2). It could be argued that the use of 'participle + per' in Homer extends, in the diachronic dimension, beyond the purely scalar. Many cases can be found in which 'participle + per' has lost its original superlativeness, to the effect that it has become a purely concessive modifier. This process is not confined to Ancient Greek. In many unrelated languages, concessive elements are erstwhile scalar expressions. Now, the concessive conditionals introduced by ei per discussed in 6.3.1 have to be located, in the diachronic space, in the neighborhood of the non-su­ perlative and non-scalar instances of 'participle + per'. They do not involve su­ perlativeness and normally they do not contain terms with scalar potential. Consequently, when they are discussed in connection with scales and scalarity, we have to conceive of the alternative lower on the scale as the negated counter­ part of the sentence in question (see also 2.3.1.6 above). But this is precisely the way to discuss non-superlative cases of 'participle + per9 in scalar terms: varying on the theme of ex. (23) of ch. 4, we may say that the reason why (33) Although he was on his own, he was not afraid may be discussed in scalar terms is that the person in question would not be afraid a fortiorì if he were not on his own.

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Thus there is a clear semantic similarity between non-superlative 'par­ ticiple + per' and concessive conditionals introduced by eiper. The use of both must have become possible when the original scalar meaningofper was either fading or had already disappeared from the language. But there is also a dif­ ference between the two. Non-superlative 'participle + per' is an organic part of an expression-type which comprises scalar expressions as well; its scalar provenance may be easily traced (see 4.2 and 4.3). Eiper, on the other hand, has no direct scalar parentage; it is a 'newcomer' in the diction. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that eiper is common in Homeric similes. There are different types of simile in Homer,43 which can be ordered by degree of increasing complexity. It may be confidently supposed that the in­ crease of complexity has a diachronic orientation: the more complex a simile is, the more recent it is in the diachronic cross-section of the Homeric language. The simplest type may be exemplified by an expression like 'Achilles raged like a Hon'. A more elaborate type consists of an extension of this simple type, in which the relevant essential property (the so-called 'tertium comparationis') of the entity compared (often an animal) is furnished. The extension is very often in the form of a non-restrictive relative clause modified by the particle te (see 3.1.3).44 An example is ex. (9) in3.1.3: "They were excellent speakers, like cicadas, which...". In the most elaborate type of simile, the extension has evolved in an often minute image of the comparing entity (animal), which has become inde­ pendent, both from the point view of content and from the point of view of syn­ tax. Shipp ( 1972) has shown that the influx of 'late' forms is greatest in these simile extensions as well as in other digressive contexts. In other words, it ap­ pears that the elaborate simile extensions are one of the most recent (contexttypes in Greek epic diction. Now ei per frequently belongs to the independent part of an elaborate simile. I think that it is not too hazardous to suppose that the regular occur­ rence of ei per in these innovative passages may be treated as an index of the relative 'lateness' of ei per. The lateness, in its turn, would seem to explain its non-superlative character. The diachronic dimension is essential for the description of concessive ei per in Homer. Not only comes concessive ei per into being at a relatively late date, it is also diachronically unstable, in that it has not had a long life46: ei per used as a concessive conditional does not occur after Homer. 46 The only Greek concessive conditional after Homer is kai ei.

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When we consider eiperand kai ei in the synchronic dimension, it appears that kai ei was, and remained, the normal Greek expression of the concessive conditional. This is in accordance with the fact that kai ei was used for the ex­ pression of both types of concessive conditional, while ei per was exclusively used for the expression of the 'even if-type'. Ei per in the concessive sense was too short-lived to be a real competitor for kai ei. It constitutes an example of aborted development in diachronic semantics. In pointing out that eiper is, on diachronic grounds, not suited for the ex­ pression of 'however mich'-conditionals, we have not yet discussed the fact that ei kai mala is used for that purpose. Now just as ei per, so ei kai mala adds to the peculiar nature of the Homeric language as regards the expression of con­ cessive conditionals, for ei kai mala does not occur after Homer either, as far as I can see. Ei kai mala appears to be the typical Homeric form of the 'however much-type' of the concessive conditional, in which mala is an index of the superlativeness which is inherent in this type (see on ex. (4) in 6.2 above). After Homer, the Greek language has a different strategy for expressing the however much-type. Just like English, it stresses the indeterminacy which is equally inherent in this expression-type, rather than the superlativeness (see on (4) above). It uses the indeterminate relative (hostis), which may be strengthened by 'free-choice quantifiers' that are equivalent to -ever in English: -oun and -pote47 (hostisoun, hostisdêpote 'whoever').48 Greek here entirely agrees with English, in that the expressions just mentioned may be used in both concessive and 'indeterminate' expressions. The former differ from the latter in that the indeterminacy implies an opposition ('Whatever he tried, he could not open the door'), whereas in the latter it does not. But this difference is only superficial: both the concessive and the non-concessive variants belong to one and the same expression-type. 6.4 Concessive and non-concessive conditionals 6.4.1 Two kinds of neutralization In 6.1 above, I stated that concessive conditionals have characteristics of both concessives and simple conditionals. I argued that the difference between concessives and concessive conditionals could be neutralized in that conces­ sive conditionals may allow of a factual reading. Various examples of this phenomenon in connection with ei per and kai ei in Homer could be given. In one case the neutralization could be shown to work the other way around, to the effect that the concessive (i.e. an instance of 'participle + per') is non-fac-

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tual, see (32) above. In the present section, I deal with the difference between concessive conditionals and simple conditionals. This difference will be used as a background for the discussion of the concessive vs. the non-concessive in­ stances of ei per. Just as the difference between concessives and concessive conditionals may be neutralized, so may the formal difference between concessive condi­ tionals and simple conditionals. However, the neutralization as it is discussed in the literature (König 1986) works in the opposite direction: the concessive conditional does not adopt a property of the opposed term (as in the case of the neutralization of the difference between concessives and concessive con­ ditionals), but the opposed term adopts, conversely, a property of the conces­ sive conditional. The formal difference between concessive and simple conditionals may be neutralized in that simple conditionals that are not overt­ ly marked for concession (by a focus particle, for instance) may allow, in cer­ tain contexts, of a concessive meaning. König (1986: 238-39) lists three contextual conditions under which the distinction may be neutralized. Neutralization occurs (i) when the conditional contains a scalar term and the conditional is not overtly marked for concession; (ii) when the conditional occurs in a question, and (iii) when the main clause is negated and contains an anaphoric pronoun which refers back to the condi­ tional. Of each an example: (34) I will not renounce my feud if you give me the most valuable presents. (35) Will you stay confident if the Trojans are victorious? (36) If Achilles refuses to fight, the Achaeans are not discouraged by it.49 However, the neutralization pattern displayed by these examples does not apply to eiper.In the present chapter we are not dealing with simple condition­ als which come to have the function, in some particular discourse contexts, of a concessive conditional. Eiperisnot a simple conditional. Accordingly, to deal with the non-concessive instances of ei per in a satisfactory way, we have to look in what ways a conditional which is overtly marked for concession, like ei per, can lose its typical concessive meaning. I will argue that the non-concessive in­ stances of ei per have to be discussed partly in synchronic and partly in diachronic terms. In a synchronic framework, there are semantic lines to be found along which ei per can lose its typical concessive meaning, adopting another typical function instead. As for diachrony, we have already seen that

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the (concessive) meaning of ei per is diachronically unstable (6.3.3); so the decision to describe the non-concessive instances of ei per in a diachronic framework cannot come as a surprise. 6.4.2 The two senses of ei per: 'even if and if really' During the discussion of concessive ei per in Homer (6.3.1), we came across an example (ex. (14)) in which the concessive meaning of ei per, on ac­ count of the function of the conditional in discourse, triggered a sceptic overtone. The specific discourse function was a fortiori argumentation: 'even if ρ (which I think is unlikely), then q; so a fortiori, if not-p, then q' The same phenomenon can be observed in (6) and (8). In these examples, the sceptic tone of ei per may be seen as a by-product of the concessive meaning of the condi­ tional. Now, a sceptical tone is the most conspicuous semantic feature of many instances of ei per, both in Homer and after, which do not allow of a concessive interpretation. These are the examples to which the ready-made lexical value if really, if indeed has been attached. In accordance with the main thrust in Greek lexical semantics, where lexical values tend to be treated as discrete en­ tities, 'if really' is commonly treated as a separate sense of eiper. This yields a clear-cut bipartition in the meaning of ei per: 'even if vs. 'if really'. This treatment ofeiper in the Greek lexicon is unsatisfactory and unwar­ ranted for two reasons. In the first place, there is the principle of unification (see 1.3.2 above). When two linguistic signs are identical in form (as in the case of two senses of one and the same lexeme), we have to assume as long as is pos­ sible, that this formal identity reflects a similarity in meaning.51 Secondly, when we have described the two senses in a unifying way, which brings out their com­ mon property, we should not conceive of the relation between them in terms of a relation between two discrete entities. Once more Prototype Theory has to be applied in the present study: the relation between two 'senses' of one and the same lexeme may often be fruitfully treated as a relation between prototypes, with transitional cases in between. These two methodological preliminaries provide the appropriate back­ ground for the description of the two senses ofeiper, too. They allow of a unified interpretation in that the very tone which characterizes 'if really' is present when ei per in the sense of 'even if is used for a fortiori argumentation, see ex. (14) above. Thus, scepsis can be explained within the framework of the seman­ tics of the concessive conditional; it is a contextually bound by-product of the meaning of the latter. But it may easily become a factor ('sense') in its own

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right, namely when the diachronically unstable meaning of ei per evaporates. Furthermore, Prototype Theory comes into the picture once we realize that the instances of ei per that have become 'sceptic' in their own right and in which concession is (near-)absent, may be viewed as one extreme of a semantic (lexi­ cal) continuum. The other extreme of the continuum is formed by the prototypi­ cally concessive instances. In between we may localize instances by degree of decreasing concession and/or increasing scepsis. 6.4.3 From concessive to non-concessive eiper Consider now, against the background of the previous section, the follow­ ing example: (37) (The seer Teiresias to Odysseus in the Netherworld: 'If you leave the cattle of the Sun-God untouched, you may reach Ithaca:') ei de ke sinêai, tote toi tekmairom'olethron nei te kai hetarois: autos d' ei per ken aluksêis, opse kakos neiai, olesas apo pantas hetairous. "But if you hurt them, then I warrant that your ship and your company will be destroyed, and if you yourself do manage to escape, you will come home late, in evil plight, upon a foreign ship, with all your comrades dead." (Od. 11,113 = 12,140). The conditional here may in principle be read as a concessive one, but there is more to it than that. There is a difference between ei per in (37) and the prototypically concessive instances of ei per: in (37) the conditional does not express a proposition which is unfavorable for the truth of the main clause: be­ tween 'Odysseus manages to escape' and 'Odysseus comes home in evil plight and without his comrades' there is no contrastive relationship; the former is not unfavorable for the latter. Rather, it is a necessary condition for the ut­ terance of the latter: it does not make sense to say that Odysseus comes home late unless he has actually escaped. In presenting the 'escaping' in the form of a conditional, the speaker effectively conveys detachment: 'it is far from cer­ tain whether you escape at all, but IF you do, you will reach home in a par­ ticularly wretched way'53. Thus what was called above the sceptic tone of eiper is more important here than the concession, and the example has to be treated as a transitional case between the prototypical concessive ei per and the prototypical 'sceptic' ei per.54 The following example is a transitional case too, an instance of the 'con­ cessive-sceptic' conditional:

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(38) (Idomeneus to Meriones: 'Don't be afraid that I consider you a coward. For if we were lying in ambush, you would belong to the brave sort of man':)) oude ken entha teon ge menos kai kheiras onoito. ei per gar ke bleioponeumenos êe tupeiês, ouk an en aukhen'.opisthe pesoi belos oud' eni nôtôi alla ken e sternôn ê nêduos antiaseie. "Nobody on such an occasion would think Ughtly of your daring and your strength! Even if you were hit in the action by an arrow or spear, it would not be behind on your neck or back that the weapon would fall; it would strike you in the chest or belly." (Il.13,288). 55 Again, the ei per-clause does not contain, as a real concessive conditional does, something that is unfavorable for the main clause to be true: being hit by an arrow cannot, of course, be viewed as an unfavorable circumstance for not being hit by an arrow in the back. Rather, the function of eiper,just as that of even if in the translation, is to introduce a sceptic tone. The speaker rather reluctant­ ly has to admit, as it were, that being wounded remains after all a possibility, even for the brave man. In the following examples we are near to the 'sceptic' extreme of the con­ tinuum. In (39) the conditional is 'sceptic' in the true sense of the word, and (40) can be perfectly accounted for in the 'concessive-sceptic' framework: (39) (Odysseus is expressing outright scepsis to Athena as to the outcome of the struggle with the Suitors: 'Being alone, how can I ever defeat them? And, moreover:) ei per gar kteinaimi Dios te seihen te hekêti, pêi ken hupekprophugoimi? ta se phrazesthai anôga. "Suppose that by Zeus' grace and yours I bring about their deaths, to what safe refuge can I fly? These are the problems I should like you to consider." (Od. 20,42). (40) (From the Ares-Aphrodite story: Ares and Aphrodite are lying caught in Hephaestus' net. Hephaestus refuses to release them, fearing that Ares will not pay him the fine: 'Who will pay if Ares does not pay?' Poseidon then says:) Hêphaist', ei per gar ken Arês khreios hupaluksas oikhêtai pheugôn, autos toi ego tade tisô. "Hephaestus, said Poseidon the Earthshaker, if Ares does repudiate his debt and abscond, I myself will pay you the fine." (Od. 8,355).

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In (39) the environment as a whole in which the conditional occurs is sceptic. In (40) the topic of conversation are the chances that Ares will pay Hephaes­ tus the fine after he has been released. Poseidon's contribution to the conver­ sation is: 'It is likely that Ares will pay thefine.But in case he does not, I will pay the fine myself. In both (39) and (40), the connection with concession is weak. Now it might be asked whether the continuum ranging from 'concessive' to 'sceptic', within which the instances oieiper can be localized, is diachronic or synchronic in nature. In other words, is thefluctuationdisplayed by the in­ stances of eiperin Homer due to a variability which is inherent in the meaning of ei per, or is it due to a change in that meaning? My answer would be that it is due to both. It seems that there is always somefluctuationinherent in the meaningofevenif-conditionals,depending on how they are used in discourse. Even if in English, too, can be used when the conditional in question is not a prototypical concessive one. See for example the translation of (38) above. But a diachronic aspect is involved as well. This appears from the fact that the one extreme of the continuum, the (prototypical) concessive eiper,simply ceases to exist at some time, while 'sceptic' eiper continues to be used after Homer. Thus, beside a semantic continuum which allowsfluctuationbetween conces­ sive and sceptic use of the conditional, there is also a diachronic shift from con­ cessive to sceptic, to the effect that the former becomes extinct at some time. The examples discussed in the present chapter do not cover all the extant instances of eiperin Homer. There are examples that are neither concessive nor sceptic and that cannot, accordingly, be localized in the semantic con­ tinuum ranging from concession to scepsis. However, those examples do not properly belong to the present chapter. They should be dealt with within the wider framework of the meaning of per in general, and the periphery of the semanticfieldofper in particular. As such they are best discussed in the next chapter, along with the other instances of per which do not conform to any recognizable semantic or discourse-pragmatic pattern.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 1) In 2.3.1.5 we saw that the scope sentenceofeven may also comprise the clause function­ ing as conditionalplusthe main clause. 2) Of these two possibilities, kai ei is best in accordance with the use of kai as a focus par­ ticle, because, like even, kai normally precedes its focus constituent. Thus, as to its form kai ei is more in accordance with even if than ei kai. It may be asked whether there is a difference in meaning between kai ei and ei kai. This question will be dealt with in 6.3.2.3 below. 3) Of course, in strict linguistic terms and apart from the metrical-formular framework, the function of kai in participial phrases withperhas to be stated in terms of strengthening. 4) In other, more logic-based terminology, it is sometimes said that concessives are im­ plicative. In König (1986:231), for example, it is stated that a concessive expression of the form thoughp,q "entails" the actual truth of both the "antecedent" (viz. the concessive adverbial con­ stituent) and the "consequent" (viz. the main clause). 5) For the oppositions between concessive conditionals on the one hand and concessives and conditionals, respectively, on the other, see König (1986). 6) Note that the main clauses of (1)-(2) are called factual while they contain difuture predi­ cate, a tense that was discussed in 2.1.4 as a typical irrealis phenomenon. But the factuality of futures depends ultimately on the nature of the speech act in which they occur. Confident predic­ tions like the main clause in (1)-(2) are (meant to be) no less factual than utterances in which unequivocal realis tenses/moods occur. See also note 17 of chapter 2. 7) In 1.4I argued that normally in linguistics, categories are discrete as to their form but continuous as to their meaning, to the effect that we should not speak of 'fuzzy edges' and over­ lap between categories but of the neutralization of the formal differences between them. However, in the case of concessives and concessive conditionals there may also be formal over­ lap: the (factual) concessive may be expressed in the form of a concessive conditional ( = even + the conditional subordinator). Examples are et-si in Latin and even though in English (see König 1986: 240). Very often diachronic factors are involved in this shift of concessive condi­ tionals to concessives {though in English is originally non-factual). 8) A different kind of neutralization between conditionals and concessive conditionals is the existence of conditionals whose main clause is factual, just as the main clause of a conces­ sive conditional. 9) Ever as it is used in (4) is sometimes called, like universal any, a 'free-choice quantifier', in that it indicates a free choice from any number of possibilities. See Quirk et al. (1972: 751) and König (1986: 231). The suffix -ever is distributionally not confined to concessive sentences, where a contrast is expressed or implied. It may also occur in 'indifferent' relative clauses ('I'll do whatever you like'). See further 6.3.3 below. 10) Dutch of (cf. German ob) is etymologically connected with English if. In a number of languages, conditional subordinators are etymologically derived from and/or semantically con­ nected with interrogatives. See Haiman (1978: 565), Traugott (1985: 291). And often, the in­ direct interrogative particle is cognate to the disjunctive particle.

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11) en is the contracted form of ean (=ei 4- an). As such it is relatively recent, diachronically, and it could be a clue as to the diachronic status of ei per (see further 6.3.3 below). 12) This 'apodotic' use of alla poses some problems. One might suppose that alla intro­ ducing an apodosis points to co-ordination (see Ruijgh 1971:712,785). And the adversative coordinate relation between two (independent) clauses is indeed semantically compatible with the concessive conditional. However, many ei per-clauses contain the subjunctive mood, the subor­ dination-mood par excellence. This would seem to point to an adverbial status of alla ('nevertheless'). Perhaps the dilemma may be solved in diachronic terms: synchronically, apodotic alia is adverbial, whereas diachronically it has the function of a coordinator. 13) The remaining instances of concessive ei per gar.Il.4,55; 8,153; 12,302; 22,487; Od. 2, 246; 18,318. 14) 'Setting the scene' may be seen as the general discourse-function of the sentence-ini­ tial conditional. The first discussion in which conditionals are described as the 'topics' of their main clause is Haiman (1978). Further testing and elaboration in Ford & Thompson (1986). Some application to Dutch and Greek in Rijksbaron (1986). Notice that what in Haiman (1978) is called the 'topic status' of conditionals (cf. Ickler (1981), where conditionals are discussed under 'situational topics') has in Functional Grammar to be discussed in terms of 'Theme' (see the definition of 'Theme' in Dik 1978:19: "the Theme specifies the universe of discourse with respect to which the subsequent predication is presented as relevant"). In spite of the confident tone of the proposals just mentioned, the discourse function of conditionals still deserves much investigation. Especially the order of the subclause and the main clause and its impact on the dis­ course function of the subclause - clause-final conditional cannot be 'topics' - needs much fur­ ther research. This does not only apply to conditionals, but to other subclauses and peripheral elements too. For an interesting discourse-oriented discussion of the linear ordering of sub­ clauses and main clauses see Ramsey (1987). 15) Ex. (7) may be read generic, too, in spite of the fact that it applies to a particular situa­ tion. See Ruijgh (1971: 726). 16) Extensive discussion in Ruijgh (1971: 719). 17) Ruijgh (1971:687,720) points out that te in digressive independent clauses {gar te, de te, alla te) is, within a diachronic perspective, more recent than te in non-restrictive relative clauses (hôs te, hos té). This observation is important in connection with assessment of the diachronic status of ei per. See below, 6.3.3. 18) To my mind, a more fundamental value of de (especially in diachronic space) is that of topic marking. The opposition between the continuative and the adversative use of the par­ ticle may then be accounted for, in a unifying way, in discourse-pragmatic terms: 'topic continuity' (see Givón, ed. 1983) vs. 'topic shift'. From Ickler (1981), it appears to me that there are striking similarities between de, especially as it is used in older Greek (Homer) and the OldRussian particle ze. The latter is described by Ickler (1977,1981) in terms of topic marking. 19) Unless we take and in the sense of 'and moreover'. 20) Actually, the extraction (left-dislocation) of a constituent which is marked by de is not confined to concessive conditionals; it is a common phenomenon in Homer. Compare the fre­ quent (formular) expression ton d'hôs oun enoêse ('And him(,) when he saw him') as well as cases like Tudeidên d'ouk an gnoiês poteroisi meteiê ('And Tudeides(,) you could not discern among whom he was',Il.5,85). See also ex. (37) in 6.4.3 below. This kind of topicalization, which

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in other terminology may be termed 'thematization' (see Dik (1978: 132 ff.), is highly charac­ teristic of the Greek epic language, and less so for later Greek. It deserves of an investigation in its ownright,preferably within the perspective of orality and the influence of writing and literacy on language use. 21) Cf. Thompson & Longacre (1985: 197) and König (1986: 233). See also ex. (23) in 2.3.1.6 above. 22) See also Ruijgh (1971:829). As regards 'rhetoric' Od. 20,49 is comparable to this ex­ ample. 23) Notice that sometimes factuality (viz. specific reference to a particular, existing state of affairs) is absent anyway, because the proposition functioning as conditional is generic, i.e devoid of any specific spatial or temporal reference (see 2.1.4 above). This is the case in (8) (simile), (9)), (10), (11) (simile) and (12) (simile). 24) Rieu translates "if you care about your family at all", but the negative polarity item at all does not capture the scalar properties of the expression. In later Greek, there are many in­ stances of ei per which involve the semantics of at all. In the present study, however, we cannot discuss these (see however ex. (37) in 6.4.3 below with note 53). See Bakker (in prep.). 25) Notice that in Dutch self ('zelf') and even ('zelfs') are etymologically cognate. Further­ more, the relevant expressions in Romance (Fr. même, It. medesimo, Sp. mismo: 'even') are derived from Lat. memet/temet/semet ipsimum ('me/you/him self). I owe the last observation to prof. C.J. Ruijgh. 26) After Homer it is even obligatory, yielding a separate conditional subordinator, ean ( = ei + an) beside ei. 27) According to Chantraine (1953:278). Notice, however, that ke(n), the Aeolic counter­ part of an, is by no means rare in optative conditionals in Homer, see Monro ( 1891:285-86). In these cases, ke seems to have its original function as a demonstrative: 'then', 'in that case'. For an example, see ex. (38) in 6.4.3 below. 28) See Kühner-Gerth (1904: 482), Goodwin (1889:147,192). 'Optative + a n ' i n a con­ ditional is an example of a typical main clause phenomenon ('potential optative') occurring in a subordinate clause. The conditional containing 'optative + an' is, paradoxically, an indicative conditional ('if it is true that..'). 29) Compare . 5,232, some lines later, where eiper an aute is localized in 5.5, before the trochaic caesura. This is of course in line with the localization of the -⋃⋃- ⋃ word-type (cp. the localization of akhnumenosper in 5.2.2 sub I.A1) above). 30) In the terminology of Nagler (1967: 281), eiper an autos /tai and ei per an aute could be characterized as two allomorphs of one and the same preverbal Gestalt in the poet's mind. Another instance is the phrase hêi per an houtos (Il. 7,286). 31) It is interesting to note that the ei per an autos/aute formula exclusively occurs in the first five books of the Iliad (both instances of ei per an aute even occur in close proximity: Il. 5, 224; 232). This is an example of what Ruijgh (1957:20-1) calls "agglomération". The agglomera­ tion of expressions which are similar in sound and/or meaning is a phenomenon the frequency of which is characteristic of oral poetry. 32) For the order of conditionals and their main clauses, see Ramsey (1987). Ramsey ar­ gues (and computes) that preposed conditionals (as well as temporals) have a much larger dis-

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course-scope than postposed ones. The latter tend to refer back solely to their main clauses, whereas the former tend to have more and wider connections in the discourse. 33) In the following subsections only examples of kai ei (ei kai) are given; it goes without saying that what is said about kai ei equally applies to oud' ei, because oud' ei is simply a conces­ sive conditional whose main clause is negative (see on scalarity/concession and negation 2.4.1, 3.2.2 (note 17) and 4.3 (note 40). For the instances of oud' ei in Homer (as well as elsewhere) see Oguse (1968:267-271). 34) The instances of oud' ei are not included in this figure. 35) The other two factual instances: Il 3,215; 15,51. 36) For this particle in connection with the concept of 'redundant semantics' see 5.2.2 sub A3) and B1) above. 37) The same T2-formula in Od. 8,139. 38) The same P2-formula, with a minor difference due to inflection in Od. 7,194. 39) But for (30) such an expression is hard to find. In Il. 15, 30 we have skai polla per athlêsanta, but,firstly,this expression is not a regular formula; it belongs to the isolated and uni­ que (from the point of view of metrics and versification) cases of 'participle + per', and second­ ly (more importantly), the phrase has no scalar-superlative meaning, while in the context of (30) a concessive expression which involves superlativeness is more suited than an expression which does not. 40) In Rijksbaron (1984:76), on the other hand, it is claimed that in Classical Greek there is no marked difference between kai ei and ei kai. 41) One of them is ex. (25); the other is.Il. 17,421. 42) Notice that oud' ei has the same metrical form as ei kai] accordingly, as a formula it behaves in like fashion, as a P2-formula. Because ei and oud'(e) cannot be reversed, like ei and kai, we do notfindT2-formulas. But oud' ei can perfectly be localized in other places in the verse, for instance in 1 (beginning of the verse). 43) See Shipp ( 1972). For a detailed account of the linguistic structure of the Homeric simile see Ruijgh (1971: 846 ff.). 44) Most of the instances of adverbial te are to be found in similes, see Ruijgh (1971: 2, 25,846). 45) See exx. (11), (12) and (19), as well asIl7.11,116;12,302; 16,263. 46) There is one instance of ei per (eanper) which is, according to Kühner-Gerth (1904: 170) to be translated as 'selbst wenn': Plat. Euthyphr. 4B 10. But Denniston (21954: 488) rightly states that this example has to be interpreted otherwise. See Bakker (in prep.). 47) Notice that -pote is semantically cognate to English -ever. Both may also be used in negative polar contexts (ever, (pô)pote). 48) Another expression-type in Greek which may be used to express indeterminacy is the subjunctive mood in a relative clause (preferably introduced by hosos). As an early example of this usage Il. 3,66 may be adduced. 49) The rationale behind the neutralization is self-evident in the case of (34): when a scalar term occurs in the conditional, the concessive marking of the conditional is optional; it just may or may not occur. In the case of (35) the neutralization, viz. the interpretation of if as even if, is

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due to Gricean principles of cooperative conversation, as König (1986: 238) plausibly states: a question in the format of q ifρ? makes sense only if both speaker and addressee assume that ρ is an unfavorable condition for q (hence the concessive interpretation), for if ρ would be favorable or even neutral, it would be useless to ask the question. As for (36), here the conces­ sive interpretation seems to be triggered by the non-obtainance of the state of affairs referred to in the main clause and the factual nature of the conditional. 50) See Denniston (21954: 487-8), Kühner-Gerth (1904:112), Iiddell & Scott, s.v. 51) This is what Haiman (1983) calls the 'iconichy of language, the principle of 'one form - one meaning'. 52) Notice that between two senses there is no formal difference: they belong to one and the same lexeme. Accordingly, we need not speak here in terms of the neutralization of the (for­ mal) differences between two items (categories), but in terms of overlap: the set of instances of a given lexeme to which sense 'A' applies overlaps with (has an intersection with) the set of in­ stances (of the same lexeme) to which sense B' applies. 53) It might be objected here that the speaker is a seer, who in that quality already knows what will happen, whereas scepsis is a matter of uncertainty. But this objection does no justice to Teiresias' communicative intentions: his point is to stress the terrible things that will happen when Odysseus and his men slaughter the cattle of Helios. 54) We might say that the conditional in (37) contains the semantic presupposition of the main clause in a hypothesized form. lSemantic presupposition' we call what a sentence implies irrespectively of its being 'true' or 'false' (see Levinson 1983:174-75) and irrespectively of its dis­ course function. Thus the presupposition of He regretted that he had murdered Jones is He mur­ dered Jones. Likewise, whether or not Odysseus comes home in evil plight, he has escaped in any case. Now semantic presuppositions may be 'suspended', when they enter in a conditional clause. The speaker then wants to explicitly state that the truth of the presupposition is not a matter of course, as it normally is. This happens in (37). Presupposition suspension is a more usual func­ tion of ei per in later, post-Homeric times. Ei per then invariably is placed after its main clause, like most presupposition-suspending conditionals. Notice that in English, presuppositionsuspending conditionals tend to contain Negative Polarity Items (, at all, compare überhaupt in German). See in detail Bakker (in prep: ch. 7). See also Horn (1972: ch. 1). 55) Notice that this example constitutes a case of anaphoric ke in an optative conditional (see on ex. (18) in 6.3.1.5 above).

7 PERIPHERAL INSTANCES

7.0 Introduction We have now discussed the instancesofper that belong to the recognizable expression-types. In the present chapter we go on to discuss the remaining material in the data-base. These instances form a heterogeneous group, but most of them have in common that the presence oiper cannot be straightfor­ wardly accounted for within the scalar-concessive framework. They are unclassifiable and/or divergent by their form or by their meaning. A number of alternative ways are open to deal with these instances. It is with these alterna­ tive approaches that we are concerned in the present chapter. It is important to notice that the distribution of the examples over the various sections and subsections of this chapter does not reflect any clear-cut division in the material: some instances can be discussed under more than one heading. Rather, the division of the present chapter serves expository purposes; it is meant to provide the various points of view from which the 'residue' which is left in the data-base can be considered. 7.1 Linguistic irregularity in Homer 7.1.1 Unclassifiable vs. divergent instances Any description of the actual use of a linguistic item has to allow for the fact that instances of the item which conform without problems to the defini­ tion exist side by side with cases to which the definition applies to a lesser de­ gree. To acknowledge this fact is essential for any sane descriptive linguistics. Linguistic phenomena often do not allow of exact classification and seem to thwart attempts to arrive at a typology which is based on discrete kinds. In other words, an adequate description has to make a distinction between prototypical and peripheral instances of the item described. This distinction is the core of

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Prototype Theory, which was introduced in 1.4 above. A second element of this theory is the notion of continuous space between two extremes. This notion has played an important part, too, at various points of the argument of the present study. Peripherality has a number of aspects, which have to be kept distinct. A given instance of per may be called peripheral either when it is unclassifiable or when it is divergent from a norm. Unclassifiable instances ofper are the ones that do not belong to one of the recognizable expression-types discussed in chapters 3-6. However, this isolated status need not preclude them from being full-fledged scalar particles. In 3.6 above I have presented some unclassifiable yet scalar instances. The willingness to call them 'peripheral' depends on the value one attaches to the classification into various expression-types: if one is prepared to claim that the classification reflects a real difference for the con­ temporary language user, the instances may easily acquire the status of excep­ tions. On the other hand, if the classification into expression-types is merely used for the sake of presentation, the unclassifiable instances may not be 'peripheral' at all. However, there are also unclassifiable instances which can­ not possibly be called scalar; to these the predicate 'peripheral' does apply. They will be discussed in 7.5 below. Peripherality may also involve divergence. The norm with respect to which an instance ofper may be divergent is one of the expression-types discussed in chapters 3,4 and 6. Instances of per may be divergent either as to their mean­ ing or as to their form. In the first case, the (scalar) meaning undergoes a change (viz. disappears), while in the second it is the specific form of the expressiontype that changes. 'Divergence' will be discussed in 7.3. In 7.3.3 I shall argue that a change in form is always concomitant with a decrease in (semantic) prototypicality. 7.1.2 The explanation of peripheral instances in Homer The existence of peripheral instances which form the residue of the data­ base is characteristic of the description of natural language facts in general, but it applies a fortiori to 'Homeric' linguistics. In Homer, the peripheral instances of a given item are more numerous than in ordinary language. Not all of those instances are peripheral without more ado; a number of them can be explained on the basis of some explanatory parameters that are specifically 'Homeric'. The nature of the Homeric poems, as well as the way they are composed, is such that pure linguistics cannot, and need not, cover all the instances of a given item. The residue left does not only comprise those instances that are diver-

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gent and/or unclassifiable in linguistic terms. Homeric linguistics has to allow, in addition, for the existence of peripheral instances the analysis of which trans­ gresses the boundaries of linguistics proper. The residue of a given item in Homer is a heterogeneous affair. In the peripheral status of a given instance, either of the following three factors may be involved. 1) Redundant semantics. A given linguistic item may be used to change the metrical form of a given phrase or expression, so as to adapt it to the ex­ igencies of the verse. This practice yields instances of the item which have a redundant and hence peripheral status. A necessary condition for this usage in the case of particles (e.g. kai in participial phrases, see 5.2.2) is that the 'redundant' element is possible anyway in the language, as a 'strengthener' (see 4.4.2 above). 2) Semantic integration of formulas. Peripherality may be due to the way the formula in which an item occurs is actually used in the epic diction. A less than perfect semantic integration of the formula may yield a less than prototypi­ cal or even peripheral status of the linguistic item(s) of which the formula con­ sists (see also 5.3.2). 3) Solution of ad hoc metrical problems. This factor differs from the other two in that no specific formular connections are involved. Small words with a high frequency in the language are apt to be used to prevent hiatus or create a long syllable which is metrically necessary. The resulting redundance is highly characteristic of Homeric poetry. After all, the metrical space of the hexameter has to be filled, and rapidly filled, also when there are no formulas or formular phrases at hand. It is important to realize that these three factors do not create any clearcut tripartition in the material (the peripheral instances of a given item). Very often it is impossible to assign a given peripheral instance exclusively to one of the three. Rather, the three factors together constitute a general framework within which the peripheral instances of a given item can be assessed. Beside the internal constituency of the framework formed by the three factors, there is the question how far the framework extends. In other words, when is a given peripheral instance to be accounted for within the framework of epic diction and when is it not? This is a difficult question and one which does not allow of a clear answer, as we do not possess any contemporaneous linguistic material in the form of (non-formulaic) prose texts. It may seem at­ tractive to treat a problematical instance of a given item as a stop-gap and to

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adduce the third factor for its explanation. But it is very hard to determine whether it is not a normal peripheral case which would still be present if metri­ cal pressure were removed. And to apply the concept of semantic integration of formulas may seem the appropriate solution to some problematical instance of a given recurrent phrase, but, again, it is impossible to determine whether the boundaries of ordinary language have been transgressed. As for the first group of the Homeric residue, the redundancy here amounts to a mere systematization of what is present anyway in ordinary language. Generally, we may say that in Homer, in spite of the constraints and ex­ igencies of the oral-formulaic 'medium', the occurrence of expressions that are in overt and provable conflict with the Greek language as we know it, or that would not have occurred outside the epicdiction,is very rare. This greatly adds, of course, to the difficulty to isolate the specifically Homeric part of the residue. Sometimes there is yet another factor at work which transgresses the boundaries of linguistics proper. A given instance of per may have the normal scalar and/or concessive meaning of per but this does not appear from the ex­ pression itself: the instance has properties that preclude it from being treated as a prototypical instance. To account for the scalarity of such instances, we have to appeal to what the poet might have meant in using the phrase. Such an attempt to justify the presence of a given instance of per means leaving the realm of linguistics proper and enter the domain of literary interpretation. To recognize this possibility may seem strange in a linguistic study, but we have to allow for the possibility that a poet (or any other language user) may mould his thought in such an unusual form that the expression falls outside the scope of the description of the expression-type in question. The examples in the present chapter will be presented according to the following ordering principle. First (7.2), I will discuss the instances that recur elsewhere in Homer. After these verbatim repeated phrases, I will discuss in­ stances whose expression-type recurs elsewhere (7.3). These are the instances that are divergent from an expression-type either by their form or by their meaning. In the remaining sections, I will discuss unclassifiable instances by degree of increasing peripherality. The examples in 7.4 are not scalar anymore. Accordingly, they lack the major prototypical propertyofper. However, they still have a strong connection with inclusive focus particles, i.e. with the wider semantic framework within which scalar particles have to be discussed (see.2.3). In 7.5, finally, there is no question of there being any alternatives for the 'focus constituent' of per.Here/peris most peripheral with respect to the prototypi­ cal scalar instances. In7.61will argue that there is a connection between a num-

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ber of peripheral cases and the use ofper in non-scalar and non-concessive sub­ clauses which is the standard in later, post-Homeric Greek. This transition marks the boundary of the semantic field of 'Homeric' per as well as the end of the present investigation. 7.2 Semantic integration of formulas again Some of the peripheral instances to be discussed in the present chapter differ from the others in that the phrase in question recurs elsewhere, in a semantic environment in which no problem arises as to the function and mean­ ing ofper. In these cases it is possible to opt for the approach in terms of seman­ tic integration of formulas. Consider the following example: (1)

(Thersites, the ugliest of the Greeks before Troy, and a notorious quibbler, is making profit of a general disorder in the Greek army. He abuses Agamemnon and tries to persuade the Greeks to sail away, instead of enduring hardships before Troy for the benefit of this man:) ô pepones, 'elengkhe', Akhaïdes, ouket'Akhaioi, oikade per sun nêusi neômetha, tonde d'eômen autou eni Troiêi gerapessemen. "As for you, my friends, poor specimens that you are, Achaean women -I cannot call you men - let us sail home by all means and leave this fellow here to batten on his spoils." (Il.2,236).

The occurrenceofper here, which takes as its focus constituent oikade ('home') poses a problem. Denniston (21954: 482) Hsts the example under the heading 'determinative' (use), citing Monro's (21891: 320) rendering: "Let us have nothing short of return home." Evidently, we are supposed to conceive of per as lending emphasis to oikade. But mere 'emphasis' is unsatisfactory as an ac­ count ofper (or any other (Greek) particle, for that matter), especially when it is meant to apply to the prototypical uses of the particle. When dealing with the prototypical uses, we can and should be much more specific. If we are to speak about a given meaningful instance of per in terms of 'emphasis', this must be the emphasis of the focus constituent of a scalar focus particle. But in the present case there is nothing scalar: we have here a simple adhortation ('Let's go home'), in which the focus constituent 'home' does not include alternative values. At best we may say that oikade ('home') is contrasted

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with autou eni Troiêi ('here in the land of Troy'). But for the linguistic realiza­ tion of such a contrast, per is strange. Thus we have here what seems a definitely non-scalar instance of per; more will follow in the present chapter. As part of the solution to the problem posed by per in (1), we may adduce the fact that the phrase and adhortation in question recurs elsewhere in the Iliad. Consider: (2)

(When Patroclus is ready to join battle, dressed in Achilles' armour, Achilles addresses his men, the Myrmidons as follows: "Often you used to say to me: 'You are a brute, Achilles, for keeping us out of battle against our will'":) oikade per sun nêusi neômetha pontoporoisi autis, epei rha toi hôde kakos kholos empese thumôi "Let us then at least return home with our seacleaving ships. For you are in a too evil mood." (Il. 16,205).

As to the form we have here the same adhortation as in (1), but here it is scalar. The useofper in (2) belongs to the expression-type described in 3.5 above, the use oiper in wishes and commands that is associated with desirability scales. For a Myrmidon warrior, the best thing you can wish for is fighting. But fighting is impossible under the given circumstances, because of the wrath of Achilles and his refusal to join battle with his contingent. So the Myrmidons have to resort to a compromise, viz. the highest item but one on their desirability scale: sail­ ing home (lying in idleness before Troy being the worst thing imaginable). The constituent 'home' {oikade) is the highest item on the satisfactoriness scale (see 3.5.3) of the Myrmidons: the least thing desirable that still satisfies their wish. Thus the occurrence ofper in (2) can be accounted for in scalar, that is, in linguistic, terms. But then (1) is accounted for, too, so it seems, by way of the concept of semantic integration of formulas. We may reason that for formular reasons the poet has used a scalar adhortation, which is, unfortunately, semantically out of place. The context of (1) has nothing to do with desirability scales and second best possibilities. But that does not matter. Formular pressure simply is greater than the desire to achieve semantic well-formedness. The approach in terms of formular integration is useful in the case of oikade per in (1), but it cannot go all the way, I think, to a complete solution: the semantic distance between the normal and the badly integrated case simp­ ly is too great. In other cases of less than perfect semantic integration (for ex­ ample agathos per eon in ex. (65) in 5.3.2), per is less than prototypical (see 4.3.4), but the phrase does remain an instance of concessive 'participle + per'.

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In the case of oikadeperin(1), on the other hand, all that remains of the scalarity of the proper use in (2) is some vague sense of emphasis. In other words, it might be asked whether the 'catachrestic' use of oikadeperwould have been possible, even in the formulaic diction, if there had not been a possibility to use per anyway as some vague emphasizing particle, irrespectively of its occurrence in the formula oikade per. In view of the examples to be presented further in this chapter (especially those in 7.5), I am inclined to answer this answer with 'no'. The following example discussed here brings us to the last part of the Odys­ sey: (3) (Penelope is telling Odysseus (who is in disguise) a dream she has had: she has twenty geese which she delights in watching. Suddenly an eagle appears which kills them all:) autoregôklaionkai ekôkuon en per oneirôi "I wept and cried aloud in my dream." (Od. 19,541). The prepositional phrase in this example, which functions as a bucoUc clausula, raises problems. A possible interpretation of it, which does at least justice to the presence of per, is concessive. However, when we interpret (3) as 'I wept and cried aloud though it was only a dream,3 who is weeping? The Penelope who is dreaming, or the Penelope in the dream? The former possibility is ruled out, for the dream goes on. But the second possibility makes a concessive in­ terpretation of en per oneirôi strained: a person who is in a dream knows she is in a dream and conceives of her crying as something she is doing in spite of her being in a dream. A better way of dealing with en per oneirôi in (3) is leaving interpretation, whether or not subtle, aside for a moment and look at the recurrences of the phrase in question: (4) (Somewhat later in book 19, Penelope tells the beggar the strategy she has chosen: she will hold a bow contest. "Whichever of the suitors proves the handiest at stringing the bow and shoots an arrow through each of the twelve axes, with that man I will go:") nosphissamene tode doma kouridion, malakalon,enipleion biotoio, tou pote memnêsesthai oïomai en per oneirôi

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER "Bidding goodbye to this house that welcomed me as a bride, this lovely house so full of good things, this home which even in my dreams I never shall forget." Od. 19,581).4

Here en per oneirôi has a clear and unambiguous meaning which precludes any uncertainty about its interpretation. The phrase functions as a pragmatic su­ perlative in a non-factual (futural) environment (see 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 above): 'till in my dreams'. The phrase evidently represents the high point of a scale: some­ one who remembers something in his/her dreams will a fortiori do so while awake. Like all other statements containing even or a scalar superlative, the relative clause in (4) has a well-defined illocution too: the assertion of a remarkable and superlative fact. In (4) this is of course Penelope's enormous attach­ ment to Odysseus' house. It seems to me that the linguistically unproblematic occurrence of en per oneirôi in (4) is a factor to be reckoned with in the interpretation of (3). Both instances of the phrase not only occur in close proximity of one another; they also belong to one and the same episode: both are part of Penelope's words concerned with her point of view with regard to the Suitors. En per oneirôi is a formula with a limited range of occurrence: as far as we can see on the basis of extant Greek epic, it is confined to one particular theme which occupies a well-defined place and role in the narrative. Consequently, the imperfect in­ tegration of the formula occurs near to the perfect one. However, just as in the case of kade per in (1), I do not believe that en per oneirôi in (3) should be accounted for in purely formulaic terms. The con­ cept of semantic integration is just a factor not to be neglected. But the nonscalar use of per in (3) may well belong to the peripheral instancesofper, in which scalarity as the major prototypical feature has disappeared. 7.2.1 Formular or linguistic irregularity? Beside (1) and (3), there are more phrases featuring per that are nonscalar and that recur elsewhere in a scalar form. For these examples, however, the approach in terms of formular integration, though it is still possible, is less suitable: in one case (ex. (5) below) the alleged badly integrated formula is repeated in its ownright,and in another case (ex. (8) below) it can hardly be called a formula at all. These two examples may serve, in the present exposi­ tion, as transitional cases between exx. (1) and (3) above and the examples to be presented below (7.5).

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Consider: (5)

In book 22 of the Odyssey it is told how, after the murder of the Suitors, the unfaithful maidservants are collectively hanged: êspairon de podessi minuntha per, ou ti mala dên. "They kicked with their feet for a little while, not very long." (Od. 22,473).

Again, the occurrence of per, which here modifies a temporal adjunct in a fac­ tual context, is problematic. Not only is per non-scalar; it is not inclusive either, as is shown by the bucolic clausula which follows (ou ti mada den, 'not very long'). The phrase minuntha per, ou ti mala den in a factual environment recurs a couple of times (Il. 1,416; 13,573). The three examples belong to the cases where an interpretation in terms of the supposed etymology of per (see 1.3.4) has been proposed ('a very short time'). Accordingly, the use of per exemplified by (5) is considered to be very old in this approach. But to suppose that (5) exemplifies an old relict, which has otherwise disappeared from the language, is entirely gratuite. To my mind there is no reason whatever to assume that the use of per in (5) is particularly 'old'. Just as all the other alleged instances of the supposed 'origina' ('intensive') meaning of per8, it can be accounted for otherwise. The phrase minuntha per as it occurs in (5) occupies a central place within the present chapter; it can in principle be discussed both in connection with the semantic integration of formulas and in connection with peripherally (see 7.5 below), thereby indicating the overlap between these concepts. The use of per in (5), where it fills, together with minuntha, the slot be­ tween the T-caesura and the bucolic diaeresis, can in principle be analyzed as the imperfect semantic integration oiminunthaper as it occurs in adhortations and commands. Minunthaper in these contexts entirely conforms to the analysis in terms of desirability and satisfactoriness scales of section 3.5.3, just as oikade per in (2). There are three instances of minuntha per in adhortations ('if only for a little while'). One of them has already been presented as ex. (37) of ch. 3; the other two are presented here: (6)

(Menestheus sends a herald to both 'Aiantes':) Aiant'y Argeiôn hêgêtore khalkokhitônôn, ênôgei Peteôo diotrepheos philos huios keis'imen, ophra ponoio minuntha per antiasêton, amphoterô men mallon.

248

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER "My lords and commanders, (he said), Menestheus my noble master begs you to come over, if only for a little while, and lend him a hand in his difficulties, preferably both of you." (77.12,356). (7)

(In his dream Achilles addresses the ghost of Patroclus:) alla moi asson stêthi, minimtha per, amphibalonte allêlous, olooio tetarpomestha gooio. "But now come nearer to me, so that we may hold each other in our arms, if only for a moment, and draw comfort from our tears." (/7. 23, 97).

In these examples, we see minuntha per in a semantic environment in which per can be analyzed as a full-fledged scalar particle. The realis environment in (5), on the other hand, robs per of its proper scalar meaning. However, there is reason to refrain from an approach to minunthaper in (5) in terms of seman­ tic formular integration. Minunthaper as it is used in (5), followed by ou ti mala dên, is apparently a formulaic expression in its own right: it occurs three times. This makes the expression less suitable for an analysis in terms of semantic in­ tegration: for the very point of this approach is that the badly integrated in­ stance is not a formula in its own right, but a 'catachresis' of it. We have to allow for the possibility, then, that minunthaper in (5) is simp­ ly a highly peripheral and atypical instance of per which is not connected, by being a formula, with the scalar per in (6) and (7). Indeed, per in (5) is so atypi­ cal and unlike any of the other instances of the particle (except the ones presented in 7.5 below) that we have to admit that the difference with the par­ ticle ge is minimal. We might even consider the possibility thatgewas not used in (5) solely because it is prosodically infelicitous (a consonant is needed before ou ti mala dên).11 The following two instances of the combimtiongunaikiper (Vornan', dat.) are in more than one way comparable to the instances of minunthaper above: (8)

(Thetis to her son Achilles, who is still mourning for Patroclos:) teknon emon, teo mekhris oduromenos kai akheuôn sên edeai kradiên, memnêmenos oute ti sitou ouf eunês? agathon de gunaiki per enphïlotêti misgesth'ai). "My child, how much longer are you going to eat your heart out in lamentation and misery, forgetful even of your food and bed? It is good for you to make love to a woman." (i7.24,130).

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(The soul of Agamemnon to Odysseus, after he has told how he was murdered by his wife Clytaemnestra:) toi nun mê pote kai su gunaiki per êpios einai. "Let this be a lesson to you also. Never be too gentle even with your wife." {Od. 11,441).

Although per in (9) certainly does not belong to the most characteristic instan­ ces of the particle, it allows at least of a scalar reading. A scalar or even an in­ clusive reading of per in (8), on the other hand, has curious consequences: 'It is good for you to make love even/also to a woman'. But homosexuality is so alien to Achilles and the Iliad as a whole that the intended meaning of gunaiki per in (8) can hardly be scalar. Per in (8) is just as peripheral and atypical as in (5), and just as in the case of minuntha per, it is false to speak oîgunaikiper in (8) and (9) as the imperfectly resp. the perfectly integrated case of one and the same formula. 7 3 Divergence: changes in form and meaning In the present section, I discuss instances that are either by their form or by their meaning reminiscent of scalar expressions discussed in chapter 3 and 4. In subsection 7.3.1,I present some examples which have retained the original form of the expression-type but lost the scalar meaning, and in 7.3.21 will dis­ cuss examples which have retained their meaning but have changed their form. Strictly speaking, the non-scalar instances that have retained the form of the original expression-type are more peripheral from a semantic point of view than those which still have a scalar meaning. But for the sake of parallelism both groups are discussed as two subsections of one and the same section. 7.3.1 Changes in meaning Sometimes we find instances of per which belong as to their form to one of the expression-types discussed earlier. However, they are not scalar. Con­ sider: (10) (Phoenix tries to persuade Achilles:) all'Akhilleu pore kai su Dios kourêisin hepesthai timen, hê t'allôn per epignamptei noon esthlôn. "Achilles, you must give honour to the Daughters of Zeus ( = the 'Prayers'), (honour), which bends the mind of other sensible people." (77. 9, 514).

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The original expression-type here is 'adjective + per' functioning as a scalar superlative in a generic hos te clause (see 3.1.1). In (10) the characteristic hos te-clause contains the combination allôn per. On account of the properties of alios ('other'), this combination cannot function as a scalar expression: other (than) is exclusive. Thus the overall structure of the original expression remains, while the meaning has changed. Notice that the discourse-function of the expression has changed, too. The original expression, where 'adjective + per' in a hos te-clause has the meaning of a scalar superlative, functions in accordance with the illocutionary potential of sentences containing a scalar expression (see 2.1.2 and 2.3.1.2), to state a su­ perlative fact. This statement is invariably made on the part of the narrator in a digressive, backgrounded statement (see 3.1.3 and 3.2.4). In (10), on the other hand, we have a directive speech act (see 3.2.2) performed by one of the charac­ ters: Phoenix is trying to persuade Achilles to give up his anger. On account of alios, however, his argument does not have the a fortiori character of the instan­ ces of kai discussed in 3.2.2. Ex. (10) occurs, interestingly from the point of view of oral composition, in close proximity of the following example: (11) αll' hote dê Meleagron edu kholos, hos te kai allôn oidanei en stêthessi noon puka per phroneontôn. "But then Meleager was overmastered by passion, and that is what happens to other sensible men too." (Il. 9,554). Here alios occurs also. But here it is the focus constituent of a non-scalar in­ stance of kai, notofper. Per instead functions to modify an adjectival combina­ tion which recurs elsewhere (see also ex. (2) in 3.1.1): (12) (The girdle of Aphrodite:) enth'eni men philotês, en d'himeros, en d'oaristus parphasis, hê t' eklepse noon puka per phroneontôn. "It contains Love and Desire and the sweet bewitching words that delude the mind of the cleverest people." (. 14,217). This example is scalar, noon.puka.per phroneontôn functioning as a full-fledged scalar superlative. Accordingly, the use of the phrase in (11), where it is a kind of apposition to the non-scalar (as well as non-directive) phrase kai allôn, may be treated as a case of imperfect semantic integration of the formula in ques­ tion. There is recurrence both on the level of expression-type and on the level of actual wording.

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The following two examples are instances of per in comparative expres­ sions. The original scalar meaning of per here (for which see 3.3) has disap­ peared, and the particle seems to be merely used because it is an organic part of a rhythmically pleasing bucoUc clausula: (13) all' aiei te Dios kreissôn noosêper andrôn. "But the thoughts of Zeus are always stronger than the thoughts of men." (Il. 16, 688). (14) (Diomedes to Odysseus:) êtoi ego meneo hai tlêsomai: alla minuntha hêmeôn essetai hêdos, epei nephelêgereta Zeus Trôsin de boletai dounai kratosêper hêmin "Indeed I will stand and take what comes. But our friends will not benefit by thatforlong. Zeus the Cloud-bearer has decided he would rather see the Trojans win than us." (Il. 11,319). Any attempt to read a scalar meaning in these examples is bound to fail: 'the thoughts of Zeus are stronger even than those of men' is certainly not the in­ tended meaning of (13) and, besides, a definitely un-Homeric way of think­ ing/saying. In Homer, the thoughts of humans simply are very weak and those of gods very strong. Likewise, in (14) there is a straightforward, non-scalar op­ position: Zeus wants to see the Trojans win, and not the Greeks; there is no question of his wanting to see the ones win even more than the others. Finally, I present an instance of ei per (gar) in which the proper meaning of that subordinator is absent: (15) (Hecuba is imploring her son Hector to come inside the walls and not to fight Achilles:) skhetlios; ei per gar se kataktanêi, ous'et'egôge klausomai en lekheessi. "He is a savage; and you need not think that, if he kills you, I shall lay you on a bier and weep for you (for he will let the nimble dogs eat you)." (Il. 22, 86). The conditional is not concessive; nor is there any trace of the characteristic sceptic modality which is the natural outcome of the use of evenifindirective speech acts (see 6.4 above).

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7.3.2 Changes inform The examples in the previous subsection have retained their form and changed (lost) their original scalar meaning. In the examples to be presented in the present subsection, it is the other way around: they have retained the scalar meaning but have changed their form. The change in form is due to a movement of per from its original locus. Consider: (16) espelagos mega toion, hothen te per oud' oiônoi autoetes oikhneusin, epei mega te deinon te. "Into that wide expanse of sea, which is so vast and perilous that even the birds cannot make their passage in the year." (Od. 3,321). Like exx. (10)-(11) above, this example is based upon the expression-type 'scalar superlative in non-restrictive relative clause modified by te' Per has been removed from its original place, forming a collocation with te} Another example: (17) (Menestheus sends a herald to both Aiantes (see (6) above): 'Ask them to come over':) ei de sphin kai keithiponos kai neikos orôren alia per oios itô Telamônios alkimos Aias. "But if the two of them are as hard-pressed as ourselves, let us at least have the brave Telamonian Aias." (Il. 12,349). Here the basic expression-type is the use of per in wishes and commands (see 3.5). Again,per has moved away from its original locus: properly speaking, oios ('alone') is its focus constituent. In (17), per modifies the whole command in­ stead, but its meaning stays the same.18 In the rest of the examples to be discussed in the present section, the scalar term oude is involved. The examples differ from (16)-(17) in that the formal change is concomitant with a decrease in prototypicahty, whereas with per in (16)-(17) nothing is amiss semantically. Consider as a start: (18) (Zeus wants to make love to Here. He assures her that they will not be seen:) -⋃⋃oud'an nôï diadrakoi Eelios per hou te kai oksutatonpeletaiphaoseishoraasthai. "Even the Sun, whose rays provide him with the keenest sight in all the world, will not see us through the mist." (Il. 14,344).

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This example is strongly reminiscent of the cases discussed in 3.2.2, in which a noun, mostly a proper name is the focus constituent of kai and at the same time the head noun of a non-restrictive relative clause. It was argued that the rela­ tive clause states the relevant superlative property of the person referred to with the proper name. On account of this property the name can function as the focus constituent of kai. The relative clause is modified by per, which is at­ tached as an enclitic to the subordinator. Semantically, ex. (18) is wholly equivalent to this expression-type. Just as in the case of the examples discussed in 3.2.2, the relative clause contains a su­ perlative (oksutaton, 'sharpest') and its head noun is the focus constituent of oude. The relative clause allows of a concessive interpretation. However, for­ mally there is an important difference: just as in the just preceding examples, per has been removed from its natural locus (hos per); it is attached to the head noun/focus constituent itself. Now the present investigation points out that in its prototypical uses per cannot be placed after extensional terms; per is the particle of intensional scalarity. And whenpercomes to be used with substantives (extensional terms), this happens within participial phrases which have lost their scalar meaning (see 4.3.2.2). The removal ofper in (18) from the intensional to the extensional part of the expression, and hence the disruption of a common expression-type, seems to be due to the influence of the verse. In the normal use discussed in 3.2.2, the preferred positionofhosper is at the beginning of the line with the superlative before the caesura, see exx. (12) and (14) ofch.3. In (18) above, however, this is unattractive because of the in­ itial vowel of oksutaton'. hou per oksutaton begins with a cretic (-⋃-) and is, hence, metrically unacceptable in the hexameter.20 When we add to this the fact thatêeeliospermakes a nice bucoUc clausula, the reason why the original expression-type 'kai/oude X, hos per superlative' is changed into oude Xper, hos seems at first sight to be sufficiently accounted for. But (18) is not an isolated case and the removal of per from its original place is a recurrent phenomenon; in the following example the same move­ ment of per can be seen: (19) (Patroclus to Eurypylos: I will go to Achilles with the message of Nestor:) all oud' hôs per seio methêsô teiromenoio "All the same, I am not going to leave you in the lurch, exhausted as you are.".(Il. 11,841).

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In the case of this example the basic expression-type is 'kai hôs' followed by 'participle + per' (see 4.2.1). Again, per has moved from its natural position, this time the participle, to the focus constituent of the scalar particle in ques­ tion. Note that ex. (19) not only differs from the original examples as to its form; semantically there is also a difference, in that the analysis proposed in 4.2.1 for kai/oud' hos does not apply here: hôs cannot be conceived of as an anaphoric pronoun referring backwards to the circumstances in spite of which the state of affairs denoted by the main clause obtains. Instead,oud'hoshas the idiomatic sense which is normal in later times (see 4.2.2), 'nevertheless', 'all the same'. Thus, concomitant with the formal difference we have in (19) a semantic dif­ ference with the original expression-type. However, the difference does not in­ volve the loss of scalarity, as in (10) and (11) above. Rather, the change involves the normal development of the meaningofper, in which scalarity is converted into concession. Exx. (18) and (19) may be seen as transitional cases between the original expression-type discussed in 3.2.2 and 4.2.1 and the examples to be discussed presently. Per has been removed from its proper seat, but that proper seat, a non-restrictive relative clause or an apposed participle, is still present. The ad­ dition of per to êelios in (18) may be due to difficulties in the versification, but the following examples show that apparently no boundaries of what is linguis­ tically possible have been transgressed: the direct addition of per to the focus constituent of oude apparently has become a practice in its ownright,and the apposed element, the most characteristic feature of the original expressiontype, and the proper seat ofper,is lost: (20) (Achilles is dragging the dying Lycaon to the river:) oud' humin potamos per eurroos, argurodinês arkesei, hôi dê dêtha poleas hiereuete taurous. "Nothing shall save you, not even fair Scamander of the Silver Eddies, to whom for years you have been sacrificing bulls." (Il. 21, 130). Admittedly, there is a (non-restrictive) relative clause here, but its meaning is not nearly as scalar (superlative) as that of (18) and the examples in 3.2.2. It may in principle be interpreted as carrying a concessive tone, but this is not a very useful thing to say, for concession is not inherent in the meaning of the relative clause. The relative clause is absent anyway in the folllowing examples: (21) (Odysseus tells about the departure of him and his comrades from the house of Circe:)

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oude men oud' enthen per apêmonas êgon hetairous. "But not even now did I get them all off without a casualty." (Od. 10, 551). (22) (Athena to Odysseus, after the latter has just landed on Ithaca:) skhetlie poikilomêta, dolôn at', ouk ar' emettes, oud' en sêei per eôn gaiêi, lêksein apataôn muthôn te klopiôn, hoi toi pedothen phïloi eisin. "And so my stubborn friend, Odysseus the arch-deceiver, with his craving for intrigue, does not propose even in his own country to drop his sharp practice and the lying tales that he drops from the bottom of his heart." (Od. 13,294). The following examples show that the expression-type oude X per may be used as a formula. On account of its convenient metrical form (bucolic clausula) the phrase oude nu soi per ('not even to you') is useful as a formula; it allows for flection, in that the personal pronoun soi (dat.) may be replaced by a demonstrative element: (23) (Athena to her father Zeus: 'Why don't we rescue Odysseus'?:) oude nu soi per entrepetai philon êtor, Olumpie? "Even your heart is unmoved." (Od. 1,59). (24) (Hector urges Melanippus to defend the body of his cousin Dolops:) houtô de, Melanippe, methêsomen? oude nu soi per entrepetai philon êtor anepsiou ktamenoio? "Melanippus, are we to take things down like this? Is it nothing even to you that they have killed your cousin?" (R. 15,553). (25) (Poseidon to Apollo, when they meet on the battle-field:) nêputV hos anoun kradiên ekhes: oude nu ton per memneai, hosa dê pathomen kakaIliamphi. "But what a fool you are and what a short memory you have! You seem even to have forgotten all the hardships you and I endured at Ilium [you do not even remember those things..]." (Il. 21,441). The following example represents the end-point of the development. Here per is not attached to the focus constituent of oude, but directly to oude itself, forming the collocation oude per.22 It occurs only once in Homer:

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER (26) (The soul of Agamemnon to Odysseus: 'You will reach your home and you will see your wife and your son':) hê d' erne oude per huios eniplêsthênai akoitis ophthalmoisin ease; paros de me pephne kai auton. "Whereas that wife of mine refused me even the satisfaction of setting eyes on my son. She could not wait so long before she killed his father." (Od. 11,452).

7.3.3 From prototype to periphery As to their form, the examples of oude {..) per discussed in the previous subsection may be ordered by degree of increasing divergence from the norm, which is posed by the original expression-type: (27) oude X, hos per

oude Xper, hos

oude Xper

oude per Χ

The leftmost item on this 'scale' represents the original expression-type dis­ cussed in 3.2.2 above; the second item represents exx. (18) and (19) above; the third item represents exx. (20)-(25) and the rightmost item ex. (26). As a general rule, we may say that the more rightward an item has to be localized, the more it is divergent as to its form from the original expression-type. But a change in function and meaning is involved as well: only at the left part of the scale has per its normal function, which has to be stated in terms of superlativeness and intensionality. In the right part of the scale, per is attached to extensional terms and the connection with intensionality has disappeared. But wherever a given instance of oude (..) per has to be localized on the scale, one thing stays the same: the instance always involves scalarity. This is why the examples in question have been dealt with under the heading 'changes of form', rather than 'changes in meaning'. Thus the examples discussed in the previous subsection may be seen as disruptions, more or less drastic, of the original expression-type leftmost on scale (27). Yet I do not believe that any of them is artificial in the sense that it could not have occurred in the ordinary language, outside the epic diction. To claim this would indeed be an untenable position, in view of the occurrence of the collocation oude per after Homer, in non-formular texts. Rather, we would have to say that increasing formal divergence from the norm, as dis­ played by (27), reflects decreasing prototypicality. In other words, the more rightward a given instance of oude (..) per has to be located on scale (27), the less specific is the contribution that per makes to the meaning of the scalar ex­ pression. At the left extreme of scale (27), per has its own, clearly recognizable

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meaning and function and is as such maximally differentiated from oude. On the right extreme, on the other hand, it might be asked about a given instance of per why it occurs at all, as it has a minimal, and minimally specified, func­ tion. Closely connected with prototypicalityispredictability. In the leftmost part of the scale {oude X, hos per, discussed in 3.2.2), per is maximally predictable; its occurrence can be predicted on the basis of the description offered in 3.2.2: whenever the relevant superlative intension of the focus constituent of kai or oude is added in the form of a non-restrictive relative clause, we predict that this relative clause is modified by per (hos per). When per is used this way, it belongs to the prototypical instances of the particle; it has a clearly specified function in an expression-type which is easily recognizable as such. Conse­ quently, it is a welcome item in the linguistic description of per, as prototypes are the most rewarding items to describe and predict. In the rightmost part of scale (27), on the other hand, the occurrence of per is minimally predictable in linguistic terms. Per as used in exx. (20)-(26) is a typical case of strengthening (see 4.4.2). The distribution of per at this ex­ treme should be dealt with in terms of the residue which is inevitable and con­ comitant with any linguistic rule or definition. The instances here are peripheral, rather than prototypical, and hence often 'redundant', strictly speaking. In the typically Homeric context of the hexameter, metrics may well be an important factor in this distribution, but peripheral cases of a given lin­ guistic item occur in ordinary language as well. 7.4 Per and inclusive focus particles In the previous subsection I discussed instances of oude (..) per in which per is clearly less than prototypical. In the present subsection I discuss instan­ ces that are even more removed from the prototypical instances. The instances of per discussed in the present section are placed after the focus constituent of kai: kai X per. Oude in the previous subsection is invariably scalar; kai in the present one is not. In most cases it is a simple (non-scalar) focus particle (see 2.3): too or also. Thus, in the present subsection we are one important step removed from the original meaning ofper: scalarity has disappeared. In 5.2.2 the collocation 'kai + participle + per' was discussed. In this expression-type per is, of course, the central semantic element, while kai is addi­ tional and a case of 'redundant semantics'. In the ordinary language, the function of kai in participial phrases would be that of a strengthener. In the ex­ amples to be presented below, on the other hand, it is the other way around.

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

Here kai is the central semantic element which cannot be missed, while per is optional and 'redundant'. In the absence of a cogent set of metrical constraints, the distribution ofper here cannot be explained or the occurrence of individual cases predicted iin the same way as withkai in the participial phrase. Consider: (28) (The Greeks are praying to Zeus just before the duel of Aias and Hector: 'Grant Aias the victory':) ei de kai Hektora per phileeis kai kêdeai autou isên amphoteroisi biên kai kudos opasson. "But if you love Hector too and wish him well, let neither man be beaten and the fight be drawn." (Il. 7,204). (29) (Thootes speaking to both Aiantes, urging them to come over to help:) ei de kai enthade per polemos kai neikos orôren, alla per oios itô Telamônios alkimos Aias. "But if there is hard fighting here too, he hoped that you at least, my gallant lord, son of Telamon, would join him." (77.12,361). These examples are similar as to their form (ei de kai per) and as to the redundant status of per. In both examples, per is redundant, being optionally attached to an instance of kai (non-scalar) and its focus constituent.25 In the case of (29), the optionality ofper is clearly brought out by the fact that the line in which it occurs (and indeed the whole passage) is arepetition of a just preced­ ing passage. In the earlier version of the Hne (see also (17) above), (30) ei de sphi kai keithi ponos kai neikos orôren "But if there is hard fighting there too..." (Il. 12,348). there are differences which are due to spatial deixis: the difference is between 'you here' and 'they over there'. The occurrence of per in (29), in a line which contains adaptations, and as a means to effect the adaptations, is telling. We have here cases where the particle has lost much of its linguistic salience; it just may or may not occur. Consequently, the useofper in (28) and (29) is minimally predictable in a linguistic framework. Some more examples: (31) mûthoi de kai êôthen per esontai Têlemakhôi kai emoi diaeipemen allêloisi "In the morning too there will be stories for Telemachus and me to tell each other" (Od. 4,214).

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(32) (Agamemnon requests Menelaus to wake the Greek leaders: 'Call each men by his father's name and let them have their dignities:') mede megalizeo thumôi alia kai autoi per poneômetha. "And do not be proud. Let's work ourselves too." (Il.10,70). In one case, the combination kai X per is scalar. Accordingly, the example in question is similar to the instances of oude X per discussed in the previous section: (33) (Menelaus deliberating in a difficult situation:) ei de pou Aiantos ge boên agathoio puthoimên, amphô ' aûtis iontes epimnêsaimetha kharmês kai pros daimona per, ei pôs erusaimetha nekron Pêleïdêi Akhillêï. "And if only I knew where the great Aias could be found, the pair of us might go and make another stand, even with Heaven against us, and try to save the body for my lord Achilles."(Il.17,104). Notice the unusual case of brevis in longo in 5 after per. The poet evidently had difficulties in filling the Pi-part of the line. Occasionally, we find instances of kai X per that belong to the early (Homeric) cases of an expression-type which is very frequent in later Greek, per in 'the same ay-contexts' (see ex. (15)-(16) in 1.2 as well as 2.3.2.2). I give one example: (34) (Hector praying for the future of his son:) Zeu, alli te theoi, dote de kai tonde genesthai, paid' emon, hôs kai ego per, ariprepea Trôessin. "Zeus and the other gods, grant that this boy of mine may be, like me, pre-eminent in Troy, as strong and brave as I." (Il. 6,477). The normal expression in later Greek is hôsper kai egô ('just like me'). In this expression-type, it is kai that may or may not occur. In the present section, on the other hand, we are concerned with peripheral and additional instances of per, not of kai. 7.5 At the outer periphery In this section we make the last step which leads from prototypicality to peripherally. The instances of 'oude (...) per discussed in 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 were

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less than prototypical, but they were scalar at least; the instances of kai (...)per in 7.4 were still less prototypical, but they were at least inclusive as a focus par­ ticle. The instances to be presented in the present section lack all of these properties. They are least specified and least distinguishable from the neigh­ boring particle ge. Consider: (35) (Nestor is repeating what Menoetius had said to his son Patroclus: 'Achilles is of nobler birth than you and he is stronger, but you are older:') all eu hoi phasthai pukinon epos êd'hupothesthai kai hoi semainein: ho depeisetai eis agathon per. "It is for you to give him sound advice, to set him an example and to take the lead, which he will follow to his own advantage." (Il. 11, 789). (36) (Patroclus to Achilles: 'It is a shame that you are sitting idly by you ship while the Greeks are being defeated':) ti seu alios onêsetai opsigonos per, ai ke mê Argeioisin aeikea loigon amunêis. "What will future generations have to thank you for, if you will not help the Argives in their direst need?" (Il. 16, 31). (37) (Aeneas:'It'sno good fighting Achilles: there is always a god who is helping him':) ei de theos per ison teineien polemou telos, ou ke mala rhea nikêsei, oud' ei pankhalkeos eukhetai einai. "However, if the gods decide to see fair play between us, he will not have an easy victory, even though he likes to think that he is made ofbronze."(77.20,100).26 (38) (Odysseus to Achilles in the Assembly:) kreissôn eis emethen kai pherteros ouk oligon per engkhei: ego de ke seio noêmati ge probaloimên polion, epei proteros genomên kaipleiona oida. "You are a stronger man than I and not a little better with the spear, but in view of my greater age and experience I may well claim to have more judgment than you." (Il. 19,217).27

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(39) (Aias the son of Oeleus to the great Aias: 'The man we just met was not Calchas our seer but one of the gods':) ikhnia gar metopisthe podôn êde knêmaôn rhei' egnôn apiontos: arignôtoi de theoi per. "His heels and the backs of his knees as he left us were proof enough for me - it is not hard to recognize a god." (7Z. 13,72). We have arrived here at the bottom of the residue. In these cases the meaning ofper is so unspecific that nothing is left of it but some vague sense of 'emphasis'. And the emphasis is definitely not the kind of emphasis connected with scalarity or even of simple inclusive focus particles or focus contexts (see 2.3.2). The examples are at the outer periphery of the semantic field ofper; they seem to have minimal linguistic significance. This appears from the fact that the difference with ge is minimal. The vague boundaries here with ge, which could be firmly drawn in the case of other, more prototypical cases (viz. the use of per in wishes and commands, see 3.5.4 above) may seem an unsatisfactory situation in the Hght of the previous chapters, in which per could be successful­ ly delimited, both with regard to ge and with regard to kai. But then we have to realize, again, that in principle any description of the actual use of a given item in language which does not allow for exceptions and border-line cases has very selectively explored its data-base: it applies only to the prototypical cases, ig­ noring the peripheral ones. However, notwithstanding the principle of prototypicality, the semantic distance between (35)-(39) and the prototypical, scalar cases ofper is very con­ siderable. It might even be asked whether it is the normal distance between a given prototypical instance and a given peripheral instance of one and the same item. In view of two of the typical complications in Homeric linguistics, epic diction and the exigencies of the verse on the one hand, and diachrony on the other, this question is highly relevant in the present connection. As for epic dic­ tion and its vehicle, the hexameter, per in (35)-(39) must have some value of its own, for the poet evidently was under no metrical constraint to use per in a situation where ge would have been more appropriate: because per is placed at the end of the line, ge could perfectly have been used instead. On the other hand, in 4 of the 5 cases, exx. (35)-(38), per comes at the end of a bucoUc clausula. Accordingly, we have to take into account the possibility that per in (35)-(38) is merely used to fill the remaining metrical space at the end of a rhythmically significant colon (see also ex. (13)-(14) above). As to diachrony, the question is whether the semantic distance between (35)-(39) and the more prototypical instances is conceivable in one and the

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same synchronic framework, or whether we have to introduce the dimension 'time' to account for it. This is a difficult question, because per in (35)-(39) is so unspecified that it does not provide any clue as to its diachronic status and position. It cannot easily be placed on a diachronic scale with items placed before it, as is the case with more prototypical cases. In other words, it is hard to determine whether (35)-(39) are the product of some genuine diachronic development. Anyway, if there was such a development, it must have stood out­ side the observable main stream, in which scalarity gradually is transformed into concession or some other recognizable semantic feature; the use ofper ex­ emplified by (35)-(39) does not occur after Homer. Perhaps it is a contem­ porary 'colloquial' use, which was avoided in the language of epic poetry. 7.6 From Homeric to Attic per In a diachronic approach 'pointing backward' is not the only relation pos­ sible. A given item may also point forwards in diachronic space. An analysis in terms of pointing forward, viz. to later, post-Homeric uses of per, seems to be the right solution to a number of instances of per which cannot, just like (35)(39), be connected with any of the prototypical, scalar uses. The instances in question occur in an independent clause; yet they point forward to a use ofper which is confined to subclauses. They involve the use of alios ('other'). All in­ stances are, perhaps significantly, from the Odyssey. Consider: (40) (Zeus to Hermes: 'Go to Calypso andtellher that she has to release Odysseus':) Hermeia, su gar aûte ta t' alla per aggelos essi: numphêi eüplokamoi eipein nêmertea boulên. "Hermes, in your capacity as our Envoy [lit: you are in all other respects our messenger], convey our final decision to that dainty Nymph." (Od. 5,29)30 (41) (Telemachus to Peiraeus:) PeiraieKlutidê,su de moi ta per alla malista peithêi emôn hetarôn, hoi moi Puloneis ham'heponto: kai nun moi ton kseinon agôn en domasi soisi endulceos phileein kai tiemen, eis ho ken elthô. "Peiraeus son of Clytius, of all who joined me on this trip to Pylus I have always found you the most reliable [lit: you are in every other respect..]. Will you oblige me [also] now by taking charge of this

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guest of ours and treating him with every kindness and attention in your own house till I come back?" (Od. 15,540). 31 Just as in (35)-(39), per is far from prototypical here from the point of view of scalarity. Its function is to lend emphasis to alios in the same vague way as in (35)-(39). Yet this time the expression-type to which per belongs is charac­ teristic and clearly recognizable. Ex. (40) and (41) seem to be early instances of the expression-type ta te alla kai X ('the other things as well as X') which is frequent in classical Greek prose. Its meaning is 'especially (above all) X', whereby ta te alla is virtually an idiomatic expression: its meaning cannot be straightforwardly deduced from its component parts. Ex. (40) is an elliptic case of this expression-type in that it suppresses kai; (41), on the other hand, ex­ emplifies the full form, featuring kai.33 Now the expression-type ta te alla kai X is in itself not relevant in the present study, simply because per does not occur in it. However, when the ex­ pression-type is put in a conditional form per does occur, modifying the con­ ditional clause as a whole, while kai introduces the main clause: eiper tis alios, kai X 3 4 This expression-type is the idiomatic way (in post-Homeric Greek) of saying 'especially X' in a conditional form: if anything, thenX. One example: (42) tên aretên phêis didakton einai, kai egô eiper allôi tôi anthrôpôn peithoimên an, kai soi peithomai. "You claim that virtue is something learnable, and if there is anyone I beUeve on this point, it is you." (Plat. Prot. 329 B9). It seems to me that this example can be placed in the same diachronic framework as (40)-(41). The fact that per in (42) is linguistically much more salient (and hence predictable) than in (40)-(41) is, in the present connection, of secondary importance. The decision to discuss (40)-(41) in connection with the later use ofper in subordinate clauses is supported by the fact that the boundary between what may be called the peripheral use oîper and the use ofper in subordinate clauses is not sharp. Sometimes it does not make much difference whether we take a given instance of per which occurs in a subclause as belonging to a single con­ stituent or as belonging to the whole clause; in the first case we conceive ofper as comparable to (35)-(39), and in the second case we treat it as an instance of subclause-per in which per is separated from the subordinator. Consider: (43) (Meriones to Deiphobus, when he has killed three Trojans - as against one Greek killed by Deiphobus:)

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LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER Dêïphob'ê ara dê ti eïskomen aksion einai, treis henos anti pephasthai? epei su per eukheai houtô. "Deiphobus! Do we judgerightlythat three against one is a sufficient recompense? When you are boasting that way..." (77.13,447).

A main clause for the epei-clause has to be supplied ('then I do the same'). In this example it is possible to conceive ofper as exclusively modifying su. But it is important to realize that there is not much difference with the situation in which per has to be described as the subclause particle which it is to become in later times; in the following example per is simply separated from its subor­ dinator and no special emphasis is involved: (44) (Melanthius the goatherd is abusing Odysseus, who is in disguise:) pantôs ouketi nôïdiakrineesthai oïô prin kheirôn geusasthai, epei su per ou kata kosmon aitizeis; eisin de kai allai daites Akhaiôn. "I fancy that you and I will have to sample each other's fists before we say goodbye. For I don't like your way of begging. And anyhow this house is not the only one where people dine." (Od. 20,181).38 Other seemingly problematic instances, in which it is difficult to assign per a recognizable meaning, likewise, are actually not instances of Homeric per. Just as in (44), the particle has to be taken together with the subordinator of the subclause. Two examples: (45) (Right through the morning the forces of Greeks and Trojans were in balance:) ernos de drutomos per anêr hôplissato deipnon oureos enbêssêisi(....) têmos sphêi aretêi Danaoi rhêksanto phalangas.. "But about the time when a woodman felling the tall trees in a mountain dell prepares himself a meal, the Danaans put forth their strength and broke the enemy battalions." (Il. 11,86). (46) (Here comes to the top of Mount Ida, where Zeus is watching the fighting:) hos d'iden, hos min erôs pukinas phrenas amphikalupsen, hoion hote proton per emisgesthên philotêti, es eunên phoitônte, philous lêthonte tokêas.

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265

"Zeus the Cloud-compeller saw her and at the first look his heart was captured by desire, as in the days when they had for the first time enjoyed each other's love and gone to bed together without their parent's knowledge." (77.14,295). These are actually instances of êmo per and hote per, respectively.39 That is, they belong to the non-scalar use of per in subordinate clauses and not to Homeric per. Accordingly, they do not properly belong in the present chapter, in spite of the fact that they are, qua instances of 'subordinator + per', peripheral too, just as the instances discussed in the present chapter. But to determine with respect to which expression-type exx. (45)-(46) are peripheral is the subject of another study.

NOTESTOCHAPTER 7 1) Unless we interpret the example in the following way, making Thersites' words still more daring: 'Let's at least go home and leave this man with his spoils here in the land of Troy. My wish would be still more satisfied if Agamemnon were killed/. This is a highly speculative interpretation which to my mind is too far-fetched. Yet in view of the above (7.1.2) remark on peripherality and literary interpretation, it has to be mentioned. 2) The end of the line, too, shows that from a formulaic point of view (1) is the special case: in (2) we have the standard plural dative epithet for 'ships' (pontoporoisi), which occurs 9 times as a bucolic clausula. The clausula makes the scalar adhortation fit into the format of the hexameter. In (1), on the other hand, the epithet is replaced by a unique adhortation (tonde d' eômen 'let's leave him...') which continues well into the following line (by way of what Parry (1971:253) calls necessary enjambment; see also Kirk 1976:148). 3) So Rieu (1946:302). 4) The whole passage is verbatim repeated, when Penelope addresses the Suitors, before the actual bow contest (Od. 21,75-9). 5) See also ei per an autoslaûte in 6.3.1.5 above. 6) That is, they could as well have been discussed among the truly peripheral (non-scalar) cases (see 7.5 below), but because there happens to be a scalar parallel, they are discussed in the present subsection, in between the cases where a formular approach is possible in principle and the cases where it is not. 7) Those who wish to treat minuntha per in (5) as something 'original' (i.e. 'old') might point to Lat.parumper, paulisper ('for a little while'). However, it is by no means certain whether this parallel has any direct bearing on Homeric minuntha per. 8) See also exx. (16) and (31)-(32) of ch. 3; exx. (33) and (35) of ch 4, and exx. (38) and (46) of the present chapter. 9) O'Neill's (1942:143) table 11 shows a 95.3% localization of the word-type U - UU in this slot ( = is position 8) in the Iliad and a 95.6% localization in the Odyssey. Notice, inciden­ tally, thatper (or of any monosyllabic postpositive) in (5) is necessary on metrical grounds: simple minuntha (word-type U - U) placed after the trochaic caesura is a violation of Hermann's Law (see 5.2.1.1 above). The same applies to gunaiki per in ex. (8)-(9) below. 10) The addition ofuti mala dên can, of course be completely accounted for in terms of typically epic 'redundant semantics' (see 5.2.2). 11) See minuntha ge localized in 8 in ex. (19) of ch. 4. 12) It is interesting to note that in Murray (41934), a truly Victorian and pedagogic work, it is suggested (p. 125) that Il. 24,130 ( = ex. (8)) belongs to the lines that have escaped expur­ gation (!) on the part of the poet because they show "traces of the work of those infamous per­ sons who misinterpreted the relations of Achilles and Patroclus." 13) Similar to minuntha per in (5)-(7) and gunaiki per in (8)-(9) is the case of thanontiper 'inIl.22,73 (scalar) and in Il. 11,453 (non-scalar).

268

LINGUISTICS

AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

14) Ex. (10) has the form of an original scalar expression-type, but as to its meaning it points forwards to a later use of per. See further below (ex. (40)-(41) in 7.6) on other instances of 'allos + per' in Homer. 15) Although alios per is non-scalar from a strictly semantic, context-independent point of view, we may say that its use in the present example is nevertheless sufficiently justified by its belonging to a directive speech act. The example is scalar as to the intention of the speaker: 'all others do it; I want you to do it too', 'all others' being functionally equivalent to a scalar expres­ sion. 16) Perhaps the linguistic justification for the poet touseper in the utterly non-scalar com­ parative expressions (13) and (14) is the use ofper in 'the same ay-contexts' (see 2.3.2.2, as well as exx. (15)-(16) of ch. 1). This expression-type yields a number of bucolic clausulas, which may have served as an analogon to (13)-(14), e.g. hos per epherte (Il. 2, 318), hoisi per arkhei (Il. 2, 805), hoi per emeio (Il. 4, 324) etc. These instances of per do not belong to what I delimited in 1.1 as 'Homeric'per, they are not discussed in the present study. 17) As a formula (T2-expression), hothen teper oud' oiônoi is similar to hothen teperoinokhoeuei (Od. 21,142 = ex. (39) of ch. 4). See for the two instances of te per Ruijgh (1971: 48081). 18) This movement of per reflects the transition from a focus particle with a single term as focus constituent to a particle which modifies a whole clause and which is placed, as an enclitic, in the second place of the clause. The development in 'the same ay-contexts' (see 2.3.2.2) is similar: *phroneeis haegôper ⇒phroneeis ha per egô. See also ex. (34) below. 19) See also Ruijgh (1971: 391-92). In attributing the concessive sense to kai in the rela­ tive clause, Ruijgh attaches more importance to this particle than I would be inclined to do. In my opinion, kai in the relative clause is a less than prototypical instance whose presence may well be accounted for in terms of the third factor in 7.1.2 above: the solution of ad hoc metrical problems. 20) Notice that hou te per oksutaton or hou per V oksutaton would have been metrically possible. But in the prototypical instances of the expression-type in question te has no proper place (see also the following note). 21) As to the occurrence of te in the relative clause, we may remark that when the removal ofper has no overt linguistic grounds, the introduction of te need not have them either. Notice, however, that the use of te in (18) is not incompatible with the original generic meaning of the particle. But this is not a particularly useful thing to say, because the relevant scalar property of an eternal entity like the sun is by definition a 'permanent fact'. 22) Compare the similar formal development of 'kai + participle + per' to kaiper + participle'. 23) Notably 'oudeper + participle'. The instances are collected in Oguse (1968). 24) To my mind, this does not only apply to the linguistic researcher, but to the native speaker as well. 25) It follows that per should not be taken as modifying the whole clause so that it would have to be discussed among the examples of ei per. For a different view see Denniston ( 1954: 488), who proposes 'even if really as a rendering of (28). 26) Notice that the concessive conditional (oud' ei..) is factual (see 6.2).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

269

27) Comparable is Od. 8,187. Notice that these examples are listed by Denniston ( 21954: 482) under the heading 'Intensifying use', as instances of the original force ofper. However, the 'force' ofper in (38) is anything but old and original. See also ex. (46) below. 28) Presumably, the poet did not use ge in (35)-(39) because this particle is a too overtly exclusive focus particle. And in the context of (35)-(39) the explicit exclusion of alternatives is no more the point than the explicit inclusion of them. Instead what is called for is some vague, not over-explicit sense of emphasis. 29) Of course, an easily definable diachronic status presupposes a well defined status in the synchronic dimension. This is of course the problem with (35)-(39): their elusive diachronic status is due to minimal synchronic prototypicality. 30) Compare Od. 17,273. 31) Compare Od. 23,7. 32) Per may perfectly be absent under semantically identical circumstances, see//. 23,483. 33) See Ruijgh (1971: 830-31). Here (40)-(41) are not discussed for the presence of per but for the presence of te. 34) This use of ei per is, incidentally, entirely disconnected from any of the uses of ei per discussed in ch. 6 above. No concession, scalarity or sceptic modality is involved. 35) For a full discussion of ei per tis alios within the framework of the use of ei per and hos per in general in Attic Greek, see Bakker (in prep: ch. 6). 36) Ex. (42) is an instance of the use of per in focus contexts (see 2.3.2 above): the main clause and the subclause have the same subject and predicate, which automatically lays emphasis on the constituent by which they differ. This use of per is very frequent in later Greek, both in relative and conditional clauses. It occurs already in Homer, but only in relative clauses; often per is placed directly after the focused constituent. See ex. (34) of the present chapter as well as ex. (15) of ch. 1 and ex. (10) of ch. 3. Full discussion of 'equative'per in focus contexts in Bak­ ker (in prep). 37) See also Leaf (1902:35). 38) Compare Od. 2,327. 39) In Denniston (21954:482) per in (46) is assigned, wrongly, a very strong and 'original' meaning: allegedly it intensifies prôton ('the veryfirsttime'). Again, we have the opposition be­ tween 'old/original' and 'recent/peripheral' and again I opt for the second possibility. See also ex. (38) above.

8 OVERVIEW

The results and aims of the foregoing chapters can be summarized as fol­ lows. The central concern of the present study is the description of the use of the particle per in Homer. I have tried to present this description within a perspective which is wider than the investigation of the use of a given linguis­ tic item in a given Greek author. I have done so in the belief that the descrip­ tion ofper benefits from it and in the hope that the present study has some value for other fields/disciplines than Greek linguistics proper. However, all the dis­ cussions in this study are primarily subservient to the description of per, only in the second place are they meant as contributions in their own right to the fields in question. Conforming to its title, the present study has two major interests, (i) the linguistic account of per and (ii) the use ofper in formulas in particular and in Homeric versification in general. Linguistics. The leading concept in the linguistic accountofper is scalarity. We speak of scalarity when a given constituent (word or phrase) represents the highest, extreme value on a scale. A scale may either consist of proper­ ties/qualities (for example 'bravest' representing the high point of the 'braveness scale') or of persons/entities which are located on the scale by degree of some property/quality (for example, a scale with 'Achilles', the bravest warrior, as its high point). Scalarity may be encoded in language by means of scalarpar­ ticles. Scalar particles are particles which mark a term that represents the high point of a scale. In the analysis of scalar particles, this term may be called the focus constituent of the particle. Per in its most characteristic uses in Homeric Greek is a scalar particle, just as kai in Greek and even in English. It is intuitively clear that high points of scales have much to do with superlativeness. What may be presented as highest on a scale has, by definition, some superlative quality. In English, superlativeness is a normal means to encode scalarity, in that a morphosyntactic superlative may convey a scalar sense by it­ self, without the aid of a scalar particle (for example, 'He could solve the most difficult problem'). The discussion of this use of the superlative (which is called in the present study the scalar superlative) constitutes an important piece of the background of the descriptionofper.

272

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

Beside superlativeness, a second major concept in connection with scalarity is concession. Between a scalar expression and the sentence in which it occurs, there is always an opposition. This is intuitively clear, too: the scalar expression representing the extreme value on a scale expresses, by its very na­ ture, the least likely or expected item in some situation ('Even Achilles (the least likely person to do so) feared the battle'). When this fact is overtly ex­ pressed, a concessive adverbial relation may arise: 'Even Achilles, who was {al­ though he was) the bravest warrior, feared the battle'. The description of per as a scalar particle hinges on the two concepts of superlativeness and concession. Per is used when scalarity is expressed either in the form of a superlative or in the form of a concessive expression. In its most characteristic use, per is used either in scalar superlative or in scalar concessive statements. In the first case, per co-occurs with an adjective, being equivalent to the English scalar superlative, and in the second case it occurs in a participial phrase or a non-restrictive relative clause. Adjectives, participles and relative clauses have one important property in common. They are all terms with what may be called descriptive content: they attribute a certain property to someone/something. As such they may be op­ posed to terms without descriptive content: proper names and demonstrative pronouns. These terms only point ('refer') to a given entity, without attribut­ ing any property or quality to it. This distinction is fundamental for the present study. It is dealt with in terms of the conceptual pair intension and extension. Constituents with descriptive content (adjectives etc.) are called intensional terms, whereas constituents which lack descriptive content are called extensional. In terms of the intension-extension distinction, per can be called the par­ ticle of intensional scalarity. This does not only appear from the fact that per in its more characteristic uses co-occurs with intensional, and not with extensional, terms; scalar superlativeness and concession are in themselves inten­ sional phenomena, because they always involve descriptive content. The alternative scalar particle in Greek, kai, on the other hand, is the particle of extensional scalarity; it may have an extensional term as its focus constituent, just as even in English. Sometimes per and kai co-occur. This co-occurrence reflects the intimate semantic bond between scalarity, superlativeness and concession. Kai marks the extensional side of the scalarity, taking a term without descriptive content as focus constituent (kai Akhilleus, kai hos - 'even Achilles', 'even so'). Per, on the other hand, marks the intensional side of the scalarity: occurring in a phrase

OVERVIEW

273

which adds descriptive content, it explains why the focus constituent of kai func­ tions as such. The result is a phrase which allows of a concessive interpretation: 'Even Achilles, the bravest warrior...'⇒'Achilles, even though he is the bravest warrior'. The relation between scalarity and concession may be conceived of as semantic in the sense that the above mentioned opposition of a scalar expres­ sion and the sentence in which it occurs springs from the very meaning of the scalar expression. However, in the case of per more is involved. The relation here between scalarity and concession has a strong diachronic orientation, to the effect that the semantic connection may easily turn into a transition in time. The scalar (or more precisely: superlative) force of per is diachronically un­ stable. After its disappearance, it leaves per as a marker of simple concession, especially in its use with participles, the combination 'participle + per' becom­ ing the normal concessive adverbial constituent in Homeric Greek. This tran­ sition, which can be parallelled in other languages, is very natural, precisely because scalarity and concession are intimately connected semantically. Scalar phenomena in language are most often discussed in (formal) semantic terms, often without any attention for the way they are actually used in discourse. In the present study I have tried to fill this gap. The most central use of scalar expressions, in any case thatofper in Homer, seems to be the state­ ment of what I call a superlative fact. A sentence in which a scalar expression occurs is often uttered not for its own sake; rather, it serves to assert something remarkable in an indirect way. For example, a sentence like 'Even Achilles fears the battle' is preferably uttered in discourse to assert that the battle in question is terrifying, not that it is feared by Achilles. On account of the scalar (superlative) force of 'Achilles', the sentence is an argument for the superla­ tive fact that the battle was terrible. The specific use of scalar expressions in discourse as arguments for superlative facts provides a basis for the differen­ tiation of the scalar instances ofper from the merely concessive ones. Beside scalarity, there is a second important concept in the linguistic description ofr'prototypicality. Prototypicality does not apply exclusively to per; it is an important concept in descriptive linguistics in general. When work­ ing in the framework of prototypicality, we acknowledge the fact that not all in­ stances of a given linguistic sign are equally salient and characteristic. Some are more characteristic of their kind (prototypical, we say) than others. Prototypicality seems to be the right way to deal with the residue that is con­ comitant with the description of any linguistic item, the instances that do not, in being exceptional and/or deviant, conform to the description. This residue

274

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

need not be troublesome, as long as it is recognized that language (use) admits a considerable amount of variability which may imply divergence from the norm which is set by the prototypical instances. In the case of per and its description, the prototype way of thinking may be appUed to gauge the degree to which instances conform to the properties of intensional scalarity mentioned above. Some instances of per are definitely more scalar than others, and some are not scalar at all. In this respect, superlativeness appears to be an important prototypical property of per, whose presence or absence determines to a high degree the prototypicality of a given instance. Formulas. The second major interest of the present study may be seen as an interesting complicating factor for the prototype way of thinking. It is specific for the Homeric context in which per occurs. A given instance of per may not be what it 'should' be as a prototypical instance, just because of the peculiarities of the Homeric text. 'Homer' is a metrical text with many charac­ teristics pointing to oral composition or at least to cognation with orally com­ posed texts. These characteristics cannot but leave their imprint on the linguistic form of the Iliad and Odyssey. For the Homeric poet, the all-important thing is to produce his verses as automatically as possible and to avoid interruption in theflowof poetic produc­ tion. To achieve this end, he may make use of what are called 'formulas' in the Parryan tradition of Homeric criticism (and indeed in most oral poetry studies). Formulas are considered to be ready-made building-blocks, which facilitate the poet's rapid production of hexameter lines. They are commonly thought to be formulaic by themselves, in the sense that they are different from ordinary lan­ guage expressions, both as to their form and as to their meaning. In this ap­ proach one is led to believe that, in being artificial and formulaic, the Homeric language is something qualitatively different from ordinary language. However, from a linguistic point of view I want to modify this view. Instead of the structural view of the Homeric formula meant above, I en­ dorseafunctional view of Homeric formulas and versification. I treat formulas not as a discrete phenomenon that has to be defined and explained, but as one of a number of possible consequences of oral composition. My claim is that 'formulas' should not be isolated and set off against ordinary language expres­ sions, because in Homer the variability which is present anyway in the language is fully exploited, so as to achieve a system of versification which enables the poet to produce a constant flow of verses. Only rarely are the boundaries of lin­ guistic possibilities transgressed, precisely because any linguistic sign or expres-

OVERVIEW

275

sion has instances which range from prototypical to less prototypical ('peripheral'). It is with the less prototypical instances that the linguistic study of 'formulas' in Homer is mostly concerned. For the study of the use ofper in Homeric versification, two main 'sources' of lesser prototypicality may be distinguished. Each may be treated as a conse­ quence of oral composition. 1) Semantic integration of formulas. A given instance of per, which is part of a recurrent phrase ('formula' in the Parryan sense of standardized buildingblock) may be used, under formular pressure, in a semantic or syntactic en­ vironment for which it was not originally devised. The result is, in linguistic terms, a less prototypical instance of the expression in question. 2) Redundant semantics. Often, it is assumed that formulas have one atomic meaning. More justice is done, however, to the facts of Homeric ver­ sification when one assumes that formulaic phrases may often be subdivided into a nucleus, which constitutes the semantic identity of the phrase, and a periphery, which is semantically redundant. This insight is especially useful in connection with the metrical form of formulas. By adding or omitting the semantically redundant material, the poet may deUberately alter the metrical form of phrases so as to make them fit into one of the metrical slots (cola) of the dactylic hexameter. This phenomenon, which to my mind is crucial for Homeric versification, can be very well observed in the case of the use ofper with participles as a con­ cessive adverbial constituent. The nucleus of the expression is formed by the combination 'participle + per', which may be localized in the verse in various ways, according to the metrical form of the participle. The semantically redun­ dant material is added in the form of other particles (kai, mala, empês) by which the phrase is extended (forwards or backwards) to the nearest metrical bound­ ary. Sometimes per itself is the redundant element which may be deliberately added or omitted. Greek epic diction exploits here in a systematic way the phenomenon of strengthening, which is very common in ordinary language: in their less prototypical uses, some linguistic items, especially particles, may be used to strengthen another expression (compare even in even though). The same applies, in linguistic terms, to kai in 'kai + participle + per', but here the strengthening element is there for the sake of easy and smooth versification. The description of per offered in the present study does not cover all the instances of the particle in Homer. Only those instances are dealt with that may in some way or another be discussed in terms of concession and scalarity. These instances may be rightly called 'Homeric' per, since after Homer scalar-conces-

276

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

sive per has only a marginal existence in the language. In most instances by far in post-Homeric Greek, per is used as an enclitic adhering to subordinating conjunctions. This use occurs as early as Homer, but it yields precisely those instances that have been left out of account in the present study.

APPENDIX

This Appendix Hsts all the instancesofper in Homer that can be found in Gehring (1891-95). Beside the instances of 'Homeric' per, which are the sub­ ject of the present study, I have included the instances of post-Homeric per (not discussed). The former are specified according to the expression-type under which they are discussed. The latter are left unspecified; they have been mere­ ly included to complete the statistical picture. Sometimes exact classification is difficult, for example in the case of the non-concessive instances of ei per, which may equally be Hsted under Homeric and post-Homeric per. Within the class of Homericper,too, there are instances which defy unequivocal classifica­ tion. But within the framework of the present study (see 1.4), this is a readily accepted phenomenon. To avoid unnecessary problems in classification, I have listed the peripheral instances of chapter 7 in one single block. However, the divergent instances that belong as to their form to one of the regular expres­ sion-types (see 7.3.1) are Hsted under the original expression-type. Finally, textuaHy doubtful instances are given in square brackets. After the Hsting of the instances, the total figures are presented in a separate table. 1) Scalar superlatives ('adjective + per'), see 3.1. Eiad: 4,421; 9,514,554; 13,300; 14,217; 16, 638; 18,108; 20,65; 21, 63. Odyssey: 3,321; 5,73; 14,464. 2) Scalar-concessive relative clauses ('kai/oude X, hos per'), see 3.2. Eiad: 6, 100; 7, 114; 9, 498; 14, 246, 344; 16, 709; 18, 118; 19, 95, 416; 20, 358;21,107,196; 24, 603. Odyssey: 7,322; 13,249; 20,46. 3) Scalarity and the comparative (ê per), see 3.3. Riad: 1,260; 8,190; 10,556; 11,319; 14,468; 16,688; 18,302; 24,504. Odyssey:4,819;8,154;17,417.

278

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER

4) Negative polar scalarity, see 3.4. Iliad: 11,391; 14,416. Odyssey: 8,212,547; 10,24. 5) Scalarity in wishes and commands, see 3.5. Iliad: 1,353,508; 8,242,243; 9,301; 11,796; 12,349,356, 362; 14,358; 16, 38,205; 17,121, 634,712; 19, [189]; 20,119,300; 21,308; 23,97. Odyssey: 4,35; 6,325; 18,122; 20,199. 6) Unclassifiable scalar instances, see 3.6. Ilid: 8,353,452; 9,110; 13,415; 15,588; 17,239; 22,73; 23,79; 24,749. Odyssey: 1,236; 4, 97; 11,441,501; 19,581; 21,79. 7) Scalar-concessive participles following kailoud' hôs, see 4.2. Riad: 3,159; 11,721,841; 15,617. Odyssey: 1,6; 5,324; 11,88,104. 8) Scalar-concessive participles, see 4.3.1. Iliad: 1, 217,241, 275,586, 587, 588; 2,246,270; 3,201; 4, 534; 5, 94, 382, 571,625; 6,85,360; 7,110; 8,125,253,317; 9,198,518,552; 10,114, 549; 11, 418,554; 12,178,410; 13,57,142, 317,419, 630; 14,33, 58, 128,260,375,379; 15,164,185,195,399,450,585,604,651; 16, 620, 624; 17,181,276,292,459,571,663,710; 18,112,126,273; 19,8, 65, 80, 82, 142, 155,189; 20, 356; 21, 384; 22, 416, 424; 23, 306; 24, 53, 104,298,523. Odyssey: 1,288,309; 2,200,219,249; 3,240,284; 4,104,416,502,549,553, 733; 5, 209, 341; 6, 87; 7, 215, 297; 8, 316, 360, 478; 9, 379; 10, 174, 189,246; 11,265,350; 12,271,340; 13,280; 14,142,155,298; 15,49, 361; 16,147; 17,555,570; 18,165,178,385; 19,324,511; 20,131,271, 274; 21,103,250; 22,172; 23,12,82,230,361; 24,499. 9) Concessive participles, specified: 9a) Non-superlative participles, see 4.3.2. mad: 1,546,577; 4,387,5,135; 8,99,284; 9,343,605,627; 10,448; 13,361; 14,1, 98; 15,30,407,476; 16,550,617, 815; 17,229,539; 18,549; 20, 21, 436; 21, 185,483; 22, 218; 23, 610; 24,20, 35, 423,428, 570,593, 609, 617,750. Odyssey: 6,136; 7,224; 8,331; 9,57; 10,441; 11, 111, 425; 12,138; 14,310; 16,264; 18,21; 19,253,356; 21,370; 23,7.

APPENDIX

279

9b) Dependent participles, see 4.3.3. Iliad: 1,352. Odyssey: No instances. 9c) Modally embedded participles, see 4.3.4. Iliad:l, 131; 9,373; 15,133. Odyssey: 1, 315; 4,284; 16,430; 17,13,47; 21,129; 22,409. 10) Conditionals (eiper), specified: 10a) Concessive, see 6.3.1. Iliad: 1, 81; 2, 597; 3,25; 4, 55,160; 5,224; 7,117; 8,153; 10,115,225; 11, 116; 12, 223, 245, 302; 15, 99, 117; 16, 847; 19, 32, 164; 21, 576; 22, 191,487. Odyssey: 1,167, 204; 2,246; 5,40; 7,321; 11,113; 12,140; 13,138,143; 16, 276; 17,14; 18,318; 20,49. 10b) Non-concessive, see 6.4.3. Iliad: 1,580; 2,123; 4,261; 5,232; 7,387; 8,205; 13,288,464; 16,263; 22, 86; 24, 667. Odyssey: 1,188; 8,355,408; 9,35; 20,42. 11) Peripheral instances (unspecified), see ch. 7. Iliad: 1, 416; 2, 236; 7,204; 8, 201; 10,70; 11, 86, 453,789; 12, 361; 13, 72, 447, 573; 14,125,295; 15, 553; 16,31,245, 523; 17,104; 18,151; 19, 57,200,217; 20,100; 21,130,410,441; 22,389; 24,130,235. Odyssey: 1,59; 3,236; 4,214,376,379,468,729; 5,29; 6,282; 8,187; 10,551; 11, 452; 13, 294; 14, 392; 15, 540; 17, 273; 19, 541; 20, 181; 22, 473; 23,209. Other instances (this is an unspecified enumeration of the instances of 'postHomeric' per (see 1.1): Iliad: 1,211; 2,258,286,293,318,805, 861; 3,3; 4,236,259,263,324,361, 524; 5, 265,340,477, 802, 806; 6,41,146,292, 379,384, 398,477; 7, 159,286,370; 8,415; 9,46,310,367; 10,7,309,396,568; 11,126; 12, 33,118,256,346,359; 13,101,524,638; 14,50,131,319,323; 15,225, 675,707; 16,557,618; 17,232,509, [587], 720; 18,263,293,363,422, 518; 19,42; 20,123,188; 21,4,55,554; 22,250; 23,84,480,583, 659, 782, 802; 24,201,348,382,398,487. Odyssey: 1,128,210; 2,56,305,327,333; 4,565,627; 5,82,188; 7,55,203, 206,312; 8,31,107,510; 9,365,543; 10,103,240,279,285,435,483;

280

LINGUISTICS AND FORMULAS IN HOMER 11,394,619,630; 12,81; 13,130,284,358,364; 14,112,415,466,532; 16,97,115; 17,169,171, [334], 580,586; 18,19,193,371; 19,245,312, 340,347,385,553; 20,7,167,282; 21,134,142,212,243,392; 22,159, 432; 23,14,56; 24,30,508.

The numerical evidence which follows from these lists may be presented as fol­ lows:

1) Scalar superlatives 2) Sc-conc. rel. clause 3) Comparatives 4) Negative polarity 5) Wishes and commands 6) Scalar unclassifiable 7) kai hôs + sc-conc. part. 8) Scalar-conc. participles 9) Concessive participles a) Non-superlative b) Dependent c) Modally embedded 10) Conditionals a) Concessive b) Non-concessive 11) Peripheral instances 12) Other Total

Iliad 9 13 8 2 20 9 4 76

Odyssey 3 3 3 3 4 6 4 54

Total 12 16 11 5 24 15 8 130

37 1 3

15 0 7

52 1 10

22 11 30 82 327

13 5 20 67 207

35 16 50 149 534

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INDEX OF SUBJECTS

A fortiori argumentation, 79,80, 85,214,229 Acceptability scale, 95 Additive, 96,97,132 Substitutive, 96 Adhortation, 243 Adjective And time-stability, 126 As intensional term, 38 In analytic participial phrase, 5 Non-superlative, 126 Adverbial constituents Dependency of, 112 Adverbial relation, 108 Adverbial semantic relation And the study of 'participle + per', 109 Causal, 109 Conditional, 109 Expressed by participle, 10,23,108 Kinds of, 109 Adverbial subclause Kinds of, 109 Adverbs Scope of, 144 Aeolic, 24,26 Afterthought, 145 Alia, 234 Also, 51 And the same as-contexts, 51 Alternatives for focus constituent, 44-45,48, 76,93,97,105,216,243 Scalar ordering of, 45 See also Focus constituent, Scale, Scalarity An, 72,217 With participles, 143 See also Ken Anaphora, 113,115,118,124 Antonymic pairs, 104 Any

Existential vs. universal, 64 Negative polarity item, 54, 59,65 Positive polarity item, 65 Quantifier, 31,35,39 Aorist, 131 Vs. present, 130 Apocope, 24 Apposition, 118,121 And identification, 118 And non-restrictive relative clause, 118 And syntactic independence, 121 Discourse-pragmatic motivation for, 118 Appropriateness, 37, 60,77 See also Reference, Speech act Archaism, 20 Argonautica, 199 Arguments, 34,57,90,113,137,144 In participial phrase, 174 Aristarchus, 148 Aristotle, 103 Ascriptive sentence, 36,129,130 Aspect, 129,202 And the background-foreground dis­ tinction, 147 And imperatives, 148 And time-stability, 130 Progressive, 147 Assertion, 32,40 Positive vs. negative, 86 At least, 94-95 Attributive Vs. predicative, 143 Vs. referential, 143 Auch nur (German), 47 And negative polarity, 56 Backgrounding, 72,131 Binary contrast, 28,69,104 Brevis in longo, 187,188,259

294

SUBJECT INDEX

Bucolic diaeresis, 159, 160, 166, 167, 177, 191,247 Caesura, 80,103,165,167,181,253 Absence of, 170 Fluctuation between P- and T-caesura, 176,183,202, 224 Penthemimeral, 103,166,179,188,200 Trochaic, 103, 156, 166, 174, 175, 180, 182,187,200,224,247,267 See also Dactylic hexameter, Metrics Cataphoric element, 118 Categorization In cognitive psychology, 14 Logic-based theories of, 15 Platonic view of, 25 Wittgensteinian view of, 25 Category, 15 Discrete vs. continuous, 15 Internal structure of, 17 Linguistic, 17 Overlap between, 17 Relation between, 17 See also Continuum, Neutralization, Prototype Theory Checklist theory of category membership, 15 Circumstances, 118 Intension of, 114 Subject to scalarity, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119,121,123 See also Kai hos Clausula, 159, 167, 169, 173, 191, 217, 245, 247,251,253,255,261,267,268 See also Bucolic diaeresis, Dactylic hexameter Co-extensive terms, 37,60,102 Co-ordination, 234 Cognitive psychology, 14,17,63 Command, 4,90,94, 95 Negative, 147 See also Directive speech act Communicative intention, 43 Comparative, 49,79,81,101 And scalarity, 83 Context-dependent, 85 Morphosyntactic, 79 Comparative clause, 50,85

Comparative particle, 84 Comparative predicate, 83 Competence-performance distinction, 25 Complement clause, 108 Complete proposition, 90 Compromise, 94, 97,100 Compromise wish, 93,132 See also Per in wishes/commands Concession, 9,10,49,80,107,120 And scalarity, 49 And the description ofper, 49 As a 'sense' of per, 10, 80,81,120 As opposition between scope sentence and focus constituent, 49,81,116 Central meaning of 'participle + per', 107 Diachronic nature of, 14 Scalar nature of, 80,107,116,120 Concessive adverbial relation, 2,5,9,10,81 Concessive conditional, 2, 6, 205 And epistemic modality, 214 And factuality,220 And indeterminacy, 208,227 And prototypicality, 207 And superlative fact, 48 And superlativeness, 208,222 Even if-type, 208,209,219,220,223,224 However much-type, 219,221-224,227 Kinds of, 207,209,223 Negation as lower value on the scale, 216 Vs. concessive, 206,215,223 Vs. simple conditional, 207,227,228 Concessive subordinator Scalar origin of, 120,146 Concessives Factual nature of, 206 Conditional, 35,42 And negative polarity items, 54,86,88 And the focus of even, 48,205,207,215 And the scope of even, 47,48,205 Concessive, 48,105,205 Contingency vs. indeterminacy, 63 Discourse function of, 234 Embedded vs. non-embedded, 62 Restrictive, 62 Subjunctive, 34

SUBJECT INDEX Connotation Vs. denotation, 60 Context of utterance, 76, 85 Continuative propositional particle, 104 Continuum Between various senses, 229 From concession to scepsis, 230-232 From extensional to intensional, 38 From formulaic to non-formulaic, 20 From prototypical to peripheral, 15-16 From scalar to concessive, 120 From time-stable to time-unstable, 125, 129 From verbatim to rhythmical repetition, 159, 161 Conventional implicature, 41 Cooperative principle, 61 Copula, 129 Correlation And concession, 119 Counterfactual, 58, 143 Dactyl, 165 Dactylic hexameter, 20, 165 Metric profile of, 165, 166,172,178 Quadripartite conception of, 200 Rhythmical structure of, 165,167 Rules and tendencies constituting the, 141,166 Tripartite instances of, 170,181,193 De, 213 And left-dislocation, 234 And topic marking, 234 Declarative sentence, 79,85,86,90,95,96 See also Sentence-type Definite article, 103 Degrees of comparison, 125,129 Demonstrative pronoun, 4,103,113 And correlation, 117 As extensional term, 38 Descriptive content, 76 See also Intension Desirability scale, 91,94,244,247 Additive, 97 See also Per in wishes/commands Diachronic descriptive linguistics, 13 Diachrony

295

As characteristic of epic diction, 20, 26, 74,146 Concession and, 14 Relation to synchrony, 120 Diathesis, 130 Direct speech, 82,103 Directive illocutionary force, 79,214 Directive speech act, 250 Discourse, 72,82 Dissuasion, 79,192,213 See also Command, Directive speech act Double negation, 146 Dutch, 46,47 Eiper And a fortiori argumentation, 214 And generic modality, 235 Concessive vs. non-concessive, 228 Diachronic status of, 226-227,232 Discourse function of, 210-211 In similes, 226 Non-superlative nature of, 209 Position with regard to main clause, 210, 218 Sceptic tone of, 229-231 Separate 'senses' of, 229 Elliptic clause, 50,63 Empês, 146,173,179,202 In participial phrases, 186 Metrical motivation for the use of, 172 Emphasis, 6,7,11 In the sense of 'highlighting*, 7-9 In the sense of 'intensification', 7,23 Epic correption, 173 Epic diction And linguistic research, 19,240 Diachronie nature of, 20,26,74,146,226 Equative sentence, 60 See also 'The same as-contexts' Etymology, 24 Even, 4,27,30,40,41,76,77,95,96 And conditionals, 205 And conventional implicature, 42-43, 208 And directive speech acts, 79 And focus particles, 40

296

SUBJECT INDEX

And illocution, 43 And scope ambiguity, 46-47,56,64 And scope-dependent scale, 46 And strengthening, 101 And superlative fact, 78,123 As a positive polarity item, 53,121 As an inclusive focus particle, 44-45 In comparative expressions, 62,83 In indirect speech acts, 79 In negative contexts, 54 In negative polar contexts, 56 Scalar implicature of, 45,48 Unspecified for scope-dependence, 46 Even if, 48 And directive speech acts, 213-214 Decompositional analysis of, 48, 214, 219 See also Concessive conditional Event, 125,130 Exclusiveness, 91,93,97, 98 Property precluding scalarity, 93 Extension, 27, 37, 38, 45, 69, 76, 77, 84, 96,225 As an inherent property of noun phrases, 60 Vs. reference, 38 See also Reference, Scalarity extensional Extensional context, 60 Factive predicate, 42,58,143 FactuaHty, 33-34, 58-59, 70, 85, 94, 97, 111, 206-207,215,219-220,223 Family resemblance, 25 Figure Vs. ground, 50,63,101 Final subclause, 88 Focalization, 103 Focus, 44 Focus constituent, 40, 44, 45, 48, 51, 69, 75, 76,77,83,93,94,113,116,208,224,243 Intension of, 107 Vs. sister constituent, 62 Focus context, 49,269 And negation, 50,52 And the study ofper, 51,52 Focus particles, 11,14,40

And at least- and at mart-meanings, 29 As positive polarity items, 53 Exclusive, 64 Inclusive vs. exclusive, 44,93 Vs. scalar particles, 40,242 Foreground Vs. background, 101 See also Figure Formula, 19,80 And 'redundant semantics', 163 And orality, 152,163 And ordinary language, 157,164 And recurrence, 158 And substitution, 160,164 Definition of, 152-153,156,160,162 Flexible vs. fixed, 198 Flexion of, 203,255 Form separated from meaning, 154-156 Functional vs. structural approach to, 151-154,157,159,162-163,189,198,199 Juxtaposition of, 187,203 Linguistic account of, 151 Localization of, 139,171,199 Metrical form of, 157-158 Modification of, 187,203 One-word formula, 162 Preserving influence of, 74 Prototypical vs. peripheral, 152 Semantic integration of, 19-20, 137,152, 189,192,204,217,241,244,248,250 Structural formula, 161-164,171 T1-formula, 156 T2-formula, 156,175,224 Use of in epic diction, 19,151 Functional Grammar, 105,145 Future, 33,58-59,90,143,233 Gar, 210,212 Ge, 7-9,18 Exclusive focus particle, 97,269 Generic present, 33,34,36,59 See also Modality generic Generic subject, 137 German, 46,47 Gradience, 15,17 See also Continuum, Prototypicality Ground

SUBJECT INDEX Vs. figure, 50,63 Head noun, 77 Hermann's bridge, 166, 167, 173, 176, 180, 182,267 See also Dactylic hexameter, Metrics Hiatus, 187,241 Oral-formulaic explanation of, 187,188 High point of scale, 28,208 See also Scale, Scalarity Homeric narrator Language use of, 82 Neutrality of, 82,203 Omniscience of, 82 Homonymy, 24, 93 Iconicity, 24 Identity, 60 Illocution, 43-44, 48, 58, 78-79, 86,100,104, 113,123, 213,246, 250 Imperative, 79,91,135 And factuality, 135 Present vs. aorist, 135,148 Implication And high point of scale, 30,45 Implicature, 29,41,47,57 Conventional, 41-42, 77, 82,114 Conversational, 41 Existential, 51 Scalar, 76-77, 80,82, 83,116 Inclusiveness, 91,98 Independence As a prototypical property of 'participle + per*, 121,124,131,165,193 Indeterminacy, 146,208 And concessive conditionals, 227 Indicative, 85,91 Integration of formulas, 186 And prototypicality, 189-195 Levels of, 187 On the level of 'content', 188,189 Phonetic, 187 Semantic, 189,192 Intension, 27,37,38,45,69,70,71,76,77,79, 96,225 Of focus constituent, 107 See also Descriptive content, Scalarity

297

intensional, Superlativeness Intensional context, 60,102 Interactive speech, 81,222 Intersection Of prototypical properties, 16 Ionic, 26 Isomorphism, 24 See also Iconicity, Unification Kai, 4,18,27,75,84 And 'redundant semantics', 175 And strengthening, 140,172,257 Collocation with mala, 175 In concessive conditionals, 205,219 In participial phrases, 5,10,20,108,140, 164,172,186,257 Metrical motivation for the use of, 20, 108,140,164,172,174,186 Kai hos, 113,254 As a fixed expression, 254 As a main clause concession marker, 117-119,145,254 As a scalar phrase, 114-117,123,146 As an idiomatic collocation, 117,145 Kaiper, 119,149,185 ,12,235 Kunstsprache, 155,158, 201 Latin, 13,267 Left-dislocation, 234 Lekton, 60 Lexical constraint, 55,87 Lexical semantics, 17,229 Limitation, 97 As a 'sense' ofper, 105 Logic, 33 Main clause And foregrounding, 101 Main clause phenomena, 58 Mala, 101,179 And strengthening, 172 In concessive conditionals, 221 In participial phrases, 140,186 Metrical motivation for the use of, 172 Maxims of conversation, 61 Metrical space, 20 Metrical word-type, 160

298

SUBJECT INDEX

And enclitics, 169 Change of, 171-172 Delimitation of, 168 Localization of, 162,166-169 Negative factor in localization, 171 Vs. actual word, 169-171,203 Metrics, 20,103 And the form of formulas, 158 See also Dactylic hexameter Mimesis, 103 Mimetic poetry, 103 Minimal quantity, 55 Modal autonomy And factuality, 135 As a prototypical property of 'participle + per', 121-124, 133,135-136,165,193 Modal embeddedness And 'participle + per', 133-135 Modality, 32,85 And referentiality, 34-35,59,104,222 Binary conception of, 33,104, 111 Deontic, 33,58, 59 Epistemic, 58, 111, 144, 214 Generic, 4, 33, 70,72,138-139,212, 220, 235 Irrealis, 32-34,62,70,86,90-91, 111, 133, 217 Modal autonomy vs. embeddedness, 110 Possibility in the past, 70,72 Realis, 33-34,70,91, 111, 206 Scope of, 112,121,133,136,137 Modality verbs Implicative, 143 Implicative vs. non-implicative, 59 Scope of, 146 Montague Grammar, 61 Mood, 33 Non-indicative, 33 Morphosyntactic categories, 130 Mycenaean, 26 Narrative passage, 81,203 Narratology, 82 Necessary and sufficient conditions, 25,31 Necessary condition, 124 Necessary enjambment, 267 Necessity, 33

Neg-raising, 102,146 Negation, 91 And 'participle + pef, 135 And irrealis modality, 35 And markedness, 64 And non-measurability, 127 And presupposition, 61 And scalarity, 52 And scale reversal, 54 And the reversal of truth-value, 54 As a lower value on a scale, 48,225 As speech act, 104 Behavior of comparatives with regard to, 50 External vs.internal, 53 In scope sentence, 53 Ontology of, 63 Scope of, 86,135 Strengthening of, 55 Negative Vs. positive properties, 87 Negative assertion And negative polarity, 86 Mixed status of, 86 Negative polarity, 54,216,220 See also Negation, Negative polarity items Negative polarity items, 52, 54, 59, 86, 216, 237 As negation strengthened, 52,89 As scalar superlatives, 55,89 Distribution of, 52, 54 Excluded from wishes/commands, 91 Neutralization Of differences between categories, 15, 17, 228,233,236,261 See also Category, Continuum, Overlap, Prototypicality Nog (Dutch), 46,104 Non-factuality, 33, 34,35, 59, 70, 85, 90, 94, 97,133,138,222 See also Modality irrealis Noun-epithet formula, 155 And 'essential idea*, 154-156 And 'redundant semantics', 156, 158, 171

SUBJECT INDEX And poetic quality, 201 Functional motivation for, 157 Metrical form of, 158 Traditional nature of, 152 Noun phrase Definite, 41 Descriptive content of, 37,38 Extensional, 37, 76-77, 83, 96, 113, 253, 256 Indefinite, 34,59,104 Intensional, 37,69,76,96 Non-referential, 35 Referential, 30,35,137 Referential vs. attributive use of, 60,76, 143 Nuclear predication, 114,116,123,146 Nucleus Vs. periphery, 144 Ontology, 33,36,72,130 Ook maar (Dutch), 47 And negative polarity, 56 Optative, 58,91 Oral performance and composition, 19, 20, 152,153,157,188,240 Oral-formulaic poetry, 19 Orality Vs. formularity, 152 Vs. traditionality, 152 Orality test, 197 Oude, 77,252 And neg-raising, 102 Outer vs. inner metric, 165 See also Dactylic hexameter, Metrics Overlap between categories, 17, 147, 233, 237 See also Category, Continuum, Neutralization, Prototypicality Paradigmatic relation, 29,39,40,44,48 Participle Adjectival (vs. verbal), 125,130,139 Analytic, 5,121,125,129,173 And aspect, 143 And complementation, 108 And syntactic independence, 110,112 And time-stability, 121

299

As a non-sentential element, 109 Attributive, 138 Circumstantial, 5, 9-10, 108, 114, 137, 138 Classification of, 109 Concessive relation 'expressed' by, 110 Discourse function of, 109,143 Modally autonomous vs. modally em­ bedded, 110-112 Perfect, 177 Predicative vs. attributive, 108 Synthetic, 5,121,125,130,173 Unspecified nature in comparison with adverbial subclause, 10,109 Vs. adverbial subclause, 108 'Participle + per Alleged causal sense of, 134-135 And 'redundant semantics', 172 And commands, 135-136,203 And negation, 135 And semantically empty substantives, 174,177,186 And the semantic integration of for­ mulas, 137 As a formula, 139,157,162,164,165,170, 191 Competing with scalar superlatives, 139140 Factual nature of, 121,135-136,206 Function of in epic diction, 151 Linguistic vs. formulaic approach to, 107 Localization of, 141,166,170-173 Metrical form of, 151,164 Modally embedded instances of, 121 Prototypical properties of, 120-124,140 Scalar vs. concessive use of, 120 Vs. concessive conditional, 223 Per And 'redundant semantics', 176 And German auch, 11-13,71 And negation, 127 And non-scalar focus particle, 257 And scalar superlatives, 69,250 And strengthening, 258 As a prefix in Latin, 13 As negation strengthener, 89

300

SUBJECT INDEX

Collocation with empês, 179 Collocation with kai, 12,23 Collocation with mala, 177-178,185-186, 222 Collocation with oude, 256 Concession as 'sense' of, 10, 80-81,117, 120 Concessive vs. non-concessive, 2 Delimitation with regard to ge, 7-9, 97, 261 Delimitation with regard to kai, 10, 12, 27, 67, 96,117,205,225 Determinative use of, 7-8,243 Diachronic description of, 3,21,98, 225 Diachronic development of, 14,107 Diachronie development parallel with te, 74 Diachronie relations between uses of, 98,225,262 Diachronie status of use as scalar super­ lative, 74 Dislocation of, 252-256 Distribution of, 1 Enclitic, 1,4,51,170,177,253 Etymology of, 12,14,71 Homeric vs. post-Homeric, 1-2, 51, 63, 243,259, 263 In comparative expressions, 84 In conditionals, 6,9,205 ff. In hos tø-clauses, 73-74,250 In negative polar contexts, 88 In non-restrictive relative clauses, 4, 9, 75,107,113 In participial phrases, 4,9,107 ff. In 'the same ay-contexts', 6, 51, 75, 259, 268 In wishes/commands, 4, 91-98,131,244, 247, 252 Intensive use of, 7-8,13-14,24,71,85,90, 132,134,247,269 Limitation as 'sense' of, 105 Original meaning of, 13-14, 71, 85, 90, 132,134,247,269 Peripheral instances of, 6,240 ff. Prototypical properties of, 18 Range of the description of, 7,10

Scalar vs. non-scalar, 3,51 'Subordinator + per', 1-2, 23, 51, 263265 Substituted for byker, 174 Synchronic description of, 3,98,107 Perì, 13 Intensive use of, 13,101 Peripheral, 19 Peripheral instances, 62,99,140,239 ff. And classification, 240 And diachrony, 261 And divergence, 240,249,256 And epic diction, 240-241 And integration of formulas, 242-244, 246 And metrics, 241,257-258,261,268 And post-Homeric per, 262-265 And redundant semantics, 241-242 And strengthening, 257 See also Prototype Theory, Residue Persuasion, 79,104 See also Directive speech act, Dis­ suasion Polarity, 52 Negative, 47,87-88 Positive, 52,86-87,95 Polarity contexts, 35,52 Polarity item, 52 Politeness formula, 194 Polysemy, 24,93 Positive polarity items, 52 Possibility, 33 Posthomerica, 199 Pragmatics Vs. semantics, 62 Predicate, 90 Adjectival vs. substantival, 121,125 Nominal, 129 Substantival, 125,128,129 Verbal, 125 Predication Nuclear, 57 Presupposition, 40 Existential, 61 Semantic, 61,237 Suspension of, 237

SUBJECT INDEX Pronominal adverb, 114 Proper name, 70,76-77 As extensional term, 38 Focus constituent of kai, 77,253 Scalar use of, 76 Proposition, 33,57 Propositional content, 42 Prototype Theory, 14-17,29,38,98,120,140, 146,189,229,230,239,257 Prototypical, 25 Vs. peripheral instances, 14,17,18, 25, 124,149,239 Prototypical properties, 16, 18, 31, 70, 120, 124,135,146,190 Of'participle + per'. 120 Prototypicality, 14-15,19,20,59,256 And diachrony, 124,146 And predictability, 140,257, 258 And the semantic integration of for­ mulas, 189-195 Degree of, 25 Quantifier Existential, 31,35,64 Universal, 31,35,64 Redundance, 20 Redundant semantics, 241,267 And metrics, 241 And strengthening, 241 Reference And felicity, 77 Connection with modality, 34 Context-dependent, 76 Spatial vs. temporal, 34 Relative clause And concessive interpretation, 80,107 And intension, 77 Concessive, 2,4 Non-restrictive, 4,28,68,72,75,252,253, 257 Restrictive, 59,75,88 Scalar, 75 Relative subordinator, 103 Repetition Metrical, 159-162 On the level of category, 160-164,171

301

Verbatim, 159-161,186 Residue, 15,18, 240,257, 261 Nature of the - of per, 19,240 See also Peripheral instances, Prototype Theory Rhetorical question, 54 Romance, 59 Rules Linguistic, 25 Satisfactoriness, 244 See also Acceptability Scalar particles, 27,39 And high points of scales, 30 Subclass of focus particles, 30,40 Scalar superlatives, 31,45,208,250 Affinity with any, 31 And illocution, 43 And intensionality, 39 And metrical localization, 184 And morphosyntax, 35-36,69 And negation, 53 And negative polarity, 55 Aadper, 35,69 And scope independence, 45 And stress, 49 And superlative fact, 31,69 As focus constituent of even, 62 Competing with 'participle + per3, 139140 Distribution of, 32,35,81 In hos te-clauses, 73 Neutrality of, 82 Non-referentiality of, 31, 35 Scalarity, 3,14,28,39 And adverbial relation, 110 And comparatives, 83,84 And concession (diachronic), 81, 116, 117,120,124,131,146,254,262 And concession (synchronic), 81, 120, 124,253 And negative polarity items, 55 As a prototypical property of per, 27, 242,246,257 Extensional, 39-40,205,208,225 In wishes/commands, 131

302

SUBJECT INDEX

Intensional, 71-72, 81-82, 116,124, 205, 208, 221,225, 253,256 Positive polar, 86 See also Scalar particles, Scale, Superlativeness Scale, 28 And at least- and at most-meanings, 29 And implicative, 29 As a continuum between two extremes, 29 High point of, 29, 45, 69,208, 246 Implicated by scalar particle, 45 Semantic feature as identity of, 29 Scale reversal, 53-54,56,87 And markedness, 55 And negative polarity, 55 Scholia, 148 Schon (German), 46 Scope Of focus particles, 44 Wide vs. narrow, 46-47,64,86 Scope ambiguity And conditionals, 47 And negation, 47,62 Scope-dependence, 45,69-70,76,84 And extensionality, 45,208 Scope-independence And intensionality, 45,208 Scope sentence, 44-45,47,80,83,87,114,205 Semantic adverbial relation Expressed by participle, 108 Semantic integration of formulas And peripheral instances, 241 Semantics Vs. pragmatics, 62 Sense, 10 Vs. reference, 60 Sentence-type, 79 Declarative, 85-86,144 Imperative, 85-86,144 Interrogative, 85-86 Showing Vs. telling, 82 Simile, 226 Diachronie status of, 226 Extension of, 212

Situational knowledge, 76 Sogar (German), 46,47,54 And positive polarity, 64 Speech act, 43,79, 233 Direct vs. indirect, 79 Directive, 79,81 Felicity of, 58,192 See also Illocution Spondee, 165 See also Dactylic hexameter State of affairs, 30,33,40,57,70,86,109,113, 116,118,123,212 Stoics, 60 Strengthening, 9,12,20,26,62,116,117,140, 172 And redundant semantics, 140,241,257 As a function of kai, 10 As a function ofper, 9,10,109,257 Stress, 40,44 Subclause Adverbial, 108 Complementary, 108 Subordinating conjunction, 1,109 Substitution, 29,44,80 And the recurrence of formulas, 160, 164 See also Alternatives for focus con­ stituent Sufficient condition, 31 Superlative And negative polarity, 54 Attributive, 37 In scalar statements, 30 Morphosyntactic, 78 Negative, 55 Positive, 55 Pragmatic, 32,78,246 Referential, 37 See also Intension, Scalar superlatives, Scalarity Superlative fact, 31-32,43,48,69,71,78,82, 113,123,206,213,246 As a technical term, 44 See also Illocution Superlative property, 76-78,84,113

SUBJECT INDEX Superlatíveness, 14,36,71,120,124,208,221, 225,256 And indeterminacy, 146 And intensionality, 39 And negative polarity, 55 And non-measurable properties, 126, 147 And substantival predicates, 128 And time-stability, 125,129 As necessary condition for scalanty, 124 As prototypical property of 'participle + pef, 121,123-124,130,139,193 Attributive, 31,69 Negative, 47 Positive, 47 Property of high point of scale, 30 See also Intension, Scalar superlatives, Scalanty, Superlative Synchronic descriptive linguistics, 13 Synchrony Relation to diachrony, 120 Syntagmatic relation, 29 Te,4 , Adverbial use of, 72-74 And concessive conditionals, 212 And generic modality, 212 And permanent fact, 72-73,105,268 Connective, 72 Diachronie development of, 74 In main clauses, 212 In non-restrictive relative clauses, 68 In similes, 226 Telic aspect, 59 Temporal reference Absence of, 73,137 Non-specific, 70,73,222 Specific, 32,33,34,35,62,235 See also Factuality, Modality Tense Relative vs. absolute, 144 Tense marking, 33,91 Future, 90 'The same as-contexts', 6,49-50,63,75,268

303

And focus particles, 51 And the study ofper, 6,51,75,259,268 The slightest, 89 As a negative polarity item, 55 As a scalar superlative, 55 Time-axis, 33,34 Time-stability, 125,129 And aspect, 130 And superlatíveness, 125,129 Timeless statement, 72 See also Modality generic, Temporal reference Too,51 And 'the same Ay-contexts', 51 Topic, 213,234 Topic continuity, 61,234 Topic marking, 234 Topic shift, 234 Topicalization Homeric vs. later Greek, 235 Transformational Grammar, 25 Trransitivity, 59 Truth-conditions, 37,40-42,60,102 And semantics, 62 Truth-value, 208 Types Vs. tokens, 73 Unification Methodological principle of, 11, 27, 51, 93,120,135,229 See also Iconicity, Isomorphism Universe of discourse, 60 Wish, 4, 90, 94-95 See also Compromise, Per in wishes/commands Word end Obligatory vs. preferred, 167-168 Yes/no-question, 35 Zelfs (Dutch), 46,54,101 And positive polarity, 64

INDEX OF NAMES

Adkins, A. W.H 204 Altmann, H. 57 Austin, N. 153 Auwera, J. van der 57, 63, 64,105 Baker, G.P. 25, 61 Bakker, E J . 2, 6, 26, 34, 51, 60, 61, 62, 63, 105, 145, 147, 203, 235, 236,237,269 Bakker, W.F 148 Bal, M. 103 Beekes, R.S.P. 160, 166, 167, 168, 169,200 Bennett, J. 61, 62, 63,104 Benveniste, E. 57,101 Bolkestein, A.M. 62,101,102 Booth, W.C. 103 Brugmann, . - Thumb, A. 24 Buck, C D 24 Carlson, G. 64 Chantraine, P. 7, 9, 23, 24, 25, 26, 144,145,148,203,235 Combellack, F.M. 188 Cruse, D.A. 24 Davison, A. 58,59,64,105 Denniston, J.D. 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 23, 24, 85, 90, 105, 132, 135, 204, 236,237,243,268,269 Dik, S.C. 57,105,145,198,234,235 Donelian, K. 60,76,143 Ducrot, . 57,102 Ebeling, H. 84,134

Edwards, M.W. 201 Fauconnier, G. 32,53,54,57,58,61, 62,64 Fillmore, C.J. 25 Fleischman, S. 58,59,143 Ford, C E . 234 Fox, B. 143 Fraenkel, H. 7, 11-14, 23, 71, 200, 204 Fraser, B. 61 Frege, G. 37,60, 61 Frisk, H. 24 Gazdar, G. 57 Gehring, A. 277 Genette, G. 103 Givón, T. 15,16,25,32,41,58,59,60, 61,62,63,64,101,104,105,143, 145.147.234 Goodwin, W.W. 23, 105, 108, 110, 143.147.235 Grice, H.P. 41, 61,237 Haack, S. 60 Haas, W. 197 Hacker, P.M.S. 25,61 Haiman, J. 24, 63,233,234,237 Hainsworth, J.B. 162,198,199 Haudry,J.145 Hawkins, J.A. 59 Hoeksema, J. 63, 64 Hoekstra, A. 74, 103, 162, 169, 171, 197,200,201,202,203

306

AUTHOR INDEX

Hoffmann, M.E. 105 Hopper, P.J. 25,58,59,63,101 Horn, L.R. 40, 52,57,58,59, 61, 64, 89,102,105,237 Ickler, N.L. 234 Ingalls, W.B. 199,200 Jacobs, J. 57, 61,64 Janko, R. 74,106 Jong, I.J.F. de 103 Kartonen, L. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 57, 61, 62 Kempson, R.M. 61, 64 Kiparsky,  58,61,143 Kiparsky, P. 58,61,143,198,199 Kirk, G.S. 170,197,200,267 Kirsner, R.S. 24 Klein-Andrieu, F. 24 Kneale, W. & Kneale, M. 60 König, E. 25,40,41,42,45,49,57,61, 62, 63, 64, 102, 105, 146, 207, 216,228,233,235,237 Kühner, R. - Gerth, . 7, 8, 23, 24, 72,103,131,143,145,146,147, 235,236,237 Ladusaw, W. 64 Leaf, W. 134,145,269 Leech, G.N. 102 Lehmann, Chr. 105,145 Levinson, S.C. 57, 61, 62,64,237 Lidell, H.G. & Scott, R. 237 Longacre, R.E. 63,235 Lord, A.B. 197,199,200 Lyons, J. 24, 36, 57, 58, 60, 62, 73, 102,104,129,144 Matthews, P.H. 57,144,145 Meister, . 154,158,201

Mffl,J.S.60 Minton, W.W. 162,199 Monro, D.B. 7,8,13,24,235,243 Monteil, P. 7,8,9,23 Murray, G. 267 Nagler, M.N. 235 Notopoulos, JA. 199 Oguse, A 9, 23, 110-112, 121, 144, 146.148.224.236.268 O'Neill Jr., E.G. 159,160, 165, 166, 168-171, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203,267 Paardekoper, P.C. 64 Packard, D.W. 199 Palmer, RR. 58,144 Parry, M. 25, 26, 152-163, 172, 173, 187, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203,267 Peabody, . 197 Peters, S. 41,42,43,44,45,46,57,61, 62 Pinkster, H. 145 Porter, H.N. 200,201 Prendergast, G.L. 201 Quine, W.V.0.61 Quirk, R. et al. 63,233 Raalte, M. van 165, 167, 168, 200, 201 Ramsey, E. 101,234,235 Rescher, N. 144 Rieu, E.V. 3,235,267 Rijksbaron, A 143,147,234,236 Rosch, E.H. 15 Ruijgh, J. 23,24,26,57,72,74,101, 102, 103, 106, 144, 147, 148, 234.235.236.268.269

AUTHOR INDEX Russell, . 64 Russo, J.A 161-164, 197, 199, 2 203 Schmerling, S. 64 Schoorl, S. 60 Schwyzer, E. - Debranner, A 24 Searle, J. 102 Seuren, P.AM. 52, 61, 64,102 Shipp, G.P. 226,236 Sicking, C.M.J. 144,148,204 Stechow, A. von 63 Strawson, P.F. 60, 64 Taglicht, J. 57

307

Thompson, S.A 25,59,63,101,143, 234,235 Tomlin, R.S. 57 Traugott, E.C. 57,233 Vandeweghe, W. 57 Visser, E. 197,198,201 Vivante, P. 201 Wallace, S. 58, 63,101 Wendel, . 148 Willcock, M.M. 148 Witte, . 154,158,201,202,203 Zwarts, F. 64