Linguistic Frameworks and Ontology: A Re-Examination of Carnap’s Metaphilosophy 9783110802351, 9789027933379

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JANUA LINGUARUM STUDIA MEMORIAE NICOLAI VAN WIJK DEDICATA edenda curai C.H. VAN SCHOONEVELD Indiana University

Series Minor, 145

Linguistic Frameworks and Ontology A Re-Examination of Carnap's Metaphilosophy

Bryan G. Norton New College of the University of South Florida

Mouton Publishers The Hague • New York • Paris

ISBN 90 279 3337 5 © Copyright 1977 Mouton Publishers, The Hague No part of this issue may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers. Printed in the Netherlands

PREFACE

In attempting to understand the metaphilosophical foundations of contemporary linguistic analysis, I have turned to a classical source - Rudolf Carnap and the logical empiricists. In my study of Carnap's writings, I have become steadily aware of a philosophical system far different than the one usually discussed and criticized as "logical positivism." As have the other members of my philosophical generation, I cut my analytical teeth on the verifiability principle, and can cite counter-examples to all major formulations of the principle. Armed with these counter-examples and their well-known companion - the claim that the verifiability principle cannot account for its own status — I considered myself prepared to refute positivism, and did so on many occasions. Two factors, however, eventually forced me to reconsider this comfortable position. First, I found myself intrigued by Carnap's essay "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," 1 and felt that the approach to ontological problems sketched in that essay could be defended against a number of standard criticisms usually given against it. Second, I found myself defending the position in that essay without any appeal to empiricistic assumptions. These two factors gradually converged to produce a new interpretation of Carnap's thought — an interpretation which diverges not just in detail, but on basic principles, from the standard views of positivism. I believe that the basic principles underlying "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" are essentially independent of verificationism in particular and empiricism in general. These factors led me to, first of all, question the standard comfortable refutations of positivism as, perhaps, too hasty. If the verifiability principle was not the central principle of Carnap's metaphilosophy, the entire system cannot be summarily dismissed simply on the grounds that that principle is rendered implausible by powerful objections. Further, I began to state, in detail, the sort of system which would result from a formulation of the alternative bases for Carnap's metaphilosophical position. I found a coherent system - including Carnap's principle of tolerance, an application of the object languagemetalanguage distinction to philosophy, and a non-empiricistic critique of traditional metaphysics. This non-empiricistic critique differs from verificationistic critiques both in its basis and in its implications for philosophy.

6 Unlike verificationistic critiques of metaphysics which banish metaphysics as meaningless nonsense, the non-empiricistic critique is reconstructive in nature. This book is an attempt to present the system which has emerged from my examination of Carnap's writings and from my thinking about the system itself. Historically speaking, I believe my interpretation of Carnap belies the suggestion by Arne Naess that "Carnap's philosophical style, at its best, prevents his formulations from being interpreted in widely different directions. The limitation of this thought is therefore unusually clear. Classical philosophical texts, even those written in the seemingly clearest of styles, undergo constant reinterpretation. It is difficult to see how this can happen in Carnap's case." 2 My approach to Carnap's thought departs radically from standard interpretations found in most commentaries. I do not take this to indicate that Carnap's style is less clear than Naess suggests, but only to suggest that Carnap's thought is a good deal more subtle and complex than many readers have noticed. Philosophically, this book deals with issues on two quite different levels. First, the Carnapian system which I develop seems to me to provide a systematic underpinning for the widely used linguistic method in philosophy. It is a system in the sense that the various components interrelate to provide a coherent picture of philosophical activity and, also, in the sense that the basic principles, if accepted, provide a justification for the methodology which is in wide use today. It is of course true, as Richard Schuldenfrei has argued with respect to W.V.O. Quine's system, 3 that any justifications for isolated elements of systems of this generality are often question-begging. I hope, however, that I have clarified the interrelationships within Carnap's system, and isolated the major differences between Carnap and his student/critic, Quine. In addition to systematic issues, however, this book has philosophical significance with respect to many less systematic issues. It will be necessary to deal with such issues of less general scope, such as conventionalism, an explication of the concept of ontology, criteria of ontological commitment, analyticity, the rationality of external questions, and absolutism versus relativism. Readers who are mainly interested in these less systematic issues may want to isolate parts of the book, abstracting the discussions of isolated issues from the argument as a whole. Such isolation of issues will not always be easy - this work is more a book than a collection of essays. It is possible, however, to provide a guide which will help the reader interested in issues of less scope than the work as a whole. Chapters 1, 3, 4, and "5 can be read as a discussion of the Quine-Carnap dispute concerning ontology. Of these chapters, 3 and 4 concern the nature of ontology and ontological commitment, and chapter 5 discusses analyticity and the relationship between analyticity and externality. For the reader more interested in the relationship between Carnap and traditional philosophical systems, chapters 1, 2, 6, and 7 provide a relatively self-contained discussion.

7

My unorthodox interpretation of Carnap is, for the most part, contained in chapters 2 and 6, while the first and last chapters deal with metaphilosophical systems and how they might be justified. I wish to express my gratitude to many of my teachers, colleagues, and students whose comments and criticisms sharpened by thinking or caused me to improve the text. I mention, in particular Robert Beard, Spencer Carr, Peter McCormick, B. Gresham Riley, Robert Pippin, Douglas Berggren, Aron Edidin, Jaegwon Kim, and G. Lee Bowie. I thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for summer support enabling me to concentrate on one section of the book during 1974. I express my gratitude to the typists, Rebecca Curry, Angela Inderwiesen, Alice Gantt, Patricia Hevrdejs, and Lori Sargent, who struggled valiantly to decipher various versions of the text. Finally, I wish to thank Aron Edidin for preparing the index. New College of the University of South Florida

NOTES 1 Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," originally published in Revue Internationale De Philosophie, IV (1950), 20-40. All references to this work will be from the reprint in Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956). 2 Arne Naess, "Rudolf Carnap: 1891-1970," Synthese, XIII (1970), 337-338. 3 My thinking about the Quine-Carnap debate has been deeply influenced by Schuldenfrei's excellent essay, "Quine in Perspective," Journal of Philosophy, LXIX (1972), 5-16.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

5

1. Systems and Meta-Ontology 1.1 Two Forms of Antimetaphysics 1.2 Systems and Meta-Ontology in Contemporary Philosophy . . 1.3 Three Systems of Meta-Ontology

11 11 15 17

2. Verificationism, Tolerance, and External Questions 2.1 The Standard Interpretation of External Questions 2.2 An Alternative Interpretation: Tolerance and the Hierarchical View of Philosophy 2.3 Tolerance and Conventionalism 2.4 An Alternative to the Standard Interpretation 2.5 That Tolerance and the Hierarchical View Are Independent of Empiricism

28 28 29 32 41 49

3. Categories and Ontology 3.1 Interpreting Quine's Objections 3.2 Many-sorted Languages, Allwdrter, and the Concept of Ontology 3.3 Quine Versus the Concept of Ontology 3.4 The Distinction Without a Difference?

60 60

4. Carnap and Quine on Ontological Commitment 4.1 Carnap on Ontological Commitment 4.2 A Dilemma for Carnap 4.3 A Critique of the Quinean Criterion of Ontological Commitment 4.4 Formal Definitions 5. Analyticity and Externality 5.1 Quine on Analyticity and Externality 5.2 A Definitional Link Between Externality and Analyticity? 5.3 Externality and Rules of Language

78 78 80

62 65 74

87 99 110 110 Ill 112

10 5.4 Analyticity and the Motivations for the Distinction Between Internal and External Questions 5.5 Analyticity and Externality

121 128

6. Externality and Rationality 6.1 Paradigms, External Questions, and Rationality 6.2 Carnap on External Rationality 6.3 Absolutism Again? 6.4 The Limits of External Rationality

132 132 137 145 146

7. Metaphilosophical Conclusions 7.1 The Carnapian Model, Verificationism, and Utility 7.2 Generalizing the Model

154 154 160

Bibliography

167

Index

171

1. S Y S T E M S A N D M E T A - O N T O L O G Y

1.1 TWO FORMS OF ANTIMETAPHYSICS

It is instructive to compare the tone of the following quotations: (1) The (pseudo) statements of metaphysics do not serve for the description of states of affairs, neither existing ones (in that case they would be true statements) nor non-existing ones (in that case they would be at least false statements). They serve for the expression of the general attitude of a person towards life.... Perhaps we may assume that metaphysics originated from mythology. The child is angry at the "wicked table" which hurt him. Primitive man endeavors to conciliate the threatening demon of earthquakes, or he worships the deity of the fertile rains in gratitude.... On closer inspection the same content as that of mythology is here still recognizable behind the repeatedly varied dressing: we find that metaphysics also arises from the need to give expression to a man's attitude in life, his emotional and volitional reaction to the environment, to society, to the tasks to which he devotes himself, to the misfortunes that befall him. This attitude manifests itself, unconsciously as a rule, in everything a man does or says. It also impresses itself on his facial features, perhaps even on the character of his gait. Many people, now, feel a desire to create over and above these manifestations a special expression of their attitude, through which it might become visible in a more succinct and penetrating way. If they have artistic talent they are able to express themselves by producing a work of art.... What is here essential for our considerations is only the fact that art is an adequate, metaphysics an inadequate means for the expression of the basic attitude. Of course, there need be no intrinsic objection to one's using any means of expression one likes. But in the case of metaphysics we find this situation: through the form of its words it pretends to be something that it is not. The form in question is that of a system of statements which are apparently related as premises and conclusions, that is, the form of a theory. In this way the fiction of theoretical content is generated, whereas, as we have seen, there is no such content. It is not only the reader, but the metaphysician himself who suffers from the illusion that the metaphysical statements say something, describe states of affairs. 1 (2) In taking the position that all philosophical problems are questions of the syntax of the language of science, we do not mean it to be a proposal or even a prescription for limiting inquiry to a definite, seemingly very narrow field of questions. Much more is meant: as soon as one exactly formulates some question of philosophy as logic of science, one notes that it is a question of the logical analysis of the language of science; and further investigation then teaches that each such question allows itself to be formulated as a formal question, to wit a question of the syntax of the language of science. All

12 theorems of philosophy take on an exact, discussable form only when we formulate them as assertions or proposals of the syntax of the language of science.2

The former passage emphasizes the emotive and the poetic force of metaphysics; and it concludes that the utterances of metaphysics are cognitively meaningless. It is aggressive and condemnatory. The latter passage, however, is conciliatory in tone, and emphasizes that philosophical utterances must be seen as proposals? Most importantly, the former passage connotes a rejection, a final lying to rest of metaphysical controversies. The latter passage, on the other hand, is forward-looking and reconstructive in tone. Both quotations embody a positivistic view of the status of metaphysical utterances. Surprisingly, both passages were written by Rudolf Carnap within three years. Furthermore, those three years (1932-35) occurred during the heyday of positivism. Even the titles of the two essays from which the passages are taken suggest a difference in attitude - the first passage is from "The Elimination of Metaphysics," while the second is from "On the Character of Philosophical Problems." A very great deal of this book can be seen as a systematic explication of the differences between these two quotations. I hope to clarify and defend the claim that positivism, especially as it is exemplified in the work of Rudolf Carnap, was not a single-minded movement. I hope also to show that because positivism is not single-minded, it is not possible to dismiss the movement as simply and conveniently as is often done. In order to defend these two points, however, it is necessary to say a very great deal. I must drive a wedge between the two passages by uncovering and explicating two philosophical systems coexisting in positivism. That such a wedge can be driven will establish that positivism is not single-minded. I have also to demonstrate that many of the criticisms leveled against positivism are applicable only to one of the philosophical systems embodied in the/fnovement. This demonstration will show that positivism cannot be dismissed easily. "The Elimination of Metaphysics," from which the first passage is taken, emphasizes verificationism — a modern, linguisticized form of empiricism. I believe that the condemnatory attitude toward metaphysics is closely tied to verificationism. I shall call this attitude the verifiability approach to metaphysical problems. "On the Character of Philosophical Problems" emphasizes the distinction between the material and the formal modes of speech. Out of that distinction stems an attitude of reconstruction — metaphysics is to be rehabilitated insofar as its utterances can be translated into the formal mode of speech. I shall call the latter attitude the formalizability approach. To philosophers external to the movement, verificationism has been and is equated with positivism. Several reasons can be given for this equation. First, philosophers often proceed as if they fully endorse Whitehead's adage, "It is more important that a philosophical claim be interesting than true"; and, the verification principle is, certainly, interesting. A whole generation of

13 philosophers have been introduced to the movement of logical analysis through introduction to the principle. A second and related reason is that this interesting principle was given a central place in the most popular expositions by the very philosophers who called themselves logical positivists. A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic is the most obvious example, but it is by no means alone. Carnap's essays "The Elimination of Metaphysics," and PseudoProblems of Philosophy strongly emphasize verificationism. Schlick's "The Turning Point of Philosophy" and Reichenbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy are likewise militantly empiricistic and condemnatory. On the other hand, Carnap's distinction between the material mode and the formal mode is presented in such technical pieces as The Logical Syntax of Language. The essay already cited, "On the Character of Philosophical Problems," could have balanced this situation, except for the fact that it was relatively unavailable until quite recently. "The Elimination of Metaphysics," by contrast, is seen as a classic statement of logical positivism. Such reasons as differences in interest and lack of accessibility, while important, cannot, however, ultimately explain the preponderance of attention lavished upon verifiability over formalizability, because these reasons are as much symptoms as causes. The single most important reason that formalizability and the approach to metaphysics which goes with it have never received much explicit attention is that philosophers both inside and outside the movement of logical positivism have failed to see that the two approaches are ultimately distinct. It has been assumed that criticisms of metaphysics which are based upon the formalizability approach are merely an alternative formulation of the criticisms based upon requirements of verifiability. In a sense, then, the most basic task of this book is to show that formalizability in fact rests upon different premises than does verifiability. I will argue that the formalizability approach depends not upon empiricism in general or verificationism in particular, but upon two metaphilosophical axioms — the principle of tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy. The first of these was expounded by Camap in The Logical Syntax of Language, while the latter, so labelled by me, is a principle embodied in Carnap's methodology. These two axioms or principles can be seen to be independent of empiricism; and, when working in concert, they imply nearly all of Carnap's metaphilosophical system. As such, they provide the basis for and significantly qualify the well-known verifiability criterion. These basic interpretive points provide the impetus for the philosophical points which develop throughout this book. Perhaps this can best be seen by stating at the outset the basic theses of the book (the statement of each thesis will be followed by a chapter number designating the chapter in which that thesis is developed and defended): I. The standard interpreters of Carnap are mistaken in assuming that the formalizability approach to metaphysics rests upon verificationism for its support. (Chapter 2)

14 II. In fact, Carnap's discussions of ontology are based upon tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy and form an independent critique and suggested reformation of traditional ontology. (Chapter 2) III. In this independent critique, Carnap presupposes a distinction between ontology and non-ontology, and recognizes an important difference between ontological and non-ontological claims. If Carnap is correct on these two points, then his distinction between categories and subclasses can be defended on pragmatic grounds alone. (Chapter 3) IV. Carnap's system, recognizing as it does an important dichotomy between ontology and non-ontology, cannot, consistently, embody a Quinean criterion for ontological commitment. (Chapter 4) V. A Carnapian alternative to Quine's criterion for ontological commitment better captures traditional ontological intuitions. (Chapter 4) VI. Quine is correct in perceiving a close connection between the internalexternal distinction and the analytic-synthetic distinction. It is not, however, simply true that the latter distinction supports the former. Rather, the two distinctions are mutually supporting, suggesting that any attempt to adjudicate disputes concerning these issues will be systematic in nature. (Chapter 5) VII. If VI is correct, and the disputes are systematic in nature, Carnap's system has a powerful prima facie advantage over the Quinean system. (Chapter 5) Further, Quine's discussion, to date, offers little prospect of overcoming this prima facie advantage. VIII. Since I, above, is true, there is no reason to assume that Carnap's tolerance with respect to external questions implies that such questions cannot be decided rationally. Carnap's undeveloped suggestions concerning the bases for pragmatic decisions provide a criterion of external rationality which can aid in the answering of properly formulated external questions. (Chapter 6) IX. The system suggested by Carnap can provide a systematic, metatheoretical justification for the methods of linguistic analysis in philosophy. (Chapter 7) In one sense, the purpose of this book is historical - its starting point and main impetus flow from a reinterpretation of Carnap's metaphilosophy. Consequently, I am concerned to explicate what Carnap really intended. But the purpose is also philosophical, in that I believe that the system which Carnap developed, at least implicitly, has great philosophical interest. The sys-

15 tem, in a sense, takes on a life of its own. I will find it necessary, then, to supplement Carnap's actual writings with points he never made, to emphasize points he failed to emphasize, and even, in a few cases, to argue that he was mistaken in adopting a certain position. Hopefully, it will always be clear when Carnap is speaking for himself and when I am making points which seem to me to be implied by the logic of the system. Thus, while the impetus of the book is historical, the upshot is, 1 hope, philosophical. The Carnapian system here developed provides a systematic and coherent approach to philosophy; and, since it does not rest upon verificationism, it cannot be dismissed with facile dismissals of verificationism. As such, it is a metaphilosophical system worthy of debate and discussion. I hope that this book will stimulate and facilitate that discussion.

1.2 SYSTEMS AND META-ONTOLOGY IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

It has often been noted, sometimes with approval, but often with disapprobation, that few philosophers are concerned, today, to build systems. Many yearn for the "good old days" when philosophers spun out magnificently complete and intricately interconnected systems of thought. I would like to suggest, by way of background to my main theses, that such systems-building is not, entirely, dead. In fact, I believe that a number of twentieth century philosophers of the analytic tradition can be properly interpreted as presenting, though in slightly changed form, systems of thought which are at least as complete and systematic as that of the traditional philosophers. Philosophical systems-builders have long been fascinated by the geometric model whereby a set of axioms, postulates and rules is sufficient to generate the truths of their system. Any important change in the form of systems in this century does not, I think, most basically involve a change in this model. Contemporary systems are, like traditional ones, built upon axioms, but contemporary axiom systems are what I would call metatheoretical rather than theoretical. 4 The basic axioms of contemporary systems are not substantive theses about the nature of reality; but, rather, metatheoretical theses about the nature of philosophy and philosophical activity. In the continual attempt of philosophers to question all presuppositions, traditionally accepted assumptions about language, philosophy, and the world have been questioned increasingly. As a consequence of this questioning, an entire area of assumptions which were once accepted uncritically are now the subject of controversy. Does philosophy concern the structure or content of reality? Is the structure of reality inherent in reality itself, or do human concepts determine that structure? These and other questions, about which answers were once assumed, are now open for debate. But these questions are of such extreme generality and abstractness that answers are difficult to

16 state clearly, and even more difficult to defend persuasively. I believe, however, that positions with respect to these issues are, in this century, the axioms of which "systems" are built. It has often been said of some of the more closely-knit of the traditional philosophical systems (for example, the systems of Spinoza and Hobbes), that once one accepts their beginning points, the rest "follows" step after inexorable step. It is, perhaps, true that detailed positions of substance do not follow in the same way from the metatheoretical systems of contemporary philosophy. It may be possible on one of these systems to choose belief in God or not, dualism or materialism, phenomenalism or realism. But they are not, necessarily, less systematic for this reason. Their systematicity stems not from the ability of the central axioms to determine questions of substance. Rather, the systematicity stems from the ability of those axioms to determine what problems are legitimate problems, the proper formulation of legitimate problems, the nature of legitimate reasons and arguments, and the proper interpretation of philosophical utterances. Great latitude is possible on this type of system, with respect to substantive details. Many have taken this latitude as an implication that systematicity no longer exists in philosophy. This, however, is an oversimplification. Systematicity is marked by two characteristics — generality and interconnectedness. I believe that the latitude with respect to many substantive issues in contemporary systems is a result of increased generality and decreased interconnectedness. The axiomatic starting points of contemporary systems are so general as to fail to have implications with respect to substantive philosophical issues. But this does not imply that the systems are not at all interconnected. The axioms imply a great deal with respect to how a philosopher may or should proceed with respect to formulating a substantive philosophical position. These implications may, ultimately, even have implications for substantive issues. Even if they do not, however, there is an important interconnectedness operating on a new, metatheoretical level. To fail to perceive that these metatheoretical systems are, in fact, systems is to make as serious an error as would be made if one failed to perceive that they are of a different level of generality than traditional systems. One effect of the increased generality and decreased interconnectedness of these contemporary systems is the failure of such systems to imply a way of life - a set of prescriptions for behavior. On this account, philosophers have been much maligned. It has been said that contemporary philosophers have abdicated their responsibilities to provide leadership on substantive problems in Western Civilization. However true it may be that philosophers no longer provide answers, the accusation of abdication of responsibility can be rebutted. If in fact, traditional philosophy provided answers to practical issues in Western Civilization, it was only by presupposing certain questionable procedural axioms. Contemporary philosophy has, by calling into open ques-

17 tion these procedural questions, raised to consciousness issues of procedure. Contemporary systems do not offer answers, but methods according to which an individual may pursue his own answers. This development should not be surprising if, in fact, the goal of Western Civilization is the achievement of democracy — a form of government the ideal of which is defined not according to some set of substantive decisions, but according to a rule of procedure — that decisions are to be made by virtue of the majority opinion of free citizens. That these brief but globally general remarks are out of character for an analytic philosopher is without doubt. One of the central procedural rules, questioned by few analytical philosophers, is a respect for precision. It is not possible to be precise concerning issues of the generality I have just addressed. Because I share the respect for precision, I will not proceed on these lofty levels of generality. Instead, I will attempt to retain the insight that even contemporary philosophers provide systems, though on the metatheoretical level, while applying this insight to a far narrower field than philosophy at large. I will, instead, examine one subpart of philosophy — that set of problems usually termed "ontological" in nature. I will, in the remainder of this chapter, explore what types of positions make up a metatheoretical position about the problems of ontology. I will present a list of five meta-ontological questions; and, I will sketch three examples of meta-ontological systems. One meta-ontological position, I will call it the "essentialistic model," will be constructed somewhat loosely from a set of assumptions I believe I have perceived in ontologists who preceded the revolution which caused philosophical systems to be metatheoretical in nature. A second model will be constructed by gleaning, from the writings of Rudolf Carnap, a system of meta-ontology quite different from the one usually attributed to him. Third, I will draw a set of answers to the crucial meta-ontological questions from the writings of W.V.O. Quine. I hope it will be possible, by extension, to see these precise remarks on a limited topic as casting light upon the more general issues of systematic metaphilosophy. For the most part, these extensions will be left to the reader; but I will, in the final section of this book, return for one more brief look at the more general issues.

1.3 THREE SYSTEMS OF META-ONTOLOGY

A comprehensive meta-ontological model would provide answers to at least the following five questions: (1) What is the most perspicuous language for discussing ontological issues? (2) What is an ontological issue and how is one to be distinguished from non-ontological issues?

18 (3) How does one know when a theory is committed to an entity or type of entities? (4) How is one to interpret ontological assertions, and what, exactly, is their import to be? (5) On what basis are ontological issues to be decided? In the last section, I said that traditional philosophers have often presupposed answers to questions which are, now, being addressed as controversial. I believe that questions (l)-(5) are among those questions. It will be instructive to sketch, briefly, the answers presupposed by a number of traditional philosophers, and to compare this model with those adopted, somewhat more explicitly, by Carnap and Quine. Because the model which most clearly opposes those of Carnap and Quine was not universally held, I will call the model sketched below the "essentialistic model" of ontology. The reasons for this label will become clear as I propose answers to questions (4) and (5). Because traditional philosophers have seldom taken positions, explicitly, on questions (l)-(5), it is only possible to infer what their answers would be on the basis of their behavior. The enterprise is hampered further by the fact that I am trying to summarize an entire tradition, rather than stating the assumptions of a single individual. This latter problem may cause the model to appear, as the social scientist's average man, to have 2.32 children. In spite of these unavoidable defects, I believe that the attempt to state, as clearly as possible, the answers that essentialistic ontologists would have given, if asked, is instructive. If for no other reason, it will shed light on the systems of Carnap and Quine by setting out the system against which they are reacting. (1) Traditional ontologists have, to a very large extent, used ordinary discourse as the language in which they propound their ontological theories. They have, of course, introduced special terminology as an addendum to the stock of expressions encountered in nonphilosophical talk. These introductions were, however, invariably explained in terms of ordinary discourse. Likewise, while it was often noted by traditional philosophers that language has the ability to trap and confuse, the corrective proposed was not wholesale attempts to replace ordinary discourse, but rather patient explanations using other parts of that discourse. The traditionalists, then, have taken the most perspicuous language for ontology to be ordinary discourse with such terminological devices as seemed necessary on an ad hoc basis. (2) Traditional ontologists have assumed that there is an important difference between ontological and non-ontological issues of an existential nature. The existence of a pencil on my desk and of tigers in India have not been countenanced as raising questions open to ontological debate. Rather, ontological questions were that special subset of existential issues which had a sort of ultimate generality. The existence of material objects, sense data, and abstract entities have been, by virtue of their generality, considered ontological.

19 The sort of generality deemed relevant, here, is not a generality, merely, of inclusion. That is, the notion of generality involved is not that whereby one would say that the class of stones, good moods, and prime numbers is more general than the class of stones. Rather, the relevant sense of generality involves a commitment to categories or, as they were sometimes called, "natural kinds." Objects, according to this view, are arranged in a system of species and genera; and, a genus gains its identity by virtue of characteristics shared by all of the entities which are its members. Ontological issues, then, were taken to be issues concerning whether a complete account of the universe must countenance a given group of entities as being most general in this special sense of generality. As will emerge in the discussion of (4) and (5) below, there were important disagreements concerning the nature of the characteristics which determine a category. I believe, however, that it is safe to say that traditional ontologists shared a concept of ontology which was based on the recognition of categories of existents. (3) Quine and a number of other philosophers have noted that ontologists have, traditionally, looked to names or referring expressions as the major indicator of ontological commitment. 5 This is not to say that traditional ontologists considered themselves to be committed to every entity for which a referring expression existed. Many carefully designed ploys were available to avoid commitment, in particular cases, to unwanted entities. But Quine is fair, I believe, in suggesting that insufficient care was taken, by traditional ontologists, in clarifying the referential system of a language sufficiently to allow a systematic criterion of ontological commitment. The ploys just mentioned seem to have been based upon referring expressions modified, in an unhappily ad hoc manner, by various attempts to explain away commitment to unwanted entities. (4) The answers given to (l)-(3) seem to me to have been quite generally held by traditional ontologists. The answers I will suggest to (4) and (5) have been, however, more controversial. Consequently, I will label that model which consists of the noncontroversial answers (l)-(3) plus the controversial answers here proposed to (4) and (5) as the "essentialistic model." On the essentialistic view, any ontological claim, if true, was interpreted as revealing some attribute of "reality." The categories chosen as the true set of categories were, on this account, determined by the make-up of reality as a whole. At the risk of confusing this sense of 'realism' with other usages, it can be said that essentialistic ontologists have given a realistic interpretation to the categories. That is, they have felt that there is objective evidence, not relative to context, situation, or human purposes which indicates the true categories, in an absolute, prelinguistic, and unchanging sense. When I say that the categories are absolute and prelinguistic, I mean that the categories envisioned to exist on this view logically precede any categories instituted by the choice of a linguistic or conceptual framework. Reality determines a set of categories,

20 languages succeed or fail to embody this set of categories. Insofar as a language succeeds in embodying this prelinguistic set of categories, it succeeds in achieving isomorphism with the structure of reality. Insofar as it fails to do so, it fails to achieve that isomorphism. One might describe the view here outlined as an "essentialistic" view of reality — ontological questions are decided by virtue of extralinguistic natures or essences inherent in objects. (5) The essentialistic answer to (5) was largely determined by the answer, just given, to question (4). Ontological issues are to be decided on the basis of arguments which, in turn, gain their cogency from the fact that their premises correctly describe the nature of reality. These premises are based upon discoveries, not decisions, and if correct, they determine them in the sense that any ontological position failing to accord with these discoveries is incorrect. The crucial point here is that however the discoveries are made — by reason, by experience, or whatever — they are not in any way relative to language, human situation, purposes, etc. Answers to (l)-(5) determine a model for ontological activity. It is the model against which Carnap, Quine, and a number of other twentieth century philosophers have reacted. There is no doubt that this model has been less than universally accepted. Extreme nominalists have, from the beginning, reacted against essentialistic views concerning categories. It would, no doubt, be possible to construct a nominalistic model, in the historical tradition, by retaining answers (l)-(3) and proposing nonessentialistic answers to (4) and (5). For my purposes, however, it is only important to highlight the model against which Carnap and Quine have reacted. I will now present two alternatives to the essentialistic model. Because Quine has answered some of the questions (l)-(5) more explicitly, it will simplify the exposition to deviate from historical chronology and present Quine's answers first. Carnap's answers can, then, be more simply explained in contrast to Quine's explicitly discussed views. In briefest terms, Quine's positions on the five questions are as follows: (1) Quine believes that the proper language for doing ontology is the first order predicate calculus (henceforth, OPC). Quine argues that ordinary language is not sufficiently precise to isolate and discuss ontological issues. It should be noted, though, that even if Quine is correct on this point, this would provide only a justification for using some precise canonical notation or other. To defend OPC in particular, it would be necessary to argue that there are specific features of OPC which make it preferable to other possible canonical notations. It will turn out, in our discussion below, that important controversies about the nature of ontology can be formalized as choices concerning which language is the best language for making the structure of ontological issues perspicuous. (2) Quine provides an answer to (2) in only an extended sense. Actually, he claims to see no difference in kind between ontological and ordinary or

21 scientific questions.6 It is unclear, initially, whether one should take Quine literally here. He sometimes seems only to be emphasizing that he believes the distinction between ontology and science to be unimportant. At other points, he seems to think that there is no way of separating the two types of questions at all. In section 3.1 I will discuss these interpretive options in detail. (3) Quine's criterion for ontological commitment is stated in several (not always equivalent) forms. The sloganized version, "To be is to be a value of a bound variable," is an oversimplicification in several ways.7 A more precise version is as follows: The ontology to which an (interpreted) theory is committed comprises all and only the objects over which the bound variables of the theory have to be construed as ranging in order that the statements affirmed in the theory be true.®

(4) Quine believes that ontological statements are posits.9 That is, theories are underdetermined by all available data, and since ontological commitment is theory relative, so are ontologies. But this is not an attempt to disparage ontological theories. Quine believes all theories, scientific as well as ontological, to be based on similar evidence. (5) Besides having a criterion for ontological commitment [i.e., (2)], Quine also suggests a criterion for choosing between ontological positions. A criterion of ontological commitment is designed to apply to a theory and gives a reading of the commitments of that theory. As such, it is a relation between theories and entities or sets of entities. A criterion for choosing between ontological positions, on the other hand, evaluates one theory vis-à-vis another theory. Which of the two theories T j and T2 is the better theory? According to Quine, all theories, both ontological and scientific, are judged according to their success in attaining overall simplicity. Simplicity, however, combines with conservatism in the criterion. Simplicity leads the theory-builder to entertain principles which allow predictions. But a "law of least action" governs which principles are considered.1® The theory-builder attempts to fit new data into old theory, retaining as much of the old theory as possible in the face of the new data. Quine does not believe that there is only one notion of simplicity, so the criterion suggested cannot be assumed to lead to a single unique result.11 Like Quine, Rudolf Carnap constructed a complete meta-ontological system. I will outline Carnap's system by sketching his answers to each of questions (l)-(5), and by comparing his views to those of Quine. (1) Carnap believed, as Quine does, that some form of canonical notation is preferable to ordinary language as the most perspicuous language of ontology. Indeed, Carnap seems to have accepted OPC, in particular, as the most perspicuous language, as he explicitly accepted Quine's criterion of onto-

22 logical commitment. 1 2 In his actual discussion of the process of ontological commitment, however, Carnap clearly presupposed a many-sorted language (henceforth, MPC) as the language of ontology. 13 (2) Carnap believed in a sharp distinction between science and ontology. Ontological questions, for Carnap, were those questions of existence which concern whole categories of existents. Carnap defined the concept of a universal word and took ontological questions to be that subset of questions of existence which are ultimately general — i.e. those which contain a universal word. Carnap's use of MPC provided a formalization of the concept of a universal word. Briefly, a universal word is a word of which the translation into MPC is true of all and only the members of one of the syntactic genera or "sorts" on a many-sorted language. 14 (3) Carnap explicitly accepted Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. In Chapter III, I will present reasons to think this was a mistake, given Carnap's other meta-ontological positions. (4) How are ontological assertions to be interpreted, according to Carnap? In "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," Carnap developed a distinction between internal and external questions. Internal questions are those asked within an accepted linguistic framework, and include ordinary scientific questions, questions of logic and mathematics, etc. The important feature of these questions is the fact that the asker has already accepted a set of rules for discourse and inquiry. These rules provide a set of conditions, either logical or empirical, for deciding the truth of answers to these internal questions. External questions, on the other hand, are asked outside any particular framework. They are questions concerning the linguistic framework itself, and can be seen as pragmatic choices as to the proper framework for a given purpose. The answers to these questions will determine the conditions of truth and falsity of internal questions asked within that framework. Ontological questions are, on the view Carnap held, one species of external questions. As such, their answers are to be interpreted as temporary linguistic expedients, accepted for a particular, perhaps passing, human purpose. (5) As Carnap's answer to (4) suggests, he, like Quine, saw ontological assertions as posits. The entities to which a theory is committed are relative to the conceptual framework in which the theory is stated. Neither the framework nor the theory have any claim to absolute correctness. Consequently, the entities in question are not discovered and have no claim to reality. Rather, they are posited, and exist only as useful means to achieve some human purpose. It is important, however, not to overemphasize the noncognitive aspects of external questions. They are relative to particular purposes, but given proper formulation, they can be decided with respect to a particular, stated purpose. The important difference between external and internal questions, then, is that they differ in their truth conditions. Carnap sometimes emphasized this difference by speaking of external questions as

23 "noncognitive," or "neither true nor false." A careful reading of Carnap shows, however, that one can decide these metatheoretical questions, and they are to be decided according to the pragmatic utility of the framework for a given purpose. 15 The much-discussed Quine-Carnap disagreements about the nature of ontology can now be located precisely. Quine's most frequently stated objection to Carnap concerns (4) and (5). Quine argues that, while Carnap is correct in claiming that ontological assertions are posits, he fails to see that all assertions, including scientific ones, are posits.1® Thus, there is no difference in kind between the manner in which ontological questions are to be interpreted or decided and the manner in which scientific or any other questions are to be answered. Because Quine doubts that a sharp distinction can be drawn between analytic and synthetic sentences, he doubts that it is possible to separate, as Carnap does, internal (theoretical) from external (metatheoretical) questions. Quine believes that there is no epistemological difference between sentences which are decided without benefit of experience and those which are decided experientially. All decisions are based, for him, upon a combination of experiential evidence and linguistic choice. Consequently, he believes that all questions have the same status as Carnap's external questions — the answers to scientific as well as to ontological questions are posits, underdetermined by the experiential data. The difference here between Carnap and Quine affects both question (4) and question (5), though it has its basis mainly in differences on the latter question. The basic disagreement on question (5) implies a corresponding disagreement concerning whether ontological assertions are to be given a distinctive interpretation and special status. Quine denies any distinctive interpretation to external questions because he denies any epistemological distinctiveness. Quine sometimes (as in the passages cited above, note 16) refers to this epistemological difference by saying that there is no difference in kind between ontology and science. When stated in this manner, it is natural to take Quine to be advocating an answer of sorts to (2). It seems as though he is saying that it is impossible to separate ontological from scientific questions. In fact, however, if (2) is distinct from (5), as I believe it is, Quine's position on (4) and (5) would not, without further argument, entail, with respect to (2), that there is no distinction between ontology and non-ontology. It is quite different to say, on the one hand, that two types of questions are to be answered according to similar epistemological criteria, and, on the other, to claim that they are of the same type. One might argue that because there is no epistemological difference, the corresponding distinction is diminished in importance, but this is surely not obvious, and would require argument. Having located the areas of agreement and disagreement between Carnap and Quine, it will be possible to compare both of these contemporaries with the traditional essentialistic model. (1) Though Quine and Carnap disagree

24 concerning the detailed features of the proper canonical notation for ontology, they are united in their belief that some precise canonical notation is a necessary prerequisite for clarity in ontological discussions. Their considered position, then, conflicts with the traditional use of ordinary language. (2) Camap adopted a contemporary logical device (a many-sorted language) in order to retain the structure of the traditional characterization of ontological problems. He introduced a logical analogue of the traditional concept of categories as a means of characterizing ontological, as opposed to nonontological, problems. Quine, on the other hand, seems to disagree with the tradition and Carnap on this point. He certainly thinks that such a distinction is unimportant, and even suggests that it is impossible to draw intelligibly. (3) With respect to a criterion for ontological commitment, Quine and Carnap differ from traditionalists, as both of the former agree that referring expressions in ordinary language are not reliable as a guide to the ontological commitments of a theory. The most important disagreements between Quine and Carnap on the one hand, and the essentialistic model on the other, concern questions (4) and (5). Quine and Carnap are conventionalists concerning categories; and, consequently, they reject realistic interpretations of ontological statements. Ontological statements are, for them, pragmatically determined posits. Likewise, they agree, in opposition to essentialists, that the decision procedure for ontological claims involves a pragmatic criterion, based to a large degree upon human purposes. These positions can be summarized in Chart 1-A. (See page 25.) One cannot overestimate the importance of the disagreements between Quine and Carnap. Yet the disagreements between these two contemporaries are less basic than the disagreements which exist between the positions shared by these two philosophers and the corresponding positions of the essentialistic philosophers. The truly basic epistemological dichotomy concerns whether ontological issues are to be given a realistic status, epistemologically, or whether such issues are conventional — pragmatically decidable — in nature. The disagreements between Quine and Carnap take place within this important area of agreement. Quine doubts that, once one has adopted conventionalism, one can continue to distinguish between a linguistic and an empirical element in the adoption of a given position. The inquirer simply compares present data with accepted theory and makes adjustments so as to minimize difficulty in getting along in the world. There is no point, first of all, in distinguishing some decisions as purely linguistic and others as empirical, and, second, there is no reason to confer the special status ontological upon some decisions rather than others. In other words, Carnap and Quine both accept conventionalism, but Quine takes this conventionalism to undermine linguistic necessity as well as extralinguistic necessity. Once linguistic necessity (i.e. analyticity) is undermined, there is little point in continuing to recognize some subset of the conventional decisions one makes as having an

25

Essentialistic Model

Carnap

Quine

Adopts canonical language

No

Yes (MPC)

Yes (OPC)

Adopts distinction between ontology and non-ontology

Yes (based on essentialistic categories)

Yes (based on conventionalistic categories)

No

Criterion for ontological commitment

Judgments based upon referring expressions

Criterion based upon bound variables (explicit position. Consistency of this questionable.)

Criterion based upon bound variables

Interpretation of ontological claims

Realist interpretation

Conventionalist interpretation (This is a special status reserved for ontological assertions.)

Conventionalist interpretation (This status is shared with non-ontologicai assertions as well.)

Nature of the decision

Discovery

Pragmatic decisions. (This is a special status reserved for ontological assertions.)

Pragmatic decicisions. (This status is shared with nonontological assertions as well.)

-

Chart 1-A

26 ontological status. Thus Quine takes conventionalism to undermine the analytic-synthetic distinction (hence, giving all assertions similar epistemologica! status) and the ontological-non-ontological distinction (because this latter distinction marks no epistemological difference). Thus, two crucial issues arise throughout this book. First, there is the disagreement between essentialists, o n the one hand, and conventionalists on the other. And, on a less basic, but still very important level, there is a second disagreement concerning the full implications o f adopting a conventional approach to ontology. Quine takes it that the adoption o f this approach undermines necessity and the very distinction between ontology and non-ontology. Carnap continues to give importance to conventionally determined concepts of necessity (analyticity) and ontology. Most of the disputes discussed in this book concern one or the other of these levels. It would be as grave a mistake to confuse the two levels of disagreement as it would to consider either of them philosophically unimportant.

NOTES

1 Rudolf Camap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics," in Logical Positivism, ed. by A.J. Ayer (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 78-79. 2 Rudolf Carnap, "On the Character of Philosophical Problems," in The Linguistic Turn, ed. by Richard Rorty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 61. 3 I do not take the switch from the use of 'metaphysical' to 'philosophical' to be denotatively significant. Indeed, Carnap's example of a philosophical problem is the metaphysical problem of positivism versus realism. The change in terminology is, however, connotatively significant. As I proceed in my attempt to distinguish two approaches exemplified by these two quotations, it will become increasingly clear that 'metaphysical' carries with it many more negative connotations and is used when the mood is condemnatory as in the first quotation. 'Philosophical' is used when the mood is conciliatory - but, both terms refer to the same set of problems. 4 See, in this regard, Richard Rorty's useful discussion of the attempt of all philosophical revolutions to overcome the presuppositions of their predecessors. "Introduction: Meta-Philosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy," in The Linguistic Turn, pp. 1-15. 5 For example, see Willard Van Orman Quine, From A Logical Point of View (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 6. 6 See, for example, Willard Van Orman Quine, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (Hereafter referred to as Ways of Paradox) (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 134, Quine, From A Logical Point of View, p. 45, and Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), p. 271. 7 Quine, From A Logical Point of View, pp. 13, 15. 8 Willard Van Orman Quine, "Ontology and Ideology," Philosophical Studies, II (1951),p. 11. 9 Quine, Word and Object, pp. 21-25. 10 Quine, Word and Object, p. 19. 11 Ibid., p. 23.

27 12 Camap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," p. 214n. 13 See Ibid., pp. 213-214. 14 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language (Hereafter referred to as Logical Syntax) trans, by Amethe Smeaton (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1937), pp. 292-296. 15 See, in this regard, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, "Remarks on Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language," in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. by P.A. Schilpp (La Salle, 111.: Open Court, 1963), pp. 533-539. 16 Quine, From A Logical Point of View, p. 45 and Ways of Paradox, p. 134.

2. V E R I F I C A T I O N S , TOLERANCE, AND EXTERNAL QUESTIONS

2.1 THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION O F EXTERNAL QUESTIONS

James Cornman, in discussing Carnap's view that all answers to external questions are not assertions (i.e. are noncognitive), says, "The only reason that I can find for holding [this view], and I believe it would be Carnap's reason, is one based upon the claim that an assertion must be an empirically verifiable sentence." Cornman then goes on to reject the argument of which the view in question is the conclusion as follows: "The soundness of this argument, then, rests on the justification of the verifiability criterion. And as has been amply shown by others, such a justification does not seem to be possible." 1 Thus, Cornman (as do most other commentators on Carnap) assumes that Carnap's views on external questions are determined by verificationism. Indeed, this interpretation fully deserves to be called "the standard interpretation" of Carnap's views on external questions. On this standard interpretation, the verification criterion provides both the historical antecedent and the philosophical justification for the system which embodies the distinction between internal and external questions. Another example of what I have called the standard interpretation is provided by D. Goldstick's recent discussion of Carnap's views on tolerance and external questions. Goldstick states, without any argument, that "Carnap's principle of tolerance with respect to Weltanschauungen [the term Goldstick uses to refer to external questions] rests upon the noncognitivism which is implied by the verifiability principle...." 2 The central element of the standard interpretation to which I will present an alternative is the assumption of a close relationship between externality and verifiability. The commentators who adopt this standard interpretation assume that Carnap's position on external questions can be justified only if the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness can be justified. Indeed, according to the standard view, Carnap's system of distinctions is little more than a contemporary formulation of the verificationist criterion. Historically, this has had the effect of polarizing much of the discussion of external questions along empiricist/nonempiricist lines, and of undercutting any discussion of the distinction between internal and external questions on its own terms. The

29 reason for this is obvious. If, in fact, Carnap's dichotomy and the system surrounding it depend upon the verifiability criterion, there are a number of considerable objections which must be overcome before that system can be considered plausible. Some philosophers have, as Cornman does, simply rejected out of hand those parts of Carnap's system taken to derive their justification from verificationism. Nowhere does Carnap explicitly connect his views on external questions with verificationism, but it must be admitted that the standard interpretation is not without textual justification. In discussing external questions, Carnap said at various points that their answers are: (a) "not beliefs, assertions or assumptions," 3 (b) "noncognitive," 4 (c) "pseudo-statements, if they claim to be theoretical statements," 5 (d) "not genuine statements but pseudostatements when meant absolutely and objectively, i.e. not relative to this or that language, or relative to this or that person," 6 and (e) "neither true nor false." 7 Given that the terminology in (a)-(e) is so very similar to that which Carnap used to describe nonverifiable, and, hence, meaningless metaphysical assertions, it is not surprising that the two views are conflated by commentators. It might be thought that this list of quotes is conclusive evidence in favor of the standard interpretation. But the evidence is only conclusive if there is no other interpretation of the passages in question, and no alternative explanation of why Carnap used the terminology he did. The point of departure for this book lies in a critique of the standard interpretation of Carnap's views as outlined in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," and the purpose of this chapter will be to sketch an alternative way of understanding that essay. I will argue that the standard interpretation is, given all the evidence, a less plausible reading than my alternative. Once these tasks are completed, it will be possible to explain why Carnap used terminology which was seriously misleading. In the final section of this chapter, I will return to (a)-(e), discussing each in turn, and explaining how they fail to provide evidence for the standard interpretation when they are properly understood.

2.2 AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION: TOLERANCE AND THE HIERARCHICAL VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY

Whereas the standard interpretation of "Empiricism, semantics, and Ontology" treats empiricism, in the form of verificationism, as the justification for Carnap's views, I see it as irrelevant and, unless carefully circumscribed, inconsistent with Carnap's actual position. It is only because of Carnap's commitment to empiricism that he must face embarrassing questions concerning the acceptance of abstract entities. Only an empiricist would feel the initial force of scruples against making use of abstract entities in semantics.

30 In setting the problem for the paper, Carnap says: Some semanticists say that certain expressions designate certain entities, and among these designated entities they include not only concrete material things but also abstract entities, e.g., properties as designated by predicates and propositions as designated by sentences. Others object strongly to this procedure as violating the basic principles of empiricism and leading back to a metaphysical ontology of the Platonic kind.®

It was an effort to resolve this dispute which led Carnap to propound his distinction between internal and external questions. He hoped to show that the use of abstract entities in semantics can be made compatible with an empiricistic approach. Thus, empiricist«; commitments led Carnap to formulate his distinction. However, these commitments led him to this formulation not because they implied the internal-external distinction; but, rather, because the empiricistic commitments seemed embarrassingly at odds with seemingly practical scientific procedures. I will argue that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions is justified not by empiricism, but by two other principles — the principle of tolerance and a second principle which I will call "the hierarchical view of philosophy." The principle of tolerance was first enunciated by Carnap in The Logical Syntax of Language? Briefly, this principle denies that there is a single, unique language deserving of the label, "the correct language." The principle which I am calling the hierarchical view of philosophy can be found to be defended or assumed by a number of philosophers. The task of the remainder of this section will be to state this latter principle as clearly as possible. Section 2.3 will be devoted to a discussion of the principle of tolerance. The principle which I am calling the hierarchical view of philosophy is cryptically illustrated by John Wisdom's dictum that "Philosophy is concerned with acquiring new knowledge of facts, not knowledge of new facts." 10 It is the view that philosophy, in some sense, concerns structure, not content. If, for example, it is assumed that what is known is a "fact," then philosophy concerns not the datum contained in a fact, but rather the structure or form in which the fact presents itself. To use a gross analogy, a gallon of liquid assumes the shape of the vessel in which it is contained. But, the liquid itself retains its identity, no matter what shape it assumes. Likewise, on the view which I am sketching, the content of knowledge has some sort of identity, but is shaped, as a vessel shapes water, by the vehicle of knowledge. Philosophy, on this view, concerns the structure or form imposed upon data in the presentation of a fact. Science, on the other hand, concerns the raw data, and presupposes philosophical issues in the presentation of facts. Such a view as that just sketched is well exemplified by Immanuel Kant, who seems, quite self-consciously, to have held some such view in a highly

31 complex and sophisticated form. For Kant, philosophy concerned the principles of human understanding which exist in the preconditions for human inquiry. But the view certainly antedates Kant, as it can be found in Hume, who argued that all nonempirical views concern only the relationship of ideas. In this century, the view is classically exemplified by the logical atomists, who considered it their task as metaphysicians to delineate the structure of facts, and ultimately, the structure of the world itself. It is a natural outgrowth of this view to look to the human conceptual apparatus as a source of this structure. If the structure in question is to be found in the form of presentation of facts, and if this form is not to remain wholly amorphous and ineffable, then human concepts quickly become an important source of philosophical insights. By relating the hierarchical view of philosophy to the study of concepts, I do not intend to attribute to all of those who hold the former view the more controversial claim that philosophy concerns nothing other than conceptual analysis, but only the comparatively noncontroversial claim that conceptual analysis is an important source of philosophical insights. In this century, this respect for conceptual analysis has become, increasingly, linguisticized and has grown into what has been called "methodological nominalism" by Richard Rorty: As I shall use this term, "methodological nominalism" is the view that all the questions which philosophers have asked about concepts, subsistent universals, or "natures" which (a) cannot be answered by empirical inquiry concerning the behavior or properties of particulars subsumed under such concepts, universals, or natures, and which (b) can be answered in some way, can be answered by answering questions about the use of linguistic expressions, and in no other way.H

What I have labelled the hierarchical view of philosophy, however, need not have been absolutized in this manner. There need be, on the view I am outlining, no claim for exclusivity for linguistic analysis or even for conceptual analysis. Rather, the view I am outlining is, most centrally, the view that philosophy operates on some quite different level than do normal theoretical disciplines. Philosophical issues are embodied in the structure, not the content, of theoretical utterances and judgments. The view does not, by itself, imply that philosophy concerns only language, or, even, only concepts. This stronger view would only follow if supplemented with other premises. This can be seen by noting that several of the philosophers listed as having held the hierarchical view (Kant and the logical atomists, for example), were very far from limiting philosophy to purely linguistic and conceptual chores. It might be thought that the hierarchical view of philosophy is a position which would only be held by empiricists — that the principle is, in some sense, a dogma of empiricism, already containing in some covert way, a rejection of nonempiricistic approaches to philosophy. But this is not true. The principle

32 is consistent with many philosophical orientations, and has been held by such nonempiricists as Kant and the followers of Kant as well as by empiricists. It is true that the principle is often associated with empiricism, but this is not because it presupposes empiricistic principles. Rather, it is because the principle affords the empiricist a much-needed account of the nature of philosophy which is congenial to his independently adopted empiricistic principles. Because the strict empiricist has often been embarrassed when required to give an account of the nature of his own philosophical activity, he has happily adopted the principle in question as it appears (at least at first glance) consistent with empiricistic theories of knowledge. But this does not mean that the view presupposes empiricism, or that only an empiricist should find the principle plausible. It is an interesting view of philosophical activity which could be, and has been, adopted entirely independently of empiricistic principles. This point, that the hierarchical view of philosophy is independent of empiricism, will become extremely important in a later section of this chapter. There, I will argue more specifically that Carnap's adoption of the principle was not motivated by his empiricistic beliefs. At this point, I hope to have shown that this principle, which contains a view of the nature of philosophy and perhaps a suggestion concerning the proper methodology of philosophy, does not in its general form presuppose empiricistic principles.

2.3 TOLERANCE AND CONVENTIONALISM

The second principle, which in addition to the hierarchical view of philosophy provided the basis for the distinction between internal and external questions, is the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance has not been accorded nearly the importance it deserves by commentators on Carnap's philosophy. It should have been obvious to readers of the "Foreword" to The Logical Syntax of Language that the principle of tolerance is the most basic idea underlying the system of logical syntax: The range of possible language-forms and, consequently, of the various logical systems, is incomparably greater than the very narrow circle to which earlier investigations in modern logic have been limited.... The fact that no attempts have been made to venture still further from the classical forms is perhaps due to the widely held opinion that any such deviations must be justified - that is, that the new language-form must be proved to be 'correct' and to constitute a faithful rendering of 'the true logic.' To eliminate this standpoint, together with the pseudo-problems and wearisome controversies which arise as a result of it, is one of the chief tasks of this book. In it, the view will be maintained that we have in every respect complete liberty with regard to the forms of language; that both the forms of construction for sentences and the rules of transformations ... may be chosen quite arbitrarily.&

33 When I say, as I just have, that the importance of this principle should have been obvious to readers, I imply that it was not. This is a slight oversimplification. As was mentioned above, commentators have assumed that tolerance is based, ultimately, upon empiricism, and provides no more than an alternative formulation of the verificationist critique of traditional metaphysics. Consequently, they have taken tolerance to be of only derivative interest. I interpret the principle of tolerance as asserting that there is no a priori and absolute means of deciding whether or not a given language form is useful and acceptable. Instead, an experimental spirit is advocated. What Carnap seems to have had in mind is some sort of distinction between procedural and substantive rules for proposing a linguistic framework. Carnap advocated two procedural rules: (a) a person must state the rules precisely, and (b)he must give definitional differentiations between various possibilities, rather than prohibitions. Other than these procedural rules, the principle of tolerance implies total freedom in choosing language forms: In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e., his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments. 13

Carnap thought that the principle of tolerance, which has the power to reconstitute traditional philosophical problems as metatheoretical problems, is really a principle of conventionalism.14 'Conventionalism', however, is hardly a less ambiguous term than 'tolerance'. I hope, in this section, to clarify in what sense Carnap was a conventionalist. Carnap's position on conventionalism is ambiguous in two quite different ways. First, it is less than clear what, exactly, is implied by the concept itself. Second, it is unclear exactly how broad is the legitimate application of this concept, according to Carnap. It is necessary, then, to clarify what is meant when Carnap says, with respect to a particular issue, that that issue is to be decided conventionally. In addition, however, Carnap's attempts to delimit the class of issues to which the description 'conventionally decidable' is properly applied, are open to several interpretations. First, I will attempt to clarify exactly what is involved in adopting a tolerant or conventional attitude with respect to an issue. Goldstick takes conventionalism with respect to an issue, I, to imply that the decision with respect to I "will in the end be wholly grounded on a free choice, a non-rational leap of faith...." 15 Now, there is textual evidence to back up Goldstick's attribution of freedom to conventionally decidable issues.16 But, I have seen no textual evidence to suggest that Carnap took this freedom to imply nonrationalism, as Goldstick assumes. It would be a gross non sequitur to assume

34 that because Carnap believes that a person is free with respect to an issue, /, that he must also believe that I must be decided on nonrational grounds. It should be obvious that it is possible to judge freely chosen decisions as rational or irrational, and that freedom does not in any way presuppose nonrationalism. This non sequitur, so obvious in these terms, is given plausibility by the assumption of the standard interpretation of Carnap. If external questions are conventional, and if, as Goldstick and other advocates of the standard interpretation assume, this conventionalism is determined by the noncognitivism implied by the verifiability criterion, then the answers to external questions are not cognitively meaningful. That is, they have only emotive meaning, and can be decided only on nonrational grounds. But, if one sets aside the standard interpretation, which is at issue in this chapter, it is not possible to find textual evidence to indicate that conventionalism with respect to external questions was taken to imply nonrationalism. I believe, contrary to Goldstick and the standard interpretation, that Carnap's conventionalism is similar to the conception described by David Lewis in his book, Convention. On Lewis' conception, convention is (usually) an outgrowth of precedent-set solutions to "coordination" problems. A coordination problem is a problem where: Two or more agents must choose one of several alternative actions.... Some combinations of the agents' chosen actions are equilibria: combinations in which each agent has done as well as he can given the actions of the other agents. In an equilibrium combination, no one agent could have produced an outcome more to his liking by acting differently, unless some of the others' actions also had been different. No one regrets his choice after he learns how the others chose. No one has lost through lack of f o r e k n o w l e d g e . 17

Lewis is concerned with a general definition of conventions; and, consequently, his conception must include tacitly arrived at precedents as one type of conventions. For a philosopher like Carnap, who is often concerned with constructed languages, equilibria are not always reached by tacit development of precedents, but sometimes by reasoned decision. These reasoned decisions are just special cases of equilibrium solutions. The important point is that the decision need not be arbitrary. All that is required for it to be conventional is for there to be alternative means to a solution or goal which is shared by participants, and for the satisfactory solution of the problem to depend upon a convergence of the actions of the various participants. If the participants are explicitly aware of the goal, and explicitly discuss the alternatives, this is merely a special case of the solution of one of Lewis' coordination problems. It should, also be noted that there may be better and worse equilibrium combinations. To use one of Lewis' examples, if two people hope to meet for dinner, they might meet at a restaurant which both like» one likes, or neither likes. Given that the primary goal is their meeting, any one of these three out-

35 comes is an equilibrium, but the first is no doubt preferable to the later two, even though all are equally effective in achieving the goal set. On my interpretation, Carnap's conventionalism is wholly compatible with Lewis' conception. In describing the choice between phenomenalism and realism as an example of a conventionally decidable issue, Carnap says: In the case of this particular example, there is usually no deliberate choice because we all have accepted the thing language early in our lives as a matter of course. Nevertheless, we may regard it as a matter of decision in this sense: we are free to choose to continue using the thing language or not; in the latter case we could restrict ourselves to a language of sense-data and other "phenomenal" entities, or construct an alternative to the customary thing language with another structure, or, finally, we could refrain from speaking. 18

There is no hint, in this passage, that a choice must be arbitrary, i.e. based on no reasons, in order to be conventional. As I interpret Carnap, his conventionalism with respect to an issue I implies the following: (1) (2)

(3)

/ cannot be decided a priori the raw data available underdetermines / (i.e. there is no uniquely correct choice with respect to / , in the abstract. Several choices might be better in different context, and, indeed, it is possible that even in a single context, two or more distinct choices could be equally beneficial.) the better choice with respect to I is variable, given changes in purposes adopted,

and, as a result of (l)-(3), (4)

given purposes, adopted by human agents, are an important factor in the acceptance of a position with respect to / .

If one rejects the standard interpretation of Carnap on external questions, as I do, this becomes the most natural interpretation of Carnap. One important source of the standard interpretation is a failure to see that Carnap distinguished between properly and improperly formulated external questions. Carnap says: From these [internal] questions we must distinguish the external question of the reality of the thing world itself. In contrast to the former questions, this question is raised neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers. Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a negative one, and the controversy goes on for centuries without ever being solved. And it cannot be solved because it is framed in the wrong way. 19

36 Carnap, however, did not imply that these questions can never be rationally decided, even when they are formulated properly. On the contrary, he said: The decision of accepting the thing language, although itself not of a cognitive nature, will nevertheless usually be influenced by theoretical knowledge, just like any other deliberate decision concerning the acceptance of linguistic or other rules. The purposes for which the language is intended to be used, for instance, the purpose of communicating factual knowledge, will determine which factors are relevant for the decision. The efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity of the use of the thing language may be among the decisive factors. And the questions concerning these qualities are indeed of a theoretical nature. But these questions cannot be identified with the question of realism. They are not yes-no questions but questions of degree. The thing language in the customary form works indeed with a high degree of efficiency for most purposes of everyday life. This is a matter of fact, based upon the content of oui experiences. However, it would be wrong to describe this situation by saying: "The fact of the efficiency of the thing language is confirming evidence for the reality of the thing world"; we should rather say instead: "This fact makes it advisable to accept the thing l a n g u a g e . " 2 0

How could one alternative be considered "advisable" with respect to another, if no reasons of any sort could be considered relevant to the decision? Furthermore, the reasons cited by Carnap are cognitive in nature, not merely the emotive considerations which could be countenanced on the standard interpretation. When Carnap described external statements as noncognitive or as pseudo-statements, he was referring to improperly formulated external questions and statements. Also, he was emphasizing the different (from internal questions) nature of properly formulated external statements. Because the advocates of the standard interpretation fail to see that Carnap distinguishes between properly and improperly formulated external questions, they take his comments which relegate improperly formulated external questions to the realm of nonverifiable, undecidable pseudo-questions to apply to all external questions. In fact, external questions are decidable, but according to very different criteria than the criteria according to which internal questions are decided. Given a distinction between properly and improperly formulated external questions, it is possible to see that, while Carnap rejected the latter as nonrational, his application of the label "conventionally decidable" need not be taken to imply that no reasons can be given to prefer one answer over another. When an external question is properly formulated, it can be decided according to rational, though conventional, criteria. To say that an issue is to be decided conventionally is only to say that it is to be decided according to special rules or criteria. If, for a given issue, /, (l)-(4) are all true oil, then a special set of decision criteria must be applied to /. That this criterion is special, however, does not imply that any answer is as good as any other. Only a prior commitment to the standard interpretation could lead a reader of "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" to believe that Carnap's references to such issues as "practical" issues implies that any answer is as good as any other.

37 A full development of a criterion of external rationality must await a later chapter (Chapter VI). The task undertaken in this section was to clarify the meaning of Carnapian attributions of conventionality to various issues; and, I take it that the central elements embodied in Carnap's meaning are (l)-(4) as stated above. I turn now to a discussion of the second area of unclarity in Carnap's discussion of conventionalism. Carnap was quite clear in Logical Syntax that his principle of tolerance applied to all and only syntactical issues. Confusion arises if the principle is applied to Carnap's later views, however. Tolerance, in Logical Syntax, applied only to syntactical issues, because these were for Carnap at that time the only legitimate metatheoretical issues. When Carnap later embraced semantics, did he intend to suggest that semantical, as well as syntactical issues, are to be governed by that principle? This question cannot be answered without clarifying Carnap's changed views on the legitimacy of semantics. Carnap's original rejection of semantics was based upon two considerations. First, although Carnap rejected Wittgenstein's belief that nothing could be said about language, he did find the discussion of the relationship between language and the world suspect. His feeling was that Wittgenstein was correct in saying that philosophy was elucidatory in nature, but that Wittgenstein was incorrect in saying that these elucidations cannot be stated precisely and sensibly. Carnap felt that he had proved Wittgenstein wrong on this latter point by developing the logical syntax in a precise way in Logical Syntax. Finally, he felt that all elucidations of language can be carried out by speaking purely about the form of language — that there was no need for an appeal to the extra-linguistic meanings or references of the pure symbols of language. Thus, as a second consideration, Carnap felt that semantics was unnecessary, as well as suspect. And, he felt this to be true because he thought, wrongly, that everything legitimate in semantics can be reduced to syntax. One particular manifestation of this mistake lies in Carnap's distinction between a thing-word and a number-word, for example. 21 Such distinctions cannot be drawn without appeal to meanings or references of the words, as Carnap thought they could at the time when he wrote Logical Syntax. Carnap cheerfully acknowledged this point, as soon as Alfred Tarski convinced him that semantics was both legitimate and necessary. Carnap's restatement of the position of Logical Syntax with this in mind is especially revealing: A few years after the publication of the book (Logical Syntax), I recognized that one of its main theses was formulated too narrowly. I had said that the problems of philosophy or of the philosophy of science are merely syntactical problems: I should have said in a more general way that these problems are meta-theoretical problems. The narrower formulation is historically explained by the fact that the syntactical aspect of language

38 had been the first to be investigated by exact means by Frege, Hilbert, the Polish logicians and in my book. Later, we saw that the meta-theory must include semantics and pragmatics; therefore the realm of philosophy must likewise be conceived as comprising these fields.22

Carnap's original and most complete discussions of tolerance took place in a context where tolerance was applied to all and only syntactical issues. Because, at that time, Camap believed that syntax constituted the entire legitimate metatheory of language, his tolerance extended to all metatheoretical issues. Ambiguity arises as a result of Carnap's later acceptance of semantics as a legitimate part of the metatheory of language. Did Carnap intend to extend tolerance to the newly accepted semantical issues, thus retaining the general rule that all metatheoretical issues are to be treated with tolerance, or did he restrict tolerance to syntactical issues alone? The question, then, is whether the principle remained a syntactic principle or whether it was extended to cover semantics, as well. Initially, two applications of the principle can be isolated: (a) (b)

The principle of tolerance applies solely to the syntactical aspects of the language. The principle of tolerance applies to the syntactical and semantical aspects of the language.

That Carnap intended only (a) even after embracing semantics has been argued. 23 Indeed, there is textual evidence for this view. In an appendix to Introduction to Semantics, "Remarks on 'Logical Syntax of Language,'" Carnap explicitly disavows a semantical analogue to the principle of tolerance: The principle of tolerance (perhaps better called "principle of conventionality") as explained in [The Logical] Syntax [of Language] section 17, is still maintained. It states that the construction of a calculus and the choice of its particular features are a matter of convention. On the other hand, the construction of a system of logic, i.e., the definitions for the L-concepts, within a given semantical system is not a matter of mere convention; here the choice is essentially limited if the concepts are to be adequate.24

This statement is, on its face, unequivocal enough. However, there are several reasons for raising further questions. First, the passage itself is confused. Carnap mentions the principle of tolerance, and speaks of it as stating that the "construction of a calculus" and the "choice of its particular features" are a matter of convention. That is, he introduces the principle of tolerance as governing the formation of object languages. Then, he contracts conventionalism of this type with choices in semantics which are "limited" if the concepts "are to be adequate." Adequacy is clearly a criterion of acceptability for judging metalanguage explications of everyday semantical concepts "truth," "logical truth," etc. — where a certain degree of similarity to the

39 ordinary concept is required. 25 It is difficult to see how conditions of adequacy on metalanguage explications could furnish any reason for denying that semantics (i.e. semantics of object languages) is conventional. Surely, parallel reasons could be given for denying conventionalism in the realm of syntax — e.g., one could, surely, set up a criterion of adequacy for an acceptable explication of our ordinary concept of provability and argue analogously that setting up a syntactic system is not a matter of mere convention. But the principle of tolerance, as Carnap introduced it, proclaims freedom of choice in constructing object languages — not in describing object languages. In other words, this passage fails, through confusion, to come to grips with the central point at issue. The question which parallels tolerance with respect to syntax would be the question of whether or not free choice is to be allowed in interpreting object languages. Carnap's invoking of adequacy, here, is totally irrelevant. Consequently, this passage fails to come to grips with the problem of conventionalism in semantics. Not only is this passage confused, there is a strong indication in Carnap's writing that conventionalism does apply to questions of meaningfulness. Indeed, one of Carnap's first examples of intolerance, after introducing the principle, is the refusal of Wittgenstein, Kaufmann, and Schlick to admit laws of nature as meaningful sentences — clearly a semantical issue.26 It might, of course, be objected that the passage was written when Carnap felt that all meaningful talk about language must be and could be syntactical in nature. Thus, all questions of meaningfulness were seen as questions of well-formedness. But, Carnap's example, here, is still a useful piece of evidence. As was noted above, Carnap, in discussing Logical Syntax many years later, 27 took pains to expand its thesis that all philosophical problems are syntactical problems to the broader claim that all philosophical problems are metatheoretical problems. Now, if the latter, expanded claim is to be strictly parallel to the earlier, narrow one, then there must be a parallel principle of semantic tolerance to provide parallel external questions of a semantic type. Thus, the textual evidence on Carnap's position concerning conventionalism in semantics is, by no means, as clear as one would hope. Leaving aside that inconclusive evidence, it seems certain that Carnap must have intended to treat some, at least, semantic issues as conventional. For example, questions such as whether to interpret the expression 'dog' as referring to the class of canines or to the class of felines is surely a conventional question. Interesting questions arise only with respect to more controversial semantic issues. Consider, for example, the question of which entities are to be considered as individuals, and which expressions are to be considered meaningful. Considering that Carnap seems to have arrived at the principle of tolerance by concluding that no reasons can be given for arguing that a given language from is the correct language,28 it is difficult to see why he would fail to apply the same principle to these two types of issue. There are, however, even more convincing systematic reasons for adopting

40 application (b) as the correct interpretation. Central to the motivation for the internal-external distinction is the desire to alleviate empiricistic scruples concerning the recognition of abstract entities in semantics. Carnap's means of avoiding these scruples is to point out that the semantic decision to quantify over abstract entities is a metatheoretical choice, based upon a practical decision. It must on this account be possible to assign an interpretation to expressions quantifying over abstract entities for practical reasons alone. That such semantic issues are conventional in nature is presupposed in this solution. It is only because such issues are, according to Carnap, metatheoretical decisions of a conventional nature that he can relegate them to the realm of the pragmatically decidable. Thus, there seem to be overwhelming reasons to think that Carnap extended (or at least should have extended) the principle of tolerance to include many semantic issues. This, however, raises serious problems for the standard interpretation of Carnap. If Carnap considered semantic issues, especially including questions as to which utterances are meaningful, to be governed by the principle of tolerance, that principle conflicts with verificationism. The verifiability criterion is anything but tolerant, banishing entire realms of discourse as meaningless. One might attempt to avoid this inconsistency by suggesting that there is no objection to assigning emotive meaning to nonverifiable utterances — the verifiability criterion being only a criterion of cognitive meaning. This suggestion provides a step in the right direction, but it is not sufficient as it stands, because it remains true that the verifiability criterion provides a prohibition against assigning cognitive meaning to nonverifiable utterances. Now, I submit that the principle of tolerance, so interpreted, rules out the advocacy of the verifiability criterion as the latter is usually stated. That criterion refuses to allow freedom to the nonempiricist to propose languages, even if his proposal fulfills the procedural requirements. In one passage in The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap took Brouwer, Kaufmann, and Wittgenstein to task for "setting up prohibitions," and suggested that their points could as well be made by careful definitional differentiation of different language forms. Once the language is proposed carefully, and has been definitionally differentiated from the other possibilities, the principle of tolerance requires that the language be considered a possible and perhaps useful language form. As Carnap said in his intellectual autobiography, "... I gained insight that one cannot speak of 'the correct language form', because various forms have different advantages in different respects." 2 9 Once Carnap has said all this, it is impossible for him to also say: Many of the theses of traditional metaphysics are not only useless, but even devoid of cognitive content. They are pseudosentences, that is to say, they seem to make assertions

41 because they have the grammatical form of declarative sentences, and the words occurring in them have many strong and emotionally loaded associations, while in fact they do not make any assertions, do not express any propositions, and are therefore neither true nor false.30

How can such statements be interpreted as anything but a prohibition of a language form on the grounds that it is incorrect? There seems to be, then, some evidence to suggest that the principle of tolerance, far from deriving its support from the verificationist principle as the standard interpretation suggests, is inconsistent with that principle. The choice of whether to adopt application (a) or application (b), then, poses a serious dilemma for the standard interpretation of Carnap. If the standard interpreter adopts (a) and limits conventionalism's application to syntax alone, it turns out that the system of internal and external questions is insufficient to accomplish the task for which it is constructed. Issues concerning the existence of abstract entities are not conventionally decidable, and it is impossible to look for conventional reasons to justify their acceptance. On the other hand, if conventionalism is extended to questions of semantics (i.e. if application (b) is accepted), the principle of tolerance seems in conflict with verificationism — the very principle from which it was supposed to have had its support. This dilemma can be answered, but only at the cost of giving up the standard interpretation. I will avoid the dilemma by firmly grasping the latter horn and admitting that the principle of tolerance is inconsistent with the standard, extremely general formulations of verificationism. This will make it necessary to severely restrict the application of the verifiability criterion. Once this criterion is properly restricted, two results will be obvious: first, the standard interpretation must be mistaken in taking the principle of tolerance to be justified by verificationism, and, second, any consistent metaphilosophical system to be found in Carnap must have not verificationism but the principle of tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy at its heart. In the next section, I will trace both historically and systematically a framework which is internally consistent, and which is based upon these latter two principles.

2.4 AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION

The two keystones of the Carnapian distinction between internal and external questions are the principle of tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy. I believe that these two principles, in and of themselves, provide for a critique of traditional metaphysics. Further, these principles are independent of verificationism in particular and empiricism in general: hence, the critique they imply is of general interest to empiricists and nonempiricists alike. Historically speaking, the standard interpretation sees that the roots of the anti-

42 metaphysics of logical positivists lie in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus;31 but, no book could be more thoroughly metaphysical than the Tractatus. If these two facts, taken jointly, seem paradoxical, it is at least partially because the book itself is not self-consistent. Wittgenstein says, in the "Preface": On the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here set forth seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the p r o b l e m s . 3 2

The problems he is speaking of are the entire class of problems which are known as the problems of philosophy. In the final two passages of the book, Wittgenstein says: 6 . 5 4 My propositions serve as elucidations ill the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. 7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in s i l e n c e . 3 3

Of course it is not possible to solve problems with nonsensical utterances, however. Elucidations must also have some sense, if they are to achieve their purpose. The standard view of logical positivism and its break from logical atomism is as follows: logical atomism is the philosophy exemplified by Wittgenstein's elucidations. That is, logical atomism is outlined in the first and largest portion of the Tractatus. Logical positivism is then seen as a movement which arose when the empiricistic, antimetaphysical elements of the last few pages of the Tractatus were taken seriously. I contend that this view is greatly oversimplified. In particular, this view ignores an interesting and important continuity between logical atomism and the positivists. The antimetaphysics of Carnap, at least, is inherent in the method according to which the atomists did metaphysics. Logical atomists used language as a guide to reality. Once one understands the structure of language (i.e. once one has discovered that list of necessary conditions for the very possibility of language, which can be summarized in the phrase, "the logically perfect language"), he has a map of reality. Thus, metaphysics becomes a structural problem to be solved by the analysis of language. The utterances of metaphysicians do not concern the world, but rather concern the structure of language. The goal is to gain an understanding of the structure of the world through a linguistic methodology. This is to say nothing more than that the atomists accepted, wholeheartedly, what I have called the hierarchical view of philosophy. The atomists continued to speak of facts, and the structure of facts, but

43 nonetheless they had taken an important step toward turning metaphysics into the analysis of language. Their clear adoption of the hierarchical view and the linguistic methodology which naturally followed left their metaphysical views in a vulnerable position. It was only through a very special view of the nature of language (what has come to have been called "the picture theory of meaning") that these metaphysical views could be susceptible of discussion, at all. It is not necessary to rehearse, in detail, all of this familiar ground. It is noncontroversial to say that the atomists proceeded with linguistic analyses, attempting, first, to attain a better understanding of the structure of language. The goal, here, can be summarized by saying that the atomists sought a logically perfect language. But a second, ultimate, purpose was to arrive at the logical simples of which the world is composed. To retain the particular method selected and the basic purpose assumed, a very special theory of language is necessary. The atomists thought that if they could arrive at the logically perfect language, they could then reason that the metaphysical structure of the world must be isomorphic with the logically perfect language. The view that there must be a unique isomorphism between the structure of language and the structure of the world depends upon the picture theory of language. Consequently, given the hierarchical view of philosophy, the picture theory, or some similar view of language, is necessary in order to have any access to the structural aspects of the world. The standard view of Camap and the positivists as simply taking the last few, empiricistic, pages of the Tractatus seriously is overly simple because it fails to see that Carnap's principle of tolerance, in denying the unique isomorphism claimed by the picture theory, is itself sufficient to justify an antimetaphysical stance. If the principle of tolerance is the assertion of a conventionalistic view of language embodied in claims (l)-(4) of section 2.3, it is in direct conflict with the picture theory. Whatever else is implied by the picture theory, it certainly implies: (1') (2')

A priori analyses of language can arrive at certain conditions which are necessary for discourse about the world. There is, at least in general terms, one unique linguistic structure which is consistent with data concerning the world.

(1') and (2') are in conflict with the first two elements of conventionalism which I have attributed to Camap. And, (1') and (2') were sufficient to lead atomists to seriously disagree with pragmatists who suggested that the structure of the world should be relativized to human purposes, and this would imply that the atomists deny Carnap's (3) and (4) as well as his (1) and (2). 3 4 In other words, Carnap's principle of tolerance amounts to a denial of the major elements of the picture theory of meaning. The denial of a unique

44

linguistic structure ascertainable by a priori methods of analysis leaves linguistic analysis divorced from the structure of the world. Carnap's acceptance of the hierarchical view of philosophy and the methodology which the atomists had adopted as a result of that view, coupled with his principle of tolerance, negates the possibility of evidence for unique metaphysical positions. If there are many acceptable and useful languages, and if the only means of choice among them are changing human purposes, then there are many structures of the world, with no means of attaching metaphysical priority to any particular language. It has been noted 35 that there was a certain circularity involved in the atomists' program. They hoped to discover the structure of the world by discovering the logically perfect language — but, how does one recognize the logically perfect language other than by checking it against one's views as to the structure of the world? I am suggesting that Carnap, in rejecting the picture theory while accepting the hierarchical view of metaphysics, implicitly adopted a slightly different critique of metaphysics. Metaphysics, on Carnap's combination of views, is radically indeterminate. There is no means of deciding among competing metaphysical structures. What seems to follow, then, is that all philosophical utterances must, to be decidable, be relativized to a particular language and a particular human purpose. It might be said that metaphysical discourse is acceptable only if it takes place within a context where the decision concerns which structure is to be attributed to the world (through the choice of a language), given a particular human purpose. This suggests a criterion of acceptability, parallel to the verification principle, for limiting philosophical or metaphysical discourse: A philosophical utterance is acceptable only if it concerns the choice of one set of linguistic rules over another set, for a given purpose. This criterion allows one to distinguish several classes of statements: first, there is the class of internal statements which contains all object language statements. External statements form a second class which is, in turn, divided into two subclasses. One of these subclasses is made up of all of the proper external statements — those which are already in the formal mode of speech. The other subclass is in the material mode of speech. Such statements are confusing; but, not necessarily confused. A statement in this class may be acceptable if it is translatable into the formal mode of speech. If it is not formalizable, it is confused and has no meaning. Another criterion which might be called the formalizability criterion now emerges: a philosophical sentence is meaningful only if it is a statement about an object language or can be made into a statement about an object language. Commentators on Carnap have interpreted Carnap's position on metaphysics as flowing purely from empiricism, but it can be clearly seen from the following two quotations from The Logical Syntax of Language that this is simply not the case:

45 In the following discussion we shall see that translatability into the formal mode of speech - that is, into syntactical sentences - is the criterion which separates the proper sentences of the logic of science from the other philosophical sentences - we may call them metaphysical. If a sentence of the material mode of speech is given, or, more generally, a sentence which is not a genuine object-scntcnce, then the translation into the formal mode of speech need not always be undertaken, but it must always be possible. Translatability into the formal mode of speech constitutes the touchstone for all philosophical sentences, or, more generally, for all sentences which do not belong to the language of any one of the empirical sciences.^ 7

The criterion outlined here differs from the standard verificationist criterion in two very important ways. First, Carnap is here talking only about philosophical (i.e. external) questions. That is, he is presupposing a distinction between philosophical and nonphilosophical sentences. Second, he is relying upon the material mode-formal mode distinction. Both of these differences stem from a reliance not upon verificationism, in particular, or empiricism, in general, but rather upon the object language/metalanguage distinction: The questions dealt with in any theoretical field - and similarly the corresponding sentences and assertions - can be roughly divided into object-questions and logical questions.... By object questions are to be understood those that have to do with the objects of the domain under consideration, such as inquiries concerning their properties and relations. The logical questions, on the other hand, do not refer directly to the objects, but to sentences, terms, theories, and so on, which themselves refer to the o b j e c t s . 3 8

Material mode questions are logical questions disguised as object questions. The criterion of meaningfulness of all nonobject questions, then, is the possibility of formalization. In other words, any nonobject question is meaningful if it retains some meaning after being rephrased as a question about the object language. If it retains no meaning after being so rephrased, it is meaningless metaphysics. If, on the other hand, the sentence has some analogue in the formal mode of speech, then the material mode sentence is an acceptable short-hand for that formal mode sentence. This criterion, informally introduced here, will be introduced in a more formal manner in section 4.4. On my interpretation, then, the basic determinant of Camap's antimetaphysics was his adoption of the hierarchical view of philosophy together with his rejection of the picture theory of meaning. My emphasis on this determinant, rather than on the empiricism adopted from Wittgenstein's Tractatus, plus my insistence that this determinant is independent of empiricism altogether, distinguishes my interpretation of Carnap's philosophy from the standard interpretation. The above Carnapian passages, which introduce the formalizability criterion, are unequivocal enough. How do standard interpreters manage to

46 wholly ignore this approach to the critique of metaphysics? The answer to this question, I believe, is as follows: the standard interpreters believe that Carnap's acceptance of the principle of tolerance rests upon verificationism; and hence it is thought that the formalizability critique of metaphysics, is nothing more than an alternative formulation of the verificationist critiques. Because, on the standard interpretation, formalizability rests upon veriflcationism, the former is taken as merely an alternative formulation of the latter. And, since the former is somewhat more complex than the well-known versions of the verificationist critique, commentators have concentrated exclusively upon the verifiability criterion at the expense of formalizability. In Section 2.5, I will demonstrate that formalizability is wholly independent of verificationism. Once this is shown, formalizability should assume its rightful place as Carnap's central approach to the critique of traditional metaphysics. But, one caveat must be offered here;, I do not intend to deny that Carnap believed in the verifiability criterion. There are innumerable passages throughout his writings where he explicitly and unequivocally embraced that criterion. I am suggesting, only, that Carnap offered another criterion of acceptable metaphysics which is independent of the infamous empiricistic criterion. I am most concerned to show that the standard interpretation which sees the two systems as intimately interdependent is mistaken. I argued, in the last section, that crucial assumptions of the standard interpretation lead to the conclusion that the principle of tolerance and verificationism are, themselves, in conflict, even though the standard interpretation clearly implies that the former principle receives its support from the latter. It might be thought that the problems with internal consistency are built into the Carnapian system. But this is not the case. I will prove this by showing how a modification of the verificationistic criterion avoids the inconsistency. Consider a system, such as the one just now introduced historically, which combines the hierarchical view of philosophy and the principle of tolerance as two basic axioms. The first of these axioms provides a distinction between internal (i.e. theoretical) and external (i.e. metatheoretical) utterances. The conventionalism implied in the second suggests a criterion of acceptable metaphysics. Also included is a suggestion as to how traditional absolutistic metaphysical claims are to be reconstructed (i.e. as metatheoretical claims about linguistic frameworks), and the rudiments of a method for deciding such issues. They are to be decided according to their practical utility. Now, this system appears to be a complete metaphilosophical system; and, if I am correct in claiming that none of its elements are inherently empiricistic, the question arises as to how empiricism is to fit into such a system at all. Indeed, I have pointed out that if the verifiability criterion is introduced as a necessary condition for meaningful utterances, it seems in conflict with the tolerance implied by one of the axioms. However, the seeming difficulty,

47 here, arises only as a result of attempting to introduce empiricism at a too basic level. If it is introduced as a totally general principle, it is in conflict with tolerance. Consider, as an alternative, the introduction of empiricism, itself, as an external decision. All external decisions concerning particular linguistic frameworks presuppose the choice of a purpose. The positivists were especially (though not exclusively) interested in descriptive, scientific purposes. They also conceded that their verifiability criterion is only a criterion of cognitive meaningfulness. Suppose, then, that the verifiability criterion is to be considered as an external statement in general form: "All object languages which are intended for descriptive scientific purposes should contain exclusively (aside from tautologies and contradictions) verifiable sentences." This conditional statement of the criterion differs from the standard, general form in several respects. First, its application is restricted to object languages and, as a result of this restriction, standard self-referential objections to the criterion are avoided. It is, on this account, a metalanguage generalization about what object languages are useful for a given set of purposes. That is to say, it is qualified in its application by virtue of being embedded in the framework of distinctions embodied by the hierarchical view of philosophy. Second, as an external statement, it makes clear reference to a specified purpose, and is, hence, applicable only to scientific disciplines. This is to say that, on this form of the verifiability criterion, it is already qualified by the principle of tolerance. Its purpose is not, on this account, to set up prohibitions, but to definitionally differentiate descriptive from nondescriptive languages. Consequently, it is, as all external statements are, a hypothesis concerning what is likely to turn out fruitful for a specific purpose. As such, it is open to debate and to experimentation with various types of linguistic frameworks, including ones with nonempirical elements. It might be asked whether a verifiability criterion, restricted in these ways, is strong enough to be worth having. I believe it is. It functions as an attempt to generalize from past experience as to what languages are likely to be useful in science. If such a generalization appears true, it would have the effect of greatly diminishing the number of languages which it is necessary to test for effectiveness. It also emphasizes the importance of recognizing distinctions between various types of meaning, and the criteria of decision relevant to them. What is important for my purposes, however, is to point out that, compared to tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy, this criterion is very specific and derivative. It is built into the system of distinctions implied in the hierarchical view, and it gains its central argumentative thrust (based upon the concept of varying human purposes) from the principle of tolerance. Once this is seen, the verifiability criterion is no longer in conflict with tolerance. But the limitation is entirely at the expense of verifiability. Tolerance maintains its central, axiomatic place in the system.

48 This indicates the error in the standard interpretation of Carnap. The standard interpreters assume that empiricism holds the central, basic place in Carnap's philosophy. Empiricism, they think, supports tolerance and the distinction between internal and external questions. It can now be seen, however, that this cannot be the case. The internal-external distinction is applicable to descriptive and nondescriptive disciplines and the principle of tolerance applies to the adoption of languages for any purpose. No principle which is restricted to purely descriptive purposes could provide the basis for the most general axioms of Carnap's philosophy. I have shown that, when the verifiability criterion is absolutized — i.e. given general application, it prohibits certain linguistic frameworks which may be useful for some particular purpose. It is in this generalized form that verifiability conflicts with tolerance. There is, then, a consistent metaphilosophical system which can be constructed from the two seemingly competing Carnapian approaches to metaphysics. Consistency cannot be gained, however, by putting verificationism in a central position. Consistency can be gained only by restricting verificationism and embedding it in a system based upon tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy. The question will surely arise as to whether the system I have outlined was intended in fully explicit form by Carnap himself. In the next section, I will present textual evidence which shows that he was explicitly aware of much of it. It is not so clear that he ever perceived that there was a potential conflict between the system here outlined and the unlimited use of the verifiability criterion. I do not take this to be the important point, however. It is more important to note that Carnap perceived himself as developing a distinctly nonempiricistic critique of traditional metaphysics and that this critique is embodied in a consistent system which contains an interesting approach to metaphilosophical issues. If this system is independent of verificationism in particular and empiricism in general, then two further points follow: first, the standard interpretation of Carnap's metaphilosophy is far from the mark; and, second, attempts to refute that metaphilosophy by virtue of facile rejections of verificationism are insufficient. This second point is worthy of further discussion. The verificationistic principle has been found to be vulnerable in several ways. Most centrally, it has been criticized, even ridiculed, for its inability to account for its own status. It claims that all meaningful sentences are either tautologous, contradictory, or empirically verifiable. Since there seemed to be conclusive objections to considering the principle to fall in either of these three categories, it was argued by its opponents that the principle, itself, must be meaningless. This objection, it can be called the "self-referential objection," has led to the dismissal, even the ignoring, of positivistic doctrines in the recent literature. Two consequences follow from the system just outlined. First, if I am correct

49

in claiming that large and important parts of Carnap's system are independent of verificationism, then it will no longer be possible to dismiss the body of his doctrines by virtue of facile rejections of verificationism as self-referentially selfdefeating. Second, on the system just outlined, the verifiability criterion is reintroduced in a restricted position, whereby it applies only to object level utterances in descriptive disciplines. As such, it is clearly not intended to apply to itself — a metatheoretical hypothesis. Thus, the self-referential objection is avoided and verificationism can be, once again, considered upon the basis of its merits, rather than dismissed out of hand as selfdefeating.

2.5 THAT TOLERANCE AND THE HIERARCHICAL VIEW ARE INDEPENDENT OF EMPIRICISM

I have argued that Carnap's system can combine tolerance and verificationism only by embedding the latter in the system built upon tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy. This does not obviate, however, the important task of demonstrating that each of these two axioms is, in fact, independent of verificationism. Having seen that verificationism depends upon those axioms for its proper statement, and for its pragmatic justification, it would be even more disastrous to the Carnapian system if either of the axioms were, in turn, to depend upon verificationism. This would indicate that the system is viciously circular. It would also, undercut my central interpretive point. Tolerance and the hierarchical view would not be independent axioms, as I have claimed, but would depend upon verificationism for their support, as is assumed by the standard interpretation. The only difference between my interpretation and the standard one would lie in the fact that I break into the circle at a different point. I now turn to the task of demonstrating that the two axioms do not depend upon verificationism in particular or empiricism in general. The demonstration will proceed in three steps: (i) I will present textual evidence to show that Carnap kept the formalizability critique of metaphysics separate from verificationism; (ii) I will argue that the hierarchical view of philosophy is not dependent upon verificationism; and, finally, (iii) I will argue that the principle of tolerance does not depend upon verificationism for its support. (i) In the "Introduction" to The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap says: We see therefore, that whenever we investigate or judge a particular scientific theory from the logical standpoint, the results of this logical analysis must be formulated as syntactical sentences, either of pure or of descriptive syntax. The logic of science (logical methodology) is nothing else than the syntax of the language of science. This fact will be shown clearly in the concluding chapter of this book. The syntactical problems acquire a greater significance by virtue of the anti-metaphysical attitude represented by the Vienna

50 Circle. According to this view, the sentences of metaphysics are pseudo-sentences which on logical analysis are proved to be either empty phrases or phrases which violate the rules of syntax. Of the so-called philosophical problems, th.e only questions which have any meaning are those of the logic of science. To share this view is to substitute logical syntax for philosophy. The above-mentioned anti-metaphysical attitude will not, however, appear in this book either as an assumption or as a thesis. The inquiries which follow are of a formal nature and do not depend in any way upon what is usually known as philosophical doctrine.39 So, Carnap clearly and explicitly thought o f his work in Logical Syntax as independent of verificationism. He adamantly insisted that the thesis that all legitimate philosophy is the syntax of the language of science can be defended without appealing to verificationism "either as an assumption or as a thesis." Thus, when Carnap in the final chapter o f the book disparagingly describes those philosophical utterances which are not translatable into the formal mode of speech as metaphysicalhe has introduced a nonverificationistic conception of antimetaphysics. It is based upon an argument which is entirely independent of verificationism. Carnap thought that the two lines of argument were complementary, and he may have thought that the two senses of the term 'metaphysical' were extensionally equivalent. There is no doubt, however, that he clearly distinguished in his own mind two lines of antimetaphysical reasoning; nor is there any doubt that he saw his use of the term "metaphysical" as ambiguous in intension, if not in extension. Carnap remained aware that the principle o f tolerance provided an alternative to the verifiability critique of metaphysics, as is shown by his discussion of the main purposes of The Logical Syntax of Language in his "Intellectual Autobiography." After emphasizing that one o f his major purposes in writing that book was to show that the concepts o f the theory of formal deductive logic are purely formal concepts, he continues: Second, it seemed important to me to show that many philosophical controversies actually concern the question whether a particular language form should be used, say, for the language of mathematics or of science. For example, in the controversy about the foundations of mathematics, the conception of intuitionism may be construed as a proposal to restrict the means of expression and the means of deduction of the language of mathematics in a certain way, while the classical conception leaves the language unrestricted. I intended to make available in syntax the conceptual means for an exact formulation of controversies of this kind. Furthermore, I wished to show that everyone is free to choose the rules of his language and thereby his logic in any way he wishes. This I called the "principle of tolerance"; it might perhaps be called more exactly "the principle of the conventionality of language forms". As a consequence, the discussion of controversies of the kind mentioned need only concern first, the syntactical properties of the various forms of language, and second, practical reasons for preferring one or the other form for given purposes. In this way,... traditional ontological problems, in contradistinction to the logical or syntactical ones, for example, problems concerning "the essence of number" are entirely abolished.41

51 Two points are notable from this quotation. First, there is no mention of verificationism at all. And, second, the view of philosophical questions which is described is exactly that expounded in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." So, Carnap's view of The Logical Syntax of Language as independent of verificationism survived into the sixties and, presumably, up until his death. (ii) If I am correct in arguing that Carnap's formalizability rests upon tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy, not upon verificationism, the only obstacle to concluding that the two critiques are independent is the possibility that either tolerance or the hierarchical view of philosophy are based, in turn, upon verificationism. First, I will argue that Carnap held the hierarchical view of philosophy for reasons other than empiricistic ones. Then, I will turn, in subsection (iii), to a discussion of whether tolerance is justified on the basis of verificationism. Actually, it would be possible to justify a position which appears, initially, similar to the hierarchical view on empirical grounds. Assume, for the moment, that the standard interpretation of Carnap is correct. Assume, also, that the link which that interpretation finds between the verifiability and formalizability approaches to metaphysics results from an empiricistic account of the distinction between object languages and metalanguages. If these two assumptions were true, Carnap's hierarchical view of philosophy would, ultimately, derive its force from empiricism. Specifically, the expression 'object question' from the passage cited above 42 would be defined in some such way as "a question concerning first-order, empirical objects." Given this definition, the formalizability criterion would be seen as the insistence that all philosophical sentences are meaningless unless they have some interpretation other than an empirical interpretation. Then, it might be thought to follow that, since philosophical sentences cannot be about first-order, empirical objects, they must be about language; and, hence, philosophical sentences are either meaningless or else intended metalinguistically.43 This line of reasoning succeeds in reducing formalizability to an empiricistic basis, but only at the cost of making the criterion and Carnap's use of it incoherent. This can be shown as follows. On the assumption that the conception of the objectlanguage-metalanguage distinction used in the formalizability criterion is empiricistic, it follows that nonobject questions would include all questions concerning the existence of entities in any nonempirical discipline. The distinction between formalizable and nonformalizable philosophical utterances would, then, be applicable only to philosophical questions concerning material objects and sense data, but not to questions like "Are there numbers?", because the latter questions would already be formalized according to the proposed definition. "Are there numbers?", by referring only to nonempirical objects, would fulfill the formalizability criterion on this definition and could not be judged by the criterion to be illegitimate. Yet, Carnap clearly

52 intends to apply his criterion to it, as many of the examples of object sentences concern numbers, and examples of pseudo-object sentences include assertions about the existence of classes of nonempirical objects such as numbers. 44 For example, Camap's first example under the heading "Pseudoobject-sentences=quasi-syntactical sentences: Material mode of speech" is "Five is not a thing, but a number" and he proposes that it be translated into the formal mode of speech as " 'Five' is not a thing word, but a numberword." 45 In order to understand my interpretation of Carnap it is of ultimate importance to keep the distinction between object questions and logical questions entirely separate from the distinction between questions concerning the existence of first-order empirical objects and higher-order nonempirical objects like numbers, classes, etc. The former of these is a distinction between questions about the objects referred to in a given language, L, "Is the chair brown?", "Do you see a blue patch in your visual field?", "Is the number 2 prime?", "Is the class of prime numbers infinite?", versus questions about the sentences and expressions of L — "How many words are in the sentence 'The number 2 is prime'?", "Is the term 'class' a substantive expression in L?", etc. An object question can refer to objects of any level, and a logical question can refer to expressions which refer to objects of all orders. The crucial difference, here, is between objects and expressions. As such, there should be no temptation to confuse this distinction with the distinction between first-order empirical objects like tables, chairs, and individual perceptions, on the one hand, and abstract, or higher-order entities like classes, classes of classes, properties, etc., on the other hand. Thus, it is possible to define a criterion similar to the formalizability criterion in empiricistic terms, by defining the object language-metalanguage distinction empiricistically. Such a criterion would distinguish sentences of the empirical disciplines (physics, biology, psychology, sociology, etc.) from nonempirical disciplines (mathematics, set theory, logic, philosophy, etc.). Carnap, however, uses quite a different categorization in The Logical Syntax of Language. He differentiates between object sentences which are sentences of the special disciplines (in the broad sense which includes all statements about object domains — including, for example, mathematics and set theory) and logical sentences which are sentences about expressions referring to any of the objects in any of the domains. The two distinctions are as follows: (A)

(B)

Science (empirical disciplines like physics, biology, psychology, and sociology) versus nonscience, i.e., nonempirical disciplines (e.g., mathematics, set theory, and philosophy). Science (object disciplines such as physics, biology, mathematics, set theory, etc.) versus nonobject disciplines (philosophy). This use of the word 'science' is more reminiscent of the oldfashioned concept of a

53 science as "any systematic body of knowledge" and carries no connotation of science as exclusively empirical. In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap did not use the first of these science-nonscience distinctions at all. Rather, he was relying upon the object language-metalanguage distinction, which produces the second distinction. If one were to attempt to draw the second distinction using a concept of empiricism to characterize the object language (object language sentences are those which talk about the empirical world), it would be impossible to have an object language for mathematics or any other abstract discipline. Since many of the examples of object level expressions given in The Logical Syntax of Language, and almost all of them in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology", are from mathematics and other nonempirical disciplines, Carnap could not have drawn his object language-metalanguage distinction empiricistically. I conclude, then, that the hierarchical view of philosophy depends upon the object language-metalanguage distinction, and not upon empiricism. Further, this latter distinction could not, if Carnap's use of it is to be coherent at all, depend in turn upon empiricism. (iii) The final step in the demonstration that Carnap's views on external questions are independent of verificationism requires a proof that tolerance does not, ultimately, rest upon verificationism for its support. As was seen above, Goldstick located the connection between external questions and nonverifiable metaphysics at this point. He took Carnap's conventionalistic position with respect to external questions to be implied by verificationism. What evidence can be given for this connection? Unfortunately, Goldstick did not think it necessary to provide quotations or citations justifying his position. His thinking that support is unnecessary for this interpretation indicates the pervasiveness of what I have called the standard interpretation, but provides little evidence for consideration, once the standard view is questioned. As far as I can tell, the sum total of evidence in favor of the connection found by the standard interpreters is to be found in the comments of Carnap similar to those in the list, (a)-(e), collected in section 2.1. I have already admitted that, on less than a careful reading of the text, these passages suggest a connection between verificationism and Carnap's position on external questions. I will proceed by discussing each of these passages in context, interpreting it in the light of distinctions drawn in this chapter, and explaining the error made by the standard interpreters if they take the passage in question to be evidence in favor of their interpretation. Out of this commentary, a more detailed account of Carnap's real position will emerge. (a) But this [ie. this decision with respect to an external question] must not be interpreted as if it meant his acceptance of a belief in the reality of the thing world; there is no such belief or assertion or assumption because it is not a theoretical question."^

54 In this passage Carnap is emphasizing the nontheoretical, i.e., the metatheoretical nature of external questions. Carnap had just explained that the acceptance of a framework for talking about entities involves accepting a set of rules according to which one decides whether the belief that some object is real is a true belief. 47 In the passage quoted, Carnap is emphasizing that the external decision cannot be a belief, an assertion, or an assumption, because it is nothing other than the adoption of a criterion which makes beliefs, assertions, and assumptions possible. To consider it a belief about reality would involve the most vicious form of circularity. One would be justifying the acceptance of a criterion of reality on no other basis than the acceptance of the criterion itself. (b) A brief historical remark may be here inserted. The noncognitive character of the questions which we have called here external questions was recognized and emphasized by the Vienna Circle under the leadership of Moritz Schlick, the group from which the movement of logical empiricism originated. Influenced by the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Circle rejected both the thesis of the reality of the external world and the thesis of its irreality as pseudo-statements....48

This is, at first glance, strong evidence for the standard interpretation. But if the proper distinctions are drawn, this passage contradicts nothing in my interpretation. First, Carnap is clearly talking about improperly formulated external questions. The external question at issue was formulated as a question about the reality or irreality of the thing world. Carnap believed that such questions, when treated as prior to language and not relative to some linguistic framework or practical purpose, are noncognitive. I have already noted that Carnap undoubtedly believed that the class of metaphysical claims isolated by the verifiability criterion is coextensive with the class of improperly formulated external questions. In other words, improperly formulated external questions are unacceptable for two quite different reasons. One reason they are unacceptable is that they are improperly formulated. Their improper formulation means that they are asked outside any particular framework, but it is only insofar as they are asked within some framework that they can be decided, because the framework provides the criteria according to which the decision is to be made. Such questions are noncognitive and metaphysical - a conclusion which Carnap thought can be reached, as well, by an empiricistic line of reasoning. Note, however, that Carnap does not associate his line of reasoning with that of the logical empiricists or Wittgenstein. He merely says that the logical empiricists, influenced by the ideas of Wittgenstein, reached a similar conclusion. Two crucial points must be made: first, Carnap does not suggest that empiricism provides any part of, or support for, the line of reasoning he is setting out in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." Second, the context shows that Carnap only intends to apply the adjective 'noncognitive' to improperly formulated external questions. While

55

Carnap thought that improperly formulated external questions are noncognitive, he only intended to emphasize that, if properly formulated, external questions are judged according to a quite different, though not nonrational, criterion. A terminological clarification is necessary here. Carnap used the term 'noncognitive' in a systematically ambiguous manner in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." Sometimes, in context, Carnap clearly means 'metatheoretical and not theoretical' by 'noncognitive'. In other contexts, 'noncognitive' has the connotation of 'only emotively meaningful'. On the latter, but not the former usage, the term implies that an utterance is not rationally decidable. All external utterances are noncognitive in the former sense, but only improperly formulated utterances are noncognitive in the latter sense. These ambiguities can be sorted out by careful attention to context, but there is no doubt that they contribute to the prevalence of the standard interpretation. (c) It seems to me that external existential sentences do not have cognitive content; therefore, I regard them as pseudo-statements if they claim to be theoretical statements.^

Here, Carnap is more explicit in adding the necessary qualifier. External sentences are pseudo-statements, if they improperly claim to be theoretical in nature. If the standard interpretation were correct and all external statements are merely pseudo-statements, this qualifying phrase would be wholly otiose. (d) I would maintain that (6) [there are classes of objects] and (7) [there are no classes of classes of objects] are not genuine statements but pseudo-statements. 1 assume that (6) and (7) are meant absolutely and objectively, i.e., not relative to this or that language, or relative to this or that person; ...50

Lest the reader think the qualifier in (c) was a one-time slip of the pen, this passage is even more explicit in limiting the label "pseudo-statement" to improperly formulated questions, which could be properly formulated by relativization to a particular language, in which case the label would be avoided. (e) To be sure, we have to face at this point an important [external] question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical question; it is the question of whether or not to accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion.51

When Carnap says that the decision to be faced is practical, not theoretical, he wants to emphasize the metatheoretical, or methodological nature of the choice. As such, it is not theoretical (asserted in the object language), nor is it "true" or "false" because these are predicates properly applied to object

56 language sentences. And these predicates, Carnap emphasizes, are applied to object language sentences according to internal criteria which cannot be applied to choices of frameworks. Passages such as (a)-(e) may mislead the unwary reader, as they conjure up memories of verificationistic attacks on metaphysics. But each of these passages and others similar to them are consistent with my interpretation. If one remembers that Carnap assumed the class of improperly formulated external statements to be coextensive with the class of "metaphysically meaningless" utterances, then it would be natural to refer to them as noncognitive, etc. This neither implies that the process of reasoning which led Carnap to the distinction between internal and external questions is verificationistic in nature, nor does it imply that properly formulated external questions are not rationally decidable. Are there any other links connecting tolerance, or conventionalism, to empiricism? Perhaps. Consider the following argument, which has a conclusion similar to Carnap's claim in (b), above: Premise (1) All cognitively meaningful sentences which are not analytic must be in principle decidable by empirical evidence (verifiability criterion). Premise (2) Answers to external questions are not decidable by empirical evidence. Conclusion: Answers to external questions are noncognitive and undecidable. Something like this argument perhaps underlies the standard interpretation (though I have not encountered it in any explicit form in print). It begins with the verifiability criterion as a premise, and concludes with a position at least superficially identical to Carnap's descriptions of external questions. If this were Carnap's line of reasoning, however, it would follow that all external questions, no matter whether they are properly formulated or not, are merely emotive and undecidable. I have just argued that this was not Carnap's intention. His concern was to separate properly from improperly formulated external questions. Improperly formulated questions are cognitively meaningless, and rest only upon "the expression of the general attitude of a person toward life." 5 2 That is, improperly formulated external questions have only emotive meaning, no cognitive meaning. According to the argument just constructed, however, Carnap could not distinguish between absolute claims to reality, which he rejected, and relativistic claims concerning the usefulness of a given language for a given purpose. Carnap clearly believed that more than mere arbitrary emotive and nonrational considerations are relevant in the latter cases: In a discussion ... intended to lead to a practical decision concerning the form of a language to be accepted, some theoretical considerations are certainly relevant. For

57 example, it would be important to investigate what can and what cannot be expressed in a nominalistic language of a specified form and, in particular, whether and how sentences of certain kinds containing abstract variables are translatable into sentences of the nominalistic language.... In recent years I have emphasized the point just mentioned, that theoretical questions too play an essential role in the philosophical discussion which are to take the place of the traditional ontological controversies.53

Thus, the proposed argument cannot be Carnap's line of reasoning, as it would not allow him to draw crucial distinctions which he is concerned to draw. Premise (2) of this argument must be a more refined one — a premise which relies upon conventionalism concerning linguistic frameworks. As I have argued, however, once one has conventionalism concerning linguistic forms as a premise, plus the hierarchical view of philosophy, the verifiability criterion becomes unnecessary. Given the former two principles, one can apply the formalizability criterion to reconstruct traditional metaphysics, avoiding nonverifiable nonsense by treating formerly metaphysical utterances as metatheoretical proposals of a linguistic framework for a given (stated or assumed) purpose. Note, finally, that Carnap's own description of how he was led to the principle of tolerance suggests my interpretation. There is no hint of an appeal to verificationism: ... 1 gained the insight that one cannot speak of "the correct language form", because various forms have different advantages in different respects. The l a t t e r insight led me to the principle of t o l e r a n c e . 5 4

I have, then, sketched an alternative to the standard interpretation of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions, and argued that, on my interpretation, empiricism plays only a subsidiary role. In a sense, the remainder of this book is an exploration of what I take to be the important philosophical issues raised by my explication of Carnap's system. I hope that I have said enough in this chapter to convince the reader that Carnap's system contains much of interest aside from his empiricism and, consequently, that facile rejections of his system based upon a dismissal of the verifiability criterion are philosophically premature.

NOTES 1 James Cornman, Metaphysics, Reference, and Language (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 181. 2 D. Goldstick, "The Tolerance of Rudolf Camap," The Australian Journal of Philosophy, IL (1971). Other examples of this interpretation can be found in E.D. Klemke, "Are 'External Questions' Non-Cognitive?" Inquiry, XIII (1970), 289-296, and in Rorty,

58 "Introduction: Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy," p. 6. One of Quine's discussions of external questions seems to presuppose such an interpretation. See Ontologie al Relativity and Other Essays (Hereafter referred to as Ontological Relativity) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 91-92. This latter example is discussed below, in section 3.3. 3 Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," pp. 207-208. 4 Ibid., p. 215. 5 Carnap, "Replies and Systematic Expositions," in Schilpp, p. 871. 6 Ibid., p. 215. 7 Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," p. 214. 8 Ibid., p. 206. 9 Logical Syntax, p. xv and pp. 51-52. 10 John Wisdom, "Logical Constructions," Mind, XLII (1933), p. 195. 11 Rorty, "Introduction: Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy," p. 11. 12 Carnap, Logical Syntax, pp. xiv-xv. 13 Ibid., p. 52. 14 Rudolf Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," in Schilpp, pp. 54-55. 15 Goldstick, p. 254. 16 Carnap, Logical Syntax, p. 52. 17 David Lewis, Convention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 8. 18 Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," p. 207. 19 Ibid., p. 207. 20 Ibid., p. 208. 21 Carnap, Logical Syntax, p. 286. Also, see p. 305, where Carnap uses the term 'experience-expressions' to distinguish between logical and descriptive symbols, and A.J. Ayer's discussion of this point in his "Editor's Introduction" to Logical Positivism, p. 26. 22 Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," p. 56. 23 This suggestion was made to me jointly by Robert Beard and David Gruender. 24 Rudolf Carnap, Introduction to Semantics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 247. Carnap then refers to an earlier discussion of "adequacy." 25 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 26 Carnap, Logical Syntax, pp. 51-52. 27 Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," p. 56. 28 Ibid., p. 68. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., p. 45. 31 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966). 32 Ibid., p. 5. 33 Ibid., p. 151. 34 See, for example, Bertrand Russell, Philosophical Essays (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), pp. 79-111, especially 109-111. 35 See, for example, I.M. Copi, "Language Analysis and Metaphysical Inquiry," in Rorty, pp. 127-131. 36 Carnap, Logical Syntax, p. 284. 37 Ibid., p. 313. 38 Ibid., p. 277. 39 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 40 Ibid., p. 284. 41 Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," pp. 54-55.

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

See above, section 2.4, note 38. See, in this regard, Comman, p. 181. Carnap, Logical Syntax, pp. 284-288. Ibid., p. 286. Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," p. 208 Ibid., p. 207. Ibid.,?. 215. Carnap, "Replies and Systematic Expositions," p. 871. Ibid., p. 873. Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," p. 214 Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics," p. 78. Carnap, "Replies and Systematic Expositions," p. 208. Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," pp. 67-68.

3. CATEGORIES AND ONTOLOGY

3.1 INTERPRETING QUINE'S OBJECTIONS

Question (2) of the five meta-ontological questions listed in section 1.3 of this book asks: What is an ontologica! issue and how is one to be distinguished from non-ontological issues? This question presupposes a positive answer to a logically prior question: Is there anything distinctive about ontological issues? In a number of casual remarks (in print), Quine has suggested a negative answer to this prior question. For example, in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Quine says that on his view, "Ontological questions... are on a par with questions of natural science."1 If this claim, taken quite literally, were true, then question (2) would never arise. As I have suggested in Chapter 1, however, there is some question as to how literally Quine is to be taken on this point. Sometimes, after making such a comment, he continues to imply that there is a mark which distinguishes ontological from scientific issues,- but that this distinction does not imply any important differences in kind. And the differences which Quine seems to take as important, in this context, are epistemologica! differences. 3 On this latter, more restricted interpretation, Quine's claim would be analogous to that of a philosopher of science who argues that there is no difference, ultimately, between the natural sciences and the social sciences. A philosopher who makes this claim need not deny that it is possible, according to some criterion, to isolate certain issues as peculiar to the social sciences. Nor need he deny that the basic terms and laws in the two areas will differ quite noticeably. The crucial point, here, would simply be that the surface differences mark no basic, underlying epistemological difference. No special methods of analysis and/or verification not available in the natural sciences are necessary in the social sciences. Analogously, Quine may simply be taken to grant that Carnap is correct in seeing a distinctive mark in ontological claims, but he may regard this distinction as implying no special means of analysis and/or verification. In short, Quine might be taken only to question the ultimate epistemological importance of the distinction between ontology and science. For simplicity, I will refer to this as the epistemological interpretation of Quine; and, by extension, I will refer to the line of reasoning behind the passages leading to this interpretation as Quine's epistemological objection.

61 While the epistemologica! interpretation is often the most natural interpretation of Quine, there are also passages which suggest the more literal interpretation. In the paper "On Carnap's Views on Ontology," Quine makes it quite clear that he thinks two separate objections can be sustained against Carnap's distinction between ontological and non-ontological questions. He says: I have doubly warranted hopes of persuading Carnap to abandon this particular distinction. First, as argued, I find it ill grounded. But, second, also, I think it is a distinction which he can perfectly well discard compatibly with the philosophical purpose of ["Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"].^

The key phrase, here, is Quine's claim that the distinction is "ill grounded". I take this phrase to imply that not only does the distinction fail to mark an important epistemological difference, it is also impossible to draw the distinction in an intelligible manner. The structure of the argument of Quine's paper supports my interpretation. The passage just quoted comes near the end and constitutes a transition to a brief discussion of the relationship between the analytic-synthetic distinction and the internal-external distinction. Prior to this transition, the paper concerned Carnap's presupposition of a concept of generality or categories as the operative concept in separating ontological and scientific issues. Quine's concern, here, is shown in the following passage: It begins to appear, then, that Carnap's dichotomy of questions of existence is a dichotomy of the form "Are there so-and-so's?" where the so-and-so's purport to exhaust the range of a particular style of bound variables, and questions of the form "Are there soand-so's?" where the so-and-so's do not purport to exhaust the range of a particular style of bound variables. Let me call the former questions category questions and the latter ones subclass questions.^

Quine follows this passage with a discussion of the importance and interest of the distinction between categories and subclasses. I take this discussion to concern the distinction between ontology and non-ontology, itself. In these passages, Quine is not merely impugning the epistemological importance of the distinction between ontology and non-ontology. He is, rather, arguing that it is "ill grounded." My interpretation of Quine, then, is that he mounts two different attacks on Carnap's distinction between ontology and non-ontology. First, he denies that there is any distinguishing mark separating ontological and non-ontological issues. The argument, here, can be called the "category-subclass objection", after Quine's suggestion that the internal-external distinction is "derivative from" the distinction between category questions and subclass questions. 6 Second, Quine argues that even if there is a distinction between ontological and non-ontological issues, the distinction has no epistemological im-

62 portance. This latter objection concerns the relationship between the internalexternal distinction and the analytic-synthetic distinction. If question (2) is kept distinct from questions (4) and (5), then two separate issues arise. First, it must be decided whether there is a distinguishing mark of ontological issues. If Quine is correct, here, there would be little hope of salvaging the epistemological distinctions which Carnap hopes to draw between ontological and non-ontological issues. Secondly, however, if Carnap's position can be sustained on question (2), the epistemological objection emerges as central. This suggests, as a possible outcome, that Quine could be incorrect in finding no distinguishing mark of the ontological, but correct in arguing that such a distinction marks no epistemological difference. However the epistemological debate comes out, question (2) is an important metaphilosophical question. It amounts to nothing less than a request for an explication of the concept of ontology. I will argue that Quine's two objections ultimately collapse into one, epistemological objection. Each attempt to formulate soundly the category subclass objection requires, as a covert premise, some form of the epistemological objection. In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss Carnap's views on question (2) and Quine's objections to those views, attempting, insofar as possible, to keep separate question (2), on the one hand, from questions (4) and (5) on the other. A discussion of the relationship between externality and analyticity will be postponed until Chapter V. The intervening chapter will deal with the problem of ontological commitment — an issue which, quite unexpectedly, leads to controversial issues between Quine and Carnap.

3.2 MANY-SORTED LANGUAGES, "ALLWÒRTER", AND THE CONCEPT OF ONTOLOGY

It is now necessary to delineate Carnap's views on the distinction between ontology and non-ontology. Quine is quite correct in seeing a relationship between Carnap's internal-external distinction and the distinction, in Quine's parlance, between categories and subclasses. Quine quotes the following passage from "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" as Carnap's description of the steps involved in the introduction of a framework: First, the introduction of a general term, a predicate of higher level, for the new kind of entities, permitting us to say of any particular entity that it belongs to this kind (e.g., 'Red is a property', 'Five is a number'). Second, the introduction of variables of the new type. The new entities are values of these variables; the constants (and the closed compound expressions, if any) are substitutable for the variables. With the help of the variables, general sentences concerning the new entities can be formulated. 7

63 The crucial phrases, here, are "the new kind of entities," and "variables of the new type." Quine correctly interprets these phrases to indicate that Carnap presupposed that entities, in ontological disputes, would be clearly segregated into kinds or categories. The mechanism assumed is a many-sorted language with a segregated domain and special variable types for each subdomain. While Carnap presupposed these mechanisms in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," he had, earlier, discussed the issues involved in Logical Syntax.8 Carnap there speaks of Allworter, or universal words, as follows: A word is called a universal word if it expresses a property (or relation) which belongs analytically to all the objects of a genus, any two objects being assigned to the same genus if their designations belong to the same syntactical genus. Since the rules of syntax of the word-language are not exactly established, and since linguistic usage varies considerably on just this point of the generic classification of words, our examples of universal words must always be given with the reservation that they are valid only for one particular use of language.9

He also gives a list of universal words, including, among others, 'object', 'property', 'relation', 'fact', 'temporal point', and 'number'. 10 A more precise criterion distinguishing universal predicates for a precise, canonical language is stated as follows: We will call a predicate of which every full sentence is an analytic sentence a universal predicate, or, if it is a word in the word language, a UNIVERSAL WORD. [For every genus of predicates a universal predicate can easily be defined. For instance, if ' p r j ' is a ' p r l ' of any genus whatsoever, we define the universal predicate *pr2\ of the same genus, as follows: pr2(vi) = ( p r j ( v j ) v ( v j ) ) ] [where subscripts identify the predicate in question, and superscripts designate its genus]. H

These passages show that Carnap assumed that the regimented language for which ontological questions will be posed is many-sorted. Hao Wang describes many-sorted theories as follows: Certain axiomatic systems involve more than one category of fundamental objects; for example, points, lines, and planes in geometry; individuals, classes of individuals, etc. in the theory of types. It is natural to use variables of different kinds with their ranges respectively restricted to different categories of objects, and to assume as substructure the usual predicate calculus for each of the various kinds of variable including the usual propositional calculus for all the formulae of the system. An axiomatic theory set up in this manner will be called many-sorted.

Given the sort of notation which would be used to state a many-sorted theory, there will be a readily available concept of genera or categories, the members of which will be clearly recognizable by syntactic indices marking all variables and referring expressions. It is then possible to define a universal predicate in the manner quoted above. More informally, a universal word in

64 an ordinary language is a word of which the translation into the canonical notation is a predicate analytically true of every member of one syntactic group. Carnap introduced the technical mechanisms required for a manysorted language and the concomitant concept of a universal word because he believed that universal words provide a characteristic mark of philosophical or ontological sentences.13 Carnap's references to the "new kind of entities" and "variables of the new type" in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" were intended to introduce these mechanisms, first discussed in Logical Syntax. Why are these mechanisms relevant to the internal-external distinction? In order to be effective, the internal-external distinction presupposes some characterization of ontological utterances. The distinction between internal and external uses of sentences is intended to clarify the import of a certain set of utterances which suffer from a particular ambiguity in ordinary discourse. Not all utterances, however, suffer from the ambiguity in question. Utterances which suffer from internal-external ambiguity are, speaking imprecisely, utterances of philosophical existence sentences. That is, they are utterances which concern the existence of a general category of entities. Some examples can be cited to illustrate, intuitively, the distinctions involved here. First, Carnap was interested in existence sentences, because he was concerned to explicate what is involved in the "acceptance of a kind of entities." This acceptance is marked, he believes, by claims of existence. There are some sentences which are susceptible of both internal and external interpretation, but which do not imply a commitment to a kind of entities. For example, the sentence "From any contradictory sentence one may infer any other sentence" could be interpreted as the description of a rule already adopted in the language currently in use. Or, it might be interpreted as a proposal concerning the rules of a newly proposed language. But whichever interpretation it is given it carries no existential import — hence, it is not relevant to Carnap's concern to alleviate scruples against ontological commitment to a kind of entities. Even given the distinction between existence sentences and other sentences, however, the application of the internal-external distinction is still not narrowly enough prescribed. Even within the realm of existence sentences, most such sentences are not susceptible of both internal and external interpretation. Sentences like "There is a pencil on my desk," and "There are tigers in India," are never interpreted externally. Only far more general sentences like "There are material objects" are so interpreted. The internal-external distinction and the accompanying analysis can only be effective if it can be applied. It can be applied only if there is some means of specifying the class of sentences which are susceptible of both internal and external interpretations. This class of philosophical existence sentences (or, alternatively, sentence in ontological form), then, must be characterized in some manner. Carnap proposed that such sentences can be recognized by

65 virtue of their containing a universal word. In order to explicate the distinction between general categories or genera of existents and lesser, more specific classes, Carnap introduced a many-sorted language and an accompanying syntactic distinction between expressions referring to entities of different genera. Carnap's adoption of a many-sorted language and a concomitant distinction between categories and subclasses can be seen as an explication of the concept of ontology (or, in Carnap's preferred terminology, "the acceptance of a kind of entities"). Carnap believed, then, that the most perspicuous languages for which ontological issues can be framed are many-sorted languages. Since Quine opts for OPC as the most perspicuous ontological language, this represents a difference of opinion between Quine and Carnap concerning question (1). They differ as to the most perspicuous language for framing ontological issues. This difference can be seen, in turn, as a formalization of the dispute concerning question (2). Carnap favored MPC, a language which furnishes a set of categories and, hence, a distinctive concept of ontology, and Quine favors OPC which provides no ready concept of categories or of ontology. The results of this section are as follows: First, Quine is correct in seeing an important relationship between the internal-external distinction and what he calls the category-subclass distinction — specifically, the relationship is one of the former presupposing the latter. Second, the category-subclass distinction provides Carnap with an explication of the concept of ontology or, if preferred, of the concept of a philosophical existence question. Third, Carnap's explication of this concept relies upon the choice of a many-sorted language as the language of ontology. The various genera involved in a manysorted language represent, for Carnap, the dichotomy between questions which involve the acceptance of a whole framework of rules, etc., on the one hand, and questions which deal only with the application of already accepted rules to some subclass of the entities involved in the framework on the other hand. Thus, built into Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions is a distinction between ontology and non-ontology, and this latter distinction is built upon the concept of categories versus subclasses. Categories and subclasses are, in turn, easily separable in a many-sorted language.

3.3 QUINE VERSUS THE CONCEPT OF ONTOLOGY

In this section, I will consider Quine's arguments against the devices attributed to Carnap in the last section. To use Quine's terminology, I will consider Quine's objections to the category-subclass distinction. My discussion, in this chapter, will be intended only to refute Quine's negative arguments. The more difficult task of giving a full-blown justification of Carnap's devices must await Chapter IV.

66 Quine attempts to undermine the category-subclass distinction by arguing: (a) that set theory is sufficient to avoid paradoxes first avoided by Russell's theory of types, 14 (b) that the distinction is based on "a rather trivial consideration", 15 and (c) that it is possible to eliminate semantic categories in favor of a one-sorted canonical notation in which all predications involving type trespasses are considered false.16 As (a) and (c) are based upon similar confusions, I will dispose of them first. Quine's equating Carnap's use of a many-sorted language with the acceptance of type theory, on the one hand, and with the concept of semantic categories, on the other hand, betrays Quine's failure to see that many-sortedness is introduced as an illustrative device — a pragmatically useful formalization of an ordinary language intuition. The pragmatic justification of the device is solely in terms of its usefulness in illustrating the difference between ontology and non-ontology. That it bears a resemblance to the theory of types is only accidental. (Indeed, the theory of types is insufficient for Carnap's purposes anyway. Carnap's many-sorted language has separate categories for first-order entities such as material objects and sensations, as well as separate categories for first- and higher-order entities.)17 Quine is more justified in finding a connection between Carnap's use of a many-sorted language and ordinary language semantic categories. This connection is more justified because it is the ordinary language intuition that there are natural kinds which provides a basis for the distinction between ontology and non-ontology. Quine seems to assume that ordinary language semantic categories are intended as a justification of many-sortedness. Here, as in (a), Quine fails to grasp that many-sortedness is given a pragmatic justification, and while it finds a precedent in ordinary language categories, these categories are not offered as justification of the device of many-sortedness. Quine also seems to assume that since all type-trespasses can be considered false, this gain in simplicity will be welcomed. Simplicity only becomes a consideration, however, when nothing important weighs in the balance; and, because a many-sorted language allows a distinction between ontology and non-ontology, there is an important point at issue. Quine might counter that the distinction between ontology and non-ontology is not worth added complications because it is a worthless distinction, but this would be begging the very issue at hand. Thus, if it is assumed that the distinction between ontology and non-ontology is useful, this, in itself, justifies the adoption of a many-sorted language. The many-sorted language allows a precise formulation of a useful distinction. At this point, a slight digression may prove helpful. Quine's arguments (a) and (c) have force for him because his view of the purpose of regimentation differs from Carnap's. Carnap sees choices of languages as temporary notational conveniences. Quine, on the other hand, believes that any useful notational device is to be used only if it can be reduced to a more basic idiom. 18 If the language is to be changed, the changes must be justified as the best

67 known theory of reality as a whole. It is not permissible to move from framework to framework according to a temporary change in purposes. All expedient notations must be reducible or else they must be justified as necessary for the proper, scientific view of reality. Carnap, on the other hand, saw purposes as variable, and, according to him, one might adopt a linguistic device for some temporary purpose (such as, for example, illustrating the nature of ontology) without justifying the device as "useful" in any absolute sense. One might say that while Quine advocates liberal divorce laws for persons and notations, Carnap advocated promiscuity. Because of his views on regimentation, Quine sees arguments (a) and (c) as attacking the general use of manysortedness, and sees himself as undercutting reasons for a general endorsement of many-sorted languages oyer OPC. Quine's insistence on systematicity — on treating every change in notation as requiring justification in terms of the entire system — is closely related to his view that there is no distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences. The latter view renders Quine's theory of evidence one of coherence. Experience impinges upon theories as a whole, not on individual, synthetic sentences. Consequently every change in theory must be justified in terms of the whole theory. It might be thought that (a) and (c) can now be revived as arguments, using Quine's holistic views on regimentation as a premise. In a sense, such a revival is possible. To argue in this manner, however, would be to reduce these two arguments to the epistemological objection. If Quine is to sustain his objection to the use of many-sortedness as a distinct objection, the epistemological objection may not be used as a premise. If the distinction between internal and external questions is accepted, that distinction, in and of itself, justifies many-sortedness as a device for drawing the distinction between ontology and non-ontology, because the latter distinction is the means to limit the applicability of the former distinction. Besides the fact that Quine's argument concerning semantic categories is irrelevant (ignoring as it does the pragmatic justification of many-sortedness), the argument he offers is flawed in yet another way. Quine seems to object to the use of semantic categories on the grounds that, given Carnap's entire enterprise, any such appeal would be circular. Quine's argument develops as follows: He begins by remarking that Carnap's purpose in introducing the category-subclass distinction is to discriminate between meaningful sentences, on the one hand, and meaningless metaphysical utterances, on the other. 19 Thus, he completely conflates the two approaches to metaphysics distinguished in Chapter 2, failing to distinguish the internal-external distinction as an attempted reformation of traditional metaphysics from the verifiability criterion which banishes that discipline entirely. Then, Quine suggests that, perhaps, Carnap's attack on metaphysics can be salvaged by introducing the concept of a:

68 ... semantic category, as Lesniewski called it, or what the linguists call a substitution class. Expressions belong to the same substitution class if, whenever you put one for the other in a meaningful sentence, you get a meaningful sentence. The question whether numbers constitute a category gives way, in these terms, to a question of the meaningfulness of the sentences we obtain by supplanting number words by other words.20

Quine, however, goes on to reject the use of such a concept in the Carnapian enterprise as follows: However, what to count as meaningful is not at all clear. The empirical linguist manages the point after a fashion by considering what sentences would be elicited by reasonable means from naive native speakers. But such a criterion is of little value to a philosopher with a reform program. In fact, the question of which existence sentences to count as meaningless was where we came in.21

Let me put this argument in premise form: Premise (1) On the theory of semantic categories, the intuitive problem of categories reduces to the question of meaningfulness of sentences in ordinary language. Premise (2) The only sense of 'meaningful' that is clear is that of the empirical linguist. Premise (3) The empirical linguist's sense of 'meaningful' is of no use for a philosophical reform program. Conclusion: The notion of semantic categories is of no use for a philosophical reform program. The key premise in this argument is clearly premise (3). Why does Quine think it is true? The last quoted sentence indicates Quine's objection. He began by equating Carnap's attempts to distinguish external from internal questions with the attempt of positivists to deny the meaningfulness of metaphysical utterances. Now, Quine suggests, it would be circular to introduce any conception of meaningfulness in order to separate external from internal sentences. This argument is based upon an equivocation on the word 'meaningful', as it fails to distinguish the two Carnapian critiques of metaphysics. If my interpretation, argued at length in Chapter 2, is correct, the objection to improperly formulated external questions is not that they are meaningless in any ordinary language semantic sense, but that they are ill formed. They attempt to be both internal (in that they are claimed to be decidable by some criterion) and external (in that they are claimed to be outside any language). As such, they mix languages, and are ill formed. If one wishes to refer to such improperly formulated questions as meaningless, there can be no objection. But, to avoid confusion, this technical sense of 'meaningless', meaning 'ill formed' or 'mixing levels of language', should be distinguished from other

69 senses of the term. I will use a subscript 'i' to indicate this technical sense of 'meaningless'. Quine, then, is objecting to the use of the ordinary language conception of 'meaningless' in the explication of 'meaningless}'. When I speak of the ordinary language semantic sense of 'meaningless', I am referring to the sort of nonsense which occurs when one commits type-trespasses, as, for example, when one says "Caesar is prime" or "The number seven is six feet tall." I will refer to this ordinary language conception as 'meaningless 0 '. If Quine is to succeed in convicting Carnap of circularity, he must show that 'meaningless,' must be explicated in terms of 'meaningless 0 '. But, this cannot be shown. 'Meaningless,' involves a mixture of languages. 'Meaningless^ involves the improper combination of predicates and substantives within the same language. This difference is important. Unless one assumes, as Quine seems to, that externality is ultimately tied to verificationism, there is no reason to connect Carnap's distinction between internal and external sentences with attempts to reject, as meaningless, all of metaphysics. Only on this mistaken interpretation of external questions is there any basis, at all, for a charge of circularity in the use of semantic categories. Thus, not only is Quine's objection to the use of semantic categories irrelevant, it is also confused. It charges that the internal-external distinction makes use of a concept of 'meaningless' which requires verificationism. But I have argued that the internal-external distinction is wholly independent of verificationism. I now turn to Quine's argument (b). Quine does not really develop an argument here, but rather comments that "the use of distinctive styles of variables, explicitly or even implicitly, is the most casual editorial detail," "a trivial consideration," "a casual and eliminable shorthand," and "not invariant under logically irrelevant changes of typography." 2 2 These remarks suggest two somewhat different arguments. First, Quine may be arguing that Carnap, being a conventionalist, must reject any absolutistic conception of categories. The conventionalist believes that, insofar as categories of entities exist, these categories are created by linguistic convention. Since different languages embody different categorizations, what counts as a category will vary depending upon the language chosen. Quine might be interpreted as arguing that any conception of categories available to a conventionalist will, consequently, be trivial and arbitrary. This first argument is suggested by Quine's quoted remarks. His continuing discussion of the point, however, suggests a second, more technical argument which turns upon the eliminability of category distinctions. I will develop and discuss the effectiveness of each of these arguments, in turn. The first of these arguments can be stated as follows: Premise (1) Given linguistic conventionalism, what counts as a genus or category is variable from language to language. Premise (2) No distinction can be based upon a concept which varies from

70 language to language. Conclusion: Given linguistic conventionalism, there can be no distinction between categories and subclasses. This argument is, initially, quite convincing. The argument would be sound, if the distinction referred to between categories and subclasses were to be an absolute distinction, invariant across languages. Carnap, however, explicitly rejects such a conception of categories.23 That is, premise (2) is ambiguous. It may mean either: Premise (2') No pre-linguistically absolute distinction can be based upon a concept which varies from language to language or it may mean: Premise (2") No language relative distinction can be based upon a concept which varies from language to language. Of these two formulations, only the first is plausible. This first formulation, however, is irrelevant to Carnap's conception of categories, as he is only concerned to develop a language-relative conception of categories. Consequently, if the argument is to be sound, the conclusion implied is irrelevant to Carnap's position. Carnap's internal-external distinction is applied, normally, to specific utterances. Suppose a philosopher says, "There are material objects." The Carnapian will invite the speaker to translate his utterance into a canonical notation. If the speaker intended his utterance as an ontological claim (i.e. as a claim attributing ultimate generality to material objects), then he will choose a language which reserves an entire genus of the domain for material objects. That is, he will choose a language where the expression translating 'material object' is a universal predicate. It will then be possible to proceed with an internal-external analysis. On the other hand, the speaker may, upon questioning, say that this utterance was not intended ontologically. For example, he may consider material objects to be collections of sense data. In this case, he would choose a language which does not translate 'material object' as a universal predicate. It will then be concluded that the original sentence was not intended ontologically, and it is not susceptible to an internalexternal analysis. Carnap's language-relative concept of categories, then, is sufficient for his purposes. These categories provide an explication of 'ontological utterances' which is applicable in particular contexts and which can be consummated by virtue of a translation of the utterance in question. The justification for choosing a particular language in any particular context is that the language chosen was the useful one to clarify, in that context,

71 whether the utterance was intended ontologically or not. That is all that is necessary in order to decide whether the internal-external analysis is to be applied in the context in question. The argument proposed, then, fails because it does not sufficiently appreciate the pragmatic justification of the category-subclass distinction and the language-relative nature of the categories implied by such a justification. It might still be objected that such a concept bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of ontology. The categories envisioned by essentialistic traditionalists are given in the world, not created by linguistic convention. Carnap's device, however, retains the structure of this traditional concept. When an essentialistic ontologist argues that a given kind of entities embody a general category (in the ontological sense of 'category'), this will be reflected in the semantics of the language he speaks. For example, if he believes that material objects are collections of sense data, he will take the sentence "There are material objects" to imply the sentence "There are sense data," but not vice-versa. His arguments for saying that material objects are collections of sense data may be quite different from those given by a conventionalistic phenomenalist. Indeed, he chooses the phenomenalistic language because he believes that features of the world imply that material objects are a species of sense data. This approach differs from that of the conventionalist who says that, because the phenomenalistic language works better, he asserts that sense data, but not material objects, are to be afforded a special genus with special variables. The structure of the categories assumed is similar, however. Ontological claims, for conventionalists and essentialists alike, concern entities of ultimate generality, and this structure will be indicated in the syntax and semantics of the language chosen. To put the point slightly differently, the essentialist can accept the distinction between categories and subclasses as an explication of his concept of ontology — but he will emphatically reject Carnap's attempt to apply the internal-external analysis to claims they agree are ontological. 24 If Quine's argument is intended simply to attack Carnap's conventionalistic conception of categories as verying across languages and, hence, unsuitable for the task of explicating the concept of ontology, the argument fails. Carnap's purposes only require a language-relative conception of categories, pragmatically justified in particular contexts as an explication of a particular ontologist's utterances. Quine's discussion, however, suggests a second, more technical argument. He proceeds, following the above-quoted remarks, to discuss the theoretical eliminability of the categories embodied in manysorted languages. This emphasis on eliminability suggests some such argument as follows: Premise (1) Given a conventionalistic view of language, Carnap's distinction between ontological and non-ontological issues depends upon manysorted quantification.

72 Premise (2) All many-sorted languages are translatable into one-sorted languages without loss of expressive power or power of provability, but the reverse does not hold. Conclusion (1) Many-sortedness is variable and even eliminable without loss of expressive power. Conclusion (2) The distinction between ontology and science is not a legitimate distinction, given a conventionalistic view of language. Premise (2) is true. It is proved by Hao Wang. 25 For present purposes, premise (1) can also be accepted. Further, it is plausible to believe that conclusion (1) follows from premises (1) and (2). Even if conclusion (1) is accepted, however, it does not, by itself, imply conclusion (2). Some sort of general principle is necessary to make the argument valid. Suppose we introduce: Premise (3) Given two theories, T j and T2, such that T j is eliminable in favor of T2 without loss of power of expression or of provability, no distinction is legitimate which depends essentially upon T j. Is this a plausible general principle? It does not seem to be. Take, for example, the distinction between disjunction and conjunction. Conjunction is eliminable in favor of disjunction, but there is no temptation to give up the distinction between the two types of connectives, or any other distinction dependent upon conjunction. Perhaps, it could be answered that examples of this sort only show that premise (3) must be revised slightly. In the case of disjunction and conjunction, the eliminability is reversible. Perhaps Quine wishes to exploit the fact that the eliminability of many-sortedness is not reversible. This suggests the following as a replacement for premise (3). Premise (3') Given two theories, Tj and T2, such that T j is eliminable in terms of T2 without loss of expressive power or power of provability, and where the eliminability cannot be reversed, no distinction is legitimate which depends essentially upon T j . But other examples would call premise (3') into question. Consider, for example, two theories 7 g and 7j, where 7 g is a purely extensional system of logic, and 7 j is an intensional extension of 7 g . Now, 7 g is eliminable in favor of T\ — that is, there is a translation of each sentence of 7 g in 7 j and the translation of each theorem of Tg is provable in 7j. The reverse does not hold. Now consider the distinction between equivalent but nonidentical predicates. Take, for example, the predicates P = 'being greater than 9' and Q = 'being greater than the number of planets in the actual world'. It seems quite plausible to say that P and Q denote the same property in 7j, but implausible

73 to say that P and Q are the same predicate in Tg. The acceptance of premise (3') necessitates given up the distinction between P and Q. Surely, however, there is a quite legitimate distinction between P and Q even though that distinction depends upon the extensional concept of predicates being true of individuals — a concept which could be eliminated in favor of the intensional concept of properties in the more powerful system of intensional logic. Thus, premise (3'), as did premise (3), eliminates too much. Could Quine further weaken premise (3') so as to avoid ruling out quite legitimate distinctions? Perhaps, but until such a principle is proposed, I see no reason to accept Quine's argument. The situation is worse, I think, as it seems to me that any principle which is designed so as to fulfill the necessary place in Quine's argument will be too strong. I do not know how to prove this, but I can, perhaps, hint at why I think any such principle is doomed to failure. Quine's argument turns crucially on the concept of eliminability in a strictly logical sense relevant to expressive power and power of provability. Distinctions are drawn in many contexts, however, some of them logical contexts, others not. In other words, eliminability is a function of specific, variable purposes, of which the purpose of developing logical systems is one possible example. Eliminability without loss of logical power might be the criterion as to which concepts would be basic if we adopt as our purpose the narrow goal of developing a logical system. But that criterion would be irrelevant in contexts where our basic purpose is perspicuity or the formalization of some ordinary language concept, or any number of other purposes. Since Carnap's purpose, in choosing a many-sorted language is to provide a formalization of the concept of ontology (i.e. a distinction between ontology and non-ontology), any requirement designed to be used in logical contexts would be irrelevant. Carnap does not attempt to justify his choice of the device of many-sortedness on any cognitive grounds, or on the grounds that it is true, but only on the grounds that it is a pragmatically justified device. Its pragmatic value lies in its usefulness in clarifying our ordinary conception of ontology and in making the process of doing ontology more perspicuous. The discussion in this section shows, I think, that Quine's objections to the ontology-non-ontology distinction as formalized by use of a many-sorted language cannot stand alone. There appeared several points along the way where the insertion of the epistemological objection as a premise would have saved Quine's argument. Quine could, for example, argue that all linguistic devices (such as many-sortedness) must be justifiable for all purposes. This premise could be justified by an appeal to the holistic theory of evidence implied by the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Or, more centrally, Quine could simply argue that the distinction between ontology and nonontology is unimportant and not worth the complications involved in intro-

74 ducing a many-sorted language. This would strike at the heart of Carnap's pragmatic justification. But the ontology-non-ontology distinction is only unimportant if one rejects its epistemological importance. One will, I submit, reject its epistemological importance only if one rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction. Thus, at the heart of each of Quine's attacks upon the categorysubclass distinction is his epistemological objection. There would be no reason to introduce a category-subclass distinction and the complexities involved unless one wants to explicate the concept of ontology. But this unless clause is crucial. Simply to deny the interest of the distinction between ontology and non-ontology would be to beg the question. And any Quinean argument given to prove that that distinction lacks interest seems to require as a crucial premise the claim that the distinction has no epistemological importance. If one, contrary to Quine, takes the view that the distinction between using a criterion and choosing a criterion is epistemologically central, then Quine's category-subclass objection carries no weight. Quine's attack on this latter distinction reduces to his epistemological attack on the distinction between internal and external questions. I conclude, then, that Quine has at most one, independent objection to Carnap's distinction between internal and external sentences. The other objections are reduced to that epistemological objection by virtue of their use of it as a premise.

3.4 THE DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE?

Quine, in attacking the category-subclass distinction, is attacking the very distinction between ontology and non-ontological disciplines. I have argued that this facet of his attack on the internal-external distinction fails as an independent argument. This raises the possibility that one might join Quine in rejecting any distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences and, consequently, in arguing that there is no important epistemological difference between ontological and non-ontological issues, and yet accept Carnap's distinction between ontology and non-ontology. In other words, while I have argued that a denial of the epistemological importance of the distinction between ontology and non-ontology is necessary for a rejection of the distinction itself, it is by no means obvious that the former is sufficient for the latter. Carnap's pragmatic defense of many-sortedness as an explication of the concept of ontology need only argue that the concept is useful in some context. A philosopher who follows Quine in rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction will lack one possible motivation for retaining the concept - he will not see the concept as marking an epistemological difference in kind. It would, however, be quite consistent to deny the epistemological efficacy of the distinction and, yet, embrace the distinction as useful for other reasons. Are there any such alternative roles that the distinction between ontology

75 and non-ontology might play? I believe there is at least one such role. James Cornman points out that there is something, at root, paradoxical about philosophical discourse.^ Ordinary men discourse about material objects, images, concepts, etc., with no seeming puzzlement. Yet philosophers puzzle about these very concepts, debating questions which, if ever considered by nonphilosophers at all, would be considered by them to be trivial and uninteresting. If the common man asserts that a stone is a physical object, he makes no ontological commitment. An ontological commitment occurs when a philosopher considers the possibility of reducing physical objects to nonphysical ones, concludes that this is impossible, and says "There are physical objects." Quine may be correct in saying that there is no epistemological difference in kind between these two assertions. Both may be, as Quine insists, pragmatically accepted bits of theory, posits intended to organize and account for the continual flow of sensations. But they are very different bits of theory. The expression 'physical object' is used quite differently in the two contexts. The set of experiences which would cause the philosopher to give up his belief that physical objects are irreducible is entirely different from the set of experiences which would cause the common man to give up his belief that a stone is a physical object. The philosopher will give up his belief, for example, upon discovering a mode of translating his talk about physical objects into talk about sensations. The common man would give up his belief only after discovering that stones lack certain qualities thought to inhere in all physical objects. One need not claim that these are radically different types of experience (linguistic versus nonlinguistic, for example) in order to admit that they are different experiences. This difference can, then, be explicated either in terms of the analytic-synthetic distinction, or in Quinean terms. One can as well say that the difference in the two cases is that sense experience is more directly germane27 to the common man's belief than it is to the philospher's, as to say that the philosopher considers analytic questions of definition and the common man considers sense experience. Even if the difference is one of degree epistemologically, it is worthwhile to explicate the very real difference in degree. This difference is, after all, the difference between philosophy and nonphilosophy. Quine's approach to ontology, treating ontological questions as no different from non-ontological ones in any respect as it does, fails to provide an explication of this difference. There is, then, a prima facie reason to admit a distinction between ontology and non-ontology. It provides a plausible account of the difference between philosophical and nonphilosophical utterances (i.e. tokens) of the same sentence (type). In accomplishing this, Carnap's internal-external distinction provides a plausible account of the puzzling relationship between philosophical and nonphilosophical discourse. There is no obvious reason why a philos-

76 opher who rejects any epistemological difference between ontology and science must reject this account. He could, simply, adopt the Carnapian distinction between ontology and non-ontology, but deny that this distinction marks any epistemological difference in kind. On this view, only a difference in degree would separate the epistemological considerations relevant to both ontological and non-ontological issues. In Chapter 5 , 1 will show that Quine rejects this compromise. Quine proposes an (at least initially) different dissolution of the paradox stated by Cornman. Quine, then, ultimately takes the uncompromising course of proposing that since the ontological-non-ontological distinction marks no epistemological difference in kind, it is better to ignore the distinction altogether. Quine recommends, then, that the distinction between ontology and nonontology be entirely obliterated. This, it seems to me, is as much as can be said about question (2), independent of later questions. I will turn in the next' chapter to question (3) concerning Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. While Carnap explicitly accepted Quine's criterion, there are many complex issues which are raised by this acceptance. Once these issues are clarified, it will be possible, in Chapter 5, to turn, once again, to Quine's objections to the internal-external distinction. There, I will take up the crucial epistemological objection.

NOTES 1 Quine, From A Logical Point of View, p. 4 5 . 2 For example, see Quine, Word and Object, p. 275. 3 Ibid., pp. 2 7 0 - 2 7 6 . 4 Quine, The Ways of Paradox, p. 133. 5 Ibid., p. 130. 6 Ibid. 1 Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," pp. 213-214. 8 Carnap, Logical Syntax, pp. 2 9 2 - 2 9 8 . 9 Ibid., p. 293. 10 Ibid., pp. 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 . 11 Ibid., p. 2 9 2 . 12 Hao Wang, A Survey of Mathematical Logic (Peking: Science Press, 1962), p. 3 2 2 . 13 Carnap, Logical Syntax, p. 2 9 6 . 14 Quine, The Ways of Paradox, pp. 131-132. 15 Ibid. 16 Quine, Ontological Relativity, p. 9 1 . 17 Rudolf Carnap, Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications, trans, by William H. Meyer and John Wilkinson (New York: Dover, 1958), pp. 83-88. 18 Quine, Word and Object, pp. 160-161. 19 Quine, Ontological Relativity, p. 91. 2 0 Ibid., p. 92. 21 Ibid. 2 2 Quine, The Ways of Paradox, pp. 131, 133.

77 23 24 25 26 27

Camap, Logical Syntax, p. 293. These points will be given fuller treatment in the next chapter. Wang, pp. 323, 326. Cornman, pp. xviii-xix. Quine, From A Logical Point of View, p. 43.

4. CARNAP A N D QUINE ON ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT

4.1 CARNAP ON ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT Concerning a criterion for ontological commitment, Carnap says: W.V. Quine was the first to recognize the importance of the introduction of variables as indicating the acceptance of entities. "The ontology to which one's use of language commits him comprises simply the objects that he treats as falling... within the range of values of his variables." 1 Thus Carnap explicitly accepts Quine's criterion for ontological commitment. But I find this agreement doubly confusing. First, in spite of it, Carnap's actual description of the process o f commitment is subtly but importantly different from Quine's descriptions. Second, a careful analysis of Carnap's metaontological system shows that the adoption of Quine's criterion without modification leads to insuperable difficulties. I will discuss these two points in turn. (i) Carnap describes the process o f "accepting a type of entities" as follows: The two essential steps are ... the following. First, the introduction of a general term, a predicate of higher level, for the new kind of entities, permitting us to say of any particular entity that it belongs to this kind.... Second, the introduction of variables of the new type. The new entities are values of these variables: the constants (and the closed compound expressions, if any) are substitutable for the variables. With the help of the variables, general sentences concerning the new entities can be formulated. After the new forms are introduced into the language, it is possible to formulate with their help internal questions and possible answers to them.2 Compare this with Quine's statement o f his criterion for commitment: We can very easily involve ourselves in ontological commitments by saying, for example, that there is something (bound variable) which red houses and sunsets have in common; or that there is something which is a prime number larger than a million. But this is, essentially, the only way we can involve ourselves in ontological commitments: by our use of bound variables.^

79 With the help of these two quotations, it is possible to pinpoint a difference which Quine and Carnap have on ontological commitment, but which neither of them seem to realize. Note that Quine says that we are committed to entities by our use of bound variables. Carnap, however, in the passage quoted, disagrees. We are committed to entities by two steps, first by the introduction of general terms permitting us to say of an entity that it belongs to this kind, and second by introducing variables of the new type. Then, he says, it is possible to formulate internal questions and answers to them. Therefore, the process of ontological commitment for Quine requires a further step than it does for Carnap. For the latter, we need only be able to say "(Ex)Px." For the former, we must also say it. One way to characterize the difference between Quine and Carnap is to say that Carnap does, but Quine does not, conflate accepting a linguistic framework with accepting a framework of entities. Quine requires not just the acceptance of a set of rules, but also a statement by the theory that some entities of the type do exist. For Carnap, accepting the linguistic framework is sufficient for commitment. For Quine, two steps are necessary. One must, first, accept the linguistic framework and, second, one must state that something of the type in question exists. But, if one considers that Quine uses the first order predicate calculus with ordinary quantification theory as his canonical language, we find that '(Ex) (Fx v~Fx)' is a theorem of the system, and hence, it is a logical truth that there is at least one object. Thus, for Quine, the language carries ontological commitments along with it. On his one-sorted theory, however, he is not committed to any particular kind of objects merely by accepting a predicate calculus which assumes a nonempty domain. In order to be committed to things of a given type, the theory must state that there are things of that type. However, to adopt OPC (and the standard existence assumptions embodied in the axioms of that system) as applying to each of the subdomains of MPC, as Carnap did, makes the existence of at least one entity of each of the subdomains a logical truth. That is, for each style of variables, n, '(Ex n ) ( F x n v ~ F x n ) ' will be a theorem. The standard existence assumptions of OPC are, then, greatly strengthened when they are transferred to MPC. For the theorems of MPC to be true, there must be entities of each of the types which are recognized as categories or subdomains. In other words, on Carnap's system, the acceptance of a set of rules for talking about a category of entities implies commitment to those entities. This can be seen, in a sense, as the formalization of the Carnapian belief that ontological commitments are nothing other than linguistic decisions. The decision to adopt a language for talking as if there were F's implies that there are F's.

80 4.2 A DILEMMA FOR CARNAP

It is now possible to raise a serious problem for Carnap's meta-ontology, given the assumption that he accepts Quine's criterion for ontological commitment. Combining Carnap's many-sorted version of the predicate calculus with Quine's criterion for ontological commitment leads to the following result: accepting a set of logico-linguistic rules commits one to assertions of existence; and, consequently, accepting a linguistic framework for referring to entities of type x is indistinguishable from being ontologically committed to x's. There is yet another way of saying the same thing: internal assertions of ontological statements are analytic. Before proceeding to discuss the plausibility of this result, I will list three statements which seem, initially, to be dissimilar, but which turn out to be equivalent statements of the result. The three statements are: (1) In all cases, the acceptance by a person of the linguistic framework (i.e. the rules of quantification) for a given category of entities commits that person to there being at least one entity of that category. (2) The most perspicuous language for ontology should have ' ( E x m ) ( F x m v ~ F x m ) ' as a theorem, and hence, a logical truth for each style of variables. (3) On the most perspicuous model for ontological activity, all internal statements in ontological form are trivial and analytic. 4 Now at first glance, the equivalent results (1) to (3) might be thought to be congenial to Carnap's system. Indeed, he often made remarks in print which suggest (l)-(3), 5 and, it might be argued, that (l)-(3) are no more than a formalization of his central metaphilosophical position — all ontological problems are to be treated as linguistic decisions. If (l)-(3) hold, then the linguistic decision to accept a particular set of rules becomes the substitute for traditional ontological assertions. Unfortunately, the situation is not so simple. While (l)-(3) seem congenial results when one is speaking of propositions, numbers, and other abstract entities, they are less so when applied to first-order objects. Physical objects, sense data, or any other first-order objects would, by the same reasoning, exist by linguistic fiat. The sentence "There is at least one material object" becomes either analytic or contradictory, depending upon which linguistic framework one accepts. Since it is surely a contingent, synthetic fact that the physical world exists, and since this follows analytically, purely by virtue of the rules of language, it would appear to be a synthetic a priori sentence. Of course, Carnap could not accept this. His belief in the analytic-synthetic distinction is as basic as his belief that all philosophical problems are linguistic in nature. To give up either would be to give up the central core of the Carnapian philosophical system.

81 To state the argument more formally, I will list five Carnapian beliefs which lead to a contradiction: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

(v)

All philosophical problems are to be solved by linguistic decisions. All sentences are either analytic or synthetic, and no analytic sentence provides information about the way the world is. ' ( E x ) (Fx v ~ F x ) ' is a theorem of logic. The proper canonical notation for making ontology perspicuous is a many sorted language, with a segregated subdomain for each ontological type of entity, and with versions of the logical axioms and rules for each style of variables. Quine's criterion of ontological commitment is correct.

Each of (i)-(v) is an element on Carnap's metaphilosophy as I have outlined it. Statement (i) is Carnap's linguisticized formulation of the hierarchical view of philosophy. Philosophy is not an object discipline but, rather, deals with human concepts embodied in the language of science. This view is central to Carnap's philosophy both on my interpretation and on the standard interpretation. The belief in the analytic-synthetic distinction and its corollary, the belief that no analytic sentences provide any information about the world is, as Quine has said, a "dogma" of empiricism. It is well known that Carnap was deeply committed to this dogma, (iii)-(v) are less central to Carnap's system, but are all beliefs which he clearly accepts. I will argue that (i)-(v) lead to a contradiction as they presently stand. Then, I will argue in dilemmatic form against (v), by (a) retaining (i) and (ii) as constantly true, and (b) varying (iii) and (iv), but arguing that such variations do not result, ultimately, in avoiding contradictions. From (i)-(v) the contradiction follows almost immediately. From (iii) and (iv) it follows that any language, L, will either have or lack the apparatus for saying ' ( E x n ) ( F x n v ~ F x n ) ' where variables of style x n range over physical objects. If L has the linguistic apparatus necessary for saying ' ( E x n ) ( F x n v ~ F x n ) \ then there is some sentence ' ( E x n ) P n x n ' where ' P n ' = 'is a physical object') which, when treated as internal, is analytic. If L lacks the linguistic apparatus in question, ' ( E x n ) P n x n ' cannot be formed, but '(EXI)Q^Xj', '(EX2)R^X2', .... ' ( ' E x r n ) S m x r n ' can be formed for the various styles of variables of L. If none of the variable styles is reserved for physical objects, it follows trivially that physical objects do not form an ontological category on L. Note that in the latter case, the denial would be a metalinguistic comment about the language, L. Now, by (v) it follows that ' ( E x n ) P n x n ' or its metalevel denial make an ontological commitment or denial respectively; and, hence, must be considered ontological assertions. By (i) it follows that these sentences must be linguistic, i.e. nonempirical. But *(Ex n )Px n ' or its denial provide information about the world. Therefore, these sentences are analytic,

82 by (iii) and (iv), philosophical in nature by (v), and yet provide information about the world. Thus, whichever of these sentences is appropriate for a given language, L, provides a counterexample to the general claim (ii). Carnap was aware of this anomaly, though there is little evidence that he saw how centrally it strikes at his position or how difficult it would be to avoid. He first discussed the issue in Logical Syntax: If logic is to be independent of empirical knowledge, then it must assume nothing concerning the existence of objects.... In the above-mentioned systems [i.e. those of Russell and Hilbcrt], not only the sentences which are true in every domain, but also sentences (for example, the one ['(Ex) (Fx v -Fx)'] just given) which are true, not in every domain, but in every non-empty domain, are demonstrable. In practice, this distinction is immaterial, since we are usually concerned with non-empty domains. But if, in order to separate logic as sharply as possible from empirical science, we intend to exclude from the logical system any assumptions concerning the existence of objects, we must make certain alterations in the forms of language used by Russell and Hilbert.6

Much later, in the Schilpp volume The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, he said, "I have called existential statements of this kind [i.e. ontological statements], formulated within a given language, internal existential statements. They are usually analytic and trivial." 7 In personal communication to me, Carnap elaborated a bit more on the point: I was here [i.e. in the Schilpp volume] chiefly thinking of questions about the existence of "higher" entities, for example classes of objects, classes of such classes, classes of numbers, and the like. Existence statements of this kind concerning abstract entities, I regard as analytic. In this context I left open the question whether the statement "there are objects (observable bodies)" is analytic or not. One might wish to regard this statement as synthetic, because it is for the observer an empirical fact that he has seen such objects. My main interest in this discussion was the problem mostly discussed by philosophers, of the existence of abstract entities (classes, relations, etc.).8

In all of these comments, Carnap saw the issue as largely one of choice, and hardly seems to have seen it as a serious challenge to his system. Yet it is difficult to see where his choice lies. Carnap's acceptance of (i), (iii), (iv), and (v) commit him to a crucial counter-example to the cherished empiricistic principle that no analytical sentence provides information about the world. Carnap's problems over whether all internal, ontoiogical statements are analytic can be formalized by considering universally free logic (henceforth, UFL) as an alternative to OPC and MPC. U F L has been developed in order to avoid existence-assumptions in logic.^ Though there is some variation in the way in which various systems of UFL treat definite descriptions, there are two essential characteristics shared by these systems. First, the singular terms of UFL are free of existential import. Second, it is not assumed that the domain of UFL is nonempty. It is not necessary, here, to explore deeply

83 the formal properties of these systems. Suffice it to say that the usual axiom '(x) (Ax DAx(y))' 10 is neither an axiom nor a theorem, but is rather replaced by '(x) (Ax D (E!x D Ax(y)). u This substitution has the effect of making the rule of existential instantiation dependent upon the contingent truth that some object, which has the property A, does in fact exist. This allows one to avoid the theorem '(Ex) (Fx v~Fx)', and the ontological assumption that accompanies the acceptance of a logic which assumes a nonempty domain. The decision facing the Carnapian at this point can be formalized thus: Should the logic of ontology be a predicate calculus (either OPC or MPC) with standard existence assumptions, or should it be UFL. Since MPC is a variant of OPC (it has the same axioms and rules of inference, but these are indexed according to domains, and anything provable by these axioms in one domain is provable in all other domains), there is, in principle, no objection to combining UFL with MPC. The result would be a system of many-sorted logic with the indexed form of the axioms and rules of inference of UFL holding for each of the several subdomains. I will call such a logic MUFL. Yet another possibility is available. It would be possible to modify MPC by adopting the existence assumptions of UFL in all first-order domains, and use the axioms and rules of OPC with its standard existence assumptions for higher-order domains. I will call this system MPFL. MPFL is a many-sorted partially existence assumption free logic. MPFL has two distinct and, strictly speaking, nonequivalent axioms systems. Three alternative logical systems are, then, available as formalizations of the Carnapian meta-ontological system. Carnap often wrote as if he were assuming MPC. At other times, when he was more concerned with ontological questions about first-order entities, he seemed to lean toward MPFL. MUFL is a third alternative which must also be discussed. The choice between these three systems can be thought of as a formalization of my question (1): What is the most perspicuous language for doing ontology? (i)-(v) above provide a set of principles which embody the basic ideas involved in MPC as it would be embedded in the Carnapian metaphilosophical system, (iii) is a statement of the characteristic theorem of a logic with standard existence assumptions, (iv) introduces many-sortedness, and (v) simply states Carnap's agreement with Quine's criterion. I have already argued that (i)-(v) are internally inconsistent. MUFL and MPFL provide two possible modifications of (i)-(v). Unfortunately, neither of these modifications avoid internal inconsistency either. I will consider MUFL and MPFL in turn, arguing that each leads to an inconsistency. MUFL modifies (i)-(v) by eliminating (iii). On MUFL '(Ex) (Fx v ~Fx)' is not a theorem. Consequently, ' ( E x n ) p n x n ' (where ' p n ' is a universal predicate meaning 'is a material object') is not a logical truth. Consequently, on MUFL the decision to accept a linguistic framework for talking about a type of entities is distinct from asserting that some of the entities exist. It is consistent to say ' ~ ( E x n ) P n x n '

84 (where 'P n ' is the universal predicate for any variable style, n). Because we are here discussing MUFL, this will hold for all types of entities. This possibility, however, undercuts the central meta-ontological purpose (embodied in (i)) of "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." In that essay, Carnap advocated tolerance of abstract entities on the grounds that they can be construed as no more than linguistic expedients. As such, they need not conflict with empiricistic scruples. The replacement of OPC and its standard existence assumptions with the axioms and rules of MUFL, however, undercuts this line of reasoning. The existence of abstract entities does not follow from the adoption of linguistic rules. If one uses the linguistic framework for talking about propositions, for example, one could still ask, "but, are there any propositions?" If such a question can arise, the Carnapian may not treat the acceptance of a kind of entities as a purely linguistic question. Further, it is hard to see how this question, as long as it is treated as a philosophical but not analytically answered question, can help but embarras an empiristically oriented semanticist. It might be thought that MPFL provides a way out of the dilemma. Under MPFL, existence assumptions will hold for all and only domains containing higher-order entities. Domains containing first-order entities will be governed by no existence assumptions. At first glance, this seems to capture the Carnapian system quite nicely. Questions like "Are there physical objects?" will be empirical, while the answers to higher-order questions like "Are there propositions?" will follow analytically from the choice of a linguistic framework. Thus, MPFL modifies (i)-(v) by replacing (iii) and (iv) with (iii') and (iv') respectively: (iii') '(Ex) (Fx v ~Fx)' is a theorem for higher-order domains, but not for first-order domains, (iv') The proper canonical notation for making ontology perspicuous is a many-sorted language, with a segregated subdomain for each ontological type of entity and with: (a) a version of the axioms and rules of OPC holding for all higher order domains, and (b) a version of axioms and rules of UFL for all first-order domains. But, on closer analysis, this alternative fails to avoid internal inconsistencies in the Carnapian system. Even though this alternative avoids treating '(Ex) (x is a physical object)' as analytic, the sentence remains problematic in another way. Given Quine's criterion for ontological commitment, this sentence ontologically commits one to physical objects. Indeed, this would be, presumably, a paradigmatic philosophical assertion. But if we adopt MPFL, the sentence would, also, be empirically decidable. It conflicts, then, with the cherished Carnapian doctrine that all philosophical assertions are to be treated as linguistic decisions.

85 But this seems to exhaust the possibilities. The Carnapian has no formal language which jointly captures his systematic meta-ontological beliefs and avoids internal contradiction. At this point, it may seem tempting to say, "So much the worse for the Carnapian system." But before counseling despair, one more examination is in order. It should be pointed out that the Quinean criterion for ontological commitment played a part in the previous arguments. It seems natural to assume, given Quine's criterion, that '(Ex) (x is a physical object)' is an ontological claim under every interpretation. Indeed, Quine's consistent insistence that existence claims are univocal entails that if l (Ex)Px' (where 'Px' = 'x is a physical object') is ever to be interpreted ontologically, it must always be so interpreted. Hence, internal as well as external interpretations of '(Ex)Px' must be considered philosophical. Carnap, in following this assumption becomes trapped in a contradiction. '(Ex)Px' is both philosophical and empirical, which conflicts with basic tenets of his philosophy. Suppose, on the other hand, the Carnapian were to reject this assumption. Suppose he were to consider '(Ex)Px', when considered to be internal, as (perhaps) nonphilosophical. Its truth, then, might depend upon empirical assumptions, and the contradiction would be avoided. However, Carnap can accept this solution only if he denies Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. Quine's criterion implies that all existence claims are ontological, and that the existential quantifier is univocal. The Carnapian, then, must provide an alternative criterion of ontological commitment. Such a criterion is ready at hand, given the foregoing discussion of ontology, categories, and many-sortedness. Assume, as Carnap suggested at times, that MPFL is the most perspicuous formalization for ontological theory construction. Given this assumption, '(Ex)Px', when interpreted as internal, may be treated as non-ontological in nature. The essential ontological step is the step of providing a separate domain and special variables exclusively for material objects. The internal assertion that there are objects which are members of the category in question need not, on this account, be considered ontological or philosophical. Whether it is considered ontological will depend upon whether it follows analytically from the choice of a linguistic framework (an ontological decision) or whether nonphilosophical considerations lead to its acceptance. This solution to the problem squares nicely with Carnap's actual, concrete description of the process of "accepting a kind of entities." Carnap says that a person accepts a kind of entities (in an ontological sense) if he chooses a canonical notation in which they are basic, categorial elements of the system. If the rules which are accepted provide rules for talking about 0's and ' 0 ' is a universal predicate, then one is ontologically committed to 0's. Given this, Carnap could not accept Quine's criterion, which relies upon the bound variables in the assertions of a theory. Carnap saw the ontological step as the

86 purely linguistic step of adopting the rules which would permit talking as if there were 0's. Because Carnap explicitly endorsed Quine's criterion, it has not been noticed that he implicitly adopted a quite distinct criterion. I have now argued that the criterion he in fact used is consistent with other elements of his system, whereas the Quinean criterion is not. The Carnapian criterion for ontological commitment, then, is as follows: An ontologically perspicuous language, L, is ontologically committed to 0's, if and only if: (1) '0' is an ontological (i.e. universal) predicate in L. (2) L has a distinctive style of variables which range over all and only 0's. Three points must be made here. First, the criterion presupposes that the canonical language of ontology is many-sorted. This assumption reflects Carnap's distinction between ontology and science, and is of the same order as Quine's assumption that his criterion applies only to OPC. In either case, the ontologist is invited to translate his utterances into the favored canonical notation. Then, and only then, is it possible to determine his ontological commitments. Second, this criterion differs from Quine's in being a criterion for languages, not for theories. It does not follow, however, that the criterion is only of interest or use for linguistic conventionalists. The criterion, like Quine's, is applicable to any philosopher who is willing to translate his utterances into the canonical notation. That it is a criterion for languages and not for theories reflects the intuition that ontological categories (i.e. questions of subsumption and generality as they are reflected in the semantics of the language) are the true guide to ontological commitment, rather than the use of bound variables to make assertions. Realist philosophers will, certainly, give different types of reasons for treating a type of entities as ontologically basic; but, regardless of this difference in reasons (i.e. with respect to my question (5)), the semantics of the canonical notation will reflect the ontological commitments of realists as well as conventionalists, as each will, by virtue of translating their utterances into the many-sorted canonical notation, reveal which types of entities they believe to be ontologically basic and most general. The fact that some philosophers will take these categorizations to be conventionalistic and others take them to be reflections of the true structure of reality is irrelevant to the question of their ontological basicness. Third, the "ontologically perspicuous language, L," refers to MPFL. In most, but perhaps not all, ontological disputes, the existence of the entities in question is presumed. Further, these presumptions may or may not be based upon "ontological" reasons. When existence is not at issue, ontological debates are merely reductionistic in nature. The issue, then, concerns whether

87 the class of entities, assumed on all hands to exist, are best seen as independent, or as a species of some other ontological genus. But this is not intended to rule out the possibility that there might be ontological disputes where the existence of the entities in question is under debate. In the case of higherorder entities, like classes, numbers, etc., the adoption of a framework will imply the existence of the elements. That is, the existence assumptions of OPC hold for higher-order domains. In such disputes, the question of the existence of the elements of the system is inseparable from the decision to adopt the framework itself. In the case of first-order domains, however, the question of existence is separable, though not necessarily separated in practice from the decision to adopt the framework for the entities. In practice, then, pragmatic, ontological, or empirical assumptions (or some combination of such assumptions) may lead to the conflating of the question of existence with the decision to adopt the framework. The understandable practical difficulties involved in separating these issues, however, should not obscure this important possibility: In cases where the assumptions of the disputants do not lead to a shared belief in the existence of entities in the first-order domain in question, there could be agreement concerning the adoption of the framework, but disagreement with respect to whether any entities of the type in question exist. If such a dispute should arise, the existence of the entities in question could, conceivably, be decided on empirical, nonphilosophical grounds. I have, at this point, reconstructed Camap's meta-ontological views so as to provide a complete and internally consistent system. This does not, of course, imply that the system is preferable to that of Quine's. In the next section I will consider what reasons can be given to prefer one or the other of the systems.

4.3 A CRITIQUE OF THE QUINEAN CRITERION OF ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT

Quine's meta-ontological system, and, logical commitment can be interpreted nary concept of ontology, or it can be posal of a new conception of ontology. lows:

in particular, his criterion of ontoeither as an explication of the ordiseen as a recommendation or a proQuine describes his intention as fol-

When I inquire into the ontological commitments of a given doctrine or body of theory, I am merely asking what, according to that theory, there is. I might say in passing, though it is no substantial point of disagreement, that Camap does not much like my terminology here. N o w if he had a better use for this fine old word 'ontology,' I should be inclined to cast about for another word for my o w n meaning. But the fact is, I believe, that he disapproves of my giving meaning to a word which belongs to traditional

88 metaphysics and should therefore be meaningless. Now my ethics of terminology demand, on occasion, the avoidance of a word for given purposes when the word has been pre-empted in a prior meaning; meaningless words, however, are precisely the words which I feel freest to specify meanings for. But actually my adoption of the word 'ontology' for the purpose described is not as arbitrary as I make it sound. Though no champion of traditional metaphysics, I suspect that the sense in which I use this crusty old word has been nuclear to its usage all along.

Thus, Quine feels that he is taking liberties with the traditional concept without failing to capture what is "nuclear" to the traditional use of the term. My strategy will be to consider Quine's criterion under both interpretations. First, I will argue that the Quinean criterion is inadequate as an explication of the traditional concept. Second, I will discuss Quine's meta-ontological system as a proposal, comparing its efficacy with the revised Carnapian system outlined in section 4.2. If Quine's criterion for ontological commitment is to be taken as a proposed explication of the concept of ontology, it may be stated as follows: (1) A theory, T, is ontologically committed to things of type F if and only if the list of sentences which makes up T, when closed under logical implication, contains the sentence '(Ex)Fx'. 13 This statement I will abbreviate as: (2) O C F = E f

(2) can, then, be considered as the conjunction of: (3) OCF D Ep

and (4) E f d O C f . First, I will argue {contra (4)) that claims of existence have not been considered sufficient for ontological commitment. My argument, here, will be based upon an analysis of the traditional usage of the concept of ontology. I will argue (a) that philosophers do, intuitively, perceive a difference between ontological and non-ontological assertions, (b) I will offer four examples of traditional ontological debates which illustrate the importance of this intuitive difference. And (c) I will argue that Quine's criterion of ontological commitment fails to capture this important difference. In Chapter 3, I noted that Carnap intended to apply the internal-external distinction to only a small subset of existence sentences. Thus, he employed

89 the concept of a universal word to isolate certain utterances as ontological in form (and, hence, susceptible to the internal-external analysis). The intuition which Carnap was attempting to capture can be illustrated by the following list of questions: A.

B.

1. Is there a pencil on the desk? 2. Is Jones having a blue after-image? 3. Is there a prime number larger than one million? 4. Is there a class made up of all the things in this room? 1. Are there any material objects? 2. Are there any sense data? 3. Are there any numbers? 4. Are there any abstract entities?

It is clear that the questions in group A are never considered as ontological questions (though how one answers them might be relevant to an ontological debate), but the questions in group B are often treated as philosophical, ontological questions. The intuitive difference between the two groups of questions is one of generality. In each case, the question in group B is of greater generality than the corresponding question in group A. The task, then, is to explicate this concept of generality. As a first step in proposing such an explication, I offer the following four examples of ontological issues and/or positions: (A) Berkeley is considered to be an ontological immaterialist. The first temptation, in explaining what it is to be an immaterialist, is to say that an ontological immaterialist is one who believes that we need only recognize immaterial entities, and, hence, an immaterialist is a philosopher who denies that physical objects exist. But if you ask an immaterialist whether there are tables, trees, shoes, etc., he will certainly reply that there are. Furthermore, he will undoubtedly say that these sorts of objects can be described as physical objects, if for example, we wish to distinguish them from words or numbers, etc. Berkeley claimed to speak with the vulgar and to think with the learned, and no one speaking with the vulgar will deny that, in one sense, physical objects exist. 14 The force, rather, of Berkeley's position is the insistence that physical objects are just a kind of perceptions. Physical objects are collections of those sensations which are not imaginary, hallucinatory, dreamed, etc. Thus, Berkeley, as an immaterialist, need not and does not eliminate the possibility of speaking about physical objects. Rather, he insists that they can be interpreted as "veridical collections of sensations." Thus, Berkeley's immaterialism is not properly characterized as a denial of the existence of physical objects. (B) As a second example, consider the program of logicism. The logicist might be characterized as attempting to avoid ontological commitment to

90 numbers. But, surely, the logicist is not attempting to deprive the mathematician of the use of numbers. On the contrary, he hopes to allow the mathematician more freedom in making use of them. How, then, are we to characterize the attempt to reduce numbers to classes? Again, we have a case of a negative ontological position in which the existence of no entities is denied. Rather, one kind of entities is subsumed under another kind of classes; the logicist is perfectly content to talk about the existence of prime numbers, real numbers, and even higher orders of infinities of numbers. (C) Consider the contemporary identity theorist as a third negative ontological position. In claiming that the mind and the body are identical, the identity theorist is not denying the existence of either minds or bodies. Surely, the identity theorist need not forfeit talk about mental entities, mental events, etc. insofar as such things are useful in describing human beings and their behavior. The identity theorist is only asserting that minds are modifications of certain kinds of material entities. To have a mind is to have a certain complex organization of one's physical body. Being a mind is just a special case of being a body — and, as long as this identity is affirmed, the identity theorist can continue to make use of the concept of the mental in human description whenever it is useful to do so. Dualism, then, must be seen as a denial that minds are a kind of bodies, or that the former can be reduced to the latter, rather than as an assertion that there are mental entities. The dualist believes this assertion, but so does the materialist or identity theorist, so the acceptance or rejection of this assertion can hardly characterize the difference between the dualist and the identity theorist. (D) Consider, finally, the problem of universals. Compare, first, the Platonic realist with the conceptualist. The conceptualist does not deny that universals exist. Rather, he asserts that universals are simply concepts of a certain type. Thus, universals are reducible to mental entities. Perhaps, however, it may be thought that the nominalist provides a counterexample to the general pattern of (l)-(3). Doesn't the nominalist deny the existence of universals? Not really — he only denies that universals are anything over and above the uses of general terms. Again, it turns out that the negative and the positive ontological positions do not differ on assertions of existence, but on the independence of the types of entities asserted to exist. It would be difficult to find a more venerable list of ontological problems than (A)-(D). But, it turns out, the dispute in these problems is not primarily a dispute concerning what assertions of existence to count as true. Rather, the dispute concerns the interpretation of sentences of existence. The real issue is whether entities, admitted on all hands to exist, must be regarded as independent of some other type of entities. What is meant by independence in this context? Very roughly, it is the concept of generality, or class inclusion. A-type objects are independent of B-type objects just in case there are A-type objects which cannot be construed as B-type objects of some sort

91 or other. Independence is closely tied to generality. Ontological disputes appear, from the examples considered, to be disputes about which entities are to be considered the basic, most general constituents of the universe. Classes of things which have ontological status include other classes of things, but are not, themselves, included in any more general classes. These traditional ontological debates are, then, all reductionistic in nature. Can numbers be reduced to classes? Can universals be reduced to ideas or to general words, etc.? I am suggesting, then, that the concept of ontological reducibility can be explicated quite straightforwardly. Objects of type A are reducible to objects of type B if A-objects can be considered to be special cases of B-objects. Or, in other words, A-objects are reducible to B-objects if the class of B-objects includes all A-objects plus some other objects. One must establish that the entities in question are not simply special cases of some other type of entity. The concept of generality is once more seen to be crucial. It was seen that the difference between "There is a pencil on the desk" and "There are physical objects" could best be expressed in terms of generality. Now it appears that all of these positive ontological positions share the characteristic of asserting that the type of entities in question are not a subset of some other, more general, class. I now offer the following criterion of generality for class-concepts: A class of objects, Cj, is more general than another class, C2, if and only if '(Ex)C2x' entails '(Ex)Cjx', but not vice versa (where '(Ex)C x' means 'There is at least one entity in the class C '). This criterion suggests that the entities which exist can be organized into some sort of hierarchy. Consider the following chart, which provides an example (I emphasize that this is an example because different ontologists would offer different hierarchies): Level A: Level B: Abstract entities Level C: classes universals

Entities Mental entities Physical entities minds perceptions solids gases

Chart 4-A A positive statement in ontological form can now be characterized as follows: '(Ex) 0x' is a positive ontological assertion if and only if the substituend for ' ' is the class-name of one of the most general classes of entities (where 'general' is defined according to the above criterion of generality, i.e., the most general class of entities refers to level B on the hierarchy). Given this definition, it is possible to define 'ontology' quite simply. On-

92 tology is the activity of asserting, denying, and providing reasons for and against positive ontological statements so understood. This explication suffers from several problems. First, not all class terms make obvious their level of generality. Consider, for example, 'the kind of things of which I am presently thinking' or 'The class of Jones's favorite things'. Second, it seems rather ad hoc to insist that the level of entailments stop at level B — why not say, rather, that the most general question concerns the existence of entities? Third, consider the class of all material objects plus the number 17. This class, according to the criterion, is more general than the class of material objects, but it would be strange to assert that it has more claim to the title ontological than does the class of material objects. Finally, the explication depends in a crucial manner on the concept of entailment. This notion is notoriously imprecise and puzzling as an ordinary language notion. If the concept of entailment is to bear as much weight as the proposed explication places on it, it must, in turn, be explicated. The most likely explication, in terms of emplication by virtue of the rules of language, is equally problematic for ordinary language. The first three of these problems seem closely related. In each case, the problem stems from our ability to form classes simply by constructing phrases which describe groups of things. The troublesome examples are, certainly, legitimate, according to our ordinary language rules for constructing classes: The class of things of which I am thinking, the class of all existent things, the class of all material objects plus the number 17, are all legitimately formed classes. In each case, one must stretch one's imagination to think of a case where it would be useful to refer to any of these classes; but, of course, it does not follow that they are not legitimate classes. The problem, put more generally, is that the explication suggested appeals to the intuition, in conflict with the intuition that classes can be constructed by merely constructing a phrase, that there are natural kinds. A natural kind of entities is a category of things which share some central, defining feature which sets that kind off from all other kinds. In other words, the explication depends upon the concept of a category. Philosophers have expended much effort attempting to provide the set of categories which are encountered in ordinary discourse.15 This is, certainly, no simple task. Nor, is it obvious that the task is possible at all. It is certainly possible that ordinary language contains no simple, selfconsistent set of categorizations corresponding to the intuitive notion of natural kinds. Because of this, it seems more fruitful to avoid this problem by moving to a canonical language intended to draw the distinction perspicuously. Note that such a move would, likewise, avoid the final problem in that the entailment relation, given a formal language, can be understood in terms of the semantic rules for using the predicate expressions. In the next section, I will provide a means of formalizing this intuitive notion. If one ignores, for the moment, the problems just raised, the explication

93 provided does, it seems, provide a reasonable explication of the traditional concept of substance. A substance does not depend upon anything else. This independence is not just causal independence. The hierarchy proposed suggests that the type of independence in question is one of inclusion or generality. Existing things which are not substances are only special cases of other classes of things. To be a special case of a more general kind is to be a member of a further differentiated class. A class is further differentiated when more properties are specified, thereby excluding more and more entities. A substance, on the other hand, is completely undifferentiated. It is that in which the properties inhere. This explication seems to do justice to two of the concepts of substance which held sway during the rationalistic period. Descartes, for example, emphasized independence as the crucial mark of substance — a substance is that which depends upon nothing else for its existence. From the emphasis Descartes placed on conceivability of separate existence as the mark of independence (two kinds of entities are independent if it is possible to conceive of the one existing without the other), it is clear that he was not suggesting causal independence, but logical independence. 1 ^ The above explication also does justice to the Leibnizian conception of substance as that which is modified by properties and predicates. A substance is that which is modified, but never, in turn, modifies anything else. That is, the hierarchy represents, in a sense, the progressive differentiation of a substance. Physical entity is the most general class, in the sense that less attributes are specified of it than are specified of the classes coming lower on the hierarchy. The class of solids is the class of physical entities which are further differentiated by virtue of their having the property of solidity. The most general classes, substances, are those classes which are, in the process of attribute assignment, to be further and further modified or differentiated. However, by virtue of their being most general and independent, they are not, in turn, further differentiated subclasses of more general classes. Thus, the traditional conception of ontology is based upon the concept of independence and generality. The search for ontological constituents is the search for basic types of things — basic by virtue of the fact that they are not specific subclasses of more general classes. Generality can be judged according to entailments, and it is possible to distinguish ontological claims as claims concerning the independence (i.e. ultimate generality) of a class of things. This intuitive notion is clear, but not precise, as it depends upon the ordinary language concepts of natural kinds and entailment, both of which are imprecise. In the next section, I will, following Carnap, develop a formalization of this intuitive notion. At this point, however, I will use the examples cited and the notion of ontology derived from them in its intuitive form in order to argue that Quine's criterion of ontological commitment fails as an explication of the traditional notion of ontology. As I have said, it would be difficult to find a more

94 venerable list of ontological problems than (A)-(D). These disputes, however, do not primarily concern existence, but rather, independence in the sense explicated above. For convenience, I will speak of this property of independence as ontological priority, and will say that a class of entities which has this property is ontologically prior to other classes. Ontologically prior classes, then, are classes of entities which include other, less general classes, but are not themselves included in any more general class. In response to my insistence that (A)-(D) are not primarily concerned with existence, it might be objected that in the context of an ontological dispute one interprets universals or minds or numbers, etc. as "existent, ontologically independent entities which are...." Hence, the objection goes, denials of independence would be denials of existence in the sense intended. Now, in a sense, this objection makes a quite correct point. The Platonist will say that the conceptualist denies the existence of universals, and, likewise for all of the positive ontologist's descriptions of their negative opponents' positions. Noting this, however, does not avoid the counterexample to (4), because the question whether an individual will utter a sentence is quite distinct from the question of what interpretation the uttered sentence is to be given. We have seen that ontologists adopting negative positions as well as those adopting positive ones will assert, in ordinary discourse, the sentence in question. If the two positions are to be distinguished in ordinary discourse, the distinction must lie in the interpretation given to the assertion. It is a merit of the revised Carnapian criterion that it relies upon the semantic inclusion relations of the language, rather than on what theoretical assertions are made. This objection, though, clarifies why Quine's criterion has initial plausibility. The ontologist who holds a positive ontological position will often state his opponent's position as the denial of an existence claim. For example, he considers his opponent to be asserting 'There are no F's'. And using his (i.e. the positive ontologist's) concept of F-hood, he is quite right. His concept of F-hood does include independence. The assertion of the positive ontologist, however, is not really contradictory of the negative ontologist's denial. They use 'F' differently, as would be expected if I am correct in claiming that the dispute is mainly one concerning interpretation, not truth. The crucial ontological difference between the two disputants is to be found not in whether a sentence of the form 'There are F's' is asserted, but in whether independence is implied in the utterance. Even Quine has noted that ontologists who hold negative positions do not, ordinarily, deny the existence of the entities in question. He says: But there is also a curious difference between common-sense existence statements and philosophical ones that needs to be played up, and it is one that can be appreciated already tight in among the rabbits. For let us reflect that a theory might accommodate all rabbit data and yet admit as values of its variables no rabbits or other bodies but only qualities, times, and places. The adherents of that theory, or immaterialists, would have a

95 sentence which, as a whole, had the same stimulus meaning as our sentence "There is a rabbit in the yard"; yet in the quantiflcational sense of the words they would have to deny that there is a rabbit in the yard or anywhere else. Here, then, prima facie, are two senses of existence of rabbits, a common sense and a philosophical sense.... Shall wc say: so much the worse for a quantificational version of existence? Hardly; we already found this version trivial but undebatable. Are there then two senses of existence? Only in a derivative way. I"or us common men who believe in bodies and prime numbers, the sentences "There is a rabbit in the yard" and "There are prime numbers between 10 and 2 0 " are free from doubletalk. Quantification docs them justice. When we come to the irnmaterialist, and we tell him there is a rabbit in the yard, he will know better than to demur on account of his theory; he will acquiesce on account of a known holophrastic relation of stimulus synonymy between our sentence and some sentence geared to his different universe. In practice he will even stoop to our idiom himself, both to facilitate communication and because of speech habits lingering from his own benighted youth. This he will do when the theoretical question is not at issue, just as we speak of the sun as rising. Insofar we may say, I grant, that there are for him two senses of existence; but there is no confusion, and the theoretical use is rather to be respected as literal and basic than deplored as a philosophical d i s o r d e r . 17

Quine, then, admits that the immaterialist will not give up talk of rabbits in ordinary speech, but he must "in the quantificational sense of the words deny that there is a rabbit in the yard or anywhere else." Thus Quine attempts to avoid the proposed counterexamples to (4) by distinguishing between ordinary claims of existence and a "literal and basic" sense of such claims. It remains true, however, that Quine is, because of his insistence upon one-sorted quantification and a univocal existential quantifier, cut off from the most natural explanation of the immaterialist's situation. It might be said that this is quibbling; Quine can, it might be said, account for the difference between ontological and ordinary existence claims. As Quine concludes, "Insofar we may say, I grant, that there are for [the immaterialist] two senses of existence; but there is no confusion, and the theoretical use is rather to be respected as literal and basic than deplored as a philosophical disorder." It may be that there is no confusion. But neither is there any clarification. How are we to distinguish the literal and basic locutions from the others? Quine would answer that we invite the immaterialist to translate his sentences into the canonical notation, and see whether he quantifies over material objects or not. This is no explanation of the difference, however — it is only pushing the problem back one level. Suppose we now ask, according to what criterion or guide does the immaterialist ontologist decide which of his assertions to treat as literal and basic for quantificational purposes? If there is an answer, it would be that he decides, on the basis of his intuitive notion of ontological independence, that his ontological commitments are to those entities which are not special cases of one of the more general types of things. Quine's criterion, because it uses a one-sorted logic with no distinction between the most general categories of entities and other classes of things, pro-

96 vides no account or explanation of what is distinctive in ontological positions. It might be said that Quine's criterion is only a criterion of existential commitment, and has nothing to do with the traditional concept of ontology. Both the revised criterion and Quine's criterion can only be applied to canonical languages. Hence, the ontologist must, in each case, be invited to translate his utterances into the canonical language. In translating, Quine expects the immaterialist to reduce all of his materialist talk to talk about sensations. Once this is done, Quine's criterion will yield the same commitments as does my criterion. The difference, however, is that Quine gives no explanation of the crucial ontological step and upon what it is based. He provides no account of the very important difference between casual, reducible talk and irreducible assertions. Furthermore, it is this distinction which is crucial for understanding an ontological position. I have noted that irreducibility to any more general type of entities is the mark of a positive ontological position. While Quine assumes the immaterialist will make the proper translations into the canonical notation, avoiding commitment to material objects, there is no clear explanation of the basis upon which he makes this translation. The intuition which he uses is the intuition that when he speaks of a rabbit, the sentence in question can be interpreted or treated as talk about collections of sensations. Because the immaterialist believes that rabbits, and material objects generally, can be treated as talk about the more general category of things, sensations, he so translates his materialistic sentences into the precise language, eliminating any implication that material objects are to be given ontological status. My Carnapian criterion, unlike Quine's, contains a formalization of the crucial concept of generality, or independence, and consequently provides a more thorough understanding of the concept of ontology. Thus, Quine's (4) either suffers from crucial counterexamples, or else is qualified by a hidden conception of ontological priority. A single-sorted language cannot, unless it is embellished with some special concepts, provide an explication of ontological priority, because it contains no formalization of general categories. Quine's explication can only draw the crucial distinction between ontological commitments and existential commitments by assuming, covertly, an unexplained distinction between literal and basic entities and entities which are not literal and basic. Any useful explication of the phrase 'literal and basic' would involve some account of ontological priority. So, mere existence cannot be considered sufficient for ontological commitment. It can be said, then, that (4) must be replaced by: (4')

.

Ep & OPp 3 OCp category).

(where 'OPp' = 'F's are an ontologically prior

Now, I will consider (3). If a theory is ontologically committed to a type of entities, does it follow that the theory is committed to the existence of some

97 entities of that type? At first glance, this inference seems plausible. But, with the replacement of (4) with (4'), even (3) becomes questionable. Given a conception of ontological priority, which I have argued is necessary for an explication of ontology, it becomes at least possible for an ontologist to consider some set of objects as ontologically prior (i.e. as irreducible objects defined by a set of characteristics), but deny for empirical or other reasons that any such entities exist. The question would then arise whether commitment involves anything more than mere priority. That is, replacing (4) with (4') demands a conception of ontological priority. If Carnap is followed in treating ontological priority as a question of generality, and if the actual existence of material objects is an empirical question, then, conceptually speaking, being ontologically committed to F's does not entail the existence of F's. In most cases, either philosophical, pragmatic, or empirical assumptions of non-emptiness of a class, F, will precede discussion of the ontological priority of F's, but this is not a necessary connection. Consequently, (3) does not necessarily hold. 1 8 I conclude from these considerations that Quine's criterion of ontological commitment is not an adequate explication of the traditional concept of ontology. Claims of existence for F's are not necessary for ontological priority, even though actual counterexamples are highly unlikely. More importantly, however, Quine's use of a single-sorted language with a univocal existential quantifier affords no distinction between ordinary assertions of existence and ontological commitments, which involve a commitment to ultiniate generality. Quine's failure to clarify the concept of ontology can be seen by his use of the existence of Pegasus as an ontological issue. 19 Pegasus is not a likely candidate for an ultimately general class of entities, and a dispute concerning his existence would not, ordinarily, be considered an ontological dispute. 2 0 Surely, Quine would reject the stringent requirements of similarity of meanings between the explicandum and explicatum upon which I have just been insisting. Thus, perhaps Quine's views on ontology are better seen as recommendations, claiming no adequacy in capturing the ordinary intuitive notion of ontology. If this is the manner in which Quine is to be interpreted, then he must argue that the entire systematic conception of ontology outlined in his answers to questions (l)-(5) (see section 1.1, above) is preferable to the answers given by traditional ontologists and by Carnap. The QuineCarnap debate becomes a debate as to whether the Quinean system or the Carnapian system is the legitimate heir to traditional ontology. The system which is to be favored with legitimacy should be the system which retains all that is important, explanatorily valuable, and generally useful from the traditional model. In the face of the arguments which show the inadequacy of Quine's conception of ontology as an explication of the traditional concept, Quine could react in two ways:

98 (I) He might accept the concept of ontological priority as a useful notion, thus accepting a formal distinction between ontology and non-ontology. He might, also, accept Carnap's many-sorted language as an adequate means of capturing this distinction. He might yet deny that there is any epistemological difference, in kind, between ontological and non-ontological questions. He would then be agreeing with Carnap on question (2) and accepting my claim that he has, really, only one argument (that based on his objections to the analytic-synthetic distinction) against Carnap's internal-external distinction. He might claim that the difference between ontological utterances and nonontological ones is merely a difference in degree not in kind. This may, indeed, be a consistent position. But it may also grant too much. If there is an actual distinction between ontology and science, the temptation immediately arises to give some account of what difference the distinction makes. How can Quine resist the temptation to describe ontological uses of a sentence as differing from ordinary uses of one by treating the ontological ones as interpretive or conceptual and the ordinary ones as empirical? It is, then, unclear whether Quine can admit a distinction without a difference; and, if he admits a difference, it is unclear whether he can explain what this difference is unless it is epistemological in nature. What is at issue, here, is whether Quine can explain what is meant by theoretical and basic without appeal to such concepts as definitional or conceptual reducibility or some other concept which is denied him by his denial of analyticity. (II) Or, Quine might admit that there traditionally has been a distinction between ontology and non-ontology, but deny that such a distinction is any longer useful. That is, he could, on the basis of the epistemological objection, deny that any distinction between ontology and science is worthy of a place in his new system. This would be tantamount to denying any difference between my questions (2) and (5). This may very well be Quine's position. If it is, the effect would be to challenge Carnap and the traditional ontologists on totally systematic grounds. The debate would then concern whether the traditional dichotomy between ontology and non-ontology has explanatory value. The systems of Carnap and traditional ontologists alike have the prima facie advantage, mentioned in section 3.4 of providing a clear, natural account of the ambiguity involved in ordinary language utterances in ontological form. Given this, it must be admitted that these systems have a prima facie advantage in explanatory value — they provide an account of the perceived differences between ordinary and philosophical discourse. If the Quinean, naturalistic system is to be chosen over either the traditional, essentialistic model or the Carnapian system, some explanation of these perceived differences must be made available to the Quinean system. The question of which system has, ultimately, the most explanatory value is at the heart of Quine's epistemological objection. This objection will be addressed more fully in Chapter 5.

99 Whether Quine adopts position I or position II, one point is quite clear. The plausibility of Quine's system depends upon the emergence of some account of the relationship between ordinary an- philosophical discourse. I have argued that the account so far offered by Quine is inadequate — it provides no illumination of the difference between ontological commitment to a kind of entities and ordinary, everyday or scientific commitment to a set of entities. It might be said that, lacking some distinction between categories and subclasses, Quine's criterion is, and must remain, a criterion of existential commitment. Ontological commitment depends not upon existence alone, but also upon what I have called ontological priority. In Chapters 5-7, I will explore the various effects and interrelationships which follow from an acceptance of the distinction between internal and external questions. Chapter 5 concerns the relationship between the internalexternal distinction and the analytic-synthetic distinction - Quine's epistemological objection. Chapter 6 concerns the epistemological nature of external questions. The final chapter will, by way of summary, survey the various metaphilosophical conclusions which follow from the acceptance of the Carnapian meta-ontological system. Before undertaking an examination of these issues of general philosophical interest, however, it will be necessary to attend to important technical details. In my criticism of Quine, I noted and discussed the intuitive concept of generality. I had already explained, in Chapter 3, that this concept is presupposed by the internal-external distinction. Before continuing with the argument of the book, I will present, in formally precise terms, definitions of the central concepts of the Carnapian system.

4.4 FORMAL DEFINITIONS

The assumptions and definitions involved in the system of internal and external questions are as follows: First, there are two assumptions about the nature of the most perspicuous language for ontology. Second, there are definitions of six terms: (1) 'existence utterance', (2) 'universal word', (3) 'utterance in ontological form', (4) 'internal utterance', (5) 'external utterance', and (6) 'formalizable utterance'. I will discuss each of these assumptions and definitions in turn. Assumption (A): The regimented language used in ontological contexts is to be a many-sorted language. As was mentioned above, Carnap believed that ontological issues could be distinguished from other issues by use of a many-sorted language. The variables and the constants of the language will all be indexed such that a sen-

100 tence will be well formed only if the variables and constants contained in the sentence agree in index with the predicate expression. Suppose, for example, that a given theory, T j , has primitive expressions for referring to material objects, to space-time points, and to numbers. The domain may then be subdivided into three parts as follows: D^ = the class of all material objects, ...} D 2 = the class of all space-time points, { , < x 2 , y 2 , w 2 > ...} D 3 = the class of integers, {x 3 , y 3 , z 3 ...} All of the constants, then, are indexed by superscript according to the domain of the object denoted by them. Likewise, the variables will be superscripted: ( x 1 ) and (Ex 1 ) for D 1 , ( x 2 ) and (Ex 2 ) for D 2 , and ( x 3 ) and (Ex 3 ) for D 3 . There are predicate constants, P 1 , Q 1 , R 1 ; P 2 , Q 2 , R 2 ; and P 3 , Q 3 , R 3 for each of the domains respectively. Atomic sentences will be well formed only if all variables, constants, and predicates have the same superscript. In addition to this apparatus, there will be logical axioms and rules for each domain of entities, plus particular axioms and rules which apply only to entities of the respective domains. It is then possible to introduce predicates and P 3 which are true of all and only the members of the domains for which they are indexed. These predicates will be interpreted, respectively, as "is a material object", "is a space-time point", and "is a number". As was seen above, Carnap referred to such predicates as Allwdrter or universal words. This framework allows us to distinguish, then, three natural kinds — material objects, space-time points, and numbers. Now, to suppose one were, in the metalanguage, to propose that T j be replaced with T2 which is identical to T j except that D* is subdivided into two separate domains, D l a and D ^ . Dla is to contain all physical objects excluding human bodies. Human bodies (persons) are to be members o f D l b . The question, then, whether persons are to be a distinct category of existents (whether T j or T2 is to be accepted) is an ontological issue. Similar systems could be set up analogously to formalize other ontological issues. Because constructed languages are precise in their construction, the various difficulties attendant upon the intuitive explication of the concept of ontology do not arise here. Each expression of the language indicates the type of entity it refers to, ranges over, or is true of. Any expression referring to all existent entities will be ill formed. No class may be formed which combines entities from the various domains, and the entailment relations between predicates can be specified in the semantic interpretation of the language. By use of a many-sorted language, then, it is possible to make precise the intuitive notion of ontology. Ontological decisions are decisions concerning which entities are to be segregated into separate domains with distinct predicate expressions.

101 Since this apparatus is somewhat cumbersome, it might be asked whether it is eliminable. Did Carnap choose many-sortedness as one possibility among others, or is it essential to a formal distinction between ontology and science? Many-sortedness is not essential, as the distinction can be drawn within a onesorted language. Consider a one-sorted language where predications which are "inapplicable" (i.e., ruled out by restrictions against combining differently indexed expressions) in the above-described many-sorted language are considered necessarily false. Thus, translations of sentences like "Caesar is prime" and "The number seven is three feet tall" will be considered necessarily false, rather than ill formed. Now, these necessarily false sentences differ from other sorts of necessarily false sentences by virtue of containing no formal contradiction, such as would occur in 'q . (p.~p)', and no contradictory predicates like "is a round square". In other words, the predications in question involve predicates which are sometimes true (when they are predicated of the appropriate entities) and sometimes necessarily false. It is possible, then, to define categories within the domain as follows: Two entities, x and y, will be said to be of different categories on language L, if there is one predicate, P, in L, such that P is necessarily false of x and true of y. On this basis, it is possible to separate the entities in the unitary domain into categories, and to introduce predicates analogous to those Carnap called universal words. Ontological issues, then, will be ones concerning which predicates are to be considered universal words. It appears, then, that given the notion of necessarily true predications, it is possible to distinguish ontological from non-ontological issues even in a one-sorted language. 21 Even though many-sortedness is not essential to the distinction between ontological and non-ontological questions, it is a useful and perspicuous means to explicate that distinction. In this book, I have used many-sortedness as a means to draw the distinction, and have taken the controversy as to whether ontology is distinguishable from non-ontology to be formalized by the choice of whether the most perspicuous language for ontology is to be a MPC or a one-sorted language such as OPC. Thus, if Quine insists that ontology and non-ontology are indistinguishable, he could be seen as arguing that a one-sorted language is the most perspicuous language for ontology. Even though many-sortedness is not essential to the distinction in question, it is sufficient to draw the distinction, arid it will be convenient to treat the choice between MPC and OPC as a formal analogue of the opposed Carnapian and Quinean positions. Assumption (B): The regimented language used in ontological contexts is to embody both an object language and a metalanguage, and object language expressions are to be sharply and easily distinguishable, syntactically, from metalanguage expressions.

102 The language adopted, then, will be composed, first, of a metalanguage, say English. English discourse then will be used to introduce and interpret a regimented, formal language or languages as (the) object language(s). The expressions of this (these) latter subpart(s) of the language will be readily recognizable by virtue of their syntactic form. For ease of reference, I will label the metalanguage L^j, and the regimented subpart, Lq. (Note that LJ^ includes LQ as a subpart. I will sometimes make references to the metalanguage minus the object language as the subpart of L^J excluding LQ.) Given assumptions (A) and (B), it is possible to begin the network of definitions necessary to delineate the Camapian system. The first definition is a preliminary one. It is necessary to define 'existential sentence' in order to indicate the general type of sentences with which Carnap is concerned. For the sake of simplicity, all of the proposed definitions will concern only atomic sentences. These definitions can be extended in obvious ways to cover molecular sentences if necessary. Definition (1): An ordinary language utterance is to be considered an existential utterance if its proper translation into LJ^J is either: (a) a well formed atomic formula in LQ which has the form: '(Ev n }0' (where 'v n ' is a variable free in ' 0 ' and 'n' is a subscript identifying the style of variable involved), or (b) in the subpart of Lj^ exclusive of LQ, and asserts of LQ that a schema of the form described in (a) is a well formed formula in L Q , or (c) some atomic sentence which logically implies a sentence included in either (a) or (b). An ordinary language utterance, then, can be an existential assertion in two quite diverse ways. The diversity is necessary because Carnap is concerned to explicate an ambiguity. The use of translation as a medium, so to speak, in the definition is necessitated because the ambiguity between internal and external sentences occurs in ordinary discourse, but is resolved in a properly regimented language of logical syntax. I will speak, then, of utterances meaning ordinary language utterances, and the proper translation of a given ordinary language utterance meaning a sentence in the language Ljy, which is the proper translation of the ordinary language utterance. Some readers may be troubled by my free use of the terms 'translation' and 'proper translation'. All that is necessary for my purposes is an appeal to the speaker to transcribe his ordinary language utterance into the regimented language. When a speaker utters some sentence which is ambiguous in ordinary language, he is invited to translate the utterance into the system Ljyj. If he refuses, discussion ends. If, however, he adopts one of the available alternatives as close enough to his original intention, then the discussion continues, taking his word as legitimatizing the translation. 22

103 At this point, then, a class of ordinary language utterances has been isolated as having existential import, by virtue of the nature of their proper translations. As was discussed at length in Chapter 3 and in the present chapter, however, Carnap was not concerned with all members of the class of existential utterances. Many less general existential utterances are susceptible of only internal interpretation. For example, the sentences "There is a pencil on my desk" and "There is sulphur in this compound" are never intended as external utterances. It is necessary, then, to define a subclass of the class of existential utterances which have ontological form. Roughly speaking, an utterance has ontological form if it is susceptible of external as well as internal interpretation. Those existential sentences which are susceptible of both of these interpretations are characterized by Carnap as those sentences which contain a universal word. A universal word is a word in ordinary discourse which has, as its regimented translation, a universal predicate. Following Carnap, 'universal predicate' will be defined as follows: Definition (2): A predicate in Lj^, P1, is a universal predicate if and only if: for any predicate of the same genus as P1, call it Q1, '(v 1 )? 1 ^ 1 )' is true if and only if '(v'XQWv ~Qi(vi))'.23 A universal predicate, then, is that predicate which is trivially true of every member of the genus in question. This definition, obviously, presupposes assumption A. The language Lj^ will have (a) many-sorted object language(s); and there will be some predicate which is true of every member of the genus, trivially (i.e. simply by virtue of their being members of the genus). Carnap suggested that troublesome (ambiguous and misleading) utterances in the material mode of speech can be characterized by their use of universal words. Thus, building on definition (2), it is possible to define the class of utterances which are susceptible of both internal and external interpretations. Such utterances will be said to have ontological form which will be defined as follows: Definition (3): An utterance is, by definition, in ontological form if and only if: (a) it is an existential utterance, and (b) ' 0 ' as it is either used or mentioned in the translation of the utterance contains a universal predicate, or (c) there is some sentence in Lp^ which is logically equivalent to the translation of the utterance which uses or mentions a universal predicate. Leaving aside, for the moment, the complexity involved if the translation chosen is only logically equivalent to some sentence which contains a uni-

104 versal predicate, an ordinary language utterance can be identified as being in ontological form if it is, first, an existential sentence; and, second, if it contains a universal word. One must be, in philosophical discourse, constantly on the lookout for such sentences, because they are susceptible of both internal and external interpretations, and can, as a result, lead to serious misunderstandings. Examples of such sentences would be: "There are material objects," "There are classes," etc. Whenever such utterances (or variants on them, like "Material objects exist," etc.) are encountered, one must take care to avoid confusions which arise in the material mode of speech. The surest, though not always the most convenient, manner to avoid these confusions is to translate, immediately, the utterances into the regimented languages of logical syntax. I have chosen, here, to follow Carnap's procedure in defining, first, the concept of a universal word, and then using this to define the class of atomic sentences in ontological form. Given my discussion of ontological priority, above, and the criterion suggested there based upon entailments, it would have been equally possible to have completed these definitions by use of the criterion of generality for class-concepts and the resulting definition of 'positive ontological assertion' (see above, section 4.3). These two alternatives are very similar, and I have presented both in the hope that each will illuminate the other. Note that both possibilities depend upon the use of a many-sorted language including a well worked out semantics which (i) makes clear the syntactical genus of each constant, variable, and predicate expression; and (ii) has a semantics which clearly indicates the inclusion relations among the predicates within the various genera. Given these features, plus (iii) suitable restrictions against class-formations which cut across the genera boundaries created by the variable styles, the counterexamples suggested above (section 4.3) can be avoided. That is, such class descriptions as 'the class of things of which I am thinking' are ruled out by (i). (iii) rules out the formation of classes with such descriptions as 'the class of all material objects plus the number 17' and also the formation of a class consisting of all entities. Finally, (ii) allows a clear and precise concept of entailment for object language sentences containing class terms. Thus, the various objections to the ordinary language concept of a natural kind or category are avoided, and precise conceptions of the concepts of a universal word and of an ontologically prior class can be formed for LQ. Given all of these assumptions and definitions, it is, at last, possible to define the internal-external distinction. Note, first, that there is no problem with 'inteirnal', itself. Internal utterances are simply sentences which are intended as object language sentences: Definition (4): An utterance is an internal utterance if and only if its proper translation into LJYJ is a sentence in LQ.

105 This trivial definition is not, however, of much interest in the philosophical contexts where the important dichotomy is between internal and external existence utterances in ontological form. 'External' is defined as follows: Definition (5): An utterance is external if and only if its translation into L^j is: (a) an existential sentence, (b) in ontological form, and (c) is not internal. An external utterance must be intended as an existential sentence and it must be in ontological form. If these preconditions are fulfilled, then the sentence is susceptible of both internal and external interpretation. If, after translation, it is learned that the utterance was not intended as a sentence within the object language, then it is an external utterance. Yet one more definition is necessary, however, as it was pointed out in Chapter 2 that Carnap saw a crucial distinction, within the class of external questions, between those which are properly formulated and those which are not. The class of external utterances, as defined in definition 5, contains utterances which are susceptible of a proper interpretation as recommendations as to what genera should be embodied in a given language, and it also includes "metaphysical" utterances. These latter utterances are deficient in that the speaker is attempting to make pre-linguistic, absolute claims about the world. Because these claims are neither made within any particular framework, nor about the suitability of any particular framework for a given task, they raise unanswerable questions. Such questions, when formulated absolutely, are unanswerable because they ignore the relativity of questions about linguistic structure to particular human purposes. It may be that such questions are, according to Carnap, meaningless, because unverifiable. The verifiability criterion, however, plays no role in these definitions. The internalexternal distinction embodies Carnap's acceptance of the hierarchical view of philosophy — all truly ontological questions are external (i.e. metatheoretical) in nature. 24 This acceptance is reflected in assumption B. The internalexternal distinction is an application of the object language metalanguage distinction to philosophical problems. If this hierarchical view is combined with Carnap's principle of tolerance, or conventionalism, the result is a critique of traditional ontology. Traditional ontologists claimed to be making discoveries about the nature of the world. Carnap's system, combining as it does the hierarchical view of philosophy and the principle of tolerance, provides a critique of such claims. Such claims are underdetermined by the data available; and, they can be susceptible of solution only if they are relativized to a clearly stated human purpose. All of these points have been discussed, at length, in Chapter 2. The pur-

106 pose, here, is to present formal definitions of the necessary Carnapian concepts. There must be some criterion or definition which separates those utterances which are susceptible of proper formulation as external questions from those which are not. Carnap was quite clear in saying that it would be too stringent a requirement to expect that all philosophical discourse proceed, at all times, in exactly proper form. Rather, he only insisted that, under demand, it must be possible for any utterance to be restated in proper form. In this manner, the simplicity, brevity, and intuitive flow of a philosophical conversation can be retained — but, whenever confusions and unclarities result, it should always be possible to remove them by translation into the formal mode. 2 5 It is necessary, then, to provide a criterion to separate utterances into those which are properly formulable and those which are not. The formalizability criterion is as follows: Definition (6): An ordinary language utterance or sentence token, S t 0 , is formalizable if and only if there is some translation in Lfyj exclusive of LQ, call it SJYF, such that S ^ is: (a) a metalanguage sentence recommending a certain form for the rules of L Q , and (b) the preferred (by the utterer of the sentence-token) translation of gto 26 This completes the formal presentation of the concepts used in the Carnapian system. The two crucial assumptions behind these definitions are the assumption A, of a many-sorted language as a means to formalize the concept of an ontological category or universal word; and B, that the object languagemetalanguage distinction is a useful distinction in philosophy. The object language-metalanguage distinction is, essentially, the embodiment in the system of the hierarchical view of philosophy. I believe these two notions are sufficient for the definitions of Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. The use of a many-sorted language allows a distinction of existential sentences in ontological form from those which are not; and, the distinction between an object language and a metalanguage allows a distinction between questions asked or answered within a framework as opposed to those asked outside any particular framework. 2 7 Once 'external' is defined in these terms, it is then possible to introduce Carnap's belief in tolerance or conventionalism. This belief, when it supplements the internal-external distinction, provides a critique of traditional, absolutistic metaphysics. These elements — the belief in a distinction between ontology and non-ontology, the hierarchical view of philosophy, and conventionalism — are the buildingblocks of the Carnapian system. Throughout this book I have argued that these elements are sufficient to imply most of Carnap's metaphilosophical

107

positions. Appeals to verificationism can be intelligible only if they are interpreted as one facet of the systematic framework here developed.

NOTES 1 Camap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," p. 214n. Carnap quotes from Quine, "Notes on Existence and Necessity "Journal of Philosophy, XL (1943), 113-127. 2 Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," p. 214. 3 Quine, From A Logical Point of View, p. 12. 4 Although I have suggested why these are equivalent statements, it might be helpful to give a more formal proof of their equivalence. To prove (l)-(3) equivalent, it suffices to show that (1) entails (2), (2) entails (3), and (3) entails (1). (1) entails (2): (1) asserts that the acceptance by a person of the rules of quantification for a type of entities commits that person to there being at least one entity of that category. In order for this to be true, each subset of the domain which has a separate style of variables must be non-empty; in which case '(Ex m ) ( F x m v ~ F x m ) ' will be a valid formula for every predicate, F (where F is applicable to, i.e. either true or false of, entities ranged over by variables with subscript'm'). Thus, there is some entity, such that it either has, or lacks all predicates applicable to the members of the domain of m-type entities. (2) entails (3): Assume that ' ( E x m ) ( F x m v ~ F x m ) ' is a theorem, on the Carnapian system, for each style of variables. Take '(Ex m ) G x m ' to be a formula of arbitrary variable style, where 'G' is the universal predicate for variables of style s m . Since ' ( E x m ) ( F x m v ~ F x m ) ' is a theorem, there is one object which falls within the range of the style of variables with subscript'm'. Thus, by existential generalization, ' ( E x m ) G x m ' is true. Since '(Ex m ) G x m ' was chosen with arbitrary variable style, the proof can be repeated for any style, x j x n , of variables. Hence, internal statements in ontological form follow from '(Ex m ) ( F x m v ~ F x m ) ' a logical truth, and are, themselves, analytic. (3) entails (1): Take ' ( E x m ) G x m ) ' (where 'm' is the subscript for any arbitrary variable style, and 'G' is the universal predicate for that style of variable) to be a statement in ontological form on the Carnapian system. Assume: ' ( E x m ) G x m ' is analytic. Therefore, the fact that a person accepts the rules of quantification for variables of a subscript'm' entails that he is committed to at least one entity which is within the range of those variables because, by existential instantiation, ' G a m ' is true. a m is an entity which is within the range of variables with the subscript ' m \ 5 See, for example, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," pp. 210 and 213, where Carnap discusses the acceptance of propositions and space-time points, respectively. 6 Carnap, Logical Syntax, p. 140. 7 Carnap, "Replies and Systematic Expositions," p. 871. 8 Personal communication from Carnap to me, June, 1970. 9 UFL has arisen in response to Henry Leonard's essay, "The Logic of Existence," Philosophical Studies, VII (June, 1956), 49-64, and his presidential address given before the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1964. The address was published in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1964, 2551. 10 Where 'A(x)' is a well formed formula in which 'x' possibly occurs free, and where 'Ax(y)' is the result of replacing each free occurrence of 'x' with 'y* in 'A(x)', provided no free occurrence of 'x' is in a well formed part of 'A(x)' of the form '(y)B'. 11 Robert K. Meyer and Karel Lambert, "Universally Free Logic and Standard Quanti-

108 fication Theory," Journal of Symbolic Logic, XXXII (March, 1968), p. 8. 'E!x' is to be read as 'x exists'. 12 Quine, The Ways of Paradox, pp. 126-127. 13 Here, I ignore a number of usual objections to Quine's criterion (such as its failure to achieve extensionality) in order to consider a new, and, I think, more basic deficiency. 14 George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, section 51. 15 Sec, for example, Gilbert Ryle, "Categories," in Logic and Language: Second Series, ed. by Antony Flew (Oxford University Press, 1955) and Fred Sommers, "Types and Ontology," Philosophical Review, LXXII (1963), 327-363. For a quite different approach, also see Jerrold J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 224-239. 16 See, for example, Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy, Principles LI-LV. 17 Quine, Ontological Relativity, pp. 98-99. 18 The argument, here, has been developed quite persuasively by logicians advocating UFL. See, for example, Leonard, "Essences, Attributes, and Predicates," p. 381. Leonard argued that, even for one-sorted languages, it is counter-intuitive to treat the ontological claim that at ieast one entity exists as a logical truth. This argument is even more persuasive in this context where (a) the purpose is to construct an ontologically perspicuous language, and (b) a many-sorted language is substituted for a one-sorted language. The existence assumptions involved in MPC are much stronger than in OPC, as it is assumed, on MPC, that there are entities in each of the general categories of existents. 19 Quine, From A Logical Point of View, pp. 7-8. 20 See G.J. Wainock, "Metaphysics in Logic," in Essays in Conceptual Analysis, ed. by Antony Flew (London: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 77-78 and Douglas Browning, "Quine and the Ontological Enterprise," The Review of Metaphysics, XXVI (1972), pp. 492, 501503. 21 The suggestion outlined in this paragraph was made by Alvin Plantinga. 22 The situation and the response, here, is analogous to that of Quine with respect to his criterion of ontological commitment. See Word and Object, pp. 242-243. 23 Carnap, Logical Syntax, p. 293. 24 Note that utterances in ontological form can be internal. When this is the case, they merely function to indicate that a given genus is represented in the object language. That is, utterances in ontological form such as "There are material objects" and "There are numbers," when intended internally, merely indicate that the genus in question is non-empty. Carnap suggested, at times, that such utterances are analytic. I have argued that this cannot be true in all cases. I also argued that the truth of such assertions is not always decided ontologically. In at least some cases, empirical considerations will determine the truth of such utterances. If this is the case, they are best not considered truly ontological. Hence, as I use the phrase 'utterances in ontological form', the application of the phrase to an utterance does not imply that the utterance is truly ontological in nature. 25 Carnap, Logical Syntax, pp. 288, 313-314. 26 Definition (6) is the proper form of the definition for the system of definitions developed in this section. Two alternative formulations are possible. Definition (6') An external sentence, S, is formalizable if and only if its translation into LM is a metalanguage sentence. Definition (6") An external sentence type, S ^ , is formalizable if and only if there is some translation into Sjjjf, of S'V, such that Sjjjf is a metalanguage sentence concerning the object language rules of LoDefinitions (6), (6'), and (6") are not to be seen as competing possibilities. Rather, the three should be seen as variant formulations of the same principle, each of which is most useful in certain situations. Formulation (6') is ambiguous. And while this formu-

109 lation is sometimes useful in contexts where the criterion is mentioned, criticized, defended, etc., it is not satisfactory when the criterion is being applied. The criterion is always applied either to a sentence type or to a sentence token (a particular utterance of a sentence type). Definition (6), in keeping with Definitions (1M5), begins with a particular utterance, by a particular person, in a particular situation. In such contexts, the formalizability principle is applied to the utterance, itself, and the crucial factor is the intent of the speaker. If he refuses to accept any translation whereby the utterance is given the force of recommending a given linguistic framework for a given purpose, his utterance is considered unacceptable and not formalizable. Sometimes, however, it is useful to apply the criterion to a sentence type, as in "Is the sentence, 'There are material objects' a meaningful sentence?" In such contexts as this, Definition (6") is relevant. The question, here, is whether there are any circumstances where the sentence type can be meaningfully used. If some formalizable interpretation is found, the sentence-type is judged meaningful. It does not, however, follow from this judgment that each utterance, or sentence token of the sentence type in question, is likewise meaningful. In order to judge the meaningfulness of particular utterances of the sentence-type, it is necessary to consult the intentions of the person uttering the sentence, i.e., it is necessary to apply Definition (6). 27

Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," p. 206.

5. ANALYTICITY AND EXTERNALITY

5.1 QUINE ON ANALYTICITY AND EXTERNALITY

Even though Quine claims to have two objections to Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions, I have argued that the first of these, the category-subclass objection, depends in a crucial manner upon the second objection. Central importance is thus accorded the objection based upon the relationship between the internal-external distinction and the analyticsynthetic distinction. This objection, which I have referred to as Quine's epistemological objection, is stated as follows: [The internal-external distinction] is a distinction which [Carnap] can perfectly well discard compatibly with the philosophical purpose of the essay in question.... The contrast which he wants between those ontological statements and empirical existence statements such as 'There are black swans' is clinched by the distinction of analytic and synthetic. True, there is in these terms no contrast between analytic statements of an ontological kind and other analytic statements of existence such as 'There are prime numbers above a hundred'; but I don't see why he should care about this. 1

In the next paragraph, Quine goes on to say: I have set down my misgivings regarding the distinction between analytic and synthetic in a recent paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and will not retrace those steps here. Let me merely stress the consequence: If there is no proper distinction between analytic and synthetic, then no basis at all remains for the contrast which Carnap urges between ontological statements and empirical statements of existence.2

As an argument, these passages are, to say the least, highly elliptical. It is by no means easy to see the form of the argument which Quine intends. My strategy will be to state, in ascending order of interest and profundity, three arguments that Quine might, possibly, intend. The first and most straightforward argument relating the analytic-synthetic distinction to the internalexternal distinction would argue that the latter distinction can only be drawn by making some crucial use of the former distinction. On this interpretation, it would be claimed that one can only distinguish between internal and ex-

Ill ternal sentences by an appeal to the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences. A second Quinean argument relates analyticity and externality by virtue of their shared dependence upon the notion of a linguistic rule. On this interpretation, Quine would be seen as noting that on some explication of analyticity, analytic sentences are isolated by virtue of their sole dependence upon linguistic rules for their truth. Quine might then argue that any attempt to isolate some set of sentences as external will likewise appeal to the concept of a linguistic rule. The latter distinction would then be vulnerable to any attacks Quine is able to sustain against the explication of analyticity in terms of linguistic rules. A third argument concerns the motivation for the internal-external distinction. Perhaps Quine intends to argue that it is only a reliance upon the analytic synthetic distinction which provides any motivation for the complexity introduced by an internal-external distinction. It will turn out that this argument is, in the end, the real crux of Quine's epistemological objection. I will state and evaluate these three arguments, in turn, in the following three sections of this chapter.

5.2 A DEFINITIONAL LINK BETWEEN EXTERNALITY AND ANALYTICITY?

Are either of the concepts internal or external defined in terms of the concept of analyticity? Apparently Quine believes so. After noting Carnap's internal-external distinction is closely related to the category-subclass distinction, Quine defines 'internal question' as follows: The internal questions comprise the subclass questions and, in addition, the category questions when these are construed as treated within an adopted language as questions having trivially analytic or contradictory answers.3

If Quine's definition faithfully reflected Carnap's distinction, then there would be an obvious link between the two distinctions; the internal-external distinction is drawn in terms of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Quine justifies this inclusion by referring to "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology": What is now the nature of the philosophical question concerning the existence or reality of numbers? To begin with there is the internal question which, together with the affirmative answer, can be formulated in the new terms, say by "There are numbers" or, more explicitly, "There is an n such that n is a number." This statement follows from the analytic statement "five is a number" and is therefore itself analytic/*

Given the detailed discussion in Chapter 4 of whether Carnap believed that all internal utterances in ontological form are analytic, little credence can be

112 given Quine's definition. Even if Carnap, in spite of the textual evidence to the contrary, 5 is taken to believe that choices of linguistic frameworks in all cases determine, analytically, an ontological commitment, it would not follow that this is a definitional characteristic of internal category questions. As can be seen from the definitions stated above (section 4.4), the notions which Carnap used are the distinction between an object language and a metalanguage, and the distinction between an ontological statement and a nonontological statement. After drawing the distinction in these terms, Carnap then pointed out that at least some internal questions in ontological form have analytic answers. In doing so, he was pointing out a characteristic, but not a definitional characteristic, of the class of internal statements in ontological form. Thus, if Quine's objection is simply that the analytic-synthetic distinction is used in drawing the internal-external distinction, he is wrong. Only in Quine's suggested definition is the concept of analyticity used, and this definition is based upon a misinterpretation of Carnap.

5.3 EXTERNALITY AND RULES O F LANGUAGE

Given Quinean assumptions, a somewhat more sophisticated argument can be constructed to link analyticity with externality. To state the argument in a preliminary, informal manner, it can be said that Quine objects to the analytic-synthetic distinction on the grounds that analytic sentences are posited as purely linguistic in nature. Because of his beliefs concerning the nature of science, etc., he does not believe that it is possible to isolate a linguistic and an empirical component in individual sentences: We lately reflected that in general the truth of statements does obviously depend both upon language and upon extralinguistic fact; and we noted that this obvious circumstance carries in its train, not logically, but all too naturally, a feeling that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic and a factual component. The factual component must, if we are empiricists, boil down to a range of confirmatory experiences. In the extreme case where the linguistic component is all that matters, a true statement is analytic. But I hope we are now impressed with how stubbornly t h e distinction between analytic and synthetic has resisted any straightforward drawing.... My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement. Taken collectively, science has its double dependence upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly traceable into the statements of science taken one by one.*>

Like the notion of analyticity, externality depends upon isolating certain sentences as wholly linguistic in nature. External statements, according to Carnap, are proposals concerning new linguistic frameworks or sets of linguistic rules governing a proposed discourse. If Quine objects to the isolation of

113 certain sentences as purely linguistic in order to explicate analyticity, he would be likely to object to isolating external sentences as purely linguistic, as well. I will attempt to make this argument as precise as possible, by making use of the concept of a linguistic rule. Quine's discussion of semantical rules as a possible explication of analyticity will provide a parallel formulation of the argument. 7 1 am suggesting, then, that Quine can be interpreted as objecting to the use of 'rule of language' in the explication of 'external question' just as he objected to the use of the concept semantical rules in the explication of 'analytic'. The move from criticizing the narrower concept 'semantical rule' to the broader concept 'linguistic rule' is necessitated because the notion of externality to a language is explicated in terms of the whole linguistic framework, and linguistic frameworks involve syntactical as well as semantical rules. I do not believe that this broadening affects the substance of the argument. I will, first, make Quine's argument against the use of semantical rules to explicate analyticity into a tight argument. It should, then, be easy to construct a parallel argument against the internal-external distinction. Premise (1): The notion of analyticity is a relation, R ^ , between a set of statements, S, and languages, L. Premise (2): The problem is to make sense of R ^ for variable S and L. Premise (3): There are t w o possibilities with respect to the use of the notion of semantic rules for explicating R ^ : (a) a specification is given, by semantic rule, of all the analytic statements of LQ. (b) there is a specification of the class of the truths of LQ. One can further demarcate the class of truths by saying that the analytic truths of LQ are those truths which are not merely true, but true solely by virtue of the semantic rules of LQ. Premise (4): a) does not help to explicate Ry\, because although it tells us which sentences are analytic in LQ, it does not give us a generalizable notion of analyticity for variable, L. We know which sentences are said to be analytic, but we do not know what it means to say "S is analytic." Premise (5): b) succeeds in explicating R ^ , but only by introducing a new word, 'semantical rule', which is as much in need of explication as 'analytic'. Conclusion: The problem mentioned in premise (2) still remains, even for artificial languages. As justification for the claim (i.e. premise (5)) that the notion of a semantical rule does no good in explicating analyticity, Quine gives the following analogy:

114 It may be instructive to compare the notion of semantical rule with that of postulate. Relative to a given set of postulates, it is easy to say what a postulate is: it is a member of the set. Relative to a given set of semantical rules, it is equally easy to say what a semantical rule is. But given simply a notation, mathematical or otherwise, and, indeed as thoroughly understood a notation as you please in point of the translation or truth conditions of its statements, who can say which of its true statements rank as postulates? Obviously the question is meaningless - as meaningless as asking which points in Ohio are starting points. Any finite (or effectively specifiable infinite) selection of statements (preferably true ones, perhaps) is as much a set of postulates as any other. The word 'postulate' is significant only relative to an act of inquiry; we apply the word to a set of statements just in so far as we happen, for the year or the moment, to be thinking of those statements in relation to the statements which can be reached from them by some set of transformations to which we have seen fit to direct our attention. Now the notion of semantical rule is as sensible and meaningful as that of postulate, if conceived in a similarly relative spirit - relative, this time, to one or another particular enterprise of schooling unconversant persons in sufficient conditions for truth of statements of some natural or artificial language L. But from this point of view no one signalization of a subclass of the truths of L is intrinsically more a semantical rule than another; and, if 'analytic' means 'true by semantical rules', no one truth of L is analytic to the exclusion of another.8

Now, consider the parallel argument against the internal-external distinction: Premise (1): The notion of externality is a relation, Rg, between questions, Q, and languages, L. Premise (2): The problem is to make sense of Rg for variable Q and L. Premise (3): There are two possibilities with respect to the use of the notion of linguistic rules for explicating Rg: (a) a specification is given, by linguistic rule, of all of the external questions for LQ. (b) there is a specification of the linguistic rules of LQ. One can define 'external question' as any question that is asked about the rules ofL0. Premise (4): a) does not help to explicate Rg because although it tells us which questions are external to LQ, it does not give us a generalizable notion of externality for variable L. We know which questions are said to be external, but we do not know what it means to say "Q is external." Premise (5): b) succeeds in explicating Rg, but only by introducing a new word 'linguistic rule' which is as much in need of explication as 'external'. (As justification for the claim of uselessness of the concept of a linguistic rule, Quine could give a parallel analogy to the one quoted above which would compare a linguistic rule to a postulate of a system.) Conclusion: The problem mentioned in premise (2) still remains, even for artificial languages.

115 Quine's point can be put in another way. Given any set of discourse (by 'discourse', I simply mean a set of uttered or written sentences), more than one set of rules will satisfactorily generate that discourse. In other words, a set of discourse underdetermines the rules describing that discourse. As one varies the rules (even assuming that each variant of the rules continues to generate all of the uttered sentences) there could be variation with respect to which sentences are true by virtue of the rules. Analyticity, then, is radically indeterminate, if projected onto a set of discourse. Similarly, if one takes, for example, the set of sentences uttered by a group of scientists, it will be impossible to isolate certain sentences as interpretable only as proposals concerning rules of language and others as interpretable only as the assertion of data, accepting certain linguistic rules. The indeterminacy of the concepts of semantical rules and linguistic rules, then, results in the indeterminacy of the concepts of externality and analyticity. Is there a reasonable Carnapian response to this argument? I think, perhaps, there is. Quine claims that his argument applies, indiscriminately, to artificial languages as well as to ordinary discourse. This is not obvious, however. Suppose it is assumed that artificial languages are languages which are constituted by a set of syntactical and semantical rules. These rules precede usage and stipulate acceptable discourse. Thus, while natural languages are constituted by discourse, and rules are developed to describe this discourse, rules of artificial languages precede discourse and prescribe acceptable discourse. In specifying an artificial language, then, one specifies a set of rules. This is a plausible account of the distinction between natural languages and artificial languages. Indeed, Carnap seems to have thought that such a view of artificial languages virtually constitutes his principle of tolerance: Up to now, in constructing a language, the procedure has usually been, first to assign a meaning to the fundamental mathematico-logical symbols, and then to consider what sentences and inferences are seen to be logically correct in accordance with this meaning. Since the assignment of the meaning is expressed in words, and is, in consequence, inexact, no conclusion arrived at in this way can very well be otherwise than inexact and ambiguous. The connection will only become clear when approached from the opposite direction: let any postulates and any rules of inference be chosen arbitrarily; then this choice, whatever it may be, will determine what meaning is to be assigned to the fundamental logical symbols.... The standpoint which we have suggested - we will call it the Principle of Tolerance relates not only to mathematics, but to all questions of logic.9

Given this assumption, it would seem that there is a generalizable notion of analyticity or externality available for artificial languages. For each artificial language, L, those sentences are analytic which are true solely by virtue of the rules constituting L and for each artificial language, L, those sentences external to L are those which concern only the rules constituting L. Quine would respond that the proposed accounts simply accept the second horn of

116 the dilemma posed in each of the respective arguments. The accounts simply introduce the unexplicated concepts of syntactical and semantical rules to explicate analyticity or externality — they provide no explanation of the concepts in question. Why does Quine insist upon an explanation of analyticity? I believe it is fair to say that he demands an explanation because he believes that any proper account of analyticity must account for the necessity which is felt to be inherent in analytical truths. The concept of artificial languages here assumed, however, can offer an account, of sorts, of necessity. Carnap's rules, on the principle of tolerance, are created arbitrarily. But they are not adopted arbitrarily (as I have argued, contra the standard interpretation). Once one adopts a set of rules, certain sentences become true by virtue of the rules — they follow from the decision criteria adopted in the rules. This concept provides a generalizable notion of analyticity and an account of the inevitability involved. The inevitability is, in a sense, hypothetical inevitability, because it is language relative. But it is generalizable in that whichever language is chosen, some list of sentences will be chosen as analytic because they are true by virtue of the rules of the chosen artificial language. Given that language and the particular truth criteria built into the rules of that language were chosen, those sentences must inevitably be true. The account here sketched provides a generalizable explication of analyticity for artificial languages, and an account of the necessity involved in analytic sentences which is constant across artificial languages understood as sets of rules constituting a discourse. Likewise, the sketched account provides a corresponding explication of 'external'. External questions are questions concerning the adoption of one or another of the sets of rules which constitute a given linguistic framework. As such, they involve the adoption of criteria, rather than the application of criteria. Why does Quine not accept those explications? He does not accept them because they are not based upon an accurate account of the process of inquiry. Or, to put the point slightly differently, he does not accept them because the original assumption — that languages are constituted ex nihilo from a set of rules — is not true of natural languages. Since natural languages are the languages in which actual inquiry finds its origination, this account can be of no use in understanding actual inquiry. It now becomes clear, however, that Quine is demanding some sort of naturalistic account of 'linguistic rules' — some explanation of the concept which is operative in actual, everyday inquiry. If the Carnapian accedes to this demand, then the argument is lost, as Quine is waiting with his Duhemian arguments to the effect that, given any new piece of data, the inquirer can react in any number of ways — he might change what is ordinarily thought of as an empirical belief, or he might shift linguistic usage. 10 In other words, Quine's demands for an explanatorily adequate explication of the concepts of

117 analyticity and externality are covert appeals for the relating of the concepts to actual occurrences in everyday inquiry. He is demanding that the explications have application to languages which, like natural languages, are not constituted by a set of posited rules. Suppose the Carnapian, rather than acceding to these demands, admits that in ordinary discourse no particular outcome is implied by a given piece of new data. He might still insist that there is an important epistemological difference between those cases where a person (perhaps arbitrarily) chooses to shift his linguistic usage, rather than to merely change an empirical belief. It could even be admitted that, in practice, it is very difficult to tell which of these types of events has, in fact, occurred. Even in the face of these admissions, the Carnapian could still insist that an important difference exists — that, perhaps, a number of imperceptible changes in linguistic usages adds up to a shift in conceptual framework. If so, it could be argued that a clear understanding of such shifts requires a different sort of analysis than do changes in empirical beliefs. I believe that Carnap was convinced that this important difference is the difference between applying a criterion (which is accepted by virtue of the acceptance of a linguistic framework), on the one hand, and questioning and/or changing the criterion itself, on the other hand. If the Carnapian is convinced that there is some important epistemological difference between changes in beliefs and changes in linguistic framework, then Quine's argument loses much of its force. Artificial languages are adopted to fulfill practical purposes. One possible purpose is to provide a precise formalization of the structure of inquiry. If there are important distinctions to be drawn in the structure of inquiry, but these distinctions are obscured in that process, one can justify the introduction of artificial languages which provide precise explications of these distinctions. The justification will depend upon conventionalistic assumptions, and will amount to treating these artificial languages as heuristic devices. In order to judge more precisely the efficacy of the heuristic devices, I will attempt to make Quine's objection to the use of linguistic rules more explicit. The argument I am attributing to Quine can be stated as follows: Premise (1): The explication of a concept for artificial languages must have some application to actual inquiry. Premise (2): In any ordinary context where new data arises, the inquirer is faced with several options, some of them involving changes in linguistic usages and others involving changes in beliefs. Conclusion (1): There are no purely linguistic or purely empirical questions in the discourse of ordinary inquiry. Conclusion (2): The artificial language concept of linguistic rule has no application in ordinary inquiry. Conclusion (3): By the criterion set out in premise (1), the concept of a linguistic rule cannot provide a useful explication.

118 The move from conclusion (1) to conclusion (2) is problematic. Consider the following two interpretations of conclusion (2): Conclusion (2'): There are no actual instances, in ordinary inquiry, where the only option open to the inquirer is a change in linguistic rules. Conclusion (2"): No actual instances of changes in position by inquirers can be usefully illuminated by an appeal to a precise distinction between linguistic rules and empirical beliefs. Conclusion (2') is implied by conclusion (1). For conclusion (3) to follow from conclusion (2'), however, a very narrow notion of 'application' would have to be imposed on premise (1). But conventionalists in general, and Quine and Carnap in particular, have consistently opted for a very loose relationship between an ordinary language explicandum and the more exact explicatum which is to be substituted for i t . u Neither Carnap nor Quine would ordinarily insist that a precise, regimented concept have a perfect analogue in ordinary discourse. Similarly, it would be odd to insist that there be actual instances, discoverable in ordinary discourse, of the concept introduced as the explicatum in the more precise system substituted for the ordinary one. Thus, if the normal conventionalistic notion of explication is accepted, conclusion (3) does not follow from conclusion (2'). The most that would normally be insisted upon would be that the explicatum illuminate, in a useful manner, ordinary occurrences. On the other hand, if conclusion (2") is intended, more argument than just conclusion (1) would be necessary to justify this claim. In particular, some such premise as the following would be necessary: Premise (3): There being no actual instances of purely linguistic decisions, it follows that no illumination of ordinary inquiry will occur through the introduction of an artificial concept of a linguistic rule. But premise (3) sounds very much like the very point at issue between Carnap and Quine. Can concepts like analyticity and externality, if made precise, provide any illumination of real epistemological situations? This, I submit, is tantamount to asking: "la there an important epistemological difference between choices to shift linguistic usage as opposed to changes in empirical beliefs?" For Quine to simply answer "No" to this latter question is surely to beg the question against the Carnapian. It is difficult, however, to see what kind of argumentation would justify this negative answer. Quine began "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" with a cataloguing of the failures in drawing the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences. He ended by suggesting a new, naturalistic epistemology which can do without the dogmas of analyticity and verificationism. If my arguments are correct, however, Quine's

119

rejection of one of the proposed explications of analyticity (in terms of semantical rules) depends upon the naturalistic epistemology with which he ends. The argument for a naturalistic epistemology is, then, circular. In summing up, the point can be put in yet one more way by using the term 'naturalistic' in a manner quite different than it has been used hitherto. Quine's argument commits something quite analogous to the naturalistic fallacy in ethics. From a set of facts concerning actual inquiry, he concludes that one should not attempt to institute a system which deviates from actual inquiry. I am persuaded by commentators on the naturalistic fallacy when they argue that it is question-begging to call the naturalistic fallacy a "fallacy." 1 2 But even the commentators who point this out are aware that to assume, without further argument, that naturalistic arguments are valid is equally question-begging. Thus, what is needed is more argument. It is necessary to prove, not assume, that the dichotomies, championed by Carnap, between analytic and synthetic and between internal and external are or are not illuminating and useful distinctions. That Quine's argument is naturalistic in nature can be illustrated by his discussion of "semantic ascent" in Word and Object: Carnap has long held that the questions of philosophy, when real at all, are questions of language.... He holds that the philosophical questions of what there is are questions of how we may most conveniently fashion our "linguistic framework," and not, as in the case of the wombat or unicorn, questions about external reality. He holds that those philosophical questions are only apparently about sorts of objects, and are really pragmatic questions of language policy. But why should this be true of the philosophical questions and not of theoretical questions generally? Such a distinction of status is of a piece with the notion of analyticity, and as little to be trusted. After all, theoretical sentences in general are defensible only pragmatically; we can but assess the structural merits of the theory which embraces them along with sentences directly conditioned to multifarious stimulations. How then can Carnap draw a line across this theoretical part and hold that the sentences this side of the line enjoy non-verbal content or meaning in a way that those beyond the line do not? 13

The premises, here, are clearly drawn from observations and inferences concerning actual inquiry — "we can but assess the structural merits of the theory which embraces [theoretical sentences] along with the sentences directly conditioned to multifarious stimulations." Surely, however, Carnap was aware of the facts Quine cites. Surely, he recognized that actual inquiry proceeds in a manner similar to Quinean descriptions. It does not follow from this, however, that epistemological accounts, such as Carnap's, which attempt to introduce a new order into the prevailing chaos, are misguided. Quine's central argument must, then, have the form of a recommendation. Or, to speak more precisely, it must be a counter-recommendation. Having clarified the argument to this point, it is possible to introduce and

120 examine the Quinean trump card: The philosopher's task differs from the others', then, in detail; but in no such drastic way as those suppose who imagine for the philosopher a vantage point outside the conceptual scheme that he takes in charge. There is no such cosmic exile. He cannot study and revise the fundamental conceptual scheme of science and common sense without having some conceptual scheme, whether the same or another no less in need of philosophical scrutiny, in which to w o r k .

In other words, Quine claims that the Carnapian recommendation is impossible to follow. One cannot, ultimately, occupy the logical ground necessary to discuss and answer external questions.15 Two points must be made in response to this argument. First, Quine fails to understand the recommendation correctly. He labels Carnap's account of ontological choices in terms of externality as a "dodge," and describes it as "the suggestion that the acceptance of such objects is a linguistic convention distinct somehow from serious views about reality." 16 If I am correct in interpreting the Carnapian system, there are no grounds for the charge that external questions are not taken seriously. Nor, is there any reason to think that they have nothing to do with reality. Rather, external, conventional decisions are relativized to a person, a purpose, and a system. The person is in the world (reality), has a purpose or purposes, and he is considering a system. Reality is an irreducible element in this scenario; and, while decisions about which system works best are not decisions about the ultimate nature of reality, they are serious and they do involve the acceptance or rejection of entities. These entities, unlike the entities countenanced by more essentialistic philosophers, however, are not absolute and pre-systematic. They are, given Carnap's belief that reality underdetermines linguistic frameworks, the result of a convention based upon both reality and human needs and desires. Second, it must be said that Carnap was not recommending cosmic exile, as much as he was recommending systematic exile. Carnap did not believe that external questions are to be answered outside every system. Rather, he believed that it is highly instructive, epistemologically, to distinguish between intrasystematic and extrasystematic inquiry. Actual inquiry can be illuminated, on his view, by comparison to an ideal style of inquiry. In this ideal style of inquiry, there would be a sharp dichotomy between questions concerning the assumptions of the inquirer, built into the axioms and rules of the system he chooses, on the one hand, and questions asked within that system on the other hand. The recommendation that a system embodying this dichotomy be treated as an ideal and as a heuristic device for understanding actual inquiry does not presuppose that "cosmic exile" is possible. Assumptions are built into systems in which metatheoretical questions are formulated, and such systematic questions are, likewise, susceptible of external analysis. There need be no end point in this process - some point where the inquirer moves outside the "cosmos" or outside every system simultaneously. There

121 need only be a recognition of the importance of the differences between using a criterion and choosing a criterion.

5.4

ANALYTICITY AND THE MOTIVATIONS FOR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL QUESTIONS

Quine can also be interpreted as claiming that, given his naturalistic epistemological system, there is no necessity for a distinction between internal and external sentences. This interpretation is strongly suggested by the passage quoted above in which Quine says, "I think it [i.e. the internal-external distinction] is a distinction which he can perfectly well discard compatibly with the purpose of the paper under discussion." Carnap's philosophical purpose was to alleviate the nominalistic scruples of empiricistic semanticists. These semanticists find it convenient to speak of such abstract entities as propositions, properties, etc., but feel that this is inconsistent with their empiricistic scientific commitments. The source, presumably, of these scruples is the positing of types of entities for which there is no actual or possible direct empirical evidence. Quine can be interpreted, then, as arguing that the problem concerning empiricistic scruples is a pseudo-problem. It only becomes a problem, given the assumption that sentences, individually, can be submitted to empirical verification. If a semanticist is asked the empirical verification for his claim "The referent of the sentence, 'Die Erde ist Runde' is the proposition that the earth is round," he will be hard put to give any direct evidence which would confirm or disconfirm the claim. If he, however, defends himself on this point by introducing a conception of indirect evidence, it is difficult to see how all manner of views he had hoped to rule out as unverifiable metaphysics could not now be reintroduced and justified on the grounds that the evidence for them is similarly indirect. It is this quandary for which Carnap had hoped to provide a solution. For a Quinean, however, this quandary would not arise. If one adopts empiricism without the dogmas — Quine's naturalistic empiricism — then there is no question of empirical verification for individual sentences. The entire set of one's beliefs will be compared to the world holistically. Consequently, there is no need, on this form of empiricism, to single out and provide evidence for any particular sentence. One chooses that set of beliefs which best fits experience as a whole, and the criterion of evidence for particular sentences is coherence with that whole body of beliefs. There is no problem of empiricistic scruples to deal with; and, hence, for the Quinean, there is no reason to posit the added complications involved in a distinction between internal and external sentences. On this interpretation, then, Quine is seen as claiming that the internalexternal distinction depends upon the analytic-synthetic distinction in the sense that, were it not for the analytic-synthetic distinction, there would be

122 no motivation for the former distinction. The problem it was meant to solve would never arise. I am willing to grant Quine this argument. It is quite true that it is only on a standard view of empiricism that the problem to which the internal-external distinction is designed to provide a solution even arises. But this is not, by itself, a convincing argument for the conclusion that the distinction between internal and external questions should be abandoned. This argument, like the one discussed in the last section, presupposes, rather than proving, Quine's epistemological naturalism. If one does not accept Quine's brand of empiricism, then one is faced with the problem Carnap hoped to solve. Or, to put the point more positively, if one does accept the analytic-synthetic distinction, then there is a problem with empiricistic scruples. When Quine suggests that we should get along without both distinctions, evidence that we can and should do so is necessary. The evidence necessary would involve a proof, not just the assertion, that a pragmatically justified artificial system with a sharp dichotomy between the linguistic component and the empirical component would be of no use in understanding epistemological issues. Or, perhaps, the proof of a weaker conclusion would suffice: the confusion and harm introduced by such a sharp dichotomy would outweigh its usefulness. But where would one search for such a proof? One would search, I submit, in the overall explanatory power, clarity, and usefulness of the two entire systems. 17 It is not surprising, I submit, that in at least some sense, the analyticsynthetic distinction and the internal-external distinction go hand in hand. Both are built upon the historically- central belief of philosophers in a dichotomy between the merely contingent and the necessary. The question which is raised by the clash between the Carnapian system and the Quinean one is essentially this: Is there any explanatory value retained for the distinction between the contingent and the noncontingent, once conventionalism has been embraced? In the next section, I will undertake to clarify exactly what is the relationship between analyticity and externality. In the process of that clarification, Quine's perfunctory remarks connecting the two will be significantly qualified. However, Quine is surely correct to this extent: The internalexternal distinction is only possible and only necessary given some dichotomy between decisions which involve the application of adopted criteria and decisions concerning what criteria to adopt. Because this is true, and because so many crucial philosophical points are interrelated with this dichotomy, it follows that the argument between the Quinean and the Carnapian is, necessarily, a systematic argument. Because so many crucial philosophical points are interrelated centering upon the interest of the dichotomy just mentioned, it is impossible to make telling arguments for or against particular elements of either Quine's or Carnap's system in isolation.

123 The systematic nature of the argument can be seen in another way. Consider the following argument, which is no more than Quine's second objection in its most general form: Premise (1): Given a conventionalistic view of language, the distinctions between ontology and non-ontology and between internal and external questions must depend upon a distinction between analytic (conceptual) and synthetic (factual) sentences. Premise (2): There is no legitimate distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences. Conclusion: There is no legitimate distinction between ontology and nonontology or between internal and external questions. In order to simplify the issues, I will, for the moment, grant both the truth of premise (1) and the validity of the argument form. Consequently, the locus of discussion becomes premise (2). Now, I admit that if premise (2) is intended as showing that there is no sharp analytic/synthetic distinction in ordinary language, it would be difficult to refute. This admission should not, however, be crucial in a debate between conventionalists like Quine and Camap. Neither of them have any compunctions about introducing a new convention in order to provide an explication of an ordinary language concept. The crucial issue in determining whether new conventions should be introduced centers on the usefulness of such conventions. As I have shown above, if Quine hopes to convince a Carnapian that there is no legitimate distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences, he must show that the concept of analyticity is a useless concept, even if it can be made precise. If the second premise is to be interpreted as insisting only that a formal explication of analyticity will not be a useful concept, Quine's argument against the distinctions between ontology and non-ontology and between internal and external questions is cast in a much different and less favorable light. The concept of usefulness implies usefulness-for-some-task; and, presumably, the usefulness of a formal language explication of the analytic-synthetic distinction would be (at least partially) judged according to its usefulness in drawing other distinctions more precisely. Two such distinctions are the distinctions between ontology and non-ontology and the distinction between internal and external questions. It begins to appear, then, that Quine's argument can be inverted. It might be argued that: Premise (1): Given a conventionalistic view of language, the distinctions between ontology and non-ontology and between internal and external questions must depend upon a distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences.

124 Premise (2): It is useful to have distinctions between ontology and nonontology and between internal and external questions. Conclusion: It is necessary (pragmatically) to adopt conventions which allow a distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences. This is not, of course, to say that Quine could not advance overriding reasons for saying that the analytic-synthetic distinction is useless. He might, for example, attempt to show that it is positively harmful. If such arguments are advanced, they must be considered. However, my point is that there is something very strange about Quine using the illegitimacy (i.e. the uselessness) of the analytic-synthetic distinction to prove that there can be no ontology-nonontology distinction. If it is true that the ontology-non-ontology distinction and the internal-external distinction inevitably rest upon the analytic-synthetic distinction, this must count as evidence in favor of the usefulness of the latter distinction. Of course, if one is already convinced that the two former distinctions are both useless, this evidence will be discounted. But this does not add up to an argument against these distinctions. It would, at best, be begging the question. At worst, as I have said, it adds up to an argument for the analytic-synthetic distinction. The fact that this inversion of Quine's argument is possible will hardly convince the Quinean to embrace any of the related dichotomies. This is not the purpose of the inversion. The purpose of that move is to emphasize the interrelatedness and systematic interconnectedness of the several issues now being addressed. To stress this interconnectedness is, hopefully, to forestall question-begging on both sides of the debate. Once question-begging is avoided, the central issues can be addressed. Does the dichotomy between disputes about meanings and criteriological questions on the one hand, and disputes which presuppose such issues on the other hand, retain any useful function on a conventionalistic theory of language? Quine would argue that once one adopts a conventionalistic view of language, changes in meanings or word usage will occur for basically the same type of reasons as do changes in empirical beliefs. In both cases the decision results from an amalgamation of empirical data and human purposes. Carnapians, on the other hand, argue that while empirical data affect decisions about linguistic rules, it is still instructive to recognize a difference between changes in beliefs and changes in meanings or criteria for accepting beliefs. The Camapian is not, here, disagreeing on the empirical question of whether or not people do (always, usually, or never) approach changes of criteria differently than they approach changes in belief. The position taken by the Camapian is not an empirical claim that people do, in fact, always or sometimes separate these two types of issues. It is, rather, a recommendation that people would, ideally, in the process of inquiry, keep these two types of issues clearly separate. The task of the rest of this section is to suggest, at least in

125 preliminary form, some evidence to suggest that there is merit in the Carnapian recommendation. If there is any value in a distinction such as the one at issue here, it will lie in its ability to clarify, illuminate, and explain. In Chapter 3, I referred to Cornman's suggestion that there is something paradoxical about utterances in philosophical contexts. Many sentences, such as "There are material objects," or "There are space-time points," are treated by philosophers as difficult questions worthy of careful analysis and intellectual debate. Yet common men and even these same philosophers in nonphilosophical moments treat these very same sentences as wholly unproblematic and obvious. Does it, then, follow that the philosopher is inconsistent and that common men know something which philosophers do not know in their philosophical moments? If these conclusions seem implausible, another option is open. It can be assumed that sentences such as those under discussion are ambiguous. An explanation of this ambiguity is provided if one adopts the Carnapian system. That system provides a distinction between internal and external askings of identical-sounding questions. Common men and philosophers in nonphilosophical moments ask the questions internally, while philosophical askings of the same questions are external. In the former case, the questions are asked with a set of criteria for answering already adopted. In the latter case, these very criteria are at issue — the philosopher is trying to explicate what is to be meant by 'material object' and 'space-time point'. And, in doing this he must relate these concepts to other concepts. Does "x is a material object" entail "x is a collection of veridical sensations?" If so, an ontological decision has been made in favor of some sort of sense-datum theory. The Carnapian system provides a plausible account of the initial ambiguity by drawing a distinction. The distinction it draws is between questions asked accepting criteria and questions asked concerning criteria. This provides a prima facie case in favor of the Carnapian system — it explains and illuminates the puzzling ambiguity which is evident in certain questions which sometimes arise in philosophical contexts as real questions, but which are often taken as too obvious to require argument in nonphilosophical contexts. Further, the system also, as an added bonus, explains why philosophical issues have, historically, been intransigent. Philosophers have sometimes been misled, failing to see the ambiguity, and arguments proceeded without both parties being clear as to the type of issue being addressed. The problem, then, is to understand, in general terms, the relationship between philosophical and nonphilosophical discourse. Surely, some difference between them is, at least initially, perceived. Philosophers offer evidence which seems, initially, different from that offered by scientists and common men. The sorts of responses which are considered to be reasonable in philosophical contexts are quite different than those considered reasonable in nonphilosophical contexts. Any metatheoretical system must account, in some

126 way, for this initially perceivable difference. One test of the success of a metatheoretical system will lie in its success in dealing with the extreme case — those sentences which appear in both philosophical and nonphilosophical contexts. The Carnapian system brands these sentences as ambiguous, and places the ambiguity involved at the heart of the metatheoretical system. The ambiguity is, then, illuminated; and, presumably, this illumination indicates that the Carnapian system has passed the indicated test. It has successfully accounted for the extreme cases where one sentence appears in two entirely different contexts and where two quite different considerations are taken as relevant. The Carnapian system, then, has an initial advantage over that of the Quinean. Can the Quinean erase this advantage by proposing an alternative explanation of the ambiguity in question? For Quine to comment that the difference between the philosopher and the common man or scientist concerns "only breadth of categories" leaves too much unsaid. First, it is unclear that there is any difference in the breadth of the category referred to by the philosopher and the common man in the crucial test case. Carnap's suggestion that the sentence is ambiguous — used internally by the common man and externally by the philosopher, with generality merely functioning as a mark of the susceptibility of the sentence to this particular ambiguity — seems the much more plausible account. Second, it is hard to believe that mere comments concerning differences in generality will provide any understanding of the important differences in method employed by the philosopher, on the one hand, and the scientist or the common man on the other. It may be true that the common man (when he, like Dr. Johnson, kicks the stone to refute the immaterialist) and the philosopher (when he provides a complex argument to the effect that some sentence referring to a material object is not cointensive with another sentence about mental images) are each presenting further evidence for their position. To leave the matter there, however, would be to fall far short of providing a useful account of the two events. Again, Carnap's account seems inherently more plausible. The common man or the scientist has accepted a framework for talking about physical objects; and, in the process, has accepted a set of criteria for deciding whether a given object is a physical object. Given these criteria, the stone, close at hand, fulfills these criteria, and the question of the existence of physical objects seems to him trivial. The philosopher, on the other hand, is concerned about whether the choice to accept the framework for talking about physical objects, assumed by the common man, is a wise choice. Philosophers, then, are concerned with the choice of criteria rather than the use of criteria. The weakness of the Quinean position, quite predictably, shows up most clearly in the extreme case. In Chapter 4 , 1 argued that Quine's account of the difference between the philosophical and nonphilosophical utterances of the immaterialist provides little illumination. Quine's system, then, does much

127 less well than does Carnap's in accounting for the test cases — those sentences which appear in both philosophical and nonphilosophical contexts. In Chapter 4, I argued that lacking some distinction between ontological and non-ontological questions of existence, Quine cannot provide an explication of traditional concept of ontology. That conclusion led to interpreting Quine as making a recommendation to the effect that the historically existent dichotomy between ontology and non-ontology be obliterated. The evidence for that obliteration turns out to commit the fallacy of drawing a recommendation solely from naturalistic evidence, and it is unclear what other evidence is available. Worse, Quine's account of the original ambiguity between philosophical and nonphilosophical askings of questions is curiously lacking in explanatory value. To say that philosophical askings of questions are simply theoretical or literal and basic is of little help. Quine might attempt to go further and give some account of what these concepts, in turn, imply. He might, for example, say that literal and basic entities are those which are not susceptible of definitional elimination, but his eschewing of analyticity makes any appeal to the concept of definition, at least initially, inconsistent. Quine would undoubtedly avoid this inconsistency by substituting for the concept of definition his restricted notion of similarity of stimulus meaning, an extensional concept. The account, then, would rest on the existential quantifier and the Quinean concept of ontological commitment. On this account, an entity or set of entities, E, would be said to be literal and basic on a theory, T, just in case T is ontologically committed to E. But this account has no explanatory value, because it is circular. The original problem was to provide some account for the difference between those utterances of the ontological materialist which are ontologically significant and those which are not. Furthermore, it would appear that this account fails even to avoid inconsistency. It is well known that ontological commitment is an intensional notion — one to which, in this full-blown sense, Quine has no access.1^ If the hope is, then, to understand the ambiguity which arises in connection with philosophical and nonphilosophical askings of the same question, Quine's system has little to offer in comparison to the explanatory power of Carnap's system, embodying as it does a distinction between internal and external askings of questions. On the Carnapian account, that ambiguity depends crucially upon the difference between using and choosing a conceptual framework. There seems little in the Quinean system to tempt one to reject the prima facie plausibility of the Carnapian explanation of the original ambiguity. The conclusion seems to be that since the argument is a systematic one, the Carnapian system has more prima facie plausibility than the Quinean system. Unless Quine can provide a more illuminating account of the difference between philosophical and nonphilosophical askings of the same questions, in particular, and a better account of the relationship between philo-

128 sophical and nonphilosophical discourse, in general, there is little reason to choose his system.

5.5 ANALYTICITY AND EXTERNALITY

I have, in the earlier sections of this chapter, accepted Quine's claim that the internal-external distinction is intimately tied to the analytic-synthetic distinction. I have defended Carnap, at least in a limited way, even granting Quine this point unqualifiedly. I cannot, however, leave the matter so. If the connection is as intimate as Quine suggests, this intimacy would conflict with my attempt to keep externality distinct from verificationism. Quine concludes a discussion of the relationship between verificationism and analyticity by saying, "The two dogmas are, indeed, at root, identical." 19 If this is true, and, if, as I have granted earlier in this chapter, externality depends upon analyticity in a systematic sense, then my earlier attempt to undercut the standard interpretation of external questions must have been mistaken. If verificationism is identical with the doctrine of analyticity, and if the internalexternal distinction depends upon analyticity, it would follow that the internal-external distinction depends upon verificationism. It was this connection that I was concerned to refute in Chapter 2. But my interpretive points can be saved by qualifying, without denying, the connection Quine sees between externality and analyticity. The necessary qualifications can best be introduced by first discussing the concept of analyticity. It is often noted that even as late as Kant, the present conception of necessity was approached in two very diverse manners. There was the distinction between a priori and a posteriori judgments on the one hand, and the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments on the other. The former concerned the place which reason played in a judgment (i.e. whether the judgment is knowable solely on the basis of reason or not) while the latter concerned the scope of the judgment (i.e. whether the subject term of the judgment includes the predicate term or not). These two, originally diverse, distinctions have been nearly collapsed in the contemporary literature. 'A priori', 'necessarily true', 'analytic', and 'true by virtue of the meaning of the terms' have all become virtual synonyms. This can be accounted for, to some extent, by the linguistic turn in philosophy. "True by virtue of reason" meant, for empiricists, "True by virtue of the relationship of ideas." But at the linguistic turn, words became the central concept, replacing ideas. Once this had occurred, the class of sentences which can be known to be true independent of experience became difficult to distinguish from the class of sentences in which the meaning of the subject term includes the meaning of the predicate term. It is the gradual collapsing of these distinctions which leads Quine to conclude that verificationism — the empiricist conception of meaning —

129 Necessary Truth I I

True solely by virtue of reason

Subject term includes predicate term

1 ^

Implied by the criteria of reason itself

True independent of experience

2 Assumption - of Empiri-

Concern language, • not the world

Linguistic turn

3 ^

True solely by virtue of the rules of language «

Convention alism

4

True by virtue of adopted conventions of language

No sentences are such that they are immune to revision on the basis of experience - hence, the concept of necessity drops out.

Distinction between internal and external sentences = distinction between questions about conventions versus questions asked while accepting conventions

Quinean naturalism - no distinctions in the epistemological type of questions

3 — Linguistic turn

I

- Conventionalism

Chart 5-A The parallel developments of two concepts of necessity are charted in the two main columns A and B. External forces affecting the concepts are shown in peripheral columns.

130 and the doctrine of analyticity are identical dogmas. These developments can be followed in Chart 5-A. (See page 129) From an empiricist's viewpoint, the two dichotomies, which began diversely as A and B, become virtually indistinguishable at level A-3. On an empiricist epistemology, the only possible account of the distinction at A-3 would depend upon experience. That is, the only means of knowing those sentences which are not true solely by virtue of the rules of language would be by experiential means. Thus, for empiricists who have taken the linguistic turn, the two dichotomies will indeed, be indistinguishable. If one also introduces conventionalism, in addition to empiricism and the linguistic turn, Quine's epistemological naturalism might result. Two points must be emphasized, however. First, the dichotomies collapse at level 3 only on the assumption of empiricism. And, second, the move from level B-4 to level B-5 requires argument, as I explained above in section 5.3. In my interpretation of Carnap, I insisted that the internal-external distinction is independent of empiricism. Quine sees a connection there, because he equivocates on the concept of analyticity. This equivocation is made plausible by empiricistic assumptions, and if one assumes that Carnap's entire philosophy is determined by his empiricism, it follows that such a connection exists. While I have not denied that Carnap was an empiricist, I have argued that empiricism is not his basic commitment. In particular, the internalexternal distinction is more basic, resting as it does directly upon the two axioms of tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy. While empiricism may be grafted onto this system, it does not determine the shape of the main system. There are, then, two senses of the concept of analyticity. One sense exploits the concept of true by virtue of rules of language, and the other exploits the empiricistic notion, true independent of experience. Empiricists who, unlike Quine, accept intensional concepts will find these two senses coextensional but not cointensional. For these non-Quinean empiricists, then, there are two different senses of the concept of analyticity, even though there is only one class of sentences denoted by the two senses. For many purposes, the two senses can be treated interchangeably; but, in contexts where the concern is definitional, not extensional, this would be a mistake. In discussing Carnap's internal-external distinction, I have been concerned with defining that distinction; and the definition depends only upon the concept of analyticity which arises from the concept of a priori truth. It depends, therefore, upon the distinction between using a criterion and choosing a criterion — analyticity as depending upon criteria adopted in the choice of linguistic rules. There is no dependence upon the extensionally similar, empiricistic concept of analyticity. Quine is correct in connecting analyticity and externality if he is granted epistemological naturalism, because on that system, all intensional concepts

131

are eliminated. It was only given the intensional distinction between two concepts of analyticity that Carnap's distinction avoids a collapse into an empiricistic basis. Thus, Quine is correct in connecting analyticity, externality, and verificationism, given his epistemological naturalism, which collapses all extensionally similar distinctions. However, that very naturalism is at issue in this chapter: Ought philosophers to recognize a dichotomy between decisions made accepting certain criteria and decisions concerning what criteria to accept? Quine's negative answer amounts to the claim that all decisions are epistemologically similar to Carnap's external questions; and, hence, Quine "espouse[s] a more thorough pragmatism." 20 Carnap's system, in contrast to Quine's, recognizes indeed, and puts at the most central place, this dichotomy rejected by Quine. It is to a systematic discussion of this dichotomy that I must now turn. In the next chapter, I will discuss a number of current publications dealing with the dichotomy which arises in a number of contexts and in varied terminological dress.

NOTES 1 Quine, Ways of Paradox, p. 133. See, also, Word and Object, p. 271. 2 Quine, Ways of Paradox, p. 134. 3 Ibid., p. 130. 4 Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," p. 209. 5 I am referring, especially, to Logical Syntax, pp. 140-142. 6 Quine, From A Logical Point of View, pp. 41-42. 7 Ibid., pp. 32-37. 8 Ibid., p. 35. 9 Carnap, Logical Syntax, p. xv. 10 Quine, From A Logical Point of View, p. 41. 11 Cf. Carnap, The Logical Foundations of Probability (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). Citation is from United States Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 5-8, and Quine, Word and Object, p. 159. 12 See, for example, W.K. Frankena, "The Naturalistic Fallacy," Mind, XLVIII (1939), 464-477. 13 Quine, Word and Object, p. 271. 14 Ibid., pp. 275-276. 15 In this connection, cf. Quine's references to Neurath's boat analogy. For example, see Word and Object, p. 3. 16 Ibid., p. 275. 17 Cf. Schuldenfrei, "Quine in Perspective." 18 Richard L. Cartwright, "Ontology and the Theory of Meaning," Philosophy of Science, XXI (1954), 316-325, and Michael Jubien, "The Intensionality of Ontological Commitment," Nous, VI (1972), pp. 378-387. 19 Quine, From A Logical Point of View, p. 41. 20 Ibid., p. 46.

6. EXTERNALITY AND RATIONALITY

6.1 PARADIGMS, EXTERNAL QUESTIONS, AND RATIONALITY

I have noted in passing that some commentators have been alarmed by Carnap's position on external questions. A number of philosophers have taken upon themselves the task of refuting Carnap's views on this subject, implying that unless these views can be refuted, meaningful and rational discourse in philosophy is at an end. Cornman asks, after outlining what he takes to be Carnap's argument, "Must we also conclude with Wittgenstein that philosophy, or at least that part of philosophy involving external questions, belongs to the realm of the mystical, the ineffable?" 1 I have already quoted Goldstick as equating Carnap's views in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" with the view that the acceptance of any external or philosophical position "will in the end be wholly grounded on a free choice, anonrational leap of faith." He goes on to suggest that Carnap's philosophical views are remarkably similar, "as far as their real content is concerned, to 'existentialist' views."2 Similarly, E.D. Klemke addresses the question "Are 'External Questions' Non-Cognitive?" with the clear implication that unless a negative answer can be given, external questions are doomed to undecidability.3 I hope it is by now clear that these worries stem not from Carnap's own views, but from the assumption, embodied in what I have called the standard interpretation, that Carnap's views on external questions were determined by veriflcationism. In Chapter 2, I argued that, while Carnap applied the label "non-cognitive" and "neither true nor false" to improperly formulated external questions, it was not his intent to impugn the rationality of properly formulated external questions. The purpose of this chapter is to expand upon and clarify the true nature of external questions. Careful attention to this question will complete the task of providing a replacement for the standard interpretation. It will also clarify the crucial distinction, highlighted in Chapters 3 and 5, between applying a criterion and choosing a criterion. The problems at issue can be illuminated by examining a recent controversy in the history and philosophy of science. Thomas Kuhn, in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, raised a number of conceptual issues in the philosophy of science by applying certain considerations from the

133 history of science. 4 In particular, he focussed attention on the difference between normal science, on the one hand, and revolutionary science on the other. Central to this distinction is the concept of a paradigm. As the controversy unfolded in reaction to Kuhn's position, the ambiguity of this central concept progressively emerged. For the moment, I will ignore this ambiguity, and note that there is an interesting parallel between Kuhn's concept of a paradigm and Carnap's notion of a linguistic framework. This suggests a corresponding parallel between Kuhn's revolutions and Carnap's external questions, on the one hand, and between normal science and Carnap's internal questions, on the other. While clear differences exist, the similarities are sufficient to suggest that a discussion of the debate precipitated by Kuhn's distinction will be instructive in understanding Carnap. Under at least one interpretation of the ambiguous concept of a paradigm, that concept is quite similar to Carnap's frameworks or linguistic frameworks. Unlike the passages where Kuhn treats a paradigm as if paradigms were a particular example of an important scientific breakthrough, 5 he often treats paradigms as a set of assumptions which determine the key explanatory concepts of a discipline, the types of experiments conducted, and the problems to be solved. 6 While Kuhn does not emphasize, as Carnap does, the place of language in embodying such assumptions, that difference can be set aside for present purposes. In a very complete and instructive critique of Kuhn's developing position, Stephen Toulmin has said: The two key notions in Kuhn's account - 'paradigm' and 'revolution' - are in fact separate and independent, both in their implications and in their historical origins. Originally, those who supported the doctrine of paradigms were in no way commited to a revolutionary view of paradigm-switches; and the full theory of intellectual revolutions is forced on us only if we construe the term 'paradigm' as equivalent to the phrase 'conceptual system' as understood in the 'logical' sense of traditional philosophy.?

In mentioning "the phrase 'conceptual system', as understood in the 'logical' sense of traditional philosophy," Toulmin is referring back to his earlier account of philosophers' tendency to view all science as taking place within closed, axiomatic systems. Toulmin describes this tendency as follows: From early on, however, all the philosophical theories proposed as solutions to this problem [i.e. of how to rationally resolve men's disagreements] began to develop in a single direction. The need for an impartial forum and procedures was understood as calling for a single, unchanging, and uniquely authoritative system of ideas and beliefs. The prime exemplar of such a universal and authoritative system was found in the new, abstract networks of logic and geometry. In this way, 'objectivity', in the sense of impartiality, became equated with the 'objectivity' of timeless truths; the rational merits of an intellectual position were identified with its logical coherence; and the philosopher's measure of a man's rationality become [sic] his ability to recognize, without further argument,

134 the validity of the axioms, formal entailments, and logical necessities on which the claims of the authoritative system depended.8

In this latter passage, Toulmin is emphasizing that the tendency among philosophers is to assume that the proper approach to a body of knowledge is to endeavor to construct axiomatic systems. Such systems would consist of (a) syntactical rules of formation for the language, (b) certain logical and/or empirical axioms, (c) rules of transformation by which one is allowed to derive theorems from the axioms, and (d) a set of semantical rules for interpreting and verifying the theorems derived from the axioms. I think it is fair to attribute to Carnap the view that such axiomatic systems are ideals in science as well as in mathematics and logical disciplines. Under the interpretation of a paradigm as a set of systematic assumptions which are operative in a discipline, Kuhn, too, can be taken to have such a view in mind. The former of the two above quotes from Toulmin can, then, be interpreted as claiming that Kuhn's position includes, in fact, two independent claims: (1) It is possible and instructive to see science as involving two types of inquiry — (a) inquiry within an accepted paradigm and (b) extraparadigmatic inquiry; and, these two types of inquiry are importantly different in their epistemological nature, and (2) Intraparadigmatic inquiries are "normal" science, and proceed according to the rules of transformation and verification set out by the accepted formal system, while extraparadigmatic inquiries proceed without any criteria at all. They are, hence, nonrational and arbitrary in nature and constitute radical and extreme breaks — revolutions — in the history of science. Toulmin claims that (2) follows from (1) only if one assumes that science must take place within the sort of closed axiomatic systems outlined above. This assumption — "the cult of systematicity" — as Toulmin derogatorily labels it, causes philosophers to assume that all decisions are either made within a closed, axiomatic system (in which case precisely describable rules of evaluation apply) or else they are totally nonrational in nature. Toulmin goes on to criticize Kuhn for unwittingly falling victim to the cult of systematicity. Toulmin sees Kuhn's thinking as undergoing several shifts, but as continuously determined by a covert commitment to that cult. When Kuhn began treating the concept of a scientific revolution as having explanatory value, he assumed that revolutions were based upon largely nonrational, arbitrary considerations, because they took place within no paradigm, and consequently, according to no set criteria of rational evaluation. Because the distinction Kuhn developed was so sharp, however, it was difficult to find any

135 examples of true "revolutions" in his sense of the term. Careful examination of historical detail showed that, in fact, major changes in paradigms took place over extended periods and after long and arduous debate. Kuhn, then, progressively construed his distinction as more and more a distinction between scientific arguments which do not involve conceptual or theoretical changes as opposed to those which do so. 9 Toulmin applauds this gradual change in Kuhn's position, but argues that, ultimately, the change undermines the original dichotomy between "normal" and "revolutionary" changes in science: Any suggestion that a complete paradigm-switch involves conceptual changes of a totally different kind from those that take place within the limits of a single overall paradigm that they represent some sort of a 'rational discontinuity', and lead to inescapable incomprehension - is quite misleading. At most, the two sorts of conceptual changes differ only in degree; and certainly they must, in the last resort, be accounted for in terms of the same set of factors and considerations. Assuming that 'normal' scientific changes can be explained in historical terms which are somehow suspended in the rare event of a scientific 'revolution' would, once again, be to fall back into an entirely naive historiography. 10

This argument is more than a little reminiscent of Quine's reaction to Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. There is one difference: Toulmin is refusing to draw a line between a normal conceptual shift and a complete paradigm-shift, whereas Quine attacks the difference (assumed here by Toulmin) between conceptual and nonconceptual shifts altogether. Both, however, attack distinctions between two types of questions on basically naturalistic grounds, arguing that, in practice, no sharp distinction can be discerned in the behavior of actual inquirers. Both admit a difference, but insist that this difference is one of degree, not of kind. There is much that is useful in Toulmin's critique of Kuhn, both in its own right and in the light it can shed upon Carnap's external questions. I agree with Toulmin that it is of utmost importance to distinguish the claims (1) and (2). It is quite possible to distinguish between intraparadigmatic disputes and extraparadigmatic disputes without claiming that the latter are nonrational and arbitrary. It is a mistake to assume that the only style of rationality is intraparadigmatic or intrasystematic in nature. Toulmin is, of course, correct in cautioning against the assumption that there will be clearly discernible differences among actual cases in scientific inquiry. But while his observation is correct — that in point of fact there is no sharp distinction between paradigmatic and nonparadigmatic shifts — it does not follow that it is not useful to recognize and develop two different concepts of rationality. The fact that some of the same types of factors affect paradigmatic and extraparadigmatic decisions alike does not entail that, on the best analysis, there will be only one style of rationality.

136 Carnap, like Kuhn, accepted (1); but, if my interpretation is correct, he, like Toulmin, rejected Kuhn's (2). In spite of this rejection, however, he did not argue, as Toulmin does, from the fact that one cannot sharply separate, in practice, internal issues from external issues to the conclusion that all scientific changes must, "in the last resort, be accounted for in terms of the same set of factors and considerations." To make this assertion without further argument is to commit the epistemological form of the naturalistic fallacy attributed to Quine, above. Kuhn, Toulmin, and Carnap can be compared as follows, given the distinction between (1) (the belief in a distinction between paradigmatic and nonparadigmatic issues) and (2) (the belief that all extraparadigmatic disputes are necessarily nonrational in nature). Kuhn (at the time he wrote The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) seems to have believed both (1) and (2), failing carefully to distinguish the two views. This position is identical to the one mistakenly attributed to Carnap on the standard interpretation. Toulmin accepts (1) and rejects (2), arguing that while the concept of a paradigm can be useful, there is no sharp difference between intraparadigmatic and extraparadigmatic disputes, and that there must be, therefore, one criterion of rationality which is operative to varying degrees in these different types of debates. Carnap, on my interpretation, accepted (1) and, like Toulmin, rejected (2). Further, he recognized, as Toulmin does, that in actual practice there are few, if any, examples of disputes which are decided according to a totally intraparadigmatic evaluation procedure. Rather than following Toulmin in concluding that there must be only one evaluation procedure, Carnap reasoned that there are, at least ideally, two rational evaluation procedures. Perhaps Kuhn accepted the cult of systematicity as a "cult"; and, perhaps, this led him to expect actual cases to follow this pattern. The commitment to systematicity functioned differently in determining Carnap's views. Carnap saw systematic science as an ideal. In an ideal situation, scientific paradigms would be worked out to such a degree that the rules of transformation would generate predictions and the rules of confirmation would indicate, almost algorithmically, answers to disputes as soon as technology allows the collection of the necessary data. This is not, however, a description of normal science, but a prescriptive ideal. It could never lead Carnap to conclude that all disputes which cannot be so formalized are wholly irrational in nature. Rather, it led Carnap to notice that even if some science were to achieve such a high ideal, it would be radically incomplete. Such a system could not account for, and provide a decision procedure for, those disputes concerning whether to accept that system itself. Rather than following Toulmin and Quine in opting for a naturalistic epistemology, Carnap's system attempts to provide two separate ideals of rationality. He attempted, especially in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," to outline an external sense of rationality — a means of deciding

137 disputes concerning the desirability of one systematic framework as opposed to another. The crucial concepts introduced by Carnap are conventionalism and utility. External questions, because they are underdetermined by the available data alone, are conventional in nature. This does not mean they are arbitrary or to be decided on fundamentally nonrational grounds. Rather, decisions concerning these questions must be decided on utilitarian grounds. Much more, of course, must be said about this concept of utility, if it is to provide the basis for a new form of rationality. I am convinced, however, that this concept of utility can and must be analyzed and developed, if a proper understanding and evaluation of Carnap's system is to take place. The standard interpretation takes the concept of utility or pragmatic decisions to signal the end of rational debate. Pragmatic decisions are, on that interpretation, merely emotively motivated, arbitrary choices, devoid of cognitive content. On my interpretation, the concept of utility is but a beginning. It is no more than a hint as to how one might construct a rational evaluation procedure for external questions.

6.2 CARNAP ON EXTERNAL RATIONALITY

Several, quite diverse, interpretations of Carnap's views on external questions appear in the recent literature. I will discuss several of these in this section, which will culminate in a statement of Carnap's criterion of external rationality. Interpretations by the following commentators will be discussed: (a) E. D.Klemke, (b) D.Goldstick, (c) Grover Maxwell, and (d) Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. (a) In his essay "Are 'External Questions' Non-cognitive?," E.D. Klemke argues that it is "unduly arbitrary" for Carnap to deny cognitive truth to the claim "The thing world is real."11 He argues as follows: All I wish to point out is that 1/anyone ever did have good reasons for accepting the thing language, upon the basis of its 'efficiency, fruitfulness and simplicity' (as Carnap suggests that one might), then this must constitute good evidence for the reality of the thing world; and that, therefore, the assertion 'The thing world is real' is no less cognitive than the assertion 'There is a piece of paper on my desk'. What is it that makes the thing language efficient and fruitful? Would it be efficient and fruitful if there were no things, if things were not real in some sense? Or are its efficiency and fruitfulness qualities internal to the thing language? Or are these characteristics freak accidents, or mysteries, for which we can thank the gods? 1 2

While this is an interesting argument, the Carnapian has a ready answer. Klemke fails to take into account that Carnap was a conventionalist about external questions. Given the account of conventionalism attributed to Carnap in section 2.3, it is possible, even given all of the evidence cited by Klemke, that just as much evidence could be amassed in favor of the phenomenalistic

138 alternative. The principle of tolerance implies that it is possible that there be more than one, even many, languages of which it can be said that each of those languages is efficient, fruitful and simple. If this is true, where would this leave Klemke's claim that the efficiency, etc. of the thing language "must constitute good evidence for the reality, of the thing world?" There would, then, be good evidence for conflicting claims. It might be responded, by Klemke, that it is not all that unusual for there to be good evidence for conflicting claims — perhaps all that is needed is more evidence to adjudicate the dispute. On Carnap's conventionalism, however, the determining factor is purpose. It might be the case that given one purpose (say epistemological reconstruction), the phenomenal language may turn out to be clearly the most efficient, etc., while for some other purpose (say, the statement of laws of nature) the thing language will be most efficient. 13 Given this situation, it would be impossible to claim that either realism or phenomenalism better describes the way the world really is. Klemke's attempt to refute Carnap's position on external questions fails because Klemke does not see the central relationship between utility and conventionalism. Klemke may have a quarrel with Carnap, but if so, it concerns, most centrally, Carnap's conventionalism. If Klemke is to make his case, he must address this central disagreement. For, if Carnap was correct in his conventionalistic claim that a number of alternative linguistic frameworks can be useful, and that different ones are useful for different purposes, then Klemke's claim that the usefulness of a given linguistic framework can be evidence for a cognitively true statement about the world must be misguided. (b) Klemke fails to see the motivation which led Carnap away from a realist interpretation of external questions. He thinks it should be possible to obtain evidence confirming unique positions on external questions. D. Goldstick commits the opposite error. He takes it that since only issues of utility are involved, external questions are entirely nonrational. 14 I have already noted that this position of Goldstick is a natural concomitant of the standard interpretation of Carnap, and I have given reasons, in that regard, which undermine the motivation for attributing the view to Carnap. However, Goldstick's interpretation can fruitfully be addressed once again, as it implies a conception of utility which is widely attributed to Carnap. While Klemke fails to see any grounds for distinguishing the truth status of Carnap's external statements from that of internal ones, Goldstick fails to see any reason for distinguishing the status of external statements from poetry and nonsense. He takes external statements to be arbitrary, emotive choices with no means available for criticism or judgment at all. He says: The basic fulcrum of Carnap's agnostic credo ... is his 'principle of tolerance'. Throughout his philosophical career he seems to have regarded this principle as saying that there is a plurality of languages which are equally appropriate for all cognitive tasks, there being absolutely nothing to choose between any two of them theoretically.^

139 I find Goldstick's attribution of this view of tolerance to Carnap totally mystifying. The reference to all cognitive tasks is curiously un-Carnapian. The central thrust of the principle of tolerance is to emphasize that all judgments concerning linguistic frameworks must take place in a particular context with a clearly stated purpose. Attempts to generalize about all cognitive tasks would surely be rejected by Carnap as smacking of the absolutism he was most concerned to avoid. Further, Goldstick's statement of the principle of tolerance suggests that he thinks that tolerance with respect to two languages L] and L2 presupposes that L j and L2 are equally appropriate for all cognitive tasks. If this were Camap's intent, he could hardly have used, as his central example of tolerance in Logical Syntax,16 the controversy between constructivist and classical mathematics. The Definite Language I is obviously weaker than the Indefinite Language II, and Carnap says as much at the outset of his discussion. 17 Still, Carnap recommends tolerance with respect to the choice between Languages I and II. The source of this tolerance is not the equal cognitive capacities of the two languages, but rather the recognition that for some purposes Language I is preferable and for other purposes Language II is preferable. Carnap also cited, as an example of a choice which should be treated with tolerance, the choice (considered by Wittgenstein) to eliminate all general statements as meaningless (because they cannot be conclusively verified). Carnap could not have thought that such a choice would not affect the cognitive power of a language. 18 It is Goldstick's assumption of the standard interpretation of Carnap which leads him to this seriously deficient view of tolerance. He believes that all external questions are cognitively meaningless in that they are ruled so by the verifiability criterion. Therefore, he thinks there can be no difference in cognitive power of the languages considered. Once one sees that verifiability is irrelevant in this context, there is no temptation to treat the two languages in question as if there is "absolutely nothing to choose between ... them theoretically." (c) Both Klemke's and Goldstick's confusions can be illuminated by the introduction of a very useful distinction suggested by Grover Maxwell. In his article entitled "Theories, Frameworks, and Ontology," Maxwell says: Let us now examine, in more detail, a question about which Carnap has been tantelizingly [sic] terse: What factors are relevant for the "pragmatic" justification (vindication) of a framework? Or: What is it for one framework to be more useful than another? I believe that there are two problems here which have often been conflated. (We shall see, however, that, indeed, they are not completely extricable from each other.) The first is: What requirements must any descriptive framework worthy of the name fulfill? The second is: Given that two or more frameworks fulfill this requirement, what additional factors are relevant for our choice of one framework over the others? ^

Maxwell speaks of factors relevant to the second question as '"purely prag-

140 matic' or useful in the weak sense" and says that they are "simplicity; ease of comprehension, communication, and computations and other inferential manipulations; and also aesthetic considerations (including, even, personal idiosyncratic tastes, provided we can persuade other relevant language users to accept our frameworks)." 2 0 Maxwell admits that it is much more difficult to characterize the factors relevant to the first question. 21 He says: As a crude stab at the first question we might say that a framework must provide the linguistic apparatus for "saying all that we want to say" or for reporting, explaining, and predicting all of "the facts." Neither of these answers is very helpful; for, as Carnap says, some of us might "want" to refrain from speaking altogether, and just what "the facts" are is, of course, part of what is at issue (i.e. what the world consists of, what exists, what "reality" is "really" like, etc.). Our experiential access to the facts, whatever these may be, is, of course, via the quickly decidable statements of our framework.

Maxwell rightly resists the temptation to use such labels as "the Given," "direct experience," etc., and leaves the requirement "only crudely formulated." He proposes that the condition, however it is finally formulated, be called "the condition of adequacy" of the framework. 2 2 I will use Maxwell's labels, but it is necessary to introduce one amendment. Maxwell, for some reason, limits conditions of adequacy to frameworks devised for descriptive purposes. 23 It makes more sense to give a generalized account of adequacy, because there are many nondescriptive purposes for which there are clear examples of what Maxwell is suggesting. Take, for example, the purpose of constructing a language in which it is possible to do truth functional logic. It seems quite reasonable to rule out a language which has as its only connective the standard ' 3 ' . Such a language, it can easily be shown, is expressively incomplete with respect to truth functions. Likewise, if one's purpose is to do all of classical mathematics, it can be shown that a system built upon purely intuitionistic principles is inadequate in the sense here explained. It would be possible to multiply examples such as these indefinitely for nondescriptive disciplines. Thus, I propose that Maxwell's first question be given more general formulation, "What requirement must a language, L, fulfill in order to be worthy of consideration for a given purpose, P?" This increase in generality has two effects, both of which are very much in the spirit of "Empiricicism, Semantics, and Ontology." First, it makes the system relevant to nondescriptive, as well as descriptive frameworks. Second, it introduces purpose as a variable, emphasizing that the system has, at its heart, the concept of varying human purposes. I do not pretend that this amendment helps to make Maxwell's formulation more precise. That problem remains, and becomes, perhaps, even more difficult, as it must now be formulated in a more general way to include questions of adequacy for nondescriptive as well as descriptive purposes.

141 One positive result with respect to clarity, however, is that there are now some excellent, noncontroversial examples of the concept of adequacy at which Maxwell is aiming. To expand the example mentioned above, suppose two logicians are considering which language to choose as the language for a propositional calculus. There will be an important difference, in kind, between the reasons given for ruling out a language which has, as its only connective, the standard 'D' and the reasons given for ruling out a language which has seven primitive connectives. The reasons in the former case will concern what Maxwell calls conditions of adequacy, while in the latter case, only purely pragmatic questions will be at issue. While I agree with Maxwell that a precise formulation of this distinction would be extremely difficult, I believe it is clear enough for present purposes. Using this distinction, it is possible to clarify the errors of Klemke and Goldstick. Klemke assumes that there will be a sufficient number of considerations relevant to the conditions of adequacy in order to achieve a unique decision as to the correct language. That is, his claim that the question of the reality of the physical world is cognitive presupposes that, for each alternative to the physical object language, considerations could be brought against that alternative to show that it fails some condition of adequacy. This ignores Carnap's conventionalism. Goldstick makes, in a sense, the opposite error. He assumes that Carnap's conventionalism implies that the only relevant considerations in choosing a framework are Maxwell's purely pragmatic factors. This assumption is indicated in his claim that Carnap took the principle of tolerance as implying "that there is a plurality of languages which are equally appropriate theoretically for all cognitive tasks." Consequently, Goldstick thinks that all external decisions are wholly determined by questions of "fruitfulness, simplicity of expression or the like." 2 4 This interpretation ignores Carnap's clear recognition that questions of cognitive power will be central in choices of linguistic frameworks. (d) Having clarified the types of considerations involved in Carnap's conception of utility, I turn now to a discussion of Carnap's formulation of these considerations. As I have noted, a number of the phrases which Carnap used to describe external questions (for example, "non-cognitive," "neither true nor false," etc.), have led to an overemphasis on the nonrational nature of external questions. Carnap seemed quite concerned to emphasize that external questions concern "practical decisions rather than assertions." 25 But he emphatically insisted that reasons can be given for these practical decisions. He says, for example, "The thing language in the customary form works indeed with a high degree of efficiency for most purposes of everyday life. This is a matter of fact, based upon the content of our experiences." It is true, of course, that he goes on to caution against treating these matters of fact as "confirming evidence for the reality of the thing world." 2 6 There is no doubt, however, that reasons can be adduced with respect to external de-

142 cisions. Presumably, a person can also make ill-advised decisions. In one very interesting passage, Carnap treats the internal-external distinction as if it were a tripartite distinction: A question like "Are there (really) space-time points?" is ambiguous. It may be meant as an internal question; then the affirmative answer is, of course, analytic or trivial. Or it may be meant in the external sense: "Shall we introduce such and such forms into our language?" In this case it is not a theoretical but a practical question, a matter of decision rather than assertion, and hence the proposed formulation would be misleading. Or finally, it may be meant in the following sense: "Are our experiences such that the use of the linguistic forms in question will be expedient and fruitful?" This is a theoretical question of a factual, empirical nature. But it concerns a matter of degree; therefore a formulation in the form "real or n o t ? " would be inadequate.27

Thus, Carnap recognized that the process of accepting a linguistic framework (i.e. answering an external question) involves two steps: First, the exploration as to which linguistic framework is the most likely to lead to success and, second, the decision to choose one language over another. The former of these questions is theoretical, i.e. to be decided by experimentation and observation. The latter, being a decision, cannot be either true or false. 2 8 Carnap comes very close, in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," to treating external statements as theoretical: The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation for the decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of e n t i t i e s . 2 9

Note that Carnap, here, says that "it," i.e. the acceptance, can be judged as being more or less expedient, etc. Yet, he refuses to identify the problem of realism with the theoretical questions of expedience: The efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity of the use of the thing language may be among the decisive factors. And the questions concerning these qualities are indeed of a theoretical nature. But these questions cannot be identified with the questions of realism. They are not yes-no questions but question o f d e g r e e . 3 0

Why did Carnap not treat external theses as a very large set of sub-theses of the form: If the stated purpose of an enterprise is X, then language L will be the most fruitful, etc?

Yehoshua Bar-Hillel suggested this possibility in his "Remarks on Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language." Bar-Hillel says:

143 ... one may insist — rightfully, I think - that discussing the utility of a proposal is essentially the same as discussing the truth of the assertion that this proposal is useful. This would confirm my contention ... that out of the various advantages, which Carnap claims for the translation of controversial philosophical theses from material into the formal mode of speech, that of forcing the participants to clarify whether they intended to make an assertion or a suggestion is probably of minor importance. The decisive advantage is in the transition from "ontological" disputes to methodological controversies.^

Carnap answered Bar-Hillel's remark as follows: Bar-Hillel suggests not only to replace ontological theses of the existence of certain kinds of entities by a discussion of practical questions concerning the choice of forms of language, but rather to interpret those theses as assertions of the expediency of corresponding language forms for certain purposes. It is true that this procedure would have the advantage that the allegedly theoretical theses of ontology would be interpreted as genuine theoretical theses. However, I still have the feeling that this re-interpretation deviates too much from the interpretation which the philosophers themselves actually had in mind.

What is to be made of Carnap's reasoning here? Why did he emphasize that these theoretical questions are matters of degree? Because, I think, identifying the theoretical question about linguistic forms with the traditional metaphysical thesis ignores language relativity. The theoretical questions of efficiency, etc. are always to be decided according to a particular purpose. So, answers about efficiency are matters of degree, i.e. they describe what is useful in some situations, but not in others. Hence, they are answers of degree only, and are not absolute. Unfortunately, Carnap failed to see Bar-Hillel's point, but his reaction is instructive nonetheless. Bar-Hillel was not suggesting that intentions concerning fruitfulness of linguistic frameworks be attributed to traditional philosophers. Rather, he was suggesting that once traditional theses are replaced with "external statements," these statements be accorded truth or falsity as theoretical assertions about language. In his reply, Carnap seemed to approve of this move, but to object only to the attribution of intentions to traditional philosophers who, he rightly thought, never had them. Thus, Carnap was not hostile to the suggestion of Bar-Hillel, which I wish to reinforce. The Carnapian model may be seen as replacing traditional ontological theses with external statements about the usefulness of particular linguistic frameworks, for particular purposes. This avoids pre-linguistic absolutism, which was the true enemy of Carnap's system, but does not lead to the nihilistic view Goldstick attributes to Carnap. Whether or not one makes the change proposed by Bar-Hillel, one point is clear from the quotes from "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology": The decision to accept or reject a linguistic framework is made on rational grounds.

144 There is evidence to be offered, and one can be mistaken in choosing a framework. Thus, Goldstick is quite mistaken in interpreting Carnap as placing external questions outside the realm of rational discourse. It is true that Carnap wanted to remove them from the realm of intrasystematic questions, to emphasize the difference in decision criteria between external questions and internal questions. He did not, however, want to remove external questions from the realm of the rational. While some of Carnap's pronouncements are misleading on this point, it should be realized that Carnap was attempting to emphasize the relativistic nature of metatheoretical questions. There is no such absolute criterion of truth as is afforded by correspondence of object languages to the world. Rather, external questions must be decided according to a conventionalistic criterion. The upshot of these considerations is to emphasize, as Bar-Hillel suggests, the theoretical/metatheoretical distinction, and to minimize Carnap's use of terms such as 'non-cognitive', etc. This suggests that it is, ultimately, possible to construct a criterion of "external rationality." The central upshot of Carnap's internal-external distinction is not to emphasize the undecidability and arbitrariness of external questions, but to emphasize that the criterion of justified decisions is quite different from the criterion for judging internal truth. In concluding this section I will, by way of summary, suggest, in outline form, what would be involved in such a criterion. At the heart of such a criterion lies Carnap's form of conventionalism, as was summarized in theses (l)-(4) of section 2.3. In this section, it has been noted, as a refinement, that purposes can interact with data and framework in two different manners. Given a certain purpose, some linguistic frameworks may be ruled out as failing conditions of adequacy for that purpose. Even given that two frameworks are each determined adequate, it is still possible to make further discriminations. These further discriminations will concern purely pragmatic considerations of simplicity, ease of computation, etc. The process in question can be described, in precise terms, in the following steps: I. State, clearly, some accepted purpose, P. II. List some set of linguistic frameworks which are possible, call it a, composed of {L}, L2, L3,..., Ljj}. III. Apply the conditions of adequacy, C, deciding which members of a are adequate to P. Call this subset of a, p. pis composed oflLj, Lj, L^,..., Lm This determination may be possible through a metaproof of the properties of the languages in question, or may require use on an experimental basis. IV. If p has only one member, then that language should be chosen. If p contains more than one member, then the members of j3 should be ordered according to how they score on an "efficiency measure," which consists

145 of a set of (perhaps weighted) considerations of simplicity, ease of computation, fruitfulness, etc. This list will be determined, at least partially, by the original statement of P. V. Choose that member of p which scores the best according to M. If there is more than one language which has the identical best score, the choice between these two languages would be arbitrary — based on questions of taste, habit, etc.

6.3 ABSOLUTISM AGAIN?

The reader might think that, on the basis of such a criterion, if all of the variables could be explicated, one could make absolute choices. One means to accomplish this would be that suggested by Klemke. But I have argued that Klemke fails to see that there is no reason to think that one uniquely adequate language will emerge at step III. Even more important, P is a variable. As P varies, it is likely that there will be different outputs at step III. Still, it might be thought that one could make a list of purposes, and / / i t turned out that some language, Lj, is adequate for all of the purposes, it could be absolutized. This is unlikely, however, unless one places some restriction upon the purposes allowed to appear on the list, as human's sometimes adopt conflicting purposes; and, for conflicting purposes, one would not expect that the criterion would yield a single answer. This suggests a final possibility, however. One could, perhaps, severely restrict which purposes are to be allowed as legitimate, and then use this criterion to make absolute judgments of utility. One might, then, wish to treat these absolute judgments realistically. This option, which may not sound initially promising, is chosen by Quine in Word and Object. There, he denies that "the quest of a simplest overall pattern of canonical notation" can be distinguished from "a quest of ultimate categories, a limning of the most general traits of reality," 3 3 and says, "On the whole the canonical systems of logical notation are best seen not as complete notations for discourse on special subjects, but as partial notations for discourse on all subjects." 3 4 It was noted in section 3.3, that Quine's position, here, led him to reject many-sorted languages as an explication of the concept of ontology. It was also noted that this different criterion of utility is motivated by Quine's coherence approach to evidence. If sentences, logical and empirical, are judged solely according to how they fit into a system, this requires a general conception of fitting whereby a particular sentence cannot fit in one context and fail to fit in another. It follows then that there is an important difference between the Quinean and Carnapian conceptions of pragmatic utility. While Carnap's system requires an abstract criterion applicable, by substitution, to variable contexts and purposes, Quine's system requires an absolute criterion applicable in all contexts. The

146 former conception results from the Carnapian willingness to tolerate many, perhaps even conflicting, human purposes, while the latter absolutism is based upon the assumption that there is a unified, systematic purpose in human communication. If some canonical language is, on Quine's view, to be adopted, then it must be shown that it improves the whole structure which is our system of beliefs. This explains, at once, why Quine rejects Carnap's manysorted language, and why he can arrive at an absolute conception of utility. Quine does not recognize limited purposes, except insofar as they fit into a systematic hierarchy of human purposes, culminating in the highest practical need — survival. These reflections emphasize, once again, that the debate between Carnap and Quine must be approached in a systematic manner. Their views on analyticity, evidence, externality, and utility are all interrelated. Given a position on any of these elements, intrasystematic reasons can be used to justify the adoption of a corresppnding position with respect to the other elements. It might be thought, then, that Quine's insistence upon a single criterion of utility, upon the general applicability of any change in notation, affords an advantage to his system by virtue of the achievement of a higher degree of systematicity. There is, however, a Carnapian rejoinder to this consideration. Carnap, likewise, achieves systematicity, but on a different level. He can give a completely general account (by virtue of the internalexternal distinction) of how a person is to make decisions with respect to any problem, given a clear statement of the purpose the person has adopted. It will emerge below that Carnap's system seems to have trouble, ultimately, with relativism with respect to human purposes. It is true that Quine avoids this relativism - but only by virtue of an unjustified legislation of some set of human purposes as absolute. While it is difficult to see how Carnap avoids, in the end, a rational impasse if two discussants steadfastly refuse to adopt the same purpose, Quine avoids this only by an act of legislation, about which very little may be said. I take it as an advantage of Carnap's system that several levels of distinctions can be made, and rational debate can be undertaken on several levels, as is witnessed by the complex nature of the criterion of external rationality outlined above. While it is an advantage of the system to make such distinctions possible, it is certainly a flaw in Carnap's exposition to have failed to provide any useful analysis of the concept of pragmatic utility. 35 In the remaining section of this chapter, I will attempt to remedy this failure by discussing the extent to which disagreements concerning utilities can be reduced to rational, decidable debate.

6.4 THE LIMITS O F EXTERNAL RATIONALITY

To what extent can Carnap's system provide a rational decision procedure for

147 all questions? Or, to put the question in slightly more traditional terms, what are the limits of rational debate, given the Carnapian system? It can be assumed that, once a linguistic framework of the type Carnap envisioned has been chosen, all internal questions become susceptible to decision procedures set out in the chosen framework. Given the choice of, and agreement upon, an adequate framework for the given purpose, all issues will be decidable, given enough data. It will not be alarming if, in practice, disagreement continues, as it is quite possible that there is an infinite amount of data available, in principle, a finite subset of which is in practice available at any given point in time. Likewise, certain types of external questions are accessible to the criterion of external rationality schematized at the end of section 7.2. Here, however, unsolved problems arise. The schema involved is just that — a schema, with none of the crucial variables explicated precisely. The crucial variables in that schema are (a) 'purpose, P', (b) 'conditions of adequacy, C', and (c) 'Efficiency measure, M'. It is the major failing of Carnap, in particular, and positivists more generally, to have failed to give anything like an account of these crucial concepts. To say that external issues depend upon questions of pragmatic utility should not be the end, but the beginning of an account. A fully adequate account of each of these concepts would require another volume. Thus, at the risk of tarring myself with a brush just used on positivists, I will pass over each of (a)-(c) in a far too cursory manner. If some person or group of persons can accept a clearly stated purpose, this can, surely, provide the basis for rational debate. Further, this rational debate can, presumably, raise considerations which involve either conditions of adequacy of the application of an efficiency measure. Further illumination must come, on these issues, from careful and systematic work in the pragmatics of languages. However difficult it might be, in practice, to formulate a criterion of adequacy which judges the sufficiency of proposed languages for proposed purposes, I can see no problems of principle. There are numerous examples of cases of adequacy and inadequacy, especially in logic and mathematics. What is required is some sort of explication of the crucial differences between the two types of cases. The situation with respect to developing an efficiency measure is both simpler, in the sense that there is no reason to prefer a single efficiency measure, and more complicated, in that lacking uniqueness, questions will inevitably arise as to which criterion is appropriate in given contexts. For example, logicians have long been struck by the tradeoff involved between the sort of simplicity involved in developing a framework of logistic in which a minimal number of primitives are necessary (which has the advantage of elegance and simplicity in doing metaproofs about the system) and the sort of simplicity involved in computations which is afforded by having many primitive expressions, rules, and axioms. Apparently, then, a full-blown efficiency measure would involve a whole list of factors, some of which would always be operational, and others of

148 which would be stated hypothetically and would only be relevant in some contexts, depending upon the particular purpose stated. Undoubtedly, the individual measures would have to be weighted, rather than treated equally. With respect to isolating such a list, one positivist escapes the criticism of having ignored the explication of the concept of utility. Herbert Feigl has suggested a list in his essay, "De Principiis Non Disputandum ...?" 3 6 Feigl's list would provide at least a beginning point for the development of an efficiency measure. Feigl lists: (1) clarity, i.e., freedom from confusion as to types of significance; (2) definiteness, i.e., univocality of meaning, possibly enhanced by quantitative precision; (3) consistency and conclusiveness, i.e., absence of self-contradiction (by means of rules of inference that insure the truth of conclusions derived from true premises); (4) warranted (reliable) assertibility, i.e., availability of evidence that confers a high degree of confirmation on our knowledge claims; and (5) maximum scope, i.e., as complete and detailed coverage of fact as is compatible with the foregoing conditions.

Carnap's system, thus supplemented by material from Maxwell and Feigl, shows that a very large subset of external questions can be submitted to rational debate. Even though no formal decision procedure is likely to be forthcoming, there is at least an intuitive notion of what is involved in conditions of adequacy, and a tentative list of purely pragmatic factors to be considered. However, all of the external questions for which these considerations are relevant are external questions about which agreement as to purposes has been attained. Can anything be said concerning disagreements concerning purposes? Must it, in the end, be admitted that in all of those cases where there is disagreement in purposes, in commitment to ends, that no rational debate is possible? For all those who cherish objectivity, this may appear to be the crux of the matter. Is there, at the heart of the system, a central core of nonrationally held commitments? There can be little doubt that, on Carnap's system, commitments to purposes have a certain priority. The criterion for external rationality outlined above presupposes the concept of purposes, and all internal questions, in turn, presuppose answers to external questions. It is possible, however, to overemphasize the practical effects of this dependence. In actual discourse, the process is reversed. Sentences are uttered and, if disagreement arises, discussion and debate ensues. Usually this discussion takes place in a context where an external framework is presupposed. Sometimes, however, the issue resists resolution within the framework, and it turns out that external questions are at issue. In most of these cases, in turn, common purposes are presupposed, and the dispute is accessible to reason by virtue of the criterion of external rationality. Even in those cases where a difference of commitments exists, tolerance is often the proper

149 stance once the difference is recognized for what it is. The upshot in these cases is recognition that the two disputants have different but compatible goals, and the natural reaction in such cases is to accept this difference as a concomitant of the necessary division of labor, or with a shrug and a "to each his own." It should be clear what a tremendously large percentage of actual debates fall into one or the other of these categories, and that all of these debates are, on Carnap's system, open to rational discussion. Still, it must be recognized that there are some disputes which ultimately fall outside this very broad class. This remainder consists of those disputes in which the disputants hold mutually incompatible purposes or ends. Those who assume that positivists are necessarily emotivists will assume that the matter ends here. The emotivist will say, at this point, that these debates are irresoluble by rational debate. Perhaps, however, the reader has by now been struck by the analogy between ethics and metaphysics. I began this book by noting the tremendous difference in treatment which metaphysical problems got, depending upon the extent of reliance upon the verifiability criterion. If the critique of metaphysics is based upon the verifiability criterion, metaphysical issues are quickly banished from the realm of rational debate. If, however, the emphasis of the critique lies not on verifiability but on the epistemological difference between questions asked given a criterion and questions asked concerning criteria, reconstruction rather than banishment is the result. Likewise in ethics. If the positivist approaches ethics from the point of view of verifiability, value questions are, without ado, relegated to nonrational status. However, just as Carnap can be interpreted as emphasizing the metatheoretical nature of metaphysics, there is an available alternative to the emotivism implied by verificationism in ethics. Again, Feigl develops this point more fully than other positivists. In his paper "Validation and Vindication," Feigl distinguishes between those ethical contexts where one holds fast to certain norms in order to examine the validity of more special moral judgments (validation) and contexts in which the norms themselves are questioned (vindication). 38 The analogy to internal and external questions should be obvious. He goes on to distinguish his position from that of emotivism and intuitionism: The present approach differs from both fhe intuitionistic and the emotivist point of view (and is in more than one way closer to the Kantian) in that the great variety of selfevident prima facie obligations countenanced by the intuitionists and the corresponding equally great variety of interest-fixations allowed for by the emotivists are supplanted by a relatively small number of basic norms and priority rules.... In contradistinction to the Kantian metaphysics of morals a plurality of alternative ethical systems is here envisaged as a matter of historical and contemporary fact. As long as there are changing and divergent terminal purposes and ideals there will be different systems of moral validation. The moral approval of a given ideal is of course trivially validated by the system which that ideal vindicates; and, contrariwise, trivially invalidated by an alternative incompatible system....39

150 While Feigl is willing to grant an ultimate relativity, he is quite correct in criticizing emotivists for missing much that can be rationally discussed in ethics. He says: It is only too tempting to hope for a ... universal code of morals. But in view not only of the stark realities of group and culture-centered ethical standards, but also because of the ever present quandaries regarding the priority between the several supreme standards ("prima facie obligation," i.e. the validating principles of moral judgments) within a given group or culture we can scarcely expect a universal unanimity of purposes which would vindicate a set of unique standards and a rigid order of priority among them for any and all questions of moral decision. At this point, I must concede, that the relativism implicit in the emotivist analyses (of Stevenson, for example) may prove insuperable. But beyond this important concession I would stress that the emotivist assimilation of moral issues to questions of personal taste and preference does not even begin to do justice to the nature of argument and justification in the moral realm of discourse. There is a great deal of validation in ethical arguments which is only too easily lost sight of, if attention is primarily fixed upon persuasion or vindication.40

This brief excursion into positivist ethics was necessitated by our analysis of external questions which are raised in a context lacking agreement on purpose. Such disputes were not straightforwardly amenable to evaluation on the Carnapian system. This brief discussion of ethics has produced two results. First, it appears that emotivism is not the only option available to positivists. Second, if, as seems natural, Carnap's internal-external distinction is supplemented by the analogous account of ethical debate, a whole process of validation of low-level specific value claims can be initiated. By virtue of this process, many differences in ends can be rationally discussed by appeal to more general ethical norms. Thus, when conflicts in purpose arise, one need not even then stop the process of debate. There may very well be general norms or criteria of right action, agreed upon by both disputants, which can serve as a means to validate one or the other positions. In the end, however, there is a sense in which an ultimate relativity lies at the heart of the system. If there is no agreement on an internal question, no agreement on a framework for deciding the internal question, no agreement on the purposes toward which the framework should aim, and no agreement in basic value commitments, then rational debate ceases. It has, already, been noted how seldom this will occur, but it might be thought that these cases, however few, are indicative of an extremely important point, theoretically. They indicate that, in some sense, the system lacks objectivity at its very heart — the most basic commitments of an individual are relativistic, noncognitive, and outside the realm of rational debate. But such labels require careful attention. 41 I will concentrate on the term 'noncognitive', as it has been central in discussions of logical positivism. Originally, in verificationistic contexts, 'noncognitive' was opposed to 'cognitively meaningful' the latter of which included analytic, contradictory, and

151 synthetic or scientific statements. Since analytic and contradictory statements were not really central to the debate, 'cognitively meaningful' became an approbative label for scientific statements, and 'cognitively meaningless' or 'noncognitive' became a derogatory label for metaphysics and value pronouncements. I have argued, however, that the importance of verificationism has been overrated, and have suggested an alternative formulation of positivistic principles. On this alternative formulation, the emphasis lies upon the importance of the distinction between using and considering a criterion. Given this distinction, it is important to avoid the question-begging which would result from justifying a criterion by appeal to itself. Hence, a backward progression is begun. Whenever a dispute about proper criteria arises, the problem is pushed back toward ultimate and basic commitments. This structure applies to science and ethics alike. In both cases, there is a tendency to move further and further away from precise, accepted criteria as disagreement concerning those criteria arises. But what is left of the original scientific (cognitive) versus nonscientific (noncognitive) dichotomy? The logic of debate in both areas is similar. Both science and ethics progress from questions where clear criteria are offered (though not necessarily accepted) toward questions of greater and greater generality (where the problem is to find some shared ground of commitment to justify agreement upon some criterion). In ethics, perhaps, the locus of debate often starts at a point somewhat closer to basic value commitments and, hence, it arrives at these basic commitments somewhat sooner. But this involves no distinction in kind between the two fields. Both are, at their heart, equally cognitive and noncognitive. 42 The reader with a serious attachment to objectivity may not be comforted by this result. He may, indeed, react violently, claiming that I have not saved ethics from noncognitivism, but have, rather, plunged science into the same slough. In one sense, this reaction is just. Consider, however, what is finally involved in this noncognitivism. To say that science and ethics are both noncognitive in this sense is to say no more than has been said by many traditionalists — if two disputants have no common ground of agreement, even in their most basic and undebatable principles, then there remains no room for rational debate. Not only does this conclusion sound reminiscent of the whole tradition of Western rationality; it also has the ring of tautologyhood (perhaps this explains why it has not been seen as inimical to the tradition). It has been said many times that unless two disputants have, at least, a commitment to rational debate itself, there can be no room for rational debate. But once there is this glimmer of agreement, then there is some basis for an attempt to forge ever more specific and precisely stated criteria to evaluate positions.

152 NOTES 1 Cornman, p. 190. 2 Goldstick, p. 254. 3 Klemke, see, especially, pp. 290-295. 4 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962). 5 Ibid., p. 10. 6 Ibid., pp. 25-28. 7 Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding, Vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 106. 8 Ibid., p. 44. 9 Ibid., p. 114. 10 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 11 Klemke, p. 292. For reasons discussed in Chapter 2, I dislike the use of the terms 'cognitive' versus 'noncognitive' in this context. I would much prefer the terms 'theoretical' versus 'meta-theoretical'. For simplicity of exposition, 1 will here follow Klemke's terminology. 12 Ibid., pp. 291-292. 13 See Camap, The Logical Structure of the World, trans, by Rolf A.George (Berkeley, Cal.: The University of California Press, 1967), pp. 99-103. 14 Goldstick, p. 254. 15 Ibid., p. 255. 16 Camap, Logical Syntax, p. 52. 17 Ibid., p. 11. 18 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 19 Grover Maxwell, "Theories, Frameworks, and Ontology," Philosophy of Science, XXIX (1962), 135. 20 Ibid., p. 137. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., p. 138. 23 Ibid., p.m. 24 Goldstick, p. 255. 25 Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," pp. 208, 214. 26 Ibid., p. 208. 27 Ibid., p. 213. 28 Carnap, in discussing value questions, makes almost precisely the same point. See "Intellectual Autobiography," pp. 81-82: We distinguish between absolute or conditional value statements, e.g., one that says that a certain action is morally good in itself, and relative or conditional value statements, e.g., one saying that an action is good in the sense of being conducive toward reaching certain aims. Statements of the latter kind are obviously empirical, even though they may contain value terms like " g o o d " . 29 Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," p. 214. 30 Ibid., p. 208. 31 Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, "Remarks on Camap's Logical Syntax of Language" in Schilpp, p. 537. 32 Carnap, "Replies and Systematic Expositions," in Schilpp, pp. 941-942. 33 Quine, Word and Object, p. 160. 34 Ibid., p. 160.

153 35 For a brief but useful discussion of this point, see Warner A. Wick, 'The "Political" Philosophy of Logical Empiricism* Philosophical Studies, II (1951), 49-57, esp. 50-51. 36 Herbert Feigl, "De Principiis Non Disputandum...?" in Philosophical Analysis, ed. by Max Black (Fnglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 119-156. 37 Ibid., p. 152. 38 Herbert Feigl, "Validation and Vindication: An Analysis of the Nature of Ethical Arguments" in Readings in Ethical Theory, ed. by Wilfred Sellars and John Hospers (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), p. 678. 39 Ibid., pp. 678-679. 40 Ibid., p. 677. 41 In this connection, see Ibid., p. 679. 42 My discussion, here, has been deeply influenced by Alan Gewirth's paper, 'Positive "Ethics" and Normative "Science,"' Philosophical Review, LXIX (1960). I strongly recommend this essay to the reader who is interested in a fuller development of these points.

7. METAPHILOSOPHICAL CONCLUSIONS

7.1 THE CARNAPIAN MODEL, VERIFICATIONISM, AND UTILITY

I have argued that Carnap's essay "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," if supplemented with materials from earlier. Carnapian writings, provides a model for ontology. It embodies an understanding of the enterprise of philosophy which is both simple and profound. Unlike verificationistic and virulently antimetaphysical forms of positivism, this model is constructive in nature, and retains much of the structure of traditional philosophy. Consequently, many of the problems, arguments, and treatises of traditional philosophy can be seen as relevant to the model. In particular, I have argued that Carnap's use of a many-sorted language embodies the concept, traditionally central in ontology, of a category, or a natural kind. Since this traditional concept is retained (albeit in modernized, conventionalistic form), the list of problems which were traditionally considered ontological are retained on the Carnapian model. I have been at great pains to argue that they are retained not as arbitrary, nonrational shadows of their former selves; but, rather, they are embedded in an entire system for rational debate. Arguments of varying degrees of compulsion can be offered, and failure to reach agreement given a certain body of evidence may result in a search for more evidence of the same type already offered; or, it may, rather, result in shifting to a higher level — to a disagreement about the type of criteria relevant. Given the distinction between purely pragmatic factors and conditions of adequacy borrowed from Maxwell and expanded in section 6.2, it is quite plausible to interpret many of the arguments given by traditional ontologists as offering considerations concerning the possibility or impossibility of a certain framework fulfilling certain conditions of adequacy. Thus, Carnap's system makes contact with the tradition both with respect to the problems considered to be ontological and with respect to the arguments which are considered relevant. There is yet one more central feature which Carnap's system shares with traditional ontology. The traditional ontologist has always considered his pronouncements to be importantly different from the pronouncements of scientists and ordinary men. These pronouncements have been considered, in some important respect, to be immune from refutation by discoveries in the

155 various special disciplines, though by no means irrelevant to such discoveries. It has traditionally been assumed that philosophical issues are decided according to criteria quite different from those criteria applied in the special disciplines - but this was, emphatically, not taken to imply that philosophy was a nonrational discipline. Indeed, it has often been thought that the special disciplines depended upon philosophy, in some way, for their claims to rationality. 1 Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions captures the central elements of this view of philosophy. First, by exploiting the distinction between theoretical and metatheoretical questions, it embodies the widely adopted feeling that philosophy is, somehow, different. Philosophy concerns the metatheory of the various disciplines. Second, it explains and illuminates the feeling that the special senses of rationality operative in the various special disciplines are somehow dependent upon philosophy. On Carnap's account, philosophical issues concern the conceptual or linguistic frameworks and, consequently, the criteria of decision which are used in the special disciplines. The crucial difference between the special disciplines and philosophy is the difference between deliberation concerning a question for which clear criteria of decision have been adopted, on the one hand, and deliberation, on the other hand, concerning which concepts and criteria are to be adopted. Of crucial importance, here, is Carnap's clear recognition of the important place which concepts (i.e. language forms) play in the adoption and embodiment of decision criteria. I believe that the application of the object language-metalanguage distinction to philosophy (which results in the internal-external distinction) is nothing other than a linguistically precise embodiment of the view which I have called the hierarchical view of philosophy. My listing of all of these areas of agreement is not intended to imply that Camap had no disagreements with traditional philosophy and the traditional approaches of ontologists. The list of important areas of agreement does emphasize the extent to which Carnap's approach to traditional ontology is reconstructive rather than destructive in nature. It also emphasizes that much of Carnap's system is essentially noncontroversial with respect to traditional ontology — and can be seen as a congenial formalization by traditionalists as well as positivists and post-positivists. The central point of disagreement between Carnap and traditional, especially essentialistic, ontologists can be found in their respective views of the nature of language and linguistic frameworks. Carnap's adoption of the principle of tolerance, or conventionalism, with respect to linguistic frameworks sets his views in sharp opposition to the tradition. Most of the central areas of disagreement between Carnap and the essentialistic tradition find their origin in this one source. Traditionalists, because they felt that reality embodies a set of concepts, sought to discover the structure of reality. The belief that the structure of the world is given pre-linguistically, that the world determines the structure of human concepts rather than vice versa, is the heart of the essentialist's

156 position. Armed with this view, he can defuse the conventionalist's insistence that human purposes are importantly relevant to philosophical issues. For, if the structure of the world exists uniquely and is discernible pre-linguistically, the task of constructing a proper conceptual framework is derivative upon the task of discovering the structure of the world. But if Carnap is correct in his conventionalistic theory of linguistic frameworks, there can be no discovery of the structure of reality. Reality assumes the structure of human language; and, languages assume the structure dictated by human needs. One important corollary of Carnap's conventionalistic theory of language is a departure from the tradition with respect to the necessity of answers to external questions. The traditionalist, because he saw himself as discerning the true structure of reality, took his pronouncements to be absolute — not relative to a context determined by human purposes. Given this, he saw his pronouncements as a priori truths. This implies that the discoveries of philosophers are not only different from discoveries in the special disciplines, but they are also logically prior to, and independent of, those disciplinary discoveries. All science, both empirical and nonempirical, must await philosophy, if it is to be set upon a firm foundation. Since philosophy is, on this view, an a priori and prior discipline, the philosopher can learn little or nothing from the scientist, mathematician, etc. Carnap's relativization of philosophical discoveries implies changes in this attitude. Philosophy is, in a sense, at the service of the special disciplines. The view of philosophy implied has something in common with that which has been called the "handmaiden view of philosophy." 2 The philosopher takes his instruction, to a significant degree, from the special disciplinarian. It is the purposes adopted by these disciplinarians which determine the problems of philosophy. Unlike the Lockean view of philosophy,-^ however, which sees philosophy as having a mainly negative and corrective function, the Carnapian system suggests a far more creative function. Philosophers can do more than just clarify, sharpen, and illuminate terms and concepts already in use; it is also open to them to propose new linguistic and conceptual frameworks and, in essence, to introduce new ways of organizing and explaining data. It may be thought that even this latter is a mean task compared to the glories of the tradition when metaphysics was the Queen of the Sciences. But it must be remembered that, given the Carnapian view of the relationship between linguistic frameworks and reality, this task is indistinguishable from the attempt to understand whatever structure there exists in reality. Philosophy, on this view, concerns language; and, with respect to language, it fulfills two functions. First, it is a propaedeutic against confusions and unclarities which arise from the careless use of language. Philosophers, by being especially aware of the role played by our conceptual apparatus in discourse, can help to avoid puzzles and paradoxes by clarifying the true function of certain words and concepts, and by making such words and concepts more precise

157 when that is necessary. Second, philosophers can, given a creative application of the understanding they gain through their careful attention to the role played by language, suggest and initiate new linguistic frameworks. If, in examining theories from the special disciplines, it becomes obvious that "conceptual cramps" inherent in the framework of language and thought are holding back progress, it is possible to propose a new linguistic framework for organizing and explaining the data. Given the Carnapian view of linguistic frameworks, this task cannot be distinguished from the task of examining world-views — though the latter description sounds much more grandiose. Several interesting results follow with respect to the relationship between philosophy and the special disciplines. First, they are mutually interdependent enterprises. Philosophical problems presuppose theoretical goals and aims. Without such goals and aims, problems concerning the structure of reality and the structure of conceptual frameworks are radically indeterminate. But by the same token, the special disciplines depend upon philosophy in that philosophical decisions concerning what terms and concepts are used in a science determine the nature of the problems and the nature of the decision criteria used in the special discipline. All of this suggests that in one sense the dichotomy between philosophy and the special disciplines is artificial. When put this way, the Carnapian position appears similar to Quine's claim that the difference between philosophy and science is only one of degree. When Carnap's position is further explained, however, it becomes clear that the similarity is only superficial. Quine goes on to explain the lack of difference in kind between a "philosophical problem" and a "scientific problem." The Carnapian will not accept this explanation, as he recognizes a crucial difference, in kind, between choosing a criterion and using a criterion. The Carnapian would explain the claim that the dichotomy between science and philosophy is artificial in a quite different manner. There is an important difference between a philosophical and a nonphilosophical problem, but "philosophers" (i.e. professional philosophers) have no monopoly on thinking about or solving philosophical problems. If the crucial dichotomy between philosophy and the special disciplines is that of adopting a criterion versus using a criterion, it should be obvious that nonphilosophers (in the disciplinary sense) as well as philosophers are often concerned with philosophical issues. Whenever a special disciplinarian such as a scientist or mathematician undertakes the task of rethinking basic conceptual issues by considering alternative linguistic frameworks, he is addressing philosophical problems. Likewise, whenever a philosopher tries out one of his proposed linguistic or conceptual frameworks by casting the data of a special discipline into this framework he is doing special disciplinary work. In other words, there is a sharp dichotomy between philosophical and nonphilosophical problems, but no sharp dichotomy between philosophers and nonphilosophers. This latter opposition is

158 only a continuum, ranging from those who work in a philosophy department and spend most of their time dealing in external issues to those who work in other more specialized departments and do most of their work within a framework of assumptions and decision criteria. No special disciplinarian can do his job well unless he, from time to time, considers the framework of assumptions within which he works. Likewise, each philosopher should, occasionally, look to the sciences to see the applications of the frameworks he discusses. Philosophers, then, differ from members of other disciplines in that they presumably develop special skills with respect to dealing with external, conceptual issues. These skills, however, cannot be applied in a vacuum. To develop frameworks and decision criteria presupposes the application of these frameworks and criteria in a special discipline. To this point, this brief account of Carnap's metaphilosophical system has made no appeal to empiricism, in general, or to verificationism, in particular. Is Carnap's empiricism, then, a useless and irrelevant appendage, bearing no relationship to the core of his system? The answer is negative. Once the framework outlined so far is clearly understood, empiricism can be introduced in its proper place. Throughout this section I have used the phrase 'special disciplines' whenever I refer to the generality of disciplines excluding philosophy. I have resisted the temptation to speak of these disciplines as the 'sciences', because of the ambiguities inherent in that term. 'Science' sometimes refers to the empirical disciplines and sometimes refers to a more general category including not only the empirical disciplines but also nonempirical disciplines such as mathematics, set theory, etc. I will continue to avoid the ambiguities involved, here, by speaking of 'descriptive disciplines' and 'nondescriptive disciplines' in referring to the two categories, and I will retain the general phrase 'special disciplines' to refer to the inclusive category. The verification criterion can now be understood as follows: It is a metatheoretical (i.e. external) hypothesis (or, if preferred, proposal) of a general condition of adequacy for conceptual frameworks intended for use in descriptive disciplines. In other words, the verification criterion exploits the shared descriptive purposes of descriptive disciplines in order to propose that only languages which contain empirically verifiable terms be considered as viable conceptual frameworks. It is, on this view, subservient to the principle of tolerance, in that it is relativized to a clearly stated purpose; and, it is subservient to the hierarchical view of philosophy in that it is a metatheoretical proposal concerning a set of object languages. The former subservience shows how the verificationist principle, which sounds so dogmatic when improperly formulated, can be compatible with, and complementary to, the principle of tolerance. The latter subservience shows how the properly formulated verificationist criterion avoids the self-referential objection which is so often used as a popular argument against positivism. This reformulation of verificationism will most likely remove some, at

159 least, of the controversy surrounding that principle. It now becomes clear what was meant by positivists when they repeatedly emphasized that the criterion was intended to emphasize a distinction between cognitive and other types of meaning.4 This emphasis upon differentiation rather than prohibition indicates the complementary nature of verificationism and tolerance. Carnap belabored the point in Logical Syntax that he was concerned not with prohibitions, but with definitional differentiations. 5 This suggests that the strong emphasis upon science and mathematics which was so evident among Carnap and the other positivists in the 1920s and 1930s was largely a historical accident. The emphasis on descriptive meaning at the expense of other types of meaning was largely due, not to the philosophical commitments of (at least the Carnapian) system, but to the backgrounds in the descriptive disciplines shared by the adherents of the system. This further suggests that the Carnapian structure should put on exactly even par with descriptive purposes the other purposes such as evaluative, logical, and emotive. The implications that these other modes of meaning are, somehow, inferior to cognitive meaning is only an outgrowth of an accidental historical fact and cannot be justified within the structure of Carnap's system. Note, also, that many of the objectionable features of the "unity of science" movement are eliminated on this system. The claim that science is a unified system is, like the verificationist criterion, a hypothesis concerning the most fruitful strategies within the general group of disciplines which share descriptive purposes. There is no reason to see such an hypothesis as, in any way, threatening to disciplines which have adopted other goals than descriptive goals. Central to this whole system is, of course, the concept of decision criteria in special disciplines. The advance of knowledge requires decisions with respect to particular issues. Carnap's rejection of the belief in pre-linguistic structures in reality led to an acceptance of a conventionalistic account of conceptual frameworks. This conventionalistic account of conceptual frameworks elevates decisions in syntax, semantics, and pragmatics to the role of decisions concerning the criteria of truth for our various assertions. The elevation of the metatheory of language to this powerful position places tremendous weight upon the concept of utility, which Carnap suggested as the basis for all reasons given for decisions in these three crucial areas. There is no doubt that more work is necessary to explain and clarify this central concept. I have only begun such a task in Chapter 6. Once one draws and emphasizes, as Carnap does in his system of internal and external questions, the distinction between using a criterion and choosing a criterion, tremendous weight falls upon the criterion used in choosing criteria, or conceptual frameworks. What is needed is a full-scale consideration of what I have called the criteria for external rationality. This latter label is nothing more than an alternative label for what Carnap called pragmatic evaluation - but, I hope, one which emphasizes its ultimate importance.

160 7.2 GENERALIZING THE MODEL

The system outlined in the last section and discussed in detail throughout this book offers, I believe, a consistent and systematic account which can provide a theoretical underpinning for a linguistic, analytic approach to ontology. By saying the account is systematic, I mean to imply two things: first, that the system is internally consistent and, second, that the various elements of the system are interrelated in a perspicuous manner. When I also say that the system can provide a theoretical underpinning for a linguistic approach to ontology, I mean that these several elements, taken systematically, jointly imply that the most fruitful approach to ontological issues will be a linguistic methodology. It is an advantage of the system that it retains a great deal of the form and a number of the basic assumptions of traditional ontology. But at the same time, this system provides a critique and a suggested reformation of traditional metaphysics. The suggested reformation implies a selfconscious application of a linguistic approach to ontological problems. Resting as it does upon two plausible axioms, the system will, no doubt, appeal to some philosophers all of the time, and it may appeal to most philosophers some of the time. The question I wish to raise in this final section is this: To what extent can the ontological model, suggested by Carnap and developed in this book, be generalized? This question is ambiguous, and has two equally interesting possible interpretations. It could be taken to mean: (a) To what extent can the specifically ontological model be generalized so as to provide a model for, more generally, all philosophical problems? Or, it could be interpreted as: (b) To what extent can it be argued that the model is the only possible model of ontological activity? That is, can arguments be given to show not only that the model is a useful approach to some problems, but also to show that all ontological issues must be addressed within its structures? To clarify (b) before proceeding to discuss both questions, I will suggest an example. A philosopher might, upon understanding the model, take the model to be one interesting approach to ontology. He might, then, say that it is a useful approach under some conditions but that, under other conditions, other models would be more fruitful. Question (b) concerns the extent to which such a reaction to the model is reasonable — is the model suggested the exclusive model for ontology or a model for ontology? (a) My comments on interpretation (a) of the generalizability question will be brief and speculative, considering the magnitude and difficulty of the problem raised. Can all of philosophy, not just ontology, be understood by virtue of the distinction between internal and external questions? A number of commentators, James Cornman and Arthur Danto among them, have applied the distinction much more broadly than did Carnap in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology." 6 It seems that if one accepts the principle of tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy, a conclusion analogous to

161 the conclusion that all ontological issues are relative to human purposes would follow concerning all philosophical issues. Insofar as philosophical issues are hierarchical, they must concern questions about concepts, rules, and criteria prior to the acceptance of explicit criteria. Thus, the answer to the question at hand seems quite simple: the internal-external distinction is just as applicable to other branches of philosophy as it is to ontology. However, there is one complication. In "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," Carnap felt secure in applying the internal-external distinction to ontology because he assumed a solution to the prior question — What is an ontological issue? As I pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4, the internal-external distinction involves an assertion that certain ordinary language utterances are ambiguous. However, the distinction is of little use unless there is some means of deciding which utterances suffer from the relevant type of ambiguity. Carnap's use of a many-sorted language was intended as a solution to this prior problem in that it provided an explication of the concept of ontological form. If one wishes to extend the internal-external distinction so that it is relevant to non-ontological philosophical problems, then there arises a problem analogous to the prior problem mentioned above. Some characterization of a philosophical utterance is necessary in order to limit the range of application of the distinction. One possibility, here, would be to say, simply, that all changes in criteria — i.e. all questions which involve changes in conceptual frameworks or criteria of application of terms — are philosophical and all questions which do not involve such changes are questions of the special disciplines. The result of this solution would be to make every question of linguistic usage, however specific, a philosophical problem. This need not be disastrous, as I admitted, above, that the philosopher-nonphilosopher distinction is one of degree. There will be, on this account, changes in meaning of very specific, specialized terms wholly decided by nonphilosophers. (Perhaps no philosopher will even know about the issues involved.) On this account, the specialists involved function as philosophers — considering, and finally consummating, a change in the usage of their specialized terms. While this account is not entirely implausible, it is unsatisfying. What was satisfying in the ontological model was its similarity in structure and list of problems, though not in method, to traditional ontology. The proposed extension of the ontological model into a philosophical model loses this appeal. Every question about linguistic usage, however specific, becomes philosophical and this fails to coincide with the historical tradition. According to that tradition, philosophy deals only with issues of a general nature. Consequently, any model of philosophy which broadens the scope of the discipline to this degree (in addition to changing its methodology) could hardly claim, intuitively, to be a model of "philosophy" at all. What is needed, at this point, is some definition of the scope of philo-

162 sophical problems, generally, analogous to the definition of the scope of ontological problems in terms of general categories.- One possibility would be to rely upon tradition to indicate which problems are philosophical, and hence susceptible of analysis in terms of the internal-external ambiguity. Such a characterization is circular, however (it defines 'philosophy' as 'that which philosophers do'), and is not really suitable for the dynamic model Carnap envisioned. On that model, the philosopher takes his cue from the changing special disciplines, and the very general conceptual issues which arise in the various disciplines. An account based upon what philosophers, historically, have done would be too conservative for Carnap's purposes. The only satisfying solution would be to have in hand an explication of the concept of philosophy, and a definition or criterion of generality capable of isolating philosophical issues from other issues. Such a definition or criterion would function as the criterion indicating utterances in ontological form, and would allow one to isolate utterances in philosophical form. Such utterances, then, would be susceptible of analysis in terms of internal and external questions. Without undertaking this very large task in any serious manner, here, I can suggest that my definition of 'ontological form' might be a useful beginning. Would it be unreasonable to suggest that metaphysics includes ontology, as defined in Chapter 4, plus other problems concerning the types of relationships possible between objects in ontological categories? Thus, for example, the problems of free will and determinism and the problem of the interaction of minds and bodies might be categorized as metaphysical by an extension of the definition of 'ontological'. Likewise, epistemological problems can be said to be general problems of the criteria for evaluating knowledge claims concerning the types of entities in these most general, ontologically prior categories. "By what criteria does one know that material objects exist?" and "By what criteria does one know that mental entities exist?" would be two examples of this extension of the definition. The various "philosophy of ..." disciplines, like philosophy of science, philosophy of art, and philosophy of psychology, etc. would, on this extension, concern the general categories of entities which must be introduced, the proper criteria for their recognition, and the relationship between the entities in these categories in order to accomplish most efficiently the goals of the disciplines in question. Such metadisciplines, then, would be concerned with a cross-section of ontological, metaphysical, and epistemological issues which arise in the special discipline in question. Evaluative disciplines, like ethics and aesthetics, can be considered similarly to the "philosophy o f ' disciplines, as the Carnapian model does not treat them as nonrational. They, too, have their central purposes, and these central purposes raise central ontological issues — for example, "Are the basic units of ethical analysis to be pleasures and pains, just actions, or both?" "If both, what is, in most general terms, the

163 relationship between pleasurable events and just actions?" The first question raises an essentially ontological issue. The second, an ethical issue of sufficient generality to involve central, important changes in the linguistic framework of ethical analysis. If these remarks on such a large and difficult subject are not entirely too brief, they may suggest, in outline form, how the ontological model discussed in this book could be extended so as to provide a model for philosophy more generally. As I mentioned, a number of philosophers have suggested the extension of the internal-external dichotomy to other areas in philosophy. The problem with simply making this suggestion lies in the fact that the internalexternal distinction requires a prior limitation of its realm of application. It does not, by itself, provide a definition of 'philosophy', but only an analysis of philosophical problems. It requires the prior adoption of some account of which utterances are philosophical and, hence, susceptible to the analysis. (b) I turn, now, to the question: To what extent can it be argued that the Carnapian model is the only model of ontological activity? In other words, what argumentative force can be brought to bear upon ontologists who opt for other models (say, for example, the essentialistic model)? I have argued that the Carnapian model rests entirely upon the twin axioms of tolerance and the hierarchical view of philosophy. The question of the exclusivity of the model, then, can be reduced to the problem of justifying these two axioms. It is an important achievement to have systematized and localized the problem to the extent which Carnap's model succeeds. Such a systematization has the advantage of localizing points of difference between philosophical systems and clarifying interrelationships within such systems. But it is also interesting and important to inquire as to the extent that these two axioms can be defended persuasively. To the extent that these two principles can be defended, the Carnapian model gains argumentative force. If they cannot be defended, then the Carnapian model is, at best, an optional approach to ontology. In this final subsection, I will examine the extent to which arguments can be mustered to convince the unconvinced that the Carnapian model provides the best approach to ontological issues. I will discuss, in turn, the types of considerations relevant to the defense of (i) the hierarchical view of philosophy and (ii) the principle of tolerance. (i) Several arguments can be marshalled to support the hierarchical view of philosophy. These arguments have all been used, from time to time, by analytic philosophers throughout this century. While none of them seem likely to provide a conclusive proof for the hierarchical view, all tend to lend plausibility to it. First, as was popular in the early years of logical positivism, one can point to the history of failures to reach agreement throughout the history of philosophy. It can be argued that traditional attempts to characterize "reality" in

164 absolute terms suffered from lack of substantial agreement because the traditional conception of philosophy failed to provide a method which could account for, on the one hand, the seeming indeterminacy of philosophical disputes and, on the other hand, to provide any positive conception of the rational basis for deciding philosophical disputes. Second, by examining the various possible accounts of what philosophical assertions are "about," one might construct a "What else?" type of argument. By arguing that philosophical disputes seem different from purely scientific disputes, and that they do not, on the other hand, seem to be mere tautologies, it can be asked, "What else could they be than metatheoretical assertions about conceptions of the world?" Third, and perhaps most convincing, is the argument that points out that two members of a special discipline who differ on their ontological commitments can often agree on the scientific data they gather, if the data can be characterized in a relatively neutral manner. For example, phenomenalistic and materialistic scientists can agree that a given instrument indicates a given percentage of a type of chemical in a compound without agreeing about the nature (in a philosophical sense) of the instrument or the compound. One might continue to construe the instrument and compound as a complex of sensations and the other might construe them as a composition of atoms and molecules. Similar examples could be constructed using logicist versus realist mathematicians and utilitarians versus deontologists in ethics. If philosophical disputes are to be considered to have any sense at all, such examples seem to suggest that the dispute is metatheoretical, and concerns alternative ways of construing facts, rather than differences concerning the facts themselves on the theoretical level. (ii) In order to provide a justification for linguistic conventionalism, two elements seem necessary. First, a complete and careful explication of the concept of a linguistic convention needs to be provided. In his book Convention, David Lewis has suggested one interesting and seemingly coherent account. 7 Whether his choice of game theory as a means of explicating linguistic conventions ultimately proves the most feasible explication or not, it is comforting to see that such a detailed and initially plausible account can be provided. That more work is yet needed in this area is obvious, as Lewis' account does little in the way of systematically relating the concept of convention to standard concepts of semantics and linguistics. If conventionalism is to provide a viable account of linguistic behavior generally, it must ultimately succeed in relating the basic concepts of meaning, reference, analyticity, rule of language, both to each other and ultimately back to the concept of convention itself. To have such a general account would be comforting, of course, but yet more is necessary to provide a full-fledged justification of the conventionalistic account. Some attempt must be made to show that conventionalism is superior to other accounts. One possibility, here, is to point out the diffi-

165 culties which seem inherent in its traditional rivals, the more essentialistic, realistic theories of the nature of concepts. Much work is being done by essentialists, attempting to provide a unified, coherent, essentialistic account of language that rivals recent advances by conventionalists. Because of the strong metaphysical commitments of essentialism, and the seemingly irresoluble puzzles which arise in the concept of essential characteristics, it may be possible to shift the burden of proof to lie with essentialistic accounts. 8 While the considerations I have brought forward in this section can hardly be considered conclusive or likely to provide a tight and convincing argument, they do seem to me to lend plausibility to the central axioms of the Carnapian system. It is, of course, important that the system not rest upon implausible beginning points, and I think that enough has been said, here, to show that this is not the case. In conclusion, it is appropriate to note that the central axiom, both in substance and spirit, of Carnap's system is tolerance. Metatheoretical questions, such as have been discussed in this chapter, also fit into the internalexternal model. They are methodological questions about philosophy, and as such they should and must be approached with an open mind and an experimental spirit. Philosophers who approach philosophical problems quite differently from the proposed model must not be ignored, because the comparison of the results they obtain with the results obtained by philosophers adopting the linguistic, hierarchical model will provide the grounds forjudging, externally, between the two models and methodologies. The presentation of the Carnapian model in detail, and without internal inconsistencies, must be seen, given the model itself, as the important task of this book. External judgments between philosophical systems will be forwarded by such a formulation, but the system itself is designed to avoid dogmatism and absolutism. And, because the internal-external distinction is applicable to all levels of philosophy, metaphilosophical questions as well as philosophical ones, dogmatism and absolutism have no more place in methodological controversies of philosophy than in methodological controversies of science. "It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions." The important task of this book, then, has been to present a complete, consistent, and systematic model for ontology (and, hopefully, by extension, for philosophy as a whole). It is also important to show that this system rests on a plausible base. I feel that I have succeeded in fulfilling these tasks. I have, perhaps, failed to show conclusively that all philosophers who have different views on philosophical methodology are misguided. This failure, however, becomes a virtue, when one sees that the system I have outlined dictates tolerance and an experimental spirit on all levels of philosophical discourse - even if the level in question is the one concerning the validity of the model itself. This does not introduce subjectivism into the system, because as

166 was noted above, there is a rational, interpersonal decision procedure available. The model will be judged by the extent to which the goals o f the philosophical community are advanced by its use - and such a judgment should not take place in a vacuum, but in a context of comparison to other, competing systems.

NOTES 1 The reader may perceive a shift in this paragraph from a discussion of ontology to a discussion of philosophy, more generally. I hope this change will be acceptable, as I believe that while Carnap's system was outlined specifically for ontology, there is little doubt that he believed that it could be extended to encompass other proper philosophical problems. In section 7.2, I will discuss how one might attempt to generalize the ontological model to cover more of philosophy. 2 Peter Winch, The Idea of A Social Science (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1958), p. 3. 3 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding-. Vol. I, ed. by A.C. Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), p. 14. 4 See Ayer, p. 16 and Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," pp. 45-46. 5 Carnap, Logical Syntax, pp. 51-52. 6 Cornman, pp. xviii-xix and Arthur Danto, What Philosophy Is (New York: Harper, 1969), especially p. 9. 7 Lewis, op. cit. 8 See, for example, Quine, From A Logical Point of View, p. 22.

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INDEX

aesthetics 162 AUworter 32ff, 100 analyticity 8, 14, 23, 24, 26, 61, 62, 64, 67, 73, 74, 75, 80ff, 84, 98, 99, 1101 1 9 , 1 2 1 - 1 2 4 , 1 2 8 f f , 146, 150, 151 artificial languages 1 1 3 , 1 1 4 , 1 1 5 f f , 122 Ayer 26n, 58n, 166n Bar-Hillel 27n, 137, 142ff, 152n Berkeley 89, 109n Brouwer 40 Browning 97n Cartwright 13 In categories 14, 19, 20, 24, 25, 61-67, 68, 69ff, 92, 95, 101, 104, 110, 111, 112, 154,162 conceptualism 90 Cornman 28, 29, 57n, 75, 76, 77n, 125, 132, 152n, 160, 166n convention 34, 35, 129, 164 conventionalism 8 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 6 , 3 3 4 0 , 4 3 , 56, 57, 69, 70, 71, 72, 86, 105, 106, 117, 118, 122ff, 129, 130, 137, 138, 141, 144, 154ff, 159, 164-165 Copi 58n Danto 160, 166n Descartes 93 Duhem 116 emotivism 149, 150 empiricism 7, 12, 13, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 4 4 , 45, 4 6 , 48, 4 9 , 51-53, 54, 5 6 , 5 7 , 8 1 , 112, 121, 128ff, 158 epistemology 23, 24, 26, 60, 61, 67, 73, 74, 76, 98, 110, 117ff, 1 2 1 , 1 2 2 , 1 2 9 f f , 149, 162 essentialism 17, 18, 1 9 , 2 0 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 6 , 7 1 , 120,155, 163,165 ethics 16, 119, 149ff, 162-163,164

Existentialism 132 Feigl 148, 149, 150, 152n first-order predicate calculus (OPC) 20, 25, 65, 67, 79, 82, 86, 87, 101, 108n formalizability 12, 1 3 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 4 6 , 4 9 , 5 0 , 5 1 , 5 2 , 5 7 , 9 9 , 106, 108n, 109n Frankema 13 In Frege 38 Gewirth 152n Goldstick 28, 33, 53, 57n, 58n, 132, 137, 138-139, 1 4 1 , 1 4 3 , 1 4 4 , 1 5 2 n hierarchical view of philosophy 13, 14, 30ff, 40, 42, 43, 44, 4 5 , 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 56, 81, 1 0 5 , 1 0 6 , 130, 155, 158, 160, 163, 165 HUbert 38 Hobbes 16 Hume 31 immaterialism 89, 94ff, 126 internal-external questions 8, 14, 22, 23, 38ff, 35, 36, 40, 41, 44, 4 5 , 47, 4 8 , 53-56, 61, 62, 64, 65, 67-71, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 85, 88, 98, 99, 102-106, 108n, 110-118, 120-131, 132, 133, 135-138, 14 I f f , 146ff, 150, 156, 158, 160ff, 165 intuitionism (ethical) 149 intuitionism (mathematical) 5 0 Jubien 13 In Kant 3 0 , 3 1 , 3 2 , 128, 149 Katz 108n Kaufmann 3 9 , 4 0 Klemke 57n, 132, 137, 138, 139, 141, 145,152n Kuhn 132-136,152n

Lambert 107n Leibniz 93 Leonard 107n, 108n Lewis 34, 58n, 164, 166n Locke 156, 166n Logical atomism 3 1 , 4 2 , 4 3 , 4 4 Logical positivism 7, 12, 13, 42, 48, 54, 147, 149, 150, 151, 154, 158, 159, 163 logically perfect language 4 2 , 4 3 many-sorted languages 22, 24, 62-67, 7174, 81, 85, 86, 99, 100, 101, 104, 106, 108n, 145, 146, 154, 161 many-sorted predicate calculus (MPC) 22, 25, 65, 79ff, 101, 108n material mode/formal mode 12, 13, 44, 45,50,52,104 Maxwell 137, 139ff, 152n meta-ontology 14, 17ff, 60, 80 metaphilosophy 13, 15, 16, 17, 46, 48, 154 metaphysics and anti-metaphysics 8, 11, 12, 13, 26ff, 41, 42, 4 3 , 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 54, 5 7 , 1 0 5 , 1 4 9 , 1 6 2 methodological nominalism 31 Meyer, Robert K. 107n Meyer, William H. 76n MPFL (partially free) 83ff, 86 MUFL (many-sorted U F L ) 8 3 , 8 4 Naess 8, 9n Neurath 13 In nominalism 20 object language/metalanguage 38, 44, 45, 47, 51, 52, 53, 55-56, 81, l O l f f , 105, 106,108n,112 ontological commitment 8, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 62, 76,78-99,107n, 127 ontological priority 94, 96ff, 104 ontological reduction 86-87, 90, 91, 98 ontology 14, 17ff, 60-67, 70-76, 79, 80, 83, 85, 87, 88-101, 103-104, 107n, 108n, 111, 123ff, 1 4 3 , 1 5 4 , 1 5 5 , 1 6 0 f f , 165,166n paradigm 132-136 picture theory 4 3 , 4 5

Plantinga 108n pragmatism 43, 131 Reichenbach 13 Rorty 27n, 31, 58n Russell 58n, 66 Ryle 108n Schlick 1 3 , 3 9 , 5 4 Schuldenfrei 8, 9n, 131n science 1 1 , 1 2 , 21, 22, 23, 3 0 , 4 7 , 4 9 , 50, 52, 53, 112, 115, 120, 126, 132-136, 151, 154-159, 164 semantics 29, 30, 37-40, 66, 67-69, 86, 92, 103, 113-116, 121, 134, 1 5 9 , 1 6 4 Smeaton 27n Sommers 108n Spinoza 16 Stevenson 150 substance 93 syntax 11, 12, 33, 44, 37-40, 49, 50, 63, 86, 1 0 1 , 1 0 2 , 103, 1 1 3 , 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 , 1 3 4 , 159 Taxski 37 tolerance 7, 13, 14, 28, 29, 30, 32ff, 3740, 43, 4 4 , 46, 4 7 , 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57, 105, 106, 115, 130, 138, 139, 1 4 8 , 1 5 5 , 158, 159, 160, 163, 165 Toulmin 133-136, 152n types, theory of 63, 66 universal words of predicates 22, 63ff, 84, 85, 86, 89, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106 universally free logic ( U F L ) 82ff, 107n verifiability principle 7, 12, 13, 15, 28, 29, 33, 40, 41, 44-51, 53, 56, 57, 67, 69, 105, 107, 121, 128, 131, 1 3 9 , 1 4 9 , 151, 154, 158, 159 Wang 63, 72, 76n, 77n Warnock 108n Whitehead 12 Wick 153n Winch 166n Wilkinson 76n Wisdom 30, 58n Wittgenstein 37, 39, 4 0 , 42, 45, 54, 58n, 132,139