Limiting the Proliferation of Weapons: The Role of Supply-Side Strategies 9780773584174

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LIMITING THE PROLIFERATION OF

WEAPONS THE ROLE OF SUPPLY-SIDE

STRATEGIES

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LIMITING THE PROLIFERATION OF

WEAPONS THE ROLE OF SUPPLY-SIDE STRATEGIES

EDITED BY JEAN-FRANCOIS RIOUX

Carleton University Press Ottawa, Canada 1992

CARLETON UNIVERSITY 1942-1992

©Carleton University Press Inc. 1992 ISBN 0-88629-193-3 (paperback) ISBN 0-88629-192-5 (casebound) Printed and bound in Canada Carleton General List Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Limiting the proliferation of weapons: the role of supply-side strategies Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-88629-192-5 (bound) - ISBN 0-88629-193-3 (pbk.) 1. Arms control. 2. Arms transfers. 3. Weapons systems. I. Rioux, Jean-Francois, 1958JX1974.L59 1992

327.174C92-090656-7

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Oxford University Press Canada, 70 Wynford Drive, Don Mills, Ontario, Canada. M3C1J9 (416) 441-2941

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Acknowledgements Carleton University Press gratefully acknowledges the support extended to its publishing programme by the Canada Council and the Ontario Arts Council. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

V

CONTENTS List of Tables and Figures

vii

Acronyms

ix

Acknowledgements

xi

Introduction Jean-Frangois Rioux

1

Part I: Nuclear Weapons Chapter 1:

Chapter 2:

Chapter 3:

Trends in Nuclear Proliferation and Supply-side Controls John Simpson

11

The New Nuclear Producers: The Main Threat to Supply-side Restraints? William C. Potter

25

Nuclear Export Controls: Can We Plug the Leaks? ... Paul L. Leventhal

39

Part II: Chemical and Biological Weapons Chapter 4:

Chapter 5:

Chapter 6:

The Supply-side Control of the Spread of Chemical Weapons Julian Perry Robinson

57

Chemical and Biological Weapons: Preventing the Spread of the "Poor Man's Atomic Bomb"? Elisa D. Harris

75

The Spread of Biological and Toxin Weapons: A Nightmare of The 1990s? Erhard Geissler

99

Part HI: Ballistic Missiles Chapter 7:

Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the MTCR Aaron Karp

Chapter 8:

Missile Proliferation: Demand-side Policies Are Needed Kathleen C. Bailey

113

127

vi

Part IV: Conventional Weapons Chapter 9:

Trends in the Production and Transfer of Conventional Weapons

139

Michael T. Klare

Chapter 10: The Changing Arms Trade

155

Keith Krause

Conclusion

173

Jean-Francois Rioux

Appendix A: Major Suppliers Groups

183

Appendix B: G7 Declaration on Arms Transfers and Non-proliferation

185

Appendix C: Meeting of the Permanent Five on Arms Transfers and Non-proliferation in London, 17-18 October 1991

189

Appendix D: Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-related Dual-use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology

193

vii LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 2.1:

Fifteen Emerging Supplier States: Export Capabilities/Actual Exports

27

Table 2.2:

Pakistani and Iraqi Actual Nuclear Imports (Centrifuge-Related Items)

30

Table 4.1:

Chemical Warfare (CW) - Weapons Proliferation and Deproliferation, 1915-1984

58

Table 4.2:

Non-NATO/Warsaw Pact Countries with Offensive Chemical Warfare Capability

61

Figure 10.1:

World Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Patterns: 1963-1988

158

Table 10.1:

Regional Distribution of Arms Imports, 1963-1987

162

Table 10.2:

Top Ten Arms Recipients, Selected Years

167

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ix

ACRONYMS ABM ACDA ATBM BW BWC CBW C3I CD CUPS CIS CW CWC CFE1 COCOM CTBT EEC EURATOM G7 GPS HEU IAEA INF IPS LSG MTCR MW NATO NPT NSG PPNN PTBT R&D SDI SIPRI START TW UN WHO

Anti-Ballistic Missile Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USA) Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Biological Warfare Biological Weapons Convention Chemical and Biological Warfare Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I Systems) Conference on Disarmament (United Nations) Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security Commonwealth of Independant States Chemical Warfare Chemical Weapons Convention Conventional Forces-Europe, 1 (1990 treaty) Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty European Economic Community European Atomic Community The group of the seven major industrialized powers Global Positioning System Highly Enriched Uranium International Atomic Energy Agency Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces International Plutonium Storage London Suppliers' Group (or Club). See Nuclear Suppliers' Group Missile Technology Control Regime Megawatt North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Suppliers' Group Project for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (University of Southampton) Partial Test Ban Treaty Research and Development Strategic Defense Initiative Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Toxin Warfare United Nations World Health Organization

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xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book is one of the last products of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS), which was dissolved by the Canadian government in the summer of 1992. The editor wants to thank many people for their support in various capacities. The Chief Executive Officer, Bernard Wood, the Research Coordinator, Mark Heller, and the Senior Research Fellow, Ron Purver agreed to this project and provided their help and encouragement at different steps of the way. Ross Mallick participated in the early planning of the conference. Louise Graham, Marilyn Miller, and Linda Makhoul have shared the secretarial work, bringing their competence and good will to the process. In the copy-editing role, Bradley Feasey must be thanked for identifying many problems and helping in their solution. Doina Cioiu has made a capital contribution in the organization of the conference and in the preparation of the manuscript. In fact, all CUPS staff members have been directly or indirectly involved in the conference and in this book. They all deserve praise, and this book is dedicated to them.

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INTRODUCTION

Jean-Francois Rioux The end of the Cold War, for obvious reasons, has raised hopes of peace and security around the world. The ideological confrontation between communism and capitalism has receded, representative democracy and human rights are spreading, and the major powers seem to agree on many international rules of the game, including the role of the UN and strategic arms control. However, it is a now a cliche to say that our era is not the "end of history." The Communist ideology may be dead or dormant, but the other ideologies, be they liberal capitalism, fascism, fundamentalism, or nationalism, are striving for the allegiance of billions of human beings. Many security problems, most of them neglected during the 1980s, are moving up the international agenda: underdevelopment, injustice, regional rivalries, ethnic and religious strife, environmental degradation, overpopulation, fanaticism, and weapons proliferation. The proliferation of weapons was a secondary security issue during the "Second Cold War" of 1977-87. "Proliferation" here refers to the "horizontal" type of proliferation, or the geographical spread of powerful weaponry. During the Reagan presidency, attention was concentrated almost exclusively on the US-Soviet arms race and strategic balance, and little energy was spent contemplating the emergence of powerful regional actors that could militarily threaten their neighbours. For political-strategic reasons, the major powers armed their friends in the Third World and neglected the future threats that some of these states could one day pose with their considerable conventional arsenals and potential weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi case offers the most compelling evidence of the dangers of such a policy: the unchecked accumulation by some regional powers of huge quantities of arms, including weapons of mass destruction, and the resulting regional destabilization and even conflict. The cases of Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea also come to mind, mainly because of their efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Moreover, rather than slowing down the arms race, the end of the Cold War may lead to a quantitative and qualitative escalation of military buildup in some regions. Despite the new roles of superpowers and international organizations, many of the conflicts previously contained or mitigated by the superpowers are bound to re-emerge, while new rivalries could arise. These rivalries may in turn be aggravated by the accumulation of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction. In effect, overarmament fosters a sense of insecurity among neighbouring

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states which, in turn, start to rely on bigger arsenals to restore the regional balance. These arms races may be aggravated further if conventional arms reductions by the superpowers result in the wide availability on the market of second-hand weapons. Destructive military potentials further put regional security at risk by tempting defence establishments to launch preventive or preemptive attacks, and to adopt "launch on warning" defensive postures. Eventually, the local wars of the future maybe unpreventable and extremely destructive. The use of weapons of mass destruction carried by long-range missiles and aircraft is now considered a serious possibility. Many people argue that the existence of would-be regional powers entertaining plans of conquest requiring the acquisition of sophisticated weapons is an unavoidable fact of international relations. Some may even defend the right of any state to do so, and would point to the poor example set by the major military powers. These are fundamental objections to non-proliferation, an activity that its critics portray as idealistic at best, and, at worst, as a plot by the West to keep the South in a state of military and political weakness. These opinions are based on a view of the world that our contributors no doubt understand, but do not share. Furthermore, it was not the intention to devote this book to lengthy discussions about the nature of international politics. These necessary fundamental debates are presented in other publications. If we can find a common denominator among the contributors to this book, it is that they think arms races are not unavoidable, and that some of the responsibility for regional military buildups falls on the powers that encourage regional rivalries and foster arms sales in their own interests. The contributors to this book believe that one of the main tasks of the post-Cold War era will be to create a world in which regional conflicts are avoided or, at least, contained at a minimal level of destruction and settled rapidly. One of the most important steps to achieve this is to tackle the proliferation of weapons. There are several approaches to addressing the issue of weapons proliferation. Most solutions address the "demand side" of weapons acquisition. Demand-side policies use incentives and disincentives to convince political leaders that it is in their interest not to acquire weapons. They include security assurances from the great powers, confidence-building measures (including multilateral arms-control agreements), conflict-resolution initiatives, and efforts to encourage economic and political development. Such measures are usually considered the most promising means to prevent proliferation. However, they are also the most difficult to implement and are often not universal in their application. Supply-side policies against proliferation mainly consist of embargoes and export-control measures on weapons, and on materials, technology, and expertise to make weapons, applied by supplier states

INTRODUCTION

3

against classes of countries or specific states, in order to place obstacles in the way of their military buildup.1 It must be stressed immediately that despite the relative success of some supply-side endeavours (for example, in the nuclear field), the diffusion of technology will always defeat denial measures in the long term. As a consequence, supply-side policies are seen as temporary measures that buy time in order to find better solutions to proliferation, and as insurance policies in case formal nonproliferation commitments are breached. Recently, much attention has been devoted to the supply-side aspect of arms control. During the 1990-91 crisis in the Persian Gulf, Western suppliers of arms and dual-use technologies realized that in Iraq, they had created a monster in the Middle East. In twenty years, a small country of 17 million inhabitants became a major military power, a user of chemical weapons, and a potential possessor of nuclear and biological weapons. In the span of ten years, Iraq attacked two of its neighbour states, Iran and Kuwait, and was stopped only by an American-led coalition sanctioned by the United Nations.2 During this episode, Iraq also attacked Israel and Saudi Arabia, and its own Kurdish and Shi'ite minorities. The complacency of governments and/or the inadequacy of their bureaucracies in controlling dangerous exports had resulted in established firms and shady intermediaries selling almost anything to the regime of Saddam Hussein. Eventually, it could have resulted in Iraq's acquisition of the atomic bomb before the year 2000. The Western suppliers of weapons and dual-use technologies have started to reevaluate their export policies and their enforcement mechanisms. For example, Germany has decided to inquire into the past practices of some of its firms, and has reinforced its export-control laws and institutions. More generally, most Western countries have stressed the importance of limiting arms sales, and have called for a strengthening of the international regimes of supply control. A suppliers regime for the Middle East was proposed by President Bush in his May 29,1991 speech, and has been discussed by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in several meetings since (see Appendix C for their original declaration). In its June 16,1991 declaration, the Group of Seven endorsed the principle of transparency in arms sales and the strengthening of supply-side measures, including restraint in conventional arms sales, and stronger export controls on nuclear, chemical, and missile technologies (See Appendix B). For one, Canada has even asked that supply control questions, traditionally the exclusive domain of industrialized states, be discussed in a conference on arms buildups and on weapons of mass destruction at the United Nations. However, strengthening export controls is not an easy enterprise. The issues of controls on dual-use products and of verification of supplyside agreements create a number of legal, technical, and economic

4

LIMITING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS

difficulties, and the emergence of new suppliers raises concern about the feasibility of establishing universally approved supply norms. Beyond these aspects of the issue, the main problems are obviously political. Many constituencies all over the world resist export controls. Not surprisingly, governments of regional powers are against restrictions on free trade in weapons. The leaders of supplying countries demand that some discretion be left to them in arms exports, for reasons of diplomacy and national security. The defence production and high-technology sectors of the economy resist export controls that can jeopardize their trade and their position on world markets. A major challenge comes from Third World and East European countries, worried that export controls could create an extra obstacle in their acquisition of high technology and leave them in a weak politico-military situation facing states that would renounce none of the weapons they deny to others. These are formidable obstacles confronting those in favour of restrictions on the trade of arms and high technology. Already, some of the proposals of 1991 have fallen by the wayside, perceived as too radical by some governments, vitiated by subsequent arms sales of these same governments, and opposed by recipient states. Will these obstacles derail supply-side measures or make them ineffective? How can these political obstacles be overcome to reach agreements on export controls? Are compromises and trade-offs possible between suppliers and buyers? How can supply-side and demandside measures be linked? What are the roles of governments, independent analysts, and political and social movements in shaping supply-side national policies and international regimes? What is the value of devoting energy and money to supply-side controls, as compared to the requirements of demand-side policies? These are some of the questions that the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CUPS) wanted to address after the Iraqi War. An international gathering of experts and decision-makers was assembled for a three-day conference in Ottawa in June 1991 to discuss the threat of weapons proliferation and the role of supply-side arms control in the post-Cold War world. The emphasis on supply-side restrictions did not result from a official preference of the Institute for that kind of control. It was, however, an effective way of delimiting the topic of non-proliferation. Also, it was judged that the opportunity for supply-side controls was at hand because of the lessons of recent international developments and the pressure from Western publics for demilitarization. The conference participants analyzed the impact of the end of the Cold War and of the Iraqi War on regional conflicts and arms races, and assessed the state of arms transfers and the potential for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by regional powers. A survey of the

INTRODUCTION

5

general prospects and problems of export-control measures against weapons proliferation was undertaken, the objective being to evaluate proposals for future action in several fields: nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missile technology, and conventional weapons. This book comprises 10 chapters which are expanded and updated versions of some of the conference papers. The papers are recent enough to take into account the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The chapters are organized according to types of weapons systems examined, since the conditions of proliferation and the opportunities for control differ for each weapons type. The restrictions on nuclear trade are the best-known form of supplyside arms control. Most analysts attribute some success in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons to a combination of unilateral restraints by suppliers and multilateral export-control groupings; for example, the Zangger Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). John Simpson, in Chapter 1, shares this conclusion, but points out the larger issues in nuclear proliferation. He reviews the current situation and examines four types of proliferating states. Only two of the types are to some extent vulnerable to export controls. In most cases, non-proliferation results from selfrestraint, hence the emphasis that must be placed on demand-side initiatives. Paul Leventhal, in Chapter 5, also credits export-control policies with some success, but thinks that this particular supply-side approach cannot work in the long run, since less-developed states tend to resist it and since proliferators can always exploit gaps in the system. He instead advocates a ban on high-level enrichment, reprocessing, and fast-breeder reactors as a way to stop the buildup in highly fissionable materials.3 In Chapter 2, William Potter addresses the issue of the new suppliers of nuclear items, since their emergence could threaten the rules of the nuclear trade established by the Western powers during the 1960s and 1970s. He identifies several problems with some new suppliers, but also detects some growing acceptance of export controls. He then studies the behaviour of the Soviet Union (in 1990-1991) and of Russia (in early 1992), and detects sales attempts with potentially dangerous consequences for non-proliferation. The commitment of the former Soviet states to export controls will probably be the definitive test for supplyside measures. Fortunately, there seems to be a general desire and means for ensuring this compliance. Multilateral supply-side measures in the chemical and biological weapons field have become important in the 1980s with the establishment of the informal grouping of suppliers called the "Australia Group." However, as Julian Perry Robinson reminds us in Chapter 4, the main objective in chemical arms control is the signing of a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that will ban the possession and use of combat gas,

6

LIMITING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS

and will create an international agency to monitor compliance. Elisa Harris in Chapter 5 agrees with the emphasis on the C WC, but considers that supply-side measures are still the first line of defence against proliferation, and that there will be a residual role for them after chemical weapons have been banned. In the field of biological weapons, as the contribution of Erhard Geissler in Chapter 6 reminds us, supply-side policies are not as important. The main task is to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), especially to its verification procedures. The proliferation of ballistic missiles threatens security by giving to many nations a first-strike capability, especially if nuclear weapons are involved. A Western group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), has been formed to limit export of components and know-how for building medium-range rockets of a certain payload. In Chapter 7, Aaron Karp credits this regime with putting obstacles in the way of several would-be prolif erators, and with establishing in the international system an informal rule against missile forces. Kathleen Bailey does not share this view. In Chapter 8, she thinks that the MTCR has had no impact on the missile arms race, and that only a multilateral treaty modelled after the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement between the USA and the USSR has any chance of slowing down missile proliferation. Our contributors in the field of conventional weapons have concentrated on the pace and type of proliferation taking place today. It is not surprising that they have focused on the arms sales situation rather than discussing supply-side controls in detail. First, there are not many multilateral supply-side controls on conventional weapons. Most of those controls are found in national legislation and policies.4 Second, the prospects for implementing export controls on conventional arms are generally considered to be dimmer than establishing supply-side restrictions on weapons of mass destruction because of the issues of internal security and basic defence requirements. Nevertheless, these two authors have definite views about the prospects for international restrictions on arms sales. Michael Klare is the most pessimistic, since he thinks arms sales, especially American ones, will experience an upswing after the Gulf War. However, his position is not a cynical one. He is not advocating passivity, but rather issuing a general warning. Keith Krause thinks that second-and third-rank producers are being marginalized, and that the US is emerging as the single greatest weapon supplier. Generally, however, he sees some hope in the current situation for a general deemphasis on militarization and a slowdown in arms exports. In the Conclusion, the editor of this book reviews some of the major issues and problems identified by the contributors, and reflects on other questions that should receive more attention.

INTRODUCTION

7

NOTES 1

2

3

4

It can be argued that the demilitarization of the economy and the conversion of defence industries is the most important form of supply-side arms control. However, in practice, as far as horizontal proliferation is concerned, the most direct form of supply-side control comprises the restrictions on the international trade of weapons and weapons components, such as arms sales limitations and embargoes, and controls on dual-use products. The export restrictions and safeguards of the nuclear industry are the best-known example of supply-side arms control. Of course, the approval of military intervention by the Security Council of the United Nations can be criticized on various grounds. Nevertheless, it remains that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has highlighted the dangers involved in the transfer of arms and dual-use items. Also, the subsequent UN-sponsored actions have created precedents for multilateral control that can be useful in other situations in the future. Enrichment is the process by which the less fissionable isotope, U238, is transformed into a fissionable material, U^. Reprocessing is the chemical separation of radioactive by-products, mainly for the production of plutonium. A fast-breeder reactor uses plutonium to generate power. At the same time, less fissionable nuclear materials are irradiated in the reactor and are, in turn, transformed into more plutonium. An exception is the COCOM, but this multilateral organization targeted Communist countries and is not likely to play a central role in the post-Cold War world, unless a major reform takes place in its membership and rules. The Arms Sales Register of the United Nations is sometimes described as a supplyside measure. However, to most people, the Register is mainly a transparency and confidence-building measure that will have as much influence on demand as on supply, and perhaps more.

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Parti: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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Chapter 1 TRENDS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SUPPLYSIDE CONTROLS

John Simpson Introduction As in all human activities, trends in nuclear non-proliferation are both positive and negative. Amongst the positive trends, no additional states have overtly sought to publicize the existence of an operational nuclear weapon stockpile since China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964.1 The explanations for this quarter-century moratorium on new entrants to the overt nuclear weapon club are various. They include the effectiveness of policies of technical denial; the realization that only the rapid acquisition of a significant stockpile, not single weapons, can deter pre-emptive attacks on weapon facilities; the gradual acceptance of the lack of military and political utility of nuclear weapon possession; and the establishment of an international norm of non-possession among non-nuclear weapon states formalized by their membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This trend appears to have been reinforced during 1991 by the accession of South Africa to the NPT and the entry into force of a bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil binding them not to acquire nuclear weapons.2 Furthermore, in 1992, North Korea agreed to a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).3 Unfortunately, this positive picture is counterbalanced by two negative trends. The first is that the technologies involved in nuclear weapon construction are now half a century old and dissemination of relevant technological capabilities, often for peaceful purposes, has provided many states with the necessary human expertise, equipment, materials and knowledge to manufacture nuclear weapons. The second is that the global stockpile of the key materials for bomb construction has been inexorably increasing, though almost all these materials are stored in the nuclear weapon states. Finally, the case of Iraq has publicized the existence of states that are clandestinely striving to acquire nuclear weapons and of states that circumstantial evidence suggests possess a covert nuclear weapon stockpile, even if they publicly deny its existence. Professor John Simpson is the Director of the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton. He is the co-director of the Programme for the Promotion of Non-Proliferation (PPNP).

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The end of East-West ideological and military confrontation, the fragmentation of the USSR into its component states, the Persian Gulf War and the Iraqi program have all served to reinforce perceptions that nuclear proliferation is now one of the major problems confronting the industrialized world. A UN Security Council Declaration on Disarmament, Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction was formulated on 31 January 1992 expressing the commitment of the Council to enhance the effectiveness of UN non-proliferation measures.4 The Gulf War has also led to renewed attempts among nuclear supplier states to enhance policies of export restraint and control. Yet while such policies may prevent states lacking a comprehensive industrial infrastructure, such as Libya, from acquiring nuclear weapons for many decades, they are only likely to slow down attempts by other, more technologically capable states, to acquire a nuclear weapon stockpile. Denial of technology can prevent proliferation in some cases, but in others it is at best a means of delaying it. Technologically capable states are only likely to be dissuaded from nuclear proliferation if it can be demonstrated to their leaders that the political and economic costs of nuclear weapon possession are certain to outweigh any perceived advantages. Thus while short-term policy may incline in the direction of denial strategies, medium and long-term policy has to concentrate on creating a norm of non-possession of nuclear weapons, backed by positive utilitarian arguments for making no attempt to breach this norm.

Changes in Perceptions of the Utility of Nuclear Weapons One explanation why no state has overtly engaged in nuclear proliferation since 1964 is that the military, scientific, and industrial context of nuclear weapon decisions has changed significantly since the 1940-60 period. This has led the leaders of those states with a capability to proliferate to believe that there was nothing to be gained by such an action. Three sources of such self-dissuasion can be identified. One, which particularly applied to the industrialized Western states and the former close allies of the USSR, was that the United States/NATO/USSR provided them with security guarantees both of strategic nuclear protection via extended deterrence and, in the case of Western European states, of access to US nuclear weapons in the event of hostilities through "key to the cupboard" procedures. As a result, there seemed little security benefit to be derived from the independent possession of nuclear weapons. One consequence of the ending of the East-West ideological and military confrontation and the collapse of the USSR is that many of these arrangements and guarantees now seem to be open to question, especially those offered to former USSR allies and the states that were once

TRENDS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

13

parts of the USSR. North Korea may be highlighted as a case in which the disappearance of security assurances has lead to the weakening of selfdissuasion. The possible retargeting of some nuclear forces toward nonnuclear weapon states, as apparently envisaged in a leaked Pentagon document, may serve to exacerbate this process.5 One policy issue is thus whether additional international security guarantees can be engineered that would go some way toward replacing these former ideologicallybased guarantees. A second element of self-dissuasion has been the willingness of the military forces in many states to ask themselves what military, as opposed to political, benefits would be derived from possession of nuclear weapons. One suspects that both Canada and Australia made such calculations, but the best documented case appears to be Sweden, where a nuclear weapon program was well advanced by the mid-1960s, but was then terminated. Nuclear weapons were seen to offer few tactical advantages over conventional weapons, and it was recognized that Sweden was likely to be self-deterred from using them in the face of the overwhelming nuclear superiority of the USSR. They were also thought to heighten the risk of a pre-emptive strike by a nuclear state during a crisis and were a burden on the defence budget. US perceptions of the limited utility of small nuclear forces and the shifting emphasis in Kennedy administration policy toward conventional weapons further influenced Swedish policy makers.6 A further element in such calculations has been the realization that if the weapons are to be delivered by air, they will displace large elements of national airforces from the conventional order of battle, both by the need to reserve aircraft for the nuclear delivery role and to protect them against attack, both on the ground and in the air. This in turn might make the state very vulnerable to conventional attack, and appears to be one of the reasons for the development and acquisition of nuclear capable missiles by a number of states. Missile technology transfer controls thus play a valuable role in the nuclear non-proliferation regime by preserving this element of self-deterrence. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was formally announced in 1987, is the principal mechanism to control the transfer of ballistic missiles and technology. It represents an attempt by a number of potential supplier states, mainly Western, to regulate the dissemination of ballistic missile systems that have ranges of, or exceeding, 300km and a 500kg payload. The payload limit is significant as it was fixed at what was believed to be the limit of Third World nuclear miniaturization technology.7 A further element in these military calculations has been the inhibitions felt by the leaders of non-nuclear weapon states in testing nuclear weapons. Since nuclear weapons containing thermonuclear materials require testing

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to provide assurance of the viability of their design, this effectively limits any state that does not engage in testing to the production of low-yield fission weapons which probably will be too heavy to be carried on missiles and be uneconomic in their use of fissile materials. Although many states still have the freedom to test under the Partial Test Ban Treaty [PTBT] of 1963, the use of testing as the criteria for nuclear weapon status in the NPT has probably had an inhibiting effect upon both NPT parties and non-parties.8 Moreover, even were a state to attempt to acquire fission weapons, a significant gap would still exist for several decades between its capabilities and those possessed by the existing nuclear weapon states. It might therefore conclude that in such circumstances, it would not necessarily enhance its security by proliferating. The significance of rational military calculations in this matter has been enhanced over time by the gradual reduction in the political power and general significance of the nuclear scientific establishments in the majority of states. From a position in the early 1960s where nuclear energy was seen as the spearhead of a state's technological development, it is now regarded in most cases as peripheral and its funding and political significance has been reduced accordingly. These changes have tended to remove many of the pressures that were central to the decisions of the five existing nuclear weapon states to acquire their weapons. Finally, there has been a significant change in the political utility of nuclear weapons. Thirty years ago, the expectation was that all those states capable of making nuclear weapons would do so, if only to establish their credentials to be one of the most powerful states in the international system. Such expectations no longer exist. International political power is seen to be derived from possession of technological expertise in areas such as electronics and computer software, and nuclear energy and weapons are peripheral to this calculation. Admittedly there still persists the situation where all the permanent members of the UN Security Council are also nuclear weapon states. But even here, the end of the East-West confrontation has produced significant unilateral nuclear disarmament, and both implicit and explicit acceptance of the very limited political and military utility of nuclear weapons to these states. One major element reinforcing these trends was the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and its implementation in 1970. This has enabled non-nuclear weapon states to formalize their status, to gain assurances that other states in their region were also going to forgo this option and, as the Iraq case has demonstrated, to provide a legal basis for UN Security Council action against them should they breach that status. Prior to 1991, refusal to sign this Treaty also served to highlight those states (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa) which appeared to still wish to hold open the option to acquire nuclear weapons.

TRENDS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

15

The Proliferation Problem in the 1990s As the world embarks on its sixth nuclear decade, both the context of the nuclear proliferation problem, and its nature, has changed. States posing a proliferation problem can now be divided into four categories: the potential proliferators; the slow proliferators; the opportunist proliferators; and the technologically capable non-proliferators.

1. The Potential Proliferators These states have nuclear facilities not covered by the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, and thus may have significant quantities of weapon-grade fissile material at their disposal. This material may already have been configured into a stockpile of weapons, or it may be in a form where this position could be achieved in a matter of weeks, if not days.9 This category currently covers only two states: India and Israel, although Pakistan may be moving slowly toward such a position.

2. The Slow Proliferators The second category is that of states which appear to be seeking covertly or overtly to acquire one or more nuclear weapons, but have no apparent capability to acquire a stockpile of weapons except over a very long period of time. Such states are likely to have a small research reactor and reprocessing plant or a pilot high-enrichment plant. They are very vulnerable to pre-emptive attack, especially if they are in an area of tension. Even if they can produce material for a weapon, its utility will be open to question in the face of the massive nuclear, but more particularly conventional superiority of the nuclear weapon states and their allies. In the context of a regional balance, however, it may appear to have significant utility. States that might have been placed in this category until recently were Argentina, Brazil, Iraq and South Africa. North Korea will cease to be a member by opening up its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. This leaves only Pakistan and Iran in this category. Western governments and Israel are said to be concerned over Iran's alleged interest in the development of nuclear weapons. There have been reports that nuclear weapons technology has been transferred to Iran from a number of sources, including Germany and the United States. The CIS, it is also feared, may have been a source of nuclear expertise or even the transfer of tactical nuclear warheads, according to one report. With suspicions that Iran is reviving its civilian program, largely suspended when the current regime came to power, including the apparent resurrection of the Bushehr power station project, Iran is seen as one of the predominant potential proliferation risks.10 There have also been allegations that Algeria is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, aided by China and Iraq. The latter

16

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

is said to have sent nuclear scientists and ten tonnes of natural uranium to Algeria. However, the reactor that is being built at Ain Oussera has been submitted to IAEA safeguards, inspectors having already visited the site twice. Some concern has been expressed, nevertheless, that if Algeria does not accede to the NPT as it has announced, the advent of a fundamentalist Islamic government might lead to a reversal of the decision, and thus make it a possible future state in this category.11

3. The OpportunistProliferates A third category comprises those states that have given grounds for believing that they want to acquire nuclear weapons, whether parties to the NPT or not, yet have no foreseeable ability to construct them. This category has links to two current areas of proliferation concern, nuclear mercenaries and nuclear terrorism. The problem over nuclear mercenaries arises primarily from the end of the East-West conflict, the consequent removal of a major motor of the nuclear arms race and a concern that if nuclear weapon laboratories in several of the existing nuclear weapon states are run down, some of the people involved will be open to bids for their services from any state able to pay their price. A particularly acute area of concern is the fate of the weapons in the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR, the fissile materials produced for it, and the future of its nuclear technicians. Nuclear terrorism covers hijacking of both nuclear weapons and fissile material either in transit or in storage areas. In both cases, what appears at the moment to be a state leadership uttering an empty threat could be transformed into a much more serious concern if it had links to such terrorists. Yet here again, the threat is likely to be of a limited nature, and the actions may invite pre-emption. One possible candidate state in both categories is Libya.

4. The Technologically Capable Non-Proliferators The fourth and latent category is states that have signed the NPT, and/ or accepted IAEA safeguards, but have significant stocks of fissile materials, particularly plutonium, or facilities that could be used to produce rapidly the materials for a stockpile of nuclear weapons. Many industrialized states, particularly those with fast breeder reactor programs, fall into this category. At the moment all are constrained by the NPT or, in the case of Taiwan, by bilateral undertakings with the United States via the NPT, but were the international non-proliferation system to collapse they might well give cause for concern. This highlights the role played by the NPT in underpinning the nuclear non-proliferation system, and its significance in allowing the Central European state system and that in the former USSR to evolve with minimal danger of nuclear proliferation by states in these areas.

TRENDS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

17

Strategies for Preventing Nuclear Proliferation The existence of these differing categories of potential nuclear proliferators suggests that policies to prevent proliferation may have to differ from case to case, and thus be multifaceted. The first observation that must be made, however, is that the number of states that can now be regarded as serious candidates for proliferation categories 1, 2 and 3 is confined to India, Pakistan and Israel. They probably already have the materials and technology for a stockpile of weapons, though the Pakistani stockpile is potentially much smaller than that of the other two states, and thus any policy of material or technology denial may affect the size of their future stockpile and the speed of its growth, but is unlikely to prevent its existence. Indeed, stopping these states engaging in nuclear testing may be a more effective method of slowing the growth of their stockpile than imposing additional export controls. The proliferation problem posed by these states can only be dealt with by a mixture of diplomatic dissuasion of overt proliferation and attempts to resolve the underlying security problems, which in part sustain the position of nuclear ambiguity adopted by these states. This may mean the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in their regions, backed up by security guarantees from the nuclear weapon states / permanent members of the UN Security Council. In the case of other potential candidates for category 2, the two most obvious slow proliferators, Iraq and North Korea, now appear to have been dealt with. Iraq's progress has been stopped by Security Council Resolution 687. North Korea has allowed implementation of its NPT safeguards agreement.12 There appears to be no other current candidate states in this category at the moment, unless one continues to count Iraq as one or adds Algeria and Iran to the list. Yet it is this type of state that is most obviously the target of any technology denial strategy. Thus, insofar as more restrictive and rigorous export controls have a role to play in non-proliferation strategies, they currently appear to be focused primarily on future unspecified threats, rather than current specific ones. Paradoxically, this may make them easier to negotiate and agree to, insofar as they appear to have no hidden discriminatory element. In the case of the opportunist proliferators, some of the actions that need to be taken to address this threat are related to supply-side control. They include reducing the global movements of plutonium and HEU and seeking to ensure that they are transferred only in irradiated fuel form. Ultimately, the cessation of fuel reprocessing and/or plutonium separation should be considered. One aspect of nuclear disarmament also intrudes at this point, namely what is to be done with the plutonium

18

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

and HEU in warheads retired as part of the massive nuclear disarmament being embarked upon by the states of the former USSR and the United States. One way of disposing of these materials may be to use them as fuel in nuclear power reactors. This would continue to pose proliferation problem in the case of plutonium but not in the case of HEU, though the dilution of the latter and its use as power reactor fuel would disrupt the commercial uranium mining and enrichment markets for decades. States in category 4 present a problem for export controls, as membership of the NPT implies that they should be free to develop all aspects of peaceful nuclear energy. In addition, these states have pledged that they will not acquire nuclear weapons. However, there clearly will be a group of states in this category that may surreptitiously have export controls applied to them, and be dissuaded from developing facilities such as fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants. South Korea, North Korea, and Taiwan will probably be part of this latter group. Any non-nuclear weapon state with extensive nuclear power or uranium fuel reprocessing or uranium enrichment plants is likely to be viewed with some latent suspicion, even if they accept international arrangements to cover these plants and their products, such as IAEA or EURATOM safeguards or specialist arrangements for specific materials, such as the International Plutonium Storage (IPS) concept. Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, South Africa and the Ukraine are possible candidates for such a list of latent suspect states. The implication of the above analysis is that a variety of strategies have succeeded in restricting the nuclear proliferation problem to three "problem states," all of whom are unlikely to have their potential to make weapons radically affected by export controls. The issue for the future, however, is whether the current positive trends will continue, and new potential nuclear states will arise that could be significantly influenced by the effect of export controls. This may depend crucially on the evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime over the next few years, and the effect of contemporary developments on it.

Trends in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime The period since the start of 1990 has seen many changes in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Several of these have been accelerated by the effects of the Gulf War. One major change has been the fresh impetus to strengthen supply-side controls, after the exhaustion of the second round of these efforts following the London Club/Carter Administration initiatives of the mid to late 1970s. There have been several facets to this. One has been the meetings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in the Hague in 1991 and in Poland in 1992. It was agreed there is a need to constrain dual-use technologies and accept new guidelines for the

TRENDS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

19

supply of these technologies. Another point of concensus was to try to assimilate the group of states often described as "emerging suppliers." It seems likely that meetings of an enlarged NSG will now take place on a regular basis. There can be little doubt that the work of this group has been made easier by France's announcement of its decision to accede to the NPT. A second change has been the move toward making supplier states insist on NPT-type safeguards as a condition for the supply of nuclear technology and materials. This is directed specifically at states that have not acceded to the NPT. This change has arisen primarily because of the decision of both Japan and Germany to adopt this policy, and the nearagreement that was reached at the 1990 NPT review conference that all states would accept this as the standard condition for supply. This would mean that those states outside the NPT with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities could not receive assistance with their peaceful nuclear energy programs unless they acceded to the treaty or negotiated an NPT-type safeguards agreement with the IAEA. A third change has been the reconfiguring of the COCOM supply list. A further change has been the attempt to alter the existing MTCR system. This has involved proposals that the membership of the MTCR should be extended to include key supplier states currently outside the regime. Also, it has been suggested that the restrictive parameters on payloads and ranges should be lowered so as to preclude the development of chemical and biological systems, since the miniaturization of a CBW warhead is believed to be difficult below a certain payload level for less technologically advanced states. In addition this suggestion would further restrict conventional ballistic missile development. The ballistic missile range limit of 150km imposed on Iraq may prove influential in the framing of future MTCR controls. A revision and updating of the Equipment and Technology Annex is also said to have been undertaken.13 Finally, there have been the decisions by both Germany and Japan to use their economic supply leverage to pressure hold-out states to either accede to the NPT or accept NPT-type IAEA safeguards. It has to be presumed that the changed German policy had an impact on the decision of Argentina and Brazil to move into an NPT-type safeguards arrangement with the IAEA, and that Japanese actions were at least partly responsible for the decision by North Korea to sign their safeguards agreement. This had been paralleled by a policy of making it clear to India and Pakistan that their eligibility for future Japanese development aid will be crucially dependent on their willingness to accept IAEA safeguards over all the nuclear material in their states.14 While there is little doubt that the impetus given to such supply-side controls is to be welcomed, particularly given its probable positive effects on Argentina, Brazil, and North Korea, these policies do seem likely to

20

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

create medium and long-term problems for the regime. Just as in 1979-80, there is a danger that they will be seen by some developing states as de facto revisions of Article IV of the NPT, which guaranteed all parties access to the benefits of nuclear energy. How this will affect the 1995 NPT extension conference remains unclear, but it may have the effect of making such states less inclined to accept compromises at that conference, arguing that the economic benefits from being in the treaty have been much reduced. It also has to be recognized that one major uncertainty with supplyside controls is the ability of the states of Eastern Europe and the former USSR to create their own national export-control regimes so that NSG and MTCR guidelines canbe implementedby these states. It also remains unclear whether gaps may open up in the Western European exportcontrol system following the abolition of customs duties between the EC states at the end of 1992. A second major trend, already alluded to, is that the number of "problem states" has now been reduced to a hard core of India, Israel, and Pakistan. This has been paralleled by an increase in states party to the NPT. Notable new entrants are China, France, and South Africa, with the latter bringing with it several of its neighbouring states. In addition, Argentina and Brazil have negotiated an NPT-type safeguards arrangement with the IAEA. The consequences of these moves seems likely to be a strengthening of the NPT nuclear non-proliferation system and increasing pressure on the three remaining "problem states" to accept safeguards on their nuclear activities. A third trend is an increased willingness on the part of the Director General and the Board of Governors of the IAEA, after the experience of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program, to review the nature of the existing IAEA/NPT safeguards system and accept major revisions to it to plug loopholes and make it more credible and rigorous. In particular, mechanisms are being developed to enable the IAEA to implement its right to conduct "special inspections," to give it access to design information on nuclear plants at a much earlier stage in their construction, to extend IAEA safeguards to cover facilities as well as materials, and to revise the frequency of inspections and the definition of significant quantities.15 This activity has been stimulated by the Persian Gulf War and the discovery of Iraq's nuclear weapon program, but it would probably have been necessary once the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed. The latter contains a much more intrusive inspection system than that of the IAEA, and also raises the need for safeguarding those chemical plants dealing with nuclear materials under a CWC regime. One further change that has been taking place has been a shift in the centre of gravity of the nuclear non-proliferation system from the United States to Europe and Japan. In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States

TRENDS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

21

provided nuclear security guarantees to many of its allies; its companies dominated the power reactor market; and it had a virtual monopoly on the supply of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel. This placed it in a position to dictate unilaterally the rules of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, by its own domestic legislation if necessary. It started to lose that position in the late 1970s, and initiatives for change in the regime are now arising from Japan and the loose coalition of Western European states, as well as the United States. Moreover, United States domestic legislation has left the administration incapable of action in several areas, leaving the field open to these new actors. United States non-proliferation policy has been regarded as particularly lenient towards Pakistan. The Reagan administration was criticized for continuing economic and military aid to Pakistan despite evidence that Pakistan was seeking to acquire technology suitable for the development of nuclear weapons. Under the "Glenn-Symington Amendment" states requiring the means to produce nuclear weapon material and not submiting them to IAEA safeguards are not eligible for assistance unless the President regards such assistance in the national interest. Furthermore, the "Pressler Amendment" makes aid conditional on the President's assurance that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device. Until April 1991, a waiver was in force and large amounts of United States aid was channelled to Pakistan. The Bush administration, however, has suspended assistance to Pakistan under the "Pressler Amendment" as it no longer finds itself able to certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.16 Indeed it can be argued that the majority of recent advances have arisen from initiatives from states other than the United States. At the same time, the defensive stance taken by the United States and the United Kingdom over a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has placed them in a weakened position over the NPT and further restricted their ability to act in this area. The consequences of the Gulf War, and particularly UN Security Council Resolution 687, also seem likely to have a significant impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Despite the distinction drawn between the IAEA and the UN Special Commission, the IAEA has been tasked with undertaking several activities that considerably extend its previously defined role. In particular it has been given the task of taking custody of fissile material, removing it from Iraq, and inspecting suspected nuclear weapon facilities. Despite the position of Iraq as a defeated state, there can be little doubt that the extension of IAEA's tasks in this specific case will have general significance. The Gulf War may also produce two more negative consequences. One is that the bombing of Iraq's reactors, while establishing a third precedent for pre-emptive strikes on suspect nuclear facilities,17 was the

22

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

first on operating reactors and will touch a sore nerve revealed at the NPT review conferences in both 1985 and 1990. The second negative consequence arises from Resolution 687 denying to Iraq in perpetuity all nuclear weapon materials. Taken literally, this means all reactors and reprocessing and enrichment plants. Indeed it maybe taken further than this to mean the exclusion of all Iraqi students from courses in nuclear engineering outside its borders. As Iraq is a party to the NPT, this appears to take away permanently all its rights under Article IV of that Treaty. Assuming Iraq remains in the Treaty, this cannot but exacerbate the already difficult task of negotiating extension of it in 1995 by consensus rather than by majority vote.

Conclusions There now appear to be very positive prospects of preventing additional states acquiring nuclear weapons, although the Iraqi case has revealed the limitations of external attempts to limit the actions of a determined proliferator, and the break-up of the USSR may have as yet undetermined proliferation consequences. International sentiment and utilitarian calculations appear to have moved strongly in this direction, while the number of "problem states" has been reduced to three: India, Israel, and Pakistan. The impetus to create a strengthened supplier regime and to make IAEA safeguards more intrusive and rigorous has considerable strength, reinforced by the Iraqi experience. Moreover, that war has illustrated the potential of the United States led coalition to take military and political action to prevent a "rogue" state proliferating, thus dissuading such states from seeking nuclear weapons. Set against this, however, is the fact that the three "problem states" have probably acquired sufficient fissile material for a stockpile of bombs, and thus supplier controls may have little influence upon them. In addition, there are the incalculable elements of chance that may lead a "rogue" state to acquire nuclear materials, and the fact that as nuclear energy programs continue, the amount of potential weapon material in the world is increasing. Finally, many states may see themselves as having gained security benefits from the nuclear deterrence structures created in the course of the East-West conflict, and it remains unclear whether an effective substitute can be found for these structures. The key to the medium- and long-term viability of the regime to prevent nuclear proliferation is not the effectiveness of denial strategies executed through export controls, but the ability to sustain a balance between supply controls and voluntary demand restrictions. This means sustaining a consensus on the operation of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system. The concern must be that the strengthening of the supplier regime and the drastic military and political action taken to deal

TRENDS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

23

with the Iraqi case will lead to adverse repercussions from developing states in the conference to extend the NPT in 1995. It may not prevent its lengthy extension, but it seems certain to create a very different agenda to that which could have been envisaged after the 1990 NPT review conference, and it may make the desirable consensus decision on extension impossible to achieve.

NOTES

1

2

3 4 5

6 7

It must be remembered that Israel has never acknowledged nor denied possessing a nuclear arsenal, though many surmised that it is a nuclear weapons state [F. Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971); P. Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); M. Sicker, Israel's Quest for Security (New York: Praeger, 1989); L.S. Spector with J.R. Smith, NuclearAmbitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); S. Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deteirence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); S. Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 1988); Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "Facing the Unavoidable: Israel's Nuclear Monopoly Revisited/' and Yair Evron, ''Opaque Proliferation: The Israeli Case," in Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: Frank Cass, 1991); Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, "Nuclear Shadows in the Middle East: Prospects for Arms Control in the Wake of the Gulf Crisis," Security Studies, 1, No. 1 (Autumn 1991): 54-77; Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991)]. Although known to have mastered atomic technology, India claims not to have nuclear weapons. (L.S. Spector with J.R. Smith, op.cit.) As for Pakistan, the declaration of Foreign Minister Shahryar Khan that his country has the know-how and the technology to assemble at least one nuclear bomb does not constitute a declaration of nuclear power status. It is a statement characteristic of the same ambiguity maintained by Israel and India over the last two decades (Washington Post, February 7,1992, p.A8). Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), Neivsbrief, No. 12 (Winter 1990M991); Nuclear Fuel, November 26 and December 10, 1990; Nucleonics Week, December 6, 1990; The Neiv York Times, November 29 and December 5,1990; The Washington Post, November 29 and December 3,1990. PPNN, Neivsbrief, No. 17 (Spring 1992): 2. See PPNN, Neiusbrief, no. 17 (Spring 1992): 15 for text [reproduced from S\PV.3046]. The Independent, 18 February, 1992, p. 1. Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) p. 71, See also pp. 37-77. Martin Navias and Darryl Hewlett, "Problems of Control," in Martin Navias, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World," Adelphi Papers 252 (Summer 1990); "Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and its Control," A Report of the Centre for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, November 1991; W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (New York: Praeger, 1991); and Janne E.

24

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

NUCLEAR WEAPONS Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1991). For an examination of the effect of a testing ban of nuclear weapon states and its link with the NPT see: Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "The NPT and the CTBT: an Inextricable Relationship?" PPNN, Issue Review, No. 1 (March 1992). A stockpile consists of weapons available for use at short notice, for example, one hour. The possession of thirty plus nuclear weapons is thought to give a state the capability to launch a credible retaliatory strike. PPNN, Newsbrief, No. 17 (Spring 1992): 12. PPNN, Newsbrief, No. 17 (Spring 1992): 10-11; The Sunday Times, 5 January; The Times, (London), 6 and 7 January; The New York Times, 8 January; The Economist, 11 January; Nucleonics Week, 9 January; L 'Express, 31 January. It should be noted that if North Korea is found to possess an operating reprocessing plant, which it currently denies, it will have moved itself from category 1 to category 4. Missile Monitor, International Missile Proliferation Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, No. 1 (Fall 1991): 103-105; Jane's Defence Weekly, 30 March 1991, p. 470; Defense News, 13 January 1992, p. 12. PPNN, Neivsbrief, No. 15 (Autumn 1991): 3; Nucleonics Week, July 18. PPNN, Neivsbrief, No. 7 (Spring 1992): 2. PPNN, Newsbrief, No. 12 (Winter 1990\1991): 1,8-9. The first precedent was the bombing of Iraq's Osiraq reactor by Israel on 7 June, 1981. See L.S. Spector with J.R. Smith, op. tit, p. 181. The second was Iraq's repeated attacks on the Bushehr facility during the Iran \Iraq War (ibid, pp. 204, 212).

Chapter 2 THE NEW NUCLEAR PRODUCERS: THE MAIN THREAT TO SUPPLY-SIDE RESTRAINTS?

William C. Potter Recent revelations concerning Iraq's nuclear weapons program demonstrate that a large and growing number of states can now export the material, equipment, technology, and services needed to develop nuclear weapons. As a result, many analysts fear that an influx of new nuclear suppliers, especially those that do not subscribe to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)1 or other international nuclear export-control accords, will erode the existing system of export restraints and undermine non-proliferation efforts.2 Until recently, however, there was little systematic research on the topic. There was also little agreement about who the new suppliers were, why they entered the international nuclear market, and the extent to which they departed from the export practices of more-established supplier states, such as the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Germany.3 To help remedy this deficiency, the Emerging Nuclear Suppliers Project (ENSP) was launched in 1985. Originally, the ENSP analyzed the export behaviour of eleven emerging nuclear suppliers: Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, China, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and Taiwan,4 and is now also monitoring four additional states: Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Presented below are the more significant project findings, along with a discussion of how recent changes in Soviet nuclear export behaviour may undermine international efforts to encourage nuclear export restraint on the part of the new suppliers.

The New Suppliers The countries analyzed in the ENSP study are far from homogeneous. They differ markedly in their level of economic development; the viability

William C. Potter is professor of International Policy Studies and director of the Center for Russian and Soviet Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he directs the Emerging Nuclear Suppliers Project. His latest book is International Nuclear Trade and Non-proliferation: The Challenge of the Emerging Suppliers (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1990). A somewhat different version of this paper appeared in the Spring 1992 issue of Orbis.

26

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

of their domestic nuclear industries; their experience in international commerce; and their perspectives on various non-proliferation efforts, such as the NPT and nuclear export guidelines. They also differ markedly in their nuclear export capability and their actual export activity. Thus, the comparative case studies reveal no simple relationship between a technical capability to produce nuclear material, technology, and equipment and the propensity to export those items. Nor do they reveal a relationship between formal non-proliferation commitments on the part of emerging nuclear supplier states and restraint in nuclear export behaviour. Indeed, among the eleven countries in the initial survey, the one that possesses the most experienced and self-sufficient nuclear industry and the one that is also the most consistent critic of existing non-proliferation structures, India, has been largely inactive as a nuclear exporter, although there are some indications this may change.5 Among the other emerging supplier states, only China has been a major exporter,6 although Argentina, Brazil, and Spain on occasion have exported materials and services that could be used in producing nuclear weapons. Japan also is likely to soon become a significant player. Factors Influencing Nuclear Export Activity

The country studies suggest that a number of factors explain the nuclear export behaviour of the emerging suppliers: nuclear industry development, profit seeking, and power seeking.

Supply Push One factor is a supply-push dynamic by which nuclear export activity tends to rise when the domestic nuclear market fails to keep pace with domestic production capability.7 This factor appears to have been the case in Argentina, China, and Spain, where new domestic orders have not been sufficient to keep the nuclear industry operating at full capacity. Japan also now appears to fit this model, and will probably search more aggressively for foreign orders as long as its domestic market is soft. In contrast to these relatively active emerging suppliers, India, South Korea, and Taiwan have had strong domestic nuclear markets and, perhaps as a consequence, have not vigorously pursued nuclear exports. Economic Incentives In addition to trying to bolster the development, or even survival, of their domestic nuclear industries, emerging suppliers have generally pursued nuclear exports for the same reasons as traditional suppliers. Principal among these incentives is the profit motive. For a number of the emerging suppliers, especially the newly industrializing countries, nuclear exports also afford a means to acquire foreign exchange, to pursue barter

THE NEW NUCLEAR PRODUCERS

27

Table 2.1 Fifteen Emerging Supplier States: Export Capabilities/Actual Exports States Argentina Brazil China India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya North Korea Pakistan South Africa South Korea Spain Taiwan States Argentina Brazil China India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya North Korea Pakistan South Africa South Korea Spain Taiwan States Argentina Brazil China India Iran Iraq Israel Japan Libya North Korea Pakistan South Africa South Korea Spain Taiwan

Enriched uranium and/or uranium enrichment technology yes /yes yes /yes yes /yes yes/? no /no yes /no yes /no yes /no no /no ?/no yes/yes yes /yes no /no yes /no no /no

Heavy water and/or heavy water production technology yes /no yes /no yes /yes yes /no no /no no /no yes /no no /no no /no no /no yes /no no /no no /no no /no no /no

UF6 production technology yes/no yes/no yes/yes yes/no no/no yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no no/no yes/no yes/no no/no no/no no/no

Plutonium reprocessing technology

Research Reactors

yes /yes yes /no yes /yes yes /no no /no yes /no yes /no yes /no no /no yes /no yes /no yes /no no /no yes /yes no /no

yes /yes yes /yes yes/yes yes/? no /no no /no yes /no yes /no no /no yes /no yes /no yes /no yes /no yes /yes yes /no

Power reactors and/or major components

Fuel fabrication technology

yes /yes yes /yes yes /yes yes /no no /no no /no no /no yes /yes no /no no /no no /no yes /no yes /no yes /yes no /no

yes /yes yes /no yes /no yes /no no /no yes /no yes /no yes /yes no /no yes /no yes /no yes /no yes /no yes /yes no /no

Nuclear scientists and technical experts yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes yes/? yes/? yes/yes yes/yes yes/? yes/?

yes/yes

yes/? yes /yes yes /yes yes/yes

28

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

transactions for coveted commodities, to reduce foreign debt, and to redress unfavourable terms of trade associated with dependency on unprocessed goods. These economic incentives, most clearly evident for Brazil, are also important for Argentina and China, and are likely to gain in significance for India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan. To date, however, nuclear exports have not in general yielded substantial economic returns for the emerging suppliers, one exception being the export of natural uranium by South Africa. This marketing difficulty, which currently also afflicts many of the traditional suppliers, results from a combination of factors, including the depressed international nuclear market, the economic ill health of most of the prospective importers in the developing world, constraints on long-term financing, and the lack of a proven record of reliable and safe exports. Even the more active emerging suppliers, such as China and Argentina, have limited experience as nuclear exporters and must labour long and hard to generate buyer confidence where competition exists from traditional supplier states. In order to cope with these difficulties, the new suppliers are likely to rely increasingly on joint ventures with established nuclear suppliers. This export strategy has already been pursued by Spain and, more recently, by South Korea. South Korea and the Soviet Union, for example, recently have discussed the joint development of small-size nuclear reactors.8 Such joint ventures have the attraction of both minimizing a number of the constraints under which most emerging suppliers must operate (for example, limited domestic financing capabilities and unproven reliability as a supplier) and exploiting the market experience these states have acquired as importers of nuclear technology and know-how.

Political Incentives Although generally subordinate to economic considerations, international political incentives tend to reinforce the new suppliers' interest in nuclear exports. The pursuit of regional influence by means of nuclear export policy is most notable for Argentina, Brazil, Japan, Spain, and China. Each of these states has sought to use nuclear trade and assistance to augment its political, economic, and, in the case of China, military position vis a vis other regional competitors. The emerging suppliers also are inclined to attach greater importance than the traditional suppliers to the symbolic importance of nuclear exports and to equate nuclear export capability with increased international status and prestige.

Reasons for Optimism and Concern A new set of states is now able to offer on the international market nuclear material, technology, equipment, and services useful for nuclear weapons production (see Table 2.1).9 But one must not equate the ability to

THE NEW NUCLEAR PRODUCERS

29

export sensitive nuclear technology with the readiness to do so. As indicated by Table 2.1, new suppliers have participated in transactions of sensitive nuclear technology and material in relatively few cases. Restraint by the new suppliers (China being a major exception), conditioned by strong international norms opposing nuclear proliferation, is probably the main reason for the low level of nuclear export activity. This restraint derives from considerations of self-interest and potential harm to a state's security that outweighs current incentives to export. Although many of the emerging suppliers may regard the NPT and existing international export controls as discriminatory and may themselves covet a nuclear weapons program, none are anxious to see other states acquire a nuclear weapons capability. For example, the two most active new suppliers, Argentina and China, though often critical of existing international nuclear export controls, nevertheless have stated that their exports will be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.10 In August 1991, China also indicated that it planned to join the NPT, thereby following the lead of two other long-time hold-outs, South Africa and France.11 One therefore may hope that a more general maturation process is at work by which suppliers over time increasingly behave in accordance with stringent nuclear export guidelines. According to this optimistic scenario, the trend toward increased joint ventures between emerging and traditional suppliers may actually reinforce the non-proliferation regime if the traditional suppliers use the teaming arrangements and the economic incentives as inducements for greater restraint on the part of the emerging suppliers. A less optimistic non-proliferation scenario involving the emerging suppliers, however, is possible. It is based less on their declaratory policies and more on their potential to make trouble. This potential is apparent from the growing body of data concerning Iraqi nuclear imports. Companies from traditional nuclear supplier states such as Germany, Switzerland, and Great Britain were active in aiding the Iraqi nuclear programs, but a number of new nuclear suppliers also played a significant export role. For example, much of Iraq's "yellowcake" (a concentrate containing 70 to 80 percent uranium oxide needed to produce uranium hexafluoride (HF6) prior to uranium enrichment) appears to have been imported from Brazil and China. Brazil is also reported to have provided Iraq with clandestine nuclear assistance since 1980 in the fields of gas centrifuge development and yellowcake conversion. A1979 nuclear cooperation agreement between Brazil and Iraq may even have provided Iraq access to the Ipero ultracentrifuge plant (a facility developed with technology supplied by West Germany).12 Pakistan and China also are reported to have assisted Iraq's gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment program.13 Although the nature of Pakistan's direct nuclear assistance

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS

has yet to be detailed, the experience it gained in circumventing international nuclear export controls when building its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities was well-known to Iraq and must have assisted Iraq's nuclear efforts. A comparison of Pakistani and Iraqi imports of a dozen key centrifuge-related items, for example, reveals a striking pattern in which Iraq followed the Pakistani course, but with a ten-year lag (see Table 2.2).

TABLE 2.2 Pakistani and Iraqi Actual Nuclear Imports (Centrifuge-related Items) Centrifuge design data Maraging steel Carbon fiber Centrifuge endcaps Centrifuge baffles Machine tools* High temperature furnaces Centrifuge bellows Centrifuge ring magnets High frequency inverters/Converters motors** Vacuum pumps Conversion plant***

Pakistan

Iraq

1975 1978 ? ? ? ? 1979 1977 1979 1978 1977 1980

by 1988 1990 late 1980s 1990 1990 1988 1988 ? 1990 1990 1987 ?

Source: ENSP Database, prepared by Daniel K. Schultz * Lathes, flow-forming machines, spin-forming machines ** Ring-shaped stators *** Used for converting U3O8 into UF6 gas

Today, no conclusive evidence can be offered for either the optimistic or pessimistic non-proliferation scenarios. For one thing, in most of the emerging supplier states, norms guiding nuclear exports are in a state of flux. As a consequence, policy makers in these states may be more receptive than in the past to supply-side arms-control measures as long as they do not deny technology exclusively to developing states and do not appear to serve the commercial interests of the established nuclear suppliers. For example, efforts to recruit Argentina, Brazil, and China to join the Nuclear Suppliers' Group ("London Club"),14 for example, may win either the formal or tacit support of those states for London Club guidelines. Similarly, initiatives to engage the emerging suppliers in more bilateral and multilateral discussions on export-control procedures may serve to allay their suspicions and to establish areas of common interest. As Lewis Dunn points out, efforts "should concentrate on

THE NEW NUCLEAR PRODUCERS

31

convincing as many of the emerging suppliers as possible to adhere, as formally as possible, to existing nuclear supply norms/' These norms include: (1) restraint in nuclear trade with states considered a threat to non-proliferation; (2) restraint in trade of sensitive equipment and technology used in the fuel cycle of nuclear reactors (for example, uraniumenrichment equipment); (3) restraint in trade of dual-use items (that is, equipment used for civilian as well as military purposes); and (4) adoption of IAEA safeguards for the export of all"trigger list" items (for example, heavy water, plutonium-reprocessing plants, and uraniumenrichment equipment).15 Support for these norms by emerging supplier states will be reinforced if they are respected by established suppliers. More pessimistically, the ENSP case studies reveal that the machinery governing export behaviour in the emerging suppliers tends to be rudimentary. Most emerging supplier states have underdeveloped and understaffed domestic nuclear export-control structures and lack welldefined procedures for regulating nuclear exports. In the absence of routine procedures to license and monitor exports and mechanisms to coordinate and implement interagency decisions, declarations of support for prudence in nuclear exports, even if they are a sincere reflection of leadership beliefs, may well diverge from actual export behaviour. A useful approach to supply-side restraints, therefore, maybe to encourage established suppliers to share their experience in export control implementation with the new suppliers.16 At present, the emerging suppliers, with the exception of Japan, do not derive the technical benefits associated with regular participation in international nuclear export-control consultations. Given the state of flux in norms guiding exports and the underdeveloped state of export-control machinery in the emerging suppliers states, the contradictory behaviour of those exporters is unsurprising. For example, although both Argentina and China now declare their support for IAEA safeguards on their nuclear exports, neither state has exercised restraint in the export of sensitive components of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is apparent in terms of their trade with each other in commodities such as heavy water and enriched uranium and in the export to Algeria of enriched uranium (by Argentina) and a large heavy water research reactor (by China).17 They also appear ready to engage in nuclear trade with states whose commitment to non-proliferation is suspect at best. (The same can be said about many of the traditional supplier states.) Chinese exports of unsafeguarded heavy water in the 1980s to countries such as Argentina and India, and possibly also to Pakistan and South Africa,18 and Argentina's efforts in the late 1980s to develop nuclear ties with India and Pakistan19 illustrate the danger of assuming that the export practices of emerging suppliers will over time evolve toward greater restraint.

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Similar caution should be observed concerning joint ventures. Although these teaming arrangements may yield non-proliferation dividends, they also may attract firms in traditional supplier states who wish to circumvent their own states' restrictive export regulations. In sum, the ENSP case studies demonstrate that, so far, only a few of the emerging suppliers have been (China), are becoming (Argentina, Spain, and possibly Brazil), or are likely soon to be (Japan) major exporters of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, technology, or services. This finding may comfort traditional suppliers. It also may help concentrate efforts to monitor trade in sensitive nuclear commodities where it will do the most good. It should not, however, lead one to minimize the present and potential problems of those emerging suppliers with limited nuclear capabilities but with few export restrictions. Such countries can pose a grave proliferation risk if they provide items otherwise unavailable to countries aspiring to possess nuclear weapons.20 Pakistani and Iraqi experience in circumventing international nuclear export controls is especially relevant, and underlines the porous nature of existing international control arrangements. The entry of new vendors into the nuclear marketplace will undoubtedly provide new loopholes.

The Soviet Union, Russia, and Nuclear Exports The international effort to encourage nuclear export restraint on the part of the emerging suppliers has been facilitated by an unusual degree of US-Soviet cooperation that persisted even during the most troubled periods of the two countries' relations in the 1970s and 1980s.21 This cooperation was expressed in regular bilateral consultations and in a variety of multilateral and international forums such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the NPT Review Conferences, and was reflected in the generally stringent nuclear export policies of both states. This tandem, if not identical, approach to non-proliferation and nuclear exports, which on occasion focused explicitly on the proliferation risks posed by the emerging supplier states, had a number of salutary effects. Firstly, it bolstered international norms opposing the spread of nuclear weapons; secondly, it removed from the international market a major potential source of sensitive nuclear material, technology, equipment, and services; and thirdly, it strengthened nuclear export guidelines. Hopefully, the depressed nuclear market in the Soviet Union and Russia after Chernobyl, a market which is witnessing cancellation after cancellation of proposed new plants, will not lead Russia to relax its export policy in order to gain new overseas markets. Recently, however, the Soviet Union had undertaken a number of nuclear export initiatives that seemed likely to weaken non-proliferation efforts. These include:

THE NEW NUCLEAR PRODUCERS

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1. Soviet readiness in February 1990 to sell Pakistan, a non-NPT state and one aspiring to possess nuclear weapons, a nuclear power plant without insisting that Pakistan place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, at a time shortly after the United States had succeeded in persuading the Federal Republic of Germany to withdraw its offer and while France was promoting its nuclear reactor; 2. Soviet readiness to supply India with two pressurized water reactors (and in 1991, possibly fast-breeder reactors) despite India's reluctance to accept full-scope safeguards; 3. Soviet readiness in 1990 to sell Argentina, a non-NPT party state, heavy water, and in October 1990, to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with Argentina in the field of breeder reactors; 4. Soviet deliberations in April 1991 with Israel, a non-NPT party state and one widely regarded as possessing nuclear weapons, over the possible sale of a Soviet nuclear reactor;22 5. Continued Soviet assistance to Cuba in the development of its first nuclear power plant despite Cuba's resistance to the NPT. (Cuba recently has given conflicting signals regarding its interest in becoming a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco,23 but has shown no change in its hostility to the NPT.) There are also reports that during the past year the Soviet Union may have delivered to Cuba a ten-megawatt research reactor which uses highly enriched uranium as fuel.24 These nuclear initiatives with non-NPT parties tell emerging nuclear suppliers that few benefits are derived from membership in the NPT and that even the supporters of non-proliferation who are most ardent in their declaratory policies are in practice prepared to sell to anyone for the right price. Such actions can only erode international norms against proliferation. A number of other Soviet export activities, however, aside from those with non-NPT parties, suggested that Moscow was rapidly lowering its guard concerning nuclear exports. During President Mikhail Gorbachev's April 1991 trip to South Korea, for example, the Soviet Union expressed a readiness to transfer sensitive nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment and fast breeder reactor processes. The Soviet Foreign Trade Publishing House has even prepared an Englishlanguage brochure providing specifications for at least one of the Soviet fast-breeder reactors, the BN-800, a liquid-metal fast-breeder reactor.25 Another example was the Soviets' resistance to efforts by several nuclear supplier states, including the United States and Germany, to make fullscope safeguards a condition of export. This resistance was evident at the 1990 NPT review conference and at the meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group in the Hague in March 1991. Private trading companies, operating in a nuclear export shadowland where no national atomic energy

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legislation exists to govern exports of nuclear material, have also begun marketing sensitive commodities. Private organizations, in the ex-USSR, apparently are able to buy such material as beryllium and zirconium, useful for nuclear weapons production, at discount prices from state manufacturing firms and to market them abroad.26 One private firm, the Internation CHETEK Corporation, has even sought to market "peaceful nuclear explosive" services abroad.27 This decentralization of nuclear export activity further dilutes the impact of Soviet declaratory policy in support of the non-proliferation regime and sends the wrong signal to the new nuclear suppliers. As a consequence of the dissolution of Soviet central authority, oversight of nuclear export practices is likely to become more ineffectual as governmental responsibilities and jurisdiction become more murky, private trading companies proliferate, and the new political entities face increased economic difficulties and demands for hard currency. Indeed, given the number of nuclear power engineers and weapons designers, nuclear research and training centres, fuel fabrication facilities, and nuclear power and research reactors in the nonRussian republics, one may soon confront a world in which there are over a dozen new nuclear suppliers.

Military versus Civilian Nuclear Programs The fundamental threats to non-proliferation posed by both the emerging nuclear suppliers and the traditional nuclear exporters derive from the difficulty of distinguishing between the raw materials and technology for civilian nuclear power and nuclear weapons programs. Ironically, this dilemma is codified in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which simultaneously commits the nuclear powers to provide non-nuclear weapons states with civilian nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in exchange for the latter's pledge to forgo a military nuclear capability. Thus, as long as there remains an international demand for nuclear energy, one must guard against the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use to the production of nuclear weapons. International nuclear export-control agreements such as the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Nuclear Exporters' (Zangger) Committee guidelines28 represent one important approach to reduce the risk of diversion. Although these measures, which need not be in the form of treaties, do not prohibit the export of sensitive nuclear material and technology, they do reduce the risk of proliferation by imposing international safeguards as a condition of export.29 The reluctance of many of the new nuclear suppliers to subscribe to these international guidelines remains a major non-proliferation concern and serves to distinguish many of the emerging suppliers from the more established nuclear exporters.

THE NEW NUCLEAR PRODUCERS

35

The progress Iraq was able to make in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is a reminder that formal acceptance of international safeguards at least in their present form is no guarantee against diversion. The export behaviour of firms from traditional as well as emerging supplier states also indicates the large gap that remains between declaratory support for nuclear export controls and supply-side restraint on the one hand, and actual policy implementation on the other. Recent nuclear export initiatives on the part of the Soviet Union further illustrate the fragile nature of non-proliferation and the potential for backsliding even among suppliers that traditionally have exercised great restraint. Nevertheless, most of the new nuclear suppliers have found it to be in their own national interest to behave prudently in the export arena. This caution on the part of the new suppliers derives mainly from the fear that other states will acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons, as well as from strong international norms opposing nuclear proliferation and a recognition that imprudent exports might jeopardize trade relations with the established suppliers. One therefore should not exaggerate the problem or make generalizations about emerging supplier behaviour on the basis of the spotty record of a few new supplier states. Although there are reasons for concern about non-proliferation, recent decisions by South Africa and China to join the NPT, and by Argentina and Brazil to create a mutual system of nuclear safeguards, provide encouragement. This non-proliferation momentum should be exploited and efforts intensified both to recruit new adherents to the London Club guidelines and to improve the export practices of NPT-party states.

NOTES

1

2

3 4

Countries that have not yet signed the treaty include, among others, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan. South Africa recently became a party to the treaty and France and the People's Republic of China recently announced their intentions to sign. See, for example, Roger Molander and Robbie Nichols, Who Will Stop the Bomb ? (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1985); S. Ing, "Emergent Suppliers, the Non-Proliferation Regime and Regional Security," in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security, ed. David Dewitt (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 119-30; and Amy Sands, "Emerging Nuclear Suppliers: What's the Beef?" in International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation, ed. William C. Potter (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 25-38. Other major traditional suppliers include Belgium, Canada, Italy, Sweden, and Great Britain. A more detailed analysis is provided in Potter, International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation.

36 5 6

7 8 9 10 11

12

13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

NUCLEAR WEAPONS India recently has sought to sell a research reactor to Iran. See Nucleonics Week, 28 November, 1991, also see Nucleonics Week, 14 April, 1991; and "India Offers to Export Technology," Nuclear Engineei'ing International, (November 1990): 18 See, for example, Yan Kong, "A Wild Card: Chinese Heavy Water Exports," Eye on Supply, (Spring 1991): 64-70; and Yan Kong and Tim McCarthy, "The Proliferation Risks of the PRC-Supplied Algerian Nuclear Reactor," Eye on Supply, (Spring 1991): 71-73. The "supply-push" hypothesis is described by Randy Rydell, "Studying the Emerging Nuclear Suppliers," in Potter, op. tit., p. 20. "Ministry Considers USSR Joint Nuclear Project," Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS), Report: Nuclear Developments, 23 April, 1991, from The Korea Times, 11 April, 1991. See the quarterly review of the ENSP, Eye on Supply. See Nucleonics Week, 4 November, 1990, pp. 6-7. The Chinese announcement on 11 August, 1991, stated that China had decided "in principle" to sign the NPT. See "Premier Li on Nuclear Treaty," JPRS, Report: Proliferation Issues, 21 August, 1991, from Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition, 12 August, 1991. See, for example, Nucleonics Week, 8 August, 1991, p. 5; Gary Milholin and Jennifer Weeks, "Keeping the Lid on Nuclear Arms," New Scientist, 17 August, 1991, pp. 26-30; Nucleonics Week, 18 October, 1990, pp. 7-8; and Nucleonics Week, 11 November, 1990, pp. 7-8. See, for example, The Washington Times, 13 December, 1989; U.S. Neivs and World Report, 4 June, 1990; and Peter Clausen, "The Iraqi Nuclear Threat," News Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, 20 November, 1990, pp. 1-4. Seven of the major nuclear suppliers began meeting in London in late 1974 to delineate nuclear export guidelines. In January 1976 an expanded group of fifteen members endorsed a uniform code of conduct for nuclear exports. Members include Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Lewis Dunn, "The Emerging Nuclear Suppliers: Some Guidelines for Policy," in Potter, op. tit., p. 402. Ibid., p. 403. See Eye on Supply, Summer 1990, pp. 56-61; and "A Chronology of Algerian Nuclear Developments," ENSP Bulletin, 16 April, 1991. See Kong, op.tit. See Nucleonics Week, 13 April, 1989. Amy Sands, op.cit. For a detailed analysis of this cooperation see William C. Potter, "Nuclear Proliferation: US-Soviet Cooperation," The Washington Quarterly, (Winter 1985): 141-54. Israel reportedly has expressed interest in a Soviet breeder reactor, as well as a 440 WER (pressurized, light water) type and a smaller reactor used to power Russian ice breakers. See The Wall Street Journal, 8 May, 1991; Israel Davar Neivspaper Reports, 26 April, 1991.

THE NEW NUCLEAR PRODUCERS

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23 The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, on 14 February, 1967, by twenty-one Latin American countries. 24 Transcript of a press conference with Soviet officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry, 11 June, 1991. 25 The Soviet Union originally planned to install three BN-800s at the South Urals Nuclear Power Station. Two BN-800s were under construction when work on the station ceased in 1987. See Thomas B. Cochran and Robert Standish Norris, "Soviet Nuclear Warhead Production/' Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Paper, National Research Defense Council, 19 October, 1990, p. 12. 26 Beryllium and zirconium were among items raised for possible inclusion in nuclear supplier guideline " trigger lists" during the March 1991 meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. See Nucleonics Week, 18 March, 1991. 27 William C. Potter, "Russia's Nuclear Entrepreneurs", The New York Times, 7 November, 1991. 28 For a discussion of these guidelines see William C. Potter, Nuclear Powei' and Nonproliferation: An Interdisciplinaiy Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: OGH Publishers, 1982), pp. 44-46. The Nuclear Exporters' Committee, or Zangger Committee as it is usually known, was set up in 1970 to interpret the safeguards clause of the NPT. 29 According to Article III, A, 5 of the statute of the IAEA, the agency is "To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy."

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Chapters NUCLEAR EXPORTCONTROLS: CAN WE PLUG THE LEAKS?

Paul L. Leventhal The various items needed to manufacture nuclear weapons continue to find their way from a worldwide nuclear industry into the purportedly peaceful nuclear programs of a number of developing countries, despite the panoply of nuclear agreements, laws, and regulations that comprise present US and international nuclear export controls. UN inspectors discovered a vast nuclear weapons program in Iraq, a party to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and one whose cooperation under the treaty had been labelled "exemplary" by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); indeed, Iraqi officials were deemed by the IAEA to "have made every effort to demonstrate that Iraq is a solid citizen/'1 This discovery provides only the latest evidence of a growing, global nuclear bazaar that makes a mockery of the long-revered nuclear non-proliferation regime. The question therefore arises: Is it possible to plug the leaks in nuclear export controls? Perhaps more to the point, given the apparent lack of willpower among governments and industry to do so, should an attempt even be made?

The Nuclear Control Regime The US proposal on the peaceful uses of atomic energy was unveiled by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a speech to the UN General Assembly in 1953. A series of "atoms-for-peace" conferences in Geneva followed, at which the United States and other countries possessing nuclear weaponry disclosed previously classified nuclear technology associated with production of materials for nuclear weapons, so that it might be applied for civilian research and the generation of electricity. The IAEA was then established in 1956 to safeguard as well as to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Today, the nuclear control regime includes the

Paul L. Leventhal is President of the Nuclear Control Institute in Washington, DC. A somewhat different version of this paper appeared in the Spring 1992 issue of Orbis under the title "Why Bother Plugging Export Leaks?"

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NPT, the IAEA (including the agency's Zangger Committee on nuclear export controls), the Nuclear Suppliers' Group ("London Club"), the Department of State Munitions List (Arms Export Control Act), the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the Department of Commerce COCOM List (Export Administration Act), and other US agency and interagency nuclear export controls, pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Casting a wider and a finer net than this one will be exceedingly difficult, and for all the effort, only a marginal or diminishing return is likely. A better net might prove successful in catching more items of importance to nuclear-bomb making, but most of the newly caught items would probably be dual-use components, computers, microchips, special alloys, pumps, valves, and the like that are also important to industrial development in the Third World. The vast majority of developing countries can make no practical use of nuclear energy and have no interest in nuclear weapons. More comprehensive lists of controlled items will not end the secrecy and political machinations that undermine enforcement of the present nuclear export-control regime. At the same time, negotiating longer, more complex lists of sensitive dual-use items however gratifying that might seem to nuclear bureaucrats and diplomats will do little to restrict commerce in these items if they can continue to be exported (albeit subject to IAEA safeguards) to countries determined to develop nuclear weapons. The safeguards are weak in the face of determined would-be nuclear powers, and acquiring the technologies to produce bomb-grade materials enables these states to produce the weapons themselves. Thus, tightening controls over these items might well stir deep resentments and widen the North-South divide far out of proportion to any gain realized in further inhibiting nuclear development in the relatively few problem states for which the new restrictions would be intended. In addition, more comprehensive lists of controlled items will not end the secrecy and political machinations that undermine enforcement of the present nuclear export-control regime. Though such list-writing is again underway in national bureaucracies and the international Nuclear Suppliers' Group, it is an exercise that will not mean much if the past decade's pattern of weak enforcement is allowed to persist, including weak or nonexistent controls over nuclear as well as dual-use items. Demarches sent by the US Government protesting the export of sensitive items to would-be nuclear states have been ignored by suppliers and have not been pursued aggressively by US officials. If diplomacy continues to transform demarches into "demarshmallows,"2 making it impossible to confront wayward exporters and importers and if secrecy is still used to conceal illicit nuclear trade, what is the point of investing untold thousands of hours on drafting, negotiating; and ratifying yet more controlled items?

NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS

41

Non-proliferation Paralysis The biggest problem facing nuclear export controls today is not a control list that is too short, but a non-proliferation regime that is too long on secrecy and too short on political will. Bluntly stated, current US practice is to abstain from enforcing nuclear export controls whenever competing interests are deemed to take precedence, which is almost always. To date, almost any political, industrial, or diplomatic interest takes precedence over nuclear non-proliferation. The net result is non-proliferation paralysis, often with no one outside of classified circles being the wiser until the damage is done; that is, the offending export is sent, the uranium is enriched to weapons grade, the weapons-usable plutonium is recovered from spent reactor fuel, or the weapons are built. Competing interests explain the failure of the United States to respond effectively to the nuclear weapons programs of Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Iraq; to the renegade nuclear supplier roles played by China, France, and Germany; and to Japan's determination to recover vast stocks of unneeded, uneconomical plutonium from USsupplied reactor fuel. In each instance, a case was made as to why immediate, specific interests had to take precedence over longer-term, nuclear proliferation concerns. History will judge whether, for example, Pakistan's cooperation with US military assistance to the anti-Soviet insurgents in Afghanistan warranted the United States finally turning a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. History will also judge whether pressing trade issues with Japan warranted a US decision to enter into a nuclear trade agreement with the Japanese in 1988, clearing the way for Japan to recover from US-supplied nuclear fuel more plutonium than in all US and Soviet nuclear weapons combined. The premise underlying these policy decisions has been that nuclear proliferation cannot be prevented, only managed, thereby justifying weak or flexible nuclear export controls that can give way to immediate industrial and diplomatic imperatives. The cumulative effect of these individual trade-offs, however, is to hasten both the spread of nuclear weapons and the industrial potential to build nuclear weapons with little or no warning. Whether this spread proves manageable remains to be seen. It would seem prudent, however, to place a higher priority on preventing today what might not prove manageable tomorrow. One only has to read accounts of the 1988-89 Bundestag investigation of the West German nuclear export scandals to get the flavour of how weak the controls have been in the face of a determined industry backed by a sympathetic bureaucracy unmoved by proliferation concerns.3 German corporations and middlemen made unsafeguarded transfers of critical components, whole plants, and heavy water to Iraq, India, and

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Pakistan after the German government ignored or rebuffed well over one hundred demarches and other communications from the United States and Great Britain protesting the impending exports. Investigators found a memo in which a German export official reported that the notes "usually end up in my wastepaper basket/'4 Only some of the export abuses involved dual-use items that lacked specific controls. Most involved nuclear items, components, equipment, technology, and materials for which there were adequate controls but inadequate enforcement. The Germans are not alone, of course; many are to blame for the presently weak export-control regime.5 The French bear a special responsibility, having remained outside the NPT, and having opposed the NPT's full-scope safeguards regime. (France recently agreed in principle to join the NPT, but is still not prepared to withhold all nuclear exports to non-NPT nations.) Moreover, France is a nuclear exporter with a long list of dubious credits: sending the Dimona reactor and reprocessing plant, and probably a tested bomb design, to Israel; offering to build reprocessing plants in Pakistan and South Korea; sending power reactors and fuel to South Africa; sending congratulations to India on its nuclear explosion; providing fuel for India's US-built power reactors after the United States cut off nuclear fuel to India; sending the Osiraq reactor and bomb-grade fuel to Iraq; sending zirconium and highly specialized steel to Pakistan; and offering power reactors to Israel, India, and Pakistan. The former Soviet Union is not without sin either.6 The Soviets offered nuclear power plants to India and Pakistan and were transferring power and research reactors to Cuba, all in the absence of full-scope safeguards. Unsafeguarded Soviet heavy water also made its way through a German middleman to India, apparently with the Soviet government's knowledge.7 In addition, the Soviets offered breeder reactors to South Korea and Israel, and plutonium fuel to Japan. Now, as Soviet central authority is replaced by a loosely knit commonwealth of former Soviet republics, there is the added risk of unauthorized transfers of nuclear know-how and materials by a growing number of unemployed scientists, and even the possibility of tactical nuclear warheads falling into the wrong hands. For two years following India's nuclear explosion in 1974, the US government covered up its role in the joint US-Canadian export of heavy water and a research reactor to India. Canada, the exporter of the heavywater-moderated CIRUS reactor usedby India to produce the plutonium for the test, was left to take the blame for the explosion. US concealment of its complicity served to isolate Canada and undercut the effectiveness of Canadian sanctions imposed against India. A US Senate committee's belated discovery of this cover-up stimulated congressional interest in the nuclear proliferation problem and led to enactment of the Nuclear NonProlif eration Act of 1978, imposing tighter controls over US nuclear exports.8

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The United States further undermined international non-proliferation efforts by exempting Pakistan from a required cutoff of US military and economic assistance in the face of Pakistan's unsafeguarded uranium enrichment program. By allowing US aid to continue in consideration of Pakistan's cooperation with US anti-Soviet operations in Afghanistan, the United States undercut its own efforts to block sensitive nuclear exports to Pakistan. Continued US aid signaled to Pakistan as well as to exporters that Pakistan's unsafeguarded program was tolerable; this led directly to Pakistan's recent development of nuclear weapons.9 China has been Pakistan's principal nuclear benefactor, providing Pakistan with hands-on assistance at the Kahuta enrichment plant, with a tested bomb design, and with enough highly enriched uranium for two bombs perhaps even conducting a test of the bomb design for Pakistan at China's Lop Nor test site.10 The US response was to reward China by negotiating an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation that would enable US exports of nuclear power plants to China. To date, however, administrations have been unable to obtain from China further nonproliferation commitments that Congress insisted must be given before the agreement would be allowed to come into force.11 These commitments include arrangements for visits by US officials to check on transfers of US nuclear equipment, materials, and technology. The Reagan administration still authorized the transfer of valuable nuclear power plant technology to China despite a commitment by a key official that "until the arrangements are in place, we will not export to China."12 China also has engaged in a number of nuclear transgressions, such as sales of unsafeguarded heavy water to India and the recently disclosed transfer of an unsafeguarded research reactor to Algeria. China also appears to be a nuclear supplier to Iraq and Iran, providing Iraq with special magnets for use in its centrifuge enrichment program, as well as lithium hydride, a rare chemical used to produce tritium, a boosting agent for nuclear warheads13 and reportedly assisting Iran with enrichment of uranium by laser and calutron techniques, as well as a research reactor.14 Nonetheless, the Bush administration has not seen fit to support congressional efforts to condition continuation of China's mostfavoured nation trade status on a halt in Chinese illicit nuclear exports.

Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program Three principal lessons can be drawn from examining Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program.15 These lessons shed light on the feasibility of plugging the leaks in nuclear export controls and suggest priorities other than upgrading export controls that must be addressed. First, the NPT, the principal bulwark against the spread of the bomb, actually facilitated the supply of very sensitive items such as research

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reactors, bomb-grade uranium fuel, and equipment for processing plutonium to a rogue state. Iraq laid to rest a long-standing belief that a state will not join the NPT for the purpose of cheating. In this case, Iraq cheated on its treaty commitments, and the treaty did not inhibit Iraq's ability to go forward with a dedicated nuclear weapons program, including the acquisition of unsafeguarded equipment and technology for enriching uranium to weapons grade. Secondly, IAEA safeguards proved incapable of detecting the vast, multi-billion-dollar weapons program that Iraq had concealed inside unsafeguarded facilities, even when these weapons facilities were located within nuclear installations where safeguards were being applied. Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq first tried to conceal and then grudgingly showed inspectors evidence of at least four technologies and several large plants for producing its own highly enriched bomb-grade uranium. IAEA safeguards also failed to provide timely detection of Iraq's removal of bomb-grade nuclear fuel from safeguarded facilities. Before the war, agency inspectors had been checking twice a year on safeguarded, highly enriched uranium fuel that the agency knew could be converted into weapons components in one to three weeks. Iraq laid to rest a long-standing belief that a state will not join the Non-Prolif eration Treaty for the purpose of cheating. Only after the war did the inspectors learn that Iraq had put most of this fuel into hiding, away from the reactor sites where it had been stored (approximately forty kilograms of safeguarded, highly enriched uranium). This was enough to build two implosion-type nuclear bombs.16 The inspectors also found traces of apparently unsafeguarded, highly enriched uranium, the origins and amounts of which are still unknown. Iraq had also violated safeguards by secretly producing and recovering three grams of plutonium in inspected facilities. Although this amount of plutonium is but a minute fraction of what is needed for a bomb, the production and recovery of this plutonium represented a clear safeguards violation. This discovery also suggested that Baghdad retained an active interest in pursuing a plutonium path to nuclear weapons even after Israel's 1981 destruction of Iraq's large but uncompleted Osiraq reactor, a facility potentially capable of producing plutonium. Thirdly, Iraq is demonstrating that the potential to produce nuclear weapons, once acquired, cannot easily be eliminated. Iraq continues to play a cat-and-mouse game with the IAEA-UN Special Commission inspection team, despite being required under the UN Ceasefire Resolution to give up its weapons-grade nuclear materials and to allow its nuclear weapons facilities to be destroyed. Although it has allowed the UN inspection team to reconfirm its declared, safeguarded inventory of nuclear materials, and has opened a number of incomplete uraniumenrichment plants to inspectors, the full extent of Iraq's nuclear weapons

NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS

45

program is still to be learned. Iraq has resisted showing inspectors anything not already learned from intelligence gleaned from Iraqi defectors and US spy satellites. Intelligence from Iraqi defectors, for example, led to the discovery of a cache of documents proving the existence of the nuclear weapons design program, code named "Petrochemical 3." Significant parts of Iraq's weapons program could still be hidden, as suggested by the traces of apparently imported, unsafeguarded, highly enriched uranium; evidence of unsafeguarded laboratory-scale production and recovery of plutonium; and an apparent plan to build a camouflaged reactor capable of producing enough plutonium to make weapons.17 Inspectors found Iraq's ability to manufacture centrifuges for uranium enrichment to be much more extensive and sophisticated than analysts had believed before the war. They also discovered Iraq's large calutron program based on electromagnetic enrichment technology developed by the United States during the Manhattan Project to produce the highly enriched uranium for the Hiroshima bomb. Calutron technology was declassified by the United States soon after World War II and was not subject to US or international export controls on the mistaken assumption that it was too messy and inefficient a technique for states wanting to enrich uranium for bombs. Iraq developed a modernized, more efficient version of it, a feat suggesting outside help. An Iraqi defector said Iraq used calutrons to produce a cache of forty kilograms, or two bomb's worth, of bomb-grade uranium. However, UN inspectors discovered only incomplete calutron plants and about a pound of uranium enriched to less than weapons grade by Iraq's first calutrons. Yet even if what has been discovered represents the full extent of Iraq's centrifuge and calutron enrichment programs, these discoveries suggest ominous failures in both nuclear export controls and intelligence gathering before the Gulf War.

What Can Be Done Iraq's nuclear weapons program makes clear that there are serious leaks under the present system of national export-control laws and international agreements, but these leaks are symptomatic of far deeper problems. A big effort to expand the list of controlled items and to upgrade IAEA safeguards on these items may serve only to treat the symptoms but not to cure the disease. The disease in this instance is not the spread of nuclear weapons per se, but of the materials and technology essential to their manufacture. The non-proliferation regime spreads these items as atoms for peace. The disease is preventable, but only if the regime is revamped to permit only those peaceful applications of nuclear energy that do not produce or use

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separated plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Such a regime is technically feasible because neither of these weapons-grade materials is essential to running nuclear power or research programs. But this benign approach may not be politically feasible because of nuclear technology companies and bureaucracies that are unprepared to change course even in the face of dangers that clearly lie ahead. The most immediate danger is the spread of advanced enrichment and reprocessing technologies to developing states that want nuclear weapons. Iraq is the living proof of that danger. A longer-term danger is that enormous stocks of recovered plutonium will accumulate in the industrial world, thus providing potential weapons material both for the states that possess them and for terrorists or rogue states that may seek to seize or divert them. The potential inventory of plutonium recoverable from accumulated spent fuel of civilian power reactors far exceeds all of the plutonium recovered to date from military production reactors in the nuclear weapons states. Japan and Germany are examples of advanced, non-nuclear weapon states that may soon possess more separated plutonium than is now contained in all US and Soviet nuclear weapons combined. Most of the plutonium has not yet been recovered from spent fuel and can still be disposed of as waste; plutonium already recovered can be collected and disposed of along with plutonium from dismantled US and Soviet nuclear weapons. Unless the lessons learned from Iraq and from the present industrial and bureaucratic mismanagement of atoms for peace are translated into a radically different approach to nuclear non-proliferation, it is anyone's guess as to when (not whether, but when) nuclear weapons will again be used. Unfortunately, there are few signs, even after Iraq, that powerful nuclear industrial interests and their backers in national and international bureaucracies are prepared to embark on a straightforward, transparent, and unambiguous approach to bringing nuclear commerce under control. For example, the nuclear industry and the Bush administration are lobbying hard against provisions in the pending Export Administration Act Amendments that would require full-scope IAEA/ NPT safeguards as a prerequisite for all US nuclear-related exports, would cut off exports of highly enriched uranium fuels, and would impose trade sanctions against foreign governments and corporations whose exports undercut these standards. By requiring full-scope IAEA safeguards and a formal agreement for nuclear cooperation as the basis for any US nuclear export, the bill closes a dangerous loophole by extending to transfers of nuclear technology and components the strict requirements that now apply only to exports of reactors and fuel. The preference of the major nuclear suppliers, as is evident from ongoing negotiations in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, is to continue to expand

NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS

47

lists of individual items for which IAEA safeguards will be required as a condition of supply to NPT and non-NPT states. Suppliers are not prepared to demand that, before any nuclear or dual-use items are transferred, receiving countries must agree to accept the most rigorous IAEA safeguards possible under the treaty on all of their nuclear activities. Nor are suppliers prepared to halt supply of bomb-grade nuclear materials and the technologies for producing them. To avoid the calamitous threat to civilization posed by the present nuclear non-proliferation regime, certain essential reforms are needed:

Upgrading Export Controls. Some export-control efforts are worth avoiding and some are worth pursuing. Further refining the list of dual-use items can become a technological and political swamp, judging by past difficulties encountered in the inter-agency deliberations in the US government alone. Better to concentrate on upgrading national and international controls on nuclear items whose significance for weapons is not debatable but which nonetheless remain uncontrolled or inadequately controlled. These items include natural (that is, unenriched) uranium, a precursor material for production of both highly enriched uranium and plutonium; heavy water, a moderator that makes possible the fissioning of natural uranium to produce plutonium in a reactor; and tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen produced in a reactor and used to boost and miniaturize nuclear warheads. Controls over unregulated calutron enrichment technology should be established, and present controls over centrifuge, laser, and gaseous diffusion enrichment technologies must be upgraded. The upgrade, however, should be that transfers of these enrichment technologies, as well as plutonium recovery (reprocessing) technology, are prohibited, not simply restricted, as are transfers and use of the bomb-grade materials themselves. In similar fashion, exports of large research reactors (reactors of more than two megawatts) should be eliminated. These reactors have questionable research value in contemporary scientific terms. Research reactors that are exported should at least be modified so they cannot use bomb-grade uranium fuel and cannot produce substantial quantities of plutonium. (The large research reactors now under construction in Algeria, North Korea, and Cuba point up the need for this priority). Power and research reactors should be exported only to states that adhere to the most extensive and intrusive system of safeguards feasible under the NPT, and that agree to forgo production and use of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium. This is especially relevant now that the technology is at hand to enable all research reactors to run on low-enriched uranium fuels unsuitable for weapons, rather than bombgrade, highly enriched uranium fuels. However, a US-sponsored

48

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

fuel-replacement program is in jeopardy because of the refusal of some operators of large research reactors in Europe and the United States to accept the new fuels when they are developed.18

Collecting and Acting upon Nuclear Intelligence. Nuclear intelligence and the ability to act on it promptly (and, as necessary, publicly) must be made into an effective non-proliferation tool. At present, nuclear non-proliferation is a relatively minor mission of the US intelligence community, commanding tiny resources compared to those that have been committed to monitoring the Soviet Union. The massive shift in resources needed to monitor and thwart the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the clandestine transfer of nuclear knowhow, materials, and equipment should now be possible, thanks to the collapse of the strategic nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. Especially important is the recruitment and training of analysts capable of interpreting the massive amounts of highly technical data that will have to be collected. Vastly improved collection and analysis of nuclear intelligence would help offset any need for extensive bureaucratic and diplomatic embroidering on existing lists of restricted items assuming there is the political will to act decisively on such intelligence. That means intervening to head off transfers from the United States and other supplier countries of both dual-use and nuclear items to countries that are identified as pursuing nuclear weapons. Possible transfers from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc states will require special vigilance. It also means being prepared to identify publicly companies and countries that persist in attempting to make such transfers. And it means finding ways to facilitate the channeling of intelligence on clandestine nuclear weapons programs to an international inspection authority capable of avoiding a repetition of the situation encountered in Iraq. As formidable as this vastly upgraded nuclear-intelligence undertaking will be, it can be made feasible by appropriate reforms in the NPT / IAEA regime and by eliminating the dangerous ambiguities that now result from civil uses of bomb-grade plutonium and uranium. Vastly improved nuclear intelligence would help offset any need for extensive bureaucratic and diplomatic embroidering on existing lists of restricted items

Reforming the NPT/IAEA Regime Weaknesses in the NPT/IAEA non-proliferation regime, as exposed by Iraq, must be dealt with on an urgent basis. Two basic reforms are essential: making international safeguards inspections more extensive and intrusive; and removing safeguards authority from the IAEA Board

NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS

49

of Governors, which over the years has been dominated by industry interests and non-NPT countries that have succeeded in keeping the agency's safeguards as weak as possible. The board, for example, has never authorized short-notice, challenge inspections of safeguarded facilities to check for possible activities related to weapons development; of unsafeguarded facilities to determine whether undeclared nuclear materials are in production or storage; or of natural uranium to ensure against diversions for secret production of bomb-grade uranium or plutonium. The IAEA's model safeguards agreement with NPT members authorizes such inspections, but some members of the Board of Governors have opposed them as being too extensive and intrusive. The board's safeguards authority should be transferred to the UN Security Council, leaving the board to pursue the agency's nuclearpromotion and technical-assistance activities. The Security Council, acting through a permanent version of the UN Special Commission now overseeing the dismantling of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs, should establish an elite inspection corps capable of acting on intelligence provided by the United States and other governments under precedents established in the current Iraqi exercise. The Security Council, while by no means a problem-free political instrument, is far better equipped than the IAEA Board of Governors to authorize challenge inspections or other UN-sponsored actions in any state where safeguards violations or weapons activities are suspected. This transfer of safeguards authority would require amending the IAEA statute by a two-thirds vote of states attending the IAEA's annual general conference and acceptance by two-thirds of all IAEA member states. Such an outcome is not beyond reach if the United States and its main supporters in the industrial and developing world were finally persuaded that a fresh start is needed to overcome the dangerous inertia of an IAEA governing board long committed to a lowest-common-denominator approach to the application of safeguards. To date, the board has failed to overcome internal divisions and act on a proposed package of reforms, which includes the use of challenge inspections and the establishment of a special unit to receive nuclear intelligence. This package represents, at best, cosmetic surgery that delays inevitable major surgery. It should be obvious that the agency has scant hope of compelling a suspect state to accept challenge inspections or of obtaining the kind of sensitive intelligence information that would warrant such inspections. The only international body remotely capable of such feats is the Security Council. It might as well be given the assignment now and thereby dispense with the dangerously slow, tortuous process that the IAEA would have to follow to bring a suspected NPT or safeguards violator to the Security Council's attention.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Outlawing Bomb-Grade Nuclear Materials If there were an international consensus that there is no longer a legitimate place for bomb-grade materials in civil nuclear programs, there then would be a solid technical foundation for devising effective national and international political controls to bar commerce in these materials and the industrial equipment for producing them. Transfers of these deadly items would no longer be ambiguous; they could be recognized promptly for the commerce in potential nuclear weapons that they are. There would also be a powerful incentive to upgrade national intelligence and international cooperation to detect and thwart such commerce. A strong incentive also would exist for international cooperation to defuse regional disputes that have sparked nuclear arms races in South Asia and the Middle East and that threaten to trigger one in Northeast Asia. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium, which are essential elements in the production of nuclear weapons, are no longer needed for civil nuclear programs. Cheap, low-enriched uranium is in ample supply, and the plutonium-fueled breeder reactor has proven technically and economically unattractive. The production of these dangerous fuels, therefore, should be prohibited. Unfortunately, the Bush administration is still saddled with a "plutonium-use policy" devised over a decade ago by President Reagan's ambassador for non-proliferation, Richard T. Kennedy. Kennedy still holds the job, and the policy remains in effect. It declares that the United States will go along with the use of plutonium recovered from USsupplied nuclear fuel by nations "with advanced nuclear power programs where it does not constitute a proliferation risk;" that is, Japan and the European Community.19 However, the United States may soon find out, as it seeks to persuade both North and South Korea neither to produce nor to acquire plutonium, that it cannot reasonably hope to divide the world into plutonium "haves" and "have-nots" as contemplated in the present misguided policy. The Bush administration should end its discriminatory plutoniumuse policy and work to build an international consensus barring nuclear explosive materials everywhere. The two Koreas cannot reasonably be expected to abstain from plutonium in the face of Japan's insatiable appetite for it, especially now that the myth of effective international safeguards has been exploded. The reality of ineffective safeguards recently prompted Japan to call on North Korea to dismantle the reprocessing plant it currently has under construction, not simply to open the plant to international inspectors. The basic inability of safeguards to detect or prevent determined bomb making also prompts Korean anxiety about Japanese plutonium. The Bush administration should end its discriminatory plutonium-use policy and work to build an international consensus barring nuclear explosive materials everywhere.

NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS

51

Equally important, with an end to the US-Soviet confrontation and with deep cuts being made in their stocks of nuclear warheads, the United States and the former Soviet republics are free to halt production of materials for nuclear weapons and to dispose of the materials recovered from retired weapons. Whatever regime they work out for collecting and disposing of excess military plutonium and highly enriched uranium could serve as a magnet for collecting these materials from civil programs as well. The IAEA has never exercised the authority contained in its statute to collect and maintain custody over excess civil plutonium and highly enriched uranium.20 Like the agency's safeguards role, this authority should be transferred to the Security Council and become a cornerstone of a new non-proliferation regime. Such a regime, based on international arrangements to dispose of separated plutonium and unreprocessed spent fuel as waste and to blend down highly enriched uranium into low-enriched fuel unsuitable for weapons, would actually have a chance to succeed. A global prohibition on further military and civilian production of nuclear explosive materials is long overdue and would come not a moment too soon. Can nuclear export controls be improved to stop the leaks? Maybe, but other non-proliferation priorities must be addressed and, in some cases, must take precedence.

NOTES 1

2

3

4 5

Jon Jennekens, IAEA's director of safeguards, quoted in Mark Hibbs, "No Bomb Quantity of HEU [Highly Enriched Uranium] in Iraq, IAEA Safeguards Report Indicates," Nuclear Fuel August 20,1990. Richard Perle, former assistant secretary of defence for international security policy, coined this term in testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee soon after leaving the government. See Senate Hearing 101-744, May 2,1989, p. 166. In particular, see Mark Hibbs's excellent and frequent reports during this period in NuckarFuel and Nucleonics Week; Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Exports: The Challenge of Control (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1990); Harald Muller, Aftei" the Scandals: West German Non-pivlifemtion Policy (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 1990); Gary Milhollin, "Asia's Nudear Nightmare: The German Connection," The Washington Post, June W, 1990; Paul L. Leventhal, testimony before the West German Bundestag Second Committee of Investigation, June 23 and September 22,1988. Mark Hibbs, "U.S. Repeatedly Warned Germany on Nuclear Exports to Pakistan," Nuclear Fuel, March 6,1989, p. 12. Except where specifically noted or referenced below, the following examples are based on press and other public accounts that are chronicled in Leonard Specter's non-proliferation volumes prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Nuclear Proliferation Today (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1984); The Nezv Nuclear Nations (New York: Random House, 1985);

52

6 7 8

9

10

11

12 13

14 15 16

17

NUCLEAR WEAPONS Going Nuclear (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987); and Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990). For a list of troublesome Soviet activities, see Chapter 2by William C. Potter in this book. Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Explosive Disunion: The Trade in Soviet Nuclear Know-How," The Washington Post, December 8,1991. See the following statements by Senator Abraham Ribicoff, chairman of the Senate Government Operations Committee: "India's Nuclear Explosion and the Export Reorganization Act," Congressional Record, June 16,1976, pp. S9632S9637; "State Department Position on India's Nuclear Explosion," Congressional Record, July 19, 1976, pp. SI 1,790-S11,792; and "India, Pakistan and Taiwan, and the Need for a Strict Nuclear Non-Proliferation Law," Congressional Record, August 30,1976, pp. SI4,917-514,929. For an analysis of US acquiescence in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and of future policy options, see Paul L. Leventhal, testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs, House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 2,1990; and Paul L. Leventhal, "Cut Off Aid to Pakistan," The Washington Post, October 8,1990. The unclassified evidence of such a test is contained in "Information Pertaining to a Possible Chinese Test of a Pakistani Nuclear Device," September 17,1985, a memorandum with attachments prepared by the Nuclear Control Institute and forwarded to a number of Congressional oversight committees. Although there is evidence of an unannounced test by China at its test site on May 16, 1983, the parameters of which fit the bomb design that China transferred to Pakistan, it has never been confirmed that China tested a device for Pakistan. For an analysis of the agreement and its implications, see Daniel Horner and Paul L. Leventhal, "The U.S. China Nuclear Agreement: A Failure of Executive Policymaking and Congressional Oversight," The Fletcher Forum, Winter 1987, pp. 105-22. See Lewis A. Dunn, "A Pact that Can be Verified," The Washington Post, December 31,1985. At the time, Dunn was assistant director for nuclear and weapons control with the Arms Control Disarmament Agency. See The Financial Times, December 11, 1989; and The London Independent, September 30,1990. In addition, a partially declassified US Army Intelligence document describes a Chinese feasibility study for building by 1990 a reactor camouflaged from satellites in Iraq. See "Declassified U.S. Intelligence Report Reveals Chinese Nuclear Assistance to Iraq," Nuclear Control Institute press release with accompanying documents, July 1,1991. See The Washington Post, October 30,1991; The Sunday Times, July 28,1991. For a detailed analysis of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, see Leonard Spector, "Threats in the Middle East," Orbis 35 No. 2 (Spring 1992): 181-98. For the significance of this amount of material for weapons, see J. Carson Mark, "Some Remarks on Iraq's Possible Nuclear Weapons Capability in Light of Some of the Known Facts Concerning Nuclear Weapons," the Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, May 16,1991. The partially declassified US Army intelligence document referred to in footnote 13 describes the reactor plan.

NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS 18

19

20

53

See Milton M. Hoenig, "An Achievable Goal: Eliminating Bomb-Grade Uranium from Research Reactors," Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, January 1991. President Reagan, "Statement on United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," July 16,1981. See also testimony of Ambassador Richard T. Kennedy before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, September 9,1982. Article XIIA.5. of the IAEA Statute.

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Part II: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

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Chapter 4 1HE SUPPLY-SIDE CONTROL OF THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Julian Perry Robinson The theme of this paper is that controls on supply can do rather little to stem the spread of chemical-warfare weapons, or "CW weapons/'1 unless demand can somehow also be controlled. No form of control is likely to work very well unless the nature of what is to be controlled is understood. The paper begins with some general observations on the spread of CW capability. This leads into an analysis of factors that are actually operating to drive or to inhibit the proliferation. The final part uses that analysis to identify potential controls, especially controls on the supply side, and offers an evaluation of their likelihood for success.

Proliferation and Deproliferation In the United States during February 1985, the Senate received testimony from the Defense Department about chemical weapons which included an instructive portrayal of the growth over time in the "number of countries having an offensive CW program."2 The data presented are included in Table 4.1. This was the first time any government had ever published its world view of the state of CW armament. Of course, the names of the countries were withheld from the testimony, although the names have been included in Table 4.1. There was also a conspicuous vagueness about what exactly was meant by "having an offensive CW program." Most vividly conveyed by the portrayal was the fact that during the 1970s, the number of those countries possessing CW programs had doubled to "about 13," regaining the level reached during World War II, and that proliferation was continuing in the 1980s at an undiminished rate, reaching "about 16" countries by 1984.

Deproliferaation Over the post-World-War-II period, there has also been considerable growth in the number of independent states in the international system. At the time of the testimony, therefore, the world, by this measure, was still far less permeated with CW armament than it had been at the time Professor Julian Perry Robinson is with the Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, England.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

58

Table 4.1 CW-Weapons Proliferation and Deproliferation, 1915-1984

Period

"Number of countries having an offensive CW program" according to US Defense Dept. in 1985

Countries reliably identified as possessors of poison-gas weapons

1915-1918

8

[17% of the world's independent states]

Austro-Hungary Britain France Germany Italy Russia Turkey (supplied by Germany) United States

1918-1933

5

[8%]

1933-1945

13

[19%]

Britain Canada Czechoslovakia France Germany Hungary Italy Japan Netherlands East Indies Poland South Africa Soviet Union United States Yugoslavia

Germany Italy Japan Poland Soviet Union

1945-1960

6

[6%]

Britain France Soviet Union United States

Britain China Cuba France Greece Israel Spain Taiwan United States

1960-1970

7

[5%]

France Soviet Union United States

Colombia Egypt Iraq Israel Portugal United States Vietnam, North

Alleged users of poison-gas weapons [all possessors save Turkey used their CW weapons during World War I]

Britain China France Italy Spain

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59

Table 4.1 (continued) CW-Weapons Proliferation and Deproliferation, 1915-1984

Period

"Number of countries having an offensive CW program" according to US Defense Dept. in 1985

Countries reliably identified as possessors of poison-gas weapons

1970-1980

ca!3 [8%]

Soviet Union United States

China Laos Morocco Rhodesia South Africa Soviet Union Vietnam

1980-1984

ca 16 [10%]

Iraq Soviet Union United States

Burma Ethiopia Iraq Israel Laos Philippines South Africa Soviet Union Thailand United States Vietnam

Alleged users of poison-gas weapons

Source: Sussex-Harvard Information Bank on CBW Armament & Arms Limitation

of World War II. Whereas more than one in five independent states had stocks of their own CW weapons in the late 1930s and early 1940s, only one in ten had an "offensive CW program" in 1984. The period since World War II has thus been one of chemical deproliferation as well as proliferation. The CW weapons programs that remained alive after World War II were augmentedby the nerve gases and other such hitherto secret wartime discoveries. Several of the programs soon moved into full-scale development, acquisition, and stockpiling. All of these, it appears, have since died: the British nerve-gas program ran until the mid-1950s, and the French one until the 1960s; the Soviet program was stopped by Gorbachev in 1987; and the American one finally collapsed in 1990. What brought them to an end was, most probably, much the same in all four cases. There was a slow realization that the promise held by those wartime discoveries was actually a false promise; the new technology was barren. Scientific developments were not, after all, capable of overcoming the inherent technical limitations of chemical warfare to the point where chemical weapons had more than marginal utility. All four countries eventually came to the conclusion that it was a utility that could be sacrificed to the pursuit of other goals.

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There was more to be gained by giving up the weapons than by hanging on to them. This raises a key question: is that a pattern of behaviour which, in the course of time, new possessor states will find themselves emulating? If so, perhaps we do not have to worry greatly about proliferation, for it carries the seeds of its own curtailment. Alternatively, however, we might suppose it to have been possession of nuclear weapons that finally tipped the balance for those four countries. If this was the case, what kept Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia and other erstwhile CW states from acquiring nerve gas? If it was indeed the barrenness of the technology that led to the deproliferation rather than the possession of nuclear weapons, the implication for the future would not be wholly encouraging. This could mean that the whole cycle might well start up again in the event of a technological breakthrough that would reverse the present ascendancy of the defence over the offence. Action to prevent any such breakthrough or somehow to contain its consequences if it did nonetheless happen, in other words, research and development constraints, could then have major counterproliferation value.

The Possessor States Since that 1985 US Defense Department testimony, public statements by cognizant government officials in the United States and elsewhere have been suggesting that the spread of chemical weapons has been continuing. For example, the very carefully worded language currently used by the British Government is: "It is believed that between 15 and 20 countries either possess or are actively seeking to acquire chemical weapons/'3 The most detailed public statement has been that of the Director of US Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, before a Congressional committee in March 1991: "At least fourteen countries outside of NATO and the Warsaw Pact currently have an offensive chemical warfare (CW) capability. Many of these nations are likely to assist other countries in developing offensive capabilities as well. Ten more nations are believed to be either developing (or are suspected of seeking) an offensive CW capability."4 The apparent certainty and clarity of this language was not matched, however, by the chart that accompanied Brooks's testimony. Entitled "Non-NATO/Warsaw Pact countries with offensive CW capability," it listed fourteen countries under the heading "probably possess" and four countries under the heading "may possess." The Washington Post later reported that these lists of countries represented the latest joint assessment of the Central and Defense Intelligence agencies.5 A number of governments subsequently issued statements of rebuttal following press reporting of Admiral Brooks's references to their

SUPPLY-SIDE CONTROL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

61

Table 4.2 Non-NATO/Warsaw Pact Countries with Offensive CW Capacity [NATO/WTO possessors] [not named]

"Probably possess offensive CW capability" Burma China Egypt India Iran Iraq Israel Libya North Korea Pakistan South Korea Syria Taiwan Vietnam

"May possess" Indonesia Saudi Arabia South Africa Thailand

Others "developing or suspected of seeking" [6 unnamed states]

Source: Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, on Intelligence Issues, 7 March 1991

countries, including India6 and Taiwan.7 The majority of the named countries had previously made formal declarations of nonpossession of CW weapons at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva or elsewhere, including Burma, China, Egypt, India, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, as well as Indonesia, South Africa, and Thailand.8 These apparent contradictions do not necessarily mean that false declarations had been uttered or that Admiral Brooks had been mistaken, for the term he used, "offensive CW capability/' is an exceedingly loose one. Evidently the term, when employed by the US Government, includes possession of CW weapons but is not limited to it. In January 1989, the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), then Major-General William Burns, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that about twenty nations, other than the Soviet Union and the United States, had the capability, but "no more than a handful, five or six, actually possess a stockpile/'9

The Nature of Chemical Proliferation What is one to understand by the term "offensive CW capability" when it is used by US officials or anyone else? The aforementioned testimony of the ACDA Director was that most of those twenty nations had some stockpiles, indicative of production, but that only a few were "significant."10 However, any country with a research program in antichemical

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CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

defence will have some stocks of CW agents, and these stock usually will have been produced domestically. It is absurd, surely, to suppose that Washington analysts regard antichemical protection per se as offensive CW capability, although it is true that users of poison gas will need to protect themselves against their own weapons. So there has to be some other, unstated, concept in use in Washington for differentiating "the capable" from "the incapable". If there is not, then all this talk of twenty or more chemical-weapons states is unreliable and should be treated as such. This whole problem is of course a difficult one for the intelligence analyst. To characterize a capability as offensive is immediately to introduce an assessment of intention; and unless that assessment is entirely independent of the assessment of capability, the characterization is flawed, becoming fit only for propagandists. In terms of what can actually be observed, a program of research into CW weapons may not be intrinsically different from a program of research into protection against CW weapons. Only at the stage of development of equipment will differences become obvious. Yet, in itself, weapons development would not necessarily mean a commitment to weapons production, although the existence of the program would certainly facilitate such a decision and might even, depending on the circumstances, imply that it had been taken. As indicated by the US ACDA, "Quantity is an important indicator of what is and is not a significant stockpile or program." Developmental quantities of CW agents might be capable of killing many people. But how large the stocks would have to be before acquiring real military significance would depend on the circumstances. It is worth recalling that the now-removed stockpile of US nerve-gas weapons in West Germany was often described by US Defense Department spokesmen as a token supply, one which, although in "excellent" and fully usable condition, only barely if at all had military significance or deterrent value. That stockpile comprised 435 tons of sarin and VX nerve gases. Moreover, however deadly a poison gas may be, it does not become a weapon until it has been filled into munitions that can be used with available weapon systems, or until it has been otherwise adapted for controllable delivery against targets. In fact those stocks in West Germany were held in projectiles for 155-mm and 8-in howitzers, in all more than 100,000 rounds. Yet possession even of that stockpile would constitute no capability for nerve gas warfare unless there were logistical channels linking the stockpile to artillery units in the field, unless those units had been trained in the special skills of firing nerve gas, and unless all of that was functionally connected to the overall command and control structure. So a continuum can be envisaged, stretching from the nerve gas itself, or, even earlier, from the beginning of a laboratory effort aimed at

SUPPLY-SIDE CONTROL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

63

learning how to synthesize nerve gas, and on from there through dissemination studies, field trials, doctrinal development, procurement and suchlike, to, ultimately, an army staff fully attuned to the combat possibilities of nerve gas, able to order up supplies and command their use. For a country advancing along that continuum, at which point would external observers feel justified in reporting that the country was now CW-capable? In other words, perhaps what Admiral Brooks meant by "offensive CW capability" was something that comes into being toward the latter part of the continuum. Using this same reasoning, those states that claimed nonpossession may have based their claims on the fact that their chemical programs are toward the beginning of the continuum. That is to say, they have no actual capability-in-being for conducting offensive chemical warfare. The various chemical warfare agents and even chemical warfare munitions that happen to exist on their territory are not usable as weapons and for that reason cannot be considered as such. A practical conclusion maybe drawn. It is useful for counterproliferation policy making if CW-capable and CW-incapable states can somehow be differentiated. If the differentiation is not to rest on criteria that are essentially subjective, much detailed intelligence, of a technical, commercial, political, and military nature will be required, much of it most probably unavailable without special collection and analysis efforts. Such increased intelligence activity must, unavoidably, take place against a background of misleading appearances, for the worldwide trade in chemicals is enormous and growing, especially now that the production of many basic commodity chemicals is moving away from the old industrialized countries. In other words, the background against which the analyst would be viewing data is bound to be one rich in North-to-South transfers of civil chemical technology, transfers which are inevitably increasing the capability of the recipient countries to make chemical-warfare weapons whether they have any intention of doing so or not. Here is the real heart of the problem. That background means that the distinction between possessors and nonpossessors is necessarily becoming less and less sharp. Although capabilities for waging chemical warfare are spreading to more and more countries, and although a part of the spread is indeed due to the conscious desire of renegade states such as Iraq actually to wield that capability, the greater part is simply an unfortunate side-effect of a process that is otherwise beneficial and anyway impossible to stop: the diffusion of competence in chemistry and chemical technology from the rich to the poor parts of the world. The concern about "chemical proliferation" lies basically in the fact that the diffusion is taking place within what seems to be an environment of

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CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

diminishing restraint, not the least of which was evidenced by the Iran-Iraq War. Put another way around and we arrive at a good definition of what it is we are concerned about: a loosening of inhibitions against using CW weapons in an environment of easier access to them.11 Chemical proliferation is a tendency, in other words, not necessarily a process, and certainly not just physical transfers of materials. Supply-side controls, therefore, can never address more than a part of the chemical proliferation problem.

The Motors of Chemical Proliferation The present state of the spread of CW weapons around the world is thus not at all easy to specify. Appearances are deceptive, the realities ambiguous. Secrets are guarded and, when some are disclosed, the possible motivations make the information suspect. It would be a rash person indeed who undertook to provide a definitive list of today's "CWweapon states." Fortunately we do not really need such a thing. For our purposes here, it is enough to know that the spread is real; our task then is to consider its possible motors and how they might be slowed down, stopped or even put into reverse. For the sceptics among us, there is one very good reason why we can be assured that the spread is real; why we should not dismiss the talk of it as a figment of alarmists' or propagandists' imagination, or as an unwarranted extrapolation from Iraqi behaviour, or as some expression of institutional self-interest by CW intelligencers and other such endangered communities. The reason is this: for half a decade now, Western governments have publicly proclaimed chemical non-proliferation policies which they have actively implemented through systems of export controls that are unpopular, awkward and costly. It is not an unreasonable inference that there exists, therefore, high-grade secret intelligence about CW-weapons programs in at least those countries against which the export controls are prosecuted the most vigorously. The first shortlist of such countries in the US Export Administration Regulations comprised Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya; a longer one is now coming into use.12 It would be invidious to attempt a statement of the reasons why countries such as Iraq and Syria embarked upon CW armament. As with the older C W states, several reasons probably contributed to the decision, their relative weights changing with time and circumstances. Yet a relatively clear idea of what it is that is driving states down this bizarre and costly path today is crucial to an understanding of the motors of chemical proliferation. The best that can be done under the circumstances is to extrapolate from the study of earlier programs an organized listing of different categories of possible reasons. Such a taxonomy can at least point speculation in a plausible direction. Here is one such listing:

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Military reasons: CW weapons assessed to have value- as instruments offirepoweron the battlefield - for countering trench-warfare tactics (Germany 1915) - for redressing manpower inferiority (USA China war scenarios, 1950; Iraq in the Gulf War; Taiwan?) - for exploiting air superiority (Britain in Russia, 1919; Egypt in Yemen, 1960s) - for exploiting specific enemy vulnerabilities (Syria? North Korea?) - as instruments of coercion and demoralization - for colonial domination by air control (Spain in Morocco, 1925; Italy in Libya and Ethiopia, 1930s) - for counterinsurgency (USA in Indochina, 1960s; Iraq in Kurdistan, 1980s; Burma?) - as instruments of morale-building - for retaliating in kind (Britain and France, 1915) or being able to do so (Israel? Iran? South Korea?) - as armaments of clandestine forces Political reasons: - national prestige (Britain in India, 191913) - deterrence, linkage and other such strategic roles14 Institutional reasons:15 - personal ambitions of well-placed individuals — preservation of specialist CW services (as by pivpagating notions ofdeteiring ON by threat of retaliation in kind, or, for that mattei; any of the other military and political utilities listed above). Some understanding is needed, too, of the different mechanisms whereby such pressures for CW armament have become translated into actual acquisition. Two main methods of CW-weapons acquisition can be identified from past programs - indigenous production and importation each with variants. Indigenous production of modern chemical-warfare agents requires a chemical industry not only capable of manufacturing organic chemicals on a substantial scale but capable also of doing so without exposing the work force to more than trace quantities of the product. Skills, materials, and utilities in quite wide variety will be needed both for this and for the production of CW weapons from the CW agent. The requirement is, in other words, for a rather well-developed industrial and technological base. It is a matter of debate exactly what stage the development of an industrial economy must reach in order for it to be

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capable of supporting indigenous CW weapons acquisition without great and conspicuous disturbance. Evidently it need not be highly advanced, yet neither can it be wholly primitive. It took Germany only about four months to adapt its well-developed dyestuff s production base to the manufacture of mustard gas in 1917; but France, with a less welldeveloped organic chemicals industry, required ten months to get mustard gas into full-scale production; Britain needed more than a year,16 and about two-thirds of the work force at its main factory received mustard injuries.17 Analyses seeking to correlate industrial development with chemical proliferation potential have been attempted in the past. In one such study, conducted in 1969-70, Argentina was judged capable of indigenous quantity-production of nerve gas within a year of decision, whereas Egypt, India, and Israel were not.18 An alternative to manufacturing the weapons domestically is to import them from abroad. The importation route includes the capture or take over of another country's CW weapons. Thus, Britain's erstwhile nerve-gas capability resided for the most part in the large stockpile of German tabun bombs which the Royal Air Force gathered during the late 1940s,19 and Egypt later seems to have done something rather similar with abandoned British CW weapons. The importation route also includes the direct supply of CW weapons to allied or client states. The USA, for example, imported large tonnages of British and Canadian CW agents in the early part of World War II and China imported American CW weapons later in the war. There have also been many reports, not always wholly credible, of the USSR having supplied CW weapons to Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Syria, Vietnam, Warsaw-Treaty states and, later, Afghanistan.20 Soviet spokesmen used to assert that the United States had supplied CW weapons to Pakistan, South Korea, and Thailand, not to mention its allies in NATO. Today it has become virtually unthinkable to suppose that one or the other of the superpowers would give or sell CW weapons to anyone, whatever they might have done in the past. As Admiral Brooks warned the US Senate, however, the same does not necessarily apply to all potential supplier states. Therefore, this route is still a pathway of proliferation, and cannot be ignored. Lying between the indigenous and the importation routes are the possibilities presented by one of the principal features of the chemical industry today, namely its strongly international character. Production enterprises very commonly build up trading relations and other dependencies abroad, including reliance on foreign corporations for supplies of particular raw materials, precursors, equipment, even know-how. These are channels that can of course be exploited in the acquisition of CW weapons. Two different models, which we may label the "Stolzenberg" and the "Imhausen" routes, typify the possibilities.

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Hugo Stolzenberg was a German entrepreneur who had some success during the 1920s and 1930s in selling complete CW-agent manufacturing and munition-filling factories, his clients including the Spanish, Soviet, and Yugoslav governments.21 Such turn-key deals would be much less feasible today than they were then, though some sources claim that they have continued into recent times, as with the initial Syrian sarin production facility, a pilot plant said to have been built by an East German concern. The "Imhausen" route is similar to the Stolzenberg route, but with the difference that the chemical-production plant supplied is not overtly for CW agents. The deal and the factory are structured in such a way as to allow subcontractors to suppose themselves to be equipping some bona fide civilian enterprise. This is the model specified in US Government statements about the Iraqi, Libyan, Syrian, and Iranian CW weapons programs. Its essence is the purchase on the open market, typically at well above normal market rates,22 of know-how, plant, and precursor chemicals. It is the pathway of proliferation that is of chief concern today.

Constraining the Motors of Chemical Proliferation Given the aforementioned motors of proliferation, various possible counterproliferation measures can readily be envisaged. They may be grouped into demand-side and supply-side constraints. The former comprise measures having the effect of weakening some or all of the reasons why states might wish to acquire or maintain C W weapons, such as those set out in the taxonomy above. Such measures could include regional security negotiation, strengthening the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and encouraging the spread of antichemical protection. Supply-side constraints comprise measures for obstructing C W armament by making acquisition more costly in one sense or another. Measures aimed at strengthening the taboo against poison weapons could,23 for example, have the effect of increasing the political costs of C W armament. Another example of such political measures is the "public diplomacy" the United States directed against Libya and its project at Rabta. Besides political barriers, other types of obstacles that can be envisaged include the trade and technology transfer barriers suggested by the actual mechanisms of acquisition just outlined. Military constraints on supply can also be envisaged, such as those recently practised against Iraqi CW facilities. The apparent predominance today of the "Imhausen route" directs attention to supply-side controls on dual-use technology transfers. There are several different ways in which such controls can be constructed. Technology comprises objects, knowledge and people, any one of which can in principle be kept under surveillance, regulated, and coerced by the state within whose jurisdiction and control they fall. Likewise, at either

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end of a transfer that is to be controlled, there will be people, corporations, and states, and the controls could be directed at any of these levels. The United States, in the wake of President Bush's Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, has recently begun to introduce several novel types of control, as have certain other countries. Trade barriers on dual-use technologies, however, are an altogether different proposition from those directed against single-use CW technologies, such as the import or export of actual CW weapons. The impossibility of outright bans is only part of the problem. There is also the fact that many dual-use technologies are, by their very nature, substitutable. This is liable to mean that technical opportunities will often exist for bypassing any particular technology transfer barrier. Eliminate thionyl chloride, for example, from availability as a chlorinating agent for making the methylphosphonyl dichloride necessary for nerve gas, and all an Imhausen-route entrepreneur needs to do is find a supply of phosgene or perhaps sulphuryl chloride, neither of which is on any export-control list, to take its place. Such evasion possibilities add to the various other ways around controls, ways long familiar to unscrupulous dealers, brokers, and shippers. A determined importer with access to appropriate technical advice will be able to capitalize still further on the primordial opposition of commercial interests to trade barriers. Controls on transfer of dual-use technologies cannot therefore be expected to function as insurmountable obstacles to chemical proliferation. If, however, the aim is simply to slow down proliferation by increasing the costs of CW armament, such controls clearly have potential. Their application has gradually been increasing since March 1984, when Iraq's use of CW weapons in the Iran-Iraq War was conclusively verified and shown to rest on indigenous production of CW weapons acquired through "Imhausen route" imports. The determinant of the effectiveness of controls is the extent to which they are internationalized. For although at the level of individual states the chemical industry has a marked monopolistic tendency, at the global level the chemical economy approaches a condition of perfect competition. In other words, the gaps in sources of supply created by one country's unilateral adoption of export controls are liable to be filled very quickly indeed by suppliers which establish themselves in other countries where there are no such controls, even supposing such sources are not in existence already. A country's controls may not count for much unless they are harmonized and concerted with those of other countries. Furthermore, they will certainly be resisted by domestic industry if competing industries abroad are not equally subject to them. One way of internationalizing the controls is to make due provision for them in the now-imminent Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This is being done. Another way is through a suppliers' club. Such a cartel

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came into existence soon after the first counterproliferation export controls on dual-use technologies were introduced in the United States at the end of March 1984. The club later became the "Australia Group/' now entering its seventh year of operation and representing the nearest thing the world yet has to an international chemical counterproliferation regime. It operates through selective trade barriers on dual-use chemicals and equipment, these barriers being created by stimulating supplier states to control exports of agreed lists of goods, and then seeking full harmonization of the way the controls are applied in each participating country. The controls promoted by the Group are both statutory and advisory. The former have the force of law, such as it may be, in each of the participating countries. The latter take the form of national governments encouraging private industry to adopt voluntary export controls according to Group-wide warning lists and guidelines.24 However, besides the technology-substitutability problem, a weakness of the Australia Group system is that the Group is not a complete suppliers' club. Nor could it ever become one, practically speaking. The governments participating are those of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA. The main sources of supply of the controlled goods are indeed under the jurisdiction of these governments; but by no means are all of the sources. For not only are the controlled technologies substitutable, they are also, for the most part, rather low technologies. It is a paradoxical display of the strength of the Group that it has induced the creation of new sources of supply in Asia and Latin America. It is because the economy in which it operates is profoundly international that the chemical industry has an almost instinctive opposition to trade barriers. But an industry with so poor a public image cannot afford any semblance of association with poison gas or germ warfare, meaning that it tends to regard the constraints of the Australia Group and, later, the Chemical Weapons Convention as a necessary price to pay for protection, given that the controls are reasonable ones. Nor are trade barriers liked by importing countries. Some Third World governmental officials have described the Australia Group as yet another device of the rich countries for controlling North-South transfers of technology to their own exclusive advantage. It is indeed virtually impossible to erect trade barriers against multipurpose low technologies without intruding upon national development goals or legitimate commercial interests. Hence the tendency in countries such as Britain and the United States to move away from bureaucratized control-list approaches to counterproliferation and instead to seek controls, such as the so-called "catch-all controls," that can be focused more intensively upon their

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proper targets. This preference of course makes much greater demands on intelligence assets of various types, but with the fading of the Cold War those assets are not unavailable. The hidden hand of government is liable to become more intrusive, but maybe that, too, is a price worth paying. A place, it would seem, where this particular cost-benefit association has actually been put to the test of democratic process is in Germany, with the belatedly successful attempts of the Kohl administration to get its 1991 foreign trade law amendments through the federal legislature.

Conclusion The problem of CW-weapons proliferation may well be judged less serious than its portrayal in some quarters has suggested, but it is not, nevertheless, a problem that can safely be ignored. The stagnancy of CWarmament technology and the increasing marginalization of the usefulness of chemical weapons is likely to influence new and aspiring chemical-weapons states in much the same fashion it did the old, leading them eventually to downgrade the role of chemicals in their military plans. For the time being, however, the seeming cheapness of poison gas and its political attractiveness as an instrument of terror are keeping the proliferation process going, though one may believe that such attractions cannot long survive the purely military shortcomings of the weapons. So there are two different categories of concern: a present danger and a long-term danger. The latter is that some future technological development might reverse the present ascendancy of the defence (ie antichemical protection) over the offence, thereby destroying a major incentive for deproliferation. The present danger is that the existing weapons might actually be used for their terroristic potential in one or another of the conflict-prone regions of the world, and further, that they may excite acquisitive interest in weapons of still greater terroristic potential, those of biological warfare. Technology transfer controls and other such trade barriers interposed between North and South have a smaller role to play in counterproliferation policies than appears at first sight, not because their practical effect is likely to be limited and short-lived, which it is, but because the motors of proliferation are not wholly within their reach. They can do nothing about the long-term danger, which requires measures for controlling technological change, not technology transfer, and in the medium term they may simply embed CW-weapons acquisition programs more deeply into local industrial economies, to say nothing of damaging North-South relations. In the short term, however, they can perhaps buy time, raising the costs of acquisition and thereby forcing proliferator states to consider more closely the disturbing effects their

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acquisitions may have on their neighbours, and therefore on their own security. To be effective in this regard, however, the controls will be exceedingly demanding of intelligence assets because their application is to dual-use technologies. A more fundamental problem with such supply-side approaches to counterproliferation is that reasons of practicability force them to focus on a relatively small number of states of special concern. This will tend to legitimize the possession or even the acquisition of CW weapons by states outside that focus. Any such legitimation is bound to weaken the basic taboo against poison weapons, and thereby weaken also the very foundation of counterproliferation activity. The projected Chemical Weapons Convention must therefore be regarded as the best of the available counterproliferation options. Nearly all of the different proliferation constraints that can be identified by the method of analysis outlined in this paper, both demand-side and supplyside, can be written into the Convention, meaning that the terms of the treaty can be specified for maximal counterproliferation value. However, until such time as the Convention is concluded, technology-transfer controls will, in a form different from that of the present Australia Group system, continue to make a worthwhile ancillary contribution.

NOTES

1

2

3

4

5

Newcomers to the field often use "CW" to denote "chemical weapons" heedless of the possible misconceptions that may result. In the military lexicons of not a few countries, "chemical weapon" is a term that covers not only the weapons of chemical warfare (those that work through toxicity) but also such things as smoke and incendiary weapons. Also used in this paper is the term "poison-gas weapons," by which is meant the sub-set of CW weapons that is confined to antipersonnel CW weapons but excludes those that are designed solely to harass rather than to cause casualties. So it means CW weapons other than tear gases and herbicides. Dr T. J. Welch, Deputy for Chemical Matters, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 February 1985. UK Foreign Office Minister of State William Waldegrave, written answer to a parliamentary question, 18 January 1989, as in Hansard (Commons), Vol. 145, No. 30, Col. 196. Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, on Intelligence Issues, 7 March 1991, pp 56-59; "Navy report asserts many nations seek or have poison gas," Neiv York Times, 10 March 1991, p.15. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Confusing data on chemical capability: US intelligence, diplomatic lists of armed nations differ," Washington Post, 15 March 1991, p. A21.

72 6 7 8 9 10 11

12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Indian Ministry of External Affairs, as quoted on Delhi domestic broadcast in English, 1430 hrs GMT, 11 March 1991, as in FBIS-NES-91-048,12 March 1991, p.37. Republic of China, Ministry of National Defense, as reported by CNA in English from Taipei, 1524 hrs GMT, 11 March 1991, as in FBIS-CHI-91-048,12 March 1991, p.69. For references see Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin No. 5, August 1989, pp.13-14. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Lawmakers plan chemical weapons curb," 25 January 1989, p. A9; and "Agency gets last word on poison gas," Washington Post, 13 December 1989, p. A23. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat: The Urgent Need for Remedies, hearings, 24 January, 1 March, and 9 May, 1989, S.Hrg.101-252, p.6. See, further: Brad Roberts ed., "Chemical warfare policy: beyond the binary production decision," in Significant Issues Series (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University) 9 (3), May 1987, pp.36-40. The new list is clearly cast more widely and, so as not, presumably, to offend friendly states, is couched in terms that include a number of nonpossessors. It comprises Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Middle East, Myanmar, North Korea, Romania, South Africa, Southwest Asia, Soviet Union, Taiwan and Vietnam. The "Southwest Asia" is stated to include Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Pakistan; the "Middle East," Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAR, and Yemen. A comparison with the lists of Admiral Brooks, quoted earlier, is instructive. E.M. Spiers, "Gas and the North-West Frontier," Journal of Strategic Studies 6, No. 4 (December 1983): 94-112. W. Seth Carus, "The genie unleashed: Iraq's chemical and biological weapons production," Policy Papers, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, No. 14, 1989, includes particularly nice discussion of these roles. See, further: J. P. Perry Robinson, "Supply, demand and assimilation in chemical-warfare armament," in Militai-y Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament ed. H. G. Brauch (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp.112-23. L. F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). Captain H. M. Roberts, RAMC, "Report on the manufacture of HS at HM Factory Avonmouth," December 1918, p.17. A copy of this paper is in UK Public Record Office file WO 142/225. Midwest Research Institute," Arms control studies in chemical and biological warfare," report prepared for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under contract ACDA/ST-182, Vol. 1,30 December 1970, p.ll. UK Royal Air Force. Directorate of Weapons, Weapons 4, A Revieiu of the State of Preparedness of the Royal Air Force for Offensive Toxicological Warfare, as at 1st Jan. 1949, Februaiyl949. A copy of this paper is in UK Public Record Office file AIR 20/8731. Elisa D. Harris, "Chemical weapons proliferation in the developing world," RUSland Brassey's Defence Yearbookl989 (London: Brasse/sDefence Publishers, 1989), pp. 67-88, includes a useful review of some of these reports.

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21 Rudibert Kunz and Rolf-Dieter Muller, "Giftgasanlagen gefullig: Einblicke in die siebzigjahrige Geschichte deutscher C-Waffen-Exporte," Die Zeit, 3 February 1989, pp 37-38; Rudibert Kunz and Rolf-Dieter Muller, Giftgas gegen Abd el Krim: Deutschland, Spanien und der Gaskrieg in Spanisch-Marokko 1922-1927, Freiburg im Breisgau, Verlag Rombach, 1990. 22 The price paid to the US manufacturing firm Alcolac International by a German broker acting for Iran for thiodiglycol purchased during 19877 88 was $0.84 per pound; the cost to Alcolac of manufacturing it was $0.37 per pound. See the written statement of US Customs Service Special Agent Dennis J Bass to the House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee, "The investigation of Alcolac International," 18 April 1991. 23 For discussion of this taboo, see J. P. Perry Robinson, "The prohibition of chemical and biological warfare in international law," in Genocide: The Winds of Death in Kurdistan (London: Kurdish Scientific and Medical Association), (in preparation). 24 See, further: J. P. Perry Robinson, "The Australia Group: a description and assessment," in Controlling Military Research and Development and Exports of Dual Use Technologies as a Problem of Disarmament and Arms Control Policy in the 1990s eds. H. G. Brauch, H. J. van der Graaf, J. Grin and W. Smit (Amsterdam: Free University Press, and New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), pp.157-76.

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Chapters CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICALWEAPONS: PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF THE "POOR MAN'S ATOMIC BOMB"?

Elisa D. Harris1 Introduction A decade ago, there was little concern about chemical or biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. To the extent this subject was considered at all, it was in terms of Soviet CBW programs and the threat they might pose to the military forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This situation began to change in the mid-1980s, following reports of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in its war with Iran. Iraq's use of chemical weapons, which was officially confirmed by the United Nations (UN) in 1984, was the first overt sign of the existence of a wider chemical weapons proliferation problem. Unfortunately, owing in part to the muted international response to Iraq's activities, other countries since that time have expanded existing chemical weapons programs, embarked upon new programs and, more recently, sought to acquire biological weapons. What remains today of Iraq's capabilities in these areas is being turned over to the UN Special Commission established by the April 1991 Security Council resolution ending the war to liberate Kuwait. Under this resolution, the facilities for developing and producing Iraq's unconventional weapons and the weapons themselves will eventually be destroyed. The elimination of Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbours and citizens with CBW will clearly be a welcome development. It will not, however, "solve" the proliferation problem. In addition to Iraq, fourteen other Third World countries have been publicly identified by US government officials as having an offensive chemical warfare capability. In the Middle East and North Africa, these countries are Israel, Syria, Iran, Libya, Egypt, and Ethiopia; in Asia, they are Myanmar (Burma), China, Taiwan, Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea, India, and Pakistan.2 Like Iraq, six of these same countries have also been publicly identified by US government officials as having biological warfare programs. These are Syria, Iran, Libya, China, North Korea, and Taiwan.3 These countries have developed their chemical and biological warfare programs with the help of foreign, often Western, companies. According to William Webster, the US Director of Central Intelligence, Elisa D. Harris is a senior research analyst with the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.

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these companies have provided crucial assistance, including chemical precursors, production equipment, actual production facilities, munitions parts, and training for personnel. Without this assistance, many of these programs simply would not exist.4 It is therefore not surprising that export controls have been central to efforts to halt the spread of CBW. But as countries move toward selfsufficiency in the production of these weapons, the utility of these supplier constraints will decline. This suggests the need for additional measures to help inhibit the acquisition of CBW. It also suggests the need for measures to inhibit the use of those capabilities that already exist in the arsenals of states. Ultimately, national and international non-proliferation efforts must seek the actual elimination of the weapons themselves. This chapter discusses four types of non-proliferation measures, explaining how each contributes to inhibiting both the acquisition and the use of CBW as well as facilitating their eventual elimination. The four measures are: export controls on the materials, technology, and services needed to produce CBW; sanctions against companies that supply proliferators and against countries that buy such exports or use CBW; assistance to countries threatened by or attacked with CBW; and measures to strengthen and extend the existing arms-control regime governing these weapons.

Export Controls Export controls constitute the first line of defence against chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Such controls can help inhibit the acquisition of these weapons by making it more difficult and costly for potential and existing proliferators to obtain the materials, technology, and services needed for production. Considerable progress has already been made in controlling chemical and biological related exports. For example, since 1984, when it was realized that Western chemical companies had played a key role in the establishment of Iraq's chemical weapons program, twenty-two of the twenty-four members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have imposed controls on various precursor chemicals used to make chemical warfare agents.5 Members of the now defunct Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) have also imposed controls on chemical precursors, as have other potential suppliers, such as China, India, Israel, and Pakistan.6 In the late 1980s, reports of the continued spread of chemical weapons in the Middle East and of emerging interest in biological weapons stimulated new controls on two additional types of chemical and biological related exports. In February 1989, for example, the United States

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placed controls on five classes of biological organisms that could be used in the production of biological agents.7 New controls were also instituted on other materials as well as technology and services relevant to CBW production. For example, Germany, which had already placed controls on chemical weapons production equipment in 1984, adopted new restrictions in 1989 and 1990 on technical data for producing chemical weapons, on equipment that could be used to produce biological weapons, and on the participation of German citizens in chemical, biological, and nuclear programs abroad.8 In the United States, President Bush signed an Executive Order in 1990 that, among other things, imposed controls on any exports that would assist a country in acquiring the ability to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use CBW. New rules implementing the President's directive were announced by the Department of Commerce in March 1991.9 Wide-ranging new restrictions on chemical and biological materials and technology were also adopted by the United Kingdom in 1990 and 1991. These new British controls concerned goods and technical data that the exporter knows or has grounds for suspecting may be used in the development, production, handling, detection, identification, or storage of chemical or biological agents, weapons, or medical means of protection against or treatment for exposure to such agents. The new controls also apply to goods or technical data that may be used for disposing of wastes from the development or production of chemical or biological agents or weapons.10 Running parallel to the emergence of these national controls on chemical and biological materials, technology, and services have been multilateral export-control efforts. Since 1985, Western industrialized countries have met periodically under the auspices of the Australian Government to coordinate their export control policies. Fifteen countries participated in the first meeting of what has come to be known as the "Australia Group," where it was agreed that member states would establish controls on five precursor chemicals. In December 1989, the Group widened its focus, agreeing to warning guidelines for chemical weapons processing equipment. Six months later, it expanded into the biological area, agreeing to warning guidelines for equipment, goods and technical data for producing biological agents. In May 1991, the Group agreed on worldwide controls for fifty precursor chemicals and on a list of chemical weapons processing equipment similar to that included in the US and West German controls. Twenty-two countries, plus the European Commission, participated in the Group's December 1991 meeting, where preliminary agreement was reached on one type of biological equipment and on several organisms and toxins.11 Further work is expected to be done on biological controls at the Group's June 1992 meeting.

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Taken together, these national and multilateral export controls represent an impressive achievement. Nevertheless, they cannot prevent a determined proliferator from acquiring CBW. Chemical or biological agents can be produced in civilian chemical or pharmaceutical facilities that have been converted for this purpose. It is, moreover, impossible to control all of the materials and equipment used to produce such agents, as many have legitimate civilian uses. Finally, proliferating countries are increasingly using clandestine means to obtain materials for their programs. Despite these limitations, export controls can help inhibit CBW acquisition. Moreover, additional steps can be taken to make the existing controls more effective. For example, countries that already maintain export controls should be encouraged to bring them in line with those of the Australia Group. This means building upon the visits US officials have made to Eastern European countries to discuss proliferation and the British and French seminars on chemical export controls attended by Eastern European countries. Ultimately, consideration will have to be given to expanding the actual membership of the Australia Group to include non-OECD countries. Efforts should also be made to persuade countries that do not maintain export controls to adopt them. Far-reaching controls on chemical weapons related exports, in particular, will continue to be necessary until it is clear that the multilateral treaty under negotiation in Geneva to ban chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), is being effectively implemented. Thereafter, these particular controls should be adjusted to apply more selectively to countries that refuse to join the CWC within a reasonable period of time after entry into force. Thus, in addition to inhibiting the acquisition of chemical weapons, export controls can also help encourage the elimination of existing programs in a wider chemical disarmament regime.

Sanctions A comprehensive non-proliferation strategy must also include sanctions against companies that supply chemical or biological materials, technology, or services to proliferators, against countries that buy such exports, and against countries that actually use chemical or biological weapons. Sanctions would seek to deter the target, be it a company or a country, from pursuing a particular activity. Should deterrence fail, the imposition of sanctions would seek both to punish the offender and, at the same time, to deter others from engaging in similar activity. Sanctions against suppliers can help inhibit CBW acquisition in two ways. First, they can induce greater caution on the part of companies in filling orders for materials, technology, or services that could be used to

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produce CBW. In addition, sanctions can help convince other governments of the international community's commitment to halting proliferation and punishing those that contribute to it. This, in turn, should encourage them to impose and enforce their own export-control regulations. Sanctions against buyers can also help inhibit acquisition by making it clear that violations of national export-control regulations will not go unpunished. Sanctions against users can help inhibit CBW acquisition and use. Countries that have not yet embarked upon CBW programs may well choose not to do so if it is clear that the use of these weapons will have certain costs. Sanctions against users can also help deter those that already possess the weapons from using them, and those that already have used the weapons from using them again. Although Iraq was not penalized for using chemical weapons against Iran, its 1988 chemical weapons attacks on the Kurds stimulated considerable interest in sanctions. Thus, in September 1988, French President Frangois Mitterrand proposed in a speech before the UN General Assembly that the use of chemical weapons be met with an embargo on all products, technologies, and weapons.12 One month later, during a campaign speech in Toledo, Ohio, presidential candidate George Bush declared that: nations guilty of chemical warfare must pay a price. They must know that continued violation of the ban against the use of such weapons carries a heavy penalty. Not just a fine or a minor sanction that can be ignored. That's not enough. Any government that resorts to such an outrage must face the censure of all nations. 13

In June 1990, during the Washington Summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev vowed to consider imposing sanctions, including those under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, against violators of the Geneva Protocol.14 A year later, the Bush Administration declared that it would impose all appropriate sanctions in response to violations of the future Chemical Weapons Convention, and especially the use of chemical weapons.15 The G-7 countries subsequently proposed, at their July 1991 summit meeting, to impose severe measures immediately against any country that used either chemical or biological weapons.16 The use of chemical weapons against the Kurds also triggered efforts in the US Congress to add sanctions provisions to US law. Not surprisingly, Iraq was the focus of the initial sanctions bills in 1988. During 1989, broader legislation aimed at stemming the spread of CBW more generally was considered in response to reports of Libya's efforts to build a chemical weapons production facility and of the continuing spread of chemical weapons outside NATO and the Warsaw Pact. During both years, however, jurisdictional disputes within and between the two Houses of Congress prevented sanctions legislation from being adopted.17

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Congressional efforts to adopt sanctions were given fresh impetus in 1990 by Iraq's attempts to acquire unconventional weapons, by its threats against Israel and, finally, by its invasion and occupation of Kuwait. In May 1990, legislation imposing sanctions on countries that used CBW and on foreign companies or persons who knowingly contributed to the spread of such weapons was unanimously approved by the Senate. That October, compromise language worked out by a House-Senate conference committee was adopted by both Houses of Congress. This new legislation required the President to impose at least six out of a possible eleven different economic, military, and political sanctions against any country determined to be using or preparing to use CBW and to deny access to the US market and government contracts to foreign companies who knowingly contributed to efforts by any country to acquire or use CBW.18 Congress, having finally adopted comprehensive sanctions legislation, quickly found its handiwork being overturned by the man who only two years before had called for heavy penalties against nations that used chemical weapons. In November 1990, President Bush pocket vetoed the legislation containing the sanctions provisions, arguing that the bill would severely constrain presidential authority in carrying out foreign policy. President Bush's veto came at an awkward moment for the administration, given the presence of thousands of American troops in Saudi Arabia, under direct threat from Iraqi chemical, and possibly biological, weapons. Perhaps in part because of this, the President's veto message was accompanied by a new Executive Order. It authorized the Secretary of State to impose various economic and military sanctions on any country that used or prepared to use CBW. The Executive order also provided for trade sanctions against foreign companies that contributed to the proliferation and use of such weapons. Unlike the congressional bill, however, these sanctions were not mandatory in nature, and could in fact be terminated or waived at the discretion of the Secretary of State.19 In February and July 1991, CBW sanctions provisions were again approved by the Senate. A few months later, against a backdrop of disturbing revelations concerning the scale of Iraq's unconventional (especially nuclear) weapons programs, the Bush Administration and the Congress reached a compromise on the sanctions issue. The new provisions require the President to impose at least five out of a possible eleven economic and military sanctions against any country determined to be using or preparing to use CBW and to deny access to US government contracts and the US market to foreign companies that knowingly contribute to the acquisition or use of such weapons. Congress agreed to allow the President to waive the country sanctions but stipulated that the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees must be notified and concur with

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any waiver decision. It also agreed to allow the imposition of company sanctions to be delayed for up to six months if the government of jurisdiction is itself taking action against the offending company.20 These sanctions provisions were signed into law more than three years after the issue first was raised. In addition to the statements by senior government officials and the various bills introduced and adopted by the US Congress, sanctions have also been discussed in the Geneva negotiations to ban chemical weapons. Two different mechanisms for responding to violations may be found in the current draft of the CWC. The first provides that the Executive Council of the organization to implement the Convention shall bring the issue directly to the attention of the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Other provisions, however, vest responsibility for responding to violations with the Conference of States Parties, the plenary body comprised of all parties to the CWC. Under these provisions, the Conference, in addition to bringing the issue to the attention of the UN, may also recommend collective measures to states parties in conformity with international law.21 Lewis Dunn has proposed that these provisions for collective measures and recourse to the UN be supplemented by additional treaty language authorizing national sanctions in the event of a violation of the Convention. Pending completion of the CWC, Dunn suggests that national sanctions be authorized and thus legitimized by a Security Council resolution.22 Dunn has also proposed that the Security Council, the European Community, and others issue statements warning that future violations of chemical arms-control norms will not go unpunished. This could be modeled after the Security Council's August 1988 warning to Iraq that it would consider appropriate and effective measures in accordance with the UN Charter should there be any future use of chemical weapons.23 Like export controls, sanctions will not "solve" the proliferation problem. Many governments are unlikely to agree in advance to impose sanctions automatically in response to a violation. Competing foreign policy interests, as was the case during the Iran-Iraq War, and fears of possible countermeasures by the target country mitigate against the adoption of automatic sanctions policies. Moreover, even if sanctions are imposed, this still may not prevent some countries from continuing to acquire or use CBW. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott's seminal work on sanctions, for example, concluded that in most instances since World War I, sanctions have not contributed very much to the achievement of foreign policy goals.24 It is worth noting, however, that Hufbauer et al. focused on the effectiveness of economic sanctions against countries. It is far from clear that the same conclusion would apply to economic sanctions against

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companies that supply prolif erators or to more comprehensive sanctions - economic, military, and political - against countries that acquire or use CBW. The very fact that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council account for more than 85 percent of all major conventional weapons sales to the Third World suggests that the denial of military assistance and sales could be a very potent sanction indeed.25 In addition to inhibiting CBW acquisition and use, sanctions can also contribute to the elimination of such weapons. Costly barriers to the acquisition of, and penalties for using, CBW could encourage the abandonment of existing programs. Sanctions can also discourage countries without such programs from withdrawing from existing treaties banning these weapons should another country violate its obligations. Finally, sanctions can encourage adherence to the future Chemical Weapons Convention by increasing the confidence of smaller powers that proliferators will be deterred from or punished for using chemical weapons.

Assistance Assistance to potential or actual victims of chemical and biological weapons is another essential element of a comprehensive non-proliferation policy. Certain types of assistance might be provided in advance of any threat or use of CBW in order to permit countries to develop credible CBW defensive postures. Assistance should also be considered in response to what James Schear calls "pre-use violations" - actions that enable or even foreshadow use, such as the development, production, or acquisition of CBW.26 Finally, assistance should be provided in situations where CBW use is threatened or actually occurs. Assistance can, of course, be justified purely on humanitarian and moral grounds. Yet, like sanctions, assistance can also strengthen the inhibitions on CBW acquisition and use. The knowledge that potential victims are likely to be in a position to defend themselves against CBW use might well inhibit a country from acquiring these weapons in the first place. Assistance can also help inhibit the use of existing capabilities by signalling the international community's intention to aid victims and by reducing the military utility of such use. The idea of assistance to potential victims has already been considered in a variety of multilateral arms-control negotiations. Formal assistance commitments were discussed during the negotiations on the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While assistance provisions were not included in the final treaty text, the UN Security Council did adopt, on the basis of a US-UK-USSR initiative, a resolution welcoming the intention expressed by certain states to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the UN Charter, to any non-nuclear party

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to the Treaty that was threatened with or subjected to aggression involving nuclear weapons.27 Language on assistance subsequently was included in the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Article VII of the BWC requires states parties to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the UN Charter, to any party that the Security Council decides has been exposed to danger as a result of a violation. The 1977 Environmental Modification (ENMOD) Treaty contains a similar provision. Assistance provisions have also been included in many of the draft chemical weapons conventions proposed over the past twenty odd years. Until recently, however, none of the proposed language went beyond the very general commitment reflected in the BWC and ENMOD Treaties. Parties were simply required to provide or support assistance based on a determination by the Security Council that the request was legitimate. Of course, this link to the Security Council provided the major powers with an effective veto over any assistance decision. In 1991, at the Geneva talks on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the industrialized powers agreed to allow the Executive Council to decide whether assistance should be provided to a party requesting it. They also agreed to require states parties to provide assistance through the treaty organization. According to the current draft of the CWC, a decision would be taken by the Executive Council following receipt of a report from the Technical Secretariat on its investigation of the facts related to the request and of the types and scope of assistance needed. Responsibility for coordinating the delivery of assistance would also fall to the Technical Secretariat. The assistance itself could be purchased with contributions made previously to a voluntary assistance fund or drawn from material commitments made earlier in agreements with or declarations to the treaty organization.28 A number of useful suggestions have been made for further strengthening the Convention's assistance provisions. Amy Gordon, for example, has pointed to the need for safeguards to ensure that assistance is not diverted to illegal purposes, such as the use of chemical defensive equipment to develop an offensive chemical weapons capability.29 James Schear has argued that the CWC needs to define assistance more broadly in order to legitimize the supply of more extensive forms of aid. Schear has also suggested that the five permanent members of the Security Council supplement the CWC's assistance provisions with an initiative signalling that violations of the Convention or the Geneva Protocol would be viewed as threats to international peace, thus invoking the mutual assistance provision (Article 49) of the UN Charter.30 Any action by the Security Council along these lines should, of course, also make mention of the Biological Weapons Convention.

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Clearly, neither unilateral nor multilateral assistance commitments will "solve" the proliferation problem. As with sanctions, governments are unlikely to agree in advance to provide assistance to any potential or actual victim. Even the new assistance provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention do not establish an ironclad obligation on the part of states parties. Assistance is obligatory in principle, but not in any particular case. Moreover, even if assistance is forthcoming, a country bent on acquiring or using chemical weapons simply may not be deterred. Nevertheless, assistance can help inhibit both the acquisition and the use of CBW. Assistance can also contribute to their elimination. Countries with existing CBW programs have much less incentive to maintain them if the use of the weapons will have limited military utility. At the same time, countries without such programs will be encouraged to adhere to treaties banning these weapons if they are assured of assistance in the event that they are threatened or actually attacked with such weapons.

Arms Control Arms-control measures are the fourth element of a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy. These should focus both on strengthening the existing regime governing chemical and biological weapons and extending that regime through the conclusion of new regional and international agreements.

Strengthening Existing Agreements Two agreements form the basis of the existing chemical and biological arms-control regime: the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the wartime use of CBW; and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisition of biological and toxin weapons. Both of these agreements have shortcomings. More than a quarter of the current 142 parties to the Protocol reserved the right, upon initially joining, to use CBW against nonparties or in retaliation. Partly as a result, the Protocol has come to be seen as a "no-first use" undertaking. In addition, the BWC permits the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisition of biological agents or toxins for "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes," without defining the amount allowed. Finally, neither agreement contains verification provisions, though the BWC does include rudimentary provisions for resolving compliance concerns. Article V requires parties to "consult and cooperate" in solving problems relevant to the BWC, while Article VI permits parties to lodge complaints about potential violations with the UN Security Council.

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Clearly, measures that strengthen the Geneva Protocol can help inhibit CBW use. Such measures might also help inhibit acquisition, as weapons that may not be used might not be worth possessing. Measures that strengthen the BWC can, by definition, help further inhibit the acquisition of biological and toxin weapons. The Geneva Protocol Various steps have been taken in recent years to strengthen the Geneva Protocol. A number of countries, including Australia, Barbados, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Mongolia, New Zealand, and Rumania, have withdrawn their reservations to the Protocol. Three others, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Russia, recently announced the withdrawal of their reservations concerning the use of biological weapons.31 Finally, Austria has proposed a meeting of states parties to adopt a declaration endorsing the withdrawal of all reservations as soon as possible.32 Efforts have also been made to deal with the Protocol's lack of verification provisions. Much of the impetus for these efforts came from the UN's unhappy experience in the early 1980s investigating reports of so-called "Yellow Rain" warfare by the Soviet Union and its allies in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Although that particular investigation was inconclusive, it did force the UN to address the issue of how to deal with alleged violations of arms-control agreements that lacked adequate verification provisions. Accordingly, in December 1982, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary General to investigate, with the help of qualified experts, any information from a member state regarding possible violations of the Geneva Protocol or of the relevant rules of customary international law. The resolution also called upon the Secretary General to compile a list of experts and laboratories and, with the help of expert consultants, to develop procedures for carrying out such investigations. The Soviet Union and its East European allies voted against the resolution. A resolution adopted by the General Assembly in November 1987 reiterated the Secretary General's investigative authority and authorized him to develop additional technical guidelines and procedures for timely and efficient investigations. Unlike in 1982, this resolution was adopted by consensus.33 In addition to strengthening specific aspects of the Geneva Protocol, efforts have also been made to buttress support for the Protocol more generally. This was the purpose of the January 1989 Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In the Conference's Final Declaration, the 149 participating countries affirmed their commitment not to use chemical weapons and condemned such use. They also reaffirmed the Geneva Protocol's prohibition on CBW use and the Secretary General's authority to investigate alleged violations, and called upon all states that had not yet done so to accede to the Protocol.34

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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Various steps have also been taken to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. A number of countries, including Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have passed domestic legislation making it a crime for their citizens to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological or toxin weapons. Others have engaged in bilateral activities designed to enhance confidence in the BWC. For example, a joint committee of the US and Soviet Academies of Science met several times in recent years to discuss measures for strengthening the BWC. This effort has spawned a series of reciprocal visits to facilities engaged in biological defence work. The two countries have also agreed jointly to develop and test a vaccine against Hemorrhagic Fever with Renal Syndrome, a disease endemic in certain parts of Asia and the Soviet Union but that also has biological warfare potential.35 The real focus of efforts to strengthen the BWC have, however, been the periodic conferences held by states parties to review implementation of the Convention. At the First Review Conference, in 1980, the question arose whether the BWC's prohibitions extended to new pathogens or toxins created using biotechnology. The conclusion, as reflected in the Conference's Final Declaration, was that the BWC was sufficiently comprehensive to cover recent scientific and technological developments. The First Review Conference also opened the door to an investigative mechanism that bypassed the Security Council by declaring the right of any state party to request the convening of a "consultative meeting" at the expert level to resolve compliance concerns.36 By the time of the Second Review Conference in 1986, confidence in the BWC had reached an all-time low. Concerns remained about the possible use of biotechnology and other scientific and technological advances for purposes contrary to the BWC. Moreover, the United State had repeatedly charged the Soviet Union with maintaining an offensive biological warfare programme in violation of the Convention. The 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk and reports of "Yellow Rain" warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan were central to the US case. The Review Conference addressed these concerns in three ways. First, it reaffirmed the BWC's comprehensive scope, declaring that it applied unequivocally to all natural or artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production. Second, it expanded upon the earlier language providing for a consultative meeting to resolve compliance concerns. Finally, it agreed to various confidence-building measures (CBMs), including the exchange of data on facilities capable of handling risky biological materials or specializing in activities directly related to the BWC; the reporting of unusual outbreaks of infectious disease or intoxication; and the

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promotion of scientific contacts and the publication of research results directly related to the Convention.37 Various changes were made in these confidence-building measures during the Third Review Conference in September 1991. The data exchange on facilities was amended to include information on national biological defence programs and facilities. A new declaration on "nothing to declare" or "nothing new to declare" was added, as were declarations on the subjects of national legislation, regulations and other measures for implementing the BWC; past offensive or defensive biological programs; and facilities for producing vaccines. Responsibility for overseeing implementation of these expanded CBMs was given to the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs. The Review Conference also took up the issue of verification, establishing a group of experts, open to all states parties, to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. Work is to be completed by the end of 1993. It further agreed that states parties would consult regarding allegations of the use or threat of use of biological or toxin weapons and cooperate fully with any investigation undertaken by the Secretary General. It also called upon the United Nations to take appropriate measures in cases of alleged use.38 The past decade has thus witnessed a concerted effort to strengthen both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In the years ahead, these agreements will be further strengthened by the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The CWC will bolster the Protocol'sban on the use of chemical weapons by prohibiting all activities related to their acquisition or use and by providing a mechanism for investigating allegations that they have been used. Since it will cover toxins, the CWC's verification provisions will also apply to some activities currently not verified under the BWC. Although much has been done to strengthen the Protocol and the BWC in recent years, neither agreement can guarantee that CBW will not be acquired or used. Many major powers continue to reserve the right to use CBW against non-parties or in retaliation. Moreover, dozens of others, including many important countries in the Middle East, have yet to join the BWC or to pledge adherence to the future Chemical Weapons Convention.

Regional Arms-control Measures Efforts to inhibit the acquisition and use of chemical and biological weapons can also be enhanced by the conclusion of new regional measures relating to such weapons. These measures can help make CBW intentions as well as capabilities more transparent, and thus less threatening. This, in turn, can help create a climate in which the actual possession of CBW is no longer deemed necessary.

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Thus far, regional efforts to control CBW have achieved the most success in South America, a region where the weapons have not yet proliferated. For example, in September 1991, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (since joined by Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay) signed a declaration not to develop, produce, acquire, store, retain, or use chemical or biological weapons. They also declared their intention to be original signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention.39 In December 1991, the five Andean countries, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, signed a similar declaration encompassing not just CBW, but also nuclear and radiological weapons.40 Proposals have also been made by countries in the two regions where CBW are spreading: Asia and the Middle East. In Northeast Asia, North and South Korea pledged in December 1991 to work toward a phased reduction in arms, including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. South Korea had previously said it would not develop or store CBW, while North Korea had expressed support for making the peninsula a nuclear and chemical-free zone.41 In South Asia, India and Pakistan agreed in October 1991 to convene an experts meeting to exchange views on banning the development, production, and use of chemical weapons. Pakistan had previously expressed an interest in a regional arrangement to keep South Asia free from all weapons of mass destruction, while India had spoken of entering into a bilateral or regional chemical weapons ban with Pakistan.42 Middle East countries have also put forward a variety of proposals. Israel, for example, proposed in January 1989 that the Middle East be made a zone free of chemical weapons.43 Proposals have also been made, for example by Iraq in the spring of 1989, to ban both chemical and nuclear weapons in the Middle East.44 Finally, there have been proposals to ban all mass destruction weapons from the region. Perhaps the best known, and most fully elaborated, is Egypt's April 1990 proposal.45 Various states, including members of the UN Security Council in the April 1991 Kuwait ceasefire resolution, have also expressed support for making the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.46 These proposals for region-wide bans face a number of serious hurdles. First, they must overcome long-standing and deeply held animosities among the countries concerned. Second, because of these animosities, they must include provisions for intrusive verification if they are to be viewed as effective. This will make agreements more difficult to negotiate. Third, they must deal with asymmetries in capabilities and thus linkages between different types of weapons as well as between military and political issues. Finally, they must not become a substitute for adherence to the existing international agreements governing nuclear and biological weapons: the NPT and the BWC.

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In light of these difficulties, efforts to control CBW in Asia and the Middle East might well benefit, at least initially, from a more modest approach, one that focuses on confidence building rather than disarmament. But if confidence-building measures are to have any chance of success, the relevant countries will have to be more forthcoming about their respective chemical, and in some cases biological, weapons capabilities and programs. After all, except for Iraq, none of the countries identified by US officials as having an offensive chemical warfare capability or a biological warfare program has acknowledged that this is the case. Both possessors and non-possessors could begin the process by participating in the confidence-building measures agreed among parties to the BWC. Actual adherence to the BWC would not be a prerequisite for participation, and the exercise itself could build enough confidence over time to encourage those that have not joined, such as Egypt, Israel, and Syria, to do so. This could be followed by chemical confidence-building measures along the lines of those agreed between the US and the Soviet Union in the September 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding. Under this accord, the two sides agreed to exchange data about their respective chemical weapons capabilities and to carry out reciprocal visits to relevant facilities.47 In the case of countries in Asia and the Middle East, third parties such as the United States or the United Nations could help facilitate these exchanges and visits. The objective of these measures would be to allay concerns and thus encourage adherence to the CWC. These CBW confidence-building measures will not come easily, especially in the absence of progress on the underlying political problems in the two regions. Even if they are adopted, there are no guarantees that the relevant countries will not continue to acquire or, in a crisis, use CBW. Nevertheless, regional confidence-building measures can, over time, help create an atmosphere conducive to adherence to international agreements banning these weapons.

New International Controls Strengthening the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention and adopting regional confidence-building measures can help stem the spread of CBW. But the most important arms-control measure, indeed the centrepiece of any comprehensive non-proliferation strategy concerning such weapons, is the future Chemical Weapons Convention. The CWC will prohibit the development, production, possession, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It will therefore not only help inhibit the acquisition and use of chemical weapons, but also contribute to their elimination. Under the CWC, all states parties will undertake a binding legal obligation not to assist others in acquiring a chemical weapons capability, thus expanding the current chemical export-control arrangements

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and providing a stronger political and legal basis for maintaining such controls. As noted earlier, the CWC will also contain provisions for sanctions against states that violate its terms as well as for assistance to countries threatened or attacked with chemical weapons. These too will help inhibit acquisition and use by making it clear that potential violators will be punished and potential victims will receive assistance mitigating the effects of an aggressor's use of chemical weapons. On a more general level, the CWC will help to delegitimize chemical weapons and to legitimize chemical non-proliferation policies. It will thus restore the taboo against chemical warfare that existed prior to Iraq's blatant and repeated violations of the Geneva Protocol during the IranIraq War and, at the same time, establish a new taboo against the actual possession of chemical weapons. The CWC may also help to prevent the further spread of biological weapons, given that every country identified as having a BW program is also believed to possess an offensive CW capability. Two issues are likely to determine whether the CWC realizes its full non-proliferation potential. The first concerns verification, whether states parties are confident that militarily significant cheating will be deterred or, should deterrence fail, detected far enough in advance to mount an effective response. The second issue concerns the number as well as the identity of the countries that join the CWC. The international organization that will be created to implement the CWC will face two verification tasks. The first will be to verify so-called declared information and activities.48 This will be carried out through a combination of data exchanges and on-site inspections, the final details of which have yet to be resolved. The second, and far more difficult verification task, will be to verify so-called undeclared activities, such as the illicit production of chemical agents or clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons. To accomplish this task, the United States, in 1984, proposed the idea of short-notice inspections that could not be refused by the inspected state.49 This proposal for "anytime-anywhere" challenge inspections was initially rejected by the Soviet Union and its allies and resisted by many Western countries. Eventually, however, the Soviet Union agreed to accept the US proposal and certain Western countries became its most ardent supporters. In July 1991, the United States introduced a new proposal for challenge inspections that was neither anytime nor anywhere. Under the new US plan, as much as a week could pass from the moment a country is notified of an impending inspection and the time it actually takes place. In addition, the country being inspected could refuse to allow the inspectors to go to the actual suspected site. Finally, the US plan would allow the country being inspected to choose the type of "access" that is

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to be permitted. Only one of the possible options provides for direct access on the ground within the actual suspected area.50 Initial reactions to the new US plan were mixed. The Soviet Union expressed support for a more stringent anytime-anywhere formulation. Certain Western countries, such as France, sought to amend the proposal to recapture key elements of the earlier US plan. The only real support for the new proposal came from the group of neutral and non-aligned states. And some of these countries, like Pakistan, made it clear that they would push for modifications, such as a filtering mechanism, that would further weaken the challenge inspection process.51 As of January 1992, it is not yet clear how challenge inspection will be resolved in the negotiations. What is clear, however, is that whatever is agreed will influence perceptions of the "verifiability" of a key aspect of the CWC. A weak challenge inspection regime, along the lines of the July 1991 US proposal, might not be seen as capable of deterring, or for that matter detecting, illicit chemical weapons production or possession. The verification provisions of the CWC could also influence the second issue that will help determine whether the CWC realizes its full non-proliferation potential, this issue is how many and which countries will join the Convention. Various ideas have been advanced in recent years to promote "universal" adherence to the CWC. For example, countries have been encouraged to declare in advance their intention to become original signatories of the CWC. This was done by the thenthirty-four members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at their November 1990 summit meeting in Paris.52 Declarations to this effect have also been made by a number of other countries including, as noted earlier, many of those in South America. The US "2-percent" proposal was also partly designed to encourage adherence to the CWC by hold-out countries. Under this plan, first proposed by President Bush in his September 1989 address before the UN General Assembly, the US would retain the last 2 percent of its chemical weapons stockpile until all chemical weapons capable countries joined the CWC.53 Rather than encouraging adherence to the Convention, however, the 2-percent proposal became an obstacle to its completion. In May 1991, the US abandoned its 2-percent proposal. In its place, the Bush Administration proposed new provisions requiring parties to refuse to trade in chemical-related materials with states that do not become parties within a reasonable period of time after entry into force. However, this proposal is also likely to prove controversial, since the administration has not agreed to lift export-controls against countries that do become parties to the CWC.54 In all likelihood, at least some countries of proliferation concern probably will not join the Chemical Weapons Convention, at least

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initially. The CWC will not, therefore, roll back the entire proliferation problem. It will, however, help prevent chemical and perhaps biological weapons from spreading to countries and regions where they currently do not exist.

Conclusion Since the mid-1980s, the primary objective of chemical and biological non-proliferation policy has been to prevent states from acquiring chemical or biological weapons. This objective has been pursued largely through the use of export-controls on the materials, technology, and services needed to make these weapons. This chapter has argued for a more comprehensive approach to the problem of CBW proliferation. In particular, it has argued for the adoption of other measures, beyond exportcontrols, to help inhibit CBW acquisition. It has also argued for measures to inhibit the use of those weapons that already exist in the arsenals of states. Finally, it has argued for measures that can lead to the actual elimination of the weapons themselves. Each of the four non-proliferation measures discussed in this chapter, export-controls, sanctions, assistance, and arms-control, can on its own help inhibit CBW acquisition and/or use. But each on its own is not enough. All four must be pursued simultaneously as part of a comprehensive non-proliferation strategy. To varying degrees, each of these measures already has drawn the attention of US and other policy makers. But as this chapter has shown, much more remains to be done. Other countries whose companies are capable of supplying chemical- or biological-related materials to proliferators must be persuaded to adopt export-controls and to harmonize those controls with those of the Australia Group. The UN Security Council and others must go on record in support of both sanctions against those involved in the acquisition or use of chemical or biological weapons and assistance to countries threatened or attacked with such weapons. Existing reservations to the Geneva Protocol must be withdrawn and wider adherence to both the Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention must be encouraged. CBW confidence-building measures must be pursued in the Middle East and Asia as a prelude to participation in international agreements banning chemical and biological weapons. And, most importantly, the long standing negotiations to eliminate chemical weapons must be brought to a successful conclusion. A more comprehensive approach to the spread of CBW, like the one proposed here, cannot guarantee that countries will not acquire, use, or continue to possess these weapons. But a non-proliferation strategy that focuses largely on inhibiting acquisition through export controls will almost certainly fail.

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NOTES

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2

3

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5

I would like to thank Gordon Burck, Ivo H. Daalder, Johan Lundin, Ray Picquet, Julian Perry Robinson, James Schear, and various government officials for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. The cut-off date for information for this chapter is January 1992. An earlier version appeared in Anns Control Vol. 12, No. 2,1991. "Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed services Committee, on Intelligence Issues/' 7 March 1991, pp. 57-58. Although Brooks does not include Ethiopia in this testimony, he did name Ethiopia in an earlier statement. For further details on Ethiopia and the other countries, see Elisa D. Harris, "Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Current Capabilities and Prospects for Control," in New Threats: Responding to the Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Delivery Capabilities in the Third World (Lanham, MD: University Press of America and Aspen Strategy Group, 1990), p. 71, n. 7. "Statementof Rear Admiral William O.Studeman, US Navy, Directorof Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, on Intelligence Issues/' 1 March 1988, p. 48; "Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, US Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, on Intelligence Issues," 14 March 1990, p. 54; and Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Remarks Prepared for Delivery by the Honorable Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, 11 June 1990," News Release, No. 294-90, p. 4. US Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 101st Cong, IstSess., (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990), pp. 11-12. Although Webster was discussing chemical weapons programs, his comments apply equally to those involving biological weapons. These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Information on the controls put in place by all but Finland and Sweden is derived from Chemical Manufacturers Association, "Chemical Weapons Precursors - Export Controls," March 1990 (unpublished paper). Finland's controls are referred to in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRl Yearbook 1988 (London: Taylor and Francis, 1988), p. 104 (hereafter cited as SIPKI Yearbook, with appropriate year), while the Swedish controls may be found in Swedish Code of Statutes, 1991:341, "Act Prohibiting the Exportation of Certain Products Which May be Used for Purposes of Mass Destruction, and Related Matters "(unofficial translation) and Swedish Code of Statutes, 1991:343," Ordinance Concerning Prohibition of Exportation of Certain Products Which May be Used for Purposes of Mass Destruction and Related Matters" (unofficial translation). Both entered into force on July 1,1991.

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12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS Information on the earliest Soviet controls may be found in International Affairs (Moscow), April 1986, pp. 151-52. The activities of other CMEA countries are referred to in US Senate, Global Spi'ead of Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 374; and "Australia 1, Leipzig 0," Pacific Research (May 1991): 25. Information has not been published on the Chinese controls, but for the others, see SIPRI Yearbook, 1988, p. 104; United Nations, General Assembly, A/S-15/PV.11,10 June 1988, p. 81; and Delhi ISI Diplomatic Information Service, 20 October 1990, as reported in JPRS-TAC, 30 October 1990, p. 9. See, US Department of Commerce News, "US Imposes Export Controls on Chemical and Biological Agents," 23 February 1989; and Fedei'al Register, Vol. 54, No. 38, 28 February 1989, pp. 8281-8301. John Tagliabue, "Bonn Limits Export of Chemical-Arms Materials," Nezv York Times, 8 August 1984; and Duesseldorf Handelsblatt, 14 November 1990 as reported in FB1S-WEU, 26 November 1990, pp. 10-13. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Executive Order 12735: Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation," 16 November 1990; and Fedei'al Register, Vol. 56, No. 49,13 March 1991, pp. 10756-70. See also, Federal Register, Vol. 56, No. 158,15 August 1991, pp. 40494-502. Statutory Instruments 1990 No. 2632, Customs and Excise: The Export of Goods (Control) (Amendment No. 6) Order 1990, made 20December 1990; and Statutory Instruments 1991 No. 1583, Customs and Excise: The Export of Goods (Control) (Amendment No. 7) Order 1991, made 9 July 1991. The Australia Group itself does not publish information about its activities, but US guidelines and lists generally embody the Group's decisions. See, for example, Fedei'al Register, Vol. 55, No. 64, 3 April 1990, pp. 12397-98; Federal Register, Vol. 55, No. 242,17December 1990, pp. 51740-42; and Fedei'al Register, Vol. 56, No. 49, 13 March 1991, pp. 10760-64. See also, "Australia Group Expanding," Pacific Research (February 1992): 25. Paul Lewis, "Mitterrand Asks Sanctions Against Users of Poison Gas," New York Times, 30 September 1988. "Excerpts of Remarks by Vice-President George Bush, University of Toledo, Friday, October 21, 1988," released by Bush-Quayle campaign, 21 October 1988. "Documents from the US-Soviet Summit," Ai-ms Control Today (June 1990): 26. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President on Chemical Weapons Initiative," 13 May 1991. "Economic Summit Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-Proliferation," Disarmament, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1991): 204. John Felton, "Iraq Sanctions Yield to Special Interests in Senate," Congressional Quarterly, 29 October 1988, pp. 3141-43; "Chemical-Arms Sanctions Bill Casualty of Turf Dispute," Congressional Quarterly, 2 December 1989, p. 3323; and Pamela Fessler, "Congress' Record on Saddam: Decade of Talk, Not Action," Congressional Quarterly, 27 April 1991, pp. 1073-75. "Senate Approves Sanctions Bill," Congressional Quarteiiy, 19 May 1990, p. 1572; and Concessional Record, Part III, 26 October 1990, pp. H12771-83, S1717991. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Memorandum of Disapproval," 16 November 1990; and White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Executive

THE "POOR MAN'S ATOMIC BOMB"?

20

21 22

23 24 25 26

27 28 29

30 31

32 33

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Order 12735, Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation/' 16 November 1990. For the various provisions, see Congressional Record, 19 February 1991, pp. S1890-1905; 20 February 1991, pp. S1944-2004; 29 July 1991, pp. S11120-11191; 3 October 1991, pp. H7460-7503; 4 October 1991, pp. S14437-14442; and 8 October 1991, H7637-7641. Conference on Disarmament, CD/1108, 27 August 1991, Appendix I, pp. 41, 49. Lewis A. Dunn, "Combatting Chemical Weapons Proliferation: The Role of Sanctions," in Combatting Chemical Weapons Proliferation: The Role of Sanctions and Assurances, Lewis A. Dunn and James A. Schear, Occasional Paper 3, (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1991), pp. 10-11. Dunn, op. cit. p. 9; and United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/620 (1988), 26 August 1988. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidei'ed: History and Cwrent Policy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985), pp. 79-91. This figure is drawn from SIPRI Yearbook 1991, p. 198. James A. Schear, "Combatting Chemical Weapons Proliferation: The Role of Assurances," in Dunn and Schear, op. cit., p. 21. This is an excellent discussion of the role of assurances in support of the chemical weapons convention. See also, Victor A. Utgoff, "Neutralizing the Value of Chemical Weapons: A Supplement to Chemical Weapons Arms Control", Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1989). Schear, op. cit., p. 16; and United Nations, Security Council, S/Res/255,19 June 1968, as reprinted in Appendix B in Mason Willrich, Non-Proliferation Treaty: Frameivork for Nuclear Arms Control (Charlottesville, VA: Michie, 1969), p. 198. Conference on Disarmament, CD/1108, 27 August 1991, Appendix I, pp. 4647. Amy E. Gordon, Assistance for Defense and Economic Development Under the Convention on Chemical Weapons, Science Application International Corp. (SAIC) Report Prepared for Office of Arms Control, Department of Energy, 23 May 1990, p. 14. Schear, op. cit., pp. 31,35. "Canadian Statement By Ambassador Peggy Mason to the Third Review Conference, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," 10 September 1991; "Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, Statement by Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Plenary," 27 September 1991; and Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network, 29 January 1992, as reported in FBIS-SOV92-019,29 January 1992, p. 3. Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.595,13 June 1991, p. 16. United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 37/ 98 D, 13 December 1982, as reprinted in United Nations, Department of Public Information, Yearbookofthe United Nations, 1982, Vol. 36 (New York: United Nations, 1986), pp. 94-95; and United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 42/37 C, 30 November 1987, as reprinted in Department for Disarmament Affairs, The UnitedNations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol 12:1987 (New York: United Nations, 1988), pp. 271-73.

96 34 35

36

37

38

39

40 41

42

43

44

45

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS "Text of the Declaration From the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons/' New York Times, 12 January 1989. Erhard Geissler, "The First Four Rounds of Information Exchange/' in Prevention of a Biological and Toxin Arms Race and the Responsibility of Scientists, eds. Erhard Geissler and Robert H. Haynes (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1991), p. 274; and "USAMRIID and Soviets Plan Vaccine Study/' USAMRDC Newsletter (January 1991): 11-12. Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.I/10,21 March 1980, pp. 7-8. Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.il/13/II, 30 September 1986, pp. 3,5-6. Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.III/22/Add.2,27 September 1991, pp. 6-7, 9,11-12. For the original declaration, see "Joint Declaration on the Total Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons," signed at Mendoza, 5 September 1991. See also, Nathaniel C. Nash, "3 Latin Nations Agree to Ban Chemical Weapons," New York Times, September 6,1991. United Nations, General Assembly, A /46/ 760,10 December 1991. David Sanger, "Koreas Sign Pact Renouncing Force in Step to Unity," New York Times, 13 December 1991; John Ridding, "South Korea forswears use of nuclear weapons," Financial Times, 9-10 November 1991; and "Plenary Statement, Delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Delivered by Mr. Chang Myong Sik," GICCW/P/49, reprinted in Final Record, GovernmentIndustry Conference Against Chemical Weapons, Canberra, September 1989, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, p. 315. Delhi All India Radio Network, 31 October 1991 as reported in FBIS-NES-91211,31 October 1991, p. 61; Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network, 6 June 1991, as reportedin JPRS-TND-91-009,24 June 1991, p. 23; and "India for chemical arms pact with Pak," Times of India, 15 June 1991. "Address of H.E. Moshe Arens, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel," Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested Parties, Plenary Session, 9 January 1989. This proposal was reiterated following President Bush's May 1991 Middle East Arms Control Initiative. See, Jackson Diehl, "Mideast Arms Plan Draws Questions," Washington Post, 31 May 1991; and Bradley Burston, "Low profile response to Bush from Israel defense establishment," Jerusalem Post, 30 May 1991. "News in Brief," Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 May 1989, p. 797. In December 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze also called for the creation of such a zone. See, David Hoffman, "Shevardnadze Urges Nuclear-Free Zone in Middle East," Washington Post, 12 December 1990. Conference on Disarmament, CD/989,20 April 1990. For further elaboration, see Mohamed Nabil Fahmy, "Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East" American-Arab Affairs, No. 35 (Winter 1990-91): 132; and Mohamed

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46

47 48

49 50

51 52 53 54

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Nabil Fahmy, "Egypt's disarmament initiative/' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1990): 9-10. See, Nick B. Williams Jr. and Daniel Williams, "Iraq, 4 Allies Urge Mideast Nuclear, Chemical Arms Ban," Los Angeles Times, 6 April 1990; "Key Parts of Statement By the Arab Ministers," New York Times, 12 March 1991; and United Nations, Security Council, S/RES/687 (1991), 3 April 1991. For the text, see "The Wyoming Papers: Documents from the Foreign Ministers' Meeting," Arms Control Today (October 1989): 23-4. This includes: 1) the initial information concerning stockpiles and production facilities provided by states parties; 2) the actual destruction of those stockpiles and production facilities; 3) the non-diversion of chemicals made in civilian facilities to military purposes; and 4) the operation of the single small-scale facility producing chemical agents for protective and other permitted purposes. Conference on Disarmament, CD/500,18 April 1984. Conference on Disarmament, CD/CW/WP.352,15 July 1991. Although the plan was cosponsored by Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the latter country clearly saw it as a "US proposal." See, "News Chronology," Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin (September 1991): 14. Much of this analysis is based on the author's own observations during a research trip to Geneva in late July 1991. For the text, see Conference on Disarmament, CD/1043,17 January 1991. "Excerpts From Bush's Speech at the Opening of the U.N. General Assembly," Neiv York Times, 26 September 1989. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet on Chemical Weapons Initiative," 13 May 1991, p. 2. The proposal itself was tabled in Geneva in August 1991. See, Conference on Disarmament, CD/CW/WP.357, 8 August 1991.

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Chapter 6 THE SPREAD OF BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS: A NIGHTMARE OF THE 1990s?

Erhard Geissler Biological weapons are living organisms and viruses that may be deliberately used, sometimes in combination with special means of delivery, for hostile purposes to cause disease or death in humans, animals, or plants. In contrast to biological warfare (BW) agents, toxin warfare (TW) agents are poisonous chemical compounds originally derived from living organisms that may be deliberately used for hostile purposes. Since they are non-living, TW agents represent a distinct class of chemical warfare agents. Despite lingering doubts about whether biological and toxin warfare agents, even if optimized by genetic engineering, might be efficient antipersonnel weapons, it is evident that even a limited use of such agents on a few selected areas of the battlefield would immediately drive the defender to don protective clothing and to take additional protective measures. US Army analyses indicate that this leads to severe restriction of hearing, vision, mobility, dexterity, and ability to communicate. Even if protective gear successfully keeps out pathogenic or toxic agents, the effectiveness of the troops would be reduced immediately by 30 percent to 80 percent.1 In addition, regardless of the degree of warning and protection, such warfare agents are demoralizing to targeted troops and generate panic, both of which are highly destructive of military capabilities.2 Moreover, military forces slowed by the need to fight in a protective posture can then be attacked with other types of weaponry more efficaciously. The US Chemical Warfare Commission, for example, recognized that "military leaders emphasize that merely being able to force an enemy into defensive clothing because of expectation of a chemical attack, and thus to impede the functioning on encumbered personnel, creates an enormous military advantage, one that can extend up and down the front, far beyond the location of any actual use/'3 BW and TW agents might also be used "surgically" against leading political and military persons and/or against critical targets such as headquarters, communication nodes, control towers, etc. Numerous experts are convinced that BW and TW agents are effective strategic weapons by virtue of their usefulness in destroying an Erhard Geissler is Professor of Genetics at the Central Institute of Molecular Biology in Berlin, Germany.

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enemy's crop and livestock. Modern industrial farming practices with monocultural cropping and specialized animals with identical genotypes are highly sensitive to specialized infections and make many crops and livestock especially vulnerable to BW attack. Therefore, the importance of anti-animal and anti-plant BW and TW agents should be seriously considered, especially in South-North and South-South contexts.

The State of Biological Disarmament Development and production of BW and TW agents as well as their use are forbidden by the Biological Weapons Convention and by the Geneva Protocol. There are now 118 states parties to the Convention, including Brunei Darussalam and Zimbabwe which ratified the treaty last year. Nevertheless there are still some sixty countries that have not yet ratified the Convention, including the majority of nations in the Middle East such as Egypt, Israel, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. The overwhelming majority of the non-participants of the Convention are developing countries. Therefore, measures should be taken to enhance participation in the Convention and to make this treaty more attractive especially for developing countries. It should also be emphasized that several states parties to the Geneva Protocol, including all permanent members of the Security Council, have reserved the right to use chemical and biological weapons in the event any adversary should use them first.4 With respect to bacteriological and toxin weapons, this reservation unequivocally is in contradiction to the provisions of the BW Convention. These states were joined during the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention by Chile5 and the United Kingdom.6 Nevertheless, only Australia, Barbados, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, and Mongolia have declared so far that they have decided to withdraw this reservation. Similar declarations by other states undoubtedly would contribute to strengthening the BW Convention. It should be stressed that the Convention binds only governments of states parties and not their respective populations. Article IV of the Convention therefore imposes an obligation on parties to pass domestic legislation criminalizing the development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. Domestic legislation is also necessary to prevent unauthorized or criminal access to biological and toxin weapons. Most of the agents studied in the Biological Defense Research Program of the United States, for example, are available from commercial companies that sell reagents to biomedical laboratories. Provisions should be incorporated therefore into domestic law, making it unlawful for any citizen or person under the states party's jurisdiction knowingly to participate in the development, production, maintenance, and/or transfer of BW and TW agents or

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corresponding delivery systems for hostile purposes or to assist a foreign state or any organization to do so. However, only a minority of states7 have so far taken action to incorporate the commitments of the Convention into national law: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the USA.8 In Germany a new Arms Trade Law on the "Improvement of the Surveillance of External Trade for the Prohibition of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons" came into force recently which, together with a revised edition of the "Act on the surveillance of weapons/'9 incorporates the obligations of the Convention into German law.10 Several countries, including Canada, have so far felt that there is no necessity to take steps toward incorporating the provisions of the Convention into domestic legislation. One wonders if these governments will be prepared to reconsider this issue especially given the involvement of numerous individuals and companies in several Western countries that supported Iraq's armament with weapons of mass destruction and corresponding technology. Press reports released during the June 1991 visit of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to Germany announced a joint Canadian-German initiative to make export controls in that very field much more stringent than before.11 Prevention of proliferation is especially important at a time when the Cold War has come to a peaceful end. Although the US government continues to claim, as seen in the latest annual report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, that the USSR maintains an offensive BW capability in violation of the Biological Weapons Convention,12 the prospect of East-West biological warfare has eased dramatically. The same holds true with respect to the possible use of biological and toxin weapons in proxy wars. In fact, quite the reverse is true. There have been increasing US-USSR efforts, at least on the scientific level, for mutual cooperation in the field of biological defence. For example, the Academies of Sciences of both countries convened a joint committee that has met several times to discuss how the Biological Weapons Convention can be strengthened and how proliferation of BW technology can be prevented. In 1989, a "Conference on Arboviruses and Arboviral Infections" was held in Moscow which was attended by, among others, scientists of the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, and by experts from corresponding Soviet institutes in Leningrad, Moscow, and Zagorsk. At present, a vaccine against a putative BW agent - the virus that causes haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome - is being tested in Russia.13 This virus was developed at USAMRIID facility at Fort Detrick. There is increasing concern, however, that development, production, and even use of biological and toxin weapons might become a South-North

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or South-South problem, especially given the increasing gap between industrialized and developing countries and the increasing risk of the emergence of new regional conflicts, including low-intensity conflicts. Concern has been expressed that in this connection the acquisition of BW and TW agents and even their possible use might be considered by some states.14 As expressed by US Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, the US Administration is "especially concerned about the spread of biological weapons in unstable areas and about the prospects of biological and toxin weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, or into the arsenals of those states which actively support terrorist organizations".15 Another US official, T.J. Welsh, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, has claimed that the number of states having offensive BW programs has risen from four to ten since 1972, including signatories to the Biological Weapons Convention. "Some are in the Middle East; some are not friendly to the United States; and we have some real legitimate concerns about these states and these weapons/'16 he added. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral C.A.H. Trost, informed the US Congress that "3 countries worldwide now have bacteriological weapons," with fifteen others "suspected" of developing them.17 Although neither chemical nor biological weapons were used by Iraq against the Allied forces or against Israel during Operation Desert Storm, BW inspections (UNSCOM 7 and 15) organized by the UN Security Council's Special Commission came to the conclusion that Iraq undertook BW research for offensive purposes.18 This conclusion was the first definitive proof that proliferation of BW and TW technology had taken place. It underlines the urgency to take measures to prevent proliferation BW and TW agents and of the corresponding technology. However, despite the findings of UNSCOM, it remains an open question whether Iraq does or did possess weaponized biological and toxin warfare agents. Iraq has claimed to possess neither biological weapons19 nor a central military BW research laboratory.20 Under the obligations of the ceasefire, international supervision might provide for the first time definitive proof to what extent proliferation of biological weapons took place, provided the Iraqis did not manage to get rid of them beforehand.21

Scientific Progress and the Biological Threat Prevention of proliferation of BW and TW agents and technology is also urgent for another reason. Twenty years ago, when the Biological Weapons Convention was negotiated and finally concluded, biological and toxin weapons seemed to have a rather low military value. However, this view has changed in recent years. Numerous diplomats, military leaders, politicians, and scientists, including the participants of the Second and

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Third Review Conferences and of the states parties to the BW Convention, share the view that the broader introduction of genetic engineering and other molecular biotechnologies has caused a re-evaluation of the military value of biological and toxin weapons. Although several experts contend that there is no real reason to be concerned, the possible military threat of molecular biotechnology has been used as a justification for introduction and expansion of biological defence research programs in several countries. But the risks of such programs should be well understood. One risk arises from the simple fact that the mere existence of such programs might trigger an action-reaction cycle of comparable activities by other nations, thus leading to a biological defence research race. Another risk is that increasing defence activities necessitate involvement of dangerous pathogens. This might result in an unintentional release of pathogenic agents, be they genetically engineered or not. Even with proper implementation of the genetic engineering guidelines issued by many countries, some of the organisms involved may endanger the personnel handling them and/or they may escape from the laboratory. Experience gained in work with pathogenic microorganisms reveals an average of 1-5 infections per year per 500 persons involved.22 A subcommittee of the US Senate has noted accordingly that" the advent of genetic engineering and other techniques raise safety concerns that were not present in earlier CBW research efforts."23 An increasing probability of unintentional release of dangerous agents is in part associated with the proliferation of BW and TW technology. Proliferation is a danger in this respect because, as Barbara Rosenberg has pointed out,24 the operations involved in the development of BW and TW agents might be carried out in some developing countries with insufficient technical competence and responsibility. This might lead, even without any military applications, to a breakdown of containment resulting in outbreaks of infectious diseases among human beings, crops, and livestock. An additional risk results from the fact that an important aspect of the biological defence research programs is the development of vaccines. Vaccines ostensibly developed for defence purposes can be used not only for defence against biological warfare agents but also to protect troops in advance of an intended attack using a BW or TW agent. In fact, vaccines can be described as having a "quadruple-capability," especially if developed by the military. First, vaccines can be used to protect against viruses and other agents that occur worldwide or are endemic in certain regions of the world only. For this purpose, vaccines have to be developed even if the techniques involved lead to progress in technology to pursue biological warfare. Second, vaccines are necessary to protect military personnel serving in areas where some pathogenic agents are endemic. Since infectious

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diseases have been the major cause of casualties in all wars in history,25 it is the legitimate right of governments and defence ministries to develop vaccines to protect their troops. Such vaccines are also necessary outside the military scene to protect civilian servicemen including officers of the United Nations and other international organizations. Third, vaccine developments are also funded by the military to protect troops against enemy attack and the personnel involved in such defensive activities, which are permitted by the Biological Weapons Convention. However, it should be noted that many experts are convinced that not even small contingents of troops can be effectively protected through vaccination from a surprise attack involving BW or TW agents whose characteristics have been changed clandestinely by biotechnological methods. Fourth, vaccine development and usage might be used to protect researchers engaged in offensive R&D programs as well as troops in advance of an intended attack using a certain BW or TW agent. Thereby vaccination might provide a biological or toxin first-strike capability, especially if the vaccine is effective in protecting against a variant agent that has been simultaneously constructed in hidden, forbidden biotechnological activities. In consequence, concern has been raised by an expert panel convened by the US Department of State in 1981 that "an increased protection capability might be an inducement to use biological warfare, since the instigator has a decreased risk of being harmed by his own actions/'26 Thus, the new possibilities provided by molecular biotechnology reveal that the BW Convention contains some loopholes. For example, the Convention does not restrict research on potential BW and TW agents, and it permits development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons agents for prophylactic, protective, and other ostensibly "peaceful" purposes without any limitation. However, as early as 1945, BW experts came to the conclusion that "development of defensive measures against BW necessitates thorough knowledge and investigation of offensive possibilities."27 This assessment is correct and still holds true. In 1979, for example, it was declared by the US National Security Council with respect to President Nixon's decision to renounce the use of BW that "this does not preclude research into those offensive aspects of bacteriological/biological agents necessary to determine what defensive measures are required."28 And still in 1987, the Ad Hoc Subgroup on the Biological Defense Research program of the US Army Science Board concluded that "the development, testing and evaluation of tactical and strategic doctrine and training in BD [biological defence] cannot be accomplished without adequate knowledge of potential threats."29 In addition, neither the Geneva Protocol nor the BW Convention provide for verification measures. The difficulties of verification in the

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field of BW and TW are well known. This holds true with respect to all activities directly addressed by the Convention as numerous pathogens and toxins are agents having dual capabilities. Microbiological agents and toxins, some of which could be used as anti-personnel, anti-animal, or anti-plant weapons agents, are more or less endemic in numerous parts of our common world as natural enemies of human beings, crops, and livestock. For example, since the Second Review Conference of states parties to the Convention, there have been more than seventy outbreaks of disease caused by pathogens classified by the World Health Organization as Risk Group III and IV agents.30 Among them were several with potential as BW agents. These include Bacillus Anthracis, chikungunya fever virus, Coxiella burnetii (the causative agent of Q fever), CrimeanCongo haemorrhagic fever virus, dengue virus, Eastern encephalitis virus, Francisella tularensis, St. Louis encephalitis virus, Western encephalitis virus, yellow fever virus, and Yersinia pestis. Occasionally, Ebola and Lassa fever viruses have been imported into Europe and North America without causing outbreaks. In addition, an "amnesic shellfish poisoning" occurred in Canada in 1987.31 This outbreak had "many similarities to the situation that might be expected from a clandestine attack using such a novel agent" as the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the CD was subsequently informed by Canada.32 However, there were no indications that any of these outbreaks involved a possible violation of the Geneva Protocol and/or of the Convention. It is the legitimate right, of course, if not the duty of the health authorities to protect their population against these natural enemies. And it is the right of developing countries to askindustrialized states for assistance in that task. Protective activities should include research on the basic features of biological agents and toxins as well as development of prophylactic, diagnostic, and therapeutic measures. This has to be done well in advance of forthcoming outbreaks. Therefore, biological and medical facilities depend both on access to the agents in question and to corresponding methods and technology. This is why it has been, so far, an unrestricted policy of the World Health Organization that its 166 member states may receive every biological agent or toxin they are interested in from any of the WHO collaborating centres without any explanation regarding the possible use, be it a putative BW or TW agent or not. Likewise, biotechnology including genetic engineering and other molecular biotechnologies are dual, ambivalent technologies. Misuse of biotechnology, including military misuse, cannot be prevented by a prohibition of gene technology per se. It is impossible, for example, to be sure that insertion of toxin genes into viral vectors is undertaken to develop a cancer-killing virus33 and not to construct an extremely dangerous second-generation BW agent. An additional difficulty arises if such a project is declared a "research project," and thus exempted from

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the provisions of the BW Convention. The same holds true for the development and use of vaccines by the military as mentioned above.

Reforming the Biological Weapons Convention Clearly, the Biological Weapons Convention needs to be strengthened. The participants in the Second Review Conference have already taken a positive first step in that direction in agreeing on an exchange of information on several items directly related to the Convention as confidencebuilding measures. Their implementation is insufficient, however.34 The efficacy of the five rounds of information exchange that have taken place so far is disappointing, both with respect to the level of participation and to the completeness of the information provided. Only forty-nine states parties have participated in the information exchange between one and five times. That means that about 60 percent of the states parties to the Convention have not yet taken part. The low level of participation by developing countries in the information exchange is especially disturbing. From the Middle East, only two reports were provided by Qatar and Turkey. Only two contributions were made by African states, namely by Senegal and Togo. In addition to the information given by Japan, only five reports have been provided by Asian countries, namely by North Korea, Mongolia, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, and Thailand. However, eight Latin American states participated in the information exchange: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. The participants of the Third Review Conference in September 1991 took measures, therefore, to enhance participation of states parties in the confidence-building measures. They also improved on them and decided on new measures forwarded by numerous authors35 and summarized elsewhere.36 A comprehensive set of recommendations was provided by an expert group convened by the Federation of American Scientists.37 In addition, the participants in the Third Review Conference considered how to resolve the contradiction found in the obligations of Articles III and X of the Convention. Article III obligates states parties not to "transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of State or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire" BW and TW agents, equipment, or means of delivery. The significance of this prohibition was emphasized by the participants of the Second and Third Review Conference who affirmed that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive so as "to cover any recipient whatsoever at international, national or sub-national levels." An opposite obligation is imposed by Article X of the Convention. This article obligates states parties to facilitate and to participate "in the

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fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes." The participants of the Second and Third Review Conference requested therefore that the provisions of Article III "should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials to states parties." Article X's call for full scientific and technological exchange cannot be reconciled with the problems posed by the possibility of proliferation. However, proliferation of BW technology cannot be prevented by inhibition of technology and information transfer. It can only be restricted by provision of transparency. For example, institutions involved in the development of biological agents and toxins, which are putative BT and \ or TW agents, and of corresponding technology should be obliged to report on such transfers to a verification agency or another supervising body. Similar declarations should be submitted by the recipients of such agents both to the donor institution and to the supervisingbody, together with information on the intended use of agents and/or equipment received. Of course, a prerequisite is the agreement on lists of agents, equipment, and technology, the transfer of which is to be reported. Additional recommendations regarding regulation of the transfer of agents and equipment related to the BW Convention have been forwarded by the FAS Working Group in a revised draft of their proposals.38

Conclusion: A Proposal Since confidence building and verification of compliance cannot be discussed separately from the problems of peaceful cooperation, states parties should consider joining forces to ensure that the fruits of biotechnology are grown and harvested for health care and other peaceful purposes only and that they also become available to the people in developing countries.39 Given the precedent of the successful international cooperation to eradicate smallpox, an international program for development and use of vaccines could be established under the auspices of the World Health Organization. An international program of this type might constitute a means to provide both confidence and proof of compliance, to restrict the danger of proliferation and, at the same time, to implement the obligations of Article X. It may also contribute to making participation in the Convention more attractive to developing countries.

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NOTES: 1

2 3 4

5

6

7

8

9 10

11

12

13

14

Report of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission, June 1985. In Chemical Warfare Review Commission, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, 1 May (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), Appendix I, pp. 35-149,99. F.J. Kroesen et al. Chemical Wai-fare Study: Summary Report, Prepared for Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, IDA Paper P1820 (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1985), p. 8. Ibid., p. 57. E. Geissler, ed. Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by ConfidenceBuilding Measures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 51-52 and table 5.2. SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies No. 10. Statement by Embajador Radomiro Tomic, Chile, to the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Weapons and Their Destruction, Geneva, 11 September 1991. Statement by Ambassador Tessa A. H. Solesby, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to the Third Review Conference, 27 September 1991. Regarding states that took national implementation measures only recently, see E. Geissler, "Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention through Greater Transparency," in Veiification Report 1992, ed. J. Poole (in press). Douglas Scott, "The concept of treaty-mandated compliance legislation under the Biological Weapons Convention," in Prevention of a Biological and Toxin Arms Race and the Responsibility of Scientists, eds. E. Geissler and R.H. Haynes (Berlin, 1991), pp. 345-367, 356. Unofficial translation. Gesetz zur Verbesserung des Uberwachung des AuBenwirtschaftsverkehrs and zum von A torn waff en, biologischen und chemischen Waff en vom 5. November 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I, P. 2428. Gesetz uber die Kontrolle von Kriegswaffen vom 22. November 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 2506. "Kanadas Premierminister zu Gesprachen in Bonn," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 14 June 1991. At the same time, it should be mentioned that the Canadian Department of External Affairs and International Trade recently issued a pamphlet designed to reduce the possibility of proliferation by raising the awareness of industry and academia about biological weapons. ("Biological and Toxin Weapons: Be Vigilant," External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1991.) Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agi'eements. Report submitted to Congress by President George Bush, Washington, DC, 6 February 1991. J.M. Meegan, personal communication, 31 May. See also USAMRDC Newsletter, January 1991. R.A. Zilinskas and C.-G. Heden, "The Biological Weapons Convention: a vehicle for international co-operation," in Views on Possible Veiification Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention, ed. S.J. Lundin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

A NIGHTMARE OF THE 1990s? 15 16

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21 22 23

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H.A. Holmes, "Action against proliferation of biological weapons urged/' Testimony, US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 17 May 1989. Testimony of T.J. Welsh, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defence, in Biological Warfare Testing, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control International Security and Science of the Committee on foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Subcommittee on Military Installations and facilities of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 3 May 1988 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), p. 42. Prepared statement by Admiral C.A.H. Trost, Chief of Naval Operations, before the House Armed Services Committee, US Congress, 20 February 1990. Quoted in Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 8 (June 1990): 9. Report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission transmitted to the Security Council by the Secretary General. S/23165, 25 October 1991. See also: "UNSCOM reports on Iraqi CBW capability," CBW News, No. 5 (October 1991): 1-2. "Bagdad verfugt noch iiber Raketen und C-Waffen," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 20/ 21 April 1991. "Response to the request for information by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission of 14 May 1991 concerning biological weapons," 26 May 1991. As of May 1992, the Special Commission had not proven that Iraq was preparing biological weapons (note from the editor). E. Israeli, "Biosafety inbiotechnological processes," Advances in Biotechnological Processes, Vol. 6 (1986): 1-30. "Preliminary Report of the Majority Staff of the US Senate Sub-committee on Oversight of Government Management on DOD's Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research," 11 May 1988, in Department of Defence Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Govei-nmental Affairs, US Senate, 27-28 July, 1988, pp. 270-286, 273. B. Rosenberg, "Comments on the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on the Biological Defence Research Program," 25 July 1988 in Biological Defence Research Program, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Frederick, MD: Department of the Army, US Army Medical Research and Development Command), pp. A14-50 - A14-55. C. Roberts, "Microbiologists in military research," in Biotechnology: Professional Issues and Social Concerns, eds. P. DeForest, M.S. Frankel, J.S. Poindexter and V. Weil (Washington, DC: AAAS, 1988), pp. 88-94. "Summary of the Genetic Engineering Expert Panel," submitted to Assistant Secretary of State James Malone, Department of State, Washington, DC, 16 May 1981. G.W. Merck,, W.M. Adams, G.W. Anderson, H.I. Cole, W.B. Sarles and L.A. Baker, "Summary and Estimate on Enemy Intentions and Capabilities in Biological Warfare," 16 May 1945, submitted to members of the US Biological Warfare Committee by W.B. Sarles on 19 May 1945. H.A. Kissinger, National Security Decision Memorandum 35, 25 November 1969. US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Hearings 4th Congress, 1st Session

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31

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35

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CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (Washington, DC: 1975), pp. 207-209. Reprinted in S. Wright, ed, Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press), Appendix H, pp. 402-405. US Army Science Board, Final Report of the Ad Hoc Subgroup on Army Biological Defence Research Program, July 1987 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army), p. 3. J.P. Woodall, and E. Geissler, "Information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and intoxinations", in E. Geissler, ed., op. tit, pp. 105-124. J.P. Woodall, "WHO health and epidemic information as a basis for verification activities under the Biological Weapons Convention," in S.J. Lundin, ed., op. cit. T.M. Perl, et al., "An outbreak of toxic encephalopathy caused by eating mussels contaminated with domoic acid," Neiu England Journal of Medicine, 322 (21 June 1990): 1775-80. CD/CW/WP, 254, quoted in Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 6 (November 1989): 8. See Geissler, 1990, op. tit, p. 19. Geissler, ibid., and "The first four rounds of information exchange," in Geissler and Haynes, op. tit., pp. 267-276. See Wright, 1990, op. tit.; Geissler 1990, op. tit.; Geissler and Haynes, 1991, op. tit; Lundin, 1991, op. cit E. Geissler, "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention," Disarmament, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1991): 104-18. Proposals for the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, report of the Federation of America Scientists Working Group on Biological and Toxin Weapons Verification, revised, October 1990. Reprinted in Geissler and Haynes, op.tit, pp. 485-505. FAS Working Group, Confidence-Building and Other Measures Undei* Considerationfor Action at The Third Review Conference of The Biological Weapons Convention, revised, May 1991, submitted to the participants of the Quaker Residential Conference on Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, Chateau de Bossey, Geneva, 31 May - 2 June 1991. E. Geissler, "Biological and toxin weapons and the responsibility of scientists —20 years later," in Geissler and Haynes, op. tit., pp. 3-28.

Part III:

BALLISTIC MISSILES

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Chapter? BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION ANDTHEMTCR

Aaron Karp Introduction Missile proliferation has emerged as a leading challenge to international peace and stability, and as a prominent symbol of potential disorder. After a stunning series of disclosures of Third World missile projects and repeated use of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, missile proliferation has risen to the top of the international agenda. Yet we still are fumbling for tools to cope with it. The existing system of export controls centring on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has strong support in the West. Yet it clearly is not enough to stop dedicated efforts to acquire long-range missiles. Having made a strong start at addressing the problem, how should we proceed to deal with it more effectively? Despite its shortcomings, the MTCR still offers the best basis for controlling ballistic missile proliferation. While it suffers from serious problems, its effectiveness can be enhanced greatly through discrete steps. No alternative arrangement can accomplish as much or offer equal security in the foreseeable future. Despite the obvious attractiveness of regional arms control, such initiatives are unlikely to inhibit or reverse ballistic missile proliferation in the foreseeable future. Comprehensive plans for regional arms control, including that presented by President Bush on 29 May 1991 and echoed by French President Mitterand, are more valuable for setting goals than as immediate policy.1 Instead, Western efforts should focus on specific measures to strengthen the MTCR and focus on the most destabilizing missile programs, and on broad efforts to build normative barriers against acquisition of ballistic missiles in general.

Guiding Principles of Missile Control The existing system of controls on the spread of long-range missile technology is the product of an evolutionary process that started in the late 1960s and continues today. At the apex of this system stands the

Aaron Karp is Guest Scholar at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden, and at the Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, Egenhausen, Germany.

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Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) negotiated by Britain, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States in the mid-1980s and made public in 1987. The MTCR coordinates national export restrictions prohibiting the transfer of missiles and technology for missiles capable of delivering a 500 kg payload over a range of 300 km.2 The regime itself is little more than a list of proscribed technologies and a commitment to cooperate on its enforcement. Despite its growing importance, the basic principles of the regime never have been formally codified. Instead, they remain tacit assumptions, implicit in the MTCR and supporting diplomacy. These informal principles constitute the real heart of the missile proliferation regime and the foundation for Western action. While not without critics or beyond alteration, these fundamental principles have withstood important challenges and are likely to endure for many years to come: 1. The proliferation of ballistic missiles is inherently destabilizing, significantly increasing the dangers from proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons. The same is true of regional space-launch projects, whose dual-use nature distinguishes them from ballistic applications only through intent, never through capability.3 Israeli strategic weapons and space-launch capabilities are accepted in the West as a partial, albeit extremely controversial, exception to this principle. 2. Emerging powers do not have the right to acquire ballistic missile or space-launch technology from foreign suppliers. Although Western countries have an obligation to aid regional economic and technical development, they have their own legitimate security interests. The maintenance of international order must take precedence over principles of free trade and technological justice. 3. Potential suppliers must distinguish between economic and security interests in their export policies. Suppliers are obligated to enforce missile proliferation policies and sacrifice trade opportunities. 4. There are practical limits to the obligation to control the spread of ballistic missile technology. It is understood that once a country has ballistic missiles, there is no way acceptable under international law to deprive it of that technology. Instead, control efforts must stress strengthening impediments to the development, deployment, arming and use of those missiles. Another guiding principle is beginning to emerge, regarding the potential role of anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) systems. The unexpected performance of Patriot batteries against Iraqi Scud missiles in 1991 strengthened enormously support for greater investment in more sophisticated ATBM technologies. This is seen most dramatically in the reorientation of the US Strategic Defense Initiative to emphasize regional threats. Even within the arms-control community, traditionally opposed

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to missile defences, there is greater willingness to accept defences against regional missile threats, so long as these do not challenge adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty. Where previous debates over missile defences stressed theoretical arguments regarding the nature of deterrence and stability, the current debate over ATBM deployment emphasizes mostly practical and economic considerations. The future role of ATBM systems remains unclear. Deployment of more dual-role weapons like Patriot is certain. But whether or not dedicated systems like the Israeli-US Arrow will reach full scale deployment depends upon the difficult trade-offs imposed by declining defence budgets. Development of new systems will accelerate in Europe, Israel, the US and possibly Japan. But the high cost - an Arrow system to defend Israel alone is estimated at a minimum of US $5 billion - will limit deployments to small, experimental units until after the year 2000. Growing interest in ATBMs does not translate into widespread support for more ambitious defences such as a system for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) to defend against small numbers of long-range ballistic missiles. Unlike regional defences, this major SDI proposal probably requires abrogation or renegotiation of the ABM Treaty. The costs, estimated from $41 billion to over $100 billion for 1000 space-based "brilliant pebbles" interceptors and related systems are difficult to justify against an intercontinental threat that has yet to appear. Modest schemes such as re-activation of the ABM complex at Grand Forks are more affordable, but their technical capabilities remain dubious.

Strengths of the Existing Regime It is widely agreed, even by architects and advocates of the MTCR system of supplier controls that it is not, nor was it intended to be, a sufficient response to missile proliferation. But its accomplishments should not be derided. As recently as 1989, William Webster, then Director of the CIA, felt compelled to draw congressional attention to missile proliferation by speaking of fifteen to twenty Third World countries building their own ballistic missiles by the year 2000.4 In fact the pace of ballistic missile proliferation has slowed remarkably since the mid-1980s. Instead of the virtually unlimited spread of missiles, we are likely to see only three to five Third World ballistic missile producers in the early years of the next century. Today only one regional power, Israel, can manufacture a complete missile force. Only one other country, North Korea, continues to make unchecked progress. The Iraqi program lies somewhere in the nation's rubble, although it almost certainly lives on in the dreams of Saddam

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Hussein. India's program, still technically the most advanced in the Third World after Israel, has slowed down considerably due to financial and technical problems. Programs in Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan appear to be moribund. Other countries that were trying to develop ballistic missiles of their own, such as Iran, Libya, and Pakistan, now are totally dependent on their ability to find a foreign supplier of finished missiles.5 At the time that negotiations for the MTCR began in 1983, few seriously anticipated that the regime would be so effective; expectations were rather gloomy and the idea that we might have anything to celebrate would have seemed absurd. Indeed, there are many reasons why regional missile progress has not been faster. Some are fundamental and unlikely to change quickly, but others could change to allow a new surge of regional missile development. The most important impediments to progress include: 1. Ballistic missile development is more difficult for Third World countries than previously appreciated. The amount of equipment and technology that must be imported, even for development of a missile comparable to the 1950s vintage Soviet Scud, is substantial. The breadth of this technology offers many opportunities for control. More advanced and longer-range missiles require even more foreign technology, creating ever more opportunities for supplier controls. 2. There are specific technologies that must be acquired to produce ballistic missiles, making export controls relatively easy to implement and highly effective. Control efforts can be tailored to focus on fuels, engines, guidance, re-entry vehicles, simulation and test technology. The brevity of the MTCR Technology Control Annex should be contrasted with the mammoth proposed Chemical Weapons Convention, for example. 3. The cost of full-scale development, production, and deployment of a ballistic missile force is a greater impediment than previously was anticipated. While many countries may be able to test a missile, few can afford to go further. Neither Argentina nor Egypt, for example, were up to the estimated $3-5 billion cost of fully developing the Condor 2 without Iraqi support.6 4. Ballistic missile proliferation rose unexpectedly high on the international agenda due to: the Iran-Iraq War in 1988; a surge in revelations of Third World missile programs; and the Iraqi use of ballistic missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia in 1991. As a result, the suppliers have been more concerned about the issue and more willing to support control policies with aggressive diplomacy. This was dearest in the case of the Argentine-Egyptian-Iraqi Condor 2 missile which was brought to a halt in 1989-90. Also, renewed pressures on China may prevent additional exports of M-series missiles.

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5. Despite wars in the Middle East and domestic conflict elsewhere, regional security problems eased during the 1980s. Even if the late 1980s did not mark the "end of history," there is less fear of interstate war. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait does not appear to portend greater international instability so much as the lingering persistence of old dangers.7 The dangers of domestic conflict may be greater than ever, but fewer countries fear foreign attack or demonstrate aggressive intentions against their neighbours. This undercuts ballistic missile projects in Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. Weak justifications also slowed missile programs in Egypt, Iran, Libya, and Taiwan, while eradicating previous interest in Southeast Asia. 6. The MTCR won greater international support than could have been anticipated, growing from seven original members in 1987 to eighteen at the end of 1991. In 1990, Moscow accepted the provisions of the MTCR, although it still is not a formal member. Most of the Soviet successor states have announced that they will respect all Soviet arms-control commitments, apparently including this one. Several other key exporters announced in 1991 that they also would unilaterally respect MTCR guidelines, including Argentina, China, Israel, and South Africa.

Weaknesses of the Current Regime Against this picture of accomplishments, another school of thought insists that the MTCR is "largely ineffective/'8 There are major avenues of missile proliferation not blocked by the existing regime, especially countries attempting to purchase missiles from suppliers outside the regime, the presence of much relevant technology already in the Third World, and the continuous threat of transfer of technology and skilled engineers. While some regional actors have lost interest in long-range missiles, others are just as determined as before, especially Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria. The difficulties of reducing their appetites for missiles leads some observers to conclude that this threat can only be addressed by new, specially tailored, military forces.9 There is a difference, however, between legitimate concern and excessive pessimism. Behind the worst fears lies an unfortunate tendency to reapply the worst Cold War perceptions of the Soviet threat to emerging dangers in the Third World. Just as there could be no absolute security from Soviet attack in the past, there can be no absolute security from rising regional military capabilities in the future. It is just such a search for absolute security, combined with the need of major national security institutions for a viable post-Cold War rationale, that leads to the worst dissatisfaction with the MTCR. A different kind of dissatisfaction has been voiced by Third World

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spokesmen, especially in India and Arab countries, resentful of the tendency for the MTCR to reinforce the political status quo. Their objections are of greater importance, since they challenge the legitimacy of the basic principles behind the regime. Using arguments honed against the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), they maintain that they have a right to possess ballistic missiles. They are not willing to abandon this right under a regime that does nothing to cut the missile forces of their neighbours, especially China and Israel. While every state has the right to acquire the weapons it wants, unless of course it has renounced some of those rights by signing an agreement like the NPT or CFE Treaty, foreign powers are under no obligation to help would-be proliferators. Regional critics may induce a feeling of guilt among MTCR members, but they have not weakened anyone's commitment to the regime. Far from undermining the MTCR, their criticism testifies to its effectiveness.

The Future of the MTCR There is much that is obviously self-serving in such criticism of the extant regime. Nevertheless, critics of the MTCR have pointed to important weaknesses. Because it fails to address the motives compelling regional actors to acquire long-range missiles, the regime will never be enough to stop the spread of missiles. And like the NPT, it suffers because not all countries that should be, are within its purview. While it probably is impossible to turn the MTCR into a universal regime by attracting the support of most potential missile proliferators, much can be done to strengthen its power among potential technology suppliers. These measures fall into three categories:

Wider Membership The growth of the MTCR from seven to eighteen formal members has been largely symbolic; few of the additional members have major rocket industries. A few such as Belgium and the Netherlands could supply materials or subsystems, but most are important only as potential trans-shippers of missile technology and as moral supporters of control. Cooperation by the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States is far more significant. Of greatest urgency is the need to win the adherence of other potential suppliers of complete rockets, especially China and North Korea, but also other Third World and East European countries with export-oriented arms industries. The difficulties of securing the adherence of China and other potential missile exporters should not lead to unwarranted cynicism. It remains not only feasible to bring such countries into the regime, but likely that they will join eventually.10

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MTCR members have an obligation to bring severe pressure on China to respect its new commitment to the MTCR and halt its promiscuous missile exports. More rapid success should be possible with countries like Argentina, Brazil, India, South Korea, and Taiwan. These potential exporters are unlikely to become formal members of a regime designed to counter their programs, but their need for Western support is a valuable lever for securing their unilateral acceptance of MTCR export restrictions. The same certainly is true of Eastern European governments. North Korea, by comparison, presents the most intractable challenge. Pyongyang has become the leading exporter of Scud-type missiles. But the hermetic isolation of its government virtually rules out any orthodox tool of diplomacy.

Better Enforcement Export controversies do not cease when countries join the MTCR. Since it is not a formal treaty but a mechanism for coordinating national policy, the MTCR largely relies on national law enforcement by member governments for implementation. Other governments, the press, and special interest groups can offer information and bring pressure on recalcitrant or slow members, but the MTCR offers no substitute for forthright national action. For several years after it went into effect in 1985, the MTCR suffered from ambivalent enforcement. Several members of the original seven, especially France, Germany, and Italy, went about much as before, tolerating the new regime instead of implementing it. The greatest barrier to effective enforcement has been the tendency to maintain rigid bureaucratic distinctions between trade and security interests. For countries highly dependent on trade, this has been a difficult obstacle to overcome. Trade ministries typically play a prominent, if not determinant, role in technology-transfer controls. Yet they have an institutional interest in maximizing exports. For them to reverse their "organizational mission" and rigorously restrain exports is asking too much. Stiff export controls tend to come only after chief responsibility is transferred to defence ministries and those departments in foreign ministries dealing with national security matters. This shift usually comes only through outside influence, typically the combined effect of serious export scandals and explicit foreign pressure. Great progress has been made in this regard, albeit at the expense of important technology leaking through the control system in the meantime. All members now undertake regime enforcement much more rigorously. But these problems cannot be solved once and for all. Yesterday's bureaucratic turf battles reappear time and again, requiring repeated reassertion of basic principles. In the United States, for example, national security agencies still must cope with the tendency for the Commerce Department to approve questionable exports of sensitive technology.11

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Another impediment in countries such as France and Germany is resistance to the concept of white-collar crime, making prosecutors hesitant to bring indictments and courts unwilling to deliver stiff sentences.

Tightening Technology Restrictions The MTCR was designed to stop exports of technology for missiles capable of carrying a payload of 500 kg a distance over 300 km. While this simplifies enforcement by requiring a relatively brief list of proscribed items, it also permits trading in smaller weapons, but such systems can reach strategic targets in many regional situations. It is Syrian shortrange missiles, for example, that pose the most serious challenge to Israeli security. An obvious way to improve the comprehensiveness of the MTCR would be lowering its thresholds to cover shorter-range missiles. Some tightening is always desirable, especially on dual-use technologies, but a point of marginal returns makes progress difficult. As a rule the difficulties of controlling missile technology increase exponentially as missile range decreases. Smaller systems are prime candidates for local production. The relatively simple technologies required for short-range missiles already is so available that uniform control may be impossible. The maximum range of artillery rockets manufactured by several Third World countries already has reached 90 km and further improvements are likely. Other widely available technology can be adapted to produce short- range missiles. An example is India's Prithvi. This ballistic missile, first tested in 1988 with a maximum range of 240 km, relies on engines developed from the aging Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile, a technology already in the hands of no fewer than thirty-four countries.12 Rather than quixotically trying to lower MTCR thresholds for all countries, it makes more sense to focus control efforts on those specific shortrange programs that seriously threaten regional stability. Targeting specific countries for tighter scrutiny is more practical than broadening restrictions for everyone. As one observer put it, "We need to distinguish those trends that threaten us and those that merely trouble us/'13

Barriers to Moving beyond the MTCR While the supplier-oriented MTCR can restrain missile proliferation, it cannot bring the problem to an end. Only a new regime that directly addresses the motives for missile proliferation can hope to achieve so much. Unlike the existing system, this would have to be tailored to meet the specific demands of potential missile proliferators, appealing to their self-interest, replacing an imperative to proliferate with an equally strong commitment to stability and disarmament. Given the extent of the challenge, there is understandable enthusiasm for such an approach.

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A missile proliferation regime based on equal responsibilities for all nations is a logical component in the New World Order envisioned by President Bush, of "new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all, to achieve peace."14 Specific proposals have not been lacking. Prominent among them is a call for globalization of the 1987 INF Treaty, extending the ban on missiles with ranges of 500 to 5500 km agreed by the Soviet Union and United States to include regional powers as well.15 Other proposals would include restrictions or elimination of missile arsenals as part of a larger agreement on regional arms-control and disarmament. The Bush plan is an example of this approach, combining controls on missiles with other weapons of mass destruction. Less ambitious plans for regional Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures (CSBMS) have been recommended to reduce the imperative for regional weapons procurement and decrease the risks of their use.16 The significant progress of arms-control agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States and in Europe offers useful models for Third World initiatives. But, heuristic tools should not be confused with concrete measures. Soviet-US and European arms-control was made possible by preconditions established over several decades. Few if any of these preconditions have been met in critical Third World regions. It is important to keep in mind just how extensive were these preconditions to progress in Soviet-US and European arms-control. For example, all sides accepted the political and territorial status quo in Europe and had not been engaged in any recent warfare between them. In addition, a direct diplomatic dialogue had been established through periodic summit meetings starting in 1954, and under the Gorbachev regime, a cooperative political atmosphere developed which facilitated routine negotiations and compromise solutions. Lastly, the Soviets' achievement of strategic parity with the United States in the early 1970s almost certainly was essential to their acceptance of strategic armscontrol. These conditions contrast sharply with most of the Third World. Regional powers, divided by overwhelming territorial, ethnic, religious, or personal disputes, often find themselves in a formal state of war. Poisonous issues such as Palestine, the Golan Heights, the Shatt al-Arab, Kashmir, Chinese or Korean unification hang over all other matters of local diplomacy. Obsessed with the outcome of previous wars and wary of future ones, regional powers remain determined to maintain superior military preparations. Discussions only occur through intermediaries or the neutral ground of the conference hall. Informal dialogues are minimal and often counterproductive. The differences are equally stark with regard to specific proposals. While a global INF offers a useful model, it must be kept in mind that for

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Moscow and Washington the 1987 treaty eliminated weapon systems of tertiary importance; it left larger forces of intercontinental systems and theatre range aircraft untouched. In regional contexts, however, intermediate-range missiles are of primary importance. Asking India, Israel, or North Korea to give up IRBMs is like asking Russia or the United States to give up their ICBMs and SLBMs. Confidence-and-security-building measures are equally difficult to transfer to other regions. The first major CSBM agreement in Europe, the 1986 Stockholm Agreement, resulted from decades of political accommodation. Its intrusive inspections of military exercises and deployments were made possible by years of superpower experience with treaty verification. Progress by Argentina and Brazil on far more limited CSBMs since the late-1980s also followed decades of mutual political accommodation.17 Elsewhere, in the Middle East, South Asia, or Korea, comparable political understandings remain distant goals. Proposals to control or reverse missile proliferation by dealing with regional motives tend to offer arms-control as a panacea for longstanding political disputes. The key to eliminating missile proliferation is not in arms-control agreements alone. Rather, it rests on resolving essential political disputes, and on limiting the ambitions of dictators like Saddam Hussein.

Establishing a New International Norm In lieu of greater progress toward resolution of regional conflicts and regional arms-control, there is no alternative to continued reliance on supplier controls in general and the MTCR in particular. While the West can promote regional arms-control initiatives, there is little outsiders can do to win their acceptance unless regional actors are ready to take their own initiatives. Changing the motives that compel countries toward missiles can only be accomplished from within, through domestic political change. Besides strengthening the MTCR, the most important task facing the West is creating a political atmosphere conducive to widespread rejection of ballistic missiles. If we are serious about ending the proliferation of missiles, it is essential to construct new normative standards against their acquisition. Indeed, most countries remain extremely proud of their missile forces. While nuclear and chemical weapons are hidden beneath layers of official secrecy, long-range missiles are the stuff of military parades. So long as long-range missiles are major symbols of national pride, the motives for their acquisition will tend to outweigh the forces of regional arms-control, and the domestic voices calling for an end to national missile programs will seem small indeed.18

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A new norm challenging possession of long-range missiles can only be created self-consciously. Ambitious measures may be necessary, especially a ballistic missile test ban. This would contribute to a new normative framework by imposing identical restrictions on all states, in a manner consistent with the expectations of a more cooperative world order. It also would erect a tangible barrier to acquisition of new missile systems by any country and rapidly reduce the reliability of those already deployed. Ballistic missile test ban proposals have been around for some time. It was part of the deep cuts Cyrus Vance proposed to Moscow in March 1977. It emerged again at the eccentric 1987 Reykjavik Summit and featured prominently in the early stages of the 1988 US presidential campaign.19 Advocated to enhance US and Soviet security, these proposals have even greater potential as a barrier to regional missile programs. Until major powers agree to reduce their reliance on ballistic missiles, it will be difficult to convince regional actors that they gain little advantage from ballistic missile forces of their own. Outright abolition of ballistic missiles, or even a test ban, obviously would be unacceptable to Moscow or Washington today, since these weapons remain the backbone of their nuclear forces. More immediate support can be found for the elimination of land-based missiles, while retaining SLBMs.20 An outright ban on ballistic missiles or test flights may seem distant, but the revolutionary changes in international security following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 may make it far more feasible. As the nature of nuclear deterrence undergoes fundamental change, there can be no doubt that force structures designed around it must change as well. Writing in 1990, a skilled analyst could dismiss the possibility as "far-fetched."21 Two years later this may no longer be so. The key to creation of a new international norm impeding missile proliferation is integrating previously separate aspects of security policy. This is already happening in Western force planning and military research and development, where regional missile forces are an explicit priority. It is essential that arms-control policies reflect similar priorities. Proliferation concerns will have to be specifically addressed in any future arms-control agreements. Amending the 1991 START Treaty to condemn ballistic missiles in general would greatly strengthen the basis for controlling missile proliferation.

Conclusion The experience of the last five years has demonstrated that coordinated efforts by Western countries can do much to control ballistic missile proliferation. The MTCR undoubtedly will remain the best basis for

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controlling the problem over the next decade. A policy based on export controls cannot eliminate missile proliferation, but it remains the only proven response, short of war. Through wider membership, better enforcement, and tighter regulations, it can be made even more effective. Control over missile proliferation is facilitated by the technology itself. Of the many proliferation threats confronting us, this is by far the easiest to contain. Unlike conventional weaponry, ballistic missiles are not accepted as essential elements of national defence. Unlike chemical weapons, they involve only a limited range of technologies. And unlike nuclear weapons, they have little overlap with legitimate civilian needs. The relative ease of control, furthered by the strengths of the MTCR, mean that missile proliferation in the 1990s probably will be much slower than previously assumed. The next decade probably will see the emergence of three to five new countries building their own ballistic missiles, not fifteen to twenty as previously believed. The spread of short-range missiles - range under 300 km - will be increasingly difficult to restrain, however, requiring progressively greater efforts to achieve progressively diminishing results. But the spread of long-range systems will continue to slow as the technology becomes less available. To minimize the dangers from new regional missile forces, especially short-range systems, there will be greater demand for theatre defences such as upgraded Patriot air defence weapons. But there is no evidence of an emerging intercontinental threat of the sort that might justify SDI-type defences for Russia, the US or Europe. Export controls clearly are not a sufficient response. But there are no readily available alternatives. Like other major challenges to international security, this one can only be eliminated by resolving the political conflicts behind it. Long-term security can be insured only by addressing the motives for acquiring missiles. In the final analysis, the answer to missile proliferation depends on the resolution of regional security issues. In the meanwhile, preferably through a ballistic missile test ban, the international community must erect a new norm making missiles unacceptable, thereby reducing their prestige value to potential acquisitors.

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NOTES 1

2

3

4 5

6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13

Speech before the US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, 29 May 1991. The Bush plan urges a freeze on exports and production of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, with sales of ballistic missiles to cease immediately, with a ban of possession of such weapons sometime later. The French proposal of 3 June 1991 applies the same approach globally. The regime is described and analyzed in Martin Navias, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World," Adelphi Paper 252 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1990), pp. 47-68; and Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington: Brookings, 1991), Chs. 2 and 5. In formal statements accompanying public announcement of the MTCR on 16 April 1987, Britain, Canada, and the US stated that the regime is not intended to hinder regional space-launch programs. In practice it is impossible to aid domestic space-launch projects without increasing ballistic missile capabilities. As recognition of this dilemma has grown, the MTCR partners have become increasingly hostile to regional space-launch ambitions. Speech before the Town Hall of California, Los Angeles, 30 March 1989. Richard Clarke, testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security, Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, 23 April 1991; and the author, "Ballistic missile proliferation," SIPRI Yearbook 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), Ch. 9. W. Seth Carus, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," Washington Paper No. 1456 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990), p. 64. Michael Mandelbaum, "The Bush Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 70 (1) (1991), esp. pp. 10-12. The Director of US Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, in annual testimony before the US House Armed Services Committee." MTCR is 'largely ineffective/" Jane's Defence Weekly, 31 March 1991, p. 583; "USA revises third world threat," ibid., 23 March 1991, p. 431. For example, Marc S. Palevitz, "Beyond deterrence: what the US should do about ballistic missiles in the Third World," Strategic Review, Vol. 18 (Summer 1990). An interesting example of this is the transformation of Soviet policy, examined in William C. Potter and Adam Stulberg, "The Soviet Union and the spread of ballistic missiles," Survival, Vol. XXXII, No. 6 (November-December 1990). For examples, see US Government Controls on Sales to Iraq, Hearing before the Committee on Government Operations, US House, 27 September 1990 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991). On global distribution of the SA-2, Steven J. Zaloga, Soviet Air Defence Missiles (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1989), pp. 51-73. Geoffrey Kemp, "Incentives to slow down missile proliferation in the Third World," in Missile Proliferation: a Discussion of US Objectives and Policy Options, ed. Robert Shuey (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 1990), p. 51.

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14 Speech before the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, 13 April 1991. 15 Kenneth L. Adelman, "How to limit everybody's missiles," New York Times, 7 April 1991, p. E19; Kathleen C. Bailey, "Arms control for the Middle East," International Defence Review, No. 4 (April 1991): 311-314. 16 Gerald M. Steinberg, "The Middle East in the missile age," Issues in Science and Technology (Summer 1989): 35-40; Janne E. Nolan, "Ballistic missiles in the Third World - the limits of nonproliferation," Arms Control Today (November 1989): 9-14. 17 The transformation of Argentine-Brazilian relations is laid out in Stanley E. Hilton, "The Argentine factor in twentieth-century Brazilian foreign policy strategy," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 100, No. 1 (Spring 1985). 18 A similar point is made by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in "Arms control after the Cold War," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1989-90): 60. 19 Robert Sherman, "Deterrence through a ballistic missile flight test ban," Arms Control Today (December 1987): 8-13, with a critical rejoined by Walter B. Slocombe. 20 See the symposium on eliminating ballistic missiles in International Security, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer 1987): 179-96, with articles by Thomas Schelling, Leon Sloss, and Randall Forsberg. (On June 16,1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed on major strategic weapons cuts, including the elimination of multiplewarheads land-based missiles. See the New York Times, 12 June 1992, P. Al, p.All - Note from editor) 21 Nolan, op.cit, p. 159.

Chapter 8 MISSILE PROLIFERATION:

DEMAND-SIDE POLICIES ARE NEEDED

Kathleen C. Bailey Supply-side policies will not prevent missile proliferation and, increasingly, they will not even slow it. This paper outlines the problems with supply-side policies and presents alternatives that might dampen demand for missiles worldwide.

Why Supply-side Policies Don't Work In 1984, Iraq and Egypt became partners in Argentina's Condor Missile program. This caused alarm among the Seven Economic Partners,1 which started discussions culminating in the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which prohibits the transfers of missiles or components of missiles capable of delivering a 500 kg payload over a 300 km range. This agreement was essentially a suppliers' cartel designed to prevent developing nations from accessing Western technology and/or materials for missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The MTCR was modelled on the backbone organization of supplyside nuclear non-proliferation policy: the London Club, or Nuclear Suppliers' Group. The London Club, formed in 1974, has been highly successful in limiting the flow of nuclear-related technology worldwide, for the reason that nuclear technology is very complex, costly, and, in a large part, not dual-use. Most countries with limited technological infrastructures and/or capital are unable to manufacture the components or build the facilities necessary for a nuclear weapons program. Because many items usable in such a weapons program are not multipurpose, it is probable that an importer intends them for nuclear use. Accordingly, it is relatively easy to require licensing for export and, therefore, it is possible to regulate which countries would be allowed to import nuclear technology. Additionally, the fact that nuclear facilities are large, distinctive, and emit identifiable effluents makes it unlikely that a nuclear program would go undetected. Thus, the supply-side policy has been fairly successful in helping prevent nuclear proliferation.

Kathleen C. Bailey is Director of Arms Control Studies, National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, VA., USA.

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By contrast, the supply-side MTCR has not been successful. The principal reason is that missile technology, unlike nuclear, is relatively inexpensive, technologically simpler, and involves dual-use equipment. In a nutshell, this means that nations unable to acquire missile technology from MTCR members can either get it from someone else, or can develop it themselves. The fact that the MTCR cannot be effective in halting proliferation can be demonstrated. Since the MTCR's inception in April 1987, the following nations have acquired ballistic missiles which otherwise would be restricted by the MTCR: 1. Saudi Arabia bought CSS-2 missiles from China; 2. Iraq upgraded Scud missiles to travel in excess of 500 km; 3. North Korea reverseengineered and upgraded Scuds; 4. India test-fired its Agni missile to a range exceeding 600 km; 5. Israel put a satellite2into orbit; 6. South Africa test-fired a ballistic missile, possibly with Israeli help; 7. Iran test-fired a Scud C, probably supplied by North Korea, to a distance of 500 km.3 In addition, China apparently is continuing its missile exports. The M-9, a ballistic missile with a range of more than 600 km, has reportedly been sold to Syria.4 Even the Condor program, which many credit the MTCR with having stopped, continues. In May 1991 and again in March 1992, Argentine Defence Minister Antonio Erman Gonzalez announced that "all installations and equipment" for the Condor-2 missile program will be moved from the Air Force to the National Commission on Space Investigation.5 This will allow the Condor, which could be used for weapons purposes eventually, to proceed under the "cover" of peaceful space exploration. Furthermore, Argentina continues work on the Alacram missile,6 which will be a milestone on the road to sophisticated longerrange ballistic missiles. Missile technology supply is likely to become even more widespread. A number of programs are underway about which little is publicly known. Countries that probably have advanced, secret programs include: Syria, Libya, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, and Iran. Furthermore, a number of developing countries may themselves become suppliers, much like China has. They will undertake "piecemeal proliferation" by selling missile components or know-how for financial or political profit. The missile proliferation problem is made even more bleak by the fact that countries are likely to focus increasingly on cruise missiles. This will occur for at least three reasons: the ease of using the Global Positioning System for guidance, the relative ease with which cruise missiles can evade air defences, and the relative simplicity of cruise missile technology. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a network of satellite

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markers that emit signals from which one's exact position on earth canbe calculated.7 The military system, encripted, is extremely accurate; the commercial signal gives accuracy to within 100 metres.8 Thousands of civilian users already depend on GPS for safe navigation, and commercial uses are growing daily. To turn off the system due to proliferation concerns would be extremely costly financially as well as in terms of lives now dependent on the system for safe transit. Yet, anyone can buy a GPS receiver for as little as $30009 and use it for destructive purposes. A GPS receiver placed in a ballistic missile would be useful; placed in a cruise missile, it would be a very effective guidance package.10 A nation might be motivated to use a nuclear, biological, or chemical warhead, instead of a conventional warhead, because it could be confident of accuracy to within only 100 metres. Most nations aspiring to acquire missiles have sought ballistic rather than cruise missiles thus far. This is for a variety of reasons, including: many countries first purchased short-range ballistic rather than cruise missiles, so they are more familiar with them; ballistic missile technology is also used in space programs, which gives a peaceful cover to dual-use technology as well as the possibility for satellite launches; ballistic missiles were emphasized by the industrialized countries, so many assumed that they were desirable; and, cruise missiles were thought to be only as effective as aircraft as they were much slower and more visible to air defences than ballistic missiles. Time and technological progress have enhanced the value placed on cruise missiles. The advent of GPS is one of the main factors favouring cruise missile development, but there are many others. More countries are able to manufacture jet aircraft; Brazil, for example, exports them. Air defences have proven to be penetrable, particularly when there is a single or small-scale attack involving one or a few aircraft. The landing of a Cessna by Mathias Rust in Moscow's Red Square in 1987 proved the difficulty of detecting and then responding to low-flying craft not ordinarily associated with offensive weaponry. The success of the Patriot air defence system against ballistic missiles will also be instructive to nationals contemplating indigenous missiles. The fact that cruise missiles are not as vulnerable to defences will not be lost on them. In summary, missile technology is not as easily controllable as nuclear technology. Developing countries have already proven that, despite export controls by many industrialized countries, they can acquire missiles either through purchase or indigenous research programs. The fact that many of these developing countries may themselves become missile suppliers greatly complicates the task of control. The picture of proliferation is made increasingly bleak by the likely shift of nations to cruise missiles, which canbe cheaper, technologically easier to master, and harder to defend against.

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Demand-side Policies Can Be Effective The best way to stop missile proliferation is to dampen demand. To do this requires removing the motivations to obtain such delivery systems. Some nations may be motivated to acquire missiles for expansionist aims or desire for prestige. In most cases, however, the motivation to get missiles is directly related to security concerns, such as fear of adversaries. Missiles are therefore perceived as a means by which to deter or respond to threats.

Ease Tensions The most obvious way to eliminate the sense of threat that drives many nations to desire missiles is to reduce the threat itself. In most cases, this is exceedingly difficult, as the Middle East amply demonstrates. Threats often are deeply rooted in mistrust and long-term problems between peoples. Even in cases where governments reach peace, as in the case of Egypt and Israel, antipathies can continue to drive both nations to be prepared for conflict with one another. A change in the leadership of Egypt, for example, could put the two nations on war footing once again.

Increase Security Because conflicts may take generations to resolve, it is usually easier to diminish a nation's sense of threat by increasing its security vis-a-vis the threat, hopefully in a manner that will not require more and better missiles. Two basic means of increasing security are: security agreements and enhanced national military capabilities. To be credible, security agreements must be formal arrangements that define the conditions under which one country will come to the assistance of another. For example, the US has an agreement with South Korea for its defence against North Korea. Initially, this agreement took account of the fact that North Korea might have allied with either China or the former Soviet Union, both of which have nuclear weapons, to overrun South Korea. Therefore, the US pledged that it would defend South Korea with nuclear weapons if necessary. This has been crucial to obtaining a commitment from South Korea to refrain from its own nuclear weapons development. A similar sort of arrangement could be worked out with some countries in which security could be extended from the US, or some other appropriate nation or nations, in return for restraint on missile acquisition. Building defensive capabilities through arms sales and assistance can also be used to increase the sense of security among nations. The US has provided military equipment to some nations with the effect of enhancing their sense of security. Such arms transfers have also been central to keeping nations from developing indigenous military production capabilities or from buying ever-more sophisticated technology

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from others. Making sure that countries have their security needs satisfied without providing them with technologies that will stimulate a regional arms race requires careful analysis and judgement. The US has a policy of careful balancing in deciding whether to make such sales or extend assistance. If the US Executive branch decides, for example, that supplying a more sophisticated version of an aircraft to a particular country would create an arms race in the region, it will not approve the sale. Each proposed arms sale, if it involves large quantities of armaments or items of technological sophistication, is reviewed for its potential impact.11 However, the US can no longer afford to make such decisions unilaterally and expect them to take effect. There are simply too many weapons suppliers. The number of missiles and missile technology marketeers is likely to continue growing. To take account of this, the US must interact with other weapons suppliers to reach common understanding on the weapons requirements needs for countries and regions in order to maintain stability without stimulating arms races. This is akin to the proposals for international restraint on arms sales to the Middle East, discussed following the Desert Storm operation. Care must be taken that such discussions do not result in a total embargo of arms sales, because that would likely result in spurring growth of regional arms industries.

Arms Control Arms-control agreements to cap or reduce weaponry can result not only in lessening the demand for certain arms, but also in lowered levels of tension. Both the capacity and impetus for conflict can be reduced. However, for arms-control agreements to dampen effectively demand for weaponry, they must be effectively verifiable. If one party thinks that the other can and may cheat, it too will be motivated to consider breaking the agreement. Thus, a central thesis of this discussion is that armscontrol among friends need not be rigorously verifiable; among adversaries, verification is critical.

International INF Treaty: A Proposal The most appropriate arms-control measure to address the problem of missile proliferation is an international accord based on the US-USSR Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987. The INF Treaty banned from US and Soviet arsenals all ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 km. The idea is that a new treaty based on the bilateral treaty would be opened for all nations to sign. It would not replace the US-Soviet treaty, which would remain intact due to many of its specialized provisions relating only to the two parties.

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There are at least five reasons why an international INF Treaty is an appropriate policy to pursue. First, it addresses the problem. An INF Treaty would cover many of the most sought-after types of missiles. Second, an international INF treaty, like the bilateral one, would be effectively verifiable.12 For one thing, the testing of missiles with ranges in excess of 500 km would be visible to national technical means of observation. Additionally, the means to verify destruction of declared missiles have been tested and proven, as a result of the bilateral INF. Third, nations will be likely to join such a treaty. This assumption is based on two reasons. Firstly, less-developed countries have argued strenuously against arms-control treaties that prohibit the "have nots" from getting arms while allowing the "haves" to keep them. This has been the primary objection by India and others to signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, for example. In the case of an international INF treaty, the situation would be reversed: the superpowers would be the "have nots" asking others, the "haves," to join them in an arms-control measure. Secondly, countries worldwide are feeling threatened by ballistic missiles, most of which are of INF range. In the past, the perception of threat was not so widespread. Now, many nations realize that it would be in their national security interests to see INF-range missiles banned. The fourth reason why an international INF would be useful is that it is a treaty whose provisions are already negotiated. Usually, armscontrol agreements, particularly multilateral ones, take years to craft. The Chemical Weapons Convention, for example, has been under negotiation in Geneva for over a decade. Nations probably would not be interested in committing themselves to more than the US and USSR have already undertaken, and most would probably agree that the bilateral INF accord provides a useful model. Adjusting the bilateral INF agreement for international use (for example, removing those items relevant only to the US and USSR, and establishing a body to oversee verification) would be a very small task compared with starting to draft a missile treaty from scratch. An additional bonus is that lessons learned from the implementation of the bilateral INF accord can be applied. A fifth advantage of internationalizing INF is to assure compliance by all successor states to the Soviet Union. Obtaining adherence by all of the newly independent republics is particularly important because, thus far, there has been only a statement that the republics intend to respect all bilateral arms-control accords between the United States and former Soviet Union. There are several benefits that would result from an international INF treaty: 1. An entire class of weapons would be eliminated, reducing the missile threat significantly. For example, the growing threat to Europe from Middle Eastern missiles would be dissipated.

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2. Nations working on developing intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would have their research programs curtailed. It is very difficult to develop ICBMs without testing intermediate-range missiles. 3. Research and development of ground-launched cruise missiles would be halted even before it begins in most nations. 4. Because the treaty would be effectively verifiable, it would build confidence and reduce suspicions and tensions among nations. 5. The international INF treaty could be the basis on which further arms-control, perhaps including regional arrangements, could be negotiated.

Arguments against an International INF One argument against an international INF is that Moscow might use the international INF treaty as a means to accomplish aims the US rejected during the bilateral INF talks. To assure that Moscow does not play politics with the international treaty, the US should consult with the Kremlin to make sure that the bilateral treaty will remain intact and that neither country will use the multilateral process to try to pursue additional agenda items. Russia will likely be willing to agree because it is directly threatened by missile proliferation. Additionally, it might be motivated to participate in hopes of placing arms-control constraints on surrounding republics, France, China, the UK, and former Warsaw Pact states. A second argument against an international INF is that missiles below 500 km and above 5500 km in range would not be covered. This is important in the Middle East, for example, where short-range missiles can be strategic, since it is easy to reach cities on the territory of one's adversary with a missile of less than 500 km range. So, why not ban shortrange missiles as well? The answer is that such a ban would not be verifiable. In a region where suspicions are deep and tensions high, it is imperative that arms-control be effectively verifiable. Then, what is the point with an INF agreement? The answer is that it would eliminate the Jericho II (Israel), upgraded Scuds (Iraq, Syria, perhaps Egypt, and Iran), and the CSS-2 (Saudi Arabia). Such a treaty would put a cap on the rapidly progressing indigenous development programs. Furthermore, it would provide a basis from which further arms-control and confidencebuilding measures could be undertaken, most of which would probably take much longer to negotiate than would an INF agreement. Why not ban missiles with ranges of greater than 5500 km? There are two primary reasons: for the moment the US and Russia are not willing to do so; and, such an extended treaty would take much longer to negotiate and might never come to fruition. Even if ICBMs continue to be allowed, the idea of an international INF would be useful in limiting

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research on ICBMs. Testing at intermediate ranges would not be allowed and this restriction would be verifiable. A third argument against an international INF is that it might somehow undermine the MTCR. Some suggest that any missile ban contemplated begin at the 300 km range so as to "agree with" the MTCR. However, there are some very good reasons why a potential international missile ban should not be tied to the MTCR: 1. There are too many missile systems easily acquired or indigenously developed at the 300 km level. This, together with the fact that developing and testing shorter-range missiles is unlikely to be observable, makes a ban of missiles in the 300-500 km range unverifiable. 2. The MTCR has not worked very well and is very unpopular. Less developed nations are unlikely to join any missile ban linked with it. 3. An agreement with terms more stringent than those imposed on the US and Russia by the bilateral INF will lose the appealing argument that the "haves" should join the "have nots." 4. Rather than a " simple" negotiation of an international regime based on the US-USSR bilateral INF, a more lengthy, complicated multilateral set of talks would be required.

Other Demand-side Policies Some nations may be unwilling to join an international INF either because they feel threatened by adversaries not parties to the treaty, or because they wish to test intermediate-range ballistic missiles as part of a peaceful space program. To address these scenarios, two additional ideas for dampening the demand for missiles and missile technology might be considered. They are: provision of defensive capabilities and satellite launch services. Protection against missile attacks is possible, as was proven by the Patriot air defence system during Desert Storm. Efforts are underway to improve such defensive capabilities. The US has a program with Israel, the Arrow Program. There is also President Bush's program of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), a program to build a network of sensors and interceptors to protect against a limited number of incoming missiles.13 The technologies involved in these efforts could be used to protect nations that agree to give up their offensive systems by joining the international INF treaty. Some nations will want to continue to pursue ballistic missile technology primarily because they have legitimate desires for peaceful space programs. Aside from the terrific financial burden such programs place on developing nations' economies, there are other risks. The technologies may later be redirected into offensive military missiles; the "peaceful"

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ballistic missile technology could be marketed to " non-peaceful" consumers in order to pay for the space program; and distrustful neighbours could misinterpret the missile program and thus begin a regional race for arms. Providing satellite and launch services reliably and at reasonable cost would reduce the motivations for developing countries to establish their own expensive, risky space programs. Although some nations may hesitate to give up the prestige and independence of having their own national space-launch programs, they will probably be willing to do so once they conduct a cost-benefit analysis. The US and other spacecapable nations could work together to assure that developing country needs are met, thus further dampening the demand for ballistic missile technology.

Conclusion Supply-side non-proliferation policies cannot work when the technology concerned is easy and inexpensive enough to be provided by alternative suppliers. Supply-side restrictions may even worsen the problem of proliferation by stimulating indigenous programs and the creation of new suppliers. Alternatively, demand-side policies are possible and workable, particularly in the form of arms-control. One of the most promising arms-control proposals is to extend the provisions of the INF treaty to other nations. This would be a relatively easy, quick, inexpensive means not only to cap missile proliferation, but to begin to reduce the arsenals of missiles worldwide. This proposal has particular appeal because it would avoid the problems of past proposals, and supply-side policies such as the MTCR, which pit "have" nations against the "have nots." The US and Russia would ask others to join them in arms-control steps these two nations have already undertaken. And, most importantly, the treaty would be effectively verifiable.

NOTES 1 2 3 4

Canada, France, Germany (then West Germany), Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. The technology for a satellite launch vehicle is essentially the same as that for a ballistic missile. Bill Gertz, "US: Iran fired ballistic missile," Washington Times, 24 May 1991, p D. James Adams, "Chinese ignore mid-East arms plea," The Sunday Times (London) 2 June 1991, p. 14.

136 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12

13

BALLISTIC MISSILES Noticias Argentinas (Buenos Aires), 13 May 1991, quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Latin America, 14 May 1991. Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 February 1990. All twenty-four GPS satellite markers are expected to be in orbit by 1992. This range can be reduced by the reception of signals from ground-based emitters, in what is called "differential GPS." Holly Porteous, "GPS: Waiting for a clear signal," Jane's, 16 November 1991, pp. 949-950. Stan Simon, "New Satellite Navigation System is Called Far Superior to LORAN," Boston Globe, 31 December 1990, p. 35. To reach its target accurately, a ballistic missile must "know" exactly its height from earth, position in space, and angle. Otherwise, when its power is shut off and gravity takes over, it will not be able to hit its target. GPS helps only with knowing the position in space relative to earth. It does not help with height or angle. Thus, guidance technology for ballistic missiles is more complicated than just a GPS system. On the other hand, GPS is highly useful for a cruise missile, which does not require calculating as many variables to reach a target. These reviews are undertaken by an interagency process involving, at a minimum, the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Department of Defense. Existing mobile INF-range missiles would still present a verification problem. Just as the Iraqi Scud missiles were exceedingly difficult, sometimes impossible to find during the Desert Storm war, mobile missiles already in inventory could be hard to locate. For an in-depth discussion of GPALS, see Keith B. Payne, Missile Defense in the 21st Century: Protection Against Limited Threats (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

Part IV: CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

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Chapter 9 TRENDS IN THE PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER

OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Michael T. Klare At the height of Operation Desert Storm, when US officials first spoke of their goals for the post-Gulf conflict era, the control of conventional arms transfers was identified as a paramount objective. "The time has come/' Secretary of State James Baker told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 6,1991, "to try to change the destructive pattern of military competition and proliferation in [the Middle East] and to reduce the arms flow into an area that is already over-militarized/'1 Similar comments were made by President Bush and by leaders of the other nations in the anti-Iraq coalition, giving the impression that the world community was prepared, for the first time since the League of Nations period, to consider the imposition of significant constraints on conventional arms exports. This commitment to the adoption of new restraints on arms transfers has been offset, however, by the emergence of an ominous counter-trend, entailing efforts by the major arms suppliers to satisfy a growing demand for high-tech weapons in many areas of the Third World. Evidence for this counter-trend can be found in the behaviour of all major military suppliers. Thus, despite statements by Baker and Bush on the need for conventional arms transfer restraint, the United States concluded billions of dollars' worth of new arms-sales agreements with Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the months following the Persian Gulf conflict. The Soviet Union, for its part, concluded a $2 billion arms deal with Syria, while France sold air-defence missiles to Saudi Arabia, and China reportedly sold missiles and other weapons to Syria and Pakistan. The coexistence of these two trends, a commitment to restraint on one hand and an inclination to satisfy favoured clients on the other, makes it very difficult to predict the future course of the arms trade. Annual sales dipped in the late 1980s, reflecting international economic hardship and a scarcity of credit, but began to climb again in the second

Michael T. Klare teaches at Hampshire College in Amherst, MA.

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half of 1990 as nations throughout the Middle East reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Heavy spending by the Saudis and the other Gulf powers are likely to push global arms sales to elevated levels in 1991-92, but it is unclear whether this upward momentum can be sustained in the following years. Adding to this uncertainty over the future of the arms trade is the existence of several other conflicting trends. The stunning success of high-tech conventional weapons in the Persian Gulf conflict has created an enormous appetite for such arms among those Third World nations that seek to join the upper ranks of military powers, but many of these countries are saddled with debt and/or are preoccupied with internal disorders. The end of the Cold War, moreover, has diminished superpower enthusiasm for the perpetuation of costly proxy wars; however, the desire of some aspiring Third World powers to fill the shoes once occupied by the superpowers has generated an increased demand for weapons in some areas.

The Political Economy of Arms Sales Attempting to predict future trends in the production and transfer of conventional arms is a difficult task at the best of times, but it is especially so today in light of all the profound changes that have occurred in the international system in recent years. Clearly, the end of the Cold War and the eruption of conflict in the Persian Gulf have had a significant impact on global military developments: an impact whose ultimate consequences cannot be fully calculated at this time. Indeed, we see a number of contradictory trends occurring simultaneously, making any judgments on the future of the arms trade highly problematical. Nevertheless, by extrapolating from past trends and considering the existing data on current trends it is possible to derive some preliminary observations on the future course of the arms trade. To facilitate this effort, it is useful to identify the key factors that have governed the direction and tempo of the international arms flow. Three factors, in particular, strike me as critical: (1) political-military considerations; (2) technological considerations; and (3) economic considerations. Let us review these three factors briefly, after first noting that each must be considered from the perspective of both supplier and recipient, and that proper attention must be paid to regional differences. Political-military factors: These are the geopolitical and security considerations that lead the major supplying nations to give or sell arms and military technology to their clients and allies abroad, and also to the internal and external pressures and concerns that lead recipients to seek arms from their patrons and allies. Also critical, of course, is the current status of regional conflicts and power struggles.

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Technological factors: Here, we are speaking of the disparity in effectiveness and lethality of the arms possessed by the major world powers and those owned by the second, third, and fourth ranks of powers. History suggests that the wider this disparity, the greater will be the desire of the weaker nations to duplicate the weapons holdings of the major powers. Economic factors: The primary economic factor is the relative importance of export sales in the economic calculations of the supplying nations, and the relative ability of recipients to finance the acquisition of arms and military systems of varying degrees of cost. Through their changing character and complex interactions, these three factors determine the degree of desire both to sell and to acquire conventional weapons. One can, in fact, design a matrix of these factors (and their subdivisions for suppliers and recipients), with positive and negative signs assigned to developments in each category depending on whether they act to promote or inhibit arms transfers at any given time. When certain "positive" conditions prevail in each area, we are likely to experience an upsurge in arms transfers. This happens when suppliers are motivated by strong security concerns to arm their allies, when recipients feel acutely threatened by rivals, when the gap in military technology between stronger and weaker states is particularly great, when suppliers have excess productive capacity, and when buyers have surplus funds. When these conditions are reversed, we are likely to see a contraction in transfers. And, of course, a combination of "positive" and "negative" conditions will normally produce a stable arms flow, without sharp ups or downs. The impact of these varying conditions and their periodic reorientation can be seen in the evolution of the arms trade over the past twenty years. A generally "positive" set of conditions prevailed in the 1973-1984 period, when: (1) the United States was driven by the Nixon doctrine and later by the military policies of the Reagan administration to bolster the defences of its allies abroad; (2) the USSR was motivated by the Brezhnev policies to expand its presence in the Third World; (3) many Third World nations felt threatened by regional rivals and/or by insurgent groups backed by one of the superpowers; (4) most Third World nations lacked modern tanks, planes, and missiles of the types found in the arsenals of the major powers; (5) the end of the Vietnam War produced excess productive capacity in the US; (6) the Soviet military buildup of the postKhrushchev period resulted in excess productive capacity in the USSR; and (7) the OPEC oil price rise of 1974 provided the oil-exporting nations and their allies with a substantial cash surplus with which to purchase arms. The effects of this extraordinary convergence of "positive" conditions can be seen in the published data on conventional arms transfers.

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According to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the combined annual value of arms imports by all nations rose from $22.1 billion in 1974 to $38.5 billion in 1983, and by the developing nations from $16.0 billion to $32.1 billion (in constant 1982 dollars).2 A similar picture is provided by the SIPRI figures on the total value of all major weapons systems transferred to the Third World, which rose from $3.6 billion in 1973 to $9.6 billion in 1983 (in constant 1975 dollars).3 The annual SIPRI data on arms transfers also reveals at this time a significant increase in the number of Third World nations obtaining such advanced systems as supersonic combat aircraft, heavy battle tanks, and guided missiles. When applied to particular regions, the matrix of arms-trade factors for the 1973-1984 period reveals a particularly favourable set of conditions with respect to transfers to the Middle East. These include: (1) the outbreak of major regional conflicts in 1973,1980, and 1982; (2) growing US concern over the security of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf area; (3) growing Soviet military involvement in key states of the region; (4) the intensification of regional rivalries involving Israel, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the two Yemens; and (5) a dramatic increase in the spending power of the oil-producing countries. This set of conditions led to a sharp increase in arms sales to the region, as reflected in the statistical data. Thus, according to the ACDA, the total value of Middle Eastern arms imports rose from $3.7 billion in 1973 to $15.7 billion in 1982 (in current dollars). As a result, the Middle East became the world's principal outlet for arms transfers, with its share of world military imports rising from 27 percent in 1973 to 42 percent in 1983.4 In the mid-1980s, the conditions that had favoured arms transfers in the 1970s and early 1980s began to be supplanted by less favourable conditions. These included: (1) an easing in the Cold War antagonisms that had characterized US policy during the early Reagan era; (2) a decline, under Gorbachev, in Soviet assistance to its allies and clients in the Third World; (3) the termination or winding down of several superpower-fueled conflicts in the Third World; (4) significant problems of absorption in many Third World countries that ordered large numbers of new high-tech weapons in the 1973-84 period; (5) little surplus capacity in the US arms industry as companies worked to fulfill the many Pentagon orders placed in the early Reagan period; (6) the onset of economic restructuring (perestroika) in the USSR, with increasingly deleterious effects on Soviet productive capabilities; (7) severe economic hardship in many debt-burdened Third World countries; (8) a sharp decline in the national income of many oil-producing countries due to a drop in oil prices; and (9) an exponential increase in the cost of sophisticated weaponry. Again, we see in the statistical data the combined impact of these negative factors. Thus, according to the ACDA, total world arms imports

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declined from an average of $58.2 billion per year in the peak years of 1982-84 to an average of $51.1 billion in 1985-88; similarly, imports by Third World countries dropped from an average of $47.1 billion in 198284 to $39.9 billion in 1985-88 (in constant 1988 dollars).5 Likewise, the SIPRI figures on the transfer of major military systems to Third World countries drop from an average of $23.7 billion in 1981-84 to $21.2 billion in 1985-89 (in constant 1985 dollars).6 At the same time, data on the transfer of particular weapons types compiled by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress reveals a sharp decline in the acquisition of tanks, supersonic combat planes, major surface ships, and other major combat systems in the 1985-88 period as against the 1981-84 period.7 The data on regional trends also demonstrates the impact of altered circumstances. By and large, most Middle Eastern countries exhibit a decline in arms imports during this period, reflecting the drop in oil prices, a decline in military assistance from the USSR, growing economic hardship in many countries (particularly Egypt, Israel, and Iran), and the struggle to absorb high-tech weapons acquired in the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to the ACDA, Middle East arms imports dropped from an average of $23.3 billion in 1981-84 to $17.4 billion in 1985-88.8 At the same time, growing tension between India and Pakistan coupled with internal conflicts in neighbouring countries, Afghanistan, Burma, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, resulted in a substantial increase in arms transfers to South Asia. Furthermore, growing wealth in the Pacific Rim countries, particularly South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, leads to increased arms transfers to this region. Thus, using ACDA figures, we find that arms transfers to South Asia rise from an average of $2.9 billion in 1981-84 to $5.1 billion in 1985-88, while transfers to East Asia rose from an average of $5.7 billion in 1981-84 to $6.8 billion in 1985-88 (all figures in constant 1988 dollars).9 The constellation of factors that developed in 1985-90 had other important effects on the character of the arms flow. Thus the rising cost of major combat systems, particularly tanks and combat aircraft, led many countries to eschew the acquisition of new combat platforms and to choose instead to obtain "upgrade kits" - new and improved guns, radars, fire-control systems, and so on - in order to enhance the combat effectiveness of systems already in their inventory. And while the gap in sophistication between the weapons owned by the major powers and those possessed by the lesser powers narrows somewhat during this period, due largely to major arms purchases in the 1973-84 period, many Third World countries sought at this time to narrow the much wider gap in productive capabilities between North and South, leading to an increased emphasis on the import of arms-making technologies.10

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Likely Trends in the Early 1990s While the evidence is still sketchy, it appears that we have now entered another transitional period, such as those of 1972-74 and 1984-85. As suggested earlier, it is not possible at this time to perceive the final outcome of all of the shifts now taking place. But in at least some key areas, we see evidence of important changes wrought by the end of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf crisis, and other international developments. Let us now consider these changes.

Political-Military factors As in the past, the relative availability of arms will be determined by the policies of the major suppliers, particularly the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and China. With the end of the Cold War, the United States faces a diminished security threat from the East, and thus has begun to scale back its military presence in Europe and other border areas of the former USSR. At the same time, however, US leaders perceive a growing threat in the South, whether comprised of emerging regional powers like Syria and Iraq, or insurgent forces like the Shining Path guerrillas of Peru. To combat these threats, the Reagan and Bush administrations have called for the direct use of American military power when needed to deal with particular contingencies, along with stepped-up transfers of military skills and equipment to threatened regimes. This post-Cold War strategic posture has been spelled out in a number of Pentagon documents and presidential statements, and was reflected in the rhetoric surrounding US intervention in the Persian Gulf conflict. Thus, in his first major address on security affairs after assuming the presidency, George Bush indicated that "the security challenges we face today do not come from the East alone." Throughout the Third World," a growing number of nations are acquiring advanced and highly destructive capabilities." Moreover, "it is an unfortunate fact that the world faces increasing threat from armed insurgencies, terrorists, and...narcotics traffickers." In response, he argued, "we must check the aggressive ambitions of renegade regimes, and we must enhance the ability of our friends to defend themselves."11 Similar comments have been made by Secretary Cheney and other senior administration officials, comprising what amounts to a broad strategic perspective on the post-Cold War era.12 This perspective was succinctly expressed in Cheney's testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 19,1991: The Gulf war presaged very much the type of conflict we are most likely to confront again in this new era - major regional contingencies against foes well-armed with advanced conventional and unconventional

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weaponry. In addition to Southwest Asia, we have important interests in Europe, Asia, the Pacific and Central and Latin America. In each of these regions there are opportunities and potential future threats to our interests. We must configure our policies and our forces to effectively deter, or quickly defeat, such future regional threats.13

If this posture prevails in the years ahead, and there is every sign that it will, it appears inescapable that the United States will continue to provide arms and military technology to key allies in areas of tension and conflict. In some areas, as in Latin America, this aid may be limited to helicopters and counter-insurgency gear, but in the Middle East and elsewhere, it is likely to entail transfers of major military systems. This inclination to supply arms is fully evident in the statements by President Bush and Defense Secretary Cheney regarding the prospects for conventional arms control in the Middle East. Thus, while calling for reduced arms proliferation to the Middle East, Bush told a White House press conference on March 1,1991, that "I don't think there will be any arms embargo because we are not going to let any friend come into a role where its security is threatened."14 Similarly, on March 19,1991, Secretary Cheney told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that while he might consider some restraints on conventional arms transfers, "I think our first concern ought to be to work with our friends and allies to see to it that they're secure."15 This stance has not, in my view, been altered in the slightest by the announcement of the President's Middle East Arms Control Initiative on May 29,1991. In announcing the Initiative, Bush indicated that his goal is: "Halting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in the Middle East while supporting the legitimate need of every state to defend itself.../'16 (emphasis added). Similarly, on June 4,1991, Secretary Cheney declared that achieving a conventional arms control agreement for the Middle East will be a "long, complicated process" and that, in the meantime, the United States will continue to arm its friend and allies in the region. "We simply can't fall into the trap of [saying] that arms control means we don't provide any arms to the Middle East," he noted. "That is not what we recommend...[and] it would be an unwise policy."17 As if to underscore this point, Cheney approved the transfer of ten additional F-15 fighters to Israel and the sale of twenty AH-64 "Apache" helicopters to the United Arab Emirates just a few days after the announcement of the Middle East Initiative. In sum, it appears that the Administration's inclination to export arms outweighs its commitment to restraint. This does not necessarily mean that the level of US transfers will automatically rise in future years, other factors, including economic constraints and/or future arms-control accords, could act to reduce US military exports but the will is there to increase the flow of arms.

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What about the other major suppliers? And what about the demand side of the equation? With respect to Russia, we see a complex and somewhat cloudy picture. While the Soviet Union clearly reduced its military presence in the Third World and cut back on aid to long-standing allies like Cuba and Vietnam during the Gorbachev era, it is unclear if Russia will entertain ambitions to assume a global power role and retain close military ties with emerging regional powers like India, Iran, and Syria. Russian maneuverability is constrained, however, by its economic plight and its desire to improve relations with the major Western powers. This means that Moscow can no longer provide arms at no cost to close allies, or to sell them at reduced rates to long-term customers; it also means that Russian leaders will heed the requests of Western leaders to reduce or terminate this aid to "pariah" countries like Iraq and North Korea. As in the past, Russian leaders will continue to make arms transfer decisions on the basis of traditional security considerations. That is, they will seek to use arms transfers as an instrument of influence in establishing and maintaining political and military ties with friendly Third World countries. But the level of these transfers is not likely to reach that of the Brezhnev period, when money was of no concern in the Soviet drive for influence abroad. Increasingly, Russian sales decisions will be made on the basis of commercial rather than security considerations, and so we will have to reconsider Moscow's position when discussing economic factors below. For Britain and France, economic rather than security considerations tend to prevail when decisionss on arms sales are made. However, London and Paris continue to view military exports in security terms insofar as they help to preserve national defence industries at a time of declining domestic and European demand. For centuries, these countries, and many of the other nations of Europe, have regarded the preservation of these industries as a vital component of military preparedness and self-sufficiency - that is to say, of national sovereignty - yet they cannot afford to keep them in operation without substantial foreign orders. And because the other NATO countries are also cutting back on their defence spending, their only viable options in many cases are to secure significant Third World orders for their products or to become component producers for pan-European or trans-Atlantic enterprises, which erases any sense of self-sufficiency in defence production. Thus, while recognizing that it may prove necessary to join in some multinational arms enterprises, Britain and France will continue to pursue Third World sales as a way of keeping at least some of their domestic arms factories in full operation. For China, the motives are somewhat harder to determine. As with the French and British, the Chinese seek to obtain foreign orders to assure

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the economic viability of national defence industries, which, as in Europe, are seen as vital national security assets. But the Chinese also seem to be motivated by traditional geopolitical considerations, to establish political and military ties with friendly Third World states on their borders and in Africa and the Middle East. In this sense, Chinese arms export behaviour has more in common with that of the superpowers than with that of the European suppliers. For all of these countries, as with the United States, economic constraints and future arms control agreements may place a limit on future sales. In general, however, these countries all perceive important security motives for continuing the flow of arms to key allies and clients abroad. Turning to the demand side of the equation, we see a different picture depending on which region we are looking at. In several areas, reduced levels of tension could result in a noticeable decline in arms imports. Thus, in Southern Africa, the moderating policies of the de Klerk administration and the ceasefire in Angola have reduced regional tensions and softened the demand for imported arms. In Latin America, we see the persistence of guerrilla conflict in several areas, particularly in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru, but no significant interstate conflicts that might generate a significant demand for major weapons systems. In North Africa and the Horn, strife continues in several countries but the recent or imminent cessation of conflict in Chad, Ethiopia, and the Western Sahara is likely to result in diminished levels of arms imports. In other areas, however, we are likely to witness increased levels of imports, assuming that financial considerations do not intervene substantially. In the Middle East, Operation Desert Storm has eliminated one major threat to regional stability, Iraq, but tensions between Israel and its neighbours persist, and there are fears that other candidates for regional dominance such as Iran or Syria, will perhaps emerge in the years ahead. The Kurdish uprising also demonstrates the great potential for civil conflict in many of these countries. Hence, many of the nations of the area, including Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Syria, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, appear to seek additional supplies of modern arms. A new arms control agreement or changing economic conditions could alter this picture, but the desire for arms appears to be there. Likewise, we see a growing demand for imported arms in South Asia and the Pacific Rim, the two areas that posted the largest gains in the 1985-90 period. If anything, internal and inter-state tensions in South Asia have increased over the past few years, and the lack of progress on arms control leads one to fear that India and Pakistan will continue to seek imported weapons for their growing arsenals. Moreover, they are likely to import military technology for domestic production schemes. In East Asia and the Pacific Rim, we see continuing efforts by the emerging

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industrial powers, especially Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand, to enhance their military capabilities, both through direct arms imports and the expansion of domestic arms production facilities. Again, changing circumstances could alter the picture in either or both of these areas, but otherwise the flow of arms and military technology is likely to continue.

Technological Factors The arms flow from North to South contracted in the 1985-90 period in part because many Third World countries had obtained a wide array of modern tanks, planes, ships, and missiles in the late 1970s and early 1980s, thus narrowingthegapintechnologicalproficiencyof their arsenals as compared with those of the major industrial powers. As a result of the Persian Gulf war, however, many Third World nations are likely to conclude that the technology gap has widened again, due to the dramatic success of America's "smart" missiles and other high-tech weapons. Although many strategists contend that the military effectiveness of these weapons has been exaggerated, there is no doubt that they contributed to the rapid and one-sided allied victory in the Gulf; they will therefore be seen as vital components of any first-rate military force in the years ahead. At this point, there are only preliminary indications of the Gulf War's impact on the military production and import policies of various nations, but all the signs point to a heavy emphasis on acquisition or development of high-tech conventional weapons and related intelligence and electronic-warfare systems. Israel, for instance, is giving high priority to the Arrow anti-ballistic missile program, which will be heavily subsidized by the United States. (On May 30,1991, Secretary Cheney announced that the United States will pump another $210 million into development of the Arrow.18) Similarly, Saudi Arabia is expected to order large numbers of advanced weapons in its next round of arms purchases from the United States. Although these new orders are not expected to reach the $15-$20 billion level once considered likely, Riyadh is expected to order additional Patriot missiles, F-15 fighters, M-l A2 tanks, Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems, E-3A AWACS aircraft, and other high-tech systems.19 Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE are also expected to request weapons of these types in negotiations now underway with US officials. Syria, another member of the anti-Iraq coalition, also seeks new hightech weapons in the wake of the Gulf War. According to one report, Syria has placed a $2 billion order with Moscow for 48 MiG-29 fighters, 24 Sukhoi Su-24 fighter-bombers, 300 T-72 tanks, and an upgraded airdefence system composed of SAM-lls, SAM-13s, and SAM-16s, plus early-warning radars and command-and-control systems.20 Syria is also reported to have been negotiating for the purchase of Scud-C missiles from North Korea and for M-9 missiles from China.21

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In many other countries, military and government officials have commented on the effectiveness of US weapons during Desert Storm, and have called for acquisition of similar systems. "The challenge of technology is a permanent phenomenon," Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff observed on March 16. "The military aspect of the Gulf war has made the fact clear that to undermine the science, technology, research, and modern advances in defence is disastrous." To prevent a defeat like that suffered by Iraq, he noted, Pakistan must become "an impregnable fortress" to aggression.22 Similar, if more guarded, comments have been made by Chinese officials, who on March 26, 1991, announced a 12 percent increase in defence spending, with much of the increase going to procurement of modern weapons and equipment.23 Although fragmentary, these reports all suggest that the demand for high-technology weapons will increase in the years ahead, as military leaders ponder the lessons of the Gulf conflict and seek to overcome any vulnerabilities they see developing in the capabilities of their forces.

Economic and Pricing Considerations At this point, it is very difficult to perceive any clear directions in the economic area, as there are signs of both positive and negative factors as regards the tempo of arms transfers. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider these various trends and to try to weigh their respective vigour. First, from the supply side, we see evidence of growing economic pressures in many countries for increased sales to the Third World. Ironically, many of these pressures derive from the end of the Cold War and accompanying advances in the arms control area, notably the CFE agreement for mutual force reductions in Europe. With large quantities of surplus arms and reduced levels of military spending throughout Europe, many defence firms in these countries face severe economic difficulty unless they can increase their exports to the Third World. This is particularly true for firms in Western Europe, which have always depended on foreign sales to ensure economic rates of production, but is also true for the United States and Russia. In the United States, the pressures to increase foreign sales are coming primarily from defence firms that face the likely phase-out of Pentagon orders for their products. "The long-term survival of a number of important domestic arms programs is tied to foreign sales," Ken Saterfield of the Pentagon's Defense Security Assistance Agency noted in March 1991.M At stake are such items as the McDonnell-Douglas F-15 fighter, the General Dynamics F-16 fighter and M-1A1 tank, the FMC Corporation's M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle, and the Boeing E-3 A AW ACS radar surveillance plane, all of which are scheduled to reach the end of their production runs in the next few years. Arguing that a "warm production base" is vital to national security, officials of these firms are

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putting immense pressure on Washington to approve substantial foreign orders for these items in order to keep their production lines open.25 While insisting that he remains committed to the adoption of new multilateral controls on conventional arms transfers, President Bush has taken a number of steps to satisfy the concerns of US military industries. On March 1,1991, he announced the sale of 46 F-16s to Egypt, thus giving added life to the F-16 production line. Bush has also expressed general support for further sales of the F-15, M-l, MLRS, and E-3A to Saudi Arabia. Most suggestive, however, was the President's decision on March 17,1991, to request congressional authority to provide up to $1 billion in Export-Import Bank credits for overseas purchases of US arms; if approved, this would represent the first use of Eximbank funds for this purpose since 1974.26 For Russian leaders, the economic pressures arise from somewhat different circumstances. Although President Yeltsin has spoken of his desire to promote the conversion of military plants to civilian purposes, Moscow desperately needs hard currencies in order to avert further economic decline. Because arms are one of the few products for which Moscow can find overseas markets, former President Gorbachev vigorously pursued new orders for Soviet weapons in both new and traditional markets abroad in 1990 and 1991. According to one report, Soviet officials offered MiG-29 and MiG-31 fighters at attractive rates to leaders of South Korea, China, and the Philippines.27 In May 1991, it was disclosed that China will buy 24 Sukhoi Su-27 fighters for an estimated $600 million - the first major Soviet military sale to China in twenty years.28 As noted earlier, the Soviets also agreed to a $2 billion sale of aircraft, tanks, and missiles to the government of Syria. A somewhat similar dilemma has forced the reform-minded government of Czechoslovakia to renege on promises to cease its foreign military sales. In January 1990, in a review of Prague's new, postCommunist foreign policy, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier declared that "Czechoslovakia will simply end its trade in arms."29 Czechoslovakia's President, Vaclav Havel, made similar promises during his 1990 visit to the United States. But having failed in efforts to obtain foreign assistance for the conversion of Czech arms plants to non-military production, and facing high levels of unemployment in troubled Slovakia, the Czech government is now committed to the sale of tanks and other weapons to Syria and Iran.30 "We would prefer that our factories for tanks be closed down and we could rely on your investments," Czech Prime Minister Marian Calfa affirmed on a visit to Israel in May, 1991. "If, however, we closed our factories for tanks, we would not have work for 80,000 qualified Slovak workers. Everybody tells us to stop production, but no one is capable of advising us how to employ the workers involved." With unemployment

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already running high in Slovakia because of the closure of uneconomic state-owned industries, "there will be no choice," he said, "but to sell off the weapons."31 Similar considerations are likely to influence leaders of other Eastern European countries with a substantial arms industry, including Poland, Hungary, and Romania. But while there are many strong economic motives driving the impulse to sell arms on the international market, it is unclear that prospective buyers will have the necessary wherewithal to purchase all the weapons they may desire. Many Third World countries are still reeling from the economic downturn of the 1980s, and are not likely to recover sufficiently in the early 1990s to become major customers for arms. Included in this category are the Latin American countries, much of Africa, and such hard-hit countries as Vietnam and the Philippines. Among the Middle Eastern countries, Iran is still recovering from the beating it took during the Iran-Iraq War, while Iraq will need years to recover from the beating it took in the recent conflict. Similarly, Jordan is gripped by severe economic hardship, Algeria and Tunisia face mounting social unrest, and Israel is struggling to house and absorb all of its new immigrants. The end of Soviet military aid, and to some extent of US assistance, will also curtail these countries' ability to purchase additional weaponry. Under these circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect a massive surge in arms transfers to these areas, even if the desire for new weapons is strong; instead, we are likely to see an increased emphasis on the upgrading of existing systems through the integration of new gun systems, engines, avionics, and so forth. In other areas, however, economic conditions may not prove so inhibiting. The oil-producing countries (minus Iraq) are likely to experience a steady increase in national income as the price of oil rises, thus enhancing their capacity to procure imported arms. Assuming present conditions prevail, the emerging industrial nations of the Pacific Rim will also experience a steady growth in national income, and so they, too, will be able to increase their procurement of imported arms and technology. And some countries, facing what are seen as acute security threats, will continue to buy arms no matter how desperate their economic condition. Predicting which of these factors, negative or positive, will prevail in the 1990s is a risky proposition. Clearly, the supplier nations are experiencing strong economic pressures for an increase in foreign sales, but their efforts to line up new customers may be thwarted by a widespread scarcity of cash and credit. Much, therefore, depends on the state of the world economy: if general economic conditions improve, the positive factors will probably predominate; if economic conditions deteriorate, the negative factors will prevail.

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Net Assessment How, then, does all of this add up? As suggested by the foregoing analysis, political and technological considerations tend to favour an increase in arms transfers while economic conditions are roughly divided between positive and negative factors. Based on past experience, this is a formula for a noticeable if not dramatic increase in military exports. This is largely confirmed by the limited data we now have on actual transactions in 1990 and 1991. The tempo of sales is not likely to accelerate beyond this level so long as money and credit remains scarce in most Third World areas, but other factors are likely to produce a continuing upward push. In arriving at this assessment, I concluded that while the positive and negative factors are roughly in balance in the political-military and economic categories, the technological category will exert a strong positive influence on the arms traffic in the years ahead. Whatever feelings one harbours toward Operation Desert Storm, it appears inevitable that senior military officials around the world will now seek to replace existing equipment with modern high-tech weapons and electronic systems of the sort used with such apparent effectiveness in the Persian Gulf. In the future, no country will choose to go to war against a wellequipped adversary without munitions of this type. And while it may take some countries longer than others to obtain the necessary wherewithall to acquire such weapons, the desire for them will remain strong.

NOTES

1 2

3

4 5

6 7

8

Statement by James Baker before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, 6 February 1991 (State Department text). US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985 (Washington DC: 1986),p. 89. (Hereinaf ter cited as ACDA, WMEAT1985.) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1985: World Armaments and Disarmament (London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1985), pp. 370-71. (Hereinafter cited as SIPRI Yearbook 1985.) ACDA, WMEAT 1985, p. 91. ACDA, WMEAT 1989, p. 73. SIPRI Yearbook 1990, p. 251. Richard F. Grimmett, Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Suppliei; 1981-1988 (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1989), p. 57. (Hereinafter cited as CRS, Trends in Arms Transfers 1981-88.) ACDA, WMEAT 1989, pp. 73 ff.

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9

Ibid.

10

For discussion, see Michael T. Klare, "Deadly Convergence: The Perils of the Arms Trade/' World Polio/ Journal (Winter 1988-89): 141-68, and "Who's Arming Who," Technology Reviezv (May-June 1990): 42-50. Presidential statement at the US Coast Guard Academy, New London, Conn., May 24,1989 (White House transcript). For further discussion of this strategic outlook, see: Michael T. Klare, "Behind Desert Storm: The New Military Paradigm," Technology Review (May/June 1992): 28-36. Statement of Dick Cheney before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, March 19,1991 (Department of Defense transcript). Quoted in The New York Time, March 2,1991. Quoted in The Neiv York Times, March 20,1991. Remarks at the US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Co., May 29,1991 (White House transcript). Quoted in The Washington Post, June 5,1991. The Washington Post, May 31,1991. Richard F. Grimmett, "Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia: Current Status," Issue Brief No. IB91007, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, February 20, 1991. Inside the Army, 8 April 1991. London Sunday Times, 5 May 1991; The Washington Post, 31 May 1991 Quoted in The Neiv York Times, 26 March 1991. See The Washington Post, 27 March 1991. Quoted in The Christian Science Monitor, 18 March 1991. See David C. Morrison, "Still Open for Business," National Journal, 13 April 1991, pp. 850-54; and The Washington Post, 9 March 1991. Morrison, op. cit., pp. 850-51. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 22 April 1991, p. 13. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 20 May 1991, p. 13. Quoted in The New York Times, 25 January 1990. See The Neiv York Times, 3 May 1991, and The Wall Street Journal, 9 May 1991. Quoted in The Washington Post, 7 May 1991.

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Chapter 10 THE CHANGING ARMS TRADE

Keith Krause Introduction There is no shortage of popular and scholarly analyses of trends in the arms trade.1 Yet many of these do not provide a basis on which to evaluate future developments in the production and trade of conventional weapons, and to distinguish ephemeral from durable changes. Most often, trend analyses simply project a reflection of the recent past, and are often explicitly contradictory.2 While some of the confusion can be explained by singular events such as the Gulf War and conventional arms control in Europe, conceptual weaknesses in the scholarly literature are apparent. As Aaron Karp observed in 1987: Since academic analysis of the international trade in arms and military equipment began in the mid-1960s...much has been done to illuminate basic facts, trends and relationships. None the less, understanding remains far from complete. ...[T]he international arms trade is evolving in ways that had not been anticipated... Old assumptions can no longer be taken for granted. Basic relationships are not as clear as they seemed to be just a few years ago.3

Events of the past three years have had even greater unanticipated impact on the evolution of arms production and transfers, and made future trends even more difficult to assess. To analyze more systematically trends in the global arms transfer and production system, and the implications of this for controlling the arms trade, this chapter will first sketch the different levels at which trends and evolution must be understood; and second, discuss what the current trends are at these levels. It will not, however, provide a comprehensive update or overview of the current arms trade, nor will it evaluate in detail the various proposals for control.

Keith Krause teaches political science at York University, Toronto, Canada. He is the author of Arms and the State: Patterns of Militaiy Production and Trade in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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Trend Analysis of the Arms Trade Trends in the global arms transfer system can be analyzed along three axes: a) the economics of arms production and trade; b) the geopolitics of interstate rivalry and c) the foreign and security policy of bilateral relations. The first refers to the underlying economic and technological structures that shape arms production and trade. These include the scale of arms production and its global distribution; the technological sophistication achieved by different tiers of producers; the pace of technological change and distribution of research and development; and the diffusion of military technology and concomitant relations of technological dependence. The second describes the political and security context in which arms are produced and traded. It includes the geopolitical relations of great power rivals, and the relations of regional rivals, who engage in arms races and attempt to produce or acquire weapons to insulate themselves from the machinations of external powers. Change on both these axes is only manifest over a long time frame, and the structures are difficult to alter. The third axis encompasses the short-term foreign policy considerations associated with specific wars, governments, and bilateral relationships between arms suppliers and recipients. It includes domestic and diplomatic initiatives or pressures to control arms transfers, foreign policy considerations that lead to the initiation or curtailment of transfers to specific clients, and any multilateral or international initiatives to control the arms trade. This is the realm of historical contingency, where changes can occur rapidly, and decision-makers can exercise the greatest freedom of action from structural constraints. These three axes are interrelated in a complex manner that need not be dealt with here. It should be noted, however, that this approach allows one to distinguish between those shifts in arms transfers and production that may be the product of ephemeral foreign economic or security policy considerations, and those that reflect changes in the underlying structures. More importantly, it does not overestimate the freedom decision makers possess to control the arms trade, as the structures of global politics constrain the options that are "thinkable" at any time. But it also avoids treating the arms trade as enduring and immutable, as the underlying structures of the global arms transfer and production system can themselves be changed, albeit with difficulty. At particular historical moments relatively unique opportunities to alter the structures of global politics may present themselves. The language of the "new world order" reflects an awareness of such opportunities (although perhaps not of the difficulty of the enterprise), and it has given rise to hopes that the structure of global arms production and trade is now more open to change than at any point this century.

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Trends in the Economics of Military Production and Trade More than 48 billion dollars (constant 1988 US dollars) of arms were traded in 1988.4 This represents a fourfold increase in real terms since 1963, with the major periods of growth occurring around 1972 and 1978. This expansion was accompanied by an increase in the number of suppliers and recipients: from twenty suppliers and eighty-nine recipients in 1963, to fifty suppliers and 120 recipients in 1988. The direction of the trade also shifted to the developing world: in the early 1960s these states received only about 40 percent of the weapons transferred, by 1977 about 80 percent of arms transferred were destined for the developing world, a percentage that has stabilized at this level. What is noteworthy, however, is that the value of global arms transfers has stagnated, and even slightly declined, since 1979. But the overall significance of arms trade figures depends on the relationships between arms transfers and military spending (the demand side), and between arms production and arms transfers (the supply side). Global military spending reached a trillion dollars a year in 1987, and annual global arms production in the mid-1980s was between $260 and $290 billion.5 Arms production and procurement thus accounts for about 25 percent of military spending, and the arms traded between states represent less than 20 percent of total arms production. These figures suggest the "real" problem of global militarization is not one of arms transfers, nor is it confined to the developing world. Arms purchases (imports or domestic production) represent only a small fraction of the total resources devoted to the military, the bulk of which goes for operating and personnel costs.6 Further, although the developing world is responsible for 80 percent of the inter-state transfers, it "consumes" only about 15 percent of total annual arms production. It is clear that from the developing world's perspective an exclusive focus on the arms trade is unjustified. If the arms trade is demand-driven, then global military spending will "limit" the arms trade over the long term by maintaining a balance between procurement and other spending. This hypothesis is confirmed in Figure 10.1, which charts arms transfers against military spending for the period from 1963 to 1988. Although there is no exact fit, the curves track each other closely, with arms transfers manifesting greater year-toyear fluctuations. Declines in both are parallel, with increases in arms transfers (in the 1971-73 and 1976-79 periods) following military spending increases (1969-72 and 1976-78). The slight reductions in the 1973-74 and 1987-88 periods, after rapid increases, also track well. Missing from this figure, however, is the percentage of demand for arms that is satisfied domestically: the decline in the trade since the mid-1980s may be a statistical artifact, given the growth in arms production capabilities

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in the developing world since the mid-1970s. Annual production was valued between 10 and 15 billion dollars in the late 1980s.7 Military expenditures have increased slowly since 1984 at an annual real rate of 0.63 percent, compared with a real growth rate of 3.4 percent between 1978 and 1984. The debt crisis and continued economic stagnation in the developing world played a significant role in this slowdown, and until these problems are resolved, it is unlikely that pre-1984 growth levels will return. If so, the arms trade is not likely to grow over the next decade or two. More importantly, if there is a causal relationship between military spending and arms transfers, then measures to reduce global military spending may be a more appropriate means to reduce the arms trade than measures that focus on the arms trade itself.

Figure 10.1 World Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Patterns, 1963-1988

Military Expenditures Arms Transfers

Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington: ACDA, various years).

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The supply-side relationship between arms production and arms transfers is complicated by the existence of different "tiers" of producers, stratified according to the scale and sophistication of production and participation in the export market. The first-tier producers, the United States and the Soviet Union, together produce two-thirds of the world's arms, spend three-quarters of world military R&D, and account for twothirds of global arms transfers. Because they export no more than 15 percent of total arms production, and are reluctant to participate in technology transfers, controls on the arms trade that protect their technological edge (or security) are often considered. Second-tier producers, such as Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and Germany, are much more resistant to controls. They account for up to 25 percent of arms exports, although the position of particular suppliers fluctuates greatly. These producers' own markets are small enough that exports are necessary for industrial well-being: Britain and France, for example, export between 40 and 50 percent of their arms production.8 As "second-tier producers," their R&D spending is already much lower than first-tier producers': Britain, France, and Germany together spend about one-fifth what the US does on military R&D; together second-tier states account for 20 percent of global military R&D. They are also extremely reluctant to participate in controls that would restrict their ability to maintain a high-technology indigenous arms industry. Third-tier producers, such as China, Brazil, India, Israel, and some smaller states are "wild cards" in the system. They are neither major producers of sophisticated weapons nor major exporters; overall they account for less than 10 percent of global arms production and military R&D, and about 10 percent of annual exports. But they possess the potential to supply large quantities of weapons on short notice to areas of tension. Their production and exports expanded rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but has reached a plateau, due in part to their continued dependence on technology transfers, in the form of licensed or coproduction agreements, to sustain production. In most cases, except China, India, and Israel, their domestic markets are so small that arms industries are often export enclaves, hence the incentives to restrict exports is low and control mechanisms are weak. Even before the events of the past three years, the continued evolution of military technology had generated a systemic crisis in arms production that made it increasingly difficult for second and third-tier arms producers to maintain their position. The crisis was masked by the boom years for arms exports associated with the Iran-Iraq War, but the underlying causes were rising R&D costs, increasing unit costs, shrinking procurement, and increased competition. The average real increase in unit cost of most weapons systems has been about 5 percent a year, which doubles unit costs every 13 years.9 Even if the pace of technological

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change slows, second and third-tier producers will have a difficult time maintaining their industries. Procurement budgets are also being frozen or cut, and rising unit costs mean fewer units are purchased. The response to this has been an accelerating trend toward collaborative weapons development and production, coordinated procurement policies, and restructured defence industrial sectors in order to share R&D costs and guarantee a larger end market.10 There are, however, limits to the savings this can generate, especially since some duplication and overall inefficiencies persist. In addition, these measures do not solve the basic problem of technological innovation, in which first-tier producers maintain their lead. Thus collaborative production, unless it involves full integration, is only a temporary solution to the problem. One final development that could have a decisive impact on the level of investment in military R&D and production is the direction of flow of technological innovations between military and civilian sectors. To date, technology has been spun-off from the military to the civilian sector, thus justifying investment in a leading military sector. However, many analysts have begun to argue that the focus of technological innovation has shifted to the civilian sector, from which technology is now "spun-on" to military applications, especially in computer and information processing applications.11 Although the argument is not yet decisive, as futuristic military technologies using ceramics, lasers, and compound materials have not yet been diffused to the civilian sector, even a balancing of the flow of technology between civilian and military sectors would dethrone defence investment from its hitherto privileged status. What are the implications of this for the arms trade? If global military spending remains relatively stable, the demand for arms will not increase significantly. Since existing overcapacities make competition for contracts fierce, some producers will inevitably lose out. The first victims have been second and third-tier producers with relatively small or fragile markets. Third-tier producers such as Brazil have seen their exports fall from a high of $730 million in 1984 to $380 million in 1988 (and less in 1989 and 1990), and the major Brazilian arms firms have been forced into or near bankruptcy. Second-tier suppliers such as France and Italy have also seen their export orders decline to levels that have sometimes necessitated large layoffs and cutbacks.12 What will separate winners from losers will be the level of direct or indirect state support devoted to arms production. Both production and exports have been subsidized heavily in the past, but this was politically made possible by the global geopolitical climate, which has changed dramatically since 1985. With decreased state support, a contraction of first and second-tier production in the range of one-quarter to one-third can be anticipated. West European production will likely drop by 15 to

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30 percent in the next five years; cuts in Britain of up to 50 percent have been suggested.13 Paradoxically, however, in the short term this increases pressure on the arms trade, as the struggle to maintain a market share intensifies. Given that none of these states, except perhaps Czechoslovakia, has abandoned the quest to maintain its defence industry, the prospects for broad multilateral negotiated restraints on the arms trade are not good.

Trends in the Geopolitics of Interstate Rivalry The two decisive geopolitical facts of the post 1945 order that have influenced patterns of arms production and trade have been the Cold War and the decolonization process. The Cold War kept Warsaw Pact and NATO defence spending inflated almost to World War II levels, although as a percentage of GNP it declined with rapid economic growth. The resulting large European arms market explains in part how second-tier states were able to maintain military production bases at the forefront of advancing technology. On top of this, decolonization, the transfer of wealth to OPEC states, and the unleashing of several regional conflicts sustained a high global demand for arms that persisted until the late 1970s. The pattern of global arms deliveries to different regions between 1963 and 1988 is traced in Table 10.1. It confirms the shifting focus of arms transfers as Europe, which accounted for 43 percent of transfers in 196367, accounted for less than 20 percent in the 1980s. Throughout the 1960s East Asia, as a result of the Indochina War, was the most prominent recipient region. After 1970 dominant recipient regions were the Middle East and Africa, which trebled their share of arms acquisitions between 1963 and 1987. In the 1980s, a small shift toward South and East Asia is evident, as an accompaniment to the rising wealth of the region. One other noteworthy trend in the geopolitics of the arms trade has been the increased sophistication of the weapons transferred. In the 1950s and 1960s, large quantities of World War II vintage weapons were distributed to the developing world. Clients soon, however, began demanding more sophisticated weapons and the rapid expansion of their arsenals provided a great boost to the arms market. By the 1980s, states in the developing world were receiving advanced arms simultaneously with their introduction in producer states. The production lines for the American F-14 and F-16 were shared with foreign recipients, the Soviet Union supplied its best clients (India and Syria) with MiG-27 and MiG-29 fighters or SA-9 surface-to-air missiles as they entered Soviet service, and France supplied Egypt with the Mirage 2000 along with its own forces.14

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Table 10.1 Regional Distribution of Arms Imports, 1963-1987 (percentages) Years Africa East Asia Latin America Middle East North America Oceania South Asia NATO Europe Warsaw Pact Other Europe Developed Developing

1973-77

1978-82

1983-87

34.6

11.3 15.6

18.7 10.7

12.3 11.5

16.6

33.6

37.5

37.8

20.3 19.1

18.3 11.2

10.2 14.7

41.7 58.3

28.9 71.1

25.7 74.3

1963-67

4.2

28.7

3.1 9.2 3.0 2.0 6.8 3.6

1968-72

3.6

4.8

3.6

2.0 0.9 4.0

3.5 1.4 4.3

2.8

2.7

6.8

1.7 1.0 3.9 8.7 8.3 2.7

19.5 80.5

7.4

1.5 1.5 7.3 7.4

10.4

2.4

20.9 79.1

(Derived from: ACDA, WMEAT, various years.) Note: regions are classified as follows: Oceania:

Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua-New Guinea. Africa: Does not include Egypt. Middle East: Egypt to the Persian Gulf, Iran and Cyprus. Latin America: Mexico south, all Caribbean states. North America: Canada and the United States. South Asia: Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka.

Mongolia, both Koreas, both Chinas, Japan and from Burma to Indonesia. Other Europe: Albania, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia. All of NATO, except Developed: Greece and Turkey; all of the Warsaw Pact except Bulgaria; Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland. Developing: All others.

East Asia:

The diffusion of unconventional or sophisticated weapons systems can also be explained in geopolitical terms as part of the struggle for global or regional military preeminence. For example, ballistic missiles capable of delivering conventional, chemical or nuclear warheads have proliferated rapidly over the past decade. Although most of these missiles are relatively primitive and not capable of delivering large warheads accurately, their presence changes the complexion of conflicts by their effect on crisis stability, deterrence, and escalation. Twenty to twenty-five states in the developing world possess some type of ballistic missile; thirteen to sixteen states possess weapons with a range greater than 200 km.15 The most prominent possessors of ballistic missiles are India, China, Brazil, Iraq, Israel, Iran, Egypt, North Korea, South Korea and South Africa. The acquisition of missiles has been driven by regional rivalries and the quest for international status and recognition as much

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as by military considerations. As one analyst described India's Agni missile, "[its] role as a weapon is the least of its roles. It is a confidence builder and a symbol of India's assertion of self-reliance not merely in defence but in the broader international political arena."16 Ballistic missiles are only the most prominent of the sophisticated weapons that have been diffused to a narrow range of states in the developing world. Other advanced weapons such as combat aircraft have also been distributed to a relatively small number of prominent recipients. About 40 states possess modern fighter/interceptor aircraft, although only eight states in the developing world (India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria) possess the most advanced models, the F-15 and MiG-29. Sophisticated strike aircraft such as the F-16, Su-24, Tornado, and Mirage 2000 also are in limited distribution, with only sixteen states possessing such planes.17 The chemical and nuclear weapons that could be delivered by such systems have been the subject of long-standing efforts at control. But these efforts have not entirely stopped the diffusion of nuclear and chemical weapons technologies. At least four states in the developing world are on or across the nuclear weapons threshold (Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa), with several others (among them Brazil, Argentina, Iraq, Iran, South Korea) having at one point pursued nuclear weapons programs.18 Chemical weapons can in principle be produced by almost any state that possesses an advanced chemical industrial plant and the number of states that possess chemical weapons has been estimated at between ten and twenty-five.19 Because ballistic missile proliferation signals the diffusion of some of the most advanced technologies hitherto monopolized by first and second-tier states, it has also been the focus of control efforts by these suppliers. These have centred on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which began in 1987 with seven members and now includes sixteen states. The success of this regime is mixed: although it appears to have slowed or even halted several specific missile development programs (in Egypt, Argentina, India and Iraq), it does not include all potential suppliers, has limited enforcement, and does not cover all systems that could contribute to a ballistic missile capability.20 Unfortunately, the attractiveness of nuclear or chemical weapons and ballistic missiles is enhanced by efforts to control their diffusion. Relatively common weapons are unlikely to be monopolized by one or two states in a region and hence a decisive advantage is difficult to achieve or can quickly be countered. But unconventional weapons, on the other hand, enhance counter-value (or deterrent) capabilities that could prove more significant than a battlefield advantage. Acquisition or production of such weapons is thus worth the greater effort. In addition, although a focus on controlling the export of

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unconventional weapons is laudable, it is too late to control the diffusion of weapons sufficient to wreak great destruction in a conventional war. Both of the geopolitical factors that fueled arms production and transfers in the post-war period have changed. The process of decolonization and concomitant expansion of new armies is essentially over, and arms acquisitions are driven now by more "normal" modernization and replacement cycles. Some of the best examples of this are apparent in Latin America, where procurement programs are on hold or being cancelled, and modernization of existing platforms is becoming widespread.21 The most significant change of recent years, which has not yet had its full impact on the arms transfer and production system, is the end of the Cold War in Europe. This will have different short and longterm implications for the supply side of the arms market (the demand side will be dealt with below). In the short term, the reductions in conventional armaments in the CSCE create tremendous surpluses of weapons that could eventually find their way into the developing world, much as was the case with surplus weapons after World War II. The decline in domestic demand for weapons creates instant pressure for export sales. The most poignant example of this is Czechosla vakia, which declared in early 1990 that it intended to end its lucrative arms exports. By early 1991, however, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier was assuring worried plant managers that a T-72 tank sale to Syria would go ahead, while a major deal with Iran was being negotiated.22 Thus despite the economic difficulties of the developing world and the shift in its arms acquisition patterns, there will be no decline in the volume of arms available to be transferred in the next decade, especially since arms sales are a valuable source of hard currency, especially for the former republics of the Soviet Union. Since the weapons retired from service will not be the most advanced models, however, their market potential is limited. The limit on the volume of weapons transfers will be the form of payment demanded by suppliers: if arms are given as grants, offered on easy credit terms, or bartered for raw material, then financial constraints will be minimized. Recent trends do not bode well for restraint in this area: the British arms-oil deal with the Saudis, American forgiveness of the Egyptian arms debt and expansion of foreign military sales credits, Soviet low-interest credits for India (2.5 percent over 17 years), and the White House proposal to reinstate Export-Import Bank credits for arms sales all suggest that suppliers are willing to respond creatively to indirectly subsidize arms sales.23 In the long term though, the new armaments levels in Europe will unleash a restructuring (and shrinkage) in defence production that will perhaps ultimately reduce the volume of exports generated by smaller defence industrial bases. Although the process will be difficult, the logic of restructuring is inescapable, as conversion is being driven by economic

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reality, not by ideology. This restructuring will be accompanied by a slowdown in the pace of weapons modernization, with more existing platforms being upgraded instead of replaced.24 This may have a curious side effect, for if sophisticated weapons technology is diffused to the developing world more quickly than technological innovation advances weaponry in the core, the gap in weapons possessed by North and South will continue to shrink, albeit slowly. The high-tech war directed by the United States against Iraq thus may not be so easily repeated in the future. In the long run the incentive to export will also be mitigated by growing conventional or unconventional military threats from the developing world. If weapons threats become global then geopolitical security factors will dictate greater restraint by major weapons suppliers (especially in high-technology sectors). Whether this will fully offset the incentives for continued high levels of exports is, however, difficult to judge.

Trends in Foreign and Security Policy Considerations The third axis encompasses the short-term policy considerations associated with specific bilateral relationships between arms suppliers and recipients, or between recipients in conflict. Few analysts have been able to sketch plausibly the future shape of North-South and South-South security relations in the post-Cold War world. This task has been further complicated by the Gulf War. In general terms, the unlocking of North-South and South-South relations from the shackles of the Cold War provides a greater margin for manoeuvre in foreign policy for most states, and for greater creativity in Third World diplomacy. Whether or not this opening is taken up positively, or is used to unleash another series of regional conflicts, will depend on unique and idiosyncratic historical circumstances. In the North-South context, the Soviet Union had, before its demise, completely reassessed the value and influence derived from its patronclient relationships. Along with the military disengagement from Afghanistan, all of its former major clients - Nicaragua, Angola, Syria, Ethiopia, Cuba, Iraq, and Vietnam - have seen arms supplies either curtailed or shifted to a cash basis. This trend implies that arms transfers from the former republics of the USSR will decline, since it is unlikely that cash exports can completely compensate for exports lost by declining military assistance. The United States, on the other hand, has been more reluctant to change its thinking, as illustrated by its contradictory Middle Eastern initiatives. Although Secretary of State James Baker said in February 1991 that "the time has come to try to...reduce arms flows into an area that is already over-militarized," President Bush argued in March that arms control "doesn't mean we're going to refuse to sell anything to

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everybody/' and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced that arms control in the Middle East would only cover ballistic missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons.25 Export policy has been under a systematic inter-agency review, and as one State Department official noted, "Middle East arms sales policies are in disarray."26 But the overall shift toward all-grant financing for American arms sales to the developing world (and some NATO allies), which began in 1989 and now covers about 40 percent of American transfers, suggests that the United States still views arms transfers as a potent tool of diplomacy in the developing world.27 This leaves the United States in a unique position, as all other major suppliers, driven almost exclusively by economic considerations, cease to occupy themselves with the foreign policy benefits to be reaped from arms transfer relationships. It is impossible at this point to determine which of the two possible alternatives will come to pass: will the United States remain alone in maintaining a large program of military assistance (the "one superpower" hypothesis); or will it abandon the commitment after deciding that the costs outweigh the benefits? Which of these alternatives comes about is important for the future of the arms trade: an arms trade in which major suppliers compete intensively for clients and influence, via the tool of high levels of military assistance28 is very different from one governed by market considerations and is fundamentally demand driven. Any change in South-South relations will have equally great implications for short and medium-term trends in the arms trade. The focus of the trade on particular conflicts and regions is evident from Table 10.2 below, which lists the top ten arms recipients at different periods. The concentration of the arms trade among a few customers is clear: together the top ten clients always account for about 50 percent of total transfers. The association between their identity and particular regional conflicts or arms races is also apparent, as is the shift to different regions. This is not surprising, given that states that are at war have the highest requirements for arms, and that most states make major arms purchases in a cyclical pattern of military modernization. The Indochina War made Southeast Asia a prime focus of the arms trade in the 1960s; the Middle East conflicts made that region the most lucrative market in the 1970s and 1980s. Between 1980 and 1988, the Persian Gulf imported $100 billion in arms, or about 25 percent of the world total, as a consequence of the IranIraq War. The implication is that the "problem" of the arms trade must be dealt with in the context of the particular regional conflicts that fuel it. When one looks ahead, what is noteworthy is the drop in demand from several major recipients. Collectively Iraq, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Afghanistan accounted for 24 percent of total arms acquisitions in the 1984-88 period (constant 1988 dollars) and Iraq alone accounted for 12 percent.29

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All of these states are likely to have greatly reduced appetites for arms over the next decade. Unless the international climate changes dramatically, increases in transfers to other states are unlikely to offset these losses to the market. Even newly buoyant customers in East Asia are unlikely to take up the slack completely, as their total share of the market is still only 11.5 percent. A 50 percent increase in acquisitions by these recipients would be needed to compensate for a 25 percent drop in acquisitions by the seven states noted above. Although there are of

Table 10.2 Top Ten Arms Recipients, Selected Years (percent of world total) 1963

2 1972

West Germany

14.6

6.5

Indonesia Italy

7.4 6.8

India Egypt

5.8 4.7

East Germany Iraq

4,1 3.3

3,3

Poland Soviet Union

3.2 2.9

2.5

South Vietnam North Vietnam

2,8

15.4

5.3

1982 2

1988 8

3.5 4.0

6.6

14.8

9.5

3.1*

11.6

Iran South Korea

5.1 3.4

3.3

4.1

Israel Syria

2.9 2.7

2.0 5.4

3.9 2.7

Saudi Arabia Libya

6.7 6.7

6.2

Cuba Algeria

3.5 2.5

3.5 5.3 3.3

Afghanistan Angola TOTAL

55.6

58.6

52.4

48.1

* Includes former South Vietnam. Source: United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington: ACDA, various years).

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course other candidates for increased purchases (notably in the Persian Gulf), there are also regions in which one might anticipate other declines (such as in the former Warsaw Pact states, which accounted for 7.7 percent of total imports in the 1984-88 period). Overall, in the postCold War world net demand will decline, at least in the absence of a major escalation of conflict in the Middle East or South Asia.

Conclusion This analysis of the structural and short-term trends in the the arms production and transfer system clearly implies that patterns of arms production and transfers reflect underlying global political and economic relations. They are, as Thomas Ohlson explain it: essentially a systemic phenomenon...[that] result from national political, military and economic motivations and considerations in both supplier and recipient countries...Arms transfers can neither be understood nor judged without insight into the dynamics of this complex web of system interaction between and within interest groups and states.30

Proposals to control the arms trade must be evaluated against this structural backdrop, and not only on the basis of ephemeral trends associated with particular conflicts or policy initiatives.31 However, although arms transfers are a product of the self-help nature of international politics, this does not mean that controlling the arms trade is impossible. The relationship between the constraints imposed by global "structures" and the freedom of decision makers to act in a changing world is more complex than such a static realist position would allow. Control measures must be evaluated for their potential effectiveness against the motivating forces that structure and drive the system. Measures, for example, that attempt to throttle down transfers without addressing the pressures to export arms faced by suppliers are unlikely to succeed. These pressures can only be relieved by altering the underlying economic or geopolitical structures that give rise to high levels of arms transfers and arms production. Accelerated defence and industrial conversion in first and second-tier states, and measures (analogous to the International Atomic Energy Agency) to encourage the peaceful exploitation of high technologies (data processing, precision machines, satellite and communications technologies) by developing countries in return for foreswearing their military applications, would be more effective in the long run. There are already indications of a willingness to impose restraints on arms exports and nuclear programs in exchange for increased access to Northern technology.32 The failure of the American attempt to curtail Pakistan's nuclear program throughout the

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Afghanistan war illustrates that an end to the Cold War was a precondition for the success of such efforts. More limited measures that focus on particular technologies such as ballistic missiles will perhaps be more successful in the short term, as long as the number of potential suppliers remains small, but such attempts to stem the diffusion of technology and to entrench permanently the relatively military inferiority of the South are deeply resented. The Chinese attitude toward the MTCR is indicative: the Chinese "will not be driven by superpower pressure and prior decisions or by selfrighteous finger-pointing by the principal arms merchants/'33 Such measures also do nothing to control the proliferation of the the conventional weapons that have wreaked much destruction in regional conflicts in the past thirty years. Finally, supply-side controls on the arms trade do not eliminate the underlying sources of insecurity that create the demand for arms, and fail to recognize the legitimate security interests of recipient states. Successful controls on the arms trade would, instead, have to be tied to broader processes of regional confidence and security building, such as those exemplified by the Esquipulas accords in Central America, or the UNsponsored negotiations in Southeast Asia, or to specific measures to reduce military spending. In this scenario, suppliers could take coercive steps, such as tying economic aid to military spending, to induce recalcitrant recipients to cooperate. Again, however, the incentive for suppliers to participate in such a regime is low, and the penalties for defection are nonexistent. Such measures, unless led by the regional participants, would also be resented as guaranteeing external powers a large role in regional security relations. The end of the Cold War has presented opportunities not only for controlling specific aspects of the arms trade, but also for addressing some of the underlying economic and political forces that give rise to it. Indeed specific measures will remain of limited value without some change in the underlying structures of arms production and trade. Thus the most important or valuable efforts will be those that focus on changing this structure, through such measures as military conversion or regional arms control. Such ideas, which not long ago could be dismissed as wild-eyed idealism, have now become common currency. But we are still far from channelling the energy devoted to the global military system into more productive and positive human endeavours.

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NOTES 1

For recent good examples of the literature see Michael Klare, "Who's Arming Who?" Technology Review (May/June 1990): 42-47; Michael Brzoska, "Current Trends in Arms Transfers," in Defense, Security and Development, eds., Saadet Deger and Robert West (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp.161-79; Stephanie Neuman, "The Arms Market: Who's On Top?" OrWs 33 (4) (Fall 1989): 509-29; Ian Anthony and Herbert Wulf, "The Trade in Major Conventional Weapons," SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 219-49; Jo Husbands, "A Buyer's Market for Arms," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 1990): 14-19. 2 This sample of media headlines illustrates the point: "Outbreak of detente dents the [arms] market", Financial Times, 17 January 1990; "Arms sales ready to rocket," Daily Telegraph, 6 March 1990; "Prospect of arms pact spurring weapons sales," New York Times, 25 March 1990; "Worldwide weapons market shrinks," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9 July 1990; "Tension restores the bustle to U.S. arms bazaar," Financial Times, 6 September 1990; "Continued fall in sales predicted," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 October 1990; "The booming new arms bazaar for conventional weaponry," Guardian, 6 March 1991; "Bullish times in the international arms bazaar," Newsiveek, 8 April 1991. 3 Aaron Karp, "The trade in conventional weapons," in SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1988 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 175. 4 Figures in this section, unless otherwise cited, are derived from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer's (Washington: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, various years). Hereafter cited as ACDA, WMEAT. 5 For a comprehensive breakdown of how these production figures were arrived at, see Krause, Arms and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Table X. 6 Evidence from a range of states in the developing world cited in Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.396-402. Prominent exceptions to this pattern from among those states for whom reliable information is available were Iran (31 percent) and Nigeria (46 percent). 7 Production estimates from Krause, op. cit, Chapter 7; Saadet Deger, Military Expenditure in Third World Countries (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 151. 8 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), TheAms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971), p.378; Edward Kolodziej, Making and Marketing Arms: The French Experience and its Implications for the Inter-national System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p.47; Krause, op.cit, Table XVIII. 9 Jacques Gansler, The Defense Industry (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1980), p.83. 10 See, inter alia, Edward Laurance, "The Future of Arms Production and Exports in Western Europe: A Model and Some Preliminary Indications," paper presented to the International Studies Association annual meeting, March 1991; Moravcsik, op.cit, pp.65-85; Martyn Bittleston, "Co-operation or competition? Defence procurement options for the 1990s," Adelphi Paper, 250

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171

(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990); Creasey and May, op.cit, passim. 11 Laurance, op. cit., p.22. 12 French exports, for example, declined from 61.8 billion francs in 1984 to 20 billion in 1989; Italian arms exports plunged from a billion dollars annually in the mid-1980s to less than 400 million in 1987-88. (Le Monde, 9 novembre 1990; ACDA, WME^T.) 13 Ian Anthony, Agnes Courades Allebeck and Herbert Wulf, Western European Arms Production (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1990), p.60; Sunday Times, 21 April 1991. 14 Gansler, op.cit., p.208, p.312n; Gu Guan-Fu, "Soviet arms sales and military aid policy to the Third World," Osteuropa Wirtschaft 29 (1), (Marz 1984): 52; Flight International 28 March-3 April 1990; Air International May 1990. It should be noted, however, that often export versions were not as sophisticated as domestic procurement. 15 Martin Navias ("Ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World," Adelphi Paper, 252 [London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990], p.8, pp.29-31), estimates the number of states with ballistic missiles at twenty-two. Aaron Karp, ("Ballistic missile proliferation," SIPRI Yearbook 1990 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990], pp.369-91), places it at twenty-six. See also Thomas Mahnken and Timothy Hoy t, "The spread of missile technology to the Third World," Comparative Strategy 9 (3) (1990): pp.245-64; Arthur Manfredi et al., "Ballistic Missile Proliferation Potential of Non-Major Military Powers," Congressional Research Service, report for Congress, 6 August 1987. 16 K. Subrahmanyam, "The meaning of Agni," Hindustan Times, 2 June 1989, cited in Mahnken and Hoyt, op.cit, p.246. See also Navias, op.cit., pp.9-13. 17 Information in this paragraph is from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990-1991 (London: IISS, 1990). See also Leonard Spector, "Foreign-supplied combat aircraft: will they drop the Third World bomb?" Journal of International Affairs 40 (1) (Summer 1986): 143-58. 18 See Leonard Spector, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 19891990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). 19 For varied estimates see SIPRI Yearbook 1988, pp.101-25; Globe and Mail, 17 October 1987; SIPRI Yearbook 1990, pp.111-12. 20 its guidelines include only systems with a range of more than 300 km and a payload greater than 500 kg. For evidence on the success of the MTCR, see Karp, op. cit., pp 376-80; Kathleen Bailey, "Can Missile Proliferation be Reversed?" Orbis (Winter 1991): 5-14. 21 For details, see "The Latin American Arms Market," Armada International (June/July 1990). 22 International Herald Tribune, 25 January 1990, 5 May 1991; Financial Times, 12 March 1991. 23 Neiv York Times, 8 March 1991; Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 February 1990; Rajan Menon, "The Soviet Union, the Arms Trade and the Third World," Soviet Studies 24 (July 1982): 385, 395n; Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 June 1986, 25 April 1987.

172 24 25 26 27 28

29 30 31

32

33

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS Major new projects such as the Eurofighter or the British Vickers tank are also being stretched out. Sunday Times, 21 April 1991. All quoted in Newsweek, 8 April 1991. Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 March 1991. See also Far East Economic Review, 4 April 1991; Intel-national Herald Tribune, 29 April 1991; Guardian, 14 March 1991. Figures for the 1986-88 period calculated from Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 February 1990; and ACDA, WMEAT1989. For details of American-Soviet competition for influence via arms transfers in the Middle East see Keith Krause, "Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships/' International Studies Quarterly 35 (3) (September 1991). Figures in the paragraph derived from ACDA, WMEAT1989. Thomas Ohlson, "Introduction," in Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security, ed. Thomas Ohlson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.ll. For a discussion of recent past attempts to control the arms trade (and of why control over arms transfers is a necessary element of regional security-building efforts), see Keith Krause, "Constructing Regional Security Regimes and the Control of Arms Transfers," International Journal 45 (Spring 1990): 386-423. See, on Brazil, Globe and Mail, 11 October 1990. For a complete discussion of " an international technology security regime" see Janne Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991), pp.131-67. John Lewis, Hua Di and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment," International Security, 15 (4) (Spring 1991): 108. According to them, China also was miffed at not having been included in the initial MTCR.

CONCLUSION

Jean-Frangois Rioux A Lukewarm Attitude One of the conclusions one can draw from these ten articles is that the supply-side approach to non-proliferation is not the preferred option of the Western non-governmental arms-control community. Our authors, chosen for their knowledge, their understanding, and their appreciation of denial policies, do not celebrate the virtues of export-controls with Tennysonian accents. To the contrary, their assessment is reserved and sober, and they are even reluctant to focus exclusively on supply-side policies. Simply put, supply-side policies are not seen as a solution, and no one sees them as a major component of future international peace and security arrangements. At best, they are thought of as a short-term armscontrol measure in fields where multilateral agreements are nonexistent or weak, and as a particular instrument for dealing with rogue states. Our contributors dwelt more often on the defects and disadvantages of the supply-side approach than on its positive contribution to the world. Finally, it is worth noting that these analysts portray export-control schemes as makeshift, pragmatic policies, and do not try to develop a theoretical rationale and explanation for their existence, other than saying that we need to rely on them in some circumstances. This simple fact tells us much. One can extrapolate that large segments of Western public opinion and of the political class are, similarly, not very enthusiastic about denial efforts, even though they support a measure of export-controls. This should give pause for thought to some detractors of supply-side policies that tend to caricature them as the preferred Western road to non-proliferation.

The Limited Role of Supply-side Arms-control Still, most of our analysts find supply-side measures to be of some utility, even if they do not always spell out why. In some cases, such as in William Potter's contribution, the positive value of supply-side efforts is an unstated assumption. Some authors, such as John Simpson, Aaron Karp, or Elisa Harris, are more precise in their assessment. Others, for example J.P. Robinson, are sceptical of export-controls, but display an understanding of why they are put in place. Generally, the value of supply-side arms-control lies in making the acquisition of weapons more costly, more difficult, and more conspicuous. If a state cannot buy its weapons from the usual suppliers, it has to

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rely on unusual suppliers such as new producers and private actors, or manufacture the weapons itself. In both cases, it will be more costly, be it in terms of quality, quantity, delays, monetary expenditures, or opportunity costs. Also, difficulties await political leaders who rely on unusual practises for acquiring weapons, and many would rather avoid the aggravation. For example, states that turn to the grey and black markets are likely to have their activities followed by secret services and exposed in the press, thus raising awareness and concern about the nature and implication of their weapons program. As was said in the introduction to this book, partisans of exportcontrols argue that these measures allow the international community to gain precious time in its struggle against proliferation before better armscontrol and disarmament agreements can be signed. Also, supply-side measures can keep non-signatories of international conventions and renegade states in check. Thus, in theory, the current emphasis on supplier regimes should be temporary. If better peace and security agreements are signed, export-controls will remain only as an insurance policy against non-compliance and cheating. These propositions make a lot of sense to many analysts, even though they differ in their evaluation of the scope, length, and fields of application of supply-side restrictions. Aaron Karp adds another reason for supply-side controls when he suggests that the MTCR has been instrumental in creating a new norm in international affairs, by de-legitimizing missile forces. This is an unusual proposition, since international norm-creation is usually believed to be effective only when originating from broad multilateral contexts, while one-sided institutions such as the Western supplier groups are portrayed as illegitimate and incapable of inspiring new ways of thinking. Karp's counter-intuitive hypothesis surely deserves attention, and empirical investigation is needed in order to evaluate if the MTCR states are themselves creators of values, and if these values actually have taken root in the international community. If an affirmative answer can be given to both of these questions, the positive side of supply-side policies would have to be re-evaluated.

Supply-side Controls and the Spread of Knowledge Of course, the spread of knowledge and technology will always defeat the best denial strategies in the long run. One has to remember that nuclear technology spread rapidly beyond the United States after the Second World War. Chemical and biological processes are very well-known, since WWI at least. Advanced conventional weapons and missile technology have become an export item for some Third World countries. Naturally, many technologies are still beyond the grasp of most states, but they eventually spill down to less industrialized societies, and it is possible that the time lag

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between innovation in the core weapons-producing countries and replication in other states is declining. Diffusion of knowledge is a factor that is taken into account in exportcontrols. As we have said earlier, since the value of supply-side policies lies not in the total ban on proliferation but in postponing this proliferation, arguing that supply-side controls are not worth the trouble because the diffusion of knowledge will defeat them in the long run is not a very convincing argument. For the arms-controller, the important questions are: are supply-side agreements implementable? Do they make peace and security arrangements more possible?

The "Supply-Push'' Problem One of the most intriguing potential problems for supply-side regimes is the "supply-push" issue. Many of our analysts, especially those dealing with conventional weapons, fear that the pressures to sell weapons may threaten any progress in export-control policies. As the Northern societies move away from Cold War militarization, the defence sector is looking for new markets, and exports to the Third World seem the most natural way to go, since diversification and conversion of the industry into the civilian field is a costly and long-term endeavour. The Western European military powers, such as France, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, depend on defence-related exports to a larger extent than the US, and they have a great deal to lose from a tightening of export-controls. However, the US is now almost in the same situation, since domestic procurement is falling rapidly. It is not clear if this convergence of structural situations will lead to an all-out commercial war among suppliers, or if it can be tempered by market-sharing, joint production, and supplier cartels. The possibilities for export-control should not be discarded, even at a time of transition. The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are especially singled-out when talking about supply-push, since the defence sector constitutes their most advanced and profitable export industry, and since the need of these societies for employment and hard currencies is enormous. Many developments in the former East Bloc make people fear an uncontrolled flow of military hardware to the Third World, consisting of items ranging from truly advanced high-technology weapons to cheap second-hand Warsaw Pact equipment. A perhaps more threatening scenario is an increase in nuclear and missile technology transfers by the former Soviet republics. William Potter has identified some risky developments in Russia. The supply-push can also come from the new producers of weapons and of nuclear technology. The end of the Cold War has not affected their business in the same measure as that of the Western producers, but they

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have been hit by the end of the Iran-Iraq conflict in 1988, and by the general decrease in Third World defence procurement. Ironically, however, the situation could be worse if the state of the world economy was better. Public expenditures have been cut everywhere, which has greatly affected military procurement. It has forced some conversion and diversification to take place in the short run. A smaller defence sector will likely emerge from the end of the Cold War and from the economic recession. Notwithstanding the occurrence of dramatic political developments, the need for weapons will likely not reach the levels of the Cold War in the foreseeable future. All this could take care of the excess production capabilities that are supposed to fuel the supply-push. After all, ten years ago, many people feared that the shrinking nuclear market would lead to a supply-push situation in which suppliers would throw away the rules of the nuclear regime. In fact, the market absorbed the excess capability. Many firms foundered, or left the nuclear sector. The importance of some suppliers, such as the US and Great Britain, declined. No major supplier backtracked on previous nonproliferation commitments. In fact, the opposite happened, as countries such as France and Germany have since strengthened their nuclear export policies. Even the so-called "new suppliers/' William Potter observes, are gradually turning to stricter export-controls. The supply-push hypothesis deserves attention in export-control issues. However, the research has so far taken the problem for granted and often has not tried to submit the hypothesis to close scrutiny by using the tools of the historical and economic sciences.

The Demand Imperative The issue of increasing demand is also a problem for supply-side controls. It takes two major forms. First, there is the demand for military weapons which is now low but can always increase rapidly if an important regional conflict intensifies, such as in the Middle East, South Asia, or Eastern Europe. Second, there is the steadily growing demand for dual-use high technology. The Northern public and political elites are calling for exportcontrols in the name of security, but their position is constantly challenged by the Third World and Eastern European countries arguing for justice and an equal opportunity for industrial development. This argument is powerful, since it appeals to high political and moral values, and can translate into profitable high-technology sales. If not satisfied by Western suppliers, the demand for weapons and dual-use products will be satisfied in ways that can threaten denial policies. For instance, new producers with extremely liberal export policies could enter the market; some states could develop an indigenous

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defence sector, as has already occurred with "pariah" states such as Israel, Taiwan, and South Africa; and some countries could rely on private intermediaries operating on the black market. The demand imperative has been taken into account in some armscontrol agreements. The best-known example is the multilateral nuclear regime. Article IV of the NPT guarantees unrestricted access to civilian nuclear technology to state parties. The IAEA offers numerous technical assistance programs to less-developed member states. Similar arrangements have been proposed in other fields to secure wide participation. For example, in missile technology, an international space agency has been put forward as a way to securely transfer high technology for civilian needs. This is a proposal deserving further study. In the same spirit, Professor Geissler has suggested a WHO program of research on vaccines that could disseminate information on biological counter-measures and decrease the need for national biological defence programs. The relaxation of the COCOM restrictions on many dual-use products may have opened the way to a freer high-technology supply. The export-control measures applied by the West will be limited to weapons of mass destruction and to the most sensitive defence technologies. Many items previously guarded are being made available to the former Communist states and flow more freely to the Third World. However, detailed scientific and economic evaluations should be made of: 1. the new COCOM lists; 2. current national export-control policies; and 3. the world demand for high technologies. These studies could allow us to assess the extent of the residual dissatisfaction with the export-control regime from the less-industrialized countries in the near future.

Different Results for Different Weapons Although one can identify generic deficiencies in supply-side restrictions, the fact that export restrictions apply to different types of weaponry raises unique challenges. The nuclear field is, as was mentioned in the introduction, the natural domain for export restrictions. John Simpson, William Potter, and Paul Leventhal recognize the importance of supply-side measures. Even though Paul Leventhal is critical of NSG-type export-control lists, he does not deny their importance, and his recommendation to halt the emergence of the "plutonium economy" is itself another type of nonproliferation measure based on the control of supply. The authors do not identify in detail why the nuclear field is particularly suited to supplyside measures, but the reasons for this state of affairs are clear. It is a strongly regulated high-technology industry with few applications, developed by a limited number of suppliers for a small number of buyers, and with the potential to produce the most destructive weapons

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known to humankind. For these reasons, the nuclear field can be considered the ideal type of sector to be subjected to supply-side non-proliferation efforts. It is not surprising that, according to our contributors, the control of chemical weapons through similar procedures does not seem possible to the same extent. Chemical technology applicable for combat gas is older, easier, and much more widespread than nuclear capacities. Hundreds of chemical plants in the world can produce deadly gases, and new plants can be built in a short time. The enormous trade in chemical items cannot be regulated in the same way as the nuclear trade, and there is great opposition to such regulation. Nevertheless, Julian Perry Robinson and Elisa Harris are confident that a CWC will be signed soon and that a reliable system of verification will be put in place. There will probably be a residual role for export-controls after the CWC, against non-member states. Biological weapons are even less a target for supply-side restrictions. The knowledge necessary to make them is widely known, and they can be produced and stored in small facilities. Some biological agents are now covered by the Australia Group list, but both Elisa Harris and Erhard Geissler would contend that this does not have much more than a symbolic effect. Missile technology lends itself more to the application of supply-side constraints, according to Aaron Karp, but Kathleen Bailey strongly differs with him on this point. Their differences can be attributed to divergent evaluations of at least two factors. First, there is the issue of how much time we have before the technology spreads. Second, the actual demand for missiles in the Third World must be assessed. Aaron Karp thinks that the MTCR will be helpful in the short and medium-term because the technology is still out of reach for many states, while the pressures for rocket acquisition can be mitigated by a mixture of supplier control, de-legitimization of missiles, confidence-building, and conflict resolution. Obviously, Kathleen Bailey does not share this diagnosis. This illustrates the lack of consensus on the missile issue among analysts. Missile technology is in large part dual-use, since it has applications in navigation, communications, monitoring, scientific research, space travel, etc. There is a growing demand for this know-how from less-advanced nations. However, many of the technologies for missiles are not yet very common, including solid and liquid-fuel boosters and ignition devices; guidance and flight-control systems; and reentry vehicle materials, their configuration, and miniaturization. It is difficult to evaluate if a combination of high demand (for example, in the Middle East and in Asia) and supply-push (for example, from Russia and other ex-Soviet republics) will lead to widespread missile technology transfers that could undermine the regime.

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Regarding export-controls on conventional weapons, the evaluation of our analysts is prudent. They identify a strong trend of de-militarization in the world, but are not ready to affirm that it will translate into strong multilateral export-control agreements. Since conventional arms exports are highly valued for diplomatic, military, and economic reasons, the political will to restrict them would have to be extremely strong.

Supply-side Controls as an Obstacle to Arms Control and Disarmament? This proposition, often repeated by Third World spokespersons and Western analysts, has been echoed in some of the chapters of this book, notably by Kathleen Bailey. She contends that the MTCR is not effective against the proliferation of missiles. According to her, it can even encourage proliferation by pitting the "haves" against the "have-nots." In a sense, as biblical references warn, the forbidden fruit will always be more tempting. Unfortunately, there might not be an answer for this age-old problem, and this constitutes the essence of the problem of regulation: does regulation make things worse than no regulation? In most societies, the supply of some goods, such as drugs, alcohol, and weapons, is restricted or banned altogether, as people think that liberalization would be worse than criminalization. However, the advocates of individual freedom are not always sure of this. The same goes with international restrictions on trade where the restrictive and liberal views always collide. However, one of the most serious flaws of international denial policies is that they are often alienating to the less industrialized countries. Many call them unjust, since they can be used to restrict the technological progress and defence capabilities of weaker states. Also, a double standard is said to be at work, since some states have the privilege of retaining their advanced weapons, and even their weapons of mass destruction, while others are denied the same. The case of the recognition of five nuclear powers in the NPT is often mentioned, but it is probably not the main problem. It could be argued that, on the whole, the tolerance of the West for proliferators such as Pakistan, South Africa, and, especially, Israel, may have created more resentment against supply-side measures than the existence of a big-five nuclear club. However, it should be said that the analysts who emphasize the negative effects of supply-side measures are sometimes at pain to demonstrate how much these actually jeopardize international peace and security. The counter-productive effects of supply-side arms-control is a hypothesis worth studying. It would be valuable to know if some conflict situations can be worsened because some local actors strongly perceive being discriminated against. But, the analysts should not take it for granted.

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For most Third World states, there does not seem to be a relationship between defiance against export-controls and confrontational positions, or provocative behaviour that could threaten peace and security. Perhaps only the would-be regional hegemons of the Third World have enough to lose due to export-controls to take strong unilateral measures to counter them. However, international political analysts still have to provide case studies of how resentment against denial policies can translate into disruptive behaviour. Of course, Northern suppliers realize that their insistence on exportcontrols engenders animosity among less-advanced states, but they reply that the situation will eventually be resolved with better armscontrol agreements to which they will be parties. However, although industrialized states affirm that supply-side agreements are partial and temporary, they do not always show by their deeds that they are committed to go beyond denial policies. In other words, firmer policies on disarmament, conflict resolution and peace-building from the West could go a long way toward convincing Southern countries to endorse limits on supply and to restrain themselves in military matters. Recent moves by the West on conventional, chemical, and nuclear disarmament, and on conciliation in the Middle East, have been welcomed, but the footdragging of some Western powers on such major issues as economic development, environmental protection, and technology transfers conveys the impression that the West asks for more compromises than it is itself ready to accept. Research in supply-side arms-control should focus on this problem, and identify the links made by the have-nots between arms-control issues and other issue areas. Western analysts and decisionmakers should better evaluate the options open for meeting the concerns of the developed and of the less-developed countries in the field of nonproliferation.

The Appeal of Demand-side Policies The recurrent theme of this book has been that supply-side policies can be helpful, but that demand-side measures are much more effective. For our contributors, lessening the need and the desire for powerful weaponry is the favoured non-proliferation measure. However, there is probably as much controversy among demand-side advocates as between supply-side proponents and opponents. For example, the opinions on great power security assurances as a demand-side measure are quite divergent. Pursuing the demand-side question a little further, we would find that some experts prefer regional arms-control agreements, and others expect multilateral ones. Some stress strong monitoring and verification of agreements, while others accept a measure of unguaranteed unilateral commitments. Some favour confidence-building measures

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over arms-control. Others believe only in conflict resolution. A good number would swear that economic development is the solution to all problems. These differences have surfaced at times in these chapters. This conclusion would have been incomplete without reference to these demand-side proposals. One could even propose a complete reading of this book from a demand-side perspective and come to interesting insights. However, to do justice to the demand-side approach to nonproliferation requires a study of the literature devoted solely to that subject. A striking feature of this book on supply-side measures has been the strong presence of demand-side concerns. This may be because some analysts ritually invoke demand-side policy proposals because of their reluctance to be perceived as technology-denial villains. However, as we noted before, the reason could be simply that supply-side strategies are not enthusiastically embraced. In any case, the message of this book to the decision-makers of the developed world appears to be that the insistence on supply-side policies is, to some extent, understandable, but that the time has come for more substantial efforts to reduce the appeal of militarization in the world.

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Appendix A MAJOR SUPPLIERS GROUPS

The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) COCOM was founded in 1949 to coordinate export controls by the Western powers on their sensitive materials and technologies. The target of COCOM was the Soviet Union and the other Communist states. Its members agreed on export-control lists covering weapons and ammunition, dual-use technologies, nuclear items, etc. The COCOM lists have been periodically updated. COCOM members have established a system of export permits and import receipts to monitor their trade in sensitive items. Membership: 15 (April 1992.) Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. (COCOM includes all NATO members except Iceland, as well as Japan and Australia.)

The Zangger Committee (Also called the "Nuclear Exporters' Committee/7) The Zangger Committee, named after Professor Claude Zangger who chaired it, was created by fifteen major nuclear exporters belonging to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It met between 1971 and 1974 to interpret article III 2) of the NPT that forbids each party from exporting fissionable materials or equipment to produce it without safeguards. The Committee's "Trigger List" of nuclear materials and equipment has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/209 in September 1974. Since then, the Committee has worked at updating the list by adding annexes. Membership: 22 (January 1992.) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech and Slovak Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

The Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) (Also called "Nuclear Suppliers7 Club/' "London Suppliers7 Group,77 "London Suppliers7 Club,77 and "London Club.77) The NSG first met in the Fall of 1974 at the American Embassy in London. It was created in the wake of the Indian nuclear test, to devise criteria covering the export of nuclear items to non-NPT clients. Its "Trigger List" was completed in September 1977, and was published by the IAEA in

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January 1978 as INFCIRC/254. It specifies a number of technologies in all aspects of the fuel cycle for which the transfer to a non-NPT member should be permitted only if IAEA-type safeguards are applied to them. The NSG was dormant during the 1980s, but was revived at a 1991 meeting in the Hague, following a Dutch proposal. It issued new guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related items at its April, 1992, Warsaw meeting. Membership: 14 (April 1992.) Belgium, Canada, Czech and Slovak Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. (The NSG membership resembles the Zangger Committee, with the notable addition of France.)

The Australia Group This group derives its name from its originator, which organized a meeting at its Paris Embassy in 1985, that assembled fifteen states interested in the control of chemical weapons. In 1991, the Australia Group drew up a list of fifty chemical "precursors" (ie, ingredients for chemical weapons) that have since been incorporated into the export-control lists of member states. Chemical weapons processing equipment is also covered by Australia Group guidelines. In 1991, it was decided to include in the list some biological and toxin agents, and equipment to produce them. Membership: 22 (April 1992.) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) During the mid-1980s, a group of seven states began to meet to devise a suppliers control system for ballistic missiles. In April 1987, it was announced that they had agreed to prohibit the dissemination of missiles of ranges of 300 km and over, and carrying a payload of 500 kg or greater. Membership: 20 (April 1992.) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Other suppliers, such as Russia, China, and Israel, have committed themselves to follow the MTCR rules.

Appendix B G7 DECLARATION ON ARMS TRANSFERS AND NON-PROLIFERATION

(Text of the Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NuclearBiological-Chemical Non-Proliferation issued on July 16, 1991, by the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA at their economic summit in London).

1.

At our meeting in Houston last year, we, the Heads of State and Government and the representatives of the European Community, underlined the threats to international security posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and of associated missile delivery systems. The Gulf Crisis has highlighted the dangers posed by the unchecked spread of these weapons and by excessive holdings of conventional weapons. The responsibility to prevent the re-emergence of such dangers is to be shared by both arms suppliers and recipient countries as well as the international community as a whole. As is clear from the various initiatives which several of us have proposed jointly and individually, we are each determined to tackle, in appropriate fora, these dangers both in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Conventional Anns Transfers 2. We accept that many states depend on arms imports to assure a reasonable level of security and the inherent right of self-defence is recognized in the United Nations Charter. Tensions will persist in international relations so long as underlying conflicts of interest are not tackled and resolved. But the Gulf conflict showed the way in which peace and stability can be undermined when a country is able to acquire a massive arsenal that goes far beyond the needs of selfdefense and threatens its neighbours. We are determined to ensure such abuse should not happen again. We believe that progress can be made if all states apply the three principles of transparency, consultation and action. 3. The principle of transparency, should be extended to international transfers of conventional weapons and associated military technology. As a step in this direction, we support the proposal for a universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations and will work for its early adoption. Such a register would alert the international community to an attempt by a state to build up

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LIMITING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS holdings of conventional weapons beyond a reasonable level. Information should be provided by all states on a regular basis after transfers have taken place. We also urge greater openness about overall holdings of conventional weapons. We believe the provision of such data, and a procedure for seeking clarification, would be a valuable confidence- and security-building measure.

4. The principle of consultation, should now be strengthened through the rapid implementation of recent initiatives for discussions among leading arms exporters with the aim of agreeing on a common approach to the guidelines that are applied in the transfer of conventional weapons. We welcome the recent opening of discussions on this subject. These include the encouraging talks in Paris among the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council on 8-9 July, as well as ongoing discussions within the framework of the European Community and its Member States. Each of us will continue to play a constructive part in this important process, in these and other appropriate fora. 5. The principle of action requires all of us to take steps to prevent the building up of disproportionate arsenals. To that end, all countries should refrain from arms transfers which would be destabilizing or would exacerbate existing tensions. Special restraint should be exercised in the transfer of advanced technology weapons and in sales to countries and areas of particular concern. A special effort should be made to define sensitive items and production capacity for advanced weapons, to the transfer of which similar restraints could be applied. All states should take steps to ensure that these criteria are strictly enforced. We intend to give these issues our continuing close attention. 6. Iraqi aggression and the ensuing Gulf War illustrate the huge costs to the international community of military conflict. We believe that moderation in the level of military expenditure is a key aspect of sound economic policy and good government. While all countries are struggling with competing claims on scarce resources, excessive spending on arms of all kinds diverts resources from the overriding need to tackle economic development. It can also build up large debts without creating the means by which these may be serviced. We note with favour the recent report issued by the United Nations Development Program and the recent decisions be several donor countries to take account of military expenditure where it is disproportionate when setting up aid programs and encourage all other donor countries to take similar action. We welcome the attention that the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President of the World Bank have recently given to excessive military spending, in the context of reducing unproductive public expenditure.

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Non-Proliferation 7. We are deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems. We are determined to combat this menace by strengthening and expanding the non-proliferation regimes. 8. Iraq must fully abide by Security Council Resolution 687, which sets out requirements for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its nuclear, biological and chemical warfare and missile capabilities, as well as for verification and long-term monitoring to ensure that Iraq's capability for such weapon systems is not developed in the future. Consistent with the relevant UN resolutions, we will provide every assistance to the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that they can fully carry out their tasks. 9. In the nuclear field, we: • reaffirm our will to work to establish the widest possible consensus in favour of an equitable and stable non-proliferation regime based on a balance between nuclear non-proliferation and development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; • reaffirm the importance of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and call on all other non-signatory states to subscribe to this agreement; • call on all non-nuclear-weapon states to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, which are the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime; • urge all supplier states to adopt and implement the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. We welcome the decision of Brazil and Argentina to conclude a fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, as well as the accession of South Africa to the NPT. 10. Each of us will also work to achieve: • our common purpose of maintaining a reinforcing the NPT regime beyond 1995; • a strengthened and improved IAEA safeguards system; • new measures in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure adequate export controls on dual-use items. 11. We anticipate that the Biological Weapons Review Conference in September will succeed in strengthening implementation of the Convention's existing provisions by reinforcing and extending it confidence-building measures and exploring the scope for effective

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verification measures. Each of us will encourage accession to the Convention by other states and urge all parties strictly to fulfil their obligations under the convention. We each believe that a successful Review Conference leading to strengthened implementation of the BTWC would make an important contribution to the preventing the proliferation of biological weapons. 12. The successful negotiation of a strong, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons, to which all states subscribe, is the best way to prevent the spread of chemical weapons. We welcome recent announcements by the United States which we believe will contribute to the swift conclusion of such a convention. We hope that the negotiation will be successfully concluded as soon as possible. We reaffirm our intention to become original parties to the convention. We urge others to become parties at the earliest opportunity so that it can enter into force as soon as possible. 13. We must also strengthen controls on exports that could contribute to the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. We welcome the measures taken by members of the Australia Group and by other states on the control of exports of chemical weapons precursors and related equipment. We seek to achieve increasingly close convergence of practice between all exporting states. We urge all states to support these efforts. 14. Our aim is a total and effective ban of chemical and biological weapons. Use of such weapons is an outrage against humanity. In the event that a state uses such weapons, each of us agrees to give immediate consideration to imposing severe measures against it both in the UN Security Council and elsewhere. 15. The spread of missile delivery systems has added a new dimension of instability to international security in many regions of the world. As the founders of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), we welcome its extension to many other states in the last two years. We endorse the joint appeal issued at the Tokyo MTCR meeting in March 1991 for all countries to adopt these guidelines. These are not intended to inhibit cooperation in the use of space for peaceful and scientific purposes. 16. We can make an important contribution to reducing the dangers of proliferation and conventional arms transfers. Our efforts and consultations on these issues, including with other supplier countries, will be continued in all appropriate fora so as to establish a new climate of global restraint. We will only succeed if others, including recipient countries, support us and if the international community unites in a new effort to remove these threats which can imperil the safety of all our peoples.

Appendix C MEETING OF THE PERMANENT FIVE ON ARMS TRANSFERS AND NON-PROLIFERATION IN LONDON, 17-18

OCTOBER 1991

(Joint Declaration Issued 18 October 1991) 1. In accordance with their agreement in Paris on 8 and 9 July 1991, representatives of the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, France, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics met in London on 17 and 18 October to take forward their discussions on issues related to conventional arms transfers and to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 2. Recalling the statement which was issued in Paris on 9 July, they: • agreed common guidelines for the export of conventional weapons (annexed). They expressed the hope that other arms exporting countries will adopt similar guidelines of restraint, • agreed to inform each other about transfers to the region of the Middle East, as a matter of priority, of tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, military aircraft and helicopters, naval vessels, and certain missile systems, without prejudice to existing commitments to other governments, • agreed to make arrangements to exchange information for the purpose of meaningful consultation, bearing in mind their shared concern to ensure the proper application of the agreed guidelines, and to continue discussions on how best to develop these arrangements on a global and regional basis in order to achieve this objective, • welcomed work at the United Nations General Assembly on the early establishment of a UN register of conventional arms transfers, and supported the current consultations on this issue between a wide range of UN members in which they are actively participating. They called for universal support for this work, • noted the threats to peace and stability posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, missiles etc., and undertook to seek effective measures of non-proliferation and arms control in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner on a global as well as on a regional basis. They reaffirmed the importance of maintaining stringent and, so far as

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Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers The People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, recalling and reaffirming the principles which they stated as result of their meeting in Paris on 8 and 9 July 1991, mindful of the dangers to peace and stability posed by the transfer of conventional weapons beyond levels needed for defensive purposes, reaffirming the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which implies that states have the right to acquire means of legitimate self defence, recalling that in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN Member States have undertaken to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, seeking to ensure that arms transferred are not used in violation of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, mindful of their special responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, reaffirming their commitment to seek effective measures to promote peace, security, stability and arms control on a global and regional basis in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner,

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noting the importance of encouraging international commerce for peaceful purposes, determined to adopt a serious, responsible and prudent attitude of restraint regarding arms transfers, declare that, when considering under their national control procedures conventional arms transfers, they intend to observe rules of restraint, and to act in accordance with the following guidelines: 1. They will consider carefully whether proposed transfers will: a) promote the capabilities of the recipient to meet needs for legitimate self defence, b) serve as an appropriate and proportionate response to the security and military threats confronting the recipient country, c) enhance the capability of the recipient to, participate in regional or other collective arrangements or other measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations or requested by the United Nations, 2. They will avoid transfers which would be likely to: a) prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict, b) increase tension in a region or contribute to regional instability, c) introduce destabilizing military capabilities in a region, d) contravene embargoes or other relevant internationally agreed restraints to which they are parties, e) be used other than for the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient state, f) support or encourage international terrorism, g) be used to interfere with the internal affairs of sovereign states, h) seriously undermine the recipient state's economy.

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Appendix D GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR-RELATED DUAL-USE EQUIPMENT, MATERIAL, AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY

Nuclear Suppliers' Group, Warsaw, April 3,1992 Objective 1. With the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, suppliers have had under consideration procedures in relation to the transfer of certain equipment, material and related technology that could make a major contribution to a "nuclear explosive activity " or an "unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity". In this connection, suppliers have agreed on the following principles, common definitions, and an export control list of equipment, material and related technology. The Guidelines are not designed to impede international cooperation as long as such cooperation will not contribute to a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity. Suppliers intend to implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation and relevant international commitments.

Basic Principle 2. Suppliers should not authorize transfers of equipment, material, or related technology identified in the Annex: • for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state in a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity, or • in general, when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Explanation of Terms 3. a) "Nuclear explosive activity " includes research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, testing or maintenance of any nuclear explosive device or components or subsystems of such a device. b) "Unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity" includes research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation or

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LIMITING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS maintenance of any reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, plant for the separation of isotopes of source of special fissionable material, or separate storage installation, where there is not obligation to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the relevant facility or installation, existing or future, when it contains any source or special fissionable material; or of any heavy water production plant where there is no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in connection with any heavy water produced therefrom; or where any such obligation is not met.

Establishment of Export Licensing Procedures 4. Suppliers should establish export licensing procedures for the transfer of equipment, material, and related technology identified in the Annex. These procedures should include enforcement measures for violations. In considering whether to authorize such transfers, suppliers should exercise prudence in order to carry out the Basic Principle and should take relevant factors into account, including: a) Whether the recipient state is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), or to a similar international legally binding nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and has an IAEA safeguards agreement in force applicable to all its peaceful nuclear activities; b) Whether any recipient state that is not party to the NPT, Treaty of Tlatelolco, or a similar international legally binding nuclear nonproliferation agreement has any facilities or installation listed in paragraph 3 b) above that are operational or being designed or constructed that are not, or will not be, subject to IAEA safeguards; c) Whether the equipment, material, or related technology to be transferred is appropriate for the stated end use and whether that stated end use is appropriate for the end user; d) Whether the equipment, material, or related technology to be transferred is to be used in research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of any reprocessing or enrichment facility; e) Whether governmental actions, statements, and policies of the recipient state are supportive of nuclear non-proliferation and whether the recipient state is in compliance with its international

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obligations in the field of non-proliferation; f) Whether the recipients have been engaged in clandestine or illegal activities; and g) Whether a transfer has not been authorized to the end user or whether the end user has diverted for purposes inconsistent with the Guidelines any transfer previously authorized.

Conditions for Transfers 5. In the process of determining that the transfer will not pose any unacceptable risk of diversion, in accordance with the Basic Principle and to meet the objectives of the Guidelines, the supplier should obtain, before authorizing the transfer and in a manner consistent with its national law and practices, the following: a) a statement from the end user specifying the uses and end use locations of the proposed transfers; and b) an assurance explicitly stating that the proposed transfer or any replica thereof will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity.

Consent Rights over Retransfers 6. Before authorizing the transfer of equipment, material, or related technology identified in the Annex to a country not adhering to the Guidelines, suppliers should obtain assurances that their consent will be secured, in a manner consistent with their national law and practices, prior to any retransfer to a third country of the equipment, material, or related technology, or any replica thereof.

Concluding Provisions 7. The supplier reserves to itself discretion as to the application of the Guidelines to other items of significance in addition to those identified in the Annex, and as to the application of other conditions for transfer that it may consider necessary in addition to those provided for in paragraph 5 of the Guidelines. 8. In furtherance of the effective implementation of the Guidelines, suppliers should, as necessary and appropriate, exchange relevant information and consult with other states adhering to the Guidelines. 9. In the interest of international peace and security, the adherence of all states to the Guidelines would be welcome.