Life, Body, Person and Self: A Reconsideration of Core Concepts in Bioethics from an Intercultural Perspective 9783495818121, 9783495488126

Citation preview

3TEPHAN 'RËTZEL %BERHARD 'UHE %DS

,IFE "ODY 0ERSON AND 3ELF

! 2ECONSIDERATION OF #ORE #ONCEPTS IN "IOETHICS FROM AN )NTERCULTURAL 0ERSPECTIVE 6%2,!' +!2, !,"%2

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121

.

3

Stephan Grätzel / Eberhard Guhe (Eds.) Life, Body, Person and Self

VERLAG KARL ALBER

A

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The editors: Dr. Stephan Grätzel is professor of philosophy and director of the section for practical philosophy at Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. Dr. Eberhard Guhe is associate professor of philosophy at the School of Philosophy of Fudan University/Shanghai. He teaches Sanskrit, Indian philosophy and modern logic. Editorial support: Christopher Nixon (MA), research associate at the section for practical philosophy of the philosophy department at Johannes GutenbergUniversity Mainz.

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Grätzel Eberhard Guhe (Eds.)

Life, Body, Person and Self A Reconsideration of Core Concepts in Bioethics from an Intercultural Perspective

Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg / München

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Diese Publikation wurde zusammen mit dem Projekt »Non-personale Begründung von Lebensrechten« von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft gefördert.

Originalausgabe © VERLAG KARL ALBER in der Verlag Herder GmbH, Freiburg / München 2016 Alle Rechte vorbehalten www.verlag-alber.de Redaktion: Christopher Nixon Umschlagmotiv: Predigender Buddha © bpk / Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin / Jürgen Liepe Satz und PDF-E-Book: SatzWeise GmbH, Trier ISBN (Buch) 978-3-495-48812-6 ISBN (PDF-E-Book) 978-3-495-81812-1

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Contents

Introduction

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Dirk Solies The Concept of Person – Shifting between the Conflicting Priorities of Rendering Our Practical Lives Meaningful and Providing Directions for Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Eberhard Guhe Menschenbild und Medizinethik vom Standpunkt des TheravādaBuddhismus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

Eberhard Guhe Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

Eberhard Guhe Transplantation from a Modern Buddhist Viewpoint

. . . . . .

59

Patricia Rehm-Grätzel The Person in Search of its Author – On Hannah Arendt’s Foundation of the Narrative Identity . . .

68

Stephan Grätzel Selfhood as a Condition for Justifying Life

. . . . . . . . . . .

80

Paul Nnodim The Conception of Person in African Philosophy: Personhood in Igbo Life and Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

Stephan Schaede Person – Body – Life. A Theological Stress Test of a Strained Term

100

5 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Contents

Michael von Brück Non-dualistic Models of Reality and Ethics. Buddhist Insights and Present Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . Eberhard Guhe Oceanic Boundlessness and the apramāṇa-Meditation

. . . . . 133

Alfred Weil Nowhere to Be Found. Self and Not-Self in the Pāli Canon . . . Mark Siderits Non-Self and Benevolence. Śāntideva’s Argument

119

144

. . . . . . . 161

Jonardon Ganeri Buddhism & Bioethics. A Theravāda Defence of Individual Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

176

Jens Schlieter The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«: Comparative Remarks on Recent Buddhist and Western Bioethical Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

193

Jonardon Ganeri Bioethics, Animalism, and the Possibility of Bodily Transfer . . .

238

Tobias Schlicht Selves – Or Something Near Enough . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

251

Matthias Koßler Body and Life, Philosophically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

278

Volker Caysa Rights of the Body and the »Common Body«

. . . . . . . . . 290

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

303

Introduction The present volume is the outcome of the joint effort of philosophers, indologists, theologians and experts on religious studies to specify the concepts »body, life, person« and »self« and to investigate their relevance to the current debate on bioethical issues such as abortion, prenatal diagnostics, organ donation, stem cell research, assisted suicide and euthanasia. By taking into account the perspectives of Western philosophy, Christian theology, classical Indian philosophy (Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools including Nyāya, Jainism and Cārvāka), contemporary Buddhism and African philosophy (Igbo) the editors try to give a multifaceted cross-cultural survey over explications of these concepts in philosophical and religious literature. Moreover, three contributors to this volume (Eberhard Guhe, Jens Schlieter and Michael von Brück) conducted interviews concerning bioethical issues with Buddhist monks, nuns and laymen in Sri Lanka, Dharamsala and Ladakh. The article »Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht« is a résumé of their field work. All the other articles in this volume are based on paper presentations on the occasion of two conferences hosted at the University of Mainz and at Fudan University/Shanghai. 1 The concept of person and how we understand it seems to be the pivot of discussions on bioethical problems in the West. Bioethical decisions are justified on the basis of certain faculties ascribed to persons. However, as pointed out by Dirk Solies in his article »The Concept of Person – Shifting between the Conflicting Priorities of Rendering Our Practical Lives Meaningful and Providing Directions for Action«, these criteria for personhood are only seemingly descriptive. They are rather chosen in order to promote or suppress the application of certain biomedical techniques. So, the person turns out to be a prescriptive construction and as such it cannot function as an objective empirical basis for bioethical decisions. Buddhism might offer a possible way forward in bioethical debates, since the Buddhist doctrine of non-selfhood is opposed to the assumption of a concept of a person as the owner of certain faculties. The conferences and the field work were part of a research project funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

1

7 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Introduction

However, there is also a concept of person in Buddhism, namely the so-called puggala. In his article »Menschenbild und Medizinethik aus der Sicht des Theravāda-Buddhismus« Eberhard Guhe explains the puggala-concept and its relevance to medical ethics from the point of view of Theravāda-Buddhism. The ethical implications of this concept of person are discussed in greater detail in his articles »Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht« and »Transplantation from a Modern Buddhist Viewpoint«. 2 Despite all differences there are also certain overlappings between the puggala-concept and the concept of person in Western and even in African culture. Patricia Rehm-Grätzel (cf. »The Person in Search of its Author – On Hannah Arendt’s Foundation of the Narrative Identity«) and Stephan Grätzel (cf. »Selfhood as a Condition for Justifying Life«) focus on the etymology of the word »person« which derives from persona, the Latin word for »mask«. In the ancient Greek drama a mask signified an actor’s role. According to Rehm-Grätzel repercussions of this original meaning of the word »person« can be found in Hannah Arendt’s concept of person. Arendt identifies a person with his or her role in society. Owing to the vicissitudes of life an individual may perform different roles at different times or even all at once. Our biographies are dynamic processes. Similarly, Buddhists regard the puggala as a constantly shifting psycho-physical complex. Apart from its dynamic character the puggala-concept is similar to the concept of person presented by Rehm-Grätzel and Grätzel in yet another respect, namely with regard to its embeddedness in a social context. As emphasized by Grätzel, the contours of a person take shape only due to one’s being confronted with partners in dialogue. Similarly, according to the Buddhist concept of the interdependence of all phenomena (Skr. pratītyasamutpāda, P. paṭiccasamuppāda) the puggala arises from the interaction with his social environment. There is an interesting parallel here in the philosophical tradition of Africa. As pointed out by Paul Nnodim, »African philosophers The articles »Menschenbild und Medizinethik aus der Sicht des Theravāda-Buddhismus« and »Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht« are published here in German, because the former article was the basis of the proposal for the above-mentioned project which was submitted to the DFG in German. The latter article is largely based on the final report, which was also submitted to the DFG in German. In order to avoid any further delay of the publication of the present volume as might have incurred from arranging appropriate English translations, the editors decided to leave these articles untranslated.

2

8 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Introduction

writing about the African conception of person during the colonial era had to distance themselves from Western liberal individualism« (»The Conception of Person in African Philosophy: Personhood in Igbo Life and Thought«, p. 87 f.). The Igbo of South Eastern Nigeria regard a person as »a creative articulation of his or her individuality within the matrix of social community. In a very fundamental sense, identity is thus shaped by the community« (ibid., p. 95). Mahāyāna-Buddhists like Nāgārjuna go even one step further and claim that the person is a purely relational phenomenon without any inherent existence (cf. Jens Schlieter’s contribution »The Ethical Significance of ›No-self‹ (anātman) and Human ›Dignity‹«, p. 210 f.). From a Western perspective this might seem rather odd. However, as noted by Stephan Schaede in his article »Person – Body – Life. A Theological Stress Test of a Strained Term«, we find similar intuitions concerning the concept of person in the works of Christian theologians who regarded the Trinity as consisting of three persons. Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther, e. g., distanced themselves from naïve anthropomorphic characterizations of God, Christ and Holy Spirit by conceiving of them as relational beings. Nevertheless, one should be aware that this relational concept of person was coined by Christian theologians in order to characterize divine persons, not human ones. From a Mahāyāna Buddhist point of view purely relational existence is even a universal feature of reality. All phenomena, once properly analyzed, turn out to be »empty« (śūnya), i. e. devoid of inherent existence. As noted by von Brück, matter should no longer be regarded as a mind-independent phenomenon. By referring to theories of the physicist David Bohm he describes reality as a fluctuating process in which the duality of mind and matter subsides: »[…] there is neither a mental realm next to a material realm, but describing the fluctuation of reality as an interrelational non-duality seems to be the best way to express this whole process.« (»Non-dualistic Models of Reality and Ethics. Buddhist Insights and Present Concerns«, p. 127) The doctrine of non-selfhood (anattā) is just an aspect of universal emptiness. Mark Siderits describes the gist of this doctrine as follows: »The point is to get us to see that our sense of there being an ›I‹ results from an understandable but remediable error. This is the real purport of the Buddha’s teaching of non-self, which is often understood as just the denial of any such entity as the self posited by the Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta schools of orthodox Indian philosophy 9 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Introduction

(or more recently by Cartesians). That denial is one part of the doctrine, but Buddhist philosophers generally recognize that this is not the most soteriologically important part.« (»Non-Self and Benevolence. Śāntideva’s Argument«, p. 169) As noted by Eberhard Guhe in his article »Oceanic Boundlessness and the apramāṇa-Meditation«, evidence for the illusionary nature of a stable self can be gathered from empirical sciences and meditative experiences. Guhe shows that Adolf Dittrich’s tripartite typology of altered states of consciousness (»veränderte Wachbewusstseinszustände«) can be mapped onto the kinds of transformations of a person’s sense of self which are described in classical Indian sources related to meditative practice. Since the sense of there being an »I« is a kind of default of our subjective experience, it requires some effort to abandon it. However, as Alfred Weil (former president of the German Buddhist Union) shows in his article »Nowhere to Be Found. Self and Not-Self in the Pāli Canon«, such a cognitive shift can be achieved at least partially even without meditating. For that purpose he formulates several maxims, which everybody can easily follow in his or her practical life. But what are the benefits of the doctrine of non-selfhood? Is it not rather detrimental to any kind of moral conduct? How should we prevent suffering if there is no owner? Siderits notes that according to Śāntideva suffering is »intrinsically bad, and its badness is just its tobe-preventedness« (»Non-Self and Benevolence. Śāntideva’s Argument«, p. 167). So, in the absence of a self there is still room for an ethical position which might be characterized as (negative) consequentialism. However, »we can all imagine scenarios in which taking a life would result in less overall suffering than would follow from any other available action. The difficulty is just that the cognitive distortions introduced by the ›I‹-sense make it difficult for the normal (unenlightened) agent to do the calculation accurately. Better that such beings follow a simple rule against killing, but also strive for an enlightenment that removes the distortions.« (ibid., p. 172 f.) In accordance with the Mahāyāna distinction between conventional and ultimate truth Siderits suggests a two-tier approach in ethics, which consists in »act consequentialism for the cognoscenti and some sort of indirect consequentialism (such as rule consequentialism and aretaic consequentialism) for those not yet free of the ignorance that results from taking our cognitive shortcuts too seriously.« (ibid., p. 172) »One thing Buddhist ethics might contribute here is a corrective to 10 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Introduction

the tendency in modern Western ethical theory to turn what is merely a tension arising out of practical necessities into a deep philosophical problem. There is no such problem, the Buddhist would claim, just understandable but remediable ignorance.« (ibid., p. 173 f.) Jonardon Ganeri addresses in his article »Buddhism & Bioethics. A Theravada Defence of Individual Autonomy« the danger of a potential impersonalist reading of the doctrine of non-selfhood, which would render it ethically counter-productive: »If Buddhist ›No Self‹ is interpreted in such a way that it implies the non-existence of the individual, then it situates Buddhism entirely outside any engagement with liberal political theory, human rights discourses, and contemporary conversations in bioethics. Instead of offering a radical and progressive alternative, impersonalism locates Buddhism as having its roots in fundamentally pre-modern attitudes towards the person.« (ibid., p. 182) Ganeri rather takes ›No Self‹ to be »the advice to cultivate a second-personal attitude towards one’s own mental states« (ibid., p. 186): »On the account presented here, there is no type difference between the way I relate to my own states and the way I relate to yours: the relationship in both cases is one of experiential empathy. That is enough to encourage altruism and even-handedness, since my states do not present themselves to me as mine, mine, mine.« (ibid., p. 187 f.) Jens Schlieter argues in his article »The Ethical Significance of ›No-self‹ (anātman) and Human ›Dignity‹« that it is rather a kind of first-person ethics which ensues from the doctrine of non-selfhood: »As a ›First Person Ethics‹ I would like to define any ethics which primarily focuses on what the agent does (his intentions, combined with his actions and their supposed long term effects). It is, to be more precise, an ethics of self-transformation, or self-cultivation.« (ibid., p. 204 f.) The first-person perspective raises questions such as »What is wholesome behavior for me facing the danger of ›I-conceit‹ ?« (ibid., p. 227) One may, however, wonder how human rights which hinge on respect for human dignity can be grounded in such a first-person ethics. A (victim-centred) third-person perspective seems to be called for. According to Schlieter there is a tension here between Buddhist ethics and Western human rights discourse. For a Buddhist the dignity of human life, i. e. its preciousness, derives from a kind a spiritual functionality, which consists in the possibility to use it for spiritual progress. 11 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Introduction

As indicated above, the Brahmanical schools in ancient Indian philosophy (Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Vedānta etc.) differ from Buddhist schools (except for the so-called Pudgalavādins), insofar as they do assume the existence of a substantial self, the so-called ātman. In his article »Bioethics, Animalism and the Possibility of Bodily Transfer« Jonardon Ganeri refers to Jains and Cārvākas, the school of materialists, as further opponents of the Buddhist doctrine of non-selfhood. The Cārvākas do not assume the existence of an immaterial soul, i. e. an ātman or a jīva (as it is called in Jinism), but they can be regarded as Animalists, i. e. self-as-body theorists. In taking the reference of ›I‹ to be the biological human being Animalism is incompatible with the idea of rebirth as a possibility that I might go from one body to another and survive the transfer. Ganeri argues that neither a theory which identifies the self with the body nor a theory according to which the self out-lasts the body can satisfy our intuitions about the concept of self. »The theory of self we are looking for is one for which having a first-person stance – an ability to conceive of my mental life as my own, including the ability to think of the states that depend on my body as my own bodily states – is a necessary condition on selfhood.« (ibid., p. 246) In Nyāya and in Jain sources he finds at least approximations to such an »embodied mind« theory. An Animalist concept of self is defended by Tobias Schlicht in his article »Selves – or something near enough«. Insofar as he rejects the Cartesian notion of a self as an independent substance or essence, Schlicht regards his position as still compatible with the Buddhist doctrine of non-selfhood. »Once the notion of self as substance or essence is rejected, there is room for different routes by which one may arrive at the self, or something near enough.« (ibid., p. 257) His concept of self derives from an attempt to develop an integrated theory of consciousness and intentionality. »A brief look at recent evidence from the cognitive sciences suggests that the subject or self of conscious experience and of intentionality should be understood as the whole animal, i. e. an embodied and embedded agent endowed with an arsenal of cognitive, affective and sensorimotor capacities.« (ibid., p. 274) In order to explicate the concept of animal (or organism) Schlicht refers to ideas of Varela, Maturana and Thompson from dynamical systems theory. Matthias Koßler expresses in his article »Body and Life, Philosophically« some doubts about the possibility of a philosophically adequate characterization of an organism via concepts from the sciences. 12 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Introduction

He argues that sciences deal only with the mere physicality of a body. As a body endowed with life an organism should not be reduced to a mere physical body. Koßler refers here to the semantic distinction between the German expressions »Körper« and »Leib«, which are commonly both rendered as »body« in English. Whereas »Körper« can refer to the mere physical body, the »Leib« is a »Körper« which is alive, an enlivened body. According to Koßler Arthur Schopenhauer’s understanding of the »Leib« as a manifestation of »the will to live« yields a philosophically fruitful analysis of the connection between body and life beyond the confines of purely scientific attributions. Although the word »Körper« can be used in a purely physical sense, a different meaning of »Körper« is at stake if we talk about the »Körper« of a human being. As noted by Volker Caysa in his article »Rights of the Body and the ›Common Body‹«, a human body has rights and needs to be protected from being treated like a mere physical object. In order to guard the body of a human being against any kind of abuse Caysa espouses trans-cultural minimal ethical norms which define a so-called »common body«. All the articles of the present volume are arranged in the order in which they have been introduced here. On a final note the editors would like to add the following acknowledgements: First of all, we are indebted to the German Research Foundation (DFG) for financing our project, i. e. the research tours to Sri Lanka, Dharamsala and Ladakh, the conferences in Mainz and in Shanghai, as well as the publication of the articles assembled here. Siriana Mouangué kindly helped to translate those articles into English which were originally submitted in German. Moreover, we would like to express our gratitude to Christopher Nixon for readying the manuscripts for publication and to the publisher »Karl Alber« for including the present volume in their program. Stephan Grätzel and Eberhard Guhe, May 2016

13 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Dirk Solies

The Concept of Person – Shifting between the Conflicting Priorities of Rendering Our Practical Lives Meaningful and Providing Directions for Action Whenever the concept of person is mentioned, we are usually confronted with a fascinating and at the same time confusing plurality of meanings, which often disturbs, hinders or even prevents an understanding of what is meant by this concept in a specific context. If we talk about a »person« we usually refer to ourselves as a persistent entity, that is, a mysterious as well as temporary continuity of our own biography, enabling us to recognize ourselves (despite individual developments) as being the same as twenty, thirty or forty years ago (at least in certain ways, which have to be defined more closely from case to case) – and that, even in spite of the fact that the manifest outer as well as inner features and states may have changed significantly between the stages, often to such an extent that the observation of a real continuity in certain individual cases may be very difficult to justify, compared to the discontinuity of shape, appearance and character. However difficult it may be to verify or justify such a continuity in certain cases – such an understanding of a person’s self is as necessary for the self-understanding, the self-interest and selfcare, as is the necessity to accept another person as a reference of action, as well as to be accepted by that other person. However, we also talk about a »person« (mostly in plural form) when we refer to our own personhood and (in connection with this aspect of meaning) to the personhood that is alien to us, thus to the immediate certainty that I view myself as well as the other individuals of my social surroundings as a potentially reliably acting entity whom I can expect to be endowed with a morally relevant and legally attributable behaviour (also if or especially if this expectation is sometimes disappointed). This second aspect of meaning results in the fact that persons are regarded as subjects of attribution – to be more precise, as the only subjects of attribution – of juristic rights and duties and therefore as 14 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Concept of Person

carriers of juristic rights and duties. In this sense, (and this usage of the word dates back to Hobbes’ doctrine of a »feigned and artificial person« that stands in contrast to a natural person) 1 we talk about a non-natural person. These above-mentioned aspects and their casuistic interactions are at stake if in bioethical debates (on active and passive euthanasia, on animal ethics, on questions of PID, on abortion rights etc.) the concept of person is debated in a controversial manner. The following observations are based on a strict distinction between two basic semantic complexes concerning the concept of person. One has to distinguish between the concept outlined above along with its indispensable constitutive function of rendering our practical lives meaningful and its moral and legal relevance as a guiding principle. The interest of a critical discussion lies in a strict separation of both understandings, even in those bioethical contexts that will become apparent to us during the discussion of the concept of person. Below we will first discuss the question of the practical relevance of the concept of person before turning to the criticism of a crypto-prescriptive use of the concept in bioethical debates. Finally, it will be analyzed how indispensable the concept of person really is in bioethical debates.

1.

Why Person? – On the Practical Relevance of the Concept of Person

If we look at the first of the above-mentioned aspects – person as selfascription – we see ourselves confronted with a collection of questions that can hardly be answered with reference to the construction of a »personal identity«: What is it that characterizes a person? Is it the »possession« of certain qualities or the »adoption of certain attitudes« that distinguishes a person from a non-person. When does a human being »become« a person? Is it legitimate to speak of a person from the moment Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter XVI: »Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated«: »A person is that man whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction. When they are considered as his own, then he is called a natural person; and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then he is a feigned or artificial person.«

1

15 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Dirk Solies

of birth or are there further attributive features that have to be fulfilled? When does personhood »end«? Does it only end with the individual death, or with the loss of certain mental abilities? And if so, which abilities belong to the pool of characteristics constituting a person? Am I really the same person I was twenty, thirty or more years ago – not in the sense of »being similar« but in the sense of »being the same«, thus, in the sense of identity? And if so, how could such an attribution of identity be justified? Who »belongs« to the circle of persons? No one would deny that human beings that are in full possession of their mental powers must be viewed as persons. From the bioethical debates of the past 30 years we know that the question whether all human beings can (at all times) be viewed as persons is just as difficult to answer as the opposing question, namely if some animal species should not also be equipped with individual rights. In his essay, »Personales Leben und menschlicher Tod«, Quante (2002) identifies four semantic fields for the concept of person: (1) Conditions of personality (2) Synchronic unity of a person (3) Diachronic persistence (4) Personhood. If we compare those four fields with the question concerning the practical relevance of the concept of person, it becomes obvious that the first semantic field (1) can be a topic in a bioethical context of discourse, while (2) to (4) cannot. The question therefore is which conditions (biological, mental, habitual) have to be fulfilled, so that one can legitimately speak of a person – we will have a closer look at those »characteristics constituting a person« later on. The resulting questions of the bioethical discourse are: • On the basis of which features and abilities can someone be regarded as a person? • Are all human beings at all times persons, or are there members within the biological species of Homo sapiens whose status as a person can be denied temporarily or permanently? • Can only human beings be persons, or are there certain animal species (or even only a few non-human individuals) that can be equipped with the same or similar rights (and perhaps also with obligations)? 16 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Concept of Person

Whenever these questions occur in bioethical debates, similar ethical cases of doubt are introduced – most of the time with a certain suggestively persuading ambition – in order to illustrate the ethical relevance of the subject more clearly: • Human zygotes and newborns undoubtedly do not yet have those mental capabilities that characterize developed persons; nevertheless, it would be counter-intuitive to treat them as a »thing«, as a non-person. • Often people suffering from severe dementia and people in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) do not possess those mental capabilities that constitute a person. Nonetheless, only a few ethical systems represent the point of view that the loss of these capabilities (actual or habitual) amount to a complete loss of their personal rights. The history of the legal regulation of euthanasia within European countries (for example the Netherlands) shows that a very extensive legal liberalization of euthanasia always increases problematic social developments. • Some higher developed animals (for example chimpanzees, orangutans) are capable of astonishingly complex mental performances. These include: temporal prospectivity, recognizing expressions of will as their own (interest), language usage, capability of using and producing tools etc. 2 On the basis of which right do we deny personal rights to this group of animals, leading activists and progressive thinkers of the animal rights movement might ask. Does this not (as was first claimed by Peter Singer), lead to an ethically untenable, thus, in a biological sense, chauvinistic »speciesism«? • Even our own treatment of the dead should be considered critically. Although, in a pragmatic way, there is no reason why the corpse of the deceased should not be »disposed of« – as we do with our household waste, for example – or why the corpse should not be hastily buried like the beloved pet. However, denying a beloved person an adequate funeral would deeply contradict our own moral attitudes. If we take a look at fundamental, society-building functions of a culture of the dead in different societies, it becomes obvious that the respect for former persons Not all of these achievements are indisputable in literature; nevertheless, the answer to the question whether certain animal species are capable of certain achievements is a question which cannot be answered philosophically.

2

17 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Dirk Solies

is something that is not only established firmly in our laws (such as, e. g., the criminal offence of disturbing the peace of the dead) but also in our moral institutions (Assmann 2005): the disposal of a corpse (which is also linguistically distinguished from carcass) unattended by weeping and singing would not only be illegal, but also disrespectful. What does this complicated hotchpotch mean for the definition of a human being or, also, for certain animal species or individuals as a person? In his essay, »Selbstbewusste Tiere und bewusstseinsfähige Maschinen« Dieter Birnbacher set up a preliminary as well as elucidating, rough classification of possible positions. According to Birnbacher there are two conflicting doctrines with regard to the concept of person: the doctrine of equivalence and the doctrine of non-equivalence. While the supporters of the doctrine of equivalence assume that, in principle, every human being at any given moment is a person and that, vice versa (as a general rule) only human beings can be viewed as persons, 3 the camp of the supporters of the non-equivalence doctrine can be divided into two to three camps that are characterized by a combination of two assumptions: (1) There are human beings that are not persons (repeatedly mentioned examples in the literature include: mentally retarded patients, comatose patients and patients in a persistent vegetative state.) (2) There are individuals that are persons without belonging to the biological species of Homo sapiens (chimpanzees, dolphins, whales etc.). (Birnbacher 2001) The views assigned to the doctrine of non-equivalence are therefore characterized by the fact that they either support the first statement or the second statement or both. It becomes immediately clear that the doctrine of non-equivalence is associated with the greatest potential for conflict with regard to traditional ethics. It is typical of the so-called »Western« (that is the European-Anglo-American) context (which is marked by a long historical tradition of ethics and moral philosophy) to regard only

Robert Spaemann is viewed as a representative of the doctrine of equivalence. »Es kann und darf nur ein einziges Kriterium für Personalität geben: die biologische Zugehörigkeit zum Menschengeschlecht«. (Spaemann 1996) Spaemann represents the view that all human beings are people. However, Spaemann also points out that this by no means automatically implies that only people can be human beings.

3

18 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Concept of Person

human beings (regardless of all possible individual or current limitations) as the only living beings capable of being a person. Therefore, Western culture provides only humans with rights, which are completely different from those rights granted to animals. This observation has a long tradition which even dates back to Plato and Aristotle, it can also be found in a similar form in Kant’s works and has even significantly shaped the thought of the »Philosophische Anthropologie« (especially in the works of Scheler, Plessner and Gehlen): it is always about the discovery of the specificum humanum, particularly in the face of the increasingly impressive insights into the common origin of and the morphological similarity between humans and higher developed animals. Therefore, only man is a possible subject of immediate rights, whereas the rights reserved for animals can only be, at best, of an indirect nature. 4 As is commonly known, it was Peter Singer with his radical claims and provocative case studies who caused a wave of indignation, initiating an intensive but in the end very productive debate on the status and relevance of the concept of person, especially in Germany. Particularly, by condemning speciesism he raised the question as to which characteristics justify the supremacy of a certain group of individuals in a morally relevant way. 5 The following cognitive skills are considered as constitutive (although not exhaustive) features of personhood: intentionality, temporal transcendence of the present (temporal prospectivity), selfawareness, distance to oneself, second order preferences and rationality, as well as moral capabilities such as autonomy, self-determination, moral conduct and morality, but also the capability of making commitments and of critically evaluating oneself (cf. Birnbacher 2001, p. 312).

Regan (2000) prominently adopted this position. Singer raised the charge of speciesism for the first time in: P. Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals. New York 1975; P. Singer, Practical Ethics. Cambridge 1979. These books followed in the 80’s: P. Singer, H. Kuhse, Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants. Oxford 1985 (dt.: Muß dieses Kind am Leben bleiben? Das Problem schwerstgeschädigter Neugeborener. Erlangen 1993) – the translation of the title alone might already have complicated the commencement of a neutral, not emotionally tinged discussion to a certain extent – as well as P. Singer: Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics. Melbourne 1994.

4 5

19 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Dirk Solies

2.

The Crypto-Prescriptive Status of the Concept of Person – a Conceptual Criticism

What exactly are we doing when we call a group of living beings »persons«? Whoever tries to answer this question is well advised to realize its performative claim, before thinking about attributions to the concept of person. In other words: before starting a controversial discussion of the concept of person, the question of the performative status of a sentence like »all x are persons« has to be settled – of course regardless of the question concerning the extension. In what follows, I will take the view that talking about personhood is in principal a crypto-prescriptive act, because, while camouflaged as a descriptive object definition, it is in fact a willful, moral prescription. In other words: By pretending to simply describe what seems to be the case, one actually shows what should be the case. Therefore, the use of the concept of person and its attribution to certain groups of individuals becomes a morally binding prescription that pretends to simply describe a fact. The extraordinary severity with which both sides – representatives of the doctrine of equivalence as well as representatives of the doctrine of non-equivalence – have dominated the discussion, is not only a consequence of the fact that all participants want to exemplify what has obviously already been included in the concept of person, while in reality the actual goal of the discussion is the question of which attributes are characteristic of a person and not the ethical conclusions that have to be drawn. If we describe certain groups of living beings as persons, we perform a discourse act which is not aligned with a description of situations, but with the prescription of collective norms of action. This discourse act becomes relevant where norms of action (individually identified as preferable) for such prescriptions are used and where utterances such as »all x are persons« are considered binding for morally acting subjects. Let us, first of all, recall what the term »discourse act« implies: A discourse act is an action which manifests itself through speech and especially via the coining of terms, i. e. with the intention of motivating other subjects to act. If, for example, during the Euro-crisis, German government representatives formulated the sentence »Naturally, Greece is a part of Europe«, this is not only considered as a statement, but as a discourse act in the sense mentioned above. A discourse act is therefore defined as an action that does more 20 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Concept of Person

than just stating facts. Sentences such as »It is July«, »This is a table«, or »Lunch break starts at 12 o’clock« are viewed as propositional statements. Discourse acts, however, intend to make promises to others, to annoy, to unsettle, to hurt, or to console them; but more than that – and this is where this train of thought becomes relevant for our problematic connection – discourse acts want to convince, persuade and induce people to do something. Let me clarify the difference by means of an example: The sentence »This is a table« can obtain a completely different meaning if I want to ask someone who is sitting on that table to refrain from doing so and to use a chair instead. The sentence »Lunch break starts at 12 o’clock« also obtains a completely different meaning if, during a meeting, the chairman uses it in order to address a speaker who, although at the end of his speaking time, seems to be unwilling to end his speech, etc. So what exactly does this mean for the statement »Naturally, Greece is a part of Europe«? This comment, of course, is not a geographical statement, but it signifies the attempt at a political specification: the alleged statement is in fact a political declaration of purpose, which is »I want Greece to stay in the Euro-zone«. Those thoughts may seem trivial at first – however, for the debate concerning the concept of person they have all of a sudden a central relevance if one considers that this purportedly descriptive statement »Naturally, Greece is a part of Europe« is not only a discourse act, but is also immediately understood by every informed listener – and rightfully so. Informed listeners would be surprised if someone who is familiar with Europe’s current economic situation (upon hearing this statement) were to take out an atlas in order to check the geographical accuracy of the utterance. Furthermore, this would amount to a basic misunderstanding of the discourse act. 6 But this is exactly the situation which we are confronted with when it comes to the ethical debate on the concept of person. The found facts – or, philosophically speaking – the ontological facts do

However, an analysis of the circumstances would be far more difficult if the listener is only insufficiently informed, or if the real facts mentioned in the statement could not be verified immediately. – How, for example, should a statement be weighted if discussing the affiliation of Turkey to Europe?

6

21 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Dirk Solies

not per se legitimize a relevant or binding statement in an ethically normative sense. By no means is this about the general (in philosophy highly disputed) and, within this formulation, unspecific problem of the naturalistically false conclusion to derive a »the-way-it-should-be« from a »the-way-it-is«. The issue is, in fact, that with the introduction of a certain concept – that is, the concept of person – the decision whether a certain amount of rights should be given to a certain group of living beings, is diverted to a purely conceptual field. The latter decision is an ethical one; it depends on certain presuppositions concerning the worth and appreciation of life, a consideration of interests and laws of humanity. A look at the argumentative status of the concept of person will clarify this point. Let us take, for instance, the so-called »school syllogism« that is well-known to every student of philosophy: Premise (1): All human beings are mortal. Premise (2): Socrates is a human being. Conclusion: Socrates is mortal. The premises (1) and (2) lead to the conclusion »Socrates is mortal« and if both premises (1) and (2) are true, then the conclusion has to be true. Furthermore, it expands the content; we learn something about the person Socrates that we did not know before or, more specifically, something that the term Socrates does imply. Only by identifying Socrates as a human being and by identifying human beings in general as mortal can we reach the content-expanding realization that the individual Socrates is mortal. This school syllogism does exactly what syllogisms generally do: it relates two terms (mortality, Socrates) by inserting human being as a middle term. And, provided that we accept human beings in general to be mortal and also the individual Socrates to be a human being, we cannot sensibly deny our assent to the conclusion that Socrates is in fact mortal. It is quite a different matter if we look at the ethical »person syllogism«: Premise (1): All persons have personal rights. Premise (2): The being X is a person. Conclusion: The being X has personal rights.

22 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Concept of Person

Although this syllogism, from a mere logical perspective, may be true, there is a difference between this syllogism and the school syllogism, since this time the middle term »person« is not well known. Because we do not know what a person is if and as long as we refrain from dealing with the question that results from it, namely, how these beings should be treated. Whoever deals with the concept of person only pretends to be deciding whether a being is a person or, more specifically, whether it can be viewed as a person. In reality, what the discussion is about is the ethical status of a human being – notabene the question which rights have to be awarded or denied. But this corresponds exactly to the criticism of a crypto-prescriptive use of the concept of person: Talking of a person is not a description of existing facts, but is the anticipative prescription of a deliberate ethical practice.

3.

Refraining from Using the Concept of Person – an Alternative?

In the past the polemic regarding the concept of person had already led well-known authors to call for the abolition of the concept from ethical debates. In her book, »Personsein in Grenzsituationen«, Thea Rehbock takes the attitude that the concept could and should not be a decisive criterion for solving bioethical problems. Dieter Birnbacher, who we quoted above, points to a necessity for »eine feinkörnige Analyse und Begründung moralischer Rechte« (a fine-grained analysis and justification of moral rights): »Ein Verzicht auf den Personenbegriff bietet Chancen für eine feinkörnigere Analyse und Begründung moralischer Rechte. Eine Person zu sein, ist eine Alles-oder-Nichts-Angelegenheit, während man bestimmte moralische Rechte haben kann, ohne jedes mögliche moralische Recht zu haben.« (Birnbacher 1997, p. 76). (A renunciation of the concept of person offers opportunities for a more fine-grained analysis and justification of moral rights. To be a person is an all-or-nothing-matter: one can have certain moral rights without having every possible moral right.)

Viewed from the perspective of this criticism regarding the cryptoprescriptive use of the concept of person, there is only one thing to be added, namely that a renunciation of the concept does not affect the semantic significance of the concept »person« as a temporally persis23 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Dirk Solies

tent entity, as described in the beginning. Seeing oneself as such a personal identity, a temporally persistent entity, is possible even if one decided to make the decision whether a certain living being or a group of living beings should be awarded certain rights independent from the concept used. The first is a necessity of an individual performance of identification, which every individual constantly executes – it is the contrastive dealing with Buddhist approaches that will clarify whether it has to be like this. The decision as to whether such an identification of the self is desired or not depends on religious-ideological decisions that do not necessarily fall within the scope of ethical decision making. But regardless of this practical (desirable or undesirable) semantic significance of the concept of person, its disputed moral and juridical relevance still have to be decided upon. The previous analysis has shown that an attribution of rights on the basis of the concept of person is problematic, since a concept is being introduced that does not simplify ethical decision-making, but unnecessarily complicates and emotionalizes it instead, since the central concept of individual self-identification is used for an ethical decision. The attribution of rights has to be based on criteria of gradualism, that is, on different criteria, of which the capacity of consciousness (as the debate initiated by Singer has shown) is only one among many others. A true human viewpoint would furthermore always have to take into account the similarity between humans and some animals. The cultural- and religious-contrastive analysis of the concept of person, and of ethical decision-making practice will provide valuable insights on this topic.

Literature Birnbacher, Dieter 1997. Das Dilemma des Personenbegriffs, in: Peter Strasser/ Edgar Starz (ed.): Personsein aus bioethischer Sicht, Stuttgart 1997 (ARSPBeiheft 73), pp. 9–25. Reprint in: Dieter Birnbacher, Bioethik zwischen Natur und Interesse. Frankfurt am Main 2006, pp. 53–76. Birnbacher, Dieter 2001. Selbstbewußte Tiere und bewußtseinsfähige Maschinen – Grenzgänge am Rand des Personenbegriffs«, in: Dieter Sturma (ed.): Person. Philosophiegeschichte – Theoretische Philosophie – Praktische Philosophie, Paderborn, pp. 301–321. Quante, Michael 2002. Personales Leben und menschlicher Tod. Personale Identität als Prinzip der biomedizinischen Ethik, Frankfurt am Main.

24 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Concept of Person Regan, Tom 2000. The case for animal rights, Berkeley. Rehbock, Thea 2005. Personsein in Grenzsituationen: Zur Kritik der Ethik medizinischen Handelns, Paderborn. Spaemann, Robert 1996. Personen. Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen »etwas« und »jemand«, Stuttgart. Singer, Peter 1975. Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals, New York. Singer, Peter 1979. Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

25 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

Menschenbild und Medizinethik vom Standpunkt des Theravāda-Buddhismus

Im Folgenden sollen das Menschenbild des Theravāda-Buddhismus und seine Implikationen für die Medizin-Ethik erörtert werden, wobei wir insbesondere der Frage nachgehen werden, ob die Ethik des Theravāda-Buddhismus – ähnlich wie in der abendländischen Philosophie – an einen Personenbegriff geknüpft ist. Der erste Teil des vorliegenden Beitrags bietet Hintergrund-Informationen zur Entstehung des Theravāda-Buddhismus und zu den Werken der Theravāda-Literatur, auf die wir hier Bezug nehmen werden. Als nächstes wird die Lehre von den sogenannten »Aggregaten« (P. khandhā) erörtert. Es handelt sich dabei um die Gegebenheiten, die nach Theravāda-Lehre den Menschen konstituieren. Im dritten Teil soll anhand des Wagengleichnisses aus dem der Theravāda-Tradition zugeordneten Milindapañha untersucht werden, ob man dem Theravāda-Buddhismus einen Personenbegriff zuschreiben kann. Im vierten Teil sollen die Unterschiede zwischen der stark am Personenbegriff orientierten westlichen Medizin-Ethik und der Theravāda-Ethik aufgezeigt werden.

1. Als »Theravāda« bezeichnet man eine Richtung innerhalb des Buddhismus, die bis heute in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Kambodscha, Laos und teilweise auch in Vietnam verbreitet ist. Die Entstehung des Theravāda-Buddhismus geht auf eine Spaltung der buddhistischen Gemeinde im 3. Jh. v. Chr. zurück, bei der der Orden in die beiden Sekten der »Sthaviras«, d. h. der konservativen »Ältesten« und der »Mahāsāṅghikas«, d. h. der »der großen Gemeinde Zugehörigen« zerbrach. Ein möglicher Auslöser dieser Spaltung war ein Meinungsstreit über die Eigenschaften des sogenannten »Arhat«, d. h. des buddhistischen Heiligen, der, nachdem er die buddhistische 26 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Menschenbild und Medizinethik vom Standpunkt des Theravāda-Buddhismus

Lehre kennengelernt hat, den Erlösungsweg des Buddha zu Ende gegangen ist und das Nirvāṇa erlangt hat. Den Ehrentitel eines Arhat wollten natürlich möglichst viele Mönche haben, s. d. manche die Anforderungen an die Erlangung dieses Ehrentitels herunterschrauben wollten, indem man z. B. zuließ, dass ein Arhat noch nicht frei sein müsse von Unwissenheit und Zweifeln, oder dass er auch mit fremder Hilfe auf dem Erlösungsweg fortschreiten könne. Solchen Liberalisierungstendenzen, für die sich die Mahāsāṅghikas einsetzten, wollten die Sthaviras entgegenwirken, indem sie die aus ihrer Sicht ursprüngliche und unverfälschte Lehre in eine strenge Form gossen. Zu diesem Zweck wurde von einer Sekte der Sthaviras, nämlich den Vibhajyavādins, der sogenannte Pāli-Kanon verfasst. Benannt ist dieses Werk nach der Sprache, die man dafür verwendete, nämlich dem Pāli. Im Pāli wird die Sanskrit-Bezeichnung Sthavira mit »Thera« wiedergegeben. »Theravāda« bedeutet somit »Lehre der Ältesten«. Der Pāli-Kanon, auf den sich die Theravāda-Buddhisten berufen, besteht aus drei Teilen und wird deshalb auch »Tipiṭaka« (wörtl. »Dreikorb«) genannt, nämlich aus der Sammlung der Ordensregeln für die buddhistischen Mönche und Nonnen (Vinayapiṭaka), der Sammlung der Lehrreden des Buddha (Suttapiṭaka) und der Sammlung der systematischen Abhandlung über die Lehre (Abhidhammapiṭaka). Zu den Quellen, auf die ich mich im Folgenden stützen werde, um das Menschenbild im Theravāda-Buddhismus herauszuarbeiten, gehören neben dem Pāli-Kanon noch zwei weitere Werke der klassischen Theravāda-Literatur, nämlich »Visuddhimagga« und »Milindapañha«. Der Visuddhimagga (»Weg zur Reinheit«) wurde im 5. Jh. n. Chr. von Buddhaghosa verfasst und bildet unter den in der PāliSprache erhaltenen Werken die bedeutendste und umfangreichste Darstellung des gesamten buddhistischen Lehrgebäudes. Der anonym überlieferte Milindapañha, der vermutlich aus dem 1. Jh. v. Chr. stammt, wurde ursprünglich in einem nordwestindischen Dialekt verfasst. Erhalten sind aber nur Übersetzungen ins Pāli und ins Chinesische. Es handelt sich bei diesem Werk gewissermaßen um das Protokoll eines (möglicherweise sogar authentischen) Dialogs zwischen einem buddhistischen Mönch namens Nāgasena und einem griechischen König namens Menandros. »Menandros« wird im Pāli mit »Milinda« wiedergegeben. So erklärt sich der Titel »Milindapañha«, was soviel bedeutet wie »Die Fragen des Milinda (bzw. Menandros)«. Die Fragen, die Menandros Nāgasena in diesem Werk stellt, 27 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

drehen sich um die Lehren des Buddhismus, denen der König zunächst skeptisch gegenübersteht. Am Ende gelingt es Nāgasena aber, Menandros’ herausfordernde Fragen überzeugend zu beantworten, s. d. dieser Buddhist wird. Einen König namens Menandros hat es tatsächlich gegeben. Er beherrschte um die Mitte des 2. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. ein indo-griechisches Königreich im Nordwesten des Subkontinents, eines jener Staatengebilde, die nach dem Ende des Alexanderfeldzuges im östlichen Teil des von ihm eroberten Gebiets entstanden ist. Die uns erhaltenen Quellen über die politische Geschichte jener Zeit sind in mancher Hinsicht recht widersprüchlich, doch darf als gesichert gelten, dass Menandros einer der bedeutendsten indo-griechischen Herrscher gewesen ist. Er hat seinen Machtbereich weiter ins nordindische Kernland ausgedehnt als seine Vorgänger, weit über das IndusLand hinaus.

2. Die Faktoren, aus denen sich aus der Sicht des Theravāda-Buddhismus ein Mensch (oder auch ein Tier) zusammensetzt, sind die sogenannten fünf »Aggregate« (P. khandhā). Sie umfassen das gesamte leibliche und geistige Dasein. Es handelt sich dabei um den Körper (P./Skr. rūpa), das Erkennen bzw. das Bewusstsein (P. viññāṇa) als zentrale geistige Instanz und drei weitere geistige Faktoren, nämlich das Gefühl (P./Skr. vedanā), die Wahrnehmung (P. saññā) und die Gestaltungen (P. saṅkhārā). Die geistigen Faktoren mit Ausnahme des Erkennens, also das Gefühl, die Wahrnehmung und die Gestaltungen werden als »Name« bezeichnet, wobei man zuweilen auch noch das »Erkennen« unter den Begriff »Name« subsumierte. Der Körper wird als »Form« bezeichnet. Name und Form, für die man im Theravāda-Buddhismus das Kompositum nāmarūpa (P./Skr.) verwendet, und das Erkennen sind also die Gegebenheiten, die einen Menschen oder auch ein Tier konstituieren. Die eigenartige Bezeichnung »Name« hat ihren Ursprung wahrscheinlich in vedischen Vorstellungen, denen zufolge der Name einer Person »ausdrückt, was nur diese Person und keine andere ist.« (Oldenberg 1921, S. 256) Nach Oldenberg ist die Vorstellung, dass die als »Name« bezeichneten Faktoren etwas mit der Individualität zu tun 28 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Menschenbild und Medizinethik vom Standpunkt des Theravāda-Buddhismus

haben, »auch aus den buddhistischen Texten nicht ganz verschwunden.« (a. a. O.) Allerdings wäre es verfehlt, den Namen oder auch das Erkennen als eine Art statischen Wesenskern oder als eine Seele zu betrachten. »Körper wie Seele existiert nicht als eine in sich geschlossene, sich in sich selbst behauptende Substanz, sondern allein als ein Komplex von mannigfach sich verschlingenden Prozessen des Entstehens und Vergehens. […] Wir müssen uns hier der Vorstellungsweise völlig entäußern, welche das Innenleben nur dann als ein verständliches gelten lässt, wenn sie seinen wechselnden Inhalt, jedes einzelne Gefühl, jeden Willensakt zu einem und demselben bleibenden Ich in Beziehung setzen darf. Diese Art zu denken widerstrebt dem Buddhismus von Grund aus. Hier wie überall verwirft er den Halt, den wir dem Treiben der gehenden und kommenden Ereignisse durch die Vorstellung einer Substanz, an oder in welcher jene sich ereignen, zu geben lieben. Ein Sehen, ein Hören, ein Erkennen, vor allem ein Leiden findet statt; von einer Wesenheit aber, die das Sehende, Hörende, Leidende wäre, weiß die buddhistische Lehre nichts.« (Oldenberg 1921, S. 290 f.)

Im Pāli-Kanon stellt Buddha in der berühmten Rede von den Kennzeichen des Nicht-Ich klar, dass es keinerlei Zusammenhang gibt zwischen den Aggregaten und der in den Upaniṣaden vertretenen vorbuddhistischen Lehre von einer unvergänglichen Individualseele, einem »Selbst« (Skr. ātman), das den Tod des Körpers überdauert: 1 Bārāṇasiyaṃ nidānaṃ Migadāye || || 2–3 Tatra kho Bhagavā pañcavaggiye bhikkhū āmantesi || la || etad avoca || || 3 Rūpam bhikkhave anattā || rūpañ ca bhikkhave attā abhavissa nayidaṃ rūpaṃ ābādhāya saṃvatteyya || labbhetha ca rūpe Evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosīti || || 4 Yasmā ca kho bhikkhave rūpam anattā tasmā rūpam ābādhāya saṃvattati || na ca labbhati rūpe Evam me rūpaṃ hotu evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosīti || || 5 Vedanā anattā || vedanā ca hidam bhikkhave attā abhavissa na yidaṃ vedanā ābādhāya saṃvatteyya || labbhetha ca vedanāya Evaṃ me vedanā hotu evaṃ me vedanā mā ahosīti || || (SN, 22.59, 1–5 [S. 66 f.]) – »At Benares, in the Deer Park was the occasion (for this discourse). At that time the Exalted One thus addressed the band of five brethren: ›Body, brethren, is not the Self. If body, brethren, were the Self, then body would not be involved in sickness, and one could say of body: ›Thus let my body be. Thus let my body not be.‹ But, brethren, inasmauch as body is not the Self, that is why body is involved in sickness, and one cannot say of body: ›thus let my body be; thus let my body not be.‹ Feeling is not the Self. If feeling, brethren, were the Self, then feeling would not be involved in sickness, and one could say of feeling: ›thus let my feeling be; thus let my feeling not be.‹ […]‹« (Woodward 1992, S. 59)

29 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

In derselben Weise wird auch in Bezug auf die anderen Aggregate klargestellt, dass sie nicht mit dem Selbst gleichzusetzen sind. Dann fährt Buddha mit der folgenden Bemerkung zum Körper fort: 17 Tasmā ti ha bhikkhave yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannam ajjahattam vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā panītaṃ vā || yaṃ dūre santike vā sabbaṃ rūpaṃ netam mama neso ham asmi na meso attāti evam etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammāppaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ || 18 Yā kāci vedanā || || 19 Yā kāci saññā || || 20 Ye keci saṅkhārā || || 21 Yaṃ kiñci viññāṇaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjahattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā panītaṃ vā || yaṃ dūre santike vā sabbaṃ viññāṇaṃ netam mama neso ham asmi na meso attāti evam etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ || (SN, 22.59, 12–21 [S. 68]) – »›Therefore, brethren, every body whatever, be it past, future or present, be it inward or outward, gross or subtle, low or high, far or near, – every body should be thus regarded, as it really is, by right insight, – ›this is not mine; this am not I; this is not the Self of me.‹ Every feeling whatever, every perception whatever, all activities whatsoever (must be so regarded). Every consciousness whatever, be it past, future or present, be it inward or outward, gross or subtle, low or high, far or near, – every consciousness, I say, must be thus regarded, as it really is, by right insight: ›this is not mine; this am not I; this is not the Self of me.‹« (Woodward 1992, S. 60)

Wenn man die Aggregate als die Bausteine der »Persönlichkeit« deuten möchte (vgl. Frauwallner 1953, S. 207), so muss man dabei auf jeden Fall von einem dynamischen Verständnis des Persönlichkeitsbegriffs ausgehen. Oldenberg bezeichnet die Aggregate treffend als »Funktionen« (Oldenberg 1921, S. 256). Man könnte diese Auffassung vielleicht sogar im mathematischen Sinne weiterdenken und die Aggregate als sich in Abhängigkeit von der Zeit verändernde Zustände deuten, die graphisch als zwar stetige aber auf keinem Intervall konstante Kurven darstellbar sind. Nun wird auch klar, warum man die fünf Gegebenheiten, die einen Menschen oder ein Tier konstituieren, als »Aggregate« (d. h. als aus mehreren Teilen zusammengesetzte Gebilde) betrachtet hat. Aggregate sind sie in dem Sinne, dass jede dieser Gegebenheiten eine Gesamtheit bzw. ein Aggregat von wechselnden Zuständen ist. Dies gilt auch für die geistigen Gegebenheiten, von denen man jede einzelne – im Gegensatz zu dem aus mehreren organischen Bestandteilen zusammengesetzten Körper – sonst nur schwer als aus mehreren Teilen zusammengesetztes Gebilde interpretieren könnte. Betrachten wir nun die fünf Aggregate im Einzelnen: 30 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Menschenbild und Medizinethik vom Standpunkt des Theravāda-Buddhismus

rūpa (Körper): Damit ist der physische Organismus gemeint, der aus den Elementen Erde, Wasser, Feuer und Luft gebildet ist. Im Gegensatz dazu handelt es sich bei den anderen Aggregaten um immaterielle Funktionen. • vedanā (Gefühl): Das Gefühl gliedert sich in körperliches und geistiges Wohlgefühl, körperliches und geistiges Schmerzempfinden und Indifferenz. • saññā (Wahrnehmung): Damit ist nicht nur der bloße Sinneseindruck gemeint, sondern auch die Weiterleitung der Sinnesreize und deren Verarbeitung im Gehirn. • saṅkhārā (Gestaltungen): Der buddhistischen Erlösungslehre zufolge erzeugen die guten und bösen Taten, die man auch als »Karma« bezeichnet, unbewusste Einprägungen oder Gestaltungen (saṅkhārā). Nach Oldenberg handelt es sich dabei um »Dispositionen des Wollens und Handelns« (Oldenberg 1921, S. 281). Diese sorgen dafür, dass sich der Mensch zwanghaft und automatisch in gleichen Situationen immer wieder gleich verhält, und sie bestimmen die Art seiner Wiedergeburt. Um sich von dem Zwang zu neuen Wiedergeburten zu befreien, müssen die Gestaltungen bewusst gemacht und dadurch aufgelöst werden. • viññāṇa (Bewusstsein, Erkennen): Das Bewsstsein kann, »wenn der Körper mit einer Stadt verglichen wird, als der Herr dieser Stadt angesprochen werden […]« (Oldenberg 1921, S. 291). Es hat insbesondere die Funktion, die Sinneswahrnehmungen bewusst zu machen und so ein Erkennen durch die Sinne zu ermöglichen. 1 Außerdem ist es der Träger des Geburtenkreislaufs und wirkt nach seinem Eingehen in einen neuen Mutterschoß als eine Art »formende Kraft […], die aus den materiellen Elementen ein Wesen, das seinen Namen trägt und mit einem Körper bekleidet ist, entstehen läßt.« (a. a. O., S. 261) Es handelt sich bei dem Bewusstsein jedoch nicht um einen beharrenden Wesenskern, der die Wiedergeburt transzendiert. Das Bewusstsein einer neuen Wiedergeburt entsteht kurz vor dem Eintritt des Todes in der vorhergehenden Wiedergeburt (vgl. VM, S. 472 f. und Nyanatiloka 21952, S. 653 f.). Es ist von dem Bewusstsein der vorhergehenden Wiedergeburt verschieden. Für den Übertritt des neuen •

1 I. allg. wird das Denken (manas), das zum Erfassen abstrakter Gegebenheiten dient, ebenfalls als Sinnesorgan (neben den gewöhnlichen fünf Sinnen) betrachtet.

31 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

Bewusstseins, das im Herzen des sterbenden Körpers entsteht (vgl. a. a. O.), in eine neue Existenz, wird das Bild eines Mannes herangezogen, der einen Wassergraben überschreitet, indem er sich an einem Seile festhält, das an einem Baume am diesseitigen Ufer befestigt ist. (vgl. VM, S. 473 and Nyanatiloka 21952, S. 654) Der Zusammenhang zwischen altem und neuem Bewusstsein wird anhand von Bildern wie dem des Echos, des Lampenlichts, des Siegelabdrucks oder des Spiegelbildes verdeutlicht (vgl. a. a. O.). Eine gewisse Bewusstseins-Kontinuität wird also durchaus zugestanden – übrigens auch innerhalb der aktuellen Wiedergeburt, wie im Milindapañha der Mönch Nāgasena dem König Menandros erklärt: Ahañ ñeva kho mahārāja daharo ahosiṃ taruṇo mando uttānaseyyako, ahañ ñeva etarahi mahanto, imañ ñeva kāyaṃ nissāya sabbe te ekasangahītā ti. […], tena na ca so na ca añño pacchimaviññāṇasangahaṃ gacchatīti. (MP, S. 40) – »Ich, o König, war damals der kleine, junge, unmündige Säugling, und ich bin jetzt der Erwachsene. Denn basierend auf eben diesem Körper werden alle diese [Zustände des Kindes und des Erwachsenen] einheitlich zusammengefasst. […] Daher ist [das Kind] nicht dasselbe wie [der Erwachsene], aber ist auch kein anderer. In [seinem] früheren Bewußtsein ist das spätere Bewußtsein einbegriffen.« (Nyanatiloka/ Nyanaponika 1985, S. 65 f.)

Aber das Bewusstsein einer früheren Existenz ist tot, wenn es zu einer neuen Wiedergeburt kommt. Im Pāli-Kanon (Majjhima Nikāya Nr. 38) wird erzählt, wie der Mönch Sāti von Buddha scharf zurechtgewiesen wird, weil er behauptet, idaṃ viññāṇaṃ sandhāvati saṃsarati, anaññan ti. (MN, 4.8.38 [S. 256]) – »›[…], that it is this consciousness itself that runs on, fares on, not another.‹« (Horner 1993, S. 312). Im Milindapañha antwortet Nāgasena auf die Frage des Königs Menandros, ob der, der wiedergeboren wird, derselbe ist wie der, der stirbt, oder ein anderer: […], tena na ca so na ca añño pacchimaviññāṇasangahaṃ gacchatīti. (MP, S. 41) – »Daher ist es weder derselbe noch ein anderer, (der wiedergeboren wird). Im früheren Bewusstsein ist das spätere Bewusstsein einbegriffen.« (Nyanatiloka/Nyanaponika 1985, S. 66)

Das neue Bewusstsein ist »der Keim eines neuen Wesens; im Mutterleibe findet dieser geistige Keim die materiellen Stoffe, aus denen er ein neues […] Dasein bildet.« (Oldenberg 1921, S. 259) So entsteht das »als Kalala-Stadium bezeichnete (embryonale) Körpergebilde 32 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Menschenbild und Medizinethik vom Standpunkt des Theravāda-Buddhismus

[…] und es sieht aus wie ein an einem feinen Wollfaden hängendes Tröpfchen Butterölschaum 2.« (Nyanatiloka 21952, S. 651) Schon im »Tröpfchen«-Stadium manifestieren sich alle Aggregate, die die menschliche Existenz ausmachen, insbesondere auch das Bewusstsein.

3. Wie wir gesehen haben, hatte der Buddha in seiner Rede von den Kennzeichen des Nicht-Ich der Ātman-Konzeption der brahmanischen Philosophie seine anattā-Lehre gegenübergestellt, derzufolge keines der Elemente unserer psycho-physischen Existenz in den Rang eines ewigen und statischen Wesenskerns erhoben werden kann (vgl. Frauwallner, S. 194). Die Frage, ob es überhaupt eine Seele gibt, lässt er dabei offen. Es geht ihm nur darum, zu zeigen, dass die Aggregate des psycho-physischen Organismus von anderer Natur sind (nämlich vergänglich und daher leidbehaftet). Später wurde die anattā-Lehre dahingehend zugespitzt, dass man die Existenz einer Seele, ja sogar einer Person bzw. eines Ichs als Subjekt des Denkens, Fühlens und Handelns bestritt. Berühmt ist das folgende gegen die »Wahnidee von einem ›Ich‹ (atta)« (Nyanatiloka 21952, S. 553 f.) gerichtete Diktum Buddhaghosas: Dukkham eva hi, na koci dukkhito, kārako na, kiriyā va vijjati, atthi nibbuti, na nibbuto pumā, maggam atthi, gamako na vijjatī ti. (VM, S. 436) »Bloß Leiden gibt es, doch kein Leidender ist da. Bloß Taten gibt es, doch kein Täter findet sich, Erlösung gibt es, doch nicht den erlösten Mann. Den Pfad gibt es, doch keinen Wand’rer sieht man da.« (Nyanatiloka 21952, S. 597)

Es gibt aber andererseits im Theravāda-Buddhismus auch Ansätze zur Etablierung eines Personenbegriffs, wie Oetke (vgl. Oetke 1988) gezeigt hat. Dabei rekurrierte man auf einen Begriff, mit dem in an2 […] ekena aṃsunā uddhaṭa sappimaṇḍappamāṇaṃ […] (VM, S. 471). Wörtlich: »[…] es sieht aus wie der mit einem Faden herausgezogene Schaum geklärter Butter […]«.

33 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

derem Sinne auch die heterodoxe buddhistische Splittergruppe der Pudgalavādins operierte. Diese war der (wohlgemerkt nicht im Theravāda-Buddhismus vertretenen) Auffassung, dass die Aggregate einen Träger haben, nämlich den sogenannten pudgala (P. puggala). Der Sanskrit-Begriff pudgala kann vermutlich in der indischen Philosophie am ehesten als bedeutungsmäßige Entsprechung zum Begriff der Person betrachtet werden: Nach dem »English-Sinhala Dictionary« von Somapala Jayawardhana ist im Singhalesischen, einer Sprache, deren Begriffswelt stark vom Buddhismus geprägt ist, das engliche Wort »person« mit pudgalayā (als der singhalesierten Form von pudgala) übersetzbar. Ebenso hält es Oetke für »nicht unwahrscheinlich«, dass pudgala ein Begriff ist, »der mit unserem Begriff der Person oder dem des Lebewesens koextensiv ist, oder wenn nicht dies, so doch ein Begriff, dessen Extension sich mit den Begriffen Person oder Lebewesen überschneidet.« (Oetke 1988, S. 180) Die Pudgalavādins knüpfen mit ihrem Verständnis des pudgala als Träger der Aggregate an das Lastträgergleichnis im Bharatasutta des Saṃyuttanikāya an. Die fünf Aggregate sind i. S. dieses Gleichnisses die Last. Das Aufnehmen der Last ist der Durst, der zur Wiedergeburt führt. Das Ablegen der Last ist die Befreiung vom Durst und der Lastträger ist der pudgala (vgl. Oetke 1988, S. 121). Nach Oetke gehen auch die Vorstellungen von einem pudgala im Theravāda-Buddhismus in Richtung eines Personenbegriffs, der sich allerdings von dem der Pudgalavādins deutlich unterscheidet. Im Wagengleichnis des Milindapañha z. B. erscheint i. S. von Oetkes Interpretation pudgala als ein Ausdruck für das aus den Aggregaten zusammengesetzte Gebilde. Dieses wird also mit der Person (dem pudgala) identifiziert. Einen Träger der Aggregate brauch man aus der Sicht des Theravāda-Buddhismus aber nicht anzunehmen. Das Wagengleichnis, in dem nach Oetkes Interpretation dieser Personenbegriff thematisiert wird, steht am Beginn des Milindapañha. Der Mönch Nāgasena stellt sich dem König Menandros dort zunächst folgendermaßen vor: Atha kho Milindo rājā āyasmantaṃ Nāgasenaṃ etad avoca: Katham bhadanto ñāyati, kinnāmo si bhante ti. – Nāgaseno ti kho ahaṃ ñāyāmi, Nāgaseno ti maṃ mahārāja sabrahmacārī samudācaranti, api ca mātāpitaro nāmaṃ karonti Nāgaseno ti vā Sūraseno ti vā Vīraseno ti vā Sīhaseno ti vā, api ca kho mahārāja sankhā samaññā paññatti vohāro nāmamattaṃ yad idaṃ Nāgaseno ti, na h’ ettha puggalo upalabbhatīti. (MP, S. 25) – »Darauf wandte sich der König Milinda an den ehrwürdigen

34 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Menschenbild und Medizinethik vom Standpunkt des Theravāda-Buddhismus

Nāgasena und sprach: ›Wie heißt du, Ehrwürdiger? Welchen Namen trägst du?‹ ›Ich bin als Nāgasena bekannt, o König, und mit Nāgasena reden mich meine Ordensbrüder an. Ob nun aber die Eltern einem den Namen Nāgasena geben oder Sīrasena oder Vīrasena oder Sīhasena, immerhin ist dies nur ein Name, eine Bezeichnung, ein Begriff, eine landläufige Ausdrucksweise, ja weiter nichts als ein bloßes Wort, denn eine Person ist da nicht vorzufinden.‹« (Nyanatiloka/Nyanaponika 1985, S. 50 f.)

Im Folgenden spielt Nāgasena verschiedene Alternativen durch, wofür sein Name stehen könnte, wobei er seine Haare, seine Zähne, seine Nägel, jedes einzelne der Aggregate, aus denen er besteht, und auch alle Bestandteile seiner psycho-physischen Existenz zusammengenommen als Kandidaten für das Bezeichnete ins Auge fasst. Der König stimmt ihm jedes Mal zu, dass alle diese Alternativen zu verwerfen sind. Wie Nāgasena nun im Rahmen seines Wagengleichnisses zeigt, verhält es sich mit dem Begriff »Wagen« ganz genauso. Dieser bezeichnet ebensowenig die Deichsel, die Achse, die Räder oder irgendein anderes seiner Einzelteile. Überraschenderweise lässt Nāgasena im Falle von pudgala und Wagen auch die Gesamtheit der Einzelteile nicht als die den jeweiligen Bezeichnungen entsprechenden Entitäten gelten. Der Name »Nāgasena« ebenso wie der Begriff »Wagen« bezeichnen etwas nämlich nur in Abhängigkeit von anderen Gegenbenheiten. […], paramatthato pan’ ettha puggalo nūpalabbhati. (MP, S. 28) – »Im höchsten Sinne ist da eine (von dem Namen ›Nāgasena‹ bezeichnete, Anm. des Verf.) Persönlichkeit nicht vorzufinden.« (Nyanatiloka/Nyanaponika 1985, S. 52) »Im höchsten Sinne« (paramatthato) existieren nur die Aggregate, aus denen ein pudgala besteht, oder die Bestandteile des Wagens, mit denen im Wagengleichnis die Aggregate verglichen werden. Als konstituierte Gebilde sind pudgala und Wagen »irgendwie nur sekundär existent« (Oetke 1988, S. 169). Wenn Nāgasena pudgala und »Wagen« als »bloße Namen« bezeichnet, so bedeutet dies nach Oetke, dass ihre korrekte Anwendung die Existenz von Gegenständen voraussetzt, die wir als Bestandteile des jeweils Gemeinten betrachten und die nicht zur Extension der entsprechenden Begriffe gehören (vgl. Oetke 1988, S. 182). 3

Interessanterweise wird in den chinesischen Milindapañha-Versionen der Zusatz »im höchsten Sinne« (paramatthato) weggelassen (vgl. Oetke 1988, S. 178 f.), so als

3

35 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

Die Idee, dem Begriff pudgala eine in diesem Sinne mittelbare Referenz zuzuerkennen, finden wir auch im Abhidharmakośabhāṣya des buddhistischen Philosophen Vasubandhu (4. Jh.). Vasubandhu hebt insbesondere hervor, dass die Aggregate, aus denen sich der pudgala zusammensetzt, fluktuierende Gebilde sind, die aus Momenten eines sich über sämtliche Wiedergeburten erstreckenden Prozesses bestehen. Im Falle des pudgalas von einer Person zu sprechen, erscheint nur unter Zugrundelegung einer Reihen- oder Bündeltheorie der Person sinnvoll, wie Oetke (Oetke 1988, S. 221 f.) und Ganeri (Ganeri 2007, S. 160 f.) ausführen. Ganeri weist auf ähnliche Überlegungen in Richtung eines solchen dynamisch angelegten (reihen- oder bündeltheoretischen) Personenbegriffs bei David Hume hin: »David Hume said that he could never catch himself without a perception, nor ›observe anything other than the perception‹. He claimed that we resort to the notion of a soul, and a self, and a substance, ›to disguise the variation‹ in the succession of our perceptions, a notion that is ›a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable‹. The mind, he said, is really a ›bundle‹, or a ›commonwealth‹, or a ›theatre‹ of perceptions, and it is the bundle that settles questions about the identity of the person over time.« (Ganeri 2007, S. 160)

4. Im Unterschied zur christlichen Ethik ist der Mensch aus der Sicht des Buddhismus keinem Schöpfer verpflichtet. Moralische Bedenken gegen die Anwendung medizinischer Verfahren zur Erzeugung von Lebewesen sind daher für die meisten Buddhisten hinfällig. So ist z. B. das reproduktive Klonen, das nicht-zeugungsfähigen Paaren die Möglichkeit zur Nachkommenschaft bietet, durchaus mit der buddhistischen Ethik verträglich, während ein Christ darin einen Eingriff in den göttlichen Schöpfungsplan sehen könnte. Ferner erweist sich die Sorge, dass das Erstellen einer genetischen Kopie auf eine Verletzung zentraler Werte der europäischen Tradition, wie Einzigartigkeit und Individualität, hinausläuft, als bloßes Scheinproblem, wenn man i. S.

wollte man den Sinn des Textes dahingehend zuspitzen, dass konstituierte Gebilde überhaupt nicht existieren.

36 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Menschenbild und Medizinethik vom Standpunkt des Theravāda-Buddhismus

der anattā-Lehre die Identifikation mit einem Selbst ablehnt (vgl. Schlieter 2003, S. 36 und 43). Auch die Debatte über mögliche identitätsverändernde Effekte bei Stammzellentransplantationen zur Behandlung von Parkinson oder Alzheimer ist aus buddhistischer Sicht somit gegenstandslos. Die Freiräume des ethisch Vertretbaren, die sich der biomedizinischen Forschung eröffnen, wenn man vom Standpunkt einer buddhistischen Ethik argumentiert, stoßen andererseits dort an enge Grenzen, wo Lebewesen zu Schaden kommen können. Das sogenannte »therapeutische Klonen«, mit dem Lebewesen erzeugt werden, um an ihnen bzw. einzelnen Zellen von ihnen Forschungen durchzuführen, ist z. B. für viele Buddhisten unvertretbar, weil es dem für die Ethik aller buddhistischen Richtungen grundlegenden und alle Lebewesen einschließenden Gebot des »Nicht-Verletzens« (P./Skr. ahiṃsā) widerspricht. Als Lebewesen gilt jedes Individuum, das aus den fünf Aggregaten besteht, d. h. Menschen ebenso wie Tiere, während die Meinungen darüber, ob Pflanzen ebenfalls dazuzuzählen sind, auseinandergehen. Schon im embryonalen Stadium besitzen nach TheravādaLehre Menschen und Tiere alle fünf Aggregate. Einen Verstoß gegen das Gebot des »Nicht-Verletzens« sehen viele Theravāda-Buddhisten daher auch in der Abtreibung, die (neben der ebenfalls oft als verwerflich erachteten Sterbehilfe) eines der bereits in den klassischen Quellen behandelten medizin-ethischen Probleme darstellt: »[…] the existence of a human being (manussa-viggaha) is counted from the first moment of the reinstatement of the mind (paṭhamaṃ paṭisandhicittaṃ: VinA. 337), from the time of consciousness becoming first manifest in the foetus in a mother’s womb until the time of death. 4 […] Hence there is no doubt about the Buddhist view of the starting point of life in an individual life span. The deprivation of life being defined as the cutting off and destruction of the faculty of life, harming its duration (Vin III, 72), there is therefore no ethical distinction between foeticide and infanticide, or any other intentional killing of a human being. […] Hence, there is no doubt about the unequivocal attitude of the Buddha’s teaching in respect of

4 Hier verweisen die Begriffe »mind« (citta) und »consciousness« offenbar beide auf das Bewusstsein. Die Tendenz zur Gleichsetzung dieser Begriffe zeigt sich bereits bei Buddhaghosa, der auch das Denken (manas) zusammen mit den beiden anderen Begriffen als »der Bedeutung nach ein und dasselbe« (Nyanatiloka 21952, S. 515) auffasst.

37 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

life from the very inception of conception, i. e., from the moment of penetration of the ovum by the spermatozoon, thereby placing artificial and intentional abortion in the same category as wilful murder.« (van Zeyst 1961, S. 137 f.)

Angesichts der Tatsache, dass sowohl Menschen als auch Tiere aus den Aggregaten bestehen und insofern gleichermaßen pudgalas sind, stellt sich die Frage, ob aus Theravāda-Sicht somit alle pudgalas gleich sind, oder ob einige einen ihrer »Würde« entsprechenden Sonderstatus genießen. In der abendländischen Bioethik-Debatte geht man nämlich meist davon aus, dass ein Individuum dann besondere Rücksichtnahme verdient (die sich im Zugestehen von Anspruchs- und Freiheitsrechten manifestiert), wenn ihm »die Würde der Person« zukommt. Dies wiederum wird oft von dem Besitz folgender moralischer und kognitiver Fähigkeiten abhängig gemacht, mit denen man den Personenbegriff reduktionistisch fasst (vgl. Birnbacher 1997): A. Kognitive Fähigkeiten: 1. Intentionalität, Fähigkeit zu Urteilen 2. zeitliche Transzendenz der Gegenwart (Zukunftsbewusstsein/ Erinnerungsfähigkeit) 3. Selbstbewusstsein, Ichbewusstsein 4. Selbstdistanz, Präferenzen zweiter Stufe (wie z. B. der Wunsch, kein Verlangen nach Drogen zu haben) 5. Rationalität, Vernünftigkeit B. Moralische Fähigkeiten: 1. Autonomie, Selbstbestimmung 2. Moralität, Moralfähigkeit 3. Fähigkeit zur Übernahme von Verpflichtungen 4. Fähigkeit zur kritischen Selbstbewertung Als problematisch erweist sich dieser Personenbegriff, wenn man an Grenzfälle denkt, wie z. B. Embryonen oder Demenzkranke, die die unter A. und B. genannten Fähigkeiten noch nicht oder nicht mehr haben. Soll man ihnen die einer Person gebührenden Anspruchs- und Freiheitsrechte verwehren? Oder müssten nicht doch Embryonen, weil sie immerhin das Potential zur Ausbildung der genannten Fähigkeiten besitzen, wie Personen behandelt werden? Sind höher entwickelte Tiere wie z. B. Menschenaffen Personen? 38 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Menschenbild und Medizinethik vom Standpunkt des Theravāda-Buddhismus

Im Buddhismus wird das Gebot des Nicht-Verletzens auf alle empfindenden Lebewesen bezogen, nicht allein auf Menschen. Dennoch genießen Menschen aus der Sicht des Buddhismus eine besondere Würde, weil die Existenz als Mensch sehr schwer zu erlangen ist, und überdies nur von dieser Existenz aus der Befreiungsweg aus dem Leiden erfolgreich beschritten werden kann. Nach einem oft angeführten Gleichnis ist es ebenso selten, dass jemand als Mensch wiedergeboren wird, wie für eine einmal in einhundert Jahren an die Wasseroberfläche kommende blinde Seeschildkröte, in einem auf dem grenzenlosen Ozean herumtreibenden Joch aufzutauchen (vgl. Schlieter 2003, S. 58). An die Stelle der kognitiven und moralischen Fähigkeiten unter A. und B. tritt hier also der Fortschritt auf dem Erlösungsweg als Gradmesser für Würde. Da nach Theravāda-Lehre nur ein Mönch oder eine Nonne die Erlösung in ihrer aktuellen Existenz erlangen können, betrachtet Buddhaghosa somit auch die Tötung eines tugendhaften Mönchs als schlimmer als die eines »gewöhnlichen« Menschen (vgl. Schlieter 2003, S. 57 f.). Die Grundlage einer solchen Sichtweise ist eine Ethik, in der das Leben nicht als Wert an sich betrachtet wird, sondern als ein Mittel, das eigene Karma in einer für die Befreiung aus dem Geburtenkreislauf günstigen Weise zu beeinflussen. D. Keown, der in der buddhistische Ethik eine auf den Grundgütern Leben, Wissen und Freundschaft basierende Wertethik sieht, bemerkt einschränkend, dass nur »life with a karmic history, that is to say, life which has a moral biography« (Keown 1995, S. 46), im Buddhismus als eines dieser Grundgüter gilt. Entsprechend bietet der Buddhismus neben Begründungen des Gebots des Nicht-Verletzens, die an die goldene Regel erinnern (vgl. Schlieter 2003, S. 8), auch solche, die einer Art täterorientierten Ethik entspringen und auf die Ansammlung negativen Karmas im Falle einer Zuwiderhandlung rekurrieren. Schlieter verweist unter Bezugnahme auf Äußerungen des thailändischen Arztes, Indologen und Theravāda-Mönchs Bhikkhu Mettānando darauf, dass von dieser Ethik-Konzeption, die sich von der opferorientierten »neo-Christian medical ethics« deutlich unterscheidet, durchaus positive Impulse für die Medizin-Ethik zu erwarten sind. Statt i. S. der christlich orientierten Opfer-Perspektive, lediglich die Patienten vor der möglichen Gefahr unverantwortlich handelnder Ärzte durch eine entsprechende Gesetzgebung in ihren Rechten zu schützten, betont der buddhisti39 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

sche Ansatz die Rolle des Arztes »als ›Täter‹ in eigener Sache, der aus eigenem (karmischen) Interesse zur Einhaltung der Selbstverpflichtungen aufgerufen ist.« (Schlieter 2003, S. 21)

Literatur Birnbacher, Dieter 1997. »Das Dilemma des Personenbegriffs«, in: Personsein aus bioethischer Sicht, ARSP-Beiheft 73, ed. Peter Strasser / Edgar Starz, Stuttgart, pp. 9–25. Frauwallner, Erich 1953. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. Band I., Salzburg. Ganeri, Jonardon 2007. The Concealed Art of the Soul, Oxford. Horner, I. B. 1993 (transl.). The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings (Majjhima-Nikāya), Vol. I. The First Fifty Discourses (Mūlapaṇṇāsa). Reprint, London: Pali Text Society Translation Series 29. Jayawardhana, Somapala 1998. English-Sinhala Dictionary, Colombo. Keown, Damien 1995. Buddhism and Bioethics, London. MN, The Majjhima-Nikāya. Vol. I., ed. V. Trenckner 1948, London: The Pali Text Society. MP, The Milindapañho, ed. V. Trenckner 1962, London: The Pali Text Society. Nyanatiloka 21952 (transl.). Visuddhi-Magga oder der Weg zur Reinheit, Konstanz. Nyanatiloka / Nyanaponika 1985 (transl.). Milindapañha: Die Fragen des Königs Milinda, Interlaken. Oetke, Claus 1988. »Ich« und das Ich, Stuttgart: Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 33. Oldenberg, Hermann 1921. Buddha. Sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde, Stuttgart; Berlin. Schlieter, Jens 2003. Die aktuelle Biomedizin aus der Sicht des Buddhismus. Ein Gutachten erstellt im Auftrag der AG Bioethik und Wissenschaftskommission des Max-Delbrück-Centrums für molekulare Medizin, Berlin-Buch, 2. verbesserte Fassung (URL: http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/kbe/Akt. Biomed.Buddh.pdf). SN, Saṃyutta-Nikāya. Part III (Khandha-Vāgga), ed. M. Leon Feer 1960, London: The Pali Text Society. VM, Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya, ed. Henry Clark Warren, rev. Dharmananda Kosambi 1950, Cambridge: Harvard Oriental Series 41. Woodward, F. L. (transl.) / C. A. F. Rhys Davids (ed.) 1992. The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Saṃyutta-Nikāya) or Grouped Suttas. Part III. Reprint, London: The Pali Text Society. van Zeyst, H. G. A. 1961. »Abortion«, in: Encyclopaedia of Buddhism. Fascicule: A-ACA, ed. G. P. Malalasekara, Colombo, pp. 137–138.

40 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht

Der vorliegende Beitrag ist eine erweiterte Fassung von Teilen des Abschlussberichts zu dem von der DFG geförderten Projekt »Nonpersonale Begründung von Lebensrechten. Komparatistisch-interdisziplinäre Aspekte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Buddhismus und des Neo-Konfuzianismus«. Es handelt sich dabei um diejenigen Teile des Berichts, die sich auf die in das Projekt integrierten Feldforschungen beziehen. Im Rahmen der Feldforschungsarbeit wurden Forschungsreisen nach Sri Lanka, Ladakh und Dharamsala unternommen, um buddhistische Mönche, Nonnen und Laien in Bezug auf ihre Einstellung zu bioethischen Fragen zu interviewen. Organisatorische Schwierigkeiten ergaben sich durch die Berufung des Mitantragstellers Eberhard Guhe nach Shanghai. So musste auf die geplante Einbeziehung des Neo-Konfuzianismus und die Feldforschungen in Korea verzichtet werden. Angesichts des zeitlichen Aufwandes, den die Koordinierung mit den buddhistischen Aspekten des Projekts erfordert hätte, erschien es sinnvoller, stattdessen eine zweite Forschungsreise nach Sri Lanka zu unternehmen und als Interviewer Jens Schlieter, einen ausgewiesenen Experten für die Thematik »Bioethik und Buddhismus«, hinzuzuziehen. Somit reiste Eberhard Guhe zweimal nach Sri Lanka (vom 22.–29. 8. 2011 und vom 30. 9.–6. 10. 2012), wo er Theravāda-Buddhisten interviewte. Auf der zweiten Reise führten er und Jens Schlieter gemeinsam die Interviews. Michael von Brück interviewte vom 14. 3.–27. 3. 2013 in Leh (Ladakh) und Dharamsala (Himachal Pradesh, Indien) Anhänger des tibetischen Buddhismus. Die Motivation der Forschungsreisen lässt sich vor dem Hintergrund der Ziele des Projekts folgendermaßen verdeutlichen.

41 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

1.

Motivation der Forschungsreisen

Ausgangspunkt des Projekts war die Lektüre eines Artikels von Dieter Birnbacher (vgl. »Das Dilemma des Personenbegriffs«. In: Personsein aus bioethischer Sicht, ARSP-Beiheft 73, S. 9–25. ed. v. Peter Strasser/Edgar Starz, Stuttgart 1997), in dem dieser auf das Dilemma des Personenbegriffs in der abendländischen Bioethik-Debatte aufmerksam macht: Obwohl es an plausiblen Definitionen des Personenbegriffs mangelt, geht man allgemein davon aus, dass ein Individuum dann besondere Rücksichtnahme verdient (die sich im Zugestehen von Anspruchs- und Freiheitsrechten manifestiert), wenn ihm die »Würde der Person« zukommt. Dabei wird das Personsein oft von dem Besitz folgender moralischer und kognitiver Fähigkeiten abhängig gemacht: A. Kognitive Fähigkeiten: Intentionalität, Fähigkeit zu Urteilen Zeitliche Transzendenz der Gegenwart (Zukunftsbewusstsein/Erinnerungsfähigkeit) Selbstbewusstsein, Ichbewusstsein Selbstdistanz, Präferenzen zweiter Stufe (wie z. B. der Wunsch, kein Verlangen nach Drogen zu haben) Rationalität, Vernünftigkeit B. Moralische Fähigkeiten: Autonomie, Selbstbestimmung Moralität, Moralfähigkeit Fähigkeit zur Übernahme von Verpflichtungen Fähigkeit zur kritischen Selbstbewertung Offenbar führt aber die Orientierung an einem solchen Personenbegriff bei bioethischen Entscheidungen kaum zu befriedigenden Resultaten. Als problematisch erweist er sich, wenn man an Grenzfälle denkt, wie z. B. Embryos, Kleinkinder oder Demenzkranke, die die unter A. und B. genannten Fähigkeiten noch nicht oder nicht mehr haben. Soll man ihnen die einer Person gebührenden Anspruchs- und Freiheitsrechte verwehren? Oder müssten nicht doch Embryos und Kleinkinder, weil sie immerhin das Potential zur Ausbildung der genannten Fähigkeiten besitzen, wie Personen behandelt werden? Sind höher entwickelte Tiere wie z. B. Menschenaffen Personen? 42 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht

In dem Projekt sollte untersucht werden, ob vom Buddhismus, dessen Ethik keinen solchen Personenbegriff voraussetzt, neue Impulse für die eher verfahrene westliche Bioethik-Debatte ausgehen können. Dazu galt es, herauszufinden, wie im Buddhismus alternative Argumentationsformen zur Verteidigung bioethischer Positionen aussehen. Was tritt hier an die Stelle des oben genannten Personenbegriffs als Entscheidungskriterium? Welche Rolle spielt die buddhistische Nicht-Selbst-Lehre (die sogenannte anattā-Lehre) bei bioethischen Entscheidungen? Da es sich hier zumeist um Probleme handelt, die erst im Zuge des technologischen Fortschritts aufgekommen sind, ist eine Klärung dieser Fragen nicht allein durch das Studium der klassischen Quellen möglich. Es ergibt sich vielmehr die Notwendigkeit, die Sichtweise zeitgenössischer Buddhisten im Rahmen von Interview-Befragungen in Erfahrung zu bringen. Wenn im folgenden von Charakteristika einer sich aus den Interview-Befragungen ergebenden buddhistischen Ethik die Rede ist, ist dies allerdings cum grano salis zu werten, denn ein möglicher Einfluss westlicher Ethik sollte bei den Antworten der Interview-Partner stets mitbedacht werden, zumal gewisse ethische Probleme zuerst im Westen durch die Einführung neuer biomedizinischer Technologien aufgekommen sind.

2.

Interviewpartner, Ort und Inhalt der Interviews

Die Untersuchung wurde gemäß der Spezialisierungen der Interviewer im Bereich der Buddhismuskunde auf zwei bedeutsame buddhistische Traditionen beschränkt, nämlich den Theravāda und den tibetischen Buddhismus. Daher wurden für die Feldforschungen Orte ausgewählt, wo diese beiden Richtungen besonders stark präsent sind, nämlich Sri Lanka (mit seiner ausgeprägten Theravāda-Tradition) und Ladakh bzw. Dharamsala (als Hochburgen des tibetischen Buddhismus). Bei den interviewten Personen handelte es sich um Mönche, Nonnen und Laien-Anhänger des Buddhismus. In Sri Lanka wurden 5 Professoren, ein Dozent, ein Arzt, 6 Mönche, 1 Nonne und der Leiter einer Selbsthilfeorganisation interviewt, in Ladakh bzw. Dharamsala 3 Mönche, 3 Nonnen, 2 Ärzte, 4 Ärzte der tibetischen Medizin, ein Grafik-Designer, 6 Geschäftsleute, 5 Lehrer, 3 Schuldirektoren und eine Psychologin. 43 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

Die durchschnittlich ca. einstündigen problemzentrierten qualitativen Einzel-Interviews wurden auf Englisch geführt. Lediglich der Interviewpartner Ven. Seelawansa (gebürtiger Singhalese und Absolvent eines Doktoratsstudiums in Soziologie an der Universität Wien) antwortete auf Deutsch. Den Inhalt aller Interviews bildeten die Fragen nach Anfang und Ende des Lebens sowie die Themen Abtreibung, pränatale Diagnostik, Organspende, Stammzellenforschung, assistierter Suizid und Euthanasie. Mit gewissen Abweichungen wurden allen Interview-Partnern die gleichen Fragen gestellt. Eberhard Guhe verwendete den folgenden Fragebogen: 1.) When does a sentient being’s life (and our moral concern for it) start, when does it end? 2.) What do you think about abortion, especially in the light of the latest advances in medical technology? Is abortion morally justified in the case of an embryo being prenatally diagnosed with some severe genetic defect which might doom him/her to lead a painful life. 3.) Transplantation is still the primary medical solution to organ failure. Therefore, lifesaving organ donation is regarded as meritorious in Buddhism. However, for a successful transplant the organs must be harvested while they are freshly oxygenated, and this usually takes place between six and twenty-four hours after brain death has been declared. In the interim, artificial ventilation is maintained and respiration and heartbeat continue. The body retains its normal vital signs which include the presence of heat. If ventilation is discontinued and the body is allowed to cool, the internal organs would rapidly deteriorate and the prospects for a successful transplant would be greatly reduced. So, what do you think about taking organs from a brain dead person? 4.) There are alternatives to regular organ transplantation: a) Xenotransplantation with animals as donors and human beings as recipients is an alternative to regular transplantation. Some organs of animals, such as, e.g., swine hearts, can be successfully transplanted in human bodies. But do you think that we have a right to kill animals and use their organs for transplantation in order to save the lives of human beings? b) A future alternative to regular transplantation might be the use of transplants obtained from therapeutic cloning. This method which involves the creation and killing of a pre-embryo (a cell mass called «blastocyst”) has already been successfully applied to 44 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht

mice. (The technique has to be explained by the interviewer here.) This procedure would have a number of advantages, when compared to regular organ transplant donated by a second person: (i) There would presumably be no danger of rejection of the transplant, because the organ’s DNA would match the patient’s DNA exactly. (ii) For transplants involving kidney (or theoretically any other organ that is duplicated in the body) another individual would not have to experience pain, inconvenience and potentially shortened life span in order to donate the organ. (iii) The patient would not have to wait until an unrelated donor dies to obtain a transplant. A new organ could be grown for them as needed. (iv) The patient would not have to make-do with a replacement organ that is old and may have reduced functionality; a brandnew organ would be grown specifically for them. (v) The procedure would save lives which would otherwise be lost waiting for a transplant that did not come in time. (vi) The atrocities of organ trade could be overcome by increasing the availability of transplants. (vii) The potential exists to cure, or at least treat, certain diseases and disorders that cannot be effectively handled today. One example is the treatment of Parkinson by implanting stem cells extracted from a blastocyst into a patient’s brain. Do you think that these benefits of therapeutic cloning outweigh potential misgivings concerning the killing of the pre-embryo as a necessary side-effect of this method? If therapeutic cloning is regarded as a method to duplicate a living being, one might argue against it from the point of view of classical liberalism, since the protection of the identity of the individual and the right to protect one’s genetic identity are at stake here. The same kind of caveat is issued by people in Western countries against the treatment of Parkinson by implanting stem cells into a patient's brain, because this therapy might change his/her identity. What do you think about such worries? 5.) Let us assume that someone suffers from a painful incurable disease and needs an aggressive medical treatment in order to prolong his/her life. If it is the patient’s wish to die peacefully, would it be

45 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

morally justified to provide him/her with the necessary means to commit suicide? 6.) If there is no perspective for a patient's genuine recovery, as in the case of a persistent vegetative state (PVS), would it be morally justified to end the life of such a patient by removing him/her from the feeding tube? Alle Interviews hier in voller Länge wiederzugeben, würde den Rahmen sprengen. Wir werden wir uns daher darauf beschränken, die Auswertung unter 3. und 4. anhand entsprechender Passagen aus einigen wenigen Interviews zu belegen. Dabei werden die von Eberhard Guhe und Jens Schlieter geführten Interviews nach den Mitschnitten zitiert. Von Michael von Brück standen schriftliche Wiedergaben der Interviews in deutscher Sprache zur Verfügung. Zur bequemeren Bezugnahme auf die jeweiligen Interviewpartner(innen) führen wir die folgenden Kürzel ein: AT = Prof. Dr. Asanga Tilakaratne, Professor für Pāli und Buddhist Studies an der University of Colombo, Interviewtermin: 23. 8. 2011, Prof. Tilakaratnes Büro an der University of Colombo, Sri Lanka AW = Prof. Dr. Ananda Wijeratne, Professor für Pāli und Buddhist Studies an der University of Kelaniya, Interviewtermin: 28. 8. 2011, Büroraum in der Pāli and Buddhist University of Sri Lanka, Colombo, Sri Lanka DR = Dawa Rinchen, Unternehmer in der Tourismus-Branche mit Studienabschluß in buddhistischer Philosophie von der Buddhist School of Dialectics in Dharamsala, Interviewtermin: 14. 3. 2013, Dharamsala NM = Prof. Dr. Nalaka Mendis, Professor für Psychiatrie an der University of Colombo, Interviewtermin: 25. 8. 2011, Prof. Mendis’ Privathaus in Colombo, Sri Lanka PP = Prof. Dr. P. D. Premasiri, Professor Emeritus für Pāli and Buddhist Studies an der University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, 2 Interviewtermine: 24. 8. 2011 (PP I) und 4. 10. 2012 (PP II), Prof. Premasiris Büro an der University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka SD = Dr. Sonam Dolma, Ärztin (Mitglied des Ärzteteams des Dalai Lama), Interviewtermin: 14. 3. 2013, Dharamsala TN = Ven. Thupten Ngodup, Tibetisches Staatsorakel, Interviewtermin: 14. 3. 2013, Dharamsala 46 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht

UM = Dr. Upali Marasinghe, Arzt, Interviewtermin: 22. 8. 2011, Sarvodaya, Sri Lanka VS = Dr. Ven. Seelawansa, Abt eines Klosters in Sri Lanka und Leiter des Dhammazentrums in Wien, Interviewtermin: 26. 8. 2011, Bhante Seelawansa’s Kloster in der Nähe von Colombo, Sri Lanka

3.

Ergebnisse

Als Richtschnur bei bioethischen Entscheidungen dient im Buddhismus das Ahiṃsā-Gebot, d. h. das Gebot, sich allen Lebewesen gegenüber gewaltfrei zu verhalten. An die Stelle der Person als demjenigen Individuum, das bei bioethischen Entscheidungen besondere Rücksichtnahme verdient, tritt im Buddhismus der puggala (die »irdische Persönlichkeit«, vgl. Erich Frauwallner: Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. Band I. Salzburg 1953, S. 207), d. h. das aus den fünf Aggregaten bestehende Lebewesen. Dieser quasi buddhistische Personenbegriff ist weiter gefasst als der oben genannte, der das Personsein von dem Besitz bestimmter kognitiver und moralischer Fähigkeiten abhängig macht. Dadurch, dass sich das Ahiṃsā-Gebot auch auf Individuen bezieht, die diese Fähigkeiten noch nicht oder nicht mehr haben (wie z. B. Embryos, Kleinkinder, Demenzkranke und Tiere – nicht nur höher entwickelte Tiere wie Menschenaffen), ist bei bioethischen Entscheidungen mehr Rücksichtnahme gefordert, d. h. das Konflikt-Potential ist eher größer, wenn man den buddhistischen Personenbegriff zugrundelegt. Dies muss aber nicht heißen, dass die Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten bei bioethischen Problemen grundsätzlich stärker eingeschränkt sind. Aufgrund der folgenden Charakteristika der buddhistischen Ethik ((i) – (v)) scheint eher das Gegenteil der Fall zu sein: (i) Die buddhistische Ethik ist kein festgefügtes einheitliches System. Die Verpflichtung zur Einhaltung des Ahiṃsā-Gebots spricht für eine deontologische Ausrichtung der buddhistischen Ethik. Genausogut gibt es aber auch konsequentialistische oder sogar utilitaristische Züge. In diesem Zusammenhang argumentieren Theravāda-Buddhisten gerne mit der Erzählung von Rāhulas Ermahnung in Ambalaṭṭhikā. Durch die Entnahme von Stammzellen Embryos zu töten, die bei einer künstlichen Befruchtung oder beim Klonen entstehen, ist z. B. aus der Sicht mancher Interviewpartner dadurch gerechtfertigt, dass 47 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

man mit Hilfe der Stammzellen einer größeren Zahl von Menschen helfen kann (durch die Züchtung von Organen zur Transplantation und durch die Entwicklung von Therapien zur Behandlung von Parkinson oder Diabetis). 1 (ii) Auch die Intention spielt eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Beurteilung der moralischen Qualität einer Handlung. Jemand, der einer im Sterben liegenden und qualvoll leidenden Person in guter Absicht Beihilfe zum Suizid leistet, lädt damit nicht unbedingt negatives Karma auf sich. 2 Ferner kann nach Ansicht eines anderen Interviewpartners das aus guter Absicht resultierende positive Karma auch negatives Karma neutralisieren, das aus einem Verstoß gegen das Ahiṃsā-Gebot (z. B. im Falle des assistierten Suizids) resultiert. 3 Vgl. dazu PP I: »In the case of some Buddhists – they have this notion that some actions are necessarily evil. Like destruction of life is necessarily evil – not in terms of what its consequence is, but the action itself being one of destroying life. So, that’s a kind of deontological approach and from their point of view they classify actions as meritorious or demeritorious. […] So, they see an action as carrying its label as sinful or evil. So, then something like abortion – irrespective of the consequences some people would consider it as wrong. And then they also relate it to karma. You should not do it, because, if you do it, then this is your bad karma. That attitide is there. That's one way of thinking. But there could be an alternative way of thinking which is more in accordance with the utilitarian way of thinking. Something doesn’t become evil merely because it is a certain type of act, that it is classed under a certain category of acts. It becomes evil, because it belongs to a class which produces certain kinds of consequences. Those who think in that way are more inclined to take a utilitarian point of view. So, both positions are possible in actual thinking of the Buddhists. They might sort of shift between these two positions. Now, in my case I am more inclined to take the utilitarian position.« 2 PP I bemerkt etwa zum assistierten Suizid: »Some people might say the motive is important. If there is no malicious motive involved, then it cannot be considered ethically wrong.« Assistierter Selbstmord ist auch aus ATs Sicht gerechtfertigt, wenn der betreffende Patient selbst diese Entscheidung trifft, »because again I would argue that is your problem. Your pain is not my problem. Maybe even living with that pain. Under these circumstances I don’t think second person can decide on my life. [...] But in my sane rational conscious moments I say to my doctor ›Do this if it happens to me.‹ I don’t think Buddhism has a problem. I dont’t think the doctor who administers this medicine is committing any harm or something bad, because he can be helping you with good intentions. So, Buddhist concern comes basically from the point that someone else can decide.« 3 Auf die Frage, ob man einem Kranken beim Suizid assistieren dürfe, antwortet TN, dass dies von der Motivation des Helfers abhänge. Wenn der Kranke keinerlei Chance für sein Leben sehe und auch die Entwicklung seines Bewusstseins zu einem reiferen 1

48 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht

(iii) Ob eine Handlung i. S. des Ahiṃsā-Gebots gerechtfertigt ist oder nicht, müssen die jeweiligen Akteure – seien es Mönche, Nonnen oder Laien – von Fall zu Fall selbst entscheiden. Der Ermessensspielraum bei bioethischen Entscheidungen wird nicht durch dogmatische Festlegungen religiöser Würdenträger eingeengt, da die buddhistische Ethik grundsätzlich anti-paternalistisch ist. Dies gilt im besonderen für die Ethik des Theravāda, in etwas geringerem Maße auch für die Ethik des tibetischen Buddhismus, denn im Unterschied zu Theravāda-Buddhisten zeigen Laienanhänger des tibetischen Buddhismus eine gewisse Neigung, sich bei bioethischen Fragen, die ihnen schwer beantwortbar erscheinen, auf das Urteil von gelehrten Mönchen (Geshes oder Lamas) zu verlassen. (iv) Charakteristisch für die buddhistische Ethik ist eine geringere Betonung von Werten wie Individualität und Einzigartigkeit, die in der abendländischen Tradition eine größere Rolle spielen. Dies spiegelt sich insbesondere in der Haltung der Interviewpartner zum Klonen wieder und zur Behandlung von Parkinson oder Alzheimer mittels Stammzellentransplantation, einer Therapie, die identitätsverändernde Effekte haben könnte. Im Sinne der buddhistischen Nicht-Selbst-Lehre hat ein Individuum keinen festen Wesenskern. Das Erbgut mag gewisse körperliche Merkmale determinieren. Aber das, was ein Individuum darüber hinaus ausmacht (bestimmte Charakterzüge, Fähigkeiten etc.) ist im Sinne der buddhistischen Lehre von der Entstehung in Abhängigkeit (paṭiccasamuppāda) in erheblichem Maße durch Einflüsse des gesellschaftlichen Umfeldes determiniert und liegt keineswegs von Anfang an fest. Selbst wenn es möglich sein sollte, beim Klonen eine genetische Kopie zu erzeugen, so sind das geklonte Individuum und der Klon aufgrund unterschiedlicher Biographien dennoch voneinander unterscheidbar. 4 Individualität als ein schützenswertes Gut anzuZustand nicht möglich erscheine, hänge es von der altruistischen Motivation des Helfers ab: Wenn dieser keinerlei Eigeninteressen verfolge und wirklich nichts anderes wolle, als Leid zu vermeiden, könne er sich dafür entscheiden, bei der Selbsttötung zu assistieren. Das sei zwar Tötung und habe die entsprechenden Konsequenzen, aber die reine Motivation könne diese »Negativität« vielleicht ausgleichen. 4 Auf das Problem angesprochen, dass Klonieren im Westen teilweise als eine Art Kopieren eines Individuums angesehen wird, womit eine Verletzung von Werten der abendländischen Tradition wie Identität und Einzigartigkeit einhergeht, antwortet AT: »Again, my understanding is that even though you clone a person like physically 99

49 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

sehen, ist aus buddhistischer Sicht weniger plausibel, da individuelle Merkmale nicht als feststehende Gegebenheiten wahrgenommen werden. 5 (v) Buddhisten identifizieren den Todeszeitpunkt im Allgemeinen mit dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem das Bewusstsein (viññāṇa) den Körper verlässt. Hierbei gilt es zu bedenken, dass das, was man im Westen intuitiv unter »Bewusstsein« (»consciousness«) versteht, sich sicherlich nicht mit dem Bewusstseinsbegriff der Buddhisten deckt. Man kann den buddhistischen Bewusstseinsbegriff nicht einmal als Mythisierung eines Begriffs interpretieren, der dem nahekommt, was man im Westen normalerweise (d. h. sowohl alltagssprachlich als auch in den Wissenschaften wie z. B. der Medizin oder der Psychologie) unter »Bewusstsein« versteht. Bewusstsein ist im herkömmlichen Sinne immer an ein Gehirn gebunden. Mediziner nehmen an, dass ein Embryo erst etwa ab der 20. Schwangerschaftswoche ein Bewusstsein besitzt. Im Buddhismus hingegen wird schon der befruchteten Eizelle Bewusstsein zugeschrieben (vgl. (viii)). Die Frage nach empirischen Erkennungszeichen für das Entweichen des Bewusstseins aus dem Körper beantworten die Interviewpartner meist mit dem Hinweis auf die klasssischen Indikatoren, nämlich dem Verlust der Körperwärme (= das Absinken der Körperor 100 percent or whatever. [...] In this moment what I am thinking about this question is: Even though there may be identical twins, but not psychologically. You have always seen that they are very very different. Their saṃsāra is different. Their karma is different.« Auf die (im Westen teilweise geäußerte) Sorge angesprochen, dass mit der Implantation von Stammzellen in Gehirne von Parkinson-Patienten identitätsverändernde Effekte verbunden sein könnten, antwortet AT: »We admit that something can dynamically change. In the absence of believing in a very static thing we don’t think we have that much of a problem. It can be explained according to the doctrine of dependent co-origination. When the conditions are different, things get different. If you put something into the head you create a different set of conditions. [...] But still we wouldn’t say that is a different person.« 5 Angesprochen auf mögliche identitätsverändernde Effekte bei der Implantation von Stammzellen in Gehirne von Parkinson- oder Alzheimer-Patienten weist NM auf die grundsätzlichen Schwierigkeiten hin, personale Identität zu definieren: »When we look at a human being, where do we put the point of identification? Normally the head or the face. This is how we do that. But what about the other parts of the system?« In Bezug auf das Problem, dass beim therapeutischen Klonen eine Art Kopie eines Lebewesens erstellt wird, worin man eine Verletzung von Werten wie Individualität und Einzigartigkeit sehen könnte, meint NM: »In Buddhism there is no self. So, what are we talking about?«

50 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht

temperatur im gesamten Körper auf die Umgebungstemperatur?) und dem »Zerbrechen des Körpers« (kāyassa bheda). Dabei reichen die Präzisierungsvorschläge zum Kriterium »Zerbrechen des Körpers« vom Atemstillstand über den Herzstillstand bis hin zum Zelltod. Der Hirntod wird als Todeskriterium kaum in Betracht gezogen oder sogar abgelehnt. Manche Interviewpartner geben zu bedenken, dass es kein definitives äußeres Erkennnungszeichen für den Todeszeitpunkt gibt. Das Bewusstsein kann den Körper des Verstorbenen sehr rasch verlassen, evt. schon bevor einer der klassischen Indikatoren feststellbar ist. Es kann aber auch noch eine gewisse Zeit nach Feststellung der klassischen Indikatoren im Körper verweilen. Angesichts dieser Schwierigkeiten bezüglich der Feststellung des Todeszeitpunktes orientieren sich manche Interviewpartner an dem antipaternalistischen Charakter der buddhistischen Ethik und machen die Entscheidung darüber, ob man z. B. einen PVS-Patienten weiter künstlich ernähren sollte oder ob man einem Hirntoten Organe entnehmen darf, von einer Patientenverfügung abhängig. 6 Während der anti-paternalistische Charakter der buddhistischen Ethik einerseits den Handlungsspielraum bei bioethischen Entschei-

Zur Frage nach Todeskriterien und zur Festlegung des zeitlichen Rahmens für eine Organentnahme zu Transplantationszwecken erklärt SD, dass der Hirntod kein Kriterium sei. Wenn alle 5 vitalen Zeichen des Todes (Ende des Herzschlags, des Atems, des Sauerstoff-Pegels im Blut, der Pupillenbewegungen, des Atems) eingetreten seien, sei der Mensch klinisch tot. Dann könne man über die Organe verfügen, auch ohne die ausdrückliche Einwilligung. Es sei dann wie im tibetischen Bestattungsritual, wenn man das Fleisch den Vögeln zur Nahrung gebe. Wenn aber der Mensch noch lebe, dürfe man seine Organe nur entnehmen, wenn er dies ausdrücklich gewünscht und dies schriftlich bekundet habe, denn dann sei es ein Akt von Generosität. Nachdem der Tod (nach obigen Kriterien) eingetreten ist, solle man den Leichnam 3 Tage in Ruhe lassen. Das grobe Bewusstsein, das mit den Sinneswahrnehmungen zusammenhänge, habe zwar aufgehört, doch das subtile, mentale Bewusstsein bestehe länger. Aber das sei jeweils verschieden. Solche, die in der Meditation fortgeschritten sind, seien in der Lage, ihr Bewusstsein entweder sofort aus dem Körper zurückzuziehen oder auch lange darin zu verweilen. Es gebe also keinen klar definierbaren Todeszeitpunkt. Die 49 Tage des Tibetischen Totenbuchs seien allerdings nicht dahingehend zu verstehen, dass das Bewusstsein 49 Tage an den Körper gebunden sei. Nein, es existiere in dieser Zeit in einem entkörperlichten Zwischenzustand. Im Übrigen berechne man den Bestattungszeitpunkt und die Zeiten für die Riten auch nach astrologischen Gesichtspunkten. Das sei wieder eine andere Frage. Aus all dem ergebe sich für die Transplantationsmedizin die klare Anforderung: Organentnahme darf es nur nach voller und bewusster Zustimmung des Spenders geben.

6

51 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

dungen erweitert, insofern man keiner Bevormundung durch religiöse Würdenträger ausgesetzt ist, zwingt er andererseits auch dazu, sich selbst bevormundender Handlungsweisen zu enthalten. Dies ist einer der Aspekte (vgl. (vi) – (viii)), die den Handlungsspielraum bei bioethischen Entscheidungen stärker einengen: (vi) Der anti-paternalistische Charakter der buddhistischen Ethik ist mit ausschlaggebend für die anti-speziesistische Ausrichtung der buddhistischen Ethik. Im Falle der Xenotransplantation das Leben eines Tieres für das eines Menschen zu opfern, ist aus buddhistischer Sicht insbesondere deshalb verwerflich, weil das Tier der Organentnahme nicht zuvor zugestimmt hat. Das eigentliche Problem des speziesistischen Umgangs mit Tieren besteht also darin, dass man sich anmaßt, über das Leben anderer zu verfügen. 7 Allen puggalas kommt aus buddhistischer Sicht ein Merkmal zu, das auch auch im Sinn des oben genannten Personenbegriffs Personen charakterisiert, nämlich die Autonomie. Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht eines puggalas ist auch dann zu respektieren, wenn dieser nur das Potential hat, sich zu einem autonomen Entscheidungsträger zu entwickeln. Für einige Buddhisten ist z. B. die Abtreibung eines Embryos mit pränatal diagnostizierten schweren Behinderungen deshalb problematisch, weil dieser sich – trotz der Behinderungen – zu einem Menschen mit einer positiven Lebenseinstellung entwickeln könnte. Bei dem Versuch, jemandem Leiden zu ersparen, sollte man sich davor hüten, die eigenen Vorstellungen von einer leidvollen Existenz auf eine andere Person zu projizieren. 8 Vgl. dazu NM: »It would be a little bit difficult, because a pig can’t give consent to give the heart.« 8 Im Zusammenhang mit der Abtreibungsproblematik weist AT darauf hin, dass die Tötung eines Menschen ein pārājika-Vergehen darstellt: »Technically the position is very clear. Life begins at conception. So, if you abort the fetus that means you are committing the sin of killing a human being.« AT fragt sich auch, inwieweit wir das Recht haben, jemandem eine (aus unserer Sicht) leidvolle Existenz zu ersparen: »Now would that fetus, that human being agree with me? I would decide that without leg etc. that will be suffering. Would that be the same for that person? I mean, perhaps not. That means, it is very difficult to decide whether I have a kind of right, even though I am the parent, the biological parent, how far I can go in that. [...] This is an important question which comes in euthanasia, in abortion. I would decide that without leg etc. that will be suffering. If it is your problem that you can’t accept the fact that the child is deformed. of course that will be suffering. In many cases that will not 7

52 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht

(vii) Eine wichtige Rolle spielt in der buddhistischen Ethik das Vertrauen auf das Karma als einer Instanz, die dafür sorgt, dass das Verhalten eines Individuums in gerechter Weise belohnt oder bestraft wird. Die karmisch bedingten Leiden eines unheilbar Kranken durch Herbeiführen des Todes zu verkürzen, ist aus der Sicht mancher Interviewpartner nicht sinnvoll, denn das restliche negative Karma, dessen Wirkung noch aussteht, würde den Betreffenden in seiner künftigen Existenz belasten. Die Abtreibung eines Embryos, bei dem pränatal eine unheilbare Krankheit diagnostiziert wird, oder der assistierte Suizid sind daher in Wirklichkeit keine Maßnahmen, die Leiden beenden. Man kann seinem Karma durch den Tod nicht entgehen. 9 Wenn keine Hoffnung auf eine Genesung des Patienten besteht, sollte sich die ärztliche Fürsorge aus der Sicht mancher Interviewpartner auf palliative Maßnahmen beschränken, um karmisch bedingtes Leiden erträglicher zu machen. Zumindest ein Interviewpartner mahnt allerdings zur Vorsicht be a very good argument. [...] Let me give a different implausible example. We believe in gods. Now god looks at me who is in this human world with a lot of suffering. Compared to his life does he have a right to be pity on my life and kill me to reduce my suffering? No, because even though this is very bad life compared to that. The same thing with a dog or some animal. I don’t think I have a right, because in the dog’s view it would be a good life. From a dog’s point of view it would be good life. Simply because I think it is a bad life I don’t have a right. Every person is a person with its own saṃsāra and karma. So, of course we as well wishers, teachers, parents or doctors we have certain duties and rightness in doing things. But ultimately I think it’s your life. Of course, you might say: ›The fetus doesn’t have a way to decide.‹ On the other hand, the fetus has a potential to be a human being. If I were a doctor and asked ›Are you comfortable with that?‹, I would say: ›No!‹ Don’t get me wrong. There might be occasions where one would do that. But that does not mean that I am comfortable with that. Whole-heartedly I don’t have any problems with doing that. In other words, what I see is, it doesn’t conflict with my overall decide to reduce human suffering.« 9 Zu der Frage, ob man Leiden als karmisch bedingt ansehen und als Arzt in karmisch bedingte Prozesse besser nicht eingreifen sollte, äußert sich UM wie folgt: »›Suffering‹ is a tricky word. It is taken in terms of pain and these external things. This is not suffering. Pain is part of the suffering. Suffering is there because we are born. Stop rebirth. Do that and suffering is gone. When you have a lot of chromosome abnormalities that is incompatible with life, it comes out, spontaneously. You don’t have to kill. And that is the karma of the fetus. When you find out that the child is physically or bio-chemically abnormal, we try to destroy that, thinking we are helping the fetus. What kind of help is this? That has to be determined by the fetus. There are a lot of abnormal people living in this world without legs, without eyes, without hearing. I am not going to kill any person. It is not my right. The fetus has to decide. If the mother does it, she is taking up his karma.«

53 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

gegenüber Versuchen, Leiden grundsätzlich immer als karmisch bedingt zu interpretieren. 10 Ferner folgt für Buddhisten aus dem Vertrauen auf das Karma als einer gerechten Vergeltungsinstanz keineswegs ein geringeres Engagement zur Abwendung karmisch bedingten Leidens. Es liegt aus buddhistischer Sicht sogar im eigenen Interesse, anderen zu helfen. Während im christlich geprägten abendländischen Kulturraum ethische Entscheidungen in gewissem Sinne opferorientiert sind, insofern man darauf bedacht ist, die von einer Handlung Betroffenen in ihren Rechten zu schützen, hat die buddhistische Ethik auch eine täterorientierte Komponente, d. h. man ist bei ethischen Entscheidungen darauf bedacht, das eigene Karma günstig zu beeinflussen. Anderen zu helfen, ist eine Art »win-winsituation«. 11 (viii) Fast alle Interviewpartner orientieren sich bei der Anwendung des Ahiṃsā-Gebots an den traditionellen buddhistischen Vorstellungen vom Anfang des Lebens. Leben ist offenbar an die Verbindung des Körpers mit dem »Bewusstsein« gebunden (vgl. (v)), einer Art Geistwesen, dessen Entstehungsbedingungen in einer früheren Existenz liegen und das sich eine befruchtete Eizelle als Wirt sucht, wenn ein neues Lebewesen entsteht. Dies geschieht etwa zum Zeitpunkt der Empfängnis (oder unmittelbar danach). Aus den buddhistischen Vorstellungen vom Anfang des Lebens resultiert prima facie die Forderung nach strengen Auflagen für die biomedizinische Praxis im Hinblick auf den Schutz ungeborenen Lebens, da schon die befruchtete Eizelle ein puggala sein kann. Tatsächlich sind aus diesem Grund viele Buddhisten prinzipiell Abtreibungsgegner. 12 Vgl. dazu PP II: »Everything is not determined by karma. There are so many other factors determining various events in the life of a person. That is why when the Buddha is asked ›Do people suffer diseases due to past karma?‹, he says: ›That is not in accordance with our experience, because people suffer diseases when there is change of climate, when people take the wrong kind of food.‹ So, there are so many reasons or causes for disease and karma may be one of them.« 11 DR weist darauf hin, dass man durch Hilfeleistung gutes Karma akkumuliere, d. h. die Zukunft sei besser für den, der helfe, und für den, der Hilfe empfange – eine gute Situation, bei der beide die Gewinner seien. 12 AW hält auch im Falle einer pränatal diagnostizierten schweren Behinderung eine Abtreibung für unzulässig. »I don't think there is any room for that. Even when the baby in the womb is expected to get some sort of disease, I don't think the Buddha has given any room for that, to abort that life. Because that comes as a result of the karma of the baby. […] Killing a person’s life is a sin.« 10

54 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht

Es darf aber nicht übersehen werden, dass einige Interviewpartner etwa im Falle einer pränatal diagnostizierten schweren Behinderung eine Abtreibung für gerechtfertigt halten, weil sie den utilitaristischen Aspekt der buddhistischen Ethik in den Vordergrund stellen. Ferner ist für manche Interviewpartner auch im Falle der Abtreibung die Intention ausschlaggebend für die Beurteilung der moralischen Qualität einer solchen Handlung. Im Sinne der traditionellen buddhistischen Vorstellungen gilt – abgesehen von der Einnistung des Bewusstseins in die befruchtete Eizelle – auch die geschlechtliche Vereinigung eines Mannes mit einer fruchtbaren Frau als Bedingung für die Entstehung menschlichen Lebens. Daher können Buddhisten oft schwer einschätzen, ob man eine beim Klonen künstlich erzeugte Blastozyste wie einen puggala behandeln sollte. Manche Interviewpartner betrachten – unter der Annahme, dass sich das Bewusstsein etwa zum Zeitpunkt der Empfängnis einnistet – eine befruchtete Eizelle auch dann als puggala, wenn sie durch künstliche Befruchtung entstanden ist. 13 Ein Interviewpartner bezweifelt jedoch, dass sich das Bewusstsein einen so ungünstigen Wirt aussuchen wird wie eine zur Stammzellengewinnung erzeugte befruchtete Eizelle, weil die daraus entstehende Blastozyste bei der Stammzellenentnahme unweigerlich abstirbt. Auch vor dem Hintergrund einer deontologischen Auslegung des AhiṃsāGebots könnte also das therapeutische Klonen gerechtfertigt erscheinen. 14

AW lehnt das therapeutische Klonen daher kategorisch ab: »If it is harmful for any living being, it is not allowed.« 14 Zum therapeutischen Klonen nimmt AT wie folgt Stellung: »Sounds better than killing an animal. A problem which a Buddhist does not have is playing god. Such problems don’t come at all. There is nothing sacred. We don’t have those things. Two areas. You have to kill this particular thing. Whether it gets qualified to call like fetus according to Buddhism. You have relationship and consciousness has to be there. Whether there is a suitable condition for consciousness to arise in that. It will not be good for consciousness to be a part of it in that situation, because there is no potential for a being to be born. That is a bit doubtful for a Buddhist. On those conditions it seems to be more acceptable. I can also do it for a good purpose. […] It’s ultimately a good purpose. Of course, I need to study these things more. Superficially, it looks like a less problematic situation, because basically it may not be a situation to have viññāṇa or consciousness. Then, of course, the problem is whether you sell these things and commercialize. These things are relatively less problematic. You can sort it out. So, I would say therapeutic organ cloning seems to be better acceptable than certain other things.« 13

55 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

4.

Fazit

Die buddhistische Ethik ist non-personal nur in dem Sinne, dass sie nicht an den oben angesprochenen im Westen allgemein akzeptierten Personenbegriff gebunden ist. Buddhisten betrachten den sogenannten puggala als dasjenige Individuum, das bei ethischen Entscheidungen besondere Rücksichtnahme verdient. Dieser quasi buddhistische Personenbegriff, der auch für die Vorstellungen vom Anfang und Ende des Lebens maßgebend ist, darf aber auf keinen Fall als eine Art statischer Wesenskern verstanden werden, der eine diachrone Identität konstituiert. Aus der Sicht der buddhistischen Nicht-SelbstLehre (der sogenannten anattā-Lehre), die sich gegen einen solchen substantialistischen Personenbegriff richtet, ist z. B. die Sorge um identitätsverändernde Effekte bei der Behandlung von Parkinson oder Alzheimer mittels Stammzellentransplantation praktisch gegenstandslos. Der puggala-Begriff ist ferner weiter gefasst als der westliche Personenbegriff und hängt im Gegensatz zu letzterem nicht von dem Besitz bestimmter kognitiver oder moralischer Fähigkeiten ab. Dadurch wird der Handlungsspielraum bei bioethischen Entscheidungen aber nicht unbedingt stärker eingeschränkt, denn das Gebot der Nicht-Schädigung (ahiṃsā), an dem sich Buddhisten grundsätzlich orientieren, wird teilweise konsequentialistisch ausgelegt, so dass es in gewissen Fällen gerechtfertigt sein kann, einem puggala Schaden zuzufügen. Ferner ist der puggala-Begriff keineswegs so klar, dass sich Verstöße gegen das ahiṃsā-Gebot an ihm immer eindeutig festmachen lassen. Auch vor dem Hintergrund einer deontologischen Auslegung des ahiṃsā-Gebots (derzufolge jede Schädigung eines puggalas verwerflich ist) kann daher eine permissive Haltung bei bioethischen Entscheidungen durchaus gerechtfertigt erscheinen. Die unterschiedlichen Auslegungen des ahiṃsā-Gebots und die Unschärfe des puggala-Begriffs erklären das insgesamt eher heterogene Bild, das sich aus den Antworten der Interview-Partner in bezug auf ihre Einstellung zu konkreten bioethischen Problemen ergibt. Im Hinblick darauf, wie stark die einzelnen Positionen von religiösen Glaubensannahmen abhängig sind, zeichnen sich aber gewisse allgemeine Tendenzen ab. Bei deontologisch geprägten Antworten ist der religiöse Kontext der Karma-Lehre von entscheidender Bedeutung, insofern Handlungen unabhängig von ihren Auswirkungen positives oder negatives 56 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Entscheidungskriterien bei bioethischen Problemen aus buddhistischer Sicht

Karma zugeschrieben wird. Die Schädigung eines puggalas z. B. hat aus der Sicht mancher Interviewpartner immer negatives Karma zur Folge. Da Karma nicht nur eine Art moralisches Gütesiegel oder ein moralischer Makel ist, sondern auch eine Vergeltungsinstanz, erscheint es naheliegend, Argumentationen auf der Grundlage des Karmas als konsequentialistisch zu klassifizieren. Allerdings determiniert hier die moralische Qualität einer Handlung ihre karmische Auswirkung. Gute (verwerfliche) Taten wirken sich im Sinne der Karma-Lehre immer positiv (negativ) auf die aktuelle oder zukünftige Existenz des Handelnden aus, während im Falle der konsequentialistischen Sichtweise die moralische Qualität einer Handlung umgekehrt vom (zu erwartenden) Ergebnis her bestimmt wird. Die prinzipiell karmisch negative Qualität einer Handlung steht gelegentlich im Widerspruch zur positiven karmischen Konsequenz, die mit der Intention einer Handlung verbunden ist (z. B. im Falle von Euthanasie und assistiertem Suizid). Je nachdem ob eine Handlung aus altruistischen oder egoistischen Motiven erfolgt, wirkt sie sich positiv oder negativ auf das Karma des Handelnden aus. Insofern ist im Buddhismus auch die Intention ein vom religiösen Kontext abhängiges deontologisches Kriterium für die ethische Qualität einer Handlung. Konsequentialistische Positionen haben dagegen eher profanen Charakter. Einige Interviewpartner berufen sich zwar auf klassische buddhistische Quellen, denen zufolge ein konsequentialistisches (oder sogar utilitaristisches) Verhalten dem Bodhisattva-Ideal entspricht. Konsequentialistische Positionen sind somit nicht unbedingt auf den Einfluss westlicher profaner Ethik-Konzeptionen zurückzuführen. Allerdings lassen sich konsequentialistisch argumentierende Interviewpartner teilweise auch von rein rationalen Erwägungen leiten. 15 Legitimierende Bezugnahmen auf religiöse Vorbilder sind hier eher von sekundärer Bedeutung, wohingegen der Glaube an karmische Vergeltung ein starkes Motiv ist, eine deontologisch als geAngesprochen auf das Problem, dass beim therapeutischen Klonen die Blastozyste getötet wird, meint NM: »Buddhism is a means to achieve an end. Happiness or joy or Nirvāṇa. The religious idea is not an end in itself. If we try this technology, trying to help so many thousands and millions of people, I can justify this. [Think of] the greater good!« Vom Interviewer daran erinnert, dass dies »at the cost of killing the blastocyst« geschieht, antwortet NM: »Buddhism is a conditional one. There is nothing absolute. That also seems to go along with a common sense kind of – whether you might call it pragmatism or something.«

15

57 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

boten oder verboten determinierte Handlung zu unternehmen bzw. zu unterlassen. Insgesamt bleibt festzuhalten, dass die buddhistische Ethik zwar teilweise auf religiösen Prämissen beruht, aber durchaus auch Vertreter religiös neutraler Ethik-Konzeptionen ansprechen kann. Im Buddhismus entfällt vor allem das im Christentum verbreitete Hybris-Argument, wonach biomedizinische Techniken (wie z. B. das Klonen) verwerflich sind, weil man sich damit eine quasi göttliche Verfügungsgewalt über das Leben anmaßt. In diesem Zusammenhang ist ferner der anti-paternalistische Charakter der buddhistischen Ethik hervorzuheben. Statt sich auf das Urteil religiöser Würdenträger zu verlassen, ist eigenverantwortliches Handeln gefordert. Die Religion soll nur Denkanstöße geben. 16

Vgl. dazu VS: »Religion soll nicht eine Art Befehlshaber sein. Religion soll eine Möglichkeit geben, zu denken. Denken soll man selber. Religion soll das Denken des Menschen ernähren.«

16

58 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

Transplantation from a Modern Buddhist Viewpoint

Transplantation is still the primary medical solution to organ failure. In the present article we will study ethical problems involved in lifesaving organ donation with special regard to differences concerning the views of Theravāda Buddhists and Christians. Apart from (I) allotransplantation and (II) xenotransplantation we will deal with (III) therapeutic cloning as an alternative to regular transplantation which is in some sense ethically less problematic for Buddhists than for Christians due to the Buddhist doctrine of non-selfhood. (I) Several stories in classical Theravāda literature suggest that for a Buddhist organ donation should be meritorious: In the Jātakamālā and the Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra the Bodhisattva prince Mahāsattva throws himself before a starving tigress. The Sivi-Jātaka refers to the donation and transplantation of two eyes by King Sivi to a Brahmin. Jens Schlieter reports that probably inspired by the Sivi-Jātaka story many Sri Lankans agreed to post mortem cornea donations in the fifties when the ophthalmologist Hudson Silva had called on making such donations. The Sri Lanka Eye Donation Society, which was founded by him, now administers an eyebank where corneae are stored for transplantation (cf. Schlieter 2003, p. 46). There is, however, a problem concerning the time when a potential donor is declared dead. »For a successful transplant the organs must be harvested while they are freshly oxygenated, and this usually takes place between six and twentyfour hours after brain death has been declared. In the interim, artificial ventilation is maintained and respiration and heartbeat continue. The body retains its normal vital signs which include the presence of heat. If ventilation is discontinued and the body is allowed to cool, the internal organs would rapidly deteriorate and the prospects for a successful transplant would be greatly reduced.« (Keown 2010, p. 20 f.)

59 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

Theravāda Buddhists usually identify the time when consciousness leaves the body as the moment of death and as an overt sign of death they accept … 1.) … the loss of bodily heat: Loss of heat on the skin takes from eight to twelve hours, but the centre of the body takes three times as long to cool down to the ambient temperature. So, as Keown observes, transplantation is impractical if an organ is explanted after diagnosis of death according to this criterion. 2.) … the break-up of the body (Pāli: kāyassa bheda): Keown interprets this as »the disintegration of the elements which compose a human being« (Keown 2010, p. 14). More specifically, he understands it as »the irreversible loss of integrated organic functioning« (ibid., p. 14), i. e. as »the breakdown of the three main systems – cardiovascular, respiratory and neurological« (ibid., p. 25). Even if we apply this criterion which facilitates an earlier diagnosis of death it is too late for a successful transplantation. The criterion which is today almost universally accepted in modern medicine and which guarantees favourable conditions for a transplantation is brain death, either the death of the whole brain (as in the USA) or of the brain stem (as in the UK). In Keown 2010 the author points out the difficulties in ascertaining brain death and he argues that this criterion is just accepted in order to promote transplantation. (Heat loss and the irreversible loss of integrated organic functioning take longer before death can be declared.) He finds it by no means plausible to determine the end of life by this criterion, since many vital signs are still being registered after diagnosis of brain death. Keown observes that a brain dead donor has to be strapped to the operating table to control spontaneous movements while the doctor slits the body (cf. Keown 2010, p. 4). He also refers to cases of brain dead mothers who have given birth to children (cf. Keown 2010, p. 19). A Theravāda Buddhist might doubt the legitimacy of organ transplantation if it causes the donor’s somatic death. In Keown 2010 the author revises some of the ideas expressed earlier in Keown 1995, where he had been arguing that for a Buddhist brain death would be acceptable as a criterion of death. In Keown 2010 he refers to bioethicists like Robert Truog who believe that the brain death criterion has been chosen to »conform with conditions that are most favourable for transplantation« (Keown 2010, p. 22) and that one might have doubts whether a brain dead person is really dead. However, Nalaka Mendis, a Sri Lankan Buddhist psychiatrist, 60 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Transplantation from a Modern Buddhist Viewpoint

whom I interviewed in his home in Colombo, interprets the movements of a brain dead donor as mere reflex actions. Since the pain centre is situated in his/her brain which is no longer intact one can be sure that the donor will not feel any pain when the doctor extracts the organs. So, some reservation concerning the kind of horror scenario depicted by Keown in his article might be appropriate. For some other reasons it is nevertheless important to think about alternatives to allotransplantation. There is, first of all, the mere practical problem to meet the need of replacement organs if one relies solely on human donors. Moreover, especially Buddhists, who put so much emphasis on compassion or empathy (Pāli: karuṇā), should be concerned about the feelings of the surviving dependants who see the brain dead donor being at least apparently still alive when the doctor extracts the organs. (II) According to Keown »xenotransplantation (transplanting organs from animals) offers another possible way forward, although the ethical implications of this for Buddhists are as yet unexplored.« (Keown 2010, p. 26) Some organs of animals such as swine hearts, e. g., can be successfully transplanted in human bodies. From my own experience with interview partners in Sri Lanka I can say that the ethical implications of xenotransplantation for Buddhists are quite clear. Without a moment’s reflection all of my interview partners unanimously rejected this kind of alternative to allotransplantation, because a) animal life has a higher status for Buddhists than for non-Buddhists in general and b) there is no possibility to obtain the donor’s consent in this case. Partly owing to the Buddhist doctrine of non-selhood a Buddhist’s attitude towards nature as a whole seems to be different from that of a non-Buddhist: »[…] from a logical point of view the non-existence of self and mine obviously excludes the existence of a master or owner as well as the opposition of an owner (man) and something owned (nature). The idea that man (be he a Buddhist or not) is the master and owner of nature is obviously borrowed from the Western tradition, more precisely from the philosophy of Enlightenment, […]« (Schmithausen 1991, p. 62) However, since in Buddhism human beings are still regarded as superior to animals, even though a higher status is generally conceded to animals than in the Western tradition, Buddhists might agree to xenotransplantations in certain cases. The kind of disease which should be cured plays a certain role here. If it is a fatal disease 61 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

and no other donor is available, a Buddhist might agree to a xenotransplantation (cf. Schlieter 2003, p. 52 f.). (III) The develpoment of artificial organs by means of stem cells is still in the process of research and might become a future alternative to allotransplantation and xenotransplantation. Keown refers to the possibility to use adult stem cells for growing organs, which is less controversial than the use of embryonic stem cells, because the production of adult stem cells does not involve the killing of an embryo or pre-embryo. On the other hand, embryonic stem cells obtained from therapeutic cloning have a greater differentiation potential. They can develop into nearly any organ. At least in experiments with mice it has been found out that embryonic stem cells can be used to grow, e. g., a liver. Here is, first of all, a description of the technique: »1. Take a woman’s ovum, and remove its DNA. This converts it to a form of human life into what is basically a factory for creating a pre-embryo. 2. Remove the DNA from a cell taken from a human, and inserting (sic!) it into the ovum. 3. Giving the resulting ovum an electrical shock to start up its embryo making operation. In a small percentage of cases, a pre-embryo will be formed. 4. The pre-embryo is allowed to develop and produce many stem cells. So far, the procedure is identical to that used in adult DNA cloning. However, the pre-embryo is not implanted in a woman’s womb in order to try to produce a pregnancy. 5. Stem cells are removed from the pre-embryo; this results in its death. 6. The stem cells would be encouraged to grow into whatever tissue or organ is needed to treat the patient. Stem cells are a unique form of human cell that can theoretically develop into many organs or body parts the body (sic!). 7. The tissue or organ would be transplanted into the patient. […] If therapeutic cloning using embryos is successful, then perfectly matched, replacement organs could become freely available to sick and dying people. That would save countless numbers of lives, and increase the quality of life of countless others. Three possible examples of therapeutic cloning ›might include the use of insulin-secreting cells for diabetes; nerve cells in stroke or Parkinsons disease; or liver cells to repair a damaged organ.‹ There would probably also be side benefits resulting from the research. ›Further advances in understanding of how organs regenerate would increase the range of possible treatments that could be considered.‹

62 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Transplantation from a Modern Buddhist Viewpoint

[…] This procedure would have a number of advantages, when compared to regular organ transplant donated by a second person: • There would be presumably be (sic!) no danger of rejection of the transplant because the organ’s DNA would match the patient’s DNA exactly. • For transplants involving kidney (or theoretically any other organ that is duplicated in the body), another individual would not have to experience pain, inconvenience, and potentially shortened life span in order to donate the organ. • The patient would not have to wait until an unrelated donor dies to obtain a transplant. A new organ could be grown for them as needed. • The patient would not have to make-do with a replacement organ that is old and may have reduced functionality; a brand-new organ would be grown specifically for them. • The procedure would save lives which would otherwise be lost waiting for a transplant that did not come in time. • The potential exists to cure, or at least treat, certain diseases and disorders that cannot be effectively handled today.« (Robinson 2005)

This technique is, however, controversial for at least three reasons. Two of them (B and C mentioned below) are irrelevant for a Buddhist. A) The first question is whether the benefits of therapeutic cloning outweigh the potential misgivings of a Buddhist concerning the killing of the pre-embryo as a necessary side-effect of this method. Buddhists like Christians normally accept the time of conception as the beginning of life. Being equipped with all 5 skandhas the fertilized ovum must not be harmed due to ahiṃsā (»non-violation«). For this very reason an artificial and intentional abortion is regarded as having the same ethical quality as wilful murder: »[…] the existence of a human being (manussa-viggaha) is counted from the first moment of the reinstatement of the mind (paṭhamaṃ paṭisandhicittaṃ: VinA. 337), from the time of consciousness becoming first manifest in the foetus in a mother’s womb until the time of death. […] Hence there is no doubt about the Buddhist view of the starting point of life in an individual life span. The deprivation of life being defined as the cutting off and destruction of the faculty of life, harming its duration (Vin III, p. 72), there is therefore no ethical distinction between foeticide and infanticide, or any other intentional killing of a human being. […] Hence, there is no doubt about the unequivocal attitude of the Buddha’s teaching in respect of life from the very inception of conception, i. e., from the moment of

63 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

penetration of the ovum by the spermatozoon, thereby placing artificial and intentional abortion in the same category as willful murder.« (van Zeyst 1961, p. 137 f.)

Since the killing of a blastocyst obtained from therapeutic cloning is essentially the same as the killing of a (naturally) fertilized ovum, van Zeyst’s objections to abortion would also strike in the case of therapeutic cloning. However, as a Buddhist one might disagree with him, since … 1.) … Buddhists might as well favour the idea of a gradual beginning of human life instead, because »it harmonizes well with the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of no self« (Goodman 2010). »If we accept this understanding, then early abortion would not constitute killing a sentient being« (ibid.). One might, of course, argue in the same way with respect to the killing of a pre-embryo obtained from therapeutic cloning. 2.) … the pre-embryo will be allowed to grow for perhaps 14 days before it is killed by extraction of stem cells. However, consciousness does not begin until at least the twentieth week of pregnancy. In a very early state of its development the foetus does not even have a brain. 3.) … one might judge the killing of the pre-embryo from a consequentialist point of view, i. e. by taking into account the medical benefits of such an action which have been outlined above. Actually, some classical Buddhist sources suggest a consequentialist interpretation of Buddhist ethics. There is, first of all, the following quotation from the Suttapiṭaka of the Pāli Canon which is to be found in the story of Rāhula’s advice at Ambalaṭṭhikā: »When you reflect, if you know: ›This action that I wish to do with the body would lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both; it is an unwholesome bodily action with painful consequences, with painful results,‹ then you definitely should not do such an action with the body. But when you reflect, if you know: ›This action that I wish to do with the body would not lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both; it is a wholesome bodily action with pleasant consequences, with pleasant results,‹ then you may do such an action with the body.« (Goodman 2010, translation according to Ñānamoli and Bodhi: The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, Boston 1995, p. 524 f.)

64 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Transplantation from a Modern Buddhist Viewpoint

»This passage identifies the criterion of permissible action in terms of consequences, and in particular, consequences that consist of happiness and suffering. Passages such as this one suggest the possibility of regarding Theravāda ethics as having a consequentialist foundation.« (Goodman 2010)

In Śāntideva’s Śikṣāsamuccaya, a Mahāyāna work, there is another passage which suggests a conequentialist understanding of Buddhist ethics: »Through actions of body, speech, and mind, the Bodhisattva sincerely makes a continuous effort to stop all present and future pain and suffering, and to produce present and future pleasure and happiness, for all beings. But if he does not seek the collection of the conditions for this, and does not strive for what will prevent the obstacles to this, or he does not cause small pain and suffering to arise as a way of preventing great pain and suffering, or does not abandon a small benefit in order to achieve a greater benefit, if he neglects to do these things even for a moment, he is at fault.« (Śikṣāsamuccaya 12; translation according to Goodman 2010)

More accurately, this passage might be interpreted in terms of a special form of consequentialism, namely in terms of utilitarianism: »Here Śāntideva focuses our attention on the future consequences that our actions can causally ›stop‹ or ›produce‹ ; at least in this passage, he seems to be advocating consequentialism. In particular, what Śāntideva is concerned with here is the experienced quality of certain feelings; he is trying to stop ›pain and suffering‹ and bring about ›pleasure and happiness.‹ Philosophers use the term ›hedonism‹ to refer to the view that takes the presence of happiness and the absence of suffering to constitute well-being. Moreover, the view Śāntideva advocates is universalist, because it extends moral concern to all sentient beings. It’s fairly clear, moreover, that Śāntideva is an advocate of maximization: he regards it as mandatory to bring about a small amount of suffering to prevent a greater amount, and to sacrifice a small amount of happiness to achieve a larger amount. And since he does not say anything about constraints or important considerations arising from the distribution of happiness and suffering, the most plausible reading of this passage would involve accepting aggregation, in which the happiness and suffering of all beings are considered together, without attaching significance to how these are distributed. Now the ethical view called ›classical utilitarianism‹ can be defined as aggregative, maximizing, universalist, hedonist consequentialism. This passage, then, can naturally be interpreted as a statement of the classical utilitarian form of consequentialism.« (Goodman 2010)

65 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

Some scholars confessing Buddhism whom I interviewed in Sri Lanka regard even Theravāda ethics as utilitarian. Hence, they feel no qualms about killing a pre-embryo by extracting stem cells in order to grow organs for transplantation. B) To Christians therapeutic cloning as a method of creating life might appear like playing god. Such worries are, of course, irrelevant for a Buddhist. C) If therapeutic cloning is regarded as a method to duplicate a living being one might argue against it from the point of view of classical liberalism, since the protection of the identity of the individual and the right to protect one’s genetic identity are at stake here. However, properly speaking the method does not involve any duplication of a living being, because the blastocyst is not implanted into a female to cause a pregnancy. Even if one did duplicate a living being a Buddhist would be less concerned about this. Because of the Buddhist doctrine of non-selfhood the potential violation of the identity of the individual as a core value of the occidental tradition is rather a pseudo problem for a Buddhist: »Ein zentraler Punkt der buddhistischen Sicht auf das Klonen ist darin zu sehen, dass mit der oben ausgefuehrten Sichtweise des ›Nicht-Ich‹ und der Aufforderung, sich nicht mit einem Selbst zu identifizieren, der Wirbel um die Vision identischer menschlicher ›Klone‹ letztlich ein Scheinproblem markieren muesste. Wer sollte mit wem wesenhaft identisch sein, wenn es kein Ich gibt?« (Schlieter 2003, p. 46)

Literature Goodman, Charles 2010. »Ethics in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism«, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available from: hhttp://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/ethics-indian-buddhism/i. Keown, Damien 1995. Buddhism and Bioethics, London. Keown, Damien 2010. »Buddhism, Brain Death, and Organ Transplantation«, in: Journal of Buddhist Ethics, vol. 17. Robinson, B. A. 2005. »Therapeutic cloning: How it is done; possible benefits«, available from: hhttp://www.religioustolerance.org/clo_ther.htmi. Schlieter, Jens 2003. »Die aktuelle Biomedizin aus der Sicht des Buddhismus. Ein Gutachten erstellt im Auftrag der AG Bioethik und Wissenschaftskommission des Max-Delbrück-Centrums für molekulare Medizin«, Berlin-Buch, 2. recti-

66 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Transplantation from a Modern Buddhist Viewpoint fied version, available from: hhttp://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/kbe/Akt.Bio med.Buddh.pdfi. Schmithausen, Lambert 1991. Buddhism and Nature, Tokyo. van Zeyst, H. G. A. 1961. »Abortion«, in: Encyclopaedia of Buddhism. Fascicule: A–ACA, ed. G. P. Malalasekara, Colombo, pp. 137–138.

67 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Patricia Rehm-Grätzel

The Person in Search of its Author – On Hannah Arendt’s Foundation of the Narrative Identity »We are here, searching for an author. – An author? What kind of author? – Any author […].« 1

At first sight, the term ›person‹ does not seem to play a central role in Hannah Arendt’s work The Human Condition from 1958. Much more conspicuous are the concepts of ›human being‹, ›humane‹ or ›humanity‹, which are more exactly determined here. Nevertheless, the concept of ›person‹ takes an important place in Hannah Arendt’s thought. This will be shown with the help of the concept of ›person‹, its role and place and the history, of which it partakes. Within her Denktagebuch there is a passage taken down in June, 1950, in which she defines the term ›person‹ in a more precise way (cf. Arendt 2002, p. 8). To Hannah Arendt, ›person‹ designates the mask a human being carries, and the role it plays. The concept of ›person‹ is borrowed from the theatre’s vocabulary and thus connoted to that effect. Besides, Hannah Arendt distinguishes two possibilities of how the concept of ›person‹ can be understood. On the one hand, she speaks of »Persona« (cf. Arendt 2002, ibid.) and thus refers to man’s mask or role, created for himself in order to hide his true self from others. On the other hand, ›person‹ is the mask or the role into which man is born, i. e. his natural shape and talent and his social position. 2 In both cases it is about the self, the ›I‹ of a Pirandello 1997, p. 41. Also cf. Pirandello 1997, p. 64, who invokes in a conversation between the director and the character of the father the following dialogue: »Director: You must have already played in a theater play. – Father: […] At most as much as everyone else also plays theatre in the role which he has got in the life or which has been assigned to him by others.« Personhood, here, therefore also consists of a dialectic of a self-created being and one that is imposed from outside.

1 2

68 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Person in Search of its Author

human being who is in a community with others and deals with it; which, according to the vocabulary of the theatre, is called the »play among and with men« (Arendt 2002, ibid) by Hannah Arendt. Speaking of person, Hannah Arendt understands a theatrical being of man in a community with his fellow men. Therefore, to her, life is a sort of dramatic art, a production. 3 Playing the role of its life, the human being can actively shape or passively endure it. As a ›Persona‹, it is »a product« (Arendt 2002, ibid.) of its self, its ›I‹, because it forms the mask, visible for the others, and the role it takes in opposition to others. In Hannah Arendt’s view, this is the »character« (Arendt 2002, ibid.) of man. It is not innate, but it is compiled, is rehearsed, and formed out of his own impulse. As a ›person‹, man is the product of what has produced him, of what has determined him, which is the biological production – according to the modern scientific level of knowledge the genotype that determines appearance and talent – and the social sphere. With respect to the concept of person as an identity-establishing unity, this means that man who creates his character himself, remains a »sovereign master […] of his product« and therefore generates his identity himself (cf. Arendt 2002, ibid.). As a person, determined by external circumstances, however, the true identity of a single human being behind the facade remains concealed; the person is nothing but a »formalistic principle« which does not take a real uniqueness into account (cf. Arendt 2002, ibid.). These two possible concepts of the person belong together, they are complementary. Hannah Arendt’s concept of the person derives from her idea of man. This becomes clear with the activities of man, which she defines in her work The Human Condition. 4 Labor is an activity, which corresponds to the biological process

Cf. Pirandello 1997, p. 21. In his preface Pirandello ascertains: »Every imaginative thing, every creature of arts needs his drama in order to exist, this means a drama whose acting person it is and by which it becomes the acting person. The drama is the reason of being of a person; it is its vital function which it needs to be able to exist.« This statement is also valid for Hannah Arendt, however, it refers not only to the imaginative creature, but to every person’s life. 4 Also cf.: Sylvie Courtine-Denamy 1997, p. 313. Courtine-Denamy also speaks, with respect to Arendt’s work The Human Condition of a philosophical anthropology (anthropologie philosophique). Here, she follows Paul Ricœur’s thoughts (1983, p. 16), who himself speaks of a philosophical anthropology (philosophie anthropologique). 3

69 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Patricia Rehm-Grätzel

of the human body. (Arendt 1998, p. 17) Through his labor, man produces and uses natural things that are necessary to his everyday life and survival, particularly food. Life itself is the basic condition for labor. To survive, life requires nourishment that is achieved through labor. Every person can perform labor by himself and, in fact, no one else is necessary. In 1952, Hannah Arendt characterizes the solely laboring human being in her Denktagebuch as being »driven from sorrow and fear«, he is »always isolated« (cf. Arendt 2002, p. 203). However, she revises this in The Human Condition. She now admits that the laborer does not necessarily need the presence of other human beings, however, he would reduce himself to an ›animal laborans‹ if he truly only worked for himself without any contact to other human beings. In this respect, to reduce himself means that he would lose his human qualities or surrender them voluntarily and he would only follow his vital and biological needs – in the same way as animals. In this respect man does not differ from the animal; labor makes him basically resemble the animal. Work is an activity, which produces artificial things man surrounds himself with and out of which he creates the world in which he lives. This happens because man is aware of his individual transience and wants to create something which will outlast him as an individual. This is only assured through the creation of artificial products. In this way, man artificially creates his own lebensraum, which consists of things. This world of things is his own home, it is his world. The basic condition for work is »worldliness« (Arendt 1998, p. 7). Man can also perform work without coming into contact with others. While working, man »is alone and inspired by the work as a creation« (cf. Arendt 2002, p. 203). He independently creates a world – his world. As a producer, man is a homo faber. This would not be the case if he lacked a specifically human quality. He would then be a divine demiurge, a creator of his own world, where nobody else lives and in which nobody participates (cf. Arendt 1998, p. 33). In this respect, a single human being would no longer resemble a human being, but rather a god. As a producer, man realizes his freedom, namely the freedom of purely biological needs. Here, he independently forms things which are not only connected with pure life and survival; in this respect, man, by his ability to produce, participates in the divine. The specifically human characteristic, however, which man has in common neither with the animal nor a divine demiurge, is action. 70 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Person in Search of its Author

This is his prerogative. Since man lives in a community with other human beings, he acts in conjunction with them. To Hannah Arendt, only action is the »explicit realization of being together« because action does not use or produce anything, which occurs directly »between men« (Arendt 1998, p. 17). Here, man meets men. Action means to set a beginning. Man was born and is conscious of his own birth. He is the only being with this consciousness which only he has as a being and which distinguishes him from all other beings, it makes him an individual. Being aware of his own birth, he is also aware of his uniqueness. And hence, he differs from others of his kind by the fact that a certain act accords up to him that concerns him alone – namely his own birth, which took place on a certain day. Especially the activity of acting is characterized by natality and is particularly connected with it. Birth, natality, being born, means to set a beginning. Whoever is born is himself a new beginning, and he carries the ability in himself to begin something new himself. These abilities are activated through birth, which every man experiences in a passive way. With the beginning of his own life, every man can go into the world actively and shape it. This occurs through initiatives. But to Hannah Arendt, each initiative is a beginning action; to her, action means to start something new. Man confirms his own birth (Arendt 1998, p. 215) by acting and taking responsibility for this action. This means that birth is the essential part of human life. For every man, life means action, not just once, but over and over again. To Hannah Arendt, human life is action since man stays in constant action throughout his entire life. In this respect, human life is action. The initiative starts with man’s birth. It is an action – in this sense perhaps the original action. Man has no power to bring forth this passive initiative as a passive or to turn it into an active initiative by his own means, even if he can say that birth is a biological fact. The original initiative, the original action, must result from something that goes beyond simple human action, yet which simultaneously contains it. This can only be achieved by the being itself. The being itself comprises the being of the world and of all living beings. The active initiative can only occur within the being, which can allow a passive initiative to happen. Being is action, and therefore human being is also action. Man 71 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Patricia Rehm-Grätzel

cannot distance himself from this fact since his nature is action with which he constantly manifests himself anew. The same applies to speaking. Here, too, man always has more initiative than in active non-speaking. To Hannah Arendt, speaking is action. By speaking, the acting person also manifests himself and identifies himself as the official author of his action. The individual identifies himself through non-speaking action; as only he begins this particular action, he becomes somebody. But through speaking, this somebody identifies himself as a ›who‹, which means that he identifies himself as the individual, who has started this action or these actions. In this respect, the speaking somebody, the who, is to Hannah Arendt the person in terms of ›persona‹. To her, acting and speaking are always a unity, because the acting person identifies himself through speaking and with it expresses his absolute difference from everyone else. (cf. Arendt 1998, p. 217) Here we find a second important aspect that is directly connected to action. Acting and speaking always serve man to distinguish himself and to present his own individuality. But this requires that man differentiates himself from someone, and in this case of someone who is speaking, there must be other speaking individuals who can distinguish themselves from each other. Self-distinction can be found only in a multitude of self-distinguishing individuals, which assumes a mutual cooperation which Hannah Arendt defines as »plurality.« (Arendt 1998, p. 17) This is generally the fundamental condition of acting and speaking. (cf. Arendt 1998, p. 213) The uniqueness of an individual only becomes manifest in plurality when individuals express themselves by acting and speaking. At the same time, with the consent of mutual communication, equality (cf. Arendt 1998, p. 213) prevails. In the plurality of a certain limited group, everyone speaks the same language and has the same mutual context for his actions. (cf. Rehm 2008, Rehm 2007) It takes courage (cf. Arendt 1998, p. 232) to manifest oneself within a plurality and to be revealed through acting and speaking. It always demands courage to come out into the open, since exceeding limits is a great effort. For instance, if someone finds himself among a group of individuals who are unknown to him, he can stay anonymous within this group. He may, however, speak to one or several members of the group or even in front of the entire group. In this case, he emerges from his anonymity and makes himself known. Only the individual who risks exceeding the limits of intimacy and 72 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Person in Search of its Author

anonymity in a group, who gets the better of himself and abandons himself or the others, is able to manifest himself and therefore reveal his personality and his uniqueness to others. If we follow Hannah Arendt deeper into her use of theatre and her metaphor of playing a role, a person who acts and speaks needs a role and a place where he can take up this role. The epoch, in which the role and place of a person are defined most clearly, is, to Hannah Arendt, the natal epoch of the drama, namely antique Greece. Here, she is even more specific, because she speaks of the antique polis. 5 Thus, an exact separation between the private and the public realm exists in the government form of the polis, which is indispensable in order to exactly determine role and place of the person. The private space is the realm where man retires from the world. This is the sphere of intimacy, the area where man is protected and sheltered. It is the function of the private realm to ensure this intimacy. (cf. Arendt 1998, p. 48 f.) Hannah Arendt gives two different meanings to the public realm. On the one hand she speaks of the general public, which means a large quantity of people who pay attention and receive attention. The one who finds himself in the public realm presents himself to this general public. He appears, and thus becomes, apparent and audible to everybody. Being public means to also betake oneself among the people. Here, only he is real who exposes himself to the largest public possible. The more people know about a thing or a person, the more vivid is the awareness of it and the more the thing or person may be recognized as somebody or something real. On the other hand, we can say that the more people hear about or see the same thing, the more they may pay credit to this and the more they are assured of its reality. On the other hand, the public realm signifies the world which means the world of things produced by man. These are now at the disposal of everybody jointly and thus connect all people who use them together. In the example of the polis, the private realm is to treat as equivalent to the house, where the household community – which Cf. Courtine-Denamy 1997, p. 315. Courtine-Denamy emphasizes that Hannah Arendt by no means deals with the Greek polis on account of an antique nostalgia. Rather, Hannah Arendt quotes the relations within the polis because their structures are still recognizable in the modern age.

5

73 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Patricia Rehm-Grätzel

consists of the family and the slaves – is lead and dominated by the head of the family, the pater familias – the father. This sphere is characterized by necessity. This means that everything which is absolutely needed for life in the sense of survival is settled only in this area. This is about the nourishing of the family as well as the economic area, which means the keeping of the house in the sense of organization or – in a more modern term – the administration of finances. On the other hand, necessity concerns the survival of the genus, namely of man. It is the woman’s part who gives birth to the children and educates them. This is why the female part of the Polis’s population exclusively belongs to the private realm. In the private area there is a clear division of roles: The father of the family presides over the household community; he rules it. This domination shows that the household community is an unequal living together. As even slaves belonged to this community, the household is hierarchically structured where everybody has and also takes on their certain roles. The private realm is set against the public realm, the realm of freedom. Here, the prerequisite is liberty in the sense of independence from any necessity. The public realm of the Polis is only reserved to men whose existence is ensured by their private realm. To be in possession of a private realm means to possess property in the form of a house or an enclosed property which is the prerequisite for liberty. At the same time this property has to be financially covered in such a way that the owner has no concern about his financial situation. The possession of property in the form of a house or an enclosed property guarantees, therefore, freedom because the owner has a place, a location. This location concretely defines the property, which is enclosed by walls and therefore shows borders. In the figurative sense this means that the owner is able to locate himself, that he has his location. He has found his certain location, his place in life; he has taken his position. Only because he has a certain place in which he can take his certain role, he is free. Hannah Arendt emphasizes the importance of the certain place with a clear separation of wealth and property. Not the rich immigrant has access to the empire of freedom, but only the one who has property, even if he is otherwise without means. In this respect, exile does not mean the loss of wealth, but the loss of property, namely the loss of one’s own place. To Hannah Arendt, freedom does not designate the absolute 74 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Person in Search of its Author

freedom from all compulsions. But man is only free if he knows his role and can take his position in society. Then he has the freedom of choice as to how he wants to fill this role and use his place. The free man has the choice of three ways of life – bioi, as Hannah Arendt calls them corresponding to Aristoteles – he may fulfil within the public realm. All these ways of life have in common that they deal with »beautiful« and thus with everything that is not necessary and needed for survival. In this respect, one way of life is »the life of enjoying bodily pleasures, in which the beautiful, as it is given, is consumed« (Arendt 1998, p. 13). The second is »the life devoted to polis, in which excellence produces beautiful deeds« – the bios politikos (Arendt 1998, p. 13). Finally the third way of life is that of the philosopher »devoted to inquiry into, and contemplation of things eternal« in the area of »everlasting beauty« – the bios theoretikos (Arendt 1998, p. 13). We can only recognize by the Greek names that the second way of life – the bios politikos – is the area of political in the actual sense. Since this way of life expresses itself in deeds, i. e. in actions, action is, to Hannah Arendt, politics. Therefore, politics only takes place within the freedom of human beings that take their role in their place. The public realm is not only distinguished by liberty but also by equality. All free men, who act in the public realm and choose a free way of life, are equal in the sense of like-minded. They fulfill the same prerequisite and now have the same aim: namely to distinguish themselves in a special way within and before the public. Thus, the public realm becomes the sphere of the best. Here, the aspect of plurality is very important as the action of self-distinction takes place before the eyes of many and happens in competition with many people, where nobody is similar to another. It takes place before the eyes of many, who all have their own individual role and their own place. In a figurative sense we can also say that every free man has his own position from which he judges himself and others. Freedom therefore means being like-minded, but being individual nevertheless. Because action and speech, which in the original sense is understood as action, belong together, according to Hannah Arendt; they are the two forms of political activity (cf. Arendt 1998, p. 25). The political consists of two things: On the one hand, it consists of the public realm, namely the being-among-men; it consists of people who fulfill the same conditions, pursue the same aims and are 75 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Patricia Rehm-Grätzel

like-minded, therefore without losing their own individuality; people who have a role and a place. On the other hand, it consists of people speaking together and acting together. 6 The political is the original place where people meet in order to form the »play among and with the people« together (cf. Arendt 2002, p. 8). Within the antique family, which shows negative as well as positive characteristic features, every member has a certain role to fulfil. The pater familias presides over the family and leads them, the mother provides for the survival of the family, while she bears children, the slaves have to provide orderly procedures within the house and for the needs of the family. Because everybody receives his role and also fulfills it, they know what is expected of them and how they have to behave. On the other hand, however, they are also sure they do the right thing and experience security in some way. In the modern mass society man has, unknowingly, taken on the antique family structure. He, again, is controlled and must behave. However, since the family has become too big, the individuals no longer have real roles to fulfill in which they can feel secure. It is quite the same with property. In the antique family structure, the most important property is the house, the estate. Within the house, the family members are safe. Only the one who owns land, the one who owns a house may consider himself part of the community of free citizens. Only he has his place and therefore the permission to take his position in the society. Modern man no longer has property in the antique sense. His possession and property is money, which he earns as a laborer and consumes again. In this respect, man no longer has a spatial place in the actual sense, and no place in society in a figurative sense. Modern man has lost himself. He no longer has a role or a place. He has become the animal laborans because he voluntarily renounces what is specifically human. Like Ahasver, he walks restlessly and aimlessly through the monstrosity of mass society, which he has created himself. One could almost say, in reference to the Eternal Jew, that modern man has turned himself into the eternal worker. Essentially, history belongs to man who takes his role and therefore a position in it. The concept of history is ambiguous and even Hannah Arendt Cf. Harms 2003, p. 332: »Acting within the plurality is the foundation of politics, not of a this or that way fateful given political order«.

6

76 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Person in Search of its Author

notices these ambiguous meanings. On the one hand, we understand it as a fictitious story, as a narration, a novel, etc. An author has created a world and makes the figures of his imagination that experience something together appear in it. On the other hand, however, history is also what people experience in their reality. It is an anecdote, an experience, a report, but also the life story, the biography as such. The third meaning of ›history‹ is the world history, the totality of stories, which people have lived and have experienced with each other. Nevertheless, the speaking and acting human being is somebody, a person who does not seem to be tangible or determinable in his uniqueness, that, however, intervenes just by being a person, namely by acting and speaking, intervenes in the course of history and in the togetherness of human beings and reveals himself as a unique person. What will remain of a person are its stories. The person can only be perceived afterwards, only when the single action is done and the person identifies itself as the actor by speaking about it, or if ›one‹ speaks of it, in recounting the action and the actor. Who this person has been only becomes explicable after his death, as soon as all stories, which the individual has experienced during his or her life, become one complete story, become his life story, his biography. Having a story is the being of a person, because it acts and speaks of it. It is by his life’s story, by speaking about the life’s story, the narration that the single man steps out of the crowd of unknown people. Only by this publicized life’s story he manifests himself and is perceived. Only like this he is remembered. For this reason it is obvious for Hannah Arendt that what will remain of a man’s action are the stories »he causes« and which become his own life story altogether. In this respect, the following is clear to her: »Who somebody is or was we can know only by knowing the story of which he is himself the hero – his biography […]« (cf. Arendt 1998, p. 186). Life means acting within time and therefore it means: to form the world to which everybody belongs for oneself and for the others, whose property it also is in order to create histories and history. But even if an individual characterizes itself by its stories, it is merely the actor. He is the hero of its biography, but he is not the author. This results on the one hand from the togetherness of the people, on the other hand, from the unpredictability of actions. No one is able to form his life or to sketch his biography (cf. Arendt 2002, p. 185). The ability to shape a life only comes to the one who 77 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Patricia Rehm-Grätzel

has a complete view, who is situated outside of the events. Man himself is too involved in his own life, as to be able to perform this. His story is lacking an author. In order for a story to have sense, it needs a narrator who determines this sense in the beginning and who forms the story accordingly. In the case of the fictitious story this is a human being; in the case of the history of people or of the people this is »nobody« (Arendt 1998, p. 185). This is what confuses man who searches for the sense of his life or the sense of life in himself. 7 But no author can be found behind his story or behind the history of humanity who offers sense, »because it is not at all written« (ibid.). The fact that man is in search of an author for his life stories, now, is due to the fact that he applies the principle of fictitious stories to his own life, according to Hannah Arendt. He recognizes his inadequacy in neither being able to form his life independently nor being able to give it sense. As a sort of analogous end – Hannah Arendt calls it »hypothesis« – man also assumes an author behind his life and behind life in general, an author who has thought of a sense (cf. Arendt 1998, p. 186). However, this is a mistake. The search for a source of sense is so important to men in general and man in particular for another reason. An author writing a story is responsible for this story, for its course and for the behavior of the characters. If man found and recognized »the big, unknown wirepuller«, he could suddenly hold him responsible for everything that has happened in his life, the good as well as the bad (cf. Arendt 1998, p. 186). To Hannah Arendt, it is important what happens within the human existence, and not what could possibly exist in the metaphysical area and, from there, could preside over everything. With this point of view, she directs an ethical demand to the person who enters the »play amongst and with the people« (cf. Arendt 2002, I, 8). And this is where the big difference between the fictitious person and the actual human person lies: To Hannah Arendt, action is the nature of being and thus it is the nature of man that only, completely, becomes effective in the interacCf. Pirandello 1997, p. 22. Pirandello also already sees a reason of being for his six fictive persons in the fact that they search their author. Even though he does not accept this, because they do not think, »that the only reason of our life exists in an ordeal which seems to us unfair and inexplicable«.

7

78 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Person in Search of its Author

tion with other free individuals. Hence, she demands that every man becomes conscious that he or she is an active person. This means that man is responsible for himself and for his own life as well as for his actions. This is man’s responsibility which nobody can take away and which no author will assume: He has to become conscious of his uniqueness and express this in front of others in public by speaking together and acting together. And this is not only an ethical demand but is now everybody’s task: Each single man has to recognize and accept his own responsibility. This is the only way for every single person becoming unique again and how he may compete with other unique persons and recognize the sense of life.

Literature Arendt, Hannah 1998. The Human Condition. Introduction by Margaret Canovan, Chicago. Arendt, Hannah 2002. Denktagebuch 1950–1973, (ed.) Ursula Ludz und Ingeborg Nordmann, München; Zürich. Courtine-Denamy, Sylvie 1996. Hannah Arendt, Paris. Harms, Klaus 2003. Hannah Arendt und Hans Jonas. Grundlagen einer philosophischen Theologie der Weltverantwortung, Berlin. Pirandello, Luigi 1997. »Sechs Personen suchen einen Autor«, in. Luigi Pirandello (ed.). Gesammelte Werke in sechzehn Bänden. Bd. 6, Berlin. Rehm, Patricia 2008. Handeln als gelebter Wert. Aus Hannah Arendts Leben und Werk, Mainz. Rehm, Patricia 2007. »Das Leben als Handlung. Das Ideal der Einheit von Theorie und Praxis im Denken von Johann Gottfried Herder, Maurice Blondel und Hannah Arendt.«, in: Chilufim. Zeitschrift für Jüdische Kulturgeschichte. (ed.) Zentrum für Jüdische Kulturgeschichte der Universität Salzburg, pp. 127–144. Ricœur, Paul 1983. »Préface«, in. Hannah Arendt. Condition de l’homme moderne, Paris, pp. 5–32.

79 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Grätzel

Selfhood as a Condition for Justifying Life

Summary This lecture is all about the issue of selfhood in Continental Philosophy. Selfhood and non-selfhood are not logical or mathematical oppositions but different performances of the internal drama which we call self. In this drama, non-selfhood emerges from selfhood. Only an existing self can be denied. Non-self is not a logical negation of the self. It arises from the decision, not to be self anymore but escape the self. Selfhood and non-selfhood are ethic alternatives. A man can revolt against his self and he can also learn to accept the self. Refutation and acceptation are performances of speech and language. They are speech-acts which justify the self, his life, and life in general. Justification of life is a performance of a speech-act in which we want to accept our self.

The Self is Inescapable The dimension and signification of the self in Continental Philosophy starts with Immanuel Kant and his Critique of Judgment. Kant argued against Hume to demonstrate the autonomy of reason and – what he calls – the upper cognitive faculties (obere Verstandesvermögen). Kant discovered that all faculties are rooted in the transcendental unity of apperception. The transcendentality is a capacity of cognition. But Kant’s intention was to transfer transcendentality for a practical reason. He wanted to demonstrate the autonomy of action and the independence of moral judgement from affections. However, Kant’s new area of transcendentality was still abstract and theoretically. Hegel changed from theoretical to practical use of transcendentality in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Following the dialectical way, self-cognition is the result of dependency and independence in the 80 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selfhood as a Condition for Justifying Life

struggle for recognition, respect and acceptance. This was the first step into a social philosophy. An individual is only self-consistent and autonomous when it is recognized and respected by the other. Autonomy is dialectic. Autonomy is dependent on and independent from the self. In Jean Paul Sartre’s philosophy in Being and Nothingness, autonomy is a claim against the other and the way he sees me. The eyes of the other and their glance evaluate the body and embody or incarnate the self. But those eyes show doubt and skepticism: the look on me only touches my surface. The internal self is not touched. It rests in an open situation in which the absolute claim can never be totally satisfied. In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard provided a better conclusion and analyzation of the issue. He demonstrated how the social phenomenon of recognition, respect and acceptance arises from the internal relation of the self. For Kierkegaard, the self is not a concept or a thing, but the experience of a dual. In this experience, »self is a relation, which relates to itself«. Analytical thinkers saw a logical and senseless tautology in this formulation. But this is an error. The relation to itself is not logical but ethical. The self must find a position towards the experience that it cannot escape from self. The self has to declare itself. The declaration is mostly negative because it is a restraint to provide a declaration. The negative declaration leads to frustration and desperation while the positive declaration leads to confidence, hope and believe. Kierkegaard extends the differentiation of desperation. Desperation can be conscious and unconscious. Of the two, the unconscious desperation is worse. This, too, seems to be logical nonsense, but it is an ethical fact. The self-cognition is not cognition in the scientific sense, but an action in which the self performs its self-relation. The self is neither a thing and nor a speechless mathematical relation. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard did not point out speech as the only medium allowing us to declare and refute. Language only obtained another importance after the linguistic turn of philosophical dialog, as it can be found in works of Buber, Rosenstock-Huessy, Rosenzweig and more recently Hans Georg Gadamer and Emmanuel Lévinas Language itself is the social situation in which we live. We act inside the language. But the language is not inside our brain (as the television movie is not inside the TV). 81 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Grätzel

Some of the speech-act theories can be found in the analytical philosophy of Austin and Searle, as well as in the theory of communication by Habermas. None of them supply any reference to dialogical thinking and philosophy.

The definition of Person As often demonstrated, the problem of the modern definition of person has its origin in the definition of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke did not refer to the original meaning of the notion. For him, a person is an identity with certain capacities. The psychological definition of person was thereby introduced in philosophy. As a consequence of the definition of person as a psychological matter, person is based on functionality and capacity. There is no trace left of involvement, ensnarement or other tragic elements of the Ancient Greek understanding. The tragic elements show the person as a part or a role in a drama as well as in a scene in everyday-life. The question is not self or not-self, but the decision, whether we play a role or accept a responsibility. This means, we play and refuse a responsibility or we do not play and accept a responsibility. In each case, we relate our acts to responsibility and give an answer to our self. The self cannot be an identity. The self is my answer to you and to myself in the external and internal dialog. If the decision comes to a conclusion depends on the result of the dialog. But even in this conclusion there is a dual of you and me. In Schopenhauer’s interpretation of the tat tvam asi (das bist Du), the other self as is not an identical to my self. In fact, the self is a relation of empathy and freedom. In the same way, the eudemonism in Greek mentality is the happiness of man because man has a good relation to his internal demon (which means a good relation to himself). The internal balance is not an identity, it is a conclusion of an internal drama in which we accept or refuse responsibility. The definition of a person can be traced back to the world of theater and is the definition of any actor in action. As a theater term, Person means mask, larva or nymph. Today, most of the terms have a zoological connotation. The common meaning is role or figure. In the German language, someone can make »a good figure«; that means someone renders a good performance. This idiom is not used in the English language. In English, the definition of Person has lost almost 82 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selfhood as a Condition for Justifying Life

all references to mythology and theatre. Goffman’s The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life makes no differentiation between person and role, since we always play a role in everyday life. The actor has completely merged with his roles as man or woman, father or mother, business-man, teacher and so on. This radical error was completely absorbed by the American and later on by the continental sociology. Today, you can find it in many anthropology and social theories. The program of the play identifies the role and actor of the dramatis personae and generates the philosophical illusion of a real identity. But even in theater play one realizes that this is just a play. Common sense – and even a child – knows the difference between role and actor and play and realty. An actor never completely immerses himself into the character he plays; on the contrary, a person immerses himself into his task if he wants to be authentical. The actor of a play is not identified with his role or the character he plays. The person, in contrast, is completely identified with his task, which is thereby no longer a role. A role has no responsibility, because it does not have to answer to anybody.

The Moods of Speech-Act Speech and language have different levels of performances and effects. Like the other theorists of speech-act, John Austin saw a propositional function as a kind of performance. Unfortunately, he did not distinguish between imperative, indicative and subjunctive as moods for the temporal distinctions of presence, past and future. RosenstockHuessy was able to illustrate that the indicative mood is the representation not of presence but of past. You can only indicate something when it has been done, which means it is no longer in progress. Only the imperative is the representation of the presence. An order generates actuality. In the same way, future exists only in and through language, especially in subjunctive and optative. Linguistic manuals list only few languages where optative is known grammatically. What is the reason for many languages not having an optative form in grammar: because they replace it with other grammatical moods. Thus, the indicative and the subjunctive receive an optative meaning. To give an example, saying »Farewell« or »Wish you well« are indicative moods linguistically, but optative with respect to the performance of the speech-act. All statements of greeting and wishes are 83 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Grätzel

optative moods. Especially, religious rituals, prayers and liturgy, baptism, confirmation, marriages, the Last Supper and last sacraments are performances of confidence and belief. In linguistics, the optative would coincide with the subjunctive. In reality, the optative meaning is the most commonly used form in speech. Talking about the weather, reading the news, the stock market or the menu in restaurants, having a date with a new friend, and so on; all the various constructions have optative meanings since we speak and think in the form of the optative. The optative is the mood of confidence, wish and believe. It does not coincide with future statements, which mostly have an indicative mood. »He will come« is an indicative statement. The subjunctive is the mood of doubt and uncertainty, and quite contrary to confidence and believe. Subjunctive and optative are extremes and antipodes. The reason for those misunderstandings in linguistics is the presupposition that language is first a non-acting form of thinking, which can further be used as a tool to communicate and to act. Thus, the theories of speech-act can be considered as a step out of this preconception. It is a big step forward to recognize that speaking is not just a form of thinking. In addition to the speech-act authors the dialogical philosophy theorizes the dramaturgical elements of a performance, the dramatis personae, the actors of the play, the cast, the plot. Very important is the prosody which defines the proposition as a statement, a question, an order, a demand etc. The speech (as dialog) is determined by performance, in which the speech is expressed to others. But this expression is always a speech to oneself. Speaking more than thinking constitutes a self-relation. To speak to others is the primary form of soliloquy; the self is involved in the speech and thus connected to and responsible for the content at the moment when the speech leaves the mouth of a speaker. That’s why Jesus said, »Not that which goes into the mouth defiles a man but that which comes out of the mouth defiles a man« (Math 15, 11). The speaker can be defiled by his own speech, because he or she is the author and origin of the speech. Origin and responsibility are not only closed neighbors in a speech-act, they are identical. The dual you-me »me and you« is a dramaturgical unity, in which we speak to ourselves when we speak to other. Our speech is attached in a manner of responsibility and involvement. The difference between thinking and speaking can be found in 84 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selfhood as a Condition for Justifying Life

the expression and realization of the dual in front of others. What is spoken has to be answered. The speaker is answerable for his statement except if he plays a role. In this way, the selfhood is a drama with actors, cast, plot, story, ensnarement, to be snared in history and wracked with guilt. This demonstrates that selfhood or personality has the same meaning as person in Ancient Greek theatre.

Justifying Life The self is a dual with an internal performance like communication with others. The internal dialog is a repetition of the external. There are the same levels of speaking and the same differences between indicative, optative and subjunctive mood. Thinking performs on the level of indicative when it is occupied with matters of fact. But this is the exception in internal dialogs. Another exception is the imperative or vocative dialog. The internal dialog is normally performed in the subjunctive or optative mood. Descartes begins his Meditationes with the radical doubt in subjunctive mood. In the third meditation he switched to indicative to prove God. Until today, nobody is convinced of this evidence. The reason is that God cannot be indicated, but only communicated. The internal dialog will mostly be performed in subjunctive and optative mood. Doubt and desperation is expressed in subjunctive mood, confidence and belief in optative mood. In the optative mood, we find the justification of life. But we first have to explain the meaning of justification. Justification is a declaration against reproach, accusation and impeachment to be guilty. As shown in my book Being without Guilt, guilt is not an invention of priests, but the fundamental existential problem in man’s life. The core of myth and mythology is to justify the guilt, which comes out of the simple fact of being. To be is only possible at the cost of another being. To be conscious means to always have a bad consciousness, because we realize and know that we have to kill and to expropriate other living beings and human beings. As Albert Schweitzer says, the good consciousness is an invention of the devil and, as we can add, the formal and neutral consciousness is an invention of philosophers. When you study the myths and rituals of ancient history and religions, you will find out that justification, which means to justify life, is the fundamental motive of these ritual 85 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Grätzel

performances. The rituals are very often about repairing and restoring a guilt which cannot be avoided because we want to live and have to eat and consume. Rituals are looking for a balance and should restore the balance of life. Rituals as performance and speech-acts create a real future. Real means it does not occur under the condition of past. We live a justified future with the optative mood of confidence and belief. The optative is the mood of a justified future which is not charged with guilt and dues. We should notice this when we use optative in everyday life. We can bless and curse with simple words because human language has the power to bind and to solve.

86 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Paul Nnodim

The Conception of Person in African Philosophy: Personhood in Igbo Life and Thought »A person is an individual only to the extent that he is a member of a clan, a community or a family«. (Mboya 1963, pp. 164–165) »The individual can only say: ›I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am‹. This is a cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man«. (Mbiti 1999, p. 106)

1.

Introduction

As the quotations above illustrate, academic and philosophical discourses on personhood and self-identity in Africa revolve predominantly around a communalistic understanding of self. While the emphasis on the social features of self-identity is of great significance to the constitution of a specifically black African conception of person, historically it served another important function, albeit one with a subversive political undertone. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, conceptualizing a cumbered self, enmeshed in the fabric of social life, as opposed to the apparently, socially un-encumbered self of Western liberal individualism, was of theoretical importance to the emerging black African politics of identity and representation. The goal of this politics was to reclaim human dignity for the colonized African. The pan-African intellectual and political movements of the colonial era, whose major goal was to decolonize the African mind, required the creation of counter-images to the European conception of person. Consequently, the pan-African project consciously eschewed Eurocentric, egological reifications in the discussion of African identities, while re-defining difference in a positive sense. Accordingly, African philosophers writing about the African conception of person 87 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Paul Nnodim

during the colonial era had to distance themselves from Western liberal individualism. Thus, as Eze (1997) notes, contemporary African philosophy may be considered a counter-colonial practice: »The idea of ›African philosophy‹ as a field of inquiry thus has its contemporary roots in the effort of African thinkers to combat political and economic exploitations, and to examine, question, and contest identities imposed upon them by Europeans. The claims and counter-claims, justifications, and alienations that characterize such historical and conceptual protests and contestations indelibly mark the discipline of African philosophy.« (Eze 1997, p. 11 f.)

Consequently, it is not surprising today that some African scholars, both local and international, continue to posit and defend a »we existence« ontology of person, which trumps every conceivable primacy and subjectivity of the subject – ego. A person in Africa, then, is a self only in relation to how he or she lives in the community, as opposed to an independent, self-authenticating individual. In my view, this conception of person constitutes an overly narrow abstraction based on epistemically and metaphysically minimal foundations, which must be understood within the context of a particular politics of identity and representation. Presently, unmeasured emphasis on group-oriented notions of personhood among Africans undermines the broader metaphysical dimensions of personhood existing in the thought systems of many traditional African societies. Bearing in mind the enigma philosophers, psychologists and scholars in the natural sciences encounter in defining the self even in the face of the simplest introspection, I do not intend to undermine the social character of personal identity nor claim that the self is a fully independent entity in an inter-subjective world. Rather, I would like to suggest in this work that the social character of persons is one among other foundational properties of personhood in African thought. This social character, as important as it may be, is but one property among others in the construction or acquisition of self identity. To illustrate this multifaceted nature of personhood in African philosophical thoughts, this paper focuses on the conception of person among the Igbo of South Eastern Nigeria in West Africa. Though Igbo thought and belief systems are closely related to those of the Yoruba, Efik, Akan, and some other groups in West Africa, Igbo no88 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Conception of Person in African Philosophy

tions of person or personal identity may not reflect the broader conceptions of person among other various groups and cultures across Africa. My discourse on the conception of person in Igbo thought and belief systems cuts across the fields of philosophical anthropology, moral psychology, cosmology and religion, since the conception of person among the Igbo has both ontological and normative dimensions.

2.

Dimensions of Personhood

The Igbo word for a human being is Mmadu. The etymology of the word Mmadu can be traced to two other Igbo words mma (beauty) and ndu (life). Hence, Mmadu literally means the beauty of life (see also Agbasiere 2000, p. 65). A closer study of the concept of Mmadu that transcends this literary meaning reveals a triadic composition of the human person: Ahu – the material human body, which includes the external body parts and internal organs; Mmuo – the non material soul, mind or spirit, which undergoes the process of disembodiment at death; and Chi – creative essence, complementary spirit or destiny. Chi is an enigmatic concept that requires in-depth exploration. From an intrinsic or ontological standpoint (what I call the »existing human being per se« or »being for oneself«), the three elements: Ahu, Mmuo and Chi constitute a person, as opposed to nonpersons (animals, plants, etc.), which may lack one or two of these aspects of being. There is also an extrinsic aspect to being human or what I refer to as the normative aspect of person in the Igbo context. The extrinsic perspective appeals to the notion of being »with« or »for others«. The extrinsic or normative status of personhood among the Igbo is attained through the acquisition of morals in communality with other persons and things. In what follows, I will examine the intricate relationship between the (1) intrinsic or ontological and the (2) extrinsic or normative constitution of personhood in Igbo thought and belief systems.

89 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Paul Nnodim

2.1. Intrinsic or Ontological Dimension of Person The intrinsic or ontological dimension of person encompasses the body, mind or soul and what the Igbo refer to as Chi. The Body or Ahu As Agbasiere (2000) notes, the human person in Igbo thought is a material and non-material composite being endowed with a life-force or vital breath known in Igbo language as Ume. This life force is found in all living things. A person’s material composition is known as Ahu or the body. The Igbo word Ahu, according to Agabsiere (ibid.), derives linguistically from the Igbo verb »hu«, which means »to see«. Thus, Ahu designates that part of the human being which is visible. A person derives his or her biological nature from the parents, while the non-material constitution of the human being originates from the creative essence of God the creator. It is the complexity of this composite nature of the human being that places a person above other living creatures, which lack such composition (ibid., p. 65). In general, though the human body is not seen as external to a person or self, it can nevertheless be objectified. Thus, an Igbo can talk of his or her body as an object of observation: »Nkea bu anu ahu m« or »this is merely the flesh of my body.« It is not surprising when asked: »How are you?« to hear someone answer: »My body is fine, but I am not doing fine«. While the state of the body conveys someone’s health condition, it does not necessarily capture the ultimate state of a person’s being. In talking about the body, an Igbo expresses the reflexive power of consciousness: I am aware of myself not only as a centered, unified conscious being, but also as a substantial locus of empirical attributes that can be objectified (see also Deutsch 1992, p. 6). In his or her capacity to objectify various modes of being, a person in the Igbo context is seen as the center of activities that can be abstracted beyond mere physical interaction between organism and environment. Though the human body can be objectified, it is nevertheless held sacred among the Igbo as the seat of life force and the non-material soul. Thus, traditional Igbo ethics strictly forbids the wanton shedding of human blood. One is forbidden to shed the blood of a clan’s man/woman, and is discouraged from committing suicide. A very good example of this is found in Achebe’s highly ac90 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Conception of Person in African Philosophy

claimed novel Things Fall Apart. The protagonist, Okonkwo, inadvertently sheds the blood of a kinsman during the burial rites of one of the elders of the clan. He is exiled for seven years to his mother’s kinsmen and will not return to Umuofia, his home town, until the land is cleansed of the abomination: »The drums and the dancing began again and reached fever-heat. Darkness was around the corner, and the burial was near. Guns fired the last salute and the cannon rent the sky. And then from the center of the delirious fury came a cry of agony and shouts of horror. It was as if spell had been cast. All was silent. In the center of the crowd a boy lay in a pool of blood. It was the dead man’s sixteen-year-old son, who with his brothers and half-brothers had been dancing the traditional farewell to their father. Okonkwo’s gun had exploded and a piece of iron had pierced the boy’s heart. The confusion that followed was without parallel in the tradition of Umuofia. Violent deaths were frequent, but nothing like this had ever happened. The only course open to Okonkwo was to flee from the clan. It is a crime against the earth goddess to kill a clansman, and a man who committed it must flee from the land. The crime is of two kinds, male and female. Okonkwo had committed the female, because it had been inadvertent. He could return to the clan after seven years.« (Achebe 1958, p. 109 f.)

The second intrinsic or ontological component of a human person is the soul, known in Igbo as Mmuo or spirit. Mmuo or Spirit Although Mmuo (or muo) is the generic term for immaterial beings, gods, ancestors and ghosts, it also designates the immaterial nature of the human being. This demonstrates that in the Igbo cosmology a human person is thought of as partaking existentially in the beingness of spirits (see Okere 1995, p. IX). Abstracting beyond mere physical appearance, the Igbo view the human person as half matter and half form (see ibid.). The Mmuo or spirit is the cause or principle of life in the individual and the primary source of self-identity. The human soul or spirit is credited in the human person with originating activities such as thought, reflection, advanced consciousness and advanced self-consciousness, memory, deliberation, planning and execution of plans, imagination, etc. According to Rev. T. Okere, the idea of self or person in the Igbo context cannot be fully articulated in the absence of Mmuo or soul:

91 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Paul Nnodim

»The Muo or spirit in man is clearly conceived as the cause or principle of life in the individual because when someone dies it is often said that his spirit has left muo ya ahafula. Further usage of the notion of spirit shows that it is regarded as the seat of emotions. […] It is the Muo in man that is responsible for the following activities without which the idea of Onwe/Self could neither emerge nor be sustained: (1) Uche, Iche echiche–-Thinking, considering, reflecting with some anxiety over one’s lot. […] (2) Iru eruru to reflect deeply, usually on some sad, sombre, tragic subject. […] (3) Ncheta lit. to think out, to remember, recall. […] (4) Nghota–-lit. to pluck, to grasp, to understand, to comprehend, to appreciate the full implications of […]. (5) Izu–-deliberation, consensus or wisdom and information resulting therefrom. (6) Ako–-Cleverness, Wisdom, Prudence. […] (7) Ngenge, Igba Ngenge–-Imagining, surmising; and finally (8) Atutu, Itu atutu–-to plan, to project, to order the execution of a plan. These and all such are activities of the Muo or spirit in man. A dead man cannot do them. An animal or any being lacking spirit cannot do them. They are therefore typical of the self of which Muo is a constituent part and it is from its aspect as Muo that the self can do them.« (Okere, 1995, IX)

Chi Chi as a constitutive element of the human person is not limited to the Igbo society. The same concept or similar concepts are found among some other African societies. 1 In the context of the colonial and missionary encounter in Igboland, and the urgency exhibited by Western missionary agents to understand local cultures, as well as to translate the Christian scripture into local languages, Chi hastily took the place of the Christian guardian angel. In reality, as Rev. Okere points out, »there is really no Western philosophical or theological equivalent« (1995, IX). In relation to the ontological structure of persons among the Igbo, Chi may be viewed as creative essence of the Supreme Being (Chi-ukwu – great Chi or God), complementary spirit, and personal destiny. Chi as Creative Essence of the Supreme Creator or Chi-ukwu To understand the concept of Chi as creative essence, one needs to revisit Igbo cosmology. According to Umeh (1997), Igbo see the uni1

Ori in Yoruba is very similar to the concept of Chi among the Igbo.

92 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Conception of Person in African Philosophy

verse as a deliberate act of a Supreme Being known as Chi-ukwu (great Chi or God). The Igbo word for the universe is Uwa, which for Umeh (1997) is onomatopoeia for the fact that the universe came into being with a mystical sound: »Uuuß…waaaa…«, and with this sound the universe »blazed forth like a flourish of light of the first sunshine at daybreak« (Umeh 1997, p. 5). The creation of human beings within the universe follows the infinite, emanative essence of the Supreme Being through the idea of Chi or God’s creative essence. Thus, »the spiritual [essence] and timeless essence of all in the universe and beyond are the respective Chi, which aggregate into ChiUkwu [great chi or God], or part thereof.« (Ume 1997, p. 6) As is evident in Igbo cosmology, every individual person has an individual Chi, who created him or her. No two individuals share the same Chi. Chinua Achebe attributes the fierce egalitarianism among the Igbo to this unique role of Chi as a constitutional element of the Igbo self: »The idea of individualism is sometimes traced to the Christian principle that God created all men and consequently every one of them is presumed worthy of His sight. They Igbo do better than that. They postulate the concept of every man as both a unique creation and the work of a unique creator. Which is as far as individualism and uniqueness can possibly go! And we naturally expect such a cosmogony to have far-reaching consequences in the psychology and institutions of the people. […] But we should at least notice in passing the fierce egalitarianism […] which was such a marked feature of Igbo political organization and may justifiably speculate on its possible derivation from this concept of every man’s original and absolute uniqueness«. (Achebe 1998, p. 70)

Chi is the emanation of the Supreme Being in every individual person. The Igbo believe that when someone dies his or her Chi returns to the Great Chi or Supreme Being (God). The individual, infinitesimal essence or Chi unites with the infinite creative essence of the Supreme Being. The Chi of a deceased person does not cease to be. However, the individuality of that particular creative essence is lost in the great »ocean« of essences of the Supreme Being. Chi-ukwu or the Supreme Being is the »Cosmic Unity as well as the Oneness of all that exist.« (Umeh 1997, p. 130)

93 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Paul Nnodim

Chi as Complementary Spirit The notion of dualism of being is present in Igbo worldview and plays an important role in the conception of the human person. This notion is expressed as »[W]herever something stands, something Else will stand beside it. Nothing is absolute. […] The world in which we live has its double and counterpart in the realm of spirits. A man lives here and his chi there.« (Achebe 1998, p. 68) Chi in Igbo is not only immanent to the human person, but also external to the self. For this reason, Chi is often translated in Igbo as personal deity, since an individual is free to erect a shrine for his personal Chi, worship or despise it (see Okere 1995, IX). Hence, Dasein or just being there (to borrow from Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit; 1993, p. 12 ff.) is not a sufficient ontological mode to categorize human existence in the Igbo context. The existence of the human person involves an intricate relationship between the corporeal and spiritual, visible and invisible elements (Okolo 2000, p. 211). Chi as Destiny Chi, as already noted, in many ways depicts an unprecedented uniqueness and individualism of the human person in Igbo thought and religion. A happy and successful person in Igbo worldview is someone, who is at peace with his or her Chi or one whose Chi is active, awake or good. If someone escapes a near fatal accident, the Igbo will say that one’s Chi is awake or active. A mad, unhappy human being or one who acts in ways antithetical to reason would be considered as one, who is in utter disharmony with his or her Chi. Chi is responsible for a person’s destiny in the world of sensible realities. Chi as destiny is not to be confused with an unalterable fatalism or pre-determination. Underlying the idea of Chi as destiny is the presence of choice and responsibility. An individual is fully responsible for his or her actions, since everyone’s Chi operates according to one’s choices in life. This is expressed in Igbo as »onye kwe, chi ya ekwe«, which literarily means »when an individual says yes, his or her Chi will also say yes«. The existentialist concept of »bad faith« is abhorrent to the Igbo. The Igbo conceive destiny as a maneuverable life path: »Every individual has a distinct destiny, ie, his allotted path in life, a path however, which is so delicately laid out that it has opportunities, failures and

94 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Conception of Person in African Philosophy

successes strewn along it. The individual’s Chi enables, helps and collaborates with him in manipulating these possibilities for his self-realization. Hence the paradoxical juxtaposition of both limitation and enablement which connects the Chi idea with destiny in the sense of fatalism, but also makes it the very agent enabling and prodding the individual towards success and achievement as he bursts the molds of fatalism.« (Okere 1995, p. IX)

2.2. The Extrinsic or Normative Dimension of Person My analysis of the idea of Chi as the mark of individuality in the Igbo conception of person may falsely suggest that the Igbo conceive of an individual as an asocial, autonomous concentration of various indifferent conditions. This, of course, is not the case. A closer study of individuality in the Igbo context clearly shows that various social dimensions of experience are constitutive of that very individuality (see also Deutsch 1992, p. 20). Within Igbo society, self identity is a relational and transactional category. Thus, a person is a creative articulation of his or her individuality within the matrix of social community (see also Deutsch 1992, p. 3). In a very fundamental sense, identity is thus shaped by the community. The extrinsic or normative dimension of personhood is a procedural, status oriented, self-realization of a human being, which is actualized by individuals in communality with other human beings and things in the world. The extrinsic or normative status of personhood is attained through the acquisition of morals. A child may be devoid of the extrinsic status of personhood, but is intrinsically speaking a human person. The normative status of personhood is acquired through one’s being in time and space, in the course of a human being’s journey from childhood through elder-hood or even ancestor-hood. This fact is clearly expressed in the Igbo proverb, which says that »what an old man sees sitting, a child does not see standing« 2. Normative personhood is neither a guaranteed status nor a permanent condition of an

A similar Igbo proverb that deals with this topic says: ana eji anya chara acha ahu ihe di na akpa dibia or »it is with matured eyes that one sees what is concealed in the bag of the medicine man«

2

95 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Paul Nnodim

adult human being. An adult, whose moral psychology fails to appropriate the standard norms of his or her community, loses the extrinsic or normative status of personhood. In this sense, the normative conception of person in Igbo traditional society hinges on a set of communalistic or communitarian ethics. When the Igbo say »nkea abughi Mmadu« or »this one is not a person«, they demonstratively point to a human being, who has not attained normative personhood or who has lost the extrinsic status of personhood. Nkea abughi Mmadu or »this one is not a person« is a judgmental statement that relates to one, whose behaviors are clearly anti-reason or anti-community. It points to the perversion of a normative persona or to some form of pathological disunity. A similar idea is observed among other African groups, such as the Baluba group of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire): »The word ›muntu‹ [person] inherently includes an idea of excellence or plenitude. And thus the Baluba will speak of ›ke muntu po‹, ›this is not a muntu‹, of a man who behaves unworthily.« (Tempels 1959, p. 101)

Furthermore, a person in the Igbo context functions as the center of a network of relationships. For example, a human being is a person in relation to being the grandson or granddaughter, son or daughter, brother or sister, father or mother, etc. of someone else in space and time. This network of relationships also serves as a channel of recognition for the individual. Phenomenologically speaking, an individual without communal recognition will be a mere Gestalt devoid of any egological reification and perhaps ontological entity. In this sense, the community grants meaning to the individual. This is expressed in Igbo as umunna bu ike or »the community is my power or strength«. The strong communalism observed among African societies led some scholars of African studies to deny Africans a sense of individuality or to accord priority to the communal over the individual among Africans. This seems to be the case for the Belgian missionary, Placide Tempels (1906–1977), who lived among the Bantu people in the former Zaire. Tempels in his work La Philosophie Bantoue (1945) 3 or Bantu Philosophy (1959) interprets the Baluba word mun-

La Philosophie Bantoue is a translation of Rev. Placide Tempels work from Dutch to French by Dr. A. Rubbens in 1945. It was first published by Lovania at Elizabethville in the Belgium Congo (see Tempels 1959, p. 10).

3

96 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Conception of Person in African Philosophy

tu or person as a concept antonymous to the European notion of individualism or individuation: »For the Bantu, man never appears in fact as an isolated individual, as an independent entity. Every man, every individual, forms a link in the chain of vital forces, a living link, active and passive, joined from above to the ascending line of his ancestry and sustaining below him the line of his descendants. It may be said that among Bantu the individual is necessarily an individual within the clan«. (Tempels 1959, p. 108)

But does the importance of the community in the shaping of a person’s identity result in the loss of individuality or to unanimism? 4 The Igbo word for self is onwe m (see also Okere 1995, p. IX), which derives from the verb »to possess«. Onwe m or self literarily means »I am the possessor of myself.« In his or her pure spontaneity, the self or onwe m, which is the deepest expression of awareness, knows itself. He or she is simply the owner of himself or herself. As much as we may try, one does not have direct memories of another person’s experience nor take direct hold of another’s conscience and will (see also Deutsch 1992, p. 16–17). Tempels (1959) seems to realize this when he talks about the notion of free will and conscience among the Bantu. He quotes a Bantu saying: »Munda mwa mukwenu kemwelwa kuboko, nansya ulele nandi butanda bumo! (None may put his arm into his neighbour’s inside, not even when he shares his bed). The neighbour’s conscience remains inviolable, even for his closest friend«. (Tempels 1959, p. 105) The traditional Igbo, so to say, had no form of insurance outside the community. The community provides for the individual in time of disaster, while the individual must strive for integration and recognition. The community with its historicity, culture and spaces for creativity becomes second nature to the human person and closes any existing sufficiency gap generated by humanity’s first or basic nature. Therefore, the human person in the Igbo context is complete within the community.

Bell citing Hountondji describes unanimism as »the illusion that all men and women in such societies speak with one voice and share the same opinion about fundamental issues« (Bell 2002, p. 60).

4

97 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Paul Nnodim

3.

Conclusion

I will conclude by saying that while the Igbo conception of person emphasizes the important role the community plays in shaping the identity of the individual, the concept of personhood in Igbo, nevertheless, partly transcends the community. This partial transcendence of the social is compatible with communitarian ethics in Igbo or African societies, since the individual remains a self-authenticating source of legitimate claims outside the group. The over-emphasis of the priority of the communal over the individual may be rightly understood within the historical and political context of pan-Africanism. Today, such emphasis has unacceptable social and political consequences within and beyond Africa. At the local level, for instance, it robs persons of their individual psychology to make legitimate claims against oppressive regimes. Domestically and internationally, those eager to postpone the application of human rights in Africa evoke the apparent group oriented nature or mentality of Africans, while vigorously claiming that the universal declaration of human rights (UDHR) is a secular version of Judeo-Christian values and Eurocentric aspirations originating from Western liberal individualism. In as much as this claim cannot be easily dismissed, a closer study of the ontological and normative status of persons among Africans, as the Igbo case demonstrates, grants retrospective cultural legitimacy to most articles of the universal declaration of human rights. A person has an intrinsic value in Igbo or African thought, whether as an individual or as a member of a group. While the Igbo (or African) may overcome egocentrism in the community, he or she is not egoless, but rather is a self-authenticating individual within a community of individuals. Therefore, the idea of personhood among the Igbo or Africans is a much more complex system that defies the rather simplistic and predictably antagonistic schema: individualism versus communitarianism or the West versus Africa.

Literature Achebe, C. 1995. Things Fall Apart. Everyman’s Library. Achebe, C. 1998. »Chi in Igbo Cosmology«, in: (ed.) E. C. Eze. Malden African Philosophy: An Anthology, Blackwell Publishers. Agbasiere, J. T. 2000. Women in Igbo Life and Thought, London: Routledge.

98 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Conception of Person in African Philosophy Bell, R. H. 2002. Understanding African Philosophy. New York: Routledge. Deutsch, E. 1992. Creative Being: The Crafting of Person and World. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Eze, E. C. 1997. »Introduction: Philosophy and the (Post)colonial«, in: (ed.) E. C. Eze. Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge. Heidegger, M. 1993. Sein und Zeit, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. Mboya, T. 1963. Freedom and After. London: Andre Deutsch. Mbiti, J. S. 1999. African Religions and Philosophy. Oxford: Heineman. Okere, T. 1995. »The Structure of the Self in Igbo Thought«, in: (ed.) T. Okere. Identity and Change: Nigerian Philosophical Studies, Vol. 1. Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. (http://www.crvp.org/book/ Series02/II-3/chapter_ix.htm). Okolo, C. B. 1998. »Self as a Problem in African Philosophy«, in: (ed.) P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux The African Philosophy Reader. London: Routledge. Tempels, P. 1959. »Bantu Philosophy«. Paris: Présence Africaine. Umeh, J. A. 1997. After God is Dibia. Vol. 1, London: Karnak House.

99 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Schaede

Person – Body – Life A Theological Stress Test of a Strained Term

Person – Life – Body. A contemporary theorist dealing with the ethics of the body might be encouraged to discuss. This triumvirate is probably fished out of the relic box of some archaic European life philosophy. Don’t these three terms represent – at least in a natural-scientific perspective – the same, namely the human body that can (in all its complexities) easily be described on a molecular-biologic, neurophysiologic level? The »body« (meaning Körper), as a material object, is tangible. The body can be put into a MRI and thus can be analyzed. However, the »body« as a physical structure, as Leib, is a dusty, unclear version of the concept of the body, a concept … created for devotional poets. Nevertheless, the term »life« seems to be an inscrutable concept. What else can be said about »life« that goes beyond the simple-minded expressions like irritability, sensitivity, metabolism, selfmovement, self-regularization, self-organization and self-reaction that are enumerated in the Bermuda polygon? Finally: »person«: what does the Episcopal city of Mainz evoke? Insufficient informed detractors might say: shouldn’t this expression function as a magic word for metaphysical tacticians of (mostly) catholic origin? By now, even the concept of the body has become object of discussion. The term is said to be a construction site. It is unclear whether »the body is a biological fact« or »a concept created by society«. The body loses its traditionally safe existence in the world. The body is altered and improved, and it is said to be unstable with regard to its view on reality and the perception of itself. When it comes to the »body« there are three options: the scientific concepts of the body, the images of the human body that are produced through cultural communication, and the fundamental self-awareness with oneself as embodied living being. Donna Haraway, who deals with the bio-politics of the postmodern body, finds an »extraordinary

100 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Person – Body – Life

strong connection between language and technology« (cf. Haraway 1995, p. 161 f.) Despite all of it: are we in our right minds, when we talk about body (as Leib) and person? It is time for a biotechnological body language. Let us talk about information-processing organisms. They make mistakes and function poorly now and then. But they do not experience suffering. They do not feel pain. The eschatological cinnabar with which theology struggles when speaking of resurrection, sorts itself out on its own. Is there a more elegant way of coping with life than to adhere to this form of biotechnological life philosophy? Allow me one interjection: are human beings body constructs? Am I a construct? I myself was born as a latecomer because my parents still liked each other very much in their late 30s and prevented conception by means of the Knaus-Ogino method. This does not exactly sound contrived. In this respect the concept of the body intermingles that what I am, that what distinguishes my life, and that what is an object of scientific considerations. I am not a body. I also do not exist as an organism. However, I can be interpreted as body and organism. And sciences can rationalize and objectify this in their manner. These objectifications have an effect on my life and me. These are repercussions that alter me. But despite that, they should not be mistaken for what I am. We are no physical beings with organic and spiritual superstructure. The way I experience my life and how it differentiates itself is so different from animal and organic life, that I cannot readily speak of the same bodily life any more. And with that, I have arrived at my topic. Person and life – in the context of a theological perspective. Both have to do with myself. As a theologian, I do not turn to my DNA in order to find out who I am. This is (inter alia) obvious due to the fact that people have 40 % of their DNA in common with bananas. The concept of person rather explains how I would have to ask from a theological perspective. It is after all a product of Christian theology. It is even nicer considering the fact that philosophies have adopted the concept of person and meanwhile it has become inevitable in anthropological reflections. What about the concept of person – from a theological point of view? And what would we lack in our thinking if it did not exist? The following theological and philosophical stress tests will examine the strained concept with regard to a few aspects. Recurrent 101 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Schaede

questions are: How can person, body and life correlate? How can theology inspire and stimulate the discourse? We do not start with an ordinary theologian, but we start with Immanuel Kant.

1.

Kant and Person

Immanuel Kant, of whom one cannot say that he suffers from sanctimonious veiling attacks, has elaborated (with problematic and intoxicating clarity) the problems concerning the religious motives of ascension and resurrection. Resurrection is an »appropriate [term] for the sensual imagination of humans« but is »in its belief in the future a burden to reason«. Kant explains this in the following way: resurrection assumes »a materialism of the human personality […], which can take place only under the condition of the exact same body«. It is not understandable, that a continuity of life after death is based on »a cohesion of a certain chunk of substance« . In opposition »the hypothesis of spiritualism of a reasonable world being« which Kant also cannot approve of is »favorable for reason«, where »the body can remain dead and buried but still be the same living person«, all the while »the human being in spirit«, is repositioned to the »location of the blessed« (cf. Kant 1983a, A 182–184, p. 793 f.). Kant cautions not to consider »the personality of an identity« as being based on the body. The body is not what constitutes a personal being. This would not at all be compatible with regard to resurrection. Should that of what man »has never (not even during his life) grown fond of be carried with him until all eternity«? Anyway: How should it be made comprehensible, »that this lime earth of that the human is made of, conditions the existence and the preservation of living beings in heaven?« (cf. Kant 1983c, A 182–184, pp. 793 f.). Being a person is not a characteristic of the body. Rather the »identity of the person« is »the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all alteration and variation of circumstances«. This sounds amply rationalistic. Kant does not plan to develop an exclusive reserve in the mental area for the person, as if to say: Person is mind and noumenal. The body is a Leib and phenomenal. Although, man rightly »imagines« to be »a better person when be transfers himself to the point of view of a member of the world of the understanding«. 102 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Person – Body – Life

Only then can freedom, as »independence on determining causes of the world of sense«, develop within him. But this embodiment is only possible if he simultaneously »considers himself as a member of the world of sense« (cf. Kant 1983c, A 110–113, pp. 89–91). This is the one thing. Here is the other: For Kant person is primarily a practical, philosophical definition. It is located around a concept of duty. »Accordingly, man must not and cannot relinquish himself from personality as long as duty is at stake« (cf. ibid., A 73, p. 555). The close association of duty and person generates, for Kant, a sort of duty concerning the care on the noumenal level for the phenomenal level. Adhering to the categorical imperative, to act all the time »as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only«, leads to: »I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage, or to kill him« (cf. ibid., A 67, p. 61) 1. Kant explains this at another occasion: the human being is entrusted to maintain the dignity of humanity – disposing of this responsibility is an offense to the latter. This protection goes so far, that Kant considers it »partial self-murder to deprive oneself of an integral part of an organ when, for instance, someone sells a tooth to be transplanted into the jaw of another person« (cf. ibid., A 73, p. 555). Two aspects matter with regard to this elaboration. Firstly, it has to be asked whether the concept of person formulated by Kant has, at least secretly, theological inspired borrowings. And secondly, in this connection a neglected moment has to be followed. Interestingly, Kant associates the constitutive regulations of freedom and dignity with the regulation of humanitas, the immediate humanity, and thereon mediated with the person. How can this be understood? Both questions cast a different light on the expatiated and strained debate on the concept of person. They have to be realized as theologically enriched, when it is clarified before: how was the concept of person introduced to the Christian doctrine and then to Christology.

Cf. Kant 1983b, A 155, p. 210, where it says that »a person, belonging to the sensual world is subject to his own personality, as long as it is as the same time part of the intelligible world«.

1

103 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Schaede

2.

Is God a Person?

It is amply known that Christian theology has transferred the concept of person from a relatively shadowy existence into an important and central determination of the living of the most complicated kind. The two central triggers for this promotion of the concept of person were not of anthropological nature. They had their origin in the Biblical doctrine of God and Christology. But what does this mean for the current person-life-discourse? Within theology, the central meaning of the concept of person with regard to the doctrine of God is highly contested. Popular-philosophically it seems compulsory to think of God as a force and power. To think of God as a person, is sign of a pre-progressive anthropomorphic way of thinking. Simple minds find the imagination of an interlocutor, with whom they can have a good cry, comforting. The criticism by Daniel Friedrich Ernst Schleiermacher of the Trinity doctrine has done the rest, since this dogmatist is sought after like no other within the Evangelic theology. It is »that condition of an everlasting separation in the highest being«, namely »unity of the being and triad of the people« no »statement about a devout self-confidence in which this could never occur« (cf. Schleiermacher 1960, p. 460). To the detriment of Karl Rahner, it does not look any different when it comes to Catholic theology (cf. Rahner 1964, p. 103). One rather enquires about the being and qualities and existence of God in order to be capable of providing something historic regarding the Trinity teachings. There were other times. For Luther the personality of God stood and fell with the Trinity teachings. In his confessions of 1528 he wrote: »Vater / Son / heiliger geist drey vnterschiedliche Personen / ein rechter / einiger / naturlicher warhafftiger Gott ist« – »Father, Son, Holy Spirit; three different persons; one rightful, unified, natural, truthful God«. Luther adds: »wie das alles bis her / beyde ynn der Romisschen kirchen und vnn aller wellt bey den Christlichen kirchen gehalten ist« (Luther 1964d, p. 500) (The way all of this practiced by the Roman church and of all the world in the Christian church.) The Augsburg Confession provides a similar statement and claims that it is ruled for each divine person that they have to exist in themselves: quod proprie subsistit (BSLK, p. 50). But one has to bear in mind that the insisting interest in the characters of a divine person was rather defined by Greek Church Fathers, while Augustine dominated in the West. It was essential for Augustine to 104 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Person – Body – Life

think of God as a unity. In opposition, the East found it difficult to use the expression person. Due to the fact that the term, with its Greek terminological equivalent prosopon, was associated with the mask and therefore with the heretical theology, the so-called modalism, which claimed that God appeared at first in the form of the Father, then the one Son, and then as the Holy Spirit. In this context, persona is a vague translation of the Greek expression hypostasis. The Latin Church Father Tertullian dared to use it. He understood persona in a quite similar way as Thomas Aquinas who later on defined it in the following way: the Trinitarian person is a »subsitens distinctum in natura rationali« (von Aquin, s. th., I, q. 30 a. 3 / a. 4), a specific autonomous realization of a reasonable being. In the same way as, among human beings, there is a multitude of such persons and realizations; there are exactly three when it comes to God. Only, they are not simply deductive appropriations and instantiations of a divine being. But what are they? It was Martin Luther, who wanted the three divine persons to be understood in a related sense as res subsistentes (Luther 1964b, p. 340 thesis 12). He reasoned that the divine persons were, per definition, relational and nothing else. The evangelic theologian Gerhard Ebling once formulated this point rather sharply: »Das reale in Gott sind allein die Relationen.« (Ebeling 1993, p. 538) (»What is real about God are only and exclusively the relations«). This, however, was already formulated by Thomas Aquinas in a similarly sharp way. He writes: »persona […] divina significant relationem« (von Aquin, s. th. I, q. 29 a. 4c). He has to write this, since the only way in which the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit can be differentiated from one another is by the nature of their relationship. Thomas pays great attention to the fact that there is an immense difference between different persons and especially between persons and a divine person. Normally, persons are understood as individual substances of rational nature. Here, Thomas strictly adheres to the definitions of Boethius and agrees with it. The decisive fact, however, is that the divine persons break rank from this definition because, in God, the relation is the all-defining momentum 2. Thomas brings this specific definition that applies to Cf. von Aquin, s.th. I q. 29 a. 4 c: […] aliud est quaerere de significatione huius nominis persona, et aliud de significatione personae divinae. Persona enim in communi significat sustantiam inidividuam rationalis naturae, […] Distinctio autem in

2

105 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Schaede

God in relation with the definition of person as subsistens distinctum, as independently existing. The divine person signifies the relationship as autonomously existing (persona divina significant relationem ut subsistentem). Thomas does not want to provide a general definition of the concept of person. Therefore, one should not pass over it in a Protestant high tone, while being glad about the fact that Thomas after a little while, urges again: the divine persons are the autonomously existing relations themselves (personae sunt ipsae relations subsistentes) (cf. von Aquin, s. th., I, q. 40a 2 ad 1). The ontological emphasis remains strongly focused on God. Since such a strict constitution of the existence of the person exists only in God, thus the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit could never have been isolated from one another. For Thomas not everything represents relation. And one must know what one does, if one adapts this definition of person in an anthropologically unbroken manner. Relations cannot be imagined without relata. If this is clear, it becomes difficult for God’s teachings. Because then an equivocal theological concept of person is present in God. This becomes tangible in Augustine’s writing De trinitate, in which he claims that God is the essential unity of lovers, loved ones and love. This sounds nice. The concept of person is about relationships, even about love relationships. This, however, is a little inappropriate for the definition of the term, since such disparate phenomena as the Holy Spirit, the outgoing Father and the passive, grateful Son should be subsumed under the same concept of person. The Christian teachings of the Trinity have buffered this intellectual problem by granting the Trinitarian persons at the same time different characteristics: The Spirit and the Father beget the Son. The Son and the Father exhale the Spirit. The Son is fathered. The Spirit is exhaled … Theology of the 20th century was inspired by this and – without overcoming the fundamental problem – indulged in all sorts of theonomous, personal poetry on relationships. The Holy Spirit is supposed to be the personality of God as purest passiveness and salvaging receptivity. The Father is purest creative freedom and generosity and the Son is reconciliatory co-determination, which is (in a most painful way) able to empathize and suffer. Maybe it is more appropriate to relate the concept of person to divinis non fit nisi per relationes originis. Relatio autem in divinis non est sicut accidens inhaerens subiecto, sed est ipsa divina essentia […].

106 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Person – Body – Life

God himself as a unity of Father, Son and the Holy Spirit in the following way: the living suggestive self-relation, which is expressed in the metaphor of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, is God. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit form personal aspects of this one God. And that is why it is reasonably said of him that he is a person as the living reciprocal penetration (perichoresis) of the three instances, while each one taken separately could not exist or be thought of. 3 Wolfhart Pannenberg, without considering the model of the perichoresis favord by Karl Barth, Eberhard Jüngel und Jürgen Moltmann, has insisted that the »inner-Trinitarian relationship« has not only led »the persons to be dependent on one another with regard to their personality, but also with regard to their deity« (Pannenberg 1988, p. 396). Within the doctrines of God the concept of person, therefore, has the function of working out the life of the one God as a suggestive life. Apart from all the systematic difficulties 4, the old teachings of the Trinity are anthropologically inspiring: to be a person means not only to be autonomous, but also to create a free space of life in strict survival-necessary dependence. They originate from commonly experienced activity and passiveness. Person is a plurale tantum. A person can only be a person together with other people. Nevertheless, the mutual dependence should not be understood in a way that a person cannot live without a certain other person. The latter can move, emigrate or die. Other people can step into one’s life. Also, the sum of all people, surrounding a person, do not form the life of that human being, even if it may have repeatedly been an attractive metaphor. After all, a human being might neglect its relationships, and thus could deteriorate as a person. A person can define oneself in different manners and not only via relationships to other humans; and this freedom does not necessarily always have to mean something good. And unfortunately this is what distinguishes us from God.

Cf. Eberhard Jüngel with respect to Barth 1986, p. 44, with Moltmann 1994. In this same way, Pannenberg’s idea to think of God as a force field of three moments of being in which way they would each have an own being outside of themselves, is not only burdened with the problematic of a contradicting definition of what ›self‹ actually is. To speak of three persons as ›directly acting divine subjects‹ does not forgoe the danger of a tritheism, since this acting happens within a field, of an unknown form. Cf. Pannenberg 1988, p. 415.

3 4

107 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Schaede

The theologian would still have to add: God’s personality is distinguished by the fact that his self-relations were originally set by himself, while the human self-relation has been and still is set by others. It is exactly this decisive criterion of a person’s life, the definition by Boethius (stressing a person’s autonomy) ignores. It does not see a person in the sense of an Aristotelian substance. By the way, one cannot therefore argue that the Boethinian definition would completely ignore this and regard persons as erratic, intellectually-soaked blocks. To assume this would be basically wrong. Because the biological writings of Aristotle and its interpretations have defined living beings as the first substances, that possess autonomy. However, selfmovement is a self-reflexive structure. This makes it obvious that the specific characteristics of self-relation, which distinguish people, must be specified. If this is not done, it remains unclear how persons differ from other living beings all of which also have self-relations. We will have to return to this.

3.

Jesus Christ – a Person?

In Christology, the concept of person has to master another intellectual challenge, namely, to think of Jesus Christ as a God and as a person at the same time. But how can the nature of God’s son and the nature of Jesus of Nazareth coexist in one person? Both instantiate themselves only in an individual substance, that is a person. The nature of man does not exist without the person. The same applies to the nature of God. Within the horizon of Boethius, who regarded the person as an individual substance of a reasonable nature, the intellectual need was great (cf. Boethius 1988, p. 74) One managed with the teachings of the so-called Hypostatic union of both natures of Christ. It states that the personal substance of God’s son has adopted the characteristics of the human nature of Jesus Christ. The human Jesus of Nazareth does not have a personal substance, but only exists hypostatically within the substance of God’s son. Against this backdrop one could therefore say: two natures but one person … and still in the 20th century, highly speculative, theological, personal replacementstructures have been claimed. In this way, Karl Barth claimed that the eternal son would be the »placeholder Jesus before God« (cf. Barth 1959, p. 103).

108 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Person – Body – Life

The medieval Franciscan theologian Alexander von Hales was not satisfied with such statements. Because in such a doctrine, in which the person of God’s son dominates the life of Jesus Christ demands, that Jesus Christ does not dispose of his own human soul. This was an unacceptable imagination for Alexander because, in this way, it could not be said anymore that the person Jesus Christ is a true person and a true God. At best, he would have been a true God with a human appearance. He has assigned and stated differently. The subject Christ is his natural being, his soul and his body. The individual Christ is his reasonable being and his person is his moral being. This allocation is possible since Alexander associates dignity and person. Dignity is just a moral definition. 5 Alexander could refer back to the pioneering achievement of Wilhelm von Auxerre. The latter defines three constitutive features of a person; firstly: singularity, which is conditioned through the soul (here, the individualization principle, obviously, is not the substance), this was the discovery of Boethius »person is the individual substance of a rational nature«, secondly: irreplaceability (incommunicabilitas). This is the innovative, person-theoretical asset, with which Richard von St. Viktor proliferated himself (cf. von St. Viktor, De trinitate IV, c. 22, PL 196, 945). The irreplaceability emphasizes that every person is unique. The individual cannot give his life away, cannot live through another person, without giving up on himself as a person. The fascinating fact is that the uniqueness, the incommunicability can only be experienced in the communication with others. It is a highly communicative incommunicability. The personal being of a human lies thirdly in the dignity of his »humanity«, justified in his humanitas (cf. von Auxerre, (altissiodorensis), Summa aurea II, tr. 1 caß, q. 8, p. 36 f.). It cannot be part of this essay, to examine whether dignity (in the 13th century) has already been an exclusive predicate, reserved only for a person. Decisive is: Alexander von Hales insists, that dignity is a prominent characteristic of a person (proprietas emines/excellens/super-

5 Cf. Kobusch 1997, p. 26. Cf. Alexander von Hales, Glossa in III Sent., d. 6 80,9: […] notandum quod haec triplex opinio fundata est super triplex esse. Est esse naturale, et mortale et rationale. Et nota quod quando Christus dicitur secundum personam, tunc dicitur secundum esse morale; quando autem secundum naturam humanam, tunc dicitur secundum esse naturale; quando autem secundum essentiam, tunc dicitur secundum esse rationale […].

109 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Schaede

eminens/superexcellens) (cf. Kobusch 1997, p. 27). Dignity therefore shows the following: The human being as a person leads a moral way of life. Thereby, he distinguishes himself from objects and other living things. A person can for example excuse, can become guilty, can promise things, he can reconcile or reshape life as he sees fit. For Wilhelm, these characteristics of the person have failed the overcome definitions of person. What a person is, is understood neither in the horizon of rational subjectivity nor individuality. Logic and natural philosophy fell short. Since it cannot capture the specific, moral way in which a person leads his life. Only with regard to this, a person differentiates himself from other naturally existing things (cf. Kobusch 1997, p. 28 f.). Here, the concept of person finds its way into what later on is called metaphysica moralis. But before that, Fausto von Reji will clap his hands with a stretched legal term and say: Persona res juris est, substantia res naturae (cited in Kobusch 1997, p. 29). This is how the so-called »juridical attempt at a solution« concerning the Christological two-nature problem was born. This attempt at a solution assumes within persons a hierarchy of dignity. Within this hierarchy the following applies: The dignity of a person can painlessly absorb the dignity of another person. The life of Jesus Christ, then, determines the »infinite dignity of the person of God’s son«. It affects the restricted dignity of the person Jesus of Nazareth. It does this so strongly that the actual »physical life of Jesus Christ« has a dignity exceeding all creatures’ dignity by the peculiarity of his person, although Jesus Christ can keep his human soul 6. This dignity has an influence on the body. This is remarkable. And yet, it is not an intellectual solution to the Christological problem. That is why Luther was right when he wrote that the history of Jesus Christ is the reason why »everyone, reason and the devil« opposed the article of the incarnation of God: »sunt enim in eadem persona maxime contraria« (Luther 1964e, p. 580, 13 f.). Divine life and human death meet as maxima contraria within the person of Jesus Christ, and this in a way that he willingly even endures death: the death, which the

Cf. Kobusch 1997, p. 30 f. with Petrus Johannis Olivi, Quaestiones de incarnatione et redemptione q. 2, 103: Christi persona, etiam inquantum est persona naturae humanae, est quid increatum et summum bonum […]. Cf. ebd. 2,117: Quamvis corporalis vita Christi sit de se finita, habet tamen ratione personae relativam dignitatem transcendentem omnem dignitatem vel indignitatem purae creaturae.

6

110 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Person – Body – Life

human being causes himself and which he inflicts upon himself in the end. This provocation might torture the theological intellect. What is essential is: this localization of the concept of person in the 14th century within the context of practical philosophy might explain, why Kant, in the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, regularly comes to speak of the person, whereas he almost does not mention the term at all in the Critique of Pure Reason. The Catholic philosopher Theo Kobusch assumes, however too quickly, that Kant has adopted this image of the elated, infinite dignity of the person from this tradition. This is wrong for four reasons. Firstly, in this tradition, the person of a human being is marked by dignity, but not by infinite dignity. Secondly, dignitas might be an exclusive predicate of living beings, which are at the same time persons. However, the medieval philosophy sees an ordo dignitatum within this group of persons (cf. Schaede 2006, pp. 7–69, 47–49). Dignity, therefore, is prone to loss and increase, is not elated above all value and can become quantitatively valorized. Thirdly, the special position of the Christological dignity discourse and personal discourse would have to be universalized for all human beings. In general, all other human beings, in spite of succession theology, are distinguished from Jesus Christ, who has an essentially different relationship to God than any other person. And, fourthly, Kant does not even directly assume that a person has infinite dignity. This leads us to the next aspect: it would spoil everything, if one tried to use this specific ethical definition of a person (worked out for the first time in the 13th century) against the definitions of the predecessors. What is essential is to let them form a symbiotic relationship with one another. Finally, the theological origins of the personal reflections should be questioned with regard to their suggestive potential concerning the question of the personal aspect of human beings. A mere moral-philosophical perception based only on the dignity discourses would be insufficient. This becomes clear in the specific peculiarities of a person, referring to someone or something else. This characteristic would not be reflected in the moral-philosophical, but in the natural-philosophical context.

111 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Schaede

4.

Person as a Phenomenon of Representation

Person is a phenomenon of representation in a theological and theology-enthusiastic context. Let’s ignore for the moment that for this reason person is a central term in an institutional context. The exciting differentiations between natural person, persona facta and persona ficta, persona repraesentans and persona repraesentata, which refer back to an understanding of the concept of person in an individual sense, should be examined another time. It suffices to focus merely on a few things. The close association of person and representation starts with the fact that Boethius (in his famous definition of person »persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia«) speaks, in connection with the philosophical theology, of prosopon as a translucent mask. 7 Boethius puts emphasis on the fact that a person should put a mirror in front of the face of whoever he meets and thus understand better, what counts in life 8. The next determining moment in the development of the referential structure of the concept of person might be, when Tertullian claims that God’s son is the only and exclusive repraesentator of the Father. The reason lies in the special connection between their personalities (personarum coniunctio). Only by means of the son is it possible to understand and to realize who the Father is 9. Ambrosius of Mailand claimed of Christ, to have taken on Adam’s weakness and to represent the latter’s person. Therefore, he has adopted Adam’s frame of mind (adfectus). 10 This representative relation daringly increases in Luther’s works on a theological level. He uses the classical idiom »personam alicuius gerere« (Luther 1964c, pp. 442,10–443,1 with p. 433,5–8 and Schaede 2004, pp. 338 f.) which says originally that somebody plays the role of another person, and thus provides this person with a new meaning It should be mentioned, however, that the mask is not a role. The role is more closely associated to the life of the acting and suffering human being than the mask. I put on a mask. I take up a role. Cf. Spaemann 1996. 8 Cf. Boethius 1988, pp. 74–76. Nomen enim personae videtur aliunde traductum, ex his scilicet personis quae in comoediis tragoediisque eos quorum interest homines repraesentabant. 9 Cf. Tertullian, Adversus Praxean XXIV, 5 and 7, CChr.SL 2, 1194 with Schaede 2004, pp. 180 f. 10 Cf. Ambrosius, Expositio Psalmi CXVIII, litera IV,2, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Bd. 62, p. 69. 7

112 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Person – Body – Life

(cf. Schaede 2004, 338 f.). Luther explains: Christ steps into the place of those people who have failed their life. However, he does not only play their role. Rather, he becomes their person before God. This is what determines his own person – to be the person of the other before God. This is the exact opposite of a mere simulation. And it is considerably more than just feeling empathy towards others. Calvin has thought of empathy towards painful and difficult circumstances people go through and spoke of »personam alicuius sustinere« (Calvin 1928, p. 488). In this respect Luther is more daring, and he formulates it that way: Christ takes on the person of all sinners and has given his person to me, so that I can unfold and form my life anew. All at once, I am different and new with regard to my uniqueness in the world. In this, Luther discovers a matchless benefit for his individuality. Without this personal referential relation to Jesus Christ, I would be a grey, de-individualized sinner, a living corpse. A faith, which makes it possible to obtain a new personality, generates in new way what makes me a person. This is a creative act. And this is why Luther boldly formulates: fides facit personam. The faith does not make the person, but it makes the person in the qualified sense of a human being who realizes that God loves him and who (through this love) learns how to live and cope with all the dreadful things that await him. Schleiermacher summarizes this brilliantly: »[…] indem der Einzelne vorher für Gott gar keine Person in dieser Beziehung ist, sondern nur ein Teil der Masse, aus welcher erst durch die Fortwirkung des schöpferischen Aktes, aus dem der Erlöser hervorging, Personen werden.« – »[…] before God a single person is no person, but only part of the mass. A person emerges only through the continuity of the creative act, from which the Savior himself arose.« He emphasizes the fact that this process of becoming a person is not based on a »natural state of the human being« (Schleiermacher 1960, p. 181), and therefore can neither be worked out in a genetic nor an ethical way. A human being cannot generate this freedom of the faith, which expresses his uniqueness in a most obvious manner. This is the point of the Protestant freedom, compared to which metaphysical concepts of autonomy are only a brittle reflection. This interpretation of the human being as a person manages without a definition of dignity. Luther neither gets anything out of the dignitas meritorum et operum nor the dignitas personae – a person’s dignity. This is probably due to the fact that he does not understand a person’s dignity in the same way as present bioethical dis113 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Schaede

courses do. Rather, he places his emphasis on a person’s integrity. Nevertheless, for Luther, this perception of a human being can never become a starting point of Protestant communications on the life of a person. 11 Dignity – in the theology of Luther – is a term that, above all, serves as a negative demarcation and not as a positive development of that what characterizes a person and what determines him before God, himself and in the world. Fascinatingly enough, the concept of the individual also determines a referential structure in Kant’s critical philosophy. Kant emphasizes repeatedly: »Respect for a person« is nothing but »respect for the law« (Kant 1983c, A 17, p. 28). This is remarkable since (for Kant) the human being, through his being a person, refers beyond himself. Those philosophical concepts, claiming that, for Kant, the person as such possesses dignity and an end in itself, already fail when looking at his philosophy on a slightly profound level. Kant expresses himself unmistakably. It is »morality and humanity, which alone has dignity« (ibid., A 77, p. 68). It is convictions which give value to certain actions. Those convictions as well as the »law itself« on which convictions are oriented, have »dignity, that is, an unconditioned and not-comparable value.« (ibid., A 79, p. 69). Kant says explicitly that he determines the »ideas of dignity«. There is no mentioning of an immanently constructed human being. Because, the latter only insufficiently lives up to the idea of dignity (cf. ibid., A 76 f., p. 67). A person’s »dignity« can be presented, when this person lives fulfilling his duty and submitting himself to moral laws (cf. ibid., A 86, p. 74). But at the same time the following applies: »All moral interest consists, in fact of, only of the respect for the law« (cf. ibid., A 17, p. 28). The »value of a person« is measured according to the degree that it »matches with the dispositions of the law«. »Destroying the subject of morality in one’s own person« is not only forbidden for the simple reason that the individual, natural, even biological, describable person stands under natural preservation; the reason lies somewhere else: it would mean the abolition of morality itself (cf. Kant 1963d, p. 555). It is not always about the appreciation and the disparagement of the person itself, but it is about »humanity in one’s own person« (ibid., A 73–75, p. 555 f.). Cf. the critic against Erasmus von Rotterdam WA 18, p. 771 and the »papists« und »anabaptists« WA 40/I, p. 36.

11

114 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Person – Body – Life

Humanity alone is holy (cf. Kant 1983b, A 237, p. 263). And a person can be the place in which humanity is represented. But this does not necessarily have to be the case. Thus, the life of morality dominates the life of a person. And the connection between morality and person alone makes sure that the protection of oneself becomes an inevitable duty (cf. Kant 1963d, p. 555). As Kant explicitly said: »It is the dignity of humanity, which man has to venerate in his own person and his own destiny« (cf. Kant 1983a, A 267, p. 857). The protection of life on the basis of the dignity of law. This is what Kant also bears in mind when it comes to his philosophical theologeme. Even »deity« itself is only »worth praying to due to his holiness and in his role as lawmaker with regard to virtue« (cf. ibid., A 269, p. 858). With this respect, it would be an important task of philosophy to prevent the catholic moral theologians, who declared Kant to be the leader of the church, from doing so. Kant’s personal definition of dignity sensitively counteracts the catholic intentions of argumentation. The catholic theology simplifies the dignity theory to an attitude of the »common crowd« which gives up on the respect towards a person as soon as it believes to have detected a bad character, while the »true scholar« still feels the awe with regard to his talents, which presents itself to us through »the examples of the law« (cf. Kant 1983b, A 139, p. 199). It is, according to Kant, the »respect-inspiring idea of personality«, »which reveals the sublimity of our nature«. The »self-conceit« of the individual person, however, looks bleak. All the while, we are forced to see the »invidiousness of our conduct« (cf. ibid., A 157, p. 211). The dignity of a specific person, therefore, cannot be determined by more or less outstanding individual characteristics. It is only consequent that Kant (in his religious writings) can merely »secure« the dignity of the individual person through the assumption of a three-folded referential structure: firstly, the good disposition represents the bad one; secondly, the good disposition is represented by a series of actions, which come closer to an ideal lifeimmanent equivalence. Thirdly, this disposition, insofar as it is holy represents the disposition, insofar as it is helpless. This means: the quality of the disposition steps in for its lacking degree of a power of realization (Schaede 2004, pp. 612–620). This is exciting, because Kant’s practical philosophy cannot renounce the representative referential structures. The passage of Kant’s sacred writings, of which is said that it was Kant who introduced humanity to the thought of 115 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Schaede

understanding personal guilt as non-transmissible liability, should be preserved. Bartolus de Sassoferrato assumed this non-transmissibility of guilt in personal matters already in the 14th century. 12 An excursion to the Roman right is unnecessary in order to show how oblivious such anti-substitutional emphases are. Persons are depended on reference structures that exculpate each other. Kant’s concept of person considers this. To correlate the corresponding passages from the religious writings to a resilient theory of the person would be a worthwhile project for a transcendental-philosophically ambitious philosopher. It would put the passages from the ethical writings and their almost brutal interest in the law and morality into a little less harsh light. The reference structures, which are substantially implemented in the definition of the person, make aware of the following aspect of human life. If a living being is a person, it refers not only to itself, but also to others. This is a crucial observation and makes obvious why the difficult concept of person cannot be simply replaced by definitions like self-confidence, self-relation and self-reflexivity. These reflected selfrelations then certainly are a condition of personhood. The fact that these references become repeatedly evident forms the difference between a person and a thing or a living being which is not a person, but is capable of referring to itself. Only persons execute these references in every aspect of life. These references are of different kind: persons are per definition dependent on other persons. Without others, they cannot live as persons. Within the person the external refers to the intimate, namely to the intimate in such a way that it remains an unavailable center of action and suffering, of which nobody else can dispose. The person refers to its own biography. A person per definition has a biography. The individuality of a person not only consists of the fact that this biography only belongs to himself and nobody else. It also consists of the way in which it chooses certain life aspects as constituting and decisive for its personality. Others are involved in this choice. With regard to the referential structure, a person is involved with other persons. But it also refers to the future. Cf. Bartolo de Sassoferrato, In Digestum novum, De damno infecto, 1. XIII § si alieno, Lyon 1563, fol. 34r.

12

116 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Person – Body – Life

One could develop the three time-perspectives of personhood with the help of the three theological, anthropological definitions of belief, hope and love. This would make it easier to show, that within the references of the three standards of living, human beings refer to God. (He can additionally give this reference as a person, without having to claim, as Walter Kasper did, that »in the person« of a human being »reality is found in its unique way« (Kasper 1982, p. 195). This would be a definition that could be assigned to the Trinitarian persons of God. Man certainly cannot do what Kasper assumes of a person. (This is a peculiar hypertrophic hyperbole.) Furthermore, is crucial to realize that belief, hope and love are no habitual virtues, rather, they are anthropologic instances that are not produced and developed by the person, but, instead, constitute the person. The above-mentioned scholastic solution of the Christological problem would have to be revised in a completely different manner. The person of God in Jesus Christ does not consume the person of the human being Jesus of Nazareth. Rather, there is a double reference structure within his person. The human being refers to God and God refers to the human being. One does not have to suppress the other, in order to live. This should just be mentioned here. With regard to the philosophical context of these observations, it is important to return to the beginning of these expositions. Personhood is not a purely mental, but also a physically tangible definition, because there exists also a kind of biography of the body. This becomes obvious, when Proust assumes the body to be a »guardian of the past«. The body allows to maintain a substantial relationship between our past and us … »a kind of bodily memory, that witnesses things that happened in the past« (cf. Merleau-Ponty 2003, p. 121 f.). Some things can become apparent on the human face. Similar to a book, the human body can hold signs, scripts, and stories. Personality and corporeality are intimate with one another under the condition of finiteness. This becomes evident through the fact that love, in its most intensive form, is erotic as well as intellectual; as well as sensuality with an eagerness for life, if it deserves this name. It is always intellectual and intellectuality with a longing for life is always sensual.

117 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Stephan Schaede

Literature Barth, Karl 1959. Kirchliche Dogmatik, Bd. II/2, Zürich. Barth, Karl 1986. Gottes Sein ist im Werden, Tübingen. Boethius 1988. »Contra Eutychen et Nestorium III«, in: M. Elsasser (ed.), Die Theologischen Traktate, Hamburg. Calvin, Johannis 1928. »Institutio christianae religionis«, in: W. Niesel und P. Barth (ed.), Opera Selecta, Bd. 3, München. Ebling, Gerhard, Dogmatik des christlichen Glaubens, Bd. 3, Tübingen 1993. Haraway, Donna 1995, »Biopolitik postmoderner Körper. Konstitutionen des Selbst im Diskurs des Immunsystems«, in: Die Neuerfindung der Natur: Primaten, Cyborgs und Frauen, Frankfurt am Main, pp. 160–199. Kant, Immanuel 1983a. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, Darmstadt. Kant, Immanuel 1983b. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Darmstadt. Kant, Immanuel 1983c. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Darmstadt. Kant, Immanuel 1983d. Metaphysik der Sitten, Darmstadt. Kasper, Walter 1982. Der Gott Jesu Christi, Mainz. Kobusch, Theo 1997. Die Entdeckung der Person. Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild, Darmstadt. Luther, Martin 1964a. Zirkulardisputation des veste nuptiali. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 39/2, Weimar. Luther, Martin 1964b. Die Promotionsdisputation von Petrus Hegemon. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 39/2, Weimar. Luther, Martin 1964c. In epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 40/1, Weimar. Luther, Martin 1964d. Vom Abendmahl Christi. Bekenntnis. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 26, Weimar. Luther, Martin 1964e. Vorlesungen über 1. Mose von 1535–45, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 43, Weimar. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 2003. »Das Auge und der Geist«, in: Philosophische Essays, Hamburg. Moltmann, Jürgen 1994. Trintität und Reich Gottes, München 31994. Pannenberg, Wolfhart 1988. Systematische Theologie, Bd. 1, Göttingen. Rahner, Karl 1964. »Bemerkungen zum dogmatischen Traktat ›De Trinitate‹«, in: Schriften zur Theologie IV, Einsiedeln. Schaede, Stephan 2004. Stellvertretung. Begriffsgeschichtliche Studien zur Soteriologie, Tübingen. Schaede, Stephan 2006. »Würde – eine ideengeschichtliche Annäherung in theologischer Perspektive«, in: von P. Bahr und H.-M. Heining (ed.) Menschenwürde in der säkularen Verfassungsordnung, Tübingen. Schleiermacher, Friedrich 1960. Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt. Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Abt. 1, 13, 2, Berlin. Spaemann, Robert 1996. Personen, Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen »etwas« und »jemand«, Stuttgart.

118 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Michael von Brück

Non-dualistic Models of Reality and Ethics Buddhist Insights and Present Concerns

1. Galileo Galilei expressed the idea that the book of nature is written in the language of geometry and arithmetic. That is to say: There is a fundamental order in everything. Though human consciousness has obviously developed so that homo sapiens may have an advantage in the struggle of evolution, it may not be suitable to know the world. Yet, the human mind can come to terms with »nature«. Experiment and the processes of falsification prove that the mind is able to comprehend something that is obviously not wrong. Whether we will ever be able to decipher the whole story is another question, but the search for knowledge is certainly not completely futile. Albert Einstein called it »the incomprehensible comprehensibility of nature« (Einstein 1949, pp. 1959 ff.) 1. This was not a completely new idea but drew on old intuitions of Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy. The human mind is searching for a principle of intelligibility of events that is unity, because it is in the mathematical idea that unity of empirical diversity is expressed. Yet, is the mathematical idea a basic feature of reality »as it is« (before evolution expressed itself in human beings), or is it a mental construction, which humans project on reality so that perception of reality and its interpretations might delude us even if we do get some things right? This very question is based on a dualistic model of reality – objective events versus subjective perception and experience. Yet, not only quantum theory urges us to realize the fundamental entangle-

»The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is at all comprehensible.« I have not been able to locate the first origin of this famous quotation, it is reported by Paul Schilpp in several publications (Albert Einstein – Autobiographical Notes, 1949; Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, 1959; und später wiederholt in: Gardner 2007, p. 188).

1

119 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Michael von Brück

ment between perceived reality and perceiving consciousness, but it is a epistemological question in Indian as well as Greek philosophy how the human mind, being part of nature in evolution, could perceive a reality that it is itself a part of: How can the eye see the eye, how can the knower know itself, asks the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 2. There is no duality between »inside« and »outside« possible. Galileo’s mathematical idea expresses relationships within a logical framework. It expresses structure or the laws of, behind and in nature. It goes against first hand empirical evidence mediated by the senses (the velocity of objects falling down is different according to empirical evidence, but laws of falling bodies tell us that this is not so – in the vacuum, of course). Science is all about establishing an order of reality that is beyond the sphere of evidence gained by sense experience. This order should describe causality, or better: interconnectivity. Accordingly, the order reflects the whole. The whole is one due to its interplay of parts which we observe as parts. But the parts are not really parts. They are isolated aspects in our perceiving attention and interpretation, they are made »parts« by us, by our mental activity. In reality they are what they are in this interconnected whole. The success of mathematical methods seems to suggest that there are no areas of the world that would be resistant to analysis and that it would be only a matter of our scientific genius in time to find the formal patterns for describing those forms. However, many scientists developed doubts because of the structural and functional complexity of so many systems. How could it be explained that the mind (informed by so many sensory illusions and being a limited part of nature itself) could comprehend the very fabric of nature? Would there be a »prestabilized harmony« between mind and matter? If so, what would be the reason for it? Is there a mathematical structure innate in physical objects (things)? What are mathematical objects – are they nature, are they forms? Again, the semantics of those questions suggests a duality between mind and matter. However, we should look for a nondual relationality, if mind/consciousness would be understood as an emerging reality and not as something completely different from matter in a dualistic fashion. Some Buddhist insights might be useful to conceptualize such a non-dual relationality of reality 3 Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 3,4,2 u. a. The following ideas are explained in detail in: G. Rager/M. v. Brück 2012, Grundzüge einer modernen Anthropologie, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 159 ff.

2 3

120 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-dualistic Models of Reality and Ethics

Theories create a horizon of expectation. Therefore, it matters by which kind of theory we ask our question which we would test in experiments. Data are being interpreted in the framework of such horizons, they are never »pure facts«. Our attention and perceptions are shaped by the horizon of expectation. Theories of self-organization were developed that could describe the emergence of new structures which would have autonomous habits and marks compared with their basic components. This made it possible to understand the mental realm within the framework of the methodology of natural sciences. However, to do so a monism of substances had to be given up in favour of more complex models, i. e. theories of emergence, which would allow for the idea that the quantitative synthesis may emerge into new qualities of a system. So there could be certain autonomy of higher systems over against their conditioning components. The components are necessary, but not sufficient to explain the working structure of a higher system. Therefore, we do not speak in terms of mere naturalism and reductionism, but of an unfolding of qualities in continuous movement within the formation of higher structures. This is explained as bottom-up causality. Science collects data by experiment and discovers relationship that will be understood in theory. Theory is to be tested by new data and their interpretation so as to falsify a provisional theory in order to get a more and deeper understanding of the world. Buddhism has a similar approach toward the investigation of the mental realm. All theories are mental projection. Sense experience is often illusory. Its interpretation depends on the mental frame. Other states of consciousness such as dream states or meditative states (the jhanas) are as valid for exploration as waking states.

2. In Indian traditions such as Samkhya the mind-body relation is mapped out in different ways compared with the Greek-Aristotelian world view: all mental states, psychic events, emotions etc. are part of the changing world (prakriti) and no permanent or independent soul. It is only pure awareness (purusha) that is formless and beyond space-time. This can be experienced. However, we need to develop a relational non-dualistic view in order to understand the bottom-up 121 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Michael von Brück

causality (body influencing mind) as well as the reverse up-bottom causality (mind influencing body). Steps toward such a non-dualistic view have been made, suggestions have been elaborated. Here, it is not so much a question to find out what is »mind« (over against matter), but the very concept of matter is to be questioned. Matter might be grounded in an evolving potentiality-space. It appears and disappears. It changes from the implicate to the explicate order, as David Bohm has suggested to call it. The world is not stable, but in continuous flux (Holomovement in Bohm’s terms). It is the brain that constructs the stability we experience in order to give us practical orientation. Whether those changes are continuous or forming discontinuous »steps« (quantum leaps) is another question. In many Indian philosophical traditions (especially Samkhya) the world is understood as a continuum, more subtle realities such as mental states are part of one reality reflecting itself as itself, which we experience as consciousness that can become self-aware. I is one reality (prakriti) that undergoes continuous transformations, attaining complexities that dissolve immediately once they have been formed. However, the stream of consciousness is being observed by a pure observing reality (purusha) that is considered to be beyond time and change. In Advaita Vedanta, however, there is only one reality that is pure consciousness (atman), it condenses temporarily, as it were, into a more conditioned matter and expresses itself under the basic categories of time, space and causality. It remains one reality all the time, but temporality and change are mere illusions (in more modified forms of Vedanta this non- dualistic idealism can take the form of a more realistic philosophy saying that the One Reality really changes into Many, though still remaining the One reality). The question is whether reality, in developing and destroying creatively new forms and structures and functions, undergoes a process of evolution to ever more complex systems, which would have a memory of previous forms, that is whether time matters for the understanding of very reality as such. Indian philosophies have different answers to this question. Mind, in any case, can comprehend the problem and experience the difference in its own formations. Memory is the matrix of the identity of a specific mind-stream (consciousness), and it is memory that in-forms new data into the frame that is established by former events. What is implied here is that non- dualistic relationality is the key concept on which all theorizing should be built upon. There are not two different realities of matter and mind. 122 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-dualistic Models of Reality and Ethics

The potentiality-space would be understood as a relational continuum of possibilities not in a Platonic sense expressing »ideas« that are already there, but in a sense of non-dual formation of new orders out of the potentiality for differentiation. This is why form is formless or pratityasamutpada is shunya, in Buddhist terms. Formation, in this sense, is not an Aristotelian forming of »something«, but an appearance of the formless relational potentiality-space as something, which appears momentarily as »this« and disappears again. Appearing and disappearing might be perspectives of the observer, in reality they are one process. And the time frame of those processes depends on the degree of subtlety of the observer. Out of the formless emerge events, which as such are forms, interactive and being formed (particles, waves). Inherently they do have the capacity for relationality that appears in consciousness as self-reflective knowing, i. e. as the knowledge that the relation to relation is experience. In meditative states this feature is even stronger than in normal waking states in so far as non- locality and non-temporal differentiation are being experienced (all times are simultaneously present in an endless space). This contains the First-Person-Perspective (I know that I know). Those new non-dualistic framings (based on the oneness of form and formlessness, as the Mahayana Buddhist Heart Sutra expresses it) are perhaps able to explain the non-substantial reality of the world better than substantialistic theories. First, there is a potentiality-space of relationships, secondary is the realm of particles, waves, things etc. Such a view is of relevance to our self-understanding and action in the world.

3. According to Buddhism knowledge of conscious events is based very much on introspection, i. e. the inner mental states are being observed as they change under that very observation. Conscious states are characterized by sense experiences that cause the perception of things and events. At the beginning there is just the impression of a round form, a straight line, some colour or a certain sound, but immediately this is brought into contact with something similar in memory, so that possible interpretations are established by exclusions of others. Therefore, knowing is a kind of comparing a present event with some 123 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Michael von Brück

pattern that is in memory. On that basis a notion is being formed, that is to say something is being perceived as something. As we note here, this is not s simple sense perception but a highly complex process of internal mapping, comparing and structuring. So something appears as something, a pen as a pen and a book as a book etc. Such notions are relative and historically conditioned. Now, the Buddhist theory of knowledge is mostly interested to understand these meta- perspectives, i. e. the events that lead to the complex and synthetic perception. In other words: the process of cognizing is being observed directly. And this goes on, because this process of observing again can be made an object of analysis and observation. It may go on, level after level, and it is a matter of training the mind that the mind can direct its attention onto itself, i. e. on the processes generating what we call conscious experience. This enhanced awareness is an ever growing awareness, a perception of perception so that self-reflexivity is continuously generated. Through continuous meditation practice one gets a more and more direct insight into the dynamics of consciousness, or to be more precise: into the dynamics of complex networking of conscious processes. This is the main point: In Buddhism there are no substances interacting with each other, but there are processes which interfere with each other, and it is by this very process that something comes into being that can be called a something, but such a moment is very brief, and change changes the situation immediately. In other words: We should not say, there is something like feelings, thoughts, memory and so on, but there are only relations in processes, which appear and disappear very rapidly. But the structuring principle, the karmic causality, is something like a blueprint according to which new formations are being structured. And this is why this whole process is not chaotic, but creates actions and reactions on the basis of former actions and reactions. There is causal connectivity. In other words: Early Buddhism does not so much describe what a human being is, but how the processes need to be understood which lead to the situation that human will creates unfree states so that one is subject to samsara, the cycle of conditioned limitation, as we could say.

124 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-dualistic Models of Reality and Ethics

4. Already in early Buddhism (Pali Canon, Suttapitaka) the notion of khandhas (Skt. skandhas) was introduced in order to criticize constructions of a substantial Self that was considered to be existent in other Indian philosophies. Skandhas signify a relational cluster of processes that instantaneously emerge in mutual interaction. The results are physical processes (1) and mental processes (2–5): rupa, vedana, samjna, samskara, vijnana. The interpretation is standardized, though there are also some differences in different schools of thought. All material and mental processes are interrelated, but usually material and mental processes are not identified, except in some later developments. Rupa skandha actually signifies material reality, including the sense organs of sentient beings. However, the material talked about here is not substance, not even a combination of smallest particles. Although in later Buddhism (Abhidhamma, since about 500 A.D.) there is a theory of the kalapas, smallest material entities which should be interpreted in non-substantial terms, for they are considered to be »arisings« which disappear immediately after they have come into being. The illusion of a substance occurs only, since arising and disappearing occurs so fast, that human perception is not aware of it. Material reality is the fast arising and disappearing of these structures, which interfere with each other and cause what we call reality. Vedana skandha is the first and nearly passive registration of the impression that is mediated by the sense organs (the impression may come from outside or inside the body, because the distinction between »inner« and »outer« reality is a later mental construction). This registration, however, is interpreted as a first undefined reaction, because it is selective in so far as not all impressions onto the living system are being registered, this is to say, there is a selecting activity in vedana. The selection process follows a pattern that is described both qualitatively and quantitatively. It is a qualitative process in so far as a pre-selection of what is important to the organism is being arranged, so what is very bad or very good gets attention; and it is quantitative in so far as stronger signals are processed whereas weaker ones might be ignored. Samjna skandha is the activity of knowing this impression as this impression. This means, the impression is identified in the context of former impressions which are already in the memory, so that 125 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Michael von Brück

the present impression is evaluated and catalogued on the basis of the past. Samskara skandha is the interpretation of the impression into a perception that is a definite notion and therefore triggers craving for the object or its opposite (aversion), so that a volition with regard to the object is created. This process is organized by patterns of processing that have been established by former processes. That is to say, this process is directed experience. Volition (cetana) is the intention that concentrates the focus of the mind on this object as this object that appears in perception. All intentional processes such as longing, craving, concentration, wisdom, intention to act etc. are the result of this skandha. The patterns of volitional evaluation are getting stronger and stronger by repetition, therefore, the process becomes more and more rigid; in other words: the mind shapes itself into a character. This, however, can be changed, but the longer the formation has taken place, the more difficult is opening up and change. It is on the basis of this skandha, that karma is produced. Vijnana skandha (consciousness) is the conscious realization of the process that just has been described, a kind of double structure, which appears when all these processes get conscious. This is a different level than the original impulses. Due to this conscious doubling the observer observes these processes objectifying them, and this is the reason that the observing mind experiences itself as a subject or Ego that seems to be different from the outer world. But this is an illusion, since the observing process is part of the whole interrelated networking of the skandhas. Vijnana skandha is connected with the respective activity of the senses, that is to say there is an eye-consciousness, an ear-consciousness etc. The very agitation of the sense organs transforms into a perception only when the agitated state of the organ and a conscious realization of that stimulus melt together into the process of perception. Therefore, we can say that vijnana skandha is the systemic and relational interconnectivity between the skandhas 1–4.

5. However, Buddhism has been understood primarily not only as a psychological theory of conscious processes, but as a path to liberation from suffering or frustration (duhkha). Suffering is the frustration 126 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-dualistic Models of Reality and Ethics

that craving for satisfying sensations cannot be fulfilled, because there is nothing substantial and everlasting in reality, and therefore craving is the cause for suffering. Craving, however, is rooted in the ongoing mental processes of evaluating impressions as good, bad or neutral, that is to say it is rooted in the reaction processes that are identified with the samskara skandha. By repetition those potentials for craving are continuously aggravated. Craving is nothing else than the quantitative enlargement of those patterns of reaction. These patterns have been developed by feelings, which again are the result of synthesized contact of the senses with impulses from one’s own body and /or the environment. And those contacts are the result of the receptivity of the sense organs that reflects the stream of the processes of life. Buddhism tries to avoid any clinging to one or the other of these arisings but states, that we are all these processes in their mutual interrelationality. Therefore, life in itself is a relational process that can be looked at under the categories of material events or mental processes, but in fact both aspects are perspectives of looking at the one reality in different ways so that processes with different qualities emerge. In reality these qualities emerge in mutual dependency. So there is neither a mental realm next to a material realm, but describing the fluctuation of reality as an interrelational non-duality seems to be the best way to express this whole process. In a different language this model of reality is conceptualized by physicist David Bohm in his idea of the holomovement, which is an implicate order of potentialities. This order explicates itself in states that we can observe as interrelated arising. As soon as they arise, they disappear in order to form again on the basis of the previous patterns. That is to say, the organization of the structure of explication and implication is not by chance or random but follows patterns that have been self-organized in the processes themselves. This is called karman. Karma, however, is not determinism, but a conditionality, a nexus of historicity of events that form themselves in mutual interdependence. There is creativity in evolution, and there is an enhanced creativity in mental processes that can reflect on their own functioning. Thus, mind creates orders of higher cognition that cognizes cognition itself. Therefore, mental processes can steer their own productivity. Mind can recognize itself and thus change the conditionality in craving and all other illusions by insight. This is called liberation. The process of liberation itself, however, is an explication of an implicit potentiality inherent in reality. 127 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Michael von Brück

6. Summary on Cognition To summarize these suggestions we can say: Reality understood as continuum implies what we observe and call material processes and what we experience as subjective conscious states. They are not »two worlds« but processes that emerge from one dynamism of one single reality. In this perspective the very notion of »correlation« between neuronal and mental states and processes (a metaphor much used in neurosciences) interprets itself in a specific way, because material processes as well as conscious states are emergent developments (arisings) in a potentiality-space or wholeness, and the very dynamism of this space produces ever new forms, some that can be objectified, and some that are experienced as »conscious states« that do observe those ones that are being called objects. Neuronal processes influence mental processes and the other way around. For mental processes can cause lasting changes in the neuronal functions and structure. Therefore, we need to conceptualize a mutual conditionality of both perspectives. The specific and non-reductive specialty of mental processes is the reality of meaning. This is the primary world of cultural activity of human beings, including science. It emerges when conscious processes cognize and interpret themselves as conscious processes. Any object, that is to say any connectivity of patterns (which appear as objects) appear only, because they appear in mental processes. They appear as images, notions, patterns, numbers, forms etc. Those mathematical or geometrical or notional forms are part of the explication of the implicate order, they are formative elements which are being formed as well. They are processes in interdependence.

7. Toward an Ethics of Nature The paper so far dealt with the Buddhist insight based on a clear assessment of what reality is and how the human being fits into this network of interdependencies. On this basis an ethics of nature would have to be developed. There are considerations in the classical Buddhist tradition, but this is not a detailed ethics of nature yet. 128 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-dualistic Models of Reality and Ethics

First, there are animistic roots in Buddhism as well. Spirit beings and nature beings are one because reality is still seen as an interconnected oneness, so there is no separation of the physical and the metaphysical realm. Therefore, all sentient beings are animated and spiritual. Even plants qualify for this animation, and this is so in Jainism until today, but not so in all later forms of Buddhism. Some of the rules in the vinaya need to be traced back to this basic feeling concerning life: – soil and water should not be polluted, especially not by urination, whereas such behaviour might be tolerated for laity, it is not proper for monks (Vin II, 109; IV, 75,1) – plants should be cherished and should be eaten only after they have been de-animated (by manual manipulation) (Vin II, 109; IV, 34) – fruits should be consumed only after thy have emitted their seeds, so that no seed of life would be killed (DN I, 64; Vin IV, 34) However, in early Buddhism the situation is even more complicated. Buddhist criticism of the Brahmanical culture implied a criticism of sacrifical rituals and this meant also a de- sacralisation of nature deities. Further, the Buddhist experience of duhkha stated, that all changing events lead to duhkha, that is clinging to those things that are enjoyable is no less to be overcome as staying away from what is interpreted to be bad. So even if nature would give some comfort or even be a source for beauty (such as trees for shadow, plants for food and shelter etc.), it would not have any spiritual qualification. On the other hand Buddhism recognizes the solidarity of all sentient beings, for in course of time in samsara all sentient beings have been mother and father to each other (Schmithausen 1991, p. 40 f.). Furthermore, in the Theragathas and Therigathas of the Khudakka-Nikaya there is the certain lyric of nature, which again are built upon the sentiment of the Jatakas. There are similarities with the tradition of Indian love poems, especially to those, which express the love for flowers and forests which was a virtue for brahmanical ascetics and is clearly visible in the Hindu epics, especially in the Ramayana. It seems that this heritage was dealt with differently by monks/ nuns and the laity. To the monks and nuns nature was first of all a teacher of impermanence. Thus, Visuddhimagga 2,9 recommends that one should contemplate on the falling leaves of the tree in order to realize impermanence and non-clinging. Nature was a place for quietness and an ideal spot for meditation, but this was not for nat129 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Michael von Brück

ure’s sake but for the monks need. In the Dhammapada, in many Suttas but also in some Theragatas and especially in Visuddhimagga (chapter 6) the human body and other aspects of decaying life forms are being meditated as unclean and not to be cherished. The human body, especially the female body, should be approached with disgust in order to eradicate craving. Vinaya III, 68 f. contains reports that monks who meditated about impermanence too strongly committed suicide or had people to kill them. It is suggested to them to contemplate a garden and beautiful waters so that they would overcome their depression (Schmithausen 1985, p. 109). For laypeople, however, it is praiseworthy and a means to make merit (punya) to care for nature, because this helps to create places for practice of the dharma. So it is not uninhabited nature but the carefully nurtured garden, which is a means to minimize suffering (ibid., pp. 14–17).Cultivated nature is a value. The concept of no-self (anatta anatman) implies that individualism needs to be overcome and the non-duality of all sentient beings is to be realized. Therefore, the conditions of life need to be moulded in such a way that less suffering occurs. This is what the central concept of karuna is all about. It is an active attitude and kindness toward all sentient beings. The realization that our own identity is established only in relationship with all other sentient beings calls for an attitude that abandons the separation of one’s own well being from well being of others. Though »well being« (sukha) is not the final goal for spiritual attainment (nirvana), it is a useful means for collecting punya, which again is necessary to advance to the final goal. For those, who have already gained some spiritual insight it is an expression of the realization of karmic interconnectivity. Thus, karuna is an expansion of consciousness in an ego-free sense, an identification with all what is alive. Though nirvana is different (kaivalya) from the world of evolutionary becoming, meditation and also nirvana cannot be separated from karuna and maitri as the four brahmaviharas clearly express. On this basis Asoka founded his welfare state in 3rd century B.C. His famous edicts proclaim general ethical values that are derived from basic Buddhist tenets, however, they are not justified by a subtle philosophical argument as it would be developed in philosophical Buddhist debates. Thus, edicts II and VII mention that an infrastructure (building of roads and water wells) needs to be constructed for the well being of humans and animals, and it is said, that Asoka did this so »humans might follow the path of the dharma with faith and 130 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-dualistic Models of Reality and Ethics

devotion« (Nikam and McKeon 1959, p. 64) 4. The same edict states further: »I have commissioned to plant Banyan tress at the roadside in order to give shade for humans and animals […] I have commissioned to dig wells and to build resting houses. I have commissioned to build places for fetching water for the benefit of humans and animals.«

As Edict II mentions, this includes animals with two legs, four legs, birds and inhabitants of the sea (ibid., p. 41). One can assume that also small animals such as insects are included as well, but there is no mention of plants here. In general we can say that Asoka’s ideal is the brotherhood not only of all human beings, but all sentient beings. He feels connected with the whole animated nature (Bhandarkar 1925, p. 220 f.). Asoka’s ideal has been given a reception in the foundation of the state in later developments in Theravada dominated countries. Thus, the Singhala chronicles construct a similar ideal with regard to their own kings: – King Sirimeghavanna is said to have built tanks that would carry water all the time because of kindness toward all sentient beings (Culavamsa 17, 98) – King Mahinda II. Is said to have supported the poor (who had been ashamed to demonstrate their poverty in public) in a hidden way, and there would have been nobody on the island who would not have supported the poor in a similar way. He pondered how the cows could be given enough food, and he arranged to be given to them sufficient corn from thousand fields (Culavamsa 48, 146–147) – King Mahinda IV. constructed a house for providing meals for the needy and gave food and shelter to the beggars. In all dispensaries and hospitals he had medicine distributed and beds given to the needy, and he also took care for the inmates of prisons. He had compassion with monkeys, wild boar, dogs and other animals, and he distributed rice and cake to them as much as they would take. (Culavamsa 54, 30–33) Of course, we do not know how much this is rhetoric or real political strategy and achievement. But this is not the point here. These reports show that standards and norms have been set, which do not 4

Edict VII, in: A. N. Nikam/R. P. McKeon, The Edicts of Asoka, Chicago 1959, 64.

131 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Michael von Brück

separate the material welfare of the people in terms of justice and the concern for other sentient beings or the ecological perspective, as we would express it today. It was already in Sri Lanka that two things had been connected: The idea of the Buddha to come who would be just, good and nurturing life in all ways, and the ideology of kingship, which then was applied to the respective ruling kings. Those righteous kings were regarded and considered to be the Buddhas to come (the present king of Thailand still carries the burden to be venerated on that basis). Under their just rule nature and human society are supposed to be in harmony. The descriptions of those paradises on earth resemble the accounts we know from cultures in the Middle East. Just rule has the consequence that nature is benevolent, that there is rain and good harvest. Unjust rule, however, has the consequence of misfortune – there is no rain, fields dry up, the earth and the forest do not give yield, there are natural catastrophies, and wars break out. Natural history and history of human society are in interrelationship. (Mahavamsa 21, 29 f.) This implies that material and spiritual reality are not two separated realms though they are distinguished. Their respective states mutually influence each other. Reality is one interconnected whole. The epistemological and the ethical dimensions are interrelated as well. To realize this is a salvational goal. To practice it in all walks of life is the way of the bodhisattva.

Literature Bhandarkar, Devadatta Ramakrishna 1925. Asoka, Calcutta. Einstein, Albert 1948. Autobiographical Notes. Albert Einstein: PhilosopherScientist. Gardner, James 2007. The Intelligent Universe. Franklin Lakes. A. N. Nikam / R. P. McKeon 1959. »Edict VII«. In: The Edicts of Asoka. Chicago. Rager, Günter / Brück, Michael von 2012. Grundzüge einer modernen Anthropologie. Göttingen. Schmithausen, Lambert 1958. »Buddhismus und Natur«. In: R. Panikkar / W. Strolz (ed.), Die Verantwortung des Menschen für eine bewohnbare Welt im Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhismus. Freiburg. Schmithausen, Lambert 1991. »Buddhism and Nature«. In: Studia Philological Buddhica. Occasional Paper Series 7. Tokyo.

132 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

Oceanic Boundlessness and the apramāṇa-Meditation

The present paper is an attempt to show that Adolf Dittrich’s tripartite typology of altered states of consciousness (»veränderte Wachbewußtseinszustände«) can be mapped onto the kinds of transformations of a person’s sense of self which are described in classical Indian sources related to meditative practice. An altered state of consciousness is a waking state wherein one loses the sense of identity with one’s body or with one’s normal sense perceptions. A person may enter an altered state of consciousness through such things as sensory deprivation or overload, neurochemical imbalance, fever, or trauma. One may also achieve an altered state of consciousness by chanting, meditating, entering a trance state, or ingesting psychedelic drugs. The first part of the present paper introduces Dittrich’s typological paradigm and the experiments he conducted in order to support his idea of a recurrent pattern in altered states of consciousness. In the second part I will show that descriptions of meditative experiences in classical Indian sources (such as Yogasūtra and Visuddhimagga) exhibit the structural features identified by Dittrich. Moreover, this part deals with the evaluation of altered states of consciousness in the Indian tradition. Some aspects of the so-called »oceanic boundlessness«, e. g., are rather ill-reputed in Theravāda-Buddhism, while others are regarded as salvific. First, I will give examples of transformations of one’s sense of self due to meditation which a Theravāda-Buddhist should not indulge in. Finally, I will deal with the apramāṇa-meditation as an example of a transformation of one’s sense of self which is regarded as salvific in Theravāda-Buddhism.

133 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

1. Adolf Dittrich found out that there is a common core of altered states of consciousness which consists in the joint experience of the following phenomena: • Oceanic boundlessness, abbr.: OB (»ozeanische Selbstentgrenzung«) • Dread of ego dissolution, abbr.: DED (»angstvolle Ich-Auflösung«) • Visionary restructuralization, abbr.: VR (»visionäre Umstrukturierung«) Roughly speaking, oceanic boundlessness is the experience of total lack of any kind of bondage and of dissolution of the boundary between self and environment. Dread of ego dissolution is just the opposite. It means loss of self-determination and feeling isolated. Visionary restructuralization consists in a distorted perception of reality and includes hallucinations (perceiving non-existent things and regarding them as real) as well as pseudo-hallucinations (perceiving non-existent things while being aware that they are not real). Adolf Dittrich found out that the joint experience of all three phenomena can be the result of various stimuli, such as: • drugs like LSD, psilocybin, mescaline etc., • sensory deprivation (in an environment such as, e. g., a samādhitank 1), • perceptive deprivation (i. e. the exposure to monotonous stimuli like, e. g., white noise), • hypnagogic states (i. e. the states which accompany the process of falling asleep), • hypnopompic states (i. e. the states which accompany the process of waking up), • heterohypnotic procedures (i. e. hypnosis by others), • autohypnotic procedures (i. e. self-induced hypnosis such as meditation) and A samādhi-tank (invented by the neurophysiologist John C. Lilly in the 1950s) is a one-person chamber where an individual enters for the purpose of deliberate sensory deprivation. It is constructed in such a fashion where one floats in a shallow salt solution resembling amniotic fluid which minimizes the sense of touch. Closed doors provide complete darkness while sound proofing eliminates the outside world. The Sanskrit word samādhi refers to a state of deep contemplation, which a person is supposed to achieve in such an environment.

1

134 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Oceanic Boundlessness and the apramāṇa-Meditation

stimulus satiation (in an environment such as, e. g., a discotheque). (Dittrich 21996, p. 44) Statistic evidence gathered by Dittrich from experiments with test persons shows that all these stimuli can equally well generate experiences of OB, DED and VR. This is the reason why Dittrich calls altered states of consciousness »aetiologically independent« in his monograph »Ätiologie-unabhängige Strukturen veränderter Wachbewußtseinszustände«, which was first published in 1985 and reissued in an updated version in 1996. It contains the outcome of empirical research conducted by Dittrich and other scholars who studied the effects of pharmacological and psychological stimuli. The following hallucinogens were involved in the experiments which Dittrich supervised himself: • N,N-Dimethyltryptamin (DMT, whose chemical structure is similar to that of the neurotransmitter serotonin), • Psilocybin (an ingredient of certain mushrooms which the Aztecs already used on the occasion of religious ceremonies for the preparation of Teonanacatl, the so-called »flesh of the gods«), • Δ9-trans-Tetrahydro-cannabinol (Δ9-THC, which is the essential psychotropic ingredient of cannabis) and • nitrous oxide (laughing gas, N2O). (Cf. Dittrich 21996, p. 18 f.) Regarding psychological stimuli Dittrich took into account the data (collected by himself and others) via experiments with: • isolation in dark rooms and exposure to white noise in order to create the conditions for perceptive deprivation, • EEG-based techniques to determine the appropriate time for waking up a test person soon after the experience of a hypnagogic state, • auto- and heterohypnotic procedures in connection with autogenic training and • visual and acoustic stimulus satiation generated by watching films and listening to music. (Cf. Dittrich 21996, p. 106 f.) Dittrich’s marginal account of physiological stimuli, such as extreme sports or austere fasting, seems to indicate that these are also appropriate means to trigger altered states of consciousness. (Cf. Dittrich 21996, p. 80 f.) An interesting example is his reference to Haitian Voodoo ceremonies which are meant to transform a dancer into a »horse of a divine rider«. In this case the physiological stimulus of forceful dancing is combined with stimulus satiation resulting from drumming and visual effects produced by the movement of the drummer •

135 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

in order to induce an altered state of consciousness in the dancer. (Cf. Dittrich 21996, p. 72) Dittrich’s method to assess the effects of the above-mentioned experimentally tested stimuli was to inquire the test persons after the experiments by means of the questionnaire »APZ«, which was especially designed for that purpose. (»APZ« is an acronym of »abnorme psychische Zustände«, i. e. »abnormal psychic states«.) The answers given by control groups, i. e. the recipients of a placebo, were contrasted with those given by test persons who were actually exposed to stimuli of an altered state of consciousness. Both sets of answers differed significantly with respect to APZ-items referring to experiences of the type Dittrich characterized as OB, DED and VR. OB was operationalized by the following APZ-items, which the test persons were asked to either affirm or deny: • I had the feeling that everything around me was somehow unreal. • I felt like hovering above the ground. • The boundary between me and everything around me became blurred. • I felt completely free and released from any obligation. • I felt like being transferred to another world. • I felt like living in a world without any opposites or antagonisms. • I felt like being bodiless. • Without any concrete motivation I felt very happy and satisfied. • I had the feeling that I might sit somewhere and look at something for hours. • I had the feeling of complete equanimity. • Past, present and future became unified. • I felt like being united with the environment. • It was a dream-like situation. (Cf. Dittrich 21996, p. 203) The most important conclusion which derives from Dittrich’s careful statistical evaluation of the APZ-results is that the occurrence of altered states of consciousness is invariant up to the mode of stimuli which he took into account. Drugs like psilocybin, perceptive deprivation, meditation etc. are all equally appropriate instruments to generate experiences of OB, DED and VR. However, Dittrich notices that the effect of such stimuli on a person varies with respect to his/her character and recent incidences in his/her life. Although an altered state of consciousness generally comprises OB, DED and VR alike, imaginative religious persons with 136 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Oceanic Boundlessness and the apramāṇa-Meditation

a positive attitude to life are more likely to experience an OB under such conditions, whereas someone whose emotional equilibrium is habitually or temporarily disturbed will rather encounter the DED situation. Imaginative power and a sense of aesthetics promote VR’s. (Cf. Dittrich 21996, p. IV)

2. a) The acquisition of supernatural powers (Pāli iddhi 2) is an example of an OB-like transformation of self, which the Buddha was suspicious of. The idea of such supernatural powers derives from the Hindu tradition. Patañjali, one of its representatives, who wrote the Yogasūtra around 200 BC, somehow already anticipated Dittrich’s idea of a multiplicity of potential stimuli generating an altered state of consciousness: janmauṣadhimantratapaḥsamādhijāḥ siddhayaḥ. (YS IV,1) – »Supernatural powers are causally related to birth, herbs, [recitation of] mantras, religious austerity and intense contemplation.«

This is the classical list of siddhis according to Patañjali and his commentator Vyāsa, the author of the Yogabhāṣya (ca. 500 AD): • The power of making the body atomically small (aṇiman) • The power of increasing size at will (mahiman) • The power of levitation (laghiman) • The power of getting in touch with distant objects like, e. g., the moon (prāpti) • Unrestrained will (prākāmya) • Mastery over the elements (vaśitva) • The power to make something appear or disappear and to control its present existence (īśitṛtva) • Power over the qualities of objects, such as the power to transform something poisonous into something pleasant (kāmāvasāyitva) 2 iddhi derives from the Sanskrit word ṛddhi (»success; supernatural power«). However, the Sanskrit word which Patañjali uses to refer to supernatural powers is not ṛddhi, but siddhi (see below).

137 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

Perfection of the body in beauty, strength, grace and brilliance (kāyasaṃpad) • The power to remain unaffected by forces (like rain or fire), which normally leave their marks (taddharmānabhighātatva) (cf. Prasada 31982, p. 258) The feeling of being liberated from all confining conditions by surmounting the laws of nature which is conveyed by the siddhis certainly coincides with some aspects of an OB. Similar siddhis as a result of meditative practice (but now designated by the Pāli-word iddhi) are mentioned in the Pāli-canon and commentarial works of the Buddhist Theravāda tradition like Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga. One of the ten iddhis which Buddhaghosa takes into account, the so-called vijjāmayā iddhi (»potency accomplished by art or knowledge«), closely resembles the joint experience of an OB and a VR: •

Vijjādharādīnaṃ vehāsagamanādikā pana vijjāmayā iddhi. Yath’āha: »Katamā vijjamayā iddhi? Vijjādharā vijjaṃ parijapitvā vehāsaṃ gacchanti; ākāse antalikkhe hatthim pi dassenti« … pe … »vividham pi senāvyūhaṃ dassentī« ti (VM, p. 383) – »That beginning with travelling through the air in the case of masters of the sciences is success through sciences, according as it is said ›What is success through the sciences? Masters of the sciences, having pronounced their scientific spells, travel through the air, and they show an elephant in space, in the sky […] and they show a manifold military array‹.« (Ñāṇamoli 42010, p. 378)

The Buddha had some misgivings about these supernatural powers, which are supposed to be attainable as an offshoot of the so-called jhāna-meditation. The goal of this type of meditation should rather be pure lucidity of mind and equanimity of heart. Pride in the accompanying iddhis is rather an obstacle to salvation and can be a bad example for non-Buddhists who might get the impression that Buddhists indulge in these magical practices while being less concerned about the soteriological purpose of meditation. Therefore the Buddha warns the monk Kevaddha in the Pali-Canon to abstain from such practices: 6. ‘Katamañ ca Kevaddha ādesanāpāṭihāriyaṃ? Idha Kevaddha bhikkhu parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cittam pi ādisati cetasikam pi ādisati vitakkitam pi ādisati vicāritam pi ādisati: »Evam pi te mano ittham pi te mano iti pi te cittan ti.« Taṃ enaṃ aññataro saddho pasanno passati taṃ bhikkhuṃ parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cittam pi ādisantaṃ cetasikam pi ādisantaṃ vitakkitam pi ādisantaṃ vicāritam pi ādisantaṃ: »Evam pi te

138 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Oceanic Boundlessness and the apramāṇa-Meditation

mano ittham pi te mano iti pi te cittan ti.« 7. ‘Tam enaṃ so saddho pasanno aññatarassa asaddhassa appasannassa āroceti: ‘Acchariyaṃ vata bho, adbhutaṃ, vata bho samaṇassa mahiddhikatā mahānubhāvatā. Amāhaṃ bhikkhuṃ addasaṃ parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cittam pi ādisantaṃ cetasikam pi ādisantaṃ vitakkitam pi ādisantaṃ vicāritam pi ādisantaṃ: »Evam pi te mano ittham pi te mano iti pi te cittan ti.« Tam enaṃ so assaddho appasanno taṃ saddhaṃ pasannaṃ evaṃ vadeyya: »Atthi kho bho Maṇiko nāma vijjā. Tāya so bhikkhu parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ cittam pi ādisati cetasikam pi ādisati […] pe […] evam pi te mano ittham pi te mano iti pi te cittan ti.« Taṃ kim maññasi Kevaddha? Api nu so assaddho appasanno taṃ saddhaṃ pasannaṃ evaṃ vadeyyāti?’ ‘Vedeyya bhante ti.’ Imaṃ kho ahaṃ Kevaddha ādesanā-pāṭihāriye ādīnavaṃ sampassamāno ādesanā-pāṭihāriyena aṭṭiyāmi harāyāmi jigucchāmi. (DN 11, 6. – 7 [p. 213 f.]) – »6. ›And what is the miracle of telepathy?‹ Here, a monk reads the minds of other beings, of other people, reads their mental states, their thoughts and ponderings, and says: ›That is how your mind is, that is how it inclines, that is in your heart.‹ Then someone who has faith and trust sees him doing these things. 7. He tells this to someone else who is sceptical and unbelieving, saying: ›It is wonderful, sir, it is marvellous, the great power and skill of that ascetic […]‹ And that man might say: ›Sir, there is something called the Maṇika charm. It is by means of this that the monk can read the minds of others […]‹ And that is why, seeing the danger of such miracles, I […] despise them.« (Walshe 1995, p. 176) 3

b) Accounts of DED-like transformations of the sense of self are rare in classical Theravāda sources, since we mostly get to know about meditative techniques how they work ideally. An example of a DED-like casualty is the so-called asubhakammaṭṭhāna (»reflection on the impure«), which is supposed to alert the meditating person to the impermanence of the human body and involves choosing a corpse as the object of meditation. In this case Buddhaghosa points out that during the process of meditating one might be haunted by the vision that the corpse suddenly straightens up and starts prosecuting the meditator: yassa hi avelāyaṃ uddhumātakanimittaṭṭhānaṃ gantvā samantā nimittupalakkhaṇaṃ katvā nimittagghaṇaṭṭhaṃ cakkhuṃ unmīletvā olokentass’ eva taṃ matasarīraṃ uṭṭhahitvā ṭhitaṃ viya, ajjhottharamānaṃ viya, anubandhamānaṃ viya ca hutvā upaṭṭhāti, so taṃ bībhacchaṃ bher3

The translator ignores redundancies in the original.

139 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

avārammaṇaṃ disvā vikkhittacitto unmattako viva hoti, bhayaṃ chambhitattaṃ lomahaṃsaṃ pāpuṇāti. (VM, p. 186 f.) – »If someone goes at the wrong time to the place where the sign of the bloated is, and opens his eyes for the purpose of apprehending the sign by characterizing the surrounding signs, then as soon as he looks the dead body appears as if it were standing up and threatening and pursuing him, and when he sees the hideous and fearful object, his mind reels, he is like one demented, gripped by panic, fear and terror, and his hair stands on end.« (Cf. Ñāṇamoli 42010, p. 176)

There is also an impressive example of a DED-like experience in a work of non-Buddhist provenance, namely the Bhagavadgītā, which orthodox Hindus regard as a kind of bible. Strictly speaking, the DED-like episode depicted there is not a meditation scenario, but we can well imagine that the author was inspired by meditative experiences. So, although the god Kṛṣṇa is presented as a real figure in human guise in the Bhagavadgītā and not just as an (imaginary) object of meditation, the way he is perceived by the warrior Arjuna, the other protagonist of the work, is very similar to meditative encounters with the absolute. The conversation between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa, which constitutes the major part of the text, culminates in the moment when Kṛṣṇa reveals his divine identity to Arjuna and appears as a kind of gigantic monster with countless ghastly mouths. Having so far gently tried to dispel Arjuna’s qualms about fighting against his enemies in the upcoming battle Kṛṣṇa now threatens to settle the affair himself. The loss of self-determination which Arjuna experiences in this situation is typically DED-like: [Arjuna uvāca |] rūpaṃ mahat te bahuvaktranetraṃ mahābāho bahubāhūrupādam | bahūdaraṃ bahudaṃṣṭrākarālaṃ dṛṣṭvā lokāḥ pravyathitās tathāham || […] Śrībhagavān uvāca | kālo ‘smi lokakṣayakṛt pravṛddho lokān samāhartum iha pravṛttaḥ | ṛte ‘pi tvā na bhaviṣyanti sarve ye ‘vasthitāḥ pratyanīkeṣu yodhāḥ ||

140 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Oceanic Boundlessness and the apramāṇa-Meditation

tasmāt tvam uttiṣṭha yaśo labhasva jitvā śatrūn bhuṅkṣva rājyaṃ samṛddham || mayaivaite nihitāḥ pūrvam eva nimittamātraṃ bhava savyasācin || (BhG XI, 23 und 32–33 [= van Buitenen 1981, p. 114 and p. 116]) [Arjuna said:] »At the sight of your mass with its eyes and mouths, Multitudinous arms, thighs, bellies, and feet, Strong-armed One, and maws that are spiky with tusks The worlds are in panic and so am I! […] The Lord said: I am Time grown old to destroy the world, Embarked on the course of world annihilation: Except for yourself none of these will survive, Of these warriors arrayed in opposite armies. Therefore raise yourself now and reap rich fame, Rule the plentiful realm by defeating your foes! I myself have doomed them ages ago: Be merely my hand in this, Left-handed Archer!« (van Buitenen 1981, p. 115 and p. 117)

The intermingling of adoration (called bhakti in Sanskrit) and horror which characterizes Arjuna’s attitude to Kṛṣṇa is paradigmatic of what the German theologian Rudolf Otto called »the numinous«, the ambivalent experience of »mysterium fascinans« and »mysterium tremendum« as a typical facet of the encounter with the absolute in any religion. (Cf. Otto 1963, p. 13 f. and p. 42 f.) It seems that in some cases »DED« is an adequate psychological description of what a religious practitioner experiences when faced with the »mysterium tremendum«.

c) An example of a meditation practice which yields a salutary transformation of the sense of self corresponding to an OB-experience is the apramāṇa–meditation in Theravāda Buddhism, which is meticu141 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Eberhard Guhe

lously described in Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga. The method is to radiate the following attitudes first to one living person and then to others, until the goal of complete universalization of these attitudes to all sentient beings is achieved: • Loving-kindness (P. mettā, Skr. maitrī) • Compassion (P./Skr. karuṇā) • joy in the joy of others (P./Skr. muditā) • equanimity (P. upekkhā, Skr. upekṣā) Because of the idea that these attitudes should become all-embracing in the process of meditation they are called »immeasurables« (apramāṇa). The order of the attainment of the immeasurables via meditation is supposed to be the same as in the preceding list. In an important dissertation on the immeasurables submitted to the University of Hamburg (cf. Maithrimurthi 1999) the author argues that the immeasurables might be regarded as successive stages of an old way to salvation, which culminates in the extinction of one’s sense of self. The method is somehow diametrically opposed to the decomposition of the sense of self into the skandhas, which has become the standard method of extinguishing the sense of self in Buddhism. In the apramāṇa-meditation the meditator blows up the sense of self instead of decomposing it. This is achieved in the first three stages by identifying oneself with others to such an extent that the barrier between oneself and others breaks down (sīmasaṃbheda). The fourth stage (upekkhā – »equanimity«) functions as a kind of »Korrektiv« according to Maithrimurthi, because it is directed against getting too much emotionally involved in the fate of others. It should be noted here that the feeling of complete equanimity is also one of the above-mentioned APZ-items operationalizing an OB. So, there is at least an affinity between the last stage of the apramāṇa–meditation and the detached mindset of an OB induced by profane stimuli, although the latter might be devoid of any soteriological aspect.

Literature BhG, Bhagavadgītā, cf. van Buitenen 1981. van Buitenen, J. A. B. 1981 (ed. and transl.): The Bhagavadgītā in the Mahābhārata. Text and Translation, Chicago; London. Dittrich, Adolf 21996. Ätiologie-unabhängige Strukturen veränderter Wachbewusstseinszustände, Berlin.

142 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Oceanic Boundlessness and the apramāṇa-Meditation DN, The Dīgha Nikāya. Vol. I, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids / J. E. Carpenter 1949, London: Pali Text Society. Maithrimurthi, Mudagamuwe 1999. Wohlwollen, Mitleid, Freude und Gleichmut. Eine ideengeschichtliche Untersuchung der vier apramāṇas in der buddhistischen Ethik und Spiritualität von den Anfängen bis hin zum frühen Yogacāra, Stuttgart: Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 50. Ñāṇamoli, Bhikkhu (transl.) 42010. The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) by Bhadantācariya Buddhaghosa, Colombo. Otto, Rudolf 1963. Das Heilige. Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen, München. Prasada, Rama (transl.) 1982. Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras, New Delhi. VM, The Visuddhi-Magga of Buddhaghosācariya, ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids 1975, London; Boston: Pali Text Society. Walshe, Maurice (transl.) 21995. The Long Discourses of the Buddha. A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya, Boston. YS, Yogasūtra, cf. Prasada 1982.

143 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Alfred Weil

Nowhere to Be Found Self and Not-Self in the Pāli Canon

Introduction The Buddha’s original teaching distinguishes between two categories of truth. On the one hand, we find in the Dharma doctrines of a relative, preliminary, ›introductory‹ nature. These elucidate the benefits of developing a generous heart and proper ethical behaviour, answer questions about death, transcendence and rebirth, give advice on training of the mind and the practice of meditation. At this ›introductory‹ level, the Buddha’s teaching still runs parallel to the core tenets of major religious and philosophical worldviews (including Western ones). On the other hand, the Buddha went further than all of these, as he went on to teach truth of an absolute, final, ultimate nature to audiences that he considered adequately prepared to understand this ultimate truth. He summarised that core of his teaching in the famous doctrine of anatta: the doctrine of ›not-self‹, ›not-I‹, of the ›inessentiality‹, the insubstantiality of all phenomena. It is this view of reality that is the genuinely and exclusively ›Buddhist‹ one. It is – in the words of the Buddha himself – paṭisotagāmin, which literally translates as »going against the stream«. In other words: This ultimate truth runs counter to any other religious belief or philosophical opinion about the ›ontological status‹ of the ›world‹ and of the ›I‹. Saccaka, a contemporary of the Buddha – who, however, followed Nigantha Nathaputta’s teaching –, once asked the Awakened One: »What is your teaching in a nutshell?« The Buddha’s brief response to this question was the following: »Form is changeable, feeling is changeable, perception is changeable, determinations are changeable, viññāṇa is changeable. Form is not-self, feeling is not-self, perception is not-self, determinations are not-self, viññāṇa is notself. All determinations are changeable. All things are not-self.« (Majjhima Nikāya 35)

144 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Nowhere to Be Found

In my paper, I will undertake to elaborate on the intrinsic meaning of this key statement by which the Buddha conveyed to Saccaka the very core of his teaching.

The Conventional ›I‹ and the Belief in ›I‹ Our ordinary, ›mundane‹ experience of life is fundamentally shaped by the impression »I am in the world!« This impression follows naturally from our root experience of duality: The reality that we experience ever appears bi-polar, divided into subject and object. In any one moment, a multitude of phenomena is ›encountered‹ by an ›I‹ via the interacting senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, with the sense contacts getting ›organised‹ by the mind (our sixth sense, according to the Buddha), getting ›arranged‹ as a world of things in space and time, a world ›inhabited‹ by both dead items and living beings. Neither the experience of ›I‹ nor the experience of ›world‹ is (as such) questioned by the Buddha, since either is – qua Erlebnis – authentic and thus irrefutable. Hence, we find in the Pāli Canon an abundance of terms that describe various aspects of our ›animated‹, ›personalised‹ world. In his numerous conversations with monks, nuns and laypeople, the Buddha frequently refers to human beings by their given names (e.g. Sāriputta, Anāthapiṇḍika, Mahāpajāpatī, Visākhā) and identifies groups of people of a specific rank or with a specific function as e.g. mahārāja, bhikkhu, bhikkhunī, and brāhmaṇa. By making use of generic terms such as manussa (»human being«), purisa (»man«), puggala and sakkāya (»person«), bhūta (»living being«), or pāṇa (»animated being«), the Buddha distinguishes various ›classes‹ of living beings (satta). It goes without saying that he also uses personal pronouns such as ahaṃ (›I‹), tuvaṃ: (›you‹) to make distinctions between his interlocutors and himself and among other (groups of) people, respectively. With great ease (which, nowadays, may strike some of us as slightly ›awkward‹), the Buddha names even beings living beyond the human and animal realm. In the Pāli Canon, the fact of the existence of sub-human and super-human beings is (as it were) presupposed, is always taken for granted. Here, transcendent beings appear ›categorised‹ into distinct ›classes‹, inhabiting a great number of various ›realms of being‹. We find terms such as deva (›gods‹), who are presented as existing in many different forms and manifestations; 145 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Alfred Weil

nerayika, i.e. ›hellish beings‹ that are doomed to suffer in the lowest realms, the ›hells‹ of existence (they are vast in number as well); and tiracchāna, ›creatures of the animal realm‹, a realm which (as we are well aware) is not transcendent to the human one and is characterised by a great variety of species, too. Of himself, the Buddha speaks as ›the Tathāgata‹, the one ›thus-gone‹ or ›thus-come‹, i.e. the one having reached the very end of the path of purification, having completely awakened from the dream of existence. The categorical divide, the watershed between the ›uninstructed commoner’s‹ view of things and the Buddhist view (at its deepest level) lies in a fundamentally different understanding and ›appreciation‹ of the concept of person or personality. The Buddha carefully avoids to draw any (necessarily false) conclusions from the experience of ›personality‹ while, as already said, not questioning the intrinsic authenticity of our ›personal‹ experience as such. Neither does he claim the subjective or the objective ends of our experience to be any kind of ›absolutes‹, ›beings in themselves‹, eternal ›essences‹ or ›substances‹ (to do which would be atta-vāda, ›the doctrine of self‹); nor does he ›overestimate‹ either the subject or the object by endowing them with ›value‹ of any kind: »The Tathāgato, having seen the visible, does not conceive of ›a seen‹, does not conceive of ›an unseen‹, does not conceive of ›visible‹, does not conceive of ›a seer‹; having heard the audible, does not conceive of ›a heard‹, does not conceive of ›an unheard‹, does not conceive of ›audible‹, does not conceive of ›a hearer‹; having experienced the experiencable, does not conceive of ›an experienced‹, does not conceive of ›an unexperienced‹, does not conceive of ›experiencable‹, does not conceive of ›an experiencer‹; having contrived (viññatvā) the contrivable, does not conceive of ›a contrived‹, does not conceive of ›an uncontrived‹, does not conceive of ›contrivable‹, does not conceive of ›a contriver‹.« (Anguttara Nikāya 4,24)

In the Buddhist understanding, ›personal‹ nouns and pronouns (as enlisted above) are characteristic of our ›conventional‹ use of language, which is an indispensable means of our orientation and communication in daily life. Our everyday language makes use of distinctive terms (vohāra) that have been coined by way of pragmatic convention, in order to designate experiences common to members of a social group. They are used to ›name‹ experiential contents that we encounter moment by moment. In these ›encounters‹, we pre-select from a notional ›entirety of potential experiences‹ certain experi-

146 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Nowhere to Be Found

ential contents shared by our environment. Via this pre-selection, we attribute to our experiential contents specific ›personal‹ meanings that are ›meant‹ to help us in our cognitive orientation in and our pragmatic dealings with the ›given‹ reality, which presents itself as a ›world of purposes‹. Thus, we get used to naming the contents of our experiences conforming to ›pre-fixed‹ linguistic patterns. Such patterns do not relate or point to an ›ultimate reality‹ existing ›beyond‹ the named phenomena. Man’s fundamental error lies in attributing to both the perceived things and living beings an ›essence‹, which is subsequently construed either as ›God’s creation‹ (as in theistic religions) or as a ›brute given‹ (which is the notion of philosophical materialism). In a Buddhist view, both these approaches reflect the ›commoner’s‹ basic attitude: ›I‹ (as a ›person‹) and the ›world‹ (surrounding ›me‹) are entities that ›exist in themselves‹. It is the (erroneous) view of ›my‹ faculty of perception ›reaching out to‹, ›mirroring‹ objects that exist outside or beyond ›my‹ experience as such. This virtually indelible, ›natural‹ attitude then gets verbalised: »I am perceiving this thing, hence it exists!«; or: »I can see and hear this thing because it exists!« In other words: The ›uninstructed commoner‹ is prone to substantialising his experience of ›I‹ that arises in the process of sensual perception. Almost inevitably, he falls victim to sakkāya-diṭṭhi, ›the belief in I‹, in an ›independent, individual self‹, since he is inclined to take what he perceives ›for granted‹, to consider it ›to be true‹, without reflecting critically on the origin of his experience. This ›naïve‹ attitude is due to the untrained mind’s ingrained tendency to be satisfied with only the ›shiny‹ surface of phenomena while not noticing their conditioned arising: ›where they come from‹ (ayoniso manasikāra). Thus, the untrained mind gets trapped in the habitual patterns of unreflected experience and of ›blindly‹ reacting to that experience: It gets caught in the web of sakkāya-diṭṭhi.

What Follows from the Belief in ›I‹ We are not concerned here with questions that satisfy a purely intellectual interest on our part or that may be treated in an ›abstract‹ philosophical manner. Our approach here is an existential one, since the ›trap of sakkāya-diṭṭhi‹ is a danger for each and every one of us: We are told by the Buddha that our belief in ›I‹ (in our ›individual 147 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Alfred Weil

identity‹) is in fact the root cause of dukkha (›suffering‹). Our experience of the ultimate inadequacy of things and of the suffering that is therefore connected with them originates in sakkāya-diṭṭhi. The Buddha explains that wherever there ›is‹ an ›I‹ (or, more correctly, the unreflected assumption of ›I‹), this ›I‹ feels threatened; from this feeling of threat and endangerment in the world then follow anxiety, sorrow, concern and perpetual ›care‹ about the survival and welfare of that ›I‹. Our existential concerns may find expression in thoughts and words such as: »I hope that nothing bad will happen to me!«; »What does the future hold for me?«; »I hope that I will stay healthy, will keep my job and secure my income!« and the like. Wherever there is (imagined) an ›I‹, a ›self‹, a ›personality‹, there is necessarily something ›lacking‹, something to be wished for, or, on the other hand, something ›dreadful‹, something to be afraid of. In short: There is always experience of unsatisfactoriness, frustration and pain proper. First and foremost, man’s identification with ›self‹ is related to his own body: In and via his body, he experiences as ›painful‹ (dukkha) old age, illness, and death, which bear the message of the intrinsic ›vanity‹, the changeability and impermanence of all phenomena. By its very being born, the body is set to lose (sooner or later) its health, vitality and beauty, in general: its capability of experiencing ›pleasure‹ in the world. Our physical well-being gets (more or less) frequently interrupted by illness and injury. No one of us can avoid the final encounter with death and the painful experience of dying. As regards man’s identification with the mental components of his ›person‹ (for example, with ›his‹ feelings, ›his‹ will and thoughts), things are not actually different. Feeling unpleasant or directly painful sensations is (at times) as unavoidable as finding ourselves (probably all of a sudden) in difficult or even dangerous situations or as having to put up with undesired and unexpected events (e.g. the loss of a spouse or of close friends). In many (or most) cases, our ›personal‹ wishes and lifelong dreams will remain unfulfilled. Our acquired knowledge, our ›personal‹ skills decrease and vanish, our memory fades, we are bereft of people, pastimes and locations dear to us. It is against this background that the Buddha’s truth of the ending of dukkha might dawn on us as an alternative to our situation of suffering: »Overcoming the illusion of ›I‹ – this, truly, is the ultimate happiness!« (Mahāvagga 1,3)

148 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Nowhere to Be Found

Unmasking the Belief in ›I‹ It should have become clear by now that Buddhist spiritual practice is ultimately aimed at overcoming the illusion of ›I‹, of ›self‹, and at ending the ›selfish‹ actions that are triggered by that illusion. For the Buddha, the belief in ›I‹ is tantamount to ignorance (avijjā). To overcome this deep-seated ignorance of man, the Buddha advocates taking an undistorted, realistic view of things. Attaining to such right view requires a radical re-orientation, a downright ›conversion‹ in the mind. In what follows, I will sketch four realisations, to practise which can help bring that conversion about:

1.

Realising that ›the solid‹ is a compound structure

Under this heading, we necessarily come across the Buddha’s teaching of the five existential factors. A ›person‹ or ›personality‹, appearing to our naïve perception as ›homogeneous‹, as ›solid‹ (as if ›made of one piece‹), is revealed, on careful inspection, as a ›layered edifice‹ made of several distinct ›building bricks‹, an intriguing compound structure that is comprised of five ›interlocking‹ constituents. These are, in their turn, intrinsically ›composed of components‹ as well. The Buddha always lists the five factors of existence as follows: »(1) Rūpa: ›Material‹ form as experienced via the body’s six senses (›corporeity‹) (2) Vedanā: Feeling, sensation (pleasant or unpleasant in reaction to sense contact); (3) Saññā: Perception = the experience of ›being in the world‹; (4) Saṅkhārā: Mental acts (volitions, determinations), speech acts, and physical acts; (5) Viññāṇa: The (usually unnoticed) intrinsic dynamics of the perceptional sequences, or: the ›momentum of their own‹ that the saṅkhārā have gained; more specifically: the pre-conscious expectation of, the unreflected ›being in‹ for further experience of ›I am in the world‹.

Wherever these five factors of existence are present, there is a basis for sakkāya-diṭṭhi to arise. As soon as those five have been ›dismantled‹, any further belief in ›self‹ is impossible: Dependent on what is there »I am«, not independent of what? Dependent on form is there »I am«, not independent of form. Dependent on feeling ..., dependent on perception ..., dependent on determi149 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Alfred Weil

nations ..., dependent on viññāṇa is there »I am«, not independent of viññāṇa.« (Samyutta Nikāya 22,83) Our existential dependence (in the sense as outlined in the above quotation) occurs through our identifying one or more of the five factors (khandha) with ›me‹, through appropriating one or more of them as ›belonging to me‹ or as ›mine‹. Usually, our preferred object of identification and appropriation is our own body (rūpa), but we may as well resort to our emotions, perceptions, intentions and thoughts, or to any combination of them, to arrive at that dependence on the khandha. As such, the process and its result are always the same: From genuinely several components of our experience, from genuinely distinct existential factors we ›make‹ ourselves an aggregate image of ›I‹ and endow it with ›essence‹, with ›substance‹. By assigning certain designations to a complex of experiential contents we end up with an attitude of ›entirety‹, ›individuality‹, ›identity‹. It is particularly the ›persuasive‹ co-arising at any one time of all khandha (in their own intrinsic dynamics) that entices us to endorse the notion of a ›self-identical‹ person or ›permanent‹ being: (Māra, the Evil One) »Who has created this living being? Where is the maker of this living being? How has this living being come into being? How will this living being cease to be?« (Bhikkhunī Vajirā) »Why are you clinging to the word ›living being‹? That, Māra, is your utterly mistaken view of things. Where there is only an aggregation of aggregates, A ›living being‹ cannot be perceived. Just as with regard to an assemblage of the required parts The word ›vehicle‹ has come into use, So the term ›being‹ has been coined To denote the presence of the factors of existence. It is only suffering that comes into being, It is only suffering that is present and ceases to be. Nothing but suffering ever arises, Nothing but suffering ever ceases.« (Samyutta Nikāya 5,10)

150 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Nowhere to Be Found

2.

Realising ›the static‹ as dynamic

From a Buddhist perspective, being and non-being are deeply misleading terms. They make a promise in terms of the ›reality‹ of things that these, on closer inspection, cannot fulfil. The very opposite (as it were) holds true, since the terms arising (to be) and ceasing (to be) are far more adequate descriptions of the reality that we experience. Particularly with regard to the term at issue here, namely the term ›I‹ or ›person‹, a fundamental change of perspective as suggested by the Buddha will dissolve the apparently ›static, permanent I‹ into a dynamic, virtually ›incessant‹ sequence of (distinct) physical and mental processes. Within this uncontrollable ›flood of perceptions‹, physical and mental processes function as triggers of each other, thus bringing (and maintaining) each other in(to) existence. The Buddha advises us therefore to examine those five factors (which themselves are no ›static data‹ either) in their dynamic interplay: By way of sense contact, forms associated with feelings will bring about perceptions; perceptions will entail volitional impulses, resolves and determinations which will manifest themselves in actions of mind, speech and body; out of these actions and their (usually unreflected) repetition, a habitual ›drive‹ aimed at having pleasant perceptions (and avoiding unpleasant ones) will develop over time. This ›drive‹ then generates and shapes ›our‹ (usually growing) affinity for experiencing certain forms, certain feelings etc. that the ›I‹ – having arisen just in and via the very process of experiencing! – is ›yearning for‹. The ›I‹ – as the conditioned counter-pole of any one experience – is now in for certain (conditioned) experience(s) of an ›I being in the world‹. To put it figuratively: We get fascinated by a ›dazzling show‹ that is being ›put on‹ by the five factors of existence. That way, we may realise the necessary circularity of those existential processes as the very constituents of ›personality‹: They have to trigger each other off and have to perpetuate themselves via each other. Hence, a ›self-identical I‹ that would ›always stay the same‹ is nowhere to be found. Instead, we find an intrinsically dynamic double-pole experience, which we are inclined to call our ›individual‹ or ›personal‹ one. It is important to note here again that ›I‹ appears by way and as a result of our experience: In this process, none of the five factors of existence is ›made of one piece‹ either: Each and every ›part‹ of this 151 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Alfred Weil

›quintet‹ is in itself a compound structure. That is exactly the reason why the Buddha termed the five factors of existence khandha = ›aggregates‹, ›accumulations‹, ›heaps‹. In a Buddhist perspective, any static, substantialist understanding of ›person‹ is therefore necessarily mistaken: Nothing ›stable‹, ›solid‹, ›self-identical‹ or ›substantial‹ is ever able to ›reside‹ within or among the five factors of existence. But even apart from or beyond these khanda, an ›eternal soul‹ or a ›world in itself‹ – denoting ›transcendent‹, ›everlasting‹ absolutes – do not, cannot exist: »The world is ever inclined to endorse either of two views: the view of existence and the view of non-existence. But for him who sees, with the highest wisdom, the arising of the world in actual fact, ›non-existence of the world‹ does not apply; for him who sees, with the highest wisdom, the ceasing of the world in actual fact, ›existence of the world‹ does not apply. ›Everything exists‹, this is the one extreme; ›nothing exists‹, this is the other extreme. Avoiding both these extremes, the Tathāgata teaches The Middle Way.« (Samyutta Nikāya 12,15)

Against this background, the frequently asked question as to ›who‹ or ›what‹ is reborn into a ›new life‹ – since Buddhists believe in the rebirth of living beings – may be readily answered without a selfidentical ›I‹ being ›to hand‹. To put it in a nutshell: As finding a ›consistent person in this present life‹ has proved impossible – we have found instead a dynamic, multi-faceted interplay of physical and mental events –, there is, of course, no self-identical being ›standing ready‹ to pass on into ›its next life‹. The virtually incessant unfolding of the process of experiencing, of ›being in the world‹ simply continues after (what we call) ›death‹. Death, in this perspective, is considerably ›de-mystified‹, is revealed as a somewhat more ›radical reshuffling‹ of the five factors of existence. The continuance of ›personal existence‹ after death is therefore well conceivable by Buddhists, without resorting to notions of an ›eternal self‹ or a ›world in itself‹ outlasting their ›individual‹ death.

3.

Realising ›the absolute‹ as dependent

The ›I‹, the ›personality‹ are directly experienced, primary phenomena that are (exactly as such) authentic. On the other hand, the assumption of ›I‹ is a second-order phenomenon appearing only in ab152 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Nowhere to Be Found

straction from our immediate experience. In the Pāli scriptures, we find the following simile for its arising: Just as, in a lamp, its flame appears in dependence of an intact wick and of suitable lamp oil, the assumption of ›I‹ appears only if ›supported‹ by particular conditions. The Buddha used to compare personal existence to a continuous ›process of nutriment‹, understanding ›nutriment‹ in a figurative sense as well. Without nutriment, neither physical nor mental phenomena could come into existence and ›subsist‹. Hence, repeated acts of appropriation (›nutriment‹) are the root condition of the assumption of ›I‹. Most prominently, ›nutriment‹ is of paramount importance to one’s physical shape. The ›material‹ body (1) with its sense faculties is kept healthy only through a frequently repeated ›intake of nutrients‹. The body’s sense contacts, in their turn, become the ›sustenance‹ for feelings (2). Feelings ›nurture‹ perceptions (3). Perceptions ›feed‹ action in thought, speech, and body (4). Through (usually ›mindless‹) repetition of action, we ›fix ourselves‹ idiosyncratic patterns of thinking, speaking and behaving (5). These become the mind’s ›automated recognition programme‹, become its ›personalised‹ grasp at reality, its ›individual‹ way of experiencing the ›I am in the world‹ (5). So we arrive at the insight that ›I‹ or ›person‹ is constituted via the appropriation of elements of not-I. ›I‹ and ›person‹ do not and cannot exist in and as themselves; they can exist only if embedded in a network of specific conditions. ›I‹ and ›person‹ become real only in correlation with other phenomena – they arise in dependence on, have their origin in other things: »Approaching things, seizing things, getting intimate with things, clinging to things: That is the way of the world. But if one does no longer approach things, does no longer seize things, does no longer let his mind dwell on things, does no longer get intimate with things, does no longer let things engage him, does not longer yield to his thirst for things, having the right view: ›There is no I‹, if one does not waver, has no doubt that ›whatever arises is suffering‹, that ›whatever ceases is suffering‹ – then he possesses real knowledge, in which he no longer depends on anybody else in the world.« (Samyutta Nikāya 12,15)

In this remarkable passage, the Buddha points out the important fact that ›nutriment‹ is not necessarily an unstoppable, self-perpetuating, ›obsessive‹ process. It can be terminated, along with the notion of ›I‹. As soon as this termination is achieved, the entire existential process – which the Buddha has revealed to be dukkha throughout: an ulti153 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Alfred Weil

mately unsatisfactory and inadequate situation – is cancelled and ›fades out‹. Conversely (and this may be important to note), an unconditioned, ›absolute‹ beginning of that process – which has revealed itself as the necessarily conditioned, dependent origination of phenomena – appears impossible: Those particular conditions that become the basis (›nutriment‹) of a particular phenomenon are, in their turn, conceivable only as links in a beginningless chain of condition precedents. Hence, a ›very first beginning‹ of dependent origination is unthinkable. Man’s apparently ineradicable obsession with ›taking a snapshot‹ of that ›initial moment of the universe‹, with reifying that ›original cause of the world‹ as ›the birth of matter in a big bang‹, or with deifying it as ›God’s creation‹, is therefore untenable from a Buddhist point of view. The latter belief in particular, i.e. the belief in a ›personal God‹ having ›created‹ man and all other species (as it were) ›out of nothing‹ will strike Buddhists as odd. The Buddha’s following ›autobiographical account‹ may adequately illustrate the Buddhist view of the innumerable past lives that the ›individual‹ has lived prior to its current existence. In that famous passage, the Buddha describes his final mental breakthrough, which – thanks to his mind having been well-prepared by a long meditation practice – enabled him to see the beginninglessness of existence directly: »I recollected innumerable past lives: one birth, two births, three, four, five, ten, twenty births, thirty, fourty, fifty births, one hundred births, one thousand births, one hundred thousand births. I recollected many eons of cosmic contraction, many eons of cosmic expansion, many eons of cosmic contraction and expansion. There and then I lived, had that name, belonged to that family, had that job, lived on that food, experienced that pleasure and that pain, lived to that age. Passing on from there, I re-appeared elsewhere. Here I had another name, belonged to another family, had another job, lived on other food, experienced other pleasure and other pain, lived to a different age. Passing on from there, I re-appeared here.« (Majjhima Nikāya 4)

4.

Realising ›the sovereign’s‹ existential lack of power

We humans have the impression of being – in principle – free, ›sovereign‹ individuals. We claim to be ›autonomous‹ in our decisions – to a relatively large extent at any rate. Within certain limits, we consider 154 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Nowhere to Be Found

ourselves free to do what we like to do (or, conversely, to not do what we do not like to do) and to become whatever we want to become. On looking more carefully, however, we discover a real ›chasm‹ gaping between our naïve assumption of ›sovereignty‹ and our frequent experience of the fundamental lack of control over whatever we tend to consider ›ourselves‹. Unreflectedly, we are inclined to view our ›own‹ body and mind as such ›sovereign entities‹ – and yet, at decisive moments in our lives, we quickly have to admit that they are ultimately uncontrollable, even alien to us. We have to realise, often painfully, that we are not ›master in our own house‹. Our ultimate powerlessness and helplessness are both amazing and tragic. Nobody is ever in a position to determine their peculiar way of ›being embodied‹ or their peculiar way of feeling. Our mundane wishes, such as ›I want to be taller!‹, ›I want to look like her!‹, ›I want to live to ninety!‹, will – in all probability – remain unfulfilled. Our ›firm‹ resolves, like ›Now I will stop feeling that way!‹, ›I will now think about this and will stop thinking about that!«, will – for the greater part – not have (noticeable) effects. Why not? Because the five factors of existence have (long since) gained a momentum ›of their own‹, (usually) overruling our well-reflected ›best intentions‹. Setting our personal ›likes and dislikes‹ against that powerful drive of the five factors is tantamount to clutching at straws along the river while being carried away by its raging torrents. Most often, our present endeavour to will differently does not effect such changes in our ›personality‹ as might enable us to act differently. More than 2,500 years ago, the Buddha had already pointed out this – usually ignored – fact, which has partly been re-discovered in our ›modern‹ age, most prominently by Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis: To his contemporaries, Freud’s doctrine of the hardly controllable ›Unconscious‹ came as a real shock. Today, it is clinical brain research that ›threatens‹ the alleged sovereignty and autonomy of the homo sapiens. The Awakened One put his fundamental insight in a both simple and comprehensive manner: »What do you think, Aggivessana? As you say: ›Form is my self, feeling is my self, perception is my self, determinations are my self, viññāṇa is my self‹ – are you really in control of that form, of that feeling, of that perception, of those determinations, of that viññāṇa? Are you really in a position to determine: ›May my form, my feeling, my perception, my determinations, my viññāṇa be like that, may they not be like that‹?« – »Of course not, Master Gotama.« (Majjhima Nikāya 35)

155 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Alfred Weil

Shifting Perspectives – Bringing about a ›Conversion‹ of the Mind (and Heart) One who has realised the structural ›conditioned-ness‹ of a phenomenon has thus been put in a position to apply his realisation in practice and to influence, to modify the phenomenon, even to prevent its arising. If the illusion of ›I‹ is conditioned, overcoming that illusion is possible. Buddhists, then, are faced with the (ultimately) highly rewarding, but (admittedly) extraordinarily difficult task of transcending the ›I-perspective‹ that is bound to arise ›spontaneously‹ on most occasions in our lives. Transcending becomes necessary at the level of our ›theoretical‹ understanding of conditionality, as well as at the more ›practical‹ level of our very perceiving a situation and of (re-) acting in this situation. I should like to point out three aspects of that transcending in some more detail. We find the Buddha’s succinct wording of these three aspects in many prominent passages of the Pāli Canon, amongst others in a famous conversation that the Buddha had with his son Rāhula: »Whatever form there is, Rāhula: past, future, or present; internal or external; coarse or delicate; mundane or sublime; close or remote – each and every form should be viewed, by one seeing clearly, as it really is: ›This is not mine, this is not I, this is not a self for me.‹« »Only form, o Noble One? Only form, o Blessed One?« »Form, Rāhula, and feeling, and perception, and determinations, and viññāṇa likewise.« (Majjhima Nikāya 62)

Here, the entire ›I-complex‹ and all the five constituents of personality (and of ›the world‹), respectively, are ›put in brackets‹. Their actual ›existence‹ is challenged in three ways: (I) The first step is an ›indirect‹ approach by which the Buddha wants to prevent any notion of ›I‹ to sneak in ›through the back-door‹. The cue for that practice is: ›This is not mine‹ (»n‹etaṃ mama«). The Buddha advises his followers to not regard anything whatsoever as ›being their property‹. No subject-matter, no ›material‹ thing in the world should ever be viewed or defined as ›belonging to me‹, since where there is ›mine‹, there is automatically ›I‹ as well, and this is exactly the perspective to be transcended. The practice recommended by the Buddha here cuts deeply into our unreflected habit of mentally 156 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Nowhere to Be Found

appropriating ›our‹ world, or to be more precise: our experience of ›world‹. Apart from their usage in pragmatic, ›everyday‹ language, there are no ›my‹ house, ›my‹ wife, ›my‹ cough, ›my‹ body, ›my‹ feeling or ›my‹ consciousness. This new, more realistic way of viewing the world is justified by the very nature of things: We really do not have power or control – sensu stricto – over any one thing in the world. Corporeity or form, as well as all other khandha, obey their own ›natural laws‹ that lie outside our sphere of influence. As we have seen, the khandha have no raison d’être apart from appearing, changing and disappearing. Hence, we cannot make any demands on them, make them our permanent property, preserve them in their present state: The label ›mine‹ is only a (dangerous) fake. 2) In a second step, the Buddha advocates a different approach to our way of experiencing the world, in order to (gradually) bring about a change of that experience itself. The key word here is: ›This is not I‹ (»n’eso aham asmi«). An important part of Buddhist spiritual practice is dealing ›consciously‹ with our perceptions, maintaining ›clarity of mind‹ in our encounters with the world. More specifically, this means continuously and intentionally ›keeping in mind‹ (initially, at a purely intellectual level only) the reality of ›not-I› (anatta) while still having the spontaneous experience of an ›I being there‹ (asmi-māno) in a given situation. Thus, this practice aims at correcting mentally our ingrained attitude of ›I am in the world‹ in line with our (now) better knowledge. In the further stages of one’s spiritual development, it is well possible to transcend even that immediate experience of ›I am‹: to experience I-lessness directly. The insubstantiality of all phenomena is then realised as a matter of fact. The very embodiment of I-less experience is a Buddha, an Awakened One, who has fully awakened from the dream of ›existing‹. A Buddha ›lives in‹ and ›experiences‹ a world, but in doing so he is no longer limited to an ›I-perspective‹: Neither does he have any ›self-related‹ concerns nor does he perform any ›self-made‹ actions. Innumerable experienced meditators – not only from a Buddhist lineage – have borne witness to the fact that ›experience‹, ›consciousness‹, ›awareness‹ are possible without an ›I‹ added to them. In certain advanced meditative states (jhāna), the fundamental division into a subject and an object – which we usually experience – is overcome, simply falls away. In such states of very deep concentration, the mind is ›absolutely‹ clear, is fully ›awake‹ without experiencing any polarity between ›an I‹ and ›a world‹. In 157 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Alfred Weil

their stead, there is increasingly blissful experience of unity (samādhi) where ›division‹ or ›difference‹ is bound to decrease in line with concentration deepening. 3) A third aspect of practice relates to the ›epistemological‹ level, to the formation and formulation of theories. Here our cue is: ›This is not a self for me‹ (»na m’eso atta«). This third step is concerned with freeing oneself from any false notions and opinions about reality. The human mind has an innate tendency to merge and ›inflate‹ several distinct experiences into comprehensive theories and ›orthodox‹ dogmas. The mere sensation of ›I am‹ – as such authentic in a given situation – is thus quickly turned into the thesis and affirmation of an ›I really being there‹, into the idea or even ideology of a ›true self‹, ›eternal soul‹ and so forth. If no phenomenon whatsoever can be ›self‹ sensu stricto, any ingenious concepts or elaborate definitions of ›self‹ will necessarily be inappropriate: They will always end up ›reifying‹ or ›deifying‹ an initially simple, primary experience: »If anyone were to say: ›The body is self‹ – that would not be tenable. The body’s arising and ceasing are clearly discernible. Its arising and ceasing being discernible, one would have to conclude: ›My self is arising and ceasing.‹ That is why ›the body is the self‹ is not tenable. Hence, the body is not self. If anyone were to say: ›The mind is self‹ – that would not be tenable. The mind’s arising and ceasing are clearly discernible. Its arising and ceasing being discernible, one would have to conclude: ›My self is arising and ceasing.‹ That is why ›the mind is the self‹ is not tenable. Hence, the mind is not self.‹« 1 (Majjhima Nikāya 148)

Conclusion and Outlook If not looked at with only an ›academic interest‹, the Buddha’s teaching of anatta will have a deep impact on many theoretical and practical problems that ›we‹ have to solve every day. Viewed from a BudThis sutta (Majjhima Nikāya 148, Six Sextets) deals with all six senses in the same way, i.e. with the sense of sight, the sense of hearing, the sense of smell, the sense of taste, the sense of touch, and the sense of thought. This ›sixfold explanation‹ of dependent origination follows the pattern: Sight ›sees‹ forms in sight-viññāṇa by which the sense of sight is ›affected‹; this affection entails feeling, which entails craving etc. Here, the six sense areas (āyatana) represent the five factors of existence (khandha), to which the same explanation pattern applies.

1

158 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Nowhere to Be Found

dhist perspective, many of these problems will have to be approached in a radically different way. At the personal level, following the Buddha’s insight might entail modifying one’s life project under ›spiritual‹ auspices. But also at the social level, the actual realisation of anatta would shed new light on many ethical and bio-ethical issues and would necessarily lead to radical re-orientation in various branches of scientific research. Here, I should like to just briefly touch upon one of those imaginable issues: A (or even: the) most crucial one would be the question as to how an ethics is possible without an ›I‹. We may note in this regard that Buddhism – in spite of or thanks to its teaching anatta? – has developed a most plausible and highly inspiring ethics. As it cannot resort to notions of a ›self-identical person‹, Buddhist ethics is based on the ›natural‹ correlation of the intrinsic moral quality of any action (the ›cause‹) having an exactly ›equivalent‹ effect upon the agent as well. One can derive that correlation from existence itself if one pays attention: It is ultimately one’s ability to see for himself the conditioned-ness of all phenomena, including ethical ones. Buddhist ethics starts from the obvious fact that all living beings have basically the same interests and desires: They all want to be happy and healthy, safe and sound, and they fear unhappiness, pain and injury. Any action performed in thought, in speech, and via the body should therefore respect the others’ sphere of interest, their own longing for happiness and satisfaction in life. The goal of Buddhist spirituality is ›minimising‹ painful experience of any kind, at any level of existence, and, in the last instance, overcoming it completely, once and for all (dukkhanirodha). The Buddha’s great claim is to have acquired the knowledge necessary for helping others pursue and reach that highest goal. Inevitably, our actions will promote or inhibit our own wellbeing along with others‹. From this we can easily derive a suitable standard for an ethically appropriate and inappropriate conduct, respectively. In this regard, the world’s major religions are all in agreement with each other, holding that ethical behaviour, by default, alleviates suffering. In Buddhism as well as in other religions, one’s ›virtuous‹ conduct, one’s ›goodness‹ means ›being good enough‹ to advance both one’s own welfare and the welfare of the society one lives in. The highest aim of Buddhist ethics is therefore to avoid the deliberate, intentional causing of any harm to any living being. This 159 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Alfred Weil

basic rule is applicable to all our activity in thought, speech, and as physical action. The core of this ethics is summarised in the Buddha’s five precepts (panca sīla), by which he advises his followers to make a strong resolve at and to put their best effort into 1) not killing, 2) not stealing, 3) not misbehaving in their sex life, 4) not telling lies and 5) not intoxicating their mind with alcohol, drugs etc. It is of paramount importance to note in this context that the Buddha defines the very intention motivating one’s external ›performance‹ (i.e. the action that is perceived by others as well) as the action proper and thus highlights it as the actually ›decisive‹ aspect in terms of an action’s ›moral value‹. It goes without saying that Buddhist ethics is far more comprehensive and refined than that and is only briefly outlined here. Its firm basis is the doctrine of karma. ›Karma‹ means that acting and experiencing are inextricably linked to each other, as they are mutually interdependent. Unethical behaviour will necessarily entail painful experience, while virtuous conduct will, by default, result in pleasant experience. In Buddhism, ›selfish‹ behaviour is therefore regarded as unskilful, as ›inviting trouble‹ – by the same rationale, ›altruistic‹ behaviour is viewed as skilful and ›auspicious‹. Man’s love and empathy for his equals and in fact for all living beings originates in his insight into the true nature of things. In Buddhism, ethical behaviour is the natural outcome of deepest wisdom: namely that I will never be able to achieve ›my‹ happiness in conflict with or at the expense of my fellow beings. And the core of that wisdom is the realisation of ›my own‹ relativity: »There is suffering, but no sufferer is there. There is action, but actor is there. There is relief, but there is no-one relieved. There is the path, but no wanderer is there.« (Visuddhimagga XVI)

(Translations from the Pāli by Alfred Weil.) English translation of the essay (from the original German by Mathias Weber)

160 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Mark Siderits

Non-Self and Benevolence Śāntideva’s Argument

Does the Buddhist teaching of non-self make it possible to solve problems that are posed in but not satisfactorily solved by Western ethics? I claim that it does. I shall speak very broadly about something I shall be calling »Western ethics«. Of course there really is no such thing. But for present purposes it might prove useful to pretend that there is an historical arc along the lines I shall describe. What I have in mind in speaking of »Western ethics« is not the sorts of pronouncements on ethical issues one finds in Western culture, but rather ethical theory in the Western philosophical tradition. For many centuries, such ethical theorizing was dominated by assumptions drawn from Christian theology. When, beginning in the Enlightenment, efforts began to ground our ethical intuitions in something other than divine commands or God’s grace, it went unnoticed that the agenda remained one that had been set by Christianity. On that agenda, a principal aim of ethical theorizing is to answer the question, Why should I be moral? And here by »being moral« is meant being moved by moral reasons, understood as reasons that are distinct from prudential reasons. 1 It is this distinction between moral and prudential reasons that I think was introduced into Western ethics by Christianity. The distinction certainly does not have the sort of pride of place in ancient Greek ethics that it has today. For the Greeks the chief question of ethics was how one should live one’s life. For the most part the answers they gave tended to conform to the moral intuitions of thoughtful people: that things like killing, stealing and lying are to be avoided. But these were not seen as different in kind from such advice as that one should guard one’s health, and not squander reBy ›moral reasons‹ is meant reasons that are other-regarding, involving for instance appeal to the welfare of persons other than the agent, or to obligations the agent has toward persons other than themselves. By ›prudential reasons‹ is meant reasons involving appeal just to the agent’s own interests (whether now or in the future).

1

161 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Mark Siderits

sources one might need later in life. For Plato, Aristotle and many other ancients, these all stemmed from the single fact that the life of happiness and human flourishing has a particular structure. They believed that a happy life requires a well-ordered soul, and such a soul will be both just and temperate. 2 Today it is instead assumed that any rational agent will understand the force of prudential reasons, but that moral reasons pose special problems. Of course we recognize that many people have trouble adopting the stance of temporal neutrality required by prudential rationality. The long-term risks of heart disease and cancer are hard to weigh properly given the present appeal of food high in animal fat. Still this is thought to be different from the case where my pleasure comes at the expense of suffering inflicted on nameless strangers. While we might agree that returning the lost wallet filled with cash to its owner is the moral thing to do, we don’t consider the person who fails to do so irrational. In the Christian vision, moral reasons could be grounded in divine commands or in the sanctity of God’s creation. It is not immediately apparent how this is to be done in the absence of the supernatural. The strategy of enlightened self-interest manifestly fails to deliver what is needed. The likelihood of my materially benefitting from relieving the suffering of the most downtrodden among us seems vanishingly small. Some have thought that the answer is to be found in a humanism – echoing the sanctity-ofcreation approach. The thought is that if the value I place in my own well-being can be shown to hold of all beings that meet certain conditions (such as being a rational autonomous ends-chooser), then it would be irrational not to give the well-being of others equal weight in my deliberations. The difficulty is that perhaps all this could show is that the reason each person has to promote their own well-being is grounded in the same feature. Thus it begins to look as though moral reasons are de novo, and must be based on mysterious non-natural facts or else have no ground whatever. And since we tend to be suspicious of allegedly non-natural facts in a scientific age, the result is

Temperance is, of course, the preeminent virtue of the prudent person, while justice, for the Greeks, is predominantly other-regarding in its exercise. For the claim that in ancient ethics no sharp distinction is drawn between moral and non-moral reasons, see Julia Annas, ›Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality‹, Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): pp. 119–36.

2

162 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-Self and Benevolence

support for moral skepticism – skepticism about there being specifically moral reasons at all. Consequentialists have toyed with the idea that we might end this impasse by questioning the assumption behind the humanist impulse, that persons are ultimately real and fundamental. The thought that moral reasons present a special problem stems from the idea that there is an asymmetry between temporal neutrality (no bias in favor of the »now«) and locational partiality (a bias in favor of the »here«). The strategy is to question the asymmetry by using the Human noself view or its Parfitian Reductionist elaboration to undermine the belief that there could be a rationally significant difference between »here« (my pain) and »there« (the pain of strangers). The difficulty this strategy encounters is that it seems it could just as plausibly be said to lead to rejection of temporal neutrality. If there is no enduring entity connecting up the different stages and episodes of my life, then perhaps the supremely rational aim is that I promote my present interests. This dissolves the asymmetry by installing a bias in favor of the »now« that parallels the bias in favor of the »here«. The supremely rational end would then be to promote the satisfaction of my present aims. And this, I might add, is what many in the West take the Buddhist teaching of non-self to counsel: to be here now, taking no heed of what comes tomorrow. When it is pointed out that this appears incompatible with the injunction that bodhisattvas exercise compassion toward all sentient beings, the response is sometimes that non-self replaces the »me« with a »we«: that dissolving the sense of self makes evident the Self or Weltgeist, the one subject of all mental states everywhere. These two ways of understanding non-self might reveal more about those who propound them than about Buddhist ethics. 3 For they proceed on the assumption that there can be no reason R to do A unless there is a subject S for which R is a reason. In the case of the present-aim theory it is an ephemeral self that is to serve as subject; in the Weltgeist theory it is the world-soul. Of course there is a sense

Here I should add that I am also going to be speaking very broadly of »Buddhist ethics« in a way that will overlook all sorts of important historical factors and doctrinal differences. Two particularly important things I shall ignore are the karma/ rebirth doctrine and the distinction between early Buddhism and Abhidharma on the one hand and Mahāyāna on the other. I believe these things can here be safely set to one side, but this will be controversial.

3

163 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Mark Siderits

in which it is trivially true that a reason requires a subject, since »reason to do A« is short for »reason for S to do A«. But this need not mean that there must be something in our ultimate ontology to which »S« refers. It could be that such subjects are reducible to thoroughly impersonal sorts of things, and that the reduction proceeds without loss of a reason’s normative force. This is what Śāntideva claims in the argument he gives at Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA) 8.97– 103. If the argument succeeds, then it removes the asymmetry by demonstrating that the supremely rational end is to remove suffering regardless of when and where it occurs. The alleged gap between prudential and moral reasons, and the seeming difficulty of grounding the latter, are shown to result from understandable but remediable ignorance. It is not difficult to suspect that Śāntideva falls into the same trap as utilitarians like Sidgwick and Parfit – failing to rule out the possibility that non-self supports the present-aim theory. Here is his argument: »97. If one says that the suffering of other persons does not harm me, hence efforts need not be made to prevent it, Then since the suffering of a future body does not harm me, why should efforts be made to prevent it? 98. ›Because that too is me‹ ; if this is one’s thought, that is a mistaken construction, For it is one set of elements that dies and another that is born. 99. If it is thought that it is the suffering that belongs just to oneself that is to be prevented, The suffering of the foot does not belong to the hand, why should it be prevented by that [hand]? 100. If it is said that while this is mistaken, still one behaves out of the ›I‹-sense, [We reply that] one should try as hard as one can to stop what is mistaken in oneself and others. 101. The series and the collection are illusory, like a queue, an army and the like, Since that does not exist to which suffering belongs, of whom will that come to be one’s own? 102. Ownerless sufferings are all devoid of distinction [between mine and other]. Because it is suffering, it is to be prevented; how can this be restricted? 103. If it were asked why suffering is to be prevented, it is agreed upon without exception by all that it is.

164 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-Self and Benevolence

Thus if it is to be prevented, then indeed all of it is to be prevented, if not then one’s own case is just like that of other persons.« 4

At first glance Śāntideva seems to employ the same strategy that Sidgwick and Parfit use. He begins (v. 97) by claiming that those who fail to acknowledge a reason to prevent suffering in others are irrational insofar as they do acknowledge a reason to prevent suffering in the future body that will arise out of their present body. Here it looks like he is using non-self to challenge the asymmetry between the temporal neutrality of the classical self-interest theory of prudential rationality and the locational bias of the skeptic about moral reasons. When the skeptic objects that the future body will be mine while the suffering of the stranger belongs to someone else, Śāntideva replies that the enduring person is a fiction constructed out of impermanent elements (v. 98). Why should where the suffering happens make a difference if when it happens does not? One might respond by confining one’s efforts to promoting one’s present interests, thereby insuring a seemingly rational symmetry of bias toward the here and the now. It seems one could, that is, restore symmetry between the temporal and the locational by shrinking the subject down to the presently existing person, something that necessarily exists only here and now. In that case it seems it would be fully rational to ignore the suffering of others. What this misses is the point Śāntideva makes in v.101ab, with his claim that the series and the collection are both illusory. His example of a series, the queue, makes the point about persistence that the question concerning temporal neutrality relies on. We readily agree that the queue in front of the cinema is not the sort of thing taddukhena na me bādhetyato yadi na rakyate| nāgāmikāyadukhānme bādhā tatkena rakyate||97|| ahameva tadāpīti mithyeya parikalpanā| anya eva mṛto yasmādanya eva prajāyate||98|| yadi yasyaiva yadduḥkhaṃ rakṣya tasyaiva tanmatam| pādaduḥkhaṃ na hastasya kasmāttattena rakṣyate||99|| ayuktamapi cedetadahaṃkārātpravartate | yadayuktaṃ nivartyaṃ tatsvamanyacca yathābalam||100|| saṃtānaḥ samudāyaśca paṅktisenādivanmṛṣā| yasya duḥkhaṃ sa nāstyasmātkasya tatsvaṃ bhaviṣyati||101|| asvāmikāni dukhāni sarvānyevāviśeṣataḥ| duḥkhatvādeva vāryāṇi niyamastatra kiṃkṛtaḥ||102|| duḥkhaṃ kasmānnivāryaṃ cetsarveṣāmavivādataḥ| vāryaṃ cetsarvamapyevaṃ na cedātmāpi sattvavat||103||

4

165 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Mark Siderits

that belongs in our final ontology (is not real in the strict sense), since it is made up of different moviegoers at different times. While we might say that the queue lasted from 8:30 to 9:15, we will acknowledge that since the people in the queue at 9:10 are not the same persons as those on line at 8:30, there really is no such thing as the queue. This is just a convenient way of referring to all the different people arranged in a line over the time in question, some at one time and some at another. When this reasoning is applied to the case of the subject we get the result that strictly speaking the enduring person is a fiction With the example of an army, however, we may be less inclined to agree that what we have here is something that is »illusory« or a »mistaken construction«. The membership of an army, like that of the queue, may change over time. But even if we were to concede that the present PLA is not precisely the same thing as the PLA at its founding (none of the present members being founding members), we would be inclined to insist that the present PLA is itself a very real thing. Śāntideva, along with all other Indian Buddhist philosophers, would disagree. A core metaphysical claim in the Buddhist tradition, traceable to the teachings of Gautama, is that partite things are reducible without remainder to their impartite constituents. This is decidedly at odds with common sense. We generally believe that the building one is in is just as real as its floors, walls and windows, that the window is just as real as the atoms making up its glass, and so on. Some philosophers go even further, and claim that for any two things there is a third thing that is their mereological sum. Following the principle of unrestricted composition, these mereological ultra-realists would say that in addition to my left kidney and the highest leaf on the tree outside the window, there is the whole made up of the kidney and the leaf. Since many find unrestricted composition absurd, there are various attempts at finding the right restrictions, ones that would allow the human body that includes that kidney along with all the other organs and tissue to be one thing, the tree containing that leaf and other contiguous tree-parts to be another, but there to be no real whole consisting of the kidney and the leaf. Indian Buddhist philosophers reject all such attempts. Using a battery of arguments that collectively can be called the »neither identical nor distinct« argument, they claim that nothing allowing of decompositional analysis could possibly belong in our final ontology. Since we commonly suppose 166 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-Self and Benevolence

such things as buildings, bodies and armies to exist, they must then explain our error. Their explanation is that the building is a useful fiction, a many disguised as a one, the disguise having been adopted in order to facilitate transactions and communication given our interests and our cognitive limitations. 5 Grasping this mereological reductionism allows us to understand Śāntideva’s second response to the moral skeptic (v. 99cd): that pain occurring in the foot does not belong to the hand. When the painful foot is mine, we take this to mean that the pain is mine as well, and that I then have a reason to use my hand to remove the source of the pain. But if this »I« is something with both hands and feet, then it is partite and so not strictly speaking real. Supposing for a moment that hands and feet are impartite, we should say that although they exist, the person who has them does not. But this in turn means that the pain is not the hand’s, so by the principles of the moral skeptic (someone who finds the asymmetry between prudential and moral reasons perfectly acceptable) there is no reason for the hand to act to remove this pain. And since a foot is unable to remove a splinter in that very foot, this means there is nothing to be done. Put more generally, the implication is that the present-aim theory of the moral skeptic must fail. Recall that the moral skeptic claims it is rational to have biases in favor of the here and the now. What they mean by »present aim« is those self-interested ends the person presently has. Presumably this will include such things as aiming to relieve the present pain in the foot. But this cannot belong to the person, since strictly speaking there is no such thing. And it would be odd to attribute it to the foot; feet don’t seem to be the sorts of things that can have aims or reasons. So the moral skeptic is forced to conclude that there is no reason to prevent pain anywhere or anywhen. Śāntideva now (v.103) presents the moral skeptic with a dilemma: either all suffering is to be prevented – the stranger’s as much as one’s own, remote future pain as well as present pain – or none is. But, he says, no one holds the latter; so pain must be intrinsically bad, and its badness is just its to-be-preventedness (v.102). This claim sounds decidedly odd to our ears. But consider the alternative. In order to preserve the rationality of a bias in favor of the here or the now, the moral skeptic must claim that a pain can be bad only by being bad For more on the argument and its ramifications see Chapter 6 of my Buddhism As Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2007).

5

167 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Mark Siderits

for someone or other. What the arguments against mereological sums establish is that nothing in our ultimate ontology could play this role of the subject for whom pain is bad. For to play this role an entity would have to be the sort of thing that could be with or without pain, could be better or worse off. This requires structural complexity, something ruled out by the arguments against partite things. So if these arguments succeed one must either grant the intrinsic badness of ownerless suffering, or else accept the rational nihilist claim that there are no reasons to do anything whatsoever. One will naturally be suspicious of this line of argument. The intuition that pain’s badness requires a subject for whom it is bad is so widely shared as to seem universal. Anyone claiming that a universally held view is false owes us not just an argument against it but also an explanation of how that view came to be so widely shared given its falsity. Śāntideva does not provide such an explanation. But he hints at the explanation that had already been developed by his tradition when he brings up the examples of the queue and the army, and when he speaks of »ownerless suffering«. This is the explanation of ignorance that had been developed by the Abhidharma schools using the doctrine of the two truths. Most Buddhists claim that there are two distinct ways in which a statement might be true, conventionally and ultimately. To say that a statement is conventionally true is, roughly, to say that its acceptance reliably leads to success in the conduct of one’s daily affairs. If you wish to see the movie, then being told you should join the queue on the left will help you attain your goal. But to call this statement true is to imply that there are such things as queues, something we now know we have reason to think is false. This is why such statements are said to be true only conventionally and not ultimately. Relative to a set of conventions that are established with our interests and our cognitive limitations in view, this statement may be called true. These conventions establish which mereological sums might usefully be treated as real, given that neither unrestricted composition nor mereological nihilism yields a workable conceptual scheme. The upshot is that things like queues and armies turn out to be real in a way after all, only just merely conventionally real. We might think of these things as together making up a sort of folk ontology. As one might expect, the things that are not merely conventionally but rather ultimately real are the impartite entities that are found at the end of decompositional analysis. It is arrangements of these 168 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-Self and Benevolence

things that serve as the truth-makers for ultimately true statements. This of course means that the statement about the queue cannot be ultimately true. But it is important to note that it cannot be ultimately false either. Were we to say that it is false we would be taken as suggesting that some other statement about the queue is true, and no statement about the queue could be ultimately true. The result is that we have two separate discourses, one for ultimate truths and another for conventional truths. There is, though, an important link between the two. For any statement that is conventionally true there must be some ultimately true statement that explains why acceptance of that statement would be conducive to successful practice. The explanans will typically be much longer than the explanandum. This is not only because every occurrence of a word like »queue« must be replaced with terms for all its many ultimate constituents. It will also often be necessary to provide some account of why the aggregating of these constituents would prove useful for such systems as human beings – some reference to our interests and cognitive limitations. So the ultimate truth will turn out to be entirely too unwieldy for use in everyday life. Still seeing that and how conventional truths might in principle be dispensed with in favor of ultimate truths helps us see that the things in our folk ontology might be mere useful fictions. Now the point of all this, for the Ābhidharmika, is not to establish that the queue and the PLA do not ultimately exist. The point is to get us to see that our sense of there being an »I« results from an understandable but remediable error. This is the real purport of the Buddha’s teaching of non-self, which is often understood as just the denial of any such entity as the self posited by the Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta schools of orthodox Indian philosophy (or more recently by Cartesians). That denial is one part of the doctrine, but Buddhist philosophers generally recognize that this is not the most soteriologically important part. Thus Candrakīrti compares those who think non-self is no more than the denial of what other philosophers proclaim as the self – a permanent, simple subject of experience – to someone who, on learning of a nest of snakes in the walls of the house, takes comfort in the fact that there is no elephant in the room. 6 The target of the doctrine of non-self is the »I«-sense, something had by ordinary people who may have given no thought to what this »I« 6

See Madhyamakāvatāra 6.141 for the snake analogy.

169 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Mark Siderits

might be like. To extirpate this »I«-sense one will need to do more than just refute the soul-pellets of rival philosophers. The doctrine of the two-truths and its associated two-tier ontology are designed to show how the persons we take ourselves to be – the enduring agents of action, subjects of experience and centers of value – are just useful fictions. The utility of the concept will then explain the ubiquity of the error. Dissolution of the error will prevent further occurrence of existential suffering. And, of particular importance here, recognition of the fiction’s utility will allow those liberated from existential suffering to continue to reap the very real benefits that come from deploying the personhood concept. All this is nicely illustrated by an exchange between King Milinda and the Buddhist monk Nāgasena in the early Buddhist text Milindapanha or Questions of King Milinda. At this point in the text, 7 it has already been established by Nāgasena that strictly speaking what we think of as a person is just a succession of sets of causally connected, impermanent, impersonal elements – a causal series for short. Since none of these elements abides over a lifetime (and thus none could be the self of the philosophers), Milinda wonders if this does not mean that infant and adult are numerically distinct persons. Indeed if we were to follow his reasoning then what we take to be the life of a single person would in fact be a series of many very short-lived persons, each one existing for perhaps no more than a moment, but serving as the cause of some successor person. If this were the case then the present-aim theorist could claim vindication for their view that non-self makes rational a bias in favor of the here and the now. We might expect Nāgasena to respond, like Śāntideva, by denying that a presently existing person could be any more ultimately real than an enduring person. But this is not what he does. While it is clear that Nāgasena would deny the ultimate reality of both the queue and the army (both enduring person and momentary person), he does not use that mereological reductionist strategy in responding to Milinda here. Instead he has Milinda consider the consequences of replacing our current personhood convention – according to which a person is something that endures as long as the causal series continues – with the convention suggested by Milinda’s reasoning. Since that would make a person something extremely short-lived, we should then have to say that the woman who has just conceived is not the same person 7

Milindapanha 41 f.

170 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-Self and Benevolence

as the woman who gives birth nine months later; that the child student is not the same person as the adult who is an educated person because of the child’s studies; that the incarcerated criminal is not the same person as the one who committed the earlier crime. As these examples make clear, the consequences of adopting this alternative convention would not be good. It would, for instance, be difficult to motivate the newly pregnant woman to refrain from conduct likely to adversely affect future maternal and fetal health. Since it would be a mistake for her to identify with the woman giving birth nine months later, the usual appeal to considerations of the well-being of herself and her child will fail. Similarly, all exhortations to the child to study in order to insure a successful life will fall on deaf ears. The child will rightly wonder why they should forego the pleasure of video games in order to benefit some stranger who does not even exist yet. And the convicted criminal could reasonably claim that they are unjustly punished, since it was someone else who committed the crime. Now it is interesting that Nāgasena should be the one who raises these considerations. For it is usually the opponents of Buddhist nonself who bring up such cases as reasons to reject the doctrine. What this shows is that those who take Buddhist non-self to mean that we should live in the here and now must be mistaken. Nāgasena’s point is just that our present personhood convention does socially valuable work. It is better, all things considered, that healthy women give birth to healthy infants; that there be a steady supply of newly educated young people entering the workforce; that criminals acknowledge their crimes and accept the justice of their punishment. These and the like benefits accrue because we have all come to think of a causal series as one enduring thing, a person who is the subject of a succession of experiences and the agent of various actions. Those benefits would be lost if we were to stop thinking of ourselves as a queue, and instead think of ourselves as just the presently existing army. Neither queue nor presently existing army is ultimately real. Their ultimately real constituents and connections are, however, too many and too multifarious for us to catalogue, given our cognitive limitations. So given our interests, it is understandable that we should have these concepts. But we can also imagine other ways in which we might bundle together those constituents and connections. That we should have these particular concepts is most likely explained by the fact that this way of bundling things turns out to be more convenient than the others. Nāgasena’s point is that in the case of our personhood 171 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Mark Siderits

concept, the cost of replacing this way of bundling things with some other would be far more than mere inconvenience. We would do well to retain the concept as currently configured. The difficulty is that because we take what is merely a useful cognitive shortcut too seriously, we are inevitably subject to existential suffering. The soteriological point of non-self is just that we can live our lives without the frustration, alienation and despair that now haunt us when we realize our own mortality; we can do this by seeing our personhood concept for the useful fiction it really is. To do this is not to live wholly in the here and now; it is better that I brush my teeth and floss each day, even though what makes this better is not something to be found here and now. To do this is to continue to see future stretches of this causal series as something whose well-being I have reason to promote – just not on the grounds that those future stretches will be me. What should now be clear is that this way of understanding Buddhist non-self will require that we see Buddhist ethics as consequentialist in form. The variety of consequentialism on offer here is markedly different from what we are accustomed to, but that should hardly surprise us given how counterintuitive the teaching of nonself turns out to be. What may seem more challenging to this reading is squaring it with the sorts of absolute prohibitions on kinds of actions (such as killing and sexual immorality) one finds in codes of conduct for Buddhist lay followers and monastics. There is also, however, the sort of anti-nomian conduct one finds in descriptions of fully enlightened beings, starting with the Buddha himself 8 and extending in Mahāyāna literature to the ideal figure of the bodhisattva. 9 And as the tales told of such beings make clear, what we have here is the usual gap between act consequentialism for the cognoscenti and some sort of indirect consequentialism (such as rule consequentialism and aretaic consequentialism) for those not yet free of the ignorance that results from taking our cognitive shortcuts too seriously. 10 We can all 8 E. g., in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya 86), where the Buddha condones the telling of a lie. 9 See BCA 5.84cd: ›Even what is forbidden is allowed of the compassionate one who sees a benefit‹ (niṣiddhamapyabujñātaṃ kṛpalorarthadarśinaḥ). For further references and discussion see Charles S. Prebish, ›Mahāyāna Ethics and American Buddhism‹, in John Powers and Charles Prebish, (eds.), Destroying Māra Forever (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2009), pp. 95–111. See also Chapter 6 of Charles Goodman, Consequences of Compassion (NY: Oxford University Press, 2009). 10 For evidence of this ›act consequentialism for the cognoscenti‹ strategy see Śānti-

172 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-Self and Benevolence

imagine scenarios in which taking a life would result in less overall suffering than would follow from any other available action. The difficulty is just that the cognitive distortions introduced by the »I«sense make it difficult for the normal (unenlightened) agent to do the calculation accurately. Better that such beings follow a simple rule against killing, but also strive for an enlightenment that removes the distortions. I began with the claim that Buddhist non-self might help us solve the problem of closing the gap between prudential and moral reasons. Now that I’ve said how I think this might be achieved, I’ll close by conceding how little importance this may have in resolving genuine moral questions in everyday life. While the alleged gap between moral and prudential reasons that plays so large a role in Western ethical theorizing may disappear at the ultimate level, it is likely that ordinary people will still experience a tension between self-interested concern and the kind of concern for others’ welfare that is central to our moral institutions. This is so because it is probably inevitable that so useful a fiction as the personhood convention will figure prominently in the practical reasoning of ordinary (unenlightened) people. The tension is an artifact of the reality underlying the convention, specifically the fact that strategic changes in the present elements of a causal series are more likely to reduce suffering in the future elements of that series than in those of other series. It is easier, for instance, for me to prevent future tooth decay in my own teeth than in yours. This helps explain why it is easier to teach the small child to engage in prudential reasoning than in moral reasoning. This does not alter the fact that both sorts of reasoning are grounded in the same ultimate fact, that suffering impersonally construed is bad and should be prevented. But for the unenlightened it will continue to seem as though there is a tension between the two. One thing Buddhist ethics might contribute here is a corrective to the tendency in modern Western ethical theory to turn what is merely a tension arisdeva’s advice to the aspiring bodhisattva (quoted in Goodman op cit pp. 89–90): »If a bodhisattva does not make a sincere, unwavering effort in thought, word, and deed to stop all the present and future pain and suffering of all sentient beings, and to bring about all present and future pleasure and happiness, or does not seek the collection of conditions for that, or does not strive to prevent what is opposed to that, or does not bring about small pain and suffering as a way of preventing great pain and suffering, or does not abandon a small benefit in order to accomplish a greater benefit, if he neglects to do these things even for a moment, he undergoes a downfall.«

173 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Mark Siderits

ing out of practical necessities into a deep philosophical problem. There is no such problem, the Buddhist would claim, just understandable but remediable ignorance. When it comes to solving specific problems in medical ethics, it is equally unclear just how much Buddhist ethics might contribute. Take for instance the many cases where a demand for paternalistic intervention is pitted against respect for patient autonomy. I have represented Buddhist ethics as consequentialist in orientation, and one might naturally expect that to mean the Buddhist would come down on the side of paternalism in such cases. But when we bear in mind the distinction between direct and indirect forms of consequentialism, we see that there is room for an obligation to respect individual autonomy in a sophisticated Buddhist consequentialism. For it may well be that a policy of acknowledging the patient’s right to make informed decisions has better overall consequences than relying exclusively on the judgment of expert medical practitioners. There might, for instance, be better outcomes (both medically and in terms of progress toward the ideal form of life) when the patient takes »ownership« of decisions about their own future. But the calculations involved in determining whether this is true are hugely complicated. One finds claims in some Buddhist literature to the effect that a fully enlightened being can actually carry out such calculations in real time. So perhaps the solution is to appoint a fully enlightened being to the medical ethics board of every hospital. But fully enlightened beings are rare in this world; and then there is the problem of certification. So it is once again unclear how much a Buddhist ethics approach might contribute to solving such problems. What it can help us see is that these are in the end empirical matters. It may not be possible for less than fully enlightened beings to work out all the consequences of adopting some particular policy of medical decisionmaking. What the ideal of the fully enlightened being suggests is that this is not due to a clash between incommensurable ethical frameworks. It is just that it is hard to predict all the ramifications of our actions. And recognizing that can only encourage us to work harder at making better predictions.

174 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Non-Self and Benevolence

Literature Annas, Julia 1992. »Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality«, in: Philosophical Perspectives 6, pp. 119–36. Siderits, Mark 2007. »Buddhism As Philosophy«, Chapter 6, Hackett, Indianapolis. Goodman, Charles 2009. Consequences of Compassion, New York: Oxford University Press. Prebish, Charles S. 2009. »Mahayana Ethics and American Buddhism«, 2009, in: John Powers, Charles Prebish (eds.) Destroying Māra Forever, Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion, pp. 95–111. Rhys Davis, T. W. 1890. The Questions of King Milinda, Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

175 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

Buddhism & Bioethics A Theravāda Defence of Individual Autonomy

According to widely employed guidelines proposed by Beauchamp and Childress (Beauchamp and Childress 1994), bioethics is constituted by four ethical principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. Aksoy and Tenik (Askoy and Tenik 2002) assert that »these principles are universal and applicable in any culture and society; they have always existed in different moral traditions in different ways.« Others have argued, conversely, that, in emphasising the rights of the individual, they neglect community values, intersubjective relationships, and the structure and organisation of health care systems. Still others have suggested that cultural traditions vary in the emphasis placed on one or other of the four principles, greater weight given to patients’ decisional agency in Europe and the United States, more emphasis on the physician’s ability to judge what is in the best interests of the patient in Buddhist and Confucian societies. Worries about paternalism tend to favour autonomy, considerations about expertise favour beneficence. I am interested in a further possibility: that Buddhist discussion of the notions of self, person, and individual will lead to a reformulation of the defining principles of bioethics and a reworking of concomitant ideas about rights, respect, and justice. Fundamental to Buddhism is the thesis that there is no self. I want to investigate whether this denial of self is compatible with a respect for the individual, their importance as loci of autonomy, responsibility, and dignity; or whether it entails impersonalism, which I define as the doctrine that the concept of the individual lacks explanatory function or normative role. Related to this first question is a second: where is the progressiveness seemingly inherent in the Buddhist world-view to be located? Does it consist in the articulation of a conception of the individual which is free from the individualism and prudentialism of more European representations; or is its progressive radicalism rather in the envisioning of a wholly impersonal (and pre176 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Buddhism & Bioethics

sumably radically consequentialist) ethics? Let me therefore distinguish at the outset two interpretations of Buddhist »no self«: as impersonalist denial of the moral or explanatory relevance of individuals tout court, and as anti-individualistic denial only of the moral or explanatory relevance of individualism. While the idea of the individual is simply an idea of freedom from subjugation to community, caste, and social station, individualism represents an aspiration for personal fulfilment and self-development in the cultivation of one’s uniqueness and difference from others. Georg Simmel (Simmel 1901, 1904) famously distinguishes between »qualitative« and »quantitative« individualism; the first, which he associated with Kant and the eighteenth century Enlightenment in Europe, affirms the individual’s independence from artificial constraints »by stressing self-interests common to all human beings« (Izenberg 1992, p. 3), the second, associated with Goethe, Schleiermacher and Nietzsche, asserts a »unique core of feeling and intuition in each person that must be developed if individuality is to be realized« (ibid. 1992, p. 3; cf. Podoksik 2010, pp. 125–126). Simmel observed rightly that the romanticism of qualitative individualism pulls against the collective concern for liberty, for each individual affirms their uniqueness against every other. I will argue that the same objection can be made against impersonalism, which seems unable to secure that freedom from outside constraint that the idea of the individual is meant to introduce. I do not deny that impersonalism exists within sectors of Buddhist Mahāyāna, perhaps especially in Madhyamaka, but what I want to argue here is for an alternative, associated more prominently with non-Mahāyana traditions. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, »Buddhist values« per se are not antithetical to notions of liberty, human rights, dignity, autonomy, and responsibility. Rather, if my argument is correct, there is a distinctively Buddhist, and consequently radically anti-Cartesian, approach to these very concepts. I will also argue, however, that any interpretation of Buddhist »no self« more sympathetic to the idea of liberty must be distinguished sharply from the quantitative individualism of the Enlightenment. What is required for a progressive Buddhism is a conception of individuals that preserves liberty without grounding it in a domain of interiority, of private access, and of brute distinction between individual private wills. Buddhist »no self« is, if nothing else, a complete rejection of these residually Cartesian notions of interior private space, however individuated. For while it is 177 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

one’s status as an individual which is the basis of one’s claim to human rights, respect, and so on, the affirmation of those rights rests only on one’s common ground with all other individuals, and prescinds from anything that makes one unique among them. This superficially paradoxical feature of the idea of the individual is precisely what makes that idea available to an exponent of Buddhist »no self«.

Impersonalism: Dismantling the First Person Stance I propose, first of all, that we should understand the fundamental Buddhist claim as stating a policy not as describing a fact, a policy that goes back to the Buddha’s celebrated declaration, in the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta, that it is a mistake ever to identify oneself with any of the mental happenings in one’s mind: »Volitional formations (saṅkhāra) are nonself. For if, bhikkhus, volitional formations were self, they would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of volitional formations: ›Let my volitional formation be thus; let my volitional formations not be thus.‹ But because volitional formations are nonself, volitional formations lead to affliction, and it is not possible to have it of volitional formations: ›Let my volitional formations be thus; let my volitional formations not be thus‹.« (SN III, p. 67).

Impersonalists interpret the foundational claim of Buddhism as consisting in the recommendation that we aim to repudiate a first-personal stance on our own mental lives. The first person stance is the stance from which I am entitled to say that my desires and preferences »are me,« as opposed merely, as it were, to discovering them occurring within me; the stance from which they present as »mine«. The policy advice is that we should not adopt this stance, there is something erroneous about it, and that we do much better instead to adopt instead a spectatorial, third-personal view with regard to our mental lives. Vasubandhu, for example, executes the programme by analysing with exceptional insight precisely what the distinction between a first-person and a spectatorial position consists in, so as to locate exactly the nature of the error involved (AK, T, P). Qua philosopher, his role is to provide justification for the normative claim that assuming a spectator’s stance on our mental lives is better than adopting the first-person stance, the stance naturally expressed in the 178 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Buddhism & Bioethics

words »I am.« One way to pursue this is to argue that what is distinctive of a first-person stance is that thoughts are associated with a distinct phenomenology of ownership as agency. Ownership, Vasubandhu states explicitly, is a causal relation, a matter of how it is generated and not what its entitlements are (AK 1975, p. 1217). The ownership of a thought is explained by the idea that the owner is a mental agent, the active thinker of the thought. The reason the Buddha gives for his claim that one should not identify oneself with any of the mental happenings in one’s mind is exactly that they are not under one’s control: there is no self because there is no agent of thinking; to be the subject of an experience is to be its producer (cf. Adam 2010; Kuan 2009). These considerations lead to a first formulation of the impersonalist reading of the Buddhist »no-self« claim: No-Agency: The phenomenology of agency that accompanies thinking should be eradicated. If philosophy is to have any practical consequence, it must also demonstrate that there is indeed a way to alter the stance we adopt, that this stance is not necessitated by our very nature or by the very nature of experience. It would be naive to think that the matter is entirely voluntary; clearly, I cannot simply choose to look upon my thoughts as if they are all alien presences (not least because, I could not regard that choice itself in the same way). So the Buddhist proposal implies that philosophy must be supplemented by techniques which are not themselves philosophical, techniques that achieve the transformation of stance that philosophy only announces, techniques of contemplation and meditation under the direction of a spiritual teacher. The teacher trains the pupil using graded spiritual exercises to turn from being a participant to being a mere observer of their inner mental lives. This formulation understands »No Self« to consist in the advice to turn to forms of mental training whose outcome is that the trainee’s thoughts no longer carry with them any sense that they have been generated by – authored by – the subject. That does not have to imply that they are felt as being someone else’s thoughts, but rather that they are occurrences from the phenomenology of which any sense of agency – and so ownership – has been removed. It is important that the phenomenology is one of thoughts not felt as generated, rather than as one of thoughts felt as generated by someone else; for a sense that the thoughts to which one has first person access are generated by someone else soon leads to mental disintegration, via the pathology frequently called »thought insertion«, and 179 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

that is not at all the aim of Buddhist therapy. We are in the grip of a false phenomenology whenever we have a sense that we ourselves have agency with respect to our thoughts. We need training to break that phenomenology, and if the training works, it will not be as if all our thoughts are insertions, but rather that they are as if arising unbidden, spontaneously. So when a Buddhist describes himself as denying that there is a self, we are given to understand this as denying the existence of an agent of thinking, someone actively doing the thinking. Specifying mental action as the core ingredient in a first person stance is a plausible move, because it means that assuming such a stance is something we do, and so something we can, in principle, stop doing. One way to unpick this account of what is distinctive about the first-person stance is to notice that the sense of agency is related to the idea that one makes up one’s own mind. In the case of someone who is uncertain about what they will do, it is not that they are simply unaware what their intention is but rather that they have not yet formed any appropriate intention. We should therefore distinguish between what Richard Moran calls »theoretical questions« and »deliberative questions«, the point being »to mark the difference between that inquiry which terminates in a true description of my state, and one which terminates in the formation of an attitude« (Moran 2001, p. 63). The difference is reflected in the often-noted fact that, if one is asked whether one believes something, for example that it will rain, one attends to the same facts as one would if one had been asked simply if it will rain. The question is not to be addressed by inspecting the inner contents of one’s mind. Buddhists do distinguish between these two dimensions of self-awareness: Vasubandhu speaks of mano-vijñāna, which is knowledge of the states of one’s mind; and manas, which is an additional sense of being-mine (T v. 5). The addition of manas marks the distinction between a merely spectatorial view of one’s inner life, and a participant’s view. Vasubandhu does not take the first-person stance to consist in the operation of anything like an inner sense, firmly rejecting anything like a Cartesian or perceptual model of self-knowledge. The refusal to identify oneself with any of one’s thoughts (including especially willings to do and intentions to act (cetanā)) is the denial of self as the owner of those thoughts qua their producer or agent. The weight of the impersonalist interpretation of the Buddhist »no-self« proposal rests on the idea that if we want to lead our lives 180 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Buddhism & Bioethics

well we should repudiate a first-person stance, and instead cultivate a detached third-personal stance. We should do this because only by so doing can we immunize ourselves against the temptations of egotism and self-pride, and thereby cultivate compassion. Again, Vasubandhu is explicit that manas, the distinguishing feature of a deliberative stance, is also kliṣṭa, »afflicted«, the source of all the vices associated with self-centredness (T v. 6). So a second formulation of the impersonalist reading of the Buddhist »no-self« policy is this: No-Deliberation: The deliberative stance towards one’s thinking should be suspended. An impersonalist reading of Buddhist »no self« says that we should give up a first-person stance and cultivate an entirely thirdpersonal, empirical stance towards our mental lives. We should view our emotions, interests, and wishes as if from nowhere, with indifference and without involvement. There are no relevant asymmetries between the states of one individual and those of another, and the very idea of the individual ceases to do any explanatory work or to carry any normative significance. An altruistic principle about equality, that there is no good reason for someone to attach greater weight to the alleviation of their own pain than to that of someone else (the principle of samatthā), is explained as being true because the very distinction a pain’s being one’s own and being that of another is dispensed with. If there is no real distinction between self and other, then the claim that this distinction is of ethical significance is necessarily false. In the context of bioethics, such a view is encouraging to the World Health Organisation but not to the local doctor, encouraging to central planning about population growth or food distribution, to forms of intervention and research that maximize well-being in the population.

Three Arguments against Impersonalism I will present three arguments against impersonalism: an argument from autonomy, an argument from alienation, and an argument from sovereignty. Autonomy. Autonomy rests on a preservation of the idea of ownership:

181 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

»The respect that individuals claim for their preferences, commitments, goals, projects, desires, aspirations, and so on is ultimately to be grounded in their being the person’s own. It is because those preferences, commitments, and so on are a person’s own that disregarding them amounts to disregarding him or her qua that distinctive individual. By contrast, disregarding preferences, commitments, and so on that are the product of coercion or deception does not seem to involve a violation in the same sense, raising the vexing issue of what makes some preferences, commitments, and so on ›one’s own,‹ and others not« (Christman 2005, p. 9).

The claim is that the only remedy for self-pride and other first-person involving vices is to refuse the first-person stance altogether. The cost of depriving the individual of discretion and judgement in the matter of moral psychology, however, is that one also deprives them of autonomy. So, for example, in order to resist the impositions of a tyrant, one needs a conception of moral boundaries that can sustain demands for one’s autonomy and individual rights to be respected. Notice that the contrast between states that are coerced and states that are »one’s own« introduces exactly the conception of ownership as agency I discussed above: for a state to be one’s own is for one to have authored it oneself. Considerations of autonomy have a large part to play in bio-ethical discussions of rights to health and patient participation in care provision. A different, more moderate claim, is that with discretion and judgement one can separate out, among the various first-personal threads in one’s moral psychology, those which harm and those which benefit. Among the beneficial virtues is authenticity, the state of being motivated by beliefs, values, desires and attitudes which can withstand self-scrutiny. The argument from autonomy is thus that if Buddhist »No Self« is interpreted in such a way that it implies the non-existence of the individual, then it situates Buddhism entirely outside any engagement with liberal political theory, human rights discourses, and contemporary conversations in bio-ethics. Instead of offering a radical and progressive alternative, impersonalism locates Buddhism as having its roots in fundamentally pre-modern attitudes towards the person. Alienation. Someone who assumes an entirely empirical stance with regard to their mental life, who sees it only in its facticity and without endorsement or avowal, is in a state of alienation from themselves. Their resolutions do not bind them, their desires or fears do not motivate them; they are mere spectators and not involved participants. They have purged their moral psychology of affliction, but 182 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Buddhism & Bioethics

only at the very high cost of purging themselves of a moral psychology, indeed, some would say, of their humanity. Moran argues that the attempt wholly to disown one’s thoughts is globally self-defeating.: »The problem with the idea of generalizing the theoretical stance toward mental phenomena is that a person cannot treat his mental goings-on as just so much data or evidence about his state of mind all the way down, and still be credited with a mental life to treat as data in the first place. For any given mental presentation of mine, just as for any utterance, it may be true that I can treat it as data, something which gives me a more or less good indication of my genuine belief. But for there to be judgments or deliberation in the first place, I cannot adopt this point of view on my mental life quite generally. At some point I must cease attempting to infer from some occurrence to my belief; and instead stake myself, and relate to my mental life not as something of symptomatic value, but as my current commitment to how things are out there. And so, for this reason the abrogation of firstperson authority is not made up for by improving theoretical access to myself« (Moran 2001, p. 150).

The idea that there can be a stance from which one views one’s entire mental life purely theoretically leads to an infinite regress, and the way to escape from this regress is not to make all thought reflexive (a move contemplated by post-Vasubandhu Buddhist philosophers beginning with Dignāga), but to notice the mistake that gives rise to it in the first place. The argument from alienation is that abandoning a view of human beings as engaged participants in a life but as mere witnesses leads to a conception of individuals as detached from the possibility of discussion of topics such as consent or advance directives; indeed the very possibility of forming a resolution to seek the improvement of their situation or enter into a binding commitment about their future has been denied them. To be alienated from one’s wishes or desires is to fail to identify them as one’s own. Sovereignty. I have said that philosophy is not a way of life for a Buddhist practitioner, not the practice through which one leads one’s life in order to achieve one’s larger aims, according to the impersonalist view. The goal is a radical altering in the practitioner’s inner phenomenology, and the techniques which are needed to achieve that involve meditation and other forms of mind-training. The description of these practices as »contemplative« tends to obscure the point: they do not involve contemplation in the philosophical sense of »reflecting upon«, but only in the religious sense of »attending to«. Many reli183 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

gions, perhaps all, aim at a form of self-negation, at the destruction of the individual ego, and do so through techniques demanding the surrender of sovereignty in reason-giving and decision-making. The defining feature of philosophy is the thought that an individual’s use of discriminative reason, rather than their guided use of spiritual techniques, is the path to be followed in the cultivation of mind. That is what distinguishes the appeal to anvīkṣikī in the Nyāya philosopher Vātsyāyana from the appeal to dharma in the Buddhism of Vasubandhu. There is a discriminating rational endorsement of mental contents as one’s own or not, rather than an indiscriminate refusal of the first-person phenomenology of ownership. The argument from sovereignty is that this turns selves into passive subjects, unable to participate in decisions that concern them or the formation of policies that affect them. The impersonalist interpretation of the Buddhist »no self« view started off sounding laudably egalitarian and altruistic but has turned out to be starkly disenfranchising. How can the proposal be seen as progressive, as providing a conception of subjects whose very humanity has not been negated? As applied to bioethics, does it not return us to a conservative view of patients as passive recipients of medical care, incapable of actively participating in their own care planning and provision? It will not help to fall back on a deflationary interpretation of Buddhist »no self« as involving merely a metaphysical denial of substantial or enduring egos; for the deflationary reading likewise deprives Buddhism of a progressive potential: it renders it banal. I do think that there is a way both to preserve the insight that »no self« is view not a theory – that it is a pragmatic and not a metaphysical recommendation – and also to save the theory from the allegation that it re-subjugates the subject by surrendering the individual. In the next section of this paper, I will begin to suggest where this alternative might lie.

Inward Empathy: No-Self as a Second-Personal Stance Empathy relates to a person’s ability at some fundamental level to comprehend the emotions and other states of mind of another, to assume what can be called a »second-personal« view, in which others appear not merely as bodies but as embodied »you«s. Such an ability has standardly been interpreted as consisting either in the individual’s 184 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Buddhism & Bioethics

possession of a theory of mind that enables them to attribute states of mind in virtue of the other’s behaviour (so-called »theory-theory«), or else as involving a simulation of the other’s states of mind by their own. Much of the contemporary discussion in social cognition concerns the respective merits of theory-theory and simulation. Recently, an interesting alternative proposal has been put forward, that empathy has to do rather with the direct experiencing of another’s attitudes in and through their bodily expression (Gallagher 2005; Zahavi 2007, 2008). Zahavi finds the view anticipated in Max Scheler’s remark that »we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person’s joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands […]« (Zahavi 2010, p. 292). According to this analysis, empathy is not a theory about others but a type of view on others’ mental lives. An idea at the heart of all of Buddhist ethics is the idea that moral value is constrained by the »intention« (cetanā) with which an action is performed. From this it follows that it is possible to apprehend the intentions of others, for otherwise there could be no practice of moral appraisal. Some account of one’s ability to know the mental states of others is presupposed by the very architecture of Buddhist ethics. If intentions were thought of on the model of private inner occurrences, however, it would hardly be possible reliably to know the intentions of another, and the practices of praise or blame would be without foundation. Empathy is the name given to this ability to discern the intention behind the act: we do not get angry with someone who pushes us if we see that it is done in error – unintentionally – or to move us out of danger – with good intentions. The same is true of our knowledge of our own intentions. There could be no moral motivation, no revision of our action plans, unless we have some way to know what our intentions in acting are. The tradition of Early Modern European thinkers has been to postulate a faculty of immediate introspection or apperception, a faculty in virtue of which we know what thoughts we are the producers of and what our will inclines us to do. That postulate has begun to seem increasingly ad hoc, and an alternative account of self-knowledge is very much required. Indeed, as soon as we give up the idea of the individual self as hidden private space, there is no need to invent special faculties to access it. This, I think, is fundamentally what motivates Buddhist »No Self«. 185 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

Are we then able to assume an empathetic relation to our own mental lives, as well as to those of others? Can we direct empathy inwards? My proposal is that if we can make sense of the idea of empathy as able to be involved in self-self attitudes as well as selfother attitudes, then a new understanding of the »no-self« stance can come to the fore: no-self is the advice to cultivate a second-personal attitude towards one’s own mental states, in the process factoring out the first-personal. No-Interiority: A second-personal stance should be adopted with respect to one’s mental life. The idea is that just as one can distinguish between empathy as abductive inference from perceived bodily movement and empathy as experience facilitated by bodily movement, so one can distinguish between Rylean behaviourism about self-knowledge (that one makes inferences from perceiving one’s own bodily behaviour) and an empathy account (that one’s own body is the vehicle through which selfexperience takes place). It seems to me that neither the theory-theory nor the simulation account can permit empathy directed towards one’s own mental states, the former collapsing into a specatorial stance and the second into a form of cognitive dystopia. It is the third approach which offers a Buddhist analysis the greatest scope. What I am suggesting is that what the Buddhist stance advises is that one seeks to dissociate an element of subjectivity and first-personality normally associated with one’s awareness of one’s emotional and cognitive inner life; if this is indeed a live possibility, then what remains is still a direct relationship with one’s inner life, but now having a phenomenological character analogous to that which the experiential model of empathy ascribes to one’s comprehension of others. The bracketing of the subjectivity seemingly inherent in normal experience is a form of dissolution of the self-other distinction, and makes sense of »no self« not as a metaphysical denial of selfhood but as a progressive practical recommendation. It is the abandonment of a false but seductive belief in first-person authority: there is no privileged access grounded in a purely interior awareness of one’s mental states. A demonstration that a bracketing of putative interiority is indeed a genuine possibility is the work of a substantive theory of subjectivity, and I suggest that Buddhist analyses of mind, whether from Abhidharma, Yogācāra, or Madhyamaka authors, have precisely such a substantive theory as their principal end, and that for the reason just 186 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Buddhism & Bioethics

mentioned. Vasubandhu’s analysis of ownership in terms of mental action is itself precisely such an account: manas is what explains the appearance to thought of a sense of mineness, grounded in the repository-consciousness or ālaya-vijñāna, and in principle separable from the flow of skandhas including mano-vijñāna (T v. 5) (Ganeri 2012, pp. 146–165). It is therefore a mistake to read such theories as involving or committed to a metaphysical interpretation of no-self. What they do is to debunk the false promise of interior access and the concomitant idea of an epistemologically prior internal subject. There is no ghost in the machine. An empathy account of self-knowledge leaves the inner subject of Descartes or Kant as at best an epiphenomenon and certainly not at the centre of one’s involvement. None of this is to deny that there can exist asymmetries between self-knowledge and knowing the minds of others. What it does is to reject one particular and corrosive understanding of that asymmetry, replacing the old dichotomy between one’s own mind pictured as something immediately accessible and other minds pictured as obscure and hidden with an asymmetry, still real but no longer wretched, between the way one can get the feel of one’s own states of mind and the way one feels for those of others. Empathetic beings are capable of recognizing the distinction between their own embodied mental states and the embodied mental states of others. My hypothesis is that it is empathy rather than interior agents which sustains a notion of the individual and so underpins the commitment to rights in Buddhism. One’s demand for access to palliative medication for example, will be understood as derived not from the self-interested claim that the pain is mine, but from the empathetic acknowledgement of its existence within oneself. Insofar as one is entitled to be partial about one’s own pain, to be differentially proactive in its alleviation, it is because one’s understanding of it is unmediated by one’s perception of others’ bodily acts, and to that extent more sure and more insightful. One happens to be more effective in managing this pain rather than another, not least because one has control of the body that embodies it, but there is no claim that the treatment of this pain is privileged merely because it is my own. One can be justified in taking a special interest in one’s health without it following that one regards one’s own health as more important than than of any other. On the account presented here, there is no type difference between the way I relate to my own states and the way I relate to yours: the relationship in both cases is one of experiential empathy. That is 187 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

enough to encourage altruism and even-handedness, since my states do not present themselves to me as mine, mine, mine. Insofar as there is a difference, it is that there are two modes of experiential empathy in play, and that asymmetry is sufficient to discriminate individuals. A detached impersonalist can raise no objection if their blood is drained to save the lives of five others, even without their consent (whether or not there is consent, it is not theirs). Now, however, individuals are defined by relations of inward empathy, and inward empathy is experiencing one’s mental states by way of one’s body, so the necessity of consent and the rights one has over one’s own body both follow from what can be identified as the fundamental moral law in this view, that inward empathy takes has precedence over outward. This law can, however, be restated as the right not to be harmed, which is to say that others must not do one harm any more than one should harm others (ahiṃsā), which is to say that one’s own states take precedence over theirs. One has the right not to be harmed even if by being harmed many others will be healed. There are reasons to be partial which are not reasons to be proud. The hypothesis that it is empathy not agency which defines an individual can serve as the target for empirical investigation within contemporary Buddhist communities, monastic and lay, in for example an examination of the kinds of reasons Buddhists are prone to give in circumstances where they defend a right to health or a right to participate in care-provision decisions, in attitudes towards advance directives and assisted suicide, and in resource allocation decisions. My conjecture is that what will be discovered is that the notion of Buddhist individuals as inward empathizers is operationally available while that of the Kantian inner self as an interior »I think:« accompanying thought is not. It will require a combination of textual research and empirical work to establish which of the three accounts of empathy is actually in play in Buddhist evaluative practices.

Conclusion If a self is the producer of the thoughts it owns, then autonomy consists in the freedom to produce desires and intentions without coercion. One is alienated from those desires which one does not choose to have; one does not identify with them; they are not oneself. I have distinguished two interpretations of »no self«, and the difference be188 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Buddhism & Bioethics

tween has to do with which step the above description is rejected. If one retains the identity between ownership and agency, then one is led to a no-ownership account of the mental, radical consequentialism, and a denial of free will; that is, to impersonalism, which I have claimed cannot provide even surrogates for the ideas of autonomy and rights, dignity and respect. What I am recommending instead is that the element in the description which should be rejected is the identity between ownership and agency. The denial of selves, qua producers of their own willings and intentions, is not the denial of individuals, the owners of thoughts. I have presented an alternative theory, in which ownership relations are defined in terms of empathy rather than agency. If nothing else, the existence of this alternative loosens the grip of the still-powerful agency account. One possibility is that inward empathy will be regarded as a cultivated skill. Ordinary human beings live in a state of radical alienation from their desires and preferences, falsely imagining that an agency model of ownership is correct, and lacking in any other means for identifying with their experience. The gradual cultivation of empathetic cognitive skills is a move from alienation to involvement, grounded in a non-agentive model of ownership. Eliminating the phenomenology of agency from one’s psychology is a ›preparatory condition‹ (Ganeri 2007, p. 19) for the cultivation of involvement and participation grounded in empathy. A hierarchical model might indeed permit a rapprochement between the two interpretations of »no self«: we might imagine the ordinary human being (puthujjana) to be entirely in the grip of the false phenomenology of agency, in a condition of alienation and vulnerability to coercion, the trainee (sekha) to be in a process of weakening this phenomenology and developing the skills of empathy, inwardly as well as externally, and the arahat to have completed the process and to occupy a fully engaged empathetic stance (Adam 2008; 2010, pp. 261–264). This picture would place policies for the cultivation of empathy at the centre of programmes for human development. Again, it seems to me an empirical question as to where actual human populations fall within this notional hierarchy. Rather than reading Buddhist »no self« as a medieval or postmodern alternative to the concept of the individual as the focal point of respect, autonomy, and human rights, my recommendation has been that we interpret it as providing the resources to identify a distinct notion of the individual. One can consistently reject individual189 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

ism as a thesis about the normative priority of subjective uniqueness and still retain a role for self/other contrasts. Mahāyāna impersonalism thus does not usurp Theravāda commitment to the significance of the individual (and it is precisely because nirvāṇa is not the survival of an individual but the eradication of an illness that this commitment does not imply a form of individualism). Indeed I have argued that Theravāda individuals sustain a form of discourse in terms of which Buddhist bio-ethical discussion into patient rights and responsibilities, future directives, resource allocation, and much else can take place, a discourse in which it is empathy not agency which defines us as human beings. Elsewhere I have claimed that the idea of a wellordered science, roughly the idea that scientific research programmes should be selected according to what would be endorsed in an ideal conversation by all human beings, is one which Indian and Buddhist theory about reasonable inquiry endorses (Ganeri 2013). The selection of research agendas is, in that sense, rightly value-driven. Buddhists can contribute to discussion about the appropriateness of research programmes in the biological sciences, not by asserting »Buddhist values« and drawing out their implications for given research agendas, but by bringing to the table new ideas about the very nature of human individuals, ideas which they will have to argue for and defend in an ideal conversation involving many other different points of view. If the Buddhist theory is understood as entailing the nonexistence of persons or individuals, then Askoy and Tenik would be wrong about the global reach of autonomy as a constitutive ingredient in the definition of bioethics, and the claim that Buddhist societies discount autonomy in favour of beneficence will be vindicated. There is, for example, a well-known story in the Lotus Sūtra of a father who deceives his children into coming out of a house that is on fire with the false promise of goodies, when they are contentedly playing inside. The story is allegorical: we are the children, and our ordinary lives are the burning house. In this story, beneficence trumps autonomy, but the point of the allegory is not that the beneficence of the physician is incompatible with the autonomy of the patient, but that just insofar as we are alienated from our desires, beneficence is called for. My argument is that the entailment does not hold, that notions of the person and the individual are available in Buddhism, compatible with the denial of selves. The error is natural, given that autono190 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Buddhism & Bioethics

my in this tradition consists not the agent causalism of an inner thinker. I defend a revision of the four constitutive principles, replacing the first two, autonomy and beneficence, with a single one: that of respect for the individual who is acting with motivations that are wholesome and beneficence towards the individual whose motivations are alienated. For it seems reasonable to say that beneficence, although paternalistic, is justifiable when the patient is acting on motivations which they do not endorse, and not justifiable when the patient is acting on motivations they identify with. The physician can intervene to prevent the drug-user from acting on his groundlevel desire, without violating his autonomy, because with respect to that desire the drug-user is not free. This is better than having to talk in terms of weighting and trumping, and it is a principle that might indeed be universal. So I have ended up agreeing with Askoy and Tenik that the principles of bioethics are universal, and in particular that it is wrong to think there is disregard for autonomy in at least the Theravāda Buddhist tradition. These are significant Buddhist contributions to bioethics.

Literature AK

P

SN

T

= Vasubandhu 1988–90, Abhidharmakośa with Abhidharma-kośabhāṣya. (1) Prahlad Pradhan (ed.): K. P. Jawaswal Research Institute, Patna 1975. 2nd Revised Edition with Introduction and Indices by Aruna Haldar. (2) Louis de la Vallée Poussin (transl.). English translation by Leo M. Pruden, 4 vols, Asian Humanities Press, California. = Vasubandhu 1984, Pañca-skandhaka. (1) Xuezhu Li and Ernst Steinkellner (eds.). Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, Vienna 2008. (2) Stefan Anacker (transl.): Seven Works of Vasubandhu, the Buddhist Psychological Doctor. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. = Saṃyutta-Nikāya. (1) L. Freer (ed). 5 vols. Pali Text Society, London 1884–1898. (2) Bikkhu Bodhi (transl.): The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. 2 vols. Wisdom Publications, Boston. = Vasubandhu 1992, Triṃśikā-vijñāpti-kārikā. Swati Ganguly (ed.): Treatise in Thirty Verses. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.

Adam, Martin 2008, ›Classes of Agent and the Moral Logic of the Pali Canon‹ Argumentation 22, pp. 115–124. Adam, Martin 2008, ›No self, no free will, no problem‹, in. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33.1–2, pp. 239–265. Askoy, Sahin and Tenik, Ali 2002, ›The Four Principles of Bioethics as Found in 13th Century Muslim Mawlana’s Teachings‹, BMC Medical Ethics 3, p. 4

191 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri Beauchamps, T. L. and Childress J. F. 2004, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th edt. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Christman, John and Anderson, Joel 2005, ›Introduction‹ to Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, John Christman and Joel Anderson eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1–23. Gallagher, Shaun 2005, How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Ganeri, Jonardon 2007, The Concealed Art of the Soul: Theories of Self and Practices of Truth in Indian Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Ganeri, Jonardon 2012, The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance.Oxford University Press, Oxford. Ganeri, Jonardon 2013, »Well-ordered Science and Indian Epistemic Cultures: Toward a Polycentric History of Science«, in: Isis 104.2, pp. 348–359. Izenberg, Gerald 1992, Impossible Individuality: Romanticism, Revolution, and the Origins of Modern Selfhood. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. Kuan, Tse-fu. 2009, ›Rethinking Non-Self: A New Perspective from the Ekottarika-āgama‹, Buddhist Studies Review 26.2, pp. 155–175. Moran, Richard 2001, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. Podoksik, Effraim 2010,[tab]›Georg Simmel: Three Forms of Individualism and Historical Understanding‹, New German Critique 109 37.1, pp. 119–145. Simmel, Georg 1889, ›Die beiden Formen des Individualismus‹ in. Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, Bd. 7, pp. 49–56. Simmel, Georg 1889, ›Sixteenth Lecture on Kant‹, in. Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, Bd. 9, pp. 215–226. Zahavi, Dan 2007, ›Expression and Empathy‹, in D. D. Hutto & M. Ratcliffe (edt)., Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Dordrecht: Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 25– 40. Zahavi, Dan 2008, ›Simulation, Projection and Empathy‹, in. Consciousness and Cognition 17, pp. 514–522. Zahavi, Dan 2010, ›Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz‹ Inquiry 53.3, pp. 285–306.

192 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«: Comparative Remarks on Recent Buddhist and Western Bioethical Approaches The following contribution 1 tries to evaluate the Bioethical significance of the prominent Buddhist conception of »selflessness«, or, more precisely, »no-self«, in classical sources and recent discourse. I will try to explore how this thought and theory is hold to be relevant (and significant) for bioethical questions or moral action-guides in the respective contexts. Surveying the global framework of biomedicine and bioethics, I will, furthermore, try to show that the globalization of Western biomedicine, the global human rights- and bioethics-discourse (and the global communication networks of Buddhist groups and scholars) are the predominant factors for the recent establishment of »Buddhist bioethics«. Regarding the emergence of »Buddhist bioethics«, a second section will make use of the observations in the first section and will aim to show that Western human rights discourse consists predominantly of a »victim-centered« perspective of »claim rights« and »negative rights« of »third persons« (a person shall not be harmed, hindered etc.). The »victim-centered« perspective itself relies on the idea of Human dignity. In contrast, the basis of traditional Buddhist Ethics is an »offender«- or »perpetrator-centered«, »first person« perspective. Therefore, the formation of modern »Buddhist bioethics« shows in some respect a shift from »victim-centered« to »perpetrator-centered« ethics. This shift could, finally, be described in terms of a general transformation of Buddhist ethics – from »salvation-centered« to »socially engaged« Buddhism. In regard to early sources of Theravāda Buddhism, it seems that »non-selfhood« is predominantly a »salvation-centered« doctrine and offers, accordingly, a »perpetraI would like to thank Stephan Grätzel (Mainz), Eberhard Guhe (Shanghai) and the other participants of the workshop for helpful discussions, and the DFG, respectively, for financial support.

1

193 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

tor-centered« perspective (and not an ontological doctrine of »persons«). The »dignity of persons«, however, is difficult to implement in Buddhist ethics due to the latter’s general non-anthropocentric – or »non-speciecist« (Peter Singer) – focus on »sentient beings« (skt. sattva). I will conclude with the assumption that »non-selfhood« is, nevertheless, of importance for the first-person perspective on bioethical decision-making (reduction of clinging to the body, mental attitudes, etc.).

1.

Bioethics and Globalization

Since I argue that »globalization« is the major force of the formation of a global bioethical discourse it should be useful to define »globalization« first. I will define »globalization« with the sociologist Manuel Castells as global spread of transnational networks and communication systems (cf. Castells 1997, pp. 1–28) – mostly of non-state actors (of which biomedical institutions or religious organizations are a good example). This definition can be combined with criteria given by Jan Aart Scholte (2000, pp. 15–17), who identified five major definitions of »globalization«: 1) globalization as internationalization (the growth of international exchange relations and interdependence); 2) Globalization as liberalization (›a process of removing government-imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an ›open‹, ›borderless‹ world economy‹ ; see Scholte 2000, p. 16); 3) globalization as universalization (examples of this process would be the homogenization of information through new media technology etc.); 4) globalization as westernization (variously understood as a spread of rationalism, individualism, industrialism, bureaucratism, capitalism etc.), inducing radical social change in pre-existent regional cultures up to the loss of local self-determination; and finally 5) globalization as deterritorialization (connected with the »spacetime compression« etc.). Scholte himself prefers the last definition because it gives a precise account of the most specific features of recent global development. I would like to argue that for our purpose all definitions may contribute some important aspects. Most fundamentally, »globalization« as deterritorialization has a tremendous effect on religious traditions. As the bonds of many religious traditions to regional cultures lose their importance, the outcome can be described with Olivier Roy 194 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

as »deculturalization« (cf. Roy 2004). Transnational networks of organized global religions cannot »globalize« the whole cultural background of their former »home« regions. Accordingly, they focus instead on ethical messages. »Ethics« thus becomes a central issue of religion in late modernity. This process has been addressed as »ethisation« of globalized religions. The formation of »Buddhist bioethics« may serve as a good example of such a process of »ethisation«. »Biomedicine«, on the other hand, can be defined as the systematic application of the principles of the natural sciences to clinical medicine. It is important to note that biomedicine not just offers certain technologies of diagnosis or treatment. Due to its close dependence on theories of genetics, molecular biology, biochemistry, statistics, etc., it is not only a set of certain healing practices. It is a perspective of looking at life, health, the body, and illness – a perspective that people adapt and employ willingly (even though it may happen unconsciously) to themselves and others. Biomedicine is granted the power to define the origin of diseases, the definition of life and death, sanity and insanity, etc. 2 The global spread of »biomedicine« seems to show all facets of globalization indicated above. Obviously, it consists of transnational medical networks and communication systems of non-state actors (hospitals, physicians, research institutions etc.), and it can, in several respects, be described as a »Westernization«. For our purpose, »bioethics« may be defined as follows. It may designate any philosophical inquiry into ethical dilemmas brought about by advances in biomedicine and biotechnology (ethical questions focusing on bios, »life«, i. e. especially issues of end-of-life and life’s beginnings). As a systematic reflection of ethical problems posed by modern biomedicine (cf. Jonsen 1998, vii), 3 e. g. pre-implantation The institutional practice of modern biomedicine – in private practice, clinics, research or health care – calls for medical specialists trained to handle its complex procedures. In comparison to other science and technologies compounds, e. g. nuclear science, modern biomedicine is highly mobile: even in low-industrialized countries research institutions can be set up relatively easy (cf. Roetz 2004, p. 213 f.). On the other hand, biomedical research and treatment promise significant financial profits. Therefore, in many parts of the world biomedical research is promoted through major investment programs – and often, as Heiner Roetz observes, by transferring funds from the public health care sector to research institutions (cf. Roetz 2004, p. 214). 3 Even though »bioethics« came up as a designation in the context of American protestant theology reflecting on new dilemmas of medical ethics (cf. Jonsen 1998), it is closely tied to the unethical use of human individuals for medical research in several 2

195 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

diagnostics, selective abortion, embryo research, brain death and organ transplantation, physician assisted suicide, or »informed consent« and the like, »Bioethics« can, moreover, from a sociologically informed point of view be described with Silke Schicktanz as depicting three different areas: 1) the academic discipline which searches for ethical action-guides and their justification, 2) the entire process of controlling biotechnologies, which includes the respective political and legal norms in individual countries; 3) the public discourse – by patients, doctors, scientists, the media etc. (cf. Schicktanz 2004, p. 264 f.). The emergence of a »Buddhist bioethics« in South-east and East Asian countries, but also in the West – in the rather narrow sense of an »academic discipline« (1) – has predominantly been shaped, I argue, by the global spread of biomedicine and the global growth of Human rights discourse and the bioethics movement.

2.

The Emergence of »Buddhist Bioethics«

In the following, I will not be able to discuss all approaches of »Buddhist bioethics« in detail here but will confine myself for pointing at some observations in respect to the general ethical foundations of these, especially in regard to the chosen focus on »selflessness« and »human dignity«. Remarkably, only a limited number of publications published so far were devoted to explicate »Buddhist bioethics« in a systematic manner. Important contributions have been published by Pinit Ratankul, Damien Keown, and Karma Lekshe Tsomo. A pioneering work has been done by Shōyō Taniguchi. Living in the U.S.A., and affiliated to Japanese Mahāyāna, the »Pure Land School« (Jōdo-shin-shū), Taniguchi has been the first to formulate a reconstruction of biomedical principles drawn from Pāli Buddhist sources. Despite the claim that »Buddhism« is »fully capable of presenting a solid and universal apcountries in the first half the 20th century, the emergence of »dark medicine« (cf. LaFleur, Böhme, Shimazono 2008), which led to the formulation of the Helsinki Declaration (1962) and other codes of medical ethics (cf. Jonsen 1998, pp. 133–143; Plomer 2005, pp. 2–10). Following this agenda, international organization such as the UNESCO, promoted bioethics hand in hand with human rights issues.

196 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

proach to contemporary biomedical ethics«, her reconstruction focuses on a rather general account of Buddhist doctrines (skillful/ unskillful deeds, kamma, compassion), which are then applied to bioethical problems such as contraception, abortion, IVF/ART, or suicide, respectively. A systematization of ethical principles of Buddhism, however, is only implicitly given. Buddhists looking for ethical advice in concrete bioethical fields (most of them not touched upon in the Theravāda Buddhist sources) are left to distill by themselves the ethical action-guides from the examples treated in the sources. In her later work, Taniguchi shifted from bioethical questions to more general observations on Buddhist ethics, such as the ethical significance of »dependent arising« (cf. Taniguchi 1996). Indeed, as Keown has observed, »Buddhist thinkers of the past have consistently failed to probe the moral foundations of their teachings or to establish a theoretical foundation in terms of which moral dilemmas can be analyzed« (Keown 2008, p. 157). Interestingly, almost all systematic, book-length attempts on »Buddhist Bioethics« written in Western languages have so far been published by scholars trained in Western bioethics – most of them Westerners. These scholars, however, do not discuss – or even mention – works on »Buddhist bioethics« written in non-Western languages (e. g., Thai, Chinese, or Japanese). We can safely conclude that Buddhist bioethical approaches in emic languages did not enter the international stage. On the other hand, »Buddhist bioethics« in Western languages are, it seems, part of a global communication network on the transcultural application of bioethics, and, quite often, more devoted to address an international Buddhist and non-Buddhist audience interested in Buddhist ethical action guides. A major approach to »Buddhist bioethics« has been developed by Pinit Ratanakul (Religious Studies, Mahidol University, Thailand). Significantly, Ratanakul attempts to incorporate not only Buddhist reasoning, but also to foster awareness for bioethics in developing countries. His position as specialist, mediator and »ambassador« of Buddhist bioethics becomes clear by surveying his numerous activities in Thai bioethics committees, his range of publications, and, finally, his contributions to the international debate, e. g. his participation as delegate of »Buddhism« in the hearing of the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of the UNESCO (Paris, 2004). Not surprisingly, his turn to bioethics has been promoted by a Western bioethicist, the American philosopher Violette Lindbeck. Ratanakul’s works include BioEthics. An Introduc197 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

tion to the Ethics of Medicine and Life Sciences (1986; modified reprint under the title Bioethics and Buddhism in 2004), pursuing as main objective »to introduce the discipline of Bioethics into the medical education in Thailand and other Asian countries; to present some of the important Western ethical theories applied to biomedical issues; and to propose general moral principles and precepts which have some common basis in the traditional morality of Thai and Western cultures as action-guides to solve these contemporary ethical issues« (Ratanakul 1986: vi). Reviewing Ratanakul’s contributions from the 1980s till today, one may observe that the Buddhist foundations did grow in regard to their importance. In his monograph of 1986, Buddhist perspectives are indeed present – yet, only an appendix shed further light on »Buddhist bioethics« in particular. Ratankul’s Buddhist motivation becomes obvious in his question how suffering is generated, and his answer being: by self-centeredness, egoistic craving, greed, lust, hatred, lies, fraud, and crime (cf. Ratanakul 1986, p. 310). The most prominent example how Western bioethics were incorporated in Ratanakul’s outline of Buddhist bioethics seems to be his adoption of the »Principalism«-approach of Tom L. Beauchamps and James F. Childress (1st ed. 1977). Beauchamps and Childress offered an applicable system of four principles, which influenced medical ethics on an international scale. Their famous »four principles of biomedical ethics« (Beauchamps, Childress 2001, pp. 12–13; cf. Ganeri [in this volume]), namely 1. autonomy (the right to self-determination), 2. non-maleficience (on should not harm or exploit patients), 3. justice (fairness, but also equality), and, finally, 4. beneficence (one should act in accordance of the benefit of patients), were initially accepted by Ratanakul (1986, p. 86) but later partly revised. Then, he declared as the four »duties« of »Buddhist Bioethics«: 1. veracity [truthfulness] 2. noninjury to life (ahiṃsā) 3. justice, and finally, 4. compassion (karuṇā) (Ratanakul 1988, p. 301 ff.). The concept of »veracity« has been introduced by Ratanakul as a principle in accordance with the early Buddhist ethics of »right speech« – one of the five training rules for Buddhist laity (cf. Ratanakul 1988, pp. 308–309). The reformulated principles of »non-injury« and »compassion« (the latter substitutes the more Christian concept of caritative beneficence 4) are, without »The principle of beneficence is a useful action-guide. However, it may be replaced by the principle of compassion which is more comprehensive, for it includes both

4

198 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

doubt, core concepts of traditional Buddhist ethics. Ratanakul did, interestingly, not substitute the principle of »justice«. Obviously, this key concept of modern Western medical ethics does not find much support in traditional Buddhism (cf. Florida 1994, p. 109 f.), as Buddhist ethics, in harmony with its perpetrator-perspective, do not focus on »rights« of persons (cf. Schlieter 2004). Nevertheless, »justice« (and generally, the human rights discourse, cf. Keown 1998) has become an important concept of »socially engaged Buddhism«. Nowadays an international movement, »Engaged Buddhism« incorporated several ethical ideas of the Western humanistic tradition. Thus, it can be seen as a background for the emergence of Buddhist bioethics, too. The correlation becomes evident e. g. in Ratanakul’s presentation of Buddhist bioethics at the UNESCO-hearing in 2004 (preparing the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, enacted 2005). 5 Here again, Ratanakul declared – in line with Engaged Buddhism – that »the principle of human dignity, human rights and justice is congruent with Buddhist teachings« (Ratanakul 2005, p. 148). However, he added that there is also »a need to produce a better balance between individual rights and social responsibilities. There is a danger of […] understanding of human rights in terms of the supremacy of individual autonomy at the cost of the welfare of others or the public good. When the right of individual autonomy reigns supreme, bioethics will be led to rampant individualism that is destructive to society and the world at large. For Buddhism, though the individual has freedom of self-determination, as a person living in an interdependent world, the individual right has to be exercised with consideration for that of others« (Ratanakul 2005, p. 149). The overarching concept of an ethics of »interdependence«, which is employed by Ratanakul here, and its relation to the idea of selflessness will be discussed below. Although Ratanakul does not point expressis verbis to the idea of »selflessness«, it – or, to be more precise, a certain interpretation of it – seems to be a background conviction of his ethics. Accordingly, he portrays an Asian »we-self« culture that does not subscribe to the strong Western principle of »I-self«-autonomy: »Different cultures imply different value perspectives and priobeneficence and non-maleficence. From the Buddhist perspective, compassion involves both doing all we can to benefit others, to enhance the value of their lives, and to do no harm to them« (Ratanakul 2005, p. 149). 5 See http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/bioethics/ bioethics-and-human-rights/ (10. 05. 2013).

199 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

rities. Due to its identification of selfhood with a larger whole such as family and community, Asian culture may be called a ›we-self‹ culture oriented to the interrelated dimension of the individual […]. The North American culture, on the contrary, is an ›I-self‹ culture as its emphasis is on the autonomous individual, separated from others and the environment. Ethical principles in this culture are usually interpreted in excessively individualistic terms to such an extent that bioethical issues are addressed in terms of individual rights and claims on society. In the formulation of general principles […] these ›weself‹ and ›I-self‹ cultures need to be brought into consideration. Any attempt to globalize the ›I-self‹ culture of bioethics is against the spirit of tolerance […]. It will also do harm to humanity and the world already damaged by our self-centered selfishness« (Ratanakul 2005, p. 150). This critique of selfishness, however, can be found in various ethical traditions – e. g., in Thomas Nagel’s diction: »Ethics is a struggle against a certain form of the egocentric predicament« (Nagel 1978, p. 100; cf. Todd 2012, p. 268). 6 Moreover, apart from these remarks (which are »modernist« in their reference to altruistic, communitybased outlook) one may not find a more specific enactment of the doctrine of selflessness in Ratanakul’s Buddhist bioethics, but a rather straightforward reference to human dignity of »persons« as its basis (cf. Ratanakul 2009, p. 47).

3.

»Personhood« and »Selflessness«: An Unresolved Conflict in Buddhist Bioethics?

The observations made so far can be substantiated by looking at the approach of Damien Keown (Professor em. of Buddhist Ethics, Kings College, London). In his work Buddhism & Bioethics (1st ed. 1995), Keown explained that the Western concepts of personhood, i. e., a person as an intelligent being or as a rational, autonomous center of volitions etc., has indeed relevance for Buddhist ethics, too: »The Buddhist view of human nature that we have set out […] encompasses the two definitions of a ›person‹ given above, and Buddhist Jay Garfield, for example, signifies the goal of Buddhist ethics as »abandon selfishness« (cf. Garfield 2011, p. 336). »Selflessness«, however, in that sense, is a common denominator of several ethical traditions and should, of course, be differentiated from the »no-self«-doctrine.

6

200 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

psychology distinguishes all of the attributes (such as rationality and reflexive awareness) listed here. Furthermore, there is an historical parallel […] in that just as the Western notion of ›personhood‹ may be thought of replacing the soul as the criterion for moral worth, the Buddhist doctrine of ›no-self‹ (anatta) was intended as an alternative to the Brahmanical ›self‹ (ātman)« (Keown 1995, p. 28). Here again, we meet the belief of an implicit, or structural »equivalence« of the Buddhist view of the »moral worth« of persons and the respective Western concept of »personhood«. For Keown, the »no-self«-theory poses no threat to the idea of human worth and human dignity because it is – from its ethical and epistemological structure – equivalent to a post-metaphysical understanding of »persons«. Buddhists, Keown argues, do not ground their ethics of »dignity« on a metaphysical concept of a »soul« (Sanskrit [below: Skt.] ātman), or an ethically loaded concept of »personhood«. Rather, they developed the empirical assumption of a fluent and ever-changing assembly of »five categories« (Skt. skandha) which, taken together, form the »bundle« of a human person not to be harmed (cf. Keown 1995, pp. 23–26). Keown admits, nevertheless, that this conception of »moral worth« differs in two respects from the European concept of »human dignity« – even if he speaks of a Buddhist respect of an »inalienable dignity« (Keown 1995, p. 45). First, it implies, by assuming a series of rebirth, that a human person has »a history and destiny which transcends a single lifetime« (Keown 1995, p. 28). However, for him the karma-cum-rebirth assumption does not count as a »metaphysical assumption« (such as the European »soul«), even though Buddhists speak of a »spiritual destiny« (Keown 1995, p. 30). Secondly, Keown argues that the Buddhist tradition saw no reason to single out an ethically significant concept of »personhood« (a »moral person«). Here, the more general concept of a person as a »given living being« resonates with the »holistic understanding of what it means to be human« (Keown 1995, p. 31) so that there was no need to identify criteria of »personhood«. While Keown’s observation in regard to the absence of a strong concept of »personhood« is certainly correct, it is significant that he does not distinguish between the first and third person perspective on »persons« (i. e., persons as victims of other’s deeds, and persons as ethical actors). 7 For him, the idea of Cf. the discussion of the consequentialist interpretation of Śāntideva’s ethics in Garfield 2011, p. 336 f.

7

201 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

»selflessness« seems to be exclusively relevant as a »disinclination to seek a metaphysical basis for moral respect« (Keown 1995, p. 28) – in other words: the idea of »no-self« is only of epistemological, 8 but not of a specific ethical or moral relevance. Karma Lekshe Tsomo (professor of Religious Studies at the University of San Diego), an American Buddhist nun and president of the Sakyadhita (International Assoc. of Buddhist Women), published her monograph-contribution to the discourse on Buddhist bioethics in 2006 under the title Into the Jaws of Yama, Lord of Death. Buddhism, Bioethics, and Death. In her work, she emphasizes again the »relational« role of »no-self«, which should be understood in relation to earlier Indian doctrines of a permanent »self« (cf. Tsomo 2006, pp. 25 and 49). In systematic respects, her work follows a Tibetan Mahāyāna-Buddhist perspective. The theory of »no-self«, for example, is from the start connected to the theory of »two truths« (cf. Tsomo 2006, p. 52 f.). »Mahāyāna texts«, she explains, »further elaborated the theory of no-self in terms of the two levels of truth, explaining the self as conventionally existent, but empty of any independent reality« (Tsomo 2006, p. 27). In her portrayal of the doctrine, she offers a first-person (practitioner’s) perspective of »no-self« (cf. Tsomo 2006, p. 47), 9 focusing on the process of illusory identification with a permanent self. Nevertheless, people will continue to assume an »everyday self« on the conventional level (cf. Tsomo 2006, p. 49). Yet, while discussing the traditional debate on the compatibility of the »no-self«-doctrine with other doctrines (such as rebirth, death, or the personal »possession« of thoughts and emotions), Tsomo does not

The same holds true for Michael Barnhart’s discussion: »The main obstacle to enlightenment and a constant source of suffering remains human bondage to the ego, which is rooted in the delusion of a substantial self at the core of an individual life. Because a self or soul remains the delusional issue for all varieties of Buddhism, egotranscending conduct is of universal value in all Buddhisms. Correspondingly, egocentric conduct constitutes the great moral error« (Barnhart 2000, p. 138). Barnhart, however, focusing on the first-person view of »no-self« and the question of »personal identity«, does not even mention the »third person view« of personhood, dignity, and human rights. 9 E. g., in her belief: »When the self and the aggregates are no longer conceived as being truly existent, the afflictive emotions and unwholesome actions based on these misconceptions are eliminated. When unwholesome actions no longer create the causes of suffering, liberation from suffering is attained. Without attachment to self, there is nothing to which suffering can adhere« (Tsomo 2006, p. 54). 8

202 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

discuss ethical question of »personhood« 10 and »dignity« – apart from the general remark »to see beyond self is therefore to see beyond selfinterest« (Tsomo 2006, p. 61). Where Tsomo uses the concept of »dignity« or »human rights«, she seems to refer to the respective discourse on »Dying with dignity« in Western bioethics (cf. Tsomo 2006, pp. 160; 169 and 192 ff.) or dignity in »world religions« (Tsomo 2006, p. 170). Buddhists, Tsomo argues, »generally speak of human potential rather than human dignity. The closest correlate to human dignity seems to be virtue. A person with dignity is one who lives virtuously, or at least within the limits of decent human behavior« (Tsomo 2006, p. 190). According to this understanding, »dignity« is not necessarily related to the discourse of human rights, or the protection of an individual victim. Indeed, less than being a »universal« ascribed to every human being, »dignity« is graded according to moral worth: »A quality life is created on the basis of virtuous conduct, generosity, wisdom, and everyday kindness. Life with dignity for Buddhists, then, has less to do with physiology and more to do with psychology« (Tsomo 2006, p. 189). As Tsomo does not discuss the ethical implication of the no-self-idea for the protection of human victims, we are not able to decide whether or not the concept has any influence on her ethical conclusions. In ethical respect, Tsomo deploys the most significant term Buddhist texts offer, namely, the concept of »life« (such as »taking life«, cf. Tsomo 2006, p. 187), or, in Tsomo’s words, the »value of life«. She argues that »many Buddhists would agree that life is not an absolute value; most schools […] are reluctant to speak in terms of absolutes in general and absolute values in particular. But life in itself does have value […]. Life is not valued because it is given and taken away by a deity, but rather because it is a basis for the mental cultivation that is necessary for awakening« (Tsomo 2006, p. 180 f.). To conclude this section, we may summarize our observations as follows: There is a certain of tension between an Western approach of declaring »human rights« on the basis of a strong (non-relativistic, if not: ontological) concept of »human dignity« based on the idea of »persons« or »personhood«, respectively. Although in various degrees, Buddhist bioethics seem to display the difficulties which arise from the assumption of 1) the absolute »selfless«, yet »convention»In Buddhist theories, the person is in the body, but is not to be identified with the body« (Tsomo 2006, p. 214).

10

203 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

ally existent« status of human beings; 2) the »intentionalist« ideal of non-harming »sentient beings«, which has, however, not been conceptualized as an »absolute value« of human life proper, and 3) the relationship between a Western concept of »personhood« and the ethical idea of a trans-human history of karmic rebirths.

4.

The Ethical Relevance of the »No-self«-Theory

Of central relevance for all questions of bioethics is the significance that a religious or philosophical tradition ascribes to the human person and personhood. Here, an outstanding moment of Buddhist soteriology is the doctrine of »no-self«, »selflessness« or »no-selfhood« (Skt. anātman, Pāli [below: P.] anattā), which is to be found in majority of Buddhist schools. Although the doctrine–and theory, respectively – of »no-self« focused initially on soteriological aspects of prescribing a certain ›advisable‹ mental and psychological attitude for reaching »liberation« (P. vimutti, Skt. vimukti, cf. Collins 1982, p. 119), it was in later philosophical developments bestowed with growing relevance for ethical argumentation. Today, a significant number of Buddhists – predominantly of the Mahāyāna-tradition – refer to the doctrine of »no-self« as an alternative means for justifying ethical conduct of life. Those classical sources of this doctrine that are mentioned by Buddhist scholars will be looked at more thoroughly. First, I would like to point to the difference in Buddhist ethics between the side of the doer of deeds (perpetrator side) and the side of the victim of actions of others (victim-centered side). It might well be the case that the doctrine of »no-selfhood« has significance just for the »perpetrator side« but is, at the same time, of no ethical relevance for persons acted upon (the »victims«). At least for Theravāda Buddhism, as will be shown below, there is no »ontology of non-selfhood«. For bioethical reasoning, therefore, the »noself«-view may only be of relevance in respect to »first person ethics« (granted that to speak of »persons« is allowed in this context). 11 Nevertheless, in Mahāyāna-sources which emphasize the idea of an As a »First Person Ethics« I would like to define any ethics which primarily focuses on what the agent does (his intentions, combined with his actions and their supposed long term effects). It is, to be more precise, an ethics of self-transformation, or self-

11

204 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

overall »emptiness« (Skt. śunyatā), the idea of »selflessness« seems to have been »ontologized« as an ethics of »interdependence« (which will be discussed below) – yet even there the »emptiness of persons« bears no great significance for the victim-side of ethics. However, certain scholars have – both in critical and in apologetic discourse – voiced the opinion that the »non-selfhood«-doctrine can be reconstructed as an anthropology or ethic which does not rely on the idea of an individual person, or on the special status of a dignified Human nature. The historical development of this doctrine, as well as the question, if it can – in fully articulated form – already be found in the early stratum of the canonical texts, is still a matter of academic dispute. But even though it is unclear if the historical Buddha opted for a fully-fledged »non-selfhood«-doctrine, the doctrine counts as one of the most widespread, most influential, and certainly »most distinct« (Wynne 2010, p. 103) teachings of Buddhism. For our context it may suffice to summarize its most central elements before we move on to its ethical significance. Steven Collins has grouped the arguments of early Pāli Buddhist sources in favor of the »no-self«-doctrine, which form, according to Collins, a »coherent doctrinal representation of the Buddha’s soteriological strategy« (Collins 1982, p. 97), under four headings. First, the argument from »lack of control«: Everything which is not in the reach of volitional control cannot be the »self« (P. attā). For example – and of bioethical significance – the »body« (or »form«, rūpa – and all other constituents of the empirical person) cannot be changed at will, as the argument runs in the important Anattalakkhaṇa–Sutta. To quote Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation: »Bhikkhus, form is nonself. For if, bhikkhus, form were self, this form would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of form: ›Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.‹ But because form is nonself, form leads to affliction, and it is not possible to have it of form: ›Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus‹« (S III. 66; cf. M I. 230). 12

cultivation. Therefore, in Buddhist traditions, is closely related to meditative and concentrative practices, such as vipassanā (cf. Schlieter 2013). 12 S III. 66: Rūpam bhikkhave anattā // rūpañ ca bhikkhave attā abhavissa nayidaṃ rūpaṃ ābādhāya saṃvatteyya // labbhetha ca rūpe Evaṃ me rūpaṃ hotu evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosīti // Yasmā ca kho bhikkhave rūpaṃ anattā tasmā rūpam ābādhāya saṃvattati // na ca labbhati rūpe Evam me rūpaṃ hotu evaṃ me rūpaṃ mā ahosīti //

205 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

Bhikku Bodhi comments, that all constituents lack »selfhood« because »they are insusceptible to the exercise of mastery (avassavattitā). If anything is to count as our ›self‹ it must be subject to our volitional control; since, however, we cannot bend the five aggregates to our will, they are all subject to affliction and therefore cannot be our self« (Bodhi 2000, pp. 1066–1067). The second argument, according to Collins, is the »right view« which prevents suffering – »What is impermanent, unsatisfactory, and subject to change is ›not fit‹ to be regarded as self« (Collins 1982, p. 98). This train of thought, which is expressed in the Anattalakkhaṇa–Sutta and elsewhere, argues that everything which is impermanent must be unsatisfactory. The third type of argument, a more philosophical one, argues that »it is pointless to speak of a self apart from experience« (Collins 1982, p. 98). Such an insentient »self«, separated from all possible forms of personal experience, the Buddha argues in the Mahānidāna-Sutta, makes no sense at all. If, nevertheless, a respective individual would stick to some kind of »self« transcendent to the empirical realm, it would seeks actively – motivated by self-pride – to identify with an illusory »I-maker« (ahaṃkāra). This is formulated e. g. in the Mahāpuṇṇa-Sutta (M III. 18): »O bhikkhus, one should regard whatever form is past, present or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, near or far – all form – as ›This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self (attan)‹ […] For the person who knows and sees it thus, bhikkhus, the tendency towards conceit in the notion ›I‹ with regards to the body and its consciousness, and towards conceit in the notion ›mine‹ with regards to external objects, does not arise« (trl. Wynne 2010, p. 119). 13 Finally, the fourth class of arguments Collins could observe aim to explain the actual experience of the continuity of consciousness. Here, the concept of »no-self« is part of the Buddhist theory of »dependent origination« (P. paṭiccasamuppāda), i. e. the formation of a Human individual (in terms of embryological, psychic, and cognitive development). This theorem, »dependent origination«, is combined

M III.18: yaṃ kiñci bhikkhu rūpaṃ – atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ, ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā, oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā, hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā, yaṃ dūre santike vā – sabbaṃ rūpaṃ: n’ etaṃ mama, n’ eso ham asmi, na m’ eso attā ti, evam etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passati.

13

206 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

with the »no-self« doctrine – at least insofar as the causal-conditional relationship explains that a certain consciousness of self, or individual »mind« (manas) evolves without building on an underlying, substantial personal »self«. 14 Furthermore, some passages devoted to »dependent origination« are referring to the analysis of the »five constituents« (P. khandha, Skt. skandhā) of the Human person (P. puggala, Skt. pudgala), implying that »consciousness« (Skt. vijñāna) is but one of these »constituents«. 15 To summarize the arguments given in the earliest texts, the theory of »no-self« advises practitioners not to identify themselves with their empirical existence. One should not assume or believe that body, feelings, volition, mind or consciousness point to the existence of a »substantial self«. Moreover, one should not try to »grasp« something as »real« which has been reified through language. 16 Actually Buddhists train themselves to overcome suffering by gaining insight into the unstable illusory nature of the ›person‹ and thus their own ›ego‹. 17 According to the Sabbāsava-Sutta (M I. 6 ff.), karma can in fact only be overcome if there is no lasting, eternal »self« (this argument will be especially emphasized by Nāgārjuna below).

Cf. Collins 1982, pp. 97–110. According to Collins, the »no-self« doctrine is a soteriological strategy on the one hand, but also a doctrinal strategy for Buddhists to »other« the orthodox systems of early Indian philosophy: »the doctrine of anattā is, in the last analysis, a linguistic taboo [… that] functions as a soteriological strategy, in two ways: in detail it forms part of a particular style of meditative self-analysis within the practice of Buddhist specialists; in general, [… it] preserves the identity and integrity of Buddhism as an Indian system separate from Brahmanism« (Collins 1982, p. 183). 15 Only few passages of early Pāli texts exist were »thinking« or »thought capacity« (manas) is established as a distinguishing or defining mark of humans. Such a passage is to be found in the Khuddhakapāṭha, which relates the term for »human being« (p. manussa) to the capacity to think (KhpA 123; = SnA 1. 300); cf., moreover, the commentary of Vimānavatthu (VvA 18): »[they are] called humans due to their plenty of mind« (P. manassa ussannatāya manussā). 16 In the Poṭṭhapāda-Sutta, we read: ›Citta, these are all only worldy designations [p. lokasamaññā], worldy conceptions [lokaniruttiyo], wordly conventions [lokavohārā], worldy conceptualizations [lokapaññattiyo], which [because they are in use] are used [voharati] by the Tathāgata, too. But he does not take them seriously [or, ›does not grasp them‹, aparāmasanti]‹ (D I. 202); cf. Ishigami-Iagonitzer 1997, p. 39 ff. 17 Some texts argue that a certain amount of suffering seems to be necessary. Only human beings – in comparison to heavenly beings, animals etc. – suffer in a way that allows them to conceptualize the insufficiency of worldly existence. 14

207 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

The ethical relevance of the idea of »no-self« should, as said above, be evaluated by distinguishing two different aspects: the side of the victim, and the side of the actor, the doer of deeds (the »first-person view«, which includes ethical reasoning in regard the deed’s effects on the actor). For Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga (and elsewhere) it is first and foremost the side of the actor where the idea of »no-self« is applied. Explaining why from an ultimate point of view (or, in ultimate truth) the four »noble truth« are »void«, Buddhaghosa explains: »In the ultimate sense all the truths should be understood as void because of the absence of (i) any experiencer, (ii) any doer, (iii) anyone who is extinguished, and (iv) any goer. Hence this is said: »For there is suffering, but none who suffers; Doing exists although there is no door. Extinction is but no extinguished person; Although there is a path, there is no goer« (Vsm 513; Nyanamoli 2011, p. 528 f.). 18

If there is in fact no person that feels, and no one progressing on the spiritual path, it might become a relevant question if other humans understood according to this doctrine are still »beings« that shall not be harmed. This question has already been addressed by king Milinda. In the Milindapañha (oldest parts ca. first century BCE), 19 the famous conversation between Buddhist monk Nāgasena and king Milinda takes its departure with the doctrine of »no-self« and its intriguing ethical dimensions. After being asked about his name, Nāgasena replies that he is known by the name »Nāgasena«, which is, however, only a common designation for worldly use – a »person is not to be found there« (na h’ettha puggalo upalabbhati, Mil [ed. Trenckner 1880] I.25,13). It is important to note, again, the »first person perspective« of Nāgasena. Here, he does not speak of other people being »no persons«, but of not identifying with »himself« as a »puggala«. Hearing this statement, Milinda replies by pointing out a – for the »Greek« perspective – crucial aspect: Vism 512. P.: suññato tāva paramatthena hi sabbāneva saccāni vedakakārakanibutagamakābhāvato suññānīti veditab bāni. Tenetaṃ vuccati – ‘Dukkhameva hi, na koci dukkhito; kārako na, kiriyāva vijjati; atthi nibbuti, na nibbuto pumā; maggamatthi, gamako na vijjatī’ti. Cf. Pérez-Rémon 1980, pp. 49–50. 19 Even though this conversation may be fictional, and has been handed down as paracanonical, it is highly relevant for our purpose. 18

208 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

»If, revered Nāgasena, the person is not got at, who then is it that gives you […] almsfood, lodgings and medicine, who is it that makes use of them; who is it that guards moral habit, practices (mental) development […]; who is it that kills a living being […]? If, revered Nāgasena, someone killed you there would be no onslaught on creatures for him« (Mil 25 f.; Horner 1991, p. 34 f.).

First, by arguing with a – as we proposed to define it – »first person ethics«, Milinda adopts the traditional Buddhist perspective (which seems, by the way, to be a shared conviction of several early Indian philosophical traditions, cf. Todd 2012): the »no-self«-theory is of significance for the actor of deeds, the perpetrator, and Milinda wonders, if »someone« will still bear the responsibility of negative actions – or, likewise, enjoy the fruits of positive ones. But then, in an important turn, he adopts a »third person ethics«: He asks – tellingly, however, still in the paradigm of »first person ethics« – if someone would still »kill« if there is, on the victim’s side, no »person« to be found. To my knowledge, this is the earliest instance of drawing this »nihilistic« conclusion in regard the theory of »selflessness«. 20 Nāgasena, however, does not offer a direct counterargument but remains silent. The king proceeds by interrogating if a person might be identified by his hairs. Nāgasena denies. The king goes on to list all possible elements of a person, including consciousness – but nowhere can, according to Nāgasena, a »person« be found – including the option of a fully »external«, unbound soul (Mil 26). Finally, the king concludes, that »there is no Nāgasena«. At this point Nāgasena offers his famous metaphorical allegory of a chariot. 21 Again, all single parts, this time of a chariot, are listed, and it is now on the king’s side to decline any identification of the »chariot« with its single parts. Finally, the king is lead to conclude that because of all single parts, taken together, the »appellation, designation, as a current usage, as a name« (Mil 27; Horner 1991, p. 37) exists. Likewise, Nāgasena adds, should the designation »Nāgasena« be understood; but »according to the highest meaning a person is not We may add that a »nihilistic« theory of ethics is propagated by two »heretic« teachers in the Pāli texts, namely Pakudha Kaccāyana and Purāṇa Kassapa, respectively (cf. D I. 52–59), although here not connected to the theory of selflessness but to an atomistic theory. 21 This example has been quoted and utilized by Western interpreters and philosophers, such as Derek Parfit (1984, p. 502 f.; cf. p. 280 ff.), cf. Siderits 2003, Farrington 2007, Adams 2010. 20

209 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

to be found here« (Mil 27). The exchange of arguments is finalized by Nāgasena quoting the essential verse of the Vajirā Sutta of the Saṃyutta-Nikāya, 22 and Milinda emphatically agrees. Obviously, the ethical relativity 23 seems to be no longer a relevant question – since Milinda agrees, it occurs to be sufficiently answered. They do not return to the radical question of »nihilism«. 24 But what should we extract as the answer? A possible conclusion could be that even though a person exists conventionally, it should not be killed on that level, too. This argument would increase the value of the conventional world. Just as there are visible parts of the chariot, there are the five factors of the empirical human being, which is known to be »living« (and shall, therefore, not be killed), but is, from the highest truth, no »person«. Nāgārjuna’s philosophy, marking the initial phase of Mahāyāna, may serve as a probe for the observations made above. 25 In his philoHere (S I.296), the bhikkhunī Vajirā reports the doctrine to Māra as follows: »Why do you believe in a living being? / Is not this your view, Māra? / This is nothing but a heap of formations: / No being is found here. (553) / When there is a collection of parts / the word ›chariot‹ is used; / In the same way, when the aggregates exist (khandhesu santesu) / the conventional term ›being‹ (satto) [is applied to them]. (554) / Only suffering (dukkham eva) comes into existence, / and only suffering endures. / Nothing apart from suffering comes into existence, / and nothing apart from suffering ceases to exist« (555). kin nu satto ti paccesi Māra diṭṭhigatan nu te, suddhasaṅkhārapuñjo ’yaṃ na yidha sattūpalabbhati. (553) yathā hi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti, evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti. (554) dukkham eva hi sambhoti dukkhaṃ tiṭṭhati veti ca, nāññatradukkhā sambhoti nāññatrā dukkhā nirujjhati. (555) (cf. Buddhaghosa, Vism. XVIII.25 ff., Warren/Kosambi ed. 1950, p. 508). 23 Ethical relativity has two aspects – first, the question of the non-personal status of the victim, and second, the question of the relationship of karmic effects (karmaphala) and universal »emptiness« and the »individual« as »selfless« or »empty« (nairātmya; śūnya; cf., in regard to the second question, Farrington 2007). In the same manner as the »no-self«-doctrine śūnyatā figures in later texts as a means for subverting distorted views – in the latter case, on existence and non-existence (cf. Gangnegi 1989, p. 94 f.). 24 Gómez (1973, p. 362) informs: »The paradox involved […] was first pointed out in the West by Hendrik Kern in his Manual of Indian Buddhism (1896) […] and »has been discussed in detail by Louis de la Vallee Poussin«. 25 Cf. Westerhoff (2009, p. 212 ff.) for the place of ethics in Nāgārjuna’s philosophical and moral works. Following the traditional paradigm, Westerhoff’s Nāgārjuna is predominantly concerned with the question of how the concept of non-self allows to overcome dualist notions of agent, action, etc.: »The fundamental mistake of an insubstantial self to regard itself as substantial creates the concepts of agent, action, consequent, and experiencer, which then in turn bring with them the whole system 22

210 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

sophical opus magnum, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), Nāgārjuna explains the »person« to be »empty« (cf. MMK XVIII, cf. XXIV. 32–40) 26 – not in the sense that there is an »ontological nonself«, but that there is, finally, no »doer« (Skt. kartṛ, cf. MMK XVII. 29 f.). In the same mood, Nāgārjuna uses an allegory to explain how the doer and the deed are dependently originated »illusions«: »As a magician creates a magical illusion by the force of magic, and the illusion produces another illusion, in the same way the agent [or »doer«, kartṛ, JS] is a magical illusion and the action done is the illusion created by another illusion« (MMK XVII. 31). 27 Again, we may note that the allegory pertains to the »doer« and his relation to his karmic »deeds«, but does not include any »illusionary« victim. 28 So again, we may ask if there is for Nāgārjuna any relevance of this doctrine for questions of ethics. of karmic interrelations« (Westerhoff 2009, p. 215). In certain respects, Westerhoff follows Nāgārjuna’s theoretical philosophy which leaves ethical questions unanswered. 26 Cf. already in the Pāli canon: »The visual organ, Ānanda, is empty of self and of anything belonging to self. Visible forms are empty of self and of anything belonging to self. Visual consciousness is empty of self and of anything belonging to self. Visual contact is empty of self and of anything belonging to self. And whatever arises in dependence on or conditioned by visual contact (yampidaṃ cakkhu-samphassapaccayā uppajjati), whether it is experienced as pleasurable or painful, or as neutral, that too is empty of self and of anything belonging to self« (S IV. 54; trl. and commented by Gómez 1999, p. 24 f.). 27 Westerhoff 2009, p. 163; Skt.: yathā nirmitakam. śāstā nirmimītarddhisam. padā / nirmito nirmimītānyam. sa ca nirmitakah. punah. // tathā nirmitakākārah. kartā yat karma tat kr. tam. / tadyathā nirmitenānyo nirmito nirmitas tathā (Inada 1986, p. 111). 28 Westerhoff comments these verses: »This construction allows Nāgārjuna to reconcile his rejection of a substantial self as an essentially unchanging unifier of our mental life distinct from both its physical and mental attributes with the acceptance of the self as an agent who will experience the results of his actions […]. This is a very important point, since the identification of the self with a causally interlinked set of events might tempt us to throw out all prudential considerations for our future selves, as well as those for other selves. Since none of these has any ultimate existence, we might think that all actions referring to them […] are all equally insubstantial too, so that in the ultimate analysis it does not make any difference how we act. Nāgārjuna counters this view by distinguishing the view from the inside of an illusion from that from the outside. […]. This does not imply that while we are still under the thrall of the illusion we should leave all prudential and moral considerations behind. On the contrary, as long as we are under the influence of the illusion, we have to act in accordance with its laws, even if we might suspect that it is an illusion« (Westerhoff 2009, p. 163 f.).

211 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

In the Ratnāvalī (RĀ I.29–32), Nāgārjuna explains: »The mental and physical aggregates arise From the conception of I which is false in fact. How could what is grown From a false seed be true? Having seen thus the aggregates as untrue, The conception of I is abandoned, And due to abandoning the conception of I The aggregates arise no more. Just as it is said That an image of one’s face is seen Depending on a mirror But does not really exist [as a face], So the conception of I exists Dependent on the aggregates, But like the image of one’s face The I does not at all really exist.« (Hopkins 2007,p. 97 f.).

»No-self« is introduced with a soteriological goal: If the conception of the »I« ceases, there is no longer an amassing of »action« (karma), and if »action« ceases, there is no longer »birth« (cf. RĀ I.35; likewise RĀ II.124). 29 Nāgārjuna holds that the conception »I« arises depending on a mirror – an idea which is already voiced at a canonical instance: »Suppose, friend Ānanda, a young woman–or a man-youthful and fond of ornaments, would examine her own facial image in a mirror or in a bowl filled with pure, clear, clean water: she would look at it with clinging, not without clinging. So too, it is by clinging to form that ›I am‹ occurs, not without clinging. It is by clinging to feeling […] to perception […] to volitional formations […] to consciousness that ›I am‹ occurs, not without clinging« (S III. 105; Bodhi 2000, p. 928).

It has a remarkable parallel in the Western psychoanalyst theory of a »mirror stage« by Jacques Lacan (cf. »The Mirror Stage as Formative In the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (Mppś), attributed to Nāgārjuna, it is argued that traditional attitudes towards »ethics« are still valid, and the thought of »no-self« serves as a corollary to it: »Bodhi is not realized by seeing or hearing or understanding, nor is it realized by the [mere] observance of morals; nor is it realized by abandoning hearing and seeing, and it is [definitely] not realized by giving up morals. Thus what one should abandon is disputation as well as [false] notions of ›I‹ and ›mine‹ : one should not cling to the diverse natures of things« (Mppś 63c; Ramanan 1966, p. 132; cf. Huntington, Wangchen 1989, p. 70). 29

212 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience«, 1949, see Lacan 1977). However, here again we should notice the »first person ethics«perspective which is articulated by Nāgārjuna in regard to the »noself«-theory, too. If »selflessness« is declared from the »first person« view, one should be careful not to conclude that »selflessness« is ascribed to the »third person«, too, because it is not only declared from the »first person«, but also for the »first person«. Indeed, all instances I could find in early Indian Buddhist, but also in later Theravāda texts, do not »universalize« an ontological »no-self«, but stick to the agent’s view about himself. 30 Therefore, other terms such as »I-conceit« (asmimāna) 31 should legitimately be understood as a description of a Apart from tantric texts, which will not be dealt with here (cf. Broido; Goodman), there are, however, some later accounts which, by addressing a generalized »emptiness«, seem to include statements of the »selflessness« of others (»third persons«). In an article on »Emptiness and Violence«, Chen-kuo Lin quotes from a Chinese translation of a »Biography of Bodhisattva Āryadeva« by Kumārajīva (T.2048, 187c.26 ff.). Here, the murdered (!) dying Āryadeva instructs his followers including his – immediately converted – assassinator: »In light of reality, who is wrongly accused? Who is treated cruelly? Who cuts? Who kills? In light of reality, there is no victim, nor the one who harms. Who loves? Who hates? Who steals? Who hurts? You cry because you are attached to the wrong views deluded by the poison of ignorance. It causes the evil karma. As a matter of fact, he harms not me, but his own retribution of karma« (Lin 2009, [2]). In Yamakami’s early translation of 1912, the core sentences, however, read: »Who is to be stabbed or cut down? If you read the essence of all Dharmas, there is no object which is to be killed, or subject which kills. Then, who is a friend and who is an enemy? Who is the murderer? Who is the victim?« (Yamakami 1912, p. 193 f.). Most interestingly for our purpose is Āryadeva’s conceptualization of a »victim«. Asked via the H-Buddhism list, several scholars of Chinese Buddhism, however, pointed out, that the respective Chinese term »shou zhe« should be translated as »one who receives [the action]«, »one with vedanā [who undergoes harm]«. The respective Sanskrit term could have been bhoktṛ or vedaka (cf. Hirakawa 1997, p. 230b: »bhoktṛ, upādātṛ; ātman, upabhoktṛ, upabhogin, […] pratisaṃvedanā, bhoktṛtva, veda, vedaka«). The translation »victim« is, therefore, a bit misleading if the meaning of some kind of karmic determination is brought into the text. – Lin, however, points to Nāgārjuna’s refutation of the »nihilism«-accusation in MK, chapter XXIV, and argues, that one should not interpret this as »nihilist«, because »essence« (svabhāva) is denied, but not »existence« (bhava). We may add that even the somehow disturbing statements ascribed to Āryadeva could be seen as »expedient means«: intended to instruct the followers to overcome attachment. 31 Farrington points to the fact that overcoming self-conceit (asmimāna) is conceptualized as a matter of self-training (sikkhitabba); in a conscious body there will be no construction of »I« or »self-conceit« (Farrington 2007, p. 70, with reference). The »I-deceit« (ahamkāra) as the root cause of »self« is also to be found in Śāntideva, 30

213 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

certain intentional-volitional state, which is the basis of karmically unwholesome deeds (cf. Pérez-Remón 1982, p. 85 ff.). However, Nāgārjuna, by introducing an advanced concept of »emptiness« (Skt. śūnyatā), 32 stresses the point that also a »non-self« cannot be declared as »real«. In Ratnāvalī, chapter II. verse 102–103, we read: »Therefore the Conquerors said, ›All phenomena are selfless.‹ Since this is so, all six constituents Have been delineated as selfless for you. 103 Thus neither self nor non-self Are to be apprehended as real. Therefore the Great Subduer rejected Views of self and of non-self« (Hopkins 2007, p. 109). 33

To summarize, the theory of »no-self« is not regarded as ethically questionable (or even relevant) in respect to the question of »killing« (a »person«). Moreover, it does not imply any »weak self« in regard to ethical responsibility because the idea that individual actors still have to bear karmic responsibility for their actions is left untouched by the doctrine (cf. Pérez-Rémon 1980, p. 51 ff.; p. 300 ff.; Farrington 2007). In early Buddhist thought, the ethical evaluation of killing a human being in particular seems, therefore, not affected by the doctrine of »no-self«. »Life«, or, for that matter, »the other’s human existence«, seems not to be directly addressed as part of the discourse on »selflessness«. For sure, all »other« persons are – from their first person perspective – confronted with the hoped-for transformative idea of »no-self«. The ethical relevance of »killing«, even though it is not connected to an inherent »person« as victim, is still relevant as »killing a human being«. Says, for example, Nāgārjuna: »A short life comes through killing« (RĀ I.14). Yet, how is a human being defined Bca (IX). Again, only a »first-person training« will overcome it. In Nāgārjuna’s Suhṛllekhaḥ (»Friendly Epistle«), we read in verse 52: »Liberation depends on oneself, not on help from others, therefore cultivate the fourfold truth« (Skt. ātmāpekṣo mokṣaḥ parasmānna labhyate kimapi sāhāyyam / catvāryāryasatyāni vṛttasthaḥ śrutacintābhirabhyasyecca // 52 (gretil-ed.). 32 There is an important difference between certain relativist conclusions drawn, by some Buddhists namely of Chinese traditions, from the doctrine of śūnyatā (or »selflessness of all dharmas«, Skt. dharma-nairātmya), which is, as a second step, universalized in regard to the skandhas, too (cf. Kleine 2006, p. 88 ff.). Yet, this is neither the case in Theravāda Buddhism, nor, as we have seen, a conclusion of Nāgārjuna. 33 Cf. Nāgārjuna’s »Letter to a Friend«, verses 48 f. (Jamspal et al. 1978).

214 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

in that ethical respect? To supply a short answer this question, we will broaden the perspective again and return to the formative early Indian Buddhist texts. First, human beings shall not be killed because all of them hold their own »self« (depicted and conceptualized, it seems, in a conventional sense) in high esteem. In the Dhammapada, we read: »›surveying the whole world in one’s mind, one finds no-one dearer than oneself [or ›than a man’s self‹]; as everywhere others hold themselves dear [literally ›self is dear to others‹] the man who loves himself should not harm others‹« (Dhp 129; quoted in Collins 1982, p. 72). Secondly, as beings – or »sentient beings«, P. satta, Skt. sattva, to be more precise – human beings are treated as instances of a more general, »non-speciecist« ethics. In the well-known Mettāsutta, for example, we read: »146. Whatever living creatures there are, moving or still without exception, whichever are long or large, or middle-sized or short, small or great, / 147. […] whichever are seen or unseen, whichever live far or near, whether they already exist or are going to be, let all creatures be happy-minded« (Sn 1.8, trans. Norman 2001, p. 19; cf. Sciberras 2008, p. 221).

All definitions on »killing« a human being depend on the assumption and apprehension of a »living being« (Skt. sattva, P. satta), a »life force« (jīvitindriya), »consciousness« (Skt. vijñāna, P. viññāṇa), or a »breathing being« (P. pāna). Thus, in the Pāli commentarial tradition, »killing« is defined by Buddhaghosa: »›Onslaught on breathing beings‹ is, as regards a breathing being that one perceives as living, the will to kill it, expressed through body or speech, occasioning an attack which cuts off its life-faculty. […] Five factors are involved: a living being, the actual perceiving of a living being, a thought of killing, the attack, and death as a result of it. There are six methods: with one’s own hand, by instigation, by missiles, by contrivance (trap or poison), by sorcery, by psychic power« (Asl 97 / M.-A I.198 f.; trl. by Conze 1959, p. 71; cf. Harvey 2000, p. 52).

Even though, from the point of view of »absolute truth«, these criteria may, as all other differential criteria of language and signs, only be of conventional use. Yet, these factors which define »killing« on the victim’s side, namely, »life-faculty« (cf. Langer 2001), 34 »living 34 Cf. Farrington 2007, p. 85: »The Life-Element, or jīva […] is not prominent in the texts but is found both as a synonym for ātman, perhaps in the latter’s early signifi-

215 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

being«, and »breathing being« are even more reinforced as (a) »the actual perceiving of a living being« is explicitly mentioned as a factor on the actor’s side, and (b) »death« as result of the perpetrator’s action. While we will return to the question of »human dignity« in »Buddhist bioethics« in the concluding chapter, we should now portray some important strands of the Western concept of »human dignity«. »Life«, it seems, is, as we could read in Tsomo (quoted above), and contrary to the opinion of Keown, in Buddhism no »absolute« value; nevertheless, we could not find instances in the early Buddhist texts in which »life« of others would in ethical contexts straightforwardly be relativized. We may now be able to compare and contrast some features of Western ideas on »human dignity« with Buddhist ethics and anthropology.

5.

Human Dignity: Key Concept of Western Bioethics

The concept of human dignity has come to be the central concept in the international debate on bioethical reasoning and regulation (cf. Kaufmann et al. 2010, v f.). An important step on the way to its international application can be seen in the »International Declaration on Human Rights« (1948). The concept holds, furthermore, a central position in recent declarations of international Bioethics committees such as the »Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights« of Unesco (1997; the same holds true for the 2005 declaration), or the Council of Europe’s »Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine« (1997), or in the Reports of the American Bioethics Committee (Advisory Commission and the Presidential Committee). Ronald Dworkin, decisively clear: »Anyone who professes to take rights seriously must accept the vague but powerful idea of human dignity« (Dworkin 1977, p. 198). 35 cance as ›breath‹, and as that which makes or marks a living thing’s animate status. We see the latter in the Pali yavajīvam (as long as life lasts, lifelong) and, from the Mahāvastu, jīvantaka (living being). I find nothing in the texts to suggest that anātman bears by way of rebuttal on the Life-Element«. 35 Dworkin, however, tends, in his later work, to »sacralize« human dignity, which makes the concept less transculturally acceptable (cf. Dworkin 1993, p. 238 ff.). Cf. in

216 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

In regard to the key role that the concept of dignity seems to play it may be of some interest to ask if Buddhist argumentation, or certain concepts or ideas can be equated with »human dignity«. But what does dignity exactly stands for? Beyleveld and Brownsword have argued that ›dignity‹, seen from a communitarian perspective, has first and foremost the function to provide a certain community with some sort of moral identity: »human dignity […] speaks […] more to what is special about a particular community’s idea of civilized life and the concomitant commitments of its members« (Beyleveld, Brownsword 2001, p. 65). Yet, this function of »dignity« – which can indeed be observed – should not be seen as the one and only. In the international discourse on human rights and transcultural bioethics, there seem to be at least four prominent positions regarding »human dignity«: (a) religious positions of Christian and Jewish (and, in part, Islamic) theology; (b) philosophical argumentation focusing on dignity of autonomy, human reason, and personhood; (c) a determination of dignity on secular philosophical grounds, that is, dignity attributed to the interpersonal acceptance and respect of others who are also subjects of suffering and harm; and unnecessary harm, than, should be avoided (cf. Wetz 2004, p. 228 ff.). In contrast to these three positions which stick to the concept of dignity there is a fourth position, (d), of denying the concept and idea of human dignity altogether. This attitude can be found in some proponents of East-Asian Bioethics, e. g. the former president of the IBC, Sakamoto, but also Western protagonists (cf. Macklin 2003). Contrasting these views with Buddhist positions portrayed above, one may note in respect to (a), that the most important feature of the theological »dignity«-tradition seems to be the idea of a human being as a creation of God. Being a creation in the image and will of God, it is endowed with dignity by being created. The difference, or hiatus, between a godly Creator and his creations (or creatures, respectively) cannot be overcome. One aspect of this concept of ›human nature‹ can be seen in the idea that a person may accept his body as this regard Jacques Maritain, one of the authors of the »declaration« of 1948, »the human person possesses rights because of the very fact that it is a person, a whole, master of itself and of its acts, and which consequently is not merely a means to an end, but an end, an end which must be treated as such. The dignity of the human person? The expression means nothing if it does not signify that by virtue of natural law, the human person has the right to be respected, is the subject of rights, and possesses rights« (Maritain 1971, p. 65).

217 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

›nature‹, that is, as a contingent but sacralized creation. To say the body should not be altered, or should be left untouched, seems to be a consequence of this view of human nature as »contingent creation«. We can determine the influence of this conception of human dignity in publications of the official American President’s Council on Bioethics. Its report on Human Cloning and Human Dignity (2002) 36 argues with the »dignity of the weak«, 37 the »inviolability and dignity of all human beings« (The Council 2002, p. 89), and »dignity of human procreation«: »In natural procreation, two individuals give life to a new human being whose endowments are not shaped deliberately by human will, whose being remains mysterious, and the open-endedness of whose future is ratified and embraced. Parents beget a child who enters the world exactly as they did–as an unmade gift, not as a product« (The Council 2002, p. 105 f.; cf. p. 13). Buddhist ethicists, in contrast, argue that there is no such dignity because humans are not a creation of God – even more important, they claim that there is generally no »blueprint« how human beings should confine themselves to their »nature«. As their nature is conditioned by karma, they may train themselves for overcoming the limiting boundaries which may include a substantial transformation of »human nature«, i. e., to reach the status of an Arhat, or become a Bodhisattva (cf. Katz 1982). Therefore, a Jewish-Christian theological concept of »human dignity« has largely been judged incompatible with Buddhist ethics and anthropology (cf. Keown 1998, p. 25 f.). In regard to position (b), the philosophical enactment of »dignity«, there are at least two important arguments for »human dignity«: humans have the faculty of reason, and their rational autonomy should be fully respected; human persons are endowed with an absolute, priceless internal worth – therefore, they shall not be used as a mere means (the famous argument of Immanuel Kant). 38 We Most prominently, the concept of dignity has been developed by the Council’s president, Leon R. Kass (see Kass 2002). 37 Cf. The Council 2002, p. 14; with reference to the 2nd Word War, the Nuremberg Code (1947) and the Helsinki Declaration (1964) cf. The Council 2002, p. 87 f. 38 Kant »distinguishes two kinds of value: On the one hand, the price of something, which allows for its substitution by something of similar price, and on the other hand, dignity, which forecloses such an exchange. Almost everything of value merely has a price, according to Kant, yet only persons – strictly, their humanity, their having reason – have dignity because the categorical imperative puts us under the obligation never to treat someone’s humanity as a mere means« (Stoecker 2011, p. 8 f.). 36

218 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

could already observe above that Buddhist bioethicists such as Keown, Ratanakul, or Tsomo build either explicitly on »dignity« in this philosophical meaning, or implicitly on corollary concepts such as »autonomy«, or »personhood«. Nevertheless, it has also been argued that these approaches are incompatible, 39 or that certain problems will arise if »autonomy«, »rationality«, or »absolute worth« will simply be introduced into Buddhist bioethics – without considering the different ethical, soteriological, and anthropological framework. The third strand of argumentation focuses on dignity on secular grounds (c). Dignity, than, is seen as an outcome of practices in a community. If most of its members behave in respectful ways, they display und communicate that they mutually respect each other as worthy, fragile, psycho-physical social beings. Such a concept of »dignity«, to be found for example in Avishai Margalit’s writings, is just an emergent self-reference to the practices of a moral community, i. e., the practices of human respect (cf. Margalit 1996, p. 80 ff.). Any action that diminishes the self-respect of a person is an attack on the person’s dignity (cf. Margalit 1996, p. 119 ff.). 40 Bioethicist Tristram Engelhardt argues in this context for a »principle of permission« among »moral strangers«, which should be seen as »the cardinal source of moral authority. […] By default, authority is derived not from reason, nor from God, nor from a will to power (i. e., force), but from the bare will to have the one authority moral strangers can share: permission« (Engelhardt 1996 [1986], p. 72). 41 This third strand of referring to »dignity« seems to be compatible with Buddhist bioethics. On the one hand, it places emphasis on the intention of »non-harming« psycho-physical others; on the other hand, it refers to a basic, common ground of acting »morally«, i. e., the regulative »[T]he Buddhist does not have recourse to the Kantian conception of rational willing grounded in the categorical imperative or respect for the dignity of autonomous agents«, argues Cumminskey (2010, p. 672). 40 Essentially, Margalit names these three forms: »(1) treating human beings as if they were not human – as beasts, machines, or subhumans; (2) performing actions that manifest or lead to loss of basic control; and (3) rejecting a human being from the ›family of Man‹« (Margalit 1996, p. 144). 41 This »principle of permission« has a strong accent on defending victims – a general feature of Western medical ethics, e. g. Beauchamps and Childress’ principle of nonmaleficience. In order to balance the victim-centeredness of this idea, Beauchamps and Childress combined it with the positive, demanding principle of beneficience (see Beauchamps/Childress, quoted above). 39

219 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

idea of not depriving other »sentient beings« in their attempt to attain happiness (a feature of Buddhist ethics that has been widely popularized by the XIV. Dalai Lama). However, a disadvantage of this approach might be seen in its rather general principles which may not provide clear guidance in concrete decision-making. Finally, the fourth position, a fundamental critique of dignity (d), has been voiced by some Western bioethicists such as Ruth Macklin, arguing against the practicability of the concept. More important, in the context of Buddhist bioethics, seems to be a second position that dignity is just another word for »taboo« – entangled, moreover, with taboos specific of Western religious and philosophical discourse. One proponent of this position is Hyakudai Sakamoto (Prof. em., Aoyama-gakuin University, Tokyo), founder and former president of the Japanese Association of Bioethics (JAB). Sakamoto’s »value relativism« criticizes the individualism that goes along with the dignityconception: »Asian people put higher value on holistic happiness and the welfare of the whole group or nation to which they belong, rather than on their individual human rights« (Sakamoto 2004, p. 47). 42 »This nature-oriented inclination rejects the rationalistic view of human being that only human beings are given innate ›reason‹, and because of it, humanity is exclusively dignified. In reality, human beings may have a non-rationalistic existence like other animals« (Sakamoto 1994, without pagina). Furthermore, traditional Asian thought »has in general a strong holistic trend. None of Buddhism, Confucianism or Taoism etc. have a concept of individual human rights, but rather the weight of consideration given to the whole, the family, neighbourhood, community, society etc. is heavy. Sometimes out of this an ethic of fierce anti-egoism, self-sacrifice or self-negation appears. Naturally here a conflict with Western ethical thought may emerge« (Sakamoto 2002, p. 54). And, finally, he refers to Japanese Buddhists like Shinran and Dōgen to strengthen his position: »In Buddhism, there is some sort of egalitarian view of life, of all sorts of animals or even of plants, which is not compatible with the view of life of Western science. […] I will emphasize the idea of ›Mushi‹ (non-ego, or selfannihilation) which is found especially in the Japanese Buddhist tradition. It is a view of human life, developed through the course of the Japanese reliSakamoto argues that the abolition of the Chinese students movement, or Chinese one-child politics (according to Sakamoto, a kind of ›eugenics‹), or restrictive regulation of the public sphere in Singapore may illustrate this (cf. Sakamoto 2002, p. 51 f.).

42

220 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

gious Reformation of the 13th century by Shinran and Dogen, and it teaches that only by annihilating oneself can one obtain ›Satori‹ (spiritual awakening). This idea of self-annihilation clearly denies the ›autonomy‹ of the self and also the idea of ›fundamental human rights‹. And this idea influences tacitly the thoughts of Japanese people even now« (Sakamoto 1994, without pagina). 43

This critique, which builds on an unbridgeable divide between Buddhist ethics and Western human rights discourse, has been prevalent among protagonists of »Asian Values« in the 1990s. But also in Western scholarly work on Buddhist ethics, one may read: »It is by no means apparent, however, how human dignity is to be grounded in Buddhist doctrine. The very words ›human-dignity‹ sound as alien in a Buddhist context as talk of rights. One looks in vain to the Four Noble Truths for any explicit reference to human dignity, and doctrines such as no-self and impermanence may even be thought to undermine it« (Keown 1998, p. 25). In order to get a fuller picture, we may now focus on further aspects of »dignity« in Buddhist traditions.

6.

Human Dignity in Buddhist Ethics?

One of the major aspects in which the Western idea of »human dignity« seems to differ from Buddhist ethics (though I will, from a descriptive point of view, neither argue in favor, nor against any specific ethical approach here), is its extension: ethics being either a strict, demanding rule in respect to humans only, or a training rule in regard to sentient beings, including humans. The difference can be made visible, again, in Buddhaghosa’s »graded« approach of judging the seriousness of »killing« humans and animals: »That action, in regard to those without good qualities (guṇa–) – animals etc. – is of lesser fault when they are small, greater fault when they have a large physical frame. Why? Because of the greater effort involved. Where the effort is the same, (it is greater) because of the object (vatthu–) (of the act) being greater. In regard to those with good qualities – humans etc. – the action is of lesser fault when they are of few good qualities, greater fault when they are of many good qualities. But when size or good qualities are Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the concept of »dignity« plays an important role in Japanese bioethics and figures, moreover, as a term in the Japanese constitution.

43

221 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

equal, the fault of the action is lesser due to the (relative) mildness of the mental defilements and of the attack, and greater due to their intensity« (Asl 97 / M.-A I.198 f.; trl. by Conze 1959, p. 71; cf. Harvey 2000, p. 52).

The Buddhist ethical evaluation distinguishes between killing animals and human beings. In respect to animals the degree of the misdeed is calculated in correlation to the size of the animal and the ›expense‹ or ›work load‹ (P. payoga) that was necessary for undertaking the action. In respect to human beings this criterion is not applied. Instead, the degree of the misdeed is calculated by the ›moral preciousness‹ (P. guṇavant) of the respective victim (cf. Tsomo, quoted above). Surely, such an opinion has its background in the idea that certain humans are most worthy individuals, e. g. Arhats, Buddhist monks of good reputation (»field of merit«), or a Buddha, respectively. Killing an Arhat, a Buddha, or high-ranking monk might, however, be seen as especially ruthless. All of these demand respect not because of their being human but because of their morality alone, or their being mediators of the knowledge of liberation (cf. AKBh IV. 73a-b in regard to criteria of moral preciousness). Nevertheless, in direct comparison, it seems that here and elsewhere human beings are not valued due to some inherent dignity (which can neither be received nor lost through any kind of behavior), but through some kind of »dignifying behavior«. We may call this a »functionalist« approach to dignity, since humans are valued in a graded scheme of (moral and soteriological) »function« for others (the designation as »functionalist« will become more plausible below). Nevertheless, many modern Buddhist ethicists are inclined to show that the broad scope of Buddhist ethics does actually encompass »human dignity«. In one of the interviews I could conduct with current Buddhist ethicists on matters of Buddhism and bioethics, I could note a small, yet significant modification of the graded scheme. Sumana Ratnayake (Buddhist Studies, Peradeniya University, Sri Lanka) brought Buddhaghosa’s criteria in the following manner into play: »It must be living being, you should know that it is a living being, you should make some efforts to kill, and you should also bring it into play, that method – you have to have a method, and you bring it into play – and the being should be killed, deprived of life, than these five factors are fulfilled, where you committed the […] demerit.« [*Question: »Of course this is only adapted for ethics towards animal life, not human life?«] »Any life, but we wouldn’t include plant’s life into it. But a life 222 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

factor as far as beings are concerned. So beings like amoeba or sort of one-cell-being and all that we wouldn’t take into consideration in such situations because Buddha considered human beings first of all. Human being has one of the most valuable lives because self-awareness is always with the human beings and other beings have something lacking. Even animals have more than instinct, some awareness, but not as much as human beings, and trees do not come to that category, so that way you find different layers, levels«. 44 Ratnayake modified one criterion, namely, he replaced the »possession of moral worth« (guṇavant) by using the concept of »self-awareness« instead. This seems to be a small variation, but one with large consequences. With this replacement Ratnayake comes close to a European concept: humans possess dignity by sharing a kind of »self-awareness«. By the same replacement, the concept of graded »moral worth« of the possible victim (obviously a thought that does not fit very well to European dignity ethics) is declared as a quantité neglieable. 45 »Selfawareness«, if understood as a human potential for self-realization, could also inform an understanding that »dignity« is to be found in the unique capacity of humans being able to consummate liberation by way of practice. In a quite similar way »dignity« is discussed by current Tibetan Mahāyāna Buddhists. I will quote from an interview I could conduct with Geshe Ngawang Samten, director of the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies (Sārnāth). Here again, we meet the opinion that the seriousness of a misdeed like homicide is graded according to the spiritual and moral status (in Mahāyāna, bodhicitta, »the mind [directed towards] awakening«) of the victim: »The object in seriousness depends on if the person is very precious – again: precious why? […] [H]e is not precious just because of holding a high position. But he is precious because he has bodhicitta, who is a Bodhisattva. He is precious because he can perform so beneficial acts, for the benefit of others, right. And therefore the preciousness of that person is important to take into account. [… If] a person kills his parents, kills his teacher […] because, you know, the teacher is very precious for him – may not necessarily for others, but for him – he has given him the Peradeniya University, in an interview (recorded by the author), February 25, 2004. Moreover, by applying the concept of size (in the commentary tradition a criteria for human beings) to human beings (in the question of abortion or embryo research), another important modification can be noticed.

44 45

223 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

eye of wisdom, and the parents are precious because they have given him the physical body of this life, and then trying to kill and kill arhats and things like that«. Being asked »So you wouldn’t see any difference between a being that has this capacity of rational choice and so on: this capacity of human beings isn’t something more valuable?«, he answered: »Yes, of course, to be a human being is regarded to be more precious, and according to Buddhist value system the life of a human being is more precious than the life of hsensationali beings. I am not talking about the deities and things like that, but the hsensationali beings who are still common beings but in sensational realms, right. […] Human beings’ life is more precious because human beings have a better opportunity of exposure to both suffering and happiness. And, on the top of that, because they have exposure to suffering they can realize that opportunity to be […] to motivate oneself to alleviate from that suffering. And at the same time a human being has this capacity of alleviating oneself if he or she makes attempts. And this type of capacity is a unique feature of a human being«. 46 Although far from being exhaustive, these examples may suffice to highlight a certain feature of Buddhist ethics that appears to be in contrast to central aspects of the concept of dignity. Notwithstanding, there are Buddhist ethicists such as L. P. N. Perera, who argue that human »dignity« in Buddhism is grounded in the assumption that »Buddhahood itself is within the reach of all human beings« (Perera 1991: 21). Furthermore, for Perera »Buddhism posits, as Jean Jacques Rousseau did much later, that the essence of human dignity lies in the assumption of man’s responsibility for his own governance« (Perera 1991, p. 28). In this line he established Theravāda Buddhist parallels to all single ideas expressed in the »Declaration of Human Rights«. Certainly, the idea that human existence counts as a form of life is very difficult to reach in the circle of samsara, that can be found already in early Buddhist texts. Human existence is »difficult to reach« (tib. shin rnjed par dka’; skt. su-durlabha/-tva), 47 because it

Sārnāth, India, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, in an interview (recorded by the author), June 20, 2005. The word »sensational« is not fully understandable, therefore marked hsensationali. 47 Cf. Bhikkhu Pasadika 1996, p. 68 S V. p. 455 f., cf. the idea of »rarity« in Buddhist thought and its parallels in the Hindu and Jaina traditions Hara 1987. 46

224 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

is very rare and »highly unlikely« in comparison with the innumerable non-human lives and life-forms, e. g. insects. To be reborn as a human means that a great amount of positive karma (i. e., merit) has been collect in former existence(s). As a reward and chance, human existence offers the unique possibility to reach final liberation. A well-known simile for the rarity of being reborn as a human is the »blind sea turtle«. 48 To summarize: If it comes to the preciousness of human life, it is appreciated for the rare possibility to practice and to attain Buddhahood. In the words of the Burmese leader of the democracy movement, Aung San Suu Kyi: »as soon as the issue of human rights became an integral part of the movement for democracy the official media […] start ridiculing […] the whole concept of human rights, dubbing it a western artefact alien to traditional values. It was ironic – Buddhism […] places the greatest value on man, who alone of all beings can achieve the supreme state of Buddhahood. […] Human life therefore is indefinitely precious« (Suu Kyi 1991, p. 174).

This ›spiritual functionality‹ of a human existence seems, however, not to be an undisputable parallel to Western notions of human dignity, even though, of course, modern Buddhists may treat them as equivalents. From the point of view of a historian of ideas, there are some differences: First, »human dignity« is a kind of rareness, yet a rareness that is valued merely as an impermanent transience to Arhatship, »full awakening« or nirvāṇa – soteriological possibilities open only to human beings. Buddhists do not think they owe their life to God, or that they are bound to stick to the role of a ›creature‹ – to overcome the boundaries of human existence is exactly part of the goal. Therefore, to accept the limits of human nature – one aspect of the »dignity« tradition – seems to go against the grain of Buddhist The »blind turtle« simile is to be found e. g. in M III., p. 169: »›Suppose a man threw into the sea a yoke with one hole in it […]. Suppose there were a blind turtle that came up once at the end of each century. What do you think, bhikkhus? Would that blind turtle put his neck into that yoke with one hole in it?‹ ›He might, venerable sir, sometime or other at the end of a long period.‹ Bhikkhus, the blind turtle would take less time to put his neck into that yoke with a single hole in it than a fool, once gone to perdition, would take to regain the human state, I say. Why is that? Because there is no practising of the Dhamma there, no practising of what is righteous, no doing of what is wholesome, no performance of merit. There mutual devouring prevails, and the slaughter of the weak« (Bodhi 1995, p. 1020). On the floating yoke simile cf. Hara 1987, p. 47 ff.

48

225 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

›soteriological‹ expectations. Keown tries to solve the problem by stating that »the source of human dignity in Buddhism« lies »in the literally infinite capacity of human nature for participation in goodness« (Keown 1998, p. 70 f.). But can a mere potential be a sufficient argument for the claim of universal human dignity? To me, the »preciousness«-idea still builds on some kind of functionality (cf. Schlieter 2006, p. 195), implying that it is not the current status quo, but the ability that may count. If humans, for example, deliberately »betray« their chances by indulging in all kinds of desire, by behaving evil etc. – will they lose their dignity, too? And what about those with little cognitive capacity for realizing their potential in this lifetime? If one defines human dignity as a kind of unalienable worthiness human beings are endowed with – no matter what they ›are‹ or ›do‹ in their life –, Buddhist concepts of »preciousness« can, of course, be used as arguments in favor for »dignity«, but they are still marked by their origin as soteriological arguments. In an interview, P. D. Premasiri (Professor em. for Buddhist Ethics, Peradeniya University, Sri Lanka) expressed his opinions on the legitimacy of using human embryos for research, human cloning etc. In this context, he explicitly argued with Kant’s idea of dignity (not using a human being as a means to an end). Asked whether or not one will find these ideas in Buddhist scriptures, he said: »The idea of dignity I don’t think is found very much in the Buddhist tradition. Well, the respect for life is there. Because I think Buddhism does not recognize a kind [of] eternal self. […]. There is only a series of, or a continuing process of change and transformation in life. It can change for the better or change for the worse«. 49 More specifically, Premasiri elaborated his argument with the idea of »legitimate interests«: »[T]he preservation of your life, then, that your basic needs are looked after, both emotional and physical; those are legitimate interests, that every individual has. Now, supposing you resort to a certain type of behavior, you could be infringing upon the legitimate interests of others. And the legitimate interests are the same of yourself and others. So, if you are resorting to any action that is an infringement of the legitimate interest of another person that action is morally wrong«. 50 »Dignity«, here, comes close to some kind of general »universalist« attitude already to be found in the Dhammapada 49 50

Peradeniya University, in an interview (recorded by the author), February 27, 2004. Ibid.

226 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

(quoted above), that all humans held themselves in high esteem, therefore, they should not only seek to avoid harm for themselves but also avoid harming others. This, we may note in passing, is also the opinion of the XIV. Dalai Lama on »dignity«: For him, »dignity« follows from the universal »nature« of human beings to seek for happiness and to avoid harm and suffering, which, for him, cannot be relativized or »particularized«: »Recently some Asian governments have contended that the standards of human rights laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are those advocated by the West and cannot be applied to Asia […]. I do not share this view […], for it is the inherent nature of all human beings to yearn for freedom, equality and dignity, and they have an equal to achieve that« (Dalai Lama 1998, XVIII). Thus, he holds: »Diversity and traditions can never justify the violations of human rights« (p. XIX).

7.

Conclusion: »No-self«, »Dignity« and »Human Rights« in Buddhist Bioethics: A Shift from »First-Person« to »Third-Person Ethics«?

To summarize our observations in respect to the ethics of »no-self« first: We could see that if current Buddhist ethicists draw ethical conclusion from the theory of »no-self«, they will do so in regard to a first-person perspective (e. g., a question such as »What is wholesome behavior for me facing the danger of ›I-conceit‹ ?«), but far less so in regard to third persons. Apart from implicit background assumptions, there were indeed important bioethical conclusions drawn from the idea of »no-self«. »Non-selfhood«, it has been argued, exerts an impact on first-person perspectives on bioethical decision-making (reduction of clinging to the body, evaluation of the motives for action, etc., cf. Ganeri [in this volume]). The ethical relevance of »no-self« in that traditional sense has, interestingly, so far only been alluded to, but remains to be systematically explored (cf. Hughes, Keown 1995; Barnhart 2000). 51 For Susantha Goonatilake explains: »All phenomena are but fleeting strings and chains of events. As the constituents of an individual change, s/he does not remain the same for two constituent moments. In the Buddhist analysis of identity, there is no individual, only a stream. Life is a stream (sota), an unbroken succession of aggregates. There is no temporal or spatial break or pause in this life continuity. This continuity is not through a soul, but through a stream of becoming« (Goonatilake [2000], p. 9).

51

227 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

example, if the (soteriologically) »correct« attitude towards one’s own »self« implies that one should not identify with one’s »body/form« (rūpa), it could be true for genetics and personal identity, too. 52 Professor Vajira H. W. Dissanayake, Medical Geneticist at the University of Colombo and member of several committees engaged in bioethical discourse, alluded to the »no-self«-doctrine in respect to the »first person« perspective: »You know, Buddhism relies on the concept of anicca, dukkha and anatta, anatta meaning ›there is no soul‹, and there is no control. So, obviously, we all accept that and we see that in practice although if you try to practice autonomy I mean you do have no control of anything. So, in that sense, the need to control is not felt strongly as would be in Western philosophy, in the Western traditions«. 53 Regarding the ethical relevance of others being »no-selves« we could, however, not find current Buddhist ethicists arguing in that »relativistic« direction: For sure, on a soteriological level there is, for the majority of Buddhists, no substantial person – but in a worldly, phenomenological perspective there are human beings (Skt. sattva) that can be hurt. Any ethics here, in the realm of »third persons«, falls under the principle of »not harming« (Skt. ahiṃsā) sentient beings. Certainly, modern ethicists of the Buddhist traditions are in close contact with the global networks of biomedicine and bioethics. Consequently, they seem to feel a necessity to transform traditional, soteriologically oriented »first-person ethics«, which are not immediately in communion with traditional Western thoughts on (third-person) »dignity«, into an ethical doctrine that allows to join the global discourse of installing a juridical sphere of dignity-based »human rights«. One might be tempted to argue here with the famous division between »ethics of intention« (or ethics of »conscience«, »Gewissensethik«) and »ethics of responsibility« (»Verantwortungsethik«) by Max Weber. According to Weber, we may describe the developTo give the example of reproductive cloning: Seen from ultimate reality a clone may neither be a deficient copy, because there is no original ›person‹, nor a helpless victim, because ›he‹ – as every other human being – shall not cling to his worldly existence but shall proceed on the Buddhist way to liberation. It is therefore, for example, not astonishing that very few Asian Buddhists are afraid of possible mental problems of cloned humans (cf. Schlieter 2006). 53 Human Genetics Unit, University of Colombo, in an interview (recorded by the author), November 24, 2012. This threefold formula can be found e. g. in S III., pp. 20–21. 52

228 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

ment of »religious ethics«, and ethics as such, in modernity as a shift from the »ethics of intention« to an »ethics of responsibility« (cf. Weber 1994). Instead of evaluating the intention (of the doer of deeds), the individual is hold responsible for the effects that its deeds have on others. Even though the Weberian scheme is not fully transferable to classical and modern Buddhist ethics, it has a specific appeal here, too, because we can indeed observe a shift in modern Buddhist discourse that tries to combine classical »first-person ethics« (comparable to »ethics of intention«) with »third-person ethics« (»ethics of responsibility«). This difference in outlook can furthermore be described as a shift from »salvific« ethics (from Latin salvo, »to rescue«; i. e. »rescuing ethics«, which are soteriological) to »salvetive« ethics (from Latin salveo, »to heal«; ethics of »healing«, or restituting by medical treatment a current status quo, i. e. non-soteriological; cf. Schlieter 2014). 54 Traditionally, the soteriological preciousness of a Human being is, as we could see, merely a potentiality, namely, to use its life for spiritual progress. Modern Buddhist ethicists, however, seem more inclined to separate soteriology (not to say »metaphysics«) and ethics, applicable in worldly existence. This can be seen, for example, in the formulation of an »ethics of interdependence«. For modern Buddhists, »ethics of interdependence« result from the philosophical ideas of »dependent origination« (Skt. pratītyasaṃutpāda), »interrelatedness« (Skt. idaṃpratyayatā), and »emptiness« (Skt. śūnyatā) (cf. Taniguchi 1996). »The belief that all beings are intimately and mutually dependent reveals the kinds of virtues Buddhists should nurture« (Nakasone 1993, p. 10; cf. Garfield 2011, p. 338). To formulate an ethics of interdependence, which is, however, centrally based on »emptiness«, and only peripherally on »no-self«, can already be found in early Mahāyāna thought, e. g. in Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, chapter IX. 55 Yet, again, Śāntideva’s advised practice belongs In close relation to this, further important difference between Western and Buddhist ethical approaches can be seen in the concept of »legitimacy« on the one hand, and personal »responsibility« for individual actions on the other hand. A key demand of modern Western ethics is that moral prescriptions should be universally applicable to all people who can understand them. Buddhist ethics, though, is generally gradualist in its approach; while it has ethical norms which all should follow, e. g. empathy with fellow beings, others only apply to those who are ready for them, as their commitment to moral and spiritual training deepens (especially ethics of the Bodhisattva’s training rules). 55 Śāntideva famously advise the meditative habitualization of the thought of ›noself‹, which should evoke the ability to exchange one’s own »selfless self« sympathe54

229 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

mainly to »salvative«, »first-person« ethics, but not to the realm of »third person« perspectives in regard to »rights« or »dignity« of others. To reformulate it from a »third-person« perspective seems, again, to be a modern innovation (cf. Schlieter 2010 on Goodman 2009). To give a recent example: Combining Mahāyāna Buddhist thought and European ethics, a group of Buddhist scholars wrote a »Declaration of Interdependence«, stating: »Those who have the good fortune to have a ›rare and precious human rebirth‹, with all its potential for awareness, sensitivity, and freedom, have a duty to not abuse the rights of others to partake of the possibilities of moral and spiritual flourishing offered by human existence. Such flourishing is only possible when certain conditions relating to physical existence and social freedom are maintained« (quoted in Keown et al. 1998, p. 221 f.). In a similar mood, Ratanakul and Stonington explain the bioethical relevance of the Buddhist »principle of interdependence«: It »means that doctors, patients and relatives must think about the emotions and interests of all parties involved in a medical decision. This is in contrast to the Western concept of autonomy, which allows a patient to decide without consideration of the feelings and responsibilities of other people concerned« (Ratanakul, Stonington 2006, [p. 7]). The visible shift from first to third person perspectives, may, in general terms, be interpreted as some kind of »secularization«. Perspectives of possible victims, whoever they may be (in terms of religious affiliation, moral status, etc.), are taken seriously, and attempts are made to ground this perspective in ethical or anthropological assumptions displayed in traditional Buddhist texts. To broaden the scope, one may regard this outcome as an indicator for the emergence of Buddhist Bioethics as such. It can be described as a reaction and response to biomedical developments. Biomedicine and its applications (for example, of prenatal sex-selection, pre-implantation diagnosis of genetic diseases and subsequent abortion of those inflicted with undesired features) exerts a certain »secularizing pressure« – it forces religious specialists to adapt their actual descriptions of the coming-to-be of human being (e. g., on the influtically with »selfless selves« of others (cf. Bca, chapter IX, trl. e. g. in Crosby, Stilton 1993; cf. Siderits 2003, p. 102 ff.; Dalai Lama 1993).

230 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity«

ence of karma) and ethical prescriptions to justify the new practices. Of course, religious specialists may resist and adhere strictly to their traditional views. If they persistently do so in Western, but also many urban Asian contexts, they will usually be questioned if they disagree with scientific framework of biomedicine (for example, the criteria of brain death) as such. In the Western bio-political discourse, individual »no-scientific« descriptions or solutions by (religious) subjects will usually not sustain; issues have to be answered in the political realm as a part of the national legal framework (based, in the end, on shared convictions regarding the limits of personal freedom and undisputable human rights). If individuals want to bring in their religious worldviews, they have to take part in the general bioethical discourse. This means, they have to subscribe largely to the correctness of biomedical descriptions. This submission seems to be a major obstacle for religious specialists. If they want to be part of the procedure of bioethical problemsolving, decision-making and law-making, they have to render their positions in a way compatible to other participant’s positions (lawyers, physicians, secular scientists, and finally, the large group of inflicted patients). Proponents of religious traditions cannot, for the most, simply refer to certain commandments of »holy scriptures« or some abstract values to believe in. If – and only if – they want to take part in the procedures mentioned above, they have to create a systematic, philosophically sound answer to biomedical dilemmas, that is: a system of »bioethics«. In order to achieve this, it seems to me that also Buddhists transformed their general ethical value systems and approaches in order to solve the ethical problems of modern biomedicine. This ongoing transformation encompasses the change of fundamental features of traditional approaches of Buddhist ethics, such as the noted shift from offender-centered to victim-centered ethics. Seen this way, the formation of »Buddhist bioethics« may show the will and ability of current Buddhist actors to adapt to a new framework – the globalization of biomedicine and bioethics, and the globalization of Buddhist traditions. The former – the spread of biomedicine and Western bioethics – may lead in some Asian countries to self-confident, »localized« Buddhist responses, whereas the latter may induce an ongoing incorporation of Western ethical approaches into Buddhist discourse in the near future.

231 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter

Abbreviations Abbreviations for Pāli texts follow the editions and translations of the Pali Text Society.

Literature Barnhart, Michael 2012. »Theory and Comparison in the Discussion of Buddhist Ethics.« Philosophy East and West 62(1), pp. 16–43. Barnhart, Michael 2000. »Nature, Nurture, and No-Self: Bioengineering and Buddhist Values«, in: Journal of Buddhist Ethics 7, pp. 126–144. Beauchamp, Tom L.; James F. Childress, 5th ed. 2001. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beyleveld, Deryck; Roger Brownsword 2001. Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bodhi, Bhikkhu 2000. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications. Castells, Manuel 1997. The Rise of the Network Society. The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Vol. I. Cambridge, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Collins, Steven 1982. Selfless Persons. Imagery and Thought in Theravāda Buddhism. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press. Conze, Edward 1959. Buddhist Scriptures. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Crosby, Kate; Andrew Skilton. trl. 1993. The Bodhicāryāvatāra, London: Oxford University Press. Cummiskey, David 2010. »Competing Conceptions of the Self in Kantian and Buddhist Moral Theories«, in: Steven R. Palmquist (ed.), Cultivating Personhood. Kant and Asian Philosophy, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, pp. 664–677. Dalai Lama XIV. Tenzin Gyatso 1993. A Flash of Lightning in the Dark of Night. A Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life. Commentary on Śāntideva’s Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life. Boston: Shambhala. Dalai Lama XIV. Tenzin Gyatso 1998. »Human Rights and Universal Responsibility«, in: Damien Keown et al., eds. Buddhism and Human Rights, XVII– XXI. Dworkin, Ronald 1977. Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Dworkin, Ronald 1993. Life’s Dominion – An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia. Hammersmith: Harper Collins. Engelhardt, Tristram Hugo 1996. The Foundations of Bioethics. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Farrington, Roger William 2007. The Identity Problem in Buddhist Ethics. An Examination of Buddhist and Parfitian Conceptions of the Subject. London: University of London (Diss.).

232 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity« Gangnegi, Hira Paul 1989. »Ethical Validity of Śūnyatā«, in: M. Tivārī (ed.), Perspectives on Buddhist Ethics. New Delhi: Dept. of Buddhist Studies Delhi University, pp. 94–107. Garfield, Jay L. 2011. »What is it like to be a Bodhisattva? Moral Phenomenology in Śāntidevas’s Bodhicaryāvatāra.« Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33(1–2), pp. 333–357. Gómez, Luis O. 1973. »Emptiness and Moral Perfection«, Philosophy East and West, 23, 3, pp. 361–373. Gómez, Luis O. 1999. »The Elusive Buddhist Self: Preliminary Relection on its Denial«. Communication & Cognition 32(1–2), pp. 21–52. Goodman, Charles 2009. Consequences of Compassion. An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Goonatilake, Susantha 2000. »Asian Foundational Approaches in Bioethics«, http://www.stc.arts.chula.ac.th/Bioethics.final.pdf (10. 06. 2013). Hahn, Michael 1982. Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī: Vol. 1, The Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese), Indica et Tibetica, Bonn. Hara, Minoru 1987. »A Note on the Hindu Concept of Man: Sanskrit mānuṣya«, in: Journal of the Faculty of Letters. The University of Tokyo, Aesthetics 11, pp. 45–60. Harvey, Peter 2004. The Selfless Mind. Consciousness and Nirvāna in Early Buddhism. Oxon: RoutedgeCurzon. Harvey, Peter 2000. An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Foundations, Values, and Issues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hirakawa Akira 1997. A Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary [Bukkyō kanbon daijiten ]. Tokyo: Reiyukai. Hughes, James, Damien Keown 1995. »Buddhism and Medical Ethics. A Bibliographic Introduction«, in: Journal of Buddhist Ethics 2, pp. 105–124. Huntington, C. W., W. Namgyal 1989. The Emptiness of Emptiness. An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Hopkins, Jeffey 2007. Nāgārjuna’s Precious Garland. Ratnāvalī. Translated by Jeffrey Hopkins, Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications. Horner, Isaline Blew (trl.) 1991. Milinda’s Questions. 2 vols. Oxford: Pali Text Society. Ishigami-Iagonitzer, Mitchiko 1997. »The Self and the Person as Treated in Some Buddhist texts. Part I«, in: Asian Philosophy 7, 1, pp. 37–45. Jamspal, Lozang, Ngawang Samten Chophel; Peter Della Santina 1978. Nāgārjuna’s Letter to King Gautamīputra: With Explanatory Notes Based on Tibetan Commentaries. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Jonsen, Albert R. 1998. The Birth of Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Kass, Leon R. 2002. Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity. The Challenge for Bioethics, San Francisco: Encounter Books. Katz, Nathan 1982. Buddhist Images of Human Perfection: The Arahant of the Sutta Piṭaka Compared with the Bodhisattva and the Mahāsiddha. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

233 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter Kaufmann, Paulus, Christian Neuhäuser, Hannes Kuch, Elaine Webster 2011. Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization. Human Dignity Violated. Dordrecht: Springer. Keown, Damien 1995. »Are there ›Human Rights‹ in Buddhism?« Journal of Buddhist Ethics 2, pp. 3–27. Keown, Damien 1998. »Are there Human Rights in Buddhism?« in: id., ed. Buddhism and Human Rights. Richmond, Curzon Press, pp. 15–42. Keown, Damien V., Charles S. Prebish, Wayne R. Husted eds. 1998. Buddhism and Human Rights, Richmond: Curzon Press. Keown, Damien 2008. »Into the Jaws of Yama, Lord of Death: Buddhism, Bioethics, and Death. By Karma Lekshe Tsomo« (review). In: Buddhist-Christian Studies, 28, pp. 157–161. Kleine, Christoph 2006. »Evil Monks with Good Intentions? Remarks on Buddhist Monastic Violence and its Doctrinal Background«. Michael Zimmermann, ed., Buddhism and Violence, Bairahawa: Lumbini International Research Institute, pp. 65–98. Lacan, Jacques 1997. Ecrits, New York: W. W. Norton. LaFleur, William; Gernot Böhme, Susumu Shimazono 2007. Dark Medicine. Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Lang, Karen 2003. Four Illusions. Candrakirti’s Advice for Travelers on the Bodhisattva Path. New York, N.Y.; Oxford: Oxford University Press. Langer, Rita 2001. Das Bewußtsein als Träger des Lebens. Einige weniger beachtete Aspekte des viññāṇa im Pālikanon. Wien: Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde. Lin, Chen-kuo 2009. »Emptiness and Violence: An Unexpected Encounter among Nagarjuna, Derrida, and Levinas«, http://library.crtvu.edu.cn/sfw/ ReadNews.asp?NewsID=5240 (10. 06. 2013). Macklin, Ruth 2003. »Dignity is a Useless Concept«. British Medical Journal 327: pp. 1419–1420. Margalit, Avishai 1996. The Decent Society, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Maritain, Jacques 1971. The Rights of Man and Natural Law, trans. Doris C. Anson, New York: Gordian Press. Nāgārjuna. Suhṛllekhaḥ Based on the ed. by Padma Tendzin. 2002. Suhridlekha. Varanasi: Central Institute of High Tibetan Studies (CIHTS); gretil-ed.: http://fiindolo.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/buddh /bsa015_u.htm (10. 06. 2013). Nagel, Thomas 1978. The Possibility of Altruism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Parfit, Derek 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pasadika Bhikkhu 1996. »Universal Responsibility according to Nagarjuna’s mDo kun las btus pa (Sūtrasamuccaya)«, in: Tewari, Ramesh Chandra; Krishna Nath. eds. Universal Responsibility. H. H. the Dalai Lama Felicitation Volume. New Delhi: FUR & ANB Publishers.

234 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity« Perera, L. P. N. 1991. Buddhism and Human Rights. A Buddhist Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Colombo: Karunaratne & Sons. Pérez-Remón, Joáquin 1980. Self and Non-self in Early Buddhism. New York, The Hague, Paris: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Plomer, Aurora 2005. Law and Ethics of Medical Research. International Bioethics and Human Rights. London, Sidney: Cavendish. Ramanan, K. Venkata 1998. [1966] Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy as presented in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Sūtra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Ratankul, Pinit 1988. »Bioethics in Thailand. The Struggle for Buddhist Solutions«, in: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13, pp. 301–312. Ratanakul, Pinit 1986. Bioethics: An Introduction to the Ethics of Medicine and Life Sciences. Bangkok: Mahidol University. Ratanakul, Pinit 2004. »Comments on the Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics«, in: International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO (ed.), Eleventh Session Report, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 147–150. Roetz, Heiner 2004. »Muss der kulturelle Pluralismus einen substantiellen ethischen Konsens verhindern? Zur Bioethik im Zeitalter der Globalisierung«, in: Eva Baumann, Alexander Brink, Arnd T. May et al., eds. Weltanschauliche Offenheit in der Bioethik, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 213–231. Ratanakul, Pinit 2009. »Bioethics in Thailand. An Update«. Asian Bioethics Review 1, 1, pp. 47–53. Roy, Olivier 2004. Globalised Islam. The Search for a New Ummah. London: Hurst. Sakamoto, Hyakudai 1994. »Post-modern Bioethics and Medical Genetics«, in: Norio Fujiki, M. D. & Darryl R. J. Macer, eds., Intractable Neurological Disorders, Human Genome Research and Society (Proceedings of the Third International Bioethics Seminar in Fukui), Christchurch (N.Z.): Eubios Institute, 285–288. Sakamoto, Hyakudai 2002. »A Challenge to the Concept of Human Rights and Human Dignity – From the Philosophical Viewpoint of the Global Bioethics«, In: Global Bioethics: problemi di bioetica 15 (3), pp. 49–54. Sakamoto, Hyakudai 2004. »The Foundations of a Possible Asian Bioethics«, in: Ren-Zong Qiu (ed.), Bioethics: Asian Perspectives. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 45– 48. Suu Kyi, Aung San 1991. Freedom From Fear. London: Penguin Books. Śāntideva. Bodhicāryāvatāra. [Bca]. P. L. Vaidya, ed. 1960. The Bodhicāryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjika of Prajñākaramati, Dharbanga: Mithila Institute. Sciberras, Colette 2008. »Buddhism and Speciesism: on the Misapplication of Western Concepts to Buddhist Beliefs«. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 15, pp. 215–240. Schicktanz, Silke 2004. »Die kulturelle Vielfalt in der Bioethik-Debatte«, in: ibid., Chr. Tannert, Peter M. Wiedemann, eds. Kulturelle Aspekte der Biomedizin. Bioethik, Religionen und Alltagsperspektiven, Frankfurt/M., New York: Campus, pp. 263–282.

235 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jens Schlieter Schlieter, Jens 2004. »Some Aspects of the Buddhist Assessment of Human Cloning«. In: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Silja Vöneky, eds. Human Dignity and Human Cloning. Brill: Leiden, Boston, pp. 23–33. Schlieter, Jens 2006. »Some Observations on Buddhist Thoughts on Human Cloning«, in: Heiner Roetz, ed. Cross-Cultural Issues in Bioethics – The Example of Human Cloning. Rodopi: Amsterdam, pp. 179–202. Schlieter, Jens 2010. Review of Charles Goodman. 2009. Consequences of Compassion. An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, in: Religion 40, (2010), pp. 358–359. Schlieter, Jens 2014. »Endure, adapt, or overcome? The concept of suffering in Buddhist Bioethics«. In: Ronald Green, Nathan Palpant, eds. Suffering and Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 309–336. Scholte, Jan Aart 2000. Globalization. A Critical Introduction. Houndmills: MacMillan. Siderits, Mark 2003. Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy. Empty Persons. Aldershot: Ashgate. Stoecker, Ralf 2011. »The Roots of Human Dignity: A Standard Account«. In: Paulus Kaufmann et al., Humiliation, Degradation […], pp. 7–19. Taniguchi, Shōyō 1987. »Biomedical Ethics from a Buddhist Perspective«. Pacific World New Series 3, pp. 75–83. Taniguchi, Shōyō 1987. A Study of Biomedical Ethics from a Buddhist Perspective. MA Thesis, Berkeley: Graduate Theological Union and the Institute of Buddhist Studies. Taniguchi, Shōyō 1994. »Methodology of Buddhist Biomedical Ethics«. In: Paul F. Camenisch, ed. Religious Methods and Resources in Bioethics, Dordrecht etc.: Kluwer, pp. 31–65. Taniguchi Shōyō 1995. »Modern Science and Early Buddhist Ethics: Methodology of Two Disciplines«, in: The Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies, New Series 11, pp. 28–67. Taniguchi, Shōyō 1996. A Systematic Structure of Ethics Founded on Causal Conditionary. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Dissertation Services (Diss.). The President’s Council on Bioethics. ed. 2002. Human Cloning and Human Dignity. An Ethical Inquiry Washington, D.C. (www.bioethics.gov/reports/ cloningreport). Todd, Warren L. 2012. A Selfless Response to an Illusory World. A Comparative Study of Śāntideva and Śaṅkara. Lancaster, Lancaster University (Diss.). Trenckner, [Carl] Vilhelm, ed. 1880. The Milindapañho: Being Dialogues between King Milinda and the Buddhist Sage Nāgasena. London: Williams & Norgate. Tsomo, Karma Lekshe Bhikṣuṇī 2006. Into the Jaws of Yama, Lord of Death: Buddhism, Bioethics, and Death. Albany: State University of New York Press. Vetter, Tilmann 2000. The ›Khandha Passages‹ in the Vinayapiṭaka and the Four Main Nikāyas. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Warren, Henry Clarke, Dharmananda Kosambi. eds. 1950. Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege.

236 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

The Ethical Significance of »No-self« (anātman) and Human »Dignity« Weber, Max 1994 [1919]. Wissenschaft als Beruf: 1917/1919. Politik als Beruf: 1919. Tübingen: Mohr. Westerhoff, Jan 2009. Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka. A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wetz, Franz-Josef 2004. »Die Menschenwürde als Opium fürs Volk. Der Wertstatus von Embryonen«, in: Mathias Kettner (ed.), Biomedizin und Menschenwürde, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 221–248. Wynne, Alexander 2010 [2011]. »The ātman and its Negation. A Conceptual and Chronological Analysis of Early Buddhist Thought«, in: Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33, 1–2, pp. 103–171. Yamakami, Sogen 1912 [reprint 2007]. Systems of Buddhistic Thought. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press (printed by Atulchandra Bhattacharyya).

237 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

Bioethics, Animalism, and the Possibility of Bodily Transfer 1

The Strong First-Person Requirement The ability to possess what has been called a strong first-person perspective is the capacity »not just to have thoughts expressible by means of ›I‹, but also to conceive of oneself as the bearer of those thoughts« (Baker 1998, p. 330). The distinction between weak and strong first-person phenomena is, Baker argues, reflected in the difference between making a first-person reference and attributing the first-person reference to oneself. Weak first-person phenomena are in play whenever one responds to one’s environment in a way that demands an egocentric perspective: ducking when one sees a projectile heading in one’s direction, for example. If asked, I might say I ducked because the ball was coming towards me, thereby making a first-person reference. But it is important to notice that animals too have a perspectival awareness, an awareness of their environment which locates them within it. What they lack is the ability to conceive of themselves, in the way that I do if, for example, I wonder whether I should have ducked, thereby attributing to myself the first-person thought »Should I have ducked?« Animal selves are perspectival, human selves are strongly first-personal. I prefer to use the phrase »first-person stance« for what Baker calls the strong first-person perspective, reserving the phrase »first-person perspective« for its use, as in Shoemaker (1996), for the idea of having one’s own mental life in view. I will call the thesis that a self is something which can conceive of itself as itself, and so entertain a first-person stance, the »strong firstperson requirement« on selfhood. Reference to memory and identification can be read as introducing such a requirement. When one says that a self must be able to remember its own past experiences, it is not 1

This chapter is an extract from Chapter 6 of Ganeri 2012.

238 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Bioethics, Animalism, and the Possibility of Bodily Transfer

enough simply that some past experience causes a given present memory, for example a memory of being rained on. What one has in mind is the strong first-person sense, as in »I remember that I myself was getting wet«, in which I attribute to myself a memory expressed in the first-person. Similarly, the point about cross-modal identification is not merely that a sufficiently sophisticated cognitive system can correlate information from different sense-modalities, but that a subject of experience can think of itself as seeing and touching the very same object: »This thing which I am now looking at is just the same as the thing which I am now touching«. Animalism is the philosophical thesis that being that a person is identical with the human animal and not with either an immaterial soul or a psychological continuum. In taking the reference of »I« to be the biological human being, Animalism is the concept of a person presumed in bioethical discussions of personhood. A phenomenon has been thought to present Animalist criteria for personal identity with insuperable difficulties is the possibility that I might go from one body to another and survive the transfer.

Is Bodily Transfer Possible? Philosophers who think that the diachronic identity of the self is that of an enduring entity and those who think that it consists in relations of psychological continuity agree about one thing: it is possible for me to transfer to another physical body and still survive, and that the Animalist thesis that the self is the body is therefore false. We are familiar with Shoemaker’s brain-state transfer device and Parfit’s teletransporter, both of which transfer all the information in one’s psychology from one brain or body to another. 2 Such thought experiments are intended to show that it is conceivable that I can continue in another body, or at least that criteria of bodily identity are not criteria of personal identity. Peter van Inwagen (1997) presents a formal argument that bodily transfer is incompatible with Animalism. His argument is based on a very simple idea: that if two objects are distinct, then they cannot become identical. If I am identical to my body, and am then transferred into another body, then that other body is identical to me after 2

See Parfit 1984, p. 199; Shoemaker 1984, pp. 108–11; cf. Williams 1973, pp. 79–81.

239 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

the transfer but distinct from me before. Two distinct things have become identical. Van Inwagen’s argument is vitually the same as the one Jayanta uses to refute the idea that one can be identical to a life-stage at one time and a distinct life-stage at another; and that is not surprising, because Jayanta’s view about the persistence of bodies implies that at each life-stage I have a distinct body. Why should we accept the principle that distinct entities cannot become identical? Van Inwagen says: »In the present case, the objects under consideration have different histories. For example, you are here now and the physical object that you are going to become after the information has flowed from one brain to another is now over there – and each of them is in only one of these two places, not in both simultaneously. If you are this organism now at t1 and will be that organism over there later at t2, that organism over there will, by a simple application of Leibniz’s Law, be able to say, truly, ›At t1 I was right here and it is not the case that at t1 I was right here.‹« (1997, p. 310).

Given that many philosophers have regarded bodily transfer as a distinct possibility, the fact that it is incompatible with Animalism seems to put pressure on that view. Such considerations have also been a decisive motivation in the development of accounts in India whose aim is to supersede that of the materialist and Animalist theory of the Cārvāka. Buddhists have told stories about survival in a new body to support their view that it is a mistake to identify oneself with one’s mere body. In one story, the parts of the body are replaced one by one until there is a completely new one, a process which induces a question about survival: »Once a man who was ordered to go to some distant place, found himself passing the night in a deserted house. In the middle of the night a demon who was carrying a dead man on his shoulders, came and set it down next to him. Then a second demon came along in pursuit of the first and began to angrily reproach him saying, ›That dead man belongs to me; why was it you who carried it here?‹ The first demon replied, ›It is my property, it’s me who took it and I carried it off myself‹. The second demon responded, ›It was really me who carried that dead man here‹. The two demons, each taking hold of the corpse by a hand, fought over it. The first demon said, ›There is a man here whom we can interrogate‹. The second demon then asked him, ›Who carried this dead man here?‹ The man thought to himself as follows: ›These two demons are very strong; whether I tell the truth or I lie, my death is certain; in neither case would I escape. How would it be good to lie?‹ He then declared that it was the first demon who had carried [the

240 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Bioethics, Animalism, and the Possibility of Bodily Transfer

corpse]. Then the second demon, in a rage, grabbed him by the hand, tore it off and threw it to the ground. But the first demon took an arm of the corpse and attached it to him. In the same way he replaced the two arms, the two feet, the head and the sides of the body [with parts of the corpse]. Then the two demons together devoured the body of the man which they had replaced [with that of the corpse], and after wiping their mouths departed. The man then reflected thus: ›The body that was born of my father and mother, I have seen with my own eyes being entirely devoured by those two demons. Now my present body is entirely constituted by the flesh of someone else. Do I quite clearly have a body, or do I no longer have a body? If I think I have one, it is entirely the body of another. If I think that in fact I don’t have one, here is a body that is perfectly visible‹. When he had thus reflected, his mind grew greatly troubled and he became like someone who has lost their senses. The next morning he returned to the road and departed. Arriving in a kingdom in a highly puzzled state, he saw a group of monks by a Buddhist stūpa; he didn’t know what else to ask them than whether his body existed or not. The monks asked, ›Who are you?‹ He responded, ›I don’t really know whether I am a person or I am not a person‹. He then told the assembly at length about what had happened. The monks then said, ›This man recognises for himself the non-existence of the ›I‹. He will easily attain the state of liberation‹. Addressing him, they said to him, ›Your body, from the beginning until today, was never a self, and it is not that this has only now come to be the case. It is only because the four great elements are assembled together that you thought, »This is my body«. Between your body at other times and that of today there is no difference.‹« 3

The possibility of psychological linkages across bodies is also considered by the Nyāya commentators, in connection with a problem about neonate emotion. Nyāya-sūtra 3.1.18–26 argue that a neonate experiences the emotions of fear (bhaya), sorrow (śoka) and delight (harṣa), emotions which, it is claimed, are constitutively such as to follow on the heels of a memory of some experience in the past. Praśastapāda analyses the respective emotions as follows. Delight is the experience of pleasure one has on fulfilling a longing for something one desired. Fear is an inability to rid oneself of the wish to flee in the presence of what will lead to something one does not desire. Sorrow is the unfulfillable longing for something which one desires and from which one is separated. Elsewhere, desire itself is analysed as an unPseudo-Nāgārjuna 1994, pp. 738–740. See Ganeri 2007, pp. 212–215 for further discussion of this passage. The example resembles Parfit’s spectrum argument (Parfit 1984, p. 237), and more especially Stone’s modification (Stone 1988, p. 522). Parfit’s view is that what such arguments show is that the man’s question as to whether he was the same person as before is an empty one.

3

241 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

fulfilled longing for something one wants but does not have. Emotions like these are complex psychological events, and only occur as part of a richly-woven psychological life, involving, in particular, remembered past experiences and anticipated future ones. Applied to the question of neonates, the further argument canvassed is that we know these emotions are felt by newly born infants, because we see that they flinch, cry, and smile; therefore, even a neonate must have memories of experiences from another body. Something very interesting can be noted about the analyses that have been given of the states of fear, sorrow and delight. In each case, a first-person stance is involved. One does not feel delight unless one is aware that one’s own longing has been fulfilled; one does not feel afraid unless one cannot rid oneself of the wish to flee from that which one does not oneself welcome. Discussing these cases, Prabhācandra the Jaina comments: »Those who have not had prior experiences of the results following from what is desired or undesired would not, in a law-like manner, wish to seek or avoid them. That to which the prior experience is ascribed, it is the self, a distinct existence« (Prabhācandra 1991, p. 3478, 1–3). Many emotions are first-person involving, and their alleged reach across bodies seemingly again calls for selves to have identity conditions distinct from bodies. If bodily transfer is a genuine possibility, then so is the possibility of fission. Thought experiments involving fission have dominated discussion about personal identity. It is therefore of some interest to note that the alleged impossibility of twins sharing psychological links with their common parents is cited by Prabhācandra as a reason in favour of independent selves over psychological streams: »It cannot be the case that repeated exposure to an object by one person leads it to be recognised by someone else. If such were the case, then each child would recognise [objects experienced by its parents] and judge ›This has been experienced by me.‹ Moreover, each child would recognise objects experienced by the other« (Prabhacandra 1990, pp. 119, 10–14).

The Embodied Self Even if Animalism is false, one might still want to maintain that selfhood requires embodiment, and perhaps even more strongly, that selves are individuated according to bodily criteria. That is to say, 242 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Bioethics, Animalism, and the Possibility of Bodily Transfer

one might take the lesson to be not that one of Reductionism or Cartesianism must be true, but rather that questions of individuation and ownership must be kept apart. One Nyāya philosopher, Vācaspati, points to a particular difficulty in the earlier theory about neonate emotion: if a newborn’s desires are the result of its remembering pleasures from its previous life, and if it is possible for an elephant to be reborn as a human being, then why is it that we do not find baby human beings with the desires of elephants, such as the desire to eat certain sorts of leaves? [Objection:] »If the desires of a neonate are the result of remembering past experiences, then in the case where a self that occupied a human body in its past life is born into an elephant’s body, the desires of the elephant cub would be for such things as are sought after by human beings.« [Reply:] The answer is that the character of the child’s desires depend on the body he has at the time; and the desires in the elephant cub would be those in accordance with the experiences undergone by that self in a remote previous life when in an elephant’s body. (Vācaspati 1997, p. 476, 17–477,2, on Nyāya-sūtra 3.1.26; trans. Jha 1984, p. 1170, modified).

There is a recognition here that the nature of one’s appetites, and other dimensions of one’s experience, are subject to bodily criteria. This is the so-called »embodied mind« thesis (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Shapiro 2004; Gallagher 2005). 4 A further argument is that it is not after all conceivable that I could be exactly as I am, enjoying the very same inner phenomenology and with the very same first-person stance, but in a different body (or different type of body). Thomas Nagel famously argues that a human being can form no idea what it would be like to be a bat, with its echo-mediated acquaintance with the world. The best one can do is to imagine one’s own body having a bat-shape; thus, recalling what we said before about the imagination, we must distinguish between imagining having a different body and imagining oneself as differently bodied (Nagel 1974). Commenting now on the Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya, Vācaspati suggests that the self is not the body because a very skilled yogī can assume the physical form of a tiger, and also because Lakoff and Johnson describe the embodied mind thesis as a »challenge to western thought«. Presumably they have in mind the Abrahamic/Cartesian picture of the mind as potentially able to exist in separation from the body. The Nyāya conception of embodied self is similarly in tension with the more ›Cartesian‹ view of the Jaina Prabhācandra.

4

243 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

one can dream that one is a tiger – but in either case »although one conceives of oneself as assuming another body, one continues to recognise the seat of one’s concept of I (ahaṃkāra).« 5 If Nagel is right, not even the most skilled yogī could know what it is like to be a tiger, and I take it that what Vācaspati means by the preservation of the »seat of one’s sense of I« in this example is that one can dream of oneself inhabiting a tiger’s body, but one cannot dream being a tiger: my dream of being in a tiger’s body is that of having all my experience, conditioned by my human embodiment, simply transplanted there. 6 The seat of one’s concept of I is just the grounds of one’s occupancy of a first-person stance, and the point is that one could never inhabit a tiger’s first-person stance: the identity conditions of one’s occupancy of a first-person stance are at least in part bodily. If some version of an »embodied mind« thesis for first-person stances is correct, then that is an argument against any conception of self which does not presume the body to be the individuative base. It is evident from this example that occupying a first-person stance is a matter of one’s whole bearing; it is not simply an issue about a special sort of content that some mental states happen to have, »phenomenal content«. The analyses of the first-person stance in three Indian thinkers, Vasubandhu, Praśastapāda, and Vātsyāyana, are all sensitive to this point. One naturalist text affirms that there is no possibility of bodily transfer at the moment of death: »Upwards from the soles of the feet, downwards from the tips of the hair on the head, within the skin’s surface is the human being (jīva), or what is the same, the self (ātman). It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not out-last its destruction. With that ends life. Other men carry the corpse away and burn it. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village. Therefore there is and exists no [immaterial] soul.« 7

This text is important because it neither denies that there is self nor does it identify it with the body. It affirms that the self and the body are co-persistents, that the self does not out-last the body. So there is here the beginning of a possibility that a broadly naturalist perspecyogavyāghravat svapnadaśāyāṃ ca śarīrāntaraparigrahābhimāne ’py ahaṃkārāspadasya pratyabhijñāyamānatvam iti yuktam | (Vācaspati 1980, p. 766, 30–31). 6 See also Kumārila 1929: Ātmavāda 59a–62d. 7 Quoted in the Sūtrakṛtāṅga 2.1.15 (trans. Jacobi 1895, vol. 2, pp. 339–340). 5

244 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Bioethics, Animalism, and the Possibility of Bodily Transfer

tive is consistent with conceptions of self other than Animalism. A naturalist who is not an Animalist might wish to argue instead that psychological traits which require specifically embodied individuation criteria are constitutive aspects of selfhood. According to what I am calling the strong first-person requirement, nothing is a self which lacks the capacity to conceive of itself as itself. So then the question is whether there any aspect of mind which is subject to specifically embodied individuation criteria and can also ground the satisfaction of the strong first-person requirement. If there is, then the claim that this is a self represents a way to endorse the embodied mind thesis without identifying the self with the body.

Core Self as Bodily Presence C. D. Broad draws a distinction between those theories about the unity of mind which »ascribe the unity of the mind to the fact that there is a certain particular existent – a Centre – which stands in a common asymmetrical relation to all the mental events which could be said to be states of a certain mind« and those »No-Centre« theories which do not. Among the theories which do propose such a Centre, it is common to take it to consist in something like a Pure Cartesian Ego. Broad notices, however, that there is room for a theory that is neither a Pure Ego theory nor a No-Centre theory. According to Broad, »[T]he most plausible form of this theory would be to identify the Central Event at any moment with a mass of bodily feeling. The longitudinal unity of a self through a period of time would then depend on the fact that there is a mass of bodily feeling which goes on continuously throughout this period and varies in quality not at all or very slowly« (Broad 1925, p. 566).

The claim that there is a more or less static sense of »bodily feeling.« It gives the naturalist just quoted much of what they want, a self essentially individuated by the body. On the assumption that bodily feeling supervenes on states of the body, such a view takes the body to be the individuative base, but not identical to the self. It is, we might say, a Minimal Ownership View. Williams James too said that there is what he called »the nucleus of ›me‹«, which consists in »bodily existence felt to be present« (James 1890, vol. 1, p. 400). As James was aware, though, this »nu245 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

cleus of ›me‹« is not yet a self, and Broad’s proposal is not a viable one. One obvious problem is that nothing in Broad’s suggestion implies that the changing body of a single individual will sustain the same or even a very similar somatic field. A more serious problem is that the presence of a continuous mass of bodily feeling is compatible with the inability to discharge any of the higher-order functional tasks alleged to be constitutive of having a self. The theory of self we are looking for is one for which having a first-person stance – an ability to conceive of my mental life as my own, including the ability to think of the states that depend on my having the body I do as my own bodily states – is a necessary condition on selfhood. According to the suggestion of Jayanta, a naturalist might derive support for their view from certain Upaniṣadic passages where the self is portrayed as »a single mass of cognition, which is risen up out of these elements and is dissolved into them«. The self is spoken of there as being without a core or a surface, but as pervading the subject in the way that salinity pervades brine water or salt crystals. The implication is that it is something which is diffused throughout one’s experiential life: »When a chunk of salt is thrown in water, it dissolves into that very water, and it cannot be picked up in any way. Yet, from whichever place one may take a sip, the salt is there! In the same way this Immense Being has no limit or boundary and is a compact mass (ghana) of cognition (vijñāna)« (Bṛhad. Up. 2.4.12). The picture is of the self as being an invariant mode of self-awareness which saturates the entirety of one’s inner life, a constant hum of presence to oneself. A similar idea is prominent in the phenomenological tradition. Michel Henry says, for example, that »The interiority of the immediate presence to itself constitutes the essence of ipseity« (Henry 1975, p. 38). It is available in Gabriel Marcel’s notion of a body-mediated sense of participation, which he called the feeling of being »at home« in oneself (Marcel 1949). Zahavi demonstrates that the idea that there is what he calls »a pre-reflective sense of mineness« in experience is part of the thought of several classical phenomenologists. He goes on to argue that »it is also possible to identify this pre-reflective sense of mineness with a minimal, core, self« (Zahavi 2005, p. 125). The term »core« refers to the version of the idea found in Damasio’s neuroscientific posit of a »core consciousness« (Damasio 1999, p. 7, 10, 127). Leibniz said that music is a sensation of counting without being aware that one is counting, and here the phenomenon falls under a similar description: the self is a feeling of being present to oneself 246 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Bioethics, Animalism, and the Possibility of Bodily Transfer

without being explicitly aware that one is present to oneself. This would explain the much discussed diaphanousness of the self, its elusiveness to conscious attention. As Ryle once said, someone who tries to catch the self »has failed to catch more than the flying coat-tails of that which he was pursuing. His quarry was the hunter« (Ryle 1949, p. 187). If the self is at core what lies beneath attention, then to try to make it into an object of attention is to engage in an act which is pragmatically self-defeating, like trying to step on one’s own shadow. Beneath whatever one does succeed in bringing to one’s attention there is a sensation of self-presence, and that, so it is claimed, should be identified as the essentially embodied core self. For this to be a workable proposal as a theory of self, and not merely as a datum within human phenomenology, one would need to be able to claim that it is precisely because of the »presence to oneself« that one is in a position to think of one’s states as one’s own, that the capacity for a first-person stance is underwritten by it – although, being a capacity, it need not presently be exercised in order to be present. More can be said about this important notion of »underwriting« (recalling also Vācaspati’s use of the term »seat«). Yogācāra Buddhists too acknowledge that something underwrites the capacity in question, which they see as a sort of first-person mental file (ālaya-vijñāna) but deny is identical with a self. 8 The worry is that the core or minimal self is too minimal to count as a self. A core self does not seem to do one of the things that a respectable concept of self must, and that is to individuate thinkers. The property »being a thought of one’s own« is a property like »being a divisor of itself«, which is equally true of every number; the reflexive pronoun is just a place-holder. Zahavi says that »the particular first-person givenness of the experience makes it mine and distinguishes it for me from whatever experiences others might have« (2005a, p. 124). This choice of words suggests that first-person givenness is individuative of individual selves, but it is not clear that it actually is. What does the real work here is an embodiment criterion; it is because of their having distinct bodies that individuals are indiZahavi makes it a »minimal demand to any proper theory of self-awareness« that it »be able to explain the peculiar features characterising the subject-use of »I«; that is, no matter how complex or differentiated the structure of self-awareness is ultimately shown to be, if the account given is unable to preserve the difference between the first-person and third-person perspectives, unable to capture its referential uniqueness, it has failed as an explanation of self-awareness« (1999, p. 13).

8

247 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri

viduated. That is what prevents this variety of Minimal Ownership View from collapsing into a Pure Consciousness View. 9 A Core Self theorist therefore does best to insist that the »presence to oneself« in virtue of which I can think of my experience as my own is rooted in the body (»risen up out of the elements«), that it is fundamentally embodied, but without identifying it simply with somatic or proprioceptive sensation. An embodied feeling of presence-to-self is, at least potentially, able to distinguish distinct individual selves, because it is distinct from one body to another. 10 For at least one contemporary Animalist, the proposal is nevertheless untenable, because the posited sense of »presence-to-self« simply does not exist: »[Some say this:] ›The ›I‹ experience, as we can all feel, is quite distinct from bodily experiences of pain or joy. Therefore, the ›I‹ experience must be grounded in something, which is quite distinct from both body and unconscious mind (manas).‹ This is not tenable: we do not believe in the possibility of any experience which may be characterised as the experience of the pure ›I‹ ; neither do those who believe in the doctrine of self (ātman). According to us self-as-body theorists, this person is no different from the body, which is the actual referent of the term ›I‹. We do not understand why one should unnecessarily look for another referent.« (Shukla 1984 [1991, p. 11]).

Shukla’s scepticism about the very existence of the posited invariant sense of self-presence is to be taken very seriously, but I do not share his confidence that a Strawsonian concept of a person is what is needed instead. What we need rather is a way to respect the asymmetry between the first- and the third-person stances in a manner compatible with naturalism. What we need is precisely a »doctrine of self,« a more robust version of the Ownership View.

This point is acknowledged, for instance in Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 184: »If my self-experience is, in the primary instance, of a purely mental nature, i. e. if my body does not figure essentially in my self-ascription of (some) psychological states, while my ascription of mental states to others are based solely on their bodily behaviour, what, then, should guarantee the ascription of the same type of states to others?« 10 As in Merleau-Ponty’s claim that subjects realise their ipseity in their embodied being-in-the world (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 408). 9

248 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Bioethics, Animalism, and the Possibility of Bodily Transfer

Literature Baker, Lynne 1998, The First-Person Perspective: A Test For Naturalism, American Philosophical Quarterly 35.4, pp. 327–48. Broad, C. D. 1925, The Mind and its Place in Nature, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Damasio, A. R. 1999, The Feeling of What Happens, San Diego, CA: Harcourt. Gallagher, Shaun 2005, How the Body Shapes the Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan 2008, The Phenomenological Mind, London: Routledge. Ganeri, Jonardon 2007, The Concealed Art of the Soul: Theories of Self and Practices of Truth in Indian Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. – (2012). The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gautama 1997, »Nyāya-sūtra«, in Anantalal Thakur ed. Gautamīya-nyāya-darśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana (Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research). See also Nyāya-darśanam, edited by Taranatha Nyaya-Taraktirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1985). Translation: Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana’s Commentary (Calcutta: Indian Studies, 1982). Henry, Michel 1975, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, trans. G. Etzkorn, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Jacobi, Hermann trans. 1895, Jaina Sūtras, Part II, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, Sacred Books of the East, vol. 45. James, William 1890, The Principles of Psychology New York: H. Holt & co. 2 vols. Kumārila 1929, Ślokavārttika. K. Sambasiva Sastri ed., The Mīmāṃsa-ślokavārttika with the commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. 90, Trivandrum). Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark 1999, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought, New York: Basic Books. Marcel, Gabriel 1949, Being and Having, Westminster: Dacre Press. Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith, London: Routledge. Nagel, Thomas 1974, »What is it Like to Be a Bat?,« The Philosophical Review 83, pp. 435–50. Parfit, Derek 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Prabhacandra 1990, Prameya-kamala-martanda, Nyaya Shastri Mahendrakumar ed. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 3rd edn. – (1991). Nyaya-kumuda-candra, Nyaya Shastri Mahendrakumar ed. (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications), 2 vols, 2nd edn. Pseudo-Nāgārjuna 1994, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra), trans. from the Chinese by Étienne Lamotte; Louvain: Bibliothéque du Muséon, 1944, vol. 2.

249 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Jonardon Ganeri Ryle, Gilbert 1949, The Concept of Mind; London: Hutchinson’s University Library. Shapiro, Lawrence 2004, The Mind Incarnate; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Shoemaker, Sydney 1968, »Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,« Journal of Philosophy 65.19, pp. 555–67; reprinted in his Identity, Cause, and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). – (1984). »Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account,« in S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne, Personal Identity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), pp. 67–132. – (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Shukla, Badrinath 1984, »Nyāya-śāstrīya-vicāra-paddhatyā dehātmavādasya sambhābhanā,« Sarasvatī Suṣamā 38, pp. 121–124. Translated as »Dehātmavāda or the Body as Soul: the Exploration of a Possibility within Nyāya Thought,« Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (1991, pp. 1–17. Vācaspati Miśra 1980, Bhāmati, in Jagdish Lal Shastri ed., Brahmasūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣyam (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass). – (1997). Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā, Anantalal Thakur ed. (Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research). Partial translation: Jha, Ganganatha (1984). The Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass). Van Inwagen, Peter 1997, »Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity« Philosophical Perspectives 11, pp. 305–19. Williams, Bernard 1973, »Are Persons Bodies?,« in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 64–81. Zahavi, Dan 1999, Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston: Northwestern University Press). – (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).

250 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

There are two kinds of philosophers in this world, those who believe in selves, and those who don’t. Or so it seems. The question whether something like a self exists has inspired philosophers 1 again and again to make all kinds of claims based on intuitions that could not be farther apart from each other. Thus, famously, Descartes (1641) argued for the existence of a self and characterized it as an immaterial, thinking thing. The self, understood as mental substance, is supposed to exist independently from any body or physical thing, the material substance. Descartes arrives at this claim on the basis of an epistemological inquiry into what we (can) know and it is based on the (alleged) attributes of the mental and of matter, namely ›thinking‹ and ›extension‹. 2 On the other end of the extreme, and much more recently, Metzinger (2003, p. 1) has claimed that there are no selves: ›Nobody ever was or had a self.‹ On this view, selves do not exist, whether material or not; the notion does not fulfill any indispensable executive function and we have indeed no clear motivation to postulate a self, especially not in a scientific investigation of consciousness, or so Metzinger argues. Just like there are various routes to argue for the existence of a self, there are many routes to a rejection of it. Suffice it to say that, notoriously, the notions of self that are rejected do not always coincide with the notions of self that are defended. When someone formulates claims about the ›self‹, it is absolutely crucial that it is clear what they are talking about exactly. Especially so because a multiplicity of notions of the self has been put forward and defended, e. g. a minimal and an autobiographical (or narrative) self (Gallagher 2000), an ecological, private and conceptual self (Neisser Not only philosophers, psychologists as well, of course. Descartes’ positive argument for the claim that the ›soul‹ can exist independently from the body (or, more specifically, the brain) is importantly flawed, demonstrated by Kant once and for all in his ›Critique of pure reason‹ (cf. Schlicht 2007).

1 2

251 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

1988), a proto-self and a core self (Damasio 2011), an embodied self (Thompson 2007), a social self (Prinz 2012), and so on (see Gallagher 2011 for an overview). Moreover, all these notions, or aspects, of the self, have been explored as answers to quite distinct questions, e. g. metaphysical questions about the nature and existence of the self (or selves), phenomenological questions about our conscious awareness of ourselves as selves, and epistemological questions concerning our knowledge about ourselves. Given this diversity, Olson (1998) has argued that given the lack of consensus about what the notion of a ›self‹ denotes, there cannot be any philosophical ›problem of the self‹ either. Consequently, he argues, books and articles purporting to be about the self are really about something else, and about different things in different cases. 3 Yet, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, psychiatrists, and other scientists continue talking and writing about ›it‹ (the self) and investigate ›it‹ empirically. So there has to be something about ›the self‹ that keeps people busy and in business. What’s going on? The paper has two main parts. I will first try to clarify which notion of self is at issue when philosophers reject or criticize the postulation of a self. In the second part, I will formulate a series of considerations (which, taken together, may constitute something like a proper argument) suggesting the indispensability of something that some parties would be inclined to call a self, although it may be less controversial if we gave it another, less contentious name like ›subject of experience‹. These considerations are based on (1) the analyses of the structures of phenomenal consciousness and intentionality, (2) empirical theories of consciousness, and (3) the embodied and situated nature of cognition and consciousness. Thus, I am trying to develop a way of thinking about the self that is both philosophically sound and empirically informed. Yet, the reader may be warned that this paper can only provide a rough sketch of the line of thought without elaborating all details and addressing all objections. 4

I cannot exclude the possibility that this paper is about something else, too, but I am sincerely trying to write about the self. 4 Cf. Schlicht (2015) for an alternative treatment of these issues in the context of a discussion of Williford’s (2015) recent approach to the self. 3

252 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

1.

Self as Thing or Essence

Many philosophers working in the Philosophy of Mind still seem to think they have to argue against Descartes’ claims as if there were still many Cartesians around, defending his position on the relation between mind and body. Many articles and books on problems in this area start their discussions with a thorough but rarely original criticism of Descartes’ famous defense of the claim that the self (or the mind or the soul) is a non-extended thinking thing that can exist independently of a body and is thus a substance in the traditional sense. A central part of Descartes’ argument is the ›insight‹ that the essential attribute of what he calls the ›soul‹, namely, thinking, can be manifested and carried out independently from any bodily condition or feature. Kant (1781) already objected very early on that Descartes unjustifiably moves from the conceivability of the separation of soul from body to the assumption of the real distinctness of soul and body. Furthermore, it is unclear how a non-extended mental substance could interact with (or act within) an extended body (or brain). This problem has led Ryle (1949) to his famous quip about the ›ghost in the machine‹. These are only two of the many famous discussions of Descartes’ position, such that it seems somewhat superfluous to still go over this today. I take it that this extreme view of the self, understood as an independently existing non-physical substance, exemplified by Descartes’ Meditations, is unmotivated and has long been successfully demonstrated to be false. Here I am in the same boat with those who reject ›the self‹. Given the venerable tradition of rejections of Descartes’ dualism of mind and body, it comes somewhat as a surprise that Metzinger’s recent claim that ›no such things as selves exist in this world‹ (2003, p. 1) has met so much controversy. After all, it turns out very quickly in his writings that the target of his rejection is the same notion of self that Descartes had in mind: Metzinger argues for the claim that ›to the best of our current knowledge there is no thing, no indivisible entity, that is us, neither in the brain nor in some metaphysical realm beyond this world‹ (2009, p. 1). Thus, he claims to have demonstrated that ›what we have been calling »the self« in the past is not a substance, an unchangeable essence, or a thing‹ (2003, p. 563). But the claim that selves are such things or essences in the world is rarely

253 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

defended these days anyway. So while Metzinger may be right, this is hardly a shocking point. 5 Metzinger also compares his »conception of selflessness« with the central claim (or even goal) of Buddhist enlightenment (2003, p. 566). This takes us to a related but different criticism of the self, put forward by various Buddhist schools of philosophy (Siderits 2007). 6 The rejection of self has been identified as one of Buddha’s central teachings. And there is a clear motivation behind this rejection, since it is believed that all suffering originates from an erroneous conception of oneself as a self, understood as an ›unchanging essence‹. But believing in an unchanging essence amounts to suffering from an illusion since there are no such things. Consequently, once one attempts to hold on to that which is not there, suffering ensues. Thus, while the self is rejected according to this understanding of Buddhist philosophy, the rejection clearly addresses a particular notion of self, which seems to be the same notion we have met before A closer look at Metzinger’s account reveals that he displays a somewhat split attitude towards the status of what is phenomenally given to us in consciousness and what we can justifiably conclude from such phenomenology. While he is prepared to grant that the ›world‹ out there around us, which we experience in perceptual consciousness, exists independently from us, our experience of ourselves as subjects or as ›selves‹ is supposed to be an illusion, which does not warrant an analogous claim about the reality of selves. We supposedly constantly ›confuse‹ the representational content of the model of a self that is generated in the brain with a ›real entity‹ because this model is transparent in the sense that it does not allow us to know that it is a model. Consequently though, there is not literally someone who mistakes the model for a real entity, since no selves exist on Metzinger’s view. But it is a legitimate question why our conscious phenomenology is basically correct with regard to outer reality – Why do we not mistake the brain’s model of the world with the real world? – but massively deluded regarding the status of our own existence. It is also a legitimate question what kind of evidence may warrant this conclusion since ›all we have‹, or at least all we can start with, is our conscious phenomenology. At some point, he calls it the ›phenomenology of singularity‹ or ›substantiality‹ (2011, p. 282 f.). It seems that if Metzinger is prepared to draw the skeptical conclusion with regard to the self, then he should – given his framework – draw the same conclusion with regard to the outer world, or vice versa grant reality in both cases. Granting reality status to some phenomenon does not imply that this amounts to an entity or even substance of some sort. 6 A warning: I am not an expert on Buddhist philosophy. A superficial look at the literature already revealed the enormous complexity and diversity of the various philosophical positions originating in Buddha’s general philosophical approach. Therefore, my brief discussion merely reveals the impression I got from relying on the secondary sources mentioned in the text. I am well aware of the shortcomings of my treatment of Buddhism although I think the general point is right. 5

254 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

– in the discussion of Descartes’ and Metzinger’s positions – the self as substance or unchanging essence. But as is also clear, this rejection is not only well motivated, given the soteriological background of Buddha’s teaching, it is also formulated against a greater metaphysical (and even theological) background from which it cannot be easily separated. In order to demonstrate this, let’s focus on one particular position. One extreme position is the reductionism defended by the Abhidharma School of Buddhism (Siderits 2011, MacKenzie 2010). According to the underlying metaphysical picture of this view, all that exists are »fleeting events« (dharmas), and all everyday entities of the (allegedly) ordinary world are ultimately reducible to such basic events. Thus, this »mereological reductionism« (MacKenzie 2010, p. 81) does not only apply to ›selves‹, but to everything. 7 Obviously, if all that exists enjoys only a momentary existence, then there can be nothing abiding. These Buddhists accept, with respect to the question of whether a self or a person exists, the five ›skandhas‹, i. e. organized aggregates enjoying merely a conceptual existence, 8 but lacking existence over time and substantiality. None of them alone qualifies as a self. Neither can they be considered in sum to constitute a self, understood as an essence or substance. But every evaluation of this kind of rejection of self must take into account the general metaphysical background against which such a rejection is put forward. And obviously the Buddhist worldview is much less ›realistic‹ than the dominant view in today’s Western philosophies. On the Buddhist picture, most of what Westerners would consider ordinary objects are seen as mere illusions: since they only enjoy a conventional existence, they are not ultimately real. To put it mildly, it is a contentious metaphysical picture. A second crucial factor in the Buddhist rejection of a self is the soteriological motivation driving this rejection (Siderits 2011, p. 312). To see the importance of this metaphysical background for an assessment of the Buddhist rejection of self, consider the following point. In general, the core of the Buddhist view is briefly stated as the No-self view. Galin (2003, p. 108) argues that this popular interpretaThus, there seems to be a structural similarity to David Lewis’ (Western) »a priori reductionism about everything« (Lewis 1994, p. 412). 8 The skandhas are the body, affect and sensation, perception and cognition, conditioning and volition, and consciousness (MacKenzie 2010, p. 77 f.). 7

255 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

tion of various Buddhist doctrines rests on a misunderstanding: Since in the Buddhist metaphysical framework, all processes in nature are dynamic, changing and in constant flux, the goal of carving off a self from the rest of nature – non-self – must seem misguided: »This Buddhist declaration is misunderstood in the West because anātman, meaning ›self-is-not-an-essence-or-entity,‹ is taken as ›self-does-notexist-at-all‹ by people who have not imagined any scheme of existence other than entities or essences« (p. 108). Ganeri (2007, p. 185 f.), another expert on Buddhist philosophy of mind, seems to join Galin in this observation. Ganeri distinguishes three readings of the no-self doctrine 9 but highlights an important one according to which »selves are not reducible to streams, but nor do they have a substantial existence distinct from the stream. With some of the pains and sufferings in the world, I seem nevertheless to hold myself in a special relationship: I think of them as mine.« According to Ganeri, philosophers such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, and Candrakīrti believe in a notion of self as an activity that has to do with self-ascription in the unsophisticated sense of experiencing »mineness‹. This will become important in the second part of this paper. As is clear from the foregoing discussion and of these assessments, the Buddhist rejection of self is not so straightforward and only seems to apply to a notion of self that we came across already, namely the traditional Cartesian substantial notion of self as an abiding and unchanging entity. In contrast, and more positively, Buddhist Schools consider the self not as a thing, a substance or essence, but rather as a dynamic process or activity. In this sense, it makes sense to say that there is something we can call a self, but we have to remind ourselves that this is nothing that remains fixed over time, but is something elusive and in continual flux. What can be accepted by Buddhist doctrines? First of all, (at least some) Buddhist schools seem to agree that there are persons (at least conventionally) as psychophysical complexes. Even within a Buddhist »She may be a reductionist, in which case the doctrine of ›no-self‹ is a thesis that there is no sui generis entity irreducible to a psycho-physical stream. But she could also be an error-theoretic irrealist, in which case she will read the slogan as a strict denial that there is anything to which the representational discourse of self refers. And she could be a non-factualist irrealist, opting to deny that the surface grammar of our talk of self is a fair guide to its true function. It is open, furthermore, for someone to be a reductionist in matters of metaphysical or personal identity but a nonreductionist about perspectival selfhood« (Ganeri 2007, p. 189).

9

256 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

framework, the notion of a ›person‹ serves important explanatory purposes (possibly akin to Dennett’s (1991) notion of a self as a »center of narrative gravity«) (Siderits 2011, p. 311 f.). Moreover, as both Ganeri and Albahari (2006, p. 73) seem to suggest, although the substantial and enduring ›self‹ is rejected and the ›person‹ only considered as a useful fiction, Buddhist teaching is not directed against (or at least compatible with) the assumption of a ›subject of experience‹. In fact, in her Analytical Buddhism (Albahari 2006) in which she is rejecting the postulation of a self, Albahari seems to defend a fairly robust notion of a subject of experience (see also Zahavi 2011, p. 63). This is already conceding a lot and as it turns out, this is all we need in order to defend a notion of self in the second part of this essay. Given this brief discussion of criticisms and rejections of the self, the question arises why a defender of the self and its reality would have to consider it as a thing or entity in the first place? The defense of the self, which is put forward in this essay, surely is not based on such a notion of self.

2.

Self as Subject of Experience and Intentionality

Once the notion of self as substance or essence is rejected, there is room for different routes by which one may arrive at the self, or something near enough. Two phenomena have dominated discussions and research in the Philosophy of Mind, namely consciousness and intentionality. In the following, I will present some considerations purported to demonstrate that realists about phenomenal consciousness and intentionality are committed to the acceptance of a self, understood as a subject of experience and intentionality. I will demonstrate that this is implied by the structure of these important phenomena. After making this case, I will add some considerations about how to conceive of the nature of this self or subject based on developments in the cognitive sciences. Let’s start with the argument from the structure of intentionality.

a.

The premiss from the structure of intentionality

In his wonderful book ›Elements of Mind‹ Tim Crane describes the structure of intentionality as follows: Subject – Intentional Mode – 257 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

Content (2001, p. 31). Subjects seem to have (or be in) intentional states with content. Often, an object is presented in this intentional content, when for example ›Peter believes that Santa Claus brings presents‹. This example shows that it is left open whether the intentional object that is so presented really exists; after all, there is no limit as to what we may be thinking about or imagine, and a central feature of intentionality is that we can be directed at things that do not exist. The intentional mode specifies the relation one stands in towards that content, or to the object presented in that content. For example, I may hope, see or doubt that it is raining. In all these different ways I may be directed at the content ›that it is raining‹ (or towards the object rain). This is all pretty familiar. But while Crane spends a whole book on analyzing various modes as well as content and object in detail, it comes as a surprise that he is completely silent about the first element of the structure mentioned above: »The nature of the subject is not something which is within the scope of this book (strange as that may sound).« (2001, p. 31) This is strange indeed. For, given the discussion above, it seems that simply accepting (or making use of) the notion of a subject without clarification is philosophically dangerous; a subject of whatever sort cannot be presupposed or assumed, since the term carries so many connotations some of which are quite controversial. Intentionality as Directedness or Aboutness is not a free floating phenomenon but a feature of something; it has often been characterized as a feature of mental states like beliefs, desires and perceptions (Fodor 1975, Searle 1983), such that it is the mental states which are directed at or about something. But something must be in such states. So neither does the structure postulated by Crane recommend that understanding, nor do recent developments in cognitive science support it. It has been recognized and emphasized that mental phenomena are in an important sense embodied and that there are forms of motor intentionality and directedness (e. g. in grasping and reaching etc.) suggesting that we need an alternative way of understanding what is directed in all of these intentional ways. Saying that mental states are directed looks like a way of avoiding any commitment to the notion of a subject. But it does not capture embodied and sensorimotor forms of directedness. That is, we cannot make do without the notion of a subject in formulating the structure of intentionality. Since Crane concedes that his account of intentionality is incomplete because he has left out a characterization of the subject of intentionality, we can take 258 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

his theory as a starting point and aim at completing it in a later section. Taking into account more recent developments in cognitive science, the characterization of the subject will be importantly different from the one given by Descartes. It will be suggested that it is the whole animal (human or nonhuman) which may be considered as the subject being directed towards objects in a variety of ways, some of them being much more direct and hands-on than others. Once these practical and motor intentional phenomena are acknowledged, the question what is intentionally directed in all these ways (like believing, perceiving, grasping, feeling etc.) towards objects or states of affairs is best be answered in terms of whole organisms (Hutto 2008, Thompson 2007).

b.

The premiss from the structure of consciousness

But before we go deeper into that territory, let’s first consider the second phenomenon, consciousness. This notion means different things to different people but there is at least one central aspect of consciousness, namely ›phenomenal consciousness‹, on which many can agree and which was the focus of much research in the mind sciences during the last decade. According to Block (1997), phenomenal consciousness is ›experience‹. A phenomenally conscious state is one with experiential properties in virtue of which ›there is something that it is like‹ to have it or to be in it (Nagel 1974/1997). Paradigmatic examples are sensations like pain or perceptual experiences of various kinds: There is something it is like to drink red wine, and this specific ›phenomenal feel‹ differs from what it is like to hear a loud sound or to smell rotten food. Many philosophers have tried to capture these subjective qualities by alluding to special intrinsic nonintentional properties of experiences themselves, namely ›qualia‹. But as Dennett (1988) has shown, the notion of a quale (plural: qualia) is somewhat problematic. 10 An alternative move to capture the phenomenal character of consciousness consists in alluding to a certain kind of non-conceptual intentional content (Tye 1995); but debates have shown that this does not work either, since it does not allow for a clear distinction between conscious and unconscious intentional Since so much has been written on the concept of qualia, I do not engage in an intensive discussion here. I don’t need the notion for my purposes.

10

259 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

phenomena (Schlicht 2011). So how can we adequately characterize phenomenal consciousness? And how does an adequate characterization of phenomenal consciousness support a case for the postulation of a subject of experience based on such a characterization? One possibility is to analyze the common characterization of phenomenal consciousness mentioned above in more detail. Of course, the standard description is based on Nagel’s (1974/1997, p. 519) famous characterization of the subjective character of consciousness as such, according to which »the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism«. As Nagel describes it, any experience is characterized by the fact that there is something that it is like to have it. But this seems to have two aspects: If I taste red wine, there is something it is like to enjoy that particular taste, and there is something that it is like for me to enjoy that taste. Thus, we can distinguish a ›qualitative character‹ of any given experience from its ›subjective character‹ (Kriegel 2005). 11 The qualitative character may function as a criterion to distinguish any given experience from all others, as for example the taste of red wine from the smell of rotten food and other experiences. The difference between them was supposed to be captured by the notion of a quale. The subjective character, on the other hand, is supposed to capture the fact that phenomenal consciousness is essentially a first-person-phenomenon. It picks out the feature which remains identical across all my conscious experiences. It indicates that they are mine; conscious experiences are presented as mine. There is something that it is like for me to have a sensation of red, and there is something that it is like for me to hear a loud sound or smell food. All these experiences differ with respect to their qualitative dimension, but they all have something in common in virtue of which they are conscious experiences in the first place. And that is their subjective character or »mine-ness«. It is different from qualitative character simply because it does not differ with respect to different experiences. There is only one point of view from which different phenomenal states are experienced, many of them at the same time. Cf. Zahavi (2011, p. 59): »If I compare two experiences, say the perception of a green apple and the recollection of a yellow lemon, I can focus on the difference between the two, namely the respective object and mode of presentation, but I can also attend to that which remains the same, namely the first-personal self-givenness of both experiences. To put it differently, we can distinguish a multitude of changing experiences from a ubiquitous dimension of first-personal self-givenness.«

11

260 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

Consciousness is not an anonymous or impersonal phenomenon, it is subjectively felt. Different experiences are presented to me and thus I can enjoy them in a privileged way, from my first-person point of view. A bystander can see that I am hungry, but she cannot feel or have my hunger. According to Kriegel, the subjective character is constitutive of a conscious experience. It is not something inessential or accidental. It’s what Block calls ›me-ishness‹ (1997; 2007, p. 484). 12 A characteristic feature of a phenomenal state is, as Block puts it, that »one is in some way aware of having it«, i. e. that its »content is in some sense ›presented‹ to the self«. As is evident, Block even explicitly makes use of the notion of self and draws the obvious connection to phenomenal consciousness and its subjectivity. But he never provides a theory of the self or explains how he understands this term. Thus, just like Crane’s account of intentionality, Block’s account of consciousness is importantly incomplete because it lacks a clarification of the notion of the subject or self. Changing qualia or qualitative characters are not free floating entities, they are not something that can be considered independently of an invariant subject experiencing, comparing, enjoying and evaluating them. Intuitively, it seems like it is conceptually impossible to point to a conscious experience without at the same time implying (or pointing to) someone having it. On the other hand, mentioning a subject of experience only makes sense given phenomenal consciousness and thus qualitative experiences. Postulating a subject or subjective character does not seem motivated in the absence of experiences. The qualities and the experiencing subject are two sides of the same coin. Some may wonder why so much ink is wasted on such an obvious point, since many thinkers have elaborated this at length already. Sartre, for example, famously held that the mode of being of consciousness is to be for-itself (Sartre 2003, p. lxiii). Other phenomenologists like Husserl and Heidegger held similar positions. The ink is not wasted since in contemporary debates this connection is neither seen very clearly nor very often; indeed, it is sometimes openly denied. Exceptions are thinkers like Zahavi (2005) and Gallagher (2000), for example, who are heavily influenced by the phenomenologists but who are at the same time naturalists and familiar with and sympathetic to developments in cognitive science. Zahavi, for example, un12

See also Zahavi 2011, p. 58 f.

261 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

derstands the self as an »experiential core self« which is »not a separately existing entity« – a notion we have encountered in the rejections of the self above; »but neither is it simply reducible to a specific experience or (sub-)set of experiences« (Zahavi 2011, p. 59). Here, Zahavi makes the point that was made above with regard to the difference between the qualitative and subjective characters of experience. He defends a position similar to the one developed here. By contrast, although the quotes from Block included above give a similar impression, Block does not see a close connection between phenomenal consciousness and either the self or self-consciousness. He reserves the latter notion for a sophisticated knowledge of one’s own mental states, restricting this capacity to creatures possessing the concept of ›self‹. But whether self-consciousness has such a monolithic meaning and whether it reduces to such a sophisticated phenomenon is of course open to discussion. The discussion above was intended to demonstrate that a realistic stance towards phenomenal consciousness – of which Block is a staunch defender – implies the acceptance of what I have called subjective character, which can only be cashed out by reference to a subject of experience. Block seems to deny this. This point can be made clearer by looking at Block’s criticism of Antonio Damasio’s account of consciousness and self. In essence, Damasio argues that conscious experience involves a sense of self, and he argues that there is a self, at the same time emphasizing that it is to be understood as »a process, not a thing« (2011, p. 8) a very »elusive presence« that is »at times so annoyingly subtle that it is there but almost not there« (2011, p. 9). But he describes the sense of self itself as an explanandum, along with conscious experience. How is it brought about? He claims that the sense of self – subjectivity – is at bottom a biological phenomenon caused by certain brain nuclei that are ultimately responsible for the regulation of the whole organism’s wellbeing. He thus distinguishes an unconscious biological proto-self – a cluster of structures – from the conscious core self that is (somewhat passively) experienced along with each specific conscious experience like the taste of red wine. On top of that an organism can generate an autobiographical sense of self that includes memories of the past, anticipations of the future and other mental states to arrive at an overall and rich conception of oneself. This latter phenomenon presupposes the possession of a concept of self and is likely to be ultimately reserved for human beings. 262 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

Without wanting to enter an in-depth-discussion of Damasio’s theory (see Schlicht 2008a) I would like to comment on Block’s discussion of it in his brief review of that book (Block 2010). While Damasio clearly stresses that the notion of the »self« and thus the relevant process associated with it has to be broken up in several stages or steps, ultimately being grounded in an unconscious neurobiological structure, and ending in a rich conceptual conscious selfconception, Block accuses him of holding the bold claim that phenomenal experience is dependent upon self-consciousness whereas Block restricts the meaning of the latter to the monolithic full-fledged meaning involving possession of the concept of self. This seems to be an unfair assessment of Damasio’s theory. Clearly, Damasio does not want to say that a creature can only enjoy a phenomenal experience of pain if it possesses the concept of self and can thus consciously selfascribe the sensation. What Damasio holds is that phenomenal consciousness depends on a creature’s possessing the relevant brain structures responsible for the biological proto-self and for the production of the core self, the conscious counterpart of the proto-self. But I cannot see that he claims that all creatures capable of conscious experiences (e. g. perceptions, sensations) need possess a concept of self. The latter claim would indeed be outrageous and amount to an overintellectualization of conscious experience. The claim Damasio does defend can be understood as one possible interpretation of the subjective character of experience. The fact that all conscious experiences feel like something for someone may be taken to mean that all conscious experiences are accompanied by a sense of self, or by ›mineness‹, as Zahavi puts it, or ›me-ishness‹, as Block puts it. Kant, Husserl and Sartre have put forward similar claims, so this is not at all new or original. But Block’s strict dismissal of Damasio’s account helps highlight the fact that he lacks any alternative account although he makes use of the notion of self in connection with conscious experience. Some may object that it is one thing to accept that conscious experience is subjective, but quite another to say that it therefore involves a subject or self. That is, moving from the subjectivity of experience to the postulation of a subject of experience without further argument may seem unjustified. Thus, Zahavi (2011, p. 64) suggests that it might be better to replace the phrase ›subject of experience‹ by the phrase ›subjectivity of experience‹, thereby avoiding any commitment to the notion of a subject or self that may suggest 263 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

the existence of an entity over and above an experience, able to exist independently of an experience. My reasons for holding on to the notion of a subject of experience will become clearer in the next sections. To sum up, just like Crane’s account of intentionality, Block’s analysis of phenomenal consciousness is importantly incomplete because it does not say anything about how the subject of intentionality and conscious experience is supposed to be understood. Nevertheless, they make use of the notions of self and subject in their characterizations of intentionality and consciousness respectively. The analyses of intentionality and phenomenal consciousness given above demonstrated that Crane and Block were quite justified to use the terms but they should have completed the task of telling us how we should understand them. What are we to make of this? I take it as an important and worthwhile task to address this lack and attempt to provide a unified characterization of these phenomena by developing a notion of subject or self that can serve in both accounts such that we end up with an integrated theory of consciousness and intentionality. For, obviously, we want it to be the same subject/self who desires red wine, perceives the glass, intends to take it, picks up the glass motorically and enjoys the taste of red wine afterwards. 13 Therefore, let’s One may ask whether anyone might hold that we can give a different account of the subject in the structure of consciousness than of the subject in the structure of intentionality. Since in general philosophers working on these topics hesitate to say anything at all about the self, it is hard to give an example. The closest I can get is Searle (2001a), who argues for the existence of a self in the context of his discussion of rational action and of freedom and neurobiology. But he seems to draw a line somewhere within the realm of the Mental between phenomena requiring a self and phenomena not requiring a self. Searle’s point is that mental capacities like perception do not require us to postulate a self, but the fact that we have the phenomenal experience of freedom at various points in a decision-making process leads him to postulate such an entity, namely, an »irreducible non-Humean self«. He admits such an entity »with the greatest reluctance« (2001a, pp. 79–96). This admission is forced upon us, so to speak, because of the property of consciousness »whereby our conscious experiences of making up our minds and our conscious experiences of acting (the exercise of the will, the conscious feeling of effort […]) are not experienced as having psychologically sufficient causal conditions that make them happen« (2001a, p. 13). All rational and irrational actions presuppose the assumption that when we make decisions we are free in the sense that we can choose among alternatives and can always change our minds; i. e. we presuppose that our decisions are neither sufficiently determined physically (or neurobiologically, cf. Libet’s (2005) experiments on free will) nor psychologically (by prior reasons, beliefs and desires). Actions do not simply happen to us, and we act

13

264 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

integrate some recent developments in the cognitive sciences with regard to a clarification of what this subject might be like.

c. The premiss from embodied and situated cognition As far as the phenomenon of intentionality is concerned, traditional cognitive science and much of philosophy of mind in the 20th century has focused on so-called propositional attitudes, i. e. mental states like beliefs and desires the content of which can be captured by adding a sentence introduced by the »that-clause« into the following schema: ›Subject S ____ that p‹, where the ____ is filled with an intentional verb like believing, desiring, hoping, etc. Dennett (1971, 1987) and others hold that the right place to look for intentionality is language. Thus, following Chisholm (1957) and Quine (1960), Dennett’s focus is on the properties of the sentences we use to talk about intentional phenomena, based on an allegedly close relationship between intentionality and intensionality (e. g. Peter believes that snow is white). That is, on this approach, the entities under investigation are ascriptions of beliefs, desires and so on in the service of understanding other people’s minds. This sophisticated variety of intentionality, which may be called propositional intentionality, for obvious reasons, is often treated as the only or at least the most important variety (e. g. Brandom 1994). To lay a foundation for intentionality, Searle (1983) developed for reasons which have to be consciously appreciated as such. Only agents can act in this way and according to Searle, »something is an agent […] if and only if it is a conscious entity that has the capacity to initiate and carry out actions under the presupposition of freedom« (2001a, p. 83). Neither a Humean bundle of experiences nor a notion of the self as ›center of narrative gravity‹ (Dennett 1991) are sufficient to capture this, Searle argues. Consequently, »›self‹ is simply the name for that entity which experiences its own activities as more than an inert bundle« (2001a, p. 93). Combined with Searle’s view that consciousness is ontologically subjective and thereby irreducible, it seems that this irreducible ontological subjectivity must also hold for the self. But while this would seem to be incompatible with Searle’s biological naturalism, according to which consciousness with all its features is caused by and realized in the brain (cf. Schlicht 2007), he also declares that there is »no metaphysical problem of the self« (2001b, p. 510 f.), trying to make do with postulating the self as a »formal requirement on rational action« (2001a, p. 93). But Searle’s complex back and forth attitude in his discussion of the self demonstrates how hard it can be for philosophers (especially for those persuaded by naturalism) to admit to a notion of self just because they are afraid they might end up in the same boat with Descartes.

265 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

the notion of the »background«, arguing that a network of intentional states only functions against a background of certain assumptions and practices, including sensorimotor skills and a general know how things are and know how to do things. Among these skills he includes knowing how to open doors, knowing how to pick up a glass or a cup and so on. The idea is that when I am in the intentional state of desiring a bottle of beer, my ›know how‹ helps me to satisfy that desire by opening the fridge and taking out a bottle. This background, Searle argues, is itself not intentional. In contrast, the phenomenological philosophers Husserl (1952), Heidegger (1927), and especially Merleau-Ponty (1964) have argued that this ›know how‹ is itself intentional! Merleau-Ponty coined the term motor intentionality for cases in which one is directed towards an object by way of grasping it or picking it up or moving it. According to Heidegger, this kind of practical involvement with things in the world is a much more basic intentional relation to the world than thinking or imagining (see also Wheeler 2005). Like beliefs, which can be true or false, and other intentional attitudes, motor intentional activities also have a normative dimension since one can succeed or fail in picking something up. Recent cognitive science has provided some support for this claim and developed it further using empirical evidence: Many thinkers have argued that cognition and mental states are essentially embodied in the sense that the body and various embodied ways of coping with the environment play a crucial constitutive role for these phenomena (Varela et al. 1991, O’Regan & Noë 2001, Clark 1997, 2008, Wheeler 2005, Gallagher 2005). Facial expressions and bodily postures are arguably literal elements of feelings and their expression; one’s bodily position (e. g. walking upright), and thus one’s bodily constitution (e. g. the position of the eyes) trivially determine what one can see. Moreover, perceiving an object from a certain point of view involves ›looking‹ by making eye-, head- and whole bodymovements. This supports the idea that perceiving is a skilful activity, not merely a passive reception of information. As Noë (2009, p. 60) puts it, »movements of your eyes or your head or your body actively produce changes in sensory stimulation to your eyes. Or, put differently, how things look, depends, in subtle and fine-grained ways, on what you do. Approach an object and it looms in your visual field. Now turn away: it leaves your field of view. Now shut your eyes: it is gone. Walk around the object and its profile changes«. If one is sympathetic to this view that cognition, including perception, is es266 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

sentially an activity, then it is clear why this provides a reason to hold on to the notion of a subject of experience and intentionality, because activities are neither anonymous nor mere happenings. These activities – perception, cognition etc. – have to be achieved by someone; and we want to know how we should characterize this ›someone‹. Second, the discovery of mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al. 1996, Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004, Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2006) can be seen as providing evidence for this claim, i. e. that perception does involve an important motor dimension, and for the case that there are embodied varieties of intentionality (Sinigaglia 2008, Butterfill & Sinigaglia 2012); mirror neurons are located primarily in the premotor cortex (specifically in area F5) 14 and become activated both when I perform a bodily action of some kind and when I merely observe someone else perform this or a similar action. Indeed, mirror neurons suggest that perception and action do not constitute two separate cognitive domains but rather form one dynamic unified system. Moreover, certain pathologies provide indirect evidence for the motor domain of intentionality: Gallagher (2005), Jacob & Jeannerod (2003) and Milner & Goodale (1995) have shown how in conditions like apraxia (when you can no longer perform certain bodily actions accurately although vision is not impaired) or deafferentation (when you do not receive any proprioceptive feedback from the neck down) patients can be impaired in their motor intentional capacities without loosing their propositional cognitive capacities. Forms of directedness as in grasping and reaching are essentially embodied and difficult to analyse in propositional terms using »that«-clauses, as is possible for beliefs and desires. Nevertheless, when I pick up a glass, I am arguably directed at an object in a particular way, using my bodily means. Therefore, evidence from recent cognitive science suggests that there is more to intentionality than propositional attitudes, and that there is a whole motoric and embodied dimension to intentionality thus far neglected by analytic philosophy of mind. According to what may be called the Embodiment Thesis, many features of cognition are embodied in that they are deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that these bodily features play not The issue is much more complicated. Area F5 was where they were first located, but subsequently mirror neurons have been found in other areas of the macaque monkey brain, too. What’s more, they have also been detected in the human brain. Since the details of this discovery do not have to concern us here, I leave this section brief.

14

267 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

only a causal role, but also a physically constitutive role in the agent’s cognitive processing (Shapiro 2011). Without being able to go into these recent discoveries and developments more deeply, they force us to reconsider the nature and structure of intentionality sketched above (cf. Crane 2001, p. 28). First of all, the range of possible intentional modes (attitudes), i. e. ways of being directed at an object becomes greater and more diverse. Intentionality should therefore not be treated as one unique and uniform phenomenon to be found only in one true manifestation, for example in propositional attitudes, or as a conscious or linguistic phenomenon. Treating it this way and thus suggesting that it can be given one essential explanation may be one important reason why more or less all theories of intentionality so far have been found wanting (Schlicht 2008b). In addition to believing, desiring, hoping etc. one can be directed at an object by grasping, picking up etc. Second of all, this whole embodied dimension of intentionality in turn seems to put constraints on how we should conceive of the subject of intentionality. As mentioned above, this question has not been addressed at all by Crane, but neither have others put forward a satisfying account in this regard. The embodied dimension of intentionality rules out a Cartesian notion of a subject or self as discussed and rejected above. Perceptual experience, as it was characterized above, provides a good example, since it exhibits both consciousness and intentionality, thus raising the question of how embodiment determines consciousness (in addition to determining intentionality). Although this issue cannot be discussed here, the fact that we want to give the same account of the subject or self in the context of consciousness and of intentionality, leads to the following proposal.

3.

Organisms as Selves

Taking the motor and bodily dimension of perceptual experience (and of intentionality more generally) into account suggests that the subject of intentionality should be identified with the whole organism, the animal, understood as an embodied agent, endowed with various cognitive, affective and sensorimotor capacities. 15 Rather than treating intentionality as a property of mental states, it should be thought 15

Note that it is not necessary to argue for any of these capacities as providing neces-

268 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

of as a property of whole organisms, of embodied agents being embedded in an environment with which they can interact in various ways (Schlicht 2008b, Hutto 2008, Thompson 2007). Treating intentionality this way is compatible with the idea that the various manifestations of intentionality have something in common which justifies us to categorize them under this same umbrella concept: they are instantiations of the basic capacity of an ›X being directed at Y‹. If intentionality is so treated as a »layered developmental concept« (Lyons 1995, p. 160 f.), taking on different forms and calling for different explanatory strategies at different levels of complexity and sophistication, then we can try to explain intentionality »from the beginning onward, rather than from the bottom up or the top down« (Gallagher 2005, p. 4). This hierarchy of levels is not only motivated by the diversity of the intentional realm and the shortcomings of traditional approaches, but also by developmental constraints regarding the acquisition and employment of different cognitive capacities in the course of cognitive growth (Bruner 1964). Developmentally speaking, the suggestion is (1) that more sophisticated forms of propositional intentionality depend on basic forms of embodied sensorimotor intentionality that humans share with many other animals and (2) that the subject or self in the structure of intentionality is simply to be identified with the whole animal. Once we put this proposal on the table, then while this promises to allow for a naturalistic account of the self, new immediate questions arise: What is an organism and what demarcates organisms from other entities in nature? What makes them special? Are all organisms endowed with consciousness and with intentional capacities and should we therefore consider all organisms as selves or subjects? What counts against this proposal? Does it face any significant problems? Although reasons of space do not allow for an extensive discussion of all these questions, some ideas shall be sketched in the rest of this chapter. In his discussion of the nature of the self Matt MacKenzie is looking for a »middle way« between the »reductionist fictionalism« about selves held by the Abhidharma school of Buddhism on the one hand and »the substantialism or ātman and Cartesian ego the-

sary or sufficient conditions on the self. The range of such capacities may in some cases be very high, in others it may be very minimal.

269 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

ories« on the other (MacKenzie 2010, p. 84). Relying on prior work by Varela (1979) and Thompson (2007), he identifies selves with organisms and characterizes them as autonomous, dynamic and selforganized systems. On this view, the defining trait of organisms is their self-organization and self-production or ›autopoiesis‹ (Maturana & Varela 1980): an organism consists of a biological network that self-produces a boundary setting it apart from its environment while at the same time allowing for the exchange of matter and energy with the environment (metabolism). In the case of humans, this semipermeable boundary is the skin, in the case of the singular cell (being the smallest organism) the boundary is the cell membrane, produced by the biological network within (or constituting) the cell. This production and exchange can be said to result in the making of an ›identity‹ because the semi-permeable boundary marks a clear delineation of what the system consists of (self) and what is outside the system (non-self). The nature of the network also determines the biological needs of the system which in turn determine the system’s intentional relations towards the environment which is immediately transformed from a meaningless physical environment into a meaningful structure: from the perspective of the organism some things then ›count‹ as food, for example, while others do not (Thompson 2007, p. 152 ff.). Thus, this continuous biological process of self-production and maintenance of identity constitutes a view of the self »as an active, embodied, embedded, self-organizing process«, and can be understood as »self-making«, also sometimes called »I-making« in the Buddhist tradition (MacKenzie 2010, p. 76). This view of the self meets the constraints set by the structures of intentionality and consciousness as outlined above. In order for the self or subject to engage in the various kinds of intentional relations to objects and states of affairs, it must be endowed with bodily, cognitive and sensorimotor capacities. The whole animal does possess these capacities, although none of its parts do. And since some of an embodied agent’s intentional activities can become (or are) conscious activities, like perceptual experience for example, where perception depends crucially on the exercise of bodily actions, it is also adequate to say that it is the whole animal which consciously perceives (it is not merely its brain, for example). Yet, this view faces an immediate dilemma: if whole organisms are selves, and if a singular cell is an organism, then either the cell must be considered as a self in the same sense as multicellular organ270 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

isms like human beings or we have to draw a line between selves and non-selves somewhere within the realm of organisms. After all, it’s questionable whether single cells can engage in any of the conscious and intentional activities mentioned so far. One may still bite the bullet and concede that a singular cell counts as a self, even though it’s range of conscious and intentional capacities is quite limited. 16 Thompson (2007) is prepared to ascribe the most basic form of intentionality to cells, for example, since they are directed in a normative way towards their environment. But it may be more adequate to say that systematically, selves are prior to intentionality and consciousness. Still, the view that cells are selves may be too extravagant and thus find only few supporters, although it is certainly not conceptually or empirically impossible. Alternatively, one may try the second horn and attempt to draw a line somewhere within the realm of organisms by appealing to yet different criteria. In this case, it seems almost impossible to tell what the right level of complexity may be. One plausible (yet anthropocentric) constraint may be to consider only organisms with a similar brain and nervous system like human beings. For all we know, having the right kind of complex brain structure may be necessary for the emergence of a full-fledged self. It seems at least to be a plausible constraint on the emergence of consciousness. Why not extent it to the emergence of a self as well? This proposal, which may be more helpful like the (almost panpsychic) view that all organisms must be considered as selves, refers us back to neuroscience. Here again, on the biological level, Damasio’s account of the biological proto-self may be important to consider: the proto-self is construed as »an integrated collection of separate neural patterns that map, moment by moment, the most stable aspects of the organism’s physical structure« (Damasio 2011, p. 190). 17 Of course, given the number of structures that are supposed to constitute the Note that panpsychism does not follow, since selves cannot be found in the inorganic rest of nature. 17 On the brain-stem level, these structures include the nuclues tractus solitarius, the parabrachial nucleus, the periaqueductal gray, the area postrema, hypothalamus and superior colliculus. In addition, some cerebral structures like the insula and anterior cingulate cortex constitute the proto-self (cf. Damasio 2011, p. 191). While the neuroanatomical details do not concern us here philosophically, it is important to note that this perspective on the self is anthropocentric and (mostly) based on indirect evidence from lesion studies in relation to pathological conditions of patients that have to do with the loss of the sense of self. 16

271 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

proto-self, the range of animals that may count as selves becomes quite limited on this view. Yet, this limitation may come as an advantage in contrast to the alternative view that all organisms count as selves. The reason for this is that the resulting view adds constraints to the pure functionalist conception of organisms as self-organizing systems. To count as a self, more is required than just this kind of organization: the system must also meet certain criteria regarding its complexity and the nature of the implementation. Of course, all this must be elaborated in much more detail in order to be persuasive, but the purpose of this paper was first and foremost to present a defense of a notion of self as subject based on some considerations of the structures of intentionality and consciousness. As we saw, reflecting on these important phenomena can help defend the use (and usefulness) of the notion of ›self‹ against the popular rejections of the notion in contemporary philosophy. There are certainly objections against this proposal which cannot all be discussed here. But let me end with a brief discussion of an objection against the ›animalist‹ conception put forward by Tim Bayne because it will, in the end, strengthen the approach taken here. In his book ›The unity of consciousness‹ Tim Bayne (2011) not only argues that phenomenally conscious experience is necessarily unified such that it can never break down, but he also draws some connections between this kind of unity and what he calls »subject unity«, i. e. the sense in which all conscious experiences at any given moment must be (trivially) had by the same subject. In the course of his argument he formulates three components of the role that a ›self‹ plays and which any working definition of the self must be able to accommodate (Bayne 2010, p. 269 ff.): the ownership component, since mental states are »had« by a self instead of being free-floating entities; the referential component, since when one is having an Ithought, some entity is denoted by the first-person pronoun; and finally, the perspectival component, since selves have a subjective point of view. On the animalist conception defended above we get the following result: »the owner of one’s mental states is an organism; first-person thought picks out a particular organism; and the perspective of any one self is none other than the perspective of a particular organism. You came into existence when a certain animal came into existence, and you will continue to exist only as long as that animal exists« (Bayne 2010, p. 269). So far, so good. Bayne agrees that the animalist conception can address all three demands. 272 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

But Bayne takes issue with this conception based on a discussion of a thought experiment going back to Peter van Inwagen (1990) who considered Cerberus, a creature with two heads, i. e. a creature being biologically unified but phenomenally disunified because it possesses two independent streams of consciousness in two separate brains. Bayne tries to show how in the imaginative case of Cerberus the animalist conception fails since it is at odds with the (alleged) impossibility of a breakdown in phenomenally unified consciousness. Disregarding the details of Bayne’s treatment of this thought experiment, I cannot see how a thought experiment conceiving of an empirically impossible creature can help us understand whether the animalist conception of the self can do the work it is supposed to do. 18 As he concedes (in the quote above), the animalist proposal can provide conceptions of the various components of the self as formulated by Bayne. The fact that it does not adequately answer an imaginary case does not weaken that virtue of the view. 19 Thus, rather than treating it as a problem for the animalist conception, I consider Bayne’s discussion of the three components of the self-role as providing independent support for the animalist conception of the self since it meets these important criteria (ownership, referential and perspectival component).

Bayne adds to this problematic discussion the empirical example of conjoined twins sharing, for example, parts of the brain and likens them to the case of Cerberus. There are indeed cases like this, for example Tatiana and Krista Hogan, but I do not think that they prove the animalist conception wrong. Though they share parts of the brain (they are conjoined at the thalamus), they constitute two independent organisms, each with a heart, liver etc. Just because they are conjoined at the important region of the thalamus, it seems impossible to disconnect them without causing major damage. They might, though, raise important questions about the ›impossibility of an error through misidentification‹ because it seems that what Krista feels or sees can also be felt by Tatiana, such that it may not always be clear whether they correctly self-ascribe conscious experiences (cf. Langland-Hassan 2013). 19 Bayne defends an account of the self in terms of what he calls a ›virtual self‹, very much along the lines of Dennett’s (1991) proposal of the self as a ›center of narrative gravity‹. According to Bayne’s view, selves are virtual entities whose identity conditions are fixed by the intentional structure of the unified phenomenal field. 18

273 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht

4.

Conclusion

This paper has addressed an important part of the philosophical discussion about the self. First, it demonstrated that the notion of self that is typically rejected by cognitive scientists and by both Buddhist and Western philosophers, matches the Cartesian notion of self as independent substance or essence. In contrast to such rejections, it has then been sketched how a workable notion of the self as subject can be motivated and defended. The positive argument to this effect appealed to the structures of consciousness and of intentionality, two very hotly debated and central phenomena. A brief look at prominent analyses of these phenomena demonstrated important gaps that are rarely addressed by philosophers: Conscious experience implies a subject or self since it is (trivially) always someone’s experience. Intentionality as the directedness at an object or state of affairs also requires an answer to the question who or what is directed in the various ways that intentionality covers. Since the two phenomena have an important overlap, it is a constraint on a theory of the self that it can cover both phenomena. So we want the same account of the self in both cases. A brief look at recent evidence from the cognitive sciences suggests that the subject or self of conscious experience and of intentionality should be understood as the whole animal, i. e. an embodied and embedded agent endowed with an arsenal of cognitive, affective and sensorimotor capacities. The answer to the question of what an animal (or organism) is can be based on ideas from dynamical systems theory and the enactive account, as proposed by Varela & Maturana (1980) and by Thompson (2007). The reader may excuse the brevity and gappiness of the account and hopefully find some useful ideas that can be developed further. Since this is all work in progress, all these aspects have only been touched upon in order to use the space for a presentation of the whole line of thought behind it. 20

Work on this paper was made possible by a grant from the Volkswagen Foundation for the Research Project ›Situated Cognition‹.

20

274 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough

Literature Albahari, M. 2006, Analytical Buddhism. The two-tiered illusion of self. New York: Palgrave. Bayne, T. 2011, The unity of consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Block, N. 1997, »On a confusion about a function of consciousness«, in: The Nature of consciousness: philosophical debates. Ed. by N. Block, G. Güzeldere, O. Flanagan. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Block, N. 2007, »Consciousness, Accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience«, in: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, pp. 481–548. Block, N. 2010, »What was I thinking? Review of Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain«, in: New York Times Book Review, November 28, 2010. Brandom, R. 1994, Making it explicit. Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge, Mass. Bruner, J. 1964, »The course of cognitive growth«, in: American Psychologist 19 (1), pp. 1–15. Butterfill, S. & C. Sinigaglia 2012, Intention and motor representation in purposive action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research doi: 10.1111/j.1933– 1592.2012.00604.x. Chisholm, R. 1957, Perceiving. Cornell University Press. Clark, A. 1997, Being there. Putting brain, body and world together again. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Clark, A. 2008, Supersizing the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crane, T. 2001, Elements of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press Damasio, A. R. 2011, Self comes to mind. New York: Pantheon. Dennett, D. C. 1971, »Intentional systems«, in: Journal of Philosophy 68, pp. 87–106. Dennett, D. C. 1987, The intentional stance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Dennett, D. C. 1988, »Quining Qualia«, in: Consciousness in contemporary science. Ed. by A. Marcel & E. Bisiach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dennett, D. C. 1991, Consciousness explained. New York: Basic Books. Descartes, R. 1941/1993, Meditations on first Philosophy in focus. London: Routledge. Fodor, J. 1975, The Language of Thought. New York. Galin, D. 2003, »The concepts ›Self‹, ›Person‹, and ›I‹ in Western Psychology and in Buddhism«, in: Buddhism and Science: Breaking new ground. Ed. by B. A. Wallace. New York: Columbia University Press. Gallagher, S. 2000, »Philosophical conceptions of the self«, Trends in: Cognitive Sciences 4 (1), pp. 14–21. Gallagher, S. 2005, How the body shapes the mind. Oxford. Gallagher, S. 2011, »A diversity of selves«, in: The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Ed. by S. Gallagher. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ganeri, J. 2007, The concealed art of the soul. Theories of self and practices of truth in Indian ethics and epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heidegger, M. 1927, Sein und Zeit. Tübingen.

275 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Tobias Schlicht Husserl, E. 1952, »Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie«. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, in: Husserliana Bd. IV. M. Biemel (ed.). Den Haag. Hutto, D. D. 2008, Folk-psychological attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Jacob, P. & Jeannerod, M. 2003, Ways of seeing. The scope and limits of visual cognition. Oxford. Kant, I. 1781, Critique of pure reason. Transl. by P. Guyer, A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kriegel, U. 2005, »Naturalizing subjective character«, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXI, pp. 23–57. Langland-Hassan, P. 2013, »Craniopagus twins and the possibility of introspective misidentification«, Talk at the Fifth Online Consciousness Conference, February 15, 2013. Libet, B. 2005, Mind time. The temporal factor in consciousness. London: Harvard University Press. Lyons, W. 1995, Approaches to Intentionality. New York: Clarendon Press. MacKenzie, M. 2010, »Enacting the self: Buddhist and enactivist approaches to the emergence of the self«, in: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9, pp. 75–99. Maturana, H., Varela, F. 1980, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The realization of the living. Boston: Reidel. Merleau-Ponty, M. 1964, Philosophie der Wahrnehmung. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. Metzinger, T. 2003, Being no one. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Metzinger, T. 2011, »The no-self alternative«, in: The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Ed. by S. Gallagher. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Milner, A. D. & Goodale, M. A. 1995, The visual brain in action. Oxford. Nagel, T. 1974/1997, »What is it like to be a bat?«, in: Philosophical Review 83, pp. 435–450. Neisser, U. 1988, »Five kinds of self-knowledge.«, in: Philosophical Psychology 1 (1), pp. 35–59. Olson, E. T. 1998, »There is no problem of the self«, in: Journal of Consciousness Studies 5, pp. 645–657. Noë, A. 2004, Action in Perception. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Noë, A. 2009, Out of our heads. Simon & Schuster. O’Regan, J. K. & Noë, A. 2001, »A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness«, in: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5), pp. 883–917. Prinz, W. 2012, Open Minds. The social making of agency and intentionality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Quine, W. v. O. 1960, Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V. & Fogassi, L. 1996, »Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions«, in: Cognitive Brain Research 3, pp. 131– 141. Rizzolatti, G. & Craighero, L. 2004, »The mirror neuron system«, in: Annual Review of Neuroscience 27, pp. 169–192. Rizzolatti, G. & Sinigaglia, C. 2008, Mirrors in the brain, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

276 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Selves – Or Something Near Enough Sartre, J.-P. 2003, Being and Nothingness. London: Routledge. Schlicht, T. 2007, Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus. Das Problem der Erklärungslücke in Geist-Gehirn-Theorien. Paderborn: Mentis. Schlicht, T. 2008a, »Selbstgefühl. Damasios Stufentheorie des Bewusstseins und der Emotion«, in: Geist und Psyche. Ed. by E. Düsing. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. Schlicht, T. 2008b, »Ein Stufenmodell der Intentionalität«, in: Zur Zukunft der Philosophie des Geistes. Ed. by P. Spät. Paderborn: Mentis. Schlicht, T. 2011, »Non-conceptual content and the subjectivity of consciousness.«, in: International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3), pp. 491–520. Schlicht, T. 2015, »Explaining subjective character: Representation, reflexivity, or integration«, in: OpenMind. Ed. By T. Metzinger and J. Windt. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, Vol. 2. Searle, J. R. 1983, Intentionality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Searle, J. R. 2001a, Rationality in Action. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Searle, J. R. 2001b, »Free will as a problem in neurobiology«, in: Philosophy 76 (298), pp. 491–514. Shapiro, L. 2011, Embodied Cognition. London: Routledge. Siderits, M. 2007, Buddhism as Philosophy. An introduction. Hackett Publishers Co. Siderits, M. 2011, »Buddhas as Zombies: A Buddhist reduction of subjectivity.«, in: Self – no self? Ed. by M. Siderits, E. Thompson, D. Zahavi. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sinigaglia, C. 2008, »Enactive understanding and motor intentionality«, in: Enacting Intersubjectivity: A Cognitive and Social Perspective to Study of Interactions. Ed. by F. Morganti, A. Carassa, G. Riva. Amsterdam: IOS Press. Thompson, E. 2007, Mind in Life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Tye, M. 1995, Ten problems of consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. van Inwagen, P. 1990, Material beings. Cornell University Press. Varela, F. 1979, Principles of biological autonomy. Boston: Kluwer Academic. Varela, F., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. 1991, The embodied mind. Cognitive Science and human experience. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Wheeler, M. 2005, Reconstructing the cognitive world: the next step. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Williford, K. 2015, »Representationalisms, subjective character, and self-acquaintance«, in: OpenMind. Ed. By T. Metzinger and J. Windt. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, Vol. 2. Zahavi, D. 2011, »The experiential self: objections and clarifications«, in: Self – no self? Ed. by M. Siderits, E. Thompson, D. Zahavi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

277 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Matthias Koßler

Body and Life, Philosophically

When, in natural sciences or humanities, it is about border questions on life, it firstly concerns the bodily existence of man. Even in research with respect to cosmological criterions on the origins of life or in speculations on the life of incorporeal souls, in the end, the experience of life through the body forms the starting point from which we try to make palpable how we understand this expression. Even in German etymology, the term for body ›Leib‹ and the term for life ›Leben‹ are strongly connected, since these terms have an identical origin: up until the late middle ages, the German word ›Leib‹ also meant life ›Leben‹. Only with the emergence of the substantive form to live ›leben‹ did the terms ›Leib‹ and ›Leben‹ separate. 1 The German word for body ›Körper‹, also deriving from Latin in the late middle ages, showed however, since it replaced the old form ›Lich‹ of the German word for corpse ›Leiche‹, that it at least could also be used for lifeless objects. Even if this difference within the modern use of the German language is blurred, for the following argumentation I would like to use the term ›Leib‹ in respect to the living, while the term ›Körper‹ demonstrates the independence of this property. It can be taken from the mere etymologic analyses that a physical existence is life not only in the sense that a life without a body ›Leib‹ is not conceivable (for example as a purely spiritual or psychological existence), but also in the sense that a body ›Leib‹ – unlike a body as an object ›Körper‹ – can only be viewed as living. 2

The old meaning was preserved with words like »beileibe«, »entleiben« and »Leibrente« in the German language until today. On the etymology of the terms ›Leib‹ und ›Körper‹ cf. Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen1993, 719, 783 f.; Kluge 2002, p. 530, p. 566. 2 Cf. my essay (Koßler 2004) which in some way can be regarded as a supplement to the present investigation. 1

278 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Body and Life, Philosophically

This differentiation is also of functional meaning for the question of the connection between the natural-scientific and the philosophical approach to the concept of life. The first conclusion: »kein Leben ohne Leib« (no life without a body) seems to belong to the problematic of life within the natural sciences (such as the science of the physical) while the second conclusion (»kein Leib ohne Leben« – no body without life) seems to turn the term ›Leib‹ as well as the term life into a philosophical problem. Speaking of a philosophical problem is not intended to suggest that it is a problem which is only reserved to philosophy as a field differentiated from other sciences. On the contrary: the problem is just insofar »philosophical« as it transcends the subjects and disciplines and finally concerns their relationship. In this way, it becomes virulent outside the field of philosophy in the confrontation between physics and biology. Life is, more so than other objects of philosophy, something in itself natural that only becomes a problem when questioned; in this case, this does not normally happen because of philosophical curiosity, but by means of existential experience. 3 The limits of life are also what firstly determines our perception of the phenomena ›life‹ and body ›Leib‹. The creation of a new life through birth and the transition of a living body ›Leib‹ to a dead object ›Körper‹ not only amaze the philosopher, leading to a desire to explain the wonders of life. Most people will have experienced, at least once, besides all the pain and horror, the mysteriousness of the death of a person or animal whereby a living body ›Leib‹ suddenly becomes something fundamentally different, namely a lifeless object ›Körper‹. It is a peculiar experience of strangeness which shows the change – from something living to an object – as a fundamental difference. There have been attempts, especially in the context of religious ideas, to demonstrate this transition as a removal or loss of the breath of life, as the separation of the soul from the body. This is the origin of the current definition of the term ›Leib‹, namely as an animated body. But this notion and definition includes something that conflicts with the experience that accompanies the sight of death. The transition from a living body ›Leib‹ to a dead object ›Körper‹ is different to Shopenhauer even goes so far to attribute the philosophical questions in general to the death experience, when he writes: »Der Tod ist der eigentliche inspirirende Genius, oder der Musaget der Philosophie … Schwerlich sogar würde, auch ohne den Tod, philosophirt werden« (Schopenhauer 1949, p. 528 f.)

3

279 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Matthias Koßler

for instance the transition from a round to a square or from red to a colorless object. Here, the object in itself remains the same, while ›Leib‹ and ›Körper‹ as such are different. ›Leib‹ cannot be thought of without animation or liveliness; that is why we still use the term ›disembodiment‹ as an expression for killing someone. Within Aristotelian tradition, there were attempts to meet these circumstances in considering that the soul was not added to and then removed from the body, like a color or a shape. Furthermore, it was considered as a form that is inseparably connected with its substance, the body ›Leib‹. Substance and form, ›Leib‹ and soul all the while are in proportion to δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, to possibility and reality. The soul is the reality of the body ›Leib‹ ; the soul turns the body into what it actually is, namely something living. Conversely, the soul can only be the form of the specific substance, which is the possibility of a body or the conception for this body. As undoubtedly there are forms on the body ›Leib‹ that disappear or change, while the body does not cease to be a body, medieval philosophy differentiated between the essential form which is the reality of an object as »forma substantialis« and other forms, the »formae accidentales« (the accidental forms). The soul as being alive is, to be more exact, the forma substantialis of the body ›Leib‹, whereas the form, for instance, of a mathematical body is the expansion and dimensionality. In this way, mathematical bodies, physical bodies ›Körper‹ and the organic body ›Leib‹ are substantially different. Consequently, it cannot be said that the physical body ›Körper‹ could take on a form of being alive, no less than mathematical bodies could be heavy, impenetrable, and flexible. This Aristotelian-medieval concept at least does justice to the experience of death and to the accompanying fundamental difference between the living body ›Leib‹ and the dead body ›Körper‹, but now it has to combat the opposite problem. As much as it seems appropriate to question the substantial difference between ›Leib‹ and ›Körper‹, it still remains a fact that ›Leib‹ is also ›Körper‹, an expanded object. Within medieval philosophy Thomas Aquinas, among others, tried to solve this difficulty with a theory of levels or grades of realization (»gradus perfectionis«) or rather completion of an object (Thomas Aquinas 1965, p. 314 f.). Dimensionality and physicality, therefore, are levels that have to be accomplished as well as overcome in order to bring the body ›Leib‹ into realization. However, they are not its substantial forms, as it would be in the case of mathematical and phy280 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Body and Life, Philosophically

sical objects. A form which should be necessary but at the same time not essential, namely a necessary accident – in this conception that is the physicality of the body ›Leib‹ – therefore poses at least a logical problem. Indeed, this problem paved way through the medieval epistemology to the modern empirical epistemology in connection with the discussion on the principum individuationis. Because physicality was also connected to individuality which could not assert itself as accidental (and at the same time essential) over the prevailing nominalism and the individualism connected to it in the interim to the modern age. Before I further pursue the logical problematic in a stricter sense, I would like to look at a modern approach to the relation of ›Leib‹ and ›Körper‹ which can be found in the first origins of life philosophy in Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer starts out from the own bodily experience ›Leibeserfahrung‹ and comes to similar differentiations as those presented in medieval opinions. In this particular experience the body ›Leib‹ is given to us in two or rather three ways. On the one hand, the body exists as an indirect object that is marked by the fact that it is subject to the forms of imagination, namely space, time, causality. Therefore, it has the same properties as physical objects: it is measurable, divisible and is subject to the laws of physics. But the body ›Leib‹ – at least in the early philosophy of Schopenhauer – also exists as a direct object. As such, it is the organ of sensations through which the entire perception of physical properties is mediated. Only by the fact that the mind puts the sensations into the forms of space, time, and causality, the object is created as a carrier of physical properties and is therefore described as an indirect object. The own body ›Leib‹ shows itself as an indirect object in contrast to a direct object if, for instance, we try to divide it as such. The difference to an indirect object also becomes evident through a deliberate act; we experience it not only externally as an observable, measurable and scientifically explainable movement of the body ›Leib‹, but also internally as an act of will. With the extension of the term ›will‹, Schopenhauer, in his matured theories, also included the sensations as inhibited intentions in this kind of bodily experience, which leaves us with two points of view on the body as ›Leib‹. On the one hand ›Leib‹ as an object among objects which are subjugated to the laws of nature in space and time and can therefore be manipulated; this description corresponds to the aboveexplained meaning of the word ›Körper‹. On the other hand, ›Leib‹ as an »objectivation«, as the »visibility of the Will to live«; this second 281 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Matthias Koßler

point of view corresponds with the term ›Leib‹, which can only be understood as the »expression« of the Will to live 4. With the differentiation of both points of view, Schopenhauer anticipated the differentiation between »having a body« and »being a body« that became the main subject within philosophical anthropology of the 20th century. Schopenhauer, however, did not stop with the bodily experience, but transferred the concept of both points of view onto the whole of nature; on one hand, this way the world exists as »representation«, that means as an object of science; on the other hand as a will, as an endless and aimless urge that can only be experienced through the body ›Leib‹ and that goes to make up life. In recent times, Friedrich Kaulbach has, in a wider sense, developed a concise formula for the differentiation according to both terms of nature: the »perspective of the confined nature« and the »perspective of the free nature« (Kaulbach 1990, pp. 26 ff.). In the medieval as well as the modern examples, an ontological meaning in the differences between ›Leib‹ and ›Körper‹ becomes apparent. Within Aristotelian-medieval tradition, there is a difference in being, in the substance. Living beings differ from physical objects. In Schopenhauer, the ontological does not refer to the existence of the being as such in this sense anymore, but – according to the Kantian revolution of the way of thinking – to an object’s way of being. The ontological difference is described by Schopenhauer, with the help of Kant’s differentiation, as the thing-in-itself and the appearance: The body ›Leib‹ as an appearance is subjugated to the laws of nature and consists only of the definitions which science can discover in it. However, with an appearance of the thing-in-itself which, in Schopenhauer is the Will as a blind urge, he refers to the foundation of the Will to live, which is withdrawn from the field of scientific understanding. Kaulbach may only speak of »perspectives« but it has to be considered that no object exists independently of one of the perspectives in this perspectivism. Consequently, the distinction between a free and an enchained nature does not take place on the same ontological level. 5

From the extensive literature on the philosophy of the body in Schopenhauer the following are mentioned representatively: Dörflinger2002; Dörpinghaus 2000. 5 Hence, Kaulbach cannot stop with the perspectivism diagnosed for Kant, but must ask for a »sensory logic« (Kaulbach 1990, p. 135) which is based on a choice of perspective which he follows up on the basis of investigations to Hegel and Nietzsche. 4

282 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Body and Life, Philosophically

Summarizing the point of views mentioned so far shows that two positions stand opposed to each other in ontological difference. On the one side there is the field to which experiences such as life, dynamic, freedom, will, power and ›Leib‹ are assigned. On the other side is the area of dimensionality, measurability, manipulability, in short: of physicality. However, just as the concept of ›Leib‹ and ›Körper‹ used here fails to indicate the ontological difference by themselves, neither can the just stated allocations. Of course, in sciences that deal with corporeal it is always about life, movement, powers and so forth. The mere use of the terms does not decide on the ontological question, but the position that is given to them in scientific context. I can understand life, for instance, in the sense of a measurable and predictable process that, in the end, is led back to physical elements and regularities. In that way, life is defined by metabolism, conversion and the exchange of molecules. Reversely, a single material body can also be understood as an expression of powers, which are in themselves no longer quantifiable and therefore not scientifically ascertainable. In this way, for instance, Leibniz has defined the monads. The difference lies in what I consider to be an ontologically fundamental element for the scientific understanding of the phenomenon. To put it less precise but a little more concise: the first mentioned example explains the processes of life through the bodies and laws as their fundamental elements, while the second example understands the body as well as the laws as »congealed« living processes which, shape the fundamental forms of thought. 6 The ontologically fundamental forms of a scientific type of treatment can be called categories 7 of thought, to simplify matters. In this way, one could also say: Life, in the first example, is thought of within Cf. Schürmann 1999, 55 ff. Admittedly, the thought is not new in Schürmann; he himself refers to Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. Even closer to the expression is the understanding of natural products as inhibitions of nature’s productiveness in Schellings natural philosophy (cf. Schelling 1988, pp. 36 ff.) 7 The meaning of the concept »category« has changed in the course of history and, above all, the presently dominating linguistic-analytic use could let its equation with ontological fundamental elements as seem incomprehensible. In addition one would have to make a distinction, strictly speaking, between the transcendentalism, that concerns the being as such, and the categories as the uppermost generic terms of the being; then it would be more exact to speak of a thing or of life than of transcendentalism. Because the talk of transcendentalism in general is linked to its specific use in scholasticism and the meaning of ›category‹ in our context was sufficiently explained, this concept has been preferred. 6

283 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Matthias Koßler

the category of the body or the thing, while in the other example the body or the thing 8 is thought of within the category of life. As categories, which cause the way and manner of an understanding of phenomena, »body« and »life« are naturally not objects but regulatory functions, »blind spots«, which in themselves cannot become objects but through which objects can only come about. Categories determine how we explain and what we understand of things. The simplified expression »to understand something by the category of the body« states that the objects are primarily understood as static, discreet entities through which and with which processes are explained by their laws. »To understand something by the category of life«, however, means that objects are primarily understood as dynamic, continuous processes from which the static entities can be understood as temporary crystallizations. To only hint at the consequences of choosing these categories, it should be said that a foundation in continuous processes is opposed to the uniqueness of a definition of entities and laws, while a foundation in discreet entities makes an understanding of entities, individualities and movement difficult. Contrary to a common misunderstanding, this differentiation is not linked to a difference in the precision of thought. If, now, the difference between ›Leib‹ and ›Körper‹ is determined as ontological and categorical, the crucial question concerns the relation between these two points of view. If it is supposed to be about knowledge of reality, there has to be a perspective which relates both points of view and relates them to one another. »Regional ontologies«, as meta-scientific definitions, might have their place in the field of scientific theories 9: regionalization, which not only tries to close off different sciences from each other, but also tries to close the field of science off from other areas of life, does not help with practical and ethical issues which fuels the debate on the concept of life, namely the The expression »thing« also should be mentioned here since, in the philosophical discussion, the talk of a contrast has become naturalized between »ontology of things« and »ontology of process«. Cf. Schürmann 1999; Abel 1985; Seibt 1990; Seibt 1995; Whitehead: 1929. Because I, for a definition of the differences, started out with the terms ›Leib‹ and ›Körper‹, I will stick in the following, however, to the name »category of the body« in which, in terms of content, the term body ›Körper‹ coincides with the term thing. 9 Concerning the term regional ontology cf. Husserl 1992, 23 ff. Husserls phenomenology is an example for a philosophy based on the category of the thing, in using the »region material thing as a guide« (Husserl 1992, p. 344). 8

284 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Body and Life, Philosophically

question of ontology developed from the above-mentioned, so-called »philosophical« problem of life, which goes beyond the limits of the subject and the areas of life. Therefore, ontology cannot be discussed as a meta-science, but only in the sense of a »first« philosophy. This circumstance is not only of significance to the relation between philosophy, science and other areas of life, but also and especially for the relation between different cultures, which have different points of view on objects’ way of being. Concerning the relations of categorical different perspectives of ›Leib‹ and ›Körper‹, we have reached the logic problem, which already has been mentioned in connection to medieval philosophy, namely how ›Leib‹ necessarily can also be ›Körper‹, if, simultaneously, they are substantially different from one another. Or, in the modern take of Schopenhauer: how ›Körper‹ can be conceived as ›Leib‹ if our knowledge is limited within the area of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, thus empirically limited to the area of the body, which is defined by space, time and causality. Since there is no superordinate category with which to comprehend this relation, the difficulties of defining a connection between ontological different objects become obvious. One can initially examine and then try to progress how this connection is formed by the usage of the categories associated with the respective areas. It has just been mentioned how a connection within the category of the body, that is the category which constitutes the objects of science, should be thought of. According to the ontological priority of discreet entities and under the condition of a regionalization of areas of life and knowledge, it is understood as purely external. The field of science with its objective facts and laws is one area; the other, for example, is arts and possibly philosophy if they try to approach the phenomenon of life in their own way. Naturally, those practicing science are aware of these other areas, but science may not be influenced by it. Science engages with those other areas by turning them into objects according to its own categories. Now, there is nothing that science in such way could not take as or turn into an object; body and life are also objects of science. A regionalization, therefore, cannot mean a division into different subject areas. One could say the method of treating any given object as what sets the field of science apart from others. But, having said this, it becomes clear that it is not actually about the given objects, but their way of being in general. The method of regionalization is un285 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Matthias Koßler

suitable to comprehend the difference in the way of being, since this manner of differentiation is only possible on the same level of objectivity in such way as a differentiation of regions on a surface area cannot be transferred to a demarcation between surface area and space or surface area and time. In this way, for instance, ›Leib‹ and life are treated as objects of science without a reflection on the categorical conditionality of their object being. ›Leib‹ or organism is consequently a body or something composed of bodies with certain features which constitutes being alive, like metabolism, self-movement, and emergence among others. Formally, these definitions are similar to the definition of ›Leib‹ as an animated body – with the same problematic as formulated by the starting point of my reflections. One example for the understanding of the connection between the ontologically different interpretations within the categories of life has already been mentioned, namely the medieval philosophy of the levels of perfection. Aristotle’s adopted conception of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια or rather substance and form can be viewed as ontology on the basis of living processes 10. The categories of science, in Thomas Aquinas, are attributed to even more fundamental terms; the transcendental of which being is the highest; but this being should be understood as an act, figuratively as an act of the Creator God. The being of everything is an act of realization of his possibility, in the course of which the physicality of every natural being also is realized as a necessary feature. Therefore, the relation to the area of the bodily here is not one of differentiation and regionalization but rather, according to the priority of continuity, it is an encompassment of the same. This encompassment does not take place in the form of subsumption, in the same way as ›Leib‹, in science, is subsumed to the term body, but as an originating act. This perception of the relationship nevertheless is connected to a subordination in degrees, which leads to the already mentioned difficulty that ›Leib‹, for instance, the physicality, despite its necessity, is merely viewed as an accident in the case of a human

With this appraisal of the Aristotelian philosophy I follow Seibt 1995, 365. Abel 1985, p. 158, however views Aristotle as the philosopher who has introduced the possibility of the ontology of things with his theory on substance and accident. Cf. Whitehead 1929, p. 387. This very different appraisal indicates the difficulties which pose themselves to distinctions on the ground of the continuity. In the same way as ›Leib‹ necessarily is also ›Körper‹, so is the Aristotelian physis inevitably also viewed as a substance-accident-relation.

10

286 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Body and Life, Philosophically

body 11. It’s not accidental that Schopenhauer has used this antic-medieval thought in his exposition on the objectivation of the will in nature, following Schelling, when talking about levels of objectivation, which are attributed to the species and types of natural objects. Meanwhile, Schopenhauer barely dealt with the logic-ontological problematic of a philosophy thought of from life. This task, in his times, was taken on by Hegel and then later in the subsequent hermeneutic life and existentialist-philosophical tendencies. It cannot be part of this essay to further examine in part very different approaches which more or less consider the questions of categories, which can be found, to name only a few, in Wilhelm Dilthey, Hellmuth Plessner, Georg Misch and Josef König. Even within the philosophy tending toward the natural sciences, there are tendencies pointing in this direction, so for instance in Alfred North Whitehead. They all have in common the attempt not to oppose the categories of objects or bodies to the ontology of living processes, but to understand them as enclosed by these processes and necessarily emerging from them. That these attempts occur in different forms lies in the subject itself, since the uniqueness caused by categories and which gives the sciences their methodical entity is not a given here 12. With regard to the reality of life, which concerns our border question, there are only approximations to the (natural) scientific thinking belonging to the category of the body as well as to an understanding of life as a category. »Approximation«, on this occasion, means a fundamental relation where the distance remains constituThis devaluation of the bodily of course also has a religious background. Still it is not a given in all the medieval concepts as the debates around principium individuation is show. In principle, this might have become clear, such devaluation on the basis of the dynamic theory of matter and form cannot hold. 12 I see the farthest advanced attempt of a specification of the relation standing in question in that of König 1937, 3 ff., developed logical figur of the »self-difference«. If one covers his example of »liveliness« (König 1937, 8 f., cf. pp. 209 f.) simplified to our problem, the difference would be between the talk of liveliness as the quality of a thing and the talk of a »living effect« as a process in whose course only that arises what we view as living, a self-difference of the latter. I. e. being alive as a quality of a thing or body and a living effect as a bodily experienced process on the one hand are substantially (ontological) different, but are at the same time also an internal difference of the original living effect. The figure of the self-difference also would be applied in this sense to the relation of ›Leib‹ and ›Körper‹, in so far as the body ›Leib‹ should be something substantially different from the object ›Körper‹ but, at the same time, however, also should necessarily be an object ›Körper‹. 11

287 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Matthias Koßler

tive. In the empiric sciences it appears as an infinite process of the progress of time; in medieval thinking, it was reflected in the manner of an analogy, a relation of resemblance, which encloses a fundamental non-resemblance. Sciences approach the phenomenon of life on an inadequate ontological basis. Since certain characteristics, which themselves are determined in a physical way, are ascribed to the body, ›Leib‹ and life (as concepts) are not obtained in their true meaning. The principal inadequacy, in a theoretical respect, does not prevent this approach from having great success for the preservation and improvement of the body ›Leib‹ in a practical sense and that it is of indisputable value (but also poses a danger). Philosophy – if, in this case to simplify matters, it is opposed to science 13 – approaches the phenomenon of life on a more or less adequate ontological basis, but at the expense of the uniqueness and stability of the definitions, which it can reach with its categories. It stays as much in a principal approximation to the form of the distinctiveness and exactness of sciences, as it stays in approximation to the content of the concept of life. But are these abstract considerations on ontology and categories of any importance in respect to the specific border questions of life, as they appear on the agenda with regard to the definition of the beginning and end of life, the classification of life worth living and the demarcation between living and non-living systems? If it were about a definite answer, a clear demarcation and a justiciable definition, the question would have to be negated. This, however, is due to the fact that a significant meaning has to be considered with respect to the way and manner in which such questions have to be treated. The result not only consists of having no definite answers but, initially, of showing in a scientific manner that there is no definite answer in this field. The borders of life also put the borders of knowledge into perspective. The decisions in practice that demand such demarcations and definitions (abortion, research involving embryos, organ transplantation etc.) are and remain in every single case moral and conscientious decisions because they are about life. Science and philosophy cannot disburden the moral pressure that is necessary where the borders of life are in question because there are no definite answers, here. To the relation between philosophy and science I have in detail taken position in Koßler 2002.

13

288 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Body and Life, Philosophically

Literature Abel, Günter 1985. »Einzelding- und Ereignis-Ontologie«, in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 39, pp. 157–185. Dörflinger, Bernd 2002. »Schopenhauers Philosophie des Leibes«, in: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 83, pp. 43–85. Dörpinghaus, Andreas, 2000. »Der Leib als Schlüssel zur Welt. Zur Bedeutung und Funktion des Leibes in der Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers«, in: Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 81, pp. 15–31. Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen 1993. Berlin. Husserl, Edmund 1992. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (Gesammelte Schriften (ed. E. Ströker) Bd. 5). Hamburg. Kaulbach, Friedrich 1990. Philosophie des Perspektivismus. 1. Teil. Wahrheit und Perspektive bei Kant, Hegel und Nietzsche. Tübingen. Kluge 2002. Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. Berlin / New York. König, Josef 1937. Sein und Denken. Halle. Koßler, Matthias 2002. »Philosophie und Methode«, in: M. Koßler / R. Zecher (ed.) Von der Perspektive der Philosophie. Beiträge zur Bestimmung eines philosophischen Standpunkts in einer von den Naturwissenschaften geprägten Zeit). Hamburg, pp. 17–37. Koßler, Matthias 2004. »Leib und Körper. Zum Zusammenhang von Körperkult und Leibesverachtung.«, in: Widerspruch – Münchner Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 42, pp. 80–88. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 1988. Einleitung zu seinem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie (ed. W. G. Jacobs). Stuttgart. Schopenhauer, Arthur 1949. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung vol. 2 (Sämtliche Werke (ed. Arthur Hübscher) vol. 3). Wiesbaden. Schürmann, Volker 1999. Zur Struktur hermeneutischen Sprechens. Eine Bestimmung im Anschluß an Josef König. Freiburg / München. Seibt, Johanna 1990. Towards Process Ontology. A Critical Study in SubstanceOntological Premises. Diss Pittsburgh. Seibt, Johanna 1995. »Individuen als Prozesse: Zur ontologischen Revision des Substanz-Paradigmas«, in: Logos 5, pp. 352–384. Thomas Aquinas 1965. De anima (Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2), Turin / Rom. Whitehead, Alfred N. 1929. Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology. New York / Cambridge.

289 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Volker Caysa

Rights of the Body and the »Common Body« 1

Corresponding to the regulative idea of the rights of the body, there is a cultural-anthropological, reasonable and appropriate, ›natural‹ evaluation criterion (applying to the different physical cultures of the world), on the basis of which we differentiate between possible forms of intolerable, self-destructive body relations or instrumentalization of the body, if the idea of a fair treatment of the body is linked to the idea of a ›natural‹ body treatment. In our eyes a treatment of the body ›according to nature‹ is a reasonable treatment. In what way? The human being is, by nature, a historically variable, rational being. Human nature is what we primarily are, and we are primarily what we – as rational beings – want and choose. Human temperament is the result of a responsible relation to oneself and to the other part of oneself, namely nature. Taking nature as a role model is innate to humans, since reason determines our temperament to a large scale. If, in this context, the body is determined as the ›great reason‹, then this also means that its nature must be understood as rational. And if we want to grant this nature rights with regard to our physical behavior, then this also means, that we interpret this natural law as a right of reason. We do justice to the nature of the body if we act according to reason. Reason is the degree of natural physical behavior and the ›great reason‹ of the body consists of reasonable body use. A reasonable and free body use is only possible if it is in accordance with the body itself. The rights of the body are in their role as rational rights autoThe term ›common body‹ was introduced in the philosophy of sport as well as in the philosophical anthropology of the body by Gunter Gebauer. Cf. Gebauer 2002, p. 243 ff. as well as Gebauer 2003. I take up Gebauer’s idea, but am aware that I, respectively to my approach to the ›rights of the body‹, add content which Gebauer probably could view as problematic. My point is, to further develop the undoubtfully innovative ideas of Gebauer and to extend them. This only works, in my opinion if one critically engages with them.

1

290 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Rights of the Body and the »Common Body«

matically natural rights that should prevent from corporal mutilation, violation and enslavement of the body. However, they cannot be separated from the personal right to decide freely over one’s own body. Nevertheless, these natural laws have to be seen as culturallyprocedural and not as naturally-substantial. That means in their role as natural laws respectively rational rights, they are granted to all human beings; but, this does not mean that they can be considered as naturally given fact, as independent from historical constellations, public welfare and the approval of the people (cf. Steinvorth 2004), instead they are products of an intercultural practice. But if they were accepted through consensus by a majority of society they are valid inter-subjectively and inter-culturally and in so far independent from single subjects and cultures and thus valid for a longer historical period. This consequently means that a natural, just and fair treatment of the body is a reasonable body behavior and that the given measure of natural behavior is relative to the cultural discourse about naturalness, artificiality, and good sense. Although there is always a cultural-relative body nature, there is at the same time a body nature that is beyond a specific culture, which we could refer to as ›common body‹ and which is defined by a globally accepted consensus with regard to normal body use. If this anthropological minimum were to be determined as a measure of a normal, reasonable, non-essentialist body treatment appropriate to our nature, it should not be reduced ahistorically to the current images of an organic, accidentally grown, innate, and in this sense, natural corporeality. One could interpret this measure as a ›law‹ of the ›common body‹ and, in this sense, as an ›intrinsic right‹ of the body, which means we have to accept limits concerning instrumental interventions into our physical constitution which, for reasons of the reason, and in so far founded by our nature, should not be crossed. This measure is to be understood as an avoidance criterion. The idea of the ›common body‹ is above all aimed at accepting borders of the manipulation of our physical constitution. Since the ›common body‹ makes the natural reason of every body culture – our natural body, the physical body as a requirement for the possibility of the cultural body – subject of discussion, the idea of the ›common body‹ in connection with the idea of the rights of the body contains not only a natural bonus, but also an omission and 291 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Volker Caysa

avoidance bonus in our own relations to the body: on the one hand we have to accept our body nature as a part of our personhood, and on the other hand we have to avoid certain manipulations in order to avoid foreseeable, irreversible damages. The ›common body‹ is about the acceptance of a universally valid limitation with regard to different forms of body instrumentalization. This limitation is determined in all body cultures in the way that they all differently grant the body a life of it’s own, which has to be to respected, which should be considered and which should not be destroyed. ›Common body‹ deals with universally applicable limits with regard to different forms of body instrumentalization and the instrumentality that results from those limits. What all body cultures have in common is the fact that they grant each body a certain degree of independent existence, which is supposed to be respected and protected. The idea of the ›common body‹ is aimed at rationally controlling the right to a self-determined body use and to self-wanted body change, while subjecting the relations to a few encompassed and general minimum standards (by the individuals themselves). Thus, the body control and body civilization linked to the idea of the ›common body‹ is not determined by others, but it is in fact self-determined. This idea of transcultural minimum standards in the respective body treatment explains the revealing assumption in the body culture comparison, that societies and communities always set standards concerning the rights and duties of a normal body treatment, if we want to evaluate the body cultures and make a distinction 2 – even if those are ›only‹ implicit, they also take the fact into account that we, if we try to understand the logic of the human body contact of foreign cultures, always assume common relations to the own body and, derived from this, common sets of terms and norms. However, the possibility of a community, based on reason and language, which is determined by the concept of the ›common sense‹, also relies on ›fundamental common characteristics of the physical behavior and its physiological base (voice, hearing, gesture)‹ (Siep

Even if we, like radical pluralists assume, always only look at body cultures, each in their specific feature, there is always something universal included in every individual one, at least implicitly, because there is nothing individual without something universal and because we must always assume this universal, if we want to explicate a comparative object with regard to its specific features.

2

292 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Rights of the Body and the »Common Body«

2005) as well as on general emotional regularization mechanisms 3, which are discussed as a central theme by Gebauer with the concept of the ›common body‹, so that it can be concluded that there is no ›common sense‹ without ›common body‹ 4. Therefore, the idea of the ›common body‹ is cultural-relativistic, but not anti-normative and anti-universal because it assumes, in its cultural relativism, that there is, in spite of all relativity and historicity, a common reason and with it the possibility for a common evaluation criterion, according to which one can evaluate the different body cultures, even if the forms of judgement always will be marked (at least to a certain extent) by the peculiarities of the language and cultures in which they have originated; which does not mean that they are always based on dogmatic-metaphysical assumptions. To talk of ›rights of the body‹ also means to question such regulations and delimitations concerning the body that want to impose a certain norm. In this respect, ›rights of the body‹ are historically conditioned, but at the same time universally valid norms, which could be applied by ourselves and to ourselves in order to increase our physical self-power. In this context the idea of the ›common body‹ is connected to Thus Antonio Damasio ascertains in connection with Paul Ekman, how astonishing, not the differences, but the resemblances are that concern the irritant configurations which release an emotion within the human being: ›We owe to them the possibility of intercultural relations, and they are a precondition for the fact that art and literature, music and film can unfold their effects so internationally‹ (Damasio 2006). 4 These fundamental psychophysical characteristics, the common body is based on, are strengthened as a result of the globalization, in connection with the formation of a worldwide body fashion market, intensified also by the modern media. Even though apparently variety rules at the worldwide body fashion market linked with it, the schematization of the bodies as a result of their media standardization and serialization leads to a centralization of body forms in all body cultures to certain forms of the body, which are drawn to the global body image market, within which, of course, certain variations and divergences of the globalizing ›normality‹ are preserved. Nevertheless and in spite of ostensible variety and individuality, this leads to a McDonald-ization of the body world: a standardization and equalization of the body forms and the relation to the own body according to transnational patterns; which again leads to the global supremacy of certain body forms and to the global production of standardized bodies on the basis of simplicity, efficiency, calculability, controllability, predictability and above all feasibility. The development of a ›common body‹, cannot be separated from the effect of the colonialization of body cultures and it has to be asked whether this can be considered as exclusively negative. For instance, it might result in a more humane treatment of women and children, who could be spared from enslavement, physical brutality and circumcision. 3

293 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Volker Caysa

those universally applicable, anthropological minimum standards concerning the treatment of the body, to which all the other, culturally different types of body can be measured and which, in connection with the idea of the rights of the body and the enslavement theorem, is obliged to the care of a positive (or life-affirming) way of living in our culture. Leading a positive life is not possible without a positive interaction with our body nature that is determined by the ›common body‹. The idea of a positive treatment of the body is the reason, the aim of an emancipator, double-edged body politics, which does not only determine what it wants to be free of, but also determines how one can be free 5. If such a body politics is supposed not to be ahistorical and imperial, the body and the treatment of the latter must be understood as a dynamic entity, subject to permanent changes and not anymore as a mere static entity. Consequently, one cannot refer to a given ›beingin-itself‹, a normative ›natural nature‹, but one must orientate oneself towards one’s interest in a lasting, repeatable treatment of our nature which we are, namely our body (cf. Böhme 2008). The ›common body‹ then would have to be understood as a culturally affirmative treatment of the body, as the body to which everybody could say ›Yes‹ and would have to say ›Yes‹ to its technological treatment, if a human measure should be further preserved in the relation to our own body. The concept of the ›common body‹ on the one hand is about the ›preservation of a fundamental uniformity of the human physical constitution‹ as well as, on the other hand, about the fundamental physical self-relations, which are, in general, a precondition for the possibility of a human culture (cf. Birnbacher 2006). However, this positive treatment of the body, with which the human being does not only produce and direct his present existence, but also his future existence, this ›common sense body‹ cannot anymore assume a steady, final human body nature, but the human being instead has to assume nature as culture, that is, a body culture that is subject to historical and technological alteration. Then, the ›common body‹ has to be determined not only as a ›flexible body‹ (Emily Martin), but also as a ›reflexive body‹, in so far as the creation of the ›natural body‹ is carried out along specifications which are based on

5

For a possible plan of such an emancipatory body politics see: Caysa 2006.

294 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Rights of the Body and the »Common Body«

scientific knowledge, biotechnologies and aesthetic methods (cf. Beck & Knecht 2003). The ›common body‹ is not a natural, but a ›cultural body‹. Here the ›nature‹ and ›naturalness‹ consequently cannot act anymore as an ahistorical, metaphysical norm, but make a new norm of natural corporeality necessary, whose universality cannot be given dogmatically, but is itself based on the individuals’ freedom of choice. This nevertheless means that this new universal norm must be negotiated in electoral acts and discourses – of course under protection of the equality and freedom of choice of the human being, the respect of the latter’s decision-making power, but also taking the knowledge into account that the freedom of choice can be limited, if the conditions of the possible freedom of choice are questioned and if one uses his freedom of choice in order to give up the free choice concerning one’s own body. However, one could also imagine limiting the freedom of choice concerning the treatment of one’s own body, not only in order to protect oneself from self-destructive behavior, but also to receive or promote old or new options through technological body asceticism. Basically the following applies to the relation to one’s own body: in dubio pro libertate; as a consequence prohibitions imposed by the state concerning the relations to one’s own body should not be taken for granted, and therefore, not only the ones against but also the ones in favor of state bans have to come up with persuasive arguments in order to prevent that constitutional laws are exploited as a means of imposing conservative-authoritarian regulations (Hoerster 2002). Central, however, for a human technological body culture of which the measure still has to be negotiated, seems to be the solution of the problem of a just, fair body technologization; because here lies the solution to the problem of the culture of reason when it comes to dealing with the body nature. The idea of a fair, that is, a reasonable, sustained instrumentalization of the body in the context of the enslavement theorem, the idea of the ›common body‹ and the rights of the body, guarantees on the one hand terms of stability and self-preservation concerning our body relations; it guarantees protective rights for our body nature and is, on the other hand, open to new technological developments without giving itself up to them in an unreflected manner. It represents an orientation of our body technologization, which is supposed to guarantee that we remain subjects capable of decision-making with respect 295 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Volker Caysa

to the nature, which we are, our physical body, and do not become objects of the bio-politics and bio-industry of others. A lasting instrumentalization of the body has to be understood as a representative of the individual’s autonomy without conservative-dogmatically and linearly stipulating norms to the individual concerning his body identity or to pseudo-pluralistically demand their constant flexibility, as on the one hand the body conservatives and on the other hand the body futurists do (cf. Caysa 2003). Rather, what should be found is a measure with regard to the idea of a lasting body technologization within the area of tension of a self-possessive body and a dignity body, by which the autonomy of the individual can be protected. The idea of a lasting, fair instrumentalization of the body, connected with the enslavement theorem, as well as the rights of the body and the ›common body‹, acts as a measure of enlightened, modern relations of the individual towards his body and as an emancipated, reasonable body culture with regard to the conditions of a developing bio-industrial society. Analogous to human rights and natural laws it tries to formulate a universal, secular idea for a worthy, enlightened, reasonable treatment of the human body, in which the progressive principle of the self-perfection of the human being is related with the conservative principle of the preservation of its natural base, in which dignity in the sense of freedom of the individual body use and dignity in the sense of inviolability and unavailability of the human body nature are connected and not seen in an either-or-relationship (Birnbacher 2006). Rights of the body do not only imply being spared from torture or rape, but they also mean that the individual is not to be enslaved and turned into raw material, not even in a highly technological, human and civil form. Through the combination of fairness and lastingness with the regulative idea of the rights of the body, a basic principle, determined by the individuals themselves, should be realized within the treatment of the body in society as a whole, which, with respect to the body, guarantees its continued preservation as well as the minimum conditions of a humane treatment – inter-generationally and globally. A fair, lasting treatment of the body should protect the existence as well as the possible future developments of an autonomous personhood. This can only be realized, if there is a core area towards which the individual can orientate itself with respect to the treatment of the 296 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Rights of the Body and the »Common Body«

body, individually and humanly, globally and inter-generationally, and which may not be ignored. Derived from the human rights as personal rights, we try to make this core area a subject of discussion when talking of the ›rights‹ (or of the intrinsic value) of the body for ourselves and through ourselves. The ›rights of the body‹ describe the idea of a culturally determined limit when it comes to the instrumentalization of our physical constitution. It concerns the principle idea of a defined border, which may seem to be a natural border, even though it is in fact an artificial natural border 6. Nevertheless, it is not nature which obliges us to accept the ›rights of the body‹, but it is our nature, our reason, that obliges us to do so. ›Rights of the body‹ in the sense of natural laws means the valid right based on reason and not a dogmatic setting of values-in-itself of nature. With this artificial idea of nature as a border of the instrumentalization of nature, we also try to correspond to the constitutive regularization mechanism of sports, which is based on the fact that the artificial world of sports is based on the assumption of a naturalness idea which serves as a standard for the assessment of sportive achievements. The basic idea of naturalness therefore is a functional norm when it comes to sports. It is central not to be connecting this naturalness (as before) with a realistic purism and of not understanding it uncritically as a ›natural nature‹ – as a nature in itself or as ›pure nature‹, as a naturalness not yet distorted by culture – but understanding it critical-culturalistically as an artificial nature, as a set nature, for us and by us, which determines what it means, to achieve something out of one’s own ›natural force‹ 7. Especially the evaluation of doping proves that the assessment norms for sports are culturally set, natural norms and in so far are artificial norms through which the sport would not have the ›nature‹, which one awards to it. The consumption plebiscite concerning doping in sports within the fitness area and sex doping shows that the doping ban could also fall and has fallen in the area of sex a long time ago. At the same time, doping also disappoints the illusions of nature which are connected with sports. Capacity romantics express outrage concerning doping, because it makes obvious that the own sportive contributions are not ›pure‹, coincidentally innate, natural achievements. One basically takes the disappointment of the elated natural illusions amiss if an athlete being doped gets caught. 7 Today, the idolatry of the human nature in itself continues to exist in the form of an aesthetic naturalism, with which the fright of the natural-elated, sporting, and sexual 6

297 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Volker Caysa

Such a cultural idea of nature has to be understood as a historical a priori, which does not dogmatically and ahistorically-abstractly specify the borders of instrumentalization and mechanization of the body, but understands it historical-specifically, relatively and, nevertheless, universally. Consequently, a natural-physical, personal contribution in a modern body culture can only be defined within the area of tension between naturalness and artificiality; thus it must be determined as a cultural product of innate talent and training, of natural disposition and of technical-scientific skills at a specific time. Corresponding the polemics concerning the use of drugs, masturbation and prostitution; doping and enhancements are also about the legality or illegality of instrumentalization of the body; they raise the question concerning, what is a normal and abnormal use of the body, what is and is not inherent to the body; what is a natural and what an anatural personal contribution of a human being. With respect to the free use of the body we can choose between either taking the path of a thoughtless technologization of the body, which leads to a non-reflexive body industrialism, to an immoderate body consumption in the form of biopolitical-neoliberal self-technologization and thus to a new form of self-enslavement. Or, we choose the path of a body-ecological technologization, the path of a temperate use of the body in the form of an ecological self-technologization, as the body-technological imperative suggests, by which new forms of the technologization of the body remain usable as liberating possibilities. The pragmatic way out of the apparent iron casing of the biopolitical-neoliberal technologization of the body represents, in our point of view, a technologization of the body, but oriented on lastingness, namely by ecologizing the treatment of the body. Here, it is also

achievements is continuously romantically transfigured and which was always a reason for admiration of sportive-sexual achievements and belongs to the mythopoesis of the modern sport and sexuality. While, e. g., making the sexual incalculability the essence of sexuality. Cf. Sigusch 2005. The idolatry of naturalness of the coincidental nature in itself turns sport and sex, as components of the entertainment industry in the form of the professional sport and professional sex into a sort of human zoo, freak shows, presentations of extinct races: it is there where we are shown what the former human animals, natural-by chance, ›own-performing‹, were capable of doing and what the civilized animals, the first, after Nietzsche the ›last‹, people, are not any more able to do; who, therefore, want to ›postprepare‹ just to be a happy ›common man‹.

298 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Rights of the Body and the »Common Body«

about an ecological-reflexive modernization concerning the treatment of the body. Although the initiated industrialization of the body cannot be stopped (to aim at this would be absolutely illusionary), but its most extreme outgrowths could remain correctable on a continuing basis. And this would at least mean to prevent a thoughtless selfexploitation and self-enslavement of human beings. With a free choice regarding the treatment of our own body, we can escape our bio-political destiny of turning into raw material. The body-ecological worry is a pragmatic utopia, a heterotopia of the self-government of one’s own body. By means of a body-ecological self-technologization some could escape from the biopolitical feasibility-mania and could serve as a role model for the majority that is still subject to the body-industrialization. Nevertheless, the alternative does not consist in a ›return to the body‹ in the sense of a return to a ›natural nature‹, to a nature not yet spoilt by modern civilization, in order to eradicate the unnaturalness of the artificial relations to our own body; but a ›return to the body‹ can exist only in the form of an ›upwards movement‹ in the direction of a higher level concerning the body-technological treatment. This ›higher level‹ means a higher degree of freedom concerning our body relations, it means the emancipation from our current addiction towards body technology, by adopting a selfdetermined relation to the different forms of body-technologization, and thus escape the destiny of the heteronomy of our own body through an ecological-reflexive technologization of the body whose center of reflection is the ecological trans-body. It is by far not yet decided, how far this future of the body is technologically feasible and which body-technological risk is permitted to produce the ecological trans-body. Here, the initial cause was to find an ethical frame which allows to regulate the experiment concerning the formation of the future of the human body, which is inseparably linked to the creation of the future of the body. Also the formation of a trans-body is situated in an area of tension between humanizing nature and naturalizing human beings, cultivating the physical body and turning reason into something physical, which could result in a body culture that is marked by bioculturality. The body concept, here, parallel to the general concept of nature, functions as a regulation and demarcation, which allows human beings to regulate the relation to their own body – that is characterized by an area of tension between the rights of the body on the one hand and the right to decide over one’s own body on the other. 299 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Volker Caysa

With respect to the human body it is important that not only its free use has to be guaranteed and protected, but also the preconditions that allow exactly this. The protection of a free use of the body demands, therefore, the protection of the preconditions, which then make this freedom possible. Those preconditions are grasped through the concept of the rights of the body and this means the fundamental unavailability, the non-producibility, the selfhood of the corporeal nature of the human being, which is a requirement for developing a kind of personhood and which consequently is guaranteed by ourselves through our ambition to form a kind of personhood. In this context the body is not viewed as an object which we need in order to exist, but it is primarily regarded as a means that must be a priori there so that we have the possibility to make use of it. In the same way as there is no subject without subjectum, as well as there is no I without something underlying, there is no personhood without a body and there is no body without a physical body. The always existing, unavailable selfhood of our body nature is a requirement for the possibility of our technologized body culture. The body is the perfect example of our non-available body nature, which is the requirement for the possibility for all our instrumentalized body relations and which has to be respected, if free and humane body relations should remain possible. In the same way as it is part of the capitalistic movement of goods, that some things are not disposable (cf. Böhme 2006), it is also part of the functionality of the modern body world that the fundamental unavailability of the body nature is not lifted completely, because then a human body culture would be destroyed completely. Therefore, there still have to be relations of the body, which are not disposed and carried out, in case a humane body world is supposed to remain possible. If we grant our body certain rights while at the same time considering the theorem of enslavement, we respect the dignity of our body and thus prevent ourselves from turning into objects of the second, third or even fourth order.

Literature Beck, St./Knecht, M. 2003. »Einleitung: Körper – Körperpolitik – Biopolitik«, in: Berliner Blätter. Ethnographische und ethnologische Beiträge. Heft 29. Birnbacher, D. 2006. Natürlichkeit. Berlin/New York.

300 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Rights of the Body and the »Common Body« Böhme, G. 2008. Ethik leiblicher Existenz. Über unseren moralischen Umgang mit der eigenen Natur. Frankfurt am Main. Böhme, H. 2006. Fetischismus und Kultur. Reinbek bei Hamburg. Caysa, V. 2003. Körperutopien. Berlin/New York. Caysa, V. 2006. »Kritik als Politik«. In: Schwarzwald, K./Grave, T./Philipps, A. (eds.): Kritik-Entwürfe. Beiträge nach Foucault. Münster. Damasio, A. 2006. Ich fühle, also bin ich. Berlin. Hoerster, R. 2002. Ethik des Embryonenschutzes. Stuttgart. Gebauer, G. 2002. Sport in der Gesellschaft des Spektakels. St. Augustin. Gebauer, G. 2003. »Plädoyer für den common Body«. In: Ränsch-Trill, B./Lämmer, M. (eds.): Der »künstliche Mensch« – eine sportwissenschaftliche Perspektive? St. Augustin. Siep, L. 2005. »Normative Aspekte des menschlichen Körpers«. In: Bayertz, K. (eds.): Die menschliche Natur. Welchen und wie viel Wert hat sie? Paderborn. Sigusch, V. 2005. Neosexualitäten. Über den kulturellen Wandel von Liebe und Perversionen. Frankfurt am Main/New York. Steinvorth, U. 2004. »Natürliche Eigentumsrechte, Gemeineigentum und geistiges Eigentum«, in: DZPh 52 5.

301 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Contributors

Michael von Brück – Professor em. of religious studies, Ludwig Maximilian University Munich Volker Caysa – Adjunct professor of philosophy, University of Leipzig Jonardon Ganeri – Professor of philosophy, New York University/ Abu Dhabi Stephan Grätzel – Professor of philosophy, Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz Eberhard Guhe – Professor of philosophy, Fudan University/Shanghai Matthias Koßler – Professor of philosophy, Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz Paul Nnodim – Professor of philosophy, Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts Patricia Rehm-Grätzel – Research associate, International MauriceBlondel-Research Centre at Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz Stephan Schaede – Director of the Protestant Academy/Loccum Tobias Schlicht – Professor of philosophy, University of Bochum Jens Schlieter – Professor of religious studies, University of Bern Mark Siderits – Professor em. of philosophy, Illinois State University 303 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .

Contributors

Dirk Solies – Adjunct professor of philosophy, Johannes GutenbergUniversity Mainz Alfred Weil – Honorary council member of the German Buddhist Union

304 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783495818121 .