Liberty, Equality, Democracy 9780814758755

Citation preview

Liberty, Equality , Democrac y

Liberty, Equality, Democracy Edited b y Eduard o Noll a

NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES S New Yor k an d Londo n

Copyright © 199 2 by New York University Press All rights reserved Manufactured i n the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dat a Liberty, equality, democracy / edited by Eduardo Nolla p. cm . Papers presented at a conference held at Yale University in April 1990 . Includes bibliographical references an d index. ISBN 0-8147-5774-X (cl ) 1. Tocqueville , Alexi s de , 1805-1859—Contribution s i n politica l science Congresses. 2 . Democracy-Congresses. 3 . Liberty—Congresses. 4 . Equality Congresses. I . Nolla, Eduardo. JC229. T8L47 199 2 321.8'0973~dc20 92-645 6 CIP New York University Press Books are printed on acid-free paper , and their binding materials are chosen for strength and durability.

To GEORG E W . PIERSO N

Contents

Preface x i Abbreviations xii i Introduction x v Eduardo Nolla

THE ANGE L AN D TH E BEAS T 1 Th

e Human Condition: Tocqueville's Deb t to Rousseau an d Pascal 1 Peter Augustine Lawler

2 Th

e Role of Religion in Preserving American Liberty—Tocqueville' s Analysis 15 0 Years Later 2 1 Catherine H. Zuckert

THE VIRTUE S O F FREEDO M 3 Th

e People and the Great: Tocqueville and Machiavelli on the Art of Being Free 3 7 Joseph Alulis

4 Virtu e and Politics in Tocqueville 5 5 Dalmacio Negro

Contents

Vlll

THE DEMOCRATI C STAT E 5 Tocquevill e Reconsidered: Foreig n Policy an d the America n Democracy 7 5 Herbert Dittgen 6 Tocquevill e an d the Historical Sociolog y o f Stat e 9 1 Pierre Birnbaum THE NE W SOCIET Y 7 Tocqueville , a Phenomenology o f the Social 10 3 Claude Lefort 8 Th

e Question of Fraternity i n Democracy in America 11 Francesco De Sanctis

3

9 Pauperis m an d Democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville and Nassa u Senior 12 9 Hugh Brogan THE WRITIN G O F DEMOCRATI C MA N 10 Tocquevill e an d American Literary Critic s 14 3 Cushing Strout 11 Democrati c Literature: Tocqueville's Poetologica l Reflections an d Dreams 15 3 Gisela Schlilter THE EN D O F 178 9 12 Wh y Did Tocqueville Think a Successful Revolutio n Wa s Impossible? 16 5 Roger Boesche 13 Tocquevill e an d the Postmodern Refusal o f History 18 7 Edward T. Gargan

Contents THE PROBLE M O F TH E TW O DEMOCRACIES

14 Ho

w Many Democracies! 19 3 James T. Schleifer Notes on Contributors 20 7 Index 21 1

Preface

This book contains some of the papers given at an international conferenc e held at Yale University in April 199 0 commemorating the 150th anniversary of th e publication o f Alexi s d e Tocqueville's Democracy in America..The conference wa s sponsore d b y th e Whitne y Humanitie s Cente r an d th e Beinecke Rare Book an d Manuscript Library , wit h the participation o f the Social Thought and Ethics Program at Yale and the generous support of the Georges Lurcy Charitable and Educational Trust. The editor woul d like to thank Yale University fo r permission t o quote from th e Yal e Tocquevill e Collectio n a t th e Beineck e Rar e Boo k an d Manuscript Library.

Abbreviations

Editions of Democracy in America Tocqueville scholar s hav e lon g discusse d th e merit s an d defect s o f th e Englis h translations of Democracy in America. Ther e seems to be agreement only on the need fo r a new translation. The two standard English editions are used in this book. The French version used is the critical edition published by Eduardo Nolla in 1990 . It contains a large number o f previously unpublishe d material s fro m Tocqueville' s drafts , notes, correspondence and manuscript of Democracy in America. DA [B ] Democracy in America. Th e Henr y Reev e tex t a s revise d b y Franci s Bowen no w furthe r correcte d an d edited.. . b y Phillip s Bradle y (Ne w York : Vintage Books, 1945) . 2 v. DA [M-L ] Democracy in America. Edite d b y J . P . Mayer . A ne w translatio n b y George Lawrence (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969). DA [N ] De la Democratic en Amerique. Firs t critica l edition , revise d an d augmented, by Eduardo Nolla (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1990) . 2 v. Tocqueville's complete works OCB Oeuvres completes. Thi s i s th e firs t editio n o f Tocqueville' s complet e works, edite d b y hi s frien d Gustav e d e Beaumon t (Paris : Miche l Lev y Freres , 1864-78). I-III. De la Democratic en Amerique. IV. L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution. V. Correspondance et oeuvres posthumes. VI. Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville. VII. Nouvelle correspondance. VIII. Melanges, fragments historiques et notes sur VAncien Regime et la Revolution. IX. Etudes economiques, politiques et litteraires.

XIV

Abbreviations

OC Oeuvres completes. The new but as yet unfinished editio n of Tocqueville's complete works. (Paris: Gallimard, 1950 - ) . I. De la Democratic en Amerique. Introductio n b y Harol d J . Laski . Preliminary note by J.-P. Mayer. 2 v. (1951) 11:1. L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution. Introductio n b y George s Lefebvre , preliminary note by J.-P. Mayer. (1952) 11:2. L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution. Fragments et notes inedites sur la Revolution. Edited and annotated by Andre Jardin. (1953) 111:1. Ecrits et discours politiques. Edite d an d annotate d b y Andr e Jardin . Introduction by J.-J. Chevallier and Andre Jardin. (1962) 111:2. Ecrits et discours politiques. Edite d an d annotate d b y Andr e Jardin . Introduction by Andre Jardin. (1985) 111:3. Ecrits et discours politiques. Edite d an d annotate d b y Andr e Jardin . Introduction by Andre Jardin. (1990) IV. Ecrits sur le systeme penitentiaire en France et a V etranger. Edite d b y Michelle Perrot. 2 v. (1985) V:l. Voyages en Sicile et aux Etats-Unis. Edite d and prefaced b y J.-P. Mayer. (1957) V:2. Voyages en Angleterre, Irlande, Suisse et Algerie. Edite d an d annotate d by J.-P. Mayer and Andre Jardin. (1958) VI: 1. Correspondance anglaise. Correspondance dAlexis de Tocqueville avec Henry Reeve et John Stuart Mill. Introductio n b y J.-P. Mayer. Edited an d annotated by J.-P. Mayer and Gustave Rudler. (1954) VI:2. Correspondance anglaise. Correspondance et conversations dAlexis de Tocqueville et Nassau William Senior. Edited and annotated by H. Brogan and A. P. Kerr. Notes by J. -P. Mayer. Preface b y Lord Roll. Introduction by H. Brogan. (1991) VII. Correspondances etrangere dAlexis de Tocqueville. Edited by Francoise Melonio, Lise Queffelec an d Anthony Pleasance. (1986) VIII. Correspondance dAlexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de Beaumont. Edited, annotated and introduced by Andre Jardin. 3 v. (1967) IX. Correspondance dAlexis de Tocqueville et dArthur de Gobineau. Edite d and annotated by M. Degros. Introduction by J.-J. Chevallier. (1959 ) XL Correspondance dAlexis de Tocqueville et de Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard. Correspondance dAlexis de Tocqueville et de Jean-Jacques Ampere. Introduced, edited, and annotated by Andre Jardin. (1970) XII. Souvenirs. Introduced, edited, and annotated by Luc Monnier. (1964) XIII. Correspondance d Alexis de Tocqueville et de Louis de Kergorlay. Edited b y Andre Jardin. Introduction an d notes by Jean-Alain Lesourd . 2 v.(1977) XV. Correspondance dAlexis de Tocqueville et de Francisque de Corcelle. Correspondance d Alexis de Tocqueville et de Madame Swetchine. Edite d by Pierre Gibert. 2 vols. (1983) XVI. Melanges. Edited by Francoise Melonio. (1989) XVIII. Correspondance dAlexis de Tocqueville avec Adolphe de Circourt et Madame de Circourt. Edite d b y A. P. Kerr. Revised by Louis Girard an d Douglas Johnson. (1984) YTC Th e Yal e Tocquevill e Collectio n a t th e Beineck e Rar e Boo k an d Manuscript Library, Yale University.

Introduction Eduardo Noll a

"Colloque: s . m. , d e cum loqui, parler ensemble. Conferenc e o u To n disput e su r des point s d e religion ; e t parc e qu'ordinairement o n s e quitte san s change r d'opinion, on nomme colloque tout entretien qui ne termine rien." Condillac, Dictionnaire des synonymes, i n Oeuvres completes de Condillac (Paris : Presses Universitaire s d e France, 1951), III, 131.

Tocqueville woul d hav e sai d tha t ther e i s n o bette r wa y t o dea l wit h hi s thought than through a collective wor k containing differen t an d frequentl y opposed points o f view. But surprisingl y Tocquevill e scholar s have rarely met in international conference s o r in the pages of books. 1 In fact, a quick glance at the most important works of Tocquevillian scholarshi p suggests a kind of oscillation between the United States and Europe, as if only through a great effort coul d interest in Tocqueville exist simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic. And even when a certain amount of intellectual contact has taken place,2 it has always been clear that the European Tocqueville is generally not the American Tocqueville. American scholars still smile to remember Raymond 1. Th

e most notable exception is the 195 9 commemoration o f Alexis de Tocqueville' s death, an d th e publicatio n o f th e paper s rea d a t th e Pari s internationa l meeting : Alexis de Tocqueville. Livre du centenaire, 1859-1959 (Paris : Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1960) . 2. Onl y durin g th e las t fe w year s hav e a certai n numbe r o f Europea n work s bee n available i n English translation . Recen t translation s includ e the following authors : Andre Jardin , Jean-Claud e Lamberti , Michae l Hereth , an d Tocqueville' s text s translated b y Roger Boesche. Also a number o f article s by Wilhelm Hennis , JeanClaude Lamberti, Raymond Aron and Francois Furet can be read in English now. xv

XVI

Eduardo Nolla

Aron's "rediscovery" of Tocqueville in 1979, 3 and their European colleagues are, fo r thei r part , surprise d b y America n neglec t o f th e secon d par t o f Democracy in America, which remains at the center of European scholarship on Tocqueville.4 But for several reasons this situation of intellectual distance and sometimes studied ignorance is rapidly changing. The renaissanc e o f Tocquevill e studie s i n th e earl y twentiet h centur y started with a number of biographical and textual works. 5 Since then, much effort ha s bee n an d i s stil l devote d t o th e publicatio n o f th e Tocquevill e papers,6 their inaccessibility unfortunately havin g slowed down and thwarted no small number of research projects. The approachin g completio n o f Tocqueville' s Oeuvres completes ha s evidently bee n on e o f th e mai n factor s tha t ha s helpe d t o expand Tocquevillian scholarship . Andre Jardin's definitive biography, an excellent work of scholarship, has solved many problems related to Tocqueville's life. It has had at the same time the perhaps unintended but remarkable result of assuring man y a schola r tha t th e remaining unpublishe d Tocquevill e manuscripts will force no radical changes in his scholarship. But a n entirely ne w orientatio n ha s bee n th e mos t symptomati c o f th e recent changes in Tocqueville studies. As more and more texts have become available, and as this availabilit y ha s coincide d wit h the emergence o f the new se t o f problems o f wester n societ y generall y groupe d unde r th e term "postmodernity," th e stud y o f Tocquevill e ha s move d awa y fro m th e historical and biographical towards the theoretical and philosophical.7 This change is not unrelated to the discovery that the unpublished papers of Tocqueville hav e come in many cases to shake the foundations o f what had until recently been accepted as the standard explanation of Tocqueville.8 3. Raymon d Aron, "Tocqueville retrouve," Tocqueville Review, 1 (1979), 8-23. 4. W e shoul d partly exclud e Franc e fro m thi s position. The French scholar s have fo r obvious reason s bee n intrigue d mor e b y Tocquevill e a s historia n o f th e Frenc h Revolution. 5. Th e works of Antoine R6dier and Roland-Pierre Marce l include d new unpublishe d materials, as did George Pierson's book. 6. I refe r no t onl y t o th e effort s o f th e internationa l commissio n i n charg e o f th e publication of his works but also to the efforts o f many scholars (James T. Schleifer , Roger Boesche, Eduardo Nolla,...) to publicize previously unpublished manuscripts. 7. Thi s is proven, among other facts, by the final abandonment o f the principle of the prophetic vision of Tocqueville, i.e. the idea that his theories are a product of a sixth sense o r intuitio n bu t hav e n o soun d philosophica l o r theoretical grounding . Fe w things have slowed the study o f Tocqueville more than this attempt to see in him a political prophet but not a philosopher. 8. Th e best evidence of a philosopher's statu s as a "classic" of the history of thought is perhaps not the amount of scholarship produced o n his work or the number of new editions, but rather the realization that Tocqueville is not yet fully understood .

Introduction

xvn

And whe n a certain postmoder n malais e starte d t o appea r i n political an d philosophical theories , Tocquevill e scholar s discovere d tha t thei r autho r possessed a difficul t an d origina l "philosophy " tha t seeme d particularl y pertinent to the present.9 This doe s no t mea n i n an y wa y tha t political theorist s ha d no t alread y dealt wit h Tocqueville , bu t rathe r tha t thei r presen t interest s ar e mor e theoretical an d philosophical . Thi s als o means , paradoxically , tha t Tocqueville's thought has become more timely and practical than before. For example , fewe r an d fewe r contemporar y studie s cente r o n th e question of Montesquieu or Mill's influence o n Tocqueville,10 in an attempt to make him fit in the classical tradition of liberal thought, while more and more page s ar e writte n o n Tocquevill e a s a Pascalia n an d Roussonia n thinker.11 It seems somehow appropriat e that an age which praises itself fo r living in the void 12 will turn its eyes to a Pascalian Tocqueville . It is known that Pascal was always afraid o f a large abyss that seemed to open to the left of his table while he was working, and that to reassure himself he put a chair to hisleft.^ Tocqueville speaks about not one but two abysses, to his right and to his left. Thi s metapho r i s s o appropriate—no t onl y t o aristocrati c an d democratic times , pre - an d post - Revolution , bu t als o t o modernit y an d postmodernity, Wes t an d East,—tha t i t i s no t surprisin g t o find tha t contemporary author s read Democracy in America as a new Pensees more than as a kind of Spirit of the Laws in the United States. Ortega liked to say that all new philosophy i s produced wit h the help of bricks and boards taken from th e fallen structur e o f previous philosophies. Today the constructive abilitie s of philosophy ar e said to be exhausted an d 9. Thi s use of Tocqueville i n relation t o contemporary question s i s evident i n author s as distant fro m eac h other a s Jean Baudrillard, Rober t Nisbet o r Gilles Lipovetsky . In a postmodern vein it could be said that Tocqueville is one of the first authors who rejects the "big narratives." 10. Thi s had been a n accepted assumptio n sinc e the first appearance o f the first part of Democracy in America. Lui s Die z de l Corra l ha s masterfull y expose d th e shak y ground o n which most o f these studie s were based. It must als o be noted tha t Diez del Corral was the first to point out the Pascalian element of Tocqueville's thought , more than thirty years ago. See his El pensamiento politico de Tocqueville (Madrid : Alianza Universidad, 1898) , especially chapter III. 11. Tocqueville' s liberalism is now considered to be strange (Roger Boesche) or elusive (Peter A. Lawler). In any case, very different fro m classic liberalism. 12. Se e Gilles Lipovetsky, Lere du vide (Paris: Gallimard, 1983) . 13 Se e Luis Diez del Corral, El pensamiento politico de Tocqueville (Madrid : Alianz a Universidad, 1989) , 246-247.

XV111

Eduardo Nolla

Alain Renaut has put Ortega's words in a modern perspective by speaking of the need of philosophers to become thieves. Whatever constructive, destructive or de-constructive view of philosophy is taken, i t is equally tru e that a t present Tocquevill e i s a prized objec t o f thievery. There is probably no other place where the interest in Tocqueville is more evident than in Eastern Europe . Like Western Europe, the countries o f the East ar e discoverin g i n Tocqueville 14 a critic an d defende r o f democrac y who has the advantage o f not using psychoanalytical, linguisti c or Marxist terminology, an d who offers th e possibility o f being read a s a philosopher (like Pascal) wh o dislikes an d mistrusts philosophy . Tocquevill e spok e of philosophy a s the "essence of all gibberish," 15 "voluntary tormen t that man consents [...] t o inflict on himself."16 One thing is clear from the beginning of the introduction to the Democracy. "The author of this work," reads a draft, "set out to write a book on politics and not a book of philosophy."17 But i s precisel y i n Easter n Europ e tha t Tocquevill e toda y run s th e greatest risks . H e i s presente d a s th e autho r o f a non-Marxis t Bibl e fo r contemporary societies , and there is always the temptation of reading him as the countries of Eastern Europe have been used to read Marx, as an author who offer s answers , solutions , recipes , forgettin g tha t th e rea l interes t o f Tocqueville's messag e i s tha t book s nee d t o b e writte n an d rea d bu t no t obeyed or followed. 18 Tocqueville, following th e steps of Plato, disliked books. He did not like books of philosophy an d especially books of political philosophy, because, for him , th e existenc e o f politica l philosoph y resulte d fro m a failur e o f politics, an absence of political practice 19. Political philosopher s wh o lack contact wit h political life , a s the philosophes, creat e a n orderly , uniform , just, simple, intellectual nation where they retire.

14. A

larg e numbe r o f conference s an d meeting s o n Tocquevill e ar e presently takin g place i n Eastern Europ e (i n Yugoslavi a i n 1991 , in Czechoslovakia , Bulgari a an d Rumania in 1992 ) 15. Draf t o f a letter to Le Peletier dAunay, November 8 , 1831 . YTC [Yal e Tocqueville Collection], BIa2. All of the documents of the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library are cited with the kind permission of Yale University. 16. Lette r to Charles Stoffels, Octobe r 22, 1831 , YTC, Blal, an d OCB, VII, 83-84. See OCB, VI, 370. 17. YTC , CVk, 1,73 . 18. Se e Eduardo Nolla, Democratia (sau) Cartea Inchisa, 22,40 (1991) , 10-11 . 19. "Tru e enlightenment comes, for the most part, from experience." DA [N] , I, 236. The Enlightenmen t i s "th e exercis e o f though t completel y abstracte d fro m activ e practice," DA [N], II, 31, note c.

Introduction

xix

Order, prediction, transparency , perfectio n belon g to theory an d not t o reality. "There is no subjec t tha t does not broaden th e more one immerses oneself in it," Tocqueville wrote to Chabrol, "neither fact nor observation at the bottom of which one cannot discover doubt. All of the objects in this life appear to us, as through a veil, like certain decorations a t the opera, whose contours one cannot grasp with precision. There are people who enjoy living in this perpetual twilight; as for me, it tires and depresses me; I would like to hold the political and moral truths the way I hold my pen." The most important element of the contemporary vision of Tocqueville is precisely th e realization tha t Tocqueville retains his attraction fo r u s today because he successfully sustain s contradictions, simultaneousl y embracin g knowledge and ignorance, theory and practice, thought and action. Tocqueville mocks the philosophy o f the Enlightenment fo r no t having direct links to reality, for being literary and above all individualistic; he, on the othe r hand , i s continuall y i n motion , i n constan t intellectua l effervescence. H e cannot sto p himself fro m thinking , fro m bein g wha t he likes t o cal l a n "examinin g machine, " " a reasonin g machine ; a kin d o f syllogism incarnate." In a not e h e onc e exclaimed : "Th e onl y trut h tha t I acknowledg e a s absolute is that there is no absolute truth."20 The process of thought, then, resembles a syllogism always in search of a conclusion. Fo r Tocqueville , lif e take s plac e i n th e doub t betwee n randomness, on the one hand, an d causes beyond calculatio n o n the other . For man , th e worl d i s a close d book , empt y o f truth s an d o f absolut e systems.21 This is precisely why one must avoid what can be observed in the United States, where "everyon e close s himself off.. . completely , an d claim s fro m this vantage point to be able to judge the world.... When they se e that they can solve all of the small difficulties wit h which they are presented in their practical lives , withou t outsid e help, " Tocquevill e remark s abou t th e 20. YTC , Bllb. 21. "Whe n I began t o reflect, I believed tha t th e worl d was ful l o f prove n truths ; tha t one only had to look hard in order to see them. However, when I applied myself t o the consideratio n o f objects , I coul d onl y perceiv e inextricabl e doub t [... ] I convinced mysel f i n the end that the searc h fo r absolute , demonstrable, truth , lik e the search for perfect happiness , was a quest for th e impossible. It is not that ther e are no truths that merit th e complete conviction o f man; but, rest assured, they ar e very few an d far between. For the great majority o f things that it is important for us to know, we have but likenesses, approximations. To despair because it is this way is to despair o f man ; fo r thi s is one of th e inflexibl e law s of ou r nature." Letter t o Charles Stoffels, Octobe r 22, 1831, YTC, Blal an d OCB, VII, 82-82.

XX

Eduardo Nolla

Americans, "they thus conclude, easily enough, that the world is explainable, and that nothing escapes the boundaries of intelligence." 22 To live in doubt and contradiction is to live in democracy and to be fully human. One coul d perhap s compar e democrac y t o the su n that produces ligh t by rollin g impetuously ove r itself an d in ceaselessly agitatin g al l of the molecules of whic h [it is made up]. 23

It i s only i n the actio n o f ma n an d i n his conflictin g idea s that th e human spirit develops: 24 only in everyday commotion, in the small disturbances of public freedom does democracy survive. 25 You hav e t o admit.. . tha t ther e i s no t on e singl e intellectua l trut h tha t ca n b e demonstrated, an d that the centuries o f enlightenment ar e centuries o f doub t an d discussion.26

It follow s tha t th e sures t wa y o f avoidin g absolut e idea s an d excessiv e generalities, of avoiding the excesses of political theory as one avoids total confidence i n books, is by forcing eac h man to engage with ideas, to think, to fight against reality, to contest, to search for an identity.27 In othe r words , fo r Tocquevill e th e ai m o f though t mus t b e t o creat e doubt, to maintain man in uncertainty, to move him away from system s and absolute truths, away, precisely, from a life of books and theories. Perhaps the most important effect o f the recent publication of previously unpublished manuscripts has been to show a Tocqueville who is more of an aristocrat and a conservative that had been thought up to now.28 22. DA [N ] II, 14. 23. YTC , CVa, 9. 24. "Feeling s an d idea s d o no t rene w themselves , th e hear t doe s no t gro w an d th e human spiri t doe s not develo p bu t b y th e reciproca l action s o f me n agains t eac h other." DA [N] II, 105. 25. L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution, OC, II: 1, 197. 26. Lette r to Charles Stoffels, Apri l 21, 1830 , in DA [N] , II, 323. 27. "When , tired of searching for wha t motivates one's fellow man , he [man ] strives at least to distinguish wha t motivates himself, he does not ye t know wha t to believe. He searche s th e universe , an d h e doubts . H e return s finally t o himself , an d th e obscurity seem s t o increas e th e close r h e come s an d want s t o know himself. " DA [N] n, 77, note v. 28. Roland-Pierr e Marcel spoke of Tocqueville as a "conservative-liberal". Hugh Broga n see s i n hi m a n aristocra t convince d o f th e succes s o f democracy . Harold Laski , Phillip Bradley , Wydha m Lewis , John Lukacs , Antoine Redie r an d Robert Nisbet think of him as an aristocrat who hates democracy. Jacob-Peter Maye r an d Albert Salomo n hav e spoke n o f a "liberal o f a new kind" . Russell Kir k qualifie d Tocquevill e a s "libera l a la Burke" . Maxim e Lero y wrot e about Tocqueville, the "liberal-conservative".

Introduction

xxi

It ma y b e enoug h t o sho w tha t i n th e draft s o f Democracy in America Tocqueville i s perfectl y convince d tha t aristocrac y i s necessar y fo r th e development o f humanity, tha t "i t i s unde r a n aristocrac y o r a prince tha t men that were half savag e have obtained th e several notions that will later allow them to be cultivated, equal and free." 29 Is it necessary to add that the author o f Democracy in America confesse s tha t h e woul d no t fre e th e American slaves?30 But as the scholar advances in the study of the manuscripts, he discovers that Tocqueville is, more than one could have supposed, a convinced liberal, and tha t fa r fro m hopin g t o sto p th e movemen t toward s democracy , h e "wishes to produce it." 31 When a reviewer of the Ancien Regime et la Revolution describes him as an aristocrat Tocqueville takes his pen and writes: You see m to think o f me as a friend o f the old regime that the force o f trut h ha s forced t o give reasons t o the enemies o f tha t regime . That is , Sir, totally wrong . There has been no person tha t has better brought t o light the vices, the excesses, the fault s o f tha t ol d regime ; eve n i f I thin k tha t i n th e mids t o f al l th e ba d institutions tha t i t containe d ther e wer e severa l thing s tha t i t woul d hav e bee n desirable to keep. No one, I dare to say, has ever described th e evil that the spiri t and prejudices o f class , class division s an d th e ba d governmen t o f royalt y hav e produced i n France. No one has shown the part of responsibility tha t the royalty, the nobility an d the bourgeoisie have had in the violence of the Revolution. How could you , Sir , put i n doub t i n on e phras e m y sympath y fo r th e people, whe n a large part of my work has been dedicated to show under a new, true, sharper light the peculia r kin d o f oppressio n tha t the y suffe r an d thei r miseries , an d t o understand how the bad education that the royalty and the high classes have given . to the m explai n thei r violence?.. . I a m a sincer e an d arden t frien d o f wha t yo u yourself conside r th e main conquest s o f th e Revolution: politica l libert y an d al l the individua l libertie s tha t thi s expressio n contains , th e abolitio n o f al l cast e privileges, equality before the law, total religious liberty, simple legislation,... 32

Richard Bendix, Seymour Lipset, Jack Lively and Raymond Aron have their doubts about Tocqueville's liberalism but see in him mainly a weapon against Marxism. 29. DA [N] , II, 96, note g. "If nations had starte d with a democratic governmen t I doubt that they woul d hav e ever been civilized", DA [N] , I, 160. 30. " I confess tha t if I had the misfortune o f living in a country where slavery had been introduced an d that if I hold i n my hand the liberty of the Blacks I would not open it",ZM[N]I,276,notef. 31. DA [N] , II, 8, note h. 32. I n a letter of July 31, 1856. Quoted with the kind permission of the Bibliotheque de Versailles.

XX11

Eduardo Nolla

One of the most important lessons of Tocqueville's manuscripts is, to say it simply and quickly, to show a Tocqueville who is at the same time more of an aristocrat and more of a democrat.33 Is thi s a contradiction? No t i n th e cas e o f Tocqueville . Tocqueville' s liberalism can only be understood if one gives its full force to the disjunction between aristocrac y an d democracy , centralizatio n an d decentralization , unity an d plurality , libert y an d equality,.. . H e require s fro m u s t o b e simultaneously democratic and aristocratic, conservative and liberal, pre and post-revolutionary.34 Th e earl y nineteent h centur y wa s no t capabl e o f avoiding this opposition. The late twentieth century finds itself i n a similar situation. Tocqueville knew well that this was at the origin of his thought. I was i n suc h a balance betwee n pas t an d futur e tha t I didn' t fee l instinctivel y attracted towards one or the other and I didn't have to make great efforts t o glance to each side with calmness. 35

Tocqueville exaggerated the tranquillity an d lack of interest with which he watched both sides but he was sincere: history made it difficult fo r him to be an ultra or a liberal. With his usual perspicacity, he predicted that the major historical division between pre-revolution and post-revolution would always prevent reader s fro m appropriatel y understandin g hi s Democracy in America, an d he wrote to a friend i n these terms: "Some will find that I do not like democracy an d that I am too severe with it, others will think that I dangerously promote its development." 36 The contemporar y scholar s o f Tocquevill e ar e beginnin g t o find themselves mor e an d mor e i n a simila r situation . The y nee d t o chos e between modern or postmodern, reason or passion, liberty o r equality, and

hav e deal t wit h thi s proble m i n som e detai l in , Autour de Vautre Democratic, Naples, 1990. 34. No t onl y di d Tocqueville propos e tha t th e powerful legislativ e powe r b e balance d with a permanent executive , which recalls Montesquieu, but there is also in all his work a confrontatio n betwee n concentratio n an d diffusio n o f power . Th e first chamber i s to be electe d b y universa l suffrage , th e secon d b y limite d suffrage . I f political powe r mus t b e concentrated , th e administratio n shoul d b e decentralized . The jury is effective onl y when directed by the judge. The oppositions and interplay of differen t principle s ar e multiplie d i n th e wor k unti l Tocquevill e end s u p presenting t o u s a democrati c regim e tha t i s onl y an d properl y democrati c i f i t contains a certain number of non-democratic elements or, using Tocqueville's word , a certain amount of aristocracy. 35. T o Henry Reeve, OC, VI: 1 , 37-38. 36. Lette r published in OC, XIII: 1, 374, but maybe not sent to Louis de Kergorlay. 33. I

Introduction

xxni

they find in Tocqueville th e only theor y tha t attempt s to maintain th e best from a system of opposition. 37 It should not be surprising then that this book contains many different an d frequently oppose d view s o n Tocqueville , tha t i t offer s a n imag e o f th e author of Democracy in America that is never totally and permanently clear, but that changes from page to page. When speakin g an d writin g abou t Tocquevill e usin g hi s ow n methodological tools there can be no clear answer, no definitive result, only a permanent intellectual search. It is only by the constant attempt to decipher the meanin g o f democrac y an d democrati c time s an d th e simultaneou s awareness o f the impossibility o f the task that we can fulfill Tocqueville' s own theory and pay tribute to his great book. As he himself put it: The book s whic h hav e mad e me n reflec t th e most , an d hav e ha d th e greates t influence o n thei r opinion s an d thei r act s ar e thos e i n whic h th e autho r di d not seek t o dictat e dogmaticall y wha t i t wa s prope r t o think , bu t rathe r wher e h e pointed them in the direction of truths for them to find, as if of themselves. 38

37. I t can be said that part of the present attraction of Tocqueville rests in the fact of his use o f a two-spee d "asynthetical " dialectica l syste m tha t avoid s th e Hegelian Marxist three-speed "synthetical" historical engine. 38. Lette r to Francisque de Corcelle, September 17 , 1853, OC, XV:2, 80.

THE ANGE L AN D TH E BEAS T

[1] The Huma n Condition : Tocqueville' s Deb t t o Rousseau an d Pasca l Peter Augustin e Lawle r

Alexis d e Tocquevill e i s widel y admire d fo r hi s distinctiv e moderation , political astuteness , and genuine devotion to human liberty . He is studie d seriously toda y primaril y fo r hi s politica l analysis , an d les s s o fo r hi s provocative an d perceptive observations concernin g the psychological ef fects o f democrati c conditions . Ther e ha s bee n remarkabl y littl e seriou s discussion of Tocqueville's comprehensive reflections o n the human condition, although they inform all of his work. Despite his many admirable qualities, Tocqueville is usually regarded as a derivativ e thinker . H e i s generall y viewe d a s a studen t o f th e politica l philosophers Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, and not quite their intellectual equal. 1 My contention is that Tocqueville's understanding of the fundamental huma n questions is not inferior to that of the political philosophers, and that his primary but hardly uncritical debt is

1. Tw o outstandin g recen t source s whic h vie w Tocquevill e a s a student o f Roussea u are Joh n Koritansky , Alexis de Tocqueville and the New Science of Politics (Durham, N.C. : Carolin a Academi c Press , 1987 ) an d Wilhel m Hennis , "Tocqueville's Perspective," Interpretation, 1 6 (1988), 61-86. Two which interpret Tocqueville i n ligh t o f Montesquie u ar e Ann e M . Cohler , Montesquieu's Comparative Politics and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism (Lawrence : University o f Kansas Press, 1987) , 170-19 0 and Jean-Claude Lamberti, Tocqueville and the Two "Democracies", Arthu r Goldhamme r trans . (Cambridge , Mass. : Harvard Universit y Press , 1989) . I asses s th e recen t literatur e o n Tocquevill e i n "Tocqueville's Elusive Moderation," Polity, 22 (1989), 181-189.

1

2

Peter Augustine Lawler

to Pascal , who m h e regard s a s th e mos t radica l o f thinkers 2. Tocquevill e understands Rousseau's thought to be a Pascalian derivative. Tocqueville, a s i s ofte n noted , calle d himsel f a "new kind " o f liberal . Scholars now generally recognize that the liberal Tocqueville meant to stand apart no t onl y fro m th e reactionarie s an d radicals , bu t als o fro m th e apolitical liberals of his time. But they see far more clearly what Tocqueville is no t tha n wha t h e is . Th e foundatio n an d characte r o f hi s innovativ e liberalism remain obscure.3 My purpos e her e i s t o com e t o term s wit h th e distinctivenes s o f Tocqueville's though t an d partisanship by showing how they ar e rooted in his Pascalia n understandin g o f th e huma n condition . I wan t t o sho w th e depth o f hi s affirmatio n o f huma n liberty . I als o wan t t o show , usin g Tocqueville, wha t feature s o f th e human conditio n ar e responsible fo r th e greatness of and our dissatisfaction wit h modern liberal democracy. The extent t o whic h Tocquevill e sa w huma n libert y a s a problem, roote d i n th e paradoxical character of the human condition, has not yet really been appreciated. Tocqueville wa s fundamentall y a partisan o f huma n liberty . Al l o f hi s political analysis is written from tha t perspective. He understood wit h what he believed to be unprecedented clarity how problematic that partisanship is. Human liberty cannot exist without considerable self-consciousness, but it is not simply self-consciousness. I t is both a response to and a diversion fro m the self-consciousness o f the mortal, from hi s experience of the truth about his condition. The Human Condition In the secon d volum e o f Democracy, nea r th e en d o f hi s accoun t o f th e democratic or skeptical destruction of the poetic propensity of human beings to idealize reality, Tocqueville describes the core of human existence. What 2. Tocqueville' s biographer , Andr e Jardin, makes any number of penetrating observa tions concernin g Tocqueville' s fundamenta l experience s i n ligh t o f Pascal , but h e does very little to connect them to his political analysis . Andre Jardin, Tocqueville: A Biography, translated by Lydia Davis with Robert Hemenway (Ne w York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1988) . 3. Tocquevill e calle d himsel f a "ne w kind " o f libera l i n a letter t o Eugen e Stoffel s (July 24 , 1836) . Roge r Boesche' s i s th e mos t recen t an d perhap s th e mos t comprehensive effor t t o determin e wha t kin d o f libera l tha t is . H e doe s wel l i n describing wha t Tocquevill e i s not , bu t h e fail s t o ge t t o th e roo t o f th e distinctiveness o f hi s thought . The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

The Human Condition

3

human beings can know about themselves when they are freed fro m illusio n or diversion or idealism is that they are time-bound beings existing contingently between "two abysses."4 The human being comes mysteriously fro m nothing and returns there. There is no natural or divine suppor t for human existence. This self-knowledge produce s "incomprehensibl e miseries. " The miserably self-consciou s morta l is the wondrous, terrible beast with the angel in him, full "of contrasts of infinite greatness and littleness." This being knows something of himself, but he cannot grasp himself as a whole. All he knows, and can ever know, Tocqueville says , are "his passions, his doubts, and his unexpected good fortune."5 He knows himself as a doubtful, incoherent , and contingent being who passionately desire s to be something else. He wishes to be a beast or an angel, but he is miserable as a man.6 The human condition is one of paradoxical discontent, or discontent with the paradoxes that constitute that condition. Human beings long to know the infinite, bu t cannot. The y desir e tha t impossibl e knowledg e becaus e the y long to understand themselves, but cannot. Human beings understand themselves as parts of a whole, and they know that the part cannot be understood without understanding the whole. But the human parts do not even begin to know why they are distinguished, an d know it, from th e whole. All human beings know that they exist, and they cannot rest content with that anxious and frightenin g knowledg e b y itself . The y lon g "fo r peac e o f min d an d moderation of desires," but cannot find them. Human beings cannot help, in their anxious uncertainty, but attempt to articulate the whole. But their theoretical efforts ar e always either distorted by partiality or pride or are excessively genera l o r self-denying. The y know , whe n the y ar e genuinely self conscious, tha t onl y Go d can se e the relation betwee n th e parts an d the whole. Hence only God can know how and why human particularity or selfconscious mortality exists.7 Human being s see k certaint y an d stability, bu t they canno t find them. When seeing their limitations, they are filled with doubtful anxiety . So terrible is that truthfu l experienc e tha t the y spen d mos t o f their live s i n flight 4. DA [M-L], 487. 5. Ibid., 487. 6. Ibid., 546. Cf. Tocqueville' s comment s abou t th e human condition , especiall y his condition, i n hi s letter , t o Kergorla y (Jul y 6 , 1835 ) i n Alexi s d e Tocqueville , Selected Letters on Politics and Society, Roge r Boesch e ed. , James Toupi n an d Roger Boesch e trans . (Berkeley , Cal. : University o f Californi a Press , 1985) , 10 3 and in his letter to Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard (Augus t 15 , 1840), 143 . 7. DA [M-L], 294, 436, 444. Letter to Edouard de Tocqueville (November 2, 1840) in Selected Letters, 148-149 .

4

Peter Augustine Lawler

from it. By "instinct" (or irrational natural inclination) they seek rest, but, by reason, o r t o th e exten t the y ar e self-conscious , the y canno t fin d it . Tocqueville's accoun t of the miserable anxiety of the self-conscious morta l existing contingently in the infinite universe is Pascal's.8 Prideful Belief Tocqueville continue s t o follo w Pasca l b y observin g tha t i t i s natura l fo r human beings to believe, to divert themselves through the imagination fro m the miserabl e isolatio n o f doubt . Unbelief , Tocquevill e says , i s "a n acci dent," "a sort of intellectual aberration," and an unfortunate one. 9 The unbeliever i s miserable, and he cannot liv e well. As Pascal sai d in general an d Tocqueville said about himself, such a being is most deserving of our pity.10 Human beings by "instinct" and "passion" are led away from the misery of doub t to prideful belief , to "sublime" illusions that give purpose, direction, and dignity to their mysterious distinctiveness or liberty.11 They do not want t o know tha t thei r existenc e i s accidenta l o r unsupported b y nature . Hence they complete or make sense out of or idealize their distinctivenes s through thei r imaginations . Human beings , in other words , are usually in clined to understand themselves poetically. They are led, usually rather unconsciously, to the conclusion that too much self-consciousness o r doubtfu l anxiety is destructive of life. They do not want to be needlessly miserable. 12 Unbelief i s a n accident , a mysteriou s defea t o f natur e o r instinct . B y making lif e to o restless an d miserable, it cannot help but be destructive of life. Paradoxically enough, too much self-consciousness tends to have the effect o f destroying self-consciousness . Unbelie f i s the accident whic h over comes the accident of human distinctiveness or liberty. Tocqueville's Pascal, distinctive in the purity of his effort t o think radically withou t pride, is presented a s literally havin g though t himsel f t o death i n a n extreme effor t t o free hi s mind or soul from th e limitations of his embodiment. Pascal's pure 8. On e outstandin g politica l thinke r wh o doe s se e somethin g o f th e deb t o f Tocqueville's politica l analysi s to Pascal is Pierre Manent, Tocqueville et la nature de la democratic (Paris : Julliard, 1982) , 80-95. Compare my discussion o f the restless American s belo w wit h Manent's , an d wit h Pascal , Pensees, F . Trotte r trans . (New York: Dutton, 1958) , "The Misery o f Man without God," fragments 60-183 , especially 100 . O n th e paradoxe s tha t constitut e th e huma n condition , se e als o fragments 434-437. 9. DA [M-L] , 297. 10. Se e letter to Edouard de Tocqueville (November 2, 1840), in Selected Letters, 149 . 11. D A [M-L], 296, 545. 12. Ibid., 483, 542-545. Cf. Pascal , Pensees, fragment s 82-83 , 100.

The Human Condition

5

devotion to the truth is the most "extraordinary" of accidents.13 In its extremism or its purity, it cannot help but be misanthropic. Belief i s not a total suppression o f self-consciousness, bu t a response to it. Unbelief or excessive doubt, Tocqueville says, is dizzying and paralyzing, whereas the passion that leads to belief is a source of human strength. If all human being s perceiv e i s "constan t restlessness, " if everythin g i s i n flux, then nothing in particular seems possible. Belief makes human liberty or action possible.14 "Sublime" or prideful, spiritua l or soul-based doctrines, Tocqueville observes, usually find support i n human instinc t o r passion. Hence they have the tendency t o be self-fulfilling prophecies . The belief tha t human being s somehow o r another transcend time, that they have "an immaterial and immortal principle " tha t i s onl y "fo r a tim e unite d t o matter " h e call s "indispensable t o man's greatness. " If huma n being s believ e tha t the y ar e more than time-bound beings , they wil l produce accomplishment s tha t endure the ravages of time.15 But huma n being s know , whe n the y d o no t distrac t themselve s fro m genuine self-contemplatio n throug h th e imaginative generatio n o f pridefu l belief, that they do not transcend time. The greatest of human accomplish ments are nothing in the light of eternity. Tocqueville call s the doctrine of "Socrates an d hi s school, " a s wel l a s it s derivative s suc h a s Christianit y (which Tocquevill e interpret s a s a sor t o f Platonis m fo r th e people , th e American's "mos t precious inheritance fro m aristocrati c times" ) "sublime" and salutary, but really "childish," even "ridiculous" as theory.16 More generally, he side s theoreticall y wit h Pasca l agains t al l th e philosophers wh o hold tha t contemplatio n i s i n som e sens e o r anothe r pleasurabl e an d th e highest good for human beings. All such experience and all the metaphysical doctrine it generates is distorted by prideful belief and imagination. 17 13. Ibid., 461. 14. Ibid., 434-436 . Se e lette r t o Jean-Jacque s Amper e (Augus t 10 , 1841 ) i n Selected Letters, 152-153 , on th e "strengt h o f th e "passions " as th e antidot e t o paralyzin g "doubt" or "philosophical malaise." For anothe r attemp t t o se e the Pascalian foundatio n o f Tocqueville' s thought , se e my "Th e Restles s Mind, " in Tocqueville*s Defense of Human Liberty, Pete r A. Lawler and Joseph Alulis eds. (Garland Publishers, forthcoming) . 15. DA [M-L] , 544-545. 16. Ibid., 544-545 . Cf. lette r t o Loui s d e Kergorla y (Augus t 8 , 1838 ) i n Gustav e d e Beaumont ed. , Memoir, Letters, and Remains of Alexis de Tocqueville, (London : Macmillan, 1861) , I, 343-347, and letter to Beaumont (Apri l 22 , 1838 ) in Selected Letters, 130 . Se e m y "Tocquevill e o n Religio n an d Huma n Excellence, " Southeastern Political Review, 1 1 (1983), 139-160. 17. I develo p Tocqueville' s criticis m o f th e philosopher s i n m y "Wa s Tocquevill e a Philosopher?" Interpretation, 1 7 (1990) , 401-414 . Se e Pascal , Pensees, o n th e

6

Peter Augustine Lawler

Contrary t o th e philosophers , Tocquevill e hold s tha t th e genuin e affirmation o f human libert y mus t be despite or because of doubt, anxiety , and error. There are, in Tocqueville's work, all sorts of tensions and contradictions flowing from hi s decision to put human liberty before opennes s to the truth , whil e acknowledgin g tha t th e forme r i s no t possibl e withou t a considerable amoun t o f th e latter. 18 T o avoi d misanthropy , o r the fat e o f Pascal, Tocqueville affirme d th e paradoxical inconsistencie s o f human liberty, and devoted himself to their perpetuation. Tocqueville say s that free huma n beings must think about "the greates t problems of human destiny," but must not "despair" about reaching solutions for them. When too much "doubt invades the highest faculties o f the mind," human being s "ignobly " giv e u p thinkin g abou t thei r fundamenta l prob lems.19 The extremely self-consciou s an d doubtfu l American s "hav e littl e time for thinking," because they self-consciously avoi d it. Tocqueville predicts that , i n thei r language , "metaphysic s an d theolog y wil l slowl y los e ground."20 The perpetuation of human liberty depends upon thought, and the perpetuation of thought depends upon belief. The human condition, in other words, must no t ordinaril y appea r t o th e min d a s problemati c a s i t reall y is . Metaphysics and theology must seem possible. The "ideal [or poetic] world" they describe must really seem to exist. Platonism and Christianity are salutary restraints on the mind that make contemplation, including self-contem plation, endurable.21 Tocqueville himsel f wa s not certain tha t human libert y eve n exists. He granted in a letter to Arthur de Gobineau that no one could be certain that fatalistic determinism is untrue. He only knew that, from the perception of his partisanship, i t wa s "pernicious." 22 Tocquevill e ha d t o suspen d doubt , t o some extent, to make the decision to defend human liberty. But his doubt or theoretical uncertaint y wa s an indispensable par t o f the nobility o r human deceit o f th e imagination, whic h i s greates t for "the wisest men." See als o on the self-deception of philosophers, fragments 15 0 and 152. 18. Bot h Michael Hereth , Alexis de Tocqueville: Threats to Freedom in a Democracy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986) , 161-171 , and Larry E. Shiner, The Secret Mirror: Literary Form and History in Tocqueville's "Recollections" (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Universit y Press , 1988 ) d o a good job o f explorin g thes e contradictions . They also both underestimate Tocqueville's own awareness of them. 19. DA [M-L], 444. 20. D A [M-L], 441,479. 21. DA [M-L], 434, 544-545. 22. Lette r to Gobineau (December 20, 1843), in John Lukacs, The European Revolution and Correspondence with Gobineau (Westport , Conn. : Greenwood Press , 1959) , 227. See the use of "pernicious" in Tocqueville, DA [M-L], 543.

The Human Condition

1

liberty o f his project. Devotio n t o a cause that may o r may not succee d i s distinctively human liberty. Such devotion is neither reactionary nor radical, nor is it apolitical.23 For Tocqueville, human liberty is necessarily a mixture of the truth and error. It is a mixture of the reason, passion, and instinct that constitutes human life. 24 Tocqueville's distinctive moderation, as some of his philosophic critics complain , i s no t tha t o f a harmoniousl y ordere d soul . I t i s a n affirmation o f the tensions, contradictions, and paradoxes of the incoherent mixture of body and soul. Tocqueville asserted emphatically that human liberty is not a product of reason, nor of the instinct human beings have to seek happiness or contentment. It is a mixture of passion and self-consciousnes s which eludes reason and resists contentment. 25 Tocqueville7 s Paradoxes Tocqueville understood himself, most fundamentally, t o be a political actor rather tha n a theorist o r writer. He wrote onl y whe n circumstance s denie d him a place on the political stage and then only on behalf o f the restoration or perpetuation of political liberty. 26 Yet he knew he was extraordinarily detached o r theoretica l an d henc e doubtfu l an d anxiou s fo r a n actor . Thi s doubtful detachmen t produce d a n indecisivenes s whic h limite d th e effec tiveness of his action. But it was also the source of the unrivaled quality of his political judgment and his political integrity. 27 He knew that action was an only partly successfu l diversio n fro m hi s anxiety , but it was enough of one for him not to doubt life's seriousnes s or experience disgust for it. 28

23. Se e David Epstein, The Political Theory of "The Federalist" (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1984), 111-125. 24. Socrati c partisans suc h a s Koritansky an d Hereth criticize Tocqueville fo r not having a harmoniously ordere d sou l and for not simply accepting, in some sense or another, wha t Nietzsch e calle d Socrates ' "bizarre " equatio n o f reason , virtue , an d happiness (The Twilight of the Idols, "The Problem of Socrates"). 25. Se e Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, Stuar t Gilbert trans. (New York: Anchor Books, 1955), 169. 26. Se e Tocqueville, Recollections: The French Revolution of1848, Georg e Lawrence trans., Jacob-Peter Mayer and Anne P. Kerr eds. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987) , 1-4 . Cf . lette r to Louis de Kergorlay (Decembe r 13 , 1850), Selected Letters, 252-253, and Hereth, Alexis de Tocqueville, 19, 83. 27. Recollections, 82-85 , 230-231. 28. Se e Jardin, Tocqueville, 384. Tocqueville, Recollections, 82-85 , 230-231.

8

Peter Augustine Lawler

Political life was not enough of a diversion for Tocqueville to insure his happiness or contentment.29 Yet he preferred it to what seems to others to be the fortunate circumstances of domestic contentment, the indolence of which sometimes mad e hi m miserable ove r "nothing". 30 Tocquevill e say s in his Souvenirs that the coming of the revolution of 184 8 made France and most Frenchmen miserable. He also says it made him happy. It freed him from the doubtful, isolate d anxiet y he experienced i n the bourgeois o r middle clas s world. In that world, there was no diversion weighty enough to engage his attention. A s a result, Tocquevill e wa s too indecisive t o choose fro m th e many simila r and not very political choices. The revolution was a great diversion. With its coming, "one could no longer make a mistake abou t the path to follow."3* In his letters and his Souvenirs, Tocquevill e attempt s to come to terms with th e tension s an d contradiction s tha t constitute d hi s ow n existence , which he understood as an extreme example of the paradoxical mixture that is the beast with an angel in him. He viewed himself a s extremely self-con scious and when undiverted, extremely miserable. His "great pride," he acknowledged, "wa s as nervou s an d restless a s the mind itself. " Th e "sad story" of "the anxious an d restless soul, " he also wrote, "is a little bit the story o f all men, but of som e mor e tha n others , and of myself mor e tha n anyone I know."32 The same paradoxes he found in himself he found in history, the record of the development of human self-consciousness . The mos t famous o f these i s his most well-know n contributio n t o contemporary socia l science , the so-called "revolutio n o f rising expectations." In the Old Regime and the Revolution, Tocqueville notes that "popular discontent" increases when material conditions improve. When conditions improve most rapidly, revolution i s most likely. He says that "this may seem illogical—but histor y i s full o f such paradoxes." 33 History, in other words, resembles and is the product of the beast with the angel in him. The movement o f the history o f the West, for Tocqueville, is from in stinct to calculation, sublime illusion to realistic selfishness, material poverty and weaknes s to prosperity an d power, political oppressio n t o liberty, and 29. See , for example, the letter to Kergorlay (Octobe r 25, 1842) in Memoir, I , 252, and the letter to Madame Swetchine (January 7, 1856) in Memoir, II, 319-320. 30. Se e letter t o Edouard d e Tocqueville (Novembe r 2 , 1840) , Selected Letters, 149 , and the letter to Madame Swetchine (February 11 , 1857), Selected Letters, 349. Jardin notes , abou t Tocqueville , tha t "ther e wa s somethin g a littl e pathologica l about his irritability in domestic life" (Jardin, Tocqueville, 373). 31. Recollections, 46-47 , 84-85, 193 . 32. Ibid., 84. Letter to Edouard de Tocqueville (Novembe r 2, 1840) in Selected Letters, 149. 33. The Old Regime, 176.

The Human Condition

9

contentment t o misery. Th e movemen t is , at th e mos t genera l level , fro m aristocracy t o democracy throug h the mind's skeptica l or doubtful destruc tion o f th e pridefu l belief s tha t suppor t huma n distinctions . Tocquevill e seems to follow Rousseau in showing that human beings, over time, become more human or historical or self-conscious an d less natural or subordinated to instinc t o r merel y brutis h desire . The y als o limi t self-consciousnes s through prideful belief , but, over time, they even free themselves from most of that. The paradox articulate d b y Rousseau i s that progress towar d prosperity, self-consciousness, an d liberty is accompanied by a decline in virtue and happiness o r contentment. Huma n history i s the destruction o f illusio n and the growth of misery.34 Pascal and Rousseau Tocqueville's debt to Rousseau for his understanding of history does not reduce his more fundamental relianc e o n Pascal. It brings t o mind th e clos e similarity o f muc h o f th e analysi s o f th e huma n conditio n i n Pasca l an d Rousseau. Bot h agre e tha t human self-consciousnes s produce s a n anxiou s and restless misery which, if immoderated, becomes unendurable. They both agree that the human condition, at least what human beings can know about themselves without faith, is an unfortunate accident . The human being is and knows himself to be a miserable error. 35 Those self-conscious mortal s who are aware of their condition, and who do not have faith, are to be pitied. Rousseau, who did not have faith, was still able to find a way of existing that was not pitiable, but only because he was able to negate his human self-consciousness, hi s consciousness of time. His most enjoyabl e an d choiceworth y conditio n wa s no t contemplation , espe cially contemplatio n o f th e human condition , bu t hi s forgetfulnes s o f tha t condition in an atemporal "reverie." The latter condition, in which Rousseau was aware of his existence but not his "troubles," brought him close, at least, to the pre-historical o r pre-human instinctua l o r natural experience o f contentment or the goodness of existence. Given that self-consciousness make s 34. Roussea u presents this history in his Discourse on Inequality. It is this very theoretical Rousseau who is presented here, not the Rousseau of, say , The Social Contract. Jardin says that this Rousseau influence d th e second volume of Democracy, but not the first {op. cit., 244) . I woul d sa y tha t hi s influenc e become s muc h greate r an d more fundamenta l i n th e secon d volume , a s doe s th e influenc e o f th e ver y theoretical Pascal. The second volume is a much more profound boo k than the first. 35. Cf . Pascal , Pensees, fragment s 83 , 100 , 139 , 151 . See Rousseau , Discourse on Inequality, not e i.

10

Peter Augustine Lawler

one miserable and anxious, even the philosopher becomes a "dreamer" who prefers "pleasurabl e fancies" or "fictions" to the truth. 36 The project o f history in Rousseau's ligh t is to bring history o r self-consciousness t o an end, because history is nothing but a misery-producing error. 37 Tocqueville views Rousseau's history as presupposing the authenticity of Pascal's experienc e o f being a self-conscious mortal . As the human being becomes more human or historical, he comes to know and experience more of what was always true abou t the contingency o f his particular existence . From Tocqueville' s perspective , Roussea u appear s a s fundamentall y a derivative thinker. Pascal had already known everything fundamental tha t he knew.38 History and Misery The historical observation that human progress increases self-consciousnes s and discontent an d hence leads to revolution o r some other form o f misanthropic self-destructiveness i s accounted for most completely by Tocqueville in at least three ways. The first is his analysis of the emergence of the misery of th e Europea n industria l worke r i n hi s ver y theoretica l "Memoi r o n Pauperism," which is instructively supplemented by parts of the Souvenirs*9 The second is his chapter in the second volume of Democracy on the restlessness of Americans in the midst of prosperity. Finally, there is his history of Western thought which informs al l of this work at least from th e beginning of the second volume. This intellectual histor y begins with the proud, sublime illusions of the Socratics and ends with Pascal's self-destructive ef -

36. Rousseau , Reveries of a Solitaiy Walker, fifthwalk. 37. Rousseau , Reveries considere d i n light of the Discourse on Inequality. Marx' s deb t to Rousseau i s clear here, as is the source of the often-noted similaritie s i n Marx' s and Tocqueville' s historica l analysis . Tocqueville, o f course , see s wit h Rousseau , but against Marx and other optimistic socialists, that the end of history would be the end of humanity. 38. I f Tocqueville i s right about this, then Allan Bloom's accoun t o f the philosophica l tradition as, most radically, a whole from Socrate s to at least Rousseau must be substantially revised . Se e m y "Bloom' s Idiosyncrati c Histor y o f th e University, " Teaching Political Science, 16(1989), 174-179 . 39. Alexi s d e Tocqueville , "Memoi r o n Pauperism, " Tocqueville and Beaumont on Social Reform, Seymou r Drescher ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1968) . For the relationship betwee n th e "Memoir " an d th e Souvenirs se e m y "Tocquevill e an d Revolution in his Souvenirs" pape r presented to the 198 9 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

The Human Condition

11

fort t o think radically withou t pride. 40 In each case the cause of human destruction i s the misery caused by an excessively heightened self-conscious ness, too much awarenes s o f th e truth, an d not enoug h dependenc e o n instinct and diversion or illusion or prideful belief . Human liberty comes to be experienced as unendurable. I wil l limi t mysel f her e t o discussin g enoug h o f th e "Memoi r o n Pauperism" t o revea l som e o f th e principle s o f Tocqueville' s theoretica l analysis an d t o sho w it s obviou s structura l similarit y t o th e chapte r i n Democracy. I will then explain how the Americans' perverse or paradoxical condition illuminates, for Tocqueville, the problem of human liberty. Tocqueville begins the "Memoir" with the observation tha t in medieval times everyone was relatively content because no one, by modern standards, had comfort. The people, in particular, "enjoyed a kind of vegetative happiness." They wer e "limited i n their desires a s well as their powers, without anxiety about a present or future tha t was not theirs to choose."41 Their contentment wa s possibl e becaus e o f thei r lac k o f self-consciousnes s o r reflection abou t thei r condition. The y though t ver y littl e abou t time . They did not have what we regard as comfort becaus e their desires had not been expanded much by mixture with self-consciousness. Only from our civilized perspective does their poverty seem unfortunate, and even we can recognize, with some prideful condescension, their good fortune in lacking anxiety. But "each century," Tocqueville goes on, "extends the range of thought" and "increase s th e desire s an d power s o f man." 42 Huma n beings , a s they progress, becom e mor e powerfu l an d knowledgeable , mor e anxiou s an d dissatisfied, and , on the whole, more miserable. They labor to conquer nature or chance, to reduce their contingency by increasing their control. In so doing, they distanc e themselve s fro m natur e o r instinc t o r unself-consciou s contentment. They also, in truth, make themselves more subject to fortune or chance. Tocqueville say s that "civilized ma n is... infinitely mor e exposed to the vicissitudes o f natur e tha n savag e man. " Becaus e "h e ha s expande d th e range o f hi s needs," he "leave s himsel f ope n t o the hazards o f fortune." 43 Natural existence is governed by impersonal necessity. Human or historical existence is accidental, that which is not governed by instinct or impersonal 40. O n this intellectual history, see my "Was Tocqueville a Philosopher?" For an earlier formulation, whic h appreciate s insufficientl y Tocqueville' s deb t t o Pascal, se e my "Democracy and Pantheism," Interpreting Tocqueville's "Democracy in America," Ken Masugi ed. (Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991) . 41. Tocqueville , "Memoir," 6. 42. Ibid.,7-10. 43. Ibid., 10.

12

Peter Augustine Lawler

necessity. Huma n beings labo r to overcome the contingency o f their existences which they, inexplicably, come to experience through their self-con sciousness. By so doing, they heighte n thei r self-consciousnesse s o r make themselves feel more contingent. They expand their needs by mixing brutish desire with anxious self-consciousness. 44 They actually make their existence more subject to chance. Human beings, the paradox goes, make themselves more miserable in response to their misery. The Restless Americans For Tocqueville , th e mos t instructiv e exampl e o f thi s parado x i s th e American one. It shows that human misery has little to do with poverty or political oppression . Tha t American s "ar e so often restles s i n the midst of prosperity" shows that human misery increases with enlightenment—or the replacement o f instinct b y selfish calculation—an d th e resulting improve ment in material and political conditions. In the chapters immediately preceding the one describing this restlessness Tocqueville says that the American theory is "that in order to gain happiness in this world a man resists all his instinctive impulses and deliberately calculates every action of life." On its basis "he habitually sacrifices the pleasures of the moment for the lasting interests of his life." 45 This "enlightened self love" or "self-interest properl y understood " exists at a great distance fro m and opposes extremely the "blind instinct" of egoism.46 It seems at first glance that Tocqueville understands self-interes t rightl y understood t o be a correction t o both "egoism " an d "individualism," two more primitiv e o r les s self-consciou s form s o f huma n selfishness . Bu t a closer examination of the progression in the text shows enlightened self-in terest actually to be more in error than its predecessors. Tocqueville begins by saying that egoism is given by nature. It is, in other words, not an historical acquisition. It is not part of the accident or error that is human distinctiveness. Tocqueville call s individualism , a somewhat calculate d for m of selfish withdrawal, a "misguided judgement" or error. Individualism appears at some point in history. Tocqueville then makes it clear that enlightened self-interest appear s at a late stage of history, among a very self-conscious people . It is a more comprehensive and calculating kind of error, an extreme form of the one that fu44. Cf . the "Memoir" with DA [M-L], 546-547. 45. Ibid., 529. 46. Ibid., 528-529. Cf. 506-507.

The Human Condition

13

els huma n o r historical development . It s fundamenta l assumptio n i s tha t happiness is simply the product of the negation of instinct and the extreme resistance to "pleasures of the moment." It also holds that it is in the self-interest properly understoo d o f human being s to adhere to a comprehensive belief that is "not at all... sublime," that, in other words, dispenses with pride altogether.47 The American inabilit y t o acknowledge dependenc e o n instinct or even belief fo r happiness results in misery. What Tocqueville calls "self-interes t properly understood," it turns out, is not that at all. The pride Americans take in their comprehensive devotion to calculation is a diversion from the miserable awareness of their mortality, which is perversely heightened by calculation. Americans exten d the spirit of calculation eve n to their acquisition of "eternal felicity" in an effort t o bring even that under their control. They are, however, sometime s aware of the futility an d even absurdity o f that effort . Hence Americans are at times vulnerable, Tocqueville says, to religious enthusiasm or "madness," to what can occur when human beings become intensely aware that they have no control over their fate. 48 Paradoxically, American s asser t tha t the y ca n control everything , but sometimes they feel they can control nothing at all. Their self-consciousnes s drives them to self-destructive excesses . They do not know a humanly appropriate mixture or moderation.49 Tocqueville's descriptio n of the extreme restlessness of Americans comes as no surprise to readers of the preceding chapters. Tocqueville begins his description the way he begins the "Memoir," not with restlessness, but with rest or contentment. H e begins, by way of contrast, with a much earlier point in the development o f history or humanity. He describes the inhabitants of "certain remote corners of the Old World... which hav e staye d stil l whil e al l around the m moved. " Thes e people "are mostly ver y ignoran t an d ver y poor, " an d "ofte n oppressed]. " History , through some accident, has passed them by. They are, obviously, still feudal people. They do not share in the modern world's liberty, prosperity, and enlightenment. The y are , as a result, conten t o r even happy . "The y d o not," Tocqueville observes , "give a moment's though t to the ills they endure." 50 They do not reflect on the limitations of their condition.

47. Ibid., 507. Cf. 526. 48. Ibid., 530. 49. Ibid., 534-535. Cf. Delba Winthrop, "Tocqueville's American Woman and the True Conception of Democratic Progress," Political Theory, 1 4 (1986), 249. 50. DA [M-L], 535-536.

14

Peter Augustine Lawler

Tocqueville move s fro m th e restful circumstance s o f these thoughtles s people to that which causes the Americans to be extremely restless or discontent. As a result of their labor to bring everything under their calculation or control , American s ar e "th e frees t an d bes t educate d o f me n i n the circumstances the happiest to be found i n the world." Despite or because of these circumstances, however, these "lucky men" seem, in contrast to their Old Worl d ancestors , "serious , almos t sad. " Despite thei r comprehensiv e affirmation o f calculation, thei r activit y seem s anythin g bu t calm an d methodical. They pursue and acquire material enjoyments wit h a "feverish ardor," bu t these materia l enjoyment s d o not make the m happy . Th e most powerful effec t o f Americans' enjoymen t i s to call attention to others they have not had. They reflect on the limits of their condition and act with the resulting dissatisfactio n i n mind. Tocquevill e observe s tha t "i n democrati c times... minds are more anxious and on edge."51 The most remarkable characteristic of the Americans, for Tocqueville, is that their experiences sho w that wha t h e regarde d a s extraordinar y menta l restlessnes s ha d becom e common. The Americans' feveris h pursui t of enjoyment o r happiness is meant to divert them from th e misery they experience at rest or leisure. Tocqueville himself know s by experience that "calm and easy circumstances " can give one "a disgust for life." He observes that, when presented wit h a vacation, the Americans will "travel five hundred miles in a few days as a distraction from hi s happiness." 52 American s ar e constantly o n the move eve n whe n there seem s to be no material need . Despite their acquisitio n o f prosperity they perceiv e thei r environmen t a s hostile an d they continu e t o struggl e against it. 53 Tocqueville's chapte r readily calls to mind Pascal's conclusio n that "me n who naturally understan d thei r ow n condition avoi d nothin g so much as rest."54 Tocqueville's Americans feel with extraordinary intensity the constraints of their existence, including "the shortness of life." They "cleave to the good things o f th e world " i n a futil e searc h fo r assuranc e agains t death . But Americans cannot escape enough from their consciousness of time ever truly to enjoy life . To divert themselves from th e knowledge that they cannot be happy, they pursue happiness. It is "remembrance of the shortness of life," 51. Ibid., 536-538, emphasis added. 52. Ibid., 536, 538. 53. Se e Ibid., 53 2 on "hostile fate " and Pascal, Pensees, fragmen t 139 : "Thus passe s away al l man's life . Men seek rest in a struggle agains t difficulties; an d when the y have conquered these, they become insufferable. " 54. Pascal , Pensees, fragment 139 .

The Human Condition

15

Tocqueville says, that "constantly goads them on." 55 Through the pursuit of material enjoyment , American s distrac t themselve s fro m thei r souls ' insatiable longing s fo r certainty an d stability. The y ar e miserable becaus e their diversions do not work particularly well . Tocqueville say s "whateve r pains ar e taken t o distrac t i t [th e soul] fro m itself , i t soo n grow s bored , restless, and anxious amid the pleasures of the senses."56 Americans, by instinct or nature, seek happiness but they canno t find it through selfis h calculation . Thei r human libert y i s manifest i n the distinctively huma n miser y o f this paradoxica l situation . The y are , despite thei r seemingly pett y materialism , no t simply beasts , but beasts wit h angel s in them. From the human perspective described by Pascal, the Americans' refusal o r inability to be simply decent and contented materialists is a sign of their greatness. 57 The y ar e to som e exten t prou d o f thei r miser y an d not wholly without reason. Most decisively, however, pity or compassion i s becoming more funda mental than pride for them. They are miserable because they perceive their existence as unfortunate. They think of themselves and their fellow enlight ened democrats, despite or because of their fortunate material circumstances, as particularly deservin g of compassion. Compassio n overwhelm s pride as Americans perceive themselves, with growing clarity, as victims of a historical process beyond their control.58 The American Faith The Americans are unfortunate becaus e they live at such a late stage of historical progress. Less historical beings, Tocqueville observes, have less miserable and accidental existences. But all human beings seem to be unable to live completely without faith. The Americans believe that history, which has produced their misery, will also somehow liberate them from it . Unlike the industrial workers of France whom Tocqueville describes in the Souvenirs 59, Americans d o not hope fo r revolutio n becaus e the y ar e stil l abl e t o tak e some pride in the perception that their misery is based on their choice. Americans have faith i n egalitarian progress. They are progressives, not revolutionaries. They hope that the process of destruction of prideful distinc55. DA [M-L], 536-537. 56. Ibid., 535. 57. Ibid., 534. 58. Ibid., 564-565, and 493-496. 59. O n the industrial workers, see my "Tocqueville and Revolution."

16

Peter Augustine Lawler

tions, which has brought them so much prosperity and so much misery, will eventually locate a resting place in which they can findsatisfaction. Thus far, equality has mainly liberated desire while making one increasingly aware of one's limitations . The gulf betwee n desire s an d the means to satisfy the m widens.60 But, perhaps with the achievement of "complete equality," a point will be reached where all are satisfied equally and without anxiety. On this point instinct or natural inclination seems to make Americans unreasonable. Their faith in history or egalitarian progress is an opiate, dulling the misery of their self-consciousness . The y cannot help but believe sometimes tha t ther e must be some connection betwee n historica l progres s and happiness, that history and the human condition are not simply perverse or paradoxical. The achievement of comprehensive equalit y will eradicate the contradictions that make them miserable. Americans, Tocqueville shows, tend to identify th e pursuit of "complete felicity" wit h the pursuit o f "complete equality. " But they achiev e neither . Tocqueville write s of the American's "futil e pursui t of.. . complet e felicit y which alway s escape s him." 61 I n just th e sam e wa y wholl y satisfactor y equality "i s always slippin g throug h people's fingers, the more when the y think to grasp it, fleeing, as Pascal says, in eternal flight."62 Perhaps this rare explicit reference to Pascal is meant to underscore that it is the pursuit rather than the achievement that genuinely attracts Americans. But Tocqueville als o says that Americans becom e increasingly anxiou s about equality. They see m to do so because they com e to suspect, in their growing self-consciousnesses , tha t i t cannot d o what the y hop e it will do. The pursuit of equality seems to become less effective, ove r time, as a diversion. The egalitarians, to remain diverted, become more fanatical. Egalitarian idealis m seem s unreasonable a s a project fo r human beings. They woul d be miserable, bored beyond belief o r without escape from the pain of self-contemplation, i n a society characterize d b y what Tocquevill e calls "absolute dead level" equality. The coming of such a society, he says, would be yet another "misfortune." 63 The paradox here is that the coming of the society to which egalitarian idealism points, a response to or a diversion from the unfortunate miser y of extreme human self-consciousness, might be the greatest of misfortunes for self-conscious mortals. This society other the-

60. DA [M-L], 537. 61. Ibid., 536. 62. Ibid., 198 . Almost th e sam e word s ar e repeated o n 538 , without th e mention o f Pascal's name. See Pascal, Pensees, fragments 135 , 139 . 63. DA [M-L], 538.

The Human Condition

17

orists call the end of history. 64 To live in such a place, one without even the possibility for revolution or greatness, Tocqueville certainly regarded a s the greatest misfortune fo r himself. "Men," he concludes, "will never establish an equality which will content them." 65 He also suggests , however, tha t th e hidden bu t rea l goa l o f egalitaria n idealism i s th e destructio n o f self-consciousnes s o r humanit y itself . Contentment wil l exis t i n th e absenc e o f men . Suc h a destruction , b y definition, woul d brin g history unproblematicall y t o an end. 66 Tocquevill e seems uncertain on the reasonableness or possibility of this goal. Sometimes he contends tha t suc h a destruction i s impossible . Bu t for th e most part i t seems to be his primary fear. His most precise thought seems to be that the misery of self-consciousness i s an indispensable component of human nature or the human condition, but there is no guarantee that the existence of human beings will last forever. Tocqueville says in the Souvenirs that he cannot be certain that socialist revolution wil l alway s fai l i n eradicating propert y o r individuality, bu t he views that possibility as most unlikely. Revolution will probably not achieve its misanthropic intention. 67 I n Democracy, h e foresees a s rather likely the possibility tha t American s migh t surrende r thei r intens e consciousnes s o f time and their anxious concern for the future. The y might well lapse into a sort of apathetic imbecility, "into a complete and brutish indifference abou t the future." 68 The y would, in other words, move toward the contentment of feudal peopl e an d beyond. I n a letter expressing wha t his biographer call s "the idea which is the key to" Democracy, Tocqueville writes that the most dangerous tendenc y o f democracy i s "a stead y lowerin g o f the intellectua l level of societ y wit h no conceivable limit." 69 Excessive self-consciousnes s destroys self-consciousness. Extrem e restlessness produces extreme passivity. The extreme attempt to negate instinct and illusion through calculatio n culminates in a decisive victory for instinct. 64. Th e ide a of th e end o f history call s t o mind Hegel , Marx, and Alexandr e Kojeve . See the instantl y famou s essay o f Franci s Fukuyama , "Th e En d o f History?, " The National Interest, 1 6 (Summe r 1989) , 3-1 8 fo r th e mos t recen t expressio n o f Kojeve's versio n of the Hegelian argument that history has come to an end. 65. DA [M-L] , 537, 640-645. Cf. Jardin, Alexis de Tocqueville, 373, 451. 66. Tocqueville , for example , says that "pantheism" is the philosophical syste m "mos t fitted to seduce the mind in democratic ages, " because "it destroys human individu ality." His conclusion is that "all those who still appreciate the true nature of man' s greatness shoul d combin e i n th e struggl e agains t it " (DA [M-L] , 452) . See , generally, my "Democracy and Pantheism." 67. Recollections, 76 . 68. DA [M-L] , 548, 690-695, 735-736, note BB. 69. Jardin , Alexis de Tocqueville, 273 . This quote is from th e draft o f a letter that may never have been sent.

18

Peter Augustine Lawler

The American Problem In another paradoxical way perhaps the deepest problem with the Americans is that their response to self-consciousness o r the truth about their condition is unreasonable. Tocquevill e say s that their reason give s wa y befor e thei r will.70 Their restlessness, of course, is willful oppositio n to the truth that they cannot fundamentally transfor m thei r condition. Their comprehensive doctrine of calculation i s a willful diversio n from tha t which they cannot bring under thei r rationa l control . I t i s als o unreasonabl e t o resis t happines s o r contentment, t o be self-consciou s simpl y becaus e i t i s unreasonable t o be needlessly miserable. Most fundamentally, i t is unreasonable to be a partisan of an accidental exception to impersonal necessity, the reasonable laws that govern nature. Human will opposes reason's desir e for consistenc y o r uniformity. The negation of instinct through willful calculatio n is bound to produce unreasonable behavior. 71 Why should the unfortunate acciden t not will self-destruction i n the name of reason and contentment? Americans know they cannot answer this question well . Huma n beings , Tocqueville believes , canno t answe r i t withou t pride, and the Americans do not believe enough or do enough justice to their souls' longings to answer it with enough pride. The Moderation of Misery The extrem e for m o f th e erro r o f th e America n Tocquevill e call s "individualism," whic h i s an expression o f th e apolitica l liberalis m o f th e state of nature doctrine of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.72 That liberty is too extreme or unmixed to be human. Human liberty, in truth, cannot come into existence or sustain itself apart from the political and other communities of prideful belief . The liberty affirmed b y the liberal philosophers is liberty 70. DA [M-L] , 538. 71. Ibid., 544, 548. 72. Thi s insight inform s muc h o f analysi s i n Manent, Tocqueville. Se e also Lamberti , Tocqueville and the Two "Democracies", especiall y 169-190 . Lambert i distinguishes wel l betwee n Roussea u an d Tocqueville : "Rousseau.. . sacrifice d th e individual t o th e citizen . Bette r tha n anyon e else , Tocquevill e pose d th e centra l problem o f modern philosophy: how to respect the individual whil e preserving th e citizen" (188) . T o perpetuat e huma n libert y o r greatnes s mean s t o perpetuat e tensions and paradoxes, even with misery and anxiety.

The Human Condition

19

for the apolitical, unendurable experience of miserable anxiety described by Pascal, one that is experienced wit h growing intensity a s the liberal projec t to achiev e unprecedente d libert y an d prosperit y succeeds . O n thi s poin t Tocqueville affirms Rousseau' s criticis m o f liberalism. But Tocqueville rejects Rousseau's radically democratic correction to the error of apolitical liberalism. Rousseau's stat e of nature doctrine, which show s the goodness of unself-consciousness contentment , points t o the destruction o f human distinctiveness, the last distinction to be destroyed by the democratic or doubtfilled movemen t in thought. The two state of nature doctrines represent, for Tocqueville, the two apolitical extremes. Tocqueville believe d h e had Pascal' s experienc e o f miserabl e isolatio n and still was able to affirm hi s human liberty. It is with his own experience that h e reject s th e misanthropi c extremis m o f Roussea u an d Pascal . Tocqueville thought himself fortunate to be so extraordinarily proud. 73 Even his prid e neede d som e suppor t fro m belief . American s mus t b e le d fro m some of their experience of lonely isolation with more prideful involvemen t in politics to remain free, and with the perpetuation of their endangered (by doubt) religious or metaphysical belief. They must also be led to recognize that, even in their extreme self-consciousness, they are more dependent upon instinct and prideful belie f tha n they admit. 74 They shoul d be led to follo w Tocqueville's ow n example, and, when in doubt, choose the more pridefu l alternative. Tocqueville, the political actor, diverted himself from the apolitical anxious misery o f Pascal. His diversion, however, wa s not completel y successful, and he was even proud of his misery. Tocqueville wanted a similar sort of mixture for the Americans and other extremely self-consciou s moder n people. He did not want the Americans to be either simpl y citizen s o r Christians. He did not follow th e Rousseau of The Social Contract in reducing religion to simply civil religion, which cannot do justice to the anxious longings in the soul of the self-conscious mor tal. The modern attempt to reduce the self-conscious individua l t o the citizen, found i n Rousseau and certain forms o f socialism, is also misanthropic in it s extrem e hostilit y t o individualit y o r self-consciousness. 75 Bu t Tocqueville als o criticize d th e apolitica l tendenc y o f Christia n theology , which culminates i n Pascal's descriptio n o f the miserable loneliness o f the 73. Se e my "Tocqueville o n Metaphysics an d Human Excellence," Teaching Political Science, 1 4 (1987), 87-88. 74. DA [M-L] , 526. 75. Conside r tha t ther e i s n o wa y Koritansky' s analysis , whic h doe s ten d t o reduc e Tocqueville's political teaching to that of The Social Contract, and hence his teaching on religion t o civil religion, can do justice to Tocqueville's analysi s of religio n with reference to the individual {DA [M-L], 542-545).

20

Peter Augustine Lawler

human being in the absence of a personal God.76 The moderation appropriate to th e beas t wit h a n ange l i n hi m include s a mixtur e o f citizenshi p an d Christianity. Tocqueville's goal was to promote the movement from th e extremism of extreme self-consciousness, throug h the leadership of extraordinarily proud statesmen, t o a more humanly appropriat e mixtur e o f extremes , to human liberty. Tocqueville remained, to the end, uncertain concerning the prospects of this movement. He rejected decisivel y the fatalistic determinis m o f radicals and reactionaries while seeing that the movement of history, immoderated by statesmanship, might reveal the truth of such theory. It is part of his human liberty, which included doubtful anxiety , that he was sometimes quite confident, bu t at other times quite doubtful concernin g the possibility o f his success. The matter, of course, is still in doubt.

76. Se e Jardin , Tocqueville, 61-64 , o n th e miser y Tocquevill e fel t whe n he , a s a n adolescent, cease d t o believe i n the personal God , a misery whic h he felt, t o some extent, hi s whol e life . Jardi n see s clearl y tha t Tocquevill e understoo d himsel f t o have entered political life as a passionate diversion from thi s misery.

[2]

The Rol e o f Religio n i n Preservin g America n Libert y — Tocqueville's Analysi s 15 0 Year s Late r Catherine H . Zucker t

More than 15 0 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville came to America to study the future o f the world. The conditions i n which human beings live d were everywhere becomin g mor e an d mor e equal , h e observed ; bu t egalitaria n conditions did not always or necessarily give rise to political liberty. On the contrary, as people became more equal, individuals became less able to act on their own behalf an d were, therefore, mor e vulnerable to oppression by others. Perceiving the danger, Tocqueville travelled to the United State s to discover ho w a nation coul d preserv e th e libert y o f it s inhabitant s unde r egalitarian conditions . Americans had been able to maintain their freedom , he concluded , a s a resul t o f th e interactio n o f thre e relate d factors : th e "peculiar an d accidenta l situatio n i n whic h Providenc e ha[d ] place d th e Americans," thei r law s o r politica l institutions , an d thei r "habit s an d mores."1 O f th e three , habit s an d more s wer e mos t important ; an d th e specific habit s an d mores that worked to preserve American independenc e were, moreover, primarily religious. A century an d a half late r we cannot but wonder whether Tocqueville' s analysis continue s t o hold. To decide whether his analysi s was , much less continues to be, tenable, it is obviously necessary, first, to determine exactly what he claimed the role of religion was in preserving liberty in America. In the second part I will then investigate the extent to which the increased ethnic, racia l an d cultura l diversit y o f th e America n population , th e 1. DA

[M-L] , 277.

21

22

Catherine H. Zuckert

"revolution" in sexual mores that followed th e widespread availabilit y an d use o f birt h control , an d th e change s i n America n la w hav e affecte d tha t place. Religion in America Circa 1840 Tocqueville's argumen t abou t th e rol e o f religio n i n maintainin g libera l democracy in the United States has itself been the subject o f a good deal of scholarly controversy. There have, indeed, been three major sources or kinds of criticism. First, some critics have pointed out that Tocqueville's description o f democrac y i n th e Unite d State s was , a t best , partial. 2 Tocquevill e himself admitte d as much. He came to the United States to discover what it could teach his compatriots. He did not set out to show Americans how their nation worked or how to preserve it. He did not include a consideration of race in his general analysis of democracy in America in the first volume, but segregated i t in the last chapter, because that problem wa s not particularl y relevant to France. Second, some commentators have argued that Tocqueville's emphasis on the socia l utilit y o f religio n undermine d th e ver y belief s h e argue d wer e salutary by suggesting that they were more beneficial than true3. Such objections ignor e Tocqueville' s emphasi s o n the natural root s o f religion , I believe, as well as his insistence that the range and effect o f religious beliefs in democratic times cannot extend far beyond their natural foundation. Finally, however, Tocquevill e himsel f wa s responsible fo r som e of the confusion an d consequent criticism of his analysis of the role of religion in preserving liberty under egalitarian conditions. In the five years between the publication o f th e tw o volume s o f hi s masterpiece , h e change d hi s min d about the applicability o f the American example to French circumstances— particularly with regard to religion. As a result, the advice he gave European legislators concernin g th e necessar y belief s an d th e mean s o f preservin g them in the second volume differed fro m that he had offered i n the first volume. 2. Sea n Wilentz, "On Tocqueville and Jacksonian America," in Abraham S. Eisenstadt ed., Reconsidering Tocqueville's "Democracy in America" (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 209-210. 3. Jac k Lively, The Social and Political Thought of Alexis de Tocqueville (Oxford : Oxford Universit y Press , 1962) , 96-97 ; Marvi n Zetterbaum , Tocqueville and the Problem of Democracy (Stanford , Cal. : Stanford Universit y Press , 1967) , 120-124, 147. Fo r a fulle r response , se e Catherin e H . Zuckert , "No t b y Preaching : Tocqueville on the Role of Religion," Review of Politics, 43 (1981), 259-280.

The Role of Religion in Preserving American Liberty 2

3

Tocqueville's Analysis in the First Volume In the first volume Tocquevill e suggeste d tha t religio n ha d a pre-eminen t role in maintaining a democratic republic in the United States. That role was, however, not merely primarily, but necessarily indirect. In a chapter entitled, "Religion Considere d a s a Political Institutio n an d How it Powerfully Contribute s to the Maintenance of a Democratic Republic Among the Americans," he took note of wha t has sinc e come to be called "American Civil Religion." 4 I n contrast to France at his time, he observed , no religious group publicly and directly opposed the liberal egalitarian political principles of the regime, not even the Catholic church. On the contrary, in America priests as well as Protestant minister s explicitly an d frequentl y prayed t o God not merely t o suppor t democrac y a t home but to sprea d it s principles and institutions abroad. Nevertheless, Tocquevill e insisted , th e "indirec t influenc e o f religiou s beliefs upon political society in the United States" was much greater than the direct effects o f such explicit preaching. It was, indeed, "just when it is not speaking of freedom a t all that [religion ] best teaches the Americans the art of being free." 5 As many political theorists have pointed out, the preservation of independence or free government has a moral prerequisite. People who are not able to control themselve s wil l inevitably find themselves controlle d b y others. No one can be independent or self-governed wh o is not self-controlled. Th e kind of self-control o r restraint Tocqueville thought religion has fostered i n America was, however, severely limited. In both volumes he insisted that no set of beliefs coul d check or oppose the materialistic desire s o f human beings livin g unde r democrati c conditions . At most , h e suggested , religiou s beliefs coul d b e combined wit h extremel y worldly , economi c concern s t o produce two politically desirable results. First, religion contributed powerfully t o the development of the stringent, if not literally "Puritanic " views of individual morality, especially wit h regard to sexual relations, characteristic of nineteenth-century America. In the United States.. . religion i s often powerles s t o restrain me n i n the midst of innumerable temptations whic h fortune offers . I t cannot moderate their eagernes s . Rober t Bellah , The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion (Ne w York : Seabury Press , 1975) , and Russel l E . Richey an d Donal d G . Jones eds. , American Civil Religion (Ne w York: Harper and Row, 1974). 5. DA [M-L] , 290.

4. Cf

Catherine H. Zuckert

24

to enrich themselves.. . but i t reigns suprem e i n the souls of the women, an d i t is women wh o shap e mores . Certainly o f al l countries i n the world Americ a i s the one in which th e marriage ti e is most respected an d wher e the highest an d trues t conception of conjugal happines s has been conceived.6

Their religiou s belief s di d no t mak e American s mor e generou s an d high minded, les s calculatin g an d self-seekin g i n thei r publi c affair s tha n the y might otherwise have been. On the contrary, the respect for the marriage tie inculcated b y religio n fostere d th e tendency American s ha d o n economi c grounds a s wel l t o atten d mor e to their ow n private affair s tha n t o public concerns. Europeans sough t to divert , i f no t t o satisf y thei r stronges t passions throug h politica l action , Tocquevill e suggested , becaus e the y wer e unhappy at home. Able to satisfy thei r desires simply and naturally at home, Americans were much less attracted by the excitement of public life; "and as the regularity of life brings [them] happiness, [they] easily form the habit of regulating [their] opinions as well as [their] tastes."7 The secon d beneficial indirec t effec t nineteenth-centur y America n religious beliefs ha d on their political "mores," according to Tocqueville, was, indeed, to restrain not only their engagement in, but also their expectations with regard to the possible results of, political action. Nature an d circumstance s hav e mad e th e inhabitan t o f th e Unite d State s a bold man, a s is sufficiently atteste d b y the enterprising spiri t wit h whic h h e seek s his fortune. I f th e spiri t o f th e American s wer e fre e o f al l impediment , on e woul d soon find among them the boldest innovators and the most implacable logicians in the world . Bu t America n revolutionarie s ar e oblige d ostensibl y t o profes s a certain respec t fo r Christia n moralit y an d equity , an d tha t doe s no t allo w the m easily to break the laws when those are opposed to the executions of their designs; nor would they find it easy to surmount the scruples of their partisans even if they were able to get over their own. Up to now no one in the United States has dared to profess the maxim that everything is allowed in the interests of society*

Like their respect for marriage vows, Tocqueville indicated, American resistance t o revolutionar y politica l idea s an d innovation s wa s no t simpl y o r strictly religious in origin. Their practical experience, in both political and economic endeavors, also made American s muc h mor e skeptica l abou t th e basis an d validit y o f abstract theories and generalizations than less experienced Frenchmen. The combined effect o n American political "mores" was, nevertheless, of decisive importance. Having read the Constitution, Tocqueville recognize d that in the United States a sufficiently larg e majority coul d legally do what6. Ibid., 291. 7. Idem. 8. DA [M-L] , 292. My emphasis.

The Role of Religion in Preserving American Liberty

25

ever it wanted. The much vaunted protections of freedom o f speech, religion and assembl y i n th e Firs t Amendmen t coul d themselve s b e destroye d b y amendment. "Thus," he concluded, "while the law allows the American people t o d o everything , ther e ar e thing s whic h religio n prevent s the m fro m imagining and forbids them to dare." Individual libert y ca n b e preserved onl y wher e governmen t i s limited ; and government woul d remain limited under egalitarian condition s onl y so long as the vast majority o f the people thought that it should. Insofar as their religion convinced Americans that human aspirations and achievements not only were but should always be limited, religion constituted the fundamenta l support o r foundatio n fo r th e preservatio n o f constitutiona l democracy . "Religion, which never intervenes directl y i n the government o f America n society, should therefore b e considered a s the first of their political institu tions."9 Tocqueville devote d th e remainder o f his discussion o f the role o f religion i n preserving fre e governmen t i n th e first volume t o convincin g hi s French readers that religion retained the influence it did in American politics, ironically enough, precisely because it kept itself and its practitioners strictly separate from the state. Eighteenth-century French rationalists had predicted that religiou s zea l woul d disappea r wit h th e sprea d o f enlightenmen t an d freedom; Americ a wa s livin g disproo f o f thei r claims . Religion wa s aliv e and well in America, because religion ha d a natural source , and America n democratic political institutions were more firmly based on nature than the aristocratic European arrangements that had preceded them. 10 Acting purel y o n th e basi s o f thei r natura l inclinations , huma n being s would both imagine and desire an afterlife . The short space of sixty years can never shu t in the whole of man's imagination ; the incomplet e joys o f thi s worl d wil l neve r satisf y hi s heart . Alon e amon g al l created beings, man shows a natural disgust for existence and an immense longing to exist.... These different instinct s constantly drive his soul toward contemplatio n of the next world.... Religion, therefore, i s only one particular form o f hope, and it is as natural to the human heart as hope itself. 9. Idem. 10. Tocquevill e conclude d th e first volum e o f Democracy in America b y observing : "An aristocratic body is composed o f a certain number of citizens who, without being elevated ver y fa r above the mass o f th e citizens, are nevertheless permanentl y stationed abov e them.... One can conceive of nothing more contrary to nature and to the secret instincts of the human heart than subjection of this sort.... An aristocracy cannot last unless it is founded on an accepted principle of inequality, legal ized in advance and introduce into the family a s well as into the rest of society— all things violently repugnant to natural equity tha t onl y constrain t wil l mak e me n submit to them." DA [M-L] , 399. My emphasis.

26

Catherine H. Zuckert

People could, indeed, "detach themselves from religious beliefs" only "by a sort of intellectual aberration, and in a way, by doing moral violence to their own nature."11 If religions founded thei r influence solel y on the longing for immortalit y native to all human beings, there would be no way to deny or stifle th e appeal. When religions sought to increase their influence by exercising temporal power, however, they brought the purity of their concern for the afterlif e into question an d aroused opposition o n grounds of political interest as opposed to questions of faith. The price to be paid for linking church and state might not have been evident when monarchies appeared to be permanent. As human being s becam e mor e equal , however , government s woul d chang e more frequentl y an d ecclesiastica l official s wh o identifie d thei r ow n con cerns too closely with temporal authorities would undermine the credibility of their claims to be concerned primarily, if not solely wit h the eternal. By allying themselves wit h a particular politica l party , churchmen woul d als o provoke hostility on purely secular grounds. If Europeans followed the American example and established a strict separation of church and state, he urged, they could preserve the natural seeds and manifestations o f religious sentiments among their populace as well and enjoy the beneficent political effects . The Change in the Second Volume By the time he wrote the secon d volume, however, Tocquevill e n o longer believed it would be possible to preserve Christian beliefs in Europe the way they had been maintained in America. The intellectual habits of people living under equal conditions did not favor religion, he observed. People who thought they were equal to all others did not easily accede to authority. They believed that they ought to be able to decide matters on the basis of their own experience. Finding that they were able to solve the minor problems that arose in daily life, they tended to conclude that everything in the world was explicable. As a result they acquired "an almost invincible distaste for the supernatural." 12 It would, therefore, be virtually impossibl e t o establis h a ne w religio n i n democrati c times ; i t would, indeed, be difficult t o preserve inherited beliefs. Religion had persisted in the United States despite rather than because of the egalitarian conditions that prevailed there as a result of two historical cir11. DA [M-L] , 296-297. 12. Ibid. ,430.

The Role of Religion in Preserving American Liberty 2

7

cumstances peculiar to that nation. First, because the colonies had originally been established in America to secure religious liberty, religion had become associated in the minds of Americans with the founding o f their nation and so had become part o f their patriotic sentiments . Second, the Christian beliefs the immigrants brought with them to the New World had survived unchallenged, because America had not experienced a democratic revolution. "Every revolutio n mus t shak e ancien t beliefs , sa p authority , an d clou d shared ideas." 13 In a nation like France where equality had been established only after a prolonged and violent struggle among the classes, religious faith could not, therefore, b e preserved th e way it had been i n America merel y through separation of church and state. Because of the past association of the church wit h a n aristocrati c order , partisan s o f democrac y wer e ap t t o b e hostile to Christianity, unless they could be convinced tha t its preservation would serve their own secular ends. The Christian religion would also have to take a distinctly democratic form. In the second volume Tocqueville concentrated, therefore, on persuading his democratic countrymen of the utility of preserving a few simple , nevertheless fundamental religiou s tenets. First, he pointed out , no individual or people could actually live solely on the basis of critically examined empirically "verified" truths. In order to get through an ordinary day people had to take a host of propositions o n faith. I f they tried to act only on the basis of what they knew without a doubt, they would be paralyzed. This was particularly tru e i n th e cas e o f th e mos t fundamental , bu t als o mos t perplexin g questions concerning the existence of God, immortality of the soul, and obligations human beings owed others. If the greatest human intellects had addressed these questions for centuries without coming to satisfactory answers , much less agreeing on them, ordinary people certainly could not. To prevent the industry of the nation from being stymied, it was thus highly desirable to have a widespread, though non-enforced consensu s on the answers to these fundamental questions . A consensus on fundamental principle s or basic articles of faith i s necessary to maintain any society, Tocqueville observed. But widespread religious beliefs have special advantages in democracies as well. They counter the two tendencies o f people living unde r equal condition s whic h mos t threaten t o destroy their liberty—their tendency to become isolated from other s and to think only of themselves, and their tendency to become inordinately fond of material pleasure.

13. DA [M-L] , 432.

28

Catherine //. Zuckert

Precisely becaus e religion generall y work s counter to the strongest tendencies of people living in democratic times, however, religion itself would be destroyed, if it remained simply in opposition. Religious faith might have a natural source in the human desire for immortality, but that desire was not strong enough to counter the more immediate attraction of physical pleasure or material gain . The only wa y religion coul d b e preserved an d exercise a salutary effect o n morals—both individua l and social—in democratic times was to combine it, as in America, with economic calculation in public opinion. Although pas t religiou s belief s had , lik e al l others , bee n throw n int o question by the revolution, i t would be possible to foster a consensus o n a few religious principles. Democratic circumstances are not antagonistic to all tenets of faith. On the contrary, people "who are alike and on the same level in this world easily conceive the idea of a single God who imposes the same laws on each man and grants him future happiness at the same price."14 They also feel the desire for immortality from which religious sentiments naturally develop. Although people who think they are the equal of all others believe that they ought to be able to decide all questions for themselves on the basis of their own experience, they find, particularly i n the case of the most fun damental questions, that they cannot. Unwilling to admit the superior insight or knowledge of a few, democrati c peoples reason that if all are equal, the greatest numbe r mus t b e right. Onc e formed , Tocquevill e thu s concluded , public consensus in democratic times would have more influence on individual belief than any tyrant's decree had in the past. If religious beliefs were to be propagated and preserved by such a public consensus, however, both the doctrinaire and formal aspect s antagonistic to democratic tastes would have to be minimized. It would not suffice, i n other words, merely t o separat e churc h an d state . The content an d for m o f religious services had to be adapted to democratic conditions. Religious leaders would als o have to work at achieving a synthesis of secula r and sacred beliefs. Rather than stressing the ways in which concern for their eternal salvation stoo d i n oppositio n t o th e materia l interest s o f thei r congregations , preachers needed to recognize the dominance of public opinion and explicitly align themselves with it in an emphatically nonpartisan way. The public consensus Tocqueville urged his French readers to foster was not, moreover, largely or even fundamentally religious . On the contrary, he suggested, the only effective wa y to counter the isolating tendencies of the primarily materialistic drives and interests of people living under egalitarian 14. Ibid., 445.

The Role of Religion in Preserving American Liberty

29

conditions wa s t o appea l t o thos e materialisti c drive s an d interest s them selves. Americans di d not do justice to their own generous impulse s whe n they attribute d al l thei r charitabl e deed s t o "self-interest , properl y under stood." Nevertheless , h e insisted , th e America n notio n tha t individual s served their greater, long-run self-interest b y postponing some present pleasures and contributing som e of their present gains to cooperative socia l endeavors provided th e most effective basi s for bot h individua l an d politica l morality unde r democrati c conditions . Thi s doctrin e served , indeed , pre cisely th e tw o function s fo r whic h Tocquevill e ha d praised religion . Although i t di d no t destro y th e materialis t desire s o f democrati c people , "self-interest, properl y understood " di d mak e the m pursu e thos e interest s honestly. It also worked to overcome the "individualism" or isolation solely economic pursuits tended to foster. Convincing people that it was in their long-run interest to discipline their immediate desire s coul d no t onl y mak e them ac t i n a more "sociall y con scious" manner, Tocqueville argued; it could also make them more religious. If the doctrine of self-interest properl y understood were concerned with this world only, that would not be nearly enough. For there are a great many sacrifices whic h can only be rewarded i n the next. However hard one may try to prove that virtue is useful, i t wil l alway s b e difficul t t o mak e a man liv e wel l i f h e wil l no t fac e death. One therefore want s to know whether this doctrine can easily be reconciled with religious beliefs.

The founders of virtually all religions had, in fact, used the same kind of reasoning to convince people "that lasting happiness can not be won except at the cost of a thousand ephemeral pleasures, and finally, that one must continually maste r onesel f i n orde r t o serv e onesel f better." 15 Th e goa l wa s simply further away . Even if people in democratic times were not entirel y convinced that there was a God, an immortal soul, or an afterlife, the y could be persuaded to act as if they did. If the doctrinaire and formal requirement s of religion were minimized, people would not have to act much differentl y on grounds of faith than they would on grounds of interest. They were used to calculating th e relation betwee n short-ru n sacrific e an d long-run advan tage; and as Pascal had pointed out, the immediate cost of professing belie f or even, perhaps, attending church services, was small compared to the possible long-run gain (or loss). If religio n survive d i n moder n egalitaria n societies , Tocquevill e con cluded, it would be as a result of such self-interested calculation s made generally effectiv e throug h th e forc e o f publi c opinion . Th e specificall y 15. Ibid., 528.

30

Catherine H. Zuckert

religious conten t o f self-interes t properl y understoo d wa s minimal , bu t irreplaceable. To convince individuals to risk their lives for the sake of the common good, belief i n God and judgment i n the afterlife wer e extremel y helpful, i f not indispensable. The necessary belief s wer e few, simple , and, we shoul d note , no t distinctivel y Christian . Indeed , whe n h e turne d t o discuss the basis of individual morality per se (as opposed to the basis and performance o f obligations to others), Tocqueville suggested, even belief in divine retribution or punishment was not essential. "Most religions are only general, simpl e an d practica l mean s o f teachin g me n tha t th e sou l i s immortal."16 Tha t functio n coul d hav e an d ha d bee n performe d b y th e ridiculous doctrin e o f metempsychosi s a s well a s by Platoni c philosophy . What was essential was for people to see that there was more to human lif e than the goods of the body, to maintain a more elevated view of the potential of human life, and hence to set themselves higher and more distant goals.17 Although he himself was most concerned about maintaining the spiritual qualities that distinguished human beings from animals, Tocqueville thought materialistic concern s woul d remai n dominan t unde r democrati c condi tions.18 Rather than appea l t o higher, bu t rarer human inclination s an d desires, he thus consistently couched his analysis in terms of interest. He concluded his comments o n the importance o f maintaining religiou s beliefs i n democratic times by observing that without an elevated conception of human potential and correspondingly distant goals, human industry and hence prosperity would itself eventually suffer . "It is easy to see that it is particularly importan t i n democratic times to make spiritual conceptions prevail, but it is far from eas y to say what those who govern democratic peoples should do to make them prevail."19 Because democratic peoples resisted authorit y an d judged o n the basis of their own experience, no attempt to prescribe a public creed was apt to succeed. "The only effective mean s which governments can use to make the doctrine of the immortality o f the soul respected," he thus concluded, "i s daily to act as if they believe d i t themselves." 20 Wha t canno t b e taught b y precept ma y b e fostered by example. 16. DA [M-L] , 544. 17. Thi s i s th e plac e o r respec t i n whic h Tocquevill e foreshadow s Nietzsch e mos t closely. Unlik e Nietzsche , however, Tocquevill e remaine d a democrat o n ground s of natural right. 18. Becaus e th e human sou l coul d neve r b e completely satisfie d wit h the material, h e predicted tha t there would be sporadic outbreaks of extreme spiritualism , includin g religious revivals . He nevertheless though t tha t suc h event s an d group s woul d re main the exception and never become the rule. 19. D A [M-L], 545. 20. Ibid., 546.

The Role of Religion in Preserving American Liberty 3

1

Because people in democratic times trusted thei r own experience muc h more than anything they were told, the most effective, i f not the only way of shaping their opinions was to affect thei r experience. And the primary way of shaping the experience of people living under egalitarian conditions in a politically, indeed , a humanl y salutar y manne r tha t Tocquevill e recom mended wa s t o decentraliz e a s man y politica l processe s an d decision s a s possible. People who became active in politics quickly learne d th e need to join with others in order to achieve their own goals. Having learned both the techniques an d advantage s o f organizatio n i n politics, American s ha d no t only applied them to promoting thei r economic interest s but had also used them to support a variety of opinions about moral and intellectual questions. In othe r words , thei r decentralize d politica l institution s ha d provide d Americans wit h the experience tha t had give n ris e to general belie f i n the doctrine of "self-interest properly understood" upon which, Tocqueville suggested, the preservation of religious sentiments also depended. Contrary t o th e impressio n h e lef t i n hi s analysi s o f Democracy in America in the first volume, in the second volume Tocqueville showe d that neither the individual self-restraint (o r morality) nor the limitations on political experimentation (o r "imagination") which preserved limited government and thereby individual freedom i n the United States were primarily results of religious belief . O n th e contrary , h e indicated , religiou s belief s wer e an d would continue to be held under democratic conditions primarily as a result of self-interested calculation. The limitations on the American "imagination" in the arts resulted from thei r special historical relation to England, as a result of which they did not feel a particular need to develop their own literature. American resistance to general theories advocating radical experimentation i n politics resulted fro m th e practical experienc e afforde d b y decentralized political institutions. And finally, he admitted, the severe "mores" he had observe d i n America n wome n resulte d mor e fro m democrati c socia l conditions, which made it hard for a man to convince a woman he loved her if he was not willing to marry her, and economic circumstances, which generally kept married men and women separate from one another, than they did from religious beliefs, strictly speaking. In the five years which had intervened between his writing the two volumes, Tocqueville finally explained, he had come to understand the threat to the preservation o f individual liberty in democratic times somewhat differ ently. It was not so much that the majority woul d impose its will politically or intellectuall y o n th e minority , a s h e ha d originall y feared . Th e dange r was, rather, that the effects o f ever more centralized political authorit y and economic organization woul d gradually erod e the grounds of all individual

32

Catherine H. Zuckert

initiative and independence. The obvious, though by no means easy, way of countering thi s danger was to institute an d preserve a s many decentralize d institutions as possible. As a result of this new understanding, Tocqueville was able, moreover, to avoid the contradiction a t the root of his analysis of democracy i n America in the first volume. A s he first presented it , th e preservation o f America n political liberty in the form o f limited government depended upon the exercise of what he himself dubbed the "tyranny of the majority" in the realm of public opinion. Religion wa s his main example. By linking religious belief first, foremost, and , indeed, almost exclusively with the individual's natural desire to prolong his own existence and only secondarily and indirectly with the rul e o f publi c opinion , i n th e secon d volum e Tocquevill e no t onl y minimized th e alway s problematic publi c aspec t o f religio n i n democrati c conditions bu t also associated i t more closely wit h the freedom o f though t and depth of soul he himself most wanted to preserve. 750 Years Later Life i n th e Unite d State s ha s change d a great dea l i n th e 15 0 years sinc e Tocqueville wrote his classic study. As a result of the waves of immigration, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants no longer constitute a majority o f the population. Most people now live in urban areas; both the economy and the government hav e becom e primaril y national . Ther e has , moreover , bee n a "revolution" in American "mores." The cohabitation of unmarried couples is now no t merel y tolerated , bu t legall y protected ; th e divorc e rat e an d th e number of illegitimate births are very high. Religious beliefs nevertheles s appear to exercise just the kind of limited influence Tocqueville attributed to them in the second volume. According to current public opinion polls, 94% of all Americans believe in God; 73% believe in some form of life after death. 21 65% of the American public say they belong to a church or synagogue; 40% attend services every week. 22 The propagation o f thes e beliefs i s not a result o f public inculcatio n o r even the sort of informal socia l pressure Tocqueville found s o tyrannous in Jacksonian America. Since World War II the Supreme Court has drawn the lines between church and state much more rigidly than they were drawn in the early nineteenth century, first, by declaring publicly required profession s of faith, i n the form o f the pledge of allegiance to the flag or as an oath of 21. Gallup Poll, October 1988. 22. Public Opinion, October/November 1984 .

The Role of Religion in Preserving American Liberty 3

3

office, t o be unconstitutional infringement s o f the freedom o f religion protected b y th e Firs t Amendmen t and , second , b y proscribin g prayer s an d Bible reading in the public schools as an unconstitutional "establishment." 23 In explaining thei r decisions , the justices repeatedl y state d tha t the y wer e trying to protect dissenters from exactl y the kind of informal socia l pressure Tocqueville ha d describe d a s the "tyranny o f th e majority" which , he had also observed, was exercised particularly with regard to religion. Aside from th e tax relief accorde d to charitable organizations in general, the major for m o f political suppor t for religion would thus appear to be the power of example. The chief officials o f the American national government appear to be even more religious than their constituents. Whereas 65% of the American public claime d t o belong t o a church o r synagogue , 94 % of the members o f th e curren t Congres s identif y themselve s a s member s o f a specific religious denomination. 24 As Robert Bellah has observed, American presidents regularly appea l to popular American beliefs i n God and the immortality of the soul in their inaugural addresses; both houses of Congress as well a s th e Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t als o begi n thei r session s wit h a prayer. Rather than constitute a constitutionally proscribed form of "civil religion," as Bellah argues, I would suggest in light of the Court's current interpretation o f th e meanin g o f th e "religion " clauses , thes e observance s ought rather to be understood primarily a s public official s actin g as if they themselves believed. (These ceremonies are constitutionally permissible, because each branch o f government ha s the right t o regulate its own interna l procedures.) Such public professions o f faith might well be politically motivated. Religiou s fait h woul d no t las t unde r democrati c circumstances , Tocqueville argued , unless i t became a part of a public dogm a concernin g "self-interest, properly understood." Religious beliefs alon e would not suffice, Tocquevill e predicted, to keep people i n democrati c condition s hones t o r sexuall y restrained . A s th e repeated investigations of Congressional "ethics" in the last two decades have demonstrated, church-going is by no means a guarantee of personal or political morality, particularly wit h regard t o pecuniary gai n an d sexua l adven tures. In the first volume of Democracy in America Tocqueville had argued that men of the highest character would be unwilling to submit themselves to the vulgarities of democratic electioneering. Nor did he think religious belief 23. West Virginian Board of Education v . Barnette, 31 9 U.S. 624; Torasco v . Watkins, 367 U.S. 488; Engel v . Vitale, 370 U.S. 421; Abington School District v . Schempp, 374 U.S. 203. Cushing Strout, The New Heavens and New Earth: Political Religion in America (Ne w York: Harper and Row, 1974) , 205-313. 24. Congressional Guide to Current American Government (Sprin g 1989) , 115.

34

Catherine H. Zuckert

alone was strong enough to maintain strict sexual mores. On the contrary, in the second volume he pointed out that the "inexorable public opinion" that so stringently regulated the behavior of women in America had commercial as well as religious roots. The economic conditions Tocqueville pointed out that kept men an d wome n separat e most of th e time in nineteenth-centur y America have vanished, an d with them much o f the public opprobriu m of premarital sexual relations. Americans now sharply distinguish between the sexual behavior they find acceptable among unmarried "consentin g adults " and that appropriate for married couples, especially the parents of children. Despite the high divorce rate, Americans stil l view both marriage and parenting as important responsibilities.25 Religious groups are as prominent and visible in American politics in the second hal f o f th e twentiet h centur y a s the y wer e i n th e first half o f th e nineteenth. Contrary to the predictions of those sociologists who argued that modernization woul d inevitabl y b e accompanie d b y secularization , Tocqueville appears to have been correct in arguing that religion and democracy were not necessarily incompatible. By bringing large numbers of previously apathetic , if no t disenfranchise d citizen s int o the American politica l mainstream, th e church-le d civi l rights , "mora l majority " an d pro-lif e movements hav e al l indubitably contribute d t o healthier, mor e democrati c politics i n the United States . Whether the political actio n promoted b y late twentieth-century America n religious organizations has served to spread or sustain faith is more debatable. Direct involvement i n the passing political concerns of the day compromises the churchman's clai m to be concerned primarily, if not solel y wit h the divine, Tocqueville warned . And in the wake of the civil rights movements, som e critic s hav e suggested , blac k churche s ma y hav e "los t thei r souls" by becoming almost entirely political. 26 Reminded by Martin Luther King o f th e politica l relevanc e o f Christia n precepts , libera l minister s o f "established" norther n Protestan t churche s lik e William Sloan e Coffi n ex tended their political activity by protesting American military involvemen t in Vietnam . A t th e sam e time , th e membershi p o f mainlin e Protestan t denominations decline d substantially , whil e the numbers of people joining 25. Accordin g to Public Opinion (November/Decembe r 1986) , 30-33, only 20 % of the American public under 30 years of age in contrast to 57% of those over 57 believed that premarita l se x wa s almos t alway s wron g (th e nationa l averag e wa s 37%) . However, 85-95% of those polled objected to adultery. 26. E . G. , Josep h R . Washington , Black Religion, cite d b y Charle s H . Long , "Civi l Rights—Civil Religion, " in Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones eds., American Civil Religion, 216 , and Williams L. Banks, The Black Church (Chicago : Mood y Bible Institute, 1972) , 100.

The Role of Religion in Preserving American Liberty 3

5

fundamentalist o r evangelical churche s that stres s the personal salvatio n of the individual and generally eschew comment on broader social issues have dramatically increased. 27 Like Billy Graham and Jerry Falwell, some ministers of these churches hav e also become politically prominent . Bu t having led the "moral majority" for more than a decade, Falwell apparently came to a mor e Tocquevillia n vie w o f th e relatio n betwee n religio n an d politics , since he explicitly retired from public life on similar grounds. Led b y th e Pope , th e Catholi c churc h ha s als o take n a stron g publi c stance against abortion. Like fundamentalist an d evangelical ministers, however, American priests have found thei r congregations deepl y divide d ove r issues concerning birth control. The religious convictions of their membership have added strength to the "pro-life" movement, but it is not clear that the movement has strengthened the churches in like measure. As Cushin g Strou t ha s pointe d out , America n religiou s organization s constitute som e o f th e most importan t example s o f th e voluntary "moral " and "civil" associations Tocqueville thought were so important in effectivel y preserving freedom o f speec h as well as economic enterprise in the United States.28 Lik e loca l institution s o f government , churche s serv e a s fre e schools in the techniques an d importance of the art of organization. King' s Southern Christia n Leadershi p Conferenc e traine d th e leader s o f non religious civi l right s organization s lik e th e Congres s fo r Racia l Equalit y (CORE) an d th e Studen t Non-violen t Coordinatin g Committe e (SNCC); 29 participation in these civil rights groups, in turn, taught future activist s in the "Women's Liberation" movement the importance not only of consciousnessraising but also of organization. 30 Many o f the leaders o f th e opposition t o the Equal Right s Amendmen t also acquired their practical training and organizational skills through previous communit y servic e a s volunteers , especiall y i n connectio n wit h thei r churches. As Tocqueville observed, in a democracy i t is difficult fo r a n individual t o articulate an d defend a n unpopular "minority " position; peopl e are much more willing "to take a stand" if they can get others to line up with them. But unlike the regular religious denomination s tha t have historically 27. Cf . Kevi n Phillips, Post-Conservative America (Ne w York: Random House , 1982) ; Martin Marty, Religion and Republic (Boston : Beacon Press, 1987), 270-302. 28. "Nothing , in my view, more deserves attention than the intellectual an d moral association i n America.... In democratic countrie s knowledge o f how to combine i s the mother of all other forms o f knowledge" (517). Cushing Strout , Heavens, 102-109 ; Catherine Zuckert, "Reagan an d that Unnamed Frenchman, " Review of Politics, 4 5 (1983), 422-432. 29. Se e Eri c Lincoln , Race, Religion and the Continuing American Dilemma (Ne w York: Hill and Wang, 1985) , 95-122. 30. Se e Sara Evans, Personal Politics (Ne w York: Knopf, 1979) .

36

Catherine H. Zuckert

served as spawning grounds for th e leadership and organization o f intense, "single-issue" groups, these "causes" tend to have relatively brief organiza tional lives. Despite th e Suprem e Court , i t is stil l probably true , as Tocqueville observed, tha t "i n th e Unite d States.. . there ar e som e wh o profess Christia n dogmas because they believe them an d others wh o do so because they ar e afraid t o look as though they did not believe them." But it is no longer true that "Christianit y reign s withou t obstacles , b y universa l consent." 31 Mos t Americans still appear to adhere to the most general tenets of Scriptural religion. Today, however, not only literar y author s an d professed atheists , but Buddhists and Bahai also feel free to dissent. In the more restricted sense he presented in the second volume, however, religion in American still remains very much alive, if not well. As Bellah an d his colleagues have shown, the religious beliefs an d practices of contemporary Americans tend to be funda mentally self-regarding. 32 Wherea s Bella h bemoan s thi s stat e o f affairs , Tocqueville thought suc h a marriage of faith an d interest was necessary, if faith wer e to be preserved under democratic conditions. A devout Christian or Jew might well find the religious beliefs and practices of his American associates all-too-loosel y o r generall y defined . Thei r fait h doe s no t preven t most American s fro m seekin g t o acquir e materia l goods . I t may , indeed , even facilitate th e process. Nor do American religious beliefs prevent them from exhibitin g rather loose personal morality—in public as well as in private. To the faithful, America n religion may generally appea r to be all-toosecular, all-too-ineffective . Bu t from a n essentially political , Tocquevillian perspective, th e savin g minimu m i s stil l i n place . Lat e twentieth-centur y American politics remain both liberal and moderate. Both religious and secular beliefs coalesc e i n the conviction tha t matters o f individua l conscienc e should be free fro m governmenta l control . There ar e stil l som e things th e vast majority o f American s d o not thin k governmen t shoul d do , and these limits ar e stil l associate d wit h widesprea d popula r America n belie f i n the sanctity of the individual spirit or soul.

31. DA [M-L] , 292. 32. Rober t N . Bellah e t al. , Habits of the Heart (Ne w York : Harpe r an d Row , 1985) , 219-249.

THE VIRTUE S O F FREEDO M

[3]

The Peopl e an d th e Great : Tocquevill e an d Machiavelli o n th e Ar t o f Bein g Fre e Joseph Aluli s

One does not ordinarily associate Tocqueville with Machiavelli and this for good reason. Whil e Tocquevill e praise s th e founder s o f Ne w Englan d fo r their obedience to the law of God, Machiavelli praises those men of Florence who thought more of their city's liberty than their souls' salvation. 1 But this apparent differenc e shoul d no t obscur e wha t the two clearly hav e i n common. In each case the polity praised is a free on e and both praise this polity for the same reason: a free polity is best because none is more powerful. For Tocqueville a s much a s for Machiavelli , it is because power i s the proper object of politics that the proper task of the founder o f the polity is to teach its members how to be free. Nowher e is Tocqueville close r to Machiavell i than in his famous tribute to freedom: "I t cannot be repeated too often: nothing is more fertile in marvels than the art of being free, but nothing is harder than freedom's apprenticeship." 2 If these two thinkers are so much at one in so vital a matter, can the difference betwee n them be significant? What follows wil l be divided into two parts. In the first I will show that both thinkers teach the same lesson about the value of freedom an d that both give the same content to the art of being free. In the second I will show that each conceives of freedom an d power in a radically different way .

1. DA [M-L] , 45-47. Florentine Histories, Laur a Banfiel d an d Harve y Mansfield , Jr . trans. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press , 1988) , 114. 2. DA [M-L] , 240.

37

Joseph Alulis

38

On Being Free A comment Tocqueville makes about one of his colleagues in French political life might be applied to himself: "all his ideas were so closely linked together that , whe n on e cam e out , i t wa s prett y wel l inevitabl e tha t al l th e others would follow." 3 I t is not surprising, then, that the single reference t o Machiavelli i n Democracy in America lead s th e reade r t o on e o f Tocqueville's central ideas, revealing a fundamental agreemen t between the two thinkers. Tocqueville writes: Machiavelli observes in The Prince: "It is much more difficult t o subdue a people who have a prince and his barons to lead them, than a nation led by a prince with slaves."4

The reference i s to the fourth chapte r o f The Prince. Her e Machiavelli divides principalities int o two kinds according to the mode in which they are governed: either by one prince, and all the others servant s who as ministers help govern th e kingdom b y hi s favo r an d appointment ; o r b y a prince an d b y baron s wh o hol d that rank not by favor of the lord but by antiquity of blood.5

He proceeds t o argu e tha t whil e th e forme r ar e harder fo r a conqueror t o take, the latter are harder to hold.6 This observation anticipates Tocqueville's argument as to the value of local liberty. The two modes of government of which Machiavelli speak s are compared t o the sam e effec t b y Tocquevill e a s system s o f administrativ e centralization and decentralization. Administrative centralizatio n succeeds , i t i s true, i n assembling , a t a given tim e and place, all the available resources of the nation, but i t militates agains t the increase o f thes e resources . I t brings triump h o n the da y o f battle , but i n th e lon g run diminishes a nation's power.7

3. Recollections, J.-P . Maye r an d A . P . Ker r eds. , Georg e Lawrenc e trans . (Ne w Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1987) , 169. 4. ZM[M-L],661 . 5. The Prince, Harve y Mansfield , Jr . trans . (Chicago : Universit y o f Chicag o Press , 1985), 17. 6. Ibid., 17-18. 7. DA [M-L] , 88.

Tocqueville and Machiavelli on the Art of Being Free

39

Locally electe d magistrate s ar e the democratic equivalen t o f independen t barons: each is a form of administrative decentralization. 8 In either form, this mode of government is characterized by Tocqueville as free an d as such is distinguished b y th e sam e qualit y Machiavell i attribute s t o it , i n Tocqueville's words, it is "more difficult t o subdue." Tocqueville's reasoning is the same as Machiavelli's. Each locality, being independent of the center, constitutes a distinct locus of political activity and hence a separate point of resistance. Tocqueville describes the spirit of the New England system of local liberty in Machiavellian terms: The New England townshi p combine s two advantages which , whereve r the y are found, keenl y excite men's interest ; they are independence an d power.... It is important to appreciate that, in general, men's affectio n ar e drawn only in directions where power exists. Patriotism does not long prevail in a conquered country. 9

Both thinker s argu e that it is the dispersal o f power, not its concentration, that makes a polity stronger . In the immediately succeedin g chapte r of The Prince, chapte r five, Machiavelli carrie s the argument a step farther. A s a king an d his nobility i s "more difficul t t o subdue " than a despot an d his slaves, so a republic is indomitable: And whoever becomes patron of a city used to living free an d does not destroy it, should expect to be destroyed b y it; for it always has as a refuge i n rebellion the name o f libert y an d it s ow n ancien t order s whic h ar e neve r forgotte n eithe r through length of time or because of benefits received. 10

This line of reasoning complements the implicit argument of chapter three of The Prince. Here Machiavelli explains France's failure to conquer Italy by its violation o f principles draw n fro m consideratio n o f the successful con quests of republican Rome. 11 In taking as well as keeping, the freer polity is

8. DA [M-L], 696-697: "The Americans, who attach less importance to words than we do, have retained the word 'county ' t o describe their largest administrative districts, but the y hav e partl y replace d function s o f th e county b y thos e o f th e provincia l assembly.... Election i s a democratic expedien t whic h secure s the independence of officials i n face of the central government even more effectively tha n it was secured by hereditary rank among aristocratic peoples." 9. Ibid., 68. Tocqueville's commen t about patriotism in a defeated countr y is reminiscent of Machiavelli's commen t tha t "men forget th e death of a father quicke r tha n the los s o f a patrimony, " The Prince, 67 . Bu t i n fac t i n hi s apparen t realis m Tocqueville i s mor e Machiavellia n tha n Machiavelli . Th e Florentine know s tha t memory o f a polity's libert y wil l retain a hold on men for a hundred years after the polity's defeat, The Prince, 21. 10. The Prince, 20-21. 11. Ibid., 11-13.

40

Joseph Alulis

superior to the less free.12 Insofar as complete prudence requires the capacity for bot h as a necessary part , the free polit y i s wiser. 13 Th e central maxim , not adequatel y graspe d b y France, but inscribed, s o to speak, o n Rome's heart i s that "wa r may not be avoided bu t is deferred t o the advantage of others."14 There is no qualification to this maxim. "War may not be avoided" by mankind because it is the necessary consequence of the human condition. Of necessity o r by nature, everyman's han d is raised agains t that of every other man. 15 This condition explains the natural attractio n power holds for men, and when their appetite is exercised, it grows. Tocqueville's account of the great activity that prevails in a free countr y reflects his own recognition that possession of power fosters a life led in pursuit of greater power. He observes tha t wer e th e citizen o f a free countr y deprive d o f political powe r "half o f his existence would be snatched from him." 16 That he proceeds to illustrate this by alluding to "the despair of certain Roman citizens" in the wake of the republic's fal l rather heightens the parallelwith Machiavelli. 17 In short, what makes freedom valuable is that in the free polity, one in which power is dispersed by means of independent local institutions, one ever finds "a picture of power, somewhat wild perhaps, but robust, and a life liable to mishaps but full of striving and ambition."18 Just as surely as Tocqueville does in Democracy in America, Machiavelli in The Prince leads the reader to the thought that "nothing is more fertile in marvels" than freedom . An d just a s Tocqueville adde d tha t thi s ar t is not easily learned, so Machiavelli raises the question of how a people comes to "know how to live free."19 One is brought to the issue of the meaning of the art of freedom an d the means of its acquisition. The paradox of freedom i s that it tends both to make the polity stronge r and to destroy it. The very avidness for power on the part of each member 12. Th e progress of the argument suggests Montesquieu's division of governments int o republic, monarch y an d despotism , The Spirit of the Laws, Ann e Cohler , Basi a Miller an d Harold Ston e trans, and eds. (Cambridge: Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1989), 10 . Machiavelli expressly makes this kind of tripartite division when subsequently h e speaks o f one' s ow n arms a s either "subject s o r citizens o r your crea tures," The Prince, 74. 13. Cf . Republic, 333e-334 b where it is observed that the man who is good at keeping must als o be good a t taking; also , Politics, 1277b20-3 0 wher e Aristotle appear s to separate these two parts of prudence. 14. The Prince, 12-13 . 15. I n this wa y Machiavelli anticipate s Hobbes' s accoun t o f the natural conditio n o f mankind as a state of war of every man against every man, Leviathan, ch. 13 . 16. DA [M-L], 243. 17. Ibid., 243, footnote. 18. Ibid., 92-93. 19. The Prince, 21.

Tocqueville and Machiavelli on the Art of Being Free 4

1

that fills th e whole wit h suc h "strivin g an d ambition" make s an y whole impossible unles s th e polity' s member s lear n t o cooperate . Tha t capacit y o f each member to make a union wit h his fellows withou t los s of his own independence is the art of being free. Tocquevill e describe s this art as a "respect" for the "idea of rights."20 It is the capacity t o distinguish i n each instance the limits of conflicting rights , to strike the just balance between them . In particular Tocqueville is concerned tha t "the man of the people" not abuse the political rights whic h he enjoys i n a democratic republic. 21 The sovereign peo ple must recognize that justice constitutes a limit to their power. 22 Here , too, Machiavelli seem s to anticipate Tocqueville. A consideration o f what he has to sa y about th e art of being fre e enable s u s to grasp mor e clearl y just wha t the groun d an d conten t o f tha t limi t upo n a sovereig n peopl e i s fo r Tocqueville. If i n chapte r thre e o f The Prince Machiavell i offer s a pictur e o f th e Roman polity at the height of its power, free an d wise, in chapter nineteen he offers th e proper counterpart , tha t polit y i n its decline. The same symmetr y is observe d i n his discussio n o f th e origi n o f eac h state : whil e chapte r si x treats the founding o f the free polity , chapte r nin e treat s th e founding o f the empire, tha t is , the fall o f the republic. 23 Th e art of bein g free i s to be col lected from a n account of how a republic fails t o preserve its freedom . Chapter nin e i s devoted t o "the civil principality " whic h arise s "whe n a private citize n become s princ e o f his fatherland, no t through crim e o r othe r intolerable violenc e bu t with the support o f his fellow citizens." 24 This sup port must come from eithe r the people or the great: For in every city these two diverse humors are found, which arises from this: that the people desire neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great, and the great desire to command and oppress the people. The tw o humors b y which alon e thes e group s ar e distinguished ar e define d as diametricall y oppose d on e to the other. Th e city then , i s alway s marke d by a tension betwee n thes e tw o groups. Give n thi s tension , Machiavell i observes tha t ther e ar e three possibl e outcomes . "Fro m thes e tw o diverse ap 20. DA [M-L], 237-240. 21. Ibid., 238-240. 22. Ibid., 250-251. 23. Thoug h Machiavell i doe s no t i n chapte r nin e spea k o f th e tru e founde r o f th e Roman Empire, Julius Caesar, he does describe him a few chapters later as "one of those wh o wanted t o attai n th e principate o f Rome " an d of who m som e sa y he "attained empir e wit h liberality, " ch. 16, 64. Caesar's liberalit y was aimed a t winning th e suppor t o f th e people, th e path t o powe r tha t i s th e principal objec t o f Machiavelli's discussion in ch. 9. 24. Ibid., 38-39.

42

Joseph Alulis

petites on e o f thre e effect s occur s i n cities : principalit y o r libert y o r li cense."25 As the civil principality b y definition involve s the triumph of one group ove r th e other , tha t is , the releas e o f th e tensio n betwee n them , i t follows tha t liberty is to be distinguished from licens e by the form in which the tension i s preserved. Th e ar t of being fre e i s the ar t o f preserving thi s tension in a manner that binds the members of the polity together rather than driving them apart. The tension is preserved if both appetites are satisfied to some degre e bu t neithe r entirely . Machiavelli' s statemen t o f th e tw o conflicting appetite s suggests how this may be done: the people agree to be ruled by the great on the condition that they wil l not be oppressed an d the great agre e no t t o oppres s th e peopl e o n th e conditio n tha t the y wil l b e allowed t o rule . Th e ar t o f bein g fre e i s th e capacit y a t eac h momen t t o distinguish wha t belongs t o each. When the members o f a polity los e this capacity, their liberty degenerates into license: the people reject rule as oppression an d the great cal l oppressio n rule. 26 The resulting stat e combines the two appetites in a destructive manner: the great oppress and the people are not ruled. The civil principality tha t puts a n end to this license in turn degenerates into another form of it. In chapter nineteen Machiavelli portrays a polity in which the people suffer a t the hands of the soldiers whose whims the prince is powerless to deny. The objec t o f th e founde r o f th e polity , an d thos e wh o succee d th e founder, mus t be to institute and preserve the means by which the appetites of each group are satisfied i n a state of creative tension. Machiavelli writes, in chapter nineteen: And well-ordered state s and wise princes have thought out with all diligence how not to make the great desperate and how to satisfy th e people and keep them content, because this is one of the most important matters that concern a prince.27

Machiavelli offer s th e France of his time as an example o f a well-ordered state, a view which Tocqueville's Old Regime implicitly supports. 28 The institution Machiavelli cites is one which redresses an imbalance favorable t o

25. Ibid., 39. 26. Marx' s accoun t o f "politica l power " i n The Communist Manifesto simpl y equate s rule and oppression. 27. The Prince, 74. 28. I n L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution (