Liberty and Landscape: In Search of Life Chances with Ralf Dahrendorf 3030843254, 9783030843250

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Liberty and Landscape

In Search of Life Chances with Ralf Dahrendorf ol a f k ü h n e k a r s t e n be r r cor i n n a j e n a l k a i sc h us t e r

Liberty and Landscape

Olaf Kühne • Karsten Berr Corinna Jenal • Kai Schuster

Liberty and Landscape In Search of Life Chances with Ralf Dahrendorf

Olaf Kühne Department of Geosciences, Geography University of Tübingen Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

Karsten Berr Department of Geosciences, Geography University of Tübingen Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

Corinna Jenal Department of Geosciences, Geography University of Tübingen Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

Kai Schuster Department of Architecture University of Applied Sciences Darmstadt Darmstadt, Hessen, Germany

ISBN 978-3-030-84325-0    ISBN 978-3-030-84326-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84326-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 The work already has been published in 2021 in German language by Springer with the following title: Freiheit und Landschaft. Auf der Suche nach Lebenschancen mit Ralf Dahre.https://www.springer.com/ de/book/9783658223496. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgment

At this point we would like to thank all colleagues who have accompanied, supported and inspired us in our search for life-chances with Ralf Dahrendorf in terms of liberty and landscape, such as Laura Leonardi and Andrea Bellini from the University of Florence, but especially our working groups. At the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, we would like to thank the staff members Timo Sedelmeier, Mohammed Al-khanbashi and our student and research assistants, especially Philipp Jutz, Anne-Cathrin Kayser, Christiane Lawrenz and Anna-Kathrin Schneider, who have supported us so wonderfully in the editorial process of literature administration and proofreading. We would also like to take this opportunity to thank our chair assistant, Ms. Diana Strauß, who has taken organization and administration to a completely new level. Special thanks also go to Abigail Goss for the careful and diligent translation of the German text into American English. Furthermore, we would like to thank Ms. Cori Antonia Mackrodt as our German chief editor of the publishing house for her constructive and trustful cooperation in the context of the many publications of the last few years. We would also like to thank Sharla Plant for her constructive assistance with the English version of the book. Finally, our heartfelt thanks also go to partners in life for all their patience, encouragement and support, which they are always able to give us in the course of our activity. v

Contents

1 Introduction  1 References  7 2 Before It Really Starts: Some Conceptual Preliminary Clarifications of Three Worlds, Spaces and Landscapes 13 References 18 3 Of Differentiations and Contextualizations: Liberal World Views in the Current Mainstream of Spatial Science and in Political-­Philosophical Comparison 23 3.1 The Starting Point: The Often Woodcut-­Like Criticism of (Neo)Liberalism  24 3.2 Main Features of Liberal Systems of Ideas: Fundamental Rights, Liberty and Cooperation  27 3.3 Classical Liberalism  33 3.4 The Liberalism of Life-Chances  39 3.4.1 The Life-Chances Liberalism: Some Basic Features  39 3.4.2 Political Liberalism and the Skills Approach in Its Significance for Life-­Chances Liberalism  44 3.4.3 Conflicts as an Opportunity for Development in Liberal Practice  51 vii

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3.5 On Contextualization: Non-liberal Systems of Ideas  55 3.5.1 Conservatism  55 3.5.2 Socialism  62 3.6 A Comparison of Political World View Concepts in Terms of Space and Landscape  68 3.7 A Brief Summary of Differentiations and Contextualization 78 References 79 4 Current Social and Spatial Developments 97 4.1 Social Developments: From Maximizing Liberty to Increasing the Complexity of Political Processes  98 4.1.1 The Process of Social Liberty Maximization  98 4.1.2 State Administration and Space: A Critique from the Perspective of Life-­Chances Liberalism 103 4.1.3 Increases in Complexity: Current Relations Between Politics and the Rest of Society: Post-­ democracy, Governance and Over-governance 111 4.1.4 Interim Conclusion on Maximizing Liberty and Increasing Complexity 117 4.2 Changes in the Relationships of Ligatures and Options and Their Relations to Landscapes 1, 2 and 3118 4.2.1 Developmental Psychological Considerations of Ligatures and Options 119 4.2.2 Space as a Source of Attachment and Options for the Individual Using the Behavior Setting Concept122 4.2.3 Space as a Source of Binding and Options for the Individual Based on the Field Theory According to Lewin 127 4.2.4 Sociological Considerations of Ligatures and Options130 4.2.5 Intermediate Conclusion on Relations of Ligatures and Options and Their Relation to Landscapes 1, 2 and 3135

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4.3 The Moralization of (Spatial) Communication and the Responsibility of Scientists 135 4.3.1 Moralizations and Society 135 4.3.2 Moralizations in Philosophy and Sociology Around the ‘Positivism’ Controversy 138 4.3.3 Moralizations and Their (Dysfunctional) Effects 140 4.3.4 Case Study: Energy Turnaround: A Moral Conflict About Landscapes 1, 2 and 3147 4.3.5 Interim Conclusion on Moralizations and Their Effects154 4.4 Challenges of Internet-Mediated Communication for Liberty155 4.4.1 Basic Principles of Communication 155 4.4.2 Special Features of Internet-Based Communication: The Individual Dimension 157 4.4.3 Special Features of Internet-Based Communication: The Social Dimension 160 4.4.4 Communicative Interferences of the Worlds 1, 2 and 3163 4.4.5 Case Study: The Internet Communication of Liberty, Represented by Internet Images 166 4.4.6 Interim Conclusion on Internet-Based Communication and Liberty 171 4.5 Shifted Weights: Liberty and Responsibility, Rights and Duties171 4.6 An Interim Conclusion: Current Social Spatial Developments173 References174 5 The Return of the Utopian and the Restrictions of Landscape 1: A Critical Analysis195 5.1 The Illiberality of the Utopian 195 5.2 The Inescapability of Landscape 1 and Its Importance as a Ligature and for Options 197 5.3 Utopia and Kitsch 200

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5.4 Case Study: Climate Change and Protests 201 5.4.1 Aspects of the Complexity of the Scientific Approach to Climate Change 202 5.4.2 Communication of Complexity in the Public Mass Media 203 5.4.3 Protest Movements and Their Positioning in Society205 5.4.4 Moralization and Ethics of Conviction as a Danger to Liberal Democracies 207 5.4.5 Resistance to Paternalistic (Thought) Patterns and Their Failure 211 5.4.6 Comparison of Protest Forms of Citizens’ Initiatives and Fridays for Future 214 5.5 An Interim Conclusion on the Return of the Utopian, the Inescapability of Landscape 1 and Kitschy 216 References217 6 Contours of a Handling of Space from the Perspective of a Liberalism That Maximizes Life-Chances225 6.1 Back to Square One!? Interpretations and Meanings of Liberty226 6.1.1 Liberty as a Struggle with Nature 226 6.1.2 Liberty as Reflection 228 6.1.3 Struggle of the Individual with Itself 230 6.1.4 Struggle with and in Socialities 234 6.1.5 Liberty as a Process 237 6.1.6 Current and Potential Liberty 237 6.1.7 Liberty in Contextualization 239 6.1.8 An Interim Conclusion on the Variety of Meanings of a Liberalism That Maximizes Life-Chances239 6.2 Liberty as a Process Between Worlds 1, 2 and 3 and Its Dependence on Ligatures and Options 240 6.3 Fear and Landscapes 1, 2 and 3244 6.4 Liberty, Space and Humor 246

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6.5 Basic Principles of Dealing with Space from the Perspective of a Liberalism that Maximizes Life-Chances 249 6.5.1 Life-Chance Liberalism and Space 249 6.5.2 Life-Chances Liberalism and the State 252 6.5.3 Life-Chances Liberalism and Private and Public Space 1253 6.5.4 Life Opportunity Liberalism and the Natural Environment255 6.5.5 Life-Chances Liberalism and Administrative Access to Space 1257 6.5.6 Life-Chances Balancing and Governance 259 6.5.7 Life-Chance Liberalism and the Tasks of Public Spatial Planning 261 6.5.8 Life-Chance Liberalism and Settlement Development263 6.6 The (Potential) Productivity of Landscape and Spatial Conflicts: Prerequisites and Consequences 266 6.6.1 The Interpretation of Landscape Conflicts in Light of Dahrendorf ’s Conflict Theory 266 6.6.2 Making Landscape Conflicts Productive: A Challenge272 6.7 Interim Conclusion: Life-Chances Liberalism, State and Spaces274 References275 7 Summary289 7.1 Key Aspects of Liberty and Life-Chances 290 7.2 The Multiple Threats for a Society That Promotes Life-Chances292 7.3 Life Opportunity Liberalism and Space/Landscape 296 References299 References301

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 An example of Fordist agriculture based on the use of economies of scale, here under the extensive use of water resources, in California. (Photo: Olaf Kühne) 70 Fig. 4.1 Gross electricity generation by energy source—in TWh in Germany between 1990 and 2019. (Source: Kühne, 2020 on the basis of Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2020)148 Fig. 4.2 Argumentation references of citizens’ initiatives in the context of electricity grid and wind power expansion according to central fields of argumentation. After: Kühne, Weber, and Berr, 2019; after Weber, 2018a 150 Fig. 4.3 Forms of deception in the context of social action. (After: Thummes, 2013, p. 41) 158 Fig. 4.4 Search term ‘Freiheit’ (en: liberty/freedom) from 2004 to 2020 over time in German-speaking countries. Source: The values shown indicate the search interest relative to the highest point in the diagram for the German-speaking area in the period 2004–2020. The value 100 represents the highest popularity of this search term while the value 50 shows that the term is only half as popular. The value 0 indicates that there was not enough data available for the respective term. (Google, 2020) 167

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Fig. 4.5 Quantitative evaluation of the Google image search for the keyword ‘Freiheit’ (en: ‘liberty’) with regard to depicted elements in May 2020. Source: Own survey and presentation Fig. 4.6 Exemplary representations of the Google image search for the keyword ‘liberty’ in May 2020. Sources: from top left to bottom right: fuehren-und-wirken.de; handaufsherz.blog; freeyourworklife.de; bistummain.de; naturundfreiheit.de; misede.org; medienarche.de; karriere-tutor.de; zendepot.de

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1 Introduction

The colloquial language knows the adage ‘He who seeks shall find’. This is in need of explanation and gives us the opportunity to briefly explain the meaning and objectives of our approach in this book. ‘Seeking’ can be compared with ‘asking’: “Every question is a search. Every search has its preceding accompaniment from the searched for” (Heidegger, 1993 [1927], p. 5).1 With Heidegger you can distinguish between that which is asked about (Gefragtes), that which is interrogated (Befragtes) and that which is to be found out by asking (Erfragtes) (Heidegger, 1993 [1927], pp. 5ff.; see for the English version Heidegger, 2013). Without wanting to overstretch this analogy, we can therefore distinguish in searching between what is sought (‘that which is asked about’) and what is found (‘that which is to be found out by asking’). In relation to the topic of this book this means the sought or ‘that which is asked about’ is the life-­ chances as forms of liberty in the sense of Dahrendorf (1979, 2002; see also: Ackermann, 2016; Kühne, 2017; Kühne & Leonardi, 2020; Leonardi, 1993, 2014; Mackert, 2010; Peisert & Zapf, 1994), and the found or ‘that which is to be found out by asking’ is the specific sense or  To ensure a more fluent readability of the text, we have translated foreign-language quotations into American English. 1

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the specific conditions and ways of development of life-chances. Moreover, what is the ‘that which is interrogated’ in our search or questions? The ‘that which is interrogated’ in our search is ‘landscape’ as a socially mediated and individually shaped form of perception as a world construction that is significant in modern societies (see, among many, Berr, 2020; Cosgrove, 1984; Edler, 2020; Gailing & Leibenath, 2015; Greider & Garkovich, 1994; Hokema, 2015; Jenal, 2019; Kühne, 2008, 2020a, 2020b). Accordingly, we want to find out which life-chances are given, given up or to be made possible and guaranteed with ‘landscape’. The aphorism ‘He who searches finds’ is intended to make it clear that a search or questioning (here for life-chances) without prior knowledge of what this is approximately, what we are searching for and asking for, would not be a meaningful search or questioning at all: the ‘searched for’, the ‘life-­ chances’, represents the ‘prior accompaniment’ of our search. On the other hand, this ‘precedence’ in no way means that we want to determine what the meaning and the development of life-chances definitely consist of. In spite of all the ‘escort’ through the ‘sought-after’, the scientific approach in this book is open to possible results, to criticism and to possible refutations, in the sense of Karl Popper and Ralf Dahrendorf. In this sense, we locate our view in the tradition of scientific Enlightenment and ‘classical science’. Characteristics of this tradition are openness to methods and results, anti-dogmatism, and striving for the autonomy of science in the face of attempts at appropriation from the rest of society (such as politics, economics and social movements). However, science and knowledge production are not an end in themselves, but are bound back to the society that makes science possible as part of this society in its institutionalized form, despite all academic independence and liberty and the danger of social irrelevance. Until possible refutation, the scientific knowledge gained is only valid for the time being and does not claim a hierarchically superior position to other forms of knowledge. The knowledge serves the description and thus the interpretation, understanding and explanation of investigated object areas, not an intended change of the ‘world’. According to this view, changing the world is a political project. In a prescriptive way, however, scientific knowledge can become effective on the meta-level of conceptual and its lower-level conceptual distinctions. For example, the concept of

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‘life-­chances’ offers a normative criterion for designing and organizing social discourses, planning processes and interventions in ‘Space 1’ or ‘Landscape 1’ (for this terminology see Chap. 2) in such a way as “to ensure a maximum degree of justice of chances and procedures” (Kühne et al., 2018, p. 30). Therefore, ‘change’ is scientifically legitimate only on the conceptual meta-level. On the object level, ‘change’ is only possible within the framework of socio-political negotiation processes, which may—or may not—draw on the expertise of scientific concepts as the basis for the description and interpretation of the world. There is no generally binding and generally accepted normative standard available to us with which to instruct ‘society’ or even ‘the world’ on how it should be changed. In this respect, we understand this book as an offer of interpretation on the relationship between liberty and landscape. Liberalism—especially in the version conceived with the prefix ‘neo’— is mostly negatively slandered in current political, public, social and spatial science debates. The root of this ‘evil’ is understood to be an image of man who, according to the critical view of Kersting (2009, p. 29), “bears clear characteristics of homo economicus, and favors a model of society […] that breaks down all social relations to economic benefits” and ignores the central question of justice (see in particular Ackermann, 2007; Fainstein, 2010). Criticism of liberal, parliamentary democracy in particular and of the liberal social system in general is also widespread. It can be discussed with Beyme (2013, p. 99) in the sense of an unintended side effect of the overthrow of the socialist regimes in East Central Europe at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, since it was “until 1990 a shining counter-image against bureaucratic totalitarianism. Since it has triumphed, it seems to have won itself dead” (cf. also Simmons et al., 2006). Liberal modernity is characterized by “icy cold, evil, sinful” stigmas as Schulze pointed out (2007, p. 62): “The wind of capitalist globalization, driven by the greed of the market, blows icy cold; evil technology puts ever more perfidious weapons in the hands of the military and warlords; sinfully seduces women with wet lips and bare thighs to consume the whole world, including themselves” (Schulze, 2007, p. 62). In the criticism of Westernism, liberalism (now neoliberalism), capitalism, individualization, and so on, from both the left and the right, what is often overlooked is what the process of modernization has (also) brought to

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societies: humanism, Enlightenment and science, democratization, human rights, religious liberty and secularization, sexual self-­ determination, liberty of movement, advancement through education and merit, overcoming the cruelties of tribal rites and much more (see, among many, Dahrendorf, 1983, 1987; Kersting, 2009; Strenger, 2017). On closer inspection of the criticism of liberalism, however, it can be seen that the criticism pertains mostly to classical liberalism, which is just one variant. In spite of criticism of the ‘West’ and its ‘(neo)liberalism’, the foundation of liberal thinking, that is, striving for liberty, is often ignored. Isaiah Berlin (1995 [1969], p. 58; emphasis in original) interprets liberty as “liberty from chains, from being imprisoned, from enslavement by others”. Liberty does not only include the individual way of life, but can also be found “in the institutional framework of political participation and representation” (Recki, 2009, p. 7). Amartya Sen (2009, p. 228; emphasis in original) points to two reasons why liberty is a precious value: “First, more freedom gives us more opportunity to pursue our objectives – those things that we value. It helps, for example, in our ability to decide to live a we would like and to promote the ends that we may want to advance […]. Second, we may attach importance to the process of choice itself. We may, for example, want to make sure that we are not being forced into some state because of constraints imposed by others.” Sen (2012) calls these two facets of liberty the ‘chance aspect’ and the ‘process aspect’ of liberty. The observation and normative evaluation of spaces and their development is highly dependent on the standpoint taken by (political) world views. This discussion of the (ideological) location-dependence of statements on spatial development has been taking place in the AngloSaxon-speaking world for some time now, while in the German-­speaking world it has only been taking place for about a decade (e.g. Eisel, 2004; Jones & Daugstad, 1997; Körner et al., 2003; Piechocki, 2010; Vicenzotti, 2011, 2012; Voigt, 2009a, 2009b; last Kirchhoff, 2019; Kühne, 2011, 2013, 2015).2 In this sense, this book deals with a special form of  The comparison includes a different number of political world views. These are: binary coded (e.g. Enlightenment/counter-Enlightenment positions in Piechocki, 2010); individualistic/communitarian as with Kühne (2011); triple differentiation (as in Voigt, 2009a, 2009b) in the democratic, liberal and conservative sense; or four world view systems (as in Vicenzotti, 2011) in the democratic, liberal, conservative and romantic sense. 2

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liberalism and its cross-references to society, the individual, spaces in general, and landscapes in particular. In our remarks we essentially follow the understanding of liberalism as formulated by Ralf Dahrendorf in numerous publications (Dahrendorf, 1963, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1994) and what we call ‘life-chances liberalism’, which takes up the challenges presented by a differentiating and also polarizing society with a pluralizing number of conflicts and regulations which lead to an increasing number of life-chances. We develop this form of ‘life-­chance liberalism’, on the one hand, from the genesis of classical liberalism, with which life-chance liberalism shares some basic features, but we also develop it in contrast to socialism and conservatism, thus following in the tradition of Karl Mannheim (Mannheim, 1984 [1927]). We complement the Dahrendorf position of life-chance liberalism with aspects of ‘political liberalism’ as conceived by John Rawls and further developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (Rawls, 1971, 2001, 2003; Sen, 1984, 2009; Nussbaum, 2009). Here we focus especially on the concept of ‘capabilities’ and its basic tenets. The central question of this book is the consequences of ‘life-chance liberalism’ in relation to the handling of spaces. We do not focus just on urban development—as, for example, Susan Fainstein (2010) in her profound work The Just City—but go beyond that both in terms of spatial structures, when we look at all stages of the ‘urban-rural hybrid’ (Kühne, 2012; Kühne & Weber, 2019; Kühne et al., 2020; Kühne & Jenal, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2021), and thematically, since we also deal with spatial development and conflicts in the context of landscape interventions by the energy sector turnaround. Our remarks on life-chances liberalism and spaces (or landscapes) also aim to formulate practical consequences for dealing with space/landscape in a way that maximizes life-chances. In this respect, it seems necessary to briefly present our understanding of the relationship between theory and practice. Following Ralf Dahrendorf (1987), in line with the philosopher Josef König, a distinction can be made between questions and problems: questions are to be regarded as “invitations to decide” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 19) or to understand, and which cannot be avoided by those involved. Problems on the other hand “we create ourselves. They are not only the work of man – as are many questions – but in a certain sense the work of those who strive to solve them. In contrast to questions, they are

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self-­made and in this respect artificial” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p.  19). In contrast to questions, the answers to which are urgent, problems can be left aside or even forgotten (Dahrendorf, 1987). In this context, Dahrendorf (1987, p.  19) poses an essential distinction: “Questions denote the world of practice, problems those of theory.” Although the pragmatic perspective of decision psychology (im Überblick Pfister et al., 2017) would draw this distinction less sharply and would rather assume a dynamic connection, this distinction leads to an essential difference between theory and practice, the distinction of time horizons: “[T]he practice cannot wait and the theory cannot rush” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 22). The questions dealt with in the following will be neither clearly located in the sphere of practice nor in that of theory; they originate from the field of applied geography and thus represent a “practical alliance of theory and practice in an effort to find medium-term solutions and answers” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p.  30). Such an “alliance of the medium term requires from the practical men an open ear, the readiness to question simple prejudices, the ability to new perspectives, by the way also a talent, often with difficulty understandable for itself and the voters into a simpler language to translate” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 30). From theoreticians who are given a function of counseling in the sense of this alliance, it demands “above all asceticism. They will become neither potential Nobel laureates nor potential prime ministers” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 32). In the following chapters, the aim is to reflect on the practical handling of landscape, to criticize landscape practices from the point of view of liberal ideas, and to work out proposals on how landscape practices can be changed to increase life-chances. We understand landscape constitutively as an individual construction that is projected into material spaces on the basis of social patterns of interpretation and evaluation. Landscape thus represents a special case of space, especially in terms of aestheticizing and synthesizing (see in detail at: Berr & Kühne, 2020; Jenal, 2019; Kühne, 2018f, 2019, 2020a). The following is thus divided into a brief examination of conceptual preliminary clarifications of spaces and landscapes, and their analytical framing based on the Three Worlds Approach according to Karl Popper (Chap. 2). This is followed by a review of the current discourse on liberalism and a differentiation of the various liberal approaches with a special focus on life-chance liberalism

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(Chap. 3). In order to contextualize liberal approaches, the chapter is supplemented by a comparison and contrast of the competing world interpretation systems of conservatism and socialism. Tendencies in the current mainstream of spatial science are also discussed, since in the course of the examination of spatial phenomena people have developed a variety of understandings of space. This is followed by an examination of current social developments and the way in which we deal with spaces (Chap. 4), which will be subjected to a critical examination in the following chapter (Chap. 5). Subsequently, requirements for spaces developed from the perspective of liberalism oriented toward maximizing lifechances will be discussed (Chap. 6). Finally, the results of our search for liberty and landscape in the light of a liberalism that maximizes lifechances will be summarized—on the one hand, the manifold dangers for a society that promotes life-­chances will be pointed out, but also perspectives on life-chances liberalism and space/landscape will be presented (Chap. 7).

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Dahrendorf, R. (1963). Conflict and Liberty: Some Remarks on the Social Structure of German Politics. The British Journal of Sociology, 14(3), 197–211. Dahrendorf, R. (1979). Lebenschancen. Anläufe zur sozialen und politischen Theorie (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch, Vol. 559). Suhrkamp. Dahrendorf, R. (1980). Der Liberalismus und Europa. Fragen von Vincenzo Ferrari. Piper. Dahrendorf, R. (1983). Die Chancen der Krise. Über die Zukunft des Liberalismus. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Dahrendorf, R. (1987). Fragmente eines neuen Liberalismus. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Dahrendorf, R. (1991). Liberalism. In J.  Eatwell (Ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (pp. 385–389). Macmillan. Dahrendorf, R. (1994). Liberale und andere. Portraits. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Dahrendorf, R. (2002). Über Grenzen. Lebenserinnerungen. C. H. Beck. Edler, D. (2020). Examples of Landscape Construction in Pinball Games – A Contribution to Landscape Research, Cartography and Pinballology. In D. Edler, C. Jenal, & O. Kühne (Eds.), Modern Approaches to the Visualization of Landscapes (p. xx). Springer VS. Eisel, U. (2004). Politische Schubladen als theoretische Heuristik. Methodische Aspekte politischer Bedeutungsverschiebungen in Naturbildern. In L. Fischer (Ed.), Projektionsfläche Natur. Zum Zusammenhang von Naturbildern und gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen (pp. 29–44). Hamburg University Press. Fainstein, S. S. (2010). The just city. Cornell University Press. Gailing, L., & Leibenath, M. (2015). The Social Construction of Landscapes: Two Theoretical Lenses and Their Empirical Applications. Landscape Research, 40(2), 123–138. https://doi.org/10.1080/01426397.2013.775233 Greider, T., & Garkovich, L. (1994). Landscapes: The Social Construction of Nature and the Environment. Rural Sociology, 59(1), 1–24. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1549-­0831.1994.tb00519.x Heidegger, M. (1993 [1927]). Sein und Zeit. Max Niemeyer Verlag. Heidegger, M. (2013). Being and Time (35. Reprint). Blackwell. Hokema, D. (2015). Landscape Is Everywhere. The Construction of Landscape by US-American Laypersons. Geographische Zeitschrift, 103(3), 151–170. Jenal, C. (2019). “Das ist kein Wald, Ihr Pappnasen!” – Zur sozialen Konstruktion von Wald. Perspektiven von Landschaftstheorie und Landschaftspraxis. Springer VS.

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Jones, M., & Daugstad, K. (1997). Usages of the “cultural landscape” concept in Norwegian and Nordic landscape administration. Landscape Research, 22(3), 267–281. https://doi.org/10.1080/01426399708706515 Kersting, W. (2009). Verteidigung des Liberalismus. Murmann. Kirchhoff, T. (2019). Politische Weltanschauungen und Landschaft. In O.  Kühne, F.  Weber, K.  Berr, & C.  Jenal (Eds.), Handbuch Landschaft (pp. 383–396). Springer VS. Körner, S., Eisel, U., & Nagel, A. (2003). Heimat als Thema des Naturschutzes. Anregungen für eine sozio-kulturelle Erweiterung. Natur und Landschaft, 78(9/10), 382–389. Kühne, O. (2008). Distinktion – Macht – Landschaft. Zur sozialen Definition von Landschaft. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Kühne, O. (2011). Die Konstruktion von Landschaft aus Perspektive des politischen Liberalismus. Zusammenhänge zwischen politischen Theorien und Umgang mit Landschaft. Naturschutz und Landschaftsplanung, 43(6), 171–176. Kühne, O. (2012). Stadt – Landschaft – Hybridität. Ästhetische Bezüge im postmodernen Los Angeles mit seinen modernen Persistenzen. Springer VS. Kühne, O. (2013). Landschaftsästhetik und regenerative Energien  – Grundüberlegungen zu De- und Re-Sensualisierungen und inversen Landschaften. In L. Gailing & M. Leibenath (Eds.), Neue Energielandschaften – Neue Perspektiven der Landschaftsforschung (pp. 101–120). Springer VS. Kühne, O. (2015). Weltanschauungen in regionalentwickelndem Handeln  – die Beispiele liberaler und konservativer Ideensysteme. In O.  Kühne & F. Weber (Eds.), Bausteine der Regionalentwicklung (pp. 55–69). Springer VS. Kühne, O. (2017). Zur Aktualität von Ralf Dahrendorf. In Einführung in sein Werk (Aktuelle und klassische Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaftler|innen). Springer VS. Kühne, O. (2018f ). Landschaftstheorie und Landschaftspraxis. Eine Einführung aus sozialkonstruktivistischer Perspektive (2., aktualisierte und überarbeitete Auflage). Springer VS. Kühne, O. (2019). Landscape Theories. A Brief Introduction. Springer VS. Kühne, O. (2020a). Landscape Conflicts. A Theoretical Approach Based on the Three Worlds Theory of Karl Popper and the Conflict Theory of Ralf Dahrendorf, Illustrated by the Example of the Energy System Transformation in Germany. Sustainability, 12(17), 1–20. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su12176772

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Kühne, O. (2020b). The Social Construction of Space and Landscape in Internet Videos. In D. Edler, C. Jenal, & O. Kühne (Eds.), Modern Approaches to the Visualization of Landscapes (pp. 121–137). Springer VS. Kühne, O., & Jenal, C. (2020a). Baton Rouge – The Multivillage Metropolis. A Neopragmatic Landscape Biographical Approach on Spatial Pastiches, Hybridization, and Differentiation. Springer VS. Kühne, O., & Jenal, C. (2020b). Baton Rouge (Louisiana): On the Importance of Thematic Cartography for ‘Neopragmatic Horizontal Geography’. KN – Journal of Cartography and Geographic Information.https://doi.org/10.1007/ s42489-­020-­00054-­z Kühne, O., & Jenal, C. (2020c). Stadtlandhybride Prozesse in Baton Rouge: von der klassischen Downtown zur postmodernen Downtownsimulation. In R.  Duttmann, O.  Kühne, & F.  Weber (Eds.), Landschaft als Prozess (pp. 431–454). Springer VS. Kühne, O., & Jenal, C. (2021). Baton Rouge  – A Neopragmatic Regional Geographic Approach. Urban Science, 5(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.3390/ urbansci5010017 Kühne, O., Jenal, C., & Koegst, L. (2020). Postmoderne Siedlungsentwicklungen in Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Stadtlandhybridität und Raumpastiches zwischen Begrenzungen und Entgrenzungen. In F.  Weber, C.  Wille, B.  Caesar, & J.  Hollstegge (Eds.), Geographien der Grenzen. Räume  – Ordnungen  – Verflechtungen (pp. 391–411). Springer VS. Kühne, O., & Leonardi, L. (2020). Ralf Dahrendorf. Between Social Theory and Political Practice. Palgrave Macmillan. Kühne, O., & Weber, F. (2019). Postmoderne Zugriffe und Differenzierungen von Stadt und Land(schaft): Stadtlandhybride, räumliche Pastiches und URFSURBS. In O. Kühne, F. Weber, K. Berr, & C. Jenal (Eds.), Handbuch Landschaft (pp. 755–770). Springer VS. Kühne, O., Weber, F., & Jenal, C. (2018). Neue Landschaftsgeographie. Ein Überblick (Essentials). Springer VS. Leonardi, L. (1993). Intervista a Ralf Dahrendorf. Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, 1, 7–20. Leonardi, L. (2014). Introduzione a Dahrendorf (Maestri del Novecento, Vol. 20). Editori Laterza. Mackert, J. (2010). Opportunitätsstrukturen und Lebenschancen. Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 20(3), 401–420. Mannheim, K. (1984 [1927]). Konservatismus. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Wissens (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, Vol. 478). Suhrkamp (Herausgegeben von David Kettler, Volker Meja und Nico Stehr).

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Nussbaum, M. C. (2009). Frontiers of justice. Disability, nationality, species membership. Harvard University Press. Peisert, H., & Zapf, W. (Eds.). (1994). Gesellschaft, Demokratie und Lebenschancen. Festschrift für Ralf Dahrendorf. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Pfister, H.-R., Jungermann, H., & Fischer, K. (2017). Die Psychologie der Entscheidung. Eine Einführung (4th ed.). Springer. Piechocki, R. (2010). Landschaft – Heimat – Wildnis. Schutz der Natur – aber welcher und warum? Beck. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as Fairness. A Restatement. Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (2003). Politischer Liberalismus (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, Vol. 1642). Suhrkamp. Recki, B. (2009). Freiheit (Grundbegriffe der europäischen Geistesgeschichte, Vol. 3233). Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG. Schulze, G. (2007). Das Drama der Freiheit. In U. Ackermann (Ed.), Welche Freiheit. Plädoyers für eine offene Gesellschaft (pp. 62–106). Matthes & Seitz. Sen, A. (1984). Resources, Values and Development. Blackwell. Sen, A. (2009). The Idea of Justice. Harvard University Press. Sen, A. (2012). Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit (Ungekürzte Ausgabe, 2). Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag. Simmons, B.  A., Dobbin, F., & Garrett, G. (2006). Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism. International Organization, 60(04), 781–810. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060267 Strenger, C. (2017). Abenteuer Freiheit. Ein Wegweiser für unsichere Zeiten (Edition Suhrkamp Sonderdruck). Suhrkamp. Vicenzotti, V. (2011). Der “Zwischenstadt”-Diskurs. Eine Analyse zwischen Wildnis, Kulturlandschaft und Stadt. transcript Verlag. Vicenzotti, V. (2012). Gestalterische Zugänge zum suburbanen Raum – Eine Typisierung. In W. Schenk, M. Kühn, M. Leibenath, & S. Tzschaschel (Eds.), Suburbane Räume als Kulturlandschaften (Forschungs- und Sitzungsberichte, Vol. 236, pp. 252–275). Selbstverlag. Voigt, A. (2009a). ‘Wie sie ein Ganzes bilden’  – analoge Deutungsmuster in ökologischen Theorien und politischen Philosophien der Vergesellschaftung. In T. Kirchhoff & L. Trepl (Eds.), Vieldeutige Natur. Landschaft, Wildnis und Ökosystem als kulturgeschichtliche Phänomene (Sozialtheorie, pp.  331–348). transcript Verlag. Voigt, A. (2009b). Die Konstruktion der Natur. Ökologische Theorien und politische Philosophien der Vergesellschaftung (Sozialgeographische Bibliothek, Vol. 12). Steiner.

2 Before It Really Starts: Some Conceptual Preliminary Clarifications of Three Worlds, Spaces and Landscapes

The approach to the world that structures our observations and allows us to consider the dimensions of social constructions, individual ideas and materialities is Karl Popper’s Three Worlds Theory (Popper, 2018 [1984], 2019 [1987]; Popper & Eccles, 1977; taken up in the social science spatial research, e.g. by Kühne, 2018 [2020 erschienen], 2020b; Kühne & Jenal, 2020; Weichhart, 1999). According to this theory, World 1 comprises living and non-living bodies, ‘World 2’ comprises the contents of consciousness, individual thoughts and feelings, and “perhaps also the subconscious experiences” (Popper, 2018 [1984], p. 82). Under ‘World 3’ he subsumes “all planned or intended products of human mental activity” (Popper, 2019 [1987], p. 17; emphasis in original) like mathematical theorems, largely shared understandings of space, landscape, liberalism, but of course also the Three Worlds Theory itself. According to this terminology, ‘reality’ consists of three interconnected and interacting worlds. A wooden spoon, for example, can be interpreted as part of World 1 as well as World 3, since it is a material object on the one hand and social conventions have been incorporated into it on the other. With his theory of the Three Worlds, Popper sought to create an alternative to three widespread understandings of the world: first, the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Kühne et al., Liberty and Landscape, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84326-7_2

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materialistic world view, which only World 1 recognizes as ‘real’; second, the immaterial world view, which World 2 alone declares to be ‘real’; and third, the dualistic world view, which Worlds 1 and 2 consider to be ‘real’ (Popper, 2019 [1987]). To Worlds 1 and 2 he added World 3, “that is, the world which anthropologists call ‘culture’” (Popper, 2019 [1987], p. 18). As has become clear, this approach does not imply a strict separation of the Three Worlds, but rather an openness to hybridity and interactions, which makes it a promising framework for the exploration of spaces in their relations to society, the individual and materialities (a more detailed exposition of the Three Worlds Theory, Niemann, 2019). Popper’s Three Worlds Theory has been criticized especially with regard to the thesis of the autonomy of World 3. Popper pleaded for “the possibility of acknowledging reality or, as one might also say, the autonomy of the Third World, while at the same time admitting that it was created by humans” (Popper, 1973, p. 179). The accusation is that both assumptions are “incompatible with each other” (Zoglauer, 1998, p. 60). Either the components of World 3 are based on human settlements and are conventions, or they are assumed to be autonomous and “therefore existed before man” (Zoglauer, 1998, p. 61). “Nothing is more dependent and vulnerable, less autonomous than the ‘world’ of culture” (Bunge, 1984, p. 215) or World 3. For example, if all mathematics books and all mathematics knowledge were destroyed, people would have to “start all over again and develop mathematics anew” (Zoglauer, 1998, p.  62) because they have to be materialized in either book form (World 1) or thought (World 2); otherwise they would not exist. Moreover, World 3 is strongly reminiscent of Plato’s world of ideas, with adaptations of Hegel’s theory of the objective mind. Nevertheless, Popper is not a monistic idealist like Plato because he assumes three independent worlds of ideas, instead of just the one and only ‘true world’. That World 2 is the indispensable bridge between the Worlds 1 and 3 leads to another problem which belongs to the so-called body-mind-­ problem or brain-mind-problem. The approach developed together with John Eccles on the relationship of the ‘I’ to its ‘brain’ (Popper & Eccles, 1977) is also called a variant of a ‘body-mind dualism’ (Brüntrup, 1996, pp. 51ff.) in the tradition of René Descartes (Descartes, 2008 [1637]). Popper, however, does not represent a ‘substance dualism’, but a ‘dualism

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of properties’ (Beckermann, 1999, p. 6 f.) for whom the thesis is characteristic “that mental qualities are independent in the sense that they cannot be traced back to physical qualities” (Beckermann, 1999, p. 7; emphasis in original). In his own part of the book, written together with Eccles, Popper explicitly protests against the substantial dualistic view of his co-­ author (Beckermann, 1999, p. 7) that “mind and brain are two independent entities belonging to different ontological areas (worlds)” (Brüntrup, 1996, p.  46). Popper answers the central question of the ‘body-soul-­ problem’ and the interactionistic dualism, how the mental (‘soul’, ‘res cogitans’, ‘World 2’) influences the physical (‘body’, ‘res extensa’, ‘World 1’) and how both worlds can interact, by assuming “that this interaction must take place in the brain” (Brüntrup, 1996, p.  52). Popper doubts that this question will ever be resolved and that the ideal of a complete understanding may have to be abandoned (Popper & Eccles, 1977, Kap. P2, Abschnitt 10). Thus, this approach leads, at least with regard to the psychophysical interaction between World 2 and World 1 (‘World 2’ is the bridge between ‘World 1’ and ‘World 3’), into an aporia. Despite this criticism and this theoretical aporia, using Popper’s Three Worlds Theory as a basis for our work has significant advantages. First, it clarifies the different ways of generating the ‘World’ concept. Second, it provides a basis for dealing with the relationship between the Three Worlds. Third, it places World 2 at the center of considerations being presented in this book, as a quasi-transmission belt between Worlds 1 and 3—a deeply liberal interpretation of the world that emphasizes the individual. Fourth, it is hybridity-sensitive since, for example, a material object cannot be thought of as part of World 1 alone, but is also a part of World 2 and World 3. According to Popper’s theory of the Three Worlds, all Three Worlds and their interrelationships and mutual influences are relevant for space and landscape research (Kühne, 2019c, 2020b; Kühne & Jenal, 2020). The plane of World 1, encompassing the animate and inanimate bodies, forms—in spatial arrangement—the physical substrate of ‘landscape’. The level of World 2 comprises the individual ideas, sensations, feelings, norms, experiences, and so on, of, and to, space in general and landscape in particular. The level of World 3 is related to the social

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constructions of space and the social conventions regarding patterns of interpretation and evaluation. In the following we concretize the access via Popper’s Three Worlds Theory (here in recourse to Popper, 1984, 2018 [1984]), which refers to the Three Worlds in general in relation to ‘landscape’ and speaks analogously to the Three Worlds of Landscapes 1, 2 and 31 (Kühne, 2020b), which are interrelated and interact with one another. Thus, for example, Landscape 3 influences Landscape 2: the individual ideas and feelings derived from, and associated with, the concept of landscape is based partly on one’s own direct experience of Landscape 1, as well as of the socialization of ideas, interpretations and evaluations of landscape, that is, Landscape 3 (see under many Greider & Garkovich, 1994; Kühne, 2019a, 2020b; Nissen, 1998). However, this influence is not unidirectional: Landscape 3, mediated by Landscape 2, also has an effect on Landscape 1: people manifest their ideas materially by the placement of animate and inanimate material objects, inevitably such as themselves (which certainly has an effect on other people in their physicality, an experience we all know, for example, when people have a quiet chat in the middle of a passageway, regardless of whether they obstruct those in a hurry). People do not only place material objects, they also design and remove them (in this case, references to the concept of spacing, according to Löw, 2001, become clear). The mediation through Landscape 2 is compelling in the relationship between Landscape 1 and Landscape 3: the ‘world of culture’ cannot inscribe itself directly into the material world, since it lacks physicality. It requires the mediation of individual content of Landscape 2, although it is initially attributed to a material body (which is part of World 1). On the basis of the human body as part of World 1, man can intervene in the rest of World 1 in general and in Landscape 1 in particular. Thus Landscape 1 is, to an increasing extent, the result of human action, according to Max Weber (1976 [1922]). This  The identical choice of words can also be found in J. B. Jackson (1984) but combined with other content: Jackson understands—in each case representatively—‘Landscape 1’ as a medieval landscape. By ‘Landscape 2’ he means the landscape of the Renaissance. By ‘Landscape 3’ he means the vernacular landscape of the present (see in summary, Prominski, 2004, [2019]). Despite the danger of confusion that comes with this identical designation, we use the designation with a different content to make clear the derivation of the approach from Popper’s Three Worlds Theory. 1

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can be understood as external or internal action, omission or toleration, with which the actor or actors associate a meaning. Landscape 1, therefore, is always interwoven with Landscapes 2 and 3. Thus, the used (and much discussed) expression ‘cultural landscape’ seems to be at least misleading, because it ignores the constitutive influence of Landscape 2 on Landscape 1. The resulting consequence is that often a quite essential, and thus mostly normative, harmony is understood between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ (more about this discussion, see, under many, Eisel, 1982; Heiland, 2006; Körner, 2005; Kühne, 2005; Kühne et al., 2018; Kühne, 2019b; summary of the discussion: Table 2.1). The influence of Landscape 2 is constitutive for the other Landscapes, whereby different possibilities of influence arise: in the simple case, it acts as a quasi-transmission screen of the patterns of imagination, interpretation and evaluation of Landscape 3 on Landscape 1. In the more complex case, it has an effect on Landscape 3 because the reflecting human being is able to formulate alternative interpretations, evaluations and conceptions which can possibly be anchored in Landscape 3 (see in general Dahrendorf, 1979, 2007). According to such an understanding, Landscape 2 is neither merely a ‘toleration’ or unquestioned ‘internalization’ of social notions of landscape and its transformation into Landscape 1, nor its uncritical (especially aesthetic) consideration on the basis of socially shared patterns of interpretation and evaluation and their simultaneous actualization and perpetuation (clearly seen in Bourdieu, 1991; Poerting & Marquardt, 2019), but Landscape 2 becomes the central element of the design of Landscape 1 and Landscape 3. In these explanations it becomes clear that landscape is constitutively linked to the consciousness that constructs it, which in turn is linked to social patterns of interpretation and valuation, whereby landscape always reaches beyond mere physical space. Because of its constitutive dependence on humans, it is also not to be equated with ‘nature’, which can also be understood independently of humans on the object level (see in more detail: Berr, 2018; Kühne, 2019d; Küster, 2009, 2012). To make it very clear, World 1 becomes Landscape 1 because it is projected individually (with Landscape 2 as a subset of World 2) on the basis of Landscape 3 (as a subset of World 3) into World 1.

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Table 2.1  Overview of paradigmatic scientific perspectives on the term ‘landscape’ Word origin

Essentialism

Positivism

Lat. Essentia (essence)

Lat. Positivus (set, given)

Constructivism

Lat. Construere (assemble, join, stack) ‘Landscape’ not as ‘Landscape’ as an Understanding ‘Landscape’ as a a physical object landscape ‘wholeness’ in the object that can be empirically explored but as a social or sense of an individual and generalized by ‘independent construction counting, being’ → Dependent on measuring and → Independent the observers weighing individual from the phenomena observers → Independent from the observers Objective description ‘Landscape’ as a Focus Investigation of result of social of ‘landscape’ by essential negotiation means of empirical characteristics processes methods (‘essence’) of ‘landscape’ in the object itself Reconstruct the most Exploring Goals Make normative processes of accurate image of statements about landscape the landscape landscape construction Exemplary Lautensach (1973) Bastian and Schreiber Cosgrove (1984) Greider and (1999) publications Nohl (2001) Garkovich (1994) Kühnau et al. (2013) Paffen (1973) Kühne (2006, Rathfelder and Wöbse (2002) 2008, 2018f) Megerle (2017) Leibenath (2014); Roth (2012) Leibenath and Otto (2013) Weber (2018)

Source: Slightly modified off Kühne et al. (2018, p. 13)

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Prominski, M. (2004). Landschaft entwerfen. Zur Theorie aktueller Landschaftsarchitektur. Reimer. Rathfelder, A., & Megerle, H. (2017). Wahrnehmung und Nutzung von Flusslandschaften durch unterschiedliche gesellschaftliche Gruppen am Beispiel des Neckars. In O.  Kühne, H.  Megerle, & F.  Weber (Eds.), Landschaftsästhetik und Landschaftswandel (RaumFragen: Stadt  – Region  – Landschaft, pp. 121–138). Springer VS. Roth, M. (2012). Landschaftsbildbewertung in der Landschaftsplanung. Entwicklung und Anwendung einer Methode zur Validierung von Verfahren zur Bewertung des Landschaftsbildes durch internetgestützte Nutzerbefragungen (IÖR-Schriften, Vol. 59). Rhombos-Verlag. Weber, F. (2018). Konflikte um die Energiewende. Vom Diskurs zur Praxis. Springer VS. Weber, M. (1976 [1922]). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie. Mohr Siebeck. Weichhart, P. (1999). Die Räume zwischen den Welten und die Welt der Räume. In P. Meusburger (Ed.), Handlungszentrierte Sozialgeographie. Benno Werlens Entwurf in kritischer Diskussion (Erdkundliches Wissen, Vol. 130, pp. 67–94). Steiner-Verlag. Wöbse, H.-H. (2002). Landschaftsästhetik. Über das Wesen, die Bedeutung und den Umgang mit landschaftlicher Schönheit. Ulmer. Zoglauer, T. (1998). Geist und Gehirn. Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der aktuellen Diskussion (UTB für Wissenschaft. Uni-Taschenbücher: Philosophie, Vol. 2066). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

3 Of Differentiations and Contextualizations: Liberal World Views in the Current Mainstream of Spatial Science and in Political-­ Philosophical Comparison

Terms such as ‘liberalism’, ‘neoliberal’, ‘left’, ‘conservative’, ‘right’, ‘socialist’, ‘communism’ and ‘neoconservatism’ are often used roughly, stencil-­ like, sometimes with stigmatizing intent in public discussions, but also in scientific discourses. In order not to follow this form of (quite misleading) use of terms, we will turn to definition in this chapter. According to Crouch (2013, p. 3), “‘liberalism’ is about as slippery as a political term can be.” Liberal, as well as conservative and socialist, world views are rooted in the Enlightenment, albeit with different affirmative, differentiating or evolutionary references. Liberals, conservatives and socialists differ “in their interpretations of historical change” (Berlin, 1995 [1969], p. 80) and have different views on the question of “what the elementary needs, interests and ideals of human beings are and who best represents these ideals, how comprehensively and over what periods of time” (Berlin, 1995 [1969], p. 80). In this respect, a detailed differentiation and contextualization of what we will talk about in the following chapters is necessary. In this chapter, we will contextualize this in three levels. First, we will briefly deal with the image of liberalism currently generated by the mainstream of spatial science (and beyond). Second, we © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Kühne et al., Liberty and Landscape, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84326-7_3

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will differentiate primarily between ‘classical liberalism’ and the image of ourselves, following Ralf Dahrendorf ’s (Dahrendorf, 1979, 1992) theory on the so-called life-chances which maximize liberalism (or in short, life-­ chances liberalism). The third contextualization takes place in relation to conservatism as well as, in the broadest sense, the socialist systems of ideas. Finally, the spatial and landscape-related implications of the world views will be outlined.

3.1 T  he Starting Point: The Often Woodcut-­Like Criticism of (Neo) Liberalism Liberalism—especially in its often stigma-laden variant of neoliberalism—is used as a blanket, and thus stereotypical, formula for justifying all the evils of this world, because the “credo of neoliberalism has nothing to do with the image of horror that is currently circulating among critics of neoliberalism. There is nothing of an unleashed market, of state-­ abolishing total deregulation, of a favoritization of the economization of all living conditions” (Kersting, 2009, p. 149). On the contrary, neoliberals demand a strong state that is not subject to the instrumentalization of interest groups, while at the same time does not claim to have extensive responsibility for the lives of its citizens, but “is able to protect the market from its self-destructive effects through a competitive order and to transform it into a system that is useful to society as a whole” (Kersting, 2009, p.  149). Accordingly, the connections of the Freiburg School of Neoliberalism to the radical market ideas of the Chicago School are rather restrained (see regarding the thoughts of Milton Friedmans: Görder, 2015). It is rather a central concern of liberalism to keep the social spheres separate: the public from the private, the political from the economic, education from the political, and so on. Liberals can certainly share the critique of the de-differentiation of politics and economy (as already Jasay, 1998 [1985] and in numerous publications by Dahrendorf, 1980, 1983, 1987, 2000, 2009a, 2009b; and in detail by Kühne & Leonardi, 2020; Leonardi, 1995, 2015, 2016, 2019), and that liberalism,

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as posited by Fraser (1997), is based on a strong autonomy of the political system. A depoliticization of society through the impression that citizens can achieve their goals in the marketplace more easily than through political commitment (see Crouch, 2004) contradicts such a liberal tradition. Following this logic, the subordination of the logic of politics and administration to criteria of economic efficiency in the course of the ‘new public management’ is also subject to liberal criticism; after all, man confronts politics and administration as a political subject and not as a customer of a service that is in principle substitutable, which state services usually are not (Crouch, 2004, 2011; Seibel, 2016). The liberal criticism of the de-­ differentiation of politics and economics does not only concern the economization of politics, but also the politicization of economics, as can be found in ‘political consumption’ (for more on the transition from a liberal philosophy to a political struggle concept, see Boas and Gans-­ Morse 2009). A more intensive examination of the (original) conceptual contents of liberalism (and neoliberalism), however, appears to many authors to be dispensable in both German-language and international literature (e.g. Prugl, 2004; Harvey, 2005, 2013; Rossiter & Wood, 2005; Wolff, 2005). For the sake of simplicity, (neo)liberalism is equated with “predatory capitalism” (Harvey, 2013, p. 158). According to this basic interpretation, the “self-image of urban and regional planning […] is essentially determined by being a counterforce of the market” (Kamleithner, 2008). Mises (2013 [1944], p. 26) takes the anti-market economy interpretation even further when he states that “the bureaucracy is filled with an irreconcilable hatred of the private sector and free enterprise.” If the connection between liberalism and space is examined more closely, the result can usually be traced as follows (among many, Danielzyk, 2004; Danielzyk & Dittmeier, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Kamleithner, 2008): the autonomy of individual location decisions in combination with the market-price mechanism led in longer periods of time to the optimal allocation of production factors, which in turn were the basis for maximizing the gross national product. Regional disparities, in turn, are explained by short-­ term market adjustment difficulties, especially as a result of persistent spatial structures. As a result of the mobility of the factors labor and capital, disparities are equalized. Since the state cannot be smarter than the

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sum of the individual actors, state intervention (e.g. through regional planning) is seen as superfluous, if not harmful, since it ultimately leads to welfare restrictions (also as a result of state inefficiency). According to Danielzyk (2004) referring back to Frey (1999), liberalization (understood as deregulation and privatization) manifests itself in a legal-­ organizational privatization (transformation of public institutions into private-law institutions), an economic liberalization (stronger enforcement of the principle of competition through deregulation measures) and a financial privatization (as realization of the principle of equivalence in the remuneration of services; see also Harvey, 2005). In the case of the infrastructure sector, according to Danielzyk (2004, p. 16), regional planning objectives are affected since, as a result of liberalization, “an infrastructure created by the private sector is subject to its own control mechanisms and success criteria” (similar Danielzyk & Dittmeier, 2002; Jessop, 2002; Simmons et al., 2006). The condensation point of current criticism of spatial development is the city: as a result of economic exploitation interests (of investors) and the desire to enjoy and benefit from inner-city locations (wealthy buyers), processes of displacement of the established population known as gentrification occur, which are implicitly (sometimes explicitly) considered immoral, since there exists a ‘right to the city’ for everyone (e.g. Harvey, 2013; Lefebvre, 1972, 2015 [1968]; Marcuse, 2009; Mayer, 2011; see also Schneider, 2016). This ‘right to the city’ contradicts the “tendency of capitalism […] to subject all aspects of life to commodification, monetization and privatization” (Schneider, 2016, p.  196). Instead of private interest, a “collective […] power” should decide “over the urbanization processes” (Harvey, 2013, p. 28). The mainstream concentration on the connection between liberalism and space is characterized by three features: first, it is limited to the economic variety of liberalism. Second, it is strongly defensive, that is, spatial planning can be forced to follow the logic of an economic-liberal or libertarian discourse. Third, the (neo)liberalism critique is highly morally charged. All in all, a strongly abbreviated concept of liberalism dominates the discussion about the connections between liberalism and space. In this respect, we see ourselves compelled to present the basic features and

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differentiations of the developments of liberalism before we develop our understanding of life-chance liberalism.

3.2 M  ain Features of Liberal Systems of Ideas: Fundamental Rights, Liberty and Cooperation The concept of liberalism is very broad: liberalism is “a name that is identified with very different, sometimes even opposite ideas, theses or actions” (cf. Rivera López, 1995, p. 17) and contains not only political and economic, but also social and philosophical, discourses. The development of liberalism is associated with names such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, but also Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt and, last but not least, Raymond Aron, Karl Popper, Hannah Arendt, Isaiah Berlin, Milton Friedman, Friedrich August von Hayek, Ralf Dahrendorf, John Rawls, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Even if a consistent, generally accepted definition of what is meant by liberalism is therefore difficult to come by, the common axioms of the freely born, equal rights, inherently good and rational human being can be identified for the different currents of liberalism. In the political system, liberalism is defined as the “defence of certain individual rights and liberties, such as liberty of expression, non-­discrimination on the basis of race, sex or nationality, procedural rights (e.g. the right of defence) and political rights to democratic participation and to vote in elections” (Rivera López, 1995, p.  17). A central conclusion from the axioms of liberalism is the recognition that a person is endowed with the same rights as any other. Accordingly Kant formulates (Kant, 1983 [1785], BA 64–65; emphasis in original) that “man, and every reasonable being in general, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for the arbitrary use of this or that will, but must at all times be regarded at the same time as an end in all his actions directed both to himself and to other reasonable beings”. Man’s dignity disallows regarding himself as a mere means. This dignity, in turn, is bound to liberty in Kant: “It is the liberty of man, his ability to act autonomously, that is, according to self-chosen

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principles, that gives him his specific dignity” (Nida-Rümelin, 2005, p. 127). If the dignity of the human being is linked to his liberty, a consistently individualistic perspective emerges (Nida-Rümelin, 2005, p. 149): “Human dignity is an expression of the special capacity of man to act morally, that is, solely out of respect for the moral law.” From these basic features, certain characteristics of liberal ideas can be specified (e.g. Aron, 2016 [1968]; Bauer & Wall-Strasser, 2008; Bratu & Dittmeyer, 2019; Dahrendorf, 2007b, 2008; Knoll, 1981): 1. The physical and mental integrity of the person 2. The ability of the individual to make free decisions based on as many alternatives as possible according to his or her own convictions 3. A development of the human being as unhindered as possible by (social) constraints with regard to his intellectual, cultural, political and economic possibilities 4. The right of the human being to educate himself, to shape his life himself and to bear responsibility Following these cornerstones of liberal basic ideas, it is trusted that social and technical progress—provided that individual liberties are strengthened—can make the future ‘better’ than the past (future optimism; Leonhard, 2001). Karl Popper accordingly believed the greatest danger in pessimism to be the suggestion that people “live in a bad world, a dishonest world” (Popper, 2018 [1984], p. 55). Historically, the current world is the best that has ever existed, although this world—compared to future possible worlds—still has potential for improvement, which he sees as an incentive to “search for a better world” (Popper, 2018 [1984], p.  55). Accordingly Ralf Dahrendorf (1979, p.  61) stated firmly: “Liberalism is necessarily a philosophy of the change.” This also includes major challenges such as climate change, global migration, species protection and land use. The understanding of liberty includes not only ‘negative liberty’, as identified by Isaiah Berlin (1995 [1969]), as the absence of coercion, threat and violence, but also the ‘positive’ liberty, the ability to act in a self-determined manner, that is, to be able to take advantage of opportunities for choice according to individual considerations: “the ‘positive’

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meaning of ‘liberty’ is derived from the desire of the individual to be his own master. I want my life and my decisions to depend on me and not on any external powers” (Berlin, 1995 [1969], p. 211). Negative liberty is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for positive liberty. After all, there are “obstacles to self-determination that remain even if everyone refrains from making each other submissive through violence, threats and blackmail” (Kersting, 2009, p. 58), such as financial destitution, illiteracy, lack of access to education and inability to make their own decisions (among others Berlin, 1995 [1969]; Jahanbegloo, 2007; Kersting, 2009; Strenger, 2017). Positive liberty also means participation in political decision-­ making processes (see Arendt, 1994; Dahrendorf, 2003b; Ladwig, 2004). But striving for ‘positive’ liberty is also accompanied by the danger that “very easily too many of the ‘negative’ liberties […] are destroyed” (Berlin, 1995 [1969], p. 245). Also, the “sovereignty of the people could easily destroy the sovereignty of individuals” (Berlin, 1995 [1969], p. 245). If liberty is understood negatively, liberty can be localized in the political context “where there is no state control” (Schink, 2017, p. 28). According to the positive understanding, however, liberty consists of “exercising control oneself ” (Schink, 2017, p. 28). At the center of liberal thinking is the individual, who is able to make his own decisions and thus lead a self-determined life (z.B. Berlin, 1995 [1969]), which is why Isaiah Berlin also rejects Hegel’s understanding of man, according to which there is a final goal of human development. Instead, Berlin decides “in favor of Kant’s view that free choice and purpose are universal human qualities” (Jahanbegloo, 2007, p. 132). In total, Isaiah Berlin (1995 [1969], p. 137) rejected all (not only Hegelian) social or individual determinisms, believing they led “to the elimination of the concept of individual responsibility” (other liberal thinkers such as Karl Popper, 2011 [1947] and Dahrendorf, 1979). From the rejection of the idea that history has “neither a priori nor even a posteriori meaning” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 24), Dahrendorf concludes (1979, p. 24): “[W]e must give it a sense if we want this (and we must want it, for the question inevitably arises for us).” As pertains to history, Ralf Dahrendorf suggests (1979, p. 26) this would then “create more life-chances for more people”. The organization of economic activity in accordance with a liberal world view sees the market economy as the “system of social cooperation

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and division of labor based on the private ownership of the means of production” (Mises, 2013 [1944], p. 37); whether the market economy is a free or a social variant depends on the selected variation of liberalism. However, liberalism’s commitment to market liberty is not based, as is often assumed (z.B. Harvey, 2005), on the fact that “it accepts economic efficiency as the only value orientation, but because the market economy is the only economic form that is consistent with the individual’s fundamental right to freedom and offers the best framework for a self-­ responsible way of life” (Kersting, 2009, p.  29). Thus it is also not compatible with liberal thinking “to leave the individual hardly any time outside of the job which makes a self-determined life possible” (Herzog, 2013, p. 167; emphasis in original). Market relations can also be described as “legalized relations” (Döhring, 2007) because they operate within a legal framework that is based on the “legally guaranteed protection of the person, the safeguarding of property and the maintenance of liberty of contract and the like” (Döhring, 2007, p. 161). This shares an ethical foundation (similar Dahrendorf, 1987). The focus of liberal ethics is again on the individual: “on the defense of his integrity, on the development of his possibilities, on his chances in life. Groups, organizations, institutions are not ends in themselves, but means to an end of individual development” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 135). Wolfgang Sofsky (2007b, p. 93) accordingly states that inequality among people is not the result of “ambition, deceit or robbery, […] but of the division of labor, the specialization of skills, the dependence of one on the achievements of the other”. Since the inequality of the distribution of goods is socially meaningful, he continues, “He who has only what everyone has, has too little of many things. And he has too much of what he neither wants nor needs. Equality or common property does not ensure a peaceful basic supply” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 95). Moreover, equal distribution would also prevent a large part of social communication, since everyone had to be satisfied with what he had: “Not even in their desires could people differ from one another […] The differences in skill, care and diligence would immediately break through any equality. Worse still: in the name of equality the development of these virtues would have to be reduced to a meager level” (Sofsky, 2007b, p.  98). Ralf Dahrendorf (1983, p. 133) combines the rejection of the goal of equality (especially

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economic, not legal) with the defense of the thesis “that inequality is a productive force in the social process because it stimulates initiative and thus change”. In this respect, Ralf Dahrendorf (1979, p. 49) also shares his perspective on maximizing life-chances in relation to a positive assessment of the medium ‘money’: “Money offers life-chances. We can do something with it. It matters whether we spend it or not. It offers possibilities, opportunities.” Money is the medium of consumer control of the economy (Mises, 2013 [1944], p. 37): “The true rulers in the capitalist system of the market economy are the consumers. They decide – by buying or refraining from buying – who can own the capital and who should run the factories.” In contrast to communitarian theories (such as conservative or socialist, see Sects. 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, respectively), liberal approaches weight the meaning of collective and individual references differently. If communitarian approaches—strongly generalized—assume a greater significance for society (supported in particular by the division of labor and social roles; see also Ipsen, 1992) or, in particular, the community (supported by personal relationships; Ipsen, 1992) vis-à-vis the individual, liberal ideas initially see the “annoying fact of society” (Dahrendorf, 2006, p. 21), that is, the compulsion of the individual to have to adapt to social conventions—in the emergence and spread of which, however, he as homo sociologicus “as the bearer of socially preformed roles” (Dahrendorf, 2006, p. 24) is at the same time himself involved, because “society is not a neutral stage on which individuals mutually watch each other’s self-­ fabrication” (Kersting, 2009, p. 24), but rather it shapes our identity formation and our ideas of a successful life. The process of socialization of social values and norms is understood as a “process of depersonalization, in which the absolute individuality and liberty of the individual in the control and generalization of social roles is suspended” (Dahrendorf, 2006, p. 63). But the individual can also gain liberty in role-play: “Role distance preserves the image that the person has of himself. By giving the role its own contour, filling unclear situations with one’s own achievements and resisting the compulsion of duties, the individual is able to escape situational oppositions” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 49). A central question of liberalism, as a result of the critical discussion of the relationship between the individual and society, lies in the question of

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justice; after all, “every constitution of liberty […] means limitations of liberty” (Dahrendorf, 2008, p. 53). This limitation of liberty requires a rational limitation, which is expressed in a “constitution of liberty” (Dahrendorf, 2007b, p. 28) which is divided into two parts: “One is the law, or more precisely the rule of law or the principle of the rule of law” (Dahrendorf, 2007b, p. 28). This is supplemented by the fact “that the law is the highest instance. No one is above the law, the ‘law’ belongs to all free citizens” (Dahrendorf, 2007b, p.  28). The second part of the ‘Constitution of Liberty’ refers to the organization of power: “This is where liberty and democracy meet” (Dahrendorf, 2007b, p. 29) because “in democracy, legitimacy is defined by the consent of the people or at least by the absence of a majority rejection” (Dahrendorf, 2007b, p. 29). Karl Popper sharpens this criterion by stating that a state is politically free “if its political institutions make it practically possible for its citizens to bring about a change of government without bloodshed, if the majority wants such a change of government” (Popper, 2019 [1987], p.  208). Aron (2016 [1968], p. 84) illustrates the difference between the two ideals of liberalism (here in the sense of negative liberty as a restriction of coercion against a person) and democracy (here, in contrast to Popper, in the classical interpretation as the opinion of the majority) in what the respective systems are directed against: “Democracy is in opposition to authoritarian government, liberalism in opposition to totalitarianism.” However, by nature of government, the state restricts liberty. According to Dahrendorf, “[a]bsolute liberty is anarchy” (Dahrendorf, 2007b, p. 29). Even if we find “[t]he trace of anarchy […] in all concepts of liberty” (Dahrendorf, 2007b, p. 29), the absolute liberty of the individual means the restriction of the liberty of others. In this respect, it is incumbent on the state, democratically legitimized, to find rules that synchronize the claims to liberty in such a way that the liberty of the individual is restricted as little as possible. Accordingly, Rawls (1993, p. 18) sees the task of political liberalism—which he deliberately does not conceive of as a comprehensive, secular liberal doctrine—as “work[ing] out a conception of political justice for a constitutional democratic regime that the plurality of reasonable doctrines—always a feature of the culture of a free democratic regime—might endorse”.

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In the following, we shall now first characterize two essential currents of liberalism: on the one hand, the strongly economically influenced classical liberalism, and on the other hand, what we have termed ‘life-chance liberalism’, following Ralf Dahrendorf, which cultivates close kinship with political liberalism (John Rawls) and a skills approach (Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum). We will then examine the competing ideas of conservatism and socialism1 (Mannheim, 1984 [1927]) in order to be able to illuminate their implications in dealing with space at a later point, while also contrasting them to the characteristics of liberal ideas.

3.3 Classical Liberalism Centuries ago, David Hume (1711–1776) referred to the social genesis of law, which originated from art and agreement, not from ‘human nature’ (Hume, 1978). That such a right became necessary results from the natural state. The ‘state of nature’ in Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) represents a ‘philosophical thought experiment’ (Bertram, 2012; Kersting, 2007; Ottmann, 2001; cf. on philosophical thought experiments in general: Bertram, 2012). The sense of this thought experiment as an ‘argumentum e contrario’ consists of showing “why the State is necessary and what it can achieve” (Ottmann, 2006, p. 287). It is therefore not a historical real state before the foundation of a state or after its collapse, but a ‘fiction’ (cf. Ottmann, 2006, p. 287). The core of the thought experiment is a constructed state without superordinate and supra-individual instances such as an impartial state, a legal system with sanctions and corresponding authorities with power. “The subjects of the experiment are the people qua tales, the natural people,” and Hobbes as a philosopher “watches what kind of coexistence results from this and what practical experiences they make with each other” (Kersting, 2007, p. 213). For Hobbes, who experienced the horrors of the English Civil War from 1642 to 1649 between supporters of King Charles I (‘cavaliers’) and those of the English  Socialism can be summarized—following Karl Mannheim—in different socialist currents as classical socialism after Proudhon (1876) Marxism/Neo-Marxism according to Marx (2018 [1867]); real socialism; communism and reform socialism. 1

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Parliament (‘roundheads’), man is not ‘by nature’ a ‘zoon politikon’, contrary to Aristotelian tradition (Aristoteles, 2009), but in the ‘state of nature’ a ‘homo homini lupus’. Without an impartial protective power (i.e. state) with its sanctions and corresponding rules of action, and in view of human self-interest, the scarcity of desired goods and means and the resulting competition for opportunities inevitably leads to hostility between competitors and thus to a ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’—the “state of nature is a state of war” (Kersting, 2007, p. 214). In fear of the arbitrary liberty of others (and vice versa), people find themselves in rationally comprehensible individual permanent readiness to use violence. In this light, war can be reconstructed in the context of self-­ preservation as a preventive counter-attack in anticipation of the violence of others. Ultimately, the ‘state of nature’ is a “wisdom trap”, because “a maximum of subjective, individual rationality produces a maximum of objective, collective irrationality” (Kersting, 2007, p. 215). As a justification of the instinctual self-preservation of humans, which leads to war, Hobbes relies on a modified ‘natural law’ of the individual, which for the first time also embodies a “right freed from morals” (Ottmann, 2006, p. 290). Within the framework of this ‘jus naturale’ the liberty of every man consists in “using his own power according to his will for the preservation of his own nature, i.e. his own life, and consequently to do everything that he, according to his own judgment and reason, regards as the most suitable means for this purpose” (Hobbes, 2017 [1651], p. 99). To this modified natural law he adds a law of nature, the ‘lex naturalis’: “A law of nature, lex naturalis, is a rule or general rule determined by reason, according to which a person is forbidden to do that which can destroy his life or deprive him of the means to preserve it, and to refrain from doing that which he considers best to preserve it” (Hobbes, 2017 [1651], p. 99). This ‘law of nature’ is divided into different laws, which can be understood as the “rules of wisdom” of human reasoning (Kersting, 2007, p. 217). These rules of wisdom suggest a way to depart from the natural state, which is deemed an unbearable situation. Kersting (2007) reconstructs this path as follows: the “basic rule” is a “conditional peace commandment” (Kersting, 2007, p.  217) in that “Everyone has to strive for peace as long as there is hope for it. If he cannot establish it, he may obtain all the means and advantages of war and use

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them” (Hobbes, 2017 [1651], p.  99f.; emphasis in original). But the unanswered question of how peace can be established remains. The answer is given by the second law: “Everyone should voluntarily, if others are likewise willing, renounce his right to everything, as far as he deems it necessary for the sake of peace and self-defense, and he should be content with as much liberty toward others as he would grant others against himself” (Hobbes, 2017 [1651], p. 100; emphasis in original). But liberty and renunciation of violence are only meaningful if there is a mutual renunciation of rights and guaranteed loyalty to the contract. Therefore the third law reads: “Contracts concluded are to be kept” (Hobbes, 2017 [1651], p.  110; emphasis in original). But how can we bind people to these ‘natural laws’? Hobbes’ answer is that this requires a state power that forces people to adhere to agreements and rules. This requires that people voluntarily hand over their power and authority to the sovereign, who guarantees and enforces the peaceful coexistence of people through laws and the threat of sanctions: “Contracts without the sword are mere words and do not have the power to offer a person even the slightest security” (Hobbes, 2017 [1651], p. 131). The state thus serves to institutionalize law and justice and to introduce and monitor the rules of a social ‘framework order’. Ultimately, Hobbes’ social contract is “a contract for the establishment of rule, not a contract for the limitation of rule” (Kersting, 2007, p.  221). The sovereign has absolute power over the citizens, he is infallible as a contractually appointed sovereign and he cannot do any injustice (“volenti non fit iniuria” = “Whoever agrees, no injustice can be done to him”). However, the sovereign is obliged to ensure peace. The contract and the authorization of the sovereign can therefore not be withdrawn by the subjects; there is no right of resistance of the citizens—an unusual thought for today’s readers, but one that can even be found in Kant’s work (Kant, 1983 [1793], pp. 153ff.). Thus, in the natural state, man could not be guaranteed his innate rights (as mentioned in Sect. 3.2). He therefore founds a state with his fellow men in order to leave the natural state in which he lacked assertiveness of his inalienable rights (see e.g. Locke, 1960 [1689]). The natural state is understood as a state of insecurity, which forces “man into a dull-­ animalistic struggle for self-preservation” (Kersting, 2009, p.  54).

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Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) explains the resulting connection between right and liberty as follows: “Right is thus the epitome of the conditions under which the arbitrariness of the one can be united with the arbitrariness of the other according to a general law of liberty” (Kant, 1983 [1798], p. 337; more about Kant’s concept of liberty, see Höffe, 2015). In addition to the preservation of life and basic liberties, John Locke (1632–1705) considered the protection of property to be a central task of the state. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) succinctly summarized this as the security of citizens, “both the external and the internal” (von Humboldt, 1986 [1851], p. 115; similarly also other classical liberals like Mises, 2013 [1944]), and defines the expression ‘citizen’ as “a person who has sacrificed his liberty to the state, thus one who adapts” (Hank, 2007, p. 150). Anthony De Jasay goes even further (1998 [1985], p. 36; emphasis in original) in his analysis of human adaptation: “Any real state, given its de facto origin, is primarily an historical accident to which society must adapt” (for the history of the idea of liberalism, see Steltemeier, 2015). For liberals (not only classical, but all) private property is neither theft (as in Proudhon, 1876) nor a time-dependent phenomenon, but a basic prerequisite for liberty. Since the human being can dispose of it, comparable to his own body, private property is a chance to exceed the limits of his own body and thus to extend his liberty (e.g. a private car allows us to extend our radius of action whenever we want beyond walking or bicycling). Whoever has no property is restricted in his liberty and is at the mercy of the powerful (Kant, 1983 [1798], see also Dahrendorf, 2007b, Krebs, 2014). In order to ensure that power is not subject to excessive concentration and cannot be used to reduce liberty, the division of powers into judiciary, executive and legislative branches is a prerequisite for liberals. In addition to one’s own body and material objects outside one’s own body (such as a piece of land), Kant’s property rights also include agreed-­ upon services (in the form of contracts) and conditions on other persons in relation to oneself (e.g. a marriage) (cf. Krebs, 2014). Property always has a spatial dimension because the body as well as the material possession has a spatial extension. But arranged services, as well as the conditions affecting other persons in relation to ourselves, are also carried out in places which carry a localized connotation (e.g. the common marriage

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residence or even the place of marriage). Even “intellectual property has a local connotation in the form that the seat of the court where a possible dispute is to be heard is determined according to a law that is valid in a certain place” (Krebs, 2014, p. 57). Hannah Arendt (1998 [1958]) also adds to the spatial dimension of property when she states that the concept of property originally denoted the area that a family lived in. The task of the state—in the opinion of classical liberals—is not the production and distribution of happiness, but to “bring about the state of greatest conformity of the constitution with legal principles” (Kant, 1983 [1798], p. 318). This has the following consequence: “The salvation of the state lies not in happiness but in justice” (Krebs, 2014, p.  66). Accordingly, the state’s task is to guarantee civil rights and liberties. The prerequisite for a self-determined life that makes use of these rights is education (von Humboldt, 1986 [1851]). The task of the latter, therefore, is to educate people to become free and responsible individuals and not, for example, to become dependent citizens, which is why a state education system is always preferable to one that is freely sponsored. In contrast to other liberals of his generation (such as Eucken or Hayek), Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) held fast to the classic liberal position, in the tradition of Humboldt or Kant, by rejecting economic activity by the state (Krebs, 2014). According to David Ricardo’s (1772–1823) socialization theory, which assumes that the total output of goods increases “if the weaker group limits itself to the goods it can produce more cheaply” (Krebs, 2014, p. 142), Mises (1940) assumes that the communalization of the human being is based on advantages of the division of labor. The latter could unfold his potential in particular if he was undisturbed by state intervention. Because of the right to physical and mental integrity, it is the task of the state, according to von Mises, to maintain security and therefore stability, which also supports economic considerations: “Economy requires stability of conditions, because it is a far-reaching time-consuming beginning, which is all the more successful, the longer it is adjusted to time spans” (Mises, 1932, p. 20). Against this background, Mises (1927, p.  33) briefly outlines the task of the state from the perspective of classical liberalism: “protection of property, liberty and peace”. Mises’ criticism of statism is correspondingly strong: if the state intervenes in market affairs, this not only produces economic

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imbalances and thus an inefficient allocation of production factors, but also bundles a great deal of power in the hands of a few, combined with the inherent danger of its abuse (Mises, 1927). Here, too, the skepticism constitutive for liberal thinkers toward an (uncontrolled) accumulation of power resources is evident. This criticism is based not least on the complementary loss of power and the increasing conformism of the ‘inferior’ (Paris, 2005) whereby “power [crystallizes] into dominance” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 17), for it is not “the rule as such, but its regular observance that creates the institutions” (Sofsky, 2007b, p.  17) which deprive the individual of his liberty without the individual problematizing or even noticing it. The “conformist […] moves in a prison of rigid thoughts. He does not even feel that his ability to think has long since been damaged” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 129). For von Mises, criticism of statism is not limited to economic issues or the distribution of power; it also aims at its internal logic, since the state, which regulates and intervenes extensively in economic life, is functional only because regulations and laws are disregarded at the individual level. Thus he formulates the alternative of either refraining from state intervention in the economy (capitalism) or—as in socialism—“transferring the entire management of production and distribution to the authorities” (Mises, von Mises, 1927, p.  69). Even though classical liberals see the significance of the state as limited (especially non-economic), they assign it a central function, in addition to responsibility for internal and external security, to define the limits of the market. This is contradicted by libertarians like Robert Nozick (1974). They strive for the state of pure private law, of the absolute market, “their ideal demands a complete reprivatization of the state” (Kersting, 2009, p. 40). With regard to the polarity of conceiving of the human being (certainly also normatively) as an individual or social being, the representatives of classical liberalism position themselves at the pole of the individual. Ralf Dahrendorf (2007a), from a rather egalitarian-liberal position, understands opening up ligatures as opportunities (see Sect. 3.4), although representatives of classical liberalism position themselves differently on this question: “External liberation must be completed by internal liberation. Emancipation from foreign rule has an external and an internal side: for not only does the foreign come across us in the form of

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foreign arbitrariness; it has also taken possession of our inner self as an ensemble of existing routines of thought, feeling and decision, which have imperceptibly penetrated us through the socialization process” (Kersting, 2009, p. 17). According to this consideration, liberty does not only consist of not being subject to a foreign will and being able to lead a self-determined life, but—according to Kersting (2009, p. 20) following Kant—is expanded so that “the process of the formation of intention and will is not heteronomously caused, neither by laws of inner nature nor by acquired convictions and existing practices”. If classical liberalism—in the terminology of Isiah Berlin (1995 [1969])—can be seen as focused on ‘negative’ freedom, life-chance liberalism, which will be discussed in the following text, refers in particular also to the maximization of ‘positive’ freedom—connected with the already mentioned dangers of the reduction of ‘negative’ freedom. In this tradition, it is not care that constitutes “the existence of the state, but only the guarantee of those rights that protect the person and his or her private life from foreign encroachments” (Sofsky, 2007a, p. 163; see also Rössler, 2001). Here something can be understood as private “if one can control the access of this ‘something’ oneself ” (Rössler, 2001, p.  23), whereby privacy, in this sense, is defined individually, and not institutionally nor collectively (Rössler, 2001).

3.4 The Liberalism of Life-Chances 3.4.1 T  he Life-Chances Liberalism: Some Basic Features The central concept of liberalism—hence its name—is liberty. Liberty is defined by Ralf Dahrendorf (2007b, p. 26) initially—quite in the tradition of negative liberty—as “absence of coercion”. He then adds, “People are free to the extent that they can make their own decisions. In the state of liberty we find conditions that reduce coercion to a minimum. The aim of liberalism or politics of liberty is that there should be a maximum of liberty under given constraints” (Dahrendorf, 2007b, p. 26). Already

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the formulation ‘under given circumstances’ clarifies the changeability of liberty, Ralf Dahrendorf (2007a, p. 8) does not understand liberty as a state, “i.e. the mere possibility of fulfillment, but [defines] liberty as an activity that makes life-chances real”. By life-chances Dahrendorf understands “first of all election chances, options. They demand two things, rights of participation and an offer of activities and goods to choose from” (2007a, p. 8), p. 44), whereby election chances must be connected with a sense. In his book ‘Lebenschancen—Anläufe zur sozialen und politischen Theorie’, Ralf Dahrendorf outlines the concept pictorially: “Lifechances are the baking forms of human life in society; they determine how far people can develop” (1979, p. 24). Here Ralf Dahrendorf underlines the difference between life-chances and liberty: life-chances alone are not considered liberty; “liberty is a moral and political demand; lifechances are a social concept” (1979, p. 61). The concept of opportunity is described by Ralf Dahrendorf (1979, p. 98) with regard to Max Weber (1972 [1922]) on the one hand as “structurally based […] probability of behavior” and on the other hand “as something the individual can have, something as a chance to satisfy interests” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p.  98). These ‘chances of satisfying interests’ in turn exist as a result of “social relations […]. The chances themselves are socially shaped. Social structures order opportunities.” Here the expansion of ‘negative’ liberty to a positive understanding of liberty becomes clear. The fight for life-chances in the scarcely past two and a half centuries seizes Ralf Dahrendorf (1983, p. 123 f.) as follows: “They [the liberals; author’s note] wanted people to become citizens, individuals, who as such make their choice between consumer goods, between political groups, between lifestyles and goals in life. Liberals were therefore opponents not only of all traditional ties, but also of all attempts to forge new ties [not in the sense of voluntarily entered into ligatures, but generally more binding; author’s note]. Liberals were opponents of the mixing of church and state. Liberals were opponents of legally fixed privileges. Liberals were opponents of a rigid concept of family; they were advocates of a simplified divorce law and opponents of the abortion paragraphs. Liberals were opponents of a social policy that tied individuals to their place of birth or residence; they wanted mobility. Liberals were opponents of feudal and quasi-feudal ties between master and servant. For almost two centuries

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liberalism was option politics, that is, the struggle for the extension of human life-chances by the multiplication of options.” Life-chances—like Lindner (2009, p. 20)—makes no guarantees: “They only become concretely lived biographies through individual efforts—or they are forfeited.” It is therefore the responsibility of the individual to decide whether or not to seize the life-chances offered to him or her. Life-chances depend on social contexts, as Ralf Dahrendorf (1979, p.  50) clarifies: “Life-chances are possibilities of individual growth, the realization of abilities, wishes and hopes, and these possibilities are provided by social conditions.” Despite the focus on the individual, in the sense of a “society of independent individuals” (Voigt, 2009a, p.  335; see also Leonhard, 2001), liberal approaches do not reject the collective in a generalized way—as is often claimed by critics of liberalism: “People must cooperate to prevent the pursuit of their interests in a world of scarce goods from leading to anarchy and general war, to ensure that competition and rivalry are transformed into a production site of technical, civilizing and cultural progress” (Kersting, 2009, p. 51). Even more the individual needs “civilizing prerequisites, previous social knowledge and cooperative relationships” (Lindner, 2009, p. 22) in order to be able to unfold individually (here the feedback relationship of Worlds 2 and 3 becomes very clear in the Popper sense). Other people are therefore not simply ‘sparring partners’ in the competition for their own success; they are “rather one of the most important sources of happiness and meaning in human life” (similarly Herzog, 2013, p. 13; Dahrendorf, 1979). The meaning that life opportunities acquire is ultimately based on certain social “values that provide standards” (Dahrendorf, 2007a, p. 44). Dahrendorf (2007a, p. 45) calls these value conceptions, these “deep bonds, whose existence gives sense to the chances of choice”, ligatures. These are strong affiliations that cannot be shaken off without anomie (Dahrendorf, 1983). They are “structurally predetermined fields of human action. The individual is placed in bonds or ligatures by virtue of his social positions and roles” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 51). Ligatures prove to be emotionally charged: “the ancestors, the homeland, the community, the church” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 51). In addition to ligatures, options determine people’s life-chances (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 50): “Options are choices, alternatives of action,

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given in social structures.” Ralf Dahrendorf illustrates the importance of options and ligatures as follows: “Ligatures create references and thus the foundations of action; options require choices and are thus open to the future” (1979, p.  51). Ligatures and options are subject to intensive mutual influence (Dahrendorf, 1979, p.  51  f.): “Ligatures without options mean suppression, while options without bindings are useless.” Looking at the relationship between ligatures and options, Ralf Dahrendorf (1979, p.  55) clarifies his understanding of ‘life-chances’: “Life-chances are opportunities for individual action that result from the interrelation of options and ligatures” (see also Niedenzu, 2001; Dahrendorf, 2003a; Alber, 2009; Hauser, 2019). ‘Reason’ is also a central concept for life-chance liberalism, which can be understood through Kant as a capacity to gain knowledge through thinking and to critically distinguish it from excessive claims to knowledge, as well as to anchor morality, and morality in the autonomy of reason, as self-legislation. With Kant, ‘reason’ can be theoretically defined as “the capability of principles”; he calls a “realization from principles” such a capability, “since I generally recognize the particular through concepts” (Kant, 1959 [1781], B 356-357) or “the ability to derive the special from the general” (Kant, 1983, p. 128). Reason is accordingly the capacity to infer; it has the interest, peculiar to it and at the same time natural, in finding the unconditional to everything that is conditional: “Human reason has the special fate in one genus of its cognitions: that it is harassed by questions that it cannot reject; because they are given up to it by the nature of reason itself; but which it cannot answer either, for they exceed all capacity of human reason. It [the human reason; annotation of the authors] gets into this embarrassment without its fault. It begins from principles whose use is inevitable in the course of experience and at the same time sufficiently proved by it. With these, it [the human reason; annotation of the authors] rises (as also its nature entails) higher and higher, to more distant conditions” (Kant, 1959 [1781], A VII). This search for the unconditional is the highest step to be climbed in the step structure of cognition. Viewing provides the mind with a still undetermined substance. The mind as the “ability to think (to imagine something through concepts)” (Kant, 1983, p. 124; emphasis in original) and as “property of the rules” (Kant, 1983, p. 128) gives a certain unity to the

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still undetermined substance with the categories and principles. Reason finally attempts to bring the conceptual knowledge thus attained to the highest unity. Reason is, then, the capacity of the unifying endowment through closure. The highest attainable unity is the condition that is no longer itself conditioned: the unconditional. Through this unconditional state, “reason arrives at a continuous connection with itself ” (Kant, 1959 [1781], B 362). The unconditional thus provides the systematic unity of all experience. If reason believes that it is not only able to think the unconditional, but also to recognize it, it gets entangled in a ‘dialectical appearance’ by equating and confusing the thought with a factual realization. For, since reason notes that “its business must at all times remain unfinished, because the questions never cease, it sees itself compelled to take recourse to principles that transcend all possible experiences, and nevertheless seem so unsuspicious that even common human reason is in agreement with them. But in so doing it plunges into darkness and contradictions, from which it can indeed assume that somewhere hidden errors must lie at the bottom of it, but which it cannot discover, because the principles of which it avails itself, since they go beyond the limit of all experience, no longer recognize a touchstone of experience” (Kant, 1959 [1781], A VII). Positively, however, the ideas of reason (think ‘God’, ‘liberty’ and ‘immortality’, which connote the unconditional) can be regarded as ‘regulative ideas’ in the sense of a necessary heuristic ‘vanishing point’ (Höffe, 1992, p.  138) from which an unfinished cognitive process can be understood. Besides this theoretical use of reason, there is also a practical use. This consists in “not acting according to the given laws of nature, but in imagining laws for oneself, e.g. purpose-means relations, in recognizing the imagined laws as principles and acting according to them. The ability to act according to the conception of laws is also called will, so that practical reason is nothing else but the ability to want” (Höffe, 1992, p.  174). With this ‘self-legislation’ or ‘self-determination’ of the will (Kant, 1993 [1790], § 8), nothing else is meant besides liberty in the sense of ‘autonomy’. The use of reason “suggests an impartial, tolerant, responsible attitude” (Dahrendorf, 2008, p. 76; similar Strenger, 2015). The constitutive significance of reason for the liberal order represents—according to

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Dahrendorf (2008, p.  79)—one of its fundamental weaknesses: “it is almost by definition a matter of the head, not of the heart.”2 The public use of reason also places certain demands on science. Thus, it is the task of the scientist, also in the consciousness of struggling for truth, “that they will not find the truth” (Dahrendorf, 2008, p. 61): “The lone fighters for truth […] do not proclaim any truth, but set out in search of it. That they drift in a horizon of uncertainty is always considered” (Dahrendorf, 2008, p. 61). Due to the resulting plural truths and inextricable antagonisms, contradictions arise, which “again and again give room to temptations of eternal peace” (Dahrendorf, 2008, p. 67). These longings—in science as well as in society—can refer to a supposedly original world as well as to “hopes for an ideal final society” (Dahrendorf, 2008, p. 67). These longings, however, always involve and hold the danger of accepting inequality of opportunity, the division of the world into friend and foe, and “hence intolerance and the abuse of power” (Dahrendorf, 2008, p. 76).

3.4.2 P  olitical Liberalism and the Skills Approach in Its Significance for Life-Chances Liberalism If the overwhelming majority of liberal contract theories (which assume that people voluntarily form supra-individual associations and thus relinquish some of their individual liberties in favor of protection) are based on the conception of man as homo oeconomicus—that is, as a completely rational utility maximizer with complete knowledge and control of himself, but without altruism and ethics—in order to build the principles of a legitimate state upon them, Rawls (also Dahrendorf or Sen and, for example, even more strongly Nussbaum) deviates from this conception. He subjects it to a generalization and raises it “to a higher level of abstraction” (Sen, 2012, p.  98). For Rawls, contract and natural state are no  Communitarian critics of liberalism, such as Sandel, MacIntyre, Taylor and Walzer, attack its concept of the person, which offers no possibility of connection to other people, thus presupposing an a-social individualism, which, however, is illusory due to the social integration of humans, and insinuate to liberalism a universalism, which disregards cultural specifics; moreover, the decisions of humans would be by far less coined/shaped by rationality than liberal philosophers presuppose (in addition see Mulhall & Swift, 1996). 2

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longer the basis for legitimate political rule, but only serve to define standards of justice (Schaal & Heidenreich, 2006). The central aspect here is fairness,3 by which—in short—impartiality can be understood (cf. Sen, 2012). According to Rawls (1971, p. 12), the natural state is marked by the “veil of ignorance”. Rawls (1971, p.  12) defines this as follows: “Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities.” Using the construct of the veil of ignorance, Rawls specifies that (Schaal & Heidenreich, 2006, p. 98; see also Mulhall & Swift, 1996) “In the original state, behind the veil of ignorance, men are to find those principles of justice which are to apply later to the society in which they are to live.” Thus, the generalized individual should develop principles of justice in a state of ignorance regarding social values and norms, regardless of the maximization of benefits based on his own individual or social endowment. Rawls relates these principles of justice, on the one hand, to the basic institutional structure of society and, on the other, to the justice of the distribution of goods in society. The results of his considerations on “behind the veil of ignorance” are two principles of justice. Rawls (1971, p. 266) summarizes the first principle of justice—quite in the tradition of classical liberal theories—as follows: “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.” Since such a position implies an equal distribution of social and political goods, their unequal distribution requires justification. The legitimacy of inequality of social and economic goods is founded in the second principle of justice, which goes well beyond the classical principles of liberalism: “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of  Sen (2012) points out that the English word ‘fair’ has Germanic roots. Thus the Old High German word fagar, from which the Old English word faegar is derived, describes aesthetic qualities in the sense of ‘pleasant’ or ‘attractive’. It was only in Middle English that the meaning was turned to ‘right’ and ‘just’. 3

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fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1971, p. 302). Rawls thus derives from the concept of a state of nature further-reaching tasks of the state than classical liberals would have done (cf. Herzog, 2013). This Rawlsian turn of phrase defuses Marx’s criticism (and that of his followers) that liberalism reserves liberty for those “who assert themselves in the marketplace” (Herzog, 2013, p. 45). Rawls’ concept differs in two central aspects from previous notions of the social contract, as Nussbaum (2009, p. 12) notes: “Rawls’s aim is to generate basic political principles from a very spare set of assumptions.” He formulates a “theory of ‘pure procedural justice’” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 12). This deviates from the historical tradition of treaty theories in that ‘natural rights’ are not a prerequisite for the treaty. Second, his theory differs from other contractualist conceptions in terms of its basic moral assumptions. Thus, the decision-making situation conceived by Rawls includes “moral assumptions that Hobbes, Locke, and even Kant (in his political writings) eschew” (Nussbaum, 2014, p. 30). The ‘veil of ignorance’ can therefore be seen as a “representation of moral or moral impartiality” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 12), which can be understood as “closely related to the Kantian idea that no person should be used as a mere means to the ends of others” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 12). Nussbaum’s (2014) critique of John Rawls’ concept refers to the lack of consideration (as Rawls himself mentioned in 2003) of people with mental disabilities, “non-human animals” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 12) as well as justice in the intergovernmental context, which she addresses by developing by her ‘capabilities approach’ (to be mentioned in more detail later). A central approach to the justification of inequality in political liberalism thus becomes the principle of equal opportunity. According to the principle of equal opportunity, all systematic inequalities in access to offices and positions are considered illegitimate (i.e. based on age, gender, sexual preference, ancestral origin). The principle of formal equality of opportunity, however, systematically ignores the initial social conditions, which are in fact difficult to modify as primary socialization effects. Because of this weakness of the principle of formal equality of opportunity, Rawls calls for substantial equality of opportunity to compensate for unequal conditions of primary socialization as a task of the state—thereby restricting the liberal principle to property, since taxpayers’ money is

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needed to create substantial equality of opportunity. In this way he moves away from the classic liberal position of the ‘night-watchman state’4 (cf. Herzog, 2013). In this sense, the “civil rights to be fulfilled include social rights, such as the right to protection from hardship through no fault of one’s own, or the right to an adequate pension or education” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p.  104). With Dahrendorf (1987, p.  132), citizenship rights become understood as “a set of rights that must be the same for all participants both in a market and in a democratic political public sphere”. At the same time, Rawls formulates the primacy of liberty (in the tradition of other liberal thinkers, e.g. Dahrendorf, 1983, 1987), because the first principle of justice is superior to the second, which means “(…), liberties, that all can enjoy cannot be violated on grounds of, say, the furtherance of wealth or income, or for a better distribution of economic resources among the people” (Sen, 2009, p. 59). The implementation of substantial equality of opportunity depends in turn on the existence of a ‘strong state’ which, by creating and maintaining institutions, “determines the basic structure of a fully just society” (Sen, 2009, p. 26). The observance of the Rawlsian social contract, which was created behind the veil of ignorance, is nevertheless based less on a “strong-armed enforcement of the agreement” (Sen, 2009, p. 204) but rather on “peoples’ willingness to follow how they have, as it were, ‘agreed’ to behave” (Sen, 2009, p. 204) because the contract will then be considered reasonable. Thus, it follows from reasonableness that compliance with the contract is also reasonable. In the light of Rawls’ theory of justice Amartya Sen (2012) and Martha Nussbaum (2014) develop—in mutual reference—approaches that focus on the capabilities (and their maximization). Sen places individual liberties more strongly at the center of his considerations and leaves the operationalization of dealing with capabilities to social negotiation processes. Walnut (2014, p.  115), on the other hand, describes the capability approach as “fully universal”, with the purpose of the approach (in the liberal tradition of thought) being individualistic, since “respect of individuality has to be paramount, if the goals inherent in the capabilities  In general, a night-watchman state is ideal-typical understood as a state system whose tasks are essentially concentrated on the protection of the physical integrity of the individual and his or her property, while other societal subareas, such as the economy, are largely not subject to state regulation. 4

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approach are to be realized” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 207). In accordance with this idea of universality, which is aimed at the empowerment of the individual, Nussbaum lists, however not exhaustively, the central human abilities: 1. Life as an ability to “live to the end of human life of normal length” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 76), that is, not to die prematurely. 2. Physical health as the ability to feed oneself sufficiently, to be adequately housed and thus to have the basics to be in good health. 3. Physical integrity as the ability to move to another place, to be free from sexual and other violent assaults and so on. 4. Senses, imagination and thinking as the ability to explore the world based on appropriate education. 5. Feelings as “the ability to have attachments to things and people outside of ourselves” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 76), to be able to react to the emotions of others, and the ability “not to be hindered in our own emotional development by fear and anxiety” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 77). 6. Practical reason as the ability “to form own’s own personal conception of good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 77). 7. Belonging as the ability to lead a life together with others, full of mutual recognition, and the right not to be humiliated and to be recognized in one’s own dignity. 8. Respecting other species as the ability to live in harmony with the natural environment. 9. Play as the ability “to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 77). 10. Control over one’s own environment as the ability both to participate in political processes and to “hold property (both land and movable goods), and have property rights on an equal basis with others” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 77), to be protected from arbitrary searches, and to be able to derive recognition from one’s own work. The central difference between Rawls’ theory of justice and the capability approach is to be found in the basic theoretical structure: if Rawls

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conceives his theory of justice (as a contract theorist) in a proceduralist way, that is, if he designs a procedure and assumes that the results of this procedure (which he does not examine more closely) are just, Nussbaum formulates concrete criteria of justice (Nussbaum, 2014). Accordingly, Nussbaum emphasizes (2009, p. 155) that the skills approach is “a political doctrine about basic entitlements, not a comprehensive moral doctrine”. Since “real people often attend to the needs of others in a way that is narrow or arbitrarily uneven” Nussbaum (2009, p. 157) recommends (with which she stands, albeit with different justification, in the tradition of liberal theory and practice) the increase of education, because it can “do a great deal to make these ties deeper, more persuasive, and more evenhanded” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 157). The theory of ‘justice as fairness’ as presented is supported by Rawls (1993, p. 6) even as “an egalitarian form of liberalism” and by Fishkin (1983) as a position of “strong equality” in the fabric of liberal theories, under this term the concepts of Sen, Nussbaum and Dahrendorf can also be subsumed. Fishkin conceives three main ideas of liberal justice approaches, two of which exclude the third (Fishkin, 1983, 1988; cf. also Rivera López, 1995): 1. Merit: Social positions are to be distributed after fair assessment of the qualification. 2. Equal opportunities: The life-chances of the individual must not depend on the family origin. 3. Family autonomy: Parents are entitled to shape the education of their children according to their own ideas.5 The position of “strong equality” arises from the combination of the first and second of the three main ideas of the justice concept of liberalism. A further argument—based on the principle of substantial equality of opportunity—with respect to a redistributive tax policy aims, in Rawls’ view, at the contingent distribution of talent (Schaal & Heidenreich, 2006, p. 106; emphasis in original). Social inequalities in the distribution  The other two conceivable principles by combining two of the three ideals are called ‘meritocracy’ (principle of merit and principle of family autonomy) and ‘reverse discrimination’ (combination of the principles of family autonomy and equal opportunity). 5

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of economic goods resulting from unequally distributed contingent talents can be unfair, because no one is individually guilty of not having talents. The emerging inequalities are—Dahrendorf (2007a, p.  86). According to the report, it is tolerable “if and as long as they do not enable the winners to prevent others from participating fully in society or, in the case of poverty, to prevent people from exercising their civil rights”. Here a substantial difference between liberal and political world interpretation becomes apparent: liberals “assign equality a subordinate rank to liberty, socialist positions emphasize the principle of equality rather than the goal of their actions” (Knoll, 1981, p. 94). The maximization of life-chances has for Ralf Dahrendorf (1979, p. 131). The development of life-chances as a task of liberty is, as it were, the full exploitation of the potential of a society. Central element of Rawls’ concept of justice (Rawls, 1993, p. 9) is, as already mentioned, the approach of justice as fairness. This approach pursues a practical goal: “It [justice as fairness; author’s note] presents itself as a conception of justice that may be shared by citizens as a basis of a reasoned, informed, and willing political agreement.” This constellation of justice is based on a thesis characteristic of liberalism: the neutrality principle. It states that “the state should be neutral with respect to the various interests, preferences, goals, life plans and views of what is good” (Rivera López, 1995, p. 28; see also Bratu & Dittmeyer, 2019). The concept of justice presented here can be explained to Rawls (1993, p. 9) as an expression of “shared and public political reason” (characterize and are constitutively based on the principle of tolerance). The rational use of the human mind is—as Rawls (1993, p. 9) is given—when citizens “as free and equal in an intergenerational system of social cooperation – are prepared to offer each other fair conditions of social cooperation (defined by principles and ideals) and to agree on them if the others accept them and to act according to these conditions even if they occasionally suffer disadvantages”. Trust in the use of reason is constitutive for liberal approaches. This also applies to classical liberalism; a more detailed examination of the political philosophy of John Rawls can be found in Kersting (2006). Amartya Sen (2009, p. 46) explains this focus on reason in relation to emotional reactions: “Reasoning is a robust source of hope and confidence in a world darkened by murky deeds – past and present. It is not

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hard to see why this is so. Even when we find something immediate upsetting, we can question that response and ask whether it is an appropriate reaction ad whether we should really be guided by it.” The choice of fairness is also based on reason: fairness arises when fair conditions are reasonably recognized both by those who propose them and by those who receive them. This introduces the principle of reciprocity into the concept of political liberalism. Thus, rational action—according to the concept of justice as fairness—can be distinguished from rational action of (the model of ) homo oeconomicus: To install a system in which “everyone benefits together with others”, people are “unreasonable in the same basic aspect when they plan to engage in cooperative schemes but are unwilling to honor, or even to propose, […] any general principles or standards for specifying fair terms of cooperation” (Rawls, 1993, p. 50).

3.4.3 C  onflicts as an Opportunity for Development in Liberal Practice As has become clear in the previous sections, the struggle for life-chances is not without conflict, but the use of reason makes it possible to regulate conflicts. From Dahrendorf ’s perspective, conflicts—as long as they adhere to certain basic conditions—can certainly be understood as socially productive (Dahrendorf, 1957, 1968, 1969a, 1972, 1992; see also: Gratzel, 1990; Kühne, 2017, 2020; Kühne & Leonardi, 2020; Matys & Brüsemeister, 2012; Niedenzu, 1997). Dahrendorf develops his conflict theory, on the one hand, in contrast to Talcott Parsons’ (1991 [1951]) structural functionalism and, on the other hand, to a Karl Marxian (2014 [1872]) understanding of conflicts. Dahrendorf (1968, p. 238) sees the dilemma of Parsons’ theory as “how the element of movement, conflict and change can be reintroduced into its models at the level of analytical abstraction, i.e. how theoretical analysis can do justice to the essentially processual character of social reality”. In this respect, structural functionalism can be said to have a basic conservative attitude, because it is critical of change (Dahrendorf, 1963, 1968, 1996b). He follows Karl Marx in his view that conflicts should in principle be understood as socially productive. As a liberal, however, Dahrendorf is fundamentally

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critical of Marx’s understanding of society and the way in which conflicts are understood as productive (Dahrendorf, 1952, 1961, 1968, 1969b, 1972). The road to communism is a “work of natural forces or divine providence” (Dahrendorf, 1952, p. 13) in the form of (bloody) revolutions. Dahrendorf rejects both communism, because it (as a classless society) lacks the conflict to develop society (and individuals), and the view that fundamental social conflicts must be resolved by revolutions, because they claimed (too many) lives (a motive that is also repeatedly found in Karl Popper [Popper, 2011 {1947}, 2019 {1987}] a formative teacher of Dahrendorf [see Dahrendorf, 2002; Kühne, 2017; Meifort, 2017]). Conflicts can only be productive for Dahrendorf if they are bloodless. Moreover, Dahrendorf (1968, p. 289) rejects the notion of an “oppressed class” as reductionist. In contrast to Parsons and Marx, Dahrendorf continues to develop his understanding of conflict theory by noting that changes are always possible in societies and every society knows conflicts. Change therefore can further develop societies. The challenge is to raise the productivity inherent in social, not individual, conflicts (Dahrendorf, 1961, 1966, 1972, 1996b). Dahrendorf sees the reason for social conflicts in the antagonism between the forces of persistence and those of progression (Dahrendorf, 1957, 1972, 1992, 1996b; Gratzel, 1990; Bonacker, 2009; Kühne, 2017, 2019a, 2019b). According to Dahrendorf (e.g. 1957, 1972), social conflicts are immanent in the pursuit, but also in the obstruction, of life-chances. In this respect Dahrendorf formulates (1979, p. 165) the task of liberals: “Liberals do not primarily represent social institutions, but they speak on behalf of the forces that keep these institutions going and drive them forward.” Dahrendorf (1972) differentiates social conflicts with regard to the dimensions ‘intensity’ and ‘violence’. ‘Intensity’ describes the social relevance: “[I]t is high if a lot depends on it for the participants, i.e. if the costs of defeat are high” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p.  38). The ‘violence’ of social conflicts also varies considerably: “War, civil war, generally armed conflicts endangering the lives of those involved probably denote one extreme; conversation, discussion and negotiation in all forms of politeness and, with open argumentation by those involved, the other. In between lies a variety of more or less violent forms of confrontation between groups—the strike, the competition, the bitterly conducted

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debate, the brawl, the attempt at outwitting each other, the threat, the ultimatum, etc., etc.” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p.  37; for this also Dahrendorf, 2004). The development of social conflicts is divided by Dahrendorf (1972) into three phases: 1. The ‘structural starting position’ describes the background of an emerging conflict. In this phase, ‘quasi-groups’ emerge, which are characterized by the fact that they each have—in certain contexts— the same, but still latent interests (here he constructs an analogy to Marx’s ‘class per se’). 2. The ‘awareness raising of latent interests’ is characterized by the manifestation of the different conflict parties. The ‘quasi-groups’ become aware of their interests, demands are made, programs are created and objectives are formulated (e.g. parties and trade unions; Dahrendorf, 1996a). 3. The ‘phase of defined interests’ is characterized by an increase in the degree of organization of the conflict parties “with a visible identity of their own” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p. 36). This phase is accompanied by a dichotomization of the conflict. Conflicts now manifest themselves accordingly as “open and visible” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p. 36) and can thus achieve ever greater social relevance. There are three principal ways of dealing with conflicts (Dahrendorf, 1972). First, the suppression of conflicts. In this case, since neither the object of conflict nor the cause of conflict is eliminated, Dahrendorf sees the obstruction of the formation and manifestation of conflict groups as reinforcing the causes of conflict. This increases the danger of a violent escalation of the conflict, so he rejects this possibility. Second, the resolution of conflicts. This refers to the elimination of the social antagonisms underlying the conflicts. However, he does not consider this to be feasible, since in every society there are relations of superiority and subordination, nor does he consider this desirable, since he sees social differences and conflicts as the essential basis for social development. Since a society would lose its dynamics, he also rejects this possibility. Thirdly, the

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settlement of conflicts, which he favors. The settlement of conflicts is again linked to four aspects (Dahrendorf, 1972): 1. The specific conflict, like social conflicts in general, must be recognized as normal and not as a state contrary to the norm. This means that it is recognized as legitimate that the opposing side also represents its position. 2. The regulation refers to the forms of conflict, not to its causes (which, as explained above, are immanent to society). The regulation thus refers to concrete objects of conflict and not to societal framework conditions. 3. The efficiency of the regulation is increased if the conflict parties are strongly organized within themselves. 4. Compliance with certain rules is a prerequisite for the success of a conflict regulation. The parties to the conflict must adhere to certain rules of procedure. This includes the recognition of the equal value of the parties to the conflict; the fundamental legitimation of the world view of the other conflict party; a principled willingness to compromise; and the existence of a third party not involved in the conflict who, in the event of an unsuccessful attempt to regulate the conflict, is legitimized to make a decision on further conflict regulation procedures. Dahrendorf understands conflict settlement, or the “rational taming of social conflicts”, as “one of the central tasks of politics” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p.  44). This ‘taming’ can take place on two levels: first, on the political level itself (i.e. for a democratic constitutional state, political conflicts are not solved with revolutions, but are settled by peaceful changes of government through elections), and secondly, in relation to society, where politics sets the framework for the non-political settlement of conflicts (Dahrendorf, 1972, 1990, 1992). For Dahrendorf, the ability to resolve conflicts without violence is closely tied to the form of rule of liberal democracy. Only liberal democracy makes it possible to transform social claims into political rule and not leave them in the general game of power. Dahrendorf specifies domination versus power (following Max Weber’s concept of power [1976

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[1922]], which is defined as an opportunity to assert one’s will even against resistance), as “an institutionalized permanent relationship of the exercise of power by a superior person or group of persons towards subordinate groups […], which would not be possible without a minimum of recognition and obedience […]” (Imbusch, 2002, p.  172; see also Dahrendorf, 1972). In addition, superiors are expected to control the behavior of the subordinate parts of society, since the effectiveness of rule is monitored by “a legal system (or a system of quasi-legal norms)” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p.  33). In the transformation from power to rule, Dahrendorf recognizes an advantage of liberal democracy, since the exercise of power is regulated by the control of force and legitimized by free, equal and secret elections (Dahrendorf, 1980, 1987, 2003b) because “Power is never good […]. But it is all the more bearable the clearer it is where the sources of initiative and where the sources of control lie” (Kreuzer et al., 1983, p. 69). This is where the above-mentioned third party not involved in the conflict is located, who can make decisions about further proceedings on topics of conflict.

3.5 O  n Contextualization: Non-liberal Systems of Ideas 3.5.1 Conservatism In principle, the system of ideas of conservatism—like that of liberalism—is based on rationality and Enlightenment; not affirming, but rather rejecting (cf. Greiffenhagen, 1971; Schoeps, 1981; Lenk, 1989). However, such a position of conservatism is quite a dilemma: without Enlightenment, rationalism and liberalism, it would not have required the formulation of the system of ideas of conservatism and it is thus constitutively bound to the appearance of progressive, Enlightenment thinking, which it rejects (Greiffenhagen, 1971; Trepl, 2012). The values represented by conservatism, such as religion, family and people, were not formulated as such until the Enlightenment began to question what was taken for granted, especially traditions. A further dilemma of

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conservatism is the adoption of the Enlightenment logic of argumentation, which it felt compelled to use in order to defend what was actually self-­evident. It had to make use of reflective reason, as is characteristic of the Enlightenment (Schoeps, 1981; Lenk, 1989). Early conservatism (associated with the names of Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre and Karl Ludwig von Haller, among others) developed in rejection of the ideas and practices of the French Revolution, with which it associated a radical de-­traditionalization combined with the dissolution of a Godordained social order: it “arose as a response to the French Revolution […]. It is a response to the dissolution of the corporative society; it is a response to secularization, and it is a response – last but not least – to progressiveness, to the pathos of the new and the absolute new beginning. Against these traits of a revolutionary break with the past, it asserts what must be preserved. Conservatives are concerned about the costs of modernity. They are in favor of modernity, be it radical or moderate opposition. In any case, conservatism is no less modern than that which gave rise to it” (Ottmann, 2008, p. 1; emphasis in original). In comparison to liberalism and socialism, the definition of conservatism is more difficult, since it lacks certain general defining characteristics “which apply to the structure and goals of this political movement” (Schoeps, 1981, p. 11). Basically, it takes a critical position on progressive ideas whenever social upheavals have formed and are forming (Schoeps, 1981). Traditional patterns of action are called into question. Identity, here in the notion of an ‘evolved form’, has since the beginning been an essential element of conservatism, from which it derives its strength “against the universality of the Enlightenment” (Furedi, 2018, p.  14). According to Mannheim (1984 [1927]; cited after Ottmann 2008, p. 3), the following can be paraphrased as “general characteristics of conservatism … the preference of the concrete over the abstract, of the past over the present and the future, of the individual case over the system, of the grown over the made, of the concrete house over its ground plan” but, as Ottmann immediately adds, “in view of the diversity of conservative movements, there can be no clear definition of conservatism.” Not only is conservatism conceptually elusive, it is also historically difficult to identify and locate. This is also due to the fact that it is partly present in mixed form with socialist or liberal ideas and movements. In

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view of this, there have been attempts at systematization. The historian Epstein (1973 [engl. Original 1966]) proposed an ideal typology with three forms of conservatives: status-quo conservatives, reform conservatives and reactionaries (cf. Ottmann, 2008, p.  2; Schoeps, 1981, pp.  36–37). Accordingly, the “status-quo conservatives are unhistorical and have a static understanding of the world. They refer to eternal principles of a supposedly ‘natural’ society. The reform conservative is convinced of the inevitability of historical change and advocates reform. The reactionary, on the other hand, wants to return to an earlier social and historical situation. He assumes a ‘natural order’ and opposes the existing society” (Schoeps, 1981, p. 37). Ottmann (2008, p. 2 f.) takes up this typology in part, proposing a classification of four types of nineteenth-­ century conservatism, and assigns well-known philosophers and writers to these types: 1. ‘Liberal conservatism’ (or ‘reform conservatism’) and its important representative Edmund Burke (1730–1797) with his major work Reflections on the Revolution in France (1991 [1790]); Friedrich von Gentz (1764–1832), who translated Burke into German; as well as Ernst Brandes (1758–1810), August Wilhelm Rehberg (1757–1836) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). 2. The ‘Romantic Conservatism’ and its main representative Adam Müller (1779–1829) with his main work Die Elemente der Staatskunst (1936 [1808/09]); Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) with On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (2013 [1840]) and Past and Present (1966 [1843]); Franz Xaver von Baden (1765–1841), Novalis (1772–1801), Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829), Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881), Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) and François René de Chateaubriand (1768–1848). 3. The ‘Counter-revolutionary Conservatism’ and its main representative Joseph Marie Comte de Maistre (1753–1821) with Considerérations sur la France (1991 [1795]), Louis Gabriel Ambroise, Vicomte de Bonald (1754–1840), Juan Donoso Cortés (1809–1853) and Carl Ludwig von Haller (1768–1854). 4. ‘Social conservatism’ and its main representative Lorenz v. Stein (1815–1890) and his main work The history of the social movement in

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France from 1789 to the present day (1850), Adolph Wagner (1835–1917), Hermann Wagener (1815–1889), Victor Aimé Huber (1800–1869) and Carl Rodbertus-Jagetzow (1805–1875). In the twentieth century, a ‘conservative revolution’ between the First and Second World Wars (cf. Ottmann, 2010, Chapter IV) and ‘conservative thinking’ after the Second World War (cf. Schoeps, 1981) can be distinguished and described. The ‘conservative revolution’ was also called ‘young conservatism’ in contrast to the ‘old conservatism’ of the nineteenth century (Petzold, 1978). Within the framework of the traditional ‘left-right scheme’, instead of ‘right or left’, it should henceforth be ‘right and left’: “The conservative idea of preservation is combined with a revolutinism that is supposed to create the conditions worth preserving first and foremost” (Ottmann, 2010, p.  144). Thus “right-left reversals [emerge], which confound the usual understanding of conservatism and the usual political vocabulary” (Ottmann, 2010, p.  202)—similarly Sieferle (1999) reconstructs such interchanges between ‘conservatives’ and ‘progressives’, Reckwitz (2017) thematizes the overlaying of the traditional left-right distinction by that of cosmopolitans and communitarians. Although occasionally described as ‘pre-fascist’ (Petzold, 1978), “sweeping judgements that simply equate the Conservative Revolution and National Socialism do not do justice to historical reality” (Ottmann, 2010, p.  203). German philosophers and writers are especially “the uncrowned kings of the Conservative Revolution” (Ottmann, 2010, p.  145), such as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (1876–1925), Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), Hans Freyer (1887–1969), but also writers like Thomas Mann (1875–1953) and Ernst Jünger (1895–1998). Carl Schmitt (1888–1995) should also be mentioned in this context. Conservative thinking after the Second World War is confronted with two fundamental difficulties (see Schoeps, 1981, pp. 34ff.): on the one hand, with the accusation of final discreditation by the experiences with fascism and National Socialism, in so far as conservatism and fascism and National Socialism are no longer distinguishable; on the other hand, with the question of whether and how conservative thinking is currently still possible and practically realizable at all. In Germany, for example, Joachim Ritter (1903–1974), Hermann Lübbe (*1926), Helmut Schelsky

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(1912–1984), in the USA, for example, Leo Strauss (1899–1973) and representatives of communitarianism (cf. Ottmann, 2012, pp. 320ff.) are worth mentioning. The ideal of a conservative order of human coexistence lies in a (initially local to regional) community, associated with a functional and obligatory connection of people with each other, but also with the nature that shapes them (Greiffenhagen, 1971; Schoeps, 1981; Lenk, 1989; Voigt, 2009b; Kühne, 2015b). This connection is often described with the metaphor of the ‘organism’, meaning “the individuals, like organs in the organism, serve the whole, in their respective place” (Trepl, 2012, p. 141). The spatial scale of this unifying reference of space and society was even extended to the national level at the beginning of the twentieth century, as Ute Wardenga (2001, p. 20) illustrated on the basis of work by the geographer Otto Maul. The state was accordingly “not merely seen as a form of distribution of a social, legal or economic institution” (Wardenga, 2001, p. 20), but rather a linkage of “space concept and state concept” in which the state was defined as a “spatial organism” (Wardenga, 2001, p. 20). Conservatism, as its name suggests (in Latin konservare is to preserve), considers tradition the central idea; it serves as a framework of order, orientation and reference for collective action, to which individual action must be normatively related. For in contrast to liberalism, which places the interests and life-chances of the individual at the center of its considerations, conservatism understands society, but especially community, as an expression of a superior order, which is why it rejects the contractual thinking of liberalism (Schoeps, 1981). Thus, the preservation of a historically grown diversity is superior to legal equality (i.e. injustice of opportunity is also tolerated). Thus, in contrast to the liberal right to expression of opinion, conservatism also believes that one “does not argue with every person about what is right in order to convince him, but takes a paternalistic attitude towards [those] who ‘would not understand it after all’” (Trepl, 2012, p. 145). Liberalism, on the other hand, rejects such a paternalistic position of carrying out actions against the will of people, even if we think that these actions are beneficial to the situation of the people concerned. A paternalistic position—from a liberal point of view—ultimately means nothing else but the absolutization of one’s own

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position (defined as superior) (see also Sen, 2012). From a liberal perspective, Isaiah Berlin (1995 [1969], p.  217) rejects paternalistic positions outright when he states (in the tradition of Kant), “Paternalism is the worst despotism – because it treats men as if they were not free, as if they were for me, the well-meaning reformer [or the conservative community moralist; author’s note], material to shape according to my purposes, not theirs.” In accordance with the paternalistic attitude of conservatism, the “decoupling of the executive branch from the broad political decision-­ making process is favored, in general a reduction of those democratic principles that raise the level of legitimacy too high” (Habermas, 1985, p. 34). Since—as already outlined—in conservatism the position of the individual is anchored in the community, the powerful—according to paternalistic logic—is authorized to decide on the concerns of the inferior. Susan Fainstein (2010, p.  31) points out in this context that the construct of ‘false consciousness’ is not “a leftist concept alone”, but is also attributed by conservatives to the masses. But the consequence drawn from this is different from that of liberalism or socialism: if liberalism is concerned with supporting people through education on their way to transforming themselves into responsible citizens (under different auspices and different influences this also applies to socialism, but more on this later), then conservatism demands the ‘management’ of the masses (see also Fainstein, 2010). The concept of liberty is understood differently by conservatism than liberalism, in which the individual realization of the chances in life to be maximized is at the center of the considerations: “Liberty means […] the adaptation to the higher order of the whole” (Kötzle, 1999, p. 23). The individual is thus tasked with responsibility integrating himself and his individuality “[in]to the higher order of the whole” (Kötzle, 1999, p. 32). This conservative understanding of the position of the individual with his abilities and talents in a society becomes obvious in the formula of the ‘suum cuique’ (‘to each his own’), which was already introduced into the discussion by Plato—in the context of a discussion of justice. In the ‘Politeia’, Plato defines justice in that “each one does his own thing”, namely in such a way that “each one must do only one thing of what belongs to the state, to which his nature is most apt” (Platon, 2013 [ca.

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410/411 before our calendar—348/347 before our calendar], 433 a-b). A technical term for this understanding “is ‘idiopragy’, ‘doing one’s own thing’. In Plato’s view, its opposite is ‘multi-touching’ or ‘meddling’ (polypragmosyne) or ‘stranger-doing’ (allotriopragmosyne)” (Ottmann, 2001, p.  37). Plato’s ‘idiopragy’ also contradicts democracy. For in democracy “everyone does everything. It is the arbitrary multiplicity (polypragmosyne), which for Plato is a sign of dilettantism and incompetence” (Ottmann, 2001, p. 62). The ‘higher order’ mentioned is usually of religious origin, an understanding that is diametrically opposed to the liberal-secular concept of society (Habermas, 1985). Thus, liberalism is characterized by the defense of individual liberties against authorities (especially state authorities, but also religious authorities). The need to justify the bundling of political power is inversely related to conservatism; conservatism regards authorities—often religiously based (Schoeps, 1981)—as guarantors of the preservation of the community, which means deviations from traditional social norms are regarded as needing justification. So-called secondary virtues such as diligence, discipline, obedience and cleanliness are given special significance in conservatism. In this context, the conservatism of European and US-American tradition differs with respect to the importance of the state: the conservatism of European provenance, which attributes great importance to the notion of the state as the guardian of stability and the guarantor for the maintenance of common norms and values, is rejected in the US-American conservative tradition. Here a restriction of the state to a few ‘core tasks’ is demanded (cf. Habermas, 1985). Conservatism has an epistemological affinity to essentialism; conservatism is concerned with preserving the ‘essence’ of whatever and whoever, ranging from ‘people’ to ‘villages’ to ‘landscapes’. In the spatial-planning context, the reference point of conservative action manifests itself in the construction of normatively understood ‘idiosyncrasies’ of landscapes, often still in the understanding of a landscape ideal of a cultural landscape of the mid-nineteenth century, as required, for example, by the Federal Nature Conservation Act (Eisel, 1997; Kühne, 2011; Vicenzotti, 2011; Trepl, 2012; Hauser, 2013). At the same time, (neo)conservatism “overburdens democracy with its religiously motivated moralization of politics in an essentialist manner” and “with its organic image of society,

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skeptically meets the contingency claim of political democracy” (Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p. 98). From this perspective, Landscape 1 should be an expression of its underlying essence, a kind of super-­ organism in which everything is in its assigned place, but not the result of competing economic interests or political negotiation processes.

3.5.2 Socialism The different concepts of socialism emerged in continuation of the ideas of the French Revolution, as well as the rejection of liberalism and conservatism in the nineteenth century (Bärsch, 1981). The theories and doctrines summarized under the term socialism define a “primacy of ‘society’ and ‘the social’ respectively” (Bärsch, 1981, p. 170), over the individual, to whom liberalism gives priority, but also over the ‘evolved community’, which in turn is given priority by conservatism. In accordance with socialism’s orientation toward a life in society, which is conceived of as a ‘wholeness’, it rejects the privileging of individuals on the basis of their pursuit of profit (Bärsch, 1981). In contrast to conservatism, socialism has a basic progressive to revolutionary attitude. From classical socialism according to Marx (2018 [1867]), which under dictatorship of the proletariat demands collectivization of the means of production, one can distinguish communism, which in the now classless society “wants to transfer the means of production as well as consumer goods into common property (distribution of goods)” (Bärsch, 1981, p. 172; see also Fainstein, 2010), since the utilitarian application of private property leads to a restriction of mutual freedom in a society: “The human right of private property is thus the right to enjoy one’s property arbitrarily (à son gré or as one pleases) and to dispose of it without reference to other people, independently of society, and in the right of self-­ interest. This individual freedom, as well as this use of it, is the basis of civil society. It lets every person find in the other person ‘not the realization, but rather the barrier of his liberty’” (Marx, 2006 [1839–1844], p. 365; emphasis in original). However, Aron (2016 [1968], p. 148) criticizes that this position gives the worker “no additional liberty at all”, since he is now subject not to the will of an entrepreneur, but to a

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collective, however defined, whose exercise of power can be influenced to a similarly small degree. A paternalistic attitude—which, as shown, rejects liberalism—is to be found not only in conservative but also in socialist world views, where the masses are to be led to a ‘just society’ by a ‘revolutionary elite’: “What led them [‘the revolutionary elite’; author’s note] was the conviction that it was their task to liberate the exploited and oppressed” (Becker, 2013, o.S.). The idea of achievement is also inherent in the socialist understanding of education, which is fundamentally different from the educational ideal of the liberals: “The liberals want to stylize the worker as a bourgeois, to integrate him into the linguistic, political and spiritual traditions of the bourgeoisie, while the socialists seek to establish class solidarity and class consciousness, also politically, by means of education” (Knoll, 1981, p. 92). It is a matter of replacing the ‘wrong’ consciousness with a ‘right’ one through educational processes. This seems necessary from a socialist perspective, since the contradiction between the individual and society, according to Marx—to which the history of socialism ‘leads’ and from which it ‘goes away’—is not only a matter of the individual but also of the society—which must be resolved (Bärsch, 1981). For, according to Marx, “[i]n the previous surrogates of the community, in the state, etc. personal liberty existed only for the individuals developed in the conditions of the ruling class, and only in so far as they were individuals of that class. The apparent community, into which the individuals were hitherto united, always became independent in relation to them, and, at the same time, since it was a union of one class in relation to another, for the dominated class not only a quite illusory community, but also a new shackle. In the real community the individuals, in and through their association, attain their liberty at the same time” (Marx, 1990b [1845–1846], p. 74f.). The underlying principle of justice is essentially the communist one: each according to his abilities, each according to his needs. Since this principle of justice—due to ‘man acting selfishly through capitalism’—is not yet realized, its fulfillment lies in the future. Socialism—in contrast to liberalism, which does not formulate any social objective—starts teleologically from a state to which society should develop. Thus Marx (1990b [1845–1846], p. 181) assumes that “an oppressed class […] is the condition of life of any society based on class opposition. The liberation of the

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oppressed class, therefore, necessarily implies the creation of a new society.” Accordingly, it was not surprising “that a society founded on class antagonism boils down to the brutal contradiction, to the clash of man against man, as the final solution” (Marx, 1990a [1846–1848], p. 182). This is critically characterized by Ralf Dahrendorf (1987, p. 83) as “key to thinking of the left”, here especially the (neo)Marxist left, which is characterized by the “dream of a qualitatively different world, socialism”, which leads to a lack of willingness to accept “gradual changes as relevant. In this respect, at least, the Marxist left has remained true to its master and his Hegelian entanglements.” Popper (2018 [1984]) rejects the attempt to understand Marxism as a science with reference to the teleology of Marxism: the process of scientific knowledge is characterized by openness to results and is not part of a predetermined social development path (similarly Dahrendorf, 1987, 1990). Thus, for example, in the “proclamations and writings of the state-official ‘scientific’ socialism, the praise of a policy is often sung, which is freedom-oriented, since it follows the insight of necessity” (Schink, 2017, p. 29). Inherent in the utopian thinking of Marxism is the ambition to “create and transform society from the bottom up, to merge it with the state and the economy” (Ackermann, 2007, p.  9). Its determinism requires the creation of a ‘new man’, this new “collective man” (Ackermann, 2007, p. 9) then beckons his “just share in the historical hereafter” (Ackermann, 2007, p. 9). Linked to this revolutionary paradigm is the thesis of the ‘self-destruction’ of capitalism, according to which “the market economy has always carried within itself the causes of its own demise” (Herzog, 2013, p. 109). The driving force of social development in Western societies is the ‘profit interest’. Central to the analysis of “the industrial society of private property […] [is] the hypothesis of the crises of capitalism, especially the crises of impoverishment” (Bärsch, 1981, p. 191), which is due to the exploitation of workers. According to this view, every market fluctuation, every spatial concentration and deconcentration process, every structural change, 9/11, and most recently the Corona pandemic, is interpreted as an “expression of the death struggle of terminally ill capitalism” (this, among others, in Harvey, 2005; a pattern of interpretation, which, by the way, is also used by conservatives in a similar way, but with different consequences; cf. Herzog, 2013). Even reformist socialist efforts

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are accordingly described as “management and manipulation of the capitalist crisis” (see, e.g. Harvey, 2005, 2013). According to (neo)Marxist-oriented scholars, liberal democracy is held hostage to capitalist interests, while state institutions are instruments of economic elites (e.g. Agnoli, 1968). Freedom of will is described as “an ideological ‘fog’ in the human brain” (Recki, 2009, p. 29), which serves to pacify the exploited masses. Socialism’s understanding of liberty is fundamentally different from liberal (and also conservative) socialism: the achievement of ‘civil liberties’ (the right to vote, liberty of speech, liberty of association, etc.) is incomplete as long as people are economically obliged to sell their labor in markets (Harvey, 2009; Misik, 2012). Rather, “the value measured by labor time is necessarily the formula of modern slavery of workers” (Marx, 1990a [1846–1848], p.  84). In advanced industrial societies, “rights and liberties which were such vital factors in the origins and earlier stages of industrial society […] gave way to a higher stage of that society” and were “losing their traditional rationale and content” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 3) . These liberties are “essentially critical ideas” and “[t]o the degree to which freedom from want, the concrete substance of all freedom, becomes a real possibility, the liberties which pertain to a state of lower productivity lose their former content. Independence of thought, autonomy, and the right to political opposition are being deprived of their basic critical function in a society which seems increasingly capable of satisfying the needs of the individuals through the way in which it is organized. Such a society may justly demand acceptance of its principles and institutions, and reduce the opposition to the discussion and promotion of alternative policies within the status quo” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 4; emphasis in original). This focusing of the debate on liberty of economic issues to the detriment of political ones is, according to Honneth (2015), the burden of socialist theory. Dahrendorf (1983) critically characterizes the neo-Marxist understanding of the world and especially of economics in three ways: 1. The economy will be “as a cow that can be milked almost without limit” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 56) where it is considered possible “that an economy steered by the community in terms of the volume and

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direction of production will guarantee more welfare for all” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 56). 2. This intention is associated “with a decided preference for small, decentralized units” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 56) which in the current interpretation of socialism can also have experimental features (see Honneth, 2015), which represents a clear demarcation from state socialism. 3. This position is connected with a “deep hope of solidarity” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p.  57), that is, the idea that “people will behave differently under certain social conditions than they do under the prevailing circumstances” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 57). The idea of a ‘solidary egalitarian society’ is contrasted with ‘capital’, an omnipresent, all-pervading and ruthless power (for it is always spoken of in the singular), not individual and collective actors acting in the market according to convictions and individual preferences. Here a dichotomous world is constructed which follows the Hegelian roots of Marxism, but in a pluralized world (for non-Marxists) this has something at least anachronistic about it (i.e. detractors could also speak of conspiracy theory). The attitude of (neo)Marxist authors toward liberalism is a negative one, and at the same time, following Dahrendorf, also a one-sided one (due to the history of ideas): “It is focused on the economic dimension; it is precisely the political dimension that is ignored, or regarded as subordinate to economic interests.” Thus they are also unable “to recognize the extension of citizenship rights as one of the dramatic changes of the modern world, […] which meant a radically new step in the creation of life-chances” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 87). Instead, the (neo)Marxist side argues that this extension of rights was merely “created as a basis for the exploitative capitalist contract of labor”, with the aim of “buying the revolutionary guts out of the worker’s movement” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p.  87). This is an argumentation that can hardly defend itself against accusations of essentialism, because here one speculates about the true ‘essence’ of the democratic market economy system, which lies solely in ‘capitalist profit maximization’. An argumentation that also applies to Edward Soja (2007, p. 87 f.) becomes clear when he points out that the task of Marxist geography is “to search beneath the superficial appearance

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of the phenomena (spatial results) in the structured and structuring social relations of production for the underlying roots”. Schipper (2013, p. 21, emphasis by authors) accuses—in an essentialist use of the term—a ‘neoliberal urban policy’ of seeing “the city by its very nature as a competitive unit in a global space of competition”. Connected with this is the claim of (neo)Marxist geography “to have given the introverted ghetto of modern […] geography a new Marxist […] form” (Soja, 2007, p. 87). For— according to the common argumentation—“bourgeois theory […] lacks insights in relating urban developments to macroeconomic disruptions” (Harvey, 2012, p. 35). The attitude of many (neo)Marxist academics is criticized by Ralf Dahrendorf as, throughout their life’s employment, they could afford “to belittle the world that pays them” (1987, p. 90) while maximizing their reputation among colleagues. The claim goes beyond ‘belittling’ in that the academic neo-Marxist ‘elite’ is ascribed the function of accelerating social change: “In this sense, for the [neo-Marxist; author’s note] radical geography, the central political goal of scientific work still lies in overcoming the ‘unjust’ system and creating a socially just world” (Reuber, 2012, p. 114; emphasis in original). In accordance with this awareness of being on the ‘good’ side of the ideological spectrum, (social) scientists are required to make a commitment: “Whose side are you on, whose common interests do you seek to protect, and by what means?” (Harvey, 2012, p. 71). Such a preoccupation with the world takes place from the perspective of one’s own moral superiority, as Strenger (2015, p.  41) points out, “The left had seen the light and was now ready to relentlessly denounce the corruption of the West from a Marxist perspective.” As a result of the inconsistency of socialist positions, three socialist currents can be distinguished: first, reform socialism, which seeks to lead a socialist world order to a socialist state through gradual changes in the social world; second, revolutionary (neo)Marxism, which rejects a gradual transition and instead strives for a radical overthrow of the social system; and third, real socialism (or state socialism), which in numerous states of East Central and Eastern Europe endeavored to implement the idea of socialism within state action until the system transformation of 1989/1990. Aron (2016 [1968], p. 65) underlines the contradictions of real socialism with Lenin’s formula ‘communism is electrification plus

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soviets’: “The Soviets were sacrificed to electrification, then the peasants to industrialization, then the consumer needs of an entire people to the primacy of heavy industry.” The position of Neo-Marxism, on the one hand, sets itself apart (as ‘Western Marxism’) from the developments of real socialism; on the other hand, it rejects the idea that society develops quasi-deterministically through revolution to the state of socialism/communism. Particularly influential for the Neo-Marxist spatial sciences is the work of Henri Lefebvre (e.g. 1972), which demanded the expansion of social and the restriction of individual powers to the availability of the city.

3.6 A  Comparison of Political World View Concepts in Terms of Space and Landscape Based on the prior presentation of the essential tenets of mainstream political world views, their implications for spatial development in general, and landscape development in particular, will be examined below (see also Kirchhoff & Trepl, 2009; Voigt, 2009a, 2009b; Kirchhoff, 2011, 2019b; Kühne, 2011, 2015b, 2019c; Vicenzotti, 2011; Trepl, 2012). Already the words space, region and development are subject to diverging interpretations. For conservatism, a region (often interpreted in terms of the entire landscape) is associated with essential ‘qualities’. These regions should be developed in the sense of the preserving their ‘own character’, whereby a region’s historical condition becomes the basis for measures taken by the community or the state. Socialist understandings of space and region show (especially in real socialism) a particular affinity toward positivism (Delorme, 1990; Kühne, 2003), on whose assumptions the centrally regulated control is based. Current neo-Marxist approaches are based more on constructivist approaches (e.g. Swyngedouw & Heynen, 2003). Development is not measured by historical conditions, as in conservative approaches, but by the goal of an egalitarian society. In the liberal world view, as well as the positivist tradition of thought, region can be understood as an empirical unit. This can be distinguished from others

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on the basis of measurable variables. Due to its strong focus on the individual, liberal approaches (e.g. following Sen, 2012) also clearly refer to constructivist understandings of space. In liberal understandings of the world, development is usually equated with social (in the sense of expanding liberty and opportunities) or economic ‘progress’. Although both liberal and socialist understandings of the world share an optimism about the future, they differ in terms of how the ‘better future’ is shaped. Socialism has a basic teleological orientation, while liberalism trusts that individual decisions lead to the maximization of liberty, prosperity and opportunities. Development thus becomes a procedural search process rather than a planning process. While classical liberalism trusts in the self-directing powers of regional development and thus rejects political intervention, life-chances liberalism considers this intervention opportune if it maximizes the life-chances of its inhabitants to create equal opportunities between inhabitants of different regions (Kühne, 2011, 2015a). Socialist understandings of the world assign the state the central function of reducing regional differences (Buchhofer, 1989; Domański, 1997; Degórska, 2007; Czepczyński, 2008; Kühne, 2018g). Political intervention makes sense in terms of a conservative world view, in order to enforce the regional target state, which is defined by the historical. The normative teleology of socialist and conservative approaches to space contradicts the individualistic basic attitude of liberalism: regions (depending on the point of view, also landscapes and general spaces) are the result of the competition of individual interests (classical liberalism), in life-chance liberalism also of the state’s efforts to establish equal opportunities (e.g. the “equalization of opportunities” principle; Michaeli, 2008; Kühne, 2011). Liberals thus reject—in the tradition of Isaiah Berlin (1995 [1969])—political ideals (whether conservative or communist) to “discover a final harmony that is valid for all people at all times and everywhere” (Jahanbegloo, 2007, p. 126 f.). In line with this basic stance, there are no ‘finally harmonious’ landscapes or spaces for liberals to strive for. We will illustrate the different (normative) concepts of space with the help of an example—a space created according to Fordist calculations (see Ipsen, 2006), characterized by large fields, functionalist architecture,

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efficient and thus large infrastructure facilities, and so on (see Fig. 3.1), is judged very differently by the differing political world views as follows: • In classical liberalism, they are considered the result of individual purpose-­rational decisions and are judged to be an appropriate use of space, since they are understood as an expression of efficient land use. • From the perspective of life-chances liberalism, this same assessment can initially be followed. Only when the Fordist structuring of space produces inequities of opportunity does state intervention appear necessary. One example is the decline in soil fertility as a result of dominant corn cultivation. This reduces the life-chances of the people in the region in the long term, which is why state intervention would be justified. • Although based on a different logic of economic management, the state-socialist economic system is immanent in the construction of

Fig. 3.1  An example of Fordist agriculture based on the use of economies of scale, here under the extensive use of water resources, in California. (Photo: Olaf Kühne)

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large units, since these are easier to subject to central control than numerous small units. In this respect, the material manifestations of a state-socialist understanding of space are not dissimilar to those of a Fordist one (with the exception of housing construction, which leads to large housing estates and not to prefabricated house suburbs while making equal use of economies of scale; e.g. Juchnowicz, 1990, Lichtenberger, 1995, Kühne, 2003). • From a neo-Marxist perspective, small, communal economic units are favored (although here, too, similar to the state-socialist form, the focus is on urban development). • Fordist spatial influences are rejected from a conservative perspective. This rejection is based on several foundations: on the one hand, Fordism’s purpose-rational calculus is rejected (which is constitutive of classical liberalism, for example); on the other hand, it is based on a tendency—arising from its purpose-rationalism—toward globally similar solutions to spatial challenges (it is not without reason that the functionalist architectural style is also called ‘international style’). Correspondingly, the physical manifestations of this rational logic are regarded as an alien intervention in the historically evolved unity of ‘country and people’ (Ipsen, 1997, 2006; Kühne, 2005; Mitchell, 2005). Postmodern spatial developments are opposed to the world view systems mentioned above in a differentiated or even openly negative way, albeit for different reasons. From a socialist perspective, these developments (in particular the development of gated communities, shopping centers, in short, the differentiation of public and private sphere) are indicators of a differentiating, individualizing and ‘de-solidarizing’ society (among many, Soja, 2007; Belina, 2009), which is developing contrary to the communitarian-egalitarian ideal. As an alternative, common property is called for, both on medium (i.e. urban; e.g. in the form of cooperative building, such as Schipper, 2013, Schneider, 2016) as well as on a large scale (within buildings and even apartments, as in Maak, 2014) within postmodern spatial development. These phenomena are also rejected from a conservative world view, but because of the contradiction to the telos of the village community. Postmodern scenic productions are accordingly considered artificial and inauthentic. They are also

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interpreted in a differentiated way from the perspective of the liberal positions elaborated here: on the one hand, they are rejected as the result of a shift from a rational approach to the world to an emotionalized one (cf. Kühne, 2013, 2015b). On the other hand, they are also interpreted as physical manifestations of a pluralistic society. From the perspective of classical liberalism, they also symbolize an incentive to ‘belong through economic success’, while from the perspective of life-chances liberalism the implications in terms of equal opportunities are subject to critical scrutiny. From a liberal perspective, the privatization of security (as in gated communities) can be viewed critically. On the one hand, they symbolize the failure of the state to fulfill its core task of establishing internal security; on the other hand, to liberalism which is committed to justice of opportunity, they mean a restriction of life-chances. Different types of space are evaluated in different ways, and not necessarily unambiguously, by different understandings of the world (see e.g. Vicenzotti, 2011; Trepl, 2012; Kühne, 2015a). The liberal understanding of the world regards wilderness as a dangerous, pre-societal natural state of struggle, that is, a ‘space of harmful chaos’, which must be controlled by man. On the other hand, it is also connoted with constituting liberty—especially in US-American reading, wilderness becomes a symbol of proof of the abilities of the individual. Here, at the frontier, it matures into a free human being, acting in his own responsibility, free from all feudal fetters (see Pregill & Volkman, 1999; Kühne, 2012). Wilderness is thus valued as a “means of its own overcoming” (Vicenzotti, 2011, p. 110). Especially in classical-liberal texts, wilderness is understood as economically unproductive, an assessment that is to be countered by the ecosystem services approach (see also Grunewald & Bastian, 2013; Kühne, 2014; Kühne & Duttmann, 2019; Kirchhoff, 2019a). In socialism, on the other hand, wilderness is regarded especially as a symbol of the starting point of the development toward socialism/communism, which is marked by class conflicts, while in conservative thinking it is “understood as a sphere of drive. It is the temptation to resist what needs to be restrained and left behind” (Vicenzotti, 2011, p.  140; see also Kötzle, 1999). According to a conservative understanding of the world, wilderness is also considered a paradisiacal origin of the ‘unity of man and God’ as well as a symbol of ‘innocent youth’ that should not be disturbed.

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The different stages of the ‘urban land hybrid’ (Kühne, 2012), from metropolitan cores and urbanized former suburbs (URFSURBS; see Kühne et al., 2016; Kühne & Schönwald, 2015a, 2015b) to rural areas, are subject to different evaluation: cultural landscape—especially in its ‘narrow’ understanding as traditional rural landscape (Apolinarski et al., 2006)—is considered in the classical-liberal understanding of the world as “an advanced stage compared to the wilderness […], but still stands below the developmental stage of the city” (Vicenzotti, 2011, p. 116). Rural cultural landscape is accordingly interpreted as a “stage victory over the chaotic inner and outer nature” (Vicenzotti, 2011, p. 116). But it also connotes political, social and technical backwardness (Kühne, 2015b): here the target category of the traditional village community dominates over the urban society of free individuals (Plessner, 1924). In the city, man is able to try out different social roles in contrast to the limitedness of the communal relationships of the village, which is based on intimacy and familiarity. The city allows him to hide, to play and to discover himself through role-playing. Sofsky (2007b, p. 38 f.) goes so far as to describe the high “degree of integration of society”, such as that of a traditional village, as the “worst enemy […]” of liberty: “Everything private is public. Any violation of custom and etiquette is immediately registered” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 39). Isaiah Berlin (1995 [1969]) made a comparable diagnosis almost five decades ago in relation to the societal urge to conform: “Loyalties are tested more rigorously; skeptics, liberals, individuals who care about their private lives and their own standards of behavior easily become the object of fear or ridicule if they do not attach importance to identifying with an organized movement” (see also Dahrendorf, 1979). However, the spatial structures resulting from traditional land management can—from the perspective of classical liberalism—be understood as ‘historically evolved cultural landscape’ which can be an economically exploitable resource if it can be made usable, especially for tourism (such as ‘alpine pasture landscapes’ cf. Kühne et al., 2013). This rational component of the assessment of ‘traditional cultural landscape’ is diametrically opposed to the socialist understanding of the world, making the criticism of rural life all the more fundamental: Marx spoke of the ‘idiocy of rural life’, since he regarded the proletariat as the motor for the

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development of socialism (Ipsen, 1992). Correspondingly, the efforts of the states of ‘real existing socialism’ to organize the economy of rural areas in the form of large, collectively managed farms can be interpreted as the effort to achieve proletarianization through the industrialization of agriculture (Wellisz, 1964; Esser, 1998); the symbolic urbanization of agrarian areas extends to the construction of multi-story apartment buildings in prefabricated construction for the ‘agricultural workers’. While the perspective of life-chance liberalism shares the fundamental analysis of classical liberalism and socialism on traditional rural society and its spatial inscriptions, its implications are different; in the sense of its approach to equality of opportunity, the aim here is to develop the abilities of residents (see, e.g. Sen, 2000, Nussbaum, 2014; see further Sect. 6.5.8). The assessment of (rural) cultural landscapes from the perspective of conservatism is contrary to liberal and socialist views, since ‘historical cultural landscapes’ are regarded as “expression, ideal and symbol of successful cultural development” (Vicenzotti, 2011, p. 147). According to the essentialist understanding of landscape as a synthesis of local/regional nature and culture, the ‘historically grown cultural landscape’, which is always thought of as rural, becomes a ‘super-organism’ to which the individual has to contribute to perfect according to local traditions (Eisel, 2004; Rodewald, 2001; Vicenzotti, 2011; on the criticism of essentialism in detail: Popper, 2010). Thus ‘historically evolved cultural landscape’ becomes a “mirror of cultural history and place of cultural memory” (Vicenzotti, 2011, p. 154), the symbol of “social cohesion” (Vileniske, 2008, p. 435), and an expression of “a perfection that corresponds both to the nature of the community (folk character) and to that of the habitat” (Trepl, 2012, p. 156). They symbolize a different understanding of liberty than is inherent in liberal world views (see Chap. 3); free life is imagined here as “unadulterated and unaffected, close to its origin and therefore natural, and precisely for this reason a reasonable way of life” (Vicenzotti, 2011, p.  160). Home thus becomes an element of social integration as a “unifying effect of cultural traditions, values, and community experiences guarantee a collective sense of belonging” (Paris, 2005, p. 161f.).

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If, for a conservative understanding of the world, the (rural) cultural landscape with its ‘embedded traditional villages with their communities’ can be understood as the physical expression of a way of life to be aspired to, this also applies to the city from the perspective of classical liberalism as well as socialism, but with different understandings and normative connotations. From the perspective of classical liberalism, the city, as briefly mentioned above, becomes “the symbolic place of the state of society, that is, the place where the state of nature is overcome and entry into bourgeois society is accomplished” (Vicenzotti, 2011, p. 121). The warlike and natural state of wilderness (cf. Sect. 3.2), which is thus deemed detrimental to individual development, is not overcome here by a feudal and thus liberty-robbing relationship of dependency (as a spatial symbol: the ‘historically developed cultural landscape’); rather, the city becomes a spatial symbol of “the productive channeling of passions” (Vicenzotti, 2011, p. 122). The struggle for physical survival in the wilderness is channeled into a welfare-enhancing competition for economic capital. From the perspective of egalitarian life-chances liberalism, this interpretation that is shared only with reservations, since urban spaces are characterized by massive inequalities in the distribution of life-chances (see, among others, Kühne, 2012). This criticism of the modern, now postmodern, capitalist city is also shared by socialist, especially neo-Marxist, perspectives (see, among many, Belina, 2009; Fricke, 2018; Harvey, 1973, 2005, 2013; Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Weber, 2002), whereby the goal is not an equal distribution of opportunities in the urban context (and beyond), but rather the design of a city based on egalitarian principles (e.g. Juchnowicz, 1990; Lichtenberger, 1995; Kühne, 2001; Degórska, 2007; Czepczyński, 2008). Especially in neo-Marxist interpretations, the idea of the ‘right to the city’, as already discussed, “does not arise primarily out of various intellectual fascinations and fads” (Harvey, 2012, p. xiii), but rather it “primarily rises up from the streets, out from the neighborhoods, as a cry for help and sustenance by oppressed peoples in desperate times” (Harvey, 2012, p. xiii). In contrast, there is a world of gentrification winners, “in which the neoliberal ethic of intense possessive individualism can become the template for human personality socialization” (Harvey, 2012, p. 14). Correspondingly, the city becomes the venue for “the abolition of that class relation between capital and labor in production that

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permits the production and appropriation of surplus value by capital” (Harvey, 2013, p. 212). The ‘right to the city’ is accordingly not considered as an individual right (this would suggest a liberal interpretation), but is understood as “a collective right” (Harvey, 2012, p. 137). For this, the common argument goes, “alliances are needed between those who represent the world scientifically or artistically, with those who are culturally and materially excluded and deprived of their own representation on the other side” (Gebhardt & Holm, 2011, p. 22). Here a certain paternalism of the ‘revolutionary elites’ resonates. But how this “collective right to the city” by the alliance of “representatives and those deprived of representation” is to be operationalized remains largely undefined, as Harvey (2013) must also admit, since from a neo-Marxist perspective, not only the democratic-market city, but also the city of real socialism as well as reform socialism, is rejected. The approximate ideal is a neighborhood-­ based, democratically organized self-government (see, e.g. Schipper, 2013; Schneider, 2016). In contrast, conservatism considers the modern city—especially the big city—to be a place of ‘seduction’ (e.g. through love for sale), but it is also itself “imagined as a devoting, opening, devouring female figure” (Löw, 2008, p. 198). Accordingly, the modern metropolis is imagined as an expression of moral reprehensibility, unnaturalness and artificiality (see also Ipsen, 1992). The modern metropolis is associated on the one hand with the barbarism of the proletariat and on the other with the over-civilization of the bourgeoisie, both symbols of uprootedness, which is contrasted with the earthiness of life in the countryside (Vicenzotti, 2011; for the anglo-saxon area, Muir, 1998). This image of the modern metropolis is contrasted with the ideal image of the medieval city of manageable size, which is ‘organically’ integrated into the estate-organized society and is characterized by craft guilds (e.g. Spengler, 1950; critical to this Häußermann & Siebel, 2004). According to this understanding, the growth of cities into their surrounding areas is criticized as ‘urban sprawl’ and ‘uniformization of the landscape’. Not only are the settlement components and landscape concepts in ‘city-land hybrids’ interpreted differently from the perspectives of the world views studied, but ecological contexts are also subject to a strongly differing construction and normative association (e.g. Eisel, 1997;

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Vicenzotti, 2008, 2011; Voigt, 2009a, 2009b; Piechocki, 2010; Kühne, 2015b). In the ecological context, the view that “the individual organism is normally not dependent on a particular society” (Voigt, 2009a, p. 338) reflects the classic liberal concept of the “society of independent individuals” (Voigt, 2009a, p.  335). The individual competes with others for resources. Succession is accordingly constructed as an open-ended— rather than teleological—process: “Who interacts with whom and who uses which resource and how […] can change at any time, because it is always possible that individuals disappear from society and are replaced by new ones” (Voigt, 2009a, p. 339). Thus, the ecological paradigm of succession is connected with a classically liberal understanding of the world as a measure of affirmation. In the ecological context, the concept of life-chance liberalism means that, in addition to secessionist development, biotopes should also be preserved and developed that, in accordance with the development of space as a secondary consequence of economic activities in particular, would have no chance of preservation and development. This is particularly due to the precautionary principle for future generations. Here, a certain similarity to the socialist world view can be seen. On the one hand, no ‘intrinsic value’ is ascribed to ‘nature’, as in both liberal approaches, on the other hand—and here we find a similarity to the liberalism of life-chances—a politically motivated intervention in an ecosystemic context is considered justified in order to create equal environmental conditions for humans. According to a socialist world view—in contrast to the liberalism of life-chances—the optimism regarding the predictability of, in this case ecosystemic, developments is much stronger (Wellisz, 1964; Czepczyński, 2008). The conservative understanding of ecology is clearly different from the liberal and socialist—in each case future-optimistic (see Chap. 3)— understandings of the world. The understanding of an “organismic community” (Voigt, 2009a, p. 339) dominates the conservative (normative) construction of ecosystems: organisms alone could therefore “mutually enable their existence” (Voigt, 2009a, p. 340), resulting in a “functional wholeness” (Voigt, 2009a, p. 340) that evolves “from a juvenile to a climax stage” (Voigt, 2009a, p.  340). In accordance with the idea of the ‘unity of country and people’—already discussed above—the ‘preservation of historical cultural landscapes’ becomes the paradigmatic basis for

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normative spatial action. This preference documents the longing for simple, seemingly orderly traditional social conditions, characterized by minimal division of labor and a concentration of knowledge (Kühne, 2015b), as well as minimal individualization and a low possibility of realizing individual life-chances. However, instead of a teleologically understood equality, as in socialism, the determinant of the conservative image of society and space lies in birth. This defines social and spatial ‘identity’—cemented by land ownership or non-ownership—the leaves only few individual development opportunities open (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Such an understanding can be achieved with Hennecke (2010, p. 100). “If the possession of an esoterically determined ‘identity’ is propagated as an exclusion criterion for belonging to a community, this opens the door to social exclusion and even the introduction of racist values.”

3.7 A  Brief Summary of Differentiations and Contextualization A fundamental problem of real socialism (which Dahrendorf, however, does not describe as an accident of the socialist movement, but as its logical consequence; Dahrendorf, 1992) is the extension of economic rights to society. These economic rights can be bought, however, with the reduction of political participation opportunities and the reduction of economic options, as a result of the inefficiency of a centrally administered economy (similarly Aron [2016 [1968]). Conservatism grants rights as unequally as options, privileging those who already have rights and options (or their descendants), while classical liberalism maximizes rights and options for society as a whole, though these are also distributed extremely unequally. Liberalism, which is committed to maximizing life-­ chances, has the task here of increasing options and distributing entitlements in such a way that people are able to obtain opportunities and to weigh and decide between different options. The principle of equal opportunities thus combines personal responsibility with a reduced inequality of options. The struggle for life-chances is connected with conflicts. However, under certain framework conditions which are necessary

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to regulate them, these conflicts can be recognized as socially productive in principle. Legitimate state action is defined “along the demarcation line of ‘valuable/worthless’ options for action” (Bratu & Dittmeyer, 2019, p. 61) for humans, whereby it must not make the former and the latter impossible (Bratu & Dittmeyer, 2019). In the following, we will orientate ourselves along this traditional line of liberalism and understand liberalism as a political and social project in particular, in which the maximization of individual life-chances is in the foreground. In doing so, we will follow a more common interpretation of liberalism as found in the USA rather than in Central and Eastern Europe, both of which typify basic liberal liberties (such as civil rights or the separation of church and state), but which advocates a much stronger intervention in the market than is the case on the ‘old continent’ (see, e.g. Crouch, 2011). Just as the different world views differ fundamentally, so do their fundamental preferences with regard to (structural) spaces: while conservatism shows a preference for ‘rural cultural landscapes’ as an expression of a traditional community, socialism idealizes an economically leveled urban society. Even classical liberalism can gain much from urbanity as the spatial center of progress. With life-chances liberalism, however, opportunities (but also limitations) for the development of life-chances can be identified in all spatial categories. In the following chapters, the interpretations of life-chances liberalism regarding the development of space and landscape, as well as the resulting demands on the handling of space, will be outlined.

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4 Current Social and Spatial Developments

After having dealt with the characterization of life-chance liberalism in alternative world views and the different principal attitudes to arrangements of space, or Landscape 1, in the previous chapter, we will now deal with the processes of maximizing liberty through the process of modernization, and the various factors restricting liberty in the context of bureaucratization, increase of complexity of communication technologies and their moralization. In doing so, we will address the question of how to deal with contingencies, because “people are constantly exposed to impressions that allow different interpretations, appear unclear, make no clear sense, seem to contradict each other, trigger contradictory feelings, seem to suggest contradictory actions” (Bauer, 2018, p. 12).

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4.1 S  ocial Developments: From Maximizing Liberty to Increasing the Complexity of Political Processes 4.1.1 The Process of Social Liberty Maximization For centuries, before the modernization of society, the majority of people lived “in a constantly recurring cycle of poverty in a predominantly rural environment” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 192). The privileged few drew their wealth from the work of the many, to whom they owed a certain degree of responsibility (e.g. protection against external enemies). Life was an “endless repetition of birth and decay, summer and winter, hard work and simple pleasure” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 193). The modernization of society brought an improved food supply and better hygiene which, in addition to modern medicine, resulted in the reduction of physical pain and the extension of life expectancy, the latter also achieved “through modern reproductive methods” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 194). In addition, modernization brought a more extensive access to many of art, more privacy through personally used living space and political democracy with civil rights (see also Crouch, 2011). Modernization did not limit opportunities for social participation to just cities, but extended them to rural areas, and it also encompassed the liberty to practice religion: “The Catholic claims of organized religion had to give way. From the ruins of the world of absolute state, the Church alone and mercantilist rigidity rose society, not just any society, but civil society” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 230; Orig. emphasis). But the enforcement of the achievements of modernity—especially liberty—was not equally distributed spatially and socially: “In the 19th century, lack of liberty arose above all from the enormous imbalance between the workers who had to offer their labor and the factory and landowners who owned the capital” (Herzog, 2013, p. 72). As Strenger (2015, p. 35) points out, the Industrial Revolution was “not necessarily a boom in human rights”. Nevertheless, the process of modernization can be described as a process of increasing life-chances: options were created, “often enough by breaking up ligatures. Mobility means that the family and the village are no longer communities of destiny, but are increasingly

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becoming communities of choice” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p.  52). Despite difficult social conditions in the early phase, the modernization of society brought mass production, mass purchasing power and the availability of high-quality consumer goods, “especially for the lower middle class, including the upper working classes” (Aron, 2016 [1968], p. 49; see also: Dahrendorf, 1974, 1980, 1983b). In the sociological literature from the 1980s to the 2000s, there is almost unanimous agreement on descriptions and language creations that are embedded in the semantic network of liberty, pluralization, dynamization, growth, experiences, and so on, but also of loss and insecurity, such as de-traditionalization (Beck, 1986), fluid society (Barz et al., 2001) and hyper-differentiation (Noller, 1999). As a basis for these tendencies, the following socio-cultural developments in Germany and other parts of the world in the post-war period are mentioned (e.g. Dahrendorf, 1965; Beck, 1986; Honneth, 1994; Schulze, 2000): • The increase in income and non-working time has significantly expanded the individual’s scope for decision-making, while at the same time reduced the influence of class-specific living conditions. • With the expansion of the service sector, the opportunities for advancement have increased for large segments of the population, and a process of social mobilization has been set in motion. • The expansion of education has (potentially) increased career choices and improved opportunities for individual reflection processes. • The massive spread of new information and communication technologies, and the growing process of globalization as a reflection of the intensification of transport, communication and exchange relationships across national borders (cf. Habermas, 1998), are leading to increased social transformations and differentiations (see, e.g. Altvater & Mahnkopf, 1999; Barz et al., 2001; Crouch, 2004; Münch, 1995; Noller, 1999). As a result, the individual gained greater autonomy to determine his or her own life course. Accordingly, the current society can be described as a “liberty-growth society” (Kersting, 2009, p. 78). The increase in liberty— according to Kersting (2009) in a classic liberal interpretation—can be

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traced back to two developments: scientific and technical progress, which increases the power of control over nature, and the weakening power of institutions: “The influence of tradition, of conventional ways of life, on our own shaping of life is becoming increasingly weaker” (Kersting, 2009, p. 78). With an increase in liberty, both become associated with a growing need for decisions, which in turn “increases the burden of responsibility and justification” (Kersting, 2009, p. 78), also as it pertains to the (further) shaping of one’s own life. According to Schulze (2000), in the second half of the twentieth century in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), this resulted in a fundamental shift of the “normal existential problem definition” from an orientation toward survival to an orientation toward experience. This had considerable consequences for the structure of society: “Instead of uniform life, a variety of milieus and lifestyles have developed” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 20). One of the most prominent lifestyle typologies was established in the early 1990s by Gerhard Schulze (1992, 2000) with his concept of the “experience society”. Based on cultural-sociological analyses of West German society, he identifies personal enjoyment and the search for experiences as the new distinguishing and recognizing characteristics, and thus as an anchor of self-­location in our multi-optional society. According to his analyses, three everyday aesthetic schemata have manifested themselves in the cultural development of West Germany in the second half of the twentieth century: in the high culture schema, enjoyment lies in the consumption of defined cultural goods of high quality, also in order to make a distinction from everything “uncultivated”. The trivial culture schema distinguishes itself from the other schemata in that it has an orientation toward domestic coziness. Everything ‘eccentric’ is regarded as a deviation, and the foreigners and individualists are rejected, especially when they give the impression of wanting to highlight their idiosyncrasies. The tension schema consists in a narcissistically oriented philosophy of life, with the aim of distancing oneself from the conventional and orderly, and focusing primarily on extracurricular, experienceoriented leisure activities: “The relationship of individual people to everyday aesthetic schemata can be understood as a relationship of closeness or distance: one person seeks the schema, the other avoids it. The term is meant as a theoretical concept of order. It goes without saying that reality is less tidy” (Schulze, 2000, p. 129). According to Schulze, these

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three collective components of everyday aesthetics form the basis for the construction of social milieu types. They are the meaningful anchors from which ‘suitable’ options emerge and whose everyday aesthetic preferences, according to Schulze, lead to five statistical milieu patterns (Schulze, 2000): entertainment milieu, self-realization milieu, harmony milieu, integration milieu and level milieu. Schulze sees special significance in these milieus in that they give the individual members of a complex society indicators and rules of the game for structuring and simplifying the world on the basis of external lifestyle signs. By contrast, former social indicators of belonging that were specific to a particular social class began to recede. According to Schulze, a social dynamic of mutual incomprehension develops with the milieu space: “Caught in subjective worlds of medium range, social milieus are in a relationship of mutual incomprehension—not merely of superficial error caused by distortion of perception, but of fundamental incomprehension. People with incommensurable systems of interpretation, who try to interpret each other, do not even understand their incomprehension” (Schulze, 2000, p. 364). Not understanding leads to a selective communication and interaction density. The milieu-specific internal communication is significantly higher than between the milieus, since the then shared “order-giving notions of normality” (Schulze, 2000, p. 374) are missing. With Pierre Bourdieu (1987 [1979], p. 728) this can be justified: “As a kind of social sense of orientation (‘sense of one’s place’), as a practical ability to deal with social differences, namely, to feel or guess what is and what is not likely to come to a particular individual with a certain social position, and inseparably connected with this, what corresponds to him and what does not, taste directs individuals with a respective social position both to social positions tailored to their characteristics and to the practical actions, activities and goods that correspond to them, ‘fit’ them, as holders of such positions.” Thus, a lack of understanding between milieus is not only manifested in direct communication but is expressed above all in the neglect of communication and the resulting lack of opportunity to get to know and develop one another. According to the sociological concepts of milieus and lifestyles, the anchors of mutual attribution are not linguistic communication or concrete knowledge of attitudes and values per se, but the interpretation of values by means of

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symbolic signs. Accordingly, individuals interpret each other on the basis of observable everyday arrangements in the areas of performance (clothing, car type, consumer characteristics, etc.), situation (education, income, professional prestige) and thus infer the mentality (values, attitudes, life goals, world views)—and thus similarity and ‘belonging’. The dissolution of traditional ligatures thus takes place at all levels of society and thus also in the area of private life; even “marital partnerships today are fragile communities of happiness of their own value, without institutional external support, without social protection of tradition” (Kersting, 2009, p. 85). This also affects people’s economic situation: employment biographies are becoming increasingly diverse and fragmented, the number of ‘secure’ jobs in industry has shrunk with the de-industrialization of North America and Europe, and for more and more people, further training is an essential part of their working lives. However, this increase in liberties does not only mean a right to, but also a duty to, liberty which Keupp (2012) describes as a “risky opportunity”. In conjunction with the dissolution of general social norms, the increase in liberty can also lead to an increase in insecurity—or, as Sennett (1998)puts it, that what is to be done has become illegible in the flexible regime—which reaches deep into moral interpretations of the world (Bauman, 2009, p. 38): “Our time is one of profound moral ambiguity: it offers a liberty of choice never known before and at the same time traps us in an unprecedented state of ‘uncertainty’,” which in turn can grow into fear (cf. Bauman, 2009). Fear, in turn, restricts the ability to act rationally, as described in general terms by Norbert Elias (Elias, 1987, 1997 [1939]) as ‘emotional moodiness’: 1. The stronger the emotional mood, the less the person is able to plan actions rationally. 2. The less a situation appears to be controllable to an actor, the more he is influenced by emotions and affects. 3. The vaguer the knowledge about relevant aspects of a situation, the less controllable a situation appears to the person. 4. The lower the ability and possibility of a person in a situation to control and monitor his or her own thoughts, the less he or she is able to act appropriately in the situation.

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The transformation of feat into risk can be described as a strategy of trying to control uncertainty and fear (more generally, contingency), whereby fear is “sold back to us as technical solutions by politicians, medics, planners, the insurance industry, and many others” (Gold & Revill, 2003, p. 30). Risk seems more calculable and more rationally controllable than fear (cf. Kühne, 2012). The less rational way of dealing with fear is the attempt “to return to the known and familiar” (Dahrendorf, 1983a, p. 9) or “to believe in wild, often utopian promises” (Dahrendorf, 1983a, p. 9). Both are difficult to reconcile with the principle of an ‘open society’, which is only possible with the combination of ‘liberty and security’ (Popper, 2011 [1947]). The increase in personal liberty is also connected with the increase in personal leisure time, which can be arranged according to one’s own ideas, for contemplation or sport, for surfing the Internet or for political commitment or doing nothing.

4.1.2 S  tate Administration and Space: A Critique from the Perspective of Life-Chances Liberalism One strategy to reduce contingency is, as mentioned above, the attempt to tame it through administration. Along with the classic powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches, the administration is a central element of the state constitution. According to Seibel (2016, p. 61), even (here: in Germany) it is the dominant one: “That fact that the administration and not the government and parliament constitutes the substance of the state proved itself in Germany during the regime changes and regime collapses of the 20th century, especially in 1918 and 1945.” Despite fundamental political upheavals, the administration continued to function, in most cases with continuity of personnel (Seibel, 2016). From a liberal perspective, which not only understands administration as a purpose-rational institution that coordinates the coexistence of individuals, but also takes a critical look at its possibilities for limiting options, its effects, its inherent logics are examined in the following. Liberalism—more so its classical variant than the one that maximizes life-chances—regards the expansion of state activities as—at the very least—in need of justification, because today “a legitimate state has

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become something tautological, since the currently widespread concept of legitimacy is a kind of circular argument. […] The power of the state exists and entails a formal-legal legitimacy, which is usually justified with the consent of a majority that is supported by the state. The ability to exercise power is regularly accompanied by the ability to establish law and order” (Prollius, 2014, p. 187). The power of the state would thus also be increased by creating multipliers for itself, who underpin the ‘lack of alternatives’ of its existence and its actions, “including state television and radio and state schools” (Prollius, 2014, p. 187; see also Kersting, 2009, Sofsky, 2007a, Sofsky, 2007b).1 These institutions contribute to the transformation of external constraints into internal constraints. As Elias (1997 [1939]) clarifies, “the line of conflict shifts into the actors themselves. He is to become his own opponent. ‘Thou shalt not’ thus turns into ‘I will not’” (Schulze, 2007, p. 101). The relationship of the citizen to the state is entirely dependent on its constitution; thus, in despotism, the subject fears the arbitrariness of the lord and his helpers and accomplices, but in democracy he longs for “the care of the authorities. He does not seek protection from the state, but protection by the state. In case of danger, he demands immediate, intensified measures” (2007b, p. 21). People who work in government offices, illustrates Seibel (2016, p. 133), “not only perform tasks, they also exercise dominion. And one cannot escape the state as an order of rule unless one emigrates,” and even emigration eventually leads one into a society that is (more or less) intensively administered by the state. The central element of the state’s handling of space (in all dimensions, not just in the literal sense) is prohibitions and regulations. This “prohibition policy […] makes use of targeted misconceptions: what is not forbidden is far from being allowed. What is not required is not permitted; and finally, only what is obligatory is permitted. The rule of norms knows only commandments and prohibitions. Liberties and permissions  A similar position can be found in the neo-Marxist discourse. Althusser (1977, p. 122), for example, assumes that “no ruling class can hold state power permanently without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the ideological state apparatuses (i.e., among other things, schools; author’s note)”. This shows that even from different perspectives and with considerably different consequences, drawn-analysis results can be quite similar. The focus of criticism is—from different perspectives—the practice of the modern welfare state. 1

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immediately arouse suspicion” (Sofsky, 2007b, p.  25). Land use and development plans, based on the Building Code and the Building Utilization Ordinance, regulate which uses are permissible and which are not; also “parking space is rationed, access to the city centers is blocked” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 25). But the restrictions on the appropriation of space do not only begin in public or semi-public spaces: “The social development of the species […] begins in powerlessness and helplessness. As soon as the first energies awake, the urge to move is curbed” (Sofsky, 2007a, p. 41). Playpens begin the process of normalizing the spatial fixation of power, which extends from barriers to video surveillance of semipublic and even public spaces. The basis for the state-regulated use of space is the accumulation and synthesis of information, here in a spatial context: “The welfare state goes hand in hand with an explosion of data collection. To the extent that it cares for the poor, the old, and the sick, and assures everyone a minimum subsistence level, it covers society with a system of collection and distribution that leaves no area of life open” (Sofsky, 2007a, p. 56 f.). Population data, as well as data on the occurrence of species worthy of protection, are both collected with the aim of ‘controlling developments’. This ‘control’ usually means a restriction of the personal liberty of individuals, the definition of permitted uses and the exclusion of other uses. Even if the bureaucratically executed representative democracy is the form of government that is most likely to comply with the essential justice of opportunity and the idea of merit, there are considerable differences between the ideal type and the real type (in the sense of Max Weber, 1972), as Vaubel (2007, p. 13) makes clear: “The typical politician is not interested in carrying out an already diffuse ‘electoral mandate’ as conscientiously and in accordance with instructions as possible, but rather in exercising power. The same applies to many members of the civil service. The instruments of power are the expenditures and regulations of the state. Both encroach on the liberty of citizens.” Here—quasi-­ incidentally—the bureaucratic criticism of liberalism is presented, which does not refer to the ideal type, but to the real type: cartels and special interest groups take over the rational design of the political process as well as the administrative implementation of policy, Olson (1985) already criticized (in detail about the logic of administrations: Seibel, 2016).

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From a liberal perspective, the introduction of individual and collective interests through officialization is criticized as inappropriate if introduced by these same individuals and collectives. In this process, “‘egoistic’, private, individual motivations and interests […] are transformed into altruistic, collective, publicly justifiable, in short legitimate, motivations and interests” (Bourdieu, 1979 [French Original 1972], p. 90). An essential element of the divergence of the interests of the experts serving in the public administration from those of the citizens (and politics) by means of officialization is the striving for social recognition within the group of experts (in this case, spatial planners). Mechanisms of identity formation are an expression of the need to be recognized as members of a group. Thus, ‘being recognized’ translates to ‘being like the other’, or “being equal as a member, as being in the midst of it” (Popitz, 1992, p. 141). These recognition relationships are at the same time asymmetrical and reciprocal: “the recognition of the superiority of other persons, the attribution of prestige, and, following on from this, the fixation of our desire for recognition on such superior persons or groups. We want to be especially recognized by those whom we especially recognize” (Popitz, 1992, p. 115). Climbing the ladder of recognition is guided and documented by initiation rites: “To gain praise, the candidate must pass several tests. Progress is documented and evaluated. Examinations link knowledge control with a power ceremony” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 134). A community-­ creating and identity-forming symbol of the formalized technical language of the landscape experts (especially the planning ones) has become the text and map work (as an expression of data-setting power) of different plans, which are used for distinctive self-description toward laymen. While intended to be self-explanatory to the layman, Burckhardt (2004, p. 103) notes that “Planners often smile at laymen who supposedly cannot read plans. Plans are an unsuitable code for describing reality; if it is not possible to describe in words what is shown on the plan to the layman, this is due to the reduced information content of the plans” (more on this in Kühne, 2008a). The formation of a standardized spoken, written and figurative language can be understood as an extreme case of a regimentation of language, as Sofsky (2007b, p. 132) states more generally: “Primers for the correct use of language, edicts from the authorities for vocabulary, grammar and spelling, constant monitoring of the ways of

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speaking in the family, in kindergarten, school and university, in editorial offices and administrations  – the agents of language policy are always busy evaluating style and vocabulary and putting the right words into the mouths of contemporaries.” The goal of the operation is to create a uniform world view (Landscape 3) in which the difference between is and should (or adaptation of Landscape 1 to the expert special knowledge in Landscape 3) is kept as small as possible. More generally, v. Beyme (2013, p. 13; similar Michelsen & Walter, 2013) formulates the importance of expertise in current politics: “The decline of the classes and the rise of the experts seems to weaken the democratic parties decisively. Expert competence has often displaced the enthusiasm of amateurs.” The result is a “scientization of politics” (Jörke, 2010, p. 275) which has led to the fact that “experts and planners […] are pushing the classical intellectual off the stage, as it were” (Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p. 365). This has led to an increasingly specialized focus on social challenges. Beyond the interests of experts in securing or expanding their power depot, experts are subject to a specific professional deformation which Burckhardt (2004, p. 44) accentuates in a figurative form: “What does the designer or architect suggest when a problem is presented to him? What does the apple tree suggest when a problem is presented to it? – Apples, of course; in other words, the designer always suggests buildings, every problem leads to a building […].” At the same time, longings for a supposedly original world as well as hopes for an ideal final society (Dahrendorf, 2008, p.  67) are not alien to spatial planning: landscape planning often refers to historicizing an ideal image of a regional unit of nature and community (alternatively, culture) by amalgamating cultural landscape with homeland (Kühne, 2009b, 2009c) and the “contents of such scenic, patriotic, native and eco-idyllic spatial abstractions” (Hard, 2002, p. 230) are achieved by “shifting the focus away from the more significant social and regional disparities to comparatively insignificant regional varieties” (Hard, 2002, p. 230)—a development of at least dubious rationality. Plans of varying scale and content, in turn, usually define a (mostly unattainable) sharply delineated final state, the construction of which presupposes an almost homo oeconomistic knowledge of the social

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and natural environment in the past, present and future (see also Kühne, 2009d). In administrations, the status of ‘semi-belief ’ (Paris, 2005) in one’s own activity often prevails which, however, does not lead to the use of discretionary powers or even to pursuit of dismantling regulation; rather the “power of doubt […] demands pure doctrine. Whoever has not been granted the evidence of the sacred itself insists all the more stubbornly on second-hand piety. Unconditionally he defends the testimony, the authority of the Vicar or the Prophet. Such semi-belief appears with a penetrating claim to submissiveness. Since it lacks the final certainty of the gift of grace, it needs hope and literalism as support. He never accepts a sphere of private convictions. The semi-believer knows no compromise and is notoriously offended. […] Double meanings such as jokes, satire, or irony shake his idol. There is little to laugh about among semi-believers” (on the significance of humor in a society oriented toward life-chances, see Sect. 6.4). This tendency toward semi-belief has been discussed in recent years, especially in relation to nature conservation and landscape planning (e.g. Spanier, 2006; Kühne, 2008b, 2008d; Wojtkiewicz, 2015). For example, very clearly discussed among landscape planners is the lack of social acceptance and the limited effectiveness of their own activities, as well as the realization that the public is primarily interested in questions of the aesthetic landscape. However, all the more vehemently planned are species or area protection measures, which—despite the lack of empirical foundation according to their own (positivist) standards— are advocated to the outside world with great emphasis (Wojtkiewicz, 2015). The development of nature and landscape, however, does not follow a uniform objective. Rather, different paradigms of landscape development can be distinguished at present: the restoration of ‘historical cultural landscape’, the successive development of Landscape 1, the reinterpretation of Landscape 1 by Landscape 3, especially by Land Art, and the change of Landscape 3 toward a greater contingency tolerance (among many, Kühne, 2008b, 2009a; Schneider, 1989; Selman, 2010). These paradigms are based on different scientific foundations and they are based on different understandings of landscape. According to these different foundations, there are clear competitions between them for the sovereignty of interpretation. These paradigms essentially shape the ideas of a

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‘successful regional development’, but are seldom addressed in regional development processes. Incrementalistic “muddling through” is more commonplace (Fainstein, 2010, p. 62). Among designers and planners there is widespread skepticism about liberal openness, as in other parts of the social world, as shown in Sect. 3.1: “They do not want negative peace and negative justice; they are mostly filled with an adolescent moral longing for ethical perfection scenarios, religious states of salvation, or visions of historical philosophy” (Kersting, 2009, p. 76). Thus, the paradigms of dealing with space sometimes take on a quasi-religious character or—with conservative planners—a direct religious connection. However, such longings for salvation are based on a false understanding of the function and efficiency of morality(ies): “Morality is not there to ensure a good life or to promote happiness. Its first task is to contain the injurious power of the one over the other. Morality is a protective wall against attacks, a bulwark of negative liberty” (Sofsky, 2013, p.  35; more about morale and space/landscape: Sect. 4.3). Resistance to planning is manifold: from the refusal to plant the front garden with ‘native’ plants (the permissible plants are named for safety’s sake) in accordance with the common (and somewhat presuming a certain xenophobia) ideas of planners (in order to then reach for the thuja, which is hated by planners), to the refusal to visit the traffic-calmed city center by streetcar and store on the Internet instead, to open resistance to infrastructure planning (from bypasses and stations to the energy transition). The increased linguistic competence of individuals as a result of the educational expansion can be understood as an expression of a growing distrust of power and its processes—certainly in the liberal tradition. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1986 [1851]), in the tradition of the older Mirabeau, calls other to distrust those in power (cf. Hank, 2007). From a life-chance liberal perspective in the sense of Dahrendorf (2008), those who plan or design space, on the other hand, are called upon to not accept eternal and irrefutable truths as the basis of their own actions, but to examine and revise their own truths (often clichés and stereotypes) to accept contradictions. Liberal civil society is at the core of a liberal understanding of society in which the citizen (citoyen) is actively involved (Kapferer, 2009).

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Dahrendorf distinguishes between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ citizens’ initiatives. He characterizes “negative” citizens’ initiatives as prevention initiatives, while “positive” ones are committed to development. Even if Dahrendorf ’s sympathies lie with positive citizens’ initiatives, because “our future is built from the constructive initiatives; they prove the inner strength of a free society” (Dahrendorf, 1983a, p. 119), he can understand the commitment of negative citizens’ initiatives, in which “the protest against the state [today increasingly also companies; author’s note] […] is usually already the beginning and end of independent activity […]” (Dahrendorf, 1983a, p. 118) because “whoever in Germany would set out on the path of self-help”, for example, to get involved in spatial development, “would probably soon find that he lacks the state authorization to do certain things, or the permit to exercise an activity, or in any case some kind of stamp that can only be obtained with endless effort” (Dahrendorf, 1983a, p. 118). In a spatial context, ‘negative’ citizens’ initiatives related to the defense of negative liberty are often formed under the assumption that one’s own private space extends to the view from the window/balcony/terrace, comparable to a painting on the wall of one’s own house (which is ultimately not completely absurd, given the history of the concept of landscape in Western and Central Europe; see Kühne, 2015). In contrast, ‘positive’ citizens’ initiatives can be seen as characterized by the pursuit of positive liberty. In the context of citizens’ initiatives on the subject of renewable energies, this can be illustrated as follows: an overwhelming number (approximately four-fifths) of citizens’ initiatives justify their protests (among other things) with the goal of preserving native and/or historical cultural landscape (Weber, Jenal et al. 2017). If the preservation of the areas designated as native or historical-cultural-landscape was indeed the focus of a positive citizens’ initiative, the members would, for example, engage in activities themselves such as landscape conservation measures, if by national defaults (for instance a “chain saw license”) or organizational-administrative-organizational restrictions (support/instruction by the responsible district in core working times of the Administrative Office for Citizens [German: Bürgeramt] on Mondays to Thursdays of 9:00–11:30 and 13:30–15:30 as well as on Fridays between 9:00 and 11:30) not discouraged.

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Even as early as 1987, Ralf Dahrendorf formulated his “Consensus to Point of Sclerosis”, to describe a characteristic of German politics which attempts to try to avoid conflicts, in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon culture of dispute (1987, p.  74). This is associated with the consequence “that conflicts that could be overcome tend to become fights for or against ‘the system’”—a tendency that can also be found empirically in citizens’ initiatives against the expansion of renewable energies or electricity grids. The refusal to accept change of the ‘normal native landscape’ or the ‘stereotypical landscape’ (Kühne, 2006) is often transformed into a systemic questions rejecting the scientific findings of climate change (and the associated doubt about the scientific system) to questions rejecting the current social system (Weber, Kühne et al., 2016).

4.1.3 Increases in Complexity: Current Relations Between Politics and the Rest of Society: Post-­democracy, Governance and Over-governance In the previous section, we dealt with the criticism and unintended side effects of a classic top-down governance model of society through politics by means of administration, paying special attention to the practice of spatial planning. This model was dominant until the 1970s and still has a residual importance today. Now we will deal with developments in the relationship between politics and administration, and the rest of society in terms of post-democracy, governance and over-governance. The term used to describe current developments in politics is ‘post-­ democracy’ (Crouch, 2004). While the formal institutions of democracy remain in place in a post-democracy, the process of policy-making is characterized by the loss of influence of the parties, media staging of politics, increased political organization on the worldwide web and an increased influence of privileged elites and large multinational corporations (see also Reuber, 2012; Reuber et al., 2012; Beyme, 2013; Herzog, 2013; Michelsen & Walter, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2013; Ackermann, 2020). This influence by the latter is essentially based on the fact that “participation options are no longer addressed to individual citizens”

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(Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p.  79), but rather to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or expert committees, which “then lend additional support to the aura of the lack of alternatives from the perspective of politicians” (Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p.  79). The expertise then serves on the one hand to optimize the output and on the other hand to increase its acceptance (Michelsen & Walter, 2013; similar Kühne, 2008c, 2008d). Admittedly, however, even when NGOs “appear selfless and idealistic […] that does not change the fact that they are self-appointed advocates, neither democratically elected nor accountable” (Ottmann, 2012, p.  388). The question in democratic theory then becomes: can such non-state actors be placed on the same level as democratically legitimized governments? In this context, the parties are also reacting to the challenge of network communication and developing their own forms of communication on the Internet, which can be understood as an element of “professionalization of election campaigns and [the] media experts” and “which have rendered the simple members of the parties functionless” (Beyme, 2013, p. 32; emphasis in original). Also—as Beyme (2013, p.  58; emphasis in the original) notes, the protagonists of the post-democratic theses underestimate the development of the “participatory revolution, which favors quantitatively and qualitatively unconventional forms of participation”, which—as in the case of protest against major infrastructure projects in Germany such as the deepening of the Elbe River in Hamburg or Stuttgart21, for example—“have steered the conflicts back into civil tracks” (Beyme, 2013, p. 58). This ‘participatory revolution’, however, has an unintended side effect: the maximization of liberty corresponds conspicuously and socio-­ politically to the maximization of complexity. How is this to be understood? The integration of civic engagement and citizen participation (on the difference between civic engagement and citizen participation, see Petrow, 2017), which has been demanded for decades and has now been largely implemented at various levels of action and planning (see Berr, Jenal, Kühne, and Weber 2019), is also discussed under the heading “New Steering Model” (Seibel, 2016, p. 158) for administrative actions in planning processes. The question under discussion was, and still is, how the state can be seen as a cooperative negotiating partner of the

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citizens and how administrative control can be organized and implemented “from below” (i.e. “bottom up”) in contrast to the former control “from above” (i.e. “top down”) (Walter et al., 2013). In research, the term ‘governance’ has become established for this ‘new’ form of management (cf. Benz, 2004; Berr, Jenal, Kühne, and Weber 2019; Fürst, 2001; Gailing, 2018, 2019; Kühne, 2018f; Leibenath, 2019; Leibenath & Lintz, 2018; Weber et al., 2018, pp. 30ff.). Due to theoretical inconsistencies, excessive expectations and demands, as well as implementation problems, this concept has been increasingly criticized in recent years and relativized in its claim and practical scope (cf. Gailing, 2019). This phase of redefinition of governance can be called ‘post-governance’ (Berr, Jenal, Kühne, and Weber 2019, p.  20). Governance, with the required participation of non-state actors such as “multinationals, expert groups, networks, non-governmental organizations” (Ottmann, 2012, p. 388) or citizens’ initiatives, can also be understood as a new edition of liberal corporatism or ‘neo-corporatism’ (Alemann, 1981; Schmitter, 1981; Streeck, 1999) in connection with Hegel’s theory of corporations (cf. Hegel, 1995; Streeck, 1999; Ellmers & Herrmann, 2017). It is this omni-participation of heterogeneous non-state actors that can lead to an incalculable increase in complexity and thus to increased uncertainty in planning and approval procedures and ultimately to over-control or over-governance (Berr, Jenal, Kühne, and Weber 2019). Decision-­ making procedures in planning processes are fragmented into hardly manageable, partly overlapping and competing responsibilities, and the participants fall into an oversteering trap. It is hardly clear anymore who is responsible for what, who can decide what, how and with what legitimacy, and how to deal with the situation. In the fog of these ambiguities and uncertainties, a ‘white whirring’ of competence and responsibility arises. Participation procedures are confronted with a specific opportunity cost problem: time, personnel, financial and other resources are completely tied up when participating actors obstruct each other. The resulting postponement of decisions also leads to a further unintended effect. In the end, the necessary decisions are usually made completely and apparently without regard to the results of the participation procedure by state actors, that is, precisely the authority in the planning

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procedure whose power should be controlled and limited by participation. Options as possibilities for action in and out of freedom are given away in so doing, the non-state actors involved feel powerless, are frustrated and tend to believe that democratic participation procedures are undemocratic. This leads to a defeatism that threatens democracy and can lead to a situation in which disappointed and disillusioned people withdraw from democratic processes and turn to populists of left- or right-wing provenance. In view of these counter-effects, the wellmeant intentioned intention to democratically legitimize planning processes through greater participation and to increase their acceptability and acceptance means that participation is not only made more difficult or even prevented, but can even be reversed (perverted) in its meaning. In addition, an increase in participation does not automatically lead to commonly shared ‘solutions’. In cases of doubt, even after many rounds of negotiations, positions that are difficult to reconcile continue to clash and are unyielding opposed to each other (see, e.g. Kühne, 2018a, 2019a; Weber et al., 2018). In recent decades, the importance of social or political ‘movements’ has increased, which can be understood as networks of organizations and individuals that, on the basis of shared collective patterns of interpretation and evaluation, use primarily non-institutionalized tactics to become effective in a political, economic or social context (Brand, 1982; Neidhardt & Rucht, 1993; Kolb, 2002; Kern, 2008). The shift of political mobilization to ‘movements’ instead of political will in parties and parliaments is often connected with the claim to directly express this ‘will of the people’ (Dahrendorf, 1994b, 1997, 2003a, 2003b). This is a position that cannot be followed from the perspective of a life-chances liberalism, as Dahrendorf (2003b, p. 25) points out: “When the Italian Prime Minister at the time, Giuliano Amato, saw such a demonstration [that of opponents of globalization; author’s note] in Washington, and the protesters told him that they represented the people, he said to them: ‘No, I represent the people, because the people elected my government to represent them, not you’.” Dahrendorf (2003b, p. 25) continues, however, saying “the demonstrators represent the peoples of the world,” but without having received a mandate for representation. Although private and public organizations are able, through the use of the Internet, “to create a strong and aggressive

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mobilization of people” (Dahrendorf, 2003b, p. 25), the question remains unanswered how to find representation for people who are not part of the ‘movement’, whether in opposition to it or not, but who nevertheless, as political citizens, have the same right to political representation as people who join the movements. This principle of (liberal) democracy must be emphasized once again in view of the tendency of ‘movements’ to paternalism toward those with ‘false consciousness’ (see detailed Sect. 5.4). The rise of populism is also connected with the increase in the significance of ‘movements’, because “populists drove this process [that of disempowering parliaments in which orderly debates can take place; author’s note] with the aim of skipping the debate and creating consensus based on the supposed, or actual, deeply felt sentiments of the population” (Dahrendorf, 2003b, p. 90). Populism is characterized by three aspects (Beyme, 2013; Strenger, 2015): 1. Populism is based less on program than on morality. It appeals more to widespread stereotypes than to scientific results (which are assumed to be inhumane rationalism), which often results in different conspiracy theories. 2. Populism is directed against the supposed corruption of the established elites. “Specialists in relevant fields, be it economics, biology, medicine or terror research, are often perceived as unrepresentative of the will of the people and as representatives of a distanced elite that defends its own interests” (Strenger, 2015: 61). In addition to ‘aloof politicians’, the focus of rejection is often personified by ‘global elites’ in business and science, who hardly have any ties to their region of origin or even their temporary place of residence and the people living there, who follow a strict performance orientation, represent cosmopolitan values and make decisions as rationally as possible (Strenger, 2019). 3. Populism is rarely based on a consistent world view, especially because it develops from a single theme, so that it does not “lead to a system of linked beliefs in one ideology, but to an overestimation of a problem in the respective society” (v. Beyme, 2013, p. 54).

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But populists are “apparently incapable of governing” (Dahrendorf, 2004, p.  317) because after all, the profession of populists is eruptive protest, not the regulated conflict of parliaments (Dahrendorf, 2004). The tendency to follow populist world views is not equally distributed socially: “Populism thrives primarily in social spaces that have been emptied of socio-cultural content by the decline of communalizations and norms that previously shaped the worlds of life” (Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p. 167; see also: Hochschild, 2016; Strenger, 2019). It is thus particularly widespread in those milieus that see themselves threatened by economic, social and cultural globalization processes, by social secularization, by an increasing plurality of society, or in short, by the increasing compulsion to liberty, such as ‘petty bourgeois milieus’ or a ‘working class without tradition’. As a counter-model of an expertocratic parliamentary democracy, direct democracy is often conceived (see also Sect. 4.1): “The idea of a democracy that grows from the ‘grass roots’, where all decisions rise like vapors and are then ultimately legitimized by the fact that they rise like vapors” (Dahrendorf, 1983a, p.  68), suggests the spirit of utopia (for more detail on the critique of utopias, see Chap. 5). A utopia that “makes innovations enormously difficult” (Dahrendorf, 1983a, p.  68) because they often end in paralysis, such as “Habermas’ longing for a society of ‘rule-free discourse’, of consensus through voluntary and permanent communication among equals” (Dahrendorf, 2004, p. 21) is described as “an idea of getting out of the success-oriented world of reality” (Dahrendorf, 1994a, p. 321). It misses the goal “which it sets itself: To guarantee people their liberty in an open society” (Dahrendorf, 1969a, p.  4) in constant mutual control, discussions of principles and moral observation (detailed: Dahrendorf, 1968). Everyone and everything is then “dragged before the tribunal of social approval by the communication community of discourse ethics […]” (Kersting, 2008, p. 23). Thus, from the perspective of a life-chance oriented liberalism, the increasing demands for referendums can be critically questioned. These can be interpreted as an expression of the helplessness of politics. They erode the principle of parliamentary democracy, in which “interests and opinions gathered around certain principles” (Dahrendorf, 2010, p. 196) in parties and, after the election, “decisions were made in open debate in

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parliament” (Dahrendorf, 2010, p. 196). Here, the danger of abridged argumentation and emotionalization is significantly lower (the Brexit referendum is a striking example of this), which in turn has a tendency to reduce life-chances (Michelsen & Walter, 2013). For Dahrendorf, until Kant’s ‘world civil society’ is established, which “in the end […] is the only convincing practical answer to the fundamental equality of rank and rights of all people” (Dahrendorf, 2004, p. 48), parliaments remain only “substitute solutions, civil societies within borders, hence imperfect civil societies with all kinds of demarcations, exclusions, privileges and disadvantages”. Accordingly, nation-states, “in which the civil rights of all members are effectively guaranteed, […] are after all the best we have achieved” (Dahrendorf, 2004, p. 48; a position which now also Nussbaum, 2019 represents). A specifically German path of democratic development can be found in the increasing “juridification of politics” (Beyme, 2013, p. 75) which can be understood as an expression of the tension “between the rule of law and democracy” (Beyme, 2013, p.  75), when in particular, “laws which have been passed legally by a majority of the democratically elected representatives of the people […] violate the constitution and thus become illegitimate” (Beyme, 2013, p.  75). Here too it becomes clear that “democracy and liberty cannot or must not simply be equated; after all, a democratic government […] is not the government of each individual over himself, but of each individual by all the rest” (Sofsky, 2007a, p. 55). Since democracy is also rule, it can “constrict the lives of citizens in an intolerable way. The majority can oppress a minority to such an extent that it needs its own protective wall” (Sofsky, 2007a, p. 55).

4.1.4 Interim Conclusion on Maximizing Liberty and Increasing Complexity The process of modernization can be reconstructed as a process of increasing life-chances, in which individuals increasingly gain autonomy in determining their own life course. This increase in liberty can be attributed to scientific and technological progress on the one hand and to the diminishing influence and binding power of institutions on the other. A double

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price has to be paid for this process of maximizing liberty. On the one hand, the dissolution of traditional ties in both the social and private spheres leads to a variety of heterogeneous and incompatible milieus and lifestyles, resulting in new kinds of inclusion and exclusion recognition schemes and mechanisms. These developments are flanked by increasing fear and uncertainty. On the other hand, the process of ‘post-democracy’ can be observed in the socio-political arena, which firstly weakens the principle of representative democracy and gives impetus to weakly legitimized political ‘movements’ as well as ‘populist’ currents and politicians; secondly, at the planning and administrative levels within the framework of the governance model, the intentional maximization of liberty leads to an unintentional increase in complexity and ‘over-control’ (‘over-­governance’) and thus ultimately to unintentional paternalism and loss of liberty.

4.2 C  hanges in the Relationships of Ligatures and Options and Their Relations to Landscapes 1, 2 and 3 The areas of tension just described between politics and the rule of law, between democracy and liberty, and between society and the individual, in terms of ligatures and options, are ultimately also represented in the individual. Thus, the question arises whether and how, in view of the social developments toward a ‘liberty-growth society’ (cf. Kersting, 2009), the concept of ligatures and options (Dahrendorf, 1979) can or must receive a new embedding or even function. What does an increase in liberty, in options, mean in relation to ligatures? What can the dynamics between them look like if the options continue to increase? To approach this question, two perspectives are taken, some of which lie outside Dahrendorf ’s plane of observation. In the first analysis, the focus is on the relationship between ligatures and options in the context of the individual and their spatial integration. The individual-related level of observation is then supplemented by a sociological view. In the sense of Dahrendorf, who did not take the psychological dynamics of the individual as the subject of his analyses, the social environment of the

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individual is at the center as a mediating instance of cultural value systems and views. In principle, the analyses of the concept of ligatures and options remain highly relevant to social theory, since their logic exhibits a fundamental capacity for integration into general social and historical processes as well as individual developmental dynamics: “History is a path to ever new shores – but do not misunderstand this: it is not only the ever new, i.e. the alternatives and options, that is important about it, but also the shores, i.e. the references and ties” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 27).

4.2.1 D  evelopmental Psychological Considerations of Ligatures and Options This statement is most directly comprehensible when it is reconstructed on one’s own person, that is, on an individual level. Regardless of whether cognitive developments, emotional processes, activity-related progress analyses or the formation of moral dimensions are used, further development needs a reference, that is, “developmental changes are always considered in relation to the previous developmental state of an individual, i.e. put into context” (Kray, 2019, p. 2). Perhaps it was due to the logic of the growth idea of “more and more”, but until the 1970s the focus of developmental psychology only reached adolescence or young adulthood, for example, the famous stage typology of cognitive development according to Piaget (1969). Modern developmental psychology, however, has moved away from this and transferred the importance of developmental processes to the entire life span. At the latest 1980, with Paul Baltes (Max Planck Institute for Human Development), developmental psychology research in Germany was extended to the most advanced ages, thus establishing the question of developmental psychological progress in all phases of life through empirical research (Freund et al., 2014; Kray, 2019). Thus, it was also recognized as self-evident that development (for the multifaceted nature of the concept of development, see, e.g. Greve & Thomsen, 2019; Krettenauer, 2014) not only deals with the “more”, but in addition to the developmental gains, the losses must also be considered. This research also made it clear that an exclusively bipolar view of profit and loss is not enough. The loss of skills does not automatically lead to a linear

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limitation of performance, but can be positively modeled in a dynamic force field. Baltes and Baltes (1989, p. 96) describe this by the principle of optimization through selection and compensation: The first element, optimization, takes into account the assumption that people behave in such a way that they seek to raise the general level of their capacity reserves and to improve the chosen life paths in quantity and quality. The second element, selection, refers to the adaptive capacity to focus on those areas of high priority where environmental demands, personal motivation, skills, and biological performance coincide. Finally, the third element, compensation, results from the limitation in the range of adaptive potential or reduced plasticity and occurs whenever certain behavioral capacities have failed or have fallen below a functionally adequate level.

The result of the research work of Baltes and Baltes (1989, p. 96) was a “psychological model of successful aging” (Baltes & Baltes, 1989, p. 85). The so-called SOC (Selective Optimization with Compensation) model has become established in scientific developmental psychology (e.g. Greve & Thomsen, 2019; Nikitin & Freund, 2019) and the applied literature on successful aging (e.g. Linde, 2018). The term ‘plasticity’ (Baltes & Baltes, 1989, p. 87) of development finds a special meaning in it and finally abolishes the linearity between more and less skills in development processes. Rather, in a dynamic process the possibility space of conditions and possibilities is shaped by cognitive, motivational and volitional processes. Accordingly, the question of successful development no longer focuses on individual factors, but rather “newer models focus more on the processes that contribute to a successful confrontation with the demands of various phases of life” (Freund et al., 2014, p. 284). The prerequisite for the success of the processes is the most comprehensive possible assessment of the respective prerequisites (ligatures) and target wishes based on the options. In fact, there is empirical evidence that a change occurs over the course of a person’s life span, away from the focus of a goal in young adulthood toward the focus on a process in later life (Freund et al., 2010). A stronger process focus (independent of age) leads to advantages (Kaftan & Freund, 2018). Freund, Henneckt and Riediger (2010, p. 217) summarize the results as follows:

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“The process focus was also positively related to measures of goal pursuit (self-reported exercise frequency and regularity). In contrast, outcome focus was not or even negatively related to measures of positive evaluation of the goal and goal pursuit. This pattern of results suggests that, at least in the context of the goal to start exercising regularly, process focus is more adaptive for various measures of subjective goal satisfaction and for goal pursuit.”

Figuratively speaking, it is a matter of looking at the possibility space as precisely and perpetually as possible, that is, of aligning both the bindings and the options in such a way that motivated progress occurs. According to these studies, those who only look at the goal and the option run the risk of under-valuing the achievement of an option and getting caught on a “hedonic treadmill” (Freund et al., 2010, p. 218). A cognitive psychological explanation lies in the so-called focusing illusion according to Kahneman (2014) who has empirically proven that mental fixation leads to a considerable overestimation of the salient thought content: “Nothing in life is as important as one believes when one thinks about it” (Kahneman, 2014, p. 496). The SOC model, on the other hand, describes a mechanism that releases the mental fixation and provides the basis for flexibility. This process perspective can be seen as an individual-motivated complement to the concept of life-chances. Dahrendorf (1979) explicitly does not regard the individual level as a central part of its concept and points out that “life-chances are not attributes of individuals” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p.  49) but “possibilities of individual growth, the realization of abilities, wishes and hopes, and these possibilities are provided by social conditions” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 50). Thus, he does not focus on the subject, but rather illuminates the social field of forces that is offered to the subject. Nevertheless, there are clear conceptual overlaps between the concept of ligatures and options and developmental psychology. From an individual perspective, the perennial task is to make the right choice within a context in the “space” of ligatures and options in order to achieve progress and expansion. An example related to the interaction between individual and space is the playground. There, children traditionally find the possibility to experience fun in movement and an improvement in the

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way they handle playing options. Playgrounds are special places to test the motor, motivational and social abilities of the individual and to push them to their limits. It can be observed with children (but probably also with adults) that they take older children as role model in the sense of model learning (Bandura, 1991), and not unusually fail because of their conditions and prerequisites, but at the same time can grow under the condition of repetition. For about ten years, the concept of playgrounds in Germany has also been based on the ages of adults and seniors, and initial studies indicated a positive effect on different physical and mental vital functions (Hessisches Sozialministerium, 2013). Dahrendorf (1979, p. 50) calls this alternating condition of offers and bindings life-chances (see detailed in Sect. 3.4.1). However, he did not, as just mentioned, individualize his concept, and instead operates from a broad social perspective. Therefore, it seems more precise to complement the broad perspective of the concept of life-chances with a narrower view as the concept of opportunity for action. It is obvious that even with this narrow view one can still speak of ligatures and options. According to Dahrendorf, options correspond to structural choices and incentives, while ligatures are the ties and affiliations that potentially create meaning and provide guidelines for action. Individual perception is thereby influenced by the role and status of the individual (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 50)—precisely by the perceived connection of the ego to the (physical) environment and social and societal regulations, and in the broader sense through cultural embedding. Whether this concept can be projected into the real environment and landscape will be examined using two examples from environmental psychology: the Behavior Setting concept by Roger Barker and the Field Theory according to Kurt Lewin.

4.2.2 S  pace as a Source of Attachment and Options for the Individual Using the Behavior Setting Concept The Behavior Setting concept by Roger Barker (1968; for an overview of Barker’s theory, see Fuhrer, 1990; Kaminski, 2008; Popov & Chompalov, 2012; Schoggen, 1989) deals with the phenomenon that people seem to

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know exactly how to behave within their own culture. Or to put it another way, the behavioral conformity observed in everyday life in individual settings/environments is—despite all the diagnosed striving for possibility and individualization in our society—striking. The starting point of his concept was developmental psychological studies of child socialization conditions related to frustration experiences and regression behavior (cf. Kaminski, 2008). In order to obtain as detailed a description as possible, one child was observed one full day without interruption. Barker noticed that the behavior is not only determined by individual factors, but that certain spaces (settings) called for an adjustment of action patterns. Barker then changed his scientific focus of attention away from individual case analysis to spatial units that encourage action, which he called Behavior Settings. A specific feature of Behavior Settings is that the differential characteristics of the persons present were largely negligible and that the spatial-material milieu and behavior seem to be related. Seized by this perspective, Barker began his groundbreaking research with considerable methodological effort (in overview Kaminski, 2008). Specifically, in the middle of the last century, all “community behavior settings”, that is, settings with a public character, were systematically analyzed for one year in a small American town. The content criteria were defined using a complex set of variables, such as the registration of behavior objects, the population, the geographical location and the temporal location. The immense effort of this field study ultimately yielded 585 Behavior Settings for the American small town “Midwest”, that is, recurring and stable behaviors that occur independently of the participating individuals in observable role assumptions at the same places with characteristic objects. Urs Fuhrer offers a vivid definition of Behavior Setting (Fuhrer, 1990, p.  32; emphasis in original), who understands them “as a public event that takes place during certain periods of time and consists of the interaction of social or socio-cultural rules following actions in a physical milieu. Behavioral Settings are thus defined as social and spatio-temporal systems, in short: as social events in a physical milieu”. Barker calls this stable space-behavioral classification “synomorphism” (structural equality). In the Behavior Setting “Lecture”, for example, the benches in the lecture hall are facing the standing desk and the desk is facing the benches. The arrangement is thus aligned with the program

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taking place in the room—and all participants in the room know how they can (must or should) fill “their” role. Although Space 1 and its characteristics play a special role, Barker’s Behavior Setting concept does not follow a purely behavioristic stimulus-­ response approach. With respect to the Behavior Setting “Mathematics Lesson”, Fuhrer (1990, p. 33; emphasis in original) summarizes the totality of the system as follows: Thus, one cannot understand how this mathematics lesson works if one looks only at the teacher's actions, only at the social structure of the class, only at the architectural design of the classroom, only at the intelligence of the students or only at the content of the lesson. […] Only the totality of this system explains the functioning of its specific parts. It is thus an interdependence of the parts and not their physical or functional similarity that distinguishes a Behavior Setting as a system.

Roger Barker (1968, p. 186) himself points out the connection between man and Space 1 as follows: “According to behavior setting theory, the behavioral environment and the occupant are not independent of each other. Rather, the environment is a set of homeostatically regulated eco-­ behavioral entities consisting of nonhuman components, human components, and control circuits that modify the components in predictable ways to maintain the environmental entities in their characteristic states.” The totality, that is, of structural moments, is important. Empirical urban space analyses have shown a linear relationship between quality of life and the diversity of behavioral settings (cf. Hunecke & Schweer, 2004). Barker (1968) has derived an “environmental richness index” from the actual availability of behavioral settings, which depends on the frequency of occurrence, duration and number related to one year. In this context, the value of Behavior Settings is usually formulated under a positive sign. Like a nested system, the time periods can be associated with the range of context. For example, there are many settings in a university, and even the teaching settings, considered in isolation, usually make up a considerable number. Seen from one’s own self-critical teaching experience, the individual units sometimes seem to have (sense) stability for only one

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teaching unit, and yet everything lies below the higher-level sense building of the university. This does not yet describe a concrete orientation of a university, nor does it define a course of study or examination regulations. A superordinate sense structure normally lies in the institutional mission to prepare current and future students to cope with social tasks— and this is normally institutionalized in a stable manner over an immensely long period of time. An advertising slogan of the University of Heidelberg sums it up like this: “Heidelberg University. The Future. Since 1386.” That the view on the “vision of the future” changes over time with societal ideals is self-evident, and the respective manifestation is shaped in the societal struggle of the groups of actors. Despite all the diagnosed individualization and diversity dynamics of our society, the collective behavioral similarity seems to bother very few people and is hardly noticeable. On the contrary, without this automatic orientation function, the individual would feel like a permanent tourist in a foreign culture, that is, more or less curious, insecure, constantly challenged and ultimately overwhelmed. Thus, the self-evident ties help us in our quest for comprehensibility and reliability while giving us the freedom for curiosity and exploration. This is reflected in the concept of landscape preference (in relation to Landscape 1) according to Kaplan and Kaplan (1989) again, who focus on two basic needs in dealing with the environment, understanding and exploring, and postulate a specific dynamic from the motives of “wanting to understand” (security) and “wanting to discover” (exploration). With regard to the concept of ligatures and options, the proximity between setting definition and social role in the setting with the ligatures is obvious. Ligatures provide security and bonding; they enable orientation and, in this case, they do not coerce but assist in facilitating everyday life, ultimately granting us liberty. The rapid grasp of the situation and the associated feeling of security are closely related to the cognitive psychological concept of heuristics. This refers to the ability of human beings to remain capable of acting even in complicated and complex circumstances, that is, in situations that are actually overwhelming and therefore risky (Gigerenzer, 2014). Daniel Kahneman (2014) distinguishes between fast thinking (i.e. a heuristic understanding in the sense of a behavioral

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setting) and slow thinking (i.e. the cognitive analysis of what is happening in a situation to determine how the person can fit in). Fast thinking is conducted heuristically if rational analysis would take too long or would not be possible due to the complexity of the situation (Kahneman, 2014). This ability of cognitive “shortcutting” is of great importance in many situations, but carries the danger of (in part typical) action errors (e.g. Döring-Seipel & Lantermann, 2015). One phenomenon (and also problem) of heuristics is that because they are less strenuous than deep thought processes due of their cognitive simplicity, they are desirable. In scientific literature, people who operate in this mode of decision-making are sometimes referred to as “cognitive misers” (Spears & Tausch 2014, p. 522; Fiske & Taylor 2020). This phenomenon suggests at least two conclusions regarding ligatures and options: first, it breaks with possible stereotypical attributions that ligatures are only considered important and valuable by a predominantly basic conservative orientation. For this, they have too strong a function in creating and providing meaning to be ascribed to a particular world orientation. Furthermore, they are guard rails which, as heuristics, can provide a structuring and hierarchization of options in complex life situations. On the other hand, options can be seen not only as offers but also as a burden through agony of choice. This supports Dahrendorf ’s statement (1979, p. 51) that it is a fallacy to achieve a maximum of liberty with a maximum of options. Rather, if there is a surplus of options without guidelines regarding selection criteria, it is to be assumed that the large number of options can, in extreme cases, lead to a stagnation of action. According to Dahrendorf, options without boundaries are (1979, p.  51) pointless, too many options without limits are psychologically oppressive, tiring, irrelevant or even disgusting (cf. Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 59), and can be disorienting and demotivating. In the article “When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?” Iyengar and Lepper (2000) confirmed this empirically by finding that too many choices do not lead to increased interest and motivation, but to overload and demotivation. These are potentiated approach-approach-­ conflict sense (Lewin, 1969).

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4.2.3 S  pace as a Source of Binding and Options for the Individual Based on the Field Theory According to Lewin The psychologist Kurt Lewin might have been the scientist who treated the connectedness between offers, demands and restrictions for action in concrete Space 1 and individual (here: Space 2) simultaneously most deeply and pragmatically in his field theory (Lewin, 1969). As is well known, the term field theory is used in various scientific fields and is also partly understood differently within specific scientific contexts, such as the social sciences (see Lück, 1996). The special position of Kurt Lewin’s field theory lies in the subjectification of spatial behavior, while at the same time taking into account the ‘objective’ spatial conditions (in the sense of Space 1). The “living world” is therefore the “epitome of all possible behavior” (Lewin, 1969, p. 36). He points out that the spatial artifacts in Space 1 generally remain stable, what Lewin calls the “hodological space”. A Space 1 remains a Space 1, no matter whether one hikes or mountain bikes in it. In the hodological space, areas, places, and so on can take on special meanings (valences) depending on the situation, or, to stay with the example, Landscape 1 functions primarily for aesthetic edification while hiking or as a technical-sport challenge with the mountain bike (interference Landscapes 1 and 2)—but in the end, they remain the same spatial components (Space 1). Lewin explains this difference in the valences using a dramatic example, namely the distinction between a landscape of peace and a landscape of war (each as interference of Landscapes 1 and 2). According to Lewin, the big difference lies in the fact that the peace landscape is open in all directions, without front and back, and is infinitely wide in all directions (Lewin, 1917, p. 441). The landscape of war, on the other hand, appears to be directional, “it knows a front and a back, a front and a back that is not related to the marching person, but is fixed to the area itself ” (Lewin, 1917, p. 441), meaning there are certain force effects (vectors) in Space 1, which are connected with certain ways of finding and avoiding areas. These forces are projected by the individual into, for example, the objects of the environment, although they are usually of a subjective nature. Thus, the reason

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attributed to certain detours is not infrequently justified by the individual as lying in the space itself and not, as is often the case, in the attribution of attraction/aversion by the observer. Nevertheless, there are Space 1-related ligatures that elude individual allocation and are binding for all. These can be space-inherent constraints, such as a rock face or a raging river, but also social or political ties, such as in landscapes during times of war. Thus, the same landscape is a fundamentally different place when it is entered in times of peace versus times of war. Kurt Lewin reports on this difference as a war veteran of First World War: While we stopped on the street after a long march as army reserves, the fight for a nearby village suddenly developed. The village remained an ordinary ‘village in the landscape.’ The whole fight did not seem very serious to me, and the warning to take cover therefore seemed somewhat pointless despite the relatively strong danger, apparently because the peace landscape had not yet been replaced by the battle landscape. […] The difference between these combat things compared to the corresponding peace things is deep enough to decisively influence the behavior towards them. To make demands on any thing in this zone, which one otherwise only makes on peace things, therefore seems at first to be absurd. The phenomenon accompanying differing perspectives of a shot-up village by an individual either standing within the village or looking at it externally also occurs when considering the destruction of the village. This concern is lost, or at least becomes greatly diminished, when one considers the village as tactical objective of war, and not as a destroyed object of peace. What lies within the battle zone belongs to the soldier as his rightful possession, not because it has been conquered – for it holds different meaning as conquered territory lying behind the enemy’s position – but because, as a battle structure, it is accepted as a natural component of the military landscape. (Lewin, 1917, p. 444f.)

Lewin does not assign individual situations or singular conditions to his hodological space as a measure of force, as would be the case, for example, with individually named ligatures or options. The peculiarity of his field theory is that he understands space as a “territory” in which these points of force lie, which charge it with different fields of force. In this

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way, the habitat is sorted according to attractive fields and those that are better avoided. Individually, according to Lewin, the physical living space is an objective space that is divided into areas of attraction and avoidance by subjective attributions. These attributions are initially subjective, but are mediated by others and are thus potentially socially divided. The space itself does not lose its objective character through the subjective force segmentation. This means that the space remains the same space even if intra-subjective reinterpretations are made, which is quite possible and sometimes even necessary in the course of life. Lewin (1935) has described the forces acting in a space as vectors that can take certain directions and lead to certain conflict situations: • Approach-approach-conflict: Two (or more) possibilities are equally attractive, such as when choosing two restaurants. • Avoidance-avoidance-conflict: Two (or more) alternatives are equally unattractive, such as the decision between an hour-long descent and ascent to cross a valley or the use of a dizzying suspension bridge. • Approach-avoidance-conflict: A Space 1 is both attractive and repulsive at the same time (in the level of Space 2), like a night walk alone in a historical city without knowledge of the place and with simultaneous time pressure. Kurt Lewin has also analyzed his concept of habitat in terms of developmental psychology and came to the following conclusion: “With the gradual extension and differentiation of the child’s life-space, a larger environment and essentially different facts acquire psychological existence, and this is true also with respect to dynamic factors. The child learns in increasing degree to control the environment. At the same time and no less important  – it becomes psychologically dependent upon a growing circle of environmental events” (Lewin, 1935, p.  74). While other developmental psychological theories have assumed, and continue to assume, that autonomy and independence increase with age in childhood and adolescence, Lewin concludes that the increase in options simultaneously leads to growing dependency on obligations. In terms of ligatures and options, as well as in the above explanations of this section, this means that the relation of bonds and possibilities has

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to be considered as a coherent, total force field. Individual force points do not tell us anything about the total system. Depending on the situation and the person, ligatures can experience different definitions or even be erased (see the comparison of peace and battle landscapes), even those that were previously emotionally highly charged. Moreover, the increase in (implemented) options does not exclusively lead to greater liberty, but also to just as many more ligatures, which is essential from the motivation-­ theoretical perspective of self-efficacy expectation. As the number of options taken increases, so do the social and societal obligations. The interweaving between the individual and society can be described prosaically with John Donne’s poetry (1623, Meditationen XVII): “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main.” Thus, no one is an island and is instead always integrated into the dynamic, fluid and liberty-expanding (see Sect. 3.4.1) society—and therefore connected with an increased individual burden of responsibility and (self-) justification (cf. Kersting, 2009).

4.2.4 S  ociological Considerations of Ligatures and Options Under these social conditions, stabilizing personal identity has become difficult, but psychologically speaking, all the more urgent, since the growing uncertainties are accompanied by an increasing pressure for self-­ stabilization. It often feels like “a life without a net and a false bottom” (Lantermann, 2016, p.  28), which, incidentally, the sociologist Georg Simmel (1908) already stated—in less dramatic terms—in the early twentieth century. In the case of de-traditionalization, or “disembedding,” as Giddens (1997, p. 123) called it, self-thematization becomes a perpetual task, which according to the developmental psychologist Erik H. Erikson (1988) leads to the identity crisis being the psychological signature of late modern societies—and this is at least as true today as it was in the past (Keupp, 2016b). The social psychologist Heiner Keupp (2016a) also points out that the search for the self does not necessarily have to be successful lead to stability. Moreover, he shows that in different contexts, this does not even have to be the (socially desired) goal. In the

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globally economized labor market, flexibility is considered a high value in itself, and it can make sense, out of superficially strategic efficiency constraints and quasi-voluntary considerations, to establish a permanently flexible attitude of intellectual, emotional, spatial and cultural permanent mobility, a so-called protective self—but with the highest risk of moving further and further beyond one’s own limits and becoming completely exhausted in permanent mobility. The social correlation is the vision of the “‘raging standstill’ […] in which the progressive growth and the resulting changes are no longer understood as part of a history of progress towards a shapeable future, but as a struggle against decline and slipping into the frightening abyss of individual or systemic collapse” (Rosa, 2019, p. 42). This state of exhaustion, in turn, has been addressed by Byung-­ Chul Han (2010) with probably the most prominent treatises being “Fatigue Society” and its expansion into “Fatigue Society. Burnout Society. Wedding Time” (Han, 2016). He observes an excess of positive challenges (options) in our society, which almost inevitably demand an even higher level of personal performance. Resistance is extremely difficult, since these are all desired and highly positive, evaluated options. All resistance energy, in the simultaneous absence of aptly named aversion topics—wherein, foreignness becomes colorfulness, annoying becomes exciting, and so on—is therefore ultimately directed against oneself, consequently driving one to deep exhaustion. If the perspective of the “always positive” is exaggerated, the friction points are missing, as are the stable banks. Above all, however, in the bad case an attitude of missed opportunities develops instead of a realistic view of possibilities and ties, which makes the struggle for fair “starting positions”, in the Dahrendorf sense, difficult or even impossible for all members of society. How urgent this question seems to be is reflected in the diagnosed radicalization (Lantermann, 2016) and aggressiveness (Rosa 2019) of society due to subjective feelings of uncertainty and a fundamental competitive orientation. Dahrendorf (1979, p. 59) puts it succinctly: “The destruction of ligatures has reduced human life-chances to the point where even survival chances are again endangered.” Sociology according to Andreas Reckwitz (2017, 2019) brings new perspectives into play. First, he introduces the term “singularization” (Reckwitz, 2017) in the sense of uniqueness which models the concept of

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“individualism”. The advantage of this designation is that with the term ‘individualization’ connected semantic focus on the release mechanism of the individual from society is removed and at the same time the term-­ related exclusivity on the subject is omitted (Reckwitz, 2017, 2019). The concept of “singularity” can also be used to describe nations, institutions, objects, and so on. In this way, it automatically links the person and society and can thus analyze the question of how the unique (singular) is socially fabricated and what individual and social consequences this process entails. The social logic of singularity thus has “an inevitably paradoxical structure: general structures and practices are formed in core areas of society whose interest is systematically oriented towards the particular. Singularities thus do not move outside the social world or are directed against it, but are located in the center. They are not ‘released into liberty’, but are manufactured in social practice” (Reckwitz, 2019, p. 20). In recent decades, a shift in the social logic of the general to the social logic of the particular has become established in late modernity, “which is proving to be an extremely ambitious form of society in which the average is no longer sufficient, but individuals, things, events, places and collectives are expected to leave this average behind. Only the singularization of the social promises satisfaction, prestige, and the power of identification; only this makes people and the world valuable from the perspective of late modern culture” (Reckwitz, 2019, p.  21). The flip side of this emphasis is devaluation of the normal, the baseline. Reckwitz justifies the concept of devaluation by the fact that the singular is not considered special in the “postmodern ‘realm of liberties’” (Reckwitz, 2019, p. 22) but is accompanied by the simultaneous devaluation of the remainder. Seen in this way, singularization always means polarization, as Reckwitz (2017, 2019) demonstrates in various areas of society, such as education and the labor market. Within this framework, even growth- and liberty-­ oriented values, such as the pursuit of emancipation, self-determination, autonomy and sovereignty in dealing with others are dangerous. Hartmut Rosa (2019, p. 41) comes to a similar assessment: The basic problem that this poses for the social formation of modernity is that this attitude ultimately forces us into a relationship of aggression towards the world and ultimately also towards ourselves, and this relationship of

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aggression is becoming increasingly apparent on the one hand in the socio-­ formative compulsions to increase, which in particular lead to an ever more ruthless, extractive use of all natural resources, including the psychological resources of man, and on the other hand, in that aggressive political relationship already discussed, in an angry bourgeoisie, in a political existence to which the others – the fascists, the capitalists, the refugees, the Muslims, the environmental polluters, the communists, the sexists, […] appear in a frighteningly increasing way as the manifestation of evil par excellence.

Rosa (2016, 2019) describes a possible way out of the downright destructive cycle of alienation—created by “unrelated relationships” (Rosa, 2019, p. 45; see in this book especially Sect. 4.3)—through the strengthening of a new collective world relationship, which he calls resonance, and which is based on physical, emotional and sociological components. What is important here is that he addresses a special human-environment relationship that does not envision any negation of, or authoritarian appropriation by, institutions and rules. What I have in mind […] is a relationship to nature and history, to political institutions and to fellow human beings, and in the end also a self-­ relationship that does not see the given, encountering or opposing entities as variables or guidelines to be accepted blindly, nor as simply autonomous and sovereign, but assumes a mutually constitutive relationship. In such a relationship, one side is not ‘perpetrator/sovereign/active’ and the other ‘victim/dependent/passive’, but everything that happens takes place as a kind of response between both sides. (Rosa, 2019, p. 45)

Reckwitz (2019) also emphasizes the path of tension between the universal and the heterogeneous. The universal is not a given, but consists of practices and norms that are constantly in the making (Reckwitz, 2019). Values for universalization could therefore be personal development, gender equality, solidarity, praise of achievement, certain treatment of nature, public interaction, value of architecture, works of art, and so on. The path to this goal is open, participatory, not geared toward uniformity and valued at all levels (local, regional, national and global) of society. With regard to the concept of ligatures and options, it is striking in sociological reflections that options become a longing when the ties

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create constraints and oppression. In this case, an increase in options usually has a positive effect on ligatures. The self-efficacy experienced helps to encourage or empower (e.g. Keupp 2018) individuals, which results in broader participation in social construction processes. However, an excess of options without ligatures, combined with an all-encompassing pursuit of growth, leads to unspecific, fluid and frameless social structures. The majority of society’s members cannot derive advantage from this that seems obvious at first glance. Instead of increasing liberty, disorientation arises with a feeling of helplessness (cf. Sect 6.3; Beck, 1986), fear, depression and/or aggression. The (psycho-) logic is this: whoever is not successful with so many possibilities can only have himself to blame. The primacy of the permanent and successful use of liberty with simultaneously missing or fluid anchors of meaning (ligatures) thus promotes a crisis of identity—whereby the excessive demands have collectivized themselves to the point of fatigue and radicalization. The search for comprehensible units leads, in turn, to self-directed orientation processes, which can also manifest itself in radical views from all directions. Even growth-oriented motives, such as the pursuit of self-efficacy and sovereignty, are in danger of being carried out in orientationless growth societies with demarcation and devaluation of others. Current sociological diagnoses of society address the issue of overcoming the individual and collective social crisis by intensifying the debate on general values and obligations in the sense of ligatures. The development of prioritization and concrete translation is proposed as a participatory process. Reflection on world experience (resonance) is a fundamental psychosocial link between individuals in this process. Ligatures thus become, as it were, the necessary option for the good life, if not for survival. Dahrendorf (1979, p.  27) has compared ligatures to a shore from which options can be navigated. If these shores disappear behind the desire to always want or need to achieve something new, the probable reaction is an urgent and emotionalized search for meaning, that is, for these very shores (ligatures).

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4.2.5 Intermediate Conclusion on Relations of Ligatures and Options and Their Relation to Landscapes 1, 2 and 3 In the context of the multi-optional zeitgeist, the variety of areas and themes of life that can be associated with radicalization and “isms” seems to be growing. The common characteristic is the strong focus, to the point of radicalization and moral exaggeration, on achieving the topic of “meaning” (cf. Lantermann, 2016). As a result, the ability to distance oneself is reduced and any discussion of the subject matter is experienced as criticism of one’s own person and not as a discussion of the subject matter (see also Lübbe, 2019). At the same time, the degree of moralization increases the tendency to exchange rationality (on the relationship between liberty and reason, see 3.4.1) for populist slogans, instead of accepting a fact-oriented culture of debate as a path to political consensus (see 4.1.3).

4.3 T  he Moralization of (Spatial) Communication and the Responsibility of Scientists Even in modern, liberal societies, the intensity of moralizations is increasing “and, in one sense, so is the moral tone in verbal political debate” (Lübbe, 2019, p. 53). The subject of such intensified moral communication is also spaces and landscapes.

4.3.1 Moralizations and Society For a long time, morality was the communication medium of religion, but with the loss of importance of religious ligatures this bond was loosened (among others, Crouch, 2011). This gap was initially filled by the classical mass media (Luhmann, 1993, 1996), but their binding power has also diminished. Today, morality is increasingly generated in pluralized echo chambers vying for moral sovereignty through Internet-based

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social media, mostly by recourse to familiar moral patterns, often in recomposition, and frequently in connection with the dichotomization of the world into a good in-group and a bad out-group (Münker, 2009; Schmidt, 2011; Nagle, 2017; Kühne, 2018b; Wagner, 2019). This loss of significance of religious ligatures and its current social consequences can also be provocatively interpreted as a reinterpretation of the theodicy problem, from an accusation of God to an accusation of man before a tribunal established by himself to assign blame for all physical (‘malum physicum’) and moral evils (‘malum morale’) of this world: Thus, in the place of the defendant of theodicy, from which God withdraws for theodicy reasons, man now enters. I may remind you of what was said at the beginning about tribunalization: now man is the defendant of this tribunal. He escapes from this tribunal only by becoming it: he accuses in things evil in the world  – proclaiming himself as the redeemer man, who, with a monopoly on accusation, is avant-gardistically only the future – of other men as emancipation-resistant, as evil creator men, and condemns them to immediately become the past: through revolution. (Marquard, 1981, p. 250)

This illustrates one dimension of the ambiguity of the Internet as a medium (see also Sect. 4.4) as pointedly clarified by Ash (2016, p. 127): “Never in human history was there such a chance for freedom of expression as this. And never have the evils of unlimited free expression – death threats, paedophile-tides of abuse – flowed so easily across frontiers.” The socialist and conservative critique of the liberal and free-market model of society is usually staged as a ‘critique of neoliberalism’. In this context, as Kersting notes (2009, p. 150), the “criticism of capitalism by the neoliberalism critic […] is not based on economic theory and philosophy of history, like those of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, but on morality.” In the capitalist system, monetary interest receives a special moral rejection, both from the socialist and the conservative side, because the community of solidarity (whether socialist or based on tradition) “will understand money lending against interest […] as an exploitation of emergency situations” (Hank, 2007, p. 163). This one-sided, moralizing view fails to recognize that “credit, indebtedness by mortgaging property

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in order to be able to invest, is the engine of prosperity – and thus the opening of opportunities” (Hank, 2007, p. 163). However, the reference to morality in public and especially scientific communication is by no means unproblematic: moralizations are difficult to reverse (cf. Bogner, 2005) in that they are not aimed at respecting one another, but rather at disregarding him or her; moral application applies to the examination of compliance with social norms. Compliance, in turn, is not rewarded with the gain of social recognition, whereas disregard is punished with the withdrawal of social recognition. The application of the moral code—as is common in communitarian argumentation (for more details, see Haus, 2003)—does not aim at the role played by another person, but rather at his or her person (Luhmann, 1993; Lübbe, 2019). The application of the moral code thus goes hand in hand with discrediting the actions or views of a person or group of persons. As an example, the effort to build a road is not technically judged (e.g. in terms of which accessibility improvements must be weighed against which environmental interventions), but morally (i.e. everyone who advocates the construction of the road is a ‘destroyer of nature’). Luhmann (1993, 1989 [1980], p. 370) succinctly summarizes the application of the moral code: “Morality is a risky business. Those who moralize take a risk and, if resisted, will easily find themselves in the position of having to look for stronger means or lose self-respect.” According to this line of reasoning, the moral code represents the highest instance of social communication. Once a communication has been moralized, objectification is much more difficult. Correspondingly, morality works in the sense that it “creates conflict, arises from conflict, and then intensifies the conflict” (Luhmann, 1989 [1980], p.  370; in relation to space communication, see Kühne, 2008d, similarly also: Stegemann, 2018). This problem becomes particularly acute when it is taken into account that the pluralization of society is also accompanied by a pluralization of morals, which means that a shared moral basis of society can no longer be found, and moral communication is often deprived of a common moral basis, a problem that remains unexamined as a result of moral self-exaltation and absolutism (Stegemann, 2018; Kühne, 2018b; Berr & Kühne, 2019). This problem of moralization is inherent in the fundamental critique of neoliberalism: “It is nothing more than powerless rejection, rebellious

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offence, shrill rhetoric, populism from the left. It exists only as a critique, as a critique of the dizzying dynamics of capitalism, as a critique of the economization of all living conditions, as a critique of social cutbacks and high managerial salaries. Its model is the poorest of all utopias, the “status quo” that resists all changes” (Kersting, 2009, p. 152). The increasingly widespread moral communication that preaches social virtue fails to recognize that virtue is always bound to liberty, not to internalized constraints: “Only those who can make a decision in an open situation are able to show responsibility and prove themselves virtuous” (Sofsky, 2007a, p. 46). Liberty can only be understood if the option is given to orient oneself differently and to decide against something: a ‘lack of alternatives’ is not characteristic of liberty (cf. Berr, 2019). Liberty and responsibility have a correspondingly close connection with rationality, which is required “to weigh the reasons” (Nida-Rümelin, 2005, p. 38). Liberty is not merely the absence of external constraints, but “it also demands the absence of internal compulsions” (Sofsky, 2007a, p. 47). This is also a prerequisite for the fact that—as Ralf Dahrendorf (1967) shows—the responsibility of a scientist does not end with contributing to the progress of his science, but must be judged by the consequences of his actions beyond science. What is specifically addressed by this responsibility of a scientist can be exemplified by the statements of the two philosophers Karl Popper and Wilhelm Kamlah. Popper is regarded as the founder of ‘Critical Rationalism’, Kamlah—along with Paul Lorenzen— as the co-founder of ‘Methodical Constructivism’.

4.3.2 M  oralizations in Philosophy and Sociology Around the ‘Positivism’ Controversy Popper presented theses on the ‘Logic of the Social Sciences’ at a Tübingen conference in 1961, which led Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas, as representatives of the ‘Frankfurt School’ and a ‘dialectical method’, to accuse Popper and Hans Albert of ‘positivism’. In this way the so-called ‘positivism controversy’ arose (Adorno et al., 1972). Since Popper saw no basis for a further discussion with the ‘Frankfurters’, he did not take part in the further discussions. Ten years later a letter became known, which

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was published without his consent and without his knowledge in the DIE ZEIT (September 24, 1971) under the title ‘Wider die großen Worte’ (‘Against the big words’), in which he made harsh criticism of the language and the style of argumentation of Adorno and Habermas and justified his refusal to discuss the matter. Popper’s criticism of Adorno, incidentally, does not lack an unintentional irony, because Adorno wanted to stylize himself as the guardian of clear speech by mocking the writing style of another, namely Heidegger, as ‘jargon of the actuality’ (Adorno, 1998) and as the “ascension of words” (Adorno, 1998, p. 420). Not mentioned by Popper himself, but quite in the tradition of Arthur Schopenhauer’s (1982) critique of philosophy professors deliberately using obscure language to deceive the reader, Popper first of all emphasizes the “very special responsibility” of all ‘intellectuals’ (Popper, 1984, p. 100). The “worst – the sin against the Holy Spirit”—is “when intellectuals try to act as great prophets to their fellow men and impress them with oracular philosophies. He who cannot say it simply and clearly, let him be silent and continue working until he can say it clearly” (Popper, 1984, p. 100). Of course, this reminds us of the famous statement of his Austrian compatriot Ludwig Wittgenstein in the preface to the ‘Tractatus logico-philosophicus’: “What can be said at all can be said clearly; and what one cannot speak of, one must remain silent” (Wittgenstein, 1995 [1953], p. 9). To Bloch, Popper reports in his letter, he had therefore once demanded “more intellectual modesty” (Wittgenstein, 1995 [1953], p. 100); basically, a “red thread” of his works was the advocacy “for critical arguments – against empty words and against intellectual immodesty and presumption – against the betrayal of the intellectual” (Popper, 1984, p. 109; emphasis in the original). What he is referring to is “phrasemongering, the pretense of a wisdom that we do not possess. The recipe is: tautologies and trivialities spiced with paradoxical nonsense. Another recipe is: write hard-to-understand rantings and add trivialities from time to time. This tastes good to the reader, who is flattered to find in such a ‘deep’ book thoughts that he has already thought himself ” (Popper, 1984, p. 103). Kamlah’s criticism of his former teacher Heidegger is even harsher (Kamlah, 1975). The criticism is of Heidegger’s famous 1953 lecture on ‘The Question of Technology’ (Heidegger, 1994, pp.  9ff.), which he

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formulated and published in an open letter. Kamlah, like Popper, also speaks of a “common public and especially academic responsibility” (Kamlah, 1975, p. 113) by scientists or philosophers. For Kamlah, this responsibility exists for the “simple commonality of the house of reason […], which we should carefully guard together, as long as we are still allowed to live together in this house, which has been built over thousands of years” (Kamlah, 1975 [1954]: 122). But instead of promoting this reason, expressing himself precisely and avoiding “philosophical chatter” (Kamlah, 1975, p. 114), Heidegger weaves “webs of words […] beyond the necessary precision of questioning and thinking” and operates a “technique of linguistic magic” (Kamlah, 1975, p. 115), a “mystery language” (Kamlah, 1975, p. 121) reliant on the “pathetic emotion” of his person (Kamlah, 1975, p.  116) and ultimately inventing a “completely peculiar […] conceptual mythology” (Kamlah, 1975, p.  119). And all of this despite the fact that Heidegger himself always despised those “who only want to let shivers run down their spines, or the reporters of the very latest and unheard of, who with their busy talk are always at the front and at the top, at the forefront of time and at any rate at the peak of complacency” (Kamlah, 1975, p. 114). In light of these criticized forms of scientific language, research, argumentation and ‘thinking styles’ (Fleck, 1980 [1935]), Kamlah asks the explicit question whether “every reasonable research and thinking is not subject to its factual accuracy” (Kamlah, 1975, p. 115).

4.3.3 Moralizations and Their (Dysfunctional) Effects The question raised at the end of the previous section about the appropriateness of scientific research and thinking leads back to the phenomenon of moralization. In addition to the effects already mentioned, moralizations have the further characteristic of disregarding factual questions and appropriate thematizations and solutions and allowing only the moral code as a standard for thematization and evaluation (Luhmann, 1989 [1980], 2017). This results in unnecessarily high moral hurdles being set up, with moralization leading to self-limitation of one’s own possibilities for orientation and action. In other words, instead of expanding or

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fortifying options for action, hard-to-remove ligatures are introduced and adopted individually or group-specifically, which restrict individual liberty of both ‘ego’ and ‘alter’. In addition, moralizations according to Luhmann thus also spark an endless dispute over such cemented convictions; together with Max Weber they lead to an ‘ethics of conviction’ (Weber, 1988, pp. 582ff.) for whom only the ‘pure attitude’ counts (cf. Lübbe, 2019) and one’s own responsibility can be externalized: ‘guilt’ and responsibility are held by others, the world, society, capitalism, and the stupidity and ignorance of fellow men. This attitude is often accompanied by missionary zeal as well as moral complacency and aggressiveness. Arnold Gehlen had therefore spoken of ‘hypermoralism’ and pointed to the consequences of a ‘radicalization of morality’ and the resulting ‘release of aggression’ (Gehlen, 2016, p.  35). Marquard spoke of a ‘over-­ tribunalization’ (Marquard, 1981, p. 47) of all life’s reality in the wake of a ‘supposed hypertrophy’, which in turn inevitably causes a ‘misery of being’ (Marquard 1986, p. 127) in which the world and its conditions are bad, where everything and everyone is subject to constant probation in the face of an anticipated better reality that has not yet been realized. With Dahrendorf, the conflicts that inevitably arise, and are not always resolved, show a tendency toward a ‘dichotomization’ (Dahrendorf, 1972, pp. 20ff.) of conflicting positions, groups and parties leading, in this sense, to an ‘agitated society’ (Hübl, 2019) and a ‘polarization’ (Grau, 2019) of irreconcilable positions and groups. The political scientist Ulrike Ackermann characterizes this ultimately as a ‘polarization trap’ (2020), in which the world is divided into friend and foe “and self-reflection is rejected as weakening one’s own position” (Stegemann, 2018, p. 12), a dichotomization that the ‘left’ has meanwhile copied from the ‘right’ (Stegemann, 2018; which the latter in turn criticizes as ‘leftism’). Ultimately, this connection between moralization and polarization in the socio-political sphere leads to a tendency to divide the world once again into dichotomies, as was characteristic of “modernity in the oldest and truly antiquated sense”, of modernity in the sense of modernity—that is, “not in comparison with the last and still binding one of the 20th century” (Welsch, 1987, p.  6). Postmodernism bids farewell to the “basic obsession” of ‘modernity of the modern age’: “the dreams of unity, which ranged from the concept of mathesis universalis to the projects of the

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philosophies of world history to the global drafts of social utopias. The radical postmodern plurality breaks with these unity brackets, which hope for a totality that can never be redeemed other than in totalitarian way” (Welsch, 1987, p. 6). This thinking represents an “anti-totalitarian option” (Welsch, 1987, p. 5) against both monistic and dualistic totalitarianism. Associated with this is a radical tolerance, in the sense of accepting that other people hold a view that is itself considered wrong (Bratu & Dittmeyer, 2019), as a basic moral attitude toward diverse “ways of life and forms of action, of types of thinking and social concepts, of orientation systems and minorities. In this, it is obviously of a critical spirit” (Welsch, 1987, p. 5). If we add to this the fact that human recognition and action are always subject to a ‘fundamental uncertainty’ in which it can never be known exactly whether the knowledge gained is ‘true’ and the actions carried out are ‘right’ or ‘just’, then an “ethics of uncertainty” is created, as noted by Dahrendorf (Dahrendorf, 1972, p. 313). With a similar intention and objective, Christoph Hubig, following on thoughts of Aristotle (2001) and Descartes (1990 [1637], Kap. III), conceives and propagates a ‘pragmatic-provisional morality’ which “fundamentally downgrades its principles back to rules”—and all these rules stand side by side in a conflicting manner in view of “the dynamic situation of being on the move (characteristic of modern science and technology) […] and open up a search space” (Hubig, 2007, p. 133). It addresses an ethically enlightened approach to epistemic and moral uncertainty. This “ethics of uncertainty is the ethics of liberty” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p.  313), meaning uncertainty is a precondition of liberty, because uncertainty forces criticism and criticism turns against every form of dogmatism and monistic as well as dualistic totalitarianism. The renewed division of the world into dichotomies thus leads to the renunciation of the positive achievements of postmodernism, such as in particular the recognition of plurality and of corresponding radical tolerance. A moralizing dichotomized and polarized world resembles a Manichaean world in which already accepted contingency and complexity are to be reduced again: there is “only good and evil, bright and dark” (Grau, 2019, p.  15). Caught up in such a world view, the individual tends to think that the whole world should submit to its own moral concepts, which are considered ‘good’ and ‘right’. Instead of dealing with the

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complexity of economic or political world views, those who think differently or disagree with them are discredited as ‘evil’ (see Kühne, 2019b). As a result of this discrediting of ideological opponents, their position is not seen as an “alternative, but perfectly legitimate interpretation of the world” (in the sense of Dahrendorf, 1969c, 1972, 1992), but “the ideological opponent becomes a pathological case. And one does not discuss with patients, one must heal patients” (Grau, 2017, p. 47). Stegemann (2018, p.  44) chooses another image by stating that “moralizing communication now treats everyone equally like children, since it does not accept their actions and statements as responsible behavior, but subjects them to constant evaluation”, with the effect that the objects of moralization begin to behave like children: “They react out of fear of punishment or the search for praise, or they rise up against the teasing” (Stegemann, 2018, p. 44). The unifying moralization also overlooks the fact that the dissent that comes with pluralism has a “high legacy value and a high option value” (Hubig, 2007, p. 149)—‘legacy values’ in so far as distinct subjective positional alternatives are already recognized, and should be preserved as recognizable from the perspective of democratic theory; ‘option values’ in so far as the ‘pluralism of values’ (Hubig, 2001) can keep the scope for evaluation, and thus liberty, open. These statements mean, first of all, that the increase in complexity of political processes in the course of the ‘participatory revolution’ corresponds conversely to a reduction in complexity of given or discursively constituted facts on the part of individuals, who, intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously, engage in moralizations and associated dichotomizations. Secondly, two problematic characteristics of modernity and postmodernity are combined in a way that endangers liberty: the urge for Enlightenment and liberty with its critical impetus is increasingly abandoned or negated, and the modern idea of progress is used post-modernly, that is, it is not ‘modern’ in relation to the future but to the present. The current ‘world’ is examined closely, but is not defined as ‘postmodern’ in its pluralistic constitution, but rather sorted into clearly definable concept and evaluation boxes in a ‘modern’ moralizing manner. Thirdly, a renaissance of ‘grand narratives’ (cf. Lyotard, 1979), which are supposed to put plurality back into a uniform explanatory framework in order to declare discussions about other positions obsolete, is added. For

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example, the narrative that ‘justice’ is equality, and that social inequalities are therefore unquestionably to be balanced by distributional mechanisms, still exists or has re-appeared (for an overview of this discussion, see Krebs, 2000). This ignores the distinction already introduced by Aristotle between ‘compensatory justice’ (lat. ‘iustitia correctiva’) and ‘distributive justice’ (lat. ‘iustitia distributiva’) (Aristoteles, 2001, Book V; see Kersting, 2002). In compensatory justice, people meet in complete equality of rights; here it is a matter of restoring the damage caused. In distributive justice, differences between persons play a role; what matters here is the possession of “attributes relevant to distribution” (Kersting, 2002, p. 63). This narrative is immediately followed by another ‘narrative’, namely the one about the supposedly unjust distribution of wealth in a society. The ‘rich’ have everything and far too much and are therefore ‘evil’. The ‘poor’ have almost nothing and much too little and are therefore ‘victims’ and, as ‘victims’, the ‘good guys’. The fact that there are historically and systematically different approaches, positions and theories—that is, plurality—in this question of justice is either not known or is ignored. To this complex of ‘moralization’ described so far belongs a psychological phenomenon related to the distinction between the three worlds of Popper. The individual longing for liberty (World 2) enters the social world (World 3) with his ideas, desires, hopes and world views, and is sometimes even able to influence it, because its structures and processes are neither without alternatives nor self-evident, but rather contingent (among many, Dahrendorf, 1959, 1969b, 1987; Giddens, 1984; Seibel, 2016). There the individual encounters sociality and perceives that others take something from him or her in liberty, which he or she either does not dare to do himself or herself or which, in subjective perception, restricts their own liberty. The others supposedly disturb one’s own liberty. This leads to an inner-psychic conflict and to the question of how one’s own orientation of action can be secured. The individual, it seems, must either regulate himself, but mainly the others. This means that the hoped-for orientation of security is that the others should no longer be able to disturb the individual who is insecure in his sense of liberty and his orientation of action. The cognitive dissonance in the experience of the liberty claims and action expectations and thus the impositions of the others leads to attempts to reduce dissonance through prohibitions and

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commandments, through indications and biotopization: in one place cycling is allowed, in another only walking; here playing is forbidden for children, there walking on the grass for children and for adults. The individual may be able to endure his own liberty, but not the liberty allowances from others, which sets limits to his own liberty. This dissonance experience of an allegedly liberty-limiting ‘World 3’ by other individuals and their claims to liberty, in contrast with their own claim to liberty, becomes possible in particular at the moment when only “the subjective feeling” (Grau, 2019, p. 100) of the individual functions as the final authority on truth, correctness and reality. Now even the private can become political (Grau, 2019, p. 103). Such an enabled “subjectivation of moral concerns” not only leads to a “triumph of ethics of conviction over ethics of responsibility” (Grau, 2019, p. 105) but also to “cognitive dissonance” through confrontation with a subjectively distorted perceived reality, which in extreme cases can even lead to “hatred” (Grau, 2019, p. 106) of others. Hegel, on the other hand, has reminded us that the condition of one’s own liberty is bound to the condition of the liberty of others. In the philosophy of law, with regard to this question, it is said that “the free will that wants free will” (Hegel, 1995, § 27). This means that those who act freely are dependent on the preservation of the conditions of the liberty of others to preserve their own liberty. For all the discomfort about the “annoying fact” of society as a “struggle of liberty with itself ” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p. 283) in view of the “unsociable sociability of people” (Kant 1983 [1784], p. 37) and the associated restriction of individual liberty, it must not be overlooked, according to Hegel, that one’s own liberty is always dependent on the liberty of others. This means that if the liberty of others is not taken seriously and is not taken into account, one’s own liberty will itself be destroyed in the long run. People have always lived in society, and that which the individual is, is also only through society. Individual liberty is always tied back to the liberty of others. With Aristoteles (2009, 1235a) and also Dahrendorf, the human being is a “social being” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p.  282) and can “only through society realize itself. The social existence of man is a condition of the possibility of his liberty. At the same time, however, his social existence is the condition of the possibility of man’s lack of liberty; for society has always meant compulsion and restriction. The act of socialization

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[…] is necessarily an act of submission to rules, norms, and controls” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p. 282) and “without discussion and conflict, every society is condemned to stagnation” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p. 311). As with Kant, people “in an Arcadian shepherd’s life, with perfect harmony, frugality and love of change […] hardly give their existence a greater value than that which their domestic animals have” (Kant 1983 [1784], p. 38). The formation and perpetuation of Landscape 3 is the landscape expression of this socialization, which—especially in common sense conceptions of landscape—is strongly stereotyped and thus provides generally accepted guidelines for the interpretation and evaluation of Landscape 2 (such a stereotyping of the relationship between landscape and space also becomes clear in Sect. 4.4). Another dissonance experience can be summarized in terms of environmental psychology. The concept of ‘Behavior Setting’ (see in detail in Sect. 4.2) can be described as a heuristic pattern of perception such as the ‘native normal landscape’ (Kühne, 2018f) which guides perception and orientation in space both factually and normatively. This means that a specific space as part of World 1 can be identified and updated as a specific construct of World 3—for example, a forest associated with walking in this setting. In the sense of a heuristic, this setting also allows an individual examination of what is or is not allowed for oneself and others in this forest. In this context, there can be individual and social misperceptions that are contrary to the constitution of ‘postmodern modernity’ (Welsch, 1987), due to the fact that settings that provide orientation are subject to rapid change and are pluralized without a generally accepted or even binding setting (interference Landscapes 2 and 3). If such a socially induced change of setting is not carried out individually within the framework of public communication, different settings in the social space can collide and lead to social conflicts and individual defensive reactions that follow the psychological stimulus-response pattern. Again, it is the liberty of others, this time the liberty to form a different setting as a heuristic orientation, with which the individual is confronted in the socio-political space and which can lead to their resistance. However, since others also take their liberty very seriously, the different settings are also vigorously defended in their orientation function in case of disturbances by other settings. The challenge facing each individual and his or her individual setting ensemble is the recognition of

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the equal rights of all settings and the insight to either accept them or relativize one’s own setting in its claim to validity. It may even be the case that through personal confrontation with other settings, the non-self-evident nature of one’s own setting comes to light first of all and a specific form of the use of liberty becomes recognizable. Such a socially induced change of setting combined with the moralization of (spatial) communication is particularly evident in the conflicts surrounding the energy revolution (cf. Berr, 2018; Hage & Schuster, 2018; Jenal, 2020; Kamlage et  al., 2020; Kühne, 2018a; Kühne and Weber, 2018a; Marg et  al., 2013; Otto & Leibenath, 2013; Schmidt et  al., 2018; Weber, Kühne et  al. 2016; Weber et  al., 2017, 2017). Accordingly, the following case study looks in particular at moral communication in relation to Landscapes 1, 2 and 3, and reflects on the conflict against the background of the previous explanations.

4.3.4 C  ase Study: Energy Turnaround: A Moral Conflict About Landscapes 1, 2 and 3 Changes to Landscape 1 often contradict aesthetic normative conceptions and/or expectations of material stability: “Every change is understood by large parts of the population, if not as a threat, then at least as a nuisance: no new road, no new railroad line and no new housing estate[s] without complaints and protests” (Laurin, 2018, p. 118). Such protests are particularly clear and spatially widespread in the context of the physical manifestos of the energy revolution. In these protests, attitudes of taste and value, forms of argumentation and conflict characteristics can be observed and exemplified, as theoretically classified and described in the previous chapters.

4.3.4.1  E  nergy System Transformation in Germany: Some Basics The political, planning and entrepreneurial implementation of the energy turnaround in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) can serve as an example of how, especially against the background of citizen

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participation running out of the control, a conflict settlement in the sense of Dahrendorf does not and cannot work. After the Fukushima reactor catastrophe in Japan in March 2011, the political decision was made in Germany to phase out nuclear power as part of the energy supply by 2022. Although renewable energies such as hydropower, biomass, geothermal, photovoltaics and wind power were already legally promoted by the Electricity Feed Act (1991) and the Renewable Energy Sources Act (2000) (see, e.g. Gailing & Moss, 2016; Gochermann, 2016; The Economist, 2012), the targets for implementing the ‘energy turnaround’ have now become more ambitious: by 2025, renewable energies are to account for 40–45% of gross electricity consumption and for 55–60% by 2035 (BMWi, 2016, p. 6). A look at gross electricity generation (Fig. 4.1) shows how massive the change is: in 1991 the share of renewable energies was just 3.2%, in 2001 6.6% and by 2015 it will be 30.0% (cf. Weber, 2018a, p.  150  f.). Energy generation from hard coal and lignite has declined just as significantly in recent years as electricity generation from nuclear power. With the expansion of renewable energies, whether in the form of wind power, biomass cultivation or photovoltaics, and their transport via new power transmission networks—as well as the problematization of suburbanization processes such as the expansion of airports, roads or 700.0 600.0 500.0 400.0 300.0 200.0 100.0 0.0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Coal

Lignites

Mineral Oil

Natural Gas

Nuclear Energy

Wind Power (on land)

Hydropower

Biomass

Photovoltaics

Geothermal Energy

Garbage

Other

Wind Power (at sea)

Fig. 4.1  Gross electricity generation by energy source—in TWh in Germany between 1990 and 2019. (Source: Kühne, 2020 on the basis of Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2020)

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railroads, and the extraction of mineral resources such as gravel and sand—conflicts over ‘landscape’ have taken on new topicality (among many, Berr & Jenal, 2019; Berr, Jenal, and Kindler 2019; Bues & Gailing, 2016; Gailing & Leibenath, 2015; Jenal & Berr, 2019; Kühne, 2018d; Kühne and Weber 2018b [online first 2017]; Kühne et al., 2019; Weber et al., 2018). The physical manifestations of the energy system transformation in Landscape 1—in particular wind turbines and new power lines—are leading to fundamental uncertainties and, increasingly, to resistance and conflicts, some of which are escalating and appear to be difficult or impossible to resolve. Institutions, project planners and communities are confronted with protests from the citizenry, some of which oppose the energy system transformation in its entirety, others pleading for other forms of implementation (e.g. wind energy primarily in the windy north of the country and photovoltaics primarily in the south, or grid expansion in the form of underground cabling), with others opposing specific projects on site (see in detail Kühne and Weber 2018b [online first 2017]; Weber, Jenal et al. 2017). Regarding the points of criticism raised, it is evident that changes in the physical basis of landscape (Landscape 1) are regularly referred to, however, it is done through the lens of individual landscape perceptions (Landscape 2), which are affected and coined/shaped by socially obtained landscape perception patterns (Landscape 3). In order to find out in what way citizens’ initiatives associate, for example, ‘home’ and ‘landscape’ with each other and what significance this association has for their arguments against physical manifestations of the energy system transformation, 123 citizens’ initiatives were examined in the context of the expansion of the electricity grid using methods of empirical social research (Weber, Kühne et al., 2016). In May/June 2017, a Google search was used to select those citizens’ initiatives that have their own website or Facebook profile (Weber, Kühne et al., 2016). Furthermore, in December 2015/January 2016, citizens’ initiatives in the context of the expansion of wind power were also recorded and evaluated using a Google search—280 citizens’ initiatives were surveyed in total, and 270 citizens’ initiatives that are active against projects were examined in more detail (Schmidt et al., 2018).

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In order to further substantiate these results, a more detailed examination of two citizens’ initiatives in the Bavarian region was also carried out, in which the protagonists argue against the expansion of the electricity grid and wind power (cf. Schmidt et al., 2018; Weber, Kühne et al., 2016).

4.3.4.2  Argumentation of Citizens’ Initiatives In a comparison of the arguments put forward by the citizens’ initiatives and considered relevant (and thus presented in the publications on websites or Facebook pages) to support their critical attitude toward the expansion of the electricity grid and wind power in Germany, the argument of the connection between ‘homeland’ and ‘landscape’ stands out clearly in both areas (Fig.  4.2) (in detail also Weber, 2018a, 2018b; Weber, Kühne et al., 2016). Critiques of the extension of the power grid are dominated by arguments about ‘landscape and homeland’, while critics of the extension of wind power argue environmental protection and nature conservation. The latter arguments can often also be interpreted as ‘masked’ arguments for the achievement of another goal, namely the preservation of native landscape. Landscape and homeland thus become ‘objects of conflict’, which often contribute to igniting resistance. Since

83.7% 85.6%

Landscape and home 74.0% 69.3%

business-related aspects

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Environmental and nature conservation 0%

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Power grid extension (n = 123)

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60%

80%

82.6%

91.5% 100%

Wind power expansion (n = 270)

Fig. 4.2  Argumentation references of citizens’ initiatives in the context of electricity grid and wind power expansion according to central fields of argumentation. After: Kühne, Weber, and Berr, 2019; after Weber, 2018a

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these are of immediate and great importance in our everyday lives, and at the same time the citizens are highly capable of organizing as a result of the educational expansion (which Dahrendorf was instrumental in initiating in Germany), a high intensity of conflict, and at the same time a dichotomous and organized structure of the conflict positions and thus a culmination of irreconcilable pro-and-con attitudes, is characteristic here (Kühne, 2018c, 2019b; Kühne & Weber, 2019). One reason for this is the tendency in ‘experience societies’ described above, that people who are involved in citizens’ initiatives are in part actually ‘trapped’ in their respective subjective worlds—to such an extent that they are in a relationship with other social milieus (planners, entrepreneurs, politicians, etc.) of “mutual incomprehension” and “fundamental incomprehension” (Schulze, 2000, p. 364). This often leads to the fact that “people with incommensurable systems of interpretation, who try to interpret each other, […] not even their incomprehension” (Schulze, 2000, p.  364) understand. The claimed interpretation of the object of conflict is then often accompanied—as described—by a moralization that sets unnecessarily high moral hurdles. This moralizing ultimately leads not only to the introduction and adoption of ligatures that are difficult to revoke and thus to self-limitation of one’s own possibilities of orientation and action, but also to the kindling of an endless dispute over cemented convictions and attitudes. In this way, moralizing leads into the orientation trap of an ‘ethic of convictions’ (Weber, 1988, pp. 582ff.) for whom only the ‘pure attitude’ counts (cf. Lübbe, 2019) and ultimately to a ‘dichotomization’ (Dahrendorf, 1972, pp.  20ff.) of conflicting positions, groups and parties in an increasingly ‘agitated society’ (Hübl, 2019), and thus a ‘polarization’ (Grau, 2019) of irreconcilable positions and groupings. This polarization can be seen in the citizens’ initiatives that criticize the expansion of the power grid, for example, in the fact that “their normal native landscape” is regarded as an endangered good and as a “home” worthy of protection in the sense of a local living environment that is “destroyed” by the economically motivated construction of power lines. In the arguments, not only colloquial terms like ‘home’ are used, but also terms like ‘landscape’, which originates from the vocabulary of ‘landscape-­ related special knowledge’ of experts (part of Landscape 3). In this way,

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an ‘official’ language (Burckhardt, 2004) is also used, which indicates an effort to be taken seriously and recognized by other actors as a party to the conflict (in the sense of Dahrendorf ) and as a representative of a legitimate concern. The opponents of wind power expansion provide a similar argument, but with a different direction of attack. They do not so much complain about the ‘destruction’ of the local landscape as the demand for the preservation of a physical space (Space 1), which is interpreted as a ‘cultural landscape’. This term is also part of the ‘landscape-related special knowledge’ of experts and is by no means a common colloquial expression. The planned wind turbines would allegedly irreversibly destroy the essentialist-­ conceived ‘cultural landscape’, since its ‘essence’, the specifically unique unity of nature and culture that has grown over generations, cannot be saved by subsequent adaptations such as renaturation measures. ‘Homeland’ and the associated ‘rural management’, on the one hand, and wind power as a supposedly one-sided economic and cultural landscape-­hostile form of management, on the other hand, are fundamentally mutually exclusive. The intensity of the conflict is generally high due to personal involvement, which is reflected in the sometimes very emotional choice of words (Kühne & Spellerberg, 2010; Kühne and Weber 2018b [online first 2017], 2019; Kühne et  al., 2019; Weber et al., 2016). This personal involvement and emotionality are favored by the fact that the ‘affected’ are ‘trapped’ in their subjective worlds. This ‘imprisonment’ is also reflected in their taste preferences, which seem to ‘fit’ not only specific social positions in these worlds, but also “the practical actions, activities and goods that correspond to them as holders of such positions” (Bourdieu, 1987 [1979], p.  728). The emotional choice of words, which is often found in moralizing arguments, also provides a breeding ground for populism, which is also found in citizens’ initiatives. This is because populists tend to “skip challenging and exhausting debates and create consensus based on supposed or actual, more or less deeply felt feelings of the population” (Dahrendorf, 2003b, p. 90). These attempts are legitimized by the activists of citizens’ initiatives who claim to act as representatives of a general interest, although studies can show that these

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are often partial or individual interests that are merely presented as general interests (cf. Kühne, 2014). The study of the two above-mentioned Bavarian citizens’ initiatives which oppose the expansion of the electricity grid (Weber, Kühne et al., 2016) and the expansion of wind power (Schmidt et al., 2018) yielded the following results: • In the context of the expansion of electricity grids and wind power, the supposed destruction or the demanded preservation of ‘home and landscape’ is also argumentatively linked with criticized forms of energy system transformation. • The use of a typical argumentation figure is striking, namely to advocate the energy transition in the course of decentralized and regional energy generation and storage in order to avoid power lines that run through the local landscape or wind turbines on site. • The economic aspects of the actual projects of the energy turnaround are associated, on the one hand, with the supposed loss of value of real estate and feared health damages, on the other hand, with the profit interests (referred to as ‘greed’) of investors and associated comprehensive criticism of capitalism. • The dichotomization of the conflict is therefore an irreconcilable opposition between an energy turnaround organized by investors (referred to as ‘monopolists’, ‘lobbyists’ and ‘windmill lobby’), on the one hand, and a surprising prima facie alliance of conservative and neo-Marxist critics of capitalism, on the other. • In view of the current legal situation in nature conservation and environmental protection, strategically ‘masked’ nature conservation arguments are brought forward in order to enforce the protection of the native landscape. • The moralization effects are very high (where ‘morality’ and ‘decency’ are only attributed to one’s own position, as the opponent is indubitably morally degraded), so the conflict shows a high intensity in the sense of Dahrendorf. Scientists from a wide range of disciplines involved in energy transition are often expected by activists to reaffirm the positions and opinions

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represented by the citizens’ initiatives in their capacity as researchers. According to Dahrendorf (1968), however, a “critical distance from the self-evident nature of one’s own society” as a basic prerequisite of science is endangered when so-called shit storms about the respective person are received in public space via ‘social media’, or inboxes are flooded with threating scam emails, because of disappointment at the failure of the researchers to affirm the positions of citizens’ initiatives and, by extension, the legitimacy of their own personal judgments (see also Sect. 4.4 on the dangers of Internet-based communication for liberty). In this context, science should only serve as a source of legitimacy for values and judgments, whereas in the argumentation of citizens’ initiatives only selective scientific results are used or referenced.

4.3.5 Interim Conclusion on Moralizations and Their Effects The preceding sections show that moralizations are directed against persons or groups of persons and their views and actions, without addressing factual questions and appropriate solution options. Only the moral code is allowed as a standard for thematization and judgment. In this way, individual liberty of ‘ego’ and ‘alter’ is restricted. The preaching of virtue fails to recognize its dependence on liberty. The critique of capitalism as a critique of (neo)liberalism is based, in particular, on morality. Taking responsibility is incompatible with internalized or external moral constraints. The social responsibility of scientists and scholars is therefore also manifested in appropriate and free scientific thinking, research and publishing. The tendency toward dichotomization and polarization that accompanies moralizations leads to a renewed division of the world into dichotomies and thus to a tendency to abandon the postmodern recognition of plurality and the tolerance associated with it. These developments lead to a predominance of ethics of conviction over ethics of responsibility, which is reflected in ways of dealing with individual experiences of dissonance.

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4.4 Challenges of Internet-Mediated Communication for Liberty The influence of the mass media, and since the end of the twentieth century, its expansion to include the world wide web, in which technical progress and increasingly user-friendly (mobile) end devices allow content to be produced, uploaded, multiplied and distributed in ever simpler ways, on the mediation and construction of the world is still unbroken today. In addition, it serves as an essential source of information and impressions, which are very often not (solely) textual, but rather in visualized form, especially photos and videos. These visualizations are particularly suitable for synthesizing, de-complexing and, last but not least, focusing a multitude of information. Accordingly, they are particularly suitable for updating and consolidating conceptual stereotypes such as ‘liberty’ (Kühne, 2008b; Bittner, 2014; Glasze, 2014). In this respect, visual media represents an essential access to research on stereotypical interpretations and knowledge (Kühne, 2012; Kühne & Schönwald, 2015; Linke, 2017; Loda et al., 2020). In the following, we will first take a closer look at the basic features of communication, the special features of Internet-based communication in relation to individual and social dimensions, and the communicative interferences of Worlds 1, 2 and 3. This will be supplemented by a case study of Internet-based communication of liberty based on an investigation of the Google image search on liberty and an interim conclusion.

4.4.1 Basic Principles of Communication Basically, communication, following Lasswell (1948), is about the question of ‘who’ expressing ‘what’ to ‘whom’ at what ‘time’ with what ‘means’ and with what ‘result’. This framework model of communication provides structure and thus basis for further analysis of communicative actions. But what happens within this process when the medium of exchange offers fluid boundaries and boundless options? This is precisely the special characteristic of the Internet as a medium of communication:

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If one looks for a general characteristic of the medium Internet, one could find it in the dissolution of boundaries […]. The Internet is amorphous in every respect: with its ubiquity it blurs the boundaries of space and time, it indistinguishably mixes information and entertainment, knowledge and opinion, fact and fiction, private and public […], it erases the difference between sender and receiver because of the possibility of interactive communication, it conceals identities because of its anonymity or replaces real with fictitious identity. Its structure is thus structurelessness. (Zehnpfennig, 2017, p. 708)

This raises the question as to what effects are produced in and between the other structural features of the communication process by the lack of boundaries of the medium from the perspective of liberty. Since the beginnings of modern language and communication models (in overview, e.g. Röhner & Schütz, 2016), reference has been made to the separation—and thus to the potential autonomy—between sender and receiver. Karl Bühler (1965[1934], p.  26) has emphasized the independence by speaking distantly of “psychophysical system α” and “psychophysical system β” and only later in the text uses the terms “sender” and “receiver” (Bühler, 1965[1934], p. 31). The more modern communication models that often refer back to Bühler’s work also emphasize this interrelated independence. On the one hand, the two ‘systems’ are independent in processing what they recognize as ‘true’; on the other hand, as soon as they are in contact with each other, they are communicatively connected. Prototypical for this is the concept of the four sides of a message (factual content, self-disclosure, relationship and appeal) according to Schulz von Thun (e.g. Schulz von Thun, 2019) as well as the first axiom of communication according to Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (2011[1967]), which states that in the case of direct contact it is not possible not to communicate. The sender’s side is usually characterized by the fact that it initiates a deliberate action in the act of communication. Bühler (1965[1934], p. 31) therefore speaks of the “transmitter as perpetrator”. This attribution of consciousness implies a high degree of willingness, purposefulness and responsibility, which in turn is linked to the concepts of liberty, causality and intentionality (cf. Heidbrink, 2010). The construct ‘responsibility’ (in summary see Heidbrink, 2017) formed with its minimal triad “who to whom for what” (e.g. Heidbrink, 2010; Kaschner, 2016; Debatin, 1997 supplements this

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triad with “before” and “why”) is also directly related to the authorship of a message, that is, its recognizability and attributability to a person or group of persons. On the other side of the above-mentioned interrelated independence of communication is the recipient, whose task it is to decode the communicated information: “If one understands communication as a synthesis of three selections, as a unit of information, communication and understanding, then communication is realized when and as far as understanding is achieved” (Luhmann, 1987, p. 203). In this respect, communication is always a two-way active event, that is, during transmission as well as during receipt.

4.4.2 S  pecial Features of Internet-Based Communication: The Individual Dimension A special feature of the Internet now lies in the simple anonymization of the sender, which can be expressed through hiding, pretending and inventing an identity (cf. Zehnpfennig, 2017). Compared to direct conversation, the Internet makes it particularly easy to deceive identity and, above all, to maintain it in a stable form without significant effort, since no questioning is required. In principle, the act of deception is characterized by three conditions (Thummes, 2013; see Fig. 4.3), namely the difference to reality on the side of the deceiver, the existence of an addressee and the intention to deceive, and can be interpreted in generic terms as the practices of lying, secrecy and pretense. On closer inspection, however, it also becomes apparent that deliberately deceiving third parties by concealing or keeping one’s own identity secret, which is to be viewed critically in principle, can be legitimized under certain circumstances and can even become a strength of the Internet. This is the case, for example, if the sphere in which Internet-based communication takes place (e.g. the political power system) would react with repression and violence to a political communicator who strives for open democratic political discourse. Another example is the form of anonymization supported by the state in Germany within the framework of the special protection of witnesses, which allows for a temporary identity according to §5 ZSHG (Witness Protection Harmonization Act).

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Fig. 4.3  Forms of deception in the context of social action. (After: Thummes, 2013, p. 41)

What is significant is the intentionality of the deception, which thus implies a justification. The Internet now offers a unique and technically unobstructed possibility to hide oneself and to create a large radius of action without traceable authorship. It is the only mass medium where no hurdles to publication have to be overcome and where there is no aggregating and filtering function of classical media (Schweidler, 2018). Zehnpfennig (2017) speaks of ennoblement and value enhancement of a published statement in classical mass media, because it could withstand the scrutiny of third parties. In the scientific community, for example, the review process is considered the quality assurance procedure par excellence, knowing full well that this does not necessarily say much about the content of the quality standards (on the social definition of quality standards, see Bruhn, 2019). The definition of quality content requires constant reflection, which, according to Zech (2015, p. 24), presupposes an ethical discussion: “A definition of good quality that is not rooted in an ethical reflection of

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successful life regresses […] to an abstract management procedure with reference to exploitation, but without reference to values.” In principle, the technical banalization of Internet use leads to the individual producibility of a fully functional mass medium that can be designed without communicative debate about ethical standards. In combination with the possibility of anonymization, this can lead to the phenomenon of disinhibition (see Zehnpfennig, 2017). The liberties that the Internet medium generates on the part of the sender dimension are thus powerful and seductive. No other medium has such mass appeal and at the same time can be designed and used so easily without power politics and ethical obstacles. In this respect, the Internet also has high democratic potential. The prerequisite is embedding the medium in a socio-political framework that binds the liberty of the Internet and its use to ethical standards, even if they are difficult to control. Equally important for the constructive handling of this structurally fluid medium is the activation and strengthening of the users’ self-responsibility, precisely because the use and design of the Internet cannot feasibly be technically controlled and, from a social-democratic perspective, this is only possible after discourses of legitimacy: “Ethically responsible action requires that ethical standards be applied under all conditions, and that means: even when there is no external control. Such purely ethical behavior, however, places high demands on the individual, since a violation of ethical standards is not sanctioned if there is no possibility of external control, and is thus merely subject to intrinsic ‘sanctioning’” (Zehnpfennig, 2017, p. 709). This addresses the responsible attitude of the sender. Those who seek the freedom of the Internet only in the liberty to express their own opinions or even in manipulation, not only use the medium in a shortened form, but also misuse its potential. If, on the other hand, communication is seen as a tool for personal growth in the sense of Carl Rogers (2005), open exchange is a prerequisite. But how can conflictual content, that is, disagreement of opinions, be modeled in such a way so that a conflict does not automatically lead to dichotomization (cf. Dahrendorf, 1979; see Sect. 4.3 and Chap. 6), but to further development? Rogers (e.g. 2005) names three basic characteristics for a growth-promoting (therapeutic) culture of conversation: empathy (empathetic understanding),

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congruence (authenticity) and emotional positive appreciation. With this attitude, affection and interest in other people is shown, while allowing simultaneous self-confidence and self-awareness to formulate and express one’s own needs and wishes. Hiding, tabooing, discrediting, subjugation, submission, and so on do not lead to personal growth. Another example of a responsible communication attitude can be found in Popper’s comments on personal growth through self-criticism—he himself speaks of “maturity” (Popper, 1996, p. 160) which can only come about through the criticism of others. He believes “that the attitude of giving and receiving […] is of the greatest importance in purely human terms” (Popper, 1996, p. 160); this works especially under the condition that the interaction partners “want to learn more than to be right” (Popper, 1996, p. 160). No one should be lectured or persuaded, but on the contrary, challenged to contradict and encourage others to see things in a new light, with the goal that each and every person can make his or her own decision in freely forming their opinion. The communicative moment of this view is inherent: to be able to criticize means to be able to be criticized. For Popper, the focus is respect for the liberty to form opinions. Among the above-mentioned communication attitudes, the broad impact and easy accessibility of the Internet creates excellent opportunities for individual and collective development. At this point, it should be pointed out once again that freedom of opinion—as one of the central liberal liberties—does not mean being allowed to overlay everything and everyone in every context with forced moralizing evaluations, to devalue others racially or ideologically at will and so on. Freedom of opinion means—from a liberal point of view—the basis for the rationally justified struggle for the most suitable arguments.

4.4.3 S  pecial Features of Internet-Based Communication: The Social Dimension Even if the individual level of consideration is put aside and regulated control of the Internet is projected onto the state, the same previously stated requirements remain pressing:

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Perhaps it is true that liberty of thought can never be completely suppressed. But it can at least be suppressed to a large extent. For without free exchange of ideas there can be no real liberty of thought. We need others to test our thoughts on them; to find out whether they are sound. Critical discussion is the basis of the free thinking of the individual. But this means that without political liberty, liberty of thought is impossible. And it further means that political liberty is a precondition of the free use of reason by each individual. (Popper, 1996, p. 164)

Roughly summarized, Popper demands the following basic conditions for critical growth: Enlightenment, freedom of thought, religious liberty, respect for the honest opinion of others and finally political freedom. From a libertarian perspective, the only permissible state restriction of liberty of Internet-related consumer sovereignty exists when the rights and dignity of third parties are restricted by individuals using the Internet (see Funiok, 2011). The search for concrete, ethically reflected and justified rules of communication that can be implemented one-to-one leads to a collection of interrelated dimensions rather than to a closed model proposal. For example, Pörksen (2014, pp. 15ff.) refers to the following central aspects of responsibility in the context of media design and use, which should be further developed in an argumentative communication process that takes various aspects into account: specification of the idea of responsibility, relativization of objectivity claims, making personal responsibility visible, sensitization for bias and deceptive security, and a vote for meta-rules that trigger discourse instead of concrete recommendations for action. These are “second-order ethics, an observation of modes of argumentation in the field of ethics, which in turn happens with ethical intentions” (Pörksen, 2014, p. 19). But ethical goals also need the bridge to action, and a general attitude of communication must be reflected in the pragmatics of communication. Assistance is offered in the psychological research for argumentation integrity, which extracted eleven conditions of fair argumentation which are summarized into four superordinate clusters (Mischo, 2000b, p. 3; summarized in text box 1). The mode of presentation is deliberately presented as direct speech in order to emphasize the application character of the underlying abstract basic research and to “describe on a medium level

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of abstraction which speech acts are to be omitted in argumentations from an integrity perspective” (Mischo, 2000b, p. 3). Thus, this research strand focuses on the procedural justice of a conflict settlement, which, according to Dahrendorf (1972; see Sect. 3.4.3), presupposes in principle that the conflict is considered ‘justified’, thus recognizing the legitimacy of the other position in principle. Textbox 1: Standards of Argumentation Integrity (Mischo, 2000b, p. 3) I. Faulty argumentation contributions 1. Stringency violation: Refrain from intentionally arguing in a non-­ stringent manner. 2. Refusal to substantiate: Refrain from deliberately not, or insufficiently, substantiating claims. II. Disingenuous argumentation 3. Truth pretense: Refrain from claiming statements as objectively true which you know to be false or only subjective. 4. Shifting of responsibilities: Refrain from deliberately denying, claiming or transferring responsibilities to others (persons or entities) without justification. 5. Consistency pretense: Refrain from deliberately or seemingly arguing not in accordance with your other (speech) actions. III. Unfair argumentation in terms of content 6. Distortion of meaning: Refrain from intentionally distorting the meaning of other’s or your own contributions and facts. 7. Inability to fulfill: Refrain, even if only lightly, from arguing for such action or demands which you know cannot be followed or met. 8. Discredit: Refrain from intentionally or recklessly discrediting other participants. IV. Unfair interaction 9. Hostility: Refrain from deliberately treating your opponent as a personal enemy in the matter. 10. Participation hindrance: Refrain from intentionally interacting in a way that hinders the participation of others for clarification purposes. 11. Abort: Refrain from aborting the argumentation without justification.

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Research on the effects of unfair argumentation revealed that those participating in a training program on how to deal with unfair argumentation not only experienced positive reactions to their integrity argumentation (Mischo, 2000a) but also their ability to recognize unfair argumentation strategies increased significantly (Mischo et al., 2002). Not only did fair communication skills increase, but also sensitivity to standard violations of fairness in communicative actions increased. However, the situations studied are conversations between people; Internet-based communication operates in a different ‘reality’. According to Misoch (2006), computermediated communication differs from face-­to-­face interaction primarily in terms of disembodiment, textuality (written form as an important form of communication), de-temporalization/de-spatialization, de-contextualization (no common context or background for action between sender and receiver is necessary) and digitization, which means that all information is potentially preserved through storage.

4.4.4 C  ommunicative Interferences of the Worlds 1, 2 and 3 This means that we are simultaneously dealing with a media-mediated information world, which would not have to have a physical-chemical reality outside the media framework at first. But the textuality mentioned by Misoch again refers to Popper’s Three Worlds Theory: “My thesis is that with the higher functions of human language a new world is created: the world of the products of the human mind” (Popper, 1996, p. 75). Karl Popper calls it the “World 3” (for more details on the Three World theory, see Chap. 2). His basic belief is that Worlds 1–3 are closely connected, meaning that even the abstract World 3 can have an extremely strong influence on World 2 and World 1: “I propose that there is a World 3 of the products of the human mind and I am trying to show that the objects of World 3 can be, in a very clear sense, not fictitious but rather real: They can be real in that they have a direct effect on us, on our experiences in World 2 and further on our brain in World 1 and thus on real objects” (Popper, 1979, p. 150). He could hardly have used a better example than Einstein’s formula E=mc2. Niemann (2019, p.  17) summarizes this relationship as follows:

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In World 1, there are relations between mass and energy which are expressed by the formula E=mc2. Einstein derived this formula from other formulas in World 3 assumed to be true. Others check this formula and understand it and its meaning. This happens within World 2, and their thinking is accompanied by nerve impulses. These nerve impulses cause muscle impulses (the researcher moves and does something), and these in turn cause further changes in World 1 in such a way that many other people become involved, patents are filed, letters to politicians are written and finally the terrible weapon is built and dropped. World 3 (the formula E=mc2) has changed World 1.

More general examples can be found in socio-psychological stereotype and prejudice research, which demonstrates the strong power of social evaluation information through communication via (non-present) third parties. This ranges from positive prejudices to destructive negative attitudes to cyberbullying. At the beginning of Chap. 2, it was pointed out that the influence of World 2 on World 1 still remains an ultimately unsolvable mystery. For the central question of how the mental (‘soul’, ‘res cogitans’ and ‘World 2’) influences the physical (‘body’, ‘res extensa’ and ‘World 1’) and how both worlds can interact leads to aporia. Nevertheless—and this is also compatible with Popper himself—it is reasonable and advantageous to make use of Popper’s Three Worlds Theory for the reasons already mentioned. This also applies to the opposite viewpoint, which remains puzzling and unsolved, on how the thought processes of World 2 and the thought contents of World 3 develop from World 1. In order to close this explanation gap, so-called emergence theories2 are often used (Beckermann, 1999, pp. 203ff.; Zoglauer, 1998, pp. 28ff.). According to Janich, however, such an attempt at explanation is deceptive, a “stopgap deity for the natural sciences and humanities” (Janich, 2011). Some evolution theorists openly admit that the gap between the brain and  “Emergence means the emergence of new characteristics or qualities that arise from the interaction of subsystems, but cannot be derived, predicted, or explained from the characteristics of the elements. Emergent characteristics are those that belong to the system as a whole, but not to its components. It is also said that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Emergence is thus a complexity phenomenon: if a system is sufficiently complex, it is capable of producing emergent qualities” Zoglauer (1998, p. 32 f.). 2

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mind, or between World 1 and Worlds 2 and 3, has not yet been scientifically closed. It still remains a mystery. Some scientists even speak of an ‘anthropic principle’, according to which the universe was designed from the beginning for the development of the human mind (Worlds 2 and 3). However, these are desperate attempts to explain the situation in the face of an aporetic theoretical situation, which are incompatible with Popper’s basic ‘criterion of demarcation’ between scientific and non-scientific theories. This demarcation criterion is the ‘falsification principle’, according to which scientific hypotheses or theories must be able to fail in principle because of experience (Popper, 2002)—with Kant just “no longer being able to recognize a touchstone of experience” (Kant, 1959 [1781], A VII). An ‘anthropic principle’ is no more falsifiable than claimed ‘emergence theories’, which “make consciousness a mystery” (Zoglauer, 1998, p. 36). Here, once again, Popper’s statement must be remembered that scientists must absolutely refrain from “playing the role of great prophets to their fellow men and impressing them with oracles of philosophy” (Popper, 1984, p. 100). Supposedly unsolvable scientific problems cannot be solved by mystification and sleight of hand, but instead call for further research on the basis of experience. The Internet, with its immense reach and multifaceted nature as a medium for information and communication, thus shows particular strengths and weaknesses. Downsides such as hate campaigns, cyberbullying (for the difficulty of definition see Fawzi, 2015), ‘shitstorms’ and bashing are real phenomena that can threaten and destroy the lives of people, organizations and companies in World 1 (see in detail: Fawzi, 2015; Katzer, 2019). The special features of the Internet medium are the previously described characteristics: de-temporalization, de-spatialization and de-contextualization. Cyberbullying can take place anywhere and at any time and can be initiated by any person; there is no room for retreat and it is more difficult than in the ‘real world’ to evade the attacks or offensively oppose the aggressors; the number of viewers cannot be limited and the victim does not know which people are the audience and which are not; others find it more difficult to intervene and provide help; the digitalized storage creates a permanent repeatability of the aggression (cf. Fawzi, 2015). In the context of cyberbullying, World 3 creates permanent stress in World 2 and disruption in World 1. Nevertheless, the

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positive aspects of the Internet outweigh the negative: innumerable people receive suggestions for a better way of life via the Internet, which they can actually implement in their everyday life. How Internet communication interacts with ‘reality’ is also shown in the following case study on the topic of liberty with recourse to Popper’s Three Worlds Theory. The case study shows that through Internet communication—here in the form of images—physical objects of World 1 are (re)produced in Worlds 3 and 2 by spatial arrangements associated with the term ‘liberty’, thus stereotypical (visual) expectations in connection with the term ‘liberty’ are formed in World 3, which in turn affect World 2 as well as World 1.

4.4.5 C  ase Study: The Internet Communication of Liberty, Represented by Internet Images If information on a question, a topic or even a place is searched for, this is often done via a keyword search of a search engine. The provider Google holds by far the highest market share among the most-used search machines worldwide. Between 2015 and 2019, for example, this market share ranged between 85% and 90% (statista, 2019) and, as the global market leader, processed an estimated 3.8 million search queries per minute in 2016 alone, which is an estimated 5.5 billion a day (Sullivan, 2016). As already mentioned, these modalities of information generation also concern abstract concepts—such as ‘liberty’—which are synthesized in visualized form as elements of World 1 in spatial sections and arrangements in World 3 and materialized for the viewer in World 2. Google-­ Trends shows a steady increase of the search term ‘liberty’ in the last fifteen years (Google, 2020), suggesting a heightened interest in and discussion of the concept of liberty (see Fig. 4.4). If we look at how liberty is visually represented in World 3  in the Google image search, a number of aspects become apparent, such as the representation of society as a disturbing and restricting factor instead of an enabler; the idealized and romanticized view and interpretation of spaces and the individuals represented in them; or the inverse of space in connection with the concept of liberty, such as urban spaces, a grocery store or the factory premises of an outdoor goods manufacturer.

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Fig. 4.4  Search term ‘Freiheit’ (en: liberty/freedom) from 2004 to 2020 over time in German-speaking countries. Source: The values shown indicate the search interest relative to the highest point in the diagram for the German-speaking area in the period 2004–2020. The value 100 represents the highest popularity of this search term while the value 50 shows that the term is only half as popular. The value 0 indicates that there was not enough data available for the respective term. (Google, 2020)

But first a short description of the methodological procedure before looking at the results in detail: based on a Google search query on the keyword ‘liberty’, the first 100 hits of the Google image search (gb-01 to gb-100) were saved in May 2020 and evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively by analyzing content in order to inductively determine categories with regard to the depicted elements (Mayring, 2008; Mayring & Fenzl, 2014). If the body of the data collected in this way is evaluated according to the inductively determined categories, a clear dominance of images taken or immersed in the light during times at the margins of the day, such as sunrises or sunsets (53%; cf. Fig. 4.5), can be seen. In literary motifs, this type of image was used in the pre-Romance period as a symbol of divine proximity and redemption, as a phase of transition and a new historical beginning, but also for calm, reassurance and appeasement, and to represent a dissolution of boundaries (Butzer & Jacob, 2012). Subsequently, the second most frequent motive is the representation of a single person (49%, cf. in Fig. 4.5). In many cases, the rear view and the gaze directed

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Google-image search 'Freiheit' (n=100) sunrise/sunset single person with saying sea others mountains flying bird/butterfly field/meadow broken chains/fetters/open cage hot-air balloon river desert multiple people dandelion 0%

10%

20%

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Fig. 4.5  Quantitative evaluation of the Google image search for the keyword ‘Freiheit’ (en: ‘liberty’) with regard to depicted elements in May 2020. Source: Own survey and presentation

into the distance is also based on the romantic pictorial language of Caspar David Friedrich, often with arms stretched far into the sky, whereby the spatial arrangements in which the individuals are staged are predominantly stereotypical ‘landscapes of longing’ such as deserted seas and mountains (21% and 19%, but no beaches or mountains during high season), followed by equally deserted pastures/meadows, river and desert with no elements that provide hints of human civilization (10%; see Fig. 4.5). In addition, 32% of the depictions are linked to aphorisms and questions of meaning about the concept of liberty, which address areas of communication such as orientation and awareness. Of the pictures examined, 19% showed flying animals such as birds or butterflies, whereby the symbolism of the wing in the literary and artistic sense stands for overcoming the earthly, while at the same time also indicating a protective function (Butzer & Jacob, 2012). Relevant to the symbology of butterflies is its metamorphosis from a slowly moving, crawling to a (freely) flying creature is (Butzer & Jacob, 2012). A further motif associated with the visualization of the concept of ‘liberty’ is that of broken chains or shackles, as well as open cages, which symbolize the overcoming

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of a captivity that has so far prevented contact with something else—and thus also the progression of one’s own development (8%; Fig.  4.5). Moreover, the quasi-presence of elements of civilization, as well as of society or sociality, is remarkable in only 2% of the images examined in the keyword search for ‘Freiheit’ (en: ‘liberty’). The analysis of the images displayed in World 3 and the visualizations associated with them refer in particular to the spread of the concept of liberty from something to something—thus associating it in particular with a negative liberty. Two central aspects are primarily connected with this: 1. ‘Liberty’ from modern civilization or ‘liberty’ merely imagined as realizable in a distant space of longing: a conservative romanticism, ­stereotypical landscapes of longing isolated from civilization or at their spatial extremes such as the sea or mountains (see Fig. 4.6).

Fig. 4.6  Exemplary representations of the Google image search for the keyword ‘liberty’ in May 2020. Sources: from top left to bottom right: fuehren-und-wirken. de; handaufsherz.blog; freeyourworklife.de; bistummain.de; naturundfreiheit. de; misede.org; medienarche.de; karriere-tutor.de; zendepot.de

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2. ‘Liberty’ from society, whereas ‘liberty’ can only be realized as an isolated individual: Only alone, without the disturbance of fellow human being or society, can ‘liberty’ be experienced (see Fig. 4.6). Thus, the spaces associated with the keyword search ‘liberty’ are idealized places of longing, which are usually far from everyday life. The images also convey ideas or feelings of these spaces as facilitators of one’s own effectiveness, one’s own limits, and to endure and perhaps improve them, possibly even in a therapeutic sense. However, this is often merely an extension of options as long as the fallback position of a society with its basic security systems remains, such as the often-criticized food industry, conventional agriculture, equipment or animal experimentation medicine, online trade and many others. In a perspective of conservative romanticism, modern society with its achievements is often despised as long as no real dependence on it is acknowledged or realized. Either the liberties, which represent a central achievement in connection with the emergence of modern society or states, are no longer thought of in this perspective in contemporary societies, or the likelihood of this perception has faded out. On the other hand, the analysis of the displayed hits of the Google image search also makes it clear that liberty is not considered in sociality, that is, in society with others, but always only as an isolated individual being liberated from something. In this context, others or society are primarily viewed as a restriction and not as an enabler. The emergence of liberties is a centrally social matter in which existing ligatures can be renegotiated through social negotiation processes and thus life-chances. Liberties can be increased as well as because life-chances or opportunities for action are—as mentioned in Sect. 4.2—not specific to individuals, according to Dahrendorf (1979), but rather their opportunities are provided by social conditions—and thus in association with others. However, the Internet-based—in this case, visual—communication presented here (re)produces and reinforces the stereotypes of a liberty beyond human societies which can only be realized individually or occasionally as a liberty from something, in which the social condition of liberty is also visually ‘sorted out’ on a large scale. In addition, the stereotypical sets of representations are often taken up by other users—also as part of World 2—and are only varied in a few nuances and distributed

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en masse in similar sets, thus dominantly anchoring certain patterns of perception and expectation of the visual representation of liberty. As a feedback effect on World 1, it is now primarily those physical object constellations outside the individually and socially dominated Worlds 2 and 3 that are primarily associated with liberty and less, or not at all, with Worlds 2 and 3.

4.4.6 Interim Conclusion on Internet-Based Communication and Liberty The competent and responsible use of the Internet as a medium is a prerequisite for activating the positive aspects of Internet-based communication (e.g. to increase life-chances through positive liberty), whereby the construct of media competence includes the following facets (in summary: Funiok, 2011, pp. 172–173.): media criticism (ability to critically understand and question the societal changes behind media developments), media studies (knowledge of the use and background of media organization), media use (ability to use receptively and interactively) and media design (ability to actively design the medium for one’s own use). Ethical questions arise in all four fields and require critical reflexivity. In this respect, the ethical design of Internet-based communication is a cross-cutting task for all users—no matter where they are in the use and design of the Internet (“One thing is certain: we are the Net – we should not forget that!” [Katzer, 2019, p. 162]). It forms the “ethical shore” in Dahrendorf ’s sense, from which the countless options of the Internet lead in a positive direction. Or to put it another way, the immense degrees of liberty in the design and use of Internet communication require a particularly high sense of responsibility for its use.

4.5 S  hifted Weights: Liberty and Responsibility, Rights and Duties With liberty comes responsibility. In most social relationships, the degrees of liberty and responsibility are proportional to each other. If the degree of liberty increases, the degree of responsibility increases as well. If

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responsibility decreases, liberty diminishes to about the same extent. This can be illustrated in the context of the modernization of society with two spheres that are attached to a rotating axis with springs. One ball symbolizes liberty, the other, responsibility. Social modernization makes the axis rotate more rapidly. With increasing speed, the spheres move outward, liberty and responsibility increase. To give a few examples: the freer the access to drugs, the greater the responsibility to deal with it in such a way as to minimize harm to oneself and others; in the social context of real socialism, the lower the civil liberties, the lower the responsibility for one’s own actions (since most questions of life were subject to state regulation anyway). This picture can be applied analogously to rights and duties; the greater the rights to something, the greater the duty to use these rights responsibly. In particular, communitarian myths of finality tend to restrict personal rights and freedoms ‘for the sake of the greater good’; one example was real socialism, another is an actionist climate protection movement which, with the aim of halting anthropogenic climate change, on the one hand calls for drastic restrictions in rights and liberties (such as the right to free choice of transport), but on the other hand increases duties (changing personal lifestyles) and responsibility (the individual is morally assigned responsibility for future generations). Such an asymmetry can result in affected people choosing the exit option, emigrating, retreating into internal emigration or facing reduced rights and liberties with a reduction in responsibility. While rights and liberties are attractive in principle, duties and responsibilities tend to be annoying because they have to do with (self-)ties. In this respect, the former can also be described as strongly options-based, while the latter are more likely to be ligature-bound. This results in a temptation to create arenas in which the balance of the two spheres can be changed unilaterally. The development of the Internet in general, and social media in particular, can be understood as such an attempt (or perhaps it is more of a side effect). Here, rights and liberties are granted to each other that would correspond to duties and responsibilities in the non-virtual world. For example, the right of free speech fundamentally contrasts to the duty to respect other people and opinions (with the restriction that the speech does not promote violence) (see Ash, 2016; Lilla, 2017; Bauer, 2018; Nussbaum, 2019). Although state institutions

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support free speech in theory, there are clear asymmetries in the expression of hatred, slander, the development and dissemination of conspiracy theories and so on versus to the duty to respect one another and accept potential consequences associated with contradictory or negative posts. This becomes especially important when the ‘space’ of virtual communication is left and a physical space is entered; this in turn is characterized by another centrifugal balance between rights/liberties on the one hand and duties/responsibilities on the other. Another strategy for maximizing rights and liberties while avoiding duties and responsibilities is to make use of the former and delegate (or attempt to delegate) them to others. Examples of this are legion, whether the almost stereotypical SUV-driving homeowners in the suburbs with a correspondingly large ecological footprint, but a Green Party membership card up to the ‘Right to City’ movement which likes to delegate the duties associated with home ownership (construction and maintenance). Another variation is the self-governing person and ‘Reichsbürger’3 who lives on state transfer payments.

4.6 A  n Interim Conclusion: Current Social Spatial Developments This chapter has highlighted seemingly contradictory social developments. On the one hand, the process of social modernization was accompanied by an immense growth of negative liberties (in the form of classical civil liberties, but also the repression of diseases), and later also with positive liberties (such as the expansion of education). The growth in liberties brought with it a considerable increase in complexity and contingency,  The term ‘Reichsbürger’ is a collective term for an organizationally and ideologically heterogeneous movement in Germany, which has its origins in the 1980s and is mostly composed of individuals, more rarely in part of tiny groups with sectarian touch, and which denies the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany as a legitimate and sovereign state and rejects its legal order. With the term “Reichsbürger” (Reich citizens) the devotees of the movement pursue in particular the linguistic demarcation from “Bundesbürger” (federal citizens), since the adherents of this ideology do not see themselves as citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany, but of the German Reich which in their interpretation has never ceased to exist, but in some cases they also consider themselves as stateless. 3

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and thus also personal responsibility for dealing with these complexities and compensations. This also affected the way in which Space 1, in general, and Landscape 1, in particular, were handled. By means of administrative measures (based on the normative content of expert special knowledge), a reduction of complexity and contingency in Space/ Landscape 1 was (and is) taking place. Through the expansion of education, citizens (and other actors) are increasingly enabled to develop and articulate their ideas of Space 1/ Landscape 1 to government authorities to oppose top-down planning. In turn, the effort to achieve greater involvement through governance processes resulted in a maximization of complexity, manifested in over-governance and legitimacy problems. At the same time, the development of the Internet brought about an unprecedented increase in communicative contingency. This ‘contingency explosion’ was countered with a dichotomizing moralization, which— due to moral exaggeration—made conflict regulation in Dahrendorf ’s sense of the term nearly impossible. At the same time, after modernization had brought ligatures in favor of options, it means a ligurative self-­ limitation and option minimization by subjecting what is sayable and ultimately conceivable without loss of social recognition to a radical restriction. Both over-governance and the moralization of communicative processes have led to a sclerotization of society—and thus to a diminished capability to search for suitable regulations in the face of challenges (climate change, energy system transformation, loss of biodiversity, etc.). What is more, the search for concrete strategies to cope with concrete challenges has been replaced by a longing for utopias, as we will see in the following chapter.

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5 The Return of the Utopian and the Restrictions of Landscape 1: A Critical Analysis

In view of the situation described above of the self-sclerotization of society through over-governance and moral communication, a revival of utopian thinking is taking place in politics, science and the rest of society. In the following we will critically examine these developments—especially against the background of the totalizing tendency of utopias.

5.1 The Illiberality of the Utopian Social harmony is omnipresent in a conservative self-image, but is also found in socialism (see Sect. 3.5). Thus, the processes that take place in conservative globalization (rather forcedly) follow “recurring patterns and take place within and as part of the plan of the whole” (Dahrendorf, 1968, p. 245). In this context, “Utopia generally appears strangely isolated from all other societies (if there is any talk of such societies at all)” (Dahrendorf, 1968, p.  245). Dahrendorf (1968, p.  246) characterizes utopian societies (conservative as well as socialist) as “monolithic, homogeneous entities, free-floating not only in time but also in space, separated from the outside world, which could always become a threat to the

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promised immobility of their social structure”. But there is also a hidden conservatism inherent in Marxism, in the idealized final state of a society free of domination: “If no norms are set, changed, or even abolished, then social structures freeze in the prison of tradition, of which it must at least be doubtful whether it is really up to all new situations” (Dahrendorf, 1968, p. 330). This is followed by a “stabilization of society in the state in which norms were last set” (Dahrendorf, 1968, p. 330). Ultimately, utopias and an ‘open society’, in which the most diverse ideas are developed so that the most suitable one may prevail, are contradictory (Popper, 2011[1947]), because “Utopia is always illiberal, because it leaves no room for error and correction” (Dahrendorf, 1980, p. 88). The process of maximizing life-chances faces great challenges: “Most liberty theorists have assumed that people strive for liberty of their own accord. They did not reckon with the apathy of the people” (Dahrendorf, 2007, p. 37). The attitude of seeking options is challenged by the longing for complexity reduction, simplicity and purity, by the longing for unambiguous and generally binding ligatures. The increasing longing for utopias (socialism, nationalism, ecologism, etc.) force conformism inwardly and outwardly (the examples of the present are striking: whether Black Bloc or Identity Movement), they discredit as ‘finality myths’ (Lyotard, 1979) also the possibilities of an open society to always look for suitable regulations for current challenges. Not only because their teleology, but also because their claim to exclusivity, they can be described as ‘secular religions’ (Aron, 1985): “I propose to call ‘secular religions’ those teachings which take the place of the vanished faith in the souls of our contemporaries and which settle the salvation of mankind here on earth, in the distant future, in the form of a social order to be created” (Aron, 1990, p. 926). ‘Political religions’ have the advantage for their followers that an understanding of the conditions, for example, of the logics of politics, science, economy and administration, is not necessary. They do not have to be understood and spiritually penetrated, but, instead, awareness of the superiority of one’s own morality is a sufficient basis for fundamental criticism: “Political religions with their holy book, with their devil and their saints, their historical interpretations and their prophecies, are only apparently paradoxical: they express revolt against an ununderstood fate, they gather zeal without object” (Aron, 1946, p. 59 f.; own translation;

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see also Grau, 2017). Radical unenlightened ignorance and the rejection of enlightening knowledge becomes a constitutive element of belonging to the religion (Grau, 2019). Belonging to one’s own religion is thereby displayed with doggedness and over-assimilation, a reflected detachment is thus impossible: “Distance is shown by overemphasizing the rules of one’s role, by abruptly changing into other roles, by joking, satire, irony, and finally by retreating into fantasy” (Sofsky, 2007, p. 49). Those who believe in ‘political religions’ initially conclude that people with other ideological foundations pursue them with a similar rigor; (self-)irony and satire irritate at best, are discredited as decadent or are fought against verbally or even physically; a satirical approach to the world does not affect one’s own religion, but rather serves to elevate one’s own position above that of others and to reassure oneself of the superiority of one’s own position, for example, in the form of mocking (Christmann, 1996; Dadlez, 2011).

5.2 T  he Inescapability of Landscape 1 and Its Importance as a Ligature and for Options The references of the Three World view systems to landscape are, as shown in Sect. 3.6, quite different. This applies in principle also to Landscape 1, the material space. If this is ‘historically grown’, it represents a resource for conservatism, which is provided with preservation standards. The relationship between socialism and Landscape 1 is problematic; Landscape 1 is resistant, it eludes the idea of equality: the shaping of physical spaces eludes—to a large extent not following human ideas—the egalitarian influence. Mountains, climatic differentiations, large bodies of water and so on have a differentiating effect, so it is not surprising that the focus of socialist spatial planning is on urban settlements (which enjoy an additional focus as classic settlement sites of the working class). The ideal of a classless and domination-free society must fail because of this resistance of physical space: inequality of physical conditions leads to economic inequality of those who cultivate the land (because certain areas are less productive than others). In order to create economic equality here, a

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balance is necessary, a balance that must be administered and in turn presupposes domination, that is, the systematized exercise of power. The exercise of power also becomes necessary in the case of temporary events such as floods, droughts, volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, not only in dealing with the consequences but also to provide immediate assistance. It can be formulated in a more pointed way: physical space is the enemy of the egalitarian. The sophistication of physical space is even more difficult to overcome and deceive than social sophistication. Egalitarianism has a problem with the inescapability of materiality not only in relation to Landscape 1 but also in relation to the physicality of man and the differentiation according to age, height, biotic sex and not least the physical constitution of the person. The ‘optimization’ of the physical (and also mental) constitution is then placed in the context of a better ‘neoliberal’ self-marketability. From the perspective of a liberalism oriented toward maximizing life-chances, however, they initially represent the possibility of expanding the ligatures of one’s own physicality (and mental constitution) and of enabling options (even if only to be able to hike a distance of 10 miles) (see, e.g. Duttweiler, 2016; Felden 2020; Gugutzer, 2013; Wagner, 2017). If ‘self-optimization’ is stigmatized and deconstructed as a ‘neoliberal compulsion’, the ‘self-passivation’ program becomes the reverse, physical (as well as mental) limitations will be increased and options will disappear. These options are dwindling not only individually but also socially in the form of fewer possibilities for ‘social involvement’. With respect to the modification of Space 1, this is a result not only of the calculation of self-interest but also of a ‘common good’; however, this is understood. The options that can enable the development of the human being according to his own ideas also include the possibility of introspection. This enables us to see us in relation to ourselves and others. From this, degrees of liberty, which we allow or even restrict, can arise. Striving for options becomes an inner (and not least, outer) attitude. Man does not develop his inner attitude independently, but in constant feedback with the expectations of society in the form of roles, norms and values, as well as through the diversity of physical space and the physical and mental diversity of others. In the evaluation of these dependencies, the liberalism we advocate differs in turn from the systems of ideas of conservatism

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and socialism: if, according to conservatism, the individual person is strongly involved in ligatures of homeland, tradition and origin, then, according to socialism, the person lacks stimuli brought in from the environment, which would induce a search for options. Neither leads to an inclination to seek options. And the pursuit for options inevitably leads— as a process of change—to internal and external conflicts: the internal compulsion to choose between options, external conflicts because one’s own search for options may violate social ligatures or simply because the favored options of different people exclude each other. In the context of Landscape 1, this means something like this: the conflict over two mutually exclusive uses of space (or seemingly exclusive uses) must be regulated; however, the process of regulation can, if certain conditions are met, become productive, for example, in the development of new options such as mixed land use or shifting use to a less conflicting location. One thing becomes clear from this: the attitude of seeking options must be seen as a development process and cannot be seen as arising from a certain inertia, laziness, incompetence, self-sufficient conviction and so on. The conditions of Landscapes 1, 2 and 3 and their repercussions on options and ligatures are very different in the three understandings of the world under study: conservatism, socialism and liberalism that maximize life-chances. The dominance of ligatures in conservatism reduces the formation of options; this is also inscribed in Landscape 1, whose structures are oriented on the traditional (see also Kühne, 2005). The reduction of options under socialism is achieved by the goal of reducing differences. This equalization not only reduces the stimulus to seek options, for example, by equalizing the design Landscape 1, but also conflicts, which can be productive, according to Ralf Dahrendorf. The focus on the development of options in liberalism, which maximizes life-chances, means again a diversity of Landscape 1, but also the recognition of conflicts between Landscape 2 and Landscape 3, combined with the adherence to certain basic conditions in the regulation of conflicts.

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5.3 Utopia and Kitsch The display of hyper-affirmation of one’s own ‘political religion’, combined with the loss of self-reflection, often leads to the production of kitsch (Gelfert, 2000; Liessmann, 2002; Grau, 2019). It grows out of sentimentality and the display of one’s own moral superiority, often in a voluntary context that likes to present itself as a ‘civil society’, and often in distinction to professional approaches. Rational analysis and the recognition, acknowledgment and weighing of different perspectives, as well as “cool reason are for him simple cynicism” (Grau, 2019, p. 15). Especially in contexts in which people earn their living through political kitsch, whether in agriculture, finance, politics or even science, the difference between their professional purpose-rationality (expressed through factual language and terminological certainty) and affective actionism (characterized by the expression of personal concern, the depiction of commitment and the recourse to ethics of conviction) becomes apparent. Kitsch can be interpreted as the expression of a search for meaning that “leads to the idea of transfiguration of the ordinary” (Grau, 2019, p.  51). The transfigured ordinary, on the other hand, is normatively withdrawn from the critical gaze (including that of scientists). If a scientific study (whether on immigration, the acceptance of wind power, the concept of home, etc.) is nevertheless undertaken, “scientific statements are denigrated as ideology” (Grau, 2019, p. 91). This kitsch not only is tied to the expressions or decorated corporeality, to individual actions, but also expresses itself in the form of manifestations in Landscape 1, its individual construction as well as the production of Landscape 3 (generally on landscape and kitsch: Kühne, 2008), because kitsch (since meaning is associated with it) has a tendency to expand (Grau, 2019). Thus communication, “which in many cases is presented pathetically, dignified and appealing to the emotions”, has strong borrowings from the Romantic period “in language and gestures to pathos, suffering and religion” (Spanier, 2006, p.  26). According to Spanier (2006, p.  31), in the context of nature conservation and sustainable development, “the very big emotions are often conspicuously used. This is true in science as well as in fiction and journalism, in the voluntary as

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well as professional field. Given the size of the tasks to be solved, it seems that only these very big feelings can be appropriate in communication. Whether this really has to be the case deserves to be well considered, because too much pathos and emotion can also be unpleasantly touching.” At least for those who strive for self-reflection. Kitsch can also be found in inscriptions in Landscape 1: for example, when the power of the state (or the ruling class) is physically manifested in, for example, fascist architecture such as the Reich Party Rally Grounds in Nuremberg or Stalinist urban planning such as the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw. But kitsch can also be found in the conservative orchard meadows of the current cultural landscape protection, as a symbol of the longing for the “lovely, Arcadian-paradisiacal nature, which above all denotes the kitsch of childlike innocence” (Gelfert, 2000, p. 42). In the conservative desire for preservation, the past is determined by the fact that “the historical structures that have produced the landscape or landscape components have themselves become history and no longer correspond to the current social, technical and legal structures” (Becker, 1998, p. 51) and have long since fallen prey to the “spatio-temporal anchoring” (Soyez, 2003, p. 31), making them ‘a cheap copy of a valued original’ (Gelfert, 2000; Liessmann, 2002) in the sense of ‘fake art’. The formerly authentic expression of social conditions (under which today’s supporters of the restoration of ‘historically grown landscapes’ certainly do not want to live) in Landscape 1 is “transformed into kitsch, because it is marketed as an expression of an authenticity that actually no longer exists” (Gelfert, 2000, p. 15). The form simulates socio-spatial conditions that no longer exist today. The manifestations in Landscape 1 are flanked by a self-­ exaggerated communication of the followers of the respective ‘political religion’. In the following, this topic will be exemplified by current protest movements on the topic of climate change.

5.4 Case Study: Climate Change and Protests The conflictual nature of the social regulation of ligatures imposed by material space is currently particularly evident in the context of global warming and the climate protests associated with it. The warming of the

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climate also means a change in Space 1, for example, in the form of coastal erosion, desertification, altered vegetation and soil conditions, and extreme weather events and their consequences. This also challenges common patterns of vision and interpretation of ‘landscape’ (in the sense of Landscapes 1 and 2).

5.4.1 A  spects of the Complexity of the Scientific Approach to Climate Change The genesis of climates, the change and the attribution of its causes— putting it euphemistically—is an extremely complex phenomenon which is composed of a multitude of factors and interlocking physical and chemical processes, thus providing a ligature of physical space. The main influencing factors are generally considered to be changing solar activity (i.e. fluctuating radiation output due to sunspots), a change in the composition of the planet’s air envelope (crucial to moderate the effect of solar radiation on the Earth), shifting plate tectonics (i.e. the movement of parts of the Earth’s crust in the upper mantle) and volcanism (as a sudden worldwide cooling of the climate linked to a punctual eruption event; cf. Rahmstorf & Schellnhuber, 2019). Accordingly, scientists from a wide range of disciplines are involved in the study of climate and its change, such as meteorology, climatology, geosciences, physics, oceanography and astronomy. While there is a broad consensus on a worldwide temperature rise, which has been anthropogenically influenced in recent decades, the extent of the effects on precipitation, sea level rise and extreme events, as well as the attribution of the causes, also show deviations and differences of opinion among the scientists involved with regard to the assessments of climate-related phenomena represented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Bray, 2010). This has resulted in a competition for the development and publication of knowledge about the world, in this case about the phenomenon of climate change and the associated future prognoses or scenarios, for a variety of reasons such as reputation, recognition, significance of the subject and funding for research. This may lead to situations in which a scientific debate breaks away from its original task of advancing knowledge and

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instead results in a power struggle for interpretative sovereignty with corresponding effects such as defamation and denigration of the respective other position, as shown in controversies and reviews of publications on the subject of climate change, regardless of whether the author is pro or contra anthropogenically induced climate change (see Weingart, 2001, 2003; Bätjer, 2012; Titz, 2012; Kulke, 2015). Laypersons in particular are usually overwhelmed with the multitude of diagrams, illustrations, climate models and so on, which are brought into the field, and in which the most diverse parameters, as well as their interpretation and analysis, from the various respective disciplines are presented in relation to each other (Gethmann, 2009; see in addition Neverla & Schäfer, 2010; Taddicken & Wicke, 2019; Weingart et  al., 2000, 2008). In order to remain capable of action in the everyday world, a common reaction to this is to reduce the overwhelming complexity by processing only that part of the construction of ‘climate (change)’ that fits in with one’s own self-image (see also comments on Schulze, 2000 in Sect. 4.1). As a result, the climate issue is increasingly dissolving as a factual question in public discourse, as will be shown in the following section.

5.4.2 C  ommunication of Complexity in the Public Mass Media The struggle for a better understanding of the ligature ‘climate’ in material space, and the possible options associated with it, is also a question of communication (see also Chap. 4). In their search for orientation, laypersons come across a number of more or less transparent websites, blogs, social media accounts or online encyclopedia entries that compete for people’s minds against the background of their respective positions (Taddicken & Neverla, 2019; Taddicken & Trümper, 2019). Even in ‘classical’ mass media, reporting is less and less up to the expectations of recipients, such as Taddicken and Wicke (2019) point out, noting a certain weariness with sensationalist presentation (see also Weingart et al., 2000; Weingart, 2002), the lack of innovative content and the one-­ sidedness of reporting. But what is the reason for the increased skepticism and the loss of credibility (Weingart, 2002)? Until the mid-1990s,

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science and the media were widely accepted and legitimized in the communication on climate change (Weingart, 2002). A look at journalists in the ‘classic’ mass media in the last decade shows that although a third stated political neutrality, over a quarter of those questioned belonged to the green or liberal-left camp (statista, 2010; Lueg, 2012). Furthermore, they were mainly recruited from an (upper) middle class, whereas representatives of population segments with a low endowment of symbolic capital are not represented (Lueg, 2012). If we consider, on the one hand, that journalists generally report on what has always interested them (see, among others, Meyen, 2009) and, on the other hand, that “[o]ne […] of course always [broadcasts] for colleagues as well” (interviewed journalist quoted from Meyen, 2009, p.  336), a certain harmony in reporting emerges. Maurer (2011) refers to the high degree of uncertainty in connection with future forecasts by showing, through examples of reporting by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Der Spiegel and BILD, that over the years there has been less and less reference to this vagueness in articles, making it clear that the media studied hardly differed in this respect (Maurer, 2011). Maurer (2011) also sees this development in connection with the journalistic task of reducing uncertainties for the reader by providing information—even if the researchers entrusted with the topic are not able to make exact forecasts for the future, journalists are nevertheless concerned “to establish clarity even in a state of uncertainty” (Maurer, 2011, p. 72.; see also on fallibilism in the context of climate research, Gethmann, 2009). In this context, the reference to the journalistic peer group becomes important: Like all other people, they [journalists; author's note] probably rely on heuristics: they orient themselves on the reporting of other media. This explains the strong consonance of reporting on the consequences of climate change. They orientate themselves on the same experts, who are easily accessible because they have already expressed themselves in earlier articles. As a result, different points of view are hardly ever made clear. […] Although the communication of external uncertainty is taught in journalism training, demanded by journalistic self-regulation and approved of by most journalists, it is therefore ‘virtually non-existent’ with regard to the consequences of global climate change. (Maurer, 2011, p. 72; see also generally Schneider & Raue, 2016)

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A differentiated presentation is, however, particularly important in view of a progressive dichotomization of society and the closing inner circles of the opposing sections of the population, as will be shown in the following.

5.4.3 P  rotest Movements and Their Positioning in Society Debates on climate, and the recent protests to implement action on climate change, particularly occur among populations with higher levels of formal education (Taddicken et al., 2019; Wahlström et al., 2019; Moor et  al., 2020) who, when considering ligatures and options, are also endowed with more choices and life-chances than, for example, persons with a low level of formal education. The activists of the climate protests that have been taking place since 2018/2019 are primarily composed of high school and university students, some of whom account for over 90% of the protesters (Wahlström et al., 2019; Moor et al., 2020). While the ligatures of these groups are comparatively small in terms of professional, family, or financial contexts, constraints and responsibilities, the possible options are very pronounced in light of the educational level achieved. In the event of a change of system or social/economic collapse, segments of the population with high/highest levels of education would be most likely to be able to adapt to the changed framework conditions, for example, by changing location or job, including at the international level. The options available to the less privileged sections of the population with a lower level of education are much less pronounced in this regard. The liberty of the majority of climate activists is based on the security of being able to choose from a wide range of options, each of which also allows them to leave ligatures and exchange them. Thus, the activists form a homogeneous entity, which in many cases increasingly argues the moral obligation standpoint regardless of the other social subareas and their (existential) conditions (Wahlström et al., 2019; Moor et  al., 2020; Neuber & Gardner Gharrity, 2020), setting climate policy goals radically ahead of all other socio-political goals. This conversely correlates poorly with the currently predominant, everyday

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concerns and fears of a broad majority of the population in Germany, among which aspects of climate change tend to be marginalized (statista, 2018; r+v Versicherung, 2019). A characteristic of this homogeneous, and at the same time medially very present social formation, is the strong (possibly unconsciously working) socio-economic self-reference and the limited empathy toward other societal perspectives that result from less preferred socio-economic starting capital. Rather, the utopia of an idealized climate-neutral (final) state seems to be pursued as the (ecological) salvation of the entire planet, without seriously considering related social and economic side effects on existing systems. Accordingly, the demands made by activists in the Lausanne Declaration (2019) are unilateral, such as (Fridays for Future, 2019) “1. Keep the global temperature rise below 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels; 2. Ensure climate justice and equity; 3. Listen to the best united science currently available” without room for errors and corrections—such as the fact that, for example, in the course of the future forecasts, the data had to be repeatedly corrected downward with regard to the assumed temperature rise (cf. Weingart, 2002). Science in liberal systems is a small-step search process characterized by responsibility with rationality and a weighing of reasons. Beyond the progress of the respective science, it also considers the consequences of its actions beyond its field (Dahrendorf, 1967) and in this context is not subject to any ideological external or internal constraints (see also Nida-Rümelin, 2005; Sofsky, 2007; see Sect. 4.3.2). The demands of Fridays for Future (FFF) activists, however, rarely take into account the multiple, complex challenges of diverse societies and associated worldwide ligatures in relation to the consequences of their actions in their own field (Fridays for Future, 2019; Fridays for Future Deutschland, 2019). Correspondingly, the distribution of empathy tends to be asymmetrical, in that it is targeted, in particular, at one’s peers or the most globally underprivileged in society. Even though the climatic conditions on the planet have been subject to considerable fluctuations during the billions of years of its existence, the activists’ demands in the Lausanne Declaration are oriented toward the temperature levels of the pre-industrial age and ignore contingent climatic conditions. Likewise the second, rather socialist-seeming, demand for climate justice and equality appears problematic—against

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the background of an above-average endowment of options and life-­ chances of the activists (90% are recruited from university degree aspirants, but represent only about 18% of the population in those parts of Germany [Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2020]), the question arises as to which concept of justice underlies the demand for ‘climate justice’. The subsequent reference to ‘equality’ also remains unclear. A narrow interpretation of the meaning of the word as ‘climatic equality’ would be simply absurd in view of the (not humanly influenced) physical-­ spatial differentiation of climatic characteristics. Equally vague is the third demand for adherence to “the best united science currently available”—what was envisioned by this and how should such a thing be measured? What happens to divergent assessments and attitudes? What does ‘united science’ mean? What epistemological concept of science is adopted? In this case, a united attitude of ‘science’ is suggested, which raises other questions. First, as is well known, sciences are not uniform and are instead differentiated by discipline, often resulting in differing positions on how to deal with climate change (e.g. with regard to mitigation and adaptation). Second, the competition for suitable theories to explain facts (as described by Popper, 1959, 1963, but also Dahrendorf, 1967, 1968), which is constitutive for sciences, is ignored. Third, the question arises who should determine the current ‘best’ position, because this can be judged—if at all—only ex-post, and this remains strongly context-dependent.

5.4.4 M  oralization and Ethics of Conviction as a Danger to Liberal Democracies Some observers even see a danger for liberal democracy in the absolute demands of activists. Thus Rödder states (2019, w.p.), again self-­ accusingly, that “[t]he climate activists – with reference to what they consider to be objective sciences and undeniable findings – make a claim to truth, which they associate with the concept of the general will of the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This means that they lay an unrestricted claim to the interpretation of knowing the common good. But democracy always consists of the competition of different opinions. This

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is precisely where the problem lies” (see also Dahrendorf, 2003, 2005, 2010; Leonardi, 2015; Traub, 2020). Correspondingly, the expectations of the climate protest movement are brought to society one-sidedly, whereas conversely, society’s expectations of the movement and its representatives—for example, to be part of constructive negotiation processes while recognizing the legitimate interests of all participants, or to assume concrete responsibility in restructuring outside the protest movement sphere—are blanked out or perceived as a burden. This one-sided connection to society, contrasted with the attempt to regulate physical space on the basis of climate models associated with numerous uncertainties and unpredictability, appears against the background of the associated claim as a self-contained world view which, however, encounters innumerable other world experiences and world views. In the process, the conditions of the possibility of one’s own actions, such as those of society or sociality, are blanked out and meet with corresponding resistance: the Fridays for Future climate activist, but also critic of the movement, Clemens Traub, warns that the movement “is beating its heads in over alleged climate sins”, but does not realize “how the moral burden of the debate paralyzes us. More and more people feel stigmatized in their lifestyle by the morally charged climate debate” (Traub, 2020, p. 135; on the problem of moral communication, see Sect. 4.3). Thus, in social discourse—instead of the extension of options for action—ligatures are introduced which are difficult to revise, which are adopted individually and group-specifically, and which are able to restrict the liberty of both ‘ego’ and ‘alter’. Furthermore, such moralizations lead to cemented convictions in the sense of Weber’s ‘ethics of conviction’ (Weber, 1988), within which—as stated by the FFF critic Clemens Traub (2020)—only the ‘pure attitude’ counts (see also Lübbe, 2019). ‘Responsibility’ and ‘guilt’ are externalized to society, capitalism, ignorance of people and so on,1 while one’s own position is flanked by moral complacency,  As statements such as “There are many different ways to implement our demand for 100% renewable energy supply. We cannot commit ourselves to one solution here, the detailed implementation of our demands should be discussed in politics” (Fridays for Future Deutschland [2020a, w.p.]) or “[f ]or the necessary change, fundamental changes must take place across all sectors. Enormous efforts are needed, especially in the energy production, housing and construction, industry, transport and traffic, and agriculture sectors. Economic activity must not continue to cross planetary boundaries” (Fridays for Future Deutschland [2019, w.p.]). 1

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missionary zeal and aggressiveness (see also Traub, 2020). In an open society, however, the conditions of one’s own potential actions are always a matter for negotiation involving the most diverse social sub-sectors, which must also be renegotiated again and again—in other words, as a process that makes liberties possible in the first place. However, if a society is primarily involved in a “consensus to the point of sclerosis” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p.  74), conflicts to be resolved are quickly understood existentially as a struggle either for or against “the system”—be it political, scientific, economic and so on, or all of them together. The great influence that the movement of a minority of people, whose ligatures are comparatively small, but whose possible options and choices are highly developed, has nevertheless been able to exert on the media and political representatives, is also linked to a certain dogmatism, a position of total competence, which as a consequence, flows from a conscience into a conscience (see in the context of philosophy Marquard, 1974). As with many demonstrations with far-reaching socio-political demands, it can be observed that parts of the Fridays for Future movement are splitting their consciences from their own actions, that is, displaying a certain flexibility, that distinguishes them from earlier environmental movements, which were more radically interpreted in their own actions (Gassert & Klimke, 2009; see, among others, Gilcher-Holtey, 1998; Weinhauer, 2001) and thus corrupt their own credibility in society. Rather, they appear as an environmental movement of anything goes— from emotionally emphasized conscience being, to conscience having, to which conscience, with simultaneous low tolerance of dissonance and striving for the great (harmonious) picture, which in turn ignores the potential fruitfulness of conflict, including in the struggle for the most suitable regulations in the context of climate change. A further problem arises from the paternalistic claim to totality that parts of the movement make their own and which is expressed in self-claims, such as the rescue of the entire society, the entire physical space or planet. ‘Salvation’ in this context is understood as knowing the solution for all human beings and the whole physical space—a radical-utopian approach, where both the movement and the individual can only fail (on the problem of utopias, see Sect. 5.1). It is important to remember that the greater the (life) task to be achieved, the greater the frustration (see also Sects. 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3).

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Fridays for Future’s gain in significance is also related to certain populist patterns of argumentation that the movement displays (see Sect. 4.1.3). For example, the organization strives to skip arenas such as parliaments and other associated forums as places of orderly debate and instead strives to “create a consensus based on the supposed or actual, more or less deeply felt feelings of the population” (Dahrendorf, 2003, p. 90). In view of the imminent climate catastrophe this approach would be self-­ evident, if, for example, the demands made not only were to be implemented immediately in national law, but also require an immediate change of the constitution, such as “the immediate anchoring of climate protection in the constitution as well as the withdrawal from oil, coal and gas by 2030!” (Fridays for Future Austria, 2020, w.p.). Furthermore, according to the understanding of von Beyme (2013) and Strenger (2015), there is also the tendency to put moral questions in the foreground and to fall back on widespread stereotypes (such as the threat of the end of the world). For example, the vagueness and unknowns of previous climate models and their associated problems are hardly addressed in the movement’s demands, but rather the moral obligation to immediately follow the formulated demands is referred to, since otherwise the question must be asked “why build on a future that will soon no longer be worth living?” (Fridays for Future Deutschland, 2020b, w.p.). The scenario is often associated with a ‘failure’ or ‘inactivity’ of socially established elites such as ‘the politicians’, ‘the business community’ and ‘energy providers’, whose representatives are perceived as “not representative of the popular will of a distanced elite, […] which defends its own interests” (Strenger, 2015, p. 61). In the process, these sectors become generalized third parties (industry, the economy, etc.), whose climate-related advances, such as the construction of more efficient production plants, the development of new technologies for renewable energies, processing methods for raw materials and much more, are hardly reflected in the lines of argumentation. Finally, the movement is based on a consistent world view whose communication attitude consists in particular of criticism, but which itself reacts sensitively to criticism and uncompromisingly places its own program above the numerous other challenges that modern societies have to face (cf. Strenger, 2019).

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5.4.5 R  esistance to Paternalistic (Thought) Patterns and Their Failure As already indicated, this paternalistic claim also implies a high probability of resistance reaction on the part of the others into whose life-worlds the claims intrude and whose liberties they restrict: as a movement, it is referred to something, but does not take everyone with it and pathologizes in the doubt dissenters (Grau, 2017). Resistance in general can be understood psychologically as a reaction to the reduction of life-chances (see in overview Faust, 2016): if a third party wants to radically change one’s own world, then the individual is left with only the option of resistance or the option of purification in the truest sense of the word, a resistant, possibly painful change of their own life. In this act there is no longer God or any other religious authority as the ultimate goal, but one’s own morality (we have already learned about this other side of the climate change debate in the context of resistance to renewable energies; see Sect. 4.6). There is a psychological moment here, in that ‘rescue fantasy’ and ‘corner-man syndrome’ are mutually dependent. In terms of the theory of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; at a glance, e.g. Köhler, 2016; Simon & Mummendey, 1997; Ullrich et al., 2011), people strive for a positive differentiation of their own group by positively distinguishing their own group from others. This has an immunizing effect on cognitive and evaluative processes in argumentation: the more resistance is generated by one’s own position, the ‘truer’ our own truth becomes. By linking content-related concerns with (social) identification processes, it is not always easy to determine the underlying forces and motives in ‘movements’. If the issue is exclusively about the cause, it is possible that a goal or at least a consensus can be reached. However, when it comes to self-stabilization by the group, anchoring oneself with content is a method of distinguishing oneself from ‘the others’: it is no longer the content that is central, but its power of distinction. If the content of other groups or even the majority approaches one’s own opinions, more extreme demands must be made in order to maintain the identity-generating distance. Resistance from outside as a guarantor and as proof of one’s own ‘truth’ is of central importance in closed, homogeneous groups, such as within

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certain circles of climate strike activists, for example, since an opening would be tantamount to abandoning the ‘claim to truth’ and thus to the uncertainty of one’s own identity. From a social point of view, however, this means that even a joint discourse would no longer be possible due to the closure: the absurdity of a movement’s claim to want to save, for example, humanity or the planet with a simple recipe, not only for today but for the entire future, is obvious from a rational point of view. However, by making debates and decisions less rational and factual and more focused on a moral discourse that no longer allows pathos to be deconstruct as such, the climate debate gains a momentum and becomes a quasi-religious dichotomizing belief system of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, in the context of which the individual is left with only the choice between approval and rejection (Rohloff & Saramago, 2020; Traub, 2020; see also Sect. 3.4.3 for conflict and Sect. 4.3 for morale). In these contexts, the scenarios of a prospective paternalism of socialism face the retrospective paternalism of the conservatives, whereas liberal positions see the individual as the central instance to set life-chances by means of education. Restrictions of personal liberty, lifestyles or aesthetic ideas by others affect the individual and make him or her resist accordingly. Against this background, the conflictual nature of the world is facing a new challenge in the course of advancing digitalization: while superordinate instances, such as God in the past or the state in modern times, set a framework for conflict, the world wide web is a medium that no longer imposes any limitations and that can place one’s own morality above everything else and which in the world wide web encounters the countless other absolutized moralities of other users, which culminate in an endless mudslinging in a fragmentation and brutalization of communication (Bishop, 2014; Nagle, 2017; Wagner, 2019; see also Sect. 4.5). Self(re)security is then often searched for and often also supposedly found in small-scale -isms like ecologism, veganism and nationalism (cf. Lantermann, 2016). The question of how liberty can be gained, won and secured in the midst of torn conditions is not a new one. At that time, Hegel examined the figure of the ‘founder of religion’ and the ‘teacher of virtue’ who, as individuals, are able to produce constructive ideas and to act in accordance with them in a ‘beautiful’ and ‘good’ manner, but cannot overcome the difficulty of communicating these ideas with social reality or the

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‘world’ in such a way that they can be generally accepted and can thus function as general orientations for action (Hegel, 1966[1907]). Gethmann-Siefert (2005, p. 66; emphasis in original) describes the problem as follows: The definition of the ideal as a beautiful action by the founders of religion and teachers of virtue does not meet the requirements of the realizability of the ideal in a changed world. For the beautiful action remains—at least as it can be represented in the analysis of the Christian founder of religion— ultimately worldless. Through the ideal in the church as the community of spirits, or as the Kingdom of God’, again only a world of its own is created beside the world. Instead of leading the real historical world out of its disunity to the harmony of the community of reasonable and free beings through the ideal of beautiful action, the church as the kingdom of God becomes a world of its own beside the real society and beside the state.

The reason for the failure of mediation lies in a negative critique of existing conditions. This means that a community of like-minded people does not gain a foothold in society because it sets an ideal conception of a ‘better world’ against the reality of the existing ‘wrong world’ by denouncing it (‘negative-critical’) without being able to offer promising (‘positive-­ critical’) ways of realizing the ‘improvement’ of the world in the medium of freely organized and generally accepted institutionalized action orientations—the path from a ‘good idea’, for example, in environmental protection, to the ‘can deposit’ was laborious, lengthy and unspectacular, but effective. The path from the ‘good climate ideas’ of the FFF to practicable, accepted and effective ‘realizations’ remains in the fog of vague demands and ideals—just as ‘utopia’ remains unattainable in the foggy distance. In reference to Hegel’s early philosophy of religion, and in a religious context, this means: “Since the ‘Kingdom of God’ cannot replace the alienated world with a better world, it does not create a real political community” (Gethmann-Siefert, 2005, p. 66). Mere negative criticism and moralizing appeals to ‘morality’, ‘virtue’, ‘civic-mindedness’, ‘decency of the upright’ and so on, without regard to the plurality of values and convictions within a pluralized and functionally organized society and without serious attempts to anchor these ideas institutionally in society in

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the course of laborious and protracted processes of negotiation, learning, mediation and socialization, must remain ineffective. Again in religious terms: “As long as the ideal remains merely negative criticism and world beside the world, no institution of liberty can be formed by the ‘beautiful actions’ of the founders of religion and teachers of virtue” (Gethmann-­ Siefert, 2005, p. 66; emphasis in the original). As a result, sectarian structures emerge within society, which cannot be communicated with society, but instead are embedded in its attitudes and dogmas. Accordingly, these formations provoke massive resistance and usually achieve the exact opposite of their original intention: they want to convert society, they want to save the world, they want the good and instead they reap mockery, scorn and even hatred, because it is overlooked that good ideas meet with broad acceptance in society and are anchored, that is, institutionalized. This means in the last consequence: “The critical potency of the demand for reason and liberty proves itself not in individual morality, but in the institution of moral conditions” (Gethmann-Siefert, 2005, p. 59). And it is precisely this institutionalization that climate activists, for example, are unable to achieve. Ultimately, they are satisfied with their own individual, supposedly moral superiority of their political-religious beliefs.

5.4.6 C  omparison of Protest Forms of Citizens’ Initiatives and Fridays for Future A comparison of the respective commitment and protest of citizens’ initiatives (CI; case study Energy system transformation; Sect. 4.6), on the one hand, and Fridays for Future (case study Climate Change), on the other show striking similarities, especially with regard to the logic of argumentation, despite central differences in content. On the one hand, the differences concern the scope of criticism, which in the case of citizens’ initiatives (CI) is predominantly small scale at the local or regional level and is directed against concrete projects in connection with the implementation of the energy system transformation on the ground. On the other hand, ‘FFF’ takes a global perspective from the outset, independent of concrete locations or projects; this also assumes totalitarian traits

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from the outset, insofar as the claim to change the world comprehensively affects all areas of society and life, both socially and individually. The CI also occasionally tends to make global claims with totalitarian consequences, but rather in regard to the need to justify the micro to mesoscale protests by argument. In the case of FFF, though, the argumentation is basically based on the global and totalitarian claim to change the world. Additionally, the composition of the CI is mixed according to age, social class or class affiliation, even though the spokespersons of the CI very often belong to a higher educational level (e.g. teachers and engineers) and/or a secure socio-economic position (Kühne, 2014). In contrast, 90% of the members of the FFF are, as shown, from the student body and, at the same time, from a higher educational level and very often from secure socio-economic backgrounds. More serious are the similarities: first, the inevitable dichotomization of the conflict; second, the tendency toward populism. Both appear in rather micro-scale conflicts in the context of the energy turnaround, in which CI appears as a party to the conflict, and the globally oriented protests of the FFF lead to the repeatedly mentioned tendency, described by Dahrendorf, to dichotomize the conflict, ultimately leading to polarization, that is, the irreconcilable opposition of extremely exaggerated positions. This dichotomization and polarization are promoted by the described process of moralization, in conjunction with emotionalization and the tendency toward populism, which mobilizes and strengthens the unity of the conflict party internally, further reinforcing the external demarcation. In this way, political adversaries can become political enemies, making it considerably more difficult, if not impossible, to resolve the conflict. This criticism must not be misunderstood as being directed against the subject matter of the protests of CI and FFF. A desired and non-negotiable proprium of democratic societies is that citizens get involved in public and take an active stand on socio-political issues. How does criticism fit in with this? This question can be answered with regard to the distinction between content and form: nobody can fundamentally object to the subject matter of the protests—that is, the desire for environmental and climate protection, the desire to preserve familiar surroundings, the aversion to changes in the physical landscape and so on. In their interest-based

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nature, the subject matter of the protest is fundamentally legitimate and debatable, because interests are first and foremost equal and of equal value. What is problematic, however, is the staging of the protest in its form, that is the form of self-representation, such as the emotionality and kitschiness of the language, appearances and arguments, the sometimes polemical intensifications, the tendencies of moralization, the dissolution of factual questions and their metamorphosis into quasi-religious questions of faith, the parroting of many protesters and activists as members or followers of a ‘movement’—resembling, in a religious context, the recitation of incantations in a religious ‘community’—which merely continue the journalistic parroting of media reports or popular science texts on another level. An unintended effect of this criticized form of protest is then that it often discredits the content (which is legitimate and debatable as an interest or claim or desire), and instead having the opposite effect of what is desired to be achieved.

5.5 A  n Interim Conclusion on the Return of the Utopian, the Inescapability of Landscape 1 and Kitschy Responses to the increase in complexity and contingency of the world in the form of governance has led to over-governance, while the communicative possibilities of the Internet (not only, but to a large extent) led to the moralization of communication and thus to a shift from options to ligatures (Chap. 4). Linked to this is the longing for a ‘better’ world; utopias are in full swing. Utopias are, however, in their totality, destroyers of contingency. They suggest a truth—alternative interpretations and evaluations need neither be accepted nor tolerated. They are therefore positively coupled with the dichotomizing moralization in the world of ‘we (in the extreme case: I) = good’ versus ‘the others = evil’. Alternative ways of dealing with challenges are not only rejected, they are rejected without prior examination, for reasons of one’s own moral superiority. In Landscape 1 utopian ideas are manifested by objects that do not correspond to a rational access to the world in the sense of current social

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conditions, in that they are supposed to imagine past times or symbolize the power of utopia. In short, the materialization of utopian Landscape 2 ideas in Landscape 1 can easily be identified as ‘kitsch’. In the following we will attempt to outline a way of dealing with Landscapes 1–3 that is based on the idea of maximizing life-chances.

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6 Contours of a Handling of Space from the Perspective of a Liberalism That Maximizes Life-Chances

The life-chance liberal alternative to the conservative Scylla of “returning to the known and familiar” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 9) and the Marxist Charybdis of “belief in wild, often utopian promises” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 9) to control anxiety is by training people to deal with challenges rationally and confidently. The central approach to this is education. Education makes it possible to not only tolerate spatial contingencies but to perceive them as enrichment. However, not only social ideas of space can have liberal traits; physical space can also serve as a medium for enabling life-­ chances to question and overcome natural and social restrictions. A liberal approach to space in terms of life-chances must therefore be oriented toward maximizing “educational opportunities, income opportunities, participation opportunities” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 12). From a liberal point of view, the lack of economic capital is justified neither in the profit interests of the ruling class (as in the interpretation of socialism) nor by the traditional structure of society (as in conservatism), but can be described (at least in essence) as a consequence of the lack of individual education as an enabler of life-chances. In the following, we will outline the basic features of such an approach to space, which is geared toward increasing life-chances, because “[t]he more people have more lifechances, the more liberal a society is” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 37). This © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Kühne et al., Liberty and Landscape, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84326-7_6

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implies “a piece of contradictory spirit against all consolidated order” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p.  136) which “distinguishes the liberal from the conservative as well as the socialist” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 136). In order to outline our understanding of life-chance liberalism, we will first explain in this chapter the seven aspects of liberty that are essential for us. We will then explain the processual nature of liberty in relation to Landscapes 1–3, deal with fear and these landscape levels, and briefly explain the extent to which humor is important for a life-chance-oriented approach to spaces. In the following two sections we will deal with the basic questions of the relationship between life-chances and spaces, as well as with a productive regulation of conflicts.

6.1 B  ack to Square One!? Interpretations and Meanings of Liberty If the previous considerations are taken together, liberty can be understood firstly as the individual’s struggle with himself (World 2), his fellow human beings in socialities (World 3) and above all with ‘nature’ (World 1); secondly, as the individual’s reflection on himself and the context that determines him in each case; and thirdly, as a process subject to time.

6.1.1 Liberty as a Struggle with Nature With Kant, liberty can be described as ‘transcendental liberty’ (Kant, 1959 [1781], A 803 / B 831), that is, as independent of “all determining causes” (Kant, 1959 [1781], A 803 / B 831) or “of all causality” (cf. Höffe, 1992, p. 199). It is therefore not empirically verifiable, but must always be assumed. Thus, the attempt of psychologists and neuroscientists to locate ‘free will’ in the brain is subject to the ‘amphiboly of the concepts of reflection’ (Kant, 1959 [1781], A 260–292 / B 316–349), that is, the confusion of a transcendental with an empirical use of the concept of liberty. This idea of transcendental liberty, however, is subject to obstacles and resistance to reason in its “practical use” (Kant, 1959 [1781], A 803 / B 831), or in other words, as a ‘practical liberty’. Whether

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it is character deficits or social, cultural, economic, political or nature-­ induced impairments or hindrances, the conditions of free action and thus the empirical conditions of free reflection, decision-making and action can in principle—even in a free democratic social order—be hindered, undermined, suppressed or even destroyed in many ways. This began with the struggle against nature, from whose constraints and horrors (cf. Horkheimer & Adorno, 1969) people had to free themselves in the first place before individual and social liberties could emerge. In today’s Western affluent societies, this struggle is almost forgotten or is reversed in a sense, when man is not against nature, but for nature within the framework of climate policy, in the belief that he has to admittedly fight to preserve his own livelihood. With Herder (1964, p. 98) man is “the first freedman of creation”. He is “according to his liberty – and even in the worst abuse of it – a king. Nevertheless he is allowed to choose, even if he chooses the worst; he can rule over himself, though he chose the lowest by his own choice” (Herder, 1964, p.  98). Here, Herder addresses in advance the susceptibility of all human thought, recognition and action to error and deception—admittedly in and out of liberty— which Popper and Dahrendorf later rightly recalled. Animals cannot make mistakes; they are integrated into an instinctive apparatus that clearly determines their behavior and their respective place in the environment. This is not the case with humans. With Helmuth Plessner, the basic situation of humans in the world can be characterized as “placelessness” or “eccentric positionality” (Plessner, 1981). Man is the “unidentified animal” (Nietzsche, 1993, p. 81) which is not completely determined by nature, but determines itself and creates its own environment. He is, as it were, ‘thrown’ into the world (Heidegger, 1993 [1927]), without a middle (center) and without home (cf. Rentsch, 2005). Because of this (natural) conditio humana, people have to create or shape their center, their places, their home and their support. With Friedrich Kambartel, this design is characterized by an irrevocable surplus of form, whereby the ‘problem of form’ arises again and again (Kambartel, 1991). With Jonas (1973), the liberty of design can be reconstructed as a decoupling of design-giving subject (human/World 2), designed form (sense/World 3) and objective reality (things/World 1). In this way, the “first line drawn intentionally (…) exceeds the current reality” and opens up a “field of

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infinite variation as a realm of the possible”, which “can be realized by man according to his choice” (Jonas, 1973, p. 243). Gehlen’s unfortunately misleading, albeit correct, thesis that man is a ‘deficient being’ in comparison to the animal (Gehlen, 1940) is therefore to be complemented by the thesis that man is an “ability being” (Gerhardus, 1978, p.  157), which is endowed with “assets, abilities, powers and talents which, depending on his overall biological endowment, are the basis of a multitude of different, mutually supporting and perfecting skills” (Gerhardus, 1978, p. 151; emphasis by author). For example, humans can’t do many things (like flying), but they can do many other things (like making airplanes). Above all, they can create a world of socialities, cultures and landscapes in and out of liberty. An investigation of human ‘deficiencies’, ‘abilities’ and ‘skills’ can be based on the well-known distinction between ‘physiological’ and ‘pragmatic knowledge of man’ by Kant: “Physiological knowledge of man is based on the investigation of what nature makes of man, pragmatic knowledge is based on what he, as a free-acting being, makes of himself, or can and should make of himself ” (Kant, 1983, p. 29). After all that has been said, liberty is a ‘fact of reason’ (Kant, 2011 [1788]; see also Höffe, 1992), but it is subject to constant dangers and threats—for example, through natural influences (i.e. World 1) such as diseases (e.g. the Corona pandemic) or natural disasters (climate change, earthquakes, floods, etc.); through individuals (i.e. World 2), if they have character deficits or commit themselves to ideas that threaten liberty; and through socio-cultural influences (i.e. World 3), if totalitarian governments come to power or political ideas restrict liberty.

6.1.2 Liberty as Reflection On the part of individuals and socialities, liberty is therefore bound to reflection. Liberty presupposes self-criticism, reflection and the will to know without reservation, and has little to do with a supposedly incontrovertible political attitude, demonstrated as if it were personal property, which is often expressed in complacent attitudes (cf. Grau, 2017, 2019). The moralizing position of the actors that can sometimes be observed in

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‘landscape conflicts’ (Knoepfel & Gerber, 2008; Berr & Jenal, 2019; Berr et al., 2019) can often also be identified as a behavior of distinction and can ultimately be seen as an expression of the lack of liberty, insofar as the orientation of action is subject to an “outside conduit” (Riesman, 1950) which either affirmatively makes itself dependent on the recognition by others in a recusant way or also makes itself dependent in a negative way through the urge to stand apart from others (Bourdieu, 1987 [1979]) (see Sect. 6.3). How one becomes subservient to another through the ‘struggle for recognition’ (Honneth, 1992) is unsurpassably demonstrated by the Hegelian doctrine of ‘dominion and servitude’1 (Hegel, 1980). Liberty, on the other hand, is always also the effort to form one’s own judgment, independent of affirmative recognition or negative detachment. But liberty is then possibly also the bitter insight to recognize beloved views and convictions as contingent in the face of current events, to acknowledge them as such and, under certain circumstances, to revise them. One’s own opinion is not a possession, but a possibility for orientation under the condition of probation in liberty. One’s own opinion or conviction, as set, is a statement on the ‘world’ in its three forms (Worlds 1, 2 and 3), which takes a position within an already given context. Taking a ‘position’ means, however, that the “diffuse horizon of possible determinations is transformed into concrete settings (‘positions’)” (Hubig, 2013, p. 276). This means that many possibilities are limited to one reality, but the respective determining is at the same time a negation of the other possibilities. The price of the (‘positive’) determination is the negation of the totality of given possibilities: ‘omnis determinatio est negatio’. The one positive determination as affirmation of a possibility is confronted with an immense variety of negations of other possibilities  With the metaphor “master and servant” Hegel presents as a central motif of his work the dialectic of human self-consciousness or identity formation, which is constituted and mutually complemented by processes of recognition by the respective others. From the dialectical shift of the elements of self-consciousness such as the being-for-himself of the master, who derives his identity from the fact that he has put his life in danger for others and therefore no longer works, and the being-for-others of the servant, who, while grounding his identity in the fact of being there and working for others, realizes in the course of time that through his work he also comes to dominate nature, the interdependence of the recognition relationship of domination and servitude is revealed: The servant is still a servant because of his enforced subordination, while the master is doubly dependent on the servant: on the one hand, he requires recognition as master by the servant, and on the other hand, he is dependent on the services and the supply of food. 1

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(and thus possible liberties). This has the consequence that liberty would be prevented by a complete definition in the sense of an unambiguous, irrevocable determination, because the space of possibilities would be restricted. Likewise, a complete lack of definition would prevent liberty, because this would open the door to arbitrariness. Reflection is always also a struggle. The struggle against nature (World 1) as a liberation from its constraints has already been pointed out as a necessary condition for liberty. The struggle of the individual with himself (World 2) and with his fellow men (World 3) encounters in each case two ideal-typically accentuated difficulties in the theoretical understanding and in the practical implementation (use) of liberty. The theoretical question is whether an individual can be assumed to have a ‘zero point of liberty’ (Marquard) or whether society can be assumed to have a zero point of moral orientation (Hegel), that is, whether an absolute ‘spontaneity’ (Kant) and a sociality without a framework narrative (Lyotard) is conceivable for the individual. The practical question is whether and how, in liberty, the individual can treat himself and the members of a sociality with care. Individually, this question leads to the ‘art of living’, and socially to the question of ‘justice’.

6.1.3 Struggle of the Individual with Itself The theoretical question is whether ‘liberty from’ is attainable without liberty-enabling given contexts, which, in the sense of ‘liberty to’, set socially and politically induced laws, rules, norms and so on. The question is whether ‘unfettered liberty’ is not already “an achievement of the community itself. Liberty from coercion is first and foremost brought about by the protection of rights. It is an achievement that the individual alone could not achieve. It is a child of that liberty which we have only in common, and which, as a common achievement, makes possible the space of undisturbed individual exercise of liberty” (Ottmann, 2012, p. 340). Behind this is the assumption of a ‘zero point’ of liberty, which “dims this context of liberty […]”—that is, education, institutions, traditions—whereby “liberty to zero determination degenerates: there liberty

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remains zero” (Marquard, 2007, p. 111); everything is, as it were, determined and thus not free. Ultimately, the question is whether liberty can mean being able to pull oneself out of the swamp of non-liberty (in the sense of heteronomy or determinacy) by one’s own pigtail. If Kant defines liberty as ‘autonomy’, that is, as ‘self-legislation’ or ‘self-determination’ of the will (Kant, 1993[1790], § 8), and speaks of ‘absolute spontaneity’ as ‘causality out of liberty’, which makes it possible “to start a series of phenomena that runs according to the laws of nature by itself” (Kant, 1959 [1781], B 474), this seems to infer that contexts and foreign determinants do not play a role. However, this impression would be a misunderstanding. Autonomous action in the sense of Kant “is not documented in the independence from all conditionalities of personal, social, economic and political nature. For one cannot put aside the manifold conditions anyway” (Höffe, 1992, p. 200). It means, however, to be aware of this human condition and not to allow empirical determinants as final reasons. In other words, liberty is the liberty of choice between alternatives, some of which are predetermined. The philosopher Wilhelm Kamlah also took into account the conditions of human action by integrating Kant’s spontaneity of action and the “character of the experience of human life” as two moments within the concept of action (Kamlah, 1973, p. 39; see Berr, 2018c). Kamlah first of all defines events as what can happen to people without acting themselves: “Illness, bright weather, toothache, the death of a loved one” (Kamlah, 1973, p.  34  f.). They are, as it were, “experiences without action” (Kamlah, 1973, p. 35). But more important is that there is “no pure action. Even such a mighty action as the so-called ‘creative’ is nevertheless always dependent on given conditions and exposed to disturbances, so that it ‘succeeds’ more or less, or not at all. Actions lead to success or failure or also to unexpected side effects” (Kamlah, 1973, p. 35). Actions are therefore always tied to the ‘danger character of life’, inasmuch as “danger and action are intertwined” (Kamlah, 1973, p. 37). Whether an action succeeds (e.g. the draft regional plan is approved by the Planning Committee) or fails (e.g. the draft is not approved) is a matter of chance. The liberty aspect of human actions (autonomous purpose) is thus always already limited in each action by the danger character of

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any action at all. This means that planners who want (and have) to design and furnish the physical space (World 1), for example, by means of a regional plan, always experience the susceptibility of their actions to failure. On the other hand, every action is always a reaction to natural (e.g. birth, mortality and need for protection), cultural (e.g. institutions of human coexistence, conventions, laws and morals) and social (e.g. communication and interaction) conditions. The aspect of liberty as a means of achieving a goal is therefore always linked to the aspect of danger in the form of success or failure, and in the form of the circumstances to which those acting must react. Accordingly, there is no ‘zero point’ of liberty; in other words, there is no context-free point from which freedom can be achieved. That means there is no absolute liberty, but only liberty of choice or options, which can be taken or not. Conversely, ‘liberty to …’ can be endangered by new subordinate social constraints, prohibitions and commandments, which are to be installed and provided with the appropriate legal and social sanctions in the course of civil society moralizations—for example, with regard to energy or climate policy issues, which frequently also affect the design of Landscape 1 (cf. e.g. Berr & Jenal, 2019; Kühne & Weber, 2018). The practical question of whether and how it is possible for the individual to treat himself or herself with care in the “use” of liberty refers to the question, which has been virulent since antiquity, of whether and how a human life can be meaningfully shaped. This question of the ‘art of living’ was widely developed in antiquity (cf. Horn, 2014), for example, by Stoics and Epicureans, in the Middle Ages by retreats or ‘spiritual exercises’ (cf. Hadot, 2005). This tradition of the art of living was first rediscovered by Friedrich Nietzsche (see Gerhardt, 1995; Kersting, 2007), then in France in the twentieth century by Pierre Hadot (2005) and Michel Foucault (1977), see Kersting, 2007), and in Germany especially by Wilhelm Schmid (e.g. 1998). Wilhelm Kamlah should be mentioned again, as he made a distinction between ‘eudaemonistic ethics’ and ‘normative ethics’ (Kamlah, 1973). ‘Normative ethics’ is identified with ‘moral philosophy’ and the question of ‘how we should live’ (Kamlah, 1973, pp. 93ff.), whereas ‘eudaemonistic ethics’ is a ‘philosophy as an art of living’ and investigates the question of ‘how we can live’ (Kamlah, 1973, pp. 145ff.; see also Krämer, 1992). The basic idea can be explained

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with a quotation from Foucault: “Why shouldn’t every single person be able to make a work of art out of his life? […] From the thought that the self is not given to us, […] only one practical consequence can be drawn: we must establish, produce and arrange ourselves like a work of art” (Foucault, 1984, p. 80). This view relies on a strong individual liberty to shape one’s own life in the face of a social and material world. The question that follows is whether such a life design is possible at all and to what extent, and what humans should actually do with their life goals and tasks. How does this art of living as a concept for shaping life prove itself at the end of a life, looking back on the ‘whole’ of this life? In his theory of the ‘life cycle’ (Erikson, 1995), Erik H.  Erikson distinguished and described eight stages of development, the last stage of which he calls ‘mature adulthood’. In this last stage of life there is a fundamental conflict between “integrity versus despair and disgust” (Erikson, 1995, p. 118). This last phase is the one in which the individual can no longer look ahead. This means that the hope and liberty of creation is only possible in retrospect, the composition of which has already been experienced, and there are two extreme cases: in one case is, life succeeds—Erikson calls this state ‘integrity’; the second case is failure, namely to look at an image that cannot be viewed in any other way, the result of which is ‘frustration’ and ‘disgust’. This question of the art of living refers to the question about a ‘zero point’ of self-formation and life design. Here, what has been said about the freedom of the will also applies. Admittedly, the aesthetic compulsion to shape affects not only the form of artifacts but also the way of life. Which hairstyle, what type of clothing or which scenic resorts are preferred: here there is a scope for shaping that falls within the use of the liberty of the individual. But as correct as this view may be in principle, it seems implausible with regard to a “successful overall life execution (eupraxia)” (Hubig, 2007, p. 128; author’s emphasis). The entire course of life cannot be summed up or counted as a “series of elective acts” (Kersting, 2007, p.  55), viewed from an outside perspective and processed like a material for a work: “Life is not a work that one could approach from the outside to impose one’s ideas of quality on it. (…) Life is practice, and incessant process that eludes any theoretical or practical objectification” (Kersting, 2007, p. 55 f.). What is possible, however, is

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“intentionally to [intervene] in the fabric of our life” in an occasional and context-dependent way, and “with a favorable central position and accommodating circumstances, perhaps even the existing texture and color pattern can be [noticeably] changed” (Kersting, 2007, p. 33). More is not possible, life as a whole cannot be aesthetically shaped or formed like a work of art. Another perspective is added using Isaiah Berlin’s terminology on the interdependence of positive and negative liberty: “Negative liberty makes possible, while positive liberty realizes. Negative liberty protects the individual and enables him to realize his self in his positive liberty. In this respect, both perspectives on the concept of liberty complement each other, although the possibility of each realization always precedes the other. Without liberty from coercion, no self-­ realization is possible” (Schwarz et al., 2015, p. 29). This concept extends also to life-chances.

6.1.4 Struggle with and in Socialities With regard to socialities (World 3), the theoretical question is whether individually a zero point of moral orientation (Hegel, 1995) can be assumed, that is, whether a sociality without a framework narrative (Lyotard, 1979) is conceivable. Hegel had argued against a purely formal morality (Hegel, 1995) that without “forms of life” as a “place of realization of liberty” (Hoffmann, 2009, p. 321) morality would have no content. It would be “‘empty’ and in a certain sense circular as long as it is not substantively underpinned with references to the social institutions and roles in which the arguing subject is currently located” (Honneth, 2007, p. 416). Liberty has long since been lived and realized more or less completely or imperfectly in areas of activity (cf. Quante, 2005). This means that human reason can know what is good and right in always being involved in moral relations and their ethos. This ethos of socialities is written in narratives about what is already recognized as good and right. However, Lyotard has been able to demonstrate the impossibility of a renewed legitimizing power of ‘grand narratives’ or ‘meta-narratives’ (e.g. Enlightenment and emancipation of man, teleology of mind, hermeneutics of meaning) (Lyotard, 1979; for more understanding, see Welsch,

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1987, pp. 172ff.). The belief in the possibility of overall interpretations is largely gone, and the price that had to be paid historically for such dreams of unity—one thinks of the terror of the political totalitarianisms of the twentieth century, which had taken up the banner of human emancipation and liberation—was alarmingly high. Nevertheless, there is a need for such narratives, in the sense of an orientation that promises security. Is there such a thing as a framework that determines what a society definitely does not want? For example, in dealing with extremist parties? What is worth fighting for? How can I position myself in the struggle for liberty? Which orientations relevant to society as a whole can be set, that is, can they be legitimized as orientations set in liberty? Generally accepted as a framework narrative, the only legal framework is the constitution, which is why Habermas, following Dolf Sternberger (1979), even spoke of a ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas, 1990). The practical question is whether and how, in the use of liberty, a caring interaction between the members of a sociality among themselves is possible, that is, whether and how ‘justice’ is possible. The meta-­narratives Lyotard criticizes are based on generally accepted binding forces, in other words, consensus. Lyotard has some reservations about consensus, in particular that it is subject to specific word games and procedures, and by no means all of them. By adopting a formal principle, other word games are suppressed, resulting in a preliminary decision that must, by extension, lead to injustice. Lyotard’s linguistic analysis had shown that there is no supreme rule; it is impossible to determine meta-prescriptions. Thus, Lyotard says: “Consensus has become an obsolete and suspect value, but justice has not. One must therefore arrive at an idea and a practice of justice that is not bound to that of consensus” (Lyotard, 1986, p. 190). Instead of a meta-narrative about the ethos of a society, the question of justice would have to be asked anew. If liberty is understood as a process, then ‘justice’ would have to be modeled as procedural justice. If this understanding is transferred to classical liberalism, to life-chance liberalism, to conservatism and to socialism, the following classifications result: socialism claims an egalitarian approach, everyone does what he is capable of doing and everyone gets what he needs. In conservatism, the essence of justice is defined either by God or through culture or sociality. In radical liberalism, justice is defined

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as the justice of achievement, and in life-chances liberalism, it is defined as procedural justice, alongside equality of opportunity. This means that justice is not just any given structure, but that justice is the result of a corresponding procedure that has given all those affected the opportunity to participate. The question is then only whether this procedure is discourse-­ ethically oriented toward consensus (Habermas), fairness (Rawls) or conflict regulation (Dahrendorf ). In this point, one can connect to a basic idea of Popper, which is his concept of an ‘open society’: a society may develop evolutionarily in a process of improvement attempts and error corrections, which presupposes a pluralistic basis (Popper, 2011 [1947]). Instead of following a constantly present ‘basic public’ sphere, the differentiation of public spheres in the sense of Dahrendorf (Dahrendorf, 1969a, 1972) seems more functional for the preservation and development of an ‘open society’: 1. The ‘latent public’ consists of the non-participants who lack (current) willingness to exert influence due to insufficient motivation, lack of interest or even “conflicting influences” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p. 230). It can always activate itself selectively. 2. The ‘passive public’ is “sporadically present in the political process as audience and voter” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p.  230). The maximum influence of this public extends to nominal membership in an organization. 3. The ‘active public’ consists of people who regularly participate in the political process with their own ideas. These are people “who take office and regret the non-participation of others in their speeches” (Dahrendorf, 1972, p. 230). A change between the public spheres is always possible and subject to individual decisions.

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6.1.5 Liberty as a Process To understand liberty as a process and to model it theoretically means, according to these remarks, that liberty has to be won and re-­conceptualized again and again, currently and often also ‘counterfactually’ (Habermas). As a result, liberty today is different from that of generations ago, since today a different society is negotiating how liberty can be concretely shaped, lived and institutionalized. Only decades ago, smoking, for example, was considered a gain in emancipation and thus a gain in liberty for women. Today, smoking is perceived by women and men alike as a threat to health and thus to liberty, and is increasingly being ostracized by society. Historically contingent understandings of liberty demand, if they are to be understood and put into practice, the acceptance of this contingency. As a consequence, liberty should by no means be misunderstood as an absolute security, as if it were possible to let oneself fall into the armchair after a historically won liberty, just as if after a job well done (Strenger, 2017). Instead, liberty is the constant struggle to preserve, defend and possibly modify already achieved liberty as well as for liberties not yet realized. The fact that, for example, democracy and its promise of liberty, supposedly fallen from the sky, cannot be taken for granted at all is something that not only German society is currently experiencing in the face of extremist and radical populist movements. Accordingly, the defense of liberty cannot be delegated to politics, to the administration or—even more abstractly—to society, but rather to the citizens (see very committed: Strenger, 2017).

6.1.6 Current and Potential Liberty From J. S. Mills’ bridge example, a different differentiation of liberties can be derived: a man is forcefully prevented by a policeman from entering a bridge which, unknown to the man, is in danger of collapsing. Mill does not consider this to be a restriction of his liberty, because the man has no desire to plunge into the depths of the bridge and possibly be killed (Mill, 1991 [1859]). We would like to use this example to distinguish between actual and potential liberty: the current liberty of the man,

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as an option to enter the bridge, is restricted, but only to maintain his potential liberty, namely to be able to choose between options in the future. Hubig’s proposal, developed in the context of technical-ethical considerations, leads in a similar direction: in a free democratic and deliberative democracy, the “principle of preserving the conditions for action” (Hubig, 2015, p. 96) should be assumed as the preservation of the conditions for free action. In summary, this approach is based on the responsible and ethical “principle of condition preservation” which states “Act in such a way that the conditions of the possibility of responsible action are preserved for all participants” (Kornwachs, 2000, p.  60). In this context, Hubig distinguishes between ‘option values’ and ‘legacy values’. Option values constitute the “future availability of a good” (Hubig, 2007, p.  141)—for example, in “View of Sen’s understanding that the ability to choose and to put oneself into relation … are themselves higher-level goods which are based on certain conditions” (Hubig, 2007, p. 141 f.)—that of liberty of choice—and are “guarantors of a maximum spectrum of options of choice as functions/access possibilities” (Hubig, 2011, p.  15). ‘Legacy values’ make up an “intergenerational use option” (Hubig, 2007, p. 141); they “mean the preservation of those social structures that are indispensable for the development of value competence […] the preservation of the subject position or the conditions of its development” (Hubig, 2007, p. 142 f.). In other words, they are “guarantors of the development of the decision subject as a bearer of capabilities/competencies” (Hubig, 2011, p. 15). We therefore understand current liberty as the possibility of being able to choose between options at a certain moment, whereas potential liberty is the chance to be able to decide between (as many) options in future situations as possible. To this extent, the creation of life-chances can be interpreted as an increase in potential liberty (see also in this context: Schink, 2017).

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6.1.7 Liberty in Contextualization In his understanding of ‘life-chances’, Ralf Dahrendorf (1979, p.  55) describes these as “opportunities for individual action resulting from the interrelation of options and ligatures”. Translated into Popper’s terminology of the Three Worlds, the dependence of individual (World 2) life-­ chances (as the basis for potential liberty in particular) on the ligatures of World 3 (social values, norms, role patterns, shared knowledge, etc.) and the possibilities of dealing with them (as options) become clear. This is also comparable in relation to World 1. These ligatures should be the subject of our considerations in the following section. It is essential to note that liberty arises in contexts in which the individual can struggle for autonomy and emancipation. However, since other individuals also struggle for it in the company of other people, the latter—in striving to expand or use their options—end up limiting the options of others. This encroachment by others “includes my inability to fend off or overcome these interventions” (Schink, 2017, p. 50; similar Nussbaum, 2019) and is thus characterized by a current or potential power deficit in (social or spatial) contexts. Thus Aron (2016 [1968], p. 135) states that “the word liberty means a social relation, that is, a relationship between several individuals.”

6.1.8 A  n Interim Conclusion on the Variety of Meanings of a Liberalism That Maximizes Life-Chances Liberty is reflection and reflection is always also struggle. This struggle is, on the one hand, a struggle against nature (World 1) in terms of liberation from its constraints. On the other hand, it is a struggle of the individual with himself (World 2) and his fellow man (World 3), whereby these struggles each encounter two ideal-typically exacerbated difficulties in the theoretical understanding and practical implementation (or use) of liberty. It could be shown that the theoretical question of whether an individual can be assumed to have a ‘zero point of liberty’, and whether society can be assumed to have a zero point of moral orientation, that is,

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whether an absolute ‘spontaneity’ is individually conceivable and a sociality without a framework narrative is socially conceivable, can be answered negatively. The practical question is whether and how, in liberty, a caring interaction of the individual with himself and with members of a sociality is possible. On the individual level, this leads to the question of the ‘art of living’, whereby ‘living’ cannot, however, be shaped by the model of a work of art. On the social level, this question does not lead to the search for a ‘consensus’ that solves all conflicts, but to a renewed question of ‘justice’.

6.2 L iberty as a Process Between Worlds 1, 2 and 3 and Its Dependence on Ligatures and Options At various points we have emphasized that we understand liberty as a process and that “liberalism is necessarily a philosophy of change” (Dahrendorf, 1969b, p. 61), as already noted. Although “history […] has by and large not been very kind to those who recognize the need for change” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p.  108), the pursuit of maximizing life-­ chances means constant change. Accordingly, liberty cannot be a state; options are tied to change. But liberty also needs structures, ligatures, which give sense to the options. Liberty does not arise in the space of arbitrary options, but between and in confrontation with ligatures. On the one hand, liberty can be suffocated by ligatures; on the other hand, it can become arbitrary by its absence. Accordingly, the change to liberty is also based on the existence of ligatures, restrictions, hurdles, limitations and so on, in which people orientate themselves, which they can question, against which they can rebel and so on. Change takes place in the Three Worlds: the materialities of World 1 change, be it through ‘natural’ processes independent of humans or through the intervention of humans, bound to their corporeality; the individual consciousness of World 2 changes through the spatio-­temporal event and perception-bound nature of life (cf. James, 1890), but also the social and cultural World 3 is subject to many different processes of

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change. More than the individual Three Worlds themselves, the relations between World 1 and World 2, as well as between World 2 and World 3, are subject to change. The relationships almost aim at change. The influence of World 1 in World 2 usually changes consciousness, through stimuli. The influence of World 3 on World 2 aims to adapt consciousness to social values, norms and roles (socialization). However, the relationship between World 2 and Worlds 1 and 3 is also usually aimed at change. In its influence on World 1, consciousness often aims at change: for example, the arrangement of the objects of the material world (even if it is only the movement of a cooking spoon) or their (even body-bound) positioning in physical space. The influence of World 2 on World 3 also aims at change: the desire to have an effect on society, to develop resonance of one’s own ideas (which in turn are created by World 3) (the consequences of the pluralization of the possibilities of influence through social media are discussed elsewhere). Since change is strongly focused on the relations between the worlds, liberty develops between Worlds 1 and 2 as well as 2 and 3, although ligatures and options are not equally distributed in the relations: if Worlds 1 and 3 affect World 2, they do so especially in the form of ligatures, social conventions are conveyed to consciousness and material restrictions (including those of one’s own body) become apparent to consciousness. The person develops options by striving to influence Worlds 1 and 3. Ligatures do not necessarily have a limiting effect alone, but often also make them possible. Thus the influence of Worlds 3 on 2 not only makes clear the “annoying fact of society” (Dahrendorf, 2006, p. 21), that is, the inevitability of the individual’s integration into social contexts, but also enables him or her to develop patterns of interpretation and action that deviate from social conventions. The restrictions of material space that affect consciousness also enable it to manifest its own ideas materially (gravity, e.g. limits one’s own activities; without it, it would be much easier to climb hills; without it, the carefully constructed bird house would possibly take off into space). These general remarks can be transferred to the relationship between Landscapes 1, 2 and 3: the interpretation and evaluation patterns from Landscape 3 provide the framework with which Landscape 1 can be observed from Landscape 2. But they also provide the framework for ideas that could change Landscape 3, as well as for how the person can

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intervene in Landscape 1. Ligatures and options can also be found in the individual approach to Landscape 1, which is also based on social conventions: The appropriation of the landscape takes place—according to the theory of Kaplan and Kaplan (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982, 1989; Kaplan et al., 1998)—in the context of security on the one hand and exploration on the other. The basis of this safety-exploration dynamic is the ability to develop options from the safe haven of ligatures, which is fundamental in humans (cf. Oerter, 2014), and is described and empirically investigated in developmental psychology by John Bowlby (1969, 1973). Landscapes 1 are appropriated with a desire for exploration on the one hand, and a desire for security on the other. Landscapes 1 are perceived as pleasant if they offer both, options and ligatures, exploration and security. The extent to which the individual tends toward the option/exploration or ligature/security side varies. The emotional limitation of exploration is fear, which is an emotional feedback for whether the ‘safe shore’ can still be reached without further ado, that is, figuratively speaking, whether we are willing to make the trip. But it is not only the willingness that is important here, but also the possibility. This concerns not only the cognitive abilities, that is, ultimately, what are we able to understand from Landscape 1, and whereby, here again, the influence of Landscape 3 becomes clear. But this also concerns the physical ability of the person, in relation to the appropriation of Landscape 1 as well as the psychological conditions, which is individually expressed as a personality trait of “anxiety” (see in the overview Neyer & Asendorpf, 2018). Different abilities, here in dealing with landscape, lead—assuming that a threshold of perception is crossed—to an in-relation setting. This comparison often does not stop at identifying differences, but is the basis for an evaluation. This can lead to recognition of the performance or willingness of others, to acceptance of the observed differences, or even to envy. Envy can lead to resentment as a negative function of comparison, in the attempt to deconstruct the other, or to deprive him of his options (in terms of equalization). But envy can also be an incentive (in the liberal sense) to develop one’s own abilities, to maximize one’s options. In terms of landscape, many conclusions can be drawn from this: different possibilities of availability over Landscape 1 can be acknowledged (acceptance of the status quo); they can serve as an incentive to extend one’s

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own possibilities of availability over Landscape 1 in order to expand one’s own options of manifesting one’s own wishes, needs and so on, but they can also lead to the goal of equalizing the possibilities of availability over Landscape 1. The same applies to Landscape 3: the (partially) social interpretations and evaluations of landscape can be accepted without question or there is a desire to revise them (at least in part). This possibility of dealing with landscape is in turn divided into the possibility of expanding the scope of interpretation and evaluation, allowing more interpretations, or the attempt to hegemonize evaluations and interpretations (see, among other things, Kühne et al., 2013; Leibenath & Otto, 2013; Weber, 2015a, 2015b). Fierce debates are taking place not only in the discussion about the materialization of the energy turnaround (or the development of infrastructure, the extraction of mineral resources, settlement expansions), but also about the sovereignty of interpretation of Landscape 1, including—and this is a source of feedback—among scientists: here, for example, positions of ‘preservation and re-establishment of historically grown landscapes’ are brought into position in relation to ‘successionist’ approaches or approaches of ‘creative interventions’ or the idea of ‘reinterpretation and alternative evaluation’ of Landscape 1 (see in detail at Kühne, 2006, 2008b; Selman, 2010). The conservative paradigm of the ‘restoration of historical cultural landscape’ shows a double contradiction: on the one hand, it strives for a state whose genesis is not ‘grown’ but deliberately restored, whereby it loses the ‘organic aspect’ of the mutual shaping of nature and culture (see Sect. 3.6), so that, on the other hand, it is bound to change, and change is first and foremost viewed critically. The equalized Landscape 1 in a socialist understanding of the world in turn lack the tension between inscribed ligatures and options; once they have been developed, they remain on a tensionless status quo, which is disturbed solely by the natural variability of Landscape 1. A disturbance, in turn, to which an egalitarian society can hardly react, since, among other things, it lacks the incentive for individual initiative (Dahrendorf, 1990, 1992).

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6.3 Fear and Landscapes 1, 2 and 3 Fear and landscape are in a multifaceted relationship (Tuan, 1979; Gold & Revill, 1999; Laundré et  al., 2001; Gold & Revill, 2003; Kühne, 2012). Fear intervenes “deeply in our lives, either activating the individual and spurring him to special achievements or inhibiting, paralyzing, even destroying him” (Krohne, 2010, p. 13).2 Fear is incorporated and is in a constant state of latency, it “[is] saturating our daily routines; it hardly needs further stimuli from outside, since the actions it prompts day in, day out supply all the motivation and all the energy it needs to reproduce itself ” (Bauman, 2010, p. 9). Fear causes people to take measures to defend themselves. Thereby “the fear […] again becomes directly tangible” (Bauman, 2010, p. 9). This becomes particularly clear in landscape contexts (Kühne, 2012, 2015). As already mentioned in Sect. 6.2, fear forms a demarcation line for the individual appropriation of Landscape 1. This process alone—besides the individual disposition mentioned—is not universal. Fences not only physically, but also legally (Landscape 3), prevent access. Frequently a fence is not even required, just the knowledge of legal conditions governing entry to properties. These can be very different, ranging from the right to enter everything at all times (possibly only found in a primitive society) to the regulation of ‘the open landscape (i.e. Landscape 1) outside the vegetation period’, to strict prohibition of access to private property. And these prohibitions must also be enforced. An armed farmer is certainly more frightening as a whistleblower than a playing child. But fear is not only found in this context of the relationship between the three Landscapes. Landscape 1 can trigger fear directly in the form of storms, floods, volcanic eruptions, heavy rainfall or, less suddenly, droughts and so on (although modernization has partially tamed it and domesticated it aesthetically as ‘sublime’). But fear can also arise when a  Contemporary psychology distinguishes between anxiety, fear and stress. Anxiety is triggered “when a situation is experienced as dangerous without being able to react appropriately at the moment” (Krohne, 2010, p. 27). Fear, on the other hand, “should be present when reactions are possible in such situations”. Stress refers to “a specific relationship between environment and person in which requirements exist that place great demands on the coping capabilities of the person concerned” (Krohne, 2010, p. 27). 2

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preferred state of Landscape 1 is to be changed (e.g. by wind turbines or the gentrification of poorer neighborhoods), or when new interpretations and evaluations are applied to Landscape 3, or conversely when changes to Landscape 1 are not possible, or when individual alternative interpretations and evaluations are punished with the withdrawal of social recognition (among others, Ronen, 2009). With the process of modernization, the danger of dying from epidemics, hunger, natural disasters and so on has decreased and continues to decrease. At the same time, understanding of the interrelationships between nature, man and society is growing (Dahrendorf, 1987). On the one hand, this leads to a reduction of threats to life. On the other hand, lifting people out of their traditional ties of status, class, village community and so on has not only brought with it the right to a free lifestyle, but is also often perceived—especially by those who do not have a high level of education and thus fewer life and mobility opportunities—as a constraint on liberty, which can trigger anxiety (Bauman, 1990, 1995, 1997). Since in an open society “no institution, no group and no individual can and may claim a monopoly on meaning” (Strenger, 2017, p. 107), the resulting liberty “is on the one hand an achievement, on the other hand it is a burden” (Strenger, 2017, p.  107). Systems of meaning must be constantly updated, developed and contextualized. They are thus subject to constant change, which obliges us to deal competently with contingencies and ambiguities. With regard to the world views examined, different strategies for overcoming fear can be derived: a conservative strategy of dealing with fear lies in strengthening ligatures, in striving to maintain a status quo. A socialist strategy in dealing with fear is the leveling of differences, since these are considered to be the cause of fear. Both strategies are bought at the price of a dwindling resilience to intervening natural developments in Landscape 1. A liberal strategy that maximizes life-chances is based on the generation of (individual) knowledge as a means against fear, to be able to assess dangers, not to fall into hysteria, and to be able to act appropriately in the case of catastrophes. One element of the knowledge-based approach to fear is linked to the transformation (or attempt to transform) of fear into risk (Gold & Revill, 2003) by taking technical,

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organizational, political, planning or market economy (i.e. insurance) measures to contain fear-inducing risks (Gold & Revill, 2003). One strategy in dealing with contingency, fear and uncertainty is that of humor, which we will deal with afterwards—beyond moralizations.

6.4 Liberty, Space and Humor The phenomenon of moralization, which affects all areas of life, and thus also the design and use of Landscape 1, has recently become increasingly related to humor and irony. More and more often the question is asked, what irony is allowed, what humor is allowed? One can think, for example, of the respective ‘shitstorm’ that Jan Böhmermann, Lisa Eckhart or Dieter Nuhr3 and others had to endure because they covered specific topics ironically, satirically or humorously with more or less light or strong mockery. Criticism can be applied to both humor and irony, that is, humor and irony are also moralized. This moralization of humor is ultimately to be interpreted as a struggle against a specific form of liberty. In the following, we would like to reconstruct irony and humor as forms of meta-reflection on liberty. If the finding of the moralization of humor is correct, then, according to the further thesis, we are on the way to a society that no longer reflects but only moralizes and that completely loses not only the critical but also the ironic distance to itself. In principle, humor can be understood as the ability to detach oneself from a given context, to reflect on that context and, in addition, not only to point out dissonances but also to place them in a comical context. This means that the reflection is reflected upon again on a ‘meta-level’, namely that of humor. For example, a participant involved in a conflict over a biogas plant can view the entire conflict context (self-)critically as well as ‘from the outside’ (from an aesthetic observer’s perspective) (cf. Grau, 2010). In this way, a participant can become aware of her own and others’ dissonances, identify them and virtually step out of this context,  German-speaking authors and cabaret artists, who were caught in the crossfire of social media and the press after jokes and satirical contributions of varying degrees of deviation from political or satirical correctness to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the metoo-debate or Greta Thunberg; see also Kruse (2016); MDR (2020); Möllers (2019). 3

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thereby gaining a reflexive distance (reflection). In a second step, she can also place this reflexive distance in a comic context (meta-reflection) by commenting and communicating on the reflected context with humor or irony for others as well. Humor and irony are in this way a “means of communication, a form of expression that draws attention to something, to the unusual in the seemingly ordinary” (Grau, 2010, p. 23). If even only a cursory look is taken at the history of art and culture, a common thread of the meaning of irony and humor can be reconstructed: the gaining of distance to persons, actions, ideas, contexts; exaggeration and understatement; the acceptance of the tension between ideal and reality; the ‘subjective refraction of the real’; the inherent skepticism; the doubt about ultimate values, ideas, orientations. In Greek moralism, sophistry and comedy, the ironist is “a negatively valued character who pretends to the lesser (‘deep imposter’)” (Weinrich, 2019, column 577). The well-known ‘Socratic irony’ adopts the “habitus of a critical dialectic” and consists in the fact that Socrates confronts those “who believe to know everything already … not as the knower, but in the role of the ignorant and eager to know. He thus pretends to be in the direction of the lesser” (Weinrich, 2019, column 578). In rhetoric, the distinction between irony as a word-figure (tropos) and as a thought-figure (schema) is given—Lausberg (1990, p. 78 f.) defines ‘ironia’ as “the use of the other party’s partisan vocabulary in the firm confidence that the audience will recognize the implausibility of that vocabulary, which then ensures the credibility of one’s own party all the more, so that the ironic words are ultimately understood in a sense that is contrary to their actual meaning”. Irony as a thought-figure is “the word irony continued as thought” (Lausberg, 1990, p.  140). What is important here is the distinction between ‘dissimulatio’, which consists in the “concealment of one’s own party opinion” and the ‘simulatio’, which “consists in the mostly affectively provocative, sometimes emphatically harmless (i.e. dissimulating the intention to have an effect) positive representation of the opponent party’s opinion” (Lausberg, 1990, p. 141). In later rhetoric, a distinction is also made between the “simulatio as disguise through exaggeration and a dissimulatio as disguise through understatement”, whereby understatement is occasionally morally upgraded in comparison to exaggeration (Weinrich, 2019, column 579).

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The ‘romantic irony’ propagated by Romantic aestheticians, especially Friedrich Schlegel, assumes that the ironic human being can “rise above his limited life and the metaphysical tension between the unconditional and the conditional, between ideal and reality”—it arises “from the feeling of finiteness and one’s own limitations” (Weinrich, 2019, column 580). It is also Schlegel who describes irony as the “highest and purest skepticism” (cited in Vieweg, 2005, p.  297). In Romantic poetry, the “suspension of all limitation and positivity of the finite by the infinite variety of subjective refraction of the real” (Preisendanz, 2019, p. 1232) is repeatedly emphasized. For the “frame of reference” of the concept of humor is “the structure of reality that diverges in subjectivity and objectivity” and is ultimately founded “in the separation of ego and world associated with Christianity, thus in the suffering of the finite as the irrevocable basic feature of human existence” (Preisendanz, 2019, p. 1233). In Thomas Mann’s work, there is an emphasis on ironic distance: “In his novels, he often uses the role of the narrator to ironically distance himself from his own position and thus achieves an ‘ironic objectivism of the epic’. For him, irony means distance, reservation, liberty” (Weinrich, 2019, column 581). ‘Distance, reservation, liberty’ refer again to the concept of skepticism or doubt as typical prerequisites for liberating oneself. Dario Fo, who received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1997, once said: “We are convinced that in laughter, in the grotesque of satire, lies the highest expression of doubt, the most important aid of reason” (quoted from Michaelis, 1997, w.p.). This ‘aid of reason’ helps to achieve liberty from paternalism, moralizations, impositions, supposedly optionless offers of orientation, namely, as a “laughter liberating itself from the orientation presupposition as a reaction to the recollection on itself, i.e. the rejection of the ultimate authority of orientation” (Gethmann-Siefert, 2005, p.  186), as this is demonstrated in an unsurpassable way in the comedies of Aristophanes. Laughter, humor and irony are thus forms of meta-reflection on the conditions of liberty. Until now, this meaning has been related to the understanding of ‘liberty from’ in the sense of a liberation from something or becoming aware of something. Little attention has been paid so far to this meaning for the understanding of ‘liberty to’ and ‘for something’, in the sense of voluntarily taking on views, tasks and activities.

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Thus the “sensual act of laughing in view of the dissolution of orientations previously considered certain […] is the act of liberation from the compulsion to orient oneself ”—but not only this, it is “at the same time the act of the compulsion to gain one’s own orientations. This last page, at least, is missing in romantic irony” (Gethmann-Siefert, 2005, p. 183). At this point, a short note referring to a well-known theorem of Hegelian aesthetics may be sufficient for the time being. Hegel finds in Goethe’s ‘West-Eastern Divan’ an example of a culture and world view that approaches its world in a positive and serene way. Hegel therefore also speaks of ‘cheerfulness in things’ and of ‘objective humor’, because it is a matter of a factual consummation of the world, that is, not of the inward circling of a worldless subjectivity. With regard to moralization phenomena, it must be added: not of an individuality nestled in its own feelings and convictions, which can no longer view the ‘world’ without prejudice. It is about “consciously making do with oneself in finiteness”, because “in serenity lies the positive attunement to a situation, the assumption of the questioning of one’s own limits and the integration of one’s own, limited life-world through other possibilities” (Gethmann-Siefert, 2005, p. 185)—for example, the commitment to something in a society, which takes place in liberty.

6.5 B  asic Principles of Dealing with Space from the Perspective of a Liberalism that Maximizes Life-Chances 6.5.1 Life-Chance Liberalism and Space The answer to the individualization of life-worlds, the increasing liberty to shape one’s life cannot be found in a forced submission to collectivist ‘grand narratives’ (Lyotard, 1987) but rather in a liberal society in which the individual can unfold and make use his life-chances: “The utopian of liberalism is to make friends with contingency. For liberty demands contingency, must leave room for contingency” (Kersting, 2009, p.  89). Thus, a way of dealing with space that is oriented toward life-chance

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liberalism is characterized at least by allowing contingencies, if not by promoting them. From a life-chance liberal perspective, the state is anything but an end in itself, and its raison d’être is not based on public welfare, “but on the guarantee of those rights of protection and liberty that protect the individual from foreign encroachments […]. Security from war and crime is the first task of the state” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 102), according to the interpretation of classical liberalism. Life-chance liberalism goes beyond this and assigns the state the task of developing substantial equality of opportunity, thereby expanding the tasks of the state, especially in the area of education. Both the creation of security and of equal opportunities have spatial implications. As has already been mentioned several times, life-chances liberalism is also based on the fundamental concern for the individual’s ability to develop oneself. The principle of substantial equality of opportunity is a central element in the position of liberalism, which strives to maximize life-chances. One task of state action is thus the creation of substantial equality of opportunity. In this context, the restriction of liberties of the economic subject, the bourgeois, in order to ensure equal opportunities for political subjects, the citizens, to participate in society, is inevitable. Spatial planning serves to concretize this goal of substantial equality of opportunity. As already mentioned in Sect. 3.4.2, according to Sen (2012), it is important to distinguish between the ‘chance aspect’ and the ‘process aspect’ of liberty. Accordingly, the use of space (of whatever conception) must, firstly, be characterized by an increase in individual life-chances, and secondly, the process of handling space must be designed in such a way that the liberty rights of the persons involved are not restricted. The modern concept of liberty has two dimensions: “It applies to individuals and at the same time has a universal claim. But only individuals can be free. It is therefore only a metaphor when speaking of a ‘free people’ or a ‘free country’, unless one explicitly refers to the ‘constitution of liberty’” (Dahrendorf, 2007b, p. 26). In the spirit of Isaiah Berlin (1995 [1969]), this can be understood as a ‘conflicting consensus’, that is, the members of societies agree “that they have liberties to pursue a variety of goals” (Jahanbegloo, 2007, p. 135). This reference to the individual is the basis of a liberal approach to space, for spatial arrangements are intensively coupled with aspects of liberty/non-liberty. This coupling is initially more

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obvious with the aspect of ‘negative’ liberty, because this is shown— according to Kersting (2009, p. 58)—in the control of space, while ‘positive’ liberty, on the other hand, shows itself “above all as control of time”: “Forced non-liberty restricts the space of movement and culminates in complete immobility. Deficiency-caused non-liberty, on the other hand, causes future shrinkage” (Kersting, 2009, p. 59). Given the relationship between space and time as immanent categories, according to which changes in time also imply changes in space (Elias, 1997 [1939]), the importance of spatial arrangements for ‘positive’ liberty also becomes clear: inadequate access to educational institutions (in the sense of access alone requiring a great deal of time) is usually to be seen in the context of spatial arrangements, such as long distances to centers or—particularly important today—inadequate data transfer rates. Ralf Dahrendorf (1979, p. 49) points to another dimension of the relationship between liberty and space: “The right to move from place to place, or even across national borders, is an important life chance for those who stay in one place for the rest of their lives.” Liberty develops in the socio-spatial context and is also restricted in this context. Central to this are ligatures. Ligatures can be—according to Ralf Dahrendorf (1979, p.  107)—classified spatially and temporally: “Space in general: nature; space in a more limited sense: nation; space in a narrower sense: region, landscape, community; social space: residential community, also family. Time in general: ‘life’; time in a limited sense: history; time in a narrower sense: age, field of experience (‘generation’); social time: ‘social construction of human life’”—a classification (albeit, in Dahrendorf ’s own estimation, incomplete) that illustrates the constitutive importance of space for ligatures. Ligatures fix social positions (and thus also people as their bearers)—and they also bind them spatially (as well as temporally): who, for example, is allowed to be when and where is determined by ligatures (during the day my presence—working—in the office can be defined as desired to the point of being required, but at night it is—sleeping—mostly undesired). There is a fundamental difference between ligatures and options: “ligatures are given, options are wanted” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 108). Options can also be summarized in relation to space and time: “as alternatives of movement in space and as alternatives of control over time” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 108). This makes

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“temporal independence and spatial liberty of movement, i.e. disposition and mobility opportunities two basic figures of social options” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 108)—both are correspondingly “identified with ‘liberty’” (Dahrendorf, 1979, p. 108). Accordingly, the focus of the liberal approach to space (as well as time) is on increasing options, while conservatives (always) and socialists (initially) seek to strengthen ligatures: “The core of all social liberty is the distance of the individual from the social situation. It is only with distance that the individual can resist foreign impositions. By keeping the others at arm’s length, he brings himself to safety” (Sofsky, 2007a, p. 48). The supreme challenge of dealing with space in accordance with liberal principles is thus to give the individual the chance to stay away from others—whether or not he or she uses this chance, or uses it temporarily, is his or her free decision.

6.5.2 Life-Chances Liberalism and the State Cuts in the free development of individuals are made not only by the demands of the community on the individual but also by state regulation (Sofsky, 2007a, p.  55): “Progress of liberty means withdrawal of the authorities, curtailment of state power, taming of the regulatory frenzy, socialization of political power, independence of the citizens.” A process that is sharply attacked by (neo)Marxists and conservatives, the (re)transfer of responsibility for one’s own well-being to the individual is seen here as a characteristic of the rejected ‘neo-liberalization’ (as in Harvey, 2005). From a liberal perspective, the significance of the state can be explained succinctly by De Jasay (1998 [1985], p. 2) “as an instrument, designed to serve its user”. Contemporary states are far from such an understanding: “Taxes are by no means for the benefit of all. The state regularly fails to fulfil its duties. Neither peace nor security can be guaranteed” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 104). This is why the redistributive state also regularly fails in its self-determined tasks: “It does not protect from material hardship, is unable to create jobs or economic growth, and in many places leaves transport routes and education to rot” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 104), while the “growth of state administration and para-state control centers” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 104) continues. This relationship of education as a prerequisite

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for participation in political processes is crucial, as Ludwig von Mises (2013 [1944], p. 125) noted almost three quarters of a century ago, after all, “democracy […] becomes unworkable if the outstanding citizens, the intellectual leaders of the community, are not able to form their own opinion about social, economic and political principles of politics. When the citizens under the spiritual rule of the bureaucratic-minded are among the professional opinion-makers, society breaks down into two castes: the ruling professional opinion-makers, the Brahmins, and the simple-­ minded citizenry.” The result is despotism, regardless of the type of constitution and law (von Mises, 2013[1944]). An essential element of such despotism also lies in the increased complexity of legal regulations and procedural sequences, which cannot be surveyed or understood by non-­ experts (in the spatial context, the state building codes provide numerous and impressive examples of this). The principle of state redistribution is critically questioned from a liberal point of view. It seems justified only from the perspective of liberalism that maximizes life-chances in order to create equal opportunities. On the one hand, this is because it is “necessary to create gigantic redistribution apparatuses, i.e. bureaucracies” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p.  104) which is associated with an “expensive frictional loss in the redistribution process” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 66), but on the other hand, it is because the “problems which are to be solved by social policy are individual in nature, bureaucratic solutions are general in nature. They often fail to address the very individual need at which they are aimed” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 104). This is also associated with the actual targeted community of the welfare state, the individuals in need, with the consequence that they “do not find caring helpers or quick help, but first of all waiting rooms and forms and officials and often humiliating procedures” (Dahrendorf, 1987, p. 142).

6.5.3 L ife-Chances Liberalism and Private and Public Space 1 From a liberal perspective, the separation of the private from the public sphere can be described as one of the great achievements of social

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modernization. Linked to this is the essential demand “that the state be put in its place and society protected from the encroachment of politics. The boundaries of the private are the boundaries of the political. The defense of privacy is the most effective objection of the individual against the fatal universalism of power” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 23). Privacy thus provides the most important protection “against the constraints of roles, collectives and institutions” (Sofsky, 2007a, p. 51). The tendency of man to enclose his possessions, to protect them with walls, which is repeatedly attacked by the communitarian side, must also be seen in this context: “The wall is one of the most important inventions of mankind, like the wheel, the plough or writing. It provides distance and protects against attacks. Behind the wall, the individual can drop the weapons with which he or she is wont to arm himself or herself against the unreasonable demands of the public. The wall ensures personal liberty” (Sofsky, 2007b, p.  30). From a liberal point of view, it is therefore important not to undermine private spaces by undercutting them with more and more administrative regulations, such as planting regulations or prescribed façade colors in development plans, because “only when private matters are left to people themselves can the variety of ways of life that give color and dynamism to a society develop” (Sofsky, 2007a, p. 51). Private space is also the place where people spend a large part of their leisure time, we can also speak of private time. This is a time that is highly suspect to communitarians—the individual is always encouraged to engage in community activities in which he or she can be controlled, instead of pursuing thoughts in peace or building model railway landscapes for his or her own edification. Private space and private time are therefore suspect— and must be defended by liberals. Attempts to abolish private property have fatal consequences for social and spatial development: “The abolition of property degrades the individual to a public figure. In property the will of the individual gains objective reality” (Sofsky, 2007b, p.  99). Private property also has an indicative meaning, because it describes, both socially and spatially, “a place of one’s own in the world” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 99), which creates a safe sphere, a space of action “in which the individual can experience the effectiveness of his actions and develop a consciousness of himself ” (Sofsky, 2007b, p.  99). Ownership—especially of houses and

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land—offers the individual the opportunity to reduce social and communal complexity in terms of space and time. Property is based on the mutual respect of privacy. Citizens respect the fact that “property is removed from the public’s ear and eye” (Sofsky, 2007b, p.  100). Accordingly, liberty and private property are subject to a reciprocal conditional relationship: “There is no personal liberty without a political guarantee of private property, and there is no independence of ways of life, opinions and actions without a minimum of economic independence” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 100). Private Space 1 is thus a place of materialization of Space 2; it is a refuge from the demand (which are not accepted as not Space 2) of Space 3. It is removed from the permanent conflicts of public space, which are currently becoming virulent, especially in the context of the changes of the modal split in the transport sector. Conflicts which are not settled on the one hand because of their strong moralization and on the other hand because of the lack of a third authority who is able and willing to resolve the conflicts against the will of the conflicting parties if necessary (here Dahrendorf actually shows the importance of the state, which cannot fulfill its neutral regulatory function as a driver of the ‘traffic turn’) are fought out in a quasi-anarchic struggle by all against all. The attempt to resolve spatial conflicts in a communist release of the private space in a general public space dries up the possible productivity of spatial conflicts and ultimately leads to an agony for those involved.

6.5.4 L ife Opportunity Liberalism and the Natural Environment From a opportunity liberal point of view, the value of the environment (or space or nature) is not derived from itself, but is to be measured by the life-chances it offers people, such as Sen points out by using a drastic example: “[To understand] why the eradication of smallpox is not viewed as an impoverishment of nature (we do not tend to lament: ‘the environment is poorer since the smallpox virus has disappeared’), in the way, say, the destruction of ecologically important forests would seem to be the connection with lives in general and human life in particular has to be

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taken into consideration” (Sen, 2009, p. 248). This means that the value of the environment (space respectively nature) is always to be understood in the context of—quite changeable—human needs, only because something is, it does not have to have a value—a value in itself, which is an essentialist approach, does not exist from a liberal perspective. Moreover, human actions give people the opportunity to actively shape the environment (space or nature). Regardless of destructive side effects of human actions, “it is also within human power to enhance and improve the environment in which we live” (Sen, 2009, p. 249). Through education, people are able to assess their importance in the world, to weigh options for action, to act sustainably out of free conviction and through “greater female education and women’s employment can help to reduce fertility rates, which in the long run can reduce the pressure on global warming and the increasing destruction of natural habitats” (Sen, 2009, p. 249). Many types of ecosystems that are considered valuable today are created solely by man, such as the meadow orchards so popular with many conservationists. This also implies a changed understanding of sustainable development; according to Sen (2012), liberty is a central element in addition to standard of living and satisfaction of needs. It extends the principles of the Brundtland Report by including “the preservation, and when possible, the expansion of the substantial freedoms and capabilities of people today” (Sen, 2009, p. 251). This can be understood as an extension of the understanding of the right of future generations to develop their choices for shaping their own lives with the same or greater liberty compared to today’s people (Sen, 2012). This does not automatically mean, as the advocates of a ‘strong’ sustainability demand, that the use of non-renewable resources should be abandoned; instead, future generations must be enabled by technical progress to “functionally replace these raw materials” (Kauch, 2009, p. 36). Ultimately, this in turn means generating more life opportunities through education and science than are limited by the use of non-renewable resources.

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6.5.5 L ife-Chances Liberalism and Administrative Access to Space 1 From the individualistic perspective (not only of life-chance liberalism), restrictions on the liberty of the individual can only be accepted if they are reasonable, that is, meaningful. This also applies to spatial planning, since it restricts the individual’s ability to dispose of his property. A central link between liberalism (and not only that which places life-­ chances at the center of its considerations) and spatial planning lies in the use of reason. Reason is regarded as the central element of expression of the Enlightenment, and because of its guidance by reason, spatial planning can be considered to be “in the tradition of the Enlightenment” (Ritter, 1998, p.  10). Both life-chance liberalism and spatial planning thus define themselves as standing in the tradition of the Enlightenment. Thus, it can be stated that spatial planning, whose goal is a rational use of space, can be considered in principle to be consistent with the liberal ideal of rational action. This statement, however, is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a life-chance-liberal justification of spatial planning. A sense of spatial planning results from this perspective if it opens up life-chances by rejecting one-sided calculations of use in the order of space. Spatial planning “in a state under the rule of law has to include the dimension of basic rights in its approaches and planning contents in an anticipatory manner, i.e. it has to design plans that are characterized by human dignity, liberty of property, etc.” (Lendi, 1998, p. 35). An essential position of liberalism is that of civil rights: even if certain legal regulations—this also applies to building and regional planning law—are considered excessive from a liberal point of view, they must be implemented appropriately until they can be revised; after all, they are— in the sense of Dahrendorf (2007a)—ligatures, which thereby develop their binding effect, since they are valid in the full sense. A so-called reduction of bureaucracy, which is to be welcomed in principle from a liberal perspective, can also contradict the liberal principle of the rule of law and the principle of equal opportunity by forcing implementation deficits—for example, caused by staff reductions. The term ‘bureaucracy reduction’ also appears to be problematic to a considerable degree. It is

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precisely a bureaucratic organization as the “purest type of legal rule” (Weber, 1972 [1922], p.  222) that is suitable for implementing the political-­liberal ideas of equal opportunities and merit and thereby obeying the Enlightenment (and thus also liberal) model of rationality; after all, bureaucratic administration—according to Weber (1972 [1922], p.  226)—means “rule by virtue of knowledge”. Depersonalization (i.e. separation of office and person), professional authority, the hierarchy of office (chain of command) and the regularity of the files result in a reduction of the arbitrariness of office, as well as a precise, competent execution of official business with unwavering objectivity (Weber, 1972 [1922]). A central element of Weber’s understanding of the relationship between politics and administration is the strict separation of their modes of action. While politicians are concerned with generating majorities for their policies, civil servants have to carry out what is decided in the political process. If, however, the civil servant assumes political responsibility, he or she transfers the logic of the administration to politics, which is then carried out in the form of an administrative practice that is broken down into processes (see also Michelsen & Walter, 2013; von Mises, 2013 [1944]; Schluchter, 2009). In the absence of political guidance, this “calls for apolitical administrative action which, in the face of the declining problem-solving ability of political institutions, is increasing in the favor of the output-oriented citizenry” (Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p. 109). A state oriented toward increasing life-chances (here with a focus on spatial development) does not mean abolishing public administration or transferring state tasks to the private sector. A state oriented toward increasing life-chances means formulating clear rules for dealing with space and monitoring compliance with these rules, rather than regulating a multitude of details, often multiple and contradictory, and then leaving it to the courts to interpret the contradictions, while at best having the will to enforce the rules in individual cases or foregoing enforcement altogether due to a ‘lack of personnel’. This also leads to the next topic of discussion.

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6.5.6 Life-Chances Balancing and Governance Currently, the hierarchical top-down mode of governance associated with the term government is increasingly being called into question; the “network character of the ‘new public’ in distinction to the immature ‘supervised public sphere’ of earlier decades” (Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p. 54) is celebrated and understood as “a new, promising emancipation project” (Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p.  54; see also Fainstein, 2010; and Sect. 4.1.2). These decentralized governance structures appear as “‘heterarchic’ [equal to each other; annotation of the authors] forms of coordination” (Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p. 75) whose success is primarily measured by the ability to meet challenges “as far as possible without resorting to a dwindling pool of formal decision-making competencies” (Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p. 77). If bureaucracy—in the sense of Max Weber (Weber, 1972 [1922])—is understood as an expression of legitimate rule, and not as a mechanism for enforcing the individual or collective interests of those working in public authorities (e.g. planners), then a shift of administrative decision-making authority to areas outside of an authority structure based on the principles of equal opportunities and merit is to be seen, from the perspective of life-chances liberalism, as just as problematic as the creation of a multitude of sometimes contradictory regulations whose enforceability is low. Thus, the increasing regional control on the basis of regional governance, that is, a coordination that is subject to a “core of networks and cooperation” (Benz, 2004, p. 117) (see also Fürst, 2001, 2007), is subject to an ambivalent assessment from the perspective of life-chances liberalism. On the one hand, this governance principle is based on the idea of competition and a strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity as central liberal ideas; on the other hand, social networks tend toward homophyly and social closure (Wald & Jansen, 2007), which is a significant violation of the principle of essential equal opportunity and merit. On the one hand, this tendency of social networks toward homophyly particularly excludes the less powerful (Paris, 2005) such as in many cases strangers and women, from the will-forming and decision-­ making processes in the networks; on the other hand, the shift of decision-­ making to social networks means a restriction of democratic rights, since

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networks (as a rule) have no (or at least limited) democratic legitimacy. Here, “network democracy” (v. Beyme, 2013, p. 13) is highly receptive to the influence of forcibly presented particular interests. These particular interests are not only represented by lobbying associations (or even more sweepingly: capital, as neo-Marxists like to assume), but in particular in the structures of public administration. This means that planners, too, have to subordinate themselves less to dogmas than to the law, because “nobody is above the law” (Dahrendorf, 2007b, p. 28). Weber’s principle (1972 [1922], p.  226) of “rule by virtue of knowledge” is here interspersed with elements of a “patrimonial” rule (patrimonium = paternal inheritance), which, among other things, knows no rules-based hierarchy of authority, but is based on loyalty to the ruler of power (cf., Scott, 1986; Kühne & Meyer, 2015). The democratic legitimacy deficit of network structures (see, e.g. Kühne, 2008a, Michelsen & Walter, 2013) can in principle be reduced by a stronger involvement of citizens (as sovereigns of a democratic state), by motivating especially those who are less powerful to participate and thus maintaining or strengthening their participation in public life as a basis for granting and maintaining electoral opportunities. However, citizens also tend to represent their particular (economic) interests as bourgeois rather than the interests of the democratic community (Selle, 2004; Hartz & Kühne, 2009). This is also shown by political science evaluations of referendums (e.g. Merkel, 2011; Beyme, 2013): in particular, the interests of the well-off and highly representative middle class prevail, while “less well-off middle classes [responded] to this experience of a selective representation of ‘the people’ often with populist tendencies” (Beyme, 2013, p. 52). Overall, the number of citizens who participate (even in referendums) is usually so small in comparison to the number of citizens affected by planning that it is difficult to speak of the representativeness of a general or majority will (see Selle, 2004; Beyme, 2013). In addition, participation also increases the complexity of the process: “The more citizens are involved in political processes, the more opaque they become” (Michelsen & Walter, 2013, p. 157). Instead of the hoped-for gain in transparency, participatory procedures often become entangled in particular detailed debates, discussions on procedural issues, sub-working groups and much more. This development can also lead to an

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accumulation of power: if procedures become more and more complex and confusing, they are associated with considerable opportunity costs in terms of time and money for those involved, which are not always accepted, thus giving a considerable gain in power to the person who ensures the organization of the process (an example of this is the widespread practice in public administrations of making large, usually disorganized amounts of data available to voluntary bodies, such as sustainability advisory boards, at short notice in order to then present their own interpretation at the meeting). As long as direct-democratic procedures are not more elaborate, representative democracy—from the perspective of life-chances liberalism—represents the most democratically legitimized form of public decision-making (and not the delegation of decisions to networks that are often oligarchically structured).

6.5.7 L ife-Chance Liberalism and the Tasks of Public Spatial Planning The constitutional mandate to create equal living conditions can be interpreted—at least in part—from the perspective of life-chance liberalism as the goal of creating substantial equality of opportunity. This gives the concept of central-location—also from the perspective of life-chance liberalism—renewed relevance (see also Blotevogel, 1996a, 1996b) “with its concern to ensure a minimum provision of public infrastructure and private supply facilities within reach for the population in all subspaces” (Kilper, 2004, p. 48). Spatial disparities resulting in “increased discrimination against certain spatial categories and population groups” (Blotevogel, 1996b, p.  652) represented an unacceptable restriction of the essential equality of opportunity from a life-chances liberal perspective. Such a spatial organization of essential equality of opportunity through spatial planning is, however, to be restricted from the perspective of life-chances liberalism in accordance with the liberal principle of personal responsibility, that is, if it applies in particular to young and old sections of the population, whose life-world spatial location is either not yet self-determined (young people) or turns out to be increasingly disadvantageous due to social developments (structural change). The task of

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state-guaranteed essential equality of opportunity is not to retroactively subsidize unreasonable (residential) location decisions, which can be assumed to be voluntary and whose merits can be weighed. For example, from the perspective of life-chances liberalism, it is desirable to organize high-quality school and medical care even in peripheral regions, but a location policy that—contrary to economic calculations—creates commercial jobs with high state subsidies is not. The substantial equality of opportunities for future generations additionally justifies an access to spatial planning (Danielzyk, 2004), for example, by restricting an unreasonable growth of settlements in the course of demographic change (remanence cost problem; see also Blotevogel, 1996b). Although this limits the life-chances of the present generation, it preserves those of future generations more than it limits those of today’s generation due to the problem of the persistence of physical structures: ecologically, areas remain unsealed, no building substance has to be removed economically and socially, future generations are thus able to (re)arrange their physical structures according to their needs. Spatial planning—from the perspective of life-chances liberalism—has the task, in conjunction with other public authorities, of shaping spatially localizable social inequalities in such a way that the inhabitants of certain districts or regions are not prevented from social participation or, in the case of poverty, from “making use of their civil rights” (Dahrendorf, 2007a, p. 86). The maximization of life-chances or the creation of equal opportunities does not, however, include the preservation of ‘historical cultural landscapes’. Cultural landscapes—understood as physical side effects of (reasonable) human action—do not require a state-determined (which limits individual life-chances) design, neither in spatial concretization of the principle of essential equal opportunities nor of merit. The explicit conservative character rather contradicts the idea of liberalism: the preservation of ‘historical cultural landscapes’ as a symbol of regional identities implies, on the one hand, the higher valuation of the collective over the individual. On the other hand, it means a preference of the autochthonous over the allochthonous and thus contradicts the principle of equal opportunities (in short, it is more challenging for foreign cultures to manifest their representations in physical space; cf. Kühne, 2009).

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With regard to dealing with the (cultural) landscape, a more critical approach to the self-justification argument for the preservation of indigenous peoples (with the interest of preserving their potential for distinction vis-à-vis foreigners), regional politics (with the interest of preserving the pattern of territorial unity) and regional development (with the interest of preserving political support) seem urgently necessary (Kühne, 2008a). The preservation of ‘historical cultural landscapes’ can be interpreted as a longing for the effectiveness of traditional interpretations of the world, but the “assumptions of yesterday’s world do not help us to cope with the problems of tomorrow. Tomorrow is not the continuation of yesterday. Nor is tomorrow the opposite, and certainly not the return to a souped-up day before yesterday. Tomorrow will be different” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 16). From the perspective of life-chances liberalism, such a critical attitude toward a conservation versus successionist landscape development does not mean that the guiding principle of preserving what is understood as ‘historical cultural landscapes’ should not sensibly implemented; it only means that the task of the general preservation of the landscape does not fall to state authorities, but—in the tradition of historical associations and the monument movement at the end of the nineteenth century—should fall to civil society actors (cf. Barmeyer, 1979).

6.5.8 Life-Chance Liberalism and Settlement Development A liberal settlement development has the goal of increasing the life-­ chances of humans: “From the casing of the organization protects the voluntary nature of the membership” (Sofsky, 2007a, p.  50). What applies to marriage, parties or associations also applies to local communities: a social space development based on liberal ideas rejects the conservative idealization of a pre-modern village community as socially desirable. An essential prerequisite for liberty—as Wilhelm von Humboldt (1986 [1851]) already stated—is a variety of situations. This is not only directed against ethnic, ideological or religious uniformity (see Kersting, 2009), but also refers to physical-spatial aspects. Uniformity can be found

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in settlement design in various ways: from the ‘pathological urbanization’ (Juchnowicz, 1990) of large socialist housing estates to their Fordist counterpart of American ‘Levittowns’ to local design statutes of the present. Spatial contingencies are accordingly desirable from a liberal perspective; they increase the options of the individual: the individual’s “preferences determine the content of what is considered useful to an individual; together they form his idea of utility. However, these utility concepts differ considerably. The egoist has a different conception of utility than the altruist; the aesthetician a different one than the ethicist; the politician vying for power a different one than the scientist who devotes himself to the increase of knowledge, the liberal a different one than the egalitarian” (Kersting, 2009, p. 32). Many of these individual preferences have spatial implications, if not directly related to Space 1. From a liberal perspective, it can accordingly be stated that “any attempt on the part of the state to enforce a certain idea of happiness through law, administration and police is unlawful violence” (Kersting, 2009, p.  69). State enforcement of spatial ideas of happiness has a long tradition: since the beginning of spatial planning, spatial paradigms have been implemented with the help of the state and its administration, from the functionalist, car-friendly city of the 1950s and 1960s to the compact, post-condensed city of today, from the forced urbanization of rural areas in the 1950s and 1960s to the ‘reruralization’ since the 1980s, or the promotion of home ownership through the home ownership subsidy and commuter allowance, which corresponded (and still corresponds, see Spellerberg, 2004) to the ‘idea of happiness’ for many individuals. If we were to ask a person behind the veil of ignorance what position he or she would take in space (center, edge or periphery), he or she would rationally choose the edge—without knowledge of the social implications—because this expands the field of possibility toward the center as well as toward the periphery (a statement, which can be substantiated in the context of the Corona crisis, because here the life-chances of single-­ family houses with a garden in a decentralized spatial context were shown in a focused way in comparison to the central apartment, surrounded by [temporarily] de-functionalized facilities for culture, sports, gastronomy, etc.). Thus, the single-family home in the semi-dense areas of the ‘urban-­ rural hybrid’ can be understood as a physical manifestation of the belief

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in life-chances; such settlements offer a combination of urban liberty with the rural availability of space. The ‘suburban’ parts of the urban land hybrid can therefore be described as the desire of individuals to combine the options of the city (theaters, restaurants, lectures, etc.) with those of the village (greater liberty of movement—both on their own piece of land and beyond) with the absence of the ligatures of the traditional village. The ‘space pastiches’ created by the different living ideals (Kühne, 2012) can be seen from a communitarian perspective as a ‘failure’ and, according to Maak (2014, p. 64), fall “under the ‘defacement paragraphs’ to be found in the building codes”, or else the aesthetic mode of observation renounces a larger-scale synthesis of space and is limited to the consideration of the individual object—with the renunciation of generalizing one’s own taste. Rainer Kazig (2016, p. 225) illustrates the importance of macro-space for the development of individual aesthetic affections, especially in the “private garden as a place of everyday aesthetic episodes”. The car can also be understood as a “room on wheels” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 82), in which “one can escape the confinement of the home and travel the world […] without having to give up the security of the familiar” (Sofsky, 2007b, p. 82). The choice of place for residence should originate from the individual’s free will—and his responsibility for himself: “From a liberty-legal perspective, the welfare state is primarily an enabler that makes provisions for liberty; it is not a repair company that repairs damage to autonomy” (Kersting, 2009, p. 64). In a spatial perspective for the individual, this means that if we decide (of our own free will) to live in the city center, we will not simultaneously be able to enjoy the silence of an alpine pasture; if we decide to live in a peripheral settlement that offers a larger property at a smaller price, then we may not expect to have a full-care hospital available at a similar time and distance as in a core metropolitan area. These expectations do not seem to be consistent with the principle of self-­ responsible action. Here, too, liberty corresponds with (self-)responsibility, not with the liberty to choose one’s place of residence while delegating the responsibility for optimal supply of public and private goods to someone else. The principle aim of the state’s handling of space is to increase the life-­ chances of citizens, not to educate them, restrict them or manifest

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specialized interests. Accordingly, the increase in rents in numerous metropolitan areas cannot be blamed on ‘morally reprehensible investors’ (as neo-Marxists like to postulate), nor on people with higher incomes who want to afford inner-city living, nor on entrepreneurs who are looking for centrally located office space, but in particular on long-lasting planning procedures and planning models to preserve historically outdated settlement patterns which prevents a demand-oriented supply. Accordingly, economic activity is first and foremost a source of prosperity and life-­ chances in the sense of positive liberty. However, an essential aspect of intergenerational improvement of life-chances has not yet been addressed: we manifest our needs in physical space, regardless of whether future generations can or want to generate opportunities from these. To put it bluntly, instead of leaving education behind, we leave concrete behind. In this respect, it seems necessary to leave behind the (financial) means to deconstruct the concrete.

6.6 T  he (Potential) Productivity of Landscape and Spatial Conflicts: Prerequisites and Consequences Conflicts, especially those that deal with spaces and landscapes, are something we have come back to time and again. After all, they are of great importance when dealing with space. In the following section, we will now summarize the various aspects of spatial and landscape conflicts and interpret them in light of Dahrendorf ’s conflict theory, pointing out options for action for regulations that can raise the productive potential of these conflicts.

6.6.1 T  he Interpretation of Landscape Conflicts in Light of Dahrendorf’s Conflict Theory How can empirical results be categorized in terms of Ralf Dahrendorf ’s conflict theory while also addressing the regulatory aspect? Societal differentiation increases the number of potential conflicts, as the number of

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specific logics, patterns of interpretation and evaluation multiplies (Luhmann, 2017). With this development, not only the demands on the use of physical space are multiplying, but also the socially existing patterns of landscape interpretation and evaluation. An increasing global cultural exchange also means an increase (and potential multiplication) of interpretation and evaluation patterns that are applied to specific physical spaces (Bruns, 2013, 2016; Bruns & Kühne, 2015). Landscape interpretations, attributions and needs are subject to strong cultural variations, for example, forests in Germany are held in higher esteem than in almost any other nation (Urmersbach, 2009; Kühne, 2014; Jenal, 2019). Such social and cultural differentiations at local, regional, national and international levels therefore increase the probability of landscape conflicts arising. However, these conflicts thus also reflect the normality of a developed democratic society which, in the course of the formation and regulation of such conflicts, demonstrates its capacity for change and productivity in the sense of an increase in life-chances. The internalized social landscape evaluation and interpretation patterns are created in the process of socialization. Individual landscape awareness can be differentiated into a ‘native normal landscape’ and ‘stereotypical landscapes’. The first is formed by the everyday access to physical objects and their symbolic or emotional occupation, especially in childhood. In the second, aesthetic, but also cognitive, attributions dominate, which create strong stereotypical understandings of landscape through school books, advertisements, feature films and documentaries, Internet videos and so on (for more detailed information, see Aschenbrand, 2016; Cosgrove, 1993, 1998; Fontaine, 2017; Kühne, 2008a, 2017, 2019b; Lyons, 1983; Nissen, 1998; Proshansky et  al., 1983; Stotten, 2013, 2015). The normative content of ‘normal home landscape’ is directed toward familiarity, that of ‘stereotypical landscape’ toward the adherence to social aesthetic norms. If a constellation of objects is evaluated in the mode of the ‘normal home landscape’, every change of this constellation that is interpreted as essential is described as contrary to the norm. In the construction mode of the ‘stereotypical landscape’, however, this is only the case if this change contradicts stereotypical social expectations (i.e. if the stereotype is generally interpreted as ‘ugly’).

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To illustrate this with an example: if the erection of a wind farm is interpreted on the basis of the ‘normal home landscape’, a negative attitude is taken, since the physical foundations of landscape are subject to a change that is generally considered to be immense and irrevocable; the evaluation on the basis of ‘stereotypical landscape’ is considered ‘ugly’ by large parts of the Central European population, but can also refer back to the aesthetic evaluation pattern of ‘sublimity’ or conceptually to ‘modern’ (Kühne, 2018e). As essentially interpreted changes of the physical bases of landscape, which contradict social conceptions of attractiveness, these form a foundational basis for landscape conflicts between enterprises, spatial planning, politics, as well parts of the population who consider themselves affected (in different conflict constellations), and which—in the sense of Dahrendorf—can assume a quite remarkable intensity. We can also see here that landscape conflicts have their basis likewise in the opposition between the forces of the persistence and those of change. The changes, both on the levels of the social landscape and of physical space, can exhibit a varying degree of intensity and violence, depending on how large the part of the population is that considers itself affected, what possibilities there are for influencing decision-making processes, how actors are networked and so on. In other words, the conflict spectrum can range from a technical dispute about landscape understanding (see, e.g. Hokema, 2013; Vicenzotti, 2011) to the triggering of bloody disputes. In democratic societies, it seems absurd to (permanently) suppress landscape conflicts, since the participation of different actors is legally prescribed (in Germany, solely by the principle of countervailing influence in spatial planning). An attempt to solve them would mean eliminating their social causes and thus maintaining a social status quo in the sense of a leveling of the interests and demands of the actors and hindering the possible change and dynamics of society. Changes in landscape and its physical foundations are also rooted in changes in society, which would also mean limiting the maximization of life-chances. Another, but not always applicable, strategy is to avoid landscape conflicts by keeping the changes in the physical basis of landscape below the ‘perception threshold’ or by removing it from perception through ‘camouflage’ (an extreme example is the County Jail in Los Angeles, which is designed to fit in with its surroundings in such a way that it could be an office

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complex, a shopping mall or a parking garage; see Kühne, 2012, 2013; Weber, 2017). As described above, Dahrendorf considers conflict regulation to be the first and foremost appropriate way of dealing with landscape conflicts in democratic societies, although it cannot do so without certain foundations when applied to the field of energy system transformation: 1. The mutual recognition of each other’s position as a legitimate expression of (landscape) needs, that is, a commitment for as well as against physical manifestations of the energy system transformation. 2. The all-round focus on concrete forms of conflict and thus actual route designs or actual wind power plant construction projects, but not the debate on the ground as to whether energy system transformation is necessary as an overall project, since it cannot be revised at this level. 3. The organization of the conflict parties with reliable and legitimate contact persons—a challenge especially in the case of citizens’ initiatives. 4. The existence of a third-party authority recognized by all parties, whose conflict regulation competencies are accepted by all parties involved. 5. Adherence to specific, jointly developed rules of procedure, for example, round tables on wind power projects, in conjunction with the existence of an independent body that is able to enforce the rules that have been found, as well as the accountability of responsibility for decisions. In liberal democracy, the latter includes, in particular, the regular review of the electorate’s satisfaction with the elected representatives’ performance record (Dahrendorf, 1969a). According to Dahrendorf (1994, p. 69), essential for a successful regulation of landscape conflicts is “the autonomy of the many organizations and institutions”, whereby autonomy is understood to mean independence “from a center of power” (Dahrendorf, 1994, p. 69). Citizens’ initiatives, for example, should not serve as the mouthpiece for political parties. Dealings between, but also

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within, the conflicting parties require politeness, tolerance and non-­ violence (Dahrendorf, 1994). The handling of current landscape conflicts shows (at least in Germany, but also in other parts of the world) that there is still a long way to go to meet these necessary foundations: in some areas neither proponents nor opponents regard the respective other side as legitimized in conflicts about energy transition, traffic turnaround or settlement development— partly neither the right to express nor beyond that the expressing persons. In the process of negotiation, the organization of the conflicting parties in spatial conflicts is sometimes rather diffuse, actors join in, others withdraw, citizens’ initiatives are institutionalized to varying degrees, or they break up in part or are represented by changing spokespersons. Especially the citizen interest groups (e.g. those organized to support citizens’ initiatives) see themselves challenged in planning processes to be recognized as an organized conflict party. In the struggle for this acknowledgment, they often resort to strongly polarized and moralizing argumentation, which is not necessarily in agreement with the rules of fair communication. The existence of an independent authority to monitor compliance with the rules falls—according to Dahrendorf (1991)—on the state. However, the state itself has become a party to numerous current landscape conflicts, such as the one mentioned above. The state is, after all, an essential driver (through legislation, financial support, etc.) of energy and transport transformation. It therefore finds itself in the situation of being responsible for both the process and its regulation, a circumstance that can be described (from a systems theory perspective) as de-differentiation, a process that leads to losses of efficiency and especially legitimacy, as was typical for real socialism (where the state was responsible for the production of goods, on the one hand, and for monitoring compliance with environmental standards, on the other; Kühne, 2001, 2003). Furthermore, the legal framework for dealing with landscape conflicts is ambiguous and allows for contradictory interpretations. As a result of social differentiation, what is understood as landscape ‘beauty’ (the preservation of which is required by the Federal Nature Conservation Act) can hardly be operationalized in a generally binding way (which is also documented by the large number of ‘landscape assessment procedures’; e.g. Roth & Bruns, 2016). As a result of the diffuse conflict situation, both on the side of the

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original conflict parties, for example, project planners or transmission system operators versus citizens’ initiatives, and then under extension of nature conservation associations, sports clubs, local history associations and so on, and the political and administrative influence, imputable decisions are made more difficult and/or externalized to the jurisdiction (Berr, Jenal, Kühne, & Weber, 2019; Gailing, 2015; Hoeft et al., 2017; Kühne & Weber, 2018 [online first 2017]; Walter et  al., 2013; Weber et  al., 2017). Thus, the question of a changing the use of space is transformed not only into an administrative question but also into an aesthetic, moral and political question, and ultimately into one of binding jurisdiction, which, in view of the latter and according to Dahrendorf, actually no longer corresponds to a productive conflict settlement. The high degree of organizational capability of the conflicting parties as a result of the expansion of education since the late 1960s (Dahrendorf, 1968) potentially helps to enable an orderly conflict settlement, but the increasing differentiation of the individual interests (from species protection to geotope protection, landscape-aesthetic questions, interests of use for dog owners, hang-gliders, geocachers, bathing enthusiasts and much more) works against the formation and organization of the conflict interests. At this point, we would like to point out a fundamental problem specific to conflict regulations, which has been hinted at rather subliminally up to now, which is the problem of mixing or inserting evaluative, moral, aesthetic and truth-claiming preferences and corresponding judgments in argumentations and statements of actors (cf. Berr, 2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020; Berr & Kühne, 2019a, 2019b; Kühne, 2018 [2020 published], 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019c). This problem is particularly connected with polarizing, moralizing and thus unfair argumentations, and further increases the described difficulties in dealing with landscape conflicts and their desired regulation. This convergence of the arbitrary ‘beautiful’, ‘good’ and ‘true’ in individual or group-specific belief and interpretation systems, as well as corresponding argumentations, becomes a serious problem for landscape conflicts if such convictions and arguments are not understood or are strategically raised to an absolute standard. That which is perceived as ‘beautiful’ and ‘good’ is simultaneously considered to be ‘right’ and ‘true’ and thus is immunized, through this supposed position of ‘right’ or ‘better’ knowledge, against criticism by those who think

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differently; the opposing position is evaluated as ‘false’ and ‘untrue’ and its aesthetically preferred objects as ‘ugly’. The same then also applies with reversed significations. This immunization and evaluation mechanism easily leads to supposedly indisputable positions on both sides of the respective spatial conflict, which prove to be inaccessible to counter-arguments in discussions and, all in all, lead to the aforementioned moralization strategies and associated polarization effects and ultimately to unfair communication—thus making it more difficult to settle the conflict.

6.6.2 M  aking Landscape Conflicts Productive: A Challenge Major obstacles in the regulation of landscape conflicts are often the low degree of organization of some conflict parties with simultaneously high moralization and polarization: instead of recognizing the positions of the ‘other side’ as legitimate, the actors of the ‘opposite side’ are morally discredited (Spanier, 2006; Kühne, 2008c, 2019c; Grau, 2017; Berr, 2018a, 2019; Berr & Kühne, 2019a, 2019b). Thus, ‘destroyers of home and landscape’ meet ‘the destroyers of the future of mankind’ (cf. Renn, 2012; Kühne & Weber, 2015). The low specificity of the conflict object ‘landscape’ in connection with further content-related references does not facilitate the regulation of landscape conflicts either. The current situation in Germany contributes to this, as legally the meaning of landscape and ‘beauty’ is not definitively regulated nor concretely understood. Thus ‘masked’ arguments (often in relation to species protection, since this is regarded as a ‘sharp sword’) come to the fore over motives of preservation of the physical bases of ‘native normal landscape’ or ‘stereotypical landscape’. With current landscape conflicts, the fact that the state assumes the dual function of conflict party and ‘neutral authority’ makes conflict settlement even more difficult. At the same time, landscape conflicts can be considered potentially productive for society, if the conditions listed above are taken into account and dealt with, according to Ralf Dahrendorf. Fundamental to this, however, is the recognition that landscape conflicts are not to be understood as a state contrary to the norm in the sense of a deviation from the

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construct of a ‘general social consensus’. Rather, landscape conflicts should be understood as an element of a developing and life-chances generating society—and this should be recognized by all parties to the conflict. The negotiation of landscape conflicts should be given an institutional framework which enables the conflict parties to negotiate in an organized form and with clear negotiation rules, for example, over the development of concrete areas designated as landscape. Attempts, which are commonly used in landscape planning to, for example, suppress landscape conflicts by standardizing ‘landscape image assessment procedures’, can be described as inadequate at best, if not dysfunctional, in view of a pluralizing society (with increasingly diverse claims, interpretations and values of landscape). A handling of landscape conflicts oriented on Dahrendorf ’s conflict theory presupposes the mutual fundamental recognition of the legitimacy of the position of the other conflict party. With regard to landscape conflicts, this also includes dealing with spatial claims, patterns of interpretation and valuation of the other party, and not least one’s own ‘sedimented’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), and thus unquestioned, interpretations and valuations that are intersubjectively understood as ‘normal’ (see for more Kühne, 2018d). For example, it could be part of individual liberty to contemplatively immerse oneself in the relatively monotonous motion of the rotor blades of a wind turbine, as a contrast to areas where this is not possible. It is an act of liberty to be able to embrace such an aesthetic as an interpretative pattern of a landscape. However, people who have moved to such an area specifically to enjoy a view that is free of wind turbines and the illusion that the mechanization of the world is taking place in front of their own window, will most likely not positively evaluate the construction of such a plant within the framework of the different patterns of interpretation together with its visual expectations. Nevertheless, it is fundamentally possible and, under specific circumstances, also reasonable that people in liberty can enter into abstraction to themselves, that is, on a meta-level to themselves, to their own needs, to their own stereotypes, to their own ideas. In this sense, liberty is also an obligation to reflect, that is, to enter the meta-level of oneself and one’s own demands, expectations and needs for the purpose of self-reflection. Even “without tolerance of ambiguity […] this

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dichotomy will not be overcome, but will continue to deepen” (Bauer, 2018, p. 85). A central obstacle in the regulation of spatial conflicts is the dual function of the state, both as a party in the significant spatial conflicts of the present (energy system transformation, transport transformation and settlement development) and as a responsible authority for their regulation and ultimately decision. From a life-chance liberal perspective, the state’s task here would be to monitor compliance with procedural rules and to be the ‘third party’ which, in case of doubt, can decide on further proceedings regarding the object of conflict even against the will of the actors, and not as an actor itself who is in dispute with citizens’ initiatives over the construction of wind turbines.

6.7 Interim Conclusion: Life-Chances Liberalism, State and Spaces Life-chances arise from options framed by ligatures. Life-chances are constitutively linked to liberty. Liberty is not a state, but a process in contexts, which takes place in the confrontation with inner and outer nature, in the social and in reflection. It can be current (in relation to current options), but also potential when future options are received or created. Spaces and Landscapes (1–3) are connected with life-chances in many ways. They represent ligatures, but also offer options. From the perspective of life-chances liberalism, it is necessary to increase the options associated with Spaces and Landscapes. This has many aspects: the diversity of Landscapes 1, 2 and 3; the preservation of private, public and Space 1; the productive regulation of spatial conflicts. Diverse contents of Landscape 3 require a multitude of options in dealing with Landscape 1, especially in the struggle to find the most suitable solutions to great challenges. Private spaces secure options to materialize Space 2, they offer the option of retreating from the conflicts in and around public spaces, and they protect from the agony of a total public space. Conflicts about spaces and landscapes should be subjected to rational regulation, a moralization of the conflict and of the other conflict party should be avoided, in which

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it is a matter of a regulation of concrete objects that is acceptable to the conflict parties. The task of the state should be to act not as a conflict party, but as an authority for monitoring compliance within the rules of conflict regulation and which, in case of doubt, can also make a decision independent of the conflict parties. The conflict parties are advised to establish a certain distance to their own position and significance, which includes the hope of increasing contingency tolerance. In this way, instead of a morally based long-term assessment of the world, an approach based on humor and (self-)irony could be adopted.

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7 Summary

At the beginning, we freely adapted Heidegger’s well-known distinction between ‘that which is asked about’ (Gefragtem), ‘that which is to be found out by asking’ (Erfragtem) and ‘that which is interrogated’ (Befragtem) in order to sketch the intentions and goals of this book in advance. As ‘that which is asked about’ or ‘sought-after’ we have defined life-chances as forms of liberty in the sense of Dahrendorf, as ‘that which is to be found out by asking’ the specific meaning or the specific conditions and modes of development of such life-chances, as ‘that which is interrogated’ in our search we have chosen ‘landscape’ as a socially mediated and individually shaped way of looking at ‘space’ that is significant in modern societies. As far as ‘that which is asked about’ is concerned first, namely an understanding of life-chances as forms of liberty, our search resulted in a kaleidoscope of diverse provisions, all of which revolve around the basic idea of the connection between liberty and life-chances. It was found that the political views examined (socialist, conservative or liberal) affirm this connection to a greater or lesser extent, but that they attributed differing weight to the necessary balance between options (opportunities, disenfranchisement and scope for liberty) and ligatures (ties, in part ‘religio’ © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 O. Kühne et al., Liberty and Landscape, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84326-7_7

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and obligations), and thus (intentionally or unintentionally; consciously or not consciously) tend to promote or restrict life-chances. Likewise, it also became clear that a liberal democracy as a form of state—in the broader sense, even as a form of society—is still the most likely to make life-chances possible. As far as the specific meaning or the specific conditions and modes of development of such life-chances as ‘that which is to be found out by asking’ are concerned, the mentioned balance between options and ligatures was revealed to us as their proprium (not as essentialist ‘essence’). In Dahrendorf ’s sense, life-chances cannot consist in an unreflective liberty without rules and obligations, nor in a supposedly alternative-less liberty-­ limiting new or re-attachment to sacrosanct values or ideas. One path leads to a hyper-individualism without ties, and in the worst case to the negation of duties and responsibility, while the other path leads to a system of rigid sacrosanct ties and obligations, and in the worst case to totalitarian political convictions, value and moral concepts, and corresponding community structures. The ‘questioning’ of ‘landscape’ as a socially mediated and individually shaped form of perception of ‘space’, which is significant in modern societies, served the purpose of finding out which chances in life are given, given up or made possible and guaranteed by ‘landscape’. Before we summarize in Sect. 7.2 the different weightings and the relationship between options and ligatures, as well as how the more detailed provisions of life-chances in the three decisive political world views, are repeated also on the level of ‘Landscape’ (1, 2, 3) and ‘Space’ (1, 2, 3), we will first discuss the core aspects of liberty and life-chances in Sect. 7.1. Finally, we will conclude our summary in Sect. 7.3 with our position on life-chance liberalism and space/landscape.

7.1 Key Aspects of Liberty and Life-Chances Before we will deal with the many threats for a society that promotes life-­ chances, and the final discussion of an approach to dealing with space that promotes life-chances, we will once again summarize the results of our research on liberty and life-chances:

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• Liberty cannot be a state, but is a constitutive process. • Liberty is localized in World 2, but is constitutively contextualized in relation to World 3, but also in World 1. • Liberty is constitutively bound to (self-)reflection. • Negative liberty is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for obtaining life-chances; positive liberty is necessary for that. • Life-chances liberalism is based more on the principle of equal opportunities than on the principle of justice of performance. • In addition, life-chances liberalism favors procedural fairness—also this ensure that positions are awarded to the most suitable candidate. • Procedural justice implies rules of respectful interaction with each other, even in conflict situations. • Conflicts (in this case about spaces or landscapes) are socially normal and can—under the conditions of procedural justice—develop their productive potential. • Moral communication contradicts a procedural approach to conflict, especially because it aims at discrediting the person. • The social increase of life-chances requires the increase of ambiguity tolerance. • Life-chances are tied to the ability to lead a self-determined life. • The central prerequisite for the ability to lead a self-determined life is education. • Liberty and responsibility are interdependent, so education for liberty is also always education for responsibility and vice versa, which means to claim liberty also means to accept the duties associated with them. • At this point, it becomes clear that in order to maximize life-chances, current liberty must sometimes be restricted to maximize potential liberty (e.g. education expands potential liberty, but sometimes on condition that the current liberty to sleep longer in the morning is restricted).

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7.2 T  he Multiple Threats for a Society That Promotes Life-Chances Liberal democracy as a form of government (in the broader sense, even a form of society), which—as shown in this book—is most likely to provide opportunities for life, is threatened by five factors: the influence of transnational corporations, the influence of illegitimate ‘movements’, administrative sclerotization, the temptations of ‘direct democracy’, but also the economization of society. In the form of a liberalism that maximizes life-chances, as we have outlined, we do not think it makes sense to assign a meaning to the market as a ‘categorical imperative’. It merely represents—and here we follow Crouch (2004, 2011), among others—a means of achieving goals associated with the distribution of scarce and substitutable goods, and not an end in itself. Where it is a matter of securing basic life-chances, such as in the areas of education or health care, a yardstick geared toward purely economic efficiency is just as incompatible with increasing or maintaining options as it is with internal and external security (see also Aron, 2016 [1968], Nussbaum, 2019). The hope for non-governmental organizations or broad-based citizen participation as a way out of ‘post-­ democracy’ (Crouch, 2004) has been clouded in the course of increasing complexity, up to and including sclerotization around many governance processes, the officialization of individual interests, and the moralization of conflicts instead of the search for an appropriate settlement. To the conservative Scylla of the “return to the known and the familiar” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 9) and the Marxist Charybdis of “belief in wild, often utopian promises” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p. 9) comes the hammer of the economization of living environments, politics and administration, the ambos of rampant participation processes (over-governance), and the rise of democratically illegitimate ‘movements’, which—also as a result of a certain degree of organization—lack positions in terms of content, as well as of well-organized initiatives, which—in awareness of their own apparent moral superiority—put ends before means and sometimes resort to a crude mix of conspiracy theories on the one hand and the mobilization of kitsch communication on the other to legitimize their

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obstructive actions. The moralization of communication often leads to denigration, which is contrary to the capability approach according to Nussbaum (2014) of being able to lead a common life full of mutual recognition, recognized in one’s own dignity, while maintaining the right not to be humiliated, because in the course of excessive moralized communication the dignity of the other is lowered, not considered equal, but rather pathologized and thus humiliated. In this context, affiliation should be voluntary, with an underlying awareness of the voluntary nature of affiliation in order to be able to break away, though this, however, leads to the problem of Internet-based communication and the debate about the ‘right to be forgotten’ (among many Jandt et al., 2013; Singer & Beck, 2019; Stumpf, 2017). All these developments lead to a reduction of options, while ligatures—which are very different in content, but also strongly moralistic—are strengthened. If, on the other hand, the aim is to increase life-chances, both for society as a whole and for individuals in particular, then the goal lies in increasing the number of options, combined with the competence to handle these options responsibly. A key element in increasing the competence in dealing with options is the shift in focus toward education rather than qualification (see, among others, Strenger, 2017). People do not only qualify for participation in the activities of economy market; they are also social and political subjects involved in cultural processes. Accordingly, access to education, as a merit of modernization, represents a central basis for opening up the world. Life opportunities arise in particular through education, since options are formed here and ligatures do not have to be taken for granted, but can be reflected upon in terms of their suitability for one’s own life. The ability to freely weigh and reflect on ligatures in order to make a rational decision as to which ligatures can be accepted, with what intensity, and what significance is attached to them, is based on the access to and acceptance of education, because through this ligatures can be questioned and influenced. This is where the state’s task to ensure education is distributed equally to maximize life-­ chances also becomes clear. Additionally, the maximization of life-chances can also be seen in relation to the handling of (material) space: life-­ chances are maximized when the state does not monopolize space or allow it to be fully marketized. It is the task of the state to allow and

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promote different forms of ownership and use of space in order to enable individuals to deal with space in a variety of ways, regardless of whether they take advantage of these opportunities or not. For “hold[ing] property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others” (Nussbaum, 2009, p.  77) is also synonymous with the possibility of having control over one’s own environment. This is furthermore also protected from arbitrary searches and allows for the availability of spaces of recognition of one’s own work, or as enabling spaces for purpose-free liberties, in which being alone is already valuable and—as in play—can serve to increase contingency. Thus, private property is not only an expression of liberty but also an expression of responsibility. In spatial conflicts, it is primarily the definition of a framework for action, that is, a constitutional procedure for conflict regulation that is needed, not a stronger manifestation of state interests in physical space. Here it is shown that neither the expansion of the state into the realm of the economy nor that of the economy into that of politics leads to an increase in life-chances, since on the one hand a reduction in the efficiency of the economy through political calculation leads to a reduction in options, while on the other hand an economization of politics leads to a reduction in the justice of opportunity. The life-chances liberalism outlined here focuses strongly on options and ligatures that are not actualized out of mere tradition, but rather those that are reflected and justified in an intersubjective, comprehensible way. To this end, the concept of the ‘veil of not-knowing’ (Rawls, 1971, 2001) comes into the play. These life-chances maximizing ligatures, which can be derived from the thought-experiment of the ‘veil of not-­ knowing’, are not so much ligatures referring to ‘what’ to do, but rather ‘how’. It is about the principles of fairness, in particular the possibility of being able to present one’s reasoned views in orderly proceedings, but also a tolerance of legitimacy toward all (non-violence affirming) views (Welsch, 2002). Associated with this are also rules of politeness and respect for others, even if they do not share one’s own views. Such an approach is in turn facilitated if moral prejudices are not made, but if (if at all) a moral judgment is made at the end of dealing with a topic or a person rather than before. In this context, life-chances liberals still insist on fair trials and on respectful interaction with one another (see also

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Nussbaum, 2019), something that Garton Ash (2016) calls ‘robust civility’, that is, an agreement about how we “agree on how we disagree” (Ash, 2016, p. 114). This ‘robust civility’ also means countering totalitarianism with reasoned ‘civilized contempt’ (Strenger, 2015), which is not to be confused with mere moralizing, since it is based on the values of a humane and enlightened way of dealing with each other, not on a diffuse feeling of unease. Rather, it aims at practical reason as the ability “to form a personal conception of the good itself and to think about one’s own life planning in a critical way” (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 76). It shows the reflective element in which liberty can also be understood as a distance to oneself, in which moral attitudes are understood as the decision of an individual, but a moralization of the world is understood as a threat to the ability to criticize or even leads to an ideologization of one’s own thinking that robs the individual of his ability to criticize. Aligning action (both individual and social) with the principle of maximizing life-chances means ensuring human dignity through access to health and education, but also to an adequate life in material terms, thereby creating options without increasing the influence of ligatures that are not subject to the principle of fairness. This approach also implies a balance between rights and duties. This also applies to transfer payments, since the rights to education and health are balanced by the obligations to finance them (through taxes, duties, insurance, etc.) (see also Nussbaum, 2019). Duties restrict options, and to that extent these are justified if the options, which are made available to other humans, are larger than the option restrictions which result from the obligations. Whether these options are used is the decision of the individual, provided that he is able to make a reasonable free decision. This excludes the liberty of choice for basic education (which is why in many states there is compulsory schooling), so that individuals are enabled to make a reasonable free decision. Moreover, since in the spirit of life-chance liberalism no one can be obliged to exercise his or her options, the transfer to secure basic options (dignified material survival, [continuing] education and health care) should be as efficient as possible.

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7.3 L ife Opportunity Liberalism and Space/ Landscape As different as the understandings of person and society with regard to liberalism, socialism and conservatism are, they also differ in their ideas about dealing with space. If socialism fundamentally sees man as a product of his environment, conservatism formulates the norm that the individual should fit into the community, while liberalism understands the relationship of man to his environment as that of liberty and maximizing life-chances. Both physical space and social notions of space become the medium for all three world views for the individual and society. If socialism attempts to physically manifest its own image of an egalitarian society through spatial design (from prefabricated concrete slab buildings in state socialism to graffiti on suspicious store premises, the operators of which are suspected of being the drivers of gentrification) and (especially at universities) to incorporate an egalitarian to statist understanding of how space is handled by those seeking recognition, conservatism aims at the traditional physical space (in the sense of an essentialist cultural-­ natural symbiosis) in its space-related actions. Liberalism, on the other hand, aims to manifest life-chances in physical space, to maximize spatial contingencies and to expand rather than limit the pluralization of concepts of space. Tendencies that limit these physical manifestations of the maximization of individual life-chances in the sense of a ‘collective spirit’ or as an expression of the ‘decline in values of the twentieth or twenty-­ first century’ (Berlin, 1995 [1969]) can be understood as “pseudo-­ sociological mythology” (Berlin, 1995 [1969], p. 187) that has “developed into a new animism under the guise of scientific concepts” (Berlin, 1995 [1969], p. 63). A liberal approach to space is more strongly oriented toward “changing attitudes” (Dahrendorf, 1983, p.  85) than a reliance on political-­ administrative solutions (which, as shown, are subject to a specific logic that is usually not necessarily adequate to the problem): “Here, as elsewhere, laws are smoke and mirrors if they are not filled with life by the citizens. If we want an environment worth living in, we have to make sure, as individuals or in groups, that we keep or restore it” (Dahrendorf,

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1983, p. 85). Legal instructions for action, which are neither known nor followed, and if they were known would be deliberately violated as they are understood to be coercion, are to be considered very counterproductive in terms of sustainable, environmentally friendly development. This is all the more true for the generalization of individual (or sub-societal, as is the case with large parts of the planning community) judgments of taste, “and to belief that one knows better than others what the ‘true’ needs of people are” (Herzog, 2013, p. 159). In principle each restriction of liberty means a dampening of the “energy of action and robs humans of the chance to chalk up the enthusiasm of achievement for themselves” (Sofsky, 2007, p. 41). Socially, the diversity of life forms dwindles with increasing regulation: “Social diversity dwindles with the degree of external interference” (Sofsky, 2007, p. 41). On the other hand, a high degree of social complexity is an expression of a liberal society; it is based “on the liberty of the individual to lead a self-determined life, so that initiative and creativity are released in the various areas of life” (Herzog, 2013, p. 123). People know better than any state authority what is right for them; a paternalism peculiar to conservatism in particular, but also to Real Socialism, “is a spawn of statist pessimism. It is based on the mistaken belief that men are unable to provide for themselves and to recognize what is good for them” (Sofsky, 2007, p. 42). Spatial planning committed to life-chances liberalism is confronted with the fundamental need to weigh the spatial concretization of the ideas of merit and equal opportunities. In particular, the idea of equal opportunity makes it possible to define the liberal boundaries of the economic liberal/radical liberal calculus. Thus, while it can be argued from the perspective of libertarianism that planning ‘limits liberty’, encourages a ‘mania for regulation’ and hinders the development of economic forces, innovative capacity and cost-cutting opportunities through “excessive planning and approval procedures” (Danielzyk, 2004, p. 20), it can also be argued liberally (in the political sense) that although liberties are curtailed, this is reasonable in terms of equal opportunities (especially for future generations) and that regulated planning and approval procedures are an essential component of liberal civil rights. The prerequisite for a reasonable relationship between state and citizens is a bureaucracy

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according to the ideas of Max Weber (1972 [1922]), whereby the observation that from the perspective of life-chances liberalism, with the establishment of bureaucratic organization as the purest type of legal rule, its form but not its scope appears to be set. In principle, it is also true of life-chances liberalism that restrictions on personal liberties by the state should only be reasonably justified, but then mediated through bureaucratic organization. Moreover, with such a reference to life-chances liberalism as in John Rawls’ conception, a contingent liberal communication code can be developed to the economic liberal resp. libertarian, so that spatial planning can free itself (at least partially) from a defensive argumentation that is, after all, reasonable (not only) despite the limitations of the bourgeois acting as an economic subject, but also because of the strengthening of equal opportunities for the citizen, the politically free subject, who is thereby given the opportunity to pursue his personal pursuit of happiness according to the principle of merit. The concept of a justice-sensitive life-­ chances liberalism in the tradition of Ralf Dahrendorf, John Rawls and Amartya Sen can—following v. Beyme (2013)—offers an approach to overcome the pessimism of the ‘post-democracy’ debate and to engage constructively in increasing life-chances in society. For neo-Marxist and life-chances-maximizing-liberal diagnoses (albeit based on completely different views of people and society) cannot be reconciled with a relapse into “neo-feudal structures, in which a small upper class uses all institutions in its own interest, while for the rest of the population dependency and insecurity increase” (Herzog, 2013, p. 78). Beyond the determination of a fundamental justifiability of spatial planning from the perspective of life-chance liberalism, a life-chance liberal understanding of spatial planning can also be derived. A reasonable, that is, impartial, tolerant and responsible approach to the issues dealt with in spatial planning—as provided for in a life-chance liberal understanding of planning—means not only a high degree of sensitivity toward the planners’ own strategies of officialization, but also the abandonment of teleological ideas about societies and their spaces, which can be resolved with the help of a “linear technocratic plan realization” (Blotevogel, 1996, p. 651). Planning oriented toward liberal ideals also means greater acceptance of contradictions and contingencies; an omnipresent pursuit of

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exclusions, unambiguities and generalities runs counter to liberalism’s concern for the particular, the individual and the particularized. One consequence of thinking in terms of ambiguities and contingencies for practical spatial planning would be a stronger inclusion of the principle of more or less broad margins (in the sense of transitional spaces) as an alternative to sharp borders (see also Ipsen, 2006; Kühne, 2012; Kühne & Meyer, 2015) or at least of “porous borders” (Fainstein, 2010, p. 174) whose constructional character is based much more on discursive power processes and leads to a perpetuation through normalization of traditional power structures (for more details, see Newman & Paasi, 1998). Such considerations ultimately lead to the consequence of a stronger opening of spatial planning toward philosophical, political and social science discourses and their consequences for the social—planning-­ mediated—organization of space.

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