Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance 9781685852689

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LEBANESE CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM

Map of Lebanon Fighter (1978)

and a Cross Drawn with the Blood of a Killed

LEBANESE CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance

Walid Phares

LYN N E RIENNER PUBLISHERS BOULDER LONDON

Published in the United States of America in 1995 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1995 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Phares, Walid, 1957Lebanese Christian nationalism : the rise and fall of an ethnic resistance / Walid Phares. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-535-1 1. Christians—Lebanon—Politics and government. 2. Lebanon— Politics and government. 3. Nationalism—Lebanon. 4. Nationalism— Religious aspects—Christianity. I. Title. DS87.P5 1995 965.92'00882—dc20 94-28297 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

@

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

This book is dedicated to the memory of my late father, attorney Halim Phares, to whom I owe my love of education, moral correctness, and the search for truth. His constant praise of intellectual rectitude, positive behavior, and justice inspired me to struggle to ameliorate the human condition. In this regard I have sought to acquire knowledge and extend it to others as a means to confront injustice.

Contents

List of Maps

XI

Introduction: Rethinking the Lebanese Conflict PART 1

1

REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

9

Arab Domination and Mideast Resistance The Arab-Islamic Conquest, 11 The Ottoman Invasion, 14 Arab Nationalism, 15 Islamic Fundamentalism, 16 Middle Eastern Christian Nationalisms, The Assyrian Struggle, 18 The Coptic Ordeal, 20 The Southern Sudanese Saga, 22 Comparative Analysis, 23

2

1

11

17

The Formation of Lebanon's Resistance: The Mardaite States Ancient Times, 29 The Arab-Islamic Conquest: The Fatah, 31 The First Mardaite State: A.D. 676-685, 33 The Second Mardaite State: A.D. 685-758, 33 The Third Mardaite State: A.D. 758-1305, 35 The Collapse of the Independent State: A.D. 1302-1305, Consequences of the Mardaite Era, 39

vii

29

35

CONTENTS

viii 3

Occupation, Emirate, and Revolution Mameluke Occupation, 43 Ottoman Domination, 44 The Emirate: 1514-1840, 46 The Fall of the Emirate: 1840, 48 The War of 1840 and the Caimacamat, The Social Revolution of 1858, 51

4

43

49

The Resistance and the War of 1860

53

General Background of the War of 1860, 54 The Evolution of the War, 55 Evaluation and Consequences, 57 The Mutassarrifiyya, 59 5

The National Movement and "Greater Lebanon" The Current for Greater Lebanon, 66 The Supporters of the Enlargement, 66 Justifications for a Greater Lebanon, 69 The Current for Smaller Lebanon, 70 The Supporters of the Petit Liban, 70 Arguments in Favor of a Smaller Lebanon, Conclusion, 72

PART 2

6

7

71

T H E RISE O F NATIONALISM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN E T H N I C CLAIM

75

Under the Republic of 1926 and the National Pact of 1943 The The The The The

Preconstitutional Period: 1920-1926, Constitution of 1926, 81 Crisis of 1936, 83 "Independentist" Coalition, 85 National Pact of 1943, 87

65

77

77

The Precarious Independent Entity: 1943-1975 The Battle of Independence: 1943, 93 The Isolation of the Christian Ethnic Current, 95 Political Arabization, 97 The Internal War of 1958, 98 Shehabism and Opposition: 1958-1970, 100

93

¡X

CONTENTS

Escalating Ethnic Threats, 101 Islands of Christian Resistance, 104 The First Clashes: 1969-1975, 105 8

The War of 1975

109

The Two Years War: 1975-1976, 110 Arab Solution and Christian Reaction: 1977, 112 The Syrian-Christian War: 1978-1982, 113 9

Development of the Ethnonationalist Claim Since 1975

119

Before the War: A Minority Claim, 119 Since the War: A Growing Platform, 123 The Monk Orders, 124 Neo-Phalangists and Neo-Liberals, 125 The Guardians of the Cedars, 126 The Lebanese Front: Senior Intellectuals, 126 The Christian Nationalist Current, 127 The Legitimization of the Ethnic Claim, 127 The Convention ofSaidet el-Bir, 128 Media Diffusion, 128 The Graffiti Phenomenon, 129 The Historical Document of the Lebanese Front, 130 Ethnic Socialization of the Community, 130 Conclusion, 131 PART 3

10

THE FALL OF THE RESISTANCE: ETHNIC INDECISIONS AND CIVIL WAR, 1982-1990

Ethnic Indecisions: 1982-1985 The 1982 Dramas, 142 State Versus Resistance, 144 Israel's Syndrome: The May 17th Accord, 145 The Christian Defeats: The War of the Mountain, The Phalangist Ghetto, 147

11

The Era of the Intifadas: 1985-1988 The Intifada of March 12, 152 The May 8 Intifada, 152 The January 15 Intifada, 153 Toward Bipolarization: Army and Militia, 154

137 141

146

151

CONTENTS

X

12

The Christian Civil War: January 31-October 13, 1990

157

Background on the Opponents, 158 Tensions and Initiatives, 160 The War of Liberation, 161 Ta'if Agreement: Fall of 1989, 162 Initiatives for Political Alternatives, 163 The Irreversible Escalation, 164 The Outbreak of the Christian Civil War: January 31, 1990, 165 The Military Aspect of the War, 165 The Political Evolution, 168 The Final Blow, 169 Geagea: Shifting Alliance, 169 Aoun: Strategic Mistakes, 170 Asad: The Historical Momentum, 171 The United States: Saddam's Priority, 171 The Blockade and the Invasion, 172 13

Analytical Perspectives

179

The Inherent Factors, 179 The Comparative Factors, 185 14

Conclusion: Whither Christian Lebanon?

195

Consequences of the Christian Civil War, 195 The Legitimacy of the Ethnic Claim, 198 The Lebanese Christian Resistance and the United States, 201 The Latest Indications of the Resistance, 204 Lessons for Future Use, 205 Epilogue: The Ta'if Age 1991: The Ta'if Regime Expands, The Resistance Goes into Exile, 213 1992: The Year of the Syrian-Controlled Legislature, 1993: The Year of the Phased Anschluss, 216 1994: The End of Hope? 217 A New Era, 221

Bibliography Index About the Book and the Author

211

214

225 243 251

Maps

1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 4.1 5.1 6.1 8.1 10.1 10.2 12.1 12.2 14.1

The Middle East: Modern States The Middle East: Pre-Arab Conquest The Middle East: Arab-Islamic Conquest The Middle East: Ethnic Minorities Geographical Lebanon First Mardaite State Second Mardaite State Third Mardaite State The Emirate The Caimacamat Regime The Mutassarrifiyya Greater Lebanon Communal Lebanon Lebanon's War ( 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 7 8 ) Lebanon's War ( 1 9 7 8 - 1 9 9 0 ) Beirut, Lebanon Christian Civil War Syrian Invasion South Lebanon

xi

10 12 13 24 30 34 36 37 47 50 60 67 78 114 139 143 167 174 206

Introduction: Rethinking the Lebanese Conflict

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the field of international studies has increasingly focused on the demands of new nationalities and ethnic strife among vying groups. The proliferation of separatist republics, the interethnic conflicts in many parts of Eurasia, and the impact these phenomena can have on world politics have generated intensive research on ethnic nationalism. Recent works on ethnic conflict have established comprehensive analysis on these issues. 1 The core of such works is not new, as the field of nationalities studies has long been active. Since the beginning of this century, academics of history, sociology, political science, public law, and, of course, international relations have written such material in abundance, packaged under various names: nations, nationalism, national identity, and, more recently, ethnicity. In recent years, the definition of an "ethnic group" has evolved considerably. Today, social scientists admit that an ethnic group can take on many aspects of nationalism. Some authors would argue that ethnonationalism is a form of nationalism. 2 This broader level of analysis attempts to classify ethnic conflict and introduces informative notions on ethnic elites and ethnic masses. Rejecting the rigid classical approaches, recent findings assert, for example that "ethnic groups are considered peoples, nations, nationalities, minorities, tribes, or communities, according to different contexts and circumstances." 3 With the onset of the East-West confrontation at the end of World W a r II, these concepts were subordinated to the bipolar thinking that analyzed global issues in terms of right versus left, capitalist versus communist, or the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d w o r l d v e r s u s the T h i r d W o r l d . W h i l e m a j o r m e d i a sources stationed their correspondents in M o s c o w or Washington, nationalist and ethnic conflicts, sometimes barely covered by the Fourth Estate, continued or began in many areas. 4 Even the basic claims of actors in an ethnic conflict sometimes differed: linguistic c l a i m s , such as in B e l g i u m and Q u e b e c ; a u t o n o m o u s 1

2

INTRODUCTION

demands in the case of the Corses and Basques; nationalistic revindication in Eritrea; minority stakes for the Cypriot Turks or the Kurds of Iraq; and r e l i g i o u s - p o l i t i c a l c a s e s , as in N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , s o u t h e r n S u d a n , and Lebanon. 5 A l t h o u g h their battle cry m a y have been p r o m p t e d by a p a r t i c u l a r claim, as shown above, most ethnic-nationalist movements embody a wide platform of political, cultural, economic, and social revindication, integrated into a central claim based on the right of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 6 Since W o o d r o w W i l s o n ' s e n u n c i a t i o n of t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s in t h e L e a g u e of Nations through the debates surrounding various universal declarations, including those of the United Nations (UN), the right for self-determination has been fully recognized by the international community. The content, however, of this right is still debated and has no universally agreed-upon interpretation. Ironically, international leaders and the U N generally o p p o s e separatism and secession as an implementation of self-determination. Ethnic movements, nonetheless, usually try to obtain independence on those grounds. Professor Uri Ra'anan, in his article "The Nation-State Fallacy," demonstrates the complicity between the international system and the central governments in opposing the right of selfdetermination to ethnic and nationality groups, even though (or perhaps because) the overwhelming majority of the world-state community is multiethnic. 7 Predictably, the central governments of the "shattered" states are against the ethnic demands and the conflict they create, citing other universally recognized concepts needed to keep international order: territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and national integration. Examples of the latter can be found in Nigeria, Iraq, Cyprus, Sudan, and the Philippines. In some lesser-known cases, the state has even denied the presence of such a claim because it d i d n ' t a c k n o w l e d g e the existence of the ethnic g r o u p itself. Lack of acknowledgment is the official policy, for example, of the Iraqi Arabs toward the Assyrians and the Egyptian Muslims toward the Copts. A c o m m o n thread in both cases is the nature of the governments under which they live; dominant Arab-Islamic powers that exclude the possibility of political existence for non-Arab, non-Muslim groups. 8 One of the most inextricable cases is the Lebanese labyrinth in which religion, identity, culture, and many other factors melt together into a multidimensional crisis, w h e r e the c l a i m s and even identification of those behind them are not easily discerned. 9 In effect, since the outbreak of the W a r of L e b a n o n in 1975, the conflict has often defied clear definition. Social scientist Paul Starr, writing on ethnic stratification in L e b a n o n , underlined that "Lebanon has been studied more than any other Arab country, but there remains little precise information regarding the size, economic status, and many other characteristics of the several groups which compose the society." 1 0

INTRODUCTION

3

Both Lebanese politicians and international media contributed to the obfuscation through distortions or oversimplifications. Throughout the war of 1975-1990 in Lebanon, commentators sought to find comfortable labels or r e f e r e n c e s to the conflict by calling it a right-wing versus l e f t - w i n g struggle, religious strife, or a fascist-progressive clash. To further complicate comprehension, the West also attributes ownership of the atrocities to h y p h e n a t e d e t h n i c l a b e l s , s u c h as C h r i s t i a n - M u s l i m or L e b a n e s e Palestinian, or, lately, Maronite-Syrian. T h e final political picture of the war was a mosaic unclear to most observers. Indeed, journalistic publications about Lebanon took contradictive approaches and further erred by not attempting to reference the roots of the c o n f l i c t . Le Martyr du Liban of 1977 by Thierry D e s J a r d i n s w a s among the first examples of "sloganization" of L e b a n o n ' s drama. Issues are presented by the French correspondent as a conflict between the right wing and the left w i n g . " Since his publication, dozens of essays have fostered the Marxist analysis of this essentially ethnic struggle. Few investigative books in the West or in the Middle East have dealt with the roots of the Lebanese crisis, in contrast to the prolific literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other examples of the chaotic perception of the Lebanese case also use popular oversimplification when authors present the Lebanese Christians as a class of mercantile politicians, excluding any reference to their historical or ethnic background. Some best-sellers published in America present the story f r o m a Western viewpoint, barely mentioning the history of the region and centuries of struggle. T h e stereotypical view toward Lebanese politics has even survived the post-Soviet era and the ethnic explosion worldwide that has followed. Despite recent academic findings, some prominent Western publishers are still dependent on obsolete "expertise" on L e b a n o n . Even in the nineties, when the real agendas of L e b a n o n ' s factions are clearer, a number of journalists-turned-experts are writing essays and books that gloss over L e b a n o n ' s historical precedence and its interpretive value. Prestigious printing houses in the United States publish authors who single out one of many factors to explain the complex ethnic-religious problems of Lebanon. Rare attempts at clarity, however, have been made in the past. In the midseventies German journalist Harold Vocke wrote The Lebanese War. He was among the first Western journalists to underscore the importance of the classical historical complexity of this Mediterranean country, as well as its role in the region today. "Christian Lebanon is emerging unexpectedly as a new political factor in the Eastern Mediterranean," he states. 1 2 His inclusion of the h i s t o r i c a l b a c k g r o u n d on this e t h n i c c o n f l i c t is m o r e insightful than the analysis that dominates the media. In reality, the War of Lebanon can be traced to specific occurrences in history. A functional approach to L e b a n o n ' s conflict may shed some light

4

INTRODUCTION

in two ways. First, analysis should include a review of the internal structure of the conflict. Next, one must examine the closely related external structure of the conflict. These perspectives reveal that the fundamental causal explanations of the war reside in permanent factors related to history, religion, ethnicity, and nationality. "Ethnic affiliation" indicates the intermingled religious-nationalist identity of the various Lebanese groups. Paul Starr wrote in this regard that "because of the ascribed nature of sectarian identities in the Middle East, and because the members of religious groups consider themselves alike due to their common ancestry and are so regarded by others, the terms 'ethnic group' and 'ethnic identity' will be used." 1 3 The Lebanese conflict (historical and modern) is an ethnic conflict that pits two m a j o r national-religious groups, the Christian and the Muslim c o m m u n i t i e s , against each other. This assertion is widely r e c o g n i z e d despite external factors. Enver Khoury, a political scientist, writes that "the primary divisions in Lebanon are along religious lines. Sectarian feelings are intense." 1 4 Since Lebanon's independence in 1943, political tensions and crises mounted, with increased confrontations over issues like Arab League membership in 1945 or the onset of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948. The first armed internal conflict erupted in 1958 between those backing Arab nationalism (embodied by Egyptian president Nasser) and those who saw themselves as part of the West, in alliance with France and Great Britain. Other clashes were spurred by the presence of Palestinian guerrillas from 1968 through 1973. By far the largest conflict occurred in the midseventies, with the onset of full-scale internecine warfare. In the context of this confrontation, the Lebanese Christians proffered what to the West was a new articulation of their political agenda. Harold Vocke was one of the first authors to present the case of the Lebanese Christians in the West, and he described them as "an endangered community." 1 5 In reality the new claim was a resurgence of past revindication, expressed by the nebulous groups of the "Lebanese Christian resistance." This very hot topic in Lebanese affairs, seen by many as critical to understanding the strategic evolution of the conflict in 1975, both internally and externally, became the political crossroad to the multiple venues of the country's future. Is Lebanon a nation-state, a binational state, a homogeneous state, or a part of a larger nation? These questions were articulated about Lebanon long before those raised about the "new" nationalities of the former Soviet Union. An early presentation of the ethnic structure of the Lebanese population as a political issue can be found in jurist-essayist Jean Salem's book Le Peuple Libanais.16 In contrast, French social scientist Pierre Rondot has repeatedly suggested a class-rooted explanation of the conflict in his writings. 17 Many observers of the Middle East stress that this region still lives in

INTRODUCTION

5

the past. Its p r o b l e m s and a s p i r a t i o n s h a v e b e e n similar f o r c e n t u r i e s . Lebanon is one of the clearest examples of a conflict with an undeniable connection to its historical background. Sociologist Hanna Kassis wrote in 1985: Not without pessimism, I suggest that the scene in Lebanon today is not new. The weapons are more sophisticated and abundant. More important, the media allow us to be participating observers to a tragedy that is inevitable, given the determination of the "peoples" of Lebanon to maintain and defend their regional ethnicities. 18 In one of the conflict's major actors, the Christian community, one finds political behavior and a perception of the future largely based on preceding centuries. Since the eruption of conflict in Lebanon in 1975, the Christians have actively demonstrated their attachment to their identity and the unique position they have held in Lebanon and the region. Their major political and military organizations, as well as a number of intellectuals, have proposed the concept of a " L e b a n e s e resistance" or, m o r e clearly, the " L e b a n e s e Christian resistance," as a label for the collective efforts of this M i d d l e Eastern ethnicity to preserve its identity. This national resistance, mostly directed toward the Arab threat (Palestinian, Syrian, and radical Islamist), was the political and ideological basis of the Lebanese Christian struggle during the war. This text will attempt to establish the historical roots of the Lebanese Christian resistance. It begins in Lebanon, in the middle of the seventh century, with the formation of a local resistance to the Arab invasion in the area known as Mount Lebanon. This excavation into the region's historical development will demonstrate how modern political and ideological currents in Lebanon come from the past. This review will also bring additional insight into t h e g e n e r a l study of the C h r i s t i a n n a t i o n a l m o v e m e n t in Lebanon. Such clarifications are needed if one is to understand the shortcomings of a m o d e r n thesis f o u n d in the M i d d l e East that r e j e c t s the idea of a Lebanese Christian nationalism. This revisionism is mainly popular among the Arabists, w h o deny the existence, both historical and m o d e r n , of a Lebanese Christian opposition to the Arab identity in the region. In our political terminology, "Arabists" are those authors, Arabs or Westerners, who espouse the Arab nationalist ideology, and reject the existence of nonA r a b n a t i o n a l i t i e s w i t h i n t h e A r a b s t a t e s . 1 9 T h e y p r o f e s s that n e i t h e r Lebanon nor its Christians populations ever enjoyed an independent history. Such claims are false. The Arabist political and ideological movement is successfully extending the denial of a separate Lebanese Christian identity into important his-

6

INTRODUCTION

torical m e d i u m s , a trend that can h a v e o m i n o u s implications for not only social scientists, but also for the minorities they seek to negate. 2 0 Indeed, m o s t A r a b h i s t o r y b o o k s , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e o f f i c i a l l y s a n c t i o n e d by t h e L e b a n e s e authorities since the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the Ta'if A g r e e m e n t in 1989, blatantly o m i t an important period in L e b a n o n ' s history. It must be m o r e than c o i n c i d e n c e that editors for these Arabist editions a p p e a r to be glossing over the several hundred years during which the L e v a n t witnessed the e m e r g e n c e of a L e b a n e s e Christian resistance in M o u n t L e b a n o n . T h e lack of easily accessible material on this topic in the W e s t and the fact that these historical accounts m a y even b e c o m e unobtainable in L e b a n o n m a k e this subject all the m o r e important. F o l l o w i n g t h e r e v i e w of the h i s t o r i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of t h e C h r i s t i a n L e b a n e s e m o v e m e n t , this text will cover the various claims of this group, p r o v i d i n g a n e w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of m o d e r n L e b a n o n ' s c o n f l i c t s . M a j o r events such as the declaration of the L e b a n e s e constitution, the negotiation of a national pact, and the decision to j o i n the A r a b L e a g u e will be analytically scrutinized, b e y o n d the classic studies of L e b a n o n ' s identity undertaken by m a n y in the past. T h e b o o k will additionally attempt to explain the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n of 1 9 7 5 a n d its e t h n i c r o o t s . M o r e o v e r , w e will broadly d e f i n e the ideological u n d e r p i n n i n g s of the spec i f i c e t h n i c c l a i m a n d a n a l y z e the m u l t i p l e c u r r e n t s within the political thought of the L e b a n e s e Christians. T h e a n a l y s i s w i l l a l s o d e a l w i t h t h e f a i l u r e of t h e C h r i s t i a n s of L e b a n o n to realize their nationalist claim, f r o m the sociopolitical clashes to fatal decisions (and indecision) that led to the irreversible escalation toward the Christian civil war. T h e i r fall f r o m g r a c e and its incalculable conseq u e n c e s will be e x a m i n e d . T h e conclusion will assess the c o n s e q u e n c e s of the r e s i s t a n c e ' s recent failure. Finally, it p r o j e c t s the p r o b a b l e e v o l u t i o n of the r e m n a n t s of the L e b a n e s e Christian resistance for the i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e and the long term. T h e e f f e c t s t h a t t h i s t o p i c m i g h t h a v e o n t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n in L e b a n o n is crucial on m a n y levels. First, it will help explain nationalist attitude of m a n y L e b a n e s e Christians during the recent conflict. S e c o n d , it will describe the historical basis f o r the L e b a n e s e Christian nationalism. Third, it will h e l p a s s e s s t h e l e g i t i m a c y of the r e c i d i v i s t a s p i r a t i o n s of m a n y Christians in m o d e r n L e b a n o n . T h i s s t u d y is an a t t e m p t to c h a l l e n g e c u r r e n t L e b a n e s e s t u d i e s by e s t a b l i s h i n g a c o m p r e h e n s i v e e x p l a n a t i o n of e v e n t s and a i m e d at a new analytical a p p r o a c h of L e b a n o n ' s ethnic strife. S u c h an a p p r o a c h will facilitate an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the c o m p l e x struggle of the L e b a n e s e Christians as a national g r o u p by presenting their claims and behaviors toward those outside their g r o u p as well as their m a n y internal contradictions. L e b a n o n can serve as a m o d e l for study of varieties of ethnic conflicts

INTRODUCTION

7

and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o f f e r insights that can be p r o j e c t e d into the r e a l m of similar c o n f l i c t s f r o m the f o r m e r Y u g o s l a v i a to the r e p u b l i c s of C e n t r a l Asia. A s a case study in ethnic conflict, m o r e o v e r , the reader should find that this analysis will shed light on international studies in general and M i d d l e Eastern studies in particular. T h o s e interested in social sciences, for academic or personal reasons, will also a c q u i r e an additional analytical instrum e n t with w h i c h they can seek u n d e r s t a n d i n g and solution to w o r l d w i d e problems.

NOTES 1. One work that covers various aspects of ethnicity as a growing factor in international relations is by Naomi Chazan, (ed.), Irredentism and International Politics, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991). Also, for discussions of the state of international law toward these kinds of conflicts, see James Anaya, "The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims," Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 13, (1991), 403-411. 2. On ethnic nationalism see Hudson Meadwell, "Ethnic Nationalism and Collective Choice Theory," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 22, No.2, (July 1989), 139-154. 3. See for example Rodolpho Stavenhagen, "Ethnic Conflicts and Their Impact on International Society" International Social Science Journal/International Conflict Research, (February 1991), 117-133. 4. See the comprehensive work of Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1990). Ryan covers many important topics such as: "Explaining Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension" and the "United Nations in Ethnic Conflict." The latter chapter, for example, discusses the attitude of the United Nations regarding the recognition of ethnic conflict as an interstate or international conflict. 5. For more on these issues, see Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 6. In his article "The Right to National Self-Determination" in Social Research, Vol. 58, No.3, (Fall 1991), 565-590, Yael Tamir establishes a model for the study of claims. He extensively refers to most nationalist and ethnic-nationalist movements. 7. In Joseph Montville, (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), 5-21. 8. For the Coptic case, see Shawki Karas, The Copts Since the Arab Invasion: Strangers in Their Land, (Jersey City, N.J.: American, Canadian, and Australian Coptic Associations, 1985). For the Assyrian case, see Sargon Dadesho, The Assyrians and the United Nations, (Modesto, Calif.: Beit-Nahrein Publications, 1986). 9. See for example Hanna Kassis's formulation of the Lebanese case complexity in his article "Religious Ethnicity in the World of Islam: The Case of Lebanon," International Political Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, (1985), 222-223. 10. In "Ethnic Categories and Identification in Lebanon," Urban Life, Vol. 7, No. 1, (April 1978), 113.

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INTRODUCTION

11. Thierry Des Jardins, Le Martyr du Liban (The Martyrdom of Lebanon), (Paris: Pion, 1977). 12. Harold Vocke, The Lebanese War: Its Origins and Political Dimensions, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), vii. 13. In Paul Starr, "Ethnic Categories," op. cit., 114. 14. In The Crisis in the Lebanese System, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), 9. 15. In Harold Vocke, The Lebanese War, op. cit. 16. Jean Salem Le Peuple Libanais (the Lebanese People), (Beirut: Librairie Samir, 1968). 17. See P i e r r e R o n d o t , Les Institutions Politiques au Liban: Des Communautés Traditionelles a l'Etat Moderne (The Political Institutions of Lebanon: From Traditional Communities to the Modern State), (Paris: Institut d'Etudes de l'Orient Contemporain, 1947); also "Les Structures Socio-Politiques de la Société Libanaise" (The Sociopolitical Structures of the Lebanese Society), Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1954), 80-104; "Breves Reflexions sur l'Evolution des Structures Libanaises" (Brief Reflections on the Evolution of the Lebanese Structures), Orient, Vol. 14, (1960), 27-31. 18. Hanna Kassis, "Religious Ethnicity," op. cit., 228. 19. For more see Walid Phares, the chapter "Al-Arabi Wal-Urubi" (An Arab and Arabist) in Al-Fikr al-Massihi al-Dimuqrati al-Lubnani (The Lebanese Christian Democratic Thought), (Beirut: Dar El-Sharq al-Massihi, 1981). 20. On the political roots and objectives of the Arabist movement in the United States, see Robert D. Kaplan, The Arabists: The Romance for an American Elite, (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

Part 1

Regional Environment and Historical Background

The region k n o w n as the M i d d l e E a s t is also referred to in other terms; it is s o m e t i m e s called the Orient, L e v a n t , the N e a r East, S o u t h e a s t Asia, and even the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n . Traditionally, most geographers, political scientists, a n d m o d e r n h i s t o r i a n s i n c l u d e the f o l l o w i n g c o u n t r i e s in the M i d d l e E a s t : T u r k e y , Iran, Iraq, the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a ( i n c l u d i n g S a u d i Arabia, Y e m e n , Kuwait, and the various emirates), Jordan, Syria, L e b a n o n , Israel, Egypt, and Sudan. 1 E t h n i c and religious similarities stretch the d e f i nition of the " M i d d l e E a s t " f r o m A r a b North A f r i c a to the T u r k o p h o n e and Iranophile regions of central Asia.

NOTE 1. See Peter Mansfield, "From Ancient to Modern: Introduction" in A History of the Middle East, (New York: Viking, 1991), 1-5.

9

1 Arab Domination and Mideast Resistance

W h e n did the countries of the region d e v e l o p the links that today help t h e m f o r m a collective g r o u p ? Unanimously, M i d d l e Eastern historians d r a w the starting line at the seventh century A.D., the period of the Islamic conquest. Prior to that era, the region of the Fertile C r e s c e n t was inhabited by preA r a b p o p u l a t i o n s s u c h as the C o p t s of E g y p t , the A s s y r o - C h a l d e a n s of M e s o p o t a m i a , the A r a m e a n s of Syria and L e b a n o n , the H e b r e w s of old Palestine, the A r m e n i a n s of Asia M i n o r , and other, s m a l l e r g r o u p s (See M a p 1.1). In A.D. 6 3 6 A r a b M u s l i m soldiers crushed the B y z a n t i n e a r m y at Y a r m u k 1 and invaded the M i d d l e East. F r o m that vantage point they marched through North A f r i c a into Spain and reached the borders of India through Persia (see M a p 1.2).

THE ARAB-ISLAMIC CONQUEST T h e A r a b - I s l a m i c Fateh (conquest), had a m a j o r i m p a c t on the r e g i o n ' s destiny and i d e n t i t y . 2 T h e c o n q u e r o r i m p o s e d a new religion on the a u t o c h t h o n o u s people, i m p l e m e n t i n g a fast and irreversible " I s l a m i z a t i o n " of the mostly Christian, Jewish, and A n i m i s t M i d d l e East. Millions of conquered people, first in the cities and then t h r o u g h o u t the rural areas, had to choose between three options: 1. First, to a d h e r e to Islam, w h i c h w o u l d g u a r a n t e e t h e m the s a m e rights as the A r a b citizens. 2. S e c o n d , to m a i n t a i n their o w n r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , but d e p r i v e d of their political, social, and cultural rights. This latter option, k n o w n as the Dhimmi status, required the p a y m e n t of a s u p p l e m e n t a l tax called Jizya. The tax was s u p p o s e d to guarantee the protection of J e w s and Christians living under M u s l i m rule. 3 T h e status of n o n - M u s l i m s under Islam has been

11

ARAB DOMINATION & MIDEAST RESISTANCE

13

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REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT & HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

detailed in the w e l l - d o c u m e n t e d book of Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi. Ye'or a n d other M i d d l e Eastern scholars h a v e recently published a large n u m b e r of texts and articles on the subject. 4 3. T h e third option w a s confrontational: the coercion of Islam by the s w o r d . T h e c o n q u e r e d p e o p l e w e r e f o r c e d to accept the new r e l i g i o n ; if they did not, they were either " e l i m i n a t e d " or forced to leave the area. 5 Within a f e w decades, f o r m i d a b l e assimilation pressures forced the m a j o r i ty of the i n d i g e n o u s m a s s e s f r o m the C a s p i a n to the M e d i t e r r a n e a n into Islam. 6 In a d d i t i o n to r e l i g i o u s c o e r c i o n , I s l a m i z a t i o n i n c l u d e d the i m p o s i tion of t h e e t h n i c , c u l t u r a l , a n d l i n g u i s t i c identity of t h e A r a b s . T h u s , " A r a b i z a t i o n " a c c o m p a n i e d the s p r e a d of Islam, albeit w i t h i n a s m a l l e r g e o g r a p h i c a l r e g i o n . 7 T h e e x p a n s i o n of M u s l i m l i f e r e a c h e d C h i n a , B o r n e o , and the A t l a n t i c A f r i c a n shores, w h e r e a s the A r a b identity w a s i m p o s e d f r o m w e s t e r n M e s o p o t a m i a ( t o d a y ' s Iraq) to the A n d a l u s ( n o w Spain). T h e A r a b c o n q u e r o r s used their b u r e a u c r a t i c p o w e r to r e p l a c e local c u l t u r e s a n d l a n g u a g e s , s u c h as t h o s e of the C o p t i c , A s s y r o - C h a l d e a n , A r a m a i c , a n d H e b r e w p e o p l e . T h e p r o c e s s of a s s i m i l a t i o n , w h i c h t o o k d e c a d e s in s o m e areas and c e n t u r i e s in others, s u c c e e d e d in c r e a t i n g an A r a b sphere of cultural p r e d o m i n a n c e . A s the n e w t o n g u e was imposed, progressively national languages of the c o n q u e r e d p e o p l e were in retreat throughout the M i d d l e East. By the fourteenth century, A r a b i c had b e c o m e the language of the region with only small and f r a g m e n t e d minorities resisting. 8

THE OTTOMAN INVASION T h e O t t o m a n s invaded Syria in 1514 and gradually took over the f o r m e r wilayat (provinces) of the A r a b caliphate f r o m the M a m e l u k e dynasty. T h e n e w e m p i r e i m p o s e d the T u r k i s h t o n g u e on the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , but l e f t Arabic as the d o m i n a n t p o p u l a r l a n g u a g e in its Near Eastern provinces. For four centuries the D h i m m i p e o p l e f o u n d themselves under multilayers of sociopolitical p r e s s u r e : the A r a b sociocultural assimilation, the O t t o m a n political and colonial d o m i n a t i o n , and the caliphate M u s l i m - S u n n i rule. At this point a r e v i e w of the b a c k g r o u n d of the various nationalist and ethnic ideologies is warranted, including those of the A r a b nationalists and Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s . C l o s e attention to A r a b and n o n - A r a b relations is needed, as they c o n s t i t u t e the basis of the regional f r a m e w o r k o n e f i n d s today.

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15

ARAB NATIONALISM The emergence of Arab nationalism was boosted by three major factors: First was the Ottoman decline since the mid-nineteenth century, after the increase of European involvement in domestic affairs of the crumbling empire. The Homme Malade of contemporary world politics of the time was the inheritor of the great Arab-Islamic caliphate. 9 By failing to stop the Western penetration into the Arab-Islamic society, the Turks lost their legitimacy to Islamic power. 10 Second was the intellectual influence of the nationalist currents of nineteenth century Europe on Arab elites who were seeking change within their society. The tribe-like communities of the Arab-speaking world couldn't be transformed without this ideological tool. Third was the natural irredentist inclination of the Arab masses throughout the Ottoman Empire. They wanted to regain sovereignty over their land and reassert their pride in their history. 11 How ironic, then, was the fundamental ideological and political role of the Christians in forging the principles of Arab nationalism. Indeed, AlQawmiya al-Arabiya (Arab nationalism) was the product of the intense reflection and rhetoric of Syrian and Lebanese Christians. They played a significant role in the Arab renaissance movement. Yet references to their participation are still debated. Contemporary secular Arab nationalists, mostly leftists, assert that Arab nationalism can be pluralistic because of its Christian founders. 1 2 On the other hand, Lebanese Christians, Assyrians, and Copt nationalists argue that although Arab nationalism was formulated by Christians, the movement is in fact the property of the large Muslim Arab majority in the region. Some recent works go further, calling the Christian role in Arab revivalism a contribution to the culture of the dominator. Most of these theses explain that in order to escape the repression of the Islamic Ottoman sultanate, Christian intellectuals of the Mashreq (Orient) imported the concept of secular nationalism from Europe and presented to their fellow Muslim Arabs an alternative to the religious state: the nation-state. What they hoped to achieve was secular A r a b i s m , in which M u s l i m s and Christians would be equals, against a Turkish form of Islamism that excluded Dhimmis. 13 Arab nationalism was politically Islamized in spite of early Christian attempts to secularize it. Michel Aflak, founder of the Arab renaissance party, the Baath, bluntly stated in a well-known slogan: "Islam is to Arabism what bones are to flesh." 1 4 As devised by its early thinkers, A1 Qawmiya al-Arabiya had a mission: "Unite the Arab nation and liberate the Arab land." 15 But little was done to define the limits of its implementation. Questions remained: who is

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REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT & HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

an Arab, who belongs to the Arab nation, and which territories are to be included? These unsettled breaches in the Arab nationalist thought brought about a long-standing series of conflicts with the non-Arab nations of the region, particularly with the Jewish people over their homeland, the Kurds over their self-determination, the Iranians and the Turks over disputed territories, and the Christians of Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon over their national identities. Arab nationalism was promoted by various ideological and political currents in the Arab Middle East. Symbolically praised by the Hachemites of Hejaz as well as others during the first two decades of this century, the movement was relayed by Al-Qawmiyun al-Arab (the Arab nationalists), an organized, educated, and activist current, which gave birth later to the mainstream political forces of Arab nationalism in the region. 1 6 The political derivatives of the Qawmiyun became Nasserism, partisans of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser; Baathists, in control in Damascus and Baghdad; the Algerian National Liberation Front; and the nebulous Arab revolutionary current, which was embodied by the most radical f a c t i o n s in the A r a b w o r l d , s u c h as the P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n Organization (PLO) and militant Arab leftist organizations. The historical implementation of Arab nationalism, in a sociopolitical context void of democracy and modernization, pushed the Qawmiyun to adopt a confrontational trend. First was a perpetual tension with the West, which they labeled "neocolonialist and imperialist," laying the basis for many conflicts such as the Suez War in 1956, 17 the oil embargo in 1973, and the Gulf W a r in 1991. The second direction, which constitutes the framework of our research, is vis-à-vis non-Arab nations in the region such as the Jewish state and the minorities within the Arab countries.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM In addition to the ethnic dividing line between Arabs and non-Arabs, another confrontational dimension erupted in the region with a universal message: The Ussouliya al-Islamiya, or Islamic fundamentalism. This movement has different doctrinal sources and various field partisans. Called fundamentalist by some, radicalist by others, militant Islam is seeking to replace the allegiances of secular nationalism with combative religious doctrines. The political history of modern militant Islam actually starts with the Sunni Wahabi movement, which was later promoted by the Sa'ud clan. The Wahabis waged a war against Ottoman rule in Arabia from the mid-nineteenth century. 1 8 By the beginning of the twentieth century, a more ideological and organized current lead the movement toward a return to pure

ARAB DOMINATION & MIDEAST RESISTANCE

17

Islam: Muslim Brotherhood. Active in almost every A r a b country, the Ikhwan (brothers) and their derivatives came close to capturing the governments in Egypt and Syria, and lately have been very influential in Tunis, Sudan, Algeria, and Jordan. In 1979, Khomeini's revolution in Iran manifested a Shia version of I s l a m i c f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . The Jumhuria Islamiya (Islamic Republic) became the first revolutionary Islamic government in modern times. During the second Cold War, T e h e r a n ' s ideological hardliners p r o m o t e d and actively supported a full-scale jihad (holy war) against the "satanic" nonMuslim world, including both the United States and the Soviet Union. The jihad was not exclusively directed toward the outside world, but also internal threats, such as the non-Muslim presence in Dar al-Islam (Islamic zone). In sum, by seeking to restore an integrated Islamist society through the imposition of the Sharia (Islamic law), the Ussouliyun became the avant garde of the annihilation of non-Muslim groups of the region. Inheriting the legacy of thirteen centuries of history, twentieth century ethnic minorities of the M i d d l e East are challenged today by a coalition of intolerance e m b o d i e d by the reductionist A1 Q a w m i y a a l - A r a b i y a and the radical Ussouliya al-Islamiya.

MIDDLE EASTERN CHRISTIAN NATIONALISMS In the aftermath of the Arab-Muslim conquest of the Middle East, Christian presence diminished. From Armenia in the north of Asia Minor to the Nubian Nile, early Christianity flourished and its major cities constituted important centers for the Roman world. Since the Fatah, however, the Christian East shrunk in demography and its sociopolitical dimension. Pre-Muslim peoples of the Near East, such as the Assyro-Chaldeans, Copts, and A r a m a e a n s , had been C h r i s t i a n i z e d and s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by the Greco-Roman civilization. Yet by the seventh century, Arab-Muslim culture erupted in the region and sought to dominate the existing identities. T h e Christian resistance to the invaders varied f r o m case to case. Initial reactions to the conquest by Christians, particularly those who were o p p r e s s e d by the B y z a n t i n e E m p i r e , w e r e s o m e t i m e s n e u t r a l . S o m e Christians even helped the Arabs against Constantinople. 1 9 With time, however, even the latter suffered with the status of Dhimmis and the implementation of the "Conditions of Umar," or Al-Shurut al Umariya, which was the status imposed by Caliph Umar on non-Muslims after the Arab conquest. They mainly dealt with economic, social and political issues. Apart from losing their basic sociopolitical rights, Christians and Jews had

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REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT & HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

to pay an additional tax, Al-Jizyia, in order to be protected by the Islamic power. Those "protected citizens" under Islam were called D h i m m i s . 2 0 These rules placed Christians in an insecure position for centuries. From the seventh century on, four major groups attempted to resist the Fatah: the Copts of Egypt, the Assyrians of Iraq, the Armenians of Anatolia, and the Christians of Lebanon. In the nineteenth century, the southern Sudanese were yet another group to join the Christian ethnic resistance of the Middle East. The latter were forced to join when the Arab-Muslim power of northern Sudan tried to force southern Africa to assimilate. Communities such as Greek Catholics (Melkites), Greek Orthodox, Latins, Protestants, Syriacs, Chaldeans, and others do not have identifiable nationalist projects, per se, but they do have strong desires to create some that will respond to their historical needs and aspirations. The Maronites of Lebanon, for example, have almost incorporated their ethnic-nationalism goal within the larger Lebanese Christian nationalism. Yet the jury is still out for groups like the Armenians, whose ideas are integral to discussions about the Caucasian post-Soviet context. In the next section we will explore the Assyrian, Coptic, and southern Sudanese cases as ethnic-nationalist movements, taking into consideration their socioreligious affinities and trends. 21

THE ASSYRIAN STRUGGLE Inherited f r o m a n t i q u i t y ' s A s s y r o - C h a l d e a n and B a b y l o n i a n civilizations, A s s y r i a n n a t i o n a l i s m can be d e f i n e d as a p r e - A r a b , A r a m a i c , Mesopotamian ethnicity. The Christian people of today's Iraq are comprised of several c o m m u n i t i e s . The Kanissa al-Sharkiya, the Eastern Church, which is also known as Nestorian, is identified as the Assyrian church. This definition should be distinguished from the Assyrian ethnic identity. The Chaldeans, who are a group splintered from the Assyrians, are C a t h o l i c s . S o m e C h a l d e a n e l e m e n t s a d v a n c e the thesis of a s e p a r a t e Chaldean ethnic identity, to which mainstream Orthodox Assyrians answer that the difference between the two is strictly confessional, as between Orthodox and Catholics. Included in the latter are Syriacs, Melkites, Greek Catholics, and other, smaller groups. 2 2 As claimed by its theorists and representatives, Assyrian nationalism has had a continual struggle against Arab domination throughout the centuries. But it w a s n ' t until the 1920s that an organized movement with a defined claim emerged as a reaction to the collapsing Ottoman Empire. 2 3 As for their neighbors the Kurds, the Assyrians revindicated an independent territory in northern Mesopotamia. Despite the pleas of the regional ethnic groups with the West, the British implemented the Sykes-Picot

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a g r e e m e n t creating an A r a b - d o m i n a t e d state called Iraq, in which both Kurds and Assyrians became minorities. The Assyrian m o v e m e n t has been strongly repressed on many occasions by B a g h d a d ' s governments since the birth of modern Iraq. During the thirties, led by their patriarch Mar Shimun, the Assyrians revolted against the Arab authorities of Iraq several times. In the summer of 1933, m a j o r massacres were perpetrated against the Assyrians. 2 4 The Baath takeover of power in Baghdad increased the oppression against Assyrians on the basis of an ideological reductionist vision that calls for the Arabization of all ethnic communities in the country. By the mid-1960s and early seventies, the assimilation process became more encompassing when the central government denied the Assyrians the use of any reference to their cultural identity. Instead of recognizing them as A s s y r i a n s , t h e B a a t h i s t a u t h o r i t i e s i m p o s e d the d e n o t a t i o n " A r a b Christians" on their identity documents. 2 5 As a result, by the early seventies, massive emigration of Assyrians to the West occurred. From the diaspora, the Assyrians have organized a nationalist current that keeps contact with their national homeland in northern Iraq. In the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, the Assyrian aspirations for an autonomous entity received a boost when the West established a protected area in the north of the country. Writing on the "Assyrians: An Ancient People, a Perennial Struggle," historian Mordechai Nisan argued that an "intervention from the outside and upheaval within Iraq could e n h a n c e the c h a n c e s for Assyrian selfdetermination." 2 6 Profiting from being located in the vicinity of the Kurds, the Assyrians reformulated their demands: 1. Assyrian autonomy within the larger Kurdish autonomous entity, as a first step, which will be translated through an Assyrian contribution to Kurdish institutions. 2. A separate Assyrian ethnic state if the whole of Iraq is to be dismembered. Currently, the Assyrians in Iraq number about one million, and their diaspora worldwide is about the same number. Their central representative institution, equivalent of a parliament in exile, is the Assyrian National Congress (whose current president is Dr. Sargon Dadesho), based in the United States. In June 1992, five seats were assigned to the Assyrian community in the newly elected Kurdish Parliament in northern Iraq. The seats are controlled by the Assyrian Democratic Movement, the largest organization within Iraq. This step brings the Assyrian struggle closer to fulfillment of its o b j e c t i v e to be recognized as a national group. In the future, the Assyrian national m o v e m e n t is expected to continue to work toward an

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autonomous Assyria, historical seed for an independent and separate ethnic entity down the road.

THE COPTIC ORDEAL Between the Egyptian authorities who estimate their d e m o g r a p h y to be less than three million and the Christian opposition sources that elevate the n u m b e r to eighteen million, moderate sources estimate the Copts to be a r o u n d ten to t w e l v e m i l l i o n p e o p l e . O n e million of t h e s e live in the diaspora. L i k e the A s s y r i a n s , the Coptic people have p r e - A r a b roots. A f t e r the conquest of Egypt by the Muslim armies in A.D. 640, t w o t r e n d s d e v e l o p e d a m o n g the C h r i s t i a n C o p t s . At first, the i n d i g e n o u s Egyptians, long dominated by the Roman Byzantines, did not fiercely side with their old masters when the Arabs invaded the valley of the Nile. With the consolidation of the Fateh and the imposition of Islam, Coptic uprisings spread all over the country between A.D. 725 and A.D. 830. The longest one was Thawrat al-Bashmuryine (the revolution of the B a s h m u r s ) in 773, which took place in the Nile Delta for seven months. 2 7 After they were crushed by the Arabs, the Coptic resistance lost the ability to unleash a large-scale revolt. It s u c c e e d e d only in a few skirmishes with the new invaders afterward. A great number of the population converted to Islam, and the r e m a i n i n g Christian C o p t s b e c a m e a minority under the heavy weight of O m a r ' s conditions. Peter Mansfield wrote: "The Coptic language of the ancient Egyptians was progressively extinguished as the A r a b occupation changed into full-scale colonization and assimilation, although it survived at least until the seventeenth century." 2 8 In the early twentieth century, while Egypt was under British rule, the Coptic nation had the opportunity to obtain political recognition as a separate identity within the country. Yet the majority of the A r a b i z e d elite a c c e p t e d an " E g y p t i a n i d e n t i t y , " in d e f e r e n c e to the M u s l i m m a j o r i t y a m o n g w h o m they l i v e d . A n o t h e r g r o u p called f o r the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a distinct Coptic state, separate from the Arabs. In March 1910, 1,158 delegates attended a Coptic Congress in Assiout and presented a list of "Coptic claims." 2 9 The first current, which advocated the Wihda Wataniya (national unity), won the battle by allying itself with the Muslim political elite. Despite this loss the nationalist Coptic movement did not relent. 3 0 In 1953, under the leadership of a young lawyer, Ibrahim Hilal, the group l a u n c h e d a p o l i t i c a l party called Al-Umma al-Qobtiya, or t h e " C o p t i c Nation." Within a few days, the new organization had more than 90,000 members. T w o weeks later, Gamal Abdul Nasser's government dissolved

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21

the party, jailed its leadership, and forbade its activities. 3 1 After this repression, many activists emigrated to the West, where they founded an expatriate network. In Egypt, the constitution and laws have never recognized the existence of the coptic community. One example is their political underrepresentation in government. Indeed, although the community represents a fifth of the Egyptian population, it has only six seats in a parliament of 4 2 0 seats. Moreover, the holders of those seats are nominated by presidential decree; that is, handpicked by the majority. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt led to anti-Coptic pogroms in Cairo and various parts of the countryside. In 1981, President Anwar Sadat, in an attempt to appease Muslims u p s e t over the C a m p David A c c o r d s , o r d e r e d the i n c a r c e r a t i o n of the Coptic pope Shenouda III and denounced him for antigovernmental activities; Sadat alleged there had been a Coptic plan to establish a separate entity in Egypt. Sadat's repression led to an increase in the Coptic nationalist activities a m o n g exiled g r o u p s operating f r o m C h r i s t i a n East B e i r u t , A u s t r a l i a , Europe, and Canada, but mainly from the United States. 3 2 Currently, largescale fundamentalist attacks on Coptic quarters and villages are increasing despite the denials of Cairo's authorities. Chris Hedges wrote in a report to the New York Times, "in the last four months more than thirty people have been killed in Asyut Province, which embraces this town, including thirteen Christians massacred by militants one morning in May. Assaults on Christians and the burning of their houses and shops are a daily occurrence." 3 3 The Coptic nationalist opposition denounces the government and the Jama'a al-Islamiya (Islamic g r o u p i n g s ) , a c c u s i n g the M u s l i m - c o n trolled Egyptian state of a conspiracy against the Coptic nation. Yet, the Coptic Associations, led by Shawki Karras, do not openly call for a separate entity. Instead, the Coptic m o v e m e n t f o c u s e s on the h u m a n rights issues for the Copts in Egypt as well as their political, social, and cultural rights. One reason why they have not called for self-determination is the demographic situation of the Copts. Although they numerically constitute the largest Christian, non-Muslim, ethnic-nationality in the Middle East, the Coptic p e o p l e do not possess the strategic a d v a n t a g e of other, less numeric minorities in the region; a geographically h o m o g e n e o u s area of residence. Scattered all over the country, they can hardly claim, as the Kurds do, an enclave for a safe haven. "Any progress toward ethnic autonomy, minority equality, or territorial independence is unique," writes Nisan. "Alternatively, a major Arab-Israeli war leading to a devastating Egyptian loss might also constitute an opening for the Copts." 3 4 T h e U.S., Australian, Canadian, and E u r o p e a n Coptic A s s o c i a t i o n s have formed a World Coordination Committee for the Coptic Opposition

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M o v e m e n t abroad. 3 5 T h e American Coptic Association's headquarters is based in N e w Jersey in the United States.

THE SOUTHERN SUDANESE SAGA Four million A f r i c a n C h r i s t i a n s and n o n - M u s l i m s live in the s o u t h e r n provinces of Sudan. The north has been Islamized and Arabized with the successive waves of tribes marching from Egypt and Arabia. The advance of the Arabs into Sudan was facilitated after the Muslim victory over the African Sudanese Christian kingdoms in 1504. 36 The attempts to assimilate the south have created resistance among its population and ignited many revolts against K h a r t o u m ' s governments since the creation of the Sudanese entity in the late nineteenth century. Many of these uprisings were led by the Nilotic tribes, mainly the Dinka and Nuer. 3 7 In recent history, two revolutions were led by the South. The first one started in 1956 and was organized by the Anyanya movement in the sixties. It quickly spread in m o s t equatorial and southern districts. In 1972, an a g r e e m e n t was reached with the central g o v e r n m e n t to f r e e z e the confrontation and discuss autonomy for the African non-Arab zones. 3 8 Yet, the Anyanya insurrection lost its steam for regional reasons. Their traditional ally, Ethiopia (whose imperial government of Haile Selassie had been overturned by Marxists), concluded an entente with Sudan in which the latter agreed to stop its support to the Eritrean guerillas in exchange for similar Ethiopian conduct with the southern Sudanese revolt. 3 9 In 1983, as a reaction to a vast campaign of Islamization initiated by Khartoum, a second southern uprising was led by the Sudanese Popular L i b e r a t i o n A r m y ( S P L A ) , a m i l i t a r y b r a n c h of the S u d a n e s e P o p u l a r Liberation Front (SPLF), under the leadership of Colonel John Garang. This second r e v o l u t i o n a c h i e v e d s i g n i f i c a n t field success. Most of the southern provinces of the country fell under the control of the SPLA. 4 0 It was more organized and efficient than the former Ananya, and its political agenda had also shifted. Whereas the first movement called for the separation of the South as a m e a n s to self-determination, G a r a n g ' s c o m m a n d went further and called for a Pan-Sudanese revolution to bring down the ruling power in Khartoum. 4 1 Diverging greatly from its original roots as a local ethnic-nationalist liberation movement, G a r a n g ' s expanded mission was both radical and untenable. Believed to be suicidal by a number of other South Sudanese elements, Garang's attitude led to a split within the SPLA-SPLF. On the one hand, a dissident wing, led by Dr. Ryek Machar, reaffirmed the initial objective of the g u e r r i l l a s to o b t a i n t h e r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r the South. G a r a n g ' s wing, on the other hand, pursued the same Pan-Sudanese revolutionary trend. The internal civil war in the South gave an opportunity to the

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A r a b N o r t h to r e n e w its o f f e n s i v e . Profiting f r o m support f r o m Iran, 4 2 as well as L i b y a and Syria, the new Islamist g o v e r n m e n t of K h a r t o u m recaptured m a n y strategic strongholds, such as the t o w n of Torit, and m a r c h e d into the southern hinterland. C u r r e n t l y , the southern S u d a n e s e resistance m o v e m e n t is facing a m a j o r threat of reduction and is a l m o s t isolated. 4 3 T h e southern S u d a n e s e case constitutes another battleground b e t w e e n A r a b nationalism r e i n f o r c e d by Islamic f u n d a m e n t a l i s m and local ethnicnationalist resistance. It is illustrative of the nature of the ethnic strife, the role of the elite, and the i m p a c t of internal d i s s e n s i o n s . " T h i s p e r i o d of rebellion m a y have s t o p p e d , " said one W e s t e r n d i p l o m a t in K h a r t o u m , "but this is not the end of the conflict. T h e g r i e v a n c e of the southerners are not only real, they are getting worse. A n d until those grievances are m e t there will be no final resolution." 4 4 (See M a p 1.3.)

C O M P A R A T I V E ANALYSIS A n o v e r v i e w of the global c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n m a j o r i t i e s and minorities in the M i d d l e East clearly reveals both reductionist trends for the first category and an irredentist inclination for the second. T h e e x a m p l e s of T u r k e y v e r s u s K u r d i s h m i n o r i t i e s , Iran v e r s u s K u r d s a n d A r a b s , a n d the A r a b states in their treatment of n o n - A r a b ethnic groups reinforce the e x a m p l e s given here. A l s o s i g n i f i c a n t , t h o u g h not d i s c u s s e d yet, is the c a s e of a r u l i n g minority toward a contained m a j o r i t y , such as the case of the A l a w i t e s visà-vis the Sunnis in Syria. T h e ruling g r o u p e s p o u s e s the ethnic ideology of the m a j o r i t y , A r a b i s m , a n d u s e s the s a m e r e p r e s s i v e m e t h o d s u s e d by Sunnis when they were in p o w e r in the region. T h e s e patterns of social and ideological b e h a v i o r s can be c o m p a r e d with other regional m o d e l s such as what is occurring in the Balkans. T h e Y u g o s l a v i a n case is one of the clearest e x a m p l e s , as ethnic conflict today openly calls for "ethnic c l e a n s i n g . " T h i s a p p r o a c h is a similar c o n c e p t to the Arabization practiced by all A r a b g o v e r n m e n t s w h e n dealing with their ethnic minorities, f r o m B a g h d a d to K h a r t o u m . T h e n o n - A r a b nationalist m o v e m e n t s , particularly the Christian ethnic r e s i s t a n c e , o f f e r s e v e r a l l e s s o n s that will be h e l p f u l in the study of t h e L e b a n e s e Christian resistance: 1. All of the cases e x a m i n e d , (including the A r m e n i a n case, w h i c h w e d i d n ' t cite a m o n g the e x a m p l e s ) , are intrinsically g r o u n d e d in history. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l factor of c h a n g e is the eruption of the A r a b Islamic conquest and its relation with i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n s and local religions. 4 5 2. In the three cases of Christian ethnic resistance, historical continu-

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25

ity has been a f a c t o r of survival f o r the nationalist claim, t h o u g h with variable degrees of political d e v e l o p m e n t . 4 6 3. G e o g r a p h i c l o c a t i o n a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n of C h r i s t i a n e t h n i c g r o u p s h a v e d e t e r m i n e d the n a t u r e of their e f f e c t i v e n e s s . " G e o g r a p h i c a l and d e m o g r a p h i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s are m o r e salient," wrote Louis Snider. "First the m o s t c o h e s i v e m i n o r i t i e s are c o n c e n t r a t e d in a d i s t i n c t territorial l o c a t i o n : T h e A r a b s of Iran, A l a w i t e s , D r u s e , M a r o n i t e s , Berbers, Kurds, and Zaidis of Y e m e n all have distinctive territorial ' h e a r t l a n d . ' M a n y of these have the a d d e d topographical a d v a n t a g e of a m o u n t a i n o u s base f r o m w h i c h d e f e n s e or d o m i n a t i o n can be s u p p o r t e d . " 4 7 A s a r g u e d by Nisan, "the relative inaccessibility of minority territory will naturally strengthen their potential viability over t i m e . " 4 8 4. T h e m a j o r c h a l l e n g e c o n f r o n t e d by the Christian ethnic g r o u p s is their nonrecognition as such by central A r a b g o v e r n m e n t s . 4 9 5. Finally, in d i f f e r e n t times, and for v a r i o u s r e a s o n s , internal divisions a m o n g the Christian resistance m o v e m e n t s have been the prim a r y source of their defeats. This p h e n o m e n o n can be applied, for e x a m p l e , to the case of the L e b a n e s e C h r i s t i a n s in 1990 a n d the southern S u d a n e s e in 1992. 5 0 T h e s e lessons will be important in u n d e r s t a n d i n g the e m e r g e n c e and f o r m a tion of a Christian L e b a n e s e nationalism.

NOTES 1. Yarmuk: a river between present-day Syria and Jordan. 2. On the Arab-Muslim conquest of the Middle East, see Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs (New York: St. Martin Press, 10th edition, 1974), 139 and 147. 3. See Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, (New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982). Also George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1946), 15. 4. See Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam, (New Jersey and London: Fairleigh Dinkinson University Press, 1985). Also from the same author see Le Dhimmi: Profile de l'Opprime en Orient et en Afrique du Nord depuis la Conquete Arabe, (The Dhimmi, Profile of the Oppressed in the Orient and in North Africa from the Arab Conquest), (Paris: Anthropos, 1980). 5. A l s o , F r o m Bat Y e ' o r Les Chretientes' d'Orient entre Jihad et Dhimmitude, 7eme-20eme siecle (Christianities of the Orient between Jihad and Dhimmitude), (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1991). 6. For more on the Islamization of the Middle East, see Peter Mansfield, "From Ancient to Modern: Introduction" in A History of the Middle East (New York: Viking, 1991), 14-16.

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7. On Arabization see Haim Rigbi, "Either the End of Zionism or the Doom of Arabism, a Treatise on the Ideological Developments in the Near East from the Beginning of the Century and Portents Towards Its End," unpublished manuscript, (Jerusalem, 1950), 22-41. 8. For e x a m p l e , see Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), 83-96. 9. Homme Malade, or literally "sick man" of the Mediterranean, was the name given by the European powers to the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century10. See Peter Mansfield, op. cit., 122-125. 11. George Antonius, op. cit., 29 and 35. 12. See C. Ernest Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, eds., The Origin of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 3-23. 13. On Islamic policies of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, see George Antonius, op. cit., 61. 14. Michel Aflaq, Fi Sabil al-Baath (In the Name of Baath), (Beirut, 1959), 68. 15. This is the first principle of the constitution of the Baath Party and is taken from a French version made by the Bureau Arabe de Presse et de Publicite, Damascus, 1951. In Sylvia Haim, ed., Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 233. 16. See Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1973), 30-101. 17. On the confrontation between Arab nationalism and the West, see Samir Amin, The Arab Nation, (London: Zed Press, 1978), 50-68. 18. See Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, op. cit., 40-41. 19. For a broad presentation of the situation of the Christians of the Middle East, see Robert Brenton Betts, Christians in the Arab East: A Political Study (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1978). 20. For a comprehensive study on non-Muslims under Islam, see Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi, op. cit. 21. This issue was addressed in the author's paper on "Les Chretiens du Moyen-Orient: Approche Historique" (The Christians of the Middle East: A Historical Approach), at the workshop on the Middle East. Third World Maronite Congress, Montreal, July 18, 1985. 22. On the history of the Assyrians see Sami Hermes, The Assyrians in History, (Berkeley, California: Nineveh, 1986), 5. 23. See Beit-Nahrain, Al-Mas'ala al-Ashuriya (The Assyrian Question), (Beirut: Beit-Nahrain Publications, 1983), 3. 24. See Albert Hourani, "Iraq," in Minorities in the Arab World, (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 99-103. 25. Al-Mas'ala al-Ashuriya, op. cit., 24. 26. Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of SelfExpression, (London: McFarland & Company, 1991), 169. 27. In Tarikh al-Muqawama al-Qubtiya, (The History of the C o p t i c Resistance), prepared by the Coptic Studies Committee (Lajnat al-Dirassat alQubtiya), (Beirut: Markaz al-Dirassat al-Qubtiya, 1984), 1-16. 28. In A History of the Middle East, op. cit., 16. 29. See Shawki F. Karas, The Copts Since the Arab Invasion: Strangers in Their Lands (Jersey City, N.J.: The American, Canadian and Australian Coptic Associations, 1985), Ch. 1. 30. On this period and on the Coptic Congress and the various options see

ARAB DOMINATION & MIDEAST RESISTANCE

27

D o r i s B e h r e n s - A b u s e i f , " T h e P o l i t i c a l S i t u a t i o n of t h e C o p t s : 1 7 9 8 - 1 9 2 3 , " in B e n j a m i n Braude and Bernard Lewis, op. cit., 185-202. 31. In Tarikh al-Muqawama al-Qubtiya, op. cit., 30. 32. On the Coptic opposition m o v e m e n t see publications of the World Coptic A s s o c i a t i o n s , ( N e w J e r s e y : P u b l i c a t i o n s of the A m e r i c a n C o p t i c A s s o c i a t i o n , 1991). 33. In " H e a v i e s t C r o s s for E g y p t ' s Copts: M a r c h of Islam," The New York Times, July 27, 1992. 34. Mordechai Nisan, op. cit., 133. 35. From an interview with Dr. Shawki Karas, (New Haven, March 1993). 36. See Francis M a d i n g D e n g ' s " T h e Identity Factor in the Sudanese Factor," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990). 37. In " M a s ' a l a t J a n o u b a l - S u d a n " ( T h e Q u e s t i o n of South S u d a n ) in the research reports of the Lijna Mashriqiya (Mashreq Committee), (Beirut, 1986), 3. 38. See N e l s o n K a s f i r , " P e a c e m a k i n g and Social C l e a v a g e s in S u d a n " in Joseph V. Montville, op. cit., 3 7 0 - 3 7 1 . 39. See H a i m Shaked and Y e h u d i t R o n e n , " T h e Ethnic Factor in S u d a n e s e Politics: South versus North," in E s m a n , Milton, et al., Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 258. 40. For a historical review of the southern S u d a n e s e conflict see Dr. Riek M a c h a r , " T h e S u d a n C o n f l i c t : T h e S P L M / S P L A - U n i t e d C a l l s on A m e r i c a to S u p p o r t t h e P e o p l e of S o u t h S u d a n in their S t r u g g l e f o r S e l f - D e t e r m i n a t i o n , National Liberation and Independence in the Sudan." Paper presented at the United States Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C. April 12, 1994. 4 1 . O n t h e " S P L M ' s s t r a t e g i c s h i f t " s e e F r a n c i s M a d i n g D e n g , o p . cit., 354-356. 42. See " G o v e r n m e n t Captures M a j o r Cities," The New York Times, July 19, 1992. 43. See "Report on South S u d a n , " M a c o m b , Illinois and Loughborough, U K , Middle East Concern, August 20, 1993; also various d o c u m e n t s of the S u d a n e s e Popular Liberation M o v e m e n t (SPLM)/United. Nairobi, 1994. 44. Chris Hedges, " S u d a n ' s Strife Promises to Outlive Rebellion," The New York Times, July 19, 1992. 45. See, for e x a m p l e , The Vatican, Islam and the Middle East, ( S y r a c u s e , N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987). 4 6 . A b o u t the "vital f o r c e of e t h n i c s e p a r a t i s m s i n c e the late 1 9 7 0 s " s e e A n t h o n y B i r c h , " M i n o r i t y N a t i o n a l i s t M o v e m e n t s a n d T h e o r i e s of P o l i t i c a l Integration," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 3 (April 1978). 47. In Lewis Snider, "Minorities and Political Power in the Middle East," in R. D. M c L a u r i n , ed., The Political Role of Minority Groups in the Middle East, (New York: Viking, 1991), 249. 48. Nisan, op. cit., 11. 4 9 . T h i s s u b j e c t w a s a d d r e s s e d in t h e a u t h o r ' s p a p e r " E t h n o n a t i o n a l i s t Minorities in the M i d d l e East: T h e Democratization Process." Paper presented at Round Table of the Research C o m m i t t e e on Political Education of the International Political S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n , B o c a R a t o n , Fla., J a n u a r y 1994. S e e also A l b e r t Hourani, " F e a r s and Aspirations of Minorities," in Minorities in the Arab World, op. cit., 36. 50. This t h e m e was the subject of the a u t h o r ' s paper " N o n - A r a b , N o n - M u s l i m ethnicities in the A r a b - M u s l i m Middle East: An O v e r v i e w . " Paper presented at the 16th A n n u a l C o n f e r e n c e of Third World Studies, University of Nebraska at O m a h a , October 1993.

2

The Formation of Lebanon's Resistance: The Mardaite States

For centuries, the Christians of Lebanon have actively demonstrated their attachment to their identity and their unique position in the Middle East. Their m a j o r political and military organizations, as well as a number of intellectuals, have put forward the concept of a Lebanese resistance or the Lebanese Christian resistance as the name for the collective efforts of this population to preserve their identity. W e propose to establish the historical roots of the Lebanese Christian resistance. Given the increasing efforts by some A r a b and A r a b i s t historians to deny the historical e x i s t e n c e of a Lebanese Christian entity, reference to this history is urgently needed. 1 T o u n d e r s t a n d t h e h i s t o r y , a brief g e o g r a p h i c a l n o t e is h e l p f u l . Lebanon is located at a strategic crossroads of the Middle East, between the S y r i a n D e s e r t in t h e e a s t , t h e h i l l s of G a l i l e e in t h e s o u t h , a n d t h e Antiochian plateau in the North. T h e country is c o m p o s e d of four geographical elements: the Mediterranean littoral, the Mount Lebanon range, the B e k a a plateau, and the A n t i - L e b a n o n range. C o m p a r e d to the other areas of the region, Lebanon is mainly a mountainous country, rich in water and fertile in soil.

A N C I E N T TIMES

Because of its geographical importance, Lebanon has long been coveted by many (see M a p 2.1). The competition for access and control of this land can be traced back to ancient times, the period most Mideast historians define as the time before the Arab-Islamic conquest of the region. This time frame starts with the appearance of the classical old empires and peoples of antiquity, such as the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Hebrews in the Fertile Crescent coinciding with the Pharaonic Egyptians in the Nile valley. During this period of about three thousand years, two m a j o r factors 29

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shaped the identity of the populations living in Lebanon. First, the ethnic roots: three groups settled in ancient Lebanon next to the old primitive populations that existed in that region since pre-antiquity. These were the Canaaneans, the oldest group; the Aramaens, the most predominant group; and the Amhorites, the only non-Semitic ethnic group. Those whom the classic world has identified as Phoenicians were in reality an ethnic mixture of the above-mentioned populations. The Phoenicians, who established many cities along the Syro-Lebanese shores and a large number of colonies in the Mediterranean, including the famous Carthage in North Africa, are known to be the "ancient Lebanese people." 2 Second, the important cultural and spiritual influences: "Outsiders" left profound marks on the historical identity of the old Phoenician people. During Alexander's campaigns into Asia Minor and the East up to India, the populations of Lebanon were influenced by the Hellenic vision of the world, as well as by its philosophies. Later, the Roman Empire that enveloped the Mediterranean left a legacy of administrative organization, principles of law, and a Latin language spoken by elites. With the spread of the Christian religion throughout the Roman world, the Lebanese people became one of the early Christian nations in history. By the beginning of the seventh century, the populations living in Lebanon had a distinct identity. They were a mix of the predominantly Aramaic ethnicity, with a Greco-Roman cultural influence and Christian religious inclinations. During this time, the Lebanese population was one among many Christian peoples of the Near East. Like the others, they experienced internal religious divisions and witnessed the emergence of many sects and confessions, such as Nestorians, Jacobites, Melkites, and, most relevant for this chapter, the Maronites. 3 These various religious communities were able to grow in relative peace—until the intrusion of a new conqueror. 4

THE ARAB-ISLAMIC CONQUEST: THE FATAH In the year A.D. 634, a new movement rose in the East: Islam. After the wars of unification and integration waged by Muhammed and his successors among the tribes of the Arabian peninsula, the new Muslim power turned its forces toward the outside world. When Islam started its conquest of the Middle East, known as Al-Fatah (the opening of the "infidel" world to Islam), its armies were Arabs. Islam unified the Arabs and gave them a mission of conquest. The invaders succeeded in spreading their power throughout Syria and Palestine after the decisive battle of Yarmuk on August 5, A.D. 636, where the Byzantine armies were crushed by the new conqueror. In less than ten

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years, the "New Arab Order" covered most of the areas between Armenia in the north and Upper Egypt in the south. The tidal wave overwhelmed all of the Near Eastern cities from Antioch to Jerusalem to Alexandria. 5 Islam changed the face of the old world and imposed itself as a giant force for centuries. Except in some areas such as Lebanon, the Berber region in North Africa, and later the mountainous northwest of Spain, the poor resistance put up by the majority of the Christians of the Byzantine Empire was due particularly to their weariness under Byzantine occupation. 6 The Muslims, unlike their predecessors, imposed their religious and cultural identity on the conquered people. This phenomenon, as successful as the military invasion, became the real tool for Arab and Islamic domination throughout the caliphate rule from India to Morocco. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Islamization and Arabization process gave three options to the vanquished nations: One, to embrace Islam and become a citizen of the new empire. Two, to remain nonMuslim, but pay a tax and lose most of their political, social, and economic rights. Those who chose this option were known as the Dhimmi, or "residents under the protection of Islam." Three, conquered people could refuse the other two options, and thus be forced to chose between the "sword of Islam" or exile from the "land of Islam." 7 A considerable part of the population living in the Near East converted to Islam and dropped their native language and culture. This converted category became the Arabized masses. Another part of the autochthonous inhabitants, mainly Christians and Jews, preferred to keep their original religion, pay the Jizya, and lose their political and social rights. That portion of the population now constitutes the non-Muslim minorities in the Arab states of the modern Middle East. (Most historians a f f i r m that Arabization and Islamization of the Near Eastern Christians occurred only at the end of the Middle Ages. 8 ) Finally, a third group refused to accept Arab occupation and decided to continue the struggle from safer locations. For those who chose the last option, Mount Lebanon offered the advantage of an outlet toward the sea. It attracted a number of Near Eastern Christians fleeing the conquerors. In addition to its original inhabitants, the "Christian island" atop the mountain gathered elements from the coastal area of the country, from its surrounding local regions, and a significant immigration from various parts of Syria. 9 The M a r o n i t e c o m m u n i t y f o r m e d the m a j o r i t y of the Christian refugees. The self-exile of these irredentist communities to Mount Lebanon provided the first component of a Lebanese Christian homeland. 1 0 The gathering of a socially organized and demographically dense group of nonArab populations in Mount Lebanon between 636 and 676 formed the human and social background of the Lebanese Christian resistance to the Arab-Muslim order. 11

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B e t w e e n A.D. 6 7 6 and 6 7 7 , a d e c i s i v e f a c t o r t r a n s f o r m e d M o u n t Lebanon from a socioreligious haven to a national sanctuary for a Lebanese Christian resistance.

THE FIRST MARDAITE STATE: A.D. 676-685 In the years A.D. 676 and 677, a warrior population of Christian Aramaens f r o m northern Syria, encouraged by Constantinople, started an uprising against the U m a y a d rule. T h e s e p o p u l a t i o n s w e r e called " M a r a d a " or "Mardaite," from the Arab word "rebels." 1 2 The Mardaite revolt spread into Mount Lebanon where the Maronites, also Aramaic, first joined, then led, the liberation movement against the Arabs. Eventually, "Mardaite" became the name of the Maronite army. 1 3 The initial Aramaic warriors that started the revolt were assimilated by Mount L e b a n o n ' s population, and the latter continued the revolution from there. 1 4 In less than two years, the Christian Resistance established an independent entity in Lebanon at a time when the Islamic Empire was stretching from Persia to Spain. T h e first M a r d a i t e state, with frontiers that reached f r o m Jabal AlLoukam in Syria to the Galilee in ancient Israel, stood from A.D. 676 to 685. (See M a p 2.2.) Mardaite raids into Arab territories pushed up to the Anti-Lebanon range, threatening the security of Damascus, the U m m a y a d capital. The new Christian power of Lebanon sought to establish a homeland for Eastern Christianity that would be safe from the Arab hegemony. E m b o l d e n e d by their success, the M a r d a i t e s did not r e m a i n j u s t a d e f e n s i v e unit. A f t e r it was clear that their military a c h i e v e m e n t s were upsetting (even destabilizing) the U m m a y a d rulers, the Mardaite leaders called for a general Christian uprising in Syria itself. Their goal was to reverse the New Order of the region by obliging the Arabs to withdraw to the peninsula. 1 5 Oddly, the Mardaite project of liberating the Mashreq w a s n ' t thwarted by the Muslims, but by a Christian power: Constantinople. In 685, by virtue of a pragmatic entente with Caliph Moawiya, a Byzantine expedition massacred the Mardaite chiefs in Kab Elias in the Bekaa Valley. As a result, the Mardaite state shrunk back into the natural limits of Mount Lebanon. 1 6

THE SECOND MARDAITE STATE: A.D. 685-758 After the Abbassid takeover of the caliphate in A.D. 700, the young independent nation of M o u n t Lebanon had to face a new type of pressure. In addition to c o n s t a n t o f f e n s i v e s l a u n c h e d by its r e g u l a r a r m i e s a g a i n s t Mount Lebanon, B a g h d a d ' s rulers, and Caliph al-Mansour, in particular,

34

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35

pushed waves of Arab tribes to settle in the Mardaites' vicinity. The new settlers waged a series of wars against the Christian state. From A.D. 758 on, two ethnic groups were struggling over the small country. The Christian Aramaic people comprised one group (of mostly Maronites), who d e f e n d e d themselves f r o m within their already reduced borders. The second, of course, were the growing A r a b - M u s l i m populations, who continued to solidify their ranks as they encircled the Christians of Mount Lebanon 1 7 (see M a p 2.3).

THE THIRD MARDAITE STATE: A.D. 758-1305 This last Mardaite state survived the Arab encirclement for five hundred years (see M a p 2.4). Despite several offensives launched by the Abbassids and their suzerains, the Mardaite state succeeded in repelling the waves. The free Christian presence regrouped itself in the central and northern part of M o u n t Lebanon, where the borders were naturally defended. But the constant pressure of the Islamic environment—either through military campaigns or economical blockades—exhausted the small nation. The last two centuries of its independent life can only be credited to the Crusades, which had been occurring in the Near East since A.D. 1096. Although they failed to change the identity of the region or bring a decisive victory against the Muslim order, the Christian European armies at least provided the Christians of Lebanon with a truce with the Muslims that lasted two hundred years. Under the Crusade era, the Mardaites kept an autonomous status. They were influenced by the feudal system brought by the E u r o p e a n s . In a d d i t i o n , the M a r o n i t e s r e n e w e d their c o n t a c t with R o m e ' s popes and were later considered by them as an Aramaean Catholic Church. 1 8 The Christians of Lebanon would soon pay a huge price for their cooperation with their religious brothers from Europe. 1 9

THE COLLAPSE OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE: A.D. 1302-1305 The Islamic reaction to the Crusades generated a series of confrontations to repel the Farangah, the Arab appellation of Europeans (Muslims referred to all crusaders as the Franks). The Westerners were driven from their possessions in Palestine, Syria, and Anatolia, 2 0 as well as Lebanon. By the end of the thirteenth century, most of the Crusade kingdoms and principalities in the Orient were almost dismantled. Only a few isolated fortresses were still resisting (such as Saint John of Acre, Tripoli, and Banias along the Mediterranean).

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It was during this era of decline that the new Muslim p o w e r in the region, the Mamelukes, decided to terminate the indigenous Christian presence in Lebanon in order to install a loyal, pliable population instead, with i n d i s p u t a b l e a l l e g i a n c e to the Sunni rulers. T h e M a m e l u k e o f f e n s i v e s against the Mardaite strongholds were aimed at eliminating the Christian State in M o u n t L e b a n o n . In A.D. 1283, for example, a m a j o r M a m e l u k e e x p e d i t i o n t a r g e t e d the n o r t h e r n part of the C h r i s t i a n h o m e l a n d . T h e invaders convinced a local Maronite leader to help them in exchange for his appointment as a prince after their victory. The collaboration of M o k a d e m ("Lord") Salem became the first known betrayal in the history of Christian Lebanon. The incursion destroyed most of the Maronite towns in that area. Ten years later, in 1293, two M a m e l u k e armies attacked the coastal city of Jubail ( B y b l o s ) , the sole port used by the Christian r e s i s t a n c e . Although outnumbered, the Mardaite forces crushed the aggressors at Fidar and Madfoun and caused great casualties among the Mameluke ranks. The Battle of Jubail was the last victory of the Mardaites before the collapse of their state fourteen years later. In 1305, u n d e r the rule of Sultan B a i b a r o u s , tens of t h o u s a n d s of M a m e l u k e t r o o p s a n d local a l l i e d t r i b e s l a u n c h e d a f i n a l a s s a u l t on Kesruan, the central part of the mountain. T h e Mardaites put up a ferocious resistance, but the invading waves overwhelmed the last Mardaite bastion, village after village, until they achieved total occupation of the territory. After the victory of the sultan, a harsh repression was forced on the Christians, including deportations, property destruction, and m a s s a c r e s . This largest loss was called the tragedy of Kesruan, known as Nakbat Kisrwan a m o n g the L e b a n e s e ; besides its drastic c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r the region's populations, the defeat brought the Mardaite state to its knees. 2 1 A f t e r the M a m e l u k e invasion of M o u n t Lebanon, the free Christian State disappeared. Thus, the Mardaite era ended as a result of the ArabMuslim occupation of the Christian sanctuary of the Near East. T h e collapse of their independence after seven centuries of resistance was a turning point for the Christian people of Lebanon. Albert Hourani wrote: The last great disturbances which violently changed the nature of the population were the Mameluke expeditions into the north of the mountain in 1283 and into Kesruan in 1292, 1300, and 1305. After that, we find the different groups either in the same positions as today or else in positions which make it easy to understand how later changes took place. 22 This small nation had to either accept the heavy conditions imposed by the new masters and become another Dhimmi population in the region, or face d e p o r t a t i o n . T h i s d i l e m m a w a s the m a i n c h a l l e n g e that the L e b a n e s e Christian resistance had to face for the next two centuries. Indeed, they

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39

were forced to live under these conditions until history would provide them with another opportunity to mount a resistance in the Levant. 2 3

CONSEQUENCES OF THE MARDAITE ERA W h a t w e r e the c o n s e q u e n c e s of the M a r d a i t e era in L e b a n o n on the Lebanese Christian resistance of today? In this phase of Lebanon's history we see the origins of the Lebanese Christian resistance to the Arab-Islamic power in the Middle East. An appreciation of this time provides insights into the deep roots of the modern Lebanese conflict and a better understanding of the Lebanese Christian attitude toward their environment. The Mardaite's preservation of their nation in Mount Lebanon established an indisputable historical fact: they had an independent Christian state in Lebanon for about 600 years of continuity. The emergence and success of the Mardaite states established the historical basis for the challenge that has, however, persisted until today. What other lessons can be summarized about the period between the seventh and the fourteenth centuries in Lebanon? The seven centuries of strife f o r s o c i o c u l t u r a l a u t o n o m y and g e o g r a p h i c a l s p a c e in M o u n t Lebanon are considered by the current Lebanese Christian resistance as one of the most important periods upon which they base their historical legitimacy. In spite of domestic and international pressures to "rediscover" their Arab identity, the Christian Lebanese community can refute such arguments by referring to the Mardaite states of the past. T o d a y ' s Lebanese Christians are indeed a product of those states, geographically, culturally, and politically. Knowledge of this past has been critical to this ethnic group in the face of the revisionist history they have faced for decades. The theme of " r e d i s c o v e r i n g their [the C h r i s t i a n s ' ] real identity" was constantly repeated in the discourse of Arab nationalist parties, groups, and intellectuals in Lebanon and the region. 2 4 Without the success of their Mardaite ancestors, the Christian presence in Lebanon might have been either completely eliminated or extremely reduced, as in the case of many other Christian minorities in the Arab world. The survival of the Christian Lebanese under the Ottoman rule, their renaissance during the nineteenth century, and their particular position in modern Lebanon since the 1920s, wouldn't have been possible if the first resistance of the seventh century had failed to establish a viable defense, even challenge, to the Arabs descending upon the region. T h e c r e a t i o n of t h e M a r d a i t e s t a t e a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of an autonomous national structure in Lebanon, despite the Arab rule in the region, provided an ideological legitimacy for modern proposals along

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those lines; that is, the call for a distinct Christian-Lebanese identity. The promotion of supra-Lebanese ideologies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as Arab nationalism or Syrian nationalism, was challenged by the presence of the Lebanese Christian nationalism. Not easily set aside, Christian nationalism had taken its roots f r o m the rich soil of resistance tilled for seven centuries by its ancestors in Mount Lebanon. Today we see that the Mardaite historical reality helped in building a political l e g i t i m i z a t i o n f o r the c l a i m of a C h r i s t i a n - L e b a n e s e national movement in modern times. Many political bodies, as well as intellectual and academic voices, in the second half of the twentieth century refer to this past as a formative element in the rise of Lebanese nationalism. In this perspective, the recent war that occurred in Lebanon, besides its regional and international dimensions, can be interpreted as another phase in the historical conflict that was passed down with the Mardaite legacy of opposition to the Arab conquest of their territory. Finally, though the conclusions and consequences of this period are sometimes debated, what remains incontestable for social scientists from all fields is the significance of the Mardaite era in Lebanon. No matter what the evolution of events has brought in the twentieth century, and independent of the political options for L e b a n o n ' s future, the period that started in A.D. 676 and lasted until A.D. 1305 must be defined as the historical basis of the Lebanese Christian resistance. 2 5

NOTES 1. For more details about debate over Lebanon's history, see Albert Hourani, "Lebanon: Historians and the Formation of a National Image," in The Formation of the Modern Middle East, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 149-169. See also Kamal Salibi's self-critique book, A House of Many Mansion: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 169-170. 2. On the ethnic formation of the pre-Arab population of Lebanon, see Boutros Daou, Tarikh al-Mawarina (History of the Maronites), Vol. Ill, (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar Publishers, 1976). 3. See on this issue Robert Brebton Betts, Christians in the Arab East: A Political Study, (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1978) 1-19. 4. On the cultural identity of the pre-Arab population of Lebanon, see Salim Abou, Le Bilinguisme Arabe-Francais an Liban (The Arab-French Bilingualism in Lebanon), (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 1962), 158-169. 5. On the invasion of Syria and Lebanon, see Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History (London: Macmillan, 1962), 235-243. 6. For details see Pierre Rondot, "Les Chretiens d'Orient (The Christians of the Orient)", in Cahiers de l'Afrique et l'Asie, (Paris, 1973), 72-73. 7. On the status of Dhimmis, see Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam, (New Jersey and London: Fairleigh Dinkinson University Press, 1985).

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41

8. See Jawad Boulos, Tarikh Lubnan wal Bilad al-Mujawira, (The History of Lebanon and the Surrounding Countries), (Beirut: Badrane, 1972), 236-237. 9. On this period see Istefan Douaihi (Maronite patriarch), Tarikh al-Ta'ifa al-Maruniya (History of the Maronite Community), edited by Rashid el-Khury elShartuni, (Beirut: n.p., 1890); also from the same author, Tarikh al-Azmina (The H i s t o r y of T i m e s ) , e d i t e d by F e r d i n a n d T a o u t e l a l - Y a s u ' i . ( B e i r u t : P r e s s e Catholique, 1951); also Yusuf Dibs, Tarikh Suriya (The History of Syria), 8 vols., (Beirut: N.p., 1899-1905). 10. On the origins of the Maronites and their relationships with the other Christians and Lebanon, see Yusuf Deryan (Maronite bishop), Lubab al-Barahin alJaliya an Haqiqat Amr al-Taifa al-Maruniyya (Essential and Clear Proofs on the Truth about the Issue of the Maronite Community), (Beirut: N.p., 1911); also Yusuf Dibs (Maronite bishop), Al-Jamih al-Mufassal fi Tarikh al-Mawarina al-Mua'ssal (The Detailed Work on the Real History of the M a r o n i t e s ) , (Beirut: Presse Catholique, 1905). 11. The analytical background of the Lebanese resistance was an item debated in a series of seminars organized by Mashreq International Magazine during 1985 in Beirut and published by the magazine in 1985 and 1986. 12. The origin of the word may also have been extracted from the adjective Marid, meaning "giant," or in reference to the city of Mardine in present Turkey, capital of the northern Aramaic tribes. 13. For a comprehensive study on the relation between the Maronites of Mount Lebanon and the Mardaites, see Matti Moosa, The Maronites in History, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 174-278. 14. See Pierre Dib, Histoire de I'Eglise Maronite (The History of the Maronite Church), (Beirut: Edition la Sagesse, 1962), 71. 15. On this period see for example the author's essay The Christian People of Lebanon: Thirteen Centuries of Struggle (Beirut: Mashreq Editions, 1985). 16. On this delicate phase of history, see Boutros Daou, op. cit., 230-234; also Matti Moosa, op. cit., 180-181. 17. Boutros Daou, op. cit., 279-281. 18. On the relation between the Maronite church and the Church of Rome see Matti Moosa, op. cit., 217-232; also Douaihi, Tarikh, op. cit., 352; Kamal Salibi, "The Maronites of Lebanon under Frankish and Mamluk Rule, 1099-1516," Arabica, Vol. 4, (1957), 2 9 0 - 2 9 6 ; also F. Charles-Roux, France et Chretiens d'Orient (France and the Christians of the Orient), (Paris: Flammarion, 1939), 13-38. 19. Boutros Daou, op. cit., 439. 20. Asia Minor or present-day Turkey. 21. Boutros Daou, op. cit., 421-445. 22. In Albert Hourani, The Formation of the Modern Middle East, op. cit., 125. 23. On the Mardaite period see Philip Hitti, Lebanon in History, op. cit., 244-249. 24. A sample of these allegations can be found in the editorials of the dailies Al-Safir, Al-Liwa' and Al-Sharq, and in the weeklies Al-Mawkif Al-Kifah al-Arabi and Al-Anba'a, particularly between 1976 and 1989. 25. See for example the author's essay Le Peuple Chretien du Liban: 13 Siecle de Lutte (The Christian People of Lebanon, Thirteen Centuries of Struggle), (Beirut: Mashreq Editions, 1981. Second Edition, 1984).

3

Occupation, Emirate, and Revolution

For six h u n d r e d years, the L e b a n e s e nation experienced A r a b and O t t o m a n o c c u p a t i o n . D u r i n g these centuries, the n o n - I s l a m i c p e o p l e of the r e g i o n were continually seeking the restoration of their a u t o n o m y through various national f o r m s and alliances.

MAMELUKE OCCUPATION U n d e r the A r a b M a m e l u k e d o m i n a t i o n ( 1 3 0 5 - 1 5 1 6 ) , L e b a n o n ' s population was subjected to harsh repression, and their d e m o g r a p h i c p r e s e n c e shrank toward the northern part of M o u n t L e b a n o n . A f t e r the fall of the M a r d a i t e s considerable anarchy reigned in the country. T h e M a m e l u k e s divided the f o r m e r C h r i s t i a n h o m e l a n d into t w o sectors: T h e y attached the northern part of M o u n t L e b a n o n ( f r o m the N a h r I b r a h i m R i v e r ) to the district of Tripoli and the southern part of it to the district of Beirut. Politically, M o u n t L e b a n o n was no longer a unit, for it had been divided, as had the Christians w h o r e m a i n e d there. In order to c o m p e n s a t e the Arab clans w h o lived on the littoral south of Beirut and in the B e k a a , and who had f o u g h t the C r u s a d e r s and the M a r d a i t e s , the M a m e l u k e s delivered to them the Christian m o u n t a i n area, divided into feudal zones. T h e A s s a f , H a m a d e h , Arslan, M a a n , S h e h a b , Freikh, and m a n y other families divided a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s the territories that n o w constitute the L e b a n e s e republic. T w o c e n t u r i e s p a s s e d b e f o r e the arrival of the O t t o m a n s . T h e s e t w o centuries saw a social and cultural transformation that was to p r o f o u n d l y affect the d e f e a t e d Christians f o r m o r e than f o u r centuries. In fact, life for the Christians was reduced to a simple struggle for survival. B a n i s h e d f r o m political life, harassed socially and e c o n o m i c a l l y , the Christians were n o more than an inferior social caste. T h e Christian fellaheen (peasants) w e r e obliged to s u b m i t to the y o k e of political and social f e u d a l i s m . But those

43

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two centuries of social and national oppression, to which would be added two centuries of further Arab domination, would cause a revolutionary current to grow in the collective consciousness of the Christian people that would be expressed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 1

OTTOMAN DOMINATION It is surprising to see that educational texts about Lebanon invariably begin with the year 1516. How ironic that today's official history of the country begins precisely at the period when the independent Lebanese nation had already ended. T h e year 1516 is indeed an important benchmark. Before that d a t e , the i n h a b i t a n t s of M o u n t L e b a n o n s u f f e r e d the y o k e of the M a m e l u k e oppression and its extension through combined feudal clans. Thereafter, the Christian people suffered at the hands of the Ottomans and their feudal allies. The Christian strategy during these four centuries was to s u p p o r t a n t i - O t t o m a n f e u d a l f o r c e s w h o w o u l d help them d e f e a t their enemy. 2 After the entry of the Ottomans into Syria and Lebanon, the Christians increased their efforts to recover their national identity and freedom. First they tried to create a formal Lebanese entity, distinguished from their Arab environment. The priority for the Christians was to stop the main danger they faced; that is, their total merger into the Arab-Ottoman-Islamic environment. For this, it was necessary to assemble Christian forces and make them available to any feudal lord or emir who would support Lebanese independence. The Christians could not act too openly, as they had been excluded f r o m the political and social scene. Instead, they had to rally around any sympathetic Muslim or Druse personality. T h e C h r i s t i a n s w e r e m o r e inclined to ally with the Druse, w h o as a m i n o r i t y t h e m s e l v e s w e r e also i n c l i n e d to f a v o r the c r e a t i o n of an a u t o n o m o u s e n t i t y in L e b a n o n . 3 T h u s it w a s in this c o n t e x t that the Christians of L e b a n o n developed a pragmatic relationship with an Arab minority. Together they opposed the domination of Muslim Sunni rulers in the region. This alliance was the basis of a Druse-Christian Lebanese emirate that continued from the end of the sixteenth century until the mid-eighteenth century. 4 When in 1516 the Ottomans invaded Syria, the Druse princes, led by Emir Fakhredine M a a n , aligned themselves with the new conquerors. In reward, the sultan r e c o g n i z e d M a a n ' s h e g e m o n y over M o u n t L e b a n o n , under the e m p i r e ' s sovereignty. Yet just a few decades later, the Turkish governors of the neighboring provinces of Syria and Palestine tried to contain, then e l i m i n a t e , the e x i s t e n c e of the e m i r a t e as a s e m i a u t o n o m o u s entity.

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The Ottoman attitude encouraged the Lebanese Christians to support the emirate and to consider it as a means toward full autonomy and eventual independence. Indeed the Christian-Druse entente produced the basis for a Lebanese independence current that characterized Mount Lebanon's struggle throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. In 1617, the Shehab family inherited the emirate from their predecessors, the Maans, and pursued a protracted confrontation with the Ottomans as well as with the local feudal families. While the Druse provided legitimacy to the emirate and even assumed its leadership, the Christians provided the m a n p o w e r to its army and the agricultural support to its e c o n o m y . 5 With the help of the Maronite church, moreover, the Christians began to establish external relations with the European powers. 6 This pragmatic cooperation explains why the Christians initially proposed only a "practical" entity for themselves. The Aramean Lebanese Christians, who were still speaking Syriac 7 when the Ottomans arrived, wished to affirm their identity. Arabization, however, had dealt a hard blow to their culture and had caused the Christians to slowly give up the use of AramaicSyriac. As the administration became Arabized and economic activity passed to Arab hands, the Christian peasants had to assimilate the language of the invader. By the seventeenth century, Arabic had become the language of most of the population. 8 But the intellectual elite of the Christian people, such as the church leaders and more particularly the Maronite monks, transferred most of the Aramaic Christian work that had been written in Syriac to western "Christian" languages such as Latin, Italian, and French. "As Syriac had been asphyxiated," noted one scholar, "the cultural values of the Christian people of Lebanon were to be transferred to brother Christian tongues, principally to French after the nineteenth century." 9 This cultural resistance, extensively researched by the works of Selim Abou and Sami Fares, demonstrates that the attraction of the Lebanese Christians to western languages was partly due to the reaction of the Aramaic population when confronted with the advance of Arabization. Arabic was to become the dominant language, but the languages of the other Christian peoples in the West were used to transmit and preserve the cultural values and heritage of the Lebanese Christian people. Thus the attachment of the Lebanese Christians to the French, especially since the nineteenth century, was not so much because of the influence of modern colonialism, but also because it was a means of cultural and religious preservation. 1 0 Similarly the Christians also supported other regional groups who they felt could help them create an autonomous identity. Realpolitik pushed the Christians to support the Druse emirs against the Sunni and pro-Ottoman Druse feudal lords, on the one hand, and the Ottomans themselves, on the other.

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THE EMIRATE: 1 5 1 4 - 1 8 4 0 The four centuries of Ottoman presence in the Levant were marked by the creation of an autonomous emirate in Lebanon (see M a p 3.1). Its chief was a Druse prince, advised by Maronite counselors. The emirate's army consisted of mainly Maronite peasants, but also various other Christians and Druse elements. 1 1 A l t h o u g h incorporated into the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , t h e policies of the emirate reflected the local desire for independence. This g o a l f u e l e d t h e s t r u g g l e of M o u n t L e b a n o n f o r t h r e e c e n t u r i e s . T h e Christian-Druse entente demonstrated the necessity for the national minorities in the region to work together. The era of the emirate, which lasted from 1514 to 1840 and was shared by t h e r u l e of t w o f a m i l i e s , t h e M a a n ( 1 5 1 4 - 1 6 9 7 ) a n d t h e S h e h a b (1697-1840), was characterized by several events: 1 2 1. During this period, the Christian p e o p l e continued to exist as a social group deprived of any national status. The Druse emirs, however, frequently favored the Maronite Church, showed some consideration to the Maronites of the mountain, and even chose Maronites as feudal lords to govern the prince's lands. 1 3 Yet the Christian leadership, especially a m o n g the Maronites, was set up and promoted by a Druse power, which after all, was ethnically Arab. The attachment of these feudal groups to the Arabs would have consequences later. The historian Kamal Salibi writes: They [the civil chiefs of the Maronites] were very popular up to the beginning of the 14th century, and collaborated closely with the clergy in governing the community. But after nearly a century of Mameluke rule, the role of the Mokadams*4 was limited to tax gathering for the Mameluke governors of Tripoli. 15 This change in relations toward the leaders appointed by the Muslim ruler was based on an ethnic rejection of the A r a b - a p p o i n t e d Christian chiefs. So among the people, the title of these Maronite civil chiefs was linked with the Mameluke authority and afterwards with the Ottoman power, which explains why they were hated by both the people and clergy. The "new Mokadams" (as we may call them to distinguish them from those of the time of the Mardaite independence) neglected the interests of their subjects and sought to obtain the favor of their Mameluke and Ottoman masters, being servile in their ways to the point of taking the names of the Moslems as well as their titles. 16 2. During this time, the Maronite church played a great role in conserving the character of the Christian people of Lebanon, in general, and

O C C U P A T I O N , EMIRATE & R E V O L U T I O N

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that of the Maronites, in particular, both as regards the collective national and popular conscience and in the cultural sphere. Salibi writes: "One of the consequences [of the recuperation of the Maronite feudals by the Arabs and the Ottomans as described above] was that the Maronite patriarch and his priests became the sole true leaders of the Maronites, so in effect undermining the power of Maronite feudalism." 1 7 3. The four centuries of the feudal emirate are much more a history of an Arab-Druse principality established in Lebanon than of the national homeland of the Lebanese Christians. However, it would be improper to detract from the role played by the Christians, particularly the Maronites, during these 350 years. As mentioned above, the Christians had elected the emirate and rejected the Ottomans. They had opted for the emir consistently and faithfully against certain Druse and Muslim feudal lords and against the Ottoman walis (governors), who from Palestine and Damascus strove continually to bring about the collapse of the emirate. 1 8

THE FALL O F T H E EMIRATE: 1840 By the third century of the emirate's era, the power of the princes weakened for several r e a s o n s . T h e O t t o m a n s never lost an o p p o r t u n i t y to exacerbate the feudal struggles between the L e b a n e s e lords, and they conspired increasingly against the emir, who was the symbol of Lebanese independence. Sunnite Istanbul had little sympathy for this autonomous e n t i t y d i r e c t e d by the u n o r t h o d o x D r u s e a n d s u p p o r t e d m a i n l y by Christians. 1 9 Initially, the alliance between the Christians and Druse served both parties well. The Druse needed the Christian peasants for trade, their soldiers for the battles, and their intellectuals for diplomacy. The Christians wanted a political shield, an autonomous entity and local ally in Mount Lebanon, so they could gradually reestablish their lost independence. The contract survived for three hundred years, during which time both communities took advantage of it. 20 A substantial number of Druse disliked the arrival of Maronite peasants in Kesruan, the Matn, and the Shuf in central and southern Mount Lebanon. They were additionally irritated by the Christianization of certain Druse emirs and by the diffusion of revolutionary ideas among Christian and Maronite peasants. Accordingly, they acted against the power of the princes and drew closer to the Turks. 2 1 A n a t i o n a l i s t and r e v o l u t i o n a r y c u r r e n t s w e p t the m a s s e s of the Christian people, principally the Maronites of the mountain. The Lebanese Christians, who had been excluded from the national political scene since

OCCUPATION, EMIRATE & REVOLUTION

49

the fourteenth century, had lost c o n f i d e n c e in the p o w e r of the princes, who, after all, represented Druse power. The reign of the last emirs of the Shehab dynasty had done nothing to improve matters. 2 2 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the emirate r e g i m e fell d e c i s i v e l y f o r t w o r e a s o n s . F i r s t w a s t h e c o n t i n u a l p r e s s u r e of t h e O t t o m a n s . Second was the collapse of the internal entente b e t w e e n the Druse and the Christians. While the latter sought additional autonomy with the help of the Europeans, the Druse minority d i d n ' t want to jeopardize its already turbulent relations with the Muslim Sunnis of the area. The gap in confidence grew, moreover, as the Druse became less willing to confront the Ottomans, a mind-set fueled by the Egyptian campaign in Syria waged by M o h a m m e d Ali in 1831. His son, Ibrahim Pasha, who led the campaign in Syria, played the Christian and Druse cards successively, in order to ensure local support for his domination in the Ottoman areas. Yet at the end of the Egyptian rule in Lebanon in 1840, a confrontation occurred between the two national groups of Mount Lebanon, which led to the collapse of the Emirate and the beginning of two decades of tension.

THE WAR OF 1840 AND THE CAIMACAMAT In 1840, incidents between the Christians and the Druse further degenerated their relations. These incidents (called Hawadeth in Arabic) were in reality a l m o s t a war in their scale of v i o l e n c e and their level of local involvement. T w o factors were critical to the outcome. One was the military disorganization of both sides; each had enough weapons to fight but not enough plans to achieve victory. The second factor was the rapid intervention of the European powers in the conflict. To head off further escalation, the European powers intervened in the conflict, preventing a major Turkish occupation of the country. The deliberations of the European powers with the Ottoman Empire led to a new form u l a : t h e C a i m a c a m a t . T h i s w a s a g e o p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n t h r o u g h the creation of two entities in Mount Lebanon, one in the northern part, exclusively Christian with Bickfaya as the capital, and a second Caimacamat in the south, populated mostly by D r u s e with a strong Christian minority (approximately 35 percent). Deir el-Qamar became its capital. 2 3 (See M a p 3.2.) A l t h o u g h it c o v e r e d l e s s t e r r i t o r y t h a n t h e f o r m e r e m i r a t e , t h e Caimacamat regime enhanced the autonomy of Mount Lebanon. The northern part b e c a m e a M a r o n i t e haven w h e r e the C h r i s t i a n s e x p e r i e n c e d a national and social revolution, while in the southern entity events took another turn.

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REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT & HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

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