Lay Theories. Everyday Understanding of Problems in the Social Sciences [1 ed.] 9780080326948

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INTERNATIONALSERIESIN EXPERIMENTALSOCIALPSYCHOLOGY SeriesEditor: MICHAEL ARGYLE, Universityof Oxford.

VoM.

BOCHNE R Cultures in Contact

Vol2.

HOWIT T The Mass Media and Social Problems

Vol3.

PEARC E The Social Psycholog y of Tourist Behaviou r

Vol4.

COLMA N Game Theory and Experimenta l Games

Vol 5.

ALBER T Genius and Eminence

Vol 6.

SMITHSON , AMATO and PEARCE Dimension s of Helping Behaviou r

Vol 7.

CLARK E Language & Action

Vol 8.

KAHLE Attitudes & Social Adaptatio n

Vol 9.

NOLLE R Nonverbal Communicatio n & Marital Interaction

Vol 10. DOISEandMUGN Y The Social Developmen t of The Intellect Vol 11. BROWN Advances in the Psycholog y of Religion Vol 12. HOLLIN and TROWER Handbook of Social Skills Training Volume 1 Vol 13. HOLLIN and TROWER Handbook of Social Skills Training Volume 2 Vol 14. FOSTER Intergroup Relations Vol 15. RUTTER Communicatin g by Telephone Vol 16. BULL Posture and Gesture Vol 17. FURNHA M g of Problems in the Social Sciences Lay Theories: Everyday Understandin

La

y

Everyday of Problems

Theorie

s

Understanding in

the

Social

by Adria n Furnha m Lecture r i n Psycholog y Universit y Colleg e Londo n Gowe r Stree t Londo n

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Sciences

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Copyrigh t © 1988 Adria n F. Furnha m All RightsReserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced, storedin a retrieval system or transmitted inany formorbyanymeans: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recordingor otherwise,without permission in writingfromthepublishers. First editio n 1988 Librar y of Congres s Cataloging-in-Publicatio n Data Furnham , Adria n Lay theories : everyda y understandin g of problem s in the socia l sciences/b y Adria n F. Furnham . p. cm—(Internationa l serie s in experimenta l socia l psychology ; vol. 17) Bibliography : p. 1. Attributio n (Socia l psychology ) 2. Commo n sense . 3. Belie f and doubt . I. Title. II. Series : Internationa l series in experimenta l socia l psychology : v. 17. HM29 1 .F86 1988 3 0 0 \ 1 - d c91 88-985 7 Britis h Librar y Cataloguin g in Publicatio n Data Furnham , Adrian , 1953 Lay theories : everyda y understanding s of problem s in the socia l sciences . (Internationa l serie s in experimenta l socia l psychology) . 1. Society . Theorie s I. Title II. Serie s 301'.0 1 ISBN 0-08-0326943 Hardcove r ISBN 0-08-0339700 Flexicove r

Printedin GreatBritainbyA. Wheaton Et Co.Ltd.,Exeter

FO R ALISO N Wh o hold s som e ver y strang e theorie s

The objectof all psychology is to give us a totally different idea of the things we know best. 3 PAU L VALER Y TELQUEL, 194

The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as to seem not worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it.

BERTRAN D RUSSEL L LOGICAND KNOWLEDGE,1956

Forewor

d

Two event s led me to becom e intereste d in lay theories , the topi c of thi s book . Th e firs t occurre d whil e doin g my doctorat e in Oxford . I joine d a smal l grou p who wer e intereste d in attributio n theory , at the tim e the mos t popula r topi c in socia l psychology . Man y of th e contributor s to the grou p — Fran k Fincham , Mile s Hewstone , Jo s Jaspar s an d Mansu r Lallje e — criticise d the predominantl y America n researc h for bein g to o asocia l as experiment s wer e concerne d specificall y wit h how individual s explai n or attribut e the cause s of othe r individuals ' behaviou r (an d thei r own) . Man y in the grou p attempte d to "socialise " attributio n theor y in a numbe r of way s by lookin g at suc h thing s as inter-grou p attributions , focusin g on the contex t of attributions , an d by examinin g the socia l natur e of wha t is attributed . I, lik e everybod y else , wa s expecte d to giv e an informa l lunch-tim e seminar . Althoug h I was intereste d in how situationa l or contextua l feature s shap e explanation s for socia l behaviour , I bega n to be mor e intereste d in how peopl e explai n socia l phenomena . A chanc e even t led me to ask how peopl e explai n poverty . Fortunately , I foun d tw o othe r interestin g studie s in the area , whic h I partl y replicated . I foun d the topi c fascinatin g an d proceede d to expan d the researc h projec t int o how peopl e explaine d the origin s of wealth , and the cause s of unemployment . Clea r results , socia l relevanc e an d consi derat e journa l editor s led me to continu e an d exten d researc h to othe r areas : How do peopl e explai n delinquency ? Wha t do peopl e thin k cause s alcoho lism ? Althoug h my dat a collectio n wa s primaril y throug h intervie w an d thenc e questionnaire , the medi a of cours e prov e a rich sourc e of ideas . Th e cause s of unemployment , delinquency , dru g addiction, menta l illnes s are frequentl y discusse d on cha t shows , debate d in th e column s of the qualit y press , dictate d in part y politica l broadcasts . Wherea s mos t psychologica l studies , particularl y thos e in attributio n theory , ha d bee n concerne d wit h the process of arrivin g at explanations , I becam e mor e intereste d in the content of thes e explanations , thei r structur e an d function s in particular . I becam e awar e of othe r peopl e workin g in thi s area , som e like Sara h Hampso n wh o was intereste d in lay theorie s of personalit y an d other s like Monik a Hender son on how peopl e explai n antisocia l behaviour . Obsessionall y regula r visit s to fou r universit y libraries , all a stone' s thro w vii

viii

Forewor d

awa y from my office , helpe d in the collectio n an d classificatio n of books , paper s and report s tha t wer e the basi s of thi s book . Whe n the pile reache d over thre e feet in heigh t it seeme d necessar y for som e prope r cataloguing , whic h of cours e mean t readin g th e papers . It wa s Michae l Argyl e wh o suggeste d tha t I migh t do a boo k on the topi c an d mak e the readin g I was doin g mor e focused . The secon d reaso n I becam e intereste d in lay theorie s originate d from my trainin g in, amongs t othe r things, socia l psychology . I, lik e all othe r socia l psychologists , in genera l department s of psycholog y in Britain , hav e learne d to becom e use d to bein g th e scapegoa t for th e relativel y low prestig e of psycholog y as a scienc e in Grea t Britain . Ther e are man y reason s for this , no t leas t of whic h is the popula r interes t in topic s in socia l psycholog y compare d with , say , psychophysiology , anima l learnin g or memory . It is relativel y easy to see the functiona l natur e of th e prejudic e agains t sof t psychology , of which , I believ e for quit e mistake n reasons , socia l psycholog y is supposedl y the prototype . Adde d to this , som e (mostl y mistaken ) socia l psychologist s hav e turne d thei r bac k on empiricism , so threatenin g th e ver y basi s of th e scientifi c credibilit y of psycholog y in general . Psychologist s oppose d to socia l psycholog y offe r a numbe r of explana tion s for thei r position : poo r theories , trivia l researc h topics , lac k of progress , etc . But the criticis m mos t frequentl y name d by psychologis t an d layma n alik e is tha t it is all "commo n sense" . I, therefore , becam e mor e an d mor e intereste d in wha t is commo n sens e — Wh o has mor e or less of it? Ho w is it acquired ? Ca n commo n sens e accoun t for counter-intuitiv e findings ? etc . Discussion s wit h student s ar e particularl y helpfu l in thi s regar d an d the y frequentl y forc e on e to attemp t to articulat e wha t on e mean s an d why . On e student , I recall , gav e som e multipl e choic e question s — so belove d of th e America n examinatio n syste m — derive d fro m a standar d introductor y socia l psycholog y textboo k to student s no t readin g psychology . Unlik e cognitiv e psychology , socia l psycholog y ha s no t develope d to o man y jargo n term s and seldo m use s ordinar y term s in a specialis t or technica l way , so it was relativel y eas y to find question s tha t wer e easil y understoo d an d free of jargon . The studen t was no t convince d tha t her subject s woul d do ver y well on the test and I was , frankly , uncertain. In the even t the y got abou t hal f right . Of cours e thi s wa s no t a grea t piec e of researc h — th e question s wer e no t carefull y selected , the respondent s wer e hardl y a representativ e grou p of the populatio n as a whole , multipl e choic e is no t alway s th e bes t metho d to examin e people' s beliefs , theorie s or understanding , etc . But the tas k left me wonderin g why the y had got som e correc t and som e not ? Wha t distinguishe d a high from a low scorer ? Wha t was it abou t question s tha t showe d floo r an d ceilin g effects ? In short , wha t determine s the exten t and rang e of psychologi cal knowledg e in th e community ? We are , of course , all psychologist s anywa y but som e of us are clearl y bette r tha n others . Of cours e we are als o all economists , lawyers , meteorologist s as well . What , therefore , determine s the

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xi

conten t an d accurac y of a person' s economic , o r medica l knowledg e an d beliefs ? Thes e question s hav e not , of course , bee n full y answered , bu t the y stil l fascinat e me . Certainl y writin g th e boo k ha s at leas t clarifie d fo r me , an d I hop e fo r other s as well , wha t we kno w an d wha t we do no t kno w abou t lay theorie s an d beliefs . ADRIA N FURNHA M Bloomsbur y London,198 7

1 La y an d Scientifi

c Theorie

s

1.1 Introduction Many of the social sciences, such as anthropology, criminology, psychology and sociology, have the unusual advantage of offering an explicit, formal, "scientific" explanation for certain behavioural phenomena (i.e. the causes of delinquency, poverty, alcoholism, etc.) while at the same time studying the layman's implicit, informal, "non-scientific" explanations for the same behaviour. That is, while some social scientists may be interested in lay theories and beliefs about human behaviour, others research the "actual" causes of this behaviour. Despite the unique advantage to compare and contrast the structure, function and implications of these two types of explanation or theory, these two research areas have, in other disciplines, often developed independently of one another. For instance, in psychology over a decade of research has been dedicated to attribution theory, which is the study of perception or inference of causation, usually held by lay people about their own or others' behaviour. Yet simultaneously, psychologists in abnormal, personality and social psychology have been formulating theories and doing research into the actual causes of people's behaviour. Of course it may be argued that the two are closely linked as people's theories of the causes of their own and others' behaviour are derived principally from self-observation (Bern, 1967). Hence the observation that psychologists study their own problems, or take up epistemological positions based on their own beliefs or experiences (Furnham et al., 1985). Indeed it is possible to argue that three, rather than two, types of theories, perspectives or explanations may be involved (Hampson, 1982): the explicit, psychological (or social science) perspective; the implicit lay perspective (lay people's explanations for others); and the ^//-perspective (lay theories of the self)· For the purposes of this book the last two will be considered together. There are those who would argue that although research into lay causal beliefs about the origins, functions, etc., of various phenomena are interesting and potentially useful in therapy, etc., this research can and should never replace research into the actual causes of behaviour. Empirically tested, explicit formal academic theories of actual behaviour represent the most 1

2

Lay Theories

important , valid , accurat e and usefu l for m of knowledge . Indee d behaviour ists believ e thes e cognition s (lay theories ) to be epiphenomenal . Fo r instanc e Skinne r (1985 ) writes : I accus e cognitiv e scientist s of emasculatin g the experimenta l analysi s of behaviou r by substitutin g description s of setting s for the setting s themselve s and report s of intention s and expectation s for behaviour . . .. Iaccus e cognitiv e scientists , as I would accus e psychoana lysts, of claimin g to explor e the depth s of huma n behaviour , of inventin g explanator y system s which are admire d for a profundit y which is more properl y called inaccessibility , (p. 300) Agains t thi s traditio n are cognitive , clinica l an d socia l psychologist s wh o sugges t tha t lay theorie s — style s or pattern s of attributio n — bot h contribut e to, an d maintain , variou s behavioura l state s lik e depression . Henc e man y theorie s in psycholog y concerne d wit h perceive d contro l (learne d helpless ness theory ; contro l of reinforcemen t theory ; expectanc y valenc e theory ) stres s tha t it is the perception of persona l control , rathe r tha n contro l perse , tha t determine s people' s behaviour . Attributio n theorist s woul d assum e tha t a particula r attributio n or styl e of attributio n lead s peopl e to act in particula r ways . Similarl y self-theorists , wh o tak e a phenomenologica l approach , focu s exclusivel y on the individual' s uniqu e ow n perceptio n an d interpretatio n of events . Tha t is , the y argu e tha t behaviou r whic h seem s puzzlin g to an observer , ma y be perfectl y understandabl e onl y whe n we kno w wha t th e situatio n mean s to the individual . The argumen t betwee n thes e tw o approache s wil l be returne d to later . Wha t is perhap s mor e importan t is to explai n difference s betwee n lay an d scientifi c theories . 1.2 Difference s betwee n "Lay " and "Scientific " Theorie s Ther e are a numbe r of criteri a alon g whic h lay and scientifi c theorie s may differ . It shoul d be pointe d ou t tha t som e "lay " theorie s hav e man y of the positiv e qualitie s of scientifi c theorie s whil e som e so-calle d scientifi c theorie s bea r few of the acceptabl e criteri a of a goo d theory . Tha t is, it is no t a four legs-good , two-legs-ba d proble m wher e th e dimension s of all scientifi c theorie s are goo d an d thos e of all lay theorie s bad . Indee d philosopher s of scienc e hav e attempte d to specif y the criteri a for choosin g betwee n "scienti fic " theories . Valentin e (1982 ) has liste d eigh t criteria : scope , parsimony , clarity , logica l consistency , precision , testability , empirica l support , an d fruitfulness . No t everyon e woul d agre e tha t the y are the bes t or mos t relevan t criteria , an d ther e woul d probabl y be littl e agreemen t as to the ran k orde r of thos e criteria . Furthermore , wherea s som e observer s ma y agre e wit h thi s criterion , the y may no t alway s agre e wit h its implie d othe r pole . Thu s to tak e Valentine' s (1982 ) first criterio n of scope, she notes : "Bot h breadt h and completenes s of coverag e may be considere d advantageous " (p . 96) whic h suggest s tha t som e

Lay and Scientific Theories

3

migh t argu e tha t th e greate r th e scop e of th e theor y (in the styl e of gran d theories ) th e better , whil e som e woul d reasonabl y argu e th e complet e opposite . Thi s is no t to sugges t tha t ther e is no agreemen t as to the criteri a by whic h one may judg e theorie s bu t rathe r to not e tha t agreemen t abou t the m is far from perfect . The followin g list of criteri a is no t exhaustive , no r is it mean t to represen t a ran k order . Furthe r it doe s no t necessaril y impl y tha t it is alway s (or , in som e cases , eve n often ) true . Howeve r it attempt s to represen t som e of the mor e importan t criteri a tha t distinguis h betwee n a goo d ''scientific " theor y and a poo r "lay " theory . (1) Explicitness and Formality

Lay theorie s ar e ofte n implici t rathe r tha n explicit , wit h tacit , non specifie d assumption s or axioms . On the othe r han d som e (bu t by no mean s all) scientifi c theorie s are formal in th e sens e tha t the y are set in a logical , internall y consisten t manner . On e of th e fines t example s of thi s is Hull' s (1952 ) wor k whic h contain s 17 postulate s wit h 15 corollarie s an d 133 theorems . Thes e are set ou t in a logical , progressiv e manner , man y of whic h are expresse d as mathematica l formulae . Other s mor e typicall y set ou t thei r theorie s in a less forma l bu t nevertheles s explici t manner . By contras t lay theorie s are rarel y explici t an d practicall y neve r formal . If aske d to provid e an explanatio n (base d on som e theory ) lay peopl e can do so but rarel y in an explici t forma l manner . Mor e ofte n the y do no t kno w tha t thei r explanation s are derive d fro m particula r sociopolitical , philosophica l or economi c tradition s or paradigms . (2) Coherent and Consistent

Becaus e the y ar e rarely , if ever , presente d formally , lay theorie s ar e frequentl y ambiguous , incoheren t an d inconsistent . Tha t is, peopl e can hol d two mutuall y incompatibl e or contradictor y idea s or belief s at the sam e tim e and no t be particularl y trouble d by tha t inconsistency . On the othe r hand , scientifi c theorie s shoul d be , an d usuall y are , bot h coheren t an d consistent . The y are coheren t in the sens e tha t the y usuall y appl y to a specifi c domai n of phenomen a an d mak e proposition s tha t "fi t together" . The y are consisten t in the sens e tha t the y are no t mutuall y contradictory . Of cours e it has bee n pointe d ou t tha t som e writer s contradic t themselve s ove r time , as thei r theorie s develo p and change , bu t rarel y doe s any acceptabl e scientifi c theor y have inconsisten t or contradictor y theorie s withi n it. Indeed , psychologist s have lon g bee n obsesse d wit h balance , consistenc y and dissonance , and the y have develope d an arra y of consisten t theorie s of consistenc y to explai n how , whe n and why peopl e are inconsisten t in thei r beliefs . Lay peopl e on the othe r han d ofte n hol d mutuall y inconsisten t beliefs . Fo r LT— B

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Lay Theories

instanc e the y migh t endors e th e wor k an d leisur e ethic s simultaneousl y (Furnham , 1984a ) or believ e in bot h nationalisatio n an d privatisatio n (Furnham , 1985a) . On e ma y argu e tha t thes e "superficial " inconsistencie s may be resolve d at a specifi c leve l — for instanc e on e ma y believ e in the nationalisatio n of vita l industrie s (transport , energy , defence ) an d th e privatisatio n of servic e industrie s (communications , health , etc. ) henc e resolvin g thi s apparen t inconsistency . Whils t thi s ma y be occasionall y tru e it seem s tha t peopl e are frequentl y mad e uncomfortabl e by inconsistencies , thoug h the y are rarel y awar e of them . Tha t is, lay peopl e are infrequentl y awar e of th e inconsistencies , incompatibilities , no n sequitur s in thei r pe t theorie s of behaviour . (3) Verification vs Falsification Althoug h no t universall y accepted , man y epistemologist s accep t Popper' s principl e of falsificatio n as the criterio n of science . On the othe r hand , th e layma n ofte n seek s for verificatio n rathe r tha n falsification . T o pu t it anothe r way , lay theorie s ofte n rel y on principle s of inductivis m whil e scientifi c theorie s usuall y rely on deductivism . For Poppe r and man y other s inductivis m an d the searc h afte r verification , whic h is very ofte n th e "method " of lay people , is unscientific . Inductivis m suggest s tha t peopl e mus t accumulat e evidenc e (b y observatio n o r experiment ) an d thereafte r mak e inference s or posi t theoretica l statements . But for deductivist s no amoun t of accumulate d evidenc e tha t all A' s are B (black s are musical ; extrovert s are sociable ) prove s tha t thi s is true . Accord ing to the principl e of falsifiability , a theor y mus t be abl e to be disprove d and hold s unti l it is disproved . Fo r the deductivist , hunc h and commo n sense , as well as experimen t and observatio n mus t be converte d int o hypothese s which , onc e th e stric t condition s for thei r falsificatio n hav e bee n establishe d by deductiv e logic , mus t be teste d by a sustaine d searc h for negative instances . Ther e is considerabl e evidenc e to sugges t tha t in attemptin g to establis h certai n fact s lay peopl e are nearl y alway s inductivis t in tha t the y searc h for confirmator y rathe r tha n disconfirmator y evidenc e (see Chapte r 2) . Whils t this may be tru e of the initia l stage s in scientifi c research , it is infrequentl y the case onc e theorie s hav e becom e established . (4) Cause and Consequence

Lay theorie s ofte n confus e caus e and effect . Tha t is, becaus e lay theorie s are so ofte n correlationa l in natur e the y canno t infe r cause , yet frequentl y do so. La y peopl e frequentl y see a relationshi p betwee n tw o variable s — an increas e in televisio n viewin g an d an increas e in delinquency ; a decreas e in churc h attendanc e an d an increas e in divorce , etc . — an d the n infe r unidirectiona l caus e base d on an implici t theory . As is frequentl y pointe d

Lay and Scientific Theories

5

out , observin g a relationshi p betwee n A and B ma y be due to A causin g B; B causin g A; bidirectiona l causatio n betwee n A and B; the relationshi p betwee n A and B bein g moderate d by a thir d variabl e C whic h indirectl y relat e to bot h A and B. Of course , scientist s are like layme n an d frequentl y fall int o thi s tra p or tend to prefe r causa l explanation s base d on correlationa l result s to suppor t thei r pet theories . Thi s is particularl y noticeabl e in th e cas e of moderato r variables . Fo r instance , Eysenc k (1965 ) has argue d tha t a correlation , albei t well established , betwee n smokin g an d diseas e doe s no t itsel f prov e a causa l connection . Fo r instanc e it ma y be tha t peopl e wh o are geneticall y predis pose d to smok e are als o geneticall y predispose d to certai n disease s or tha t smoker s hav e different''lifestyles " to non-smoker s so tha t thoug h chronolo gicall y th e sam e age the y ar e biologicall y olde r an d henc e mor e at risk . Thoug h hotl y conteste d thi s moderato r variabl e approac h is quit e reasonabl e and a goo d exampl e of th e weaknesse s of inferrin g caus e simpl y fro m correlation . (5) Content vs Process

Thi s issu e will be mor e full y discusse d in the nex t chapter , thoug h som e mentio n ma y be mad e here . Man y academi c theorie s are proces s rathe r tha n conten t oriente d wherea s th e opposit e is frequentl y tru e of lay theories . Conside r theorie s of huma n nature . Academi c theorie s of the aetiolog y of personalit y an d individua l difference s ar e frequentl y concerne d wit h pro cesse s whereb y peopl e ten d to diffe r on e from anothe r on variou s dimension s — intellectua l or cognitiv e reactions , emotiona l responses , etc . Mos t lay theories , on the othe r hand , are conten t oriente d in the sens e tha t the y are primaril y descriptiv e of type s or categories . On e can , in fact , observ e thi s in the developmen t of thinkin g abou t personality . Mos t earl y attempt s wer e essentiall y attempt s at taxonomie s base d on observation . Som e peopl e hav e subsequentl y bee n supporte d by empirica l evidenc e (for instanc e the idea s of Kan t and Wundt ) whil e other s hav e no t (lik e muc h of the wor k of phreno logy) . Further , ofte n earl y conten t oriente d theorie s are tautologica l as the y do no t attemp t to describ e the proces s whereb y the type s arise . Agai n no t all lay theorie s ar e conten t oriented , an d no t all scientifi c theorie s ar e proces s oriented , as we shal l see . Thes e ar e no t mutuall y exclusive . However , it ma y be fair to poin t ou t tha t as descriptio n frequentl y precede s explanatio n and lay theor y frequentl y precede s scientifi c theory , lay theorie s are ofte n descriptiv e an d conten t oriente d whil e scientifi c theorie s are explanator y an d proces s oriented . (6) Internal (Individualistic)

vs External (Situational)

Accordin g to Heide r (1958 ) peopl e are the prototype s of origins : tha t is, mos t ofte n see n as th e cause s of events . In othe r word s peopl e generall y

6

Lay Theories

underestimat e the importanc e of externa l or situationa l factor s in explainin g behaviour . Thi s ha s bee n describe d by Ros s (1977 ) as th e fundamenta l attributio n erro r whic h refer s to th e fac t tha t lay peopl e frequentl y infe r broa d persona l disposition s (traits ) and expec t the consistenc y of behaviou r (acros s situations ) an d stabilit y of behaviou r (ove r time ) acros s widel y disparat e situation s and contexts . In othe r words , whe n attemptin g to explai n others' socia l behaviour , lay peopl e ten d to ignor e or pla y dow n situationa l force s and constraint s preferrin g to locat e the "causes " of huma n behaviou r in an individual' s personality , motive s etc . The layma n the n is a psychologis t (becaus e he/sh e focuse s on individua l behaviour ) rathe r tha n a sociologis t (becaus e he/sh e focuse s on societa l or structura l forces) . Conside r th e exampl e of vocationa l choice . Sociologist s see vocationa l choic e as constraine d an d dictate d by socia l force s like class , education , race , etc . Psychologists , on the othe r hand , like the layman , ten d to focu s on needs , personalit y an d othe r interna l motive s in the choic e of jobs . Wherea s a lot of sociolog y attempt s to explai n individua l behaviou r in term s of macr o and micr o sociologica l forces , psycholog y (mor e personalit y tha n social ) attempt s to explai n individua l behaviou r in term s of individua l pathology , genetic s and learning . It is no t surprising , therefore , tha t psychol ogist s are mor e intereste d in heredit y tha n sociologists . (7) General vs Specific Som e theorie s ten d to rel y on a few superordinat e concept s or axiom s whic h are very broa d construct s tha t can * 'explain " a wid e variet y of type s of huma n behaviour . Thi s is no t the sam e dimensio n as simpl e vs comple x as it is quit e possibl e tha t genera l theorie s ar e complicate d an d specifi c theorie s simple . An exampl e of a genera l approac h ma y be Eysenck' s concep t of introversion-extraversio n whic h ma y relat e to behaviour s as divers e as learnin g style , mat e selection , dru g use , sexua l experience , etc . Thes e broad ban d theorie s ma y be contraste d wit h narrow-ban d an d specifi c theorie s whic h do no t attemp t suc h complicate d endeavours . Wherea s it ma y seem tha t academi c theorie s ten d to be specifi c an d lay theorie s general , Jaspar s (1983 ) ha s argue d th e opposite . He foun d tha t throug h the logica l inductiv e inferenc e proces s peopl e are abl e to offe r clea r theorie s or explanation s for specifi c phenomena , bu t tha t peopl e do no t generalise . It is possibl e tha t prio r expectation s an d variou s motivationa l determinant s shap e people' s explanation s an d theorie s rathe r tha n a reason able generalisatio n from the specifi c to the general . Wha t ma y be occurring , then , is tha t lay peopl e formulat e theorie s or explanation s for specifi c phenomen a base d on th e informatio n tha t the y receiv e or seek but do no t generalis e to abstrac t theoretica l principles . Tha t is, ther e is no "bottom-up" , "data-to-theory " proces s whereb y specifi c obser vation s buil d up int o a general theory , bu t smalle r "mini-theories " for ver y specifi c events .

Lay and Scientific Theories

7

(8) Strong vs Weak

Eysenc k (1960 ) ha s distinguishe d betwee n wea k an d stron g theorie s in science . Stron g theorie s hav e a numbe r of identifiabl e characteristics . The y are base d on numerou s accurat e observation s mad e by man y differen t people . The y brin g togethe r variou s sub-field s in whic h quantitativ e law s hav e bee n discovered ; th e phenomen a in questio n wer e relativel y clear-cu t and unambiguous ; mathematica l relation s wer e no t of a very comple x order ; and prediction s wer e straightforwar d an d precise . Als o stron g theorie s hav e interdependency , in tha t it is rarel y possibl e to chang e one postulat e withou t changin g others . Wea k theorie s do no t shar e thes e characteristics , bu t are usefu l in directin g researc h to problemati c areas . Wea k theorie s frequentl y do no t hav e precise , trustworth y data , henc e the y direc t scientist s to accumu late goo d evidence . Thus , ever y stron g theor y probabl y starte d ou t as weak , but obviousl y no t ever y wea k theor y necessaril y become s strong . Th e fac t tha t the evidenc e for wea k theorie s is poo r an d occasionall y equivoca l doe s not necessaril y mea n tha t the theor y is wron g and shoul d be rejected . Eysenc k (1960 ) writes : The best that can be expected is a set of low correlations , usually in the expected direction, but occasionally directly opposed to prediction; on such a foundation we can then begin to erect the infinitely complex set of laws and functional relationships , concepts and definitions, which will ultimately, shorn of ambivalence s and ambiguities , constitute that proper science of behaviour and personality which so obviously does not exist at the present time, except possibly as a foundation for a palimpset. (p. 315)

It ma y be argue d tha t few existin g theorie s in the socia l science s coul d be describe d as strong , thoug h nearl y all aspir e to it. Clearl y mos t lay theorie s are wea k an d th e majorit y weake r tha n th e explici t academi c theorie s tha t exist . Ther e ma y wel l be othe r dimension s upo n whic h one coul d differentiat e lay and scientifi c theories , e.g . parsimoniousness , operationalisation . Bu t rathe r tha n stres s th e differenc e betwee n th e tw o it ma y be as wis e to stres s similarities . La y theorie s overlap wit h scientifi c theories ; the y function in simila r ways , indee d the on e ma y be seen as an outgrowt h of the other . Lay peopl e can , an d do , formulat e theorie s tha t ar e explicit , coheren t an d falsifiable , as do "scientists " wh o are frequentl y far fro m infallibl e in thei r own model-building . 1.3 The Stud y of Lay Theorie s of Huma n Behaviou r The stud y of lay implici t belief s has man y facets . Indee d thes e facet s do not diffe r greatl y fro m thos e of peopl e studyin g or reviewin g professiona l or explici t beliefs . Fo r instanc e Pervi n (1984 ) ha s identifie d th e fou r crucia l feature s of all theorie s of personalit y as structure , process , growt h an d development , an d psychopatholog y whic h provid e a way of comparin g and

8

Lay Theories

contrastin g differen t theories . Ther e ar e a numbe r of importan t area s of researc h in the psycholog y of lay theorie s of huma n behaviour . (1) The Aetiology or Development of Lay Beliefs It is impossibl e to understan d full y th e natur e of lay theorie s withou t understandin g thei r origin . Wherea s developmenta l psychologist s hav e alway s bee n intereste d in how , whe n an d why childre n lear n abou t physica l concept s of mass , tim e and space , and to a lesse r exten t abou t how the y com e to understan d aspect s of societ y (economics , politics ) ver y littl e wor k ha s been don e on children' s understandin g of individua l needs , motives , emo tions , etc , i.e . meta-learning . Som e hav e speculate d on th e origi n of lay beliefs . Fo r instanc e Sarbi n et al. (1960 ) ha s liste d fou r mai n sources : inductio n or experience ; constructio n or inferenc e an d deduction s fro m observations ; analog y or extrapolatio n fro m specifi c encounters ; an d authorit y or acceptanc e of idea s from others , the media , etc . Althoug h ther e has bee n som e wor k on children' s mora l an d cognitiv e developmen t whic h has attempte d to identif y stage s of developmen t ther e is no parsimoniou s theor y whic h can accoun t for wh y peopl e hol d different , contradictor y or simila r lay beliefs . Wha t is neede d is to establis h whic h socialisatio n exper ience s and maturationa l processe s contribut e to the establishmen t of whic h specific , stabl e belief s abou t huma n behaviour . Equally , it is importan t to know how thes e belief s develo p and chang e onc e the y hav e bee n established . Som e of the mos t promisin g wor k in thi s field ha s take n plac e in the field s of economic s an d politic s (se e Chapter s 6 an d 8) . Stace y (1978 , 1985 ) ha s considere d bot h politica l and economi c socialisatio n in Wester n societie s and has attempte d to defin e whe n childre n acquir e thes e concept s an d wha t socialisatio n experience s are important . Clearl y muc h need s to be don e on children' s and adolescents ' belief s abou t othe r individual s an d the societ y in whic h the y live . (2) The Relationship between Lay Beliefs Jus t as reviewer s hav e attempte d to classif y forma l academi c theorie s of personalit y int o variou s categorie s and specif y th e relationship s betwee n them , so it is possibl e to examin e the relationshi p betwee n variou s lay belie f systems . Furnha m an d Lewi s (1986 ) hav e note d tha t ther e are thre e equall y importan t bu t distinc t area s of researc h on th e relationshi p betwee n lay belief s concernin g differen t issues . Th e firs t is th e relationshi p betwee n specifi c belief s withi n an individua l or group . Fo r instance , do peopl e wh o hold radica l economi c belief s hav e differen t view s abou t th e ' 'natur e of man " from thos e wh o hol d conservativ e economi c belief s (Furnha m et al. 1985) . Peopl e may als o hol d variou s belief s abou t differen t aspect s of socia l life whos e implication s or assumption s are mutuall y contradictory , bu t no t

Lay and Scientific Theories

9

realis e that . On e ma y therefor e loo k at the relationship s betwee n lay belief s on conceptuall y relate d topics , lookin g for contiguity , overla p and contradic tion . Thirdly , on e ma y loo k at th e relationshi p betwee n lay belief s an d behaviour . Th e vas t bod y of psychologica l literatur e on th e lin k betwee n attitude s an d behaviou r suggest s tha t thi s is a complicate d an d subtl e relationshi p bu t tha t certai n prediction s ma y be made . Ther e exis t man y excellen t attempt s to discriminat e betwee n an d taxo nomis e variou s lay belief s in specifi c area s an d the n see how the y interrelat e as well as relat e to othe r issues . Goo d example s are Forsyth' s (1980 ) wor k on ethical , ideologica l an d mora l judgemen t an d Paulus' s (1983 ) wor k on sphere s of perceive d control . (3) The Function of Lay Beliefs Muc h of cognitiv e socia l psycholog y is concerne d wit h how peopl e mak e sens e of the socia l world . Tha t is, variou s belie f system s (locu s of control , jus t world , Protestan t wor k ethi c beliefs ) are sai d to serv e to mak e the worl d a stable , orderl y an d predictabl e place . Th e functio n of thes e belief s is probabl y to establis h a cause-and-effec t relationshi p betwee n phenomena , whic h in tur n enable s on e to apportio n blame , prais e or responsibility . Fo r instance , Lerne r (1980 ) argue s tha t jus t worl d belief s ar e functiona l an d essential , in fac t the y are way s of adaptin g to a worl d in whic h on e feel s relativel y helples s by attributin g absolut e virtu e to the lega l system . He notes : Much of the previous discussion portrays the "belief in a just world" as inextricably bound up with the person's motives and goals. People want to and have to believe they live in a just world so that they can go about their daily lives with a sense of trust, hope, and confidence in their future. If it is true that people want or need to believe that they live in a world where people get what they deserve, then it is not surprising that they will find ways, other things being equal, to interpret events to fit this belief, (p. 14). Similarl y Gan s (1972 ) has propose d a functiona l analysi s of povert y whic h implie s tha t the existenc e of, an d explanation s for , povert y fulfi l a numbe r of importan t functions . Fo r instanc e the poo r ma y be labelle d and punishe d as deviant s in orde r to uphol d th e legitimac y of dominan t socia l norms . Als o povert y help s to guarante e the statu s of the non-poor , in tha t the y remai n a relativel y permanen t measurin g rod for statu s comparison . Functionalis t theories , thoug h somewha t unfashionable , provid e usefu l insight s int o why peopl e maintai n an d chang e thei r lay beliefs . It has bee n objecte d tha t functiona l theorie s are teleological , and thu s incu r the logica l erro r of placin g the caus e of an even t afte r it in time . However , thi s take s plac e in an y self-regulatin g syste m wit h a negativ e feedbac k loop . Fo r example , in a thermosta t th e behaviou r of the syste m lead s to the goa l of a certai n temperatur e bein g attained , thoug h the goa l was actuall y set befor e this temperatur e was reached . Ther e is no myster y onc e the mechanis m has been described . It has bee n objecte d tha t functionalis m encourage s or reflect s

10

Lay Theories

a conservativ e bia s by emphasisin g the positiv e function s of ever y aspec t of the statu s quo . Advocate s of socia l chang e can try to brin g abou t alternativ e institution s to mee t the sam e needs , or to mee t the m better , and to avoi d area s of dysfunctio n in society . Functionalis m does , however , contai n a warnin g for reformer s — tha t existin g institution s ma y be servin g hidde n functions , and it is importan t to understan d thes e hidde n function s befor e attemptin g change . Thus , if lay belief s serv e unspecifie d or no t wel l understoo d func tion s the y ma y well be ver y difficul t to change . (4) The Stability and Consistency of Lay Beliefs The questio n of how and whe n individua l lay belief s chang e is of consider able interes t to psychologists , advertiser s an d politicians . Th e tempora l stabilit y of bot h micro - and macro-sociologica l belief s has importan t impli cation s for how thes e belief s ma y be changed . Th e stabilit y of belief s refer s to thei r similarit y ove r time , whil e consistenc y of belief s refer s to thei r similarit y acros s situations . Thu s the stabilit y and consistenc y of lay belief s abou t socia l behaviou r hav e implication s for how the y are measured . Fo r instance , if lay belief s are fairl y inconsisten t an d influence d greatl y by the contex t in whic h they are gathere d (e.g . marke t interview ) it is importan t to mak e referenc e to the contex t whe n evaluatin g th e evidence . Similarly , if the y are relativel y stabl e ove r time , result s fro m survey s an d interview s ma y be safel y genera lised to predic t futur e beliefs . If cultura l factor s influenc e lay beliefs , change s in th e cultur e — e.g . it becomin g mor e or less permissiv e — ma y well affec t man y lay belie f systems . People' s belief s no t onl y chang e ove r tim e bu t ma y be expresse d differentl y in differen t situations . Peopl e ma y describ e thei r understandin g of ho w a particula r featur e or proces s (e.g . influenza , inflation ) relate s quit e differ entl y to an adul t and to a child . Also , dependin g on the natur e of the person , he or she migh t expres s belief s an d attitude s tha t he or she feel s mos t congruen t with , or attractiv e to , the peopl e in the situatio n rathe r tha n wha t he or she actuall y believe s (Snyder , 1979) . Wha t need s to be researche d is wha t factor s accoun t for eac h lay belief , abou t huma n behaviour , bein g eithe r stabl e or unstabl e ove r time , an d consisten t or inconsisten t acros s situations . (5) The Consequences of Lay Beliefs Lay belief s — like attitude s and explanation s — do hav e consequence s for the developmen t of othe r belief s and for behaviour . Centra l to a grea t dea l of the earl y psychologica l wor k on attitude s is the concep t of balance . Balance , congruit y and dissonanc e eac h assum e tha t peopl e are motivate d to be, and to appear , consistent , whil e an awarenes s of imbalanc e or unconsistenc y is tensio n producin g an d no t easil y tolerated , so tha t attitud e chang e is a

Lay and Scientific Theories

11

principa l too l for resolvin g inconsistencies . Thu s if on e majo r cor e belie f changes , for whateve r reason , other s relate d to it are als o likel y to change . For instance , Furnha m and Blan d (1983 ) found , as predicted , tha t Protestan t wor k ethi c belief s ar e closel y relate d to mor e genera l conservativ e socia l attitudes . The y als o argue d tha t if wor k ethi c belief s are on the declin e one migh t expec t conservativ e socia l attitude s to chang e likewise , and as ther e is no evidenc e of the latte r one shoul d no t necessaril y infe r the occurrenc e of the former . Secondly , lay belief s hav e behavioura l consequences . As Furnha m an d Lewi s (1986 ) hav e noted , lay economi c belief s can actuall y affec t economi c variable s jus t as muc h as economi c variable s ma y affec t economi c beliefs . Consume r sentimen t ha s consequence s for consume r demand , in tha t if peopl e believ e hig h inflatio n is likel y to continu e the y ma y spen d rathe r tha n save and hav e hig h wag e demands , whic h partl y account s for the continuanc e of hig h inflation . Similarl y Katon a (1971 ) foun d tha t publi c pessimis m abou t the econom y showe d a shar p declin e abou t 6- 9 month s before a majo r recession . Of cours e it is impossibl e to teas e ou t caus e from correlatio n whe n examinin g lay belief s an d behaviou r an d it is probabl e tha t som e for m of reciproca l determinis m operates . Finally , lay belief s ma y hav e othe r consequences . Fo r instance , the y ma y affec t a person' s self-concep t and/o r th e wa y the y interpre t thei r ow n behaviour . (6) The Changing of Lay Beliefs Centra l to socia l psychologica l researc h on attitude s an d belief s ar e theorie s of attitud e chang e and consequen t suggestion s as to the bes t method s of changin g them . Ther e ar e a numbe r of differen t approache s includin g learnin g an d reinforcemen t theorie s base d on behaviouristi c idea s of stimu lus-respons e learning , socia l judgemen t an d consistenc y theorie s whic h stem from Gestal t tradition , an d functiona l theorie s whic h plac e mos t emphasi s on huma n needs . Thes e theorie s plac e differen t emphase s on bot h the cause s and method s of change , an d ar e in larg e par t mutuall y exclusive . Applie d researc h in th e are a of racis m an d religiou s prejudic e ha s reveale d th e difficult y of attitud e chang e becaus e of th e complexit y of th e proces s and the numbe r of interna l an d externa l factor s involved . Yet ther e are case s of quit e sudde n an d surprisin g chang e in belief s as a resul t of variou s happenings . Sudde n inflation , th e collaps e of a bank , increasin g unemployment , sudde n persona l wealth , ma y eac h serv e to chang e lay economi c beliefs . Ther e are man y example s of ho w religiou s experience s chang e people' s lay belie f systems . (7) The Manipulation of Lay Beliefs Ther e is a wid e rang e of group s of peopl e intereste d in changin g lay belief s abou t th e economy , thei r ow n healt h an d minorit y groups . Politicians ,

12

Lay Theories

advertisers , healt h educator s an d pressur e group s all attemp t to chang e belief s and behaviour s to sui t thei r ow n ends . Ofte n thei r aim s are to chang e specifi c belief s or to encourag e a chang e in on e particula r behaviou r (e.g . how to vote , wha t to purchase) . Howeve r othe r group s ar e intereste d in changin g people' s entir e theorie s abou t genera l phenomena . Ther e is a whol e rang e of technique s know n to laymen , advertisers , salesmen , etc. , whic h hav e been show n to be successfu l — in appropriat e circumstance s — for thi s task . Thes e includ e ingratiation , conformit y pressure , usin g multipl e request s (i.e . foot-in-the-doo r approac h an d door-in-the-fac e tactic) , inducin g guil t or pity , etc . Th e manipulatio n of lay belief s ma y als o be observe d in extrem e situation s of brainwashing , torture , etc . (8) The Structure of Lay Beliefs Man y socia l scientist s hav e attempte d to classif y belie f system s int o discret e categorie s or alon g variou s dimensions . Fo r instanc e Furnha m an d Lewi s (1986 ) hav e suggeste d tha t lay economi c belief s ma y fall nicel y int o four quadrants , describe d by tw o dimensions : individualistic-collectivistic ; tough-minded-tender-minded . Th e firs t dimensio n woul d reflec t right-wing , conservativ e capitalism , free enterpris e belief s vs left-wing , radical , socialist , stat e contro l beliefs , whil e th e secon d dimensio n woul d reflec t economi c polic y implication s wit h tough-minde d belief s emphasisin g state , lega l or politica l action , whil e tender-minde d belief s woul d emphasis e passive , con sensua l or conventional , rathe r tha n interventionis t policies . Th e term s "wet " an d "dry" , alread y in curren t usag e in Britain , ma y be use d inter changeabl y wit h tough - an d tender-minde d view s to avoi d confusio n wit h Eysenck' s work . Eysenc k (1981 ) howeve r ha s develope d a mor e genera l syste m lookin g at the structur e of socia l attitude s in term s of tw o dimensions . His syste m is set out in Fig . 1.1 , whic h show s how attitude s to a wid e rang e of issue s fall nicel y into a two-dimensiona l structure . Ther e are , of course , othe r dimensiona l solution s for othe r beliefs . Despit e numerou s difference s an d subtl e distinc tion s in th e structur e of lay belief s ther e appea r to be man y commo n solutions . (9) Lay Beliefs about Social Behaviour vs Social Scientists 9 Beliefs about Lay Behaviour

As has alread y bee n discussed , whethe r tha y mak e it explici t or not , man y academi c socia l scientist s hol d variou s belief s abou t th e behaviou r (an d beliefs ) of lay people . Economist s devis e sophisticate d model s of the econ omy base d upo n axiomati c belief s abou t an individual' s purchasing , saving , etc. , strategies . Similarl y healt h educator s devis e instructiv e poster s an d othe r materia l base d on wha t the y thin k lay peopl e believ e abou t thei r health .

Lay and Scientific Theories

13

N \ \ \/ \ \x \ \ \ \ x \ ÜJ \\ \ \ \ \ Companionat e . \ \ marriage® . x \ \ \ Easie r divorc e law s ® \W \ \ \ Coloure d peopl e inferio r \x Sunda y observanc e® \ \ \ .® N \ \ \ ' ® s to old-fashione d \ ■ Jew o powerfu l s Abolis h abortio n ® % 0 X\\ >/ H a rhs * ®Floggin g and licensin g laws ^ D \ \ /treatm ® e®nDeat t h penalt y \ / \ r fo criminal s \ Remov e marriag e \ \ x /^ ®Anti-miscegenatio ® n bar on femal e teacher s v \ \ . Spar e the rod ® CONSERVATIS M RADICALIS M \ -— Nationalisatio n Abolis h Patriotis m ® forc e inefficien t privat e propert y t agains peac e \ \ Nocompulsor y N/ Giv e up nationa l ® sterilisatio n ^ \x χ \\ e religiou Maks educatio n sovereignt y _ ^ • \N \ compulsor φ y χ .\ ® Pacifis m \ v / \ \ \ \ :\\ \ \ \ \ Conscientiou s tobjector \ \ \ ®" Mak e birt h contro l illega l no traitor ss ®· \ \/ \ \ . x\ \\=v\ \ X \\ \ \ \ \ \ A \ X X\ \ \ x A \ ^ n \® Go back to religio \ \ \ \X ' \ \ \ \

FIG. 1.1. Distributio n of Attitude s with Respec t to Tough-Mindednes s and Radicalism . Reprinte d with permissio n from Eysenck , H. (Ed.) The PsychologicalBasisof Ideology Lancaster : MTP Press . Politician s hop e to presen t themselve s in accordanc e wit h the belie f system s of prospectiv e voters. Ther e has bee n ver y littl e wor k on the reason s for socia l scientists ' view s of huma n natur e an d huma n behaviou r thoug h thes e are ofte n implici t in the school s of though t withi n variou s academi c disciplines . 1.4 Som e Definitiona l Distinction s If on e is to discus s lay theorie s of huma n behaviou r it is importan t to describ e the feature s of a theor y an d distinguis h betwee n simila r concept s such as theory , mode l an d law . Indee d ther e are a whol e rang e of possibl y relevan t term s whic h ma y be used . Thes e include : adage , aphorism , attribu tion , axiom , belief , corollary , creed , definition , dictum , doctrine , explana tion , guess , heuristic , hunch , hypothesis , idea , law , maxim , metaphor , model , motto , observation , paradigm, postulate , principle , proverb , rule , rumination , theory , truism , etc . Althoug h dictionar y definition s ma y prov e interestin g the y are seldo m ver y usefu l in makin g carefu l workin g distinc tions . Fo r instanc e conside r Chambers ' New English Dictionary definition s of som e of the mor e commonl y use d terms : Hypothesis :

A propositio n or principl e put forth or stated (withou t any referenc e to its correspondenc e with fact) merel y as a basis for reasonin g or argument , or as a premis e from whic h to draw a conclusion ; a supposition . A suppositio n or conjectur e put forth to accoun t for known facts, especiall y in the sciences , a provisiona l suppositio n from which to draw conclusion s that shall be in accordanc e with know n facts

14

Lay Theories Law: Model: Paradigm: Principle:

Theory:

and which serve as a starting-poin t for further investigatio n by which it may be proved or disproved and the true theory arrived at. In the sciences of observation a theoretical principle deduced from particular facts, applicable to a defined group or class of phenomena , and expressable by the statement that a particular phenomeno n always occurs if certain conditions be present. A description of structure; something that accurately resembles something else; an archetypal image or pattern. A pattern, an example, exemplar. A fundamenta l truth or proposition,on which many others depend; a primary truth comprehendin g or forming the basis of, various subordinate truths; a general statement or tenet forming the (or a) ground of, or held to be essential to, a system of thought or belief; a fundamenta l assumption forming the basis of a chain of reasoning. A scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena ; a hypothesis that has been confirmed or established by observation or experiment and is propounded or accepted as accounting for the known facts; a statement of what are held to be the general laws, principles,or causes of something known or observed.

Fro m the few term s selecte d it appear s tha t thes e ma y be arrange d in som e sequentia l orde r reflectin g developments . Henc e a hypothesis , whic h ma y contai n a mode l or paradigm , precede s or is par t of a theor y whic h ma y or may not develo p int o a principl e or law . Eysenc k (1981 ) in fact spel t ou t thi s relationshi p (see Fig . 1.2) Alternative, — theor y Falsificatio n Verificatio n fObservatio n inductio n Hunch Hypothesi s Theory Law FIG. 1.2. Demarcation Theories of Science: A Unified Point of View. Reprinted with permission from Eysenck, H. (1981) A Modelfor Personality. Berlin: Springer-Verlag . He writes : At an early stage of development , we are reduced to fact-collectin g on the basis of vague hunches, serendipitou s discoveries of unforeseen regularities and inductive generalisations . When sufficient data have been collected along these lines, we are in the position of being able to put forward hypotheses of relatively small compass, and now the emphasis shifts to verification; unless we can verify these hypotheses, at least within the confines of certain parameter values, it is unlikely that they will be pursued further or interest other scientists. g proper, and Given that this stage is successfully passed, we enter the realm of theory-makin now falsification becomes the most important aspect of our experimenta l work. When a given theory is firmly established, it becomes a scientific law, and now the paradigm has become settled; only a revolution, sparked off by the accumulatio n of anomalous findings, and the emergence of an alternative theory, will dethrone such a theory. Thus what constitutes a scientific approach will depend on the degree of developmen t of a particular field; too rigorous a demand at too early a stage may well prevent the proper developmen t of

Lay and Scientific Theories

15

a disciplin e from ever takin g place , just as too lenien t a requiremen t at a later stage of developmen t will preven t the disciplin e from growin g up and assumin g its rightfu l place . (P.2) Earlie r Hul l (1943 ) ha s attempte d to spel l ou t th e natur e of scientifi c theory . He argued , from his strongl y hypothetico-deductiv e principl e thus : Scientifi c theor y in its ideal form consist s of a hierarch y of logicall y deduce d proposition s which paralle l all the observe d empirica l relationship s composin g a science . This logica l structur e is derive d from a relativel y smal l numbe r of self-consisten t primar y principle s called postulates , when taken in conjunctio n with relevan t anteceden t conditions . ... Empirica l observation , supplemente d by shrew d conjecture , is the main sourc e of the primar y principle s or postulate s of a science . Such formulations , when taken in variou s combination s togethe r with relevan t anteceden t conditions , yield inference s of theorems , of which some may agree with the empirica l outcom e of the condition s in question , and some may not. Primar y proposition s yieldin g logica l deduction s which consistentl y agree with the observe d empirica l outcom e are retained , wherea s those whic h disagre e are rejecte d or modified . As the sifting of this trial-and-erro r proces s continues , there graduall y emerge sa limited series of primar y principle s whose joint implication s are progressivel y more likely to agree with relevan t observations . Deduction s made from these survivin g postulates , while never absolutel y certain , do at length becom e highl y trustworthy , (pp. 381-382 ) Howeve r it shoul d be pointe d ou t tha t ther e is no accepte d agreemen t as to the use of thes e variou s terms . Fo r instanc e Valentin e (1982 ) has provide d rathe r differen t definition s for variou s terms : a hypothesis is a tentativ e law ; a postulate is an assumptio n of a theor y no t intende d to be subjecte d to empirica l test ; a system is a genera l theor y plu s metatheoretica l recommenda tions ; a law refer s to a relativel y wel l establishe d statemen t of regula r predictabl e relation s amon g empirica l variables . She appear s to be satisfie d with Marx' s (1976 ) definitio n of a theory as a "provisiona l explanator y proposition , or set of propositions , concernin g som e natura l phenomen a and consistin g of symboli c representation s of (1) th e observe d relationship s amon g (measured ) events , (2) th e mechanism s or structure s presume d to underli e suc h relationship s or (3) inferre d relationship s an d underlyin g mechanisms " (Valentine , 1982 , p . 90) . Similarl y she quote s Simo n an d Newel l (1956 ) to distinguis h model s fro m theories : the forme r (models ) are (a) usefu l rathe r tha n tru e (heuristi c aids , rathe r tha n complet e descriptions) , (b) less dat a sensitiv e (disconfirmin g evidenc e is damagin g to a theor y bu t no t necessaril y to a model ) an d (c) the y are mor e susceptibl e to Typ e II error s (mor e liabl e to mak e fals e claims) . The use of thes e "epistemological " term s is ope n to fad an d fashion . Furthermor e certai n term s ma y becom e linke d wit h specifi c peopl e or schools . Thu s th e ter m paradig m seem s inextricabl y linke d wit h Kuhn' s ideas . Ther e are therefor e no hard-and-fas t definition s in thi s area . Thu s term s like mode l an d paradig m or principl e an d theor y ma y be use d inter LT— C

16

Lay Theories

changeabl y by som e writers . Philosopher s of scienc e on the othe r han d in an attemp t to brin g orde r int o thi s are a hav e attempte d to taxonomis e or specif y differen t type s of models , theories , etc . Fo r instanc e Mar x (1970 ) ha s distinguishe d betwee n thre e type s of theor y (dependin g on the relationshi p betwee n theor y and data : deductive theor y — theoretica l generalisation s are induce d fro m observation s an d prediction s of futur e observation s ar e deduce d from theoretica l hypotheses ; functional theor y whic h is a restate men t of the data , wit h bot h dat a an d theor y bein g give n equa l weight ; an d inductive theor y wher e theoretica l statement s ar e simpl y summarie s of empirica l findings . Bu t as mos t reviewer s an d lexicographer s note , "theories " hav e man y meanings . Lace y (1976 ) in his Dictionary of Philosophy has noted : Theor y has variou s meanings : (i) Oneor more hypothese s or lawlik e statement s (eithe r of first two senses) , regarde d as speculative , (ii) A law abou t unobservable s like electron s or evolution , sometime s called a theor y becaus e evidenc e abou t unobservable s is felt to be inevitabl y inconclusive , (iii) A unifie d system of laws or hypotheses , with explanator y force (not merel y like a railwa y timetable) , (iv) A field of study (e.g. in philosophy ; theor y of knowledge , logica l theory) . These sense s sometime s shade into each other , (p. 110) Anothe r way of lookin g at definition s is to conside r thei r function . Thu s Sellti z et al. (1959 ) not e tha t * 'th e intentio n of a theor y in moder n scienc e is to summariz e existin g knowledge , to provid e an explanatio n for observe d event s and relationships , an d to predic t the occurrenc e of as yet unobserve d event s an d relationship s on the basi s of explanator y principle s embodie d in the theory " (p . 481) . Valentin e (1982 ) note s tha t theorie s serv e to summaris e and organis e dat a by bringin g orde r and coherenc e to material . The y also are attempt s at explanatio n an d serv e a heuristi c functio n of guidin g research . However , she doe s not e tha t som e (particularl y Skinner ) hav e pu t forwar d a case agains t theories , arguin g tha t the y creat e new problem s by givin g a fals e sens e of security . 1.5 How Doe s One Measure , Asses s or Investigat e Lay Theories ? The socia l science s as a whol e offe r a plethor a of methodologie s for studyin g socia l behaviour , eac h wit h its ow n distinc t advantage s an d disad vantages . Som e of th e mor e powerfu l techniques , however , suc h as labora tory and field experiments , seem less usefu l for lookin g at lay theorie s tha n othe r methods . Differen t methodologie s ma y be profitabl y use d to investigat e lay theorie s of huma n behaviour , suc h as thos e base d on self-report, thos e derive d fro m test data and thos e actuall y concerne d wit h observin g behaviour, as wel l as others. Thes e methodologie s ar e by no mean s exhaustiv e or mutuall y

Lay and Scientific Theories

17

exclusive , and ma y well overla p considerably . Othe r method s includ e ethno methodolog y an d ethogenic s (1) Self-Report

An obviou s way to "ge t at " lay theorie s of behaviou r is throug h listenin g to, or recordin g the answer s to , specifi c questions . Thi s ma y be don e throug h questionnaire s and survey s (i.e . pen-and-pape r exercises ) as well as interview s (i.e . face-to-fac e interviews) . Eac h ma y diffe r accordin g to the amount , typ e and qualit y of informatio n available , though , of course , on e ma y use mor e tha n one methodolog y at the sam e time . Therefore , as Furnha m (1983a ) and Forga s et al. (1982 ) did , on e can simpl y ask "Wha t cause s peopl e to becom e rich? " an d do a conten t analysi s on th e answers , whic h ma y or ma y no t reflec t theories ; bu t the y als o gav e peopl e variou s explanation s (classifie d a priori) whic h the y wer e requeste d to rate . Bot h yielde d comparabl e data . The use of questionnaire s wit h eithe r open-ende d or close d question s has obviou s advantage s an d disadvantages . Som e of thos e tha t hav e bee n psychometricall y assesse d an d ma y be usefu l for investigatin g genera l lay belief s abou t huma n natur e ma y be see n in Chapte r 2 . Questionnair e measure s have , however , bee n constantl y criticised , sometime s justl y an d sometime s not . Essentiall y ther e appea r to be fou r criticism s of frequentl y used questionnaires , chec k list s an d intervie w schedules . Th e firs t is th e proble m of response sets — socia l desirabilit y bias , fakin g goo d or bad , acquiescin g wit h thei r perceive d demand s of the researcher , etc . Thoug h thi s is an extremel y frequen t objectio n aime d particularl y at personalit y inventories , and ma y well be far less relevan t whe n investigatin g lay theories . In any event , the exten t to whic h respons e sets threate n the validit y of self repor t measure s ha s bee n challenge d by Furnha m (1986a) . Th e secon d objectio n is the limitatio n of self-repor t dat a in tha t peopl e ma y tell more than they know (Nisbet t an d Wilson , 1977 ) or simpl y be unabl e to repor t on certai n feature s suc h as thei r needs , motives , etc . Onc e agai n it is no t alway s clea r to wha t exten t thi s objectio n applie s to studie s on lay theorie s except , perhaps , th e cognitiv e processe s involve d in thei r maintenance . Thirdly , ther e are inevitabl e sampling problems whe n usin g self-repor t measure s suc h as questionnaire s (bu t no t interviews ) whic h are by definitio n limite d to the literate . Indee d interview s ar e als o biase d to th e articulate . Thus , bette r educated , highe r socioeconomi c classe s ma y be over-researche d whil e illiter ate or marginall y articulat e peopl e are neglected . It ma y wel l be tha t the latte r grou p hold s qualitativel y as wel l as quantitativel y differen t theorie s tha t do not get sufficientl y researched . Finally , ther e is alway s th e proble m in standar d questionnaire s of imposin g th e researchers ' ow n cognitiv e con struct s on to the respondents , rathe r tha n allowin g the m to revea l the rang e and conten t of thei r own constructs. Thi s is a well-know n objection , favoure d by follower s of Kell y (1955 ) an d his persona l construc t theory .

18

La y Theorie s

Onc e again , thi s is probabl y less tru e of studie s in lay theories , wher e open ende d question s are frequentl y use d in whic h subject s ma y respon d entirel y in thei r ow n words . Som e researcher s suc h as Harr e (1984 ) woul d aim to gathe r "accounts " whic h are full an d free description s of socia l episode s whic h coul d be use d to revea l people' s understandin g of the worl d in general . (2) Test Data A numbe r of differen t type s of test s ma y be use d to attemp t to ascertai n lay theorie s or knowledge . Consider , for instance , the possibilit y of usin g studie s of memory. Man y studie s hav e supporte d th e selectiv e recal l hypothesi s whic h suggest s tha t peopl e remembe r informatio n bette r if it is congruen t with thei r attitudes , becaus e the attitude s or belief s act as a typ e of organisin g framewor k whic h tend s to promot e th e encodin g an d retrieva l of attitude suppor t material . Thi s ha s bee n demonstrate d wit h religious , politica l an d sexua l stimulu s material , thoug h no t all attempt s hav e supporte d th e hypotheses . A recen t stud y by Furnha m and Sing h (1987 ) teste d the hypothe sis by gettin g male s and female s to liste n to a tap e tha t liste d 30 "facts " abou t sex difference s (15 pro-female ; 15 pro-male) . The y wer e als o teste d on thei r attitude s toward s women . In accordanc e wit h the hypothesi s the y foun d tha t male s an d thos e subject s wit h mor e negativ e attitude s toward s women , recalle d (fre e an d cued ) less pro - and mor e anti-femal e item s and vice versa . Thus , by givin g lay peopl e materia l to proces s (read , watch , liste n to , etc. ) and the n askin g the n to recal l as muc h as the y can of it, variou s organisin g schem a ma y becom e apparent whic h shap e othe r theories . A secon d (relativel y obscure ) tes t metho d involve s askin g peopl e to deliberately dissimilate in test s (tha t is, no t necessaril y giv e the correc t or preferre d answer s bu t the one the y expec t a particula r typ e of perso n to give) . For instance , if a perso n is aske d to respon d to a tes t as the y believ e an accountan t might , an d thei r resultan t profil e is tha t of an obsessive , boring , non-spontaneou s person , on e ma y argu e tha t thi s is th e stereotyp e th e responden t ha s abou t accountants . Similarly , if, whe n aske d to fak e goo d respondents , the y produc e a healthy , adjusted , intelligent , etc. , profile , on e may argu e tha t the y hav e understoo d the underlyin g dimensio n investigate d by the researche r (Furnham , 1986a ; McCarth y an d Furnham , 1986) . Simi larly , if a perso n can predict thei r scor e accuratel y on a tes t (of personality , ability , skill , etc. ) one ma y conclud e tha t the y are familia r wit h the concep t bein g tested . Thu s if you aske d non-alcoholic s to "preten d to be an alcoholic " and the n intervie w the m regardin g thei r drinkin g habit s and motives , as well as othe r feature s of thei r socia l behaviour , on e migh t elici t th e full subtlet y an d complexit y of thei r belief s an d theorie s abou t alcoholism . Furthermore , if they wer e require d to predic t thei r scor e on som e alcoholis m relate d test , thi s

Lay and Scientific Theories

19

too ma y yiel d interestin g insight s int o thei r theorie s of the manifestation s of alcoholism . Ther e ar e numerou s othe r way s in whic h tes t dat a migh t be use d to investigat e lay theories . Thes e includ e usin g selectiv e attentio n tests , mea sure s of preconsciou s processing . A metho d whic h appear s to be attractin g mor e attentio n an d is highl y relevan t in thi s fiel d is th e developmen t of prototypes . Horowit z et al. (1981a,b ) devise d a metho d for developin g prototype s of depression , whic h chang e wit h experienc e an d are theoretica l standard s agains t whic h example s ca n be measured . Eac h wil l have , of course , differen t advantage s an d disadvantage s regardin g th e qualit y an d typ e of informatio n on lay theories . (3) Observing Behaviour

Becaus e of the problem s associate d wit h self-repor t som e researcher s hav e preferre d to observ e behaviou r an d infe r attitudes , belief s and theorie s from it. Thus , if a perso n is know n to be attemptin g to los e weigh t an d substan tiall y reduce s his or her intak e of carbohydrates , on e ma y infe r tha t he or she believe s carbohydrate s are fattening . However , on e canno t kno w muc h mor e tha n this , whic h itsel f ma y no t be ver y informative . Fo r instance , one canno t kno w whethe r th e perso n believe s carbohydrate s are mor e or less fattenin g tha n protein s or anima l fats ; indee d on e canno t eve n kno w whethe r th e perso n know s wha t carbohydrate s ar e or if he or she is jus t followin g instruction s fro m a boo k as to wha t to sto p eating . Simpl e observatio n of behaviou r ma y no t be ver y usefu l at all in researchin g lay theorie s for huma n behaviour , particularl y as the relationshi p betwee n attitude s and behaviou r is know n to be wea k an d mediate d by man y othe r factors . Participant observation on th e othe r han d ma y be muc h mor e useful , as one can observ e contextua l an d socia l determinant s of behaviou r ove r time , whic h ma y lead to man y mor e cue s as to the natur e of lay theories . However , as participan t observatio n nearl y alway s involve s direc t interactio n betwee n researche r an d respondent , it coul d be see n to shar e all the advantage s an d disadvantage s of the self-repor t methods . It is, then , no t surprisin g tha t mos t of th e researc h reporte d in thi s boo k concern s self-repor t data . 1.6 Conclusio n In an attemp t to mak e sens e of th e socia l an d physica l worl d to see it as stable , orderly , predictabl e an d understandable , peopl e develo p theorie s or arriv e at explanation s for phenomen a salien t to thei r lives . Throug h obser vation , exposur e to others , the medi a and persona l experienc e peopl e becom e familia r wit h "ho w thing s work" . Thes e theorie s — or belie f system s — are frequentl y differen t fro m th e sor t of theorie s on e ma y find in the physica l or

20

Lay Theories

socia l science s or the humanities , partl y becaus e the y fulfi l differen t func tions . Ther e are enormou s individua l difference s in the qualit y an d quantit y of theorie s tha t peopl e hold . Thes e difference s occu r partl y as a functio n of experienc e (education , interests ) bu t als o as a functio n of necessity , e.g . farmer s no doub t hav e mor e comple x meteorologica l theorie s tha n shop assistants , youn g parent s mor e varie d theorie s of chil d developmen t tha n thos e choosin g no t to hav e children . Scientist s an d othe r academics , whos e profession s involv e th e refinemen t an d developmen t of theories , ma y be highl y sophisticate d in the expositio n and testin g of theorie s in thei r ow n are a or discipline , bu t naiv e in thei r understandin g of othe r phenomena . Hence , a brillian t physicis t ma y hav e highl y simplistic , eve n misleadin g notion s abou t the cause s of alcoholism , or the bes t predictor s of academi c excellence . Thus , one ma y be at onc e bot h naiv e an d sophisticated , comple x an d simple . In othe r word s a perso n ma y be a "scientist' ' wit h regar d to theor y abou t certai n phenomenon , bu t a "la y person " in othe r areas . It is therefor e no t the aim of this boo k to dra w clea r distinction s betwee n scientifi c metho d an d theor y (whethe r in the physica l or socia l sciences ) and lay theories . No r can thi s be a discours e on the philosoph y of scienc e an d distinction s betwee n th e natura l and socia l sciences . It has bee n argue d tha t the distinctio n betwee n lay and scientifi c theorie s is by no mean s clear . Variou s distinction s wer e mad e whic h ma y be usefu l in clarifyin g wha t may constitut e a scientific , as oppose d to a lay theory , thoug h it shoul d be admitte d tha t man y theorie s accepte d as scientifi c do no t fulfi l thes e criteria , whil e man y lay theorie s do . It was als o suggeste d tha t the stud y of lay theorie s merite d scientifi c researc h an d variou s aspect s of thes e theorie s wer e developed . Fo r instance , it was argue d tha t lay theorie s wer e bot h hel d and develope d by peopl e becaus e the y fulfille d variou s functions . Hewston e (1983 ) has suggeste d thre e function s of lay theories : the contro l functio n (to achiev e som e contro l throug h understandin g of caus e and effect s in th e physica l an d socia l world) , th e self-estee m functio n (t o protect , validat e and enhanc e feeling s of persona l wort h an d effectiveness ) an d self presentatio n functio n (to gai n publi c approva l an d avoi d embarrassment) . Thu s it is quit e possibl e tha t differen t theorie s fulfi l differen t function s an d misleadin g to sugges t tha t all lay theorie s fulfi l th e sam e function . Curiously , Maslo w (1969 ) ha s liste d wha t he call s cognitiv e pathologie s whic h are "anxiety-instigate d clinicall y observe d expression s of ou r need s to know" . It is suggeste d tha t thes e cognitiv e needs , suc h as intoleranc e of ambiguit y a compulsiv e nee d for certaint y and prematur e generalisatio n lead to the developmen t of poo r theories . Fo r Maslo w (1969) : The path to the full truth is a rocky one. Full knowin g is difficult . This is true not only for the layma n but also for the scientist . The main differenc e betwee n him and the layma n is that he has enliste d on this searc h for truth deliberately , willingly , and consciousl y and that he then proceed s to learn as much as he can about technique s and ethics of truth-seeking. Indeed ,

Lay and Scientific Theories

21

science in general can be considered a technique with which fallible men try to outwit their own human propensities to fear the truth, to avoid it, and to distort it. (p. 29) Harr e (1984 ) too is sceptica l abou t the empirica l method s use d by psychol ogist s and the theorie s the y deriv e from them .

2 Commo Natur

n Sens

e an d Huma

n

e 2.1 Introductio n

Ove r the las t decad e or so , socia l psycholog y ha s bee n dominate d by the stud y of socia l cognitio n whic h stresse s tha t the way to understan d comple x socia l behaviou r is throug h studyin g ho w peopl e process , represen t an d utilis e informatio n abou t themselves , other s an d the socia l world . Cognitiv e socia l psycholog y als o assume s tha t thes e processe s are dependen t on variou s othe r factor s suc h as emotiona l states , motivation , contextua l factors , as well as thinkin g style s or preferences . Ther e appea r to be tw o basi c strand s to thi s research . Th e firs t concern s socia l categorisatio n an d knowledge . Perhap s the bes t way to summaris e thi s approac h is to list the five genera l question s tha t Canto r et al. (1982 ) believ e to be importan t in the area :

1. The Multipl e Focu s question : What are the variou s differen t overarchin g scheme s that people use to organis e and categoris e social experience ? 2. The Accessibilit y question : Are some organisation s and construction s very accessibl e and frequentl y and easily used to structur e and encod e social experience ? 3. The Structur e question : How orderly , complex , and concensuall y agree d upon are the internal , cognitiv e representation s of socia l experience ? 4. The Conten t question : What kinds of informatio n do we represen t and store about social experience ? 5. The Functio n question : How and unde r what condition s is socia l knowledg e used in generatin g and plannin g social behaviour ? (p. 33) The secon d are a of researc h — attributio n theor y — is concerne d wit h how or why ordinar y peopl e explai n events . Variou s theorie s hav e bee n develope d and extensivel y tested , an d variou s criticism s hav e bee n mad e of them . Perhap s the two mos t relevan t criticism s of the theorie s concer n how muc h actua l thinkin g or processin g the layma n doe s and whethe r the logica l model s develope d are impossibl y comple x an d sophisticate d for th e lay thinker . As ther e is so muc h evidenc e for erro r an d bia s sophisticatio n in everyda y thinkin g make s mos t model s appea r inappropriate . Fo r instance , Hanse n (1980 ) suggest s tha t peopl e mak e inference s an d deriv e theorie s in th e cognitivel y easies t ways . Peopl e loo k at problem s wit h hypothese s and henc e 22

Common Sense and Human Nature

23

look of confirmatio n of thes e expectations . If the y find them , the y loo k no further . The y do no t see k ou t an d evaluat e co-occurrin g factor s if thei r expectance s are confirmed . Others , suc h as Jaspar s (1983a ) hav e agree d tha t error s in common-sens e reasonin g are du e no t so muc h to misperceivin g the informatio n available , bu t are the consequence s of the sequenc e of process ing information . Rathe r tha n goin g fro m th e genera l to th e specific , common-sens e explanation s ofte n star t wit h the specific , bu t do no t alway s correctl y or appropriatel y generalise . Secondly , muc h attributio n theor y researc h wor k has concerne d everyda y understanding s of problem s of physica l causatio n and no t socia l issues . Mos t lay theorie s are abou t intra-personal , inter-persona l an d socia l issues , yet the theorie s an d researc h hav e neglecte d ho w peopl e explai n suc h thing s as delinquency , wealth , alcoholism , etc . In a sense , attributio n theorist s hav e concentrate d on "ma n th e psychologist' ' no t "ma n th e sociologist" , ignor ing how peopl e com e to understan d sociologica l issues . Other s hav e attempte d to dra w togethe r variou s strand s in th e abov e traditions . Fo r instanc e Kruglansk i (1980 ) ha s develope d a theor y of lay epistemolog y whic h assume s tha t all knowledg e is comprise d of belief s wit h an orientin g structure , specifi c conten t and suppose d validit y or truthfulness . All belief s are validate d by deductiv e logi c (onl y if X, the n Y) and confidenc e derive s fro m logica l consistenc y amon g propositions , whil e awarenes s of inconsistenc y result s in doub t an d confusion . He believe s tha t all knowledg e seekin g behaviou r follow s a stric t sequenc e — the formulatio n of a proble m whic h ma y hav e severa l mutuall y exclusiv e proposition s and proble m evalua tion or validit y testing . It is an impressiv e attemp t to devis e a conten t and proces s mode l tha t evaluate s and compare s variou s attributio n theories . He is not withou t his critic s (Effler , (1984 ) an d he doe s attemp t to answe r the m (Kruglanski , 1984) . However , it shoul d no t be though t tha t all thi s wor k on lay theorie s ha s reveale d th e superiorit y of "scientific " theorie s ove r lay theories . Curiously , on e tes t of a psychologica l theor y ma y be the exten t to whic h it form s par t of th e layman' s theory . Bud d an d Spence r (1986 ) demonstrat e tha t Fishbein' s attitude-behaviou r theor y form s par t of a lay person' s intuitiv e psycholog y of intention , an d tha t thi s lay theor y or intuitiv e psycholog y "ma y act as a sourc e of respons e bia s whic h motivate s peopl e to creat e consistenc y betwee n th e component s of th e theor y of reasone d actio n whe n completin g questionnaire s whic h measur e the model' s constructs " (p . 109) . In othe r word s if peopl e hol d lay theorie s simila r or identica l to scientifi c theories , an d if the y see tha t thes e (latter ) theorie s are bein g tested , the y are likel y to respon d in a way whic h confirm s them . Other s suc h as Reiche r an d Potte r (1985 ) hav e argue d tha t "scientific " theorie s of crow d event s are erroneous , in par t becaus e the y hav e take n the perspectiv e of th e outsider . Thus , forma l theorie s stres s the anonymit y of crow d member s an d emphasis e the negativit y of crow d events , whil e crow d member s themselve s stres s th e meaningfulnes s of crow d action , solidarit y

24

Lay Theories

and positiv e emotions . In othe r words , the perspectiv e of the theoris t be he or she "lay " or ''scientific' ' inevitabl y effect s th e typ e of theor y tha t emerges . Finally , it has bee n suggeste d tha t man y socia l psychologica l theorie s are in fact no t even ope n to empirica l investigation . Burto n (1986 ) for instance , has argue d tha t Heider' s naiv e analysi s of actio n is an empirica l syste m of neccessar y relation s embedde d in the language . Nearl y all the researc h in thi s area has concerne d itsel f wit h th e conten t of th e layman' s knowledg e an d informatio n processing . Th e concep t of commo n sens e reoccur s frequentl y and it is to thi s tha t we now turn . 2.2 Commo n Sens e To man y laymen , the theorie s the y com e acros s in a numbe r of the socia l science s — psychology , management , sociology , criminolog y — are commo n sense . Tha t is, the theorie s or finding s are alread y well known , and henc e the researc h is though t to be a trivial , expensiv e and pointles s exercis e describin g or provin g wha t we alread y know . Bein g sensitiv e to thi s criticism , whic h is naturall y seen as misplaced , socia l scientist s hav e ofte n confronte d thi s poin t at th e beginnin g of thei r textbooks , warnin g reader s of th e danger s of commo n sens e whic h lull s peopl e int o the fals e belie f tha t the y understan d other s (Lindgre n an d Harvey , 1981) . Som e hav e eve n provocativel y men tione d th e ter m "uncommo n sense " in thei r paper s an d title s (Gammack , 1982) . For instance , McKeachi e an d Doyl e (1966 ) begi n thei r genera l psycholog y textboo k askin g ho w is a scientifi c explanatio n differen t fro m commo n sense , and presen t the followin g figur e an d explanatio n (Fig . 2.1) . k befor e yo u Lea p | * ^ 2 C Loo He wh o hesitate ss i los t C^"" " u sow,s o shal l yo u reap | ^ g s ^ J U\s yo Tim e and chanc e rulet h ove r the m al

0^2?^

, out of min d | = ^ 2 C Out of sight Absenc e make s the hear t gro w fonde r

C^ =

r too old to lear n | = ^ 3 C Neve s You can' t teac h an olddog new trick

GL ^

s mak e the ma n | ^%5^j L Clothe You can' t mak e a silk purs e ou t of a sow' s ear Q ^ g"^ "

FIG.2.1. The Troubl e with Folk Wisdo m is that it Gives No Guide for Determinin g

Which of Two Contradictor y Saying s is Appropriat e in a Particula r Situation . Thus the Usefulnes s of Such Saying s is Quite Limited . Reprinte d with permissio n from McKeachie , W. and Doyle , C. (1966 ) Psychology.Reading , Mass : Addison-Wesley .

Thus , it is argue d tha t commo n sens e canno t tell us unde r whic h condition s

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each generalisation is true — for that scientific research is required (Fletcher, 1984). Others have attempted to persuade readers that common knowledge provides only inconsistent and misleading suggestions for understanding social behaviour by giving a short test. Baron and Byrne (1981), in their popular textbook on social psychology ask the following 10 questions each of which has a True-False response format: the numbers in parentheses indicate the number who got the answer correct by putting false in a study by Furnham (1985b)

1. In general, women conform more than men. (42%) 2. In bargaining with others, it is best to start with a moderate offer — one close to the final agreement desired. (63%) 3. In making decisions, committees tend to be more conservative than individuals. (18%) 4. Dangerous riots are most likely to occur when temperatures reach extremely high levels (e.g. around 95-100°). (54%) 5. The more persons present at the scene of an emergency, the more likely are the victims to receive help. (82%) 6. If you pay someone for doing something they enjoy, they will come to like this task even more. (46%) 7. In choosing their romantic partners, most people show a strong preference for extremely attractive persons. (51%) 8. If you want to get someone to change his or her views, it is best to offer this person a very large reward for doing so. (77%) 9. When a stranger stands very close to us, we usually interpret this as a sign of friendliness and react in a positive manner. (68%) 10. Most people feel sympathy for the victims of serious accidents or natural disasters and do not hold such persons responsible for the harm they have suffered. (8%) They later assure the reader that research findings suggest that all these statements axe false. Similarly in a book on Organizational Behaviour Baron (1983) offers a similar quiz, again where all the answers are false. Items include:

1. Unpleasant environmental conditions (e.g. crowding, loud noise, high temperatures) produce immediate reductions in performance on many tasks. 2. Directive, authoritative leaders are generally best in attaining high levels of productivity from their subordinates. 3. In most cases, individuals act in ways that are consistent with their attitudes about various issues. 4. Top executives are usually extremely competitive, hard-driving types. 5. Most persons are much more concerned with the size of their own salary than with the salary of others.

26

Lay Theories

6. Direct , face-to-fac e communicatio n usuall y enhance s co-operatio n betwee n individuals . 7. Mos t person s prefe r challengin g job s wit h a grea t dea l of freedo m an d autonomy . Som e hav e explicitl y contraste d "scientific " vs "lay " account s of event s (Reiche r an d Potter , 1985) . Other s hav e take n specifi c proverb s an d attempte d to tes t them . Sigelma n (1981 ) attempte d to tes t — usin g Genera l Socia l Survey s — the fol k prover b "ignoranc e is bliss" . Fro m his fairl y extensiv e an d well-analyse d stud y he argue d for the rejectio n of the age-ol d notion . On the othe r han d Mische l and Mische l (1981 ) foun d tha t eve n 9- and 11-year-ol d childre n coul d predic t som e of the mos t basi c empirica l studie s in psychologica l research . Furnha m (1983b ) has suggeste d tha t the "commo n sens e objection " ma y howeve r tak e thre e forms . Th e firs t — tha t th e finding s ar e wel l known , intuitive , unsurprising , uninformative , etc . — ha s bee n discussed . Th e secon d is partl y the obvers e — tha t is, academi c discipline s whic h investigat e issue s whic h are the "stuf f of persona l experience " (perso n perception , jo b motivation , lov e an d attraction ) hav e tende d — eithe r by use of excessiv e jargo n or technica l language , or the focusin g on minute , esoteric , trivia l or irrelevan t aspect s of socia l behaviou r — to debas e or corrup t commo n sense . Tha t is, topic s tha t are amenabl e to commo n sens e shoul d hav e explanation s in term s of commo n sense . A third , related , objectio n occur s whe n experimenta l finding s or socia l scienc e writing s appea r to contradic t widel y hel d view s of huma n nature . Nearl y all socia l psychologica l finding s whic h hav e demonstrate d tha t peopl e are cruel , uninsightful , self-centred , compliant , antisocia l hav e bee n criti cised mor e tha n thos e tha t hav e painte d the opposit e pictur e (Milgram , 1974 ; Zimbard o et al, 1973) . Tha t is, wher e finding s are agains t the consensus , or commo n sense , of peopl e bein g basicall y good , altruistic , intelligent , etc. , objection s are made . It is no t onl y socia l scientist s wh o hav e ha d to answe r th e "contrar y to huma n nature " argumen t of lay people . Politician s too , particularl y of the left, hav e attempte d to counte r th e argumen t tha t huma n being s are solel y motivate d by competitive , self-interest , rathe r tha n co-operativ e sharing . In a boo k entitle d Why You Should be a Socialist Pau l Foo t (1977 ) argues : What' s good and what' s bad in huma n natur e is decide d by the kind of societ y peopl e live in. If the main purpos e of societ y is to make a fortun e for a few, then the virtue s which societ y extols will be the virtue s of the fortune-maker s —meanness , competition , "to hell with your neighbour" , "stuf f your pocket s never mind the other man's" , "advanc e your children , abuse other people's" , "love your God, Quee n and country , hate the peopl e aroun d you". If societ y is controlle d by the peopl e who work , in the interest s of the peopl e who work , then societ y will encourage anothe r side of huma n nature : co-operatio n and concer n for others , poolin g of skills and resources , stop the ruffia n and exploiter , (p. 40) Indeed , som e Marxist s believ e commo n sens e actors ' account s are epiphe -

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27

nomena l fals e consciousness . Tha t is , despit e th e fac t tha t peopl e believ e personalit y difference s to be the cause s of thei r ow n an d others ' behaviou r it is reall y onl y economi c factor s tha t ar e th e fundamenta l cause s of huma n behaviour . Stroeb e (1980 ) ha s argue d tha t man y socia l psychologica l theorie s ar e intuitiv e an d therefor e no t easil y abandone d in th e fac e of contradictor y evidence . He mention s the complementar y need s hypothesi s whic h ha s no t been replicate d or supporte d in ove r tw o doze n attempt s to tes t it. "Despit e this devastatin g record , th e theor y is stil l presente d in mos t attractio n an d socia l psycholog y textbooks . It jus t make s to o muc h sens e that , for example , somebod y wh o love s to pus h peopl e aroun d shoul d get alon g bette r wit h a spous e wh o prefer s bein g pushe d tha n pushing " (p . 186) . Thu s the objectio n of "commo n sense " is fairl y comple x an d ma y tak e variou s forms . Yet no t all academic s see thi s as a problem . Paradoxically , it is the * 'hard " scientists , wh o are mos t convince d tha t all scienc e is jus t commo n sense . Huxle y (1902 ) note d in an essay : Scienc e is nothin g but traine d and organise d Commo n Sense , differin g from the latter only as a vetera n may differ from a raw recruit : and its method s differ from those of Commo n Sense only as far as the guardsman' s cut and thrus t differ from the manne r in which asavag e wield s his club . . . (p. 42) Also Whitehea d is repute d to hav e said tha t "Scienc e is roote d in the whol e apparatu s of Commo n Sens e thought" . Thi s ide a of organised , disambi guate d commo n sens e is als o supporte d by Roc k (1979) , wh o suggeste d tha t all the differen t academi c theorie s of crim e an d delinquenc y are to be foun d in common-sens e formulations : Commo n Sense can neithe r be wholl y incorporate d nor wholl y abandoned . Rathe r it is typicall y subjecte d to a doubl e form of exploitation . . . . Ideas of anomie , differential , association , relativ e deprivation , functiona l interdependence , conflict , and labellin g theor y may all be found in folk wisdom , early tracts , and conventiona l explanation . They represen t parts of the commo n stock of everyda y analysis . It is only the tendenc y of criminologica l discours e to becom e independen t that render s such formulation s academicall y novel and remarkable . They have to be restructure d befor e they becom e availabl e to criminologica l enquiry . Restructurin g may resolv e contradictions , uneart h implications , and refine arguments . But it also sets up a barrie r to participatio n in the large r conversatio n of ideas . The criminologis t is at once unusuall y sophisticate d and unusuall y simple , (p. 78) Similarly , as Brickma n (1980 ) ha s pointe d out , becaus e socia l scienc e return s its finding s to th e genera l culture , the y ar e ap t to becom e mor e familia r an d commo n sensica l ove r time . A findin g in social psycholog y canno t remai n non obviou s as peopl e hear it again any more than a joke can remai n funny to peopl e who hear it again and again . More generally , we may propos e that discoverie s emerg e from a regio n in which we disbeliev e them into a zone in which we find them interesting , and then a zone in whic h we find them obvious , and eventuall y perhaps , into a furthe r regio n in which we are again obliviou s to them. (p. 12) However , thi s view of th e socia l scientis t as a taxonomis t an d disam -

28

Lay Theories

biguato r of commo n sens e canno t explai n how counter-intuitiv e theorie s or idea s occu r (Peters , 1960) . As Gerge n (1980 ) has noted : "Thi s present s us with a specia l paradox : if one' s understandin g inevitabl y depend s on existin g interpretativ e modes , how can on e engende r 'interpretation ' tha t is alie n to the existin g modes , If 'Commo n Sense ' is employe d as the instrumen t of understanding , how can on e absor b an argumen t tha t violate s 'Commo n Sense. ' " (p . 263) . Indee d on e coul d ask ho w someon e suc h as Freu d develope d so man y completel y counter-intuitiv e theorie s of huma n beha viour . Furthermore , thi s positio n doe s no t explai n th e man y theoretica l an d methodologica l difference s betwee n socia l scientists . Tha t is, if socia l scienc e is simpl y commo n sens e why do we find so muc h disagreemen t amon g socia l scientists ? Of course , on e migh t repl y tha t the ver y contradictor y natur e of psychologica l theorie s prove s tha t the y are simpl y commo n sens e becaus e commo n sens e is itsel f contradictory . Othe r scientist s hav e dismisse d commo n sens e as a sourc e of ideas , let alon e testabl e theories : som e psychologist s hav e bee n particularl y dismissiv e of the importanc e of commo n sense . Skinne r (1972 ) wrote : "What , afte r all , hav e we to sho w for non-scientifi c or prescientifi c goo d judgement , or commo n sense , or th e insight s gaine d throug h persona l experience ? It is scienc e of nothing ' (p . 160) . Similarly , Broadben t (1961) , Cattel l (1965 ) and other s hav e talke d abou t prescientifi c or moralisti c thinkin g whic h is to be ignore d as wrong , unabl e to be proven , etc . Eysenc k (1957 ) in his celebrate d boo k Sense and Nonsense in Psychology states : This is only one exampl e of what appear s to be an almos t universa l belief to the effect that anyon e is competen t to discus s psychologica l problems , whethe r he has taken the troubl e to study the subjec t or not and that while everybody' s opinio n is of equa l value , that of the professiona l psychologis t must be exclude d at all costs becaus e he migh t spoil the fun by producin g some facts whic h woul d completel y upset the speculatio n and the wonderfu l dreamcastle s so laboriousl y constructe d by the layman , (p. 13) Thu s for thes e eminen t psychologist s commo n sens e is a dangerou s are a from whic h to dra w idea s as the y are ofte n misguide d or untestable . Eve n worse , variou s "common-sense " idea s ma y be base d no t on simpl e surmis e but prejudic e an d politica l ideology . Moreove r on e can cite extensiv e litera ture tha t illustrate s lay persons ' "faulty " reasoning , e.g . th e repeatedl y observe d failur e of lay peopl e to mak e appropriat e use of disconfirmator y informatio n in proble m solvin g and the overwhelmin g preferenc e for confir mator y strategie s in logica l reasonin g tasks . A slightl y stronge r and mor e popula r criticis m of socia l scienc e as commo n sens e is tha t ofte n commo n sens e notion s are unclear , ambiguous , inconsis tent , and occasionall y contradictory . On e way of illustratin g thi s poin t is to produc e contradictor y idiom s as don e by McKeachi e and Doyl e (1966 ) (see pag e 2). Of course , it coul d be pointe d ou t tha t bot h supposedl y contradic tory saying s ma y in fac t be compatible , whe n the y are mad e specifi c for

Common Sense and Human Nature

29

certai n circumstances . Thus , it migh t be tha t on e is "neve r to o old to learn " certai n verba l tasks ; however , whe n it come s to reaction-tim e skills , "yo u can' t teac h an old dog new tricks" . Similarly , "ou t of sigh t ou t of mind " may appl y to an acquaintanc e or distan t relativ e bu t "absenc e make s the hear t grow fonder " to a love r or clos e friends . However , the standar d argumen t advance d is tha t of McKeachi e and Doyl e (1966 ) namely: ' ' A majo r weaknes s of all thes e pre-scientifi c mode s of explanatio n — superstition , Commo n Sense , an d intuitiv e philosoph y — is tha t contradictor y prediction s an d explanation s are offere d withou t an y mean s of resolvin g th e differences " (p. 3). Thi s discussio n beg s the questio n as to wha t constitute s commo n sense . Indee d man y are no t sur e wha t the ter m actuall y refer s to (Sehwieso , 1984) . Althoug h Descarte s sai d tha t commo n sens e is th e bes t distribute d com modit y in th e world , becaus e everyon e is convince d tha t the y ar e wel l supplie d wit h it, it remain s quit e unclea r wha t it is. Differen t writer s hav e describe d it differently : "th e layman' s conviction " (Köhler , 1947) , "goo d sense " (Ryle , 1949) , "intuitiv e philosophy " (McKeachi e and Doyle , 1966) , "prescientifi c goo d judgement " (Skinner , 1972) . Schwies o (1984 ) has exa mine d fou r terms : commo n sensation , ordinar y intelligence , goo d sens e and commo n opinion , whic h he argue s hav e subtl e differen t meaning s bu t stil l offe r no clea r workin g definitio n of commo n sense . Fletche r (1984 ) ha s suggeste d tha t thre e aspect s of commo n sens e nee d to be delineated :

1. Commo n sens e as a set of share d fundamenta l assumption s abou t th e natur e of the socia l and physica l world . Thes e assumption s are though t to be culturall y unanimousl y held ; neve r questioned , justifie d or eve n articulated ; an d whic h are th e ver y stuf f of philosophy . Example s are , accordin g to Fletcher : tha t the worl d exist s independentl y of ou r percep tion of it; tha t othe r peopl e posses s state s of consciou s awareness , tha t we are the sam e perso n from da y to day . 2. Commo n sens e as a set of cultura l maxim s an d share d belief s abou t the socia l an d physica l world . Thes e assumption s in the for m of proverbs , allegorie s an d fables , ar e highl y invarian t acros s an d withi n culture s as regard s to whethe r the y ar e know n or believed . Example s includ e tha t sever e punishmen t deter s criminals , tha t the unemploye d are lazy and tha t our countr y need s a powerfu l arm y to survive . 3. Commo n sens e as a share d way of thinkin g abou t the socia l and physica l world . Thes e are tacitl y know n menta l processe s involve d in explaining , interpretin g an d understandin g th e behaviou r of self an d others . Essen tiall y thi s concern s all aspect s of lay socia l cognitio n and the way s in whic h peopl e proces s informatio n abou t thei r world . In the secon d par t of his pape r Fletche r (1984 ) is specificall y concerne d with how psychologist s tur n taci t common-sens e knowledg e int o explici t knowledge . On e wa y is throug h th e conceptua l scheme s embedde d in

30

Lay Theories

everyda y language . "Conceptua l analysi s is onl y on e way of assessin g ou r common-sens e cognitiv e schemata . Lik e all investigativ e techniques , it has its drawback s an d weaknesses , so tha t a rang e of othe r empirica l investigativ e researc h strategie s wil l be neede d to explicat e ou r commo n sens e cognitiv e schemata " (p . 210) . However , Fletche r argue s tha t commo n sens e is a valuable , bu t difficul t an d dangerou s resourc e for psychologist s precisel y becaus e it operate s silentl y an d implicitl y in psychologists ' thinkin g an d analysi s abou t lay people' s commo n sense . A relate d issu e concern s wha t socia l scientist s shoul d kno w abou t commo n sens e — in othe r word s wha t aspec t of everyda y lay account s shoul d be investigated . Fo r instanc e whe n considerin g lay or common-sens e belief s abou t the econom y Furnha m and Lewi s (1986 ) argue d tha t one need s to kno w the development , function , stabilit y and consistency , consequences , chang e and manipulatio n an d structur e of common-sens e belief s abou t th e economy . In psychology , the attributio n theorists , notabl y Heide r (1958 ) and Kelle y (1973 ) hav e attempte d to loo k no t so muc h at the content of commo n sens e bu t the cognitiv e processes involved . The y are essentiall y attempt s to explicitl y formalis e ou r common-sens e understandin g of causit y an d per sona l responsibility . Mos t attributio n theorist s appea r to be impresse d by the complexit y of the proces s and the profundit y of the conten t rathe r tha n bein g simpl y dismissive . Nearl y all th e psychologica l studie s in socia l cognitio n hav e bee n proces s oriented , attemptin g to describ e the proces s by whic h lay peopl e mak e sens e of (explain ) thei r worlds . Yet as Sillar s (1982 ) has noted : 'Th e portrai t of socia l actor s depicte d by attributio n theor y is plurastic . Peopl e ar e bot h reflectiv e an d spontaneous , rationa l an d rationalising , logica l an d illogical . Th e curren t proble m is how to integrat e differen t processes " (p . 96) . In fac t Whit e (1984 ) has suggeste d tha t psychologist s are wron g in adoptin g statistical , logica l an d scientifi c criteri a as optima l or necessar y for th e stud y of lay inference , whe n in fac t th e fulfilmen t of practica l criteri a is a muc h bette r criterion . Wherea s ther e appear s to be a modicu m of agreemen t as to how commo n sens e explanation s of actio n are to be researche d in psycholog y — tha t is the natur e of the question s to ask — the sam e canno t be said for philosoph y and sociology . Walli s an d Bruc e (1983 ) hav e contraste d structuralist/functiona list an d ethno-methodologica l approache s to commo n sense . Th e former , especiall y Marxists , discoun t common-sens e explanations , particularl y of politica l events , as merel y epiphenomena l as all consciousnes s is determine d by mode s of production . Th e latte r ten d to assum e the very opposite , namel y tha t actors ' common-sens e account s are all we can eve r kno w abou t the socia l world . The y criticis e bot h an d sugges t tha t commo n sens e an d sociologists ' explanation s diffe r accordin g to thre e criteria :

1. Sociologist s are mor e routinely , regularl y an d professionall y concerne d with explanatio n tha n lay people .

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2. Common-sens e explanation s are mor e superficial , an d mor e easil y satis fied . 3. Common-sens e explanation s are mor e concerne d wit h the persona l tha n with the general . For many who hold a traditional view of the scientific enterprise and wish sociology to possess the dignity of science, the absence of sharp distinctions between sociologica l and commonsens e accounts will seem a great disadvantage . For ethnomethodologist s who often accuse conventiona l sociology of resting, usually without acknowledgement , on commonsense conceptions and theories, the continuities to which we point merely confirm a weakness they had previously announced . For us, however, no shame attaches to the fact that sociology is — in its method, of course, rather than in its content or focus — only a more systematic form of common sense. Rather we are impressed by how well common sense has got along without sociology for all these years; how little the advent of sociology has added to the sum of human knowledge;and thus, how much there is to learn from what others affect to despise. (Wallis and Bruce. 1983, p. 105) Few sociologist s or psychologist s hav e trie d to explai n the rol e of commo n sens e in everyda y thinkin g an d behaviour . An exceptio n is Smedslun d who , in a serie s of papers , attempte d to explai n th e origi n an d functionin g of commo n sens e an d suggeste d tha t vali d theorie s in psycholog y are explica tion s of conceptua l relationship s embedde d in ordinar y languag e or commo n sense . By "common-sens e psychology " is here meant "the network of concepts pertaining to psychologica l phenomena , imbedded in ordinary language". These concepts were acquired during our socialisation as persons, and, hence, are anterior to our observation s and our theorising. Becoming a person means becoming a member of a society, and this again means functioning with an enormous amount of constraint, shared with the other members.There are severe limitations on what are acceptable ways of perceiving,acting, speaking, thinking, and valuing. Furthermore , these shared constraints form a highly organised system, such that, given one set of percepts, acts, sentences, thoughts or values, others follow necessarily or are necessarily excluded. Becoming socialised as a human being, therefore, involves acquiring an implicit psychology , which one cannot, as an individual, transcend. Psychologists are also persons, and, consequently , their observations , descriptions , and explanation s must also conform with the common sense conceptual network". (Smedslund , 1978, p. 13). To illustrat e his poin t he too k Bandura' s self-efficac y theor y an d trans late d it int o a set of 36 common-sens e theorems . Essentiall y Smedslun d (1979 ) argue s tha t (all ) psychologica l theor y constitute s a syste m of logicall y necessary , analyti c theories , and he ofte n choose s geometr y or philosophica l logic as an analogy . Therefor e he tend s to lamen t to th e exten t to whic h psychologist s do no t attemp t to tes t thei r theorie s logically bu t rel y on (pseudo ) empirica l suppor t whic h is situation-and-culture-specific . In othe r words , attempt s at soun d empiricis m are confounde d by the prevalenc e of necessarily , logicall y tru e an d fals e assumptions . Fo r Smedslun d (1979 ) psychologica l (bu t presumabl y othe r socia l sciences ) studie s hav e usuall y five majo r weaknesses :

1. Aspirations to generality whic h are usuall y unfulfilled . LT— D

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2. A set of unrecognised , an d henc e unexplored , analytic assumptions. 3. A numbe r of logically incomplete assumptions. 4. Assumption s disregardin g commonl y know n fact s whic h ignor e import ant variation s in subjects , laborator y and culture s as irrelevan t feature s or constraints . 5. A low leve l of precisio n of theoretica l analysis . "W e mus t recognis e tha t theoretica l psycholog y can onl y advanc e whe n it become s trul y legitimat e to ask an d pursu e th e followin g question : wha t is necessaril y tru e in psychology " (p . 140) . In a very interestin g debat e in the Scandinavian Journal of Psychology in 1982 , Sjöber g an d Smedslun d argue d th e rol e of commo n sens e in psycho logica l theory . Sjöber g (1982 ) ha s note d tha t commo n sens e — a set of explicitl y or implicitl y hel d belief s concernin g huma n behaviou r — differ s betwee n individuals , subculture s an d culture s an d change s ove r tim e an d henc e ther e is no suc h thin g as the commo n sense . Common-sens e belief s are inconsistent , implicit , ambiguous , loos e mode s of thinkin g whic h provid e post-hoc "explanations " no t prediction s and therefor e offe r littl e in the way of profoun d insight . Commo n sens e has problem s of conten t an d proces s — erroneou s in the former , illogica l in the latter , an d is henc e no t a promisin g sourc e of psychologica l insight . Finall y he criticise s Smedslund' s rejectio n of empiricism , critiqu e of historicis m an d tota l relianc e on logica l analysis . In his repl y Smedslun d (1982a ) argue s tha t Sjöber g has bee n usin g the term commo n sens e incorrectl y and tha t " a propositio n in a give n contex t belong s to commo n sens e if an d onl y if all competen t user s of the languag e involve d agre e tha t the propositio n in the give n contex t is tru e and tha t its negatio n is contradictor y or senseless " (p . 23) . Henc e it is argue d tha t the exten t to whic h somethin g is see n as commo n sens e ca n be determine d by how muc h consensu s ther e is involve d an d henc e discussio n abou t th e consistency , precisenes s and stabilit y of commo n sens e can be dispense d with . He believe s commo n sens e to be stable , measurabl e and a necessar y preconditio n for all communication . He believe s tha t Sjöber g an d man y othe r psychologist s are wron g in denyin g the importanc e of commo n sens e becaus e the y maintai n the unreflectiv e presuppositio n tha t psychologica l languag e an d psychologica l realit y are independen t realms . In othe r word s psychologica l construct s mus t consis t of explication s of commo n sens e or be translatable int o suc h explica tions . Curiousl y Smedslun d (1982b,c ) resorte d to empirica l studie s to illustrat e his poin t tha t man y psychologica l theorems , whe n translated , ar e consen suall y accepte d by a very hig h percentag e of the population . In two studie s he demonstrate d tha t consensu s abou t concret e prediction s derive d fro m theorem s was generall y hig h and argue s tha t thes e widel y held common-sens e theorem s are a kin d of "calculus " use d in everyda y interaction. Thus , in a sense , Smedslun d is a natura l languag e philosopher , translatin g

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psychologica l theorie s int o simpl e everyda y non-technica l terms . If thes e natural-languag e theorie s are the n seen to be logicall y correc t and held widel y this is describe d as commo n sense . He als o make s th e poin t tha t man y psychologica l theorie s whic h clai m to be empiricall y testabl e and falsifiabl e are , in fact , logicall y necessar y an d irrefutabl e in principle . The y are in a sens e lik e th e "dee p structure " of languag e whic h is tru e for all people . Smedslun d is a littl e lik e a latterda y Wittgenstein , wh o is remembere d (or repressed ) by som e psychologist s for his damnin g dictu m "i n psycholog y ther e is experimenta l metho d an d conceptua l confusion " (Wittgenstein , 1953 , p . 232) . He als o has his critic s (e.g . Valsiner , 1985 ) bu t his wor k has mad e peopl e thin k agai n abou t th e rol e an d importanc e of commo n sens e in everyda y behaviou r (Smedslund , 1986) . Thu s socia l scientist s originall y so dismissiv e of common-sens e beliefs , account s an d explanation s primaril y on ground s of ambiguity , unfalsifi abilit y an d inferentia l error s ar e beginnin g to examin e commo n sens e in detail . Wherea s psychologist s seem particularl y intereste d in the process of lay peopl e explainin g everyda y events , sociologist s seem mor e intereste d in the content of lay theories . Furthe r philosopher s hav e subjecte d socia l scienc e theorie s to test s of whethe r the y are commo n sens e or not , and foun d tha t at hear t man y of the m are perfectl y understoo d by the layman . Perhap s the greates t advantag e of thi s curren t interes t in commo n sens e (or its man y synonym s — lay epistemology , everyda y accounts ) is tha t it ha s encourage d socia l scientist s to elucidat e and systematis e thei r theorie s and do mor e pre-empirical , logica l analysis . In one sens e the realisatio n tha t peopl e are pron e to numerou s logica l an d inferentia l error s has encourage d socia l scientist s to inspec t thei r own theorie s for the sam e errors . Thi s is particularl y the cas e becaus e recentl y psycholog y ha s becom e mor e concerne d no t wit h behaviou r itsel f bu t rathe r wit h th e account s of behaviou r (Shotte r an d Burton , 1985) . 2.3 Huma n Natur e At one leve l it may be argue d tha t all theorie s of behaviou r depen d on one' s fundamenta l belie f abou t huma n nature . Thes e broade r philosophie s of huma n natur e tha t peopl e hol d serv e to mak e the worl d a mor e orderly , stabl e and predictabl e place . Ther e is no shortag e of philosophica l speculatio n abou t the natur e of man . Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832 ) describe d ma n as a rationa l being , makin g choice s an d decision s in term s of enlightene d self-interest . Le Bon (1841-1931 ) on the othe r han d stresse d the irrationalit y and impulsivenes s of men in crowds . Hobbes (1588-1679 ) viewe d ma n as selfish , nast y an d brutish , whos e striving s ha d to be restraine d by a powerfu l government . Rousseau (1712-1778 ) saw the restraint s of his civilisatio n as the forc e tha t

34

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was destroyin g the nobilit y of natura l man , the nobl e savage . Furthermore , ther e ar e numerou s philosophica l treatise s whic h carefull y compar e an d contras t som e of the majo r thinker s of ou r time : Marx , Darwin , Freud , Levi Strauss , Chomsky , etc . It ma y als o be argue d tha t th e majo r school s of psycholog y — Skinneria n behaviourism , psychoanalysi s an d humanisti c psycholog y — hav e quit e differen t theorie s abou t the essentia l natur e of man . Accordin g to Wrightsma n (1964) : The most extende d statement s of huma n natur e have appeare d to treat at least nine broad issues: (1) What are the differin g views of huma n nature , (2) How do these views explai n behaviou r in interaction s amon g people , (3) How do the behaviour s explaine d and predicte d by philosophie s of huma n natur e compar e to the actua l ongoing , observabl e ways in which people act, (4) What types of societie s and institution s are to be inferre d from these views of human nature , (5) How do these societie s and institution s compar e with existin g socia l structures , (6) Whic h of the views of huma n natur e thus considere d are most accurate , (7) Which behaviour s are most congruen t and which behaviour s are least congruen t with this view of huma n nature , (8) Wher e is it possibl e to place societa l and institutiona l constraint s upon behaviour , and how may these constraint s be arrange d to dampe n or correc t deviation s and aberration s from huma n nature , (9) How can constraint s be placed or remove d in order to maximis e the good in man's basic nature , (p. 13) In his boo k Wrightsma n (1964 ) attempt s to systematis e th e variou s tradition s in philosophi c assumption s of huma n nature . He als o attempt s to spel l ou t th e implici t an d explici t assumption s of prominen t psychologist s and sociologist s regardin g huma n nature . In doin g so , he no t unnaturall y touche s on issue s suc h as the nature-nurtur e debate , how thes e philosophie s of huma n natur e develop , etc . Experimenta l an d socia l psychologist s hav e attempte d to specif y empirically the basi c dimension s tha t underpi n th e writing s of philosophers , theologians , politicians , sociologist s an d other s abou t th e fundamenta l natur e of"huma n beings" . In doin g so , the y hav e attempte d to spel l ou t the determinants , structur e an d consequence s of variou s ''philosophie s of huma n nature" . Fo r instanc e Wrightsma n (1964 ) has devise d an 84 item scal e tha t measure s six basi c dimension s of huma n natur e in his Philosophy of Human Nature Scale (PHN) :

1. Trustworthines s vs untrustworthines s 4- = belie f tha t peopl e are trustworthy , mora l an d responsibl e - = belie f tha t peopl e are untrustworthy , immora l an d irresponsible . 2. Strengt h of will and rationalit y vs lack of will powe r an d irrationalit y + = belie f tha t peopl e ca n contro l thei r outcome s an d tha t the y understan d themselve s - = belie f tha t peopl e lack self-determinatio n an d are irrational . 3. Altruis m vs selfishnes s + = belie f tha t peopl e are altruistic , unselfish , an d sincerel y intereste d in other s

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- = belie f tha t peopl e are selfis h an d self-centered . 4. Independenc e vs conformit y to group pressure s + = belie f tha t peopl e are abl e to maintai n thei r belief s in the face of grou p pressure s to the contrar y - = belie f tha t peopl e give in to pressure s of grou p an d society . 5. Variabilit y vs similarit y + = belie f tha t peopl e are differen t fro m eac h othe r in personalit y an d interest s an d tha t a perso n can chang e ove r tim e - = belie f tha t peopl e are simila r in interest s and are no t changeabl e ove r time . 6. Complexit y vs simplicit y + = belie f tha t peopl e are comple x an d har d to understan d - = belie f tha t peopl e are simpl e an d eas y to understand . Two additiona l dimension s of the philosophie s of huma n natur e propose d by Wrightsma n (1964 ) concer n belief s in th e variatio n tha t exist s amon g huma n beings . Thes e tw o dimension s ar e similarit y vs variabilit y an d complexit y versu s simplicity . However , Wrightsman' s six dimensio n scal e facto r analyse s int o tw o majo r variable s or subscales : Positive-Negative (strengt h of will , trust , independenc e and altruism ) and multiplexity (variabi lity and complexity ) whic h are by-and-larg e independen t of on e another . In researc h usin g the Philosoph y of Huma n Natur e Scal e wit h peopl e of differen t ages , sexes , race s an d occupations , Wrightsma n an d his colleague s hav e foun d tha t the averag e perso n believe s huma n natur e to be : (1) neithe r extremel y trustworth y no r extremel y untrustworthy ; (2) somewha t rationa l and possessin g a moderat e degre e of wil l power ; (3) neithe r extremel y altruisti c no r extremel y selfish ; (4) somewha t mor e likel y to confor m to grou p pressure s tha n to remai n independent ; (5) moderatel y variabl e an d unique ; an d (6) moderatel y comple x an d har d to understan d (Wrightsman , 1974 ; Wrightsma n an d Satterfield , 1967) . Th e scal e was develope d in the earl y 1960 s an d a decad e of researc h in Americ a is summarise d in Wrightsma n (1974) . The scal e ha s bee n use d fairl y extensivel y in othe r area s of researc h includin g cross-cultura l researc h in th e Sout h Pacifi c (Stewart , 1983 ) and Sout h Afric a (Edwards , 1984) . Furthermor e th e scal e ha s bee n show n to relat e predictabl y an d systematicall y to values , religiou s and politica l beliefs , etc. Others , too , hav e develope d scale s or measure s whic h attemp t genera l belief s in huma n nature . Ther e are variou s measure s of Machiavellianis m (MS) , of whic h perhap s the bes t know n is tha t of Christi e an d Geis , (1970) . Take n fro m th e writing s of Machiavelli , th e scal e measure s th e exten t to whic h peopl e believ e lying , cheatin g an d decei t are acceptabl e whe n the end s justif y th e means . Item s whic h scor e highl y on thi s scal e includ e 'Th e bes t

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way to handl e peopl e is to tell the m wha t the y wan t to hear" ; "Anyon e wh o completel y trust s anyon e else is askin g for trouble" ; an d "I t is safes t to assum e tha t all peopl e hav e a viciou s strea k tha t will com e ou t whe n it is give n a chance'' . Peopl e wh o hav e a Machiavellia n view of huma n natur e ten d to be competitive , manipulative , egocentri c and amoral . Overal l the scal e tend s to hav e acceptabl e reliabilit y an d predictiv e validity . Thornto n and Klin e (1982 ) argue d tha t the genera l syndrom e of antisocial , anticonformis t delinquenc y is partl y attribute d to delinquents ' tendenc y to interpre t othe r peopl e as malevolent . Henc e the y devise d the Belief in Human Benevolence Scale (BHB ) whic h assesse s the degre e to whic h a perso n expect s other s to be generall y benevolen t an d malevolent . Th e 20 item scal e yield s a singl e score : hig h scorer s asser t tha t peopl e ar e unselfishl y concerne d for others ' well-being , can be truste d no t to exploi t other s an d ar e likel y to reciprocat e kindness , wherea s low scorer s asser t tha t peopl e ar e selfishl y (activel y an d maliciously ) concerne d wit h thei r ow n interests , will exploi t other s if give n a chanc e an d are unlikel y to reciprocat e kindness . Th e scal e has no t bee n extensivel y use d bu t ha s bee n wel l psychometrised . Anothe r usefu l scale , no t extensivel y use d an d develope d for a specifi c purpose , Beliefs in Human Nature Scale (BHS ) was devise d by Furnha m et al. (1985 ) to measur e people' s belief s in th e determinant s (heredit y vs environmental ) in six huma n characteristics , physica l characteristic s (height , weight) , psychologica l skill s (sport , intelligence) , personalit y (neuroticism , extraversion) , belief s (political , religious) , psychologica l problem s (alcoho lism , schizophrenia ) an d physica l problem s (diabetes , asthma) . Thes e belief s were show n to be relate d to sex , age , class , politica l opinio n an d education . Specifically , male s mor e tha n females , younge r mor e tha n older , middle clas s rathe r tha n working-class , left-win g mor e tha n right-wing , an d bette r educate d rathe r tha n less wel l educate d peopl e tende d to be mor e environ mentalist . Furnha m et al. (1985 ) argu e tha t the y hav e develope d a robust , multi dimensiona l instrumen t for measurin g belief s in the determinant s of huma n nature . Thes e belief s are strongl y relate d to a perso n apolitical orientatio n in predictabl e an d logica l way s — left-winger s ten d to attribut e the origi n of mos t huma n characteristic s to th e environmen t an d right-win g peopl e to geneti c factors , thoug h ther e are vas t difference s dependin g on the charac teristi c considere d (e.g . personalit y vs physica l characteristics) . Thus , it may be possibl e to determin e a person' s politica l orientatio n by askin g his or her view s on th e nature-nurtur e issue , or vic e versa . Wherea s man y othe r variable s — age , education , class , religio n an d sex ar e als o importan t determinant s of thes e belief s in the origin s of huma n characteristic s the y may be eithe r confoundin g or mediatin g variables . In additio n to thes e thre e measure s of huma n natur e ther e are a numbe r of othe r test s which , thoug h less general , attemp t to measur e belief s abou t aspect s of othe r peopl e an d the world . Fo r instance , on e importan t dimen -

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sion that has been considered is the extent to which it is believed that the world is just (where good people are rewarded and bad people are punished) or unjust (the rain falls on the just and the unjust alike). There is a substantial literature on the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1980; Rubin and Peplau, 1975) which may be stated thus: "Individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve. The belief that the world is just enables the individual to confront his physical and social environment as though they were stable and orderly" (Lerner and Miller, 1978, p. 1030). Studies on the determinants of just world beliefs have shown that believers in a just world tend to be more authoritarian, religious, have internal locus of control beliefs, believe in the Protestant work ethic and are more likely to admire political leaders/social institutions, and to have negative attitudes towards the underprivileged (Rubin and Peplau, 1973). A number of American studies have shown that believers in a just world tend to be hostile and unsympathetic towards victims of social injustice, especially in cases where their suffering cannot be easily alleviated — hence the desire to live in a just world leads not to justice but justification (Rubin and Peplau, 1975). This is not a theory of human nature so much as "more or less articulated assumptions which underlie the way people orient themselves to their environment" (Lerner, 1980). But it is, because the just world is one in which individuals "get what they deserve", that one can infer human nature from fate. People to whom fate has been kind tend to be perceived as energetic, friendly, generous, intelligent, kind, etc. while those who suffer at the hands of fate tend to be seen as cruel, lazy, stupid, unfriendly, ugly, etc. That is, fate, which is highly discriminating, distinguishes between those who are inherently good and those inherently bad. There are a whole host of measures in psychology which relate to beliefs in human nature. For instance, Wilson (1973) discusses conservatism beliefs, many of which closely reflect assumptions about human nature. Similarly there are numerous measures of perceived control, each of which relates partly to views of human nature. Apart from Wrightsman's (1964, 1974) work, and that of his disciples, surprisingly little work has been done in the social sciences on lay people's beliefs on human nature. The reason is most probably because of the generality, as well as incoherence and inconsistency of their views, as well as their poor predictability. Although a number of questionnaires have been devised to measure views on human nature they have had only modest success in predicting a person's beliefs or behaviours. Specific measures are nearly always more useful in predicting specific behaviours than general. Secondly, ideas about human nature are nearly all found in studies of political and moral beliefs as well as the nature-nurture debate, rather than as a separate issue. Thus, whereas there is a plethora of philosophic treatises on human nature

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ther e is a paucit y of empirica l studie s on lay people' s views , thoug h wit h goo d reason . 2.4 Two Approache s to Understandin g Lay Theorie s (Worl d Views , Cognitiv e Systems ) Socia l scientist s of all persuasion s are intereste d in lay people d lay theorie s on worl d views . In the word s of Helma n (1984) , a medica l anthropologist : This world view enable s man to locate himsel f spatiall y and historically , and provide sa conceptual-perceptua l structur e beyon d the limits of whic h few men transgres s even in imagination . This cognitiv e system , share d with other member s of one's cultur e or society , makes the chaos of life, understandabl e and gives a sense of securit y and meaning to people' s lives, (p. 108) Wherea s som e discipline s are intereste d in the cultura l determinant s an d consensu s of thi s worl d view , other s are mor e intereste d in its structur e and measurement . Sociologist s an d anthropologist s appea r to be particularl y intereste d in cultura l and grou p determinant s on the ''actor' s perspective " on his or her world ; how thes e belief s or view s ar e "socialised " int o member s of th e group ; how thes e belief s functio n to facilitat e interactio n wit h othe r group s and th e natura l environment ; an d ho w thes e view s chang e ove r time . Psychologist s on th e othe r han d hav e bee n intereste d wit h th e content of thes e belie f system s and how the y operat e in practic e — tha t is the process by whic h peopl e understan d an d attribut e the cause s of behaviour . Thes e tw o areas , whils t overlapping , represen t rathe r differen t way s of understandin g the proble m of lay theories . (1) Content

The conten t approac h ha s bee n dedicate d to describin g the conten t an d organisatio n of a belie f syste m an d th e lay theorie s tha t go alon g wit h it. Som e description s hav e bee n restricte d to on e topi c like justic e or morality , but other s are muc h mor e widel y conceived . A goo d exampl e is conservativ e socia l attitude s whic h encompas s idea s like authoritarianism , dogmatis m and Machiavellianism . Indee d it is ove r 40 year s sinc e Eysenc k (1947 ) firs t propose d a clea r structur e for socia l attitudes . Conservatis m is conceive d as a genera l facto r underlyin g all socia l attitudes , muc h the sam e as intelligenc e is seen as underlyin g all abilities . Psychologist s an d sociologist s intereste d in this topi c hav e attempte d to describ e th e conten t of thi s "factor" . Wilso n (1973 ) illustrate d the conceptualisatio n of conservatis m (th e averag e of all the factors ) bu t admit s tha t it show s onl y hal f th e pictur e becaus e th e othe r extrem e (liberalism ) ha s bee n left ou t (see Fig . 2.2) . He als o develope d a theor y for the conservatis m syndrome , it is state d thus : The theor y suggest s that certai n geneti c factor s such as anxiet y proneness , stimulu s aversio n

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Religiou s dogmatis m t Superstitio n i l Genera χ conservatis m / Anti-scienc e / / Conventionalis m / \ \ / Anti-y/nedonis m \ \ \

\

/

\

/ /

/

/

/ /

/

/

/

/

/

^^

La " w and order " Pro-establishmetnpolitics

Punitivenes s Militaris m Racialis m

FIG. 2.2. Diagra m to Illustrat e Possibl e Arrangemen t of Attitud e Cluster s to Form

a Genera l Conservatis m Facto r (Wilson , 1973 , p. 10). Reprinte d with permissio n from Wilson , G . (1973) . The Psychology of Conservatism.London : Academi c Press .

(sensitivit y to strong stimuli) , low intelligence , lack of physica l attractiveness , old age, and female sex, and certai n environmenta l factor s such as parenta l coldness , punitiveness , rigidity and inconsistency , and membershi p of the lower classes , will give rise to feeling s of insecurit y and inferiorit y (low self esteem) . For example , a child continuall y subjecte d to harsh punishmen t mighteventuall y accep t or *'internalise' ' the low evaluatio n of himsel f that he perceive s his parent s or teacher s to hold. Feeling s of insecurit y and inferiorit y may be expecte d to result in a generalise d fear of uncertainty , the insecur e individua l fearin g stimulu s uncertaint y becaus e he perceive s the environmen t as complex , changeable , and treacherous , and the individua l with low self-estee m fearin g respons e uncertaint y becaus e he lacks confidenc e in his ability to contro l event s in his environmen t or make autonomou s decision s regardin g his own behaviour . At the behavioura l level the fear of uncertaint y would manifes t itself as: (1) a tendenc y to dislike and avoid uncertai n stimulu s configuration s —innovation , novelty , risk, complexity , social disorganisation , etc., and (2) a tendenc y to dislik e and avoid situation s that involv ea great deal of respons e uncertaint y — conflict , decision-making , etc. These two group s of tendencie s would be differentiate d to some extent , the fear of stimulu s uncertaint y being associate d more strongl y with insecurit y and the fear of respons e uncertaint y being more closely tied with inferiorit y feelings . There would , however , also be a positiv e correlatio n betwee n them becaus e of their commo n geneti c and environmenta l origins . The last step in the mode l suggest s that this dislik e for and avoidanc e of stimulu s and respons e uncertaint y would be manifeste d as an organise d patter n of attitude s —that which we have labelle d "the conservatis m syndrome" , (pp. 259-266 ) The theor y has bee n abl e to predic t people' s response s to jokes , art prefer ence s and superstitiou s behaviour . It is set out diagramaticall y in Fig . 2.3 . It is argued , then , tha t peopl e can be dimensionalise d on thi s dimensio n of liberalism-conservatism , an d tha t thes e belief s hav e an orderin g and simpli fying function . Conservativ e belief s ac t as a len s or filte r on th e world . Hence , on e ma y deriv e hypothese s as to the lay explanation s hig h and low score s woul d give for socia l phenomena . Thus , hig h scorer s prefe r a physical ,

40

Lay Theories Origin s

Intervenin g motivationa l variable s

Geneti c factor s e.g. Anxiet y pronenes s Stimulu s aversio n Low intelligenc e Unattractivenes s Old age Femal esex

Environmenta l factor s e.g. Parenta l coldness , punitiveness y trigidit and inconsistenc y Lowe r clas s membershi p

"Z y " .X s of insecurit Feeling y an d inferiorit

Ir of uncertaint Generalize d fea y Behavioura l tendencie s 2 :s uncertaint Avoidanc e of stimulu y Avoidanc e of respons e uncertaint y Dislik e for innovation,novelty,risk , Lac k of self relianc e complexity , anomie , Dislik e for conflic t and decisio ndevian t behaviou r makin g Need s and feeling s subjugate d to externa l authorit y (norms,rules , etc.)

Verball y expresse d

attitud e

/ X Conservativ e attitud e syndrom e

FIG . 2.3. A Theor y of the Psychologica l Antecedent s of Conservatis m (Wilson , 1973 , p. 261) . Reprinte d wit h permissio n fro m Wilson , G. (1973 ) The Psychologyof Conservatism. London : Academi c Press .

rathe r tha n a psychological , mode l to explai n menta l illnes s (Lillie , 1973) . In othe r word s th e la y explanation s fo r variou s socia l phenomen a o f hig h scorer s on a measur e of conservatis m are likel y to be very differen t fro m the lay explanation s of low scorer s on the sam e scale . Conservatis m is onl y on e o f a rang e o f "syndromes" , "dimensions " o r individua l differenc e variable s considere d by socia l and personalit y psychol ogist s t o relat e t o how peopl e perceiv e an d explai n the worl d aroun d them . Other s include : locu s o f contro l belief s (Rotter , 1966) ; jus t worl d belief s (Lerner , 1980) ; th e Protestan t wor k ethi c belief s (Furnham , 1988a) , etc. , whic h are not surprisingl y all relate d to one anothe r in logica l and predictabl e way s (Furnham , 1984a) . This approach , then , is t o systematicall y describ e a belie f variable , t o describ e the organisatio n o f attitude s in it, an d t o explai n how thi s variabl e relate s t o people' s attitude s to , an d explanation s of , a wid e rang e of socia l behaviours . (2) Process

This approac h has bee n intereste d not in describin g the conten t of a belie f system , bu t in describin g th e proces s tha t peopl e go throug h in gathering , orderin g an d selectin g informatio n t o arriv e a t a n explanation . Thi s approac h is not so muc h concerne d wit h the belief s tha t peopl e hol d abou t the socia l world , bu t how the y assimilat e fact s an d arriv e at an explanation . Thu s researcher s in thi s area , suc h a s attributio n theorists , hav e bee n concerne d

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41

with describin g the processe s lay peopl e go throug h in explainin g everyda y phenomen a suc h as why the y (or others ) pas s or fail tests ; why the y like or dislik e others , etc . One suc h exampl e is Weiner' s (1985 ) theor y of achievemen t motivatio n and emotio n whic h is concerne d wit h th e perceive d cause s of succes s and failure . Accordin g to Weiner , whe n peopl e attemp t to explai n thei r ow n succes s or failur e for an y behaviou r thes e attribution s hav e thre e commo n properties : locu s of causalit y (interna l vs external) ; stabilit y (ove r tim e and acros s situations ) an d controllabilit y (whethe r or no t th e outcom e wa s controllable) . Othe r dimension s of relevanc e includ e intentionalit y (of th e action ) and globalit y of causes . Thus , in arrivin g at an explanatio n a perso n will selec t thes e fro m th e taxonom y set ou t below . Attributiona l decision s represen t phenomena l causalit y (see Tabl e 2.1) . TABL E 2.1. A Three-Dimensional Taxonomyof theperceivedcausesof success and failure. Stable

Controllabl e

Unstabl e

Interna l Stabl e effort of self

Unstabl e effort of f sel

Externa l Stabl e effort of others

Unstabl e effort of other s

Stabl e

Uncontrollabl e Unstabl e

Abilit y of self

Fatigue , mood , and fluctuation s in skill of self Abilit y of others , Fatigue , mood , and ktas difficult y fluctuation s in skill of others , luck

Weine r (1985 ) furthe r argue s tha t th e perceive d stabilit y of th e caus e influence s change s in expectancie s of futur e succes s as wel l as effectiv e response s (e.g . anger , gratitude , guilt , shame ) whic h in tur n guid e an d motivat e behaviour . Thus , a person' s expectanc y an d affect , whic h are bot h mediate d by causa l attributions , influenc e th e choice , the intensit y and the persistenc e of behaviour . Thus , attribution s of failur e to lac k of abilit y (stabl e cause ) are debilitating , generatin g feeling s of incompetence , whil e attribution s to lac k of effor t (unstabl e cause ) shoul d or migh t enhanc e performance . Thi s affec t influence s th e use of causa l anteceden t whic h in tur n influence s causa l description s whic h hav e psychologica l an d beha vioura l consequence s whic h in tur n influenc e futur e attributions . Weine r recognise s tha t cause s are inferre d for specifi c event s (an d pre sumabl y theorie s ar e develope d for genera l phenomena ) on th e basi s of severa l factor s whic h includ e specifi c issue s (suc h as a person' s pas t history , socia l norm s prevailing , the patter n of performance , etc.) ; causa l preference s of individual s base d on thei r persona l history ; rule s tha t relat e cause s to effect s als o know n as causa l schema ; reinforcemen t history ; communicatio n from others ; and presumabl y thei r "la y theories" . For Weine r the way in whic h on e characteristicall y processe s informatio n to deriv e explanations , attribution s an d theorie s ca n hav e wid e conse quences , suc h as respons e to therapy , helpin g others , etc .

42

Lay Theories

The conten t an d proces s approache s are no t antithetica l bu t overlapping . It ma y wel l be tha t peopl e wit h specifi c belie f system s (e.g . conservativ e syndromes ) hav e characteristi c style s or strategie s for processin g data . Thus , for Weine r (1985) : Perceive d causalit y certainl y will differ from perso n to perso n and within an individua l over occasions . This is true not only for a specifi c causa l inference , but also for the meanin g or dimensiona l locatio n of the cause . For one individual , luck may be perceive d as an external , unstabl e cause of success ; for another , luck is conceive d as an endurin g persona l property . Indeed , a cause migh t conve y differen t meaning s in disparat e contexts . But althoug h the interpretatio n of specifi c causa l inference s migh t vary over time and betwee n peopl e and situations , the underlyin g dimension s on which cause s are ' 'understood' ' or given meanin g remai n constant . That is, dimension s are conceive d as invariant , wherea s the locatio n of any specifi c cause on a dimensio n is variable , (p. 553) 2.5 Informatio n Gatherin g and Hypothesi s Testin g In orde r to formulat e a theory , a certai n amoun t of informatio n gatherin g and hypothesi s testin g need s to tak e place . Considerabl e psychologica l researc h has bee n concerne d wit h how peopl e dra w inference s (usuall y abou t causality ) fro m specifi c (pre-programmed ) informatio n provide d by an experimenter . Logically , the inferentia l phas e follow s fro m th e informatio n gatherin g phase , whic h is a clearl y necessar y precedin g phase . Thus , for instance , to selec t somebod y for a jo b an interviewe r collect s informatio n (from applicatio n forms , references , an d th e intervie w itself) , test s certai n hypothese s tha t are formulate d durin g th e intervie w an d the n make s his or her decision . Of course , how peopl e choos e to gathe r informatio n differ s widely ; som e may passivel y observ e peopl e in specifi c situation s (ove r lunch , in a grou p discussion ) whil e other s ma y construc t or manipulat e situation s to elici t specifi c response s — thes e includ e developin g particula r test s or questionnaires . But it was no t unti l comparativel y recentl y tha t psychologist s looke d at the sort of question s lay peopl e ask whe n gatherin g informatio n an d testin g hypotheses . Mos t of the earl y systemati c wor k in thi s field was undertake n by Snyde r an d his colleague s wh o wer e initiall y intereste d in th e kind s of question s peopl e ask to obtai n informatio n to tes t thei r hypothese s abou t another' s personality . Perhap s the stud y whic h attracte d mos t interes t wa s tha t of Snyde r an d Swan n (1978) , wh o hypothesise d tha t an interviewe r choose s informatio n seekin g strategie s designe d to confir m a pre-establishe d hypothesi s abou t the interviewee , an d tha t thi s strateg y actuall y affect s th e behaviour of th e interviewee . In othe r word s peopl e ofte n ten d to caus e self-fulfillin g prophe cies in thei r hypothesi s testin g at leas t in certai n settings . Tha t is, question s aske d ma y searc h for confirmatory , disconfirmatory , or bot h kind s of information . Subject s wer e aske d to selec t question s from a list whic h woul d best tes t whethe r a perso n wa s an extrover t or an introvert . Th e result s strongl y confirme d confirmator y (self-fulfilling ) strategy , suc h tha t in th e

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43

extrover t conditio n subject s aske d mor e extrovert-orientate d questions , whil e in the introver t condition , subject s aske d mor e introverte d orientate d questions . Accordin g to Snyde r (1984) , in the gatherin g of informatio n abou t socia l phenomena , lay peopl e are clearl y biase d agains t th e expressio n of answer s tha t are indicativ e of the alternative , and thi s strateg y trap s the m int o confirmin g the hypothesi s tha t the y are testing . Snyde r has don e a numbe r of studie s in thi s field , an d th e title s sho w the diversit y of topics : Testin g hypothese s abou t othe r peopl e (Snyde r an d Campbell , 1980) ; testin g hypothese s abou t huma n natur e (Snyde r et al. 9 1982) ; testin g hypothese s abou t th e self (Snyde r an d Skryprek , 1981) . In a revie w Snyde r (1984 ) list s the impressiv e evidenc e for behavioura l confirma tion in socia l interaction. Fou r area s are pin-pointed :

1. Beliefs about appearance — ther e is considerabl e evidenc e to sugges t tha t peopl e assum e tha t thos e wh o ar e physicall y attractiv e als o hav e othe r desirabl e trait s like sensuality , intelligence , kindness , sociability , and tha t peopl e trea t other s as if thi s wer e so . 2. Beliefs about gender — sex rol e researc h ha s consistentl y demonstrate d tha t sex rol e behaviour s ma y be the produc t of othe r people' s belief s abou t the sexes . 3. Beliefs about race — ther e is som e evidenc e to sugges t tha t belief s abou t differen t race s ma y constrai n the behaviou r of peopl e tha t cause s the m to behav e in accor d wit h thos e beliefs . 4. Beliefs about job performance — evidenc e suggest s tha t selector s ma y allow thei r belief s to influenc e th e way the y intervie w jo b candidate s to mak e it mor e likel y tha t thos e wh o fit thei r belief s sho w up bette r in thei r job interview s tha n do jo b seeker s wh o do no t fit thei r beliefs . For Snyde r (1984 ) ther e are sequentia l behavioura l confirmatio n processe s whic h lea d to self-fulfillin g hypothesi s testing . "Realit y testing " become s realit y construction . In the firs t phas e the perso n internalise s and persevere s in the behavioura l confirmatio n proces s by followin g tw o maxim s — " I am wha t I do " an d "Believin g mean s doing" . Thes e belief s guid e questioning , whic h in tur n prompt s peopl e to behav e in way s tha t confir m thes e initia l beliefs . Snyde r believe s tha t ther e ar e bot h behavioura l an d cognitiv e consequence s of assumption s an d hypothese s abou t othe r peopl e an d the self . In considerabl e detai l he show s how ou r informatio n processin g (e.g . memor y for events ) and interpersona l behaviour s are dependen t on assump tion s abou t the socia l worl d (themselves , others , the natur e of specifi c jobs ) as well as variou s hypothese s the y develop . He conclude s thus : These investigation s have suggested that, whether individuals regard their beliefs as assumptions or hypotheses,whether their beliefs concern themselves or other people, social beliefs g of past events in ways that determine both the subjective can and do channel the rememberin and the objective reality of these beliefs . .. The things that individuals believe exert powerful

44

Lay Theories influence s on they way they and other peopl e live their lives. Belief s and impression s do not exist in a vacuum . Instead , the processe s of socia l though t are intimatel y wove n into the fabric of socia l interactio n and interpersona l relationships . The event s of our lives are very much a reflectio n of our belief s about ourselve s and about other peopl e in our socialworlds . It is in this sense that belief s can and do creat e reality , (p. 298)

Snyder' s wor k has attracte d considerabl e attentio n wit h bot h replication s (Sackett , 1982 ) and refutation s (Semi n and Strack , 1980) , as well as replica tion s of bot h refutation s an d replications ! (Meerten s et al. 1984) . Mos t studie s are concerne d to demonstrat e how experimenta l artefact s in Snyder' s repeate d paradig m led him an d his colleague s to dra w the incorrec t conclu sions . Fo r instance , Sacket t (1982 ) performe d fou r studie s to tes t th e generalisabilit y of th e confirmatory hypothesis finding . Al l fou r faile d to suppor t the hypothesi s whe n experience d interviewers , rathe r tha n universit y students , wer e used ; whe n the stud y was set specificall y in an employmen t intervie w setting ; an d whe n trait s lik e agreeablenes s or conscientiousnes s were tested . A fourt h stud y showed , however , tha t th e typ e of hypothesi s held doe s affec t th e questionin g strateg y chose n by the subject , yet no t the likelihoo d tha t th e hypothesi s woul d be confirmed , bu t tha t th e evaluatio n mad e is determine d exclusivel y by the informatio n receive d regardles s of the hypothesis . Curiousl y the subjec t adhere s to the questionin g strategy , eve n if the informatio n consistentl y run s contrar y to the hypothesi s expressed . Fou r explanation s are posite d for th e inabilit y to generalis e thes e results :

1. Th e hypothese s wer e no t forme d by the subject s bu t "given " to the m and this ma y engende r less commitmen t or interest . 2. Th e question s wer e likewis e provide d an d no t generate d by the subjects . 3. Th e studie s hav e concentrate d almos t exclusivel y on verba l behaviou r and hav e ignore d non-verba l behaviour . 4. Th e experienc e and trainin g of the interviewe r as well as the constraint s of the situatio n ma y affec t th e question s aske d whic h constrain , inhibi t or promot e the tendenc y to confirmator y hypothesis . Thu s the suppose d ubiquitousnes s of the confirmator y hypothesi s testin g hypothesi s has bee n challenged . A simila r approac h ha s bee n take n by Trop e an d Basso k in a serie s of studie s (Trop e an d Bassok , 1982 , 1983 ; Trop e et al., 1984) . The y wer e particularl y intereste d in the exten t to whic h peopl e can tak e int o accoun t factor s affectin g th e hypothesi s testin g valu e of behaviour , or the exten t to whic h its probabilit y depend s on possessio n of the persona l dispositio n unde r consideration . Th e strateg y of askin g question s to the exten t tha t the answer s are diagnosti c for discriminatin g betwee n the hypothesi s and the alternativ e was termed , by thes e authors , as the diagnosti c strategy . The y argu e tha t the informatio n gathere r select s question s tha t elici t subjectivel y "diagnostic " answer s and, hence , question s are preferre d for thei r diagnostic/discrimina tory feature s regardles s of whethe r the feature s are probabl e or improbabl e

Common Sense and Human Nature

45

unde r the hypothesis . In the firs t of thei r serie s of studies , Trop e and Basso k (1982 ) found , as predicted , tha t diagnosticit y was the majo r determinan t of the informatio n gatherin g preferences , an d littl e evidenc e was foun d for the confirmator y strategy . "I n fac t improbabl e evidenc e was preferre d whe n it was mor e diagnosti c tha n probabl e evidence . Thu s the confirmator y stra tegy , whateve r appea l it ma y hav e ha d to subject s did no t reduc e th e diagnosti c powe r of the informatio n assembled " (p . 221) . In a set of thre e furthe r studies , Trop e and Basso k (1983 ) wer e intereste d in the informatio n gatherin g strategie s peopl e use d as a functio n whethe r the y were testin g th e actua l hypothesi s or its alternative . The y argue d an d demonstrate d tha t whe n the boundar y is at th e mid-poin t of a dimension , hypothesi s and alternativ e question s are equall y diagnostic , bu t at extremes , hypothesi s consisten t question s becom e mor e diagnosti c tha n alternativ e consisten t questions . Furthermore , the y wer e abl e to sho w tha t subjects ' judgemen t abou t th e diagnosticit y of question s for discriminatin g differen t boundarie s parallelle d subjects ' preference s amon g thes e questions . In othe r word s the lay informatio n gathere r doe s no t enquir e abou t feature s of the hypothesi s unles s th e featur e is simultaneousl y unrelate d to the hypothesi s and vice vers a wit h the alternativ e thesis . Lay theorist s thu s conside r no t onl y the implicatio n of the hypothesis , bu t als o the implicatio n of the alternativ e in the evidenc e the y seek . Mor e recently , Trop e et al. (1984 ) hav e examine d the kin d of questio n tha t lay interviewer s spontaneously formulate , as oppose d to ratin g a predeter mine d set of questions . Subject s wer e encourage d to formulat e question s whic h wer e classifie d as biase d in favour of the trait , against the trait , abou t consistent features , abou t inconsistent features , bidirectional and open ended . As predicte d mos t of thei r subject s aske d open-ende d or bidirectiona l rathe r tha n biase d questions . Furthermore , the y demonstrate d in a secon d experiment , concerne d wit h th e diagnosticit y of question s formulate d by subject s eithe r wit h or withou t a hypothesis , a simila r result . As a resul t the y believ e Snyder' s result s to be artefactua l in the sens e tha t peopl e use biase d question s no t becaus e of thei r relianc e on th e confirmator y strategy , bu t becaus e the hypothesi s the y are testin g and its alternativ e are no t accuratel y conveye d to them . Ther e are , therefore , man y doubt s abou t the behavioura l confirmatio n or self-fulfillin g prophec y strateg y of lay person s engage d in informatio n gatherin g an d hypothesi s testing . Snyde r ha s carrie d ou t researc h an d collecte d report s from other s to suppor t his case . Yet man y hav e challenge d the result s or the interpretation s of the result s of his studies , suggestin g tha t ther e ar e man y caveat s for th e rathe r simplisti c mode l of behavioura l confirmation . Thi s is no t to sugges t tha t all the result s of experiment s in the behavioura l confirmatio n are wron g or arte f actual , bu t rathe r tha t bia s in the proces s of informatio n gatherin g an d by hypothesi s testin g is dependen t on specifi c circumstance s an d no t as prevalen t as previousl y suggested .

46

Lay Theories 2.6 Conclusio n

Thi s chapte r concerne d tw o basi c themes . Th e firs t sectio n deal t wit h the issu e of commo n sens e an d people' s view s on huma n nature . Bot h of thes e section s focuse d on th e conten t of lay theories . Studie s on commo n sens e hav e attempte d to demonstrat e tha t man y psychologica l finding s are indee d counter-intuitive , thu s no t supportin g a common-sens e view . Other s hav e pondere d on the logi c of commo n sense ; wha t to mak e of common-sens e explanations ; th e relationshi p betwee n ordinar y languag e an d commo n sense , etc . Empirica l wor k on common-sens e belief s ha s don e muc h to revea l bot h the proces s of how lay peopl e com e to understan d thei r world , and how academics ' theorie s are base d ver y muc h in lay thinking . The sectio n on belief s abou t huma n natur e attempte d to revie w variou s attempt s to loo k at the basi c dimension s tha t peopl e agre e and disagre e on , as to the fundamenta l natur e of man . Variou s dimension s hav e bee n propose d and instrument s develope d to measur e them . It has bee n suggeste d tha t thos e belief s functio n to mak e the worl d a mor e stable , orderl y an d predictabl e plac e and provid e a filte r or scrip t throug h or by whic h to mak e sens e of one' s own and others ' actions . The secon d par t of th e chapte r was mor e concerne d wit h how to stud y lay theorie s of huma n behaviour . Th e conten t approac h aime d specificall y to describ e the majo r dimension s or categorie s of belie f tha t peopl e hold . Thi s approac h attempt s to differentiat e an d describ e in detai l th e content s of differen t belie f system s abou t huma n behaviour . Th e proces s approach , on the othe r hand , is concerne d mor e wit h how peopl e proces s informatio n in orde r to arriv e at an explanation . Onc e again , ther e are man y approache s to this issue , the currentl y mos t fashionabl e of whic h is attributio n theory . The fina l sectio n of thi s chapte r review s briefl y th e growin g researc h on how lay peopl e tes t hypothese s an d assumption s in general . It look s specifi cally at the sor t of informatio n tha t peopl e selec t and reject , and how the y use this informatio n to examin e or test , variou s hypothese s tha t the y ma y wish for or hav e bee n aske d to verify . Variou s strategie s hav e bee n examine d thoug h ther e is som e doub t as to whethe r everybod y use s the sam e strateg y on all occasions . This chapte r ha s bee n concerne d wit h lay theorie s an d belief s at a ver y genera l level . Subsequen t chapter s will loo k at variou s lay theorie s withi n specifi c contexts .

3 La y Theorie

s i n Psycholog

y

3.1 Introductio n Probabl y mor e tha n an y othe r discipline , ther e is no generall y accepte d definitio n of psycholog y as an academi c enterprise . Definition s var y from the scienc e of menta l life to th e stud y of behaviou r or , mor e specifically , th e stud y of cognition , emotio n an d behaviour . Fo r som e the boundarie s of the disciplin e are extremel y wide : "Anythin g tha t peopl e are , or peopl e do , or peopl e thin k can be studie d by psychologists . Psychologist s are concerne d with wha t make s peopl e tick , why the y do thing s an d how the y do things " (Gale , 1985 , p . 1). Other s find it easie r to defin e wha t psycholog y is no t rathe r tha n wha t it is (Colman , 1984) . Anothe r way of describin g the scop e of psycholog y is to offe r a pictur e of wha t is know n as the shor t histor y of the lon g pas t of psychology . Nearl y all textbook s set ou t th e majo r school s in psycholog y or th e approache s of differen t branche s in psychology . Thes e are not theorie s bu t explici t school s with differen t assumptions . Roedige r et al. (1984 ) set ou t the variou s school s — psychobiological , ethological , behavioural , cognitive , psychoanalyti c and humanistic . Academi c and professiona l psychologist s ma y well feel happie r classifyin g themselve s in term s of thei r approac h rathe r tha n the schoo l tha t the y fall into . In fact , th e concep t of schoo l is rathe r old fashione d an d som e (i.e . structuralists , functionalist s an d Gestal t psychologists ) ma y hardl y exis t at all, bein g replace d by humanistic , existentia l or cognitiv e psychology . However , it ma y be tha t the belief s an d value s tha t lea d som e psychologist s to fal l int o a particula r schoo l or adop t a certai n approach , similarl y influenc e lay peopl e to tak e up a certai n epistemologica l stance . Tha t is, ther e may be lay behaviourist s wh o rejec t introspection , cognitiv e or emotiona l factor s in explainin g behaviour , preferrin g th e infamou s "blac k box " approach . On the othe r han d som e peopl e migh t "naturally " gravitat e to psychoanalyti c thinking , preferrin g to emphasis e the importanc e of uncon sciou s motivation . The issu e of value s or belief s determinin g researc h paradigm s of scientist s has recentl y surface d again . Kimbl e (1984 ) has argue d tha t curren t academic psycholog y ha s tw o distinc t cultures , labelle d scientifi c an d humanistic ,

48

Lay Theories

TABL E 3.1. ScalesandSubscalesof theEpistemicDifferential. Relate d opposin g ideas

Scale

Increasin g knowledg e vs improvin g human condition ; methodologica l strengt h vs relevance ; obligatio n to apply vs no such obligatio n Lawfu l vs not lawful ; understandabl e vs Degre e of lawfulnes s of behaviour : determinis m vs indeterminis m incomprehensible ; predictabl e vs unpredictable ; controllabl e vs uncontrollabl e ; observatio n vs Sourc e of basic knowledge : objectivis m vs Sense data vs empathy intuitionis m self-report ; operationa l definitio n vs linguisti c analysis ; investigatio n vs commo n sense Investigatio n vs interpretation ; inductio n Methodologica l strategy : data vs theor y vs deduction ; evidenc e vs argumen t Experimentatio n vs survey/cas e study ; Settin g for discovery : laborator y vs field manipulatio n vs naturalisti c observation ; hypothesi s testin g vs correlation ; contro l vs realism ; precisio n vs ecologica l validit y Tempora l aspect s of lawfulness : historica l Developmen t vs descriptiv e approach ; vs ahistorica l longitudina l vs cross-sectiona l study y vs situation ; biologica l vs Positio n on nature/nurtur e issue: heredit y Physiolog social scienc e vs environmen t Specie s genera l vs specie s specific ; Generalit y of laws: nomotheti c vs "standar d man" vs individua l idiographi c uniqueness ; universalis m vs contextualis m Concretenes s of concepts : hypothetica l Biologica l realit y vs abstrac t conceptio n construct s vs intervenin g variable s Molecula r vs molar ; part vs whole Leve l of analysis : elementis m vs holism Reaso n vs emotion ; thinkin g vs Facto r leadin g to action : cognitio n vs motivation ; intellec t vs impulse ; affect rationa l vs irrationa l Automaticit y vs voluntar y control ; Conceptio n of organisms : reactivit y vs associationis m vs constructivis m creativit y

1. Mos t importan t values : scientifi c vs human

2.

3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11.

12.

Reprinte d with permissio n from Kimble , G. (1984 ) Psychology' s two cultures . American Psychologist,39, 833-839 . Copyrigh t (1984 ) by the America n Psychologica l Association . Reprinte d by permissio n of author . Reproduce d from Kimbl e (1984) . whic h diffe r on specifi c explici t values . Scientific. "Al l behaviou r is cause d by physical , physiologica l or experientia l variables . In principl e it is possibl e to discove r exac t law s relatin g ever y individual' s behaviou r to thes e variables . Behaviou r is understandable , predictable , controllable. " Humanistic: "Th e concep t of causalit y probabl y doe s no t appl y to behaviour , certainl y no t to individua l behaviour . Ther e is nothin g lawfu l abou t behaviou r excep t per hap s at the leve l of statistica l averages . Eve n in principle , behaviou r mus t be regarde d as incomprehensible , unpredictabl e an d beyon d control " (p . 835) . This is mos t clearl y seen in his 12-poin t tabl e whic h emphasise s som e of the majo r difference s in the disciplin e (see Tabl e 3.1) . It shoul d be emphasise d tha t thes e are no t lay theoretica l approache s bu t th e position s of polarise d

Lay Theories in Psycholog y

49

academi c psychologist s wh o are frequentl y explici t abou t thei r assumptions . Psychologist s of a tough-minde d natura l scienc e approac h ten d to favou r the "scientific " approach , whil e psychologist s in the tender-minded , socia l scienc e schoo l ten d to valu e the mor e humanisti c approach . The ide a tha t psycholog y is no t valu e free bu t valu e lade n has als o bee n take n up by Krasne r an d Hout s (1984 ) wh o als o demonstrate d the existenc e of tw o groups , whic h the y calle d behavioural and non-behavioural. The y showe d tha t peopl e wh o endorse d freedo m or enquir y as oppose d to ethica l constraint s on research , an d wh o favoure d socia l Darwinis m as oppose d to socia l altruis m favoure d th e behavioura l ove r the experimenta l approac h to psychology . Essentiall y the sam e poin t is bein g mad e — psychologist s as a grou p ten d to polaris e on variou s discipline-specifi c epistemologica l assump tion s and values . But , as Howar d (1985 ) point s out , on e mus t be carefu l to separat e non-epistemi c value s (attitudina l or emotiona l response s in certai n individuals ) from epistemi c value s (criteri a employe d by scientist s to choos e amon g competin g theoretica l explanations) . It is onl y on the latte r tha t on e migh t expec t psychologist s to differ . Indee d som e researcher s hav e suggeste d tha t certai n psycholog y textbook s hav e stron g epistemologica l biases . Fo r instance , Hoga n an d Schroede r (1981 ) clai m tha t author s of textbook s introduc e the followin g behaviouristi c biases : (a) The y ignor e traditiona l topic s suc h as thoughts , feelings , sensa tions , state s of mind ; (b) The y equat e "scientifi c study " wit h a searc h for causa l relationships , relationship s inferre d from the covariatio n of events ; (c) The y equat e "scientifi c study " wit h laborator y experimentatio n an d statis tica l analysis , implyin g thereb y tha t non-experimenta l methodologie s ar e unscientifi c or worthless . Thi s findin g or clai m is dispute d by Brow n an d Brow n (1982 ) whos e analysi s of text s showe d littl e evidenc e of glarin g behaviourist , environmen talist , or libera l biase s in treatin g th e topic s of emotion , personalit y assess ment , and instincts . Therefore , ther e is, probabl y alway s has been , and will be, variou s majo r issue s — nearl y all of them epistomologiea l — on whic h psychologist s differ . Whethe r thes e are calle d schools , approaches , sub-disciplines , value s or culture s is immater ial — suffic e it to say tha t they exist . Wha t is unclea r howeve r is wha t lead s peopl e who presumabl y hav e share d a fairl y homogenou s education , to adop t differen t theoretica l axiom s or stances . Tha t is, wha t are the aetiologica l factor s in the preferenc e for one or othe r stance . It may well be tha t the sam e factor s pre determin e how lay peopl e fall alon g the scientific-humanis t continuum . Harr e (1984) , however , sees the divid e no t withi n academi c psycholog y bu t betwee n academi c psychologist s an d laymen . He writes : Two image s of huma n psycholog y compet e for our attention . Academi c psychologists , particularl y those who work in the "experimenta l tradition" , make the implici t assumptio n that men, wome n and childre n are high-grad e automata , the pattern s of whose behaviou r are though t to obey somethin g very like natura l laws . .. it is assume d that there are program s

50

Lay Theories which contro l action and the task pf psycholog y is to discove r the "mechanisms " by which they are implemented . Lay folk, clinica l psychologists , lawyers , historian s and all those who have to deal in a practica l way with huma n being s tend to think of peopl e as agent s strugglin g to maintai n some sort of reasone d order in their lives agains t abackgroun d flux of emotions , inadequat e informatio n and the ever-presen t tides of socia l pressures . I shall try to show that the great difference s that mark off these ways of thinkin g abou t human psycholog y are not ultimatel y grounde d in a reasone d weighin g of the evidenc e availabl e to any studen t of huma n affairs . They turn in the end on unexamine d politica l and moral assumptions . . .. Althoug h these profoundl y differen t ways of interpretin g and explainin g huma n though t and action have their origin in preferre d linguisti c forms rathe r than any compellin g facts of the matter , they do have profoundl y differen t practica l consequences . They carry with them very distinctiv e stance s as to the moral , politica l and clinica l problem s with which moder n people are beset, (p. 4)

Harr e therefor e appear s to recognis e the tw o culture s of psychology , bu t presume s tha t mos t psychologist s favou r th e "scientific " cultur e an d lay peopl e the "humanistic " culture . He provide s no evidenc e for thi s assump tion , whic h ma y be somethin g of a stra w ma n as it is quit e likel y tha t man y psychologist s (no t onl y clinica l psychologists ) are "humanistic " an d man y lay peopl e (i.e . non-psychologists ) believ e the y ar e "scientific" . It is no t necessaril y the fac t tha t on e is a traine d academi c scientis t tha t determine s one' s value s — it coul d wel l be othe r factors , suc h as conservatism , predic t bette r whic h epistemologica l positio n a perso n favours . 3.2 Knowledg e of Psychologica l Principle s Man y psycholog y textboo k authors , particularl y if the y ar e writin g a genera l or socia l psycholog y introductio n for th e layma n or beginnin g student , provid e a brie f quiz , or shor t test , at the beginnin g of thei r boo k for the reader s to asses s the exten t of thei r knowledg e of the topic . Th e aim of the autho r is usuall y to persuad e th e reade r how littl e he or she know s an d by implication , ho w muc h he/sh e ha s to learn . Man y of thes e questions , therefore , hav e counter-intuitiv e answer s an d are designe d to impres s upo n the reade r how littl e he or she knows . Th e test s hav e no t bee n validate d an d may no t fulfi l appropriat e psychometri c criterio n bu t ar e mean t to be illustrativ e of th e ignoranc e of th e lay reade r of basi c psychologica l principles . Howeve r ther e has bee n som e researc h int o popula r misconception s abou t psycholog y and the knowledg e of the layman . Mos t of thi s researc h usin g the behavioura l myth s questionnair e has bee n don e on introductio n psycholog y classe s at the beginnin g of thei r course . (McKeachie , 1960 ; Vaughn , 1977 ; Ellis and Richard , 1977 ; Best , 1982) . Nearl y all thi s researc h has bee n don e in orde r to asses s the effectivenes s of an introductor y cours e in dispellin g myth s abou t th e natur e of psychology . Fo r instance , Elli s an d Richar d (1977 ) compare d a grou p of student s wh o complete d an introductor y psycholog y cours e wit h a matche d grou p wh o had no t on a 75-ite m multipl e choic e test . The forme r go t abou t 25 % of the answer s correct , whil e the student s wh o complete d the cours e onl y got 30% correct . Nearl y all the finding s hav e bee n

Lay Theories in Psycholog y

51

disappointing : althoug h student s improve d significantl y in th e studie s of McKeachi e (1960 ) and Vaugh n (1977 ) the chang e was neithe r substantia l no r impressiv e (6. 6 and 5.5 % improvemen t respectively) . Othe r researc h in thi s are a has bee n concerne d wit h the imag e of psycholog y as a disciplin e (Smit h et al. 1969) . Recentl y Kirto n et al. (1983 ) foun d tha t schoo l childre n wer e surprisingl y inaccurat e in thei r belie f abou t th e cours e conten t of typica l psycholog y course s an d th e natur e of psycholog y as a career , bu t wer e moderatel y well informe d abou t the wor k psychologist s do . Out of a possibl e scor e of 56, sixt h former s got mea n score s of 30.36 , (53 % correct) . Les s tha n 50 % kne w tha t no t all psychologist s ar e medicall y qualifie d an d man y confuse d psychoanalysi s an d psycholog y as wel l as psycholog y and sociology . Smit h and Casbol t (1984 ) repeate d a stud y 15 year s afte r the firs t lookin g at sixth-formers ' (12t h grad e pupils' ) knowledg e of psychology . The y wer e aske d suc h question s as whethe r the y had any talks/lesson s abou t psycholog y at schoo l (35 % said yes) ; ha d the y eve r me t a psychologis t personall y (87 % said yes) ; the y wer e als o aske d to list psychologist s tha t the y had hear d of and psycholog y book s tha t the y ha d read . Relatin g thei r result s wit h a compar able stud y execute d 15 year s before , th e author s foun d tha t th e pupils ' reporte d les s contac t wit h psycholog y an d tha t th e distinctio n betwee n psycholog y and psychiatr y was no clearer , bu t tha t psycholog y was seen mor e as a scienc e subject . Curiously , mor e pupil s believe d the governmen t shoul d not spen d mor e mone y on psychologica l research , an d fewe r though t tha t psycholog y is very usefu l for society . On the othe r hand , ther e is a no t inconsiderabl e literatur e attestin g to the surprisin g amoun t of knowledg e tha t the lay perso n actuall y has of psycho logica l phenomena . Fo r instanc e Mische l an d Mische l (1980 ) foun d tha t bot h 9- and 11-year-ol d childre n wer e abl e correctl y to predic t th e outcom e of nearl y two-third s of the famou s experiment s presente d to them . In a recen t study , Furnha m (1985b ) set ou t to examin e sixth-for m (12t h grade ) pupils ' knowledg e of variou s aspect s of psycholog y in orde r to determin e how muc h the y kno w or did no t kno w abou t specifi c area s of psychologica l researc h an d findings . In all , 250 subject s too k par t in th e study . Subject s wer e give n a bookle t whic h containe d thre e questionnaires . (1) Misconceptions about Psychology Questionnaire (Best , 1982 ) Thi s is a 23-ite m true-fals e questionnair e designe d to tes t commo n myth s abou t psychology . Th e questionnair e was base d on previou s questionnaire s of thi s typ e (McKeachie , 1960 ; Vaughn , 1977 ) an d othe r statement s wer e draw n from item s appearin g in contemporar y textbook s (Brau n and Linder , 1979) . Bes t (1982 ) attempte d to asses s th e validit y of th e item s by askin g colleague s to evaluat e eac h item' s ambiguity . Th e correc t answe r to all item s was false whic h render s thi s an unbalance d questionnaire . Som e erro r varianc e ma y occu r as a resul t of the decisio n to key all the item s negatively . (2) Common Knowledge (Baro n an d Byrne , 1981 )

52

Lay Theories

Thi s is a simpl e 10-ite m true-fals e tes t devise d to impres s upo n the reade r of thi s genera l socia l psycholog y textboo k th e counter-intuitiv e natur e of man y socia l psychologica l researc h findings . All the item s are false , and refe r to variou s area s of socia l psycholog y suc h as dissonanc e theory , altruism , conformity , etc . (3) Self-Assessment Quiz (Colman , 1984 ) This is a lon g 20-ite m multipl e choic e test , wit h th e possibilit y of bonu s points . Eac h questio n is introduce d by a lon g paragrap h whic h set s th e questio n in context . Th e question s are draw n fro m all area s of psychology , psycho-physics , learnin g theory , socia l and clinica l psychology , etc . Th e tes t offer s betwee n thre e an d fou r multipl e choice s an d it is, by and large , a very difficul t test . Th e autho r believe s tha t a scor e of 13 an d abov e show s tha t a perso n is well-rea d in psychology . Curiousl y ther e wer e no age , sex or chose n specialit y at school , effect s on the subject' s knowledge . Th e result s are howeve r interesting . Misconceptions about Psychology (Bes t 1982 ) Overall , subject s go t abou t 50 % of th e answer s correc t to thi s tes t (i.e . responde d tha t 50 % of item s wer e false) . Tabl e 3.2 show s the percentage s of correc t response s to eac h question . Th e rang e is fairl y substantia l (11-93%) . Ove r three-quarter s gav e th e correc t respons e to item s 4, 5,1 3 an d 15. Yet unde r a quarte r gav e the correc t answe r to item s 3, 9 and 19. It is possibl e tha t th e subject s wer e fairl y accurat e on item s 4 an d 5 becaus e the y relate d to thei r ow n experienc e in school , whil e thei r superficia l readin g in psycholog y ma y hav e led the m to be abl e to distinguis h betwee n th e mentall y retarde d an d th e mentall y ill (ite m 13) . Thes e result s are surprisingl y simila r to thos e of Bes t (1982 ) wh o foun d tha t first yea r universit y student s got abou t 50 % of thes e question s correc t bot h befor e and afte r thei r course . Common Knowledge Subject s tende d to far e slightl y bette r on thi s tes t of socia l psychologica l knowledge . Th e result s showe d tha t ove r three-quarter s of the subject s kne w the answe r to the questio n on crowdin g an d dissonanc e (item s 5 and 8). On the othe r han d the y ha d littl e ide a of th e researc h on th e risky-shif t phenomen a (Ite m 3) and jus t worl d belief s (ite m 8). On the othe r question s abou t hal f the subject s gav e the correc t answer . Self-Assessment Quiz Predictabl y subject s did leas t wel l at thi s difficul t multipl e choic e test . On only eigh t of the 23 item s did mor e tha n hal f of the subject s get the correc t answer s whil e on two , less tha n 10 % go t th e answe r correct . Th e bes t answere d question s referre d to people' s knowledg e of cognitiv e dissonanc e and how ofte n individual s dream . Overall , subject s foun d thi s a ver y difficul t task . Ther e was als o a predictabl y negativ e correlatio n ( - 0.27 ) betwee n the percentag e of peopl e wh o offere d th e correc t answe r an d th e numbe r of choice s available .

Lay Theories in Psycholog y

53

TABL E 3.2. Percentageof RespondentswhocorrectlygaveFALSEasresponsesto eachitem(N = 250)

1.

2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

19. 20.

21. 22.

23.

Th e behaviou r of most lower animal s —insects , reptile s and amphibians , most rodents , and birds —is instinctiv e and unaffecte d by learnin g Fo r the first week of life, a baby sees nothin g but a grey blue regardles s of what he or she "look s at" Achild learn s to talk more quickl y if the adult s aroun d him habituall y repeat the word he is trying to say, using prope r pronunciatio n Th e best way to get a chronicall y noisy schoolchil d to settle down and pay attentio n is to punis h him Slo w learner s remembe r more of what they learn than fast learner s Highly intelligen t peopl e — "genuises " —tend to be physicall y frail and sociall y isolate d O n the average , you canno t predic t from a person' s grade s at schoo l and college whethe r he or she will do well in a caree r Mos t nationa l and ethni c stereotypes are completel y false nI small amount s alcoho l is a stimulan t LS D cause s chromosom e damag e Th e larges t drug proble m in the Unite d States , in terms of the numbe r of people affected , is marijuan a Psychiatr y is a subdivisio n of psycholog y Mos t mentall y retarde d peopl e are also mentall y ill Athird or more of the peopl e sufferin g from sever e menta l disorde r are potentiall y dangerou s Electroshoc k therap y is an outmode d techniqu e rarely used in today' s menta l hospital s Th e more sever e the disorder , the more intensiv e the therap y require d to cure it, for example : Schizophrenic s usuall y respon d best to psychoanalysi s Quit e a few psychologica l characteristic s of men and wome n appea r to be inbor n in all cultures , for example , wome n are more emotiona l and sexuall y less aggressiv e than men No reputabl e psychologis t "believe s in" such irrationa l phenomen a as ESP, hypnosis , or the bizarr e menta l and physica l achievements of Easter n yogis To chang e people' s behaviou r towar d member s of ethni c minorit y groups , we must first chang e their attitude s Th e basis of the baby' s love for his mothe r is the fact that his mothe r fills his physiologica l needs for food, etc. Th e more highl y motivate d you are, the better you will do at solvin ga comple x proble m Th e best way to ensur e that a desire d behaviou r will persis t after trainin g is complete d is to rewar d the behaviou r every single time it occur s throughou t trainin g (rathe r than intermittently ) Aschizophreni c is someon e with a split personalit y

Percentag e correc t 6 5 16 81 39 68 86 92 8 3 4 7 14 9 2 36

2 5 8

55 05 44 19 11 42 13 43 6

3

The result s of thi s stud y sho w tha t if psycholog y is commo n sense , the n this populatio n certainl y did no t appea r to hav e a grea t dea l of it. However , certai n objection s to th e use of thes e measure s ma y be made, whic h cast s sever e doub t ove r the reliabilit y of thes e results . Th e firs t is tha t the question s themselve s wer e badl y worde d or ambiguous . Yet accordin g to Morga n (1961) , tha t is a sufficien t reaso n to rejec t the m as false . A secon d possibl e

6

54

Lay Theories

artefac t occurre d becaus e all the item s in bot h the firs t an d secon d tes t wer e false . Wit h mos t test s ther e is a balanc e betwee n tru e an d fals e bein g correc t and , realisin g this , subject s ma y hav e bee n tempte d to pu t ' 'true' ' in instance s simpl y becaus e the y wer e led to expec t at leas t som e correctl y tru e answers . Tha t is, ther e was a respons e categor y bia s in thes e questionnaires . A thir d objectio n refer s to th e representativenes s of th e items . Indeed , Colma n (1984 ) writes : The question s do not represen t an entirel y balance d selectio n from a typica l undergraduat e syllabu s in psychology . The choice of topics was constraine d in a numbe r of ways.In the first place the question s were specificall y chose n to trip you up; they were based on ideas and researc h finding s which are on the whole unexpecte d or abou t which there is widesprea d misunderstanding . Finally , the author' s persona l interest s have inevitabl y playe d a part in biasin g the selection , (p. 71) Thes e thre e factor s all militat e agains t the subject s gettin g a goo d score . However , to off-se t thi s bia s it shoul d be born e in min d tha t the majorit y of thes e subject s wer e abov e averag e intelligenc e wit h a stron g interes t an d readin g in psychology . Turnin g to the actua l result s themselves , the y are muc h the sam e as thos e of previou s studie s (Best , 1982 ; Smit h et al., 1969) . Commo n misconception s still abide : less tha n hal f the subject s realise d tha t schizophreni a is no t a "spli t personality" , tha t alcoho l is no t a stimulan t an d tha t fixe d interva l ratio s are not as * 'addictive' ' as variabl e rati o interva l rati o schedule s of reinforcement . However , ove r hal f kne w tha t psychiatr y was no t a subdivisio n of psycholog y and tha t the mentall y retarde d are no t necessaril y mentall y ill. Certainl y som e of thes e result s revea l tha t ther e ha s bee n an increas e in six-formers ' knowledg e of psycholog y ove r the pas t decad e (Smit h et al., 1969 ; Plowma n and Leytham , 1957) . Furthermore , the y seeme d to hav e a gras p of som e of the mor e fundamenta l socia l psychologica l principles , bu t a direc t tes t of thei r knowledg e of th e earl y psychologica l law s (Weber's , Fechner's ) reveale d considerabl e ignorance . Housto n (1983 , 1985 ) ha s als o bee n intereste d in wha t he call s the self eviden t and obviou s basi c principle s in psychology . He develope d a 21-ite m multipl e choic e questionnair e (see Tabl e 3.3 ) to measur e th e principle s of learning an d memory foun d in classica l experimenta l psychology . It can be seen tha t the item s are jargo n free an d generall y comprehensible . He foun d tha t 71 % of the item s wer e correctl y answere d (mor e ofte n tha n by chance ) by the 50 introductor y psycholog y students , and tha t the probabilit y of an item bein g answere d correctl y wa s unrelate d eithe r to th e familiarit y wit h th e name s of the phenomen a or psychologists ' rating s of the importanc e of the phenomen a (Houston , 1983) . Thi s stud y wa s replicate d on 50 voluntee r adult s recruite d in a Lo s Angele s par k on a Sunda y afternoo n (Houston , 1985) . He foun d 76 % of the question s wer e answere d correctl y mor e ofte n tha n by chanc e bu t tha t th e correc t answer s wer e correlate d wit h ag e (educatio n partialle d out ) and educatio n (ag e partialle d out) .

Lay Theories in Psycholog y 55 TABL E 3.3. SampleQuestionsEmbodying,Respectively,Extinction,Subjective Organisation,Memoryfor Wordsvs Pictures,Levelsof Processing,Partial Reinforcement Effect,RecencyinFreeRecall,andSecondaryReinforcement

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

If, over severa l weeks , a child has been feedin g pigeon s on her windo w sill and then suddenl y one day stops feedin g them altogethe r the pigeon s will: (a) immediatel y start comin g to the windo w much more often than they did when they were fed there . (b) graduall y increas e the frequenc y with which they come to the window . (c) com e to the windo w sill just as often as they did when they were fed there . (d) graduall y stop comin g to the window . (e) neve r come to the windo w again . Suppos e someon e reads a list of word s to you in a rando m order and then asks you to recall as many of the words as you can, in any order . Then he reads the same list of word s to you again,but this time in a new rando m order , and asks you to recallthem again in any order . You go throug h this procedur e a numbe r of times , each time hearin g the same word s in a new rando m order befor e you attemp t to recall them.As you progres s you will: (a) recal l the word s in the rando m order that you just heard . (b) begin to recall certai n word s togethe r even thoug h they are not presente d together . (c) recal l the word s in an essentiall y rando m order each time you try to recall them. On e group of subject s is show n the wordspencil , dog, cloud , branch , car, ant, shirt, and building . Anothe r group is shown picturesof these sameitems . Both group s are tested for recall of these items at a later time. Whic h of the followin g is true? (a) the group show n the picture s will do best on the retentio n test. (b) the two group s will do about the same on the retentio n test. (c) the group show n the word s will do best on the retentio n test. Wha t shoul d be the best way to think about word s if you want to remembe r them ? (a) to think about what they sound like (e.g. think about where the accen t falls, or whethe r the word has an "r" sound in it). (b) to think about what the word looks like (e.g. think about how many syllable s the word has, or whethe r it has any curve d letter s in it). (c) to think about the meanin g of the word (e.g. can it fit in your hand,or how pleasan t is it). (d) all of these ways of thinkin g about word s will lead to equal recall . Suppos e a child likes to feed two pigeon s that come to two differen t window s at her house . One pigeo n she gives a piece of corn each and every time it lands at its window . The other pigeon she only feeds every fourt h time it comes to its window . After a while both pigeon s come to their respectiv e window s equall y often , but only one of them gets fed every time. Then the girl move s away and the house is empty . Whic h pigeo n will come back to the windo w more often ? (a) the pigeo n fed every time. (b) the pigeo n fed every fourt h time. (c) they will both come back equall y often . Someon e reads a list of word s to you and asks you to recall them in any order (a) the first few items in the list will be the easies t to recall . (b) the last few items in the list will be the easies t to recall . (c) all the words , regardles s of their positio n in the list, will be of equal difficulty . Arat first learn s to run down alittle hallwa y to find food in a white compartmen t at the end of the hallway . Then the rat is put in anothe r little hallway , but this time, when the rat runs down to the end of the hallway , it is faced with a choice . If it turns left it will enter a black compartment . If it turns right it will enter a white compartment . But there isn't any food in either compartment . What will the rat tend to do? (a) turn left and right about equall y often . (b) turn into the white box. (c) turn into the black box. (d) it will not turn into either compartmen t unles s someon e puts food in one of them .

Reprinte d with permissio n of autho r and publishe r from Houston , J. P. Psychology : a closed system of self-eviden t information ? Psychologica l Reports , 1983,52, 203-208 . Table 1.

56

Lay Theories

Housto n suggest s tha t psycholog y is a syste m of self-eviden t informatio n but doe s poin t ou t tha t som e importan t principle s are no t obvious , even whe n frame d in ordinar y language , as a quarte r of th e item s wer e no t answere d correctly , mor e tha n on e migh t expec t by chance . He suggest s tha t the fac t tha t lay peopl e can predic t man y psychologica l finding s (albei t in onl y on e are a of psychology ) doe s no t invalidat e or rende r pointles s the disciplin e of psychology . Rather , wha t psycholog y can and doe s offe r is firstl y the precise measurement of behavioura l phenomen a an d secondl y a goo d theoretical explanation for wh y the y occur . In othe r words , lay people , throug h observatio n an d experience , ma y be abl e to predic t behaviou r pattern s bu t have no theor y for why the y actuall y occur . Overal l studie s ten d to sho w thre e things : first , tha t lay people' s psycho logica l knowledg e is patch y — the y ten d to kno w a lot abou t som e aspect s of behaviou r bu t ver y littl e abou t others . Second , peopl e ar e no t abl e to distinguis h betwee n the differen t emphase s of the differen t socia l science s or knowledg e of to wha t exten t psychologist s ar e medicall y trained . Third , individua l differences , as wel l as specifi c educationa l experience s in psychology , do no t mak e muc h differenc e in people' s lay knowledg e of psychologica l theorie s an d principles . 3.3 Change s ove r Tim e One argumen t use d by psychologist s to refut e th e "al l psycholog y is commo n sense " objectio n is tha t becaus e psycholog y is frequentl y popular ised peopl e becom e mor e knowledgeabl e abou t psychologica l principles , whic h in tur n are regarde d as commo n sense . On e may , therefore , expec t psychologica l knowledg e to increas e ove r time . Variou s researc h project s ar e of relevanc e here . Th e firs t concern s the maintenanc e of superstitio n ove r time . In 1925 Nixo n sough t to demonstrat e tha t his student s arrive d at th e beginnin g of his psycholog y classe s wit h "unsubstantiate d beliefs " abou t huma n behaviour , bu t tha t thes e change d as a functio n of teaching . He gav e ove r 350 student s the 30-ite m True-False tes t show n in Tabl e 3.4 . Despit e th e fac t tha t nearl y all are fals e th e student s rated , on average , betwee n 10 and 12 to be true . Ove r 50% believe d item s 11 , 22, 29, 18 and 24 to be tru e yet less tha n 25% circle d 19, 9, 10, 14, 3, 7, 5 and 13 to be true . Twenty-fiv e year s late r Levit t (1952 ) replicate d thi s stud y on superstition s whic h he define d as irrational ; popularl y accepted ; usuall y influencin g th e behaviou r of the holder ; ma y relat e to supernatura l phenomena ; hav e no soun d evidenc e of persona l experienc e to suppor t it and arise s spontaneousl y and spread s withou t eve r havin g ha d th e sanctio n of authority . Th e sam e questionnair e was administere d to 110 me n an d th e result s compare d wit h thos e of Nixon . Ther e was , overall , a significan t chang e in superstitio n wit h the mea n tru e respons e droppin g fro m 8.3 1 to 1.76 . He categorise d th e

Lay Theories in Psychology

57

TABL E 3.4 .

1. The numbe r of man' s sense s is five. 2. Achild come s into the world with an instinctiv e knowledg e of good and evil. This is his conscienc e and is born in him. 3. Certai n lines in a person' s hand foretel l his future . 4. If you will stare at a person' s back you can makehim turn around . This is a form of telepathy . 5. It really is unluck y to have anythin g to do with the numbe r thirteen . 6. Aman'scharacte r can be read by notin g the size and locatio n of specia l development s of his head. 7. Peopl e with greenis h eyes are not as trustworth y as peopl e with blue or black eyes. 8. An expectan t mothe r by fixing her mind on a subjec t can influenc e the characte r of her unbor n child. 9. Wome n are inferio r to men in intelligence . 10. Peopl e born under the influenc e of certai n planet s show the influenc e in their characters . 11. Intelligenc e can be increase d by training . 12. Long , slende r hand s indicat e an artisti c nature . 13. Beginnin g an undertakin g on Frida y is almos t certai n to bring bad luck. 14. If a man but had faith enoug h he could heal a broke n limb instantly . 15. Man y eminen t men have been feeble-minde d as children . 16. Som e animal s are as intelligen t as the averag e human . 17. No defec t of body or mind can hold us back if we have enoug h will power . 18. Adult s sometime s becom e feeble-minde d from overstudy . 19. All men are create d equal in capacit y for achievement . 20. The marriag e of cousin s is practicall y certai n to result in childre n of inferio r intelligence . 21. Especiall y intelligen t chidre n are likely to be weak and retarde d physically . 22. The study of mathematic s is valuabl e becaus e it gives one a logica l mind . 23. Asquar e jaw is a sign of will power . 24. You can estimat e an individual' s intelligenc e pretty closel y by just lookin g at his face. 25. Ahigh forehea d indicate s intellectua l superiority . 26. Fea r is unnatural . It is a bad habit . 27. Wome n are by natur e purer and better than men. 28. Aperso n who does not look you in the eye is likely to be dishonest . 29. Ma n is superio r becaus e his conduc t is very largel y guide d by reason . 30. Any physica l or menta l diseas e can be contracte d by thinkin g about it. Reproduce d from Nixon (1925) . superstitions to highlight the point about the drop in numbers. Some superstitions, like those concerning phrenology and physiognomy he believes extinct, while others such as those concerning magic will probably find modern replacements. The author concludes that superstitions (or cognitive distortions) must be important to the individual (otherwise they would not be held), ambiguous (because the true facts are lacking or concealed) and related to certain personality factors (insecure, anxious, neurotically prone). Over 30 years later Tupper and Williams (1986) replicated the study in Australia and found the level of superstition back up to 2 1 % — compared with Nixon (1925) at 30.4% and Levitt (1952) at 6.5%. These results, categorised, are seen in Table 3.5. Thus instead of seeing a steady decline in superstitious beliefs over time the results are moderately consistent between 1925 and 1983. These results do show a modest decline but not as much as predicted by Nixon (1925) and indeed an increase on Levitt (1952). Of course,

58

Lay Theories

TABL E 3.5. Prevalenceof Superstitions 1925,1950and 1983by Categories. Categor y Phrenology-physiognom y Cheiromanc y Numerolog y Natura l phenomen a Astrolog y and magic Intelligenc e and menta l condition s

Item numbe r 6, 7, 23, 24, 25 3, 12 5,13 2, 19, 20, 26, 27 4, 8, 10, 14, 17, 28, 30 9, 15, 16, 18,21,2 2

Averag e percentag e 1925 195 0 1983* 33.40 25.00 1.00 32.20 28.71 40.17

1.9 8 4.1 0 1.3 5 6.8 0 7.1 7 11.8 7

7.2 10.7 4.0 13.8 19.6 25.5

♦The 1983 data were gathere d in Australi a by Tuppe r and William s (1986) , other data reproduce d from Levit t (1952) . it ma y wel l be tha t methodologica l artefact s accoun t for thes e results : i.e . Levit t (1952 ) onl y had mal e subjects ; Tuppe r and Williams' s (1986 ) stud y was don e in Australia ; subject s fro m all thre e group s wer e no t comparabl e in term s of education , etc . On the othe r hand , it ma y wel l be tha t superstitious , non-scientifi c belief s regardin g huma n natur e hav e onl y marginall y decrease d ove r time . The y believ e tha t althoug h thes e superstitiou s belief s ma y be culturall y relativisti c and changeabl e followin g fashions , the y are unlikel y to declin e greatl y as they fulfi l an importan t psychologica l function , namel y th e reductio n of anxiety . In a simila r stud y Warburto n (1956 ) replicate d a stud y by Raly a wh o gav e 141 America n pre-medica l student s a questionnair e in whic h the y wer e require d to not e whethe r the y believe d or disbelieve d the truthfulnes s of the statment s in Tabl e 3.6 . The topic s covere d astrology , heredity , etc . Th e result s showe d tha t on 13 items(3,4 , 10, 11 , 14, 15, 20 , 21, 23 , 24, 36, 38,40) ove r 50% of the subject s responde d incorrectly , wherea s on 11 item s less tha n 10% got the answer s incorrect . Warburto n (1956 ) repeate d th e stud y mor e tha n 10 year s late r on 143 Britis h graduat e educatio n students , bu t foun d no clearl y define d difference s betwee n th e tw o groups , althoug h on averag e 3 % mor e of th e Mancheste r sampl e marke d eac h item correctly . Thus , onc e again , ther e is littl e evidenc e for the declin e in superstitio n and the increas e in psychologica l knowledg e ove r time . Thirdly , Gregor y (1975 ) replicate d a stud y by Conkli n (1919 ) on genuin e superstition s in colleg e students , suc h as unluck y symbol s (blac k cats , the numbe r 13 , broke n mirrors) . Th e result s showe d tha t superstitiou s belief s and practice s hav e change d rathe r tha n decline d ove r time . Fo r instance , carryin g a luck y rabbit' s foo t or avoidin g pavemen t crack s wer e no longe r held , whil e savin g certai n coin s and findin g hors e shoe s wer e though t to be even mor e luck y tha n was though t in the past . Ther e are , however , a numbe r of methodologica l problem s wit h thes e studie s tha t hav e investigate d chang e in belief s ove r time . First , the result s are

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59

TABL E 3.6 .

No.

Statemen t

1. The positio n of the stars at the time of a man's birth determines , in part, his characte r 2. The ancien t Greek s were born with better intellect s than people are endowe d with today 3. Man is biologicall y descende d from a specie s of existin g apes 4. Ape s have been know n to solve problem s that the averag e 3-year-ol d child could not solve 5. Som e of the highe r apes are as intelligen t as the averag e man 6. Animal s depen d to a greate r exten t on inherite d ways of doing things than does man 7. The conscienc e is part of man's natura l equipmen t at birth 8. Mother s instinctivel y know the best ways of caring for their childre n 9. Mos t childre n are born bad 10. Mos t childre n are born good 11. Huma n nature canno t be change d since it is based upon instinct s 12. All peopl e reach physica l maturit y by the age of 18 14. All traits presen t in a child at birth are inherite d traits 15. All traits appearin g in a child after birth are the result of environmenta l influenc e 16. With the exceptio n of identica l twins , it is extremel y unlikel y that any two peopl e have exactl y the same heredit y 17. Voodois m is in the blood of the negro 18. An Englis h speakin g perso n with Germa n ancestor s finds it easier to learn Germa n than an Englis h speakin g perso n with French ancestor s 19. If the tails are cut off of generatio n after generatio n of rats, there will eventuall y be born rats withou t tails 20. An averag e child of the cave-ma n of 10,00 0 years ago, if brough t up in an America n home of today , would in all probabilit y becom e an ordinar y America n adult 21. Huma n progres s is due to increase d native intelligenc e from age to age 22. All men are born with equal power s 23. The averag e white man is born superior , intellectually , to the averag e man of any other race 24. Primitiv e peopl e are born with keene r sense s than the more highly civilise d 25. Men are, on the average , born superio r intellectuall y to women 26. Peopl e canno t be sharpl y differentiate d into blonde s and brunette s in many cases 27. If we knew all about a person' s heredit y we could predic t his succes s in the world 28. Any child, if carefull y traine d from birth, could be made into a successfu l doctor , lawyer , enginee r or journalis t 29. Geniuse s are alway s successful , whateve r the handicap s of their environmen t 30. Mos t great men have been born of poor but hones t parent s

Percentag e of subject s incorrec t Key* Al l student s 141 D

18

D D

21 61

B D

52 11

B D

10 36

D D D

46 19 68

D D D

55 10 66

D

54

B D

29 32

D

32

D

42

B

65

D D

74 9

D

65

D

51

D

37

B

11

D

22

D

30

D D

21 43

60 La y Theorie s 31. On the averag e the stronges t men physicall y are the weakes t mentall y 32. Homel y wome n are born with more intelligenc e than beautifu l wome n 33. Brillian t childre n are more subjec t to brain fever than childre n of averag e or sub-norma l intelligenc e 34. No defec t of body or mind can hold us back if we have willpower enoug h 35. Fait h alone can heal a broke n leg 36. Intelligenc e plays a larger role in huma n happines s than does emotio n 37. We are more likely to becom e fatigue d from work that does not interes t us than from work that does interes t us 38. Aperso n who is fatigue d invariabl y does poore r work than the same perso n fully rested 39. Two individual s of the same intelligenc e will give almos t identica l testimon y concernin g an acciden t which they have both witnesse d 40. All of man' s action s are determine d by his desire to seek pleasur e and avoid pain 41. Aman's characte r can be read by notin g the size and locatio n of certai n development s on his head 42. Certai n lines on a person' s hand are indicativ e of his futur e 43. Peopl e with long finger s are likely to be artisti c 45. Red-heade d peopl e are likely to be temperamenta l 46. Large-mouthe d peopl e are likely to be generou s 47. Green-eye d peopl e are likely to be more jealou s than blueeyed peopl e 48. Brunette s are more trustworth y than blonde s 49. Cold hands are a sign of a warm heart 50. Aperso n who holds his thumb s in his hands is a cowar d 51. Aperso n may be a cowar d in one situatio n and not in anothe r 52. Illegibl e handwritin g is a sign of superio r intelligenc e in the educate d adult 53. If your ears burn it is a sign that someon e is talkin g abou t you 54. It is unluck y to have anythin g to do with the numbe r 13 55. Beginnin g an undertakin g on Frida y is almos t sure to bring bad luck

8D1 D 7 D

94 D

D2 3 6 5D5

B

3 D 29 D6 2 D 25

D D D D D

18 20 47 40 28

D D D D

16 21 8 7 B6 D 7 D

D4 1 D4

*Key to attitude s which the write r takes as correct : B —Belief ; D — Disbelief. Reproduce d with permissio n from Warburton , F. (1956) , publishe d in the BritishJournalof EducationalPsychology. not necessaril y comparable , as differen t group s hav e bee n used . Thus , on e migh t attribut e the finding s to sex , age , educationa l or nationa l difference s jus t as muc h as difference s ove r time . Second , the sample s hav e nearl y alway s been universit y students , wh o are no t at all representativ e of the populatio n as a whol e and henc e migh t give very misleadin g results . Third , nearl y all of thes e studie s hav e concerne d non-factua l superstition s rathe r tha n psycholo gica l fact s an d it ma y wel l be tha t th e tw o do no t chang e similarly . Yet , despit e thes e shortcomings , it seem s tha t belief s abou t behaviou r do no t alte r as muc h ove r tim e as som e peopl e migh t expect .

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61

3.4 Personalit y and Individua l Difference s The use of the ter m "personality " by the lay perso n (sh e has no persona lity ; he has a stron g personality ) is very differen t fro m tha t of the academi c psychologis t wh o use s it in a technica l sense . Thi s doe s no t sugges t howeve r tha t ther e is an agree d upo n definitio n of personality . Compare : (a) Sullivan (1947 , p . 10) "Personalit y is the relativel y endurin g patter n of recurren t interpersona l situation s whic h characteris e a huma n life . . . A personalit y can neve r be isolate d from th e comple x of interpersona l relation ship s in whic h the perso n lives.' ' (b) Child (1968 , p . 80) "Personalit y is . . . the mor e or less stabl e interna l factor s tha t mak e on e person' s behaviou r consisten t fro m on e tim e to another , an d differen t fro m th e behaviou r othe r peopl e woul d manifes t in comparabl e situations. " (c) Maddi (1976 , p . 9) "Personalit y is the stabl e set of characteristic s an d tendencie s tha t determin e thos e commonalitie s and difference s in the psycho logica l behaviou r of peopl e tha t hav e continuit y in tim e and tha t ma y or may not be easil y understoo d in term s of th e socia l and biologica l pressure s of the immediat e situatio n alone. " (d) Pervin (1984 , p . 6) "Personalit y represent s thos e characteristic s of the perso n or of peopl e generall y tha t accoun t for consisten t patterns of respons e to situations. " Althoug h it coul d be argue d tha t thes e definition s wer e no t dramaticall y differen t it is stil l tru e tha t no on e accepte d definitio n exists . Furthermore , ther e ar e numerous , ver y differen t theorie s of personalit y in academi c psychology . Reviewer s and propagandist s of thes e theorie s appea r to fall int o thre e groups : benevolen t ecclectics , partisa n zealot s an d taxonomi c enthu siasts . Benevolent ecclectics are happ y to list and describ e the theorie s of the mos t famou s personalit y theorists : Adler , Cattell , Eysenck , Freud , Rogers , etc . Althoug h limitation s of eac h theoris t are mentione d the y are usuall y impar tiall y compare d an d contraste d wit h n o good-bad , correct-incorrect , valid-invali d judgemen t made . Fo r instanc e Hal l and Lindze y (1957 ) in thei r celebrate d textboo k compare d 17 personalit y theorist s on 18 dimension s includin g unconsciou s determinants , organismi c emphasi s an d multiplicit y of motives . Similarly , Phare s (1984 ) wh o review s personalit y theorist s from variou s approaches , argue s tha t the y can be compare d on six dimensions . Systemati c vs unsystematic ; operationa l vs non-operational ; conten t vs process ; experienc e vs heredity ; generalit y vs specificity ; interna l vs situational . A majo r proble m wit h thi s approac h is tha t ther e is no explici t criterio n for inclusio n or exclusio n of an y theor y or theorists . On e canno t affor d to be benevolen t wit h theorie s tha t ma y hav e historica l interes t bu t preciou s littl e empirica l support .

62

Lay Theories Surfac e Trait s and factor s

Temperamen t Biologica l line

Psychoanalysi s Phenomena l e lin

Motivationa l e lin

FIG. 3.1. The "Surface* ' of Personalit y and Three "Lines " Travellin g Beneat h it. Reprinte d with permissio n from Cook , M. (1984) . Level s of Personality . London : Holt, Ruehar t and Winston . Partisan zealots on the othe r han d ten d to ignor e all theorie s excep t one , denyin g the relevance , significanc e or validit y of all theorie s excep t the one . Thus , Cattel l (1965 ) reject s psychoanalyti c and phenomenologica l theorie s of personalit y arguin g for a multivariat e experimenta l method s bein g use d to defin e an d measur e th e underlyin g traits . Similarl y follower s of Kelly' s (1955 ) persona l construc t theor y frequentl y choos e to ignor e all othe r theorie s of personalit y in favou r of thei r chose n approach . Th e mai n dange r of thi s zealou s defenc e of on e theor y is the potentia l blindnes s to contradic tory evidenc e tha t ma y result . Everybod y recognise s th e complexit y of personalit y an d individua l difference s an d it seem s unlikel y tha t an y on e narrow-ban d theor y woul d be sufficientl y powerfu l to predic t an d describ e all huma n behaviour . Taxonomic enthusiasts on the othe r han d hav e attempte d to classif y all personalit y theorie s int o groups . Thi s ma y be don e historicall y in term s of schools , empiricall y in term s of method s or epistemologicall y in term s of the sort of dat a admitte d in suppor t of the theory . Althoug h ther e are numerou s and dramati c difference s betwee n the resultan t taxonomie s of reviewer s ther e doe s ten d to be som e agreement . Fo r instance , Coo k (1984 ) describe s fou r type s of personalit y theor y — thos e on the surfac e (th e descriptio n of trait s and factors ) an d thos e belo w th e surfac e biological , phenomena l an d motivation . Thi s is set ou t diagrammaticall y in Fig . 3.1 . Of cours e one coul d spli t eac h one of thes e approache s (schools , lines ) int o furthe r groups . Thus , for instance , trai t theorist s may be spli t int o singl e trai t theorist s wh o emphasis e jus t on e majo r dimensio n (e.g . field independence -

Lay Theorie s in Psycholog y

63

dependence ; A/ B typ e behaviou r patterns ; locu s of control ) o r thos e wh o favou r multi-trai t theorie s (Cattel l ha s 16, Eysenc k ha s three) . But as Hampso n (1982 ) point s ou t ther e are thre e quit e differen t perspec tives o n personality : th e personality theorists' perspectiv e whic h involve s studyin g othe r peopl e an d derivin g coheren t theories ; th e lay perspective , whic h ar e everyda y theorie s derive d fro m experience , genera l knowledge , language , etc. ; an d the ^^//-perspectiv e whic h concern s ou r knowledg e of , and theorie s about , ourselves . The lay perspectiv e has bee n investigate d extensivel y by psychologist s wh o hav e usuall y referre d t o it as implicit personality theory. Fo r instance , th e boxe r Mohamme d Ali ha s mad e explici t his theor y o f personalit y whic h is base d on fruit . Th e theor y depend s on the hardness/softnes s of the insid e and outsid e of fruit . Thi s allow s fo r fou r type s of frui t thus :

Inside

Hard Soft

Outsid e Hard Pomegranat e Walnu t

t Sof Prune Grape

The boxe r confesse d t o bein g a ' 'Grape " (i n his view the mos t desirabl e of the variou s fruit ) bu t usuall y lettin g th e publi c se e onl y hi s ''Walnut " personality . Perhap s on e of the area s wher e lay theorie s are bes t observe d is a t work . Manager s frequentl y hol d stron g belief s base d on taxonomi c theories . As a resul t man y ''theories " i n occupationa l psycholog y reflec t thi s bias . McGrego r (1960 ) has in fact argue d tha t manager s hav e two basi c theorie s (calle d X and Y) abou t the personalit y of employee s whic h lea d him or her to exercis e hig h level s of contro l (if a followe r o f theor y X and less contro l if a followe r of theor y Y) . In essence , theor y X assume s huma n being s inherentl y dislik e wor k an d will , if possible , avoi d it; mos t peopl e mus t be controlle d an d threatene d wit h punishmen t if the y ar e to wor k toward s organisationa l goals ; th e averag e perso n actuall y want s to be directed , thereb y avoidin g responsibility . Secur ity is mor e desirabl e tha n achievement . Theor y Y proceed s fro m a differen t se t of assumptions . Thes e ar e tha t wor k is recognise d by peopl e as a natura l activity ; huma n being s nee d no t be controlle d and threatened , the y will exercis e self-contro l an d self-directio n in the pursui t of organisationa l goal s to whic h the y are committed ; commitmen t is associate d wit h reward s fo r achievement ; peopl e learn , unde r th e righ t conditions , t o seek as well as accep t responsibility ; man y peopl e in societ y hav e creativ e potential , no t jus t a fe w gifte d individuals ; unde r mos t organisationa l condition s the intellectua l potentia l of peopl e is onl y partiall y utilised . The plethor a an d diversification s o f thes e idiosyncrati c lay theorie s hav e LT— F

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led cynic s to argu e tha t ther e are basicall y tw o type s of peopl e in thi s worl d — thos e tha t believ e tha t ther e are two type s an d thos e tha t do not . Psychologica l researc h on implici t personalit y theor y has bee n concerne d with the way s in whic h peopl e organis e or systematis e judgement s of othe r peopl e int o *'naive , implici t theorie s of personality " (Brune r an d Taguiri , 1954) . Ther e is a ric h literatur e on people' s unstate d assumption s abou t whic h personalit y trait s are associate d wit h eac h other ; th e range , meanin g and relationship s betwee n trai t descriptions ; the difference s betwee n centra l and periphera l traits ; the natur e of prototypes , etc . (Cook , 1979) . Strictl y speaking , thi s literatur e is no t abou t personalit y theor y so muc h as a postulat e or inferenc e syste m of rule s by whic h peopl e proces s informatio n abou t others . It is no t abou t th e developmen t or structur e of a coheren t systematise d workin g mode l or theor y of personalit y functionin g whic h ma y explai n when , how an d why peopl e behav e as the y do . Essentially , studie s on implici t personalit y theor y can be divide d int o two areas . Th e firs t is concerne d wit h the usag e and structur e of personalit y traits . Thu s Rosenber g and Sedla k (1972 ) foun d student s use d the term s intelligent , friendly , self-centred , ambitiou s an d laz y mos t frequentl y whe n describin g peopl e tha t the y knew . Other s hav e attempte d to describ e the structur e or dimension s underlyin g thes e traits . Perhap s the bes t know n is tha t of Osgoo d (1962) : evaluatio n (good-bad) , activit y (active-passive ) an d potenc y (hard soft) . Norma n (1963) , on the othe r hand , foun d five factor s whic h hav e bee n widel y replicated : extraversion , agreeableness , conscientiousness , emotiona l stabilit y and culture . Stil l other s hav e attempte d to describ e centralit y powe r or preferenc e for variou s trait s (Asch , 1946) . The secon d are a of researc h ha s bee n on wha t Shartea u an d Nag y (1984 ) call informatio n integratio n theory . Thi s ha s bee n concerne d wit h how individual s proces s trai t informatio n abou t other s in orde r to deriv e an impressio n or picture . Ther e is extensiv e researc h on how peopl e acquir e thes e implici t theorie s bu t mos t concer n the integratio n an d inferenc e fro m materia l presented . Term s lik e cognitiv e algebr a hav e bee n replace d by schem a theory , an d psychologist s fro m variou s tradition s (cognitive , linguistic , personality ) hav e all attempte d to loo k at thi s process . Despit e differen t (an d ofte n rathe r sterile ) methodologie s lackin g in externa l validit y ther e is considerabl e agreemen t as to wh y an d how peopl e proces s infor matio n abou t other s (Hampson , 1982) . Wha t is less clea r an d of cours e probabl y mor e important , is how accurat e thes e perception s are . Differen t investigator s hav e focuse d on differen t type s of personalit y rating s to attemp t to acces s wha t the y measure . Som e hav e argue d tha t the personalit y rating s (or trai t words ) reflec t neithe r actua l no r believe d co-occurrenc e likelihoo d of traits , bu t revea l semanti c similarit y betwee n the trai t term s (D'Andrade , 1974) . Further , it ha s bee n conclude d from researc h tha t rating s of behaviou r mad e from memor y are all subjec t to systemati c distortion , cause d by the rate r confusin g the similarit y in meanin g

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betwee n the term s wit h the memor y of whethe r the two categorie s did (or did not ) actuall y co-occu r in th e stimulu s perso n tha t the y rate d (D'Andrade , 1974) . Other s hav e adopte d a constructionis t positio n whic h argue s tha t jus t as trai t theorist s categoris e (throug h facto r analysis ) socia l behaviou r int o a smal l numbe r of highe r orde r factors , so lay peopl e implicitl y deriv e thei r own codin g or categorisin g scheme . Psychoanalyti c theorie s of personalit y are generall y no t wel l understoo d by lay-peopl e (Kline , 1972) . Whil e lay peopl e probabl y kno w of the distinc tion betwee n consciou s an d unconscious , mos t do no t understan d th e concep t of preconscious . Furthermore , the three-fol d structur e of id, ego and superego , as well as defenc e mechanisms , instinctua l processes , etc. , are no t well known . Th e od d concept s lik e phalli c symbo l an d peni s env y hav e becom e par t of lay languag e (albei t bawd y rathe r tha n serious ) few lay peopl e kno w or understan d the frequentl y counter-intuitiv e psychoanalyti c theorie s of personalit y (Pervin , 1984) . 3.5 Intelligenc e The way in whic h on e defines , measure s an d perceive s the "causes " of intelligenc e has lon g bee n a sourc e of considerabl e interes t to lay people , no doub t becaus e of its obviou s polic y implication s (Furnha m et aL, 1985) . Man y lay peopl e appea r to believ e tha t intelligenc e is eithe r som e sor t of proble m solvin g abilit y (thinking ) or acquire d knowledge , or preferabl y both . Man y of the passionat e debate s tha t academic s hav e ha d concernin g such thing s as the geneti c basis , definitio n an d measuremen t of intelligenc e hav e bee n of equa l interes t to lay people . On e exampl e of thi s wa s th e considerabl e correspondenc e to The Times (of London ) concernin g the Bur t scanda l — the ide a tha t Sir Cyri l Bur t ha d "faked " his dat a concernin g the heritabilit y of intelligenc e in twins . Ove r 50 letter s wer e publishe d ove r a perio d of a mont h (26 October-2 9 November , 1975) . Letter s wer e receive d from prominen t academic s as wel l as lay people . Som e wer e frivolou s an d trivial , and other s genuinel y naive . The y give , in thei r own way , a fascinatin g accoun t abou t lay theorie s of the origin s of intelligenc e (Furnham , 1986b) . Conside r for exampl e the following : (a) CM. Johnson, 11 Novembe r "Ca n som e exper t explai n why equall y love d children , wit h identica l hom e background s an d equa l educationa l opportunities , shoul d var y so greatl y in thei r abilit y and achievements ? I hav e a horridly right-win g suspicio n tha t the answe r lies in the genes. " (b) B. Barnadiston, 15 Novembe r "Doe s it matte r whethe r intelligenc e is inherite d or not ? Commo n sense , integrit y and the will to serv e the communit y are far mor e important. " Ther e wer e man y puzzle d lay peopl e askin g supposedl y straightforwar d questions :

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(c) J.A.G. Miller, 15 Novembe r "I am one of two son s bor n to middle-clas s parents . At the age of 68 I loo k back on an undistinguishe d caree r befittin g a perso n of quit e averag e intelligence . My late brother , on the othe r hand , was a man of outstandin g intelligence , a distinguishe d engineer , researc h scientis t who held for man y years a high positio n in industry . Am I averag e and was he brillian t becaus e he inherite d superio r genes , or did my differen t IQ aris e from 'socia l institution s and structures' ? If the latter , how did this arise ? We lived in the same house , wen t to the sam e gramma r schoo l and bot h receive d the sam e devote d and impartia l lov e and care from our parents. " (d)M . Tracy, 15 Novembe r 4'Woul d expert s debatin g the questio n of whethe r intelligenc e is inherite d pleas e say why the intelligenc e of childre n of the sam e parent s can diffe r so much whe n thei r intellectua l environmen t is usuall y so similar . Surel y the explanatio n is genetic?' ' (e) M. Baglow, 17 Novembe r "Althoug h onl y a parent , not an expert , I thin k I can answe r Mrs Tracy' s query . Differen t childre n in one famil y hav e differen t environment s in at least two respects : one , tha t the parent s wh o cope d wit h the first child , learne d from doin g so and will probabl y handl e thei r nex t chil d differentl y (over anxiou s with the first , perhaps , mor e relaxe d with the second) ; two , that each chil d in a famil y is in its own plac e in relatio n to the others : Mar y has a differen t environmen t from Jimm y in that she is his sister , and he has his own , becaus e he is her brother . A thir d consideratio n is that one chil d may be born with curl y hair and engagin g way s (heredity! ) and anothe r may be ugly and less apparentl y lovable ; this will produc e differen t reaction s from the peopl e wh o form his world , and thes e are an importan t part of the individual' s environment . Havin g said that , I woul d like to add tha t no matte r who has experience d the vivi d and varie d personalitie s of her bran d new infant s can possibl y doub t the importanc e of heredity , and that it is also importan t to remembe r that whe n expert s talk abou t 'intelligence ' they only mean 'the abilit y to do well in intelligenc e tests' . " It has been suggeste d that academi c researcher s too are not value-fre e (or valu e fair ) in thei r conceptio n of intelligence . Severa l commentator s on scienc e believ e that moder n bourgeoi s ideolog y is responsibl e for the accep tanc e of idea s of biologica l determinis m whic h attempt s to justif y huma n inequalit y on a social-Darwinia n vie w of huma n natur e (Albee , 1982 ; Lewonti n et aL, 1982) . Eysenc k (1982 ) has recentl y offere d curren t and historica l evidenc e to justif y his positio n tha t the "allege d conformit y of politica l ideolog y and scientifi c stanc e is, in faöt , completel y erroneou s and historicall y untenable " (p. 1288) . In a reply , Albe e (1983 ) has claime d that biologica l determinis m is a majo r ideologica l weapo n agains t Marxis m althoug h he omitte d the invers e implicatio n that environmenta l determinis m

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is a majo r ideologica l weapo n agains t bourgeoi s ideolog y an d social Darwinism . Yet a stud y by Pastor e (1949 ) whic h investigate d the relationshi p betwee n an individual' s view s abou t the nature-nurtur e controvers y and his / her attitude s to social , political , economi c questions , foun d upo n examinin g the work s of famou s scientist s (Galton , Rutherford ) tha t ther e was a stron g correlatio n betwee n belief s in th e influenc e of heredit y an d th e degre e of conservatis m in the sociopolitica l attitudes . Certainl y mor e wor k has gon e int o the determinants and measurement of intelligence , tha n has gon e int o its operationalisation . Ther e are considerabl e problem s an d debate s as to wha t constitute s intelligence . Variou s attempt s were mad e in the 1920 s to com e to an agree d definitio n bu t non e suc h wer e found . Som e argue d tha t it was the abilit y to carr y on abstrac t thinking ; whil e other s though t adjustmen t to th e environmen t a bette r definition . Jus t as ther e is no agreemen t on the definitio n of intelligenc e amon g psychologists , so ther e is no agreemen t abou t the natur e of intelligenc e (whethe r ther e is one primar y or mor e tha n on e factor ) or indee d th e bes t wa y to measur e intelligence . In man y way s thes e debate s are no t differen t fro m lay conversa tion s abou t intelligence , thoug h ther e are numerou s technica l term s whic h hav e to be mastere d (e.g . flui d vs crystallise d intelligence ; culture-fre e vs culture-fai r tests , etc.) . Sternber g is on e of th e few peopl e wh o ha s don e systemati c researc h on lay theorie s of intelligenc e (Sternber g et al., 1981 ; Sternberg , 1982 ) thoug h other s hav e worke d in thi s are a (e.g . Neisser , 1979) . Sternber g argue d tha t ordinar y lay peopl e hav e definit e idea s as to wha t intelligenc e actuall y is, an d how to measur e it, an d that , equally , academic , scientifi c researchers ' idea s are als o firml y base d in the rea l world . In a fairl y larg e stud y Sternber g an d colleague s aske d nearl y 500 lay peopl e and abou t 150 psychologist s specialisin g in intelligenc e to list behaviour s the y though t characteristi c of "intelligence" , "academi c intelligence" , "every day intelligence " an d "unintelligence" . The y foun d suc h characteristic s as reason s logically , widel y read , ope n minded , an d display s commo n sense , were quote d bu t tha t ther e wa s a grea t diversit y of ofte n idiosyncrati c responses . Thes e characteristic s wer e the n rate d on a 7-poin t scal e and facto r analysed . Fo r bot h group s thre e quit e clea r factor s emerged , and thoug h the y were similar , the y wer e no t exactl y the sam e (see Tabl e 3.7) . Sternber g (1982 ) notes : On the whole , the informa l theorie s of intelligenc e that layme n carry aroun d in their heads — withou t ever realisin g that their ideas constitut e theorie s —confor m fairly closel y to the most widely accepte d forma l theorie s of intelligenc e that scientist s have constructed . That is, what psychologist s study as intelligenc e seems to correspond , in general , to what peopl e untraine d in psycholog y mean by intelligence . On the other hand , what psychologist s study corres ponds to only part of what peopl e mean by intelligenc e in our society , which include s a lot more than IQ tests measure , (p. 35) In a secon d serie s of studie s Sternber g (1985 ) looke d at implici t or lay theorie s of intelligence , creativit y and wisdom . Whe n ratin g attribute s of all

TABLE 3.7. Laypersons'vs Experts'RatingsofIntelligence ) (b Experts'RatingCharacteristicness of ImportantBehavioursin Ideal (a) Laypersons'RatingCharacteristicin IdealPerson Person Facto r Facto r Facto r loadin g loadin g Facto r I. Verba l intelligenc e I. Practica l problem-solvin g abilit y 0.7 4 0.7 7 Reason s logicall y an d wel l 0.7 4 Display s agoo d vocabular y 0.7 7 Identifie s connection s amon g idea s 0.7 4 Read s wit h hig h comprehensio n See s all aspect s of a proble m 0.6 8 0.7 6 Display s curiosit y Keep s an ope n min d 0.6 6 0.7 3 Is intellectuall y curiou s Respond s thoughtfull y to others ' idea s 0.66 0.7 0 See s all aspect s of a proble m Size s up situation s wel l 0.65 0.6 9 Learn s rapidl y Get s to the hear t of problem s 0.65 0.6 9 Appreciate s knowledg e for its ow n sak e Interpret s informatio n accuratel y 0.65 0.6 6 Is verball y fluen t Make s goo d decision s Listen s to allside s of an argumen t befor e 0.65 0.6 4 decidin g 0.6 4 Goe s to origina l source s for basi c informatio n 0.6 4 Pose s problem s in an optima l wa y Display s alertnes s 0.6 2 Is agoo d sourc e of idea s 0.6 4 Think s deepl y 0.6 2 Perceive s implie d assumption s an d conclusion s 0.6 4 0.6 2 Show s creativit y Listen s to all side s of an argumen t 0.6 4 Converse s easil y on avariet y of subject s 0.6 1 Deal s wit h problem s resourcefull y 0.6 3 Read s widel y 0.6 1 0.6 2 Like s to rea d 0.6 0 Identifie s connection s amon g idea s m solvin g abilit y l abilit y II. Verba II. Proble Speak s clearl y an d articulatel y 0.7 4 0.8 3 Abl e to appl y knowledg e to problem s at han d 0.7 3 0.8 2 Is verball y fluen t Make s goo d decision s 0.7 3 0.7 6 Converse s wel l Pose s problem s in an optima l wa y 0.6 6 Is knowledgeabl e abou t aparticula r fiel d of Display s commo n sens e 0.6 6 knowledg e 0.7 4 Display s objectivit y 0.6 6 Studie s har d 0.7 0 Solve s problem s wel l 0.6 4 0.7 0 Read s wit h hig h comprehensio n Plan s ahea d 0.6 2 Read s widel y 0.6 9 Has goo d intuition s 0.6 2 0.68 Get s to the hear t of problem s Deal s effectivel y wit h peopl e 0.6 1 0.65 Write s withou t difficult y Appreciate s trut h 0.6 1 0.6 4 Set s asid e tim e for readin g Consider s the end resul t of action s 0.6 0 0.61 Approache s problem s thoughtfull y Display s agoo d vocabular y 0.6 1 Accept s socia l norm s 0.6 0 Trie s ne w thing s I I. I Socia l competenc e l intelligenc e I I. I Practica Accept s other s for wha t the y are 0.8 8 0.8 4 Size s up situation s wel l Admit s mistake s 0.7 4 0.8 3 Determine s ho w to achiev e goal s Display s interes t in the worl d at larg e 0.7 2 0.6 9 Display s awarenes s to worl d aroun d him or he r 0.71 Is on tim e for appointment s 0.6 3 Display s interes t ni the worl d at larg e Has socia l conscienc e 0.7 0 0.7 0 Think s befor e speakin g an d doin g Display s curiosit y 0.6 8 Doe s no t mak e sna p judgement s 0.6 8 Make s fai r judgement s 0.6 6 Assesses wel l the relevanc e of informatio n to a proble m at han d 0.6 6 Is sensitiv e to othe r people' s need s an d desire s 0.65 0.6 4 Is fran k an d hones t wit h sel f an d other s 0.6 4 Display s interes t in the immediat e environmen t Reproduce d fro m Sternberg , R.,Conway , B.,Ketron , J., an d Bernstein , M.(1981 ) People' s conception s of intelligence . Journal ofPersonality andSocial Psychology, 41,37-55 . Copyrigh t (1981 ) by America n Psychologica l Association . Adapte d by permissio n of the author .

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thre e qualitie s he foun d tha t bot h academi c and lay peopl e believ e intelli genc e and wisdo m mos t similar , an d creativit y an d wisdo m to be the leas t simila r of th e thre e possibl e pair s of attributes . A shor t analysi s yielde d variou s bi-pola r dimensiona l solution s to the rating s of eac h quality , i.e. : Intelligenc e

Creativit y

Wisdo m

1 . Practica l problem-solvin g abilit y vs verba l abilit y 2. Intellectua l balanc e an d integratio n vs goa l orien tatio n an d attainmen t 3 Contextua l intelligenc e vs flui d though t 1 . No n entrenchmen t vs integratio n an d intellectualit y 2. Aestheti c tast e an d imaginatio n vs decisio n skil l and flexibilit y 3. Perspicacit y vs driv e for accomplishmen t an d recog nitio n 4. Inquisitivenes s vs intuitio n 1 . Reasonin g abilit y vs sagacit y 2. Learnin g from idea s an d environmen t vs judgemen t 3. Expeditiou s use of informatio n vs perspicacity .

Sternber g argue s tha t lay people' s theorie s of intelligenc e overla p with , bu t also go beyond , skill s measure d by tests . Tha t is, th e intelligen t perso n is believe d to solv e problem s well , reaso n clearly , thin k logically , hav e a goo d stor e of informatio n bu t als o abl e to balanc e information , an d sho w one' s intelligenc e in wordly , as well as academi c contexts . Lay theorie s of creativit y overla p wit h thos e of intelligence , bu t ten d to dow n pla y analyti c abilitie s stressin g rathe r unconventiona l way s of thinkin g an d acting . Also , aestheti c taste , imagination , inquisitivenes s an d intuitivenes s are par t of lay theorie s mos t of whic h go way beyon d conventiona l psychologica l test s of creativity . Lay theorie s of wisdo m stres s sagacit y an d makin g clear , sensibl e an d fai r judgement s tha t tak e accoun t of lon g an d short-ter m issues , as wel l as learnin g from experienc e and bein g flexible . Sternber g (1985 ) believe s tha t whil e lay theorie s are precursor s to academi c theorie s the y ar e wort h studyin g in thei r ow n right . In fac t he list s fou r reason s why the stud y of lay theorie s of intelligence , creativit y an d wisdo m are wort h pursuing : (a) the term s — intelligence , creativity , wisdo m — are frequentl y use d in everyda y discours e as wel l as in psychologica l discours e wit h no or minima l definition , an d it is usefu l to kno w wha t peopl e mea n whe n the y use thes e terms ; (b) peopl e evaluat e th e intelligence , creativity , an d wisdo m of themselve s an d other s wit h som e regularity , an d it is worth whil e to kno w th e psychologica l base s on whic h thes e evaluation s ar e made ; (c) as peopl e mak e thes e judgements , it is helpfu l to kno w to wha t exten t the y correlat e wit h measure s derive d from explici t theories , suc h as

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However , Sternber g doe s not e tha t the tes t of a lay theor y is quit e differen t from an explici t academi c theory . Th e forme r is teste d by whethe r an y accoun t is an accurate , comprehensiv e accoun t of wha t peopl e * 'hav e in thei r heads" , whil e the latte r are teste d throug h classi c empirica l methods . Thes e lay theorie s chang e ove r tim e wit h fashio n (see Chapte r 2), as well as develo p and chang e in people . Furthermore , the y are learn t and henc e cultur e bound . This , of course , suggest s mor e wor k in thi s importan t field ! Bot h lay peopl e an d expert/scientifi c peopl e wer e aske d to rat e academi c intelligence , everyda y intelligenc e an d genera l intelligence . The y bot h felt them to be highl y correlate d bu t ther e wer e two mai n difference s betwee n the groups . Experts , mor e tha n lay people , stresse d the importanc e of motivatio n (dedication , persistence) , whil e lay peopl e stresse d socia l competenc e mor e tha n the experts . Lay peopl e consistentl y stresse d />zter-persona l competenc e in a social contex t (gettin g on wit h others ) whil e expert s stresse d intrapersona l competenc e in an individual contex t (learn s quickly , solve s pro blem s fast) . Althoug h lay theorie s of intelligenc e ma y hav e man y similaritie s to exper t theorie s the y are mor e ofte n descriptiv e tha n explanatory . Tha t is, scientifi c theorie s mus t ask wha t it means to reaso n logically , solv e problem s or get on with others ; scientist s mus t als o devis e way s of measuring thes e concepts ; mor e importantly , the y mus t explai n individua l variation in the concepts . Despit e the fac t tha t lay theorie s are descriptive , the y are functiona l in tha t peopl e use the m to asses s the abilit y an d competenc e of others . Mos t peopl e believ e tha t the y are ver y goo d at this , thoug h Sternber g has show n tha t the y are onl y modestl y goo d at assessin g or predictin g thei r ow n personality . The y are , however , muc h bette r at self-descriptions , or checklists , of thei r ow n abilit y whic h relat e mor e closel y to thei r actua l IQ tes t derive d scores . It may be naiv e to suppos e tha t ther e are individua l group , sub-cultural , or even cultura l difference s in lay people' s understandin g of th e natur e of intelligenc e (Berry , 1984 ; Valsiner , 1984) . Studie s by anthropologist s an d psychologist s hav e show n remarkabl e cultura l difference s in the meanin g of the term intelligence . Fo r instanc e the Shona of Zimbabw e regar d intelligenc e as bein g cautiou s an d prudent , particularl y in socia l relationship s (Irvine , 1969) whil e eve n withi n Ugand a tw o tribe s ha d rathe r differen t view s (Wober , 1969) . Th e Baganda associate d intelligenc e wit h menta l order , whil e

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the Batoro wit h turmoil . Othe r studie s in Afric a (Serpell , 1974 ; Pulma n and Kilbride , 1980 ; Super , 1982) , Lati n Americ a (Klein s al., 1973 ) and Asi a (Gil l and Keats , 1982 ) hav e all pointe d to subtl e cultura l difference s in th e understandin g an d definitio n of intelligence . Man y reflec t a distinctio n betwee n cognitiv e an d socia l skills , whil e in man y culture s alertnes s an d wisdo m are stressed . Berr y (1984 ) has set ou t a possibl e framewor k for explorin g bot h loca l and universa l feature s of differen t groups ' conception s of intelligence , thoug h at this stag e it ha s no t bee n tested . However , as man y hav e pointe d out , a culture' s definitio n of intelligenc e (lik e intelligenc e itself ) changes , particu larl y wit h the introductio n of schooling . Valsine r (1984 ) has argued : The majo r differenc e betwee n culture s in conceptualisin g intelligenc e seem s to be in the inclusio n of social-interactive characteristics("friendly" , "honourable" , "correct" , "happy" , "public " — in the Africa n and Asian cases , which were not parallele d in the Australia n group s under study ) togethe r with cognitiv e "skills" . On the other hand,it shoul d not be taken for grante d that in non-Europea n cultures , all skills that would be labelle d "cognitive " or "intellectual " in Europea n cultures , share the same categor y assignmen t In the system s of meanings in differen t cultures , "intelligence " and other terms relate d to it, can cover differen t areas of the space of meanings , and can be associate d with differen t other concepts . Therefore , buildin g a scientifi c conceptio n of intelligenc e on the common sense meanin g of the term "intelligence " within a given culture , would not help us to arrive at a universa l conceptualisatio n of intelligence , equall y applicabl e to all huma n beings , in the particula r structur e of their culture s and habitat . The cross-cultura l difference s in the meanin g of "intelligence " and relate d terms seem to fit the notion of correspondence betwee n the characteristic s of "intelligence " and the causa l textur e or demand-characte r structur e of the mode s of huma n activitie s in the given cultures . In culture s wher e technologica l advancemen t is in the centr e of the cultura l demand characte r structure , the applicatio n of the terms of intelligenc e tends to exclud e social , moral , or emotiona l aspect s of huma n action . More specifically , it may prescrib e additiona l implici t criteri a —e.g. speed and numerosit y of responses , or taxonomi c classificatio n of object s— to characteris e intelligence . If, however , the demand-characte r structur e of a cultur e is more complex , includin g differen t centra l units at the same time (e.g. both technologica l advance ment andretainmen t of traditiona l values) , thencharacteristi c feature s of intelligenc e can includ e correspondin g qualitie s (e.g. "reasonin g logically" , "havin g a storehous e of knowledge " togethe r with "correctness" , "socia l orientation " as in the case of the Chinese) . If, in a particula r culture , individual s (rathe r than socialgroups ) are expecte d to contro l their environments , then the characteristic s of individuals ' action s that have the goal of controll ing the environmen t may dominat e the meanin g of "intelligence" . If, however , the contro l over the environmen t is conceptualise d as the task for socialgroup s (family , clan,collective) , the meanin g of "intelligence " is very likely to includ e the characteristic s of socia l relation ships and social (moral ) norms. "

3.6 Conclusio n This chapte r focuse d on people' s lay knowledg e an d belief s abou t psycholog y an d psychologica l topics . Psycholog y as a disciplin e is itsel f divide d int o differen t school s or approaches , ofte n wit h differen t epistemo logica l assumption s and it is quit e possibl e tha t lay peopl e ten d to believ e in, or support , th e axiom s of on e schoo l (e.g . psychoanalysis ) vs anothe r (e.g . behaviourism) . Mor e recently , researc h ha s suggeste d tha t a mor e simpl e

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dimensio n of scientifi c vs humanisti c or behavioura l vs non-behavioura l ma y be sufficien t to divid e peopl e int o differen t "believer " groups . Studie s of lay people' s actua l knowledg e of psychologica l principle s are difficul t to compar e becaus e the y hav e use d differen t materia l presente d in rathe r differen t (simpl e vs complex ; true/fals e vs multipl e choice ) ways . Som e result s ten d to indicat e tha t man y lay people , eve n wit h fairl y advance d education , hol d man y misconception s abou t psycholog y an d hav e onl y limite d knowledg e abou t psychologica l principles . On the othe r hand , ther e appear s to be evidenc e for the fac t tha t if presente d in clear , simpl e jargon free languag e man y people , eve n comparativel y youn g children , hav e a goo d knowledg e of principle s an d theorie s in cognitive , biologica l an d socia l psychology . Som e evidenc e suggests , however , tha t thes e belief s ma y chang e over time , som e superstition s bein g forgotten , other s remainin g relativel y unchange d an d stil l new one s arising . The chapte r focuse d on tw o topic s tha t ar e of interes t to th e academi c psychologist s an d layma n alike . Th e firs t concerne d personalit y an d indi vidua l differences . Ther e ar e a grea t numbe r of personalit y theorie s in psychology , som e wit h muc h mor e suppor t tha n others , an d attempt s hav e been mad e to taxonomis e or categoris e them . Althoug h lay peopl e do hol d lay theorie s abou t personalit y thei r implici t personalit y theorie s ar e mor e frequentl y way s of processin g informatio n abou t others . Th e languag e peopl e use to describ e other s is a ver y usefu l beginnin g to get at thi s process . Similarly , lay peopl e hol d theorie s abou t huma n intelligence . Onc e again , ther e ar e numerou s academi c theorie s abou t th e exac t natur e of huma n intelligenc e an d studie s don e on lay theorie s suggest s a clos e similarit y betwee n lay thinkin g an d academi c research . It is, of course , no surpris e tha t lay peopl e hav e a fairl y goo d gras p of psychologica l principles . Indee d it woul d be strang e if the y did not . Yet ther e are area s wher e lay peopl e ar e simpl y incorrec t abou t huma n behaviour . Interestingl y lay theorie s of psychologica l phenomen a see m to fall int o school s of though t muc h the sam e as thos e foun d in academi c textbooks . One area , no t extensivel y discusse d in thi s chapte r tha t is a psychologica l theor y of the non-commo n sens e kin d is psychoanalysis . A grea t man y of the theorie s and model s in psychoanalysi s are counter-intuitiv e and paradoxical , such as the ide a tha t peopl e gambl e to lose , no t to win . On the othe r hand , man y Freudia n insights , suc h as the relationshi p betwee n mone y and faeces , are no t par t of commo n sense . Indeed , on e reaso n why som e peopl e rejec t psychoanalysi s an d other s fin d it a particularl y interesting , insightfu l an d powerfu l theor y is precisel y becaus e man y of the theorie s an d idea s are no t commonsensical !

4 La y Theorie

s i n Psychiatr

y

4.1 Introductio n A very larg e numbe r of lay peopl e are ignoran t of the difference s betwee n the academi c discipline s of psycholog y and psychiatry . Thi s ma y be perfectl y understandabl e becaus e althoug h the trainin g of a psychologis t ma y be very differen t fro m tha t of a psychiatris t ther e ma y be considerabl e overla p in thei r theories , method s an d interests . Of course , a cognitiv e psychologis t intereste d in visua l illusion s ma y hav e ver y littl e in commo n wit h a psychia tris t intereste d in alcoho l dependence , nevertheless , ther e is frequentl y a fair degre e of overla p betwee n the tw o disciplines . Lay people' s knowledg e (or ignorance ) of psychiatr y ma y be observe d in the numerou s joke s abou t psychiatrists . Man y of the joke s are reflecte d in the remar k attribute d to Sam Goldwyn , wh o sai d tha t "Anyon e wh o goe s to a psychiatris t ough t to hav e his hea d examined" . A commo n belie f is tha t psychiatrist s are themselve s rathe r odd , an d possibl y dangerou s becaus e of thei r perspicacity . Essentially , psychiatr y ma y be define d as tha t specialit y in medicin e concerne d wit h the diagnosis , treatmen t an d preventio n of menta l disorder s associate d wit h disturbance s of emotion , thought , perceptio n an d behaviou r (Kisker , 1964) . Ther e are probabl y as man y myth s abou t psychiatr y as ther e are abou t menta l illness . Fo r instance , it is frequentl y erroneousl y believe d tha t all psychiatrist s advocat e th e diseas e or medica l mode l of menta l illnes s whic h asserts : Menta l illnesse s are of organi c origi n wit h specifi c etiology , cours e and outcome ; an underlyin g physica l stat e affect s surfac e psychologica l symptoms , an d henc e changin g th e symptom s wil l no t cur e th e disease ; peopl e frequentl y get thes e menta l illnesse s throug h no faul t of thei r own ; cure depend s primaril y on professiona l interventio n by medicall y traine d people ; menta l illnes s ma y hav e smal l culturall y distinc t manifestation s bu t the proces s is essentiall y universa l an d no t culturall y specific . Psychiatr y is, and mus t be, concerne d wit h a wid e rang e of disorders , at the one extrem e identifiabl e in term s of physica l malfunctioning , an d henc e amenabl e to conventiona l medica l treatment s an d at th e othe r extrem e behaviou r patterns tha t are compare d wit h socia l norm s and wher e manage men t focuse s on counsellin g or lega l measures . However , becaus e of th e 73

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

Lay Theories TABL E 4.1. Someof theQuestionsusedinNunnally's(1981)Study The mentall y ill pay little attentio n to their persona l appearanc e Peopl e who keep themselve s occupie d with pleasan t thought s seldo m becom e mentall y ill Few peopl e who enter menta l hospital s ever leave Olde r peopl e have fewer emotiona l problem s than younge r peopl e Peopl e canno t maintai n good menta l health withou t the suppor t of stron g person s in their environmen t Wil l powe r alone will not cure menta l disorder s Wome n have no more emotiona l problem s than men do X-ray s of the head will not tell whethe r a perso n is likely to becom e insan e Emotiona l problem s do little damag e to the individua l Psychiatrist s try to teach menta l patient s to hold in their stron g emotion s Menta l illnes s can usuall y be helpe d by a vacatio n or chang e of scene Disappointment s affect childre n as much as they do adult s The main job of the psychiatris t is to recommen d hobbie s and other ways for the menta l patien t to occup y his mind The insan e laugh more than norma l peopl e Psychiatrist s try to show the menta l patien t wher e his ideas are incorrec t Menta l disorde r is not a hopeles s conditio n Menta l health is one of the most importan t problem s Menta l disorde r is usuall y brough t on by physica l cause s It is easier for wome n to get over emotiona l problem s than it is for men Achang e of climat e seldo m helps an emotiona l disorde r The best way to menta l health is by avoidin g morbi d thought s Ther e is not much that can be done for a perso n who develop s a menta l disorde r Menta l disorde r is one of the most damagin g illnesse s that a perso n can have Childre n sometime s have menta l breakdown s as sever e as those of adult s Nervou s breakdown s seldo m have a physica l origin

diversit y and ambiguit y inheren t in the disciplin e ther e has , and continue s to be, considerabl e controvers y an d dissent . 4.2 Attitude s to , and Concept s of, Menta l Healt h Ther e are man y historica l account s of how peopl e at variou s period s in tim e — the classica l period , th e middl e ages , the age of reaso n — perceive d and treate d th e mentall y ill . However , it wa s no t unti l th e 1940 s tha t systemati c studie s wer e don e on publi c attitude s toward s menta l illnes s (Ramse y and Seipp , 1948) . Perhap s the mos t importan t stud y conducte d was tha t of Nunnall y (1961 ) whic h was a 6-yea r stud y on wha t th e genera l publi c kne w an d felt abou t menta l illnes s an d its treatment . A nationall y representativ e sampl e com plete d a numbe r of questionnaires , an exampl e of whic h is set in Tabl e 4.1. Thi s scal e was facto r analyse d an d 10 interpretabl e factor s resulted , thes e were labelled : loo k an d act different ; wil l power ; sex distinction ; avoidanc e of morbi d thoughts ; guidanc e an d support ; hopelessness ; externa l caus e vs personality ; non-seriousness ; age function ; organi c causes . Attempt s hav e been mak e to replicat e the facto r structur e wit h lac k of succes s (Ahme d an d Viswarathan , 1984) . Bu t the exercis e shoul d no t be seen as purel y an exampl e of descriptiv e research , as it set ou t to tes t a numbe r of propositions . Publi c

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informatio n is no t highl y structured ; th e publi c do no t mak e connotativ e distinction s amon g th e subprofession s in th e menta l healt h field ; publi c attitude s are differen t towar d neuroti c and psychoti c disorders , etc . Proposi tion 2.3 read : "Th e averag e ma n is no t grossl y misinformed " an d Nunnall y was force d to conclud e "Regardles s of whic h way comparison s are mad e the sam e conclusio n is reached : Mea n response s for th e publi c are no t markedl y differen t in mos t case s from mea n response s for experts " (p . 22) . Howeve r ther e wer e issue s on whic h the tw o disagreed :

1. Book s on "peac e of mind " preven t man y person s fro m developin g nervou s breakdowns . (Expert s repudiate , publi c agrees. ) 2. If a perso n concentrate s on happ y memories , he will no t be bothere d by unpleasan t thing s in the present . (Expert s repudiate , publi c agrees. ) 3. Th e mai n jo b of the psychiatris t is to explai n to the patien t the origi n of his troubles . (Expert s repudiate , publi c agrees. ) 4. Goo d emotiona l habit s cannot be taugh t to childre n in schoo l as easil y as spellin g can . (Expert s support , publi c disagrees. ) 5. Whe n a perso n is recoverin g from a menta l illness , it is bes t no t to discus s the treatmen t he has had . (Expert s repudiate , publi c agrees. ) 6. A perso n cannot rid himsel f of unpleasan t memorie s by tryin g har d to forge t them . (Expert s support , publi c disagrees. ) Summarisin g th e result s it seeme d tha t "a s is commonl y suspected , th e mentall y ill are regarde d wit h fear , distrus t an d dislike . Th e stigm a associate d with menta l illnes s was foun d to be ver y general , bot h acros s all socia l group s and acros s attitud e measures , wit h relativel y littl e betwee n peopl e fro m differen t demographi c group s suc h as age an d education . Ol d peopl e an d youn g people , highl y educate d peopl e wit h littl e forma l trainin g — all ten d to regar d the mentall y ill as dangerous , dirty , unpredictabl e an d worthless . A stron g negativ e hal o surround s all the mentall y ill, an d considered , unselecti vely , as bein g all thing s bad. " (p . 186) However , thes e negativ e attitude s wer e not hel d becaus e of existing informatio n or eve n ra/sinformation abou t menta l illnes s by th e publi c but , rather , becaus e of lack of information . Whil e marke d difference s wer e foun d as a functio n of age an d educatio n regardin g kind s of information held , differences in attitudes wer e small . Th e younger , bette r educated , hel d slightl y less derogator y attitudes , bu t thei r attitude s wer e stil l markedl y negative . Tha t is, whateve r thei r knowledg e of menta l illness , the respondent s seeme d universall y negativ e to the mentall y ill. Anothe r stud y by Whatle y (1958 ) focuse d on socia l distanc e an d foun d tha t peopl e ten d to kee p a distanc e betwee n themselve s an d forme r menta l patient s whic h tend s to creat e for the patient s the proble m of socia l isolatio n whic h usuall y serve s onl y to exacerbat e thei r problem . All the earl y studie s foun d tha t menta l patient s wer e feared , stigmatise d and shunned . In her revie w of finding s sinc e 1960 Rabki n (1974) , however ,

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divide d the studie s she reviewe d int o the optimisti c findings , th e pessimisti c findings , an d equivoca l findings . Despit e certai n methodologica l problem s and limitation s (definitions , rating s scales , etc. ) som e studie s (Lemka u an d Crocetti , 1962 ; Bent z an d Edgerton , 1970 ) seeme d to sugges t an increas e in the public' s acceptanc e of menta l illnes s an d less extrem e rejectio n of thos e labelle d mentall y ill. Othe r studies , however , demonstrate d tha t the dislike , fear an d aversio n traditionall y associate d wit h th e mentall y ill continued , probabl y becaus e the y are unpredictabl e (Bord , 1971) . Ther e were , however , also som e equivoca l finding s whic h did no t clearl y indicat e greate r or lesse r rejection . Rabki n (1974 ) note s tha t peopl e are bette r informe d abou t menta l illnes s bu t tha t althoug h variou s mora l issue s remain , socia l an d medica l consideration s hav e become , for mos t people , mor e significant . Further more , peopl e believ e tha t menta l illnes s is like any othe r illness . The characteristic s of patient s tha t influenc e th e degre e of publi c acceptanc e include : the degre e of unpredictabilit y an d loss of accountability ; the persona l characteristic s of person s manifestin g th e behaviour ; the parti cula r symptom s an d diagnosti c categor y involved , th e visibilit y of th e disturbe d behaviou r an d th e exten t to whic h violenc e is an issue . Similarly , the researc h has indicate d tha t the characteristic s of the publi c tha t influenc e the degre e of acceptanc e of menta l illnes s includ e age , education , occupa tion , race , ethnicity , socia l class , an d predictably , actua l experienc e wit h menta l patients . Th e result s of thes e studie s ma y be expected : the olde r the person , th e mor e intolerant , unsympatheti c an d rejectin g ar e his/he r atti tude s to th e mentall y ill ; th e lowe r th e social-economi c clas s th e mor e rejectin g the y are of th e relativ e of a menta l patient ; th e lowe r the clas s the greate r feeling s of fea r an d resentment , whil e the highe r the clas s the greate r the feeling s of sham e and guilt . Rac e or ethnicit y is nearl y alway s confounde d with income , clas s and statu s and by itsel f doe s no t relat e to eithe r positiv e or negativ e attitudes . Similarly , mer e contac t wit h th e mentall y ill is no t a sufficien t conditio n for attitud e change . Becaus e differen t communitie s hav e differen t level s of familiarit y wit h menta l healt h professional s an d services , differen t expectation s regardin g ease of acces s to treatment , an d differen t perception s of how commo n or unusua l it is to be a menta l patient , ther e are variou s contextua l feature s as well tha t predic t belief s abou t menta l illnes s and menta l patients . Rabki n (1974 ) conclude s her revie w thus : The gross inhumanit y of involuntar y psychiatri c hospitalisation , its immens e financia l cost, the emergenc e of psychotropi c drugs , and the developmen t of alternativ e styles of treatmen t have, together , impresse d man y menta l healt h professional s and legislator s with the undesirabilit y of inpatien t care for menta l illness , and with the consequen t need for identificatio n of population s at risk in the communit y to facilitat e early interventio n and treatment . Once such an epidemiologica l framewor k is adopte d in the searc h for precipitat ing factors , attentio n become s addresse d to stressfu l aspect s of everyda y living , such as poverty , over-crowding, unemployment , and socialisolation . At this point it no longe r seems helpfu l to regar d menta l illnes s as an illness like any other that can strike anyon e at any time,

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as a germ or a virus might do; alternative formulation s of a psychosocia l nature offer greater explanatory value. Concepts developed within this latter framework today seem more important to communicat e to the public, but prevailing educational efforts still follow the older, traditional format, (p. 29) Mor e recen t studie s in differen t countries , wit h differen t populations , lookin g at differen t aspect s of menta l illnes s ten d to sho w the sam e patter n of results . Thu s Furnha m and Pendre d (1983 ) foun d peopl e bein g mor e favour ably dispose d toward s the physically , rathe r tha n the mentall y handicapped . Similarl y Nieradzi k an d Cochran e (1985 ) confirme d th e followin g hypothese s in a recen t study : publi c attitude s toward s menta l illnes s are mor e rejectin g tha n accepting ; socia l rejectio n increase s wit h increasin g severit y of disturbanc e in behaviour , an d attitude s of the genera l populatio n toward s the mentall y ill will be influence d by th e labe l of menta l illnes s as wel l as by behaviou r indicativ e of menta l illness . Studie s on attitude s to menta l illnes s hav e traditionall y focuse d on differen t feature s of th e problem : for instanc e sex difference s in menta l disorders . Thu s Farin a (1981 ) foun d fro m an extensiv e revie w of th e literatur e tha t me n an d wome n expres s simila r belief s abou t the mentall y ill but behav e in quit e differen t way s toward s them : female s ar e kinde r an d mor e sympatheti c tha n me n toward s the mentall y ill; wome n wh o are or hav e been menta l patient s are treate d mor e benignl y an d favourabl y tha n men . The reaso n for th e fac t tha t femal e patient s are treate d bette r tha n male s is probabl y tha t the y are less aggressiv e an d adventurou s bu t als o becaus e thei r "deviant " behaviou r is less inconsisten t wit h traditiona l sex rol e norm s (Rosenfield , 1982) . Other s hav e focuse d on children' s attitude s toward s menta l illness . In a developmenta l stud y Weis s (1985 ) showe d tha t as childre n got olde r (betwee n 7 an d 14) the y saw th e mentall y ill as mor e simila r (les s inferior ) to themselves ; the y wer e less likel y to distinguis h betwee n menta l illnes s an d othe r afflictions ; the y though t the mentall y ill less of a threa t to societ y and the famil y system , an d though t tha t menta l illnes s wa s less likel y to be attributable to inadequate , deprive d or inter-persona l experiences . Yet in a late r stud y (Weiss , 1986 ) she foun d attitude s to devian t group s wer e evi dence d by kindergarte n (a 6-yea r old ) an d did no t chang e appreciabl y wit h age and tha t "craz y people " are regarde d wit h the sam e fear , disgust , an d aversio n by childre n an d adult s alike . However , accordin g to Robert s et al;. (1981 ) childre n (age d 9-13 ) can differentiat e betwee n medica l an d psycho logica l disorder s in thei r peer s in term s of diagnosis , aetiology , prognosis , effectiv e treatmen t strategie s an d desirability . Ye t th e childre n did no t consistentl y respon d on the severit y dimension , an d in fact saw mor e seriou s psychologica l problem s (hallucinations ) as les s sever e tha n les s seriou s problem s (actin g out) . Ther e is als o evidenc e of ethni c difference s in reaction s to menta l illnes s and consequen t help-seeking . Fo r instance , Tucke r (1979 ) foun d a majorit y

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of America n black s hel d concept s of menta l illnes s inconsisten t wit h th e standar d (explicit , white ) conception s formulate d by menta l healt h pro fessionals , an d tha t the y (th e blacks ) ha d less nee d becaus e the y ha d bette r copin g strategems . Hal l an d Tucke r (1985 ) similarl y foun d significan t difference s betwee n blacks ' an d whites ' conception s of menta l illnes s in tha t blacks ' response s wer e mor e stereotype d tha n whites . The y believed , for instance , mor e tha n whites , tha t the mentall y ill loo k an d act differentl y fro m normals , tha t wome n are mor e likel y to suffe r fro m menta l illnes s tha n men , and tha t menta l illnes s ca n be controlle d by th e avoidanc e of morbi d thoughts . Thu s it is argue d tha t attitude s to the mentall y ill, as well as help seekin g belief s an d strategie s are culturall y specific . It seems , then , tha t attitude s to th e mentall y ill are learn t fro m parents , teacher s and the media . Hence , ther e hav e bee n studie s whic h hav e focuse d on the way the medi a present s menta l illnes s an d how thes e presentation s affec t attitude s (Mata s et al. , 1985) . On e ma y suppos e tha t as menta l illnesse s are portraye d mor e frequentl y in film s an d on th e televisio n tha t peopl e woul d becom e mor e familia r with , an d less hostil e towards , them . However , televisio n dram a ma y in fact hav e the opposit e effec t an d misinfor m as muc h abou t psychiatri c problem s as it informs . Certainly , the result s from man y studie s in differen t countrie s lead s one to believ e tha t man y lay peopl e remai n ignoran t as to the aetiology , prognosi s and mos t effectiv e cure s of a wid e rang e of psychiatri c illnesses . 4.3 Attribution s for Addictio n Mos t peopl e are ver y familia r wit h the concep t of addiction , be it to alcoho l or drugs , foo d or nicotine , stimulant s or depressants . Man y admi t to bein g addicte d to som e substanc e or at leas t kno w other s wh o are . As a conse quenc e the y ofte n hol d strong , comple x belief s abou t bot h the cause s of, an d the cure s for , thes e addictions . Withi n the socia l sciences , explici t theorie s of addictio n fall roughl y int o thre e mai n categories . Biologica l model s or theorie s ofte n ten d to emphasis e the pharmacologica l propertie s of the addictiv e substanc e (alcohol , nicotine , LSD , etc. ) and its effec t on the centra l nervou s system . Thi s approac h tend s to see the addic t as someon e wh o is biologicall y predispose d to developin g physiologica l dependence . Psychologica l theorie s on the othe r han d ten d to assum e tha t addict s shar e personalit y traits , belief s an d values , and/o r maladaptivel y learne d behaviou r patterns whic h mak e the m particularl y vulnerabl e or predispose d to develo p addiction . Thirdl y sociocultura l or structura l model s poin t to class , regiona l or othe r macro-sociologica l differ ence s in additio n an d ten d to explai n addictio n as a mean s of copin g wit h structurall y induce d stres s or inequality . Clar e (1979 ) has subdivide d thes e approache s yet further . Biological cause s includ e idea s concerne d wit h metaboli c defects , neurotransmitte r alteration s an d geneti c factors ; whil e psychological cause s includ e approache s from psychoanalysi s (th e alcoholi c

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is dependent) , personalit y theorist s (identifyin g alcoholi c traits ) and behavioura l (learnin g history ) theories ; as wel l as sociocultural theorie s whic h may emphasis e occupationa l factors , ethni c factors , familia l factors , or mor e simpl y the availabilit y of alcohol . However , progressivel y fewe r researcher s and reviewer s are zealousl y partisa n regardin g on e or othe r approach , preferrin g to be mor e benevolentl y ecclectic . Considerabl y less work has gon e into implici t lay theorie s of addiction , yet a surprisin g amoun t of highl y varie d materia l exists . Thi s sectio n wil l concentrat e on lay theorie s of two of the mos t commo n form s of addiction : alcoholis m and addictiv e smoking . It shoul d be pointe d out that lay theorie s abou t addictio n may be held by at least thre e groups : non-addicte d lay people , addict s themselves , and pro fessional s wh o hav e not receive d any specifi c theoretica l training . Other s includ e ex-addict s and thos e specialist s traine d to dea l with addictions . (1) Alcoholism As the drinkin g of alcoho l in nearl y all societie s is, and has been , a frequen t occurrence , peopl e are very famila r wit h the consequence s of alcoholism . However , they remai n surprisingl y ignoran t abou t the effect s of alcoho l and the cause s of, or cure s for , alcoholism . Tabl e 4.2 show s 17 commo n misconception s abou t alcohol . A surprisin g numbe r of peopl e woul d endors e thes e item s as true despit e the fact that all are demonstrabl y false . If thei r knowledg e is so patchy , if not downrigh t wrong , it is perhaps , therefore , not surprisin g that thei r explanation s of, or theorie s for , alcoholis m are simpl e or misguided . Researc h in lay theorie s of alcoholis m originate d from studie s investigat ing the attitude s of variou s professiona l and non-professiona l population s such as doctors , nurses , psychiatrist s and alcoholi c counsellor s toward s alcoholis m and alcoholics . Furthermore , muc h of this researc h is base d on the implici t assumptio n that a person' s belie f abou t the cause s of alcoholis m influence s thei r attitude s toward s the alcoholi c person . However , thi s researc h into publi c attitude s usuall y assume d a simpl e moralisti c (the y were bad) vs medica l (the y wer e sick ) dichotomy , revealin g evidenc e for an increasin g acceptanc e of the diseas e concep t of alcoholism , whic h view s the alcoholi c as someon e wh o is medicall y unabl e to tolerat e the effect s of alcoho l (Mulfor d and Miller , 1961 , 1964 ; Linsky , 1972 ; Hey , 1977 ; McHug h et al. , 1980) . A proble m with this approach , however , is tha t belief s abou t the cause s of alcoholis m do not fit int o nea t bidimensiona l categories , and endorsemen t of one view doe s not necessaril y impl y rejectio n of another . Man y studie s hav e show n peopl e to be ambivalent , endorsin g bot h moralisti c and medica l model s (Mulfor d and Miller , 1961) . Furthermore , this is to assum e that ther e are onl y two model s — thu s peopl e may suppor t a psychologica l or sociocultura l mode l in additio n to the abov e two . Mulfor d and Mille r (1961 ) foun d an almos t equa l preferenc e for moralisti c and

LT— G

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TABL E 4.2. SomeCommonMisconceptions AboutAlcoholand Alcoholism 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Alcoho l is a stimulan t Alcoho l is essentia l to the treatmen t of certai n disease s You can alway s detec t alcoho l on the breat h of a perso n who has been drinkin g One ounce of 86 proof liquo r contain s more alcoho l than a 12-ounc e can of beer Bod y size has little or nothin g to do with how much liquor a perso n can hold Drinkin g severa l cups of coffee can counterac t the effect s of alcoho l and enabl e the drinke r to "sobe r up" Alcoho l can help a perso n sleep more soundl y Impaire d judgement does not occur befor e there are obviou s signs of intoxicatio n The individua l will get more intoxicate d by "mixing " liquor s than by takin g comparabl e amount s of one kind —e.g. bourbon , Scotc h or vodka Exercis e or a cold showe r helps speed up the metabolis m of alcoho l Peopl e with "stron g wills" need not be concerne d about becomin g alcoholic s Alcoho l canno t produc e a true addictio n in the same sense that heroi n does One canno t becom e an alcoholi c by drinkin g just beer Alcoho l is far less dangerou s than marijuan a In a heavy drinker , damag e to the liver shows up long befor e brain damag e appear s The physiologica l withdrawa l reactio n from heroi n is more dangerou s than is withdrawa l from alcoho l Mos t alcoholic s who have successfull y complete d treatmen t can safely resum e socia l drinkin g

From Abnormalpsychology andmodernlife,by James , C. Coleman , Jame s N. Butcher , and Rober t C. Carson . Copyrigh t © 1980 , 1976 by Scott, Foresma n and Company . Reprinte d by permission . medica l model s in an initia l surve y of publi c attitudes . Yet , in a subsequen t stud y tha t enable d subject s to endors e bot h views , nearl y hal f of the subject s endorse d bot h models , suggestin g the complexit y of lay views . Orcut t (1976 ) obtaine d simila r results , indicatin g tha t a mor e flexibl e methodolog y was require d for assessin g lay belief s abou t alcoholism . Th e simpl e dichotom y not onl y exclude s the wid e rang e of alternativ e theorie s available , bu t it als o prevent s researcher s from investigatin g the possibilit y of multivariat e expla nations . Severa l researchers , suc h as Tolo r an d Tameri n (1975) , Robinso n (1976 ) and Beckma n (1979) , attempte d to overcom e thi s proble m by usin g questionnaire s whic h include d item s representin g severa l differen t models , whic h th e subject s rate d on a scal e indicatin g thei r degre e of support . However , as Furnha m (1983b ) observed , studie s of thi s kin d assume d a direc t correspondenc e betwee n explici t academi c theorie s an d the causa l belief s of the lay person , restrictin g th e subjec t to thos e particula r explanation s expresse d in the questionnaire . An alternativ e approac h is to ask subject s to give free response s to open ende d question s abou t th e cause s of alcoholism . Us e of a free-respons e measur e enable s on e to explor e the degre e of congruenc e betwee n forma l model s an d lay explanations , whils t avoidin g constraint s impose d by th e experimente r (McHugh , 1979 ; Antaki , 1981) . It has the additiona l advantag e of allowin g for the possibl e discover y of previousl y unrecognise d lay theorie s of alcoholism .

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A free-respons e techniqu e wa s utilise d by Linsk y (1972) , wh o aske d a sampl e of adul t subject s wha t the y believe d to be the cause s of alcoholism . The response s wer e divide d int o five categories , whic h suggeste d a stron g resemblanc e to forma l models . Th e majorit y of subject s viewe d alcoholis m as a psychologica l illnes s rathe r tha n a biologica l illness , an d ver y few of the subject s expresse d a moralisti c view of alcoholism . Twenty-seve n per cen t believe d alcoholis m to be cause d by "disorder s of th e personalit y system " whil e a simila r numbe r believe d it to be du e to "psychologica l reaction s to structiona l problems " whil e onl y 9% attribute d it to the "mora l characte r of the alcoholic" . In a simila r study , McHug h (1979 ) aske d bot h alcoholic s an d non alcoholic s why the alcoholic s drank . Nin e categorie s of attribution s mad e by the subject s wer e generated , unde r genera l heading s includin g "dissatisfac tion" , "boredom" , "persona l characteristics" , "illness " an d "escape" , almos t all of whic h reflec t element s of forma l aetiologica l models . Onl y 1.8% of response s referre d to the medica l or diseas e mode l of alcoholism , and ther e were no attribution s referrin g to a moralisti c view of alcoholism . Externa l factor s suc h as no t enoug h money , jo b pressure s an d children' s behaviou r accounte d for nearl y a fifth of th e response s whil e 12.3 % rathe r tautologi cally gav e the explanatio n tha t the y wer e addicted . Curiously , nearl y 10% of the respondent s cite d boredo m as a facto r whic h ma y be relate d to sociocul tura l idea s of deprivatio n or individua l measure s of arousal . Similarly , Robinso n (1976 ) aske d member s of th e genera l populatio n to explai n wh y the y though t peopl e dran k "i n a wa y tha t cause s the m pro blems" . Anxiety , depressio n an d worr y wer e the commones t explanations , and othe r commo n response s wer e becaus e of loneliness , boredom , life problems , to escap e problem s or fro m habit . Interestin g thoug h thes e conten t analysis-typ e studie s are , the y mus t be considere d as preliminary , particularl y as the y do no t tak e int o accoun t any demographi c (age , sex , class ) feature s of thei r subjects , wit h the exceptio n of thei r occupation/profession , or th e amoun t of drinkin g tha t the y report . Freiz e (1979) , however , foun d tha t female s use d the sam e basi c categorie s to explai n alcoholis m in women , bu t the y attribute d femal e alcoholis m mor e to factor s relatin g to "dissatisfaction " an d "escape" , an d less to "addiction " and "likin g to drink" . Methodologica l problem s hav e bese t thi s research , however , primaril y becaus e researcher s hav e ignore d individua l determinants (demographic , psychographic ) of lay theorie s or else the structur e of the lay theorie s has bee n treate d non-empirically . Hence , Furnha m an d Lowic k (1984a ) did a stud y aime d to loo k specificall y at th e determinants — sex , age , education , employmen t status , amoun t drun k etc . — an d structure derive d empiricall y of lay people' s theorie s of th e cause s of alcoholism . Ove r 250 peopl e complete d a questionnair e in whic h the y rate d 30 explanation s for th e importanc e in explainin g the cause s of alcoholism . The y showe d a numbe r of

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significan t sex differences , wit h female s believin g mor e tha n male s tha t alcoholic s were sociall y inadequate , with feeling s of aggression , inferiorit y and anxiety . The y also believe d that ther e was too muc h pressur e for , and not enoug h prohibition s against , drinking . Ther e wer e als o variou s age , educational , employmen t and drink-consumptio n relate d differences . Overall , subject s preferre d explanation s whic h referre d to socia l stresses , psychologica l trait s and cultura l or socia l norms , as oppose d to biological , geneti c and moralisti c explanations . Thes e result s confir m the shif t awa y from a moralisti c mode l and toward s a psychologica l model , whic h previou s studie s of lay belief s abou t alcoholis m hav e revealed . Tabl e 4.3 show s the mea n scores . Overal l the subject s though t the thre e mos t importan t explanation s wer e 14 "The y hav e foun d tha t alcoho l help s them reduc e their anxiety" , 23 "The y find drin k is the onl y way to cop e with frequen t depression " and 24 "The y suffe r fro m considerabl e stres s at work" . The explanation s though t leas t importan t wer e "Alcoho l is far too cheap" , "Religiou s prohibition s agains t drinkin g are not so ofte n heard " and "The y hav e geneticall y inherite d alcoholis m from thei r parents" . Tabl e 4.3 also show s the result s of the facto r analysis . The facto r analysi s reveale d six clea r explanatio n type s for alcoholism , som e of whic h strikingl y resemble d forma l models : for example , severa l item s referrin g to inadequat e developmen t and unresolve d conflict s wer e groupe d together . Thes e closel y resembl e a psychoanalytica l mode l of alcoholism , whic h view s alcoho l as the mean s of providin g relie f fro m psychi c anxiety , and addictio n as the defensiv e mechanis m whic h suppresse s unresolve d childhoo d conflicts . Furthermore , the fourt h facto r can clearl y be compare d to a sociocultura l mode l of alcoholis m whic h emphasise s cultura l beliefs , attitude s and prac tices , and the role of socia l learning . As reveale d in previou s studie s on lay belief s and confirme d in this study , boredo m seem s to be an importan t lay explanatio n for alcoholism , and yet it has not been incorporate d into any of the forma l explici t model s or receive d muc h attentio n from researchers . The explanation s referrin g to biologica l or geneti c cause s wer e not regarde d as bein g very importan t by the respondent s in this study , as was foun d in previou s studie s (Frieze , 1979 ; McHugh , 1979) . However , thes e aetiologica l factor s hav e receive d muc h attentio n fro m theorist s and researcher s alike . In a secon d relate d study , Furnha m and Lowic k (1984b ) focuse d specifi cally on actor-observe r difference s betwee n thos e wh o wer e non - , light , mediu m and heav y drinkers . The result s showe d simila r finding s to studie s on smoking . Indeed , ther e hav e bee n quit e a numbe r of studie s on alcoholics ' (or proble m drinkers' ) belief s abou t alcoholis m and muc h is mad e of actor observe r difference s whic h sugges t tha t non-alcoholic s woul d tend to mak e dispositiona l (individua l pathology ) attribution s whil e alcoholic s woul d tend to mak e situationa l attribution s or appea l to uncontrollabl e factor s (Richar d and Burley , 1978 ; McCartne y and O'Dowd , 1981) . Bot h McHug h (1979 ) and

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TABL E 4.3. FactorAnalytic (Varimax)Resultsfor the 30 Explanationsfor Alcoholismoverthe TotalSample(N = 265)

Variance Mean Loading Eigenvalue (%)

Factors/items Psychological 10 The y canno t cope with their financia l problem s 14 The y have found that alcoho l helps them reduce their anxiet y 16 The y have feeling s of inferiorit y that alcoho l alleviate s 19 Drinkin g helps them cope with the boredo m of their lives 20 The y have found drink the cheapes t and quickes t way to relax 22 The y are confronte d with frustrate d ambitio n which alcoho l relieve s 23 The y find drink is the only way to cope with frequen t depressio n 24 The y suffer from considerabl e stress at work 30 The y are sociall y inadequat e and canno t make friend s Personalandsocial 2 The y have experience d considerabl e marita l discor d 4 The y have experience d job insecurit y and instabilit y 10 The y canno t cope with their financia l problem s 11 The y often have sexua l problem s "Freudian " 6 The y are immature , self-indulgen t peopl e 7 The y feel alienate d from their own societ y 16 The y have feeling s of inferiorit y that alcoho l relieve s 17 The y have self-destructiv e urges 26 The y often rebel agains t a puritanica l repressiv e upbringin g 29 The y are unabl e to expres s aggressio n toward s other s Sociocultural 1 Ther e is so much social pressur e put on people to drink 5 Ther e is too much socialisin g in pubs and clubs 18 The y grew up in a cultur e wher e everybod y drinks to exces s 25 The y have never been taugh t to use alcoho l sensibl y 27 The y enjoy the compan y of other heavy drinker s Biological 9 The y have a biologica l need for a drink 13 The y are often physicall y ill and feel there is no hope

3.50

0.48

2.36

0.74

3.13

0.64

2.83

0.68

3 3.32 3.30.5 0.5 3.68

0.59

2.66

0.74

2.91

0.59

3.83

0.44

3.15

0.80

3.41

0.6 7 3.4 0.6

3.50 3.83

0.58 0.64

4.57 4.01

0.47 0.52

3.13 4.40

0.42 0.67

4.24

0.59

4.93

0.62

3.34

0.48

3.82

0.69

3.67

5 3.60.5 0.5

3.87

0.42

3.70

0.68

4.83

0.63

4.36

0.6 3 4.3 0.6

7.1 4

23. 8

2.9 3

89.

1.87

26.

1.4 6

94.

1.2 7

24.

84 15

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The y hav e geneticall y inherite d alcoholis m fro m their parent s Socialdesirability 1 Ther e is so muc h socia l pressur e put on peopl e to drink 8 Ther e is too muc h emphasi s on booz y busines s lunche s 12 Advertisin g encourage s peopl e to drin k too muc h 21 Religiou s prohibition s agains t drinkin g are not so often hear d

3

00.75.3

4

10.5 3.3

7 4.6 2

60.6 4.3 1.16 20.7

8

90.45.4

3.9

Mean s on scale : Importan t 12 34 5 6 7 Unimportant . Reproduce d wit h permissio n fromFurnham , A. and Lowick , V. (1984a) . Lay theorie s of the cause s of alcoholism . British Journal ofMedical Psychology , 57, 319-332 . Publishe d by the Britis h Psychologica l Society .

Beckma n (1981 ) attempte d to test this theor y but foun d littl e suppor t for it, suggestin g that ther e is a consensua l view abou t the cause s of alcoholis m that is independen t of actua l drinking . In fact , a stud y by Robinso n (1976 ) showe d that distressin g event s or environmenta l stresse s (earl y hom e life , faile d marriages , job stress ) were rate d by alcoholic s as less importan t in causin g one' s own (severe ) drinkin g proble m tha n in causin g mos t drinkin g pro blems . In fact , alcoholic s see m to accep t a larg e amoun t of persona l responsibilit y for thei r drinkin g problem . In a stud y comparin g the belief s of hospita l staff , othe r personne l and alcoholics , Hey (1977 ) foun d a high amoun t of agreemen t and conclude d that there may be a "ver y genera l stereotyp e of alcoholis m consisten t wit h a personalit y disorde r concep t whic h is implicitl y held eve n in the fac e of nomina l acceptanc e of othe r concepts " (p. 227) . Thes e result s carr y additiona l implication s concernin g peopl e attemptin g to help alcoholic s and thos e designin g treatmen t programmes . As suggeste d by Furnha m (1982a) , the succes s or failur e of strategie s of socia l chang e partl y depend s on the exten t to whic h the innovator s hav e take n int o consideratio n the cognitiv e structur e of thos e bein g changed . Henc e it may be beneficia l to investigat e alcoholics ' explanation s for alcoholism . Differen t treatmen t programme s are relate d to differen t theoretica l belief s abou t the cause s of alcoholism , and thei r effectivenes s ma y be improve d if the relationshi p betwee n alcoholics ' concept s of causatio n and the relevan t theoretica l concept s is examine d and substantiated . A treatmen t programm e base d on theoretica l concept s whic h are strongl y associate d with thos e of the patient s woul d be expecte d to produc e successfu l results . Conversely , a treatmen t derive d from aetiologica l model s whic h are incongruen t with the alcoholic' s implici t theorie s woul d be muc h less effectiv e in overcomin g the proble m of alcoho l addiction .

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As McHug h et al. (1980 ) hav e noted : causal belief s abou t alcoholis m have severa l importan t implications . First , the internalit y (and possibl y the intentionality ) of the causa l attributio n is seen as mediatin g affectiv e reaction s to the alcoholi c individual , includin g the degre e of derogation , and the willingnes s to endors e treatmen t as oppose d to punishment . And, base d on severa l attributiona l perspectives , a tendenc y to attribut e alcoholis m to interna l factor s is predicted . Second , beliefs abou t the cause s of alcoholis m are relate d to the type of treatmen t an individua l advocate s or endorses . Third , the stabilit y of the causa l attribution s given for alcoholis m is seen as mediatin g an individual' s expectation s concernin g the prognosi s of the alcoholic . More intensiv e effort s are directe d toward s the alcoholi c when he is perceive d as curabl e— that is, when the causa l factor s are perceive d as modifiable , (p. 174) It seems , then , tha t lay peopl e ten d to suppor t psychological , rathe r tha n biologica l or sociocultura l theorie s for th e cause s of alcoholism . However , ther e are systemati c individua l difference s whic h relat e to whic h particula r theoretica l positio n a lay perso n migh t adhere . (2) Nicotine

Althoug h the smokin g of tobacc o doe s no t hav e as lon g a histor y as tha t of alcoho l consumptio n (at leas t in the West ) it ha s bee n know n and consume d by European s for nearl y 500 years . In th e earl y 1970 s nearl y 130,000,00 0 cigarette s wer e consume d annuall y in Grea t Britain , thoug h thi s numbe r is graduall y reducin g (Elkind , 1982) . A rang e of factor s determin e smokin g behaviour : psychologica l (persona lity , image) ; pharmacologica l (amount/effect s of nicotine) ; sociologica l (demography , family) ; medica l (anti-smokin g advice) ; commercia l (price , advertising ) an d political/lega l (anti-smokin g legislation , taxation) . Researc h int o smokin g ha s focuse d on eac h of thes e factor s wit h psychol ogist s focusin g on smokin g as a psychologica l too l to increas e psychologica l comfor t by increasin g arousa l (an d henc e vigilanc e and performance ) as well as controlle r of stress . Psychologist s hav e als o looke d at personalit y differ ence s betwee n smoker s an d non-smoker s as wel l as differen t typologie s of smokers . Sociologist s hav e focuse d on socia l attitude s toward s smoking , socia l clas s and famil y determinant s of smokin g behaviou r an d the develop men t of the habi t in youn g people . Pharmacologist s hav e predictabl y focuse d on the effec t of nicotin e — specificall y th e absorptio n into , an d distributio n of nicotin e in the bod y as wel l as its biphasi c effect s on the centra l nervou s system . Scientist s as wel l as lay peopl e hav e speculate d for a lon g tim e on why peopl e begi n an d continu e to smoke . In an earl y pape r publishe d in Science Finnega n et al. (1945 ) wrote : opticalperceptio n of the smoke ; fire worship ; agreeabl e smel l and taste ; mechanica l manipulatio n somewha t resemblin g the influenc e of the nippl e on the infant ; pleasurabl e irritatio n of the laryngea l and trachea l sensor y branche s of the pneumogastri c nerve ; relief of tension ; stimulation ; sociability ; gives peopl e somethin g to do; permit s one to do nothing ,

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Other s have attempte d to categoris e popula r theorie s for smoking . Ashto n and Stepne y (1982 ) list the following : (a) Displacement activity — the variou s activitie s involve d in smokin g (a pipe in particular ) can give the impressio n of pleasur e rathe r tha n the real reaso n whic h is anxiety . (b) Taste, smell and irritation — smok e excite s variou s sens e organ s includ ing the lips , mout h and throa t causin g sensation s of touch , taste , heat and irritation , but unlik e eatin g doe s not accumulat e in the body . (c) Sex — smokin g is substitut e sucklin g or a sort of ora l eroticis m that may take man y forms . (d) Absorption of nicotine into the body — smokin g is a way of ingestin g into the bod y a powerfu l drug . (e) The control of arousal — smokin g facilitate s arousa l contro l such that smokin g can decreas e arousa l (an d henc e alternat e stress ) or increas e arousa l (and maintai n vigilanc e or increas e selectiv e attention) . Alon g with belief s as to why peopl e smoke , or wha t typ e of gratificatio n they deriv e from this activit y ther e is a wealt h of interestin g and importan t studie s on individua l and socia l attitude s toward s smokin g and smokers . For a lon g time psychologist s hav e been intereste d in the attitude s of smoker s vs non-smoker s and the denia l of the forme r regardin g the consequence s of smoking . Eiser et al. (1977 ) addresse d this topi c directl y in a serie s of studies . The y observe d that man y smoker s recognis e the well-publicise d healt h risk s whic h they incu r by smoking , and yet persis t in the habit . Eise r et al. (1977 ) set out to investigat e whether , and to wha t extent , smoker s overcom e the attributiona l dilemm a pose d by the healt h factor , by labellin g themselve s as "addicts" . Attributio n theor y woul d lead one to expec t that individual s who hold a very negativ e view of smokin g (usuall y non-smokers ) woul d be mor e likel y to regar d smoker s as addict s tha n smoker s themselves . It was predicte d that non-smoker s woul d be mor e willin g to appl y the unattractiv e labe l of "addict " to the habi t of smokin g (whic h they disapprov e of) , tha n smoker s woul d be willin g to appl y to themselves . It was hypothesise d tha t thos e smoker s wh o do appl y the labe l of "addict " to themselve s mak e thi s attributio n to absolv e themselve s from the persona l responsibilit y of continu ing a potentiall y dangerou s habit . A questionnair e investigatin g the difference s betwee n smokers , and non smokers ' view s of addictio n supporte d the forme r prediction : abou t four fifth s of non-smoker s regar d smoker s as addicts , wherea s approximatel y half of the smoker s saw themselve s as addicts . Non-smoker s underestimate d the amoun t of pleasur e obtaine d by smokers , viewin g the typica l (addicted )

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smoke r as someon e wh o woul d find it difficul t to give up smokin g bu t wh o doe s no t particularl y wan t to give up , eve n thoug h smokin g is no t especiall y pleasurable . In contrast , amon g smokers , th e self-attributio n of addictio n was associate d wit h wantin g to giv e up , derivin g mor e pleasur e fro m cigarette s an d smokin g mor e heavily , as wel l as the estimate d difficult y of givin g up . Furthermore , thos e smoker s wh o wante d to give up bu t wer e no t tryin g to do so tende d to say the y wer e mor e addicted , derive d mor e pleasur e from smokin g an d woul d experienc e mor e difficult y in givin g up . Thes e finding s suppor t th e explanator y functio n of attribution s suc h as "addiction" . Thes e attribution s enabl e smoker s to rationalis e thei r behav viou r whils t acknowledgin g the healt h hazard s of smokin g an d claimin g tha t they woul d like to give up . Non-smoker s seem to use the labe l of addictio n as a mor e internal attributio n to explai n wh y smoker s continu e an unhealth y habi t eve n thoug h it is no t perceive d to be particularl y pleasurable . In a secon d study , Eise r et al. (1978a ) foun d non-smoker s underestimate d the amoun t of pleasur e obtaine d an d th e degre e to whic h smoker s ar e frightene d abou t th e healt h risks . Subject s wer e als o aske d to estimat e the amoun t of influenc e variou s factor s hav e in "startin g peopl e off smoking" . Peopl e wh o hav e neve r smoke d tende d to attribut e mor e influenc e to seein g advertisement s abou t smokin g an d seein g actor s an d personalitie s smokin g on TV tha n did smokers . Thus , non-smoker s seem to regar d smoker s as bein g mor e susceptibl e to th e influenc e of th e media . Tha t is , compare d wit h smokers , non-smoker s see m to attribut e smokin g mor e to internal, dispositiona l characteristic s of smokers , suc h as thei r greate r persuasibility , ignorance , or disregar d of th e healt h hazards , an d less to externa l factors , such as the pleasur e derive d fro m smokin g itself . However , Eise r and Va n der Plig t (1983) , wh o investigate d the influenc e of evaluativ e factor s upo n preferenc e for situationa l an d dispositiona l attribu tion s relatin g to smoking , foun d tha t actor-observe r difference s in attribu tion are relate d to evaluativ e factor s in accordanc e wit h a "positiv e bias ,\ Thus , althoug h th e actor-observe r distinctio n seem s to appl y to smokers ' and non-smokers ' attributions , on e shoul d no t assum e a general self-othe r differenc e withou t takin g int o accoun t th e attributor' s evaluation s of th e acto r or situation . As Eise r et al.'s (1978 ) stud y revealed , man y smoker s are concerne d about , or at leas t the y recognise , th e persona l risk s of smoking . McKennel l an d Thoma s (1967 ) distinguishe d betwee n "consonant " smokers , wh o hol d fairl y positiv e attitude s abou t smokin g an d do no t wis h to give-up , an d 'dissonant ' smokers , wh o wis h to sto p bu t hav e greate r difficult y in doin g so and thu s seem mor e "addicted" . Accordin g to Festinger' s (1957 ) theor y of cognitiv e dissonance , dissonan t smoker s experienc e inconsistenc y betwee n the cognition s tha t the y smok e an d tha t smokin g is bad for thei r health . Th e nicotin e in tobacc o doe s produc e physiologica l dependence , inabilit y to give up experience d by the majorit y of smoker s obviousl y involve s othe r socia l

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and cognitiv e factors . Bern' s (1967 ) theor y of self-attributio n state s tha t individual s ma y mak e self-attribution s on the basi s of observation s of thei r own behaviour , in orde r to accoun t for previou s behaviou r an d to predic t thei r behaviou r in the future . Th e self-attributio n of addictio n ma y be one way in whic h dissonan t smoker s resolv e the proble m of counter-attitudina l behaviour . Th e belie f tha t on e is addicte d account s for pas t failure s at giving up and it als o predict s tha t on e will fail in futur e attempt s at giving-up . Th e dissonanc e arouse d in the dissonan t smoke r can be resolve d by regardin g smokin g as beyon d voluntar y control , or , mor e specifically , by labellin g the behaviou r as an addicte d behaviour . Thus , self-attributio n provide s a justifi catio n for smokin g whils t enablin g th e dissonan t smoke r to admi t th e potentia l healt h hazards . Th e contrastin g implicatio n is tha t the consonan t smoke r wh o smoke s from choic e is less motivate d to see him(her ) self as an "addict " an d less likel y to acknowledg e the potentia l healt h risks . Bot h of thes e prediction s wer e substantiate d in Eise r et al.'s (1978b ) stud y of th e relationshi p betwee n th e self-attributio n of addiction , ''consonant " and dissonant " smokers , and the smoker' s perceptio n of persona l risk . Ove r two-third s of the subject s wer e dissonan t smoker s (i.e . the y woul d like to give up smokin g if the y coul d do so easily ) an d the y wer e mor e likel y to say the y were addicted , to acknowledg e the potentia l healt h hazard , an d to say tha t they had trie d to give-u p smoking . Th e healt h facto r seeme d to be importan t in encouragin g th e wis h to giv e up smoking , an d it was als o an importan t predicto r of tryin g to sto p or reduc e smoking . However , it did no t affec t succes s or failure . Loke r (1982 ) has confirme d tha t the healt h hazard s are no t the mos t importan t determinant s of tryin g to give up smoking : smoker s are generall y awar e of th e harmfu l effect s of smoking , althoug h the y do no t evaluat e the m as negativel y as non-smoker s do . Th e differenc e in belief s abou t smokin g hel d by non-smokers , ligh t smoker s and heav y smoker s wer e generall y foun d to be unrelate d to th e healt h hazard s of smoking . Thi s substantiate s Eise r et tf/.'s assertio n tha t anti-smokin g campaign s whic h focu s exclusivel y on healt h are no t effectiv e in discouragin g smoker s fro m smoking , particularl y if the y associat e smokin g wit h addiction . Althoug h ofte n overlooke d by anti-smokin g campaigners , the amoun t of pleasur e derive d from smokin g was foun d to be an importan t variabl e (Eise r et al. 1977 , 1978) . Mor e "rea l pleasure " was associate d wit h no t wantin g to give up , wit h perceivin g onesel f as addicte d an d unabl e to give up easily . Th e numbe r of cigarette s smoke d pe r da y wa s not associate d wit h whethe r subject s attempte d to give up smoking , no r was it associate d wit h the succes s of thei r attempts . However , it wa s correlate d wit h th e self-attributio n of addiction , suggestin g tha t thi s cognitiv e facto r play s an importan t rol e in maintainin g an d predictin g th e cours e of th e behaviour , in additio n to pharmacologica l factors . Mor e recen t studie s hav e confirme d Eiser' s result s on attributio n for smokin g amon g smoker s an d ex-smoker s (Kleink e et al. 1983 ; Sadav a an d

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Weith e 1985) . As a resul t researcher s an d practitioner s involve d in helpin g smoker s sto p th e habi t stres s cognitiv e therapie s (cognitiv e restructuring , chang e in self-definition) . In othe r word s thes e lay * 'theories ' * of smoker s are dysfunctiona l in tha t the y hel p to maintai n the habi t tha t man y smoker s are tryin g to give up . The particula r interestin g featur e of thi s researc h on lay attribution s for smokin g is no t so muc h th e structur e of th e theorie s tha t peopl e hol d bu t rathe r the functio n of thos e theories . 4.4 Explanation s for Depressio n Althoug h no t alway s recognise d unde r thi s term , th e phenomeno n of depressio n (als o calle d melancholia) , has bee n recognise d by lay thinker s for literall y thousand s of years . Kan t (1798 ) in his Anthropologi e describe d the characteristic s of melancholi a thus : The MelancholicTemperament.Peopl e tendin g toward s melancholi a attribut e grea t importanc e to everythin g that concern s them . They discove r everywher e causefor anxiety , and notic e first of all the difficultie s in a situation , in contradistinctio n to the sanguin e person . They do not make promise s easily , becaus e they insist on keepin g their word , and have to conside r whethe r they will be ableto do so. All this is so not becaus e of mora l considerations , but becaus e interactio n with other s make s them worried , suspiciou s and thoughtful ; it is for this reaso n that happines s escape s them . As is the cas e wit h man y psychologica l an d psychiatri c condition s ther e hav e bee n man y attempt s to classif y differen t type s of depression : i.e . neuroti c vs psychotic ; exogenou s vs endogenous ; unipola r vs bipolar ; primar y vs secondary . On e of the reason s for thes e different , ofte n overlap ping classification s is tha t the y hav e looke d at th e differen t type s of depressio n at differen t level s an d stages , som e concentratin g on aetiology , other s on sympto m presentatio n an d stil l other s on treatmen t response . Ther e exis t a numbe r of differen t theorie s for depression . Gilber t (1984 ) has describe d thre e majo r approaches : (a) The psychoanalytic approach: Thoug h ther e are numerou s subtl e differ ence s betwee n variou s neo-psychoanalyti c thinker s (Jung , Bowlby ) an underlyin g them e is tha t of los s (of objec t or self-esteem) . Thi s approac h has als o attempte d to understan d th e rol e of inherite d psychobiologica l predispositio n an d the functio n of depression . (b) The behavioural approach: Onc e agai n ther e ar e variou s differen t theorie s unde r thi s rubri c bu t all are unite d in attemptin g to understan d depressio n in term s of a person' s specifi c learnin g histories , environmen tal response s and stimul i tha t maintai n maladaptiv e behaviours . Tha t is, a perso n learn s a particula r behaviou r patter n whic h ma y caus e and/o r maintai n depressiv e reactions . (c) The cognitive approach: Thes e theorie s argu e tha t maladaptiv e cognitiv e processe s translat e externa l event s int o meaningfu l interna l represen -

90

Lay Theories tation s whic h are the pathogeni c agent s (no t the event s themselves) . It is in the organisation , storag e and retrieva l of this informatio n that maintain s depression . The concep t of learne d helplessnes s is perhap s the best know n of this approach .

Ther e are , however , othe r academi c approache s to depression , includin g psycho-neurochemica l and psycho-evolutionary . Yet , predictabl y ther e is no commo n agreemen t as to the primar y cause s and cure s of depression . However , unlik e man y othe r area s of menta l illness , ther e hav e bee n a numbe r of studie s on lay theorie s of depression . Thi s has been dominate d by Ripper e (1977,1979,1980a,b,c ) wh o has describe d her work as "exploratory , tentative , heuristi c and descriptive " (Ripper e 1981a , p. 169) . Amongs t othe r things , she has demonstrate d that , perhap s unsurprisingly , peopl e (wh o may or may not be depressed ) hav e clea r idea s about : how ofte n they and other s say they feel depressed ; how ofte n they try to do somethin g abou t it; whethe r their "treatment " works ; the exten t or dept h to whic h they feel depressed ; how long thei r depressio n lasts ; the mos t appropriat e thin g to do unde r thes e circumstances ; how helpfu l variou s theorie s are; how muc h consensu s ther e is abou t lay theorie s of depression ; and wha t sort of thing s peopl e say , make s them worse . A them e runnin g throug h her work is that ordinar y peopl e hav e extensiv e knowledg e of depressio n and how peopl e manag e it whic h the y brin g to , amongs t othe r things , psychologica l studies . Also , peopl e are prepare d for the experienc e of depressio n throug h socialisation , thoug h wha t is unclea r is "wha t peopl e learn , from whom , how , where , and how , havin g learnt , they appl y their knowledg e in thei r dail y lives " (Rippere , 1977 , p. 62) . Ripper e (1980a ) has bee n particularl y impresse d by the degre e of consensu s that she has foun d in lay people' s knowledg e of depressio n and anti depressiv e behaviour . Thi s is seen to be descriptiv e and normativel y functio nal in tha t the y (th e consensuall y hel d cognitives ) enabl e individual s to estimat e thei r own and others ' depressiv e state , and do somethin g abou t it. To give som e idea of the sort of finding s tha t Ripper e (1981b ) has found , Tabl e 4.4 illustrate s the 10 pair s of historica l preposition s (and thei r anti theses ) in orde r of thei r degre e of consensus . The asteris k represent s belief s consisten t with historica l belief s (8 out of 10). Ripper e has also attempte d to replicat e her work cross-culturall y (Car o et al. 91983; Miralie s etal., 1983) . She compare d Britis h and Spanis h answer s to the questio n "What' s the thin g to do whe n you'r e feelin g depressed? " The Britis h showe d a highe r rati o of consensua l to non-consensua l items , but overal l ther e were fewe r difference s tha n similaritie s suggestin g a corpu s of Wester n common-sens e idea s on dealin g with depression . In fact Car o et al. (1983 ) drew up a list of 12 consensuall y and cross-culturall y held solution s for depression .

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19

TABL E 4.4. ObservedPercentage of People(N = 64)EndorsingStatements Statemen t * la

b 2a * b 5a * b *8a b *3a b 9a * b 4a * b *7a b 6a * b * 10a

b

Som e types of peopl e are more likely than other s to becom e depresse d Th e chance s of becomin g depresse d are pretty much the same for everyon e Th e way peopl e live is not an importan t facto r in whethe r or not they get depresse d Th e way peopl e live can be an importan t facto r in whethe r or not they get depresse d Aperson' s diet is probabl y unrelate d to whethe r or not he gets depresse d An imprope r diet can help bring on a depressio n and a prope r diet can help protec t peopl e from it Keepin g one's bowel s regula r is importan t in preventin g depressio n Keepin g one's bowel s regula r has little to do withprevent ing depressio n Th e weathe r and climat e can affect people' s liabilit y to depressio n People' s liabilit y to depressio n is generall y unaffecte d by weathe r and climat e Aphilosophica l outloo k isn't really much use when thing s go wron g in one's life Aphilosophica l outloo k may help a perso n when thing s go wrong in his life Th e amoun t of sleep a perso n gets is probabl y unrelate d to whethe r or not he gets depresse d Los s of sleep can help bring on a depressio n and obtainin g adequat e sleep can help preven t it An active perso n is less likely to get depresse d than one who is idle Aperson' s amoun t of activit y is unlikel y to contribut e much to whethe r or not he gets depresse d Th e amoun t of exercis e a perso n gets is probabl y unrelate d to whethe r or not he gets depresse d Insufficien t exercis e can help bring on a depressio n and sufficien t exercis e can help preven t it Keepin g a check on one's emotion s may be helpfu l in preventin g depressio n Keepin g a check on one's emotion s is not much use in preventin g depressio n

(%) 89.06

d Consensu Observe s with historica l view +

10.94 12.50 87.50

+

18.75 81.25

+

18.75 81.25

—

76.69

+

20.31 23.44 76.56

+

26.56 73.44

+

71.88

+

28.12 37.50 62.50

+

50.00

=

50.00

♦Indicate s the "correct " answer . Reproduce d with permissio n from Rippere , (1981c) . The surviva l of traditiona l medicin e in lay medica l man: An empirica l approac h to the histor y of medicine . MedicalHistory\25,411-414 .

1. Attributin g the depressio n to a cause . 2. Attemptin g to rectif y th e problem s considere d responsibl e for evokin g the feelin g of depression . 3. Findin g socia l and mora l support . 4. Engagin g in divertin g an d distractin g recreations . 5. Keepin g bus y an d working .

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6. Focusin g one' s attentio n elsewher e tha n on th e depressin g proble m or feelings . 7. Restructurin g one' s cognition s so as to minimis e the significanc e of the depressin g events . 8. Engagin g in self-car e an d self-maintenanc e activities . 9. Ventin g one' s emotions . 10. Takin g prescribe d medicatio n an d self-medicating . 11. Findin g compensation s an d boostin g feeling s of self-estee m or self efficac y throug h useful , purposiv e activity . 12. Takin g comfor t in one' s religion . In anothe r stud y usin g th e sam e populations , Miralie s et al. (1983 ) aske d "Whe n you'r e feelin g depressed , wha t sor t of thing s ca n mak e you feel worse?" . Agai n th e Englis h speakin g group s produce d a larg e variet y of item s and showe d a highe r degre e of consensu s in thei r responses . However , the author s wer e abl e to com e up wit h eigh t generall y hel d belief s abou t wha t make s depresse d peopl e feel wors e suc h as : feelin g isolate d an d depressed ; bein g reminde d of th e depressin g proble m or th e fac t of bein g depressed ; encounterin g furthe r problem s or an exacerbatio n of th e origina l problem ; feelin g overworke d or unabl e to cope ; havin g to do thing s on e doesn' t wan t to do ; contac t wit h othe r people , etc . By-and-larg e thes e ar e "correct" , thoug h it is difficul t to generalis e to all cases . The author s note d the paradoxica l natur e of the findings : Feelin g depresse d appear s to be a paradoxica l state in which certai n opposite s can have simila r effects : rejectio n and sympathy , isolatio n and socia l contact , reminder s of the proble m and distraction s from it. Anothe r parado x is that so many of the situation s mentione d as makin g peopl e feel worse when they are feelin g depresse d are variant s of the same situation s which subject s of the previou s studie s mentione d as being "the thing to do when you'r e feelin g depressed" : seekin g socia l suppor t and sympathy , crawlin g away on one's own, scrutinisin g and analysin g the reason s for one's depression , workin g hard , forcin g onesel f to keep going , wallowin g in one's feelin g of depression , going to a cheerfu l social event , havin g a meal with people , havin g a drink , talkin g about somethin g other than the problem . (Miralie s et al., 1983 , p. 490) It is no doub t that , becaus e depressio n of all sort s is suc h a wide-sprea d phenomenon , ther e is suc h hig h consensu s as to its cause s and cure . Th e wor k abov e has , however , no t attempte d to see if ther e is an underlyin g structur e to lay people' s theorie s of depression , no r has it bee n considere d tha t certai n lay theorie s of the cause s of depressio n ma y themselve s be partl y responsibl e for the aetiolog y an d maintenanc e of tha t depression . Th e rise in interes t in cognitiv e explanation s for depressio n poin t to th e fac t tha t attributiona l style s ma y be , alon e as well as in additio n to othe r factors , a majo r caus e of depressio n an d it is indee d thes e style s tha t relat e to lay theorie s of depression .

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4.5 Explanation s for Neuroticis m The concep t of neuroticis m is use d widel y by lay person s an d frequentl y occur s in everyda y conversation , popula r writin g an d literature . Thoug h the term is mos t ofte n use d pejoratively , som e peopl e hav e suggeste d tha t ther e may be benefit s to neurosis . Fo r instanc e Proust is said to hav e remarked : "Everythin g grea t in the worl d is don e by neurotics , the y alon e founde d ou r religion s and create d ou r masterpieces" . Th e ide a tha t unhappines s and/o r neurosi s is relate d to artisti c creativit y is relativel y widesprea d amon g lay peopl e bu t has littl e or no empirica l support . Etymologicall y the ter m mean s "weaknes s of th e nerves " an d is derive d from th e Gree k wor k for nerves . In fact , unti l the 19th centur y all form s of menta l illnes s wer e include d in the clas s neurotica, so muc h tha t the diagnosi s was abandone d as to o genera l unti l the end of the 19th centur y (Kisker , 1964) . Bear d (1880 ) introduce d th e ter m neurasthenia, whos e symptom s include d lack of energy , fatigue , physica l complaint s an d genera l disability . Kraepeli n (1915) , however , distinguishe d betwee n neurasthenia , psychastheni a an d hysteria , whic h remaine d th e basi s for th e descriptio n of th e neuroti c condition s from th e 1890 s unti l the appearanc e of the America n Psychiatri c Association' s publicatio n of thei r Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1952 . However , the lates t editio n (1980 ) has no referenc e to neurosi s at all . Mos t textbook s hav e difficult y in arrivin g at a clea r definitio n of neuroti cism , thoug h mos t are agree d on categorisin g neuroti c symptom s int o variou s group s — anxiety , phobic , obsessive-compulsive , conversion , dissociativ e and depressiv e reaction s (Buss , 1966 ; Kisker , 1964) . Althoug h he admit s a numbe r of ambiguitie s in the concep t of neurosis , Eysenc k (1978 ) offere d a simpl e definitio n for his lay readers : Neurosi s is a term we often use for behaviou r which is associate d with strong emotion , which is maladaptive , and which the perso n givin g rise to it realise s is nonsensical , absur d or irrelevant , but which he is powerles s to change , (p. 15) Similarl y in thei r EP Q Manual , Eysenc k an d Eysenc k (1975 ) defin e a typica l neuroti c as a perso n being : an anxious , worryin g individual , mood y and frequentl y depressed . He is likely to sleep badly , and to suffer from variou s psychosomati c disorders . He is overl y emotional , reactin g too strongl y to all sorts of stimuli , and finds it difficul t to get back on an even keel after each emotionall y arousin g experience . His stron g emotiona l reaction s interfer e with his prope r adjustment , makin g him react in irrational , sometime s rigid ways . .. If the highly neuroti c individua l has to be describe d in one word , one migh t say that he was a worrier,his main characteristi c is a constan t preoccupatio n with thing s that migh t go wrong , and a stron g emotiona l reactio n of anxiet y to these thoughts , (pp. 9-10) Psychologist s hav e bee n fascinate d by th e neurotic paradox — the self defeatin g strategie s of neurotic s whereb y the y continu e behaviou r or though t pattern s tha t are maladaptiv e an d brin g distres s and unhappiness . Predictabl y ther e exis t a numbe r of theorie s whic h cove r the aetiolog y and cure of neurosis : dynamic theories , whic h sugges t tha t neuroti c behaviou r is

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an externa l manifestatio n of an underlyin g disturbance ; learning theories , whic h see neuroti c behaviou r as the produc t of an inappropriat e contingenc y of behaviou r learnin g or conditioning ; and cognitive theories , whic h sugges t that the neuroti c conditio n is characterise d by particula r pattern s of selectiv e informatio n processin g (Youn g and Martin , 1981) . Ther e are , however , othe r academi c theorie s of neurosis . For instanc e follower s of Personal Construct Theory hav e argue d that neurotic s hav e tigh t inflexibl e construc t systems , an anxiet y occur s becaus e so man y dail y occurrence s are unabl e to be interprete d withi n the construc t system . Rogeria n phenomenologists, on the othe r hand , believ e the tensio n and anxiet y in neurosi s is cause d by people' s realisatio n that ther e is lack of congruit y betwee n thei r experience s and their self-concep t becaus e they falsif y thei r own experience s to perciev e them onl y in term s of the value s of other s (Mackay , 1975) . However , very few theorie s attemp t to explai n neurosi s in genera l prefer ring to divid e neurotic s into variou s categories . For instanc e Macka y (1975 ) mention s six and offer s a brie f definitio n of each : Anxiety neurosis — this neurosi s is characterise d by anxiou s over-concer n extendin g to pani c and frequentl y associate d wit h somati c symptoms ; Phobias — a phobi a is a persisten t fear of a specifi c objec t or situatio n for whic h ther e is no rationa l basis ; Obsessive-compulsive neurosis — the patien t with obsessive-compul sive neurosi s experience s persisten t though t pattern s whic h he trie s to preven t (obsession ) and repetitiv e tendencie s to behav e in a way whic h he doe s not wish to (compulsions) ; Neurotic depression — in the cas e of reactiv e depressio n the individual' s symptom s of extrem e dejectio n are seen to be a respons e to som e stressfu l even t or serie s of upsets ; hysterical conversiontype neurosis — traditionall y the diagnosi s of conversio n hysteri a is used with thos e condition s wher e the symptom s of som e physica l illnes s appea r in the absenc e of any organi c pathology ; Hysterical dissociative-type neurosis — As the nam e migh t suggest , it is used in thos e case s wher e the patien t attempt s to escap e from stres s by cuttin g his/hersel f off in som e way or other . To som e exten t researcher s hav e advocate d slightl y differen t form s of treatmen t dependin g on the precis e typ e of neurosi s tha t they are considering : desensitisation , modelling , psychotherapy , electro-convulsiv e therapy , etc . Suffic e it to say that mos t researcher s are agree d that neurosi s take s differen t form s but they are not agree d on eithe r the caus e or cure of thes e differen t type s of neuroses . A numbe r of issue s concernin g lay theorie s of neurosi s are important . First , to what extent can people predict their neuroticism scor e derive d from valid measures ? A numbe r of studie s hav e looke d at norma l people' s abilit y to predic t thei r scor e derive d from the Eysenc k (EP I or EPQ ) measures . Correlation s hav e bee n modest , positiv e and significan t betwee n the subjects ' estimate , and the actua l score . Harriso n and McLaughli n (1969 ) 0.56 ; Gray (1972 ) 0.21 ; Furnha m and Henderso n (1983 ) 0.47 ; and Furnha m (1984b ) 0.40 . Whil e the actual/estimate d correlation s are significant , the data do not

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provid e ver y stron g suppor t for the convergenc e of ordinar y people' s estimate s and standardise d test scores . Anothe r way of lookin g at people' s conceptio n is to get them to fake neurotic. Thus , Sala s (1968 ) administere d the EPI twic e to soldier s — onc e unde r norma l conditions , and then they were aske d to respon d "in a manne r you woul d expec t of a neurotic , badl y adjuste d soldier " (p. 56). As predicte d unde r the latte r conditions , thei r score s ros e significantly . Ther e are man y othe r studie s whic h suppor t this conclusion , namel y that whe n aske d to fake bad (or mad) , neuroticis m score s go up , whil e whe n aske d to fak e good , neuroticis m score s go dow n (Farle y and Goh , 1976 ; Michaeli s and Eysenc k 1971; Powe r and MacRae , 1977 ; Furnha m and Henderso n 1983a) . Thoug h the score s chang e they do not do so perfectly ! In othe r words , thoug h subject s know whic h directio n to mov e on a neuroticis m scor e from high to low , they do not (or cannot ) mov e to the extremes . Interestingly , the evidenc e suggest s tha t it is not onl y ' 'normal " non neuroti c peopl e who can simulat e or fak e neurotic , but neurotic s can fake norma l (Gendrea u et al., 1973) . MacCarth y and Furnha m (1986 ) aske d two group s of psychiatri c patient s — anxiet y stat e and depresse d — and a norma l grou p to fill in two questionnaire s twice : first respondin g honestl y and then as the y believe d a "norma l person " might . Th e result s showe d tha t "normal " peopl e tend to see othe r normal s as well-adjuste d as themselves , if not slightl y less well-adjusted , wherea s patient s see themselve s as less well adjuste d than the ordinar y person . The control s were not significantl y mor e able to predic t the norma l respons e to thes e measure s tha n the patien t group s were . However , the depresse d and anxiou s group s differe d in the accurac y of their estimate s and in thei r conception s of norma l functioning . The two patien t group s did diffe r in thei r level s of accuracy , the depresse d patient s were generall y fairl y accurat e in thei r estimate , althoug h holdin g a somewha t negativ e view of ordinar y adjustment . The anxiou s patient s estimate s were alway s furthe r from the scal e norm s tha n thos e of the depresse d patient s and they substantiall y overestimate d the adjustmen t of the ordinar y personalit y and underestimate d the adjustmen t of ordinar y socia l behaviour . Overall , the anxiou s patients ' estimate s deviate d fro m scal e norm s in the sam e directio n as the controls ' but thi s deviatio n was usuall y mor e extreme. Thus , it seem s that it is not possibl e to generalis e abou t abnorma l groups ' perception s of normality : psychiatricall y disturbe d patient s are not necessarily less able than undisturbe d norma l peopl e to perceiv e normalit y accu rately . It is anxiet y but not depressio n that appear s to impai r this ability . It appears , then , that bot h norma l and neuroti c peopl e hav e som e idea of what normalit y and neurose s are , eve n thoug h this is by no mean s perfect . One reaso n for them not bein g abl e to fak e perfectl y is that they may not realis e the variou s dimension s of neuroticism . Tha t is, they may recognis e that , say , anxiet y and obessionalit y are neuroti c but not phobi c or hysteri a responses . LT— H

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TABL E4.5. ThePercentage ofSs CorrectlyIdentifyingtheItemsintheEPQwhich SupposedlyMeasureNeuroticism

Items from the EPQ

3. 7. 12. 15. 19. 23. 27. 31. 34. 38. 41. 47. 54. 58. 62. 66. 68. 72. 75. 77. 80. 84. 88.

°/o

Does your mood often go up and down ? 45.1 Do you ever feel "just miserable " for no reason ? 41.( Do you often worr y about thing s you shoul d not have done or said? 87.: Are you an irritabl e person ? 25.( 41.( Are your feeling s easily hurt? Do you often feel "fed-up" ? 25.( Are you often trouble d about feeling s of guilt? 75.( Would you call yoursel f a nervou s person ? 58.: Are you a worrier ? 62.: Do you worry about awful thing s that migh t happen ? 91.( Would you call yoursel f tense or "highl y strung" ? 79.: Do you worry about your health ? 79.: Do you suffer from sleeplessness ? 66.( Have you often felt listles s and tired for no reason ? 16.( Do you often feel life is very dull? 8.: 54.: Do you worry a lot about your looks ? Have you ever wishe d that you were dead? 33.: Do you worry too long after an embarrassin g experience ? 79.; Do you suffer from nerves ? 54.1 20.J Do you often feel lonely ? Are you sometime s bubblin g over with energ y and sometime s very sluggish ? 54.1 Are you easily hurt when peopl e find fault withyou or the work you do? 4.: Are you touch y about some things ? 37.: Mean °/o53.< SO 28.1

Reprinte d with permissio n from Furnham , A. (1984b ) Lay conception s of neuroticism . PersonalityandIndividualDifferences, 5, 95-103 . Copyrigh t (1984 ) Pergamo n Journal s Ltd. The secon d importan t case for investigatin g lay theorie s of neuroticis m is to attemp t to identif y lay people's understanding of the dimensions of neuroticism. One way of goin g abou t thi s is to see whic h item s in a neuroticis m inventor y peopl e can identify . Furnha m (1984b ) gav e subject s the 90 item EPQ and told them that 23 item s measure d neuroticism . Thei r task was to identif y thos e 23. Tabl e 4.5 show s the results . The mea n numbe r of item s selecte d by the subject s was 21. 3 (SD = 3.41) , and correc t identificatio n for the 23 "neurotic " item s range d from unde r 10% to over 90% , the mea n correc t identification s bein g 53.9% . Six item s (12,27 , 38,41,47,72 ) wer e identifie d by ovej; 70% and they relate d primaril y to worrying , whil e six item s (15,23 , 58,62,77,84 ) wer e identifie d by less than 30% of the lay peopl e and they relate d primaril y to feelin g bore d and listless . They seeme d best able to detec t item s concernin g anxiety , but less sensitiv e to item s abou t depression . Thi s findin g was confirme d whe n anothe r grou p of lay peopl e wer e aske d to rate 100 characteristic s of peopl e for how characteristi c each was of neuroticism . The thre e mos t highl y characteristi c were "tend s ofte n to be very anxious" , "tend s to be highl y strung" , and

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"find s it har d to relax" . Whe n thes e rating s wer e facto r analyse d fou r quit e clea r factor s emerged . Thes e wer e labelle d communication problems (shy , anti-social , erratic) , unstable (emotionall y labile , unabl e to concentrate) , obsessional (ritualised , superstitious ) an d phobic (panics , repetitive) . Althoug h peopl e ma y no t be abl e to taxonomis e type s of neuroticis m or eve n recognis e item s from all categories , thei r ratin g of trait s tend s to sho w a clea r underlyin g structure . Onc e again , therefore , peopl e are moderatel y goo d at perceivin g the differen t type s of neuroticism . Thirdly , ther e is the issu e of belief s abou t the occurrence of neurotic traits in other s as oppose d to self . Furnha m (1984b) , an d others , hav e demon strate d tha t peopl e hav e a tendenc y to believ e themselve s to be significantl y less neurotic , disturbed , depresse d an d generall y "mad " an d mor e happ y and stabl e tha n th e averag e person . Thi s appear s to be a commo n adaptiv e featur e of "normal " peopl e tha t is no t foun d in psychiatri c patient s whic h may hel p to accoun t for thei r problems . Ther e remain s a grea t dea l of wor k to be don e on lay theorie s of neurosis . Researcher s hav e concentrate d far mor e on th e perceive d characteristic s of neuroticis m tha n its cause , occurrenc e or cure . Furthermore , littl e is know n abou t th e perception s of peopl e differin g in neuroti c symptom s abou t neurosi s itsel f (MacCarth y an d Furnham , 1986) . In view of th e curren t researc h it woul d appea r as if neurotic s hav e a differen t view of the leve l and exten t of thei r ow n neurosi s as wel l as tha t of non-neuroti c people . Further mor e the manifestation s of neurosi s ma y be cultur e and tim e specific , in tha t in certai n culture s at specifi c time s it ma y be mor e or less acceptabl e to displa y form s of neuroti c behaviour . Indee d thes e trend s ma y themselve s be a functio n of the dominan t lay theorie s prevailin g at the time . 4.6 The Attributio n of Cur e Peopl e hav e belief s an d theorie s no t onl y abou t th e cause an d occurrence of psychologica l problem s in the communit y bu t als o how thes e problem s are best cured . Despit e considerabl e researc h interes t in th e perceptio n of th e cause s of problems , comparativel y littl e attentio n ha s bee n pai d to the perceptio n or attributio n of the cure of thes e problems . It migh t be argue d tha t the typ e of explanation/attributio n peopl e offe r for a phenomeno n implie s the sor t of remed y tha t is necessar y to cur e or eradicat e it. Thus , if one believe s tha t the primar y caus e of delinquenc y is inadequat e disciplin e an d neglec t of mora l educatio n in schools , it is logica l to attemp t to chang e educationa l practice s in orde r to discourag e delinquency . On th e othe r hand , if on e believe s tha t delinquenc y is primaril y du e to societa l factor s suc h as hig h unemploymen t or inadequat e leisur e an d recreationa l facilities , attempt s to preven t delin quenc y woul d involv e suc h thing s as governmen t expenditur e on jo b creatio n scheme s and/o r mor e recreationa l facilities . Similarly , if on e believe s th e

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cause s of addiction s (smokin g or drinking ) to be pharmacological , presumabl y one woul d advocat e som e sort of drug therapy , wherea s if one perceive d the caus e to be psychologica l on e migh t advocat e som e sort of psychologica l therap y (psychotherapy , behaviou r modification) . It is mor e difficult , however , to predic t whic h curativ e measure s woul d be advocate d wher e the caus e is perceive d to be geneti c or socio-cultura l — other , perhaps , than the detectio n of specifi c type s of individual s (an d preventin g them havin g children) , or in the case of the latte r explanation , a radica l chang e in the structur e of society . It appears , therefore , tha t belief s abou t "cause " and "cure " may be closel y linked , but it canno t be as certai n tha t the one (cause ) necessaril y precede s the othe r (cure) . Tha t is, it may be that belief s in the mos t effectiv e way to eradicat e delinquenc y or cure alcoholis m impl y the caus e of delin quenc y or alcoholis m rathe r than the othe r way round . Mor e importantl y it may not eve n be the cas e tha t people' s belief s abou t caus e and cure are consisten t or indee d logical . Tha t is, thei r belief s abou t effectiv e cure may be unrelate d to , or even contradictor y to thei r belief s abou t cause . Ther e is also an extensiv e literatur e on "copin g behaviours" , whic h coul d be viewe d as a sort of applicatio n of cure attributions . Tha t is, the copin g behaviour s that peopl e adop t migh t reflec t thei r belief s abou t the efficac y of thes e variou s strategies . As Pearli n and Schoole r (1978 ) hav e pointe d out , little is know n abou t the natur e and substanc e of genera l copin g repertoires , and even less abou t thei r relativ e effectiveness . However , in a recen t study , Parke r and Brow n (1982 ) foun d six structura l dimension s (copin g styles ) that mediat e betwee n majo r life event s and depression . Thes e were recklessnes s (brea k things , tak e alcohol) , socialisatio n (spen d tim e with friends , socialise) , distractio n (bus y yoursel f in work) , proble m solvin g (thin k throug h the problem , pray) , passivit y (read , ignor e the problem) , and self-consolatio n (spen d mone y on yourself) . Yet ther e are a numbe r of reason s why the examinatio n of copin g style s and strategie s do not necessaril y reflec t lay beliefs . For instance , peopl e may not be able to indulg e in the strateg y they believ e mos t effectiv e or appropriat e becaus e of variou s restraints , such as cos t (of psychotherapy) . Also , peopl e may not be abl e to fulfi l thei r preferre d copin g strateg y (see k out socia l support ) becaus e other s rejec t them . Further , peopl e ma y believ e in a sequentia l patter n of copin g strategie s or completel y differen t strategie s for differen t problem s and henc e an examinatio n of strategie s pursue d by a perso n for one particula r proble m at one poin t in tim e migh t not revea l the true complexit y of people' s beliefs . On the othe r hand , ther e may be conservativel y held belief s abou t cure in societ y at large , whic h may or may not be accurate . Ripper e (1979 , 1980 , 1981a,b ) has argued , on the basi s of her ow n extensiv e wor k on lay belief s concernin g the treatmen t of depression , tha t "wel l cultivate d adults " in our societ y posses s a rich and comple x stor e of

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knowledg e abou t the cause s and cure s of psychologica l illnesse s in themselve s and others . But Rippere' s wor k doe s not sugges t why certai n peopl e hol d differen t view s from others , and how effectiv e thes e variou s treatment s actuall y are (see Chapte r 4). In one of the few investigation s specificall y concerne d with the attributio n of effectiv e cure and overcomin g persona l problems , Knap p and Delprat o (1980 ) aske d subject s the exten t to whic h the y believe d will powe r to be necessar y for overcomin g 24 ''proble m behaviours " suc h as smoking , gambling , shoplifting , stutterin g and bedwetting . The result s showe d larg e differences , will powe r bein g rate d as mor e necessar y for overcomin g ''self indulgence ' ' problem s (e.g . alcoholism , smoking ) and certai n "non-self indulgent " problem s (e.g . shyness , fear of flying ) tha n for overcomin g "psychopathological " problem s (e.g . nervou s breakdown , hallucinations ) and "abilit y deficits " (e.g . inabilit y to swim , poo r mathematica l ability) . Judgement s of the importanc e of wil l powe r wer e unrelate d to year s of education , numbe r of psycholog y classe s completed , whethe r or not the responden t ever attende d a college , and particula r colleg e attended . Tha t is, educatio n howeve r measure d is not necessaril y a predicto r of lay belief s abou t cure . In a late r study , Knap p and Karabenic k (1985 ) examine d the perceive d importanc e of will powe r and variou s othe r contributor s toward s overcom ing six problems : smoking , stuttering , nightmares , excessiv e fear of dogs , hearin g voice s and overeating . Facto r analysi s yielde d four factor s though t to be variousl y usefu l in the solutio n of thes e problems , namel y socia l conse quence , inne r control , understandin g and positiv e outlook . "Wil l power " was seen as extremel y importan t in overcomin g smokin g and overeatin g problems , less so for stutterin g and dog phobia , and relativel y unimportan t for nightmare s and hearin g voices . "Inne r control " contributor s (sel f control , effort ) wer e seen as mos t importan t for overcomin g smokin g and overeating , whil e "positiv e outlook " ("th e instrumenta l approach" ) was seen to be mos t importan t for curin g stutterin g and fear of dogs . The author s poin t out that facto r analysi s differentiate d betwee n two somewha t differen t form s of interna l contro l — inne r control , referrin g to self-relianc e or self help implyin g littl e externa l intervention , and positiv e outlook , referrin g to the possibilit y of helpin g onesel f by surrenderin g self-relianc e and gettin g help . The y sugges t that thes e score s shoul d relat e to genera l locu s of contro l beliefs , but did not themselve s loo k at any individua l differenc e variabl e in the perceptio n of overcomin g persona l problems . Followin g this wor k Henle y and Furnha m (1988 ) set out to examin e lay belief s abou t importan t contributor s toward s overcomin g som e relativel y commo n social psychologica l problem s — specifically , alcoholism , depression , sexua l dysfunction s and shynes s — to examin e the underlyin g factor s or dimension s of coping , and whethe r or not the facto r structur e differe d accordin g to the proble m bein g considered . In doin g so they aske d

100

La y Theorie s TABL E 4.8 .

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

How hard a perso n tries How much willpowe r (inne r strength ) a perso n has How lucky a perso n is Whethe r a perso n gets professiona l help Aperson' s genera l abilit y to overcom e problem s How much informatio n a perso n has about the proble m Whethe r the proble m is a sympto m of some other deep-roote d problem Whethe r the perso n believe s it is possibl e to eliminat e the proble m How embarrasse d the perso n feels about havin g the proble m How damagin g the problemis to the person' s feeling s of self-wort h or self-estee m How much eliminatin g the proble m would pleas e other s How much a perso n stays away from situation s that make the proble m worse How much a perso n understand s about the underlyin g reason s for the proble m How much self-contro l the perso n has Whethe r the perso n gets help from other peopl e (friend s and loved ones) How intelligen t the perso n is How much a perso n believe s in God How much the perso n stays away from other s with simila r problem s Whethe r there is somethin g wron g with the person' s brain or nervou s system Whethe r the person' s mothe r and/o r fathe r have a simila r proble m Whethe r the perso n seeks out traine d medical/psychologica l professional s How much the perso n really wants to get better Whethe r the perso n joins other self help group s for this proble m How much courag e a perso n has to chang e his/he r lifestyl e

their subject s to rate the effectivenes s of the 24 strategie s show n in Tabl e 4.8 . Facto r analysi s yielde d seve n interpretabl e factors , the first four , whic h accounte d for nearl y 50% of the variance , wer e almos t identica l to thos e foun d by Knap p and Karabenic k (1985) . Thi s replicatio n is all the mor e impressiv e give n (a) that all five facto r analyse s yielde d the sam e structur e and (b) that the response s wer e to four rathe r differen t problems . Indeed , thes e fou r factor s are not unlik e thos e foun d in studie s of actua l copin g (Parke r and Brown , 1982) . Overall , understandin g was though t of as the mos t importan t contributor , particularl y for overcomin g sex problems . As Knap p and Karabenic k (1985 ) suggest , this "ma y reflec t the belie f on the part of respondent s tha t thes e problem s are symptomati c of somethin g els e tha t need s to and can be addressed , but not throug h persona l effor t alone " (p. 351) . In fact , under standin g was seen to be mos t importan t for all four problems , thoug h leas t so for shyness . Socia l consequence s (embarrassment , Stigmatisation ) were seen to be less importan t in relatio n to alcoholis m and depression , but moderatel y so for sex problem s and shyness . Subject s believe d that a physica l or geneti c basis to the proble m was mos t importan t in depression , but of limite d importanc e in relatio n to the othe r problems . The idea of isolatin g onesel f from peopl e or situation s tha t aggravat e the proble m yielde d a highl y significan t difference , primaril y due to the fact tha t this was perceive d as relativel y importan t in overcomin g alcoholism . This is not inconsisten t with the idea tha t will powe r or effor t is perhap s the

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TABLE 4.9. MeanScoresfor thePerceivedEfficacyof theSevenFactorsfor the FourPsychologicalProblems.TheHigherthe Scorethe More the Factor is ThoughtEffectivein Curingthe Problem Facto r

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Inner contro l Receive s help Understandin g Socia l consequenc e Physica l base Isolatio n Fate

Alcoholis m 6.98a 6.77a 6.5Γ 5.07a 4.10a 5.1Γ 2.30ab

Sex Depressio n proble m Shynes s F level 5.94b 6.50ab 6.48a 4.30b 4.46a 4.74a 2.83a

5.29c 6.27bc 6.97b 5.93c 3.38b 3.03b 2.09b

6.38d 25.62** * 6.05c 5.42** * a 6.17 6.45** * 5.53ac 16.92** * * 4.16a 6.92** c 3.73 24.75** * 2.35ab 2.84*

***/?