Landholding and Land Transfer in the North Sea Area (Late Middle Ages - 19th Century) (Corn Publication Series) 2503510973, 9782503510972

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CORN Publication Series 5

© 2004 Brepols Publishers n.v., Tumhout, Belgium All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2004/00951131 ISBN 2-503-51097-3

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century) Edited by Bas J.P. van Bavel & Peter Hoppenbrouwers

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CONTENTS List of contributors

7

List of figures

8

List of tables and annexes

9

Preface

11

1. Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages19th century) Bas J.P. VAN BAVEL and Peter HOPPENBROUWERS

PART I

13

BELGIUM AND NORTH FRANCE

2. 'Social agrosystems' as an economic concept to explain regional differences. An essay taking the former county of Flanders as an example (Middle Ages-19th century) Erik THOEN

47

3. Ricardo in Flanders. Landlords and tenants in Flemish agriculture in the 18th and 19th centuries Eric VANHAUTE

67

4. Land markets in the Parisian Basin (17th-19th centuries). Changes over time and variation in space Gerard BEAUR

86

5. An abbot's most worldly concerns. Transfers of land and the land market in the notebook of William of Ryckel (c. 1250-c. 1270) Peter HOPPENBROUWERS

101

PART II

THE NETHERLANDS, NORTHWEST GERMANY AND DENMARK

6. Structures of landownership, mobility of land and farm sizes. Diverging developments in the northern part of the Low Countries, c. 1300-c. 1650 Bas J.P. VAN BAVEL

131

7. Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900 Otto S. KNOTTNERUS

149

8. Landownership, farming and peasants in Denmark in the Middle Ages Nils HYBEL

187

5

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

9. Rural credit and land market in the Duchy of Schleswig c. 1450-1660 Bjorn POULSEN 10. Farms and land - a commodity? Land markets, family strategies and manorial control in Germany (18th-19th centuries) Stefan BRAKENSIEK

203

218

PART III ENGLAND 11. Tenure and landholding in England 1440-1580. A crucial period for the development of agrarian capitalism? Jane WHITTLE

237

12. Redefining copyhold in the 16th century. The case of timber rights Richard W. HOYLE

250

13. Access to land by labourers and tradesmen in 18th-century England Leigh SHAW-TAYLOR

265

14. Freehold from copyhold and leasehold. Tenurial transition in England between the 16th and 19th centuries John V. BECKETT and Michael E. TURNER

282

6

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS BAS J.P. VAN BAVEL

Dept. of History University of Utrecht/NWO, NL

GERARD BEAUR

CNRS and EHESS, Centre de Recherches Historiques, Paris, F

JOHN V. BECKETT

Dept. of History University of Nottingham, UK

STEFAN BRAKENSIEK

Dept. of History University of Bielefeld, G

RICHARD W. HOYLE

Dept. of History University of Reading, UK

NILS HYBEL

Dept. of History University of Copenhagen, DK

PETER HOPPENBROUWERS

Dept. of History University of Amsterdam, NL

OTTOS.KNOTTNERUS

Zuidbroek, NL

BJ0RN POULSEN

Dept. of History University of Arhus, DK

LEIGH SHAW-TAYLOR

Dept. of Geography University of Cambridge, UK

ERIK THOEN

Dept. of History Ghent University, B

MICHAELE. TURNER

Dept. of History University of Hull, UK

ERIC VANHAUTE

Dept. of History Ghent University, B

JANE WHITTLE

Dept. of History University of Exeter, UK

7

LIST OF FIGURES 2.1 3.1 3 .2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3 .8 3. 9 3.10 3.11 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 5.1 5.2 7.1 9 .1 9.2 9.3 11.l 13.1 14.1 14.2

8

Key factors used to characterize regional social agrosystems Flanders (the modem federal state) and its regions Share of leaseholding in Belgium, 1850-1950 Share of leaseholds in Flanders in 1846 Share of leasehold land in Flanders in 1846 Share of leaseholds in Flanders in 1895 Share ofleasehold land in Flanders in 1895 Share ofleaseholding in Flanders, 1750-1900 Lease prices of agricultural land, 1750-1910 (francs/hectare) Lease prices of agricultural land, 1750-1910 (labour days/hectare) Weight of taxes and rents on agricultural land in Belgium, 1846-1910 Weight of taxes and rents on agricultural land in East-Flanders, c.1790-1910 Land markets in the Parisian Bassin, 17th-19th centuries Types of contracts.Three samples from Normandy The "split market" in the Domfrontais Land market activity in Normandy. Three measures The land markets of Janville and Maintenon, 1760-1790 Land markets and the French Revolution. Four samples Land market activity after the French Revolution Main principalities in the Low Countries (c. 1250), and location of possessions of the abbey of Saint-Truiden Main locations of possessions of the abbey of Saint-Truiden in the SaintTruiden area, c. 1250 The Wadden Sea coastal marshes in the early modem period and the main Frisian districts The Duchy of Schleswig in the later Middle Ages Credit flows from town to country in part of the Duchy of Schleswig, c. 14701500 Distribution of tax returns (in marks) over the number of taxpayers in two hundreds of southern Schleswig in 1483 Types of tenure on English manors (mid 16th century) Counties mentioned in the text Distribution of enfranchisements by type of lord, 1840-1920 Distribution of enfranchisements by county, 1841-1882

LIST OF TABLES Annual turnover of land Some parameters of the farm structure in Flanders, 18th-middle of the 19th centuries 3.2 Some parameters of the farm structure in Belgium, 1850-1950 5.1 Acquisitions of land (emptiones) by the abbot of Sint-Truiden, 1249-1271 6.1 Regions in the Netherlands for which a quantitative reconstruction of the social distribution of land ownership in the 16th/early 17th century has been made 6.2 Social distribution of the land in the western part of the Guelders river area 6.3 Development of the average size of tenancies in the Guelders river area (15th and 16th centuries): lease land of the abbey of Marienweerd and the Lord of Culemborg 6.4 Distribution of tenancies in the Guelders river area by size (second half of the 16th century): lease lands of the abbey of Marienweerd and the Lord of Culemborg 6.5 Distribution of farms in the Over-Betuwe by size and by percentage of the cultivated area used by farms in the different size groups, 1650 6.6 Distribution of farms in Leeuwarderadeel and Ferwerderadeel by size, 1511 6.7 Distribution of rural households by farm size in various villages in the northern part of Holland around the middle of the 16th century 7 .1 Social property relations in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes (c. 1900) 8.1 Structural changes on the estates of the Bishop of Roskilde 8.2 Social stratification on the estates of the Bishop of Roskilde, 1370 8.3 The distribution of tenant farms on Sealand, 1688 8.4 Number of cottars and smallholders per manorial unit in 1370 and 1688 9.1 Eler Martens' (Stintebiill, Strand) loans, 1491 9.2 Total annual sums of credit put out by the Fladsten farm, 1636-1658 9.3 Total annual sums of credit put out by the N0rre Vollum farm, 1647-1658 13.1 Percentage of men on militia lists with land tax assessments 13.2 Relative frequency of landlords, tenants and owner-occupiers 13.3 Size of occupier's land tax assessments 13.4 Labourers with land or cottage common rights 13.5 Tradesmen with land or common rights 13.6 Poor people or cottagers keeping cows 13.7 Probate inventory evidence of agricultural activity 13.8 Probate inventory evidence of crop growing 14.1 Tenurial status 14.2 Tenurial distribution of Oxbridge lands in 1871

1.1 3.1

9

Preface

The history of this volume goes back to the CORN conference 'Access to land and land markets' that the second undersigned, together with Erik Thoen from the Ghent University, organised in Leiden, The Netherlands, on 26 and 27 June 1998. Of the fifteen original papers that on that occasion were given eleven have been printed in this book; those by Robert Allen, Robert Brenner, Juul Hannes, and Jan Luiten van Zanden are not, due to other publication commitments of their authors or because they already have appeared in print. By way of compensation two freshly made articles were added, one on early modem Germany by Stefan Brakensiek, the other on medieval Limbourg by the second undersigned. There also was a change in the editing team: Erik Thoen had himself replaced by the first undersigned when other work for the CORN project took up too much of his time. Starting point of the conference was the assumption that for a better understanding of rural society in preindustrial Europe it is of crucial importance to have detailed knowledge about the possession of land within a wider historical-geographical context of types of land tenure, social property relations, and mechanisms of access to land as well as of transferring land (either by inheritance, or by collective rights, or commercially via land markets). Of course this proved to be too ambitious a theme to treat in two days or within one volume. For that reason certain choices were made that are amply accounted for in our introduction. It also restrained us from adopting the - melodious - sign-board of the Leiden conference as the title of the volume. Whereas our feeling at the time of the Leiden conference was that we were going to tackle some topics that seemed to be banished to a remote comer of social and economichistorical research, to our surprise the last couple of years have seen a true proliferation of conferences (and volumes) on approximately the same subject. We just mention the two conferences on Le marche de la terre au Moyen Age, organised in Paris in 1999 and 2000 by Laurent Feller, Chris Wickham and Monique Bourin, and the conference on land markets, organised by the Istituto Intemazionale di Storia Economica "F. Datini" at Prato in May 2003. Apparently, the history of land tenure and land transfers is in the air, and this is a good thing, because undoubtedly it will further enrich our comprehension of some basic features of rural society in the past, while at the same time it will enable us in the future to make interregional comparisons of a wider geographical reach and of far greater refinement than could be made thus far. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the authors, who have shown so much patience during the many years it took to complete this volume, especially in dealing mentally with all those sudden requests to come into action that were followed by long periods of silence. During the last phases of the editorial process technical editor Koen de Scheemaeker from Antwerp has been a great support. UvA-Kaartmakers b.v. in Amsterdam did a wonderful job in re-creating all sorts of drafts and prints, passed to

11

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

us by the authors, into uniform, fine-looking geographical maps. The printing of this volume was made possible thanks to the financial support of the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research (FWO-Vlaanderen) to the CORN project. Utrecht/Amsterdam, September 2004 Bas van Bavel, Utrecht Peter Hoppenbrouwers, Amsterdam

12

1 Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century) Bas J.P. VAN BAVEL, University of Utrecht/NWO Peter HoPPENBROUWERS, University of Amsterdam

I.

Introduction

Having land is not a big issue in present-day Western society. Who cares about landownership structures and access to land in countries where agriculture as a source of national income or employment has dwindled to insignificance, and where most people are all too happy to lay their hands on a house with a garden of 100 square metres? This was quite different in the later medieval and early modem era, when land was the principal source of income and subsistence, the foremost object of property and the most solid base of power. For that reason all sorts of questions concerning landholding, land tenure and land transfer are crucial in understanding the workings and the development of the rural economy in that particular period. It certainly also applies to the North Sea area, where in addition land markets developed within an increasingly capitalist setting, after land had become a commodity from an early date onwards. Our first concern as the editors of this volume was to cope with the tremendous legal variety of land tenure and land transfer in a world that did not adhere to the modem idea of exclusive property rights. For one thing, the expression of this variety in written sources and secondary literature presented a barrier to comparison between countries perhaps the single most important aim of the CORN project - that was quite difficult to surmount. It also forced us to narrow down our scope in two respects. First, with regard to landholding this volume is restricted to land owned or used by private persons, versus land used by corporate persons, such as village communities. 1 Thus, all common land use is disregarded (such land use is the subject of a separate volume in the CORN series (De Moor et al., 2002)). Second, with regard to the equally vast field covered by the concept of land transfer, our volume is restricted to non-familial transfers of land, thus largely disregarding intra-familial or family controlled transfers. Each of these two categories into which transfers of land can be broadly divided has its own historiography and its own specialists, and bringing them together in one volume, interesting as this may seem, was seen as both impractical and unmanageable. However, it is clear that rather than being absolute opposites, the commercial land market and intra-familial transfers of land are partly overlapping areas. Such was the case, for instance, when members of the family of the person selling land exercised their retrait lignager ('preferential right')

1 With respect to all grades of ownership or possession of land one should, in strictly legal terms, distinguish between two different oppositions: individual versus collective ownership, and private versus public ownership. In practice, 'individual' and 'private' are often mixed up.

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Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

to buy (Derouet, 2001: esp. 367). 2 Another interface between land market and the family was the possibility of leaving specific parts of an inheritance - in our case, land - to a rightful heir or future heir by selling them to him/her. This could be done post mortem, as part of a mutual understanding among all heirs, or inter vivas, as part of an agreement between a person who was going to leave an inheritance and his/her heirs, for instance, as part of a dowry settlement or an old-age pension settlement. In all such cases it could be decided to sell land from the estate to one of the heirs, for instance to raise money to satisfy other heirs. 3 Even after excluding common land use and intra-familial transfers of land, the main subject of this volume is complicated and broad enough, especially because in addition to creating some order out of the seeming chaos of land tenure terminology, as well as clarifying some major issues of non-familial land transfer in later medieval and early modern north-west Europe, we explicitly intended to link these subjects to the vast and ideologically charged theme of social property relations. The principal reason for this is that land tenure cannot be seen apart from the fundamental role land played in the strategies of both lords and peasants: for the latter, being in the possession ofland was a cornerstone in a variety of survival strategies aimed at maximum control over vital resources, while for the former, landownership was one of the keys to lordship itself as well as to high social status. Consequently, the social division of multi-graded rights over land to a large extent determined the power balance between the two main classes of preindustrial agrarian society. By making a variation on Robert Brenner's famous sentence, one could say that we can only shed an adequate light on long-term changes in land tenure and land transfer if we have them 'refracted through the prism of social-property relations and fluctuating balances of class forces' (cf. Brenner, 1985: 218).

II. Variety of land tenure and of landholding It is always amazing- and confusing for outsiders - to see how in later medieval and early modern Europe many different types of landholding and land tenure coexisted. The confusion is often aggravated by the entrenchment of specific terminologies in na2 Derouet has quite justly pointed out that the retrait lignager could only be exercised after a buyer had been found and a competitive price settled. The price paid by the person who appealed to the retrait had not been negotiated by him/her nor was it a giveaway (Derouet, 2001: 338345). Cf. also some recent attempts to deal with both categories in Bouchard, Goy and HeadKonig, 1998, and the papers presented in section '11 microcosmo della proprieta e della famiglia' of the 35th Settimana di Studi of the Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica "F. Datini" at Prato on the land market in late medieval and early modern Europe (Prato, 5-9 May 2003). 3 Sales of this sort could or could not be done at a 'special price'. Derouet argues that a special deal could more easily be expected in areas of impartible (or, better, unequal) inheritance than where partible inheritance was practised (Derouet, 2001: 359-363; also Brakensiek, this volume: 223-225; Beaur, this volume: 89, on licitation and cession de droits; and Hoppenbrouwers, 2004, who describes such a practice in an area of partible inheritance). Next to this, there is also the (partial) dissolution of joint ownership arrangements, such as the Danish fadlig (Bybel, this volume: 190), or the Brabantine 'devolution' (Hoppenbrouwers, 2004), which in both cases could lead to an appeal to market transactions.

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Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

tional academic traditions, which no doubt obstructs genuine cross-border comparison. For instance, while English historians juggle with references to various forms of customary tenure and/or copyhold, freehold and leasehold, terms difficult for outsiders to grasp (Harvey, 1996: 395-396; Whittle, Hoyle, and Turner and Beckett, this volume), in the Low Countries - that is, roughly present-day Belgium and the Netherlands - the most common distinction until after the beginning of the early modern period is between allodium or eigen land (literally 'own land'),feodum or leengoed (land held from a feudal court), a confusing assortment of cijnsland or tijnsland, that is, land held against payment to a landlord of a perpetual, fixed rent in money or in kind (e.g. Hoppenbrouwers, this volume), and other types of hereditary tenure of various historical origins (e.g. Knottnerus, this volume). Obviously, this raises questions as to the free availability ofland of various categories, as well as to the openness of land markets. Probably, the North Sea area was characterized by an increasing liberalization in both respects in the course of the late medieval and early modern period, but there are exceptions to this general rule, and it is interesting to know what the situation was before these changes. The deeper background to much of this confusion was the absence of the modern concept of 'property', according to which there can only be one owner of a good at any one time. In later medieval and early modern Europe, however, two different 'parties' namely landlord and landholder/tenant- could both hold simultaneously what we would now call property rights to all kinds of fiefs and land held in hereditary tenure. 4 And although these rights were graded, with the landlord having the higher or ultimate (or 'direct' or 'eminent') property as opposed to the lower (or 'utility') right of the tenant, the latter was not easy to overcome. In the case of cijnsland or other types of 'hereditary tenure', including servile land held under customary law in England, the tenant was the factual owner; for example, he could freely sell the land, although in the case of nonpayment of the rent the land would revert to the landlord. This strong position of persons not having the ultimate property of the land applied in a way to all sorts of rights that could be exercised on land and/or its produce. By implication, this lack of 'clearly defined, absolute property rights' (Beaur, this volume: 88) had important consequences for the functioning of land markets (see further below). Beckett and Turner (this volume) show that these older forms of land tenure did not become completely obsolete in the course of time; in some instances, they remained in place until well into the modern period. Beckett and Turner challenge the view that by the start of the nineteenth century most old forms of land tenure had disappeared from the central parts of England, and were finally replaced by the dichotomy of freehold (tenure) - leasehold, which further stimulated capitalist development on the basis of commercial rack renting. Beckett and Turner argue that only in the protracted period of rising agricultural prices during the second half of the eighteenth century was there a clear willingness to convert ancient tenures into rack rents. But even then many, especially institutional large landowners had their reservations because of the high supervision Derouet, 1995: 646, proposed a second 'double dominium' with respect to property of land, viz. between rights of a (banal or justiciary) lord and rights of a (peasant) community. But because this distinction applies only to common resources, such as common (pasture and wood) lands, we have taken no further notice of it.

4

15

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

and collection costs of rack rents. Only the installation of the Copy hold Commission by Parliament in 1841 paved the road to modernization so far as it recommended both the commutation of manorial charges to annual rents and the conversion of copyholds and customary freeholds into simple freeholds. However, costly procedures and the fact that enfranchisement offered little advantage to copyholders impeded the smooth and rapid implementation of these changes. The process did not gain speed before about 1860, until finally, around 1900, 'ancient tenures were lingering only in an emasculated form' (Beckett and Turner, this volume: 290). The situation was completely different in the Low Countries, where already from the sixteenth century onwards the only distinction that mattered was between property (eygendom) and short-term leasehold (huer), even if, in a formal sense, all the older categories of land tenure mentioned above somehow survived (van Bavel, this volume; Vanhaute, this volume). The early predominance of the new dichotomy was in a general sense a result of the swift pace and profoundness of the transition of society and economy in most parts of the Low Countries, and of the importance of trade and the early commodization ofland. Also the gradual reception of Roman law certainly came into it. But far more important was increasing state taxation. When direct taxation on land andJ or other real property was put on a firm, annual footing (in the principalities constituting the present-day Netherlands, this happened from the fifteenth century onwards, with important revisions during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), the state as tax collector had to decide who it should assess, namely the actual user of a piece of land or the 'owner' of some sort. Consequently, all kinds of hereditary and feudal tenure became regarded as simple property. Because of this wide variety of historical types of landholding and land tenure, as well as of the manifold segmentation of the land market, transfers of land, permanent or temporary, in the later medieval and early modem past have been studied mainly - if at all - on a local or a regional level. Attempts to make comparisons across larger areas have been scarce, and most have been only tentative (Amalric, 2004 for the western Mediterranean; van Bavel, 2004 for the North Sea area). This imperfect state of research is reflected in the diversity of articles brought together in this volume, although many of the authors have sought to arrive at generalizations for particular countries or the other way round - to highlight specific patterns and regional differences within a country. We consider both procedures as valid steps towards a better understanding of the larger picture. Moreover, what has been brought together in this volume covers all of north-west Europe, and resounds with a common academic language, which facilitates comparison. The natural next step would be to try to draw the larger picture, for instance in terms of long-term international trends in sales and lease prices of land, as well as in terms of the general characteristics of land markets, the factors influencing the mobility ofland, and the chronology of the evolution towards more absolute and exclusive property rights. For all these aspects there were both clearly common elements and pronounced regional differences in our area that deserve further attention, also by contrasting them with observations for other parts of Europe.

16

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

III. Land transfers and pre-industrial land markets III.1.

General characteristics

Roughly modelled out, non-familial transfers of land can be subdivided into a series of oppositions: commercial/non-affective transactions (e.g. sales and leases) versus noncommercial/affective transfers (e.g. donations and feudal grants), permanent transfers versus temporary transfers, transfers of complete farms/agrarian enterprises/estates versus transfers of separate parcels of land, registered transfers versus non-registered transfers, etc. Evidently, the concept of land market is central to any closer consideration of these oppositions, but it is important to see that not all the types of transfers just distinguished necessarily had to take place on a land market of any sort, whereas on the other hand, as has been demonstrated, apparently non-commercial transactions could in actual practice involve the momentary use of a land market at any one point. Even more confusing are land transfers in the guise of gifts. Some 'gifts' of land were actually paid for. One could, however, argue that many gifts in money to religious houses were invested in land; in these cases, 'sales' of land were actually gifts, although the land itself was purchased in the market (van Bavel, 1993: 206; cf. Menant, 2003: 11, discussing Barbara Rosenwein's To be a neighbor of Saint Peter). Other types of land transfers that at first sight may look like non-commercial transfers were in fact commercial - that is, commercial in a late medieval socio-economic context. This holds true for many feudal grants, particularly in the period after the dissolution of the link between land grant and effective military service, and certainly so for transactions with various types of hereditary tenure. A final example of confusion is offered by the existence of what some authors call 'consensual concessions' or transfers of land that could be qualified as sales because a purchase price was paid, but were not in fact proper sales because the same purchase price had not been determined by the workings of the law of supply and demand on a open market. In his article, Gerard Beaur distinguishes a whole range of transactions in Normandy on the eve of the French Revolution that he would not 'truly' consider sales in the modern legal sense, namely fieffes (not to be confused with 'fiefs'), subrogations defieffes, adjudications, licitations and cessions de droit (Beaur, 1991, and this volume: 88-89). Often they were some form of hereditary tenure, or were linked to the payment of 'rents' -which in turn could be the object of sale on a 'rent market', and as such constituted one of the links between the land and the credit market. The historical material and analyses presented in our volume's articles, as well as in other recent studies, allow us to try to define some key characteristics of later medieval and early modern land markets. First of all, typical of all sorts of land markets at all times is that both supply and demand - but especially supply - are relatively inelastic. Consequently, shifts in demand are highly price sensitive. The effects are cushioned only when there are ample possibilities to move from one partial market to another, for example to exchange the property market for the leasehold market. Consequently, the long-term evolution of prices on property markets and that on leasehold markets tend to have a similar curve (van den Noort, 91). We can look at these prices from various angles. From a purely economic point of view, changes in the demand for land are

17

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

mostly induced by three factors, namely changes in the size and composition of the population (rather paradoxically, in the later Middle Ages the growth of the non-agrarian, urban population increased the demand for land), 5 changes in GDP (more specifically, in that part of GDP that is generated in agriculture) and technological innovation. Only long-term changes in the demand for land are able to induce any substantial adjustment of supply. When demand increases persistently, and prices of land rise for a considerable period of time, the pressure to extend the quantity of agricultural land, either by reclamation near existing settlements or by colonization, or by both, increases. Vice versa, the permanent abandonment of land can follow in the wake of serious and protracted demographic contraction. This pattern, which links the dynamics of land markets to long-term shifts in the land-labour/population ratio, has provided one of the key features of the 'secular trend', namely the well-known concept that historians since the 1930s have used to describe long-term demographic and economic development in later medieval and early modem Europe, ranging from around the year 1000 to the beginning of the nineteenth century. It still is one of the main backdrops against which the emergence and subsequent longterm fluctuation of land markets are often painted. 6 The adjective 'long-term' has to be stressed, because in the shorter term things could work differently. Schofield, for instance, has convincingly demonstrated that the buying and selling of land on the Westminster manor of Birdbrook, rather than bogging down, flourished like never before during several decades following the Black Death. He explained this by pointing to several factors: more people had the means to accumulate land, more land was purchased by outsiders or non-peasant residents (especially local tradesmen), and the freedom of action oflocal peasants had increased because of the dissolution of serfdom (Schofield, 2001). 7 However, in the longer run, when the demographic depression persisted, this flickering dynamics faded out. Whittle (this rnlume), closely following Postan (Postan, 1973a: esp. 43), has characterized the English land market during the long period 1350-1530 as being 'slack' as a result of demographic stagnation. Campbell already qualified this observation by pointing out that although the number of transactions must have dropped steeply, the average volume increased considerably (Campbell, 1984: 107-134). Whatever the best characterization, it was only after the first quarter of the sixteenth century that a real turning point came. The rapid population growth accelerated the demand for land, and consequently increased prices. The same turning point also played a role in tenure terms and land tenants' rights. In various parts of England, the 'slack' demand One can deduce this from, for example, the fact that land in the proximity of a town was more expensive than land further away from a town (e.g. Morsel, 2003: 14-15, referring to figures from Cologne and Basel). 6 For the former: e.g. Britnell, 1993: 145-147; Hatcher and Bailey, 2001: Ch. 2. Cf. Abel, 1980: 28-31, who was one of the main proponents of this idea. According to Brunel, 2003: 2, in French historiography the relationship between demographic fluctuation and land markets became a target of research especially during the decades 1960-1980. The most important works - mainly theses are mentioned in her bibliography. Ibidem: 10-11. 7 The same inverse relationship a population low speeding up demand on the land market can be found in the work of Leopold Genicot on the County of Namur in the Late Middle Ages. Genicot, 1982: 322-325. For a summary of Genicot's point of view see Brunel, 2003: 4-5.

5

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Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

for land in the fifteenth century had led to the assimilation of customary tenure to freehold tenure. Rising demand in the sixteenth century helped to bring this process to completion, while at the same time free competition for land and rising prices induced social polarization among the rural classes. There emerged at the one extreme a class of successful, large tenants (yeomen), while at the other extreme the proletariat oflandless labourers increased in number. It is fair to say that these developments were not equally pronounced everywhere in England, while in continental Europe things had a different rhythm anyway because the dissolution of serfdom and manors, as well as the rise of short-term leasing, had taken place long before, namely at the end of the expansion period of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which had been marked by high population pressure (e.g. Duby, 1968: 239-242). So we should constantly be aware that regional diversity impels us not to over-generalize, in this case with respect to the supposed positive relationship between land market dynamics on the one hand, and long-term demographic growth and upward secular trend on the other hand. This is especially the case because, as we shall see, the workings of pre-modem land markets were influenced by a host of non-economic factors.

111.2.

Segmentation of land markets

Another line of argumentation can be added to the one given above. Agricultural economists and economic historians alike tend to consider 'land market' as an umbrella term for what in reality is a range of submarkets or partial markets. The most obvious distinction is between markets for land held in property and markets for leaseholds problematic as the terms 'property' and 'lease' in a historical context may be (see below). It already gets more complicated when the various categories of 'property' in the sense of non-leasehold land are taken into account. Closely related to possible land market segmentation along the lines of legal categories of land, is segmentation according to the social background of the parties involved. We should at least ask ourselves - as several generations of British medieval historians have asked themselves - whether one can speak of 'manorial land markets' or, more broadly, of a 'peasant land market' that functioned largely separate from a 'baronial land market'. 8 A further possible difference depends on the free versus unfree status of peasants. British historians have been able to distinguish between (unfree) villeins and freeholders participating in local land markets (Harvey, 1984: 19-24; cf. Whittle, 1998: esp. 46, who did not see much difference on Hevingham manor). Are there any parallels to be found on the European continent, for instance in early modern Denmark or East-Elbian Germany? A question of no less interest is the extent to which land - other than common pasture land - was available to agricultural labourers or to tradesmen living in villages in the early modem period and afterwards (Shaw-Taylor, this volume). In any case, with respect to such socio-historical segmentations one can imagine the objects of sale as well as the kind of money involved to have differed greatly, and also that there were few border crossings. Only wealthy urban investors may have operated 8 Hyams, 1970; King, 1973: esp. 168; Glennie, 1988. Cf. Menant, 2003: 1-2, and Brakensiek, this volume. Morsel, 2003: 8-9, poses the question to what extent sales of land and/or estates by German noblemen included (various types of) lordship rights.

19

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle .lges-19th century)

on both land markets (i.e. the peasant and the non-peasant market), and exactly for that reason not have occupied a distinct land market segment of their own. And even these segmentations are not the only ones, for we can easily imagine other partial markets, for example more or less separate markets according to agrarian land use (e.g. a market for hay land or meadows next to a market for arable land), the composition of the objects of sale (i.e. complete peasant holdings or farms versus single plots of land) and the political power context (holdings or plots on manors or estates versus non-seigneurial, 'free' land, with crown lands and confiscated lands that were sold or leased out on a large scale forming a special category; cf. below). Finally we can distinguish according to the procedure by which land was bought and sold, or leased. An obvious distinction is between public auction sales (or adjudications inAncien Regime Normandy; cf. Beaur, this volume) and private, underhand sales. The latter type of sales probably always formed the large majority, although public sales gradually, and with considerable differences between regions, became more important in the course of the early modem period. The Low Countries seem to have been precocious in this respect: public auctions of private land became common already from the fifteenth century onwards (see below). A more special instance of public auctions is the 'clearance sales' of relatively large amounts of land by the state, often after sequestration. The first example that springs to mind were the large-scale sales of Church lands, noble estates and royal demesnes in France following the Revolution (Cf. Bodinier, 2004 for a comparative overview). But various other examples are offered by the land reforms, if we may call them that, carried out in the wake of the wars of religion that racked early modem Europe. A third, altogether sui generis category were sales of formerly common wood and pasture land, so far as this happened by public sales. In mainland Europe, this was largely a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. In sum, 'the' land market in the later medieval and early modem period was no ordinary market; in fact, it was not one market at all but a conglomerate of partial markets, each with its own mechanisms, but none fitting a purely economic definition of 'market'. Consequently, the standard economic price mechanism did not work as it does - at least to a larger extent on 'ordinary' markets for mass commodities. This means that sales prices of land that are found in sources from our period hardly obey the textbook mathematics used by agricultural economists to explain how prices on land markets are determined - which can be reduced to the simple formula (P = [N/i]*lOO): the selling price (P) of agricultural land (provided 'judicious land use', so that no debiting of the Yalue of the land is needed) is equal to the net rent (N) divided by the interest rate (i), times 100. One should be aware of that when analysing and interpreting series of sales prices of land, and always take into account non-economic (i.e. social, demographic, institutional and cultural) factors (Cf. Dyer, 2003: 5, on Richard Smith's scepticism regarding noneconomic factors).

111.3.

Imperfections and strains

As part of the general transition of economy and society, these non-economic factors have gradually lost their influence in the course of the centuries, although even now land markets of all sorts still suffer from certain imperfections in the sense that they

20

21

The validity of a third possible reason, one much stressed by Giovanni Levi, namely that most sales of land in local peasant land markets were emergency sales, remains controversial (Levi, 1989: esp. 128-138. On Levi's work: Menant, 2003: 9-11). Although a positive correlation between subsistence crises in peasant society and the number of transfers on local land markets is undeniable (e.g. Dyer, 2003: 8-9), it would be going too far to doubt the entire existence of a land market in later medieval and early modern village society, as some historians following Levi's lead do. According to Luigi Lorenzetti, such a 'market' would in any case be a 'market without demand' (quoted in Beaur, 2004: 992; cf. Feller, 2004: 39, who attributed this characterization to Levi himself). However, this idea is at loggerheads with another icon of post-war peasant studies: the Chayanovian peasant household that chronically adapted the quantity of land it used to the changing size of the family (e.g. Menant, 2003: 7-9; Dyer, 2003: 3-5). Consequently, in the absence of a collectiYe system of redistribution such as existed in Russia (the mir system), the pressure of family needs alone would have created constant demand on the land market, especially in areas with a partible inheritance regime where the reclamation of new land was not an option (Cf. Derouet, 2001: 356, and Morsel, 2003: 7-8 respectively). We could add to this that Levi's claim ignores the possibility that emergency sales might not have been what they seem. In a society where money does not circulate quickly, selling land can be part of a strategy to obtain cash whenever cash is needed (Morsel, 2003: 10).

never function as perfectly open, 'liberalized' markets with complete competition. There are several reasons for this. First, being markets in immovable and non-homogeneous means of production, land markets are never markets with large numbers of anonymous sellers and buyers. They are not now, and they certainly were not in later medieval and early modern society with its predominantly local and rural-agrarian character, when transfers of land, and especially the buying and selling of land, were as much governed by social (interpersonal, family, communal) and cultural considerations as they were by economic calculation. Second, far more than nowadays, land transfers in the distant past were guided by non-economic factors such as various kinds of social restrictions on the selling or buying ofland, embedded in customary law or seigneurial prerogatives. All such factors in one way or another disturbed the unhampered workings of the forces of supply and demand. Family restrictions on the selling of land, for instance, could be intensified in times of population pressure, for fear of losing control over the scarce land, thus counteracting the influence of growing market demand. Also, in addition to the pre-emption right enjoyed by family members (retrait lignager), other similar limitations in relation to outsiders could be recognized in local or regional customary law codes, many of which were intended to protect the rights of local seigneurs (examples from northern France in Brunel, 2003: 8; also: Poulsen, this volume). Reversely, the English case shows that the dissolution of manors and serfdom and the increased security of landownership could exert a strong, positive influence on the mobility of land in times of a population low. But then again, the liberalization of power relations did not always lead to more open land markets. Ghislain Brunel has pointed out that many 'charters of liberty' granted to villages (franchises rurales) in the upper Meuse region contain clauses that explicitly exclude 'foreigners' from doing business on the local land market (Brunel, 2003: 9).

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

III.4.

The link between land markets and credit

'Chayanovian' buyers ofland were put under another kind of strain when they had to find the money or other assets to finance the purchase, a point brought to the fore by Beaur (Beaur, 1994, and Derouet, 2001: 365). Probably only small parcels ofland were paid for in ready cash; larger ones had to be financed, either partly or wholly, by way of credit (e.g. for Limburg: Servais, 1982: 71-72). For that reason, land markets were intimately linked to credit markets, as they are today (Thoen and Soens, 2004). Credit could be provided by the seller of the land in the form of a delayed payment in annual terms, or be procured in the capital market. Poulsen argues that in early modern Denmark, credit was quite crucial for the mobility of land and the development of wellfunctioning land markets (Poulsen, this volume). But he also stresses that credit and land markets were interlinked markets with many losers, especially in times of falling prices, such as in Denmark during the seventeenth century. Only the winners were well off because circumstances favoured 'the development of a social system fit for market production' (Poulsen, this volume: 215), in other words, favoured the rise of capitalism in the countryside. Of course, countrymen did not obtain credit only to finance the acquisition of land, nor did the advance of credit in the countryside always have negative results. Based on a sample of loans contracted in the village of Haaldert in inland Flanders around 1500, it was concluded that in only a minority of cases was rural credit used to this end. Nor could many of them have been emergency credits. From these results, Thoen concluded that most loans were contracted to finance in-depth investments in farms, such as new buildings, tools, animals, seeds or manure (Thoen, 1988: 894-940, and especially 929935; cf. also Poulsen, this volume: 203). These findings, with their positive view on the use of rural credit, cannot be generalized without further research, but they do form a valuable correction of the classical view that rents sold to countrymen almost inevitably led to their financial ruin, the forced sale of land and their subsequent expropriation. Nowadays, the intimate relation between land and credit markets is painted in more shaded colours.

III.5.

State intervention

The buying and selling of agricultural land, or more generally the control of the access to land, lends itself to intervention by any sort of public authority, although obviously this applies far more today than it did in the later medieval and early modern past. For instance, in the present-day Netherlands access to agricultural land markets is strictly regulated by law, for example by the Wet Agrarisch Grondverkeer ('Law on Agricultural Land Transfers') for property markets and the Pachtwet ('Leasehold Law') for leasehold markets. Besides, all transactions of agricultural land have to be approved afterwards by the Grondkamers ('Land Courts'), while the Dutch state has a priority right to buy up land. Moreover, there are various kinds of legal arrangements in the background that strictly limit the room to make use of land for agricultural purposes, like bestemmingsplannen ('zoning schemes'), the vestigingswet ('Law for Licensing Establishment'), the milieuwet ('Environment Protection Law'), the hinderwet ('Nuisance Law'), etc. All this means that at present citizens in the Netherlands have only very

22

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

restricted access to land, and that on agricultural land markets neither open competition nor the law of supply and demand freely rule. The situation in other EC countries will not be very different. One can imagine that in the distant past the hampering of free competition on land markets was less caused by central state intervention than by the interference of local lords (landlords or seigneurs). Particularly in regions where manorial organization was strong, as in late medieval England and many parts of early modem Germany, the restrictions imposed by the lords were often rigid. The lord had to accord every sale of villein land, and he often blocked a sale completely (North, 2004 ). In addition, manorial customs often prohibited the accumulation of land and the possession of multiple villeinage holdings, and, reversely, the splitting of standard landholdings, in order to prevent the fragmentation of the obligations connected to them, thus indirectly curbing the growth of the land market (Smith, 1998: 355-360). It was only in the course of the centuries and in parts of the north of Germany not until into the eighteenth and nineteenth century - that these lordly restrictions lost their influence during the transition of economy and society or were finally abolished by state legislation or agrarian reforms. But even if in most areas intervention by private lords was more important for a long time, intervention by central state authorities was not completely unknown. Hybel (this volume: 189 and 199-200) mentions Queen Margrete of Denmark's Charter of 1396, which forbade the Danish nobility to buy up freehold land. At the same time, freeholding peasants were thence considered to be 'peasants of the Crown'. The intervention of the state in the land market was equally strong in early modem Germany and France, where territorial princes and the king, respectively, protected peasant landownership against the land-hunger and the claims of noblemen and burghers from the early sixteenth century onwards (Achilles, 1993: 25, 47 and 73-76; Brakensiek, this volume). This Bauemschutzpolitik, and the concomitant strengthening of peasant landownership, was aimed at protecting the fiscal basis of the states, which increasingly consisted of taxes on peasant landownership. Of a different nature, but also with a fiscal background, was state intrusion into the land market in the form of imposing transfer fees. Although precursors were not unknown in the later Middle Ages, 9 it would take until the full deployment of state power in the early modern period before such fees could be generally imposed. In the Habsburg Netherlands, as early as 1569 the much feared governor the Duke of Alva introduced the 'Twentieth Penny' - a 5% tax on the transfer of immovables - but it was abolished just three years later (Grapperhaus, 1989: 146-191). Only in the course of the seventeenth century were new experiments on a provincial level more successful, for instance in 1673 in the province of Groningen (Paping, 1995: 351) (see also under heading IV).

9

One could think of the rights of saisine and lods et ventes - usually amounting to I/12th of the sales price - due to local seigneurs in France from at least the thirteenth century onwards, and of the Flemish wandelkoop ('change of right [to land]'), due to the Count's bailiff (bailli). See Beaur, this volume: 92 and Brunel, 2003: 8-9, and Thoen, 1988: 901, respectively.

23

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

Initially, various sorts of indirect 'state' interference, implying both rights and duties for substantial landowners, may have weighed heavier. The former occurred when ownership of land was related to voting rights or to the possession of local public local offices, and the latter when, conversely, landownership was linked to the fulfilment of public duties, especially military service and the paying ofland taxes (cf. Hybel, this volume: 190). The rising tax burden on land from the later medieval period onwards may have slowed down the mobility of land, but we know of no attempts to actually measure this. The relationship between landownership and public taxation did not come to an end at the beginning of the modern period, at least not where the right to vote for parliament was dependent on taxable wealth (censuskiesrecht in the Netherlands). However, by that time the influence of land taxes on the rent and lease prices of land had diminished, as is convincingly demonstrated for Belgium by Vanhaute. Whereas in Belgium the tax burden on land hardly changed during the nineteenth century, lease and sales prices of agricultural land rose sharply (Vanhaute, this volume).

III.6.

Social and cultural values

Finally, one has to realize that the demand for land, and the price one was willing to pay for it, depended not only on a whole array of demographic and institutional factors in addition to economic considerations, but also on strong social, cultural and emotional values. Ownership ofland provided prestige and social esteem, certainly to non-agricultural landowners (cf. Brakensiek, this volume: 218, referring to Hagen's work on the Brandenburg Junkers, 2002). To noblemen, landownership was not only a symbol of their noble status, but also an integral part of their position of power, although this element in most parts of the North Sea Area - with the exception of parts of Germany - diminished in the course of the early modern period (Dewald, 1996: 65-67 and 76-77). Connected to this link with prestige and power, noble landownership was often part of larger complexes, including seigniorial rights, or attached to noble mansions or large feudal estates. This made such landed possessions much less mobile and unattainable for non-noblemen, resulting in a segregated market. For ambitious members of the bourgeoisie, the acquisition of land or landed estates, besides being a secure investment, contributed to 'aristocratizing' their position. From that perspective, the buying of land was far more than acquiring a commodity: it transformed the buyer's social status (Morsel, 2003: 13). However, land represented social prestige not only for noblemen and for bourgeois landowners eager to emulate the nobility: also later medieval and early modern peasants would have been deeply attached to 'their' land, even to the point that they could never see it as an object of commercial exchange, or, if one would not want to got that far, as any object (cf. Feller, 2004: 27-28, discussing the work of Henri Mendras). How far the emotional attachment of peasants to their land went and to what extent land was part of their 'identity' - which is also suggested by Feller - will be difficult to establish on a more or less general level, but there is no doubt that peasants, like noblemen, derived status from landownership. This was reinforced, as we saw, by the fact that participation in local public administration was often made dependent on the ownership of land. In many places, only owners of complete farms, or of a specified minimum quantity of land, were considered a full member of the village community and could have a say in the decisions made by the village assembly, for instance about the appointment of vil-

24

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

lage officials, the control over natural or financial resources, or the settlement of disputes. This role of the village community was strong particularly in parts of late medieval and early modern Germany (e.g. Blickle, 1981; 1991; Weber, 1998 for the northern Rhineland). Landless people and cottagers were often excluded from the village community (the Doifgemeinde or communitas villae) and were not considered as 'neighbours' (buren, Bauern).

IV. Institutional arrangements related to land transfers and legal security of landholding It will be clear from the preceding sections that the functioning of land markets is always embedded in a wider social, political and cultural context. This also applies to their organization. Just like any other concrete market, land markets should not be seen as neutral, almost abstract elements in economic life, but as institutions complying with very specific sets of rules, laws and ideas. Such institutional arrangements, which include contracts, rules of exchange, means of surveillance, standard measures, methods of registration and particularly the availability of clear property rights are major factors in facilitating both the mobility of and the access to land. More specifically, they determine to an important extent the risks, possibilities and costs of marketing, and thus the degree to which lands markets can develop. Together they ensure the security of transactions, the availability of information, the costs of measuring, and the effort required for negotiation and exchange. In sum, economic institutions related to land transfers could - and still can - increase or lower transaction costs considerably. In that way they codetermine the chances for markets to expand. For all these reasons, the rise of markets should be seen not only as a spontaneous and neutral result of the growth of supply and demand, but also as a constellation of social institutions.

The growing interest in these elements, which has been stimulated by the new institutional economics, links up in a new and exciting way with the attention paid in the past, particularly in England, to the legal aspects of land tenure. We shall take a closer look at the organization of land markets by focusing on two such elements: the protection of property rights and the registration of land transfers. In both respects the influence of 'public authority' appears to have been crucial. As to the former element, one could think both of the general, physical protection of landowners and land users by states or state-like principalities and towns and, more specifically, of the warranting of all sorts of legal titles to land by public courts of justice. The protection of property rights by royal authorities, for instance against unlawful intrusions by manorial lords, did exist in England both for freeholds and customary tenures (Hoyle, 1990), although to a lesser extent than on the continent, as a result of the stronger position of private landlords and the aloofness of public authorities vis-a-vis landownership and land tenure. The other side of the coin was that strong states - and late medieval and early modern England was certainly a strong state-could threaten landowners with confiscation of their land, not only for such obvious reasons as a conviction for a crime but also if they dared to defy 'public duties' such as military service or tax payment, or simply if they did not show political loyalty.

25

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

As to the second element, one should consider the growing influence of public authorities on the registration of land transfers. During the second half of the Middle Ages - and in many parts of our area, long after- transfers of land could be made legally valid in many ways, depending on the legal status of the land: in the case of alods, by simple written agreement between private persons; in the case of villein tenures (such as customary land in medieval England), by declaration before a local lord or manor court; in the case of fiefs, in a feudal court; in the case of 'hereditary tenure' (cijnsland in Dutch), in special 'rent courts' (cijnshoven or laatbanken in Dutch); and in the case of common freehold land, such as predominated in the European continent in the later Middle Ages, by registration in local public courts, which were increasingly aldermen's courts in the Low Countries and the German Rhineland. When registration took place before a lord, this was often connected to the latter's desire to hold some control over the transaction of land and the eventual levying of a transaction fee. For instance, in Flanders feudal lords leYied a fee of 10% of the sale price at the selling of fiefs (Opsommer, 1995: 427 and 533-553). The same applies to lords in possession of justiciary rights (gerechtsheren in Dutch). In the southern Low Countries, such lords exacted a fee for each sale ofland on the 'hereditary tenure' under their jurisdiction, and sometimes even for all sales of land. In inland Flanders, this fee amounted to 8-16% of the sale price (Thoen, 1988: 779-880; Scholliers and Daelemans, 1981: 59-62). The lords' grip was even stronger with respect to customary land in England, where manor lords vigorously enforced the registration of all transfers in their manor courts, not only because of the need to keep track of the obligations connected to the land, but also because of the 'entry fine' (fee) they were entitled to charge. These fees varied sharply between regions and between periods, but often they were huge, sometimes extremely huge, as they were in thirteenth-century England (Miller and Hatcher, 1978: 46-49). In view of the vigilance of manor courts and the severe prosecution of people buying and selling land without the lord's consent and outside the manor court, this enforced registration was no dead letter. 10 This is in contrast to the coastal areas of the northern Low Countries. In most places the role of lords as large landowners was insignificant, and manors had either disappeared by the end of the thirteenth century or had always been absent. However, the nobility did play a role as possessors of justiciary rights. For that reason, the registration of private land transfers before public rather than manor-type courts started relatively early and became more important than elsewhere. The same development can be observed in the adjacent parts of the German Rhineland. Initially, from the fourteenth century onwards, registration in 'aldermen books' (Schoffenbucher) became common in towns, which also covered the surrounding countryside. Subsequently, from the late fifteenth century onwards village courts started to keep similar records (e.g. Kastner, 1997: esp. 9-13). The parties engaged in land transactions increasingly preferred to have the transfer take place in public courts of justice, and to have it registered there, rather than doing things

10 The Winchester pipe rolls registered no less than 36,000 entry fine payments for the 87 years between 1263 and 1349, i.e. about 414 per year. Calculated by Mark Page, according to Bourin, 2003: 11. Also Campbell, 1984: esp. 107-108; Hatcher, 1981: 21.

26

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

privately, and they mainly did so because of the stronger legal security vis-a-vis third parties (e.g. Neve, 1985: esp. 27-29). The court books or protocols had legal validity and evidential value. Registration was not free; the registration itself entailed some costs, and smaller sums were asked for inspecting the protocol afterwards or copying from it, but the amounts involved were not very large. In some parts of the Netherlands, authorities went a step further, by making seisin after sale (levering in Dutch) before a public law court compulsory, sometimes even on penalty of the nullification of the sale. 11 Also, local courts were increasingly compelled by central authorities to register all enacted deeds, not so much because of the direct revenues involved, but because of the fiscal interests of the government (e.g. Ketelaar, 1985: esp. 39-42), which could use these registers to check the property returns of all taxable persons. However, the pace of this entire development differed from region to region. For instance, the supply of real property before a qualified court was made compulsory in the Land van Culemborg in 1416, in Overijssel in 1457 and in Holland only in 1529 (Cerutti, 1972: 192 and 247-251). In most other parts of the present-day Netherlands and the adjacent Rhineland, the registration of such transactions before a public law court had been made obligatory around the middle of the sixteenth century, which was early compared to other parts of north-west Europe. This early rise of compulsory registration was connected to the development of direct taxation systems based not just on landownership, but also on the estimation of the fiscal value of each and every parcel of cultivated land. Additional factors were the strong influence of authorities and public courts in matters concerning landownership, and the propitious extension of a network of local public courts of justice in the countryside (for northern Brabant, see van Asseldonk, 2002, especially Chs. 7, 26 and 33). The foregoing can also partly be applied to the organization of the land lease market, which also benefited from the protection of property rights and the registration of all sorts of transactions and contracts before public courts of justice. The organization of the lease market, however, is a topic of its own that as yet has been hardly investigated (cf. the studies on the rise of short-term leasing in: van Bavel and Schofield, 2004 ). We shall only point out one particular aspect here, namely the ways landlords and potential leaseholders were brought together. At one end of the spectrum there were underhand arrangements between landlords and sitting tenants or their sons, sometimes even resulting in a silent renewal of the lease (see also below, 31), while at the other end there was leasing by public bidding. The latter theoretically increased the competition for land and assured landlords of the best possible lease price, and probably increased the mobility oflease land enormously. In the coastal areas of the Netherlands, leasing by public auction, not only of agricultural land but also of such revenue sources as tithes, mills, tolls and all sorts of excises, already took place as early as the fourteenth century, but this manner of leasing out land became more common only at the end of the sixteenth century. At that time (i.e. shortly after the Reformation), the provincial estates of the new

11 Not necessarily the sale itself. For instance, in the Netherlands until 1 September 2003 sales of real property contracted by oral agreement between private parties were regarded as legitimate. Only since that date must there be a written agreement, duly signed by both vendor and buyer.

27

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

Dutch Republic even made this procedure compulsory for the leasing of the sequestered and 'secularized' possessions of former religious institutions. In Guelders, for instance, this happened in 1580. It was decreed that all public leasing should be announced in church well in advance, that the bidding should take place in the presence of government officials and that no pact or arrangement should be made in advance (Brusse, 1999: 140-145; for Holland: Kuys and Schoenmakers, 1981: esp. 26 and 34). Alternatively, land was sometimes leased out by tender. In various other parts of the Netherlands from at least the fifteenth century onwards, sales of land could also take place by auction. In addition to maximizing the selling price to the benefit of the seller, it was advantageous to both buyer and seller. If the auction was announced clearly and properly, for instance after Sunday mass, it was assumed that all the seller's relatives had had a chance to hear about the sale and to buy the land. If they didn't come forward, they lost their preferential right (retrait lignager in French, naastingsrecht in Dutch), 12 and buyers did not have to fear being confronted by an eager relative of the seller long after the sale. Even the usual term of one year and a day, during which the preferential right could be exercised, was abrogated as a result of this procedure. To what extent either the selling or leasing of agricultural land by public auction existed outside the Low Countries at the start of the early modem period remains difficult to establish from the existing secondary literature. Clearly, more research is needed in this field.

V.

Mobility of land

For some regions, the turnover of land on land markets has been reconstructed quantitatively. At first sight, sources are abundant for England because of the persistent registration of entry fines in manorial court rolls. It has been suggested on the basis of this material that land markets were very active already from the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries onwards. However, this assumption is grounded only on numbers of transfers per year for particular manors, and there is no indication as to what percentage of the total area was sold every year, and that would be the only indicator allowing real comparison. This problem can be observed in such local studies as An DeWindt's on the manor of King's Ripton, whose land market in the fourteenth century she characterized as dynamic and flexible (DeWindt, 1978: 145 and 150-151). On closer consideration, howeyer, the data concern transactions of no more than two parcels of some 0.5-1 hectare of land per year on average. In addition to sales, leases are included in this number. Unfortunately, no data are given on the total number of parcels or the size of the area, but it can be surmised - for instance by comparing these data with those for other parts of England or the Netherlands (see below) - that the King's Ripton land market was in fact not at all mobile or dynamic.

12 E.g. Moorman van Kappen, 1973: 8 and 10; Godding, 1987: 241-247 (nos. 428-438). For later medieval England, see Hoyle, 1995: 154-158, where the right of pre-emption by relatives seems to have been typical borough right. Derouet, 2001: 338-345 opposes treating re trait lignager as a right of pre-emption - as it is usually translated in English. See note 2.

28

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

At this point we shall limit ourselves either to calculations of the mobility of land in terms of its annual turnover on the market in a particular region, expressed as a percentage of the total area of cultivated land, or to data allowing us to calculate this turnover. Brought together here are all such calculations available for the North Sea area that we came across in the literature (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1

Annual turnover of land (percentage of total area sold per year)

locality/region

present-day country

type of land

annual turnover

Maintenon (Beauce) Janville (Beauce) Domfront (Normandy) Guelders river area

France France France Netherlands

all land all land all land all land

Zeeuws-Vlaanderen Neckarhausen (Swabia)

Netherlands all land Germany all land

Schbningen (Braunschweig) Redgrave (Suffolk) Martham (Norfolk) Slaidburn (Yorkshire)

Germany England England England

0.7% 1.2% 0.8% 0.9% 2.0% 1.6% 1.2% 1.4% 2.6% 0.1% l.7o/c c.1.6% 1.3% 1.4% 2.2% 2.1% 1.5% c.5 %

Lea Valley (Middlesex/Essex) England

all land customary land customary land copyhold

copyhold

period 1760-1789 1760-1789 1789-1815 1515-1518 1542-1557 1680-1847 1700-1709 1740-1749 1780-1789 1661-1808 1260-1320 c.1300 1520-1570 1570-1620 1620-1670 1670-1720 1720-1780 1528-1562

Sources: Van Bavel (2004) and the publications mentioned in the text below.

Let us first take a closer look at the data from the Netherlands. In the Guelders river area, where registration had become obligatory, aldermen's protocols from the sixteenth century provide a rather reliable insight into the mobility of the land that was sold in the land market. In the four subregions investigated, on average 0.9% of the total area was transferred in the market each year in the period 1515-1518, and 2.0% in the period 1542-1557. On average this is 1.5%, meaning that a parcel of land was sold in the market once every 67 years (van Bavel, 1999: 415-417). This figure is remarkably close to that for a later period, namely 1680-1847, for Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, the Dutch part of the Flemish polders: here, on average about 1.6% of the land was transferred on the land market every year (calculated from van Cruyningen, 2000: 22 and 65). There are also figures for early modem Germany, for instance for the Swabian village of Neckarhausen (which, although not in the North Sea area, has one of the few series available for comparison). The mobility of land in the land market increased here from 1.2% of the total area in 1700-1709 to 1.4% in 1740-1749 and to 2.6% in 1780-1789

29

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-I 9th century)

(Sabean, 1990: 355-370). In the district of Schoningen, in Braunschweig, which was investigated for the period 1661-1808, the mobility of land was very low: less than 0.1 % of the area was sold in the market each year (Achilles, 1965: 10-13). In this area, the lords had a strong influence, which apparently reduced mobility sharply, as did family restrictions. Fascinating data from the north-western part of France are provided by Beaur (e.g. this volume), who studied many thousands of land transfers, both outright sales and other 'consensual transfers', as well as the related cash and credit flows in several Norman villages in the decades before, during and after the French Revolution. His conclusion is that before the Revolution, 'land changed hands at a snail's pace'. In the main, the land market was sluggish, although very capricious, with large differences from place to place and from time to time (Beaur, this volume: 91-94). Even then, one can discern certain patterns: during the short-term subsistence crises, which were both severe and inveterate until into the eighteenth century, land markets became buyers' markets that were fed by impoverished peasants (cf. also Campbell, 1984: 110-120, for later medieval England). After the Revolution the land market in many places 'exploded', a phenomenon whose longer-term effects remain ill-studied. It is clear, however, that for decades the land market underwent 'heavy fluctuations'. Only after about 1850 did it 'doze off' again: the average annual turnover of land in Beaur's Norman villages is estimated at 0.9'7o for the century between 1859 and 1966. It would be nice to know how this figure relates to other regions of France. As we observed, calculations covering entire regions or village territories are completely absent for England for want of sources. The closest to our continental data are calculations made for parts of manors, or for specific types of land or sets of parcels within a manor. For instance, on the manor of Redgrave (north Suffolk) during the period 1260-1320, a parcel of customary land was sold in the market once every 60 years on average, that is, 1.7% of the total area of customary land per year (Smith, 1984: 153). On the manor of Martham (Norfolk) around 1300, customary land was sold every 50 to 70 years on average, which would amount to the same percentage of annual turnover (Campbell, 1980: esp. 186-187). For the manor of Slaidburn (Yorkshire), the turnover of copyhold land has been investigated for the period 1520-1780. In 1520-1620, on average 1.3% of the area was transferred by way of extra-familial transactions, rising to 2.2% in 1620-1720 and declining again to 1.5'/~ in 1720-1780 (French and Hoyle, 1999). Differences between the various types of land were strong, and particularly copyhold land was very mobile. This is a relevant observation with respect to the following example, a calculation relating to a manor in the Lea Valley, north of London: in the period 1528-1562, nearly 5% of the copyhold land of this manor was transferred each year (Glennie, 1988: 20). This extraordinarily high figure, however, is only partially indicative, and does not say anything about the mobility of other types of land in the same area. What is clear, though, is that in earlier periods the number of transfers of land in the same area was apparently very small; it increased strongly in the sixteenth century. What can we learn from all these figures? First of all, that there were marked regional differences in the mobility of land that was sold on the land market, with the annual

30

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

turnover varying from 0.1 to no less than 5% of the total area. Secondly, periods of high population pressure - such as the decades around 1300 and the middle of the sixteenth century - show a relatively high mobility. Apart from this chronological element, mobility in the late medieval land market seems to have been higher in the Netherlands and in parts of England than in Germany. For England, however, indicators are only very partial and concern particular manors or legal types of land that were relatively mobile, as is almost always stressed by the authors who wrote on England. More research on this theme is clearly needed; only then will we be able to attempt to construct a comprehensive explanation for the differences in land mobility. It is not difficult to see that the turnover of land on a lease market was much higher than it was on a sales market. A first indicator is provided by the nominal terms for which leases were concluded. Although these could differ widely, some patterns are discernible. In the fourteenth century, for example, the lifelong lease was still important, though short terms of one, three or six years were often used. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, however, the picture in most parts of the Netherlands became more uniform, with ten-year terms becoming predominant, for both arable and pasture land. From the middle of the sixteenth century onwards, we also come across terms of eight, six or even three years (van Bavel, 1999: 536-537), resulting in a reduction of lease terms to an average of less than eight years. This picture more or less corresponds to that for other parts of north-west Europe. Terms of five to ten years predominated especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; six- or nine-year terms were particularly common, probably in connection with three-course rotations, for instance in central France, Normandy, Flanders, Brabant and the Lower Rhine area (Bois, 1976: 219; Vandewalle, 1981: 26-27 and 44; Thoen, 1988: 361-363; Jansen, 1955: 91-92; and Reinicke, 1989: 127-131). Longer terms can be found in the county of Namur (9 to 27 years), the bishopric of Cologne (12 and 24 years) and particularly in large parts of England (21 years, and sometimes even more) (Genicot, 1974: 280-281; Reinicke, 1989: 127-131; and Cooper, 1985: 163 and 172).

However, in practice the length of leases could be longer as a result of the prolongation of the lease agreement. Moreover, in some regions there existed the practise of the silent re-letting (tacita reconductio) or after-letting of the tenancy. The tenant expected that the lease would be continued under the same conditions, without him having to seek the consent of the landowner (Kuys and Schoenmakers, 1981: 23-25, and de Smidt, 1954: 105-106 and 126-133). In Holland, tenants on short-term leases even claimed this right of re-leasing, and their claim was backed by customary law. In some cases, tenants even sold the right to re-leasing to third parties or made it an object of marriage or inheritance settlements. To remain in possession of a leasehold, ex-tenants often threatened or even attacked their successors, destroyed their crops or hurt their cattle. As a result, lease lands often remained in the hands of the same tenant, or his widow or son, for a long time. Such lands did not enter the market, and this of course led to a sharp decrease in their mobility. The same applies to many of the large tenant farms in Flanders and parts of France. Here, too, continuity was often strong and farms rarely entered the market. This was a result not so much of customary claims as of the personal relationship between tenants and landlords. Not only did many landlords use the leased farms as a kind of status symbol and a rural pleasure ground, where special rooms and horses were

31

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

reserved for them, but they also relied heavily on these large farms for the provisioning of food, and all this required a solid and personal relationship with the tenant (Thoen, 1988: 567-574; Moriceau and Postel-Vinay, 1992: 98-102). This situation contrasted sharply with that in many other parts of the Netherlands, where the mobility of lease land was very high, not only formally but also in practice. This was, for instance, the case in the Dutch river area and also in the adjacent northern parts of Brabant. There, in the fifteenth century, parcels of land were rarely let for a second time to the sitting tenant or his son (Jansen, 1955: 77-80). The landlord granted the lease to the highest bidder, regardless of the wishes or pretended rights of the previous tenant. This applied particularly in situations where land was let by public bidding. The mobility of lease land was further increased because of the application of the 'death breaks lease' and 'sale breaks lease' rules, whereas in Holland neither the sale of the land nor the death of the tenant or landlord was a reason for annulling the lease agreement. For these reasons, the mobility of lease land was much higher in the Dutch river area and northern Brabant, and in the county of Namur (Genicot, 1943: 283-285 and 292), than it was in Holland. In the early modem period there was one exception to the high mobility of lease land in the regions just mentioned, namely in relation to the emergence of large tenant farms. Despite the prevalence of short lease terms, these farms often remained in the hands of the same tenant or his offspring for longer periods, sometimes even for a century or more. However, this continuity was the result not of underhand renewal, silent re-letting or claims made by the tenant, but of the financial strength of these large tenants. In the competition for lease land they almost always outbid other interested parties and were the only ones able to guarantee payment of the high lease prices and the often huge entrance fees (van Bavel, 2001). However, in contrast to the situation in Flanders and in the parts of France mentioned above, competition for large farms remained real. Not only could parcels of such farms be leased out separately, but also the number of candidates for leasing large farms was relatively large as a consequence of strong socioeconomic polarization, from which a substantial number of wealthy tenant farmers emerged. At least lease land did come on the market in these regions. This applied even more so to these separate parcels of farms, which became the object of fierce competition and changed hands very often. In sum, markets for lease land were much more mobile and accessible than sales markets were, although in this respect too there were marked regional differences. In England, lease terms were much longer than they were elsewhere. In Flanders, the north of France and in Holland continuity in lease agreements was strong, as they were often renewed with the sitting tenant. In the Dutch river area and surrounding regions, the mobility of lease land was the highest. Here, as mentioned above, lease land entered the market on average every 6 to 10 years, whereas land was sold on average only once in 45 to 55 years.

32

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

VI. Landholding and social property relations It is self-evident that, whatever their type, transfers of land at all times were closely linked with structures of property and surplus extraction relations, as well as with the power relations that lay behind them. Such structural features determined who had access to and who had control over land, what types oflandholding and land tenure there were, who could transfer land and on what conditions. That is perhaps why there is an undertone of this larger topic of social property relations - defined as the di vision of the possession of land between various classes in a society - in most of the articles in this volume, even if their authors, as a result of deficient sources or even a total lack of them, do not present much tangible material to substantiate this vital link. Perhaps Gerard Beaur has come the farthest by showing how the connection between the crises de subsistence in Ancien Regime Normandy and the dynamics of village land markets was shaped (Beaur, this volume: 92-94). In villages where small landowners predominated, the land market was sensitive to crises and supply-oriented (in times of crisis many peasants were forced to sell land), while in villages with many large estates and large farms, it was demandoriented (in times of crisis there were only few emergency sales, but there were many purchases of land as soon as real income developed farnurably). In Beaur's Normandy, both these market-cum-property types existed next to each other within a limited geographical space.

One of the related themes many authors have touched upon is unfree status (or, in medieval and early modern terms, serfdom) and its effects on the mobility of land. Not surprisingly, the general idea is that the disappearance of serfdom had liberating effects on the buying and selling of land. From that point of view, a peasant land market must have developed and flourished much earlier in continental Europe than in England, where a manorial regime remained in existence long after it had disappeared from the continental parts of the North Sea area. Ironically, the primary sources to test this supposition are as poor and inadequate for the European continent as they are plentiful for England. Although it was clear even before Michael Postan's seminal paper on the carte nativorum that unfree tenants at least in the English context were allowed to buy and sell customary tenures, this happened relatively seldom.13 As Britnell (1993: 69) notes: 'the buying and selling of land was nowhere characteristic of village life. If it was unusual even for unmanorialized peasants to give or sell their property, it is improbable that more subordinate classes of countrymen would do so.'

It was only after the gradual dissolution of serfdom that sound conditions for buoyant trading in land were created as a result of a growing security of landholding and land tenure (Schofield, 2001:10-11; also Whittle, this volume: 240-241). This 'transformation' (Schofield) took place - again, ironically in a period of population depression, when land markets were not exactly booming. But the negative effects could now partly be offset by the structural changes in the economy and society. Particularly in urbanized areas the demand for rural land was stimulated by a certain eagerness of non-resident

13 Postan, l 973b; cf. Menant, 2003: 4-7, and Dyer, 2003: 2-3 on this paper. Cf. Feller, 2004: 30, for the buying and selling of land by slaves in early medieval Italy.

33

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

and non-peasants groups (gentlemen, clerics, townsmen) to invest in land, also in customary tenures. That the effect of changes in population size on land markets, the mobility of land, and farm sizes is not as straightforward as is sometimes assumed can also be observed for sixteenth-century England. In some regions renewed population growth with falling real wages induced engrossment, but in others smallholding persisted. One of the main elements playing a role in this divergence was the region's 'commercial potential of agriculture' (Whittle, this volume: 243). On the whole, accumulation tendencies were stronger in most regions, and in the English countryside a process of rapid proletarization took off. Around 1550, over 20% of all rural householders were landless, and this percentage would increase rapidly in the following decades (Whittle, this volume: 245). From that point on, the rural proletariat would become a lasting feature of the early modem and modem English countryside, a phenomenon further accentuated by the fact that the landless (farm labourers and small tradesmen) had only very limited access to common land (Shaw-Taylor, this volume). According to Whittle, who opposes Brenner on this point, those who profited most from this development were the successful larger tenants and yeomen. They, rather than the large landlords, were at the forefront of agrarian-capitalist development. Hoyle, who in his article takes up the same question, reveals some interesting details of the boxing match between lords and tenants by concentrating on conflicts over copyhold tenants felling timber and using underwood. The north-eastern parts of the North Sea area underwent a development that in many respects was the opposite of what happened in England and the Low Countries. In central and eastern Germany, the manorial regime (Gutsherrschaft) lingered and/or from the sixteenth century onwards made a comeback in a harsher guise than it had had before. In Denmark as well, many peasants lost their free status in the late fifteenth century, but despite some resemblance, on the whole the new Danish serfdom (vornedskab) contrasts favourably with both medieval English villeinage, and German (Prussian) and Polish Leibeigenschaft (Hybel, this volume). In any case, the enserfment of Danish peasants marked the endpoint of a drawn-out historical process that had started in the central Middle Ages with the predominance of small-scale, free peasant production, which was then supplanted by extensive large landownership, leading to a regime which in some respects foreshadowed the classical three-tired 'capitalist farming system' of early modem England. Noble estates in later medieval Denmark were usually leased out as a whole, while the farmers hired labour to work the land. However, even before the start of the early modem period this regime would virtually disappear and give way to peasant production on middle-sized farms, although now the peasants became legally tied to their lords, and had to pay taxes, unlike their noble masters. If this volume sheds light on shifting patterns of landholding and land tenure against the background of changes in property and surplus extraction relationships, this surely is the most remarkable witness. In the area of the present-day Netherlands, regional diversity in social property relations was enormous at the beginning of the early modem period, ranging from 80-90% of all cultivated land owned by peasants in Drenthe to 50-75% of all land owned by all kinds of non-peasant landlords in the Guelders river area (van Bavel, this volume: 135135, esp. Table 6.1). Van Bavel argues for the stability oflandownership structures over

34

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

the centuries, at least from the Middle Ages until well into the modern period. Although there were some strong changes in the exploitation of landownership, particularly as a result of the rise of the lease, the social distribution of landownership generally showed considerable stability (van Bavel, this volume: esp. 139-140). For the Dutch river area, van Bavel discusses seYen factors of 'possible mechanisms towards structural change' that failed to actuate, or to do so sufficiently, any structural changes in landownership structures. The same phenomenon is observed for Flanders by Thoen, who opposes the different 'social agro-systems' in coastal Flanders and inland Flanders (Thoen, this volume). The strong differences between these two regions, in which the social distribution of landownership and the power structures connected to it played a crucial role, remained in place for many centuries and became even more pronounced in the early modern period. It goes without saying that these sharply diverging social property relations in their turn had a profound influence on the access to land, the mobility of land and the nature of land markets. These elements also influenced the evolution of farm sizes. Already in the fourteenth century, the regions dominated by large landownership had an ample supply of lease land, since landlords gave out almost all of their land in shortterm lease in the decades around 1300. The existence of a competitive lease market combined with increasing possibilities for marketing in the growing towns of the Low Countries resulted in the rise of large tenant farms and an accumulation of land on the level of the land users. In the fifteenth-seventeenth centuries, these regions (e.g. coastal Frisia, the Dutch riv·er area) thus became characterized by engrossment, mainly by large tenant farmers. At the end of this process, large farms had become dominant in almost all of the coastal and river clay regions (cf. van Bavel, this volume, and Knottnerus, this volume). In inland regions, the situation was quite different. Although in most regions of the Netherlands there was a tendency towards moderate engrossment throughout the late medieval/early modern period, more recently small farms came to dominate Dutch agriculture. In 1950, on the eve of the last wave of modernization, the overall average size of farms in the Netherlands was 5.7 hectares; 66% of all farms had less than 5 hectares of land at their disposal (Douw, 1990: 40-41). This was the outcome of a drawn-out (but not synchronized) process that ran counter to the tendency just described. In those regions that were already dominated by small peasant-landownership, most of which were in the sandy, inland parts of the Netherlands, holdings were even further fragmented because very labour-intensive, horticulture-like branches of specialized agriculture on small-scale farms were viable thanks to self-exploitation by the peasant families who worked them (van Zanden, 1985: 28 and 326; for the sixteenth century: van Bavel, this volume: 144-145). A similar development can be observed in regions undergoing proto-industrialization, such as the rural textile regions of Twente and Noord-Brabant in the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries (Trompetter, 1997: 40-48 and 81-88). In the coastal regions, smallholding did not disappear entirely in the course of the specialization process, as sketched by de Vries (de Vries, 1974: Ch. 4). At first sight, this may seem paradoxical because part of the specialization process consisted in the enlargement of farms, but its obverse was a parallel increase in the number of smallholdings held by such groups as small, ultra-specialized farmers (see preceding point), as well as by non-agricultural occupational groups in villages (craftsmen and shopkeepers), who often held some land for small-scale, non-commercial agricultural activities on the side (cf. for England: Shaw-Taylor, this volume). Lastly, in some regions from

35

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

the late nineteenth century onwards there was a kind of 'deproletarization', viz. a development leading to the ownership of small plots of land by wage labourers in agriculture. This movement can be explained by the clear increase in real wages during the last decades of the nineteenth century, technical innovations working in favour of small producers (e.g. milk factories) and the foundation of agricultural co-ops, which reinforced the position of small producers on all kinds of markets (van Zanden, 1985: 331-337). In most parts of Belgium, the evolution of social property relations at the start of the modern period was mainly characterized by a double tendency of the increasing fragmentation of farms coupled with the expansion of leasehold. At the end of the line (i.e. in 1950), the average farm size was less than 1.9 hectares - or 6.8 hectares if mini-holdings ofless than 1 hectare are excluded. At that time no more than 33% of all agricultural land was cultivated by the owner, which means that two-thirds was used on a leasehold basis (Vanhaute, this volume: Table 3.2). With respect to the ownership-leasehold ratio, Vanhaute clearly demonstrates that the unmistakable shift towards leasehold had started at the beginning of the early modern period from a situation in which a considerable part of all agricultural land was still owned by the peasant occupiers (Vanhaute, this volume: 73-74: 50% in East-Flanders and up to 75% in the Land van Waas until into the eighteenth century). In its turn, this early modern situation was rooted in the central Middle Ages, as is demonstrated by Thoen (this volume, and his publications mentioned there). In a way, this structure of small peasant holdings was the legacy of the situation that emerged here already during the occupation of the region.

In inland Flanders, the rise of leasing was slow and protracted; it started in the thirteenth century but became dominant relatively late, mainly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Only then was the existing peasant structure of smallholdings, which dated back to the Middle Ages, finally broken. In other regions, such as coastal Flanders, this rise had taken place much earlier (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) and more rapidly. Here, a pattern emerged similar to the one that was discernible in such Dutch regions as the Guelders river area, Zeeland and Friesland (see above). Vanhaute and van Bavel, who analysed structural changes in inland Flanders and in the Guelders river area, respectively, came to different conclusions (not surprisingly, considering the totally different property relations within their research areas) as to the nature of these changes and the 'possible mechanisms' that triggered them. Whereas the latter proposes a positive correlation between large landownership and the 'emergence of large tenant farms' in an area of low population density (e.g. van Bavel, this volume: 140-141), the former connected the 'extreme parcelling out of (lease) land' in inland Flanders to competition between (generally relatively small) landowners (Vanhaute, this volume: 80). Evidently other factors were involved. Among them, the opportunities to produce for the market, although important, do not seem to have been determining. They were relatively strong in van Bavel's Guelders river area, which must have contributed to the creation of conditions for the accumulation of lease land from about the middle of the fifteenth to at least the end of the sixteenth century. But in Flanders the same opportunities were even greater, without however having a similar effect. So once again a basic dissimilarity in long-term social property relations seems to have been decisive, and may also have been responsible for the difference in the pace of change: a gradual rise of leasing in a peasant-dominated countryside (Flanders), and a swift and radical rise in a countryside dominated by large landowners (Dutch river area).

36

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

VII. Conclusions With respect to landholding, land tenure and land markets in the North Sea area during the late medieval and early modem period, several points stand out. To start with, there were three remarkable changes in dealing with land: first, the gradual establishment of clear-cut, exclusive property rights to land, protected by increasingly stronger public authorities; secondly, the expansion of more or less open and integrated land markets; and thirdly, the emergence of short-term land leasing. Each of these changes resulted in the increasing mobility of land. At the same time, they also accompanied the long-term evolution of new types of social polarization (more 'economic', less 'political') that gradually grew out of the transformation of the feudal social property structure. One of the main features of this evolution was the relative retreat of the peasant family subsistence holding (either held in free ownership or as villein tenement) in face of the emergence of a pattern of landholding characterized by a discrepancy between small numbers of larger, specialized farms and massive smallholding. From the perspective oflandholding and land transfers, various well-known key factors played a role in this transformation, namely population growth, the commercialization of the rural economy and the growth of markets, the transition of economy and society from feudalism to capitalism, and institutional innovation following the growing interference of the state. In the predominantly rural-agrarian societies of the North Sea area, the alternation of longer periods of demographic growth and decline was evidently related to the availability ofland (the land-labour ratio), although this relationship proves to be not nearly as clear-cut as it is sometimes presented. Apart from that, the cyclical nature of population and wage-price developments in the later medieval and early modem period meant that periodic variations in the available stock of land not necessarily resulted in structural and lasting changes in the distribution of landholding. What may have been more important in that respect, at least in the North Sea area, was the increasing commercialization of the rural economy, especially in those parts of our region that were characterized by strong urbanization and the presence of large towns. The growth of market demand provided commercial opportunities for successful farmers, which led to increasing social polarization and enhanced the monetization of obligations and economic relationships. Another important element in the rise of open land markets is the well-known socio-economic transition from feudalism to capitalism. Specific aspects of this transition are the disappearance of manorialism and its most destructive features from a market economic point of view, such as the virtual absence of market pressure in the distribution/redistribution of land and labour, arbitrariness in the fixation of levels of rent to be paid for holding land, and the use of extra-economic, 'political' force and pressure. The weakening and disappearance of these elements increased the security of landownership and enabled the rise of more exclusive property rights to land. The last element of this process to be mentioned is the growing influence of the state to the advantage of key institutions in the process of economic exchange, in particular markets. In many instances, such as the Netherlands, this kind of interference by public authorities was mainly positive, even it was induced by growing fiscal needs: private property rights to land were better protected by public law, facilities were created for the obligatory registration, as well as for the conveyance of immovable property, etc.

37

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

It cannot be stressed enough that in all the developments just outlined, even the North Sea area - which at first sight may look like a fairly homogeneous economic zone - experienced quite profound differences in the historical period considered here. In their turn, these differences appear to be connected to a large extent with specific social property and power structures of the area's subregions. For example, whereas the rise of clear property rights and an open and flexible land market occurred in the northern and western parts of the Low Countries already in the late Middle Ages, in some parts in the north of Germany this took until the eighteenth/nineteenth centuries. Such differences also existed between areas located close to each other, for instance between on the one hand Holland and the Guelders river area, and on the other hand the eastern parts of Guelders, which are only a few dozen kilometres apart. The elements that may explain such regional differences have already been mentioned. Of these elements, the set pattern of alternation of growth and decline that characterized the long-term demographic development of late medieval and early modern Europe is far too general to make it responsible for each and every change on the regional or subregional level. As we already suggested, what may have been more important was the process of commercialization, although in our part of Europe regional differences in this respect were smoothed down by the relatively large general influence of towns and urban markets. Therefore, the most decisive factors as far as accounting for regional differences as well as differences in time paths were the varying degree of capitalist development and the evolution of modern-type states and their institutions. The most progressive from that perspective were England and the Low Countries - ewn if some regions, such as inland Flanders and parts of the province of Overijssel in the Dutch Republic, were to retain feudal relics until into the nineteenth century. At the other extreme were northern Germany and Denmark, where open land markets emerged only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

However, by the nineteenth century all regions in the North Sea area were in more or less the same situation as regards landholding and land transfer. State interference, by way of influence on property rights, taxation and law, had now become forceful everywhere. As a result of this, differences between regions within one state became levelled out, as did - to a lesser extent but increasingly so - the differences between states. The second main element in the disappearance of the regional differences in this field was the transition from feudalism to capitalism, which had now been completed in all parts of the North Sea area. Although some differences remained, and still do, the result was a' north-west European' social and economic structure, which extended into landholding, land tenure and land markets, and was more homogeneous than it had ever been before. All parts of the North Sea area now shared clear property rights to land, a modern leasing system and relatively open land markets.

38

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area

Bibliography Abel, W. ( 1980) Agricultural fluctuations in Europe from the thirteenth to the twentieth centuries, London. [orig. German 1966] Achilles, W. (1965) Vermogensverhi:iltnisse braunschweigischer BauemhOfe im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart. Achilles, W. ( 1993) Deutsche Agrargeschichte im Zeitalter der Reformen und der lndustrialisierung, Stuttgart. Amalric, J.-P. (2004) 'La propriete de la terre dans l'Europe du sud (Italie, Midi de la France, Espagne): typologie, utilisation, marche', in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), fl mercato della terra, secc. XIII-XVIII. [Atti della 'Trentacinquesima Settimana di Studi', 5-9 maggio 2003], Prato, pp. 97-117. Asseldonk, M.M.P. van (2002) De Meierij van 's-Hertogenbosch. De evolutie van plaatselijk bestuur, bestuurlijke indeling en dorpsgrenzen, ca. 1200-1832, S.l. Bavel, B.J.P. Yan (1993) Goederenverwerving en goederenbeheer van de abdij Marienweerd ( 1129-1592), Hilversum. Bavel, B.J.P. van (1999) Transitie en continui'teit. De bezitsverhoudingen en de plattelands-economie in het westelijke gedeelte van het Gelderse rivierengebied, ca. 1300 ca. 1570, Hilversum. Bavel, B.J.P. van (2001) 'Elements in the transition of the rural economy. Factors contributing to the emergence oflarge farms in the Dutch river area (15th-16th centuries)', in: P. Hoppenbrouwers and J.L. van Zanden (eds.), Peasants into farmers? The transformation of rural economy and society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages-19th century) in light of the Brenner debate, Tumhout, pp. 179-201. (CORN Publication Series; 4). Bavel, B.J.P. van (2004) 'The land market in the North Sea Area in a comparative perspective, 13th-18th centuries', in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), Il mercato della terra, secc. XIIIXVIII. [Atti della 'Trentacinquesima Settimana di Studi', 5-9 maggio 2003], Prato, pp. 119-145. Bavel, B.J.P. van and Schofield, Ph. (eds) (2004), The emergence of short-term leasing in Western Europe, forthcoming. (CORN Publication Series; 10). Beaur, G. (1991) 'Le marche foncier eclate. Les modes de transmission du patrimoine sous l' Ancien Regime', Annales ESC, 46, pp. 189-203. Beaur, G. (1994) 'Foncier et credit dans les societes preindustrielles: des liens solides ou des chaines fragiles?', Annales ESC, 49, pp. 1411-1428. Beaur, G. (2004) 'Marches fanciers et rapports familiaux dans I' Europe du 18e siecle', in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), Il mercato della terra, secc. XIII-XVIII. [Atti della 'Trentacinquesima Settimana di Studi', 5-9 maggio 2003], Prato, pp. 985-1001. Blickle, P. (1981) Deutsche Untertanen: ein Widerspruch, Munich. Blickle, P. (1991) 'Kommunalismus: Begriffsbildung in heuristischer Absicht', in P. Blickle (ed.), Landgemeinde und Stadtgemeinde in Mitteleuropa, Munich, pp. 5-38. Bois, G. (1976) Crise dufeodalisme. Economie rurale et demographie en Normandie orientale du debut du 14e siecle au milieu du 16e siecle, Paris.

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Bodinier, B. (2004), 'Vente de biens nationaux et marche de la terre. Essai de comparaison europeenne', in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), 1l mercato della terra, secc. XIII-XVIII. [Atti della 'Trentacinquesima Settimana di Studi', 5-9 maggio 2003], Prato, pp. 271-314. Bouchard, G., Goy, J., and Head-Konig, A.-L. (eds) (1998) Necessites economiques et pratiques juridiques. Problemes de la transmission des exploitations agricoles, XVIIIe-XXe siecles, Rome. (Special of Melanges de !'Ecole Fram;;aise de Rome. Italie et Mediterranee; 110).

Bourin, M. and Wickham, Ch. (eds) (2003) Le marche de la terre auMoyenAge [papers presented at the Colloque International accueilli par la Fondation des Treilles, on 21-26 June 2003]. Pre-publication on website http://lamop.univ-parisl.fr/W3/Treilles. Brenner, R. ( 1985) 'The agrarian roots of European capitalism', in TH. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin (eds), The Brenner Debate. Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe, Cambridge etc., pp. 213-327. Britnell, R.H. (1993) The commercialization ofEnglish society, 1000-1500, Cambridge. Brunel, G. (2003) 'Le marche de la terre en France septentrionale et en Belgique. Esquisse historiographique', in M. Bourin and Ch. Wickham (eds), Le marche de la terre au Mayen Age, [12 pp.J. Brusse, P. ( 1999) Overleven door ondernemen. De agrarische geschiedenis van de OverBetuwe 1650-1850, Wageningen. Campbell, B.M.S. (1980) 'Population change and the genesis of common fields on a Norfolk manor', Economic History Review, 33, pp. 174-192. Campbell, B.M.S. (1984) 'Population pressure, inheritance and the land market in a fourteenth century peasant community', in R.M. Smith (ed.), Land, Kinship and LifeCycle, Cambridge, pp. 87-134. Cerutti, F.F.X. (1972) Hoofdstukken uit de Nederlandse rechtsgeschiedenis, Nijmegen. Cooper, J.P. (1985) 'In search of agrarian capitalism', in TH. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin (eds), The Brenner debate. Agrarian class structure and economic development in preindustrial Europe, Cambridge, pp. 138-191. [orig. 1978] Cruyningen, P.J. van (2000) Behoudend maar buigzaam. Boeren in West-Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, 1650-1850, Wageningen. Derouet, B. (1995) 'Territoire et parente. Pur une mise en perspective de la communaute rurale et des formes de reproduction familiale', Annales HSS, 50, pp. 645-686. Derouet, B. (2001) 'Parente et marche foncier al' epoque modeme: une reinterpretation', Annales HSS, 56, pp. 337-368. Dewald, J. (1996) The European Nobility, 1400-1800, Cambridge. DeWindt, A. (1978) 'A peasant land market and its participants: King's Ripton, 12801400', Midland History, 4, pp. 142-159. Douw, L. (1990) 'Meer door minder. Ontwikkelingen in de agrarische structuurna 1950', in A.L.G.M. Bauwens, M.N. de Groot and K.J. Poppe (eds), Agrarisch bestaan. Beschouwingen bi} vijftig jaar Landbouw-Economisch Instituut, Assen/Maastricht, pp. 35-53. Duby, G. (1968) Rural economy and country life in the medieval West, London. [orig. French 1962]

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Dyer, Ch. (2003) 'The peasant land market in medieval England', in M. Bourin and Ch. Wickham (eds), Le marche de la terre au Mayen Age, [11 pp.] Feller, L. (2004) 'Quelques problemes lies a l'etude du marche de la terre durant le Moyen Age', in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), fl mercato della terra, secc. XIII-XVIII. [Atti della 'Trenta-cinquesima Settimana di Studi', 5-9 maggio 2003], Prato, pp. 21-45. French, H.R. and Hoyle, R.W. (1999) 'The land market of a Pennine manor: Slaidbum, 1650-1780', Continuity & Change, 14, pp. 349-383. Genicot, L. (1974) L'economie rurale Namuroise au Bas Mayen Age, 1199-1429. l. La seigneurie fonciere, Lou vain. Genicot, L. (1982) L'economie rurale Namuroise au Bas Mayen Age, 1199-1429. Ill. Les hommes - le commun, Louvain/Brussels. Glennie, P. (1988) 'In search of agrarian capitalism: manorial land markets and the acquisition ofland in the Lea Valley c. 1450-c. 1560', Continuity & Change, 3, pp. 11-40. Godding, Ph. (1987) Le droit prive dans les Pays-Bas meridionaux du J2e au l 8e siecle, Brussels. Grapperhaus, F.H.M. (1989) Be lasting, vrijheid en eigendom. Hoe belastingheffing leidde tot meer zeggenschap voor burgers en meer eenheid tussen staten, 5Il-1787, Amsterdam. Hagen, W.W. (2002) Ordinary Prussians. Brandenburg Junkers and villagers, 15001840, Cambridge. Harvey, P.D.A. (1984) 'Introduction', in P.D.A. Harvey (ed.), The peasant land market in medieval England, Oxford, pp. 1-28. Harvey, P.D.A. (1996) 'The peasant land market in medieval England - and beyond', in: Z. Razi andR. Smith (eds.),Medieval society and the manor court, Oxford, pp. 392-407. Hatcher, J. (1981) 'English serfdom and villeinage: towards a reassessment', Past and Present, 90, pp. 3-39. Hatcher, J. and Bailey, M. (2001) Modelling the Middle Ages. The history and theory of England's economic development, Oxford. Hoppenbrouwers, P.C.M. (2004) 'Passing property under an egalitarian system. The case of the Land van Heusden (the Netherlands) in the late medieval and early modem period', in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), fl mercato della terra, secc. XIII-XVIII. [Atti della 'Trentacinquesima Settimana di Studi', 5-9 maggio 2003], Prato, pp. 951-977. Hoyle, R. (1990) 'Tenure and the land market in early modem England. Or a late contribution to the Brenner debate', Economic History Review 43, pp. 1-20. Hoyle, R.W. (1995) 'Debate: the land-family bond in England', Past & Present 146, pp. 151-173. Hyams, P.R. (1970) 'The origins of a peasant land market in England', Economic History Review, 23, pp. 18-31. Jansen, H.P.H. (1955) Landbouwpacht in Brabant in de veertiende en vijftiende eeuw, Assen. Kastner, D. (1997) Das Troisdoifer SchOffenbuch, Cologne. Ketelaar, F.C.J. (1985) 'Van pertinent register en ordentelijk protocol. Overdracht van onroerend goed in de tijd van de Republiek', in De levering van onroerend goed, spe-

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cial Ars notariatus, 32, pp. 39-56. King, E. (1973) Peterborough Abbey 1086-1310. A study in the land market, Cambridge. Kuys, J.A.E. and Schoenmakers, J.T. (1981) Landpachten in Holland, 1500-1650, Amsterdam. Levi, G. (1989) Le pouvoir au village. Histoire d'un exorciste dans le Piemont du XVlle siecle, Paris. Menant, F. (2003) 'La circulation d'un theme de recherche chez les medievistes de la fin du XXe siecle: le marche de la terre', in M. Bourin and Ch. Wickham (eds), Le marche de la terre au Mayen Age, [19 pp.] Miller, E. and Hatcher, J. (1978) Medieval England. Rural society and economic change 1086-1348, London/New York. Moor, M. de, Shaw-Taylor, L. and Warde, P. (eds) (2002) The management of common land in north west Europe, c.1500-1850, Tumhout. (CORN Publication Series; 8). Moorman van Kappen, 0. (1973) 'Met open buydel ende in baren gelde'. Enkele beschouwingen over het oud-vaderlandse familienaastingsrecht, Deventer. Moriceau, J. -M. and Postel-Vinay, G. (1992) F erme, entreprise,famille. Grande exploitation et changements agricoles: les Chartier, XV!Ie-X!Xe siecles, Paris. Morsel, J. (2003) "'Le marche de la terre" dans les regions de langue allemande ala fin du Moyen Age. Essai de bilan historiographiqu e', in M. Bourin and Ch. Wickham (eds), Le marche de la terre au Mayen Age, [19 pp.]. Neve, P.L. (1985) 'De oYerdracht van onroerend goed in de middeleeuwen', in De levering van onroerend goed, special Ars notariatus, 32, pp. 23-37. Noort, P.C. van den (1989 3) Jnleiding tot de algemene agrarische economie, Leiden/ Antwerp. North, D.C. (1991) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge. North, M. (2004) 'From land mobility to immobility. The emergence of the early modem manorial economy', in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), fl mercato della terra, secc. X/11-XVIII. [Atti della 'Trentacinquesim a Settimana di Studi', 5-9 maggio 2003], Prato, pp. 261-269. Opsommer, R (1995) 'Omme dat leengoed es thoochste dine van der weerelt'. Het leenrecht in Vlaanderen in de 14de en 15de eeuw, Brussels. Paping, R. ( 1995) Voor een handvol stuivers. Werken, verdienen en besteden: de levensstandaard van boeren, arbeiders en middenstanders op de Groninger klei, 1770-1860, Groningen. Postan, M.M. (1973a) 'The fifteenth century', in M.M. Postan, Essays on medieval agriculture and general problems of the medieval economy, Cambridge, pp. 41-48. [orig. 1939] Postan, M.M. (1973b) 'The charters of the villeins', in M.M. Postan, Essays on medieval agriculture and general problems of the medieval economy, Cambridge, pp. 107-149. [orig. 1960] Postan, M.M. ( 1975) The medieval economy and society. An economic history ofBritain in the Middle Ages, Harmondsworth . [orig. 1972] Priester, P.R. ( 1991) De economische ontwikkeling van de landbouw in Groningen, 18001910, Groningen/Wage ningen.

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Priester, P. (1998) Geschiedenis van de Zeeuwse landbouw circa 1600-1910, Wageningen. Reinicke, C. (1989) Agrarkonjunktur und technisch-organisatorische Innovationen auf dem Agrarsektor im Spiegel niederrheinischer Pachtvertrdge, 1200-1600. Rheinisches Archiv 123, Koln/Wien. Sabean, D.W. (1990) Property, production, and family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870, Cambridge. Schofield, P.R. (1997) 'Dearth, debt and the local land market in a late thirteenth-century village community', The Agricultural History Review, 45, pp. 1-17. Schofield, P.R. (2001) 'Extranei and the market for customary land on a Westminster Abbey manor in the fifteenth century', The Agricultural History Review, 49, pp. 1-16. Scholliers, E. and Daelemans, F. ( 1981) De conjunctuur van een dome in: Herzele, 14441752, Brussels. Servais, P. (1982) La rente constituee dans le ban de Herve au XV/Ile siecle, Brussels. Smidt, J.T. de (1954) Rechtsgewoonten. De gebruiken en plaatselijke gebruiken waamaar het burgerlijk wetboek verwijst, Amsterdam. Smith, R.M. (1984) 'Families and their land in an area of partible inheritance. Redgrave, Suffolk 1260-1320', in R.M. Smith (ed.), Land, kinship and life-cycle, Cambridge, pp. 135-195. Smith, R.M. (1998) 'The English peasantry, 1250-1650', in T. Scott (ed.), The peasantries of Europe from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries. London, pp. 339-371. Soens, T. and Thoen, E. (2004) 'Appauvrissement et endettement dans le monde rural. Etude comparative du credit dans les differents systemes agraires en Flandre au bas Moyen Age et au debut de l'Epoque Moderne', in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), Il mercato della terra, secc. XIII-XVIII. [Atti della 'Trentacinquesima Settimana di Studi', 5-9 maggio 2003], Prato, pp. 703-720. Thoen, E. (1988) Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen gedurende de late Middeleeuwen en het begin van de Modeme Tijden. Testregio: de kasselrijen van Oudenaarde en Aalst (eind l 3de-eerste helft l 6de eeuw ), 2 vols, Ghent. Trompetter, C. ( 1997) Agriculture, pro to-industry and Mennonite entrepreneurship. A history of the textile industries in Twente, 1600-1815, Amsterdam. Vandewalle, P. ( 1981) 'Het pachtkontrakt in westelijk Vlaanderen, 1550-1645. Een analytische studie', Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis 'Societe d'Emulation', 118, pp. 5-61. Vries, J. de (1974) The Dutch rural economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700, New Haven/ London. Weber, P.K. (1998) 'Organisation und Politik Iandlicher Gemeinden im nordlichen Rheinland vor 1800. Ein ortsgeschichtlicher Befund', in Gemeinde, Reformation und Widerstand, Tuebingen, pp. 57-67. Whittle, J. (1998) 'Individualism and the family-land bond: a reassessment ofland transfer patterns among the English peasantry', Past and Present, 160, pp. 25-63. Zanden, J.L. van (1985) De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw in de negentiende eeuw, 1800-1914, Wageningen.

43

PART I BELGIUM AND NORTH FRANCE

2

'Social agrosystems' as an economic concept to explain regional differences. An essay taking the former county of Flanders as an example (Middle Ages-19th century) 1 Erik THOEN, Ghent University

I.

Introduction: the 'social agrosystem' approach

There is an increasing tendency, both in England and on the continent, to focus on regional differences in agricultural development in the past (see Campbell, 2000; van Bavel, 1999 and 2002; Jessenne, 1999). Although regional analyses of preindustrial agrarian society date back to the beginnings of the Annales school, the boundaries used in these studies to define the areas taken into consideration were either purely political or purely pedological. In the 1980s, the concept of agrosystems or farm systems (French: agro-systemes, German: Betriebssysteme) was introduced (for a survey of the use and the history of these terms, see Bieleman, 1999). However, most existing definitions of these agrosystems are in our view too unsatisfactory to be of any practical use for comparative economic history, because they centre on just one part of the economic reality of peasant life, namely the technical production methods. The basis of the agrosystemic approach presented in this article is much more social; we therefore prefer to label our version of the agrosystem a 'social' agrosystem. In our definition, a social agrosystem is a rural production system based on the regionspecific social relations involved in the economic reproduction of a given geographical area. Social agrosystems in this particular sense were not stable at all, but underwent structural changes over time. A social agrosystem was built up with many qualifying and mutually influencing factors such as social relations, economic behaviour, etc. To a certain extent, possibilities for economic growth were determined by the interplay of all the elements, whereas differences in their features reflect regional differences in social agrosystems. The main difficulty with this kind of study is and always will be one of delineating, spatially and temporally, the objects of analysis. Such is possible only after a thorough study of a larger geographic area, the borders or which in turn have been chosen on the basis of existing studies. In the first part of our article, we shall give a short description of the determining factors of the social agrosystem. In the second part, we shall demonstrate the usefulness of the concept by employing it for a historical analysis of two regions within the former county of Flanders.

1 I am very grateful to my colleagues and friends Bas van Bavel and Peter Hoppenbrouwers for their fundamental support in writing this article.

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Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

II. The building blocks of social agrosystems The key elements of a social agrosystem are presented in Figure 2.1. Needless to say, the figure is meant as a model for description and analysis, and does not necessarily represent any concrete historical reality.

Figure 2.1 Key factors used to characterize regional social agrosystems

JJ Soil and environment* II soil and physical environment 21 the 'cultural' environment (private as well as public infrastructure)

IJJ Social property relations and power structures** II division of property rights and political power between lords and peasants (including access to commons) 21 division of property rights and political power within peasant communities

IIJJ Size of holdings (seen as an important indicator of the social division of wealth), and labour input*/** IV/ Labour relations and income strategies** II Labour organisation a/ free versus unfree labour bl labour relations between large and small holdings [cf. under III] cl importance of non-agricultural activities ('protoindustry') di labour productivity 21 Peasant or farm income in connection with commercialisation and access to markets 31 Capital input and non-economic surplus extraction by lords and/or the state 4/ Risk-reducing versus risk-increasing strategies 51 Family lifecycle strategies (and their demographic consequences) VI Agricultural technology* II Mixed versus specialised agriculture 21 Intensive versus extensive agriculture 31 Collective versus individual use of rural capital 4/ Technological complex and tradition VJJ Links with other agrosystemic areas*/** II via permanent migration of people 21 via temporary migration of labour 31 via diffusion of technology 4/ via supra-regional power structures, labour relations and market structures **=primary factors * = secondary factors

48

'Social agrosysterns' as an economic concept to explain regional differences

In principle, a fundamental change in any one of these elements can bring about changes in the agrosystem as a whole. In the context of this article, it is our intention to investigate the composite elements of social agrosystems as they can be illustrated on the basis of a double case-study. It is not our goal to search for prime agents of social change, or for combinations of such, in rural areas in general. Even so, we were obliged to try to discern 'primary factors' from 'secondary factors', 2 if only because we are going to concentrate on the interaction between the building blocks of the agrosystemic concept. From this exercise it will appear that some relationships are stronger than others. Although any such division between stronger and weaker factors is artificial, the resulting 'hierarchy' can be further refined only via in-depth regional case studies, such as the one we are going to present further on. Besides, not all combinations of features are likely to come about in the same social agrosystem; some are just more obvious than others - even independent of historical circumstances. For example, it is logical that extensive agriculture (V/2) almost always corresponds with larger farms and a specific labour system with a high labour productivity (III+ IV/I). In our model, primary importance is attributed to social property-relations and their connection to power structures. The extent to which peasants succeeded in acquiring or maintaining (factual if not legal) property rights to land was extremely important to the nature of the commercialisation of the rural economy, including the extension of land markets (Brenner, 1982). As the Flemish case proves, different property rights went along with different avenues to commercialisation. To explore this element, it is useful to resort to the old distinction between large landownership and the possession of jurisdictional rights the late medieval successor, so to speak, of the distinction between seigneurie fonciere and seigneurie banale applied to the post-Carolingian period. Especially (and this was less studied in the past) the relationship between these two forms of power determined the evolution of property rights (Thoen, 1988 vol.2: 1038ff.). To pursue this point only briefly, some authors have interpreted the loss of peasant property rights, often paralleled with the extension of leaseholding arrangements, as a catalyst for the emergence of a commercial attitude and a competitive, pre-capitalist spirit, whereas the persistence of small peasant property would have preserved an anticommercial 'survival' attitude (Brenner, 2001; for an elaborated example: van Bavel, 2001). Others have contested the value of such simple dichotomies. The evident solution is to confront these opposed views by studying regional land markets and property structures more carefully. A really competitive market for land or lease land is a precondition for a pre-capitalist attitude (Brenner, 2001). But at the same time it is important to recognise that such a market does not automatically spring from a growing practice to lease out land or from reductions of peasant smallholding. The comparative rural history of the North Sea area has brought to light enough mechanisms that blocked the development of a sufficiently large leasehold market to stimulate commercialisation, innovation and production maximisation. Another relevant point that is often overlooked concerns the size of large holdings. In our view, large holdings in medieval and early modern North West Europe had a certain maximum size (although it differed from region 2

See '-' * and

* in Figure 2.1.

49

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

to region) beyond which they could no longer be handled by their farmers, at least not without the intervention of the farmers' landlord. At a certain point, the risks simply became too big for farmers to bear without the input from well-to-do investors in the event of a calamity. Thus, if this input - or the intention to provide such if necessary was absent, the stimulus for farmers oflarge holdings to innovate was probably frustrated. As a result, engrossment often a side effect of a more commercial attitude - had its limits, even in a very competitive leasing market, and could from a certain point on actually restrict commercialisation. Only if engrossment was supported with extra input of capital by landlords, such as may have happened in eighteenth-century England, could a really capitalist agriculture further develop. Another much debated subject concerns labour input and labour organization in a peasant economy, as well as their influence on labour productivity, peasant family income strategies and investment behaviour. A typical concern of mediaevalists is the distinction between free and unfree, or servile, labour in legal terms, which evidently had an impact on labour costs, labour productivity and the functioning of a labour market. However, one should not forget that in addition one could distinguish dependent farm work (e.g. by daily paid journeymen or by living-in servants) and independent family labour on peasant smallholdings. The latter was often divided over both agricultural and nonagricultural (or 'protoindustrial') activities. There has been much discussion about this division and the nature of protoindustry in late medieval and early modem rural society. It will be evident that all such distinctions, just like any other aspects of labour organization in rural society, were to a certain extent determined by the proportion between large farms and smallholdings. For that reason, the collaboration in the matter of wage labour inpul and/or the hiring of living-in farm servants remains an important field of research. Additionally, large farms mostly- but not necessarily-had more 'capital' (horses, ploughing equipment, etc.), which was often available to the village via various exchange arrangements (e.g. temporary use of equipment in exchange for occasional labour).

As to the element of labour productivity, we want to stress that in our view increases in labour productivity were more important for economic development in preindustrial rural society than were increases in total factor productivity, 3 since the effects of the latter are less structural and more linked to temporary, cyclical economic developments. They are also more important than increases in physical productivity (yields per surface unit), because within the limits of prescientific agriculture, high yields were neither a sign of high agricultural development nor any guarantee of high market surpluses. The input, organization and, eventually, also the productivity of labour are closely connected to the income strategy of peasant households and their access to the markets. With regard to income strategy, the main opposition is that between market orientation (of 'farmers') and a subsistence-related survival strategy (of 'peasants') (Brenner, 2001; Thoen, 2001a). Nevertheless, historical literature abounds in misunderstandings in this respect. As we and others hme demonstrated elsewhere (Thoen, 2001a), and as we shall prove for Flanders in this paper, a clear and very common misunderstanding is to think 3

Often seen as more important in 'classic' economic studies: Campbell, 2000; Allen, 2003.

50

'Social agrosystems' as an economic concept to explain regional differences

that a survi.-al-oriented economy was isolated from the markets. Many peasants - and in many areas, the majority of them - also produced for the markets (in what we called a 'commercial peasant economy'). The market can have been part of the survival strategy. One of the major issues at stake here is whether the cash income from products or labour sold on the market was used for immediate consumption or for investment, and if the latter, whether it was productive or unproductive investment. One can speak of productive or 'capitalist' investment if such investment generates or pays for new technology, or leads to the permanent engrossment of a farm and/or to a larger average income of the farmer. If, on the other hand, investment serves no other goal than to maintain existing farming practice as well as average income level in the longer term, it is unproductive and not capitalist. 4 Of course, the problem is that the available historical data hardly, if ever, allow us to distinguish sharply the two kinds of investment, if only because farmers could easily switch from one form to the other in response to, for instance, new market conditions, changes in transaction costs, new forms of investments, changes in social property relations, etc. (cf. van Cruyningen, 2000a: 215 ff.). A further element to be studied carefully in the context of social agrosystems is the role of coercive measures, either in their economic form (e.g. rent collection) or in their extra-economic or political form (e.g. state taxation) (IV/3). The obvious importance of this element is interpreted quite differently by historical analysts. According to many, these burdens provoked peasants to change (e.g. the burdens stimulated productive investment) and pushed them to look for markets and for more land. Others are more pessimistic: in their opinion, surplus extraction discouraged change and investment in rural society. A similar difference of opinion exists with regard to capital put out by the propertied class - the 'rent investments' which may or may not have invited productive investments. Whichever side one is inclined to take, one will always have to reckon with substantial differences between one area and another, and between one period and another. A regional analysis (in the past, this element has been studied too much in the context of states) can probably place the impact of this factor in a broader context and in that way stress its real importance for economic development. The next point that deserves a brief comment concerns the importance of 'risks' (IV/4). Indeed, one of the major elements determining the production costs (including transaction costs) in a preindustrial society are the negative effects of risks inherent to a society in which ecological (including climatic) changes and destructions brought about by war were substantial. These risks were at least partly influenced or controlled by man. The evolution of social agrosystems can have had risk-reducing or risk-increasing consequences. The example of coastal Flanders will illustrate this quite clearly. With respect to the last key factor used to describe regional social agrosystems agricultural technology - we want to stress the following. First, it is our opinion that technology is a secondary and not a primary factor for explaining regional differences 4

Temporary engrossment was also often part of a 'family-lifecycle' strategy which in itself was part of a more encompassing peasant surviYal strategy. For that reason both land and credit markets were very active in peasant survival economies such as that of inland Flanders. See further the second part of this article.

51

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

(especially elaborated in Thoen, 2002). The technological level in agriculture follows from other factors that are more basically linked to income strategies. In relation to the same supposition, we want to underline a point that we have developed elsewhere in more detail, namely that a regional pattern of high physical productivity per hectare (and a high level of technique) is not necessarily the result of a prosperous, or of a capitalist-oriented, economy. Often it was the opposite: the high leYel of physical output was the result of a lot of unproductive labour input (and a low labour productivity). The case of inland Flanders is a clear example of this. Yet we believe that there is no contradiction between some kind of path dependency in the field of technical know-how on the one hand and a socioeconomic agrosystemic approach on the other hand. Although technical know-how can disappear when an agrosystem is changing, it is more likely that technical advantages are passed on to the changed system as long as they fit in with the economic needs of the system. For instance, when an intensive agricultural system is replaced by a more extensive system, the technical advantages of intensification may survive if they are able to increase productivity in the extensive system. Finally, it is clear that one should not necessarily study social agrosystems on their own, but rather, if possible, in comparison with others, certainly when they were integrated into larger market and labour systems, as was the case in Flanders. Such comparisons can lead to important insights into supra-regional complementariness, for instance in terms of migration of labour or of capital flows, or in terms of supra-regional market integration.

III. The two social agrosystems in the former county of Flanders In the following part of our article, the model of social agrosystems outlined above will be put to the test by considering the evolution of the two social agrosystems that can be distinguished within the former county of Flanders, namely that of the coastal area and that of 'inland' Flanders. Due to a lack of space, we cannot elaborate an indepth comparison between the two agrosystems. 5 In our analysis we will closely follow the order of key explanatory elements as presented in the model.

1. Soil conditions and physical environment The foremost environmental feature distinguishing the social agrosystem in coastal Flanders is the influence of the sea. Although it had a variety of influences, to a certain extent it was always threatening. From the High Middle Ages (and especially from the eleventh century) until into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the soils were increasingly composed of embanked (or re-embanked) heavy marine clays. Its reverse

Unless stated otherwise, most material for this paragraph is based on: Thoen, 1988a, 1988b, 1993, 1997, 1999, 200la, 200lb, 2002; Thoen and Vanhaute, 1999; Thoen and Soens, 2001, 2003, forthcoming; Dejongh and Thoen, 1999; Soens and Thoen, 2004.

5

52

'Social agrosystems' as an economic concept to explain regional differences

was the diminishing extent of peat lands and sea-influenced sandy soils - often depleted peat lands. Probably this was caused by a combination of anthropogenic intervention and natural disaster, such as the settling down of peat layers, the increased number of storm surges and the overexploitation of the natural dune barrier. There have been attempts to distinguish various successive 'waves' in the influence of the sea in the area from the Carolingian period, but there is no agreement about their exact chronology or their impact. However, what seems to be undeniable is that the human costs of protecting the area against the sea steadily rose during the twelfth and especially the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (see Thoen, 1999; Thoen and Soens, 2001; Augustyn, 1992). Overexploitation of the peat areas and of the dune barrier, and underinvestment due to the short-term profit-seeking mentality of the large landowners probably caused a rise in the costs of maintaining vulnerable dikes. As we will see below, the consequences for the peasants were considerable. Nevertheless, the infrastructure was of good quality and had been rationally developed around an extensive and ever-expanding network of canals, which were necessary for draining the area as well as for transport over water to regional markets. Inland Flanders has lighter sandy and sandy-loamy soils, which were not influenced in their formation by the sea. The larger part of the area was reclaimed more gradually and often at an earlier stage, and consequently within a different social and institutional setting. This had resulted in a less rational infrastructure. The physical environment was not a 'burden' on the peasants, except perhaps in relation to the growing shortage of firewood. 6 Although essential differences between the two areas existed from the beginning, the aforementioned burden of the physical environment increased from about the twelfth century onwards, especially in the coastal area. At that point, such institutions as the wateringen (water boards) became necessary in order to take care of draining problems in a collective way. The environment slowly began to require more and more human capital, and this disfavoured the smaller peasants, whose numbers seem to have been increasing before the second half of the thirteenth century. But, of course, this development was linked and possibly due to changes in social property and power relations. 2. Local wealth distribution: large and small holdings: the empirical changes Although data - and especially those related to the period before the end of the sixteenth century - are scarce, there is a striking opposite evolution of the size of holdings in our two regions. Around 1300, the difference was probably less outspoken than in it was in later centuries. On the eve of the late Middle Ages, peasant smallholders were dominant in both areas. However, in the coastal area there already must have been considerably more large holdings (including some giant ones) than there were in inland Flanders. But the gap was clearly widening after 1300. In the coastal region, the number of peasant landowners often freeholders - who, according to recent research, played a major part in the occupation of the salt marshes and peat bogs, was gradually decreasing

6

Leading to a majority of a bocage landscape (see Thoen and Soens, 2003)

53

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

(Soens and Thoen, 2004; Thoen and Soens, forthcoming). In some places this evolution had started as early as the late-thirteenth century, while elsewhere it took place after 1400 in particular. This can be observed, for instance, on a well-documented large demesne of the abbey of St Peters at Ghent, which was situated in western Zeeland Flanders. Here, between 1280 and 1375 a lot of smallholders leased small quantities of land: 40% leased less than 1 ha, and 83% less than 3 ha. In 1456, these percentages had already shrunk to 15 and 56%, respectively. A hundred years later, in 1561, only 44% leased less than 3 ha. At that point, the majority of those involved in agriculture already leased larger plots of land; for example, 20% leased as much as 15-49 ha. In the polders of Veurne in 1569, no less than 69% of the farmers had holdings of more than 10 ha (Vandewalle, 1986). As far as we can establish from the available sources, this slow but gradual concentration process continued until about 1750, although there were of course temporary setbacks resulting from local circumstances and from economic fluctuations (Daile, 1963: 43 ff.; van Cruyningen, 2000a). In inland Flanders the opposite evolution took place. Although some larger holdings were still emerging during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, especially as a result of the purchase policy of the bourgeoisie, the number of smallholdings was far larger. Here, the large number of peasant possessors laboured about half the total amount of cultivated land, and their holdings were continuously split up: the 1571 censuses of many villages in this area show that more than 70% of all holdings were smaller than 5 ha (van denAbbeele, 1985); only 12% were larger than 12 ha. Although at the end of the sixteenth century many farmsteads and holdings were temporarily deserted as a result of the wars of religion, the trend just described was not reversed after the sixteenth century. The subdivision of holdings continued, and even accelerated in the second half of the eighteenth century. In that period, even the larger holdings of the coqs du village tended to become smaller or to be split up, although they never completely disappeared. Two examples may illustrate this contrary evolution, which became more pronounced as the early modern period progressed. For example, in the Land van Aalst - a region in inland Flanders - 83 % of all holdings were smaller than 5 ha in 1571; at the end of the eighteenth century, this figure had increased to as much as 91 % (van Isterdael, 1988). On the other hand, in Groede - a village in coastal Zeeland Flanders - 14% of all holdings were larger than 50 ha cultivating 36% of the total acreage) in 1665, while by 1795 these percentages had increased to 26% and 51 %, respectively (van Cruyningen, 2000a: 100). Only de-urbanization and competition from Holland for dairy products in the eighteenth century eventually put a halt to this process of enlargement of farms in the coastal area. In sum: the almost opposite evolution of the size of the holdings in the two areas is a clear indication that the two social agrosystems were developing in divergent directions.

3. Social property relations and power structures Akey to explaining the opposite evolution described above is the divergent seigneurial influence in both areas. Of course, here 'seigneurial' is used in the broad sense of the word, namely to refer to all non-peasant individuals and institutions owning substantial amounts of land and/or capable of exercising some form of extra-economic (or political)

54

'Social agrosystems' as an economic concept to explain regional differences

power over the peasant population. It is easy to imagine that any changes in the type of lordship that prevailed in a certain region affected its social property relations. In our case, whereas in the coastal area there had been a clear decrease in peasant property rights to land since the late thirteenth century, in inland Flanders the same rights were better maintained, and were transferred to seigneurs at a much slower pace. This can be clearly demonstrated by the unequal diffusion of short-term leasing. In part of Zeeland Flanders (namely the area of the Oude Yevene, as this water management organization is called), the number of peasant landowners had fallen dramatically (i.e. by about 70%) between the end of the fourteenth century and 1550 (Thoen and Soens, forthcoming). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, most of the land was leased out (van Cruyningen, 2000a; Priester, 1998). 7 In short, in the later Middle Ages and throughout the sixteenth century, there was an unmistakable evolution towards a rural society in which leaseholding was predominant, and small peasant landowners were driven from their property, a situation which continued until finally large and middle-sized farms dominated this area. By then most peasants had been forced into leasing, and many had lost the property rights of their farmsteads - or had even been evicted from their farmsteads, which were gradually being absorbed by large farms. In inland Flanders, the situation was totally different. Here, from the late thirteenth century on, only the larger farms were leased out. Also, only part of these leases resulted from shifts from peasant property to leaseholding, since several of these large farms had been estates, run directly by their lordly owners. The number of large farms further increased between ca. 1250 and 1450, especially because townspeople who wanted to create large farms were purchasing small plots of land. This evolution did not continue, but came to an end in the fifteenth century. Although the leasing of smaller plots of land also occurred from the later Middle Ages onwards, mostly this was not a result of the 'expropriation' of peasants. Rather, this practice followed the reduction in size of large estates, and its aim was to provide, temporarily or permanently, a complement to peasant families' smallholdings -which, as we have seen, tended to become smaller by subdivision from about the end of the sixteenth century. Even if this process was reinforced by expropriations, many peasants in the area succeeded in keeping at least part of their farmstead in full property (Thoen, 1999). The highly contrastive evolution of property structures just described was certainly intensified by the already mentioned growing ecological pressure on the coastal area from the twelfth-thirteenth centuries onwards, with heavy financial consequences for its population - mischief from which inland Flanders was spared. Many peasants in the coastal area could not afford the increased maintenance costs of the infrastructure, let alone the costs of re-diking after storm surges. In the belt between the sea and the Scheldt, the increased number of storm surges meant that for many peasants it was impossible to contribute sufficiently to new embankments. This resulted in the eviction of numerous impoverished peasants. The application of the 'right of abandon' - by which the private property rights of insolvent peasants were automatically transferred to those

7

In eighteenth-century Zeeland, some large farmers could buy their previously leased farm anyway. Within the context of this article, we cannot deal with this phenomenon in detail.

55

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

who could bear these costs (namely the larger landowners) - enhanced engrossment and furthered the development of short-lease arrangements to the profit of the latter group. However, this was not just a case of the 'bankruptcy' or unintentional impoverishment of insolvent peasants: we are convinced that this evolution could happen only in combination with the application of different power relations in the area. As mentioned earlier, in order to explain different property rights a key role must be given to seigneurial power, namely to local lordship, which, according to the classical definition used especially in the French historiography, can be roughly divided into lordship rights dependent on large landownership, and lordship rights dependent on the possession of jurisdictional and other 'banal' rights (e.g. the right to tollage, to hold a market, to exploit a mill, etc.). Although local lordship in this double sense had lost much of its jagged edges by the end of the Middle Ages as a consequence of the evolution of state-like princely power, it remained a distinguishing factor that shaped the different fates of inland and coastal Flanders. Quite relevant in this respect is the different power base of lay lords and the count of Flanders in our two areas. In coastal Flanders, the count was able to keep intact the early medieval system of officials representing comital power on a local level (apart from our own studies, see Koch, 1952). For that reason, the power of the rare local lordships that emerged in this area during the high Middle Ages was limited, and many peasants enjoyed a completely free status. As a result of the same sustained local power of the counts, the large amount of waste land in the area - especially the vast tracts of peat land - could from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries on smoothly become the full property of the count, who subsequently sold these lands to private institutions (monasteries, hospitals, alms houses, etc.) and rich townspeople. Not only could the buyers in this way reinforce their position of power in the redistribution of income between lords and peasants, but it also opened up an easy avenue to raise their income, because there was no pressing power of local lords that could oppose them or nibble at their income. Contrary to the situation in inland Flanders, the interests of local administrative and judicial power were in accordance with the interests of the large private landlords. In short, the lordly 'collaboration' model of coastal Flanders favoured new structures of large landownership. Its corollary was the loss of property rights by numerous peasants who until that time had virtually - if not always nominally - owned their land. Many lost part of their rights by becoming peasant-fiefholders of either the count or a religious institution. In that case their loss was only partial because fiefs were hereditary and entrance fees were low. Much more dramatic was the effect of the aforementioned 'right of abandon', which had been applied in the area since at least the twelfth century. It caused the complete loss of property rights. This was clear proof of the effectiveness of the collaboration between the judicial power of the count and local lordly power based on the possession of land (and capital). Nothing of this sort happened in inland Flanders. There, a power struggle between the count, numerous secular and ecclesiastical local lords, and bourgeois investors precluded the harmonious coexistence of large landownership and the possession of jurisdictional rights (Thoen, 1993). It eventually furthered peasant property rights. Peasant

56

'Social agrosystems' as an economic concept to explain regional differences

freeholding was able to survive more easily and for much longer here than it could in coastal Flanders. 8 The pronounced differences in property rights accompanied the changing power structures within peasant society itself. In the coastal area only the more well-to-do farmers could survive in the longer term; a large percentage of the peasant smallholders disappeared. The power of the village elites became more and more economically based rather than based on their participation in local public administration. Initially, they exercised a certain measure of coercive power via the water boards (Dutch: watering en, waterschappen or wateringues), since all local landowners were represented in these boards according to the amount of land they possessed. After the beginning of the fifteenth century, they gradually lost this type of influence and power over other peasants to the advantage of the (non-peasant) large landowners (Soens, 2001). This was because the new class of large farmers were leaseholders who did not have property rights to the land they cultivated. One should also realize that wateringen may have been more important as channels of local power than were other local institutions, such as parishes, seigneuries, schoutheetdommen or bailiwicks. Therefore, the increasing dominance of non-resident large landowners in the water boards probably contributed much to the diminishing solidarity of the village communities, which was still so very prominent in the well-known insurrection of coastal Flanders of 1323-1328. 9 In inland Flanders, of course, such water boards did not exist. Nevertheless, a similar evolution took place in this area, with more or less the same consequences. Here, the extreme power competition gave rise to an institution that did as much to undermine village solidarity in inland Flanders as did the exclusion of local farmers from the wateringen in coastal Flanders. This institution was the bourgeoisie foraine, or buitenpoorterij in Dutch (literally 'external burghership'; the economic and political meaning of this institution has been elaborated in Thoen, 1988b). As from about 1250, it became possible for village people to acquire the status of townsman, and many peasants seized this opportunity. In some areas, as many as 40-50% of all villagers were buitenpoorters during the later Middle Ages. Of course, this institution could only thrive under the protection and even the encouragement of the count. It was born out of an alliance between the Flemish towns and the count, and was meant to curb the power of local lords in the countryside in favour of the towns. Only when the large towns, such as Ghent, Bruges and Ypres, in their turn became a threat to the princely power of the count did the latter withdraw this privilege, while at the same time further encouraging buitenpoorterij in the smaller towns, now in an attempt to counterbalance the power of the large towns by favouring 8

The specific power structure of inland Flanders, with its relatively large influence from the towns and real power of local lords, had another favourable effect: for a long time it was able to curb capital extraction by the state via taxes. Only from the late sixteenth century on did this new type of extraction start to become a pressing burden on Flemish peasant society. Franklin Mendels once attached a lot of importance to increased taxation in order to explain the further development of protoindustry in central (inland) Flanders, and he may have been quite right on this point (Mendels, 1975,1983). 9 Cf. TeBrake, 1993. We are preparing a new study on this major insurrection, in which we shall put it into its newly studied economic context.

57

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

the small ones. After that, the buitenpoorterij lost some of its importance, although it remained in existence until the end of the Ancien Regime. It probably continued to undermine the political coherence and internal solidarity of village communities. To conclude, in both inland and coastal Flanders, village communities were gradually based on purely economic relations, loosely connected to a small administrati\"e-judicial backbone.

4. Labour relations and labour organization; income strategies and levels of investment In both our areas labour organization was only to a lesser degree determined by the contrast between unfree and free labour. Since the high Middle Ages, free labour had been predominant everywhere (Verhulst, 1990). Of course, the relation between large and small holdings determined the labour organization the most. Since in both areas the distribution between large and small holdings was different and was evolving in a different way, labour relations were also divergent. In the coastal area, polarization created a growing class of full-time and resident farm labourers, who worked for most of their life on a large farm. In inland Flanders, part-time wage labour of non-resident workers was predominant, or if they lived-in on large farms, they did so only temporarily during a limited stage of their family lifecycle. In inland Flanders, wage labour generally provided only part of the peasant income because it was mostly combined with the Yery intensive cultivation of a smallholding, as well as with protoindustrial activity. The latter can be traced back to the thirteenth century and especially concerned linen processing, further growing in importance in the early modern period. In the eighteenth century, about half the population was inYolved in it in one way or another. Even large holdings prmided organizational support. But the interdependence of large farms and smallholdings in the same area was also influenced by labour relations related to the redistribution of capital. Indeed, larger holdings lent their capital, especially horses for ploughing, to the smaller ones in exchange for labour (Lambrecht 2002). Once again, the opposite evolution took place in coastal Flanders. There, protoindustrial activities or non-agricultural income strategies such as fishing and peat digging (and perhaps also salt making) were still very popular in the twelfth-fourteenth centuries, although they gradually lost their importance. Around the middle of the sixteenth century, most of the surface-level peat had been cut. There were also considerable losses as a result of storm surges. Finally, as farms grew larger and became more commercially oriented, they were less interested in non-agrarian subsidiary business. In sum, in inland Flanders the labour of small peasants and that performed on large farms were interwoven in a different way than they were in coastal Flanders. This also affected labour productivity. Although it is difficult to measure, it seems likely that labour productivity was higher on commercially oriented farms of middle and large size. This implies that from the later medieval period onwards, labour productivity must have been on the increase in the coastal area while it was decreasing in inland Flanders. There are indications of technical improvements with further labour-saving effects in Zeeland Flanders. On the other hand, labour productivity on peasant smallholdings probably was very low. We know how labour-unproductive the cultivation of flax and the processing of linen really were, and that much arable land was worked with the spade.

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'Social agrosystems' as an economic concept to explain regional differences

Elsewhere, we labelled the peasant economy of inland Flanders 'a commercial surYival economy' (Thoen, 200la). Since, as we mentioned, the size of peasant holdings was gradually declining due to the tendency of holdings to be split up in times of demographic growth, the peasants' first concern was survival. They therefore developed different survival strategies, such as a very intensive cultivation of the land resulting in a high physical output per acre, as well as a constant search for additional sources of income such as wage labour, the maintenance of symbiotic labour relations with large farms, the production for the market via protoindustrial activities, and the production of industrial base materials, such as vegetable dyes etc. But even then their first concern was not investment, sustainable engrossment (on the contrary) or competition (again on the contrary), but the survival of the family members. As we shall see below, this does not mean that these peasants were not interested in land (a common misunderstanding). In coastal Flanders, many features of a commercial survival economy were still present in the late Middle Ages. However, from that time on the peasants and farmers in this area clearly started to give up survival strategies. Peat digging, salt making and even the cultivation of madder as a cash crop all declined in the sixteenth century (Mertens 1981 ). 10 On the other hand, a more and more commercial attitude became apparent: specialization in grain, cattle raising and dairy production became the rule. As van Cruyningen has brilliantly described, there was fierce competition between the large farmers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and only the toughest survived (van Cruyningen 2000b). As far as we can see, investments by large landowners, even in the coastal area, were mostly limited; their profits far exceeded their reinvestments. In the coastal area, the short-term thinking of large landowners was to a large extent responsible for the disastrous impact of storm surges during the thirteenth-sixteenth centuries. Durable investments in the infrastructure were absent, although the necessity to make them became bigger as a consequence of changes in the physical environment. In reality, however, money was only put into the short-term maintenance of dikes and locks. Undoubtedly, this was partly because the water boards were dominated by the large landowners, most of whom did not live in 'threatened' areas and who in the long term could profit most from new embankments since they offered opportunities for the engrossment of estates. As far as we can see now (but further investigation is needed), only from the second half of the seventeenth century onwards did regular taxes for durable maintenance - and in its wake, increased interference from central authorities - become common. Immediately, the damage caused by storm surges became far less substantial, production recovered and production methods improved. In inland Flanders, peasant family strategies were evidently linked to the availability of land. As we have seen, peasant households in that area were interested primarily in survival. They therefore preferred a nuclear family strategy; that is, as soon as land was

w Later in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries, the production of madder became again common in Zeeland Flanders but probably with changed production methods on the larger farms (Priester, 1998)

59

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

available, children - many of whom had worked for a period as a domestic servant were pressed to start their own household, even if they had to be satisfied with a smaller holding than their parents had. The problem was that land in Flanders generally had been scarce and expensive since the thirteenth century. Therefore marriage and the creation of a new family often had to be postponed due to the lack of land in periods when death rates were low (and only a minimum amount of land became available in that way) and/or credit facilities were limited (and possibilities to get a loan to buy land were restrained). Consequently, a West European marriage pattern with relatively high ages at first marriage and relatively many people never marrying at all became established in inland Flanders only after the later Middle Ages. This improved the interrelation between larger farms and smallholdings in so far as it forced younger adolescents to hire themselves out as cheap in-living farmhands for a limited period of their life.11 In other words, the family lifecycle became an integral part of the survival strategy. This strategy, and the land hunger intrinsic to it, resulted in very dynamic land and credit markets. In certain periods of their lifecycle, peasant households bought as much land as they could, often on credit. This land was not meant to permanently engross the farmstead, but to provide the possibility to raise children, to pass on to them part of the holding (often officially only after the parents died) and to continue the survival strategy into old age. The most common type of credit in this part of Flanders the selling of annuities - presupposed the widespread peasant ownership of land (and capital), which acted as a form of security. In coastal Flanders, the tendency to protect the integrity of farms as business enterprises large enough to remain competitive in an open market economy meant that the age at first marriage was relativ-ely high from the start. 12 This tendency was reinforced by the prevailing leasing system, which also prevented farms from being split up. So although more research in this field is urgently needed, what emerges is a dual demographic system that, once again, separated coastal Flanders from inland Flanders. The duality in predominant family strategies also promoted the interplay of our two social agrosystems, as we shall see below.

5. Agricultural technology The comparison between the two areas with regard to agricultural technology is complicated. One would expect that the large holdings of coastal Flanders (and for the period under consideration, this means holdings that were further increasing in size) were cultivated in a more extensive way than were the typical smallholdings of inland Flanders. This holds true to a certain extent. In the crop rotation systems of coastal 11 However, in the preceding period (say from the beginning of the fourteenth century until into the first half of the sixteenth century) young people probably still could marry at a slightly earlier age because of the higher death rates. 12 This idea of a dual family strategy was developed by Bas van Bavel in a slightly different way but for a larger area (van Bavel, 2002). For the family strategies of peasants in general, see also Brenner 2000, who rightly focuses on the strategy to marry as early as possible. Specifically for Flanders, it nevertheless needs to be explained anyway why these inland-Flemish 'peasants' married late in the second half of the Old Regime.

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'Social agrosystems' as an economic concept to explain regional differences

Flanders, fallow still had a place as late as the late eighteenth century, by which time it had completely disappeared in inland Flanders (Dejongh and Thoen, 1999). But we should not stress the difference on this point. Even in coastal Flanders, fallowing had been restricted from at least the middle of the thirteenth century. Moreover, from about the same period on the growing of fodder crops was more popular in the coastal area than it was in inland Flanders. And in both areas the yields per hectare were high from at least around 1300: a hectare produced 1500-2000 litres of rye or wheat, and often even more in the coastal area with its naturally productive soils. Farms in that area focused on cash crops (such as wheat) and on cattle and dairy products. By contrast, in inland Flanders the 'survival-oriented' holdings, which generally were smaller, 13 grew a wider variety of crops, certainly also cash crops, such as dye plants, flax and hemp. The difference was in labour intensity. Cash crops grown in the coastal area (wheat; fodder crops, such as vetches, which were often consumed on the spot) clearly demanded less labour - as did cattle breeding, for that matter - than did most of the cash crops cultivated in inland Flanders. That probably is also the main reason why the production of madder declined in coastal Flanders with the increasing size of farms between the thirteenth and the sixteenth century. An apparent contradiction seems to be the fact that in the course of the fourteenth century more labour-saving tools were used, and perhaps even invented, in inland Flanders than in the coastal area. The most obvious example is the well-known Flemish reaping hook (Dutch: zicht or pik), which replaced the sickle for harvesting in the first decades of the fourteenth century, allowing the work to be performed much faster. The reason may be that the large farms in inland Flanders - which, as explained, were a necessary backup for the commercial survival economy of the smaller farms - employed wage earners from as early as the twelfth century, and were therefore driven to develop labour-saving technology. In coastal Flanders many larger farms had grown out of peasant smallholdings and were worked by resident servants, who were much cheaper. In addition, it is likely that the greater importance of cattle breeding in the area made it worth continuing to use the sickle (until the eighteenth or even the nineteenth century), because reaping with sickles left larger quantities of stubble in the fields with which to feed the large cattle herds. To conclude, in both our areas a kind of mixed farming was popular from the late thirteenth century onwards. But in each area the character of this mixed farming was different, and adapted to the different social agrosystems. This leaves the question why the agricultural technique in the coastal area was so "progressive". One answer may be that the commercial economy evolved from a survival-oriented peasant economy in which the impetus towards intensive agriculture was present, and that - given the quite rapid evolution towards a commercial economy in the fourteenth-sixteenth centuries many of these techniques continued to be applied, as far as they did not hamper the deployment of existing income strategies.

13 And although we have to be careful not to generalize the cultivation methods of all types and sizes of holdings; see: Thoen and Vanhaute, 2000.

61

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

6. The connections between the two social agrosystems In what ways were our two areas interconnected? This is not easy to establish. As some scarce data from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seem to reveal, there was a constant migration from the coastal area - where many sons of peasants did not have the chance to start a farm of their own - to inland Flanders. In turn, the coastal area attracted multitudes of seasonal workers from inland Flanders, who were needed during harYesting time. In this way, the two agrosystems supported each other's existence and evolution. This is only one way in which the two agrosystems were interrelated. Future research is needed to further refine the sketchy portrait of the two Flemish agrosystems we have tried to paint. For example, we could not expand on - let alone explain - the fact that within the coastal area the situation in the north (the Wester Scheldt area) differed in some respects from that in the west. Peasant smallholdings better survived in the early modern period in the former region than they did in the latter (compare e.g. Dalle and van de Walle with Priester and van Cruyningen). In inland Flanders, there was probably some difference between the southern part (the kasselrijen ('castellanies') of Courtray, Ypres and further to the south) and the northern part. In the south, the larger and middle-sized holdings managed to survive longer than they did in the north, probably because of the greater importance of fief-holding in the south (fiefs were allowed to be split up only in the seventeenth century). However, such secondary differences do not erode the general features of the agrosystems we distinguished. 14

IV. Tentative conclusions This article defends the usefulness of a regional approach to study economic and social phenomena in a preindustrial rural society. To that end, we designed a descriptive model the 'social agrosystem' - and used it to classify and unravel what in our view were the main elements determining social relations in the countryside of the late medieYal and early modern North Sea area. This made it possible to analyse and explain observed differences in demographic and economic behaviour in terms of different sets of social and political relations. For instance, the model forces us to try to connect agrotechnological deYelopment with such explanatory factors as labour relations, division of social property rights, constraints of physical environment, family or household strategies, etc. Such systemic connections have been studied either on the level of single rural communities (e.g. the English tradition of local history, namely the history of one parish or one manor, which nowadays is popular also in Germany, e.g. Sabean, 1990) or of larger geographical or political entities (e.g. the French Annales tradition). But in our experience neither works well and we prefer to depart from the intermediary level - that is, from regions of limited extent - which allows us to look across strictly local borders of parishes, seigneuries and manors, while keeping track of the interconnectedness of the basic elements of supra-local, regional social structure. 14 These nuances will be further elaborated in our book on the Flemish rural economy from the twelfth to the nineteenth century (in preparation).

62

'Social agrosystems' as an economic concept to explain regional differences

In the second part of this paper, we demonstrated the usefulness of this kind of systemic approach by elaborating a double and comparative case study of medieval and early modern Flanders. This clearly revealed two quite different social agrosystems which proved not to be static but, on the contrary, constantly evolving. Whereas the two systems still had features in common around 1300, after that they started to grow ever further apart and to change in opposite directions.

Bibliography Abbeele, H. van den ( 1985) De penningkohieren als sociaal-ekonomische en demografische bran. Het Land van Waas 1571, Ghent. Unpublished licentiate thesis Ghent University. Allen R.C. (2003) 'Progress and poverty in early modern Europe', The Economic History Review, LVI, No. 3, August, pp. 403-443. Augustyn, B. (1992) Zeespiegelrijzing, transgressiefasen en stormvloeden in maritiem Vlaanderen tot het einde van de XVlde eeuw: een landschappelijke, ecologische en klimatologische studie in historisch perspektief, Brussels, 2 vols. Bavel, B.J.P. van (1999) Transitie en continui'teit. De bezitsverhoudingen en de plattelandseconomie in het westelijk gedeelte van het Gelderse rivierengebied ca. 1300-ca.1570, Hilversum. Bavel, B.J.P. van (2001) 'Land, lease and agriculture: The transition of the rural economy in the Dutch River Area from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century', Past and Present, 172, pp. 3-43. Bavel, B.J.P. van (2002) 'People and land: rural population developments and property structures in the Low Countries, c. 1300-c. 1600', Continuity and Change, 17, May, pp. 9-38. Bieleman, Jan (1999) 'Farming system research as a guideline in agricultural history,' in B.J.P. van Bavel and E. Thoen (eds), Land productivity and agro-systems in the North Sea Area. Middle Ages-20th century. Elements for comparison, Turnhout, pp. 235-250. (CORN Publication Series; 2). Brenner R. (1982) 'The agrarian roots of European capitalism', Past and Present, 97, pp. 16-113. Brenner, R.P. (2001) 'The Low Countries in the transition to capitalism?', in P. Hoppenbrouwers and J.L. van Zanden (eds), Peasants into farmers? The transformation of rural economy and society in the Low Countries (middle ages-19th century) in light of the Brenner debate, Turnhout, pp. 275-338 (CORN Publication Series; 4). Campbell, B.M.S. (2000) English Seigniorial Agriculture 1250-1450, Cambridge. Cruyningen, P. van (2000a) Behoudend maar buigzaam: boeren in West-Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 1650-1850, Wageningen. (AAG Bijdragen; 40). Cruyningen, P. van (2000b) 'De koopman en de boer. De export van graan vanuit westelijk Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, 1648-1794', Nehalennia, afl. 126, 2000, pp. 32-41. Dalle, D. (1963) De bevolking van Veume-ambacht in de 17de en de 18de eeuw, Brussels. Dejongh, G. and Thoen, E. (1999) 'Arable productivity in Flanders and the former territory of Belgium in a long-term perspective (from the Middle Ages to the end of the

63

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th centur,)

Ancien Regime)', in B.J.P. van Bavel and E. Thoen (eds), Land productivity and agrosystems in the North Sea Area. Middle Ages-20th century. Elements for comparison, Tumhout, pp. 30-65. (CORN Publication Series; 2). Isterdael, H. van (1988) 'Landbouwstrukturen in het Land van Aalst (l 7e-18e eeuw)', Het Land van Aalst, 40, 5-6, pp. 269-308. Jessenne, J.-P. (1999) 'Agrosystems and rural change in Northern France, c.1750-c. l 850' in B.J.P. van Bavel and E. Thoen (eds), Land productivity and agro-systems in the North Sea Area. Middle Ages-20th century. Elements for comparison, Tumhout, pp. 251-270. (CORN Publication Series; 2). Koch, A.C.F. (1952) De rechterlijke organisatie van het graafschap Vlaanderen tot in de 13e eeuw, Antwerp. Lambrecht, T. (2002) Een grote hoeve in een klein dorp: relaties van arbeid en pacht op het Vlaamse platteland tijdens de 18de eeuw, Ghent. (Economie en ecologie; 1). Mendels, F. (1972) 'Proto-industrialization: The first phase of the industrial process', Journal of Economic History, 32, pp. 241-261. Mendels, F. (1975) 'Agriculture and peasant industry in eighteenth-century Flanders', in W.N. Parker and E.L. Jones (eds), European peasants and their markets, Princeton, pp. 179-204. Mendels, F. (1984) 'Des industries rurales a la protoindustrialisation: historique d'un changement de perspective', Annales E.S.C., 39, 5, pp. 977-1008. Mertens, J. (1981) 'De meekrapteelt in de omgeving van Brugge, vooral in de XIVe en XVe eeuw', Het Brugs Ommeland, 21, pp. 259 -282. Priester, P.R. (1998) Geschiedenis van de Zeeuwse landbouw circa 1600-1910, Wageningen. (AAG Bijdragen; 37). Sabean, D.W. (1990) Property, production, and family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870, Cambridge. (Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology; 73). Soens, T. (2001) 'Het waterschap en de mythe van de democratie in hetAncien Regime. Het Yoorbeeld van de Vlaamse Kustvlakte in de Late Middeleeuwen', Jaarboek voor Ecologische Geschiedenis, pp. 39-56. Soens, T. and Thoen, E. (2004) 'Appauvrissement et endettement dans le monde rural. Etude comparative du credit dans les differents systemes agraires en Flandreau bas Moyen Age et au debut de l'Epoque Moderne', in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), fl mercato della terra, secc. XIII-XVIII. [Atti della 'Trentacinquesima Settimana di Studi', 5-9 maggio 2003], Prato, pp. 703-720. TeBrake, W.H. ( 1993) A plague of insurrection. Popular politics and peasant revolt in Flanders, 1323-1328, Philadelphia. Thoen, E. (l 988a) Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen gedurende de late Middeleeuwen en het begin van de Moderne Tijden. Testregio: de kasselrijen van Oudenaarde en Aalst (eind 13de-eerste helft 16de eeuw ), 2 vols, Ghent. (Publikaties Belgisch Centrum voor Landelijke Geschiedenis; 90). Thoen, E. ( l 988b) 'Rechten en plichten van plattelanders als instrumenten van machtspolitieke strijd tussen adel, stedelijke burgerij en grafelijk gezag in het laat-Middeleeuwse Vlaanderen. Buitenpoorterij en mortemainrechten ten persoonlijken titel in de

64

'Social agrosystems' as an economic concept to explain regional differences

kasselrijen van Aalst en Oudenaarde vooral toegepast op de periode rond 1400', in Machtsstructuren in de plattelandsgemeenschappen in Belgie en aangrenzende gebieden (l 2de-l 9de eeuw ). Handelingen van het l 3de lnternationaal Colloquium Spa, 3-5 sept. 1986, Brussels, pp. 469-490 (Gemeentekrediet, Historische Uitgaven, reeks in-8°; 77). Thoen, E. (1993) 'The count, the countryside and the economic development of the towns in Flanders from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. Some provisional remarks and hypotheses', in E. Aerts, B. Henau [et al.] (eds), Studia Historica Oeconomica. Liber amicorum Herman Van der Wee, Louvain, pp. 259-278. Thoen, E. (1997) 'The birth of the "Flemish Husbandry": agricultural technology in medieval Flanders', in G. Astill and J. Langdon (eds), Medieval farming and technology: the impact of agricultural change in Northwest Europe, Leiden, pp. 69-88. Thoen, E. (1999) 'De twee gezichten van de Vlaamse landbouw en het probleem der 'Wiistungen'. Middeleeuwen-Modeme Tijden', in Docendo discimus. Liber Amicorum Romain Van Eenoo, Ghent, pp. 75-84. Thoen, E. (2001 a) 'A "commercial survival economy" in evolution. The Flemish countryside and the transition to capitalism (Middle Ages-19th century)', in P. Hoppenbrouwers and J .L. van Zan den (eds), Peasants into farmers? The trans!ormation of rural economy and society in the Low Countries (middle ages-19th century) in light of the Brenner debate, Tumhout, pp. 102-157 (CORN Publication Series; 4). Thoen, E. (2001 b) 'Waterschappen en de maatschappelijke en ecologische transformatie van de kustvlakte in de Middeleeuwen en het Ancien Regime. Bedenkingen en onderzoeksmogelijkheden', in E. Huys and M. Vandermaesen (eds), Polders en Wateringen. Studiedag georganiseerd te Damme op 19 mei 2000, Brussels, pp. 111-134. (Algemeen Rijksarchief en Rijksarchief in de Provincien, Miscellanea Archivistica. Studia; 139). Thoen, E. (2002) 'Transitie en economische ontwikkeling in de Nederlanden met de nadruk op de agrarische maatschappij', Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 28, 2002, 2, pp. 147-174. Thoen, E. and Soens, T. (2001) 'Van landschapsgeschiedenis naar ecologische geschiedenis. Waterbeheer in de Vlaamse kustvlakte in de Late Middeleeuwen en het Ancien Regime', Jaarboek voor Ecologische Geschiedenis, pp. 1-24. Thoen, E. and Soens, T. (2003) 'Energy: Tensions between ecology and economy in Flanders before 1800', Dealing with Diversity, Prague, 3-7 September 2003. Unpublished paper presented at the conference of the International Society for Environmental History. Thoen, E. and Soens, T. (forthcoming) 'The origins of leaseholding in the former county of Flanders', in B. van Bavel and Ph. Schofield (eds), The origin and early development of leaseholding in Europe, Tumhout. (CORN Publication Series). Thoen, E. and Vanhaute, E. (1999) 'The 'Flemish Husbandry' at the edge: farming system on small holdings in the middle of the 19th century', in B.J.P. van Bavel and E. Thoen (eds), Land productivity and agro-systems in the North Sea Area. Middle Ages-20th century. Elements for comparison, Tumhout, pp. 271-296. (CORN Publication Series; 2). Vandewalle, P. ( 1986) De Geschiedenis van de Landbouw in de kasselrij Veurne ( 15501645 ), Brussels. (Gemeentekrediet van Belgie, Pro Civitate, Historische Uitgaven, reeks in-8°; 86). Verhulst, A. (1990) Precis d' histoire rurale de la Belgique, Brussels.

65

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

Verstockt, A. (1998) Conjunctuurstudie van een domein in de late middeleeuwen. Het West-Zeeuws-Vlaams domein van de Gentse Sint-Pietersabdij in Oostburg Ambacht aan de hand van pachtprijzen, Ghent. Unpublished licentiate thesis Ghent University.

66

3 Ricardo in Flanders. Landlords and tenants in Flemish agriculture in the 18th and 19th centuries Eric VANHAUTE, Ghent University Thus, the landowners actually reap all the benefits resulting from the progress made by the entire community in various fields. (E. de Laveleye, 1881: 467)

Until the early twentieth century, the distribution of landed property in Flemish agriculture was characterised by three trends: fragmentation of the land, expansion of leasehold farms and increased land rent prices (Vanhaute, 1993). The question to be dealt with in this article concerns the relation between these trends, and more specifically, whether a pattern can be discerned which enables us to explain the shifts in the distribution of property in the course of the 'long nineteenth century'. I shall examine successively the main shifts in the distribution of property, the ownership of land, the prices of land, the yields, and the profit rates of land. I shall focus on a typical Flemish pattern of surplus extraction, in which the fragmented use of land is coupled with the fragmented ownership of land. 1

I.

The fragmentation of agricultural land

About 1900, the English sociologist avant la lettre B.H. Seebohm Rowntree described Belgium as un pays de petites exploitations ('a country of smallholdings') (Seebohm Rowntree, 1910). He had calculated the average farm size in Belgium to be 2.3 hectares, which meant that Belgium did indeed lag behind significantly in comparison with other Western European countries (fourteen hectares in Denmark, twelve in Great Britain, six in France). If mini-farms smaller than 40 ares were not taken into account, the area of land cultivated on a typical farm in Great Britain rose to 26 hectares, in Denmark twenty, in Germany fourteen, in France ten and in Belgium a mere six. While in Belgium holdings smaller than twenty hectares accounted for two-thirds of the agricultural area, in England they accounted for a mere fifteen percent. It was no coincidence that during the decades before and after the tum of the century, smallholdings in Belgium were the subject of an ideologically coloured debate: c 'est une garantie pour le maintien de l 'ordre social actuel ('It guarantees the maintenance of the established social order') (de Laveleye, 1878. See also Vandervelde, 1902 and Seebohm Rowntree [1910]).

1

Flanders means here the Flemish speaking, northern part of Belgium. East-Flanders and WestFlanders are two of the provinces in Flanders, and Inner-Flanders is the textile-producing region that covered most of the provinces of East-Flanders and West-Flanders. The typical 'Flemish' case refers in particular to the latter region.

67

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

Seebohm Rowntree's observation was made on the eve of an historical turning point. After an age-long trend of parcelling out farm land, the number of farms started to decrease again from the 1930s onwards.

Figure 3.1 Flanders (the modern federal state) and its regions

D

Polders Inner Flanders - Loamy

~ Campine area ~ Land van Waas

[ {J j

Inner Flanders - Sandy

-

-

0

b--: --

50 ====r== -

- -

.j

km

Urbanised areas

As the figures in Table 3.2 in Annex show, two out of three households, including the urban population, at least partially depended on an agrarian income in the middle of the nineteenth century. However, more than half of the farms were smaller than one hectare, which is significantly below the survival minimum. As an illustration, in 1850 between a quarter and one-third of all Belgian households were able to live on an agrarian income. Fewer than ten percent of farms cultivated more than ten hectares, and only eight per mil had more than 50 hectares. The latter, large holdings accounted for sixteen percent of the farm land, whereas the hundreds of thousands of mini-farms accounted for only four percent. A second characteristic of nineteenth-century Belgian agriculture was the dominance of leaseholds: only a third of the cultivated land was held as freehold property. Mini-farms especially were being leased out, whereas in relative terms the middle-sized group (one to ten hectares) accounted for the highest number of property holders. Land-parcelling took place most intensively in Inner-Flanders (the textile region between Gent, Kortrijk and Aalst). Farms with more than twenty hectares were almost completely absent from this region. However, such farms did occur in the coastal area (polders) and in the Campine region, which resulted in somewhat lower figures for the mini-farms there. The figures of the first national agrarian statistics of 1846 provide a snapshot of a development which started in the late Middle Ages, but continued and even accelerated as late as the second half of the nineteenth century (Thoen, 2001). This trend is confirmed by existing village-level micro studies for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as

68

Ricardo in Flanders

summarised in Table 3.1 in Annex. Throughout the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, there was a further increase in the number of small farms and leaseholds in the various Flemish regions. Because this increase was most noticeable in terms of percentages - in areas which traditionally had a lot of freehold farms and property, regional differences became less important in the course of the nineteenth century. Between the middle of the nineteenth century and the crisis of the 1930s, the total number of farms doubled. This was exclusively the consequence of a spectacular growth in the number of mini-farms of less than a hectare, which in 1929 accounted for 75 percent of all holdings. In absolute figures, the middle group remained strikingly stable, as evidenced by the average size (about 6.5 hectares). The number of large holdings was halved. Nevertheless, the share of agriculture in household incomes decreased further, as could be expected. Until the middle of the twentieth century, half of all Belgian families cultivated a piece of land, although only ten to fifteen percent were able to earn a livelihood from it (cf. Table 3.2, nos. 1 and 2).

69

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages- 19th century)

II. The tenure of the land Until 1900 the share of property decreased; leasehold was gaining importance even further. More than half of all farms were fully leased, as were as many as two-thirds of the mini-farms.

Figure 3.2 Share of leaseholding in Belgium, 1850-1950 100% 90%

80% 70%

60% 50%

40% 30%

20% 10%

0%

1846

1866 •

1895

1910

% leasehold land

D

1929

1950

% leaseholds

The turnover after World War I was significant, primarily in the same category of small part-time farms (cf. Table 3.2). These played an ever-decreasing role in rural income, but kept their importance as the allotment gardens of the commuting working classes and employees. The cross-section of 1950 shows that the importance of agriculture as a main source of income (maximum ten percent of the households) and as an additional source of income (maximum 35 percent of the households) was decreasing. The mixed, market-oriented family farm (which in 1950 had at its disposal an average of seven hectares of farm land) became the standard type of farm in the 1950s and 1960s. The size of this type of farm continued to increase, be it at the expense of land held in property, especially on the larger farms .

70

Ricardo in Flanders

Figure 3.3 Share of leaseholds in Flanders in 1846

D go%

0

km

71

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

Figure 3.5 Share of leaseholds in Flanders in 1895

[ _ _]


o·'-' ' : \

(,0

'

OVERSTICHT c (PrinceBishopric : . --- '

0

_ NEDER~TICHT .,,

,;;i"' ..P (

o -.,.·

,r f- u ·~~ , ,-

~

_.!

"~i§

~ .· ~----

R~

FRISIA

I

rv;;--._ ,.... ' \\ ~ '/

:'J'

~'="'

-. ,

'

_,

,'

~ - ;'. _ ~ I

, ;_; l./'"'\.,

L

\ _,.:

Border Kingdom of France - Holy Roman Empire Town ofSaint-Truiden and its surroundings II

102

Northern possessions in the lower Meuse area (Aalburg and Alem manors)

I

(

0

~- -., 35 ha total percentage total number

(a)

(b)

50% 22% 14% 14%

390 13% 28% 56o/c

100% 891

100% 891

Source: Brusse, 1999: 48-53.

me suspect that these developments took place as early as the fifteenth/sixteenth century. The same goes for the sea clay regions in Friesland, where lease land was amply available. In Ferwerderadeel and Leeuwarderadeel, farms with more than 15 hectares had become dominant as early as 1511. This certainly applies to the proportion of the land they cultivated, but even in absolute numbers these farms were almost in the majority, as is shown by Table 6.6 below. Table 6.6

Distribution of farms in Leeuwarderadeel and Ferwerderadeel by size, 1511

Leeuwarderadeel

Ferwerderadeel

1-5 ha 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30 30-40 >40ha

12% 13% 23% 20% 23% 5% 3%

16o/c 18% 19% 16% 22% 6% 4%

total percentage total number

99% 473

101% 365

Source: de Boer, 1907.

In all these regions, a strong process of accumulation of land on the level of land use can be observed during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a process which was connected primarily with the social distribution oflandownership, and secondarily with the possibilities for market specialization. In the course of this process, access to land became increasingly restricted to a small group of wealthy tenant farmers. On the other hand, in regions dominated by small-scale peasant landownership and/or with few possibilities for market specialization, such a trend towards the enlargement of farm sizes did not occur. Here, the connection between average farm sizes and demographic developments stayed intact, with an inherent tendency towards population growth and

143

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

the fragmentation of farms (van Bavel, 2002). If a region was dominated by peasant landownership and had ample possibilities for market orientation - for example, as a result of favourable market structures and a location close to large markets - these possibilities strengthened the tendency towards fragmentation, enabling ever smaller farms to survive (Thoen, 2001 and van Bavel, 200la). This situation can be found above all in fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Holland, as can be exemplified for the northern part of Holland, and also for the Gooi to the south-east of Amsterdam, regions characterized by peasant landownership and situated close to large population centres. Most farms here were small, and some were even dwarfish, ranging from only a half to four hectares (de Vries, 197 4: 63-67; Janse, 1992). In these regions a relatively large part of the land users had direct access to land by way of their landownership, but their holdings were very small. Precise figures from around the middle of the sixteenth century are available for the following villages in the northern part of Holland:

Table 6.7

Distribution of rural households by farm size in various villages in the northern part of Holland around the middle of the 16th century

no land < 1 ha 1-4 ha 4-9 ha 9-13 ha 13-17 ha >17 ha total percentage number

no land < 1.75 ha 1.75 -3 ha 3-7 ha > 7 ha total percentage number

Twisk

Opmeer

Beets

Broek

13% 8% 42% 23% 11 % 3% 0%

0% 24% 46% 14% 8% 5% 2%

16% 0% 43% 37% 3% 0% 0%

0% 24% 63% 13%

100% 91

99% 102

99% 86

100% 54

Landsmeer

Zunderdorp

Broek

Ransdorp

11% 18% 56% 14% 1%

24% 16% 45% 14% 1%

0% 0% 46% 43% 11%

9% 21% 31% 37% 2%

100% 137

100% 123

100% 70

100% 248

oo,o

0% 0%

Calculated or copied from de Vries, 1974: 66; van Gelder, 1953: 15-16 and Janse, 1980. The same situation can be observed in the Land van Heusden, in the south-eastern part of the county of Holland. Also in this region, which was also dominated by peasant landownership (though to a lesser extent), farms were mainly small; this applies to both tenant farms and mixed farms, but especially to farms in full property (Hoppenbrouwers, 1992: 433-436 and 820-830). The fragmentation of farms was less outspoken than in,

144

Structures of landownership, mobility of land and farm sizes

for example, the northern part of Holland. This was probably due to fewer possibilities for successful market specialization, but the overall tendency is clear. Although Holland was situated close to large population centres, in a part of Western Europe where market forces must have been relatively very strong, no tendency towards the rise of large farms can be observed during the late medieval period. On the contrary, during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries the countryside of Holland, which was mainly dominated by peasant ownership, seems to have taken the route of population growth, fragmentation of farms and labour-intensive agriculture. However, this development was halted, as discussed above, by the fundamental change in the structure of landownership from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards in the southern, most urbanized parts, and by the new pattern of land ownership in the newly reclaimed polders. This new situation resulted in the rise of large landownership, a strong increase in the availability of lease land, the emergence of large tenant farms, and the development of agrarian capitalism during the late sixteenth and the seventeenth century. This was an exceptional transformation, and it accounts for so~e of the peculiarities of the economic development of Holland as it headed towards its Golden Age. Other parts of the Netherlands did not witness a comparable rift in property structures during the late medieval or the early modern period. There, the structure of landownership inherited from the period of occupation of the region was still unbroken, and in its turn this structure codetermined the possibilities for the development of agrarian capitalism.

IV. Conclusion In this article I have tried to show how access to land was to a large extent determined by structures of landownership: directly by way of the share of land available to the various social groups, and indirectly- but even more importantly- by way of its influence on the development of farm sizes and of the rural economy in general. In the Netherlands, these developments appear to have operated mainly at a regional level, with the regions in question being a few thousand km2 in size and characterized by homogeneous soil conditions and a specific occupation history. Differences in landownership structure between these regions were very strong. These differences were not the outcome of processes active during the late medieval or early modern period, but were rooted in the period of occupation. Structures of landownership - or in other words, the division of rights to land among the various social groups show strong stability over the centuries from the period of occupation onwards, despite changes in the expression of these rights. In their turn, these strongly differing ownership structures to a large extent determined developments in the fields of leasing and farm sizes. In the course of the period under consideration ( 1300-1650) these developments were dramatic in most of the Netherlands, with two diverging routes. First, in the regions dominated by peasant landownership there was a strong fragmentation of farms, with a large part of the population having access to a family holding, but with holding sizes becoming increasingly smaller. In regions dominated by large landownership, on the other hand, the users of the land were almost completely dependent on the lease market, a market which was increasingly dominated by a small group of wealthy tenant farmers accumulating ever larger tenancies, and thereby limiting the access to land for large parts of the rural population.

145

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

Bibliography Baars, C. (1973) De geschiedenis van de landbouw in de Beijerlanden, 2 vols, Wageningen. Bavel, B.J.P. van (1999) Transitie en continui"teit. De bezitsverhoudingen en de plattelands-economie in het westelijke gedeelte van het Gelderse rivierengebied, ca. 1300 - ca. 1570, Hilversum. Bavel, B.J.P. van (2001a) 'Elements in the transition of the rural economy: Factors contributing to the emergence of large farms in the Dutch river area (15th-16th centuries)', in P. Hoppenbrouwers andJ.L. vanZanden (eds), Peasants into farmers? The transformation of rural economy and society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages-19th century) in light of the Brenner debate, Tumhout, pp. 179-201. (CORN Publication Series; 4). Bavel, B .J.P. van (2001 b) 'Land, lease and agriculture. The transition of the rural economy in the Dutch river area from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century', Past & Present, 172,pp.3-43. Bavel, B.J.P. van (2002) 'People and land: Rural population developments and property structures in the Low Countries, c. 1300- c. 1600', Continuity & Change, 17, pp. 9-37. Bavel, B.J.P. van (2003) 'Early proto-industrialization in the Low Countries? The importance and nature of market-oriented non-agricultural activities in the countryside in Flanders and Holland, c. 1250 1570', Revue Beige de Philologie et d'Histoire, 81/4, pp. 181-237. Bieleman, J. (1987) Boeren op het Drentse zand, 1600-1910. Een nieuwe visie op de 'oude' landbouw, Wageningen. (A.A.G. Bijdragen; 29). Boer, T.J. de (1907) 'De Friesche grond in 1511 (Leeuwarderadeel-Ferwerderadeel volgens het Register van den aanbreng)', Historische avonden, 2, pp. 95-114. Brenner, R. (1982) 'The agrarian roots of European capitalism', Past and Present, 97, pp. 16-113. Bruijn, M.W.J. de (1996), 'Het gebruik van anachronistische begrippen als eigendom en erfpacht voor de middeleeuwse rechten op onroerend goed', Signum, 8, pp. 121-128. Brusse, P. ( 1999) Over/even door ondernemen. De agrarische geschiedenis van de OverBetuwe, 1650-1850, Wageningen. (A.A.G. Bijdragen; 38). Chayanov, AV. (translated by R.E.F. Smith) ( 1966) 'Peasant farm organization', in D. Thomer et al. (eds), A. V. Chayanov on the theory of peasant economy, Manchester, pp. 29-269. Croot, P. and Parker, D. (1985) 'Agrarian class structure and the development of capitalism: France and England compared', in TH.Aston and C.H.E. Philpin (eds), The Brenner debate. Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe, Cambridge, pp. 79-90. Cruyningen, P.J. van (2000) Behoudend maar buigzaam. Boeren in West-Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 1650-1850, Wageningen. (A.AG. Bijdragen; 40). Demoed, H.B. (1987) Mandegoed, schandegoed. De markeverdelingen in Dost-Nederland in de 19de eeuw, Zutphen. Diepeveen, W.J. (1950) De vervening in Deljland en Schie/and tot het einde der zestiende eeuw, Leiden.

146

Structures of landownership, mobility of land and farm sizes

Formsma, W.J. (1981) Beklemrecht en landbouw. Een agronomisch-historische studie over het beklemrecht in Groninge, in vergelijking met ontwikkelingen elders, Groningen. (Historia Agriculturae; 13). Gelder, H.A.E. van (1953) Nederlandse dorpen in de l 6e eeuw, Amsterdam. (Verhandelingen der KNAW Afdeling Letterkunde; Nieuwe Reeks; 59). Hoppenbrouwers, P.C.M. (1992) Een middeleeuwse samenleving. Het Land van Heusden (ca. 1360-ca. 1515), 2 vols, Wageningen. (A.AG. Bijdragen; 32). Hoppenbrouwers, P.C.M. (1994) 'Doorgifte van erfgoed op het laat-middeleeuwse platteland', Madoc. Tijdschrift over de Middeleeuwen, 8, pp. 88-98. Hoppenbrouwers, P.C.M. (2001) 'Mapping an unexplored field. The Brenner debate and the case of Holland', in P. Hoppenbrouwers and J.L. van Zanden (eds), Peasants into farmers? The transformation of rural economy and society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages-19th century) in light of the Brenner debate, Tumhout, pp. 41-66. (CORN Publication series; 4). Janse, K.P.J. (1980) De zes Waterlandse dorpen. Een onderzoek naar de middelen van bestaan op het platteland van Waterland tot in het begin van de 19e eeuw, Amsterdam. Unpublished Master's thesis Universiteit van Amsterdam. Janse, K.P.J. (1992) 'De koptienden als bron voor de economische geschiedenis van het Gooi, 1500-1850', Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek, 55, pp. 35-74. Koch, E.M.F. (1994) De kloosterpoort als sluitpost? Adellijke vrouwen fangs Maas en Rijn tussen huwelijk en convent, 1200-1600, Leeuwarden. Le Roy Ladurie, E. (1966) Les paysans de Languedoc, 2 vols, Paris. Linden, H. van der ( 1955) De cope. Bijdrage tot de rechtsgeschiedenis van de open/egging der Hollands-Utrechtse laagvlakte, Assen. Moorman van Kappen, 0. (2000) 'Ongedeeld ten eeuwigen dage. Enkele rechtshistorische kanttekeningen bij de geschiedenis van de Erfgooiers', in E.C. Coppens (ed.), Lex loci. Opstellen over Nederlandse rechtsgeschiedenis, Nijmegen, pp. 51-64. Paping, R.F.J. (2001) 'De Groningse provinciale rekeningen van de voormalige kloosterlanderijen', in G.A.M van Synghel (ed.), Brannen betreffende de registratie van onroerend goed in Middeleeuwen en Ancien Regime, The Hague. (Broncommentaren; 4). Priester, P.R. (1998) Geschiedenis van de Zeeuwse landbouw ca. 1600-1910, Wageningen. (A.A.G. Bijdragen; 37) Slicher van Bath, B .H. ( 1957) Een samenleving onder spanning. Geschiedenis van het platteland in Overijssel, Assen. Thoen, E. (2001) 'A "commercial survival economy" in evolution. The Flemish countryside and the transition to capitalism (Middle Ages-19th century)', in P. Hoppenbrouwers and J.L. van Zanden (eds), Peasants into farmers? The transformation of rural economy and society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages-19th century) in light of the Brenner debate, Tumhout, pp. 102-157. (CORN Publication Series; 4). Vrankrijker, A.C.J. de (1968) Stad en lande van Gooiland. Geschiedenis en problemen van de erfgooiers 968-1968, Bussum. Vries, J. de (1974) The Dutch rural economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700, New Haven/ London.

147

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

Vries. J. de and Woude, A. van der (1997), The First Modern Economy. Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815, Cambridge. Woude, A.M. van der (1972) Het Noorderkwartier. Een regionaal historisch onderwek in de demografische en economische geschiedenis van westelijk Nederland van de late middeleeuwen tot het begin van de negentiende eeuw, 3 vols, Wageningen. (A.A.G. Bijdragen; 16). Woude, A.M. van der (1982) 'Large estates and small holdings. Lords and peasants in the Netherlands during the late middle ages and the early modem times', in P. Gunst and T. Hoffmann (eds), Grande domaine et petites exploitations en Europe au moyen dge et dans les temps modernes. Rapports nationaux, Budapest, pp. 193-208. Zanden, J .L. van ( 1993) The rise and decline of Holland's economy: Merchant capitalism and the labour market, Manchester. Zanden, J.L. van (2001) 'De opkomst van een eigenerfde boerenklasse in Overijssel, 1750-1830', in C. Trompetter and J .L. van Zanden, Over de geschiedenis van het platteland in Overijssel, 1500-1850, Kampen, pp. 15-33.

148

7 Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes,c.1500-c.1900 Otto S.

I.

KNOTTNERUS

A farmer's paradise?

Large-scale commercial fanning took a relatively early start in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes (Knottnerus, 1996; 1997; 2001; Nitz, 1989; Bierwirth, 1967: 42-58; Wiese and Bolts, 1965; Auhagen, 1896). At the end of the Middle Ages property relations, scale of holdings and patterns of production were quite diverse. By the middle of the eighteenth century agrarian capitalism completely dominated the scene, leaving limited room for smallholders. 1 Relatively large farms from 30 to 60 hectares mainly produced grains and cash crops for urban markets. Large herds of store-cattle and substantial quantities of cheese and butter found their way to London, Amsterdam and Hamburg. The typical landholder could be depicted as a gentleman farmer, who combined farm-management with a bourgeois lifestyle, whereas farm hands and seasonal labourers did the actual work (Botke, 2002; Folkers, 1956: 26; Swart, 1910: 1-2, 224; Sering, 1908: 156, 439440; 483-484). Foreign visitors were stunned by their observations. In their eyes the coastal marshes were a farmers' paradise. The British radical Thomas Hodgskin visited Northern Germany in 1820. He claimed that he had seen no other place on the Continent where the people were more happy and prosperous than in the Elbe-River marshes and in Ostfriesland: 'The proprietors [ ... ] resemble very much in their hearty manners English farmers. In Hadeln, however, they are the principal people, while an English farmer is often of little importance' (Hodgskin, 1969: vol. 1, 256-258). In the classical Marxian account aristocratic landowners instead of farmers play a prominent part in the creation of large holdings. The landowner '"clears"[ ... ] the land from its excess mouths, tears the children of the earth from the breast on which they were raised' (Marx, 1973: 276). Many contemporaries have shared this judgement, however gloomy. Smallholders were reduced to wage earners, whereas landowners simply consolidated the vacant holdings, which were then let on lease to capitalist farmers. The alternative - the 'peasant road' to capitalism - was thought to be rather painful and protracted (Hussain and Tribe, 1984). In the marshes and fenlands along the German and Dutch coastal fringe, however, developments seem to have taken a third direction. So did they in many other parts of Europe, where fertile farmlands bordered the urbanized core zones (Abel, 1955; Lucassen, 1987). Successful farmers, who usually descended from yeoman families and large leaseholders, gradually appropriated 70 to 90% of the cultivated land without any major 1 Agrarian capitalism is defined here as an historical constellation in which social relations and economic structures in a specific region are dominated by large agrarian holdings mainly using hired labor and producing for external markets. Cf. Archer Brown, 1990; Albritton, 1993; Zmolek, 2000; as well as the subsequent discussion in the Journal of Peasant Studies.

149

Landholding and land tran>fer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

social upheaval (Table 7.1). 2 Until the 1820s the redundant peasant population could easily be absorbed by the growing demand for hired labour and trade products. By then, a typical rural working-class came into being, impoverished but obstinate and persistently clinging to traditional beliefs and semi-urban patterns of consumption. The wealthy farmers had a long history of political participation and cultural persistence. They were deeply aware of their own identity, which sharply distinguished between their own fortune and the perceived misery of the upland peasants. Even the local farm hands held the latter in contempt. As the sociologist Rudolf Heberle rightly observed, the farmers' modern attitude was 'entangled with "pre-capitalist" passions: a quick temper and a certain combativeness[ ... ], strangely associated with urban manners and an aristocratic lifestyle, but also with a desire for conspicuous consumption and an inclination towards pomposity, which were, however, counterbalanced by a generosity with money and a preference for commercial speculation, stockjobbing and risky farm operations' (Heberle, 1963: 52-53). 3

The possibility of an inherent peasant path to capitalism was already acknowledged by Lenin, who considered the American 'farmers road' as an important alternative to agricultural modernization from above, the latter being represented by the British and the Prussian example in which aristocratic landowners took a leading role. Others, among whom the Russian agronomistA.V. Chayanov, were more sceptical about the willingness of peasants to give up subsistence-farming. Historians, on their part, went in search of the roots of agrarian capitalism in medieval and Early Modern Europe. Recent discussions following the line of the Brenner debate have thrown some doubt on the potential development of agrarian capitalism from below (Ashton and Philpin, 1985; Hoppenbrouwers and Van Zanden; 2001; Thoen, 2002). Even in the most highly developed parts of Western Europe the absence of powerful landlords is supposed to have resulted in the prevalence of 'commercial peasants' stuck in small-scale commodity production. Whenever this was the case, only the massive input of urban capital was able to separate the peasants from their traditional property rights. In a recent contribution Bas van Bavel stated that the collaboration between landlords and successful tenant farmers was decisive for the development of agrarian capitalism in the Low Countries (Van Bavel, 2001a; 200lb). Judging from his material from the central river clay districts, he concluded that largescale commercial farming was increasingly successful since the decline of feudalism in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Neighbouring fenland districts dominated by peasant landownership, on the other hand, were struck by morcellement and agricultural stagnation. The rise of agrarian capitalism in the adjoining coastal districts, where most farms were in the hands of bourgeois investors and local gentlemen, seems to support his conclusions (Priester, 1998; Van Cruyningen, 2001; Thoen, this volume). Our material from the Wadden Sea Region gives proof to the existence of an alternative path, starting later, but having the same outcome. Apparently, the triumph of agrarian capitalism took place irrespective of landholding arrangements. At its latest since the sixteenth century successful farmers using hired labour were able to enlarge their holdings at the expense 2

The term 'yeomen' is used here for the category of middle-range freeholders that exercized political and ecclesiastical franchise. 3 The original passage was skipped from the American 1945 translation. Cf. Heberle, 1970. For a contemporary account: Allmers, 1979: 126, 152-153.

150

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

Table 7.1

Social property relations in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes (c. 1900)

District * for the greater part marsh- and fenlands ** partly marsh- and fenlands

Percentage of cultivated land, held by farms larger than 20 ha in 1895 (Germany) and 1910 (Netherlands)

Noord-Holland: polder districts Fryslan: pastoral districts (marsh and fenlands) Fryslan: mixed farming district (marsh) Groninger Hogeland Oldambt* Rheiderland* (Kr. Weener) Krummhorn (Kr. Emden) Norden** Harlingerland** (Kr. Wittmund) Jeverland* (Kr. Jever) Butjadingen Wesermarsch (Kr. Brake and Elsfleth) Osterstade Land Hadeln * Ostemarsch** (Kr. Neuhaus) Kehdingen Altes Land (Kr. Jork) Elbmarschen** (Kr. Steinburg) Krempermarsch Wilstermarsch Dithmarschen** Eiderstedt Nordfriesland** (Kr. Husum)

Percentage of cultivated land, used for arable farming and marketgardening in 1900 (Germany) and 1910 (Netherlands)

75

52

78

4

69 83 81 85 91 74 65 82 78 63 65-70 70 52 83 44 80

44 67 90 30 59 71 59

76 77 67

10-15 62 64 65 70 49 51 27 67 10 22

Sources: Grondgebruik, 1913: Table I and Appendix III; Swart, 1910: 19, 31, 227; Tienken, 1901: 39, 181; Cramer, 1906: 10; Sering, 1910: 15, 443; Nagel, 1925: 190, 208.

of medium-sized family farms. By the eighteenth century landholding differentiation had given way to genuine polarization, leaving only a relatively limited share of the village territories to smallholders and family farms. Following a general introduction on the area we will concentrate on varying patterns of land distribution and diverging landholding arrangements during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Subsequently, the inherent tendency towards engrossment

151

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages- 19th century)

of agricultural holdings after about 1650 will be examined. Finally, we present a number of general mechanisms as well as local contingencies, which might explain the successful rise of a classical 'kulak' class in our area.

II. A non-feudalized region During the Late Middle Ages the coastal marshes were one of the largest nonfeudalised regions in Europe. Reaching from the Zuyderzee to Southern Jutland, the amphibious coastal fringe harboured about 50 largely autonomous districts, ranging from independent peasant communities to pristine republics under the rule of local abbots, illage chiefs and podesta's. Since the twelfth century laws and privileges of the ancient marshland districts had been extended to the newly reclaimed fenlands. Immigrants from Holland settled down behind the Weser and Elbe-River banks. Immigrants from Ostfriesland occupied the coastal marshes to the North. Personal freedom prevailed; vassalage and serfdom only played a minor role (Bloch, 1961: vol. 1, 248- 267, vol. 2, 445;Aubin 1965: 115 ff., 349-401; Slicher van Bath 1978: 259-280; Van Lengen, 2003).

Figure 7.1 The Wadden Sea coastal marshes in the early modern period and the main Frisian districts

152

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c.

1500~c.

1900

The local population had learned to cope with the amphibious environment since the early Iron Age or ev-en earlier. Initially, farm-dwellings and infields were located on natural holms and riverbanks or on artificial dwelling mounds (terpen, wierden or wurten). During the eleventh or twelfth centuries people began to build embankments around their village territories. At the same time, settlement was extended to the adjoining bogs and peat-moors, which were systematically reclaimed and brought under cultivation. In the course of the years, the dikes were heightened and enlarged. By the sixteenth century most of them had reached a height of two to three meters, offering a certain degree of protection that enabled individual farmers to settle down in the village outfields. The coastal area was relatively densely populated, its inhabitants were proud and wealthy, their manners of life constituted a rural counterpart to Hanseatic civic culture. The former salt marshes and reclaimed peat-moors (fenlands) were fertile, as compared with the upland bogs and moors. The numerous harbours were easily accessible to small-scale commercial shipping. Countless ditches, bottomless roads and inland bogs, on the other hand, impeded road-traffic. Fuel and timber were scarce and had to be imported. Powerful communal arrangements were indispensable. Dike repairs and military defence required a compulsory organization, particularly on the parish level. Nevertheless, the agricultural system was largely individualized. The open-field organization had been restricted to infields near the villages and remote meadows at an early age. By the sixteenth century most of the remaining commons had been enclosed or let on a annual base. State officials, local communities and foreign investors went great efforts to embank saltings and river forelands, which were subsequently parcelled out. Originally, pastoral farming prevailed, but on former beach ridges and riverbanks, in recent embankments and on the newly reclaimed fenlands arable could increase up to 40 to 50% of the total cultivated area. This mainly took place in the districts East of the Weser River, where grain exports started as early as the thirteenth century and began to boom after 1450 (Poulsen, 1988). Timber-framed farm-buildings were introduced here in order to store the growing harvest in the loft. In the West the original long houses remained in use until the seventeenth century, supplemented with barns and haystacks. Large three-aisled farms, modelled after the medieval granges in the Southern Netherlands replaced the latter (Glantzer, 2002). As a rule, arable farming expanded since the sixteenth century, largely due to dike-building programs and extensive drainage schemes. The main crops were barley, oats, fava beans and oilseed rape. A number of waterlogged districts, on the other hand, specialized on dairy farming. Sometimes farmers even refrained from corn growing, as they preferred imported rye from the Baltic above locally grown cereals. Everywhere graziery and horse breeding were an additional source of income. From the fifteenth to the early eighteenth century, large herds of oxen were driven southward from Jutland. Cattle from the upland districts supplemented these imports. After having been fattened on the fertile marshland meadows, the cattle were sold to urban markets. The large Frisian, Hannoverian and Holstein horses had a military reputation all over Europe (Wiese and Bolts, 1965: 1-129; Gijsbers, 1999). In the Middle Ages, the local gentry and leading clergymen usually made political decisions. In the ancient Frisian districts between Zuyderzee and Weser the leading role of the gentry as military entrepreneurs and major landowners was uncontested. Tenants were often obliged to take part in military expeditions during prolonged civil wars or to

153

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

render labour services and deliveries in kind. Additionally, there were about 120 monasteries in the area. Ecclesiastical foundations owned at least 20-30% of the land under cultivation. Leasehold was largely commercialised; tenants were legally free and subjected to customary law and judgement by a jury of peers. Political leaders could only assert their claims by mobilizing their supporters. Moreover, the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw the rise of a self-confident stratum of wealthy yeomen, who made themselves heard in public affairs (Slicher van Bath, 1958; Bergsma, 1988). In most of the eastern districts, on the other hand, the gentry were relatively weak. Instead, wealthy yeomen and traditional clan-leaders came to the fore. This was particularly the case in Dithmarschen, Hadeln, Wursten and other districts near the Elbe River, where Hanseatic influence was profound (Stoob, 1959). Local community leaders identifying with urban patricians shared the bourgeois' life-style and their anti-aristocratic attitudes. Other districts, such as Kehdingen, were characterized by a mixed system, in which the local gentry shared its power with successful yeomen-farmers. Only at the edges of the coastal area, in the Oste-River marshes, the Haseldorfer and Kollmarer Marsch (Northwest of Hamburg), second feudalism raised its head. But even there, tenant farmers fiercely resisted the attempts by their landlords to (re )impose labour services and to restrict their traditional privileges (Lorenzen-Schmidt, 1995). The political autonomy of the ruling elite was curbed during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as the coastal districts were incorporated into territorial states. The provinces of Friesland and Groningen were conquered by the Habsburgers and became part of the newly founded Dutch Republic after 1579. 4 Denmark dominated the eastern realm; in 1559 a military coalition conquered Dithmarschen the last of the peasant republics. Native rulers such as the Counts of Oldenburg and Ostfriesland, the Duke of Saxony-Lauenburg and the Archbishop of Bremen were able to retain the territories in between. By the eighteenth century, however, they had been replaced by major powers, such as Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and Hannover (Britain), who ruled their outer provinces from a distance. Yet, the distinctive features of marshland society remained largely untouched. The sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were the golden age of district assemblies (Landschaften) and regional estates (Landtage). Sometimes yeomen were formally enfranchised in order to win their loyalty and to legitimise the regime. Usually they participated in representative institutions responsible for drainage arrangements, coastal defence, parish-government, tax collection and the administration of justice. Everywhere 'communalism' was the rule (Blickle, 2000). Only where either the prince or the landowning gentry managed to gain unrestricted power, the yeomen's influence was greatly reduced. The former was the case in the County of Oldenburg and parts of Ostfriesland (Esens and Wittmund), the latter in the province of Frysliin and to a lesser degree in Groningen and parts of the Elbe-River marshes. As far as we know, family farms were the rule until the beginning of the Early Modem Age. In the fenlands and in predominantly pastoral districts holdings could be quite substantial, ranging from 10 to 30 hectares. The initial peat-moor reclamation units might even have been larger, but were split up at an early date. Recent research suggests, however, that twelfth-century Dutch immigrants considered 21 hectares as the norm 4

The former Dutch province of Friesland has been officially renamed to Frys!an in 1997.

154

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

(Fliedner, 1970: 25, 38-39; Wassermann, 1985; Nitz and Riemer, 1987, 21 ff.; Hofmeister, 1991: 25; Van der Linde, 2000). Wherever substantial arable farming was to be found, typical holdings tended to be smaller, ranging from 5 to 20 hectares. In the province ofFrysian in 1479 a yeoman-farmer had to own at least 11 hectares or 20 heads of cattle if he was to be enfranchised. Members of the gentry, on the other hand, were obliged to have at least 37 hectares. In Groningen the ownership of five to eight hectares or six cows seems to have been sufficient to become a judge. As the number of successful farmers increased during the sixteenth century, the minimum requirements to be enfranchised were fixed at 12-18 hectares (depending on the local measure) (Postma, 1934: 179-181; Westendorp, 1974: vol. 2, 521, 531; Formsma, 1988: 115-116). Apparently, actual landownership was very fragmented due to egalitarian succession rules. Female descendants were allotted with at least half the portion that male relatives got. In order to counteract the inherent tendency towards morcellement endogamous marriage strategies and intricate financial arrangements were an absolute requirement. As a consequence, successful yeomen as well as gentry' families maintained an intricate web of cognative kinship relations (Noomen, 1994: 76-77; Auhagen, 1896: 718-721; Sering, 1908: 431-515; Swart, 1910: 291-307; Sievers, 1976: 33-34, 56-56; Norden, 1984: 239-246; Lorenzen-Schmidt, 1987: 177-181). Up to the end of the Middle Ages the majority of the coastal population might be described as peasants, who lived off the land and marketed their surplus production. Even on the unembanked saltings, in the amphibious fenland districts and right up to the edges of the peat-moors modest quantities of cereals for home consumption were grown. Notwithstanding the fact that the number of large holdings of over 20 hectares was limited, they covered half to three quarters of most village territories. Agricultural exports were quite substantial (Jurgens, 1914; Kaufhold, 1998: 473, 479-515, 550-552; Van Tielhof, 1995: 76-85, 198-203). For the time being, increasing commercialization and lingering self-sufficiency went hand in hand. This began to change, however, as soon as population started to grow again during the sixteenth century.

III. The distribution of farming-land In the following section we shall concentrate on the actual distribution of farmingland among various categories of holdings, instead of the distribution of size categories among the total number ofholdings. 5 This has an advantage over the usual method, which underestimates the impact of successful commercial farming. As we shall see, minor The figures in this section have been derived from the various sources: Fryslan: Faber, 1972: 209, 414-415, 424, 427, 440-441, 475, 485-487, 490; De Boer, 1907: 102-104; Postma, 1934: 44, 67-68; Spahr van der Hoek, 1952: vol. 1, 104; H. Spanninga, personal communication. Groningen: Ligterink, 1968: 427-434; Hoppenbrouwers, 1987; 1991; Feenstra, 1981: 133-134, 146153; 1994: 164; Formsma, 1982: 54; Arkema et al., 1992: 127-128, 130. Ostfriesland: Ecke, 1968; 1980; Ohling and Konig, 1954; Mammen, 1963; Engelbrecht, 1982: 91; Heyken and Heyken, 1985; Volger, 1852: 8-9. Oldenburg (including lever and Butjadingen): Swart, 1910: 368-371; Onken, 1919-1920: 303-304, 309; Schaub, 1963: 52; Petri, 1994: 156, 195-201; Norden, 1984: 248-298; Kramer, 1985: 87-96. Duchy of Bremen (including Osterstade, Hadeln, Kehdingen and

5

155

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

changes in the distribution of landholdings had major social implications. From the sixteenth century onwards, the growing size of the large farms greatly reduced the acreage available to others, thereby forcing smallholders onto the market, either as labourers, or as petty commodity producers. While the variation between individual holdings merely increased, the actual polarization of agricultural production was well on its way. Most studies on early-modern marshland farming agree that holdings measuring 20 hectares or more might be considered as large farms. 6 On holdings this size the labourinput by servants and labourers normally exceeded family efforts. Likewise, we shall treat holdings cultirnting more than 40 hectares as very large farms or large landed properties. Holdings measuring 10 to 20 hectares might be treated as middle-sized familyfarms, holdings less than 10 hectares as smallholdings. It might be assumed that the majority of smallholders with less than 5 hectares were dependent on additional wagework or market gardening: they are defined as crofters. As a rule, at the beginning of the Modern Age middle-sized and large farms dominated coastal society, though their respective share in the village territories varied sharply. Additionally, most coastal villages had a restricted number of large landed properties, occupying 10 to 30% of cultivated area, as well as dozens of cottages whose occupants were dependent on additional wagework or trade. These crofters, artisants and tradesmen were usually known as small people or cotters (scamel ruters, keuters, Katner, Warfsleute). Regulations for contract work are known at least since the fourteenth century. By the end of the sixteenth century these miscellaneous bands of reapers, ditchers and threshers had become part of a growing class of agricultural labourers, most of their time working for the wealthy farmers, who increased their acreages plot by plot. As we indicated before, regional differences were quite pronounced. In several districts large farms of over 20 hectares predominated from the very outset. On the fenland island of Nordstrand (Schleswig-Holstein) they covered 72% of the cultivated area in 1436. Holdings of over 40 hectares accounted for a quarter of the acreage, whereas smallholders were totally lacking. Consequently, many seasonal workers from the mainland were needed to complete the harvest. Cotters accounted for a mere 37% of the population as late as 1581. On the nearby peninsula of Eiderstedt large holdings were predominating Altes Land): Thiel, 1901, 70; Pieken, 1991: 448-449; Lenz, 1964; Mangels, 1957: 20, 62; Klenck, 1986: 257-261; Poppe, 1924: 122; Hauschieldt, 1988: yo!. 1, 111; Bohmbach, 1976; 1981. Dithmarschen: Stoob, 1959: 188; Sering, 1908: 141; Gietzelt, 2000: 144; Hansen, 1897: 225227, 243-249. Nordfriesland (including Eiderstedt, Nordstrand and Pellworm): Prange, 1988: 59; Kuschert, 1981: 136; Falkenstjerne and Hude, 1895-1899; Petersen, 1906-1907: 9; Zimmermann, 1977: 15-31; Hansen, 1974: 220; Von Chamisso, 1986: 119, 191, 215-232; Volquardsen, 1965a; 1965b: 45-53; Kuenz, 1978: 326-329; Panten and Melfsen, 1982: 170. 6 Early-modern population figures were approximately 30 to 50 per square kilometer of the area involved, including artisans and tradesmen. Seasonal migrants and foreign servants accounted for an additional labour supply, which may have added another 5 to 10 persons on a yearly base. The amounts of wasteland were limited. Presuming that the labour supply was evenly distributed among landholdings and that one out of every two inhabitants (including children and elderly people) actually did some farm-work, we may assume that each 20 hectares farm employed 4 to 7 able-bodied persons at least. Thus we may conclude the farmers family was able to meet up to half of the labour requirements of a 20 hectares farm.

156

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

as well, but here the number of crofters and landless villagers was more substantial. Farms of over 20 hectares covered about two-third of the area in 1575, 35-40% was used by farms of over 40 hectares. In the village ofHohenkirchen (Seignory of Jever) in 1547 69% was in the hands of large farms, but large landed properties as well as smallholdings were lacking. In the whole district of Jever (including Knyphausen) in 1587 large farms accounted for 65% of the area under cultivation. Other districts were characterized by smallholding. In the Land Hadeln, where arable farming prevailed, in 1566 only 40-50% was covered by large farms, whereas crofters with less than 5 hectares accounted for half the population at least. In Dithmarschen holdings were even smaller, probably due to an unusual agnatic clan system that was in force until the tiny republic was defeated in 1559. According to local succession rules, legacies had to be split up infinitively between male descendants. Female descendants, on the other hand, only got a dowry, which prevented the spouses from different families to join their portions into a new household, as was the case in most other coastal districts. Holdings of over 20 hectares accounted for a mere 30-40% of the area, typical farms measured only five to ten hectares, half of the holdings were smaller than five hectares. In the district Osterstade, where similar succession rules applied, large farms played only a minor role (see below). 7 Around the Dollard Bay smallholdings prevailed as late as 1660, due to the effects of subsequent storm surges that had destroyed the former fenland landscape. In Ostfriesland holdings of over 20 hectares covered 50% of the marshland in the western district of Greetsiel, but 67% and 84% in the northern districts of Berum and Esens. As indicated before, large farms tended to be more numerous in areas with mainly pastoral farming than in the districts where mixed farming prevailed. The large farms in the mainly pastoral districts in Frys!an covered 50-70% of the cultivated area in 1511, but in the mixed farming districts near Harlingen only 25-40%. In the province of Groningen large farms accounted 75-80% of the Middag district in 1540, but only 50-55% in the nearby Humsterland district. Adjoining districts showed the same contrast. Initially, crofters were only a minority of the population. But as population figures rose during sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, their numbers rapidly increased. In the eighteenth century they were supplemented by an additional group of landless labourers, artisans and tradesmen (known as inwoners, Haus- or Hauerlinge, Mietsleute, Einwohner or lnsten) (Lorenzen-Schmidt, 1986a; Hinrichs et al., 1988: 51-53, 55-58, 62-64; Wolf, 1989: 20-38). About 1550 30-50% of the rural population had less than five hectares. This proportion increased to 50-70% around 1600, 60-80% in the second half of the seventeenth, 70-90% in the eighteenth, and 80-90% in the nineteenth century. A few examples might suffice: in the district of Greetsiel (Krummhorn) the number of crofters and local crafts- and tradesmen climbed from 38% around 1550 to 61 % in 1606-07 and - after a severe crisis during the Thirty Years War - 73% in 1663, in Osterstade (near Bremen) from 34% in 1535 to 59% in 1595 and 89% in 1677, in Alte Land from 42% in 1524 to 73% in 1588, in Eiderstedt from 40-45% in 1538 to 70% in 1597. Though population growth stagnated after the middle of the seventeenth century, the number of small people tended to increase further. The growing number of crofters, 7

Theoretically, the figures from Dithmarschen, Land Hadeln and Osterstade may only reflect the fragmentation of ownership units. It is unlikely, however, that the majority of petty landowers did not live off the land they owned. Cf. Hausigk, 1995: 59; Pieken, 1995: 54-55.

157

Landholding and land transfer in the ll'orth Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

artisans and tradesmen, however, did not change the overall distribution of the land within the village territories, as their holdings accounted for less then 10% of the cultivated area. Moreover, they cannot be regarded as farm-labourers in any modern sense. Most crofters held one or two cows and some sheep, which they could graze on dikes and roads or on the farmlands after the harvest. As far as we know, most of them had a personal relationship with their more successful neighbours, who counted on their work force, provided them with grazing lands, strips of meadow, draught-animals and a baking oven and sometimes even lent them a few heads of cattle. They were also dependent on their wealthier neighbours for credit and legal protection (Knottnerus, 1992; Knottnerus, forthcoming; Stoob, 1959: 372, 376). Migrant workers from upland districts supplemented the local work force. Particularly the large landed properties measuring 40 to 100 hectares or more had to rely on hired labour. These properties mainly consisted of former monastic granges, demesnes, ecclesiastical properties and noblemen's estates, which were let on longterm lease (the so-called Meierrecht) or managed by the owners and their representatives. In the latter case, the landowners often favoured immigrants from Holland as managers, sharecroppers and tenants (cf. Heyken and Heyken, 1985). Working arrangements on such estates may have served as an example for other large farms. Successful tenants were often intermarrying with wealthy yeomen. The average size of the large landed properties was varying: in the eastern districts of Ostfriesland (Esens, Wittmund, Jever) they measured merely 40 hectares, but in the commercialized district of Greetsiel the average size was growing from 60 hectares in 1583 to 70-75 hectares in 1625. Individual estates were ranging from 40 to 120 hectares. Comparable figures have been observed in Fryslan and Groningen. In Fryslan a mere 30-40 hectares were considered to be sufficient for a landed estate, in Groningen many members of the gentry held about 50 hectares; often the state-owned demesnes were even bigger. The petty noblemen in Osterstade (Duchy of Bremen) hardly distinguished themselves from common yeomen. They had to lend a hand on their farms, which contributed to their nickname 'beansquires' (Auhagen, 1896: 716; Thiel, 1913: 35-41). The noblemen at the Elbe River, on the other hand, were far better off. Nineteen estates in the district of Neuhaus measured about 100 hectares on average. In Kehdingen estates were much smaller, yet one hundred noblemen owned a third of the cultivated area in 1603. In Land Hadeln five demesne farms measured 68 hectares on an average. In Nordfriesland and Dithmarschen the gentry had a marginal existence, but state-owned demesnes and private estates were quite extensive: several demesnes cultivated 200 to 300 hectares; gentlemen's farms measuring 100-150 hectares were not exceptional (Leister, 1952: 67, 76-78). The largest properties could by found in the County of Oldenburg, where thirteen demesne farms were 170 hectares on average, the largest one measuring almost 500 hectares. As late as 1820 the 258 hectares that by then had been left were considered as 'probably the largest holding in the entire coastal fringe from the Eider to the Schelt Rivers' (Arends, 1974: vol. 2, 65, 223). In the long run, however, demesne farms and large landed properties were not very successful, probably due to mounting labour and supervision costs. As we shall see, most of them were dissolved after 1650, let on lease or sold to genuine farmers.

158

Yeomen and farmers in the Radden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

IV. Landholding arrangements 8 In the Frisian districts to the West leasehold or lanthure may already have been known since the tenth century or even earlier. During the High Middle Ages a class of tenants came into existence who were legally free but dependent on their landlords as far as protection and public representation were concerned (Swart, 1910: 247-72; Hauptmeyer, 1997: 1098; Algra, 2000: 275, 285-286). The remaining labour duties and payments in kind, which were rather insignificant, were usually converted into cash payments during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Moreover, the western districts were characterized by an abundance of short-term leases, typical of commercialised and pastoral areas. Many detached lands were let on lease by family-members and neighbours, probably in an effort to undo the effects of egalitarian succession rules. Holdings were often split up, rearranged and encumbered with all kinds of rents and mortgages in order to buy off the siblings' claims (Spahr van der Hoek, 1952: vol. 1, 130-131; Stover, 1942: 86-88, 91). In the eastern coastal districts, on the other hand, lease holding was the exception. Apparently, suitable legal arrangements were lacking here. Though commercial leasehold became widespread during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it happened to be a short-lived phenomena. Peasants feared the imposition of feudal dues, urban investors had to deal with local communities inclined to protect their members against foreign creditors. Moreover, the territorial princes who took control of the coastal marshes during the sixteenth century were eager to support peasant property rights in order to secure regular tax payments. As a rule, only church lands, noblemen's possessions and state demesnes were let on long-term lease. Lands that had once been granted as hereditary fiefs or burdened with a rent-charge were often treated as alodial property by the grantees. This contrasted sharply with the situation in the more or less feudalized hinterlands, where the majority of the peasants were hereditary tenants who were legally - and sometimes also personally - dependent on the aristocratic landlords. In the latter case, short-term leasehold emerged as well, but the lessees were usually townsmen and other wealthy investors, who could not infringe upon their subtenants' hereditary rights. By the sixteenth century the preYailing hereditary arrangements (the so-called Meierrecht) were largely uncontested (von Boetticher, 1986: 220-227; Hauptmeyer, 1997: 11231130; Saalfeld, 1998: 641-647). Alternatively, potential investors could tum to taking landed property in pledge, which often required, however, that the pledgee took the farm management into his own hands (Planitz, 1935: 35-37, 104-128, 185-189). Also the imposition of annual rent payments on landed property (the so-called Rentenbriefe) became more common since the fourteenth century. The rent market spread from the cities towards the surrounding countryside and began to boom as soon as state power and legal security grew. Yet, even close to the city of Hamburg landowners used to build a cottage on their properties in order to uphold their rights. This lasted until 1620, when 8 In the following section I have tried to standardize the wide variety of contemporary terms describing long-term tenure and leasehold arrangements in the northern coastal areas of the late medieval and early modern periods. I used 'hereditary tenure' to indicate all variants of the Northwest-German so-called Meierrecht, 'hereditary leasehold' to indicate all (other) sorts of hereditary lease, and 'long-term leasehold' to refer to all other solid- i.e. non short-term- types of leasehold.

159

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

official registers of debts and pledges were introduced. On the island of Nordstrand the official registers go back to 1559, in Eiderstedt to 1591. We may conclude, therefore, that successful investment in agriculture was dependent on the development of suitable legal arrangements and corresponding institutions (Poulsen, 1988: 93-98, 115-121, 150151; 1990; this volume; Hofmeister, 1979-1981: vol. 2, 163; Lorenzen-Schmidt, 1986b; Finder, 1922: vol. 1, 130; Klasen 71-75, 85-90; Bauche, 1978: 161; Stein, 1985: 98; Sering, 1908: 162, 166-168, 275-277). Generally, the distinctions between tenants and freeholders were often vague. Contrary to freeholders, tenants were normally excluded from political and ecclesiastical franchise. As far as they were legally free, however, they were able to negotiate favourable conditions quite comparable to yeoman farmers. In most cases the tenants owned farm-buildings, cattle and equipment. Whenever the landlord terminated the lease, he was obliged to take over the buildings at market value. And as these became more costly during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, due to the introduction of brick walls, extensive panelwork as well as enlarged barns and byres, landowners found it even more difficult to expel their tenants. Moreover, sixteenth-century inflation tended to reduce the real value of rent payments and leases, encouraging tenant-farmers to hold on to their farms. The landlords on their part tried to negotiate for shorter terms, considerable rent increases and substantial recognition fees. In the long run, however, their efforts were largely in vain. Territorial princes tried to prevent excessive rent increases for the same reason as they supported peasant property rights. As a result, most leases were silently continued and transferred at will, even if the renewal of the tenancy agreement involved some negotiation. Wherever peasant ownership prevailed, the actual land market was largely restricted to detached plots. Yeoman families usually clung to their hereditary farmsteads. Moreover, traditional pre-emptive rights gave neighbours and kin a lead against foreign investors. The constitution of the island of Nordstrand from 1572, for example, explicitly stated that a property could only be alienated after the rightful claimants had refused to take control: He, who wants to buy, must loudly cry. He, who wants to sell, must loudly ring the bell. If the ringing is loud, then (one may) bid and outbid. Land-exchange is irreversible; buying can be made undone (Hansen, 1974: 154, 217-219).

This began to change, however, as soon as urban capital penetrated rural society. State officials, wealthy townsmen and successful yeoman families bought dozens of properties and leased them out to their former owners. Territorial overlords, or, in the case of the Netherlands, cities and provincial governments confiscated ecclesiastical properties and unembanked foreshores. They also appropriated peasant holdings whenever the owners could not uphold their dike-reaches and tax-payments. As public funds were running out, these landed properties were often resold to private investors. In the province of Fryslan extensive demesnes were brought under the hammer since the 1630s. Most of the buyers were noblemen and state officials with their families. In the province of Groningen private investors had to wait until the 1760s. The city of Groningen sold the mass of its extensive demesne lands in the countryside as late as

160

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

1810. By then wealthy farmers were the main buyers (Kalma et al., 1968: 170-171; Schroor 1996: 16; 1997: 20). The Count of Ostfriesland also kept many demesnes to himself, but the most successful owner of state demesnes was the Count of Oldenburg (see below, section V.4.). At least eight different landholding and credit arrangements can be distinguished, which largely define the range of property relations - to be treated in more detail below - in our area: a. Most frequent in the Wadden Sea Region were long-term leases to tenants known as landsaten, meier(s), Heuerleute, lansten, /rester or otherwise. Leasehold probably developed from older and fuzzier arrangements of indeterminate duration. According to these long-term arrangements homestead and infields were considered as a whole - be it real or fictional from which no part could be split off. Farm-buildings were owned by the tenants, which made it difficult to have the latter expelled. Often landowners were not even allowed to terminate a lease. In case of serious crop failure they were obliged remit part of the rent. Similar arrangements applied all over the feudalized hinterland, albeit with many restrictions on farm management and succession. The marshland farmers, on their part, were able to negotiate quite favourable conditions at an early age. Particularly in Groningen and Ostfriesland several models of hereditary leasehold became the rule during the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (vaste huur, beklemming, Beherdischheit, Heuer or Erbheuer). Initially, the tenancy agreements had to be renewed every six or twelve years, but as these agreements tended to become hereditary recognition fees were often limited to those occasions when the next generation took over. Moreover, rents tended to become fixed, due to the fact that inflation came to a standstill after the 1620s. This was also the case on state demesnes and ecclesiastical properties farther to the East. Given the favourable conditions, freeholders short of money were often prepared to sell their proprietary rights in exchange for a long-term lease (Formsma, 1981; Priester, 1991: 106-113; Swart, 1910: 247-291; Onken, 191920: 325-328; Saalfeld, 1998: 641-647; Sering, 1908: 305-338; Van derWoude, 1982: 203-205; Fiedler, 1987: 197; Sievers, 1976: 33-34, 49-54; Hofmeister, 1979-1981: vol. 2, 100; Auhagen, 1896: 864; Goens, 1929: 48-49). b. Short-term leases (also Heuer or Landmiete) for detached plots and individual homesteads, ranging from one to seven years (depending on the rotation schemes) largely played a subsidiary role. Temporary arrangements such as these were probably known since the High Middle Ages; they became frequent in the western districts since the sixteenth century, partially under the influence of Roman Law and especially in those cases where morcellement had taken place. Thus the negative effects of egalitarian succession rules could be made undone (Swart, 1910: 247-249, 262-265). To the East short-term leases probably became more frequent too, but most land registers do not account for them. Apparently, they were very popular among cattle-traders and upland farmers who were keen to get hold of marshland meadows for the sake of graziery (Auhagen, 1897: 819; Sering, 1908: 447). c. Short-term leases for complete farms, including house, byre and barns also played a subsidiary role. Only in the province of Frys!an they became the rule since the seventeenth century. These commercial arrangements, usually for a period of 5 to 12 years, seem to have been a sixteenth-century innovation, inspired by Roman Law with its unambi-

161

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

guous property rights. It may have developed earlier, however, from pledging. Shortterm leases proved an important alternative to landlords who were not able to find tenants prepared to take over the farm on the conditions preferred by the owner. Yet, agreements like these must have required painstaking interference by the owners and their superintendents, who had to maintain the farmhouse with its dikes and ditches and had to prevent that the fields became exhausted by the tenants. This may explain, why these arrangements were popular around countryseats on which the urban elite spent the summer. They were also popular on state demesnes in Ostfriesland, Oldenburg and Schleswig-Holstein. In the course of the nineteenth century short-term leases became the rule, under the influence of the introduction of modern civil law. d. The leasing out of complete farms with their inventories, including cattle and equipment, to so-called Hollander or Kasemeier ('cheese-tenants') was not very common. Yet, it offered an interesting opportunity for landlords who wanted to improve their farms by means of introducing the latest agricultural innovations. The agreement normally applied for one year and involved some form of sharecropping. During the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century letting out became a convenient solution for noblemen's estates and state demesnes, particularly in Ostfriesland and further East, where dozens of skilled 'Hollanders' were available. These wealthy immigrants were known for their superior cultural heritage. They took part in an interregional network of former countrymen, which gave them an advantage above local tenants. However, a pledgee could also lease out a farm to its original owners, benefiting from their hope to get it back after a few good harvests. Once they failed, the new owner could always let the farm on short-term lease. Apparently, the actual involvement with the farm management was quite demanding. Arrangements such as these became outmoded as soon as the urban investors adapted to a more refined way of life. Nevertheless, comparable arrangements survived in the Baltic, where immigrants from the Wadden Sea marshes settled on large landed properties (Leister, 1952: 82-84; Iversen, 1992; Knottnerus, 1994: 33--44 ). e. Investments in specific feudal dues instead of acquiring a whole farm originally must have formed an obstacle to agricultural growth, because the actual landholders did not receive anything in return for their annual payments. During the Late Middle Ages these arrangements offered a popular investment opportunity for wealthy townsmen, noblemen and ecclesiastical foundations. Feudal relics such as tithes, fiefs, labour duties and land-tax exemptions mainly survived on the fringes of the coastal area, particularly in the Elbe- and Weser-River Marshes and parts of Nordfriesland (Schwabstedt). In most cases, however, the remaining tithes and labour duties were rearranged or bought off during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, often being transferred into normal leases or annuities. Sometimes neighbours simply purchased the claims resting on their lands, in order to terminate them for once and for all. Sometimes a farmer acquired a hereditary fief, which gradually lapsed into long-term lease or actual ownership (Von Lehe, 1947). Others tried to benefit from the land-tax exemptions resting on former manors. The Seignory of Jever, for instance, witnessed a vivid trade in tax exemptions that had been originally granted to community officials: in 1684 a third of the marshland area was exempted. As such, the trade in ancient privileges encouraged the rise of a class of successful gentleman farmers (Onken 1919-1920: 344; cf. Allmers, 1896: 92, 104). f. The imposition of annual payments (renten) on the land by way of a mortgage offered an important alternative to lease holding, because it provided successful farmers

162

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

with the financial means to enlarge their holdings. Originally, it was a convenient solution resulting from the medieval ban on taking interest on debts and mortgages. Yet, as we saw before, annuities became more common in the eastern districts than in the West, where commercial lease holding had made an early start. Though the provinces ofFryslil.n and Groningen witnessed a vivid trade in annuities from the second half of the fifteenth century, this boom came to a sudden end after the change to Protestantism in the 1580s and 1590s. Modern credit arrangements took over the role that annuities had played before (Feenstra, 1994: 149-151 ). In the eastern districts, on the other hand, the transition took much more time, despite the fact that the Lutheran Reformation gained foothold at an early age. g. Successful farmers profited from various other forms of credit, such as advances on the coming harvest, share-cropping, secured loans, debentures, undivided legacies, postponed dowries, annual rent payments and written engagements of various kind. In case of misfortune, such credit arrangements could all be transformed into leases, which did happen occasionally. Apparently, in the western districts these modern solutions were adopted earlier than in the eastern realm. In sixteenth-century and early seventeenthcentury Germany complaints about usury were still frequent. Wealthy merchants often took the harvest in pledge even before it was gathered (Beninga, 1961-1964: 700; Jiirgens, 1914: 14; Hansen, 1974: 134, 234). Later, creditors got used to more sophisticated tactics. As soon as personal liability and bailing were accepted, secured loans and mortgages became the normal solution to the financial requirements of successful farmers eager to enlarge their holdings.

V.

Divergent tendencies (1500-1650)

Landholding arrangements developed in very different directions, largely under the influence of the shifting power balance between farmers, landlords and government officials. Wherever the state was dependent on popular support against the nobility, the position of the actual landholders was much stronger than in districts where government officials and landowners shared a common interest. The former was the case in the province of Groningen (V.2.), parts of seventeenth-century Ostfriesland (V.3.) as well as in the districts East of the Weser River (V.6.). The latter was the case in the province ofFryslil.n (V. l), the County of Oldenburg (V.4.) and the fenland districts around Bremen (V.5.). The classical situation, in which landlords and farmers worked together, was to be found around the city of Emden (V.3.) as well as in the newly embanked forelands (V.7.). V.1.

FrysHin

Tenancy was most widespread in the western province of Fryslil.n, where, according to a sixteenth-century survey, only a minority of the agricultural population owned their farmlands; the majority were (short-term) leaseholders. Yet, land-ownership was very scattered and highly commercialised. Even the richest nobleman owned a mere 600 hectares, dispersed over dozens of villages. In 1511 15 to 35% of the lands were occupied by freeholders, in 1711 their share had dropped to 5 to 20% or even less. Moreover, most farm buildings had been transferred into the hands of the landed gentry or urban patricians. Agricultural investments were facilitated by the early introduction of Roman Law,

163

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

according to which the landlords could freely dispose over their properties. Apparently, many leaseholders became financially dependent on their landlords during the seventeenth-century agrarian crisis. The burden of taxation in the Dutch Republic was quite heavy, leaving the farmers no other choice than to go to their landlords for money. As a consequence, the latter became more involved in actual farm management. They acquired the farm-buildings and renovated them, thereby reducing the farmers to sheer tenants at will. Besides, landownership became tied up with social prestige and political power. Members of the ruling gentry forestalled all farmsteads that were equipped with political votes. The introduction of entails on landed property served to prevent the dissolution of noblemen's estates. As a result, in Frysliin short-term lease became the standard, just as in the marshland districts around the Rhine, Maas and Scheidt Rivers as well as in Zeeland and coastal Flanders. As such, the province of Frysliin remained more or less the exception in the Wadden Sea Region (Faber, 1972: 216-222, 492; Spahr van der Hoek, 1952: vol. 1, 126-131, 170-173, 333; Kuiper, 1993: 71-73; Formsma, 1981: 58-61, 68-70, 110-116; cf. Knibbe, 1989; Vanhaute, this volume).

V.2.

Groningen

In the province of Groningen tenants were rather better off than in Frysliin. True enough, two-third of the farmers in district of Humsterland 1550 were leaseholders. Seventy years later their share had risen to 75%. One of the most successful urban landlords is known to have acquired no less than 50 farms. Just as in the neighbouring provinces, lease holding was commercialised at an early age. In Groningen and Ostfriesland state demesnes and ecclesiastical properties were rented out to the highest bidder since the 1580s (Feenstra, 1994: 165-166; Feith and Brugmans, 1911: vol. 2, 400, 402-403, 727). Unlike in Frysliin, however, tenure at will did not develop further. Apparently, most sixteenth-century tenancies were let on short-term lease, but customary property rights remained largely undisputed. The most important group of landowners consisted of public institutions. Following the change towards Protestantism in 1594 23% of the cultivated area had been confiscated by government institutions, whereas the remaining ecclesiastical foundations accounted for another 16%. According to the 1721 land survey, the local gentry in the three main districts owned a mere 18%. A sample of 12 parishes reveals that 31 % was owned by the government or by ecclesiastical foundations, 32% by noblemen or townsmen and 41 % by local families; another 14% was

tilled by the owners. In the Oldambt district urban patricians held undivided sway as the gentry was lacking here. According to another estimation 95% of all the lands in Groningen was let on lease (Feenstra, 1988: 193; Schoor, 1996: 16; 1997: 13-17). Probably as a consequence of the power equilibrium between local gentry, urban patricians and state officials, the tenants were able to hold on to their lands. In the course of the years long-lease agreements (vaste huuror beklemming) began to prevail. The most successful yeomen farmers were even allowed to participate in public affairs. Moreover, the growing power of the stadtholder after 1750 guaranteed that leaseholders could not be evicted. As a result, the remaining short-term agreements were converted into hereditary leaseholds. Step-by-step leaseholders became the actual owners of the land, paying only a fixed ground rent to their former landlords (Formsma, 1981: 94-97).

164

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

V.3.

Ostfriesland

In several districts urban capital had a revolutionizing impact on the rural economy at an early date. This was particularly the case around the city of Emden, where hundreds of protestant merchant families from Holland and Flanders found refuge since the 1550s. In Ostfriesland lease holding was already widespread at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The richest patrician in Emden owned about 700 hectares, one of the burgomasters 184 hectares. The noblemen Frederic ofHinte left about 1530 441 hectares and 13 house-yards scattered over 20 villages. The development of existing tenancy arrangements into long-term leasehold was well on its way in 1543, when the nobleman Eggerik Beninga complained that successful tenants rented large farms, conspiring to acquire the farm-buildings and to hire the cows of their less fortunate neighbours. According to his estimations, the maximum size of their farms had recently increased from a mere 20 to at least 35 or 40 hectares. The Countess of Ostfriesland acknowledged these problems and tried to forbid selling hay, hiring-out cows, partitioning the farms, subletting the farmlands and selling the farmhouses above their actual value (Kappelhoff, 1977: 84; Swart, 1910: 205-208; Wiemann, 1969: 451-453; Lamschus, 1984: 24 ff.). Even then, legal measures did not have any lasting effect. Urban capitalists began to invest in landownership and long-term leasehold properties, which they sublet to farmers. Contrary to customary rural law, the claims of city residents were not nullified by lapse of time. As a consequence, the latter had an advantage in comparison to rural investors. Successful farmers moved into the cities, leaving the land to their most energetic neighbours. Unproductive holdings were split up and combined into larger ones. Noblemen and state officials also invested in agriculture itself, exploiting large landed properties and letting out complete farms, which were equipped with huge aisled barns after the latest fashion. Hereditary leasehold (Beherdischheit) became the rule, just as in the neighbouring provinces. By the middle of the seventeenth century most of lands - including church lands and state demesnes - were in the hands of wealthy townsmen and state officials (Swart, 1910: 201-203, 206-208, 265 ff.; Feith and Brugmans, 1911: vol. 1, 331, 373; Beninga, 1961-1964: 694-696, 764; Wiemann, 1969: 446). Consequently, the scale of holdings grew rapidly: in the Greetsiel district farms of over 20 hectares increased their share of the cultivated area from 50% around 1550 to 61 % in 1583 and 77% in 1625. Farms of over 40 hectares were even more successful. They were absent in 1550, but enlarged their share from 23% in 1583 to 43% in 1625. In the course of the sixteenth century, a class of capitalist farmer-entrepreneurs came into being, which gained a voice in public affairs. Leaseholders having 30 to 40 hectares were taxed as if they were 'wealthy burghers or rentiers', the richest yeomen more than a city burgomaster (Ecke, 1968; Engelbrecht, 1982: 101-114, 115-162; Swart, 1910: 232).

Yet, the situation around Emden might have been exceptional. In the more remote parts of Ostfriesland the scale of holdings did not increase at all until mid-seventeenth century, despite the fact that long-term leases were widespread. Most of these lands were formally owned by the state. Rent increases were restricted, as tax-rises were far more effective to the purpose of filling the treasury. Apparently, long-term leasehold (Heuer) had developed from earlier short-term agreements. In the district of Wittmund in 1586 93% of the marshland was held on long-term lease, in the village of Dornum at least half the area (Swart, 1910: 274-275; Mammen, 1963: v-vn; Heyken and Heyken,

165

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

1985: vol. 1, 554-562; Droste, 1981). Particularly the aftermath of the Thirty Years War had a devastating effect on the financial situation of the rural population. So did the 1686 and 1717 storm surges. Many long-term leaseholders were forced to sell their holdings to wealthy townsmen or civil servants, because they could not redeem the pledges and mortgages incurred. Apparently, these investors bought long-term leases in order to sublet them to their former proprietors on short-term lease. In three villages of the district of Esens the amount of (short-term) leaseholders rose from about 25 to 30% in the 1660s to at least 60% in 1710 (calculated from Heyken and Heyken, 1985; cf. Jakubowski-Tiessen, 1992: 195-198). After 1750 many holdings were resold to successful farmers or repurchased by their occupants. Nevertheless, short-term lease remained important well into the nineteenth century. In 1895 38% of the cultivated area used by large farms in Ostfriesland was let on (short-term) lease. In the marshland districts we may assume higher figures as compared to the inland districts, where peasant property prevailed. Unlike their colleagues in Fryslan, however, leaseholders in Ostfriesland did not play the second fiddle; in many respects they barely distinguished themselves from genuine yeomen farmers (Arends, 1974: vol. 3, 396-400; Swart, 1910: 33-35).

V.4.

Oldenburg

In addition to Fryslan the County of Oldenburg offers another example of a territory in which tenants saw their property rights restricted, albeit largely due to the fact that not the gentry but the state acted as the major landowner. In the Seignory of Jever tenants still held a position more or less comparable to Groningen and Ostfriesland. In the village ofHohenkirchen (Seignory of Jever) in 1542 87% was held on lease (Heuer), in 1587 74%. During these years the lord managed to increase his share from 19% to 32%, whereas private landowners saw their share falling from 45% Lo 20%. The parish churches accounted for the rest (22%). Between 1495 and 1624 the acreage of state property, mostly leased out to hereditary leaseholders (Erbheuerleute), quadrupled (Swart, 1910: 368-371; Onken, 1919-1920: 303-304). State intervention was far more pronounced in the districts of Butjadingen and Stadland. During the sixteenth century the Count of Oldenburg was able to acquire about 40% of the land under cultivation, partly by confiscating ecclesiastical properties, private farms and newly embanked forelands, partly by compelling their occupants to transfer their property rights to the state (Allmers, 1896: 63-68). The latter is illustrated by the fate of the yeoman farmer Lubbe Onnen in Butjadingen. He privately owned a number of parcels, loans and pledges, and he was entitled to thirteen years of leasehold on another parcel of land, yet he was dogged by debts, due to the fact that he owed a substantial dowry to his sisters. As a solution to his financial problems the Count of Oldenburg in 1546 offered to take over his properties, in return for a long-term lease (Riithning, 1927: nr. 762). Similar agreements between farmers and individual landlords must have been common to all coastal districts. In Oldenburg, however, the territorial prince was the main beneficiary. As a result, the Count was able to reallocate his possessions into substantial estates, which were managed by a superintendent or else leased out. These large landed properties, covering about 10% of the Butjadingen and Stadland districts, were mainly used for graziery and horse breeding. The remaining forelands were parcelled out into large leasehold-farms. In spite of compulsory labour

166

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

services by the tenants, however, estate management suffered from diminishing returns as the economic situation deteriorated. Most estates were subdivided and sold around 1650, others had fallen to the Danish crown in 1667. Labour services were subsequently converted into money payments. Still, the extent of (long-term) lease holding tended to increase further, because the state was obliged to take over abandoned holdings. Merchants and state officials also took their share, benefiting from the fact that many farmers went bankrupt due to storm surges and crop failures. Just as in Ostfriesland, however, many long-term leases seem to have been converted into short-term agreements. Between 1750 and 1850 in Butjadingen about 60-80% of the area under cultivation was let on lease (Allmers, 1896: 82-122; Swart, 1910: 236, 278-284; Onken, 1919-1920: 309-312; Ramsauer, 1931; Wiese and Bolts, 1965: 140-141, 170-172, 180-183; Norden, 1984: 219, 245, 247; Stover, 1942: 90-92).

V.5.

Bremen

The city of Bremen and its surroundings formed a third example of a district where state power - in this case the state power of a city republic - paralleled the interests of the landlords. Private urban investments in rural property started as early as the thirteenth century. At the beginning of the seventeenth century citizens from Bremen owned half of the cultivated area in the district of Hollerland. Ecclesiastical foundations as well as foreigners, most of them noblemen from the surrounding territories, had acquired the rest. Peasant property was almost non-existent. Yet, contrary to the rural districts around Emden, the waterlogged fenlands near Bremen hardly offered any prospects for agrarian capitalism. Hereditary tenants (Meier) clinging to their hereditary farmsteads and traditional property rights dominated the scene up to the nineteenth century (Fliedner, 1970: 111, 170; Schwarzwalder, 1975: 87, 281, 301; Meyer, 1977: 100-102, 357-359). As a consequence, wealthy citizens tried to find additional investment opportunities in neighbouring territories, largely in the form of cash advances, loans, mortgages and annuities. Extensive re-allotment schemes were conducted in the district of Osterstade as early as the sixteenth century, which enabled commercial graziery for the urban market. About 1630 probably 35 to 40% of the lands were in the hands of foreigners living outside the district borders, another 14% consisted of hereditary tenancies, owned by gentry, church or state. Nevertheless, petty landholding prevailed: farms over 20 hectares accounted forno more than 15-20% of all cultivated land in 1665 (Pieken, 1991: 36-51, 377, 453; Thiel, 1913: 47-49, 79). The citizens' investments seem to have been more substantive in the County of Oldenburg. In 1624 merchants from Bremen claimed that they had lent 200,000 guilders to tenant farmers in the Weser River marshes, who paid their rents in butter and cheese. One of these tenants (a wealthy Mennonite from Dutch descent) litigated for almost thirty years before the imperial court of justice decided about his claim that a large shipment of cheese had been not paid. Several citizens acquired tenant farms in Oldenburg (Knottnerus, 1994: 34, 42; Schwarzwalder, 1975: 255; Goens, 1929: 14, 31).

V.6.

East of the Weser River

In the eastern districts the picture was even more diffuse. It seems that leasehold did increase since the close of the Middle Ages, but apparently at a lower pace than in the West, and with significant regional variety. In Nordfriesland and on the northern banks

167

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

of the Elbe River the land-market became largely commercialised in the course of the sixteenth century. Successful investors were able to acquire up to 4 or 500 hectares and dozens of farmsteads, which were mostly let on short-term lease. In Eiderstedt a quarter of all landholders in 1597 were leaseholders (Landsaten). On the nearby island of Nordstrand 1581about11 % of the area was held on long-term lease (Festeland) and probably a comparable amount on short-term lease (Heuer or Landmiete ). After the re-embankment of the island in 1654 by investors from Brabant short-term lease became the rule (Heimatbuch, 1981: vol. 2, 140-141, 150; Petersen, 1906-1907: 9; Hansen, 1974: 8384, 173, 191, 215, 220, 243, 278; Hanssen, 1965: vol. 2, 367). In Dithmarschen, on the other hand, evidence about lease holding is scarce. Apparently, townsmen did obtain large tracts ofland during the seventeenth-century crisis. Yet, most of these lands seem to have been resold to successful farmer-entrepreneurs. As late as 1882 only 70/c of farmland was given out on lease as against 34% in Eiderstedt. The marshlands North of the Elbe River had fallen back to a mere 7% (Hausigk, 1995; Hansen, 1897: 230-232; Sering, 1908: 16, 447, Appendix, 98). South of the Elbe River the expansion of lease holding was curbed by the growing power of the gentry. Rent payments and short-term leases had been introduced at an early age, but the latter evolved into long-term leasehold (Hauer), probably because the territorial rulers were inclined to protect their rural taxpayers against aristocratic claims. Moreover, the number of Heuerleute or Landpachter did not increase any further as soon as aristocratic landlords began to impose feudal duties and labour services on their tenants. Consequently, urban investors unable to compete v; ith the gentry tended to retreat from the land-market. The remaining leaseholders were apprehensive not to be turned into ordinary hereditary tenants (Meier). In the Alte Land 27% was held on longterm lease during the seventeenth century, another 2% in fief. In Neuhaus at least 1015% of the cultivated area was held by hereditary tenants, in Kehdingen long-term leaseholders probably held the same amount. As a rule, however, the attempts to integrate tenant labour into the demesne economy were bound to fail, as they did in Oldenburg (Fiedler, 1987: 196-197; Brummel, 1975: 63, 86; Siemens, 1951: 283-296; Hofmeister, 1979-1981: ml. 2, 101-102; Klenck, 1986: 275-276, 328; Poppe, 1924: 162-163).

V.7.

Commercial embankments

The most pronounced examples of capitalist agriculture were to be seen in the newly embanked polderlands. In order to reclaim huge tracts of unembanked salt marshes the sovereigns called on wealthy state officials, townsmen and foreign investors, who acquired extensive privileges in exchange for a portion of the foreshores taken from the peasant communities. Normally, the work was carried out by hundreds of navvies instead of conscripted peasants, while civil engineers were in command. An early example was the district of Het Bildt in Frys!an (1506), where a group of noblemen from the city of Dordrecht financed the reclamation of more than 5,000 hectares of salt marsh. Other famous projects were the embankment of the Zijpe Bay (1597) and the reclamation of Lake Beemster in Noord-Holland (1608-1612), the latter with the help of 42 drainage mills. Dutch projects served as an example for other regions farther East, particularly in Oldenburg and Nordfriesland. Land-surveyors parcelled out the land into substantial patches, which were usually let on short-term lease to wealthy farmers. Often the land-

168

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

lords provided for the farm buildings that were constructed after the latest fashion. An exception were the so-called Bildtmeiers in Frysliin, who were able to hold on to their original hereditary rights. As a rule, polderland-holdings were much bigger than the farms in the old-established villages: in Lake Beemster they measured 17 to 25 hectares, in Germany often 30 to 40 hectares. In the eighteenth-century embankment holdings measuring 50 to 60 hectares were not exceptional. Smallholding was virtually absent here. Soon the agricultural regime in these newly reclaimed areas served as an example for the surrounding districts. The initial expenses were often covered by abundant yields of oilseed rape, delivered to the Dutch oil-mill industry. The polderland farmers tended to surpass most of their inland colleagues in status and wealth. In time, they often became the actual owners of the land (Van der Ven, 1993: 123-126, 131-136; Baars, 1981; Ciriacono, 1994; Ey, 1987; Knottnerus, 1992; Gietzelt, 2000: 206-209, 227; Hanssen, 1965: vol. 2, 412-444).

VI. The seventeenth-century crisis and its effects The sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were a Golden Age for the inhabitants of the marshland districts. Notwithstanding the fact that the share of 'full-grown' holdings of over 20 to 25 hectares did increase at the expense of smaller ones, the latter remained numerous for some time. Smallholders were tempted to quit subsistence farming. Instead, they became accustomed to purchase imported foodstuffs, textiles, fuel and timber, instead of using their own inferior products. Activities such as grinding, brewing, baking, spinning and weaving were increasingly left to specialized artisans, particularly in the western districts, where peat was more easily available and productive technologies were more adYanced. After about 1650 this situation began to change. Many rural families suffered from the effects of the Thirty Years War and the agrarian crisis that followed in its wake. Falling prices, mounting tax burdens and dike-charges, crop failures and severe storm surges had a devastating effect. The stocks of cattle were repeatedly decimated, due to subsequent outbreaks of cattle-plague and foot-and-mouth disease. Consequently, the cattle-imports from Jutland came to a standstill in the early 1700s. Some freeholders were forced to sell their lands as their credits ran out. Others were eager to sell, because patronage and clientele gave them a better chance than merely clinging to their properties. By and large, large landowners, urban investors and farmer-entrepreneurs did relatively well. The area under leasehold was increasing, especially in the mainly pastoral districts, such as parts of Frys13.n, Butjadingen and Eiderstedt. Despite the fact that land prices were falling, landownership seems to have offered relatively secure investment opportunities, especially when compared with the alternatives available. Moreover, it attributed to the owner's prestige and his political influence. In the Dutch Republic the centre of political power shifted to the landed gentry and their urban allies. The remaining yeomanfarmers were often effectively disenfranchised. Tax burdens were much higher here than in the German and Danish coastal districts, leaving the farmers no other choice than to turn to investors and moneylenders. Consequently, landholding patters became more or less polarized. 'Full-grown' farms were on the winning side, in spite of frequent bankruptcies and re-allocations. Their average size as well as their share in the

169

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

village territories was growing rapidly. Medium-sized farms and smallholdings from 5 to 20 hectares, on the other hand, were on the wane. Usually, smallholders did not have enough money to undo the effects of the cattle plague that killed most of their cows. In relative terms they suffered greater losses during storm-surges than their richer neighbours. Crofters, artisans and tradesmen were prejudiced by the partition of the remaining commons and foreshores. By the nineteenth century, most smallholder families had been reduced to landless wage earners. Labour was scarce, however, so that wage earners were able to earn a decent living. Often farmers had to rely on additional seasonal migrants. Surprisingly, the remaining large landed properties were rather unsuccessful. Apparently, marshland farming dictated a scale optimum, beyond which profits were declining. Wages and supervision costs tended to outweigh the proceeds. After 1650 many properties were split up and leased out to genuine farmers. Only where farm ownership was entangled with seignorial rights or where it enhanced the owner's social prestige, the latter was inclined to remain directly imolved in its exploitation. In the western districts, the land market was biased by strategic investments. The members of the landed gentry competed for holdings to which specific political, juridical and ecclesiastical franchise rights were attached. As noted before, this was especially the case in the province of Frysliin, where political power had been restricted to the owners of a limited number of franchised homesteads, farms and mansions. In large parts of Groningen the major landowners tried to accumulate political privileges tied to specific farmsteads. As a result, a few landowning families largely monopolized local jurisdiction. In the Oldambt district and in Ostfriesland the urban elite invested in landed property in order to influence ecclesiastical policies or to get their relatives appointed as clergymen. Probably these strategic investments had a more or less conservative effect, as they fostered the actual involvement in village politics and farm management, instead of leaving them to the farmer-entrepreneurs (Feenstra, 1981; 1988; Engelbrecht, 1982; Blauw, 1995). It is obvious, therefore, that the mechanisms by which the original peasant holdings were transformed into modern capitalist farms were quite diverse. Institutional arrangements were not only very distinct from one district to the other. Their operation was also contested: landlords, leaseholders and actual tenants each followed their own interests. Political strife, litigation and private enterprise were very much knit up. Landlords often played a part at all three leYels. In most cases, howe\er, landlords mainly served as credit-providers for successful yeoman-farmers and leaseholders. To the peasants, the sale (or purchase) of property-rights might have been just another alternative to loans, annuities and mortgages. Many landowners and creditors were in fact familymembers and other locals. To them landed property merely represented a secure investment and an additional source of income.

170

Yeomen and farmers in the l/vadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

VU. The triumph of agrarian capitalism As large farms were increasingly successful, particularly after the middle of the eighteenth century the tendency towards lease holding was reversed. Rising grain prices caused an unprecedented agricultural boom, which mainly benefited large farmer-entrepreneurs. Hereditary leaseholders were well under their way to become the actual owners of the land; short-term leases were enfranchised or converted into long-term lease. Landowners, on their part, were eager to sell, as they saw their earnings melting away under the heath of inflation (Priester, 1991: 115-116). Large farms were growing in size, whereas the number of medium-sized farms waned. Smallholders under 10 hectares could only survive by specializing on dairy-farming, pig-breeding, market gardening or providing transport facilities. By the nineteenth century the ruling elite of capitalist farmer-entrepreneurs dominated the coastal scene completely, though they were still outnumbered by their less successful colleagues. Inherent social tensions, however, were mitigated by the growing demand for hired labour necessary to complete the shift towards arable farming. The introduction of new crops, extensive drainage schemes, marling and other technical improvements required much labour. By the early nineteenth century, about 60 to 80% of the coastal area was used for arable farming (Knottnerus, 1997: 98, own calculations). Working-class families were able to compensate for the declining real wages by growing staple foods on their own small plots. Consequently, a dual economy came into existence: large commercial farms became dependent on relatively cheap wage earners, largely fed by a potato-growing subsistence sector. Contract work and seasonal trade such as peat-digging and diking supplemented daily farm work. In the eastern districts servants and farm hands often demanded excessive meals in order to compensate for scarcity at home (Knottnerus, forthcoming). Genuine proletarization did not occur before the nineteenth century, when rising food prices, continuing population growth and seasonal unemployment led to a general decline in the standards of living. Even then, most local workers were better off than many of their upland colleagues, notwithstanding the fact that coastal society had become highly stratified (Schaer, 1978; Nissen, 1988; Wolf, 1989; Paping, 1995: 99-118; Cramer, 1906). The triumph of the large commercial farm was a general phenomenon. A survey of several coastal districts will show that developments that started from a different outset and at a different pace had similar outcomes, despite the variety in agricultural regimes and landholding arrangements.

VH.1.

Frysliin and Groningen

In both the provinces of Fryslan and Groningen the remaining middle-range farms gave way to large ones during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, despite the fact that landholding arrangements were diverging sharply. In Fryslan short-term lease prevailed: in 1884 60-70% of all holdings in the coastal districts were let on lease. The landlords often owned the farm-buildings; they were actively involved in farm management and played an important part in public life. In Groningen long-term hereditary leaseholders or beklemde meiers dominated the scene. They owned their farm-buildings and were considered as the actual owners of the land. Their farms covered at least 75% of the territory. Short-term leasing and subletting remained rather unimportant until the

171

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

second half of the nineteenth century; in 1910 about 30% of the area was given out on short-term lease. The most successful gentleman farmers became part of the liberal bourgeois elite that dominated village politics as well as provincial government (Blauw 1995: 64-112, 251-253; Kuiper, 1993; Formsma, 1981: 98-108; Priester, 1991: 107108; Botke, 2002). Tax registers from Groningen show that farms of over 30 hectares were increasingly successful since the middle of the seventeenth century at the expense of medium-sized farms and smallholdings. Particularly in the Dollard area smallholding soon gave way to large-scale arable farming. At the close of the eighteenth century large farms accounted for 80-90% of the coastal area in both provinces. They were even bigger in the amphibious fenland districts of Fryslan: here dairy farms of over 40 hectares dominated, whereas smallholders became marginalized. In the arable districts farm size had increased as well, but so had the number of crofters. Farms of over 40 hectares were also numerous in Groningen. Around the middle of the eighteenth century farms of over 40 hectares occupied a third, and in the nineteenth century at least half of the Groningen marshland districts (De Vries, 1974: 135-136;Knottnerus, 199l;SpahrvanderHo ek, 1952:vol. l, 103-109;Faber, 1972: 209-215, 486-487; Priester, 1991: 93-99, 505-506, 512-513; Paping, 1995: 7173, 317-320). An educated gentleman-farmer from Fryslan recalled in 1841: 'Since I came here 48 years ago ten farms have successively been broken down, their fields were let on lease or combined with adjacent farms; each time when this happens, the villagers tend to say: another place of livelihood has been cleared away, and indeed, the well-to-do take advantage of the situation in order to increase their assets, purchasing more land' (Hellema, 1978: 265).

VII.2.

Ostfriesland and Oldenburg

Similar developments took place in Ostfriesland and Oldenburg, where most longterm leasets had been converted into short-term agreements during the eighteenth century. Initially, medium-sized farms prevailed. As late as 1620 a property of nine hectares (or alternatively eighteen hectares of tenancy) was enough to be enfranchised for the regional parliament in Ostfriesland. But most of these medium-sized farms were bound to disappear. In the village of Oldendorp (Rheiderland) they were usurped by their larger neighbours after 1650. In Manslagt (North of Emden) arable farms over 20 hectares gradually increased their share in the village territory from 41 % in 1550, 59% in 1583, 60% in 1625, and 73% in 1779 to 87% in 1904. At first the number of crofters and smallholders doubled, subsequently most of them were reduced to landless labourers. In three neighbouring villages most of the medium-sized farms had already ceased to exist in 1719. During the nineteenth century the majority of farms of less than 40 hectares disappeared as well (Arends, 1974: vol. 3, 391; Swart, 1910: 229, 363-364, 373376; Wiese and Bolts, 1965: 139; Ecke, 1968; 1980; Kappelhoff, 1982: 32-46). In the former Seignory of J ever the shift towards larger farms started later than in Ostfriesland, though holdings under 21 hectares were considered 'incomplete' at an early age. After 1725 farms of over 30 hectares were growing in size at the expense of the smaller ones. Smallholdings remained rather unimportant: the large majority of the rural population consisted of crofters (Onken, 1919-1920: 303; Hinrichs et al., 1988:

172

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

111-112, 183). In the district of Butjadingen, where a shift from pastoral to mixed farming took place during the eighteenth century, large farms held 55% of area in 1613, 65% in 1729 and 85% in 1846. In the same period of time, farms of over 40 hectares saw their share growing from a quarter to half of the acreage. Most cotters held out, but the number of small and medium-sized farms was rapidly decreasing after 1729, as many farmers went bankrupt due to the effects of storm-surges, cattle-plague and crop failures. Other families were extinguished by malaria and left their holdings to surviving neighbours and relatives (StOver, 1942: 73-76; Kramer, 1985: 90-92; Norden, 1984: 90-92). At the wake of the nineteenth century typical farms in Ostfriesland and Oldenburg measured at least 20 to 40 hectares, in some districts up to 50 or 60. The scale of the holdings was growing further, whereas landholding patterns became polarized. By 1900 most elderly farmers recalled dozens of large farms haying been dissolved since the days of their grandfathers.

VII.3.

The Elbe- and Weser-River marshes

Though comparable figures are lacking, general indications from the Elbe- and WeserRiver marshes seem to prove our point. 9 As has already been told, most landholders in this region were yeomen-farmers. Lease holding remained rather unimportant, probably due to the delayed introduction of modern civil law. Generally, tax registers determined the size of the 'full-grown' farm (Pflug, Hufe) at an early date. In the Vierlande (near Hamburg) a complete farm measured 19 hectares, in Butjadingen 23 hectares, in Land Wursten 24 hectares, in Krempermarsch 26 hectares and in Land Hadeln 47-50 hectares. In the Wilstermarsch, where dairy farming prevailed, 35 hectares applied for a fullgrown farm. Typical holdings tended to be much smaller, but bit-by-bit the 'full-grown' large farms grew at the expense of medium-sized and small ones. In the 1770s typical large farms in the Alte Land comprised 17-20 hectares, in Kehdingen 37-38 hectares. The largest farms in Land Hadeln in the 1790s measured 80-90 hectares, typical holdings probably 30-45 hectares, the smallest ones in the more remote fenland Yillages at least 15 hectares. Contemporaries commented that successful farmers were hungry for land at the expense of the remaining smallholders. The gentleman farmers of Hadeln and Kehdingen were known to be quite enlightened, but they were also notorious for their ordinary bragging and excessive consumption (Gerdts, 1939, 24; Allmers, 1979: 274-275: Klenck, 1986: 250). In the districts close to the city of Hamburg, however, engrossment was impeded by the development offruit-culture, market-gardening and small-scale dairy-farming. Though the number of full-grown farms tended to be constant since the sixteenth century, smallholding increased rapidly since the eighteenth century. In the Alte Land in 1907 a mere 36% of village territories close to Hamburg had remained in the hands of large farms, as opposed to 68% in the most distant villages. The village of Moorburg (now part of the city's harbour) had only four large farms in 1814, covering just a quarter of the village territory. On the corn-growing river island of Billwerder and in the Vierlande district, Figures after Finder, 1922: vol. 1, 129; Swart, 1910: 236-237; Von der Osten, 1900/03: vol. 2, 32; Heimatbuch, 1981: vol. 2, 70-71; Siemens, 1951: 335; Poppe, 1924: 76; Bierwirth, 1967: 61-69.

9

173

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

on the other hand, most large farms remained intact (Siemens, 1951: 295; LorenzenSchmidt, 1986c; Wolf, 1989: 23; Finder, 1922: vol. 1: 129). Quite spectacular, on the other hand, were the developments in Osterstade at the Weser River (near Bremen), where probably due to archaic inheritance rules - smallholding was dominant as late as 1665. Up to the nineteenth century large farms had increased their share from 15-20% to 6070%, then the process of engrossment was partly reversed due to a switch back towards graziery, dairy farming and market-gardening (Pieken, 1991: 453; Tienken, 1901: 39).

VII.4.

Dithmarschen

The Schleswig-Holstein coastal marshes were no exception to the rule that farm size tended to grow. As we saw before, in Dithmarschen smallholding prevailed until the sixteenth century. The situation began to change, however, as the government ordered the introduction of partible inheritance laws in 1560. Popular protests against supposed usurers and foreign investors were ignored. In the parish of Mame (Stiderdithmarschen) farms of over 20 hectares increased their share in the village territory from 33% in 1590 to 56% in 1620. After a temporary setback during the Thirty Years War their share grew from 45% in 1668 to 72% in 1798. This happened mainly on account of the largest ones of over 40 hectares, which occupied 43% of the cultivated area. In Norderdithmarschen large farms took in 37% of the cultivated area in 1560 and 48% in 1638. Apparently, major changes took place since the last decades of the seventeenth century. In 1707 6575% of the area had already been taken in by large and very large holdings. Detailed figures from the village ofWellinghusen show that the largest farms were most successful. Contemporaries observed that many farmsteads had been abandoned during the eighteenth century. Consequently the number of crofters grew as well, being supplemented by a growing number of landless villagers after 1750. Smallholding tended to disappear. Farm sizes further increased after 1800, resulting in the rise of the typical gentlemenfarmer entrepreneur, described by Heberle (Hansen, 1897: 222, 238; Bolten, 1979: vol. 4, 450; Witthohn, 1984; Hausigk, 1995: 57-94; Lorenzen-Schmidt, 1987: 196-197).

VII.5.

Nordfriesland

In the district of Eiderstedt developments were even more spectacular than in Dithmarschen. During the seventeenth and eighteenth century two-third of the smalland medium-sized dairy farms (Milchereien) were usurped by their more successful neighbours. Typical large-scale holdings measuring 25-35 hectares gave way to even larger ones, ranging on an average from 40-50 hectares in the arable districts to at least 60-100 hectares in the mainly pastoral districts. Their share in the village territories increased from about 65% in 1617 to 80-90% in 1795. During the nineteenth century this tendency was reversed, when extensive graziery came into vogue and several very large farms were being dismantled. Contrary to many other districts, the extent of shortterm lease remained substantial (Kuschert, 1981: 136; Volkmar, 1976: 60 and Appendix IX; Hanssen, 1965: vol. 2, 407). On the reclaimed island of Pellworm large farms increased their share from 57% in 1684 to 64% in 1706, 69% in 1828 and 74% in 1854. None of the surviving full-grown farms was smaller than 40 hectares. The number of medium-sized holdings was cut by half, whereas smallholding had increased. Figures from other marshland districts are lacking. Yet, the tendency towards agrarian capitalism

174

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

seems to have been prevalent, except for the Wiedingharde district, where mediumsized farms remained numerous until the nineteenth century. Particularly the gentlemen-farmers in the recently embanked polderlands might be considered as capitalist entrepreneurs pur sang. Here, as in Eiderstedt, short-term lease remained frequent (Von Chamisso, 1986: 182-184, 215-232; Hanssen, 1965: vol. 2, 341, 367, 416, 460).

VIII. Explanation By the nineteenth century 'the farms had been largely consolidated, at the same time their mean size had often been tripled, smallholdings had disappeared'. This was the conclusion by the agricultural historian Friedrich Swart in 1910. And, so he added, 'Marshland farms with 30 to 60 hectares are immediately confronted by a large working class. Thus, the contemporary marshland economy is a product of the Early Modern Age. The same development took place all over the North Sea coast from Holland up to Jutland, in some districts faster and more thoroughly, in others slower. As such, it might be considered as a counterpart to the formation of the East-Elbian estate economy' (Swart, 1910: 224).

According to my findings Swart's conclusion still stands. There are a number of possible explanations for these converging tendencies. Some of them are rooted in the ecological context of marshland farming, others follow from the growing importance of distant markets and modern techonologies. Additional explanations involve institutional arrangements, reproductive strategies, investment schemes and status considerations. 1. The tough marine clay soil required a minimum number of draught-animals, as has been stressed by Jan Luiten van Zanden (1985: 320; 1991). In most districts, four to six horses and an additional ploughboy were needed. Those landholders that could not sustain sufficient animals and servants were dependent on their richer neighbours (Auhagen, 1897: 808). On the other hand, the introduction of the swing plough in Groningen and Ostfriesland in the end of the seventeenth century did not result in smaller holdings, though it required only two or three horses and could be navigated by one man alone. Moreover, smallholders used to borrow each others' horses (Van der Poel, 1967: 23-25;Arends, 1974: vol. 2, 392-396; Knottnerus, 1991: 65; Hanssen, 1965: vol. 2, 347). 2. Wars, floods, cattle plagues and crop failures must have caused the ruin of thousands of smallholders, as they could not mobilize sufficient assets to overcome such crises (Jakubowski-Tiessen, 1992: 195-198). Of course, the effects of disasters lowered the costs of acquiring a farm, providing an opportunity for healthy newcomers who were prepared to invest their own labour and accumulated savings. As farms grew bigger, however, substantive assets were needed (Folkers, 1956s). 3. Malaria endemics were responsible for high mortality rates, which diminished the number of landholding families and contributed to an accumulation of wealth in the hands of the survivors (Norden, 1984; Knottnerus, 2002). The number of farm hands, on the other hand, was supplemented by immigration. 4. Coastal weather conditions were rather unstable. As a consequence, farming was very dependent on a flexible labour supply. The harvest could easily be spoiled by rain; the sensitive clay soils could only be ploughed when they relatively dry but not yet

175

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

hardened by the sun. As a rule, large farms had better chances to meet their labour requirements than medium-sized ones. Not only did they have more resources to support a working class clientele, which could supply sufficient helping hands during harvest times. They were also able to pay higher contract wages whenever these helping hands were needed. 5. Access to product markets was dependent on the scale of the holdings: large farmers were able to store their products until prices went up. They were better informed; they had cheaper transport facilities and were able to negotiate at wholesale prices. 6. Access to financial markets was unevenly distributed: large farmers could get credits more easily, their more extensive social network and their political influence at the village level added to their solvency. The German historian Lorenzen-Schmidt (1988) has worked out a model on nineteenth-century trade recessions, implying that loans, debts and bankruptcies had the effect of increasing the scale of holdings. 7. The increasing scale of production and the change towards arable farming during the eighteenth century may have favoured large farms: labour-saving innovations such as horse-driven churns, winnowing-mills, riddles and threshing rolls - typical for the western districts - could only be conducted by 'full-grown' farms (Van der Poel, 1983: 37-44, 46, 62; Priester, 1991: 99-103, 118). 8. Family policies led to a concentration of holdings, due to endogamous marriage strategies originally meant to counteract morcellement. Reproductive strategies worked in the same direction, as a research project by Eckart Voland has shown (Voland, 1995). 9. Status considerations could have led to an outspoken preference for extensive large-scale farming, instead of more intensive methods. The well-known agricultural historian B.H. Slicher van Bath has referred to a 'pastoral way of thinking', which implied distaste for manual labour (Slicher van Bath, 1963: 129-131 ). The sociologist E.W. Hofstee, on the other hand, presumed that average nineteenth-century mixed farmers wished to imitate their neighbours who had successfully specialised in corn-growing (Hofstee, 1947; Priester, 1991: 99-100). 10. Village regulations and customary law might have favoured local landholders as against foreign investors, smallholders and crofters. In several coastal villages -especially to the East- newcomers were not allowed to settle down if they could not pay a substantial recognition fee. 11. State regulations often implied restrictions on farm partition, in order to keep the number of substantial taxpayers at a constant level. The Count of Oldenburg and the Countess of Ostfriesland were the first to introduce such measures in the 1540s, soon to be followed by other German princes who tried to avert a possible reduction of their limited tax revenues (Saalfeld, 1998: 645). Complaints about the partition of existing farms remained common until the nineteenth century. Yet, most government officials seem to have endorsed these partitions, because the resulting parts were usually absorbed by the surrounding farms. 12. Embankments of foreshores often favoured large farmers, as they were in a better position to meet the financial obligations connected to the newly reclaimed lands. In several coastal districts (Groningen, parts of Ostfriesland, Hadeln, Kehdingen, Siiderdithmarschen) the landowners maintained traditional rights to the adjoining foreshores, whereas in other districts these rights was claimed by the state. 13. Finally, landlords also contributed to engrossment wherever they tried to rearrange their landed properties in order to create larger holdings. For one part, landlords may

176

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

have been motivated by status considerations, on the other hand they expected successful tenants to pay higher rents. Their actual involvement in agriculture, however, was sometimes counterproductive, as the situation in Fryslfin can prove. Here, contrary to the adjoining districts, the introduction of convertible husbandry in the eighteenth and earlynineteenth century was largely prevented by restrictions on converting pasture into arable lands.

IX. Conclusion Did landlords really matter? Did their involvement help to create larger holdings? I think it did, but often unintentionally. In many cases, non-peasant landowners merely advanced the money to successful farmer-entrepreneurs, either as conventional landlords or as genuine moneylenders. In my opinion, the gradual disappearance of smallholding in the coastal marshes is mainly due to a step-by-step integration into international markets, which triggered off all kinds of economies of scale. Our material suggests that the development towards commercial farming started in the late Middle Ages. Several districts came to be dominated by large holdings at an early age, though on the whole smallholding and medium-sized family farms prevailed. Additionally, every coastal district had a limited number of large landed properties whose owners relied on hired labour by their peasant neighbours. Large farms were increasingly successful during the sixteenth-century agricultural boom. Opportunities for the export trade were ubiquitous; the rapidly growing number of crofters and landless villagers provided an adequate supply of hired labour. Puzzling, however, is the different pace at which capitalist farming developed. Despite the fact that the ecological, demographical and commercial circumstances in our area were largely identical, several districts witnessed major changes in landholding patterns, whereas others seem to be have been largely unaffected by the growing pressure of the market until the eighteenth century. Part of the explanation may lie in the tenacity of traditional institutions such as kinship ties, village regulations and ambiguous land holding arrangements. Equally important were the emergence of open land markets and clear-cut property rights, the availability of capital and the willingness of its owners to invest in agrarian ventures (e.g. Ostfriesland). Finally, we need to acknowledge that the rise of capitalist farming did not always result in an upheaval of land holding patterns. Especially where large farms were already widespread, capitalism could pull in smoothly. The process of engrossment became irreversible during the agrarian crisis, which set in after about 1650. Regional differences narrowed, as soon as districts that had hitherto been dominated by small- and medium-sized farming made up their arrears. Large landed properties, on the other hand, were dissolved. By the middle of the eighteenth century capitalist farms were the rule in every one of the coastal districts, leaving a shrinking portion of the village territories to smallholders and family farms. Until then, the transition to capitalist farming had been funded - to a greater or less extent - by non-peasant investors. After about 1750, however, most farmer-entrepreneurs took their fate into their own hands. Henceforth the 'farmers road' to capitalism held sway.

177

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Nissen, N.R. (ed.) ( 1988) Menschen-Monarchen-Maschinen: Landarbeiter in Dithmarschen, Heide in Holstein. Nitz, H-J. ( 1989) 'Transformation of Old and Formation of New Structures in the Rural Landscape of Northern Central Europe during the 16th to 18th Centuries', Tijdschrift van de Belgische Vereniging Aardrijkskundige Studies BEVAS, pp. 267-290. Noomen, P. (1994) 'Consolidatie van familiebezit en status in laat-middeleeuws Friesland', in J.A. Mol (ed) Zorgen voor zekerheid: Studies over Friese testamenten in de vijftiende en zestiende eeuw, Leeuwarden, pp. 73-174. Norden, W. (1984) Eine Bevolkerung in der Krise. Historisch-demographische Untersuchungen zur Biographie einer norddeutschen Kiistenregion (Butjadingen 1600-1850 ), Hildesheim. Ohling, J. and Konig, J. (1954) 'Das alteste Schatzungsregister Ostfrieslands', Jahrbuch der Gesellschaft fiir bildende Kunst und vaterlandische Altertiimer zu Emden, 34, pp. 60-74. Onken, C. (1919-1920) 'Die landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse in der Herrschaft Jever und in der Herrlichkeit Kniphausen im 17. Jahrhundert', Oldenburger Jahrbuch, 31, pp. 294-347. Osten, G. von der (1900-1903) Geschichte des Landes Wursten, Bremerhaven. Panten, A.A. and Melfsen, C.S. (1982) Die Christian-Albrechts-Koge, 1682-1982, s.l. Paping, R.F.J. (1995) 'Voor een handvol stuivers'. Werken, verdienen en besteden: de levensstandaard van boeren, arbeiders en middenstanders op de Groninger klei 1770-1860, Groningen. Petri, W. (1994) Fraulein Maria von lever. Studien zur Personlichkeit und Herrschaftspraxis, Aurich. Pieken, H.A. (1991) Die Osterstader Marsch. ""erden und Wandel einer Kulturlandschaft, Bremen. Planitz, H. (1936) Das deutsche Grundpfandrecht, Weima. Poel, J.M.G. van der (1967) Gude nederlandse ploegen, Arnhem. Poel, J.M.G. van der (1983) Honderdjaar landbouwmechanisatie in Nederland, Wageningen. [orig. 1967] Poppe, H. (1924) Vom Lande Kehdingen, Freiburg an der Elbe. Postma, 0. (1934) De Friesche kleihoeve: Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van den cultuurgrond vooral in Friesland en Groningen, Leeuwarden. Poulsen, B. ( 1988) Land - by - marked: To r)konomiske landskaber i 1400-tallets Slesvig, Flensburg. Poulsen, B. (1990) '"Alle myne rent": Bondekrediti 15-1600 tallet', Historisk Tidsskrift, pp. 31-59. Prange, W. (1988) 'Der schleswigsche Bauer als Urteiler im Gericht', in U. Lange (ed.), Landgemeinde und friihmoderner Staat, Sigmaringen, pp. 45-70. Priester, P. (1991) De economische ontwikkeling van de landbouw in Groningen 18001910, Groningen.

184

Yeomen and farmers in the Wadden Sea coastal marshes, c. 1500-c. 1900

Priester, P. (1998) De geschiedenis van de Zeeuwse landbouw circa 1600-1910, Wageningen. Ramsauer, H. ( 1931) 'Zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte der oldenburgischen Wesermarschen im Zeitalter des 30jahrigen Krieges', Oldenburger Jahrbuch, 35, pp. 3-63. Saalfeld, D. (1998) 'Landliche Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte vom Beginn des 16. bis zum Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts', in C. van den Heuvel and M. von Boetticher (eds), Geschichte Niedersachsens, Vol. III, Part 1: Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft van der Reformation bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, pp. 635-688. Schaer, F-W. (1978) 'Die landlichen Unterschichten zwischen Weser und Ems vor der Industrialisierung - ein Forschungsproblem', Niedersi.ichsisches Jahrbuchfiir Landesgeschichte, 50, pp. 45-69. Schaub, W. (1963) 'Die Bevolkerung der Herrschaft Jever nach dem Huldigungsregister von 1618', Oldenburger Jahrbuch, 62, Part 1, pp. 1-70. Schroor, M. (1996) Atlas der Provincielanden van Groningen ( 1722-1736), Groningen. Schroor, M. (1997) Atlas der Stadslanden van Groningen (1724-1729), Groningen. Schwarzwalder, H. (1975) Geschichte der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, Vol. 1: Von den Anfi.ingen bis zur Franzosenzeit (1810), Bremen. Sering, M. (1908) Erbrecht und Agrarverfassung in Schleswig-Holstein auf geschichtlicher Grund/age, Berlin. Siemens, H.P. (1951) Das Alte Land. Geschichte einer linkselbischen Marsch, Stade. Sievers, J. (1976) Die Agrargesetzgebung fiir die Herzogtiimer Bremen und Verden im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, Hamburg. Slicher \an Bath, B.H. (1958) 'Een Fries landbouwbedrijfin de tweede helft van de 16e eeuw', Agronomisch-historische Bijdragen 4, Wageningen. Slicher van Bath, B.H. (1963) The Agrarian History of Western Europe, A.D. 500-1850, London. Slicher van Bath, B.H. (1978) Herschreven historie. Schetsen en studien op het gebied der middeleeuwse geschiedenis, Arnhem. [orig. 1949] Spahr van der Hoek, J.J. (1952) Geschiedenis van de Friese landbouw, Leeuwarden. Stein, H-K. (1985) 'Der Grundbesitz der vermogende Li.ibecker und Hamburger Oberschicht im 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert', Zeitschrift des Vereins fiir Liibeckische Geschichte undAltertumskunde, 65. pp. 87-117. Stoob, H. (1959) Geschichte Dithmarschens im Regentenzeitalter, Heide. Staver, W. ( 1942) Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Butjadinger Bauerntums - gezeigt am Beispiel der Eckwarder BauernhOfe, Oldenburg. Swart, F. (1910) Zur friesischen Agrargeschichte, Leipzig. Thiel, E. (1913) Zur Agrargeschichte der Osterstader Marsch, Hannover. Thoen, E. (2002) 'Transitie en economische ontwikkeling in de Nederlanden met de nadruk op de agrarische maatschappij', Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis 28, pp. 148-174. Tielhof, M. van (1995) De Hollandse graanhandel, 1470-1570. Koren op de Amsterdamse molen, The Hague.

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Tienken, A. (1901) 'Die Geest und Marsch des Amtes Hagen in ihren wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen', Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbiicher, 31, pp. 1-221. Ven, G.P. van der (ed) (1993) Man Made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, Utrecht. Vo land, E. ( 1995) 'Resource Competition and Reproduction: The Relationship between Economic and Parental Strategies in the Krummhorn Population (1720-1874)', Human Nature, 6, pp. 33-49. Volger, C.E. (1852) Beschreibung des ehemaligenAmtes Pewsum in ecclesiasticis et politicis [. .. ] in anno 1735, Stade. Volkmar, F.C. (1976) Versuch einer Beschreibung van Eiderstadt in Briefen an einen Freund im Hollsteinischen, Husum. [orig. 1795] Volquardsen, J.R. (1965b) Der Brunottenkoog in der Wiedingharde, Bredstedt. Volquartsen, J.R. (1965a) 'GroB-Bombtill und seine Besitzer seit dem Mittelalter', Nordfriesisches Jahrbuch, l, pp. 120-132. Vries, Jan de (1974) The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700, New Haven and London. Wassermann, E. (1985) Aufstrecksiedlung in Ostfriesland: Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Moorkolonisation, Aurich. Westendorp, N. (1974) Jaarboek van en voorde provincie Groningen, Groningen. [orig. 1829-1832] Wiemann, H. (1969) 'Beitrage zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Ostfrieslands', in J. Ohling (ed), Ostfrieslands im Schutze des Deiches, Pewsum, Vol. I, pp. 377-500. Wiese, H., Bolts, J. (1965) Rinderhaltung im nordwesteuropiiischen Kiistengebiet vom 15. bis zum 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart. Witthohn, P. (1984) 'Aus dem "Stiderteicher" und dem "Norderteicher Teich Buch"', Dithmarschen, Nr. 4, pp. 93-94. Wolf, B. (1989) Unterbauerliche Schichten im Hamburger Marschgebiet: Die Kiitner in der Landherrenschaft Bill- und Ochsenwerder im 18. undAnfang des 19. Jahrhunderts, Hamburg. Woude, A.M. van der ( 1982) 'Large Estates and Small Holdings. Lords and Peasants in the Netherlands during the Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Times', in P. Gunst and T. Hoffmann (eds) Grand domaine et petites exploitations en Europe au Mayen Age et dans les temps modernes, Budapest, pp. 193-207. Zanden, J.L. van (1985) De economische ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse landbouw in de negentiende eeuw, 1800-1914, Utrecht. Zanden, J.L. van (1991) 'From Peasant Economy to Modern Market-Oriented Agriculture: The Transformation of the Rural Economy of the Eastern Netherlands 1800-1914', Economic and Social History in the Netherlands, 3, pp. 37-59. Zimmermann, U. (1977) Die alteste Steuerliste Nordfrieslands, Groningen. Zmolek, M. (2000) 'The Case for Agrarian Capitalism: A Response to Albritton', Journal of Peasant Studies 27, pp.138-159.

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8 Landownership, farming and peasants in Denmark in the Middle Ages Nils

HYBEL,

University of Copenhagen

Charters issued by German emperors in the tenth century to the churches in Slesvig, Ribe, Aarhus and Odense indicate accumulation of large ecclesiastical estates. They also suggest that these estates were occupied by servos et colonos who exclusively should serve the bishops and be subject to the bailiffs of the episcopal churches alone (DD 1 1:1, nos. 330; 343). Apart from these slight and problematic statements we have no direct information about landownership and how land was distributed in Denmark before the end of the eleventh century. The oldest known Danish deed is from 1085. In this we are told that King Knud donated 52 mansi on Sealand and in Scania to the cathedral under construction at Lund. Part of this gift was land given pro pace sua by certain individuals and the deed thus gives reason to believe that the king and lay aristocrats by the turn of the eleventh century had substantial estates (DD 1:2, no. 21).

I.

The distribution of land

It is unquestionable that large holdings did exist in Denmark before 1100. But we don't know more about them than what I have just summed up because the amount of written sources is extremely small before the twelfth century and because archaeological finds are no help in this respect. We just do not know how many estates there were and it is neither possible to form any idea of the sizes of them. Only for the period starting in the year 1103, when the Danish church was placed under its own archbishopric at Lund, the study of how the land was distributed and which legal forms landownership took on becomes possible. From then on we can follow the creation and further development of ecclesiastical and monastic estates in more detail. From the growing number of lists of donations, deeds and charters it appears that this has been a process that had its greatest momentum between the late eleventh and early fourteenth century. The first Danish survey, the Liber Census Daniae or so-called Kong Valdemars Jordebog, was made c. 1230. It is a motley collection of information about the king's estates and his sources of income. The valuation of the king's land on the isle of Funen is in the survey made up to a total of c. 400 marks of gold. On Sealand the king owned a number of more or less important towns and forests in the northern part of the island. The isle of Falster is the part of the realm on which the survey sheds most light.The intention of this section seems to have been to account for the relationship between land owned by the king and by other landowners. The King owned 28% of this island. No doubt this was a much larger portion than he had in any other part of the realm (Aakjrer, 1926). 1 Abbreviations: AaDJ: Aarhus Domkapitels Jordebpger; DD: Diplomatarium Danicum; DDR: Den Danske Rigslovgivning; DM: Danske Magazin; DMR: Danmarks Middealderlige Regnskaber; SMHD: Scriptores Mino res Historiae Danicae; SRO: Scriptores Rerum Danicarum Medii Aevi.

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Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

On Sealand, another large landowner was the Bishop of Roskilde. According to the survey of his estates made around 1370 the bishop owned 2,600 tenant farms for the most part accumulated during the twelfth and thirteenth century (DMR, 2nd Series, Vol. 1). It has been estimated that in the thirteenth century the bishop owned one sixth of the cultivated land of Sealand. This impressive accumulation of land took place partly because the Roskilde diocese was favoured by the kings from its very beginning, partly due to the fact that some of the prominent bishops were recruited from the network of the most powerful magnates on Sealand (Arup, 1932: 125). The estates of the aristocracy on Sealand are rather well documented. Members of the aristocratic network, traditionally called the Hvideslcegt, were the main contributors to the Cistercian monastery in Sor¢. From this institution we have one of the best sources for the study of Danish landownership in the twelfth and thirteenth century. The Liber Donationum Monasterii Sorensis is an annotated list of the land donated to the monks in Sor¢ during the Middle Ages (SRD, Vol. IV). This list, supplemented with papal letters, makes it possible to study the expansion of land belonging to the monastery and to identify the donators from the last decades of the twelfth century. From these sources it has been assessed that members of the so-called Hvideslcegt originally owned more than half of the land in districts around Sor¢, and that in the half century after 1162, when archbishop Absalon, a member of this aristocratic network, had given the former Benedictine monastery to the Cistercians, the latter had accumulated half of the total amount of land that was owned by the monastery on the eve of the Reformation (N¢rlund, 1927). A study of the expansion of the land of the Cistercian monastery in Esrum, also on Sealand, shows a similar development. The enlargement was most intensive from the foundation of the monastery in 1151 to about 1200. This process of accumulation of land also provides an excellent reflection of the status of the landowning aristocracy on Sealand. From 1128, about twenty years before the former Benedictine monastery was handed over to the Cistercians, and into the following century it is possible to trace the donations by the king, the lay aristocracy and various churchmen (Overgaard J¢rgensen, 1987). In Jutland the chronicle Exordium Monasterii Qvoud Dicitur Cara lnsula informs us about the creation of the monastery in 0m located in the mid-eastern part of the peninsula. This monastery too acquired vast estates in the first half century after its foundation in 1166. Like the Cistercians in Sor¢ their fellow brothers at 0m during this period seem to have accumulated almost half the amount of land they possessed just before the Reformation. The bishops of Aarhus must have been their major patrons. In 1180, for example, bishop Sven donated 6 villages to the monastery (SMHD, Vol. II).

Large-scale landownership was a feature becoming more and more conspicuous during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The king, the religious institutions and private persons and families concentrated large estates in their hands. Still, judged from the provincial laws from this period, peasant landownership seems to have been the standard in the High Middle Ages. Together with the fact that in this period most of the land donated to the ecclesiastical institutions was located in villages, this conveys the impression that in most villages there was a division between farms owned by magnates and farms owned by individual peasants. But it also reflects the simple fact that land was indeed very

188

Landownership, farming and peasants in Denmark in the Middle Ages

unevenly distributed and that there was a non-landowning segment. At the opening of the thirteenth century archbishop Anders Sunesen gave the following paraphrase of the Law of Scania: 'some have to lease out land and some have to lease from others' (Sunesen, ch. 143-149) in Danmarks gamle landskabslove, II). The so called Law of Scania is one of the three records of the provincial courts in Scania and on Sealand, extant from the end of the twelfth to the second part of the thirteenth century. These law books, and the Law of Jutland from 1241, suggest a society that in majority consisted of free peasant landowners. Three hundred years later, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, peasant landowners owned at most one-eight of Denmark even though Danish kings during the preceding centuries had tried with increasing vigour to prevent peasants from giving up ownership by handing over their land to aristocratic magnates and lease the land instead in order to avoid royal claims and/or to seek protection (Erslev, 1898-1905: 621; Christensen, 1903: 517-520; Arup, 1932: 117). We cannot say how important this process was, since we do not know how many peasant landowners there were in Denmark in the high Middle Ages. Neither do we know when peasants began to give up landownership in return for leasehold, but the process was possibly pronounced around the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century due to internal unrest, civil wars and rebellion. The first sign we have of the king's awareness of the problem is in a royal charter from the 1250's, and in a body oflaws issued in 1304. In these documents a ban on patronage must be read as an attempt to prevent peasants to give up landownership in exchange for protection against royal burdens (DDR indtil 1400, pp. 50 and 310). If this interpretation is correct the ban was violated again and again. Several deeds from the fourteenth century prove that peasant landowners continuously handed over land to lay and spiritual lords, and subsequently leased it back (DD, 2:5, no. 342; 2:9, no. 398; 3: 1, no. 14; SRD VI, pp. 397 and 486). At the tum of the fourteenth century the crown appears to have eventually succeeded in stopping this process. A royal statute, issued by Queen Margrete in 1396, sets down the norm that would remain valid during the late medieval period, namely that the nobility was not allowed to buy up freehold land. In the same document freeholders are considered to be 'peasants of the crown' (DDR indtil 1400, pp. 335-336). Much later, in a court verdict of 1507, any parcelling out of freehold farms was forbidden, and it was underlined that the land should be kept under cultivation and the royal taxes paid (Repertorium Diplomaticum 2nd Series VI, nos. 10890 and 10896). During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the separation between tax-free aristocratic land and peasant land subject to royal taxation became more and more distinct. Just like the nobility could not buy peasant freehold land, it was entered in the coronation charter of King Hans from 1483 that neither the crown nor any unfree peasant could buy tax-free aristocratic land, or take it as security (DDR 1397-1513, p. 152). It is impossible to estimate the relative size of social classes in Denmark in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is even impossible to determine how the land was distributed between magnates and peasant landowners. It is neither possible to estimate the seize of the non-landowning segment of the peasant population in the high Middle Ages. At the end of the Middle Ages perhaps one sixth of the Danish peasants were freeholders

189

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

while the rest were tenant farmers. About one third of these tenant farmers leased Crownlands, another third held church land while the last third were tenants of land owned by the lay nobility (Erslev, 1898-1905: 621; Arup, 1932: 117-118). In the duchy of Schleswig there were about 14,500 peasant farms in the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Duke owned about 2,000 farms or some 14% of the farms in the duchy. About 2,300 peasant farms were church property and 2, 700 were in the hands of the lay nobility while 7,500 farms were owned by peasants (Carsten Porskrog Rasmussen, Rentegods og hovedgardsdrift. Godsstrukturer og gods¢konomi i hertugd¢mmet Slesvig 15241770, I, Aabenraa 2002: 111, 117-118). We have seen that the bishop of Roskilde in the fourteenth century owned 2,600 farms. Thus, the bishop was richer than the Duke of Schleswig and any lay nobleman at the end of the Middle Ages. Mo gens Goye, who in 1536 owned around 1,500 peasant farms, was the richest Danish nobleman in the late Middle Ages, but other owned several hundred farms. When Poul Laxman died in 1502 he had 900 farms, at MetteAlberchtsdatter 's death in 1513 she had 710 farms, and Axel Lagesen Brok left about 600 farms when he died in 1498 (Ulsig, 1958: 289-302).

II. Landownership In the provincial laws peasant landowners appear burdened by personal military obligations, living in rather well organized villages, in some cases together with free leasehold tenants - who were likewise subject to military service. According to high medieval Danish law landownership was in principle the same for all landowners: they all seem to have enjoyed equal legal rights and to have been subjected to military obligations and the same rules of inheritance - which did not consider land as private property in the modern sense of the term. The laws considered land a very personal thing. When people married they brought together their inherited personal holdings into a so-call fcellig - a joint ownership, of which adult children and unrelated persons could also be part. When a married couple 'parted', as the Law of Sealand puts it, 'either dead or alive without any children, the husband or his heirs shall have as much land as he brought into the fcellig and the wife or her heirs shall take what she brought into the fcellig' - the joint ownership (Eriks Sj::ellandske Lov, I, ch.l). The laws make a distinction between personal holding - the separate land - in a fcellig, and the land bought by this collectivity. The latter land is considered joint property. In case of divorce this acquired land had to be divided between the husband and the wife. If one of the spouses died and the couple had no children alive, the acquired land is to be divided between the widow and the heirs of the deceased. Thus, land bought by afcellig becomes personal land when the fcellig is given up because of the death of one of the parties or on account of a divorce (Eriks Sj::ellandske Lov, I, ch. 3; Skaanske Lov, ch. 7). Adding to this that the rules of inheritance allowed sons to have full shares and daughters half shares, and that there is no trace of primogeniture, strict application of the laws would have implied a constant redistribution of properties. The provincial laws in principle countervailed the tendency of accumulation of land into fewer hands (Jyske Lov, I, ch. 4; Eriks Sjaellandske Lov, I, ch. 4 and 6; Skaanske Lov, ch. 22).

190

Landownership, farming and peasants in Denmark in the Middle Ages

If these laws of inheritance and succession had been strictly observed, lay accumulation of large estates would hardly have been possible. Therefore, the provincial laws in this respect should be interpreted as much as an attempt by the church at creating a state of peace by strengthening kinship as a reflection of actual custom. During the period when the provincial laws and the Law of Jutland were written down (see above), the Danish kings gradually gained control over the military forces of the realm and the capability of imposing taxes on the population (Hybel, 2003). Accordingly, the laws, as mentioned before, prescribe that landownership and lease of land implied military obligations. All landowners who owned at least two marks of land had to perform personal military service, unless they were permitted to send a servant instead. Leaseholders, who by the laws were considered legally independent persons, i.e. persons who could plead in cases of theft and malicious damage perpetrated on the holding they leased, were also liable to military service if they paid a rent of four 0rtug 2 of silver or more. When paying less, they should pay eight (ilrtug of silver to the King instead. But the laws accentuate that tenants leasing free land that by royal privilege was exempt from military services or tax, have no military obligations, whether the land was owned by bishops, priests, monasteries and churches, or by peasants or housecarls (Jyske Lov, III, ch. 2, 7, and 11-13).

Actually only lay landowners and leaseholders seem to have been seriously burdened by various royal claims and personal military services. Royal privileges following donations to ecclesiastical and monastic institutions freed the donated land, and every leaseholder living on it, from these burdens time and again. In the greater part of the twelfth century only leaseholders - coloni - are mentioned in royal charters granting exemption from royal burdens and jurisdiction. But froml 184 onwards, when the pope confirmed the liberties of Roskilde Chapter, individuals, to whom the chapter had farmed out manors - villici - are still more often referred to in the charters. After 1250 the phrase villici et coloni can be found in the majority of of royal charters. 3 About 1241 priests who lived in celibacy, were absolved from royal tax and personal military obligations in the provincial law of Jutland, and about the end of the fourteenth century general measures were taken to free religious institutions from any royal burden whatsoever, including military service. The first time this occurred, was in King Oluf's coronation charter from 1376 (Jyske Lov, III, ch 10; DDR indtil 1400, p. 277). For the majority of the lay population personal military service seems to have been commuted during the thirteenth century, if it had ever existed at all in the way it was depicted in the provincial laws. If that is what indeed happened, the free peasant landowners in reality became mere taxpayers, while the large landowners - the lay aristocracy - kept their high status expressed in their right to bear arms and their obligation of performing military service for the king. If on the other hand the military system as mirrored in the laws merely expressed wishful thinking in circles around the crown and the higher clergy, who presumably produced the laws, the burdens imposed on the free peasantry in the centuries after the writing down of the laws were a novelty, which could then be

2

Unit for the payment of land rent. One !Z)rtug = one third of an ore= one eight of a mark. DD, 1:3, nos. 118, 143, 192; 1:4, nos. 115, 118; 1:5, nos 63, 107; 1:6, nos. 38, 244; 1:7, no. 21; 2:1, nos. 2, 3, 15, 16, 27.

3

191

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

sanctioned with reference to the laws' normative provisions for military service in a distant past. In principle three forms of landownership crystallized at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century: 1. Ecclesiastical and monastic landownership free of royal burdens at the will of the king. 2. Free aristocratic landownership conditioned by personal military services and/or the ability of self-defence. 3. Peasant landownership subject to a variety of royal claims. It must be stressed that all three groups consisted of landowners, they all had land in property. It is also important to keep in mind that the nobility gradually freed itself of military service, so far as it ever had been an uninterrupted royal prerogative to conscript the nobility. 4 With respect to the access to land the traditional concept of feudalism does not at all apply to the realm of Denmark in the Middle Ages. But the accumulation of land and the differentiation of landownership described above resulted in deterioration of peasant landownership. As we shall see, it might be reasonable to speak in this context of a process of feudalization.

III. The farming of manors Besides the grange system of the Cistercians, which was introduced in Denmark in the second half of the twelfth century, two types of large-scale production co-existed from the last decades of the twelfth century on: manors at farms and manors directly managed by stewards. The attempts of the Cistercians to consolidate their land are well known. In the beginning of the thirteenth century the monastery in Sor¢ had concentrated about 60% of their land in the district surrounding Sor¢, but much of it was scattered over rather small plots (N¢rlund, 1924: 86). The same endeavour can be traced when the Cistercians in Jutland moved from Kalv¢ to 0m and sold possessiones suas, que longe lateque disperse erant (SMHD, 176). The monks in Esrum seem to have been fairly successful in consolidating their land too. By the opening of the thirteenth century the greater part of their land had been consolidated (J¢rgensen, 1987). But consolidation did not automatically lead to the creation of granges. In the charters we find distinctions between plots of land in villages, entire villages and land connected to a mansio and granges. 5 The steward as an agrarian manager may be an ancient figure in Danish agrarian history. The first vague traces go back to the first years of the twelfth century, but all evidence of direct management by stewards is tentative until the late fourteenth century. Conclusive proof is only produced by the first steward's account that has been handed 4 In the coronation charter of Kristoffer II from 1320 the right of the King to force the nobility to fight outside the realm is abolished. But this provision must be understood in the light of struggle between Kristoffer's predecessor Erik VI Menved and the nobility. Among other issues the military campaigns abroad had given offence for years due to Erik's ambitious foreign policy. DDR, 188. 5 See for example the accounts for the land given to the monks in Esrum by the Archbishops of Lund, Asser and Eskil from 1133 and 1158 and the ratification of the estates of the monastery in Soro issue by Archbishop Absalon between 1186 and 1197. DD, 1:2, nos. 56, 126; 1:3, no. 140.

192

Landownership, farming and peasants in Denmark in the Middle Ages

down from medieval Denmark. It dates from 1388/99 and bears upon the Bishop of Ribe's manor Brink on the west coast of Jutland. 6 This does of course not prove that direct farming was exceptional in the thirteenth century. Some of the mansiones of the lay magnates may very well have been managed by the landowner himself or by stewards in mutual partnership with the owner. The latter arrangement is described in the provincial laws. 7 The alternative farming system appears for the first time in Danish sources in the 1180's. As indicated above, the first charter which mentions a mansio with villici et coloni dates from 1184, and the same combination of words becomes more common in the following century. In particular after 1250 the farming out of manors spread rapidly (Hybel, 1995). In the fourteenth century this system was dominant on the lands of the best recorded ecclesiastical estates - those of the bishop of Roskilde and the canons of Aarhus - and for the same century one can trace manors that were leased out in sources covering lay estates as well. 8 Most manors belonging to Danish lay magnates were in all appearance leased out around the beginning of the late Middle Ages. These manors were, as far as we know from the few sources, either farmed out against a fixed rent or in a share-cropping arrangement, like in the rest of Western Europe. Metayage can possibly be traced down in Denmark to 1261 when the villici of the canons of Ribe are referred to as partiarii colentes terras ipsorum. 9 Firm evidence of share-cropping can be found in a deed from 1310, issued by Bishop Oluf of Roskilde. Here the villici paid one third of the grain grown on the bishop's estates. 10 A few cases of metayage can also be observed in the register of revenues of the canons of Ribe from 1291 (Avia Ripensis, 65 and 74). It is much more uncertain under which conditions and by whom the land was actually tilled. Unlike in England, France and Western Germany, in Danish medieval sources labour services are only rarely recorded. The survey of the land of the Aarhus canons from the second decade of the fourteenth century provides the earliest hard evidence. It does not point to regular week-work being normal, but only a limited number of boondays. In the survey of the estates of the Bishop of Roskilde from c. 1370 week-work was performed on only one manor. In all other locations the peasants performed boonwork at more or less the same level as that shown in the survey from Aarhus.

'Perseptio pecunie per Cristernum Jacobi anno quarto ex parte domini episcopi Ripensis'. DM, 8th series VI, 319. 7 In one of the chapters dealing with these so called 'fa:llagh bryti' they are opposed to another official called a 'retha: swa:n'. What this word means, is uncertain, but it could be accountant or even steward. Jyske Lov, II, chapter 66. 8 The first Danish manorial survey is a survey of the land of the canons of Aarhus Chapter. It has been dated to between 1313 and 1321. AaDJ, III: 5-72.The next one is the aforementioned survey of the estates of the Bishop of Roskilde from about 1370. It contains retrospective parts which have been dated to the last decade of the thirteenth century. DMR, op.cit. 9 'Villici vel coloni partiarii vel nummis colentes terras ipsorum.' It is not certain from the context whether partiarii refers to the villici or the coloni. DD, 2: 1, no. 328. 10 'Dant tertiam annone.' D.D., 2:6, no. 251.

6

193

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

Prior to 1500 labour services did not play an important part in Danish agriculture. Still, much labour was needed on the large farms. The two surveys from the fourteenth century demonstrate a very marked stratification in the distribution of land. In the district of Aarhus the farms of the villici were ten time the size of the land sown by the coloni. On the Aarhus Chapter's estates on Sealand the difference was even more striking. In Jutland the villicilcoloni ratio was normally one to four or more and a substantial part of the peasantry held very small plots of land or should even be classified as cottars. The same picture has been deduced from the survey of the Bishop of Roskilde. Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that many peasants and the cottars were forced to work on the large estates as day-labourers (Christensen, 1964: 257-260; AaDJ III: 63-67). Anyhow, there is not much direct evidence of wages or wage-labourers in Danish sources. A few examples of mercennarii, which might be interpreted as wage-labourers, can be found on the Cistercian estates from the end of the twelfth century. In addition there is evidence in Innocent Ill's charter to the monastery of Soro from 1198 and in the 0m chronicle where it sets down the life of Bishop Sven in the 1180's. In the latter source we are told how highly Bishop Sven did respect the manual labour of the laybrothers and how he even took care of paying the lay workers if the monks were not able to do so. Mercennarii are also mentioned in Alexander IV's charter to the Cistercian nunnery in Roskilde from 1257 (DD 1:3, no. 241; 2:1, no. 234; SMHD II: 188). A century later there were about twenty persons on the payroll of the above mentioned Bishop of Ribe's manor Brink. Eleven of them were probably agricultural workers (Hybel, 1994: 54-55). Still, the very little information on labour services, the distinct difference between peasant holdings and demesne farms, and the evidence of a landless stratum within the rural population all make it plausible to conclude that wage-labour cannot have been absent in Danish manorial production, and also that the wage-labourers must have been largely recruited from the social strata of cottars and tenants on small holdings. In the opening years of the thirteenth century Anders Sunesen, in his aforementioned Latin paraphrase of the Law of Scania, described the lease terms of these smallholders coloni - as one-year leasehold contracts (Sunesen, ch. 143-149). It would seem that this type of contract was prevalent during the next two or three centuries. Article twentythree of King Oluf's coronation charter from 1376 can be read as a reminder of such free leasehold terms in the provincial laws (DDR indtil 1400, p. 281). The first actual information about the leases paid by coloni are to be found in the two fourteenth-century surveys of the estates of the canons of Aarhus Chapter and the Bishop of Roskilde. They give the impression of fixed rents in contrast with the [negotiable leases] of the villici, whereas in reality of course the rents of smallholders and cottagers could be adjusted each year. From a European perspective it can be argued that the way in which large landed estates were run in later medieval Denmark was relatively progressive. It was marked by wage-labour, short-term leaseholds, and [adjustable] rents. These were the very features that were aspired to all over Western Europe in the thirteenth century and in the first part of the fourteenth century - in particular of course in those parts, most typically England, where the classical manorial system, characterized by direct management and unfree forced labour, was still widespread. In the twelfth century both the Christian

194

Landownership, farming and peasants in Denmark in the Middle .lges

faith and large landownership were still young in Denmark. This is probably the reason why the organization of large estates from the very beginning of it neatly responded to the long-term upward demographic and price movements of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as well as to new trends in management that became known from new treatises on estate management, administration and agricultural technology. The farming of manors, peasant leaseholds, and wage-labour in agriculture were not introduced in Denmark against the background of a tottering manorial system. They were initial relations of production which also in the crucial half century before the Black Death seem to have matched the international and national economic climate very well. That is perhaps one of the reasons why in Danish sources no trace of a major structural change in large estate exploitation can be found before the fifteenth century.

IV. The peasant farming system The survey of the lands of the Bishop of Roskilde was made when the third plague epidemic presumably ravaged Denmark about 1370. In this survey an intact manorial system is recorded, but there are signs of desertions and, perhaps more important, there is also information about villages without manors. A peasant farming system is detectable, in which all the land was distributed between peasant holdings. In fact, in just 62 out of 224 villages (i.e. 28%) in which the bishop owned land there were manors or units belonging to a manor. This distribution between peasant holdings and manors definitely foreshadows the typical Danish peasant farming system known from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it certainly is also reminiscent of the picture of the preceding centuries in which small-scale peasant production outside large landed estates probably dominated agricultural production. For that reason, the pattern that becomes visible in the Roskilde survey needs in itself not to be taken as a sign of structural change in the middle of a demographic decline. Still, structural changes did happen on the Roskilde estates between the end of the fourteenth and the sixteenth century. Unfortunately, the fifteenth century remains very shadowy. There are no Danish surveys available before the sixteenth century. Therefore one can do no better than compare the survey from ca. 1370 with a survey from about two hundred years later. It provides the following picture of structural change on the Roskilde estates:

Table 8.1

Structural changes on the estates of the Bishop of Roskilde

Manorial units Peasant holdings Cottars Peasants + cottars

Anno 1370

Sixteenth century

119 1539 431 1970

19 1436 46 1482

Source: Christensen, 1964: 269-277.

195

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

The comparison points to an almost complete abandonment of manorial production and nearly a 25% decline in the number of peasants and cottagers; in particular the number of the cottagers had tumbled down by some 90%, apparently creating more equal peasant communities and an economy based on peasant production. In contrast a very distinct social stratification is detectable in the survey from 1370:

Table 8.2

Social stratification on the estates of the Bishop of Roskilde, 1370 Percentage of farms

Cottages and farms with < 4 prtug Farms of 4-8 ¢rtug Farms of 8-12 ¢rtug

60 25 15

Percentage of land 25 36 40

Source: Christensen, 1964: 269-277. Table 8.2 shows that cottars and small tenants made up more than half of the total number of tenants, but they only tilled one quarter of the peasant land. The biggest tenant farms made up nearly 15% of the total number of holdings and they cultivated no less than nearly 40% of the land, while the middle layer constituted ca. 25% of the holdings and tilled almost 36%. A similar social stratification is indicated by the already mentioned Aarhus survey from ca. 1313. Here as well a substantial section of the rural population were either landless cottars or held very small plots of land. A general survey of the diocese of Sealand from 1567 provides further indication that the ratio between peasant holdings and cottars improved drastically in the post Black Death period. The survey is among other things accounting for the number of peasants liable to render tithe to the churches on Sealand. In the survey two categories of peasants are mentioned - decimantes and garsaeder. Of course, the former term refers to the peasant or rather tenant holdings liable to tithe whereas the latter is more obscure. The Latin word for it - inquilinus - appears for the first time in Danish sources from around 1230. On Sealand the name for small holder and cottar from that point in time slowly changed from colonus into inquilinus or gartsaetae, being the standard in the surveys of the fourteenth century. But in the sixteenth century these names gradually fell into disuse. In the survey only in one district the distinction between decimantes and garsaeder seems to have been carried out consistently. In 0lstykke herred 255 decimantes and 46 garsaeder are listed. In other districts of the diocese even fewer garsaeder are recorded; in Sm¢rum, for example, the district around Copenhagen, merely twenty-one against no less than 439 decimantes. It can be proved that many cottars are not recorded as garsaeder in the survey and also that the term sometimes coyers normal tenant farmers, i.e. is used synonymous with decimanus. In short, it is difficult to produce statistics from the survey, but it leaves the impression that peasant society, even in the district of 0lstykk:e, had undergone a process of levelling in the late Middle Ages (Sjrellands Landebog 1567).

196

Landownership, farming and peasants in Denmark in the Middle Ages

Still, the distribution of land among the peasants was far from even in the sixteenth century. From the survey of the Chancellor (rigshofmesteren) Mogens G0ye's estates from 1532 it has been calculated that 31 % of G0ye's peasant holdings on Sealand measured 1-4 tfi)nder hartkorn (tdr.hrt.) against 38% 4-8, 22% 8-12, and 9% 12-20.11 From this calculation it can be concluded further that on a large part of the peasant holdings - perhaps on more than half - hired labour was an absolute necessity. But the levelling process continued into the seventeenth century. In 1688 a national land register was published on the basis of which the following calculation of the distribution of tenant holding sizes on Sealand can be made:

Table 8.3

The distribution of tenant farms on Sealand, 1688

Size class in tOnder hartkorn 1-2 2-4 4-8 8-12 12-20

No. of farms

Percentage of farms

699 2835 8365 3109 917

4.4 17.8 52.5 19.5 5.8

Source: Pedersen, 1928: 361-363. 12

Comparing Table 8.3 with the calculated distribution ofland among Mogens G0ye's peasants above tells us that the dominance of medium sized holding (4 to 12 tdr.hrt.) was more outspoken in 1688 than in 1530. Cottars with less than one tdr.hrt. of land or no land at all also have been left out of Table 8.3, but according to the 1688 land register there were 4,724 of such people. Thus, nearly 23% of the total number of holdings belonged to cottars with very small plots of land or no land at all. Compared with the social stratification on the estates of the Bishop of Roskilde in 1370 - cf. Table 8.2 - the relative number of the members of this more or less landless stratum was rather moderate at the end of the seventeenth century, even though in 1688 3,131 out of 4,724 cottars were absolutely landless. On the Roskilde estates in 1370 cottars and smallholders made up 60% of the total number of cottar- and tenant holdings. In 1688 the percentage of cottars and smallholders on Sealand as a whole was only 22. From this perspective one may speak of a process of levelling out of peasant society from the late Middle Ages to the Early Modern period as well. But when comparing the ratios between manors and the number of smallholders and cottars in 1370 and 1688 such a description is perhaps not too evident.

11 Tdr. hrt. (t(inde hartkorn) unit of land valuation. One tdr. hrt =the value of one barrel ofrye or barley or 2 barrels of oats. Eline Goyes Jordebog; Ulsig, 1968: 330-331. 12 231 farms of more than 20 tdr. hrt. have been left out, because farms of that size on Sealand must have been manors, not tenant holdings.

197

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

Table 8.4 shows that there were 231 farms with more than 20 tdr.hrt. of land on Sealand in 1688 and 4,724 cottars and smallholders, i.e. 20.45 per manor. According to Table 8.1in1370 there were 431 cottars and 119 manors on the estates of the Bishop of Roskilde, i.e. 3 .62 cottar per manor. The ratio between the total number of tenant farmers plus cottars in 1370, and the number of manors on the Roskilde estates was 16.55, i.e. five less than the ratio of cottars plus smallholders to manors in 1688. In that respect it is perhaps not that obvious to speak of social levelling. Table 8.4 Number of cottars and smallholders per manorial unit in 1370 and 1688 Year

No. of cottars +smallholders

No. of manors

Ratio

1370 1688

431 4,724

119 231

3.62 20.45

It is perhaps more obvious that in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period a substantial portion of the peasantry must have been just as badly off as many cottars and agricultural labourers probably were in the pre-plague period, even though it is much easier to find documents about a prosperous stratum in Danish peasant society than it is to trace the fate of the poor. Valuations of the silver, money, oxen and cows of wealthy tenants from the early sixteenth century show that some peasants were fairly rich. They possessed movable property with values up to 400 Marks, even though there were marked differences in peasant wealth (DMR, 5th Series II: 38-52). Some peasants were prosperous probably because they just had cleverly and energetically taken advantage of available resources and the favourable international economic situation. Denmark was exporting animal products in the Middle Ages, and this export became increasingly valuable from the late fourteenth century onwards, when the demand for fat, bacon, beef and hides in the urban centres of the Netherlands and Northern Germany increasingly stimulated Danish agriculture.

V.

The f eudalization of the peasantry

In European historiography it is traditional to consider the late Middle Ages as 'the golden age of the people' .13 This view has also been adopted by Danish historians referring to the declining rents and the abundance of land caused by the demographic downturn of the fourteenth century. Back in 1931 C.A. Christensen did find indications that the price of lease land dropped with roughly 50%, after having compared prices of realestate, mortgage bonds and rents in the period before 1330 with the years 1330 to 1400. On the basis of these estimates he dated the decisive swing to the 1340's and claimed that the peasantry must have lived at subsistence level around 1300 (Christensen, 19301931). Accepting Christensen's very sophisticated calculations it must be stressed that land rent of course was not the only burden imposed on tenant farmers. In addition to leases for their plots of land they had to pay other dues. 13 One of the first, if not the first, using this phrase was H.M. Hyndman in his book The Historical Basis of Socialism in England from 1883.

198

Landownership, farming and peasants in Denmark in the Middle Ages

Rents on the estates of the Bishop of Roskilde, both for the farmers of manorial units and the tenant holdings, were made up of a land rent in grain, butter or money, and a variety of other dues, primarily consisting of domestic animals. In contrast some of the villici farming the manors of the canons of Ribe at the end of the thirteenth century, as mentioned aboYe, paid one-third of the grain grown as a land rent plus, for example, certain quantities of cheese, butter or wool. Other farmers had to provide domestic animals and dairy products together with a fixed quantity of grain, while the lesser tenants only paid a fixed rent in money or grain (Avia Ripensis). Likewise the canons of Aarhus about 1315 demanded a substantial rent in grain and some petty dues from the manors that were farmed out, but merely boon-days, a little money and some poultry from the lesser tenant farmers (AaDJ). Apparently it was something new in the late fourteenth century that both the manors at farms and the tenant holdings of the Bishop of Roskilde were liable to paying a principal land rent and additional dues, presumably of a more personal nature than the land rent. Perhaps the Bishop of Roskilde in 1370 tried to compensated possible losses of the land rent in grain, butter or money, lamented by the accountant in several entries of the survey, by imposing both land rent and additional dues not merely on the farmers of his manors but also on his smaller tenants. In principle the same composition of rent as on the Roskilde estates can be found about one and a half century later in the above mentioned survey of the estates of Mo gens G0ye from 1532. Here rent was paid in money, grain, domestic animals, hospitality, etcetera, but grain was the principal form of retribution, making up perhaps half the total amount of the land rent (Eline Goyes Jordebog). Unfortunately no one as yet tried to estimate the value of the various dues in the Roskilde survey by comparing the value of the principal land rent with the additional personal dues. Therefore, and because there are no Danish surveys from the fifteenth century to compare with, it is difficult to say whether the relative burden of the personal dues was on the rise in the late Middle Ages. Still, Yarious charters indicate that a system of land rents, comparable with the one found in the Roskilde survey, was standard on many estates in the fifteenth century (Ulsig, 1968: 336). The [adaptation] of dues and services from the late fourteenth century was maybe the landowners' response to dwindling land rents. Perhaps it is merely a relic of a rentier class's successful attempt to push up their revenue. From a legal point of view one might say that the Danish peasantry was under pressure in the late Middle Ages. Tenant farmers became increasingly subject to the judicial power of the landowners. In Scania this happened already from 1284 onwards; in the rest of the realm the idea was for the first time expressed in the coronation charter of 1320, when private lords were granted some of the royal fines, i.e. part of the jurisdiction over their tenants. This development escalated in the fifteenth century and culminated in the first quarter of the sixteenth century when the Crown in 1536 privatized jurisdiction completely. At that time the task of accusing, trying, and eventual executing of tenants was put into the hands of the landowning nobility (J0rgensen, 1940: 389sqq.; Christensen, 1903: 607sqq.). Various attempts were made to tie the peasants during the demographic downturn of the second half of the fourteenth century. Both free peasant landowners and leaseholders suffered humiliation and were deprived of control over their estates. As we have seen

199

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

above, from the end of the fourteenth century freeholders were considered as peasants of the Crown. We have also seen how the Crown during the following centuries exercised authority over freehold farms in different ways. Article twenty-three in King Oluf's coronation charter can be read as a reminder that tenants had to give notice to the landowner when they renounced their tenancy and that he should then set them free at their request according to the provincial law (cf. Sunesen, chapters 143-149). If this reading is correct, the article might be interpreted as a royal measure against some landowners' attempts to impose bondage on their tenants when the demographic effects of the plague epidemics probably were most severe. In fact the landowners did not succeed in their intent before the demographic evolution presumably had taken another turn. The first solid signs of peasant bondage appear in the sources in the first halfof thel490's, in 1495 or perhaps in 1492, and they substantiate that bondage was of recent date. The so called vornedskab implied the right of the landowner to impose bondage on male persons born on his land. In 1521-1522 it was provided by Royal Statute that vorned could not be sold or given away. This humiliation did no doubt only happen to the peasantry on Sealand, Lolland, Falster and M0n with sorrounding small islands, while it is open to dispute whether indeed all peasants or only the tenants of private lay and ecclesiastical lords were included. The fate of the free peasant landowners, who, as we saw, were more and more considered to be peasants of the crown, is somewhat uncertain in this respect (Pedersen, 1984). During the late Middle Ages the Danish peasantry was subject to a gradual feudalization process - in some ways parallel to what happened in Northern Germany east of the Elbe and in the eastern part of Central Europe. Still, the unfree status of the Danish peasantry could not be described as serfdom or villeinage like these institutions are known from late medieval and early modern Eastern Europe or central medieval Western Europe. Various oppressive obligations known from these institutions, such as merchet or heriot, were never imposed on Danish peasants, and they were never burdened by heavy labour services at the will of the lord as were their contemporary colleagues from Eastern Europe or as the serfs in the West in the high Middle Ages had been. Anyhow, the Danish peasantry seriously came down in the world. Peasant landownership was a focus in the provincial laws of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The laws describe the peasantry as legally independent individuals, capable of carrying arms and having military obligations. At the end of the Middle Ages all such marks of freedom had disappeared.

200

Landownership, farming and peasants in Denmark in the Middle Ages

Bibliography Printed sources Aarhus Domkapitels Jordeb¢ger (AaDJ), vol. III, Copenhagen 1975. Aakjkonomi i hertugdpmmet Slesvig 1524-1770, Aabenraa. Ulsig, E. (1968) Danske Adelsgodser i Middelalderen, Copenhagen.

202

9 Rural credit and land market in the Duchy of Schleswig c. 1450-1660 Bj¢m PouLSEN, University of Arhus

I.

Introduction

Years ago, it was hardly recognized that pre-industrial European peasants were involved in credit operations and, if it was noted at all, peasants were nearly always considered the weak and exploited party in such relations. However, recent research has led to a much more positive view of credit in agricultural societies and it is now unusual to paint the picture of rural credit only in dark colours. Rather, rural credit is regarded as part of a general process of commercialization and as an expression of modernization, often with a positive appraisal of its economic role (e.g. Holderness, 1976; Rebel, 1983; Poulsen, l 990b; Epstein, 1998). It is therefore possible to see rural credit as a subdivision of a land market with peasants serving as active agents. This is of course closely related to our changing general understanding of peasantries (cf. Poulsen, 1997). In the following I shall deal with the widespread use of credit from the mid-fifteenth century up to the mid-seventeenth century among peasants or better, farmers on the west coast of the Duchy of Schleswig. 1 This credit was, as I am going to demonstrate, structurally connected to land ownership and the land market. Also, it had direct consequences for the use of reading and writing. Some of the earliest account books written by peasants in Europe have come down to us from the same area (Poulsen, 1992). The internal structure of these books will be examined below. In a wider sense, the increasing use of money and credit furthered the integration of town and country, and became a precondition for new cultural patterns in our region.

II. Sources Most of the earliest extant sources are to be found in church archives. Among them are, for instance, documents and accounts registering the buying of rents (Rentenkauf) by the institution in question. A typical document surviving from 1493 records how in Schobiill a peasant called Volquard Jensen sold an annual rent of one mark to a vicar in Husum for the sum of fifteen marks. The security Volquard provided was one Demat (ca. 0.45 hectare) of land in Hatsted Marsch (Christensen, 1932: 356 no. 7366). An analysis and comparison of accounts can provide some insight into the structure and development of peasant credit. For instance, the accounts of the Chapter of Schleswig from 1466 show that at the time the Chapter received no money rents from peasants,

1 Doubt has been expressed about the usefulness of the contrasting terms 'peasant' versus (capitalist) 'farmer'. E.g. Christiansen, 1985.

203

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

although it did from noblemen, and these rents amounted to a substantial amount of money. By 1532, however, the situation had changed dramatically. Out of the total chapter capital of 1515 Lubeck marks, peasants had borrowed 995, townsmen 300 and the nobility only 220 (Poulsen, 1988: 116 sqq). This can only be taken as evidence of important changes. From the late fifteenth century onwards, one also comes across private documents such as the one drawn up in 1491 by Eler Martens of Stintebiill, a peasant from the isle of Strand (now Nordstrand) (Christensen, 1935: 491 - no. 6903s). It contains Eler's will, and details his donations to local churches and ecclesiastical institutions, namely the parish church, Schleswig Cathedral and the Morber Augustine monastery. The account money on the isle of Strand was partly in Liibeck marks and schillings and partly in English pounds a very unusual situation in the northern German and in the Danish region. Most probably, this use of English account money is an indication of the early integration of the western Schleswig area into a North Sea economy. The money Martens donated to his parish church amounted to 10 English pounds (30 Liibeck marks). However, this was not cash money but money already lent to a man called Peter Banesen against a security of ii deymet landes beleghen in Anne Ypkes mark, namely, two Dematofland (ca. 0.9 hectares) in a specified place. So, what the church in fact received was the interest on invested capital. This was not the only credit operation in which Eler Martens was involved. After the notes on donations to churches, the document continues with a section headed Dyt is de inschult Eler MartensjJ ('This is the credit owed to Eler Martens'), followed by a list of seventeen people indebted to Martens for money and other goods. The amounts of money that were advanced are distributed as follows (Table 9.1):

Table 9.1

Eler Martens' (Stintebiill, Strand) loans, 1491

Liibeck marks

-1

-------

Number of persons

2

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

I 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 I 34

---------

I

4

2

I

I

Source: Repertorium Diplomaticum Regni Danici Medicevalis. 2. Series, ed. William Christensen, vol. 7, Copenhagen 1935, no. 6903s.

Eler Martens' list contains two small amounts (seven and eleven Liibeck schillings, respectively), a number of medium amounts and three large entries of eighteen, twentytwo and twenty-four marks, respectively. The person who had borrowed eighteen marks was the most powerful man on the island, namely the king's official - the staller Laurens Leve. Only three cases deal with non-cash transactions: one peasant was recorded as owing twelve sheep (half of them old sheep), a couple of heirs to a peasant, and a widow who received 3.5 marks and two loads of straw. In three cases, security comprising a specified quantity of Demats of land is mentioned. Eler Martens' list very much resembles the early peasant account books of Schleswig. The oldest that has survived - a 206-page book bound in leather - was begun by a man named Walke Widdesen, who lived in the village of Maas, just outside the town of

204

Rural credit and land market in the Duchy of Schleswig c. 1450-1660

Husum. 2 Widdesen was an important man in his local community and functioned as the king's official - a herredsfoged (lit. 'hundred bailiff') - in the district S¢nder Gos herred. Around 1511 Widdesen began writing in his book, starting with a somewhat selfassured sentence: /ck Walke Wyddefi bekene dat dyt nha geschreuen ys myn rekenschop sza /ck wyll voer Gode unde allen Chrysten mynschenn bekant wesenn ('I, Walke Widdesen, recognize that what has been written down below is my account [book], which I want to be known by God and by all Christian people'). From the book it is possible to reconstruct how during the preceding 60 years land had been acquired for the Maas farm. Walke Widdesen's book was not used for some decades after his death, but in 1558 a grandchild, Backe Detlefsen, started using it again. Initially, like his grandfather, he used the book to record his landed possessions, but in 1567 he changed the 'account' into a real account book. Backe Detlefsen noted: Up martyny anno ( 15)67 hebbe ick dyth bock ersst tho enem Rekens boeck gename(n) un( d) myne schulde dar in vortekent ('On St. Martin's Day anno [15]67 I have made this book into an account book, and entered my debts in it'). In the following years and until his death around 1580 the book was used to register debts. The Maas book is not the sole representative of sixteenth-century peasant account books. In the 1540s, for instance, a rekensboek (account book) was kept by a western Schleswig peasant tradesman in the village of H¢jer (in present-day Denmark), and there is an account book starting in 1592 from the Fladsten farm in the eastern Schleswig village of Stollig. 3 Still, most extant account books are from the seventeenth century or later. One book from the western Schleswig village of Liitjenhorn begins in 1600 and is followed by other specimens starting in 1609, 1631, 1651, 1660, 1673, 1674, 1676, 1680 and 1698. Most of these books register credits and debts, even if generally they contain other sorts of information and some, after having been used for a while as an account book, turn into family and local chronicles. A typical page notes the name of a peasant in a neighbouring village, the amount he had borrowed, the rate of interest on the loan (normally 5-6%) and its final repayment marked by a cross over the whole entry. From around 1600 another, classic type of source material appears, namely probate inventories and lists of estates that have gone bankrupt. A collection of about 130 lists of estates in bankruptcy on the island of Fehmarn, dating from the late sixteenth century until 1688, is very interesting in this context, as it shows the enormous wealth and the large debts of this group of peasants living near the city of Liibeck. 4 The estate of a peasant named Claus Witte in the village of Hinrichsdorf in 1598, not untypically contained no less than 63 promissory notes amounting to a total debt of more than 13,000 marks. Witte's debts can be divided into six main groups. First, there was a limited amount of wages owed to servants (1.7%), further the also quite manageable amount of money owed for grain (.f.517o), and then an extremely large item concerning loans from the local community (37% ), partly consisting of loans from churches. On the other 2

Stadtarchiv Husum (Germany). D 2/H 1318a. Stadtarchiv Flensburg (Germany). Altes Archiv. B. Konigliches Gymnasium, No. 566a. Landsarkivet Aabenraa. Topografica, No. 432. Cf. Poulsen, 1990a, 50-77, 118-145. Poulsen and Hansen, 1994. 4 Landesarchiv Schleswig (Germany). Abt. 173, No. 151, 152. 3

205

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

hand, credits taken up in the towns of Burg, Lubeck, Rendsburg, and Kiel were not particularly important (15.2%), but those extended by various noblemen certainly were: they amounted to 41.6% of Witte's total debts. Before dealing further with the contents of all these sources, I shall briefly describe the geographical area we are dealing with (see also Figure 9.1).

III. The Schleswig area Broadly speaking, Schleswig is characterized by three different geophysical and agricultural zones. In the eastern part are the hilly and fertile lands, in the middle the more sandy and unfertile geest lands and out west the rich marshlands. Around 1500 there were 14,500 peasant farms within the Duchy of Schleswig. As to its social structure in the two centuries between 1450 and 1650, one could roughly say that the eastern part was dominated by noble estates with servile tenants, the midlands by a mixture of tenants and freeholders (i.e. peasants directly dependent on the prince), while the west-coast areas facing the North Sea were almost exclusively populated by freeholders. Admittedly, this is an approximate picture which can be refined by differentiation, but it is quite correct when viewed on a large scale (cf. Seering, 1908). Natural conditions clearly determined that the best prospects for agrarian market production were in the east and in the west. An important difference between east and west, however, lay in the different ways in which surplus was diverted to non-peasant groups in society. Without any doubt, peasants were best off in the west. In that region agricultural production from the 1460s became strongly marked by cattle breeding for the northern German and gradually also Dutch markets (Enemark, 1983; Blanchard, 1986). A good part of the capital that flowed into the area was generated by this new orientation of agriculture, although grain production was also important, in both eastern and western Schleswig. I have mentioned a number of sources with data on peasant credit. In fact, they are nearly all from western Schleswig. Schobull - where in 1493 a peasant was borrowing money from the church in Husum - is situated on the edge of the marsh area, as is the village of Maas, where the oldest extant peasant account book came from. Stintebull, where the will of 1491 was written, is on the west-coast island of Nordstrand (then Strand), and indeed in a very rich area. An exception reminding us of the fact that also rich peasants lived on the east coast of Schleswig is the account book of 1592 from the Fladsten farm on the Lojt peninsula, near Aabenraa. And, of course, we should not forget the very important case of the rich peasants on the island of Fehmarn in the Baltic, practically outside the gates of Lubeck. Both in Schobull and in Stintebull, the sources mention examples of marshland measured in Demat functioning as security for loans. This is important, because parcels of land that had been enclosed and surveyed must have been accepted much more easily as collateral for money loans than was land farmed in common with others. From the late sixteenth century onwards, there was enclosed land also on the east coast of Schleswig; actually, by 1640 most land had been enclosed in the parish where the man who wrote the Fladsten book was living (Fink, 1965). But only in the west was a fixed

206

Rural credit and land market in the Duchy of Schleswig c. 1450-1660

Figure 9.1 The Duchy of Schleswig in the later Middle Ages

*) after 1460 personal union with Duchy of Schleswig

under the Danish King

207

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

measure in use - the Demat - which already existed in the late Middle Ages, and which clearly reflected the system of individual farming in the area. In other parts of both Schleswig and the Kingdom of Denmark, however, land measures were connected to common (normally, open-field) cultivation of arable land, such as bol (hide) and (!rtug Jard, etc.

IV. Development of credit 1450-1660 The somewhat scattered sources allow us to follow how the use of credit spread geographically. In the Duchy of Schleswig, credit among peasants - that is, loans rather than delayed payment - did not originate on the west coast. It rather seems to have evolved on the isle of Fehmarn near Lubeck in the form of 'rent-buying' by the citizens of Lubeck and by northern German ecclesiastical institutions. Here, from the middle of the fourteenth century, urban capital was invested in land in return for yearly payments of money. 5 This type of credit appears on the Schleswig mainland by the middle of the fifteenth century, perhaps furthered by the lowering of interest rates at that time. From some 10% per year, the rate around 1450 began to move down to 6%, and finally ended up at only 5% in some more developed areas (Dahlerup, 1963; Dahlerup, 1991). However, it is quite clear that credit became most used along the west coast of Schleswig. Only few of the loans advanced by townsmen or institutions from the town of Flensburg on the east coast went to the surrounding rural district; by far the majority were taken out by people living on the west coast. Typically, in 1469 the vicar of Flensburg - Peter Partzow - provided a loan of 50 marks to a widow in the west-coast village of Langenhorn (Christensen, 1929: 121 no. 2552). Partzow's security was the widow's farm; the annual rent was fixed at a rate of 4 marks. Based on my examination of all sources dealing with rent-buying in ca. 1470-1500, I drew the map as presented in Figure 9.2. From this figure can be seen that a liYely credit flow started to run through the rural society of western Schleswig from ca. 14701520. The accounts of Schleswig Cathedral cited above give the impression of a rapid development in the countryside between 1466 and 1532. This view is supported by accounts of Saint Mary's Church in Flensburg, which in 1507 had not yet provided any loans at all to peasants but in 1541 lent money to a considerable number, many of whom lived on the west coast (Sejdelin, 1873). The accounts of Walke Widdesen in the village of Maas just outside the town of Husum from 1511 are a relic of a society where most land was mortgaged. The entries in the Maas book from the years around 1567-1580 further document that by that time all social strata were involved in credit transactions. The owner of the farm - Backe Detlefsen - had an astonishingly complex pattern of credit. Periodically, Detlefsen, like most farmers, was in arrears with his farm servants. But otherwise it was credit that dominated. Small loans without security and interest were very rare. In 1573, quite exceptionally, Detlefsen granted a small loan of eight schillings to the wife of a local artisan who, as he notes, 'came running to me, as I

5 See for example Urkundensammlung der Schleswig-Holstein-Lauenburgischen Gesellschaft fiir vaterliindische Geschichte, 3. Ser., vol. 2 (Kiel 1880), p. 1, no 2.

208

Rural credit and land market in the Duchy of Schleswig c. 1450-1660

Figure 9.2 Credit flows from town to country in part of the Duchy of Schleswig,

c.1470-1500

0

20

1===·-=-=====:l

km

The buying of rents from private persons and institutions in the towns of Flensburg, Husum and Schleswig in the countryside in a selected area, c. 1470-1500 returned from the court of Hatstedt'. 6 When Detlefsen wanted to put out his money, he preferred to do so against security in land. From his account book it is evident that, besides being active on the local credit market, he and other west-coast farmers, just like the peasants on Fehmam, were borrowing money from noblemen and townspeople on the east coast of Schleswig-Holstein. The book registers a fair number of loans of 100- 500 marks each, provided by well-known noblemen living on the east coast. After 1540, credit provided by the nobility was appearing to an ever-increasing extent in the rural money market, and the annual money market in Kiel - the Kieler Umschlag became important in the sixteenth century to both west-coast farmers and east-coast noblemen. We know from a local vicar - Johannes Petreus - how large investments could grow in a small part of the country. In 1565 Petreus was told 'by Mom OBlichsen who (even ifhe was burdened by heavy debts) was a wise and reasonable man, living in Pel worm, and who had good knowledge of this land's [i.e. Strand's] conditions, that the nobility at this time has capital out for a sum total of 35,000 Lubeck marks' (Hansen, 1901). Similarly, the Fehmam sources show that here too peasants' farms constituted a solid investment for Schleswig-Holstein noblemen in the late-sixteenth century. With-

6 However, women acting in the money market are rare in my sources. For a discussion of the role of women in credit markets , see Jordan, 1993 .

209

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

out hesitation, large sections of the nobility and gentry entrusted their money to farmers. In the above-mentioned peasant estate of Hinrichsdorf, from 1598 there appear not only nobles from the neighbourhood but also, for example, the lady of the manor of bvelgonne in the Elbmarsches on the North Sea coast, and Asmus von Ahlefeldt zu Gronwohld from the mainland near the east-coast town of Eckernforde. It seems that after a first phase in the 1540s, from the east coast to the west coast of Schleswig, noblemen's as well as townsmen's credit culminated around 1560-1570, and was decisively reduced around 1600. At that time the vicar of Nordstrand could write with satisfaction that the entire debt owed by the inhabitants of the island to the local nobility, had, 'thank God', been 'wiped out' (Hansen, 1901). On Fehmarn a similar reduction of credit following a period of expansion is indicated by the many bankruptcies and complaints about usury in this town in the years after 1600. The sources seem to indicate that these were trying times for rural credit in Schleswig, as well as more generally in Denmark and other parts of Europe, and they make it clear that the level of credit kept falling throughout the seventeenth century, ending in deep crisis around 1660 (cf. Kaphahn, 1912; Weisser, 1987; SchlOgl, 1988). This process of decline can be demonstrated on the individual level by an analysis of two Schleswig account books. The credit sums registered in the account book of the eastern Schleswig farm of Fladsten can be divided over three periods, namely 1568-1588, 1589-1601and16361658 (Poulsen, 1990a, 118-145). In the first phase the total annual amount of credit was about 400-500 Thaler. Nearly all of it was invested strategically, that is to say, the money was advanced to peasants who had to provide land as security. Because money lenders asked for securities that were located as close as possible to their own lands, they could, in the case of default, easily extend the resource area of their farm with nearby acres and meadows. In the period 1589-1601 much more money was lent out, and the money from the loans was invested over a much larger area. Most interest was now paid in money (6.25% per year). The debtors were not only peasants but consisted of a socially very differentiated group of people, who seem to have needed money for a variety of reasons. Among them one finds, for instance, wealthy burghers of the nearby towns of Aabenraa and Flensburg. The total amount of loans was normally around 800 marks per year. In 1594, however, it reached 1029 marks. In the next period (1636-1558), the sums of credit put out by the owner of Fladsten farm developed as follows:

Table 9.2

Total annual sums of credit put out by the Fladsten farm, 1636-1658

Year Marks

1636

1637

1638

1639

1640

1641

1642

1643

40

72

92

182

289

322

342

342

Year Marks

1644

1645

1646

1647

16.f.8

1649

1650

1651

332

284

224

224

224

228

224

224

Year Marks

1652

1653

1654

1655

1656

1657

1658

224

224

224

224

124

82

20

210

Rural credit and land market in the Duchy of Schleswig c. 1450-1660

A farmer named J orgen Matzen was a creditor throughout this period. After his father's death in 1632 he became the master of the tenant farm. On 23 January 1633 he wrote in his book that he had taken over Fladsten farm against a payment to the landlord of 32 Reichsthalers, and that he had had to take a loan of 300 marks to buy out the other heirs. But after three years he had paid off his loan and started to put out money. Borrowers were both neighbours and others from the local parish, many of whom seem to have needed the money to pay duties to their landlord and to the state. Interest was still paid predominantly in money. From 1643 to 1658 there was a crisis of capital. First the lending of money broke down and the supply of capital stagnated at a low but fixed level until 1656. In those years rents in money were to a large degree replaced by rents in kind, and more in general there were constant problems with money payments. The low point was reached in the years 1656-1659, when income from interest payments was reduced to practically nothing and all the principal money was lost. A lot of this misery can be blamed on the Danish-Swedish wars of 1657-1660, but presumably other factors were also involved. From a smaller western Schleswig farm in the village ofNprre Vollum (in the parish of Brede) we have another account book, written by the peasant Peder Brorsen (Poulsen, 1990a, 146-156). The credit as noted down in this book mainly consisted of short-term (i.e. one-year) loans. The rate of interest was always 6.375%. It becomes clear that money was invested in the villages close to the farm. The total sums of credit put out were as follows: Table 9.3

Total annual sums of credit put out by the N!'lrre Vollum farm,

1647-1658 Year (29 Sept.29 Sept.) Marks

1647/ 1648

1651/ 1652

1652/ 1653

80

41

161

1653/ 1654

1654/ 1655

1655/ 1656

1656/ 1657

1657/ 1658

72

65

127

10

A brief consideration of these data must start from the fact that the interest payments were normally made on 29 September, Michaelis (Michaelmas). From this it becomes clear that the credit put out by Brorsen was closely related to the cattle trade (ox trade), which is also revealed by the account book. The missing loans of September 1653 can only be explained by the collapse of the cattle trade in 1652, whereas the quite large sums granted as loans in 1654 to 1656/7 are quite consistent with the good revenues from the cattle trade during these years. That no credit was put out hereafter has no doubt to do with the interruption of the cattle trade, but must also be seen against the background of the Swedish-Danish wars. There is little doubt that the rural credit market began to expand during the fifteenth century and swelled in the sixteenth century, only to be reduced in the course of the seventeenth century. The mid-seventeenth-century crisis was very clearly visible in the material just presented. Presumably, the change from long-term to short-term credit, which can be observed in our farmers' accounts, should be taken as a symptom of the

211

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

shrinking of the money market. In those Danish rural districts from where seventeenthcentury lists of taxes on investment income have been preserved, one can observe a similar reduction in the decades between 1627 and 1657 (Madsen, 1978: 44). Some of this reduction can be explained by temporary market crises and war, but it can hardly be doubted that in the long run credit became connected in an ominous way to the increasing demands of the state. On the one hand the state drove peasants to increased borrowing, while on the other hand it threatened a well-functioning rural credit market as a consequence of increasing cash-flow problems following from heavy state taxation. Some peasants took out local loans in order to pay taxes, as is revealed in the farmers' account books; other peasants who already were used to credit, went to other money markets looking for cash. When, for instance, in 1657 the peasants of the hundred of Slogs (Slogs herred) had to pay a tax of 2,200 Reichtstaler, the money was partly borrowed in the city of Hamburg for 6% per year. 7 Of course, none of these forms of financing peasant debt was viable in the long run and they are clearly expressions of a crisis situation. My analysis of the accounts of Fladsten and N¢rre Voll um revealed how around 1660 loans and capital totally disappeared from these farms. There is hardly any doubt that the collapsing fortunes of the two farmers were followed by those of many peasants, and that the miserable state of the rural credit market formed only part of the general economic and social decline of the Schleswig and Danish peasantry after ca. 1630 (Gamrath and Petersen, 1980). On the west coast of Schleswig the crisis seems to have been temporary, whereas in other parts of the Duchy as well as in the Kingdom of Denmark it was much more prolonged. A large number of hoard finds from Denmark and Schleswig partly explains what happened to the fortunes which were not paid in taxes or taken as war booty (Olrik, 1909; Lindahl 1988; Jensen and Stoklund 1984). The magnificent silver treasures which have been found in rural areas (some of the hoards were hidden during the wars of the seventeenth century) show to what extent peasants could afford to buy silver bowls, silver belts and silver buttons, while many of them must have had at their disposal a considerable quantity of good silver Thalers. To judge from the finds, this accumulation of wealth started in the sixteenth century. In 1985, for instance, in a village next to N¢rre Vollum, where Peder Brorsen kept his account book, a hoard was found, consisting of 328 silver coins, mostly Thalers. The coins have been dated between 1550 and 1642 and are assumed to have been buried during the Torstensson's war of 1643-1645. I believe that, just like the increased putting out of credit logically goes together with a reduction in hoarding, the credit crises of the seventeenth century generated increased treasuring. This must have been a general tendency of the highest importance for the continuity of peasant societies. A failing credit market would have contributed to the ruin of many farms, and in the worst case even to their desertion, because in such circumstances new holders were not able to take out loans to finance the landlord's entrance fees or to buy off their co-heirs. Because most rural treasure finds can indeed be related to periods of war, such finds are important signs of crisis situations, during which a maximal amount of capital was withdrawn from a normally lively credit market. Seen from that perspective, treasure hoards are relics of a society in which the willingness to Landsarkivet, Aabenraa (Denmark). Sma embeders arkiver. Slogs herredsfoged 1652-1675 (1648-1681). Slogs herredsregnskab, p. 165.

7

212

Rural credit and land market in the Duchy of Schleswig c. 1450- 1660

take financial risk and earn a rent could disappear, and loyalty and trust, essential to any well-functioning economy, be temporarily gone.

V.

The connection between credit and land market

In itself the buying of rents has nothing to do with a rural land market, because the possession of the land remains with the borrower/debtor. But a connection between the two could develop . The Maas accounts, for instance, clearly demonstrate many of the problems that accompanied credit, such as bankruptcy and forced sales. In a society like west-coast Schleswig, where ownership of land by the direct producers went hand in hand with strong market integration, social differences tended to be accentuated under certain demographic and economic circumstances. Less successful farms could be broken up into smaller plots fairly easily, and many of these small plots in their turn changed hands on the land market. Already from the first decades of the fifteenth century we can observe a sharp division between a mass of small farms and a few very large ones. The resulting, quite typical social distribution of landownership is clearly reflected in the returns of a tax imposed in 1483 (Figure 9.3).8 Figure 9.3

Distribution of tax returns (in marks) over the number of taxpayers in two hundreds of southern Schleswig in 1483

N. Gos

Ny

0

2

3

4

5

6

7

Ny herred on the east coast, and N¢rre Gos herred on the west coast. The maximum amount paid was 6 marks, as is shown by the horizontal axis; the vertical axis indicates the number of peasants.

8

Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen. Slesvig og holstenske regnskaber for 1580. Kongens og dronningens arkiv. 1483. Regnskab over skat i Flensborg amt.

213

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-I 9th century)

From Figure 9.3 it becomes very clear that the east-coast district of Ny herred had only a few poor peasants; moreover, there was a smooth transition from rich to poor. On the other hand, in the district of N¢rre Gos herred there was a large gap between a small - although not insignificant - elite of rich farmers at one extreme and a large group of cottars and small peasants at the other. Here there were many small farms; also most people proved unable to pay their taxes. Typically, it was in one the Yillages in the west - Bredstedt- that Jeppe Brodersen lived; the tax list of 1483 called him 'totally poor' .9 In a society which was very sensitive to movements in prices and changes in markets, this created possibilities for capital accumulation. Credit became one of the factors that created mobility in the land market as well as a potential for acquiring wealth. To give just one example: north of the farm of Maas lay a bot - corresponding to the English hide and the German Rufe - that had been sold around 1480. Its owner, Peter Volquardsen, in his turn sold it to another peasant named Harrens Boye. However, ten years later Boye went bankrupt - he could de betalynghe nycht raden ('[he could] not pay his debt') - and the owner of the Maas farm, Walke Widdesen, immediately showed up to buy it. Harrens Boye's economic problems are evident from the conditions under which Widdesen took over his farm. A good part of the land, nineteen ska:pper geest land, 10 was mortgaged to others (one of whom was the rich customs officer of Husum) and Widdesen had to buy everything back. The remaining 10 ska:pper geest land and one demat of marshland- the only land Boye still possessed and could sell - was acquired by Widdesen after he had paid the debts on the farm. Schleswig Cathedral was the creditor for 100 marks of principal money and 21 marks of payable interest, which it received, and a rich townsman of Husum collected the 70 marks he had lent. Harrens Boye was left with only 32 marks in cash and nine marks' worth of wood and straw. One could imagine that the bankrupt peasant used the wood and straw to build himself a small hut. Apparently, Harrens Boye had got himself into a bad situation: the sales of his produce could no longer cover the annual interests. The inevitable result had been bankruptcy and the sale of his farm to his rich neighbour, Walke Widdesen. From the continuation of the same account in the years 1567-1580 it becomes clear that money was often borrowed against security in land, and this created the basis for the further enlargement of the Maas farm. It also becomes clear that its owner was very determined to acquire land by taking the role of a trustee of estates in bankruptcy. The size of such transactions was much larger on the west coast of Schleswig and on Fehmarn than in other parts of Schleswig or in the realm of Denmark. But the analysis of the Fladsten account book reveals that strategically extending credit against security in land could also be quite profitable to a tenant farm in the sixteenth century. A recently published account book indicates that the same pattern - namely, small pieces of land given in security for money loans - was common in the 1670s among tenants of a typical region in Zealand dominated by large estates (Mogensen and Bruun, 1998). 9

Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen. Slesvig og holstenske regnskaber for 1580. Kongens arkiv. 14721499. Flensborg lens regnskaber. Skat og bede 1483, s. 35. 10 One ska;ppe land is about 690 m2, but one has to bear in mind that local variation in measures was considerable.

214

Rural credit and land market in the Duchy of Schleswig c. 1450-1660

The shady side of credit, of course, concerns the people who lose. During the long sixteenth century, economic growth and immense opportunities meant social ascent for some but ruin for many others. The high incidence of mortgaging land in times of rising prices always brought with it the built-in danger of disaster as soon as the economic tide turned - as it did structurally in the course of the seventeenth century. In the seventeenth century the darker sides of credit came to predominate, often in negative connection with the rise of the tax state. The peasants of the Chapter of Schleswig, for instance, tried to meet tax demands by taking out local loans. In the 1630s and 1640s it became common for them to mortgage small pieces of their land to get credit (Reumann 1965). As I mentioned before, credit must be seen in this context as an integrated part of the difficulties that peasant society was running into in the course of the seventeenth century. However, it should be noted that the fact that most Danish peasants at that time were tenants offered them some protection: going bankrupt is difficult if you do not own your farm. And it should be stressed that those regions of western Schleswig where many freeholders failed displayed an amazing ability to quickly overcome the credit crisis. What this crisis did promote in the long term was a downward social trend, characterized by a decreasing number of farms that could still grow in size while at the same time the numbers of cottars and landless people were swelling, which in my opinion points to the development of a social system fit for market production (cf. Lorenzen-Schmidt, 1988). More in general, credit in the case considered here contributed to the creation of agricultural systems better suited to operate in a world of expanding markets.

Bibliography Blanchard, I. (1986) 'The continental European cattle trades: 1400-1600', Economic History Review, 2nd series, 39, pp. 427-460. Christensen, W. (ed.) (1929) Repertorium Diplomaticum Regni Danici Medicevalis. Fortegnelse over Danmarks Breve fra Middelalderen, 2. Series, vol. 2, Copenhagen. Christensen, W. (ed.) (1932) Repertorium Diplomaticum Regni Danici Medicevalis. Fortegnelse over Danmarks Breve fra Middelalderen, 2. Series, vol. 4, Copenhagen. Christensen, W. (ed.) (1935) Repertorium Diplomaticum Regni Danici Medicevalis. Fortegnelse over Danmarks Breve fra Middelalderen, 2. Series, vol. 7, Copenhagen. Christiansen, P.O. (1985) Gardens reproduktion. Om peasant/farmer-debatten og danske landbofamilier, Lyngby. (IFF Arbejdspapir; 1). Dahlerup, T. (1963) Bidrag ti! Rentespt)rsmalets Historie i dansk Senmiddelalder og Reformationstid, in Festskrijt til Astrid Friis, Copenhagen, pp. 47-64. Dahlerup, T. (1991) 'Kirche und Kredit. Ein Beitrag zur Geldwirtschaft im spatmittelalterlichen und friihneuzeitlichen Danemark', in Michael North (ed.), Kredit im spiitmittelalterlichen und friihneuzeitlichen Europa, CologneNienna, pp. 171-180. (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Hansischen Geschichte, Neue Folge; 37). Enemark, P. (1983) 'Oksehandelens historie ca. 1300-1700', in A. Pedersen, P. Enemark, E.J. Ipsen and V. Bro (eds), Sortbroget kvceg, Aarhus, pp. 9-87. Epstein, S.R. (1998) 'The peasantries ofltaly, 1350-1750', in T. Scott (ed.), The Peasantries ofEurope from the Fourteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, London/New York, pp. 75-108.

215

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

Fink, T. (1965) Die beginnende Auflosung der Flurgemeinschaft im ostlichen Tei! der Flurgemeinschaft im ostlichen Tei! des Herzagtums Schleswig um 1600, Die Bauerngesellschaft im Ostseeraum und im Norden um 1600. Acta Visbyensia 1965, pp. 213-219. Gamrath, H. and Petersen, E.L. (1980) Danmarks Historie. Vol. 2. Tiden 1340-1648. Andet halvbind 1559-1648, Copenhagen. Hansen, R. (ed.) (1901) Johannes Petreus' Schriften iiber Nordstrand, Kiel. (Quellensammlung der Gesellschaft for Schleswig-Holsteinische Geschichte; 5). Holderness, B.A. (1976) 'Credit in English rural society before the nineteenth century, with special reference to the period 1650-1720', Agricultural History Review, 24, pp. 97-109. Jensen, J.S. and Stoklund, B. (1984) 'Skatten fra Lres0', Skalk, 4, pp. 3-9. Jordan, W.C. (1993) Women and Credit in Pre-industrial and Developing Societies, Philadelphia. Kaphahn, F. (1912) 'Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Kreditwirtschaft im XVII Jahrhundert und der DreiBigjahrigen Krieg', Deutsche Geschichtsblatter, 13, pp. 139-162. Lindahl, F. (1988) Skattefundfra Christian !V's tid. Danish Seventeenth-Century Silver Hoards, Copenhagen. Lorenzen-Schmidt, K.-J. (1988) 'Ein Verlaufsmodell for konjunkturbedingte Bodenmobilitat', in I. Momsen (ed.), Schleswig-Holsteins Weg in die Moderne. Zehn Jahre Arbeitskreis fiir Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Schleswig-Holsteins, Neumiinster, pp. 105-112. Madsen, H.B. (1978) Det danske skatteva:sen. Kategorier og klasser. Skatter pa landbefolkningen 1530-1660, Odense. Mogensen, M. and Bruun, N.W. (eds) (1998) Fdrslevdegnens optegnelser. Optegnelsesbog for degnenAnders Jensen Kier 1667-1693, Odense. Olrik, J. (1909) Drikkehorn og S(>lvt(Jj fra Middelalder og Renaissance, Copenhagen. Poulsen, B. (1988) Land. By. Marked. To (>konomiske landskaber i 1400-tallets Slesvig, Flensburg. Poulsen, B. (1990a) Bondens penge. Studier i spnderjyske regnskaber 1400-1650, Odense. Poulsen, B. (1990b) 'Alle myne rent. Bondekredit i 15-1600-tallet', (Danish) Historisk Tidsskrift, 90, pp. 247-275. Poulsen, B. (1992) 'Die altesten Bauemanschreibebiicher. Schleswigsche Anschreibebiicher des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts', in B. Poulsen and K.-J. Lorenzen-Schmidt (eds), Bduerliche Anschreibebiicher als Quellen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Neumiinster, pp. 89-105. Poulsen, B. ( 1997) 'The necessity of state in early modem peasant society', Scandinavian Journal of History, 22, pp. 9-19. Poulsen, B. and Hansen, I.B. (1994) 'Med egen hand'. Optegnelser fra Fladsten og (!Jrsted 1592-1809, Haderslev. Rebel, H. (1983) Peasant Classes. The Bureacratization of Property and Family Relations under Early Habsburg Absolutism 1511-1636, Princeton.

216

Rural credit and land market in the Duchy of Schleswig c. 1450-1660

Reumann, K.P. (1965) 'Untertanen und Obrigkeit in der alten Bauernvogtei Alsen', Schriften der Heimatkundlichen Arbeitsgemeinschaft far Nordschleswig, 12, pp. 71-95. SchlOgl, R. (1988) Bauern, Krieg und Staat. Oberbayerische Bauemwirtschaft und Frii.hmoderner Staat im 17. Jahrhundert, Gottingen. Seering, M. (1908) Erb rec ht und Agrarveifassung in Schleswig-Holstein auf geschichtlicher Grund/age, Berlin. Sejdelin, H.C.P. (ed.) (1874) Diplomatarium Flensborgense. Samling af Aktstykker ti! Staden Flensborgs Historie indtil Aaret 1559, vol. 2, Copenhagen. Weisser, M. (1987) 'Rural crisis and rural credit in XVIlth-century Castile', The Journal of European Economic History, 16, pp. 297-313.

217

10 Farms and land - a commodity? Land markets, family strategies and manorial control in Germany (18th-19th centuries) Stefan BRAKENSIEK, University of Bielefeld 1

I.

Introduction

Because of the current state of research an article on rural land markets in Germany during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could hardly give more than an outline posing questions and making suggestions. The focus will be on the importance which manorial control, longstanding village customs and current strategies of the peasants had on the scale of market transactions and the modes of fixing prices. My reflections have been prompted initially by the stimulating results of Giovanni Levi (Levi, 1986: 75-106) concerning the land market of Santena in Piemont during the seventeenth century and the findings of Gerard Beaur (Beaur, 1984) concerning the land market of the countryside surrounding Paris. The French villages showed a different mix of socially fragmented markets which functioned according to specific rules. My preliminary heuristic approach for Germany also distinguishes between a market for large estates, and a market for farmsteads and farmland, on which this paper will primarily focus.

II. Noble Estates The market for large estates needs only a short treatment. They show a quite different performance depending on whether the estates in question were noble ones, which secured access to political corporate bodies, or just large farms that should mainly make a profit. The fixing of the price could also be influenced by the right to exercize manorial jurisdiction (Patrimonialgerichtsbarkeit) or other prestigious forms of local authority (Ziekursch, 1927: 121-125). Moreover, it was crucial whether these estates were subject to feudal law, as was the case in the west of Germany, or whether they were regarded as unrestricted private property (Allod) like the manors in Prussia since 1721 (Ziekursch, 1927: 53-61, 328-329, 402-407; Henning, 1976: 176-188; Abel, 1978: 337-340). The still authoritative study on mortgage credit in Prussia by Weyermann has shown that it was also important for the determination of the price whether the ownership of an estate gave access to privileged credit institutions (Landschaften) or whether the owners had to resort to the private credit market just like everybody else (Weyermann, 1927: especially 87-114; Ristau, 1992). All these factors influenced the attitudes of owners who could look upon their estates as profitable money investments, but for the most part mainly looked for a means of social and cultural distinction (Hagen, 2002).

1

I am grateful to Axel Fltigel for the English translation of this article.

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During the eighteenth century noble estates would normally not be divided when they were sold, but because of the specific prestige and the political rights connected with them, they were transferred undivided to noble buyers and more and more also to buyers from the middle-class (cf. Fliigel, 2000, for middle-class owners of noble estates in the electorate of Saxony). This does not mean, however, that these estates were always run as large farms. In many parts of Germany they were sometimes split up and leased out seperately to a multitude of peasants. Former tenants often acted as buyers when such estates, which had already been parcelled out, were sold in the wake of secularization and the appearance of liberated land markets cleared of legal restrictions (Cf. the study on secularization and mediatization in the territories west of the Rhine by Muller, 1980: esp. 138-157; Schieder/Kube, 1987: 97-98). With the exception of studies by Reif on the nobility of the bishopric of Munster, by Pedlow on Hessian nobles and by Buchsteiner on Pomeranian noble estate owners there is very little known about the family strategies of sellers and buyers in land markets. Their evidence suggests that the traditional, politically privileged nobility experienced a crucial period at the turn of the nineteenth century, which endangered its standing in society and its economic basis alike. But in the course of the nineteenth century these families splendidly surmounted most of the crisis, and secured their standing on the basis of the property of real estate that was gradually cleared from debt. They were helped in this by the emergence of a liberalized land market, because now it became possible to add farmsteads and plots to an existing estate and thereby round it off. The funds necessary were earned in time by the redemption payments of the peasants (Reif, 1979: esp. 223-230; Pedlow, 1988: 55-153; Buchsteiner, 1993; Buchsteiner, 1994; Buchsteiner, 1999; Hagen, 2002: 280-333 and 593-643. For redemption capital and its employment sec Winkel, 1968). Nevertheless, the 'free land market' that had barely emerged in many parts of Germany came immediately under fire. Around 1800, Albrecht Daniel Thaer still advocated with verve the unlimited saleability of land to promote a transfer of land 'to the better manager' (Wanderung des Bodens zum besseren Wirt) in order to improve the standard of agriculture in general. But afterwards the debate followed a socially conservative line throughout the nineteenth century. Estate owners and large peasant farmers often formed a coalition that did reap the profits of free mortgage borrowing on the one hand but still would not accept the economic risks of a free-market economy on the other hand. Agrarian lobbyists and conservative politicians lamented about the allegedly widespread 'slaughtering of estates' (Giiterschliichterei) because thereby productive units of peasant farms and estates would be broken up and they would fall into the hands of smallholders and labourer-peasants who could only act unprofessionally. The effect had to be a disaster for the national welfare and the social stability of the villages. A statistical survey by August Meitzen published in the years 1868 and 1869 proved how unwarranted these prophecies of doom were (Meitzen, 1868: 471-510; Meitzen, 1869: 306-327). He summarised quite resolutely: 'The final result of the enquiries undertaken about the question of the consequences of the free divisibility of real property ... obviously yield the proof that the current laws did not lead to a severe fragmentation of real property and that in the course of more than forty years smallholdings in general did not at all got out of control.' (Meitzen, 1868: 509).

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III. The land market for peasant holdings The state of research concerning the land market for peasant holdings in Germany during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries can only be called unsatisfactory. It means that my comments have a preliminary character. Distinctions concerning timing, social groups and regions present themselves as possible starting points. As long as the land cultivated by peasants was subject to manorial control in many parts of Germany, such limitations gave the markets in real property a strong regional diversity. The village land market in many south-western parts of Germany was hardly under seigneurial restrictions any more (Hippe!, 1977: esp. 277-278). In the centre of Germany the difference between lands subject to feudal law and private property, which coexisted in each of the villages in very different mixtures, seems to have been decisive. Here, village boundaries encompassed two distinct land markets. In the principality of Hohenlohe, for instance, a lively land market existed for so-called 'rolling plots' (walzende Stucke), whereas land subject to feudal law, under landlord supervision and with customary impartible inheritance (Anerbensitte) was sold considerably less often (Schremmer, 1963: 14-25; Steinle, 1971: 65-120; Robisheaux, 1989: 79-83). A similar difference between an unrestricted sale of partible freehold property and feudal tenure, which could only be passed on undivided and sold with the assent of the landlord, is to be found in Hessen-Kassel (Sakai, 1967: 11; Liitge, 1967: 198-199; Fox, 1993: 100-114). In the north-west of Germany there legally was almost no land market that was not under the tight control of landlords or princes. It still remains to be demonstrated whether in fact there were markets developing secretly that were structured in a peculiar way and insufficiently formalized. The EastElbian area of strict estate management and landlordism (Gutswirtschaft) would have had no land market at all, but it is safe to assume that in the background transfers by enserfed peasants took place nonetheless (For the land market in East-Elbian Prussia during the early nineteenth century see Harnisch, 1984: 277-302). With respect to the eighteenth century one must therefore take for granted a considerable regional and even local variation in markets. The manorial control of most lands was indeed an obstacle to an adaptation of land use to the changing needs of peasant households, but the rigid legal system seems to have been made more flexible by individual agreements amongst neighbours and by existing hereditary practices within families. Because of the differences between legal proprietary rights and current customs this situation really implied some risks for individual peasants. Only the liberal agrarian reforms, which were carried out from the end of the eighteenth century to 1848, provided a legal framework for a developing land market which was undivided and not fragmented along social or corporate lines. To what extent the intentions of the liberal proponents of reform were really put into practice was again subject to regional differences which continued to be of great importance throughout the entire nineteenth century. The following considerations are based essentially on the few local studies available, namely Sabean's book on Neckarhausen in Wiirttemberg, the work of Schnyder on Bretzwil in the countryside near Basel, the book on Hohenlohe by Robisheaux and my own observations concerning the parish of Schildesche in Prussian Westphalia (Robisheaux, 1989: esp. 79-91; Sabean, 1990: esp. 355-415; Brakensiek, 1991: esp. 158-168; Schnyder-Burghartz, 1992: esp. 183-230).

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111.1.

a commodity?

Neckarhausen in Wtirttemberg

A suitable starting point is provided by the pioneering study of David Sabean on the village ofNeckarhausen in the period between 1700 and 1870. Formal market transactions already were a widespread phenomenon in that village in the early eighteenth century and they evolved into the main pattern of land circulation until 1800. The formerly quite common exchange of plots was replaced by public sales, predominantly in the form of auctions. Most transactions took place exclusively between village inhabitants. If outsiders participated, it usually happened to be sales of single plots by heirs who did not live in Neckarhausen and therefore could practically make no use of the land. The apex of changes in the ownership ofland was reached in the 1820's. According to Sabean this was a consequence of economic crisis. In 1700 women had been virtually excluded from the land market, in the course of the eighteenth century they occasionally became buyers and in the early nineteenth century ten per cent of all purchases were done by widows and unmarried women, whereas married women remained being rare as buyers (Sabean, 1990: 359-360). Not only did the number of transactions increase but also the quantity of land that was transferred. In the decade after 1700 just one fifth of the village lands became an object of barter or sale. This share rose to one quarter in the decade after 1780 and even to almost one third in the years from 1820 to 1829. However, in the further course of the nineteenth century the quantity of land channelled through the land market decreased again to the percentage that had been reached 150 years earlier. Correspondently, a growing number of the inhabitants of Ncckarhausen was active on the land market. At the height of its development, during the decade of the 1820's, almost one third of the population acted at least once as a buyer of plots of land or of houses. This development, however, was counteracted by massive population growth. It is true that village people met each other more often as buyers and sellers of land but the plots that were traded got smaller and smaller. In the course of this development land prices rose steeply, and moved from 31 gulden per morgen (approximately 0.25 hectare) in the early eighteenth century to roughly 110 gulden at the end of the century. During the crisis of the first half of the 19th century they did not go down. Finally prices reached a ceiling at 564 gulden for one morgen in the 1860ies. Accordingly, the highest prices were fetched in the face of a declining frequency of transactions. The Neckarhausen study is particularly interesting because it analyses the land market not only on the basis of aggregate data but also of the individual identification of sellers and buyers and of their internal relationships. To give just one example: the analysis of age structure shows that on average sellers were about ten years older than buyers. Here, the land market reveals itself as an integral part of a local system of transfers, regulating the passage of land from one generation to the next. The formal market transfer was often used to secure the informal handing down of farms between successive generations in a flexible way. However, the precondition for that was a far-reaching autonomy of the villagers to dispose of their lands and farm buildings. This freedom of action was a peculiarity that could only be found in the west and south-west of Germany. There, the noble landlords had to abandon the local arena of economic and political action to the peasants since the constitution of local communes during the late Middle

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Ages. But this was in no way what happened in the large remaining parts of the Empire, particularly in the north and east of Germany. These areas were characterized by circumstances in which the presence of the landlord could not be ignored. It will have to be shown that this had serious consequences for the shaping of the rural, and particularly the peasant land market.

HI.2.

Bretzwil in north Switzerland

Another micro-historical study which presents important insights into the land market is available for the village of Bretzwil near Basel. The peasants in the northern parts of Switzerland equally enjoyed almost complete freedom in disposing of their lands. Albert Schnyder ascertained the interesting fact that there was an excess supply of money in the canton of Basel which as it were was looking for secure investment in mortgage loans. But the urban creditors were rather a check than a motor ofland market expansion because their objective was a secure and long-term interest payment against the best possible conditions (Schnyder-Burghartz, 1992: 203-206). These findings are similar to what has been found for many parts of Germany. Urban creditors, among them many widows of businessmen, looked for secure and long-term profit on their capital. In addition, there were the institutional investors of pious foundations pursuing the same logic. This investment behaviour corresponded to a conduct of the villagers which Albert Schnyder called Giralisierung of the village economy: Until the middle of the eighteenth century the cash flow into villages mainly went via urban loans, and to a lesser extent resulted from profits made with sales of agricultural produce or manufactured goods. Consequently, the village economy was characterized by a shortage of money, which forced the villagers to organize their economic transactions on the basis of cash-less borrowing. The debt economy was stabilized by a well-contrived system of guarantees. Risks were minimized by a fine dispersion of mortgage debts over numerous plots owned by different persons. In that way, even when an individual went bankrupt, a cascade of bankruptcies with their concomitant mobilizing effects on the land market was avoided (Schnyder-Burghartz, 1992: 206-209). The land market of Bretzwil in about 1700 appeared to be socially segregated. It was the domain of the grain-growing peasant upper class and, to a lesser extent, the village craftsmen. The poor and the meagre landowners virtually did not show up. But in Bretzwil the land market was not dominated by local families like in Giovanni Levi's Santena (Piemont) case, where the price fixing depended on the social distance between the parties (Levi, 1986: 91-106). Instead, Schnyder perceived ambivalent factors behind the fixing of prices. Tensions within the family, for instance, could bring about land being sold or auctioned and, because of this, land being included in a system of price fixing outside the family. It still does not yet follow from this that an anonymous and objectified market, only recognising supply and demand as price fixing elements, prevailed in Bretzwil. Rather, one has to assume a socially embedded market process in which the solidarity amongst villagers, and especially amongst male peasant farmers, could exert an important influence (Schnyder-Burghartz 1992, 193-199, 202, 227-230, 380-385).

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IV. Land market and inheritance practices On the basis of the evidence collected by David Sabean and Albert Schnyder there are grounds to assume that in an area where the buying and selling of land was little affected by manorial control, the land market served as a means of allocating resources among the well-to-do peasants. The attempt to optimize resources was often frustrated by demographic vicissitudes and the occurrence of inheritance. The land market provided one possibility how to deal flexibly with resources. A second possibility was short-term leasehold, a third was provided by inheritance practices themselves, which did not always adhere blindly to written norms. In the case of Bretzwil they were, with the approval of the magistrate of Basel, rather handled according to circumstances. Inheritance practice and the land market thus appear to have been flexible and interrelated systems (SchnyderBurghartz, 1992: 167-169). Vice versa, one has to suppose that in areas with strong restrictions imposed by the lords on the land market and on mortgage credit, the requirements concerning a flexible handling of the resource 'land' fell entirely on the inheritance practices. It would be worthwhile to make a comparative investigation in order to see whether the persons affected were not forced in many cases to choose a transfer arrangement between generations which diverted from the norm. In Westphalia and Lower Saxony such constraints could be the reason for a special remedy. On the level of legal provisions there already existed very sophisticated arrangements for interim farmer-managers (Mahljahre, Zwischenwirte) who were married in second or third marriage to the widow of an owner and who directed the farm as long as the heir still was under-age. The study of Belm by Schlumbohm underlines how extremely diverse family strategies could be, in order to cope with the consequences of demographic vicissitudes (Schlumbohm, 1994: 152190 and 379-480). In the district of Blumenau in Hanover plots of real property were never used to pay off second-born sons and daughters. Flexibility in these cases always meant a flexible handling of inheritance rules so that, if need be, a daughter was appointed to be heiress of the farmstead (Begemann, 1990: 114-218). The question of how the difference between partible inheritance and entailed property in the case of peasant farms could arise in the western parts of Germany, and what processes were responsible for the customary rights of succession to undivided farm estates, are treated in an important and stimulating way in the study by Robisheaux on Hohenlohe (Robisheaux, 1989). An idea suggested in this study is that the co-operation between well-to-do peasants and political authorities was responsible for this development. The widening of the socio-economic distance between the grain-growing peasants and the village poor of Hohenlohe during the sixteenth century had drastic consequences for the inner stability of the village community. Increasing competition for resources and a quite different density of market relations outside the Yillage threatened to undermine the impressive strength which these communes had developed in their dissociation from lordly power during the late Middle Ages. It was mainly population growth and the rise in the number of the village poor connected with it resulting in a social and economic polarization that destroyed the inner cohesion of the village.

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Thomas Robisheaux detected an interesting regional inner differentiation in the wake of this process. The increase of households seemed to be concentrated in villages in the vicinity of towns and places located near trading routes, whereas remote and isolated hamlets remained almost unchanged demographically. Lands well suited for agriculture or viniculture were firmly in control of the peasant farmers so that the aspiring petty smallholders had to contend themselves with the clearing of marginal lands. The availability of uncultivated soil and a demand for labourers on the part of larger farms exerted a magnetic attraction on the poor, which drove them to the villages. If, however, all arable land was in the hands of a few families, as was the case in some hamlets, then the poor hardly had any chance to settle down there. These hamlets could preserve their demographic stability and economic prosperity while taking advantage of the poverty and instability of other places. At the peak of the rural season they made use of the labour surplus in the crowded villages and small towns without having to take on the social costs. This socio-geographical pattern can be found in various regions, and as well in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Friedeburg, 1997: 38-55). The divergent development of adjoining settlements was going back to differences in late medieval inheritance practices and usages concerning the land market that were only feeble in the beginning, but later hardened into fixed customs. In Hohenlohe the dissemination of the custom of impartible inheritance (Anerbensitte) and the inalienability of real property in the case of peasant farms was first developed autonomously amongst the peasantry and without pressure from the landlords in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. However, that the territory of Hohenlohe finally became one of the islands of impartible property in an ocean of partible inheritance in the south-west of Germany in the eighteenth century the other islands being the Black Forest, the Klettgau, and upper Swabia - was due to the fact that the Earls of Hohenlohe since the 1560s took over this custom from the peasants and enforced it generally. Within the framework of this system of impartible property the land market served just as an additional, flexible, and therefore stabilizing factor for the whole system. In the years between 1552 and 1600 three quarters of a total of 332 sales of land consisted of transfers of complete farms simply within the confined circle of close relatives (viz. from parents to children, to sons-in-law and daughters-in-law, or to grandchildren) (Robisheaux, 1989: 82). These preferential buyers then paid a lower, so-called 'child's price' (Kinderpreis), that was tied to the acknowledgement of reciprocal obligations, such as provisions for old age, compensation to siblings excluded from inheritance, previous inheritance portions and dowries, or debts. If a farm slipped out of the hands of a family, this only happened because there was no heir available or because of an insolvency. The sale of small plots obviously did play hardly any part in hamlets with compact farms. In densely populated villages, on the other hand, a market for small plots existed that was not entirely family-controlled (Robisheaux, 1989: 83). This indicates that amongst smallholders family ties were less marked than among substantial farmers. Plots not subjected to impartible inheritance were called 'rolling plots' (walzende Stucke). Farms proper were kept outside of the circulation of goods and were only passed on within the tightly knit network of families of substantial farmers. In the village of Unterfinning in upper Bavaria in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century it was also observed that landlords were very interested that estates were passed on in their

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entirety, but that peasants tenaciously and successfully stuck to the habit that they were able to transfer certain plots unhindered (Beck, 1993: 397-400. SchlOgl, 1992, gives hints that in the districts of the Landgerichte Schrobenhausen, Vohburg, Kelheim and Kirchberg located further north in Bavaria, the number of 'rolling plots' increased in the course of the Thirty Years War.) The case of Hohenlohe as reconstructed by Robisheaux is also remarkable because two different systems of inheritance and two land markets existed side by side within a quite limited space. In that way they formed complementary structures. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the custom of impartible inheritance (Anerbensitte) has obviously been developed at the beginning of the early modem era out of a desire of the families of substantial farmers to back up their social standing in rural society. But its practice only became more common at the tum of the sixteenth century thanks to pressure from the authorities. The Earls of Hohenlohe favoured peasant farms that were large, compact and stable for longer periods because, given the low standard of administrative instruments in most early modem principalities, large farms could be controlled considerably more effective than the fluid farming of small plots which often changed hands. Therefore, the custom of impartible inheritance and the norm of the integrity of estates (Geschlossenheit der Hofe) constituted a strategy to keep up the status of the upper stratum of the peasantry as well as a common model of extraction on the part of lordships in order to have a secure collection of taxes, imposts, and services. IV.I.

Evidence from north-west Germany

Another local case study gives rise to the assumption that the integrity of estates in areas of prevailing impartible inheritance in north west Germany was only of early modem date as well and not, as scholars had believed hitherto, an institution which existed continually from the Middle Ages on. The importance of Lienen's work on Tudorf in the bishopric of Paderborn has not yet been sufficiently appreciated by rural historians, although it questions our picture of social conditions in Westphalia at the start of the early modem era (Lienen, 1991 ). His evidence for a period of time running from the fourteenth to the end of the sixteenth century shows great similarities to the familiar development in the west and south west of Germany. The predominance of landlords had also been questioned in Westphalia by a strong co-operative cohesion of the village community. The restrictions by personal bondage (Leibherrschaft) had been replaced by objectified means of economic dependence. This was paralleled towards the end of the Middle Ages by certain habits of the land market which appear to be highly modem. As a result of population decline and the rise of money economy landlords in the 14th century had to stop their attempts to uphold serfdom. The predominant form of land lease became the short-term leasehold because of the demographic and economic situation and because of a tendency towards lower prices. Peasants leased plots and farm buildings for a short term to be able to adapt their household economy to the changes in the markets for agricultural commodities and to make optimal use of the potential of their family workforce. In this way, in the late Middle Ages the outline of a highly mobile rural society becomes visible where any emotional commitment of peasants to 'their' farmsteads was out of question. With a growing population in the sixteenth century circumstances became fixed once more, as the tenurial status was transformed

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Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

by customary right from leasehold to hereditary right with hereditary tenants (Meierrecht). In exchange for the right to hand their leases on to from generation to generation, and to safeguard them against unilateral termination, the peasants accepted higher rents. But only in the seventeenth century, when a renewed want for people occurred in the wake of the Thirty Years War, landlords, with the help of the territorial state, pushed through the integrity of estates and the custom of impartible inheritance. What consequences did this 'seigneurial reaction' have for the land market? Achilles' study of the financial circumstances of the peasants in the territory of Brunswick in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gives us some hints. On the basis of the officially registered sales of plots of land and farmsteads in the district of Schoningen between 1661 and 1808 he traced just a small number of estate sales in which moreover only relative low prices were obtained. Single plots were primarily sold to pay off debts; arable land that had been mortgaged only passed to a new owner if the debtor had lost all hope of repaying his debt. On the buyers' side of the market there were relatively large numbers of non-peasants, often rural craftsmen, eager to safely invest their surplus money in land. If one compares the transactions of the land market in Schoningen with the corresponding findings ofBretzwil and Neckarhausen, then it becomes obvious how marginal commercial land transfers have been in this north-western region. Even during the last decade of the eighteenth century, when the local land market was at its height, there was a turn-over of less than 0.1 per cent of the total acreage per year (Achilles, 1965: 11) !

IV.2.

Schildesche and Lohne in eastern Westphalia

My own findings which are derived from the parish of Schildesche in the Prussian county of Ravensberg over the period from 1686 to 1830 fit very well into the picture outlined sofar. The parish is situated near the town of Bielefeld and consisted, besides the densely populated village of Schildesche, of five additional hamlets (Bauerschaften) with scattered settlements (Brakensiek, 1991: 158-165). The investigation was aimed at the consequences of the partition of common lands which was carried out between 1771 and 1800 and the effects of the commutation of obligations which started in the year 1808 during the reign of Napoleon. In Ravensberg, peasant landholding was subject likewise to quite strict seigneurial restrictions in the eighteenth century. For every sale of either a single plot of land or a whole farm the consent of the respective landlords had to be obtained. In many cases this meant the King of Prussia. Most of the largest enterprises of substantial farmers, however, were leased out by noble landlords to substantial farmers (Mooser, 1984: 95-104; Brakensiek, 1991: 25-34). At the end of the seventeenth century, the enterprises of substantial farmers dominated the scene in the Bauerschaften of the parish of Schildesche. Backed by a strictly enforced system of impartible inheritance, their number and the acreage they cultivated, remained nearly stable for almost one hundred years. The sons and daughters who did not inherit the farm or were unsuccessful in marrying a heir of another farm were forced to descend into the unpropertied class of cottagers (Heuerlinge) who became the majority of the population towards the end of the eighteenth century. The families of cottagers lived as lodgers in the numerous outbuildings of peasant farms. They earned their living by

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agricultural side-occupations, as well as by spinning flax and weaving fine linens. The population dynamics of this proto-industrial linen region resulted not only in a rapid growth of the households of landless cottagers but also led to an increase in the number of small part-time holdings. This development was anything but detrimental to the landed property of the old-established substantial farmers. Instead, one has to notice that until 1830 a rather dramatic expansion of the peasants' acreage occurred and that at the same time a group of smallholders emerged that until then was unknown in this region (Brakensiek,1991: 165, table 21). What events had been responsible for this development? An examination of the mobility of land in the Bauerschaften of the parish of Schildesche between 1686 and 1830 gives a hint. Until the last third of the eighteenth century the sale or auction of plots or of whole estates took place rather seldom. The land market was effectively controlled by the landlords and blocked in the interest of secure rent collecting. Change came only from new settlers who had got so-called allotments (Zuschliige). These extra lands were plots which had been part of the village commons and had now been rented out by the administrators of state demesnes, because the Prussian state pursued a policy of population increase (Peuplierungspolitik), and strove to reward war veterans (Brakensiek, 1991: 159, table 17). The assingment of holdings to veterans was a policy not only used by the Prussian Crown, but also by the Hanoverian Crown. This development ceased with the privatization of the commons between 1771 and 1786. The partition of common lands caused a short and violent shift in the rural property distribution. The old-established substantial farmers profited most, more than the early modem new settlers, whereas the cottagers remained empty-handed. The modest turnover of land during the last decade of the eighteenth century and during the first decade of the nineteenth century clearly shows that the partition of the common lands by itself could not accelerate the land market. However, substantial farmers got the chance to find themselves a new source of money income by establishing tenant holdings (Erbpachten ). Interestingly, the peasants adopted a pattern of behaviour of the nobility who in this region for the most part did not manage their estates themselves and neither did rent them out as a whole. Noble estate owners usually rented out their landed possessions in small plots to smallholders (Erbpiichter) who acted as a kind of 'miniature farmers', but who must primarily be considered as linen weavers. Those tenant holdings newly erected on former commonland were leased out in almost half of all cases to the siblings of substantial farmers. Seen from that perspective, these holdings thus formed an innovative strategy of transmission. The market for plots of land in the parish of Schildesche only very gradually gained volume after the liberation of the rural population (Bauernbefreiung) in the year 1808, as the personal and material restrictions were abolished following the French example. Women were virtually absent on the land market as buyers, and only marginally present as sellers. When whole farms were sold, these exclusively consisted of middle or small farms, and particularly of the newly erected tenant holdings (Erbpiichtereien). Such transactions were mainly an expression of the economic crisis of the textile industry and not of the state of peasant agriculture. This can also be seen by looking at the rising number of compulsory auctions, which predominantly involved the smallest farms. The

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evolution of transfers of whole farms in the Bauerschaften of the parish of Schildesche developed as follows: there was no sale between 1686 and 1755, two sales and one compulsory auction between 1756 and 1770, just one sale between 1771 and 1785, five sales between 1786 and 1800, six sales and four compulsory auctions between 1801 and 1815, and finally six sales and nine compulsory auctions between 1816 and 1830 (Brakensiek, 1991: 161, table 18). Among the buyers of plots some craftsmen and some weavers who took an active part in the linen trade were successful all the time. In addition, four millers who little by little attained possession of a peasant farm by purchasing strips of land were exceptionally successful. During the first three decades of the 19'h century, the trade in immoveable property in the parish of Schildesche only in exceptional cases reflected signs of prosperity. More often the sale of a building or of plots of land had its cause in the fading solvency of the owner, without the buyer being really better off economically. In the face of declining possibilities to rent lands or living space there was no viable alternative to the purchase of a plot ofland, in spite of the indebtedness linked to it and the sacrifices which ensued. A small number of weaver-traders who had sufficient funds at their disposal to bid at compulsory auctions, and to sell their acquisitions afterwards with a profit gained by the increasing mobility of land. But a class of rentiers did not come into being on the basis of these deals which rather served as a means to strengthen the social position of local brokers who were also politically influential. When the findings on the land market of the parish of Schildesche in the eighteenth century are compared to those of Sabean on Neckarhausen, and of Schnyder on Bretzwil, then the insignificance of the transactions that were officially registered stands out. But occasional evidence from the source material suggests that the firm control landlords exercised over the credit behaviour of the peasantry and of the mobility of land, aimed one-sidedly at the interest of taxes, rents and other payments, promoted the adoption of illegal forms of arrangements among neighbours with respect to land use as well as unsecured and usurious methods of borrowing. Unfortunately, this observation could not be verified systematically but only made plausible by looking at individual cases. Source material of this kind was generated when in case of a conflict suchlike illegal arrangements came into the focus of the political authorities or of lords of serfs or landlords (Leib- und Grundherren). Plots of land sold had already been partly used by the buyer for some years without the consent of the landlord, and the actual change of possession had caused no entry into the register. That in the end there was an entry at all can therefore be interpreted as a form of legalization of an illegal market transaction after the event (Cf. the marginal notes relating to the years from 1702 to 1743 in the register of the land survey and evaluation of 1693: Staatsarchiv Munster, Kriegs- und Domanenkammer Minden, no 990). The tables about the rents and the conditions of the pasture of cottagers in the district of Amt Sparenberg, Vogtei Schildesche, around 1805 are also illuminating. Contrary to their headline, they also show the actual usage of the former common lands by the peasants. This case equally confirms that such lands were not always used by the holders of the title of property but by a third party (Cf. Staatsarchiv Munster, Kriegs- und Domanenkammer Minden, no 3310).

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But how was the land market developing after seigneurial restrictions ceased? The analysis of the parish of Schildesche terminates in the year 1830. Fortunately, there are preliminary outcomes available of a study of the village of Lohne in the nineteenth century (Fertig, 2001). Lohne is situated only twenty kilometres north of Schildesche and was also subjected to Prussian rule. The two villages show similarities in many ways. Until the middle of the nineteenth century Lohne's market for real property gradually grew. It received an additional boost by the fact that Lohne got a railway junction. The traffic in real property among the villagers was not predominantly familycontrolled. The formal land market in Lohne did also work as a functional equivalent to the inheritance system because numerous sales were the consequence of inheritance or marriage. But the findings suggest that in in a European perspective wider kinship relations only played a minor role in the land markets here. In Neckarhausen, the formalization of purchase acts was compatible with the reciprocity and social proximity of the actors on the land market. Sabean reached the conclusion that the descendants of the same ancestors tried to counterbalance the effects of free partibility by endogamous marriages. In such a system the land market provided a specific flexible response and the formalization made it easier for other heirs to regard the proceeds as appropriate sales prices, and to be satisfied with their respective portion of inheritance as a 'fair compensation'. In the case of Santena, Piedmont, in the seventeenth century Levi could establish that the prices of land in transactions among relatives clearly varied more widely than in sales to strangers. His conclusion was that price fixing was a variable of social distance. In contrast to this, Fertig found out for Lohne that social distance - be it kinship or neighbourhood · had hardly any influence on prices. In Lohne the usual purchase price of immoveables turned out to be the thirtyfold of the tax assessment of a plot. This is remarkable because it suggests that even in the middle of the nineteenth century a market sale still aligned to public prescriptions.

This evidence implies in general, and underlines, that unlike in Neckarhausen in Wiirttemberg the rural class society of Ravensberg did not emerge only around 1800 and aided by the land market, but that class divisions already existed at that time. The question arises anyhow whether not everywhere where the holders of substantial farms dominated the villages the rights to succession of undivided farms reflected a convergence between the interests of authorities and those of the large farmers. This would also mean that the blockade of the land market did not serve one-sidedly the interests of landlords but also continued to promote the economically based and politically cemented priority position of the substantial farmer.

V.

Conclusion and further outlook

What can be said in summary about the land market in eighteenth and nineteenth century Germany? The findings of local studies have demonstrated how fruitful a micro-historical approach can be, if one wants to know how the behaviour of the actors was motivated, and what strategies they pursued. For that reason alone it would be desirable that henceforth sales and purchases of land will be further researched within a framework of actor-orientated studies. Yet, the starting point should not be written norms,

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as in the traditional historiography on rural society, but local practices as they can be discerned in the records. On such a basis an attempt could be made to reconstruct the playground of forces in which territorial laws and unwritten peasant customs constituted important points of reference. Normative preconditions like the habits of the peasantry, the law of inheritance sanctioned by political authorities, as well as the growing pressure in favour of written deeds in cases of property transfers were certainly of prime importance in influencing the actions of contemporaries. They equipped the participants on the land market with arguments and, aided by these arguments, these participants could legitimise their actions. However, empirical studies suggest that there were always several options at the same time available. Buyers and sellers in the land market acted within social, legal and political fields of action, their actual strategies were situated in them but these strategies were simply not determined by factors which could be moulded into a typology. The question arises what additional general statements the findings from micro-studies presented in this article allow. It is evident that the various land markets we distinguished were very differently organized. They obeyed such different rules that the manner of price fixing could not be summarized easily. However, we may presume that locally and socially segregated land markets were loosely connected with each other in the sense that massive price movements in one market had an effect on other markets in the same region. These considerations have consequences for the analysis of economic fluctuations. It is a must to try to reconstruct long price series of various partial markets that subsequently could be compared systematically with respect to those factors that were conducive to co-determining the prices. In this way the micro-historical approach also opens up possibilities for reaching macro-historical conclusions. Small as their number may be, the micro-studies available already suggest quite similar patterns of long-term price development on land markets, although there are important restrictions. A secular increase in land prices can be seen everywhere in the eighteenth century. Its peak was accentuated especially in those regions where - over and above the usual participation of estate owners, tenants and substantial farmers in rising grain prices - exceptional profit expectations prevailed, like for instance in eastern Prussia (because of the speculation in estates) or in north Switzerland (because of the very profitable transition to dairy farming and pasture), or in the north-west linen region of Germany (because of the economic and demographic intensification). All these different developments resulted in a remarkable boom towards the end of the eighteenth century which stopped around 1800 mainly for political reasons. From that point on, under the conditions of the socio-economic crisis of the early nineteenth century, land prices took an extremely whimsical course. The speculation in estates in Prussia collapsed in the year 1806 leading to insolvencies on a huge scale (Ristau, 1992: 215-221 ). Added to this was the expanded supply of loose plots, farmsteads, and complete estates as a consequence of the mobilization of land in the course of peasant liberation movement (Bauernbefreiung) and of the separation of the lands of tenants and landlords which kept land prices at a low level until the 1830s. The densely populated regions in west Germany followed a sharply differing path. Here, the high demand for land on the part of the class of smallholders and landless forever prevented a fall in land prices, although this part of Germany as well was hit very hard by the economic crises (cf. Abel, 1978:

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338, for the development of prices in the land market in general, and Achilles, 1965: 11, table 1, for the Amt Schtiningen in Brunswick). In Neckarhausen, Bretzwil and Schildesche in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the land market was essentially a local market. This observation has to be further explained. Why did sales and auctions of peasant farms and separate plots of land scarcely attract prospective buyers from outside? Obviously, personal management was no option for non-residents, and even opportunities to lease out immovable that had been bought with a profit at an auction were relatively sparse. Otherwise more surplus money of non-peasant investors would have flown into the land market, as it did in France, in the Mediterranean and particularly in the Low Countries. But as long as the manorial control of peasant lands in large parts of middle, north and east Germany remained in place, a widespread lack of free leasehold contracts almost followed automatically. However, the same restrictions caused by lordship rights still seem to have lingered on even after the latter had been legally abolished. In Ravensberg after 1808, for instance, urban merchants were certainly legally entitled to purchase, and then lease out, single plots or whole farmsteads in the villages and Bauerschaften we surveyed. In the face of a dense population and the 'land hunger' of the lower classes, leasing out land in separate plots was a very profitable trade which the large peasants eagerly pursued (Mooser, 1984). Nonetheless, one seeks in vain for signs of money investments from the urban sector. In case of a compulsory auction it could happen that lots or whole farms were acquired by main creditors who often were urban merchants but these found nothing better to do than to sell again such an immovable acquisition to a peasant (Brakensiek, 1997, for evidence from Bardiittingdorf, in Ravensberg). Until now the reasons for this kind of behaviour are not sufficiently clear. They could have been purely economical in character, for instance because the need for circulating capital on the side of merchants who had provided credit was far too urgent. But it may also have been a question of a tradition deeply embedded within social practice. It is possible that in many parts of Germany the permanent leasing out of land by outsiders at market prices that were regulated only by supply and demand, was still regarded as offensive as late as the nineteenth century. To answer the question that we posed at the start: Land had been a commodity in Germany in the period from 1700 to 1900, with plots or whole farmes and estates becoming more and more marketable after 1800. But real property remained a very special commodity because any sale ofland endangered the heart of the social order in the countryside and could change this order at the local level with just one blow. Accordingly, any historical survey of the land market that looks at the actions and motives of those who took part in it, as well as at the reactions of their environment can say something about the nature and the transformation of social order itself and about the picture contemporaries made themselves of it.

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Bibliography Abel, W. (1978) Geschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft vom friihen Mittelalter bis zum 19. Jahrhundert, 3. Aufl., Stuttgart. (Deutsche Agrargeschichte; 2). Achilles, W. (1965) Vermogensverhaltnisse braunschweigischer Bauernhdfe im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart. (Quellen und Forschungen zur Agrargeschichte; 13). Beaur, G. (1984) Le marche fancier a la veille de la Revolution. Les mouvements de propriete beaucerons dans les regions de Maintenon et de Janville de 1761-1790, Paris. (Recherches d'histoire et de sciences sociales; 9). Beck, R. (1993) Unterfinning. Landliche Welt vor Anbruch der Moderne, Miinchen. Begemann, U. (1990) Bauerliche Lebensbedingungen im Amt Blumenau (Fiirstentum Calenberg) 1650-1850, Hannover. (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte Niedersachsens; 104). Brakensiek, S. (1991) Agrarreform und landliche Gesellschaft. Die Privatisierung der Marken in Nordwestdeutschland 1750-1850, Paderborn. (Forschungen zur Regionalgeschichte; 1). Brakensiek, S. (1997) 'Sozialtypologie und -topographie eines Gewerbedorfes. Die Bauerschaft Bardiittingdorf (Ravensberg) im Vormarz', Zeitschriftfiir Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, 4512, pp. 181-200. Buchsteiner, I. (1993) Grofigrundbesitz in Pommern 1871-1914. Okonomische, soziale und politische Transformation der Grofigrundbesitzer, Berlin. Buchsteiner, I. (1994) 'Besitzkontinuitat, Besitzwechsel und Besitzverlust in den Gutswirtschaften Pommerns 1879-1910', in H. Reif (ed.), Ostelbische Agrargesellschaft im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik. Agrarkrise - junkerliche 1nteressenpolitikModernisierungsstrategien, Berlin, pp. 125-140. Buchsteiner, I. (1999) 'Pommerscher Adel im Wandel des 19. Jahrhunderts', Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 2513, 1999, pp. 343-374. Fertig, G. (2001) 'Gemeinheitsteilungen in Lohne: Eine Fallstudie zur Sozial- und Umweltgeschichte Westfalens im 19. Jahrhundert', in K. Ditt, R. Gudermann and N. RiiBe (eds), Agrarmodernisierung und okologische Folgen. Westfalen vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, Paderborn, pp. 393----426. (Forschungen zur Regionalgeschichte; 40). Fliigel, A. (2000) Biirgerliche Rittergiiter. Sozialer Wandel und politische Reform in Kursachsen (1680-1844), Gottingen. (Biirgertum. Beitrage zur europaischen Gesellschaftsgeschichte; 16). Fox, Th. (1993) 'Land Tenure, Feudalism and the State in Eighteenth-Century Hesse', in R. Herr (ed.), Themes in Rural History of the Western World, Ames, pp. 99-139. Friedeburg, R. von ( 1997) Landliche Gesellschaft und Obrigkeit. Gemeindeprotest und politische Mobilisierung im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, Gottingen. (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft; 117). Hagen, W.W. (2002) Ordinary Prussians. Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 15001840, Cambridge. Harnisch, H. (1968) Die Herrschaft Boitzenburg. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der sozia!Okonomischen Struktur liindlicher Gebiete in der Mark Brandenburg vom 14. bis

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zum 19. Jahrhundert, Weimar. (Veroffentlichungen des Staatsarchivs Potsdam; 6). Harnisch, H. ( 1984) Kapitalistische Agrarreform und lndustrielle Revolution. Agrarhistorische Untersuchungen iiber das ostelbische Preuj3en zwischen Spdtfeudalismus und biirgerlich-demokratischer Revolution von 1848149 unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Provinz Brandenburg, Weimar. (Veroffentlichungen des Staatsarchivs Potsdam; 19). Henning, F.W. (1976) 'Die Entwicklung des Grundstiicksverkehrs vom ausgehenden 18. bis zum Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts', in H. Coing and W. Walter (eds), Wissenschaft und Kodifikation des Privatrechts im 19. Jahrhundert 3: Die rechtliche und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Grundeigentums und Grundkredits, Frankfurt, pp. 172-201. (Studien zur Rechtswissenschaft des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts; 3). Rippel, W. von (1977) Die Bauernbefreiung im Konigreich Wiirttemberg, 2 Bande, Boppard am Rhein. (Forschungen zur deutschen Sozialgeschichte; 1). Levi, G. (1986) Das immaterielle Erbe. Eine bduerliche Welt an der Schwelle zur Moderne, Berlin. Lienen, B.H. (1991) 'Aspekte des Wandels bauerlicher Betriebe zwischen dem 14. und 17. Jahrhundert an Beispielen aus Tudorf (Kr. Paderbom)', Westfdlische Forschungen, 41, pp. 288-315. Liitge, F. (1967) Geschichte der deutschen Agrarverfassung vom friihen Mittelalter bis zum 19. Jahrhundert, 2. Aufl., Stuttgart. (Deutsche Agrargeschichte; 3). Meitzen, A. ( 1868) Der Boden und die landwirthschaftlichen Verhdltnisse des Preussischen Staates nach dem Gebietsumfange vor 1866, Bd. 1, Berlin. Meitzen, A. (1869) Der Boden und die landwirthschaftlichen Verhdltnisse des Preussischen Staates nach dem Gebietsumfange vor 1866, Bd. 4 (Anlagen), Berlin. Mooser, J. (1984) Liindliche Klassengesellschaft 1770-1848. Bauern und Unterschichten, Landwirtschaft und Gewerbe im ostlichen Westfalen, Gottingen. (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft; 64 ). Muller, M. (1980) Sdkularisation und Grundbesitz. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Saar-MoselRaumes 1794-1813, Boppard am Rhein. (Forschungen zur Deutschen Sozialgeschichte; 3). Pedlow, G.W. (1988) The Survival of the Hessian Nobility, 1770-1870, Princeton. Pfister, U. (1994) 'Volumes et prix sur le marche immobilier de trois communes zurichoises au XVIIIe siecle', in M. Dorban and P. Servais (eds), Les mouvements longs des marches immobiliers ruraux et urbains en Europe (XVle-XlXe siecles), Louvainla-Neuve, pp. 71-94. Reif, H. (1979) Westfdlischer Adel 1770-1860. Vom Herrschaftsstand zur regionalen Elite, Gottingen. (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft; 35). Ristau, B. (1992) 'Adlige Interessenpolitik in Konjunktur und Krise. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der landschaftlichen Kreditkasse OstpreuBens 1788 bis 1835 ', in Denkhorizonte und Handlungsspielrdume. Historische Studien fiir Rudolf Vierhaus zum 70. Geburtstag, Gottingen, pp. 197-234. Robisheaux, Th. (1989) Rural Society and the Search for Order in Early Modem Gennany, Cambridge. Sabean, D.W. (1990) Property, production and family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870, Cambridge. (Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology; 73).

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Sabean, D.W. (1998) Kinship in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870, Cambridge. (Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology). Sakai, E. (1967) Der kurhessische Bauer im 19. Jahrhundert und die Grundlastenablosung, Melsungen. (Hessische Forschungen zur Geschichtlichen Landes- und Volkskunde; 7). Schieder, W. and Kube, A. (1987) Sakularisation und Mediatisierung. Die Veri:iujJerung der Nationalgiiter im Rhein-Mosel-D epartement 1803-1813, Boppard am Rhein. (Forschungen zur deutschen Sozialgeschichte; 4). SchlOgl, R. (1992) 'Zwischen Krieg und Krise. Situation und Entwicklung der bayerischen Bauemwirtschaf t im 17. Jahrhundert', Zeitschrift fiir Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie, 4012, pp. 133-167. Schlumbohm, J. (1994) Lebensliiufe, Familien, Hofe. Die Bauern und Heuerleute des osnabriickischen Kirchspiels Belm in proto-industrieller Zeit, 1650-1860, Gottingen. (Veroffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts fiir Geschichte; 110). Schnyder-Burghartz, A. (1992) Alltag und Lebensformen auf der Basler Landschaft um 1700. Vorindustrielle, liindliche Kultur und Gesellschaft aus mikrohistorischer Perspektive, Liestal. (Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte und Landeskunde des Kantons BaselLandschaft). Schremmer, E. (1963) Die Bauembefreiung in Hohenlohe, Stuttgart. (Quellen und Forschungen zur Agrargeschichte; 9). Steinle, P. (1971) Die Vermogensverhiiltnisse der Landbevolkerung in Hohenlohe im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Schwabisch Hall. (Forschungen aus Wtirttembergisch Franken; 5). Weyermann, M.R. (1910) Zur Geschichte des 1mmobiliar Kreditwesens in Preussen mit besonderer Nutzanwendung aufdie Theorie der Bodenverschuldung, Karlsruhe. (Freiburger volkswirtschaftliche Abhandlungen; 1.1 ). Winkel, H. (1968) Die Ab!Osungskapitalien aus der Bauembefreiung in West- und Siiddeutschland. Hohe und Verwendung bei Standes- und Grundherren, Stuttgart. (Quellen und Forschungen zur Agrargeschichte; 19). Ziekursch, J. (1927) Hundert Jahre schlesischer Agrargeschichte. Vom Hubertusburger Frieden bis zum AbschlujJ der Bauernbefreiung, 2. Aufl., Breslau. (Darstellungen und Quellen zur schlesischen Geschichte; 20).

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PART III

ENGLAND

11 Tenure and landholding in England 1440-1580. A crucial period for the development of agrarian capitalism? Jane WHITTLE, University of Exeter

I.

Introduction

The period 1440-15 80 stands between the dissolution of serfdom in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century and the increase of trade, rural industry, landlessness and poverty that characterised the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. For this reason, since at least the time of Marx onwards, it has been identified as a period crucial to the development of agrarian capitalism in England. This paper examines the nature of land tenure and rural social structure in this period, asking what changed in this century and a half, and how and why did these changes take place? The two most important trends in the development of agrarian capitalism are identified as engrossment (the enlargement of farms) and increased landlessness. Engrossment indicates an increasing predominance of commercial farming; landlessness indicates an increasing importance of wage labour and rural industry, as well as an increased market for agricultural produce. With regard to these two broad issues, the focus is placed on four questions: how secure were tenants' rights to land, who was responsible for engrossment, what was the extent oflandlessness in sixteenth-century England, and how did people lose their rights to land? In answering them attention will be paid to local and regional variations, as well as change over time. Before embarking on a detailed examination of land tenure and social structure, it is helpful first to outline the changing pattern of demand for land in this period, and the possible reason behind these changes. The period of study can be divided into two subperiods, 1440 to the 1520s when demand for land was quite low and land was relatively easy to acquire, and 1530 to 1580 when demand for land was high and land became difficult to acquire. Demand for land was affected by the demographic situation, by the supply of land, by the demand for agricultural produce, by engrossment, and by terms of tenure. The decline in population levels by a half or more between 1348 and 1440 obviously reduced demand for land. There is little evidence of renewed population growth until the 1470s, and no firm evidence of significant growth until the 1530s. Growth was quite rapid thereafter, with the exception of a severe mortality crisis in the late 1550s (Hatcher, 1977; Wrigley and Schofield, 1982; Poos, 1985; Bailey, 1996). While trends in population are undoubtedly important other factors had a strong influence on the demand for land. The mid fifteenth century was marked not only by low population levels but by an increased supply of land available to tenants as the result of the leasing out of demesne land which had previously been managed directly by manorial lords and their officials (Miller, 1991). The reason lords were keen to lease out their demesnes was the low demand for agricultural produce on the market and the high price of labour. Low market demand for produce also affected the larger tenants, and can be considered

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another factor dampening tenant demand for land in the mid fifteenth century. Some engrossment of farms was evident in this period, however, and especially by the late fifteenth century (Miller, 1991). Engrossment has the potential to reduce the supply of land independently of demographic change, by monopolising tenures in a few hands. When combined with population growth, as in the mid sixteenth century, engrossment reduced the supply of land at a much faster rate than population growth could have achieved on its own. The consequent increase in landlessness strengthened the demand for agricultural produce on the market, further increasing the value of land, and therefore demand. Finally, terms of tenure affected the demand for land on a local level. Secure tenures with low rents and fines were more attractive than insecure tenures, or tenures that were heavily burdened with payments. That said, when land was in plentiful supply, as in the mid fifteenth century, security of tenure became relatively insignificant and the level of rents and fines all important.

II. Tenure An examination of the changing nature of land tenure leads to the answers to the first two questions: 'how secure were tenants rights to land', and 'who was responsible for engrossment'. Tenants' rights to land could be made insecure in a number of ways, by variable rents and fines, by short term tenancies, and by a lack of defence against eviction in law. There is good evidence that tenants could not be evicted at random, at the whim of a landlord: a landlord needed to be able to justify eviction or the termination of a tenure. This does not necessarily mean tenants had secure rights to land. There were numerous routes by which rights to land could be lost. Tenants lost rights to land because they could not pay rents or fines, because their term of tenancy had come to an end, because they had no proof of tenancy, or because they infringed the terms of their tenancy, for instance by enclosing land without permission. The last two occurrences are the most clearly documented, with records of lords seizing land from tenants for these reasons; but they were also the least common. It is the levels of rents and fines and the limited duration of some tenures that affected the majority of tenants.

Figure 11.1 Types of tenure on English manors (mid 16th century) Demesne land leased on customary terms

Secure and favourable customary tenures

Vacant customary land leased I

Freehold rights sold to tenants

...

Demesne leasehold

I

Customary tenure (copyhold)

Subtenures

238

...

Freehold

Tenure and landholding in England 1440-1580

Figure 1L1 shows the main types of tenure found in England in this period. It is necessarily schematic, as no firm figures of the proportion of land held by different tenures exist (Kosminsky, 1954). The arrows show the movement of land between different tenures. Freehold land owed low, fixed rents to the manorial lord. By the mid fifteenth century the tenants of freehold had few other obligations to their landlord, and those they had were fixed. 1 This form of tenure was thus virtually equivalent to full ownership. Most tenanted land was held by customary tenure, however. Customary tenure applied to all land that had been held by servile tenures during the medieval period. It owed fixed rents, 2 but customary tenants also had to pay fines, an entry fine when they first took on a holding, and in some cases a heriot or death duty when a tenant died (Tawney, 1967; Kerridge, 1969; Harvey, 1984). They might also be bound by other restrictions, for instance forbidding them to divide their landholdings, or requiring them to be resident (Whittle, 1998). Demesne land was the full property of the lord with which he could do what he wished, including leasing it at market rent. Land could not be casually transferred between these three types of tenure. In the exceptional circumstances of the fifteenth century transfers did take place. Customary land which was vacant because no tenants could be found became part of the demesne. When potential tenants were found the lord could choose whether to lease the land, or concede it on customary terms. In the late fifteenth century a number of lords conceded all or part of their demesne land to tenants on customary terms, thus effectively transferring demesne to customary tenure. In the fifteenth and early sixteenth century some customary tenures became so favourable, with low and fixed rents and fines, and few other restrictions, they were equivalent to freehold, although they were still formally described as customary tenures. On other manors customary tenants were allowed or encouraged to purchase freehold rights to customary tenures from their manorial lord (Harvey, 1984; Hoyle, 1990; Miller, 1991). Finally freehold land, and customary land if the custom of the manor allowed it, could be sublet by their tenants. Subtenures, like demesne leasehold, were not controlled by custom, and could be rented at market rates. 3 The situation was more complicated than this however. The terms by which customary tenants held land were determined by the custom of the manor to which that land belonged, and customs varied significantly from manor to manor. So not only were there different types of tenanted land within manors (freehold, demesne leasehold, and customary land), but significant variations between manors. For the purpose of analysis manors can be classified into three types, according to the broad type of customary tenure found within them, as restrictive manors, land-market manors, and privileged manors. Restrictive manors were the classic manors of the medieval period where customary tenants held standard sized holdings, owed heavy dues and services, and whose activities were tightly controlled by their lord. Such manors were most common in southern, western and midland England (Harvey, 1977; Howell, 1983; Schofield, 1992). 1 For example in Hevingham, Norfolk, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, freeholders paid a small rent, which could not be raised by the landlord, of 3d per acre. They had to attend the manorial court or pay a fine of 3d per year to be excused. They had no other tenurial obligations. 2 Although rents were in theory fixed, they did fall in the fifteenth century, as a result of landlords trying to attract new tenants to vacant land. 3 In exceptional cases, subtenures did become customary (Mcintosh, 1986).

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However, even in the period before the Black Death, many manors did not fit this stereotype, and are characterised here as land-market manors. The customary tenants on these manors were burdened with servile status, and owed labour services and other servile dues as on classic manors, but they were allowed to exchange land between themselves, creating a market for customary land. The market tended to fragment landholdings, which were typically small. Such manors were likely to be more commercialised with a higher presence of wage labour and rural industry. These manors were most common in East Anglia and the East Midlands, but also occurred elsewhere in England, especially near urban centres (Campbell 1981; Smith, 1984; Glennie, 1988). Finally there were privileged manors, such as ancient demesne manors which belonged or had belonged to the crown, and also privileged regions, such as large parts of Kent, where serfdom had never developed fully. These manors resembled land-market manors without serfdom, on which customary tenures were hard to distinguish from freehold (Mcintosh 1986; Miller, 1991; Zell, 1994). The different types of manors experienced the upheavals of the fifteenth century differently, and emerged, despite changes, as still distinctively different in the sixteenth century. So what were the main changes that occurred in the fifteenth century? Serfdom, as an aspect of customary tenure, largely disappeared between 1380 and 1420. Most commonly, this was achieved by servile tenants leaving the manors that conferred that status upon them, and taking up land elsewhere on non-servile terms (Hilton, 1983; Miller, 1991). However, in the early to mid fifteenth century, with lords attempting to lease demesne land as well as find tenants for customary holdings, the removal of servile status alone was not sufficient to ensure a fully tenanted manor. In these circumstances, lords seem to have adopted two quite different policies. The first was to make customary tenures attractive by reducing rents and fines, and removing other restrictions on tenants' activities. The advantage of this policy was it enabled land to be partly or fully tenanted, ensuring a low, steady income for the lord. It also increased demand for demesne leasehold. The disadvantage was that manorial custom was changed to the advantage of the tenants. Restrictive lordship could not be reimposed once it had been abandoned. The second type of policy was to leave the terms of customary tenure largely unchanged, but to lease vacant land to tenants on favourable terms, in the hope that demand for customary land would recover, and customary land could be tenanted again on the old terms. The advantage of this policy was that lords retained a degree of control over their tenants and customary obligations were not eroded. The disadvantage was that lords had to tolerate vacant land as tenants left to take up more favourable tenancies elsewhere. In extreme cases lords were left with no tenants at all. It is possible that some lords aimed to depopulate their manors by being intransigent. With large areas of vacant land, lords were in a position to lease land to commercial farmers at market rates. But given the low level of market rents it is very unlikely that this was more profitable than a fully populated village in the fifteenth century (Dyer, 1982). There is no obvious regional pattern to which policy lords followed. Both types of policy were found in different regions, and the same lord could follow different policies on different manors. Lords were most likely to follow a 'hands-off' policy of low rents and fines and fully tenanted land where demand for land was highest for other reasons, for instance near urban centres and in localities where population density remained

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relatively high. Sometimes they appear to have followed the policy accidentally by careless administration. On the other hand, lords were more likely to retain strong control of manors where they were resident, or at least resident nearby, or in localities were demand for land was generally low and full tenancy was not an option. Neighbouring manors, following opposite policies, could generate similar levels of revenue, although loosely administered manors were much more favourable to the tenants. It was in this situation of flux, and general low demand for land, that various new forms of customary tenure crystallised out of the old servile tenures. These were copyhold of inheritance, copyhold for lives, beneficial leases, and tenure at will (Kerridge, 1969; Harvey, 1984; Hoyle, 1990). Of these tenures copyhold of inheritance was the most secure. Copyhold for lives and beneficial leases were secure for their duration, but the lord could veto renewal and thus undermine inheritance or sales. Tenure at will was insecure. Copyhold of inheritance was most common in the land-market manors of eastern England, while the other types dominated in the restrictive manors of midland, southern and western England. Once demand for land began to rise in the sixteenth century lords began to question the rights conferred by these new forms of tenure in an attempt to raise revenue in line with the increased value of land (Tawney, 1967). There was a certain legal logic to the way in which the law responded to these challenges, but to the tenants it must have appeared something of a lottery (Gray 1963; Kerridge, 1969). In the medieval period when serfdom was in force, lords had fought to tie tenants to the land. In the fifteenth century leaseholds and other short term tenancies were often the most attractive. Rents were falling, and short-term tenancies with no obligations of inheritance had none of the overtones of servility from which tenants were so keen to escape. Tenants could choose to renew the tenancies if they wished. By the mid sixteenth century however, the tables had turned: variable rents and fines and short-term tenancies worked in the lords' favour. On the other hand, many lords did not foresee future trends. In the early sixteenth century when demand for land began to rise, some lords were busy regranting leaseholds as secure customary tenures, seemingly oblivious to the possible disadvantages (Hoyle, 1990; Whittle, 2000).

However, even in the sixteenth century many tenures were secure and unchallengeable: freehold tenures, tenures on privileged manors and copy hold of inheritance. On restrictive manors where tenure was insecure and lords had the right to veto new tenants and control land exchange actiYities, and in places where the lords' intransigence had largely brought about depopulation, we can hold lords responsible for engrossment. Although it should be noted that it was precisely on this type of manor that lords fined their tenants for allowing buildings to fall into disrepair, showing a degree of hostility towards tenants' engrossing activities (Whittle and Yates, 2000). On land-market and privileged manors, where customary tenure was secure and land market activity was controlled by the tenants not the lord, lords had no control over engrossment. Yet engrossment occurred here as well, as a result of the land market activities of the larger tenants. Land markets were active precisely because tenure was secure; but when demand for land was high, the market gradually but inevitably redistributed land towards the larger, more wealthy tenants. Land markets bring their own kind of insecurity for smaller, poorer tenants via the price of land, the ability to mortgage and the ability to sell (Whittle, 2000). Many customary tenures, and particularly the most secure customary tenures, also allowed

241

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle ,1ges-19th century)

tenants to sublet land. Most subtenures were insecure, like demesne leasehold. Some landholders therefore were denied secure tenure not by the manorial lords, but by the customary and freehold tenants from whom they leased land. In short, the secure tenures of the sixteenth century became a means by which tenants exploited other tenants (Croot and Parker, 1985). We asked 'how secure were tenants rights to land?' On some manors tenurial traditions combined with the redefinition of customary tenure in the fifteenth century allowed manorial lords to undermine the security of customary tenure in the sixteenth century, but on other manors this opportunity was denied to lords. Similarly, when we ask 'who was responsible for engrossment', the answer is not the same on all manors. In some manors lords brought about engrossment while elsewhere, and I would argue most commonly, it was the work of tenants. However, the important point is that engrossment was common experience in manors with very different types of tenure, and therefore it cannot be explained by tenure alone.

III. Social Structure This leads us to the detailed examination of rural social structure in the period 14401580, and towards the answers to the second two questions 'what was the extent of landlessness in sixteenth-century England' and 'how did people lose their rights to land'. Farm size is commonly used as a proxy for both social status and the degree of commercialisation. This is in some ways unfortunate, not only because the link between farm size and status or commercial orientation was variable (Cooper, 1985), but also because the historical data relating to farm size is problematic in many ways. 4 Nevertheless, evidence of farm size remains our most plentiful source of data about rural social structure for this period. As long as the drawbacks are born in mind, we can use farm size as a general indicator of wealth and status. The following section uses the broad categories of 'smallholders', referring to those with less than five acres of land; 'medium sized farmers', those with between 5 and 30 acres of land; large farmers, with over 30 acres, and very large farmers with over 100 acres. Despite the increased availability of land, smallholders remained in eYidence across England in the mid fifteenth century. They were certainly not as numerous as in the preBlack Death period, and were concentrated in those manors with low rents and fines, and few restrictions on tenants (Miller, 1991; Poos, 1991). When land lay vacant, why did some householders remain as smallholders? A number of factors may have discouraged them from taking on larger holdings. Land was never free for the taking, in loosely administered manors it had to be purchased from the previous tenant; in tightly administered manors it owed heavy obligations. Thus holding land brought financial and social 4

Small farms could, of course, be highly specialised and commercialised. The calculation of farm size is made problematic by the fact many documents record land area in traditional units such as 'virgate' and 'yardland' which were variable in size; by the fact farmers often held land from more than one manor, making it difficult to reconstruct total farm size; and by the presence of unrecorded subtenures.

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Tenure and landholding in England

1440~1580

obligations, and in a period of low market demand for agricultural produce, was not likely to be particularly profitable. For some, the management of a substantial landholding may still have held connotations of serfdom, with financial obligations owed to a lord and they chose a freer, if less secure lifestyle. The attraction of smallholding lay in the fact real wages were relatively high, while non-agricultural craft occupations offered a way to earn a living free from feudal obligations (Penn and Dyer, 1990). However, in the first half of the sixteenth century the position of smallholders quickly deteriorated. Inflation reduced the real value of wages while the price of land increased rapidly after 1530. Smallholders sold their land as a result of indebtedness, or probably more commonly, failed to acquire direct tenancies at all, and were instead forced to sublet holdings from other tenants. Smallholding direct tenants did still exist in southern, midland and eastern England in 1580, but on average they held less land than before, and their numbers had not increased in line with population growth. 5 The fate of more substantial farmers was mixed. The average size of landholdings grew significantly in the years following the Black Death. Whereas before the mid fourteenth century the maximum holding size on most manors was perhaps 30 acres, by the mid fifteenth century the largest tenants often held 100 acres or more, taking advantage of leased demesne land as well as engrossing customary holdings (Miller, 1991; Dyer 1991). However, in the mid fifteenth century there was little incentive to hold so much land, and many tenants were content with less than 30 acres, despite the presence of vacant land (Hatcher, 1996). By the late fifteenth century more pronounced engrossment was in evidence, and apparently profitable. Engrossment continued in the sixteenth century, with large and very large holdings growing in number at the expense of medium sized farms (Thirsk, 1967; Spufford, 1974). It has been assumed by a number of writers that population growth was a major impetus behind engrossment in the sixteenth century (Stone, 1967). But, as Brenner (1976) pointed out, population growth in the late thirteenth century brought about the opposite trend, the increased fragmentation of farms and a proliferation of smallholdings (Smith, 1984 ). A clue to this paradox is provided by those areas of England that did not experience continued engrossment in the sixteenth century: population growth resulted in increased numbers of smallholdings in parts of northern England and Cornwall (Outhwaite, 1986). Reed has noted that as late as the nineteenth century there were isolated areas within southern England where smallholding remained common (Reed, 1984, 1986). Such localities were typically areas of poor soil, often remote from centres of marketing, in other words, they were areas where there was little potential for commercial agriculture. It was the commercial potential of agriculture which drove the trend towards engrossment.

There was a noticeable change in the character of customary tenants between the fourteenth century and the late fifteenth and sixteenth century. In the later period customary tenants included people who clearly did not farm the land themselves, such as gentlemen, clerics and wealthy townsmen, many of whom were non-resident (Mcintosh, 5

The situation was different in the north of England and the extreme west, see below.

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Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-I 9th century)

1986; Glennie, 1988). Before the fifteenth century such people had restricted their purchases to freehold land as well as the ownership of whole manors: they did not purchase customary land because it conferred unfree status. Their entrance into the customary land market in the late fifteenth century pushed up the price of customary land beyond the reach of many potential farmers and indicates that land was considered a profitable investment. Of course, the majority of tenants of this type sublet their land. In localities such as Norfolk, where customary tenures were secure and inheritable, manorial lords bought customary land in neighbouring manors, which they could sublet more profitably than direct tenures from their own manors (Moreton, 1992; Whittle, 2000). The extent and nature of subtenures, like the connected issue of the extent of landlessness, remains one of the great unknowns of sixteenth-century England. Those rare sixteenth-century land surveys that record subtenure reveal it to be extensive, with the majority of land sublet (Harrison, 1979). But they also present a picture of even more extreme social polarisation within the countryside than the records of direct tenure. Most subtenants were cottage dwellers with virtually no land. The bulk of sublet land was rented by the larger farmers, meaning their farms were even larger than the direct documentation indicates. Research on this topic remains scanty. The presence of apparently landless householders can be detected by cross-referencing manorial documents with records of the more general population, such as taxation returns and parish registers. The result of carrying out this exercise for one Norfolk village indicated that a minimum of 20% of married householders were landless in the mid sixteenth century (Whittle, 2000). Moreover, the fact that population growth was not reflected in an increase in the number of direct manorial tenants in many manors across England in the sixteenth century is a strong indication that landlessness and subtenancy were on the increase (Tawney, 1967). Much more research on this topic is needed, although poor documentation means that it is likely the results will always be tentative. Inferring the number of landless householders backwards from the size of the hired workforce, even if this was known, is not possible. Much of the hired workforce was made up of young, unmarried people in their late teens and early twenties, often working as servants and living within their employer's household (Kussmaul, 1981). How had landless householders, both subtenants and direct tenants with little more than a dwelling house, lost their rights to land? They were not, apart from exceptional cases, evicted from tenures, the process was more gradual and less Yisible than that. A number of reasons have already been suggested above. First, there were factors that reduced the pool of land available to smaller tenants. As Allen (1992) has shown, most villages that were depopulated in the fifteenth century remained so in the sixteenth century and beyond, farmed instead in large units by commercial farmers. On manors that remained well populated, engrossment, usually as a result of tenants' activities, reduced the amount of land available for everyone else. If English tenants had had a strict custom of inheritance, engrossment might have been much more difficult. But while substantial farmers generally passed their land on to one or more sons, smallholders did so less often, and men of all classes often expected heirs to make payment for inherited land (Hoyle, 1990; Whittle 1998). In manors with active land markets the sons of smallholders simply could not afford to purchase direct tenures by the mid sixteenth century, while their fathers often sold land before their death as a result of indebtedness. The sons of

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Tenure and landholding in England 1440-1580

tenants on restrictive manors were dependant on the lord's discretion to renew their tenures, and were required to pay increasingly heavy fines for this privilege as the century progressed (Beattie, 1982; Howell, 1983). Those who didmanage to acquire landholdings became increasingly vulnerable, as the increased purchase price and/or entry fines, or the case of leasehold, increased rent, reduced the profitability of farming. Smaller farmers were badly affected by poor harvests which left them without enough grain for subsistence and seed, forcing them to purchase on the market at times of high prices. Conversely, large farmers benefited from bad as well as good harvests, whether they sold small amounts of grain at high prices or large amounts at low prices (Spufford, 1974; Overton, 1996). To argue that market mechanisms played a large part in increasing the degree of landlessness among the English population in the sixteenth century is not to argue that this was inevitable, it is simply to say this appears to be the way things happened. In answer to question 'what was the extent of landlessness in sixteenth-century England' it has to be admitted that we don't really know. It seems likely that a substantial proportion, perhaps 20%, almost certainly more, of rural householders were landless by the mid sixteenth century, and that the proportion grew rapidly in the second half of the century. 'How did people lose their rights to land?' Landlessness came about by a variety of means, predominantly because many men could not afford to acquire direct tenancies, or found themselves heavily burdened with payments if they did, 6 and because each bad harvest improved the lot of large farmers while reducing that of smallholders and medium sized farmers. Behind both trends lay the increasing importance of selling agricultural produce, of profit motivated rather than subsistence motivated farming. This pushed up the value of land, and increased the differential between large and small farms.

IV. Conclusion To understand what made commercial farming by large tenants possible and profitable in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, we have to understand what had held them back before. There had been large commercial farms in the medieval period, but they were almost exclusively manorial demesnes, managed directly by lords and their officials. Lords abandoned direct demesne farming in the early fifteenth century precisely because commercial farming was unprofitable, and never returned to direct farming on the same scale. As soon as the demand for agricultural produce recovered, it was tenants, not lords, who were in a position to exploit the opportunities. They could produce more cheaply than lords by exploiting their own and their family's labour, and by managing their affairs directly. Most manorial lords showed no inclination to return to direct demesne farming in the sixteenth century. Leasing land was quite profitable. The end of serfdom had reduced lords' control over tenants, and had reduced income from lords'

6

These payments might either be to the landlord, in the form of an entry fine for customary land, or high rents for leasehold land; or they might be to the former tenant in the form of a high purchase price; in some cases it might be to both. All were symptoms of the high demand for land.

245

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

jurisdictional rights, but it also increased the market value of land, precisely because it was no longer so heavily burdened by manorial payments and jurisdictional inconveniences and duties. The customary land market was no longer protected by a restriction to those of low social status because customary land was no longer tainted with serfdom. Freedom was double edged for the tenants. In the fifteenth century it conferred an unquestionable improvement in wealth and status. But as the economic tide turned in the sixteenth century poorer tenants were left to sink or swim in the new open market situation and many sunk. The social structure of rural England that had emerged by the late sixteenth century was fundamentally different from that of the fourteenth century. In the fourteenth century there was a gulf between manorial lords and everyone else, be they poor freeholders or servile tenants (Hilton, 1975). By the late sixteenth century a new gulf had emerged between lords and large tenants on the one hand, and the landless and near-landless on the other (Wrightson, 1977). In the period 1440-1580 the consequences of the disappearance of serfdom were played out in the social and economic structure of rural England, first in a situation of low demand for land and general economic malaise, and then in a situation of high demand and increased market integration. To produce a full picture of how and why these changes took place we would need to examine non-agricultural employment and production, and look more closely at the nature of wage labour and markets for agricultural produce. By the late sixteenth century, however, we can say that some parts of England already looked more capitalist than peasant, in that farming was primarily profit rather than subsistence orientated. The unusual situation of a substantial tenantry, unburdened by serfdom, and lightly burdened by rents and taxes, had allowed a substantial capitalist farming sector to develop away from the direct control of the gentry and aristocracy. Typically these capitalist farmers or yeomen held a mixture of freehold, customary and leasehold land, their farms were large, but rarely greater than 150 acres, and they relied chiefly on the labour of their family and servants, rather than day labourers. It was the emergence of these men which led to a polarisation of rural society below the level of the gentry, between those with land, and those without, transforming the nature of village communities.

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Penn, S.A.C. and Dyer, C. (1990) 'Wages and earnings in late medieval England: evidence from the enforcement of the Labour Laws', Economic History Review, 2nd Series 43, pp. 356-376. Poos, L.R. (1985) 'The rural population of Essex in the later Middle Ages', Economic History Review, 2nd Series 38, pp. 515-530. Poos, L.R. ( 1991) A rural society after the Black Death, Essex 1350-1525, Cambridge. Razi, Z. (1993) 'The myth of the immutable English family', Past and Present, 140, pp. 3-44. Reed, M. (1984) 'The peasantry of nineteenth-century England: a neglected class?', History Workshop Journal, 18, pp. 53-76. Reed, M. (1986) 'Nineteenth-century rural England: a case for peasant studies?', Journal of Peasant Studies, 14, pp. 78-99. Rigby, S.H. (1995) English society in the later Middle Ages: class, status and gender, London. Schofield, P. (1996) 'Tenurial developments and the availability of customary land in a later medieval community', Economic History Review, 2nd Series 49, pp. 250-267. Smith, R.M. (ed.) (1984) Land, kinship and life-cycle, Cambridge. Spufford, M. (1974) Contrasting communities: English villagers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Cambridge. Stone, L. (1967) 'Introduction to the Torchbook edition', in R.H. Tawney, The agrarian problem in the sixteenth century, New York, pp. 1-16. Stride, K.B. (1989) 'Engrossing in sheep-corn-chalk areas: evidence in Norfolk, 1530/ 1-1633', Norfolk Archaeology, 40, pp. 308-318. Tawney, R.H. (1967) The agrarian problem in the sixteenth century, New York. [First published London 1912]. Thirsk, J. (ed.) (1967) The agrarian history of England and Wales, Vol.4, 1500-1640, Cambridge. Whittle, J. (1998) 'Individualism and the family-land bond: a reassessment of land transfer patterns among the English peasantry c.1270-1580', Past and Present, 160, pp. 25-63. Whittle, J. (2000) The development of agrarian capitalism: land and labour in Norfolk 1440-1580, Oxford. Whittle, J and Yates M. (2000) ' "Pays reel or pays legal?" Contrasting patterns of land tenure and social structure in eastern Norfolk and western Berkshire, 1450-1600', Agricultural History Review, 48, pp. 1-26. Wrightson, K. (1977) 'Aspects of social differentiation in rural England, cl580-1660', Journal of Peasant Studies, 5, pp. 33-47. Wrightson, K. (1982) English society 1580-1680, London. Wrigley, E.A. and Schofield, R.S. (1981) The population history of England 1541to1871: a reconstruction, Cambridge. Yelling, J.A. (1977) Common field and enclosure in England 1450-1850, London. Zell, M. (1994) Industry in the countryside: Wealden society in the sixteenth century, Cambridge.

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12 Redefining copyhold in the 16th century. The case of timber rights 1 Richard W.

I.

HOYLE,

University of Reading

Introduction

In early 1587 John Mayhew, a copyhold tenant of the Suffolk manor of Monk Soham, lodged a bill in the court of Chancery against his landlord, Lionel Talmach. 2 A year previously Mayhew had been presented at the manor court for cutting down an ash tree without his lord's permission. The jury had found against Mayhew and his tenement had been seized as a forfeiture. Mayhew variously claimed that the tree had been felled a long time before, that it had stood on a part of his tenement not held of the manor of Soham, and most importantly, that the custom of the manor entitled copyholders to cut timber of oak, elm and ash growing on their tenements, which they could then make into 'bardstiles, troughs, bridges, chairs, stools, shelves, "stayers to take water", ladders, bowls, cheese vates [chesfates] and cheese ledges [chesledes], cheese presses, cart bote, plough bote, paling and for any other kind of necessary uses'. So whilst Mayhew was convinced that he was the subject of a conspiracy to deprive him of his tenement, the point at issue which divided him from his landlord was quite simple. Did the custom of the manor give a tenant the right to fell timber on his copyhold for his own use without the lord's permission - or not? And we might ask how it was that when timber was a daily necessity, the tenants' rights should be a matter of uncertainty and debate, especially when the penalty for illegal timber felling was the severe one of forfeiture for waste.

1

The present article is the first part to be written of a much larger project on tenure in England, 1540-1640. Much of the material for this was gathered during 1991-1992 with the aid of a British Academy small grant whilst I was a British Academy research fellow at Magdalen College Oxford. I can happily repeat my thanks to the Academy for its patronage. And I am grateful to CORN for the excuse to write up this small corner of the larger project. The first part of this essay is an account of my present thinking in the light of extensive archival work. As I hope to develop all the themes I touch on here at greater length in a future book, I have deliberately kept references to the minimum. The book will attempt to quantify the frequency with which disputes took place: the approach here is anecdotal. All documents cited are in the Public Record Office (PRO), London. The spelling of all quotations from manuscripts has been modernised. 2 PRO, C2/Eliz (Chancery pleadings, Elizabeth) /M8/24. For the manor, see Copinger, IV, pp. 80-81. In a later case from the same manor, it was claimed that the tenants had a right to 'fell timber trees growing and standing upon their copyhold lands, and the same to dispose of either to build or repair their houses, or to make pale [fences] or to sell or otherwise, without any gainsaying to the lord of the said manor'. Talmach did not accept this claim. PRO, C2/Eliz/H 13/36, replication (1596).

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II. The character of manorial custom An interest in custom and customary tenure seems to be a curiously English obsession which, having particularly flourished before the First World War, is now returning to fashion. The eternal questions have been to ask first, whether customary tenure gave the copyhold tenant security of tenure against his landlord and a right of inheritance and second, whether a lord was able to evict copyholders so he could add their land to his demesne (that is to the leasehold sector) and compel his tenants to pay rack rents (economic market rents) instead oflow customary dues? One historiographical tradition, most recently represented by Brenner, has tended to argue that because customary tenure was not pleadable in the common law courts until a late date, the law did little to safeguard the tenant's right to his land. Hence the weakness of customary tenure in England allowed lords to transfer land from the customary to the leasehold sector or even take it in hand. Timber disputes have a special significance here, for as the penalty for the illegal taking of timber ('waste') was forfeiture, prosecution for timber offences might potentially be a mechanism by which copyhold could be transferred to the demesne. The perceived English experience thus stands in opposition to the European (especially French) pattern where the state acted to guarantee the customary rights of tenants against their lords, thereby establishing a pattern of peasant proprietorship and the retardation of agrarian capitalism (Brenner in Aston and Philpin, 1985, pp. 293-296). An alternative school of English historical writing would argue that lords can only be seen converting copyhold to leasehold where the former was technically flawed, and that the courts not only recognised but would uphold the rights of customary tenants (including the right to moderate fines) from the late fifteenth century onwards (Kerridge, 1969: chapter 3). The time is ripe for a reassessment of both these viewpoints: this essay is a first step towards that end. Whilst it uses custumals, the essay draws on the largely unexploited archives of the equitable jurisdiction of Chancery in the Public Record Office. Whilst a fuller statement of the frequency, geographical spread and character of litigation in Chancery between 1550 and 1640 will follow later, a preliminary assessment shows how the court at this period would support the customary claims of copyholders when they could be verified by oral or written evidence. As I demonstrated some years ago in the case of tenant right manors in north-west England, Chancery acted as a restraint on the aspirations of manorial lords to 'modernise' tenurial arrangements both in that they found against some lords, but almost certainly discouraged others from embarking on courses of action which they knew the courts would rule against (Hoyle, 1984). Thus, customary tenants had a much stronger claim against their lords than commentators like Brenner have acknowledged (see also Hoyle, 1990). Copyhold came in two forms, copyhold for lives and copyhold of inheritance. The key distinction between them was that in copyhold for lives the tenancy continued for the lives of named individuals - usually three - after which it concluded without a right of renewal (although de facto such rights were normally conceded). This inferior form of copyhold was found mostly in western and south-western England. In copyhold of inheritance the tenancy was perpetual and inheritable: the tenant had the right to sell

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and bequeath his usufruct for the payment to the lord of an entry fine. This had to be 'reasonable', that is not so large as make it impossible for the heir or purchaser to take up the tenancy. Rules of thumb developed over what was and was not 'reasonable', but these have produced some rather unnecessary controversy amongst historians. In both forms of copyhold the tenants' 'deed' was an extract from the record of the court at which he was admitted, his 'copy' (hence 'copyhold' - land held by copy of court roll). Where a lease would spell out the tenant's rights to, say, timber and common at length, the copy simply referred to a body of tradition which was specific to the individual manor and which might, as we shall see, be largely oral in character. Because custom both defined and guaranteed the copyholder's rights, the character as well as the content of custom could be vigorously contested between the lord and his tenants. Custom in the sixteenth century and later impeded the lords' ability to secure the maximum benefit from their estates. It prevented them from taking advantage of the greatly increased demand for land which emerged in the second quarter of the century (or perhaps earlier) except through fines. It denied them the chance to raise rents in line with inflation; and it excluded them from a share in the increased profitability of farming. For all of these reasons, custom allowed their tenants to grow rich at their expense. And in addition, rising demand for land coupled with security of tenure also meant that the tenant's usufruct in the land became increasingly valuable and could be bought, sold and mortgaged for increasingly large sums, sums which the lord was unable to tax except through entry fines. There was no single understanding in the sixteenth century of what custom was or where it might be found. Lords and tenants were therefore able to adopt different understandings of custom in order to secure the maximum advantage in their litigation. Broadly speaking a custom was a mode of behaviour which had existed from before the memory of man, which could not be contradicted by the recollection of any living person. Hence the jurists placed an emphasis on its unchanging character over time. Customs could be disproved though by written materials such as court rolls. Copyhold could be invalidated if it could be shown that the land at some earlier moment had been held by a tenure other than copyhold (i.e. demesne or leasehold). It was this which sank the tenants of Abbot's Ripton whom we shall encounter later. Customs might be recorded in statements of customs (custumals) which were declarations by the tenants of what they understood custom to be. The evidence of the elderly was therefore especially valuable when custom was called into question, but the individual memory could not extend much more than half a century. 3 There was therefore a tension between two notions of custom, between that derived from written sources including the court rolls, and that which the tenants knew from their own experience, this, inevitably, being short term. It is no surprise that tenants tended to rely on their own memory where the lords (and their lawyers) came to see custom in terms of the precedents recorded in the court rolls, especially in disputes over the rate of fines. Here the court rolls showed considerable

3 The ability to draw upon elderly witnesses was very much to the advantage of the tenants. For an example where the lord waited until the leading witnessess had died before challenging tenure, Large, 1990: 116).

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variations over the later middle ages which could be used to defeat the claim of a certain rate of fining. The weakness of the lords was that their documentation gave at most only a partial account of custom. When lords wished to know what the full custom of the manor was, they were forced to tum to the tenants to secure a statement either by calling a special court of survey or by asking the tenants to declare the custom of the manor on a particular point in the manorial court. It is these opinions of tenants which then become incorporated in the lord's documentary record and which be used in the future to bind the lord to what was essentially the tenants' point of view. It might be added that the conversion of oral testimony into written regulation was not invariably the work of the lords: in a number of cases it appears that peasant communities maintained their own statements of customs, a practice which lords found extremely threatening. As documentary historians we are perhaps too prone to think of custom in terms of documents and too little as memory. Custumals, which are apparently a godsend, are actually more difficult to interpret than might at first sight appear. As an authoritative statement, custumals are negotiated documents, often mediated by a steward or estate officials. The act of recording custom - of taking oral testimony and formulating a statement which would satisfy tenants and lord out of a diversity of conflicting tenant recollections - means that custumals are inclined to reflect an ideal present practice rather than a true historic practice. Statements of customs in manorial surveys, and especially in confirmations of custom (where the lord approved custom for a gratuity) are therefore likely to be poor guides to the custom which operated before the formulation of the custumal. It ought to be emphasied that the custom of the manor consisted of much more than the legal and financial nexus between lords and tenants. When we see custom recorded for posterity as settled practice, we find that it deals with a whole range of matters of varying importance. Broadly these can be divided into three categories. 1. The regulation of relationships between the lord and his tenants: the tenants' right of access to resources within the manor. Most fundamentally these include the rights of inheritance and sale, that is the tenant's use rights of his property, but they also include the rate of fines and other duties, the procedures to be followed when surrendering a tenement to a new tenant, the right to sublet, the obligation to undertake repairs, the right to timber, wood and commons. 2. Inheritance practices: where the first category deals with the interface of the lord and his tenants, inheritance practices are much more an internal matter to the community; the treatment of children, the use of wills, widow's rights in land. The last is a matter of concern to the lord in copyhold for lives as it might determine the length of a tenancy. 3. The regulation of communal resources within the manor: the use of fallow field, commons and moors including the dates between which animals could be grazed, the obligation to maintain ditches and fences and so on - all matters of little interest to the lord. Here custom shades into by-laws made by the manorial court for the benefit of the community.

All of these areas of custom were subject to constant reinvention according to changing circumstances. Inheritance customs were not fixed but altered over time with demo-

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graphic change. In the fifteenth century, when land was in an abundant supply, this area of custom barely mattered to tenants. In the sixteenth century, as access to land became more difficult to secure, custom both became more important as a guarantee of a livelihood for the next generation but also as a defence against landlords. The broad change may be characterised as a shift from a state in which lords valued tenants at a time of tenant shortage - no tenant, no rent - to one in which lords had an abundance of suitable tenants who would accept land at enhanced rents, but in which sitting tenants were jealous of their rights of inheritance, modest rents and notional fines. Manorial administration in the early sixteenth century was low pressure. By the time lords wished to demand the increased rents and fines which their estates could deliver them in the later part of the sixteenth century, the tenants were all too prone to look back to the low pressure administration of the early sixteenth century and call that custom. So the custom described by the tenants in complaints to the higher courts is frequently an account of their treatment in the generation before last. It is how the present manorial lord's father's or grandfather's officers conducted matters on the estates. As an example of this we can take developments in the Suffolk manor ofWalsham. In 1584 the tenants petitioned Chancery complaining that Sir Nathaniel Bacon was raising the fines on copyhold lands to extortionate levels. Bacon had inherited the manor in 1579 from his father, Sir Nicholas Bacon, Lord Chancellor. The tenants of Walsham had paid 1s an acre for their entry fines when Bacon had acquired the manor in 1559. Sir Nicholas acknowledged that this was custom, but persuaded some of the tenants to pay 2s an acre, promising never to ask more. Sir Nathaniel held that by agreeing to pay more than 1s an acre, the tenants had foregone their custom and that he was now entitled to demand larger fines. The tenants, understandably, wished to return to the customary practices of the 1550s (Simpson, 1961: 80-81). Custom then stands in contrast to the present lord's attempts to secure larger fines, restrict access to resources such as commons (or to sell access to those resources) or even declare that the tenants' copyhold had no validity in law. The aim of custom is to bind the lord to the practices of his progenitors precisely because in changed conditions they were advantageous to the tenants. But custom is more than that. Custom is a rough and ready peasant equity. It described how they felt they ought to be treated by lords. It maintained the supremacy of the tenants' use rights over the lords' ownership of the property. And this was not particular but general. Custom transcended the individual manor to become part of a more generalised peasant mentality. We tend to read custom as existing within the bounds of individual manors because the documents describe custom manor by manor in terms which seem unique to each place. Conflicts occur a manor at a time: it was a fundamental weakness of the peasant estate in the sixteenth century that- except perhaps in 1536, 1549 and 1553 -it never succeeded in articulating grievances against landlords as a class rather than as individuals who transgressed the bounds of the acceptable. But the events of, and articles produced, in those two years show that a peasant consciousness could overspill the individual manor to become something greater. Custom therefore articulated a peasant political consciousness about how their tenancy rights should be respected by lords, how much they ought to pay them in rents and fines, how their widows should be provided for, and how their tenement should devolve to the next generation.

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Redefining cop)hold in the 16th century

III. The tenants' claim to timber Disputes oyer timber rights are relatively infrequent and overwhelmingly drawn from Eastern England, but they reveal very clearly a dimension of the conflict between lords and tenants. The rights claimed by tenants came in a variety of forms. The greatest was the right to fell for sale timber trees growing on their copy holds. Here the tenants claimed an absolute right of possession in the timber. Tenants who did not claim so permissive a right claimed the right to fell without licence timber to be expended on their tenements as housebote (building timber),ploughbote andfirebote (fuel). Tenants might also claim the right to pollard trees, to take the small wood left after a tree was felled, to take dead trees and to cut green foliage as winter feed for cattle. 4 Copyhold tenants in the mid-sixteenth century tended to claim that they had an absolute right to the timber, sometimes tempered by an acknowledgement that the wood had to be spent on their copy hold tenements. Whilst the full range of their claims will appear on a number of occasions subsequently, they are neatly illustrated in the customs recorded by the tenants of an Essex manor, Great Bentley, in 1583-1584. Here the tenants were asked to record their customs by their lord after an existing book of customs was lost. When they came to the matter of timber rights, the tenants testified as follows: 'Now to shew you how we may use our timber [which grows] upon our copyhold lands. We may sell it without the assignment of the lord or his bailiff, and we may build or repair any new house or any piece of a new house or any barn or stable. We may rail or pale in any orchard or garden with pales and make it as big or as little as we will, or rail in any field or wood that we have with rails of timber, or make stakes of timber to set or stand in any hedge we have about our copyhold lands to hedge withal, or to make any bridges over slippers, waterways or brooks where any pathway or through way lieth with[in] our copyhold lands. We may take it and use it for plough timber, timber or cart timber, i.e. we may repair or make any new carts, ploughs, tumbrils, drags or sleds [sledges] to carry our own carriage, or to plough our own land, or to carry other men's carriages, or to plough any other men's lands with the same ploughs, carts, tumbrels drags or sleds. Thus we may use the timber that groweth upon our copyhold lands or for any other necessary reparations that we shall think good of about our copyhold lands. If we fell timber to build or repair withal, and if we fell more than shall serve our turns at that time, whether it be tree, 2 or 3 or how many or few so ever it be, the same timber or trees may lie by us so felled down until such time as we have cause to use them about any such things as is before mentioned. Now to shew you what we have done or may do with the refuse of our timber or timber tops, i.e. the refuse of our timber we have riven out to blocks or logs and with the tops we have made billet, talwood and cubit, those blocks or logs, billet, talwood or cubit we may either burn them or sell them, which [ever] of them we will by our custom. For all our woods or underwoods upon our customary lands, we may take them, fell them down and sell them, and any of our husband trees we may stub them down and rive them out and 4

The problem of landless people gathering wood from hedges (hedgebreaking) is a matter apart and will not be considered in this paper.

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make them to blocks and logs, and we may burn them or sell them, which of them we will. We may stub up any row of trees we have within our copyhold lands and lay two or three fields, pightles or closes or more to one. By our customs we may girt, crop or lop any tree we have about our copyhold lands, whether oak, elm ash, asp, beech or any other three whatsoever.' (Source: Emmison, 1975: 322).

The tenants of Great Bentley claimed possession of the great and smaller wood and the right to dispose of it by sale as they wished. Lords, where they were interested in their tenants' timber rights (and this is an important caveat) tended to take the contrary view. The aggressive landlordism of the later sixteenth century instinctively believed that all standing timber belonged to them, that for a tenant to use it without licence was theft, or, more technically, waste, and that the penalty for waste was the forfeiture of the premises to the lord. The lord therefore had a right to enter his tenants' copyholds and fell the timber without their consent. The tenants' claim to have the free disposal of timber was, ipso facto, ludicrous. As was said on behalf of the lord in the case of Herring versus Jerningham, which we shall consider shortly: 'who[m] hath ever known or heard that any custom in copyhold tenure hath been such that the copyholders may cut and fell down timber and build and employ the same upon other grounds not demised ... by copy of court roll but upon a man's own grounds or inheritance, or else upon any other man's, which law or custom (if any there be) is such a law that any person or persons being a copyholder may at his pleasure build his own houses in what place he liketh, or at any time, may, with his timber build for his friends, or gi\'e the same away for malice that the tenant carrieth or beareth to the lord of the copy holds to any person or persons that will draw or require the same. And so a malicious person for the evil will that he beareth to the lord may in short time make spoil of all timber growing in the said grounds demised ... by copy of court roll.' (Source: PRO, C2/Eliz/H18/60, replication of Henry Jemingham and others)

Lords expected that the taking of timber without licence was waste, and so punishable, unless custom proved otherwise. What was at question was not merely a conflict over a form of property - wood - but also but the possibility of profiting from any felling or sale of timber by the tenants which could be declared to be a form of waste by exacting penal fines or forfeitures. But the conflict was also over two forms of equity: the belief on the part of tenants that woods belonged to them, and the contrary belief on the part of landowners that the wood was theirs. Underwood was a different matter. As underwood had little economic value it might be conceded to the tenants. The lord's disinterest in the less valuable trees may be seen in developments on a Buckinghamshire manor in the 1560s. The tenants of Temple Wycombe claimed all the timber growing on their copyholds except oak and ash, and all underwood. In the early 1560s the lord began to argue that he was entitled to all the beech growing on the copyholds, beech probably being amongst the predominent trees in the locality. At about the same moment he began to raise sharply the fines on copyholds. The competing claims of the lord and tenants were put to arbitration. The resulting award (made in January 1564) gave all oak, ash, elm and beech to the lord but reserved

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Redefining copyhold in the 16th century

to the tenants sufficient timber for repairs to their houses. The tenants were also to have all the underwood (described as birch, hazel, maple, holly, whitebeam and willow), together with all the lops of beech and oak felled on their lands except for any which could be made into billet and tallwood. The tenants were also to have every tenth load of the beech trees felled by their lord. Little over a decade later it was alleged that the lord had felled all the timber on the tenants' copyholds, even their fruit trees: he was also trying to take forfeitures for the tenants' alleged infringements of the award. 5

IV. Timber rights in the courts The pattern of future conflict over timber is laid out in the notorious case of the tenants of Abbots Ripton (Huntingdonshire) against their landlord, Oliver St John. 6 Abbots Ripton was a manor of Ramsey Abbey, dissolved in 1539. In July 1541 this manor, detached from the remainder of the monastic estate, passed to John St John who transferred it to his son Oliver St John as a part of his marriage settlement. In the early sixteenth century Ramsey Abbey appears to have had a practice of forcing tenants to take copies for a variety of terms. These were clearly liable to be impeached by a future landlord as lacking the patina of antiquity. (It might be added that Ramsey was by no means unusual in granting copies - of inheritance - in the early sixteenth century.) This has allowed the case to be dismissed by one recent authority as merely being about demesne copyholds, but the dispute concerned much more than this (Kerridge, 1969: 87, 92). The immediate background appears to be that when St John took possession of the manor, some tenants either petitioned him to grant leases of their lands in substitute for their copyhold titles or were bullied into a voluntary surrender in return for leases at enhanced rents. A minority of tenants, seven in all, refused to travel down this road and stood by their copies. St John attempted to intimidate them by launching actions of trespass against some or all of them. The Abbots Ripton seven approached the Court of Requests, probably in late 1543, seeking the court's aid against their landlord. St John's answer to the plaintiff's bill argued that the copyholds were void in law, but he also introduced a secondary issue. The copyholders claimed to be entitled to cut timber on their copyhold tenements, a right which St John denied. The tenants' timber rights remained a subsidiary matter in the litigation. Requests found for St John, holding that the tenants' copies were not good, and so their rights to wood were not considered by the court because they were not copyholders. But, most helpfully for the historian, evidence was gathered about the tenants' timber rights, and these witnesses confirm the tenants' claims. The witnesses included not only other tenants, but the dissolved abbey's stewards who were adamant that the tenants had the right to fell wood not only on their tenements but also on the common heath, and that they were entitled to sell this wood (Leadham, 1898: 73-77). William Warwick of 5

PRO, C78/60 no. 11; the award recited in PRO, C78/78 no. 9. The tenants launched their suit in Requests: the file (PRO, Req2/7/10) is printed with commentary in Leadham, 1898: 64-101. 6

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Upwood, who had lived in Abbots Ripton for most of his life and whose father had dwelled there for 66 years (and so whose recollection must stretch back into the late fifteenth century) recalled that in some years his father and other tenants had felled twenty loads of wood and sold that timber to whoever would buy it. And they had done this without any rebuke (Leadham 1898: 80-82). The abbot's regime had been entirely permissive: the custom of the manor had allowed the tenants to fell as much or as little as they wished. Perhaps because they recognised that they were going to loose, some of the tenants felled large amounts of timber during 1545. St John secured an injunction to prevent further felling (Leadham 1898: 82-86). The Tenants of Abbots Ripton versus St John makes the important point that when the tenants claimed a right to take timber, they may well have been describing a situation which had genuinely existed rather than trying to enlarge their rights against landlords. The case also introduces another common theme of the litigation, that of the incoming landlord trying to instil discipline into a manor in which the tenants have prospered under a benign seigniorial regime. This in turn raises the question of whether cases challenging timber rights are prompted by changes in landownership or the more general recognition that tenancies had become a great deal more valuable as the demand for land increased with population in the later sixteenth century. It appears that in Norfolk at least there was a general pressure on timber rights by the early 1550s. The evidence here comes from a petition presented to Parliament by the group of Norfolk commons in 1553 which sought legislation to curb the abuses of landlords on a whole range of matters including the conversion of demesne copyholds (such as those at Abbot's Ripton) into leaseholds and the manipulation of the foldcourse: 'And whereas also if there grow any oaks, ashes or elms upon any of the said copyholds which have been planted by the same tenants or others whose estate the same tenant have and now are grown to timber, the owners of the same manor will not permit nor suffer the same tenant to fell the same timber nor no parcel thereof not only for the reperation and building of the same messuage, tenement or cottage, nor yet to burn in his own house unless his said messuage, tenement or cottage is of the same fee whereas [whereof] the said woods is growing. By reason whereof for lack of woods and timber the said county of Norfolk, the husbandry of the same, the maintenance of shipping (which is a great strength unto your grace's realm), the artificers as shipwrights, carpenters, ploughwrights and wheelwrights are not able to live: not yet the same tenants and owners of such messuages lands and tenements and other the premises will not maintain, set nor plant neither in dike, hedge nor row no such kinds of wood as oaks, ashes or elms nor suffer them to grow till they come to timber for that they cannot be owners of the same when they should be able to do them any profit or good: for if they should, the same lord will not only take away from the same poor tenant the same timber but also all the said messuages, land and other premises thereunto belonging to the utter impoverishment and undoing of the same poor tenant, his wife and children for ever unless your grace's favour be shown in this behalf.' (Source: Hoyle, 2001: 234-235).

The grievances seem to be two in number. The commons complained that they were only allowed to use their timber on the lands of the manor on which the timber had grown. They were denied the right to sell timber, but in an area in which a single tenant might hold land from several lords, the objection was that he could not burn timber

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Redefining copyhold in the 16th century

grown on his lands held of manor A in his house which stood on lands held of manor B. There is a larger, ill-articulated grievance of ownership. Unless the tenant owned the timber on his property, he was not likely to allow any timber to grow: and the implication is that if tenants were not able to sell the timber they grew, then there would be a shortage for the use of shipwrights and the other carpentry trades. What the tenants sought was the same right of ownership as they had of timber grown on their freehold lands: 'and also to fell and take all such woods as well timber as underwoods at their liberty and pleasure without any let or disturbance of the same lord or lords of the manors as [they] is used there to do now upon their freeholds in the same county of Norfolk' (Hoyle, 2001: 235). Of course, they secured none of this, but their logic is compelling enough. And the complaint that they were impeded in moving timber between the separate units of their tenements appears to be genuine. These various elements of complaint are all found in a well-documented case of 1583-1585 concerning the manor of Syleham Comitis in Suffolk, the property of Henry Jerningham of Costessey. 7 In 1583 one Thomas Herring exhibited a bill in Chancery outlining how he had been admitted to a sizeable copyhold of the manor in 1544 which had now been seized by Jerningham after he had procured a fraudulent presentment of a forfeiture of the copyhold in the manor court. The steward of the manor, one John Godfrey, was alleged to have intimidated the jurors at the manor court into finding against Herring for felling timber when the custom of the manor was that the tenants had the right to fell and 'bestow at their pleasure' (that is sell) all the trees and timber growing on their copyhold lands. Jerningham had leased the copyhold for 21 years. Superficially, this looks as clear a case of landlord oppression as we will find. Jerningham confirmed that he had seized the lands for waste, Herring having felled trees and converted then to his own use contrary to custom. The lands had then been leased for 21 years for a rent of £20 per annum. The steward, Godfrey, submitted a long and detailed answer which described a conflict, probably extending over several months, between Herring and his landlord. The story began with a fire in the bakehouse at Costessey. Lady Jerningham had ordered the bailiff of Syleham Comitis to go and fell timber growing on one of the copyholds within the manor which could then be used in the rebuilding. The bailiff asked Herring where the best timber on his tenement might be found; but Herring refused to allow him to cut any timber. The bailiff then returned with a warrant from Lady Jerningham to fell timber on Herring's land and on the lands of other copyhold tenants. And despite Herring's objections and threats, the timber was felled. Lady Jerningham then took her revenge. She complained to the manor court that Herring had both felled timber contrary to custom but had also twice resisted her bailiff when he had come to fell timber for her bakehouse. Herring's own felling of timber was presented by the jury. Herring admitted in open court that he had obstructed and threatened her bailiff, but he also maintained that Lady Jerningham had no right to cut the timber on his lands and would not, in future, allow her to do so. Challenged by Lady Jerningham's surveyor 7 The pleadings in the case are PRO, C2/Eliz/H21/55 and Hl8/60, the decree PRO, C78/63 no. 9. I have searched both PRO, C21 and C24/170-181 for examinations of witnesses but without success. For the manor, see Copinger, 1905-1911, IV: 90-92.

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Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle ,-\ges-l 9th century)

'unto whom the property of the timber growing upon the said copy hold land of the said manor did belong, he answered that the same did belong to the copyholders of the manor and not to the said lady and this he said he would defend against the said lady, and [he] confessed in the court that before that time he had cut down and overthrown divers timber trees upon the said copyhold lands of the manor without any licence thereof first obtained. And that with the said trees he had builded upon his freehold tenement and that henceforth he would so do at his free will and pleasure.' 8

Jerningham retaliated by seizing Herring's copyhold lands. Here it is worth pausing to note that the rights Herring maintained were precisely those claimed in the 1553 petition. Herring claimed the absolute possession of the timber, the right to fell timber without licence and the right to use timber from his copyhold on his freeholds, which is little short of claiming the right of sale. And whilst Lady Jerningham automatically regarded these claims as being contrary to the custom of the manor, and certainly quite antipathetic to her absolute rights in the timber, this was evidently not quite so clear cut to the manorial jury. Godfrey, the steward, was told to convene a court at which Herring's felling of timber could be found. At this court the jury were asked to bring in a presentment that the premises were forfeited, but they proved less than willing to do this (which Godfrey attributed to the presence of the plaintiff) until extracts from the courts rolls had been read to them. They finally ruled that whilst Herring had felled a timber tree on his copyhold without licence, if he had used it to build or make repairs to his copyhold, then, as that was permissible by the custom of the manor, there were no grounds for forfeiture. But if the timber had been used in other places, then it was contrary to custom. Herring seems to have been outraged by this and threatened Lady Jerningham with the law if she tried to seize his premises. At his request a further court was convened at which nineteen of the 'chiefest and most ancient copyholders' were sworn and charged to enquire into the custom. After much deliberation, they confirmed the custom declared by the previous jury. Lady Jerningham then proceeded to seize the premises and leased them to Blacklock, her servant, and Herring commenced suit in Chancery. Herring continued to maintain his claim to all timber growing on his copyhold but Chancery gave him short shrift saying that he 'could not well excuse' the forfeiture of the premises for waste. As a footnote, it might be added that Chancery was not without compassion towards Herring. The case was referred to commissioners who negotiated a settlement whereby his son (Herring having died) was allowed to redeem the premises as copyhold for £20 paid to Blacklock for his lease and £40 paid to Jerningham as a penal fine. And yet there are other aspects of this case which require consideration. The manorial jury clearly found the matter hard to decide. Their ruling on custom was a clear compromise: tenants had the right to timber on their copyholds, to be expended on their copyholds. They clearly did not accept the whole of Lady Jerningham's claims. In turn, 8 Taken from the answer of John Godfrey: the same quotation also appears in the summary of pleadings in the decree.

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Redefining copyhold in the 16th century

this suggests that Herring may have had more right on his side than at first sight might be allowed. His absolute conviction and willingness to stand up to his landlady was rash in the extreme. 9 Whilst men of reckless principle are not uncommon in the Chancery records, may it be that Herring was actually right? His claims are similar to those contained in the 1553 petition. He entered the copyhold in 1543: are his claims not those which were thought equitable in the 1540s and 1550s when the jury's reading of custom, even after they had consulted the court rolls, was one which seemed right for the 1580s? If this is right, or even part right, then it suggests a further conclusion: the jury's view of what custom ought to be was not historical but contemporary, stating what was reasonable for the 1580s. In other cases it is possible to see the lord taking the initiative over a period of years to mould custom and to limit the tenants' rights over timber. The three manors selected to illustrate this were originally all manors of the Earls of Oxford. Edward de Vere, 17th earl (d. 1604) was a notorious waster of his estates, many of which were sold in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, often to a small group of intimates who exploited Oxford's lack of business sense. The Oxford estates in the previous generation had certainly been ill-managed. The tenants were used to a low pressure management which respected their customary rights. The first case concerns a manor still in the family's possession but leased to a tenant, one EdwardAtslowe of London, a physician. 10 In the early 1570s Atslowe was suing the copy holders of the manor of Ches ham Higham and Che sham Bury in Buckinghamshire, making the claim that as lord, he ought to have all the timber trees growing on the copyhold tenements, that a copyhold tenant had no right to fell any tree growing on his copyhold and that if they did fell any trees, then the Atslowe had the right to seize the tenement as a forfeiture. He also claimed for himself the right to take all the timber growing on copyholds for himself. The copy holders persisted in cutting timber and they refused to make any presentment of offenders who cut timber, alleging that this was not an offence. The copyholders, for their part, claimed the right to fell trees and use them as they wished. They appear to have upheld their claim in Chancery, the court finding against Atslowe but allowing him to try his luck against the tenants at a trial before a common law jury. The documentation for the second case is much fuller. John Wiseman bought the manor of Great Canfield in Essex from the Earl in 1579-1580 and immediately set about transforming it into a disciplined enterprise. The first few manorial courts held in his name in 1580-1581 show him trying to limit the tenants' right in a variety of ways. At his second court, there was an ordnance promulgated forbidding the use of underwood for fuel without licence. At the third court there was an order forbidding the copyhold tenants to sublet for terms longer than a year and a day; and a further order forbidding the transfer of manure between tenements (a novel extension of the rule that timber could not be moved from copy holds to freeholds). Infringements of these newly created 9

Herring tried to suggest that the Jerninghams were hostile to him because he had presented them for recusancy, but this may be a red herring. 10 What follows is based on PRO, C78/47 no. 11.

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Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

offences were prosecuted at the court held on 4 December 1581. Thirty tenants were prosecuted for wood cutting without licence and fined 30s each, no matter how many trees they had felled. Others were prosecuted for conveying manure between tenements and a tenant was fined £10 for making a lease of a tenement (Eland, 1949: 15-16). Wiseman appears to have been able to at least get some tenants to purchase licences. In 1585 he licensed one tenant to cut firewood and lop trees on his tenement, and this individual paid 26s 8d to do something which he probably regarded as his by right (Eland, 1949: 55). All these orders appear to have been based on Wiseman's expectation of his rights rather than on any recognition of custom. The historian of Great Canfield comments that no earlier manorial court had tried to enforce any regulations on manure. The medieval court rolls record prosecutions for the theft of wood from the lord's demesnes but offer no hint that permission was needed to cut wood growing on the individual copyholds (Eland, 1949: 53-55) At the same time Wiseman was also raising entry fines and threatening to sell timber growing on the copyholds. How much antagonism his orders produced within the manor does not appear, but in 1590-1591 the tenants approached him with a request that their customs be restored and Wiseman agreed - at a price. A decree in Chancery outlines how this was done. The tenants claimed what we may now recognise as reasonably permissive customs. They maintained that they had the right to fell trees growing on their copyholds to expend either on their copyholds or freeholds. They could fell trees without licence. They denied that the lord could fell trees growing on their copyholds. The tenants did not go so far as to claim a right of sale: they curbed their claims by holding that the trees had to be used on their copyholds or other free land and tenements held of the manor. The tenants also had a customary right to make leases for periods of three years recurring without licence, to move earth, marl and dung within the manor without licence. The fines of copyholds within the manor were also certain. When approached by tenants seeking to draw him to a composition, Wiseman denied the validity of their customs: 'he doubted not but that he should find certain court rolls which would in some sort impeach the customs aforesaid and that he would endeavour by all the good ways and means he might to impeach and avoid the customs'. But he was persuaded, partly, we might suppose, by the smell of money, perhaps equally by the threat of litigation. For £40 Wiseman conceded the tenant's claims, accepted that fines were fixed and acknowledged that he had no right to fell timber on the tenants' copy holds. His agreement was ratified by Chancery in November 1592. 11 Wiseman may have come to recognise that his claims to timber would not be supported by either the tenant's recollections or by the documentary record of the court rolls. A similar failure of evidence to support the landlord's claims is found at Earls Colne, also in Essex. Richard Harlakenden bought the two manors which formed the parish of Earls Colne from the Earl of Oxford in 1584 and 1592. 12 The pre-Harlakenden court rolls

11

PRO, C78/69 no. 3. The following account is based on the fuller account by Dr Henry French which will appear in French and Hoyle, Earls Colne. 12

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Redefining copyhold in the 16th century

include presentments for taking timber on copyholds, but is not clear that those named were fined for this. The court rolls do include occasional licences for permission to take timber for repairs. In 1586 the court rolls contain a presentment that 'that whereas the most part of the customary tenants of this manor have felled wood and underwoods upon their customary land and spent the same other where [elsewhere] contrary to the custom of this manor, therefore we present ourselves in the lord's mercy' (Macfarlane, 1980-1982, section 665.01492). Six years later a concordat between the lord and the tenants was registered in the court rolls. Acknowledging that the felling of woods and underwoods on tenements had been the subject of contention in the two manors, Harlakenden, on the petition of the tenants, agreed that they should be able to take and bum the lopings of bollingers and husbands, that they could take dead trees, but that they could not cut any timber except for repairs and then only with the licence of the lord. This was a narrow definition of their rights but one for which the court rolls claimed they 'most thankfully accept[ed] and promise[d] to be contented with all' (Macfarlane, 1980-1982, section 669.01718). Following this ruling there are a small number of licences enrolled in the court rolls: but in 1598 the rule was restated, perhaps because it was not universally accepted. Indeed, there were a handful of forfeitures of copyholds in the following decade although these were normally resolved by the payment of a penal fine. In 1612 Harlakenden's reading of custom was apparently challenged in the court of Common Pleas in a suit brought by a tenant which, it appears from rather scanty evidence, Harlakenden lost. About this case, we can tell two things. The first is that the court rolls offered him little support, the second that the earliest documentary evidence he could gather from his tenants was as recent as 1581. The need to secure a licence before felling timber appears not to predate that moment. Further cases were then brought against Harlakenden including, it would seem, one or more cases in Star Chamber. Finally an agreement was made by arbitration between the lord and the tenants. Having agreed to withdraw all suits, the agreement allowed the copyholders to take the lop and shred of their pollingers and expend it on their copyholds or freeholds, to take old trees for fire wood and to have wood for repairs, apparently without licence. Whilst this fell far short of the full range of their claims, it was a considerable retreat for a lord who had doubtless assumed that his rights were somewhat wider.

V.

Conclusion

From these various cases, let us offer a few assertions in conclusion. In the midsixteenth century there was a body of opinion amongst copyhold tenants in eastern England that they had the right to fell the timber growing on their copyholds without the need to seek permission, and to use this timber as they wished, including offering it sale. On some manors this right existed, if only because the lord and his administrators were disinterested in controlling the tenants' use of the timber. In these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to claim that custom allowed them to use the timber as they wished: their rights grew in the space vacated by unambitious estate administrations. Keen, avaricious manorial lords and their officers could not accept this. Their concept of property held that the timber was theirs to fell as they wished (as Lady Jerningham clearly believed). They wished to exercise a monopoly of ownership of the timber on copyholds and a monopoly on its sale. Custom, however, even on the most minimal

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reading, compelled them to allow the tenants reasonable provision for timber for repairs provided the lord's licence was sought first. 13 Custom, seen as past practice, clearly promised the tenants something more. The scene was thus set for conflicts over the tenants' timber rights. Copy holders and lords together might try and defend large claims over the other. Lords might try and manufacture custom as much as tenants did. If the reading of Herring versus Jerningham offered earlier is correct, tenants, when asked to declare their customs, might well claim as custom practices which seemed appropriate for the moment rather than those which their fathers and grandfathers had claimed, and quite possibly exercised. Memory was short: custom was malleable. No one should allow the jurists to persuade us otherwise.

Bibliography Manuscript sources Public Record Office (PRO), London.

Printed and secondary sources Aston T.H. and Philpin, C.H.E. (eds) (1985) The Brenner Debate. Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe, Cambridge. Copinger, W.A. (1905-1911) The manors of Suffolk. Notes on their history and devolution. 7 Vols., London. Eland, G. (1949) At the courts of Great Canfield, London. Emmison, F. G. (1975) Elizabethan life: home, work and land, Chelmsford. Hoyle, R.W. (1984), 'Lords, Tenants and Tenant Right in the sixteenth century: four studies', Northern History, 20, pp. 38-63. Hoyle, R.W., (1990), 'Tenure and the land market in early modern England: or a late contribution to the Brenner debate', Economic History Review, 43, pp. 1-20. Hoyle, R.W. (2001), 'Agrarian agitation in mid-sixteenth-century Norfolk: a petition of 1553', Historical Journal, 44, pp. 223-238. Kerridge, E. ( 1969) Agrarian problems in the sixteenth century and after, London. Leadham LS. (ed.) (1898) 'Select cases in the court of Requests, AD 1497-1569', Selden Soc., 12, pp. 64-101. Large, P. (1990) 'Rural society and agricultural change, Ombersley, 1580-1700', in J. Chartres and D. Hey (eds), English Rural Society, 1500-1800, Cambridge, pp. 105-138. Macfarlane A. (ed.) (1980-1982) Records of an English Village: Earls Colne, 1450-1750 (microfiche edition of records, Cambridge). Simpson, A. (1961) The wealth ofthe gentry, 1540-1660: EastAnglian Studies, Cambridge.

13 Jemingham accepted the notion of the reasonable custom in the section immediately following that quoted earlier.

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13 Access to land by labourers and tradesmen in 18th-century England1 Leigh SHAW-TAYLOR, University of Cambridge

I.

The historiographical background

One of the most influential works in English agrarian historiography has been the Hammonds' study of agricultural labourers first published in 1911. The book made a number of bold, if poorly evidenced, claims: 'The classes making their living mainly as labourers were the cottagers, farm servants, and squatters. The cottagers either owned or occupied cottages and had rights of common on the waste, and in some cases over the common fields. These rights were of various kinds: they generally included the right to pasture certain animals, to cut turf and to get fuel. The cottagers, as we have already said often owned or rented land. ( ... ) The squatters also often went out as day labourers. The farm servants were usually the children of the small farmers or cottagers; they lived in their masters' houses until they had saved enough money to marry and take a cottage of their own. Were there any day labourers without either land or common rights in the old village? It is difficult to suppose there were many. ( ... )The most important social fact about this system is that it provided opportunities for the humblest and poorest labourer to rise in the village.( ... ) The farm servant could save up his wages and begin his married life by hiring a cottage which carried rights of common, and gradually buy or hire strips of land. Every village( ... ) had its ladder and nobody was doomed to stay on the lowest rung.' (Hammond and Hammond, 1995: 31-33, my italics).

These claims have echoed through the historiography ever since, with some historians, notably E.P. Thompson, Jeanette Neeson and Keith Snell supporting the Hammonds' position (Neeson, 1993; Snell, 1985: 138-227, Thompson, 1968; 233-258; Thompson, 1992: 97-184). Others including J.H. Clapham, J.D. Chambers and Gordon Mingay rejected their claims. Chambers and Mingay went so far as to argue that 'the majority of cottagers had no rights of common' (Chambers, 1953; Chambers and Mingay, 1966: 97; Clapham, 1926: 115-117). Over time village craftsmen and traders have been incorporated into the Hammonds' argument, most explicitly in the work of J.M. Martin (Martin, 1984). In the rest of this chapter, to avoid the constant repetition of the cumbersome phrase 'craftsmen and tradesmen', I shall refer to both groups collectively as tradesmen. In 1750 at least half of English settlements still had common land (Shaw-Taylor, 2001 b: 640). It is now generally accepted that large labour-employing 'capitalist' farms 1

I should like to express my gratitude to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding some of this work. Chris Briggs, Romola Davenport and Rhiannon Evans each made a number of helpful suggestions for clarification of the argument. Any errors or ambiguities which remain are my own.

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were not the creation of the final phase of the enclosure movement which reduced common land to a purely residual element in the agrarian economy between 1760 and 1820 because they can be shown to have developed before enclosure (Allen, 1992). What remains in considerable doubt is the nature of the workforce in agriculture before enclosure. As will become clear below the most common use of agricultural land by labourers and tradesmen was for keeping a cow or two. The value of keeping a couple of cows on common land at the end of the eighteenth century was roughly equivalent to what an agricultural labourer might hope to earn from a year's labour in his employer's fields (Humphries, 1990). If the Hammonds were right about the extent of access to common rights and small plots of land in settlements with common land then it follows that the agricultural labour force was only semi-proletarian. So although farms may have been generally large and labour-employing, and hence not peasant, before enclosure, the transition to a fully capitalist agriculture would have remained incomplete. In short, what is at stake is the timing of the transition to a fully capitalist agrarian regime. In assessing the contrasting claims discussed above, the problem, until recently, has been the absence of suitable datasets against which to test the claims. In the rest of this chapter I will present a brief overview of four separate empirical studies. 2 These studies are aimed at answering two questions. Firstly, what proportions of agricultural labourers and rural tradesmen had access to land or common rights in villages with common land? Secondly, what did those labourers and tradesmen who did have access to land or common rights actually do with them? The first three studies to be discussed shed light principally on the first question. The last study to be discussed focuses on the second question. Gardens or other small plots of land around a cottage are not considered in this chapter. This is not because they were unimportant forms of access to land. A garden could be a crucial asset to offset the grinding poverty of the agricultural labourer. Indeed the father of the poet John Clare depended, for many years, upon the produce of an apple tree for paying the rent on his house. When it failed he was forced to apply for parish relief (Robinson, 1986: 114-115). The distribution and size of cottage gardens have been almost entirely neglected by economic and social historians. Nevertheless the focus here is firmly on access to strictly agricultural land in open-field villages. But this caveat should be borne in mind in what follows. Access to land in open-field villages could take three forms. Firstly, it could be the cultivation of scattered strips in the open fields. Secondly, it could be access to common grazing land. As in most of north-western Europe only those who held common rights were entitled to pasture livestock on common pastures (De Moor, Shaw-Taylor and Warde, 2002). In southern England individuals held common rights either through occupying land in the open fields or because they held a cottage to which common rights were attached (Shaw-Taylor, 2002). It should be noted that the holder of the common right was not necessarily the same person as the occupier of the cottage (ShawTaylor, 200lb). Cottage rights were typically for one or two cows and from six to ten

I intend to publish a full account of these studies in a monograph in the near future.

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Access to land by labourers and tradesmen

sheep. As will become apparent these rights were the major form of access to land for agricultural labourers and tradesmen. The third form of access was to land which had already been enclosed, known to contemporaries as closes, which could, of course, be used however the owner or occupier wished.

II. Labourers' and tradesmen's land tax assessments The first of the datasets to be considered here is based on an analysis of taxation in thirteen open-field settlements in the counties of Buckinghamshire and Northamptonshire (see Figure 13.1 for the location of these counties) in the late eighteenth century. 3 Here a brief outline of the results will haYe to suffice together with a highly abbreviated account of the methodology underlying the study which makes use of data to be found on land tax assessments and militia lists. The land tax was principally a tax on land and buildings levied more or less in proportion to the assessed value of the property. It should be noted, for the moment, that this is a considerable over-simplification of the actual operation of the tax (Ginter, 1992). For each settlement for which they survive, the land tax assessments provide the names of the owners and occupiers of the enumerated properties together with the amount of tax assessed on each property. Militia lists were compiled during the selection of men to serve in local militias. They consist of comprehensive lists, for individual settlements, of the names of adult males within certain age-brackets together with their occupations. This study makes use of surviving militia lists which are available for much of Northamptonshire in 1781 and which enumerate adult males between the ages of 18 and 45, and of a more comprehensive militia list, the posse comitatus, which covers adult males between the ages of 18 and 60 for the whole of Buckinghamshire in 1798. Both these documents list the great majority of men in these age ranges with no detectable social bias (Shaw-Taylor, 2001b: 647-649, 654655). For each of the men on the militia lists for the thirteen sampled villages, the corresponding land tax assessments have been searched to establish whether or not the individual concerned was assessed and the amount and type of any land tax assessment for that individual. Two methodological points should be noted here. Firstly, an obvious problem exists where two men on the same document shared an identical name. All such individuals have been entirely excluded from the analysis presented here. Secondly, those described here as tradesmen were a diverse group encompassing about sixty distinct occupations. The most common occupations, in rank order, were: shoemakers (including cordwainers), weavers, carpenters, tailors, bakers, blacksmiths, masons, wheelwrights, millers and bricklayers. These ten trades between them accounted for over three-quarters of all the enumerated tradesmen. A small number of miscellaneous occupations have been excluded from the present analysis, principally butchers, gentleman, servants and shepherds. The focus here is on tradesmen and labourers although some comparison will be made with farmers.

3 The Buckinghamshire settlements are Aston Clinton, Dinton, Haddenham, Mulsoe, Newton Longville, and Radnage. The Northamptonshire settlements are Aynho, Kings Sutton, Paulerspury, Polebrook, Ravensthorpe, Ringstead and Wilby.

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Table 13.1 Percentage of men on militia lists with land tax assessments

Labourers Tradesmen Farmers

Number on militia lists

Percentage with assessments as owner

Percentage with assessments as occupier

323 217 102

4 21 39

11 29 61

As can be seen from Table 13.1 these exclusions leave some 642 individuals (column one) in view. It is immediately apparent that there were considerable differences between the land tax assessments of those enumerated on the militia lists as labourers, tradesmen and farmers. Perhaps the most surprising feature of Table 13.1 is that only 60 per cent of those described as farmers were assessed as occupiers of land. This is a methodological artefact that should be dealt with first. It can be demonstrated that the great majority of the apparently landless farmers worked on a family farm assessed for the land tax to a close male relative, typically the father of the supposedly 'landless' farmer. 4 This is not the case with the landless artisans and tradesmen, the majority of whom were indeed neither owners nor occupiers of agricultural land. Only 4 per cent of labourers were assessed to the land tax as owners. Nearly three times as many appeared as occupiers. Tradesmen were five times as likely as labourers to be assessed as owners and three times as likely to be assessed as occupiers. At this point certain problems entailed in the use of the land tax assessments need to be confronted directly. The first of these, which is well known, is that in law, properties with a notional annual rental value of less than £1 per year were exempt from the tax. Actual practice is much harder to establish (Ginter, 1992). Secondly, small assessments were generally on houses with common rights and not on land as such, though such houses, of course, occupied a certain amount of land and came with rights to the use of other land (Shaw-Taylor, 1999: 48-158). Neither of these problems can be explored in detail here. However, a number of more detailed studies, summaries of which are presented below, document that in Buckinghamshire and Northamptonshire at least, the level of omission of agricultural land and common right houses appears to have been very low. It follows from this that the percentages in Table 13 .1 are reasonably accurate assessments

of the proportions of labourers, tradesmen and farmers owning or occupying agricultural land or houses with common rights. In other words, in these two counties, in settlements not yet enclosed in the late eighteenth century, around one labourer in ten had access to land either through the occupation of arable land in the open fields or of a common-right cottage. Nearly one tradesman in three was in that position. Nevertheless it should be noted that, on these figures, most tradesmen and the great majority of labourers had no access to agricultural land or common pasture rights.

4

This will be documented in the full version of this study which will appear in the monograph alluded to earlier.

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Access to land by labourers and tradesmen

Some owners rented their properties to other individuals, so levels of owner-occupation and tenancy cannot be assessed from Table 13 .1. Table 13 .2 documents the proportions of those labourers, tradesmen and farmers assessed to the land tax assessment who were pure landlords, pure tenants or some combination of owner and occupier of property. The first column of Table 13. l shows those who were assessed to the land tax as owners but not as occupiers. For all three occupational groups the figure is similar at something under 10 per cent of those with an assessment. This figure should be treated with some caution because the underlying methodology will not detect any individual who was an absentee landlord elsewhere. Nevertheless it strongly suggests that for each of these occupational groups the primary reason for owning agricultural land or common-rights was to make personal use of those resources rather than to rent them out.

Table 13.2 Relative frequency of landlords, tenants and owner-occupiers*

Labourers Tradesmen Farmers

Landlord only

Tenant only

Owner and occupier*

%

%

%

8 9

62 36 40

30 56 52

7

''' For labourers and tradesmen virtually all those who were listed on the land tax as owners and occupiers of property were in fact owner-occupiers of a single property. For farmers the situation was more complex: see text.

Before continuing the analysis it is worth pointing out that in the last column 'owner and occupier' describes those who appear as both an owner and as an occupier somewhere in the land tax assessment. The vast majority of tradesmen and labourers who were owners and occupiers were in fact owner-occupiers of a single piece of property. 5 In the case of farmers, individuals were frequently owner-occupiers of one piece of property and tenants of another and multiple pieces of property were often associated with one individual. The possible permutations are too numerous for convenient analysis and have been reduced to three for present purposes. Bearing this in mind, it can be seen from a comparison of columns two and three that the majority oflabourers with tax assessments were tenants rather than owner-occupiers, whereas the majority of tradesmen with assessments were owner-occupiers. This presumably reflects tradesmen's higher earning capacities which must have made it considerably easier to acquire property. It now remains to consider the actual size of the assessments which are set out in Table 13.3. Land tax assessments are at best a crude indicator of the value of land, and an even less satisfactory indicator of the area of land. The ratio between land values and tax assessments varied considerably from one village to the next and was far from consistent even within villages (Ginter, 1992). Nevertheless, the patterns exhibited in Table 5

At least in the sense that the property concerned was represented by a single line in the land tax assessment. My use of 'single property' corresponds to Ginter's 'property bundle'.

269

Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)

13.3 are so stark as to be quite unmistakable. The polarization of access to land, already apparent in Table 13 .1, becomes much starker once the size of the assessments is considered. Three-quarters of assessed labourers occupied property assessed at less than ten shillings (£0.5) as did oYer half of assessed tradesmen. By comparison two-thirds of assessed farmers occupied property assessed at £4. Put simply the typical farmer's access to land was valued at over ten times that of the relatively fortunate minority of propertyoccupying labourers and artisans.

Table 13.3 Size of occupier's land tax assessments (in decimal £)

Labourers Tradesmen Farmers

Sample size

< 0.50 o/o

0.5 < 1 %

1