Land Grabbing and Conflict in the North West Region of Cameroon: An Endemic Situation, 1958-2017 1527556328, 9781527556324

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Land Grabbing and Conflict in the North West Region of Cameroon

Land Grabbing and Conflict in the North West Region of Cameroon: An Endemic Situation, 1958-2017 By

René Ngek Monteh

Land Grabbing and Conflict in the North West Region of Cameroon: An Endemic Situation, 1958-2017 By René Ngek Monteh This book first published 2024 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2024 by René Ngek Monteh All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-5632-8 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-5632-4

To All peace advocates in Cameroon in general and in the North-West Region in particular.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ................................................................................... x Preface ...................................................................................................... xi Abbreviations And Acronyms .............................................................. xiv General Introduction................................................................................ 1 Chapter One .............................................................................................. 7 Background Study and Causes of Land and Boundary Conflicts in the North-West Region A- The Geographical Environment ............................................................ 7 a. Location, Relief and Vegetation .................................................... 7 b. Climate, Soils and Drainage ........................................................ 12 c. Occupation and Network System ................................................. 15 B- The Historical Environment ................................................................ 18 a. Migration and Settlement in the North-West Region ................... 19 b. Inter-Community Conflicts before 1958 ...................................... 28 c. History of Administrative Reforms .............................................. 34 C- Land and Boundary Conflicts: Classification and Causes ................... 36 a. Classification of Conflicts ............................................................ 36 b. Causes of Land and Boundary Conflicts...................................... 38 Chapter Two ........................................................................................... 58 Land Conflict in Mezam: Bambili versus Babanki-Tungo A- Geo-history of the Area ....................................................................... 58 a. Geography of the Area ................................................................. 58 b. History of the Area ...................................................................... 63 c. Inter-Village Relations before 1958 ............................................. 66 B- Origin and Manifestation of the Conflict ............................................. 70 a. Origin ........................................................................................... 71 b. Manifestation ............................................................................... 82

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C- Impact of the Conflict .......................................................................... 90 a. Political Impact ............................................................................ 90 b. Economic Impact ......................................................................... 93 c. Social Impact ............................................................................... 94 Chapter Three....................................................................................... 103 Land Struggle in Ngoketunjia: Balikumbat versus Bafanji A- Geo-history of Balikumbat and Bafanji............................................. 103 a. Geographical Context ................................................................ 103 b. Historical Context ...................................................................... 108 c. Inter-Village Relations before 1966 ........................................... 115 B- Origin and Evolution of the Conflict ................................................. 123 a. The Origin of the Conflict .......................................................... 123 b. Evolution of the Conflict ........................................................... 128 C-The Consequences of Balikumbat-Bafanji Conflict ........................... 143 a. Political Consequence ................................................................ 143 b. Economic Consequences ........................................................... 146 c. Socio-Cultural Consequences .................................................... 147 Chapter Four ........................................................................................ 150 Land Conflict in Wum Central, Menchum Division: Farmer - Grazier Problem A- Geographical and Historical Setting of the People ............................ 150 a. The Geographical Setting........................................................... 150 b. Historical Setting ....................................................................... 153 B- Origin of the Farmer-Grazier Problem .............................................. 162 a. Problem of Space Occupation .................................................... 162 b. Demography .............................................................................. 166 c. The Administration .................................................................... 169 d. Politics of Identity (Aborigines and Allogines) ......................... 172 C- Evolution of the Conflict ................................................................... 174 a. The 1968-1981 Situation ............................................................ 175 b. The 1984-1999 Episode ............................................................. 180 c. The 2000-2005 Incidences ......................................................... 183 D- The Consequences of the Problem .................................................... 188 a. Political Impact .......................................................................... 189 b. Economic Impact ....................................................................... 190 c. Socio-Cultural Impact ................................................................ 193

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Chapter Five ......................................................................................... 196 Land and Boundary Problems in Bui and Boyo Divisions: Oku versus Mbesa A- The Geographical and Historical Context ......................................... 196 a. Geographical Context ................................................................ 196 b. Historical Context ...................................................................... 201 B- Inter-Fondoms Relations and Causes of the Conflicts ....................... 209 a. Pre-War Relations ...................................................................... 209 b. Remote Causes of the Conflicts ................................................. 219 c. Immediate Causes of the Conflicts ............................................ 228 C- The Escalation of the Conflict ........................................................... 229 a. The 1982 Land Conflict ............................................................. 229 b. The 1988 Confrontation ............................................................. 234 c. The 2007 and 2008 Confrontations ............................................ 237 d. The Recent Crisis of May 2008 ................................................. 246 D- Effects of the Oku-Mbesa Conflict.................................................... 248 a. Political Effects .......................................................................... 248 b. Economic Effects ....................................................................... 251 c. Socio-Cultural Effects ................................................................ 254 Chapter Six ........................................................................................... 258 Attempted Solutions and the Problems faced by the Intervening Parties in Resolving the Conflicts in the North-West Region A. Attempted Solutions .......................................................................... 258 a. Government Attempts ................................................................ 258 b. The Role of Traditional Authorities and Institutions ................. 277 c. Religious Authorities and Institutions ........................................ 285 d. Non-Governmental Organizations ............................................. 293 e. Women and other Voluntary Mediators ..................................... 312 B- Problems Encountered by the Interventionists .................................. 317 a. Government Officials ................................................................. 318 b. Traditional Authorities and Institutions ..................................... 322 c. Problems Faced by NGOs .......................................................... 325 C- Recommendations ............................................................................. 330 a. Recommendations in line with the farmer/ grazer conflict ........ 330 b. Recommendations on other areas visited in the Region ............ 332 General Conclusion .............................................................................. 337 Sources Consulted ................................................................................ 348 Index of Names and Concepts ............................................................. 373

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research received moral, technical, and financial support from a number of persons and institutions to whom I am indebted. While thanking God Almighty for sustained blessings and inspiration that kept me in good health throughout my research period, the realization of this work would not have been possible without the valuable contributions made by some reliable persons, religious, traditional and research institutions within and out of the North-West Region of Cameroon. I thank and highly recognize early authors on similar work, whoever participated in this research and those who were committed to freely providing their information and experiences. I am very grateful to the Universities of Ngaoundere and Yaounde 1 for providing me with the logistics and wherewithal for carrying out this study. To Professors Saïbou Issa, and Wullson Mvomo Ela, our supervisor and cosupervisor respectively who supervised the base of this work in form of a PhD thesis. Much appreciation goes to Professors Verkijika G. Fanso, Daniel Abwa, Willibroad Dze-Ngwa, Mark Bolack Funteh and Confidence Ngam Chia who read an earlier draft of this work and suggested important improvements. I also express my gratitude to Doctors Mbibe Luis and Patrick Belibi Enama for their English literacy input and support. I am immensely grateful for their time and intellectual generosity. Nevertheless, all interpretations and conclusions reached here are, of course, the author’s responsibility. René Ngek Monteh April 2022

PREFACE

William Zartman holds unequivocally that conflicts help the community to make valuable and sustainable choices. This assertion is grossly true in situations where there are clashes or overwhelming interests over power and other intangible resources to make informed choices and to determine commitment. However, when there is a focus on land-related cases among homogeneous or heterogeneous societies of the Cameroon Grassfields, the impact of such conflicts greatly negates meaningful efforts towards development and peace. This is the case with land-related conflicts within the local communities of the North-West Region of the Republic of Cameroon. This area is a hub not only of distinctive natural interest but also of high political and social sensitivity where there is a high concentration of a harmony of differences, consciously and unconsciously journeying together amidst the storms and gales of time. As an assortment of mixes between traditions and ethnic affiliates that have and are still struggling to understand the dynamics of state authority and essence, this niche has been rife with manifold conflicts, some with clearly identified causations and others borne out of a litany of both mismanaged situations and misconceptions of policies that have come along with change. Change in all its forms may imply a compendium of issues which can hardly be exhaustively comprehended even under the most refined social scholarship, but change in the Cameroon North-West Region, roughly corresponding to the Bamenda Grassland or Grassfield, can and should be seen as any form of social, economic, and political developments that have consciously or otherwise brought disruptions, reform, and contradictory appeals to known facts, phenomena, structures, and institutions. One key area that has exerted pressure on the communities through engineering conflicts of a kind apart from this study niche is land grabbing. The value attached to land by North-West folks moves in consonance with that of other African folks, which sums up to say that land constitutes far more than just physical ownership or direct economic value. To these people, land ownership or administration represents power and an eternal connection with cosmic spirits best understood within the context of African religion or mythology. Aside from the need to preserve land for progeny and other unspecified future projects, North-West residents simply

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revere land holdings and would rather preserve the cultural prestige that came and went with them than sell them out. The statist-modern policies/ordinances on land during the historical growth of this region ignited a legion of problems for the local folks, not only because state cooperation and other multi-nationals deprived locals of the widely held concept that land is a gift of nature to all its owners, but more on account that these policies clearly removed chieftains from complete claims of absolute land ownership and placed these rights within the hands of the state and its agencies. The ignorance of such reforms is combined with an unwillingness to respect the new land laws, along with the complications of understanding and applying the native land laws in honour of tradition and state laws. By no small measure, this established the first layer of land-related conflicts in the North-West Region. While state agents like administrative officers and other personalities within the hierarchy of the Cameroon governing norms grappled with these conflicts within the margins of sustainable resolutions, a new phenomenon over land incidentally emerged to compound the situation. This new situation is land grapping by individuals, state and non-state institutions, and multinational cooperation. The emergence of such new pressures on a precious or treasured factor of production like land has enriched the debate of scholarship with all the quintessential elements sought. Prof. Monteh’s treatise is one such worthy contribution to the understanding of not only land-related conflict but the whole morphology of conflicts in Cameroon in particular and Africa at large. Like all studies in the realm of social sciences, this document is far from being exhaustive and the author does not make that claim anywhere. It thus heals the wound of exposing the true colours of conflicts within the ecological niche known as the Bamenda Grassfields by a broader scholarship. The study is pieced together in more than 400 pages of refined stuff consisting mainly of a thorough description of general and specific causations of conflicts, case by case analyses of conflicts of discourses on the state agents' and agencies’ tact and lapses in handling the conflicts of indigenous contributions to the conflicts and of the challenges and problems faced by intervening parties in the resolution of conflicts within this niche. The ideas and discourses sustained by this conflict companion are telling and charming. The ideas are graphically illustrated, referenced, and demonstrated, which strengthens the understanding of the fundamental theme. Issues relating to conflicts are not only lodged within a single discipline like history, sociology, or political science alone. Conflicts straddle a broad range of scholarship, and so any meaningful attempt to offer scholarship submissions on any aspect of conflicts must make equitable

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recourse to cross-disciplinary data and analysis. This study has made effective use of all the conflict-related and sensitive disciplines to offer its submissions, which all have the merit of conveying a broad range of unbiased readership. In a special way, this book offers new insights into the understanding of conflicts and why they have grown endemic within the North-West ecological niche. Its submissions provide a complementary scholarship to those involved with policy definition and application, students of conflict and polemical studies, state and non-state institutions operating here, as well as all the social and even exact scientists both within this niche and beyond. Owing to the fact that understanding conflicts informs the mind both for curative and preemptive actions, I make no hesitation to wholesomely offer that this book is like a scholarship bank where any reader will find his/her curious account adequately balanced. On this score, I offer it as a companion and a must-read to all and sundry. Prof. Confidence Ngam Chia Associate Professor, History Bamenda, Cameroon

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADR Alhaji Ardo CAMSU CCC CNU CPDM CSO DA DAB DAW DO EMPED ERC EYPIC F/G FIACAT GTZ HELVETAS Hon JPC LA LMA MBOSCUDA MEDINO NA NAA NAB NC

Alternative Dispute Resolution Title given to a Muslim male who had undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca Head of a Muslim Community Cameroon Muslim Student Union Cattle Control Committee Cameroon National Union Cameroon Peoples’ Democratic Movement Civil Society Organisation District Administrator Divisional Archives Bamenda Divisional Archives Wum Divisional Officer Ecumenical Mission for Peace and Development Foundation Elak Rural Council Ecumenical Youth Peace Initiative Farmer / Grazier Federation of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture Geselleschaft Techische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Co-operation) Swiss Association for Development and Co-operation Honourable Justice and Peace Foundation Local Authority Land Management Agency Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association North West Development Authority Native Authority Native Authority Area National Archives Buea Native Court

Land Grabbing and Conflict in the North West Region of Cameroon: An Endemic Situation, 1958-2017

NCHRF NDECA NEF NGO NOWECA NOWEBA NOWEFCO NOWEFU NVCR NWF PAB SDF SDO SEF SeP SIRDEP SODELCO UNVDA WADA WRC

National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms Ngoketunjia Development and Cultural Association North-East Federation Non-Governmental Organisation North West Crafts Association North West Bee-Farming Association North West Fons’ Conference North West Fons’ Union Non-Violent Conflict Resolution North-West Federation Provincial Archives Bamenda Social Democratic Front Senior Divisional Officer South East Federation Service Œcuménique pour la Paix (Ecumenical Service for Peace) Society for Initiative in Rural Development and Environmental Protection Société Commerciale pour le Développement de l’élévage du Cameroun Upper Noun Valley Development Authority Wum Area Development Authority Wum Rural Council

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This study addresses land grapping and conflict in the North-West Region of Cameroon, also known as the Bamenda Grassfields, from 1958 to 2017. As the world’s leading theatre of conflicts, Africa is experiencing an increase in the scope and intensity of conflicts underlined by internecine ethnic rivalries. Many of such conflicts, which involve land and boundary problems, have antecedents in historical legacy. The history and oral tradition of most African societies, therefore, contain elements of conflict, including land conflict situations, which largely result from ethnic plurality. Conflict situations have increased rapidly across Africa during the postcolonial era as a result of competition involving two or more people or groups over limited resources such as water and land. History has demonstrated that the scramble and quest for natural resources have always led to serious clashes in communities. The quest for more land and property during and in the aftermath of the European invasion of Africa undoubtedly caused great conflicts in traditional African societies. Indeed, the manner in which land demarcation was carried out during the pre-colonial period was given little or no consideration during the effective occupation of Africa by the European powers. Then, conflicts of great magnitude took place when private or communal land was tampered with by the colonial administration. For instance, the indigenous inhabitants of Kenya were disgruntled at the way communal land was expropriated by traditional rulers of the region to offer to white settlers referred to as ‘strangers’ in the 1950s. In the same way, the invasion of Cameroon by European colonial powers and the seizure of land by the colonial and post-colonial administrations of the country triggered land and boundary conflicts that exist today in the North-West Region of Cameroon. The Berlin Conference, which aimed at partitioning the African continent for effective European occupation, administration and optimal exploitation of its natural resources, was the most predominant act of contemporary land demarcation and delimitation in Africa. This partition created major land and boundary disputes in Africa in general, and in the North-West Region of Cameroon in particular. Conflict subsequently arose between the indigenous populations and the colonialists in places that witnessed greater socio-economic changes due to the expropriation of farm land, grazing land, fishing grounds and hunting land amongst others. Worse

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General Introduction

still, population expansion in Africa, and in the North-West Region of Cameroon in particular, led to more attention over the value of land. This situation thus limited the action and control of local chiefs, who were, till then, thought to be the owners or supreme controllers of all lands within their localities. Demographic factors, especially during the post-colonial period, further contributed substantially to the frequent land claims in the study locale. Cameroon, like many other African countries, has witnessed conflicts resulting from increased antagonism between diverse ethnic groups. In this kind of configuration, therefore, ethnic antagonisms and land conflicts become difficult to resolve. Conflicts erupt and escalate due to group struggles, and are underpinned by complicated alliances in which ethnic identity and affiliations are key variables. In some traditionally stable societies, land and boundary conflicts are becoming increasingly common. In fact, in many countries in Africa, indigenous people have been dispossessed of their land, or are at risk of being dispossessed of their rights and authority to own land. To be more precise, these rights are currently being invalidated by the State through the issuance of land laws that (most of the time) run counter to the indigenous conceptions. From the above discussion, intrinsic causes of land and boundary conflicts and their effects on social cohesion are endemic in the North-West Region of Cameroon, hence the justification of writing a book on this topic. Life in the African continent, like elsewhere in the world, is indirectly linked to land. On the account of its importance in defining power and geostrategic positioning, land is seen not only as wealth, but also as “steam centre” on which any decision emanates, grows and takes shape. In the North-West Region where life revolves around agricultural activities and the population increases exponentially, the value of land and the problems linked to it continue to shape policies, define identities and bring out the contours of multi-dimensional relations and cohabitations. Land problems are certainly not new, but these problems mostly have their roots in the inappropriate manner in which the colonialists attempted to carve out ethnic boundaries. The inability of both colonial and postcolonial authorities in charge of arbitrating on land matters in a manner acceptable to all, as well as the expansionist policies of some traditional ethnic formations continue to make the already bad situation worse. In addition to those two factors, land and boundary problems have often been fuelled and fanned by political elites to distract their constituents from the failure to meet their campaign promises. In the North-West Region, traditional authorities (namely chiefs, Fons and Ardos), on whose ambits were bestowed ancestral claims over

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land, exploit the ignorance and blind loyalty of their subjects to engage in illicit practises. For example, they sell land to the central government, causing landlessness among their own people. They are equally involved directly or indirectly in land conflicts resulting from multiple sales and double allocation of land titles that have been made possible by legal pluralism, or undocumented customary tenure between competing state agencies all legitimized to do so. The presence of the traditional leaders, elites, state personals like Divisional Officers and Lawyers dubious’ standards over land has been that conflicts of all dimensions have been in a meteoric rise. The most violent conflicts over land, however, are those involving two different ethnic groups fighting over and claiming ownership over a piece of land. In the North-West Region, what is often reported as an ethnic conflict is usually a conflict over (arable or pasture) land. It has been noticed that many of the land and boundary conflicts are due to the effects of climate change, environmental degradation, demographic and economic transition on the local populations. Scarcity of land due to environmental degradation and population growth often leaves hardly any choice to people but to fight for land which might or might not be theirs. All land conflicts, no matter how peaceful or violent they may be, produce negative consequences for individual people as well as for entire communities. For example, several people and communities across the North-West Region have seen their homes destroyed. Others have experienced the sale of their property by someone else claiming sole ownership. Farmers have lost their production base. Moreover, where they are frequent, land and boundary conflicts have undermined trust and increased fear and suspicion often between formerly close people such as neighbouring communities and family members. Also, violent land conflicts and the fear of becoming a victim of them proved to have had a traumatising effect on some of the communities at risk. These conflicts have become so protracted that solutionary efforts are often far-fetched. Even when solutions are advanced, complying with them remains another serious problem. This work, then, seeks to answer the following questions: What are the general and specific causes of land problems in the North-West Region? How have these conflicts manifested themselves? How have these conflicts been conceived and managed by state and non-state actors? What theoretical and practical mechanics have been deployed to curb land conflict and with what measure of success or failure? How best can land conflicts in North-West Region and Cameroon be resolved and what are the lessons to be drawn from them?

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General Introduction

This research work is limited to the North-West Region of the Republic of Cameroon, otherwise known as the Bamenda Grassfields. It is focused on four land and boundary conflicts, namely Bambili versus Babanki-Tungo, Balikumbat versus Bafanji, the Mbororos graziers versus the Aghem farmers, and Oku versus Mbesa. These conflicts cover five out of the seven Divisions of the North-West Region of Cameroon: Mezam, Ngoketunjia, Menchum, Bui and Boyo. These four cases were selected because they each have different historical perspectives on land and boundary conflict in the region. The first case, Bambili versus Babanki-Tungo, was chosen not only for various land disputes, but also for its geographical and strategic location in Tubah Subdivision of Mezam Division. The second case, the Balikumbat/Bafanji territorial conflict, is related to the long lasting unresolved boundary dispute between these two communities from different ethnic origins (Chamba and Tikar respectively), though both groups are found in the same Sub-division in Ngoketunjia Division. The third case, known as the farmers-graziers conflict of Wum Central (Bui Division), is a typical example of the impact of bigotry and ethnicity in land settlement disputes. Also, the efforts of the various peace advocates in the disputed area had been a point of great attraction. The last case opposing Oku to Mbesa is related to land and boundary matters, considering the fact that throughout history, these two communities have lived together as brothers until recent time, when the State of Cameroon decided to administer Oku became as a Sub-division in Bui Division, and Mbesa as a village in Belo Sub-division in Boyo Division. Each of the cases mentioned above has involved different historical moments related to land conflicts worthy of interest to researchers willing to evaluate the attempts at restoring peace in the selected cases. From the above point of view, personal and scientific reasons motivated our choice of the four cases, which have been sufficiently characterized by current and recurrent conflicts over land and boundary issues. The study covers the period 1958 to 2017. The year 1958 has been chosen as a starting date because of the agreement by the British colonial authority and the people of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo over A.B. Westmacott’s (Resident) Review of May 1958 on land and boundary problems. In the area, the Westmacott decision has been referred by the various authorities as the only legal document which demarcated the area under dispute. It should be noted that the Westmacott decision was the last colonial peace attempt to land and boundary disputes settlement in this part of the country. The study ends in 2017. This year was chosen because of the relative peace that reigned in this area due to State, NGOs’, and dispute parties’ efforts. Note is also taken from the last demarcation exercise

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conducted in July 2008 and the subsequent diplomatic peace attempt recorded by both communities in March 2017. The book is structured into six chapters excluding a general introduction and general conclusion. Chapter one provides the background information about the study area and how it could be relevant in the understanding of the various conflicts in the North-West Region. To this effect, the first part opens with the geographical and ethnographical survey of the area. It focuses on the land, human, traditional and socio-political setting in which the contestants find themselves. The second part treats the general causes of land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region. Chapter two examines the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo land dispute in Tubah Sub-division, found in Mezam Division of the North-West Region. This conflict started in the colonial period but in 1958 during the last years of British rule, the last significant efforts were made available by the British colonial masters through the Wesmacott decision on the Buea High over the disputed area at Ntah. Chapter three is our second case study. It deals with the evolution of the Balikumbat versus Bafanji land dispute in Ngoketunjia Division. Here, issues of ethnicity and the direct and pervasive involvement of traditional and government authorities have further exacerbated tensions, while an attempt at a final resolution of the conflict is still pending. Chapter four focuses on the land conflict opposing the Mbororo graziers to the Aghem indigenous farmers in Wum Central of Menchum Division. This chapter highlights the evolution of territorial conflicts in Wum Central among the above-mentioned contestants. In this connection, care has been taken to examine the advent and organization of the Mbororos in Wum, Menchum Division, the main causes, evolution and impact of the conflicts involving this community. Chapter five, our last case study, is the most recent devastating land conflict in terms of damage and casualties in the North-West Region. The conflict opposes the people of Oku and Mbesa, who live respectively in Oku Sub-division (Bui Division) and Belo Subdivision (Boyo Division). In this chapter, we assess the degree of lineage of the two communities, and discuss the various wars they fought against each other from 1982 to 2017 and the devastating effects of the conflict on the two communities. Chapter six is in relation to the various attempts made by different peace advocates and the problems they faced in providing a lasting solution to the land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region. However, this chapter ends with some proposed solutions to the various parties or peace advocates in an attempt to prevent or resolve conflicts of similar magnitude not only in the North-West Region, but in Cameroon in general. The general conclusion begins with the summary of the main issues discussed in the various parts of the work. This part of the book equally

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General Introduction

highlights the theoretical link of this work in relation to the existing ones on land and boundary conflicts between communities. Finally, it discusses the lessons learned from these conflicts.

CHAPTER ONE BACKGROUND STUDY AND CAUSES OF LAND AND BOUNDARY CONFLICTS IN THE NORTHWEST REGION

Conflicts between communities in the North-West Region cannot be analysed adequately without an in-depth understanding of the area’s geography and history. Under geography, the location, relief, vegetation, climate, soil and drainage of the areas under study are hereby analysed. Elements of history including migration, settlement and traditional or indigenous institutions are discussed in depth, alongside causes of land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region.

A- The Geographical Environment Owing to its unique features, notably the topographical relief and vegetation, the North-West Region of Cameroon caught the eye of various colonial explorers who came to the area, especially the Germans. The latter then referred to this part of the country as the Grassfields or Grasslands.

a. Location, Relief and Vegetation Shaped liked a rough diamond,1 the North-West Region of Cameroon lies between longitudes 9°45’ and 11°10’ and 7°30’ north of the Equator (see map 1). It is flanked to the north by the Adamawa and the Taraba State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, to the west and south west by the Manyu Division of the South West Region, to the south and south west by the Bamboutous and Noun Divisions of the West Region, and to the east by the Mayo Banyo Division of the Adamawa Region of Cameroon. The region possesses seven Administrative Divisions, namely Boyo, Bui, Donga1

National archives Buea (NAB), W.E. Hunt, 1921, Report on the Bamenda Division of the Cameroon Province for the League of Nations for the Year Ended, 31th December, p.2.

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Mantung, Menchum, Mezam, Momo and Ngoketunjia, (see map 2) which all derive their names from some prominent geographical features of the region.2 The region is made up of 31 Sub-divisions and 31 rural and 2 urban areas. According to the 1987 population census, the North-West Region had an estimated population of more than 1,238,348 inhabitants, which increased to about 1,884,200 inhabitants in 2001.3 According to Suh Neba, the North-West Region is the fifth most populous region of Cameroon after the Far North, Littoral, Centre and Western Region.4 The North-West Region covers an area of about 17,510 square kilometres. The dominant physiographical structure of the region is the Bamenda plateau that extends almost horizontally across the Bamenda Grassfields, forming splendid natural divisional and regional boundaries. There are some mountainous chains on this plateau extending southwards and northwards into the West and Adamawa Regions. Some of these montains include Mounts Lefo (2,550 meters), Fungom (1,804 meters) and Oku (3,011 meters) above sea level. This means that Mount Oku, the second highest point in Cameroon after Mount Fako, is found in our area of study. The Bamenda town, the headquarters of the region, lies on an altitude of above 1,600 meters. However, there are plains and valleys that spread between these high peaks of the plateau within the region. Outstanding among the major plains and valleys are the Ndop and Mbaw plains in the Ngoketunjia and Donga-Mantung Divisions respectively, as well as the Yemgeh valley in Menchum Division.5 By and large, the entire region consists of hills broken by valleys at varying breaths with numerous streams, lakes and rivers.6

2

North West Provincial Delegation MINAT, 2001, p.5. North-West Regional Master Plan for Sustainable Development Report, April 2001, p.7. 4 T. Brinkhoff, 2007, “Institut National de la Statistique Cameroun”, in http://www.citypopulation.de, consulted on 3 April 2009. 5 A. Suh Neba, 1987, Modern Geography of Cameroon, Canidian, Neba Publishers, p.166. 6 G. Ladaviere (ed.), 1980, Atlas of the United Republic of Cameroon, Paris, Editions Jeune Afrique, p.7. 3

Background Study and Causes of Land and Boundary Conflicts in the North-West Region

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Map 1: Location of the North-West Region in Cameroon

Source: Adapted by the author from the (1992) administrative map of Cameroon, INC, Yaoundé, drawn by Enchaw G.B, (2011).

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Chapter One

Map 2: Location of the study Areas in the North-West Region of Cameroon

Source: Adapted by the author from the (1992) administrative map of Cameroon, INC, Yaoundé, drawn by Enchaw G.B, (2011).

Many streams and water sources are found on the slopes of the numerous hills. The main rivers of the region are the Donga, Bui, Momo, Mezam, Menchum, Katsina and Kimbi, after which some of the divisions of the region are named. It should be noted that most of these rivers flow west into the Benue River in Nigeria, while the Momo flows into the

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tributaries of the Cross River in Manyu Division. However, these rivers are not navigable within the region due to numerous rocks, rapids and waterfalls. Prominent lakes within the region include: Lake Oku, Wum, Nyos, Bambili, Benakuma, Kuk and Awing. These are crater lakes resulting from volcanic activities that occurred centuries ago.7 Given the latitude, prevailing rainfall and general climatic conditions, the vegetation of the North-West Region can be classified under the savannah (Guinea Savanna), which lies immediately adjacent to the Equatorial rainforest. Patches of deciduous and motane forest gallery are found along streams, river valleys and fertile mountain slopes. Dense forests, for instance, are found on the slopes of Mount Kilum and Mount Ijim, and valleys of rivers such as the Menchum, Katsina and Donga. The patches of forest on the Menchum River Valley begin from Bafut and extend to the Isimbo area up to border with Nigeria. Dense forests are also found around the Mbengwi area of the Mekaf chiefdom, and down to the villages of Nser, Kepp, Badji, Sambari and Furu-Awa. They are equally present along the valley of the Katsina Ala River, which makes up the Fungom Forest Reserve, and, finally, along the valley of Menchum and in parts of Donga-Mantung Division.8 On higher elevations as well as heavily grazed areas, shorter grass of 1.5 metre or more grow luxuriantly in the rainy season, and whither during the dry season, giving a brownish appearance and presentation of the landscape. This grass cover is a biotic climax. Patches of rain forest, characterised by scattered trees with twisted stems and corky heat persisting backs give rise to occasional gallery forests. Such geographical features are common in the valleys of the steep hills where the top soils which washed down by rain are deposited. Examples are found in Upper Fungom. These features have made the people of this area to be in a constant search for the most permeable parts of land for farming, with the result that farming land has become scarce, leading to conflicts between neighbouring villages. Map 1 illustrates selected cases of conflict discussed in this work. However, it should be noted that a greater part of the grasslands is formed from destructive human activities such as deforestation (for human settlement and farming), burning of the bush and more recently, overgrazing.

7

Ladaviere, 1980.p.8. The World Bank, 1993, Ecological Sensitive Sites in Africa, Vol-1, Occidental and Central Africa, Washington DC, The World Bank, pp.5-6.

8

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Chapter One

b. Climate, Soils and Drainage The North-West Region has a sub-tropical climate. Like in most tropical areas, the winds which influence the climate of the North-West Region are the North-East Trade winds that blow from the Sahara and the South-West monsoons from across the Atlantic Ocean that bring about rainfall. Straddled over Longitude 10° East, the North-West Region is a capsule replica of most of the climate and vegetation experienced in the Region. The region enjoys a sub-tropical climate with cold frosty mornings, and hot dry afternoons especially during the dry periods. The monthly average temperature ranges between 20.18°C minimum to 29.40°C maximum.9 This implies that the temperature is much more stable and regular. As a result of proximity, to the flood plains of rivers and Lakes, some areas in the region are likely to register very low temperatures especially at night and early mornings due to evaporation and cooling of the vapour. Areas such as the Ndop plain, part of Lower Fungom, Munka and Gayama experience high temperatures as a result of the proximity with Ngaoundere. These low areas lie among hills, such that air is trapped within them. Consequently, these places are warm but not as the areas found in the coastal regions. These villages have a climate good for the cultivation of cash crops such as oil palm, banana, cocoa and a host of others.10 Two main seasons are experienced in the region, namely the wet and dry seasons. The former lasts from early March to mid-November, with the highest rainfall usually registered in August. This is a season of lower temperatures, and heavier and more regular rainfalls. Smaller daily ranges of temperatures are characteristics of the wet season. This culminates into an annual average rainfall of about 2000mm. Daily temperatures are sometimes as low as 13°C and the atmosphere is sometimes foggy or cloudy during day and night. There is a short, but well-marked dry season which does not last more than four months. The dry season often begins from late November to early March and is characterized by cold and sometimes frosty mornings and evenings, hot afternoons with temperatures averaging 28°C, a misty atmosphere during the day and a clear sky at night. The dry season is a season of higher temperatures and a large diurnal range of temperatures. As observed earlier, the mornings are relatively cold and chilly, while the atmosphere is generally dusty. The harmattan is greatly felt through dry winds during this

9

North West Provincial Delegation for Agriculture Archives, Annual Report 1988/89, p.6. 10 A. Neba, 1987, Modern geography of the republic of Cameroon, 3rd edition, Bamenda, Neba Publishers, p.269.

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period. On the average, the region has a mild climate which is very conducive for hard work.11 The North-West Region equally consists of three main soil types: volcanic, hydromorphic and ferralitic. Volcanic soils, which are rich and black, are the result of weathering over the years of volcanic rocks. Hydromorphic soils are organic and have a low drainage capacity which frequently suffers from seasonal flooding. A good example is the flood plains of River Menchum. Also, ferralitic soils are found in varying qualities throughout the region.12 The most common type of soil found here is volcanic, it is generally littered with basalt stones, dark and rich in humus of good structure and texture. However, the hilly regions are often deprived of plant nutrients due to rains, seasonal wild fire and deforestation, which leave the surface exposed to both water and wind erosion. However, in most areas, high temperature and rainfall conditions have encouraged dense vegetation that is immediately decomposed into humus once the vegetation is withered off by bacteria. This humus content is released into plants but the soil soon becomes deteriorated as the heavy rains easily leach away the nutrients. The soils consequently become unfertile and the farm is abandoned for a virgin piece of land. The use of fertilizers, therefore, becomes imperative. Nevertheless, the soils are sometimes rich for agriculture, especially the black volcanic soils of Nduh, Oku, Buwum (in Bafut), Befang, Ndu and Wum which have always been as pull factors to the various communities. Other areas with fertile soils include the encroached crater lakes of Befang, the Santa environment, the hilly site of Kom, just to name a few. Rice and yams do well in the flood plains of Ndop, while maize, cassava, cocoyams, plantains, groundnuts, beans and many other food crops are commonly cultivated in the other areas of the region. It is, however, noteworthy that this limitation in soil fertility had witnessed a serious population pressure, especially during the wet season, thus resulting to land conflict. The drainage of the region has also played a greater role in fuelling land conflict in this area.13 Although the topography of the North-West Region is very uneven, it is well watered in most places by rivers and streams which flow 11 P. Hawkins and M. Brunt, 1965, The soils and ecology of West Cameroon (with special reference to the Bamenda Area), Rome, FAO, p.56. 12 S.V. Zonn, 1986, Tropical and Sub-Tropical Soil Science, Moscow, Mir Publishers, pp.6-8. 13 C.A. Nkwemoh, 1999, “The impact of agro-Pastoral activities on the physical environment of the Mezam-Ngoketunjia area”, Doctorate Thesis, University of Yaounde I, p.282.

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Chapter One

down the mountain sides into the valleys where they meander. Most of the streams and rivers run fast during the rainy season. Rivers Bui and Menchum, from which the divisions of the same names derive their denominations, have their sources in Rivers Noun and Bamboutos respectively. These rivers range and flow through Bui, Mezam, Momo, Beba-Befang and Esimbi regions to Nigeria.14 Rivers Kimbi and Mer rise from the Oku Mountains and flow through the Bum and Fungom areas to Nigeria. Both tributaries meet a little after the border line with Nigeria and eventually flow into River Katsina Ala and virtually join the Benue River, some kilometers from Makurdi.15 There are many other smaller rivers and streams which favour soil fertility and the production of specific crops required by the people of the area. Crops commonly cultivated in this region include plantains, Irish potatoes, yams, vegetables and beans. In the dry season, these rivers, rich in fish, and most of the streams in the region dry up. This has, of course, serious negative economic consequences for the people. Rivers of the North-West region of Cameroon, like many other streams in Africa, are characterized by numerous waterfalls and rapids. This partly explains why these rivers are navigable over very short distances. The waterfalls and cascades are the result of powerful erosion, followed by relatively slower upstream recession. Almost all the rivers and their tributaries have great pools, rapids and falls on their courses.16 Another common feature along the rivers’ courses is the wide river valleys and the flood plains, especially around the plain belt of Ndop, Beba-Befang, Mbam and the Esimbi palm belt area. Rice and yams are cultivated along the flood plains, which become potential areas of land conflict as the limited cultivable spaces are incommensurate with the growing population. However, lakes, waterfalls and rapids constitute great tourist sites in the region, like the Menchum Falls,17 Lake Wum, Lake Oku, Lake Bambili and Lake Nyos. In fact, the shortage of these favorable geographical features (fertile lands for that matter) has always generated conflicts as everyone living in the region would prefer to settle on favorable farming areas.

14

Provincial Archives Bamenda (PAB), NW/Sa/d.2002/4/BK, Akum Joseph N., Population growth and Land use: An Assessment of the relationship between farmers and Graziers in Wum North-West Province of Cameroon, 2002, p.35. 15 Ibid. 16 J. Neba Chungong, 1977, “Le Pourvoir traditionnel et le pourvoir d’Etat: Cas de la Province du Nord-Ouest du Cameroun”, Thèse de Doctorat de 3eme cycle, Université de Nice, p.56. 17 N. Akum, 2002, p.36.

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c. Occupation and Network System Agriculture, livestock, trade and handicraft constitute the economic mainstay of the people in the region. Farming is done mostly in the valleys and plains where the soil is fertilized by the silt washed down from the hills and mountains. The food crops grown in bulk vary according to the eating habits of the different peoples of the areas. Generally speaking, the growing of crops such as maize, plantain, cocoyams, potatoes (Sweet and Irish), beans, groundnuts, yams and a wide variety of vegetation is aimed at providing a staple food for the people.18 Arabica coffee has been and remains the major cash crop grown in the region, followed by Kola nuts. Tea, another cash crop, is grown in the Estates of Ndu, in Donga-Mantung Division, and Ndawara Estates, in Boyo Division. Recently, bee-farming was introduced on a large scale with the coordination of the North-West Bee Farmer Association (NOWEBA). In this regard, white honey of great quality is directly produced in Oku, where bee farmers have grouped themselves in associations.19 Besides farming, animal husbandry is another income-generating activity of the people. Goats, sheep, pigs, rabbits, guinea pigs and fowls are among the animals bred by the indigenes. Cattle rearing is solely reserved for the “well-to-do” indigenous people and minority groups like the Fulani, Mbororo or the “Aku”. The limited and poor land demarcation process in Wum Central, Jakiri, Sabga, and Bali has often led to farmer/grazier problems. Animal husbandry too has been a source of conflict in the region.20 Trade is another economic activity of the people. Items sold in the main markets of the major towns include food stuff, general provisions and hardware. Marketing is carried out through a chain of retailers and some wholesalers, who are the principal suppliers of most provisions. Commerce of this nature has subsequently replaced what used to be known as “long distance trade”, where indigenes had to move across long distances with products like kola nuts (originating from places as Kom, Nso, Oku and its

18

MINAGRI, 1987, Upper Noun Valley Development Authority (UNVDA) Ndop, Report, p.4. 19 C. Wild, 1994, “The status and ecology of the Montane Herpetofauna of Mt. Oku, Cameroon, Africa”, ASRA Journal, pp.73-91. 20 C. Harsbarger, and A. Nji, 1991, “Farmer-Grazer Conflicts in the North West Province of Cameroon: Implications for research and policy”, In International Symposium on Agricultural Policy Analysis in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed, M.R. Langham and F. Kamajou, Proceedings, USAID, Yaounde, Cameroon, pp.163-169.

16

Chapter One

neighbours) to sell in neighbouring Nigeria for better profits and exchange rates21. After the Independence of Cameroon and reunification of the two Cameroons, a few agro-based industries were established in the North-West Region. Such industries include the Wum Area Development Authority (WADA), the Upper Noun Valley Development Authority (UNVDA), the coffee canning factory in Santa and the tea factory in Ndu. Today, WADA, the coffee canning factory and the UNDVDA, to an extent, exist only as agro-industrial relics, since they have all gone out of operation. The last surviving section of UNVDA is the rice hauling mill.22 There is also the North-West Development Authority, commonly referred to as MIDENO, its French acronym. Of recent, dairy and soap factories were implanted in the region to boost industrial activities. On the 17th of January 2003, the Bamenda Crafts People Association (BACPA) was renamed as North West Crafts Association (NOWECA) in a bid to expand its scope to all the seven Divisions of the North-West Region. Headquartered in Bamenda, the crafts people association of the Mezam Division identified a clear necessity to involve craftsmen and women in Boyo, Bui, Donga Mantung, Menchum, Momo and Ngoketunjia in order to grow stronger, share experiences and speak up for their needs, rights and interests. This socio-economic grouping was strongly encouraged by some foreign Nations, including Germany, which has provided technical assistance to the development of craftwork.23 Map 4 illustrates the network map of NOWECA with some related statistics on membership. Since pre-colonial times, communication within and beyond the region has remained a major aspect linking the people. This is because road construction in this part of the country has been improvement by successive governments since Independence. For instance, the Bamenda Ring Road project which links Bamenda and the administrative town of Ndop, Kumbo, Nkambe, Wum and Mbengwi is fast realised. However, this road has existed as a trunk, “A” road designed since colonial times from Victoria (Limbe), passing through Kumba, Mamfe, Bamenda and Nkambe to Wum.24

21

F. E. Ngende, 1966, Geography of West Cameroon, Berlin, Basel Mission, p.45. P. Kips, et al., 1987, Soils, Land Use and Land Evaluation of North West Province of Cameroon, Ekona, FAO/UNDP, p.19. 23 E. Ndenecho, 2006, Mountain Geography and Resource Conservation, Bamenda, Unique Printers, p.21. 24 Southern Cameroons Information service, 1958, Introducing the Southern Cameroons, Lagos, Southern Cameroons Information service, p.73. 22

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Map 3: Situating North-West Crafts Association (NOWECA) in the Study Locale

Source: Adapted by author from NWECA, 10th December 2005, drawn by Enchaw G.B, 2011.

During our field study, we noticed that nearly all the administrative towns are linked by motorable roads, some undergoing tarring despite some difficulties during the peak period of the rainy season, especially during the periods that runs from June to November. In the dry season, the roads are very dusty. However, the region can boast of a few kilometres of partially tarred road, from Santa to Bamenda, Bafoussam to Bamenda, Bamenda to Fundong, Bamenda to Nkambe passing through Ndop, Jakiri and Kumbo. Roads from Bamenda to Bafut and Batibo to Bali are equally tarred. Other

18

Chapter One

secondary roads, known as farm-to-market roads or trunk “B”25 roads link various parts of the region with the major un-tarred trunk “A” roads are under rehabilitation. Some of these roads here at times constitute a major problem especially in the wet season. During this period, it becomes very difficult for the forces of law and order to intervene when such conflicts arise. Most of the destructions encountered during the conflicts are always attributed to the fact that, the forces of law and order could not reach these places in time especially in remote and mountainous areas where mobility seems difficult. From 1997 to date, the region has witnessed the development of some community radios and television stations in areas such as Bamenda, Kumbo, Nkambe and Oku. Some of these stations includes the National Provincial radio station in Bamenda, the CBC radio station in Nkwen and the rural radio station in Oku (a Canadian gift to some six rural areas in Cameroon. Broadcasting of programmes from the Oku rural radio station fully went operational in March 1997.26 Radio Communication in the region has played a vital role in resolving a good number of community conflicts. In fact, in times of conflict, the population of the region is often informed through the radio about the on-going crisis till when peace is restored. The public and private press most often get first-hand information through public and private radio stations before they send reporters to the field for data collection. It is regrettable, however, that these radio communications are regulated for short distances, thus limiting information to other parts of the region.27

B- The Historical Environment The population of the North-West Region is a conglomerate of many ethnic groups, comprising tribes and a significant proportion of immigrants from other regions and foreign places, particularly Nigeria with whom the region shares boundaries in the North and North-West. It is in this light that this section of the work is consecrated to migration and early propelling in the region, and how these phenomena influenced inter-community conflicts

25 In Cameroon roads terminology, Trunk “A” roads are national roads, while trunk “B” roads are provincial and divisional roads. 26 M. Tarka, 2002, “The Challenge of Rural Radios in Cameroon: The case of the Voice of Oku (VOO)”, Dissertation in the Advanced School of Mass and Communication (ASMAC), University of Yaounde II, p.23. 27 Author’s observation from field work.

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before and during colonial periods. The section ends with an examination of the recent situation in the North-West Region.

a. Migration and Settlement in the North-West Region The people of the North-West Region, according to the 1987 national population census, have the highest number of ethnic groups in Cameroon estimated at 51. They occupied the area at different historical intervals. The main ethnic groups are the Tikar or Tikari, the Widikum, the Chamba, the Aghem and other small or non-indigenous groups such as the Hausa, the Fulani/Mbororo, Ibo, Kassimbela, Yukum and Fura-Awa among others.28 Table 1 presents the main ethnic composition of the North-West Region. For the purpose of this study, the Tikar, Chamba, Tiv and Mbororo ethnic compositions are discussed in this work. Table 1: Main Ethnic Composition in the North-West Region Major Ethnic Group Tikar

Widekum Chamba Tiv Mambila Others small groups

Peoples Kom, Nso, Oku, Mbiame, Wiya, Tang, War, Bum, Bafut, Mbaw, Fungom, Mmen, Bamunka, Babungo, Bamessi, Bamessing, Bambalang, Bamali, Bafanji, Baba, (Papiakum), Bangola, Big Babanki, Babanki Tungo, Bambili, Bamukumbit, Mbesa, and Yamba. Essimbi (Age), Beba-Befang, Ngemba, Ngie, Ngwo, Mogamo, Meta. Bali-Nyonga, Bali-Kumbat, Bali-Gangsin, BaliGashu, Bali-Gham. Aghem Federation Mbembe, Misaje, Mfunte. Hausa, Faru-Awa, Yukums, Kassimbela, Fulani or Mbororo (Aku), Ibo.

Source: Nkwi P.N., 1987, Traditional Diplomacy: A study of Inter-chiefdom Relations in the Western Grassfields, North West Province of Cameroon, Publication of the department of Sociology, University of Yaounde, p.15.

28

Nkwi, 1987, p.15.

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Chapter One

Note: From the table above, most of the villages in the North-West Region belong to the Tikar (Tikari) ethnic group, as its population is spread across different Divisions of the Region, especially in Boyo, Donga Mantung and Bui.29

According to Kaberry, the various groups of Tikar that settled in Bamenda came originally from Tibati, Banyo, Kimi and Ndobo, all in the present Adamawa Region. Some French anthropologists including Hawkes worth inclined to the view that the Tikar derived from the Mbum, and that the separation occurred many generations ago at a point somewhere between Ngaoundere and Tibati. From there, they settled in a vast plain watered by the Mbam River and its tributaries, the Mape and the Kim.30 About 350 years ago, increasing Chamba pressure, internal dissension, and a desire for new land resulted in the splitting off of small bands. Some of these groups were under the leadership of sons of a Tikar ruler, who were later to arrogate to themselves the title of Fon (Paramount Chief or King). They travelled West and South-West, and eventually reached what is now Bamenda, but the sequence of their migration is confused. Among the earliest were those coming from Ndobo to the Ndop Plain in the south of the Region, where small politically autonomous villages were constituted, some six to ten miles apart. None of these units was sufficiently strong to dominate the others; then hostilities over land, murder and enslavement characterised their relations. Even the Fulani and Chamba raids in the last century failed to bring about some semblance of political unity or federation, though from time-to-time asylum was granted by one village of refugees from another.31 Mbaw, Mbem, and Nsunglik in the North-East of Bamenda were also the scene of early Tikar migrations from the former French Cameroons. Settlements were made below the escarpment in the area formally known as Ntem, but, at a later date, three main groups, whose descendants were to constitute the sub-tribes of Wiya, Tang and War, went up on to the Nsunglik plateau and founded a number of small villages. In each sub-tribe one Village Head claimed the title of Fon and supremacy over the others, but even before the advent of the Germans, his authority had been challenged by some of the opponent villages that intended on asserting their own autonomy. From Mbwot (most senior of the War group), a large band split off and travelled South into Nsaw (Nso), where some remained to establish the villages of Nkor and Djottin-Vitum and their offshoots Dom, Din, 29

Provincial Delegation MINAT, 2007. M. Phyllis Kaberry, 1952, Women of the Grassfields, London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, p.4. 31 Provincial Delegation MINAT, 2007, p.5. 30

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Mbinon and Lassin. The main body of migrants under the leadership of their Fon journeyed further west, subdued earlier settlers, and founded the centralized kingdom of Bum. According to Kabbery, Bafut, Nsaw (Nso), Kom, Oku and Fungom32 were probably the last of the large scale Tikar migrations to Bamenda. The Kom, who are matrilineal, defeated some patrilineal groups in the surrounding areas (Nchang, Ake, mejang, Basaw) and made them tributaries. The sub-tribes which constituted the Bafut Native Authority were earlier migrants who passed through the Ndop Plain on the way to their present territory. They comprised Bafut (which claims seniority over the rest), Babanki, Bafreng, Babanki-Tungo, Bambili, Bambui and Bamenda. The Nsaw (Nso), according to Kabbery, settled first at Kovifem, some 12 miles to the North-West of their present capital of Kimbo (Kumbo). There, they prospered, multiplied and dispersed over the land to the South and South-West. There, they were joined by small bands from other Tikar groups which had settled earlier in what is now known as the Nsunglik area, the Ndop Plain and the former Bafut Native Authority. These groups became voluntary allies, but some of their leaders were elected to maintain a semi-independent status as m’tar. Some other leaders of groups who were voluntary allies were assimilated into the Fon’s own clan as distant clansmen or duiy, and they became the founders of important sub-clans. Among these were the ancestors of three high-ranking councillors (vibai), namely Fai-o-Ndzendzev (from the Tang clan in the Nsunglik area), Fai-oTankum (from Mbaw), and Fai-o-Luun (from Kiluun in former French Cameroon). In the 19th century, as a result of Fulani raids, the reigning Fon decided to move his capital to the south. He subdued the Chief of Nkar who, until that time, had held much of the land in the vicinity of Kimbo and to the south-west. He then defeated some villages in the North-West whose founders had come originally from the Nsunglik area. These were DjottinVitum, Din, Dom, Lassin, Mbinon, Nkor and Nser. By the time the Germans arrived the Fon had consolidated his kingdom and established a centralized machinery of the government.33 According to Nyamnjoh, the Tikars of Cameroon are spread as follows: Bamenda (Western Grassfields, North-West Province); Fumban (Eastern Grassfields, Western Province); Bankim (Tikar Plain, Upper Mbam, Mayo-Banyo Division, Adamawa Province); and Nkambe (Tikar Plain, Upper Mbam, Mbam Division, Central Province). As concerns the 32 During the British colonial period, there were five Tikar villages In the Fungom Native Authority (Fungom, Mme, Nyos Kuk and Kung) which like Kom, are matrilineal. The first four may have been originally an offshoot of the Kom. 33 Kaberry, 1952. p.5.

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Chapter One

Bamenda Tikar, they originated from North-Eastern Cameroon, around the Adamawa and Lake Chad regions. Tikar migration southwards and westwards probably intensified in the 18th and 19th centuries. The pressure of invasion by the Fulani raiders certainly fuelled movements that led the Tikar to their current locations in the Bamenda plateau, Eastern Grassfields (Fumban) and the Tikar plain of Bankim (Upper Mbam).34 Upon arrival in the Grassfields, the Tikar found other populations in place. These peoples had either migrated from elsewhere or had inhabited the region for centuries. Their arrival led to population movements just as did the arrival of others after them.35 Pre-colonial Cameroon, like other African nations, was richly characterised by population movements not always induced by conflict or invasion. In the North-West Region, those who claim Tikar origin include: Nso, Kom, Bafut, Oku, Mbiame, Wiya, Tang, Yamba, War, Mbot, Fungom, Weh, Mmen, Bamunka, Bafanji, Baba (Papiahum), Bangola, Big Babanki, Babanki-Tungo (small Babanki), Nkwen, Bambili and Bambui. Their alleged migration from the Upper Mbam River region occurred in waves, and was mostly led by princes of Rifum Fons decisions of settling up their own dynasties.36 In A History of Cameroon, Francis B. Nyamnjoh, captures the Tikar migration in the following words: It was about three hundred years ago that increasing pressure from the north and internal troubles plus the desire for new small bands, which having left Kimi, drifted further west and south-west. Some of these moved under the leadership of the sons of a Tikar ruler who later called themselves Fons, the most common Bamenda term for paramount chiefs. These groups, at various times reached what is now called Mezam. Among the earliest were those who came from Ndobo to the Ndop plain in the south of Bamenda, where they formed small, politically independent villages a few kilometers apart. No semblance of political unity was achieved. In the North-East we have Mbam, Nmem and Nsungli, also settlements of Wiya, Tang and War. The main body of this group however,

34 T.E. Brain Mbuaghaw and R. Palmer, 1987, A History of the Cameroon, Essex, Longman, p.26. 35 E.M. Chilver and P.M. Kaberry, 1968, Traditional Bamenda: The Pre-Colonial History and Ethnography of the Bamenda Grassfields, Buea, Cameroon Government Printers, p.18. 36 P. N. Nkwi, and J.P. Warnier, 1982, Elements for A History of the Western Grassfieds, Yaounde, The University of Yaounde, p.16.

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set off under the leadership of their Fon and founded the kingdom of Bum. The Bafut, Kom and Nsaw were among the last to arrive. 37

The political structures and institutions of the Tikar chiefdoms are very similar in nature. In fact, each chiefdom has influenced their neighbours in one way or another, and has been influenced equally by neighbouring non-Tikar groups. Like other groups in the North-West Region, a Tikar community is led by a chief who is popularly known as “Fon”, whose chiefdom is commonly called, a Fondom. The Tikar in this region arrived mostly as small princely emigrant groups, and later occupied areas that were already settled by other groups, with the result that in almost every Tikar Fondom, there are smaller or sub Fondoms that were either conquered by the Tikar, but that have largely retained their hereditary dynasties. It is in this respect that during the 19th century, Fondoms (or chiefdoms) such as Nso, Kom, Bafut, Bum and Ndu expanded their boundaries by incorporating or making tributaries of neighbouring Fondoms, while at the same time entertaining relations of conflict and tension, or conviviality with their fellow Tikar Fondoms. Bum, for instance, though small, gained influence when it became an “entrepot for the kola trade with Jukum and Hausa in the north-west during the late part of the century”. It was involved in intermittent hostility with Kom, its southern neighbours, while maintaining friendship with Nso and Ndu. In the meantime, Nso was mostly in conflict with Ndu, while it enjoyed an alliance with Kom, which was in competition with Bafut on its South- Eastern boundary.38 The various groups of Tikar in the North-West Region traced their origin back to Tibati, Banyo, Kimi and Ndobo in North-East Cameroon. Indeed, many royal lineages of various Grassfields Fondoms claimed to have originated from the “Ndobo-Tikar” country, a region that covers the area between the Upper Mbam and the Upper Noune. In certain cases, Bafut, Nkwen, Bambili and Bambui, claim to be of Tikar origin, even though these claims are not backed by traceable direct contact, rituals, exchanges and links. Culturally, the distillation of Tikar origin in the Fondoms mentioned above is the result of the princes’ ties of kinship known as Ngirri, which the Fondoms of Nso, Oku and Bamun for example, claim to have acquired long ago along with the paraphernalia from Rifum. Other institutions such as kwifon (ngwerong in Nso and chimbi among the Yamba) are widespread in the Grassfields and are practised by the Tikar groups of the Upper Mbam 37

F.B. Nyomnjoh. 2007, “Americans seeking Tikar Origin in Cameroon”, pp.2-3, in http://www. nyamnjoh. cp, consulted on 6 November 2008. 38 Nkwi, 1987, pp.23-30.

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Chapter One

region. Genetic relationships between languages can be obscured as a result of contact and borrowings. Consequently, it often happens that several slightly different classifications can be proposed for the same languages, depending on the methods used by the linguists. Languages of the Grassfields are the end product of a double process of internal differentiation and extensive language contact that tended to obscure the genetic relationships.39 The anthropologists Nkwi and Warnier observe that despite little change, some Fondoms have maintained authentic oral tradition from their origins because of the significance of such tradition in their life.40 This issue has been termed “The Tikar problem” by scholars. The latter remains the subject of much debate.41 According to Jean-Pierre Warnier, an anthropologist and archaeologist who has worked extensively on pre-colonial Bamenda Grassfields, the “Tikar Complex” is essentially an affair of the relations between Fons on the one hand, and between a Fon and his people on the other hand. First, for Fons sharing common claims of origin, the Tikar Complex was a sufficient basis in principle to establish mutual obligations and taboos in an assumed alliance without the need for resource to adhoc rituals. And for Fons who did not share the same myths of origin, the mere reference to Ndobo-Tikar was enough reason to establish difference as legitimate basis for hostility, or to render necessary a ritual of alliance, or in other instances, to fuel sentiments of aristocratic superiority on the part of a “Tikar” Fon. The prestige that came with declaring oneself as Tikar, even when an individual was not actually a Tikar, revealed the desire to be associated with renowned Fondoms such as Nso and Fumban.42 This means that the Tikar identity, like identities everywhere, is not only subject to renegotiation with new encounters, but cannot be understood divorced from the power dynamics that avoid or deny value to identities. Prior to the 19th century, the Grassfields of Bamenda was largely an isolated region. Given the high altitude and mountainous and difficult landscape discussed in the first part of this chapter, the region did not benefit from the trading networks that crossed Africa in various directions, and which coastal chiefdoms took great advantage of. This was also because of the lack of navigable rivers, and the fact that transportation prior to the 39

Nkwi and Warnier, 1982, p.34. Ibid, p.26. 41 R.M. Chilver, and P.M. Kaberry, 1984, “The Tikar Problem: A Non-Problem”, Journal of African Languages, Vol (2): pp.13-14. 42 J.P. Warnier, 1985, Exchanges, Développement et Hiérarchies dans le Bamenda Pré-Coloniale (Cameroun), Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, pp.264-266. 40

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opening of motorable roads was largely done by human porterage. Trade was essentially based on slaves, ivory, kola nuts, salts, oils, iron, cloth pearls and cowries, which in certain regions, were adopted as forms of payments. During the 19th century, the North-West Region was still very excluded from the trading networks of the Benue and Adamawa.43 Two Tikar Fondoms (Bum and Fumban) occupied strategic positions as trade routes. Bum traded with Wukari, and Fumban with Banyo. At first, trade between the Benue and the Grassfields was not as easy as that with the Adamawa region, which was totally under the control of the Hausas. Their impact in the Grassfields has been such that there is hardly a local market today without a Hausa trader on a mat selling items such as herbs, salt, powder and little packets of mixtures of cooking ingredients of all sorts. The mountainous nature of the region, in addition to many rivers, made it difficult to travel, especially during the rainy season. Kola nuts, which were mostly produced in Oku, Nsungli and Nso, were sold in Nigeria through Banyo, Yola and Takum.44 The donkeys seen today in Nso and elsewhere in the North-West Region were probably introduced during the Kola trade. In the second half of the 19th century, the Fon of Bafut was allegedly so powerful that he used to send traders as far away as Takum.45 Next to the Tikar in terms of population are the Widikum. This group claims to have migrated from Mamfe in the South-West Region to their current locations in the Mezam, Momo and Menchum Divisions. Some villages belonging to this group are Bujong, Akum, Menchum, Awing, Pinyin, Mambu, Bugiri, Mankaa, Mbekum, Beba-Mundum, Modelle, Badji, Mukum and Okoromanjang. Oral sources revealed that these people claimed to have originated from an old market site at Ntarenkom, in Widikum, where their ancestors are said to have emerged from the earth. Then, they dispersed, climbed the escarpment and took up residences in various locations in the southern part of the Bamenda plateau. Each group has its local traditions which relate to how they dispersed and finally occupied their present-day locations.46 Migrations were led in groups of kinship, and usually, the longest units could have three kinships. They lacked solid political groupings and were constantly exposed to the raids of the most powerful groups in their neighbourhoods. In this connection, sources revealed that the Bali raided 43 B. Chem-Langhee (ed.), 1995, Slavery and Slave-Dealing in Cameroon in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, Paidenma (41), Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, p.59. 44 Warnier, 1985, pp.141-148. 45 Ibid., p.146. 46 Nkwi, 1987, p.28.

26

Chapter One

the South-Eastern Mogamo around 1830 to 1835, and made many slaves who were sold in North-ward directions. The Bali also subdued Meta and turned to Ngie, where they met resistance. However, this scenario persisted until the arrival of the Germans in the region.47 After the Germans, some British sources speculated that the Tikar either conquered and displaced or absorbed these people in some cases. Another group is the Chamba. This ethnic group claimed to have migrated into the region from northern Nigeria, fleeing Fulani raids, with stop-overs in Adamawa and the West Regions of Cameroon. They arrived in the North-West Region in seven fractions, three of which settled in Balikumbat Sub-division (Ngoketunjia Division), and the rest in Mezam Division.48 The Chamba were a loose confederacy of raiding bands that evolved into a hierarchically organized mini-state. Other sources said that these people moved out of Koncha because of Fulani pressure from Yola, creating an exodus in the first or beginning of the second quarter of the 19th century. According to Zintgraff, the Bali-Nyonga got to the Bamenda plateau around 1814. This information contradicts that of other researchers; Russels, (1980) who asserts that the Chamba moved into Cameroon by late 1700, crossed the Buti area and turned south, crossing the Tikar country and entering the Western Grassfields by 1820’s under Ta-Gawolbe.49 Whatever the case, the Chamba came South through Tibati and Tikar country, fighting their way with weapons such as bows and poisonous arrows, spears, guns and gunpowder. After successes recorded in Yoko, Ngambe and Bamum, they went south to Bagam in the Bamileke area. They moved to Bamenjinda, Babaju, passed through Bamenda to Nkwen, Bande, Bafut, and Meta, burning and harrying as they progressed. It was then at Bafu-Fundong that the Chamba group broke up into six sub-groups, namely: Bali-Nyonga, Bali-Kumbat, Baligasing, Bali-Muti, Baligashu and Balibasho. The BaliMuti broke off from Bali-Nyonga and went north through Wum to Takum in Nigeria.50 Of these six groups, Balinyonga and Balkumbat became bitter rivals. Balinyonga set up their dynasty on the present site; they fought, defeated and enslaved or incorporated indigenous populations that came to constitute a third component of Bali society, the Ba-Ntanka. Balikumbat 47

National National Buea (NAB), A.E. Tweed, 1923, Assessment Report on the Ngie Families of the Bamenda Division, (Ms), pp.47-48. 48 North-West Regional Master Plan for Sustainable Development: Report 1, 2001, p.20. 49 S.W. Russel, 1980, “Aspects of Development in Rural Cameroon: Political Transition amongst the Bali of Bamenda”, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Boston, p.48. 50 Ibid., p.48.

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was militarily very strong and did make its impact felt in the Ndop plain. They drove the Bamumkumbit from the hill on which the present royal palace of Balikumbat is found. From this vantage point, they were constantly at war with their numerous relations of Balinyonga and perhaps from their almost impregnable position, managed to maintain their independence. In fact, the Chamba-derived chiefdoms entered the Western Grassfields by the beginning of the 19th century and through military might, they were able to make their way and influence felt, and went ahead to establish their various dynasties in the region.51 We have to assert that the pre-colonial history of the peoples of the North-West Region reveals population movements, the re-adjustment of cultural patterns and adaptation to the social ecology. In line with the 1953 census, other smaller groups such as the Aghem (Wum) the Fukun of the Furu-Awa Sub-division (of the Menchum Division), the Kassimbela (found in parts of Donga-Mantung Division) and other non-indigenous groups such as the Hausa, Ibo and Fulani (at times known as the Mbororo or Aku) were scattered all over the North-West Region. These groups had different histories of migration and settlement in the region. But what seems to be clear is that a good number of these groups are said to have migrated into this region from parts of northern and eastern Nigeria and the Adamawa Region of Cameroon.52 The establishment of diplomatic networks built on kinship marriage, alliances and friendship were predominant elements in the years leading up to European arrival. The kinship system of the area was mostly patrilineal, except for Kom, Aghem, Bafmenn, Kuk and Kung of the Fungom area, which were matrilineal. Following their political systems, the Tikars and Chamba are characterised by centralized structures under the rule of powerful kings or Fons.53 Meanwhile the Widikum were organised in decentralized or segmentory political systems. Here, power is diffused among clan elders. Generally, chiefs are granted precedence over commoners. Some of the details on each group shall be analysed under specific cases in the subsequent chapters. In the next section we shall attempt to analyse inter-community conflicts before (1958) so as to highlight land and boundary-related conflicts, before considering recent 51 (NAB), W.E. Hunt, 1925, An Assessment Report on the Bali clan in the Bamenda Division of the Cameroon Province (MS), p.34. 52 R. B. Eyongetah and P. Robin, 1988, A History of Cameroon, New Edition London: Longman, p.66. 53 R.M. Chilver, 1966, Zintgraff’s Exploration in Bamenda, Adamawa and the Benue lands 1889-1892, Buea, Ministry of Primary Education and Social Welfare and West Cameroon Antiquities Commission, p.11.

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Chapter One

historical innovations in line with varying administrative changes in the region in particular, and in Cameroon in general.

b. Inter-Community Conflicts before 1958 Conflicts were common in the Western Grassfields in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries during the great migratory age when the present settlement patterns in the region were set up. This situation was due to the simple fact that some, if not all the ethnic groups that migrated into the region were in constant search for land on which to settle, and when they did, they eventually claimed it as theirs. Also, some of these conflicts arose probably as a result of some Chiefdoms wanting to acquire new lands or expand existing ones. Consequently, conflicts between the bigger and the smaller chiefdoms became obvious. Chilver and Kaberry described how the Bamessing took refuge in Kom when Fulani raiders arrived in their area. The Bafanji, who did not want to pay tributes to Balikumbat, escaped unpleasant consequences and took refuge in Bagam.54 It is also noted that the Chamba, who entered the region at the beginning of the 19th century, raided the Chiefdoms of Bafut, Bande (Mankon) and Nkwen before settling in their present site. While in Balinyonga, their current location, they carried out incessant warfare against the neighbouring Ngemba, Meta and Moghamo chiefdoms whom they met and whose land they seized. They eventually ended up effecting suzerainty over these groups, which was regular practice imposed by stronger tribes over weaker neighbours that refused to pay tribute, perform their rites, or attempt to monopolise trade routes. Then because the Ngemba, Meta and Moghamo chiefdoms were weaker than the Balinyonga, they were forced to acknowledge the latter’s suzerainty over them, and, therefore, provided the suzerain with leopards’ skins amongst other items as tribute.55 Similarly, the Mekaf traditions report that when the Bali-Muti left their cradle somewhere around Bebbe Jatto in today’s Donga-Mantung Division, probably due to famine or the desire for new lands, and settled along the valley of the Katsina Ala River (the place known to them as Mgbwe-Mgbwe), they were raided either by the Fulani or the Chamba group on their way to Nigeria. This raid caused them to split into three groups under different leaders. Then, the new groups migrated to their various present sites of Mekaf and Mashi in today’s Fungom Sub-division, and Nser 54

(PAB), J.C. Drummond-Hay, 1926, An Assement Report on the Bandop Area in the Bamanda Division for the Year Ended 31st December, p.2. 55 (NAB), W.R. Hunt, 1920, Annual Report of the Bamenda Division for the year Ended 31 December, p.7.

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29

in the Fura-Awa Sub-division in Menchum Division.56 Each of the different leaders led their own group with the hope of finding better and secured land for their new settlement. Other causes of ethnic conflicts in the region were identified. They include the refusal to pay tributes by tributary chiefdoms to powerful chiefdoms, non- performances of mortuary rites during the passing away of the ruler of a chiefdom by friendly neighbours, attempts to monopolize trading routes and some commodities, and other socio-cultural practices such as the refusal to consume intermarriage customs between some Chiefdoms. Some of these factors have been discussed in the work “peacetime relations”;57 in fact, they (factors) became sources of conflict when they were not performed as required by the principle of reciprocity and mutual respect that existed between the chiefdoms during peace time. However, the non-performance of mortuary rites of (a) deceased chief or chiefs by their friendly neighbours could cause conflict since the other neighbouring chiefdom felt humiliated and despised by their neighbours. A glaring example was the straining of Nso-Bamun relations at the close of the 19th century. The Nso chiefdom did not perform the mortuary rites of the passing away of two Bamun chiefs, namely Njoya and Mapiri. This created a tense atmosphere between the two groups. In view of restoring peace between the two communities, The Bamun sought the intervention of the Baba, Ngoran, Bambalang, Bamessi and Balikumbat rulers to induce Nso to perform sacrifices on the graves of their deceased rulers. The Nso still refused to honour the departed, and the Bamun felt humiliated and despised by their neighbours.58 Our findings revealed that most, if not all of the ethnic groups that migrated into the region were in constant search for land in which they could settle and that they would eventually claim as theirs. After comfortably settling in their present locations, they had to protect and preserve the land they claimed as theirs. Consequently, the land boundaries of some chiefdoms were in most places vaguely determined by trees, streams, rivers, hills, valleys or forests, which had existed among the various chiefdoms or

56

(NAB), W.R. Hunt, 1920, p.8. P.N. Nk wi, 1983, “Traditional Diplomacy, Trade and Warfare in Nineteenth Century Western Grassfields”, Science and Technology Review, Social Science Series, 3-4 (July - December 1983), 106-8. Hereafter as “Traditional Diplomacy, Trade and warfare”. 58 P. Bungfang, 2000, “Inter-chiefdom conflicts in the North-West Region of Cameroon from 1889-1999, Colonial and Post-colonial influences”, Maîtrise Dissertation in History, University Yaounde I, p.10. 57

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Chapter One

communities in the pre-colonial times and were often protected.59 Whenever a given boundary between the various chiefdoms was violated, conflict was bound to arise. Inter-community or chiefdom conflicts during colonial era are classified under two headings: the German and the British era. Conflicts under German rule particularly occurred between the chiefdom of Bali and the 31 chiefdoms that had been put under the suzerainty of the Chief of Bali by the Germans. By organising the chiefdoms in this way, the Germans used the Bali Chief to assist them in their tax collection efforts.60 While the 31 chiefdoms wanted their freedom, autonomy and independence from the Chief of Bali, and to be recognized as corvee and tax units by the Germans, the Chief of Bali, who felt that his authority had been strengthened, wanted the chiefdoms to come and settle in Bali under his authority. He threatened war against them if they dared refuse. The ultimatum, however, did not frighten the Widikum chiefdoms and, consequently, through the intrigues of the Chief of Bali, some of these chiefdoms were punished by the Germans in 1906-7. A combined force of Bali and German soldiers invaded and destroyed the houses and farms of these break-away chiefdoms and forced their people into Bali. Altogether, some dozens or more Meta and Moghamo chiefdoms, including Nfawmengen (Ngyen-Mboh), Nfawbossa (Bossa), Ngawbang, Nfawyam (Zang-Nembang), Nfawngu (Njindom), Take (Funam), Babunji (Mbunjei), Bamenjong (Oshun), Batabi (Zang-tabi), Bameinsi and Banja,61 all in today’s Momo Division were defeated and their inhabitants forced to live in Bali. By so doing, the struggle for freedom and autonomy resulting in hostilities between the chiefdom of Bali-Nyonga and the rebellious chiefdoms which wanted the Germans to recognize them as independent began in earnest.62 There had been many armed confrontations between the breakaway villages on the one hand, and the Bali and the Germans on the other. In 1910 for instance, after the Chief of Batibo headed a rebellion against the established order, he was exiled for life to Banyo as punishment by the Germans. The situation became worse in 1911 as growing tension led to more insecurity. The Germans were then compelled to liberate some of the break-away chiefdoms, including Batibo, Njindom and Ashong from Bali. The German Governor at the time, Theodore Seitz, was compelled by the 59

Ibid, p.11. (NAB), Hunt, Assessment Report, 31st December 1920, p.11. 61 (NAB), C.J.A. Gregg, 1924, Assessment Report on the Meta clan of the Bamenda Division for the year Ended 31 December, pp.2-3. 62 Ibid. 60

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continuous tension to order an inquiry into the roots of the problem between Bali and the neighbouring chiefdoms. Following investigations, it was revealed that the smaller chiefs under the authority of the Chief of Bali wanted to treat directly with the Germans, as they felt oppressed and exploited by the Bali ruler.63 Governor Ebermeir summoned a meeting of all administrative officials and the chiefs of the district of Bamenda on the 16th of December 1912. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the future relationship between the Chief of Bali and his sub-chiefs. During the meeting, the Governor became dissatisfied that the Chief of Bali treated his sub-chiefs with contempt. Then, by 1914, as they grew weary of their continuous assistance to the Bali chiefs against other chiefdoms, the Germans decided to abandon their original policy in order to end the continuous warfare between the two groups. Several chiefdoms were immediately recognized as autonomous and independent from Bali. However, nothing was done to liberate and recognize those chiefdoms that the Germans had forcefully herded into Bali. By only partially solving this problem, the seeds of endless discord between the Bali and those chiefdoms still under their authority were to continue. The rebellious chiefdoms, after experiencing a lot of hardship from many German expeditions, were to continue to suffer similarly under the British who succeeded the Germans in the Western Grassfields during World War I. This was because the British subsequently continued with some of the German policies (indirect rule). Shortly after Bamenda was occupied by the British troops in 1915, the Chiefdoms of Bamenjong (Oshum), Babunge (Mbunjei) and Bamenyansi (that saw the defeat of the Germans as their eventual emancipation from Bali) reclaimed their freedom and decided to return to their former homes. The Bali Chief who had first won the favour of the commander of British troops sought his military assistance and recovered the break-away chiefdoms only for a while. When these chiefdoms were able to break away for the second time, they began to raid Bali lands and farms as an act of reprisal. Since Bali could not single-handedly enforce their return under their authority, they had no alternative but to allow these chiefdoms regain their old homes and freedom.64 Two months after the arrival of Podevin (British military commander), the wish of smaller groups or chiefdoms to break away from the authority and control of paramount chiefs and establish their freedom and autonomy became rampant. This desire was very serious, especially in the Bali area where the chiefdoms that 63

(NAB), Hunt, 1925, p.15. (NAB), G.S. Podevin, Anual Report of Bamenda Division for the year Ended 31st December 1916, pp.3-4. 64

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Chapter One

had been forcefully brought under the suzerainty of Bali refused to continue to recognize this authority over them. A state of uncertainty was, therefore, maintained between the two parties. In the Bikom (Kom) area, one of the sub-chiefs, Myee of Mbenkas rebelled against the paramount Fon of Kom who was also as influential as the chief of Bali, though not in the same ways. The situation was further aggravated when Chief Myee met the District Officer of Bamenda without the knowledge of the Fon of Kom, pretending to be a big chief also.65 Similarly, in the Bameta (Meta) area, chiefs Fominyam of Ingenibi (Njinibi) and Njokum of Ibengwi (Mbengwi) were the ringleaders of the rebellion against the so-called paramount chief. They fanned a good deal of trouble and alienated a section of the population from the ageing Head chief whom the Germans had appointed as Chief Myee of Mbenkas in the Kom area, “Chief Fomenyam went as far as informing the district officer that he was an autonomous chief who wanted permission to build a new village where his scattered people could gather”.66 From the above, we can subscribe to the view that the nature and characteristics of inter-community conflicts in the North-West Region during the period of British rule from 1921 to 1961 was different. Firstly, inter-community conflicts arose from territorial disputes. Secondly, the conflicts were limited between neighbouring chiefdoms, and third, the role of the British colonial administrations that had created the problems extended to arbitration, mediation and conciliation. These boundary conflicts were, therefore, very common in all the sixteen Native Authority Area (NAs) from which the Bamenda Division had been carved out.67 The first recorded inter-chiefdom conflict during this period was that between the Bali and the Barforchu (Mbu). Fighting between Bali and Mbu over land boundary problems had begun in 1920. However, from 1921 to 1934, sporadic but incessant fighting occurred between many chiefdoms, including Balinyonga and Bamenfen (Ngyen-Mboh) over farmland, Bali against Bafut and Nkwen over ownership of raffia bushes, Babanki-Tungo, Bamessing and Bamumkumbit against Baligasho over trespassing over the boundary, and between Mukuru and Mbelifang (Befang) also over the boundary, in the Bali, Meta, Ngemba, Ndop and Wum areas.68

65

(NAB), G.S. Podevin, Anual Report of Bamenda, p.3. Ibid. 67 (NAB), Ja/a 1922/3, Native Authority Ordinance XIV of 1916 and 1918, Action under 1922. 68 (NAB), N.C. Denton, Annual Report of Bamnda Division for the year Ended 31 December 1933, p.22. 66

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During the British colonial period, there were several cases of farmland and boundary disputes, fishing and hunting disputes, renewed claims for freedom and autonomy and other related conflicts that led to disputes among the communities. Examples include the Bafut and Bafreug (Nkwen) farmland and boundary dispute, the Balinyonga and Bamengen (Ngyen-Mboh) boundary dispute, the Bali-Kumbat and Bafanji dispute over fishing rights, and the Bambui and Fafungui (Fungwi) dispute over farmland. These conflicts were characterised by renewed calls for recognition of the Bafut, Ngomba, Bali, Meta and Ndop chiefdoms as autonomous socio-political entities.69 The peace that reigned during the last years of British administration in the Southern Cameroons was disrupted in May 1957 when conflicts erupted between Bambui, the paramount chiefdom, and Bafungui (Fungui), a quarter in the paramountcy of Bambui. Like many others, conflicts that originated from land dispute were often promptly managed before the quick intervention of the colonial police in the area because only local weapons such as sticks and cutlasses were used in the fighting. Concerning the case of Bambui vs. Fungui, it was reported that four people had minor injuries and 8 houses were burnt. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the conflict escalated into hostilities because the quarter Head of Fungui wanted his freedom and autonomy from the Chief of Bambui.70 Thus 31 people were arrested, judged and sentenced with varying terms. Besides, “both the Chief of Bambui and the quarter Head of Fungui were bound to keep peace”.71 From the above, it can be submitted that the prevalence of interchiefdom conflicts in the Bamenda Division from 1921 to 1961 was due to the fact that most of the settlements provided by the British colonial administrators to the numerous land, boundary and other related disputes were not satisfactory to either one or both parties concerned. This might have resulted from the fact that most chiefdoms found it difficult to accept the splitting into fragments and arbitrary demarcations of their ancestral lands, since these acts had some socio-cultural ramifications.72 Although some of the conflicts emanating from territorial claims were purportedly resolved by the British colonial administrators under the various Articles of

69

Bungfang, 2000, p.37. (NAB), A.B. Westmacolt, Annual Report of Bamenda Division for the year Ended 31 December 1957, p.2. 71 Ibid., p.4. 72 Fanso, 1981, p.3. 70

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the Native land and the inter-tribal boundary settlement ordinances,73 interchiefdom conflicts were still going on in the region by the time independence was granted to the Southern Cameroons in 1961 after a referendum to join French Cameroon. It should be noted that territorial claims continued to persist under the post-colonial regime. This is because some of these conflicts were not satisfactorily resolved during the colonial period. However, it is necessary to highlight the evolution of some of these conflicts from the pre-colonial and colonial periods so as to have a leading line on subsequent chapters each with idle cases. Before discussing postcolonial land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region, it is necessary to discuss the major administration changes in the region coupled with some major causes of land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region.

c. History of Administrative Reforms By the end of World War I in 1916, British and French troops defeated and expelled the Germans from Cameroon. Cameroon was now under French and British control, and in 1922, it was assigned to Britain and France by the League of Nations, as a mandated territory in the “B” category. The Bamenda District, which was in the British sphere, became part of British Cameroons. British Cameroons was further divided into two parts, namely: the British Northern and Southern Cameroons. The Bamenda District, therefore, became part of the British Southern Cameroons, and, like the British Northern Cameroons, was administered as an integral part of Nigeria. The British on their part renamed the Bamenda District, Bamenda Division, “which was one of the four Divisions of the Cameroon’s Regions during the mandate period”.74 The outbreak of the World War II in 1939 ended the League of Nations and the Mandate system, and the end of the war in 1945 saw the birth of the United Nations’ Organization (UNO), with its Trusteeship system replacing the League’s Mandate System under which the Southern Cameroons became a trust territory in 1946, and the British trusteeship administration in the Southern Cameroons administered as an integral part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. The Southern Cameroons continued to constitute only one province until 1949 when Bamenda Division became a province.75 Thus, the Bamenda Province was recognized 73

(NAB), Information on the 1933 Ordinance in Line with the Native Land and Inter-Tribal Boundary Settlement was found at the N.A.B. 74 V.G. Fanso, 1989, Cameroon History f or Secondary schools and Collages, Vol.2, London, Basin and Gstoke, Macmillan, p.83. 75 Fanso, 1989, p.128.

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into the Bamenda, Wum and Nkambe Divisions, with provincial and divisional headquarters in Bamenda, Wum and Nkambe respectively. The province was short lived as it was abolished in 1954 with the creation of the Quasi Federal Region of the Southern Cameroons. In 1961, Southern Cameroons, during the UNO organized plebiscite, voted in favour of the Reunification option with la République du Cameroun which had gained her independence in 1960. The result of this new arrangement was the birth of the Federal Republic of Cameroon in 1961. The Former Southern Cameroons became the Federated State of West Cameroon and the Former Republic of Cameroon, the Federated state of East Cameroon. The Federal Republic of Cameroon lasted from the 1st of October 1961 to the 20th of May 1972, when the Federation was abrogated and the state system was put in place. This led to the birth of the United Republic of Cameroon and the creation of the provinces. The 61/DF Decree 15 of the 20th of October, 1961 gave rise to administrative regions. The constitutional revision of June 2nd 1972 created 7 provinces (sometimes called districts) from the 5 provinces of the former state of East before independence: North, East, South, Central, Littoral and West. The 2 provinces of Cameroon’s former state of West before their union are the Northwest and Southwest. Two former provinces of the former British Cameroon joined Nigeria. On the 22nd of August 1983, the number of provinces increased to 10, following the division of the North into three (Northern Province, province in the Far North and Adamawa Province), and two of the Central South (Central Province and the Southern Province). When the North-West was a province in 1972, there were five divisions instead of the three that existed during the colonial period. The former Bamenda, Nkambe and Wum Divisions became the Mezam, DongaMantung and Menchum Divisions respectively, alongside two new creations, Bui and Momo Divisions with Kumbo and Mbengwi as their respective administrative headquarters. Later in 1992, Decree No 92/ 207 of 5/10/92 on the administrative reorganization of the Republic of Cameroon created new divisions. In the North-West, Boyo and Ngoketunjia with Fundong and Ndop as their respective headquarters were created giving a total of 7 divisions. In 2008, the President of the republic of Cameroon abolished by decree the name “Provinces” and replaced it with the appellation “Regions” (Decree No. 2008/376 of 12th November 2008 on the administrative organization of the Republic of Cameroon).

Chapter One

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C- Land and Boundary Conflicts: Classification and Causes There are many different criteria for classifying land and boundary conflicts. These criteria vary from one context to another. Some of these classifications include micro, meso and macro levels. This study, however, will adopt the classification based on the social dimension of land conflict since it better reflects what obtains in the North-West Region, especially as concerns conflict resolution.

a. Classification of Conflicts One possibility that research offers is the classification of conflicts according to levels. Here we have identified the following entries: social, intra-personal, inter-personal, inter-societal or inter-societal/international levels. While the intra-personal level can be ignored in the case of land conflicts, the other three levels are very useful for the purpose of classification.76 Land conflicts within communities will then occur at either the inter-personal or intra-societal level as illustrated in Table 2 below. Table 2: Classification of Land Conflicts Level

Inter-personal

76

Dimension Micro-social

Types of land conflicts (examples) • Boundary conflicts between neighbours • Conflicts of inheritance • Occasional multiple sales of private property by individuals without administrative assistance and without harming third parties • Individual occupation of private land • Building extensions on the private land of another • Illegal lease/sale of somebody else’s private land

GTZ, 2008, Land Conflicts: A Practical guide to Dealing with Land Disputes, Video/DVD, Eschborn, p.29.

Background Study and Causes of Land and Boundary Conflicts in the North-West Region

Meso-social

Intra-societal

Macro-social

37

• Boundary conflicts between tribes or villages • Illegal sale/lease of communal land/tribal land • Group invasion of private land •Simultaneous use of land between farmers and pastoralists • Occasional building extension on State land • Occasional illegal use of State land • Illegal use of one’s own land • Violent attacks on property • Ownership conflicts due to legal pluralism • Land grabbing • Illegal sale/lease of State land by individuals • Improper land privatisation •Land use conflicts between private and public utilization due to a general disregard of land use regulations by a majority of people • Expropriation without compensation • Illegal acquisition and sale of somebody else’s private property by individuals, supported by corrupt public agencies or courts • Multiple allocation of particular plots by officers working at the land registry

Source: GTZ, 2008, Land Conflicts: A Practical guide to Dealing with Land Disputes, Video/DVD, Eschborn, p.30. Note: Although levels of analysis are not necessarily mutually exclusive, in the table above, there are three general levels into which research on land and boundary may fall: micro-level, meso-level or middle-range, and macro-level.

Micro-level is the smallest unit of analysis in the social sciences as it concerns the individual in their social setting. At the micro-level, also referred to as the local level, the research population typically consists of an

38

Chapter One

individual in their social setting or a small group of individuals in a particular social context. Examples of micro levels of analysis include, but are not limited to the following: Person, Citizen, Partnership, Marriage, Families, Household and Neighbourhood. Meso-level analysis indicates a population size that falls between the micro and macro-levels, such as a community or an organization. However, meso-level may also refer to analyses that are specifically designed to reveal connections between micro and macro-levels. This level is equally referred to as mid-range, especially in sociology. Examples of meso-level units include the following: Clan, Tribe, Community, Village, Town, City, Formal Organization and State. Macro-level analyses generally trace the outcomes of interactions, such as economic or other resource transfer interactions over a large population. This level is also referred to as the global level. Examples of macro-level units of analysis include: Nation, Society, Civilization, International and Global. In Table 2, the classification of conflicts also involves a social dimension. This distinguishes between micro-societal, meso-societal and macro-societal dimensions. While the micro-societal dimension is equivalent to the inter-personal level, the other two represent intra-societal conflicts as in the study locale. It is worth mentioning that the classification of land conflicts in relation to the social dimension illustrates the high number and diversity of intra-community land conflicts compared to the inter-personal types. While inter-personal land conflicts are very easily resolved, intra-community ones are much more difficult.

b. Causes of Land and Boundary Conflicts The general causes of land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region can be grouped under political, economic, social and psychological causes. This part of the chapter dwells on these causes. Political and Administrative Causes Land and boundary disputes were less recurrent before the advent of colonialism in the North- West Region. In this area, like elsewhere in Africa, it was generally believed that all land is the home of ancestral spirits where nobody can claim ownership. Boundaries were not marked by individuals, but by natural features such as trees, rivers, streams, stones or hills,

Background Study and Causes of Land and Boundary Conflicts in the North-West Region

39

mountains, just to name these few. To V.G. Fanso boundaries were points of convergence, not points of separation. These natural features constituted natural boundaries within ethnic groups. These aspects of convergence helped to minimise land and boundary conflicts in the region. However, there were few isolated cases caused by some hostile ethnic groups such as the Chamba, who have left the Adamawa region more recently, prior to the Jihad.77 In case of conflict, both parties easily assembled their relatively honest notables to discuss the issue on the disputed site. Since it was very common for boundary frictions to be solved through dialogue, rituals were performed on the disputed area or boundary as a means of collecting the consensus of the ancestors on the solution to the problem. Boundary rituals were of various types, ranging from libation, burial of animals to burial of humans, depending on the severity of the conflict. Indeed, ritual boundary demarcations remained the surest proof of serious commitment among Cameroon Grassfields states to uphold accepted state boundaries. In addition to demarcating boundaries, ritual pacts also helped affirm good relations among states in the North-West Region.78 Nkwen is known to have concluded ritual pacts with her neighbours by burying two dogs and planting two fig trees on their graves, despite the trenches it had dug around its settlements and the non-ritual alliances it had secured from other states in the sub-region. In doing this, Nkwen secured lasting peace and agreement with Mankon “to mutually defend and protect each other’s trade and traders”. Small and weaker states like Nkwen in the North-West Region were very keen on alliances with their peers which protected them mutually against would be aggressors and annexationists. All serious diplomatic alliances including boundary and trade treaties were sanctioned by ritual performances which involved blood. It was either the blood of a slave, dog, goat or sheep that gave an alliance or treaty the sacredness it needed to remain inviolable. Though small-size states were usually more anxious to secure ritual alliances, such alliances had become very fashionable in the area before the arrival of the European colonialists at the close of the century. Thus, ritual alliances like the ones between Balikumbat and Bamum, Balikumbat and Bafut, Nso and Baba, Nso and Bum, Nso and Ntem, Mankon and Nkwen, Balinyonga and Nkwen, Balinyonga and Bamesseng, Kom and Ajung, some of which concerned 77

V.G. Fonso, 1982, “Transfrontier Relations and Resistance to Cameroon-Nigeria Colonial Boundaries”, Doctorat d’état Thesis, University of Yaounde, p.8. 78 E.S.D. Fomin and V.S. Ngitir, 2011, “Rituals in Traditional Boundary Settlements in the Cameroon Grassfields”, in D. Abwa, A-P. Temgoua et al. (eds), Boundaries and history in Africa: issues in conventional boundaries and ideological frontiers (festschrift in honour of Verkijika G. Fanso), Bamenda, Maryland Printers, p.48.

40

Chapter One

boundary issues, occurred by the end of the nineteenth century. The hostility between the Nso and Bamum tribes, which resulted in the Nsa’ngu’s head affairs, appeared to have been brought about by the fact that no known ritual boundary pact existed between the two brother states, and as a result, border conflicts between them seemed to have been frequent.79 The numerous ethnic conflicts in the North-West Region are the result of new clan boundaries which the colonialists imposed on the people in an effort to reduce administrative costs. Clan boundaries often ignored the ritually established ones. For example, the British colonialists fused states to create the so-called native authorities, thus subordinating many hitherto independent states with recognized ritual borders under others, and in so doing, desecrating the boundaries and destabilizing the balance of power in this area. Moreover, the demarcation of inter-chiefdom boundaries by colonial authorities continues to be a source of conflict between communities sharing a common boundary. The delimitations and demarcations did not take into account the cultural similarities or differences of the neighbouring people. The colonial presence disrupted ethnic rational and besides other social problems. They created new administrative entities not to the satisfaction of the people in the area but for your own interest. The colonialists went further to pit ethnic groups against one another.80 The situation in Balinyonga is a glaring example. The Germans signed a treaty with the Balinyonga which made them the “manager or supervisor” of the Grassfields, a situation that became a problem in the course of time. This has led to many bloody conflicts between the Balinyonga and their Moghamo neighbours. Since the people of Balinyonga always make reference to the colonial period to affirm their supremacy over the Moghamo, conflicts over values have persisted in the area, including those on land matters. According to V.G. Fanso, both Africans and Europeans had diametrically opposed views on the purpose and functions of boundaries. It seems land boundary among chiefdoms did not exist until the colonial masters began defining boundaries with pillars, posts and cairns. These tools were fixed on the lands in question and represented on maps. Hence, when the British authorities began delimiting and demarcating boundaries between the chiefdoms with posts of cairns, the purpose and significance of the cairns could not be understood by the chiefdoms in the Bamenda

79

Ibid. Okwudiba Nnoli, 1998, Ethnic conflicts in Africa, Dakar, CODESRIA Book Series, p.18. 80

Background Study and Causes of Land and Boundary Conflicts in the North-West Region

41

region.81 It was only when disputes arose that the intention and purpose of the demarcated boundaries became clear. Fanso highlights this problem in the following words: In traditional Africa, the concept of a political or ethnic boundary was expressed in terms of neighbours with whom the particular State or polity shared the boundary. A people shared a boundary with another people and such a boundary was conceived of in terms of a region or narrow zone fronting the two neighbours sharing it where both were united or joined together. The African spoke of where his people ‘meet’ with neighbouring people on the land where they ‘share’ the earth not where they separate.82

As mentioned earlier, land boundaries between communities did not exist in this part of Cameroon prior to the coming of the colonial administrators to the area. Before this time, what existed were borders or buffer zones. This attempt of demarcation by the British gave birth to the appellation “boundary”. However, the delimitation and demarcation of the boundaries of chiefdoms was just exactly what the Native Land Ordinance and the Inter-Tribal Boundary Settlement Ordinance of 1926, 1933 and 1962 respectively did. Section One of the Ordinance states that whenever a Divisional Officer reports to the Secretary of State that a boundary disagreement exists between two or more communities in his division, the Secretary of State may declare such disagreement to be a dispute, and shall thereupon refer the matter to a Boundary Tribunal which shall make due inquiry into the dispute and report its findings to the Secretary of State. Also, the decision of the Executive Council on any land or boundary dispute shall be final and conclusive, and shall not be contested in any court of law. In fact, land conflict between communities became incessant; it is clear today that the inefficiency of the colonial administration in providing a permanent solution during their days has become the major cause of inter-land conflicts in the North-West Region during post-colonial period. During the colonial period, cases of farmland and boundary conflicts, fishing and hunting disputes, renewed claims for freedom and autonomy from more powerful chiefdoms, and other related conflicts among the communities of the region were numerous. Some explosive cases were the Bafut and Bafreng (Nkwen) farmland and boundary dispute, the Balinyonga and Bamengen (Ngyen-Mboh) boundary dispute, the Balikumbat and Bafanji dispute on land and boundary, the Bambili and 81

Fanso, V.G., 1981, “Traditional and Colonial African Boundaries: Varieties, Functions and Problems”, Yaounde, ‘History Week’ of the Department of History April 13-15, pp.2-3. 82 Ibid, p.3.

42

Chapter One

Babanki Tungo boundary dispute, the Oku and Mbesa land and boundary dispute, and the Bambui and Bafungui (Fungui) dispute over farmland, which were all characterised by smaller groups claiming full autonomy from their more powerful neighbours.83 In this respect, the Westmacott decision of (1958)84 is still contested by the Babanki-Tungo community. The following is an extract of that decision. After carefully inspecting the land (3days) I have decided that BabankiTungo should remain in possession of the land which they now occupy but that all the grazing land on the Bambili side which is now occupied with the exception of three Babanki houses with several Fulani Rogers, should be confirmed as belonging to Bambili. Stated from the Bambili Lake, the boundary will be as decided by the appeal court until it approaches the foot part running from Babanki-Tungo to Bamenda. It will then bear almost due North from this point along a grassing spur until it reaches a rocky out crop on the steep escarpment until the cliff feature ends and the land becomes rolling down land. The boundary will then follow the line as defined by cairn until it reaches the main Bamenda Kumba Nkamba road (the ring road) at the Sharp Conner just beyond mile post 13.85

The interpretation of the decision is not obvious. Conflict arose because each party interprets the document in their favour. Colonial influence is, therefore, clearly at the background of most of the land and boundary conflicts in the region. The Germans had earlier ignored this issue of boundary demarcation in the region, contrary to the British who deployed energy to do so in some of the areas under study. Some post-colonial laws on land tenure coupled with some modalities on land acquisition by nationalists and foreigners who reside in Cameroon had made ownership of land, especially at the local level where illiteracy is high, more cumbersome as illustrated in Figure 1. Land acquisition in Cameroon after the 1974, 1976 and 1978 Decrees have rendered the situation more complicated for the local population. But despite this situation, some people and traditional authorities like village and compound heads still exercise their authority on those areas which they describe as communal or ancestral land. Decree No 74-1 of July 6th 1974 83

P. Bungfang, 2000, pp.37-38. We may like to know what we mean by Westmacott decisions. The decision is the review jurisdiction that took place in the Bafut on the 15th of May 1958, before A.B. Westmacott, who was the resident District Officer for the Bamenda Province. 85 (NAB), Extract from the Westmacott Decision, 15th of May 1958. 84

Background Study and Causes of Land and Boundary Conflicts in the North-West Region

43

sets out rules governing land tenure, while Decree N° 76-185 of April 1976 provides the condition for obtaining land certificates, and Decree N° 78-263 of the 3rd of July 1978 establishes the method of land tenure on national land. It should, however, be noted that the above Decrees had established a new form of land ownership before 1974 consisting of two types of ownership, known as private and government owned land. The decrees, therefore, abolished the type of land ownership previously known as communal land. The concept of land ownership was greatly simplified, but acquiring land was rendered at times difficult for the local population, as noticed in the various procedures in Figure 1. Another political cause underlying land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region may aptly be called the conquest theory. According to Gam, the existence of an iron industry in the region as early as the 19th century in Babungo and Bamenyam brought a new source of military power. In fact, the tribes that first learnt to use iron attempted to subjugate and rule their neighbours. It is also important to note that centralised authority and administrative organization seem necessary to accommodate culturally diverse groups within a single political system, especially if they have different modes of livelihood.86 A look at the hot spots of some boundary conflicts in the area reveals that these conflicts are predominantly engineered by centralized chiefdoms against their cephalous neighbours. In a bid to assert and strengthen their autonomy, some chiefdoms attempted to go beyond their boundaries to claim land from their neighbours. In those days, it was easier for the administrative unit of a centralised chiefdom to take a decision on war related issues and follow it up to the end. Information was easily assembled, noted and executed. This was not the case with stateless societies, and this element was used by belligerent centralised groups that wanted to seize land by force. For instance, the Balikumbat and Bafanji; Bambili and Babanki Tungo; Bambui and Nkwen were noted cases for frequent land conflict. Social Darwinism could be used to explain the nature of conflict in the North-West Region. This is the belief that societies, like biological species, evolve and advance through competition resulting in the survival of the fittest and the elimination of the weak.87

86 W. Kwi Gam, 1998, “Boundary Conflicts in the Bamenda Grassfields c. 19501995: A case study of the Bambili and Babanki Boundary Conflict”, Master Dissertation in History, University of Buea, p.46. 87 Ibid, p.47.

44

Chapter One

Note: From Figure 1, we practically understand how complicated it is to acquire a land certificate in Cameroon. This does not depend on a particular ministry or service. There is a full chain to follow at each level of the dossier. The application has to follow the channel starting from the DO’s Office to the divisional level, then to the regional level before it is forwarded to the Directorate of Lands in Yaounde for final approval. Many people find it lengthy and more complicated, and the end result is often negligence or abandonment.

Background Study and Causes of Land and Boundary Conflicts in the North-West Region

45

On the other hand, the domineering character of some traditional rulers and administrators during the post-colonial period has fuelled these numerous land and boundary conflicts. A good example is that of Big Babanki, whose Fon was burnt alive in 2005. Traditional rulers with larger populations may feel superior to their counterparts ruling over smaller populations, as noted in the cases of Oku versus Mbesa, and Balikumbat versus Bafanji. These domineering rulers consider it rightful to take control over farmlands from neighbouring smaller chiefdoms. We must not forget that the so-called classification of rulers has also led to a number of intertribal conflicts. In fact, some Paramount Fons have misused their influence, and in so doing, have instead exacerbated tensions between communities instead of assisting the government in resolving some of the conflicts. A typical example is the petition letter addressed by the Paramount Fon of Kom to the Governor of the North-West Province in 1983, requesting the latter to refund 1,700,000 Francs given to him to enable Kom gain the status of a Division in the North-West Region. The amount was a first installment paid to the Governor to carve out some three villages of Oku (Ibalichim, Ndom and Jikijem) – which would join Kom – as a punishment to the people of Oku following their role in the 1982 Oku versus Mbesa conflict. According to some stakeholders, some Fons become sponsors to others and believe that administration will always and only listen to them. Therefore, the struggle between peace and war revolves around the institution of power and only the possession of the power makes it possible for the supporters of an ideology to realize their goals.88 Kum Set Ewi (of blessed memory) made the following statement in the Herald Newspaper concerning Fon Doh Gah Gwanyin III of Balikumbat in relation to a conflict with neighbouring Bafanji: The Fon of Balikumbat is viewed in the North West as not unconnected to organised destruction of Bafanji village. Moreover, North Westerners have still not forgiven the Fon, over widely held allegations that he shot and killed a subject of his who raised alarm when he observed that his Fon was apparently involved in some malpractices during the March (1992) legislative elections. These allegations may indeed be untrue yet public perception of the Fon remains one of stigma, which is why sensible politicians should have steered clear of him.89

The general opinion got from our informants from Bafanji points to the fact that Fon Doh Gah Gwanyi III of Balikumbat is domineering 88

Interview with Philemon Yang, Yaounde, 06 July 2008. The Herald, N° 231, 1995, Kum Set Ewi, Inter-Cheifdom Conflict in the North West Province, p.5.

89

46

Chapter One

because he is partisan. He is a parliamentarian, a member of the central committee of the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), the Mayor of Balikumbat and a contractor. He acquired these positions before the year 2007. Again, these activities were not compatible with the position of chief or Fon. The attitude of some Administrative Officers in conflict resolution is also a cause for concern. In fact, some of these authorities, including those who do not master the conflicts on the one hand, and those who want to make personal gains from both sides on the other hand, keep on delaying in providing solutions. In consulting some Bambui versus Finge conflict documents in 1961, Justice Sainsbury, who was the speaker of the then Southern Cameroons High Court, had looked into the long-standing case. He was of the opinion that the decisions of the previous courts should be reenforced. Sometimes the common good of the people within the conflict zone is never considered. This is worsening when some administrative authorities receive bribes and side with the highest bidder in a conflict. Such conflicts hardly come to an end as it was noticed in Menchum Division in the conflict opposing the farmers versus the grazers. As soon as money is placed on the apex of values, human action is no longer checked. In this phrase, communal interest is no longer taken into account. The idea of saving the community suddenly disappear since a good number of State Officials are no longer doing their work with caution, but as insatiable and exclusive quest for gain. Thus, only personal interest comes first.90

The corrupt and ‘laisser-faire’ attitude of some administrative officers towards guilty persons has also been noted as a cause of prolonged land conflicts. All those who are found carrying out malpractices, including stealing, crop destruction and fighting should be brought to justice. Section 317 of the Cameroon Penal Code provides sanctions for crimes such as destruction of boundary marks and fences: Whoever a) Destroys, removes, or displaces a boundary stone or any other set up to show the boundary between properties or b) destroys any fence or whatever nature, shall be punished with imprisonment for from 15 days to 1 year and with a fine from 5,000 to 50,000 francs.

90 P. Titi Nwel (ed.), 1999, Corruption in Cameroon: Study Realised by GERDDESCameroon, a Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Yaounde, p.203.

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These sanctions are hardly applied as people keep on destroying boundary pillars and marks with impunity. In cases where justice is not applied, frustration simmers before erupting at some point into a situation of complete disregard for the administrative authorities. Cases such as that of Bambili versus Babanki Tungo, Balikumbat vs Bafanji and Oku vs. Mbesa, among others are well known cases that can be traced after the colonial period. In line with the above facts, the influence of non-members in the disputes, coupled with politics and dispute over names had contributed a great deal to the frequent land and boundary conflicts in the Bamenda region. For personal or administrative reasons, some chiefs in the region were noted for the assistance they provided to neighbouring chiefdoms during wars against their opponents during inter-ethnic wars. A similar situation occurred in 2008 when the then Governor of the North-West Region, Abakar Ahmat issued a warning letter (Reprimand) to the Paramount Fon of Kom on 12th June 2008, for chasing non indigenes of Kom, especially people of Oku origin out of the area because of the recent inter-community dispute between the Oku and Mbesa communities in February 2007. The Governor expected nothing but a soothing approach from the First Class Chief (Auxiliary of the Administration) that the Paramount Fon of Kom is (openness and inter-community diplomacy). His words read thus:

[...]I have been reliably informed that you have of late been calling on your subjects to chase out of your ‘Fondom’ people you qualify as strangers, especially those of Oku origin. This xenophobic attitude of yours may not be unrelated to the recent skirmishes between Mbessa Chiefdoms and the Okus. Suffice it here to say that, given the subsistence of the said conflict, I would have expected a soothing approach from the First Class Chief (Auxiliary of the Administration) that you are, consisting of openness and inter-community diplomacy. Rather, you have opted for the wrong cause, going as far planting traditional injunctions on the properties of some Oku people in Belo. In a bid to chase them away and deprive them of their constitutional rights to settle wherever, they want in Cameroon. Given the awkwardness of that approach, I want to use this opportunity to advice that you quickly turn tables and begin preaching peace and peaceful coexistence as well as tolerance, failing which you will most likely be held

Chapter One

48

personally, liable for any breakdown of law and order in your Fondom emanating from an uncalled for attitude[...]91

Economic Causes Competition for scarce economic resources in relation to demand was one of the major sources of land and boundary conflicts. The economy of the region revolves around farming, thus the infertility of land causes people to leave their original settlements and farming areas to farm in neighbouring more fertile places. After some decades, the agreements previously held are forgotten. These agreements could be about farm renting, or delimiting the farming or grazing area to friendly or neighbouring communities. Consequently, false information starts going around, probably released by the administration or neighbouring communities who might have something to do with same area. This is the case in the Oku and Mbesa conflict, where a fertile piece of land was handed over to the former community by their Mbesa neighbours for farming. While Mbesa expected their piece of land returned to them at some point, the Oku neglected or forgot the terms of the agreement, and later claimed ownership of the farmland. We also notice a similar pattern in the Bafut versus Bambui conflict over patches of arable land around the border zones of these two communities. The search for and competition on the scarce fertile land and other economic resources have led to many conflicts between chiefdoms. In the Bambili-Babanki conflict for instance, points of contention include the fertile area at Ntah and Lake Bambili. In fact, Lake Bambili provides water for irrigation and the area around the lake is fertile. The Fon of Bambili has presently launched a complaint against the Babanki tribe after they attempted to create an outlet from the lake towards their own territory. If the Babanki community succeeds in doing this, there will be catastrophic consequences for the Bambili farmers who grow lots of green vegetables, carrots and tomatoes along the stream flowing from the lake.92 This may lead to another conflict. A similar situation is brewing up between the Baligham and Awing communities over Lake Awing. The two cases, therefore, should be addressed immediately by competent authorities to avoid any future conflict. Likewise, in the Menchum valley Sub-division, the question of ownership of Lake Benakuma divides the Benakuma and Atue communities. The two groups argue even over whether the lake should be called Lake Benakuma or Lake Atue. The main reason for the argument here 91 92

Confidential Data from the Governor’s Office Bamenda, June 2008. North-West Regional Master Plan, Report 1, 2001, p.22.

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49

is that the land around the lake is very fertile, as it comes from previous seismic activity. There is also timber in the forest around the lake, and its economic value is likely another major reason for the scramble around the lake. Similarly, the Oku-Mbesa conflict is linked to the Kilum-Ijim forest economic resources. The various chiefdoms try to allocate their resources to maximize utility. Men, like animals always strive to defend themselves against threat to their vital interests. We may say that the problem is not just that of competition, but that of scarcity of resources such as fertile lands for agriculture and livestock farming.93 Demographic influence is largely responsible for land conflicts in the North-West Region in particular and in Africa in general. Population increase leads to expansion. Agriculture is cultivation that uses land intensively and continuously. As the number of people living together increases, the potential for inter-community conflict grows. Immigrants in some communities do not only increase the population, but also sometimes try to head these communities in economic ventures. Divisions in the NorthWest Region that have a fast-growing population density (see Table 3) with limited fertile land for cultivation because of reduced opportunities for fallowing and shifting cultivation easily get into land conflicts, especially during farming period. Figures representing the population density of the North-West Region within the period 1987-2000 show a geometric increase of the population which rivalled the limited fertile land set for agriculture. It is true that the value and the investment capacity over land could be a major source of conflicts in the North-West Region but what can we say when we compare this with other areas which have a higher capacity but fewer conflicts? In this case, we may not limit ourselves to population density. If the administration does not take care of the cultural and agricultural techniques of farming, then the region runs the risk of falling into conflicts over land resources. The acquisition of wealth and sources of wealth are sometimes the immediate causes of land and boundary conflicts in the region. Nkwi maintains that: The acquisition of wealth was an ambition of equal or nearly equal in performance to that of power over other peoples. This might entail the occupation of farmland, and thus was found up with territorial expansion. Another common aim was the exaction of tributes from the conquered which suitable circumstances were preferable thought akin to the taking

93

G. Cheo Ngwa, 2003, “Inter-chiefdom Conflicts in the North West Province of Cameroon”, Master Degree Dissertation in Social Sciences, Catholic University of Central Africa, pp.38-39.

105,664

313,043

143,466

117,093 1,238,348

Menchum

Mezam

Momo

Ngoketunjia Average Total

161,700 1,884,200

169,600

578,700

130,500

333,300

148,400 362,000

Population 2000

Source: North-West Provincial Service of Statistics, 2001.

226,916

Donga-Mantung

Population 1987

144,102 218,064

Division

Chapter One

1117.00 17510,00

1735,00

1841,00

4489,00

4340,00

1636,00 2352,00

Surface Area Km2

104,83 70.72

82,69

170,06

21,75

52,28

69,74 92,71

Population density 1987

144,76 107,61

97,75

314,34

29,07

76,80

90,71 153,91

Population density 2000

Table 3: North-West Region Distribution of Population per Division

Boyo Bui

50

39,93 36,89

15,06

144,28

7,32

24,52

20,97 61,20

Density change

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of booty. Access to trade and control of trade routes were similarly strong motives for war.94

Some chiefdoms in the Grassfields acquire land sometimes by invading neighbouring communities. In the Ndop plain, Balikumbat used to receive tributes from vassal states such as Bamumkumbit and Balighasu. With limited exceptions, in the North-West Region, the exaction of tribute was uncommon in Nso, Oku, Yamba, Mbaw, Kom and Bafmen just to name these few. Sources of wealth included farmland, women, hunting grounds and slaves. The Bafut tribe fought their Meta neighbours because hunters from the former tribe went hunting with dogs and crossed into the latter’s hunting ground. The Meta chiefdom sent warriors to expel the Bafut hunters. The Bafut on a similar expedition killed many Meta warriors, but took no heads home. It was reported that some Meta girls were captured and brought to Bafut, before they were later sold in Pinyin. Balinyonga raided Bambui for cattle. Bambui fought against Bambili over Kola plantations.95 However, during the German colonial period there was relative peace in the hinterlands because the trade was between the middlemen and the Whiteman on the coast. Later on, the desire to protect trade was one of the reasons for the natives’ attacks on traders and caravans to the interior. Carriers would attack women and make raids on villages when they ran out of food. Traders were constantly asking the government for protection against hostile natives. Wars were often fought between who and who if the natives failed to comply with the terms of the treaty, and sometimes, accusations of cannibalism were given as reasons for military actions against sometimes unarmed natives.96 This situation reflects the precolonial and colonial periods. In all, soil fertility and the search for agricultural and pasture lands, terrain accessibility, colonial economic neglect and the reviling economic crisis have contributed a great deal in land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region. Besides that, social and cultural factors were equally responsible for these conflicts in the study area.

94 P. N. Nkwi, 1976, Traditional Government and Social Change, Fribourg, University Press, p.44. 95 Nkwi. 1987, p.68. 96 H.R. Rudin, 1955, Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914, A case study in Modern Imperialism, Archon Books, Yale University Press, p.308.

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Chapter One

Social and Cultural Causes Socially, the proximity factor may be used to explain land and boundary conflicts in the region. It is practical common sense that there can be no conflict of any kind without contact. Consequently, the North-West Region, though having a mountainous relief, still permits a very high degree of contact among different communities. Land and boundary conflicts would have been largely unheard of if there were natural barriers. Unfortunately, the absence of these barriers has caused several communities to fight against one another or among themselves over specific areas.97 The importance attached to land in the region cannot be separated from the constant disputes recorded in the region. Land rights were (and are) either patrilineal or matrilineal, cousins comprise an inner lineage in which there is continuous mutual assistance. With the coming of European and their conceptions of the essential, relationships between people and land became fundamentally different. Different colonial masters decided to give the appellation “crown land”.98 It should be noted that the coming into force of Ordinance No 74-1 of July 6th 1974 later modified by Law No 81-21of November 27th 1981 gave ownership of all lands to the State as stipulated in Articles 1(2) and 15. The implication of this is that chiefdoms no longer laid claims to land ownership. The chiefs were described in the ordinance as custodians of national lands. They could not, therefore, make war with each other over land issues. Decree No 77-525 of December 13th 1977 modified the boundaries of certain traditional communities in the Mezam and Momo Divisions. In fact, this issue concerns the nationalization of all land, thus limiting the powers of some traditional rulers who could decide to sell the limited community land to recent migrants, especially to cattle owners and foreigners in the region in many instances without valid land certificates. Inadequate documentation as a likely consequence of illiteracy is another cause of land conflict in the area. The lack of maps and the absence of written records result in false information, which is readily exploited by “trouble makers”. Some of the cases under study in this chapter illustrate this aspect. Examples include the Bambui versus Finge, Bambui versus Bafukum, Bambili versus Babanki, Balikumbat versus Bafanji conflicts among others. In this light, Lecron and Rubenstain excerpted that:

97

R. Mack W., 1963, Race class and Power, New York, American Book C°, p.375. E. Colson, 1971, “The Impact of the Colonial period on the definition of Land Rights”, in Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, Profiles of change: African Society and Colonial Rule, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.193-215. 98

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Identification with land and ownership of it, often lie at the root of conflict. The origins of land disputes may eventually be forgotten, especially in the absence of written records, and symbolic and mythic assertions of rights to territory are often added to or blended with the practical reasons for a war, by both sides, to justify a land claim. When such claims are based upon such divine sanctions, war may become endemic, as seems to have been the ease in this political conflict-in-microcosm, painstakingly reconstructed from ancient pictorial records.99

It is true that the lack of written records can lead to conflict, but their presence is not a miraculous solution to prevent or resolve intercommunity conflicts. We discussed earlier some instances where written records existed, but the attitudes of some traditional rulers and administrative authorities accounted for the conflict. Some very striking examples include the land conflicts due to legal pluralism found all over Sub-Saharan Africa in general, and in the North-West Region in particular. A common practise in the sale of state land by customary authorities who claim customary rights over the same land. Though fully aware that they are not entitled to sell the land “though in some cases they are entitled to use it or to hold it as a trustee”, they still do so, thus showing their lack of respect for the State as much as for their community.100 Land conflict here is only the visible part of a traditional culture falling apart and a modern state not being accepted by the traditional society as illustrated in Figure 2.

99

M. Lecron Foster and R.A. Rubenstein (eds.), 1986, Peace and War, CrossCultural Perspectives, Oxford, Transaction Books, p.93. 100 Babette Wehrnann, 2008, Land conflicts, A practical guide to dealing with land disputes, Eschbom, University Press, p.30.

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Figure 2: Broader Causes of Land Conflict

State Visible land conflict

Private Individual

Partly visible land conflict and invisible conflict over power influence, values, identity and culture

Mutual Mistrust + dislike

Land Transaction of state land

Traditional Authority

Money

Clan

Violation of traditional values due to changes brought by colonial powers now being continued by the government of independent State

Source: Based on Babette Wehrmann (2005), Land conflicts, p.30. Note: From this figure, one can easily view and understand the broader causes of land conflict in a tropical African society, especially during the post-colonial period. This figure broadly highlights some of the causes that had often played a prominent role in land conflicts. The figure equally explains the transaction (sale) or movement of land between traditional authorities and individuals.

The above phenomenon is quite common in the North-West Region in situations whereby land is considered as communal property, or in cases where the land in question is not titled. From the figure, one can notice the divergent views between the State and traditional authorities over land. The movement does not highlight any financial transaction between these groups of people. However, land conflict could be recorded if the

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pattern in this diagram is constant. Land conflicts are more common in situations where the government interacts directly with individuals through nationalisation of the land formally used by individuals. Apart from other causes, we shall examine psychological causes as an important factor for land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region. Psychological Causes Data collected from informants reveals that fear and desire are also likely to cause conflicts. Some of these aspects include: fear for existence, fear of insecurity, desire to be recognized, cared for and loved resulting in material and emotional needs for shelter, need for a production base, longing for selfesteem, or seeking power and wealth. These needs outline people’s interests, which then result in their attitudes, which at the end, define their behaviour (see figure 3). This behavioural pattern, when queered towards the need of land, becomes complex. Here, there are different factors which influence people’s fears and desire to be identified. As is the case with most egoistic behaviours, taking advantage of functional deficits for the sake reckless individual profit maximization is based on emotional and material needs which again are a consequence of psychological fears and desires.101 Therefore, psychological phenomena form the basis, for one’s existence become very difficult to handle when conflicts emerge. This fear can result in extreme emotional and material needs such as the need for shelter, the need to survive and the desire to maintain selfesteem. In some cases, this might result in a desire for power, and strong need for independence, often resulting in the accumulation of wealth. It is primarily this combination of very strong emotional and material needs “seeking power and wealth” that allows people to either break rules “institutions” or profit from institutional shortcomings. Land conflict resolution should, therefore, look at the psychological fears and desires of those situations where illegal behaviour is the rule rather than the exception.102 This is the case in many post conflict countries where psychological fears in addition to those needs directly created by the conflict itself, “for instance loss of property due to forced displacement”, are common phenomena influencing the entire society and its overall development.

101 102

Wehrmann, 2005, p.25. Wehrmann, 2005, p.26.

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Figure 3: The Roots of Conflict

(Land) conflict Behaviour Attitude/ Position Interests

Natural Needs

Emotional

Psychological Source: Author’s conception after consulting varying sources (2009).

Similarly, other factors such as an institutional change (causing a transparency institutional vacuum on the land) can generate fears, desires, needs, interests, attitudes and opportunities concerning land use and ownership, and because these are no longer controlled, can easily lead to land conflict. Looking at these causes from a different analytical perspective, one can also classify them into categories including political, socio-economic, socio-cultural, demographic, legal, judicial, administrative, technical “land management”, ecological and psychological causes as earlier explained. It should be noted that all of these causes are also included in the model presented in Figures 2 and 3. Altogether, this background chapter has described aspects such as the geographical environment of the North-West Region, the historical context of the study and the general causes of land and boundary conflicts in the area. The geographical environment has provided various aspects such as the relief, vegetation, climate, soils and occupation, coupled with

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the network system in the region, that are prone to generating or regenerating land and boundary conflicts. These factors, as we have shown, can equally cause land conflict in the other regions of Cameroon. In line with the above, an attempt has been made to discuss the historical background of the various communities that constitute present-day inhabitants of the North-West Region of Cameroon. In fact, this chapter ends with a classification and with the general causes of land and boundary in the North-West Region. The causes discussed range from political, administrative, economic, social, cultural and psychological aspects. The above factors, we have seen, need not to be taken in isolation. They are only the visible parts of a more serious conflict which is rooted much deeper in the society and its history. Very often, land conflicts only reflect general inequality or unfair distribution of wealth, voice and power in a given society and the discrimination against certain groups, such as women or ethnic minorities. This accounts for the numerous land and boundary conflicts in the area, especially as from 1972 to present times. The next chapter (Chapter Two) examines conflict involving the people of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo over land and boundary matters. This conflict has been noted as one of the oldest land and boundary conflicts in the region.

CHAPTER TWO LAND CONFLICT IN MEZAM: BAMBILI VERSUS BABANKI-TUNGO

The land conflict between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo is one of the oldest in the North-West Region. The Bambili versus Babanki-Tungo territorial claims started in the 1950s over a boundary situation around Ntah the most fertile and disputed land. For quite a while, the area had been left uncultivated by both communities. Long ago before the war episodes, it was often considered a “no man’s land” since the area was abandoned by both parties as there was no legal claim over the area. As time passed by, both communities began to farm in the area, which led to disputes. The quarrel reached a climax when the Fulani grazing community settled in Sabga and decided to pasture their cattle in the area. In this case, the growing fertility of the area became a call for concern to both communities. As a result of this need, ethnic tension became the order of the day fastened with a delay or failure in the proper demarcation of the area generating conflicts. This chapter focuses on the Bambili versus Babanki-Tungo boundary problem. It discusses the geographical and historical context of these two communities, the nature of inter-community relations before the conflict, the causes and evolution of the conflict, and its consequences.

A Geo-History of the Area This section discusses aspects related to the geographical features of both communities. The aim is to provide the basis for understanding the conflict. Within this context, we examine pre-war activities between the people of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo.

a. Geography of the Area Bambili is situated on the Bamenda Plateau, some eighteen kilometres northwest of Bamenda town (the regional headquarters of the North-West Region of the Republic of Cameroon). It is a village in Tubah Sub-Division.

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Bambili lies on the Bamenda-Kumbo portion of the Bamenda Ring Road. Before 1980, its population was approximately 13,000.103 Bambili is surrounded by Bambui to the west and northwest, Babanki-Tungo104 to the northeast, Nkwen (Bafreng) to the south, Awing to the east and Mendankwe (Bamendankwe) to the southeast. There is also a small hamlet to the southeast of Bambili known as Banjah (Njah), which shares boundaries with both Bambili and Mendankwe. It is said that the present Ady Banjah was given to its people in the early 1930s by both the chiefs of Bambili and Mendankwe. Like Bambili village, Babanki-Tungo is situated at the foot of the Bamenda Plateau, lying between latitude 5º40 and 7º50 north, and longitude 9º45 and 11º10 east.105 The fact that Bambili and Babanki-Tungo fall within the same geographical zone provides the reasons why they fall within the same sub-equatorial type of climate. However, the area has two climate zones that correspond closely to what is common to the low and high plateau areas that most parts of the Republic of Cameroon experience. The existence of local climates in this area is also common. With its sub-equatorial climate, the area’s vegetation is dominated by tall grass and trees. The grass is predominant on the hills and covers a large area of the Awing, Baryah and Babanki-Tungo villages. Grass can also be seen on the escarpments of the plateau while the forest is found mostly along streams or valleys in Bambui and Nkwen. Generally, most of the land surface of the villages of Bambili, Bambui and Nkwen is covered with raffia palms, while the forest of Bambili is dominated by old kola nut trees. These palms produce palm wine for markets and local consumption. The eucalyptus tree was recently introduced in all the villages. As a result of their grassy landscape, the villages of Banjah, Babanki-Tungo and Awing, serve as rearing grounds for cattle. The grass is also used for making thatched roofs.106 The difference in soil types explains why certain crops do better in some of the villages and not in others. What is important here is that these communities (Banjah, Bambui, Bambili, Awing, Babanki-Tungo and Mendankwe) fall within the same soil zone often known as the humid ferralitic soil. They all have different soil types which favour the growth of particular crops namely potatoes, yams, 103

J.W. Mimang, 1980, “The Bambili Chiefdom and its institutions: A Historical Perspective”, Postgraduate Diploma Dissertation (D.I.P.I.E.G), E.N.S. Yaounde, p.3. 104 Kedjem Kitingu, Babanki Tungu, Babanki Tungaw, Babanki Tungo and Small Babanki, all refer to the same village. 105 J.W. Mimang, 1980, p.7. 106 Ibid.

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maize, beans, garden eggs and vegetables, among others. The production of these crops in large or small quantities is consequent to the variations in the climate discussed. Villages such as Banjah, Awing and Babanki-Tungo, which are found on the high plateau area, are endowed with regosol and humid ferralitic soils. The villages of Bambili, Bambui and Nkwen have mostly regosol as well as lithosol soil types (mostly found on slopes and around lakes, including the areas around Lake Bambili and Lake Awing). The patches of alluvial soil can also be found in Bambili and Babanki. The alluvial soils, found mostly in patches along the lower slopes and valleys, and the humid ferralitic soils (mostly in the high plateau villages) are said to be favourable for farming.107 As such, the climate, vegetation and soils have largely favoured the economy activities of these communities. Thus, varying goods are producedin this locality throughout the year, promoting inter-village relations. Map 4 situates both communities and the conflict zone. Bambili, like Babanki-Tungo, operates under an essentially agricultural economy. Like in most villages of the North-West Region, the women of these villages are the main actors in food cultivation, and several crops grown in the region are common to all the villages. Meanwhile, male folk get involved in the cultivation process only as farm clearers and harvesters.108 Men also control the raffia palms (for wine), the kola-nut trees, as well as the building and weaving activities. This redistribution or division of labour is rooted in tradition. Generally, the men do the clearing and fencing of the farmlands, while the women take care of the tilling, planting, tending and, in most cases, help the men in harvesting and preparing food.109 Though fishing activities are almost absent in the villages, a bit of fishing is undertaken by young men in small groups, mostly in the lakes Bambili and Awing. Forestry and smelting are carried out on a significant scale in the villages of Banjah, Mendankwe and Bambili. Forestry involves the cutting down of trees for building and charcoal, while mining is about the extraction of stones from the hills for building houses and bridges.

107

F. Makwondo Cheo, 1995, “Bambili and her Neighbours: Inter-village Relations Since 1961”, Maîtrise Dissertation in History University of Yaounde I, p.8. 108 Ibid., p.11. 109 P. Afekehfehnun Foleng, 1988, “The significance of Royal Symbolism in Bambili Traditional Society: A Philosophical Evaluation”, B.A. Dissertation in Philosophy, St Thomas Aquina’s Major Seminary, Bambui, p.10.

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Map 4: Location of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo Conflict Zone in Tubah Sub-Division

Source: Adapted by author from the 2005 monographic study of Tubah Rural Council, drawn by Enchaw G.B, 2011.

The secondary sector in the villages is not completely absent since a few elementary secondary activities can be noticed in some of the communities dominated by handicrafts; baskets made of bamboo, bags and caps made of raffia products, wood carvings (to a limited extent), Dane-gun manufacturing and many other blacksmith articles like hoes and cutlasses. The existence of the bread factory in Bambili and the soap factory in Bambui constitutes a boon for this sector in these villages.110 It would be necessary to mention here that some of these villages occupy a comfortable place on the Sabga and Bambili passage ways by which they enjoy trade 110

Ibid.

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from Ndop, Kom, Akum and Meta areas. This serves as a motivation to the people of Nkwen, Bambili, Babanki-Tungo, Bambui and Babanki to get involved in trade and exchange. Trade has, therefore, contributed more than any other factor to enhancing closer relations between these villages. Therefore, trade between the villages stands out as the most widely practised economic activity that encourages inter-village relations, especially if one considers the fact that each village has at least a single local market that is held weekly.111 Communication is enhanced through a network of roads that link the villages. These roads facilitate the movement of the local population to and from the neighbouring villages. However, transport and communication between the villages are not yet advanced. The rugged terrain and densely forested valleys of the Bamenda plateau have no doubt made communication and transport networks difficult to come by, especially in terms of road construction. Nevertheless, this limitation in a good road network had not disturbed the smooth inter-village relations.112 These untarred roads are for the most part seasonal. They are dusty and truncated during the dry season and muddy and slippery during the wet season. Despite their poor nature during the rainy season, the roads have been able to facilitate communication between the villages. As a matter of fact, there still exist footpaths like the ones linking Bambui, Bambili, Banjah and Mendankwe on one hand, and Banjah, Bambili and Babanki-Tungo on the other hand. As concerns the motorable roads, there is one that leaves Nkwen from Bamenda town to Bambui and from Bambui to Bambili up to BabankiTungo. It is worth mentioning here that the Bambili cultural and Development Association (MBECUDA) has constructed a road linking the market at Ntah-Mitow Ntah to the border with Banjah. This was achieved with the aid of the Banjah Cultural and Development Association (NJACUDA). This road has facilitated movement through Banjah to Bamenda town, making it easier for farmers to transport their produce for sale. At the moment, these villages link each other by roads, motorable enough for vehicles of all kinds. Through self-reliance projects, various attempts have been made, especially through joint village projects to improve roads to enable goods and services to flow without much hindrance between the villages. Priority has, however, been given to roads leading to the palaces of the various villages, since the palaces are seen as village capitals. In addition, the government of Cameroon undertook to grade the 111

S. Mbah Mbah, 1994, “Inter-village Relations in the Moghmao Clan since 1961”, Maîtrise Dissertation in History, University of Yaounde I, pp.12-13. 112 F. Beken, 1989, “Market Gardening and its impact the rural economy of Bambili”, DIPES II Dissertation in History, ENS, University of Yaounde, p.9.

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Nkwen-Bambui-Bambili road up to Nso passing through Babanki-Tungo. This was per the government’s intention to carry out construction works on the Ring Road. There are patches of the tarred road from the Bambili “Three Corners” (about 300 metres) up to the road leading to Babanki-Tungo.113 It would be misleading to limit the idea of communication to road construction and footpaths. Thanks to modern technology, telephones can be found in most villages of the Western Grassfields. For example, the localities of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo can boast of telephone booths. Thus, as a result of the improvements in transport and communication, one can assert that transport and communication have facilitated the movement of people from one village to another, and made trade and exchange between the villages easy. Inter-village relations among these localities have also been fostered thanks to the history of their people as discussed below.

b. History of the Area This section examines the arrival of the Bambili and the Babanki-Tungo people in the region with a close look at their traditional and socio-political organisations. It is obvious that the two neighbours did not reach this destination as enemies. Initially, their relationship was cordial before the quest for land became the bone of contention in the Ntah area. According to the Fon of Bambili, the people of Bambili were related to the Bafut at Ndobo. The former left with Baba at the same time, but instead of following the usual mountain track, the Bambili broke away from the Bafut and went directly to their present site along the Noun Plain, passing between Babungo and Bambalang in the Ndop plain. The Bambili oral traditions maintain that the Bambili people never settled in Bafut before proceeding to their present site. They assert that they migrated from Ndobo to the Ndop plain, and from there, moved to their present site.114 When they migrated from the Ndop plain, they went to Awing and settled at Mumfieh. They settled at Mumfieh because the area around Lake Bambili had got enough fresh water. It equally provided fish and contributed to the fertility of the area. When the first migrants arrived at Mumfieh, they named their community Mbili, meaning “to sleep”, because it is purposed that it was during their sleep that it was revealed that the area had favourable conditions for settlement. It was from the word Mbili that the village later

113

F. Beken, 1989, p.9. National Archives Buea (NAB), File No. 3325 (Ab2), 1926, Assessment Report on Bafut Tribal Area of Bamenda Division, p.8.

114

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derived its name, Bambili. The group was led to this area by a man called Isahahten, who became the first Fon of the Mbili tribe.115 The Mbili were not the first settlers at Mumfieh. The indigenous inhabitants of this place were led by a man named Nchotilem, whose origin has been difficult to trace till today. A conflict soon developed between the family of Nchotilem and the Mbili. This conflict stemmed from the fact that Nchotilem wanted to control the dynasty while the Mbili wanted to maintain their sovereign authority with Isahahten as their ruler. The conflict was eventually resolved when Nchotilem accepted the supremacy of the Mbili dynasty. A consensus was reached between the two factions with Nchotilem condescending to become part of the Mbili dynasty. The Mbili further moved and settled at Achi, which had been discovered by hunters to be another fertile area.116 At the time of the settlement, the only neighbouring village was Bambui, whose inhabitants had settled in the Bamenda plateau much earlier. When the Mbili arrived, they quickly spotted the Bambui hamlet since it was lower, in a plain. The Mbili launched sporadic attacks to subjugate the Bambui, in vain. When the attempt failed, the Mbili became contented with Mumfieh (the present site of Bambili) because it was fertile. Babanki, also called Babanki-Tungo (Tungaw, Tungo or KidjemKetinguh) derived its name from the gigantic pillars of rock some hundreds of feet high that tower on each side of the village. Their oral tradition maintains that they are an offshoot of Big-Babanki. They broke away from Big-Babanki in the early 1820s as a result of problems that arose in the royal family. It should be noted that the two Babankis left Oku and Ndop together, and then settled in the present site of Big-Babanki. They lived in peace until a disagreement sparked up between them on whether to celebrate the annual cultural festival Kabenkendong, or not. This cultural feast coincided with the death of a prince when the festival was just about to begin. Normally, the two events could not be observed at the same time; one had to be done first. This resulted in disagreements in the palace and the village as a whole. When it was finally decided that the annual dance would be performed first, those who were for the death celebration to be held first left the village (forty princes and their supporters) for Babanki-Tungo.117 Makwondo Cheo Wanti, who had succeeded his father Yufani, as the Chief, declared that the funeral rites must be postponed until the end of 115

Ibid. (NAB), File No. 3325 (Ab2), 1926, Assessment Report on Bafut Tribal Area of Bamenda Division, p.8. 117 (NAB), File No. 3325 (Ab2), E.G. Hawkesworth, 1926, an Assessment Report on the Bafut Area of the Bamenda Division Cameroon Province Nigeria, p.9. 116

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the cultural festival. His brothers refused and proceeded to carry out the usual death ceremonies. But the Kwifon (the regulatory society) was sent to stop them, and they migrated to a site near Kuwi and established themselves as an autonomous unit. Since then, they established a small chiefdom for themselves. The population of those who left Big-Babanki for SmallBabanki was larger than those who stayed behind.118 Oral sources, especially from Bambili, maintain that after the dispute in Big-Babanki, the leader of the displaced group came to Bambili to beg for land on which to settle. Thanks to the contributions of Bambili, Bamessi and Bandja, a piece of land was given to help settle the BabankiTungo. Officially, they became the guests, and Bambili their hosts, since they were the first to arrive in the region.119 However when the land was given to the Babanki-Tungo, there was peaceful co-existence between them and the Bambili. It is only later that relations got strained over the disputed area. The socio-political organizations of the communities in the NorthWest Region can conveniently be grouped into a centralised system. To better appreciate this system, it is necessary to look at its fundamental characteristics. Generally, the pre-existing social and political structure of the village was not seriously tempered with, and each lineage retained its role and status in the village. With the spreading influence of the royal family cult, the leader gradually acquired semi-divine authority over the Kingdom.120 What is important to note about centralised communities is that they started as a clan and expanded by subjugating neighbouring states, thereby making them their vassals. Most great empires such as the empire of western Sudan expanded through this method.121 It is through the attempt of the centralised Fondoms of the North-West Region such as Bambili and Babanki-Tungo to expand in this manner of state formation that land conflicts have become commonplace. There exist few societies such as Yukums and Kassimbela with little concentration of authority. Such authority-role affects a rather limited sector of the lives of those subjected to them. The wielding of authority as a specialized unit within which people feel an obligation to settle their disputes according to agreed rules without resorting to force tends to be

118

Makwondo Cheo, 1995, p.18. Interview with Chwingum Anthony Takwinfor, Bambili, 25 October 2008. 120 J.F, Ajayi Ade and M. Crowdes (eds.), 1976, History of West Africa, Vols 2, London, Longman, p.65. 121 E. J. Harris, 1987, African and their History, New York, New American Library, p.55. 119

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relatively small.122 Each of these villages was under the tutelage of a village head that had little or no political authority. The village government, instead of resting on a government, was run by a council of elders which comprised the constituent lineage heads known as Meukum Si. This council met at regular intervals and in times of emergency in the compound of the village head. These meetings were usually presided over by the village head, and matters of social, religious, economic and judicial importance were discussed. Decisions were usually taken only when consensus had been reached. Matters affecting the village, lineages or individuals were usually thrown open for the councillors to voice their opinions before final decisions were taken. Generally, the audience was swayed by the most eloquent speaker who was listened to in silence, while an unimpressive speaker was often hushed down. Decisions which were arrived at by the council were disseminated in the lineages by the councillors who also enforced their execution.123 Thus, the decision of peace and war or both were settled by these before the village could embark on such.

c. Inter-Village Relations before 1958 Before the arrival of the colonialists, inter-village relations in most parts of the North-West Region were not the same as they were in the colonial period. After colonialism, relationships among villages changed their pattern as a result of a new administrative system brought by the colonialists during their stay in the area. Inter-village relationships as a whole did not only depend on blood ties. They also involved economic, political and of course, socio-cultural considerations. Therefore, the villages co-operated in the production and exchange of goods and services, and shared their happiness and sorrows as a people.124 As Thomas and Anderson put it: “We tend to be attracted to those who are nearer us and have qualities similar to our own […] we also are attracted to people whose interests and beliefs match our own”.125 It is on this count that these villages are determined to have a relationship that can be described as cordial. 122

Ajayi Ade and Crowdes (eds.), 1976, p.66. E. Tangie Ngengong, 2007, “From Friends to Enemies: Inter-Ethnic Conflict Amongst the Tikars of the Bamenda Grassfields (North West Province of Cameroon)”, Master Dissertation in Peace and Conflict Transformation, University of Tromsø, p.26-27. 124 Ngek Monteh, 2004, p.63. 125 Thomas W. Laverne and Robert J. Anderson, 1932, Sociology: The Study of Human Relationships, 3rd ed, New York, Harcourt Brace Yovannovich Publishers, pp.101-102. 123

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Before 1958, the villages of Bambili, Babanki Tungo, Babanki (Kedjom Keku) or Big Babanki, Bambui, Nkwen, Bafut and Bamenda were grouped by the British into what became known as the Bafut Area of the Bamenda Division. These neighbouring communities or villages had a population of approximately 22,000 (see Table 4). Besides, Awing, Bamendankwe and Banjah communities comprised the bulk of what was known as the Mogimba tribe. This grouping was based on a common origin and, of course, slender linguistic similarities. But conscious of such historical ties, the two communities have utilised these ties to maintain friendly and good neighbourly relationships in the political, economic and social aspects of their lives.126 Table 4: Names and Population Figures of the Seven Villages under the Bafut Area in 1934 Villages Bafut Bambili Babanki Bambui Bafreng Bamenda Babanki Tungo Total

Population Figures 9,577 1,234 2,143 1,516 2,584 1,596 3,167 21,817

Source: (NAB), File No. L.G. 1303 (Ab3a) 1934 0.98, Intelligence report on the associated village groups occupying the Bafut Native Authority Area, p.6.

At the time, these villages paid allegiance to the Fon of Bafut who had one of the largest followings. As a result, the villages considered themselves as belonging to a common entity. They cooperated until each village thought it was capable of settling on its own. Because hostilities among them were not common, the villages supported each other in times of minor warfare, especially those that were orchestrated by the Balikumbat. But as time went by, these villages started requesting their separation from the Bafut area. Conflicts and wars became a major issue which characterised this Native Authority. For example, the Bafreng waged a war against Bambui in a bid to acquire more land. The Babanki-Tungo assisted Balikumbat against both the Bali Nyonga and Bambili. These instances 126

(NAB), File No. 3325 (Ab2) E.G. Hawkesworth, 1926, an Assessment Report on the Bafut Area of the Bamenda Division Cameroon Province Nigeria, p.6.

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indicate the levels at which neighbours may become enemies at given times in history.127 By the late 1930s, long after the introduction of British rule, there was a call for an administrative reorganisation of the village groups in the Bafut area of the Bamenda Division. This area, which contained seven independent villages, was joined in a common Native Court which was presided over by the Fon of Bafut. Together with the Fon of Bafut, the chiefs of six other villages advocating for equality in the Native Court agreed that “no one of them (including the Fon of Bafut) will make laws without first informing the others or make a law which will not also be made (or accepted) by the others”.128 Meanwhile in a report to the District Officer, Hook asserted: I think, therefore that whilst each unit of the Confederation will be independent and not subordinate to any council, they will work in union enough to justify a united authority and I recommend that the Native Authority of the Bafut area shall be the Village Head of Bafut Bafreng, Bambui, Babanki-Tungo, Bamenda, Bambili and Babanki in council.129

Hence as proposed, the Bafut Native Area Administration was recognized and the Native Authority was made up of the head chiefs of the seven village groups in the council. The chiefs were to be responsible for their respective village groups, but at the same time had to work in the council. Furthermore, each of the village chiefs would be a member of a Court of Appeal called the Bafut Native Court. The other villages protested on the basis that the Bafut Chief still received a salary which was by far higher than theirs (£60)130, with Bambili and Bamenda Chiefs receiving the lowest (£9 each).131 Later in the 1940s, with the arrival of the Banjahs, the Mendankwe people at one time wrote to the District Officer of the Bamenda Division informing him of how they gave some land to the people of Banjah who were now asking to join the Bambili Village Court. Relations between Banjah and Mendankwe were at stake because when the Banjahs came in through Bafuchu, they were accorded land by the Mendankwe Chief who formally had a boundary only with the Bambili to the west. However, this land award was done with the complicity of the chief of Bambili. 127

(NAB), File No. 3325 (Ab2). (NAB), File No. B. 3059 (Ab3c), R.J. Hook, 1934, Intelligence Report on the Associated village Groups occupying the Bafut Native Authority Area, p.99. 129 Mimang, 1980, p.62-63. 130 £ = means Pounds, the British Currency used in her various colonial territories. 131 Makwondo Cheo, 1995, p.23. 128

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Consequently, the Mendankwe did not understand why the Banjah bypassed them for the Bambili village Court instead of joining theirs.132 As a result of the above aspects of political cooperation between the villages, it can be deduced that friendly interaction was common before 1958, especially for the greater part of the political scene. During the late 1950s, these villages were often at loggerheads with one another. In such situations, short-term alliances between two or more groups of people were always possible. Again, these were highly unstable and mostly temporal alliances geared towards a particular goal were contracted. This goal could be to increase population, acquire more wealth (such as fertile land areas), and gain independence as sovereign communities or groups. The people of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo have lived at their present sites for more than a century. They had lived peacefully from the period they settled to the 1950s. In the 1920s, the administration of R.J. Assistant Divisional Officer (ADO) for the Bamenda Division coerced the villages to live in peace. This was facilitated by the creation of the Seven Head Chiefs who constituted the Bafut Native Area. The head chiefs declared that they were going to work together. This meant that none of them was to make or execute any law without the consent of the others. There was also a consensus on every decision. This seemed a good reason to accept the assembled chiefs as individuals, and at the same time as a collective unit of the Native Authority to Bafut area.133 This could be seen as all the villages jointly operating a single court at Bafut, which worked satisfactorily under the leadership of the chiefs of Bafut and Big-Babanki (which later gave birth to Babanki-Tungo). Apart from this legislative aspect, the two neighbours paid taxes into a common treasury at Bafut. For more than a century, the inhabitants of the two villages intermarried with ample ease. This, therefore, means that they must have experienced social intercourse through trade, cultural ceremonies and other festivities. From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the relationship between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo was cordial, despite the unanimity with which the chiefs exercised their duties in the Bafut Native Area. They frequently displayed envy towards each other as one was either larger than the other in terms of territory, stronger than the other in times of war (and weapons), or more influential in administrative matters as one village hosted most of the institutions in the region. Other chiefs of the Bafut area petitioned for the position and influence of the Bafut Chief in the area over

132

(NAB), File No. B.3059 (AB 3C), 1934, R.J. Hook, intelligence Report on the Associated Village Groups Occupying the Bafut Native Authority Area, p.126. 133 Tangie Ngengong, 2007, p.23.

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administrative and traditional issues.134 Each chief was determined to resist the exercise of any authority except his own inside his territory. Each chief was also ready to recognize the fact that his territory was autonomous, with land area wealth and history. The two chiefs were also suspicious of neighbouring villages which allegedly nursed aggressive and expansionist desires in them. However, economic relations were better since the villages traded goods and services. Likewise, the socio-cultural relations witnessed little or no setbacks since inter-group marriages were frequent, visits between chiefs were excellent and the social aspect of understanding one other’s language kept them in daily communion. Despite some minor early conflicts, it can be said that inter-village relations before 1958 between the two communities of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo were more or less cordial before the dramatic quest for more land by both communities became a major source of conflict. Like people who belonged to a single Confederation under Bafut, they saw the need to maintain that unity after 1958. But as time went on, this became known as unity in diversity because of the need to exercise full autonomy over one’s chiefdom or community. Peace reigned during the last half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. This was partly thanks to the German and British colonial administrators who used the indirect rule system coupled with forceful policies to maintain peace in the area. But by the 1950s, the piece of land between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo became a bone of contention. In examining the reasons for the conflict, it is realized that many variables, aggravated the ethnic conflict.

B- Origin and Manifestation of the Conflict Many scholars hold that conflict, wars and violence are caused by either the nature of man, the perception limitation of man, poverty and disparity in wealth, the internal structure of the state or the international system itself.135 Given the fact that our traditional set-ups are organised like states in international relations, what happens at the global level is quite similar to what happens in the villages which have relations, with their neighbours. The Bambili and Babanki-Tungo land conflict also respects the global international principles of conflicts. It may have been caused by any of the 134

(NAB), File No. B.3059 (AB 3C), 1934, Hook, intelligence Report on the Associated Village, p.127. 135 Daniel S. Papp, 1984, Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks Understanding, 2nd edition, London, Macmillan Publishing Company, pp.508-510.

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above-mentioned reasons. Some of these causes are stated by Nchoji Nkwi in the following words: No human group exists without the logical dialectical opposition of friendenemy either among its members or between it and others. Groups live with defined objectives which may be realized with or without the assistance of others whoever puts into jeopardy the common goal of groups creates a situation of conflict and becomes an enemy or a less friendly partner.136 The causes of different conflicts in the western grass fields were multifarious and rooted in the interest of groups, individuals and the converging sequences of events.137

a. Origin The Bambili and Babanki-Tungo land conflict is said to have originated from the activities of colonialists when they decided to demarcate the area. The disputes that pitched Bambili and Babanki-Tungo in the 1950s were because the two village heads were claiming Jangali tax from the Fulani of Sabga. The British colonial authority, as a result of perpetual conflict between the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo, came up with the idea of finally demarcating the boundaries of the contesting communities. Though the boundaries remained unaccepted by both communities, the demarcation was the result of four successive judgments: the Native Court Judgment of 11th of December 1953, the Native Court of Appeal Judgment of the 15th of July 1956, the District Officer Review Judgment of the 8th of September 1956 and the Resident A.B. Westmacott Review of the 15th of May 1958.138 Nevertheless, the colonial masters were not the only cause of numerous territorial conflicts in the Bamenda Grassfields. Other aspects such as political, economic and social issues were equally responsible for these conflicts. Politically, the uncontrolled circulation of imported guns and ammunition in the North-West Region had also caused the boundary conflict between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo. The Cameroonian Law requires that for an individual to possess a gun, he or she has to be granted a licence by the government. The illegal production, sales and ownership of 136 P. Nchoji Nkwi, 1987, Traditional Diplomacy. A History of inter Chiefdom Relation in the western Grassfields of the North West Province of Carneroon, Yaounde, Department of sociology, p.64. 137 Ibid, p.65. 138 C. Anuafor Asongwe, 2007, «Administration in the Management of the BambiliBabanki Tungo Boundary Disputes since Colonial Era», Maîtrise Dissertation in History, Univerty of Yaounde I, p.45.

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arms are commonplace in the area, thus violating Cameroon Law. When stricter gun control measures were put in place, killings in the region became very rare. Since then, fighting with guns during conflicts has become common in the last two decades of the twentieth century. As far as Bambili and Babanki-Tungo are concerned, the presence of guns and weak control measures on the circulation of guns have favoured numerous arms fighting in the region when need be. With this advancement in technology and lawlessness, the weapons used during inter-community warfare have changed from locally fabricated weapons to modern ones. Some sources revealed that Peter Abety (Minister in charge of special duties at the Presidency of the Republic, and a member of the CPDM Central Committee), an elite of Bambili, is behind the boundary conflict. According to Kwi Gam, Abety’s closest associate revealed that he armed the Bambili people with automatic rifles to “crush” the people of Babanki in times of conflict.139 One should note that the laxity of the civil administration to competently handle the situation between the two contestants has equally regenerated the long outstanding Bambili versus Babanki-Tungo boundary conflict. As earlier discussed, the British colonial administration attempted to demarcate this boundary, which gradually led to a thaw in the Bambili Babanki-Tungo relations. But between 1965 and 1995, several complaints were brought before the court. What was common about these complaints was that court injunctions were contravened by both communities. Effective sanctions were not carried out on the individuals who went against the law or Court decision. To emphasise this point to the two communities, it was reported that an agreement was reached between the two parties after a meeting convened by J.N. Foncha in the Bafut Council on the 13th of February 1965. In the decision, amongst other things, it was made clear that the disputed area was to be returned under the authority of Bambili. Also, it was instructed that the people of Babanki be allowed to open up a market for their potatoes in the area, and therefore, a piece of land should be sliced from the Bambili land in this area and allocated to Babanki for this purpose. Another ruling was that all houses built by the people of Babanki on Bambili land should remain in Bambili and be known as part of the Bambili community, or leave the area. This was closely followed by an entente between the two communities on the 25th of July 1973. In the agreement, both village heads accepted the Westmacott Decision on the existing land dispute as being the only authentic administrative decision that can put an end to the long-standing dispute. In the same decision, the local authorities 139

Kwi Gam, 1998, p.72.

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accepted to collaborate with the team of surveyors that would be sent by the administration to trace and demarcate the boundaries. As such, they accepted that their people would carry stones and sand for the successful accomplishment of the demarcation exercise. Unfortunately, the understanding was violated by the Babanki group, and they were never brought to order, nor was the Fon of Babanki-Tungo called for interrogation. This, unfortunately, gave the impression that the agreement was not taken seriously by the parties concerned.140 The Babanki-Tungo natives hold that the land dispute between the two villages started with the enthronement of Awemo II as the Fon of Bambili earlier in 1950. In fact, the Babanki-Tungo, who arrived at their present site before this date, had never had any disputes with the Bambili till the 1950s, when Awemo II was enthroned as the new Bambili Fon. According to Loh Mufi, Mayor of Tubah, the environment marked the beginning of the conflict between the two communities. This was probably because he was one of the few educated Fons at the time. Some sources noted that Fon Awemo II wanted to expand the kingdom beyond its borders by acquiring enough land for his people.141 The actions of the Fon of Babanki-Tungo could be considered legitimate thanks to Emmanuel Kant’s idea that “there is no state whose leader does not wish to secure permanent peace in conquering the entire universe”.142 Contrary to Babanki-Tungo, the people of Bambili hold that the disputes between the two communities could not have been caused by the enthronement of Awemu II because, before this time, Fon Afungchwi I of Bambili had had frictions with the Babanki tribe over the collection of royalties from the Fulani graziers who had recently settled on the Sabga Hills.143 The people of Bambili further claimed that their Fon could not have had expansionist tendencies since they arrived in the area before the Babanki-Tungo group, and could have objected to their settling in the area if they wanted expansion. Therefore, in the Bambili’s version of the story, their neighbours of Babanki-Tungo are to be blamed for not being grateful. Following our investigations, it would be an overstatement to say that the enthronement of Awemu II was the single reason behind the subsequent territorial disputes between the above-mentioned communities. Besides that, economic factors are believed to be at the heart of this conflict. 140

Interview with Loh Mufi Emmanuel, Bambui, May 15th 2007.

141 Interview with Vifieh Clement, Sabga, May 18th 2007, as confirmed by Loh Mufi

Emmanuel. E. Kant, 1969, Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals, Indianapolis, Bobbs, Merill, p.12. 143 Interview with Awemu II, Bambili, May 19th 2007. 142

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As noticed in similar cases in this work, the land is a resource over which much blood has flowed in history. Many disputes both within and between countries have centred over the simple control of territory. The Bambili-Babanki-Tungo case is not different. The “Ntah” area over which the two villages have been fighting (see Map 4) is a very fertile land rich in black humus soil which is good for cultivation. The climate in the area is also cool and conducive for the cultivation of vegetables like tomatoes, huckleberries, carrots, cabbage and leek amongst others. Given that most of these vegetables are highly demanded in big towns like Yaounde and Douala, much land is needed to cultivate them.144 Besides, most of Bambili’s farmland at “Nibie” quarter was taken over by the Government for the construction of the Cameroon College of Arts, Science and Technology (CCAST) Bambili, the Higher Teachers’ Training College commonly known by its French acronym (ENS Annex), the School for Agriculture and the University Teaching Hospital (CUSS Annex) Bambili. Part of this area was also reserved for the construction of the University of Bamenda. Since most of these lands were used for these establishments, the Bambili decided to move upwards to the land which was formerly used for hunting by the contesting and neighbouring communities.145 Another economic cause of the disputes is the arrival of the Mbororo at Sabga. Around 1905, the leader of the Fulani group called Sabga arrived at their present site and occupied it for grazing their cattle. This was done with the approval of the German colonial administration. Meanwhile, the people of Babanki-Tungo claim that they had donated land to the Fulani to settle and pay them royalties. The Bambili, on their part, questioned how the Babanki could have donated such vast land to Sabga when they needed land themselves. They claimed, therefore, that the Sabga village was found in Bambili, and as such, its inhabitants were supposed to pay royalties to Bambili.146 It was this argument that led the British to attempt the demarcation of the villages, leading to more disputes. Today, the Sabga graziers pay royalties to the Fon of Bambili. However, they have refused to get involved in the disputes between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo. The quest for more agricultural land and royalties further fuelled the conflict.147 The increase in population in any given community in the world has always been accompanied by a series of problems. Although population growth is encouraged as a source of cheap labour in the developing world, its main drawback is to provide food, shelter and protection for the growing 144

Interview with Miyama Caroline, Mendankwe, 19 March 2007. Asongwe, 2007, p.24. 146 Interview with Viyouh Nelson, Sheleh, Babanki-Tungo, May 18th 2007. 147 Interview with Viyouh Nelson. 145

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population. In the words of Michael Alan, the growth of the population in an area has always had positive and negative consequences. Michael Alan expressed that: The growth of population especially in less developed ethnic groups in Africa has been very fast over the years. Though a good source of cheap labour especially for African extended families, it is disadvantageous, especially where land is limited. This is because; the many newly born will need land which is fixed. The end result is always inter-tribal conflicts as the excess populations will always seek land from their neighbours either through peace or aggression. This has been the cause of many intercommunities conflicts in Sub Sahara Africa today.148

It is recorded that when the two villages migrated to their various sites, they had very few inhabitants. Bambili numbered only about a total of two hundred and ten (210) women, men and children.149 Later on, many more groups joined the two villages and increased their populations. The group of Tikars that migrated from Widikum joined the Bambili natives, thereby increasing their population. In the same vein, many more people who were not comfortable living in Big-Babanki (Kedjom Keku) left the village and migrated to meet their other family members in Babanki-Tungo (Small-Babanki). The coming of the Sabga in 1905 also helped increase the population. Over the years, many people entered Bambili either as staff of the many government institutions or as students of the many government schools in Bambili.150 The increased migration into Bambili and Babanki-Tungo added to the high birth rates recorded since the two groups settled permanently in the area. This increase in population translated into the need for more land for farming and settlement. It was this rush by the two communities to occupy the land at Ntah that had been long abandoned to graziers that led to the controversial questions of ownership.151 Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the population growth of the area under study in two historical periods. In 1913, the population of Babanki-Tungo amounted to two thousand (2,000) people while that of Bambili stood at one thousand one hundred and sixty (1,160).152 Later on in 1925, the populations of the two 148

M. Alan Park, 1999, Introducing Anthropology; An Integrated Approach, London, May Field Publishing Company, p.124-126. 149 (NAB), File no 318/16 of 27 January 1919, Bamenda District Native Population Statistics, p.6. 150 Interview with Mathew Motale Itoe, Bamenda, June 16th 2008. 151 Interview with Mathew Motale Itoe, Bamenda, June 16th 2008. 152 (NAB), Files No 318/10/27/1/1916, Populations of Villages in 1913.

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villages grew to two thousand seven hundred and twenty (2,720) for Babanki-Tungo, and one thousand seven hundred and thirty-nine (1,739) for Bambili as shown in tables 6 and 7. Recently in 2001, the population rose to seventeen thousand (17,000) for Babanki-Tungo and fifteen thousand (15,000) for Bambili. It is, therefore, clear that this increase in population required serious attention from the administration to control and reallocate land for cultivation and shelter. Given that such land was limited in the agglomerations, the hunting land which until then was not cultivated had to become a bone of contention. This seriously helped fuel land disputes between the two communities. Table 5: Population of villages of Bafut Area in 1925 Villages Bafut Babanki BabankiTungo Bambui Bafreng Bamenda Bambili

No. of Males 2,463 542 648 413 668 287 208

No. of Females 3,047 656 898 476 871 532 400

No. of Boys 1,804 403 579 293 447 334 501

No. of Girls 1,720 411 591 247 416 284 630

Total Population 9,048 2,018 2,720 1,429 2,407 1,441 1,739

Source: (NAB), Ab23, 1925, An Assessment report on the clans of Bandop Area in Bamenda Division of Cameroon Province.

Table 6: Population of villages of Tubah Sub-Division in 2001 Village

Population

Kedjom Keku Babanki-Tungo Finge Bambui Baforkum Bambili

18,000 17,000 4,000 12,000 500 15,000

Source: Tubah Rural Council Archives, March 2002 Monographic Study.

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Individuals have always influenced events in international relations when forums are granted to expose or express their desires. Such individuals, who are respected for their positions in society, always use the latter to create good relationships between their communities and neighbours, or create differences between them. At times, the actions of such influential individuals are based on personal rather than communal interest.153 As Karen Mingst posits, “some individual leaders have aggressive characteristics that lead them to bring their communities to conflict with others for personal gain”.154 On the other hand, Hughes Ginnett emphasizes that “such conflicts occur because the goals of such individuals in two communities are incompatible”.155 The role of the elites in causing inter-community disputes in the Grassfields of Cameroon has been evoked by observers, and this could also be the case in the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo territorial claims. The two villages have accused each other’s elites of inciting conflicts. These elites are said to have personal interests that they want to achieve. From the perspective of the Babanki-Tungo, whenever a Bambili man is appointed to a position of administrative power, the dispute will always resurface. The case of S.N. Kindo, who was the Secretary of State in then West Cameroon, illustrates this point. Sources revealed that S.N. Kindo used his position to illegally grab much land for his people.156 He is the one who signed as a witness to the agreement between the Fon of Bambili and the Fon of Babanki-Tungo in 1973. The natives of BabankiTungo also claimed that he equally used his position to block the appeal launched by Babanki-Tungo to the Westmacott decision.157 According to the natives of Babanki-Tungo, politics and the role of some elites such as Peter Abety Alange of Bambili as Minister in Charge of Special Duties at the Presidency of the Republic have helped fuel the differences between the two communities. He had been constantly accused of fuelling the disputes when he was appointed in the early 1990s. In the words of one elite;

153

P. Conrad Kottak, 2004, Anthropology: The exploration of Human Diversity used, Boston, Mc Crawtill Company, p.614. 154 Karen Mingst, 1999, Essentials of international relations, New York, University of Kentung WW Norton and company, p. 145. 155 Hughes Ginnetti, 2002, Leadership, Enhancing the Lesson of Experience, 4th ed, New York, Mcgraw Hill Company, p.78. 156 Hughes Ginnetti, 2002, p.78. 157 Anuafor Asongwe, 2007, p.30.

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Chapter Two When late Kindo came up as Secretary of State in the then West Cameroon, he could use the advantage and grab much land for his people. The appeal launched by Babanki-Tungo to the Westmacott decision was never heard, thanks to his influence. When he left his position, there was no dispute until Honourable Abety Peter Alange was appointed Minister of Special Duties in 1994. He probably intervened because of his personal interest, after all, he owns three quarter (3/4) of the land in the disputed area.158

According to the Fon of Babanki-Tungo, whenever a native of Bambili is appointed to a high position in government, he uses this position to grab land for himself and his people. This situation is not quite different from that of the Oku and Mbesa land crisis. Many Mbesa natives claimed that the decision over the disputed area of Embel had always been advantageous to the natives of Oku since they had a Governor and a Prime Minister.159 The people of Bambili, on the contrary, regard their elites as peaceloving leaders who would not want to see the village in trouble. Instead, they accuse the Babanki-Tungo elites of being the cause of the problem. Awunti of Babanki-Tungo, (Cabinet Minister), Male Emmanu (cattle rarer), and Emmanuel Loh Mufi (Mayor of Tubah) amongst others have been often accused of fuelling the conflicts for their interests. From this regard, it is verified that the elites are all cattle owners who needed large land to graze their cattle. Emmanuel Loh Mufi, for example, has vast grazing land in the contested area.160 As far as the Babanki-Tungo’s claim is concerned, the people of Bambili maintained that it is true Peter Abety has a piece of land near the disputed area, but his possession is not part of the contested area. Also, the natives of Bambili believe that piece of land belongs to the entire village. People have farms there, but cannot claim land ownership. That is the reason why the Fon intended to partition the land to youths when the disputes will be over.161 Concerning the role of cabinet ministers from Bambili, it is accepted by Chwingum that the elites have their political showground not limited only to Bambili but the whole of Tubah Sub-division, including Babanki-Tungo. They cannot thus be fighting to seize their land when they

158

Ibid. Interview with Viyouh Nelson, Sheleh, age 33, Fon of Babanki-Tungo, May 18th 2007. 160 Anuafor, 2007, p.31. 161 Interview with Awemu II, age 72, Fon of Bambili, May 19th 2007. 159

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are expecting the people to vote.162 Reacting to the Babanki Tungo claim, Peter Abety posited that; The Babanki-Tungo people cannot claim I started the disputes between the two villages. These disputes started in the early 1950s when I was in primary school. How could I have started the disputes then? The wars that took place from 1991 to 1996 cannot be said to have been started by my being a cabinet minister. Remember that the wars started in 1991 but I was only made minister in 1994. Instead, I think it is the very nature of the Babanki-Tungo man that started the disputes. We do not expect people who could not agree with their own brothers and split to be at peace but with their neighbours. Throughout their history, the Babanki people have always been warriors who even once fought, defeated and beheaded the Fon of Balikumbat and brought to their village. How do you expect such a warrior people to be at peace with their neighbours? I think my political leaning is the cause of the Babanki claim. I don’t think I have contributed to the disputes especially as the two villages are all in my political arena.163

Whatever the situation, one needs to have mastery of the previous cases of land and boundary conflicts in the region, to establish an appropriate view of the above statement. What is factual is that the actions of an individual or a few individuals have always contributed in one way or another, to the recurrent land disputes in the mentioned locality. According to the present Fon of Babanki-Tungo (H.R.M Viyouh Nelson), the 1991 confrontation started between two individuals, a Bambili farmer and a Babanki-Tungo farmer whose farms shared common boundaries around the disputed area. Mokenyu and Veleih of Babanki-Tungo who were farming in the area reported to have noticed regular trespassing from neighbouring Bambili farmers. It was this conflict between two individuals that degenerated into an outright war between the villages in 1991.164 Both communities were probably using this piece of land for hunting before the Fulanis arrived in the 19th century with their cattle and settled on it. With the introduction of law and order (by the State), some natives of Babanki-Tungo left the valley that they had originally settled in, as they lacked land for farming. They started to farm in the highland known now as Ntah. As time went by, these two villages made claims and 162

Interview with Chwingum Anthony Takwinfor, age 65, Bambili Educated Elite on Retirement in teaching, 25 October 2008. 163 Interview with Dr. Peter Abety Alange, age 61, former minister in-charge of special duties at the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon, May 11th 2008. 164 Interview with Viyouh Nelson, Sheleh, Babanki-Tungo, May 18th 2007.

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counterclaims over this land. For the administration, it became difficult to decide who owns the piece of land. If we take into consideration the fact that the Bambili people arrived first, then we could accept the fact that the disputed land belongs to Bambili. But there is a difference between who makes a claim over the land and who effectively occupies the land. In as much as the people of Babanki-Tungo have built on and are farming on the land, one is tempted to conclude that the land belongs to them. However, for a better understanding of the history of the conflict, it is imperative to look at land ownership on the eve of colonization.165 Land was one of the most important reasons for the formation of States in the North-West Region. Even within the states, the ruling authorities struggled to control the resources; the land was important for agriculture, hunting, fishing, settlement, crafts and manufacturing, amongst others. For these reasons, the land tenure system evolved to be fundamentally communal. The German colonialists met the land tenure system on a political basis of control. The land was placed under the household, lineage or clan heads by the State. Each family, as a constituent of a lineage, had the right to land; ownership was transferred to the offspring on an inscriptive basis. This took place when the male offspring was getting married and needed a piece of land.166 Land, therefore, constituted the basic form of property, status and prestige in society. However, the development of a monarchical system of government and social stratification transferred the basis of land ownership to chiefs. Nonetheless, communal ownership dominated, and all land was, in principle, under the control of the Fons who administered it through their officials, including the neighbourhood warden and village chief. They equally developed local laws and customs prohibiting the sale of land, but made it possible for easy transfer from one noble to another. Under this arrangement, the right to perform sacrifices to a local god or other ancestors was also transferred. Only these nobles could own large pieces of land or be designed to do this transfer. Similarly, land could be distributed to non-lineage members, only after taking into consideration the interest of the immediate lineage and descendants. In the same way, the settlement on any land within a state by an outsider was permitted only by the Fon through his administrative officials.167 The coming of the British colonial administration in 1916 saw the introduction of the certificate of occupancy. This meant that when the Fon possessed a piece of land, he could lease it out for ninety-nine years to his subjects or tenants. But it should be noted that this did not confer 165

Tangie Ngengong, 2007, pp.34-35. Ibid, p.35. 167 Ibid. 166

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titles, because it was leased to the individual, yet the Fon remained the landlord. According to the 1974 land ordinances discussed in Chapter One, the certificate of occupancy was abolished and followed by Decree No 76/165/27 of April 1976 in which new conditions were established for obtaining the new document, a land certificate. It is difficult to tell whether it should be regarded as private property. Article one of the Decree stipulates that a land certificate shall be the only authentic document of real property rights to land. This meant that without this document, it was difficult, if not impossible, to claim land. And with this document (land certificate) land can be sold to someone. Concerning the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo land conflict, each group had claimed ownership of the disputed piece of land, yet none can show any document to support their claim. Instead, the Bambili natives point to the lake as their ancestral home. They also maintain that libations are poured into this lake once a year to appease the ancestors and to have a good harvest during the farming season. The natives of Babanki-Tungo also consider the lake and the entire piece of land as theirs. More still, none of the villages seems to possess a land certificate of occupancy, probably due to their ignorance of land ownership issues. If they had met the administration earlier on the issue, they could have got vital information to orientate their actions. What is disturbing as far as land title procedure is concerned, is who should produce the certificate. Is it the individual or the community? If it is the community, could it be possible for the whole community to possess one certificate? Here the role of the Fon becomes very important. He is, according to what existed before colonization, the lord of the manor who leases out land to his subjects. This is evident in a letter written by the Fon of Babanki-Tungo, on 29th of June 1973, to the Assistant Cattle Control Officer of the Bafut Area Council. In that letter, The Fon said: […] This is to certify that I the Fon of Babanki-Tungo have given a plot to Mr Fulum Joseph of Mbuateh-Tengam nearest to Aigh Ale at the lake. He is going to do farming there and to make a fence round the farming plot. So I hereby wish to inform you and your office to let you know […].168

With this, it is clear that the Fon owns the land, and leases or distributes it to his subjects. In the event of ethnic conflict, it is expected that his subjects would come out to defend their land, firstly because the Fon is looked upon as the hope of any ethnic group. In the same manner, 168

Provincial Archives Bamenda (PAB), Fon of Babanki-Tungo to the Assistant Cattle Control Officer, Bafut Area Council, June 29th 1973.

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the individuals and elites could lead their communities into conflict, but this can only be possible if the two communities are in favour of a conflict. What is clear is that the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo had collective or individual disagreements over the farmlands area before the intervention of these varying Fons, politicians and administrators who have mostly helped to fuel the hostilities.

b. Manifestation The territorial conflict between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo had similar patterns with others (still to be discussed) in the North-West Region. The conflict opposing the people of Bambili to those from Babanki-Tungo was earlier noticed on the eve of Independence. Episodes of this conflict resurfaced in the early 1990s. In fact, the land conflict between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo manifested itself in three principal ways. From 1950 to 1958 it was characterized by lawsuits filed by the contestants. From 1950 to 1978 it led to the signing of the Bambili/Babanki-Tungo entente. This second period can be called the “thaw” or less manifested conflict. The last period, from 1973 to 1998, was characterized by skirmishes, threats, suspicion and outright warfare. It ended in 1998 with yet another lawsuit. The natives of Bambili filed a lawsuit against the people of Babanki-Tungo in the Bafut Native Court in 1953.169 As already mentioned, this claim was made over a piece of land bordering the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo villages, which had been given to Babanki-Tungo by Bambili, Bandja and Bamessi when Babanki-Tungo split from BigBabanki. The court judgment of 11th of December 1953 drew a line dividing the piece of land on the hills on the west side of the outlet of the lake and valley. The court granted Bambili part of the land which they had claimed. This land stretched from the German-drawn boundary170 of Babanki-Tungo, 169

Civil Suit N°23/53. As earlier discussed in our theoretical framework, Boundaries mark the sharp edge of the territorial limits within which the states exercise their distinct jurisdictions. They are, therefore, the lines of contact, more often for conflict than for harmony, between rival systems of governmental control. A boundary could also be the line of delimitation or demarcation between administrative units or between geographical regions of various types, Asiwaju (1985). It is imperative to make a distinction between natural and artificial boundaries. While the issue of carving out boundaries is natural to man, these boundaries are artificial. According to Asiwaju (1985), artificial boundaries are those boundary lines which though not being dependent upon natural features of the surface of earth for their selection, have been artificially or arbitrarily created by men. In ancient Greece and Rome, and during 170

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including Mendankwe and Kukets up to the hills west of the lake and valley. The Bambili population was not satisfied with the 11th of December 1953 decision. Consequently, they appealed, and in the judgement of the 15th of July 1955, the Appeal Court shifted the line to the high grazing land near the escarpment beyond the Bambili village. Yet, they were still not satisfied and called for a review by the Colonial District Officer. On the 8th of September 1956, the Assistant Divisional Officer, Ward, rendered his review judgement which came close to giving Bambili most of the land they had been claiming. While he was trying to solve the conflict, Ward noticed mounting disagreements from the Babanki-Tungo community. They later showed their discontent by asking for a review. On the 15th of May 1958, A.B. Westmacott, the colonial resident in Bamenda, gave his judgment. According to Westmacott, Ward’s decision was one-sided, since he maintained that many natives of Babanki-Tungo were affected and no Bambili man was even required to make a choice. Westmacott inspected the land and decided that Babanki-Tungo should remain in possession of the land which they now occupy, but that all the grazing land on the Bambili side which was then unoccupied should be confirmed as belonging to Bambili. The legal battle over the conflict involved moving from one court to another; from the Bafut Native Court to the High Court of Appeal, from the Divisional Officer in Bamenda through the advisory bodies to the President, Westmacott. The Westmacott decision has remained on the map, meaning that it was never implemented on the ground. What was required was a visible demarcation of the decision on the map, that is, physical marking on the ground to show the border of the disputed area. Obviously, the two villages reacted differently when this decision was made public on the 15th of May 1958. The population of Bambili was not satisfied with the decision. In April 1959, the Fon of Bambili protested against the decision of the Government of the Southern Cameroons.171 On the 8th of July 1959, the Deputy Commissioner of the Southern Cameroons, J.A.A. Tamkoh, replied to the Fon, announcing that his petition was rejected. The natives of Babanki-Tungo were not satisfied with the Westmacott decision either. As a result, they paid the sum of 138,400 CFA francs in July 1967 as a deposit the Middle Ages, there were no fixed boundary lines between political communities. The limits of a state jurisdiction were vague; there were border zones but no fixed lines. The need for fixed boundaries arose as the modern states of Western Europe replaced the Holy Roman Empire. 171

In Civil Suit No. 23/53.

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for an appeal against part of the marked areas by the 1958 decision. Unfortunately, this appeal was never heard. However, on the 25th of July 1973, both villages signed an agreement acknowledging and accepting the Westmacott decision as the only authentic document. It was hoped that the decision would put an end to the long-standing dispute between the two communities. The entente was signed by the Fons of Babanki-Tungo and Bambili for their villages. This understanding was witnessed by the Cameroon government representative, Ngonge Sone, B.N. Mukong, the representative of Babanki-Tungo, S.N. Nkindo who represented Bambili, and several land survey officers.172 As a result of the entente, peace reigned in the area and in the Bamenda region in general for more than a decade. Unfortunately, the Westmacott Decision and the 1973 accord were later rejected and the conflict took a different dimension and magnitude in the early 1990s. The conflict led to an accumulation of weapons, the rising aspirations of the peoples and their rulers to expand and annex the piece of land under dispute, and also the involvement of politicians and the training of local militiamen. These factors increased threats, tension and fear among the people of both villages. These aspects culminated in open clashes in 1991, 1993 and 1995. Before the outbreak of the war in 1991, the 1973 peace accord had been violated. On 1 August 1981, the Fon of Bambili reported to the Civil Administration that the natives of Babanki-Tungo continued their activities in the disputed area. In response to this, on the 17th of April 1986, the District Officer of Tubah reported to the Divisional Officer for Mezam what he called a provocative trespass into Bambili land by the natives of BabankiTungo. In his reply, the Divisional Officer for Mezam stated that he had summoned the gang leaders of the aggressors to his office for interrogation and cautioning. Despite this, the provocation continued uninterrupted. On May 24th 1991, the people of Bambili went to the disputed area and started farming. On the 25th of May 1991, the Babanki-Tungo community attacked their Bambili neighbours. This led to the outbreak of the Bambili/BabankiTungo War of 1991. On the 27th of July 1991, the Babanki-Tungo reported to the Civil Administration of Tubah that the natives of Bambili had illegally started activities in the disputed area.173 By Prefectoral Order No. 194/712/S. 1 of the 27th of March 1991, the Senior Divisional Officer of Mezam set up a commission to study the written decision and retrace the boundary between Bambili and BabankiTungo. Before this Prefectural Order, there had been hostilities on the 1st of 172 173

Tangie Ngengong, 2007, p.38. Tangie Ngengong, 2007, p.38.

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January 1991 at the disputed site, which resulted in a District Injunction Order that restrained all parties from carrying out any development on the disputed area. While the exercise was going on, the disturbances of the 25th of May 1991 started.174 In the afternoon of May 24th 1991, the Regent of Babanki-Tungo reported to Jum Martin Ndiyeng, the Divisional Officer for Tubah that the Bambili natives had violated the Injunction Order. The DO for Tubah requested him to proceed to his people and tell them to remain calm until the DO take the necessary administrative action. Early in the morning of the 25th of May, information reached the DO that there were hostilities in the disputed area and that it was alleged that one Yufanyi Chwimin was shot. The Brigade Commander and the DO quickly arranged for reinforcement from Bamenda since the Brigade elements in Tubah were few and could not control the situation. Before then, the Brigade Commander had attempted to go to the scene, in vain, as a result of the fight roadblocks. Meanwhile, the traditional rulers of both communities were contacted to that effect.175 Reinforcement came from Banja and Bambui. Government officials proceeded to the area where two corpses laid. The corpses were identified as Awemo Martin and Asongwe Martin, all natives of Bambili. It was also noted that crops in Yufanyi’s compound were all destroyed and his cattle taken away. While the DO and some government officials were on the hills to witness the situation, hostilities continued in Bambili where all property and compounds belonging to natives of Babanki-Tungo were destroyed by the indigenous people of Bambili. To that effect, there was no alternative than to evacuate the Babanki. These people were all kept in the Brigade for safety. Then, the DO of Tubah was briefed by natives of Bambili that seven women of Bambili origin were kidnapped in the Babanki-Tungo market and taken to the Regent.176 On the morning of the 26th of May 1991, Bambili women staged a protest at the DO’s house and threw the children of the kidnapped women at the administrator, chanting evil songs. Out of fear of an eventual attack on the Brigade, the commander ordered a quick evacuation to Bamenda. Having succeeded in calming the women the Company Commander, the forces of 174

Sub Divisional Archives Tubah (SDAT), Report, Ref No. E 29-01.2/165/229, “Report on Hostilities between the people of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo”, Tubah Sub Division, May 1991, p.2. 175 Sub Divisional Archives Tubah (SDAT), Report, Ref No. E 29-01.2/165/229, p.4. 176 W. Kwi Gam, 1998, “Boundary Conflicts in the Bamenda Grassfields c.19501995: A case study of the Bambili and Babanki Boundary Conflict”, Master Dissertation in History, University of Buea, p.85.

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law and order and the DO proceeded to the battleground to ensure that there were no more hostilities. These officials also proceeded to the palace of Babanki to get back the kidnapped women. Their mission to the palace was successful as the women were released to their families. Relative calm returned in the Bambili community and the Three-Corners. On the 28th of May 1991, Bell Luc René, Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam, flanked by some administrative and local authorities, visited the area to evaluate the damages caused on the property of the Babanki natives residing in Bambili. At the disputed area, an additional corpse was registered. This time it was a Babanki-Tungo man, killed by bullets and butchered. He was identified as Zhuh Ngonange Emmanuel, aged 39.177 After the SDO had educated the people on the need for peace, the communities at loggerheads agreed to ensure peace among them until the Commission to be set up by the SDO to probe into the matter completed its work. Both parties went back to their respective villages after having assured the SDO that they would maintain maximum peace. On the following day, 29th of May, reports of aggression by the Babanki-Tungo on the Bambili natives were filed by the latter, including a messenger sent by the Fon of Bambili. Reinforcement of forces of law and order was requested and upon their arrival, the DO of Tubah, M. Jum realised that the situation was not that chaotic. However, three individuals found with arms in the disputed area were arrested; Ndifon Henry of Babanki-Tungo, Mamuluh Cornelins of Babanki-Tungo and Emmanuel Bedang of Bambili community. They were all taken to the Tubah Brigade for further questioning.178 From this account, it is obvious that the violation of the agreement between the two communities led to the escalation of the armed conflict from time to time since both parties seemed unsatisfied with the decision. The terms of the agreement explained that any person encroaching on the disputed area would be penalized by the administration as was the case with the three fellows found with arms in the disputed area. Similarly, trespassers and gang leaders were called and cautioned by the DO, following the early confrontation between these two communities where many people were wounded, died, and others were displaced after their homes were destroyed. After the confrontation, the DO of Tubah and the SDO of Mezam, Bell Luc René, set up an administrative commission to investigate and resolve the

177

(SDAT), Ref No. E 29-01.2/165/230, “Report on Hostilities between the people of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo”, Tubah Sub Division, May 1991, p.4. 178 Interview with Sama Benjamin, Bamenda, July 2nd 2008.

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problem.179 The 1991 commission began to retrace the conflict area on the map in an attempt to satisfy both parties. Despite all the painstaking efforts to resolve the dispute, the inhabitants of Babanki-Tungo violated one of the terms of the commission; that of not farming around the disputed area. The inhabitants from both villages attempted to expand their farms and by so doing, crossed the line to the other village. The Babanki-Tungo inhabitants struggled to dry up Lake Bambili whose water was used for the irrigation of farms, and they also threatened Bambili women working in their farms around the disputed area. The Bambili inhabitants, on their part, destroyed crops in the farms owned by natives of Babanki-Tungo and blocked the Bamenda road as well as the Bambili-Mbingo highway.180 All of these led to another war. On the 23rd of January 1993, there were renewed provocations. The people of Babanki-Tungo asserted that those from Bambili came to their territory, destroyed their crops and chopped down a young eucalyptus forest and set fire to the compound of a native of Babanki-Tungo. This act was immediately reported to the administration by the Babanki-Tungo elites. The administration claimed that there was no evidence to prove that it was Bambili inhabitants who had caused the destruction.181 According to the forces of law and order of Tubah Sub-division, those committing the crimes should have been apprehended in the course of wrongdoing. On the 26th of January 1993, the Bambili blocked the road from Bamenda to Ndop, and from Bamenda through Bandja to Babanki-Tungo, and attacked the inhabitants of Babanki-Tungo. Apart from car stops, the Bambili people pulled out their enemies from the travelling agencies to beat them. Some students schooling at the various high institutions of learning such as in CCAST and HTTC in Bambili were also targeted. Civil Servants from Babanki-Tungo were occasionally attacked at their various jobs in Bambili. Some were beaten and driven out of their job sites, and many sought refuge in neighbouring villages. During the conflict, all suspected structures such as houses belonging to Babanki natives were burnt down in Bambili. In this regard, student hostels owned by natives of Babanki-Tungo, such as “The Oasis” were burnt down by Bambili inhabitants during the clash, alongside some Babanki houses at the Three-Corners of Bambili.182 Bambili students invaded residences of students from Babanki regularly. As this was going 179

Kwi Gam, 1998, p.88. Interview with Aberty Christian Ndifor, Bambili, 25 October 2008. 181 Report by the Bambili Cultural and Development Association on 7 October 1993, on the Bambili land dispute. 182 Report by the Bambili Cultural and Development Association on 7 October 1993. 180

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on in Bambili, the Babanki-Tungo reacted similarly towards Bambili natives in Babanki-Tungo. According to the Babanki-Tungo, the hostilities happened when they had gone to Big-Babanki for the annual traditional festival known as Kabenkendong, so they had to rush back and confront their Bambili neighbours. Before the Bambili people could launch an assault, the Babanki-Tungo people had burnt down some houses and several people were wounded in the process. The senior Divisional Officer for Mezam, Samuel Sufo went to the battlefront on the 27th of January 1993 to appease the belligerents. The warring factions retreated, but fighting resumed the next day and continued for more than a week before the administration brought in the gendarmes. Six gang leaders were arrested from Babanki-Tungo for instigating the fighting and detained in the gendarmerie Brigade.183 On the 31st of January 1993, a meeting was thus convened by the SDO in the Tubah DO’s office. Conclusions were made public and a radio announcement was addressed to both communities, requesting them to completely withdraw from the disputed area until a lasting solution is arrived at. It is important to note that the war broke out when the 1991 Commission set up by the administration was still at work in its attempt to solve the problem. When the battle was over, the Divisional Officer for Tubah inspected the area and found out that both sides had violated the agreement. He implemented his own decisions, and ignored the Westmacott Decision; this move was not appreciated by both parties. A technical subcommission was formed in 1994 and charged with special functions for settling the ethnic dispute in a way acceptable to all the factions. The technical sub-commission made futile efforts to settle the conflict, as farming activities still went on unabated in the disputed area against the prescriptions of the Commission. The result was the war that broke out in 1995. As farming continued in the disputed area, in defiance of the terms of the 1994 Commission, there was evidence that conflicts caused by petty quarrels, threats and disagreements could arise in the nearest future. The next thing was an exchange of gunfire between two hunters from the rival villages who were each hunting around the disputed area. In the process, the Babanki-Tungo hunter was killed. Immediately, his village declared war against Bambili. The war was fought with renewed ferocity by both belligerents for three days until the forces of law and order intervened.184 The prompt intervention of the forces of law and order never 183 184

Report by the Bambili Cultural and Development Association on 7 October 1993. Interview with Ndofor Protus, Bambili, 26 October 2008.

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gave enough chance for any terms to be deliberated upon. When Samuel Sufo attempted another Decision on the conflict area, the natives of Babanki-Tungo took him to the Bamenda high court twice, in 1995 and 1998. The Babanki-Tungo claimed that he attempted to impose a line on them in the conflict area without referring to the Westmacott line. 1998 marked a major court hearing on this inter-village conflict. Later, similar confrontations were high-marked in the early and mid-2000s. However, what seems to be clear here is that the confrontations noticed after the year 2000 were characterized by fear, distrust and to a larger extent, skirmishes rather than wars as was the case in the 1990s. Our findings indicate that the Babanki-Tungo natives are portrayed to be more aggressive than their Bambili neighbours. This is justified by the fact that administrative authorities, especially the Senior Divisional Officer in Bamenda, had received over the years many letters of complaint from the Bambili village, lamenting the non-respect of administrative decisions by the Babanki-Tungo inhabitants. Although it cannot be denied that Bambili natives were aggressive as well, the people of Babanki-Tungo were more responsible for the hostilities since the outbreak of the boundary conflict. In the same vein, they people have shown their unwillingness to arrive at a consensus with their Bambili neighbours. It should be recalled that the two villages buried their hatchet in 1973. But as events later revealed that the Babanki-Tungo became less interested in peaceful solutions. According to letter Ref. No.ABA1O2/S.9/56 of the 8th of March 1972, the chief of Babanki-Tungo and his councillors failed to turn up to the surveyor, although they actually received his invitation. This attitude continued in 2001 when the Babanki people attacked the workers from the Ministry of Lands and Surveys who attempted to demarcate the disputed area. However, the chief of Bambili and his councillors agreed after a series of administrative threats that the area surveyor should carry on the erection of the pillars. The natives of Babanki-Tungo are portrayed as more aggressive than their Bambili neighbours. To support this claim, we shall examine three letters written to the Senior Divisional Officer in Bamenda by the Bambili elites. In the letter, Ref. No. E2901/102/s.9/74 of October 13th 1990, the Bambili elites wrote: [...] we have received a complaint from the Fon of Bambili that Saidou Anguh and 400 others in your village have trespassed into the Bambili land (doing farming and fencing the area) despite the Westmacott’s Decision which agreement you signed with the Fon of Bambili on the 25th of July 1973 with the effect that both villages were restrained from

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Another letter from the Bambili Fon’s Palace captioned “Trespass into Bambili land by the people of Babanki-Tungo”, states: “Your attention is being drawn to the fact that the people of Babanki-Tungo have continued to cause provocative activities on Bambili land by building fences with barb wires, huts and farming in the area place under core-studies”.186 Finally, letter Ref. No. E2901.2/10/vol.3/144 from the Divisional Officer of Tubah, Tabe Besong, of 17th of April 1986 to the Senior Divisional Officer Bamenda reads: “[...] in view of the unpleasant circumstances that might result, should the natives of Babanki-Tungo continue to trespass into Bambili land I would suggest that you arrange a talk with the population of that village on this subject [...]”.187 The message which is carried by these letters points to the fact that the natives of Babanki-Tungo were more aggressive than the Bambili. Although it cannot be denied that the Bambili residents were equally aggressive, the Babanki-Tungo were judged by the Cameroon Government Officials as having been the immediate causes of the outbreak of the various clashes discussed earlier.188 Whatever the form, these conflicts however, left remarkable impacts in the domains of politics, economic and social platforms on both communities.

C- Impact of the Conflict The land conflict between Bambili and Babanki Tungo had lasting ramifications which have adversely affected the political, and socioeconomic lives of the people of both villages. This section attempts to examine the impacts of the long outstanding land and boundary conflict between the two parties. The war did not only affect the belligerents but also the neighbouring Sabga and Bambui communities.

a. Political Impact In the political sphere, the boundary conflict exposed the weaknesses or the inability of the administration to resolve conflicts. The Fon of Babanki185

Kwi Gam, 1998, p.105. Report by the Bambili Cultural and Development Association on the 25 October 1993, on the Bambili/Babanki-Tungo boundary dispute. 187 Ibid. 188 Interview with Sama Benjamin, Bamenda, July 2nd 2008. 186

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Tungo, who signed the 1973 peace accord related to the disputed area, did not call on his people to stop their farming and hunting activities on the disputed land. Yet, neither he nor the people involved were penalized. The weaknesses of the civil administration were further shown by the fact that the various administrators did not understand the history of the boundary conflict. Following an interview in The Herald, Bell Luc René confirms this in his own words: I have said it over and over that the solution to this problem is not exclusively that of the administration. It concerns all of us. All of the disputes are old. For example, the Bambili/Babanki-Tungo case was resolved in 1958 by the colonial master. The real problem lies in the implementation of the decision taken at that time. The people are not helping the administration to solve this problem. I am only there to help. I am not a native of the North West Province and do not know the boundaries. I cannot sway from decisions taken before or be expected to work on empty files.189

Certain pertinent points could be deduced from the above quotation. Firstly, 1958 was pronounced as the year which gave a final verdict to the Bambili/Babanki-Tungo boundary conflict seems to portray the ignorance of the administration. This is because before the 1958 decision was taken, the colonial administrators had been worried about the issue since 1953. That year, Ward, the Colonial resident in Bamenda attempted a solution. Five years later, in 1958, his successor A.B. Westmacott modified Ward’s attempted solution. Owing to the fact that Southern Cameroons gained independence in October 1961 through reunification, the British colonial administrators were obliged to quit the territory. Since the attempted solution to the boundary quarrel was still not implemented in 1953, one expected the Cameroon administration manned by Cameroonians to better handle this issue. What is more surprising and interesting is that Bell Luc René recognised that the 1958 decision solved the problem in theory, but not in practice. The problem here is the application of the 1958 decision, which had not been an easy task for the postcolonial administration officials. Given that civil administrators have failed to implement the Westmacott decision, it is tempting to say that the government has not been much concerned about the matter. What shocked the people here was the down-to-earth refusal of the Governor to implement the decision on grounds that he was not a native of Bamenda, and therefore, does not know the boundaries of the disputed 189

Kwi Gam, 1998, p.6.

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area. As the highest-ranked administrator in the region, his statement was regrettable.190 Still, in the political dimension, the Bambili-Babanki Tungo boundary conflict exposed the weaknesses and corrupt nature of some civil and legal administrators. According to letter Ref. No. ABA: 102/50 of 12th of March 1970, the two villages were anxious to know what became of the deposits of 138,400 francs CFA paid by each side in the case. It was further confirmed in the letter that the Bambili community paid the above sum on receipts No. 81/242331 of 11th of April 1963 and 41/242959 of July 13th 1963. It is easy to establish, though the letter issued by the Senior Divisional Officer of Mezam, H.P. Sone, on the 20th of April 1971, that this money was not properly used. In the letter, the administrative authority dismissed any phrases aimed at discrediting the administration's actions. Amongst other things, the letter read “[…] these statements are meant only to discredit the Administration and also to indicate your unwillingness to abide by the decision of Dr J.N. Foncha then Prime Minister of West Cameroon[...]”.191 However, this boundary conflict has adversely affected the sense of nation-building in the area. Since the 1950s when the boundary conflict erupted, the two communities have exercised an aggressive tendency towards each other. Despite the July 1973 accord, sporadic trespasses in each other’s zones were noted, especially from the side of Babanki-Tungo. Had peaceful co-existence existed between the two communities, it is probable, and even possible, that the fertile piece of land at Ntah (which is the bone of contention) would have been effectively utilised to the advantage of both parties. The various contributions made by the inhabitants of the two communities living in the Diaspora would have gone a long way to accentuate the socio-economic structure of the two villages. It was also in this connection that each of the above communities lost portions of land in the early and mid-1990s because of frequent warfare and its consequences, notably the injunction orders and recent demarcations in 2004. Plate 1 illustrates a site view of the territories earlier mentioned. As a result of this boundary conflict, the zone has been turned almost into a war ground. The Bambili natives are fighting against the Nkwen and Bambui, while Babanki-Tungo clashes with the Balikumbat and Bamessing. Furthermore, other neighbouring villages in the North-West

190

Kwi Gam, 1998, p.6. (SDAT), References on Lettre, No. 81/242331 of 11th April, 1963 and 41/242959 of 13tth of July, 1963.

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Region tend to copy some of the actions of the belligerents in the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo land conflict.

b. Economic Impact Economically, whenever the boundary conflict surfaced, it was difficult for fresh vegetables and other farm produce from the fertile boundary area of “Ntah” to be transported to the Bamenda metropolitan market and even beyond. The consequences were two-fold: firstly, there was a scarcity of vegetables and which resulted in price hikes and secondly, the farmers experienced extreme hardship because they could not earn money and sustain their families. The trade and interaction that had been going on between the two villages effectively became difficult to be implemented. With the advent of the boundary conflict in the 1950s, the cordial interaction between the two communities significantly came to a standstill, thus generating serious difficulties for the inhabitants of both communities. The constant road blockades by the natives of Bambili led to the opening of the Babanki-Tungo-Bandja highway. This became a safety valve for the Babanki-Tungo who were the most affected by these road blockades. The opening of this highway improved the region’s road network. In this regard, the road blockades pushed the people of Babanki-Tungo to strengthen ties with the natives of Balikumbat and Bamessing in Ngoketunjia Division. These varying episodes between Babanki-Tungo and Bambili enabled Big-Babanki to normalise old-time filial affiliations with small-Babanki (Babanki-Tungo). It can be argued that the Bambili/Babanki-Tungo boundary conflict accelerated the construction of the Babanki-Tungo-Bandja highway to ease the movement of goods and services since the communities at war were all using the road blockade issue to criticise the Cameroon government for not doing enough to solve the conflict. In addition, the new road led to a normalisation of relations between the Babanki-Tungo and the Balikumbat on the one hand, and Bamessing and Big-Babanki on the other hand.192 This type of new relations during periods of conflicts was simply to request for all necessary assistance during and after conflicts. Another economic consequence was that the tourism industry in Tubah Sub-Division was particularly affected. The geographical location of Lake Bambili attracted tourists from around and beyond the North-West Region. Besides, the killing of cows and looting did not only affect the owners particularly as much as it did affect the government. The major 192

Interview with Aberty Christian Ndifor, Bambili, 25 October 2008.

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source of income for the Fulani people was the proceeds from the sale of cattle. Livelihood was jeopardized when they lost some and were unable to sell their cattle.193

c. Social Impact From a social perspective, the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo communities suffered a considerable number of deaths during the wars. Properties like houses, cattle and other fixed assets were damaged. Men, women and children were rendered homeless as has been the case in other war-torn areas. Many people were left without families, while others were mutilated and rendered inactive for the rest of their lives. For instance, during the 1991 conflict, a group of Babanki-Tungo inhabitants attacked Yafamwi Chimia, the quarter head of the main disputed area. Some informants testified that his cows and money were taken away and his property damaged.194 It is reported that his aggressors were armed with guns, cutlasses and spears. They inflicted considerable damage which cost the victim three fences around his compound, and his crops (plantains, maize and bananas) were either destroyed or looted. As the Bambili natives rushed to the scene to rescue the children, some of them were shot and others sustained injuries. Furthermore, when the boundary conflict crystallized into warfare in the early l990s, natives of Babanki-Tungo who were students in Bambili were prevented from writing their end-of-year examinations, as evidenced by letters Nos; E.2901.2/165/109 and E/290l.2/C.2/lO/4/11 respectively, captioned “insecurity of students in institutions in Bambili […]” from the Bambili Fon’s palace. This situation was also accepted by the Director of ENS and the Principal of CCAST Bambili. The Fon wrote to the DO of Tubah Sub Division as follows; Your earlier correspondence, I wish to dare say that it was due to specific circumstances which generated this state of insecurity, namely, the invasion of my village by the neighbouring Babanki-Tungo and the consequent repercussions of destruction of property around this semiurban agglomeration over a boundary dispute which has remained unresolved since the colonial days. It was not felt within the CCAST complex only, it shrouded my entire village and students of BabankiTungo went without exams.195

193

Interview with Ndofor Protus, Bambili, 26 October 2008. Kwi gam, 1998, p.97. 195 (SDAT), A Letter addressed by Fon Awemo II, to the Divisional Officer, Tubah Sub-division, June 14th 1991. 194

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The Fon was reacting to the Babanki-Tungo version of the story that said their students were sent out of examination halls by the Bambili natives sent by the Fon. The Fon of Bambili refuted this allegation and maintained that the act was carried out by vandals from Bambili. Whatever the case, Babanki-Tungo students were momentarily prevented by the natives of Bambili from writing their examinations. Apart from students, the majority of Babanki-Tungo natives and civil servants working in Bambili were not safe. This was shown in a correspondence from BabankiTungo addressed to the Governor of the North West Province, Bell Luc René. According to the Babanki-Tungo: […] every bit of thing in Bambili that had any relation to a KedjomKetinguh (Babanki Tungo) element, including our houses, cars, domestic [sic] animals and household property were destroyed. We now find it absolutely impossible for us to live and work in Bambili as we are completely unsafe in the place. We are therefore appealing very strongly to the Governor to come to our aid now that most of us are refugees in our own Province since we cannot pass through Bambili […].196

This meant that the Babanki-Tungo community in Bambili lived in perpetual fear and insecurity as a result of the boundary conflict. There were about 181 Babanki-Tungo natives living in Bambili and they exerted a considerable influence on the daily activities of the region. Unfortunately, the natives threatened their existence in Bambili. In a related issue, some of the people from Babanki-Tungo who were working in Bambili preferred to be transferred as a result of the antagonistic sentiments shown towards them by the Bambili residents. At the health centre, Shey Ngafi Francis stated that one of his workers named Kendong Bertha held the view that with the present insecurity, she would prefer against her wish, a transfer from Bambili to another health unit where her security could at least be guaranteed. Moreover, the contributions made by both communities during and after the war were enormous. These contributions involved both an administrative request to individual levels. This is because during the wars, contributions in cash and in kind were needed to assist the victims. Administratively, money was needed from both communities to set up commissions to work on the boundaries.197 As earlier mentioned, many people were wounded or killed, and some were displaced to unknown 196

(SDAT), A Letter addressed by the President, Babanki-Tungo Cultural Association through the Sub-divisional Officer Tubah Sub-division to the Governor of the then North West Province, 28th May, 1991. 197 Interview with Ndofor Protus, Bambili, 26 October 2008.

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destinations. Table 7 illustrates the recorded victims by gunshot resulting from the 1991 conflict. The statistics of Table 7 shows that all 10 patients were operated upon and bullets removed from their bodies at the Health Centre. 8 patients were referred to the hospital for an X-ray of soft tissue to identify situations of bullets for removal, among whom 1 was in critical condition due to a head injury. 21 patients had their wounds treated and sent home to report every day for wound dressings except complications set in. From the table, only one patient from Babanki-Tungo named Zuh Francis was killed at 3 corners Bambili. He was equally referred to the Bamenda Provincial Hospital. A total of 38 victims were received at the Bambili Health Centre. It should be noted that the 6 wounded persons of Babanki-Tungo origin were admitted at the Ndop Hospital. These persons were: Asah joseph, Chia Lucas, Samuel Nsamoh, Peter Zhuh Kendong, James Vivesi and Samuel Che.198 In the absence of the three deceased in Table 7, two people were reported dead at the battlefront and the DO for Tubah ordered Shey Ngafi Francis, the Chief of Centre CUSS Annex Bambili, for burial.199 Plate 1: Partial View of the Loosed Territories by Both Communities

A

198

(SDAT), DOs Report, Ref No. E 29-01.2/165/230, “Report on Hostilities between the people of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo”, Tubah Sub-division, May 1991, p.5. 199 Archives of Health Centre CUSS Annex Bambili, Correspondence to the Divisional Officer Tubah, Ref. No. 150/BDTHC/TSD/A4, May 27th 1991.

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C

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D

Source: Snapped by author, Tubah Sub-division, 15 July 2007. Note: A and B: Are Photos of Contested site taken from Bambili C and D: Are Photos of contested site taken from Babanki Tungo

Besides the wounded and dead victims, the situation at hand became more serious when it was noticed that the conflict displaced many students of Babanki origin together with a good number of families whose parents worked and lived in some of the renowned government institutions located in Bambili. Table 7 illustrates some cases recorded after the 1991 conflict.

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Table 7: The May 1991 List of Victims Registered in the Bambili Health Centre Gunshot victims operated and bullets removed at Health Center Bambili John Tafa, Shombong David, Ndumo Paul, Richard Bajong, Zacheus Asanga, Benedict Ashongmbeng, Ndumu Joseph, Joseph Takang, Christopher Chenui and Nico Ekongwe Total: 10

Victims referred to Hospital for serious injuries

Victims treated and sent home

Deaths

Taminang Chigsi Joseph, Joseph Tamukom, Mabo Augustine, Ashano John, Martina Sandoh, Richard Achinui, Afegenui Isaac and Zuh Francis (from Babanki) Total: 08

Mushongong Martin George, David Tih Asongwe Achu, Christina (from Formbong, Rahel Bambili) Lem, Awantang Valintine, Awamo Nicodemus Martin Ikongne, David (from Akongnui, Peter Bambili) Forbigi, Max Ajeh, Gregory Anuafor, And Christopher Chenui, Zhuh Gregory Takui, Ngongage Anthony Asongwe, Emmanuel martin Awemo, (from Peter Nforkeh, Nkeh Denis, Forlum Babanki) Tenislo, Gregory Che, Tangie Fungsa Total: 03 and Ashongwe peter Total: 21 Source: The Archives of Health Centre CUSS Annex Bambili for May 1991.

As seen in Table 8, the displaced families of Babanki-Tungo origin migrated to Bamenda after their property and houses were burnt down. It should be noted that most of these persons were civil servants attached to TSA, MINEPIA, RCA, CCAST, ENS, Health, ONAREF and others in Bambili while some were traders. However, this list is not exhaustive since some displaced persons were either in Babanki-Tungo or elsewhere for the time being. Some were students who had been living with some friends in Bambui in order to complete their examinations. Besides, some people were

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still missing even though the DO and some government officials instructed natives of both communities to intensify the search for the missing.200 Table 8; Displaced Families of Babanki Tungo Origin Names of Victims Tifah Elias Tinsuh Amuh Martin A. Abonyang David Abongeh Abuh David Nkwoh Johnson Akongwe James Makwando Z. Nse Nse Peter Akong Kendong Benita N. Joseph Nkwih Nyingchuo Mathias Kanyu Joseph Chumbom Moses Mukengu Isaac Zhuh Francis Agustin Tum Chuyum David Kubam Emmanuel Muffui Esther Angu Peter Kenyim Akuli Joseph Alfred Nkwain Ategfon Silvester Ngong Benjamin

Number of Wives 2 3 1 3 3 1 1 (not available) 1 husband 1 1 1 (not available) (not available) 1 1 1 1 (not available) 1 3 1 1 2

Number of Children 5 12 2 14 8 3 7 (not available) 4 non 5 4 (not available) (not available) 5 5 7 3 8 5 19 5 4 10

Source: Sub Divisional archives, DOs Report, Ref No. E 29-01.2/165/230, “Report on Hostilities between the people of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo”, Tubah Sub Division, May 1991, p.7.

We said that some Bambili natives erected road blockades against their enemies, the Babanki Tungo and any other group that supported them. The consequences of these blockades were severe, especially in the 200

Interview with Sama Benjamin, Bamenda, July 2nd 2008.

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Babanki-Tungo community. Given that almost all the Civil/Health services are located in Bambili, the people of Babanki-Tungo were cut off from these social amenities. During the conflict, the blockades made it difficult for the victims of the war to be evacuated to government medical health centres in Bambili and Bamenda. The movement to nearby mission hospitals in Bafut and Mbingo was equally interrupted. Apart from the inability to evacuate war victims, the inhabitants of Babanki-Tungo were barred from passing through Bambili. The people of Babanki-Tungo people could not retaliate because the natives of Bambili had nothing to gain by going to Babanki-Tungo. In order to "balance the equation", the people from Big-Babanki who claimed cultural affiliation with Babanki-Tungo, erected road blockades against the natives of Bambili. The natives of Big-Babanki had an additional reason for raising road blockades: one of their pronounced princes and apparent heir to the throne was killed during a confrontation with the people of Bambili.201 In conclusion, this chapter has described the geographical and historical context of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo. It has shown that both communities are located in the administrative unit of Tubah Sub-Division of Mezam Division of the North-West Region of Cameroon. Many factors influenced both the distribution of plant and animal life and also determined human occupation, especially the settlement patterns which have characterised the degree of inter-community conflict. In line with the historical context, it has also discussed the origins and migrations of both communities which claimed Tikar origin. As Tikars, the Bambili and Babanki Tungo people originated from Ndobo in Northern Cameroon. They lived originally to the northeast of their present territory, between Tibati and Ngoundere. They settled to the south of Bamenda station in the Ndop plain to which they gave the name of their area of origin. The Bambili and Babanki Tungo communities are centralised societies with Fons as rulers. The villages of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo formed the group that made up the Bafut Native Area of the Bamenda Division of then Cameroon’s Province. The chapter has further examined the period in history when the two communities were fraternal friends. It has shown how these villages jointly operated a single court which worked satisfactorily. It has also brought out land ownership procedures and practices in the area. It has revealed how Land is one of the most important factors in the formation of states in the North-West Region and how local authorities struggled to control land resources. We have seen that a land certificate is the only 201

Kwi Gam, 1998, p.101.

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authentic document of real property rights. The people of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo, however, cannot show any document (land certificate) to claim the disputed land is theirs. The claims of the two communities over the disputed are, therefore, not authentic since none of the above parties can prove they own it. This chapter has attempted to discuss the various ways in which the conflict between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo was manifested during the post-colonial period. The dramatic consequences of the conflict have also been discussed in line with the context. We can see that the histories of the Tikar of the North-West Region in general, and Bambili and BabankiTungo in particular, have already confirmed the view that limited land resources against the background of a fast-growing population and increased economic needs account for the ethnic or inter-community conflicts in the North-West Region. Chapter Three shall examine another case of land conflict, but in a different context and location in the NorthWest Region.

CHAPTER THREE LAND STRUGGLE IN NGOKETUNJIA: BALIKUMBAT VERSUS BAFANJI

There have been many land-related conflicts in the Ngoketunjia Division with the Balikumbat Sub-Division recording the highest number. Examples include the conflicts between Baligansin and Bamukumbit, Baligashu and Bamukumbit, Bamukumbit and Balikumbat, and the most devastating of all pitting Balikumbat against Bafanji. The five communities mentioned above have claimed Tikar and Chamba origins. The Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict traces its roots far back as the pre-colonial period. The two groups of people had migrated and settled in their respective sites at different intervals. Alliances were created on the basis of their histories. These alliances, which did not constantly last, mounted Balikumbat and Bafanji against each other as they fought over patches of agricultural plots. It is in this light that this chapter examines the history of these two people (Balikumbat and Bafanji) and inter-village relations before the crisis. It systematically looks at the genesis, stages and the impacts of the conflict.

A- Geo-History of Balikumbat and Bafanji This section locates Balikumbat and Bafanji geographically and traces their history so as to situate the history of conflict in this area.

a. Geographical Context Balikumbat and Bafanji are located at the Eastern end of the Ndop plain, between Latitude 40 and 100 North of the Equator, and Longitude 80 and 10o East of the Greenwich Meridian. Both villages are located in Ngoketunjia Division, with Ndop (Bamunkah) as the Divisional headquarters. Bafanji is found in Balikumbat Sub-division, with Balikumbat as the sub-divisional headquarters. Balikumbat Sub-division is made up of five villages, namely; Balikumbat, Bafanji, Bamukumbit, Baligansin and Baligashu. It is located to the southwest of Ngoketunjia Division. It shares boundaries to the south

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and southeast respectively with the Bamboutous and the Noun Divisions of the West Region.202 Mezam Division borders it to the west and northeast. The sub-division is about 60 kilometres away from Bamenda, and about 25 kilometres away from Ndop, the divisional headquarters of Ngoketunjia. Balikumbat Sub-division covers a surface area of about 434.5square kilometres.203 Map 5 shows Balikumbat Sub-division and the conflict zone (commonly called “T-junction”). The T-junction is locally called “Menchu” by the Balikumbat and “Teadong” by the Bafanji. For consistency, we shall be using “T-Junction” throughout this work to refer to the conflict area. According to the 1987 General Population and Housing Census (GPHS), the population of Balikumbat Sub-division stood at 31,910. In 2001, the population increased to 36,304 and was estimated in 2004 at 37,763, with Balikumbat recording the highest population as indicated on Table 9. Table 9: Estimated Population Distribution in the Balikumbat Sub-division in 2004 Village

Estimated population in 2004

Percentage of total population

Balikumbat Bafanji Bamukumbit Baligashu Baligansin Total

18,504 11,386 6,008 1,314 544 37,763

49.0 30.2 15.9 3.5 1.4 100

Source: SIRDEP, 2001, “Monographic Study on the Balikumbat Rural Council”, p.17.

202 203

SIRDEP, 2001, “Monographic study of the Balikumbat Rural Council”, p.17. SIRDEP, 2001, p.20.

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Map 5: Location of Balikumbat-Bafanji Conflict Zone in Balikumbat Sub-Division

Source: Adapted by author from the 1992 administrative map of the North-West Region, INC, Yaoundé, drawn by Enchaw Gabriel Bachange, 2011.

Geographically speaking, Balikumbat Sub-division is not entirely a plane area. It constitutes a delicate physical environment characterized by very deep valleys, rugged topography, fragile volcanic soils and humid climate of the Cameroon interior type. It has an average altitude of 1500m with the highest elevation being the most famous Balikumbat plateau, Kayitbi-kola.204 Besides this are numerous conical hills that provide an undulating landscape with hills having both concave and convex slopes. The flat valleys are favourable grounds for crop cultivation. In areas where the 204

Kayitbi- kola refers to the hill on which the Balikumbat Palace is situated.

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relief feature is almost level, groundnuts and maize cultivation are carried out extensively. This is due to the presence of rich fertile soils washed from the conical hills around the main Balikumbat plateau and deposited into valleys. It is important to note that the topography of Balikumbat Subdivision is made up of escarpments and numerous outcrops of granitic and plutonic rocks. The landscape consists of vast dry and fertile plains often referred to as ‘lasouh’205 by its people. The presence of spotted swamps in different parts of the community favours rice cultivation.206 This Balikumbat Sub-division is intersected by many rivers and streams which find their sources in the Bamboutos Range, the Balikumbat Tableland and the numerous knolls in the area. Examples of such water bodies include the Rivers Ntam-Ntam, Wetgwa and Gahwet. They all provide quality water for the irrigation of farms. Also, some of these rivers have giant falls, such as the case of the Wetgwa fall on the Lamissang escarpment. Moreover, the construction of the Bamenjin Dam, the levelness of the landscape and the high river density in the study area led to much flooding, and this increased the surface of swamps in Balikumbat Subdivision. This has greatly encouraged rice cultivation, especially in the months of June and July. The hydrographic network in this area is influenced by relief, climate, seasons and topography. Some of the streams either dry up partially or completely in the dry season while they may even flow overbanks in the rainy season leading to flooding and damages.207 The climate of the area, just like in the rest of the region, is characterised by high temperatures and rainfall. The hottest month of the year is February, with temperatures up to 22.0oC and as low as 18.0oC usually registered in August, thus giving an annual average of 20.4oC in the area.208 In terms of precipitation, the area is dominated by orographic and conventional rainfalls. This is because the tableland of the area forms a great barrier to the rain-bearing winds at its windward side which causes the air to rise and the moisture it contains to condense and fall back as relief rain. This climate favours the production of variety of crops which provide the local population with a source of livelihood. The weather in Ngoketunjia Division is dominated by two seasons: the rainy and dry seasons. The rainy season begins approximately on the 205

Lasouh refers to the farmlands. L.D. Langmi, 2009, “The Emergeance of New Agricultural Activities and State Disengagement: The Case of Balikumbat Sub-division”, DIPES II Dissertation in Geography, ENS, University of Yaounde I, p.4. 207 Ibid, p.5. 208 1999 Annual report from the Sub-divisional Delegation of Agriculture, Balikumbat. 206

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15th of March and runs to the 15th of October. It is characterized by very heavy rainfall with sporadic and violent thunderstorms and lightning. The dry season, which goes from mid-October to mid-March, is characterized by high temperatures, drought and the harmattan. This is because during these months, there is little or no vegetation growth except in areas near the streams. Sometimes, streams dry up and bush fires become more rampant.209 The climatic situation and human activities in the region have always been a major source of conflict between the communities of Balikumbat and Bafanji, since the land available does not gratify their desires. The villages in this area offer a great diversity of plant species ranging from simple fungi to complex angiosperms (seed bearing plants). The farmlands here are always saturated, with over 80 different species of plants within a square kilometre landscape. There is also the savanna and forest vegetation types found around the valleys of the Tableland and the knolls. Bamboo, forest and tree species like mahogany, camp-wood, pines, fig trees and wild fruits are equally common. The trees provide firewood and shelter in times of conflict. Bamboo is used for the construction of houses, the production of palm-wine and as firewood.210 Fauna species in this area range from simple protozoa through arthropods to complex chordates. Common species here include molluscs, annelids and chordates. The vast nature of the grass and the forest land rich in pasture add more impetus to the zeal of the indigenous population to raise livestock like goats, pigs, horses, rabbits and cows. Fowls, ducks and dogs are also domesticated and consumed locally.211 The rich pasture on the slope of the Balikumbat plateau provides the entire population of the area with material for the roofing of their houses. The soil pattern of the area reflects the axonal formation which varies with the relief; soils from the hills have different horizons from those of the lowlands and the unhampered regions. The semi flat nature of the area allows the clay soils to be formed mechanically. This explains the presence of swamps in parts of the village, which makes it possible for the local population to practise rice farming. Villages in Balikumbat Sub-Division are easily accessible from Mbouda through Galim (West Region), and from Bamenda through Bamessing and Bamali (North-West Region). There exists a variety of municipal and minor roads which link different quarters, settlements and farm lands. The main municipal road goes round the famous Balikumbat 209 S. Billa Ande, 2000, “Environmental Degradation in Balikumbat Sub-division”. DIPES II Dissertation in Geography, ENS, University of Yauonde I, p.22. 210 Ibid. 211 S. Billa Ande, 2000, p.32.

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Tableland commonly called the Balikumbat Plateau.212 It is, however worth noting that none of these roads is tarred, and, therefore, the area remains very difficult to access in the rainy season, especially in the months of July, August and September. This poses a great handicap to peace-builders who may not able to move around easily in times of conflict. Poor roads equally constitute a problem for other inhabitants who find it very difficult to evacuate their produce to the markets both within and beyond the area of study. However, the people of Balikumbat and Bafanji have good intervillage road network which helps promote inter-community relations.

b. Historical Context The Toukung, Mbakwa, Munjong, Mbajang, Papiakum, Mbalang and Mbatuo are said to be the original settlers of the areas now occupied by the Bafanji and Balikumbat. Though these people were the earliest inhabitants, no trace of tribal or cultural homogeneity seems to have existed among them. According to oral tradition, the Tikar are considered as the earliest migrants in the area. It is recorded that the Tikar arrived around the sixteenth century while the Chamba arrived later by the late eighteenth century.213 The communities that claimed Tikar origins in this area are Bafanji and Bamukumbit while the communities of Balikumbat, Bali Gashu and Baligansin claimed Chamba origins.214 The Bafanji call themselves Fielungwe Mamgie (the people of Mamgie), while the Bamumkumbit are referred to as Makong (the people of the hill). For the Chamba derived villages, the Balikumbat refer to themselves as Nekolpe (the people of the hill), Baligashu, Gaso nep, while Bali Gansin are Doh nep (the successor of Gawolbe). Though these villages today have degrees of cultural homogeneity, the presence of conquered indigenous groups is evident. This is common with Balikumbat and Bafanji. The former Mbalang and Papia, who were conquered and incorporated into Balikumbat, today constitute distinctive quarters of the Balikumbat community. The Toukung quarter chief was recognized and is today a subchief in Bafanji. The rest of the groups found new settlements out of the area whereas others were incorporated into Bafanji.215 In Balikumbat, the conquered groups were given special status and their chiefs were recognised as sub-chiefs, answerable to the Ga’s palace at Gayiru (the traditional headquarters). 212

Observations of the author during field work, February 2007 and July 2008. Nkwi, 1987, p.4. 214 Ibid. 215 Interview with Fon A.Y. Ngwefumi II, Bafanji, June 20th 2008. 213

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However, the Chamba derived chiefdoms still speak the Mubako dialect, which is the original dialect of the Chamba band led by Gawolbe. In this sphere, the Muga’aka language spoken in the kindred village of Bali Nyonga, is widely spoken in these villages.216 It owes its survival mainly because of its adoption in 1903 as the medium of instruction and evangelisation by the Basel mission, and because of its use in the courts. On the other hand, the Bafanji and Bamumkumbit speak a dialect called Nyeba, which is common among the rest of the kindred villages of Bamumka (Ndop), Bambalang and Bamali.217 The local languages (vernacular) of both communities, whether Tikar or Chamba, are variations of the Niger-Congo group of Bantu language. As earlier said, the Balikumbat and Bafanji, because of their respective traditions, broad linguistic and cultural systems, fall within two main groups: Tikar and Chamba. These communities originated from different locations, followed different routes and fought several wars before getting to their subsequent settlements. The Tikar derived chiefdoms which the earlier settlers originated from upper Mbam River valley known as Ndobo. Nkwi, a renounced anthropologist and writer on the history of the Grassfields, asserted that the migrating Tikar, led by princes, were relatively numerous and powerful enough to oust or dominate autochthon (early settlers) groups. Nkwi’s view was supported by the fact that the ruling classes (royal lineages) traced their origin from Ndobo.218 The migration of the Tikar to their present sites is said to have taken place about three centuries ago. Evidence provided by graves and names of chiefs reveal that Tikar groups also migrated into Ndop plain from Ndobo. Among these groups, Bamessing, Bamali, Bamunka, Bambalang and Bamumkumbit arrived first. Then Oku, Baba, Bafut, Babungo, Nso and Babessi came later.219 The Bafanji tradition holds that Bafanji, Bambalang, Bamumka, Bamali and Bamukumbit had a common ancestor, the Mamgie. The founders of these villages are believed to have descended from the same parents, Tani and Mamgie. This legendary couple had many children, though only five survived. Among these five children were two daughters and three sons. From the information we gathered, during their migration 216

G. Hougie Ngwochu, 2005, “Balikumbat and Her Neighbours, from 1898 to 1998: Quest for Hegemony”, Maîtrise Dissertation in History, University of Yaounde I, p.9. 217 Ibid. 218 Nkwi, 1987, p.23. 219 Provincial archives Bamenda (PAB), 1983, nw/Aa. 1983/1: A Collection of Ethnography Notes.

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from Ndobo, Tani’s three sons and two daughters led the bands of Tikar across River Noun to a place called Piemukwo (Bamali). It was at this juncture that these leaders founded individual chiefdoms. Subsequently, Bafanji, Bambalang, Bamumkumbit, Bamali and Bamumka became known as Mamgie family because of their ancestral links.220 The Bafanji natives hold that when they left Piemukwa, they first settled at Njanung (present day Njuguru in Balikumbat).221 Their next stop was Batoukeng (the present day Bafanji), where they conquered and incorporated the autochthonous groups of Toukung, Mbepa and Mbafang. Bafanji today reflects an amalgamation of aboriginal chiefdoms of Toukung, Manjong Mbakwa, Mbafang and Mbashie communities. However, they later moved to Mbouda around the 18th century as a result of the Fulani raids. Their migration took them as far as Funghe, near Bagam. But pressure from their hosts forced them to return to Beton-Mbepah, where they occupy till date.222 As concerns Bamukumbit, their first stop according to oral tradition, was at Mbeshie near Bambalang. While at Mbeshie, Mbamboh, a hunter, is said to have situated a plateau with excellent terrain for defence, located to the West of Bambalang. The Bamukumbit, who thought they would be safe there, moved to the plateau and settled near Nkohmbayah hill. However, this was not for long as they fled shortly after to Mbouda due to Chamba aggression. Making temporal settlements at Mulow (between Bagam and Bamessingue) and also afraid of raids from the Bagam, the Bamukumbit later returned to re-join the rest of their kinsmen who had settled at Nkohmbayah.223 The Chamba of the area, namely Balikumbat, Baligashu and Baligasin formed part of the Chamba movement into the Western Grassfields. Nkwi described the Chamba as a loose confederacy of raiding bands that evolved into hierarchically organised mini states after the death of their leader Gawolbe around 1830. His death resulted in the breakup of the group into about six units.224According to Chilver and Kababerry, the Chamba originated from North Cameroon around the Adamawa region, specifically around the Gashaka area and southwest into the Benue valley. This settlement occurred before the establishment of the Fulani Emirates of Muri and Banchi. The dispersal site for the migrating Chamba of the Western Grassfields was the Kontcha Tignere area, where it is reported that 220

(PAB), NW/Ac 1960/1/BK: 1960-63, Historical Notes on the Bamenda Grassfields. Ibid. 222 Interview with Pa Tiatang, Bafanji, June 21st 2008. 223 Interview with Pa Tiatang, Bafanji, July 16th 2009. 224 Nkwi, 1987, p.29. 221

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other groups referred to as Bati, Kontcha, Nabali, Babele and Sagueba joined them.225 The above assertion is corroborated by Njeuma Zachary, who linked the origin of the Chamba to the Adamawa region because of the fact that some words from the Adamawa indigenous languages are also present in the Bali Chamba languages. This is equally found in the languages spoken by some ethnic groups along the Nigeria-Cameroon border which claim similar origins, according to their traditions. The migration of the Chamba from this area was attributed to the Fulani raids and pressure. Their movement took them to Kontcha and Ngaoundere from where they reached, conquered and subdued the inhabitants of Banyo District. In Banyo, they were given the name Bani because their fighters used bows and arrows and rode horses. Their displacement from the area around Lamurde Jungum could also be attributed to clashes between the two Chamba groups of Bata and Lobo.226 The result was the terrible draught that struck their homeland, thus forcing them to move southward. These movements were not in the same direction since groups of mounted raiders moved southwards by different routes. The first group was comprised of the Ndamgambila led by Gawolbe. The second, the Taka, was led by Gyanda, while the third group of migrants were known as the Kashimeda, also referred to as the die-hearts, was under Modi and Gadi.227 From the above, the Ndamgambila who left under Gawolbe today constitute the ancestors of the Bali Chamba in the Bamenda Grassfields. According to their traditions, Gawolbe took his followers to Kontcha and later Tabiti, where they moved westwards, toward Kovifem. They reached the Bamoum country and crossed River Noun to the Bamenda Grassfields. Around 1830, they were involved in a battle with Bafu-Fundong near Dschang where they lost their leader, Gawolbe. This incident engineered succession quarrels, leading to the split of the group into six units under rival princes, with Nyongpassi and Galabi cited as the main ones. This split around 1835 led to the establishment of individual Bati Chamba chiefdoms in Bali Nyonga, Balikumbat, Baligasin, Baligashu, Baligham and Bali Muti noted in today’s North West and West Regions of Cameroon.228 The Balikumbat, under Galibi, according to oral tradition, were the first to reach the Ndop plain. On their way, they had to pass through Sabga where they clashed with the Bambili. Once they reached the Ndop plain, 225

Chilver and Kaberry, 1967, p.16. M.Z. Njeuma, 1988, Fulani Hegemony in Yola (old Adamawa), 1809-1902, Yaounde, CEPER, p.6. 227 (PAB), NW/Aa. 1983/1: 1983, A collection of Ethnography Notes. 228 (PAB), NW/Ac, 1960/1/BK: 1960-63, Historical Notes, Bamenda Grassfield. 226

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they dislodged the Bamumkumbit from their site on the plateau, settled there and called themselves Nekolpe (meaning people of the hill). Baligasin, on their part, claim that their leader Gavibi was the heir of Gawolbe. Factional fighting among the Chamba groups had flared up and their leader became over jealous. Hence, he killed his brother and arch rival Galibi. This unfortunate situation earned him rebukes and curses from his brother. He therefore took his supporters to Bamoum land from where he crossed the River Noun to the Ndop plain. They settled first at Ndowelu near Bafanji. Unlike Balikumbat, they negotiated with the Balikumbat leader Chief Yieng and settled peacefully.229 Baligashu, under Gaya, was probably the last major group to settle in the Ndop plains. Prior to their arrival, they first settled in the west of Baligham before moving to the present location. They passed through Balikumbat, a kindred village which tried to incorporate them. They later moved to a new site, west of Bafanji. Bafanji traditions have it that the Baligashu begged for a piece of land from their chief, Hong Ngwehong, who gave them the Munjong quarter of Bafanji where they settled. Hence, they paid allegiance to Bafanji until the late 19th century when they became autonomous.230 From these facts, the Tikar ethnic group constitutes forty-six percent of the total population of the Balikumbat Sub-division. Since their implantation, the Bafanji have been ruled by twenty-eight Fons, the last four being Fon Gwehong, Fon Nwana Mafang, Fon Luc-Nkve Daniel and Fon Gwanyin III. Regarding the fact that Balikumbat and Bafanji villages originated from different ethnic cultural backgrounds, differences between them were obvious. Hierarchically, the Chamba have a Fon or Gah as the highest authority of the village. With no other authority capable of checking the Gah, there is the possibility for him to be absolute in his decisions. The traditional organization is illustrated in Figure 4 below.

229 230

Interview with Stephen Pansiah, Balikumbat, June 21st 2008. Interview with Fon A.Y. Ngwefumi II, Bafanji, June 20th 2008.

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Figure 4: Traditional Organization of the Balikumbat People

Source: Chilver and Kabberry, Traditional Bamenda, p.64.

The Gah is the head of every authority in the village and cannot be checked by any organ or group. The Ngagham is Gah’s standard-bearer and is appointed by the Gah for the duration of his reign. The Dambira are civil magistrates who execute judgment over subjects (the people) while the Tandu are the liaison between the age regiment and the Gah.231 In this type of traditional structure, the Fon has the highest authority in the community and his decisions, especially on issues related to expansionist tendency, cannot be checked or rejected by any organ in the traditional diplomacy of the community. A Fon with absolute power, as the one in Balikumbat, can easily go to war when need be. Sometimes, in the North-West Region, such traditional rulers contest for political positions without the need for anybody’s approval in the chiefdom. The present Fon of Balikumbat (Fon 231

Chilver and Kaberry, 1968, p.64.

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A.Y Ngwefuni II) is a living example in the area under study. This situation of absolute power had, however, nursed expansionist tendencies to the detriment of weaker neighbouring communities. On the other hand, what holds in at the head of the Tikar traditional power hierarchy is the Kwi’fon (a secret society) which regulates the powers of the King, hence making him less likely to become an absolute ruler as is the case in the Balikumbat Fondom. The organisational structure of the Bafanji community is shown in Figure 5 below. Figure 5: Traditional Organization of the Bafanji People

Source: Chilver and Kaberry, Traditional Bamenda, p.21.

Regarding modern administration in the area under study, it should, however, be noted that the Balikumbat Sub-division was created in 1992 by Presidential decree No 92/187 of 1992, following the transformation

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of Ndop Sub-division into Ngoketunjia Division. In 1996, the Balikumbat Rural Council was accorded a special electoral constituency. Since the creation of the Balikumbat Sub-division, it has had seven Divisional Officers (see Table 10) out of which only the first three DOs have actually witnessed and managed in their own way the conflict situation.232 From the above analysis, we can conclude that all the groups of people who migrated and settled in Balikumbat played a dominant role in the socio-economic and traditional administrative politics of the area. Balikumbat displaced Bamukumbit and occupied the plateau, securing a defensive position. But this was not enough, as they had to fight to keep that position. The constant search for security, therefore, was to govern the relationships of each of these two groups with their neighbours, especially the Bafanji and some of the villages found in the same sub-division. Table 10: Balikumbat Sub Divisional Officers since Its Creation Name James, Asombang Simon, Nwenti Ndoh Eboue Njoumbe Jean Daniel, Ondjia’a Ayo Vincent, Mbita Jean Claude Theophile, Owoutou Owoutou

Period of Effective Service 1993-1995 1995-1998 1998-2000 2000-2003 2003-2007 2007-2009

Benoit William, Emvoutou Binta

2009- till date

Source: Sub-Divisional Archives Balikumbat (SDAB), June 20th 2009.

c. Inter-Village Relations before 1966 These fore mentioned groups from the Tikar and Chamba were not consistent vis-à-vis the perception of powerful or less powerful chiefdoms. In fact, conflict was not prevalent all the time, given that peace, cordiality and cooperation also reigned among them from time to time. In fact, there were joint hunting ventures, exchange of gifts and fishing expeditions involving the two communities. In this section, we will discuss inter-village relations in the domains of politics, economy society and culture between Balikumbat and Bafanji before 1966. 232

Hougie, 2005, p.11.

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After the sudden defeat and departure of the Germans in Cameroon in 1916 as a result of the First World War, the British and French took over the administration of the former German Cameroon, and the area under study became a British console. Inter-village relations were strengthened during the British era, simply as a result of the nature of the British administrative policy. The first was the new administrative set-up. The second was aligning relations among them to suit the socio-economic and political exigencies of the British era. So when the Germans left, the villages had no option but to welcome their new colonial master, the British. The major changes came when Podevin, during the early years of his appointment to Bamenda as Governor, attempted to revive the former German system of regrouping chiefs under paramount chiefs. An attempt to put the Chamba from Ndop area (Balikumbat, Baligasin and Baligashu) under the authority of Bali Nyonga was met with stiff resistance, especially from Balikumbat. With the idea of Indirect Rule in the division and with the creation of Native Authorities (NAs), the villages were rather put under different NAs. Balikumbat, Baligashu and Baligasin formed part of Ndop Native Authorities while Bafanji and Bamukumbit became part of Ndop Native Authority.233 As a result of kinship relations, the Balikumbat and other Chambarelated groups of the Ndop plain rejected Bali Nyonga leadership. Series of complaints were levied to the British to that effect. These complaints by the Balikumbat and the Chamba of the Ndop area were justified, and hence by 1928, the villages were detached from Bali NAs and put under Ndop NAs.234 This decision of placing these villages under the same Native Authority had both positive and adverse effects on their socio-economic and political relations in the area under study. The Balikumbat Fon, Yambe, had already showed power concern among his neighbours when he was appointed Vice President of the Bamenda Native Court (NC) in 1917 to take care of the division. At that time, only Fon Nkwangoh of Bafanji was a member of this Court as other villages were never represented in this Court. Though the mandate of this court was short-lived and its powers questioned by many chiefs not represented in the court, the interesting issue above all was the fact that the Bafanji and Balikumbat aged-old rivals in the region maintained high profiles. This was reminiscent of their rivalry since the pre-colonial and

233

(NAB), W.E Hunt, 1922, Annual Report for Bamenda for Bamenda Division. (NBB), NW/Ea, 1929/1, File N.B. 86, 34/1929, Inspection Notes by Resident, Cameroon Province 1929, PAB, Annual report Bamenda Division, 1929.

234

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even during the German colonial period. It was this rivalry that continued in the same locality of the Ndop NA in the 1930s.235 The Ndop NA, just like the Banso NA where a single chief ruled, was made up of chiefs with equal status who presided over the NA and NC in rotation. When Balikumbat joined the Ndop NA in 1928, the NA was under the presidency of the Fon of Bamunka. He was subsequently replaced by the Fon of Bamungo in 1931.236 Three years later, it came under the presidency of Balikumbat. During the election, the Balikumbat Fon, Galabe III, was nominated by the Fon of Baligashu. The Fon of Bafanji nominated the Fon of Bamunka to the presidency instead, despite the fact that he had had his turn as president of the NC just three years before. After the victory of the Fon of Balikumbat as president of the NC (scoring eight out of the fourteen votes), the Bamunka and Bafanji Fons feared Balikumbat’s dominance in the NA.237 This feeling may have accounted for the absence of the NA during the first meeting held in Bamunka on the 21st of September 1932 under the chairmanship of Galabe III of Balikumbat. Notably absent during this session were the Fons of Bamukumbit and Babungo who had supported the candidacy of the Bamunka Fon in the election that Balikumbat finally won.238 From all indications, it was evident that the rivalry between Balikumbat and Bafanji in the Ndop NA was taking a new course. It was against this background that the Fon of Balikumbat, Galabe III, refused to renew the Nkenka Mandate peace treaty reached by both villages after the 1906 dispute. Failure to renew that treaty, according to Piyinchu’s dissertation, re-kindled distrust between the two communities, finally culminating into the 1933 and 1934 border skirmish between Balikumbat and Bafanji.239 Since the understanding reached between the belligerent villages at Nkenka Mundele during the German era, relations between them had improved considerably. In the 1930s, the rivalry between the two villages in the Ndop NA, following Balikumbat’s inclusion in 1928 and the holding of the presidency in 1934, weakened relations between both villages. This problem was further made difficult when Bafanji refused to support Balikumbat in a conflict with Bambalang in 1933 over the control of certain border raffia bushes. 235

(NBB), NW/Ea, 1929/1, File N.B. 86, 34/1929. (NAB), Mb/A/1917/1: N.Cs. Bamenda Division. 237 Ibid. 238 (PAB), NW/CC/1929/1, file B.107: Annual Report on Bamenda Division. Correspondence, Recommends, 1929-33. 239 M. Piyinchu, 2001, “The Balikumbat-Bafanji Intermittent Land Conflicts, 19251998”, DIPES II Dissertation in History, E.N.S, Yaounde, p.29. 236

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Balikumbat decided to launch an attack on Bafanji. The war was fought from December 1933 to January 1934; a war that caused injuries on both sides.240 It should also be noted that this conflict coincided with the passing of the inter-community Boundary Settlement Ordinance of 1933 in which, according to the DOs, were to settle boundary problems together with the NAs to avoid conflicts with the colonial administration. It further stated that when a decision on a boundary was reached by the DO and the NA concerned, it could only be overturned by the Resident of the Governor.241 From all indications, the position held by the Fon of Balikumbat in the Federal Council for the SEF in 1955 indicated the prominent role of Fon Galabe III within the NA. The Bafanji Fon also had the chance of becoming a member of the Federal Council in 1954. Such positions permitted them to influence the construction of a local bridge at Gabe in Balikumbat in 1956 and a culvert in Bafanji in the same year. The budget adopted in the Federal Council by the village Finance Committee was £48 (about 48,000 F.cfa) for Balikumbat and £30 (about 30,000 F.cfa) for Bafanji.242 When the SEF NA was finally broken up in 1960 into BafutNdop and Banso NAs, the representation of Balikumbat was ameliorated. The Bafut-Ndop NA (with a total of 39 members) was represented per village as follows: Balikumbat, 3 representatives (the Fon, Adamu Segah and A. Nwana) and the other villages were represented only by their Fons except for Bamukumbit, which was represented by DA Tanti. Whatever, Balikumbat still played a dominant role in the area.243 The Balikumbat sought to exploit adequately their pre-eminent position in the region in the post-colonial period. From an economic perspective, fishing promoted peaceful relations among communities. Bafanji is one of the villages drained by the River Noun which provides suitable waters for fishing. The Tangwoang River and the Fombefu Island provided fish of all types to the Bafanji and Balikumbat villages. This area was at the boundary between Bafanji and Bagham in the West Region. Hence, Balikumbat could join Bafanji people in fishing, as this activity was often done in groups. This joint-fishing venture enhanced the degree of cordial relations between the two peoples. In this case, when

240

(PAB), File No NW/QF/b/1933: Land and Bamenda Matters, Bamenda Division, 1933. 241 (NAB), OF/1933/1: Inter-Community Boundary Settlement Ordinance, 1933. 242 Ibid. 243 Ibid.

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any dispute erupted between Bafanji and Bagham over the fishing grounds of Fombefu, Balikumbat intervened as a mediator in the problem.244 Hunting was also an important factor in bringing cordiality between the communities. Balikumbat and her neighbours including Bafanji and Baligashu hunted together, especially in the Barefoh forest in Balikumbat. Balikumbat often accompanied their neighbours in the exercise, and after the expeditions, the animals caught were shared amongst them. According to Billa, an indigene of Baligashu, a portion of the catch was reserved for the Fon of Balikumbat who was considered as the owner of the forest.245 Hence, cordial relations existed amongst these chiefdoms, but the serenity that recouped amongst them was threatened with the arrival of the Chamba. The war-like attitude of the Chamba, especially in leadership positions, affected inter-village relations as each village struggled to grab as much land as possible to preserve her economic activities in the area concerned. These needs to expand territorially obviously sparked hostilities among the villages and also bred suspicion amongst them. Balikumbat, due to its military might in the area, dictated the pace in inter-village relations246 until the advent of Europeans in the North-West Region in the late 19th century. As a matter of fact, cordial relations stemmed from the pacification of the area by the Germans, which promoted trade and inter-village visits. The creation of communication networks encouraged movement between the peoples of Balikumbat and Bafanji. However, the recognition of the Balikumbat Fon by the Germans and the forceful and abusive manner in which he recruited labour in the area revived grudges. It was in such circumstances that a conflict between Bafanji and Balikumbat in 1906 came to be. The genesis of the problem could be traced back to the defeat inflicted on Balikumbat by the Bafanji after their return from Funghe to recover their lands. It was also attributed to the abusive manner in which the Balikumbat chief (after Gwanyi I) used his functions to recruit workforce and collect taxes. Labour recruitment here was usually carried out by vassal villages to recognized chiefdoms. This was the case between Bali Nyonga and her Widikum neighbours. It should be noted that Bali’s association with the Germans as intermediary alienated other chiefs who attributed all the hardships orchestrated by the Germans to Bali, thus developing serious hatred for them.247 244

Interview with Billa Dennis, Baligashu, June 22nd 2008. Interview with Billa Dennis. 246 Interview with Tieowah Ignatius, Yaounde, 1 April 2010. 247 J. Doh Penbaga, “Bali and their Neighbours, A study of Political Relations of the Bali and the Widikum from pre-colonial Times to 1961”, Maîtrise Dessertationin in History, University of Yaounde I, 2000, p.63. 245

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Also, Balikumbat’s attempts to collect taxes and recruit labour in Bafanji were reminiscent of their numerous attacks against the Balikumbat during their settlement. This act irritated the Bafanji natives who considered it as domination on them. The labour recruitment issue created tension between the two communities. Some elders of Bafanji upheld that war actually broke out when Balikumbat encroached into their land around the Nkwagung area.248 In fact, Bafanji did not tolerate an attempt by their neighbours of Balikumbat to occupy that piece of land. They resisted their neighbour’s attempt to occupy the area, and tried to chase away enemy warriors. Surprisingly, the Balikumbat launched an incursion on them which orchestrated the outbreak of the 1906 war. The hostilities lasted for some days and this episode was later described in Bafanji as Chua Mugua, literally meaning “war fought with stones”.249 Nevertheless, economic activities in the area were improving significantly. The building of the Gabe Bridge in Balikumbat greatly eased the transportation of goods and services in the region. Vehicles could now leave the villages of this area to Ndop and Bamenda. This also boosted trade, especially after the Bamunka market was constructed with funds from the SEF in 1959. With regard to their geographical proximity and not withstanding their socio-cultural differences, the people of Balikumbat and Bafanji are condemned to live together. In reality, relations governing these villages have not always been characterised by tension and wars. Occasionally, cordial relations, manifested through the exchange of visits and gifts, hunting cooperation, inter-marriages and cultural exchanges prevailed in the area. This strengthened relations between both villages. According to Nkwi, “alliances were methods by which chiefdoms sometimes turned their enemies into friends and allies. Alliances were second and forcefully binding. The taking of oath and sacrificing of slaves gave religious alliances and sacred characters”.250 It is in this light that a noble of Balikumbat, Doh Ndima, traced the origin of the Lela dance, performed during a Bali state ceremony, back to Bafanji. According to him, this dance was given to Balikumbat after the 1906 war as a sign of post-war alliance. In the socio-cultural domain, the communities also interacted during German rule. In 1903, the Basel Mission established a station in Bali Nyonga. The first school was created in Bali in 1907 and Muga’aka was adopted as the language of instruction and evangelisation by the Basel Missionaries. Balikumbat, where Mubako was spoken, was designated to 248

(PAB), NW/Ac, 1960/1/Bk: Historical Note on Bamenda Grassfields, 1960. Hongie Ngwochu, 2005, p.28. 250 Nkwi, 1987, p.38. 249

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host the Mission because of its location at the centre of all the villages in the area, its prolonged experience in security and peace, and the role it played in that region. The creation of missionary schools and churches in Balikumbat made that village influential in the area. Many people from neighbouring villages used to go there to attend occasional church services. More so, the fact that the Baptist and the Presbyterian missionaries had also established their premises in this locality made things more understanding. Balikumbat became a converging point for the other villages which were obliged to get there to learn Muga’aka in order to understand the sermons.251 Furthermore, cordial relations amongst these villages were evident in the areas of marriages, joint celebration of annual festivals, exchange of traditional dances and fishing ventures. The 1906 post-war peace treaty further encouraged inter-village relations amongst these communities. Consequently, the dances became annual festivals in the respective villages. In Bafanji, the Lela dance became an annual traditional dance. During such occasions, indigenes came together, wearing the traditional regalia and the nchembeh,252 a source of pride to the people. These events were usually characterized by the visits of Fons and “natives” of other villages, especially from Balikumbat. This forum provided ample co-operation grounds between chiefs and their people. Inter-marriages also enhanced cordiality amongst these villages. Tieowah Ignatius, our informant of Bafanji origin, reported that intermarriages followed to a great extent the tribal line, as was the case during the pre-colonial and colonial periods.253 Things, of course, could not remain the same forever. A respectable woman in Bafanji named Pongho traced the grand-parents of her father to Balikumbat. Because of this, she performs some of her ancestral rites in Balikumbat. She also mentioned that two of her children live in Balikumbat with her relatives while some are with her in Bafanji.254 Some cases of inter-village marriages in these communities included the following among others: Mafanni Paul, a Balikumbat hunter, got married to a Bafanji girl in 1953; Pungnoh, a prince from Bafanji, got married to a Balikumbat girl in 1960; Tiehie Margerate got married to a Balikumbat man before the 1995 crisis; and Tiefa Samaon got married to a Balikumbat woman in 1997. Cases of inter-community marriages continue to date as noticed with the case of Lecigah Emmanuel who got married to a Bafanji girl in 2003.255 251

Doh Penbaga, 2000, p.72. Interview with Fon A.Y. Ngwefumi II, Bafanji, June 20th 2008. 253 Interview with Tieowah Ignatius, Yaounde, 1 April 2010. 254 Hongie, 2005, p.32. 255 Interview with Tieowah Ignatius, Yaounde, 1 April 2010. 252

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The nature of the communication system improved during the German period and promoted inter-village links. The building of the Balikumbat-Ndop road was very instrumental in linking the villages of this area to Bamenda. It is, however, regrettable that Balikumbat took advantage of this facility to maltreat the people of the neighbouring villages, especially in times of conflict. For instance, it was reported that the Bafanji delegation to the meeting in Bamenda in 1908 had to pass through Babanki-Tungo to reach Bamenda. This was out of fear that Balikumbat would attack them. In fact, Balikumbat took advantage of being the first to have established good working relationships with the Germans. They used the road passing through their village to prevent other villages from having direct contact with the German administration.256 Trade was a factor of inter-chiefdom relations. The advent of the Germans revolutionised trade as the traditional economy, which was based on an exchange system based on cowries, beads and iron-rods (shovels) as currencies, came to change. The introduction of the German currency gradually replaced the old system, with the German Mark becoming the only medium of exchange. This facilitated exchange as the people carried their wares from one village to another for sale. The first market to be created in the area was the Ganji market in Balikumbat. The Bafanji natives went there to sell items such as fish and cocoyams, which they often got from and around streams like the Nchuagha, Nchuanung and Tangwang. Also, Maize and Okra that were mostly produced in Balikumbat attracted buyers from both Balikumbat and Bafanji.257 Trade was also boosted by the weaving ingenuity of the Balikumbat. Like the other Chamba villages, the Balikumbat were experts in the fabrication of women dresses and caps which were highly appreciated by their neighbours. More still, the understanding between the Chamba in the area paved the way for the creation of inter-village cultural dances in the 1960. This understanding was evident in 1934 when the Fon of Balikumbat’s candidacy for the Presidence of the Ndop NA was supported by Baligashu and Baligasin. The dance was also demonstrated when Balikumbat requested a separate court for the Chamba in Ndop area in 1959, a request which was granted in 1962. In the same spirit, since Bafanji and Bamukumbit jointly opposed the candidacy of Balikumbat in 1934, it became clear that inter-village relations seemed to have followed tribal links, and this was not good for a conflict free environment.258

256

(PAB), NW/Ac. 1960/1/Bk. Historical Notes on Bamenda. 1960. (PAB), NW/Ac. 1960/1/Bk. Historical Notes on Bamenda. 1960. 258 (PAB), NW/cc/1929/1/NW/Ia, 1959/4/, file No. 3297/vol. II: Minutes of N.As councils Meetings, 1959-65. 257

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B- Origin and Evolution of the Conflict This section dwells on the origin, the different stages and the consequences of the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict.

a. The Origin of the Conflict From the history of migration and settlement, the Balikumbat fought a series of wars on their way from Northern Nigeria and Adamawa to their present site. In Ndop, they further embarked on an expansionist policy in order to gain physical and political power in the area, as explained by Nkwi and Warnier.259 This was one major remote cause of the Balikumbat/ Bafanji land and boundary conflict. When the people of Balikumbat settled in the plateau, they soon expanded to occupy the low land areas. This was obviously done by force, as they attacked neighbouring villages which either escaped and abandoned their sites, or simply submitted to their might. The first victims of Balikumbat expansionism were the Papiakum and Mbalang, who had broken from Bamoum and settled in Balikumbat plateau before the raids in Yola. In fact, they were later subdued by the Balikumbat. Under constant Balikumbat attacks, the villages of Bafanji, Bamukumbit and Baligasin resorted to compact settlement in order to better resist the pressure and constant raids.260 The Mbepa quarter became a safe place for the Bafanji who were avoiding Balikumbat raids. Most people had to leave Mbagang, Njamung, Bafanji and Toukung to settle here because of these attacks. Referring to the settlement and expansion of Balikumbat in the Ndop plain, Chilver and Kaberry postulated that the Balikumbat claimed hunting rights over the whole plain and the foothills by virtue of conquest.261 Colonialism also played a dominant role as a remote cause to the Balikumbat and Bafanji conflict. The administrative system set by the Germans regrouped various communities in the Bamenda Grassfields under the authority of the Fon of Bali Nyonga who won their confidence. In this regard, Bali Nyonga was made the headquarters of German administration in the Bamenda Division for quite some time. This idea was resented by the other Fons of the Division who wanted to be recognized as individual

259

Nkwi and Warnier, 1982, Element for the History of Western Grassfields, SOPECAM, pp.127-128. 260 (PAB), NW/Ac, 1960/1/Bk: Historical Notes on Bamenda Grassfields, p.9. 261 Chilver and Kaberry, 1986, p.67.

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authorities in their own rights and not through the Fon of Bali Nyonga, as earlier designated by the Germans.262 The North-West Region in particular greatly influenced the pattern of inter-village relations in the Ndop plain. During the German era, one could significantly notice these changes. These communities, except for Balikumbat, had just come back from the Mbouda area. This was as a result of the Fulani raids that had displaced them. They had embarked on rebuilding their villages. Some of them, including Bafanji, had to fight a war to recover their lands that had been occupied by Balikumbat. Balikumbat territorial expansion was stopped by the Germans during their various expeditions in the North-West Region. The aim of the Germans here was to improve on their colonial legacy by building their economy, pacifying the chiefdoms and stopping alleged inhuman practices like slavery and ritual killings in the said chiefdoms. The arrival of the Germans in the area was also seen as a source of help for these villages which had been under constant Balikumbat’s threats. The German influence in the region was, therefore, supreme because a military station was created in 1905 in Bamenda, and the entire region was under the authority of that station. The idea of giving freedom to chiefdoms to manage their affairs and influence traditional diplomacy was thus curtailed. Within this era, all the chiefs were presumably under Galega I of Bali Nyonga, who was the only recognized Paramount Chief in the early years of German rule in the Bamenda Grassfields.263 This idea, advocated by the German colonial Authorities, instead encouraged inter-ethnic conflict since none of the communities was ready to lose their sovereignty to a neighbouring community. When the British took over the administration of this area, the Bali Nyonga leadership over the said Fons was kept in check because of the British policy of Indirect Rule. This system brought some powerful Fons of the Bamenda Division in conflict with less powerful ones who had been struggling to regain their autonomy from the favoured chiefdoms. Since Bali Chamba was generally favoured from the time of the Germans, Balikumbat began mounting pressure and claiming to be superior to other chiefdoms around the Ndop plains.264 During the British period, series of administrative changes took place in the area. These changes were first of 262

Charles Gabriel Mboc (ed.), 2000, Les Conflits Ethniques au Cameroun Quelles Sources, Quelles solutions? Yaounde, Edition Service Oecumenique pour la paix and Editions Saagraph, p.99. 263 (PAB), NW/Ha. 1972/2. DD45A: Dossiers for Fons and chiefs of the North-West Region. 264 P. Bungfang, 2000, p.22.

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all noticed in the Native Authority (NA) when the NAs of Ndop, Bafut and Banso were federated into the South East Federation (SEF) as earlier discussed. In one way or the other, colonial administration was at the genesis of the Balikumbat/ Bafanji territorial crisis. But it was after the 1933-1934 hostilities between Balikumbat and Bafanji that the SDO for Bamenda, Candle, together with his assistant EHF Georges after dispatching the forces of law and order to restore peace visited the area. In fact, this conflict signalled much concern to the British colonial Administrators and this explained why they introduced the inter-community Boundary Settlement Ordinance in 1933 to solve similar cases in the future. The SDO, flanked by some elements of the police, the traditional rulers of the belligerent villages, and the Fons of Bamunka and Babungo, held a meeting in Bamukumbit on the 28th of May 1934 with the aim of finding a lasting solution to the problem.265 Though the Fon of Bafanji was not at the meeting, the SDO visited the area and designated the River Teadong as the boundary between the two villages. That settlement was viewed in Bafanji as punitive: the village was getting punished because their traditional ruler could not attend the meeting organized by Candle. Meanwhile, the day of the meeting organized by Candle coincided with a traditional festival day in Bafanji on which the Fon was not supposed to go out. He only joined the SDO and his entourage later after he was advised to do so. It is clear that before Fon Nkwangoh of Bafanji joined his colleagues, the boundary had been fixed and the Bafanji had no option than to pay the price of adherence to their tradition.266 It should be noted that the conflict between Bafanji and Balikumbat in the 1930s signalled wider conflicts of interest in the same area. In 1946, Baligashu, which had been a tributary chiefdom to Bafanji, was separated from that sphere. Relations between the two villages had been cordial and this explains why Bafanji gave farm land to Baligashu in the 1930s. The cordiality ended when it was alleged that Baligashu supported Balikumbat in the 1933 conflict.267 Despite the fact that conflict over land issues did not characterise relations between villages in the 1930s and 1940s, the situation changed rapidly in the 1950s. This was attributed to the fact that by 1949, the NAs of Ndop, Bafut and Banso were federated into a South East Federation (SEF). This federation was headed by paramount chiefs, having as President the Fon of Banso, and as his Vice President the Fon of Bafut. The presence of these Fons and the increased number of representatives in 265

(PAB), NW/Fe/1934/1: No 748: Tours and Visits of the SDO for the Bamenda Division, Notes, Addresses, 1934-36. 266 Interview with Fon A.Y. Ngwefumi II, Bafanji, June 20th 2008. 267 Interview with Fon A.Y. Ngwefumi II.

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the Federal Council of the NA reduced Balikumbat’s preponderance. It was against such a background that the Balikumbat in 1959 requested the creation of separate Court for the Chamba of Ndop area.268 This request by the Balikumbat Fon could also be regarded as a leading weapon in order to effectively play a dominant role in the political landscape of the area. The traditional diplomacy of Balikumbat and Bafanji was determined by several factors. The representation of a village within the local council during the post-colonial period was very important. In the Bafut-Ndop council, Balikumbat alone had four councillors against one for each for her neighbours. Tribal influence was another major factor. Within the Ndop Customary Court, Balikumbat constantly petitioned the court on tribal sentiments. Under the presidency of the Fon of Bafut, the Balikumbat Fon in 1962 petitioned to the Secretary of State for Local Government, J.N. Lafon to deplore the preponderance of Bafut within the council. He also accused the other villages, including Bamukumbit, of treating Chamba unfairly and referring to them as strangers in the sub-region.269 It was noticed that during the elections and voting of the budget, villages or communities with hostile intensions such as Balikumbat were always found in opposing camps to their neighbouring communities. This was the case in the Bafanji and Balikumbat conflict. When the Fon of Bafanji, Lwekui (Ngwana), was elected Chairman of the Council in 1963, the Fon of Balikumbat boycotted the council for a year because the election did not favour him. He only attended the last session of that year since the election of a new Chairman was to come up. However, he declared his candidacy and was elected as the next chairman. Amongst the ten (10) councillors in the Executive Council, six (6) voted for him and the other three (3) from Bambalang (Bafanji, Bamunka and Babungo) voted against.270 This mounted tension within the councils since each leader expected more powers in the council so as to influence the political situation of the area. From an administrative perspective, when the Balikumbat Subdivision was created, the Bafanji contested Balikumbat’s position as headquarters for fear of their expansionist tendency. According to reports from the Sub-divisional Officer of Ngoketunjia Division, the differences led to socio-political disorder in his area. According to the natives of Bafanji, the creation of the subdivision in 1993 with Balikumbat as the headquarters, 268

(PAB), NW/La/D/1958/1: SEF N.A, Executive Committee Meetings, Minutes, 1958-60. 269 (PAB), NW/La//1965/1, Complants, Bamenda Natives. 270 (PAB), NW/Jc/d/1961/1, File No B. 393, Minutes of the Bafut-Ndop Council, 1961-63.

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was only going to generate further differences and war. They claimed that because the Balikumbat leaders like to impose their will on the other villages within the administrative set up, Bafanji requested that the subdivisional headquarters escape from the domineering or expansionist tendency of Balikumbat. In Bafanji, some people believe that the natives of Balikumbat took advantage of this administrative leadership position to renew old conflicts with Bafanji.271 Politically, the present Fon of Balikumbat, Doh Gah Gwanyi III, and Member of Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), wields enormous political power within the Sub-divisional and Divisional levels. He was the Mayor of the Balikumbat Rural Council from creation in 1995 to 2007. Beyond that, he has equally been one of the Members of Parliament (MP) of the ruling CPDM. This political maturity favoured the Balikumbat Fon to persistently launch attacks on Bafanji with impunity, on the grounds that Bafanji was a small quarter within his village. Some of our informants in Bafanji said he also used the said “unlimited powers” to order his subjects to uproot the pillars planted in 1969 demarcating the boundary between the two ethnic villages of Balikumbat and Bafanji.272 This view was further supported by Mope, who states that: One of the unclear causes of the conflict had been the rivalry for the prominence and the spoils of power […] as member of the CPDM party who has become Mayor. The Fon of Balikumbat had been reluctant to forfeit this his source of patronage that is, of the same political party, which the Fon of Bafanji had been lobbying to become a local boss too.273

In the same vein, the Fon of Bafanji, in an interview with The Post newspaper said that land was not the cause of all the disputes between them. He added that he had worked together with the Fon of Balikumbat until he became “Mayor, Fon of Fons and parliamentarian”.274 This is justified by the fact that the two villages had lived in peace since 1978 and only returned to hostilities when the Fon of Balikumbat became Mayor of Balikumbat Rural Council and Member of Parliament. In the course of this investigation, all attempts to get the point of view of the Fon of Balikumbat about this issue failed. In many instances, 271

Interview with Tiebubagang Victor, Bafanji, July 17th 2008. Interview with Tieowah Ignatius, Yaounde, 1 April 2010. 273 J.A. Simo Mope, 1996, “Customary Land Tenure Regimes in North-West Cameroon: Evolution and interactions with Wider Economic and political Development”, Mimeographed; Franco British Conference on Land Tenure and Resource Access in West Africa, Dakar, 18-19 November, p.18. 274 C.Mbunwe, 1998, “Balikumbat Warriors Wipe out Bafanji”, The Post, April, p.3. 272

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we travelled to Balikumbat for a rendezvous scheduled with him, but his attitude made us to understand that he was unwilling to talk to us. In February 2000, the Land Commission which embarked on a mission to demarcate the boundary between the two chiefdoms was unable to accomplish its mission because the Fon of Balikumbat did not show concern and did not provide the assistance needed by this commission. In some extreme cases, the workers of the Ndop High Court attested that evidence of administrative and judiciary documents that were in their keeping were finally stolen and others destroyed by the Fon and his messengers.275 The absence of these administrative documents had a negative impact on our research. The rugged topography of Balikumbat, which hinders extensive cultivation practices, has been a major factor in the conflict. The lands in many cases are infertile and insufficient for the growing population of the locality. This situation caused Balikumbat to encroach upon the fertile lands at the conflict zone commonly known as “T-junction”, but locally called “Menchu” by the Balikumbat and “Teadong” by the Bafanji. This is the area where most of these wars were fought. As earlier mentioned, we shall use the appellation “T-junction” throughout this work to signify the conflict area. Plate 2 presents the disputed area.

b. Evolution of the Conflict From the above analysis, the Bafanji and Balikumbat relation deteriorated following the election of the Fon of Bafanji, Ngwana, as the Chairman of the Bafut-Ndop council in 1963. This was because the Balikumbat people had long been contesting the monopoly of this post. In 1964, when the chairmanship went to Balikumbat, events took a different turn since the people of Bafanji were now answerable to Balikumbat. This was as a result of the death of the Fon of Bafanji who had just handed the chairmanship to the Balikumbat Fon in 1964. His death led to accession of Ngwefunji II to the Bafanji throne. The young Fon of Bafanji had just assumed his functions when the hostilities with Balikumbat broke out. The outbreak of the hostility in 1966 was as a result of the erections of houses by Balikumbat on Bafanji land. The protest letter of the Bafanji Traditional Council to the SDO of Bamenda Division claims how on September 13th 1966, the Balikumbat started erecting houses on Bafanji

275

Interview with Ngum Martin Yong, Ndop, July 15th 2008.

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land.276 This was corroborated by the DO for Ndop, J.A Fominyen, when he explained how the natives of Balikumbat built houses on Bafanji land. He further stated how a market was built overnight on this land, all in an effort to suppress the Bafanji market. Such action, according to the DO certainly irritated the Bafanji people.277 As a result, the Bafanji had to rescue their land from occupation and the only way of doing so was to openly challenge Balikumbat’s actions. This resulted in skirmishes from which some natives of Bafanji were injured. In order to avert further bloodshed, the Mezam Divisional Administration, through the SDO, promptly intervened. He instructed the Gendarmes and Police Officers to visit the area and investigate the matter. Upon arrival at the disputed area, the team encountered about 3,000 Bafanji women with their farm tools. These women decried the fact that the people of Balikumbat had deprived them of their farm lands.278 The DO appeased them by promising to forward their complaints to higher authorities, via the Governor and the Minister of Territorial Administration. The DO also cautioned both parties to remain calm, and forbade farming on the disputed area till a permanent solution was reached. Nevertheless, the angry women expressed dissatisfaction as they needed to work on their farms. The chief of Bafanji intervened and asked them to wait calmly for the administration to solve the problem. As a temporary solution, the DO ordered all the houses built by Balikumbat to be demolished while waiting for a final solution. It is in this vein that some five mud houses, purported to have been built by some Balikumbat natives, were pulled down.279 After the episode, the administration made efforts to definitely solve the issue as a good number of strategies were adapted. In line with the above resolutions, the West Cameroon Land Tribunal had been struggling to settle the boundary problem between Balikumbat and Bafanji. According to some sources, pillars were positioned on the boundaries a long time ago. Whereas the final resolution was adopted in 1966 by the West Cameroon Government Executive Council against Balikumbat. She was levied a

276

(PAB), File No Ga, 54/s.4, 2030: violation of Government and Court Decision in to Bafanji land. 277 (PAB), File No DBA. 2912/145: Balikumbat Vs Bafanji Land Dispute, 22 March 1968. 278 (PAB), File No NSB, 39/67: Balikumbat vs. Bafanji Land Dispute, 16 March 1968. 279 Ibid.

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penalty amounting to a sum of 50,000 Fcfa. A sum that was never paid. The refusal later on degenerated into a pre-conflict scenario.280 Balikumbat contested this decision and actually, this re-vindication was in contravention of Article III of the 1962 Inter-Community Boundary Settlement Law of 1962 which forbade such an act when the High Court had granted its final verdict. Balikumbat, through a solicitor named P.D. Koti, sued the Bafanji and West Cameroon Government in the Buea High court. According to the lawsuit, Balikumbat, who had claimed ownership of the disputed land were charged to pay compensation for damages amounting to 20,000,000 Fcfa. The president of the Buea High Court, S.M.L. Endeley, after assessing the claims of the plaintiff declared the suit admissible.281 After assessing the claim of both parties, he delivered a judgment that confirmed the recommendations of the Land Tribunal. In a judgment of the 22nd of February 1971, Endeley dismissed the case, claiming that it was misconceived. However, Balikumbat was fined to pay the sum of 50,000 Fcfa.282

280

Hongie, 2005, p.41. (PAB), suit No 162/A, Fon Galabe III Vs Andrew Fongwen. 282 National archives Buea (NAB), File No Q6/QF/b/522/1971: Fon Galabe III of BalikumbatVs Afongwen (Sic) and the Government of West Cameroon. 281

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Plate 2: Site View of the Main Contested Area at T-junction

A

C

B

D

Source: Snapped by Author, disputed area (T-junction), 28 July 2008. Note: all the above pictures portrayed the main contesting area by the people of Balikumbat and Bafanji in (1995) and in (1998). A is an out view of the contesting Tjunction on our way from Bafanji. B is the main way from the T- junction heading to Balikumbat. C and D are main farming and disputed areas few meters from the Tjunction on the way heading to Balikumbat. The people farming are from both communities but dominated by the Balikumbat.

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As Balikumbat lost the case, they appealed to the Supreme Court in Yaounde. The rulings of the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. Balikumbat did not take the court decision kindly, as relations between the two villages deteriorated in the late 1970s. This finally led to the tribal grievances between Bafanji and Balikumbat in 1978. Many Balikumbat natives felt disgruntled after the dismissal of the court case between Balikumbat and Bafanji, leading to the confirmation of the 1969 boundary between the two villages. The efforts of Fon Galabe III to normalise relations almost reached fruition in 1974 when he personally attended a fund-raising ceremony in the Bafanji Fon’s palace. Such gesture was interpreted by many in both villages (Balikumbat and Bafanji) as the beginning of peaceful relations between the two rivals. But three years later, in 1977, Fon Galabe III died. According to our informants (we promised not to cite them) and the Divisional Officer of Ndop, when the successor Fon Doh Gwanyin III took over Fonship in Balikumbat, he instigated his people to uproot the pillars planted some fifteen years earlier. The case was reported to the DO of Ndop who, in turn, ordered the planting of some boundary plants on the spot where the pillars were removed. The people of Balikumbat removed the plants and continued encroaching into the Bafanji land. In this same light, Fon Doh Gwanyin III foreign policy was summarised in his inaugural address during his installation in 1978. He declared his intentions to re-conquer all Balikumbat lands from her neighbours.283 This declaration and his refusal to recognize any agreement concluded between his father and the neighbours created tensions in the region. In this atmosphere, relations between these two villages deteriorated soon after Balikumbat lost the land case at the Supreme Court. Hence on March 4th 1978, again during the planting season, an invading force of some 200 Balikumbat youths reached Bafanji in Mbangang. With machetes and clubs, they destroyed crops, looted, burnt and pulled down houses. It was also revealed that they took away some food items. War signs were displayed in the area around the Bafanji Health centre.284 Unfortunately, the Bafanji Chief was not in the village. Some people present in the village at the time chased after the invaders and seized some of their identification cards. The matter, unfortunately, was not promptly reported to the DO in Ndop. Two days later, on the 6th of March, some Bafanji natives who had been victims of the Bamendjim Dam accident were returning from Ndop with their compensation from the State when they got attacked by the 283

(PAB), NW/Ha, 1980/1, Fon of Balikumbat Installation ceremony Address. (PAB), File No 1491/5H/s.4, Unprovoked Aggression against the Bafanji people by Balikumbat of Ndop Sub-division, 8 March 1978.

284

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Balikumbat people, resulting in many wounded casualties. Also, the victims had their bicycles seized by the attackers. Sources revealed that four Bafanji people were seriously injured and were helped by the Bamukumbit residents to nearby hospitals.285 On 7th of March 1978, the King Makers of Balikumbat announced in the market place that people could go to the disputed area and continue fighting. This was certainly because the following day was Bafanji market day and, the presence of hundreds of people would make an attack on the Bafanji market effective and a serious blow to the enemy. On the same day, the Bafanji retaliated, a retaliation that left many on both sides seriously injured. Bafanji women were captured as war prisoners.286 When the Bafanji Fon returned from his journey to Yaounde, he formally lodged a complaint with the administration in Ndop and Bamenda. On the 11th of March 1978, the Governor of the North-West Region, Abouem Atchoyi, flanked by the SDO for Mezam and DO for Ndop, visited the disputed area accompanied by Gendarmes and Fons of the belligerent villages. On the site, some disobedient people from both sides were arrested and detained. The two Fons, who accompanied the Governor and his entourage to Ndop, later signed a pact before the Governor never to go to war again. They also promised to respect the various Court decisions concerning the boundary.287 Despite the strained relations between Balikumbat and Bafanji, when the Bafanji Fon, Lwekui, died in 1964, the Balikumbat Fon and Fons of other neighbouring villages attended the funeral. The successor, Ngwefuni II, narrated how Fon Galabe III of Balikumbat advised him and invited him to his palace. During the installation of the new Fon, Gwanyin III in 1978, all the chiefs of the neighbouring villages attended the ceremony.288 Indigenes from both villages commenced to visit each other’s market. In the social domain, Balikumbat was the educational headquarters in the region. Important celebrations like the Youth Day and National Day celebrations usually took place in Balikumbat. The pupils of the neighbouring villages and their parents could be seen performing joint activities during such celebrations. After the building of the Catholic Parish in Balikumbat, a new resident priest arrived and welcomed Christians from villages around into his fellowship. The parish priest paid routine visits to 285

(PAB), File N.Ga. 54/s.4, 2030: Violation of Government and Court Decision into Bafanji Land on 4, 6 and 7 March, 1978. 286 (PAB), File No 1491/S.H./S.4 Unprovoked Aggression against the Bafanji. 287 (PAB), NW/Fa/1978/4, File No CE 58, NW Provincial Tours of Governor to Noni, Ndop, Nkambe and Wum. Reports on the Governor Tours, 1978-79. 288 (PAB), NW/Hg. (1980)/1/PT: Fon of Balikumbat, Installation Ceremony, 1980.

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all the outstations in the neighbouring villages. But this was not enough for much needed to be done to consolidate the needed peace. In the political domain, the unity provided by the Cameroon National Union (CNU), the only national party at the time of its creation in 1966, was instrumental in cementing relations. This sense of unity was later reinforced by the creation of the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) in 1985. The sense of belonging to one party provided meeting grounds for cooperation between the villages of those areas. Militants from Baligashu and Bafanji attended party meetings in Balikumbat. That is why when Balikumbat attacked Bafanji in 1978, an elite from Bafanji and member of Sub-section of the CPDM for Ndop wrote to the DO for Ndop. In the letter, Thafung Peyechu regretted the fact that the Balikumbat Fon could support his own people to carry such acts. He insisted that such acts were contrary to the principles of their party, the CNU.289 Before the 1990s conflict situation between Balikumbat and Bafanji, it should be noted that the administrative authorities played significant role in overcoming the hostile relations that characterised these communities in 1960s and 1970s. The creation of the Fon’s conference alongside with the unity provided by the unique political party (CNU later the on CPDM) provided an avenue for cordial relations between Balikumbat and Bafanji. The participation of the Fons at one another’s funeral celebrations, the creation of tribal student unions, joint activities during National Day celebration and church services evidently revealed the extent of cordiality after each war. While relations between Balikumbat and Bafanji alternated between cordiality and hostility, what was undeniable was the fact that these events were all dictated by Balikumbat. Land conflicts in the area, as seen from the causes, were orchestrated by her and when she did not cause any problem, peace reigned. Such dominance continued into the 1990s, following the reintroduction of multiparty politics. During this era, two successive wars were fought in 1995 and 1998. During the 1990s, the villages were regrouped under a single administrative unit, namely, Balikumbat Sub-division. Multiparty politics returned and became the principal factor that influenced traditional diplomacy in this area during this period. Balikumbat supported the ruling party (CPDM) that won elections in the area both in the 1992 and 1997 Presidential Elections. In fact, these developments went a long way to consolidate events that had played a major factor in the territorial dispute between Balikumbat and Bafanji during this decade.

289

(PAB), File No 1491/sh/s, 4: unproved Aggression against the Bafanji people.

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However, the peace that reigned in this area in the 1980s was disturbed by a series of administrative and political developments in the 1990s. It is quite true that problems always resurfaced in 1992 when both villages applied for and were expecting a secondary school. After a careful study of the two villages, the Cameroon Government saw Balikumbat as the central point in the villages of the West of Ndop, which included Bafanji, Balikumbat, Baligham, Baligashu, Baligansin and Bamukumbit. After all, the Catholic Church itself had also seen Balikumbat as the central point of those villages.290 Furthermore, Balikumbat had the highest population in the region, that is, about 32,000 inhabitants as against 10,000 for the Bafanjis following estimates after the 1987 population census. As a result, the Government, erected a Government Secondary School (GSS) in Balikumbat in 1992. Since then, the Bafanji expressed their bitterness against the Balikumbat village. This bitterness was openly expressed in their boycott of GSS Balikumbat from its creation, even when there was no problem between the two villages.291 After the creation of GSS Balikumbat, there were rumours that Ndop would be made headquarters of a division while Babessi and Balikumbat would be dub-divisions of that division. This news embittered the Bafanji even more.292 As a result, the pillar stones which acted as boundary between Balikumbat and Bafanji disappeared creating suspicion in both villages. The gossips finally came to pass and Balikumbat was made a sub-division with Bafanji as one of the village units under the new administrative unit. It was not long after the creation of Balikumbat SubDivision that another Presidential decree, signed in 1995, created the Balikumbat Rural Council. In the midst of all these, the Bafanji protested. They wanted the sub-division changed to Ndop West and its headquarters moved to Bafanji. They said the headquarters was far away from them. But the Balikumbat maintained that the area was suitable. They took one of their quarters Fombagoun as an example of an area whose inhabitants had to trek a longer distance to get to the administrative headquarters.293 The tension in the area increased when Balikumbat Fon, Gwanyin III won the parliamentary election in the constituency under the CPDM. This was preceded by the council election in which the CPDM had won in the Balikumbat Rural Council. Though the CPDM list that won the 290

Steve Sama, 1998, “Balikumbat/ Bafanji: war; who caused it? What should be done”, The Errand, No. 16 of Friday 29, p.4. 291 Steve Sama, 1998, p.4. 292 Interview with Liwo Lawrence, Bafanji, June 14th 2008. 293 Interview with Pa Pansiah Stephen, Balikumbat, June 18th 2008.

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Municipal election included the Fons and the indigenes of all the villages, the Fon of Balikumbat was elected as the first Mayor of the Council, a post he held till 2007. Many of our informants from both villages made us to understand that they thought that since the Balikumbat Fon was already a parliamentarian, he would not stand for election for the post of Mayor again. In this regard, other councillors, especially from Bafanji, refused to take seats in the council, accusing Balikumbat of domination. One of our informants revealed that the Fon of Bafanji, who seems to have an eye on the mayorship, refused the position of Assistant Mayor (1st Deputy Mayor), after the Balikumbat won the 1995 elections.294 Subsequently, the Fon of Bamukumbit, Chofong II accepted the post of Assistant Mayor though his people still resisted the extension of the council’s jurisdiction to their village. It was in this light that the Bamukumbit sent away council agents from Balikumbat who came to collect revenues. Continuous resistance from villages, especially Bafanji, to accept Sub-divisional and Council services in their villages strained relations between them and Balikumbat.295 Tension and distrust heightened in 1993 when the cairns and pillars that had been planted to mark the boundary between Balikumbat and Bafanji following the 1969 demarcation, were destroyed by unknown persons. The destruction of these pillars created tension in the area and all that was needed was a spark to set the situation ablaze. This spark came in 1995 when Tadagumba a notable in Balikumbat and two others from Balikumbat were kidnapped by the Bafanji, an act that marked the beginning of the 1995 Balikumbat/ Bafanji territorial dispute.296 On the other hand, the political differences and the boundary incident in 1993 brought tension between these villages culminating into open confrontations after the land sharing incident of 1995. In Hongie’s work, an eye witness and prince from Baligashu named Sama Victor revealed that the conflict began when some Bafanji youths came to share land on the disputed area (Three or T-corner Junction) close to the boundary with Balikumbat. Some Balikumbat women who were working on their fields saw them. According to the Baligashu prince, these women went back to the village and informed the Balikumbat people who came in their numbers to see things for themselves.297 Our informant claims that he had no knowledge on how four Bafanji people were shot, but testifies that the injuries sustained by these four youths pushed the Bafanji natives to capture 294

Interview with Joseph Honsieh, Bafanji, June 20th 2008. Interview with Joseph Honsieh. 296 G. Tume, 1996, “Bafanji-Balikumbat Border conflicts”, Cameroon Tribune, No. 677/3060 of January, p.4. 297 Hongie, 2005, p.70. 295

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two Balikumbat people coming from Mbouda, in the West Region of Cameroon, purportedly to buy cows. War broke out when the Balikumbat people learnt of the killing of the captured people.298 According to Fon Ngwefumi II of Bafanji, the attack by Balikumbat was well prepared. In fact, the ruler of Balikumbat refused to co-operate with the administration to replant the pillars and cairns that were destroyed in 1993. This, coupled with the fact that the Fon of Balikumbat challenged the 300meters buffer zone provided by the government officials for the two communities at loggerhead as a “worthless piece of paper”. This then opened the way for serious clashes on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of June 1995.299 According to oral sources, the clashes of the 3rd of June 1995 left eighteen people dead, six from Balikumbat and twelve from Bafanji. The Bafanji people equally lost a lot of properties including houses (still visible in the disputed area as illustrated in Plate 3). The Bafanji Health Centre, the Mbangang market, the co-operative society and Ali Nekenbeng’s coffee factory were equally destroyed. About three thousand Bafanji residents fled to Bagam and Mbouda in the West Region of Cameroon.300 On the second day of hostilities, June 4th 1995, the early morning attacks almost pushed Bafanji into Bambalang. On the third day, the 5th of June 1995, a Bafanji farmer named Oscar Punchu died while fleeing for safety. The number of people that fled from Bafanji was estimated about 5,000, and the damage caused by the conflict was outstanding: over 300 people were wounded and about 460 houses destroyed.301

298

Ibid., p.73. Interview with Fon A.Y. Ngwefumi II, Bafanji, June 20th 2008. 300 Interview with Fon A.Y. Ngwefumi II. 301 Evaluation Report of the commission set up to assess the value of individual property destroyed during the 1995 war. 299

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Plate 3: Remnants of the Houses Destroyed in the 1995 Conflict

A

B

C D

E

F

Source: Snapped by Author, at the contested Area (T junction), 28th of July, 2008. Note: The above pictures provide a vivid idea about the 1995 destruction which took place around the contested area (T- junction). A portrays a modern building that was destroyed during the 1995 conflict. Presently, both communities especially the Bafanji people farm in the areas since building injunction was passed by the Governor of the N.W. Region. From B to F we can see old fashionable buildings that were equally destroyed in 1995. On the other hand, picture C shows (overhead), a newly constructed Government Primary School under Bafanji’s jurisdiction (GS Bafanji).

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The government could not be indifferent in the face of such conflict which has been described by many as the bloodiest and most catastrophic of the North-West Region. It was as a result of the destruction around the “T-Junction” that the DO of Balikumbat Sub-Division informed the SDO for the Ngoketunjia Division, Joseph Mbassi Ngoh of the situation. Accordingly, reinforcements were sent from the Gendarme Brigade Ndop to help the units in Bafanji. Partial peace was restored.302 Later, the SDO wrote a letter to the two Fons, informing them of the Governor’s visit to the area on the 8th of June 1995. On that day, the SDO and the Governor, Bell Luc René visited and reiterated the fact that both villages should respect the boundary of 1969. He also asked the SDO to forward the court decision to the various Fons, since the Balikumbat Fon declared that such decision did not exist. In collaboration with the Divisional service of Surveys, the SDO levied the sum of 435,000Fcfa to be paid by each of the belligerent villages for the retracing of the boundary. The replanting of the cairns was scheduled for Tuesday, the 26th of September 1995. But unfortunately, the decision to retrace the boundary was never implemented303 as the Balikumbat village did not pay their own share of the money designed to finance the project. Meanwhile, the Bafanji people had earlier paid theirs and were willing to see the problem solved once and for all. In an interview, Ngwana, a Bafanji war victim, revealed that there was great lamentation from the Fon of Bafanji Ngwefuni II because the exercise still ended in futility. He further explained that on the day the boundary was to be retraced, the Balikumbat Fon and his people did not show up. The Bafanji people regretted the absence of their neighbours. After the SDO insisted that the retracing exercise should go ahead as planned, some disgruntled Balikumbat natives, purportedly sent by their Fon, came and attacked the SDO and his entourage on the site. Unable to overcome the situation, the SDO postponed the retracing exercise.304 The reasons for Balikumbat’s refusal to pay their own share of the estimated amount and their absence on the day of retracing the boundary were not made known. The Fon of Bafanji insisted that the reason for that, in his opinion, was because the Fon of Balikumbat was a member of the Central Committee of the CPDM. He also questioned why he was not punished if this was not the case. In a related episode, failing to sustain the 1995 crisis worsened relations between Balikumbat and Bafanji, especially when Peter Ngufor, a businessman in Bafanji, sued the Balikumbat Fon and 302

Tume, 1996, p.5. (PAB), File No 31/045/295: Retracing of the Bafanji-Balikumbat Boundary. 304 Interview with Jeremiah Ngwana, Bafanji, July 17th 2008. 303

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other people for the destruction of his properties during the 1995 war. Charging the Balikumbat Fon and four others for invasion, wanton destruction and looting of his properties, he claimed the sum of 550,000 Fcfa.305 In a judgment passed by the Bamenda High Court on the matter, the Fon of Balikumbat and his four collaborators were fined to pay the sum of 172,000,000 Fcfa. The court also noted that the Bafanji people had really suffered significant damage as a result of the Balikumbat invasion and thus passed a guilty verdict against Balikumbat.306 Unfortunately for Ngufor and Bafanji, the Balikumbat Fon took an appeal which was declared admissible in the Bamenda Court of Appeal. In the 1997 parliamentary election, the Fon of Balikumbat won another five years mandate as a Parliamentarian for the CPDM. As a result, he was protected by parliamentary immunity. This privilege forbade him to appear in the court of law except that the immunity was uplifted.307 While such immunity was a relief to the Balikumbat people, Bafanji people were completely frustrated. Their attempt to revenge the attack on the village had been foiled. All this helped to aggravate the mutual distrust and boycott that characterized relations between them. With all the forces seemingly militating against peace, another spark would be enough for a confrontation between the two villages. Unfortunately for them, it came in 1998, leading to the second serious confrontation for a period of less than four years. In this case, many people thought that war would not happen since the two communities had suffered a lot during the previous dispute of 1995. But this was not the case as 1998 began with the two villages in crisis. The Bafanji claimed that the renewed fighting begun when a man named Stephen Pasiah led a gang to attack a group of Bafut women in Bafanji. On their part, the Balikumbat claimed that the fighting began when Stephen Pasiah was kidnapped on his way from Baligashu. Then, they captured another person named John Lewoh in retaliation, and promised to release him only if Stephen Pasiah is also released. The Bafanji claim they handed over Stephen to the Balikumbat gendarmes, while the Balikumbat said that Stephen was brought to Balikumbat after suffering from serious corporal and psychological torture.308 305

(PAB), Suit No. HCB/40/45: Peter Ngofor versus Fon of Balikumbat and Four Others. 306 The Herald, No 2045 of March 1996, C.A. Ezieh, “North West Tribal Wars, Fon of Balikumbat, Ordered to pay 172 Million Francs for Bafanji Destruction”, p.21. 307 Special Official Gazette of 30 January, 1996, constitution of the Republic of Cameroon. 308 Sama, 1998, p.5.

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It should be noted that one of the consequences of the 1995 incident was the fact that since the two communities were avoiding each other, mischievous elements from both sides took advantage to cause trouble in the neighbouring quarters. Some informants from Balikumbat who lived at Njuguru quarter on the border with Bafanji explained how a notorious thief in Bafanji nicknamed “Bruce Lee” constantly attacked them in broad day light and took away their valuable items. According to him, the said thief had a rifle, purportedly given to him by the Bafanji Fon to use in case of an attack from Balikumbat. Bruce lee was considered as a war hero in Bafanji, and so was given arms so as to be ready for any eventuality. In this case, it was also revealed that he used such weapons to intimidate and even extort money and goods from defenceless people. The theatre of his operations was a border quarter of both villages, especially as most of these quarters suffered damage during the war as illustrated in Plate 3. Since the area had been deserted by their inhabitants, it became a hiding place for thieves who carried out cross-border mischievous acts in surrounding villages.309 It was in this circumstance that a Bafanji man named Joseph Maligufeh was caught by the Balikumbat guards. After he was beaten and his bicycle seized, the Bafanji people had no option than to launch an attack on the Balikumbat village. This was the first confrontation between the two villages barely forty-eight hours after the Fons of Balikumbat and Bafanji agreed at the office of the Governor of the North-West Province (Region) not to go to war. Some sources revealed that Balikumbat people harassed and attacked Bafanji women who had gone to farm on the disputed piece of land on the 29th of January 1998.310 Pansiah, a Balikumbat notable contradicted the view by saying that it was Bafanji people who launched an incursion into Balikumbat by burning farm herds in the quarters of Njuguru and Manchu.311 Hongie Godlove brought further clarification on the conflict. In fact, after suffering serious casualties on the first day, the Balikumbat retaliated in the most heinous manner. The Njanung, Mbangang and part of the Ekwo quarters in Bafanji were completely burnt down as illustrated in Plate 4. Plants, animals and other items were destroyed.312 In an attempt to defend their village, the Bafanji people registered about twenty deaths. Series of hostilities proceeded from the 29th of January and the 19th of 309

Hongie, 2005, p.76. Interview with Liwo Lawrence, Bafanji, June 14th 2008. 311 Interview with Pa Pansiah Stephen, Balikumbat, June 21st 2008. 312 The Post, No. 5096, 30 January 1998, C. Mbunwe, “Balikumbat wiped out Bafanji”, p.20. 310

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February 1998. These attacks painted a different scene in the Bafanji history, for more than half of Bafanji inhabitants took refuge in neighbouring chiefdoms. The issue came to a halt when a joint Gendarmerie and Army forces contingent from Bamenda caught some inhabitants of both villages with weapons. They were seriously beaten and some of them, mostly from Bafanji taken to Bamenda where they were locked up in the Bamenda Central Prison. It should also be noted that Balikumbat inflicted heavy casualties on Bafanji, and in retaliation, Bafanji pounced on Joguru, a quarter in Balikumbat, and inflicted serious damage.313 This feeling of loss is captured in the following words of the Fon of Bafanji: If this attack was because of land, then we would be fighting on the stretch of land under dispute. But Balikumbat just fell short of capturing my palace and the market. They destroyed all the houses at Njuru, Mbangam. I say it is jealousy because when they destroyed all our houses in 1995, we began reconstruction work. Now they have destroyed them again.314

The non-aggression pact of 1995 by the Ngoketunjia Fons in Ndop could not stop the two communities from fighting the 1998 war as earlier discussed. Military action was, therefore, agreed upon after several consultations at the Sub-divisional, Divisional and Provincial (Regional) levels. This was applied between March and April 1998 by the Governor of the then North-West Province, Fai Yengo Francis, and the Senior Divisional Officer for Ngoketunjia Division, Nji Mouliom Ali. Damages recorded during the 1998 war were enormous. More than 80 people were killed; about 6,000 people were displaced, and more than 853 houses were destroyed as illustrated in Plate 4. An evaluation of all damaged properties stood at 6,000,000 Fcfa.315 The 1998 war came and went with its numerous casualties as briefed above, but with many things coming to light. The first is that the Fon of Balikumbat who is one of the CPDM parliamentarians from the North-West Region now holds an enviable position in the political scene. Administrators in the North-West Region, especially those of Ngoketunjia, including some CPDM barons, now look at the Fon as a threat to their ambitions. Consequently, the administration, some Fons and some CPDM barons went behind to investigate wars between the two villages just to 313

The Post, No.4095, 2 February 1998, W. Formi, “SDO Access Fon Doh Gwanyin III of Balikumbat-Bafanji Conflict”, p.12. 314 Cam-balikumbat-murder-saddam 083004. html. 315 Formi, 1998, p.13.

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discredit the Fon of Balikumbat. Again the Bafanji had been deceived into believing that they could have a Sub-division through violence. This is evident by the declaration of the Fon of Bafanji, Ngwefuni II who said: My humble proposal to the government for a lasting solution is; one, that a big trench be dug separating Balikumbat from Bafanji; two, that permanent security be installed in Bafanji; and three, that the government should carve out Bafanji from Balikumbat and create an administrative unit in Bafanji with other villages included.316

Fon Ngwefuni III, therefore, insinuates that there can be no peace between Balikumbat and Bafanji unless a Sub-division is given to Bafanji. Another point that has come to light is that the North-West administration seems to be playing a “hide-and-seek” game. This is because when war broke out in 1998, troop deployed to the region reportedly prevented the Balikumbat from fighting, while allowing, at the same time, Bafanji men to penetrate into Balikumbat land through the Joguru quarter. This was on February 4th 1998 when five Balikumbat men were killed. Whatever the case and whoever the aggressor may be, war must be condemned by all means and costs. In war, there is no absolute winner for all are vanquished. The Balikumbat and Bafanji land conflicts have had far reaching effects on both sides, which have disturbed inter-village relations for a reasonable period, as discussed in the last part of this chapter.

C-The Consequences of Balikumbat-Bafanji Conflict The Balikumbat/Bafanji conflicts of 1966, 1995 and 1998 left tremendous consequences in the two communities in particular, and in the entire division in general. It should be made known that these consequences significantly disrupted political, economic and social relations between the contestants. It is from the backdrop of these circumstances that I thought it necessary to discuss some outstanding post-war impacts noticed during the crisis.

a. Political Consequence From a political perspective, there have been series of total breakdown in inter-village relations between Balikumbat and Bafanji since the colonial period. The breakdown during colonial and post-colonial periods was widening because the colonial masters created their own administrative 316

Interview with Fon A.Y. Ngwefumi II, Bafanji, June 20th 2008.

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system to suit their taste, which was not always aligned with the thoughts of the people within these communities. During the post-colonial regime, inter-village boundaries were already delimited and others well demarcated for administrative purposes. It is as a result of such conflicts that some of the canes and pillars were often off rooted by the unsatisfied communities, especially when some traditional rulers, as was the case of Balikumbat after 1978, opted for an expansionist tendency. This view was further aggravated by both communities living in mutual suspicion. It is in this same light that one can say that the Balikumbat and Bafanji conflicts of 1995 and 1998 were another example of some of the conflicts emanating from a renaissance of land and boundary dispute. As we have noticed earlier, the immediate causes of these conflicts can be attributed to the vaulting “ambitions for territorial aggrandisement on the part of some politicians, Fons and local elites”.317 It was in this framework of destruction that after the bloody and destructive conflict of June 4th 1995, the Fon of Balikumbat and some of his subjects were dragged to Court by the Bafanji elites. Standing trial on a five hundred and fifty (550) million Fcfa suit filed by Peter Ngufor, an elite from Bafanji whose properties were destroyed during the conflict. On behalf of the Bafanji elites on charges of invasion, he said; Wanton destruction and looting of property, the Fon of Balikumbat and some of his subjects were found guilty by the Bamenda High Court and awarded to the plaintiff general damages of 172 million Frs cfa. The Court was satisfied that the Bafanji people had really suffered damages as a result of the Balikumbat invasion of their chiefdom in 1995 and so passed a verdict of guilt against the aggressors.318

317

Simo Mope, 1996, p.18. The Herald, 4-6 October 1996, C. Andu Ezieh, “North West -Tribal wars: Fon of Balikumbat ordered to pay 172 million Fcfa for Bafanji Destruction”, p.6. 318

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Plate 4: Portrait of the 1998 House Destruction in Bafanji Community

Source: Data Collected from Ecumenical Mission for Peace and Development Foundation (EMPD), Ntirinkun-Bamenda, 16th of July 2008. Note: The above pictures are summarized houses damaged by the Balikumbat people in Bafanji main land (beyond the T-junction) in 1998. We never thought it necessary to allocate any letter on each since they have the same story and all found in the same Bafanji land.

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In fact, the above Court decision was however short lived; since the Balikumbat Fon was a CPDM Parliamentarian, he took an appeal at the Yaounde Supreme Court and the 1997 election accorded him another mandate in parliament. From this regard, inter-village diplomacy was now at risk since a Fon could possibly become a parliamentarian as to safeguard his interest in his traditional milieu. What became clear during this last decade of conflict was the fact that Balikumbat continued dictating the peace of inter-village relations in the region. The advent of multiparty politics and her political position in the CPDM seemed to have favoured this state of being. As a CPDM central committee member, Parliamentarian, Mayor and later President of the North-West Fons Conference, the Balikumbat Fon, Doh Gwanyin III, had everything going his way as he dictated the pace of relations between the villages of this area and in the entire Division.

b. Economic Consequences In the economic domain, it was investigated and made known that the conflict that took place on the 2nd of June 1995 was the bloodiest and most devastating in the whole of the North-West Region. In fact, some sources revealed that as many as sixty or more Bafanji people were killed, four hundred and fifty compounds were destroyed, including farmlands, the Bafanji water supply tank, and other properties worth hundreds of millions Fcfa. More than two thousand (2,000) people were rendered homeless as illustrated in Plate 4.319 In hide manner of destruction, during the second main confrontation alleged to have been initiated again by Balikumbat in 1998, the Bafanji village was thoroughly ransacked and destroyed as noticed in Plate 4 that illustrates the 1998 destruction. Besides the unprecedented displacement of human beings, several properties were looted and burnt. The Balikumbat Society Building, Government Primary school and a coffee factory which belonged to Nekenbeng Ali (home base elites) were all destroyed. Evidently, Balikumbat brought Bafanji village crashing to a state of ruin.320 Since there was no peace between the two communities, the Bafanji people who were going to Ndop did not use the Balikumbat road, especially during the inter-war periods.

319

The Post 20 April 1998, C. Mbunwe, “Balikumbat Warriors Wiped out Bafanji”, p.5. 320 Simo Mope, 1996, p.18.

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Political cooperation never excluded economic relations because such relations were impaired between Balikumbat and Bafanji. However, economic relations continued between these two communities when the conflict stopped. For instance, the destruction of the Bafanji main market following the last two confrontations of 1995 and 1998 made the Balikumbat main market the other alternative for the neighbouring villages. For instance, Bamukumbit residents, who used to sell their goods in the Bafanji market, were forced to use the Balikumbat market. Because the Bafanji people accused natives from the other Chamba chiefdoms of siding with Balikumbat during their confrontations, they treated them poorly, and this made the Balikumbat market the only alternative for them.

c. Socio-Cultural Consequences In the social and cultural domain, the conflict opposing the Balikumbat and Bafanji people also resulted in the burning down of houses, the destruction of Government Primary School Bafanji, the Bafanji Cooperative Society buildings and the Bafanji Health Centre. In retaliation, the Bafanji people destroyed crops and houses found at the periphery of the Balikumbat headquarters. During our research in the area, we were equally briefed that no Bafanji person came to the Balikumbat market. It was evident that the boycott had to do with fear, or was designed to affect the economy of Balikumbat. On the contrary, the Balikumbat people attended the Bafanji market although no Balikumbat villager resided in Bafanji and vice versa during conflict moments.321 Judging from the above fact, the villages devised new ways of living without depending on each other. It is for this reason that a bridge was constructed overnight on the Nchuagha swamps by the Bafanji to link their village to Bambalang just after the 1998 conflict. After the conflict, the Bafanji did everything to avoid passing through Balikumbat to Ndop. In the same manner, the Balikumbat preferred to pass through Bamukumbit, though a much longer distance, to Mbouda in the West Region than through Bafanji. Moreover, inter-tribal marriages between Balikumbat and Bafanji disintegrated and friendship ties were broken.322 It is no doubt that the Bafanji people suffered enormously from material damage since most of the wars were fought in the Bafanji settled areas. The Bafanji people boycotted Balikumbat, the Sub-divisional head-quarters. There was total breakdown in relationship between the two communities. 321 322

Interview with Wasum Augustin Lehdogha, Balikumbat, June 20th 2008. Interview with Florence Ngwefuni, Bafanji, June 17th 2008.

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It should be noted that conflicts have a very significant impact on education. In areas of conflict, in the Balikumbat/Bafanji case for example, a secondary school building on the buffer land was destroyed by the Balikumbat people. The Bafanji villagers tried to reconstruct this school located at the buffer land (T-junction). The building had gone up to the roofing level but an injunction was given by the Divisional Officer of Balikumbat that the school building should not be roofed. The Bafanji people held that the Fon of Balikumbat, who was by then a Parliamentarian, influenced the Divisional Officer.323 During our research, we were briefed that no Bafanji student attended Government High School Balikumbat in times of conflict. The parents considered it insecure to send their children to Balikumbat. The Bafanji children stopped attending the lone High School in the Sub-division because it was located in Balikumbat village, but preferred to go to Ndop, the head-quarters of Ngohkitungia Division. The distance from Bafanji to Balikumbat is about 10 kilometres while the distance between Bafanji and Ndop is about 40 kilometres.324 In a similar situation, there was a slow-down in the usage of the health services located in Balikumbat by the Bafanji villagers. The medical officer in charge of the Ndop Health District, Dr. Teta Godwin, reported that diseases and illnesses increased among the Bafanji people because some of them found it difficult to travel far to seek medical care. In his words: This conflict has consequences on my practice since the conflict started again in 1995; the Bafanji people do not visit the health centre any more. They rather go all the way to Ndop and spend a lot of money than coming to the health centre in Balikumbat. Some people have died because of this very long way to Ndop and they do not reach there on time.325

Developmental activities in the Sub-division were greatly inhabited by these conflicts. Since the head-quarters of the Sub-division is Balikumbat, the natives of Bafanji after the conflict, were no longer willing to go there for any administrative reason. The road linking the two villages could not be maintained. Council revenue collection dropped since the conflict rendered collection very difficult in the Bafanji area. The Bafanji 323

Interview with Joseph Honsieh, Bafanji, June 20th 2008. Interview with Florence Ngwefuni, Bafanji, June 17th 2008. 325 Cheers Groele, 2004, “Exploring the possibilities and challenges of PCTA methods within Early Warning system; A case study of Balaikumbat-Bafanji conflict in Cameroon, Africa”, Masters Dissertation in intercultural work and conflict management of applied science, Alice-Salomon-Plat-25D-12627, Berlin, p.39. 324

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people stopped using the social amenities provided by the Sub-division since these were mostly found in Balikumbat. For example, the lone secondary school by then in the area and the road itself was boycotted. The Sub-division suffered from fear, mistrust and lack of communication between the two villages in terms of diplomacy. This act rendered administration difficult.326 The electrification of Balikumbat and the improvement of the communication network by the Council made Balikumbat an inviting business centre in the Sub-division to buy vital items. Though Bafanji seemed to have been indifferent to such a favourable atmosphere at first, the people were later obliged to visit Balikumbat village. First, as the Subdivisional head-quarters, they were bound to go there for some administrative services such as signing and certification of documents and complaints. Chapter Three has thus examined the conflicting relationship between the Balikumbat and the Bafanji in the Ndop plain. The geographical and historical context of the area under study was equally treated. The origin and the stages of the conflicts over land and boundary matters constituted the major focal points in this work. In this regard, we equally attempted to throw more light on the successive series of land conflicts from 1966 to 1998. Note should be taken that these people had been experiencing friendly relations before and after the wars. That is why care was taken to analyse friendly relations before, during and after the calamities. In this regard, post-war effects were equally noted on both communities. We demonstrated that Bafanji suffered enormously from property damage. In this manner, this perennial conflict still persisted in some other areas in the North-West Region. The next chapter, (Chapter Four), shall equally treat a similar case of conflict, but this time between Mbororo graziers and the Aghem farmers in Wum central.

326

Interview with Wasum Augustin Lehdogha, Balikumbat, June 20th 2008.

CHAPTER FOUR LAND CONFLICT IN WUM CENTRAL, MENCHUM DIVISION: FARMER - GRAZIER PROBLEM

The Mbororo are scattered throughout Western and Central Sudan, the Senegambian region, Cameroon and Central Africa. They are referred to in different parts of Africa as the Fulbe, Peul, Foulah, Mbororo, Aku, Pullo and Fellata. They are mostly nomadic herdsmen. For the sake of consistency, the appellations Mbororo, Fulani or Aku shall be used interchangeably throughout this work. When we talk of the Mbororo question, we merely make reference to the stages and difficulties encountered by this minority group in the mastering of their present habitation vis-à-vis the indigenous population of the Aghem federation. The difficulties encountered by the Mbororo have always plunged both parties into what is commonly known as the farmer-grazier (f/g) conflict. This chapter examines the geographical and the historical environment of the conflict area, the advent and organisation of the Mbororo in Wum, the causes of their differences with the indigenous farmers of Aghem, and the dramatic stages of the conflict and its consequences.

A- Geographical and Historical Setting of the People The preoccupation of this section is to discuss the geographical and historical situation of Wum, the conflict area.

a. The Geographical Setting Wum Central is situated at the north-western end of Cameroon, on the western border with Nigeria. It is bordered to the northeast by Donga Mantung Division, to the east by Boyo Division, to the south by Mezam and Momo Divisions, to the southwest by Manyu Division and to the north and

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northwest by Nigeria.327 The study area at large forms part of the Cameroon highlands which are a range of volcanic highlands stretching from south of Lake Chad and ending on the coast in Mount Cameroon. The area is also drained by two important tributaries of the Benue River: River Menchum and River Katsina-Ala. The region lies in the Guinea savannah belt of the tropical grassland.328 Wum, the administrative and commercial town, is located along the Ring Road, 82 kilometres from Bamenda. Generally speaking, the topography of Menchum and Wum as a whole is mountainous and undulating, characterised by abrupt escarpments, towering mountain peaks and deep valleys. All of these natural beauties are of great geographical interest to the people. Wum Central is a lowland with spotted hills, while the surrounding areas are highly mountainous and hilly. The topography varies from low altitudes of about 200 metres above sea level to high altitudes of approximately 2.500 metres and above.329 The hills are covered with short tough grasses and wooded valleys with interlocking spur, especially around Lake Nyos. As a result of the diversified terrain and the existence of large rivers like the Menchum, Kimbi and Katsina-Ala, the Wum area is totally lacking in routes transport and as such, the generally poor and inadequate road network of the region calls for the government attention.330 Among the natural features of the area are Lakes Wum and Nyos, found respectively in Wum Central and few kilometres away from Wum Central. Other surrounding lakes include Lakes Benakuma and Ilum. Two important branches of the Benue River drain the area. The Menchum River, from which the name of the Division was derived, has its source from the Bamboutos range and flows through Mezam, Momo, Beba-Befang and Esimbi regions to Nigeria. In the dry season, these rivers and most of the streams reduce in volume. This has economic implications on farmers and cattle owners for the dry season often permitted cattle owners to carry transhuman activities in the region.331 Map 6 illustrates the settlement of the Fulani in Menchum Division.

327

J.A. Ngwa, 1967, An outline Geography of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, Longman Green and Co Ltd, London, p.9. 328 J.A. Ngwa, 1967, p.9. 329 J.I. Clarke, 1981, Population Geography, Second Edition, Oxford, Pergamon Press, p.17. 330 Ibid. 331 Annual Report, from the Divisional Delegate for Agriculture for Menchum, 1988/89.

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Chapter Four Map 6: Fulani Settlements in Wum Central, in Menchum Division

The winds that influence the climate of the study area are the northeast trade winds that blow from the Sahara and the southwest monsoons from across the Atlantic Ocean, which brings about rainfall. Straddled over longitude 10° east, the study region is a capsule replica of most of the climate and vegetation experienced in the North-West Region. Temperature, rainfall and sunshine play a fundamental role in controlling agriculture, especially the

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growth of particular crops like cocoyams, beans, maize, potatoes just to name a few. The rainy season becomes an encouraging factor of agriculture and livestock activities in the area. During the dry season, human activities evolve around soil breaking, burning of the bush and more recently overgrazing,332 which, most often than not, conditions the conflict situation in the area.

b. Historical Setting Wum Central comprises four clans: Fungom, Aghem (Wum), Beba-Befang and Esimbi. Esimbi and Befang straddle over a wide river valley and flood plains of river Menchum and its tributaries, and lie in the hot palm belt which extends to Mamfe and Nigeria. The rest of the region is a rolling countryside with domes of hills here and there. Fungom has the hilliest landscape. A satisfactory attempt to trace the origin of a people must depend upon a synthesis of all available sources. For the sake of authenticity and objectivity in building the history of the people in this study area, many factors such as oral traditions, linguistic contributions, written material and toponyms were taken into account. Linguistics has contributed in determining the origin of the people of the study area through the discovery of features and languages which bear evidence of prehistoric cultured contacts. The existing written sources here are quite significant. For instance, mythical tales and dynastic legends (oral traditions) give us some clarification on the origins of the different groups of people found in the area. Taking all these into consideration, writing the history of the people of this locality did not pose serious difficulties. The people of the region are alleged to be of the Tikar, Aghem and Widekum origin. For example, Fungom is part of the originally Tikar chiefdoms.333 Other Tikar tribes that were previously in Menchum are Kom and Bum, known today as part of the Boyo Division. However, these ethnic communities are not within the scope of our work. Often, the presence of resemblances is the result of obvious historical connections between the people. Mmen, Kuk, Nyos and Fungon villages were settled by the Tikar who came from Banyo at the same time

332

Provincial archives Bamenda (PAB), NW/Sa/d.2002/4/BK, Akum Joseph N., Population growth and Land use: An Assessment of the relationship between farmers and Graziers in Wum North-West Province of Cameroon, 2002, pp.45-46. 333 (PAB), L. Cantle, 1932, Assessment Report on the Wum Native Authority of the Bamenda Division Cameroon Province, p.4.

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as the Kum and Bafut peoples.334 They all practice matrilineal succession and appear to be offshoots of Kum. Fang is the only village that practises patrilineal heritage, and some reports suggest that they are of Widekum extraction. The non Tikar groups in Funfom, Furu-Awa, Munken and others appear to have a common place of origin.335 The Aghem people are reported to have reached their present site passing through Esu. It is believed that the ancestors of the Aghem came from the Benue lands or the Tiv country (present day Taraba and Benue states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria still called Munchi by the Aghem), which is often referred in their history as the remote place of origin. Linguistic evidence helps to enlighten their historical connection with some Benue ethnic groups. The existing evidence explains that the Aghem originated from the Tiv region and are often connected with the “Munchi” ancestry.336 It is believed that the Aghem people originated from the Upper Mbam River, which was originally populated by people from the Tikari ethnic group. While searching for a new land, they stopped in the Tiv region, which is today considered as their place of origin.337 The real reason behind the Aghem leaving Tiv land is not well known, but some stories hold that they were not fairly treated, especially because they were a minority group that had no chief ruling them. They were led out of the region by a man named Sihngdong, who later became their first chief (Batum) when they settled in Waindo, in Wum. Linguistic evidence suggests that the villages of Ngo, Muntung and other smaller villages appear to have some connections with the Aghem Federation. Most of the people of the Menchum valley, Modelle, Befang, Bazi and Okormanjang point to Widekum as their ancestral home,338 which is a sub group of the Bantu and of the same stock with the Tikar. For many centuries, there have been population movements in and out of Menchum valley, resulting in the creation of eight independent village chiefdoms by the end of the 19th century. These are Aku, Ide, Befang, Beuta, Ngo, Essimbi, Okoremanjang and Muntung. These chiefdoms spoke different languages and pointed to different origins. Six polities (Ide, Modelle), (Aku, Befang, Bangwi, Okoremanjang) point to a Widekum ancestry. However, the village chiefdoms of Ngo, Muntung, and Beuta seem 334

A. Sa’ad, 1977, The Lamibe of Fombina: A Politgical History of the Adamawa 1809-1901, A.B.U. Press, p.10. 335 Nkwi and Warnier, 1982, p.202. 336 (PAB), NW/Sa/d.2002/4/BK, Akum Joseph N., Population growth and Land use. 337 Sa’ad, 1977, p.12. 338 Nkwi and Warnier, 1982, p.204.

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to have connections with Aghem. These valley chiefdoms, though having different parochial histories, set up attractive trade networks among themselves which brought Aghem, Kom and Bafut into a triangular trade. This explains why by the end of the 19th century, the chiefdoms of the valley supplied Kom and Aghem with oil and received in return livestock and other iron goods.339 The Aghem became a federated clan under the leadership of Nnunyom of Zongokwo village (the only group that took up patrilineal succession under Nnunyom after suppressing matrilineal succession practices in the Zongokwo village). In this connection, each of the six villages of the federation, Su, Tselegha, Wanangwen, Waindo, Zongokwo and Zongofu-uh had specific functions within the clan. The Kesu chiefdom, which was found at the entrance of the clan, was conferred the leadership of military affairs with the authority to send the clan to war if need be. The Zongokwo chiefdom was chosen as the political and ritual authority of the federation because of its geo-strategic position in the area. Though having paramount power, the ruler in that chiefdom could not challenge the powers of Kesu over military matters. In this regard, the Zongokwo paramount chief remained the spiritual leader and ritual head in times of war, epidemics, annual dance festivals, planting and harvesting seasons. The chiefdoms of Waindo, Tselegha, Zongofu-uh, Wanangweh and Kesu were conferred with the duties of King Makers.340 During the 19th century, other chiefdoms such as Magha, Naikom, Ghii-Dze and Wa’ajung sprang up almost certainly due to chieftaincy succession problems, making it to ten chiefdoms in the Aghem clan. During the reign of Dze Nyuo of Waindo, the conquest against the forest neighbours seemed to have been terminated by the 1880s. The Germans invaded the Aghem Federation in mid-1903 and later on, some Fulani nomads started coming into the said locality with their cattle. Their presence helped to diversify and accelerate the economy of the area through the ‘Jangali’ tax.341 This settlement of the Fulani in the Aghem Federation was received with mixed feelings, for it generated what is known today as the farmergrazier conflict in the said locality. The Mbororo arrived in Cameroon from the west only at the end of last century. They are said to have comprised 12% of the Cameroonian

339

I. Kopytoff, 1973, Aghem Ethnogenesis and the Grassfields, Ecumene Paris, C.N.R.S., Conference on Cameroon, p.17. 340 Nkwi and Warnier, 1982, p.204. 341 Ibid.

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population of over 12 million people by 1992.342 In 1987, the Mbororo of the Bamenda Plateau in the North-West Province are estimated to number 120,000.343 They arrived in the region in the early 1900s from Adamawa, further to the north and East Nigeria, and are said to comprise two groups. These groups are named each after the type of cattle they traditionally raise. The Jafun, who came to the North West province at the beginning of the 1920s and settled primarily in Sabga, have traditionally raised large dark brown cattle. The Aku have raised small white black-nosed cattle and have been in the region for the last fifty years or so. Within these groups are several distinct family clans. For example, the North West Jafun are further divided into ten clans or Koen. Those who reside in Sabga are called Goshi.344 The nomadic Mbororo, a predominantly pastoral Islamic tribe, began to move into the North-West Region in the first half of the 20th century. Ardo Sabga, a Mbororo patriarch, led their migration into the North-West Region from 1916 from Banyo.345 It is believed that Ardo Sabga and his followers came from Nigeria through the Northern part of Cameroon. It was from the Adamawa region of Cameroon that the pastoralists began expanding to other parts of the country, including in the present-day North-West Region.346 Under the leadership of Ardo Sabga, they came through Foumban and Jakiri with thirty (30) Jafun herdsmen of the Gosi clan (near Kano in Northern Nigeria) with over 10,000 herds of cattle.347 The earliest band of Mbororo under Ardo Sabga settled on the Babanki-Tungo escarpment facing the Ndop plain, known today as the Sabga hill. This hill got its name after Ardo Sabga settled there with his people. While in Babanki, the nomadic herdsmen learnt of the fertile and abundant land in Menchum Division. The Fulani graziers began to move to the area with their cattle.348 Their animals included cows, sheep and goats 342

MBOSCUDA, Constitution of the Mbororo social and cultural development Organisation, MBOCUDA, Yaounde; (1993), The Mbororo social and cultural Development Association of Cameroon: Project Proposals, for the year 1992. 343 Djago S. & N.P. Mzeka, “Naming and Intiation Rights in the Western Grassfields: The Fulani Case”, unpublished, Bamenda, Kaberry Research centre, 1993, pp.1-3. 344 A. Jabiri Muhammadou, 2004, “The Advent, Organisation and Integration of the Fulani into the Menchum Community from early 20th Century to 2003”, DEA Dissertation in History, University of Yaounde I, p.10. 345 P. Nchonji Nkwi and J-P. Warnier, 1982, Elements for a History of the Western Grassfields, Yaounde, SOPECAM, p.203. 346 V.J. Ngoh, 1996, History of Cameroon since 1800, Limbe, Pressbook Ltd, p.33. 347 Ibid. 348 Interview with Christopher Mua, Waindo-Wum, May 26th 2007.

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of the Fulani group who set out from Adamawa province under Ardo Juli, a relation to Ardo Sabga. The number of Fulani nomads and cattle started growing, requiring more settlement areas in the North-West Region. This need for more settlements and grazing lands encouraged the establishment of Fulani settlement in other parts of the North-West Region. As such, Menchum in general, and Wum central subdivision in particular, was not left out to host the nomadic graziers. The cattle-increase phenomenon now spurred Mbororo settlements, which sprang up in places such as Kom, Bafut, Bali, Nsugali, Nso, Wum and Esu.349 Some local authorities in Menchum Division further encouraged this settlement of Mbororo nomads. Fon Bah Mbi I had chosen some villages to settle Fulani nomads because their land extended to the borders with Nigeria. While in Menchum, the Fulani graziers was also moved towards the Aghem clan which was rich in pastures. Seven years later, in 1937, Major Walters, the then resident officer for Wum, met with Fon Bah Mbi I and other chiefs of the locality, and successfully negotiated a place for the coming of the Fulani.350 By the 1940s, there was a massive influx of more Mbororo in the Menchum area from Adamawa and Nigeria who forced some early settlers to move from Wum to Bafmen. In the early 1950s, a new wave of Fulani of the Aku clan under Ardo Umaru left Northern Nigeria and headed for Wum. Upon arrival, Ardo Umaru contacted local authorities and obtained their permission to settle. He found the area conducive for the rearing of cattle, and Dr Tigani, a veterinary doctor, encouraged him to settle there.351 After helping his people to settle in Wum, Ardo Umaru returned to Nigeria for the purpose of convincing more Mbororo to join the Wum settlements. Hundreds of cattle owners followed him, flanked with their families and animals. They reached Wum in the mid-1950s. When the Fulani population had considerably increased in the area, the administrative authorities decided to introduce the Jangali tax.352 During the early 1960s, the Mbororo in Wum were frightened due to political uncertainty; the plebiscite of 1961 and threats from some political leaders in the area made them feel as targets if war broke out. That made the majority of them to

349

National Archives Buea (NAB), Cb 1928, Annual Report for Bamenda Division, 1928-1934, p.7. 350 Interview with Thomas Ndong, Naikom-Wum, May 30th 2007. 351 Jabiri Muhammadou, 2004, p.11. 352 Jangali tax was cattle tax introduced by the British Colonial masters to cattle owners. This tax was introduced in British Cameroon in the md 1950s.

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return with their cattle to Nigeria. In an effort to induce some of them to stay, Ardo Umaru promised to pay their Jangali tax for at least two years.353 After the plebiscite, Ardo Umaru went back to Nigeria to convince those who had left to come back, assuring them that things had returned to normal. Hundreds of these Mbororos came back to Wum with their cattle and families. As years went by, more and more Mbororo communities became well pronounced in the area. New settlements in other parts of Menchum were founded since the need for more grazing land became urgent. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the permission of the chiefs, Mbororo settlements had been set up in the neighbouring villages of Esu, Weh and Nyos. The Mbororo were a traditionally organised people. Everywhere they went, regardless of whether there was a central authority (power) or not, they had no problem as far as organisation was concerned. But for economic reasons and the maintenance of security and unity, the colonial administration and local chiefs executed their influence on the Mbororo of the entire North-West Region. This was because their property was visible wherever they settled. Thus, in order to gain revenue, the administrative authorities understood that it was vital to organize these nomads. During this period, it was quite remarkable that the Mbororo people kept multiplying their temporal houses otherwise known as ‘herds’ as shown on Plate 5. When they faced attempts by the authorities to organise them, the Mbororo sometimes migrated, and other times, they preferred to deliver the demanded revenue and stay aloof to graze their cattle freely.354 One of the most economic influential and religious authority in Wun Central in the person of Alhadji Bofom claims, when they wanted to move, they did so in groups and at successive intervals as earlier observed during their settlement in the area under study. The Mbororo, therefore, were made up of segmentary societies, each led by an elder or a leader. Who was usually the eldest person in the family, often referred to as Ardido. He was the migratory leader, adviser and father of his group, and as a result, people saw him as their leader. He organized the group under his influence and eventually became the Ardo, or the political head of the family.355 Since he had some Wakilis (administrative agents in the Muslim communities) as his administrative agents, Ardo Umaru of Wum promoted some of them to heads of new settlements. These Wakilis were henceforth called junior Ardos, but continued to pay allegiance to Ardo Umaru who now was acting as paramount Ardo of all the Mbororo in Menchum 353

Jabiri Muhammadou, 2004, p.12. Interview with Alhadji Bofom, Gheido-Wum, May 30th 2007. 355 Interview with Alhadji Bofom. 354

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Division. Ardo Umaru was recognised by the Divisional Officer, J.W. Griffith, as chief Ardo of Wum. He was assisted in his administration by councillors made up mostly of Wakilis, among whom were Wakili Kauru and Wakili Kosha, who were very instrumental in the management of Mbororo affairs. Plate 5: A Typical Mbororo Family Compound in the Bamenda Grassfields

Source: Snapped by Author, Hill side of Lake Wum, May 12th 2007.

From a political and administrative point of view, the Ardo was a successful and influential man whom others envied. He was the one who matched in front or led herds to pasture grounds. They opened the door so that his companions would enter. The Ardo was the intermediary between his followers and the indigenes. Just like Wakili, elders Maube equally assisted the Ardo. They were important personalities who decided on major issues such as where and when to go on transhumance. He also officiated marriages and funerals, settled disputes and headed the Islamic group during prayers on Fridays and important feast days.356 During the colonial era, 356

M. Z. Njeuma and N. Awasom, 1988, “The Fulani in the Bamenda Grassfield: Opportunity and Conflict, 1940-1960”, in P. Gescheire & P. Konings (eds), Proceedings/Contributions: Conference on the Political Economy of Cameroon; Historical perspectives, Leiden, African studies Centre, pp.466-467.

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Menchum or the Grassfields was composed of centralised chiefdoms, each under a Fon or a chief. The society was politically united under his influence and he acted as a traditional leader who supervised the collection of colonial revenue from his subjects (Jangali taxes).357 As concerns the judiciary, Ardo Umaru had a Muslim judge known as Alkali. But there was no Alkali court in Wum. The DO of Wum informed the Mbororo that there was an Alkali court in Ndop. It was for these reasons that the Mbororo in Menchum were reluctant to seek justice in native courts. It should be noted that in the early 1930s, the Mbororo were not among the recognised Native Authorities in the North-West Region. The indigenous people still regarded them as aliens, even though the British relied heavily on them for tax. In 1949 Bamenda Division was raised to a Province, and Wum became a division. Following these developments, the Mbororo became members of Native Authorities in the 1950s.358 In the economic domain, the Mbororo were predominantly a pastoral community. Those of Wum owned mostly the white breed cattle. The availability of grazing land had attracted many of them to settle in Menchum Division. Their pastoral activities brought much revenue to the division in form of Jangali tax. In addition to pastoral activities, the Mbororo also practised other economic activities like blacksmithing, handicraft, embroidery, leather works and even subsistence farming. In the socio-cultural domains, the Mbororo in West Africa are traditionally nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral cattle herders characterise their traditional identity. They are the group of Fulani that have been most resistant to change, and were the last to embrace the Islamic faith. The North-West Mbororo are becoming more sedentary, coming together in larger communities with better access to schools and health facilities.359 They at first sent their children to Arabic schools, avoiding Government or Christian schools. But in 1972, the SDO of Menchum embarked on a campaign to sensitise the Mbororo to send their children to western schools before they began to do so.360 As time went by, some young male Mbororo were able to assimilate town life. Some of them acquired unskilled labour jobs and took on western education. In this regard, the decision and wiliness by the Mbororo people to send their children to Western and Arabic education was expressed in the locality. In some cases in the sedentary 357

Ibid, p.467. Jabiri Muhammadou, 2004, p.14. 359 Lucy Davis, 1995, “Opening Political Space in Cameroon: the Ambiguous Response of the Mbororo”, in Review of African Political Economy N° 64: 213-228, ROAPE Publications Ltd, p.218. 360 Jabiri Muhammadou, 2004, p.14. 358

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Mbororo society, married women were not permitted to go to the market to sell milk and buy provisions.361 Initially, the Mbororo preferred their traditional medicine to modern medicine. But in the course of time, some individuals started going to hospitals. Language wise, Fulfulde was the only language they spoken when they arrived Wum. But with time, they gradually learned to communicate in Pidgin English. They also adopted other forms of dressing. The Fulani generally lived on pap and milk. But with time, they got acquainted to other foodstuffs such as, fufu corn, beans and potatoes found in this locality. They suddenly started building modern houses with new zinc roofs contrary to what Plate 5 illustrated.362 Concerning the socio-cultural organisation of the Mbororo, especially their integration into the local community, the people were highly attached to their own cultures. Their religion (Islam) made them to feel isolated as they went only to Arabic schools, curing themselves with traditional herbs, speaking Fulfulde, dressing in gowns, caps and wrappers, taking pap, milk and butter foods, and getting married only among themselves. But as time evolved, they started adopting some aspects of the local culture. Their children began to go to school, their women to modern hospitals when sick or during prenatal visits, and they spoke not only Pidgin English but also good English. The Mbororo also began to adapt to local foodstuffs. But they continued to hold firm to some aspects of their culture without deviation. For instance, most of the adults still dress in gowns and caps, practise Islam, marry among themselves and conduct their naming and death ceremonies strictly in respect to the Islamic laws.363 To some extent, the Mbororo still face problems of integration. Due to the fact that they migrated to the area in search of grazing lands, many local farmers continue to regard them as aliens illegally occupying their land. This negative attitude of locals towards them has made the Mbororo not to feel at home in Wun Central. The local authorities in the division have been doing everything possible to resolve the differences between the two communities and see if they could live together peacefully. In fact, the problems earlier faced by the Mbororo in this area are a combination of the inescapable influence of outside political and economic pressures and the apparent inability of the Mbororo society to counter these pressures or resolve the problems that perhaps they might have created within the locality.364 Most Mbororo people would point to external factors 361

Lucy Davis, 1995, p.14. Interview with Ardo Sule Dicko, Gheidze-Wum, May 24th 2007. 363 Interview with Ardo Sule Dicko. 364 Lucy Davis, 1995, p.219. 362

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as constituting the main threats to their society and causes of their problems. However, conflicts between the Mbororo and the other ethnic groups in the area have been building up over many years. This is reflected in the terms they use to refer to each other: ‘Natives’ and ‘Akus’, which date back to the language of colonial surveys and are used as commonly as the more neutral ‘farmers’ and ‘graziers’ by both groups. The dichotomy allows, on the one hand, the Mbororo to maintain their claim to racial and cultural distinction, and on the other hand, the ‘Natives’ to regard the Mbororo as immigrants with lesser rights to land. In fact, this was the background of the differences.

B- Origin of the Farmer-Grazier Problem The differences opposing the Mbororo graziers to the Aghem farmers, especially when it came to the domain of land exploitation, have been a major factor of clashes between both peoples in Wum Central and in Menchum Division in general. A continuous struggle between two types of farmers, the livestock breeders and the crop cultivators in which there is trespassing by one of these two groups into the other group’s zone of operation signalled great attention, especially during post-colonial period. This struggle or confrontation on the use of a piece of land has causes and origins, which can be easily understood as both natural and man-made.

a. Problem of Space Occupation The main problem of the agro-pastoral conflict in the North-West Region at large and in Wum in particular has been the uncontrolled and rampant destruction of crops by cattle. During the late 1950s, when the Fulani people immigrated to Wum, very little attention was given to crop destruction. But as time went on, the destruction of crops became common due to the farming system of farmers and graziers. The two cultures could not successfully coexist on the same land. By the 1960s there were over 200,000 cattle in the North-West Region and this explains why cases of trespassing on indigenous women’s farms gradually increased.365 The promotion of cattle rearing by the British and the Cameroon government as one of the leading economic activity in Wum as elsewhere in the North-West Region subsequently increased the number of cattle, and this eventually posed serious problems between the indigenous farmers and the successive administrators in handling the matter. In this case, the Aghem women uprising in this locality was largely as a result of crop destruction by cattle 365

Lucy Davis, 1995, p.219.

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probably due to the limited grazing land at the disposal of the cattle owners.366 Cattle encroachment coupled with the Grassfields’ farming technique (based on open fields) caused incessant crop destruction in the clan. The traditional method of cultivation encouraged farming in scattered portions both uphill and on lowlands. The regular use of bush fire to clear farms in the dry season by the Mbororo graziers encouraged the farmers to search for fertile portions of land which could be found where cattle had been kept for several years as a result of organic manure. The graziers were also in search of pasture and moved down to lowlands, especially during the transhumance period, causing damage as they moved. From 1970 to early 1981, it was difficult to keep away from complaints of food crop destruction. Between 1970 and 1981 there were street demonstrations in Wum town following the Mbororo’s refusal to compensate for crops destroyed by their cattle as framed in Table 11. This delay and refusal to pay for food crops damaged provoked the farmers and caused them to believe that the damages were not accidental, but premeditated by graziers. In Naikom village alone, more than forty cases of crops destruction were reported to the administration; a situation which was not adequately handled.367 Table 11 shows the number of cattle that trespassed in NaikomAghem as an established typical case study of crop destruction. The farmergrazier commission in charge of inspection and evaluation of crop damages was given the task to supervise damages in Naikom village so as to establish a periodical report on crop damages, then forward the records to the administration for a possible compensation. The non-acquisition of legal documents by both parties had, at times, contributed to the farmer grazier friction in Wum central. The legal documents required by graziers include a grazing permit and to an extent a land certificate. However, the land certificate is optional since it backs just a small portion of land around the compound and not the whole grazing zone. What can be identified as important is the grazing permit which is usually issued by the DO authorizing a grazier to rear cattle within a grazing zone. Most of the Fulani graziers were not in possession of a grazing permit. The reasons which they advanced were that the procedures were a bit demanding and difficult and that they had never thought of it. This can be identified as a major cause for farmer-grazier conflicts, since the graziers

366 367

Interview with Akuo Ikei, Zongefu-Wum, 21May 2007. Interview with Akuo Lydia Ikei, Zongefu-Wum, 21May 2007.

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had no grazing permit and were dwelling on a zone not legally recognized as a grazing zone.368 Table 11: Farm Damage Inspection –Evaluation of Farm Crops in Naikom Village Wum in 1978 Name of farmers of Naikom

Approximate acres of farm

Crater Ewi

2 Acres

Helen Anje Nsen Kom Nji Kwore Ika Bih Nge Ngumse Bih Nchu Yue Anang Ndoe Neng Kwala Ndon Iszwoa Acho Ywie Chu Iszieawi Chu Bih Njang Fbe Wi Kwalo Ndom Anna Nnaa Veronica Sih Roa Sih Fransica Nchu Ndua Hbie Chu of Naikom Sih Mbong Nom Abi Abe of Naikom Sanga Achu of Naikom

1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/4 “ 1/4 “ 1/4 “ 1/4 “ 1/100 “ 1/3 “ 1/3 “ 1/8 “ 1/4 “ 1/3 “ 1/3 “ 1/3 “

Groundnuts, punking and corn “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “

1/3 “ 1/10 “ 1/10 “

“ “ “

368

Crops damaged

Compensation in Francs CFA 3000 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 2000 2000 2000 2000 500 600 600 600 2000 600 600 600 600 300 300

C. Fung Nchia, 2006, “The farmer-grazier Conflict in the Aghem Federation 1950-2005”, Maîtrise Dissertation, History, University of Yaounde I, p.31.

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Kwala Chon of Naikam Lusi Nnam Justina Mbee Agatha Sanga Martha Ika Mbong Sih Nam of Naikom Susana Sih of Naikom Mary Mbong of Naikom Dinna Ika Frida Kwala Mbong Mnambi Mbisi Mdze Justina Sih of Naikom Nnambi Chuo of naikom Ncho Nchua of Naikom Ika mbong of Naikom

165

1/2 “

“

2500

1/4 “ 1/4 “ 1/10 “ 1/2 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “

“ “ “ “ “ “

2000 2000 2500 2500 600 600

1/8 “

“

600

1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “ 1/8 “

“ “ “ “ “

600 600 600 600 600

1/8 “

“

600

1/8 “

“

600

1/2 “

“

2500

Grand total

40900

Source: Sub Divisional Office, Wum Archives, farm inspection and assessment of farm crops damage, Wum 1978, p.3.

Also, the non-acquisition of land title by the Mbororo graziers contributed in fuelling the farmer-grazier conflict in Wum. The reason advanced was that the procedure of acquiring a land title/certificate was not well known, and was costly to most of them. Very few had land titles. They had the impression that the government did not want to issue land titles to them. This claim is backed up by the fact that all those who attempted to acquire a land title were told that land titles could be issued only for their habitat areas. To this end, the Mbororo explained that they could not develop land which did not belong to them.369

369

Interview with Ardo Mama, Zongokwo-Wum, May 28th 2007.

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b. Demography In Menchum Division, the number of graziers became well-built around the 1950s. This was predominantly as a result the arrival of the Aku in great numbers with their cattle from Nigeria. Before then, the natives had sufficient farm land extending from the immediate environs of their settled nucleus to the limits with the neighbouring villages and divisions. With the increase of the native population in the villages and the inflow of civil servants and other resent settlers from neighbouring towns and villages after the creation of more governmental and non-governmental institutions in Wum, farming activities greatly dropped in the region because some space had been used to accommodate these structures. Also, the local farming population subsequently declined especially when the prices of basic cash crops such as coffee drastically dropped in the late 1980s. In this set, cultivating and selling excess food products actually reduced, while the population continued to increase.370 The graziers, who had hitherto obtained and occupied grazing areas outside the then arable lands and far out of the settled areas on which they paid Jangali tax371 per cattle head, saw farmers encroaching into patches of isolated farms and sometimes farm houses into their grazing zones. As studied from Tables 12, 13 and 14, the eventual increase in livestock production in Menchum and the North-West Province was a leading force behind the farmer-grazier frictions. Table 12: Livestock Population in Cameroon in 1978 Zones

Cattle

Adamawa Centre and South East Littoral North and Far North North West South West

1,400,000 70,000 166,000 1,300 1,205,750 385,000 6,950

West

155,000

370

Interview with Kum demant Aji, Waindo-Wum, May 21st 2007. Jangali tax is a tax paid per cattle head by graziers to the local councils on whose lands they are grazing.

371

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Source: Jabiri, Muhammadou Amadou, “The Advent, Organisation and Integration of the Fulani into the Menchum Community from early 20th Century to 2003”, DEA Dissertation in History, University of Yaounde I, 2004, p.52.

Table 13: Livestock Population in Menchum Division and the NorthWest Province Species

Menchum 125 485 2 311 10 881

North West Province Population 438 612 8 302 176 068

Percentage of Menchum 28.6 27.8 6.2

Cattle Horses Sheep Goats Pigs Donkeys Poutry Rabits

1 818 2 496 40 895 -

121 748 57 934 58 100 1 220 855 1 186

9.7 4.3 3.3 -

Source: (PAB), File N° 140/49 in file 23/6 vol. II, Cameroon Economic Committee. Provincial Office Cameroon Province, Buea, 20 January 1948.

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20000 5000 5500 1000 25 7500 65 30 2 35

Bovine Ovine Caprine Porcine Equine Avian Canine Feline Rabits Ducks

3900 320 1500 900 30 1500 33 20 15

Weh 15000 2000 900 1010 20 5000 25 10 25

Esu 7500 500 1000 400 200 1500 15 18 100

Memn 4500 2500 4000 3320 15000 10 4 30 26

Befang 5000 50 1000 2000 20000 -

Essimbi 3000 7100 9000 4000 20 6500 600 100 200

Fura Awa 2500 60 200 150 3050 25 -

Abome 1520 250 492 138 7 1263 18 16 38

Bu

62920 17780 23592 12918 302 61313 791 198 32 439

Total

Source: Ministry of livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries Menchum Divisional Delegation 2005 second semester report July to December 2005, pp.7-9.

Wum

Table 14: Livestock Population Estimate in Menchum Based On the 2002 Livestock Populations Census

Animal species

168

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As seen from Tables 12 to 14 we can rightfully say that cattle production outnumbered other species of animals in the region. Equally, the North-West Province in 1978 was ranked third highest cattle producing area in the country after the Adamawa, the North and the Far North provinces. As such, this high percentage had always caused serious problems between the farmers and the cattle owners since the land itself had remained constant. In fact, the above tables are merely illustrations of the sudden increase of cattle in Wum Central, which had always pledged both parties at loggerheads on the pattern of land used in the region.

c. The Administration The increase in cattle production in Menchum Division made the British colonial authorities to introduce the payment of cattle tax known as Jangali. At the beginning, some of the Mbororo people were reluctant to pay because the jangali tax was higher than the poll tax paid by the native population who mostly practised subsistence agriculture. When the jangali was introduced, Ardo Sabga was empowered to collect it from the Fulani. After sometime, Native Authorities took over the collection, although in collaboration with the Ardos of each Mbororo community.372 In order to avoid misunderstanding in the collection of the jangali, the Divisional administrator in Bamenda proposed that cattle be counted twice a year by administrative officers, village heads and Ardos before the amount was determined. It was after such an exercise that the Ardo collected the money and paid to the treasury. The amount of money collected corresponded to the number of cattle counted. The village head and Ardos who carried out this exercise received 10 percent of the amount collected.373 The payment of jangali forced many Mbororo in wum to start selling their cattle. In 1956, the thought of increasing the jangali rate was abandoned because of the fear that it would force the Mbororo to dispose of their large stocks of cattle. It was also feared that any increase would cause a massive exodus of the Mbororo to French Cameroon. The authorities also feared losing the revenue from jangali. As such, the rate for 1956-57 was left unchanged.374 From the above, the grazing permit of 1947 which was instituted by the British colonial authorities in order to control the influx of cattle in 372

Jabiri Muhammadou, 2004, p.49. (NAB), File No B.2879 (1) Handing over notes (2) cattle control officers Bamenda, 1952 PAB; AB 17 (5) File No 2329 Vol. III Fulani in Bamenda reorganization. 374 Ibid. 373

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the region became problematic since the Ardo of Wum was to assist any officer or the Native Authority to effect the lawful arrest of any Mbororo who committed any offence under the grazing law of 1947. The permit no longer worked effectively as the British colonial mandate drifted towards an end. As time went by, the owners of cattle in transit through the area did not obtain a valid permit issued by the Native Authority in the Bamenda Division. In fact, the weaknesses of the British policy of cattle and farming cohabitation subsequently deteriorated during the post-colonial era on to what became known as farmer/grazier conflict. One strong point put forth by the technical field staff is that graziers and farmers often disregarded their authority, and since the technical staff were few, decisions taken against or for each group of farmers could be supervised and supplemented as the case should be. They also complained that there was limited road infrastructure to open up new grazing areas so as to better manage the cattle found in the cross villages of Wum Central.375 It was also noticed that the conflicts were not only limited to the farmers and the graziers, but among the graziers themselves, for example when a grazier encroached into the grazing area of another. Equally, other areas in the North-West Region such as Jakiri, Ber, Oku and parts of Donga-Mantung were greatly involved in such differences and this must have been due to the extremely small grazing areas. There were more complex cases which did not involve farmers and graziers only, but some natives and even civil servants who possessed cattle, and so had to encroach or use their authority to graze on previously demarcated Fulani grazing land or native farmlands.376 Usually, a technical field staff, in consultation with the landlords or chief of the area concerned do work together to determine and declare lands which could be used exclusively for farming and for grazing respectively. At times, this commission worked by tracing lines of demarcation between such lands. In this regard, there was also the possibility to alter and re-demarcate lines, fix the dates or seasons on and after which lands lying within any such liens of demarcation would be used solely for farming or for grazing. It should however be noted that in effecting such divisions, climatic conditions were be taken in to considerations. This was due to crop cycles and natural boundaries existing before. In grazing areas, the movement of cattle from one place to the next or from a water point to another should be solely

375

As cited by E. Ngwa Nabasina, 1981, “Settlement Grazier or agricultural land: A confrontation of Interests in the North West Province of Cameroon “. In Annals of the Faculty of letters and Social Sciences, Yaounde N° 10, pp.179-181. 376 As cited by E. Ngwa Nabasina, 1981.

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through the transhumance passage of 25-meter-wide tracts reserved for the purpose.377 Similarly to the above, corruption from all levels of administration was a major cause of farmer-grazier conflict in Wum. Scarcity and the desire to have much money have made some custodians (chiefs) of ancestral heritage to bargain on communal land. However, Aghem women always staged mob action when they discovered such traditional rulers and government administrators collecting money from the Fulani graziers in exchange for communal land. Such corrupt practices were unveiled when the paramount Fon of Aghem, Bah Mbi III, received the sum of 350,000 Fcfa from Alhadji Bodjom, a grazier, in exchange for a piece of land. In opposition, the Aghem women who were already farming on the area confronted Bodjom, who testified to the Divisional Officer for Wum Central concerning his negotiation with the Fon. In 1970, when Alhadji Manto arrived in Wum, a chief sold him a piece of land on which women were already cultivating.378 The act later gave birth to clashes between women and Manto when the latter’s cattle entered farms and destroyed crops. In fact, this situation has been constantly noticed by the indigenous farmers, but their poor manner of handling and presenting their problems to the leading administrative authority has generally resulted in the failure to effect real change to the farmers-graziers conflict. It should be noted that traditional rulers who had no sources of income fell under the influence of the wealthy Mbororo graziers who corrupted them. Related information from Aghem people reveal that between May 1999 and 2000, the Senior Divisional Officer, Nzegge Onyong Charles, with Chief Mathias Ebua Nsagha, received as bribe a sum of 9,000,000 Fcfa from Alhadji Ulua. This money was to serve as compensation for victims of crops destruction caused by the cattle of Alhadji Ulua on their extension farms.379 Some administrators also issued contradictory prefectoral orders that frustrated farmers and the Aku graziers, thus keeping them at loggerheads.380 Such contradictory administrative orders included prefectural orders N° 036/2004, Ref. 12/026/04, P.O N° 054/2004 bearing on the modification of P.O N° 036/L 12/007/04, Ref. N° 756/L/E.28. 01L/6 VOL 25/783 of May 7th 2004, and that of Ref. N° 100/L/5 VOL/27/859 of 6 April 2005, show proof of corruption on the part of some administrators in the locality.381 377

Fung Nchia, 2006, p.33. Interview with Ewi née Kang Elezabeth, Naikom-Wum, May 22th 2007. 379 Collective data from my informants mostly farmer in Agham, May 22-25th 2007. 380 Interview with Alhadji Bofom, Naikom-Wum, 30May 2007. 381 A Collective Prefectural Orders from private archives and SDO, Office Wum, May 2007. 378

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Article one of N° 036/2004 decisions ordered 26 graziers who had been in occupation of farmlands to evacuate. The second prefectural order authorized the same graziers not to quit. The third prefectural decision was addressed to nobody in particular, but its contents indicated implicitly that it was meant for graziers. In some cases, unscrupulous administrators demanded evaluation fees from victims of crops destruction but hardly solved the problem.382 Furthermore, the 1973 decision aimed at resettling the differences between the warring parties could not be implemented because the government gave fifty million francs (50,000,000 Fcfa) for a bulldozer, a tipper and other accessories to open roads to the designated areas where cattle had to go, but, as usual, this money was badly mismanaged.383 This showed negligence on the part of the administration, and this helped to fan and sustain the agro-pastoral problem in Wum.

d. Politics of Identity (Aborigines and Allogines) The problem here is that the nomadic Mbororo were always considered unstable with their cattle. As such, they were looked upon as allogines (strangers) anywhere they settled in Wum area. Worse still, it is claimed, most of them did not consider themselves as an integral part of the communities in which they found themselves. There is, therefore, a psychological problem not to be underestimated in connection with the farmers/graziers problem. The Mbororo had no difficulty, therefore, to move cattle to feed on the crops.384 These nomads continuously considered themselves as strangers and the natives treated them as such. All the educational and other persuasive methods on the part of the graziers to share common undertaking in order to form a brotherly community without conflicts did not succeed. The differences between farmers and graziers stem from the fact that the people of Wum do not deal much in cattle, given that only a few of the Aghem people actually possessed cows in the post-colonial era. The Aghem people, therefore, do not just want to see cattle in their farms and when that happens, a conflict arises between the two communities. As earlier mentioned, the Aghem people are rather tied up to their traditional 382

Interview with Ewi née Kang Elezabeth, Naikom-Wum, May 22th, 2007. Anonymous, “Resolutions of the truth and Reconciliation Meeting on Farmer/Grazier in Wum Sub Division on 12 December 2002”, p.1. 384 N.B. Wabi, 1993, “Fulani settlement and mode of adjustment in the North West Province of Cameroon Pastoral development network”, Paper series N° 35 D. ODI London, pp. 36-98. 383

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crop cultivation. That is why the Mbororo are treated as pure strangers trying to intrude in unknown lands, hence numerous land predicaments.385 The Wum people depended, for a very long time, on hunted meat, fish and vegetable as supplement to their diet. Beef and other cattle products remained for long almost excluded from their diet, except in recent moments. This situation has led the Aghem people to develop a negative attitude towards Mbororo cows.386 Besides the shortage of pasture land, poor control of cattle, agricultural diversification coupled with the land tenure system and the nonconstruction of paddocks (fences) have divided the Mbororo graziers and the indigenous farmers of Wum. Transhumance activities and nomadic life were (and are still) part of the Fulani tradition. During the dry season, cattle move from place to place looking for water and fresh grass. In this season the hills are extremely dry and most cattle are in search of green pasture and water. In the course of these movements into valleys and plains, cattle destroy crops.387 The crops cultivated down the valleys and those in most fertile plains are often badly damaged during this season. Cattle were not also properly controlled probably because of the insufficiency of heard boys or drovers. Poor control during the night equally led to cattle intrusion into nearby farms. This pushed the graziers to resort to night paddocks as a move to control the animals. More to that, more than five million Francs (5,000,000 Fcfa) was spent on herdsmen periodically. This was explained by the fact that most Fulani youths and formally professional herdsmen were becoming more involved in other sectors such as driving and education. Also, the challenging transhumance period had scared away most Fulani youths who were formerly involved in these activities, leading to the scarcity of herdsmen and, consequently, resulting in the high prices of those herdsmen available. Over the years, the Mbororo who could have been preoccupied with the control of their parents’ cows became interested in town life; they have abandoned nomadic life and are now known as the “town Fulani”.388 As the value and pressure on land increased, there was the need to introduce coffee plantations in Wum in the late 1950s. This colonial initiative to diversify the agricultural activities of the inhabitancy of the area further exposed the stark differences between the graziers and farmers. 385

Interview with Thomas Ndong, Naikom-Wum, May 30th 2007. Interview with Thomas Ndong. 387 National Archives Buea (NAB), File N° 19124, Ab 17(3), Education of Nomadic Bororo. 388 E. Gwan, 1973, “Pypes, processes and Policy Implications of various migrations in West Cameroon”, Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, pp.167-9. 386

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However, the land tenure system of Menchum and Wum in particular could also be at the origin of these differences earlier said. This view goes back to the Fons who have dominion over land.389 As the trustees and custodians of the Aghem clan, they give their approval to new settlers to reside on the land. In the same direction, dishonesty, greed and the ignorance of some graziers and farmers on the best methods of managing limited land at their disposal while maintaining peaceful coexistence had been at the mercy of conflict between both communities. The dubious and dishonest nature of some chiefs and administrators has continually pushed some Mbororo graziers to be ignorant of the best method of settling disputes with farmers. Whenever cattle destroyed crops, some graziers would prefer to negotiate with chiefs or administrators rather than the farmers. For instance, an evaluation of damage costs could be fifty thousand francs (50,000 Fcfa) only, but out of ignorance, the grazier usually preferred to meet the chief or a local administrator where he would pay two hundred thousand Francs (200,000 Fcfa). With the passing of time, both parties became frustrated when their differences were not treated accordingly. This ignorance did not only help to sustain the conflict, but equally reduced Mbororo graziers’ cattle. A typical example is the case of Alhadji Ulua.390 In the course of this research, we identified the non-construction of fences by the farmers and the graziers as another major cause of farmergrazier conflicts. This was true of the farmers who worked near grazing land without erecting fences. The non-construction of paddocks (enclosures) by the cattle owners around the farms led to the encroachment of cattle into farming lands, and the eventual destruction of crops by the cattle. If these farmers had the means to build fences to protect their crops, the Aku cattle would have found it difficult to enter into farm lands and destroy crops. The friction really began in 1968 when the first major farmergrazier conflict was reported and progressively in the subsequent years, the situation became more recurrent high marked by series of violent clashes between farmers and graziers.

C- Evolution of the Conflict This section is aimed at examining some outstanding episodes of direct contact between the Mbororo graziers and the indigenous farmers in Wum, Menchum Division. It should be noted that the British colonial authorities 389 390

E. Gwan, 1973, p.169. Interview with Buokang Mathias, Zognokwo-Wum, May 23rd 2007.

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instituted the idea of resident permits, especially to cattle owners in the North-West Region. The 1947 grazing law which went on operationally from its initial stage, completed settlement in this area as was the case before. As time went on, this law was no longer effective probably due to laxity from the authorities, or as a result of the massive influx of cattle herds in the region. During the colonial era, agro-pastoral problems were easily noticed and resolved. But as years evolved, the situation became more turbulent and more difficult to handle by the Cameroon government officials. This has resulted in a series of conflicts between the farmers and graziers. This study discusses conflicts from 1968 to 2005.

a. The 1968-1981 Situation During the early 1960s, relations which have existed between the farmers and graziers degenerated into perpetual friction. The reasons for these dwindling relations included crops destruction by the Mbororo cattle, and the burning of hills in 1968 in Wum central Sub Division. Farmers staged protest marches. The double imparts of crops destruction by Fulani cattle incited women’s streets rioting.391 From our sources, some Mbororo graziers delayed and other refused to pay compensation. The farmers, mostly women, rallied and moved to the palace to see their paramount Fon for a solution. After failing to get a satisfactory answer, the women led a peaceful procession to the Senior Divisional Officer, led by Mbei Mbong Echou. When they reached the SDO’s office, their leader presented their grievances. In 1969, a cattle committee guide was introduced by the Ministry of livestock, fisheries and animal husbandry to educate the people who practise cattle rearing. This was also an attempt to resolve and prevent the farmer grazier problem that was straining relations between indigenes and nomads.392 In the 1970s, wanton crops destruction by cows took place and the farmers launched their complaints to the traditional and administrative authorities. In Naikom village alone, more than forty cases were registered. When farmers waited and no satisfactory response was given to them, they concluded that it was a premeditated act to destroy crops.393 In a meeting, the farmers agreed to launch a sit in strike for one continuous week to show their dissatisfaction.394 In 1971, the destruction of crops came from 391

Interview with Kah Augustin, Waindo-Wum, May 21st 2007. Divisional Archives Wun (DAW), file N° E28/02/51, Fulani-Aku Affairs. 393 E. Soh, 2004, “Farmer-Grazier Friction in Some Selected Areas in the North West Province of Cameroon”. DIPES II Dissertation, University of Yaounde I, pp. 20-26. 394 Ibid. 392

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neighbouring areas of Kom and Bum. The episodes of recurrent crops destruction led to growing tension, agitation and street rioting. Crop destruction and women’s agitation extended in the mid1970s. In 1973, about one thousand women covered a distance of 84 kilometres to stage a peaceful march to the Governor’s office in Bamenda. Their intentions were to draw public attention and to make the Governor aware of their grievances and the situation in Wum.395 As a result, from the 5th to the February 13th 1979, in application of the 1978 law as detailed in the appendices, the Wum farmer grazier commission undertook a tour of Aghem Ulan in view of solving some of the pressing problems. They received series of promises from the varying stakeholders, some of which shall be discussed in Chapter Six under peace attempts. From the 2 December 1980 to early January 1981, the most sensational and violent dispute in Wum exploded between the Fulani graziers and the indigenous farmers. This phase of the conflict turned a new page in the history of the clan in particular, and of Menchum in general. The principal cause of the conflict was the violation of the Nseke’s commission rulings. Farmers noticed that the graziers had started violating the rules laid down by the Nseke’s commission. In line with the commission, graziers were not only encroaching on areas reserved for cultivation, but were even building their settlements in farming areas. Consequently, their cows started trespassing on farms and destroying crops.396 Some nomads took advantage of this general official malaise to invite graziers to settle around farmland. Some chiefs and administrative officials such as A.T. Ngalla settled some graziers on areas allocated for farm land, thus violating the Nseke’s boundary. The complicity between chiefs, government officials and recalcitrant graziers prepared the ground for turmoil in Wum central. By so doing, these unscrupulous and selfish individuals had sown a bitter seed of discord between the farming and grazing communities. This, in our view, is the foundation to the manifestations that precipitated to the 1st of January 1981 killing in the Aghem clan. The 1981 clashes are often regarded as a turning point in the history of farmer–grazier conflicts in Wum Central.397 After the Christmas feast of December 1980, Aghem women went to their farms and discovered that cows had invaded and trampled on their farms and ransacked crops completely. When they tried to talk to the graziers whose cattle had done the damage, they were seriously beaten up and many of these women sustained serious injuries. This incident began in Waindo village and triggered general women rioting in the clan. By 395

Interview with Akou Vania Mfou, Zougefu-Wum, May 24th 2007. Interview with Dze Bkei Rebecca, Gheidze-Wum, May 27th 2007. 397 Soh, 2004, p.27. 396

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coincidence, Aboum à Tchoyi, the then Governor of the North-West Province was in Wum holding a development meeting. A delegation of women farmers moved to the residence of the SDO of Wum where the Governor was lodged to book an audience with him. The women found the Governor’s car parked but the SDO told them the Governor had left urgently to meet with the Head of State in Yaounde. Therefore, the women invited the SDO to follow them and see for himself the grave damage inflicted to their farms by cows.398 The famers’ appeal failed since the SDO said he was occupied and could only visit the farms in question later. On the 28th of December 1980, the frustrated and angry women decided to ransack all the huts constructed by nomads on farming zones. The dismantling of huts was done peacefully as they never attacked Mbororo settlers on that instance. Later, the situation resulted in general outrage, which generated ferocious fighting. Sixteen people were seriously injured, among which were Alfred Fung Sih, Boy Wanei, Awah magdaline, Kouko Chou, Ahuo Ngeu-Ewei, Celina Nsih, Gladys Nsen, Emilia Nuh and Alhadji Kosha and who all were admitted in the Wum District hospital.399 The forces of law and order arrested the graziers who initiated this attack on women and detained them for few days, but later released them while the wounded women were still hospitalised.400 When these graziers were released, the people of Aghem believed that the graziers had corrupted the entire administration coupled with the fact that it was said that the then government was ruled by a pro-Fulani. In short, it was believed that there was no lasting solution to the matter. As a result of the above failure, multiple women rallied and moved to dismantle Mbororo huts on the 29th of December 1980. This act gave birth to another serious confrontation with the graziers where the damages in lives and properties increased. During this period, many youths from both sides took part in the scenario. On the 31st of December, Aghem women, youths and men armed with clubs, machetes and sticks headed to Fulani residential areas. This act was an open war declared by the farmers in Wum Central. This time, the farmers had now embarked on chasing the Akus away from their farmland. The dispute was then transformed from agropastoral to an ethnic conflict.401 When the clashes erupted once more, some Mbororo people and their families fled to neighbouring villages such as Bafmen, Befang, Kom, Bafut, Bu and Fungom Sub-division.402 To temporally 398

Interview with Kali Augustin, Waindo-Wum, May 21st 2007. Interview with Paa Kam Lucas Ngong, Zougefu-Wum, May 26th 2007. 400 Interview with Paa Kam Lucas. 401 Interview with Akou Vania Mfou, Zougefu-Wum, 24th May 2007. 402 Interview with Akou Vania Mfou. 399

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calm hostilities, on the 31 December 1980, a secret administrative meeting in Wum, which included some chiefs and politicians such as Patrick Mua and Josepha Mua, was held but the agenda of the meeting was never disclosed. It was at the mercy of this secret meeting that the indigenous inhabitants accused the politicians, traditional rulers and administration of fuelling the differences between the farmers and the graziers in the said locality. On the 1st of January 1981, despite warnings from some chiefs, the inhabitants still went to attack the Fulani. In fact, the issue over land gave birth to an ethnic war in Wum. During the attack, as tension multiplied, cattle keepers and Fulani houses and properties around the farmland were burnt down by demonstrators. A serious case noticed by the field surveyors was the destruction of the properties of Ndong Thomas, an indigent of Aghem who equally practised cattle rearing in the said locality. His house was completely demolished as noticed in Plate 6. From Naikom to Kesu village, attacks on graziers continued and information leaked that the Ardo Umaru’s residence was the next targeted area because his compound did not only serve as a refugee camp for the fleeing Mbororo, but was protected by the forces of law and order in Wum.403 Because of this, women, who had been at the fore front of the dispute, decided to boycott their local chiefs for they had been considered as slow mediators and share-holders behind this conflict. As a result of a massive movement of angry folks toward the Mbororo leader’s residence, armed policemen halted the Aghem natives below the Sub-divisional office in Wum. The Senior Divisional Officer, Joseph Mbase Ngoh, the Sub-divisional Officer, some chiefs, politicians, the company commander of Gendarmerie Nkambe and Wum, Mohamadou Boubakari, the commissioners of Public Security and Special Branch Wum namely Isaac Konghnso and Bouba Sambo were all present at the scene (roundabout below the sub-prefecture Wum).404

403 404

Interview with Ardo Mama, Zongokwo-Wum, May 28th 2007. Interview with Nnam Filomina, Waido-Wum, May 29th 2007.

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Plate 6: The Properties of Thomas Ndong Destroyed in January 1981

After an unsuccessful attempt to calm the angry crowd down, the company commander ordered that forces of law and order to fire up so as to disperse the crowd. It was this fusillade which caused the deaths of 9 natives including Buh Clement Kum, Fung Tesih, Peter Enah, Joseph Kedze Sangha, Wahkelly kwalla, Wahfuh Chung, Wah Buh, Kedze Sih and Simon Achuo and many others wounded.405 These killings dispersed the crowd and sent shocking waves to the entire community of Wum. Mourning and refusal to sell foodstuff to non-indigents went on for some days. However, 405

C. Fung Nchia, 2006, “The farmer-grazier Conflict in the Aghem Federation 1950-2005”, Maîtrise Dissertation, History, University of Yaounde I, p.57.

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loopholes from the administration coupled with those from the local chiefs made the offended indigenous farmers to resume their farming and selling activities. Despite this shocking incident, no major step was put in place to overcome the differences between the two communities. Consequently, tension and conflict have persisted with varying degrees of magnitude over the years.

b. The 1984-1999 Episode Another phase of the confrontation between the farmers and the graziers in Wum that needs to be taken into consideration is that which stretches from 1984 to 1999. Between 1984 and 1986, farms damaged by cattle owners, especially by the Mbororo, led to some skirmishes between farmers and graziers just like the one described in the previous paragraphs. Aghem women again took the lead by marching to the palaces, as these places had become targeted areas by the women. The next places were the offices of Ardo Umaru and the SDOs office. On the 13 August 1984, the then Governor, Mutanga Ngouba Alexander, confirmed the Nseke commission.406 This gave some hope to the women who called off their strike. From late 1985 to early 1986, a similar situation occurred. This time, when women moved to the SDO’s office, the graziers were called to order. Some women were compensated to their satisfaction even though not all.407 In 1988, particularly during the rainy season when farmers were busy cultivating their crops, an appalling agro-pastoral dispute erupted in Wum. It happened when cattle invaded farms and destroyed a large portion of crops. In order to keep the matter cold, the Fulani graziers promised some compensation to the farmers but failed to realize them. This failure to comply gave another forum for serious battle between the two opposing parties. Indigenous farmers confiscated some cattle from graziers.408 Fon Bah Mbi II of Aghem and Ardo Umaru, leader of the Mbororo, played an important role in reconciling farmers and graziers. The graziers were asked to pay compensation while farmers were asked to return the cattle. In order to manage the disputes between the two ethnic groups the leaders resorted to regular meetings and exchanged visits. Unfortunately, Ardo Umaru died in 1990 and the intent that prevailed between the two pragmatic leaders

406

Provincial Archives Bamenda (PAB), file N° B 1978, Ministry of Agriculture WADA Annual Report, July 1978-June 1982. 407 Interview with Kum demant Aji, Waindo-Wum, May 21st 2007. 408 Interview with Ardo Mama, Zongokwo-Wum, May 28th 2007.

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ceased.409 This was evident in the subsequent agro-pastoral problem that occurred during the late 1990s. Therefore, in the 1990s, herdsmen occupied farmlands and refused to quit on the grounds that the land was given to them by the chiefs and the administration. The indigenes resorted to force and attacked graziers and their cattle. This led to violent confrontations between the farmers and graziers. The intervention of the security agents and the administration did resolve their differences. But, before the intervention, both sides had incurred some damages, especially considering the killing of hundreds of cows noticed by the field commission in charge of investigating the matter. Some of the dead cows were noticed but later as seen in Plate 7. In 1998, a few days to the beginning of harvesting season, another conflict erupted. It happened when graziers from neighbouring villages of Naikom-Aghem led their cattle into farms and destroyed some crops. Indigenous farmers mobilised themselves and marched to the graziers’ homes, attacked and destroyed their houses.410 This escalated into another serious conflict. Native farmers continued burning graziers’ houses and killing cows in Wum central. In the course of the incident, both parties sustained injuries and some people were hospitalised. There, the farmers were told that the evaluation team had started its work to assess the compensation rate. The farmers went back and waited in vain. This general frustration was what generated into the subsequent conflict that came up in the Aghem federation.

409 410

Interview with Nnam Filomina, Waido-Wum, May 29th 2007. Interview with Ardo Sule Dicko, Gheidze-Wum, May 24th 2007.

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Plate 7: Some of the Cows Killed During the Confrontation in Naikom VillageWum

Source: Private files, SDO’s office Wum, Menchum Division, Exploited on May 26th 2007 Note: The above pictures illustrate the visit of some government officials to examine some dead cows during the early 1990s. Their reports were to be forwarded to the Divisional Officer for legal measures.

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c. The 2000-2005 Incidences At the beginning of 2000, another farmer-grazier conflict occurred in Wum. Unresolved problems of compensation and farmers complaint kept piling up without a solution. The farmers, whose problems were unsolved again, invaded Fulani settlements. The nomadic graziers, in self-defence, armed themselves with swords, clubs, and knives and confronted the farmers. In the course of the clash, indigenous protesters murdered a Fulani man and his family; Hassan Jawara Goma, his wife Goma Fadima Hawwa, and his son Chedu Ali Hassan. Also, an old man named Mahmond Moussa was victimized.411 As the confrontation continued, the forces of law and order arrived and arrested some of the notorious Aghem fighters including Meh Ndum and Jacob Inah Songsih. They were asked, along with their families, to pay indemnity to the families of the Fulani who were killed. In 2001, Haruna Jibrile, a Mbororo grazier, had his cow stolen. He searched for it and discovered it in a native’s compound in Waindo village. When the grazier tried to retrieve his cow, he was murdered by the thief, Mua Zou, a native of Wum. The incident infuriated the Fulani community who rallied and sparked another serious clash in which one of theirs, a man named Yakubu, was killed.412 The government once again intervened and restored temporal law and order. Those who began the conflict were arrested and locked up, while the victims were promised compensations. However, the constant attacks on Fulani graziers by native farmers discouraged many Fulani paternalists from settling in Menchum Division. A great deal of them migrated back to Nigeria with their cattle and families.413 Efforts to reconcile the graziers and farmers after two meetings summoned by the administration failed. However, this problem was given some attention in 2001 by the Senior Divisional Officer for Menchum, Mr Abram Enow Egbe who fought against the corrupt authorities who had relentlessly depended on bribe from graziers. He also ensured the farmers whose crops were destroyed that compensation was to follow. He further advised graziers to be more cautious. With his departure from Wum, things went worse from what they used to be even before the coming of WADA. Aghem women, pending compensations, called for the removal of all cattle to an undisclosed location in the hills. By 2003, another skirmish broke out in the Aghem clan when Fulani cattle occupied and destroyed farming areas and crops. The women 411

The Herald, No 915, June, 2000, J. Randy Sa’ah, “Conflicts Hinder a Country’s Economic Prosperity”, pp.4-6. 412 Interview with Metoh Mbah Yoachim, Naikom-Wum, May 26th 2007. 413 Jabiri Muhammadou, 2004, p.67.

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reported the destruction to the Fon of Aghem and were bent on seeing justice done before they would leave the palace. Failure to compromise the pending situation encouraged Aghem women to move and seize the royal palace of Zongokwo. At the palace, the paramount Fon Bah Mbi III and other chiefs were kept hostage as noticed in Plate 8 below for closely two months.414 According to their spokeswoman, Madam Elizabeth Ewi, they vowed not to leave the palace until their problem was looked into. They asked for compensation for their destroyed crops and for the graziers to evacuate the area of their farmlands. The Fon and the other chiefs pleaded to no avail. The youths of the clan organised militant groups and attacked the Fulani graziers. It was the interventions of the then Governor of the North West Province, Koumpa Issa, and the former Prime Minister, Simon Achidi Achu, that made the women accept to leave the palace. In fact, when these authorities arrived in Wum, they met the women and had cordial talks with them. The two administrators assured the women that a committee to look into the matter and find a lasting solution would be set as soon as possible.415 The Koumpa Issas’s farmer-grazier commission put in place in late 2003 has been working hard to seek a lasting solution to the conflict pitting the farmers and graziers in Wum. In early 2004, a provincial and divisional commission was set-up by the government to investigate into the matter, to meet and discuss with the two parties and come up with a lasting solution to the problem. The administration appointed Emmanuel Kouam416 as the committee head. His duty was to study the farmer-grazier problem in Wum and come up with a report suggesting possible or adequate solutions to the conflict. The Kouam commission, after having met and listened to the two parties, came to the conclusion that 26 graziers will quit their grazing lands alongside their cattle. A deadline was then set for the graziers to quit those lands. Farmers, on their part, were asked never to farm on grazing lands. Graziers were still cautioned from grazing in farming lands. Measures were taken by the commission to adequately demarcate farming from grazing lands. All these efforts carried out by the commission went a long way to calm tension between the farmers and graziers. The time set for the Mbororo to pull out from the 26 farm lands came and passed, but they refused to do so. The government, on her part, 414

British Broadcasting Channel (BBC), “Cameroon royal palace under siege”, November 10th, 2003. 415 Menchum Chronicle, December 21st 2003; “Cameroon royal palace under siege”, Randy Azeng, BBC news, November 12th, 2003. 416 Emmanuel Kouam is the head of the committee set up to seek a solution to the farmer-grazier conflict.

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was too slow to enforce the resolution, and as such, did not follow up to see the Mbororo quit the lands they had illegally occupied. The local farming population kept on waiting until they became impatient. Some of the farmers even reminded the administration of the 26 grazing lands withdrawal, but the government still remained too slow to act. Tired of waiting, the local farming population decided to take things in to their own hands. According to them, they were determined to resolve the farmergrazier problem once and for all.417 During the 2003-2005 years, rampant crop destruction by Aku cows persisted, further spurring Aghem women’s uprising. The women started protest marches, which took them to their royal palace as seen in Plate 8. The protesters’ marches included the old, nursing and pregnant women who moved to the palace to seek for a final solution. Once again, chief Bah Mbi III with seven other sub chiefs were held hostage by the women of Aghem for more than 90 days.418 The women stayed in the palace in the sun and in the rain. Youths, sympathising with their mothers, later on joined in and took control of the problem, as they formed series of gangs to overcome Mbororo activities in the Aghem Clan. Similar to the above, the protesting women suspended all their marital duties. The situation gained enough impetus when their husbands were seriously starved from all matrimonial and domestic activities. The year 2005 was the climax of friction, masterminded by the youths of Wum Central against cattle owners. The youths terrorized and threatened many graziers. Their target was Fon Bah Mbi III, who resided out of the clan ever since he was crowned Fon of Aghem.419 It was in this scenario that Fon Bah Mbi III earmarked about 45 youths to be shot and arrested when his position was threatened in the clan.420 According to the women, the Fon had certainly not stayed for more than a month in his royal palace and this explained why he had never had time to resolve the agro-pastoral problem in Wum Central. The arrest and torture of the youths by forces of law and order (gendarmes and police forces) was meant to frighten and intimidate them, for they had threatened to depose the Fon as the Paramount ruler of the Aghem Federation.421

417

Interview with Ewi née Kang Elezabeth, Naikom-Wum, May 22nd 2007. Menchum Chronicle, December 21st 2003; Cameroon royal palace under siege, Randy Azeng, November 12th, 2003. 419 Interview with Camilus Ayi, Waindo-Wum, May 21st 2007. 420 Interview with Ewi née Kang Elezabeth, Naikom-Wum, May 22th 2007. 421 Interview with Ewi née Kang Elezabeth. 418

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Plate 8: Aghem Women Seiged the Royal Palace of Zongokwo Village from November 2003-January 2004

Source: Photos Wolfgang, Wum, Compiled in May 2007 by Monteh. Note: The photos show the climax of the farmer’s discontentment and their ability to see that the pending agro-pastoral problem in Wum Central be resolved immediately. These ladies were headed by Ewi née Kang Elizabeth as the spokeswoman addressing the crowd during the hostage in the Royal Palace in Wum.

During field work, we gathered that some prominent Aghem elites called on all Aghem sons and daughters in and out of the Republic of Cameroon to come back home in order to mobilise energies to seek a lasting solution to the farmer-grazier problem. They also requested for financial assistance from wealthy elites to make use of when need arises. By the

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beginning of July 2005, most of the Aghem youths converged in Wum to strike the graziers. Each time the cattle marched into people’s farms, they were caught and impounded at Wum Rural Council. However, this was not for long as the Mayor would always release them a few days later. The Mayor of Wum Rural Council, Edward Cheng Muwah, claimed that according to council regulations, he could not impound the cattle indefinitely. But for the majority of Aghem people, he was an accomplice of the graziers, and as such, the farmers decided not to table further complaints to him.422 Judging from public opinion in Wum, what the DO had done so far was his best, but it was certainly not good enough. The population took great exception to his contradictory approach to the problem. Their frame of reference was his controversial conduct in April 2005. Reacting to a protest letter sent to him, Koumpa Issa, the then Governor of the North-West Province, issued an order on April 18th, 2005. As a result of pressure from the farming population, the DO ordered that cattle be removed from farmlands, but later contradicted himself with a secret letter to the graziers through Djibrila Masanga, telling them to remain in the same spot with their cattle.423 In mid-2005, some 600 disguised Aghem youths, women and men headed by Elizabeth Ewi, armed with Dane guns, spears, machetes and sticks marched to Wum town protesting against the destruction of their crops by Fulani graziers. They went on to block the traffic, closed the Wum market and stopped all other activities that were normally going on. They later headed to the Mbororo grazing lands, attacked and wounded some of the Fulani, killing many of their cattle. Almost all of the graziers were chased out of their grazing lands except for Ardo Maman, who mediated and had some men for his security. Every Mbororo caught on the way by the Aghem angry crowd was beaten up.424 In the process, eight people were wounded, a Deputy Mayor and two Fons arrested following the deployment of troops in Wum to quell the growing uprising between the farmers and graziers.425 The eight people were said to be women: Cecilia Mua was allegedly hit on the head with the butt of a gun; Yuoh Ndum sustained a broken hand; Navine Mbong is said to have been tortured to the point of aborting a six-month old pregnancy. Another victim was Ewo Ndum, who broke her leg, and like the others, was 422

The Post Weekender, 2005, “Farmer-Grazier Conflict: Troops Wound 8, Arrest Mayor and Fons”. No. 0688 Friday, July 29, p.6. 423 Interview with Nnam Filomina, Waido-Wum, May 29th 2007. 424 Interview with Ardo Mama, Zongokwo-Wum, May 28th 2007. 425 Interview with Ardo Mama.

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treated in the Wum District Hospital. It is reported that forty-seven people had been arrested, including Elizabeth Ewi, first Deputy Mayor of Wum Rural Council and the Fons of Waindo and Naikom.426 Besides being Deputy Mayor, Elizabeth Ewi was (still) the leader of the dreaded Ndugufumbui “Aghem reputation women’s secret society”. Her reputation soared during the mass protests of Aghem women against the excesses of the graziers in 2003 for the simple fact that besides being a daughter from the area, she was trusted by the women for her determination and for the effective leadership she portrayed, especially to the various government officials during the various frictions. During the protests, the Aghem women besieged the Fon’s palace, and the Ndugufumbui, decreed that all sexual activities with men were taboo until their problem was resolved. The campaign produced the desired result as Fon Mba Mbi III and his sub-chiefs soon took a firm position against the administration in the conflict, which resulted in the arrest of many Aghem indigenes. At the Judicial Police where they were detained, it was said that only the local administration had the powers to comment on the arrests. Menchum Senior Divisional Officer, Dr. Alexander Njoya,427 said troops were in Menchum to check the growing violence between farmers and graziers. He denied that people were being tortured or that any were wounded. Of course, many of the suspected ringleaders, predominantly farmers, such as Sule Buh, decided to hide. From all evidence, the agro-pastoral conflict which escalated to a conflict from 1968 to 2005 left significant consequences as will be collectively discussed in the next section.

D- The Consequences of the Problem This section seeks to analyse some of the consequences of farmer-grazier conflicts on both communities. This impact will be studied at three levels; political, economic and socio-cultural levels.

426

The Post, 2005, “Wum Farmer-Grazier Conflict: When Violence Becomes Inevitable”, NO. 0691 Monday, August 8, p.3. 427 A senior administrator, Yague Njoya, took over from Abrams Enow Egbe after receiving a few hints on the farmer-grazier conflict. He obviously heeded the predecessor’s advice and that is why dialogue was for a long time the main instrument in the search for a solution to the conflict. The formation of a commission by Koumpa Issa to study and propose solutions to the crisis surely came as a great relief to him. Unfortunately, the mental disposition of the SDO was entirely at variance with trust of the Menchum people whose chief executive he is; that Menchum people never forget and the administrator scarcely remembers.

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a. Political Impact The farmer-grazier conflict had a far-reaching impact on the political scene in Wum Central in particular, and in Menchum Division as a whole. From the period 2005 to 2007, the conflict had caused dissension within the ranks of political parties in Wum such as the Social Democratic Front (SDF), and the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM). Within the SDF, the conflict caused animosity between the Mayor Cheng Edward and the Councilors on the one hand, and some militants who are farmers and the Mayor on the other hand.428 The Lord Mayor’s unilateral decision to release impounded cattle in the council premises without the consent of the farmers caused disagreement within the SDF party in Wum. Worst of all, the cows which had destroyed crops and were impounded at the council yard were released at night by the Lord Mayor.429 This act was suspicious as the farmers and councilors believed the Lord Mayor had secretly received favour from the graziers concerned. Consequently, within the ranks of the party in Wum Central, following pressure from farmers, the SDF councilors motioned a vote of no-confidence against Lord Mayor Cheng Edward. As a result, the conflict had reduced to rubble his political career and popularity in Wum Central. This explains why at the end of his mandate in 2007, the then Deputy Mayor Mrs Ewi Elizabeth became gradually a public figure within Wum Central in particular and in Menchum Division in general.430 Equally, division and continued blackmail within the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) party in Wum occurred as a result of the farmer-grazier conflict. This animosity within the CPDM party in Wum led to the creation of two camps. This includes the popular camp of Hon. Chuo Cyrian Akwo and the unpopular minority camp of Fon Bah Mbi III. This division in the party steadily intensified and as a result, weakened the strength and unity of the party in Wum Central.431 This conflict discredited the party in the region because of the apathy of political leadership to arbitrate on the problem. From a political perspective, the conflict between farmers and the graziers had caused some over-zealous politicians such as Kum Daniel, Ngong Ngum, Wallang Akwo David and Fon Bah Mbi III to settle scores at the detriment of the CPDM party and the general population in Wum. It should also be noted here that the political development of the Division had been delayed as a result of the frequent farmer-grazier conflict. Equally, the 428

C. Fung Nchia, 2006, p.81. Ibid. 430 Interview with Camilus Ayi, Waindo-Wum, May 21st 2007. 431 Interview with Abi Jacob Tabi, Wum, May 22th 2007. 429

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tussle between farmers and graziers intensified blackmail and sabotage within the SDF and the CPDM parties in the area.432 Consequently, the strength and political unity of these parties fell apart. Suspicions of complicity with the graziers in the conflict between farmers and graziers had discredited the administration and its officials. Some administrators received sanctions as a result of the farmer-grazier problem. For example, Njoya Alexandre Yangue, former Senior Divisional Officer of Menchum Division, was sacked for mishandling the dispute.433 Again, the Divisional Officer for Wum Central, Njiwah Muluh, had a punitive transfer following his incompetency in handling the farmer-grazier problem. As a continuous drawback, John Afuh Nkuo, principal of Government High School (GHS) Wum was also dismissed from his functions,434 though he was later on reappointed as Director in charge of examination for Secondary Education in the North-West by then Provincial Delegation to the dismay of his detractors. Consequently, the conflict greatly affected some administrators suspected to have further instigated the conflict. While some were genuinely transferred, others were given punitive transfers and a few were completely dismissed from their duties. Thus, the farmer-grazier conflict in Wum Central had far reaching repercussions in political as well as administrative positions.

b. Economic Impact The farmer-grazier conflict was equally very economically destructive to both parties. In many instances, the Mbororo were often asked to identify the damage they have incurred as a result of these conflicts. Generally, the damage included the destruction of cattle, seizure of grazing land, harassment of children and herdsmen and, in some cases, destruction of their dwelling units. The seizure and occupation of land was one of the shortcomings of the ongoing farmer-grazier conflicts. This did not only end there as cattle drinking points were equally destroyed. The situation and constant complaints by the farmers greatly reduced their grazing land, putting them in a difficult situation. As a result, some of them acknowledged having removed and transferred their cattle to distant and unfavourable grazing areas where the cattle were exposed to flies and other illnesses.435 The destruction of cattle as earlier mentioned and illustrated in Plate 7 had been another major impact. Killing of cattle was carried out in 432

Interview with Abi Jacob Tabi. Interview with Abi Jacob Tabi. 434 Fung Nchia, 2006, p.82. 435 Interview with Ardo Sule Dicko. Gheidze-Wum, May 24th 2007. 433

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three ways: the cattle were wounded, whereby treatment was carried out and some survived thereafter; the cattle were poisoned as reported by many; and the cattle were butchered as noticed in severe confrontations with the farmers. Some cattle were also lost or missing during the process as the farmers drove them into the wilderness where they were hardly traced.436 There have also been cases of harassment of children and herdsmen. It was reported that some herdsmen received serious beatings and were held hostage, while some children, especially school pupils, were harassed on their way to school in some of the localities of Aghem, making them reluctant to continue with the process. This conflict situation was not the best to many cattle owners in Aghem who depended solely on this business for income. Some cattle owners spent huge sums of money in court for justice to favour them.437 In this regard, the Aghem people blamed the authorities, but mostly the Mbororo. A common habit among the Mbororo was to give bribes even in situations where the case was genuinely in their favour. Probably, this aspect was due to illiteracy coupled with hopes to see their problems solved with ease. They did so first to create acquaintance, as some acknowledged. In many of such incidents of bribery and corruption, some authorities were forced to accept these as a token of appreciation for a service rendered, even if they were only performing their duties. The fear of imprisonment and intimidation pushed some of the Fulani to these acts. These expenses coupled with the recompenses paid to farmers for crop destruction by cattle have made the Fulani grow poorer, as acknowledged by the informants. It was partly due to these situations that some Mbororo youths were compelled to move to more urban areas such as Bamenda to diversify their activities.438 During field study, about 90 percent of the Aku indicated that the size of their cattle was reducing, while 10 percent indicated a constant herd size despite the explained existence of conflicts. This reduction, they explained was partly due to the manner in which the cattle were being grazed. They argued that due to farmer-grazier conflicts and encroachment into grazing land by the farmers, grazing areas had been reduced and the cattle no longer grazed as they did before. Some reported having transferred their cattle out of Wum Central to neighbouring areas such as Esu, Banakuma, Mukum, Mmen, just to name a few. These new environments did not completely favour cattle ranching.439

436

Interview with Ardo Sule Dicko. Fung Nchia, 2006, p.84. 438 Interview with Ardo Mama. Zongokwo-Wum, May 28th 2007. 439 Interview with Alhadji Bofom, Gheido-Wum, May 30th 2007. 437

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Another reason for the reduction in cattle size was the direct confrontations and destruction of cattle by the farmers. The Mbororo were equally forced to sell cattle in order to not only settle the damages caused by their animals, but also to follow up resolution procedures. In fact, when informants were asked how many cows they sold per year just because of farmer–grazier conflicts, the general average recorded was 7 cows, with some admitting having sold up to 30 cows per year just to handle cases arising from disputes either in law courts or with the administrative authorities and the forces of law and order. This number cannot be doubted since a majority of the Mbororo depend solely on cattle as their source of income and economic strength. These reasons coupled with lightning and thunder strikes had already wiped out all the cattle of some Mbororo people and had forced them to migrate into Northern Nigeria, as testified by some MBOSCUDA officials in the region.440 The majority of the Aku in Wum have testified that the farmergrazier conflicts had affected their household income. They attributed it to the excessive expenses involved in legal procedures and compensation for damages caused. This, they explained, eyed up the money which would have otherwise been conserved for household management. As a result, they no longer had enough money for medical consultations and check-ups, proper nutrition and clothing. The women, in particular, who depended on their husbands, indicated that the money for household management handed to them by their husbands had dropped.441 The few among the Aku who indicated that their household income was in equilibrium were those engaged in some commercial activities. Those who depended solely on grazing as a source of income were the most affected, and this explained why many Mbororo people whom we could have used as informants were not willing to provide full information since the episodes were still fresh in their mind. As a result of the reduction in grazing land caused by the encroachment of farmers, many Fulani who depended on pasture have now identified the need to improve on pasture. The Fulani, reacting to a question on how they intend to better graze their cattle and limit the occurrence of farmer-grazier conflicts, identified pasture improvement as a remedy. Some of them have already embarked on this project. They are working hand in hand with the expertise of Helvetas Bamenda. The species of grass planted here include Bracaria, stalozanthus species and the guatamala grass. These are high yielding species that show high resistance to drought. They also 440 441

Interview with Mohammed Bawuro Abubakar, Bamenda, May 20th 2007. Interview with Ardo Sule Dicko, Gheidze-Wum, May 24th 2007.

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added that fencing (night paddocking) and proper control of cattle had been seen as a necessity and will be looked into.442 During our research, most of the Mbororo attested to the fact that they would likely take up other business ventures so as to diversify their sources of income. Cattle rearing, despite all odds was still considered a major preoccupation of the Mbororo and they cannot, despite their difficulties, totally abandon this practice. They attribute this act to culture, whereby one cannot be considered as a true Mbororo if he does not own cattle. However, their high level of illiteracy has been and is still a hindrance in taking up other business ventures. The need for diversification of income sources was felt, since total dependence on cattle as economic wealth was proving insufficient.

c. Socio-Cultural Impact Fear resulting from threats and tension was another major impact of the farmer–grazier conflict on the lives of the Mbororo in Wum Central (Aghem). Several Mbororo acknowledged that they lived in stress caused by the fear of the unknown. They went ahead to testify that a Mbororo man is restless as he moves from one agency and one administrative authority to another on issues of farmer–grazier disputes. The women in particular acknowledged that their husbands had no peace of mind. The mere thought of cattle dwindling away is enough to keep an Aku man restless.443 Both communities indicated that the relationship with their neighbours was strained. Some even explained that they considered each other as enemies all because of farmer–grazier conflicts. The general atmosphere, they testified, was that of hatred resulting from the difference in ethnicity between the two communities in that locality. However, few indicated they were quite fine and faring well. They indicated that moments of crisis usually arose only when there was a serious problem and that thanks to negotiation, they had been coping well and interacting well with their neighbours.444 To the best of our knowledge, the relationship between these communities was seriously disturbed regardless of the view of a few members in the last group of informants. Perhaps some of these informants thought that we were agents sent by the State or by the elites of the said locality.

442

Fung Nchia, 2006, p.81. Interview with Nnam Filomina, Waido-Wum, May 29th 2007. 444 Fung Nchia, 2006, p.83. 443

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It was also noticed that the farmer-grazier frictions were affecting the Mbororo children’s schooling. This was seen at various levels where some Mbororo were totally incapable of concentrating on or prioritising their children’s education because of their involvement in the conflict and the expenses it involved, while others struggled with their children’s education. Haruma Umaru, one of the MBOSCUDA officials, reported that the few children who were attending primary school were withdrawn to watch and take proper care of cattle, thus preventing them from going astray.445 Some parents, however, indicated their willingness to educate their children, but confessed that they would not go above primary level due to more expenditures involved which they could not endure at the same time with those arising from disputes. It should be noted that the illiteracy level was very high among the Fulani community of Menchum Division in general, and in Aghem in particular. In some localities where confrontations were severe like in the Aghem plain, the children were even harassed by the natives on their way to school since they had to trek for long distances. The presence of farmer–grazier conflicts coupled with long distances (proximity to schools) and lack of parental interest in prioritising the education of their children made the illiteracy level in the Mbororo community quite high.446 Less than half of the Mbororo acknowledged that their children’s education was not in any way affected by farmer-grazier conflicts. They explained that they had some other sources of income alongside grazing, and that they were bent on educating their children despite all odds, since their marginalisation was partly due to their low level of education. A parent testified that farmer-grazier conflicts have instead urged him to send more children to school so that they grow up and be responsible and have a place among major decision makers in society. Very few of the Mbororo were neutral, under the pretext that their children were below school age or that they were not yet married.447 From the efforts put in place by MBOSCUDA and some NGOs in the area, it was justifiable to acknowledge that about 30 percent of the Mbororo acquired new skills in conflict mediation in an attempt to prevent further conflict between the two communities. They further acknowledged that they had subsequently come to realise that in life, the best way to resolve a dispute is through dialogue with the opposition. Some Mbororo informants added that because of conflicts, they have sought and acquired grazing permits, which they had not thought of before then.448

445

Interview with Haruma Umaru, Bamenda, June 25th 2008. Interview with Alhadji Bofom, Naikom-Wum, 30th May 2007. 447 Interview with Alhadji Bofom. 448 Fung Nchia, 2006, p.88. 446

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To sum up, our major preoccupation in this chapter was to look into the farmer–grazier problems in Wum. The advent of the Mbororo in the region, the causes of the differences, their manifestations and the consequences were the major points discussed in the chapter. The advent of the Mbororo graziers in Menchum Division as early as 1950, coupled with their unstable settlement, affected their relationship with the indigenous Aghem population. Because their crops were destroyed by cows, the indigenous farmers laid series of complaints to their local chiefs and to the successive administrators, but no lasting solutions were achieved. In this regard, varying parties took part in in efforts to harmonise relationships between the Aku graziers and the indigenous farmers in the said regions, but with little or insignificant achievements since the differences between conflicting groups had mounted to series of bloody episodes since independence. The colonial authority did not foresee any rebellion in Wum, as they encouraged Fulani settlements in the North-West Region with the principal aims of collecting revenue (jangali tax). Little did they know about the implications of these settlements on land crisis during the post-colonial period. However, various efforts brought different peace advocates and thus, hope for a resolution of the conflict, as shall be examined in Chapter Six of this work.

CHAPTER FIVE LAND AND BOUNDARY PROBLEMS IN BUI AND BOYO DIVISIONS: OKU VERSUS MBESA

This chapter examines the conflictual relationship between the natives of Oku and Mbesa. Oku and Mbesa have a common historical setup which influences their behavioural patterns. This chapter attempts an analysis on the geographical and historical context of both communities, examines the framework of inter-village relations and the causes of the conflicts, and evaluates the evolution of the conflict and its effect on both peoples. Map 7 shows the conflict zone.

A- The Geographical and Historical Context The geographical and historical setting of both communities simply informs of the location of their site, the conflict zone and of course, their political and socio-economic observances.

a. Geographical Context From a geographical perspective, the Oku Fondom is situated in the eastern part of Bui Division with a surface area of about 232 square kilometres. It is bounded to the west by Boyo Division, to the north by Noni Sub-division, to the east by Kumbo and Jakiri Sub-divisions, and to the south by Ngoketunjia Division. The Oku Fondom lies approximately between latitude 6° 5 and 6° 20 north of the equator and longitudes 10° 20 and 10° 40 east of the Greenwich Meridian. The grid reference of the summit of Mount Oku is 6° 12 north and 10° 27 east.449 Its terrain is generally hilly, with mount Oku having the highest elevation of 3,008 metres above sea level. Deep valleys and extensive escarpments constitute relief features of 449

Heather Maclead, 1986, “The conservation of Oku Mountain Forest, Cameroon”, Study report N° 15, ICBP, England Cambridge CB3, p.13.

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the area. Given that Oku is situated below the mountain and falls within the tropical climate region, its partly fertile soils have over the years encouraged rapid colonisation of its slopes for agriculture.450 Because of the state of the terrain, local transportation has not been easy. In fact, dust and mud characterise their main roads during the dry and rainy seasons, prompting the people to construct their houses on the hill slopes. Movements of populations from one area to another in search of a suitable construction area are often observed. Mbesa, on the other hand, is a small chiefdom in Belo Subdivision. It constitutes one of the ten (10) chiefdoms of Kom, alongside Baiso, Menjang, Mejung, Mbenkas, Akeh, Ajong, Mbueni and Baicham. It lies between longitude 5 and 35° North and longitude 10 and 22° South of the equator.451 With the exception of Asuh and Ibal-Avin (known as lower Mbesa), Mbesa is found on a highland and is partly surrounded by ranges of hills and the Ijim plateau, a continuation of the Bamenda plateau. The Ijim plateau is the second dominant physiographical structure in this area after that of Kilum which runs above these two communities. Mbesa is bounded to the east by Oku, to the south by Akeh, to the north by the Ijim forest and to the west by Kom.452 It is made up of man-planted trees like eucalyptus and cypress, which are predominant all over the area. These trees are used as firewood for domestic purposes. The presence of the thick Ijim forest in the north of Mbesa has favoured the area with a very cold climate. The soil in Mbesa varies with topography; the soil around upper Mbesa where a hilly topography is experienced is mostly of the chernozem type. This type of soil is mostly dark and found in temperate grasslands. They are very rich in humus and ideal for the cultivation of maize, beans and Irish potatoes, groundnuts, yams and plantains, as they are favoured by the Asuh and Ibal-Avin red sandy soil. These two communities depend mainly on these crops for livelihood, since the people are still very much subsistent in agriculture.453

450

D. Noni Lantum, 1985, “Traditional Medicine men of Cameroon: the case of Bui Division”, Traditional Medicine Census report series N°1, Yaounde, p.47. 451 J. Peeters Tohmutain, 2002, Roman Catholitism in Njinikom 1927-2002, Yaounde, Imprimerie Mondial, p.4. 452 Z. Mbuh Yem, 1991, “The Notion of Ngkfusea: The Human person after Death”, A Metaphysical Analysis; Dissertation, Bambili, St. Thomas Aquinas Major Seminary, p.10. 453 Ibid.

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Map 8: Oku-Mbesa Conflict Zone in Oku and Belo Sub-divisions of Bui and Boyo Divisions Respectively

Source: Adapted by author from Macleod (1987), the 2001 forest fire and vegetation map of KIFP and the 2009 conflict map of KIFP area by Enchaw, drawn by Enchaw Gabriel Bachange, 2013.

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The activities that characterized the economy of Oku and Mbesa are agriculture, hunting, fishing, trade and art carving. Both localities are also famous for their “active” traditional medical practitioners. The local population of these Fondoms practise farming as their main occupation. These people give a lot of importance to land that is why more than 80 percent of the working force is engaged in farming. They carry out the cultivation of food and cash crops. Animal husbandry is done, but to a very limited scale. Some animals reared include goats, pigs and fowls. Food crops produced are maize, beans, cocoyams, plantains and groundnuts. Oku and Mbesa are noted for producing more than 60 percent of the beans that is sold in Kumbo markets. Their produce is sold equally in metropolitan towns like Bamenda, Douala, Bafoussam and Yaounde. Groundnuts are produced only in areas that are slightly warm like Mbam (Oku), Asuh (Mbesa) and Ibal (Oku). The only cash crop produced here is coffee. In the past, coffee was largely produced but the constant fluctuation in prices in the late 1980s discouraged many farmers. Many of the coffee trees were cut down to create playing grounds, and some of the lands that was used to cultivate the crop were instead reallocated for the cultivation of beans, which is always in high demand.454 Both men and women are involved in farming. The men clear the farms while the women till the soil. Agriculture here is done through slash and burn. Some plots are usually left to fallow and cultivation done on a new piece of land. This is generally known as rotational bush fallowing. The burning of grass is an annual practice that enables farmers to clear the land of trees and tall grasses. Female children accompany their mothers to the farms for tilling while the boys accompany their fathers during clearing periods.455 Little animal husbandry is practised in these areas. Neighbouring villages like Akeh have a considerable Mbororo population who practice cattle rearing. Goats are also reared in Oku and Mbesa. Fishing is done, but in a small scale since some of the rivers in the area are shallow, coupled with rapids and as such, not favourable for aquatic beings. In this regard, since the fishing ground is small, the activity is then practiced by women and children who use small weaved baskets and locally made nets. The fish caught are mainly for domestic use and the quantity is not always enough to satisfy the local population. This explains why they have to trade with people from Ngoketunjia Division, especially the Babungo and Bambalang villages for exchange. In fact, this idea greatly promoted inter-community 454

R. Ngek Monteh, childhood personal experience in the villages of Oku and neighboring communities. 455 R.B.B. Bunnett and P. Olatude Okorotifa, 1983, General Geography in Diagrams for West Africa, Glasgow, Blantyre Printing Co Ltd., p.20.

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development and cooperation through trade.456 Men do not practise fishing; they consider it a waste of time. Local trade transactions are done in the few markets located in Oku and Mbesa. Trade also extends to the neighbouring villages of Babungo, Noni, and Ndin, and in towns like Kumbo, Bamenda and beyond. The traded goods here are mostly food items. Manufactured products such as cloths, hard drinks and electronics mostly come from Nso and from neighbouring Nigeria. Proximity with neighbouring villages encouraged the Mbesa people to move to Elak-Oku with their food items on the weekly market days. It is, however, regrettable that trade transactions were always shattered during periods of hostilities. Other incoming groups like Kom, Babungo also carried out trade with these villages, especially during the dry season when the roads were easily accessible.457 As far as hunting is concerned, the people of these communities also practise the illegal (perching) killing of some animals, especially those found in the Ijim and Kilum reserve forest. They use guns, spears and arrows for hunting. Some of them at times set local traps in the forest where some species of animals could easily fall victim. But as time went on, the people became more acquainted with modern hunting guns though at their detriment. At times, hunting methods included burning of grasslands surrounded by hunters to catch the escaping animals. However, this method was practised on individual and communal bases before and even during post-colonial periods. The burning of grass as a system of hunting was mostly practised in the low land areas of Oku and Mbesa where there was no forest. Communally, there was an annual hunt for the Fon in which all able men went out on the same day to hunt for the Fon and his wives. Titles were awarded to those who caught animals like antelopes458, lions and tigers on such occasions. Concerning Industries, one can mention a few located mostly in Manchock, Keyon and Elak (all these are villages in Oku Sub-division). Carving, weaving and honey products were the major local industrial activities done by the individuals or groups of association. In fact, carving was (still) well advanced in Oku and their carved items flooded all markets of Cameroon, especially in Foumban town where the people then modified the items to be transformed in more advance items for tourism. Honey and paper were (still) also processed in Oku by local factories under the 456

Bunnett and Okorotifa, 1983, p.22. R. Ngek Monteh’s personal account and experiences on the area. 458 D. Gwedji Wainwel, 2005, “The Mbesa-Oku Land Conflict and its Impact on the Development of Mbesa”, Maîtrise Dissertation in History, University of Yaounde I, p.23. 457

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initiative of the Kilum Mountain Forest Project. After the departure of the Germans under the GTZ team, the local population benefited to a larger extent from the knowledge acquired from the Germans Technical Cooperation. The honey produced in Oku is different from any other in West Africa. The Oku honey is white in colour and can be used as medicine, especially for children.459 However, Oku has a Crater Lake which attracts tourists to the land. The people of Oku, especially the Fon believes much in ancestral worship around the bounds of Lake Oku (Mawes). Many herbalists constantly harvest plants found in the lake for medicinal purposes. The geo-strategic position of the lake has rendered the site easily accessible, coupled with the accessibility linking many administrative units within the area under study.460

b. Historical Context Like in most Grassfields chiefdoms, Oku has some conflicting versions of its origin, migration and settlement. The first account points to the Gonba forest as a centre of dispersal. According to this version, two princes of Rifum separated in this forest in the late 18th century and went off to establish their dynasties. The Oku Fondom is found to the west edge of Nso with whose traditions asserted a dynastic connection.461 According to the second account described by Nkwi, the Kovifem ruler and many of his people fled from the Gonba forest after the first raid and the sacking of Kovifem prince of Rifum after a quarrel with his brother. The two met and lived together until one moved north to settle in Tavisa still in Nso land and the other travelled west and founded Elak, the present Oku capital.462 One thing that is clear from these accounts is that the founders of Oku and Nso were close brothers. Whether they were close kings or brothers, cultural and linguistic evidence as well as oral traditions do point out to a common ancestry. According to oral sources, the Oku people found upon arrival that the Kijem people were already occupying the area. Due to power dynamics, his group (Kijem) later moved out of Oku and took residence in the Southern sector of Kom only to be displaced around 1845 by Fon Tufoyn of Kom. The Jikijem village, which the Kijem people abandoned, was established 459

Gwedji Wainwel, 2005, p.24. R. Ngek Monteh’s personal account. 461 C. Ndifon Ndey, 1991, “Traditional authority in Oku from the earliest settlement to 1961”, Maîtrise Dissertation in History, University of Yaounde, p.4. 462 Nkwi and Warnier, pp.140-146. 460

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most probably in the first half of the 19th century. If the second sacking of Kovifem would be taken as a landmark, the Kijem people who had reached the area in an early population movement already occupied the village.463 The removal of the Kijem people from the area was partly attributed to the anger of the gods of the lake, but the idea that Oku must have received instances of disputes from the people should not be completely ruled out. According to the works of Dr. Jeffreys, a man called Yunji founded the village. Yungon, Tsemton, Ngube, Ndisiango and Ndifo after the Kijem people had evacuated the area. He further explained that Oku never became an expanding state despite its access to iron products. Her land made defence easier, especially from the Fulani raiders though she was raided in the reign of Fon Ngang who fled from his palace and took refuge in the Ijim forest. The raiders burnt nearly the whole of Oku but did not reach Jikijem village.464 The origin of the name “Oku” is highly attributed to oral tradition. The story goes that the Oku people were invited by neighbouring Nso people to help in a building project in the Nso palace. After the building was accomplished, the Oku people then threatened to remove the plaster from the walls if they were not given food. When their demands were not met, they carried out their threats and removed the plaster from the walls. They were then referred to by the Nso people as veku, which means “plaster removers”. But the British colonial documents spelt it as “Oku” The Oku people pronounce the name as ebkuor, meaning Oku people.465 As a centralised Fondom, Oku has three major clans: Mbele (royal), Ebjung (clan of traditional priests) and the Mbulum (the clan with families having some sacrificial duties). After intensive findings, we were able to record from key informants the various Fons that have successively reigned in Oku. The royal throne of this Fondom has passed through the following hands though some without a defined period of succession: Nyanya, Ewuh, Mkong Ewuh, Ney, Moteh, Mkong Moteh, Ngang, Yanchoh, Keming, Ngum Tayeah, Mkong Ndakoh (?-1909), Ngek Yulam (19091940), Ngum Yuteh (1940-1956), Sentieh (1956-1992), Ngum III (19922006), Nsetieh II (2006-2021).466 And Ngum IV since December 2021. Mkong Moteh, accredited with founding the Fondom of Oku, is honoured as the most important of all Fons of Oku and has entered history 463

Interview with Ndishiangong Thaddeus, Elak-Oku, 21 October 2004. M.D.W., 1988, Who are the Tikars in Africa, in African studies Vol. XXII, Nos ¾, p.56. 465 Ndifon Ndey, 1991, p.7. 466 Oku Cultural and Development Association (OCDA), Almanac for the year, 2007. 464Jeffreys,

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as a “good devil”.467 Towards the end of the 1970s, Mkong Moteh was the most outstanding heroic figure in the history of Oku and, therefore, it was customary to assign not only all actual events of great importance, but also those historical activities of vague or questionable date to his reign. Mkong Moteh’s era represented the heroic and transfigured prehistoric times in Oku. Many esteemed institutions such as Kwifon and other secret societies were assigned without question to that period. Consequently, Mkong Moteh was and still remains the highest of the ancestral kings and, at the same time, represents one of the most important gods of Oku entitled to receive additional offerings. Mkong Moteh was worshipped as a god, honoured as the founder of Oku and held as its greatest and most successful leader. Nonetheless we realised that there were indications, (albeit lacking in detail, among them the incomplete list of past Fons) that he was not the very first Fon of Oku.468 The honour showed to Mkong Moteh as a prominent figure in the history of Oku was extended to the royal clan of Mbele. His past is identified with the history of Oku, while at that time, the histories of the other clans Ebjung and Mbulum were in comparison insignificant. Yet it must be noted that membership in clan did not play a decisive role then, not even for the royal clan Mbele, which was at advantage through its position of power, privileges and size (opposite the clans of Ebjung and Mbulum). In those years, the history of Oku was similar to the history of Mbele and it is claimed that the founders of Oku, Nso and Mbiame were ‘real’ brothers. In reality this is not true; the persons in question are not the founders of the three closely related kingdoms, but instead the forerunners of later royal clans.469 In this view, the history of the Oku people just like that of any community in the Bamenda Grassfields, was characterised by successive Fons. On the other hand, in Mbesa, the people who have written have used various names to refer to the natives of Mbesa. The natives of Mbesa nowadays obey to the name Mbesa contrary to what early writers and administrators had documented. The name has always been pronounced and written in different ways (Mbesanaku, Mbesen-Oku, Mbesei and Mbessa or Mbesa), all these to the dislike of the people. In this light, some of these appellations try to justify Oku’s claims over this group of migrants who had once settled in Oku.470 467

Interview with Ndishiangong Thaddeus, Elak-Oku, 21 October 2004. Hans-Joachim Koloss, 2000, World-view and Society in Oku (Cameroon), Berlin, Verlag Von Dietrich Reimer, p.30. 469Ibid., p.31. 470 Z. Mbuh, 1991, “The Mbesa Notion of Ngkfusea: The human person after death”, Bambui, pp. ix-x. 468

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Njong, a reliable informant from Mbesa, briefed us that many people, especially from Oku, had been calling them by the names Mbesanaku, Mbesen Oku, Mbesei and Mbessa (Mbesa). Their saying holds that Mbesa is in Oku and that is why it is called Mbesanaku and Mbesen Oku. They further said the Oku people do this to suit their whims and caprices and to concretise their claims over Mbesa.471 The second school of thought is in line with a Kom man’s version. Some informants from Kom briefed that the name Mbesanaku means side of the forest. They further explained that Mbesa means beside, while aku means forest. From the above, one could say Mbesanaku means beside the forest.472 The third school of thought provides us with a version similar to the second. This school of thought holds that Mbesanaku means Mbesa is in the forest. This could be due to the fact that Mbesa is situated below the Ijim plateau, a thick forest that almost surrounds the whole village on one side. Aku which comes at the end of Mbesanaku is referred to a forest. In the midst of all these interpretations, the Mbesa people had been tolerating the name Mbesa instead of other appellations as earlier denounced.473 In fact, they decided to take Mbesa for the sake of avoiding the confusion brought by the administrators and probably by the Oku and Kom people. It should, however, be noted that Mbesa was written in many documents before 1982 as Mbesanaku. In this work, we shall apply Mbesa or Mbessa to refer to the same people. This is for the intention of consistency and administrative exigencies despite the fact that administrators nowadays always write Mbesa at times with a double “S” (Mbessa). It was good to give some logical clarifications on various appellations of Mbesa before discussing their history of migration and settlement in the area they claim is theirs. Some oral sources hold that the Mbesa chiefdom was founded in recent times. But according to old versions, Mbesa came from different directions and at different time intervals, and the first inhabitant of this area was Tfukenvu. He is said to have been driven from Nkar after it was discovered that he was in keeping of some dangerous traditional medicines which the people never liked. From Nkar, he moved to Djue Mengvu where he finally settled in Wimbum land, Djottin and Akek. Before he settled at the present site, the natives of Oku, Kom with some neighbouring Tikar groups had settled in their present sites when they left Bankim.474 This migration was partly due to Fulani raids and chieftaincy disputes. It was 471

Interview with Njong Peter Nchia, Belo, June 19th 2008. Interview with Vimoti Jon, Belo, June 18th 2008. 473 Gwedji Wainwel, 2005, p.16. 474 Z. Mbuh, 1991, pp.6-7. 472

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from the Oku group of Tikars that another early inhabitant of Mbesa (Nyiete) emanated. Nyiete was a prince from Oku, but later became an independent Fondom after the sudden death of his mother. It is important to divulge that movements and settlements at different places in recent years characterise the history of Mbesa. This group of people are recent migrants within the geographical context of this study. Their origin has sometimes been linked up with the Oku people. One opinion holds very strongly that Mbesa people were a family in Oku and their leader, a family head, was a noble and kingmaker in the Oku Fondom. Nyiete left the Oku palace and settled at Jiyane-Oku, where he later on moved with his sister Nful through Jikekem and Chung-Kueke to Ijim. From Ijim, they followed a track of wild animals to Kuekansang and finally settled at Keti. It was from here that he went back to Oku and brought many of the natives who supported his decision to leave Oku.475 While at Keti, Nyiete and his family were attracted by the geographical features of the other part of the village. When leaving, he came across ifukenvum, thus creating an expanding group with Nyiete’s son, Tofombel, becoming the First Fon of Mbesa to be crowned. When these people partially established their chiefdom, many more people came from Oku, Akeh, Kom and Bajmeng. Out of the more than twenty patrilineal families in Mbesa today, more than fifteen came from Oku. Yokefoing, Menkong Naing, Nshom Fendji, Ndosak, Njong Mbel in 1922 and Thomas Toah in 1961 later succeeded Tofombel, the first Fon.476 Very much has been noted in the history of Mbesa during the reign of Fon Njong (192261). During the First World War, the Mbesa people escaped to Nkor. When these people returned from Nkor after war, their Fon (Njong) was thrown into prison after disagreeing with Fon Ngam of Kom. After the death of Fon Ngam in 1926, Fon Ndi took over but failed to solve the problem he inherited from Fon Ngam simply because Fon Njong did not want to cooperate. In this case, the latter was forced to take his people out of the Kom land. This forced migration took the Mbesa people back to Oku main land, more specifically at Ibalichim while the royal family settled at Ntinfidjou (about four kilometers below the present Oku Fondom).477 Ntinfidjou was the birth place of late Fon T.T. Njong. In the 1940s, he equally attended standard one to standard four in the Cameroon Baptist Mission School at Jiyane.478

475

Interview with Fon Ngum Samuel III, Elak-Oku, 26 October 2004. Interview with Fon Ngum Samuel III. 477 Interview with Njong Peter Nchia, Belo, June 19th 2008. 478 Interview with Bah Moses Nkwah, Mboh-Oku, 27 October 2004. 476

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While they lived in Jiyane, Fon Njong and his people were hunters. When they caught a tiger, as Oku tradition holds, they were supposed to present it to the Fon of Oku, but this was not usually done. Some sources hold that because of this non-observance of Oku tradition, the Mbesa people left Ntinfidjou in the mid-1940s. Another version holds that their Fon was insulted in the Oku palace by Menchase and Ntanfu of Oku. This was when he had come to ask why his father, the Fon of Oku (Fon Ngek Yulam), was buried and a new Fon (Fon Ngum Yulam) was enthroned without his notice in 1942. The above explanations encouraged their movement to Ibalichim and, subsequently, to their present site. It was, therefore, because of their settlement in the strip of land between Kom and Oku that Mbesa became a sub Fondom under the Kom Paramount Fondom. However, her sociopolitical status remained up to date similar to that of Oku. Language wise, the dialect of the Mbesa people remained slightly modified during her era with Kom. The name changed from Mbesanaku to Mbesa only as a result of the 1982 territorial dispute. The history of the Mbesa people is thus characterised by movements and settlements mainly to and from Oku. But the Mbesa chiefdom was gradually established with Tofombel crowned as the first Fon. Other successive Fons followed the throne of succession: Tofombel (1772-1802), Yokefain (1803-1832), Mekong Nain (1832-1863), Nshom Fendji (18631892), Ndosak (1892-1922), Njong Mbel (1922-1961), Thomas Toah (19611986) and Fon Gilbert Njong (1986-up to date).479 The political structures of these villages are highly centralised with powers vested in the hands of the Fon. The Fon is the highest authority in the political, social and economic hierarchy of the area. Below the Fon is the King’s Mother (notock), who is trained by the Fon’s wives and the secret societies. The Kwifon, a secret society, open only to the male gender is there to help the Fon in his ruler-ship. Its members, often purported to be well repudiated, are recruited occasionally when need arises. Formerly, any person related to the Fondom could not be recruited for they form part and parcel of the noble class and had their own club “nguerry” with mixed traditional Juju and dances. With time, and considering the growth of the royal family, it became really necessary to include members of the extended royal family (princes of the third generation). Although membership is open to defined families, it is not open to all male members of such families. A selected few are initiated once every five years or more. The kwifon served as the Traditional General Assembly. It took all the decisions affecting the 479

Z. Mbuh, 1991, p.17.

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Fondom. It was responsible for the protection of the Fon, defended the traditions, ensured and performed burial rites in case a Fon died. The kwifon opened death ceremonies, gave final decisions on criminal cases and exiled people proven to possess evil spirits. In this regard, the kwifon decided on the fine to be paid for grievous crimes committed. This secret society also prophesied impending disaster thanks to the spiritual powers bestowed on its members.480 In the two communities, a major way of summoning somebody to kwifon is through the use of an injunction plant which is taken to the compound of the culprit by mabu481. This injunction plant (kelan) must be honoured and conveyed to the kwifon immediately because it is not to wither in any person’s home. This plant can even be thrown to the Fon when he violates any law of the land. It is believed that any person who breaches a traditional rule and is fined is already free from the unforeseen vengeance which must befall any person who is not punished. When an injunction plant roots in anyone’s home, the home shall be abandoned out of fear that misfortune may strike in future. The kwifon society is highly respected in the Cameroon grassfields. This respect is seen in the regard which the society gives to its members. Initially, non-members are not allowed to frisk their bags; kwifon members do not sleep in a bed with a non-member for fear that they may dream and talk during sleep, just to mention these examples.482 As earlier briefed, the members of kwifon are responsible for the surveillance of the palace by day and by night. They patrol the palace at night to make sure that adult males do not walk around. During the day, they stay around the palace to assist those who are visiting the palace and need assistance to see the Fon since people of the Western Grassfields do not gain access to the Fon’s presence directly. They equally assist those visitors in drinking the “palace water” (wine) that is given to any palace visitor. In the past, most of these retainers (nchindas or nchiyse ndaa) were given a princess in marriage as reward for faithful services to the palace. In fact, the secret society (kwifon) is significantly made up of “nchindas” or palace retailers who play vital roles as earlier discussed. We also have a number of quarter heads who mediate on minor issues within their neighbourhood or quarter. These quarter heads take issues they cannot solve to the Kwifon to

480

J. Jakoi Mbah, 2004, “‘Ntok ebkuo’: A Western Grassfields’ Palace (Cameroon)”, Anthropos, 99: p.440-441. 481 A renowned and most respectful marguerite (juju) from the Oku palace whose main mission is to reinforce sanctions. 482 Jakoi Mbah, 2004, p.446.

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deliberate upon. Other minor problems were resolved at the quarter head’s compound.483 Besides this structure in both communities, there also existed the “manjonj” and “nfou” clubs. These clubs were spread (are) to nearly all villages or quarters depending on the size of the men’s population. These groups were the ones responsible for any recruitment of soldiers, preparation of war and the fighting proper. Members of these clubs could be any person of good morals. They met for aid associative or njangi purposes and also prepared and performed during the funeral ceremonies of any of their members.484 In line with modernity, the Oku and Mbesa people are engaged in both traditional religion and Christianity. Traditional religion here is the belief in ancestral worship. Significant sacrifices and rituals are performed to the ancestors of each community or family. On the other hand, some people in these Fondoms embraced Christianity. Some who believe in the doctrine of Christ do not practise ancestral worship though in most cases, there are always hypocrites who have been seen fighting over traditional tittles in the village. A good example of this kind of person is the former Fon of Oku, Fon Ngum III, who had been the Secretary General of the Cameroon Baptist Convention (CBC) before his enthronement in 1992. While on the throne, Fon Ngum III was at a dilemma and this explains why he had to mix both ancestral and Christian worships. He was always attending the Elak Baptist Church with some of his wives, notables and nchindas of free will. Before the end of his reign, he had built a new Baptist Church in his Royal Palace.485 The presence of this church significantly encouraged several members of the Royal family to become Christians, thus reducing tension among the people. It should be noted that those who were Christians in these communities under study mostly belonged to the Baptist, Catholic and Presbyterian churches. The Jehovah witnesses and other Pentecostal churches only began entering the villages by the late 1990s. On the other hand, Islam was visibly preponderant only where there were Muslim agglomerations or grouping. In fact, such situation projects our vision of a people prior to the conflict era.

483

Interview with Kfum Philemon, Ibalichim-Oku, 27 October 2004. Interview with Fai Komsum, Manchock-Oku, 2 November 2004. 485 R. Ngek Monteh, 2004, “Oku and her Neighbours in Conflicts 1982-2002”, Maîtrise Dissertation in History, University of Yaounde I, p.29. 484

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B- Inter-Fondoms Relations and Causes of the Conflicts Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Oku and the Mbesa communities had had cordial relations from settlement up to the first violent encounter of 1982. These communities did not only live in peace, but were also fully engaged in socio-economic and political exchanges. Some people hold the opinion that Nyiete, who settled at Ayuo, came from Kom, and Tefombel, who settled at Keti, came from Oku. What is clear, however, is that both Kom and Oku are Tikar derived chiefdoms and the vernacular spoken in Mbesa is a kind of an amalgamation of Oku and Kom languages. It is in this sphere that we shall examine some socio-economic and political dealings before the advent of the 1982 dispute. It should also be noted that this dynamic relationship between Oku and Mbesa was also characterised by conflicts, especially when one party was not fully satisfied with any of the above elements.

a. Pre-War Relations For various political, economic and social reasons, maintaining good relations with neighbours was fundamental amongst the people of Oku and Mbesa. As earlier mentioned, language and celebrations such as death and religious activities enhanced social interactions between these communities of Tikar descent. The Oku and the Mbesa people speak almost the same vernacular (lamebkuo and lambesai). Though slight differences exist in the languages, the linguistic similarities facilitated interaction between the two people. Trade, marriages, death celebrations were all made easy due to the fact that they understood each other’s language and as such, were almost considered as brothers and sisters of the same area.486 In the political domain, despite some difficulties faced by both communities within internal levels, their relationship was still characterised by an atmosphere of peaceful co-existence. Within the framework of Grassfields diplomacy, Oku and Mbesa exercised a significant degree of inter-village diplomatic relations. Political relations that existed between them were essentially good, despite differences in opinion on certain issues. When these differences came up, many attempts were made at local levels to solve the problems through chiefs who were the traditional leaders of

486

Author’s personal interactions and experience while in the villages of Oku and Mbesa.

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these villages.487 These diplomatic ties established between the two Fondoms were all aimed at protecting and guaranteeing peace and harmony. The exchange of “palace bags” was highly noticed. The term “palace bag” was collectively applied to all the gifts a chief sent to his fellow chiefs. These gifts were usually sent to enhance and consolidate friendly relationships amongst chiefdoms in the western grassfields. Oku and Mbesa also cemented their relationship through the exchange of “palace bags”. The exchange of these bags also helped strengthen diplomatic ties. Exchange of visits amongst chiefs and commoners and the opening up of regular trade also helped to enhance closer relations. Nkwi rightly affirms that: “The exchange of gifts and counter gifts among chiefs had diplomatic implications or connotations. The exchange might follow the settlement of boundaries and succeeded by the return of captives and run-away wives and the opening up of regular trade”488 This quotation explains the fact that the exchange of visits by the Fon of Oku and the Fon of Mbesa, and between commoners both in time of trouble and joy had diplomatic undertones. Trade was also instrumental in enhancing cordial relations even in times of conflict. The circulations of royal bags or diplomatic bags which is known in Kom as bo-nto, in Nso as kibam kefon and in Oku as kebam ntok, was an extensive and frequent practice among the chiefs of the Western Grassfields. The principal regular gifts exchange between chiefs was that “no bag that entered the palace ever came out empty”.489 Either the bags were carried back by the visiting envoy with counter gifts, or they were later brought back by the receiving chief with counter gifts. A diplomatic bag could contain anything judged to be of value to a friendly chief. These things included palm oil, palm wine, goats, camwood, kolanuts, gowns, clothes (doma), caps, ornament and calabashes, stools, leopard pelts, elephant tusks, salts, gun powder, money and royal wife just to name a few. In most cases, these bags bore emblems of certain plants called peace plant (nkeng), raffia wine, often corked with this plant.490 A palace bag was also sent in times of sorrow, during the death of a Fon. In this light, when Fon Njong settled in Ntinfijuo (Oku) in 1927, he sent and also received palace bags from the Oku palace. These palace bags promoted their relations until the outbreak of their first hostilities in 1982.

487

Nkwi, 1987, p.42. Ibid. 489 J. Ndoah Toyih, 2009, “Inter-chiefdom Relations in the western Grassfields: The case of Mbesa and Her neighbours, 1927-1988”, DEPES II Dissertation, ENS Yaounde I, p.43. 490Ndoah Toyih, 2009, p.43. 488

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The occasional visits of one chief to a friendly Fondom in the Western Grassfields were known as “State” visits in modern inter-village relations. They were most often than not pre-arranged by inherent envoys or any palace notable of the villages concerned, or at the invitation of any one of the Fons. This did not only happen when relations were good as earlier said. It could be that there was a problem that required settlement or that a clan needed help from the other. This was the case between the Fon of Mbesa and Fon of Oku in 1927 when the former and his people were driven from the Kom land and were well received by the latter. While the Mbesa people were in Oku, their host (The Fon of Oku) ordered for the construction of a temporal palace for the Chief and houses for his people at Ntingjidjou (few kilometers below the present palace of Oku).491 Besides “State” visits, it should be noted that envoys played an important role in inter-chiefdom relations between Oku and Mbesa. They were sent mostly on occasions where the chiefs were unable to honour the invitations of their colleagues. They also carried with them some messages concerning the reason why the chief in question was absent from the occasion. At times, a chief’s visit to a friendly colleague was usually accompanied by these envoys whose knowledge of the given chiefdom helped interpret the required behaviour and diplomatic etiquette.492 This was frequently seen in the relation that existed between Oku and Mbesa, especially before 1982. Each of the Fons was always accompanied by envoys when they were going to visit any of their friends in a distant chiefdom. Envoys were sent to the palace of Oku to inform the Fon of Oku of the passing away of chiefs Njong in 1961 and Nsom Ngwe in 1974. Also, when the people of Oku arrested Mbesa boys in their farms at the disputed land in 1982, they took them to the palace and the Fon of Oku sent envoys to the Fon of Mbesa to inform him that his people have arrested his children who were caught stealing in their farms.493 In some cases, the envoys were from the royal family and girl children married to friendly chiefs. This was usually the greatest gift a chief could give a friend though this practice was not frequent. The friendship that existed between the two clans, the linguistic similarities and the various exchanges coupled with the inter-marriages 491

L. Ayong Tangwa, 2001, “Inter-village Relationship, cordially and confrontation: The case of Mbesa and Oku 1922-1989”, Law Essay DEPES I, ENS Annex Bambili, p.19. 492 B. Chem Langhëë, V.G. Fanso et al (eds.), 1996, Nso and its Neighbours: Reading in Social History, Massachusetts, Amherst College Press, p.26. 493 Ngek Monteh, 2004, p.22.

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meant that both people functioned as one. In this regard, their political institutions were structured and functioned in a similar way, and certain ritualistic celebrations were bound to be performed in like manners. In most Tikar groups, people celebrated the death of their grandfathers and grandmothers as they did for their ancestors. This relationship between the people and their palaces therefore united Mbesa and Oku before the advent of hostilities in 1982. The celebration of the death of the Fons of Mbesa was, therefore, imperative for the Oku people and vice versa. These chiefs were also unavoidably supposed to take part in the enthronement of new Fons. For instance, in 1961, when Fon Njong died, Oku actively participated in the enthronement of the new Fon (T.T. Njong). At this time, Thomas Toah Njong was chosen to the throne of Mbesa. He was kept in the Oku palace for a week before officially taken to Mbesa as the new Fon. The Fon’s associates and kinsmen actively took part in the enthronement of the T.T. Njong. This goes a long way to show the degree to which the chiefs of Oku and those of Mbesa before 1982 exercised diplomatic ties.494 The political relations that existed between Oku and Mbesa before the conflict years were very cordial. It is against the backdrop of the above briefing that one would like to find out the causes of the differences which led to series of hostilities witnessed in 1982, 1988 and 2007. From an economic perspective, Oku and Mbesa were bound to carry out trade and other economic transactions. The economic production that has made for economic relations among these chiefdoms has been mostly in response to local climatic and soil conditions. The economic potentials of these villages depended (still) on the various goods that they produce. Agriculture within the context of both communities involves the cultivation of crops and the rearing of animals and birds. In terms of production, these communities earned their living from farming. Generally, the climate and soil of the chiefdoms is almost the same, though there are local realities and differences because of the influence of relief. For instance, Oku, Din and Akeh are located almost at the same altitude while Mbesa and Kom are found on hillsides and valleys. These differences have, therefore, encouraged the production of different crops.495 The production of maize, beans, cola nuts, potatoes and vegetables was a bi-product of the said climate. Beans and maize are the most commonly produced goods and serve as the main export crops. Production of beans and maize is concentrated around Embel (the disputed area), Njain, and Njinakwa (also once attempted 494 495

Ibid. Ngek Monteh, 2004, p.22.

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to be taken by the Akeh neighbours). Cash crops like coffee are also produced, but production started dropping around the 1980s due to a reduction in the prices. Before this time, coffee was the major source of income, especially to the men, but with the fall in prices, many farmers in these communities turned to the production of beans and that is why they both had to safeguard their interest on land.496 In fact, the availability of farm land for agriculture made trade to flourish in this area, thereby promoting interaction and improving inter-relationships between Oku and Mbesa before the advent of the conflict. Trade was one of the principal economic activities which enhanced inter-chiefdom relations between Oku and Mbesa. In the Western Grassfields, the production and circulation of products depended on the basic principle of demand and supply. The exchange network between these communities linked areas that had mutual interest and benefits. Those who were involved in the exchange system either for cash profit or social promotion determined the variables that constituted their centres of interest. It is worth noting that trading activities went on at times with the encouragement of the chiefs.497 Trade contributed a great deal to enhance closer relations between these communities. This gradually led to the formation of market sites where trade contacts were carried out from time to time. The people practised both short and long-distance trade. Short distance trade was the buying and selling of goods between Oku and Mbesa, which made them to be in close touch with each other. Meanwhile longdistance trade brought together people of different geographical and cultural areas. Trade was not only limited to agricultural products but extended to other industrial products produced in these communities. Some of these industrial products were honey, carvings, paper processing and smelting. As a result of the mountain forest reserve in Oku (Kilum), Oku was and is still distinguished for its carvings, which explains why she was ranked as the second highest producer of carved articles in the North-West and Western Regions, behind the Bamoun kingdom in the Western Region.498 Artisans from Oku carved articles and portraits that had various expressions in the society. These carved products were sold in the nearest markets, the Mbesa market inclusive. Most carved articles found in the Mbesa palace were bought from Oku by Fon Njong during peaceful moments between the two communities. In fact, these carved instruments constituted one of the most 496

Ibid., p.30. Nkwi, 1987, p.111. 498 Kilum/Ijim Project (KIP), Periodic Reports on the Echology of the area, January 2002. 497

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flourishing businesses that took place amongst the two communities and beyond the area under study.499 These communities under study organised trade activities by establishing local market centres in their respective chiefdoms. Market days were synchronised between the various chiefdoms in such a way that they would not coincide. This strategy permitted traders from both localities to attend markets of other chiefdoms. Furthermore, Oku and Mbesa created other internal markets in their villages which were also used as basis for trade contacts. In this regard, chiefs also maintained trading, diplomatic and matrimonial relationships with many other chiefs. Goods that were not sold in the next market day were to be transported back home later. Trade friendship greatly promoted inter-chiefdom relations as some daughters of traders got married to their parents’ trade friends.500 This eased trade as some traders, especially those married to any of these two villages were able to preserve their goods in other chiefdoms. The people who engaged in trading activities were mostly ordinary men who attended the various markets either to buy or sell. For instance, an Oku man could go to Babungo to buy fish and garri from a Bambalang trader. He would then take the fish and garri to Nso and exchange it for tobacco and livestock which he could sell in Oku. The people of Mbesa would then go to Oku to buy these tobacco and livestock. It should be noted that before 1982, there were little or no restrictions on trade. Everybody was free to engage in any trading activity, provided he or she had the means, and no market fee existed until the early 1980s.501 Usually, these markets were situated near the different palaces or within reach of the regulatory societies of the Fondoms. The Oku market is situated few metres (about 400meters upward) from the palace. This guarantees fairness, honesty and protects the system and trading behaviour. The trade contacts corresponded to the geographical divisions of production in the area. It should be noted that before 1982 both internal and external trade flourished in the communities of Oku and Mbesa. During the conflict years trade relations were shattered but when a bit of calm was restored in these chiefdoms, trade friendship was renewed. Friendships at times generated lasting interactions and the traders’ families became so close to each other.502 From a social perspective, most chiefdoms in the Western Grassfields used marriage alliances to consolidate inter-chiefdom relations. These marriage relations were and are still taking place between Oku and 499

Interview with Shey Tama Protus, Ntimati-Mbesa, 27October 2004. Ndoah Toyih, 2009, p.75. 501 Interview with Njakoi John Bah, Elak-Oku, 20 October 2004. 502 Chem Fanso et al. (eds), 1996, p.31. 500

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Mbesa. There was a high frequency of women among commoners. But during conflict moments, frequent marriages between any communities of the Grassfields chiefdoms were absent. Though these frequent marriages still take place now, it is clear that the rate at which people inter-married before the conflict years was enormous, since to them, marriage alliances cemented family and inter-village relationships.503 Royal marriage alliances actually strengthened relations between chiefdoms as daughters of chiefs married to other chiefs acted as intermediaries or as resident ambassadors. They lived in the palace and had greater access to the chief. When people from her chiefdom visited the palace of her husband, they were usually welcomed and given primary hospitality. Children born from this type of union often had a bi-cultural outlook for they were able to express themselves in both vernaculars. Hence, marriage was an instrument that created a long-lasting alliance between the villages.504 It should be noted that no marriage was contracted at the level of the palace between Oku and Mbesa. This was because of the belief that the two palaces were related. They were considered to be “blood brothers” Marriages took place mostly among commoners. Nevertheless, frequent marriages between Oku and Mbesa were not common during the conflict years.505 During peaceful years, inter-chiefdom marriages between these communities were contracted. Hence, inter-village marriages opened chances for relatives to visit each other on a reciprocal basis. Births and deaths also constituted elements of socio-cultural relations amongst the Fondoms of Oku and Mbesa. Inter-chiefdom marriages encouraged family ties which later strengthened relations between families and encouraged affinity ties in the various chiefdoms. Consequently, when there were birth and funeral celebrations in the Oku or in Mbesa chiefdoms, the families concerned were expected to visit the village or to condole. In these chiefdoms, during birth celebration, the women prepared large quantities of maize, potatoes and vegetables for the feast while the men supplied meat, firewood, palm wine and kolanuts. The name of the child was given from the names of the great grandparents to ensure continuity. Hence the child was a vector of unity and joy to the chiefdoms.506 These feasts and celebrations of birth ceremonies usually acted as a renewal of friendship ties between the two communities. Funeral celebrations in these chiefdoms brought the people together since they were linked historically. In many cases, they were called 503

Interview with Njong Peter Nchia, Belo, June 19th 2008. Nkwi, 1987, p.47. 505 Ngek Monteh, 2004, p.28. 506 Interview with Fai Mentan, Elak-Oku, July 15th 2008. 504

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upon to perform certain services not only to the living but also to the dead. It was, therefore, a popular or common practice in these chiefdoms that when a person died, relatives rallied from other chiefdoms to mourn the deceased even if they were not directly related to his or her family. Thus, it was very normal to see people trekking from Oku to Mbesa and vice versa for death ceremonies. This was due to the fact that families already comprised citizens from the two Fondoms. Usually, during such occasions, new alliances were created and old ones strengthened.507 Therefore, the chiefdoms were linked by dynastic origin, friendly ties and brotherhood. Chiefs were in touch with the deceased who constituted along with the living a rational continuum essential for the maintenance of inter-chiefdom relations. In the Western Grassfields, the performance of the mortuary rites of deceased chiefs by their friendly neighbours was not only a diplomatic act, but also a deep ideological gesture with metaphysical implications. Oku and Mbesa were also part of this diplomatic exercise. Royal successions were carried out after a Fon is dead or “missing”. The death and succession of a Fon was often an important event in the chiefdom because it brought together all categories of persons from all over the chiefdom and beyond.508 Thus, upon the death of a chief, all allied chiefs, brother-chiefs and tributary chiefs were to convey the message verbally or orally to them and to their regulatory societies. Funeral ceremonies in this area were (are still) a forum to strengthen cooperation ties. But in cases of conflict, information was not sent following the pattern of traditional diplomacy. This was the case when Fon Mbah of Akeh died. The people of Mbesa did not go to condole with them because they claimed that the Akeh people had killed their women and children in the past. The Mbesa people only participated during the enthronement and at death timidly because of the above point, and also because of their alliance with the Oku chiefdom.509 We earlier mentioned that one of the people who created Mbesa was a grand prince of Oku. As such, certain ritualistic celebrations were bound to involve both villages. The relations of Oku with the palace of Mbesa bound them together before the skirmishes. Chiefdoms were linked either by historical putative tie of a dynastic origin or by friendship ties sanctified by oath or blood brotherhood. Against this background, the celebration of deaths of Fons of Oku was, therefore, imperative for the Mbesa people and vice versa. These chiefs were also unavoidably supposed to take part in the enthronement of new Fons. The Fon of Mbesa, according 507

Interview with Njong Peter Nchia, Belo, June 19th 2008. Ndoah Toyih, 2005, p.89. 509 Ibid. 508

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to royal descent, was one of the king makers of Oku.510 This position was maintained and exercised up till the reign of Fon Njong. In 1942, when Fon Ngek Zuelam died, Fon Njong of Mbesa was not informed. The late Fon of Oku was buried and a new Fon, Fon Ngum Yuteh, was enthroned without the knowledge of Fon Njong. This incident caused a hitch in the Oku-Mbesa relations and when Ngum Yuteh died in 1956, Fon Njong was informed but he refused to honour it. When Fon Njong died in 1961, the Oku people fully participated because their relationship by then was peaceful. They also actively participated in the enthronement of the new Fon Thomas Toah Njong. He was kept at the Oku palace for a week before officially taken to Mbesa as a sign of cooperation in traditional diplomacy.511 In the light of religious activities, the two communities had a common way of worship. In fact, they had long ago embraced three systems of belief and worship like in any other chiefdom in the western grassfields of Cameroon: traditional religion, Islam and Christianity. Many churches existed in both communities, with the Catholics dominating in Mbesa and the Baptist in Oku. However, other churches like Presbyterian, Apostolic, Full Gospel, Seventh Day Adventist and Jehovah Witness were also noticed in the areas. The Catholic Church throughout the whole world is carved out under diocese, parishes and stations. Stations fall under parishes and parishes under dioceses. Before the conflict years, all the mission stations both in Mbesa and Oku were under the St. Joseph parish in Njottin-Noni. Today, both villages are parishes.512 This made both villages to be completely linked religiously to carry out their evangelistic doctrines. Later, when the Oku parish was created, part of Mbesa Ichim was carved out and placed under the St. John the Baptist parish in Elak-Oku. This made the people to be always linked together in the religious domain. Religious feasts were all jointly celebrated at the parish centre in Elak-Oku as it was formerly done under Njottin-Noni. Educational activities under Christ the King Parish Ashing were noticed before the early 1990s. In the Baptist denomination, both Christians from Oku and Mbesa were always at the mercy of attending annual conferences organised by both hosting centres.513 Other diplomatic gestures were noted in the field of medicine. Oku is well known for its strength in traditional medicines. This aspect contributed immensely to enhance cordial relations with its neighbours, especially Mbesa people who constantly came to Oku for healing during 510

Ngek Monteh, 2004, p.26. Interview with Fai Mentan, Elak-Oku, July 15th 2008. 512 Gwedji Wainwel, 2005, p.47. 513 Gwedji Wainwel, 2005, p.47. 511

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peaceful moments. The Njikejim (Oku) Baptist health centre also acted as an impetus to peace between Oku and Mbesa. Many patients who could not be healed by the few traditional doctors in Mbesa turned to these modern hospitals for help. Pregnant women always turned to this hospital for safe delivery. Many adults in Mbesa were born in this hospital before the creation of the Catholic health centre in the village in the mid-1980s. Peace was to an extent guaranteed during this period due to the fact that there was hardly a day without a person from Mbesa in the Njikejem hospital maternity, thus her security mattered so much back home. In fact, conflicts were avoided at all levels due to the services rendered by this health centre.514 The people were admitted for treatment in health centres, hospitals or with the native doctors especially when there was peace. While there, they shared gifts and food with the people around the area. This encouraged hospitality and cooperation, thus creating long lasting friendship. In addition, education is an important factor that encourages peaceful diplomacy. It was noticed that many people from Mbesa and those from the neighbouring communities studied in Oku. Examples include Fon T.T. Njong of Mbesa, Frederick Ful Njong and Fon Abel Mbah of Akeh who went to school in Oku. They studied in the Cameroon Baptist School at Jiyane-Oku from the 1940s to early 1970s. As classmates, they became friends and this friendship fostered the relations between Mbesa and Akeh during their reigns. When St. Agnes Catholic School was opened in Mbesa, teachers were sent from Oku to teach there. This only helps to explain the degree of cordiality that existed between these chiefdoms especially in the domain of education. When Fon Njong of Mbesa subjected himself under Kom’s influence by 1942, most Mbesa students went to secondary school in Kom and Oku.515 Communication network also facilitated social interaction between Oku and Mbesa. These chiefdoms are found on hilly topography, and their physical conditions are not different from those of the Bamenda plateau. The hilly terrain made road construction very challenging, which equally affected the communication and transport network negatively. This explains why footpaths linked the villages and helped the communities either for commerce, farming or funerals. However, footpaths as of now equally still serve as the greatest means of transportation. This poor development in transport in particular and communication in general did not upset the smooth inter-chiefdoms relationship despite the fact that all the roads linking the chiefdoms were not tarred. These roads were seasonal, muddy 514 515

Interview with Fai Mentan, Elak-Oku, July 15th 2008. Interview with Wambeng Samuel Nshom, Elak-Oku, 23 October 2004.

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and slippery during the rainy season and dusty and truncated during the dry season. In spite of the poor quality of roads, especially during the rainy season, the chiefdoms still managed to communicate with one another.516 The people of Mbesa, though based in the Belo Sub-division, rely mostly on the various roads in Oku Sub-division to ease circulation of their goods and services. But in times of conflict, these movements were constantly blocked by the Oku people, there by retarding the socio-economic developments of both communities. Modern communication means like mobile phones were inexistent in Mbesa, Akeh, Din and Ajung because of the absence of electricity, while Chiefdoms such as Oku, Kom and Nso had good communication network because of the presence of electricity. The other chiefdoms which did not have constant electricity moved to these chiefdoms to type examination questions, get internet services and make or receive phone calls. This made people to interact with one another especially during peaceful moments. In the same light, language played an important role in inter-chiefdom relations between Oku and Mbesa. Oku, Mbesa, Kom and Ajung speak similar vernaculars. There exist slight differences in their vernaculars and this makes them to understand each other better. This could probably be because these chiefdoms have a common history of origin.517 This linguistic similarity has facilitated interaction between Oku and Mbesa. Trade, marriages, death celebrations were made easy in the chiefdoms due to the fact that the two communities understood each other’s language. In times of conflict, linguistic similarity posed a serious problem because an Oku man or Mbesa was capable of transforming himself through speaking the Oku or Mbesa dialects in order to confuse and harm an enemy.

b. Remote Causes of the Conflicts The remote causes of the Oku/Mbesa conflict can be traced far back to the 1940s. And this was specifically when the Mbesa people left Ntingfidjou (in Oku) in anger after Fon Ngek of Oku died and was buried without informing their own chief, Fon Njong, who was one of the king’s masters in Oku. Because of the above, tribal antagonism started growing between the two communities. This antagonism combined with suspicion, distrust and tension finally came to hamper the unity and cordial relations that had

516 517

Ndoah Toyih, 2009, p.99. (OCDA), Almanac for the year, 2007.

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existed between the Oku and Mbesa people.518 This culminated to the three major wars fought so far by these people from 1982 to 2008. It is said that when Fon Njong and his people left Oku in anger, they settled on a strip of land between Kom and Oku. Today, the area is recognised administratively under Boyo Division. The settlement of the Mbesa people in this area gradually grows her influence in Ibalichim and Ichim (villages in the north east of Oku) as a result of the growing population and the need for more farm land. The presence of the Mbesa people in this strip of land between Kom and Oku greatly influenced the activities of the people living at Ibalichim and Ichim. However, the Mbesa people had already declared that they were part of Kom but with passage of time, the people extended claims in Ibalichim-Oku. In fact, the Oku people did not raise any eyebrows because all along they had been carrying out numerous activities such as inter marriages, farming, and other sociocultural activities in common. Despite this tolerance from the Oku people, the Mbesa people decided to pay their taxes in Kom. To that effect, many petitions in relationship to the tax boycott were sent by the Oku people to the administration but the situation was never redressed in time.519 To avoid further land problems in the Bamenda region, the British colonial authority via M.D.W. Jeffreys520 began in 1942 by tracing the boundaries in the entire North-West Region. He traced the boundary line under the inter-tribal Boundary Settlement Ordinance and gave Ichim and Ibalichim to Oku. The disputed area of Embel or Ambel (Oku and Mbesa appellations respectively) was not well delimited as a result of the presence of the thick Ijim forest. This boundary was placed at the time Mbesa was still between Kom and Oku until the post-colonial period, when the chieftaincy decree recognised her (Mbesa) as an autonomous chiefdom. In the boundary drawn by Dr. Jeffrey (the British administrator) Mbesa fell under Menchum Division, present day Boyo Division. This was the beginning of another problem.521 Another reason for the friction was the ethnic division created by the colonial boundaries. The colonial arrangements made under Jeffrey added more injury to the already existing wounds among the Mbesa people living at Ibalichim. Many inhabitants of Ibalichim were people from Mbesa who had earlier left Oku to settle on this piece of land separating Oku and 518

Ngek Monteh , 2004, p.35. Interview with Wambeng Samuel Nshom, Elak-Oku, 23 October 2004. 520 M.D.W. Jeffreys was the British colonial surveyor in the region who was assigned to delimit and demarcate inter-tribal boundaries in the Bamenda region. 521 National archives Buea (NAB), File No 59/26/Ad2, 1927, Assessment Report on Bikom, p. 67. 519

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Kom. But according to the boundaries, they were divided with people of the same ethnic group (Ichim and Ibalichim all border villages of Oku) falling under Oku and the other people under Kom. They could not sit and watch their brothers carved out and given to the Kom people while they remained on the Oku side. This act led to a near war situation in 1961 between Ichim and Ibalichim when the government school at Ibalichim was constructed under the custody of Oku contrary to what the Mbesa view thought. To them, the school should have been under Kom. In fact, it should be clarified that the people who lived there (Ibalichim) at that moment were mostly Mbesa people.522 In the 1972 fight broke up between the Oku and Mbesa people in which five people from Oku were caught and jailed. Temporary calm was maintained but in 1974, another fight broke up between the farmers of Ibalichim and Ichim (mostly Oku people). This was because the people of these areas harvested maize and destroyed the growing crops on the farms at Ibalichim, claiming that it was their land. Sources revealed that the Mbesa people registered the matter to the then DO of Menchum, R. Boma, who wrote a letter to the Governor of the then North-West Province in which he said: I remember that when I paid my first visit to Wum, I reported to you that the village head of Mbesa Oku handed a letter to me in which he reported that there would have been a conflict between his subjects and those of the Fon of Oku on the 23rd July, 1974 […]. From your file on this dispute you would find that it has been demarcated between the two villages under the inter-tribal boundary ordinance of Jeffrey, the then senior divisional officer Bamenda. Since the dispute affects the two (i.e.) Menchum and Donga, it would be advisable if you could communicate the senior divisional officer of Bui to warn the Fon of Oku to stop his people from farming on the disputed area until the administration comes to look into the problem in order to seek a peaceful solution.523

After receiving the letter, the Governor instructed the DO to go to the spot and restore peace until a lasting solution is arrived at. The DO executed and during his visit, he warned the Oku people from entering the spotted area till the administration comes to look into the problem. The geographical milieu itself had been the source of the various conflicts in the North-West Region in general, and between Oku and Mbesa in particular. In fact, the dispersed nature of settlements in Oku and Mbesa 522

Interview with Wambeng Samuel Nshom, Elak-Oku, 23 October 2004. Provincial archives Bamenda (PAB), GNW, File No 54/58/SG/DAJ/BCR, 1988, disputes in Boyo. 523

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is characteristic of most grassfield settlements. This settlement pattern has made the people to always be in a constant struggle over farm land. A geographical survey of both communities as earlier discussed in the first part of this chapter made it difficult to easily identify that Oku and Mbesa are two different communities. Each of the warring parties accused the other of encroaching into his land, especially during planting and harvesting periods.524 It should not be under regarded that the multifarious causes that harmed the relations between Oku and Mbesa ranged from the manner in which Nyiete, an Oku prince and one of the original inhabitants of Mbesa, left Oku. There was misunderstanding between the Fon of Mbesa (Njong) and some notables in the Oku Fondom, which led to the hostilities.525 Related stories explained that Fon Njong Yaeh (a native of Kom and Head master in Oku), refused to respect tradition in Oku and preferred to pay periodic taxes to Kom instead of Ibalichim. The falling of trees at Embel (area in dispute) and the seizure of the Oku engine-saws by Fon T.T. Njong of Mbesa mounted pressure on both camps. However, when Fon Nyiete finally settled at the present site of Mbesa, he finally went back to Oku to bring more people who sympathised with him. This act might have been to show that he had founded Mbesa and thus wanted to completely cut links with the legitimate native land (Oku).526 From the data collected, it is clear that the Mbesa people have been wanderers. The natives of Oku claimed that Mbesa people had never had land of theirs, cannot lay claim to any legitimacy and have proven to be unpeaceful and bad neighbours as a result of their constant up and down movements. This explains why the natives from Mbesa, finally settled in the strip of land between Oku and Kom in the 1940s when the British colonial administrator Dr. Jeffrey had already carried what they referred to as the inter-tribal boundary between the Kingdoms of Kom and Oku. Serious tension started mounting in July 1972 when it was alleged that the Mbesa people destroyed crops in Embel and an Oku man was found dead in the neighbouring area. Relations between Oku and Mbesa were made uneasy by a number of factors amongst which was the quest for power by the Oku people.527 From a demographic point of view, the increase in population has always been the root cause of most territorial wars in the Western Grassfields. The situation between Oku and Mbesa was not different. The 524

Interview with Taintian Thomas, Mbesa, 27October 2004. Interview with Taintian Thomas. 526 Interview with Fon Ngum Samuel III, Elak-Oku, 26 October 2004. 527 Interview with Fon Ngum Samuel III. 525

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increase in the population of both communities with limited land had put the people at loggerheads on various occasions. This population increase has been attributed to early marriages and to the fact that polygamy is a common practice amongst the inhabitants of the area under study. Also, little attention was (and still) given to family planning, since both communities considered children as wealth, especially female children. This failure to consider family planning methods had led to a demographic increase in the population of both communities, thus endangering the already limited arable land placed under cultivation.528 Population growth, whether natural or through net migration, has had a preponderant role as far as agrarian space is concerned. In Bui Division, Oku counts as one of the sub-divisions with the highest annual population growth rate which stands at about 43 percent.529 The high growth rate represented a danger to space by adding more need for agricultural land. Table 15 and figure 6 illustrate the evolution of the population of Oku from 1921 to 1976 and from 1987 to 1995 and 2000. Table 15: The Evolution of the Population of Oku 1921 to 2000 Date

Male Population

Female Population

Total

1921 1925 1969 1976 1987 1992 1994 1995 2000

659 11,312 11,952 15,184 26,722 31,800 34,050 35,250 42,200

679 11,352 14,959 17,804 28,860 34,300 36,750 38,050 45,000

1,338 22,664 26,911 32,988 55,582 66,100 70,800 73,300 87,200

Source: North-West Provincial Service of Statistics, 1997, p.24.

528 529

Ngek Monteh 2004, p.21. Gwedi Wainwell, 2005, p.56.

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Figure 6: A Graphical Evolution of the Population of Oku 1921 to 2000 100000 90000 80000 70000

Key

60000

Male Population

50000

Female Population

40000

Total

30000 20000 10000

20 00

19 95

19 94

19 92

19 87

19 76

19 69

19 25

19 21

0

Source: The information in this figure is adapted from the table above while the Graph is the Author’s Conception.

Following the recent national population census, Oku Sub-division is noted to be the most populated sub-division in the North-West Region. Her present population is noted to be more than 120,000 inhabitants.530 The population of Mbesa has equally been growing though not as rapid as that of Oku. She has a population growth rate of 1.5 percent illustrated in Table 16 and Figure 7. Table 16: The Evolution of the Population of Mbesa 1976-1997 Date 1976 1987 1992 1994 1995 1997

Male Population 1,816 2,833 3,440 4,842 4,844 5,850

Female Population 2,010 2,226 3,033 3,037 5,042 6,160

Total 3,826 5,059 6,473 7,879 9,886 12,010

Source: Statistics year book for the North-West 1976- 1997, November 1997, p.52.

530

Statistic year book for the North West, 1997, p.98.

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Figure 7: A Graphical Evolution of the Population of Mbesa 1976-1997 14,000 12,000 10,000

Key Male Population

8,000

Female Population 6,000

Total

4,000 2,000 0 1976

1987

1992

1994

1995

1997

Source: The information in this figure is adapted from the table above while the Graph is the Author’s Conception.

From the illustrations, we notice that both populations, especially that of Oku, doubled, but the land under which they have been operating has remained stable. It is on the basis of these population estimates that the need for more land by each community was deemed necessary. Some of the abandoned areas of Ibalichim, Ichim, Ndom and the disputed area of Embel became major areas of conflicts over farm land between the Oku and Mbesa people. Nobody was ready to see his farm land encroached by any invader. The expansionist tendency of the Oku people, in comparison with the neighbours, has always been an immediate source of conflict between Oku and neighbouring villages. In this regard, Oku has had two bloody conflicts with Din-Noni in 1997 over the disputed area of Balu. Oku has also had minor clashes with Kom in general over Ngemsiba-Oku. It is also alleged that Oku has been clashing with Babungo over their area at IbalOku. Oku had recently had problems with neighbouring Nso over Tankiy, a border-land area between Oku and Tadu-Nso. With the case of Mbesa, it should, however, be perceived that Oku might have had an expansionist desire with neighbouring Mbesa probably as a result of poor demarcation and delimitation of her territorial spot.531 Another reason for armed conflict between neighbours in this area has been the uncontrolled circulation of guns and ammunitions. Cameroon’s 531

Interview with Njong Peter Nchia, Belo, June 19th 2008.

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law requires that to possess a gun, one has to be granted a gun permit by the government and this can only be given to private individuals above the ages of twenty-five and whose reasons for possessing a gun must have been studied carefully by the competent authorities. The settling, possession and ownership of arms is common placed in the grassfields and in the area under study in particular. Initially, when guns were strictly controlled, killing in this region was very rare. People used to fight with sticks, stones and spears. Today, fighting with guns has become very common since the relaxation of measures relating to the acquisition of guns or arms. The possession of Dane guns and its ownership had never been controlled in the region. Shooting and firing of guns in death ceremonies is very common. As such, when societies are able to acquire these arms with no restrictions, the result is that they are obliged to use them during periods of conflicts. A situation of this magnitude has been a genuine case amongst the Oku and Mbesa communities.532 Another major belief held the people of the western grassfields is that the only way to resolve conflicts is by going to war. The peoples believed that as long as boundaries are drawn verbally (delimited), they will never really be respected, so the best way to draw final and definitive boundaries is by fighting and conquering the other village. The people of Oku and Mbesa saw war as the only means of resolving their crisis. The then Sultan Njoya affirms that boundaries are drawn with blood; when boundaries are verbal, they are easily erased by one the parties concerned; “Je poserai les limites des royaumes avec du sang et du fer. La guérre c’est mon affaire lorsqu’on trace les frontières avec la bouche, cela s’éfface toujours”.533 In fact, these sayings broaden the understanding that when an area has been verbally or artificially demarcated, it remains subjected to inter-community conflicts and the end result is war. But if the area concerned had a natural boundary, it becomes very difficult to the various communities to have conflicting ideologies on the area. What caused conflicts in this region has been the laxity of civil administrations to completely handle the situation between the communities in conflict. Before 1927, the British colonial administration attempted to demarcate the boundary between Kom and Oku with little success. The demarcation was only finalized in 1942 by Dr. Jeffreys, the Senior Administrator of the Bamenda Region. Mbesa was administratively attached to Kom. It was only in 1974 when there was signal of land boundary dispute between Oku and Mbesa that the present postcolonial 532

Interview with Mentan Martin Tata, Elak-Oku, July 16th 2008. Njoya, 1980, Histoire et Coutumes des Bamoun, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, p.26.

533

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regime had to make reference of the Jeffreys inter-tribal map of 1942 whereby the name Mbesa and the place it refers to were clearly mentioned and demarcated. If the Cameroon Administrators were not relaxed on this issue, the existence of Mbesa would have long ago featured in an updated map. This, unfortunately, was never the case till the outbreak of war between the two communities. It should be noted, however, that the errors of this map had been used frequently by the present administrators. This explains why the Mbesa people had never been contented when the former Inter-tribal boundary was retraced and redrawn in effect of the 2007 final settlement.534 The silent role played by non-conflicting (neutral) parties had at times fuelled inter-community conflicts, especially when they had a direct interest in the conflict. In this connection, during our findings, we came across regrettable letters (as earlier noticed in Chapter One under general causes) from neighbouring Fondoms (Kom, for instance) requesting administrative favours. In line with the pending case of Oku and Mbesa, we earlier discussed in Chapter One that the Fon of Kom took side with Mbesa in the conflict. As such, he was granted a reprimand by the then Governor of the North-West Region, Abakar Ahamat. Similar acts existed long ago, as noticed in the content of the letter from the 30th of April 1983. This was an official letter addressed by the paramount Fon of Kom to the then NorthWest Province Governor requesting him to pay back his 1,700,000 Francs. It was alleged that this money was given to the Governor to woo the villages in Oku to come to Kom after the 1982 dispute.535 These villages included Ibalichim, Ndum, Ichim and Jikijem. Moreover, most of the religious establishments such as the Catholic and the Baptist churches were no longer prepared to operate in Ibalichim-Oku because most of its members who attended these churches were from Mbesa origin, and the political tension within this area could not lead to peace as these people were considered by the Oku natives as strangers. Therefore, church membership dropped drastically as the Mbesa people preferred to attend church ceremonies in the Kom main land. This resulted to the closure of these religious establishments.536 Following the above analysis, and because of the unenthusiastic nature of both traditional leaders and Government Officials, the two communities thought that war was the only way for them to solve their differences as noticed in 1982. What finally brought armed conflict between the two villages was the dispute over a piece of farm land which lies below the Ijim forest on the 534

Interview with Sama Benjamin, Bamenda, July 2nd 2008. Interview with Ngum Martin Yong, Ndop, 20 October 2004. 536 Interview with Nsanen Solomom, Ibalichim-Oku, 27 October 2004. 535

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northern boundary of Mbesa and Oku. Ibalichim was the first area occupied by the Mbesa people who, over the years, came to outnumber the early settlers of Ibalichim-Oku. The Mbesa people judging from their history of migration and settlement, finally settled in a strip of land found between Oku and Kom. The area under influence was the most fertile area of Embel due to the volcanic soils that were left by the volcanic eruption that took place years ago. It was on the basis of this monopoly expressed by both communities, coupled with other related facts already discussed that these two friendly communities decided to go to war in March 1982, August 1988, February 2007 and February 2008 respectively.

c. Immediate Causes of the Conflicts The above analysis has revealed the long term causes of the conflicts between the two communities of Oku and Mbesa. Despite the circumstances that had characterized friendly relations between these people, war was seen as an indispensable factor to overcome their differences over territorial claims around and beyond Ibalichim village. Confrontation between Oku and Mbesa changed from “cold war” to open fighting depending on what was at the background during each of the episodes. Before these violent outbreaks, there had never been any open fighting between the two communities; an attempt in 1974 but was quickly stopped by the forces of law and order. It became clear, over time, that there were ideological differences between the two communities as earlier discussed, and the immediate source of the conflict came to be in 1982 when people from both sides sharpened their cutlasses and loaded their Dane guns to the battle field at Ibalichim and Embel (The main targeted area by both communities). The Oku-Mbesa land problem was originally called “Bikom-Oku Land conflict”. The name changed in the early 1940s when the Mbesa people finally settled in their present site. In fact, the original cordial relationship between Oku and Mbesa was strained in 1982. It is claimed that on the 16th of March 1982, some Mbesa boys were arrested after destroying the crops from farms owned by Oku natives at Embel. But the boys claimed that they simply went there to fetch Indian bamboos for the construction of their houses.537 Meanwhile, the Oku natives insisted that some villagers hid in the bushes and saw the Mbesa boys harvesting maize and destroying crops around Embel. According to the Ibalichem village head, these Mbesa boys visited the farms of Oku people at the contested area of Embel on a day which by tradition, people were not allowed to farm in Oku, because it 537

Interview with Kfum Philemon, Ibalichim-Oku, 27 October 2004.

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was a day set for traditional activities. The arrested boys were immediately taken to Elak-Oku, the village headquarter of Oku.538 In the Mbesa community, it was reported instead that on the 16th of March 1982, some Mbesa boys who were fetching firewood and Indian bamboos were arrested at Embel. The Oku people treated them as thieves, and took them to the Oku palace. This issue nursed discontent and brought the two communities to an open confrontation in March 1982.539

C- The Escalation of the Conflict After a discussion on how these two communities (Oku and Mbesa) lived, we intend to show that this cordiality gradually turned to hatred and war was inevitable. With time, mutual distrust and the insatiable quest for more farm land turned a once peaceful people into bloody and bitter enemies at the beginning of the 1980s. This section shall, therefore, discuss the immediate causes of the Oku versus Mbesa land and boundary conflicts.

a. The 1982 Land Conflict The 1982 conflict extended from the 16th to the 18th of March 1982 when the government immediately deployed administrative officials and forces of law and order (police and national gendarmerie units) from Jakiri and Fundong to the scene at Ibalichim. Upon arrival, the Gendarmes struggled to restore calmness. Some Oku boys who were still agitated and wanted to continue fighting were arrested and locked up in the Bamenda prison for eleven months, after which they were released on bail as explained by one of our informants, Samuel Wambeng. The police unit was based at the Catholic Mission, while the Gendarmes were at the cooperative hall at Ibalichim. Both forces spent close to two months in the disputed area to ensure that the injunction order issued to both parties was respected, while waiting for a lasting solution on to the matter at Ibalichim.540 From our informants, it was alleged that about three (3) Mbesa nativeslost their lives during this confrontation, while there were no casualties on the Oku side. To that effect, a commission from the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINAT) headed by the Minister, Ayissi Mvondo, his deputy, Yang Philemon, and the Minister of Agriculture, Awanti Emmanuel, arrived at the disputed area. But since Yang Philemon 538

Interview with Kfum Philemon. Interview with Njong Peter Nchia, Belo, June 19th 2008. 540 Interview with Nsanen Solomon, Ibalichim-Oku, 27 October 2004. 539

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was from Oku, the people of Mbesa suspected that he was not giving a right version of the story since he was merely translating what his Boss the Minister was saying in French.541 They left the area unceremoniously after an injunction order from the Governor of the then Province forbidding farming and other activities at the disputed area had been issued. In fact, this order was short-lived as both parties resumed farming activities at the said disputed area, and also because both communities appealed especially to the Fon of Oku requesting Government Officials to maintain the original map as spelled out in the certified extract of the Nigerian Gazette No 74 which was not respected during the 1986 demarcation exercise. From the above facts, it was clear that if serious measures had not been taken, another warring episode of the conflict would have surfaced sooner or later. The military success of either community within the area under study was due partly to the organisation of its defence forces, logistics and effective leadership. In fact, indigenous resistance in each of the crises mentioned earlier was not defined by the types of weapons, difficulties of the terrain and leadership only, but also quite significantly by the military organisations of the chiefdoms. In Oku and Mbesa, all young men were required to join the military during the war. Also, both communities gave importance to supernatural forces at all stages of warfare. Diviners and religious leaders, especially the priests or pastors, were consulted before the declaration of war. At one point, “medicine men”, widely known as witch doctors, were sent by each warring community to all villages to ensure that there was no spy. In Oku, just like in Mbesa, rituals were performed and various medicine or concoctions (gang man) were prepared in order to weaken the enemy’s resolve to fight. It is claimed that the elephant grass stalks were mixed in traditionally prepared concoctions and were used to burn houses down and, in so doing, weaken the fighting ability of the rival, as was the case in March 1982. It is also believed that in order to maintain the destructive power of the elephant stalk, the person carrying it was to lead the fighters without looking behind.542 Religious leaders, especially the priests and diviners, formed part of the warring factions. They were among the major actors of the Oku/Mbesa land and boundary dispute. All war clubs throughout the region were organised along the same lines. The size of a village war club could range from 10 to 100 young men of fighting age. Their mastery and skills in using weapons or armaments as part of the defence forces was vital. These weapons ranged from natural in541 542

Interview with Njong Peter Nchia, Belo, June 19th 2008. Interview with Baa Nditor, Elak-Oku, 24 October 2004.

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built devices to artificial man-made arms. During the Oku-Mbesa war of 1982, we could distinguish three forms of weapons that were used, namely the local projectile, shock and defence weapons.543 Weapons were essential tools which facilitated the practice of war and reflected the technological achievement of the people. The main local weapons included: spears, jabbing stick, machetes, guns, bow and arrow. The battle field had also proven that both communities used war medicine and war magic as a determinant factor of their successes in the wars at Ibalichim and Embel.544 Some outstanding warriors that took part in most of the wars are up to date regarded as heroes and genuine sources of information, in the same way as some sculptures. Plates 9 and 10 illustrate this point.

543

P. Nchoji Nkwi, 1986, Traditional Diplomacy: The study of inter-chiefdom relations in the Western Grassfields North West Province of Cameroon, Yaounde, Publication of the department of Sociology, pp. 76-79. 544 Ibid., p.80.

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Plate 9: Sculptures Representing the Attires and Appearances of Warriors in the Area under study

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Plate 10: Key Informant and War Leader

Source: Monteh’s collection, 25th October, 2004 at Elak-Oku.

From our investigations, the method used in these confrontations was that which is commonly referred to as the “guerrilla tactics”; this strategy involves retreating when the enemy advances and pursuing the enemy when he retreats. The wars were fought generally in the early mornings and late evenings. All the participants usually assembled in the compound of the quarter head for inspection to see whether anybody was missing from the group that went to the warfront. Most often, the Mbesa warriors gathered at the palace and the Manjong houses to plan for the next day.545

545

Gwedji, 2005, p.72.

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Houses, individuals, and more recently, crops and social amenities (water supply catchments and a school as was the case in the 2007 confrontation) were attacked. Houses were burnt down in 1988 and in 2007. During the war, each camp had a signal to identify its group members. We were briefed that the Oku people used a white piece of cloth tied round the right arm during the 1988 war for easy identification.546 Anybody without this white piece of cloth was considered as an enemy. However, despite all the necessary methods and precautions deployed by both camps, there were still cases of casualties as noticed in the various episodes.

b. The 1988 Confrontation If one wants to find out what had become of the 1982 injunction order put in place by the Yaounde delegation, diverse answers will be given. In fact, information collected from the present village head of Ibalichim revealed that the immediate cause of the second Oku-Mbesa land conflict was based on the fact that; One of the natives of Ibalichim-Oku by name Emmanuel Som organized a clearing party on one of his farms at the disputed area of Embel during late August 1988. Suddenly, they were surrounded by the Mbesa people who claimed the same area. The people of Mbesa burned the farm hamlets found there and this act raised more attention at the communities.547

In this regard, the defence forces of Mbesa conducted a raid around Mbesa villages that led to the interpellation of five Oku people and even brought them right to the gendarmerie post in Fundong. The next day, the Mbesa people killed two natives of Oku and had several others wounded. Our sources revealed that as earlier as 3.p.m., war broke out between the two villages after five (5) Oku boys were also arrested in the forest of Embel. These boys were handed over to the Sub-divisional Officer in Fundong who immediately briefed the then SDO of Menchum, Fai Yengo Francis. The latter requested the SDO to send him the boys with immediate effect. Sources later revealed that these boys were later on granted free transport by the SDO of the Menchum to Oku through Kumbo. This information was revealed to us by Mr. Njong Peter Nchia, the present first Deputy Mayor of Belo Sub-division. What seems to be the real cause of the fighting was that the Oku people came to clear farms at Embel on the 25th August 1988, and met some 546 547

Ibid. Interview with Kfum Philemon, Ibalichim-Oku, 27 October 2004.

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people from Mbesa already clearing the same farm lands. Fighting immediately broke out. The cutlasses that were intended for clearing were turned into fighting instruments. Many people sustained serious injuries, and most of them were rushed to the nearby hospitals of Tolon-Oku and Fundong.548 In this regard, it is alleged that the Mbesa people in line with the 1982 episode, had to mobilize the entire Mbesa community for an eventual attack the next day on the Oku people. In Oku, unlike in Mbesa, the “Manjong” group, which was considered the military club, rallied all the men to the Fon’s palace where they prepared their war equipment, and spent the entire night deliberating on the defence strategy for the next day if the people happened to launch an attack.549 On the other side, preparations in Oku were too serious for none of their villages wanted to see another being attacked by any neighbour. In this line, the village heads of Ibalichim and Ichim were highly concerned and sent the message of an eventual attack against Mbesa the following day. Then nearly all the “Manjong” and “Nfu” group leaders mobilized the capable boys along with their weapons550 and instructed them to converge on the residence of the quarter head of Ichim. Some slept there and others met them in the early hours of October 26th. Both parties were aware of the war next day, which is why they had earlier mobilized youths and war leaders to converge at the disputed area of Embel. Early in the morning, a serious attack was perpetrated on the Mbesa people who resided at Ibalichim and Ichim and who refused to pay allegiance to Oku customs. Most of their houses were set on fire while other Mbesa people living at Ibalichim who were worried about their safety, had abandoned their houses before violence erupted as illustrated in Plate 11. Real fighting, however, took place for two (2) days: the 26 and 27 August, 1988. The fighting mostly occurred at the boundary line drawn by the then colonial administrator, Dr. Jeffrey in 1942 that is, from Asuh through Soa-lam to Kuokensang and Embel closer to Ibalichim. It was recounted by the village head of Ibalichim that to the best of his knowledge, one person from Mbesa named Kelvin Chimise was killed while many others sustained serious injuries. He also admitted that about three (3) Oku boys were killed in the confrontation. After the end of hostilities, the five (5) Oku boys who were arrested before the war were released by their Mbesa captives with no major problem.551

548

Ngek Monteh, 2004, p.22. Gwedji, 2005, p.67. 550 Interview with Baa Nditor, Elak-Oku, 24 October 2004. 551 Ngek Monteh, 2004, p. 23. 549

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Source: Monteh’s collection from field work, 27th October, 2004. Note: The above site view photos were the main compounds of the Mbesa people who resided at the disputed area of Ibalichim. These houses were abandoned after the 1988 war.

This second confrontation came to an end only when a report from Walson Ntuba, the then Governor of the North-West Province was sent to the government officials in both Sub-divisional and Divisional headquarters. The arrival of the combined Military legions scared the entire population around the battle area. It should be noted that the Oku people had already encroached in the main land occupied by the Mbesa people. This time, military men who arrived at the scene were stationed at Soa-lam, a quarter in Mbesa after the village head of Ichim-Oku refused to welcome the military battalion from Bamenda on grounds that he never called for any war. This military battalion then had to move to Soa-lam-Mbesa where, as our informants briefed us, they stayed for about a month before leaving the area. They instructed both parties to vacate the disputed area, promising that the government would find a quick solution to the matter this time.552 Following instructions from government officials, the Oku natives who still had farms there were supposed to harvest their crops and desert the place.

552

Interview with Ndishiangong Thaddeus, Elak-Oku, 21 October 2004.

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It was accounted that the second confrontation was less bloody compared to the first one which took place in 1982. During the wars, women played significant roles as they were responsible for feeding the warriors, providing shelter for the kids and senior citizens, and leading escape attempts to neighbouring villages for safety and peace-calling. The wars proper were left in the hands of the Oku and Mbesa Military clubs members (Manjong and Nfu) until the administration had to intervene, though often with short term solutions. It was at the background of this last confrontation that both parties contributed the sum of money that was used to raise the 1989 pillars. These pillars never lasted because the Oku natives confronted the builders and off rooted them that very day.553 Immediate action was put in place thanks to the timely intervention of the Senior Divisional Officers (SDO) for Bui and Menchum Divisions and the Governor of the North-West Province. It was only a question of time as war broke out again in 2007 and 2008, barely two decades later.

c. The 2007 and 2008 Confrontations To uphold their respective claims, the two villages were engaged in brutal conflicts in 1982 and 1988. All episodes were bloody in addition to massive destruction noted in both communities. From a different perspective, suspected traitors were expelled from either side and their properties were destroyed. In 1988, some Mbesa related families living in present day Ibalichim and Ndum escaped to Mbesa. Following a reconciliation by the then administration (commission) they were given a period of three months to return to their respective area of habitation. Some returned and rehabilitated their property while others remained in Mbesa. It is regrettable that 19 years later, the conflict resurfaced. According to the statements of the DO of Oku Sub-division, some Mbesa inhabitants were said to have master-minded the present conflict. They wanted to get back to the 1982 situation, and in connivance with some relatives in Ndum and neighbouring communities around the conflict area, they trespassed and unilaterally shared farmland and retrieved lost property in Oku. This statement was confirmed by Mr. Mbu (Fon of Mbesa’s representative) while he visited the disputed land with the forces on May 15th 2007. He said that the representative of the Mbesa Fon declared on that day before them that he was advised by Rev. Father Anthony Viban to reserve his statement: “they are not out to send away Oku people from their farms if only they can accept that they are farming on Mbesa land”. And if 553

Interview with Njong Peter Nchia, Belo, June 19th 2008.

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that be the case, “they should respect the Mbesa country Sunday”. The DO of Oku related to us that Oku is claiming not to have been prepared for war and that Mbesa may have been manipulated to fight them by some foreign forces. for they have for ages always related very cordially (friendly football encounters between schools, market exchanges, good road link, intermarriages, many Mbesa children in Oku educational institutions and vice versa, building and farming across boundaries).554 Following a series of reports since November 13, 2006, the quarter head of Ichim forwarded complaints of theft of food crops (beans, potatoes, plantains) by Mbesa people at Embel to the Sub Divisional Office in Oku. Some of the complaints were referred to the Gendarmerie Brigade of Elak for investigation and feedback. It was alleged that a man named Tamfu Ful Agency of Mbesa was notorious for harassing women and harvesting from Oku farms. The Divisional Officer invited the Ichim village head and village council to the office on several occasions and advised them to create vigilante groups to track down the suspects, as their actions were pure acts of criminality. Thus on Sunday, 14 November 2006, Tamfu Allan aged about 18 of GSS Mbesa was caught (four of his mates having escaped) harvesting Irish potatoes from farms owned by Oku natives. A messenger from the palace of Oku was sent to the Fon of Mbesa to report on the situation. Unfortunately, the Fon dismissed him harshly. The alleged thief was taken into custody at the brigade for three days, and the Divisional Officer, accompanied by the Brigade Commander, took him back to the Fon of Mbesa. There, the DO reminded the Fon on the necessity for peace and order, and harmonious relations between the two communities. Amongst many things, the Fon said that Embel belonged to Mbesa and that the Oku people beheaded his uncle in 1988.555 Complaints continued flowing in. On February 9th, 2007, the village head Ndikintum of Ichim arrived very early at the residence of the Divisional Officer of Oku to complain of mass harvesting at Embel by Mbesa natives who were cutting down trees and setting farms on fire. He was advised by the government official to remain calm but vigilant. On February 10th, 2007, the Fon of Oku, two notables, and the mayor of Elak Rural Council held a meeting with the Divisional Officer to seek ways and means to resolve the high crime wave and growing tension. It was agreed that hierarchy and the judicial police be brought in to investigate the matter, for the acts were provocative.556 554

Interview with Martin Gang Tangyie A., Elak-Oku, June 25th 2008. Sub Divisional Archives Oku (SDAO), 2007, Ref, No15/L/E26.03/10, Report on the Mbesa/Oku Conflict. 556 Interview with Ndishiangong Thaddeus, Elak-Oku, 21 October 2004. 555

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On the 12th of the same month, it was reported that the Fon of Mbesa, armed with a rifle and flanked by many dogs, harassed Oku women in the farms at Embel. Some of his close attendants, including Buji Lamgwa and Ngong, had two Oku women severely molested. The children who witnessed the scene ran to Ichim to inform adults of the women’s cries uphill. However, upon arrival at the scene, these suspects ran away for safety. They retreated to Ichim in fear of any confrontation. On their way back, they met Pa Zacharia Sani Menu of Asoh-Mbesa who witnessed the attack on the women. They suspected him of been part of the evil act and took him to the Divisional Officer of Oku. He acknowledged that the Mbesa people had trespassed because his farm is on the other side of the area and the DO asked for his release. After the gendarme had interviewed him at about 11:00pm, he was securely escorted back to his home at Mbesa.557 On the 13th, the Divisional Officer went to Ichim to calm the population and to restrain them from going to the farm at Embel. Seeking an intervention from armed forces, and since it was difficult to get his Colleague in Belo, he immediately reported the matter to the Senior Divisional Officer for Bui and the Governor by phone. Two Oku women who had left very early for Embel before the Divisional Officer’s arrival were kidnapped, raped and taken to the palace of Mbesa where the Fon of Mbesa later released them. They were taken to the Health Centre at Ichim and later to the Sub Divisional Hospital for medical attention.558 On the 14th, the First Assistant SDO for Bui accompanied by the Divisional Officer of Oku, the Commissioners of the Special Branch of the police in charge of national surveillance, the Mayor of Elak Council and the representative of the Company Commander Gendarmerie Kumbo came to Ichim and personally witnessed the Mbesa aggressors firing downhill at the population. The Divisional Officer asked the angry population in Oku to continue to observe calm and not retaliate. They were ordered to block and protect property and prevent the aggressors from entering the village. Two elements of the Gendarmerie were obliged to stay behind all night long to prevent Oku from retaliating. There was total pandemonium in the whole of Oku Sub Division. Upon return to Elak, the Divisional Officer was approached by a man sent by the Divisional Officer for Belo requesting for an appraisal of the situation.559 Later, on the 15th of the same month, Rev. Father Ache of Tobin Parish Kumbo Diocese released a message that the Divisional Officer of Oku should meet his colleague of Belo at the disputed land. Upon arrival at 557

Interview with Martin Gang Tangyie A., Elak-Oku, June 25th 2008. Interview with Yang Daniel, Jikijem-Oku, June 23rd 2008. 559 (SDAO), Ref, No15/L/E26.03/10, 2007, Report on the Mbesa/Oku Conflict. 558

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Ichim, as the Divisional Officer was climbing uphill to meet his colleague, he came across the first set of two Oku casualties. These two casualties claimed that they have been preventing the aggressors from attacking the village when they received bullets respectively in the right chest and in the neck. The Divisional Officer could not continue uphill because security and protection were not assured. He then called the Governor and proposed a different meeting place, that is, at the borders between Mbesa and Oku at “Bakassi Bar” since he could not get in touch with his colleague. They later met and moved to the area of confrontation where they found hundreds of Mbesa youths armed with locally fabricated guns. The two administrators talked to both parties to hold a cease-fire as instructed by the hierarchy.560 The situation worsened on the 16th as both parties compromised the cease fire. The people of Oku declared that at 3:00am, Mbesa almost entered Ichim with wild gun firing, which forced them to retaliate in selfdefence. This retaliation came up at 7:00am when reinforcements sent from other villages in Oku Sub-division arrived to help them push back the aggressors. They set fire on the homes in Mbesa because they had no ammunitions and were never prepared for war. The Senior Divisional Officer for Bui visited the affected areas. From his point of view, he remarked that the Oku people reacted injuriously while at the palace of Mbesa it was agreed that the Fon of Oku be advised to call his people to observe the cease-fire. On the way to the area under dispute, he was embarrassed as he discovered the reality. The SDO stumbled on fresh casualties from the Oku side, which meant that the two villages were actually at war. Both communities blamed the two Divisional Officers for not assuring a proper cease-fire.561 On the 17th, the posted military unit in Mbesa by the Senior Divisional Officer of Boyo came to Ichim but failed to go to Ndum to stop the burning of homes and destruction. This was because the Brigade Commander of Oku was unwilling to lead them there in the absence of the Divisional Officer of Oku who had gone uphill to call the Governor on the need for an intervention at Ndum. Meanwhile, in the morning, angry and armed Mbesa boys near “Bakassi Bar” threatened the Divisional Officer of Oku who had to escape back to Ichim.562 On the 18th, the Divisional Officer of Oku, Martin Gang Tangyie, went to Ndum and advised the population to remain calm even though he could still see, with binoculars, Mbesa boys armed with guns on neighbouring hills. He also rehabilitated displaced people resulting from 560

Interview with Martin Gang Tangyie A., Elak-Oku, June 25th 2008. Interview with Martin Gang Tangyie A. 562 Interview with Yang Daniel, Jikijem-Oku, June 23rd 2008. 561

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burnt homes likely perpetuated by Oku people themselves against their Fon with Mbesa. This was more curious to those to whom they suspected were fighting at the Mbesa front. He also gave them some bread and apportioned the displaced to the homes of close relatives. On the 19th, the last day of fighting, the Divisional Officer for Oku instructed the Gendarmes of Boyo to conduct an inquiry on the damages and casualties on the side of Oku. The DO of Oku lamented the fact that the promised arrival of requisitioned forces from Kumbo to assist him and his colleague from Belo had not turned up on time. The DO of Oku bravely said that something had to be done to end the recurrent dispute once and for all. He further said that, apart from Mbesa that had a problem with Oku at Embel, some people of Din in Noni Sub Division equally participated in the armed conflict. It was publicly said in Belo that the Fon and his gang damaged the decking of the water catchments in order to pull Din into the fight to add to their relatively small numbers, since Din depends on these catchments. However, it is regrettable that the catchments were destroyed as illustrated in Plate 12. It is also alleged that the Fon of Mbesa had promised his subjects that Embel would be recovered from Oku by the use of force and had called on every Mbesa youth to possess a gun. There is very little doubt about this, judging from the alarming number of guns seen on the 15th of February 2007. The persistent shooting by the Mbesa boys was indicative of a steady stock of cartridges. The use of sophisticated military weapons during the fight increases suspicions of the presence of military officers in the fight. It will be proper to carry out independent inquiries in this direction.563 The burning of homes largely occurred in Mbesa because owners of these houses were absent. These acts of terror were perpetrated by the Oku people residing in villages found on the other side of Lake Oku. Since most of the quarters of Mbesa were found near the battle field, they were the most vulnerable during attacks. In fact, only very old and helpless people

563

(SDAO), Ref, No15/L/E26.03/10, 2007, Report on the Mbesa/Oku Conflict.

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Source: Photos Collected from the Rev. Anthony Viban, Parish Priest St. Agnes Parish Mbesa, June, 2008.

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were seen at the time of the burning as vigorous young men were on the battlefield. One remarkable observation is that while Oku had more human casualties from bullets, Mbesa suffered more damage from burnt houses (see Plate 13). Despite the instructions of Governor Koumpa Issa that the two Divisional Officers initiate a cease-fire, the Divisional Officer of Oku was side lined and left to work alone. While the Brigade Commander of Belo remained with the Divisional Officer of Belo, the one of Oku and his elements were not with their authority. Even in the absence of the squadron, they should have saved the situation at Ndum. The state of insecurity was still quite high because people in Oku believed that the intervention from armed forces was one-sided, giving Mbesa youth the guts to continue to patrol around with guns. In their opinion, intervention would have also meant the seizure of guns.564 The Divisional Officers for Oku and Belo Sub-divisions together with some administrators in both communities, did well to administer our interview. This was, however, besides the assistance they gave us with some official correspondences related to the dispute in question. However, some calm was witnessed on Thursday, 15th, and it was believed in Mbesa that all was returning to normal again. That calmness lasted only till Friday morning. Around 7:30 am, people from Oku suddenly entered Ntimati (Mbesa) and started burning houses. Meanwhile, a proceeding meeting was supposed to take place there at 10:00am between the administrative officials and local rulers. On the hills overlooking the village of Mbesa, crowds of people from Oku could be seen coming down and burning, cutting, destroying and looting anything valuable on their way. They sprayed houses with fuel and set them ablaze. There was panic and total confusion, and the people of Mbesa mostly women and children, were fleeing for their safety towards Akeh, Fundong and Ajung. The destruction was unimaginable: the aggressors burnt down houses, shot people in their houses, cut down banana plants, cola-nut trees, coffee plants, and looted property. About three inhabitants of Mbesa were shot and wounded.565 It is to be noted that this act of terror occurred before the eyes of the Sub Divisional Officer for Belo and the Forces of Law and Order who did very little to stop the aggression. One wonders what might have pushed Oku to attack their neighbours and cause so much destruction. Even after attending several meetings, we did not get reports of dead casualties following the gruesome attack on Mbesa. It was at about 4:45 p.m.

564 565

Interview with Martin Gang Tangyie A., Elak-Oku, June 25th 2008. Interview with Rev. Anthony Viban, Mbesa, June 20th 2008.

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Plate 13: A Summary View of the Damages by the Oku People in Mbesa, February, 2007

Note: A brief explanation and the source of these pictures are found on the continuation in the next page.

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Continuation of Plate 13

Damaged Administrative D t Source: Data Collected from Justice and Peace Commission, Archdiocese of Bamenda, June, 2008. Note: The need for the above pictures is merely to illustrate the various damages encountered by the Mbesa people during the 2007 war. There are no specific explanations on the pictures since the damages shown were specifically on houses and we thought it necessary to group them together.

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that the SDO for Boyo arrived at Mbesa to see the destruction himself. Fifty elements of the forces of Law and Order arrived at Mbesa that Friday from Bamenda when the damage had been done as seen in Plates 12 and 13. The only reported death, which occurred among the Mbesa people during this period, was that of a young man named Elvis Ngwain. He was among the guards who had kept watch on Wednesday night at Ntimati. About midnight that Wednesday, Elvis got into a trance and started shouting; he then ran down a steep slope and fell into a ditch. He was only discovered dead about 6 a.m. on Thursday morning. The Sub-divisional Officer for Belo and the Gendarmes were called to the scene. The victim was later buried that morning at Ntimati.566 It is only after some preliminary negotiations coupled with the efforts of the mediators that calm was reestablished after the 19th of February 2007. Governor Koumpa Issa with the then Provincial Delegate for Lands and Surveys held series of meetings with the aim of effectively retracing and re-demarcating the Oku and Mbesa boundary. But as time went on, a similar encounter between these communities resurfaced in May 2008, though with less consequences when compared to the previous face-off.

d. The Recent Crisis of May 2008 It all started on Sunday, May 4, 2008, when some Mbesa men gathered on the hill overlooking Ichim, and started firing guns thereto until the next day, Monday the 5th. Then gunshots became more frequent during planting and harvesting periods, especially when the Mbesa people were farming or harvesting at the borders (at Embeh). They would often go to farms with guards who shot guns to frighten or intimidate their brothers of Oku. In Ichim, people reacted by firing back, as they suspected an imminent attack by Mbesa. That certainly was the situation on Tuesday, May 6th 2008. Things would have probably escalated but for the timely intervention of the local administration and the forces of Law and Order.567 According to the DO of Oku, a brief meeting that included the Brigade Commander, a Member of Parliament, and the Mayor of Elak, Chiefs of Ichim and Ibalichim and their population was held. There, the DO of Oku reiterated firm instructions to people to come gather at the Ichim quarter head’s compound, and not to go up hill, informing them of an imminent arrival of intervention forces. The following day, the same message was delivered to the population in the presence of the Company 566 567

Interview with Rev. Anthony Viban. Interview with Laura Naddin Ngwa, Bamenda, June 28th 2008.

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Commander of Kumbo on the front. The Divisional Officer of Oku had earlier sent a memo to the Fon of Oku instructing him to use the “ngumba” so as to warn all Oku villages not to enter the so-called war, as was the case in May 2007. This memo was followed up by a circular from the DO of Oku, forbidding any groupings in Oku as was the case in the previous year, until further notice.568 In as much as the peace talks proposed by the Fon of Mbesa were most cherished, the termination of the boundary demarcation process already started by the then Provincial Commission made matters worse. For the DO of Oku, the respect by the two belligerent parties of the new boundaries would be pivotal in any peace talks, as the matter was shifting to a “hide and seek” game with the use of weapons of destruction. Contrary to public opinion, it was on Thursday, May 22nd, 2008, that some Oku women from Ichim met with the SDO of Bui, Daniel Panjuounou, at the Divisional Office of Oku, after he had co-presided over the Administrative, Management and Stores Accounts Session of the Elak Council earlier on the same day. The Oku women showed some corn stalks allegedly destroyed at their farms by Mbesa people to the government official. After advising them to stay calm, the SDO promised to report the matter as soon as possible to the hierarchy, took the stalks along as evidence, and, before leaving, advised the women against the dangerous consequences of war.569 On Saturday, May 23rd, 2008, the situation degenerated into an open warfare between the two Fondoms, with casualties reported on both sides. No deaths were recorded despite exaggerated or sentimental rumours. On the side of Oku Sub-division, while the Mayor of Elak, Jerome Ngum, and the Member of Parliament, Hon. Andrew Kwei came to dissuade villages of Ibalichem and Ichim from going uphill to fight, the Divisional Officer went to Shinga-ah zone (Ibal, Ngemsiba, Mbockevu, Lang, Ngvuinkei I and Mbockemlung) to stop Oku people from joining the war. The Fon of Oku and his “ngumba” were also instructed to warn other villages not to heed to any alarm (call) from Ichim. All these moves worked because of the relatively reduced number of Oku boys found at the war front (about 30) against Mbesa youths (about 300).570 That same evening, at about 5:30 p.m., the Senior Divisional Officer for Bui Division and his Etat Major visited Ichim to talk to the people seemingly following reports of the degeneration of the crisis. The 568

(SDAO), Sub pectoral Decision No.08/2007, prohibiting public rallies and meetings in Oku Sub Division. 569 (SDAO), Ref. No.10/R/E26.03/10, 2007, Report on the present Oku-Mbesa crisis. 570 (SDAO), Ref. No.10/R/E26.03/10, 2007.

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following day, confrontations continued uphill. The Divisional Officer for Oku and his colleague of Belo joined the forces uphill and talked to the two belligerent groups. They were able to calm them down. The two communities posed the same problem, via the need for a quick demarcation of their entire communities so as to avoid any trespassing. Without mincing words, the two administrators instructed the two communities to stop crossing, harvesting and destroying crops on both sides, and that they both respect the injunction Order instituted by their respective administrations on the disputed area. As a solution, both villages proposed that the Provincial Commission urgently finish the demarcation of the boundary already retraced the previous year by the same commission. In the light of the above, and in consonance with the insistent proposal from Mbesa, people on both sides believed that it would be an uphill task to talk peace if the boundary was not demarcated.571 Moreover, the people on both sides really wanted to farm if their respective portions were clearly indicated, as there was already hunger on both sides because of the shortage of farm land. In fact, the disputed land was very fertile. The Oku and Mbesa land boundary conflicts had dramatic consequences on both communities. During the fights, these communities deployed guerrilla warfare before the arrival of the forces of law and order in the disputed area. Before their arrival, most of the damages (lives and properties) had been made as was the case in 2007. The next section shall then examine the effects of the conflicts on both communities.

D- Effects of the Oku-Mbesa Conflict This section will briefly discuss some of the direct consequences of the various conflicts between the two communities concerned. Just like in the previous chapter, both villages were affected in the domains of politics, economy and socio-cultural ties. It should, however, be noted that care had been taken to discuss just the visible aspects of the impact rather than the psychological.

a. Political Effects From a political perspective, the relations between Oku and Mbesa were greatly affected by the various conflicts. By this, we are referring to the diplomatic relations which concerns visits, celebration of the deaths of Fons and inter-village marriages. All these usual events became practically 571

Interview with Kwei Andrew, Bamenda, 19 December 2008.

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impossible during and after the wars. Some sources revealed that the formation of alliances between Oku and Akeh to combat Mbesa in 1988 was noticed. This alliance has put Mbesa and Akeh at loggerheads, thereby making Mbesa a political isolate among its eastern and southern neighbours.572 The conflicts affected the customary practice of the celebration of deaths of foreign chiefs in these communities. The mutual funeral ceremony for Fons in both communities has never taken place again since the ever first conflict of 1982. For instance, Mbesa lost Fon T.T. Njong in 1986, and during the funeral rites, the Oku chief and its nkwifon did not attend. Equally, several of such celebrations in the Oku palace have not been attended by the Mbesa Nkwifon. In 1992 and in 2006, the Mbesa Fondom did not take part in the enthronement of Fon Ngum III and Fon Nsetieh II respectively. According to the tradition and customs of these people, blood that was spilt during the hostilities must be cleansed through rituals on the fighting ground.573 These rituals have to be performed by the two chiefs, who rather continued to differ in opinion. The heavy casualties witnessed in both communities especially in Mbesa during the last episodes strained the relations between Oku and Mbesa because it created a vacuum in some households. The old memories of the death of their loved ones in the conflict brought ill-feelings and the idea of revenge constantly pre-occupied their minds. Thus there were no hopes for a peaceful relationship between these communities.574 The war equally affected the neighbours of both communities. When the Oku-Mbesa war reached its climax in 2007, the Kom people showed concern and sympathy to the Mbesa people who became homeless. In this regard, the drivers’ union from Belo-Kom went ahead to ask nonindigenes of Kom to leave. This injunction was largely addressed to the Oku people who had earlier settled in Kom. It was, however, thanks to the timely intervention of Patrick Pelopuh, the DO for Belo, who issued a warning memo to the drivers’ union that their act come to an end.575 Akeh equally exploited this opportunity to openly express their grievances against their Mbesa neighbours. Immediately after the major first and second wars, the Akeh people started claiming Mbesa’s land at Njinakwa. They also laid claims over Ibal-Avin, part of lower Mbesa, found beyond Akeh. This almost led to a war situation between the two communities between 1990 and 1992. Relations have continued to be tensed between Mbesa and Akeh. 572

Gwedji, 2005, p.90. Ibid. 574 Ngek Monteh, 2004, p.45. 575 Interview with Sama Benjamin, Bamenda, July 2nd 2008. 573

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This reached a dangerous stage in 1992, when the bridge linking Mbesa and Akeh was destroyed and the passage between the two communities was made difficult for some weeks.576 Exchange visits between Oku and Mbesa were also affected adversely. As earlier mentioned, relations between Oku and Mbesa were cordial and visits were common before the periods of hostilities. Before the wars, exchange visits between Oku and Mbesa commoners were also experienced. This aspect completely came to a standstill during and after any war. People felt very insecure visiting their relations in both communities. Above all, no visit was witnessed among the chiefs of Oku and Mbesa. The idea of exchange visits among royals and commoners as was the case before 1982 became very rare. Marriages could no longer be contracted among these communities.577 The relationships between families in Oku and Mbesa both temporally and permanently ceased to exist. Inter-tribal marriages between families of both communities were discouraged. These conflicts led to the breaking of inter-tribal marriages that were already contracted before the conflicts. The Oku people with Mbesa wives drove them away as the conflict was restricted. Ma Philomena Vifwe testified that she got married to Mr Chung Ndishangong (former mayor of Elak-Oku Council) of Oku, and during the conflict years, especially that of 2007, she was beaten and sent away from Oku because the Oku people believed that she had been spying for Mbesa, especially in times of conflict.578 After the wars, there were never any inter-village visits. Visits for whatever reason after the wars were only possible between Mbesa and Oku by the few Mbesa natives who could speak the Oku or Kom languages, and by Oku people who could speak Mbesa, Kom or Noni languages. This was because any true Oku man who was identified in Mbesa could eventually pay for the damages his tribe caused caused during the war and vice versa. In relation to data collected, many indigenes abandoned their houses forever.579 As earlier mentioned in the first part of this chapter, the name Mbesenaku subsequently changed to Mbesa immediately after the war of 1982. Above all, these conflicts brought fear and insecurity, and the chiefdoms could not interact as before. The movement of people from one village to another was unsecured. Fear made some Mbesa people who lived at Ibalichim and Ichim along the boundary area to migrate to different areas in the Mbesa chiefdom, or to neighbouring chiefdoms. Nkwi reiterated that 576

Interview with Njong Peter Nchia, Belo, June 19th 2008. Interview with Fai Mentan, Elak-Oku, July 15th 2008. 578 Interview with Ma Philomena Vifwe, Bamenda, July 18th 2008. 579 Interview with Ma Philomena Vifwe, Bamenda. 577

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some wars have led to mass movement of peoples, or have forced some people to abandon old sites or settlements, as was the case with Mbesa people who left Ibalichim and Ichim villages in Oku after the 1988 war.580 Those who chose to remain in these Oku villages accepted to be Oku people. In this case, the wars led many people to opt for total submission rather than going in search for a new homeland. During these war periods, neighbouring communities were also faced with situations of accepting refugees. Accepting refugees from neighbouring communities was closely determined by the type of inter-chiefdom ties the communities shared before the outbreak of hostilities. As for the case of Mbesa people, they were often welcomed by neighbouring communities in the Kom Fondom, thus increasing the size and volume of the population. This painful situation caused by the massive destruction in Mbesa also provided a forum for some politicians, especially those in the opposition to the CPDM government. For example, the leaders of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), Chairman Ni John Fru Ndi, visited the displaced Mbesa people in their palace, and the areas damaged by the war. Their visit could also be linked to the preparation towards launching preliminary campaigns for the upcoming 2007 joint municipal and parliamentary elections in Cameroon.

b. Economic Effects From an economic perspective, Mbesa depended very much on Oku. In the Belo Sub-division, Mbesa stands out as one of the highest producers of beans, maize and Irish potatoes. These products were and are mostly bought by traders from Kumbo who always passed through Oku. Whenever there was a war between Oku and Mbesa, this economic activity was brought to a standstill. The devastating economic impact witnessed by the two communities was the drastic fall in living standards, low agricultural production and a possible advent of malnutrition in the conflict zone. The wars significantly reduced the consumption of consumer durable goods in Mbesa since she relied much on the Oku and Kumbo main markets to purchase manufactured goods such as dresses, utensils, metals, imported drinks, building equipment among others that were mostly sold in the above-mentioned markets. It should also be noted that whenever relations between the communities became harsh due to wars, the Mbesa men were

580

Nkwi, 1986, p.86.

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obliged to trek to Kumbo, passing through Din and Djottin, thus covering more than double the normal distance if they passed through Oku.581 In fact, note should be taken of the many houses burnt and destroyed, estimated at 474,800,000 Fcfa as illustrated above. In the same manner, properties in Mbesa were completely looted and destroyed. In fact, between 1,000 to 1,500 people were rendered homeless.582 The Mbesa crops found at the contested area and in the Mbesa mainland were completely crushed by the Oku people during the last manifestations of the conflict. Signs of these destructions of crops in the area are still visible, as illustrated in Plate 14. Human and material damages were enormous on the side of Mbesa since the wars were fought in the border, and in Mbesa mean land. Many houses were burned in Ibalichim and Mbesa respectively. These damages were done by the Oku people, who equally promised to chase away members of the Mbesa community staying at Ibalichim, but paying taxes to Fundong. Many fighters during the war were deported as war victims to the various sub-divisional, divisional and at the regional levels and detained in places such as police stations, Gendarmerie brigades and the Bamenda Central Prison, before achieving their freedom later.583 On the other hand, these dramatic episodes also gave birth to the visit of the Chantal Biya’s Friends (CERAC) to Mbesa to sympathise and present gifts to the displaced and affected people during the 2007 war.

581

Interview with Nforme Peter Ndeh, Elak-Oku, 27October 2004. Justice and Peace Commission (JPC), Oku-Mbesa war report from Justice and Peace Commission, Archdiocese of Bamenda, February, 2007. 583 Interview with Wambeng Samuel Nshom, Elak-Oku, July 19th 2008. 582

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Plate 14: Crops Damaged at Mbesa 2007/2008

Source: Data Collected from Justice and Peace Commission, Archdiocese of Bamenda, June, 2008. Note: The above collection portrays crops such as banana, cocoyam and stems of kolanuts trees among others, destroyed by some Oku vandals on the Mbesa farm land. One should note here that, the above destruction was in Mbesa main land, and not in the disputed area

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c. Socio-Cultural Effects From a social perspective, many more people in Mbesa understand and speak the Oku local language compared to the number of Oku people who speak the Mbesa language. This has been caused by inter-village marriages and the prolonged contact that these communities had earlier enjoyed. Whenever hostilities reached the war level, inter-village marriages gradually stopped. People did not only stop getting married, but also went as far as divorcing. Movement from one side to the other was no longer frequent between the two communities till people gradually came to forget about these conflicts. The celebration or funeral rites of a deceased ruler was and is a common practice in the grassfields regions but it stopped between Oku and Mbesa since 1982. Immediately after these crises, people could no longer officially leave Mbesa to celebrate the death of their brothers and sisters in Oku. When Fon Ngum III of Oku was enthroned in 1992, taking over from Fon Nsetieh his predecessor, no delegation (official) came from the chiefdom of Mbesa to sympathize with the Oku traditional authority.584 This attitude continued in October 2006, when the present traditional ruler of Oku, Fon Nsetieh II, was enthroned and no official delegation came from Mbesa. Following the 2007 and 2008 crises, many people were displaced from the village to unknown destinations as illustrated in Plate 15. Some children were declared missing from the village since the day of the burning. Schools were closed down from February 13th, 2007, till the war came to an end. Related information briefs us that three schools’ premises at Mbesa (Catholic School St. Leo at Ntimati, C.S. St. Anthony Asuh and G.S. Fetongle) were rendered unsecured for children.585 As earlier discussed in the evolution of the crisis, the water catchment system was completely destroyed, which put at risk the health of the population and gripped them with fear. On Sunday, February 18th, 2007, the churches were virtually empty. The Developmental Projects that were going on in the village before the war such as the Construction of a Hydro Electricity plant was left in suspense. Since AES Sonel got 2,500,000 million francs from the people of Mbesa and Ibalichim and had not made any efforts to extend light into these villages, the people of Mbesa started exploiting the water fall in their village to get electricity.586 Before the war, there was an ongoing construction of a community hall. But since the war stepped in, the work was abandoned. The 584

Interview with Wambeng Samuel Nshom, Elak-Oku, 23 October 2004. Interview with Rev. Anthony Viban, Mbesa, June 20th 2008. 586 Interview with Rev. Anthony Viban. 585

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rehabilitation of the Ibalichim, Mbesa, and Belo Road was left undone. In fact, the economic empowerment of the women of Mbesa, the running of the women cooperative (Common Initiative Groups) was left with doubts. Relatively, all these and other social activities came to a standstill, especially in Mbesa.587 As concerns health, the Mbesa people were forbidden from going for either traditional or modern treatment in Oku. This was due to fear, and probably because the Oku people were harassing the Mbesa people beyond Ibilichim. Therefore, they resorted to treatment in Kom as roads to Djottin in Noni passed through Oku, in the exception of some abandoned foot path. The Mbesa people equally stopped sending their children to schools in Oku as the secondary schools in Mbesa started late due to the crisis. The children continued their education in Kom after the primary level. Also during the early conflicts of 1982 and 1988, schools were halted as women ran away with their children leaving the men to engage fully in the fight. Some children finally dropped out of school. Also the government school at Ibilichim was completely destroyed, thus interrupting the educational process of some children within the area.588 During the first two wars (1982 and 1988), the Mbesa people restricted their children from going to school in Oku because of the outburst of war. There was an influx of Mbesa students into secondary schools in Kom because of the absence of a secondary school in Mbesa to reduce the number of students going out of the village. Most students whose parents could not afford rents trekked right to Kom for education as they could not live far away from their parents. In a similar case, during the conflict of 1982, the doors of churches at Ibalichim were closed due to fear and insecurity. Hence, there was no religious body to try to sensitise the people on the importance of love and unity. The Ibalichim churches were finally abandoned by the Mbesa people to join the Kom Christians in 1986. The situation during the years 2007 and 2008 was quite different for the Mbesa people had had religious autonomy as opposed to the situation before this era. But the situation of secondary schools still posed a big problem to the fast-growing population of Mbesa.589

587

Interview with Laura Naddin Ngwa, Bamenda, June 28th 2008. Ngek Monteh, 2004, p.63. 589 Interview with Laura Naddin Ngwa, Bamenda, June 28th 2008. 588

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Plate 15: Displaced Population of Mbesa in February, 2007

A

C

B

D

Source: Data Collected from Justice and Peace Commission, Archdiocese of Bamenda, June, 2008. Note: The above pictures described the pending and panic situation of the Mbesa people mobilizing to leave in search of safety during the 2007 war. In A, we noticed that the people mostly the women and adolescents have stationed on the road with their luggage. B and C show how mobility is intensifying along the road side to get access from any possible vehicle as the one in both pictures. On the other hand, D pictures some adults who had intentionally stationed themselves within the destroyed banana farm in Mbesa.

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All in all, this chapter, just like the previous ones, has examined the degree and magnitude of land and boundary conflicts between two formerly friendly communities. These people thought that their differences could best be resolved only by way of fighting (war) rather than applying peaceful diplomacy. In this regard, since 1982, Oku and Mbesa had gone to war four (4) times: 1982, 1988, 2007 and 2008. This chapter has also examined inter-chiefdoms relations before and after the various conflicts. Following our investigations in the area, it was noticed that war destroyed the long enjoyed inter-chiefdom relations, especially in the domain of traditional diplomacy. The effects of war already analysed are lamentable, especially when lives and properties are endangered, as discussed in the successive war episodes. Despite significant efforts, much still has to be done so as to redress the devastating effects of conflict in the communities concerned which will be our concern in chapter six. It should also be noted that these conflicts experienced during the post-colonial administration though centred on land and boundary issues, had similar origins, evolutions and consequences, but differed in peace attempts. Chapter Six, therefore, examines the various peace attempts on the respective cases so as to determine which of the mechanisms had been effective or could be implemented on issues related to land and boundary problems in particular, and conflicts in general.

CHAPTER SIX ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS AND THE PROBLEMS FACED BY THE INTERVENING PARTIES IN RESOLVING THE CONFLICTS IN THE NORTH-WEST REGION

After considering the intensity, the regularities and the consequences that land and boundary conflicts have on the people of Cameroon in general, and in our case studies in particular, third-party actors have paid attention to these conflicts in an attempt to resolve them. For most of these actors, achieving peace is essential for the Region since it activates political, economic or social development. This chapter, therefore, examines the degree of peace-attempts made by the intervening parties and the problems they faced in the process of doing so. To successfully deal with a land conflict, the third parties made use of different strategies and stages all illustrated in Figure 8. Depending on the stage of the conflict, these actors applied either crisis prevention, peace-making, peace-keeping or peace building.

A. Attempted Solutions In this section, we examined many actors (negotiators) who played significant roles in the resolution of these conflicts. We looked at the role played by government authorities, traditional authorities, institutions, religious authorities, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), women and other voluntary mediators.

a. Government Attempts The administrative authorities in the North-West Region tried in their own way to resolve inter-community conflicts and to promote the peaceful coexistence among them. Since British colonial times, government officials became aware of the fact that amidst these communities, there was a

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struggle for domination and expansion by the stronger communities or chiefdoms over the weaker ones. Figure 8: Stages of Conflict and Approaches of Intervention

Source: Wehrmann, 2009, p.25. Note: Once the details of a conflict’s development over time are known, its different stages can be identified. This allows the current degree of intensity of a conflict to be determined, perhaps showing that it is just before escalation so that urgent actions are needed, for instance. Figure 8 shows the typical stages of a conflict. The conflicts over land and boundary are currently at Stage 2 (confrontation) and close to crisis. From the figure above, the stages of conflict reflect the changes in activity, intensity, tension and violence of conflicts over time, from the first moments of tension to their resolution. Although each conflict has its own dynamic, every conflict goes through at least three phases: pre-conflict, in-conflict or crisis, and post conflict. In conflict resolution, these three phases are further detailed into five phases: • Pre-conflict: A conflict generally starts with an incompatibility between the goals of two or more parties, which have the potential to lead to open conflict. At this stage, the conflict is hidden from general view, although one or more of the parties are probably aware of the potential for confrontation. There may be tension between the parties who often try to avoid each other at this point. • Confrontation: The second phase of a conflict is more open and marked by occasional fighting or other low levels of violence. Each side is looking for resources and supporters. Polarisation between the parties increases. • Crisis: At this level the conflict is at its peak. When the tension or violence is most intense, a conflict can easily get out of control. At this point, there is rarely any

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communication between the parties who are fighting and are publicly accusing each other. In worse cases, the different sides are at war. • Outcome: In one way or the other, the crisis will end. One party may defeat the other or give in, both parties may agree to negotiate, or a third party may impose a settlement. In any case, tension and violence decreases but the conflict is not yet settled. • Post-conflict: At this stage, relations have become more normal again. However, if the roots of the conflict have not been adequately addressed, and if the incompatible goals still prevail, there are possibilities that the situation will turn again into a pre-conflict. It is very important to identify the current stage of the conflict in order to be able to choose the appropriate manner of intervention or conflict resolution.

In addition to the current stage of the land conflict, its social dimension, general characteristics and the position of the parties involved are all crucial factors in determining the most suitable form of conflict resolution, such as consensual or non-consensual approaches. The case between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo was not left indifferent by the British colonial Authority. During the colonial period, there have been series of efforts by the colonialists to settle the BambiliBabanki-Tungo. During the late 1950s, there had been series of negotiations and ground work to establish a final boundary between these two communities, but with little success. In 1958 under the lordship of Wastmacott, the British colonial authorities were able to establish a map of reference, aimed at settling the Bambili-Babanki-Tungo conflict. This decision finally became known as the Wasmacott decision, despite the persistent attitude of some communities that refused to respect government decisions. This decision was the major step taken by the British colonial authority to resolve the inter-chiefdom claims over the disputed area at Ntah. The 1958 colonial map of the contested area illustrates claims from both communities. It should, however, be noted that the Wastmacott demarcation and map of 1958 established a legal framework for the Cameroon government to resolve any conflict within this area. In 1989, the SDO of Mezam Division, Bell Luc René, accompanied by the provincial technical team, visited the disputed area (Ntah) and gave instructions that all the maps concerning the area should be carefully studied so that the old boundary get re-demarcated in accordance with the 1958 Westmacott decision. This study episode mounted more concern and tension from both communities, which later on occasioned another war time episode. This war episode, which lasted from (1991) to (1996) was due to the dissatisfaction of both communities.590 In 1995, the SDO of Mezam, 590

Interview with Loh Mufi Emmanuel, Bambui, May 15th 2007.

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Sufor, together with the DO of Tubah and a technical team from Yaounde, planted pillars to delimit the boundary of the two communities. These pillars were removed by the Babanki-Tungo people as they claimed the boundary did not reflect the colonial map of the appeal court in 1953.591 Map 8 illustrates the contested area and claims from both communities. The removal of the pillars by the Babanki-Tungo people, led Bell Luc René, then Governor of the then North West Province, to visit the site again. This time, Babanki-Tungo accused the administration of trying to give total control of Lake Bambili to the Bambili village. They claimed that; The lake is a natural resource, which is government property and that can be exploited by everyone. For example, the Lake Chad which is at the boundary of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria is used by the bordering countries. Since Lake Bambili was found in the frontier, the BabankiTungo people were supposed to be allowed access to it.592

The disagreement continued until a National Commission to settle the problem was created by the Governor of the then Province. Given the bloody wars that followed in 1996, the administration was forced to take things more seriously this time. The two villages, which did not find a solution to the disputes from the local administration, decided to petition the central administration through the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, to the Prime Minister’s office and then the Presidency of the Republic. In response, the President of the Republic, Paul Biya, gave firm instructions that a National Commission for the Regulation of litigations of territorial limits between the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo communities in Mezam should be constituted. The commission was, therefore, constituted and work began in the office of the Senior Divisional Officer. Members of the commission, accompanied by the then Minister of Territorial Administration, Koungouo Edima, visited the disputed area.593 The commission exploited all the maps that backed up the decisions taken by the colonial administration to resolve the disputes, as well as the map that was adopted alongside the one which accompanied the Wasmacott decision in 1958.

591

Interview with Loh Mufi Emmanuel, Bambui, July 9 th, 2007. Interview with Viyouh Nelson, Sheleh, Babanki-Tungo, May 18th 2007. 593 (JPC), Comments by the Babanki Tungo Delegation on the Report of the interprovincial Christian Justice and Peace Commission on the land dispute with Bambili. 592

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Chapter Six Map 8: Bambili-Babanki Tungo Land Boundary

Note: Map 8 above shows the disputed area, and this presents the claims of the two communities and the various markings that have been drawn in an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the problem. Section B-W represents the claims as made by the Babanki-Tungoh; the Bambili claimed the section B-A. None of the communities has been willing to recognize the claims of the other party. The demarcation of the line between these communities by the Bafut Native Court judgement of December 11, 1953, is indicated by section C-T. This line was established in the presence of

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Fon Awemo of Bambili and Fon Asik of Babanki-Tungoh, and it was registered in the Bafut Native Court Civil Suit No. 23/53. Yet it did not satisfy the two communities. After many other attempts, Ward, the British resident in Bamenda, suggested another line which is represented by section C-W. This was later rejected by the two communities because it did not coincide with their respective claims. Another line – the Westmacott line represented by section M-W, was later established by Westmacott on the 15th of May 1958 at Bafut.

The commission also exploited data from the Bamenda Arch Diocese about the final report on the boundary crisis conducted in September 1998. The National Commission also594 conducted interviews with people from the respective communities, neighbouring communities and the Fons of Bamessing and Awing who claimed to have given land to the Babanki-Tungo when they split from Babanki-Kedjom Keku (BigBabanki) as earlier explained. It is worth noting that during the work of the commission, the Babanki Delegation refused to present their copy of the map that accompanied the Westmacott decision which the two Fons agreed to recognise on the 25th of July 1973. The Babanki natives instead claimed that the map that was presented by the Bambili Fon accompanying the Westmacott decision was falsified, as it was not signed.595 Therefore, they called on the Commission to use the map that accompanied the lower court decision in 1953. The Commission members drew their attention to the fact that the final decision that settled the land disputes between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo was the Westmacott decision and as such, this decision was going to be followed to the latter.596 This commission finished its work on the 9th of May 2000 and came up with the final minutes which were transmitted to the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization for approval. It was, therefore, in this light that a ministerial order (arête) No. 00210/A/MINAT/DOT/SDOA/SCA, bearing approbation of litigations of territorial limits between the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo communities in Mezam Division was signed, granting the disputed land to Bambili.597 This new boundary defined by the National commission, which is the highest instance at which disputes between communities are resolved, was rejected

594

Interview with Sama Benjamin, Bamenda, July 2nd 2008. Anuafor, 2007, p.54. 596 Minutes of the National Commission, 9th May, 2000. 597 Sub Divisional Archives Tubah (SDAT), Arrêté No. 00210/A/MINAT/ DOT/SDOA/SCA, bearing approbation of minutes of May 9th 2000, of the national commission for the regulation of litigations of territorial limits between the Bambili, Babanki-Tungo communities in Mezam. 595

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by the natives of Babanki-Tungo who claimed that the boundary was imposed on them. They expressed their anger as thus: We are not going to accept a boundary imposed on us. A boundary fabricated in Yaounde by the so-called experts. We find it extremely objectionable and futile to be party to an exercise that is at best a masquerade which can only intensify the conflict between our peoples and cause them to continue to destroy themselves and their property.598

Following the above declarations, it was visible that the new boundary was not going to be respected. As a follow-up of the Commission’s proposals, and in application of the ministerial order defining the boundaries, the then SDO of Mezam, Nzegge Onyong Charles, assisted by the DO of Tubah, the survey services and delegations of the two communities held a series of meetings in his office. In the meeting held on the 14th of June 2001, plans were made on how to erect pillars on the boundary. In another meeting held on the 25th of June 2001, in the Subdivisional Office in Tubah, a technical committee met to draw a program of work.599 The meeting saw the participation of the two Fons, and the program was effectively drawn. The meeting went on well the first two days. The third day witnessed a boycott by representatives from the villages and delegation.600 On this day, 9th of July 2001, the technical team was surrounded, assaulted and held hostage by people from Babanki, and the materials brought by the technical team for the pillars were seized. Among the items seized were spades, iron rods, boxes and buckets. The same night, the pillars built on that day were destroyed and the materials carried away by the Babanki people.601 Another case that highlights administrative intervention is the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict. The crisis between Balikumbat and Bafanji became more serious in 1966, which prompted the then West Cameroon government to try to solve the crisis once and for all. Honourable John Ngu 598

The Herald No.201, May 4-7th 2001, Kum Set Ewi, “Babanki-Tungo rejects solutions, write to Prime Minister”, p.3. 599 The committee members were made up of the DO. of Tubah, the Divisional Chief of Lands, and Surveys, the Divisional Chief of Agriculture and the Divisional Chief of Housing and Urban Development’s. The two communities were represented by their village leaders, and some notables as observers. 600 Interview with Peter Tiende, Bamenda, June 17th 2008. 601 Aggression against government staff during the exercise of duty, correspondence of Divisional Delegate of Housing and town planning Mezam to the Senior Divisional Officer of Mezam, July 13th 2001.

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Foncha, the then Secretary of State for land and Survey was assigned to handle the matter. In 1968, he instructed the Land Tribunal Commission to investigate the matter and make recommendations. This Tribunal actually went to work, and the lands and survey officer in the tribunal presented a report which showed that infrastructural development of the Balikumbat on the disputed land was more than what the Bafanji’s had on their own village.602 Secondly, the report showed that the Bafanji claim did not show any formal boundary apart from a stone which they claimed was an area for their sacrifices. Looking at the area, what the Bafanjis claim to be their land was what falls within the farms and houses of the Balikumbat people. In this regard, the Balikumbat people were able to show some boundary between them and the Bafanjis in the form of piled up stones known around as “canes” These Balikumbat claims extended to Mbangang, a quarter in Bafanji. However, most of the canes had been destroyed and it is not possible to ascertain their original position that had long ago been demarcated by the colonial masters. Whatever the case, the District Officer for Ndop at the time, DO Fomenyen, a Meta man, was not satisfied with the work of the land tribunal, and so chased away the tribunal members whose report ended up not being recognized. DO Fomenyen reported work with Honourable S.T. Muna, who accidentally was bent on punishing the Bali for the part they took in the Balinyongha versus Meta wars in general, and particularly the BalinyonghaNgembo war.603 With this connection, DO Fomenyen deployed forces of law and order in 1969 to arrest some 400 Balikumbat subjects, including their Fon, Fon Galabe III. After the arrest and detention of the above people, the DO wrote in letter no. Ref. DBA/C 122/Vol.11/284 that the Bafanji needed more land, and thus moved ahead to plant pillars demarcating the land in dispute. This act enabled the Balikumbat to seek legal redress at the Bamenda High Court. They wanted first to obtain the release of the 400 persons and their Fon. Secondly, they sued the chairman of the land tribunal, Ajebe Sona, and his secretary, Justice O.M. Englis, for not presenting their report and findings on the Balikumbat-Bafanji land conflict.604 The Bamenda High Court was about to carry out its job when DO Fomenyen phoned S.T. Muna, the then Prime Minister of West Cameroon. Honorable Muna, in a quick action, ordered that the case be transferred to Buea where he was residing at the time. The Prime Minister’s car appeared on the premises of a crowded court and took along the Fon of Bafanji and the two judges: Justice Nijal Thomas and Justice Endeley, while Justice 602

The Errand, No. 16 of 29 Friday 1998, Sama L. Steve, p.4. Ibid. 604 (SDAT), 1969, Reference Letter from DO. Ref. DBA/C 122/Vol.11/284. 603

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Sabum a native from Bali, was alleged to be sick and lying in the hospital. After several hours of waiting on the court premises, the judges finally appeared and announced to the crowd that the Balikumbat had lost the case and were to pay a fine of 50,000 Frs C.F.A. This decision, whether correct or not, increased bitterness among the Balikumbat, and that increased their aggression towards their Bafanji neighbours. In like manner, in accordance with the West Cameroon Law on Inter Community Boundary Disputes and Settlement of 1962, a Land Consultative committee was established in 1969 to look into the matter again, following the preliminary clashes. This Committee partially demarcated the boundary between the two communities using canes and pillars. As the demarcation of the Tiandong stream seemed to favour Bafanji, the Balikumbat natives were not happy, and appealed against the decision to the judge in the Buea Federal Court but with no fruitful result. In 1971, Fon Galabe III of Balikumbat launched another appeal in suit No. FCJ/3/1970 of February 1971. But this appeal was, once again, decided in favour of Bafanji, confirming the ruling of the West Cameroon government of 1969.605 It should also be noted that in 1978, Balikumbat, under a new Fon, resorted to armed struggle in order to regain control over the longdisputed area around the “T- junction”. This desire by the new Fon of Balikumbat degenerated into a war which could have claimed several lives, if not for the timely intervention of the then DO of Ndop, Oben Peter Ashu, who successfully brought the two communities to leave harmoniously until the advent of the 1990s episodes. The government equally stepped in to solve the farmer-grazier problem that erupted in Aghem in 1967. One of the very attempts made by the Government to resolve the crisis in the locality began in 1969. The Wum Area Council (WAC), in collaboration with the veterinary department, established cattle committee guides in 1969.606 The commission was in charge of receiving complaints from both parties. The matter was again channelled to the Sub Inspector for Settlement the preceding year. In this regard, the commission was also to inspect and assess damaged farms and report any grazier or farmer who defaulted on any obligation levied by the sub inspector as demonstrated in Chapter Two. The major challenge of the cattle committee guides was to ease the work of the administration in resolving conflicts. This was in accordance with the application of the farmer/grazier law of October 3, 1962 and that of Decree N° 78/263 of July 3, 1978. According to the law, the inspector was responsible for determining 605

C.J. Anyeh, p.22. Divisional Archives Wum (DAW), file N° DWM/754, 31 January 1969, Facts and figures about Menchum Division.

606

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and setting aside land for agro-pastoral activities while the decree was out to organise the method of regulating Farmer-Grazier disputes in respective areas in Cameroon. One of the 1962 laws related to the inter-tribal boundary settlement commission went operational in 1973 when the Nseke (the first Governor of the then North-West Province Cameroon) Commission delimited agropastoral lands. The demarcation scheme separated farming and grazing areas for the purpose of preventing crises between farmers and graziers in the clan. The early measures taken by the administration to resolve the farmer-grazier problem were good, though graziers rejected the proposed boundaries.607 Despite the defeats, the attempt was an important step by the government to resolve the perennial problems. Another step taken by government was to put in place the promulgation of the tenure law. The law spelled out rules governing land tenure law in Cameroon.608 Before that law, land did belong to the indigenes of Wum and their local chiefs (Fons). Somebody could obtain land either directly from the Fon or chief who were leaders of the clan, or indirectly through local representatives.609 The enactment of this land law, it was believed, would enable the administration to better handle farmer/grazer problem in Cameroon in general, and in Wum in particular. This law embarked traditional and administrative authorities on educational and sensitization tours. This consisted of demarcations of farming and grazing land. But natives thought it was government machinery to expropriate their land to give to Mbororo graziers. The law of 1962 remained in effect until 1975 when a presidential decree N° 78/263 of July 3, 1978, was passed establishing the terms and conditions for settling the farmer–grazier problems as earlier cited in the above paragraph. The 1972 law became necessary due to the number of complaints filed with regards to the farmer–grazier boundary conflicts and crops destroyed by cattle. Hence, the 1978 decree was another step by the government to seek a lasting solution to the problem in Cameroon in general, and Menchum in particular. The law clearly spelled out the methods and conditions of arbitrating the farmer–grazier conflicts in Cameroon as a whole by stipulating the forming of a consultative commission.610 Article 2 of the law stipulated that the board should ensure 607

Interview with Pa Dze Clement Kum, Gheidze-Wum, May 27th 2007. Gabriel Mbock, 2000, pp.93-96. 609 Ibid. 610 The consultative Commission is a replica of the commission envisaged in article 12, Decree N° 76/166 of 27 April, fixing the methods of land tenure over the national territory. 608

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that both farmers and graziers respect the boundaries demarcated. This order was another significant step put forward by the administration in seeking a lasting solution to the persistent conflict. This was a good mechanism, but some administrators failed to apply it effectively. Due to the above failure, the ministerial order N° 58/MINAGRI of August 13, 1981, outlined compensation rate for crops destroyed by livestock. The purpose was to determine cost on damaged crops. This ministerial order was another good effort, but what remained questionable was its effective implementation. Between 2002 and 2005, a series of commissions, prefectural and sub-prefectural orders were issued as a means of solving the differences. On February 12th, 2004, the report of Governor Koumpa Issa’s Provincial commission of inquiry was made public in Wum. It became law as per the provisions of Article 4 of Decree N0 263 of July 3, 1978. In fact, the main points of Governor Koumpa Issa’s report of 2004 were basically the same as those of the Nseke commission in 1973. Laws are what they are; the responsibility of implementing those lies in the hands of the Governor’s subordinates, notably SDOs and Divisional Officers. Thus, government efforts to arrest the perennial disputes were good, but remained inapplicable. This explains why the conflict persisted over the years till March-April 2005 when the chairman of the Wum Agro-Pastoral Commission with some elites of the area revisited the zone set by the commission to reallocate farmers and graziers in respective quarters in Wum Central.611 Since then, no major confrontation between the Aghem people and the entire Mbororo community in the said locality was registered. Concerning the Oku-Mbesa conflict, Mbesa belongs administratively to Belo Sub-division in Boyo Division, while Oku is a Sub-division in Bui Division. The administrative authorities were expected to provide a final solution to the conflict as well as to improve cordiality among the two communities. During the first war of 1982, the forces of law and order reacted first by stationing at the disputed region of Ibalichim to make sure that both camps stop the fighting and respect the injunction order. According to my informants, priority was given to collaboration rather than to hostilities. The administration, during the early stages of the conflict, provided relentless efforts to curb tension and establish a brotherly relationship between the two villages. This act was, however, considered as peace-marking rather than peace-building.612 A critical study of the end of this period will show that the two villages had grievances against each other 611 612

Interview with Ewi née Kang Elezabeth, Naikom-Wum, May 22th, 2007. Interview with Laura Naddin Ngwa, Bamenda, June 28th 2008.

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for a lasting solution was not attained. This explains the fact that though the traditional leaders and the government spent time working for peace, much was still to be done. In line with the above observations, the Ministry of Territorial Administration began to re-trace the Jeffrey’s map work in a map on June 26, 1982. This map did not satisfy the Oku community who petitioned the colonial boundary on February 3rd, 1986.613 This petition received the attention of the government in many ways. This was in most cases done through visits of government officials to Oku and Mbesa. The Governor, Abouem Achuoi David, and the then Minister of Territorial Administer of Territorial Administration, Ayissi Mvondo, were to provide a suitable solution after the war and establish peace among the two communities (but this was not achieved). There were regular visits by the Divisional Officers of Fundong to Mbesa and Jakiri to Oku (since Oku was still a district under Jakiri Sub-division till 1992). During these visits, an injunction order was passed over the disputed area, but was never respected by both communities. The main reasons behind this failure were that the disputed land was the main farming area for the two communities, so they had difficulties living without their farms, and also the government was too slow to provide a lasting solution to the issue. Some gestures in the form of financial contributions were made by both communities with the aim of solving their territorial claims. The then Governor of the North-West Province, Walson Ntuba signed Order No. 0939/PD/GNW/55/S.G/BA on the 10th of April 1982 appointing different commissions614 including one in charge of retracing and demarcating the boundary between the two communities. Over 70 law officers were stationed in Mbesa and in Ibalichim-Oku to monitor the construction or demarcating exercise of a local boundary between these two communities. The Jeffrey’s map of 1942 was used as reference for the problem at hand.615 After the 1988 confrontation, serious attempts were made by the government to solve the problem. The main pillars were erected in the following quarters: Balasang, Ntimati, Ndong-Ebinsih and Ndong-Tucatih in an attempt to demarcate the boundary between the two communities of Oku and Mbesa. The first phase of the demarcation exercise failed after the Oku people claimed that a wrong map was used and subsequently, destroyed the pillars. The commission and the officers did not visit the scene anymore, 613

S. Wambeng Nshom: Inter- tribal boundaries settlement ordinance 49 of 1933, p.3. 614 Ibid, p.3. 615 Interview with Ngum Martin Yong, Ndop, 20 October 2004.

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and the land demarcation between these two communities stopped prematurely. It should be noted that the rest of the cement that was to complete the building of the remaining boundary markers got spoilt. In Mbesa, it was claimed that the 1988 conflict amplified because Fai Yengo Francis, the then Senior Divisional Officer of Menchum Division, was from Oku, so he was hardly impartial on the matter. So they believed that their reports forwarded to the government to express their plight did not go through because the Senior Divisional Officer was a native of Oku.616 It was in this regard that the Ministry of Environment, under the banner of Kilum/ Idjim Mountain Forest, carved out a reserved area of the forest in question and considered it a co-conservative zone. The place was called a sanctuary. Now, both the Mbesa and Oku claimed that the forest belonged to them. As time passed, both communities became eager to farm over the disputed area at Embel. This act, coupled with other socio-economic factors, gave way to inter-community confrontation barely 19 years after the previous one. It was after the 2007 confrontations that the Cameroon administration took the matter seriously, partly due to the fact that both communities, especially Mbesa, suffered serious material damages. This exercise began with the then North-West Governor Koumpa Issa, Who, considering the need for peaceful co-existence between the inhabitants of Mbesa in Boyo Division and Oku in Bui Division, ordered that a Provincial Commission comprising some administrative Officers was instituted to examine and resolve the boundary dispute between Oku and Mbesa. In this regard, a commission for the examination and resolution of the boundary dispute between Oku and Mbesa was constituted. Its members included the Governor or his representative as the chairman, the Provincial Delegate of Land Tenure, the Provincial Delegate of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Provincial Delegate of Animal Breeding and Industries Bamenda, the Provincial Chief of Surveys, the Provincial Chief of Service, State lands, the SDOs and DOs of the two communities, the two Fons with four (4) of their notables, the mayors and one religious person from Mbesa and one from Oku.617 In this regard, the said commission, under Article 2 was supposed to meet at the instance of the chairman, and, thereafter, proceed to the fields for examination and demarcation of the boundaries. Article 3 required that the immediate expenses of the Commission should be borne by the contesting parties and the Councils concerned. In Article 4, the report of the 616

Interview with Ngum Martin Yong. Provincial Order No. 000079/PD/E/GNW.CG.30/SG/LA, Appointing Members of a Provincial Commission to examine and demarcate the boundaries between Mbessa (Boyo Division) and Oku (Bui Division), Bamenda, 29 March 2007.

617

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afore-mentioned Commission was to be submitted in six copies to His Excellency the Governor for further action. And finally, Article 5 required that the present Order be registered, published and communicated wherever and whenever necessary.618 As time passed, a final report by the Provincial Commission in charge of retracing and demarcating the boundary between Oku and Mbesa deliberated its final verdicts on how to carry out the demarcation exercise. In execution of Provincial Order No. 000079, PD/GNW/CG/ p.30/SG/LA of March 29, 2007, the members of the commission effectively carried out the retracing exercise from the 1st to the 5th of June 2007. Fieldwork proper was preceded by a working session meant to put into place the methodology of work and consult the necessary working documents with Dr Jeffrey’s maps of 1942. The parties presented the following two documents to the commission: a) A copy of Dr. M.D.W Jeffrey’s 1942 Bikom/Oku tribal boundary map. b) A copy of an extract of the above map retracing the boundary between Oku and Mbesa, carried out by the 1988 commission. Upon the observation of both documents, the commission concluded that M.D.W Jeffrey’s 1942 Bikom/Oku tribal boundary map was a more reliable document to be used. The commission’s observation was buttressed by the instructions of the Honourable Minister of Territorial Administration contained in his message No. 954/MTLX/ MINAT/IGAT of July 6, 1989, indicating that only Jeffrey’s 1942 Bikom/Oku tribal boundary map should be used in retracing the Oku/Mbesa tribal boundary. In this regard, the sole document used in the 2007 and 2008 retracing and demarcation exercise respectively was thus M.D.W Jeffrey’s tribal boundary map as updated in the 2007-8 Oku/Mbesa tribal boundary showed in Map 9.

618

Provincial Order No. 000079/PD/E/GNW.CG.30/SG/LA, 29 March 2007.

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Chapter Six Map 9: Tribal Boundary between Oku and Mbesa following the 2007 Provincial Order

Source: Provincial Chief of Service Surveys, North West Province, 7 June 2007.

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It should be noted that the demarcating exercise, which was carried out from the 14th to the 18th of July 2008, was placed this time under the Chairmanship of Governor Abakar Ahamat who had taken command from Governor Koumpa Issa since December 10, 2007. In an attempt to reinforce the above efforts to demarcate the disputed area, the Governor of the NorthWest Region forwarded regular confidential letters to the Minister of State, Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization about any latest events in the area concerned. In the Press/Radio communiqué of July 28, 2008, accompanied with a confidential letter (feedback) to the Minister of Territorial Administration, the North West Governor, Abakar Ahamat, briefed that the planting of the boundary pillars had completed the legal and physical efforts deployed by the State to bring peace to the brotherly communities. However, to ensure lasting peace and attain total reconciliation, much effort will be required from members of the Oku and Mbesa communities who must leave behind the memories of their repeated confrontations that had bereaved them on several occasions in the last fifty years. The role of their friends and neighbours in this enterprise of reconciliation is not an easy one. In fact, these actors are called upon to use every conceivable forum to bring the natives of Oku and Mbesa to live again like brothers as history tells us.619 The Governor made use of this occasion to draw the attention of all stakeholders of the Oku-Mbesa saga to the fact that any attempt by whosoever and under whatever circumstances to distort the government’s objective to bring peace in that part of the province will not be tolerated. Rather, any such attempt will be phased out with appropriate administrative, judicial and penal sanctions to ensure that peace reigns permanently between these two communities.620 Finally, the good auspices of State institutions remain very available in case of any social misunderstandings that may crop up between the two communities anytime in the future. In other words, by carrying out this exercise, the government intends to hurl the perpetrators of violence, disorder and disrespect of the rule of law. (Plate 16 illustrates the 2008 demarcation exercise.) It was, however, regrettable that as time went on, the people of the Fondoms of Oku and Mbesa did not completely accept the work done by the 2007/8 retracing commission. This explains why the area in dispute had been characterised by sporadic attacks from both sides. Governor 619 620

Press/Radio Communiqué, No. 466/L/E/GNW.54/SG, of July 28th 2008. Ibid.

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Plate 16: The Demarcation Exercise, July (2008)

B

A

D

E

G

C

F

H

Source: Data collected from Jacob Feghang, one of the technical team leaders, November 2008. Note: The plates illustrate in A: First assistant SDO of Bui (left), DO of Belo Subdivision (middle) and first assistant SDO of Boyo (right) and some security

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forces concerting. B: Technical team getting set for field work. C: Women supplying sand and gravel for the construction of Cains. D: Security forces deployed from Bamenda and Nkambe. E: Technical construction of a Cain. F: Mayor of Oku (part of administrative team) posed on Cain. G: Cain one. H: Cain 5.

Abakar Ahamat’s commission did not provide a lasting solution to the Oku-Mbesa ethnic strife. This then explains why there was the need for another peace-making episode from the Cameroon Government during the reign of current Governor, Adolphe Lele Lafrique. In fact, the Oku and Mbesa Fondoms have suffered pain, hardship and lost family members in the long-lasting conflict. It was against this backdrop that the North-West Governor Adolphe Lele Lafrique paid a visit to Mbesa on Thursday April 21st 2016. He is the first Governor to visit Mbesa since the conflict started over 30 years ago. This visit had in attendance over 450 women and 100 men of Mbesa alongside the traditional and administrative authorities of Oku and Mbesa.621 They all assembled at the Mbesa Community Hall to seek a lasting solution to the boundary dispute and demarcation in an attempt to give peace and tranquility a chance after the difficulties they encountered in 2007/8. The Governor’s working visit came just a day after the Fon of Mbesa led a delegation to Oku to discuss ways to end the conflict. Besides, his visit followed a public manifestation initiated by over 250 Mbesa women aged between 25 to 70 years who planned to walk from Mbesa to the Governor’s office in Bamenda The women were finally intercepted by the Governor in Babanki, Tubah Sub-division, since he got the news and did not want them to reach Bamenda. The women’s objective was to table a petition and their grievances to the Governor about sporadic attacks by some persons from Oku on the Mbesa community members in their farms.622 The Governor collected the messages and the petition they had, and ordered for vehicles to carry them back to Mbesa while promising to channel the issue to the hierarchy for a prompt solution. In the aftermath of the peaceful public manifestation, a high-level consultative peace meeting was held in 2016 at the Mbesa Multipurpose Hall. In attendance were the Senior Divisional Officers (SDOs) of Bui (Nzeki Theophile) and Boyo (Oum II Joseph), the Mayors and Divisional Officers (DOs) of Oku and Belo, the Fons of Oku and Mbesa villages and 621

Regional News, “Mbesa, Oku should build a peaceful atmosphere-Governor”, Cameroon-tribune, Wednesday, 27 April 2016, in www.camerounweb.com/.../Mbesa-Oku-should-build-a-peace, consulted on 12 November 2018. 622 Ibid.

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a cream of members of their traditional councils. The historic nature of this meeting is seen in the fact that in over 30 years, this was the first time a Fon of Oku was visiting the Mbesa village. The over three-hour meeting witnessed frank and open discussions aimed at establishing sustainable peace. Four of the Community’s Initiative for Sustainable Development (COMINSUD) peace volunteers were also able to participate. Key resolutions from this meeting as agreed by all the stakeholders were that: x The people in the disputed land boundary area should shun violence and remain calm for the governor and a regional technical team that will visit the area in the period ahead to demarcate the boundaries of the two communities; x More exchange visits between the Oku and Mbesa communities will be carried out to ensure continuous dialogue and sustainable peace; x Necessary traditional rites should be carried out by the Fons to enforce peaceful decisions and dialogue.623 The event offered a moment for the Mayors of Belo and Elak municipalities, Tosam Bernard and Njioh Jerome Ngum, as well as their Majesties Gilbert Njong of Mbesa and Sintieh II of Oku to move peace and reconciliation efforts forward. “Let us co-exist and not see land to slow our progress and development” was the message that emerged from each of the speakers. The tone for field work was set when the Governor spoke to the works Commission on the strength of Provincial Order No. 00007/ PD/E/GNW. CG.30/SG/LA of March 29, 2007. An endorsement Order of August 28, 2008 by the then Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MINATD) matters when Commission members later proceeded to the disputed area for work with the Governor and urged the population to avoid derailing the commission. The Governor stressed that demarcation work was not meant to separate Oku and Mbesa people, but that the two communities had to emerge from the process with a new spirit as people with a common origin. He saluted initial peace building initiatives by the Fons of Oku and Mbesa which paved the way for the Administration

623

Community Initiative for Sustainable Development (COMINSUD) Report, Posted on April 26, 2016, “A commission set up to demarcate the boundary between Mbesa and Oku village”.

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to foster reconciliation efforts with the materialization of work on the boundary.624 The Governor insisted, unlike his predecessors, that Cameroon is a State of Law, would protect every citizen wherever they live. He insisted that it was possible that after demarcating the boundary, an Oku native could be left to reside on the side of Mbesa and vice-versa. If this was the case, this person would have to continue settling there because the laws and regulations of the country granted them the right to obtain a land title wherever they settle. The new found spirit of collaboration between the Fons of Oku and Mbesa is an inspiration for their populations to co-exist as a people with a common origin. Besides that, nobody can be buried along with a piece of land and so, Oku and Mbesa should focus on building a peaceful atmosphere to foster the livelihoods of their people instead of creating tension that slows their efforts towards progress and development.625 Besides the part played by the government, others peace advocates also contributed for peace building in this arena. It is in this light that the part played by traditional authorities and institutions was equally examined in building peace in the communities concerned.

b. The Role of Traditional Authorities and Institutions Considering the fact that quarrels and struggles are inevitable in any given society, people must seek ways by which their problems can be solved. In the course of investigation, we found out in the various cases of land and boundary conflicts that we have discussed that the people interviewed used traditional methods of handling issues. At times, when the situation got intensified, traditional organizations or institutions came in to assist the administration in handling them. The resolution of conflicts between chiefdoms or traditional authorities in the North-West Region is not different from that among the Suku of the Republic of Congo. “The settlement of inter-lineage conflicts, including capital offence, is entirely an internal matter, and it is achieved through the consensus of lineage elders whose authority is ‘mystically’ sanctioned”.626 Here, the elders are used as 624 Choves Loh, “North West: Governor Wades into Mbesa, Oku boundary Dispute”,

in Cameroon tribune, 25 April 2016. M. Ambe Bruno, “Historic action by Oku and Mbessa Communities in seeking peace”, in Cameroon tribune, 4 March 2016. 626 Ignore Kopytoff, 1961, “Extension of Conflict as a method of Conflict Resolution among the Suku of the Congo”, in, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. No. 1, pp.6169. 625

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agents of mediation and reconciliation. One would have easily expected the conflict to be handled in a traditional fashion, for each of the chiefdoms has a traditional council which takes care of the various problems they face. The resolution of conflicts between family members and even between neighbours was the responsibility of the traditional council. In most of the communities, the body that disciplines or sanctions conflicting parties is known as quifor, kwifor or kwifon. But this was not the case with our respective cases, due to neglect and influence of the colonial and post-colonial administrations. There were mechanisms put in place for the settlement of conflicts and for redressing the injuries caused: Chiefs, accompanied by councillors, visited each other, or, when relations were tense between them, they met together halfway between their chiefdoms. The Fons of Mankon and Bafut met that way a few times, to challenge each other, threaten and negotiate, while their people were fighting, until eventually a common oath was taken by the two parties. A great friendship existed before the colonial period, between the chief of Mbu and the Fon of Mankon.627

It is in this sphere that we must relate that before the advent of hostilities, the communities in question were living in some degree of harmony as earlier presented. This was the case between the Aghem people and the Mbororo recent settlers, between Oku and Mbesa among others. There was union between the two communities as discussed within their context. In the case of Oku and Mbesa, there was a regular exchange of visits, especially at the level of kwifons. During special ceremonies such as death celebrations, traditional dances from both communities took active part. But since the land conflict began, these activities have come to a standstill for there are no more formal exchanges of visits. Using the background above, we shall examine the efforts of the various traditional leaders in conflict resolution in times of land conflict, especially during post-colonial era. In 1947, the traditional rulers of Wum, in accord with Major Walters, the then Resident Colonial Administrator, agreed to host the Fulani nomadic group in the community. Following the grazing law of 1947, Ardo Umaru had the responsibility of instructing new Fulani nomads entering the clan on the land tenure system.628 The law stipulated that each grazier was 627 J-P. Warnier, 1975, Pre-colonial Mankon: the Development of Cameroon Chiefdom in its Regional Setting, Xerox, University Micofilms, pp.398-399. 628 Provincial Archives Bamenda (PAB), File B. 3152 Vol. II, Mbororo Grazing Rights NW/GLA.

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to have both grazing and transit permits issued by the Native Authority in Bamenda, and that graziers would be prosecuted if they were caught trespassing with their cattle. The Ardo of Wum was to assist the Native Authority to effect the lawful arrest of any grazier who dishonoured the grazing law.629 This was the idea put in place by the then colonial administration at the eve of the independence of Cameroon. Both traditional authorities in Wum Central were, therefore, expected to peacefully resolve any agro-pastoral differences before making it known to the post-colonial administrators only when the parties concerned were at prolonged logger-heads. Significant efforts were always made by these leaders to maintain peace and harmony before the advent of administrative decisions on land rights throughout the national territory. It was in this line of thought that Wallang Mbong I and Bah Mbi II, all paramount rulers of the Aghem clan, and Ardo Umaru deployed significant efforts in settling agro-pastoral differences in Wum when required. Both community leaders had been mutually cooperating with the seal of building peace and harmony between the two ethnic groups. The method these leaders initiated at first to bring peaceful co-existence was through meetings, encouraged by the successive Governors of the then North-West Province. This idea went a long way to reduce growing tension between the farmers and graziers.630 Unfortunately in 1990 and 1992, tension rose when the two pragmatic mediators Ardo Umaru and Bah Mbi III could not reach mutual entente as their predecessors always did. This explains why between 1990 and 2005, there has been growing animosity between the two communities. But what remains clear is that the leaders had agreed to the effective application of the 1973 Nseke (the first Governor of the then North-West Province) resolution commission based on collective efforts by both traditional leaders of the area and the administration to resolve differences peacefully. As a result of persistent agro-pastoral differences in Wum Central, the Fons of Aghem, in a meeting on October 24, 2003, decided to reiterate the decision of 1943, which followed a series of consultations between the colonial administration, among whom Major Walters, and Aghem Traditional Rulers. Some elites equally attended, and under the leadership of Dengkeghem and Bahmbi I, the following areas were selected for the settlement of cattle in Aghem: Kesu, Waindo, Zongofu, Mbo’o Mbulom, Tiemuambo and Kanye, all in Wum Central. This initiative by the Aghem traditional rulers was followed by an administrative decision to appeal strongly 629 630

Ibid. Interview with Ardo Sule Dicko, Gheidze-Wum, 24th May 2007.

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to the authorities for the sake of peace in Wum Sub-division. In this regard, cattle owners were asked to move their cattle to the above-mentioned areas with immediate effect, thus complying with Decree No. 78-263, Article 4, reinforced by Prefectural Orders Nos. 142/2002 of December 19, 2002 and 144/2002 of December 31st, 2002.631 The inability to maintain the above decisions, coupled with the Aghem women sit-down strike at the Divisional Office brought together all the Aghem chiefs and Ardos, accompanied by some co-opted members in charge of conflict resolution to carry out several field trips from March 31st to April 7th, 2005. It is equally during this period of difficulty that the commission executed the recommendations of the Provincial Commission of Inquiry into the perpetual agro-pastoral conflicts in Wum Sub-division on February 9th, 2004. This was ordered by the North West Provincial Governor, causing the removal of cattle from farmlands the owners of which were already known.632 Despite all these efforts recorded by the Aghem chiefs and Ardos to maintain peace in the area, much was still to be done by the government with some peace advocates in the area to build up a lasting solution. Regarding the case of Oku and Mbesa, during the conflicts, traditional authorities (the Fons and their auxiliaries or subordinates among whom quarter heads, Fai and Nchindas), in collaboration with the local authorities (mayors and councillors), were very preoccupied with resolving the conflicts at their outbreak. The traditional authorities from the onset had eased government efforts to provide a lasting solution to the conflict. Before petitions reached the administrative authorities, they were initiated and drafted by quarter-heads or Fons. As documents have proven, various letters and petitions were often pending at the various administrative units despite the methods used by government officials to address such appeals from the various Fons.633 In some cases, the government officials would arrive at the conflict scene after getting updates from traditional authorities on the situation between the two communities. We noticed, for instance, during our research, that local or traditional diplomacy was less active during the post-colonial period, and specifically during the era under study. However, apart from reporting the issues to the government, these traditional authorities from Oku and Mbesa collectively, acted as witnesses to the various decisions taken on the conflict area despite some degree of disagreement at times. From all administrative sources consulted, agreements were always signed by the two traditional 631

C. Fung Nchia, 2006, p.58. (DAW), Reference, 107/C/E28-01/GW/27/859, Maintenance of Status in Wum, 18 April 2005. 633 Interview with Fon Nsetieh II, Elak-Oku, July 14th 2008. 632

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leaders and notables who constituted members of the inquiring commissions set by the government. But it is regrettable that these agreements were always violated by the inhabitants of the communities at times with the collaboration of their Fons.634 This explains why the numerous “injunction orders” were repeatedly violated at the disputing area of Embel. Following the report of Tekum Mathew, head of the December 17th, 1982 regional delegation for the settlement of the Oku-Mbesa land dispute, the Governor of the then North-West Province used this avenue to remind the people of the role of the traditional rulers in governing their subjects and settling land disputes. He informed the population that these traditional rulers were to invoke their ancestors and perform certain rituals to settle disputes. He also said that this was going to be the first of its kind in the region and they (SDOs) were proud to host it first before it could be emulated.635 It was in this connection that the then Fon of Oku, Fon Sentieh, collaborated with his people to sort out an issue concerning a missing gun of a Gendarme from Jakiri after the 1988 confrontation. The missing gun was found at Tolon-Jikijem (Oku) where sources reported that the gun was in the keeping of some Oku women who deceived the said Gendarme from Jakiri and took away his firearm.636 Still in the same line of traditional diplomacy, we were reliably informed that after the first major confrontation, the various Fons exercised traditional rituals on the boundary line, invoking their ancestors to find a lasting solution and promising to maintain peace in this area. The report of the administrative officials stated that after their speeches, the Fons moved to a point called “Chuabug-e-soalam” where wine was poured from horns invoking their ancestors to assist in bringing peace in the area where the traditional boundary peace plant ‘Nkeng’ was planted.637 However, the seriousness of both traditional authorities and institutions at this moment did not go far to provide a lasting solution to the brotherly Fondoms till the advent of a new era. The Oku-Mbesa 2016/17 Reconciliation Deal After a series of inter-tribal wars between Oku and Mbesa that resulted in human losses and damaged properties, the consequences were unbearable on both sides. The findings from the investigation of this case show that Oku inflicted heavy damage on e Mbesa including human deaths, the 634

Interview with Sama Benjamin, Bamenda, July 2nd 2008. (PAB), File No.54/58/SG/DAJ/BCR/GNW, Boundary Disputes in Boyo, p.680. 636 Interview with Kfum Philemon, Ibalichim-Oku, 27 October 2004. 637 (PAB), File No.54/58/SG/DAJ/BCR/GNW. 635

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destruction of crops, and burned houses. The Oku community equally went through this pain, but the level of destruction of properties was not comparable to what happened in Mbesa. These destructions coupled with the sufferings of the populations went a long way to slow down any peace process amongst the two brotherly communities separated by war. From all these, there was absolute need for reconciliation. The reconciliation move began in the Oku Fon’s palace on April 20th, 2016 under the distinguished patronage of His Excellency Yang Philemon, the then Prime Minister Head of Government of the Republic of Cameroon, referred to by many as a “Peace crusader”. This same exchange visit took place at the Mbesa Fons Palace, once again under the distinguished patronage of His Excellency Yang Philemon, on February 22nd, 2017. Present in these occasions were the following dignitaries: His Royal Majesty Fon Sentieh IIof Oku, His Royal highness Fon Njong IIof Mbesa, HRM Shemn Mbinglo III, Paramount Fon of Nso, HRM the Fon of Kom, HRH the Fon of Din (Noni), HRH the Fon of Akeh, HRH the Fon of Lasin (Noni), HRH the Fon of Ajung, HRH the Fon of Achain, and all the thirdclass chiefs of Oku. On the administrative bench were His Excellency Lele Lafrigue, Governor of the North-West Region, Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) for Bui Zekei Theophile, the Divisional Officer (DO) for Bello Subdivision Nicolas Manchang who doubled at the time as the 2nd Assistant SDO for Boyo Division, the DO for Oku Sub-division Patrick Lienwoutue Pelukpou, the Lord Mayor of Elak Council Jerome Ngum Njioh, the Lord Mayor of Bello Council Bernard Tosam Nenghabi, and Hon. Member of Parliament Oku/Noni Special Constituency Tantoh Mngo Andrew Kwei. In the domain of cultural and development associations, were present the Oku Cultural and Development Association (OCDA) President Wilfred Keng Nshiom, and the Mbesa Development Association (MADA) President Augustine Gopte.638 On the 22nd of February 2017, the Oku people under the leadership of HRM Fon Sentieh II, arrived at the Mbesa Palace to seal the peace deal that was initiated on April 20th 2016 at the Oku Fon’s Palace. The occasion was marked by only two speeches from the natural representatives of the people, notably the Fons of Oku and Mbesa (Pictures 17 and 18 illustrate these peace processes in the two Fondoms). The Fon of Mbesa in his speech expressed satisfaction that at last, two brothers who were separated for a long time and who had everything in common, were able to commune again.

638

T. Taal Babeh, 2018, “The history of Oku: Recognizing your roots in a global and dynamic society”, draft document.

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Note: From the collective plates above, we can identify the various key advocates earlier mentioned, such as the former Prime Minister Philemon Yang together with the two Fons of Oku and Mbesa.

He said he was highly convinced that the problems that plagued the brotherly communities of Oku and Mbesa never would happen again in history. His words read thus: Truth, frank talk must be our objectives for a lasting solution to our problem. I think we should go back to the life our fore-fathers lived […]. I seize this opportunity to call on the village heads to always transmit authentic information to the Fons and the administration. I have a strong

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Note: This Plate illustrates the return visit paid by the Fon of Mbesa to the Fon of Oku. In this visit, he was accompanied by his entourage and some administrative officials from Boyo Division. We can equally notice the presence of some neighbouring traditional authorities on invitation who come to take part in the peace process activities in the Oku Fondom.

639 Words of Fon Njong II of Mbesa, captured from Timothy Taal Babeh, 4th Deputy Mayor Elak Council, November 2017.

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On his part, the Fon of Oku apologized to the people of Mbesa and acknowledged that Oku regretted the fact that the programmed visit to Mbesa on September 21, 2016 never took place due to some constraint beyond his capacity. In line with his brother of Mbesa, Fon Sentieh II called for unity and peace among the Oku and Mbesa Fondoms. However, he called on both parties to respect the traditional days (country Sunday) of the Fondoms wherever they find themselves. He pointed out that the visit was highly traditional and that brighter days were to be expected from the traditional exchange. In his words, he said: I appreciate my brother the Fon of Mbesa and the Mbesa population for the patience, we are here for peace and we have to celebrate our relationship as brotherly and friendly Fondoms. I wish to signal here sincerely that this return visit is purely and essentially traditional. Peace is necessary for everything positive […]. I called on you to respect the traditional days that farming is not authorized in both Fondoms, for if we do, we shall harvest much for ourselves, our children and for our neighbours.640

From this perspective, it shall be necessary to examine the efforts of religious authorities coupled with the activities of some civil society groups in resolving land conflicts in the North-West Region.

c. Religious Authorities and Institutions Like other peace builders, the involvement of religious authorities and institutions had gone a long way to open dialogue with the warring camps. It should be reminded here that religion helps in maintaining social order, and can also be an instrument of change, sometimes even of revolution. It is because of this that Christian authorities had hardly silent concerning the above conflicts. In 1996, the Catholic Bishops of Cameroon wrote a pastoral letter in which they appealed to Christians and all men and women to abandon tribalism and ethnic discrimination, and tolerate each other in these words: To you, leaders of political parties: accept that your socio-political thought is only your opinion. The other person may be correct. That is why it is important to enter into dialogue with them. To you, who harbour hatred against those who are not from your ethnic group, from your religion of the country, or from your political

640

Words of Fon Sentieh II of Oku, captured from T. Taal Babeh.

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Chapter Six party, as well as to you who preach division; know that you are the greatest enemy to national unity. Change your hearts. To you, parents, the first educators of your children and of the youth of the country, prepare the future of our nation; do all in your power to inculcate in your children the virtues of honesty, of sharing, of tolerance and especially of charity towards others, irrespective of their ethnic or regional origin. (Paragraph 11-13).641

The Bishops said it all. Ethnic prejudice has bedevilled man’s attempt to live in harmony with man. The Church thus tried to heal the wounds of division, build bridges of unity and free man from bias and discrimination. In this regard, the Church struggled to acknowledge the fact that ethnic and cultural diversities were precious to the society. In this connection, His Lordship Cornelius Fontem Esua created the Kumbo Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission as a pastoral structure on May 23, 1996 by circular Letter KD/ A1-3/96/14. This commission was involved in resolving the conflicts between communities in the Diocese, with a particular focus on areas such as Djottin, Buh, Mbiimm, Ngiptang, Nkor, and Elak (Oku), all found in Bui Division. Seminars took place in Djottin, Nkor and Elak. In these seminars, it was stressed that only the traditional rulers and the administration were reliable agents to solve the various conflicts between communities thus, indirectly shifting the responsibilities to the Cameroon Government. With reference to the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo conflict, the Catholic Christians of Bambui, Bambili and Babanki-Tungo Parishes set up a Christian Justice and Peace Commission after the 1996 confrontation. Other Christian denominations such as the Baptists and the Presbyterians in Tubah Sub-division were also actively involved. The objective of the Commission was to seek a Christian solution to the protracted conflict. The exercise was carried out with seriousness and dedication, as acknowledged by the Archbishop of Bamenda. In a letter of thanks addressed to the President of the Christian Justice and Peace Commission dated April 8th, 1999, the Archbishop appreciated the the invaluable contribution of the Commission in assisting the authorities in finding a lasting solution to the boundary problem between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo.642 However, the Commission did what it could, and it was then left for the competent authorities (government officials) to act on the findings of the said Commission.

641 642

(PAB), File No.54/58/SG/DAJ/BCR/GNW, Boundary Disputes in Boyo, p.75. Interview with Rev. Father Fonkwa Hyacinth, Bambui, June 21st 2008.

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It should be noted that the Christian Justice and Peace Commission painstaking and judicious study of the problem and the carrying out of the detailed investigation for over three years (April 1996 to June 1999) came out with a report which confirmed the Westmacott’s Decision on the demarcation of the two communities. The people of Bambili, therefore, accepted the report for the following reasons: (a) The Christian Justice and Peace Commission had painstakingly and judiciously studied the matter for over three years. (b) The Commission sought and obtained documents from appropriate sources to support their decisions. (c) The operating tool in the Commission’s arbitration is peace based on justice. (d) The commission’s decision as to the boundary between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo is in line with the letter and spirit of the Westmacott’s decision accepted by both parties in 1973. (e) The two communities had fought and hated each other for a long time, it was their ardent wish to put this longstanding dispute behind for ever. (f) Without peace, there has been little or no development in the two villages. In fact, the development which was achieved out by both villages was largely destroyed by inter-village conflict over the years.643 It was on the basis of the above findings that the people of Bambili sketched references to the Christian Justice and Peace Commission as one of the most reliable peace mediators in an attempt to resolve the longawaited territorial dispute between the above-mentioned communities. In the same light, the decision of the Divisional Officer, R.C. Ward of September 8th, 1956 returned to Bambili some of the land which the Babanki-Tungo had illegally acquired, and directed the natives of Babanki who were living on the Bambili side to stay if they wished, but would have to pay their taxes to the Fon of Bambili. The decision by Resident A.B. Westmacott of May 15th, 1958, which modified R.C. Ward’s decision on the grounds, was considered by the Babanki-Tungo as one sided. As such, an agreement was made between the Fons of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo dated May 25th, 1973. Besides these traditional leaders, the Land’s Officer, the Administration and one 643

(JPC), Report from Justice and Peace Commission after the final findings of the Bambili-Babanki-Tungo Land Dispute, Bamenda 23rd February, 2000.

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notable each from Bambili (S.N. Kindo) and Babanki Tungo (B.N. Mukong) partook in the agreement. This agreement stipulated that both villages accepted the Westmacott Decision. Moreover, the map retrieved by the Christian Justice and Peace Commission from the archives of the Bamenda Provincial Surveys with transferred reference from Provincial Surveys Buea was similar to the one produced by the Fon of Bambili.644 Concerning the Balikumbat versus Bafanji conflict, the Catholic, Baptist and the Presbyterian Christians from both communities did attend meetings together when the conflicts were at the processing phase. These points are very important for gestures like these are instruments for and factors of reconciliation. Viktor E. Frank has been quick to notice the role religion plays in shaping people to be tolerant. His words, according to Gregory Cheo Ngwa, have a profound meaning of tolerance and community living in master dissertation: “Hunger, humiliation, fear and deep anger at injustice are rendered tolerable by closely guarded images of beloved persons, by religion, by a grim sense of humour, and even by glimpses of the healing beauties of nature […] a tree or sunset”.645 It is in this direction that the priests in the various areas of conflict encouraged the people to pray for peace. In fact, prayer for peace by Saint Francis of Assisi was said daily in the Churches of the Archdiocese of Bamenda when the conflicts in the area under study were gaining more impetus in the 1990s and early 2000s. This prayer went thus, Lord, make me an instrument of peace. Where there is hatred, let me sow love, Where there is injury, pardon, Where there is doubt, faith, Where there is despair, life, Where there is darkness, light, Where there is sadness, joy. O Divine Master, grant that I may never seek to be consoled as to console, To be understood, as to understand, To be loved, as to love, For it is in pardoning that we are pardoned, In giving that we receive, And in dying that we are brought to life.646

644

(JPC), Report from Justice and Peace Commission. Frank Victor E., 1998, Man’s Search for Meaning, (Translated by Ilse Lasch), Bandra, Better Yourself Books, p.10. 646 As quoted by Rev. Father Gregory Cheo Ngwa. 645

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In the case of Oku and Mbesa, religious authorities were not quiet either. Religion was noted in these communities as an important factor of social integration and general wellbeing of the society. After all, it was the duty of men of God to ensure that peace reigns among their parishioners. The religious groups in Mbesa and Oku have tried over the years to help solve the conflict between the two communities. For instance, Christians of the different denominations of Oku as well as those of Mbesa contributed food to help the victims of the conflict following the different confrontations. As far as the Catholic Church is concerned, the Mbesa branch, following internal organisation, was placed under the Oku Parish at Elak probably because Mbesa is more accessible to Oku than to the Fuli Kom Parish. When the major conflict broke out, the people of Mbesa boycotted the Oku Parish for the Fuli Kom Parish. On May 22nd, 2002, His Grace Paul Verdzekov, the Archbishop of Bamenda, officially opened Mbesa as a Parish. The Christians saw that the problem could be resolved by appealing primarily to the consciences of the people with children. Then the Cadets of Mary of Mbesa visited those of Oku. The visit was peaceful and no problem was reported. The Mass Servants did the same and visited their brothers in the Oku Parish. The Cadets of Oku and Mass Servants of Oku also decided to visit those of Mbesa.647 It should be noted that the idea behind these counter visits were for both communities to forget about the aged periods of war between them. Equally, when war broke out in February 2007, some religious authorities, notably Rev. Father Anthony Viban, the Parish Priest of St. Agnes Parish Mbesa, assisted by the present Justice and Peace Commission at the Bamenda Archbishop Diocese, initiated peace talks. At this time, the Priest was obviously at the war front to witness the damages scored in Mbesa community. It was after seeing the destruction and suffering that the priest devoted all his time to record and talk to the people at war.648 Rev. Father Anthony Viban and Justice and Peace Commission from Bamenda have been more concerned with post war effects. In this regard, the Rev. Father acted as the most reliable mediator since he had all the necessary facilities to move on to the disputed area to calm down the warring camps. In this light, it should be noted that Mbesa at that moment (and till date) was relatively inaccessible by roads. The motorbikes are the main engines patrolling the area. The general telecommunication system in that area is a call for concern as access to mobile communication is sporadic 647

Interview with Helman Gofla, Elak-Oku, 24th June 2008. (JPC), Report on the Oku/ Mbesa war, presented by the Justice and Peace Commission of St. Agnes’ Parish, Mbesa, Archdiocese of Bamenda, to the Archdiocese Coordinator of Justice and Peace, Sunday, 18th February, 2007.

648

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in Mbesa. The assignment of contacting government officials during the crises was thus left to the Man of God “the priest”.649 When fight erupted, the Parish Priest was the mediator between the two groups on the battlefront and the administration. It was thanks to this role that he was able to alert the Sub-divisional headquarters (of Belo) and some stakeholders for an immediate solution of the on-going crisis in Mbesa. According to the Parish Priest, it was at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday February 13th, 2007, that he received a phone call from his curate Reverend Father, Dominique Mbarta, informing him that war had broken out between Mbesa and Oku, and that his attention was needed back in the Parish. He then immediately alerted the attention of the Archbishop of Bamenda, Most Rev. Mgr. Cornelius Fontem Esua. When he arrived at the Parish that same day (Tuesday February 13th, 2007 at about 5:30 p.m.), he inquired about the situation. He then went to see the Fon of Mbesa who told him that the people of Mbesa were in the farms uphill fighting against people from Oku. The Fon also said that he had sent one of his messengers to the Subdivisional Officer of Belo. Since it was not possible to get the phone numbers of the Senior Divisional Officer of Boyo and the Sub Divisional Officer of Belo, the Parish Priest alerted Hon. Philemon Yang, a son of Oku, and the then Governor of the North-West Region, Koumpa Issa, by phone. These were attempts to find a peaceful solution to the problem. Given that there was no telephone network, the Parish Priest of Mbesa could not get in contact with his colleague, the Parish Priest of Elak-Oku.650 On the morning of February 14th, the Parish Priest went uphill (to the battle field) to see the situation by himself, and, if possible, get the two parties to a cease-fire. As he located the people of Mbesa uphill, he could also see in a distance those from Oku. Going between the two camps, and being aware of the dangers of being shot, he could only wave his hands while shouting for a cease-fire and peace. Again, he called the attention of the then Governor of the North-west Province, Hon. Philemon Yang, the Archbishop of Bamenda, and Ni John Fru Ndi to intervene, as tension was high and urgent action was very necessary. At 3.30 p.m. he went to see the Quarter Head of Ibalichim in Oku. There, he found two elements of the Forces of Law and Order from Oku. After some dialogues with the Quarter Head and some dignitaries from the area, they all agreed that peace was what was needed. Then the Parish Priest of Mbesa made it clear that he was going back to the battlefield to preach that message of peace to the two 649 650

Interview with Laura Naddin Ngwa, Bamenda, June 28th 2008. Interview with Rev. Father Anthony Viban, Mbesa, May 20th 2008.

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camps. The women of Ibalichim wanted to take violent action against the man of God from Mbesa, but the Quarter Head, the Forces of Law and Order and some Elites of Ibalichim calmed the situation.651 The Priest then returned to Mbesa and went once more to the battlefield. This time he went as close as possible to talk to both parties. At a distance of less than one kilometre in full view of all the parties, he gave the message of a cease-fire to all the parties. The immediate reaction from the belligerents was gun shots over his head. According to him, someone from Oku shouted to him: “We have heard, go back!”. Then the priest left the place and came down from the hills at 7 p.m. where he met with the SubDivisional Officer from Belo, the military Company Commander of Fundong, the Brigade Commander for Belo, three other elements of the Forces of Law and Order and the second Deputy Mayor of Belo, a son of Mbesa. The Priest was not happy with them for coming so late. He then invited them to the Parish House where the Sub Divisional Officer for Belo explained that the cause of their delay was due to transport difficulties, and the state of the road from Belo to Mbesa. The Priest then took them to the phone booth where the Sub-Divisional Officer of Belo informed the Senior Divisional Officer of Boyo about the situation.652 The Archbishop of Bamenda was also informed. It was agreed that a meeting between the Sub Divisional Officers of Belo and Oku should take place on the battlefield, (Disputed Land). The Senior Divisional Officer of Boyo accepted to inform the Senior Divisional Officer of Bui and the Sub-Divisional Officer of Oku respectively of the time and place of the meeting. From the Priest, the meeting was scheduled at 10 a.m. on the battlefield. On Thursday February 15th, at about 10.30 a.m., the Subdivisional Officer of Belo, the Company Commander of Fundong, the Brigade Commander of Belo, the second Deputy Mayor for Belo, a Representative of the Fon of Mbesa, and the Parish Priest of Mbesa arrived at the meeting place on the battlefield. After waiting for about 2 hours, they inquired from the Oku people to know why the delegation from Oku was not forthcoming. The Oku people told them that the Sub Divisional Officer of Oku was still on his way to the meeting ground. Within those two hours of waiting, there were over 30 gunshots coming from both camps. Shortly after, the Commander of the Oku Gendarmerie Brigade and some other elements of the Forces of Law and Order, and a representative of the Quarter Head of Ibalichim-Oku arrived. They said that the Sub-divisional Officer of Oku could not come uphill because it was too steep and that he would like 651 652

Interview with Rev. Father Anthony Viban. Interview with Rev. Father Anthony Viban.

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the meeting place to be changed to a spot called “Bakassi Bar”.653 Having accepted the proposal of the Sub-divisional Officer of Oku, it was agreed that they should see the water catchments which had been destroyed, and some farm houses burnt by natives of Oku on Mbesa farms before going to the meeting. There and then, the Senior-divisional Officer for Boyo transmitted a phone message from the Governor of the North-West Region requesting that a cease-fire be observed and all parties retire to their respective villages. Fortunately, since the representatives of the Quarter Head of Ibalichim-Oku and the Fon of Mbesa were present, the authorities then commissioned them to bring the Governor’s message to their respective camps. The officials then went to inspect the destroyed water catchments. After that, they moved to another battle area, as they thought that the news of the ceasefire may not have reached the fighters there in time, and feared that the meeting between the two Divisional Officers might be interrupted the Parish Priest opted to take the message to that second battle field. The Sub-divisional Officer of Belo and the rest of the delegation moved towards the meeting place, meanwhile the Priest went with the Governor’s message to the two camps on the second battlefield. When he shouted the message, the Oku fighters responded by saying that they did not recognize him. After a long and painful effort, he pleaded with the Mbesa natives to withdraw. Reluctantly, they began to withdraw.654 Meanwhile, the Sub-divisional Officer of Belo and the rest of the delegation stopped on the way to the meeting place to wait for the Priest. When they finally arrived, they all went to the meeting place where they met the Sub-divisional Officer of Oku, the Hon. Member of Parliament for Oku, and the Lord Mayor of Oku. After a brief meeting, it was agreed that the message of the ceasefire should be carried to the respective people by their traditional rulers. It was expressively emphasized that the traditional ruler of the camp that would break the cease fire should take responsibility. Another meeting was then scheduled for the following morning to see the casualties and evaluate what had happened in order to find a long-lasting solution to the problem. At Ntimati (Bakassi Bar) where the meeting took place, there was a reasonable population from Mbesa who got this message. The authorities at the meeting decided to bring the same message to the people of Oku at the Quarter Head’s compound at Ibalichim. Before the meeting ended, some women from Mbesa lamented the fact that while the people of Mbesa were respecting the order by retreating from the battlefront, 653

At Ntemati a quarter in Mbesa, on the boundary area between Ibalichim (Oku) and Mbesa. 654 (JPC), 18th February, 2007.

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their enemies from Oku were instead advancing toward their initial positions.655 The Sub-divisional Officers of Belo and Oku, the Forces of Law and Order, the second Deputy Mayor of Belo and the Parish Priest of Mbesa went to Elih to find out whether the Oku fighters had advanced in their position. This was immediately confirmed. The Sub-divisional Officer of Belo tried to talk to the people of Oku about stopping hostilities, but to no avail. However, the fighters became more receptive when told that their Sub-divisional Officer was around. After they recognized one of the Gendarmes from Oku, they called him by name and demanded to talk only with their Sub-divisional Officer. The Sub-divisional Officer of Oku went and spoke with them. The delegation then went to the Quarter Head of Ibalichim at 7:30p.m., where they held a brief meeting. The Parliament’s representative for Oku and the Mayor for Oku went back to Oku where they carried a message of the ceasefire and immediate withdrawal from the battlefield. They equally invited people to attend a meeting the following morning at 10:00am at Bakassi Bar.656 In fact, the above explanations from Rev. Father Anthony Viban reveal that his mission was neither limited to prayer nor to communicating with the administrative officials; he honestly assisted the administrative officials by deploying them to various areas where the security of the people was at risk. In this regard, the “man of God” deployed a lot of efforts to mediate peace talks with the communities concerned. But when things turned out to be beyond his religious reach, he had to appeal to his background origin as a man from a nearby locality (Nso) who had frequently witnessed the devastation left by inter-community conflicts. Apart from the efforts of religious authorities, non-governmental organisations also contributed to the search for peace in the area.

d. Non-Governmental Organizations It will be unfair to talk about conflict resolution in the North-West Region without mentioning the activities of some NGOs in the area. Though the advent of NGOs is recent in the country and the region in particular, these organizations proved to be indispensable in times of conflict. Given the overwhelming need to maintain peace in the region and assist the victims of violent conflict, the assistance provided by NGOs was highly welcome. For 655 656

Interview with Laura Naddin Ngwa, Bamenda, June 28th 2008. Interview with Rev. Father Anthony Viban, Mbesa, May 20th 2008.

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example, some of these organizations proved that they were capable of assisting the administrative authorities to restore dialogue between communities in the areas affected by inter-tribal wars. It is important to highlight that very few NGOs including EMPED, SeP and MBOSCUDA were able to provide formidable results in some of the areas which suffered from the occurrence and recurrence of land and boundary conflicts within the scope of our study. Some of these organisations existed only on paper, as their activities were hardly felt in the areas where their expertise much needed. That explains why we limited ourselves to these organisations. As concerns the case opposing Balikumbat and Bafanji, it is, however, regrettable that the government officials had completely neglected the demarcating exercise on the disputed area between the two communities, especially when their relationship had been fragile since the last major confrontation of 1998. The fear was that if peace advocates do not show concern in this Sub-division, there might be another full-scale war against each other. In the Balikumbat Sub-division, Ecumenical Service for Peace (SeP) had played a major role in enhancing harmonious relations between Balikumbat and Bafanji during the early 2000s. To that effect, EMPEDFoundation, formerly known under the name Ecumenical Youth Peace Initiative Commission (EYPIC), had had remarkable achievements in Balikumbat Sub-division before the advent of SeP in the area. However, the activities of SeP were a continuity of what EMPED-Foundation left before embarking in various cases of conflict in the North-West Region. A good example from this regard can be the agro-pastoral conflict in Wum Central. We then thought it was necessary to make it clear that EMPED had earlier operated in Balikumbat Sub-division from 1997 to 2002 before SeP’s arrival in the area.657 SeP’s activities included the organization of seminars, visits, exchanges, socio-cultural activities, sporting events, just to name a few, but these were not all that much different from those introduced in Wum by EMPED. In a nutshell, some related activities carried out by SeP in Balikumbat Sub-division were, however, recorded.

657

Interview with Madam Toh Nja’ah Helen, Bamenda, June 21st 2008.

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Table 17: Some NGOs involved in Peace Building in the N.W.R between 1995 and 2008 N°

Abbreviations

1

ACAT

2

CHRAC

3

EMPED

4

SeP

5

MBOSCUDA

6

SHUMAS

Full Meaning Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture Community Human Rights and Advocacy Ecumenical Mission for Peace and Development Foundation Ecumenical Service for Peace Mbororo SocioCultural Development Association Strategic Humanitarian Service

Location Finance junction Bamenda Commercial avenue Bamenda Council junctionNtarikon Bamenda Presbyterian Mission Ntamulung Bamenda Old-town Bamenda Funcha Street Bamenda

Year of Operation (1999)

(2004) (1996)

(2003)

(1992)

(1992)

Source: Data from study in the North-West Region of Cameroon, October, 2008.

The Ecumenical Service for Peace (SeP) is an inter-denominational religious association whose mission is to contribute to a non-violent social transformation in Cameroon. It is, however, known that SeP is an organization in Cameroon and the Central African Sub-Region that draws its inspiration from Muslims, Christians and cultural foundations to complement and reinforce contemporary conflict resolution approaches. This NGO was founded by Reverend Luc Norbert Kenne in 1995. He was the first executive president till his death on July 12, 2000.658 It should be noted that this NGO originated from the Western Region of Cameroon, and

658

Peace News, N° 54, 2005, January-February, 2005, p.1.

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had Yaoundé as its headquarters with regional services all over the national territory.659 To be able to attain its general objectives, SeP had put in place a number of strategies. First, it organized training sessions in non-violent conflict resolution, democratic citizenship, socio-political leadership and Para-legal work. These training sessions targeted various social groups in Balikumbat Sub-division. Secondly, it organized manifestations and expositions of educative and cultural character in avenues like conferences, and symposia in the area concerned.660 In line with its records, SeP effectively started work on peace building in the Balikumbat Sub-division in May 2000. At the moment, there was total breakdown in relationship between Balikumbat and Bafanji. The first visit that introduced the services of SeP in the domain of peace took place from April 11th to April 14th 2000, in Balikumbat and Bafanji respectively.661 The conclusion drawn from this visit was that the two communities were very suspicious of each other and sensitive about whoever would be discussing peace-related issues with them. Inhabitants of the area had developed very negative feelings against each other; bitterness, hatred, division and suspicion were so common among the people. Post war effects on the people were still visible and attempts at direct mediation seemed unlikely to succeed. Yet many people were ready and eager to follow genuine peace building guidelines.662 SeP then developed a number of strategies from the findings reached after their first visit in the area. To that effect, identifying the opposition leaders within the area to work alongside the NGO in organizing workshops on conflict resolution was targeted. Mobilizing the five villages under Balikumbat Sub-division was another target since they had been directly or indirectly concerned with the previous conflict. Participants in the workshops were organized into Peace Committees and Peace Forums; structures which were intended to attempt to resolve conflicts within the villages, and continue to sensitize the local population on the need for peace and peace building.663 After the workshops, there was regular follow up to evaluate work at the meetings that brought Peace Committees and Forums together. From the 28th to 30th of April 2000, the first workshop was organized in Bamukumbit. The second was held in Balikumbat from the 7th to 9th of May 2000, and the third in Bafanji from the 10th to 12th May of the 659

Service écuminique pour la Paix (SeP), Activity Report, 1998, p.2. Interview with Ndi Richard, Bamenda, May 17th 2007. 661 Interview with Ndi Richard. 662 (SeP), “From conflict to post conflict peace building”, June 2004, p. 8. 663 Interview with Ndi Richard, Bamenda, May 17th 2007. 660

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same year.664 The main objective of the workshops was to create awareness on the need to tackle conflict positively and to promote an extensive use of conflict resolution/transformation methods in daily life. The focus was on defining peace and conflict from the perspective of the villagers, and making them understand that violence is not the best or the only way to solve a problem. Skills on how to deal with conflict situations were also learnt. In addition to mediation, negotiation, reconciliation and personal approaches to conflicts were also learnt.665 Members were to send across the knowledge gained, practice the skills learnt and exchange peace ideas with others in their communities. They were also expected to meet once a month to evaluate the impact of their work in their communities because of the effective and transparent ways in which conflicts were being handled. Before long, some traditional leaders recognized that the Peace Committees and Forums provided an effective structure for conflict resolution and, therefore, started involving them in the management of local conflicts.666 After series of follow-up studies, SeP thought that traumas have been healed because the conflicting parties were equipped in a way that they were now able to collaborate in the search for solutions to conflict. A glaring example came in September 2003 concerning the construction of a Government Secondary School in Bafanji. The Fon of Balikumbat ordered that the building be destroyed because, according to him, it was constructed on the disputed land. This brought about tension between the two villages.667 Some members of the Balikumbat Traditional Council rushed to the construction site to protect the building. Meanwhile, Bafanji sent a delegation led by the president of the peace Committee to meet the Fon of Balikumbat in his palace and discuss the lifting of the injunction so that construction of the school can continue peacefully. This example shows that this method of conflict resolution had greatly changed the mindsets of the participants in the workshops organised by SeP. In this direction, SeP also thought that contacts were beginning to be renewed between the two villages, as movements from one village to the other were now on the increase, and people were looking into the future with great expectation. In the Balikumbat and Bafanji chiefdoms, villagers and participants at the workshop acknowledged that there was a growing understanding and obedience among the people. Tension and the level of violence had also reduced in the community. The spirit of dialogue in resolving conflicts was developed and the number of cases brought to the Traditional Council for 664

(SeP), “From conflict to post conflict peace building”, June 2004, p.9. Bonji Ndi, 2007, p.58. 666 Found in, www.peacehumanus.org, consulted on, May 17th 2009. 667 Ibid. 665

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solution greatly reduced.668 At the inter-community level, participants and villages of Balikumbat and Bafanji acknowledged that their inter-village relationships were improving, leading to a revival of participation in the weekly market. They understood that they had to live and work together. They also had time to concentrate on their main activity, farming, thus improving productivity. This soon led to an increase in business activities. Villages and traditional authorities began to co-operate with the administration669 Collaboration between the traditional authorities of the two villages also improved greatly as could be gathered from the words of Ndimanjeh, the president of the Bafanji Peace Committee: “I was very impressed when I saw the traditional chairmen of Bafanji and Balikumbat sitting together and discussing intimately”.670 He said that during a workshop held in October 2002 aimed at analysing the conflict and developing strategies of intervention. At that workshop, the Fon of Bafanji called on each of his councillors to choose and entertain one councillor from Balikumbat.671 From all indications, it is clear that though there was still conflict, relationships had greatly improved. Trust and confidence were being restored amongst the people during the follow-up workshops and at other places of interest. During these occasions, presidents of peace committees also talked about the state of activities in their committees and strongly requested that peace forums at the Sub-divisional level be organised.672 On May 27th 2003, the Bamenda Appeal Court visited the Subdivision to verify facts presented by witnesses on the case between Ngufor and the Fon of Balikumbat, following the destruction of the farmer’s house.673 During the visit, the traditional rulers of the two villages were present and sat together after the verification. The Fon of Bafanji also invited them to a reception. In his word of welcome, the Fon of Bafanji thanked the Appeal Court and villagers from the two communities for coming. He went further to say figuratively that the cemented floor of peace 668

(SeP), «A Documentary Address presented by the Bafanji Peace Committee and Forum president», June 2003. 669 (SeP), «Report on evaluation and contact visit to the Balikumbat subdivision», July 2003. 670 “Peace News” N0 038, October, 2002. 671 (SeP), «From conflict to post conflict peace building», p.19. 672 Found in, www.peacehumanus.org, consulted on, May 17th 2009. 673 Found in, www.africanindependent.com/cam_balikumbat_murdersadam083004.html, consulted on, May 17th 2009.

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which united the Balikumbat and Bafanji people developed cracks and they had come together to “buy cement and reinforce the peace floor”. He affirmed that the people of Bafanji stood for peace. The Fon of Balikumbat said he had no objection to what his colleague had just said and invited the delegation to his own village for another reception.674 The judge in appreciation of what he witnessed said: I am very impressed and grateful that people of Bafanji and Balikumbat have taken the course of peace. Cameroon is well known for its peace and peace continues to be the pre-occupation of the Head of State. I am hopeful you will continue to be this direction so that the next time we come here, we will not come to see evidence of destruction but to celebrate the peace that has started to reign.675

Equally, very interesting was the formation of the Balikumbat Subdivisional Integrated Farmers (BASUDIFF). This idea was initiated in February 2004 as a follow-up to the meeting. The federation was launched on Saturday, May 8th, 2004, at the Balikumbat Catholic Parish. The association brought (and still brinks) together farmers from the villages of the sub-division. The members of the executive committee that ran the affairs of the association were drawn from the five villages of the subdivision. The president was from Balikumbat, the secretary from Bafanji, and the treasurer from Bamukumbit.676 Since the 1995 war between Balikumbat and Bafanji, the five villages of the sub-division had not worked together on anything on their own initiative. Present at this occasion were Achere Arrey, the second assistant Senior Divisional Officer for Ngoketunjia Mbida, the Sub-divisional Officer for Balikumbat Subdivision, Mbipe Pius, the Provincial Delegate of Agriculture for NorthWest, and the Divisional Delegate of Agriculture for Ngoketunjia and other officials.677 Some of the objectives of the federation were to train members on farm maintenance, carryout health education seminars for their farmers, give loans and supervise farmers’ activities, help farmers to market their produce and defend the interest of members of the organization. Furthermore, the federation was to undertake activities which will compete with those of its members. The role played by this kind of structure in consolidating peace in a conflict area cannot be over emphasized as parties 674

A Report on five-hour visit to Balikumat, May 2003. Ibid. 676 Minutes of the general meeting of the Balikumat Sub-divisional Integrated Farmers Federation of the Common Initiative Groups, February 2004. 677 (SeP), “From conflict to post conflict peace building”, p.24. 675

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in the conflict jointly organized and executed activities. The federation can be said to have been the result of peace initiatives, notably the Peace Forums in the area. According to GTZ678 guidelines, the intervention of SeP needed to be carefully investigated, as the target group that attended the workshop might have had good reasons to keep knowledge to themselves. As a result of this, peace advocates advised that time be spent in the field having informal discussion with the villagers. During our investigation, people seemed enthusiastic about the activities of SeP, even among the people who did not attend the various workshops. Although SeP carried out a lot of positive actions in the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict, more still needed to be done at the level of Fons. According to some elites, peace could only be achieved if a neutral body like SeP brought the two Fons together. They also stressed that SeP could invite all the members of the Traditional Councils and the two Fons to participate in a workshop. Only members of the Traditional Councils attended the workshops and though there was peace reigning in the area, the two Fons concerned had never been brought together by SeP to a workshop, meeting or negotiation. The elites who were usually very influential and were increasingly becoming the backbone of development in the villages and rural areas in Cameroon had not been involved in the peace process. They too might have political interests which could jeopardize the work done at the grassroots. It was, therefore, important for SeP to consider including everybody in the Balikumbat Sub-division in mediation processes.679 In the same line, it is regrettable that SeP in late 2006 was faced with a lot of difficulties including a financial crisis and mismanagements of funds. This resulted in lack of confidence from some donors, and the eventual closure of SeP’s activities in the North-West Region of Cameroon. In Wum Central, EMPED and MBOSCUDA among others have had formidable records as they organized forums for peace building in the area between government officials, traditional rulers and the inhabitants of Wum Central. In this regard, we shall attempt to examine the activities of EMPED and MBOSCUDA together with those of other peace advocates noticed in the area. The Ecumenical Mission for Peace and Development Foundation abbreviated (EMPED-Foundation) is a non-governmental, ecumenical and non-partisan organization which was created in 1996 and legalized on 678

GTZ: Geselleschaft Techische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation). 679 (SeP), Office Bamenda, “Consolidating peace in Balikumbat Sub-division”, February 2005.

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February 26th, 1997 (Ref. No. 1076/VOL. 7/IPPD) in Mezam Division, North-West Region of Cameroon. From then onwards, the NGO was named EYPIC (Ecumenical Youth Peace Initiative Commission) right up to 2003 when the founders, headed by the then Executive Director Rev. Nja’ah Peter Toh, decided to give a new name and vision to the organization. This organization is specialized in human rights, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, advocacy, gender, HIV/AIDS mainstreaming, and developmental empowerment.680 EMPED-Foundation has worked in Aghem-Wum Central for so many years, including on the farmer–grazer dispute. To help solve this case, it organized meetings, training workshops on equitable distribution of farming and grazing land to the disputants in that locality. The organization carries out peace advocacy as an alternative to litigation. EMPED-Foundation works closely with members of the North West human Rights forum, that is, Human Rights Defense Group (HRDG), Human Rights Clinic and Education Center (HURCLEC), Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT), Global Communication Consultancy (GCC), Community Human Rights and Advocacy Centre (CHRAC), Volunteer for Prison Inmates (VPI), International Club For peace Research (ICPR), Human Rights and Advocacy (CHRAPA), Cameroon University Women Association (CAMUA), the Fomuyen Foundation (TFF), North-West NGO Forum (NWADO) and the Commonwealth Civil Society in Cameroon. The collaboration with these organizations is at the level of joint meetings and discussions on Human Rights issues and exchange of resource persons and material when need arises.681 EMPED-Foundation worked with “Swiss Catholic Lenten Fund” from 1999 to 2001. This donor withdrew her activities in Cameroon. HELVETAS Cameroon sponsored EMPED's activities from 1998 to 2002, when they suddenly stopped without prior notice. However, in spite of all these, they made contact with Canadian Pro-Democracy NGO that accepted to sponsor some of their projects, including two seminars on Early Warning Signals in the North-West and South-West Regions. They are equally consulting with them on what area of intervention they will want EMPED to come in. Up to this point, the discussions have not ended. So far, the Canadians have sponsored five sub-projects in Menchum Division on the consolidation of peace efforts and good governance.682 For the past few years, the requests from target communities for EMPED-Foundation to intervene in their conflicts have enabled the group 680

Interview with, Rev Nja’ah Peter Toh, Bamenda, May 18th 2007. Interview with, Rev Nja’ah Peter Toh. 682 Found in, www.emped-foundation.itgo.com, consulted on, 17th May 2009. 681

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to organize contact/sensitization/discussion sessions or visits and analyze community profile in Wum Central. These activities have helped conduct a proper identification and analysis of the problems with the target population in their various sectors (that is youth, men, women, Fulani, Fons, etc.). The requests and visits or analysis of community profiles have equally helped EMPED to identify training needs and enhance the knowledge of Fons, Traditional/ Municipal councillors in Wum on non-violent transformation of conflict. This identification has helped EMPED to plan and execute the trainings with the beneficiaries (men, youths and the few women who attended). In Aghem, EMPED had also worked with the “Kefa’ah” in Bu and “Ndofumbwei” in Wum and with women peace groups to encourage women’s massive participation in future projects. The participation of Muslims from Upkwa Camp was very high in all the trainings and monitoring activities.683 It was from the bases of the above background that EMPED by early 2005 mobilised her staff to carry out series of meetings and seminars in Wum with the sole objective of assisting the Cameroon government to handle the agro-pastoral problem in Wum Sub-division. To that effect, and as part of capacity building for ethics of consolidation of the peace-building, a four-day seminar workshop was organised in Wum on the theme “Hands across the borders”. The aim of the workshop was to promote peace between farmers and grazers in Menchum Division. Participants included local administration staff, farmers, grazers, municipal councillors, Peace volunteer collaborators (PVC’s), traditional rulers and the Ardos. The seminar took place at the Wum Rural Council Hall from February 28th to March 3rd, 2005. The pre-planning (contact sensitisation) meetings communications ran from the 22nd to the 25th of February 2005 with all the above personalities assisting in the planning and implementation stages.684 The crisis between the farmers and the grazers was protracted for about forty-one (41) years. Although many attempts had been made by the administration at finding a lasting solution to the conflict, the implementation of decisions arrived at has always been the main problem. The Divisional Officer for Wum, present at one of the seminars, appreciated the efforts of the EMPED-Foundation for their timely intervention. He blamed the farmers for their impatience to adhere to his administrative plan of action and the chiefs for bad faith due to their not attending meetings when invited. He equally blamed the grazers for failing to implement the Koumpa Issa’s

683

Ecumenical Mission for Peace and Development Foundation (EMPED), periodic reports on the pending issues in Wum central, 28th July 2005. 684 Interview with Madam Toh Nja’ah Helen, Bamenda, 21st June 2008.

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Report on time.685 The Deputy Mayor for Wum was also present at the seminar and extended words of welcome before giving the audience the assurance that she will support the decision arrived at. Plate 19 illustrates how the parties concerned were devoted to have a lasting solution to their pending problem. The discussions during the workshop confirmed the existence of a problem between the farmers and the grazers in Wum Central. However, the question was not on the departure of the Mbororos or grazers, but the need for cattle to graze only in the areas demarcated in Aghem. On the other hand, both parties accepted to resolve the conflict peacefully. They also expressed their worries and fears with regards to the attitudes of the Administration, traditional rulers, Ardos as well as farmers and some grazers. In order to facilitate the process of a peaceful resolution, group-work was organised. The work was sub divided into three groups: the Fons, Farmers and Grazers. The groups drew up and presented a plan of action that was adopted in a plenary session that followed.

685

(EMPED), Minutes from the Seminar organized by EMPED in Wum, drafted on the 2 March 2005.

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Plate 19: A Cross View of the Participants of the February-March

A

B

C

D

Source: Data Collected by Author at EMPED Head Office Ntarikon-Bamenda, 22 June 2008. Note: A: Farmers (Women) at the Wum Rural Council planning to attend the Seminar B: Arrival of Fons at the Workshop Venue (Wum Community Hall) C: A Cross Section of Wum Grazers/Farmers at the Workshop D: A Cross Section of Fons at the Workshop for Crisis Management.

After the workshop, a commission was set up to follow up allocation of land to the latter. This exercise took the commission members to Kesu: Mebu’uh/Mbulom, Waindu and Zonghofu. The commission started on Saturday March 5, and ended on March 10, 2005, as illustrated in Plate 20. The job that was executed successfully was as a result of a plan of action drawn by participants during the seminar. This then give birth for a commission to implement resolutions of the Governor Koumpa Issa. From the commission, the Governor’s report confirmed the allocation of land to both parties in contest. However, after the above fieldwork, there was an

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evaluation of work on March 11, 2005 in the Wum Council Hall by the Commission members. Before arriving at the final recommendations, the following remarks were observed: 1. The efforts of the farmers/grazers to dialogue and propose a plan of action for a peaceful implementation of the Koumpa Issa’s commission were highly appreciated. 2. The interest of the administration in the peaceful implementation of the Koumpa Issa’s recommendations was highly recommended. 3. The role of the Fons and Ardos in providing assistance for the peaceful implementation of Koumpa Issa’s recommendations was appreciated. 4. The fieldwork of the commission team of EMPED-Foundation, farmers/grazers, notables and the youth leaders was successfully carried out without bias.686 Plate 20: The Commission on Fieldwork Retracing the Original Boundary March, 2005

Source: Data Collected by Author at EMPED Head Office Ntarikon-Bamenda, June 2008.

686

Interview with Madam Toh Nja’ah Helen, Bamenda, 21st June 2008.

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In this regard, it was noticed that the Koumpa Issa Commission had thoroughly and judiciously carried out its work. Only implementation was left. The following points were recommended: 1.

2.

That the administration should as soon as possible assist in the implementation of both the Koumpa Issa Commission and the joint commission between farmers and grazers and EMPED Foundation. Equally, they were expected to respect the 20nd March 2005 deadline as agreed during the workshop. That the hierarchy should help Wum and the Administration in various places with logistics for the implementation.

It is, however, regrettable that despite all the efforts and assistance granted by EMPED, implementing these decisions on the field had never been serious. This explains the regular attacks by both parties until 2007 when several seminars were organised by EMPED with the attention of government officials. These seminars provided a breeding ground for peace amongst the parties concerned. Government Officials (SDO, DO and the Divisional Delegate of Agriculture Wum-Menchum Division) were invited to the opening day of a seminar workshop on mixed farming and conflict resolution for NGOs and CIGs organised by EMPED-Foundation. This time, the venue of the workshop was Morning Star Hotel, and the forum began on March 6th and ended on March 10th, 2007.687 In this connection, some of the seminars organised by EMPED-Foundation within the period discussed are illustrated in Plate 21. Monitoring was effectively done in Wum Central as there was enough time for this. From my informants, the extra expenditures that were incurred during the death of the Executive Director for his funeral arrangements tremendously affected the running budget of the organization. It was also noticed that with this heart-breaking news, several projects within and out of Wum were left untouched as a result of financial crisis in the entire organization. Some of the key donors such as Canadian ProDemocracy were no longer answering the needs of this organization. In a nutshell, the NGO contributed a lot in peace building in Wum Central during the last phase of the farmer–grazer conflict.688 The social and economic context of the project changed greatly both positively and negatively. Positively, most of the disputes were settled 687

(EMPED), Records of the Pending Issues in Wum Central, by EMPD-Foundation, March, 2007. p.5. 688 Interview with Madam Toh Nja’ah Helen, Bamenda, June 21st 2008.

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in traditional councils instead of law courts as most grazers preferred amicable settlement through compensation of damaged crops. For example, in the Ko’oh Fondom in Bu, most cases are settled by the Kwifon (ngoumba), while in Wum, three (3) big grazers Pa Ita, Pa Ewi and Pa Agem are practicing mixed farming as a tool to resolve conflicts. In Upkwa, grazers have intensified paddock/oxen farming and also most Fulanis now teach their children the Aghem language as a means to integrate. Interaction between farmers and grazers is cordial; for instance, the people in Aghem noticed peaceful farming in 2007 and no cases have been registered with the administration. There have been equally increases in crop yield this same year (2007).689 At this point in time, the administration has started land demarcation process and given back pieces of land seized from individuals who have enabled Pa Ita to regain his land at Mbienjam. There was also a high awareness on the importance of peace. For example, three (3) peace organs were trained by previously trained participants to replace an auto defence group, settle matters and report on conflicts and peace issues. Also, there is now more dialogue between farmers and grazers. However, women’s participation in the project dropped in 2007 from 75% to 35%, the reason being that most women were now very satisfied with the state of things and considered any further meetings as men’s affairs. Finally, the administration was still very slow and lacked funds to hasten land demarcation process.690 The effect was that EMPED-Foundation, was generally being accepted, recognized and embraced in the disputing communities thanks to the trainings and mediation it offered to the population. The impact was much greater in the areas where EMPED-Foundation had worked such as Wum, Zhoa and Benakuma. These communities are now able to identify their problems and amicably resolve them through alternatives to dispute. The trainings enabled the Aghem communities to make use of the traditional councils in resolving issues instead of law courts. The participants were also trained to prevent occurrences of violent confrontations. There were also trained Peace Vigilante Clubs (PVCs) and Peace Cluster Groups trained by EMPED-Foundation who work tirelessly in their respective communities to resolve and mediate in conflicts. From the above regards, it shall be also relevant to discuss the activities of the Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association (MBOSCUDA) in an attempt to resolve the farmer/grazer problems in Wum Central.

689 690

Interview with Muchu Sylvester, Bamenda, June 23rd 2008. Interview with Muchu Sylvester.

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Plate 21: Training of Farmers and Grazers on the Techniques of Mixed Farming

Executive Director coordinates on Conflict Resolution

Lecturing on how to acquire a Land Title

Mr. Ning Romero and Mr. Tem Peter (facilitators) presenting the topic Mixed Farming

Illustration of mixed farming by Mr. Ning Romero

Studying on night Paddocking

Source: Data Collected by Author at EMPED Head Office Ntarikon-Bamenda, June, 2008.

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The period 1990 saw the birth or liberation of multi-party politics and freedom of association in Cameroon. Political pressure on the government and the quest for more liberties by Cameroonians at the time resulted in the promulgation of Liberty Laws in 1991, which inter alia, allowed freedom of association. A few educated Mbororo youths in the urban areas took advantage of the new political dispensation at the time to form the Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association, better known by its acronym, MBOSCUDA. Historically, the plans to create the Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association started in 1987. Three groups (FUSODA, FUFOUCAM AND MDA, formed respectively in Bamenda, Kumba and Yaounde), merged in 1992 to form MBOSCUDA, a non-partisan and non-profit socio-cultural development association. Their aim was (and is still) to empower the Mbororo people to achieve sustainable and equitable development on their terms and to secure their human, social, cultural and economic rights as valued and active citizens of Cameroon. MBOSCUDA is a national organization that was registered on October 21st, 1992 in conformity with the Law on Freedom of Associations.691 Its headquarters is in Yaoundé, with autonomous regional secretariats in seven out of the ten regions of Cameroon. In 1994, MBOSCUDA was inaugurated in Sabga Community (the headquarters of the Mbororo people in the North-West Region of Cameroon). This idea was copied by other Mbororo communities in the region, notably in Menchum Division.692 In fact, Menchum Division is said to have the largest number of Mbororo settlers, resulting in the frequent farmer–grazer conflict which has existed since the colonial era. MBOSCUDA is an umbrella association of the Mbororo people working towards the de-marginalization of the Mbororo people living in Cameroon, especially in the North-West Region. It currently executes various programmes aimed at the de-marginalisation of the Mbororos with access to justice as its principal activity with particular focus on rights over land for the Mbororo herders.693 As earlier mentioned, the initial objectives of MBOSCUDA were to protect the rights and promote the culture of all Mbororo people in Cameroon. With zero funding, MBOSCUDA concentrated its activities on the promotion of the culture of the Mbororo. In 1998, MBOSCUDA formed a partnership with Village Help, a UK-based charity organization. The organization in partnership with Village Aid had its first funding from 691

Robert Nso Fon and Musa Ndamba, 2008, “Mboscuda’s Access to Justice and Promotion of Land Rights for the Mbororos of the North West of Cameroon”, Long Assay, pp.5-7. 692 Interview with Haruma Umaru, Bamenda, 25th June 2008. 693 Interview with Haruma Umaru.

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Comic Relief and the execution of this project caused MBOSCUDA to enter into yet another partnership with three other local NGOs, with respective strengths in participatory approaches on human rights as discussed in the case of EMPED-Foundation. In regard to some of our previous Legislations on Land, its limitations in the constitution are moderated in other laws of the land. That is why there is Ordinance No. 74-1 of the 6th July 1974 to establish rules governing land tenure, Ordinance No. 74-2 of the 6th July 1974 to establish rules governing state lands, Ordinance No. 74-3 of the 6th July 1974 concerning the procedure governing expropriation for a public purpose and the terms and conditions of compensation, Decree No. 76-165 of the 27th of April 1976 to establish the conditions for obtaining land certificates, Decree No. 76-166 of 27th April 1976 to establish the terms and conditions of management of national lands, Decree No. 76-167 of the 27th of April 1976 to establish the terms and conditions of management of the private property of the state and Decree No. 78/263 of the 3rd of July 1978 to establish the terms and conditions for settling farmer-grazer disputes. Decree No. 78/263 of the 3rd of July 1978 governs mobile grazers who practice traditional grazing methods. Those with ranches are governed by a different law. In the North-West Region of Cameroon, there is only one multi-millionaire grazer with a ranch, the Elba ranch, which displaced more than 70 Mbororo Fulani families with more than 10,000 cattle without due compensation.694 It is as a result of some of the above malpractices and none respect of the above Laws that our intention was geared to examine what MBOSCUDA did in concrete terms in an attempt at resolving the agropastoral conflict in Wum Central since its existence in the region. The Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association (MBOSCUDA), worked together with the Cameroon Muslim Student’s Union (CAMSU), Société Commerciale pour le Développement de l’élévage du Cameroun (SODELCO), and HELVETAS Cameroon in organising forums with aims at educating the Mbororo communities in Menchum Division, and Wum Central in particular.695 Just like the voluntary mediators, these organizations also adopted regular sensitization meetings in redressing the farmer-grazier conflict when it took a different dimension in the mid-2000. MBOSCUDA spent some time educating especially the grazers on how to manage their fixed limited resources (land) without problems. The Association was also aided by EMPED coupled with the assistance granted by the Divisional Delegation in-charge of Agriculture 694 695

Fon of Nso and Musa Ndamba, 2008, p.7. Interview with Achou Joseph Paul, Ghertze-Wum, May 29th 2007.

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when they collectively introduced modern methods of farming to both farmers and grazers of the Aghem community.696 Thus, the organization did well to organize seminars and workshops and educate farmers and graziers on how to manage their limited resources on limited lands. In this sphere, Plan Cameroon was priding the necessary support to MBOSCUDA so as to fulfil its objectives as earlier mentioned. Through MBOSCUDA with other NGOs, such as EMPED-Foundation, peace and harmony gradually returned in Wum between conflicting parties in the early 2007. The role played by MBOSCUDA, especially as they educated the Mbororo people in Wum Central on how to handle their cases vis-à-vis their counterparts (farmers owner), gave hope to both camps since they were in constant collaboration with the local community of Wum Sub-division.697 To secure rights over individual grazing lands required a mastery of the laws governing land tenure in a particular country. It was from this angle that MBOSCUDA had then psychologically prepared the concerned on the legal process to secure rights over the lands in question. MBOSCUDA used the law courts to secure the rights of Mbororo herders over grazing lands. The laws governing rights over land and grazing lands in particular are many and are found in various legislations, which were interpreted differently by different administrative officers. Three cases were handled in the trial courts right to the North West Court of Appeal where judicial precedence were stated on some of the rights over grazing lands. MBOSCUDA thereafter caused all the courts in the North-West Region to respect the judicial precedence from the court of appeal and the rights of the herders over their lands.698 Also, farmer-grazer conflict awareness and transformation workshops have greatly assisted the Mbororo herders to secure their rights over grazing lands. Three of such workshops were organized in Menchem, Ngoketunjia and Donga Mantung Divisions of the North-West Region wherein all the stake holders in the farmer-grazer palaver were in the same workshop and the rights and responsibilities of each properly explained by experts. After the workshops, the harassments of the grazers by the farmers greatly reduced as well as the exploitation of the herders by the local administrators. Replicate and community education on land rights were also

696

Provincial Archives Bamenda (PAB), NW/Sa/d.2002/4/BK, 2002, Akum Joseph N., Population growth and Land use: An Assessment of the relationship between farmers and Graziers in Wum North West Province of Cameroon. 697 Interview with Ardo Sule Dicko, Gheidze-Wum, 24th May 2007. 698 Interview with Mohammed Bawuro Abubakar, Bamenda, 20th May 2007.

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used by the organization to secure land rights for Mbororo herders.699 The replicate and community education campaigns were carried out by community facilitators, psycho-legal counsellors and the Barrister of the programme. In this vein, lobby and advocacy greatly assisted in securing rights over grazing lands in favour of the Mbororos. When the Mbororos started to apply for land title over pieces of land in communal grazing lands in the North-West Region and in Wum in particular, it was very strange to many local government officials. The Organization had to lobby and advocate at the regional headquarter and the necessary legal justification used. Instructions were then sent to the Divisional level by the provincial bosses, which instructed MBOSCUDA to respect the later.700

e. Women and other Voluntary Mediators The part played by women with some voluntary groups and personalities not mentioned earlier had in one way or the other promoted land conflict resolution in the North-West Region. Whatever the case, the activities of these mediators should not be undermined for it had significantly improved cordiality among the contesting communities. Their activities echoed the problems to the administrations in place. The building of peace is an activity in which all affected sectors of society have a responsibility to take part. Women are given at times special attention because they represent a vital resource for conflict resolution from the grassroots level upward. Moreover, women face new challenges and inherit additional responsibilities in the post conflict period that need to be highlighted and addressed. The social transformation occurring in the post conflict context opens up opportunities to women to empower themselves and to strengthen and enhance their contributions to conflict resolution in the Region under study. During the many formal peace negotiations that took place between the Bafanjis and the Balikumbats with government ministers as negotiators, women played the role of entertainers as they cooked and danced for the negotiators. The chiefs, quarter heads and village elders (all men) were brought to the negotiation tables. Women were ignored and decisions were taken on issues that affected their lives. The peace negotiations were considered to be male matters, which could also mean that they employed discourses and practices closer to men’s reality than to 699

Haruma Umaru, 2005, “New Twist in Farmer/ Grazier Conflicts”, The Lantern Vol. 1, June, p.1. 700 Haruma Umaru, 2005, p.2.

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women’s.701 Women from outside who played a role in bringing peace in the region were mainly female Non-Governmental Organizations for example, CAMAUW, and elite women of the area in the Diaspora. The female NGOs lobbied for peace; they were peace mediators, peace negotiators and carried out peace sensitization by organizing training seminars and workshops on peace. Elite women in the diaspora joined their male counterparts in lobbying and assisting in the creation of a government secondary school in the area, which now provides free education to children. They took part in negotiating and creating a new road in the area. They comforted and consoled their men, who were frustrated because of the war.702 The Aghem women who have been victims and were principal actors of the conflict committed themselves financially, materially and morally in finding a solution to the recurrent crisis. In order to halt tension between the farmers and the graziers, the Aghem women impounded the cattle caught on farms. This method, according to women leaders, helped to reduce tension. The problem of one became that of the entire women in Aghem.703 Their protest marches, demonstrations and solidarity stood as a weapon in settling the crisis in Wum. That is why through their mob actions, solutions, reduced tension. As such, their approach in handling the problem remained a major concern to all parties with the sole feeling based at conflict resolution. The women group leader, Mrs. Ewi Kang Elizabeth, addressed this problem through various means. Mobilising the women was simply a means to call for national and international concern on the existing problem. She addressed this issue through reports writing and through various correspondences in and out of Cameroon. Moreover, Aghem women raised the sum of three hundred thousand francs CFA in 2002 to facilitate the movement of the SDO for Menchum and his collaborators to inspect the three designated areas allotted to Fulani graziers.704 This was an effort to evacuate cattle from farming areas so as to stop conflict between both parties. Really, the women had played a fundamental role by taking part in most of the seminars organised by EMPED-Foundation, MBOSCUDA 701

Rosemary Ngufor, 2008, “Women, Conflict and Peace: A Case Study of a Tribal War in Cameroon”, Long Assay draft, p.3. 702 Ibid, p.4. 703 Interview with Nchuo Bih, Gheidze-Wum, May 28th 2007. 704 Etienne Tazo and Unusa Haman, 2006, “Contraction of Land use Conflict to Peasant Impoverishment: The case opposing the Mbororo Pastorialists and the Indigenous Crop cultivators of Mezam Division North West-Cameroon” In Cameroon Geographical Review, Vol; XVIII: N° 1, pp.50-52.

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among others.705 In the Wum contest, these activities carried by women went a long way to systematically arrived at a long-awaited solution. On the other areas, though less organised, the women equally played a great role in solving the conflicts. However, their role was more felt during the conflicting moments. In Mbesa, when the government was about to demarcate the Oku Mbesa boundary in July 2008, a significant uprising from Mbesa women surfaced. This was because many of them never wanted their farm lands to be seized by government officials. This explained why the government had to deploy troops from Bamenda and Kambe to re-enforce law and order which permits the surveyors to peacefully carry out the demarcation exercise in July 2008.706 The women finally understood the need to demarcate the places, as such went a long way to assist in the planting of the pillars. However, women in other areas were not quite noticed. The presence and services of free will mediators are always needed whenever peace and social cohesion are threatened. The conflict in Wum did not only catch the attention of local mediator in looking for peace, but also that of foreign representatives or diplomats resident in the nation as they got involved in the peace process needed in Wum.707 These voluntary mediators include Rev Pastor Ekum of the Presbyterian Church in Wum and His Excellency Norbert WM Brachuis, Netherlands Ambassador in Cameroon. Rev. Pastor Ekum initiated regular meetings between farmers and graziers. Both parties were educated on how to live together without problems. The Netherlands Ambassador in Cameroon held series of working sessions with the stakeholders involved in the perennial conflicts. This greatly reduced tension between the Mbororo graziers and indigenous farmers in Wum, Menchum division.708 In fact, the efforts of these voluntary mediators were equally complimented with the assistance of some national and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as earlier discussed. Aghem elites, both at home and abroad showed concern in settling the agro-pastoral problem. Their role in finding peace and harmony to the conflict also proved their commitment and interest to the development of the locality. Looking at their financial assistance in resolving the conflict, the Aghem diaspora, especially those living in the Netherlands, Belgium, 705

Interview with Ewi Kang Elizabeth, Naikom-Wum, May 22th 2007. Interview with Sama Benjamin, Bamenda, July 2nd 2008. 707 S. Nfor Gwei, 2000, “Human Rights, Conflict and Human Development: the Role of Cameroonian Traditional Rulers in the Promotion of Human Rights and Conflict Management in a Transitional Democracy”, Conference report in Bamenda, 14-15th February, pp. 14-15. 708 Interview with Chrysantus Chu, Wanagwen-Wum, May 24th 2007. 706

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Germany, Britain and the USA, donated a sum of eight hundred thousand francs.709 According to their president General Dr. David Achuo, the money was to provide logistics and assist the women and the administration in fuelling their cars to inspect the three places allocated to graziers. Part of the money was to be used to construct roads leading to the grazing areas. The elites felt that farmers and graziers were all needed in the clan and as such their gesture could partially provide a situation. With the search for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, some voluntary mediators supported the elites. Hence, the contributions of the elites and voluntary mediators were equally indispensable in reducing growing tension in Wum. Equally, land conflict in Wum Central did not leave politicians of the locality indifferent. On their part, they tried to devise a way of solving the persistent problem. Considering their political positions, they all resolved to a lasting solution to the problem. The politicians involved were those in the CPDM, the SDF, and the NUDP political parties. The most prominent politicians who stood out remarkably in preventing the farmergrazier conflict were Hon Simon Kucha, Hon Chou Cyprian Akwo, and John Afuh Nkou of the CPDM, and Buh Sale Tegha and Ewi Elizabeth of the SDF.710 These politicians, despite their political inclinations, agreed to find a solution to the problem through their educative meetings. The leaders, who had always been at loggerheads, especially during elections periods, unanimously agreed for a rapid implementation of the Nseke commission’s resolutions. This idea was because each political leader needed a peaceful atmosphere before preaching their political philosophy to the warring camps. From the above studies, one could easily understand that the idea and full implementation of varying mediators in line with our cases were however more renounced in Wum Central contrary to other areas where communities were frequently at loggerheads. The situation in Wum had called for multiple or alternative peace-makers simply because the idea of minority group had been used in this context in referring to the Mbororo or Fulani community in the area. On the other set, when the Mbororo people eventually gained awareness on how to overcome their crisis, the issue became more serious around mid-2000.711 In this connection, a good number of administrators tried to provide a solution to the situation but with little successes that is why the activities of alternative mediators were rampant in Wum Central. 709

Interview with Dze Eunice, Ehudze-Wum, May 23rd 2007. Interview with Metoh Mbah Jaochim, Naikom-Wum, May 26th 2007. 711 Betty Bigombe, et al, 2000, “Policies for Building Post Conflict Peace”, Journal of African Economics, Vol. 9 (3), pp.48. 710

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During the last conflicts between Oku and Mbesa (2007 and 2008), the National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF) members made their point during a three-day workshop at Mansel Hotel, Yaounde (see Plate 22), organised by the Commonwealth Secretariat. According to a report by the commission of inquiry deployed in the conflict zone, many lives were lost and several other casualties recorded. There were massive destruction of homes, plantations, educational establishments and water installations. The report also indicated that more women and children were continuously being displaced, many of whom were taking refuge in neighbouring villages. The Chairman of the NCHRF, Dr. Divine Chemuta Banda, expressed gratitude to sympathisers of the Oku/Mbesa conflict for their show of solidarity and generosity. He appealed for kindness and responsibility in order to restore the dignity of the people and urged the communities concerned to show more understanding and tolerance for the preservation of social peace. Dr. Chemuta however condemned the conflict and insisted that the perpetrators have to be prosecuted in accordance with the law.712 They also deplored the resurgence, lately, of similar cases that are typical of conflicts between ethnic groups which are otherwise bound by historical links and condemned to live together and share a common destiny. Chemuta paid tribute to the Commonwealth Secretariat for assisting the commission. He said the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), had resumed its program of technical and financial support to the commission. He also acknowledged that the fight for the respect of human rights is a difficult one, reason why the skills of members and staff had to be sharpened to engage a relentless fight for the dignity of humanity.

712

Nformi Sonde and Christopher Jator, 2007, “Human Rights Commission Condemns Oku/Mbesa Conflict”, available in, http:/www.postnewsline.com, consulted on 12 December 2008.

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Plate 22: Human Rights Commission Condemns Violations of Human Rights in Oku/Mbesa Conflict

Source: http:/www.postnewsline.com.06.2007, consulted on 12th August 2008. Note: Banda (Centre), NCHRF Chairman with collaborators in workshop at Mansel Hotel, Yaounde organized by the Commonwealth Secretariat all worried about land conflicts in the North-West Region.

Speaking for the Commonwealth Secretariat, Jarvis Matiya said national human rights institutions are very critical in the promotion and protection of human rights and freedoms. He observed that if national human rights institutions were not worthy of trust, members of the community whose rights are violated would not approach such institutions to complain. He advised the NCHRF to work closely with NGOs and the civil society operating in the domain of human rights. Issues discussed hinged on how to enrich NCHRF members and staff with the mechanism of implementing human rights at the national and international levels.

B- Problems Encountered by the Interventionists In this section, we shall examine some of the problems encountered by some peace advocates in their attempt to promote the idea of peace and conflict resolution in the various conflict areas in the North-West Region. From our findings, we concluded that, these problems vary from structural to manmade. In this light, the difficulties faced by government officials,

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traditional authorities and institutions and NGOs are examined in this section.

a. Government Officials It should be clarified that government efforts to resolve land and boundary conflicts in this Region was not an easy issue. This explains why some of the area under dispute are subjected to frequent tension when need be. Following the case between Bambili versus Babanki-Tungo, it should be noted that, the technical team that was assigned to plant boundary pillars on the 10th September 2001 was interrupted by the Babanki-Tungo people. On this day, a mass of the Babanki-Tungo inhabitants came out and halted the work.713 Their claim was that a certain 1913 map drawn by the colonial administration should be used. That same night, they destroyed all the pillars which had already been planted and carried the materials to an unknown destination.714 Gendarmes intervened and arrested the Fon of Babanki-Tungo together with some of his notables who were detained for three days. In this regard, the people of both communities blamed the Cameroon Government for not suitably handling this case despite the intervention made by the newly created commission on the 27th of April 2005. This commission was charged with the implementation of Ministerial Order No. 002210/A/MINAT/DOT/SDOA/ SCA, of the 16th August 2000. The Senior Divisional Officer’s office following letter No. 0126/L/E.29/PS, of the 21st of April 2005, continued in the same line with the previous. One has to note that there had been no lasting solution on the pending problem for diverse reasons.715 Till date, the Babanki-Tungo had never paid the bill prior to their attacks and destruction of the canes and pillars erected by the government officials. In this regard, the erection of the canes stopped and tension continued to rise between the two communities, and as such making peace attempt very difficult. It should be highlighted that government’s failure to provide a lasting solution to the Bambili-Babanki Tungo boundary problem and other similar cases in this study area are due to many reasons. First of all, cooperation between the government officials and the inhabitants concerned had always been a major problem. The belligerent at times refused to cooperate in the search for peace. On November 16th 1971, following the Bambili versus Babanki-Tungoh conflict, an attempt for a demarcation 713

Nformi Sonde and Christopher Jator, 2007. (SDAT), Correspondence No. E29.03/165/382, of the 11 September 2003, from the Sub-divisional Officer Tubah to the Senior Divisional Officer of Mezam. 715 (SDAT), 21 April 2005, Following letter No. 0126/L/E.29/PS. 714

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failed principally because of the intransigence of the Babanki-Tungo. This attitude was lucidly made by the Area Surveyor and Lands Officer, Kay Simo, on 18th November 1971. The area surveyor and land Officer and the other administrators used their initiatives to meet the Fon of Babanki-Tungo to cooperate in the search for a solution. He accepted and sent his own working team, but when the team arrived, it rejected the new map. The foot-dragging attitude adopted by the Babanki-Tungo delayed the peace process. Their attitude stemmed from the fact that they had paid the usual Land Tribunal deposit and had expected the Tribunal to go into the matter and as a result, they rejected the Westmacott Administrative marking which was imposed on them. Also the Babanki-Tungo people failed to honour an invitation of the Divisional Officer of Bamenda Central Sub-Division, D.N.N Pufong. On the 8th of March 1972, Pufong regretted the situation and in his letter to the Area Surveyor and Land Officer said: Unfortunately, the Fon of Babanki-Tungo and his councillors failed to turn up, although they actually received my invitation. After a short discussion between Kindo and Mukong, the Fon of Bambili and his councillors agreed that the Area Surveyor should carry on the erection of the pillars according to the Westmacott decision and if the Babanki-Tungo community felt dissatisfied they were free to petition to the Government.716

From the above, it can be concluded at this juncture that the failure of the Babanki-Tungo people to cooperate made the efforts towards solution ineffective. Closely related to the above fact is the injunction order No. 2901.2/C.18.162 of January 7th 1991 which was, on the other hand, also violated by the Bambili people. This violation took place on the 7th May 1991 when the Bambili started farming in the disputed area.717 With this action, it became difficult to arrive at a peaceful solution to the conflict between the two communities. Another reason that could explain the failure of the attempted solution is the inherent determination of these neighbouring villages to seek revenge. In a letter ref. No. E2901.2/165/302, from the Sub Divisional Officer, Tubah, Kamga, to the Divisional Officer Mezam on the 16th of November 1995, Kamga remarked:

716

Divisional Officer (DO), 8th March 1972, D.N.N., Pufong to the Area Surveyor and Lands Officer. 717 Cited in a communiqué from the Rents Office, Kedjom Ketinguh, to the Chairman Bambili/Babanki-Tungo Commission of Enquiry, 27th July, 1991, National Archive Bamenda.

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Chapter Six It is clear that peace is a far away cry between the two communities (Bambili and Babanki-Tungo). The two are full of reciprocal hatreds at all. The solution does not lie in confrontation. They do not take into consideration the serious consequences of preceding conflicts. One even wonders if it is for this strip of land at the summit of the hill that they are fighting so much for, it seems to me that the real problem should be the rivalry between the two neighbours and as long as this sentiment of hatred persists, the risk of confrontation shall remain a permanent phenomenon.718

This meant that the two neighbouring villages were not prepared to bury the hatchet. Furthermore, there have been many groups and individuals involved in the attempts to resolve the conflict. For instance, the colonial administration, civil administration, the Bafut Chiefs, Traditional councils, and educated elite, were involved in the attempts to resolve the conflict. These groups failed to refer to the past or what had already been done in order to better understand the problem. Thus, the independent approaches and varying resolutions confused the parties concerned, and negatively affected the peace efforts. The complete interpretation and implementation of the Westmacott decision was not successful. The two villages initially did not believe the decision but saw it as the only objective map to hang on. But when a map was drawn, it was opposed by the Babanki-Tungo. This map was reported to be different from that which was approved by Westmacott. For this and several other reasons, the Babanki-Tungo refused to cooperate. Moreso, the surveyors charged with the demarcation were not the local surveyors agreed upon in the 1973 agreement. These surveyors displayed ignorance on the field with regard to identifying the bearings on the grounds as they were on the map. In a petition against the demarcation by the Babanki-Tungo to the Senior Divisional Officer, the ignorance of the Yaounde experts was put in the following words: […] we decided to give the said experts a chance and follow them to the Lake where the Westmacott decision of 1958, page two, paragraph five, line six clearly stated where the markings starts from but the experts and the SDO’s party went parallel to and far beyond the Lake to take their bearings and from there decided, rather embarrassingly, into BabankiTungo where people lived long before the Westmacott decision of 1958.719

718

(SDAT), 15 November 1995, Sub Divisional Officer to the Senior Divisional Officer of Mezam, Bamenda. 719 (SDAT), 19 April 1995, Chairman of Babanki-Tungo to the SDO.

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The above citation portrayed that the surveyors from Yaounde knew little or nothing about the disputed site. The ignorance displayed by the experts made any attempt towards a peaceful resolution far-fetched. The quotation above shows that the technocrats from Yaounde were not conversant with the topography. The suspicion and uncertainty of both parties concerning the objectivity of the civil administration also led to the failure of the efforts towards resolving the ethnic conflict. Reports from both parties showed that they doubted the honesty of the Senior Divisional Officer. This explains why the Senior Divisional Officer for Mezam, Samuel Sufo, convened several peace meetings in the Governor‘s Hall. He was, at one time, accused of favouring the Babanki-Tungo. It was also because of similar suspicion that the Babanki Tungo withdrew their cooperation during the demarcation attempt in 1995. When matters resurfaced, the SDO for Mezam was taken to court to answer charges on whether he had any powers to change or alter the Westmacott decision which was agreed upon by the two communities. Another reason why the attempts at reaching a negotiated settlement failed was because the two villages continuously made claims and counter claims on the disputed area. This is because the disputed land is very fertile and the two villages depended on this piece of land for their livelihood. Besides, both contestants have failed to recognize the time-lap between the Westmacott decision and current attempts at demarcation. This meant that within this long period, new developments took place in this area, and because of this any attempt to hinge at the Westmacott decision, without taking into effect the changes ended up in futility. From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the several attempts carried out to solve the conflict failed for reasons already mentioned. Regarding the case of Balikumbat and Bafanji, the Cameroon government in 1988 created a “no man’s land buffer zone” in the disputed area at T-junction. To that effect, one hundred metres from each direction, between Balikumbat and Bafanji was known as the buffer zone. It was discovered during our field work that, none of the above parties had been respecting this decision since they all farm in the disputed area. The general impression is that the present Fon of Balikumbat had been using his position as a Parliamentarian, coupled with the fact that the government had been silence, to cause havoc in the sub-division as a whole and in the disputed area in particular. It should be noted that Balikumbat refusal to cooperate with the administration to replant the pillar led to further clashes in 1995. In this regard, the description of the earlier Peace Pact and the suggestions in it that Bafanji and Balikumbat provide a 300 metres Buffer zone contrary to the above one between these two communities as a «worthless piece of

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paper» by the Fon of Balikumbat opened the way for serious clashes on early June 1995.720 Attempts by the then Cameroon’s Prime Minister, Simon Achidi Achu, and the then Governor of the North West Province, Bell Luc René, yielded no significant results. This was because an Administrative Commission of Inquiry was set up to investigate the matter and issue a report of its findings, so as to fully implement the 1969 West Cameroon decisions, in order to rebuild the destroyed pillars; an issue which never took place. This laxity from the government still gave forum for another major confrontation in 1998 being the most recent, where property destructions were heavily recorded in Bafanji as discussed in chapter three. The presence of the then Governor Fai Yengo Francis, a son of the region, and the then SDO for Ngoketunjia Division Mouliom Ali, could not content this crisis as they failed to provide a lasting solution to this old conflict that had been recurring in the same locality. Worse still, none of the communities actually respected the Senior Divisional Officer’s memo of the 16th of August 1995 based on the retracing of the boundary of the two communities. Following investigations, it should not be an overstatement to mention that the government had failed in providing a lasting solution as that had been the case with other areas in the Region. Thus, the people of the said locality are living together thanks to faith and thanks to the activities of some peace advocates in the region. It should also be noted that many administrative decisions and proposals have never been effectively implemented or whenever done, they had never been at the satisfaction of one community who hold in custody the destruction of the few planted pillars. To that effect, during our findings, we have not been able to be in possession of any official map designed to carry any demarcating exercise.

b. Traditional Authorities and Institutions These institutions had equally suffered from numerous setbacks in achieving peace in the areas under land conflicts. In the contest of Oku and Mbesa first conflict of 1982, this traditional attempt at times was mocked to be a fiasco for barely after six years (1988) another war erupted among these communities. It was however questionable and confirmed that traditional diplomacy in the North-West Region during our period of study had undergone series of fragmentations and division. Similar attempts were experienced in Wum and in Balikumbat during their various conflicts which 720

Interview with Sama Benjamin, Bamenda, July 2nd 2008.

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did not provide a lasting solution to the contestants. This explains why most of those Fons during the era of multi-parties politics, became more concerned with party politics rather than assuming their rules as auxiliaries to the post-colonial administrators. This was one of the most difficult tasks during our research for many of these traditional leaders who turned out to be more political incline, had little or no contributions from our interviews. Many of these Fons like the case of Fon Ndoh of Balikumbat who had been a parliamentarian and the same time Mayor of Balikumbat before 2007, had made use of these administrative powers to his favour. This further explained why a lasting solution at the disputed “T-junction” between the Balikumbats and the Bafanjis had been at a standstill despite all administrative efforts to demarcate the area under dispute. This non compromising attitude of some leaders had also given forum to some Fons in the Tubah Sub-division to pay little or no attention as far as the intercommunity land dispute settlement is concerned. These Fons have not been playing their normal rules as facilitators or agents to the Cameroon government. It is at the bases of these failures that further findings revealed that the North-West Region had been noted as a Region with the highest number of territorial disputes so far registered in Cameroon. Many of these conflicts as noticed in appendix II, are up to date unresolved due to failures related to traditional diplomacy and the attitude of some community leaders when it comes to applying administrative exigencies. The off-rooting of some pillars and claims by some inhabitants in the various demarcated areas have always been with the complicities of their chiefs.721 In this regard, it is true that the North-West Region has recorded a lot of inter-community conflicts related to land problems in recent years. However, we must not lose sight that there are some steps which have been taken towards a harmonious resolution to these conflicts. There had been (still) solidarity among some chiefdoms especially as a result of the advent of the North West Fons Conference and which have been, in some circumstances instrumental towards the resolution of conflicts between communities in the region. Chiefdoms have to be friends to survive and develop. Gluckman posits that, the necessity of friendship by itself is not enough to achieve lasting friendship: Men quarrel over many things; cattle, land, women, prestige, indeed over accidents […] or if men don’t quarrel, they have differences of opinion about the rights and wrongs of a contract, and these differences have to be

721

Interview with Yang Philemon, Yaounde, 03 December 2009.

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Peace can only be achieved by common agreement among the chiefdoms of the North-West Region. It should not just be the initiative of the administration; it must come from within the leaders of the communities. To that effect, we see some sort of antagonism among the Fons as we have the North-West Fons Conference and the North West Fons Union. The North-West Fons Conference would have been more effective if it could be organised as the House of Chiefs we had in the former West Cameroon. The houses of chiefs, which was considered as the senate in the West Cameroon House of Assembly acted as a democratic force to the West Cameroon Government. We therefore feel that the reorganisation of the institution of the House of Chiefs in the Cameroon modern state government will go a long way to accept, in some measure, some elements of the traditional democracy in the Cameroon modern political institutions.723 In making reference to the House of Chiefs, we are not guided by any sentimental desire to idealise the past but we wish to point to the fact that the present state of affairs can be improved and similar structures and institutions set up. In a nutshell, to ignore the past and the future is to a suicidal rhythm.724 When the North-West Development Partnership was launched on Saturday the 14rh of June 2003 in the Bamenda Congress Hall, it was at the witness of some elites of the region who occupied or had been cabinet ministers in the Cameroon government. Some of these elites include: John B. Ndeh formal Minister of transport, Ngafeeson Emmanuel, Secretary of State of National Education, and Oteh Emmanuel Secretary of State for Territorial Administration and Decentralisation in Charge of the Penitentiary and Kibuh Henry of Special Duties at the Presidency. It was hoped that, these personalities could lend a hand by assisting the above structure in the resolution of land conflicts among communities in the North-West Region. It is true that, development cannot take place in an atmosphere of hatred and conflicts.725 On the other hand, it is worthy of note that, the people of the region saw the creation of the North-West Development Partnership as a political strategy to campaign for the upcoming elections by then. In fact, peace was difficult to achieve as a result of the incompatible values and incompatible interests from each of the above elites and chiefs. Each member had been 722

M. Gluckman, 1973, Customs and Conflict in Africa, Oxford, Alden Press, p.9. Aletum Tabuwe, 2001, Political Sociology, Yaounde, Patoh Publishers, p.223. 724 Aletum Tabuwe, 2001, Political Sociology, p.223. 725 Ngwa Cheo, 2003, p.72. 723

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working towards the destruction of the other. In other words, a divided mind cannot stand, for unity is strength. In this view, there are possibilities of many other land conflicts in the region since these parties concerned are adamant in positive readjustments. It is true that, if these Fons can put their efforts together and solve their differences, then they can easily suggest traditional alternatives to conflict resolution.

c. Problems Faced by NGOs The NGOs equally faced series of problems while working and fighting for the restoration of peace in the areas under study. The sustainability of the MBOSCUDA program, unlike EMPEDFoundation, is thanks greatly to external donors. Conflicts between the Mbororo and non-Mbororo over the right to own land increased with population growth. Some powerful corrupt individuals were above the justice system in Cameroon coupled with the frequent transfer of enrolled government officials retard project activities. The inability of MBOSCUDA to extend the Paralegal services to other regions and divisions of Cameroon due to inadequate funding constitutes some of the major challenges. So far as NGO activities are concerned in attempt at conflict resolution, we have just discovered that their activities were limited to two out of the four cases that we have studied in the Region. In this regard, many people still question their raison d’être since their activities and existence are often short-lived. Notwithstanding, the role played by NGOs in conflict resolution in the two areas is still visible. But the trouble is that some of these organizations lack follow-up procedures and one wonders if they are not just money-making ventures since they get funds mostly from foreign sponsors. Some of these organizations start a process and then disappear where no one can trace their whereabouts. However, the execution of EMPD projects as a whole went through as planned, though the organization was struck with the death of the Executive Director Rev. Chief Nja’ah Peter Toh on July 26th, 2007. This brought a temporal rupture to the activities, thus calling for re-planning of activities in the 2nd half of the on-going project. His death left a vacuum in the fast implementation strategies of the NGO since his successor, Muchu Sylvester (his junior brother), could not cope with the challenges left by his predecessor. Just like EMPD, SeP also suffered from financial hardships which resulted in its final closure in 2008, and the operating unit sent back to Bafoussam. It is as a result of the attitude of NGOs described above that some people believe that these organizations are out for money.

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Delays in the disbursement of funds by donors also played negatively on the activities of NGOs in the region. Some NGOs complained that sponsors made things difficult for them by not releasing funds in time. This delay coupled with bureaucratic red-tape made matters worse.726 In a conflict situation, there is need to act fast and prevent the crisis from reaching the threshold of war. Since NGOs depended much on sponsors and foreign donors, some of these organizations found themselves in a helpless situation when their sponsors or donors did not act in time for them to intervene in a conflict situation. At times, the sponsors came with stringent demands which some NGOs could not meet. Richard T. Ndi, SeP’s Director, confirmed this and revealed that at times, they were helpless in conflict situations when their sponsors delayed their response to them. In order to avoid such “embarrassments” NGOs should reduce their over-dependence on donors and turn to local resource mobilisation. Notwithstanding, the role NGOs play in conflict resolution in the North-West Region lack follow up procedures at times, and people wonder whether these organizations are not just money-making institutions since they get funds mostly from foreign sponsors. The lack of collaboration on conflict resolution was not only noticed among NGOs, but equally from conflicting parties. The reluctance of conflicting parties to accept NGOs as mediators in conflict situations was not an easy matter to overcome by these NGOs. The advent of NGOs in the region is rather a recent phenomenon as these organizations surfaced in great numbers in the region after 1990. Hence, knowledge about them among local communities was modest. Before then, the state had always been considered as the sole custodian of peace and arbitrator in intercommunity conflicts. Communities in the region, just like in other regions of the country, always looked up to the state as the lone mediator in conflicts, especially those related to land and boundaries. Local communities and conflicting parties generally minimised and mistrusted the NGOs because their knowledge of NGOs as partners in conflict resolution was very limited. Since most of the NGOs in conflict resolution were based in Bamenda, the regional headquarters little was known about them in rural communities. Therefore, most of them came in to salvage crisis situations in an atmosphere loaded with tension. This resulted in scepticism as people were very cautious about talking to “strangers” on issues they considered too pertinent and could not be understood and handled by a third party. This was especially when they doubted the origins of the NGOs that requested information from them. Some natives feared that the information collected 726

Interview with Ndi Richard, Bamenda, 17th May 2007.

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by these NGOs could be used against them.727 This challenge made the collection of data, diagnosis, analysis, dialogue and the peaceful resolution of the conflicts very difficult. Another aspect of non-collaboration was the refusal by both aggressors to admit their faults and to pay compensation to the aggrieved. NGOs in conflict resolution often found themselves caught in this web. As mediators, they always had to be impartial and tolerant. They had to take time to listen to both parties without necessarily whipping up sentiments or ascribing blames. In a conflict situation, there are often two parties: the “aggressor” and the victim. This impartiality was one of the cardinal factors in conflict resolution because its absence could aggravate rather than extinguish conflicts. In most of the land and boundary conflicts handled by NGOs in the region, this issue always came up. As such, NGOs were often accused of taking sides. This accusation sometimes came from both parties in conflict, generally from the victims of acts of violence who often accused the NGOs of siding with the supposed “aggressors” thereby rendering them incredible.728 In a conflict situation, the need to listen to the parties involved is indispensable. People in conflict situations in the North-West Region spoke with a lot of emotions due to the effects of the conflict on them. It was, therefore, very difficult at times for field staff to discern the truth. Some informants even told lies in order to win the sympathy of mediators.729 This was one of the major problems faced by SeP and EMPED in Balikumbat and Wum Central respectively. Such situations made the process of conflict resolution difficult as more time was needed to listen to all parties before proper diagnosis of the situation. The parties involved usually wanted the outcome to be in their favour and, at times, felt frustrated when their version of the story did not seem to win over the mediators. Some NGO Officials made us to understand that some administrative authorities often looked at these organizations as a threat to them because they often exposed their corrupt practices and delay in the treatment of files. The Executive Secretary of EMPED-Foundation, Sylvester Muchu, testified that some DOs refused to sign authorisations and attestations of recognition to permit them carry out their activities. Some of these corrupt officials asked for envelopes before authorising peace-building seminars in their areas of jurisdiction.730 One of such cases cited by our informant was the refusal by state authorities to issue them letters of recognition and 727

Interview with Rev. Nja’ah Peter Toh, Bamenda, May 18th 2007. Interview with Rev. Nja’ah Peter Toh, Bamenda, May 18th 2007. 729 Interview with Mohammed Bawuro Abubakar, Bamenda, May 20th 2007. 730 Interview with Sylvester Muchu, Bamenda, June 23th 2008. 728

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competence to the British High Commission in Cameroon, which was willing to sponsor activities of EMPED-Foundation in the region. According to our informant, no reason was given for the DO’s refusal and several attempts to find out always ended in vain.731 This kind of attitude, which we found common with Cameroonian state administrators, is totally unacceptable and requires urgent redress so that they can liaise with NGOs in finding lasting solutions to some of the ravaging conflicts in the region. NGOs in the North-West Region were very competitive due to the fact that they competed against one another in conflict resolution. Apart from the NGOs mentioned in this study, there were many others that were also involved in various aspects of conflict resolution. These include the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), Ozone Friendly People (OFP) and the Agro-forestry Promoters (AFP). In order to gain credibility from foreign donors and the local community, they scrambled over conflict areas. This made it difficult for new and younger NGOs to keep pace with older ones, talk less of meeting their objectives. This mad rush led to unhealthy practices such as blackmail and influence peddling, which often caused several victims. A case in point was the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict of 1998 where EMPED-Foundation, SeP and other NGOs claimed to have been the main actors responsible for the restoration of peace in the area. The natives argued that this was usually done at the tail end of violence when both communities were already at peace. This is usually the time when a stream of NGOs floods the villages concerned for the peace-building phase. Toh Nja’ah Helen testified to this claim in the following words. That is what happened in the Balikumbat-Bafanji conflict, which we have been handling for a long time. One NGO, which I will not like to mention the name, came in at the tail end, tipped the traditional rulers to recognise their presence, and by so doing were claiming credit for work they never did. We were shocked when we were received with a lukewarm attitude when we got back for follow up.732

Fon Nana Wanda III of Bawock cited another case of dishonesty among NGOs. He revealed that a certain NGO, which came under the pretext of providing assistance, conducted a couple of interviews, took some photos and video images of him and his people. The NGO then sold the images to a foreign TV station (name withheld) for huge sums of money. This kind of atmosphere resulted in lack of trust, inefficiency and poor output. Some communities in the region were sceptical of NGOs because of 731 732

Interview with Sylvester Muchu. Interview with Madam Toh Nja’ah Helen, Bamenda, June 21st 2008.

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such dishonest attitude. These situations put to question the credibility of NGOs in the Region. NGOs were thus at loggerheads with each other in the quest for recognition in the field and getting funding from donors. NGOs that promoted this kind of unhealthy competition discredited the work of other NGOs and the civil society in the region.733 The ones that worked hard with all sincerity had a difficult time trying to win the confidence of communities in the region while impostors went away with the booty. This tampered with the objectives and credibility of the NGOs. The over-dependence of Cameroonians on government as the sole referee in conflicts also made it difficult for NGOs to operate smoothly. This was visible in the fact that in almost every conflict related to land, the people always rushed to the Divisional Officers for arbitration. This made it difficult for NGOs to operate.734 Moreover, some of the conflicts were either partially handled or neglected altogether by the administrators. Sama Benjamin argues that this was because the administration is not always there to solve problems.735 According to him, when people are able to solve their problems amongst themselves, they help the administration to do its job. People, therefore, need to reduce their over dependence on the government and belief in themselves and NGOs which are out to help them. NGOs in collaboration with the local administration need to establish well-rooted community-based structures that can promote the settling of conflicts both at home and the community level. The issue of insecurity and poor roads in the field was another challenge faced by NGOs. Since some of the conflicts in the region were violent, there was always the issue of insecurity. Conflicting parties were often armed and very sceptical when they saw anybody they did not recognise and felt could be a threat to them. Most often, the State did not provide the necessary security for such missions and neither did the administrations of these NGOs.736 With such an atmosphere of insecurity, workers and volunteers found it very difficult to do their job. On the other hand, the activities of women and other volunteers in actions and

733

E. Neba, Ndenecho, 2009, “NGO Input and Stakeholder Participation in Natural Resource Management: Example of North West Cameroon”, International NGO Journal Vol. 4 (3), pp. 050-056, Available online at http:// www.academicjournals.org/INGOJ, ISSN 1993–8225 © 2009 Academic Journals, consulted on 12 November 2009. 734 Nso and Ndamba, pp.13-17. 735 Interview with Sama Benjamin, Bamenda, 2nd July 2008. 736 Interview with Sama Benjamin.

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discussions aimed at promoting peace in the localities was also a call for concern.

C- Recommendations This section handles the various recommendations proposed by the various field actors and existing literatures. In this sphere, recommendations in relation to the farmer–grazer conflict and those resulting to others cases visited in the North-West Region are discussed in this section.

a. Recommendations in line with the farmer–grazer conflict In Wum, just like in the other areas, land has been the primary cause of the frequent agro-pastoral conflicts. The conflicting episodes in this locality generate a new view on the revision of Decree N° 78/263 of July 3, 1978, organizing the methods of regulating the farmer-grazier dispute in Cameroon at large. The concept of ethnicity among the Mbororo and the indigenous farmers of Aghem (Wum) exacerbated the differences and exposed some weaknesses of traditional diplomacy in the two communities. This also holds true with administrative authorities who faced difficulties in handling the matter, except in a few cases where ministerial orders were observed, with little or no applications. In this regard, recommendations in relation to indigenous farmers and Mbororo grazers in Wum might foster a peaceful co-existence among the contestants, irrespective of their activities in the disputed areas. The first solution has to do with the implementation of the legislation on the demarcation of pastoral fields. In this light, the government should make available more resources for the definition and redefinition of boundaries in the grazing lands for a more harmonious coexistence between farmers and graziers. The department of land should provide resources to the agropastoral commission to enable them perform their role permanently. This will help to avoid unorthodox practices such as the illegal occupation of national lands and the invasion of the transhumance areas by farmers. In this case, the construction of paddocks to confine cattle at night so that they will not get loose and destroy crops is a welcome project. Furthermore, administrative authorities should always turn to the farmer–grazier commission as a last resort when all attempts to dialogue with the conflicting parties have failed. The promotion of discussion forums between farmers and Mbororo graziers will not only promote peaceful coexistence but will also save money and time spent in settling disputes.

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Administrative authorities should avoid taking money from parties in disputes. To facilitate this, the plight of administrative authorities should be looked into to reduce their temptation of receiving bribes from any of the parties contesting a piece of land. However, both farmers and graziers should also learn to channel their problems to the authorities’ concerned showing evidence (photographs) of property destroyed. In addition, traditional authorities, the farmers and graziers should be schooled on the legislation governing grazing and farmland which all form part of the national land policy. As earlier said, graziers should also be encouraged to construct paddocks to confine their animals at night. This method is practiced by one of my key informants, Alhadji Shehu Garba, who resides in Aghem where he has about two hundred (200) of cattle well padlocked in the earlier proposed gazing land in Aghem. However, to facilitate this, the ministries in charge of livestock and agriculture should provide barbed wires and other construction material to the farmers/graziers at subsidized prices. To fight against the unavailability of pastureland in the dry season, the practice of planting grass such as Guatemala and Bracaria should be encouraged. MINEPIA should take up the challenge of making available the different species of grass that can withstand drought. In the same light, a data bank of plants that are good for animals should be created. In related issues, graziers should team up to fight against the invasion of pasture by shrubs and obnoxious grass. This notwithstanding, graziers should be discouraged from burning pastures in an attempt to get rid of unwanted grass, especially in the dry season. Instead, they should be advised to spray herbicides to get rid of such grass. There is also a need to intensify the training of local breeders to produce feed from rice brands, cow horns and plantain peelings. This will help to reduce the pressure on pastures. Besides this, water points should be provided where there are grazers. Digging boreholes could be the ideal solution in this context. In addition, the farmers-graziers commission should avoid over valuing crop damage by cattle as earlier discussed in Chapter Two. Over valuing would not only help to further antagonize the disputing parties, but will also throw the grazer out of production in the long run. The practice of over grazing on a particular site should be discouraged, as over grazing makes the soil vulnerable to erosion, thus rendering the land unfit for agricultural use in the future. Unauthorized transfer of cattle from one area to another must be checked, especially by the veterinary services of the locality. Proper regulations must be carried out to ensure that each changing site follows the cattle paths provided by the grazing authority. This will

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prevent the cattle from trespassing in to the farmland and creating conflicts with indigenous farmers. Finally, the herding of cattle should be done by adult males who can better control the animals instead of minor boys who cannot be held accountable for any criminal offense resulting from handling a large number of cattle alone. Besides, the idea of inter-ethnic marriages should be encouraged so as to tie-up the country’s integrated policy approach of national peace and harmony. By the nature of their occupation, the farmers and graziers are bound to live side by side. Therefore, any solution to the farmers–graziers conflicts must be geared towards creating an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence between the two communities. If the above suggestions are taken into consideration, farmers and graziers will be able not only to sustain their differences, but also share their resources for the common good.

b. Recommendations on other areas visited in the Region Suggestions from the area of study hold the view that there should be a return to original tribal boundaries which should determine jurisdiction over land. Artificial boundaries may be created to delimit administrative jurisdiction and not determine traditional and tribal jurisdiction over land. When conflicts arise, the contesting parties should always be reminded of their original and traditional boundary, which shall enable them to use it to resolve conflicts when need arises. In this line, traditional rulers should be constantly reminded that they must respect their landlord and pay tribute. Encouraging annual ritual to be performed on the land in question could do this. History should not be forgotten but instead should be handed down from generation to generation. When it becomes necessary to create administrative boundaries, recognition should be taken of the original boundaries and where possible administrative boundaries should be contiguous and conform to the original ones. In this way, there will not be arbitrary and artificial boundaries. Where necessary, all the interested parties should be consulted and a consensus arrived at to create an administrative boundary only for the purpose. In this case, the boundary (administrative) should be respected by the administrators. In fact, administrators should not use disputes arising from boundaries to amass wealth. As far as boundary disputes are concerned, administrators have created more disputes than they have solved. They exploit conflict situations for their own benefit. A stop should be put to such ventures.

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The use of dialogue should be encouraged by the administration in situations of conflict. This is true with the case of Oku and Mbesa. If dialogue is used very effectively, the two parties will eventually resolve their differences by mutual agreement. Corruption should be stamped out, given that some parties sometimes make tempting pecuniary offers to administrators during conflict settlements. Administrators should not yield to such temptations. Administrators who fuel disputes should be banned from mediating in conflicts. In this regard, administrative decisions should not be over delayed because postponing opens up more avenues for corruption. Also, administrators should be to remain objective and clear because sometimes administrative decisions are so ambiguous that they cannot be interpreted correctly. Besides dialogue, effective communication has always paved the way for efficient development and cooperation within the masses in times of crisis. However, a rapid global evolution in communication technology in Cameroon and, more recently the case of Radio Oku, has greatly catalysed development in all parts of the contesting communities (Oku and Mbesa) and in the region at large. Only adequately informed persons should embark on veritable and meaningful development in all spheres, especially in the domain of peaceful coexistence. In this view, self-knowledge and the ability to perpetually act towards improving the living conditions constitute a good method to prevent or solve war. Following our fieldwork experience, we noticed that the advent of the Oku Rural Radio in February 1997 was perceived with mixed feelings within and out of the community. Indeed, the installation of Radio Transmission equipment on Elak-Oku which is received more than fifty kilometres away from the station has enhanced communication in the area and has given forum to programmes that are run specially in the Oku language, English, French and partially in neighbouring dialects such as Lamso, Noni, Limbum and Laikom. It should, however, be noted that the Oku rural radio which went operational in March 1997, has and is still acting as a major tool in promoting peace between Oku and her neighbours. In the course of the investigation, we realized that some commissions were formed with the aim of resolving the conflicts between Balikumbat versus Bafanji, as well as of Bambili versus Babanki-Tungo. These commissions failed for various reasons. From the point of view of concrete institution-building, there is perhaps no better evidence than the creation of a boundary commission. This commission should have a legal backing and a good text of application, preferably an act of parliament or a presidential decree. The commission should comprise the representatives of

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the state: Ministers of Defence, Territorial Administration, Justice, as well as the Delegate General in charge of Internal Security, one member nominated by the president, and representatives from the villages concerned. The commission will have the sole responsibility of resolving ethnic conflicts and preventing conflict in the country. It should operate through two technical committees under the Minister of Territorial Administration. The solution to conflicts like those discussed in this book could depend on increased contact amongst the communities. It is important to note that tension reduced when there was contact between equal status members of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo. This is possible because the Bambili and Babanki-Tungo villages are not separated by any natural features-rivers, mountains and valleys. Thus their permeability gives room for contact and, therefore, if these contacts are better handled, they can reduce conflict. Both communities ought to understand that interaction with the other side is frequently a matter of necessity and even survival. This is especially true with the two neighbouring villages because they both enjoy a high level of economic inter-dependence. Another suggestion that can bring peace between the two communities is to determine who owns the disputed land at T-junction and Ntah respectively. From our findings, it is very difficult to know who owns that piece of land because none of the villages is ready to show a land certificate in accordance with Decree No. 76-165 of the 27th of April 1976 that establishes the conditions for obtaining land certificates. Proviso 1 Article 1 of the Decree states that the land certificate shall be the main official document of real property. Neither Bambili nor Babanki-Tungoh seems to possess the required land certificate. Therefore, the State has the right to claim the disputed piece of land as National Land. According to part II of Ordinance No. 77-1 of January 10th, 1977, National lands shall of right comprise lands which at the date on which the present Ordinance enters into force, are not classed into the public or private property of the State and other public others. Based on the above, the government can transform the disputed area into a national reserve or offer it to foreign investors who could then make use of it. On the other hand, the government can accelerate agricultural activities in the area by opening up an experimentation farm which will be affiliated with the Regional School of Agriculture in Bambili. By doing this, the two contestants will retreat from carrying out acts of aggression in the disputed area. The government could also build a school or hospital on the disputed piece of land for the people of both communities. As earlier mentioned, the government can encourage provincialism. This means that the inhabitants should have a sense of belonging to a region.

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The nation Cameroon is a combination of regions which are made up of clan lineages. It can safely be said that a problem cannot be solved at a macrolevel when the micro-level is ignored. In this case, the inhabitants of the region are compelled to know and carve out certain objectives geared towards the socio-economic development of their region. For instance, the North-West Elite Association and the Chiefs Conference should be overhauled in terms of objectives and structure. It would be an overstatement to assume that the above proposed solutions for resolving land and boundary conflicts between communities in the North-West Region in particular and in Cameroon in general can be the best models. But if the parties concerned skilfully make use of these solutions, it is likely that they will be able to re-establish harmonious relations. Ethnic or inter-tribal conflicts are common in the North-West Region. This work, a little contribution to our collective history, highlights some elements of these conflicts, which call for reflection and for the tolerance of one another. We notice that making peace and keeping peace are much more difficult for a people than making war. At any rate, it appears that the members of every society, small or great, think of themselves as better than the members of the other communities. In a nutshell, this work argued that land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region have become so protracted that resolving them has been difficult and complex. In fact, while trying to make a historical analysis of land and boundary conflicts in this part of the country, we have seen how this field of study is essential in monitoring and assessing the impact of social policy, and questioning accepted assumptions in these areas. We have tried to bring out the pertinent issues concerning land and boundary problems and to clarify understanding in the Region. We have supplied the necessary information, brought out the background and causes to the conflicts, pointed out the evolution of territorial conflicts in respective cases coupled with the attempted solutions. We have equally proposed solutions collected from our informants to the quagmire of territorial conflicts in the North-West Region in particular, and in Cameroon in general. From our findings, related conflicts over land elsewhere in Africa for example in countries like Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda and Zambia to name a few can be traced to factors that are foreign to the African system of arbitration and resolutions of conflicts. Thus, the only veritable and viable solution to these conflicts over land, which appears to be common and endemic, is to go back to the source and find out how these conflicts were peacefully resolved in the earlier times before European colonization since all peace attempts had never provided a lasting solution. In this regard,

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further research should be carried out on other types or forms of conflicts within and out of the North-West Region with their various peace attempts. This shall help future researchers to possibly establish a comparative analysis on those conflicts, since this work was limited to selected cases of land grapping and conflict situations in the North-West Region of Cameroon. Altogether, this chapter had as main objective to assess the role played by the various peace advocates in an attempt to resolve land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region. The chapter has so far examined the various peace attempts by the Cameroon administration, traditional and religious authorities, NGOs, women groups and other voluntary mediators. From all indications, this chapter has thus played a leading role in discussing peace attempts in the conflicting localities. Judging from our field work experience, we can confidently argue that in situations of conflict resolution, a collective approach to participation is highly required from the intervening party (third party) so as to win the confidence of the inhabitants of the communities at war. In this respect, if both mediators and the two parties work hand in glove, a genuine solution will be achieved on issues where some doubts still persist. This explains why this chapter ends with some recommendations for the cases discussed. In fact, the general conclusion shall then provide a panoramic view of the chapters discussed. This final section examines the conceptual and theoretical linkage with our general introduction and ends with lessons learned throughout this investigation.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Results from our research work in the North-West Region show that the historiography of this region has been subjected to various types of studies. These studies include sociological, anthropological and historical works. Despite this vast coverage, very few studies have investigated the hostile inter-societal relations in the North-West Region, especially during the postcolonial period. Therefore, the work focuses on land grabbing and conflict episodes in this part of Cameroon from 1958 to 2017. This study relied on information from diverse sources such as archival materials, oral interviews and a litany of published and unpublished documents. It shows that conflicts here were shaped by multifaceted factors. From the findings, we were able to see how the conflict of the contested land resurfaced and how government policies in the various cases rather helped in the escalation of the conflict. This study argues very strongly that land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region have become so protracted that solving them has turned out to be a complex and difficult task. From the analysis of field evidence, we found that government’s laxity, greed of the Fons and some modern and traditional elites partnered to make a bad case. It was equally found that population increase without proper land management policies between the concerned communities was also a main cause of land conflicts. In most cases, the work revealed that the indigenous population in the region increased (and is still increasing) against the background of a stable arable land. It also revealed that ethnic conflicts in this region are a product of the ever-growing centralised state formation characterised by ambitious, expansionist and hegemonistic rulers. The rulers embarked on an outward push for land to accommodate the increasing population. It also explains why this region is rife with ethnic conflicts. It is evident from the work that inter-community conflicts between the local inhabitants stemmed, to a certain degree, from economic imperatives. This is because of the fertility of the disputed piece of land and the contestants involved in carrying out their daily economic activities in the disputed region as seen in Chapters Two and Three. Furthermore, the work tried to investigate, with significant success, the owner of the disputed areas following our respective cases. It suggests that in the present context, ownership of land can no longer be by claims that have their relevance in

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ancestral rights, but the possession of a Land Certificate as spelled out by Decree No. 76/165 of the 27th of April 1976 elaborately presented in Chapter Five. It further stipulates that without a Land Certificate, the disputed land becomes state owned. But none of our contestants had provided any official document to back their claims on the issue. The need to keep peace and order on the one hand, and to apply the law as it should be on the other hand, got into a very tight contest giving room to look for conflict management strategies on the basis of sound judgement which anchors a number of subjected elements. From the study, it is evident that from the beginning (during early settlements) the people shared many common features and interacted in several domains especially in social and economic undertakings. From a social point of view, they inter-married and shared at times the same artistic values as is the case of the Tikars. From an economical point of view, they shared similar treasury and market activities. Since they were dynamic societies, they were subjected to internal and external upheavals with the consequent periodic expansion of the territorial framework. In the context of the present conflicts and problems plaguing the North-West Region, various attempts were made by various peace advocates to resolve the differences, but with little success. Some of the advocates involved were civil administrators and legal experts, among others. Some of the proposed solutions included the creation of commissions, attempted demarcations and meetings convened by the civil administration, educated/traditional elite, religious and Non-Governmental Organizations. These endeavours had little success because of a lack of consensus between the contestants, difficulties in demarcating the disputed area, a lack of technocrats in the domain of land surveying, psychological differences (ethnic consciousness and ethnic determinism) between the belligerent groups, and the egoistic, expansionist and hegemonistic tendencies of some Fons in the region. In Chapter One, we attempted to bring out the historical background of the various communities that constitute the present inhabitants of the North-West Region of Cameroon. In fact, this chapter ended with a critical assessment of the general causes of land boundary conflicts in the North-West Region. The causes are geographical, political, social and economic. Although land is always the central and obvious conflict issue, land conflicts often disguise other societal conflicts. They are often just a visible part of a more serious conflict which is rooted much deeper in the society and its history. Very often, land conflicts only reflect general inequality or unfair distribution of wealth, voice and power in a

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given society and the discrimination against certain groups such as women or ethnic minorities. Chapter Two documented the first case study in relation to land and boundary conflict in Mezam Division of the North-West Region of Cameroon. The reason for this choice was simply due to the fact that the land conflict opposing the two communities of Bambili and Babanki-Tungo was regarded as the oldest boundary conflict inherited by the Cameroon government from colonial powers. This chapter focused on the hostile relations between Bambili and Babanki-Tungo of Tubah Sub-division in Mezam Division. The area of attraction between the two communities had been Ntah, for it was noted by both communities to be a good area for agriculture as a result of its fertility. This area of contest had often brought these communities at loggerheads when need came up. We also noted here that colonial efforts such as the Westmacott decision of 1958 aimed at delimiting and demarcating the contesting area yielded no lasting solution since the decisions were partially accepted by the contestants during the post-colonial regime. Up to date, the post- colonial administration has been unable to provide a lasting solution since the two communities had hardly accepted the final boundaries retraced by government officials following series of attempts to demarcate the contesting area. In this regard, this protracted boundary problem has posed serious difficulties to the Cameroon government to resolve it once for all. Chapter Three like the previous, examined the conflicting relationship between the communities of Balikumbat and Bafanji in Ngoketunjia Division. Care was taken to examine specific aspects such as the geographical and historical context of the two communities. The origin, coupled with the stages of the various conflicts over land and boundary matters constituted a major focus in this chapter. In this regard, we discussed a series of land and boundary conflicts recorded from 1966 right up to 1998 as the latest event in conflict emanating from boundary issues. Significant studies also focused on the consequences of the conflict since it has affected inter-community relations in Balikumbat Sub-division in particular, and Ngoketunjia Division in general. The failure by the Cameroon government to react promptly so as to demarcate the conflict zone led to constant disputes within the contestants. In Chapter Four, we discussed the advent of the Mbororo graziers in Menchum Division during the period of the 1950s. Their instability to normalise friendly relations with the Aghem natives as early as 1965 alongside the mastery of the area under study (Wum Central) created a conflicting atmosphere often described as the farmer grazier friction. From our findings, it was noted that the indigenous farmers of Aghem laid series

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of complaints to their local chiefs and to the successive administrators but with no permanent solutions. As a result of total distrust and open war, the relationship between the Mbororo graziers and the indigenous farmers led to series of bloody episodes. We showed that peace reigned because during the colonial era, the cattle owners paid a special tax known as the ‘jangali tax’, and little attention was paid to the subsequent implications of land conflict during the post-colonial period. Government laxity to provide a lasting solution to the problem gave birth to series of deathly wars amongst the two communities. Chapter Five’s focus was on one of the recent and most devastating land conflicts in recent times in the Region under study. Like the previous cases, this chapter set out to examine the extent of land and boundary conflicts between friendly Fondoms of Oku and Mbesa in Bui and Boyo Divisions respectively. From our investigations, we remarked that these people thought that war rather than diplomacy could be the alternative means to resolve their differences over land matters. In this regard, since 1982, Oku and Mbesa went to war four (4) times in 1982, 1988, 2007 and 2008 over the ownership of the piece of land located at Embel, a strip of land bordering the two communities. This chapter has closely examined the relationship between the two Fondoms before war time moments. Following investigations, it was noticed that war helped to widen the gap in interchiefdom diplomacy between the two communities. Really, the effects of war as noticed in our analysis are lamentable, especially when lives and properties were tempered with as earlier discussed in the successive war episodes in this chapter. Despite significant efforts to redress the situation, much still needs to be done to harmonise relations between the two communities. One should also understand that this constant and prolonged conflict made it difficult for the people of both communities to freely interact as was the case before 1982, especially in the domain of traditional diplomacy. Chapter Six examined the work of the various peace advocates in promoting peace, solidarity and the eventual resolution of the numerous land and boundary conflicts discussed in various cases in the North-West Region. This chapter elaborated the various peace attempts by the Cameroon administration, traditional institutions and authorities, religious institutions and authorities, the activities of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) the role of women groups and some voluntary mediators. This chapter equally examined the challenges faced by these peace advocates, and the challenges recorded in specific cases and at different levels of intervention. The major problem here was the frequent and protracted conflicts which rendered resolution difficult and almost impossible. This

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explains why in this work we still maintain the view that land and boundary conflicts in the North-West Region has become so protracted that resolving them became complex or difficult that generated and regenerated numerous land conflict in the region. In this study, we discussed the North-West Region of Cameroon, equally referred to as the Bamenda Grassfields. We focused on a few typical cases of land and boundary problems in this Region that can help us make a systematic historical analysis of the situation in that part of our country. Talking about conflicts in general, one is tempted to say that people do not learn from history. There is still a long way to go in relation to building a universal brotherhood. Throughout history, war or conflict has always been a man-provoked hazard that claims lives, pollutes the environment, and sows seeds of misery, much more than natural calamity can do. From the findings and analyses throughout the different segments of the study and from the premise of the research questions and theoretical links provided, this study validates the following points: the causes of antagonism should be viewed from a multidimensional perspective; the economy is at the core of the antagonism as communities struggle over land ownership, and the policies of the civil administration have contributed to the conflict. The antagonism also appears to have a psychological root, resulting from the past history of the belligerent communities. This is because the neighbouring villages concerned see themselves as ethnically different, though they are all of the North-West Region. The 1990 era further reveals that while land and boundary disputes remain the principal source of inter-communities conflict, these conflicts were instigated by some elites and politicians during the early 1990s for selfish enrichment. Evidence from campaign speeches during the periods before parliamentary or municipal elections attest to this. Tribal and ethnic sentiments were stirred and people were induced to fight political opponents physically. A genuine case of this is drawn from the political attitude of the Fon of Balikumbat, which led to the 1995 Balikumbat versus Bafanji conflict. From the above, it is evident that ethnic identity occupies a prominent position in relations among people and communities. The ethnic identity of the people living around the contested areas undermines the rights over the piece of land, as each community looks at the other as different, though they are all grassfielders. One might, therefore, raise the argument that this contested identity over land struggle is partly responsible for the increasing antagonism between the North Westerners. Ethnicity is a special form of identification wherein group histories and cultural traditions are capable of producing either constructive or destructive actions when emphasized and associated with competition for reources. As such, identity is an expression

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which refers to the ways in which collectivities are distinguished in the relations with other collectivities; similarities are the dynamic principles of identity, the heart of social life, as echoed by Ger Duijzings. From the ongoing findings and analyses this study seeks to validate and call for a reshaping of the theories and schools of thought discussed below.

Theoretical Links and Contentions First and foremost, the work disqualifies the much-hallowed Johann Heinrich Von Thünens’ theory of economic land value and usage. Most of the conflicts and boundary problems identified in this study have little or nothing to do with the value of land depreciating as one moves away from the centre of activities. If Bamenda town is taken to mean the centre of all activities of the different towns closer to where most conflicts have occurred, it is clear that the zones of conflict are not of interest as a result of their relation to the centre of activities but rather, as a result of their intrinsic qualities that emerge from an arena of sources. This conflict situation may range from the economic value of the area in question to the traditional value attached to it or better still, to the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the area. The study strongly holds that the persistent land and boundary conflicts in this region encouraged a high level of expansionist, annexationist and economic greed that has become ingrained in the collective psychology some ethnic groups. It therefore goes that Von Thünens’ theory of economic land use lacks universal applicability because the value of land is not only measured by a price tag, but also by an arsenal of concerns that are better understood by experts in polemical studies like Claude Innes, Joseph S. Nye and William Zartman. Secondly the study disqualifies the Marxist School of thought or theoretical stand point which suggests that all conflicts can be traced and better apprehended only from the premise of economic motives. Here we have seen that not all the conflicts emerged as a result of economic consideration. While it is true that economic consideration contributed immensely to make the North-West Region a reputed land conflict zone, many of these conflicts were caused by pride, traditional arrogance and the willingness of the modern and traditional elites to divert people’s attention to the forest and in the conflicting areas so that they can find space to market themselves in the present context of political bandwagonism. The case of Fon Doh Gah Gwanyi III of Balikumbat was a clerical example in this context. As to the theories of functionalism of Emile Dunkhie and basic needs of Max Weber announced and developed at the research protocol of

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this study, our findings give us reasons to posit that both of these theories, including a battery of post-modernist theories, can be employed in mixed function approach to explain the constant escalation of conflicts in this region. This is particularly true when the causes, manifestations and the dynamics employed to manage conflicts are seen more from a political science or sociological stand point. As noted in this study, the 1990s was a period of drastic proliferation of conflicts in the North-West Region as a result of dramatic paralyses of the state institutions which was further sustained by the hardships imposed by economic crises. These are all developments that were not earlier perceived in the elaboration of theories dealing with conflicts. The general breakdown of state authority that resulted from the confusion that followed the restoration of multiparty politics in the early 1990s gave room for some traditional rulers to settle old scores and try to regain lost ground through conflicts. This was probably because some individuals and village communities, due to their political leanings felt confident that they could reverse earlier established boundaries and other decisions to their favour. Against the zero-sum realist school of thought which suggests that human societies, especially those under study are like a black box with most often conflicting aims of the control of land, people and the resources. This study then proposes a post-modernist approach to conflict resolution and management techniques. In this direction, Claude Innes argued that with genuine zeal and concerted action by the stake holders of any conflict, swords that were formerly prepared for war can systematically be transformed into ploughs for use in farming. In this context, dualist and multi-dimensional approaches are required to understand the conflicts. We made a case here that from the way the state has issued regulations on land and the complexities surrounding the demarcation of boundary either by the colonial school or the agents of the present governance, a purely legalist approach to management of conflicts and boundary problems may only help to calm down than provide lasting solutions to the problems in this zone. From here we find it compelling for any actor involved in the pursuit of a solution to these precarious problems to take into account sociological and anthropogenic factors of the area concerned. In this realm, our findings give the latitude to send across a number of messages.

Lessons Learned/Thesis Standpoint Looking at all the procedures involved in resolving land conflicts, we would conclude that it is easier to prevent a conflict than to end it. In resolving a

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conflict, we cannot do much about the harm that has already been done. It is, therefore, a more worthwhile investment for every government to invest in land conflict prevention measures by putting the right policies in place and ensuring implementation of what the policies require. At first glance, most land conflicts seem to be simple and straightforward. Some really are. Many, however, are not that easy to comprehend. That is, when the second party also tells its side of the story, contradictions between that and the first party’s interpretation arise, and it quickly becomes difficult to tell who is right and who is wrong. Therefore, analysing a land conflict always requires listening to all parties involved, some of whom are often not easy to identify. To understand the nature of the problem, it can be useful to look at the land conflict from an historical or chronological perspective. This can be done with the help of timelines as those discussed in the North-West Region of Cameroon. People, especially those in a position to improve the situation, often ignore land conflicts until they cannot be overlooked any longer, as tension and violence rise to a level which threatens major parts of society. However, many land conflicts linger for years in a state of pre-conflict or early conflict characterised by tense instability and repeated confrontation which, each time, raise the average level of tension. Intervention should start here so as avoid the crisis that may come. Thus, finding a realistic solution for all parties at loggerheads. Of course, this is only possible if no party has totally lost face or been entirely destroyed by the other. To achieve this requires that the hidden land conflict be uncovered and intentionally named. While everybody may talk about it in private, the issue might not be publicly addressed or, if it is, it may be ignored by those responsible for it. NGOs, local associations as well as land administration can play a major role in this process of peace building since they are in touch with the masses and are specialised in the activity. Documentation can be compiled in different ways: National Human Rights Commissions often have detailed accounts of violent land conflict manifestations such as evictions. NGOs sometimes gather information and publish lists of all land conflicts (cases) within a country or a given area. This was the case of EMPED-Foundation and SeP which did amazing work in the North-West Region. Some of these NGOs are well known for identifying the conflict issue, its parties and the previous attempts and failures to solve it. Land administrations can create GIS-related databases which do not only describe the type of conflict but also indicate the location and size of the property/properties involved. Not all government administrators are open to addressing the issue of their own illegal allocations of state land. Most administrators still ignore

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or even deny such accusations. In this case, there might be few alternatives to a public denunciation by civil society. Once land conflicts are identified and brought to the level of discussion, their settlement can start. This can involve classical or alternative ways of conflict resolution, special land tribunals, land management measures, special local contracts, land conflict resolution by the victims and land governance. Many land conflicts can be predicted, and if not avoided, at least mitigated if provisions are made against them in time. It is, therefore, crucial to be aware of those changes and occurrences that have the potential to trigger land conflicts. Once a potential cause of conflict has been identified, the extent of possible land conflicts and the scope of their social, economic, ecological and political consequences should be roughly calculated and immediately communicated to decision-makers and responsible land management experts at both the central and local level. Land conflict experts should preferably discuss with these decision-makers so that appropriate measures are taken to avoid confrontation. Proposals should be made to them in case the conflict is not prevented in time. Legal security is the key to preventing land conflicts. Where property rights are clearly defined and secured and where conflicting interests over land can be negotiated in a fair and predictable environment, conflicts over who owns or may use which piece of land can be reduced to a minimum. Land registration is another important factor. To secure property rights, all existing claims have to be documented and overlapping interests addressed and clarified in a fair and transparent way. Land registration can be done in many different ways and does not necessarily have to include a technology-based land information system or highly accurate surveying. It should be as simple and cost effective as possible, “corruption-proof”, adapted to local conditions, established with active public participation and reflecting all legitimated property rights: formal, informal, customary and religious; state, private and common/collective; primary and secondary; permanent and temporary. In areas with great potential for land conflicts such as peri-urban areas, systematic land registration should be considered. Customary land administration should not be underestimated so far as preventing land conflict is concerned. To prevent conflicts resulting from either legal pluralism or a misuse of customary power over land allocation, a number of provisions can be made: 1. 2. 3.

Legal recognition of customary land rights. Identification of the boundaries of customary areas if possible. Identification of tasks and responsibilities of customary chiefs.

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4. 5. 6. 7.

Improvements in record-keeping, to avoid multiple allocations of the same parcel. Adjustment of customary land law to conform to the national constitution and human rights doctrines in regard to equity. Establishment of local control mechanisms and the introduction of sanctions for chiefs misusing their authority by irregularly allocating land for their own profit. Empowerment of communities living on customary land classified as state land to directly negotiate with investors who receive concessions there from the state in order to prevent people being dispossessed of their customary rights but instead to share in the profit made from and on their lands.

On the other set, the establishment of the rule of law is a prerequisite for all other measures for the prevention and resolution of land conflicts. This includes clearly defined, non-concealing, non-contradictory laws, legal norms and by-laws without loopholes. Also, clearly defined roles, functions and responsibilities of all participating actors, a hierarchical court structure, administrative courts responsible for monitoring, an independent media and public participation in the making of laws and rules are required. Land conflicts are the visible manifestation or outcome of the often-invisible power and politics concerning access to and use of land. People generally have limited knowledge of who has what influence on the way decisions about land are made and enforced, or how these individuals and groups use that power. Governance of land is rather obscure, and often threatened by corruption. To prevent land conflicts, land governance has to be transparent, fair and sustainable. How can land governance become good? Land governance can be called “good” when decision-making over access to and use of land as well as its enforcement and the reconciliation of conflicting interests are done in a fair and transparent way, allowing everyone to equitably participate and to receive an adequate share while at the same time guaranteeing economically, socially and environmentally sustainable land development. Good land governance, therefore, requires the honest and serious application of certain principles to land policy, land related legislation, state land management, land administration, land management, land reforms, land conflict resolution among others. These principles include: equity, accountability, integrity, transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency, rule of law, legal security, civic engagement, subsidiary, security and sustainability.

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A key governance principle for the prevention of land conflicts is equity. Once there is a sense for equity, the realisation of other principles will follow. Equity in this regard has several dimensions. It includes the equal recognition of formal, customary, religious and informal legitimate property rights over land. It also means respecting the land rights of men and women, as well as the legitimate claims of marginalised and vulnerable groups such as indigenous people, orphans, the elderly, minorities, refugees and slum dwellers. Equity also calls for inclusiveness of all stakeholders in decision-making on land issues such as land policy processes, land commissions, land tribunals, land laws out of many. Finally, it means that all decisions on land, including those on conflicting interests over land, should firmly rest upon respect for fundamental human rights.

SOURCES CONSULTED

A- Primary Sources 1- Archival Materials a. National Archives Buea (NAB) NAB, A.B. Westmacolt, Annual Report of Bamenda Division for the Year Ended 31st December 1957. NAB, Ab23, An Assessment report on the clans of Bandop Area in Bamenda Division of Cameroon Province, 1925. NAB, Ab 32, Cantle L., Assessment Report on the Wum Native Authority of the Bamenda Division Cameroon Province, 1932. NAB, Assessment Report on Bafut Tribal Area of Bamenda Division, 1926. NAB, C.J.A. Gregg, Assessment Report on the Meta Clan of the Bamenda Division for the Year Ended 31st December 1924. NAB, Cb 1928, Annual Report for Bamenda Division, 1928-1934. NAB, Chairman of Babanki-Tungoh to the S.D.O., 19 April 1995. NAB, Divisional Officer, D.N.N. Pufong to the Area Surveyor and Lands Officer, 8 March 1972. NAB, E.G. Hawkesworth, an Assessment Report on the Bafut Area of the Bamenda Division Cameroon Province Nigeria. File No. 3325 (Ab2), 1926. NAB, File No 19124, Ab 17(3), Education of Nomadic Bororo. NAB, File No 59/26/Ad2, Assessment Report on Bikom 1927. NAB, File No B.2879 (1) Handing over notes (2) cattle control officers Bamenda, 1952 PAB; AB 17 (5) File No 2329 Vol. III Fulani in Bamenda reorganization. NAB, File No Q6/QF/b/522/1971: Fon Galabe III of BalikumbatVs Afongwen (Sic) and the Government of West Cameroon. NAB, Fon of Babanki-Tungoh to the Assistant Cattle Control Officer, Bafut Area Council, 29 June 1973. NAB, G.S. Podevin, Annual Report of Bamenda Division for the Year Ended 31st December 1916. NAB, Hook, intelligence Report on the Associated Village Groups Occupying the Bafut Native Authority Area. File No. B.3059 (AB 3C).

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NAB, Hunt W.E, Report on the Bamenda Division of the Cameroons Province for the League of Nations for the Year Ended, 31st December, 1921. NAB, Hunt W.R., Annual Report of the Bamenda Division for the Year Ended 31 December 1920. NAB, Hunt, W.E. An Assessment Report on the Bali clan in the Bamenda Division of the Cameroon Province (MS), 1925. NAB, J.C. Drummond-Hay, An Assessment Report on the Bandop Area in the Bamanda Division for the Year Ended 31st December, 1926. NAB, N.C. Denton, Annual Report of Bamanda Division for the year Ended 31 December 1933. NAB, Native Authority Ordinance XIV of 1916 and 1918, Action under 1922, Ja /a 1922/3. NAB, NW/Ea, 1929/1, File N.B. 86, 34/1929, Inspection Notes by Resident, Cameroon Province 1929. NAB, OF/1933/1: Inter-Community Boundary Settlement Ordinance, 1933. NAB, R.J. Hook, Intelligence Report on the Associated Village Groups occupying the Bafut Native Authority Area. File No. B. 3059 (Ab3c), 1934. NAB, Sub Divisional Officer to the Senior Divisional Officer pf Mezam, Bamenda, 15 November 1995. NAB, Tweed. A.E., Assessment Report on the Ngie Families of the Bamenda Division, (Ms), 1923. NAB, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1608(XV), April 21, 1961. NAB, W.E Hunt, Annual Report for Bamenda for Bamenda Division, 1922.

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INDEX OF NAMES AND CONCEPTS

A

B

Abakar Ahamat, 227, 273 Abouem Atchoyi, 133 Africa, 1, 2, 11, 22, 24, 40, 41, 49, 52, 116, 127, 148, 150, 160, 199, 201, 202, 324, 335, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 369 Aghem, 4, 5, 19, 27, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 171, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 267, 268, 278, 279, 280, 301, 302, 307, 310, 311, 313, 314, 315, 331, 339, 356, 367 agriculture, 13, 49, 152, 197, 199, 213, 331, 339 agro-pastoral problem, 172, 181, 185, 302, 314 Aku, 19, 27, 150, 154, 156, 166, 171, 175, 193, 195, 204, 351 Alhadji Manto, 171 Alhaji, xiv Ardo, xiv, 156, 161, 165, 178, 180, 181, 187, 190, 191, 192, 279, 311 Ardo Umaru, 178, 180, 278, 279 Awemo II, 351 Awing, 11, 25, 48, 263 Ayissi Mvondo, 229, 269

Babanki Tungoh, 4, 5, 47, 57, 61, 260, 261, 262, 263, 286, 287, 318, 319, 320, 321, 333, 334, 339, 366 Babungo, 19, 109, 117, 125, 126, 199, 200, 201, 225 Bafanji, 4, 5, 19, 22, 28, 33, 45, 47, 52, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 265, 266, 288, 294, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 312, 321, 322, 333, 339, 349, 350, 365, 366, 368 Bafut, 11, 13, 17, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33, 42, 48, 51, 67, 76, 109, 118, 125, 126, 128, 140, 154, 155, 157, 177, 278, 320, 348, 349, 350, 351, 363 Bafut Area Council, 348 Bah Mbi, 157, 171, 180, 184, 185, 279 Bah Mbi III, 171, 184, 185, 279 Bali-Gangsin, 19 Baligashu, 103, 104, 112, 117, 122, 125, 135 Balikumbat, 4, 5, 26, 45, 47, 51, 52, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142,

374 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 265, 266, 288, 294, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 321, 323, 333, 339, 349, 350, 365, 366, 367, 368 Bali-Nyonga, 19, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 51, 124 Bambalang, 19, 29, 109, 110, 117, 137, 147, 199 Bambili, 4, 5, 11, 19, 22, 23, 42, 43, 47, 48, 51, 52, 57, 61, 67, 76, 99, 111, 197, 208, 210, 211, 214, 260, 261, 262, 263, 286, 287, 318, 319, 320, 333, 334, 339, 351, 353, 366, 367, 368 Bambui, 22, 23, 33, 46, 48, 51, 52, 67, 76, 203, 286, 366 Bameleke, 26 Bamenda District, 32, 34 Bamenda Division, 7, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 76, 116, 117, 118, 123, 124, 125, 128, 153, 157, 348, 349, 350, 366 Bamenda Grassfields, 4, 5, 8, 18, 19, 22, 24, 36, 43, 48, 111, 119, 120, 123, 149, 152, 157, 158, 312, 314, 322, 325, 332, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 344, 350, 352, 355, 367, 368 Bamenda province, 34 Bamukumbit, 19, 103, 104, 108, 109, 110, 115, 116, 117, 118, 122, 125, 126, 133, 135, 136, 147, 296, 299 Bamunka, 19, 22, 109, 117, 120, 125, 126 Bamunkah, 103 Bangola, 19, 22 Belo Sub-division, 4, 5, 197, 234, 268 Benakuma, 11, 151, 307 Big Babanki, 19, 22 Biya, 252 Border, 136, 355, 357, 360, 361, 362, 364, 366 Borderland, 354, 355

Index boundary, 1, 2, 3, 4, 18, 23, 30, 32, 33, 34, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49, 57, 118, 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 135, 136, 139, 149, 176, 220, 221, 226, 228, 229, 235, 246, 247, 248, 250, 257, 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 269, 270, 271, 273, 281, 286, 287, 292, 294, 312, 314, 322, 327, 332, 333, 335, 337, 338, 339, 340, 342, 343, 353, 361 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 354 Boyo Division, 4, 5, 15, 150, 153, 196, 220, 268, 270 British, 5, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 42, 116, 124, 127, 202, 220, 226, 357, 366, 369 Bui Division, 4, 5, 196, 197, 223, 247, 268, 270, 286, 369 C Cameroon, xiv, 5, 7, 8, 10, 14, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 38, 42, 46, 47, 49, 57, 76, 103, 110, 111, 116, 127, 129, 130, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 148, 150, 151, 153, 155, 156, 159, 160, 167, 170, 172, 173, 175, 184, 185, 196, 197, 200, 205, 207, 208, 218, 225, 231, 251, 258, 261, 264, 265, 266, 267, 270, 278, 279, 295, 299, 300, 301, 302, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 318, 322, 323, 324, 325, 330, 333, 335, 336, 338, 339, 340, 344, 348, 349, 350, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 363, 364, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372 Chamba, 4, 19, 26, 27, 28, 103, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 119, 122, 124, 126, 147 Charly Gabriel Mbock, 267

Land Grabbing and Conflict in the North West Region of Cameroon: An Endemic Situation, 1958-2017 Chem-Langhëë, 362 chief, 23, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 46, 108, 112, 117, 119, 124, 129, 132, 154, 159, 160, 170, 171, 185, 188, 210, 211, 215, 216, 219, 249, 267, 278, 351 chiefdom, 11, 19, 23, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 40, 49, 51, 52, 113, 122, 125, 144, 155, 204, 205, 210, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 231, 250, 254, 257, 340, 357, 366, 367, 368 Chiefdom, 278, 359, 369 Chofong, 136 Christian, 160, 208, 261, 286, 287, 288, 301 conflict, 4, 5, 22, 23, 30, 32, 36, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 117, 118, 123, 124, 125, 127, 139, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 155, 162, 171, 174, 176, 177, 178, 181, 183, 184, 188, 194, 212, 213, 217, 219, 221, 225, 226, 227, 228, 230, 237, 252, 257, 260, 264, 268, 270, 278, 280, 281, 286, 288, 289, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 306, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 325, 330, 332, 333, 334, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 343, 344, 345, 346, 357, 358, 363, 365, 366, 368, 370 D delimitation, 225 demarcation, 33, 40, 42, 136, 170, 225, 226, 247, 248, 267, 270, 271, 307, 314, 318, 320, 321, 330 Doh Gah Gwanyi, 127 Donga Mantung, 8, 16, 20, 311

375

E Ecumenical Mission, xiv, 295, 300, 352 Elak, xiv, 200, 201, 205, 208, 214, 215, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 226, 229, 230, 235, 238, 239, 240, 243, 246, 247, 250, 252, 254, 286, 289, 290, 333 Embel, 212, 220, 222, 225, 228, 229, 231, 234, 235, 238, 239, 241, 270, 281, 340 EMPED, xiv, 294, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 310, 311, 313, 344 Endeley, 130, 265 Essimbi, 19, 154, 168 ethnic, 4, 18, 20, 28, 29, 39, 40, 57, 111, 112, 127, 154, 162, 177, 178, 180, 220, 279, 285, 286, 321, 332, 334, 339, 341, 361 ethnicity, 4, 5, 193, 330, 360 F Fai Yengo Francis, 142, 234, 270, 322 Fanso, 33, 34, 41, 355, 362 farmers, 4, 5, 14, 15, 37, 149, 150, 151, 153, 162, 163, 164, 166, 170, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 180, 181, 183, 184, 187, 188, 191, 192, 195, 199, 221, 267, 268, 279, 299, 302, 303, 305, 306, 307, 311, 313, 314, 315, 330, 331, 332, 339, 350, 352 Fominyen, 129 Fon, 23, 24, 25, 32, 45, 47, 48, 108, 112, 113, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 157, 171, 175, 180, 184, 185, 188, 200,

Index

376 201, 202, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 227, 230, 235, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 247, 249, 254, 263, 265, 266, 267, 278, 280, 281, 287, 288, 290, 291, 292, 297, 298, 309, 310, 318, 319, 321, 323, 328, 329, 341, 348, 350, 351, 353, 365, 369 Fon Ngum III, 208 Fon Njong, 205, 212, 219, 222 Fon Nkwangoh, 116, 125 Fon Nsetieh, 254, 281 Fondom, 23, 47, 48, 114, 196, 197, 201, 202, 205, 206, 211, 222, 249, 251, 307 Forest, 11, 196, 201, 270, 369 Francis B. Nyamnjoh, 22 Fulani, 19, 22, 26, 27, 28, 42, 110, 111, 124, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 183, 184, 185, 191, 192, 193, 194, 202, 204, 278, 310, 313, 315, 351, 357, 360, 363, 364, 369 Fundong, 17, 26, 35, 111, 234, 235, 243, 252, 269, 291 Fungom, 8, 11, 12, 19, 22, 27, 28, 153, 177 Furu-Awa, 11, 27, 29, 154 G Galabe, 117, 118, 130, 132, 133, 265, 266, 348, 350 Galabe III, 117, 118, 130, 132, 133, 265, 266, 348, 350 Germans, 7, 26, 30, 31, 32, 34, 42, 51, 116, 117, 119, 122, 123, 124, 155, 201, 358 Governor, 30, 31, 45, 47, 48, 118, 129, 133, 139, 141, 142, 177, 180, 184, 187, 221, 227, 236,

237, 239, 240, 243, 246, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 273, 290, 292, 304, 321, 322, 350, 351 Grassfields, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 40, 51, 57, 109, 110, 111, 123, 124, 155, 156, 160, 166, 175, 201, 203, 207, 210, 211, 220, 222, 231, 254, 337, 341, 356, 357, 358, 363, 364, 368, 369 Grazer, 301 Gwedji, 200, 201, 204, 217, 233, 235, 249, 367 H Haruma Umaru, 309, 312, 362 Hausa, 19, 23, 25, 27 Helman Gofla, 289 Helvetas, 192 Herald, 45, 140, 144, 183, 264, 365, 366 I Ibalichim, 205, 206, 208, 220, 221, 222, 225, 227, 228, 229, 231, 234, 235, 237, 246, 252, 254, 268, 269, 281, 290, 291, 292, 293 Ichim, 217, 220, 221, 225, 227, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240, 246, 247, 250 Ijim, 11, 49, 197, 200, 202, 204, 205, 213, 220, 227, 369 inter-chiefdom relations, 122, 231, 257 inter-community conflicts, 18, 27, 32, 53, 293, 323 inter-village conflict, 287 Isimbo, 11 Islamic, 156, 159, 160, 208

Land Grabbing and Conflict in the North West Region of Cameroon: An Endemic Situation, 1958-2017 J Jakiri, 15, 156, 170, 196, 269, 281 jangali, 169, 195, 340 Jean-Baptiste, 356 Jeffrey, 220, 221, 235, 269 Jeffrey’s, 227, 269, 271 Jeremiah Ngwana, 139 K Katsina Ala, 11, 28 Kedjom Keku, 76, 263 Kesu, 155, 178, 279, 304 King, 114, 155, 206, 217 kingdom, 23 Kinship, 27, 116 Kola trade, 25 Kom, 13, 19, 22, 23, 27, 28, 32, 45, 47, 51, 153, 155, 157, 164, 176, 177, 197, 200, 201, 204, 205, 206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 225, 226, 227, 228, 250, 251, 252, 255, 289 Koumpa Issa, 184, 187, 188, 268, 270, 273, 302, 304, 305, 306 Kovifem, 111, 201, 202 Kuk, 11, 27, 153 Kumba, 16, 42, 309 Kumbo, 16, 35, 196, 199, 200, 234, 239, 241, 247, 251, 286 Kwifon, 23, 206, 307 L Lake, 22, 42, 48, 151, 201, 241, 261, 320 Lake Chad regions, 22 Land, xiv, 14, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 52, 53, 54, 55, 70, 117, 118, 127, 129, 130, 133, 134, 153, 154, 200, 228, 229, 265, 266, 270, 287, 291, 309, 310, 311,

377

313, 319, 334, 338, 344, 345, 346, 349, 350, 353, 354, 356, 360, 361, 362, 364, 367, 368, 369 land and boundary, 4, 5, 7, 33, 38, 45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56, 144, 230, 248, 257, 258, 335, 339, 340, 341 Land Certificate, 338 Laura Naddin, 246, 255, 268, 290, 293 Loh Mufi, 260, 261 M Manjong, 110, 233, 235, 237 Mankon, 28, 278, 359, 369 Manyu, 7, 11, 150 Martina Fischer, 361 Mayor, 46, 127, 136, 146, 187, 234, 239, 246, 247, 291, 292, 293, 303, 323, 366 Mbele, 202 Mbengwi, 16, 32, 35 Mbesa, 4, 5, 19, 47, 48, 49, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254, 257, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 278, 280, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 314, 333, 340, 351, 367, 368 Mbesenaku, 250 Mbeshie, 110 Mbororo, xiv, 19, 27, 150, 156, 160, 161, 187, 193, 195, 199, 267, 268, 278, 295, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 315, 330, 339, 349, 363, 364 MBOSCUDA, xiv, 156, 294, 300, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 325

Index

378 Mbulum, 202 Mekaf, 11, 28 Mentan Martin, 226 Meta, 19, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 51, 265, 348 Mezam, 4, 5, 8, 10, 16, 22, 25, 26, 35, 50, 52, 104, 129, 133, 150, 151, 260, 261, 263, 264, 301, 313, 318, 319, 320, 321, 339, 349, 351, 364 Mogamo, 19, 26 Mohammed Bawuro, 192, 311 Monteh, 199, 200, 201, 208, 211, 212, 215, 217, 220, 223, 235, 249, 255, 368 Mount Oku, 196 N N.G.Os, 258, 295, 306, 310, 311, 325, 336, 340, 344 Naikom, 155, 157, 163, 164, 165, 171, 172, 173, 175, 178, 183, 185, 188, 194, 268, 314 Native Authorities, 116 Native Court, 116, 351 Ndi Richard, 296 Ndishiangong, 202, 203, 236, 238 Ndop plain, 12, 22, 27, 51, 103, 109, 111, 116, 123, 124, 149, 156, 354 Ndugufumbui, 188 Ndum, 183, 187, 227, 237, 240, 243 Nfou, 208 Nfu, 235, 237 Ngie, 19, 26, 349 NGO, xv, 295, 301, 306, 325, 328, 329, 371 Nguerry, 206 Ngwefuni II, 112, 133, 139, 143 Nigeria, 7, 10, 11, 16, 18, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, 111, 123, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 166, 183, 192, 200, 261, 335, 348, 360, 364

Njeuma Zachary, 111 Njikejem, 218 Njuguru, 110, 141 Nkambe, 16, 17, 35, 133, 178, 350 nomadic Mbororos, 156 Noni, 133, 196, 197, 200, 217, 225, 241, 250, 333, 350, 369 North West Region, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18, 25, 26, 29, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 124, 133, 142, 146, 224, 227, 258, 273, 294, 295, 300, 301, 309, 310, 311, 323, 324, 335, 338, 344, 350, 366 notock, 206 NOWECA, xv, 16 Nseke commission, 180, 315 Nso, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 109, 157, 200, 201, 202, 225, 293, 309, 362, 369 Ntah, 5, 48, 334, 339 Ntimati, 214, 243, 246, 254, 269, 292 Nyiete, 205, 209, 222 Nyos, 11, 151, 153 O Oku, 4, 5, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25, 47, 48, 49, 109, 170, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254, 257, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 278, 280, 281, 286, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 314, 333, 340, 351, 362, 366, 367, 368, 369 Oku Sub-division, 5, 237, 240 Osaghae, 358, 364

Land Grabbing and Conflict in the North West Region of Cameroon: An Endemic Situation, 1958-2017 P palace, 27, 108, 132, 133, 142, 175, 184, 185, 188, 202, 205, 206, 207, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 229, 233, 235, 238, 239, 240, 249, 251, 297, 351, 370 pasture, 51, 159, 163, 173, 192, 330, 331 Paul Nchoji Nkwi, 231 Pinyin, 25, 51 Piyinchu, 117, 368 Q quarter head, 33, 208, 233, 235, 238, 246 R Rev. Chief Nja’ah Peter, 325 Rev. Father Anthony Viban, 289, 290, 291, 293 Richmond, A.H, 364 Rifum, 22, 201 S Sabga, 111, 156, 309 Salomon, 148, 367 Sama Benjamin, 227, 263, 281, 314, 322 SeP, xv, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 300, 344 Supreme Court, 132, 146 T Tamfu, 238 Thomas Schelling, 358 Tikar, 4, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 103, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114,

379

119, 153, 154, 204, 209, 212, 361, 372 Tikari, 19, 20, 154 Tobias Debiel, 361 Tolon, 235, 281 traditional diplomacy, 124, 126, 134, 257, 280, 281, 322, 323, 330 traditional society, 53 tribe, 156, 278 Tubah, 4, 5, 61, 76, 261, 264, 286, 318, 319, 323, 339, 351 U UNVDA, xv, 16 Upper Fungom, 11 Upper Mbam, 22, 23 V village heads, 235 violence, 143, 188, 273, 297, 344 W WADA, xv, 16, 180, 183, 349 Waindo, 154, 155, 156, 166, 175, 176, 177, 180, 183, 185, 189, 279 Wambeng Samuel, 218, 220, 221, 229, 252, 254 Wasum Augustin, 147, 149 Wesmacott decision, 5, 339 Western Grassfields, 110 Widikum, 19, 25, 27, 30, 119, 368 World Bank, 11, 13, 359 Wum, xiv, xv, 4, 5, 11, 13, 14, 16, 26, 27, 32, 35, 133, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 157, 162, 164, 165, 166, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 192, 193, 194, 195, 221,

Index

380 266, 267, 268, 278, 279, 280, 294, 300, 301, 302, 303, 305, 306, 307, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 330, 339, 348, 350, 351, 352, 366

199, 200, 201, 231, 261, 264, 296, 309, 320, 321, 323, 324, 354, 355, 356, 357, 359, 362, 363, 366, 367, 368, 369 Yemgeh valleys, 8 young, 128, 230

Y Z Yang Philemon, 45, 229, 323 Yaounde, 18, 19, 22, 29, 41, 45, 109, 111, 117, 119, 132, 146, 156, 164, 170, 175, 179, 197,

Zintgraff’s, 27, 355 Zongokwo paramount chief, 155