Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong: Perspectives of Justice and Social Values [1st ed.] 9789811552656, 9789811552663

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Governance and Citizenship in Asia

Betty Yung Kam-Por Yu   Editors

Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong Perspectives of Justice and Social Values

Governance and Citizenship in Asia Series Editors Kerry J. Kennedy, The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Sonny Shiu Hing Lo, School of Professional and Continuing Education, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Aims and Scope This series explores how citizenship is shaped by social, political, cultural and historical contexts and how it may be moulded to serve the nation state in the age of globalization. In these publications we see how governance relates to all aspects of civic life, including politics, public policy, administration, civil society and the economy, as well as the core values of society. Titles cover themes including public trust and trust building, the role of civil society, citizens’ rights and obligations, citizenship identities including those related to gender, class and ethnicities. Authors explore how young people are shaped by democratic and traditional value systems and the importance of citizenship challenges in the Asia Pacific region. Research collaborations in this interdisciplinary series probe questions such as: What are the links between ‘good governance’ and new forms of citizenship? What is the role of citizenship education as a tool in state formation and the development of active citizenship cultures? How do we explain the distinctive features of governance and citizenship in Asian societies? Through these publications we see that citizenship is an integral part of ‘good governance’ and that such governance ultimately enriches citizenship. Scholarly investigation and academic dialogue in this series describe the interdependence and mutuality of governance and citizenship. Please contact Melody Zhang (e-mail: [email protected]) for submitting book proposals for this series.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11911

Betty Yung Kam-Por Yu •

Editors

Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong Perspectives of Justice and Social Values

123

Editors Betty Yung Department of Public Policy City University of Hong Kong Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong

Kam-Por Yu General Education Centre The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Kowloon, Hong Kong

ISSN 2365-6255 ISSN 2365-6263 (electronic) Governance and Citizenship in Asia ISBN 978-981-15-5265-6 ISBN 978-981-15-5266-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

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Land, Housing and Social Values—The Context of Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Betty Yung

Part I 2

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Space, Housing and Development

Nano-apartments: The Synergy of Rights, Choice, Markets, and Regulations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kam-Yuen Cheng

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Third Sector Housing: Housing Philanthropy, Self-reliance and Policy Facilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Betty Yung and Alex Chan

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A Rawlsian Model of Land Justice for Hong Kong: The Controversy on the Development of the North New Territories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jack Chun

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Reconsidering ‘Develop First, Conserve Later’ Principle: The Case of Third Runway in Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sui Ming Tsang

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Land Development in Hong Kong: To Conserve or not to Conserve? That’s not the Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ho Mun Chan and Chun Kit Chui

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Part II 7

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Place, Neighbourhood and Sustainability

Heritage Preservation Versus Development: The Case of Queen’s Pier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Koon-kau Ying

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Collective Versus Self-interests: What Is Behind NIMBY? . . . . . . . 145 Shan Shan Chung

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Columbarium Siting in an Urban Chinese Society: Any Way Out? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Betty Yung

10 Relocation of the Christian Zheng Sheng College: Challenges in Justifying the Siting of Rehabilitation Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Larry Lai 11 A Critical Assessment of Voluntary Siting Mechanism in Dealing with NIMBYism: From Canada to Hong Kong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Francis K. T. Mok Part III

Conclusion

12 The Ethics of Land and Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 Kam-Por Yu

Chapter 1

Land, Housing and Social Values—The Context of Hong Kong Betty Yung

Abstract Land is pertinent for the provision of Housing which can form cozy Homes well located in a congenial Habitat. The three Hs intertwine in the context of available land articulated by land governance. Since WWII up till the present, there have been different strands of paradigmatic changes in the nature of urban planning in Hong Kong. Exactly how to strike a balance between competing demands in urban planning, amidst rising aspirations, to forge a vision for future Hong Kong necessitates the answering of fundamental definition-process-client question: What is the definition of the ‘good’ or the ‘vision’ in the city planning (definition)? How is it defined (process)? For whom does it serve (client—different classes, stakeholders, generations)? The dynamics underlying the conflicts that may arise for finding the “answer” for the fundamental definition-process-client question often triggers off the town planning controversies or “politics”, within which the normative (e.g. equity, justice, rights, equality) may lead the way as the guiding light, striking a balance between interests among “winners” and “losers”, forming the basis of land and housing governance. Urban land and housing controversies (often related to city planning) form the main “issue” of this book, while “justice and social values” form the “perspective” and the “main thread” linking all discussed controversies, highlighting related theoretical and philosophical underpinnings. The “Politics-JusticeGovernance” Model is highlighted in this book. It is hoped that academic and intellectual analysis from the “justice and social values” perspective, being applied to examine land and housing controversies, can bring about sound policy suggestions and conclusions, thereby bringing about a new angle to land and housing governance.

Before joining City University of Hong Kong in August 2018, I have conducted some research work related to this book project under the capacity as Centre Research Fellow at the Centre for Governance and Citizenship of the Education University of Hong Kong, with which I am affiliated. B. Yung (B) Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_1

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Land for Three Hs—Home, Housing and Habitat Space allows the possibility of different human activities and interaction; land provides space and site for such human activities to take place and making them a reality. Land itself is not homogeneous, with different variations (such as in soil fertility, accessibility, neighbourhood amenities and topography), affecting its economic value or price of a particular land lot (Cheshire and Sheppard 1998). Because of different natural elements, physical terrain and various historical factors, certain land use tends to centre around specific location. Urban planning may alter or give future direction for city development. Planning involves the planning for a “good city” which is essentially value-laden (Stanley et al. 2017), trying to enhance the livability for the city concerned, thereby furthering the well-being of the residents. There are different types of land use within a city (including economic, residential, infrastructural, recreational, historical, government land use, etc.), and there should be optimal land allocation to satisfy different social, environmental and economic needs, which may be mutually exclusive to a certain extent (Li et al. 2016). Among different types of land uses, space for shelter is the most basic human necessity and utility. Shelter, natural or constructed, provides a place of refuge for humans from exposure to adverse weather and danger (Waskey 2006). Shelters that are constructed by man can be considered housing, even though these may be inadequate ones. “Housing is integral to the economic, social and environmental well-being of cities. It is the single largest land use in cities…” (Stanley et al. 2017, p. 161). Housing is not valued per se, but is often valued because of it being instrumental to other goals. Housing may be conceived as investment to capture price appreciation, especially in booming housing markets. Most importantly, housing is valued for its use value for consumption, and housing investment is feasible only when it rested fundamentally on the value of housing for use. As for residential housing, humans do not merely demand a shelter, but hope to find a Home in the housing they dwell in. According to Tipple and Speak (2005), the concept of “Home” is a rich one which embraces ideas such as comfort, belonging, identity and security. It provides shelter, privacy and roots, affecting relation with oneself (e.g. relaxation, happiness) as well as with others (e.g. stable relations with family members) (Ibid.). Cooper (1995, quoted in Tipple and Speaker 2005) highlights “home” as place where we are able to define the space as our own, able to control its form and shape as well as activities within it, enjoying privacy in term of controlling access to it, often giving us a sense of identity. According to Honoré (1961), full ownership includes (1) the right to possess, i.e. to have exclusive physical control; (2) the right to use; (3) the right to manage; (4) the right to the income of the thing; (5) the right to the capital, i.e. the power to alienate, consume, waste or destroy whole or part of it; (6) the right to security, i.e. immunity for expropriation; (7) the incident of absence of term, i.e. the duration of ownership; (8) the prohibition of harmful use; (9) liability to execution, i.e. to be taken away in case of insolvency. Even though one’s well-being in relation to land and housing

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does not necessitate full ownership as outlined by Honoré, it at least should include (1) the right to possess, in the sense of having a space that can exclude others from intrusion to protect one’s privacy; (2) the right to use, in the sense of having a site used for one’s dwelling; (3) the right to manage, in the sense of deciding how the dwelling space is to be used and whom is allowed to use such space; (6) the right to security to avoid arbitrary forced eviction; and (7) which involves the right to use certain dwelling for a minimal duration which at least will give the dwellers a sense of stability and security, though the duration may not be very long. (1), (2), (3), (6) and (7) will represent the minimalist form of ownership in relation to land and housing if one is to have well-being in such aspect at all, which essentially adds up to the notion of “access to land and housing” or the “access to a home”. However, well-being in relation to dwelling involves not only “access to housing and land” or “access to a home”, but also other basic requirements of the housing concerned. According to Yung and Lee (2012), the right to housing includes five indispensable dimensions: (a) the “right to adequate housing”; (b) the “right to affordable housing”; (c) the “right to enjoy” one’s housing without arbitrary interference; (d) freedom from the threat of arbitrary forced eviction; and (e) the “right of choice” in relation to: (e) (i) the decision to rent or home ownership; and (e) (ii) choice over the neighbourhood one is to live in accordance with one’s needs, preferences and lifestyle. The (c) and (d) dimensions overlap with (1) and (6) aspects of the minimalist form of ownership aforementioned, while (e) (i) is related to whether there is full ownership in Honoré’s sense. With regard to (a) and (b), the crux lies in how adequate housing is defined and how far such adequate housing is affordable. In housing studies, such issue is often viewed from the physical and technical attributes of the dwelling itself from the economic value angle, rather than from the social value perspectives, such as human rights, justice, choice and freedom, autonomy and paternalism, and sustainability. This book is to fill this gap in housing studies by centring on the role of social values in our search for appropriate housing for all. Dimension (e) (ii) relates to the context of neighbourhood beyond the dwelling itself. Housing well-being not only lies in the physical attributes of the dwelling per se, but also is essentially linked to connectivity and accessibility within neighbourhood, with other parts of the city, country as well as the world, forming the Habitat for the housing concerned. In addition to the dwelling itself, “habitat” in which the dwelling is situated is pertinent to well-being of dwellers, giving them a sense of “place” in which the dwellers “give meaning to a part of the larger, undifferentiated geographical space and with emotional ties and affective feelings …. combined through experiences and interaction in and with that place” (Parker and Doak 2012). Dwellers especially guard their neighbourhood as “place” against specific land uses that impose negative externalities, particularly LULUs (locally unwanted land uses) and NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) projects, such as columbarium, landfill, rehabilitation centres, incinerators and airport, very often leading to land controversies, with those living in nearby residential areas vigorously aroused to safeguard their well-being in relation to housing and land. The successful resolution of such land controversies in neighbourhoods may involve the application of different social values (such as

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justice, rights and equality) as the guiding principles in negotiation, compromise, compensation and settlement which forms the foci of discussion in this book. Besides a sense of “place” and a sense of belonging, congenial habitat for a home will incorporate accessibility, including that to amenities, schools, open and public space, transport infrastructure, medical services, etc., within the neighbourhood. It also includes its connectivity within the overall city planning, such as its convenience in relation to work location, commercial and economic activities, city centre as well as other parts of the country and the global world via railway, port or airport facilities. Accessibility often comes with a price tag. Places and neighbourhoods that are well situated and well connected tend to have higher land price which “excludes” the comparatively low income. Thus, there may be trade-offs between accessibility and affordability, with the market dynamics operating to segregate different social groups, if there is no government intervention to market logic. However, the ideal is to design neighbourhoods with mixed social groups that may lead to cost-effective provision of facilities and services (Forrest 2000, quoted in Clapham 2005), generating harmony through social interactions and synergy of different groups, such as local work opportunities for the low income generated from middle-class neighbours in the form of their childcare and domestic needs, etc. The concurrence of different social classes within a neighbourhood, very often, necessitate careful and visionary urban planning and governance that “transcend” market logic, especially in the form of the geographical distribution of the supply of subsidized, affordable housing to the low income or the form of such housing subsidy may take. One’s housing and neighbourhood are also affected at a macro-level by the development, planned or unplanned, in ones’ hometown at local level or even homeland at the national level. Very often, land controversies will arise out of the need to relocate existing housing dwellers to make way for development. Development also leads to other dimensions of land controversies, involving the tensions between human and nature; heritage and progress; new and old social capital and networks; and local, national versus international character as well as preservation and development. Such tensions related to land development that affects housing and neighbourhoods will be examined in this book, with social values as the guiding light for the alleviation of such tensions. All in all, land is pertinent for the provision of Housing which can form cozy Homes well located in a congenial Habitat. The three Hs intertwine in the context of available land articulated by land governance. Clos highlights that “[g]ood cities do not come by accident” but are the result of broad community consensus, longstanding political determination and good urban planning (Clos 2014, p. 5, quoted in Stanley et al. 2017, p. 193). The following part will discuss land and housing in relation to land governance, providing background information about Hong Kong land and housing developments so as to allow the readers to have sufficient background to read the cases of land and housing controversies in the book.

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Land, Housing and Governance Land, Urban Planning and Land Administration in Hong Kong Hong Kong is a small city, with a land area of 1106.3 km2 in 2016 and a population size of 7.4 million in 2017 (Census and Statistics Department 2018). Population increased from 3.13 million in 1961 to 7.34 million in 2016, more than doubled over past 55 years (Census and Statistics Department 2017), with the average annual population growth rate decreasing from 1.5% in 1981–1986 to 0.7% in 2011–2016 (Ibid.). Population is projected to reach its peak at about 8.22 million in 2043, then decreases slowly to 7.72 million in 2066 (Task Force on Land Supply 2018). Population is not evenly distributed throughout the city, with Hong Kong Island hosting 17.1% of the total population within a land area of 80.7 km2 , Kowloon giving home to 30.6% of the total population within a land area of 46.9 km2 , while 52.3% of the total population dwell in New Territories and Islands which have a land area of 978.7 km2 (Census and Statistics Department 2018). Judged from the above information, population density is not even throughout the city—with Kowloon being most densely populated (47,750 persons per km2 ), followed by Hong Kong Island (15,690 persons per km2 ), while New Territories and Islands are most sparely populated comparatively (4020 persons per km2 ). The overall population density of the city is 6780 persons per km2 . Hong Kong has a mountainous topography. 24.3% is developed built-up area, with the remaining 75.7% being not-for-development or non-built-up area, including country parks, wetland, reservoirs, fishponds, etc. (Task Force on Land Supply 2018). There are a total of 24 country parks in Hong Kong, covering about 40% of the total area of Hong Kong (Task Force on Land Supply 2018). Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) in China, its boundary is fixed by the Hong Kong Basic Law (which is often regarded as the “mini-constitution” of Hong Kong) which sets a very binding constraint on potential land supply (Leung and Tang 2014), rendering the geographical growth and extension of the city beyond its boundary more difficult, if there are no additional new special political or administrative arrangements from the Mainland Chinese government facilitative of such extension. The Hong Kong Basic Law (HKBL) came to effect on 1 July 1997 after the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong from Britain to China. The following is stipulations in HKBL which are relevant to property ownership and land (Nissim 2016): • The HKBL Article 6 stipulates that the HKSAR shall protect the right to private ownership of property. • Article 7 of the HKBL states that: (i)

The land and natural resources within HKSAR are State Property;

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(ii) The HKSAR government is responsible for: (ii) (a) management, use and development and (ii) (b) for their lease or grant to individuals or organizations for use or development; (iii) The revenues derived shall be exclusively at the disposal of the Government of HKSAR. • Article 120 stipulates that all land leases granted before the establishment of HKSAR which extend beyond 30 June 1997 shall continue to be recognized and protected. • Article 121 states that all land leases where the original leases contain no right of renewal before 30 June 1997, which extend beyond 30 June 1997 and expire no later than 1 July 2047, will not be required to paying additional premium, but have to pay an annual rent equivalent to 3% of the rateable value of the property. The Hong Kong government is the sole owner of all land in the city, and the city adopts a leasehold system whereby the government owns all land and purchaser of land receives a lease to use the land concerned (Hui and Soo 2002). The lease has the right to transfer, use and earn income from land, but does not own the land (Ibid.). He/she only has exclusive rights over specific time (Ibid.), whereas the government has an absolute perpetual title to all land holdings in Hong Kong, except the land of St. John’s Cathedral which enjoys freehold privilege as long as it remains a church (Ibid.). Hong Kong land are “sold” or leased out under the high-premium-low-rent structure—a 50-year lease may be required to pay only 3% rateable value as ground rent, implying that an overwhelmingly large percentage (perhaps as high as 97%) of the land value is the upfront land premium, while a very tiny portion (maybe merely 3%) is to be paid cumulatively throughout the whole lease period (Nissim 2016). This is much different from the pre-WWII period when the premium-to-ground-rent ratio for a 75-year lease was 50:50 (Ibid.). The present high-premium-low-rent structure has various implications (Ibid.): • Only large developers can have the financial ability to bid for land lease, reducing competition and lead to oligopoly in the property development arena; • Government primarily receives lump-sum premium for land leases, rather than recurrent ground rents which will bring in recurrent revenue for recurrent expenditures, thereby may facilitate long-term fiscal planning; • Land premiums are earmarked in a separate account called “Capital Works Reserve Fund” which may lead the government to feel obliged to spend it on one-off infrastructural project, instead of other long-term expenditures; • The high land costs are reflected in the high sale price of newly built buildings, including residential, commercial ones, etc. (Ibid.). In view of the limited land resources in Hong Kong, town planning is needed to strike a balance among different types of land utilization, including that for housing, commerce, transport, recreation, natural conservation, etc. (Planning Department 2019). Town or urban planning is often forward-looking, instigating purposeful and positive spatial (and land use) changes, through guiding and controlling development

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towards a future “good” (Lee and Tang 2003). For example, the planning vision of 2030+ (public engagement document) aims at steering Hong Kong towards a “smart, green and resilient city” (Development Bureau and Planning Department 2016, p. 58). In the light of state ownership of both land and development rights in Hong Kong in legal terms, urban planning as an element in public administration is one of prominent government strategies to manage societal resources and public affairs, especially in the light of the fact that land sales generate considerable revenue for the government (Gurran et al. 2016). Since WWII up till the present, there have been different strands of paradigmatic changes in the nature of urban planning in Hong Kong: (a) From an elitist and paternalistic mode to a more participatory engagement— This is reflected in the more comprehensive public engagement exercise for the planning of 2030 and 2030+ (Hong Kong SAR Government 2007; Development Bureau and Planning Department 2016); (b) From essentially Hong Kong focused to a regional oriented approach in planning, with Pearl River Delta integration as a planning component (Hong Kong SAR Government 2007; Development Bureau and Planning Department 2016)—With economic integration targeted in the town planning process which inevitably will bring integration in other arena (such as social, cultural and political aspects) to the fore since they are interlocking, these changes may cause imminent challenges to the exact implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” in practice, an issue that should not be ignored or underestimated, especially by authorities if they aim to achieve a win-win situation for both Mainland and Hong Kong. (c) From primarily Hong Kong centred to Hong Kong positioning in World perspective (Laquian 1996)—The positioning of Hong Kong as “Asia’s World City”, preserving her Asian characteristics while being simultaneously globalized, through being situated and being part of Pearl River Delta Region, with the latter serving as its hinterland, competing for parallel ranking and recognition with other globalized cities in the world. (d) From economic development oriented to: (i)

Sustainability-steered—This conceptual change is reflected in Hong Kong 2030 Planning Vision and Strategy which highlights the overarching goal for HK2030 Study, emphasizing sustainable and balanced development in different aspects rather than sheer economic growth: ‘“The HK2030 Study should adhere to the principle of sustainable development to balance social, economic and environmental needs to achieve better quality of life for present and future generations”. Thus, “Asia’s world city” is not only about economic growth and competitiveness, but ensuring we have a city that is ground for being Asia’s exemplary city in achieving the sustainable development’ (Hong Kong SAR Government 2007, Sect. 3.2.3) (ii) Livability-directed—Besides, land supply arising from urban development, merely satisfying the “quantity” component, there have been increasing demand for the “quality” component in urban planning in the

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form of better housing, enhanced walkability and cyclability, availability of public space for the fostering of a “sense of community” and social capital building. All these become important considerations in town planning in Hong Kong in the twenty-first century which in the end target at strengthened livability, thereby better quality of life in the city (Development Bureau and Planning Department 2016; Siu and Huang 2015; Gurran et al. 2016). (iii) Distinctiveness-targeted—With recent incidents of mass mobilization for heritage preservation, there has been a reorientation from unreserved sheer development towards maintaining the city’s identity and East–West integration distinctiveness, through cultural and heritage preservation, balancing the new and the old in city planning, thereby creating a “sense of place” for the present and future generations (Hong Kong SAR Government 2007; Douay et al. 2010). In Hong Kong, the planning authority regulates land use mostly through zoning and planning application system (Hui and Soo 2002). The Town Planning Ordinance aims at “making provision for the systematic preparation and approval of plans for the lay-out of areas of Hong Kong as well as for the types of building suitable for erection therein and for the preparation and approval of plans for areas within which permission is required for development” (Town Planning Ordinance, Chap. 131). The organizations responsible for town planning in Hong Kong include Development Bureau, Town Planning Board, Planning Department. Land administration is in the hands of the Lands Department which plays a prominent part in the whole property development cycle, including granting leases, arranging public auctions, tenders for land, granting approval of building plans and monitoring development performance (Nissim 2016). Among the various ways to increase land supply, development of new towns in urban fringe areas contributed most land supply in past decades (Wang et al. 2017). The first generation of new town includes Tsuen Wan, Shatin and Tuen Mun which started works in early 1970s; the second generation of new towns began works in late 1970s, including Tai Po, Fanling/Sheung Shui and Yuen Long, whereas the third generation of new towns commences in 1980s and 1990s, including Tseung Kwan O, Tin Shui Wai and Tung Chung (Ibid.). New Development Area (NDA), which are small-scale extension of new towns (with due regard to the planning concepts of “community vibrancy” and “nature”), is designated as one of the main approaches for medium and long-term land supply in 2007 (Ibid.). Some of the planned NDAs include Fanling North, Ping Che, Hung Shui Kiu, etc. Recent developments of NDAs are embroiled in issues related to relocation, development versus environment, mode of development, etc., that spark out great land controversies. On the whole, there may be trade-offs in different dimensions of town planning; for example, the emphasis of livability may reduce the intensity of land use, thereby a reduction in residential land and housing supply, adversely affecting the low-income and the non-homeowners (Gurran et al. 2016); more participatory town planning process may undermine efficiency and certainty in town planning decision-making;

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more emphasis of the “Hong Kong-in-region” perspective may challenge intrinsic Hong Kong distinctiveness and identity. Exactly how to strike a balance between competing demands, amidst rising aspirations, to forge a vision for the future necessitates the answering of fundamental definition-process-client question: What is the definition of the “good” or the “vision” in the city planning (definition)? How is it defined (process)? For whom does it serve (client—different classes, stakeholders, generations)? Furthermore, there may be “winners” and “losers” in view of the managed urban and social changes under town planning (e.g. the need for relocation of some to give way for urban redevelopment or development), often involving the issue of interests (such as justified compensation, site or housing replacement), thereby land or housing disputes. The dynamics underlying the conflicts that may arise for finding the “answer” for the fundamental definition-process-client question often triggers off the town planning “politics”, within which the normative (e.g. equity, justice, rights, equality) may lead the way as the guiding light, striking a balance between interests among “winners” and “losers”, amidst the managed urban and social changes under town planning.

Housing and Home in Hong Kong Hong Kong has been praised as an exemplar of laissez faire; however, this is largely a myth as evidenced of massive government intervention into the housing market through being the city’s largest housing provider (Li 2016). In 2016, as great as 45.7% of the households in Hong Kong live in public housing—with about 30.4% in public rental housing (PRH) and about 15.3% in subsidized sale flats (Census and Statistics Department 2017). About 49.8% of households live in private housing— with about 16.6% living in private rental housing and about 33.2% living private self-owned housing, while a small percentage live in temporary housing, rent-free housing, etc. (Ibid.). Land supply for new housing depends on different sources, including government land selling through auction or tender, land from Mass Transit Railway (MTR) Corporation,1 Urban Renewal Authority (URA),2 other private urban regeneration projects and other redevelopment involving land use changes in the form of lease modifications and land exchanges (Li et al. 2016). High land premium associated with formal alienation of land use is an important source of government revenue which plays an important part in the state’s ability to balance its budget and makes the low tax regime (by international standards) in Hong Kong feasible and viable (La Grange and Pretorius 2005).

1 The

government grants land along railway station to MTR Corporation as capital injection for financing railway infrastructure. The MTR Corporation invites developers to develop such land on profit basis to finance railway development (Li et al. 2016). 2 The URA is the statutory body, tasked for resuming old buildings for redevelopment.

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There is a time lag in land supply and housing unit completion since there is the requirement of building time. Even if there is increase in land supply, there will not be immediate increase in new flats as it usually takes a few years for the building process to take place, even if the new supply is “shovel-ready” land (with all the necessary infrastructure established) and there is no hoarding of land, on the part of the developer concerned, for the purpose of profit maximization. In Hong Kong, the land lease specifies the time period constraint for construction, that is the time period which the developer must complete the development, usually 48 or 60 months for most sites, although longer periods may be granted, if appropriate (Nissim 2016; La Grange and Pretorius 2005; Hui and Soo 2002). Because of the building period required, increased land supply will not have much immediate effect on the short run rather inelastic housing supply, often leading to a mismatch between short-term housing demand and supply, with significant implications on house prices. Hong Kong people usually live in high-density, high-rise housing by international standards. This can be attributed to the high population density in the city. Compared to other international cities, including London, New York, Tokyo, the population density of Hong Kong is at least five times higher (Task Force on Land Supply 2018). The median per capita floor area of accommodation is 15.0 m2 (Census and Statistics Department 2017). The living environment of Hong Kongers may be “overcrowding” when compared to other parts of the world—the average floor space per person in Hong Kong is 14 m2 , while that of Japan is 31 m2 , Singapore is 20 m2 , USA is 67 m2 , and UK is 35 m2 (Jayantha and Hui 2012). However, Hong Kong living conditions are getting better by the indicator of “degree of sharing” in housing by households in recent years—the degree of sharing, measured by the average number of domestic households in 1000 units of quarters decreased from 1008 in 2006 to 1002 in 2016 (Census and Statistics Department 2017), implying less number of households are sharing housing units. However, unauthorized subdividing of flats gives rise to small subdivided housing units which though reduce the chance of housing-unit-sharing on the one hand and give rise to new problems of building safety, ventilation, fire safety, etc., on the other hand. Furthermore, the flat size may be getting smaller, with the emergence of nano-apartments in recent years. The “overcrowdedness” in Hong Kong high-density housing leads to coping strategies and adaptations, on the part of Hong Kongers [such as the use of “flexible” furniture (including folding dining table, folding chairs) (Rooney 2003)], which has become part of their everyday life. It also affects their conception of an ideal home, often framed in very pragmatic and modest terms. Rooney (2003) finds out that the narration of PRH residents in Hong Kong about their “ideal” home is firmly related to Hong Kong space and Hong Kong style home which is linked to their deeper knowledge that larger space would cost them a lot of money and the implications of this on their affordability. Having a room of one’s own may be a modest (by international standards), yet unfulfilled, wish of many in Hong Kong. Housing affordability is a prominent issue in Hong Kong context. Public housing, both rental or for sale, is provided by the government as affordable housing to those with modest means. However, private house price and rent escalation is an issue of major concern in recent years. The price index of private domestic housing

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increased from 100.5 in May 2007 to 396.9 in May 2019 (Rating and Valuation Department 2019a). Within eight years from 2007 to 2015, housing prices increased approximately three times. Within the same period, the median household income increased modestly by about 40%, from $17,500 in 2007 to $24,800 in 2015 (Census and Statistics Department 2007, 2016). Thus, housing affordability worsens in recent years, increasing the wealth gap between the haves (own a housing unit) and the have-nots (not owning any housing unit) in view of house price escalation. There is also significant rent increase in the rental market since the rental market is also affected by the housing sale market. The rent index of private domestic housing increased from 102.2 in August 2009 to 196.5 in June 2019 (Rating and Valuation Department 2019b). From 2009 to 2015, the rent level increased by about 74%. However, the parallel median household income increased by merely about 43% within the same period (Census and Statistics Department 2009, 2016). The Task Force on Land Supply (2018) sees a relation between land supply, house price and housing affordability and concludes that “inadequate land supply and high property price have made housing in Hong Kong increasingly unaffordable” (p. 6) and there is a pressing need to increase land supply. Different means suggested by the Task Force to increase land supply (including reclamation, alternative uses of sites under private recreational leases, development of country parks, development of brownfields, etc.) will be controversial, with stakeholders from different classes, different walks of life, different backgrounds presenting issues of their concern, some self-interestedly while others being public-oriented. While finding new source of land supply may be important, making efficient and effective use of existing available land may also be equally crucial, especially in the light of “perceived” justice in the eyes of those who may need to sacrifice (such as “forced” to relocate to make way for increased land supply for future development) in name of “public interest”. Very often, it is the form the land supply options take and the priority among different land supply options that are more contentious than the options per se. A government with a high degree of trust and legitimacy (perhaps not the present Hong Kong government) will be able to reach a settlement on this under the guiding principles centring on ideals and social values, to the satisfaction of different stakeholders.

NIMBY as Land Controversies NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) siting issues often lead to land controversies. NIMBY usually comprises the following characteristics: • Conflicts between the local residents and the town planner over the siting issue of a locally “unwanted” facility; • Active participation and the voicing of opposition of such siting on the part of local residents, sometimes together with activists and pressure groups; • Spatial separation of the benefits and burdens of such facility in question, with the former widely diffused and shared by society as a whole, while the latter being

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localized and concentrated among those who dwell near its site; thus, the local dwellers near the site are more aroused and vocal in opposition to (than other general citizens in speaking for) the facility building; • The burdens of siting such facility nearby may involve objective and subjective risks and nuisances, perceived to be a threat to quality of life and well-being in the neighbourhood, thereby arousing negative reactions; • Free-riding mentality may be involved, hoping that the siting issue can be resolved through other siting alternatives, without the need of “cooperation”, thereby the “sacrifice”, of one’s own neighbourhood (Pol et al. 2006; Wolsink 1994; Ernti 2017; Halle and Mirrer-Singer 2008). Some examples of NIMBY are: landfill sites, hazardous waste and nuclear facilities, airports, homeless shelters, facilities for the mentally ill, low-income housing, even schools and sporting stadiums (Halle and Mirrer-Singer 2008). Palma-Oliveira (2000) put forth the social dilemma theory to explain why a certain NIMBY siting will arouse a strong “No” reaction, while simultaneously lead to strong positive reactions from others by highlighting that distance matters—though high-risk perception of the facility concerned prevails throughout the society, those dwelling farther away from the proposed facility site will develop positive attitudes towards the facility, while those nearer the site will have their risk perception reinforced and will develop stronger negative reactions. The negative reactions towards NIMBY may be classified according to different perspectives (Ernti 2017; Pol et al. 2006; Wolsink 1994): (a) Self-oriented perspective—Individual dwellers near the NIMBY site may oppose such siting decision out of self-interested, if not selfish, motives, ranging from actual, potential and perceived risks or disturbance to their individual wellbeing, often reflected in decreased property prices, implying potential and/or real psychological, economic and health threat and loss. (b) Community-oriented perspective (i) Effects on attachment to “place”—“Familiar affinities” (Ernti 2017, p. 291) to the physical and intangible characteristics that add up to the sense of place commonly shared by dwellers within the neighbourhood may be jeopardized by the siting of NIMBY nearby, giving rise to negative psychological reactions, thereby intense opposition to such siting. (ii) Effects on the common good—The “destruction” and the “jeopardization” of the local environment of the neighbourhood (which is considered the common good shared by local dwellers) by location of NIMBY nearby lead to the arousal of negative response within the locality. (c) Principle-oriented perspective (i)

Sustainability Principle—Destruction of green space and a sustainable environment, especially within or near residential areas, with the construction of NIMBY nearby, is often criticized by local residents as against the principle of sustainability. Very often, the very installation of NIMBY

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(such as landfill and waste treatment plant) makes local residents question the initial defence and justification for the necessity of building such NIMBY (such as mass waste generation) as violation of sustainability. (ii) Principle of fairness and justice—NIMBY grievances among local dwellers often rest on a sense of injustice and unfairness, calling into question of whose voices are heard, whose interests are taken into consideration and how far their arguments have weight in the siting decision-making process. (iii) Principle of participatory legitimacy—The decide-announce-defend model for NIMBY siting decision may lead local residents to challenge such decision and call for a more participatory mode to increase its legitimacy. Very often, an interplay of some or all the above perspectives may combine to explain the opposition forces against NIMBY which usually are not homogeneous. Such NIMBY resistance may also be “tainted” by practical considerations. Though the local residents may reject the hazardous and negative impact of the siting of NIMBY nearby, sometimes they are embroiled in a dilemma since such NIMBY may bring about employment opportunities, thereby economic benefits to the locality (Pol et al. 2006). Such practical considerations may be more significant and attractive to distressed neighbourhood, especially if chances of relocation and mobility to other neighbourhoods are not readily available. In the light of the prospective distribution of benefits and burdens in a NIMBY siting case, it is highly justified to frame it as a land and housing controversy within the discourse of justice as well as other social values (such as rights and equality).

Special Features of the Book Land is a precious and finite resource in all societies. Because of this very nature, land controversies are prevalent (ranging from conflicts arising from relocation due to development to debates over natural conservation to dilemmas related to heritage preservation, etc.), forming part of our everyday life. Land is essential for housing provision. Thus, housing and land issues are often intertwined. At the level of good citizenship, it is pertinent for all to be alert to housing and land issues woven into every thread of citizen’s life, involving issues of rights and duties as citizens, private interest of individual citizen versus public interests of the whole citizenry. At the level of governance, government capacity to resolve unavoidable land and housing controversies is a sound indicator of good governance. In robust land and housing governance, the government should look beyond settlement of land and housing disputes and controversies through mere power politics or established policy-making procedures, but to appeal to social ideals and values (such as land justice, equality, land rights and procedural justice) in reaching a solution largely acceptable to all.

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This book concentrates on land and housing controversies, of which their resolution is pertinent to good and sound governance, affecting the well-being of the citizenry. Urban land and housing controversies form the main “issue” of this book, while “justice and social values” form the “perspective” and the “main thread” linking all discussed controversies, highlighting related theoretical and philosophical underpinnings. It is hoped that academic and intellectual analysis from the “justice and social values” perspective, being applied to examine land and housing controversies, can bring about sound policy suggestions and conclusions, thereby bringing about a new angle to land and housing governance. The chapters in the book collectively attempt to answer three fundamental questions: • Is housing a basic right? If so, what are its implications on public policy? Are there measures beyond that of the government to satisfy such right? • How should the balance be struck between different competing land uses, especially that between residential needs and other land use needs (as well as societal concerns)? What are the justifications for such land use balance? • What is justice in housing or land use issues and controversies? What are the relevant criteria for a just land use policy? How should the benefits and burdens associated with different land uses be distributed among different stakeholders, classes and generations?. In the final chapter, it will be assessed how far the chapters in this book are successful in answering these three questions. Each chapter will focus mainly on one case study of housing and/or land controversies. Land and housing controversies are “public discussion and argument [related to land and housing issues] that many people strongly disagree about, disapprove of, or are shocked by [them]” (Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries). Such controversies may involve one or more of the following different dimensions: (i) Market versus Rights; (ii) Philanthropy versus Market provision; (iii) Preservation (or conservation) versus Development; (iv) Public versus Local neighbourhood; (v) Collective interest versus Self-interest; (vi) Paternalism versus Voluntary decision. The aim of this book is to enhance readers’ understanding of the social values, philosophical and theoretical issues that underpin the controversial land and housing topic concerned as well as its policy implications. This book stresses the ethical perspective, rather than technical and substantive sociopolitical aspects of land and housing issues. While the choice of topics is based on concrete real-life problems within an urban context resting on diversified concerns, the investigation is mainly theoretical and philosophical in nature, which considers perspectives and arguments that can have general validity and universal appeal. The results are discussions with practical relevance and philosophical depth. The discussion in each chapter goes beyond mere substantive and contextual analysis, explicitly conceptualized and theorized within the wider context of social values, with a theoretical and philosophical framework for analysing the issue concerned. Concepts are presented in easily understandable terms, comprehensible to non-experts in philosophy and ethics. The

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book is interdisciplinary in nature, with each chapter integrating two or more disciplines (including philosophy, political science, policy studies, urban studies, etc.) to examine different controversial land and housing issues.

“Politics–Justice–Governance” Model For each case of land and/or housing controversy discussed in each chapter, a “politics–justice–governance” model (Fig. 1.1) will serve as the framework for analysis, illustrating how such model facilitates the resolution of the specific land or housing controversy concerned: (a) Politics (Refer to (a) in Fig. 1.1) In any land and housing controversies, there involve different stakeholders (including officials, developers, construction industry practitioners, local residents, housing pressure groups, environmental groups, public at large, etc.) fighting for their interests and/or public concerns. These stakeholders may be ideal-driven and/or interestdriven. It is often the integration of efforts of both types of stakeholders that may give rise to different land and housing controversies (i.e. land and housing “politics”). How to strike a balance among these different stakeholders becomes the main issue in land politics, especially in view of the unequal relative powers among them. Not only we should seek a political settlement that rests on power differentials and politics in land and housing controversies, but also we should attempt to look for a well-justified resolution acceptable, if not welcomed, to most, if not all, stakeholders. (b) “Justice and Social Values” Perspective (Refer to (b) in Fig. 1.1) Such well-justified resolution in land and housing controversies very often does not rest merely on power differentials and dynamics, but can be found by appealing to sound social values, especially justice. Justice and other social values help to define the “good” and desirable” to be sought after, guiding the way out of conflicts. In any land and housing controversies, there often involves the distribution of limited land and housing resources, and thus, the question of justice will set in. “Justice is defined as the quality of being just or fair … contain[ing] references to moral rightness. Social justice … is typically linked to distributive justice, or the just (right) distribution of limited resources relative to demand.… Distributive justice refers to what society owes individual members in proportion to: the individual’s needs, contribution and responsibility; the resources available; and the society’s responsibility to the common good …” (King 2017), implying duty to the needy, on the part of society and virtuous citizens, as well as equal access to basic necessity for decent life (Ibid.). In an urban setting, land and housing are the precious resources that involve the question of distribution, including matters related to the access to the use of space, the location of different land use, the differential development and prosperity level of different parts, the uneven exposure to environmental risks, etc. All these will embroil

Ideal-driven Stakeholders Interest-driven Stakeholders

Fig. 1.1 Politics-justice-governance model

Integration of (i) and (ii) in land and housing controversies

ii.

i.

a) Politics

ii.

i.

Define the ‘desirable’.

Justice (Substantive, Procedural, Intergenerational, Perceived) Other social values (e.g. equality, rights, autonomy, freedom, self-reliance, sustainability)

b) Justice and Social Values

Keys to Good Governance

Normative and Prescriptive Dimensions of Justice and Social Values: i. Impetus for Social Reform (Initiator) ii. Framework for Conflict Resolution (Process) iii. Standards for Public policy making (Decision making) iv. Aspirations for future planning (Vision)

c) Governance

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the intricate issues of land justice, justice related to housing and/or environmental justice. UN-Habitat (2012) highlights seven criteria for a land tool (which is a practical way to solve a problem in land administration and management): (i) pro-poor; (ii) equitable and gender-responsive; (iii) affordable; (iv) sustainable; (v) subsidiarity—being devolved to community or local level; (vi) governance; (vii) systematic, large-scale—applicable city-wide or across a whole country. Criteria (i), (ii) and (iii) are inter-related, directing to an ideal end-state which can be characterized as justice-related. Criterion (iv) represents intergenerational justice, while (v) and (vi) are related to procedural justice. Criterion (vii) essentially relates to the implementation and application of the land tool. Thus, a sound land tool (suggested by UN) is evaluated mostly by the guiding principle of justice (substantive, procedural or intergenerational in nature) in the resolving of land controversies. It should be noted that besides substantive, procedural and intergenerational justice, “perceived” justice is also important in the ultimate resolution of land controversies, though the former three notions of justice may very often affect the latter, but not necessarily always. This book will examine dimensions of social values beyond the justice dimension suggested by the UN in land governance. Besides justice, there are other social values that may help to define the “good” in land and housing controversy resolution (such as equality, rights, autonomy, freedom, self-reliance and sustainability), establishing the pluralistic basis for land and/or housing negotiation and governance, which this book will investigate. Wei (2009) explains social values in the following way: “A ‘society’ is an entity where people interact. The relationships among people in the society are ‘social relations’. The judgements of right and wrong about social relationships are ‘social values’…” (p. 54). Social values are normative in nature, highlighting what is “desirable”, as distinct from the “desired”. According to Yung (2016), the bases of “social values” are: (a) human commonalities, such as human psyche and physique, that underlie human flourishing; (b) what are crucial for the well-functioning and the continuity of society as a whole; and (c) societal contingencies such as the social, economic and political circumstances of a society concerned. For social values resting on (a) and (b), they tend to be universal (justified by human nature and the essentials of a society), while those “social values” resting on (c) which can be regarded as “societal values” embraced by the majority or the dominant in a society concerned may tend to be relative in nature, varying with place and time (often explained by convenience, history and habits). The “desirable” as represented by the “social values” [those resting on (a) and (b)] may differ from the “desired” as represented by “societal values” that rest on (c), though sometimes they may overlap. How the former guides and shapes the latter as a way out of land and housing controversies is the main theme of this book. When there are more overlaps between “social values” and “societal values”, with the former being translated into the latter (embraced by the majority in society), the society may be moving towards a more well-justified and just condition, with land and housing controversies more appropriately handled. In the post-industrial era of most developed countries, there is a “revalorization” of the value of land in most urban cities, from that of the value of land for developmental use to its value in other more diversified deployment, ranging from natural

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preservation to heritage continuity to public space and many others. The discussions in this book may steer the reframing and rethinking concerning such “revalorization” through the lens of pluralistic values, conceptions and perspectives. Such debates and dialogues may also underpin the pre-emption of future undesirable developments in urban settings in both the developed and developing world. (c) From Justice and Social Values to Governance (Refer to (c) in Fig. 1.1) The normative and prescriptive dimension of justice and social values may take various roles in land and housing governance: (i)

As an initiator and impetus for social reform, especially triggering social activism that leads to reorientation of the mentality for and mode of governance. The societal values adopted by the majority or the dominant in society may be challenged by an emerging critical minority who “sells” certain universal social values as a vision for the future (Yung 2016) (e.g. those to promote the value of justice beyond the humankind versus sheer development, sustainability versus economic development), giving future directions for urban governance; (ii) As a guiding light and framework in the process of conflict resolution among different stakeholders in a land or housing controversy at a particular time; (iii) As the criteria, standards and considerations for public policy decisions (Yung 2016), including urban policy decisions, facilitating urban governance; (iv) As aspirations and directions for future urban planning (Friedmann 1957) through defining the “desirable” and the “good” as the end and the outcome to be achieved through various developmental endeavours. Policy implications derived from the discussion and analysis of the land and housing controversy from the social value perspective will give sound policy inputs to urban governance This book aims to promote the social value perspective, beyond the economic value, technical and physical attributes of land and housing, as an aspiration and future direction for land and housing governance. The main argument of the book is that justice and social values can be a way out of the politics involved in land and housing controversies, serving as the framework and aspirations for good governance. This forms the “politics–justice–governance” model. Each chapter of the book gives expression to this model in different, instead of monolithic, ways. Each of them illustrates how justice and social values can be used to analyse and resolve the land controversy concerned in practice.

Urban Asian Context of Hong Kong as Pivot Point for Investigation The land and housing controversies discussed in the book are related to the Asian city of Hong Kong (which is also global in nature in view of its high connectivity with other parts of the world), serving a reference point for comparison and analysis of similar or contrasting cases overseas from the perspective of social values.

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Hong Kong shares commonalities with both other global cities and other Asian cities. Resolutions of land and housing controversies and conflicts in the context of Hong Kong are to some extent generalizable and transferrable to other globalized cities and Asian cities. In addition, Hong Kong has a special East–West dimension, with both a colonial legacy and a Chinese citizenry, facilitating the discussion of social values in land and housing issues from both the Western and Chinese perspectives, adding substance to the debates unparalleled in other city contexts. It is anticipated that this book can act as food for thought for both local and overseas readers, with cases of Hong Kong land and housing issues being representative and special illustrations in the Asian as well as the broader international context. Relevant overseas examples examined as comparison with Hong Kong cases will give a more international perspective, thereby throwing new lights on land and housing governance. The examination of land and housing issues from the perspective of justice and other social values, bringing the discussion beyond and above any specific city context to a theoretical and philosophical arena, will be of interest to the international community.

Pedagogy of the Book This book aims at stimulating readers to reflect on cases of land and housing controversies in the Hong Kong context, which will act as good reading and reference materials for citizenship education, both within classroom (as teaching or reference materials which act as foci of in-class discussions) and outside classroom (as general reading materials and food for thought for common citizens), thereby extending citizenship education from solely a classroom activity to a lifelong and everyday pursuit and engagement. The book chapters also aim at encouraging readers to examine the controversial land and housing issues from the perspectives of different stakeholders. This will facilitate interactive learning (Kooiman and Jentoft 2009, p. 931) [with other citizens], engaging in citizenship education at the societal level, with the citizens being well-informed of different issues at stake in different land and housing controversies, viewing the issues from the perspectives of different stakeholders, evaluating different available options by examining and balancing the social values behind eventual satisfactory resolutions, nurturing a sense of belonging and shared citizenship. Such reflective process will bring about “higher quality” citizens. In fact, governance can, by itself, be a learning process (Kooiman and Jentoft 2009, p. 830), with different stakeholders involving in debates and discussions, learning from each other in interactive learning, fostering “alternative citizenship education”, not at the classroom or school level, but at the societal level. This book aims to facilitate such type of citizenship education. Thus, land governance, land citizenship and citizenship education are entwined. This book encourages readers as citizens to look beyond power politics and take social values into consideration in everyday land and housing controversies in the context of increasingly complex context for citizenship and governance.

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Structure of the Book Each chapter in this book is a case of land and/or housing controversy, illustrating how the “politics–justice–governance” model applies to throw lights on its resolution. Each Hong Kong case of land and/or housing controversies will be compared and contrasted with overseas example(s) to give a more international dimension. The book is divided into two parts. Part I is related to Space, Housing and Development. Part II is related to Place, Neighbourhood and Sustainability. This chapter is the introductory chapter written by the first editor, Yung.

Part I: Space, Housing and Development Land space is needed for the construction of housing. Development makes land available in large scale for housing provision, infrastructure building and the provision of other facilities. Housing and land controversies may arise, ranging from how decent housing is defined to how such housing is to be provided to how land is made available for such provision. Such housing and land controversies lead to tensions not merely between different groups of stakeholders of the time, but may involve an intergenerational dimension as well as a human versus nature facet. Chapters in Part I will examine such tensions in housing and land controversies and show how social values can shed light in leading the way out. Chapter 2, written by Cheng, examines the development of nano-apartment in Hong Kong from the perspectives of market, rights, choice and regulations, highlighting a housing controversy involving market versus right. While the supply of nano-apartments can satisfy the market demand in view of the decrease in the household size of domestic households on the one hand, it limits homebuyers’ choices by reducing (or displacing) the supply of regular (i.e. non-nano) apartments on the other hand. Cheng thinks that the development of nano-apartments magnifies the violation of the right to adequate housing, and is also detrimental to community values. The rectification of this may include pecuniary compensation, regulation and more subsidized housing provision. Yung and Chan, in Chap. 3, discuss the housing controversy of philanthropy versus government provision versus self-interest, centring on third sector housing. The chapter examines whether third sector housing and housing philanthropy measure up to the dual requirements of moral justifiability and practical feasibility. It concludes that third sector housing and housing philanthropy are justified by versions of cosmopolitanism, self-reliance (as freedom and autonomy), justice, rights to housing and equal right to housing. The challenges facing third sector housing overseas are applied to examine issues related to such housing sector in Hong Kong context, thereby enhancing the understanding of its practical feasibility. In Chap. 4, Chun discusses the land controversy on the development of the North New Territories, focusing on contentious land options, including the development

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of brownfield sites, the Fanling Golf Course and private agricultural land reserve. Chun views these from the perspective of stakeholders’ dialectics, bringing out the controversy between self-interest versus collective interest through Rawlsian distinctions between rationality and reasonableness. Chun highlights the Rawlsian model in reframing the dynamics between politics, governance and justice from a holistic perspective. Tsang, in Chap. 5, discusses how the principle of “develop first, conserve later” is articulated in the discussion of third runway, highlighting the land controversy of natural conservation versus development. He points out how “develop first, conserve later” principle fails (even if we assume that human interest always overrides other living animals). He further reconsiders Greater Value of human interest Assumption (GVA) embedded in “develop first, conserve later” principle. Tsang highlights that human interest is not always incompatible with ecological consideration, and embracing “enlightened human interest” in public deliberation facilitates the realization of the “politics–justice–governance” model. In Chap. 6, Chan and Chui discuss the controversy concerning conservation and land development by drawing on the study of environmental ethics which leads to a deadlock. Thus, a reconciliatory approach advocated by environmental pragmatism is called for. It may be possible that, through careful and innovative planning, the adoption of the constructive conservation approach can make reclamation and developing the periphery of country parks constructive in enhancing both the ecological system and the well-being of the Hong Kong people, leading to the win-win situation.

Part II: Place, Neighbourhood and Sustainability Humans do not merely want a space to dwell in, but a place where they have a sense of belonging, with an established social network. Thus, our well-being is not only measured in terms of the quality of the dwelling we reside in, but also depends on land use developments in our neighbourhood and our hometown. Part II will examine how such land use developments lead to different controversies and how social values facilitate their resolution, with insights from both Western and Chinese traditions. Some of the controversies discussed in this Part represent an epitome exaggerated in the Asian and Hong Kong context. Insights from resolution of such controversies in such context can serve as exemplary guidelines for the search for answers for similar situations elsewhere, highly relevant to urban policy-makers from different parts of the world. In Chap. 7, there is a discussion of the land controversy of heritage preservation versus development. Ying discusses the values of heritage, how the balance is to be struck between development and heritage preservation, with a conceptual apparatus derived. Ying then uses such conceptual apparatus to analyse the case of Queen’s Pier controversy, thereby concluding on the lessons learnt about land governance from this case study.

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Chapter 8, written by Chung, focuses on the extension of South East New Territories (SENT) landfill (as a case of NIMBY) which is a land controversy involving collective interest versus self-interest. It argues that common textbook solutions to NIMBY (including burden sharing, self-sufficiency principle and voluntary siting) do not work well for this case. Chung examines compensation as a solution to this NIMBY case and concludes that direct one-off financial compensation for property price loss may be effective, yet not very feasible and involves too big an expense, on the part of the government. The alternative effective solution is to “repackage” and “make” the potentially unwelcome facility into an asset, thereby rendering the resultant property value appreciation as an indirect means of compensation. In Chap. 9, Yung highlights the issue of columbarium siting in a Chinese society, representing a case of controversy of public, collective interest versus neighbourhood, self-interest. “Equality” can be the social value leading way out of the controversy by minimizing free-riding as short-term solution in increasing land available for columbarium-building, while managing and decreasing demand for columbarium through promotion of green burials will be more effective in dealing with issue in the long run. Yung suggests that better life and death education will facilitate the more harmonious juxtaposition of artefacts for both the dead and the living in an urban built environment as a long-term solution. Chapter 10 focuses on the land controversy over the siting of a specific type of NIMBY, namely rehabilitation centres, involving the issue of public/collective interest against the vested interest of the host community. Lai argues that the perception that public interest is pursued at the expense of local and/or personal interest in a NIMBY controversy is very much related to how the siting is morally justified. A justificatory approach that intentionally plays down the consideration of one’s vested interest may seem neutral and fair, but may perhaps be inappropriate in some cases. Lai tries to demonstrate that a change in the justificatory approach that takes legitimate consideration of people’s vested interest will change the perspectives that the host community held towards such land controversy, making the justification of rehabilitation centres siting more palatable, thereby gaining more potential in rallying support from the host community. In Chap. 11, Mok examines the voluntary siting mechanism which has been practised in different Canadian provinces, involving the land controversy of paternalism versus voluntary decision. Such siting mechanism seems to provide an “effective” and “fair” way to settle the siting of LULU (locally unwanted land use). Mok evaluates replicability of voluntary siting mechanism in the context of Hong Kong, thereby highlighting its merits as well as its limitations. Mok then concludes on the strong tension between replicability and justifiability of such siting mechanism. In the last concluding chapter, Yu reviews this book project, highlighting the contributions of the preceding chapters to the theme of land justice, land politics and land governance. The relation between social values and public policy is scrutinized, and the merits and limitations of different approaches are considered. A theoretical review is put forward together with illustrations taken from the preceding chapters of this book. This chapter takes stock of the contributions of each of the preceding chapters and reviews this book project as a whole.

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References Census and Statistics Department. (2007). Quarterly report on general household survey October to December 2007. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department. Census and Statistics Department. (2009). Quarterly report on general household survey July to September 2009. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department. Census and Statistics Department. (2016). Quarterly report on general household survey January to March 2016. Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department. Census and Statistics Department. (2017). 2016 population by-census: Main results. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Census and Statistics Department. (2018). Hong Kong in figures. Available online at: https://www. censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/hkif/index.jsp. Chapple, K. (2015). Planning sustainable cities and regions: Towards more equitable development. New York: Routledge. Cheshire, Paul, & Sheppard, Stephen. (1998). Estimating the demand for housing, land, and neighbourhood characteristics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60(3), 357–382. Clapham, D. (2005) The meaning of housing: A pathway approach. Bristol: Policy Press. Clos, J. (2014), ‘Towards a new urban agenda’, in LSE Cities, Governing our urban futures, papers for the urban age. Governing Urban Futures Conference, Delhi, 14–15 November. Development Bureau and Planning Department. (2016). Hong Kong 2030+: Towards a planning vision and strategy transcending 2030. Hong Kong: Development Bureau and Planning Department. Douay, N., Chung, S., & Jayaram, N. (2010). The emergence of a collaborative approach challenges Hong Kong’s Urban planning model. China Perspectives, 81(1), 97–109. Ernti, V. (2017). Re-visiting NIMBY: From conflicting interests to conflicting valuations. The Sociological Review, 65(2), 285–301. Forrest, R. (2000) ‘What constitutes a balanced community’. In I. Anderson & D. Sim (Eds.) Social exclusion and housing: Context and challenges (pp. 207–219). Coventry: Chartered Institute of Housing. Friedmann, John. (1957). Planning, progress, and social values. Diogenes, 5(17), 98–111. Gurran, N., Gallent, N., & Chiiu, R. L. H. (2016) Politics, planning and housing supply in Australia, England and Hong Kong. New York and London: Routledge. Halle, D., & Mirrer-Singer, P. (2008) “NIMBYism” in Vincent N. Parrillo (Ed.) Encyclopedia of social problems. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Online version. Hong Kong SAR Government. (2007) Hong Kong 2030 planning vision and strategy final report. Hong Kong: Hong Kong SAR Government. Honoré, A. M. (1961) “Shelter”. In A. G. Guest (Ed.) Oxford essays in jurisprudence (pp. 105–147). London: Oxford University Press. Hui, E. C. M., & Soo, J. A. (2002). Development conditions and supply of housing: Evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of Urban Planning and Development, 128(3), 105–138. Jayantha, W. M., & Hui, E. C. (2012). Housing consumption and residential crowding in Hong Kong: A long-term analysis. Journal of Facilities Management, 10(2), 150–172. King, C. S. (2017) “Social justice”. In: Joseph, P. (Ed.) The SAGE encyclopedia of war: Social science perspectives. Online version. Kooiman, Jan, & Jentoft, Svein. (2009). Meta-governance: Values, norms and principles, and the making of hard choices. Public Administration, 87(4), 818–836. La Grange, A., & Pretorius, F. (2005). Shifts along the decommodification—Commodification Continuum: Housing delivery and state accumulation in Hong Kong. Urban Studies, 42(13), 2471–2488. Lee, W. Y., & Tang, W.-S. (2003). Role of development plans in development control: A new research agenda for town planning in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Centre for China Urban and Regional Studies.

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Leung, C. K. Y., & Tang, E. C. H. (2014). Availability, affordability and volatility: The case of Hong Kong housing market. MPRA Paper No. 58770. Li, S. (2016). Burst of the property bubble and Hong Kong’s changing land and housing policies post-1997. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(2), 228–248. Li, L.-H., Kelvin, S. K., & Cheung, K. S. (2016). Land supply and housing prices in Hong Kong: The political economy of urban land policy. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 34, 981–998. Laquian, A. A. (1996) “Pearl river delta development in the world perspective”. In A. Gar-On Yeh (Ed.) Planning Hong Kong for the 21st century. Hong Kong: Centre of Urban Planning and Environmental Management, University of Hong Kong. Merrifield, A., & Swyngedouw, E. (Eds.). (1997). The urbanization of injustice. Washington Square: New York University Press. Nissim, R. (2016). Land administration and practice in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries. (2018). “Controversy”. Available online at: https://www. oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/controversy#controversy__4. Palma-Oliveira, J. M. (2000) A new theory for the explanation of the NIMBY effect. In M. P. Cottam (Eds.). Foresight and precaution (pp. 1167–1171). Rotterdam: Balkema. Parker, G., & Doak, J. (2012). Place and sense of place. In Concepts in Planning (pp. 158–170). London: Sage [online version]. Pavel, M. P. (Ed.). (2009). Breakthrough communities: Sustainability and justice in the Next American Metropolis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Planning Department. (2019). Hong Kong: The facts—Town planning. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government. Pol, E., Masso, A. Di, Castrechini, A., Bonet, M. R., & Videl, T. (2006). Psychological parameters to understand and manage the NMBY effect. Revue Europeenne de Psychologie Appliquee, 56(1), 43–51. Rating and Valuation Department. (2019a). Private domestic—Price indices by class (territorywide). Retrieved from http://www.rvd.gov.hk/en/property_market_statistics/. Rating and Valuation Department. (2019b). Private domestic—rent indices by class (territory-wide). Retrieved from http://www.rvd.gov.hk/en/property_market_statistics/. Rooney, N. (2003). At home with density. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Siu, K. W., & Huang, Y. H. (2015). Everyday life under modernist planning: A study of evertransforming urban ara in Hong Kong. Urban Design International, 20(4), 293–309. Stanley, J., Stanley, J., & Hansen, R. (2017). How great cities happen. Edward Elgar M.U.A. Task Force on Land Supply. (2018). Land for Hong Kong: Our home, our say! Available online at: https://landforhongkong.hk/en/index.php. Tipple, G., & Speak, S. (2005). Definitions of homelessness in developing countries. Habitat International, 29(2), 337–352. Town Planning Ordinance. (Chap. 131). Available online at: https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/ cap131. Traer, R. (2009). Doing environmental ethics boulder. CO: Westview Press. UN-Habitat. (2012). Handling land: Innovative tools for land governance and secure tenure. Nairobo: United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). Wang, A. Q., Chan, E. H. W., Yeung, S. C. W., & Han, J. B. (2017). Urban fringe land use transitions in Hong Kong: From new towns to new development areas. Procedia Engineering, 198, 707–719. Waskey, A. J. (2006). Shelter. In M. Odekon (Ed.), Encyclopedia of world poverty (pp. 975–976). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Wei, P. (2009). Core social values in contemporary societies. Diogenes, 221, 53–73. Wolsink, M. (1994). Entanglement of interests and motives: Assumptions behind the NIMBY-theory on facility siting. Urban Studies, 31(6), 851–866. Yung, Betty. (2016). Introduction: Ethical dilemmas, social values, and public policy: The context of Governance and Citizenship. In B. Yung & Y. Kam-Por (Eds.), Ethical dilemmas in public

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policy: The dynamics of social values in the east-west context of Hong Kong (pp. 1–19). Singapore: Springer. Yung, B., & Lee, F. (2012). Right to housing” in Hong Kong: Perspectives from the Hong Kong Community. Housing, Theory and Society, 29(4), 401–419. Yung, B., & Yu, K.-P. (Eds.). (2016). Ethical dilemmas in public policy: The dynamics of social values in the east-west context of Hong Kong. Singapore: Springer.

Part I

Space, Housing and Development

Chapter 2

Nano-apartments: The Synergy of Rights, Choice, Markets, and Regulations? Kam-Yuen Cheng

Abstract This chapter aims to investigate how the issues of market, rights, choice, and regulations interrelate with each other in the development of nano-apartments in Hong Kong. The monopolization of housing market and the decrease in number of household members create a market for nano-apartments. The development of nanoapartments sustains and enhances the violation of the right to adequate housing and also threatens the community values. Although it seems to provide one more choice for homebuyers, housing developers in fact limit homebuyers’ choices by limiting the supply of regular apartments in the first place. The rectification and solutions to the shortage of housing include pecuniary compensation, providing more subsidized housing, and bifurcating the market between regular housing and luxury housing.

Introduction According to the Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey, Hong Kong has the highest home price in the world; a standard two-bedroom apartment costs 19.4 times gross annual median family income.1 Hong Kong also has the lowest average living space per capita: 170 ft2 (Wong 2017, 6). In order to make their apartments affordable to homebuyers and to enhance revenue per square foot, housing developers have been selling nano-apartments (or micro-apartments) since 2013. The number of nano-apartments (less than 215 ft2 )2 increased steadily in the

1 This

is the figure in the third quarter of 2017. Data source: https://fcpp.org/wp-content/uploads/ dhi2018-fcpp.pdf. 2 Although the HK government does not have an official definition, apartments having floor area smaller than or equal to this figure are classified as the smallest category in its official documents. This definition of nano-apartment is also used in Wong (2017). K.-Y. Cheng (B) Humanities Domain, Centennial College, Pokfulam, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_2

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past three years.3 In 2019, the number is expected to be 1066 (Wong 2017, 11). Currently, the smallest apartments have only 128 ft2 . Hong Kong is not the only place where nano-apartments are blooming. Such apartments can also be found in other big cities, such as Washington, London, and Melbourne. For example, Washington has apartment units as small as 150 ft2 . The main reasons why nano-apartments are booming in these big cities are the same: (1) the price of real estate is high, and (2) the number of members in an average domestic household has been decreasing. In addition to the development of nano-apartments, the two aforementioned factors are also conductive to the booming of illegal subdivided units, which are usually for lease, in Hong Kong. Subdivided units are formed when an apartment that is originally designed for a household is converted to several self-contained units. However, such conversions usually fail to fulfill the ventilation and fire safety requirements. Whereas nano-apartments are designed for lower division of middle class, subdivided units are usually for the grassroots or fresh grads. Because subdivided units are usually illegal and in poor conditions, the injustice involved in them is conspicuous to many. Nano-apartments, in contrast, are first-hand, stylish, and seem to be the free choice of the homebuyer; the issue of their injustice is seldom raised. So this chapter aims to address this issue. On the one hand, private housing is a commodity, the price of which is regulated by the supposedly free market in a capitalist city like Hong Kong. On the other hand, housing is also a necessity. According to the United Nations’ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, everyone has a positive right to adequate housing, which “is more than just four walls and a roof. It is the right of every woman, man, youth and child to gain and sustain a safe and secure home and community in which to live in peace and dignity.”4 To say that the right to adequate housing is a positive right is to say that the society at large has an obligation to help its citizens to acquire adequate housing. This implies that both the government and the developers of private housing have an obligation to supply housing that fulfills the standard of adequate housing. In order to fulfill its obligation, the former can provide pecuniary subsidy to homebuyers or provide government housing directly. The government should also impose regulations on private developers if the market fails to provide such housing. This is particularly true in Hong Kong where the market is an oligopoly and thus not really free. That is, the government should try to balance the freedom and the obligation of developers. This chapter will investigate how the issues of market, rights, choice, and regulations interrelate with each other in the development of nano-apartments in Hong Kong. In the first section, I will investigate the relation between the governance and the housing market in Hong Kong. In the second section, I will examine the justification of a right to housing and what it consists in. In the third section, I will argue 3 The figures are 79, 206, and 691 in 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively. Data source: https://www. thb.gov.hk/eng/legislative/housing/expenditure/2018/THB(H)-1.pdf. 4 Quoted from UN’s the Right to Adequate Housing Toolkit. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Hou sing/toolkit/Pages/RighttoAdequateHousingToolkit.aspx.

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that the availability of nano-apartments, instead of providing one more choice for homebuyers, actually sustains the deprivation of their housing right. Afterward, I will discuss how nano-apartments contribute to the decay of social values. Before the conclusion, I will examine what regulations and other solutions the Hong Kong government can adopt in order to protect the housing right of its citizens.

Concepts and Deliberation The Governance and the Housing Market The price of private housing, like other commodities, is determined by the supply and demand. The HK government, nonetheless, fails to control both. Regarding the supply of private housing, as discussed in Chap. 1 of this book, because of the government’s adoption of a high premium-to-ground rent ratio in land lease,5 only large developers can afford to bid for it. Consequently, the supply of private housing is monopolized by several large developers. Although these developers have a large reserve of land,6 they limit the development of their reserve in order to control the supply and thereby maintain the high housing price. Not only does the HK government contribute to the oligopoly in the private housing market, but it also ceased to supply purchasable subsidized housing for ten years. There are two types of subsidized housing provided by the HK government: public rental housing (PRH) and homeownership scheme (HOS). After 1997’s Asian Financial Crisis, in order to rejuvenate the private housing market, the HK government terminated the HOS in 2001 and did not resume it until 2011. The termination of HOS has further increased the demand for private housing. In addition, the government did not try to increase its land reserve for housing during the ten years of the termination of the HOS.7 As for the demand of private housing, there are two kinds: accommodation and investment. In order to curb the latter, the government has already imposed heavy stamp duty to those homebuyers who have already owned an apartment. Nonetheless, the government has no control in the demand for accommodation because the immigration policy is in the hand of the Beijing government, rather than the HK government. Beijing has been allowing up to 150 mainlanders to emigrate to Hong Kong every day since 1997.8 Also, about 200,000 children whose both parents are 5 Basically,

the HK government owns all the land, and it only leases, but does not sell, land. For more details, one can read Chap. 1. 6 In 2016, just three of the largest developers have amassed of a combined land reserve of over 90 million square feet. Data source: https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/196 3560/housing-starved-hong-kong-way-tap-developers-land-banks. 7 In 2012, the government announced that it had less than 4 million square feet for general housing demand. Data source: https://news.now.com/home/local/player?newsId=48643&past=1. 8 From 1997 up to the present, there have been about one million mainland immigrants.

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mainlanders have the right of abode in Hong Kong because they were born there.9 Furthermore, any mainland student who has stayed in HK for 7 years can become a HK citizen. Given these polices, Hong Kong’s population grew from 6.86 million in 200610 to 7.41 million in 2017.11 That is, the population increased by about 8% in 11 years even though the birth rate in HK is extremely low. In fact, the Hong Kong government is highly motivated to keep the price of private housing high. Not only can the government collect higher amount of stamp duty from the buyers, the developers are also willing to pay higher prices to bid for land from the government. And the non-democratic government is not subject to any voting pressure. Therefore, both the HK government and the private developers will be benefited from the high housing price. Because of all these factors, the housing price has risen more than 500% from 2003 to 2017,12 whereas the medium monthly household income only increased by 76.7% in the same period.13 Nowadays, regular housing14 is already beyond the affordability of the general public. The expected consequence is that the effectual demand15 for regular housing will drop and so will the housing price, if we assume that the supply is constant and the government’s policy that curbs the demand from investors is effective. However, the development of nano-apartments let the developers maintain the high price of regular apartments by reducing their supply.16 Developers can even increase their profitability in selling nano-apartments, which cost more per square foot than regular apartments. That is, the availability of nano-apartments not only sustains, but also increases, the housing price per square foot. Some may think that the price of regular apartments will not drop even without the availability of nano-apartments. It is true that, in a free market, if few people can afford to buy regular housing, the price and thus profitability of housing development will drop initially and some developers will leave the market, resulting in reducing the supply and thereby reestablishing the original price level. But given the oligopoly of housing development, the profitability is much higher than that of other kinds of business. No developers will leave the market because the profitability of housing development is still higher than that of other kinds of business.17 So the availability of nano-apartment is pivotal to the high housing price. 9 Data

source: Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly 512, p. 76. source: https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp20.jsp?productCode=B1010003. 11 Data source: https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp20.jsp?productCode=B1010002. 12 Data source: https://www.rvd.gov.hk/doc/en/statistics/graph2.pdf. 13 Data sources: https://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B11303012003AN03B0100.pdf, https://www. statistics.gov.hk/pub/B11303012017AN17B0100.pdf. 14 Regular housing refers to apartments ranging from 350 to 1000 ft2 , and they are not designed for luxury lifestyle. 15 The effectual demand is the quantity demanded by those who are willing and can afford to pay the price. 16 This idea is originated from Chan Kim Ching, a researcher of Liber Research Community, HK. 17 In fact, most multi-business enterprises in Hong Kong have housing development as their first and/or core business. 10 Data

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There is a market for nano-apartments because, in addition to the high housing price, the number of members in an average domestic household is small in Hong Kong: The average household size is only 2.8 in 2016.18 This shows that many households consist of singles or childless couples. Because of late marriage,19 high divorce rate (34.4% in 2016),20 and low birth rate (7.7% in 2017),21 many middleclass singles and couples look for accommodation for their own and thereby create the market for small apartments. There is also a special feature of Hong Kong that is also conducive to the development of nano-apartments: the availability of nearby storage facilities. Since nano-apartments do not provide enough space for storage, especially for couples, renting a nearby small storage room can solve this problem.

Right to Housing What is a right to housing? This right presupposes a right to land appropriation or use. Land is a natural resource. According to John Locke, an appropriation of a natural resource is justified only when there are “enough and as good left in common for others” (1967, Sect. 27). This proviso, according to Robert Nozick, can be interpreted as two different requirements: one stringent and the other weaker (1974, 176). The former requires that an appropriation of an object should not deprive others of their opportunity of appropriation of similar objects. The weaker requires only that an appropriation should not deprive others of their opportunity to use what they previously could. So, even if we endorse the weaker requirement, Locke is arguing that everyone has a right to land use. John Rawls, a contemporary liberalist, thinks that in order for a person to exercise her political liberty, she must possess certain primary goods, which are “what persons need in their status as free and equal citizens, and as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life.” (1999, Preface, xiii). Without primary goods, citizens will trade their political rights for them. Hence, a government has an obligation to secure primary goods for its citizens. And accommodation is a primary good. Rawls invites us to do a thought experiment: Supposing that you are a member of a committee responsible for forming the constitutions of a new state but you do not know what social status you will have in this state, what constitutions will you agree to? According to him, you will agree that the constitutions should secure and maximize everyone’s political rights. In order to do so, the government needs to secure everyone’s primary goods. 18 Data

source: https://www.bycensus2016.gov.hk/en/Snapshot-04.html.

19 In 2016, male’s median age at first marriage was 31.4 in 2016, and female’s was 29.4. Data source:

https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp160.jsp?productCode=FA100055. 20 The divorce rate refers to the ratio of the number of divorces over the number of marriages. Data source: https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp160.jsp?productCode=FA100055. 21 The crude birth rate refers to the number of birth per 1000 population. Data source: https://www. censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp150.jsp?tableID=004&ID=0&productType=8.

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In the modern society, as Yung and Lee point out, without an address, one cannot exercise his right to vote, work, and education (2012, 403). One even cannot apply for a bank account, which is necessary for city life. On the whole, there should be a positive right to housing, which entails that others, and thus the government, have an obligation to provide adequate housing for those who cannot afford it. As mentioned in the introduction, according to the UN, the right to adequate housing is the right “to gain and sustain a safe and secure home and community in which to live in peace and dignity.” To provide a home in which to live in dignity, the housing should provide enough space for the inhabitants to exercise their right to privacy, develop their social relations among each other, and make family plans. To sustain a community in which the inhabitants live in peace, the housing should facilitate them to participate in community development. One of the elements of adequate housing is affordability, which means that “the financial costs related to housing do not threaten or severely compromise the satisfaction of other basic needs (e.g., food, transport, access to health care).”22 A common objection to a positive right to housing (or other primary goods) is that it is in conflict with our negative right to keep our properties, which entails that others have an obligation not to take away our properties. It seems that to levy tax in order to provide housing for the needy is to infringe the property right of tax payers. However, Shelly Kagan distinguishes full right from thin right. A full right consists of three elements: an option, an injunction, and an enforcement privilege, whereas a thin right consists of only an injunction (1989, 219–221). For example, a full (negative) property right includes the following: an option to keep one’s property or not; an injunction to forbid others taking away one’s property; and an enforcement privilege that gives one the right to enforce the injunction.23 On the other hand, a full (positive) housing right includes the following: an option to receive housing or not, an injunction to require others to provide housing for the right holder, and also the corresponding enforcement privilege. Although a full property right and a full housing right are not compatible with each other, a thin housing right (which lacks the enforcement privilege) and a thin property right (which lacks the option) are. On the one hand, because the housing right lacks the enforcement privilege, the needy have no right to force the better-off to provide housing for them although it is morally wrong for the latter not to do so. On the other hand, because the property right lacks the option, the better-off are morally required to share their properties with the needy although it is morally wrong to confiscate their properties.24

22 Quoted

from UN’s the Right to Adequate Housing Toolkit. right can further be analyzed into the corresponding three elements, and so on. 24 But this is what the tax system is doing. That is, the law does not respect our thin property right. 23 This

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Choice Social justice concerns equality and liberty. The preceding section has argued that everyone should have equal right to housing. This section focuses on liberty, i.e., freedom of choice. Developers of nano-apartments argue that such apartments provide one more choice to homebuyers, particularly the lower middle class, who do not qualify for public rental housing and have not enough money to buy private regular apartments. Without nano-apartments, the lower middle class can only choose the purchasable government housing, of which there is an extremely shortage of supply. But is buying nano-apartments a free or autonomous choice? First of all, as discussed above, because housing developers maintain the high price of regular apartments by limiting the housing supply, they take away from the lower middle class the option of owing a regular apartment. In addition, the HK developers, unlike those of other cities, cannot claim that nano-apartments provide an affordable urban living for people who do not want to bear the social, personal, and economic costs of living in suburban or rural areas. This is because many nano-apartments in Hong Kong are located at either old districts or new towns, which are not close to the central business districts. Second, not only does the government provide insufficient subsidized housing, it also regulated that the loan-to-value ratio for mortgage be no more than 60% for regular housing.25 In response to such regulation, housing developers themselves provide loans to homebuyers for buying their first-hand housing, including newly built nano-apartments. As a result, in the second-hand housing market, but not in the first-hand market, homebuyers must have a large sum of cash for down payment. Such a policy further deprived homebuyers of the choice of regular housing. If we consider the notion of freedom as a matter of degree, i.e., the more options are there for a choice, the freer is the choice, then both developers and the government have rendered the choice of nano-apartments less free by taking away the affordability of regular apartments.

Decay of Social Values The development of nano-apartments maintains the high price of regular apartments and thereby sustains the shortage of adequate housing. But this is not the only demerit of nano-apartments. As mentioned before, Hong Kong has low birth rate and high divorce rate. Although the recent development of nano-apartments is not conducive to the current rates, it may sustain them. The shortage of space takes away from many couples the option of raising children in a healthy environment and thereby renders their choice in having no children not free (or less free). Hence, nano-apartments 25 The regulation requires that the loan-to-value ratio be 60% for any property that costs HK$7million or more, while most regular apartments cost more than this figure. However, the HK government has relaxed this ratio to 90% in the 4th quarter of 2019.

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hinder the residents’ family planning. Regarding the high divorce rate, although there are many factors causing it, the shortage of living space is also likely to be one of the causes. It is easy to infringe other’s right of privacy and thereby cause conflicts if the living space per capita is so small. In addition, the development of nano-apartments will lead to the deterioration of community values. Nano-apartments’ residents, even if they are owners rather than tenants, tend to plan for only short-term residence. They consider nano-apartments as a stepping stone to regular apartments. For young couples who plan to have children of course will want to move to a bigger apartment. For singles and couples who do not plan to have children will also look for opportunities, e.g., a plummet in the housing price,26 so that they may be able to afford a more humanistic home. Furthermore, the residents tend to be young adults because most middle-age people even of lower middle class have already owned their regular apartments when those apartments were still affordable. Young people usually do more commuting and traveling than people of other ages. And the very reason why the residents choose nano-apartments may be that they do not often stay at home for a long time. That is why they do not mind the tininess of nano-apartments. Accordingly, residents of nano-apartments are less committed to the local communities than the other residents. They will be less concerned with and thereby participate less in the community development. Their high tendency to commute will also increase the traffic load and thereby the likelihood of traffic jams. In sum, nano-apartments are also inadequate in the sense of failing to facilitate the inhabitants to participate in community development.

Regulations and Other Solutions This section will discuss the rectifying policies to protect the right of adequate housing. In order to rectify the intergenerational injustice resulted from the deprivation of virgin land, in 1797, Thomas Paine, an American philosopher, argued that every child on reaching adulthood should be paid a national fund “as a compensation in part, for the loss of his or her natural inheritance, by the introduction of the system of landed property.”27 Many economists (Sandford 1969; Atkinson 1972; Ackerman and Alstott 1999) put forward similar ideas. For example, Ackerman and Alstott propose a sum that is around double the median family annual income. This sum may or may not be restricted only for dwelling purpose. But in the former case, in order to prevent the money further pushing up the housing price, the government must have already succeeded in lowering the housing price before distributing such fund. Following other cities, the Hong Kong government can impose restrictions on the dwelling size of private housing. For example, New York City and Sydney both 26 The

housing price dropped 60% in the 1997’s Asian Financial Crisis. website of the U.S. Social Security Administration under the heading of “Social Insurance History”. http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/paine4.html. 27 The

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require that new apartments be a minimum of 400 ft2 .28 Given that Hong Kong’s average living space per capita is much smaller than other cities, the government can adjust the restriction accordingly. In Hong Kong, statistics show that building more public rental housing cannot reduce the shortage of housing. According to the by-census 2016 conducted by the government, from 2006 to 2016, the number of PRH units increased by around 70,000.29 However, during this period, the population living in PRH only increased by around 2000.30 One of the reasons is that, for elderly tenants, when some of the household members die or move out, the government, for humanistic reasons, could not force the remaining elderly members to move to a smaller apartment. As a result, particularly in old estates, an elderly “empty-nester” may occupy an apartment that is designed for five or six. The figures show that, in the long term, PRH is not an efficient way to fulfill the housing demand, since its efficiency will decrease as time passes by. Given that there are only two kinds of government housing, the other option is to increase the supply of purchasable subsidized housing (the HOS). Given that the HOS units are private properties, the owners need to bear the opportunity cost if they let their units vacant. Nonetheless, PRH is necessary because some low-income families would not be able to own even subsidized housing. Singapore has the most extensive subsidized housing scheme in the world: 80% of Singaporeans live in self-owned apartments, called “HDB (Housing and Development Board) flats,” that were built, subsidized, and managed by the government.31 Only a small portion of Singaporeans live in commercial or private housing, which can be sold and bought in the free market. Although Hong Kong’s subsidized homeownership is, to a certain extent, like Singapore’s HDB flats, only about 17% of Hong Kong population live in the former.32 If we agree that housing, like water supply, is a primary good, the housing supply cannot be subject to the free market. As there is a difference in the market between tap water and bottled water, the government should also draw a difference between regular housing (subsidized or private) and private luxury housing such that only the latter is subject to the free market. That is, the government should be either the main provider of regular housing or impose stringent control on both the size and price of private regular housing. Or the government can collaborate with private developers to produce regular housing. Actually, some HOS housing is the result of such collaboration. On the other hand, the government can also lower the land price and/or profit tax as well as reduce the premium-to-ground rent ratio in land lease in order to attract small developers to enter the housing market.

28 Although

the UK also has adopted nationally described space standard, it is optional. source: https://www.bycensus2016.gov.hk/en/Snapshot-05.html. 30 Data source: Ibid. 31 Data source: http://www.tablebuilder.singstat.gov.sg/publicfacing/createDataTable.action?refId= 14910. 32 Data source: http://www.census2011.gov.hk/pdf/key-statistics-cover.pdf. 29 Data

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In fact, according to the study of Prof. Ng Mee Kam,33 the number of residential units of all the three kinds of housing (private housing, PRH, and HOS) adding together is more than that of domestic households.34 Hence, there is more than enough housing if each domestic household only occupies one residential unit. In order to reduce the vacancy rate of private housing, the government is going to levy vacancy tax on developers, although not on individual owners. In order to reduce the vacancy rate of HOS, the government has also released certain constraints on the owner’s reselling their apartments. It is also considering similar relaxation for those elderly empty-nesters to sublease one or two rooms of their apartments.

Conclusion From the perspective of politics, the controversies concerning nano-apartments involve conflicts of interests among the homebuyer, the homeowner, the developer, and the government. While developers, homeowners, and the government would like to see rising housing price, homebuyers want to have the opposite. Whereas large developers want to have fewer regulations imposed on their business, homebuyers and small developers want to have their interests protected by regulations. In order to balance the interests of different parties, an ideal situation is that the housing price changes in pace with the average salary, and the regulations can attract new housing developers and allow free competition between all developers, while at the same time protect the right to housing. The availability of nano-apartments both results from and sustains the lack of such balance. Social justice concerns both equality and liberty. Given that everyone has an equal right to adequate housing, the development of nano-apartments is conducive to injustice by maintaining the unaffordability of adequate housing and thereby violating such right. The fact that there is a market for nano-apartments is partly due to the lack of choices of homebuyers. Given that developers can obtain even higher profitability from selling nano-apartments than regular apartments, the development of the former augments the injustice. In addition, because the nano-apartment residents tend to be short-term residents, their lack of participation in the community development will be detrimental to community values. The bad governance contributes to the twisted housing market in Hong Kong. Not only does the HK government have no control in its immigration policies, but it has also adopted certain policies that favor large developers. Although the first issue is beyond the government’s scope of power, it can rectify its housing policies and

33 Prof

Ng is a faculty member of the Department of Geography and Resource Management of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 34 Data source: https://theinitium.com/article/20180427-opinion-ngmeekam-hk-land-and-housing/.

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separate the market of regular housing from that of luxury housing in order to protect the housing right of the general public. But given that the HK government’s revenue depends heavily on the land lease, it is doubtful whether the government resolves to lower the private housing price.

References Ackerman, B., & Alstott, A. (1999). The stake-holder society. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Atkinson, A. (1972). Unequal shares. London: Allen Lane. Kagan, S. (1989). The limits of morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Locke, J. (1967). In Two treatises of government. P. Laslett (Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Cambridge: Blackwell. Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press. Sandford, C. (1969). Economics of public finance. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Wong, Y.-S., et al. (2017). Lacunae in land planning: Undersized, undersupplied and underestimated. HK: Our HK Foundation. Available from www.ourhkfoundation.org.hk/sites/default/ files/media/pdf/land_housing_research_report_engv3.pdf. Yung, B., & Lee, F.-P. (2012). “Right to housing” in Hong Kong: Perspectives from the Hong Kong Community. Housing, Theory and Society, 29, 401–419.

Chapter 3

Third Sector Housing: Housing Philanthropy, Self-reliance and Policy Facilitation Betty Yung and Alex Chan

Abstract Public–private dichotomy predominates in Hong Kong housing arena. Housing can take the form of housing philanthropy, in addition to being a form of consumption and investment, as represented by the offer of Light Homes (光房) in Hong Kong, with the benevolent landlords renting out properties at below-market rent to low-income single-parent families, managed and operated by a third sector housing organization. This third sector housing endeavour represents philanthropic acts towards disadvantaged groups in relative poverty in an affluent society, rather than towards those in more desperate situations of absolute poverty in the global context. Will philanthropic acts towards the relative poor in our home city be comparatively more morally justified than such acts towards the absolute poor in faraway developing countries, or vice versa? Charity may lead to dependence and undermine self-reliance. Light Homes and Light Housing provision, as a third sector poverty relief approach, aims at using housing as a means to self-reliance. How far should self-reliance be a justified end of anti-poverty efforts in terms of sustainability and efficacy? The success of third sector housing, very often, depends on policy facilitation, both in financial and non-financial terms. For example, Light Housing (光 屋) relies on ceremonial lease of former factory quarters and administrative facilitation, on the part of the government. If public resources are involved, the question of justice sets in. How far is it just to devote public resources to support the third sector in their housing provision for the disadvantaged? How far is this justified by “right to housing” and “equal right to housing”? Before joining City University of Hong Kong in August 2018, Yung has conducted some research work related to this chapter under the capacity as Centre Research Fellow at the Centre for Governance and Citizenship of the Education University of Hong Kong, with which Yung is affiliated. B. Yung (B) Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] A. Chan School of Professional Education and Executive Development, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_3

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Introduction Public–private dichotomy predominates in Hong Kong housing arena (Yung and Chan 2016), with the mentality of policymakers, housing advocates, housing sector practitioners and common citizens primarily limited to either private housing or public housing, without extending their imaginations beyond such sectors to third sector housing provision. Though the exact definition of third sector is highly debatable, there are a number of characteristics commonly identified among third sector organizations, including (1) voluntary participation, involving volunteers; (2) performed in public, instead of the private or personal, sphere; (3) in an organized form, with self-governing structures; (4) in a “non-private” and “non-governmental” organization; (5) for societal or public good, rather than profit-maximization motives; and (6) with a primarily non-profit-distributing constraint, reinvesting most or all “profits” for the furtherance of societal and public good (Salaman and Anheier 1998; Hulgard 2011; Kurian 2011; Yung and Chan, In press). Third sector can be broadly demarcated to include non-governmental organizations, cooperatives, social enterprises and non-profits. Third sector housing will thus be described as housing provided by such sector, as distinct from the public (government) and the private (predominantly profit-seeking) sectors. In Hong Kong, and indeed many parts of the world, housing is chiefly conceived as a form of private consumption for the occupants (especially in rental housing), and/or investment (in owner-occupancy, house purchase for leasing purposes as well as housing speculation), especially viewed by many as “hoard of wealth” to serve as safeguard against inflation and as a form of self-devised “retirement-protection” in Hong Kong in the light of the absence of a public pension scheme (though admittedly house purchase does not guarantee asset increase since it may entail similar chances of wealth vaporization, or even negative equity). However, housing may be envisaged as housing philanthropy, in addition to the two commonly held conceptions of consumption and investment. Philanthropy, as defined by Leisinger (2007), is the donation of resources to support organized, often sustained, efforts intended for specific beneficial social purposes. It is to be differentiated from charity which usually involves short-term relief (e.g. for tsunami or earthquake victims), whereas philanthropy attempts to address the root causes of social problem(s) and endeavours to bring about tangible positive changes in social conditions to alleviate such problem(s) (Leisinger 2007). The resources donated can be in the form of cash, in kind, time and efforts (Leisinger 2007). Housing philanthropy will be philanthropy based on housing. It covers not only housing provision per se, but more often treated as a means to achieve various social objectives, such as poverty alleviation through providing affordable housing, promoting self-reliance and encouraging community development. Since philanthropy is often directed at those in need, usually targeted at those with lesser economic means, housing philanthropy will frequently aim explicitly or implicitly towards alleviating the housing plight of the economic and social disadvantaged. Very often, the third sector will take the lead in soliciting, coordinating and managing such housing

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philanthropy efforts to make housing provision for the needy and the low income a possibility and a reality, outside both the government bureaucracy and private corporations, often serving different social purposes under the umbrella goal of poverty alleviation. In this way, third sector housing significantly intertwines with housing philanthropy. Whether one is born into a rich or poor family in a local context, within a rich or poor country in the global context, is somewhat arbitrary and somewhat like a “lottery of life” (Gordon 2008) which significantly will affect one’s life chances (Miller 2007), especially that of the young. In a world with unequal distribution of resources, housing plight and unsatisfied housing needs due to limited means or poverty call forth housing-related philanthropy targeted at reducing suffering caused by dwelling in inadequate housing which may be cramped, unsafe, poorly ventilated, unhygienic, etc.; all of which are considered to be bad, if not the worst, thereby necessitating sympathy and care, thus justifying philanthropic efforts to bring about improvements especially in the housing aspect. Such housing support is often viewed as part and parcel of or as a means to larger poverty alleviation efforts, thereby reducing suffering and facilitating overall human flourishing. To date, the most common form of housing philanthropy in Hong Kong is the leasing of decent and safe housing units (some being idle and underutilized, while some are property bequests to descendants, with a few even purposefully purchased for philanthropic purposes) by “benevolent” landlords at below-market rent levels to the needy and the low income through the coordinating efforts of third sector housing organizations (including non-governmental organizations, social enterprises and social service organizations) in provision of some recent emerging examples of third sector housing in Hong Kong, such as Light Homes,1 Good House2 and SOUK.3 Besides, the offering of physical housing units by philanthropists, cash donations for refurbishing housing units suitable for dwelling by private foundations and other sources, voluntary or “cost-recovery” services by professionals such as architects, surveyors and housing managers as well as common citizens serving as volunteers in assisting needy households in home-moving, etc., all together make philanthropic housing provision materialize recently, under the management and the governance of third sector housing organizations, though admittedly still in comparatively small scale when compared to the massive total housing units in Hong Kong. However, a “quiet conceptual reorientation” is taking place, transforming Hong Kong people’s conception of housing through adding in the third option of housing philanthropy, instead of limited to merely the binary conceptions of housing as merely for profitmaximization or/and private consumption. This chapter highlights the controversy of philanthropy versus government provision versus self-interest in the context of housing. Housing in Hong Kong is often 1 Please

refer to latter parts for further discussion. House is housing leased out by “benevolent landlords” in accordance with a standard lease which promotes more equal relations between landlords and tenants as a way to improve the quality of life of the low income and the disadvantaged. 3 This is below-market rent housing for rehabilitated offenders provided by benevolent landlords. 2 Good

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dichotomously conceived in terms of private housing provision (embracing selfinterest) or public housing provision (crystallizing public and social interest). In fact, housing philanthropy (often coordinated by third sector efforts) can serve as an alternative to government provision of affordable housing and self-interested, profitoriented private housing delivery, with housing philanthropy, government housing provision and profit-maximization private housing sector playing different roles in the housing arena, serving different values, groups and targets, and complementing one another.

Review of Recent Development of Third Sector Housing in Hong Kong The biggest third sector housing organization in Hong Kong with the longest history is the Hong Kong Housing Society. It was founded in 1948. However, since we are more concerned about the conditions required for the development of third sector housing at the present stage, we shall focus on another two third sector organizations which have been actively contributing their efforts to solving housing problem in present time. Light Be started to provide Light Homes since 2010. Light Homes are rental units targeting tenants who are single mothers with children. The rent is set at a level affordable to them. In turn, these rental units are offered by socially conscientious landlords who are willing to rent out the unit at a sub-market level. Light Be serves as the intermediary between landlords and tenants. In 2016, Light Be launched the Light Housing project in Sham Tseng. With the support of donations from the business sector, Light Be renovated a previously vacant factory staff quarters building belonging to the government to provide rental housing with affordable rent below the market level. Light Housing targets low-income families (Hong Kong Economic Journal 10-10-2017). Unlike Light Homes which must be shared by two to three families, Light Housing offered rental units, each for one family. In 2017, Hong Kong Council of Social Service (HKCSS) launched the Community Housing Movement (社會房屋共享計劃). Similar to what Light Be has been doing, HKCSS serves as an intermediary to connect socially conscientious landlords and tenants who are the disadvantaged group in society. It targets people who have waited for public rental housing (PRH) for more than three years. Priority will be given to those living in subdivided units. The rental period is at least two years. At the present stage, both Light Be and HKCSS focus on transitional housing. They specialize in social subleasing and property management. However, they have also begun to move further along the direction of property development, with a specific focus on property renovation (Light Be’s Light Housing project) and the construction of prefabricated modular housing (HKCSS’s modular housing project).

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The efforts of both Light Be and HKCSS are innovative. At present, Light Be is managing around 140 rental units.4 HKCSS’s Community Housing Movement, which began in 2017, aims to provide 500 units in 3 years for rent. If the number of units to be provided is compared to the 257,500 applications on the PRH waiting list in September 2019 (Hong Kong Housing Authority 2019), and more than 90,000 low-income families living in subdivided units (Census and Statistics Department 2018), the contribution of Light Be and HKCSS can only be described as meagre. However, the achievement of Light Be and HKCSS does not lie in the quantity or scale of service provided. The contribution lies in their distinct approach to housing, which prioritizes the affordability of the housing units as well as achievement of non-housing social objectives, such as self-reliance on the part of tenants. In Hong Kong, Light Be and HKCSS are providing affordable housing. The rent is determined on the basis of tenants’ income level (Singtao 23-01-2017; HK01 18-01-2018). Through the support of social workers, Light Be also helps single mothers devise personal plan about seeking employment eventually. To the extent that Light Be sees the rental service it provides for these single mothers as a means for personal empowerment, it is also encouraging the self-reliance of these single mothers. Light Be also offered Light Homes for sharing among two to three families in order to encourage the building of social connections among tenants. The Light Housing project also includes regular social activities among tenants organized by social workers. It is hoped that through these connections, tenants can share useful information and learn good practice from each other, no matter about parenting, job seeking or other tasks related to personal empowerment. In developed countries, the contribution of third sector housing also lies in providing affordable housing (Davis 1994; Caragata 2012), promoting self-reliance or self-sufficiency of tenants (Shlay 1993; Bratt and Keyes 1997; Bratt 2008), and encouraging community development and neighbourhood revitalization (Walker 1993; Cole and Powell 2010; Silver 2012). The nature of all these efforts is social, concerning the well-being of tenants. Note that the achievement of social objectives (through largely organized private means) is what distinguishes the third sector from the first and the second sectors. Generally speaking, the three sectors are distinguished by different logics of governance, or different ways to engage collective management of common problems of a country. The third sector highlights a distinct logic, which gives priority to social values and social objectives such as affordability and self-reliance. In Hong Kong, since the recent emerging third sector housing organizations in Hong Kong have not taken up the expanded role as property developers, and for this reason, do not engage in land assembly, design and construction of housing

4 According

to news reports, Light Be has 100 Light Homes and around 40 units in Light Housing. See Ta Kung Pao (06-10-2016) and Hong Kong Economic Journal (10-10-2017).

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units,5 they are yet to make additional contribution to community development6 and neighbourhood revitalization.7 A practice is sound and sensible if it is satisfactorily assessed both in terms of moral justifiability and practical feasibility. The following parts of this chapter will examine the practice of third sector housing and housing philanthropy from the dual angles of moral justifiability and practical feasibility. The former part will centre on discussion of moral justifiability through answering three questions from a philosophical perspective: (1) How far are housing philanthropic acts towards those in relative poverty within our affluent society justified in view of the greater plight of those in absolute poverty in the global context? (2) How far is self-reliance justified as the aim of poverty alleviation efforts morally and in policy terms, thereby being defensible purposes of third sector housing and housing philanthropic efforts? (3) How far is it just and justified to devote public (or governmental) resources to facilitate third sector housing and housing philanthropy? The latter part of the chapter will adopt a social science and policy analysis approach to examine what are the challenges and major concerns in making third sector housing a practical feasibility. This chapter represents an interdisciplinary endeavour to examine third sector housing in Hong Kong context, with implications that can be applied and transferred elsewhere.

5 Though

HKCSS will involve in the development of modular housing (which is temporary, rather than permanent form of housing) in near future. 6 In the context of urban studies, community development refers to the practice of mobilizing local community effort to solve a wide variety of problems, including the rebuilding of housing, local economies or social fabric (Stoecker 2010). In the USA, community development has been referred to the refurbishment of decay central city properties, whereas in other countries, it can refer to the rebuilding social relationships among neighbours or advocacy of social change through community organizing (Ibid.). Thus, community development in the broader US sense is more than merely neighbourhood fostering and social network building, but also involves house building, housing and neighbourhood rebuilding as well as redevelopment. 7 Nonetheless, the long-established Hong Kong Housing Society undertakes all such roles (including obtainance of land, construction of housing units and urban renewal), perhaps more plausible for her because of her longer history, larger size and scale as well as close connection with the government. It should be noted that four officials of the government serve as ex officio members of the Supervisory Board (consisting of a total of 25 members) of the Housing Society. The Supervisory Board is responsible for the formulation of the Housing Society’s mission and guiding principles. One official of the government serves as ex officio member of the Executive Committee (a total of 12 members) of the Housing Society. The Executive Committee establishes policy and oversees the performance of the Management which is led by the Executive Director. Members of the Supervisory Board and Committees contribute on voluntary basis to the Housing Society (Hong Kong Housing Society 2018).

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Moral Justifiability of Third Sector Housing and Housing Philanthropy in the Context of Hong Kong Charitable Acts in Local Versus Global Context Concepts and Deliberation “If one involves in housing philanthropy in Hong Kong, one will be involving in charitable acts towards the relative poor8 in an affluent society. Will it be more justified if one donates the resources to help the absolute poor9 in the global context, especially those in developing countries, which will be life-saving rather than povertyalleviating as in the former case? Will the latter make a more imminent and justified demand of our charity resources than the former?” If one has this dilemma in mind, one is pulled in different directions between demands from helping those in one’s society and calls for saving lives of distant strangers. Such a predicament may reflect “middle-ground cosmopolitanism”. Cosmopolitanism refers to emphasis put on belonging not to one’s local community, but to the whole single community of humanity (Tambakaki 2013), calling for an equal concern for and equal treatment to all individuals across the globe (Straehle 2016), putting local and distant individuals on equal footing. “Middle-ground cosmopolitans” are not “complete” cosmopolitans—their concern for compatriots’ distress gives them a headache in face of the strangers who are more distant, yet in even greater plight. They are in the middle way between local “obligations” and distant “callings” and are torn between them. If there is “middle-ground cosmopolitanism”, there implies the presence of “strong cosmopolitanism” and “weak cosmopolitanism”. “Strong cosmopolitans” may be “complete” cosmopolitans who believe that all human beings form one single community and are on equal footing with each other. Thus, “strong cosmopolitans” will believe that in the light of the greater plight of those in developing countries, we should try to help those in greatest distress, even if they are distant from us. To them, there is an urgency to help these distant sufferers beyond any doubt, if we have resources to help others. Singer (1972) makes a famous pond analogy, reflecting “strong cosmopolitanism”: when I walk past a pond and see a child drowning in it, I am morally obliged to wade into the pond to save the child, even though these may cause some “inconvenience” to me. Analogously, I am “obliged” to prevent someone from dying in distant developing countries if it only involves sacrificing something of lesser comparable moral importance, such as spending less on luxuries and donate the money to save starving children’s life in the third world (Ibid.). The fact that these starving children are far away from me does not reduce my obligation 8 The relative poor are those who are poor when compared to the average living standard in a society,

often refers to households with income below a certain percentage of the median household income of society. 9 The absolute poor are those who do not have the minimum income to sustain a very basic living, often refers to those who do not have enough food, in poor health condition, without health services, sanitary water and housing etc.

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towards them in view of their imminent and profound misery (Ibid.). Such version of moral obligation towards distant sufferers is based on subject-centred conception of justice. That is, whether other people have duties of justice towards a subject (or a person) depends on whether the subject concerned (or s/he) has certain characteristics, for example as a human being, rational capacity and capacity of suffering (Buchanan 1993). As an illustration, I have a moral obligation as a matter of justice towards distant starving children in the light of the fact that these children have the characteristics of a human being who has rational capacity and a capacity to suffer; in short, they are human beings entitled to certain rights with correlative duties (of justice) on us as fellowmen. To “strong cosmopolitans”, one is obliged to assist the destitute beyond doubt, though they belong to a faraway territory. Gomberg (2002) responds to the aforementioned Singer’s pond analogy that the mere pulling of the drowning child out of the pond is just addressing the effects without trying to fix the cause which is more important in the case of tackling global poverty. There may be many institutional causes of severe poverty in certain countries—locally such as corruption and bad governance; internationally such as unfair international trade practices; and globally such as global capitalism and extreme weather conditions affecting certain localities due to global climate change. All these necessitate global, international and national institutional changes which may “attack” absolute poverty at its roots. These call more for a change in world order and institutions, rather than an extremely demanding personal ethics of donations, which even a bankrupting amount from an individual point of view may just be “a drop in the sea” of global poverty (if not many are doing likewise with institutional facilitation). These may lead some to hold the view that the mere donation of resources on individual basis is merely “palliative”, targeting at the symptoms, but not the cause of the problem. Such individuals may think that global poverty does not amount to calls of “perfect” duty that correlates with rights as a matter of justice, but “imperfect” duty of beneficence in which the impoverished people (in the developing world) do not have a moral claim on any specific individual in the affluent world to help (Ashford 2011) on individual basis (though collectively these affluent people may be obliged to help these global destitute, such as through foreign aid of their government, supporting efforts for international and global institutional change etc.). In the case of beneficence, one has the latitude over whom to help, the nature of help; and insufficient help does not constitute a failure of obligation or moral indecency (Ibid.). This will lead some to further think that they are more obliged to assist those needy compatriots than the distant poor, amounting to “weak cosmopolitanism” which calls for an “equal concern to all individuals across the globe while acknowledging our special, local, obligations that derive from our belonging to a national community” (Straehle 2016, p. 646). To “weak cosmopolitans”, they believe that they are obliged to help the relative poor in their own community or give priority to them when they engage in philanthropic or charitable activities. If each family takes care of her own children, then all the children in this world are well taken care of. Similarly, if each society takes care of her needy and poor, then all those deprived will be well catered for. This may be viewed as a kind of division of labour in welfare provision in the

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global context, making cosmopolitanism and communitarianism10 complementing each other. “Weak cosmopolitans” may embrace justice as “self-interested reciprocity”, with the scope of justice limited to the co-participants in the mutually beneficial cooperative scheme (Buchanan 1993) which usually refers to as the local community or within one’s own country. “Weak cosmopolitans” will have priority on devoting resources to fellow citizens, rather than distant strangers, without any dilemma. Based on “justice as self-interested reciprocity”, assisting compatriots in need in the form of redistribution, involuntarily through taxation, or voluntarily in form of charity, is mutually beneficial for all within a certain community as there may be future reciprocity, especially in cases of potential personal misfortune and life-cycle risks. Fellow citizens will give priority in assisting each other as a result of a special relation, with accompanying obligations, among them (Nagel 2005), just like a parent will give priority in feeding her children because of the special parent–child relations. Xunzi (fl. 298-238 BC), a Confucian thinker, asserts that we have a natural affection towards our closer social circle, such as family, friends, by extension, our fellow citizens within one’s country, and we have “a unique capacity to draw social distinctions, and to follow social norms developed from such distinctions” (Wang 2017, p. 63)—we should treat relatives as appropriate for relatives, treat old friends as appropriate for old friends, by extension, treat compatriots as appropriate for compatriots and treat distant strangers as appropriate for them (Wang 2017, p. 92). In this light, Confucian philosophy may intersect with “weak cosmopolitanism” to a certain extent, while also, considerably communitarian. Having discussed “middle-ground”, “strong” and “weak” versions of cosmopolitanism, it should be noted that regardless of whether one is devoting one’s resources to fellow countrymen in need or desperate faraway strangers in acts of beneficence or charitable acts, one is nonetheless performing deeds of goodwill, thus should be equally commendable. Criticisms of helping those distant destitute rather than needy countrymen, or vice versa, may not be appropriate since, after all, these are all acts of care, concern and kindness, regardless of the targeted recipients, distant or local. One may have the choice of targeted recipients of charitable actions in accordance with one’s conviction, no matter whether one adheres to “middle-ground”, “strong” and “weak” versions of cosmopolitanism. In reality, the very fact that different people embrace different versions of cosmopolitanism can lead to the result of “hundred flowers bloom”. As different people donate charitable resources to different benevolent causes (both local and afar), it will bring about the effect of facilitating different local and overseas philanthropic projects. Altogether, these various philanthropic projects bring about improvements of life of many (both locally and in different parts of the world). Actually, one may not necessarily need to adopt an all-or-nothing approach—devoting resources to local causes does not preclude doing similarly to

10 Communitarianism is often contrasted with individualism. It puts values on the community, emphasizing the connection (and the relation) between the individual and the community, and the role and the importance of the community in shaping and defining the individual.

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overseas issues. Very often, it is a matter of priority that rests on one’s value judgement and conviction related to cosmopolitanism.

Self-reliance as Justified Goal of Poverty Alleviation? Concepts and Their Applications Welfare and charity may lead to dependency, on the part of the recipients, often entailing social exclusion, rendering them incapable of exercising their rights and/or responsibilities as citizens (Marsland 1995; Weidel 2016). Dependency may also create the question of long-term financial sustainability of such welfare and charitable efforts as the reliance, on the part of beneficiaries, is perpetual and the number of recipients is cumulative. The recent third sector and philanthropic endeavour, Light Homes and Light Housing, aims at providing “transitional” housing for a 3-year period, allowing a respite phase for the dwellers to make more long-term future arrangements for accommodation, work, financial planning as well as life plan. It is hoped that through social capital building and empowerment under the mutual support of neighbours as well as assistance from social workers, volunteers and the private sector, these Light Home and Light Housing dwellers will achieve self-reliance and getting out of poverty, thus moving out of these “transitional” housing, thereby allowing those more in need to move in. In this way, the third sector housing as a philanthropic effort can be sustainable in the long run. According to a Light Be and the Hong Kong Polytechnic University collaborated evaluation research since 2014, the Light Home dwellers on average improve their living and move out in less than two years (Sing Pao 23-1-2017). Among those who moved out Light Homes, 51% of them, because of closer relations with family members and friends, thereby co-live, co-rent or being referred housing. Among these, 19% moved to public rental housing (Ibid.).

Deliberation In the light of this, a related philosophical question will be “Is self-reliance a justified goal of poverty alleviation efforts, including both welfare and philanthropic ones?” By intuition, self-reliance will be a very legitimate aim of poverty alleviation since it is financially sustainable in the long run, with cohorts of the needy and the economic disadvantaged being transient beneficiaries from short-term aid targeted for future long-term independence and well-being. However, the question will be: For whom? In which aspect(s)? First, the question “for whom”? Is self-reliance a justified aim for all those needy and poor? In fact, there are some economic disadvantaged who are also social disadvantaged that need long-term dependency on welfare or charitable assistance in order to survive, not to say thrive. Some of them may include the seriously and terminally

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ill, the severely handicapped, the old and frail. Do these individuals in such great plight deserve poverty alleviation assistance even though they have a slight chance of really become self-reliant? The answer seems to be positive and justifying the devotion of even greater resources for their assistance and support in view of their greater need than those with a potential for independence. Thus, self-reliance will not be a legitimate universal aim of all anti-poverty efforts. For those who have a potential to become self-reliant, measures and the design of assistance should aim at such so that resources can be more efficiently utilized to help different needy people through turnover arrangements. For those who are in severe plight, with slim chance of restitution to stand on his/her own feet, long-term care and support to minimize their suffering and maximize their well-being, instead of “imposed upon” self-reliance, will be the appropriate end of welfare and philanthropic endeavours. Second, the question “In what aspect(s)”? Self-reliance is often associated with autonomy, independence and freedom which are often viewed in a positive light, especially in the Western world and increasingly so in Hong Kong, though it is essentially a place where East meets West. As for serving as the goal of anti-poverty efforts, “self-reliance” often more specifically refers to self-reliance in the economic aspect, financially self-sufficiency and self-provisioning. It usually implies particularly at finding a job to support oneself and one’s family, and not to depend on welfare or donation to sustain one’s living. Yet, to achieve self-sufficiency (and self-reliance) in the economic aspect may very often entail mutual dependence (and interdependence) in other aspects, with the latter frequently viewed as an effective means to achieve the former. “Social capital” in the form of social networks built on reciprocity, cooperation and trust may be important key to achieve economic selfreliance. Single-parent dwellers in Light Homes solve everyday household, family and personal issues through mutual support with one another. For example, they would pool money together to buy household appliances which thus become more affordable to them, taking mutual care of each other’s children (which is especially important for working single parent), share experience on educating and managing children in the family context, involve in volunteering work together, or a few single-parent households, even arrange to have daily meals together (benefiting from economies of scale, thus becomes more money-saving) (Sing Pao 23-1-2017). These Light Home single parents can even become good friends, with their children doing likewise (Ibid.), forming personal and family support system. With the social network and the social capital built through housing philanthropy, these economic and social disadvantaged will have a better chance to find a stable job, devise strategy and make plans for future economic self-provisioning, thereby “emerging” from poverty. Thus, with social capital building as empowerment, resting on mutual dependence and interdependence (not self-reliance) in the social aspect, anti-poverty efforts succeed. In sum, the efficacy of housing philanthropy efforts as anti-poverty measures does not aim at self-reliance in all aspects, but mutual interdependence and social connection (based on social capital) as a means to achieve self-reliance in the economic aspect as an end. This may be an effective strategy to ensure the sustainability of housing philanthropic efforts in helping those in need, with the recipients, “emerging” from poverty and not dependent on philanthropy in

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the long run; moving out of Light Homes after building up social capital, thereby releasing the limited housing philanthropic resources to others more in need. In sum, there should be different aims of different anti-poverty efforts—selfreliance in the economic aspect for those who can potentially do so; efforts to alleviate the plight for others who cannot be financially independent. Thus, self-reliance is not a universal aim and end of all anti-poverty efforts. In addition, self-reliance as a goal mainly refers to self-reliance in the economic (not all) aspect, but mutual interdependence in the social aspect. Self-reliance in the economic aspect is compatible with social capital, mutual interdependence and social connection. Very often, the former builds on and presupposes the latter, e.g. social connections provide access to information about job opportunities which will be an important step in securing a job for economic self-sufficiency.

Public Resources to Support Third Sector Housing Provision? There are various initial forms of government facilitation of third sector housing in Hong Kong, essentially marginal, if not nominal. For example, non-financial policy facilitation includes the setting up of a special unit within the Office of Chief Secretary for Administration to facilitate the Light Housing project (Lianhe Zaobao 11-102016); financial support such as government leases out the former factory quarters to be renovated for Light Housing provision for a period of six years at HK$1 “symbolic” rent (Hong Kong Commercial Daily 13-10-2016); and the partial funding through the Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship Development Fund by the government for Hong Kong Council of Social Service’s (HKCSS) office for the Community Housing Movement Project, though essentially a small office, comprising of merely a few staff members. Relatively more concrete and noteworthy government sponsorship of third sector housing endeavour only comes in 2018 with the government announcing her subsidization of the building of HKCSS modular housing through the Community Care Fund (News.gov.hk 2018). If public resources are involved, the question of justice sets in. The related question will be: “How far is it just to devote public resources to support third sector housing for housing provision for the disadvantaged? Should further public resources be allocated to such cause?”

Concepts We may approach this issue from the perspectives of “right to housing” and “equal right to housing”. “Right to housing” rests on the basic proposition that “adequate housing is a basic human need” (Bengtsonn 1995; Leckie 1992; Yung and Lee 2012). Those who dwell in inadequate and unaffordable housing are the housing disadvantaged, with “right to housing” as a human right violated (Yung and Lee 2012), often

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are also the social disadvantaged and economic disadvantaged. “Equal right to housing” essentially refers to equal opportunity or non-discrimination in having the “right to housing” satisfied (Yung and Lee 2014). In Hong Kong, there is housing discrimination in private housing sector, mostly in the form of unwillingness, on the part of private landlords to lease to certain social disadvantaged groups, e.g. single-parent families, ethnic minorities, gay couples (Ibid.).

Deliberation There are also groups not well catered by public housing policy, for example nonelderly one-person households who have longer waiting time for public rental housing (PRH) under the Quota and Points System than “family” households. There are some who are long on the PRH waitlist—by September 2019, there are 149,500 general applications for PRH and the average waiting time for PRH was 5.4 years (Hong Kong Housing Authority 2019), implying that there are some who wait longer than 5.4 years (the average waiting time) before having the first offer of PRH flat, and even longer for really “physically” moving into the PRH flat (if the applicant decides to take a specific PRH flat only after the second or the third offer of PRH unit). Gay couples, who cannot legally get married in Hong Kong (thereby lacking legal documents to prove their marital and family status when applying for PRH as a couple or family), are being disfavoured in the current public housing policy (Yung and Lee 2014). New immigrants, including those from Mainland China and ethnic minorities, are put in a less favourable situation in relation to public housing because of limitation put on residency for PRH allocation (Ibid.). Essentially, there are groups left out by both the private and the public housing sectors, disfavoured by both, such as gay couples, ethnic minority new immigrants and Mainland New Arrivals. The long waiting time and list of PRH also put the grassroot at a disadvantaged position, rendering them to dwell in substandard private housing, such as subdivided units, board-partitioned rooms or even bedspaces. All these are the least advantaged in housing aspect, forming the housing “underclass”. Third sector housing (being philanthropic, high in flexibility, non-profit-making and serving social objectives) will have a prominent role to play in the housing arena, serve as gap fillers between the private and public housing sectors, catering for those left out by both sectors, putting emphasis on pursuing social values through largely organized private means and distinguishing itself from the other two sectors. Even if public housing is in greater supply, with shorter waiting time for PRH, there is still a part for third sector housing to play in Hong Kong housing arena through serving specialist housing needs, such as that of rehabilitated offenders, single-parent families, Mainland New Arrivals and ethnic minorities through “diversified” and “micro-” governance, rather than standardization and the “one-size-fits-all” approach in public housing policy, catering for more specific housing needs that changes with time and societal conditions. The volatility of such changes calls for the flexibility and adaptations in housing provision which the third sector is good at. Furthermore, third sector housing can target more at using housing as a means to serve other social

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needs, such as poverty alleviation, neighbourhood fostering, integration of the old and the young, and social capital building, empowering the economic and social disadvantaged. According to Rawls (1999), social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they both lead to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged. Distribution of resources is just if it caters for the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. Beneficiaries of third sector housing are mostly the least advantaged in the housing aspects, especially those who are left out by both public and private housing sectors, if not being discriminated by both. Third sector housing also serves the economic and social disadvantaged, often also and thereby housing disadvantaged as well. Thus, it would be just and justified to devote public resources to facilitate the development of third sector housing to serve the “triple” disadvantaged, that is in the social, economic and housing aspects simultaneously. In fact, public resources directed in this aspect will trigger off and prompt more third sector efforts and endeavours in the housing arena, putting underutilized and idle resources in use to meet housing needs under the coordination, management and leadership of third sector organizations which often have an acumen and insight of critical and imminent societal needs, including housing ones. After examining three philosophical questions related to moral justifiability of third sector housing and housing philanthropy, we may conclude that housing philanthropy and third sector housing are largely justifiable (regardless of whether it targets at local or overseas communities). This is especially so when they aim at achieving self-reliance (in the economic aspect for those potentially capable of doing so) as well as mutual dependence and community fostering in the social aspect. Such philanthropic endeavour often justifies government devotion of public resources which can act as the spark to ignite greater impetus of further third sector housing efforts. Thus, the government and third sector efforts may not necessarily be viewed as incompatible (with one substituting or displacing another), but complementary to each other, with government resources conducive to third sector functioning, serving as a catalyst to stimulate further “momentum” of third sector in the housing arena.

Practical Feasibility of Third Sector Housing and Housing Philanthropy Recently, there have been emerging examples of third sector housing and housing philanthropy in Hong Kong. Long-term feasibility of a practice involves meeting various challenges and overcoming different obstacles. Looking into the future, the challenge of the future development of third sector housing in Hong Kong can never be underestimated. It lies in three areas, namely funding, training and networking, as well as policy environment. Note that this is not unique to Hong Kong. Third sector housing organizations in developed countries are also facing challenge in the

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same areas. The following part will examine such challenges and major concerns in handling them so as to enhance feasibility of third sector housing in Hong Kong.

Funding Funding is a significant obstacle to the development of third sector housing organizations. Compared to other social services such as social security and education, housing is capital-intensive. The average cost of constructing a PRH unit in Hong Kong is HK$870,000 (Apple Daily 23-02-2017). Even renovation can be expensive. Light Be spent HK$22 million on the renovation of a previously vacant factory staff quarters building in Sham Tseng (Ta Kung Pao 01-2016). This project, called Light Housing, provided 45 units of rental housing. In other words, the average cost of renovation per unit was almost HK$500,000. HKCSS’s Community Housing Movement aims to offer 500 units to families in need. The renovation cost is estimated to be HK$50 million (HKCSS 19-09-2017). In other words, the average renovation cost per unit is $100,000. In the longer run, housing units require maintenance, which implies additional financial burden. The larger the scale of service, the heavier will be the burden. Taking renovation and maintenance into consideration, a stable source of funding is critical to the long-term sustainable development of Light Be and HKCSS. In developed countries, third sector housing organizations face two problems about funding. Firstly, housing projects are financed by a tight budget. Secondly, funding comes from multiple sources, creating complications. In the USA, funding is a major challenge to the development of third sector housing. Development projects tend to be financed by a tight budget. Third sector housing organizations, which are called community development corporations (CDCs) in the USA, suffer chronic shortfalls of operating revenues needed for the finance of ongoing operating costs (Walker 1993). Even larger CDCs with good track records often face inordinate difficulty in covering administrative costs and must devote large amounts of time to fund raising (Ibid.). Another challenge is the management of multiple sources of funding. Since the 1980s, when federal government reduced funding, CDCs increasingly turned to state governments, local governments and foundations for funding. Typically, CDCs relied on multiple financing sources, which was also called “patchwork” finance (Ibid.). Mayer and Blake (1984) found six funding sources per project; Abt Associates (1992) found that 7.8 sources per project were necessary. Financial packaging can confuse even experienced development staff. Extraordinary efforts are often needed to assemble multiple funding sources. In Hong Kong, both Light Be and HKCSS rely on donation and project-based government funding at the present stage.11 In principle, third sector housing can make 11 Light Be received $22 million for Light Housing project from Chow Tai Fook Charity Foundation (Ta Kung Pao 161006). HKCSS received $50 million for the Community Housing Movement from Community Chest. It received an additional $11.5 million from both Community Chest and

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intervention into housing through the role as developers or landlords. To a certain extent, the fact that both Light Be and HKCSS focused on the role of subleasing rather than development can be explained by their limited financial capacity. When they move further along the direction of property development, the pressure of project financing increases. To support the social housing project at the preliminary stage, HKCSS received one-off project-based funding from the government. But to secure more regular funding source, HKCSS has called upon the government to set up a social housing fund to provide further and more stable funding support (am730 12-06-2018).

Training and Networking With respect to training and networking, housing is a technically complicated, involving not only property development, but also property management and asset management (Bratt et al. 1998). Property development includes land assembly, financing, including assembling complex finance packages and cost control, working with building subcontractors, overcoming “NIMBY” opposition to social housing in middle-class neighbourhoods, creating, imagining, controlling and orchestrating the process of development from the beginning to end (Gilmour 2009). Property management includes collecting rents, maintaining buildings and dealing with the social needs of low-income tenants (Bratt et al. 1998). Asset management includes planning and taking actions that conserve the buildings’ long-term financial and physical condition (Bratt et al. 1998). On the other hand, third sector housing organizations are usually small. For example, some third sector housing organizations in the USA, which are called community development corporations (CDCs), have six staff members, with two to three professionals. So few staff members make specialization and division of labour difficult (Walker 1993). The technically complicated nature of housing and the small size of third sector housing organizations imposes two conditions on the future development of these organizations. First, training of staff is important to make them versatile. Placement in different organizations can also help to train up staff and allow them to accumulate experience their own organization cannot give (Ibid.). Second, networking with other organizations is crucial to increasing the competence of third sector housing organizations. Gilmour (2009) studied the network power of third sector housing organizations. Since these organizations operate in a complex environment, forming partnerships and exchanging information with a wide range of actors become crucial. Networking may help them learn from each other, building strength through mimicking good practice, transferring staff and forming coalitions to lobby governments (Gilmour 2009). the Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship Development Fund for establishing the Community Housing intermediary platform (HKCSS 19-09-2017).

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In developed countries, the rise of intermediary organizations in the 1980s helps third sector housing organization develop. Walker (1993) described this phenomenon as “the single most important development of the decade”. He summarized three vital functions that intermediaries perform. The first is the mobilization of capital, including project and operating support as well as predevelopment finance. The second is the provision of technical assistance in financial packaging, project development and local institution building. The third is the legitimation of CDCs, enhancing perceived technical competence and reducing risk to both public and private sector funders (Walker 1993). Third sector housing organizations regularly partner with public sector agencies, private developers and other third sector housing organizations. For example, HKCSS teams up with a number of professional bodies as partners, including the Law Society of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of Architects, Hong Kong Institution of Engineers and Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors, in order to push its social housing project (HKCSS 19-09-2017). An intermediary organization for third sector housing can be formed by umbrella NGO, together with other professional bodies, with the facilitation of the government, thereby regularizing such cross-professional partnership, thus giving a stable, regular and long-term platform for professionals who are willing to offer assistance for a specific period of time or on long-term basis. Such intermediary can further diversify into capital mobilization and public education, turning individual third sector housing endeavours into a “genuine” third sector housing movement in Hong Kong.

Policy Environment With respect to policy environment, a stable government policy about the third sector is critical to the development of third sector housing organizations. Based on the development experience of third sector housing organizations in Canada, Dreier and Hulchanski (1993) argue that it takes time for third sector housing organizations to build their capacity. These organizations cannot emerge and mature if housing policies and programmes frequently change. Such change makes it impossible to build the staffing and organizational infrastructure that the third sector housing organizations need in order to become a real player. Furthermore, Pawson et al. (2018) distinguish between organizational capacity and institutional capacity. While organizational capacity refers to the capacity of a single organization, institutional capacity comes from the interactions between the organization and a large number of actors, including lenders, intermediaries, professional development institutes, support partners, regulators, programme managers and policymakers. Such interactions depend on the government guaranteeing policy coherence and consistency in regulation. Pawson et al. (2018) argue that the development of third sector housing organizations in Australia has been impeded more by external factors, including a weak national policy regime, than by poor organizational capacity of individual organizations.

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Third sector housing organizations traditionally received funding support from the state. Since the introduction of neoliberalism, particularly new public management in the 1990s, third sector housing organizations were pushed to seek help from the market (Priemus 1995; Koschinsky 1998; Hodkinson 2011; Bratt 2012; Wainwright and Manville 2017). In the UK, the government encourages the development of a new residential bond market so that third sector housing organizations could get access to capital (Wainwright and Manville 2017). But financialization12 has weakened the ability of third sector housing organizations to achieve social objectives (Wainwright and Manville 2017), particularly community development and neighbourhood revitalization (Koschinsky 1998; also see Bratt 2012; Hodkinson 2011; Priemus 1995; Salamon 1993; Walker 1993) because the effects of community development are extremely difficult to measure. Many of the benefits are implicit, deferred and widely dispersed (Walker 1993: 392). As capital market does not respond to anything that cannot be priced, the social objectives that cannot be quantified and priced are likely to be ignored. In short, financialization of funding support may jeopardize the development of third sector housing. In Hong Kong, the development of Light Be and HKCSS has received strong support from Carrie Lam, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR. In her first policy address in 2017, she made explicit her expectation of third sector organizations contributing to the development of transitional housing. Transitional housing refers to housing characterized by short rental period required for the transition of tenants through a short but difficult period of deprivation. Third sector housing organizations, such as Light Be and HKCSS, are making contribution to transitional housing. However, transitional housing has been controversial. Critics see the effort spent on transitional housing as unproductive. The focus on transitional housing may imply a diversion of effort to provide permanent housing solution to the society (HK01 10-08-2016). The government makes clear its position that transitional housing is expected to play a “supplementary” role only, while its primary focus remains the construction of PRH. To the extent that the scope of this “supplementary” role is not clearly defined, there is no guarantee to the continuity of policy support to transitional housing and to third sector housing organizations in the near future. In general, the uncertain policy environment will hamper the longer-term development of third sector housing organizations in Hong Kong. To conclude, third sector housing deserves support because of its commitment to social objectives. On the other hand, it is unlikely to thrive on its own.13 Bratt (2012) refers to the multiple commitment of third sector housing as the “quadruple bottom line”, which covers financial accountability, social objective, contribution to neighbourhood and environmental concerns. This multiple commitment makes 12 Financialization refers to the turn to the financial market for funding support of service. Owing to financialization, the dependence of funding support on the state through tax or on philanthropy through donation is reduced. 13 Salamon (1987) introduces the concept of “voluntary failure” to highlight the observation that the third sector has weaknesses as much as strengths. To this extent, the third sector should not be expected to serve as a functional substitute for the first and the second sectors. One may go further to argue that the third sector is unlikely to develop on its own and thrive.

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the development of third sector housing especially challenging. Collaboration with the public sector (through funding support in various forms by various levels of government) and the private sector (financialization of funding support) has been tried in different countries, but the result is mixed. In future, the governance of third sector housing is likely to be a hybrid (Cole and Powell 2010; Mullins and Acheson 2014), characterized by the combination of logics of different sectors. By now, it is common for scholars to describe the phenomenon of hybridity as the blurring of the boundaries of the public sector, the private sector and the third sector (Bassi 2014; Hudson 2002). Brandsen et al. (2005) go even further to argue that hybridity is an intrinsic feature of all third sector organizations. Rarely does one find a third sector organization in its pure form in reality. In this light, third sector housing can be understood as combining affordability (a core emphasis of public housing) with the promotion of self-reliance, thereby forming a unique value of third sector housing. There is no guarantee that the combination of different logics or principles will work (Bassi 2014; Billis 2010). The environment in which the hybridity takes place is critical. It is entirely possible that these different principles may be complementary in one scenario, but contradict each other in another scenario, resulting in the colonization of one principle by another. The mixed result of the financialization of funding support to third sector housing is an example of not so successful hybridization. Any search for the optimal point of balancing among the distinct logics of various sectors is likely to be delicate, with a minor change in the process of hybridity causing major and perhaps unintended consequence. Since the state is the most resourceful, it is expected to continue to play a proactive role in helping third sector housing to strike this balance through devising alternative arrangement in funding support, facilitating the rise of intermediaries and providing stable policy environment. But the prioritization of social values and social objectives that defines the identity of the third sector should not be compromised.

Conclusion To sum up, in the midst of housing controversies in Hong Kong (especially with a significant part of the population dwelling in inadequate housing), the very existence of housing philanthropy and the third sector housing is justified by justice and other social values such as different versions of cosmopolitanism, self-reliance (as autonomy and freedom), “right to housing” and “equal right to housing”, thus being desirable. Such third sector housing provision represents a ground-breaking approach to housing governance in Hong Kong, with the third sector serving as an alternative to and complementing the private and public sectors, catering for those left out by both sectors as well as pursuing social values (as the aspiration or the goal) through housing provision. In this way, third sector housing (which inherently embodies justice and social values as impetus for “reform” in the housing arena) crystallizes the “Politics-Justice-Governance” Model, serving as a partial way out, though not the panacea, of the housing controversies (politics), contributing to sound

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housing governance and serving as a housing alternative that goes beyond that of the first and the second sectors. Future development of third sector housing in Hong Kong will be facing various challenges. Different stakeholders (including the government, third sector organizations, professionals, private sector and above all, common individual citizens) can make contributions to third sector housing governance in different ways. All in all, the successful development of the third sector housing in Hong Kong involves the efforts, interactions and synergy of different stakeholders, who jointly make the present piecemeal third sector housing efforts into a genuine “Third Sector Housing Movement” and “Housing Philanthropy Movement”, forging constructive change in Hong Kong housing arena under the guidance of a vision for future housing development in Hong Kong that soundly rests on justice and other social values.

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Pawson, H., Milligan, V., & Martin, C. (2018, May 01). Building Australia’s Affordable Housing Industry: Capacity challenges and capacity-enhancing strategies. International Journal of Housing Policy, 1–23. Priemus, H. (1995). How to abolish social housing? The Dutch case. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 19(1), 145–155. Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Salamon, L. M. (1993). The Marketization of Welfare: Changing Nonprofit and For-profit Roles in the American Welfare State. Social Service Review, 67(1), 16–39. Salamon, L. M. (1987). Of market failure, voluntary failure, and third-party government: Toward a theory of government-nonprofit relations in the modern welfare state. Journal of Voluntary Action Research, 16, 29–49. Salaman, L. M., & Anheier, H. K. (1998). Social origins of civil society: Explaining the nonprofit sector cross-nationally. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 9(3), 213–48. Shlay, A. B. (1993). Family self-sufficiency and housing. Housing Policy Debate, 4(3), 457–95. Silver, H. (2012). Cooperative housing. In A. T. Carswell (Ed.), The Encyclopedia Of Housing. SAGE: Los Angeles. Singtao. (2017). ‹140單親低收入家庭受惠; 「光房」媽媽改善生活遷出› 23-1-2017. Singer, P. (1972). Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(3), 229–243. Stoecker, R. (2010). Community development. In R. Hutchison (Ed.), Encyclopedia of urban studies. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Straehle, C. (2016). Falling into the justice gap? Between duties of social and global justice. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 19(6), 645–661. Tambakaki, P. (2013). Cosmopolitanism. In: Gregory Cheys (ed.), Encyclopedia of modern political thought. Thousand Oaks: SAGE, p.195. Ta Kung Pao. (2016). ‹九龍紗廠宿舍活化, 月租3000元起, 光屋助基層家庭擺脫蝸居› 06-102016. Wainwright, T., & Manville, G. (2017). Financialization and the third sector: Innovation in social housing bond markets. Environment and Planning A, 49(4), 819–838. Walker, C. (1993). Nonprofit housing development: Status, trends, and prospects. Housing Policy Debate, 4(3), 369–414. Wang, E. H. (2017). Crafting the self through losing the self: Exploring Xunzi’s ideal self and the role of others. Soochow Journal of Philosophical Studies, 8, 59–102. Weidel, T. (2016). Philanthropy, cosmopolitanism, and the benefits of giving directly. Journal of Global Ethics, 12(2), 170–186. Yung, B., & Chan, A. (In press). Third sector housing in 21st century Hong Kong opportunities and challenges. Voluntary Sector Review Yung, B., & Chan, A. (2016). Third sector as housing delivery approach in Hong Kong: Challenges and opportunities. In Presented at the fourth international conference on social policy and governance innovation: innovation in social service delivery, 24–25 November 2016, Hong Kong, China. Yung, B., & Lee, F. (2012). ‘Right to Housing’ in Hong Kong: Perspectives from the Hong Kong Community. Housing, Theory and Society, 29(4), 401–419. Yung, B., & Lee, F. (2014). ‘Equal right to housing’ in Hong Kong housing policy: Perspectives from disadvantaged groups. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 29(4), 563–582.

Chapter 4

A Rawlsian Model of Land Justice for Hong Kong: The Controversy on the Development of the North New Territories Jack Chun Abstract I adopt a Rawlsian model in analysing the challenge recently faced by the Hong Kong government regarding its governance of the land development. The challenge is illustrated with the stakeholders’ debates on three case studies: the brownfield sites, Fanling Golf Course and the private agricultural land reserve. The Rawlsian model adopted here aims to unfold the dialectics of the land controversy and identify the Rawlsian solution. For this purpose, expounded are certain important Rawlsian concepts, including the distinction between rationality and reasonableness. In conclusion, I argue that, while an immediate political reconciliation seems unlikely, the possibility of such a reconciliation is open in the long run if one grasps the crux of the stakeholders’ dialectics and recognizes the intricate interconnection of the overlapping consensus in the constitutional and institutional levels on the political conception of justice.

Introduction Overview In this chapter, a Rawlsian model is adopted in analysing the dynamics between politics, governance and justice in the land controversy of Hong Kong. First, I outline the background of the land controversy. Then, I introduce the concepts of reasonable pluralism, reconciliation and overlapping consensus, and explain how the Rawlsian model is applicable to the general situation of Hong Kong. Followed is an examination of three selected case studies of the land controversy in the North New Territories, whereby the nature of the stakeholders’ argumentative dialectics is illustrated. In addition, I further probe into the Rawlsian distinctions between rationality and reasonableness and between the overlapping consensus in the constitutional and institutional levels on the conception of justice vis-a-vis his two principles of justice. J. Chun (B) Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_4

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The purpose is to unfold the crux of the land controversy and identify the Rawlsian solution.

Context: Public Engagement in 2018 on the Land Development in Hong Kong To begin with, a public engagement on the land development in Hong Kong was officially embarked on 26 April and ended on 26 September 2018. It was conducted by the Task Force on Land Supply (henceforth Task Force), formed in September 2017 by the commission of the Hong Kong government. In the Engagement Paper (Land for Hong Kong, Our Home, Our Say!), the Task Force discussed 18 possible choices for the land development. Their aim was to provide the public with the information and consultation on how to meet the urgent need for extra 1200 ha in land supply. In their final Report (Striving for Multi-pronged Land Supply: Report of the Task Force on Land Supply [henceforth Report]), the Task Force claimed that the public engagement has “heighten[ed] society’s awareness of issues of land resources; it also has stimulated heated discussions on the planning, allocation and rights over land. Its impact on Hong Kong is therefore profound”.1 The Task Force’s observation was by no means an exaggeration. One of the reasons for the citizens’ active engagement is the fact that Hong Kong, with a total area of 1106 km2 , has topped the world’s housing market in price and become, for 9 consecutive years up to 2018, the least affordable city to buy a modest home (Demographia 2019). This was the background of the community’s fervent participation in the public engagement and a source of the land controversy in Hong Kong. This public engagement, like others, faced a pressing question after the collection of the stakeholders’ different opinions: that is, what follows? One has to appreciate the fact that the participants had diverse and often opposing motivations and expectations. Gustafson and Hertting (2017) rightly note that the success of a public engagement depends on the identification of the participants’ different motives. In this connection, I will identify the source of the land controversy in Hong Kong in the dialectics of the stakeholders’ disputes. Now, among the 18 options considered by the Task Force, each unavoidably touched on certain deep-seated interests represented by different sectors of the community. No matter what choices the government may finally make after the public engagement, it is clear that those negatively affected stakeholders would suspect that they have been treated unjustly and unfairly by the government. Is there any way to settle the disputes among the stakeholders? Can justice be ever served if a certain degree of arbitrariness in the space of reasons,2 as will be illustrated below, seems to play a role in the stakeholders’ dialectics and the government’s final decision? In short, is there land justice as such? And if there is, how should one make sense of it? 1 Report, 2 The

p. 1. term is borrowed from Sellars (1956).

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Concepts and Theories The Rawlsian Model Confronting these questions, I will first introduce three conceptual tools found in Rawls’ theory of justice (1972, 1996, 2001) and then show how the Rawlsian model is applicable to the general situation in Hong Kong. The first conceptual tool is Rawls’ idea of reasonable pluralism. This idea suggests that the divergence and discrepancy of people’s moral, philosophical and religious beliefs are, as a matter of fact, bound to exist in a pluralistic society. It is a fact one should recognize and respect if a pluralistic society is to be sustained. At the convergence of Chinese and the western values, Hong Kong has a history of pluralism in the cultural, social and religious dimensions. Overall, different values and traditions are well respected by the citizens. This seems to fit in with the Rawlsian notion of reasonable pluralism. In addition, for Rawls, it is illegitimate for any government to use any coercive force in rigidly unifying people’s diverse, comprehensive doctrines of beliefs into a single system. This sort of coercion would completely undermine the essence of reasonable pluralism. A corollary of this recognition is Rawls’ emphasis that the political conception of justice he advocates is not a comprehensive doctrine in competition with any other comprehensive doctrines. Instead, it is a free-standing political conception that could belong to any reasonable comprehensive doctrine. What is the function of this free-standing political conception of justice? It concerns Rawls’ general view of political philosophy, which, in his later years, is assigned the mission of achieving a reconciliation among people who embrace opposing philosophical and moral doctrines in a pluralistic society. Rawls (2001, 3) claims, [P]olitical philosophy may try to calm our frustration and rage against our society and its history by showing us the way in which its institutions, when properly understood from a philosophical point of view, are rational, and developed over time as they did to attain their present, rational form. This fits one of Hegel’s well-known sayings: “When we look at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back”.

Reconciliation facilitates people to go along with each other, despite the discrepancy of their comprehensive doctrines of values. Rawls’ quotation of Hegel’s (1977) famous statement above is remarkable. The whole Rawlsian project of reconciliation hinges on the way we see (or conceptualize) how justice be formed and served in society. To a large extent, it is a matter of what perspective (or, in Hegel’s terms, idea) one adopts in the dialectics on justice. Now, there is a hope for reconciliation when and only when the conceptual confusion and misunderstanding regarding what counts as justice are cleared up, so that a rational order of the society can come to sight to all stakeholders. This sort of perspectival reconciliation is important for a pluralistic society, as is demonstrated in the case of Hong Kong below. To accomplish the reconciliation in a pluralistic society, according to Rawls, stakeholders need to achieve an overlapping consensus on the political conception

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of justice. Only after such an overlapping consensus on justice had been attempted and constructed could people ever attain their long-term reconciliation (in distinction from a temporary and fragile compromise or, in Rawls’ terms, modus vivendi). This idea of overlapping consensus is an important conceptual tool in the context of reasonable pluralism. One might legitimately ask: How can a whole-hearted consensus on any political issue ever exist among all the stakeholders who basically have their interests in conflict (as represented by their incompatible comprehensive doctrines of philosophies and moral values)? Long-term reconciliation and persistent reasonable pluralism sound almost like an oxymoron. For this reason, the search for the conceptual space where one can find the consensus of different stakeholders overlapping across different comprehensive doctrines becomes the most daunting task for any model that aims at a political reconciliation. I will explain how the Rawlsian model helps construct this important conceptual space applicable to the land controversy at issue. At this point, replies to two possible objections are in order. First, one might question whether it is appropriate to apply the Rawlsian model to a case like Hong Kong. The Rawlsian model is seen to apply to a specific type of society Rawls (2001, 145–8) calls constitutional democracy. The objection questions the current status of Hong Kong as a constitutional democracy and casts doubt on the applicability of the Rawlsian model. This objection is worth considering because an answer to it here paves the way towards the discussion of a possible solution to the land controversy by the end of the chapter. Now, so far as the issue of constitutionality is concerned, one should note that, after the return of Hong Kong to China from the United Kingdom in 1997, the Basic Law has officially taken effect as the supreme law of Hong Kong, with which all the local, specific laws are required to square. According to the Basic Law, except for the military and foreign policies, Hong Kong government has the freedom to exercise its capitalist governance in line with the principle of “One Country Two Systems” for 50 years with no change to the lifestyles of people. And the Basic Law is mentioned in Article 31 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.3 In a derivative sense, Hong Kong is ruled under the Basic Law as its minuscule constitution within the rubrics of the grand Chinese Constitution. In this way, constitutionality is implemented in the legal system of Hong Kong in an indirect but real sense. Concerning the idea of democracy, obviously, Hong Kong is not a politically democratic society so far as, for instance, the election of the Chief Executive is concerned. The right to the nomination and election of the Chief Executive is currently limited to the Election Committee, composed of 1200 members, who are either ex officio members or individuals in different professions elected by 38 designated functional constituencies (or sub-sectors).4 Currently, apart from the 1200 members of the Election Committee, the general public do not have the right to nominate or elect the Chief Executive. 3 The

Basic Law (https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html). Election Committee Sub-sectors Election (https://www.elections.gov.hk/ecss2016/eng/).

4 2016

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But it is fair to say that, according to Article 43 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong is entitled to evolve into a certain model of political democracy so far as the election of the Chief Executive is concerned. The Article reads, The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accord with democratic procedures.5

It is difficult to foresee the exact trajectory or destination of the development of Hong Kong democracy. Suffice it to note that the very possibility of developing Hong Kong into (something close to) a democracy and the fact that it is now in a process of morphing towards it as a political goal warrants the feasibility of the adoption of the Rawlsian model. Indeed, such a possibility and such a fact, when compounded, make the case of applicability even stronger, as the need for the guidance of a theoretical model in facilitating the process of democratization is normatively justifiable. The Rawlsian model is one of such theoretical models. On the other hand, the adoption of Rawls’ theory might pose a different question. His thought experiment of the veil of ignorance in the original position, which lays down the foundation of his theory of justice, is controversial for its generality and abstractness. Dworkin (1989, 16–7) succinctly summarizes Rawls’ idea of original position in this way: It imagines a group of men and women who come together to form a social contract…. They are men and women with ordinary tastes, talents, ambitions, and convictions, but each is temporarily ignorant of these features of his own personality, and must agree upon a contract before his self-awareness returns…. Rawls tries to show that if these men and women are rational, and act only in their own self-interest, they will choose his two principles of justice.

In the original position, people are supposed to be rational and yet ignorant of their personal background and subjective inclinations. Behind this so-called veil of ignorance, they collectively deliberate and attempt to reach a consensus on the principles of justice. One might challenge that Rawls’ theory as such could at most outline a hypothetical conception of justice. And, the objection goes, it could not address the actual problems of the real political world. Exactly in this spirit, Nagel (1989) raises an objection regarding the abstractness of the presuppositions of Rawls’ theory, in particular with regard to the original position. Nagel argues, “There is a real question whether hypothetical choice under conditions of ignorance, as a representation of consent, can by itself provide a moral justification for outcomes that could not be unanimously agreed to if they were known in advance”. That is, even if the rational agents in the original position chose the Rawlsian principles of justice, it would not follow that, once they knew their personal backgrounds and abilities by stepping outside the veil of ignorance, as we do in reality, they might still stick to the same principles of justice that they agreed upon in the original position. On this score, the specific details of the land controversy in Hong Kong, entangled with the 5 Article

43, the Basic Law.

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competing stakeholders’ informed preferences and self-understanding, might be too mundane and contextualized to be suitable for the examination by such a general and abstract theory. What is the justification for the application of Rawls’ general theory of justice to the specific reality of Hong Kong? This is the question raised by the second objection. This objection might appear to be more legitimate to Rawls’ early than later works. After his switch to the practical consideration of reasonable pluralism, his theory is intended to address the actual conditions of the political reality. In his words (2001, 4), We view political philosophy as realistically utopian: that is, as probing the limits of practicable political possibility. Our hope for the future of our society rests on the belief that the social world allows at least a decent political order, so that a reasonably just, though not perfect, democratic regime is possible. So we ask: What would a just democratic society be like under reasonably favourable but still possible historical conditions, conditions allowed by the laws and tendencies of the social world? What ideals and principles would such a society try to realize given the circumstances of justice in a democratic culture as we know them?

The idea of political philosophy viewed as realistically utopian is important. It highlights the applicability intended by Rawls to the concrete contexts of the political reality. The theory is no longer limited to the contemplation of merely idealistic, “perfect” cases of democracy. Instead, a more down-to-earth approach to the “reasonably just, though not perfect, democratic regime” is adopted so that “reasonably favourable but still possible historical conditions” are addressed within the framework. Rawls’ appreciation of the “historical conditions” of society allows for the contextualization of his theory of justice by “probing the limits of practicable political possibility”. The historical condition of Hong Kong, as delineated above, favours, where applicable, such a quest for the realistic application of a theoretical conception of justice. Now, with the two possible objections briefly replied, I now move on to the deliberation of the further specifics of the land controversy, especially with regard to the development of the North New Territories. I will further unravel the “space of reason” in the stakeholders’ dialectics under the Rawlsian analysis.

Deliberation Land Development Recommended by the Task Force for the North New Territories The Task Force’s Engagement Paper and Report outlined the implementation schedules of the 18 options in three categories: the short (within 10 years), middle (10– 20 years) and long term (20–30 years). Now, given the urgent need for the land supply in Hong Kong, options that could help, to a certain extent, meet the demand

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within a short-term period have become highly important. Three such options were identified by the Task Force from their final 8 recommendations in their Report. All of the three options belong to the North New Territories. I will elaborate on the three options one by one. The Task Force’s first and most recommended option is the development of the brownfield sites, where there are villages or business operations of commercial activities, such as open storage sites and container lorry parks. This option has received the widest support from the general community. The Task Force recommended the government to develop the brownfield sites that might feasibly provide new land supply up to 330 ha (of which 110 ha is for the short-term development, out of the total area of the scattered brownfield sites in 760 ha). At the same time, the Task Force also realized the challenge for the government to step into this area because the force of resistance by the stakeholders there was strong. In as early as 2014, the government had had confrontations with the villagers of the brownfield sites in Wang Chau by forcing them out from their village (5.6 ha in size). In addition, the government at that time failed to negotiate with the local kingpins for reclaiming their brownfield sites (33 ha) with business operations.6 Two problems with the large brownfield sites posed a serious challenge to the government: that is, first, how to move the business operations out from there to somewhere else in a cost-effective way, and, second, how to make a fair compensation to the property owners. The Rawlsian model, discussed in the next section, is to examine the nature of this sort of question in terms of land justice: Is it justice to force people and business operations out from there for the purpose of land development when there are other options available for meeting the target of seeking extra land supply? Mutatis mutandis, this type of question is recurrent for all other options for the land development as well.7 In the Report, the second top recommendation is to tap into the private agricultural land reserve owned by developers, again mostly found in the North New Territories. In Hong Kong, a number of developers have kept the agricultural land in their reserve, the total area of which is estimated to be as much as 1000 ha.8 Keeping such agricultural land in reserve, the private developers look for the opportunities to change the land use into private residential sites. In the past, developers on their own initiatives have applied for such an alternation of the land use. However, the success rate was low. In the past several years, only 7 out of 40 applications were successful.9 The real problem was that all those approved applications were only small and scattered pieces of land, totalling to 18 ha only, which were not helpful enough to meet the demand for land supply. And such applications obviously lacked

6 This

series of incidents has been documented in detail as the “Wang Chau housing saga” by the South China Morning Post (SCMP) (https://www.scmp.com/topics/wang-chau-housing-saga). 7 Indeed, this sort of question is applicable not only to the land controversy of this chapter but also to other cases, such as the controversy of NIMBY. 8 Report, p. 50. 9 Report, p. 53.

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the proactive support from the government, as the developers only aimed at making profits for themselves. For this reason, the Report recommended that the government take the lead and identify the suitable agricultural land currently owned by the developers. The Task Force called this second top option as the public–private partnership (PPP). However, objections to this option arise from two opposite directions. First, questions have been raised as to whether there are conflicts of interests in PPP, as the developers may receive favourable compensation from the government for returning their sizeable land and get further benefits when they are (naturally) chosen to be the developers of those areas into residential areas, including the private residential areas. The community’s suspicion of the “collusion between the government and businesses” over the transfer of these sorts of benefits through PPP has already been noted by the Task Force in their Report.10 On the other hand, since the target of the government is to build more public than private housing,11 another possible scenario is that the benefits gained by the developers may not be as high as they expect after their land is reclaimed. Resistance from certain developers may happen and should not be neglected. The Report suggested that the government could in this case apply the Land Resumption Ordinance for “public purposes”. According to the Ordinance (Land Department 2013), “[t]he Government may acquire private land by resumption for the implementation of public projects such as a road scheme, a public housing development, an urban renewal project, an open space, a drainage improvement project, a new market, a school or any item in the Public Works Programme”. If there is any dispute between the government and the stakeholders over the amount of compensation, it can be brought to the Lands Tribunal for the judicial review. Obviously, this idea of PPP, if implemented, will engender a lot of controversies from the perspectives of different stakeholders. Finally, the third option among the top priorities recommended by the Report was the use of the sites under the private recreational leases. In Hong Kong, there are many private recreational leases by the government to the private clubs and organizations for a nominal annual rent. Among the 66 private recreational lease sites, the Fanling Golf Course (FGC) has become the hottest topic. It is partly due to the large size of the site, which amounts to 172 ha. Another important factor concerns the timing. The expiry date of the government’s lease of FGC is 2020. It means that the government could promptly start the development of this area. This is possibly the fastest track one could ever find among all the options and recommendations by the Task Force. The Report recommended that the government might first of all develop 32 ha of FGC in order to ease up the pressing housing needs within a short period of time (i.e. less than 10 years). The remaining 140 ha could still be used for the international golf tournaments in the short term, allowing time for the consultant to examine how to develop the remaining area into the residential area. This proposed plan was divided into two phases because it would take time to deal with the conservation of heritage 10 Report,

p. 52. Chief Executive’s 2018 Policy Address (https://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2018/eng/highli ghts.html).

11 See

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buildings and the preservation of endangered species of trees in the remaining 140 ha of the site. Debates by different stakeholders on this recommendation on FGC have been publicly staged. The antagonistic dialectics was fierce. For instance, the Hong Kong Golf Association sternly expressed their opposition to the development of FGC in an open statement published on the local newspapers. Their rationale was that such development would be detrimental to the high ecological values of FGC. In response, the Legislative Council member Andrew Wan fired back, “Our city is so small and our hunger for land supply is so severe – not only for housing, but also for public facilities such as hospitals and elderly care centres…. I find it rather clownish to hear that [the golf course should not be redeveloped because] it will affect the businesses of tycoons”.12 However, the Hong Kong Golf Association continued their dialectics by arguing that “[r]eclaiming any part of Fanling Golf Course would be a devastating and irreversible loss for Hong Kong”.13 Other arguments have been advanced by the stakeholders. The protection of the historical buildings and the conservation of precious trees there would inevitably reduce the size of the developable land of FGC. And the value of the development of the site would be significantly dwindled. Furthermore, the large-scale construction of the transport and infrastructure would delay the completion of the project, in spite of its appearance to be the fastest possible option for the land development. On the other hand, for the public who have not visited FGC or had no interest in golf, the site was considered merely as a theme park solely for the rich that should be reclaimed for the public interests. Yet, still, hundreds of the staff members of FGC opposed to the claw-back of the land because of a very simple and direct concern: they would lose their jobs. A further twist to the land controversy should be mentioned here. It was the government’s announcement of their own preference, which was made even before the release of the Task Force’s Report. It was to build an artificial island close to the Lantau Island. This option was dubbed “Lantau Tomorrow Vision” (HKSAR Government 2018). Immediately, the environmentalists and the general public attacked the government for a fake consultation. Even afterwards the government claimed to accept all the 8 recommendations by the Task Force, the public basically suspected that this was only the government’s lip service, as it seemed to have its own agenda for the land development. In the face of the land controversy, the question of justice seems to be unavoidable. It is remarkable that, in their Report (2018, 32), the Task Force considered the political topic of land justice as “outside their purview”. They deliberately did not touch on this question. But, as I argued above, the concept of land justice is crucial for understanding the nature of the controversy and the possibility of a viable solution. The Rawlsian model examined here is exactly to address the critical issue of land justice omitted by the Task Force in their Report. 12 SCMP, 2 January 2019 (https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/ 2180350/hong-kong-golf-alliance-says-using-fanling-course). 13 SCMP, A1, 21 February 2019.

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Rational Resentment and Reasonable Judgement To adopt the Rawlsian model in examining the land justice, I will start with the two principles of justice as fairness. However, as will be clear below, my main concern is not the consideration of their theoretical justification but the examination of their practical implication for the “special psychologies” found in the stakeholders’ dialectics. Rawls’ two principles of justice in the latest version (2001, 42) read: (1) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and (2) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).

I will discuss the second principle first and then return to the first principle. Now, for the second principle, one may note that social and economic inequalities do take place in Hong Kong. For Rawls, such inequalities are allowable in a just-and-fair society so long as the fair equality of opportunity is open to all in respect of the associated offices and positions. In the case of Hong Kong, one may find that offices and positions, when attached to certain forms of inequalities (such as the significant discrepancies in income between different types of jobs), are in general open to all citizens according to their abilities and qualifications. Given this sort of openness in Hong Kong that, more or less, meets the first part of the second principle, I will narrow down the scope of my discussion to the second half of the principle, namely the difference principle, according to which social and economic inequalities are allowed only in the cases where they are to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society. For my purpose, it is important to differentiate theoretical from practical questions on the difference principle. Sandel (2009, 160), for instance, notes that the difference principle as adumbrated in the original position is counter-intuitive. He argues that, if one follows through Rawls’ position, the theoretical consequence is that people would strangely not be considered to deserve their dues (such as high salaries) on account of their personal talents and efforts expended. For Rawls, personal talents and subjective propensities to make efforts in work are only natural endowments that randomly obtain in nature. They lie, in a sense, beyond one’s control. Rawls’ position is that the justification for such dues should be linked up with nothing but the question whether they contribute to the greatest benefits of the least advantaged in society. This position, Sandel contends, is problematic because it seems to disregard the fact that agents do deserve the moral recognition and dues for their talents cultivated and efforts made. On the other hand, Sen (2010, 61) contends that the difference principle is problematic because it seems to infect Rawls’ position with an inconsistency. The alleged inconsistency is Rawls’ allowance for the particular idea of incentive (high salary, for instance, to a CEO) in the rational agents’ deliberation in the original position.

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The idea of incentive would constitute a problem because it looked like a bribe to motivate people to work hard to the benefit of the least-advantaged people. Rawls seemingly depends on this idea but he does not provide any justification why only this sort of bribe-based inequality be allowed while other inequalities are ruled out in the agents’ abstract considerations in the original position. Furthermore, Cohen (2000) criticizes the difference principle because of its inability to safeguard against the theoretical possibility of substantial inequalities that might happen in society. That is, apparently, there would be no limit to the possible scale of inequality by dint of the difference principle. But all these general criticisms, important as they are, are worth mentioning only to clarify the very fact that, for my present purpose, they should be considered as side issues off the focal point I want to make regarding the difference principle. The point I want to make is not so much about the theoretical justifications as practical implications. Sandel, Sen and Cohen are concerned with the justification for the difference principle in the original position. However, my current concern is about, vis-à-vis the application of the difference principle, how to interpret and channel away the stakeholders’ misconception in their dialectics, specifically with regard to their perception of the government’s possibly unequal treatment of them as a type of injustice in reality (i.e. outside the veil of ignorance). To analyse such a dialectical misconception, one may start by highlighting a typical mentality of the stakeholders from the aforementioned case studies. For instance, the employees of FGC opposed to the reclamation of the site because they would lose their jobs if such an option was implemented. Underlying their opposition was their frustration as to why it would be they who should be unfairly chosen to make the sacrifice (of their jobs), while some other stakeholders apparently did not need to. The same mentality could be found in the villagers of Wang Chau who confronted the government and the kingpins who completely rejected the idea of clawing back their brownfield sites by the government in 2014. When the stakeholders preferred to maintain their status quo, they would see the government to be unreasonable to select them as the target and force them to make the concession. In a similar vein, the public suspected the collusion between the government and the developers in the proposed PPP. From their perspective, the government should not unjustly allow a selected group of stakeholders (i.e. the developers) to unfairly take advantages of the situation when Hong Kong people collectively facing such a serious land problem. To come to grips with the stakeholders’ mentality and the embedded confusion, it is necessary to further analyse the general tendency of their dialectics. People tend to identify inequality or unequal treatment by the government’s policies with unfairness towards them. That is, when interpreted from within their perspectives, the stakeholders’ resistance to (or, depending on the context, insistence on) certain choice of land to be selected and reclaimed by the government seems rational enough. In particular, when there is more than one possible choice to be selected for solving the problem with land supply, one tends, not without good rationales, to shift the onus to other parties so that one’s own stakes need not be adversely affected. In other words, no matter how the government’s land policy might be formulated in the aftermath of the public engagement, it would be (mistakenly) challenged as unfair in

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the eyes of many stakeholders because of the unavoidably unequal treatment of the different options, such as in the scenarios where some are chosen and some are not for the land development. Indeed, unless a perfectly equal distribution of resources and responsibilities were possible in reality, there would always be perceivable arbitrariness to some degree in the government’s policy in selecting the choices of land supply. To find an answer to this dialectical challenge, one has to go into the crucial distinction Rawls (2001, 7) makes between rational 14 and reasonable people.15 This is closely related to the question about the application of the difference principle to the land controversy at issue. Now, people are rational if, crudely put, they act for their self-interests and, whenever possible, take advantage of their situations. On the other hand, people are considered as reasonable if they respect the fair terms of cooperation and the principles thus derived, even at the expense of their own interests. At some point, rational people, when taking advantages of their situations, could be acting unreasonably, that is, unfairly taking advantages of other stakeholders. Another way of putting this distinction is to see the difference between private and public reason. In the individual level (private reason), one may adopt many legitimate rationales in chasing one’s self-interests. Yet, for the public reason, people reason not from their own private interests. Instead, they reason from a collective viewpoint, which need not guarantee that the self-interests of any individuals, including their own, are protected against any interference when such an interference is deemed as necessary and legitimate, such as its being to the greatest benefits of the leastadvantaged members of society, as advocated by the difference principle. But how can one postulate reasonableness (public reason) from one’s rational self-interests (private reason)? In reply to this question, Rawls (1996) stresses the importance of the possession of a minimal moral sense by the rational agents in the original position in order for them to figure out the two principles of justice. In other words, the two principles of justice are already inclusive of both the rational and reasonable perspectives. Being rational, the agent should be in some sense moral at the same time in the original position. This point is important because only by underscoring this minimal moral sense can Rawls fully answer the challenge, such as the one raised by Habermas (1995), that merely from the self-interested rationality (private reason) one can never yield reasonableness (public reason) in one’s judgement, which is required for the impartial agents in the original position to formulate the two principles of justice, especially the difference principle. However, Rawls’ answer only underpins his clarification of the situation in the original position. It does not explain how one may interpret the implication of the rationality/reasonableness distinction for the stakeholders in reality, which is my

14 The

term “rational” applied in the distinction here has a specific meaning for Rawls, which is different from the term used, for instance, in Hegel’s remark noted in section “Deliberation” 15 Lange (2014) also touches on this distinction but he seems to omit the broader context and the complexity of the practical issues, such as the stakeholders’ “special psychologies”, that would demand a more systematic application of Rawls’ theory of justice, which I attempt to address here.

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focal point here. Now, applying the crucial distinction to their dialectics, the fundamental point is this: on pain of inconsistency, the stakeholders need to but typically fail to grasp the fact that, even if they have justifiable rationales in arguing why their vested interests need not (and from their perspectives, a fortiori, should not) be negatively affected, it does not follow that their position as such is a reasonable one. In other words, although stakeholders may have their rational justifications for disagreeing to the government’s choices of the land supply, their position may well be only rational without being reasonable. As a result, the stakeholders might rationally resent the government (if they wanted to). But they could not reasonably disagree to it if the government’s decision follows the public reason, aimed, for instance, at a fair distribution of resources in society to the greatest benefits of the least advantaged. In this light, the distinction at issue helps the stakeholders distinguish their rational resentment from reasonable judgement in their dialectics, which, I argue, are constantly confused by them. Their rational resentment being fully justified (in the case where they have been adversely and unequally treated by the government), the stakeholders should also understand that it is fair for the government to ask them to follow the reasonable judgement (public reason) for the sake of others and at the expense of their self-interests. This recognition of the distinction between rationality and reasonableness is important on two counts. First, this is the demarcation between equality and fairness. For Rawls, only fairness, not equality, counts as justice. That is why he allows inequalities in his principles of justice. However, many a stakeholder confuses the two (equality and fairness) as one concept, mixing up the justification for their rational resentment (at inequalities) with that for their reasonable judgement (in favour of fairness). In other words, when they found that they were inflicted with an unequal treatment, they typically inferred that this should be unfairness to them. The Rawlsian model demonstrates that this inference is incorrect. Second, the distinction is helpful for equipping the stakeholders to conceptually revamp their perspectives on what truly counts as justice. Once the rationality/reasonableness distinction is incorporated into their perspectives (no matter what comprehensive doctrines they variously subscribe to), it can address their “special psychologies” regarding the extent to which they should put the collective interests prior to their self-interests when they pursue justice as fairness. An objection arises. Why should the stakeholders’ judgements be demanded to be reasonable in the first place if they are already rational? This is a legitimate question if the stakeholders’ question is not to be begged. To answer the question, a regressive argument is in place here. In the first place, the stakeholders’ rational resentment is legitimate enough and should be appreciated when their self-interests are unequally undermined by the government. But in order for them to criticize the government as being unfair or unjust to them, they need a consistent framework of justice, from which they can meaningfully mount their criticism. Such a framework cannot be based merely on the stakeholders’ private reasons or self-interests, as they are constantly in conflict with each other, clearly demonstrated by the land controversy. The framework, therefore, has to be established on the basis of collective interests, postulated by the public reason. And what the public reason yields is the reasonable judgement, which sees the public interests as logically prior to the private

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interests. In other words, reasonableness is indispensable because, as Rawls holds, only when society collectively functions as a fair system of cooperation may one find justice (and derivatively injustice) therein. Interpreted in this sense, reasonableness is indispensable for any stakeholders, including those who attempt to criticize the government as being unfair or unjust to them. This is the reason why reasonableness (public reason) would be regressively assumed in the dialectics of the stakeholders against the government, no matter what position they adopt in reality. To apply this regressive argument to the land controversy in Hong Kong, it means that the stakeholders, for instance, those of the North New Territories, should agree to the espousal of the public reason along with the private reason side by side. And the public reason always takes precedence over the private reason in order to make possible the conceptual framework of justice. Now, if the government exercises the public reason in their policies, the stakeholders should understand, normatively speaking, the need to square with the government’s policy, despite the fact (which is the focal point I want to make in this chapter) that (a) this might go against their private reason or rational interests, and (b) a certain amount of inequality and arbitrariness of the choice of land supply inevitably remain in the government’s final decision, as the perfect distribution of resources and responsibilities is impossible. My point, then, is boiled down to this, that, even when (a) and (b) occur, as they are bound to in reality, the final decision of the government can still be a just-and-fair re-distribution of the stakeholders’ interests in the land controversy, provided the public reason is well exercised by the government. This is what the stakeholders cannot consistently reject.

Overlapping Consensus Versus Modus Vivendi Now, suppose the stakeholders recognized this distinction between rationality and reasonableness. Wouldn’t this already put them in the position where they could have an overlapping consensus on how the land justice be served? Would the problem not, then, be solved? However, the Rawlsian answer is much more sophisticated and, as one may say, realistic than this short-cut approach. For one thing, even recognizing such a distinction between rationality and reasonableness, the stakeholders need not be motivated to reach any overlapping consensus on the conception of justice. Their rational resentment easily in reality supersedes their reasonable judgement, unless the stakeholders have a deep sense of justice cultivated and are willing to stick to it. Such a cultivation, however, would depend on the existence of a well-ordered society, in which one finds oneself situated in the just-and-fair social and political institutions. In the actual world is a reciprocal relationship between the citizens’ possession of the sense of justice and the existence of the just-and-fair social and political institutions. Both would mutually depend on and reinforce each other through the reflective equilibrium. If one asks how this reciprocal relationship is initiated and sustained at all, the answer has to do with the motivation on the part of the

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stakeholders from a higher or more general level, which serves as a foundation that facilitates this reciprocal dependence and reinforcement in the particular institutional (policy) level, including that of the governmental policies on the land development. This higher level is found in the overlapping consensus, according to Rawls, in the constitutional level. At this point, one has to return to the first principle of justice to complete the inquiry of this chapter. In Hong Kong, the Basic Law, the mandate of which comes from the Chinese Constitution, as noted above, serves as the minuscule constitution, given the special concept of One Country Two Systems. Now, in the discussion above, we have also noted an obvious omission in Hong Kong from the scheme of equal liberties that fall into the first principle of justice, that is the absence of Hong Kong people’s liberty (and right) to vote for the election of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. This particular lacuna of the scheme of liberties in the present poses serious problems with the formation of the overlapping consensus in the foundational or constitutional level. One typical question, engendered by this problem, is whether the government led by the Chief Executive and other politically appointed high-rank officials can be seen to have the mandate from Hong Kong people or serve as the embodiment of the people’s collective interests in general so that it can genuinely represent people’s public reason with the political accountability to them. The answer, at this stage, is clearly negative. Without a clear mandate from the people or legitimate embodiment of the public reason as such, the overlapping consensus on the political conception of justice (here specifically referring to the first principle of justice) at the constitutional level (the Basic Law) cannot be completed. Without the completion of this general foundation, people at most might maintain a modus vivendi in associating themselves with others who have in possession contrasting philosophical and moral preferences. A type of what Rawls (1996, 147) calls “equilibrium point” would take place. That is, people may be, to a certain extent, willing to go along with others over the government’s policies only for the sake of expedience, without their genuine support or commitment to them. This fragile compromise among the people could easily be disrupted should any critical events occur that are considered to undermine the integrity of their comprehensive doctrines. Recent incidents, such as Occupy Central or the umbrella movement in 2014,16 the large-scale confrontational incidents in society between the Hong Kong people and the government (and the police) over the proposed extradition bill in the second half of 2019 and the community’s criticism of the government’s policies in fighting against the epidemic spread of novel coronavirus in early 2020, were but some of the never-ending manifestations of, among other things, the instability of the “equilibrium points” at work in Hong Kong. If one moves from the constitutional to the policy level, such as the level of the government’s land policy, the same type of situation applies. In modelling the land controversy, one sees that a similar “equilibrium point” is at work. That is to say, even if the Rawlsian distinction between rationality and reasonableness could 16 SCMP has a succinct description of the nature of this large-scale civil disobedience in Hong Kong (https://www.scmp.com/topics/occupy-central).

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be made known to all, people would, whenever possible, continue to pursue their rational stakes (vis-à-vis their private reason) at the expense of their reasonableness (and public reason). For, in their mind, the government, without the mandate or accountability to them, could not represent the public reason. If any stakeholders perceived their rational stakes jeopardized by any of the government’s policies, it is likely that strong resistance would result. Stakeholders would find it difficult to reach any reconciliation with any other stakeholders (including the government). Crudely put, all this can be explained by the fact that the difference principle, as part of the second principle, can hardly be fully subscribed by the people because the first principle of justice (regarding people’s equal liberties, such as their right to elect the Chief Executive of the government) is not yet fully established in the case of Hong Kong. People would continue to challenge the government (including their policies) on the ground that they could hardly represent their collective interests or be given their genuine mandate to implement justice as fairness. Their challenge would be posed not only at the constitutional level but also, as a corollary, at the policy level. For this reason, Rawls puts the rightful liberties of people, expressed in the first principle of justice, prior to the second principle as a theoretical construct more important and more fundamental. This delineation of the idea of overlapping consensus in the constitutional and institutional levels provides a crucial context in which one sees, first, how the clarification of the rationality/reasonableness distinction is necessary for the stakeholders to understand the possibility of their reconciliation with one another and, second, the fact that the stakeholders would likely achieve merely a compromise (modus vivendi) without the rationality/reasonableness distinction endorsed unless, and until, their overlapping consensus can be achieved at the constitutional level with their political liberties fully recognized. Then, and only then, could their public reason be well formulated and represented in reality through the Hong Kong government.

Conclusion In conclusion, it is illuminating to cite a passage from Rawls (1996, 165), [P]olitical groups must enter the public forum of political discussion and appeal to other groups who do not share their comprehensive doctrine. This fact makes it rational for them to move out of the narrower circle of their own views and to develop political conceptions in terms of which they can explain and justify their preferred policies to a wider public so as to put together a majority. As they do this, they are led to formulate political conceptions of justice…. These conceptions provide the common currency of discussion and a deeper basis for explaining the meaning and implications of the principles and policies each group endorses [emphasis added].

The passage explains how the process of reflective equilibrium takes place when people are engaged in the institutional (policy) level with their collective deliberation on social and political issues. It is true that the cited passage is followed by a qualifying statement by Rawls (1996, 165) that this sort of public forum may help only

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“once a constitutional consensus is in place”. Nevertheless, the mechanism of the reflective equilibrium in shaping a conception of justice, such as that of land justice in the institutional level, reveals a moral. Namely, if the obstacle to the overlapping consensus in the institutional level (e.g. land justice) is to be removed, it has to have the corresponding one removed (first or simultaneously) at the constitutional level so that, for instance, Hong Kong people would have the genuine liberty to participate in the election of the Chief Executive, rendering the public reason to be legitimately represented by the government, which is then conceptualized to be accountable to the citizens. This emphasis on the connection of the overlapping consensus (and reconciliation) in the constitutional and the institutional levels, together with the cultivation of the requisite sense of justice among the stakeholders, is the political conception of justice that serves as the Rawlsian long-term solution to the land controversy. To round out the discussion of this chapter, it is worth considering how the application of the Rawlsian model to the land controversy addresses the main theme of the book, namely the interrelationship between politics, governance and justice. To begin with, Rawls’ notion of reasonable pluralism defines the dialectics of politics in a liberal society. In more than one way, politics concerns how stakeholders, including the government, dialectically navigate to a collective agreement through the pluralistic values of the society. At some points, the government’s policies might result in the reallocation of social resources to different parties, engendering disputes among the latter. Now, the government’s attempt to seek the citizens’ wide-ranging support for their governance, however, is bound to fail unless the citizens’ sense of reasonableness has been cultivated so that, as stakeholders, they are equipped with a perspective where they can, conceptually speaking, exit from their parochialism and enter into the realm of public reason. Nonetheless, the Rawlsian model further asserts that this perspectival process of “in-and-out” in the citizens’ deliberation would not happen if it were merely a political goal demanded by the government and imposed on the citizens for the sake of expedience. Instead, this political goal has to be formulated with the citizens’ support from bottom up as well. This requires, among other things, the mandate of the government and the legitimacy of their governance to be endorsed by the citizens. Only in this way can the government function as the embodiment of the people’s public reason even when its governance in some cases comes into a conflict of interests with these or those stakeholders. Furthermore, this embodiment would not be completed unless the stakeholders had reached their overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice, whereby the governance of the government can be collectively understood as “just” and “fair” to them, again even in the cases where some parties’ interests have been adversely affected. These triangular factors— politics, governance and justice—are in this way dialectically interconnected with one another. Really, to follow through the Rawlsian model, justice is not something hammered out once and for all but dynamically constructed through a long, ongoing process of political negotiation, reconciliation and collective commitment to a political conception of justice in two levels. This moral ultimately allows one to see clearer the essence of the long-term (though not perfect) solution to the land controversy, while

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the original intents of the government and other stakeholders to look for a solution to the housing and land problem that has already exacerbated in Hong Kong, ironically, are something no one has ever doubted from first and last. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Yu Kam Por and Betty Yung for their incredible editorial patience and probing questions that have helped me turn the chapter into a less opaque one, though they will still disagree to many of the points I try to make.

References Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR Government. Population. https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/ hkstat/sub/so20.jsp. Cohen, G. A. (2000). If you’re an egalitarian, how come you’re so rich?. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Demographia. (2019). 15th Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey: Media release, 21 January 2019. http://demographia.com/media_rls_2019.pdf. Dworkin, R. (1989). The original position. In N. Daniels(Ed.), Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls’ ‘A theory of justice’ (pp. 16–52). Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. Gustafson, P., & Hertting, Nils. (2017). Understanding participatory governance: An analysis of participants’ motives for participation. American Review of Public Administration, 47, 538–549. Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). Phenomenology of spirit (A. V. Miller, trans.). Oxford University Press. Habermas, J. (1995). Reconciliation through the public use of reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s political liberalism. The Journal of Philosophy, 92, 102–131. HKSAR Government. 2030+. https://www.hk2030plus.hk. HKSAR Government. The Basic Law. https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/index.html. HKSAR Government. (2016). Election Committee Sub-sectors Election. https://www.elections.gov. hk/ecss2016/eng. HKSAR Government. 2018. Chief Executive’s 2018 Policy Address. https://www.policyaddress. gov.hk/2018/eng/highlights.html. Lands Development (HKSAR Government). (2013). Land resumption and compensation in the urban area. Guidelines for owners, occupiers and surveyors (Revised ed.). https://www.landsd. gov.hk/en/images/doc/ulm_resumption.pdf. Lange, M. M. (2014). Reconciliation arguments in John Rawls’ political philosophy. Critical Horizons, 13, 306–324. MingPao, A1, 20 February, 2019. Nagel, T. (1989). Rawls on justice. In N. Daniels (Ed.), Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls’ ‘A theory of justice” (pp. 1–15). Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. Rawls, J. (1972). A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rawls, J. (1996). Political liberalism (Expanded ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, J. (2001). In E. Kelly (Ed.), Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Sandel, M. (2009). Justice: what’s the right thing to do? London: Penguin Books. Sellars, W. (1956). Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. In Science, perception, and reality. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Sen, A. (2010). The idea of justice. London: Penguin Books. South China Morning Post, A1. (2019, February 21). South China Morning Post. South China Morning Post. (2019, January 2). https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kongeconomy/article/2180350/hong-kong-golf-alliance-says-using-fanling-course.

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South China Morning Post. Wang Chau Housing Saga. https://www.scmp.com/topics/wang-chauhousing-saga. The Task Force on Land Supply. (2018). Land for Hong Kong: Our home, our say! How to tackle land shortage? The Task Force on Land Supply. (2018). Striving for multi-pronged land supply: Report of the task force on land supply.

Chapter 5

Reconsidering ‘Develop First, Conserve Later’ Principle: The Case of Third Runway in Hong Kong Sui Ming Tsang

Abstract There are three objectives in this chapter. (a) Outlining how the principle ‘develop first, conserve later’ is articulated in third runway discussion. (b) Articulating scenarios which ‘develop first, conserve later’ principle fails, even if we assume that human interest always override other living animals. (c) Reconsidering Greater Value of human interest Assumption (GVA) embedded in ‘develop first, conserve later’ principle. The author tries to show that GVA cannot be given up as it captures the importance of human rights. But, GVA does not need to assume that human interest is always a direct opposite to ecological consideration. Acquiring enlightened human interest through public discourse is the best way to link ecological consideration and politics, and makes the application of ‘politics-justice-governance’ model possible.

Introduction Whether the land should be conserved for natural conservation or economic development is a perennial debate for all city planners and different stakeholders. The pressure of population which induces housing needs and the building of transportation infrastructure can put natural habitat at stake. Hong Kong is no exception. The development of new town has already changed our New Territories into city. Cows, birds, and insects lose their habitat and need to migrate or even lose their life during this development process. Can this process repeat endlessly? Does the past ‘successful’ development justify the future one? Not necessarily. It is because citizens can have changing needs, they may not only focus on economic development but asks for higher quality of life, which involves more different pursuit. At the same time, the natural environment may no longer be able to support similar type of development which may be possible in the past. The building of third runway is another case to urge us to reconsider how to balance natural conservation and economic development. Do this kind of so-called ‘balance’ S. M. Tsang (B) Chinese University of Hong Kong, HKSAR, China e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_5

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is just a disguise? Do we have to change our outlook to natural environment? What philosophy is embedded in our city development discourse? This chapter does not focus on whether building third runway is pragmatically desirable. For the sake of argument, we assume that the whole project is efficient, procedurally just and in public interest. More light will be shed on the principle of ‘develop first, conserve later’ shown in the third runway official discourse. The following are the tasks that I would like to do in this chapter. (i) Outlining how the principle ‘develop first, conserve later’ is articulated in third runway discussion. (ii) Articulating scenarios where ‘develop first, conserve later’ principle fails, even if we assume that human interest always overrides other living animals. (iii) Reconsidering Greater Value of human (interest) Assumption (GVA) embedded in ‘develop first, conserve later’ principle.

Concepts: Development, Conservation, and GVA The principle of ‘develop first, conserve later’ does not deny the importance of conserving but rather prioritizes development. Moreover, conservation is often just regarded as compensation and a way to gain public support for development. Development very often narrowly refers to economic activities and thus largely serves human interests and wants. This seems to govern the rationale of the use of land and other natural resources. However, if we put development into wider context, it can include many different dimensions. For example, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) consider environmental, health, and social development rather than just monetary value.1 This principle may look too narrow if we take development as it assumes. Moreover, the principle may also have taken for granted that human interests always come first. Here we coin this thought as ‘Greater value of human interest assumption’ (GVA afterward). This is an assumption as it has not been proved but widely accepted in current discourse. Some may even think that even conservation is only for the long-term interest or non-economic satisfaction of human being. But what justifies the priority of development? What kind of normative theory is relevant in this kind of value judgment? Can we make value judgment only from the perspective of human? Is human vs nature a necessary dichotomy? Is there alternative way of thinking? I am going to show that GVA cannot be given up as it captures the importance of human rights. But it does not mean that I want to defend the status quo. I am going to argue that GVA does not assume that human interest is always a direct opposite to ecological consideration. What is considered human interest is often short-term economic benefit or desire satisfaction. To overcome this shortsighted view, we can acquire enlightened human interest through public discourse. It is also the best way to 1 ‘Millennium

Development Goals (MDGs)’ at https://www.who.int/topics/millennium_develop ment_goals/about/en/.

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link ecological consideration and politics. Nature and human can be interconnected through public discourse, which involves dimensions including politics (involving different stakeholder), justice (involving autonomy and respect among citizens), and governance (power of government to sustain free and thorough discussion).

Deliberation How the Principle ‘Develop First, Conserve Later’ Is Articulated in Third Runway Discussion The Chief Executive-in-Council granted the approval for the draft Chek Lap Kok Outline Zoning Plan, and the authorization of the reclamation under the Foreshore and Sea-bed (Reclamations) Ordinance for the expansion of Hong Kong International Airport into a three-runway system on April 26, 2016.2 The three-runway system project is more than a new runway but like building a new airport next to the existing one. It involves a reclamation of approximately 650 hectares of land north of the existing airport island, which is equivalent to 34 Victoria Parks, or 100 artificial islands for the New Wing of Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre. Reclamation as an option to increase land use is not without controversy though it may not involve the redistribution of current land; however, it can involve the use of taxpayer’s money. For example, Lantau Tomorrow Vision can cost $500 billion, which is already half of Hong Kong’s financial reserve, which Chief Executive confesses that is expensive though she thinks it is worthwhile and affordable.3 But, it is reasonable to expect that this can raise public debate and objection. Reclamation can also imply the destruction of communal symbol. For example, Victoria Harbor reclamation has to be limited, and government has promised to undertake no further reclamation projects along the northern shore of Hong Kong Island.4 The reason is straightforward: Victoria Harbor will disappear if reclamation has no limit. Land can be created but people treasure this natural resource and symbol of city more. In third runway case, Chinese white dolphin, as one symbol of Hong Kong, can also be made extinct due to the construction. It is thus analogical to reclamation of Victoria Harbor. Moreover, third runway project involves building of a 3800-m-long new runway and its supporting taxiway systems, third runway passenger building and an apron. The existing north runway will also be reconfigured. This project plans to meet future air traffic growth and maintain Hong Kong’s competitiveness. For the sake of discussion, this chapter will not question third 2 ‘Three-runway

system.’ at https://www.threerunwaysystem.com/en/. of CE’s press conference on ‘The Chief Executive’s 2018 Policy Address,’ at https:// www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201810/10/P2018101001041.htm. 4 ‘Government limits reclamation in Victoria Harbour,’ at https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/bra ndhk/1106228.htm. 3 Transcript

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runway system’ s effectiveness or whether there is better alternative, though there are quite a lot of debates in it.5 Our focus here is chiefly on third runway system’s environmental impact. Largescale reclamation of this project definitely can influence marine life, thereby making the building of the third runway a land controversy since it involves land creation that have negative environmental impacts. Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) also does not deny this. To be fair, the building of third runway has to go through environmental impact assessment in 12 aspects.6 Even so, one cannot naively think that there is no adverse effect to environment and non-human animal. The keyword is ‘to mitigate.’ At the same time, HKIA’s guiding principles are ‘avoid, minimize, mitigate and compensate.’7 How to mitigate? third runway system adopts ‘Deep Cement mixing’ instead of conventional drilling which will release heavy metals and contaminate the seabed. This non-drilling method cost three times more than the conventional one but can reduce negative effect to ocean life.8 It should be noted that even if mitigation policy is adopted, marine life is still greatly influenced by the project.9 The number of iconic Chinese white dolphin is sinking due to increasing marine traffic related to different reclamation projects and infrastructure building such as Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge (HZMB) Project. Chinese white dolphin inhabits the Pearl River Estuary, including Hong Kong. Due to its friendly nature and special pink color, it is welcome by Hong Kong people. It is also the official mascot of Hong Kong’s handover to China in 1997’s Sovereignty Changing Ceremonies. However, Hong Kong people seem to have not done enough to save Chinese white dolphin. Dr Samuel Hung, the chairman of the Hong Kong Dolphin Conservation Society, says, ‘The plan is to establish a marine park in an area the dolphins don’t utilize that much. It’s all wrong! Even more ridiculous – they will only make this provision after the construction is over.10 During the seven years of construction the damage is already done!’11 I hope above sketch suits our discussion purpose. We can find that HKIA does not deny the importance of environmental protection and negative effect caused by 5 ‘Public opinion turns against third runway, poll shows’ at http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/ article/1744898/public-opinion-turns-against-third-runway-poll-shows. 6 ‘Environmental Impact Assessments’ at https://www.threerunwaysystem.com/en/commitment/ environmental-impact-assessment. 7 ‘Mitigation Measures,’ at https://www.threerunwaysystem.com/en/commitment/mitigation-mea sures. 8 ‘Expansion of a third runway—to build or not to build?’ at https://www.polyu.edu.hk/cpa/excel/ en/201408/viewpoint/v1/index.html?print=1. 9 ‘Hong Kong’s iconic dolphins sinking under ‘develop first, conserve later’ approach,’ at http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1689796/hong-kongs-iconic-dolphinssinking-under-develop-first. 10 ‘Please refer to ‘Marine Park Proposal’ at http://env.threerunwaysystem.com/ep%20submiss ions/201603%20Marine%20Park%20Proposal/0313181_Marine%20Park%20Proposal_v3.htm#_ Establishment_of_a. 11 ‘Hong Kong’s third runway project: We explore the controversy surrounding the $145.5 billion plan,’ at https://www.timeout.com/hong-kong/blog/hong-kongs-third-runway-project-we-explorethe-controversy-surrounding-the-145-5-billion-plan-051916.

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the project. But these factors do not provide enough reasons to stop the project, which can bring huge monetary benefit and much convenience to general public. Compensation to non-human animal is used to mitigate the negative impact or harm of the third runway project. However, the compensation to whom is not that clear. In the case of building Heathrow third runway, money is spent to compensate those people’s house located at where the third runway is built.12 It is understandable that citizen has rights to adequate housing. Demolishing their house clearly violates this right.13 To get a balance between this right and development, compensation plays its role here. Also, it is not so sensible to say that economic development trumps human rights. Human rights are never forgotten in the whole process but just making it compatible with developing purpose. In the case of building the third runway in Hong Kong, the scenario is quite different. The land is acquired through reclamation, and no citizen’s house or home is affected by the project. In strict legal sense, compensation is also a means to recognize the property rights of house owners. This cannot be applied in marine organisms as they do not have any property rights. Do they have right to adequate housing? They live in a specific habitat, but it cannot be regarded as house since migration and movement are very common in nature.14 If animal cannot find food in one area, they tend to move to other place rather than to stay and wait. Different from other issues covered in this book, the building of third-runway system does involve not only people, but also non-human animal and future generation. It thus makes the ‘Politics-Justice-Governance’ model difficult to apply directly here: Non-human animal and future people are not included in our political arena and cannot speak for their interests.15 Strictly speaking, they do not have political power and thus it is difficult for them to fight for their interest directly or even to have political representatives. Moreover, the use of moral words such as ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ seems to be not applicable here. Marine animal is not regarded as citizen, and their moral status is also not secured. In short, these moral vocabularies are human-centered. Thus when there is interest conflict between human and non-human animal, we do not have alternative moral discourse to locate a more impartial point of view. In daily discourse, we have already assumed that human interest trumps, the best we can do is just to mitigate the harm to non-human animal.

12 ‘ Dolphins offered a ’phoney’ deal over Hong Kong airport’s third runway’ at http://www.scmp. com/news/hong-kong/article/1536420/dolphins-offered-phoney-deal-over-hong-kong-airportsthird-runway. 13 ‘The Right to Adequate Housing Toolkit’ at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Housing/toolkit/ Pages/RighttoAdequateHousingToolkit.aspx. 14 But we cannot assume that pink dolphins can live everywhere in ocean. They can only live in shallow water near the shore. Thus, we cannot easily say the building of third runway does not affect them as they can move away. 15 To avoid making it too complicated, we will not touch the issue of future person in this chapter.

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Thus, the compensation in building third runway system does not show that we recognize non-human animals as right holder or acting as our peer. In Hong Kong context, compensation seems to be more than a political gesture: A new marine park area is proposed to be established after the runway’s completion in 2023. The Dolphin Conservation Society describes the proposal as ‘phony’ since damage to dolphin and other oceanic organism will be done and may not be able to be recovered.16 To let dolphin enjoy the park, you have to ensure the species of white dolphin survive before 2023 and they will be able to move to new Marine Park. But, it is unlikely to happen as the white dolphin cannot easily resettle as human and if huge harm has already been done to the species, ‘resettlement’ can just be an empty word. So, why we have to build the marine park is not answered. We may diplomatically say that it is because white dolphin has intrinsic value and thus we have to preserve it. But it cannot explain why the building of third runway trumps dolphins’ life and put the whole species’ survival at risk acceptable at the very beginning. Therefore, the best explanation is that we just try our best to conserve the nonhuman animal, not protecting their rights. We somehow think that the conservation of it is good to human being. Thus, they only have instrumental value, say attracting tourist or enhancing the image of Hong Kong. However, other human interests can weigh against the benefit bought by white dolphin. Clearly, the benefit bought from third runway hugely outweighs the preservation of the white dolphin from human point of view. All above is just a common cost–benefit analysis. After above analysis, we find that ‘develop first, conserve latter’ does indicate not only the sequence of action but also the value priority. It seems to be politically correct and thus easy to embrace. But, is it morally well-justified? I think that from utilitarian and communitarian point of view, even we assume the priority of human interest, the principle can fail in certain circumstances. Part (b) will be on this. In this chapter, I am also going to show that human-centered thinking and use of moral vocabulary do not imply that human interest always trumps non-human animal interest. Some so-called human interest can be found ‘narrow, short-term and alienated’ if adequate dialogue is conducted among different stakeholders or people with different value systems. ‘Development,’ in current context, is largely in terms of economic development. If we equate this with ‘human interest,’ it cannot but easily fall into the danger of being ‘narrow, short-term and alienated.’ Moreover, if taking ‘Develop first, conserve later’ as a general principle, it does not only put natural world at stake, but it also harms our liberal and democratic political culture. We will do more discussion about this in part (c).

16 ‘Dolphins

offered a ‘phoney’ deal over Hong Kong airport’s third runway’ at ‘http://www.scmp. com/news/hong-kong/article/1536420/dolphins-offered-phoney-deal-over-hong-kong-airportsthird-runway’.

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Cost of conservation

Developing third runway

89

Benefit of development

10000 units

8000 units

Fig. 5.1 A case of rejecting ‘develop first, conserve later’ principle

Articulating Scenarios Where ‘Develop First, Conserve Later’ Principle Fails, Even We Assume GVA In this part, I am going to argue that, even we take it for granted that GVA is true, it does not imply that ‘develop first, conserve later’ can be a principle to guide our policy making. To start, let us look through utilitarian’s eyes. Strictly speaking, utilitarianism is not strictly human-centered,17 but its basic rationale can help us reveal the absurdity of taking ‘develop first, conserve later’ as general guiding principle. When compensation or conservation cost is much higher than the benefit of the development, we will not consider development has higher priority. This is exactly utilitarian economic calculations embedded in earlier conservationism. Earlier conservationism uses economic analysis in resolving environmental debates and treats natural resources as commodities to be used for human consumption.18 In the case shown in Fig. 5.1, we have reason to reject ‘develop first, conserve later,’ since the cost of conservation is larger than the benefit of development. But if we strictly use the framework of utilitarianism, we may still find that above calculation is quite narrow. Utility has a wider scope than economic development. The environment, the dolphins and other non-human beings can all bring utility, even if they do not bring monetary gains. So, it can have the case that utility overrides monetary gains (see Fig. 5.2). Economic development is just one aspect of human development, and very often overemphasis of it can hinder other aspects’ (such as ecological and environmental aspects) consideration. Moreover, if the development will destroy what you try to conserve, you will not take development as first policy. For example, if you really want to conserve Chinese white dolphin (the conservation of which has very high utility to you), but the third runway project will definitely or very likely eradicate the species, you should not let the project run. Utilitarianism need not to assume development is the only end and which brings out most utility.

17 Utilitarianism accepts that only human can be an agent to do utilitarian calculation and follow utilitarianism calculation. But, ethical consideration under it extends to other non-human animals. See O’Neill, Onora, ‘Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism,’ p. 129. 18 Joseph R. Des Jardins, Environmental Ethics, p. 51.

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Utility (Putting all human and

Economic benefit

non-human animals benefit into consideration)

Not developing third

$0

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Fig. 5.2 Economic benefit and utility calculation are different criteria for developing third runway

Lastly, ‘develop first, conserve later’ is not so sensible in utilitarian’s eye, as the governing principle of utilitarianism is utility maximization, not economic development. As mentioned above, utility has wider scope than monetary value. And utility maximization is measured by the greatest good/pleasure/well-being for the greatest number. As Bentham’s dictum says, ‘everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one.’ Economic development, however, does not have this egalitarian dimension. Most of the time, economic development serves the interest of business man and ruling class (which is always minority) first. Thus, economic development is not always utility maximizing and always not egalitarian. It is more accurate to say that ‘develop first, conserve later’ is powerful only when it fits with this kind of utilitarian thinking rather than the slogan itself can support any policy making. As for communitarian consideration, it can be a stronger force to deny ‘develop first, conserve later.’ It sheds light on the moral fact that development (economic development) can degrade what we value. We can refer to a community, a country, or city’s people and obviously a human-centered consideration. What we have to conserve (say x) is something constitutive of our identity. If we develop first (which harm or even destroy x), conserve later, either (a) we deceive ourselves that x is really important to us or (b) we degrade x. We either are hypocritical or not ethical. It is not easy to accept that people will develop a holy city into a casino even though it can bring insurmountable economic benefit. To avoid making such plan or development, they do not weigh religious value with economic goods as this weighing has already degraded the special status of their religion which constitute their identity. They will simply reject the proposal.

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In Hong Kong case, it seems that Chinese white dolphin is not such important to Hong Kong people. It may be an interesting and cute icon but not really constitutive to Hong Kong identity. Thus, it violates neither (a) or (b)! If Chinese white dolphin simply is not so important to Hong Kong community, it can partly explain why third runway system with mitigation policy is communally accepted. But this is not the end of the story. We can still do some reflections: Do our Hong Kong community have any link to these non-human animal? If not, doesn’t it mean that Hong Kong identity is too narrow? Hong Kong identity is not only related to our Chinese name and face, local food we eat or what passport we held, but also can be our connection to Hong Kong natural environment. Why our community cannot recognize the link to non-human animal and wider nature? Is it because our perspective is restricted by human interest in narrow sense?

Reconsidering Greater Value of Human (Interest?) Assumption (GVA) Embedded in ‘Develop First, Conserve Later’ Imagine, if an infrastructure construction causes the number of people declining, we have a very strong reason to stop it and reject the proposal at the very beginning. If you find our government upholds the principle of ‘develop first, conserve later’ to defend, it can be very morally annoying since the violation of human right is prima facie wrong. If one tries to defend that as far as the whole human species is protected, some human beings are killed or harmed is thus acceptable, we will question whether he/she knows the meaning of human rights. Human rights aim to protect human as an individual entity, not the entire humankind. That means it protects every human individual, not human species only. Applying to third runway system case, we find that we protect white dolphin at most as species and thus no language of rights is applied to individual white dolphin and other non-human animal. There is another backbone of ‘develop first, conserve later’ principle, what is conserved is less valuable than who do the conservation and development, viz human animal. Human animal is right holder, while non-human animal is not. Thus human interest in development can trump non-human animal’s interest and even life. At most, non-human animal have to be preserved as species only. This rationale is popular, but I am going to show that it is wrong. There are two routes to reconsider GVA: (i) moral extension approach which argues for the same moral status of non-human animals and (ii) internal criticism or reconstruction of GVA. I will argue that (ii) is the most plausible route for us to criticize ‘develop first, conserve later.’ In other words, we cannot reject GVA just by pointing out that it is human-centered or assuming greater value of human is wrong. On the contrary, to provide convincing arguments to our peer and fellow citizens, we have to use human-centered thinking. We have to work on this platform.

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Some animal right defender argues that non-human animals have moral rights due to common characteristic shared by human and non-human animals, such as intelligence, sentience, and even biological complexity. I will not spend too much ink here. The question I am concerned is how far the extension goes. Different from ‘animal liberationist,’ ecological ethics extends it to the whole ecological system. Leopold’s land ethics states that ‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.’ From the eco-centric point of view, we are just a member of the ecological system, not master. Ecological realism also claims that ecological values exist in this world, no matter human recognize them or not. Value simply exists in this physical world without depending on mental properties of human beings and even sentient beings. I am not trying to show that ecological realism is false, but to point out that from the perspective of citizenship and rights, there exists the fear of ecological fascism. Ecological fascism is coined by those who are worried that human life can be sacrificed for the good of the biotic community and thus human rights (including the right to life) can be trumped. Following the logic of ecological fascism, we can also sacrifice human life for the good of non-human animal, at least in some cases. It is not a fabricated idea but shared by writer and ecologist: ‘In his Desert Solitaire, Edward Abbet notes that he would sooner shoot a man than a snake. And Garrett Hardin asserts that human being injured in wilderness areas ought not to be rescued; making great and spectacular efforts to save the life of an individual ‘makes sense only when there is a shortage of people. I have not lately heard that there is a shortage of people.’19 Sober points out that from the viewpoint of ecological holism, ‘the only value is the holistic one of maintaining ecological balance and diversity.’ However, not only the term ecological balance and diversity is vague, this claim also makes the special status of human being questionable. Moreover, to put ecological holism in political context, it is just a powerless and weird philosophy to citizens (who assume their special status). It can be expected that it is powerless to motivate general public to protect the environment. I am discussing the issue of building third runway with our peers, which assume we have same special status (Yes! You do not discuss with other non-human animal). You will commit performative contradiction if you try to argue that we don’t have same special status in the discussion. (If no, why you are trying to persuade me?). On the other hand, in current political discourse, human rights are an indispensable concept. The protection of human right mirrors one very important ‘fact’, namely human is the valuer, viz he/she is the source of value. Why is it a ‘fact’? According to Korsgaard, we human animal are the sources of normativity because it is our human nature, this we cannot escape from this fact and it is part of our identity.20 She writes, But you are a human being and so if you believe my argument you can now see that this is your identity. You are an animal of the sort I have just described. And that

19 Elliott

Sober, ‘Philosophical Problems for environmentalism,’ in Environmental Ethics, p. 241. The sources of normativity, p. 123.

20 Korsgaard,

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is not merely a contingent conception of your identity, which you have constructed or chosen for yourself or could conceivably reject. It is simply the truth.21 Korsgaard argues that my humanity is the source of value since we have reflective nature. Different from other animals (and of course different from plants and other non-living things, like rock), we can think about (reflect about) our inclination, desire, and belief. Thus, we are able to obligate ourselves, according to our own will, but at the same time what we oblige ourselves is law binding us. Morality is exactly the reflective endorsement. Thus, according to this view, without human, there is no reflective endorsement, thus no value. Human is the source of normativity and value. On the contrary, ecological ethics often have to claim that value exists even there is no human being. It can imply that we have to accept that aesthetics value, moral value, and even economic value can make sense even if there is no human being. Environment has to have intrinsic value in itself which independent from any valuer. It can be philosophically correct, but to many people, it seems so absurd, alienating, and thus difficult to accept. That is partly why ecological ethics is not so politically feasible and thus difficult to form plausible public policy. Public policy is inevitably formed by human being. To be more accurate, it is formed by citizen under a political institution. Asking your citizen to think from a non-human point of view may ask for too much. It can also make value judgment incomprehensible to general public. Adopting a human-centered point of view and accept that human being has greater value due to the reason that he/she is the source of value is more political feasible and more possible to form concrete public policy. It also explains why human rights are different from non-human animal rights. However, this assumption does not deny that other non-human animals also have value; it only claims that human has higher value or is the source of value, which is mirrored by the fact that he/she is right holder. Korsgaard also spends inks to explain our obligation to other animals. She says, ‘When you pity a suffering animal, it is because you are perceiving a reason. An animal’s cries express pain, and they mean that there is a reason, a reason to change its condition. And you can no more hear the cries of an animal as mere noise than you can the words of a person. Another animal can obligate you in exactly the same way another person can. It is a way of being someone that you share. So of course we have obligations to animals.’22 The source of value does not mean that it is the only thing valuable. Therefore, we have to clearly point out that the claim that human has higher value and thus his interest is always more important is wrong. We have to distinguish greater value of human vs greater value of human interest. The former is protected by human rights, while the latter is not. We also have to distinguish Kantian interpretation of GVA with human chauvinism. The latter argues that human is the only subjects of value and morality.23 Thus, human interest does not only trump other interest, it is 21 ibid. 22 Korsgaard,

The sources of normativity, p. 153. Routley and Val Routley, ‘Against the inevitability of human chauvinism,’ in Environmental Ethics, p. 105. 23 Richard

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the sole source of interest. Non-human animal can at most have instrumental value, but never end in itself. Richard Routley and Val Routley formulate the argument of human chauvinism as follow: Premise 1: Values are determined through the preference rankings of values. Premise 2: Valuers’ preference rankings are determined through valuers’ interests. Premise 3: Valuers are human persons. Conclusion: Therefore, values are determined through human interests.24 Most importantly, preference satisfaction is the only route to define what interest is according to this view. And interest then establishes what value is. However, humancentered approach or GVA does not need to assume this. It can just uphold that there are human rights protecting human being’s dignity and respect. Yes, it is absolute and universal. But it responds to man’ unique reflective nature, not particular interest or desire/preference satisfaction. On the other hand, human interest cannot merely be preference satisfaction. If 1000 people are satisfied in torturing an animal for little fun (say 1 unit utility), it still cannot outweigh the pain of that animal (say 500 units of disutility). Torturing which causes pain is simply not good. We have to do reflective endorsement on what kind of preference satisfaction is legitimate. This fits our understanding in daily life. In liberal society, different citizens can share different conceptions of what is good and what is valuable. But, they do not just merely ask for desire satisfaction and self-concern. The sphere of right is well grounded and solid, and it sets the foundation of political structure and citizen’s dialogue. However, the sphere of what is valuable is open to free and continuous discussion. Only through this public dialogue, our reflective nature can be fully expressed. And why human being is valuer is also reflected by the pluralistic value exists in society. We cannot presuppose there is one value system for all citizens to follow, or blindly obey. Only through public dialogue and democratic procedure, we can bind each other by law. Thus, what we have to fight against is not human-centered approach, but narrow understanding of human interest which depicts human chauvinism. No doubt, our formulation of human interest can be ‘trivial, narrow and short-sighted’. It can be manipulated by authority and power which divert our attention from some perspectives or relation. Thus, this can systematically distort what is ‘real’ human interest. Historically, culturally, and of course, economically, human interest is also relational to nature. We depend on nature for air, resource, food, leisure, and inspiration. Nature has transformative power which can shape and reform our identity. Thus, real human interest definitely cannot ignore the ecological consideration. Real human interest may even sometimes have to put ecological consideration come first. For example, (i) 24 ibid,

Ecological consideration is closely linked to our identity. p. 111.

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(ii) Ecological consideration is closely linked to our quality of life (not just GDP). (iii) Ecological consideration is closely linked to our social justice. (iv) Ecological consideration is closely linked to common good of society. All above linkage is human-centered, viz there are social concepts embedded in it. However, it can also show that following solely ‘develop first, conserve later’ can violate real human interest if it ignores above important dimensions concerning ecological consideration which forms real human interest. To put it bluntly, development nowadays serves mainly and merely the economic benefit and desire satisfaction of individuals, which ignores plurality of goods and community concerns. Above also shows that how ecological concern can become a social issue. The philosophical tradition that makes a clear demarcation between right and good is liberalism. Political liberalism defines social structure as neutral to different comprehensive doctrine, but in public policy formation, it cannot avoid catering different clashes of comprehensive doctrine: Environmentalist may stress the importance of ecological system to our identity formation. Some may even claim that we need nature as our bigger self to make our life meaningful and rewarding. Marxist may point out that development just meets the interest of ruling class and capitalist. Some may point out that the extinction of dolphin is a big loss to our coming generation. Some may point out that biodiversity is valuable. Treating every citizen as equal does help new thought comes out and the voice of minority is being heard. That is why Avner de-Shalit argues that liberalism encourages the environmental deliberation and the rise of Green thought.25 But at the same time, liberal has to prepare for the fact that there can be no neutral action to the environment—if they do not act to protect the environment, some forms of life will die and being neutral is just a kind of letting die. Theoretically, the debate can be endless. But all of this can definitely enhance our understanding of what real interest is through the dialogue and debate. At least, it can help extend individualistic desire satisfaction to a wider whole, from individual to community, and from community to nature. In other words, liberalism can be environmentally friendly only if it emphasizes its liberal terminology, such as equal dialogue and participation, rather than employing desire-satisfaction model.26

Alternative to the GVA Principle To sum up, what I propose is ‘respect of rights first, conserve or develop later,’ not ‘develop first, conserve later.’ Rights ensure all citizens can participate in political discussion in how to shape our environment and future. Also, all these discussions can contribute to finding out what real interest of human being is. This approach 25 Avner 26 ibid,

de-Shalit, ‘Is liberalism environment-friendly,’ p. 293. p. 309.

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saves us from claiming that all natural world cannot be altered and wilderness is the only valuable scenario. At the same time, it recognizes the special status of human as right holder and actors of moral norm. Last, it links environmental issue to political world, which only the latter can make change possible. The site, certainly, is human dialogue, but the scope can be extended to non-human concern. In open political dialogue with different people holding different conceptions of good life, preservation and conservation can trump development in certain condition and in certain debate context. For example, if a project brings a systematic harm to nature or majority think that a particular natural system has special meaning to them, it has to be stopped even it can bring us a lot of economic interest. We do not know when this happen in advance but possibility leaves open. However, upholding ‘develop first, conserve later’ principle closes this possibility. Some may criticize that modern liberal democracy just reflects voter’s preference, which has nothing to do with environmental protection. How can liberal democracy ensure protecting the environment proactively, rather than being reactive?27 Majority of citizens may also think that economic development is more important than environmental protection. Moreover, liberal liberalism, usually with market economy, worsens the condition. It is the fact that the conception of nature is not closely tied to the concept liberal democracy. Some liberal political theories may also have excluded non-human animal’s interest and may systematically make human domination of nature looks reasonable and legitimate. Focusing on happiness and good life is also individualistic. Human is also chiefly regarded as possessive individual and nature proprietor. It has to be criticized that liberal tradition has to be transformed in this era of ecological crisis. However, it does not mean that rights, liberty, and autonomy of liberal values can be thus washed away too. We can modify liberalism by accommodating the concept of sustainability, avoiding equating good life as material gratification and reconsidering how human can secure right to life and become free with the consideration of the natural world. It cannot be denied that some liberal political theory is dogmatic and with a lot of prejudice, but liberal democratic dialogue exactly is a way to stop and avoid the rigidity of our current ideology. Liberal tradition, especially social liberal tradition, also contains resource to support the idea of sustainability. One of the most important liberal, J.S. Mill beautifully says, It is scarcely necessary to remark that a stationary condition of capital and population implies no stationary state of human improvement. There would be as much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, and moral and social progress; as much room for improving the Art of Living and much more likelihood of its being improved, when minds cease to be engrossed by the art of getting on. Even the industrial arts might be as earnestly and as successfully cultivated, with this sole difference, that instead of serving no purpose but the

27 M

de Geus, ‘Sustainability, Liberal Democracy, Liberalism’, in Sustaining Liberal Democracy, p. 21.

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increase of wealth, industrial improvements would produce their legitimate effect, that of abridging labor.28

Moreover, the conception of nature and human as possessive individual may be historically linked to classical liberalism or economic liberalism, but not conceptually, to liberalism per se. Marius de Geus says. Liberal theorists and political parties tend to overlook the fact that—also according to their founding father John Locke—the essence of individual liberty in Western liberal democracy does not lie in an unlimited freedom of choice or consumption, but in having a right to participate in politics and to enjoy a protected position with regard to the state.29

Conclusion The third runway project involves large-scale reclamation. It is thus a land controversy which demonstrates a tension between land creation for development and natural conservation. To determine whether the building of the third runway satisfies our real interest, we can only go back to our assumption: Is our procedure of forming the will of building of third runway really just and open? Do we have enough dialogue and do enough reflection to our desire and interests? We cannot but have to review our political culture to see if we really want to protect and conserve the environment, with human hands. Upholding the principle ‘Develop first, conserve later’ rigidly and complacently can make politics futile. Politics should not be a mechanical procedure and definitely should not be manipulation through slogan. What make reflection and criticism possible would be an open and inclusive dialogue accommodating different citizens’ point of view. The dialogue will only be possible if we can have a neutral government, which does not ‘sell’ particular proposal and willing to let citizens make enlightened choice. Human is not the enemy of nature, bad politics and bad economics are. To summarize, ‘develop first, conserve later’ can be applied only in following limited circumstances: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

It does not bring inherent contradiction. It does not degrade what we conserve. It does not violate real human interests. It does not violate the majority’s will under full and transparent political dialogue.

We are going to find more similar debate in the future, especially after Hong Kong government’s launch of the ‘Lantau Tomorrow Vision,’30 which involves reclamation 28 J.S.

Mill. Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy. de Geus, ‘Sustainability, Liberal Democracy, Liberalism,’ in Sustaining Liberal Democracy, p. 32. 30 ‘The Chief Executive’s 2018 Policy Address’ at https://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2018/eng/hig hlights.html. 29 Marius

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for artificial islands to increase land supply in Hong Kong. The aim to drive economic development and improve people’s living quality should not be the only considerations. These limited circumstances serve us a reminder for us to plan our future. The ‘Politics-Justice-Governance’ model applied in this chapter also highlights the importance of social values and justice, which is quite obviously missing in current discourse of development.

Bibliography Agar, N. (2001). Life’s intrinsic value. New York: Columbia University Press. Barry, J., & Wissenburg, M. (Eds.). (2001). Sustaining liberal democracy: Ecological challenges and opportunities. New York: Palgrave. Baird Callicott, J. (1989). In defense of the land ethic. Albany: State University of New York Press. Bell, D. (2002). How can political liberals be environmentalists? Political Studies, 50(4). Coglianese, C. Implications of liberal neutrality for environmental policy. Environmental Ethics, 20(1), 41–59. de-Shalit, A. (1995). Is liberalism environment-friendly? In Social theory and practice (Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 287–314), Special Issue: The environmental challenge to social and political philosophy (Summer 1995). Elliot, R. (1995). Environmental ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Humphrey, M. (2002). Preservation versus the people?. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Korsgaard, C. (1996). The sources of normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nolt, J. (2015). Environmental ethics for the long term. New York: Routledge. O’Neill, O. (1997). Environmental values, anthropocentrism and speciesism. Environmental Values, 6(2), 127–142. Routley, R., & Routley, V. Against the inevitability of human chauvinism. In Environmental Ethics (pp. 104–128). Rowlands, M. (2000). The environmental crisis. London: Palgrave Macmillan, UK. Sober, E. Philosophical Problems for environmentalism. In Environmental ethics (pp. 226–247). Sagoff, M. Can Environmentalist be liberals? In Environmental ethics (pp. 165–187). Talshir, G. Ecological sustainability: A private case of social justice? In Sustaining liberal democracy (pp. 37–56).

Chapter 6

Land Development in Hong Kong: To Conserve or not to Conserve? That’s not the Question Ho Mun Chan and Chun Kit Chui

Abstract The controversy about land supply and development in Hong Kong has been a hotly debated topic in recent years in Hong Kong. Through the analysis of key stakeholders’ views and the underpinned values, it is argued that the controversy exhibits parallel deadlocks in the political and the ethical arenas. To resolve the conflict, it is recommended that a reconciliatory approach in line with the “PoliticsJustice-Governance” Model be adopted for dealing with the controversy.

Introduction This chapter examines the recent controversy about land development in Hong Kong in accordance with the “Politics-Justice-Governance” Model. First, we will show that, from the political perspective, there is a deadlock among the stances of major stakeholders in the debate in regard to the land development options which may cause destruction to the natural environment, like the marine waters and the country parks in Hong Kong. A political compromise seems unavoidable. Yet the deadlock does not just stem from the conflicting evaluations of how serious the land shortage problem is, but also from a clash of ethical values in regard to the conservation of nature. Their different points of views can be captured or justified by some major schools of thought in environmental ethics. So one may wonder whether some clues or insights can be drawn on from the study of environmental ethics which will enable the stakeholders, without making a compromise, to arrive at a conclusion about whether or not those options should be adopted and in what way and to what extent if they should be adopted at all. Unfortunately, there is a parallel deadlock in The research related to this paper has been supported by the Research Centre for Sustainable Hong Kong (CSHK) at the City University of Hong Kong. H. M. Chan (B) · C. K. Chui Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] C. K. Chui e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_6

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environmental ethics which calls for a reconciliatory approach. The stance of any of those major schools, if adopted, will lead to a situation that the winner takes it all which is even worse than a zero-sum game and so we are doomed to make a black-and-white choice between to conserve or not to conserve (to destroy). It seems that this alleged dilemma can be compared with the existential question raised by Shakespeare in Hamlet: To be or not to be. However, this chapter argues that on the contrary, the dichotomy created is indeed a false one. The deadlock can be resolved by a reconciliatory approach advocated by environmental pragmatism which may lead to a result even more fruitful than a zero-sum game as in the case of constructive conservatism. By taking social justice into account, this approach to environmental ethics can be adopted as a model of governance to resolve the controversy about land development in Hong Kong.

Theories: A Brief Overview of Anthropocentric and Non-anthropocentric Environmental Ethics Environmental ethics is a systematic account of the moral relations between human beings and their natural environments in which the key normative issues that are highly relevant to the debate of land supply in Hong Kong are included. For example, what should be the moral norms that regulate the interactions between human beings and the natural world? To whom and to what extent do human have responsibilities and how these responsibilities are justified? A sketch of various theories of environmental ethics will be presented in this section. It can be seen that different points of views upheld by various stakeholders in Hong Kong regarding the value of natural conservation can be captured or justified by one or another major school of thought in environmental ethics. Environmental ethics can be broadly divided into two major types, namely anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism, stems from the ancient Greek anthropos meaning “human being”, is an environmental ethics which primarily centres on human beings. By embracing the principle of human superiority, which human needs ought to be central in dealings with nature, anthropocentric environmental ethics adopts a perspective that includes only human concerns. In other words, from an anthropocentric point of view, the impacts on human should be the basis when an environmental policy is evaluated (Stenmark 2002a). This also reflects the idea that whilst human beings have an intrinsic value, nature has only instrumental value. The value of natural environment depends on whether it can be used as a resource and is treasured by human beings. As a result, natural environment should be conserved not for its own value but for the welfare of human beings. With concern of sustainable development, anthropocentrism stresses justices within generation and between generations. Intragenerational justice refers more just distribution of resources between rich and poor should be achieved, whilst intergenerational justice

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stresses on the moral obligation to satisfy not only the needs of people who are alive but also those of the future generations (Ibid.). Anthropocentrism can further be classified into two kinds: economic anthropocentrism and non-economic anthropocentrism. Economic anthropocentrism advocates solving environmental problems by economic measures. From economic anthropocentric viewpoint, as people are assumed to be self-interested beings, environmental problems can be tackled by introducing measures that can create economic incentives for people to contribute to the public good. It should be noted that the use of economic measures does not imply that there is no governmental involvement. The government plays its role as a rule maker, and the market should operate in accordance with proper rules set up by the government. In the situation where market activity is not environmentally beneficial, the government should change the rules that regulate the market to rectify the problems. Cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is a commonly used tool by the government to determine what and how change should be made (Wenz 2001). CBA requires that all costs and benefits of proposed plans or policies will first be identified in terms of monetary value. The costs and benefits will then add up and see if the aggregate benefits outweigh the aggregate costs. To maximize social wealth, only plans or policies which can produce the greatest excess of benefits over costs should be implemented. By adopting CBA in environmental issues, the government should not implement any rules or policies in which costs are higher than the benefits (Ibid.). CBA facilitates comparative judgments of different economic solutions to environmental problems as strengths and weaknesses of proposed solutions are conceptualized into the same unit, i.e. dollars. In contrast, non-economic anthropocentrism advocates that people are not self-interested all the times and our society should not be richer only but to be better. Therefore, non-economic anthropocentrists will not only consider material wealth when tackling environmental problems. Other important values, such as human rights, equality among citizens, obligation to future generations, aesthetic values, religious commitment and national heritage, should also be concerned. As shown from the above, anthropocentrism upholds the idea that only human beings possess intrinsic value, whilst the natural environment, including non-human animals and plants, is regarded as a resource to human and thus has instrumental value. According to anthropocentrism, decisions regarding environmental issues should be made solely by considering the impacts to human beings. It implies that only human beings have moral worth and all other living organisms have not. Anthropocentrism is not uncontroversial and has been under attack by advocates of animal rights and welfares as well as other non-anthropocentrists. First, anthropocentric stance towards animals has been challenged by Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument and Tom Regan’s theory of animal rights. Singer (2002) argues that the non-human animals should not be unfairly treated by and their welfares should not be ignored by human beings. The attitude of bias in favour of the interests of human and against those of the other species is called “speciesism”, which is comparable to racism and sexism (Singer 2002). According to Singer, sentience, which refers to the capacity to suffer and to experience enjoyment, is the prerequisite of having interests. Sentient beings having interests imply that they have moral standing and can be

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treated rightly or wrongly (Ibid.). Therefore, it requires that moral concern should not be limited to human beings but should extend to non-human animals which have sentience. But it does not mean that harming or even killing sentient non-human animals is always wrong. As Singer is a utilitarian who embrace the principle of utility maximization, we can imagine that under a situation where the benefits of human created can outweigh the pain and suffering inflicted on an animal, he would agree that it is morally permissible to do so. Regan (2002) also contends that moral consideration should be given to non-human animals but for different reasons. Some hold the view that to compare with human beings, non-human animals have less or even no inherent value and thus do not deserve moral concern due to the fact that inherent value is based on certain properties, such as rationality and autonomy. Regan responds that some human beings who do not have those capacities, such as the infants, small children or patients in persistent vegetative state, but it does not entail that they have less or have no inherent value (Regan 2002). Moral agent and moral patient are two essential concepts employed in his theory of animal rights. According to Regan, moral agents are humans that can understand their duties, make autonomous choices and can be held responsible for their choices whilst moral patients refer to incompetent and immature humans, such as babies and mentally incapacitated individuals. It is true that the latter cannot act morally, but they still have the right of not being acted upon immorally. He further argues that, similar to human beings, non-human animals are subjects of a life which have beliefs and desire, memory, a sense of future and an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain, and thus, their moral status is akin to that of moral patients (Ibid.). Whilst Singer and Regan argue that non-human animals deserve moral consideration for either being sentient or being subjects of a life, biocentrism, as a branch of non-anthropocentric ethics, maintains that not simply human life and certain nonhuman animals but all life has an intrinsic value. According to Paul Taylor’s biocentric ethics, every organism should be treated as an object for moral concern since it possesses a good of its own. This intrinsic good is objective, of a biological nature and can be known since all living organism strive to attain some good for themselves. For instance, to speak of the interest of a butterfly, we can know the environmental condition where it needs to survive healthily by observation. Then, we can tell what is beneficial or harmful to a butterfly (Stenmark 2002b). According to Taylor (1995), every organism is a “teleological center of life” that strives to achieve maturity and reproduction. If a living organism has a good of its own, it implies that such living being can become an object of human duties as we can tell what is beneficial or harmful to it. Once an entity deserves moral consideration and has its intrinsic good, we can say that it has inherent worth and should not be treated as merely an object or an instrument. Taylor puts forward four core beliefs of biocentric outlook which are about nature and the proper role of human beings within it. First, humans, being members of the Earth’s community of life, hold a membership that applies to all other non-human members. Second, the natural ecosystems of the Earth are seen as a complex web that contains interconnected elements, and thus, the biological functioning of beings is interdependent. Third, each living being is regarded as a

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teleological centre of life, pursing its own good in its own way. Fourth, it is groundless for the claim that human beings are understood as inherently superior to other living beings (Taylor 1995). Ecocentric ethics, another branch of non-anthropocentric ethics, goes one step further. It advocates that moral concern should not be limited to living beings but to extend to non-living beings, including rocks, rivers, landscapes and even the entire ecosystem. Deep ecology, proposed by Arne Naess, is one of the prominent schools of thought in ecocentric ethics. Comparing to so-called “shallow ecology” which stresses on tackling environmental problems like pollution and resource depletion, deep ecology is a more spiritual and philosophical approach (Devall and Sessions 1995). The essence of deep ecology is to keep asking questions about relationship between human lives, society and nature and attempts to articulate a more comprehensive worldview which is fundamentally different from “dominant worldview” that regards humans as isolated from and superior to the rest of nature. Thus, deep ecology is a holistic and non-anthropocentric approach of environmental ethics (Ibid.). There are two ultimate norms in deep ecology: self-realization and biocentric equality. To Naess, humans’ unique spiritual or biological personhood is robbed of by the individualistic conception of the self. Self should not be conceptualized as an isolated ego striving for individual hedonistic gratification. Instead, it should be seen as an identification which not only includes human species but also the non-human world. As a result, self-realization should be seen as the realization of “self-in-Self” where “Self” refers to the organic wholeness. This idea can be summarized by the motto “No one is saved until all saved” where “one” refers not only to one self as an individual, but to all humans, living beings or natural objects, including ecosystems (Ibid.). Given that all living things in the ecosphere are interdependent and form an interrelated whole, deep ecology proposes the idea of biocentric equality which advocates all organisms and entities are equal in intrinsic worth and have an equal right to live and reach their own forms of self-realization. A practical implication of these norms is that human “should live with minimum rather than maximum impact” on other living organisms and on the Earth (Ibid., p. 159). In sum, except to satisfy vital needs, humans have no right to reduce the richness and diversity of life forms on the Earth. From the above, we can see that the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric environmental ethics have contrasting understanding of the relationship between humans and the nature. This also entails their different and even conflicting approaches to evaluate and tackle environmental problems which often involve interest conflicts between humans, non-human animals and the natural environment. One major disagreement between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism is about the moral status of human beings in relation to other beings. Anthropocentrism defends the idea that human is superior to other non-human living things, whilst nonanthropocentrism offers arguments to justify the status of various beings, such as humans, animals, other living organisms, natural objects and even the ecological system. These philosophical insights certainly can provide forceful justifications to explain why the well-being of certain entities has to be considered. But it remains unclear which position we should take in order to solve the environmental problems

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in real life. In other words, the moral controversies in environmental aspect seem impossible to settle if we merely rely on the philosophical insights discussed above. Such difficulty does not only occur on a theoretical level but also is found in real-life cases. The debate on Hong Kong’s land supply in 2017 is chosen as an illustration and will be discussed in the later section. Before that, we will first introduce housing problem and land shortage of Hong Kong in details as they are essential to understand the land supply debate.

Hong Kong’s Housing Problem and Land Shortage Housing in Hong Kong is a serious problem. It is not just a consensus among ordinary citizens but also is recognized as a social issue by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. For instance, in Transport and Housing Bureau’s Long Term Housing Strategy, the first sentence of the foreword is written as “(h)ousing stands out as one of the most challenging social issues Hong Kong is facing today” (2014, p.iii). The problem is characterized by several features, such as “serious supply-demand imbalance, housing prices and rents at a level beyond the affordability of the general public and out of line with our economic fundamentals, the proliferation of subdivided units,1 and long queues for public rental housing (PRH)” (ibid). To tackle these issues, the government has adopted a “supply-led strategy” which includes providing more public rental housing, increasing the quantities of subsidized sale flats and ensuring steady land supply to stabilize property market (Transport and Housing Bureau 2017). Whilst it is unrealistic and unreasonable to expect that the measures stated in Long Term Housing Strategy could bring immediate effects in averting the housing problem, the situation, however, has become more serious. Take affordability as an example. According to The 14th Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey, Hong Kong is classified as “the least affordable market” which has a median multiple2 of 19.4, far exceeding other severely unaffordable housing markets, such as New Zealand (8.8) and Australia (6.6) (Demographia 2018). In addition, Hong Kong has been recognized as “the least affordable market for the 8th consecutive year” (Ibid., p. 10). The figure implies that the huge disparity of residential property price and income is still serious. The figures about subdivided units (SDUs) in the past few years also portray a worrying situation: more SDUs can be found in Hong Kong, and there are an increasing number of persons living there. In 2013, it is estimated that there were 66,900 SDUs and about 66,900 households or 171,300 persons were living in SDUs 1 Subdivided units refer to the space that “are formed by splitting a unit of quarters into two or more

‘internally connected’ and ‘externally accessible’ units commonly for rental purposes.” See Census and Statistics Department (2018). 2 In the survey, housing affordability is assessed by “median multiple” which refers to “median house price divided by gross pre-tax annual median household income”. See Demographia (2018).

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(Policy 21 2013). In 2014, the number of households and persons living in SDUs increased to 85,500 and 195,000, respectively (Census and Statistics Department 2015). The figures kept growing in 2016. According to the 2016 Population Bycensus Thematic Report: Persons Living in Subdivided Units, there were 92,700 SDUs which have accommodated 91,800 households and 209,700 persons (Ibid. 2018). The environment of SDUs is not favourable as the residents are living in a crowded and inadequate housing condition. For example, by comparing the median per capita floor area of accommodation, the figure of all domestic households in Hong Kong is 15 square metres whilst that of the households living in SDUs is only 5.3 square metres. Besides, nearly 30% of the households living in the SDUs do not have independent kitchen in their units (Ibid). Although Long Term Housing Strategy has set the goal of shortening the long queues for public rental housing (PRH), the reality is disappointing. As at the end of June 2014, the numbers of general applications and Quota and Points System (QPS)3 applications for PRH are 125,400 and 130,400, respectively (Housing Authority 2014). The average waiting time (AWT) for general applicants in June 2014 was 3 years, which was closed to the AWT target of the Housing Authority (around three years). As at the end of June 2018, the number of general applications for PRH has increased to 150,600 and there are about 117,900 QPS applicants. The AWT in December 2018 is 5.5 years, which is far beyond the AWT target (Housing Authority 2018). In other words, the queues for PRH are not shortened but become even longer than those of 2014. Apart from tackling housing problem, increasing land supply also aims at meeting demand of extra land for future development. In 2016, Development Bureau and Planning Department (2016) issued a study “Hong Kong 2030+ : Towards a Planning Vision and Strategy Transcending 2030”. The study estimates that in 2043, population of Hong Kong will reach its peak of 8.43 million (Development Bureau and Planning Department 2016, p. 7). Therefore, in the next 30 years, at least 4800 ha of land for residential uses, economic uses, and infrastructure and facilities is required (Ibid., p. 47). With committed and planned projects which will supply 3600 ha of land, Hong Kong still requires not less than 1200 ha of outstanding land (Ibid.).

Land Supply Options in Land for Hong Kong: Our Home, Our Say! In September 2017, the Task Force on Land Supply was established in order to tackle problem of land shortage, and a series of public engagement activities are initiated 3 To

“accord priority to general applicants over non-elderly one-person applicants in the allocation of PRH flats”, QPS was introduced in 2005. Different from the general applications for family and elderly one-person applications, QPS has the following features: (1) the allocation of PRH flats is subject to an annual quota; (2) a points system is used to determine the priority of applicants; and (3) the average waiting time of around three years is not applicable to applicants of QPS. See https:// www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/housing.pdf.

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from April 2018 (Task Force on Land Supply 2018a). According to the Consultation Paper Land for Hong Kong: Our Home, Our Say! issued by the Task Force, there are 18 “land supply options” for public consultation. In addition to the “areas” (size of the land), the Task Force also concerns about the “timing” (Task Force on Land Supply 2018b, p. 11). Therefore, all the options, ranging from developing brownfield sites to reclaiming reservoir, are classified into three categories, namely “short-medium term options”, “medium-long term options” and “conceptual options”.4 Table 6.1 shows the classification of all the land supply options. Benefits, costs, challenges and uncertainties of these options are also presented (Ibid., pp. 36–75). Considering the size of expected developable land provided by each land supply option, the Task Force comments that “there is neither a single option that can solve the overall land supply problem, nor a perfect solution. A multi-pronged approach is therefore required to increase land supply” (Ibid., p. 34). Some of the conceptual options, such as developing more areas on the periphery of country parks and reclaiming part of Plover Cove Reservoir, have raised debates among different stakeholders of the society.5 In view of the uncertainties in timing and size of land provided, conceptual options which lack of feasibility studies will not be included in the following discussion, except the option of developing more areas on the periphery of country parks for two reasons. First, two pilot studies on such a development as mentioned in the above table have been started. Second, the country parks in Hong Kong occupy around 40% of the territory and the residential area only amounts to no more than 7%. As C. Y. Leung, the former Chief Executive, once said, taking 1% from the former away for the development of the latter will amount to more than 10% increase in the residential area (明報 2011). This can be a way to improve the living condition of many poor people. As we shall argue, it will be unjust for them to bear a heavier burden for natural conservation than the better off if it is taken for granted that the marine waters and country parks in Hong Kong must be let alone and untouchable. C. Y. Leung is a controversial figure in Hong Kong politics, but to be fair, no matter how many people and how much you do not like him for whatever reason, his idea in itself still sounds like a fair deal and so his point does have a point in any case, even if it has to be rejected eventually after a rational discussion. Indeed, quite a number of stakeholders do support the idea.6 Some people, such as former director of the Hong Kong Observatory and conservationist C. Y. Lam, had strong objection to C. Y. Leung’s proposal. They believed that once a tiny proportion of the country parks is used for land development, more and more will be used later on 4 “Short-to-medium

term options” refers to the options “with potential to provide additional land in around 10 years’ time”, “medium-to-long term options” are those with potential to provide additional land in around 10–30 years’ time”, and conceptual options are suggestions which the Task Force is “unable to confirm when and how much additional land can be provided for the time being” (Task Force on Land Supply 2018b, p. 34). 5 Here are a few examples: 綠色和平 (2018b), 郭浩文 (2013), 林超英 (2017). 6 The discussion of relationship between country parks and land supply shortage was first initiated by Paul M.P. Chan, the former Secretary for Development, in 2013 (何雪瑩 2015). Some others also support the idea of developing country parks to ease the land shortage and housing problem. Here are a few examples: Lai (2015), Lau (2015) and Ng (2014).

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Table 6.1 Land supply options from Land for Hong Kong: Our Home, Our Say! (Task Force on Land Supply 2018b) Short- to medium-term options Medium- to long-term options

Conceptual optionsb

Developing brownfield sites (760 ha)a

Near-shore reclamation outside Victoria Harbour (400–490 ha)

Developing the River Trade Terminal sites and its surroundings in the long term

Tapping into the private agricultural land reserved in the N.T. (1000 ha)c

Developing the East Lantau Metropolis (1000 ha)

Developing more areas on the periphery of country parks

Alternative uses of sites under Private Recreational Leases (341 ha)d

Developing caverns and underground space (not specified)

Increasing development intensity of “Village Type Development” zones

Relocation or consolidation of land-extensive recreational facilities (285 ha)e

More new development areas in the N.T. (720 ha)

Topside development of existing transport infrastructure

Development of the River Trade Terminal site (65 ha)

Utilizing the development potential of public utilities sites

Developing two pilot areas on the periphery of country parks (40 ha)

Relocation of Kwai Tsing Container Terminals Topside development of Kwai Tsing Container Terminals Reclaiming part of Plover Cove Reservoir for new town development

a Numbers

in the bracket refer to the size of expected developable land size of expected developable land is not applicable to “conceptual options” c The amount of land could be smaller as some of the reserved private agricultural land may overlap with New Development Areas or brownfield sites d There are 27 Private Recreational Lease sites held by private sport clubs which occupy about 341 ha e There are 95 land-extensive recreational facilities occupying an area of 3 ha or more each. So the number of 285 ha is a rough estimation b The

in a unstoppable way. This criticism seemed to be based on a slippery slope which sounds fallacious, for any further land development in the country parks can easily be barred by legal means and he said very clearly that only a very tiny proportion with low ecological value of the country parks will be used. So the criticism might well have stemmed more from a distrust of his government’s ability to control herself or to keep her promise than such argument being a fallacious one. For short- to medium-term options, “developing brownfield sites” can increase the land supply without much conservation concerns (Ibid., p. 38). The costs, first of all, include land resumption and compensation as most brownfield sites are now owned by private parties. Relocation will also be needed for industries that are now using the brownfield sites (Ibid., p. 36). After the relocation, some operators of those

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industries may have higher and unaffordable operational costs which force them from closing business (Ibid., p. 38). “Tapping into the private agricultural land reserve in the New Territories by Public-Private Partnership (PPP)” could benefit existing and future population by making use of private land resource (Ibid., p. 42). Roughly 1000 ha of farmland owned by major developers could be released by a partnership of the government and private developers. Except huge amount of public expenditure on infrastructures, the development of farmland would bring negative impact to local agricultural industry and to areas with high ecological value (Ibid). This option may also be under the criticism of collusion between the government and business sector (吳婉英 2018). Some commentators believe that PPP is a more efficient option (徐家健 2018), whilst others hold a different view (王永平 2018). “Making alternatives uses of sites under Private Recreational Leases (PRL)” is a proposal of turning 27 PRL sites held by private sport clubs (total size is about 341 ha) to other land uses (Ibid., p. 44). In the Consultation Paper, Fanling Golf Course (FGC) is used as an illustration of alternative use of PRL sites and two development options of FGC are proposed. Developing FGC may bring negative impacts to local sport (golf) development as certain part of or the entire golf course would be closed for other land uses. Expenses on building or upgrading infrastructures would be required, and additional expenditure is needed if the golf course would be rebuilt or relocated in other areas. Some other factors also need to be considered, for instance, over a hundred graves and urns, about 160 potential old and valuable trees, and a few buildings with historic values can be found in FGC (Ibid., p. 48). “Relocation or consolidation of land-extensive recreational facilities” is an option that makes alternative use of 95 land-extensive sports and recreation venues managed by Leisure and Cultural Services Department for increasing land supply (Ibid., p. 45). One major drawback is that residents who use the facilities would be affected. It also takes time and expenditure on land searches for alternative sites and relocation (Ibid., p. 48). For medium- to long-term options, “developing caverns and underground space” is a proposal of relocating suitable government facilities to caverns for releasing some above-ground sites for other uses. To develop underground space, holistic planning is required to enhance connection between surrounding spaces and to improve environment at ground level. By considering the development expenditure in terms of per square metre cost, this option is the most expensive one among all other proposed options. Operation and maintenance costs are relatively higher. Technical issues in developing caverns and underground space should also be noted. For instance, creating underground space may impose disturbance to existing facilities on ground level (Ibid., pp. 56–59). “New Development Areas (NDAs) and new town extension projects” includes four development projects which have almost completed planning and engineering study and can contribute about 2521 ha of land. Besides, the development project of New Territories North covers three areas and new towns are still at conceptual stage and about 720 ha of land can be released by estimation. Developing more NDAs on the existing land in the New Territories will affect a huge number of residents, farmers and business operators, which implies longer planning time required and involves costs on land resumption, compensation, replacement and site formation. If the NDAs are developed on reclaimed land, apart

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from capital investment on reclamation, impacts on marine environment and fisheries issues are the major concerns (Ibid., pp. 60–61). “Development of the River Trade Terminal site” seeks the potential of developing the River Trade Terminal (RTT) for other land uses. An alternative use of the site of RTT can provide extra amounts of land. Carrying out this proposed option involves various costs and challenges. First, other port facilities in Hong Kong need to be upgraded to absorb RTT’s throughput. Besides, there will be costs on site formation and decontamination. Costs on upgrading infrastructure in the area (such as transportation and water supply) also are needed (Ibid., p. 64).

Land Reclamation and Developing Periphery of Country Parks as Land Supply Options Except aforementioned land supply options, special attention needs to be paid to three medium- to long-term options, including two reclamation options and a proposal on development of the periphery of country parks, as they are most relevant to the focus of this chapter, i.e. the conflict between satisfaction of human needs and preservation of natural environment. “Near-shore reclamation outside Victoria Harbour” is one of the reclamation options mentioned in Land for Hong Kong: Our Home, Our Say! Five potential reclamation sites outside Victoria Harbour have been identified in “Enhancing Land Supply Strategy: Reclamation Outside Victoria Harbour and Rock Cavern Development”, a study commenced by The Development Bureau, the Civil Engineering and Development Department and the Planning Department. These sites include Lung Kwu Tan, Siu Ho Wan, Sunny Bay, Tsing Yi and Ma Liu Shui. 400–490 ha of land can be created by near-shore reclamation in the above areas. The reclaimed land is expected for various purposes, including industrial, residential, educational and recreational uses (Ibid., p. 52). Another reclamation project is “developing the East Lantau Metropolis” which refers to building artificial islands with developable land of about 1000 ha in the Central Waters between Lantau and Hong Kong. The reclaimed land is planned for housing, commercial and industrial uses. The East Lantau Metropolis, according to the Consultation Paper, includes a new town and a central business district, which can accommodate 400,000–700,000 residents and can provide about 200,000 employment opportunities (Ibid., p. 53). These two options are also known as “5 plus 1” reclamation sites. The reclamation projects are expected to have the following benefits. First, large size of land can be generated for comprehensive planning. Second, lesser impacts will be given to the existing land use and land resumption or household resettlements will not be required. For costs, substantial capital investment is generally needed for reclamation projects. Besides, additional expenditure on supporting infrastructure, such as transportation, compensation and relocation, is expected. For the five near-shore reclamation projects, the estimated cost of reclamation and infrastructures is ranged from $15,000 to $25,000

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per square metre. The costs of investment on construction of artificial islands are even heavier than the reclamation projects since the islands would be built in the Central Waters without transportation or infrastructures; investment on these facilities is required (Ibid., p. 54). Apart from financial burdens, reclamation development not only will give impacts on human activities, such as fishery, port operations, sea and road transport (Ibid., p. 54), natural environment, especially marine ecology, will also be compromised. Even environmental assessment and mitigation measures will be carried out, the Task Force admits that “reclaiming land in the Central Waters could potentially impact the water quality, bio-sensitive receptors and fisheries nearby; these include coral groups, the Dibamus bogadeki lizard, the white-bellied sea eagle, finless porpoises and fish culture zones” (Ibid., pp. 54–55). Besides, the construction of infrastructures “may also impact water flow and quality”, as well as the growing site for coral reefs near Kau Yi Chau (Ibid., p. 55). “Developing two pilot areas on the periphery of country parks” is originated from Hong Kong Housing Society’s ecological and technical studies initiated by the government in May 2017. The objective of the studies is to investigate the possibility of developing public housing and elderly homes on the periphery of country parks with lower ecological and public enjoyment values (Ibid., p. 66). Two pilot areas, one in Tai Lam and the other in Shui Chuen O, cover totally 40 ha of land and were selected for the study. According to Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, Hong Kong has 24 country parks and 22 special areas which cover a total area of 44,300 ha (Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department 2006). The area of pilot sites is accounted for about 0.1% of the total size of country park area. By estimation, 40 ha of land might be used to build around 7500 flats to relieve the problem of housing shortage. One major challenge of this land supply option is that statutory procedures must be taken to revise boundary of country parks (Ibid., p. 67). To develop periphery of country parks, expenditures on land formation and construction of infrastructural facilities are required. Ecological and public enjoyment value of country parks may also be undermined (Ibid., pp. 66–67).

Deliberation What Is the Crux of the Matter? Among all the land supply options proposed in the Consultation Paper, the above medium- to long-term options are relatively controversial since natural resources and environment will be compromised. For example, developing the East Lantau Metropolis requires extensive reclamation to build artificial islands at the location between Lantau and Hong Kong Island which may adversely affect marine environment. Developing areas on the periphery of country parks has also been criticized by green groups and grassroots communities as the development will cause irreversible damages to natural environment (綠色和平 2018a).

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The Task Force of the Land Supply believes that the issues mentioned above, especially the housing problem, are resulted from land shortage.7 In other words, increasing land supply is crucial in solving the housing problem in Hong Kong. It is worth noting a different view that the housing problem cannot be viewed simply as a consequence of land shortage. For instance, P. L. Lam thinks that the government should not only stress on the issue of land shortage as that the total number of permanent quarters exceeds that of the occupied quarters by about 250,000 units. It implies that there are a huge number of unoccupied housing units (林本利 2017). C. Y. Lam shares similar view and believes that there are sufficient land supplies. Therefore, reclamation is not essential for solving housing problem (林超英 2018a). Furthermore, M. K. Ng argues that in principle, Hong Kong has about 378 km2 of land which can be used for development. What we are lacking is not land supply but strategic land use planning (伍美琴 2018). So there is a sort of deadlock stemming from the conflicting evaluations of how serious is the land shortage problem in Hong Kong by different stakeholders. A political compromise seems unavoidable without taking reclamation and the use of the periphery of some country parks into consideration because of the limitation of the other options. However, it should be noted that those who oppose land reclamation and developing country parks are not overlooking the severity of housing problem in Hong Kong or are rejecting all forms of development that will bring negative impacts to the natural environment. Instead, most of them only hold the view that alternatives which impose lesser impact to the environment, such as developing brownfield sites, should be first considered.8 They believe that the benefits or effectiveness of those more environmental-friendly options, however, is underestimated by the government (Liber Research Community 2018). So the deadlock does not just stem from the conflicting evaluations of how serious is the land shortage problem, but also from a clash of ethical values in regard to the conservation of nature. Their different points of views can be captured or justified, as it has been shown previously, by some major schools of thought in environmental ethics. In the debate on Hong Kong land supply issues, anthropocentricism can be identified in the views of certain people. For example, C. W. Lui, founder and chairman of a listed property development company who supports land reclamation, claimed that Hong Kong has plenty of land and doubted if there are too much brownfield sites and farmlands. He further questioned: “There are many fishes and dolphins. Should we save them first? Or should we save ourselves? I think we should voice out. We can yield a lot of land by reclamation” (香港電台 2018). Lui’s short comment may implicitly reflect the idea of human supremacy: whenever there is a conflict between human and non-human organisms, we should always favour the former rather than the latter. It is anthropocentric because non-human organisms (like 7 A typical example is Task Force on Land Supply (2018a, b) Land for Hong Kong: Our Home, Our

say!, pp. 5–7. 8 For example, World Wildlife Fund Hong Kong opposes any land reclamation without comprehensive planning and favours alternative options which have less impacts to environment (李美華 2018).

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dolphins and fishes) either have no moral worth at all or their moral status is inferior to that of human being. W. C. Shih, founder of a property agency company and a local free newspaper, apparently exhibited a more complex view on the land supply issue. He claimed to be “actively engaged in environmental protection” (施永青 2018b) but also supports land reclamation. In one of his columns, he wrote that some endangered animals should be protected but admitted “their survival has little impact to the natural environment”. However, his anthropocentric position is clearly stated in the conclusion: “this world is governed by human, and the guiding principle is human’s interests” (施永青 2018a). On the other hand, non-anthropocentric stance is also not difficult to be found in the debate. WWF Hong Kong conservationist Samantha M. W. Lee worried that near-shore reclamation at Lung Kwu Tan may cause irreversible destruction to the marine ecosystem as the location is the major habitat of Chinese white dolphins and the calving ground of various marine animals. As a result, she argues that land reclamation should be the last resort and urged the government to have careful investigation and planning before implementation of reclamation projects (世界自然基金會香港分會 2018). Although it is unclear whether such view reflects ecocentric ethical values which advocate moral concern on non-living being (i.e. marine ecology is by itself morally valuable), we can at least be certain that Lee does take the well-being of non-human animals, such as the Chinese white dolphins and other marine organisms, into account. Thus, her opinion can be seen as an example of non-anthropocentric voice in the debate. To certain extent, view of C. Y. Lam, former director of the Hong Kong Observatory and conservationist, also echoes some values of non-anthropocentricism, in particular ecocentric ethics. Lam opposes any development proposal on country park not only appealing to practical reasons (e.g. due to a lack of transportation infrastructure, the new land cannot provide plenty of flats for ordinary citizens and cannot help lowering property price) (林超英 2015b) but ecological value of country parks. In his view, Hong Kong’s country parks constitute a holistic system with different forms of landscape that serves as the habitat for various animals and plants (Ibid. 2015b). Meanwhile, even he regarded countries’ parks as a precious shared property that everyone can enjoy, it does not imply that biodiversity is found in the country parks merely as an instrument and has no value in itself (Ibid. 2015b). From the above, one may wonder whether some clues or insights can be drawn on from the study of environmental ethics which will enable the stakeholders, without making a compromise, to arrive at a conclusion about whether or not those options should be adopted and in what way and to what extent if they should be adopted at all.

Towards a Reconciliation of Various Environmental Ethics The overview of environmental ethics presented at the beginning of this chapter reflects that tensions occur among different ethical theories regarding how we should

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tackle environmental problems. One of the prominent conflicts between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism is about the role of human beings: Is human superior to other non-human living things? Different theories have provided arguments to justify the values and moral status of different beings, including humans, animals, other living organisms, natural objects and the ecological system as a whole. These theories are valuable for they provide strong reasons why well-being of all these entities has to be taken into our moral consideration. Unfortunately, if we stick to any of these single-value theories, we will end up with a situation in which the winner takes all. For argument’s sake, if reclamation and land development of the periphery of some country parks are unavoidable to alleviate the housing problems in Hong Kong, will it be humane for so many people to keep on suffering in their poor living conditions? If we adopt the other way around approach, can we ignore the well-being of non-human animals and other living organisms, and our other ecological concerns? According to environmental pragmatism (Hourdequin 2015; Iannone 2017; Sandler 2018), adopting the perspective of value pluralism is unavoidable and the issues can only be resolved by reconciliation among the rival values. This is different from strategic pragmatism which targets at striking a balance based on power politics. Environmental ethics should not be conceived as merely a discipline of theory construction but also as diplomacy not in the political but in the intellectual sense (Iannone 2017). The diplomacy is action-oriented, which targets at keeping the dialogue open to new possibilities and the hearing be fair (to different voices in terms of values and interests, social conditions and culture backgrounds).9 These are essential so that the reconciliation will not be biased. This indeed echoes Wittgenstein’s view that philosophy is “not a body of doctrines but an activity” (1994, 4.112), a conception of philosophy that he upholds in his earlier and later work. As an exemplar, Sterba (1998) adopts a reconciliationist approach to bridge the gap between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. He proposes three principles which, he believes, both anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists would agree on: first, principle of human defence, which permits killing or harming animals or plants if one is to defend oneself and/or other human beings from harmful aggression; second, principle of human preservation, which also permits human aggression against the basic needs of non-human organisms under a situation where it is necessary for meeting one’s basic needs or the basic needs of other human beings. However, according to the principle of disproportionality, aggression of humans against the basic needs of non-human organisms is prohibited if the action taken is merely for satisfying non-basic or luxury needs of human (Sterba 1998). Whilst nonanthropocentrists would probably agree with these three principles, anthropocentrists may hold different view. As mentioned above, anthropocentrists believe that humans are superior to non-human organisms and think that moral concern should be limited to human beings. As a result, they may disagree with the third principle formulated by Sterba. In response, Sterba argues that there is no non-question-begging ground to show that humans are superior to non-humans. It is true that the traits of humans 9 Similar

views can be found (Wolff 2011; Hampshire 1991). The same approach has been adopted by H. M. Chan. See Chan and Tse (2016) and Chan et al. (2015).

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and those of non-humans are different. But it does not entail that the excellences of humans are superior to those of the non-humans. Since humans and non-humans are having excellences of their own, it implies that both are intrinsically valuable. Even we accept the view that non-humans are not intrinsically valuable as humans, it does not mean that the latter are superior and have the right to dominate over the former. Sterba uses an analogy of a race as an illustration: “someone who came in first in a race would not support the aggressing against the basic needs of those who came in second, third, fourth and so on” (Ibid., p. 136). Based on Sterba’s articulation, Warren (1998) offers a refined approach and focuses on the moral status of non-humans. Warren generally agrees with the strategy used by Sterba to resolve the conflicts between anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists. She argues that moral standing of beings should not be equal as purposed by Sterba but should be evaluated and ranked in accordance with levels of sentience, mental sophistication, capacity of moral agency and their relationship to its ecosystem, and to human beings. For instance, she thinks that there are no strong moral reasons opposing the idea of killing or harming some of the species that is “common, not native to the ecosystem, unendangered, quick to reproduce, and non-sentient” (Warren 1998). Furthermore, contrast to Sterba’s principle of human preservation, Warren believes that it is still morally objectionable to aggress against the basic needs of non-humans for meeting that of the human beings if the species in question is “uncommon, viral to the ecosystem, slow to reproduce, and greatly endangered by human activities” (Ibid.). In short, Warren advocates a more fine-tuned trading off between the conflicting needs and interests of humans and non-humans. Furthermore, in discussions regarding land development, such as the debate of land supply in Hong Kong, people may have an impression that development and preservation appear to be incompatible: the former encompasses activities which enhance human well-being but lead to degradation of natural environment, whilst the latter is equivalent to disconnection between natural environment and human activities for the good of non-human animals, plants and ecosystems. As Silva et al. (2017) comments, this type of dichotomy can be found in “traditional conservation approach” which fails to recognize “human societies are part of nature and highly interconnected with ecological systems” (p. 75). The case of the Keoladeo Ghana National Park in India may serve as an illustration, showing that human activities do not necessarily compromise ecological value of natural environment. Keoladeo Ghana National Park is situated in Bharatpur and has an artificial wetland of 459 ha in size. The wetland was created in the nineteenth century as a reserve for bird hunting. After 1947, the area also was used as a grazing land of surrounding villages. In 1981, the government turned the wetland into a national park and grazing was prohibited. The experts, who did not carry out systemic study, believed that by banning grazing, bird diversity could be promoted. Surprisingly, the sizes of bird population decreased since then. Later, the reason was discovered by an Indian conservation NGO: grazing helps to control the growth of paspalum grass and other opportunistic weeds. Without grazing, the weeds grew rapidly and resulted in a decline of fish and bird populations (Sarkar 2011, pp. 18–19). From this example, we can see that human activity (grazing) does not compromise the ecological value of the wetland. The wetland in

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Keoladeo Ghana National Park is not preservation of the place as it was, but rather a kind of human preservation, which does not exclude human intervention and human activities, and is better in promoting both the interests of human beings and those of the natural environment. In the following, we can see similar examples in Hong Kong, such as the wetland enhancement near Lok Ma Chau Station and the establishment of Hong Kong Wetland Park. Sticking to a particular school of thought or a single value will lead to the worst scenario, which is “the winner takes it all”. For example, by endorsing anthropocentricism, people will be benefited whilst natural environment will be harmed. Or, if it is believed that natural environment is “untouchable” and should be preserved under all circumstances, people will be suffered in some conditions. Some believe that reconciliationist approach can only strike a balance between human development and preservation of natural environment. It cannot guarantee that harms will not be imposed to any parties involved. Therefore, the “zero-sum game” occurs when one benefits in the expense of other’s loss. For instance, in some development projects, mitigation is required by laws in order to reduce harm for natural environment. It implies that harms to some parties are inevitable whilst others are benefited. However, we argue that reconciliationist approach can go further by looking for solutions on the basis that can accommodate conflicting views and attain a winwin situation for well-being of humankind and nature as far as possible, as in the case of Keoladeo Ghana National Park we have just discussed earlier. The concept “constructive conservation”, an approach commonly used in conserving historic places, may bring us some insights on the discussion of land supply in Hong Kong. Historic England, a public body protects historic places in England, considers constructive conservation as a “positive, well-informed and collaborative approach” that tries to strike a balance between historic conservation and sustainable development (Historic England 2019a). One of their “high-level principles” is to manage significant places in a way that sustains their values (Historic England 2019b). In practice, historic places are protected but also used by people. We believe that similar approach can be adopted in Hong Kong in order to balance development aiming at satisfying human needs and environmental conservation. For example, with comprehensive assessment and planning, artificial islands can be built for yielding extra lands to meet people’s need for housing. At the same time, certain portions of the island can be used for long-term conservational purposes, says building artificial forests or wetlands as habitats for animals and plants. More coastal protection areas could also be founded as compensation for marine animals being affected by the construction of artificial islands.10 10 Some may worry that some marine animals will die because of the construction of artificial island,

and thus, no meaningful compensation could be made. To avoid the occurrence of this situation, comprehensive study should be carried out for estimating whether the harms to marine animals are permanent or temporary. Compensation should certainly be made to rectify temporary harms. For example, compensation in terms of creating ocean parks for white dolphins had been taken for some constructions of the Hong Kong International Airport in Chap Lap Kok. Yet, some experts may still concern that their community may be hard to recover since the number of dolphins spotted in Hong Kong waters has dropped from 188 in 2003 to 47 in 2018 (Heaver 2018). However, the boundary

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Some people may argue that constructive conservation is unrealistic and cannot truly protect the invaluable natural environment. But we have already seen a supporting example of wetland in Keoladeo Ghana National Park in India. There are also two local cases which, to certain extent, have successfully mitigated the conflicts of development and environmental protection. The first example is wetland enhancement near Lok Ma Chau Station. The enhancement was a compensation project for some fishponds being reclaimed for the construction of a spur line connecting Sheung Shui and Lok Ma Chau. The wetland, of 32 ha in size and managed by MTR Cooperation, was set up in 2007 to fulfil the requirements of Environmental Impact Assessment. It is reported that the number of bird species increased by 18% from 2007 to 2017. There are about 260 species of birds, which amount half of the bird species of Hong Kong, can be found in the wetland. C. N. Ng, a member of independent supervisory group for the wetland and an associate professor of the University of Hong Kong, believes that the current development of Lok Ma Chau wetland has gone beyond the compensatory requirements, although there is room for improvement (香港電台 2017; 東方日報 2017). Another example is the Hong Kong Wetland Park. The Park, located at North Tin Shui Wai, was an ecological mitigation area (EMA) set up by the Hong Kong Government due to the loss of wetland from developing new town in late 1980s (Hong Kong Wetland Park 2018). The EMA was a huge piece of wasted paddy field that had relatively low ecological value. In 1998, the government decided to build artificial wetland on the site and to develop it into a wetland park for conservational, educational and recreational purposes (李卓賢 2008). According to the Agriculture, Fishery and Conservation Department Annual Report 2016–2017, the Park had attracted around 490,000 visitors during the year. The ecological value of the Park is also remarkable: there are totally 260 bird species recorded in the wetland reserve. Besides, other species have also been recorded, such as dragonfly, amphibian and reptile species (Agriculture, Fishery and Conservation Department 2017). These two local examples, together with the case of Keoladeo Ghana National Park in India, indicate that natural environment or ecosystem is not always compromised in the course of development or is negatively affected by human activities. With comprehensive studies and careful planning, we believe that development and conservation can go hand in hand to achieve a win-win situation in which both human and ecosystem can be benefited.

of what can be counted as an ecological system is often hard to be defined (Sarkar 2011) as there are so many different species, each with a different boundary of habitat. The mobility of marine animals should not be ignored. In other words, marine animals, like dolphins, may find habitat in other places, from the coastal area stretching from that above the South China Sea to all the way down to Singapore or even further. It is too simplistic to think that they just live in the marine waters in Hong Kong like being inside a closed water tank, which implies that if fewer can be found, more of them are killed by the construction of infrastructure in Hong Kong.

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Justice and Land Supply Aside from the reconciliation between anthropocentricism and nonanthropocentricism, the resolution of the conflicts arising from sharing the burden for the conservation of nature has to be addressed as well. Justice is regarded as a concern of distributing benefits of and burdens for promoting the common good. In particular, it would be unfair for the poor to stay in unfavourable living environment because of protecting natural environment if it is regarded as absolutely “untouchable”. We can see that, in fact, the idea of justice also underpins the debate of land supply discussed in the previous sections. What guiding principle should be applied in this particular case? As mentioned, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is commonly used by the government to determine what and how change should be made. By applying CBA in the land supply issue, only plans or policies which can maximize social wealth should be chosen. One possible option is keeping the current situation unchanged since the social wealth (in monetary terms) could be maximized when property prices keep increasing. Or we can choose to build some amount of housing units for those who can afford to pay, whilst the supply increased would not lead to a decrease in property price that offsets the aggregate benefit from selling those houses. Being neutral to distributive matter, CBA is blind to the question of how benefits and burdens are assigned to different parties. As aforementioned, serious social problems, such as unaffordable property price, poor living environment in subdivided units and long waiting time for public housing, have already occurred in Hong Kong. Thus, it is morally problematic to ignore the situation of those vulnerable. But this does not lead us to another extreme that we should maximize the well-being of the worst off in accordance with Rawls’ difference principle (Rawls 1971). Since people generally cannot have strong motives to maximize those who are likely to be strangers to them, thus it sounds psychologically implausible to endorse Rawlsian conception of justice in reality. The concern for natural conservation may now even impose a constraint for just promoting, even to a limited extent, interests of the worst off in terms of housing because of the limited supply of land in Hong Kong. Furthermore, empirical study has shown that Hong Kong people are likely to take a position in between the above two extremes: fairness and cost-effectiveness are both important in distributing resource among different parties (Chan 2013). People in general find it acceptable if the standard of living of the worst off can reach a decent minimum or protected by a so-called safety net. In view of this, we should look for solution for the housing problem in the cultural context of Hong Kong and, at the same time, try not to sacrifice the natural environment as much as we can. Fair sharing of benefits and burdens cannot be attained if we take a particular school of thought to the extreme. In case natural environment cannot be disturbed by human activities, we cannot effectively tackle the housing problem and those who are vulnerable and living in poor condition have to bear all the burdens. On the other hand, animals and plants cannot be properly preserved if we merely stress on human needs without taking environment into account. So although the target should not be maximizing the

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interests of the worst off for reasons as stated in the above, there should be measures to ensure that the housing condition of the poorer people can reach a decent level and that should be the best way for striking a balance between protecting the interests, especially the poor and the vulnerable, and the conservation of nature. One measure that the government should take is to promise that a certain proportion of new reclaimed land would be reserved for public housing by law and regulation.11

Conclusion A sketch of outcomes of consultation on land supply options and the latest government’s response will be presented below. On 24 September 2018, two days before the end of public engagement, Stanley Y. F. Wong, Chairman of the Task Force on Land Supply, submitted a 7-page document of “preliminary observations” to Chief Executive Carrie Lam. In the document, five land supply options that “are more frequently discussed” are mentioned (Task Force on Land Supply 2018c, p. 2). These options include “Developing Brownfield Sites”, “Tapping into Private Agricultural Land Reserve in NT”, “Alternative Uses of Sites under Private Recreational Leases”, “Reclamation Outside Victoria Harbour” and “Developing the Periphery of Country Parks”. Each option has its own supporters, but various concerns are also raised.12 The debate on land supply became more complicated when Carrie Lam launched “Lantau Tomorrow Vision” in her second policy address on 10 October 2018. The proposed project aims to “instil hope among Hong Kong people for economic progress, improve people’s livelihood and meet their housing and career aspirations” (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government 2018). Artificial islands with total area of 1700 ha will be built near Kau Yi Chau and Hei Ling Chau. The new land can provide 260,000–400,000 flats, which 70% of them are public housing and can accommodate 700,000–1,100,000 people (Ibid.). Although the cost of the project is not mentioned, some estimated that $500 billion to $1 trillion will be needed and, according to a poll of more than 3000 Hong Kong people, about 60% respondents worried the massive reclamation project would exhaust government’s fiscal reserve (Zhao 2018). Besides, the size of artificial islands in “Lantau 11 One possible measure is to ensure certain proportion of new reclaimed land will be reserved for public housing through regulation (李芝蘭、郭文德、李建安 2018). 12 For instance, the society and different sectors generally support developing brownfield sites. However, practitioners of logistics and other industries operating on brownfield sites concern about the continuity of their business if the brownfield sites are resumed by the Government (Task Force on Land Supply 2018c, p. 3). Whilst some agree that private agricultural land in the New Territories should be unleashed, the concern of collusion between the Government and business sector remains (Ibid., p. 4). More importantly, some criticize the Task Force is not impartial and its observation is biased. For instance, regarding the option on developing the sites under private recreational leases, in particular the Fanling Golf Course (FGC), the Task Force states that “the views are rather polarised.” (Ibid., p. 4). A commentator regards it as exaggeration since, in his view, the public mostly supports the developing FGC and the reasons for opposing the option are weak (Chan 2018).

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Tomorrow Vision” is even larger than that of the land supply option by 700 ha, which would give greater impact to the natural environment. On 31 December 2018, the Task Force on Land Supply released a report titled Striving for Multi-pronged Land Supply. In the consultation period, the Task Force has received “more than 29,000 questionnaires” and “some 70,000 public submissions” and conducted “some 3000 interviews in a randomised telephone survey” (Task Force on Land Supply 2018d, p. 1). The Task Force has given a number of recommendations to the government for studying and implementation, including three short- to medium-term options (developing brownfield sites, tapping into private agricultural land reserve in the New Territories and alternative uses of sites under private recreational leases) and five medium- to long-term options (near-shore reclamation outside Victoria Harbour, developing the East Lantau Metropolis, developing caverns and underground space, more new development areas in the New Territories and developing the River Trade Terminal site) (Ibid., p. 6). It has not recommended a termination of the ecological and technical study in two pilot areas on the periphery of country parks initiated by Hong Kong Housing Society’s in May 2017 though it recognized there is some strong reservation for using the periphery of country park for land development in the community (Task Force on Land Supply 2018d, pp. 93–95). A number of guiding principles for land development and planning are also suggested but briefly discussed, such as “caring for the environment for balanced development” (Ibid., p. 39) and “adopting a people-oriented approach and adequate communication” (Ibid., p. 41), which appear to be constructive in resolving the conflict between satisfaction of human needs and preservation of natural environment. Although Carrie Lam claimed that it would be “irresponsible” for her to fully accept the Report’s recommendations (Ng and Cheung 2019), Secretary for Development Michael W. L. Wong announced that the government has “fully endorsed” the Report on 19 February 2019. A day after the announcement, it is reported that two proposals, reclamation project at Ma Liu Shui and housing development at Tsing Yi, were rejected by Wong’s department (Zhao 2019). But we may still say that the government has basically accepted the Task Force on Land Supply’s recommendations. In view of the fact that different stakeholders have different views on the seriousness of land shortage and the most preferable methods to tackle the problem, political compromise is unavoidable. In accordance with the “Politics-Justice-Governance” Model as the framework of analysis, we have argued that various stakeholders have different views on the value of natural environment and how the problem of land supply should be solved. Thus, the political conflicts are entrenched in a clash of social values in regard to how much and in what way the nature should be treasured. In the perspective of social values, we have further argued that if reclamation and/or the use of periphery of country parks are necessary for solving the housing problem in Hong Kong, it will make the poor people to bear an unfair burden for natural conservation which is indeed a violation of social justice. The reconciliatory approach advocated by environmental pragmatism should therefore be adopted as a model of governance for resolving the political conflict in regard to land development in Hong Kong. This will imply that reclamation and developing the peripheral

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of country parks should not be regarded as a taboo to talk about in the first place, as some environmentalists in Hong Kong have insisted. Since we have to strike a balance between human interests (particularly of those who directly suffer from the land shortage problems, such as those who live in subdivided flat), this is one more reason for taking these two options into consideration. Of course, other options should be explored first for the sake of protecting the environment, but, as we have argued, they all have limitations. So the solution may require us to press multiple buttons at the same time, including reclamation and developing the peripheral of county parks, but of course with restraints and caution as we also need to maintain the integrity of the ecological system in Hong Kong as far as possible. However, with careful and innovative planning, it cannot be ruled out that by following the approach of constructive conservation, adopting these two controversial options may lead to a win-win situation, i.e. a mutual enhancement between the ecological system and the well-being of people in Hong Kong which is even better than a zero-sum game, i.e. enhancing the well-being humans at the expense of nature to a comparable extent. This is the second best and sometimes we have to accept it if not better solution can be found by applying the reconciliatory approach. The worst scenario is to follow the strategy of the winner’s taking all, as advocated by some major schools anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. They just do not recognize that the dichotomy between to conserve or not to conserve (to destroy) is indeed a false dilemma.

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Part II

Place, Neighbourhood and Sustainability

Chapter 7

Heritage Preservation Versus Development: The Case of Queen’s Pier Koon-kau Ying

Abstract This chapter is related to the land controversy of heritage preservation and development: How should we balance between the need of development and the preservation of some of the city’s precious historical landmarks (heritage preservation). This chapter would focus on (1) what kinds of value could such heritage have, and (2) how should we balance between heritage preservation and development, (3) how should we use the conceptual apparatus earned to analyze the case of Queen’s Pier, and (4) what are the lessons about governance we can learn from this case. Besides, in 2007, the then Chief Executive Donald Tsang once famously said that being overzealous in saving the past may hurt Hong Kong’s competitiveness, and called on conservationists to take a more balanced view toward economic growth and conservation. According to some conservationists (the “Local Action” group for example), “the whole central reclamation project is a conspiracy between the Hong Kong government and real estate empires to privatize public assets.” Is this dichotomy between economic growth and conservation reasonable and fair to the problem of heritage preservation? This chapter would also try to show that (1) in developmental policy making, whether a historical building should be preserved depends on a bundle of intertwined factors with heritage value being one of them, and (2) in the case of heritage preservation, we should balance or even integrate expert decisions and collective decisions (as represented by participatory governance and bottom-up participation), to strike a balance among stakeholders.

Introduction: Heritage Preservation and Its Values This chapter is related to the land controversy of heritage preservation and development: How should we balance between the need of development and the preservation of some of the city’s precious historical landmarks (heritage preservation). This chapter would focus on (1) what kinds of value could such heritage have, and K. Ying (B) School of Humanities and Languages, Caritas Institute of Higher Education, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_7

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(2) how should we balance between heritage preservation and development, (3) how should we use the conceptual apparatus earned to analyze the case of Queen’s Pier, and (4) what are the lessons about governance we can learn from this case. In the recent decades, heritage preservation has been a rising issue attracting widespread civil society and community attention in Hong Kong. Examples include the former Central Police Station (Tai Kwun), the former Marine Police Headquarters in Tsim Sha Tsui, King Yin Lei complex in Mid-levels, and the Blue House in Wan Chai. In late 2006, some newly formed civil society organizations (CSOs), such as Local Action, became very active in the movement for the preservation of Queen’s Pier (and also the Star Ferry Pier not long before, both of them were located in Central). But before we investigate their rationales, we should first of all clarify conceptually the idea of heritage preservation and its significance. In order to understand the concept of heritage preservation, let’s read the following quotation from P. Philippot’s paper (1996) on this topic which is quite illustrative: Every object (or complex of objects) that is recognized to be of artistic or historical significance is entitled to be safeguard as an item of cultural value and as a legacy of the past to the present and the future. The recognition of such significance, however, does not depend upon the fulfillment of pre-established criteria, but rather upon the progress of the development of the historical consciousness and the culture of the people involved. This progress is expressed by the work of historians and the sensitiveness of cultivated people. As a matter of fact, the range of interest in this connection has been continuously expanding since the beginning of the nineteenth century, progressively including all cultures of the world and all kinds of folklore and reaching up to the threshold of the present, which in turn will deserve protection whenever its objects qualify as items with artistic or social value. The universality of this modern viewpoint, as compared to the classicistic or nationalistic one, does not prevent some fluctuation of values from one nation to the other. In fact, this fluctuation is quite justified inasmuch as the significance of the past is indeed relative to the peoples who recognize it as their past. Any other view of universal values would be a purely abstract one. (Philippot 1996, 270)

This paragraph contains several important points worthy of further elaboration. Firstly, heritage as tangible objects or building structures are a part of evidence of the study of human culture and history. It is something that someone or a collective considers to be worthy of being valued, preserved, catalogued, exhibited, restored, and admired (Kersel and Luke 2015, 71). As historical evidence, heritage reflects the lives of people in the past, the behaviors, and civilization of them, which characterize the culture and evolution of a place (a city or a country). Therefore, landmark building or structure can symbolize the image and history of a city or a country. Heritage preservation has historical and cultural value. Secondly, from a social point of view, heritage implies a shared bond of local people, our belonging to a community. It represents our history as well as our identity. This is what we call collective identity and collective memory, defined by shared experiences and culture, makes an essential contribution to group cohesion of a social community. According to the research of social scientists, to foster a sense of belonging to the place, heritage as a part of “social imaginary” is essential (Thompson 1984, 6). When we say that we belong to a community, and this “community” certainly is not a solid physical entity with unchanging essence and a clear

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boundary (it is the interaction of people rather than any tangible object), our sense of belonging is inevitably built upon an imaginary—this is what the social scientists called “social imaginary”: a set of values, institutions, laws, stories, and symbols through which a particular social group and the corresponding society imagine their social whole as social reality (Searle 1996, 4). According to John Thompson, the social imaginary is “the creative and symbolic dimension of social world, the dimension through which human beings create their ways of living together and their ways of representing their collective life.” (Thompson 1984, 6). Almost certainly, the place we are living in together plays a crucial part in our social imaginary, in which our social identity would be cultivated through heritage which represents people’s collective memories in a society. Heritage shapes our lifeworld, which is the background of our articulation of meanings and values, so to speak. As Habermas emphasized the importance of it, “the massive background of an intersubjectively shared lifeworld … lifeworld contexts that provided the backing of a massive background consensus.” (Habermas 1996, 322). Therefore, more and more people and institutions (for example, UNESCO with their designation of World Heritage Sites) deem cultural heritage as a basic human right needed to be protected. Feeling at home is a basic requirement for any human being to live and function well in any society. And heritage preservation is the building of home feeling (social imaginary). This is the social value of it. Thirdly, since social imaginary is something constantly becoming, as our values and interpretation of our own identity change over time, heritage may have different meaning and significance to people of different era of history, to the extreme that different generations of people may make very different judgments and selections on cultural heritage. This is simply natural, because we are social and historical animals both inheriting and transforming values all the time. Nevertheless, in this process no one has the right to dictate values to judge authoritatively which heritage is valuable to preserve, least of all non-democratic governments. We all know that in our history, both government and cultural industry manipulate our collective memory for their dynastic, political, religious, and cultural purposes (Gillis 1996). But they should not be the paternal authority of our history. In order to actualize a more liberal society and avoid manipulation, two things should be done: We have to educate ourselves (with the help of scholars especially historians) to attain good sense of history and heritage preservation; and develop mature civil society to voice out the opinions of people, to gain autonomy and agency for ourselves in civic engagement. As Lorraine Ryan notes, individual memory both shapes and is shaped by national/collective memory, and that there is a competition between the dominant and individual memories of a nation. Thus, we can separate two different kinds of heritage: “official heritage” determined in “top-down” way by official characterizations of heritage from government or formal institutions (forming expert decision or paternalism); and “unofficial heritage” in “bottom-up” direction by individuals who sort out their relationship to, and uses of, the past in their own authentic way (forming folk or collective decision) (Harrison 2009, 8). Therefore, from a moral point of view, in order to better our society and attain our human flourishing, we all have an obligation to heritage preservation. As Harding

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summarized, “cultural property does not really belong to anyone… that all of us have a duty towards cultural property because of its relative scarcity and profound significance.” (Harding 1997, 760). Interestingly to note, the consciousness and sense of heritage preservation grows rapidly only in the recent decades, for example in Hong Kong, along with the gradual awakening of the globalized world to the values of local culture and heritage. Therefore, we can say that the social value of heritage preservation has been becoming more and more emphasized. It goes without saying, as social imaginary the value of heritages is socially constructed. As Philippot’s words quoted before, “the significance of the past is indeed relative to the peoples who recognize it as their past.” On the other hand, we can also notice the change of social values of Hong Kong people due to the self-discovery of our younger generation. According to Betty Yung, “[…] the younger generation of Hong Kongers were mostly born and bred in Hong Kong; their outlook is different from the transient mentality of the older generation of refugees from China who merely treated Hong Kong as a ‘Borrowed place; Borrowed time’ refuge. Thus, the new generation of Hong Kongers has a stronger sense of belonging and has a deeper concern for the developments of Hong Kong toward a better place to live in, forming a stronger ‘subjective’ sense of citizenship.” (Yung 2016, 13). The urge to pursue our own unique collective identity and sense of citizenship produce the demand to preserve our collective memory and history. Eventually, this awakening of the sense of heritage preservation is something we cannot ignore in public policy making. Fourthly, apart from the values we mentioned (the historical, cultural and social ones), there is another value which we usually neglect in the consideration of heritage preservation. That is, economic value. Historical buildings can be precious assets of a place, add goodwill to a city, and attract visitors. After restoration, heritages can be revitalized and reused adaptively. For example, the former Marine Police Headquarters Compound, a declared monument in Tsim Sha Tsui, is being transformed into a heritage hotel with food and beverage outlets, and retail facilities. Another example is the newly revitalized Tai Kwun Centre for heritage and arts, which was originally Central Police Station complex. Heritages can also be converted to tourists’ spots like museum, making the city more unique and attractive. Such preservation strategies would bring heritage to the communities at large and preserve collective memory and would also enhance cultural tourism, which produces great economic benefit and income (Chui and Tsoi 2003, 28). Apart from the values we mention before, these forms of heritage preservation can make economic value. Let’s see a meaningful example from Singapore. In the 80s of last century, many residents of Singapore were leaving as they felt they were losing their own identities as Singaporeans. And this alarmed the government. Later Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew admitted, “We made mistakes, in our rush to rebuild, we knocked down many old and quaint buildings. Then we realized we were destroying a valuable part of our cultural heritage, that we were demolishing what tourists found attractive and unique.” (Chui and Tsoi 2003, 31). Very soon the Singapore government found out that heritage preservation plays a very vital role in building national identity and cohesiveness (a collective identity and a sense of belonging to the home country),

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as well as promoting tourism and bringing about economic growth. After that, the Singapore government carried out extensive heritage projects, which prove promising and rewarding.

Concepts: Development and Heritage Preservation Since modern times, the conflict between economic growth and preservation has been understood as become more and more severe and heated. Although human beings are becoming more and more conscious of the need and value of heritage preservation thanks to the development of historical and social consciousness of educated peoples, the demand for economic growth, especially urban development along with the explosion of population, the advancement of technology and the high rise of capitalism, is even more rampant. For development, land is the most important resource. But in Hong Kong, land is a scarce resource too. It is because Hong Kong has a large population and little land, which is mostly rugged or mountainous. Therefore, facing the strong socio-economic demand for urban development, many old buildings located at potential sites of development are regarded as barriers and have to be torn down. This is an inconvenient fact forcing us to reflect on the relationship between development and heritage preservation. First of all, the most important lesson we have to learn is that we should not equate development with economic growth. According to the United Nations Development Programme, human development is “the process of enlarging people’s choices,” in order to “lead a long and healthy life, to be educated, to enjoy a decent standard of living, as well as political freedom, other guaranteed human rights and various ingredients of self-respect” (UNDP 1997, 15). Development is a multi-dimensional business leading to human flourishing. That means there can be different dimensions of development—hygienic, economic, educational, cultural, social, political, transportational, environmental, etc. And all of them are indispensable for any wellfunctioning society. Therefore, development is something far richer than economic growth, which is only a means of enlarging people’s choices (livelihood betterment). But in the modern mentality of instrumental reason, we usually and simply equate development with economic growth, measuring the success of a society only by the calculation of cost and profit. In public policy making, some of us think economic efficiency (“profit making”) is the most important factor in our agenda setting. But actually we should neither let economy nor market to determine our lives. Market cannot be left completely to itself (the myth of “free” market), and political concerns (notably the well-being of the citizens) may constitute a legitimate reason to check or regulate the market. The telos of politics, if anything, should be the good lives of the citizens (human flourishing which results from human development, which includes a lovely home city/country with memorable heritage and social solidarity), and market (and the economic growth it demands) is at best means of it, not ends in itself. The value and success of Hong Kong should not be measured only by economic growth, but by a more comprehensive and balanced idea of development.

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Since the colonial period, urban planning has been a top-down process in Hong Kong (Ng and Cook 1997). In the old days, as long as the government’s planning and construction did not disturb the everyday lives of them, common people did not pay much attention to the government’s resolutions. Therefore, the government was technocratic with little concern to civil society, not to mention to build up a sense of belonging (or even ownership) to the community for the people. “Social imaginary” is simply too avant-garde for it.1 Together with this technocratic approach, the colonial government developed a practice of commodification of land. Since the low tax rate policy was adopted, which was favored by the British government and commercial capitalists (Chiu 1994), Hong Kong government had to find ways to make money to sustain its administration. Eventually, it strived for income by selling land (As all land was legally owned by the Crown, sales of land were in the form of leasehold for a definite period of years). This became a major source of public revenue. By public auction and control of the supply of land, the government secured a good financial return and ensured a stable process of town planning, which was called “high land price policy.” Land became an expensive commodity, leading to the result that land use was often determined by economic interests. As Lee et al. (2013, 16) notes, “Both the government and the real estate sector have an economic interest in urban planning. Social needs and the rights of residents are often marginalized.” Gradually, this has created the common image of “business-government collusion” in the minds of the general public. This image induces the common judgment that whenever Hong Kong government demolishes historical buildings it does so only on the ground of economic growth or even only for the interests of real estate sector. This is the reason why some comments such as the “Local Action” group’s catchphrase appeared, “the whole central reclamation project is a conspiracy between the Hong Kong government and real estate empires to privatize public assets” (The Guardian 18/6/2007). In the following, this catchphrase would be shown misleading and wrong, at least in the case of the demolition of Queen’s Pier. On the foremost, it can be argued that the government should have a holistic outlook and has to consider all kinds of concerns, in the process of policy making to ensure development. Both economic need and heritage need are only part of the ingredients of development. Very often, different needs of development conflict with each other. In resolving such developmental conflicts, the society concerned has to prioritize different needs (or values behind them). But to simplify the conflicts involved in heritage preservation as “economic growth vs preservation,” usually it misses the point. Firstly, considering its economic value (mentioned in the last section), heritage preservation is not necessarily against economic growth. Economics and preservation are not mutually exclusive, while preservation can be an important and far-reaching economic development. So the balancing between economic growth and heritage preservation is no longer a zero-sum game of either-or. Secondly, in considering 1 For

example, the first-generation Queen’s Pier, built in the first quarter of twentieth century, was originally located in Central’s commercial heart where it was “a colonial and racially segregated trading enclave” “not assessable to the Chinese community”, therefore making this first-generation Queen’s Pier totally foreign to common people and failed to be a “lived” space of the general public (Ng et al. 2010, 411–412).

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the best policy for development, heritage and economics are only factors to weigh alongside with the many others, for example, transportation (later we shall show that the main argument for the demolition of the Queen’s Pier has nothing to do with real estate sector but the transportation need of the general public), politics (later we shall show that the demolition plan of Queen’s Pier was announced and confirmed long ago through established procedures), etc. Thirdly, in consideration of heritage preservation, we are not considering only the well-being of the present generation but also that of future generation. We should not calculate the pros and cons of heritage preservation just for us here and now, because our actions have effects on future people too. This is the basic idea of intergenerational justice, which is based on an understanding of the ethical significance of seeing ourselves as members of a transgenerational polity and community. If there is an intergenerational conflict of interests, present generations may be obligated by considerations of justice not to pursue policies that impose an unfair intergenerational distribution of costs and benefits; otherwise, they are doing harms to future generations (Meyer 2015). These considerations of justice, namely the welfare rights claims of future people, can guide us in choosing among long-term policies, for example those of heritage preservation. Again, these considerations concern not only economic growth, but the whole scope of development: We save the heritages not only for the present, but for the benefits (historical, cultural, social as well as economic) of future generations; conversely if we choose not to save heritage, it may be because both the present and future generation cannot attain better development by preservation. This is certainly in line with the requirement of sustainable development we now highly value: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). This concept of sustainability is indeed the pursuit of development in line with intergenerational justice.

Deliberation: The Case of Queen’s Pier From the above analysis, we clarified the values as well as the awakening sense of heritage preservation and explained that in developmental policy making whether a historical building should be preserved still depends on a bundle of factors with heritage value being only one of them. Nowadays, surely the orientation of policy making of any government (Hong Kong government included) cannot be solely economic in nature; it should have a more comprehensive and long-term outlook of development. Let us turn to an example (the case of Queen’s Pier) in Hong Kong to see how we should make use of the conceptual apparatus earned in real case analysis. Although it has been more than 10 years apart, I believe that many Hong Kong people still have a vivid memory of Queen’s Pier. There is no doubt that this Queen’s Pier, a historic building structure full of stories and memories will continue to exist in the hearts of our generation of Hong Kong people. However, in order to facilitate land reclamation in Central, Queen’s Pier was demolished in February 2008. Now,

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we shall deliberate the rationales for and against its demolition, with some further reflections. In the year 2007, conservationists opposed fiercely. Built in 1925, Queen’s Pier (first generation) was one of the last remnants of the territory’s waterfront past and has very special significance in Hong Kong colonial history. Since then, all official arrival of Hong Kong’s governors took place there; Queen Elizabeth II landed there (1975), as did the Prince and Princess of Wales (1989). It is in the memory of, and also part of the identity of, Hong Kong people. The final pier structure (which was the second generation) was opened by Maurine Grantham, wife of Governor Alexander Grantham (who was one of the most contributive and memorized governors, who made a very great and long-lasting influence on Hong Kong history), in June 1954. The design of it was modern and characteristic, forming an integral whole with City Hall and Edinburgh Place, as a special ceremonial cluster for the colonial city, also as a “lived” space appropriated by the general public (Ng et al. 2010). Nevertheless, the then Chief Executive Donald Tsang once famously said (2007) that being overzealous in saving the past may hurt Hong Kong’s competitiveness, and called on conservationists to take a more balanced view toward economic growth and preservation. This represents the usual stand of Hong Kong government (usually dichotomize and polarize economic growth and preservation and then go for economic growth) which demolishes much of its own history, in the eyes of quite a lot of reviewers. According to some conservationists (the “Local Action” group for example), “the whole central reclamation project is a conspiracy between the Hong Kong government and real estate empires to privatize public assets.” (The Guardian 18/6/2007). But most reviewers ignored the fact that, interestingly and ironically, the demolishment of Queen’s Pier was not originally proposed by the Hong Kong SAR government after handover, but by the British Hong Kong government in the 1980s. And actually reclamation, especially in the area around Victoria Harbour, was considered as a solution to the shortage of land for development since the beginning of the history of colonial Hong Kong. Tracing the origin of the plan, the “end” of Queen’s Pier was first designed and included in the “Central reclamation project,” which was studied and endorsed by then Land Development Policy Committee on the project in 1989, before 1997 the handover (Website of Civil Engineering and Development Department, HKSAR). The rationales included supplying land for some very crucial infrastructure, for example the Hong Kong Station of the Airport Express [years later the government emphasized the underground structure of Queen’s Pier hindered the construction of the extended overrun tunnel of this Airport Express railway (The Standard 22/3/2007)], supplying land for Central-Wan Chai Bypass and Island Eastern Corridor Link, supplying land for supplementary open space to improve the surroundings, etc. Reclamation was a common practice used by the British Hong Kong Government to increase land. In the past, people did not complain much about reclamation, as the public did not fully realize the environmental problems yet. Moreover, it is worth noting that the construction of the second-generation (the final one) Queen’s Pier (in 1950s) was precisely due to reclamation: The first-generation Queen’s Pier had to be

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dismantled due to reclamation and a new one had to be re-built on the new seashore. According to literature, no one cried out for preservation of this first-generation Queen’s Pier, as the consciousness of heritage preservation was not awakened yet. Therefore in 1980s, when British Hong Kong Government once again found reclamation was in need, it proposed the demolishment of building structures like Queen’s Pier without hesitation. This “Central reclamation project” was part of the government’s plan to build new road networks and underground railways (facilitating the relocation of airport and upgrade of the transportation system), while these infrastructural projects were urgently needed in the central business district, in order to boost the transportation effectiveness as well as economic competitiveness of Hong Kong. And this brought heavy criticisms from people. For example, although traffic congestion has plagued Central for decades, the opponents suggested an electronic road toll scheme could equally solve the problem (The Standard 6/10/2003). Building more roads would only make pollution more serious. Besides, opponents also pointed out that sea reclamation as a means of land development is not sustainable. Rougher tides would be caused, sea traffic would be congested, both of which causes dangers to the sea travelers and vessels. Because of the dredging and dumping operations, habitats would be destroyed and seawater would be polluted. If the harbor is made narrower and narrower, the water flow would be decreased and the water quality would be deteriorated (Ng and Cook 1997). As Winston Chu repeatedly said, the Victoria Harbour would soon become a “river” if actions were not taken to stop further reclamations (Ho 2001). In short, the sustainability of harbor reclamation as a strategy of development is highly questionable. Thanks to the efforts and campaigns of professionals and environmentalists such as lawyer Winston Chu, who set up the Society for the Protection of the Harbour (SPH, set up in 1995), Hong Kong people from 1990s onwards were becoming more conscious of the importance of environmental protection and heritage preservation. Comparing to the past that common people did not pay attention to government’s urban planning, the public now became more alert and more vocal to demand that the planning should meet also environmental and social concerns. As the main issue of this chapter is heritage preservation instead of environmental conservation, let’s put aside the environmental problem and focus on the social concerns. According to the research work of Ng et al. (2010), quite different from its first-generation predecessor, the second-generation Queen’s Pier was conceived by its original planners as public space in the commercial heart (Ng et al. 2010), enabling it a real “lived” space of “social imaginary.” And since then, Queen’s Pier became part of Hong Kongers’ collective memory. This is why it has a social value worthy for preservation. On the other hand, people have learnt that architectural development should not be their sole target. This was the awakening of the civil society with a growing sense of agency and a serious concern over collective identity. After SPH, a number of other Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were formed in relation to harbor protection as well as heritage preservation (Lee et al. 2013, 29). During this wave of civil society activism, government agreed to reduce the scale of reclamation,

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for example to reduce “Central reclamation project” Phase III from 38 to 18 ha (Ng 2008). Realistically speaking, the reduction of reclamation proposed has already clearly proved that the project had nothing to do with the “real estate empires” or “to privatize public assets,” but to meet real transportation needs. Certainly better transportation boosts economics, but even more fundamentally people’s livelihood. Too much reclamation is not sustainable, but better transportation can be a great merit to the future generation. Considering intergenerational justice, not only a better environment with preserved heritages but a better transportation is also good for the future people. Therefore it seems that we should not ban reclamation absolutely in this case, but to balance the different demands of development in a wise way. Even though this “Central reclamation project” has indelible necessity, even though the infrastructures are too crucial to decline, even though the seashore around Queen’s Pier should be reclaimed, back to the issue of heritage preservation, we can still ask a question: Could Queen’s Pier be preserved despite the reclamation and road building? Surely after reclamation, Queen’s Pier could no longer function as a pier; but in the same way, many famous heritages in the world no longer play their original functions, for example old railway stations with no train traffic anymore, old palaces with no more kings living in, etc. Moreover, even if Queen’s Pier would block the proposed road, it could be solved by slightly change the location of the road. As mentioned before, the government emphasized the underground structure of Queen’s Pier hindered the construction of extended overrun tunnel of Airport Express, but this could also be solved by some underpinning works (The Standard 22/3/2007, surely this would cost a good amount of money and time, the government claimed). Therefore, preservation of Queen’s Pier was still technically viable, even though the reclamation could not be stopped. And judging from the analysis of the historical, cultural, social, and economic values of heritage, Queen’s Pier was undoubtedly a valuable heritage to preserve. The symbolic meaning of Queen’s Pier is unquestionable, considering its stories and functions in the colonial history of Hong Kong: The primary role of the pier was ceremonial, while the secondary role was a public space for leisure and everyday life: This is where many young people used to meet their dates, and many movies and TV dramas took impressive shots there too. On 9 May 2007, the Antiquities Advisory Board (AAB) held a public hearing to assess and grade Queen’s Pier [Before that, another authoritative society Hong Kong Institute of Architects had already opposed the demolition (SCMP 27/3/2007)]. AAB is a statutory body, comprises of members who, appointed by the Chief Executive, are professionals from various disciplines including archaeologists, historians, architects and planners. They are deemed as experts in aspects of heritage preservation, and their role is to support and guide the Antiquities and Monuments Office (AMO), under the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance enacted since 1976. The main tasks of AAB are to identify and classify heritage according to a three-tier grading system, and to record buildings of considerable historical and architectural significance (Hong Kong Ordinance Chapter 53, Chui and Tsoi 2003). The definitions of the three-tier gradings are as follows:

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Grade I: Representing buildings of outstanding merit, which should be preserved at all costs. Grade II: Representing buildings of special merit. Efforts should be made to preserve these, but discretion is needed. Grade III: Representing buildings of some merit, but not yet qualified for consideration as possible monuments. They should be recorded and used as a pool from which future monuments may be selected. (Chui and Tsoi 2003, 9)

In the public hearing on 9 May 2007, Board members voted by a majority a Grade I listing for Queen’s Pier. This result excited the conservationists. An activist from Local Action declared the AAB’s grading a victory for the people and warned the government “not to treat the voice of the people lightly.” (The Standard 10/5/2007). Ironically, in the same day of 9 May was scheduled for a debate by the Public Works sub-committee (Legco) on an application to fund the dismantling and relocating of the pier.2 Although the government stressed the timing was a coincidence, government ministers declared that it had “no plans to list the pier as a declared monument,” and insisted that there was “no direct relationship between the grading and whether we will demolish and relocate the pier.” (The Standard 10/5/2007). Declaration of monuments is the legal power of the government, according to Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance. Declared monuments are legally protected and demolition of them is strictly prohibited. However, the historical buildings graded by AAB don’t enjoy such legal protection. AAB’s grading is only an administrative reference for the government, and the government has the legal right to ignore it (Chui and Tsoi 2003, 8–10). Apart from the professional judgment of AAB, many Hong Kong residents had come to believe that it is necessary to protect Queen’s Pier in order to save their collective memories. Therefore, some civil society organizations (CSOs) were formed for the purpose of preservation of this unofficial heritage. They occupied the pier and some of them (members of Local Action) started a hunger strike, but the government ordered an end to the “unlawful occupation” by midnight of 30 July. There was fierce opposition by the conservationists, and police officers evicted some 30 protesters from the site on 1 August (The Standard 2/8/2007). After an unsuccessful judicial review asked by conservationists, Queen’s Pier was dismantled in February 2008 and the disassembled pieces were stored (SCMP 24/6/2008). We should understand that from the viewpoint of procedure justice, the actions taken by Hong Kong government were perfectly legal and formally argued in the judicial review, on the ground that the whole plan was announced and consulted long ago through established procedures. But we can say that the government failed in several aspects: (1) It failed to notice the growing consciousness of heritage preservation of the general public, and still stuck to some old fashion advisory and consultative mechanism (clarified in the next section); (2) it can be argued that the government’s decision should not be confined to the limited scope of a committee or office, but it 2 Eventually, the government was forced to withdraw this motion after heated debate. But afterward,

a re-submitted request for funds to dismantle and relocate the pier was approved on 23 May (The Standard 24/5/2007).

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must have good reason to lobby and persuade the public and pay due respect to the committee or office concerned, which it failed in this case; (3) in heritage preservation, citizens demanded (Queen’s Pier was only one of the trigger points) a more participatory bottom-up governance (civic engagement); but the government failed to respond.

Conclusion: From Values to Governance From the above discussions, we found that Queen’s Pier deserved to be preserved as a valuable heritage. But we have to bear in mind that the value of heritage preservation is not an absolute imperative. We have to balance it with other developmental demands, and also the will of the people. Since the Queen’s Pier has ceased to exist, we should now look to the future and review what lessons we have learnt. We can summarize the main points discussed so far by the Politics-Justice-Governance model used throughout this book: (a) Politics Hong Kong government, following the technocratic tradition since its colonial past, was insensitive to the general public’s growing sense of heritage preservation. But as the civil society was gaining momentum in efforts and campaigns of heritage preservation, the government cannot rely on its old fashion advisory and consultative mechanisms any more. It has to be more responsive to people’s demand (to correct its past image of “business-state collusion”) and be more communicative to promote its policy; otherwise, social conflicts will be intensified. Objectively judged, for the issue of heritage preservation, integration of the demands of different stakeholders, or at least balance among them, is still wanting in Hong Kong. (b) Justice A more comprehensive and balanced idea of development should be acknowledged by all relevant stakeholders, no matter they are ideal-driven or interest-driven. Apart from economic growth, we should also value hygiene, education, culture, society and community, politics, transportation, environment, etc., as demands all conducive to human development. In this new framework, heritage preservation is an important issue becoming worthy or even urgent to consider, because of its hybrid of historical, cultural, social, and economic values. Morally and politically, there is an awakening and enlightenment of the right to cultural heritage as well as obligation to heritage preservation. Certainly, we also have to bear in mind that we have to weigh its importance against other demands, and considering not only the goods of our present generation but also those of the future. In practice, in order to ensure the value of equity and inclusiveness can be actualized which is intrinsically valuable in governance (Yung 2016, 10), we should balance or even integrate expert decisions and collective decisions (as represented by participatory governance and bottom-up participation), to strike a balance among stakeholders.

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(c) Governance Concerning the problem of governance, we have the following points to make to conclude this chapter.

A Mistaken Preservation Strategy One serious mistake that most of the commentators and advisors (including the government and AAB) committed was to consider Queen’s Pier as merely one single independent building structure. But alas, it was completely wrong. According to the original design of the colonial government, Queen’s Pier, Edinburgh Place, and City Hall constitute a trinity whole, a governmental building complex for ceremonial use. For example, in the past welcoming ceremonies of newly appointed colonial governors, each new governor would land at Queen’s Pier from yacht; inspect a guard of honour at Edinburgh Place; and then take an oath at City Hall. This is the very place they began their governorship. The value of Queen’s Pier cannot be appraised alone. But even the AAB voted to grade Queen’s Pier as an independent unit. This is not an appropriate view in heritage preservation. We can take Macau as a good example (Japan is another good example to compare. But let us use Macau here as it is more proximate to the case of Hong Kong). The preservation policy in Macau is well thought and well implemented by the Macau government. The Macau government targets not only at isolated buildings and structures, but the whole building complex, the streetscapes, and even the natural setting would all be protected. The policy is to preserve the whole district around a central square, or along a street, and to link up all these spots of historical interests with pedestrian walkways (Chui and Tsoi 2003, 27). According to such foreign experience, heritage preservation has to integrate with the urban planning framework that the development of neighboring environment should be considered and coordinated. And the preservation of Queen’s Pier-Edinburgh Place-City Hall complex would enjoy great synergy if preservation can revive their integration. Otherwise, the demolition of any one part of them would destroy the integrity and therefore the value of them (This is also the reason why so many thought that relocation of the structure of Queen’s Pier alone is not a good option). Only holistic preservation strategy would bring heritage to the communities at large and preserve collective memory and would also enhance cultural tourism. As in Macau’s case, it relies heavily on cultural tourism which is its important economic pulse. And the success of Macau’s tourism proves perfectly the economic value of heritage conservation. In the past, it was a common practice that AAB classifies a historical building from individual spots bureaucratically. It did not regard the heritage and its adjacent buildings and the neighboring environment as an organic whole and comprehensive structure (Chui and Tsoi 2003, 25). Such isolated consideration usually neglected the synergy the building complex together with the environment can have, and therefore cannot have a fair and far-sighted appraisal of heritage. We can learn from foreign

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examples that preservations should focus on groups of historic buildings forming an organic whole.

Government Structure, and Advisory and Consultative Mechanisms Moreover, in such practice, heritage preservation should be integrated into the planning framework. But in Hong Kong’s present legal system, the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance and the Town Planning Ordinance are not related. That means in legal terms, town planners do not have any responsibility to preserve the heritage, or to consider the harmony between the heritage and its environment. Heritage preservation is separated from the strategic land use planning as the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance is not under the Town Planning Ordinance (Chui and Tsoi 2003, 15–20). As said before, the historical buildings graded by AAB do not enjoy legal protection. The government can ignore AAB’s grading and allow the graded building to be abolished. AAB’s grading is only an administrative reference for the government, and the government has the legal right to ignore it. As said before, it can be argued that the government should have a comprehensive outlook and has to consider all kinds of concerns, and hence should not be confined to the limited scope of any one committee or office. However, there must be good basis of the decision of the government. If it does not take the advice of the experts and it is not responsive to popular demands, then it has to be shown, by good communication and dialogues, that the government’s decision is not arbitrary. In the case of Queen’s Pier, the government seemed to be failed in doing so and made the AAB humiliated (In the same day of AAB’s public hearing about Queen’s Pier the government scheduled a debate by the Public Works sub-committee on an application to fund the dismantling and relocating of the pier, and throughout the process ignore totally the listing of AAB without formal explanation). In order to respect the professional and intellectual dignity of AAB as all members in it are qualified authorities in the area of heritage preservation, the listings of it should not be ignored brutally. For example, AAB should have a say to advise the government departments in town planning and determine the major directions in the preservation strategy. The grading of AAB should be acknowledged by the related government departments during decisionmaking process. Under the Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance, the Antiquities and Monuments Office (AMO) was set up to protect monuments. This AMO should be upgraded so that it can have reasonable authority over the heritage preservation matters (Chui and Tsoi 2003, 65). No matter what, it was commonly agreed that the government’s problematic and confusing framework was exposed by the battle to preserve Queen’s Pier (The Standard 11/8/2007). The need to formulate a consistent policy for various departments to follow, or even to set up a mechanism coordinating all existing departments involved in the field of heritage preservation became highly important. Therefore the setting

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up of the newly Development Bureau in 2007, as an agency of the Hong Kong Government responsible for all the related subjects of urban planning and renewal, land administration, housing, infrastructure development, and heritage preservation, with the appointment of Carrie Lam as the Secretary for Development (who earned praises from citizens during the occupation of Queen’s Pier when she appeared in forums dialoging with activists and clarifying government’s standpoint), was seen as a sign that the government “was aware of the strong mobilizational potential of collective identity formation, and hence the need to adopt a more engaging approach in matters related to heritage conservation.” (Lee et al. 2013, 38). And as the name of this new bureau may tell, the government tried to show a more comprehensive outlook and idea of development (at least in the area of land issues). Anyway, the unexpectedly large scale of the preservation campaign of Queen’s Pier perfectly exposed the weaknesses in the government’s advisory and consultative mechanisms developed long ago. Before the campaign broke out, the government considered that it had already grasped the public opinion by some commonly used channels. In 2002 the public inspection of the Outline Zoning Plan (OZP) received no objection. Legislators sitting on the relevant panels did not raise any objections to the Central reclamation project. Central and Western District Council had no objections. And even the AAB originally did not oppose the reclamation project when it was consulted (Lee et al. 2013, 9). So the resulting campaign and the large outcry from citizens raise question about the effectiveness of the traditional consultation methods.

Civic Engagement and Participatory Bottom-up Governance In the past, Hong Kong people were considered as “economic animals,” that they raise no objection to the government as long as their daily livelihood and economic pursuit are not be disturbed. Moreover, they were individualistic in political outlook, that they cared little to voice their opinions about the community affairs, and they kept very functional and alienated relationship with the government. But as their educational level, consciousness of citizenship, as well as a vision of liberty and democracy has been promoted in the last decades, they became more and more eager to develop and define their own collective identity, more and more eager to voice their demands and gain their agency. Therefore, a well-organized, highly mobilized, and contentious civil society was born. As Putnam (2000) argues that the value of civil society lies in the provision of a rich associational life and social capital building, we can see the momentum of Hong Kong civil society have been striving for greater participation in the area of public affairs, in the form of more “civic engagement”: “By civic engagement here we refer to an arrangement through which the state opens up its policymaking process and actively includes citizens as partners in making decisions. This may involve the setting of the policy agenda, identification of problems, clarification of values and interests, or the development and prioritization of policy alternatives.” (Lee et al. 2013, 1).

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As a result, the top-down mode of urban planning and heritage preservation since the colonial period is obviously outdated, and being challenged and criticized. The value of civic engagement is in the now commonly held belief that public policy making should be backed up by bottom-up participation, that is, reasoned arguments and agreement among free and equal citizens. Transparency and public input in policy making are desperately needed (Putnam 2000). The government should open up and see the citizens as partners of governance. In so doing, not only the policy option would be more reasonable but also more acceptable, making governance smoother and more effective (Yung 2016, 210). Not to mention, in the case of heritage preservation, the importance of bottom-up participation is too obvious to be neglected. Since the value of heritages is socially constructed, citizens are the most suitable candidates to sort out their relationship to, and uses of, the past in their own authentic way according to their own social imaginary (Harrison 2009, 8). Thanks to the early efforts of Winston Chu and Legco member Christine Loh, the Harbour Protection Ordinance passed before 1997 with a very important clause stated in it, “The harbour is to be protected and preserved as a special public asset and a natural heritage of Hong Kong people, and for that purpose there shall be a presumption against reclamation in the harbour.” (Lee et al. 2013, 25). This was an early victory of civil society as its demand was heard and valued. According to the ordinance, the harbor (including the natural environment as well as the cultural heritages) is public. It belongs to the people, not the Crown or the country or the real estate sector. Along with the spirit of this ordinance, to answer the demand of more engagement from civil society, a statutory committee, the Harbour-front Enhancement Committee (HEC) was later established in 2004, with the principle for “Preserving Victoria Harbour”: “Victoria Harbour must be protected and preserved for Hong Kong people and visitors as a special public asset, a natural and cultural heritage asset, and a driver for the creation of economic and social values.” (Lee et al. 2013, 33). In this principle, apart from the people’s ownership of harbor, the balance between social and economic values was also emphasized. Throughout the campaigns and developments, Hong Kong people are cultivating themselves as to be more visionary and knowledgeable, the emotional attachment and collective memory of them are growing stronger and stronger, creating a sense of collective ownership and an urgency to save the harbor and heritage, and eager to define its own identity and the usage of public space. Although in the end the Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier were not preserved, but the emergence of a rapidly maturing and energetic civil society is still something worthy to congratulate, a crucial part of the core values of which was nicely summarized by Lee et al. (2013, 28–29): In the juxtaposition of post-materialism and collective memory, a postcolonial collective identity was formed, one that collectively remembered a better past (the Victoria Harbour before massive reclamation), that was dissatisfied with the status quo (massive reclamation associated with developmentalism and the threat of imminent loss of the collective memory), and shared a sense of agency (stop the government from reclaiming the harbour, find a way out of developmentalism and make the government more responsive to public demands).

However, in order to make more bottom-up participation possible, political reform is needed in order to consolidate and realize the idea, balance the demands of different

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stakeholders, and give due respect to procedural justice. This can shed light on the problem we mentioned before: As heritage preservation is one of the factors we have to weigh in developmental policy making, and we should carefully consider not only the goods of our present generation but also those of the future, a reasonable, persuasive as well as durable balance between all viewpoints and interests of stakeholders become very crucial. Collective decisions are important in building up collective identity and social cohesion, while expert decisions are also not to be neglected to maintain professionalism and avoid populism. In order to ensure the value of equity and inclusiveness, we should balance or even integrate expert decisions (represented by AAB and other governmental department’s decisions) and collective decisions (as represented by participatory governance and bottom-up participation) to strike a balance among different stakeholders. This integration or hybrid form of governance can be a way out, in the case of heritage preservation in Hong Kong.

References Chiu, S. W. K. (1994). The politics of laissez-faire: Hong Kong’s strategy of industrialization in historical perspective. Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies: Occasional Paper No. 40. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Chui, M. H. M., & Tsoi, A. T. M. (2003). Heritage preservation: Hong Kong and overseas experiences. HK: The University of Hong Kong. Gillis, J. R. (1996). Commemorations: The politics of national identity. USA: Princeton University Press. Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms (W. Rehg, trans.). Boston, MA: MIT Press. Harding, S. (1997). Justifying repatriation of native American cultural property. Indiana Law Journal, 72(3) (US: Trustees of Indiana University). Harrison, R. (2009). Chapter 1: What is heritage? In R. Harrison (Ed.), Understanding the politics of heritage. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Ho, C. W. (2001). Against harbour reclamation in Hong Kong: Lesson of success. In J. F. Williams & R. J. Stimson (Eds.), International urban planning settings: Lessons of success. Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd. Kersel, M. M., & Luke, C. (2015). Civil societies? Heritage diplomacy and neo-imperialism. In L. Meskell (Ed.), Global heritage: A reader. Chichester: Wiley. Lee, E. W. Y., et al. (2013). Public policymaking in Hong Kong. Civic engagement and state-society relations in a semi-democracy. London: Routledge. Meyer, L. (2015). Intergenerational justice, Item in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-intergenerational/. Ng, M. K. (2008). From government to governance? Politics of planning in the first decade of the Hong Kong special administrative region. Planning Theory and Practice, 9, 165–185. Ng, M. K., & Cook, A. (1997). Reclamation: An urban development strategy under fire. Land Use Policy, 14, 5–23. Ng, M. K., Tang, W. S., Lee, J., & Leung, D. (2010). Spatial practice, conceived space and lived space: Hong Kong’s ‘Piers saga’ through the Lefebvrian lens. Planning Perspective, 25(4), 411– 431. Philippot, P. (1996). Historic preservation: Philosophy, criteria, guidelines. In M. Talley, et al. (Eds.), Historical and philosophical issues in the conservation of cultural heritage. Los Angeles: Getty Institute.

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Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. N.Y.: Simon & Schuster. Searle, J. R. (1996). The construction of social reality. US: Penguin. South China Morning Post (SCMP), March 27, 2007. South China Morning Post (SCMP), June 24, 2008. The Guardian (digital newspaper), June 18, 2007. The Standard, October 6, 2003. The Standard, March 22, 2007. The Standard, May 10, 2007. The Standard, May 24, 2007. The Standard, August 2, 2007. The Standard, August 11, 2007. Thompson, J. B. (1984). Studies in the theory of ideology. Los Angeles: University of California Press. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (1997). Human development report 1997. USA: United Nations. World Commission on Environment and Development. (1987). Our common future. UK: Oxford University Press. Yung, B. (2016). Introduction: Ethical dilemmas, social values, and public policy: The context of governance and citizenship. In B. Yung & Y. Kam-por (Eds.), Ethical dilemmas in public policy: The dynamics of social values in the east-west context of Hong Kong (pp. 1–19). Singapore: Springer.

Chapter 8

Collective Versus Self-interests: What Is Behind NIMBY? Shan Shan Chung

Abstract “Not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) describes a social sentiment that opposes to the establishment of certain essential public facilities in the opposing group’s neighbourhood. These public facilities are therefore considered unwelcome facilities which become subjects of land controversies. Facilities that may be confronted by NIMBY include but do not limit to, clinics for the mentally ill, columbarium, wind turbines and various waste facilities, such as refuse transfer stations, waste and recycling depots, waste incinerators and landfills. In this chapter, the author will review the NIMBY phenomena on the extension of a major waste facility in Hong Kong, namely the South East New Territories (SENT) Landfill extension project proposed in 2013–14 in Hong Kong. Among the readily available textbook solutions, offering adequate financial compensation is likely the only effective means to get the vocal opponents agree to the establishment of the unwelcome facility in question, and this is unlikely to get government buy-in because of the inexplicable growth in the property market in Hong Kong in the recent decade. If yielding to the financial demand of the vocal opponents is not a feasible solution, then is there a way out to achieve good land governance in Hong Kong over the aspect of major waste facility siting? At the end of the chapter, the author will argue that the most effective solution to NIMBY in Hong Kong is to render a potentially unwelcomed facility a sustainability steered asset which can enhance property value and other social values for the local community.

Introduction In this chapter, the explanation on NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) as stated in Chap. 1 of this book will be adopted. Synonyms of NIMBY include LULU (locally undesirable land use), BANANA (build absolutely nothing anywhere near anything) and NOPE (not on planet earth). While LULU and NIMBY have similar meanings, they S. S. Chung (B) Department of Biology, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, China e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_8

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are more neutral when compared to BANANA and NOPE which show how radical and uncompromising this sentiment can become. More frequently than not, the emergence of a NIMBY site/facility is an indication of the dichotomy between collective and self-interests. This is because the “benefits of NIMBY projects are usually spread broadly among a large population”, i.e., collective interest (Halle and Mirrer-Singer 2008) but their socio-economic and/or environmental costs tend to concentrate in certain groups, usually the community in the neighbourhood. Out of self-interest, therefore the local community is “highly motivated to oppose the project strenuously” (Halle and Mirrer-Singer 2008) and become NIMBYers—those who oppose to a development in their neighbourhood due to the perceived adverse effect on them. The study of NIMBYism in environmental projects or facilities falls into the scope of environmental politics, and NIMBYism is an intractable phenomenon in public governance with social values as a possible guiding light for solutions. Other than paying compensation, standard textbook solutions to NIMBYism include burden sharing, self-sufficiency principle and voluntary siting wherein an open and consultative decision-making approach consisting transparent community engagement is adopted to build trust between the project/facility owner and the duly affected local community (Kasperson et al. 1992; Pushchak and Rocha 1998). Furthermore, the hosting community is given extensive opportunity to deliberate over the acceptance of the facility in question (Rabe et al. 2000). Burden sharing refers to a more equitable distribution of various unwelcome facilities within a jurisdiction, e.g. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. In line with the equity principle, the adoption of the self-sufficiency principle, i.e., to distribute the risks to where they are generated can also be a solution to NIMBY. These approaches are believed to be a more effective replacement of the traditional Decide-AnnounceDefend (DAD) decision-making approach (see section “Decide-Announce-Defend (DAD)”). In Hong Kong, a number of environmental facilities have met local community opposition, such as the waste-to-energy (WtE) plant1 originally purported to be built in Tuen Mun district, refuse transfer stations and more recently, landfills. In this chapter, the extension of the South East New Territories (SENT) landfill will be used to illustrate that the mentioned textbook solution albeit appealing is not able to resolve the landfill siting deadlock in Hong Kong. I would like to further argue that in Hong Kong, given the continuous high property prices, a new angle, i.e., to create positive sustainability-based values, is needed to tackle the siting problem. Having said that, effective communication to build trust and respect between the facility owner and the affected local community is still conducive and indispensable in this democracy seeking generation.

1 A waste-to-energy plant is one that incinerates waste matters and recovers the heat energy obtained

from the incineration process.

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Concepts Key technical terms or core concepts are explained in this section.

Decide-Announce-Defend (DAD) DAD is a top-down decision-making approach where analyses were developed by professionals, experts, project developers or government and “solutions” were simply communicated, usually imposed upon in reality, onto the public (Komendantova and Battaglini 2016). DAD was commonly used in siting various public facilities through the 1970s (Kunreuther et al. 1993).

Voluntary Siting “Voluntary siting approaches seek a negotiated agreement with a community, usually confirmed by a local referendum that manages risks at levels acceptable to its resident. … Siting agreements are reached through extensive public participation programmes and are supported by open communication of the risks involved. Both participation and effective communication are believed to build trust between the siting authority and stakeholders.” (Pushchak and Rocha 1998). Voluntary siting, however, is compatible with making (monetary) compensation to the adversely affected community. It is important to note that in the deliberation process, the community has the right to withdraw their acceptance if the risks are considered excessive or the benefits too low. Because of the transparency in risk and benefit information, fairness in voluntary siting is assumed through the making of informed choices by the host community (Pushchak and Rocha 1998). So far, both successes and failures have been experienced in the use of voluntary siting in the planning of LULU.

Landfills The SENT landfill is a landfill for general solid waste, i.e., non-hazardous. Hazardous waste landfills are also common land-use forms attracting NIMBY opposition. The SENT landfill in Hong Kong is an engineered landfill with state-of-the-art landfill gas and leachate collection and treatment infrastructure. Despite pollution abatement measures, environmental nuisance that can adversely affect local communities around a landfill usually includes offensive odour, noise and traffic congestion brought about by the transportation of waste and the landfill itself.

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Landfill Crisis and Responses from the Hong Kong Government In this section, the background to the emergence of NIMBY towards SENT landfill is discussed. Table 8.1 states the municipal solid waste (MSW) quantities disposed, population and growth rates for MSW disposal, population and GDP in current market prices for Hong Kong from 2006 to 2016. MSW growth rates for Hong Kong in the past one decade have surpassed population growth rates for the same period and are not strongly correlated with economic situations. In addition to the MSW disposed, about 5233 t of materials were diverted for recycling in 2016 and 5014 t in 2017. This put the total MSW generation rate at 15,578 t per day (tpd) in 2016 and 15747 tpd in 2017 for Hong Kong. The over-reliance of waste disposal on landfills in Hong Kong was delineated in the 1989 Waste Disposal Plan in which all the then running waste incinerators would be phased out and three mega strategic landfills would be built. These three mega strategic landfills have become SENT, North East New Territories (NENT) and West New Territories (WENT) landfills today. With the closure of the last MSW incinerator at Kwai Chung in mid-1997, MSW disposal in Hong Kong has since been solely relied on landfilling. Landfilling is a land-intensive waste disposal strategy, and it has been pointed out earlier that with land being a premium in Hong Kong, deploying such a land-intensive strategy to accommodate an ever-increasing stream of waste is an unwise strategy (Chung 1996). As a result, a landfill crisis where there Table 8.1 MSW disposal rate, population and GDP growth rates of Hong Kong from 2006 to 2017. (Environmental Protection Department 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, 2017b; Census and Statistics Department 2018, 2019) Year

MSW (tons per day)

Population (mid-year)

GDP growth (%) at market prices

% change in MSW from last year

% change in population

2006

9279

6857100

6.7

−1.0

0.6

2007

9428

6925900

9.5

1.6

1.0

2008

9453

6977700

3.8

0.3

0.7

2009

8963

7003700

−3.3

−5.2

0.4

2010

9100

7067800

7.5

1.5

0.9

2011

8996

7071600

8.9

−1.1

0.1

2012

9278

7150100

5.3

3.1

1.1

2013

9547

7178900

5.0

2.9

0.4

2014

9782

7229500

5.7

2.5

0.7

2015

10159

7291300

6.1

3.9

0.9

2016

10345

7336600

3.9

1.8

0.6

2017

10733

7391700

6.9

3.8

0.8

5.18

1.09

0.68

Annual % of increase

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is a lack of available landfill space for waste disposal is almost doomed to happen. Not surprisingly, Hong Kong Government had to propose building a mass-burn waste incinerator and to expand the capacities of the three strategic landfills in 2013–2014. The extension proposal for SENT met strong, if not the strongest, public opposition at that time (see section “Delibration 1: What Is Really Behind the Opposition”). The need to extend the landfills in Hong Kong was felt as early as 2000 when the Director of Environmental Protection commissioned a study to look at the feasibility in extending the three strategic landfills. As a follow-up of this study, the SENT landfill extension feasibility study was launched in 2005 (Environmental Protection Department (EPD) 2010a, b). The original plan was to commission the extension of SENT in 2008–9, but the feasibility study which confirmed that “the SENT Landfill Extension project [was] engineering feasible and environmentally acceptable in the construction, operation, restoration and aftercare phases with the recommended design and incorporation of the recommended mitigation measures” (EPD 2010b) did not complete until 2010 (The “Decide” in DAD). The extended phase of SENT was expected to have an operating life of 6 years (Environment Bureau 2014). From 2004 to 2014, over 650 site visits with about 20,000 participants were arranged to the SENT landfill. Road shows, roving exhibitions and outreached programmes were arranged to schools and residents in Tseung Kwon O (TKO) to publicize the SENT extension project in addition to consulting the TKO communities, Sai Kung District Council, green groups, professional bodies and the Advisory Council on the Environment (Environment Bureau 2014) (The “Announce” in DAD). However, such preparatory work (The “Defend” in DAD), including a promise for an MSW landfill ban in SENT (Environment Bureau 2013), hereafter “Waste Diversion Plan”, did not win public support when this project was brought to the Legislative Council (Legco) in 2013. Strictly speaking, the SENT project was still a DAD development. Standard solutions, such as voluntary siting, were not considered owing to the vigorous site requirements: a large void space, remote from sensitive receivers2 and essential public infrastructures, a stable and impermeable rock layer and non-private land ownership are all needed. Sites that can fulfil all these requirements at the same time are limited in Hong Kong. Among the three strategic landfills, SENT landfill has the closest proximity to large-scale residential developments with the shortest lateral distance being 800 meters only (Chan et al. 2013). Thus, the Waste Diversion Plan3 is a means to address local community’s concerns on the odour, air quality and dust problems on the TKO area, which was administratively part of the Sai Kung District. The distance between the extended phase of SENT and “the nearest residential development would be around double of that of the existing landfill” (Environment Bureau 2014). In addition, to ease opposition, the Environment Bureau had in parallel applied funding from the Legislative Council to subsidize the retrofitting of “private refuse collection vehicles with metal tailgate covers and wastewater sump tanks” (EPD 2017a) so as 2 Sensitive

receivers in environmental projects are parties or people that are likely to be affected by nuisance or pollution produced by the project. 3 This will be further discussed in section “Injustice of the Waste Diversion Plan”.

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to reduce the environmental and public hygiene impacts on sensitive receivers along the route. Furthermore, in view of the objections received for the original scheme of the draft outline zoning plan in relation to the SENT extension, the Administration reduced the extension area by 5 hectares and totally spared the Clear Water Bay Country Park from landfills (Environment Bureau 2014). However, the Environmental Affairs Panel of the Legislative Council still objected “to the Southeast New Territories landfill extension project” on 27 May 2013 (Council Business Division 1 2013) despite a majority “support or no objection” view was formed in Sai Kung District Board in 2011 (Environment Bureau 2014).

Deliberation 1: What Is Really Behind the Opposition? Gathered from a series of submissions and deputations, reasons put forward by the objecting parties on the SENT extension projects can be summarized into eight points: 1. Residents of TKO had the expectation that the SENT landfill “would be closed down by 2012 or 2014”; thus, the extension of the landfill was in contravention with their expectations (Town Planning Board 2011b). 2. Unpleasant odour, dust and pests from the SENT landfill and the refuse collection vehicles (Chau 2014; Sai Kung District Council 2014). 3. Toxicity of the construction waste, e.g. asbestos and heavy metals, to be landfilled in SENT landfill. 4. With the Waste Diversion Plan, all odorous food and other MSW would be disposed of at WENT and NENT, overburdening (i.e. being unfair to) the sensitive receivers of the two landfills and corresponding waste delivery routes; higher collection cost of MSW would also be resulted. 5. Other major impacts on the society include long lead time and the high cost incurred for the restoration of landfills. 6. Expanding the landfills was a wrong approach to tackle MSW in Hong Kong. Instead, the Government should step up reduce, waste reuse and recycling (3Rs). 7. Uneven burden (i.e. injustice) to parties in the society and/or not practicing the self-sufficiency principle. 8. Inaccurate waste recovery data.4 The first three reasons are adverse impacts directly affecting the TKO residents, while the rest go beyond local interests. Are these reasons sound? I will discuss them one by one below.

4 The

waste recovery data released by the Environmental Protection Department was believed to have overestimated the amount of materials recovered from the MSW stream of Hong Kong.

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Dishonouring Previous Promise From two-meeting minutes of the Town Planning Board (TPB) in 2011 (2011a, b), it was evident that residents believed that there was the Government promise to close the SENT landfill, first in 2012 and then later extended to 2014. Thus, when the residents were consulted in 2011 for the extension of the SENT landfill by the Town Planning Board (TPB), they opposed to it violently. However, it was also evident that the residents were told by Hong Kong Government that the commitment to close the SENT landfill did not exist as expected (TPB 2011b). Despite the belief, residents of TKO did not provide concrete evidence for the alleged government commitments (to close SENT landfill in 2012 or 2014) and neither was the source of their information known. In the 997th meeting of the TPB, however, a District Councillor of Sai Kung, Fong Kwok Shan, provided a clue, “MTRC5 must have expected that the SENT Landfill to be closed by 2012 when they decided to invest in the development of the Lohas Park6 ”. If this speculation was the main basis of the SENT landfill closure belief, then the Government should not be accused of dishonouring the closure promise.

Victims of a Planning Fiasco? Residents of TKO have reasons to worry that their health and well-being would be adversely affected because of the SENT landfill and its continued use. No matter how well-operated a modern MSW landfill site is, it is very difficult, if at all possible to confine unpleasant odour which is originated from waste decomposition just within the landfill proper. Air pollutants and traffic congestion resulting from waste and construction waste transportation are also inevitable even though proper site operation and monitoring of waste transportation should keep them down. As a result, it is a normal practice that landfills are located far away from sensitive receivers. SENT landfill is unique in this aspect because subsequent urban development took place on what should be the buffer zone of SENT Landfill, resulting in the undesirable situation that a MSW landfill and a housing development are found side by side. Obviously, the (planning) authority needed to provide sound justification why they would approve a residential development to take place next to a landfill. If the real cause of suffering for the TKO residents was due to planning failure and that there was no concrete promise for the closure of the landfill, it followed that for any residents moving into TKO (especially those in the vicinity of SENT) since the commissioning of SENT in 1994, they were either voluntary receivers of environmental nuisance or victims of the closure roamer and/or planning failure. For the victims of planning failure, the legitimate question to ask is why would such 5 The

MTR Corporation Limited (MTRC) is the owner of the Lohas Park. locations of the Lohas Park and the SENT landfill are shown in Fig. 8.2. As explained previously, the shortest lateral distance between Lohas Park and the SENT Landfill is only 800 m.

6 The

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a planning blunder be tolerated? And if a mistake could be compensated in some ways, the planning authority that approved this private housing development should be held responsible for making the compensation.

Construction Waste Is More Toxic? The import and sale of asbestos has been banned in Hong Kong since 1993 (s.80, Cap. 311). The handling of asbestos waste and asbestos containing waste has been governed by the Waste Disposal (Chemical Waste) (General) Regulation (Cap. 354C) since 1992. This is similarly the case with heavy metals (zinc, mercury, lead, cadmium, etc.) containing waste. Thus, theoretically, asbestos and heavy metals containing waste should not be found in the waste disposed in the SENT landfill as the law requires the waste generators to register with the Government and hire licensed contractors to collect and dispose of the chemical waste properly. However, the enforcement of Cap. 354C contains a loophole—that Environment Protection Department (EPD) can never be sure that all chemical waste generators will proactively register with the Government and thus be subject to the legislative control and monitoring. However, this legislative loophole might not be able to justify the opposition because of the Waste Diversion Plan. As explained before, under the Waste Diversion Plan,7 only construction waste would be disposed of in SENT landfill. This actually offers better protection of the TKO community from hazardous waste than without the Waste Division Plan because the Government has clear knowledge who the major construction waste generators are (when compared to their knowledge on chemical waste generators), and therefore, it is more difficult for them to shroud from regulatory monitoring, and arguably, the chance of having hazardous waste mixed in the construction waste stream in SENT after the implementation of the Waste Diversion Plan is small.

Injustice of the Waste Diversion Plan As mentioned earlier, the Waste Diversion Plan was a measure to reduce the health impact and environmental nuisance of TKO residents brought about by SENT landfill extension. The inevitable side effect is the redistribution of environmental burdens among the sensitive receivers of the three landfills. It is true that with the Waste Diversion Plan and the extension of the three landfills, the local communities of the WENT and NENT landfills will bear the full thrust of the impacts from MSW 7 The two main types of solid waste accepted in sanitary landfills are MSW and construction waste.

With the implementation of Waste Diversion Plan, MSW will be banned in the SENT landfill. Thus, only construction waste which primarily consists of inert materials, such as sand, rock, rubbles and concrete, would be accepted in SENT landfill.

8 Collective Versus Self-interests …

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Table 8.2 Complaints against the three landfills in 2017 (Environment Bureau 2016, 2018) No. of complaints by type Air Year

Noise

’13

NENT

2

WENT

20

SENT

Water

Waste

Miscellaneous

’15 ’17 ’13 ’15 ’17 ’13 ’15 ’17 ’13 ’15 ’17 ’13 1

’15

’17

0

0

0

0

3

1

1

0

1

0

2

0

0

9 25

6

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

2462 213 49

1

0

0

3

2

0

0

0

1

0

4

0

transportation and landfilling. However, since the sensitive receivers of the WENT and NENT are more distant from the landfill proper than their counterparts in SENT, it can be argued that other things being equal, total adverse impacts on the three local communities can be reduced due to the Waste Diversion Plan. This is evident by the 2017 complaint figures for the 3 landfills (Table 8.2). It should be noted that in 2017, the Waste Diversion Plan has already been fully implemented (i.e. no MSW was sent to SENT) with NENT and WENT receiving 3117 and 7616 t of MSW per day, respectively, in 2017 (Environment Bureau 2018). As a result, from the utilitarian stance, the Waste Diversion Plan brings greater collective interests but may marginally reduce the welfare of the local communities of WENT. With fewer disposal sites for MSW, it is inevitable that more road transport will incur for MSW collection and transfer. Yet the extra financial cost incurring from greater distance of waste transportation due to the implementation of the Waste Diversion Plan is borne by the whole society of Hong Kong and not the local communities of NENT or WENT. Thus, even if there is a shift of burden due to the Waste Diversion Plan, the final distribution of burdens should be more even than without the Plan.

Other Costs to Be Borne by the Society as a Whole Other major impacts on society at large associated with the extension of the SENT landfill include long lead time and the high cost incurred for the restoration of landfills. However, these costs were borne by the whole society, not a particular community. Similar to the transportation cost issue mentioned previously, bearing such (financial and time) costs by the whole society will not disadvantage certain communities excessively. While the financial and time costs for landfill extension are indeed high, the opponent simply says that these projects are not good investment for the society (as a whole) but no unfair distribution of cost and benefits is found in the issue. In terms of public policy decision-making, this argument is also flawed. A public policy decision should be based on merit grounds, i.e., whether a policy will bring about more benefits (or aggregated utility) than costs to the society. Thus, simply mentioning the cost but not taking into consideration the benefits of landfill extension is an incomplete argument. As mentioned before, landfill (and its extension) is a

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necessary evil for any modern society. Thus, even if the cost (lead time and financial investment alike) of establishing and extending landfills is considerable, the right question to ask is whether there are better alternatives. In the next section, I will explain why there are no other viable alternatives for landfill extension for Hong Kong.

The Ideal of a Zero-Waste Society Many opponents of the landfill extension proposal have counter-proposed the Government to more extensively adopt the 3R approaches in dealing with MSW in Hong Kong as if 3Rs alone are able to handle the >15,000 t of MSW generated each day and to make Hong Kong a zero-waste society. Half-hearted waste education and a lack of government support on the development of waste recycling infrastructure are the frequently cited reasons for the waste crisis (Middleton 2014; Brown 2014; Living Island Movement 2014,…to name a few). Thus, the critics argued that end-of-pipe solutions, such as, landfilling and waste incineration, if should be used at all, can only be used when the potential for 3Rs is fully exhausted (Hope 2014; Cheung Chau Pak She Kai Fong Association 2014, … to name a few). Holders of this view, however, have confused environmental priorities with the implementation sequence of various waste management approaches. It is true that the 3Rs should be accorded higher environmental priorities than landfilling and waste incineration in most cases. However, in terms of implementation sequence, all necessary mechanisms and facilities for waste management, (from collection, transfer to various waste transformation processes, including waste recycling and incineration infrastructure as well as disposal facilities for the residues or materials that failed to be source reduced or diverted for recycling), must be made available before proper and timely waste management can be carried out. Thus, it makes no sense to demand the maximization of source reduction and waste recycling opportunities while holding back the development of other waste (collection, disposal) infrastructure even if the latter is less environmentally desirable. In fact, given the consumption-oriented economy today, it is unrealistic to think source reduction and waste recycling alone will be able to rid the need for further waste treatment and final waste disposal. In addition, proponents of zero waste tend to be either ignoring the long lead time required for a full maturity of the low-waste society or being very optimistic in the lead time. For instance, the Zero Waste Smart City Resources Association Ltd. (2014) cited Taiwan and Europe for their zero waste and no recyclables at landfill or incinerator policies, respectively, and criticized Hong Kong for going the other way round. This Association by proposing some “proven” recycling technologies and an aggressive education plan argued that a zero-waste society which means, among others, no waste to landfills, zero carbon and pollutants to air, zero pollution from waste collection and processing, can be achieved in Hong Kong in as short as 4 years. Is the ideal of Zero Waste Smart City Resources Association Ltd. achievable?

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Zero waste is just an idealistic slogan. Advocates of zero waste do not mean no waste is generated or no waste needs to be disposed of. Rather, they mean zero waste to landfills and incineration (Hong Kong Outdoors 2014; Hong Kong Waste Management Association 2014). While Europe has been spearheading towards zero landfill by its 7th Environment Action Programme (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2013) which allowed only non-recoverable and nonrecyclable waste to be landfilled, there were still 59.1 million t of waste landfilled in 2016, accounting for almost 24% of total waste generated in EU (Eurostat 2018). Even though EU is still far from “zero waste” in the strict sense, much adverse impact from increasing waste recycling was already felt. In order to keeping waste to landfill at a minimum, there was the excessive use of mechanical and biological treatment on residual waste, leading to high waste treatment cost and high carbon footprint in waste treatment. The outputs of high-capacity mechanical waste sorting of residual waste are low-quality organic and non-organic waste. Since both waste streams can neither be composted nor landfilled, anaerobic digestion (AD) or WtE is the remaining options. However, none of these available options is pollution free, the very ideal of the Zero Waste Smart City Resources Association Ltd. In Taiwan, their “zero waste” goal which was set in the 1990s actually means “minimization of landfilling”. By 2016, while the percentage of waste landfilled dropped from 90.4% in 1992 to 2.6% in 2016, its waste incineration rate jumped from less than 3% in 1992 to 95.53% in 2016 (Taiwan Environmental Protection Administration 2018). Thus, it is clear that even for societies aiming at zero waste and cited as role models by the proponent of zero waste, after decades of sturdy efforts, zero waste to landfill and zero pollutant and carbon emission are still not achievable, not to mention zero pollution from waste collection and processing. If achieving “zero waste” in one decade’s time is more a slogan than a feasible waste management approach, the 4-year target set by Zero Waste Smart City Resources Association Ltd. is even more improbable. A related argument for opposing waste incineration and landfilling is that once the pressure on waste disposal is eased by the availability of incinerators or new landfills, the Government is likely to put the cart before the horse by slowing down other resource-conserving actions, such as enacting more producer responsibilities systems8 (Civic Party 2014). Even if the Government intended to use this tactic, it was possible to have it circumvented. Sharing a similar fear, Clean Air Network (2014) proposed that the Government should make available more detailed and transparent waste policy targets and deadlines to enable effective public scrutiny of the various waste reduction and recycling progress. This Clean Air Network proposal is more sensible and realistic than an outright rejection of the use of incineration technology in Hong Kong. 8A

producer responsibility system requires manufacturers, importers and retailers (producers) to reduce the environmental impact associated with the product lifecycle. In actual implementation, the most common duties required from the producers are to take back and recycle or properly disposed of the end-of-life waste. Various types of packaging (e.g. glass beverage bottles, general packaging) and electrical and electronic goods are products commonly subject to producer responsibility control in developed countries.

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Undermining the Self-sufficiency Principle Uneven burden is the reason for some Tuen Mun residents to object to the extension of the WENT landfill (Chan 2014). Chan (2014) was dissatisfied that the extended capacity of WENT landfill accounts for 76% of the total proposed expansion capacity. This uneven distribution of waste disposal burden on Tuen Mun and North District residents can also be understood as the absence of the self-sufficiency principle. The self-sufficiency principle when applied in environmental issues calls for individual entity (e.g. a nation) to ensure their self-sufficiency in reducing or cleaning up the pollution that they have created, MSW in this case (Wong 2014; Cheung Chau Rural Committee 2014). This implies that every local community should in principle be responsible for the satisfactory management of the solid waste produced by the very community. While this principle sounds equitable and reasonable, there are unsurmountable technical constraints with the strict application of self-sufficiency in all areas of MSW management. First, most environmentally acceptable ways of treating and disposing MSW are subject to economies of scale. Thus, it will be expensive and even counter-productive to build a landfill, incinerator or even material recycling facilities in each administrative district in Hong Kong. In addition, the minimum size of a unit to practice self-sufficiency is not clearly defined by the principle itself. What should be counted as the basic unit for “self”? A household, a residential building, a street, an administrative district or the Hong Kong Island? The reality is that many (welcome or unwelcome) infrastructure are not evenly distributed, e.g. commercial centres, columbarium, education institutes, highways, rail alignment, tourism sites and facilities. Yet, people generally accept the clustering of economic and tourism facilities. Thus, this is a selective application of the self-sufficiency principle. The reason for rejecting own neighbourhood to host unwelcome facilities is the perception that the host district will bear excessive (environmental, economic and health) costs when compared to other districts or local communities which do not have such unwelcome facilities. However, holders of this argument are ignoring the fact that even the most (economically) beneficial infrastructure (e.g. central business district) will also bring adverse effect on the neighbourhood, such as more traffic congestion, higher Rate and Land Rent, higher living expenses, and a noisy and more polluting ambient environment. As a result, while NIMBYers may truly believe that they are unfairly treated because of the unwelcome facilities in their neighbourhood, this may actually be a misconception because they are oblivious to the cost borne by other communities due to the establishment of indispensable social and economic infrastructure that bring NIMBYers benefits. Thus, at most, NIMBYers are fighting for justice at their individual levels rather than justice for the wider community and future generations.

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Inaccurate Data A substantial number of written objections were based partly on the inaccurate waste recovery data the Government was reporting. There are two different arguments here. The first was that if the Government did not know the accurate quantities of waste recovered, it did not know how much waste was generated in Hong Kong, and therefore, it was irresponsible to extend the landfill or to build a WtE plant because these projects were founded on inaccurate statistics (Parlett 2014). The second was that because the very government department, namely Environmental Protection Department (EPD), had a proven track record of dishonesty, it should not “be trusted with billions of taxpayer dollars” (Bunker 2014; Living Islands Movement 2014; Larigo 2014… to cite a few). The first argument is erroneous. Both landfills and WtE plants are end-of-pipe waste treatment facilities. How much landfill and incineration capacities a city needs are primarily determined by the waste disposal need and not the waste recovery capacity of the city. Despite the lack of accurate ways to obtain reliable waste recovery data in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government is the owner of all major waste collection and disposal facilities in Hong Kong and all these facilities are equipped with weighbridges to measure the waste flow objectively. Thus, Hong Kong Government is the sole authority in Hong Kong that possesses all the raw waste disposal data and it is very difficult for any members of the public to question the accuracy of the waste disposal data released by the government. In short, whether the waste recovery data9 published by the Government are accurate or not matters little in the establishment of the two types of end-of-pipe treatment facilities in question. The second argument is emotional and based on far-fetched logic. EPD’s waste recovery data were sourced from other government departments, e.g. Custom and Excise and Census and Statistics. EPD’s fault was that it was not able to critically assess the meaning and the reliability of the data provided. Thus, the inflation of waste recovery data reported by EPD was not due to dishonesty. While it might be argued that EPD was not competent enough to detect the loopholes in the data provided, such incompetence did not necessarily imply that EPD was also incompetent in other areas. As a result, the opposition to the SENT landfill extension can be explained by a deficiency in the knowledge of the opponents (e.g. unsound or unfounded beliefs and use of invalid arguments) or purely self-interested NIMBY reasons, i.e., concerns over the disproportionally large cost borne. The sturdy stance of the SENT Landfill extension NIMBYers was further fueled by planning failure. Yet, even for the NIMBYers who have fallen victim to the environmental pollution and nuisance originated from the SENT Landfill, the author would argue in the next section that they did not suffer for nothing.

9 In

Hong Kong, the waste recovery data are composed of two parts, domestic recycling and recyclable exportation. The Trade Department published data on recyclable exportation regularly based on the import and export declaration made by the companies.

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Deliberation 2: What Is Really Behind the SENT NIMBY? In this section, I would like to argue that the vested financial interest of the local communities of SENT is the main real reason behind their objection to the extension proposal. The vested financial interest is represented by an expectation of a handsome increase in property values due to the closure of the SENT landfill. In addition, I would like to further argue that the scale of potential financial loss for local communities of SENT is so large that no compensation scheme from the Government will be able to adequately cover it. Making compensation is a long-used measure to resolve NIMBY. The forms of compensation range from recreational facilities, community development, road improvements, employment opportunities to monetary compensation. Is making compensation to the affected communities fair or not fair? It is fair if the level of compensation is proportional to the levels of perceived (physical and financial) harm on the affected communities and the trade-off made is totally voluntary. However, there is the worry that pseudo-voluntarism where the host community accepts the facility due to imminent economic pressure may exist (Summers and Hine 1997). In the latter case, the hypothetical host community can only choose between remaining in poverty and accepting a level of risk that normally people will not accept from the facility. The lack of choice of the host community may also present an opportunity for the facility proponent to offer a lower but acceptable level of compensation. Thus, injustice can be present in pseudo-voluntarism. The siting of a number of nuclear waste facility, nuclear weapon plants and gunpowder plants in USA and Canada in the 1980s–90s were examples (Summers and Hine 1997). From the discussion in section “Delibration 1: What Is Really Behind the Opposition” (especially section “Injustice of the Waste Diversion Plan”), the environmental and health risks attributed to the extension of the SENT landfill are not as unacceptable as the TKO residents have claimed. So, what is the real reason for the opposition? Figure 8.1 shows that private property prices in the New Territories (where all the three Landfills and Lohas Park are situated) have been increasing since 2003 and that unitary prices of smaller properties are the highest among all classes since 2014. Property prices in the New Territories are used as indicators here because Hong Kong Government does not have breakdowns for the property prices of individual administrative districts. The average annual rate of increase in property prices in the New Territories ranged from 3.7% (Class E) to 7.0% (Class A) from 1999 to 2017. Are the values of private properties situated near the SENT landfill really lower than the average market value, such that the financial stake of the relevant property owners is too high to render compensation scheme ineffective? Good quality transaction information of this kind is hard to obtain. One publicly available property value database, CENTADATA, is found to be useful, and the transaction data of the Lohas Park in this database will be used as comparison. The property values of three estates in Lohas Park, namely La Splendeur, Le Prime and Le Prestige, are used as comparison because these three housing estates are the closest residential buildings to the SENT landfill in the whole

1999

2000

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Class E (>160m2)

2004

Class D (100-159.9m2)

2003

Class B (40-69.9m2)

2002

Class A (< 40m2)

2001

2011

2012

2013

2015

2016

Class C (70–99.9m2)

2014

2017

E: 91 785

D: 103 235

B: 106 554

C: 112 805

A: 121 633

Fig. 8.1 Average private domestic property prices per square meter of saleable floor area in the New Territories from 1999 to 2017. Source Rating and Valuation Department (2018)

0

20 000

40 000

60 000

80 000

100 000

120 000

140 000

HK$/m2

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Fig. 8.2 Locational map of Lohas Park and the SENT landfill

Lohas Park development10 (see Fig. 8.2). However, owing to the lack of authoritative sources of information on property values, results of the below calculations should be interpreted as indicative only. The saleable floor areas of these three estates range from around 60−90 m2 with only one unit in La Splendeur having a saleable floor area exceeding 100 m2 (Class D) (MTR Corporation Limited and Rich Asia Investments Limited 2018). As a result, the predominant majority of flats in these three estates fall into classes B and C private 10 The whole Lohas Park development consists of nearly 20,000 flats in about 40 towers from >7 housing estates. By 2019, about 10,000 flats will have been completed. At the time of writing, other than the three housing estates mentioned, complete housing estates in Lohas Park include Hemera and the Capitol (MTR Corporation Limited, 2014).

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Table 8.3 Estimated economic loss of property owners of the three housing estates in Lohas Park Le Prestige

Le Prime

La Splendeur (all)

La Splendeur (exclude one Class D unit)

Saleable area (m2 )

61.7–90.0

60.1–90.9

55.6–158.6

55.6–92.5

No. of units

1688

1416

1168

1167

Potential loss (HK$/unit)

0.12–0.18 million

55,623–84,128

0.29–0.84 million

0.29–0.48 million

residential flats. According to CENTADATA,11 the average prices of Lohas Park were HK$115,815/m2 of saleable floor area in 2017. Thus, the average prices of residential flats of Lohas Park are 2.7–8.7% above the prices of their counterparts in the New Territories in 2017. This shows that the pre-condition for pseudo-voluntarism is not found in this community. However, the prices of La Splendeur, Le Prime and Le Prestige were 4.6, 0.8 and 1.7% lower than the average of Lohas Park for the same period, respectively, making them only 0.9–7.8% above average prices of residential flats of the same classes in other areas in the New Territories in 2017 at best, and for some units in La Splendeur, it was 2.0% lower than their counterparts. Thus, it appears that the effect of having the SENT landfill in the neighbourhood is to depreciate property prices between 0.8 and 4.6% when compared to the average selling prices of Lohas Park. In other words, if the SENT landfill is closed, property prices of these three housing estates are expected to rise to match the average Lohas Park level. While most units in these three estates had unit prices above the average for residential flats in the New Territories, in the worst case, property prices can be 2% lower than the average. This is translated into HK$55,623 for the smallest units in Le Prime to HK$0.84 million loss per flat for the largest units in La Splendeur (Table 8.3). Even if the largest unit in La Splendeur is ignored,12 potential economic loss for the owners of those second largest units (between 92 and 93 m2 ) in La Splendeur amounted to HK$0.48 million. While it appears that only landlords of Le Prestige and La Splendeur are suffering more significant financial loss, if the Government has decided to financially compensate the landlords, the political reality is that the owners of Le Prime and possibly other buildings in Lohas Park will demand compensation similar, if not equal to, that of Le Prestige and even La Splendeur. With 4272 units affected, the estimated monetary compensation is in the range of HK$1–2 billions, just for the 3 housing estates. Yet, the demand for equal treatment is unlikely to stop here. If financial compensation is granted to the landlords only, what about the tenants? Since there is no guarantee that the landlords will share this compensation with the current tenants, 11 http://hk.centadata.com/ptest.aspx?type=3&code=YAPPWPPJPW. 12 Because

it belongs to Class D and there is only one such unit in the three housing estates, it is arguably an outlier.

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to fight for equal treatment, the tenants will also demand some forms compensation or privileges that appeal to them and it is likely to be a form of compensation that will incur every year because new tenants will similarly expect compensation. Another complexity lies with the loss and expectation from future landlords. The new/future owners of Lohas Park are likely to argue (although not necessarily convincingly) that the continued existence of SENT landfill will keep the rental prices of their properties at a lower than usual level, and thus, they also deserve compensation. Furthermore, all along, the local community opponents to the SENT extension have portrayed themselves as residents of TKO, not residents of Lohas Park. As a result, if the Government is willing to make compensation to address the financial loss of owners of Lohas Park, it is likely that the owners and tenants of other residential and even non-residential buildings in TKO will also expect similar compensations. With this exponential expansion of the circle of compensation eligibility, and with 0.46 million people or 147,945 households in TKO in 2016 (Census and Statistics Department 2018), total one-off compensation can be in the order of ten to twenty billions Hong Kong dollars not to mention a continuous stream of recurring expenses of unknown amount to be paid out in the form of compensation for many years to come. To help readers to appreciate the magnitude of this expense, total subsidy granted by the Government to all private refuse collection vehicle owners to retrofit their trucks with metal tailgate and a sump tank amounted to only HK$18.8 million in 2013 (Council Business Division 1 2014), just about 1% of the estimated one-off compensation. In short, using monetary compensation to induce the TKO residents to accept the extension of the SENT is a very expensive option to Hong Kong society and it is unrealistic to expect the Hong Kong Government to adopt this option.

Solution and Conclusion While there are many seemingly useful measures to resolve this very NIMBY deadlock, e.g. public education related to public interest, stepping up the 3Rs, not to mention the “textbook” solutions—burden sharing, achieving self-sufficiency and voluntary siting, none of these is really effective in relieving the imminent landfill crisis in Hong Kong. There is a long lead time (can be up to 10 years) for more 3Rs to take place owing to, among others, the lack of domestic waste recycling facilities and the increasingly protracted policy delivery process. Public education on 3Rs and other public interest does help to generate goodwill and understanding from the society to accept waste facilities, but success cannot be assured. As explained before, the applications of burden sharing and self-sufficiency principle are limited in relation to siting landfills owing to the vigorous site and technical requirements. The approach proposed by the author to resolve the NIMBY deadlock is similar to the idea put forward by Hong Kong Association of Energy Engineers (HKAEE). HKAEE believes that to pacify the communities affected by landfill extension, the Government should address the socio-environmental impacts “above and beyond their expectations” and highlight the “positive impacts that could be resulted from

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the landfill extension to the local residents” (HKAEE 2014). “Positive impacts” suggested by the HKAEE include discounted rates for using public facilities and transportation, discounted property rental rates and electricity tariff rebate and are similar in nature to giving compensations. However, as shown in the above analysis, few of these would be attractive enough for the affected communities and even if they are, it is unlikely that the Hong Kong Government with its conservative financial governing philosophy would find them amenable. As a result, other strategies to create values (tangible or intangible alike) for the local communities of unwelcome facilities are required. Such values should be able to deliver economic benefits but be consistent with environmental sustainability. A specific idea is to make the closed areas of landfill an integral part of a smart eco-city development with large areas of green space, eco-garden and technology demonstration/education centres. A case in point is the recently completed T·Park which is a sludge incinerator to showcase a sustainable building with a spa and garden accessible to all. Since its opening, it has maintained a high visitation rate with an average of about 80,000 visitors per year in the first two years of its operation. Occupancy rates of both the spa and guided tour service stood at 73 and 70% respectively (Wan 2018). T·Park is an example of remodelling an unwelcome facility into a well-received education and recreational public facility. However, it remains to be seen if the existence of such a smart ecocity can have any noticeable positive impact on the property values in its vicinity. Furthermore, this approach may not be applicable to siting facilities associated with much higher perceived levels of risk, e.g., nuclear power plants as such risk cannot be monetarily compensated in any forms. Many of the LULUs are “necessary evils” of a modern society; i.e., while they are all unwelcome neighbour, they are also indispensable. The fact that these facilities are necessary, however, does not make people willingly bear the adverse consequences of having them. On the other hand, the very nature of an asymmetrical distribution of costs (collective vs self-interest) and benefits (i.e. injustice) has very much politicized the issue to cause controversies (NIMBY dilemma) in land use and pose challenges to many governance regimes. This study shows that standard solutions (see section “Introduction”) to NIMBY do not work well in SENT extension project in Hong Kong owing to the very nature of this waste facility, the high population density and the extremely high property values in Hong Kong which drive up the opportunity costs and the expectations of the NIMBYers.

References Brown, J. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects (a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from a member of the public dated 24 February 2014, CB(1)974/13-14(24). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/ea/papers/ea0224cb1-974-24-e.pdf. Retrieved on May 11, 2018.

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Bunker, R. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Mr Robert Bunker, CB(1)1109/13-14(05). https://www.legco.gov.hk/ yr13-14/english/panels/ea/papers/ea0322cb1-1109-5-e.pdf. Retrieved on May 16, 2018. Census and Statistics Department. (2018). 2016 population by-census. https://www.bycensus2016. gov.hk/data/Table_for_District_Councils.pdf. Retrieved 13 June 2018). Census and Statistics Department. (2019). Gross domestic product: Third quarter 2019, Government Printer. Chan, K. W., Fong, K. S., & Residents of Tseung Kwun O. (2013). Alliance for the permanent closure of the SENT landfill. Submission to the Legislative Council on 28th October, CB(1)177/13-14(01). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/chinese/panels/ea/papers/ea1 028cb1-177-1-c.pdf. Retrieved on May 15, 2018. Chan, S. Y. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Ms CHAN Shu-ying, CB(1)1132/13-14(10). https://www.legco.gov.hk/ yr13-14/chinese/panels/ea/papers/ea0322cb1-1132-10-c.pdf. Retrieved on May 18, 2018). Chau, Y. M. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Office of Sai Kung District Council Member CHAU Yin-ming, CB(1)1124/13-14(02). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/chinese/panels/ea/papers/ea0328cb11124-2-c.pdf. Retrieved on May 18, 2018. Cheung Chau Pak She Kai Fong Association. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Cheung Chau Pak She Kai Fong Association dated 20 March 2014, CB(1)1132/13-14(13). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/chi nese/panels/ea/papers/ea0322cb1-1132-9-c.pdf. Retrieved on May 11, 2018. Cheung Chau Rural Committee. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects— (a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Cheung Chau Rural Committee dated 22 March 2014, CB(1)1156/13-14(15). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/chinese/panels/ea/pap ers/ea0322cb1-1156-15-c.pdf. Retrieved on May 15, 2018. Chung, S. (1996). Policy and economic considerations on waste minimization and recycling in Hong Kong. Ph.D. Thesis, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong. Civic Party. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Civic Party dated March 2014, CB(1)1109/13-14(03). https://www.legco. gov.hk/yr13-14/chinese/panels/ea/papers/ea0322cb1-1109-3-c.pdf. Retrieved on May 15, 2018. Clean Air Network. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Clean Air Network dated March 2014, CB(1)1109/13-14(48). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/chinese/panels/ea/papers/ea0322cb11109-48-c.pdf. Retrieved on May 15, 2018. Council Business Division 1. (2013). Background brief on “Legislative amendments relating to the ‘Waste Diversion Plan’ for the Southeast New Territories Landfill” prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat, LC Paper No. CB(1)107/13-14(04), October, Hong Kong.

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Halle, D., & Mirrer-Singer, P. (2008). NIMBYism. In V. N. Parrillo (Ed.). Encyclopedia of social problems. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, online version. Hong Kong Outdoors. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Hong Kong Outdoors, CB(1)1132/13-14(12). https://www. legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/ea/papers/ea0322cb1-1132-12-e.pdf. Retrieved on May 15, 2018. Hong Kong Waste Management Association. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Hong Kong Waste Management Association dated 22 March 2014, CB(1)1156/13-14(10). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/eng lish/panels/ea/papers/ea0322cb1-1156-10-e.pdf. Retrieved on 1May 6, 2018. Hope, T. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects (a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from a member of the public dated 24 February 2014, CB91)974/13-14(22). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/ea/papers/ea0224cb1-974-22-e.pdf. Retrieved on May 11, 2018. Hong Kong Association of Energy Engineers. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Hong Kong Association of Energy Engineers dated 14 March 2014, CB(1)1109/13-14(44). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr1314/english/panels/ea/papers/ea0322cb1-1109-44-e.pdf. Retrieved on May 15, 2018. Kasperson, R. E., Golding, D., & Tuller, S. (1992). Social distrust as a factor in siting hazardous facilities and communicating risks. Journal of Social Issues, 48(4), 161–187. Komendantova, N., & Battaglini, A. (2016). Beyond decide-announce-defend (DAD) and notin-my-backyard (NIMBY) models? Addressing the social and public acceptance of electric transmission lines in Germany. Energy Research and Social Science, 22, 224–231. Kunreuther, H., Fitzgerald, K., & Aarts, T. D. (1993). Siting noxious facilities: a test of the facility siting credo. Risk Analysis, 13(3), 301–315. Larigo, M. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Mr Martin LERIGO dated 21 March 2014, CB(1)1141/13-14(01). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/ea/papers/ea0322cb1-1141-1-e.pdf. Retrieved on May 16, 2018. Living Island Movement. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects (a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Living Islands Movement dated 20 February 2014, CB(1)974/13-14(01). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/ea/papers/ea0224 cb1-974-1-e.pdf. Retrieved on May 11, 2018. Middleton, J. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects (a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from a member of the public dated 24 February 2014, CB(1)974/13-14(18). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/ea/papers/ea0224cb1-974-18-e.pdf. Retrieved on May 11, 2018. MTR Corporation Limited. (2014). MTR Properties—Lohas Park Station. http://www.mtr.com.hk/ en/corporate/properties/tkol_lohaspark.html. Retrieved on August 15, 2018.

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MTR Corporation Limited and Rich Asia Investments Limited. (2018). Sales Brochure of La Splendeur, 16 May. http://www.lasplendeur.com.hk/mobile/index.html. Retrieved on June 4, 2018. Parlett, M. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Mr Mark Parlett, CB(1)1156/13-14(07). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr1314/english/panels/ea/papers/ea0322cb1-1156-7-e.pdf. Retrieved on May 16, 2018. Pushchak, R., & Rocha, C. (1998). Failing to site hazardous waste facilities voluntarily: Implications for the production of sustainable goods. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 41(1), 25–43. Rabe, B. G., Becker, J., & Levine, R. (2000). Beyond siting: Implementing voluntary hazardous waste siting agreements in Canada. The American Review of Canadian Studies, winter, pp. 479– 496. Rating and Valuation Department. (2018). Private domestic—Average prices by Class. http://www. rvd.gov.hk/en/property_market_statistics/index.html. Retrieved 31 May 2018. Sai Kung District Council. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects— (a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Sai Kung District Council, CB(1)1187/13-14(02). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/chinese/panels/ea/papers/ea0328cb11187-2-c.pdf. Retrieved on May 18, 2018. Summers, C., & Hine, D. W. (1997). Nuclear waste goes on the road: Risk perceptions and compensatory tradeoffs in single-industry communities. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 29(3), 210–222. Taiwan Environmental Protection Administration. (2018). The path for the economic and environmental cooperation in Taiwan [unpublished materials, in Chinese]. Town Planning Board. (2011a). Minutes of the 997th meeting of the Town Planning Board held on 16 November 2011. http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/meetings/TPB/Minutes/m997tpb_e.pdf. Retrieved on May 2, 2018. Town Planning Board. (2011b). Minutes of 999th meeting of the Town Planning Board held on 20 November 2011, 1 December 2011, 2 December 2011, 3 December 2011, 7 December 2011, 9 December 2011 and 13 December 2011. http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/en/meetings/TPB/Minutes/ m999tpb_e1.pdf. Retrieved on May 2, 2018. Wan, C. (2018). Personal communication with Environmental Protection Department on 27 June and 4th July. Wong, S. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from a member of the public dated 24 February 2014, CB(1)974/13-14(30). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/english/panels/ea/papers/ea0224cb1-974-30-e.pdf. Retrieved on May 11, 2018. Zero Waste Smart City Resources Association Ltd. (2014). Submission on “Environmental infrastructure projects—(a) 5163DR: Northeast New Territories landfill extension; (b) 5164DR: Southeast New Territories landfill extension; (c) 5165DR: West New Territories landfill extension; and (d) 5177DR: Integrated Waste Management Facilities Phase 1” from Zero Waste Smart City Resources Association Ltd., CB(1)1124/13-14(06). https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr13-14/chinese/ panels/ea/papers/ea0328cb1-1124-6-ec.pdf. Retrieved on May 21, 2018.

Chapter 9

Columbarium Siting in an Urban Chinese Society: Any Way Out? Betty Yung

Abstract Columbarium landuse is unwelcome in many societies. The Hong Kong case can serve as an epitome of the controversies related to columbarium siting in an urban setting because of its dense population, compactness and citizenry upholding traditional Chinese gravesweeping practices. Columbarium-building can be viewed as in public interests according to Barry’s, Rees’ and utilitarian definitions of the term. However, this will bring about various nuisances and costs to the hosting community. “Equality” in the “share of responsibility” as represented by DistrictBased Columbarium Development Policy of Hong Kong government may serve as a short-term way out through increasing available land for such landuse, thereby increasing supply of columbarium niches. In the long run, managing and reducing demand for such landuse will be a longer term win-win solution which may take the form of “revolutionizing” the “tradition” of handling the dead through promotion of green burials. More fundamentally still will be educating the public about life and death, removing Chinese myths and negative overtones of death, thereby enabling serene co-existence of landuse for both the living and the dead within an area.

Introduction Siting of “landscape or space for the dead” or “deathscape” is controversial in most societies. Even in western countries, such as the U.S., proposals of new or expansion of existing cemeteries often give rise to resistance from local community, with potential neighbours opposing the idea of living next to the dead (though sometimes, graves of notable individuals may have positive effect of becoming tourist attractions) (Basmajian and Coutts 2010). Deathscape, notably columbarium siting, is especially Before joining City University of Hong Kong in August 2018, I have conducted some research work related to this chapter under the capacity as Centre Research Fellow at the Centre for Governance and Citizenship of the Education University of Hong Kong, with which I am affiliated. B. Yung (B) Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_9

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contentious in the Chinese context of Hong Kong, with its gravesweeping traditions, dense population and compactness. Columbarium-building may be viewed as serving public interest under prevailing social customs of handling the dead in Hong Kong; however, it will bring about “negative externalities” to the hosting community. This may bring about the question of justice—why my neighbourhood is chosen as the host community; why not other communities? One’s choice is dependent on others’ choices—if others are willing to take a share of the responsibility, I am also willing to take my share. “Equality” in the “share of responsibility” may be a short-term apparent solution to the columbarium siting problem from the supply-side perspective. More thorough longer term solutions from the demand-side perspective will be examined in the latter part of this chapter.

The “Dead” and the “Living” in the Chinese and Hong Kong Context Death is viewed as a taboo in the Chinese culture—it should never be mentioned or even thought of (Chan et al. 2006). There are voluminous myths related to death in the Chinese culture which are anxiety-provoking (e.g. afterlife in the burning hell, with numerous devilish figures), leading to the widespread belief that discussion of death will bring about bad luck (Ibid.). Thus, preparation for death, both psychologically and in practical terms, is quite uncommon (Ibid.) in Chinese society, though Hong Kong government is indirectly promoting this through soft-selling green burial in recent years. Traditionally in the Chinese culture, the feng shui or the geomancy of the burial place of ancestors has been considered crucial as this will affect the family fortunes of the descendents (Teather 1999). Similarly, in modern times, the exact direction and position of the columbarium niche are thought to be critical as reflected in the price determination of different niches in private columbaria in Hong Kong, with those at the ground level commanding the lowest price, while those at eye-level yielding a much higher price. It is specific to the Chinese culture that the descendents will visit the resting place of the ancestors in the form of “family outing” during two Gravesweeping Festivals, namely Qingming and Chongyang Festival, as an expression of filial piety and familial responsibilities in the Confucian tradition. Thus, accessibility for family visits during Gravesweeping Festivals is also considered vital to site selection of ancestors’ resting place in the Chinese culture (Ibid.). Cremation has recently been gaining acceptance around the world. Even in the U.S. where land is more available, the percentage of Americans choosing cremation increases from 4% in the 1950s to 15% in 1990, 25% in 2000 and is projected to rise to 43–51% by 2025, with the rates of cremation vary by state and region, with highest rates in west U.S. (Basmajian and Coutts 2010). In parts of Asia where land may be more limited, for example in Japan, cremation became the prevailing practice during the 1960s, coinciding with periods of economic growth (Kong 2012).

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Whereas in Korea, the rates of cremations increased consistently since the 1980s (Ibid.). In Singapore, the government actively promoted cremation in the 1960s, with the funeral specialists, serving as the middlemen, being given the task of encouraging such change through “persuasion” rather than “coercion” (Ibid.). In the context of Hong Kong, the government began to encourage cremation in 1968 (Ibid.) and has been very successful in changing the social custom of coffin burials to cremation since the 1970s, with cremations increasing from 35% (a total of 7300) of deaths in 1975 to 90% (a total of 41,244) of deaths in 2014 (Audit Commission 2015). This successful policy of moulding the customary practices of handling the dead, together with rising number of deaths, has led to escalating demand for columbarium facilities in recent years. According to the Audit Commission (2015), the average annual number of deaths and cremations was about 38,000 and 31,000, respectively, in the past 20 years. In view of the ageing population, it is expected that there will be increasing number of deaths and thereby cremations in future years, with an estimation of the annual number of deaths about 55,000, while that of cremation around 52,000 on average from 2015 to 2034 (Ibid.). It is easy to envisage that this social custom, representing a shifting of social choice from burial to cremation, will lead to greater landuse demand for the building of columbaria, replacing that for cemeteries, though the former already reflects a more “efficient” form of landuse than the latter, with greater intensity of the use of land through the building high-rise niches in Hong Kong columbaria, representing a “new cultural artifact” (Teather 1999, p. 409) in the modern Chinese society of Hong Kong, resulting mainly from the shaping of the Chinese citizenry by a western style British colonial government in Hong Kong before the transfer of sovereignty to China in 1997. The urban pressure for space, including that for deathscape, is intense. This may be contrasted with “rural cemetery”, with the burial ground also serving as spacious parkland, leisure and recreation places for tourists and locals, based mainly on the “Western” construct of the idea of rural cemetery as beautiful parkland for leisurely activity rather than sites wrapped in negative mist (Kong 2012). What is more critical for columbarium landuse in the urban context of Hong Kong is the compactness of this city, with the total area of about 1106 km2 , accommodating more than 7 million people in all their vibrant urban daily activities and interactions. This generates intense competition for different types of urban landuse, including residential, commercial, infrastructural, recreational etc., among these, the columbarium landuse, with the dead competing for land space with the living. Because of the need of intense and efficient landuse in compact Hong Kong, it is difficult to avoid siting columbarium close to other urban landuses. This non-separation of the dead from the living will generate psychological pressure for the living, especially residents living close to the columbaria. This is even more exacerbated in the Chinese society of Hong Kong, with a long-established cultural taboo of death and a belief that feng shui will be adversely affected by “bad-luck-artefacts” situated nearby. Since the demand for columbarium landuse rests on cumulative deaths and cremations, with low “recycling” of niches in columbaria, it can easily be visualized that its limited supply (as circumscribed by the land supply and competition from different landuses as afore-mentioned) will not be able to satisfy the cumulative, “endless”

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and incessant demand, if the social custom of placing the dead in columbarium persists into the future. This is a great potential landuse problem that mainly rests on prevailing social customs and norms of placing cremated ashes of ancestors in purpose-built columbarium niches. This landuse problem is further exacerbated by the Chinese cultural practices, which still play a prominent part in modern urban Hong Kong. One of such practices is to have family outings for the purpose of “gravesweeping” and paying respect to ancestors at two specific gravesweeping festivals, namely Qingming and Chongyang Festival. Such practices will generate critical upsurge of transport and human flow, during and days before and after the two specific gravesweeping festivals, in the neighbourhood areas of columbaria in which high-rise niches are located, thereby attracting innumerous families who pay visit to the resting place of their ancestors at these critical times of the year. All these will generate intense traffic jams, concentration of crowds, leading to noise and environmental pollution, causing great nuisances to those working or residing in surrounding neighbourhood. Another Chinese cultural practice still embraced by HongKongers when visiting the resting place of their ancestors is the burning of incense and joss paper. When such practices are commonly performed in concentrated areas and time, it will generate serious air pollution and even risks of fire hazards. Thus, the design and the siting of columbaria that involve open areas, with good ventilation and free flow of fresh air, will be critical to the health and safety not only to those paying family visits to their ancestors in columbarium, but also those residing and working in the neighbourhood areas. Thus, resting on the existing social customs, columbarium landuse will be controversial (in the sense of potential arousal of opposition from those neighbouring landusers) and unsustainable (in form of its cumulative and incessant demand) in Hong Kong, giving rise to land controversies and politics. The columbarium siting issue represents a case of controversy of public, collective interest vs neighbourhood/selfinterest and this will be further elaborated in later parts of this chapter. This landuse controversy may also be existing in other countries to a certain extent. However, in the urban Chinese society of Hong Kong, this landuse issue is aggravated to a greater extent by traditional Chinese cultural practices that persist even up till now as well as the condensed and intense landuses in this compact city. Thus, the Hong Kong case can serve as an epitome of the controversies related to columbarium siting in an urban setting, densely populated by a citizenry that displays continuities with past Chinese traditions.

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Concepts and Deliberation Columbarium-Building—in Public Interest? Though siting a columbarium in certain neighbourhood will bring nuisances to neighbour land-users as afore-mentioned, is the columbarium-building in public interest so that this can “trump” over “special” or “sectoral” interests of these affected neighbours? In order to answer this satisfactorily, the fundamental questions are “What is public interest?”, “Who is regarded as the public?”, “How and who is going to define public interest for a specific society?”. The concept of “public interest” is, by itself, controversial. Its definition is subject to debates, repeatedly leading to disputes and conflicts when applied to a specific context. Because of this very nature, so-called “public interest” often merely reflects the interests of the dominant (O’Flynn 2010) or being used as a pretext to further the interest of the influential. Some pluralists even assert that public interest is an “implausible idea”, thus not a focus for deliberation (Ibid.). Nevertheless, no matter how vague and controversial the term “public interest” might be, it is a source of political legitimacy for public policy (Minteer 2005). In the light of this, if it can be shown that building columbarium is in public interest, the government still has the legitimacy to pursue this even in face of local neighbourhood opposition. Let’s examine some definitions of “public interest” to further our discussion. Barry (1964) distinguishes public interest as interest that affects a person in a favourable way in his/her capacity as a “member of the public” as distinct from his/her other capacities, such as “as a parent”, “as a businessman”, “as a house owner” (pp. 14–15). Rees (1964) further explains the concept in terms of “human interests within a given political region” which is “under a common public authority” (pp. 31, 35), setting it apart from private interest, class interest or sectoral interest. Putting Barry’s and Rees’ definitions of “public interest” in the context of Hong Kong, it will be the interests of human beings (i.e. human interests) that live under the common authority of Hong Kong government, with Hong Kong being a Special Administrative Region (with high degree of autonomy, especially over local affairs) of China. Since the majority of the HongKongers are ethnically Chinese, embracing many of the Chinese traditions, they commonly separate the place for the living and the place of the dead, with families paying regular visits to the resting place of their ancestors in specific gravesweeping festivals in form of family outings. It is natural that common HongKongers will have some ancestors that need purpose-built resting places. In the view of the recent trend of cremation and placing cremated ashes in columbarium niches, it is reasonable for individuals as a member of the public in Hong Kong to expect that there is a supply of columbarium niches, public as well as private ones, that allow them to place their ancestors’ ashes, furthering peace and respect for both the dead and the living. Thus, it will be understandable to consider the building and supply of columbarium niches to be in public interests, under the specific cultural norms of the Hong Kong citizenry.

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HongKonger X may rebut that all my ancestors’ remains are placed in Mainland China or overseas; thus, not all members of the public in Hong Kong are in need of columbarium niches. The demand for columbarium niches only represents sectoral interests, rather than public interest in Hong Kong, though perhaps representing a significant sector. Others may refute this stand by arguing that one day you yourself as a member of the public may need a columbarium niche sometime in the future when you pass away and you may reasonably expect your descendents to show their respect to you through gravesweeping visits to your resting place. What is critical for this refutation of HongKonger X is that it is resting on the assumption that future customs and norms concerning the treatment of the dead in Hong Kong will remain the same as that of the present. In the view of the paradigm shift in regard to the dead from burial to cremation in recent decades, it may be justified to expect that there may also be alternations of social norms in this aspect in future, especially in view of government promotion of green burials, including the scattering of cremated ashes in gardens of remembrance or at sea. Or perhaps, in the future, HongKongers, instead of paying family visits to resting place of their ancestors physically, may shift to paying respects to ancestors during gravesweeping festivals through the internet virtually. In this case, a physical resting place of the ancestor may be less important in future, which may be in line with green burials. Such changing social norms, thereby evolving definitions of “public interest”, are in line with Dewey’s view that public interest is “not an absolute, universal or ahistorical good” (Minteer 2005, p. 49), but is continuously constructed through “democratic social inquiry” that “reveal[s] shared interests” (Ibid.) of a particular citizenry at a particular period of time. Looking from the utilitarian perspective, public interest is viewed as the “mechanical or aggregation of individual interests” (Minteer 2005, p. 42). In the context of columbarium-building, under the prevalence of current social customs, the supply of columbarium niches for the majority to place their ancestors’ cremated ashes will bring about positive utility to the majority in Hong Kong society, satisfying individual interests of the mass in society. However, a minority, namely those residing in the neighbourhood where the columbarium is located, will have both disutility (in the form of nuisances brought about by nearby columbarium) and utility (in form of having a resting place for his/her own ancestors available). However, because of the intensity of columbarium landuse in the form of high-rise niches within a small plot of land, it is easy to visualize that the positive utility derived from the majority will be much greater than the disutility generated to those minority neighbours of the columbaria, regardless of how severe it may be to the latter. That is, the aggregate of utility of columbarium-building tends to be positive and great, thereby is in public interest from the utilitarian perspective. If we only concern about aggregate and total utility, rather than its distribution, in the issue of columbarium siting, the question of land justice may emerge. Even though columbarium-building is in public interest, why is it situated in Neighbourhood A and adversely affects those residing there? Those affected in Neighbourhood A may ask, “Why not build the columbarium in Neighbourhood B? Why not in Neighbourhood C, Neighbourhood D or Neighbourhood E and so on? Why my neighbourhood is

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chosen for the siting?” If all those in Hong Kong ask similar questions and not willing to accommodate columbarium in their own neighbourhood, then there will be no place in any neighbourhood for columbarium-building and the whole of Hong Kong will suffer disutility with no supply of columbarium niches as there is no place for their siting due to local opposition.

Columbarium as NIMBY NIMBY is the acronym for “Not in My Backyard”. “[T]h benefits of NIMBY projects are usually spread broadly among a large population, while the drawbacks and costs of these projects tend to be focused in concentrated form on the small group who inhabit the host community” (Halle and Mirrer-Singer 2008). Thus, the community at large generally welcomes NIMBY project because it serves public interest and brings about common benefits to the community at large, but it is preferred not to be situated in my neighbourhood, being caricatured as “my backyard” because of the costs and nuisances such project will bring to the host community, though people will have no similar objections if it is located elsewhere in other neighbourhoods. This is due to the “spatial separation of benefits and burdens” of the NIMBY facility, with benefits shared by most in the entire community, while burdens are concentrated on the shoulders of the hosting neighbourhood, as what Yung suggested in the introductory chapter. Thus, NIMBY project will typically arouse strong opposition from the host community who bears the brunt of the adverse effects of such project, leading to land controversies and politics. NIMBY is also closely related to other acronyms such as LULU (“locally unwanted land use”) and BANANA (“build absolutely nothing anywhere near anything”) (Birkland 2007), that hold similar implications. Judging from above definition, columbarium-building in Hong Kong can be considered as NIMBY or LULU. Columbarium-building can bring benefits to HongKongers at large since they will have room for placing the cremated ashes of their ancestors under the prevailing social customs; yet locating columbarium in a specific neighbourhood will bring intense costs and nuisances to the specific host community which may arouse strong opposition from them, giving rise to land politics. One may argue that building columbarium in a specific neighbourhood does not involve a violation of property rights (Hermansson 2007), that is, those in the host community do not owe the land for building the columbarium; they merely have property right over properties nearby. One can decide on what is to be built over one’s own land and property, but not on land which one does not have property rights. Thus, opposition to columbarium-building by local community is illegitimate. Yes, it is legitimate to raise objections if one’s property rights are violated. However, property right violation is only one among many justifiable reasons for a local community to raise opposition. Though it seems that the property rights of those in the neighbourhood are not violated if the columbarium is built on a piece of land which they do not owe, it is quite legitimate for them to oppose if their right to

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be protected from harm is threatened. What kind of harm is brought by the building of columbarium to the host community? According to the Opinion Survey on Review of Columbarium Policy (2010), about 75% of those HongKongers being interviewed consider the greatest impact of columbarium to neighbouring residents is “psychological”, implying psychological harm will be imposed on the host community of columbarium. Such psychological harm mainly arises out of the negative connotations of death in the Chinese societal context. This psychological brunt may have financial implications—about 40% of the interviewees consider decreased property value to be the most significant effect on the host community of columbarium (Ibid). Not only will there be psychological and financial harm to the host community of columbarium, there may be other harm in the form of costs and nuisances generated by “negative externality” which is in economics means “a cost that accrues to nonparticipants in a transaction” (Birkland 2007), that is, the costs, thereby harms, created by the columbarium to nearby neighbours. These costs may take the form of traffic congestion, increase of human flow, noise pollution, air pollution and fire hazards generated, especially in the critical times of gravesweeping in the Chinese tradition, as afore-mentioned, leading to community-oriented opposition to columbarium siting in the host community. Judging from the psychological, financial and other harms generated by negative externalities, it is quite legitimate for host community of columbarium to oppose such siting in view of their right to be protected from harm is threatened. One may criticize the host community merely focus on their own interest without paying due regard to the public interest that columbaria will serve, thereby being self-centred, if not being selfish, an essentially self-oriented perspective of negative reaction to NIMBY which is highlighted by Yung in the introductory chapter. Even if a sufficiently other-regarding person who understands that the whole Hong Kong community needs the provision of columbarium niches, s/he may worry that other free-riders will take advantage of his/her good-heartedness (in the form of willing to sacrifice for the public interest by allowing columbarium to be sited nearby). It is quite understandable that those residing near columbarium want to be assured that others will not free-ride on, thereby exploit, their “benevolence”. Even if one is willing to sacrifice for public interest, one would like to see that others are also ready to make similar sacrifice and will not “selfishly” free-ride on his/her goodwill. “That is, if I wish to cooperate, to do my share in the provision of the collective good but if the assurance that my participation will not be exploited by other agents is not forthcoming, I will retreat into more narrowly self-interested behavior in selfdefense…” (Gillroy 1991, p. 327). That is, the self-oriented and community-oriented negative reactions to NIMBY can be balanced and offset by assurance and guarantee of no free-riding (on the part of others in society). It is reasonable to expect this assurance will come from the government, as neutral arbiter in different conflicts of interests in society, maintaining the “balance of responsibility” from different sectors of the political community, implying fairness and justice in the handling of the issue concerned (Gillroy 1991, p. 330). This lays the foundation for sound land governance in resolving this land controversy.

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The Social Value of “Equality” and District-Based Columbarium Development Equality necessitates equal treatment of two persons/parties unless, judging by the relevant criterion, there is a relevant difference between them (Lucas 1997, p. 105; Gaus 2000, pp. 132–133; Williams 1973, pp. 232–233). This entails, in essence, the impartial treatment of all without discrimination. Concerning the shouldering of responsibility for siting columbarium in one’s locality, people in different parts of a territory share the same duty, implying that columbaria are to be evenly distributed among the territory, imposing the same degree of burden on people living in different areas. Alternatively, there can be “fair sharing” of the responsibilities of hosting different NIMBYs taken as a whole, with some form of division of labour among different parts of the territory, for example, one district hosting columbarium, while another district taking, say mid-way hostels for mental patients. However, in the view of the cumulative and incessant demands of columbarium niches, especially with excess demand for public columbarium niches in the context of Hong Kong, it is practically more justified and viable if there is provision of columbarium niches in different parts of territory rather than a few, thereby ensuring greater supply to meet the unsatisfied demand. The District-based Columbarium Development Scheme, adopted in 2010 by the Hong Kong government, can be evaluated in the light of “equality” in the “share of responsibility” for accommodating columbaria in different Districts, with all 18 Districts “collectively sharing the responsibility of developing columbarium facilities” (Audit Commission 2015, p. 12). Under this scheme, the government identified 24 potential sites in 18 Districts for columbarium development, subject to traffic impact assessment studies, engineering feasibility studies, technical feasibility studies and consultation with District Council concerned (Op. cit., p. 13). This Scheme implies, no District can shirk their responsibility of hosting columbarium facilities and every District is treated equally and shares the same duty as other Districts. Originally, no community or neighbourhood would like to host columbarium and prefer other neighbourhoods will do so. However, individual choices are not made in isolation; one’s choice and its results are dependent on the choices made simultaneously by others (Gillroy 1991). If all communities and Districts are willing to share the responsibility of hosting columbarium, my community or District will be willing to shoulder our share of responsibility since we are not “unfairly” treated by being solely selected to bear the brunt, while other communities and District free-ride on this, thereby alleviating fairness- and justice-principle-oriented negative reactions to columbarium siting in view of the fact that no single district is singled out as the host district which may create a sense of injustice and unfairness. This is in line with the general mentality of HongKongers. According to the Opinion Survey conducted by the Center for Communication Research of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2010), 68.0% of HongKongers indicate that the responsibility of

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developing columbarium needs to be shouldered together by different Districts in Hong Kong. The government in adopting the District-based Columbarium Development Scheme explicitly adopts the role of protector of the hosting District of columbarium from being exploited by other free-riders through trying to ensure that columbarium sites are to be identified in all 18 Districts in Hong Kong. This assumption of the role, on the part of the government, as arbiter of different conflicting interests and protector from free-riders is a further persuasion of the HongKongers to accept the siting of columbarium facilities in one’s own District, which forms the crux of land governance in the issue concerned, thereby facilitating the resolving of the conflict concerned. Equal distribution of columbaria among different Districts will further prevent the exploitation of the poor communities that have weaker political voice and bargaining power which may be expressed in the form of concentration on NIMBY projects in such “poor” Districts, representing a form of environmental injustice and unfairness. In this sense, District-based Columbarium Development Scheme reflects a form of environmental justice and fairness, with every District, rich or poor, powerful or weak in bargaining power, sharing same responsibility for hosting columbaria, avoiding exploitation of the disadvantaged. One may say, “Is it a better arrangement if a number of columbaria are put in a non-residential area, say next to a temple in a remote area, rather than distributing columbaria among different Districts in Hong Kong?” In view of the rapid urban development in Hong Kong, once remote areas has become very vibrant and developed areas nowadays. Similarly, remote areas nowadays may be filled with residents in future. Due to the compactness of development in Hong Kong, with the juxtaposition of different landuses within a condensed piece of land, it is unavoidable that there are some residents living nearby (even though it may not be large-scale residential area) who may be affected even if the columbarium is located in a remote “mainly” non-residential landuse area. In addition, having columbaria concentrated in the so-called remote area may lead to the problem of converging the upsurge of traffic and human flow during gravesweeping periods, which may not be a good management strategy, especially in the view of less developed infrastructural developments in remote areas. Having different columbaria located in all Districts not only increase the supply of niches, but will also have the effect of spreading the traffic and human flow all over different parts of Hong Kong during the gravesweeping festival periods, thereby alleviating the associated traffic jam, noise, air and environmental pollution problems as compared to concentrating traffic and human flow in merely one or two Districts. Thus, the District-based Columbarium Development Scheme has some practical implications in land governance. Furthermore, such scheme has some political feasibility implications. Since local voices tend to be district-based as represented by District Council, if District Councillors are informed that every District will host columbarium, it is more politically palatable for District Council to shoulder their share of responsibility and will not take a fierce and non-negotiable stand against siting columbarium in their District, leading to the resolving of the land politics involved. Thus, by March, 2017, out of

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a total of 24 potential sites in 18 districts for columbarium development, support from relevant District Council for 14 projects are obtained (Food and Health Bureau 2017), which is a great step forward as compared to the potential opposition from all District Councils not to locate columbarium in their “backyard”, if there is no policy of “shared responsibility of every District”. In view of the large area of a District in Hong Kong, especially some bigger Districts such as Sai Kung District of about 130 km2 , North District of about 137 km2 , Islands District of about 175 km2 , there are innumerous neighbourhoods within a District. Siting columbarium in every District will not solve the NIMBY problem as columbarium will intensely affect a particular neighbourhood in adverse way within each District, though this will reduce District Councils’ opposition to host columbarium within their District. Thus, although every District shares the responsibility for columbarium siting, the residents of a particular neighbourhood in every District “unfairly” bear the brunt for the actual hosting for the whole District. In order to be fair to those residents of the hosting neighbourhood of each District, compensation for them is justified. The compensation can take the form of blurring the public interest and the private interest of those hosting neighbours by allowing them priority in the allocation of niches for their ancestors in the columbarium nearby. Since the public interest (of columbarium niche provision) and the private interest (of having priority in being allocated a niche for their ancestor nearby) are intertwined for those residing in the hosting neighbourhood (not in the whole District), their opposition to columbarium hosting will be thus lessoned in the light of land justice. The feasibility of such practice is reflected by the Cheung Chau Columbarium Project in 2013, with niches reserved exclusively to local residents, thus was well-supported by Islands District Council and local residents (Audit Commission 2015).

Any Alternatives? Any Way Out? In order to minimize nuisances and costs to nearby neighbour land-users, appropriate site selection for columbaria in different Districts is necessary. Attempts need to be made to try to identify sites that may have natural or other types of buffer (e.g. a hill or open area) from major residential areas in the District so as to reduce the psychological impact on hosting community. Sites with feasible infrastructural building may reduce the traffic jams during gravesweeping periods. Better design and management will be able to lessen associated air pollution, noise pollution and fire hazards. Death spaces may be “reframed” as places that also accommodate services to the living (Basmajian and Coutts 2010), such as venue for life and death education, built-in open space and natural infrastructure as “city lung” i.e. breathing places etc. With all these in place, the host community of columbarium may find it more acceptable than expected and find a way to “accommodate” and “live with” the modern artefact built for the dead. For the people to accept their share of responsibility related to columbarium siting or the placing of any other kind of NIMBY projects, public trust in the government as

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genuine protector of public interests as well as neutral arbiter of conflicts of interests of different sectors in community is pertinent to the resolution of the problem. If the public does not view the government as sincerely trying hard to reach a solution acceptable to all, with earnest attempts to find sites that are naturally and technically appropriate as well as trying hard to devise good design and management of the columbarium, any acts of the government in handling the matter will be viewed with scepticism. The worst scenario is that the government is perceived to be favouring some at the expense of others, involving environmental justice issues. Thus, gaining trust from the public, on the part of the government, as sincere in finding the way out, is very critical in eventual solution of the matter. This lays the foundation of sound land governance, especially in resolving land controversies. For the process of urban planning, especially related to siting of NIMBY projects, such as columbarium, it is essential that the public are involved and consulted early in the process so that the public will have psychological preparation for it. The provision of information on the actual impact, the associated preventive measures and the accompanying package of compensation is critical to the eventual acceptance of the project concerned and is indispensible for sound land governance. Sometimes, even if the hosting community may be reluctant to accept the arrangement, a longer gestation period allow more time to psychologically “digest” the news, making the arrangement more palatable, though still perhaps with some reservations, but not strong opposition. Involving the public early in a more “democratic” urban planning process, rather than merely informing them when decisions are quite final in a paternalistic way, will give the public more sense of “ownership” of the urban plan, thus more ready to support it, giving rise to participatory legitimacy, with reduced opposition to its implementation. This applies to the planning of all urban projects, including those with NIMBY flavour. The prevailing custom of gravesweeping at specific days of the year can also be altered by promotion. If families pay respects to their ancestors all year round, instead of concentrating at two specific Chinese traditional gravesweeping festivals, then the traffic and the human flow may be distributed out, preventing intense nuisance to the neighbourhood reaching the peak at specific days. In Mainland China, on-line mourning and memorialization has gained more acceptance, with some overseas Chinese choosing virtual space that matched the province where the deceased came from to arrange on-line mourning ceremony (Kong 2012). SMSs from mobile phones to memorial websites are also possible (Ibid.). The Food and Environmental Hygiene Department also set up an internet memorial service for those who have used its death-related services such as scattering of cremains at sea, columbarium (Food and Health Bureau 2010). This should be further promoted to gain greater popularity in Hong Kong, emphasizing its positive aspects, such as cost-saving, time-saving, eco-friendly (with burning of virtual candles and incenses, etc.) and free from the constraint of time and place in the sense that respect to the deceased can be paid at any time and place at will. Columbarium landuse poses as a problem, mainly because of the incessant demand generated under the prevailing social custom of treatment of the dead in view of limited land supply and competition from other urban landuse. In addition to work

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on the supply side through increasing supply, another way is to manage or even decrease the demand. Demand for columbarium niches mainly rests on the present social norms in Hong Kong society of placing the cremated ashes of ancestors in a permanent resting place, thereby leading to cumulative and continual demand of such niches. If there is a “quiet revolution” of the social tradition of the way to handle the dead in Hong Kong through promotion of green burials, the columbarium landuse problem will thereby be resolved, representing an alternative approach to land governance in the controversial columbarium issue. Green burials involve the scattering of cremated ashes in gardens of remembrance or at sea. This “quiet revolution” is slowly under way—in 2016, the government handled more than 4900 green burials in Hong Kong, accounting for 10.5% of the total number of death, representing a significant rise from 4.6% in 2010 (Food and Health Bureau 2017). Such change of social customs of handling the dead represents a win-win situation for both the families concerned and other land-users in the long run, eventually effectively addressing sustainability-principle oriented opposition to the issue of siting of columbaria as NIMBYs. Whether such “revolution” is really successful very much depends on the promotional work of the government in this regard. There are other forms of green or “eco-friendly” burials in other countries. In Taiwan cities, especially Taipei, there are woodland burials, with the placing of cremated ashes in urns made of biodegradable material (such as paper, starch) which is buried in earth next to existing tree. Within a few months, the urns will be degraded and the ashes with mix with the earth. The burial spot will be reused to serve further burial needs (Kong 2012). Or some such urns are placed in earth, with a fresh tree sapling planted next to it (Ibid.). Such type of woodland burials symbolizes rebirth through integration with nature, instead of finality at death, with a plant that marks a locality for remembrance. In the U.S., green burials may take the form of burial in a simple wooden box in a hand-dug hole in unmarked ground, eschewing the use of flesh preservatives to facilitate eventual integration with nature (Basmajian and Coutts 2010). The Texas Parks and Wildlife Department partners with the Green Burial Council in the U.S. to allow cremated ashes to be scattered in state parks for a fee (Ibid.) Thus, green burials, with the crux of it being reunion with nature, often associated with rebirth and recycling, is gaining grounds in different parts of the world. Such reorientation of the conception of life and death, on the part of HongKongers, is also creeping in, with greater effects to be seen in later days. More fundamental will be the education related to life and death in Hong Kong society so as to dispel myths and negative overtones associated with death and encourage more positive attitude towards it, accepting it as a stage in life and get prepared for it psychologically and in practical terms. With less negative connotations related to death, co-existence of landuse for the dead and the living within a certain area will be more acceptable to nearby land-users in future, reshaping the view of landuse for the dead as NIMBY in the context of Hong Kong.

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Conclusion Columbarium landuse poses a problem under the prevailing social customs of handling the dead in Hong Kong context. This has been exacerbated by the traditional Chinese gravesweeping practices that persist even up to the present in Hong Kong. Changing such social norms and customs takes time. In the short run, introducing “equality” in the “share of responsibility” among different Districts can increase land available for columbarium-building, with the government serving as the protector from free-riders’ exploitation. Thus, in the midst of politics within the land controversy of columbarium siting, the social value of “equality” serves as the framework for conflict resolution, thereby as the way out for good land governance in this arena, with the government serving as the just defender against exploiting free-riders, giving a vivid illustration of the “Politics-Justice-Governance” Model. In the long run, “revolutionizing” the “tradition” of handling dead and education related to life and death will serve as the keys to satisfactorily resolving such landuse problem in a more fundamental way. Signs of success in this direction are emerging, and we need to wait and see whether there will be ultimate triumph in finding a solution to this land issue in the future decades to come. This involves the incessant efforts of the government, the private sector and the nonprofit sector. The most important of all will be the involvement of individual members of the public who collectively make up the “whole” in Hong Kong.

References Audit Commission. (2015). Burial and cremation services. Available online at: http://www.aud. gov.hk/pdf_e/e65ch04.pdf. Retrieved on June 19, 2017. Barry, B. M. (1964). The public interest. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, Vol. 38, pp. 1–18. Basmajian, C., & Coutts, C. (2010). Planning for the disposal of the dead. Journal of the American Planning Association, 76(3), 305–317. Birkland, T. A. (2007). Nimby. In P. Robbins (Ed.), Encyclopedia of environment and society (electronic resources). SAGE: Thousand Oaks. Center for Communication Research of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. (2010). Opinion survey on review of columbarium policy. Hong Kong: Hong Kong SAR Government (In Chinese). Chan, T. H. Y., Chan, F. M. Y., Tin, A. F., Chow, A. Y. M., & Chan, C. L. W. (2006). Death preparation and anxiety: A survey in Hong Kong. Omega, 54(1), 87–78. Food and Health Bureau. (2010). Public consulation on review of columbarium policy. Hong Kong: Food and Health Bureau. Food and Health Bureau. (2017). Supply of Niches and related issues after the enactment of private columbaria bill. Hong Kong: LegCo Panel on Food Safety and Environmental Hygiene. Gaus, G. R. (2000). Political concepts and political theories. Boulder: Westview Press (Chapter 6). Gillroy, J. M. (1991). Moral considerations and public policy choices: Individual autonomy and the NIMBY problem. Public Affairs Quarterly, 5(4), 319–332. Halle, D., & Mirrer-Singer, P. (2008). NIMBYism. In V. N. Parrillo (Ed.), The encyclopedia of social problems (electronic resources). SAGE: Thousand Oaks.

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Hermansson, H. (2007). The ethics of NIMBY conflicts. Ethical Thoery and Moral Practice, 10, 23–34. Kong, L. (2012). No place, new places: Death and its rituals in urban Asia. Urban Studies, 49(2), 415–433. Lucas, J. R. (1997). Against equality. In L. P. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (Eds.), Equality: Selected readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Minteer, B. A. (2005). Environmental philosophy and the public interest: A pragmatic reconcilation. Environmental Values, 14, 37–60. O’Flynn, I. (2010). Deliberating about the public interest. Res Publica, 16, 299–315. Rees, W. J. (1964). The public interest”. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 38, pp. 19–38. Teather, E. K. (1999). High-rise homes for the ancestors: Cremation in Hong Kong. The Geographical Review, 89(3), 409–430. Williams, B. (1973). Problems of the self . London: Cambridge University Press (Chapter 14).

Chapter 10

Relocation of the Christian Zheng Sheng College: Challenges in Justifying the Siting of Rehabilitation Centers Larry Lai

Abstract This chapter focuses on the land controversy over public/collective interest against the vested interest of the neighborhood. In the cases of the siting of NIMBY venues, more than often the major oppositions come from the communities where the facilities will be located, as the members of which typically perceive the public interest that these venues will bring is to be pursued at the expense of their local and/or personal interest, such that the pursuit of the former must entail an encroachment of the latter. This chapter argues that this perception has a lot to do with how the siting is morally justified. A justificatory approach that purposely takes away consideration of one’s vested interest may look impartial but is not desirable, at least in some cases. As this chapter demonstrates, a change in the justificatory approach that caters for people’s vested interest will change the way they look at the land controversy, and the justification of siting will consequently be more promising in getting support from the local community.

Introduction This chapter addresses the challenges in justifying the siting of one particular kind of NIMBY venues, i.e., rehabilitation centers, in a policy context that has limited public engagement. Unlike other kinds of NIMBY venues, like nuclear power plants and strategic landfills, wherein there is basically no person residing, or prisons, wherein there are people residing but are disconnected with local residents, rehabilitation centers are special in that the clients in these centers are, during their stay, newcomers to the community. As already defined in Chap. 1, rehabilitation centers are commonly unwanted because the benefits they bring are shared by society as a whole, whereas the burdens—real or perceived—only go to the community members. But this chapter wants to add that the situation is even worse when there is little or even no public participation in the siting process, as in the case of Hong Kong, L. Lai (B) University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_10

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whether the decision is morally justified depends essentially on whether the stakeholders’ interests are sensibly considered. From a self-oriented perspective, when the current residents think that their interests and concerns, reasonable or otherwise, are ignored in the siting process, their feeling of not being respected may, unfortunately, turn to strengthen their NIMBY mentality, and they would hence direct their hostility toward the rehab clients. This chapter argues that the lack of concern on stakeholders’ interests in the siting process has an adverse impact on how the current and new community members understand and interact with each other. If my arguments here are valid, then to make a morally justified siting decision by maintaining impartiality in the siting process, through which the stakeholders’ interests are neglected, is problematic, because doing so would, as a result, defeat the purpose of establishing rehabilitation centers in the neighborhood. Assuming that stakeholders’ interests are efficaciously considered in genuine public participation in siting, when public participation is insufficient or inadequate, one commonsensical way to maintain impartiality in the decision of siting is to not take anyone’s interest into account, but to appeal to general public interest. Approaches of this kind are impartiality approaches, and in this chapter, I discuss one of them, which I call it the Rawlsian approach, signified by John Rawls’ famous “veil of ignorance.” This chapter argues that the Rawlsian approach, which keeps stakeholders’ vested interest away from the consideration of siting, does not help but may instead worsen the social relationship among different groups and will hence be harmful to public interest. But there is another kind of approaches, which is based on human affection, and in this chapter, I discuss one of them, which is the Mohist approach, the one that comes from the philosophy of Mozi (墨子), an ancient Chinese philosopher. By seeking to analyze and compare how the Rawlsian approach and the Mohist approach works differently in the justification of the siting of Christian Zheng Sheng College, this chapter argues that in the case of the NIMBY venues that characteristically comprise allegedly unpopular newcomers to the community, the Chinese approach would offer a more convincing justificatory reasoning for all the community stakeholders in the siting process, because, in contrast to the Rawlsian impartiality approach, the Mohist approach takes into account the stakeholders’ partial interest as legitimate points of consideration in siting. In the following, firstly, I will briefly recap the story of the Christian Zheng Sheng College relocation. Attention is to be paid on how the current residents of the community perceived the boys and girls from the College upon their anticipated arrival, as well as how much these people were involved in the siting process. Secondly, I will describe an impartial siting model based on the Rawlsian approach for rehabilitation centers and analyze how this approach, despite its merits, is unhelpful to morally justify the siting. Thirdly, I will introduce an alternative approach, based on the theory of Mozi that conceptually links private and public interest together, and will argue how this approach would serve as a better candidate than the Rawlsian one in the siting of rehabilitation centers.

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Relocation of the Christian Zheng Sheng College—The Episode Established in 1985, Christian Zheng Sheng Association is a charity aimed to support and help drug addicts by offering drug rehabilitation services in Hong Kong. In 1998, the Association founded Christian Zheng Sheng College. Located at Chi Ma Wan, Southeastern Lantau Island, Hong Kong, this registered private secondary school was the Southeast Asian first-of-its-kind that served both rehabilitative and educational purposes (Zheng Sheng Association 2018). The problem of overpopulation—having had 120 students (as in 2010) (Hong Kong Legislative Council 2010: 3) in a residential campus that could only accommodate 30—has only come to involve the public in 2009 when the Education Bureau and Security Bureau decided, after two years of consideration, to accept Zheng Sheng’s request to relocate it to an abandoned school campus at Mui Wo, city center of Lantau Island. The most dramatic moment came on the scene on June 14, 2009, where the government officials, Zheng Sheng College Principal and student representatives, and some 200 Mui Wo residents attended a consultative meeting organized by Mui Wo District Council. Some of these residents shouted out “drug-addicted boys/girls” against these students, and the crying girls have caught most media’s attention. Until now, there is still no hope of relocation (Oriental Daily 2018, January 5), despite some minor renovations in the original campus (Li 2016). This incident can be attributed to the lack of proper public consultation and public engagement throughout the relocation exercise.1 Expressed in that public consultation meeting, some residents worried that this rehabilitative school would bring negative impacts to the younger children living there as well as the tourist industry (Hong Kong Economic Journal 2009, June 15). Some even described that the possible arrival of Zheng Sheng students was like “bringing in a big malignant tumor” to the community (Apple Daily 2009, June 15). All these public comments on Zheng Sheng College were made, regrettably, without sufficient empirical support. Although the school does not offer medical rehabilitation treatments, the relocation project was coordinated by the Narcotics Division of the Security Bureau. As the College Principal has suggested, this gave the public an image that the students are still drug addicts rather than drug rehabilitees (RTHK 2009, June 18). Due to the lack of clarification of and discussion about the relocation project, residents’ misunderstandings have strengthened their NIMBY mentality. Unfortunately, this lack of public engagement in the planning and siting of sensitive public facilities has not been rare in Hong Kong. As early as 1992, the protest 1 There is no doubt that the discrimination held by the Mui Wo community members against Zheng

Sheng students can already explain a lot about the siting controversy. This chapter, however, not only wants to demonstrate that the approach that the government adopted failed to address the issue of discrimination, but also proposes an alternative approach that attends to that discrimination. As will be discussed below, it is argued that discriminating against others will eventually be harmful to one’s personal benefit. The author thanks the anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this issue.

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against the relocation of a day-care center that accommodates ex-mentally ill persons in Laguna City, a private estate, was said to be the first well-known case of NIMBY protest against rehabilitation facilities (The Mental Health Association of Hong Kong). In late 1992 to early 1993, the protests against the site of a hostel for severely mentally handicapped persons in Tung Tau Estate, a public estate in Wong Tai Sin, Kowloon, involved eventually the Legislative Council as all its members declared their support of the siting (The Hong Kong Joint Council of Parents of the Mentally Handicapped). The protests that have taken so far the longest span were in 1995– 1999, during which the siting of a general outpatient clinic that provides medical services to, among others, AIDS patients in Kowloon Bay. The issue of siting has brought about much dispute in the neighborhood because the clinic was located right next to Richland Gardens, a government-assisted private residence.2 It was a time when the stigmatization of AIDS patients and treatments was very strong in Hong Kong (Chan 2002: 14–17). However, having agreed to locate the clinic 25 m away from the original siting as a response to the discontent of the residents, the government thought that the discontent was only a result of people’s misunderstanding of venereal diseases and therefore insisted that the clinic must be built (Chan 2002: 4). This decision has led to the organization of a series of protest activities against the government, the clinic, and its staff, including petition campaigns, rallies, filing a complaint with The Ombudsman against the Health and Welfare Branch of the Government Secretariat for inadequate public consultation with Richland Gardens residents over the siting issue, and even posting abusive banners outside the clinic, insulting and blocking the way of clinic staff and visitors (Chan 2002: 5). In 2010 and 2018, respectively, the location of a rehabilitation center for ex-mentally ill persons in a public estate in Tuen Mun (Mingpao 2011, February 13) and Tai Wai, Hong Kong, has again brought about abusive banners by the local residents at the site. It was reported that in both cases, there was a lack of proper public consultation, which not only failed to clarify local residents’ misunderstanding of mental illness, mentally ill patients, and rehabilitation, but instead strengthened their NIMBY position (Equal Opportunities Commission3 2016: 134–135). But misunderstanding of the idea of a rehab school, or fundamentally, rehabilitation, is but one of the many causes of the formation of the NIMBY mentality. Sometimes, the negative view toward rehab centers is based on one’s own living experience. In November 2016, in a case of opposing a proposed drug and alcohol treatment center to be located in the neighborhood in Pleasant Township, Indianapolis, the United States, some residents straightforwardly admitted their NIMBY mentality. One of them explained that she moved to this community so as to get rid of drug addicts staying nearby her home. Another said, “I’ve got 10 grandchildren, and I 2 In

the late 1970 s, the Hong Kong government launched the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) to enable lower middle-income families and public rental housing tenants to possess their own homes. To expedite the HOS, the government invited the private sector to participate in the building of HOS flats under the Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS). One of the PSPS was the Richland Gardens. Inaugurated in 1985, this government-assisted private residence has in total 5904 apartment units, in 22 blocks (Hong Kong Housing Authority). 3 Hereafter: EOC.

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don’t need [the rehab clients] walking down the road or walking on my property.” (The Journal Gazette 2016, November 17). Sometimes, the opposition is based on community concerns, which looks less personal and hence looks more legitimate. In August 2018, the residents who opposed the project of building a new residential long-term addiction rehab center in a city in Manitoba, Canada, complained that this project, if successful, would make the community suffer more from a loss of public green-space, lack of recreation facilities, and higher risk to safety (Winnipeg Free Press 2018, 20 August). And sometimes, NIMBY projects do affect property values. A study of the impacts of residential substance abuse treatment center on neighboring property prices in Richmond, eastern part of central Virginia, the United States, in the period between 2001 and 2011 shows that homes within 200 m of a treatment venue are sold approximately 8% cheaper than comparable homes located farther (Roche et al. 2014). In this Zheng Sheng episode, some Mui Wo residents worried about the drop of property prices due to the relocation of Zheng Sheng College in their neighborhood.

Explain, Not Justify, the Siting What should be done when proper public engagement in the policymaking process is in lack? The Hong Kong Government has been using different—and hence as the criticism goes, inconsistent—approaches of public consultation in different siting projects for rehabilitation centers, which resulted in bringing the public more confusion rather than clarity (EOC 2016: 85). Sometimes, local oppositions do not halt the projects as the authority just rams through them, but sometimes they do. The case of Zheng Sheng College illustrates exactly the situation in which local opposition has been delaying the relocation project for almost 10 years. But again as a case of delay this is not rare. In the cases of securing permanent accommodation for mental wellness facilities in Hong Kong, as the Government understands it, the aims of public consultation are as follows: (i) to explicate the welfare service plans in the community and to collect the stakeholders’ views; (ii) offer the community public education; so that (iii) the service operator and community stakeholders can develop good relationship and strengthen mutual communication (EOC 2016: 96). In the view of the facility service providers, conducting public consultations is to (iv) explain the services and to clarify the misunderstanding and worries of the residents; and (v) to obtain their support for setting up the facility in their community (EOC 2016: 96). Although the Government states clearly that “unless reasonable arguments are given, for example, the environment of the proposed site is not suitable for providing the service, the [Social Service Department] will not shelve the provision of any welfare facilities urgently needed in society due to the opposition of the local community,” as it turned out, opposition from the residents has been a cause of siting failure (EOC 2016: 99–100). This means that while clarifying misunderstandings of the issues concerned by way of explaining them to the community members in

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public consultation exercises may be a good case of public education, doing this is not helpful in justifying the siting of sensitive human services facilities. More importantly, all the cases revealed so far in this chapter show that the Hong Kong government has poorly convinced the residents by justifying the choice of siting these facilities in their community. But this is crucial. Failure in achieving this has finished up in either the delay of necessary service provisions, and/or not able to get better ones, and/or bringing pressure to both the community members and the service recipients, i.e., a lose-lose situation (EOC 2016: 83–84, 97). In the following, I analyze what seems to be the justificatory approach the government has been using and explain what is wrong with using it. In the part afterward, I will argue that adopting an alternative approach is a better way out of the trouble in obtaining community support in the siting of these facilities.

Theories and Deliberation The Rawlsian Approach The Rawlsian approach is named after John Rawls, a prominent American political philosopher during the turn of the last century. This approach refers to the one by which he derives his principles of justice for a just society. He argues that most if not all of us have our vested interests in society, i.e., personal interests that are socially constructed. For instance, in a patriarchal, capitalist society, it is normal to see that male tycoons are always in an advantageous position in the distribution of social resources. Therefore, no matter how democratic the decision-making procedures are, any agreement reached or policy made that is based on our real-world circumstances is likely to be biased toward one’s vested interests; democratic participation does not necessarily bring social justice. To get rid of this, Rawls proposed a veil of ignorance, a thought experiment that aims to ascertain a choice-making process that appeals to self-interest, yet precludes any consideration of one’s vested interest (Rawls 1999: 118). In his original design, Rawls asked us to deliberate over the basic principles of distributing social and natural resources in the society, so that everyone would agree with these principles, and such an agreement would be fair to everyone. What makes this kind of deliberation distinctively different from others is that while we remain self-interested, i.e., we always aim for one’s gain and maintain basic knowledge of the real-world, i.e., there are people of different sexes, races, wealth, physical and mental conditions, people hold different conceptions of the good, we should assume ignorance of who we really are in the real-world, i.e., we know nothing about all the information of ourselves just mentioned. This is because all these variables are tightly linked with our vested interests, which would likely to induce us to make choices biased toward oneself. According to Bernard Gert, “moral impartiality is achieved…by the total elimination of individuality.” (Gert 2005: 149). So, we are

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asked to make choices as if we are standing behind a veil of ignorance, arriving at what Rawls calls the “original position.” (Rawls 1999: 11). Any choice that we make behind the veil of ignorance should be agreed to all, as Rawls believes that people would deliberate likewise in this imaginary circumstance, and because of this, the choice is understood as fairly made. Rawls thinks that when people are in the “original position,” they can still reason in a rational manner, yet since they are supposedly ignorant of their real-world situation, they need to make choices under such uncertainties, which will make them to be impartial. The situation is like your colleagues and you co-sponsored a cake and will share it during teatime. Since you know that that cake happens to be the flavor you like most, you volunteer to be the one who will cut the cake, with an intention to cut a bigger share for yourself. Now what interrupts your plan to have a bias toward yourself is that you are the one who will slice the cake, but it is your colleague who will distribute the slices. As the distribution of the cake is out of your control, if you slice unequally, and the chance of getting yourself a bigger slice is uncertain, there always remains the chance that you will end up in having a smaller slice, which defeats your purpose of cutting the cake unequally. If you think rationally enough, out of such uncertainties all you would want to do is to play safe, i.e., you would like to maintain the best possible gain even when you end up in a worst case scenario. Therefore, you would try your best to be impartial, that is, in this case, to cut every piece in the same size, so that even if you have an unlucky day, the share of the cake you will have will still not be significantly smaller than anyone’s. Of course, there is no guarantee that all slices will therefore be of the exact same size; the point here is rather that because you are disconnected from your real-world vantage point in your choice-making, in order to favor yourself, the only thing you can do is to make a choice that is impartial to all participants. What is more, not only “you,” but everyone, according to Rawls, would cut the cake in the same manner. In short, the most interesting point in the Rawlsian approach is that self-interested individuals would rationally reason to make impartial choices.

The Rawlsian Approach to Zheng Sheng’s Relocation How does this Rawlsian approach work in the siting of a NIMBY facility? A NIMBY facility is one that serves public interest, i.e., interest or welfare of the general public qua the public,4 yet it would, as one understands it, probably be harmful to one’s personal interest when it is located in one’s neighborhood. The harms can be alleged or genuine, physical, and/or psychological. This is not to say that there cannot be a few persons who do not mind having such facilities next to their home. For example, parents who have their children as clients of those rehabilitation centers would give their thumbs up when the centers are to be close to their residence; likewise is the case for the staff working there, for more convenient commutes. But it is by definition 4 This

means that public interest is not understood here as the summation of individual interest.

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impossible to have most members of the community welcome such facilities. The first two things to do in the siting process is therefore to give a head-on response to the NIMBY factor by ignoring consideration of anyone’s personal interest and to consider only the general public interest, i.e., how the public would potentially benefit from such NIMBY projects, and/or how the establishment of such NIMBY facilities can meet the proclaimed social needs. More importantly, the government is expected to minimize the possible risk of harms to the community where the concerned facility is to be located. If by nature the facility does bring a health risk or a security problem, these problems are a matter of public interest. Here, the government prepares all the relevant data to support a NIMBY facility be built somewhere. However, this does not follow that a NIMBY facility be randomly situated anywhere, as there are also realistic and prudential concerns, e.g., concerns about the availability of land or premises, logistics, traffic, geographical locations, and construction costs. All these are the basic knowledge admitted for deliberation in the Rawlsian approach. The argument that the Rawlsian approach wants to develop can be put in two forms. One form is: suppose there is a need to locate that NIMBY facility somewhere, and for sure its neighbors’ personal interest will be harmed because of this. If one is to consider the case behind the veil of ignorance, i.e., one does not know which community one is staying, there is no personal attachment to the case—or, put it this way: There is nowhere by which one can formulate personal attachment. One would consider only public interest, i.e., whether the social need and public benefit prevail over the minimized, possible risks and harms. In short, according to the Rawlsian approach, if that facility is to be set up in anyone’s backyard, what one would only contemplate are public interest, and the extent of possible risks and harms that one would accept in case that one, unlucky enough, happens to be the neighbor of that facility. And because anyone who reasons behind the veil of ignorance can reach the same conclusion, it seems enticing to claim that anyone in the position behind the veil of ignorance should have agreed to the siting, and the siting is therefore morally justified. Another way to put the Rawlsian argument is to turn to the well-being of the least advantaged group in the society. Behind the veil of ignorance, if one is able to put oneself into the shoes of the most vulnerable people, i.e., by appealing to empathy behind the veil, one must wish to offer them, as if one were in that group, the greatest possible benefits. The Rawlsian approach maintains that this is still an impartial choice, as long as the choice-maker has no idea of who will actually benefit or be harmed by it (Gert 2005: 149). By offering the least advantaged group their best possible benefits, the distribution of resources is not to be equally proportional to all the groups in the society, which means that there are social and economic inequalities, yet they are morally justified, according to the argument of impartiality (Rawls 1999: 13).5 So, in this light, the Mui Wo residents may consider the Zheng Sheng relocation project in the hypothetical capacity of being the Zheng Sheng students, who belong 5 In

Rawls’ original design, the case is put differently. He suggests that a just distribution of social and economic goods allows—and even requires—social and economic inequalities “if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.” Rawls’ attention is put on the possible patterns of an overall distribution of social and economic

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to the least advantaged group in the episode. Thus, these residents would be more clear-headed to see what the students are expecting from the local community, and would no longer only consider their vested interest. There is no proof to support that the Hong Kong government has ever justified any of its policy by the Rawlsian approach. What is argued here is that the Hong Kong government’s approach in the Zheng Sheng College episode can be interpreted as a Rawlsian one.6 For instance, in his oral reply to the Legislative Council on June 25, 2009, the Secretary for Security said that “the government has considered all factors concerned, which included alternative sites available, and supported Zheng Sheng’s proposal (of relocating the College at the abandoned secondary school in Mui Wo).” (Hong Kong Government 2009a). In reply to the complaint of long commuting time for Mui Wo students traveling to school, and hence the request of reopening the abandoned secondary school (which will thereby reject Zheng Sheng’s relocation there), the Secretary for Education answered that the abandonment of that secondary school, as well as the seats available for children in Mui Wo in other places in the Island District, fitted well the current policy for secondary schools, which serves public interest (Hong Kong Government 2009). In the written reply by the Acting Secretary for Security to the Legislative Council, on April 21, 2010, after the Zheng Sheng 2009 siting dispute, it was said that: Through carrying out discussions and explaining the justifications in various aspects, the Government will strive to ensure adequate communication among the community and all stakeholders with a view to working out an option that is in the public interest. (Hong Kong Government 2010)

There were four points that the Hong Kong government attempted to present in the Zheng Sheng episode. First, the social need for the educational rehabilitation service that Zheng Sheng now operates for juveniles is strong, which serves public interest. Second, there is no violation to public interest to abandon that secondary school in Mui Wo, even if Mui Wo students need to spend long commuting time. Third, while the government remains willing to discuss the case of Zheng Sheng’s relocation at Mui Wo with all the stakeholders concerned, personal perceptions and labeling of Zheng Sheng College and its students are not considered. Lastly, although it was not made explicit in the expressions above, the government would insist that it was the Security Bureau that did the coordination and liaison of the relocation project, and supposedly, the Bureau should prioritize the issue of security wherein Zheng Sheng goods in the society that favours the more advantaged people, where he argues that “there is no injustice in the greater benefits earned by a few provided that the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved.” (Rawls 1999: 13). 6 One may be tempted to consider a utilitarian approach to interpret the case here, because it seems common that a government should consider the interest of all the agents concerned in the case, and maintain the option that best achieves the highest overall net utility. The controversy over quantifying people’s utility and disutility aside, a utilitarian approach is not a convincing interpretation here because it does not work: If the Hong Kong government has really considered the outcry of those who opposed the relocation project that were quite a lot in number, and those who would be happier because of the relocation, i.e., mainly the Zheng Sheng management and the students, the government might have not endorsed the project in the first place.

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College is to be relocated. When the Bureau gave the green light for it, there should be no security issue that would bother Mui Wo residents.

Critique of the Rawlsian Approach Since the first publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, the Rawlsian approach has never been short of criticisms, but I only address the most relevant ones to this discussion, which are (1) there cannot be unanimous deliberation, and hence unanimous agreement, behind the veil of ignorance; (2) if any conception of the good is taken away in the deliberation behind the veil of ignorance, then no choice can be made; and more importantly, (3) it is dubious to require a person be morally responsible for a choice made behind the veil of ignorance. The first two points attribute directly to the very theory of the Rawlsian approach, while the third one refers to the application of the Rawlsian approach in justifying a real-world policy. According to the Rawlsian approach, when people have no knowledge of who exactly will be advantaged or disadvantaged due to their decision, they would reason impartially and make choices fair to everyone, and since great minds think the same, the choices they finally make should be agreed by each other. One might wish to argue that such agreement produces a moral binding force, which means that if one does not do according to the terms one has (or would have) committed to, one violates the contract co-signed with all other parties. But this kind of voluntary consent argument does not apply to the Rawlsian approach, not only because, as Ronald Dworkin has famously argued, “a hypothetical contract is not simply a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all,” (Dworkin 1975: 18), but also, according to Nagel, “prior agreement for the right reasons can be obtained or presumed, but it is not the agreement that justifies what has been agreed to, but rather whatever justifies the agreement itself .” (Nagel 1975: 5). If Dworkin and Nagel are right, then the decision made behind the veil of ignorance cannot be justified by the hypothetical agreement that the parties would have made. But if so, then the decision can only be justified by one argument, which comprises two elements: (1) What motivated the people to make the choice, i.e., impartiality out of uncertainties, and (2) anyone behind the veil of ignorance would reason in the same manner. Yet, it is argued that impartial people can still think and therefore decide differently. Bernard Gert, by analogy with basketball referees calling a foul, argues that impartial referees, who attempt no personal advantage in a game, make differing judgments of calling a foul, because they have differing conceptions of how the flow of the game should go (Gert 2005: 151–152). One may recall here the defining feature of the Rawlsian approach, i.e., the veil of ignorance deprives of, among other things, any conception of the good the people hold in the reality. But this will only make the situation worse, since, following Gert, no one can possibly make any decisions. (ibid.) Taking away any conception of the good that people hold allows no interpretation of any rule or decision in the deliberation behind the veil of ignorance, but “it goes against all human experience, however, to maintain

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that all qualified impartial rational persons will always interpret or apply a rule in exactly the same way.” (Gert 2005: 152).7 Consequently, the Rawlsian approach is problematic, because firstly, impartial people may still hold differing views and hence make disparate choices behind the veil of ignorance; secondly, to the extent that any conception of the good is removed in the deliberation, impartial people cannot make any decision. While the above critics point at the theoretical defects of the Rawlsian approach, the following points at the problem of its application. In his comments of Rawls’ theory of veil of ignorance, Thomas Nagel argued that given the diversity of interests—some of them are even conflicting—shared by the people, in order to balance these interests, much of the information needs to be veiled so that people can come up with complete agreement. But when people were so ignorant in their deliberation, “there is then a real question whether hypothetical choice under conditions of ignorance, as a representation of consent, can by itself provide a moral justification for outcomes that could not be unanimously agreed to if they were known in advance.” (Nagel 1975: 6). If a commitment is made not in one’s full capacity, but under a constrained—or even distorted—condition, how does it make sense to argue that that is one’s genuine choice? As Nagel continued, “when one justifies a policy on the ground that the affected parties would have (or even have) agreed to it, much depends on the reasons for their agreement. If it is motivated by ignorance or fear or helplessness or a defective sense of what is reasonable, then actual or possible prior agreement does not sanction anything.” (Nagel 1975: 5). This is to say, asking a person to commit to the things for the reason that “those things are what you, after thinking in a particular way that you have never thought, would have agreed to,” is not morally justified. The Rawlsian argument of empathy behind the veil of ignorance is also problematic in this regard, not because of empathy (although, one may doubt, if empathy had ever been efficaciously appealed, then NIMBY might have never existed in the first place), but because the choice to benefit the least advantaged is merely a hypothetical one, which does not look morally binding. Here, one might wish to argue, as in the case of an unconscious patient for lifesaving surgery, that we can comfortably assume that the patient would have agreed to that surgery, as if she were to be asked in an otherwise conscious, normal condition (Huemer 2013: 38). There are two replies to this argument. First, whether it is morally valid to appeal to the judgment made in a hypothetical scenario depends on whether the person concerned can normally reason. The case of the hypothetical consent of an unconscious patient is acceptable on the ground that it is simply impossible to consult her if she would consent to the surgery. But it does not seem valid to put forward a hypothetical judgment, for example in the case of consulting community members for siting a rehabilitation center in the neighborhood, because the people concerned are fully ready for consultation. There is no reason to not consult them but to appeal to a hypothetical choice that “they might have made.” Second, whether it is morally valid to appeal to the judgment made in a hypothetical 7 Thomas

Nagel has made a similar point regarding the problem of suppressing any conception of the good behind the veil of ignorance, in (1975: 8).

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scenario depends on whether the said hypothetical scenario constitutes distortion of the person’s fundamental moral and/or religious beliefs (ibid.). It is morally dubious to go ahead with a surgery in the case of an unconscious patient, who is known of opposing surgery of any kind due to religious reasons, on the ground that he would have agreed to the surgery if he does not hold those religious beliefs. Likewise, even if some community members are opposed to the siting of a rehabilitation center based on their egotistic beliefs, it still looks problematic to appeal to a hypothetical reasoning in which people would think differently. As Huemer noted, “hypotheticals that require alterations of subjects’ fundamental beliefs and values – even if some of those beliefs and values are misguided – are irrelevant to establishing morally efficacious hypothetical consent.” (Huemer 2013: 38). Now we can see why the Hong Kong government’s policy of NIMBY siting, interpreted by the Rawlsian approach, has failed to pave the way for the relocation of Zheng Sheng College. It seems attractive to convince the Mui Wo residents, especially those who opposed the relocation project, by appealing to the argument that comes from the Rawlsian approach, as this approach considers human beings as self-interested yet rational, and they would reason impartially, without being bothered by their vested interests. The conclusion that such deliberation offers looks fair to everyone and serves public interest. From the government’s point of view, the Rawlsian approach can best defend its political neutrality, so that even when the conclusion turns out, as expected, to upset some of the Mui Wo residents, these residents cannot complain that this decision is biased against them. However, the Rawlsian approach is problematic on several counts. The decision of relocating Zheng Sheng College in Mui Wo must be a unanimous agreement made by all people who deliberated behind the veil of ignorance, but the above discussion has shown that this result cannot be produced. If any conception of the good is removed in the deliberation behind the veil of ignorance as required by the Rawlsian approach, then people who reason in such a hypothetical scenario can no longer interpret the meaning of “public interest,” and hence cannot reason whether Zheng Sheng’s relocation would best serve public interest. Finally—and just as importantly, it is too difficult to convince the opponents of the relocation project to accept the decision based on a reasoning in which their held beliefs are disregarded or distorted. If the government insists on justifying the new siting of Zheng Sheng College by the Rawlsian approach, it will substantiate the claim by the opponents that the government disrespects their opinion, which will only add fuel to the fire.

The Mohist Approach This chapter proposes an alternative approach, which stems from the ethical theory of the ancient Chinese philosopher and political activist, Mozi (479–381 B.C.), to justify the siting of Zheng Sheng College, a sensitive human services NIMBY facility. The following discussion will argue that the Mohist approach is more preferable to the Rawlsian one. The Mohist approach considers the people as they are in the real world,

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i.e., they are naturally self-loving persons. It does not deny the legitimacy of self-love, but directly attends to people’s vested interest. Yet, it requires, as a moral command, that people should confine their pursuit of self-interest to the achievement of public interest.8 As in the case of Zheng Sheng College relocation project, allowing the College to site in Mui Wo should benefit both the general public and the community members, which is a win–win situation. The ideal society that Mozi aspires to achieve is one in which “inclusively care for each other, interact with and mutually benefit each other” are fully manifested. People are expected to, each in their social roles,9 take into account others’ wellbeing in one’s moral considerations, such that they do not pursue only their own benefit and thus sacrifice others’ (Chiu 2014: 204). In this regard, benefit merely for oneself or one’s social group, aka self-regarding benefit, is condemned for bringing social disorder. As cited in Chiu (2014: 204), Mozi argues that when one concerns merely self-regarding interest, one must pursue it at all costs, even at the expense of others. When everyone thinks and does the same, the whole society will end up in chaos and disorder, If a son cares for himself but does not care for his father, then he disadvantages the father and benefits himself. If a younger brother cares for himself but does not care for his older brother, then he disadvantages the older brother and benefits himself. If a minister cares for himself but does not care for his prince, then he disadvantages the prince and benefits himself. This is what is spoken of as disorder…Even if we come to the disorder that great officers bring to each other’s houses and the attacks made by the feudal lords on each other’s states, it is also the case. (Mozi 14.2; cited in Chiu 2014: 204)

Although the pursuit of mere self-regarding interest, i.e., interest characterized by consideration of only oneself or one’s local community, is harmful to the society,10 this does not follow that one should pursue no interest at all, because the problem lies in the scope of interest, not interest per se. To realize the ideal of “inclusively care for each other, interact with and mutually benefit each other,” one is required to extend the scope of interest that goes beyond mere self-regarding interest, that is, 8 It

may be suggested that Confucian benevolence and Christian love are also good candidates to serve as an alternative approach to the Rawlsian one. But these concepts must be one way or another premised on, for example, an assumption of the presence of a moral heart-mind (e.g., Confucianism), or the existence of some divine being (e.g., Christianity), which can be challenged by those who do not hold them. In contrast, although the Mohist approach holds the assumption that human beings all have concerns over their own benefit, this fits particularly well in the discussion of a NIMBY policy context, which originates in the concern over individual interest. 9 Mozi assumes that each of us plays various social roles in society and takes for granted the duties that correspond to these roles (Chiu 2014: 203). This point will be further discussed below. 10 And the pursuit of one’s self-regarding interest is harmful to oneself too, in Mozi 46.18–19. There was a man, Wu Ma Zi, who holds the view that self-regarding interest should always be preferable to other people’s interest, so that “it is possible to have them killed to benefit me, but not possible to have me killed to benefit them.” Mozi replied, “In that case, then, if one person who agrees with you, one person will want to kill you to benefit himself…If one person disagrees with you, one person will want to kill you, taking you to be a person who disseminates evil words…What benefit is there is your words?” Similar to Kant’s universalizability test, the pursuit of self-regarding interest is self-defeating and should ultimately be harmful to oneself.

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to reciprocate and share each other’s interest. In Mozi 16: 13, Mozi cited the famous Chinese idiom, “offer others a peach will be repaid with a plum,” to demonstrate that (1) it is common that people expect to have themselves concerned and looked after by others, and (2) people are inclined to requite how they are treated (Mozi 15: 4). Holding these two points together as assumptions about human psychology, here comes the Mohist approach of extending the pursuit of self-regarding interest to other-regarding interest: Everyone has one’s own interest, and it is no more natural to consider it. But if one merely looks after it, it will be harmful to oneself as well as to the whole society. Granted the two points mentioned just now, one should consider the possible reciprocal goods others will repay oneself, which will essentially benefit oneself. As an illustration, Mozi invites us to look at the case of a filial son, in Mozi 16: 13: a filial son must want other people to love and benefit, not hate and harm, his parents. Mozi asks, In this case, then, to what would I give priority in day-to-day business in order to attain this? If I were to give priority in day-to-day business to loving and benefiting the parents of others, would others subsequently requite me by loving and benefiting my parents? Or if I were to give priority in day-to-day business to hating and harming the parents of others, would others subsequently requite me by loving and benefiting my parents? Most certainly, if I were to give priority in day-to-day business to loving and benefiting the parents of others, others would subsequently requite me by loving and benefiting my parents.

When more and more people have verified, in their own experience, the currency of such a mentality in the society, more and more people will be motivated to behave according to it. There is always a good reason—be that as it may an instrumental one—to the pursuit of other-regarding interest. But this is very important to the realization of Mozi’s social ideal. As Dan Robins put it, in Mohism, to ask people to behave morally requires that doing so make practical sense to them, “if inclusive care were regularly and seriously at odds with people’s existing practical interest, then they would be unlikely to care inclusively even if they recognized that inclusive care is right.” (Robins 2012: 68; cited in Chiu 2014: 213). All this, then, is how the Mohist approach works to produce an outcome that serves public interest. In fact, Mozi argues that the way in which everyone, in each of their social positions, cares and benefits everyone else—he calls it “universal”—is the way to realize good governance, So, for the gentleman, there is nothing equal to carefully examining “universal” and assiduously practising it. It makes rulers necessarily kind, it makes ministers necessarily loyal, it makes older brothers necessarily well disposed, and it makes younger brothers necessarily respectful. And, for a gentleman, there is nothing equal to wishing to be a kind ruler, or a loyal minister, or a compassionate father, or a filial son, or a well-disposed older brother, or a respectful younger brother, so it is right that “universal” cannot but be put into practice. This was the Way of the sage kings and is of great benefit to the ten thousand people. (Mozi 16: 15)

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What makes this Mohist approach powerful is, I think, that it takes human beings as they are, i.e., they all want to benefit themselves, which provides a benefitdriven argument to practise morality.11 Seeing that the pursuit of mere self-regarding interest as eventually harmful to oneself, this Mohist approach requires one to give up pursuing this, and pursue instead other-regarding interest, which will eventually benefit oneself. Understanding the idea of interest broadly, which goes beyond merely material interests, the Mohist approach promotes also care and concern for everyone by everyone.

The Mohist Approach to Justify the Zheng Sheng College Siting The Mohist approach works differently from the Rawlsian approach, and it is not difficult to see why the former would work better in justifying Zheng Sheng College’s relocation. The Rawlsian approach, which aims at impartiality out of uncertainties, does not consider the concerns over one’s vested interest as legitimate, so all these concerns are taken out of sight in the reasoning. Justifying the new siting this way makes the government prone to the criticism that they being not able to put their feet into the residents’ shoes. The Mohist approach, however, listens to the residents, directly addresses their concerns, and attends to their interest. In order to persuade the residents to accept the relocation, the government goes no further than to ask them to care about other-regarding interest, yet by doing so, the government still looks after the residents’ welfare. The government may reason with the opposing Mui Wo residents, as follows: First of all, if you are to resist the arrival of the Zheng Sheng students for your mere self-regarding interest, then you will not treat the students in a friendly way. But if so, it does not seem realistic to expect the students to like you and be good to you. On the contrary, if you could warmly welcome the students, care for them, present them a peach, there is also no reason why the students will not repay you with a plum, which will ultimately benefit you. Secondly, if there are legitimate other-regarding concerns, like public health and/or security issues, the government should carefully deal with them, for example, by providing some facilities wanted by the local community to balance their benefits and burdens, which will, again, benefit each of the community members. Last but not least, when the residents and the students are able to treat one another in good terms, there will be a more harmonious atmosphere in the neighborhood, which should contribute to a lower crime rate, and thus to better defend the property value. The government may also help the Zheng Sheng students according to the Mohist approach. For example, the government may encourage the students to offer the community new services, which is to show that they are assets, not burdens, to the community. Here, the Mohist reasoning is that 11 It

is important to clarify here that Mozi by no means thinks that obtaining benefits is what all people only want. People can still act morally simply because they think doing so is proper in itself. For more details, please refer to Fraser (2008).

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the students can do something that benefits others, which will ultimately benefit themselves. In taking the Mohist approach, the government may be prone to criticism of threatening the residents, warning them to be careful about the price they would otherwise pay, should they not be kind to the Zheng Sheng students. But it is important to note that, the matter of presentation aside, what the government does is only to request the people concerned to anticipate the possible scenarios, with contrasting results, all of which are causal to the very interest of the people themselves, and all of which attribute to their attitudes and actions toward others. The Mohist approach is no more than an appeal to prudence, asking people to consider the effects their decisions may bring ultimately to themselves. In any case, it would be off the mark to describe the government’s action as threatening, having an intention to inflict retribution upon the people. And there is one more point from the Mohist approach. In order to realize the ideal of “inclusively care for each other, interact with and mutually benefit each other,” not only people are encouraged to pursue other-regarding interest and thus care, love, and benefit one another, they are also required to do all these in their capacity as the social roles they play. People belonging to the superior positions, e.g., government officials and social, community leaders, are expected to shoulder a greater duty in the promotion of other-regarding interest.12 Notwithstanding the differences between the Mohist socio-political system and that of contemporary Hong Kong, the point that greater responsibility is expected from the social and community leaders is commonly shared. According to the report by the Equal Opportunity Commission on the difficulty of the choice of siting of rehabilitation centers for patients and rehabs of mental illness, community leaders in neighborhoods where NIMBY is sited should play a stronger role in the public consultation exercise, in at least two ways, first, offer their support to the rehabilitation services; second, serve as a bridge between the government and the residents (EOC 2016: 131–132). These leaders should help to clarify people’s misunderstanding toward, for example, rehabilitation for mental illness or drug addiction, help disseminate accurate information about the relocation projects to their community members, and more importantly, reason with the community members according to the Mohist approach.

12 Here, I refer to the Mohist concept of “Exalting Unity”, the details of which will not be discussed

in this chapter. Briefly, the idea is that all positions in the socio-political hierarchies are also an ethical hierarchy. The leader of the entire state is, in theory, the most virtuous, who selects the next virtuous to assist her in the administration of the state, as well as the defence of right and wrong. More socio-political positions are created until the whole set of socio-political system is ready to accommodate the needs. The crux is that all positions below ought to follow the moral standard of their superiors. In this sense, I argue that in Mohism, the people of superior positions are expected to shoulder greater moral duty (Mozi 11:2–11:3).

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Conclusion By no means, this chapter wants to put forward a claim that the Mohist approach will guarantee the Zheng Sheng College relocation a success.13 The position this chapter wishes to develop has been that, in conducting public consultation with community members over the siting of a sensitive human services NIMBY facility, as in the case of the Zheng Sheng College episode, what the government has done, understood in terms of the Rawlsian approach, brought only little hope of success, because of the reasons provided above, which include the theoretical defects of the approach itself, and the impression it brings that the voices of the people concerned are not truly heard. In this light, this chapter proposes an alternative approach, the Mohist approach, which directly addresses and appeals to the vested interest the people hold, yet to reason with them that only by defending other-regarding interest, rather than their mere self-regarding interest, can essentially benefit themselves. Justifying the new siting of Zheng Sheng College by the Mohist approach will, by impression at least, show more respect to the community members, which will better convince them to accept the new siting. As revealed in the Zheng Sheng College episode, to demonstrate that the government does not only hear people’s voice but also listen to them is especially important in the cases where there is little public participation in the policymaking process. Therefore, this chapter calls for a change of strategy in the justification of the siting of sensitive human services NIMBY facilities. What is more, referring to the Politics-Justice-Governance model, the political controversy in the Zheng Sheng episode essentially involves the rehab juveniles and the local residents of which the rehabilitation school would be relocated. Both parties were largely interest-driven to the conflict: The Zheng Sheng students wanted a new venue that could fully accommodate them as well as enable them to engage in a local community, whereas the Mui Wo residents, out of perceived risks of security and/or simple discrimination against the drug rehabilitees, held strong opposition to the students. This chapter argued that political settlement was not reached because the justificatory approach of the siting that the government adopted did not attend to the interests of the parties concerned. In the perspective of justice and social values, this chapter showed that ignoring consideration of vested interest in justifying the siting did not provide a good resolution. What seems counter-intuitive but illuminating is that the approach that can bring more hope to settling the controversy should be one that openly yet rightfully considers each stakeholder’s personal benefit. Manifestation of justice is surely important, yet an efficacious justification cannot be achieved by a conception of justice that appeals to impartiality, which neglects people’s vested interest. There should also be clear demonstration of genuine respect of the stakeholders in the pursuit of a just settlement to a land use conflict. In the governance perspective, in order to obtain most if not full political support and thereby to achieve 13 According to a report by the Equal Opportunity Commission, in some cases of public consultation on the siting of rehabilitation centers for mental rehabs, the exercise has, regrettably, become a public endorsement exercise, i.e., until there was “not a single person opposed the plan”, the relocation project was still put on hold (EOC 2016: 97).

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good governance, the way to justify a policy needs not only to be just but also to pay proper respect to the people concerned, understood as being attentive to their legitimate interest. Good governance, in this light, requires both manifestation of justice as well as respect for people, but both should not only be done but should be manifestly seen to be done.

Bibliography Apple Daily. (2009) 梅窩居民拒正生書院港府籲理性包容別讓孩子哭 https://hk.news.appled aily.com/local/daily/article/20090615/12877681. Accessed September 9, 2018. Chan, K. M. (2002). Resistance of the Neighbourhood Community to the AIDS Treatment Facilities— Case study of Kowloon Bay Health Centre. Hong Kong: Red Ribbon Centre. Chiu, W. (2014). Assessment of Li in the Mencius and Mozi. Dao, 13, 199–214. Department of Community Planning and Economic Development, Minneapolis. (2011). Siting public facilities: A guide for the city of Minneapolis. Minneapolis: Department of Community Planning and Economic Development. Dworkin, R. (1975). The original position. In N. Daniels (Ed.), Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls’ A theory of justice (pp. 16–53). New York: Basic Books. Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC). (2016) Study on the challenges encountered in the Siting of Integrated Community Centres for mental wellness and other social welfare facilities in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: EOC. Fraser, C. (2008). Moism and self-interest. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 35(3), 437–454. Gert, B. (2005). Morality: Its nature and justification (Revised ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. Hong Kong Economic Journal. (2009). 正生書院遷梅窩居民激烈反對. http://forum.hkej.com/ node/15584. Accessed September 9, 2018. Hong Kong Government. (2009a). 立法會: 保安局局長就基督教正生書院遷往梅窩前鄉議局南 約區中學事宜動議辯論發言. http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200906/25/P200906250262. htm. Accessed September 9, 2018. Hong Kong Government. (2009b). 立法會:教育局局長就基督教正生會申請重置院舍和書院 往梅窩前鄉議局南約區中學休會待續辯論議案演辭.http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200 906/25/P200906250219.htm. Accessed September 9, 2018. Hong Kong Government. (2010). LCQ19: Christian Zheng Sheng College. http://www.info.gov.hk/ gia/general/201004/21/P201004210198.htm. Accessed September 9, 2018. Hong Kong Housing Authority. Public housing development. https://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/ linear/en/about-us/public-housing-heritage/public-housing-development/index.html. Accessed September 9, 2018. Hong Kong Legislative Council. (2010) Background brief prepared by the legislative council secretariat for the meeting on 18 March 2010: Education for young drug abusers. LC Paper No. CB(2)1085/09-10(04). Huemer, M. (2013). The problem of political authority: An examination of the right to coerce and the duty to obey. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. I-Cable. (2018, July 13). 新聞刺針: 精神健康中心落戶有幾難?https://www.facebook.com/news. lancet/. Accessed September 9, 2018. Johnston, I. (trans.). (2010). The Mozi: A complete translation. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Li, Z. 黎梓緯. (2016) 遷校無期 暫盼改善工程紓困 陳兆焯:前路還很長. https://www.hk01. com/%E7%A4%BE%E6%9C%83%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E/58906/%E6%AD%A3%E7% 94%9F%E8%BF%91%E6%B3%81-%E9%81%B7%E6%A0%A1%E7%84%A1%E6%9C% 9F-%E6%9A%AB%E7%9B%BC%E6%94%B9%E5%96%84%E5%B7%A5%E7%A8%8B%

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E7%B4%93%E5%9B%B0-%E9%99%B3%E5%85%86%E7%84%AF-%E5%89%8D%E8% B7%AF%E9%82%84%E5%BE%88%E9%95%B7. Accessed September 9, 2018. Mingpao. (2011, February 13). 24 精神康復中心阻撓多僅 6 間落戶. https://www.e123.hk/Elderl yPro/details/52647/75. Accessed 9 September 2018. Nagel, T. (1975). Rawls on justice. In N. Daniels (Ed.), Reading Rawls: Critical studies on Rawls’ A theory of justice (pp. 1–16). New York: Basic Books. Oriental Daily. (2009, June 8). 梅窩擬開戒毒校群情洶湧. http://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/200 90608/00176_004.html. Accessed September 9, 2018. Oriental Daily. (2018, 5 January). 中環出更:幫學生買鞋 陳兆焯食住包暴走商場. http://orient aldailyon.cc/cnt/news/20180105/00176_130.html. Accessed September 9, 2018. Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice (Revised ed.). Cambridge: The Belknap Press. Robins, D. (2012). Mohist care. Philosophy East and West, 62(1), 60–91. Roche, C., Waller, B., & Wentland, S. (2014). Not in my backyard: The effect of substance abuse treatment centers on property values. Journal of Sustainable Real Estate, 6(2), 63–92. RTHK. (2009). 議事論事: 正生書院遷校風波. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T4nF8D PLrE4. Accessed September 9, 2018. The Hong Kong Joint Council of Parents of the Mentally Handicapped. 細說當年: 東頭邨. https:// www.hkjcpmh.org.hk/zh-hant/estate. Accessed September 9, 2018. The Journal Gazette. (2016, November 17). Neighbors Oppose Rehab Center. http://www.journalga zette.net/news/local/Neighbors-oppose-rehab-center-12783703. Accessed September 9, 2018. The Mental Health Association of Hong Kong. 香港心理衞生會 – 大事年表 http://www.mhahk. org.hk/chi/sub1_6.htm. Accessed September 9, 2018. Winnipeg Free Press. (2018, August 20). Harsh opposition to Bruce Oake Recovery Centre plan. https://www.winnipegfreepress.com/our-communities/metro/Harsh-opposition-torecovery-centre-plan-491267971.html. Accessed September 9, 2018. Zheng Sheng Association. http://www.zhengsheng.org.hk/about.html. Accessed September 9, 2018.

Chapter 11

A Critical Assessment of Voluntary Siting Mechanism in Dealing with NIMBYism: From Canada to Hong Kong Francis K. T. Mok

Abstract The voluntary siting mechanism as practiced in several Canadian provinces appears to be able to suggest a way by which sites for hosting LULU (locally unwanted land uses) are effectively and fairly selected. By examining the replicability of such a novel siting mechanism in the context of Hong Kong, we can understand better its merits as well as its limitations. It will be argued that there is strong tension between its replicability and its justifiability.

Introduction: NIMBYism as a Key Issue in Land Justice NIMBYism or the NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) syndrome can be witnessed in almost all communities trying to build or to expand socially needed but politically unpopular facilities such as waste disposal facilities, power plants, crematorium, columbarium, and mental patients clinic. Hong Kong is no exception. Attempts to persuade residents to host such ‘locally unwanted land uses’ (LULUs) always breed frustration, antagonism, and protest (see the section NIMBY as Land Controversies in Chapter One). As mentioned in Chapter One, siting of LULU is inherently problematic because the resulting distribution of costs and benefits is bound to be unequal, with the socioeconomic benefits shared by the society at large but the environmental burden shouldered mainly by the local community. Where those unwanted but necessary facilities should be built, how the sites should be selected, and who should bear the burden of hosting those facilities are perennial issues of land justice. Very often, failures to identify willing hosts were attributed to inadequate consultation and flawed decision-making process. But is it just a matter of more or less consultation? Could local residents really be convinced? Some even wonder if there exists a consultation process or decision procedure that would work. Those who are skeptical of the viability of a voluntary and open consultation process might even think that siting is bound to be paternalistic. But the good news is that there are F. K. T. Mok (B) Department of Social Sciences, The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_11

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successful examples of siting process in North America through which residents of local towns showed their overwhelming agreement to host a hazardous waste treatment facility. If they were really successful, they could be seen as perfect example of procedural justice where siting decision can be regarded as just if certain steps in the consultation process are followed and some critical components are included in the decision-making mechanism. However, the question is whether or not those encouraging examples, especially the factors contributing to their success, were unique to North America. What we want to know is the degree of replicability and desirability of the ‘workable’ siting processes they have adopted. In this chapter, I will examine the cases of ‘successes’ in Canada and identify the factors leading to solid political support in the local communities. The reasons of doing so are of two-fold: first, to determine what Hong Kong can learn from foreign cases in revising her conventional siting process; second, and more importantly, to illustrate the limitations and hidden defects of a successful siting mechanism renowned for its high level of voluntary participation. In other words, the chapter will serve two purposes: the practical purpose of identifying viable alternatives as far as siting process is concerned and the theoretical purpose of assessing procedural justice (counting on citizens’ initiatives and voluntary consent) as a proxy or approximation of environmental justice. In so doing, it can illustrate the Politics-Justice-Governance Model by drawing our attention to the limits of seemingly fair procedures and showing how substantive injustice may be sustained in the name of procedural justice.

Background: NIMBYism in Hong Kong To begin with, let us take note of the unique geographical and topographical features of Hong Kong as captured by a group of researchers familiar with the local siting process: Given the prevailing easterly wind, most major air polluting sources are located in the western part of Hong Kong. Topographical and water circulation considerations have also excluded certain districts, such as Shatin, as potential sites for major air and water discharge facilities. Hence, it would probably be undesirable, at least from the environmental perspective, to equally distribute environmental LULUs across the 18 districts of Hong Kong. (Lam et al. 2011, p. 170)

This can explain why most of the notorious LULUs of Hong Kong are not evenly distributed but instead concentrated in two districts, Tuen Mun and Tseung Kwan O. For example, Tuen Mun (TM) is home to one of the Hong Kong’s two power stations, one of its three strategic landfills, an aviation fuel receiving facility, plus a steel plant, a cement plant, and a waste recycling plant. Whereas Tseung Kwan O (TKO) used to be landfill sites starting from the 1970s, it is currently home to the South East New Territories landfill, another one of the three strategic landfills, in spite of its development into a major new town with over 300,000 people in the last two decades (Woo and Lam 2008, p. 3).

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Given these facts, it would not be a surprise to find that residents in these two districts found it unfair to have these facilities imposed on them. According to a survey conducted in 2007/8, when asked to respond to the statement ‘LULUs have to be sited in your district for the benefit of Hong Kong,’ 73.5 and 66.3% of the residents of TM and TKO, respectively, regarded it as unfair or very unfair (Lam and Woo 2009, p. 861). It was also revealed in the same survey that most residents (68% of the people of TM and 81% of that of TKO) recognized the need of Hong Kong as a whole to have landfills. But only 12.5 and 21% of residents of these two districts felt the need of their own district to have landfill (Woo and Lam 2008, p. 4). It is typical NIMBYism. Besides, the survey results suggested that the level of trust between residents and the government was rather low. Only about 30% of the residents found the government trustworthy or very trustworthy in siting matters. It is in deep contrast to the 60% of residents who found the community and green groups trustworthy or very trustworthy (Woo and Lam 2008, p. 7). Against such a background, it is just natural for researchers and stakeholders concerned with siting of LULUs in Hong Kong to call for a ‘new public engagement strategy … [with] frequent, open and continuous interactions between the authority and the local community,’ (Lam et al. 2011, p. 9) ‘more participative decision-making process,’ (Lam and Woo 2009, p. 868) and ‘institutional change of the siting decisionmaking process from top-down DAD [i.e., Decide-Announce-Defend] to a more community involved public participatory approach.’ (Liu and Yau 2014, p. 30). While it is obvious to everyone that the top-down approach is not going to work, it is not at all clear what alternative siting procedures would work and how, even with more public consultation and participation, social facilities ‘unwanted’ before could be turned into something ‘acceptable’ to and even ‘wanted’ by local residents. It would certainly be a breakthrough if an innovative mechanism could be devised to overcome the deadlock created by NIMBYism in site selection.

Concepts: The Idea of Voluntarism and the Alternative Siting Mechanism in North America The first major breakthrough was the siting process in 1980s by which residents of Swan Hills (in Alberta, Canada) overwhelmingly gave their consent to host a hazardous waste treatment facility. Following this breakthrough, many cities in North America tried to replicate the successful experience of Swan Hills, though with limited successes. Now let us take a good look at the case of Swan Hills. It is a town 209 km northeast of Edmonton, the capital city of Alberta, Canada. The population was about 2400 in early 1980s when the Alberta provincial government started to try a novel way to find a site for the disposal of hazardous waste produced by the province. The siting process commenced in early 1981. After a rigorous public engagement process, residents of Swan Hills voted in favor of building a waste treatment facility in their town in September 1982. This siting decision was formally endorsed by the

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provincial authority in March 1984. Three years later, the facility named Swan Hills Special Waste Treatment Centre started to operate in September 1987. Since then, it has been expanded several times. To understand the procedures and mechanisms resulting in such a siting success, we need to take note of the following key words or key factors: (i) voluntary initiative, (ii) intensive and extensive involvement, (iii) empowerment, and (iv) veto power. Details are as follows. First of all, no city would be identified (let alone selected) as site for LULU simply because outsiders, whether government officials or private companies, consider them suitable. The suitability of a city would only be preliminarily assessed upon reception of her explicit expression of interest. In other words, voluntary initiative of the city concerned is a prerequisite to the formal assessment of her suitability of hosting a site for LULU. As a first step, instead of announcing which cities are already being considered by the government (usually upon expert advices), the government would invite any city interested in being a host to come forward and to explore further their feasibility. That is why it is also called ‘invitational siting’ (Huitema 2009, p. 124). In the early stage of the siting process, Alberta Environment officials conducted more than 120 informational meetings in various counties and municipalities to respond to concerns of residents, to brief them on the hazardous waste situation in the province, to provide information about the criteria of site selection (Rabe 1991, p. 191). 70 communities were identified as possible hosts after a series of information giving and sharing. 52 of them proceeded to ask for further investigation of their suitability. Experts comprising geographers and cartographers then conducted a detailed assessment of their soils, hydrology, and terrain before determining their feasibility of hosting a site. At the same time, citizens’ committees were formed in each community to study all relevant information and to discuss the merits and demerits of being a host. As recalled by Margaret Hanson, then mayor of Swan Hills, ‘These gatherings were held every week over a twelveweek period and every Swan Hills resident was actively encouraged to attend at least two of them. All relevant provincial and local officials were available at these meetings to discuss any aspect of the proposal.’ (Rabe 1991, p. 192). Not surprisingly, many communities subsequently dropped out because of either environmental concerns or lack of local support. Fourteen of them, however, chose to go ahead to explore further their feasibility. Five communities eventually reached the final phase of the siting process—community endorsement through referendum. The proposal of hosting a hazardous waste treatment center was endorsed with overwhelming support in three communities, namely Swan Hills, Ryley, and Veteran, with 79, 77, and 70%, respectively, of votes in favor of the proposal. It would not be an exaggeration to say that there was genuine ‘competition’ among communities for being selected to host the waste treatment facility. It can be explained, at least partly, by the wide range of expected benefits and support. In the case of Swan Hills, they anticipated that there would be a creation of 55 new jobs and an injection of $45–$50 million (US) capital investment arising directly from construction of the facility. In the siting process, the siting authority provided them a grant of about $100,000 to cover expenses for town meetings and the hiring of external independent experts to review the proposal. There was also funding for

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the town to hire a permanent consultant to evaluate monitoring data and subsidized housing for about 35 family units. Besides, the private corporation responsible for operating the waste treatment center would provide fund to support sports (e.g., golf course development), education, and cultural activities; planting of trees; and provision of special medical surveillance program for all employees working at the facility (Rabe 1991, p. 193; Tammemagi 1999, pp. 237–8). Since the operation of the waste treatment center in 1987, Swan Hills actually experienced a period of relative prosperity: 86 new jobs created; major increase in housing starts; opening of a new hospital with 25 beds; construction of new office complex; upgrade of water supply facilities; new industries attracted by the waste treatment center; and, somewhat unexpected, tourists eager to visit the facility (Rabe 1991, p. 197). The latest update is that the facility is employing 110 people, out of the current population of about 1300.1 It should be clear by now why and how the siting procedures and mechanism as adopted in the case of Swan Hills can bring about ‘successes.’ It is successful in the sense that within a reasonable timeframe a site can really be found, but without any community feeling that a siting decision was imposed on them, and with almost all stakeholders getting more or less what they want. Perhaps the only party deeply disappointed with the decision was the residents of Ryley (as mentioned above, 77% of them voted in support of hosting the facility in the final referendum) who was ultimately not chosen to host the facility. However, the importance of this case is not just that in terms of consequence, a socially useful facility built and almost all stakeholders were satisfied. From the institutional and procedural perspective, the most precious lesson of Swan Hills is that there is a practical path to achieve fairness in the siting of LULU as long as certain mechanisms and procedures are followed. In fact, key elements of the siting process in Swan Hills can be seen as mechanisms deliberately installed to defend against potential charges of unfairness. Firstly, the necessity of having voluntary initiative was to make sure that the siting process from day one was bottom-up rather than top-down, so that it would once and for all be free from the usual charge of having a siting decision imposed on a reluctant community. Secondly, early and sustained participation of residents through attending informational meetings, access to expert opinions, and participation in town meetings suggested that they were well-informed and deeply involved starting from the beginning of the siting process, hence diffusing criticism that siting decision was made in a black box where local residents were largely excluded. Thirdly, with financial support in organizing town meetings and hiring independent consultants, residents were not only encouraged to participate but actually empowered to make an informed judgment on the feasibility of their community. It can forcefully address the common critique that residents were misled and manipulated in a merely formal consultation process. Finally, after several rounds of exploration and deliberation, an overwhelming consensus of the community has to be obtained through a referendum. To confer such a veto power to local residents is to give them the real and final say. In going through this step, they can develop a sense of ownership, rather than a sense of 1 http://www.townofswanhills.com/lifestyle/tourism/alberta-special-waste-treatment-facility.

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alienation, towards the facility. To recapitulate, the siting decision made in the case of Swan Hills was considered fair because the specially designed procedures made sure that local residents were not excluded and manipulated in the siting process.

Preliminary Assessment: Tests of Replicability and Justifiability In light of the successful experience of Alberta, other provinces in North America including Minnesota, Manitoba, and Ontario followed suit by bringing in similar mechanism and procedure in their siting processes. Most of them eventually found a suitable site for LULU. However, two queries always come up. One is about replicability, that is, to what extent the set of procedures that worked in Swan Hills can be applied to other places; another is about justifiability, especially whether or not the invitational siting procedures can really bring about justice. Here are some figures showing how eager local communities in three Canadian provinces were in being considered as host to LULUs: Swan Hills, Alberta

Montcalm, Manitoba

Deep River, Ontario

Starting year of siting

1982

1986

1987

Type of LULU to be sited

Hazardous waste treatment center

Hazardous waste treatment center

Low-level radioactive waste treatment center

No. of communities with initial interest

55

60

26

No. of communities with final interest

3

2

2

Pushchak and Rocha (1998, pp. 30–31)

Those who are pessimistic would find these figures not impressive and contend that the so-called successful examples were only rare and isolated cases which may not work in the majority of siting cases. They would probably agree with Pushchak and Rocha that ‘… it is not the small number of volunteer communities that is the issue but the large number of communities that have chosen not to volunteer.’ (Pushchak and Rocha 1998, p. 30). But to be fair, we have to remember that what are being sited are by definition ‘unwanted’ land uses, it would be unrealistic and unreasonable to expect that through some magical procedures something ‘unwanted’ could be transformed into something ‘wanted’ by the majority. As long as we can think alternatively that it is exactly the small number of volunteer communities that is the issue, we may be more able to appreciate the success of making normally unwanted land uses into something moderately wanted or only slightly unwanted by a small minority. The above figures in fact suggest that the case of Swan Hills is replicable because a small number of communities in other provinces can really be persuaded to ‘compete’ for hosting an otherwise ‘unwanted’ land use.

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Next, we need to address the claim that the voluntary procedures as practiced in Swan Hills, though effective in finding a site, fail to achieve justice as it is far from voluntary. The usual criticism is that only those communities suffering from social and economic deprivations would ‘volunteer’ to participate in the siting process; hence, the ‘voluntariness’ of their participation is in doubt. But was it the case in Swan Hills and other Canadian towns? It was not, if we only look at some common economic indicators. For instance, the median household income of Swan Hills in 1981 was $29,000 (Canadian), which was higher than both the neighboring towns and the provincial median of $24,500 (Baxter 2007, pp. 7–8). The per capita income of Montcalm ranked 8th out of 21 rural districts in Manitoba in 1988. And her 4.1% unemployment rate compared very favorably with the provincial figure of 7.8% (Castle and Munton 1996, p. 78). Obviously, those cities most eager to host unwanted facilities were not really the ones which were most poor and deprived. As a result, the argument that the apparently ‘voluntary’ siting mechanism is only taking advantage of those towns suffering from deprivation and destitution would be hard to establish. However, we need to make an important distinction here. Absence of relative deprivation and destitution is one thing, and freedom from vulnerability is quite another. For sure, the Canadian towns willing to host unwanted facilities fared pretty well in terms of household income and employment rate, but if we look behind those impressive figures, we will realize that they were vulnerable in significant ways. As a matter of fact, the community of Swan Hills was evolved from a petroleum exploration camp in the early 1950s. Its economy since then was heavily dependent on oil and gas extraction activities. The bright side was that they can count on oil companies to provide a substantial portion of full-time jobs, and some of them were quite wellpaid. That’s why the median household income of Swan Hills was generally higher than the provincial average. But the down side was that oil industry was cyclical by nature. The volume of oil to be extracted and processed, and hence the manpower needed, was directly affected by the ups and downs of international oil prices. Swan Hills therefore has to live with a ‘boom-and-bust economy.’ The result of economic fluctuations was high proportion of mobile homes and transient population (Castle and Munton 1996, p. 61). To have economic stability and long-term prosperity, they need to have a diversified economy. One option of economic diversification available to them in early 1980s was to take in a waste treatment facility which can directly provide jobs and attract further investments. Montcalm was different from Swan Hills in that it used to be an agricultural town and was famous for its food processing plants. However, just like oil and gas industry, agriculture was also cyclical. Montcalm was suffering from an economic downturn in the 1980s because of dropping crop prices resulting from international competition. As the town was losing job opportunities, people were also leaving. The population of Montcalm dropped drastically from 2500 to 1600 in one decade. Desperately in need of economic diversification, two third of the residents voted in favor of hosting a hazardous waste facility in the referendum held in September 1991 (Castle and Munton 1996, pp. 69–71). In Ontario’s voluntary siting process for a low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) treatment facility, Deep River turned out to be the only city willing to host the facility. However, her

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‘willingness’ was compromised by the fact that the job market and local economy of Deep River was already relying heavily on nuclear industry, notably the Chalk River nuclear research station in the neighborhood. What’s even worse is that residents of Deep River were informed that taking in the LLRW facility was integral to keeping the 2300 jobs offered by the nuclear research station already there (Pushchak and Rocha 1998, p 30). In a way, the residents of Deep River were accustomed to a not very environmentally friendly neighborhood. These three Canadian towns were strictly speaking not in destitution; they were willing to host land uses unwanted by others not out of mere survival and decent minimum level of well-being. So the judgment that they have no choice but to take in those unwanted facilities is not warranted. But to say that they were ‘willing’ and ‘voluntary’ hosts is also far from the truth. Certainly, the site process was voluntary in that there was no coercion, intimidation, deception, or manipulation. However, when we inquire into why they were particularly ‘interested’ in being selected as hosts, we cannot evade the fact that they were either (a) facing real threats of economic decline and instability (in the case of Swan Hills and Montcalm) or (b) already living with other unwanted land uses (in the case of Deep River). The former suggests that local residents would probably be more ‘willing’ to accept environmental risks if it is needed to offset other social and economic risks. If ‘other things being equal,’ it is hard to imagine that any community would be especially eager to volunteer in taking up extra risks. In other words, we can reasonably expect a few communities to come forward to go through the ‘voluntary’ siting process and even to compete for being hosts if we are pretty sure that some communities are obviously in disadvantaged position. If it is the case, the availability of ‘willing’ hosts and the ‘success’ of voluntary siting procedures would be largely dependent on the fact that there is significant difference among communities in terms of their vulnerability to economic threats and fluctuations. Another point is about the possibility that ‘willingness’ to take in unwanted land uses may not be the product of rational and impartial assessment of environmental risks. As we all know, how people perceive and assess risks is affected not just by the amount of information and expert opinions provided to them in the siting process but also the background level of risks they have been living with. As in the case of Deep River, residents’ perception of the risks of taking in a low-level radioactive waste treatment facility must, in one way or another, have been affected by the existence of a nuclear research station in the neighborhood (not to mention that it was already a major job provider). Similarly, in Manitoba’s siting process, the eagerness of Pinawa, a town of 2100 residents located 90 km northeast of Winnipeg, to be selected can partially be explained by the presence of a ‘sizable concentration of technically-skilled residents accustomed to environmental risk [generated by] the Whiteshell Nuclear Research Establishment’ (Rabe 1991, p. 202) already operated in the neighborhood. Of course, there is a chance that residents of Deep River and Pinawa were actually more well-informed and knowledgeable of environmental risks because of their previous experiences, willing or reluctant, in dealing with nuclear risks arising from the nuclear facilities already there. However, it is equally likely that the more familiar they are with a higher than normal level of background risks, the

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less would be the marginal fear and costs they feel towards an additional, but not more serious, risks. It is in this sense that familiarity would probably breed insensitivity to danger and a distorted perception of risks. Replicability of the voluntary siting procedures as ‘successfully’ practiced in Swan Hills depends very much on the fact that a small number of communities are more receptive to environmental risks. But we need to note that such an unusual receptivity may in turn depend on the significant difference in background risks imposed on or taken up by different community in the first place. In order to pass the test of replicability, siting authority has to make sure that there are a small number of ‘volunteers’ to stay in the siting process until the final referendum. However, the above assessment suggests that availability of willing hosts is premised on the presence of significant background inequality between communities in either socioeconomic threats and opportunities or environmental risks, or both. Of course, background inequalities would not directly entail background injustices. But the justifiability of the Albertan type of siting mechanism would certainly be undermined if it is counting on the fact that some communities are in an especially vulnerable position. To understand this point, it would be helpful to bring in John Rawls’ notion of ‘veil of ignorance.’ (Rawls 2001, pp. 15–18). He contends that it is extremely difficult for people in actual circumstances to enter into agreement over social and political issues because in the process of deliberation their claims and positions would be biased towards the principles and institutions most favorable to their own socioeconomic background. Even if there is an (ad hoc) agreement, it would probably be a product of strategic and prudential considerations instead of an impartial consideration of interests of all concerned; hence, it could not claim to be fair. Only a hypothetical agreement reached in an imaginary situation where all stakeholders can put aside any knowledge of their background (e.g., race, gender, and religion), strength and weakness, tastes and preferences, etc., as if they deliberated behind a ‘veil of ignorance,’2 could be regarded as fair and justifiable. It follows from this Rawlsian concern that the ‘voluntary consent’ given by residents clearly aware of their vulnerabilities, that is, without the protection of some kind of ‘veil of ignorance,’ cannot be regarded as impartial and therefore not justifiable. As a result, there is a real tension between replicability and justifiability. And the cases discussed above demonstrated further that replicability of ‘successful’ siting procedures may only be achieved at the expense of their justifiability. The presence of background inequalities may of course undermine the defensibility of the voluntary siting mechanism, but it is only a contingent problem because it can in principle be solved by reducing the inequalities to a minimum. However, there is another problem which is inherent to any siting mechanism appealing to community participation and deliberation. Certainly, no one would object to the general principle that people living close to the unwanted facility have to be consulted and 2 It is a conceptual device suggested by John Rawls who

contended that deliberations among stakeholders often fail to reach genuine consensus because participants are biased by their knowledge, positions, and vested interests. He therefore argued that fruitful discussions and fair decisions could be made only if stakeholders can imagine that in the process of deliberation they forget their stakes as if they were behind a ‘veil of ignorance’.

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involved in the siting process. But the real question is: ‘what counts as a reasonable distance from a facility to warrant participation in the decision process and negotiation for compensation?’ (Baxter 2007, p. 6) The people of Swan Hills, which are 15 km from the proposed site, should of course be involved. But it is hard to claim that it was exclusively the business of the people of Swan Hills. What about those living in Kinuso and Fort Assiniboine, which are both 70 km away from the site? People living in these neighboring towns may also be entitled to a say because ‘the spillover effect, whether they are positive or negative, may not be confined to local spatial and administrative boundaries.’ (Lesbirel 2011, p. 832). Unlike Swan Hills which has long been a resource town relying on oil and gas industry, Kinuso and Fort Assiniboine are predominantly agricultural and hunting community, respectively. While the benefits and subsidies provided can be specified for residents of Swan Hills only, any environmental risks and burdens cannot be kept within the boundary of Swan Hills. So, one may wonder how residents of Kinuso and Fort Assiniboine would vote if they were also given a say in the siting process. In fact, according to a survey conducted in 2002, 91% of the people of Kinuso and 54% of those living in Fort Assiniboine opposed the waste treatment facility (Baxter 2007, p. 8). It follows that the deliberations and the decision in the siting process would be entirely different if we define the ‘communities’ concerned differently. More importantly, the voluntary siting mechanism can give rise to a procedurally fair siting decision on condition that the scope of the community or communities to be involved in the siting process is regarded as fair and inclusive enough. But this question of scope is inherently controversial and cannot be resolved by appealing to other procedures.

Further Assessment: Applicability of the Voluntary Siting Procedures in the Case of Hong Kong In the last section, I started by considering the successful replications of voluntary siting mechanism as used in Swan Hills and went on to consider if the conditions favorable to its replications would coincide or contradict with the conditions of its justifiability. Now let us return to the case of Hong Kong. By assessing the applicability of voluntary siting mechanism in Hong Kong, we would not only know more about the replicability of this mechanism but also its limitations and hidden problems. First of all, Hong Kong is, needless to say, not comparable to any Canadian province. If Alberta, with about 4 million people sharing 640,000 km2 , is as big as any European country or a province in Mainland China, Hong Kong, with a population of 7.3 million residing in merely 1105 km2 , is smaller than any major Chinese cities. With such a huge geographical and demographic difference, it is easy to understand why Alberta, in the early stage of the siting process, can make initial contacts with 1500 communities, out of which 55 showed interest and 3 finally held referendums (Pushchak and Rocha 1998, p. 31). Whereas in Hong Kong, if the government is to invite volunteers to host a LULU, all she could look forward to are

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the 18 administrative districts, whose size ranging from 6.99 km2 (Yau Tsim Mong) to 175 km2 (Islands), and with a population density of 44,864 and 825 people per km, respectively. Together with the topographical obstacles mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, no one would realistically expect that there are many suitable sites in Hong Kong for waste treatment facility. However, as in the Canadian siting process, we may just want to have a few candidates to volunteer and to come forward to explore their feasibility of being hosts. The next concern is the capability of the citizens of Hong Kong to go through the Canadian type of voluntary siting procedures. In this regard, Hong Kong is a quite prosperous city with a per capita GDP of HK$339,531 (or US$43,681) and homeownership rate of 50%, and resided by a pretty well-educated population of which 32% acquired post-secondary education. Together with a vibrant civil society and an extended period (starting in mid-1980s) of political participations in local and territory-wide elections, we have a good reason to believe that average citizen of Hong Kong has the necessary knowledge, skills, and temperament to exercise properly the powers and responsibilities granted them in the process. The third thing to note is the degree of background inequalities between potential volunteers, that is, the 18 administrative districts of Hong Kong. According to the latest by-census conducted in 2016, the overall median monthly household income for all districts taken together is $25,200. As expected, there are significant differences across districts. There are seven districts whose median monthly household income is lower than the overall figure. For instance, the figure of Tuen Mun, the district with several LULUs, is 22,500. Sham Shui Po has the lowest figure of 20,600 while the highest figure of 40,000 goes to Wan Chai district. Regarding educational attainment, 32% of the whole population is in possession of post-secondary degrees. However, there are three districts whose figures are only 23–24%; they are Wong Tai Sin, Kwun Tong, and North. The districts on the Hong Kong Island, namely Central and Western, Wan Chai, and Eastern, are the most well-educated districts with over 40% of the residents having post-secondary qualifications. When it comes to unemployment, the overall rate has been quite low, ranging from 3.3 to 4.8, in the last decade (2006–2016). From the economist’s point of view, there is full employment in most of the time. However, there are regional differences. Though the government has not announced the difference in unemployment rates across districts, we can roughly tell from news reports that residents in the more remote districts such as North, Tin Shui Wai, Tuen Mun, and Tung Chung (near the airport) have more difficulties in job seeking. From the above, we may note a few things: (i) The society in general is doing quite well with an impressive per capita GDP and nearly full employment; (ii) there are real differences across districts in terms of median household income, educational attainment, and employment opportunities; and (iii) in spite of the regional differences, no district is experiencing economic threats or instability peculiar to their neighborhoods and, therefore, can be described as particularly deprived and hopeless. (i) and (iii) put together can support the view that voluntary siting procedure, if practiced in Hong Kong, may be subject to less queries about its justifiability because no particular districts appear to be so desperate as to have an unusual receptivity of environmental risks; (ii) may suggest that those districts not doing too well

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and lagging behind would be interested in taking in a waste treatment facility such as landfill or incinerator in exchange for development opportunities. In the following, I will mainly assess the latter claim. Without doubt, socioeconomic differences across regions are also found in Hong Kong. But I am still of the view that even if the Canadian type of voluntary siting process is implemented, it is not likely that some districts would volunteer to host a normally unwanted land use. First of all, we need to understand that the regional differences in Hong Kong differ significantly from that in Canada. While inequalities between resident in different districts of Hong Kong are essentially a matter of their difference in socioeconomic background of residents, regional inequalities in Canada are attributed more to differences in geographical features of local community. For instance, in Sham Shui Po, the district with the lowest median household income, it is the rather weak socioeconomic background of the people residing there that makes it a poor district, and it has nothing to do with the geographical location or basic infrastructural facility in the district. In fact, Sham Shui Po is not remote at all and its access to highway, railway, schools, and hospitals is more or less the same as other districts. In the Canadian towns mentioned above, their limited development is not so much the quality of the people living there as the small size of the town and the remote location that severely limited the mobility and opportunity of residents. For them to have new development, they would need something done specifically for and exactly in the neighborhood such as bringing in factory, industrial plant, or taking in a waste treatment facility that can become stable supply of jobs. In contrast, what residents of Sham Shui Po need is more empowerment of the people than development of the district itself. For example, they can be empowered by either boosting their class mobility through the newly announced $30,000 subsidy for high school graduates to enroll in self-funded degree programs (not to mention other publicly funded educational and vocational training programs) or enhancing their mobility to work in other districts with the help of the Work Incentive Transport Subsidy Scheme which provides as much as $600 to low-income working adults. The critical point here is that they would not need to look forward to construction or infrastructural projects within the district, not to mention that no plants or projects would be big enough to be major job providers in districts with at least 300,000– 400,000 residents. In Hong Kong, districts are already in close proximity. With an extensive transportation network and some redistributive policies, the gap between districts can be bridged by enhancing the mobility of residents of the ‘poor’ district so that they can benefit from the opportunities available in the better-off districts. In a way, it is safe to say that no district is severely ‘segregated,’ physically and socially. They do not need to feel that they are on their own. If territory-wide redistributive or investment initiatives are available, residents would certainly not need to resort to a localized solution or an essentially district-based package in trying to improve their plight. It is therefore not realistic to expect that some ‘poor’ districts in Hong Kong would be interested in hosting a facility with environmental risks in exchange for socioeconomic development. In fact, such a conclusion is not surprising at all. The point of going through the reasoning process leading to this conclusion is not only to deliver

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the pretty clear verdict that the voluntary siting process that worked in Canada is not replicable in Hong Kong, but more importantly to illustrate further the conditions of its success and the tension between replicability and justifiability. The ‘unfavorable’ conditions leading to the expected failure in Hong Kong are in fact, like a mirror image, a reflection of the ‘favorable’ conditions vital to the success of a voluntary siting process. In the siting process, the condition that made Hong Kong so ‘unfavorable’ was that residents in the less developed districts were mobile enough that their development options were not confined to investment projects inside the district. It can therefore be inferred that the condition most ‘favorable’ to the successful application of voluntary siting procedures is that districts are relatively segregated that economic development depends essentially on having a major job provider to invest and to settle in the district. Trying to apply the Canadian siting mechanism to Hong Kong is to illustrate the important point that success of voluntary siting procedures presuppose not just the presence of regional inequalities (in development opportunity and perception of risks) but also that some regions are somewhat segregated, socially and physically, in such a way that inequalities between them could not be easily bridged by central policies and the less developed regions are very much on their own. In other words, the condition conducive to successful siting is almost in direct opposite to the condition that would make the siting procedures fairer. The greater the regional inequalities and the more the poor districts are on their own, the more likely they tend to be ‘volunteers’ and the siting process would come to a success; but at the same time, the more vulnerable and desperate the residents are, their consent is less than ‘voluntary,’ and the entire siting process would be less justifiable. Hence, the tension between replicability and justifiability will only get stronger. Following the above line of thought, we can see that the nature of the Canadian type of siting mechanism is unexpectedly quite similar to the market mechanism, though with a more ‘visible hand.’ For example, in the allocation of unpleasant goods such as dirty and risky jobs, market mechanism would work as long as we are confident that there are significant socioeconomic inequalities among the population and eventually the ones who are vulnerable, desperate, marginalized would come forward and even compete for those unpleasant jobs. Similarly, the apparently ‘fair voluntary siting procedures’ also rely on the fact that existence of background inequalities and some extent of segregation between districts would be able to ‘invite’ some of them to ‘volunteer.’ But the argument that the Canadian voluntary siting procedures resemble a market or quasi-market mechanism cuts both ways. If we believe that the market is basically fine—background inequalities are inevitable and the initial inequalities are justifiable, those with less bargaining power only get what they deserve, and then, decisions reached by the siting procedures are just. Any distribution resulted from procedures prescribed by the market mechanism, regardless of who is getting more and who is getting less, would be considered just. It is what we usually call procedural justice. However, if we are of the view that vulnerable members of society should not be left to the mercy of market forces, the apparently voluntary procedures that intentionally and systematically steer the less developed regions to assume more

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environmental risks would thereby be far from being just. Then, it would become procedural injustice. The novel siting mechanism as witnessed in the selection of Swan Hills was particularly impressive because it appeared that residents well aware of their own situation (and the situation of others) can enter into an actual agreement that was generally considered to be voluntary, mutually beneficial, and fair. In Rawlsian terms, a just and actual contractual agreement can be concluded without invoking the help of ‘veil of ignorance.’ However, upon critical assessment, we come to realize that if people deliberate without some kind of ignorance, there are two possible scenarios: In the case of Canada, communities fully aware of their vulnerabilities would tend to be more receptive of risks, but assumption of risks is liable to the charge of being not fully voluntary; in the case of Hong Kong, the poorer districts, knowing too well that their vulnerabilities can be effectively addressed by central (redistributive) policies than by localized solutions, would have no intention to enter into the siting process at all. One may wonder if it is possible to make use of the idea of veil of ignorance as mentioned above so that residents of different regions could enter into a hypothetical contract and deliberate among themselves impartially in the siting process. If residents can imagine themselves without any knowledge of their background advantages or disadvantages, they would probably agree that no community, with or without special vulnerabilities, should be expected to bear more than their fair share of risks. And under the ‘play safe’ mentality, the hypothetical consent that would likely be reached is: better not to place the burden of hosting a not entirely safe facility in any region, that is, Not-In-Anybody’s-Backyard. It is certainly not a very fruitful conclusion. But, at least, it is not bad at all for something inherently unpleasant to remain ‘unwanted.’ What we actually need to be cautious is in hearing that through some extraordinary decision-making procedures or mechanism even unpleasant goods could become something well received. To say so is not to suggest that the voluntary siting mechanism is no good. It is just to remind us that it would be overambitious to expect a siting mechanism to secure consent of a willing host and, at the same time, making sure that the potential hosts are not deliberating under economic threats, instability, or other socioeconomic disadvantages. It appears that the way out is not to ask through what procedures and mechanism unpleasant facility could effectively and legitimately be built in somebody’s neighborhood. Instead of attempting the ambitious task of inviting some residents to take in unpleasant things willingly, an alternative way of overcoming NIMBYism is to appeal to all citizens to keep waste to a minimum, hence reducing greatly the need to look for somebody’s backyards as waste dumping sites. In reality, we all know that not many citizens would respond to such a reasonable appeal because they all have their vested interests and would not be willing to pay extra for a problem that could be solved in a less costly way, for example, by putting the waste treatment burden on somebody inside or outside the territory. However, the ideas of ‘veil of ignorance’ and procedural justice may still have a role to play here. If citizens could be arranged to deliberate behind some kind of ‘veil of ignorance,’ for example, without taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of their own regions, it is possible for them to reach a consensus over the cost (in terms of time, money, change of habits

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or ways of life, etc.) and they would be willing to incur in reducing the amount of unpleasant stuffs to be dumped in other people’s backyard. The agreement reached through this procedure would be impartial and may therefore be accepted as just.

Conclusion After an examination of the applicability of the ‘successful’ siting mechanism that appeared to work well in Canada, we can understand better not just the replicability of such a novel siting procedure but also its nature and justifiability. The siting procedures calling for citizens’ initiatives, allowing extensive and genuine public participation, and granting veto power to potential hosts are definitely better than the traditional Decide-Announce-Defend (DAD) approach in that it would be able to show respect, to build up trust, and to generate a sense of ownership among residents. But these merits would materialize only if we could come up with a consensus regarding which community or communities should be involved in the siting mechanism. Besides, we need to note that in view of regional inequalities in either socioeconomic threats or background risks, the principle behind its successful operation is in fact quite similar to the market mechanism which relies on having people with less bargaining power to ‘volunteer’ in taking up jobs and positions unwanted by the better-off. In addressing political disputes like that engendered by the need of finding site for unwanted facilities, public authority may think they have done their best by appealing to ‘procedural justice,’ that is, trying to reach a consensus among stakeholders by involving them in set of open, transparent, and fair deliberative procedures. However, in light of the above discussions, we may note that good governance means more than simply going through a set of apparently fair procedures but to pay attention to the regional differences in bargaining power and the danger of legitimizing unfair distribution of environment burden in the name of ‘procedural fairness.’ To conclude, it would be better to admit honestly that there is no perfect siting mechanism no matter how ‘voluntary’ they appear to be than to pretend that hazardous waste treatment could fairly be left to some parts of the society.

References Au, C. (2014). Public opposition to NIMBY facilities: the extension of SENT landfill in Tseung Kwan O. Thesis. University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. Retrieved from: http:// dx.doi.org/10.5353/th_b5334147. Accessed on June 14, 2017. Baxter, J. (2007). Reassessing the voluntary citing process for a hazardous waste facility in Alberta, Canada 15 year later. In International Conference on Siting of Locally Unwanted Facilities: Challenges and Issues (December, 2007). Baxter, J. (2009). A quantitative assessment of the insider/outsider dimension of the cultural theory of risk and place. Journal of Risk Research, 12(6), 771–791.

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Baxter, J., & Lee, D. (2004). Understanding expressed low concern and latent concern near a hazardous waste treatment facility. Journal of Risk Research, 7(7–8), 705–729. Castle, G., & Munton, D. (1996). Voluntary siting of hazardous waste facilities in Western Canada. In D. Munton (Ed.), Hazardous waste siting and democratic choice (pp. 57–83). Washington D. C.: Georgetown University Press. Coenen, F. H. J. M. (Ed.). (2009). Public participation and better environmental decisions: The promise and limits of participatory processes for the quality of environmentally related decisionmaking. Dordrecht: Springer. Freeman, S. (2007). Rawls. London: Routledge. Huitema, D. (2009). Hazardous waste anyone? A comparison of participatory and non-participatory approaches to hazardous waste siting. In F. H. J. M. Coenen (Ed.), Public participation and better environmental decisions: The promise and limits of participatory processes for the quality of environmentally related decision-making (pp. 111–133). Dordrecht: Springer. Kuhn, R. G., & Ballard, K. R. (1998). Canadian innovations in siting hazardous waste management facilities. Environmental Management, 22(4), 533–545. Kunreuther, H., Slovic, P., & MacGregor, D. (1996). Risk perception and trust: Challenges for facility siting. Risk, 7, 109–118. Lai, O. K. (2000). Greening of Hong Kong? Forms of manifestation of environmental movements. In S. W. K. Chiu & T. L. Lui (Eds.), The dynamics of social movements in Hong Kong (pp. 259–295). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Lam, K. C., & Woo, L. Y. (2009). Public perception of locally unwanted facilities in Hong Kong: implications for conflict resolution. Local Environment, 14(9), 851–869. Lam, K., Lee, W., Fung, T., & Woo, L. (2011). Challenges of managing NIMBYism in Hong Kong. In T. Fung, S. H. Lesbirel, & K. Lam (Eds.), Facility siting in the Asia-Pacific: Perspectives on knowledge production and application (pp. 169–182). Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Lesbirel, S. H. (2011). Project siting and the concept of community. Environmental Politics, 20(6), 826–842. Liu, T., & Yau, Y. (2014). Institutional inadequacies and successful contentions: A case study of the LULU siting process in Hong Kong. Habitat International, 44, 22–30. Munton, D. (Ed.). (1996). Hazardous waste siting and democratic choice. Washington D. C.: Georgetown University Press. Pushchak, R., & Rocha, C. (1998). Failing to site hazardous waste facilities voluntarily: Implications for the production of sustainable goods. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 41(1), 25–43. Rabe, B. G. (1991). Beyond the NIMBY syndrome in hazardous waste facility siting: The albertan breakthrough and the prospects for cooperation in Canada and the United States. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 4(2), 184–206. Rabe, B. G. (1994). Beyond NIMBY: Hazardous waste siting in Canada and the United States. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Sun, L., Zhu, D., & Chan, E. H. W. (2016). Public participation impact on environment NIMBY conflict and environmental conflict management: Comparative analysis in Shanghai and Hong Kong. Land Use Policy, 58, 208–217. Tammemagi, H. (1999). The waste crisis: Landfills, incinerators, and the search for a sustainable future. New York: Oxford University Press. Woo, L., & Lam, K. (2008). Managing siting conflict in Hong Kong: Public perceptions towards siting and the importance of trust. In Summer international symposium and lectures on social policy: construction and development of social policies in East Asia (July 2008).

Part III

Conclusion

Chapter 12

The Ethics of Land and Housing Kam-Por Yu

Abstract This concluding chapter reviews what has been achieved by the chapters in this book. Together, the chapters in this book address three main sets of questions, relating to (1) individual rights; (2) societal needs and public concerns; and (3) justice. This chapter reviews the above questions systematically, drawing findings and analyses from the preceding chapters.

Together, the chapters in this book address three main sets of questions: 1. Is housing a basic right? What are the implications on public policy if housing is taken as a basic right? What are the possible ways to uphold such a right? What role should the government take in regulating the supply and demand of housing? 2. How should the housing needs, or the needs for landuses in general, be balanced with other societal needs or public concerns? What should be taken into consideration in determining whether certain landuses are justified? 3. What does justice mean when applied to housing or landuses? What are the relevant factors in determining whether certain policy on the use of land is just or unjust? How should the benefits and burdens regarding landuses be distributed? In each chapter, a specific and concrete issue related to landuses is selected for discussion, shedding light on one or more of the above questions, which are more philosophical in nature. In this final concluding chapter, I will review the above questions systematically, drawing findings and analyses from all the preceding chapters.

K.-P. Yu (B) General Education Centre, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 B. Yung and K.-P. Yu (eds.), Land and Housing Controversies in Hong Kong, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5266-3_12

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The Relevance of Philosophy When we ask questions about what is good or bad, right or wrong with the housing or land policy, we are talking about normative issues and have moved into the realm of ethics. If we are not satisfied just with voicing out our opinions or taking a political stance but instead seeking to provide a reasoned justification or evaluation, then we cannot avoid appealing to some philosophical ideas, which are referred to as “general principles” (Chun 2020) or “the crux of the matter” (Chan and Chui 2020: 110) by some of the contributors of this volume. Such general principles are necessary not only in providing justification and comparative evaluation of different opinions, but together also constitute a more comprehensive and systematic consideration. Very often, critics make advocacy or raise objections on one or a few grounds that they regard as most important, resulting in more or less one-sided views. The contributors in this book show that there is no one single concern that is so important such that a conclusion can be drawn once that crucial factor is determined (be it housing needs, environmental protection, or equity, etc.) In particular, the following simplistic principles have been debunked by the contributors: 1. Develop first, conserve later. Such a principle recognizes both the values of development and conservation, but prioritizes development over conservation. This cannot be accepted as a general principle, as it implies a destruct-andconstruct process which may be self-defeating, since the harm done may not be revocable. A large scale of reclamation near the outlying islands could potentially impact the water quality, bio-sensitive receptors and fisheries nearby, including species such as coral groups and sea birds (Chan and Chui 2020: 110). The building of a marine park area (to resettle the dolphins) is not acceptable as a means of compensation, as the harm to the dolphins and other oceanic organisms would have already been done and may be too late to make any recovery or adequate remedy (Tsang 2020: 88). 2. Always choose an environmental friendly option whenever there is an option. This principle assumes that the environment always has a higher weighting than other human concerns, such that it is never to be compromised. It is unreasonable because it rules out all considerations of balance and proportionality. The question is not to conserve (natural environment such as marine ecology or country parks) or not to conserve, but what to conserve and how to conserve (Chan and Chui 2020: 120). 3. Cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis is certainly too narrow as it only counts in economic terms and fails to capture other human values (Tsang 2020: 89). It should at least be expanded to cost-effectiveness analysis, though costeffectiveness analysis is still confined to consequentialist thinking. A more complete picture should include at least two important values: fairness and costeffectiveness (Chan and Chui 2020: 117). A third one perhaps should also be added: decent minimum (decent minimum for everyone, which is more modest than the Rawlsian maximum minimum for the least advantaged) (Cheng 2020: 33).

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Decent Housing Nano-apartment is a recent phenomenon in Hong Kong. On the appearance, it is at least better, so far as decent housing is concerned, than the currently popular sub-divided units, or the bedspaces that were quite common in the fifties and sixties. However, considering that Hong Kong is an affluent society, and the owner of a nanoapartment may have to save most of his or her monthly salary for decades in order to pay for it or to receive help from his or her parents in paying the downpayment, the size of a nano-apartment is absurdly expensive (in terms of price per square ft., among the most expensive in Hong Kong) and ridiculously small, commonly less than 215 ft2 , and has been as low as 128 ft2 (Cheng 2020: 30). Such a phenomenon, especially when it is becoming more and more common, raises the question what counts as decent housing suitable for human beings to live in, taking both the endproduct and the cost into consideration. There are international standards for the size, facilities, and ventilation of prison cell. Should there also be some basic requirements for what should be regarded as minimally decent housing for humans? Cheng argues that housing is a basic human right. But this claim immediately leads to the question: Who has a duty to provide the housing? Cheng suggests that besides public housing, there can also be housing subsidy for everyone on becoming an adult—“pecuniary compensation, providing more subsidized housing” (Cheng 2020: 29). Cheng also suggests making a distinction between regular housing and luxurious housing, such that only the latter is subject to the free market. The government can either produce the regular housing itself, or lower the land price for the land designated to build regular housing (Cheng 2020: 37). While Cheng considers the roles of the government and the market in the provision of housing, Yung and Chan look for another possibility—the third sector. Third sector housing is philanthropic, high in flexibility, non-profit-making, and serving social objectives (Yung and Chan 2020: 52). Yung and Chan also regard adequate housing as a basic human need and a basic human right (Yung and Chan 2020: 52). Third sector housing is not a duty, but still a moral response to a right. It gives priority to those who have urgent needs, such as single mother with children, low-income family, people who have waited for public rental housing for more than three years, or those living currently in expensive and small sub-divided units. However, third sector housing is not purely charity, as the government and the market still play important roles. The landlords can make reliable (but not maximum) income without the hassles in the renting out process, as the third sector housing organization would be helping in screening the tenants, refurbishing the unit, and collecting the rent. Giving the landlords a reasonable financial return can help to make the project sustainable. The beauty of the third sector housing is that it does not just address housing as a basic human need or human right, and it also manages to promote other social values, such as choice, self-reliance, and personal empowerment (Yung and Chan 2020), which are the topic for the next section.

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Landuse and Other Social Concerns and Values One big issue that has been discussed in a number of chapters in this book is the sources of land—where to get land for housing? Should land be made from reclamation of the sea, through the conversion of some part of the country parks, pulling down of old buildings which may have historical or emotional meaning? What should be done if there is conflict with other social concerns, such as environmental protection, cultural heritage, or respect of private property? A salient feature of the Hong Kong society is that it is a pluralistic society upholding pluralistic values (Chan and Chui 2020: 100). We call such values social values as they are values commonly recognized in the society. Surely, economic value is one important value, but it is not the most important value and definitely not the only important value. As pointed out by Tsang, “The aim to drive economic development and improve people’s living quality should not be the only considerations.” (Tsang 2020: 98). Other social values like people’s sense of (including cultural and communal) identity, relation with the environment or nature, should also be considered. Public interest is a value that is held very dearly in our society. Not all people’s interests are public interest. It is a more strictly and narrowly defined, and as a result, it is only confined to the common and fundamental part of people’s interest, which deserves and demands stricter defense and protection. Having an uncontaminated reservoir or a safe airport is a public interest, though the degree people need them or use them may vary a lot. Yung defines “public interest” as “people’s interest in their capacity as members of the public” (Yung 2020b: 173). This definition has two interesting parts: 1. interest, to be contrasted with subjective perceptions. It includes only real interest, and people’s prejudice is not part of it; 2. public, to be contrasted with private. It includes interest people have as members of the public, not as an individual, whose interest may vary from person to person, and may conflict with each other. The availability of enough columbarium in the society is a public interest, as it is in the interest of a common member of the public, though people in the neigborhood may have a negative impression towards it, and not everyone personally has an interest in the availability of columbarium in Hong Kong. However, such public interests are by no means “absolute, universal or ahistorical good”, yet they are still fundamental, common, “shared interests” (Yung 2020b: 174). In a modern, vibrant, and competitive society like Hong Kong, development is of course an important value. But Ying is quick to point out that development should be given a broader interpretation and should not be equated with economic growth (Ying 2020: 131). Development should be taken as “the process of enlarging people’s choices”. It is multi-dimensional and should include sustainability. Cultural and historical value is also emerging as a dear value in Hong Kong in recent decades. The values are regarded as particularly important when people have a feeling that they are beginning to lose something that is important to them—the importance is only realized, or at least more clearly envisaged, at the verge of losing. Personally, I never realized the Notre Dame of Paris was so close to me and held

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so dearly by me in my heart until I saw it burning—it was like seeing one’s own house burning, and I felt like a victim myself. Saving the Notre Dame is not less important than saving human lives—this shows that things that have artistic or cultural significance can have intrinsic value comparable to the intrinsic value of human lives. Likewise, heritage landmarks in Hong Kong, like the Star Ferry Pier, Central Police Station, Queen’s Pier have been seen as having intrinsic value, representing history or identity, and collective memory (Ying 2020: 128–129). The Queen’s Pier, though hardly remarkable as a concrete structure, has special meaning in the eyes of one or more generations of Hong Kong people: Young people used to meet their dates there, and many movies and TV dramas took numerous shots there, which were instrumental in forming people’s collective memory, and giving emotional meaning to artifacts. A related value is aesthetic and architectural value. This value has more reliance on knowledge and expertise, and is not just supported by popular opinions. For example, the value of the Queen’s Pier was heightened when it was pointed out that it was part of a grand design: “The design of it was modern and characteristic, forming an integral whole with City Hall and Edinburgh Place as a special ceremonial cluster for the colonial city.” (Ying 2020: 134). Another value that is now commonly recognized is environmental value. It is, for example, stated in the law of Hong Kong (The Harbour Protection Ordinance) that “The harbour is to be protected and preserved as a special public asset and a natural heritage of Hong Kong people, and for that purpose there shall be a presumption against reclamation in the harbour.” The official principle for “Preserving Victoria Harbour” also ratifies such a social value: “Victoria Harbour must be protected and preserved for Hong Kong people and visitors as a special public asset, a natural and cultural heritage asset, and a driver for the creation of economic and social values.” (Ying 2020: 142). What is important to governance is the question of how to strike a balance among the above values. Who is the judge of how such a balance is to be struck? Government officials? Those with power and money? Common citizens? Experts? Or perhaps there should be a dialogue and negotiation on how such a balance be struck at societal level among different stakeholders—that will bring in the “politics” dimension.

Justice in Landuse The next set of questions is on the allocation or distribution of benefits and burdens of housing or landuse. The NIMBY problem has been discussed in a number of chapters in this book. The NIMBY issues all have a similar structure: the benefits spread broadly among a large population, while drawbacks and costs tend to concentrate on a small group within the community (Yung 2020b: 175; Chung 2020: 146). As a result, there is strong opposition of the establishment of certain essential facilities by a neigborhood, for example, waste disposal and landfill sites (Chung 2020), columbarium (Yung 2020b), and rehabilitation centre (Lai 2020).

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In order to determine whether the distribution of benefits and burdens is just or not, we have to consider a number of aspects which are pertinent to the nature of justice. 1. Justice does not mean equal treatment but only equal consideration. As pointed out by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BC), justice does not require us to treat everyone equally, but only to treat equals equally and unequals unequally. That is to say, if people are equal in the relevant aspects, they should be treated equally. But if they are actually different in the relevant aspects, then it is alright to treat them differently. Of course, when are two cases equal and what counts as a relevant aspect is a complicated and controversial issue. But the uncontroversial part of Aristotle’s claim is that justice cannot be equated with treating all people equally. This means that the so-called “Self-sufficiency principle,” which holds every local community to have equal share of burdens is not required by the principles of justice (Chung 2020: 156). It may work in some cases where the situations of different communities or districts are not significantly different. But in cases where some communities or districts have special advantages or disadvantages for the arrangement, that would be treating unequals equally, involving ineffective use of resources or distribution of burdens that is not required by justice and may actually go against justice. For example, equal “share of responsibility” in all 18 districts in Hong Kong for the setting up of columbarium sites, regardless of population density, regional differences, historical backgrounds, etc. (Yung 2020b: 170). Because of the prevailing easterly wind in Hong Kong, which has different implications on air pollution for different districts in Hong Kong, it makes more sense to put the major air polluting sources in places which will cause less serious air pollution problems. As a result, most major air polluting sources are located in the western part of Hong Kong—most LULU sites are concentrated in two districts, Tuen Mun and Tseung Kwan O, instead of evenly distributed in all the 18 districts in Hong Kong (Mok 2020: 206). 2. Due process. Following due process constitutes what is called “procedural justice.” It is a basic part of justice, but again it cannot be equated with justice. Due process is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of justice—without due process, justice is denied, but due process may not lead to substantive justice. With regards to the landfills in South East New Territories (SENT), it makes a big difference whether the extension of the landfill sites is against a promise or earlier agreement. If the neighborhood has already borne their share of responsibility for a long period as agreed, and then they find out that a further extension has been imposed on them, then justice has not been done to them. The first time can be justified, but the second time is clearly excessive. But if it is just a subjective conjecture or an unfortunate misunderstanding as no former agreement or promise has been made, then it is a totally different matter (Chung 2020). On the other hand, voluntary siting (Mok 2020) is usually regarded as more in line with justice, as it is relatively free of problems in procedural justice. However, if it is

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“pseudo-voluntarism where the host community accepts the facility due to imminent economic pressure may exist” (Chung 2020: 158), then there is problem in justice, but it is in substantive justice rather than procedural justice. 3. Fair share of benefits and burdens. Consider two scenarios. The first scenario is that there is a big burden, and the task is to find someone to bear the burden. The second scenario is that different parties all have to make an effort to make the burden smaller, such that the burden that is allocated to the unlucky one is significantly smaller. It can be seen that the second scenario is more preferable from the point of view of justice, as there is a fairer share of benefits and burdens. In the case of siting for unwanted facilities, it makes more sense in justice to “appeal to all citizens to keep waste to a minimum, hence reducing greatly the need to look for somebody’s backyards as waste dumping sites.” (Mok 2020: 218). In the case of taking back some of the land from the golf club for housing uses (Chun 2020), it can be argued that the golf club has been taking advantages for many decades, and the new arrangement just means that they can take less advantage or for a shorter further period. It is not asking them to sacrifice (or bear a very big burden), but to take less advantage instead. From this perspective, converting some of the land of the golf club to meet housing needs results in a fairer share of burdens and benefits, especially in view of the present housing plight and “intolerable burdens” of the low-income households in Hong Kong. 4. Compensation and remedy. Even if it is agreed that public interest should override private interest in some particular case, it does not mean that we value public interest and do not value private interest. If the private interest is a legitimate one, then it still has to carry weighting. In taking back the land for urban reconstruction, we can say that we put public interest before private interest. The value of public interest has been recognized, but there is still the remaining question of how to recognize the legitimate private interest in this case? There must be a reasonable and fair compensation. In the case of an unwelcome facility, compensation can also make the distribution of benefits and burdens fairer. “The compensation can take the form of blurring the public interest and the private interest of those hosting neighbours by allowing them priority in the allocation of niches for their ancestors in the columbarium nearby.” (Yung 2020b: 179) If justice cannot prevent creation of winners and losers by a public policy, it should at least make the loss of the losers in a public policy less serious. Another thing that can be done for the sake of justice is remedy. Although the SENT (South East New Territories) site has continued to be used, steps can be taken to minimize the adverse effects. For example, the Waste Diversion Plan, which bans MSW (municipal solid waste) and only allows construction waste in SENT, while directed MSW to more remote sites WENT (West New Territories) and NENT (North East New Territories) (Chung 2020: 152–153). 5. From impartiality to care. Justice is commonly understood as impartiality, which implies staying neutral and leaning to none of the sides involved in the distribution of benefits and burdens. Such an understanding has serious problem. It implies anything less than perfect universal love is unjust, and complete apathy is just. In the case of the Zheng Sheng College, if we care neither the students nor the

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residents, our judgments would be very different if we care both the students and the residents. Lai argues against the Rawlsian conception of justice, which upholds the value of neutrality and impartiality, and argues for an alternative conception which has equal care in its core (Lai 2020). Neutrality and impartiality are compatible with treating both sides equally bad. But there is no value in the kind of justice that treats people equally bad. If justice has any positive content, then it must prefer equal care to equal apathy. Equal care would allow us to get to know the background of different people concretely and to understand the context of their concerns and actions with empathy. This implies care and sympathetic understanding rather than neutrality.

The Politics-Justice-Governance Model The Politics-Justice-Governance model can be understood as a response or an alternative to the traditional Decide-Announce-Defend decision-making approach (Chung 2020: 147). The Decide-Announce-Defend approach, in its best form, is technocratic in nature. It might work in the old days, but today it faces great challenge when the younger generation has a much stronger sense of belonging and a sense of ownership of the society—such an approach can no longer be accepted (Ying 2020: 130) Of course, any alternative model has yet to be justified. As commented by Mok in the discussion of NIMBY siting issue: “While it is obvious to everyone that the top-down approach is not going to work, it is not at all clear what alternative siting procedures would work and how” (Mok 2020: 207). In the tripartite Politics-Justice-Governance model, “politics” refers to the situation involving different stakeholders (Tsang 2020: 85), who have different interests, preferences, and claims, “justice” refers to a process of seeking for an arrangement that can be regarded as normatively justified, through giving different parties fair consideration, with equal care of their interests and respect of their will, while “governance” refers to a stable and sustainable maintenance of the established institutions and policies. As pointed out by the political philosopher John Rawls (1921–2002), justice is the “first virtue of institutions” (Rawls 1999: 3-4, 513) “If men’s inclination to selfinterest makes their vigilance against one another necessary, their public sense of justice makes their secure association together possible. Among individuals with disparate aims and purposes a shared conception of justice establishes the bonds of civic friendships; the general desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends. One may think of a public conception of justice as constituting the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human association.” (Rawls 1999: 2–3) The view that governance should be normatively justified is shared clearly in the Confucian tradition. As sharply stated by Confucius (551–479 BC): “governance should be guided by rightness (政 者正也)” (Analects 12.17; Confucius 1992: 114), as well as by Xunzi (c.310–c235 BC): “Distribution according to justice leads to harmony (義以分則和).” (Xunzi 1999: 236) Rightness or justice may not be adequate for good governance, but it is

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an essential part of good governance, which will result not only in order and stability, but also real harmony. In order to settle dispute, justice has to be done and seen to be done. At the minimal level, the arrangement cannot be too unjust and it cannot be seen as clearly unjust. One way to intercept justice is for the government to take side of a socially divisive dispute at an early stage. According to Tsang, “The dialogue will only be possible if we can have a neutral government, which does not ‘sell’ particular proposal and willing to let citizens make enlightened choice.” (Tsang 2020: 97) In the opinion of Ying, two requirements are needed: 1. Learn from those who know, and make use of reliable information and knowledge; and 2. Develop mature civil society to voice out the opinions of people (Ying 2020: 129). While Tsang points out what should not be done, Ying points out what should be done. Because of the political reality, a fair allocation of burdens across different districts will meet less resistance. Yung illustrates this point with the case of persuading the district councilors to accept hosting columbarium into their districts. Each District Council will of course defend the interest of its own district, yet, “if District Councilors are informed that every District will host columbarium, it is more politically palatable for District Council to shoulder their share of responsibility and will not take a fierce and non-negotiable stand against siting columbarium in their District, leading to the resolving of the land politics involved.” (Yung 2020b: 178). In short, the demonstration of fairness is important in settling political disputes. It would even be better if the government is seen not just as doing fairly in a particular instance, but has a fair-minded mode of operation, which will gain trust for the government. “For the people to accept their share of responsibility related to columbarium siting or the placing of any other kind of NIMBY projects, public trust in the government as genuine protector of public interests as well as neutral arbiter of conflicts of interests of different sectors in community is pertinent to the resolution of the problem.” (Yung 2020b: 179–180). By contrast, “The worst scenario is that the government is perceived to be favoring some at the expense of others, involving environmental justice issues. Thus, gaining trust from the public, on the part of the government, as sincere in finding the way out, is very critical in eventual solution of the matter. This lays the foundation of sound land governance, especially in resolving land controversies.” (Yung 2020b: 180). A similar observation is made in the analysis of the siting of the Zheng Sheng College. As the people in the neighborhood felt victimized, they had resentment and resorted to escalated actions (Lai 2020: 186). The lack of proper public consultation and public engagement resulted in the failure to clarify local residents’ misunderstanding and strengthened their NIMBY position. Eventually, the strong opposition of the local community led to siting failure (Lai 2020: 187–188). The lesson to be learnt is that the interests and concerns of the local community have to be taken seriously and carefully considered and addressed, otherwise they would feel that injustice has been done to them, and that they have some grievances that have not been heard and have to be voiced out with greater effort (Lai 2020: 201). The Politics-Justice-Governance model does not assert that justice is all there is for good governance, yet it is nevertheless an essential part of good governance. A good

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policy is more than a just policy. For example, a sensible public housing allocation policy has to strike a balance between justice, choice, administrative soundness, and available resources (Yung 2008: 189–202). Justice is the primary virtue, though it is not the only consideration. In short, there can be justice without good governance, but there cannot be good governance without justice. Table 12.1 sums up how the justice perspective contributes to the solution of the landuse issues as discussed in the chapters in this book and hence relevant to good governance. The discussions illustrate how the Politics-Justice-Governance model works or may work.

Table 12.1 Issues discussed in this book, and the insights for the Politics-Justice-Governance model Chapter

Landuse issue

Conflict/controversy (politics)

Light shed by the justice perspective (justice)

2

Nano apartments

Free market and decent In a market housing distorted by the monopolization of large land developers, policy intervention is justified in recognition of minimally decent housing as a basic right

Possible instruments include: pecuniary compensation, increased quantity of subsidized housing, and bifurcating the market between regular housing and luxury housing

3

Third sector housing

Public/private dichotomy in the housing arena

Private property and profit-making, charity, and government contribution can work together to provide affordable housing at least to some extent to some of the people

The concern for social justice is compatible with the search for a creative solution, where the public and private sectors, charity and profit-making motives, can work together

Lessons for governance (governance)

(continued)

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Table 12.1 (continued) Chapter

Landuse issue

Conflict/controversy (politics)

Light shed by the justice perspective (justice)

Lessons for governance (governance)

4

Priority in developing different types of land (brownfield, agricultural land) for housing uses

Conflicts of the legitimate self-interests of different stakeholders, and fair consideration of reasonable claims

Overlapping consensus can only be obtained on the basis of reasonableness (instead of mere rational pursuit of self-interests), which the justice perspective can help to find out

Reconciliation based on political interaction is unlikely. But reconciliation on the basis of justice is possible through identifying and affirming the reasonable claims of different parties in reaching overlapping consensus

5

Reclamation as a means to make land for an additional runway of the airport

Development and conservation; human interest and environmental protection

The principle “develop first, conserve later” cannot be justified. The assumption that human interest is most important seems reasonable from the human perspective. But human interest should be understood in the broad sense

Acquiring enlightened human interest through public discourse is the best way to link ecological consideration and governance

6

Country parks Preserving natural and reclamation environment and as sources for the meeting housing needs supply of land

The political conflicts are entrenched in a clash of social values. A reconciliatory approach is called for. The solution is not to choose one or the other of the two opposite sides, but to give due respect to both legitimate concerns at the same time

The issue for governance is not to conserve or not to conserve, but what, how, and how far. It is a matter of proportionality

(continued)

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Table 12.1 (continued) Chapter

Landuse issue

Conflict/controversy (politics)

Light shed by the justice perspective (justice)

Lessons for governance (governance)

7

Heritage preservation

Heritage preservation and the need of development; historical, cultural, and emotional values, in addition to economic interests

Both heritage preservation and city development are part of a larger scheme of human values. It is necessary to recognize and consider different kinds of values

To fully recognize and consider different kinds of values, participatory governance and bottom-up participation have important roles to play

8

Locations for landfills

Public facilities that are Yielding to the locally unwelcome financial demand of the vocal opponents is not a feasible solution. It is reasonable to share responsibility but not to overburden some particular districts or communities

To share responsibility but to avoid overburdening some of the districts or communities, a more effective solution to NIMBY is to render a potentially unwelcomed facility a (sustainability steered) asset which can add value for the local community

9

Columbarium siting

Columbarium-building as in public interests while at the same time bringing about various nuisances and costs to the hosting community

Equality can be used a guiding principle for conflict resolution. The government should serve as the just defender against exploiting free-riders

In the midst of politics within the land controversy of columbarium siting, the social value of “equality” serves as the framework for conflict resolution

(continued)

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Table 12.1 (continued) Chapter

Landuse issue

Conflict/controversy (politics)

Light shed by the justice perspective (justice)

Lessons for governance (governance)

10

Siting of Rehabilitation Centers

Land controversy over public/collective interest against the vested interest of the neighborhood

The perception and reception of a facility in the local community has much to do with how the siting is morally justified. A justificatory approach that purposely takes away consideration of one’s vested interest may look impartial but may also appear to be inconsiderate

A change in the justificatory approach that gives due recognition to people’s vested interest will change the way they look at the land controversy, and the justification of siting will consequently sound more reasonable and convincing in getting support from the local community

11

Voluntary siting mechanism in dealing with NIMBYism

Voluntary siting vs. expert (or paternalistic) siting of NIMBY: foreign successful experience and fitting the local context

One important aspect of justice is procedural justice. In the case where substantive justice is unclear or impossible to attain, upholding procedural justice is essential in settling disputes. However, in case where there are good reasons to believe that such voluntary siting mechanism may violate substantive justice, procedural justice can no longer be regarded as an approximation of justice

Good governance means more than simply going through a set of apparently fair procedures but to pay attention to the regional differences in bargaining power and the danger of legitimizing unfair distribution of environment burden in the name of “procedural fairness”

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Conclusion On top of the review of what has been done and achieved by the authors of this book, in this final section of the final chapter of the book, we are going to look further and comment on the scope and direction of this book. The following questions will be addressed: What are the limitations of the book? How far can the insights of the local case studies be shared by international readers? What else can be studied in the future? This book looks at issues in housing and land with reference to justice and other social values. However, no unified theory is used throughout the book. Different authors may look at different aspects of justice and social values which they believe to be most relevant or significant to the particular issue they are dealing with in their respective chapter. Philosophers have argued for positions ranging from grand theory to anti-theory. This book adopts something like the middle position—while it is not assumed that there is some kind of robust theory which can serve as a solid foundation ready for acceptance and application, it is also attested that there are some clearly relevant and important ethical considerations. As a result, the authors as a whole adopt plurality of theories and plurality of values. In spite of the suspicion of supposedly grand theory, it is important to note that moral theory is needed to provide justification and to make rational discussion possible. As pointed out by Robert Loudon, “Effective criticism of social practices and attitudes eventually requires moral theory,” the reason being that “criticism that hopes to convince must eventually step back from particular moral practices and attitudes and ask what (if anything) justifies them.” “Because moral theory involves the all-thing-considered articulation and justification of certain ways of living over others, all sustained attempts to criticize ways of living and acting must eventually consort with moral theory” (Louden 1992: 148). This way of doing ethics (as taken by this book) has a number of salient features: action-guiding, empirically informed, non-reductionist, recognizing plurality of values rather than deriving them from a single standard, and recognizing that not all conflicts in morality can be resolved (Louden 1992: 142). The task is not just to give all the relevant ethical considerations their due place in making an overall ethical judgment, but also to find the reflective equilibrium between theoretical tools in general and the reasonable (and acceptable) judgments in specific cases. This way of commenting of public policy requires a dialogue between theory and philosophizing on the one hand, and practice and context on the other hand. The authors of this book look at housing and land issues in particular, but such an approach of working back and forth between normative theory and reasonable judgment is quite common among contemporary ethicists. “Many moral philosophers today see ethical theory as a matter of working back and forth between our moral intuitions about particular cases and the general principles that account for the particular judgments or are themselves intuitively attractive, in order to weave our moral thinking into a coherent and consistent web.” (Arthur and Shaw 1991: 10).

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This kind of normative study of public policy is not exactly scientific or technical, and is not typical in the academic world. But it is something needed by the community as a whole, for the sake of public discourse and critical discussion. It is also better done by scholars with academic and critical rigor. This kind of study is more like an art than a science. Such kind of intellectual study is the nature of ethics in general and applied ethics in particular. As noted by Aristotle, we cannot demand greater precision than the nature of the subject allows, “since it is a mark of an educated person to look in each area for only that degree of accuracy that the nature of the subject permits.” (Aristotle 2000: 5). One possible limitation of this book is that it focuses mainly on cases in Hong Kong. This is related to the next question, which is about what international readers can learn from this book if they are not particularly interested in the Hong Kong cases. This question is also related to the transferability of foreign experience to local community as well as transferability of local experience to a foreign setting. The case studies are interesting not just as cases, but also as illustrations and yardsticks of theories and ideas. Almost all the cases discussed in this book are about urban issues common to many modern cities, and only the specific “form” these issues take may be specific to the Hong Kong context. Some of the issues such as nano-apartments, urban columbarium siting, may be particularly special or imminent in Hong Kong. But even in such cases, the ethical considerations such as minimally decent living, conflict of local community interests and public interest at large, obligatory role of the government, are readily understandable and has some degree of universal validity. The insights gained in one case may have bearing to a comparable case elsewhere, both in terms of (significant) similarities and differences. As a number of authors in this book have pointed out, not all foreign experiences are transferable. Chung argues that because of the special situations in Hong Kong, none of the standard textbook solutions of NIMBY can work in Hong Kong, and some innovative solution has to be invented (Chung 2020: 146, 162–163). Mok explains why the successful experiences of voluntary siting mechanism in Canada cannot be adopted without sacrifice of justification, due to the totally different context in Hong Kong, in terms of space, economy, population density, and district differences (Mok 2020: 207, 213). Even when the insights in the case studies are not transferable, the comparative study can help to bring out what exactly are the significant features and differences that make a policy works in one case but not in the other. This may show the limitations of general solutions when apply to specific context which may require adaptations, modifications, and innovation. While the principles or values may have somewhat universal validity, the relevance and significance of specific principles and values may be different due to different contexts, which actually make the cases different kinds of cases. Hence, the conclusion or the recommended solution of the normative analysis will be context-specific, path-dependent, locally circumscribed, to a more or less extent. Sometimes a theory developed in one area can also shed light in a different domain. This explains why an interdisciplinary approach can be fruitful. In their chapter, Chan and Chui show that the reconciliatory approach advocated by environmental

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pragmatism can shed light on resolving the political conflict in land development in Hong Kong (Chan and Chui 2020:113). The case studies are valuable not just in providing insights into cases. They are meaningful in the sense that they illustrate the interplay between philosophical analysis and contextual understanding, as well as between conflicting ethical considerations. The case studies are important in illustrating that different principles or values may be more relevant and significant than others, depending on the nature of the issues and the context of the disputes. They illustrate that both theoretical analysis and attention to context are important in the discussion of applied ethics. Applying philosophy and ethics to policy-making can also give the latter a theoretical and justificatory basis, thereby providing a direction to improve it and make it more reasonable. Finally, let us consider this book project not just as an isolated project, but as a component of a larger program. This group of authors is interested in the interplay between ethics and public policy. An earlier book (Yung and Yu 2016) of similar nature is on different ethical issues in public policy across a rather wide spectrum, and also with special reference to Hong Kong. This volume focuses on housing and land policy in particular. The main reason is a practical one, as Hong Kong in particular has serious problems and controversies in housing, and housing and land problems have been identified by the government as the single most imminent problem the government has to handle in the domain of public policy. Justice is in the centre of ethical consideration of this book. This is because of the importance of justice in ethics, especially pubic ethics. “To justify is to show the justice or rightness of something.” (Smith 1994: 24) But of course justice is not the whole story of ethics. There are other important ethical considerations, such as public interest, care, and liberty. If such values are regarded as part of justice, then there has to be excessive expansion of the concept of justice. A more reasonable alternative is to adopt a pluralistic approach. So the ethical considerations taken in this book include justice as well as other social values. As further projects in this program, the scope can be narrowed, from public policy in general or housing and land policy in particular, to some other areas of policy concerns, such as city and urbanism. On the other hand, the theoretical framework can also be refined to have a sharper focus. A forthcoming volume (Yung et al., forthcoming) is planned with highlight on a salient component of social justice, namely different conceptions of rights, including human rights. Human rights occupy a key position in social justice, as “human rights can be seen to be intimately connected with social justice. Human rights and principles of social justice are similar in that they both: (1) are concerned with fundamental human needs or interests (as opposed to say, ‘mere desires’); (2) issue in coercible obligations (i.e., obligations that the state or, in some cases, other individuals can legitimately force us to meet); (3) provide a basis for justifying our actions and, in some cases, invoking the protection or aid of others; and (4) provide grounds for justifying or criticizing social institutions, programs, or policies” (Peffer 1990: 366). The first volume is on public policy in general, and the theoretical tools used are also general in nature. The present volume focuses on housing and land, and

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justice is highlighted among a plurality of social values. A forthcoming volume will be specifically on city and urbanism, with special emphasis on one core aspect of justice, namely rights. These enterprises are all meant to fill the gap between ethics and public policy.

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