Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy: Between Power and Network (The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific) 3030760111, 9783030760113

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The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific

Seungjoo Lee Sangbae Kim   Editors

Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy Between Power and Network

The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific Series Editor Vinod K. Aggarwal Political Science #1950 University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA, USA

The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific series analyzes the evolution of both formal and informal regional institutions in economic and security affairs as well as possible disputes in the region over energy, maritime security, and territory. Books, both edited and single authored, provide new analytical and empirical insights that will be relevant for scholars, policymakers, businesspeople, and students of the Asia Pacific. More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/7840

Seungjoo Lee  •  Sangbae Kim Editors

Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy Between Power and Network

Editors Seungjoo Lee Dept Political Sci and Intl Relations Chung-Ang Univ Dongjak-ku, Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

Sangbae Kim Dept Political Sci and Intl Relations Seoul National Univ Gwanak-gu, Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

ISSN 1866-6507     ISSN 1866-6515 (electronic) The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific ISBN 978-3-030-76011-3    ISBN 978-3-030-76012-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76012-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Our research team’s interest in middle power diplomacy dates back to 2013. Two research groups that were working on changes in world politics in the 21st century merged into a research group to lay a theoretical foundation that reflects the realities of East Asia or Korea. In 2016, a research group of 17 professors and researchers based in South Korea was launched to explore topics “The Rise of Emerging Power and South Korea’s Search for Middle Power Diplomacy,” which then was not readily captured by the traditional theory of international politics alone. Our research team spared no time and effort in exploring the nature of the changes brought about by emerging powers in different research fields. Some of the efforts of the past seven years appeared in this book. This book is a turning point in our intellectual journeys and a new milestone in the direction of future research. In the course of this research, we faced a number of daunting challenges. Questions raised at numerous conferences and seminars at home and abroad were exhaustive but ultimately served as productive intellectual stimuli. Questions ensued as to how much fundamental change the emerging powers produced in the nature of international politics. Although many scholars sympathized with us that a new phenomenon was emerging in international politics, questions were still lingering about whether the change brought about a qualitative change in international politics. The traditional approach to conceptualizing middle power based on material power was also a huge barrier. The sheer focus on the attributes of middle power such as material power tends to highlight constraints and challenges rather than possibilities of middle power diplomacy. For the two key questions, a complete consensus was not reached within the research team. Nevertheless, what we shared was that the importance of emerging power in the context of power shift and power diffusion has rapidly increased and thus the opportunities of middle power leadership was ripe under leadership vacuum. In particular, the COVID-19 and U.S.-China strategic competition was a defining moment to gauge the promises and limitations of middle power diplomacy. In the parallel development of the COVID-19 and the U.S.-China strategic competition, the window of opportunity is opened for middle powers to exercise leadership for global governance and transnational cooperation. In this regard, middle power v

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diplomacy in the 21st century is differentiated from the traditional middle power diplomacy centered on niche diplomacy. Middle power diplomacy in the 21st century is not without challenges. As the U.S. and China intensified strategic competition, middle powers are squeezed to exercise leadership between the two great powers, as demonstrated by the Trump administration’s unilateralism and China’s offensive diplomacy. COVID-19 was a decisive opportunity for the U.S. and China to promote strategic competition. It is against this backdrop that this book examines the theoretical merits and practical efficacy of various types of middle power diplomacy, such as network diplomacy, coalition-building and normative diplomacy. The hard work and dedication of many colleagues and friends helped us distill refined collective works from rough ideas. Contributors to the book have encouraged each other to complete their long intellectual journey from beginning to end. I also thank my colleagues in academia for providing valuable advice at numerous academic conferences, seminars and workshops held during the research. Generous institutional support also helped us complete our journey to the middle power diplomacy. In particular, this work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of KOREA (NRF-2016S1A3A2924409). This book would not have been completed without individual and institutional support. Professor, Chung-Ang University Professor, Seoul National University 

Seungjoo Lee Sangbae Kim

Contents

1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 Seungjoo Lee 2 Thucydides on Thucydides Trap: A Reading with the Emphasis of Middle Powers and Its Application in the East Asian Context������������������������������������������������������������������������   11 Sungwoo Park 3 Roles of Middle Power in East Asia: The Perspective of Network Theories of World Politics ��������������������������������������������������   29 Sangbae Kim 4 Emerging Powers and a Middle Power: U.S.-China Competition and South Korea in Cyberspace��������������������������������������   55 Sangbae Kim 5 The Dilemma of South Korea as a Middle Power with Regards to the Conflicts Between the United States and China in the South China Sea���������������������������������������������������������   77 Dong Ryul Lee 6 The Inter-network Politics of Cyber Security and Middle Power Diplomacy: A Korean Perspective����������������������������������������������   97 Sangbae Kim 7 Power Shift, Power Diffusion, and Middle Power Diplomacy: MIKTA and Changes in Global Governance����������������������������������������  125 Seungjoo Lee 8 Unpacking the Domestic Political Foundation of Middle Powers: Cases from South Korea and Turkey ����������������������������������������������������  141 Chaekwang You

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Chapter 1

Introduction Seungjoo Lee

Abstract  This book aims to shed light on the changing nature of the world order in the twenty-first century and its influence on middle powers, and to explore South Korea’s middle power diplomacy. The world order in the twenty-first century is profoundly different from that of the cold war period in the sense that both quantitative and qualitative changes are underway simultaneously. The concurrent progress of power transition and power diffusion symbolizes the changing nature of the world order. Changes in world order in the twenty-first century signals a return of “middle power’s moment.” Identifying factors underlying middle power diplomacy, this book aims to present a new direction for middle power diplomacy in the twentyfirst century. The world order in the twenty-first century has been marked by various uncertainties, including hyper-globalization and de-globalization, acceleration of U.S.-China strategic competition, and the global spread of Covid-19. Middel powers including are in a position to find a maneuvering room by cooperating with state and non-state actors to cope with hyperglobalization, intensifying rivalry between the US and China, and the COVID-19. Such strategic space enables middle powers to garner diverse diplomatic tools so that they can depart away from traditional diplomatic methods of bandwagoning or balancing. The room for strategic maneuvering also allows middle powers to form coalitions with other actors. Unlike hegemonic powers that can project hard power unilaterally vis-à-vis small powers, Middle powers can enhance their influence or wield leadership only when they successfully make coalitions with other actors. In this sense, middle power diplomacy “after the moment of middle powers” is at a crossroads. Keywords  Middle power diplomacy · Middle power’s moment · South Korea · Hyper-globalization · The U.S.-China strategic competition · COVID-19

S. Lee (*) Dept Political Sci and Intl Relations, Chung-Ang Univ, Dongjak-ku, Seoul, Korea (Republic of) e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Lee, S. Kim (eds.), Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76012-0_1

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 he Crisis of International Order and Middle Power T Diplomacy: Hyperglobalization, the U.S.-China Strategic Competition, and COVID-19 This book sheds light on the changing nature of the world order in the twenty-­first century and its influence on middle powers, and to explore Korea’s middle power diplomacy (Alexandroff & Cooper, 2010). The world order in the twenty-first century is profoundly different from that of the cold war period in the sense that both quantitative and qualitative changes are underway simultaneously. The concurrent progress of power transition and power diffusion symbolizes the changing nature of the world order, signaling a return of “middle power’s moment” (Tiberghien, 2013). Identifying factors underlying middle power diplomacy, this book aims to present a new direction for middle power diplomacy in the twenty-first century. The world order in the twenty-first century has been marked by various uncertainties, including hyper-globalization and de-globalization, acceleration of U.S.China strategic competition, and the global spread of COVID-19. First of all, the 2008 global financial crisis brought to the fore the domestic origins of resistance to globalization. After the global financial crisis, existing powers were constrained domestically to exercise leadership needed to maintain world order. The emergence of the Trump administration and Brexit, which emerged after the global financial crisis, demonstrated that the world order established after World War II is shaking from the roots. It is not the first time that the liberal international order has experienced a crisis. However, the current crisis of the liberal international order that originated from the global financial crisis is profoundly different from the previous ones. While developing countries discontent with the existing order primarily launched a challenge in the previous crisis (Ban & Blyth, 2013), after the global financial crisis, advanced Western countries that had designed the liberal international order attempted to deviate from it. As the U.S., the architect of the liberal international order, strengthened protectionism by advocating “America First,” it caused a series of chain-­ reactions to other countries, spreading protectionism in the global scale. As a result, the growth rate of trade, which was the driving force behind post-war economic growth, was stagnant. This change calls for the central role of middle powers in maintaining and innovating liberal international order. Until superpowers return to a multilateralism, middle powers are expected to play a tentative role in maintaining an international order in crisis. The rise of China and the subsequent U.S.-China strategic competition has emerged as another factor in promoting middle diplomacy (Gilley & O’Neil, 2014). As shown during the U.S.-China trade war, the U.S. broke away from multilateralism, criticized the WTO, and pursued a bilateral approach in dealing with China. While China has acted as a supporter of globalization and multilateralism, it has not demonstrated the capabilities and will needed to maintain it. As the U.S.-China strategic competition facilitates the securitization of the economy, many countries are exposed to risk of economic sanctions and retaliation. Countries facing China’s

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economic sanctions such as South Korea, Canada and Australia began to explore the possibility of a collective response to China’s coercive diplomacy. It is against this backdrop that interests, either academic or practical, in middle power diplomacy have resurfaced, believing that middle powers have a potential to bring about meaningful changes in global governance. The global spread of COVID-19 has been a new factor highlighting the importance of middle power diplomacy (Jones, 2020). Although transnational cooperation is essential to effectively prevent the spread of pandemics, COVID-19 broke out in a leadership vacuum. The U.S., which should lead transnational cooperation on COVID-19, has revealed a variety of problems ranging from leadership for global public goods and the ability to coordinate policies among countries in the face of crisis to domestic governance. China sought to turn criticism into a favorable response by emphasizing its system’s efficiency and aggressively launching “mask diplomacy” (“China’s Vaccine Diplomacy”, 2020). Although these efforts have paid off in part, China also revealed its own structural problems such as concealment of data, media control, and oppression of civil liberties, demonstrating fundamental limitations in exercising leadership for international cooperation. As a result, according to the Pew Research Center Survey in 2020, soft power of the U.S. and China substantially declined. Negative perceptions of China have increased dramatically in 14 major countries. In particular, negative perceptions of China in Korea, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, Spain, and Canada have reached the highest level since the outbreak of the COVID-19. Negative perceptions of China have increased 24%, 19% and 13% in Australia, Britain and the United States over the past year, respectively. The increase in negative perceptions of China is closely related to the assessment that China has misrepresented its response to Covid-19 (Silver et al., 2020). Soft power in the United States has also been at its nadir during Trump’s presidency. Positive perceptions of the U.S. fell even in allies and partners.

 he Promises and Challenges of South Korea’s Middle T Power Diplomacy South Korea is in a position to find a maneuvering room by cooperating with state and non-state actors to cope with hyperglobalization, intensifying rivalry between the US and China, and the COVID-19. Such strategic space enables middle powers including South Korea to garner diverse diplomatic tools so that they can depart away from traditional diplomatic methods of bandwagoning or balancing. The room for strategic maneuvering allows middle powers to form coalitions with other actors. Unlike hegemonic powers that can project hard power unilaterally vis-à-vis small powers, Korea as a middle power can enhances its influence or wield leadership only when it successfully makes coalitions with other actors (Higgott & Cooper, 1990). In this sense, middle power diplomacy “after the moment of middle powers”

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is at a crossroads that in turn will be a litmus test for South Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the twenty-­first century (Robertson, 2020). The opportunity does not unconditionally boost powers and the status of South Korea unless it has clear visions and strategies of how to turn these opportunities into tangible outcomes. First, common identity, goals and interests are known for middle powers to facilitate international cooperation and leadership. In sharp contrast to traditional middle powers in Europe such as Sweden, Norway, and Finland, however, East Asia suffer from heterogeneity among middle powers in East Asia, which has been cited as a hindrance to middle power diplomacy to lead regional and international cooperation. Given that middle powers in East Asia do not share the unity or similarity, it is time to take advantage of diversity and heterogeneity as a complementary asset rather than a burden for international cooperation. Rather than perceiving heterogeneity as an obstacle to international cooperation, middle powers in East Asia should be able to turn diversity into complementary asset for international cooperation. It is better for South Korea to actively take advantage of diversity as a factor for promoting and expanding international cooperation. Second, regional environments surrounding South Korea is not conducive to middle power diplomacy because East Asia became the very locus where the U.S. and China wage strategic competition. The U.S.-China strategic competition creates a dual dynamics of middle power diplomacy in the region. On the one hand, as the U.S. and China that should lead international cooperation reveal their lack of leadership, the demand for middle power diplomacy increased to fill the leadership vacuum (Cook, 2020). On the other hand, due to strategic competition, the two superpowers’ interest in international cooperation with middle powers declined as the U.S. and China placed their strategic interests on a higher priority. Such complex situations present middle powers both opportunities and challenges to exercise the leadership for international cooperation.

The Organization of the Book In Chap. 2, based on a close reading on Thucydides’ History, Sungwoo Park focuses on a crucial role of middle powers that went unnoticed by scholars and experts on middle powers. In the background of the heated debate on US-China power transition, Graham Allison resurrected “Thucydides’s trap” to demonstrate the way in which the U.S. and China would antagonize (Allison, 2017). While agreeing to Allison’s structural interpretation of the likelihood of the great power war, Park notes that for the complete understanding of the Thucydides’s trap, one should take “secondary yet influential states” into account. Thucydides implied that middle powers substantially influenced hegemonic powers’ decision to enter into war. In order explicate the Thucydides’ thesis, Park picks up three middle powers: Corinth, Melos and Syracuse. Each state demonstrated different strategies and behaviors in coping with the hegemonic transition. Dubbing Corinth a peace-­ breaking power, he points out that Corinth reverberated the tensions between Athens

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and Sparta, playing a critical role in pushing the entire Greek into war. Corinth’s decision had to do with its grievance against Athens that interfered the conflicts between Corinth and Megara, which ultimately led to the war between Athens and Sparta. Melos, “irrational middle power,” also facilitated the war by rejecting the negotiations offered by Athens. By defying the negotiation, Melos was forced to escalate the tension with Athens, thereby unable to avoid the tragic war. Third, Syracuse, a regional hegemon, could not avoid the war against Athens that ultimately dissipated Athens’ power. Syracuse secured the status as a regional hegemon by claiming that it would protect Sicily. However, Syracuse had an inherent limitation because its status was linked to Athens’ imperialism. Grounded on the interpretations on the three cases, Park attempts to examine whether the Thucydides’s trap is relevant to the contemporary middle powers. While it may be not appropriate to juxtapose middle powers in the ancient Greek period with contemporary middle powers in East Asia, argues Park, one can still draw some lessons from the Greek cases. From the Corinth case, it is not wise for middle powers to exaggerate security threats or intensify tension between great powers for the sake of their interests. The Melian case tells that the risk is high when a state mixes irrational claims with value-oriented claims. From a Syracusan case, one should keep in mind that the middle power that aspires to become a regional hegemon should be able to offer the public goods rather than solely seeking its own interests. In Chap. 3, from the perspective of network theories, Sangbae Kim examines a variety of roles middle powers in East Asia. Kim points out that network theories can fill in the gap left by traditional theories of middle powers that largely focus on actors’ attributes. In this view, it is important to figure out the structural attributes of a system. Kim specifically picks up three concepts to explain South Korea’s middle power strategy: structural holes, positional power, and translation strategies. Kim provides four strategies South Korea should seek to promote middle power diplomacy. The first strategy South Korea should seek in the context of middle power diplomacy is “framing and positioning in the network.” Should it not be squeezed between the U.S. and China, South Korea needs to frame the configuration of regional order in East Asia. For this task, South Korea should go beyond the narrow-minded and myopic pursuit of self-interests to form coalitions. The second strategy is “connecting and disconnecting ties.” South Korea should simultaneously embark on severing the existing ties and creating new ones in the region. The third strategy is “collecting and attracting like-minded groups” that enables middle powers to wield collective power. It is absolutely crucial for South Korea to identify common interests to elicit cooperation from like-minded middle powers. The last strategy is “complementary standard setting.” At this stage, South Korea should play a role of “complementary programmer” that contributes to enhance system interoperability and compatibility. In contrast to the U.S.-China rivalry in traditional territorial disputes, in Chap. 4, Sangbae Kim shifts gears to the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace to examine South Korea’s middle power diplomacy. Cyberspace emerged as the new sources of power in the Fourth Industrial Revolution to pave a new horizon of world politics

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that goes beyond the traditional power politics based on military and economic resources (Schwab, 2016). With the unfolding of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (IR), cyberspace emerged as a new area for the U.S.-China strategic competition where both countries attempt to grasp the first-move advantages in cutting-edge technologies such as e-commerce, fintech, AI, blockchain, etc. Kim argues that the U.S. and China engage in the “three-dimensional competition of technology, standard, and charm.” Given that the U.S. and China expanded the strategic competition to cyberspace, it is highly critical for South Korea to come up with national strategies by comprehending the nature of the emerging nature of international politics with “power transformation,” “power diffusion,” and “power shift” simultaneously unravelling. Kim takes three types of middle power strategies—brokerage, coalition, and norm-­ setting—to examine South Korea’s strategies in cyberspace. In order to explicate the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace, Kim proposes “network theories of world politics” because international politics, particularly in cyberspace, transforms into “inter-network politics.” Kim suggests that as the U.S. and China engage in technology and standard competition as demonstrated by the US government sanction on China’s Huawei, South Korea should seek to maintain openness and compatibility in order to not repeat a dire experience of the THAAD deployment and China’s retaliation. In conjunction with a strategy of openness and compatibility, Kim offers, South Korea should create and diffuse an inclusive model of socio-political engagement, transcending the previous model of industrial catch-up so that the model could elevate the charm and attractiveness of the Korean model. In doing so, South Korea would be able to exercise the leadership in digital diplomacy to attenuate the pressures from the U.S.China strategic competition. In order to materialize the strategy, Kim concludes, South Korea should be able to figure out structural position in the newly emerging configuration in cyberspace to take concrete actions. In Chap. 5, Dong Ryul Lee explores South Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the context of the U.S.-China strategic competition. He notes that the escalation of the U.S.-China strategic rivalry poses a daunting challenge to regional countries in East Asia because it profoundly reshapes the regional order. South Korea is in a unique position as it has maintained military alliance with the U.S. for over 70 years, while its economic ties with China has dramatically increased in the twenty-­ first century. This situation was often dubbed “the U.S. for security, China for economy.” China’s economic retaliation about South Korean government’s decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to strengthen the ROK-US alliance vividly shows the dilemma South Korea faces. Against this backdrop, he focuses on the clash between the U.S. and China on the South China Sea to examine the way in which South Korea handled the issue. The case is a litmus test to examine whether and how South Korea under simultaneous pressure from the U.S. and China attempted to implement middle power diplomacy in terms of addressing universal norms and rules on territorial disputes and regional maritime security, although it was not a player with sovereign interests in the South China Sea disputes.

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Lee argues that the South Korean government sought principled diplomacy as it consistently stick to three principles it announced in a preemptive manner: “freedom of navigation and commerce,” “peaceful settlement of disputes” and “support for non-militarization of the South China Sea.” Lee goes on to argue that the South Korean government attempted to make a balancing act between the two great powers by consistently maintaining the principles, although they did not fully satisfy both the U.S. and China. Lee cautions that the success of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy is not unconditional, arguing that the complex nature of the South China Sea disputes restrained the U.S. and China to unilaterally demand South Korea to take sides. Lee suggests that in order to sustain middle power diplomacy under the circumstance of the U.S.-China strategic competition, it is essential to cooperate with like-minded countries. In Chap. 6 titled “the Inter-network Politics of Cyber Security and Middle Power Diplomacy: A Korean Perspective,” Sangbae Kim explores South Korea’s potential as well as constraints as an emerging middle power in new issue areas such as atomic energy, global warming, and cyber security, official developmental aid (ODA), global trade and finance. In the realm of cyber security, conventional wisdom falls short of explaining the middle power diplomacy of South Korea, because it tends to examine exclusively actors’ capabilities. In order to remedy the analytical pitfall, he suggests the “positional approach” that pays attention to actors’ position, not actors’ attributes, within the network. Out of various types of positional powers, he specifically draws on “brokerage power” South Korea could wield as it secures a certain position within the cyber security network. In terms of issue areas, cyber security is a double-edged sword for South Korea. On the one hand, exposed to cyber attack from North Korea, South Korea is in dire need of minilateral and multilateral cooperation with neighboring countries in order to prevent cyber threats in a preemptive manner. On the other hand, cyber security emerged as an area where South Korea with its cutting edge IT technologies and effective digital infrastructure is in a position to broker the countries with conflicting interests. Brokerage requires a middle power to identify overall configuration of the network, attract like-minded countries to exercise collective power, and forge programming power. Cyber security is also an issue area where two approaches to global governance are competing: inter-governmentalism and multistakeholderism. While no single institution has yet emerged as a dominant form of global governance in cyber security, the competition between the two approaches called the U.S. leadership into question in the global governance of cyber security. As a result, the overall configuration of the network in cyber security centered around the U.S. and Europe vs. Russia and China, signifying the competition between the two opposing blocs. And with the rise of China, the U.S.-China competition began to intensify in cyber security since the 2010s. The gist of the competition in cyber security, argues Kim, is “inter-network politics,” which is distinctive from traditional “inter-national politics.” The changing network structure in cyber security presents South Korea both opportunities and challenges. First, South Korea faces an inescapable dilemma to

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choose the network led by the U.S. and China in cyber security in terms of technical standards, which requires South Korea to play an “asymmetric coordination game.” Second, South Korea is also under a mounting pressure as developed and developing countries confront in updating the ITRs in 2012. Kim suggests that it is needed for South Korea to seek compatibility between the two networks rather than making a choice between them. In the process, South Korea should be able to cooperate with like-minded countries to wield collective power, thereby playing a role of broker between the two networks. Kim concludes that the ultimate test for South Korea’s middle power diplomacy is whether South Korea could “program” the new rule of the game complementary to the existing system. In Chap. 7, Seungjoo Lee points out that the time is ripe for middle power diplomacy as dual changes take place in world politics represented by power shift and power diffusion. Lee explores the origins and evolution of MIKTA from the perspective of “coalition diplomacy.” Plagued with a number of problems such as the rise of “the rest,” emergence of non-state actors, and leadership vacuum, a fundamental reconfiguration of global governance is absolutely needed to better incorporate the changing realities and avoid the danger of “non-governance.” Furthermore, the emergence of crosscutting issues such as climate change, natural disaster, immigration, cyber security, and sustainable development prompts state and non-state actors to seek profoundly different solutions, departing away from traditional handling of single issues. Great powers are unable to address newly emerging global challenges single-­ handedly as they used to do. Middle powers emerged as an alternative to overcome multiple cleavages residing in global governance. Middle powers are better equipped than great powers because they are firmly committed to multilateralism without hegemonic ambition. All in all, the changing nature of world politics paves the way to “middle power’s moment.” However, the window of opportunity is not open for middle powers indefinitely. In order to seize the opportunity, middle powers should demonstrate that they can address global challenges in a creative manner in contrast to great powers relying on hard power. Lee maintains that the key to middle powers’ success lies in their ability to combine hard power and soft power effectively to demonstrate that they are legitimate to run global governance. MIKTA showcases the way in which middle powers redefine their roles to create a new diplomatic platform addressing issues related to global commons. Building on such institutional platform, MIKTA can take an innovative approach to global governance. MIKTA was initially created as a residual group within the G20 that did not belong to the G7 and BRICS. Despite the diversities and differences among MIKTA countries, MIKTA was expected to mitigate conflicts between the two opposing groups. MIKTA is stark contrast to traditional power politics led by great powers for two reasons. Lee stresses that MIKTA countries place high priority on addressing global commons rather than taking advantage of the platform as a means to realize their own narrow-minded interests. Second, MIKTA inherently seeks informal and network-­based cooperation, reflecting the constantly shifting and fluid making of coalitions in twenty-first century world politics. Meanwhile, MIKTA does face challenges in order to increase its visibility and influence in global governance. It is

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often pointed out that MIKTA countries do not have many commonalities, which are likely to procrastinate its further development. However, Lee argues that MIKTA countries do not have to perceive the diversity among them as a burden. MIKTA countries should be able to utilize the diversity to elevate MIKTA cooperation to even higher level. In Chap. 8, Chaekwang You points out that it is worthwhile to explore why middle powers’ commitment to middle power diplomacy demonstrates a wide range of change. While it paid attention to either middle powers’ common behavioral traits such as respect for multipolarity, rule-based order and institutions or their ideational foundations altruistic norms of good citizenship and enlightened self-interest, conventional wisdom has not extensively addressed the domestic sources of middle power diplomacy. In his view, numerous attempts to derive middle power diplomacy from material capabilities failed, because they neglected domestic dimensions underpinning middle power diplomacy. He finds that democratic consolidation was pivotal in South Korea’s pursuit of middle power diplomacy. You explores how and why consolidated democracy served as a domestic foundation of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy. You posits that consolidated democracy is a sufficient condition for middle power diplomacy, in addition to material capabilities. In order to capture the impact of consolidated democracy on middle power diplomacy, You proposes the “capability-democracy nexus model.” He starts out by arguing that because a variety of middle powers’ behavioral characteristics are highly embedded in consolidated democracy the “democracy-free approach” is unable to explain why some middle powers are more interested in seeking liberal international norms than nondemocracies. The capability-democracy nexus model illucidates that positional power and domestic institutional power are the defining factors that encourage middle powers to commit to middle power behavior such as counterhegemony, pro-multilateralism, peace-building, conflict mediation, and rule-making. He contrasts South and Turkey to test the model. In the late 1980s, South Korea grasped the idea of middle power diplomacy as it secured material power commensurate to the middle power. Since then, South Korea has actively pursued middle power diplomacy in dealing with China in parallel with its democratic consolidation. South Korea’s penchant for middle power diplomacy culminated to the notion of “balancer” between the U.S. and China. Until 2014, Turkey was also an active promoter of middle power diplomacy, demonstrated in its interests in brokerage among countries in the Middle East and sought collective leadership with likeminded middle powers such as MIKTA. However, democratic decay and backsliding into authoritarian regime in Turkey coincided with decline of middle power diplomacy. It is known that in reality, domestic foundations of middle power diplomacy have precipitously declined in under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as was plagued with erosion of institutional basis of democracy.

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References Alexandroff, A. S., & Cooper, A. F. (2010). Rising states, rising institutions: Challenges for global governance. Brookings Institution. Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war: Can America and China escape thucydides’s trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Ban, C., & Blyth, M. (2013). The BRICS and the Washington consensus: An introduction. Review of International Political Economy, 20(2), 241–255. China’s Vaccine Diplomacy. (2020). Partnering for trials in at least 16 countries worldwide. MERICS China Briefing. https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/draft-­landscape-­of-­covid-­ 19-­candidate-­vaccines Cook, M. (2020). The middle power alignment in public attitudes about Covid-19. https://www. lowyinstitute.org/the-­interpreter/middle-­power-­alignment-­public-­attitudes-­about-­covid-­19 Gilley, B., & O’Neil, A. (2014). China’s rise through the prism of middle powers. In B. Gilley & A. O’Neil (Eds.), Middle powers and the rise of China. Georgetown University Press. Higgott, R. A., & Cooper, A. F. (1990). Middle power leadership and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns group, and the Uruguay round of trade negotiations. International Organization, 44(4), 589–632. Jones, B. (2020). Can middle powers lead the world out of the pandemic? Foreign affairs. https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/france/2020-­06-­18/canmiddle-­powers-­lead-­world-­out-­pandemic Robertson, J. (2020). Middle powers after the middle-power moment. https://www.eastasiaforum. org/2020/06/06/middle-­powers-­after-­the-­middle-­power-­moment/ Schwab, K. (2016). The Fourth Industrial Revolution. World Economic Forum. Silver, L., Devlin, K., & Huang, C. (2020) Historic highs in many countries: Majorities say China has handled COVID-19 outbreak poorly. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/ unfavorable-­views-­of-­china-­reach-­historic-­highs-­in-­many-­countries/ Tiberghien, Y. (2013). Leadership in global institution building: Minerva’s rule. Palgrave McMillan.

Chapter 2

Thucydides on Thucydides Trap: A Reading with the Emphasis of Middle Powers and Its Application in the East Asian Context Sungwoo Park

Abstract  In the background of the heated debate on US-China power transition, Graham Allison popularizes the phrase “Thucydides’s trap” to contemplate the very likelihood that the U.S., a currently dominant power, comes to war with China, a rising power. He suggests that the great powers can avoid the trap if and only if they defuse the escalating tension with the cautious awareness of the imminent war. However, getting out of the trap requires more than just two great power’s alertness and enlightenment. Above all, it should be noted that the Thucydides’s trap is not constructed merely by the major powers’ capabilities and perceptions. It is affected in particular by the secondary yet influential states. Notably, Thucydides himself takes pains at probing into rhetoric and actions of the secondary states in order to explain the cause of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Thucydides’s own elaboration of Thucydides’s trap is more comprehensive than the structural interpretation of it that Allison endorses. This paper notes how Thucydides redirects us to the role of the secondary states, or, middle powers in contemporary terms, which had a remarkable influence on the decisions of the hegemonic powers. Three  secondary states, namely, Corinth, Melos and Syracuse are chosen  on the ground that they show distinctive features of engaging in hegemonic powers. Through examining those states, this paper identifies three different types of middle powers, in particular, with respect to the ways in which they involve in the hegemonic transition. Keywords  The Thucydides’s trap · Secondary states · The Peloponnesian war · Corinth · Melos · Syracuse

The earlier version of this paper was delivered at IPSA 2018, Brisbane in Australia on July 21–25, 2018. S. Park (*) Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Lee, S. Kim (eds.), Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76012-0_2

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Introduction In the background of the heated debate on US-China power transition, Graham Allison, a prominent IR scholar, popularizes the phrase “Thucydides’s trap” to contemplate the very likelihood that the U.S., a currently dominant power, comes to war with China, a rising power. According to him, the U.S. and China now get caught in the same trap as Sparta and Athens experienced about 2500  years ago.1 In fact, Allison is based on the structural interpretation of Thucydides’ History that the real cause of the Peloponnesian war was the structural imbalance between Sparta and Athens (Allison, 2017, pp.  29–30). While he shares the structural perspective in analyzing the US-China power transition, Allison does not endorse the structural determinism that the war is inevitable once there is a power transition of hegemonic powers. Instead, he estimates the possibility of avoiding allegedly inevitable war between the U.S. and China, even though they seem to be nearing to the door of the Thucydides’s trap. He suggests that the great powers can avoid the trap if and only if they defuse the escalating tension with the cautious awareness of the imminent war. Hoping that relevant states do not repeat the same blunders, he surveys the major great wars in history and makes a list of cautions to avoid escalating tensions among competing powers.2 I agree with Allison in particular in that the Thucydides’s trap is not a curse but a warning of the historian that the descendants should think over and act with for better and more desirable results. However, if Allison’s effort to avoid the Thucydides’s trap is targeted only at the great powers, it is not a sufficient warning that Thucydides had intended. Getting out of the trap requires more than just two great power’s alertness and enlightenment. Above all, it should be noted that the Thucydides’s trap is not constructed merely by the major powers’ capabilities and perceptions. It must be affected by the other actors such as secondary yet influential states. It is notable that Thucydides takes pains at probing into rhetoric and actions of the secondary states such as Megara, Corcyra, Corinth, etc. in order to explain the cause of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. Needless to say, Thucydides’s own elaboration of Thucydides’s trap is more comprehensive than the structural interpretation of it that Allison endorses. For our better understanding of Thucydides’s trap, therefore, we should return to Thucydides’s History and explore what he himself would say on the Thucydides’s trap. In particular, I will emphasize that Thucydides 1  Of course, the naive application of Thucydides’s trap in the twenty-first century raises a fundamental question concerning whether the current US-China competition is comparable to the hegemonic rivalry of Athens and Sparta 2500  years ago. This paper does not address this problem because it invites a bunch of controversies over the philosophy of history. Instead, the paper attempts to derive the best instruction from Thucydides’s History. Along the similar line, there is enormous amount of works on Thucydides. For the various ways of deriving Thucydides’s instruction, see Ahrendsdorf (1997), Bruell (1974), Connor (1984), Forde (1995), Lebow & Kelly (2001), Orwin (1994), Raaflaub (1994), Riley (2000). 2  Allison provides twelve  clues to avoid wars that are likely to be inevitable (Allison, 2017, Chap. 9).

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redirects us to the role of the secondary states, or, middle powers in contemporary terms, which had a remarkable influence on the decisions of the hegemonic powers. Once we focus on Thucydides’s attention to the middle powers in the History, we come to realize that Thucydides’s interest in middle powers is not confined to the explanation of the outbreak of the war but also to the entire span of the History. Thus, in order to earn Thucydides’s own instruction regarding the Thucydides’s Trap, we should extend our perspective  further than the outbreak of the War. Moreover, it is notable that Thucydides’s attention to the middle powers is not merely for the comprehensive explanation of the hegemonic war but also for the concerns of the middle powers themselves. Thucydides cares for the actions of the middle states, which influence and even determine the future of the major powers. If there were any eternal instruction in the History, the instruction would include the lessons for the middle states as well as for the great powers. In this perspective, this paper pays special attention to the role of middle powers in Thucydides’ History. Multiple states in the History may belong to the category of the middle powers. Among those, I choose three states, namely, Corinth, Melos and Syracuse on the ground that they show distinctive features of engaging in hegemonic powers. Through examining those states, the paper will identify three different types of middle powers, in particular, with respect to the ways in which they involve in the hegemonic transition. Before coming to the detailed discussion of the three states in the following sections, let me briefly introduce what they did and what happened to them in the course of the Peloponnesian War. First, Corinth, a powerful second-tier state just below Athens and Sparta, was notorious for exaggerating the tension between Athens and Sparta and urged Sparta to open a war with Athens in the early stage of the war. It finally achieved the goal but it also paid the penalty for driving the entire Greek world including itself into violent war. Second, Melos, an allegedly neutral state yet Spartan ally, astonishingly rejected the negotiation offered by Athens, the negotiation that would have avoided their total destruction. It deliberately ignored the reality of power politics and faced tragic result. Third, Syracuse, a regional power in Sicily, had difficulties in managing its status in the region, although it never challenged the Athenian hegemony in the mainland. In fact, Athens launched the Sicilian expedition mainly against Syracuse. Interestingly, the expedition required Athens to wage a war of attrition, which resulted in serious decline of the Athenian power. Finally, this paper revisits the contemporary relevance of the Thucydides’s trap with the benefit of reviewing the three examples of the middle powers in the History. In particular, it tries to figure out how this reading of Thucydides helps us understand the proper roles of the East Asian middle powers in the contemporary US-China power transition. All the East Asian countries such as Japan, Russia, South Korea, and even China share a part of characters as a middle power.3 The 3  The definition of middle power varies according to which standard or combination of standards is applied to the definition. The standards may include military and economic capabilities, natural resources, international reputation, geographical or positional advantage and, last but not least,

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empirical examinations of those states in terms of their roles as middle powers go beyond the capacity of this paper. However, the paper attempts to shed a new light on the controversies over the US-China power competition by means of comparing East Asian states to the three types of middle powers in the History. Now, let me go back to the Greek context to start discussing Corinth, one of the three middle powers that I select in the History.

Corinth: A Peace-Breaking Middle Power Corinth was a middle power in the sense that it had the capacity of playing an independent and significant role in influencing the decision of the outbreak of the War.4 In other words, without the role of Corinth, the Peloponnesian War may have begun at a different time and the War would have been deployed in a different direction. In particular, Corinth used the rhetoric to escalate the hostility between Sparta and Athens and it affected the Spartan decision on declaring war against Athens. The traditional interpretation endorses the view that the structural imbalance is the “inevitable” cause of the outbreak of the War. The interpretation rests on Thucydides’s own comments on the cause of the war, which declares “the genuine cause of the war is the rise of the Athenian power and the Spartan fear” (Thuc.I.23).5 However, this interpretation tells merely a half of the truth because Thucydides fills the gap between the two factors, the rise of Athenian power and the Spartan fear by telling details of other factors including the role of Corinth.6 In fact, the “genuine cause” is mediated by Corinth’s independent effort of instigating Sparta. Thus, the other half of the true cause of the war is to be disclosed by means of paying attention to the role of Corinth who drives the Spartan fear eventually into the decision of the War.

state’s willingness to be a middle power. Generally speaking, defining middle power is not a work of a scientific objectiveness but a function of rhetoric in terms of how a certain state uses its existing conditions for persuading its position as a middle state. For the difficulties of defining middle power, see Robertson (2017). This paper does not take any particular standard for defining middle power. Instead, it is based on the flexible and rhetorical understanding of middle power. 4  According to Donald Kagan, an authoritative historian of the Peloponnesian War, there were three groups of Spartan allies. One group consists of small states such as Phlius and Ornea that were close to Sparta, thus being easily affected by it. Another group includes states such as Megara, Elis, and Mantinea that are apart from Sparta. They are stronger than the first group but not so powerful as to avoid the ultimate punishment of Sparta. Corinth was an exemplar of the third group, which was powerful enough to conduct its foreign policy independently (Kagan, 2003, p. 5). 5  This indicates Thucydides’s History of Peloponnesian War, Book 1 and Chap. 23. Hereafter, I follow this format when citing Thucydides’s History. For the translation, I use the Landmark edition, which updates the Richard Crawley translation (Thucydides, 1996). 6  In fact, Thucydides presents the details about the roles of Corinth, Megara, Corcyra and other states in the explanation of the outbreak of the war. In particular, for the significant role of Corinth, see Novo (2016).

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To see the decisiveness of the role of Corinth, let me turn to the context of the Athens-Sparta rivalry before the outbreak of the War. The rivalry relationship started in the aftermath of the Persian war. Athens became an emerging power by leading the Delian League, while Sparta, a former hegemonic state at the Persian war, was now relatively in recess, recurrently being embroiled in wars coupled with revolts within the Peloponnesus. There were good reasons that Sparta and its allies were cautious about the ambition of the emerging power  and took a measure. However, this does not necessarily mean that Sparta made war with Athens. In spite of the potential hostility, both Sparta and Athens showed prudence to manage an apparently escalating tension during the 50-year process, namely, Pentakontaetia, of intensifying the rivalry between the two after the Persian war. Both Athens and Sparta did not want to be involved in a total war. In other words, Athens and Sparta shared a common understanding that they needed to avoid destructive conflicts between the two until Corinth embodied Spartan hostility toward Athens.7 Why was Corinth so eager to break a peace? There was a history that Corinth developed its hostility toward Athens. In fact, after the Persian war Corinth steadily tried to consolidate the status of middle power by taking advantage of Athens-Sparta rivalry. Megara as another candidate for a middle power was engaged in the competition with Corinth because both of them were sea powers and Spartan allies. Megara was strategically important to Athens due to its geopolitical position having a western port, Pegae, which gave easy access to the Corinthian Gulf and an eastern port, Nisaea, from which an enemy could launch an attack on the port of Athens. Megara was aware of its geopolitical value. Thus, when it was defeated in 459 BCE in the border disputes with Corinth, it declared secession from the Spartan alliance and joined with Athens for seeking help against Corinth. Megara’s joining with the Athenian alliance escalated the tension between Athens and Sparta. Thus, after this, the number of conflicts between the two powers had increased for about 15 years to the extent of expanding the front lines further to Egypt (Thuc.1.104, 109, 110). It is notable again that even in this increasing tension both Athens and Sparta were moderate enough not to bring in the battleground to Attica. In 446  BCE, Megara defected from the Athenian alliance and returned to the Peloponnesian league. Megara’s defect meant for Athens that it was vulnerable to Spartan invasion into Attica. In this background, Athens and Sparta agreed at the Thirty Year Peace Treaty that they acknowledged their hegemonic status in each area.8 Briefly, Megara was unsuccessful in using the hegemonic rivalry to strengthen its middle power status. In other words, Sparta and Athens passed the test of Megara’s instigation to open a total war between the two.

7  In a similar vein, Kagan emphasizes that Sparta consciously avoided direct conflict with Athens at the early period of the War. According to him, when Athens had trouble in Thasos, an island in the northern Aegean Sea in 465 BCE, Sparta could have invaded Attica, but it did not lest Athens should suspect that Sparta was willing to open a total war with Athens (Kagan, 2003, pp. 16, 24). 8  In addition, the Peace treaty rules that Athens gave back Peloponnesian lands, which they had annexed during the conflict, and both Athens and Sparta forbade each member state changing sides.

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In the series of conflicts, Corinth increased a grievance against Athens for its interference on behalf of Megara (Thuc.1.103).9 In addition, Corinth realized that as far as the two hegemonic rivals controlled their conflicts peacefully under the provisions of the Peace Treaty, it had no room to strengthen its status as a middle power. In fact, after the Peace Treaty, both Athens and Sparta were prudent not to give a wrong signal to its counterpart. There were two occasions demonstrating that both Athens and Sparta tried to avoid the full-fledged war as much as they could. The first occasion took place in Thurii, a remote place of southern Italy, in 444/3. Former citizens of Sybaris sent an envoy  to mainland Greece for assistance in founding a new colony at Thurii. Sparta disregarded their request, while Athens welcomed the idea of founding a new colony and gathered settlers. The positive reaction of the Athenians on the Sybaris’s request could be viewed as an evidence of Athens’s imperial intention. However, Athens successfully disapproved of it by not helping Thurii anymore. No sooner was Thurii founded than it fought a war against one of Sparta’s colonies, Taras. Thurii lost and the winners set up a trophy of victory at Olympia for all the Greeks to see. If Athens had been an imperialistic empire at this point, it should have protected Thurii. The loss of Thurii may have been bitter to Athens. However, Athens clearly understood that its action for restoring Thurii may lead to an outbreak of war with Sparta. Athens did not want Sparta to misunderstand it. The other occasion demonstrates that Sparta also did not want a total war with Athens. The test took place in the southeastern area of the Aegean sea, far from Thurii. In 440 BCE, Samos and Miletus waged a war over the control of Priene, a town lying between them. Samos was independent and an original member of the Delian League as one of the three allies that paid no tribute and possessed their own navies. Miletus was also a member of the League but had a history of revolt and subjugation against Athens and was forced to pay tribute. In the dispute with Samos, Milesians asked Athenians for help. Athens could not reject it because otherwise it should lose a hegemonic status by allowing a powerful league member to impose its will on a helpless ally. At first, Athenians tried arbitration; yet Samos refused it. This refusal apparently challenged Athens’ leadership and authority and deserved punishment. It was no wonder for Pericles himself to lead a fleet against Samos. He replaced the ruling oligarchy with a democratic government and imposed a large indemnity. However, the Samians resiliently resisted. They turned over the democratic government and went against Athens even by colluding with Pissuthnes, Persian satrap in Asia Minor (Thuc.1.115). News of the rebellion stirred other Athenian allies such as Byzantium and Mitilene.10 If Sparta had had an intention to 9  Here Thucydides reports, “The Athenians occupied Megara and Pegae, and built for the Megarians their long walls from the city to Nisaea, in which they placed an Athenian garrison. This was the main cause of the Corinthians conceiving such a deadly hatred against Athens” (Thuc.1. 103). 10  Byzantium was also an important city to Athens as a key point on the Athenian grain rout to the Black sea and Mytilene was an autonomous and reliable ally, the chief city of the island of Lesbos, which was strategically important to Athens.

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suppress Athenian power, it should have taken advantage of the turmoil in the eastern AegeanSea and invaded Attica when Athenian power was dispersed to deal with the revolts in the Aegean Sea (Thuc.1.116–7). However, Sparta was inactive at the very moment of Samian revolts. With this inactivity Sparta sent a signal to Athens that it would not open war with Athens. The pre-history of the Peloponnesian war indicates that the outbreak of the total war between Athens and Sparta must have accompanied some other factors than just increasing tension. It was Corinth that played the role of making a decisive agitation and finally induced Sparta to declare war. True, the rise of Athenian power and the increase of Spartan fear were a genuine cause of the war. Without Corinth’s active  role, however, the two factors would not have resulted in the outbreak of the war. Corinth’s strategy is to make Sparta more fearful of the Athenian threat. When Athens besieged Potidaea, Corinth looked for a breakthrough by means of using anti-Athenian sentiment, which was prevalent among the Greeks after the Megarian Decree. The Corinthians encouraged all states that had any grievances against Athens to put pressure on the Spartans. Corinthian efforts had a result. In 432 BEC, the ephors called a meeting of the Spartan assembly, inviting any allied state with a complaint against Athens to come to Sparta and speak out (Thuc.1.67). The Corinthian speech was the most effective among the speeches delivered at the meeting (Thuc.1.68–71). The speech persuaded the Spartans that their traditional policy of prudence and reluctance to fight was disastrous in the face of the dynamic power of Athens, and substantiated the analysis by contrasting the characters of the two states. According to the speech, the distinctive Spartan qualities were moderation, tranquility or restfulness, satisfaction with what they possess, clinging to immutable laws and aversion to being away from home, old-fashionedness, reliability and trust among themselves coupled with distrust of foreigners, hesitation, slowness, and finally lack of inventiveness. The Spartan characters included some praiseworthy virtues but the general tenor was censuring Spartan inactiveness. The Athenian characters were described in an opposite way: constantly restless, innovating, quick to invent and to execute, daring beyond their power, full of hope. They were not praised for virtues but apparently depicted as qualified for acquiring an empire. Finally, the Corinthian urged that it was time that the Spartans should change their manners and to assimilate themselves to the Athenians in order to overcome the danger (Thuc.1.68–71). The accuracy of the Corinthian speech depicting the contrasting national characters of the two states was doubtful. It turned out that Athens adopted a moderate strategy under the leadership of Pericles at the earlier stage of the War. On the other hand, Pausanias, a representative Spartan king in the past was notorious for his outrageous character. The Corinthian speech was exaggerated. However, it was effective to move Spartans to take action against Athens. It would be an overstatement that the Corinthian’ agitating speech was the “essential cause” of the outbreak of the War. However, it is fair to say that Corinth successfully finalized its strategic goal through the speech. Corinth had developed the idea that their state would be an effective and influential middle power in the Hegemonic transition period. To

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achieve this goal, Corinth chose to break the peace that both Athens and Sparta had carefully and patiently managed. In a certain sense, Corinth won over the hegemonic powers in terms of realizing its strategy through its speech. Corinth’s success means  that it convinced both Athens and Sparta that they were set  up  by  the “Thucydides’s trap”. Athens and Sparta felt that their tension was so intense that they could never escape from physical conflict. Without the Corinthian strategy, Athens and Sparta may have continued the peaceful rivalry for a longer period of time. “The rise of the Athenian power and Spartan fear” could have played differently had there not been the Corinthian exaggeration of the characterization of two hegemonic powers. An emerging power may cause fear of the existing power. However, the fear does not directly result in war. What matters is the characterization of the emerging power. The rise of Athenian power looked to be more formidable to Sparta because it was depicted as “always greedy and ambition” in the Corinthian speech.

Melos: An “Irrational” Middle Power In Thucydides’s History, the episode of Melian dialogue is one of the most well-­ known cases to IR readers. The Melian dialogue took place in the backdrop of growing political polarization in the Hellenic world. Melos, a colony of Sparta and a small island, refused to be subject to Athens, a superpower and declared to be neutral staying outside both the Athenian and Spartan blocs. In the earlier stage of the War, the Athenians had attacked the island in 426 BCE but abandoned the campaign as not worth the time or effort (Thuc.3.91). Ten years later, Athens sent again the fleet to punish Melos to make it a subject city. In the meantime, Athens underwent many challenges and suffered remarkable damages. As Thucydides himself comments, the war became one of the most influential elements among the Greeks so that “war is a most violent master and it conformed most men’s passions to the present occasion” (Thuc.3.82). It was in this atmosphere that the current attitude toward Melos demonstrated that the Athenian empire gradually diminished the room for honor and grace. However, the Athenians did not immediately lay waste to the Melian land. The Athenian generals Cleomedes and Tisias first wanted to solve the problem by verbal means. The Melians refused to allow the Athenian generals to speak before the demos but “commanded them to deliver their message before the magistrates and the few” (Thuc.5.84). The Athenian generals accepted the proposal with the condition that they should not make long speeches but answer each other to every particular point. Melians had no objection to the dialogic setting. So began the so-called Melian dialogue. The dialogue was about whether the Melians were entitled to maintain their neutrality. In the course of rejecting the neutral status of Melos, the Athenians came to betray covert anxiety about their control over their allies and their status as an empire. From the beginning, the Athenians urged that Melians should not say about

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“what is just” but about “what is feasible” on the ground that justice between two states could have any meaning only when they have equal power (Thuc.5.89). After this point, the Athenians presented a hardline of realism epitomizing that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thuc.5.89). The Melians rejected the Athenian thesis based on their own version of realism that must have opened the possibility that the Athenians should lose imperial status someday in the future and then their former subjects would seek cruel revenge on Athens for what they previously did to the weaker cities (Thuc.5.90.). The Athenians were also concerned about the rebellion of the subjects but their prescriptions were deterrence rather than appeasement. The Melians’ attempt to convince the Athenians aborted. Now the Athenians tried to convince the Melians that both of them would get benefit because the Melians would save themselves from being completely devastated and the Athenians would save energy by efficiently subjugating a headache state as a subject (Thuc.5.92). The Melians still brought up the possibility that they remained neutral while being friends with Athens (Thuc.5.94). The Athenians turned down this request immediately by responding, “No, because it is not so much your hostility that injures us; it is rather in the case that, if we were on friendly terms with you, our subjects would regard that as a sign of weakness in us whereas your hatred is evidence of our power” (Thuc.5.95). The Athenian empire felt a greater security threat from the inside than from the outside. In addition, the Athenian empire turned out to be based not on good will anymore but on its own power and fear of the allies. In response, the Melians used the same argument spoken by Diodotus at the Mytilenian debate. They argued that if the Athenians were to enslave Melos, that would give an impression that the Athenians would attack the neutral states sooner or later and this impression would increase the number of revengeful enemies by turning the currently neutral cities into enemies by giving the impression (Thuc.5.98). Melians’ claim demonstrated that they did not understand the Athenians as they presented themselves. The Athenians were clear on the point that they would not depend on good will anymore for the management of their empire. The Athenians would count on fear rather than on respect from the allies. In addition, the Athenians pretended to sympathize with the Melians by assuming Melians’ anxiety that their submission would appear as an indicator of their cowardice. On behalf of the Melians, the Athenians declared that “since this is not a fair fight, it is the question of intelligence rather than the question of cowardice” (Thuc.5.101). At this point, the Melians could not help falling back on the  hope-argument. They seemed to be franker in saying, “In war fortune sometimes makes the odds more level than could be expected from the difference in numbers of the two sides. And if we surrender, then all our hope is lost at once, whereas, so long as we remain in action, there is still a hope that we may yet stand upright” (Thuc.5.102). The Melians’ frankness was followed by the Athenians’ cynicism. The Athenians warned them not to rely on divination, oracles and other such things in the time of war lest they should be destroyed. The Melians were adamant in their position with the belief that gods must be on their side and Spartans must come to save them for the sake of honor. The Athenians again disapproved of  Melians’ hopeful reliance on

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gods and Spartans. First, concerning the reliance on gods, the Athenians claimed that they had an equal right to gods’ favor and presented a theological explanation of natural realism that gods must condone ruling of the powerful because that is the general and necessary law of nature (Thuc.5.105). Second, concerning the reliance on Spartan assistance, the Athenians discarded the Melian hope by predicting that Spartans like any other states would not come to aid due to their own interests (Thuc.5.105). The Melians still resorted to the hope that their hope of gods and Spartans came true. It was almost an eternal regression of hope. In principle, the Melians were not based on solid calculations of self-interest. In contrast, the Athenians were constantly based on the principle of maximizing self-interest. They urged the Melians to follow the same principle. According to the Athenians’ calculation, the Melians should accept the Athenian offer by remaining an inferior ally on the basis of paying a tribute while enjoying their own regime. For the Athenians, the choice before the Melians was either to accept disgraceful safety or to wage a hopeless war. The Athenians gave more general advice that they should stand up to their equals deferring to their superior and are moderate to the inferiors (Thuc.5.111). The Melians did not take the advice. They remained trusting to the fortune that gods would preserve the city and to the hope that the Spartans would come to help. However, all the Melians’ hope turns out in vain. The Athenians wasted the land and slaughtered all the male adults and took all females and children to sell slaves. The Melian case is often used as an example for showing the sheer effect of power politics in international relations. However, it is hard to believe that Thucydides took pains to describe the details of Melian dialogue merely to demonstrate a case for power politics. It is reasonable to believe that Thucydides had a more subtle intention in reporting the Melian dialogue in an unusual format of direct conversation. Melos seemed to fall short of the ordinary level of a middle power in terms of its physical power. The Melians depended on their belief in gods, nature and human virtues. Melians’ worldview was consistent. Their worldview as such was not absurd, although it did not work well for them. It is true that the Melians had suffered from a disaster. However, Melians’ failure did not mean that the Athenian worldview of the vulgar realist view of international relations was more preferable to the Melian worldview. In the long run, the Athenian worldview turned out to be an implosion of itself. If we look at Athenians’ fate in a broader context, the Athenians’ outrageous attitude toward the Melians was closely related to the self-­ destructing decision on the Sicilian expedition.11

 Many scholars point to the connection between the Athenians’ hubris at Melos and the absurdity in the decision of the Sicilian Expedition. In particular, Strauss points out that Thucydides implies the connection between Athenians’ moral corruption and their blunder in the Sicilian expedition by noting the closeness of the descriptions of the two incidents in the History while there is some time gap (Strauss 1977). The Melian dialogue appears at the end of Book 5 and the first debate on the Sicilian expedition appears at the very beginning of Book 6.

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At first glance, Athenians’ responses may sound more “rational.” However, the Athenians’ rationality was valid only with the presence of their formidable fleet in front of the helpless Melians. From the beginning of the dialogue, the Athenians were not merely participants but judges of the dialogue. Thucydides contrasted Athenians’ rationality with Melians’ irrationality. However, this does not mean that Athenians’ vulgar rationality is always preferable to Melians’ adamant irrationality. Of course, Thucydides does not imply vice versa. Instead, Thucydides’ point is that the Athenians should have been more careful in dealing with the  Melians not merely for the sake of behaving generously to the Melians but for the sake of maintaining balanced rationality for Athenians themselves without being affected by the “irrational” middle power. That being said, Melians’ irrationality does not consist in the contents but in the lack of practical knowledge. Belief in gods, trust in an ally, and respect for human virtues like justice, honor, and courage, all of those are reasonable elements that any normal state should keep in mind in order to maintain a healthy political community. However, while the Athenians suppressed the Melians’ irrationality, they inadvertently rejected the virtues that they should have respected. Strauss, a prominent political philosopher, comments that Thucydides had the  intention to show that there is a certain connection between Athenians’ treatment of Melians and their absurd decision to make the Sicilian expedition that eventually resulted in the decline of the Athenian empire.12 In fact, when the Athenians decided to send 60 ships to Sicily for the expedition under the command of Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus, their excuse was to aid the people of Egesta and Leontini against Selinus and Syracuse (Thu.6.8). However, it turned out that their real intention was to rule Sicily to satisfy their avaricious desires. At the Athenian assembly for deliberating about the expedition, Nicias and Alcibiades came forward to speak. Nicias’s speech attempted to rescind the decision by deflating the bubbled and rosy expectation of the expedition among the Athenians. In contrast, Alcibiades’s speech merely pandered to the Athenian ambition, ensuring victory and the following wealth. The Athenians affirmed the decision to carry out the expedition even though they knew that it meant creating a new frontline leaving Spartan enemies on the back. In fact, Alcibiades was dropped out even before he arrived at the battleground and the expedition brought about tragic results that ultimately affected the decline of the Athenian empire. The entire procedure of deciding the Sicilian expedition exhibits the corruption of Athenians who came to have excessive desires. There is a good reason to believe that Athenians’ excessive desires accompanying moral corruption were affected by their experience of treating the  Melians. As the Melian dialogue shows, the Athenians deliberately

 Strauss (1999, 192–209). There is a huge amount of studies on Sicilians Expedition dealing with the questions including “Why did the Athenians make the decision on the expedition?” “Was the decision really absurd?” “If it was absurd, was it because Athens was democratic or because it was an empire?” “Was the Expedition doomed to failure or could it be carried out successfully?” For this line of interpretation, see Doyle (1991), Garst (1989), Bagby (1994), Parlmer (1982).

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disregarded human virtues, while taunting the Melians. Their disregard of virtues infected themselves to the extent of making self-destructive decisions for themselves.

Syracuse: A Middle Power Pursuing a Regional Hegemon It was Syracuse in Sicily that clearly positioned itself as a middle power and even a regional hegemon. About a decade before the Athenian expedition, Sicilian cities gathered in Gela to deal with the potential possibility of the Athenian interference in the disputes among the Sicilians. At the Gela congress, Hermocrates of Syracuse proposed a doctrine rejecting the interference of foreign states in Sicilian affairs. Thucydides comments that Hermocrates was the most influential speaker among others in the Congress. He warned fellow Sicilian states of Athenians’ conspiracy to rule the entire island and proposed to stop fighting among Sicilians and inviting foreign powers (Thuc.4.60). Hermocrates reiterated harmony and cooperation in Sicily. It is notable, however, that Hermocrates blamed more inside traitors than outside invaders. He states: “That the Athenians should cherish this ambition and practice this policy is very excusable; and I do not blame those who wish to rule, but those who are too ready to serve. It is just as much in men’s nature to rule those who submit to them, as it is to resist those who molest them. Meanwhile, all who see these dangers and refuse to provide for them properly, or who have come here without having made up their minds that our first duty is to unite to get rid of the common peril, are mistaken.” (Thuc.4.61). Hermocrates relates peace among Sicilians to the independence of Sicily claiming that internal conflict often invites foreign power (Thuc.4.63). Thus, Hermocrates concludes that Sicilians should always unite against any foreign invaders, implying that the Sicilian states should acknowledge and follow the leadership of Syracuse. Did come true Hermocrates’s worrying prediction a decade ago that the threat to Syracuse would start from within Sicily, rather than from outside. In 416  BCE, Segesta and Leontini sent an envoy to the Athenians for help against the neighboring city of Selinus and its protector Syracuse. Their main argument was that “If the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of Leontini, to ruin the allies still left to Athens in Sicily, and to get the whole power of the island into their hands, there would be a danger of their one day coming with a large force as Dorians to the aid of their Dorian brethren, and as colonists, to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and joining these in pulling down the Athenian empire.” (Thuc.6.6). They also offered to bear the costs of the war and stressed the importance of defense against future aggression. At first, the Athenians took Segesta’s claim as a pretext for ruling the whole island (Thuc.6.1). However, Athens finally made a decision to send a large-scale fleet to fulfill their own ambition in 415 BCE. The news of the Athenian expedition came into Syracuse from many quarters. However, few Syracusans believed that the Athenian invasion was imminent. Again, Hermocrates came forward to deal with the report of the Athenian expedition. He warned his fellow Syracusans that Athens was about to

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attack at any time and the Athenian fleet was formidable. However, he also emphasized a favorable position of Syracuse. The great size of the Athenian expedition, for instance, would frighten other Sicilians and induce them to unite under the leadership of Syracuse. Hermocrates assumed that external threat makes internal harmony (Thuc.6.33). His assumption was that Sicilian states would acknowledge Syracuse’s leadership at least in Sicily instead of subjugating to the Athenian power. Although Hermocrates ignored the fact that the foreign power was actually invited by the fellow Sicilian state, he now took for granted the leadership of Syracuse in Sicily. Hermocrates constantly claimed that Syracusans should bear in mind that they should establish regional leadership. He also directed other Sicilian states that Syracuse should be a regional hegemon in Sicily. Earlier Syracuse had tried to convince other Sicilian states that the whole island should unite to prevent the interference of the foreign power. As the war loomed large, Syracuse made it an accomplished fact. It is notable that Syracuse asserted a regional leadership as a protector of Sicily. Yet Syracuse wanted to play a ruler within the region. Thus, it had to convince other Sicilian states that it could provide the common good of Sicily, for instance, the protection from the Athenian threat. However, Syracuse also needed to answer the question of  why the other Sicilian states should follow Syracuse, approving  a regional hegemon instead of a greater hegemon like Athens. In terms of ethnicity, some Sicilian states were closer to the Athenians than the Syracusans. There was no compelling reason for Sicilians to treat the whole island as a unit. Would the regional hegemon be more lenient? It may be so. However, geographical closeness may facilitate tighter ruling. There was no compelling reason for the regional members to approve a regional hegemon. Syracuse was successful in establishing a status of regional hegemon but it had to deal with the dilemma that its regional hegemonic status could be justified as far as the Athenian imperialism only appeared to threaten the entire island and paradoxically it was not strong enougth to annul the role of the regional power. Theoretically and pratically, the establishment of the regional hegemon was hard to justify. This does not mean that any state intending to be a regional hegemon is doomed to failure. At any rate, Syracuse made it. Someone would say that Syracuse became a regional hegemon by chance. Syracuse benefited from Athenians’ misfortunes in Sicily. Yet it had its own merits. First, it had formidable military force as a middle power that Athens could not ignore. In addition, it had a clear intention to be a regional hegemon. Finally, Syracuse was able to accuse  potential threat from Athenian imperialism while remaining a regional hegemon by distinguishing itself from the Athenian ruling.

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Application to the East Asian Context The previous sections examined three distinctive cases of the middle powers in the History. Corinth represents a peace-breaking middle power that readily jeopardizes existing peace and stability by exaggerating the tension between hegemonic powers. It prefers to intensify military tension in order to strengthen its influential power. Melos represents an irrational middle power that adamantly insists on its own moral values while disregarding practical knowledge, the accurate perception of the current situation. Melians’ attitude in international politics brings in tragic results of total destruction. However, this does not mean that the opposite attitude is desirable. Athens’s disregard of moral values, the very attitude that they forced to Melians, results in its self-destruction. Finally, Syracuse represents a middle power that seeks after a regional hegemon. How to become a regional hegemon is an open question. In particular, it should convince the regional members  that the regional hegemon  provides common good to its regional members better than the higher-­ level hegemonic power. Now, how does this reading help us understand the East Asian context that experiences the similar embarrassment about the future of the power transition? It is not possible to compare one of the three examined states in the History to a certain country in East Asia. However, reading the History from the perspective of middle powers teaches us which elements should be considered in order to manage the tension in this area. First, what is the lesson from identifying a middle power like Corinth that often aggravates the existing tension in the contemporary US-China power transition? Apparently, no state in East Asia wants to escalate the  US-China conflict. However, the  Corinthian case alerts us that a middle power’s excessive desire to strengthen its position may cause intensifying the tension between the major powers. There are scattered local tensions in East Asia such as miliary confrontation in the Korean peninsula, and potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, in the East China Sea (Senkaku Islands), and the South China Sea. The intensity of the conflicts goes up and down, endangering peace and stability of the area. However, the most dangerous moment is when a certain actor dares to strengthen its own position by intensifying the tension of major powers. In this perspective, any attempt to exaggerate the  “China threat” or, conversely, any attempt to underestimate it excessively, deserve suspicion. Second, what is the lesson from the Melian case? The point was not simply about which state is a dangerously irrational state. Rather, it was  about how a major state falls into the pitfall of self-defeating immorality in the guise of rationality, while it deals with the irrational state. North Korea has been regarded as an irrational rogue state, pursuing nuclear weapons. It is easy to refute the irrationality of North Korea’s nuclear policy. However, North Korea should be treated very carefully when it integrates irrational claims into the value-laden ones such as a claim to regime stability, or, a claim to nationalism, or, history war. Athenian’s reckless treatment of Melians let them pay back in the process of waging war. Thus, even when

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the relevant states deal with the most irrational state like North Korea, they should be careful not to lose balanced rationality. Lastly, what is the lesson from a Syracusan case? Which country in East Asia seeks after a regional hegemon power? Traditionally, Japan identifies itself as a representative of the U.S. power in East Asia. South Korea overtly claims to be “a balancer” in the U.S-China power competition. China, a rising power in the major competition, is interested in becoming a regional hegemon at least in the meantime. Potentially, all of these states are candidates for a regional power. That being said, they all have similar problems that Syracuse had when it pursued a regional hegemon fighting against the major power of Athens. The problem is concerned with the question of  whether the new regional power provides reliable common good to replace the common good that the existing major power allegedly has provided. The common goal of the denuclearization of North Korea is a test for who can be a regional hegemon in this area. If the problem is completely cleared out, although the likelihood looks very low, the U.S. has little rationale for intervening in the affairs of East Asia. In that case, China remains a single super power in this area, which is not acceptable for both the U.S. and other regional members such as Japan and South Korea. Therefore, the new regional power should persuade the U.S. and other regional members that the U.S. remains a super power while not actively engaging in this area and the new regional power prevents the hegemonic war in this area. Interestingly enough, China most actively develops the rhetoric for the new regional hegemony, distinguishing itself from the traditional super power.13 For example, China’s “One Belt, One Road” policy averts direct confrontation with the U.S. and establishing a regional power. So far, China seems to take for granted its regional hegemony, as Syracuse did at some point. However, China confronts the same challenge from other regional states. Why should they follow the new regional power instead of remaining a strong ally with the traditional super power, the U.S. If China keeps showing hubris in dealing with problems with regional members, its candidacy for a regional power loses legitimacy.14 Thucydides intended to convey the eternal instruction to the descendants. In the early part of the History, he declares that “[his work] should be judged as useful by those who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it” and that he would be pleased if his work is “possession for all time” instead of winning the applause of the moment (Thuc.1.22). Who should then it be “those”  President Xi Jinping in the speech at Seattle in 2015 emphasized that there is no such thing the so-called Thucydides trap in the world. He spoke that should major countries again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves (Xi Jinping’s speech at the welcoming dinner hosted by local governemnts and friendly organizations in the US was searched at the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa-eng/topics-665678/xjdmgjxgsfwbcxlhgcl70znxlfh/t1305 429.shtml. 14  Other regional members often complain about China’s hubris such as economic retaliation against South Korea, assertive attitude in the territorial disputes with Japan, Philippines, and Vietnam. 13

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that Thucydides expected to have “the exact knowledge of the past”? Of course, the statesmen and decision-makers of the current hegemonic powers, namely, the US and China, should learn from the History to prevent from following the same traces that Athens and Sparta left. However, as we have seen, the Thucydides’s trap cannot be properly understood merely by focusing on the roles of the hegemonic powers. The danger of the trap is constructed by the combined work of hegemonic and middle powers. The leaders of the hegemonic power should be concerned with the roles of middle powers as well as their bilateral relationships. In addition, the leaders of the middle powers should be aware of their significant roles in defining the character of the Thucydides’s trap. Thus, they should also learn something from the History in terms of how to deal with the Thucydides’s trap on their sides. The significance of the role of middle powers is highly relevant in the East Asian context. The leaders of the East Asian states should determine their roles in the current power transition period. The three examples of the middle power in the History will provide them with valuable options, although they need not identify their state with one of the three examples.

References Ahrendsdorf, P. J. (1997). Thucydides’ realistic critique of realism. Polity, 30, 2. Allison, G. (2017). Destined for war: can America and China escape Thucydides’s trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Bagby, L. M. J. (1994). The use and abuse of Thucydides in international relations. International Organization, 48, 1. Bolotin, D. (1987). Thucydides. In L. Strauss & J. Cropsey (Eds.), The history of political philosophy. University of Chicago Press. Bruell, C. (1974). Thucydides’s view of Athenian imperialism. American Political Science Review, 68, 1. Connor, W. R. (1984). Thucydides. Princeton University Press. Doyle, M. (1991). Thucydides: A realist? In R. Lebow & B. Strauss (Eds.), Hegemonic rivalry. Westview Press. Finley, M. I. (1978). The fifth-century Athenian empire: A balance sheet. In P. D. A. Garnsey & C. R. Whittaker (Eds.), Imperialism in the ancient world. Cambridge University Press. Forde, S. (1986). Thucydides on the cause of Athenian imperialism. American Political Science Review, 80, 2. Forde, S. (1995). International realism and the science of politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism. International Studies Quarterly, 39, 2. Garst, D. (1989). Thucydides and neorealism. International Studies Quarterly, 33, 1. Kagan, D. (2003). The Peloponnesian war. Viking. Lebow, R.  N., & Kelly, R. (2001). Thucydides and hegemony: Athens and the United States. Review of International Studies, 27, 4. Novo, A. R. (2016). Where we get Thucydides wrong: The fallacies of history’s first “hegemonic” war. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 27, 1. Orwin, C. (1994). The humanity of Thucydides. Princeton University Press. Parlmer, M. (1982). Love of glory and the common good. American Political Science Review, 76, 4.

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Raaflaub, K. A. (1994). Democracy, power, and imperialism in fifth-century Athens. In J. P. Euben, J. R. Wallach, & J. Ober (Eds.), Athenian political thought and the reconstruction of American Democracy. Cornell University Press. Riley, J. (2000). Freedom and empire: The politics of Athenian imperialism. In L. S. Gustafson (Ed.), Thucydides’ theory of international relations: A lasting possession. Louisiana State University Press. Robertson, J. (2017). Middle-power definitions: Confusion reigns supreme. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71, 4. Strauss, L. (1977). On Thucydides’s war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians. In The city and man. University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1964). Thucydides. (1996). In R. B. Strassler (Ed.), The landmark Thucydides: A comprehensive guide to the Peloponnesian war. Free Press.

Chapter 3

Roles of Middle Power in East Asia: The Perspective of Network Theories of World Politics Sangbae Kim

Abstract  The existing studies of middle power are inadequate in providing a guideline for the new roles of South Korea. They mostly look to individual countries’ attributes or capabilities to explain the generalized responsibilities of middle powers in world politics. Thus, they fail to explain the proper roles for middle power under certain structural conditions that might be more essential determinants for middle powers’ actions than for great powers’ actions. In contrast, some theorists in International Relations (IR) adopt an anti-attribute imperative that rejects all attempts to explain actors’ actions solely in terms of actors’ attributes (Hafner-­ Burton and Montgomery, J Conflict Resolut 50:3–27, 2006; Goddard, Int Theory 1:249–281, 2009; Nexon and Wright, Am Polit Sci Rev 101:253–271, 2007; Nexon, The struggle for power in early Modern Europe: religious conflict, dynamic empires, and international change, Princeton University Press, 2009). These IR theorists maintain that it is an actor’s “position,” not its attributes, that creates opportunities for a country and that how an actor is connected to others influences its diplomatic direction. In this context, a new approach to middle power must consider the structural attributes of a system rather than those of an actor. This paper adopts three notions from network theories: “structural holes” and “positional power” from social network theory, and “translation strategies” from actor-network theory (ANT). Relying on these notions, this paper attempts to develop a theoretical framework to understand the diplomatic strategies of South Korea as a middle power. (The theoretical framework of this paper is in a similar context to other IR studies that adopt network theories (Hafner-Burton et  al., Int Org 63:559–592, 2009; Kahler, Networked politics: agency, power, and governance, Cornell University Press, 2009; Maoz, Networks of nations: the evolution, structure and impact of international networks, 1816–2001, Cambridge University Press, 2010). However, my framework of “the Network Theory of World Politics” (NTWP) is more comprehensive than other attempts that have mainly relied on social network theory. Along S. Kim (*) Dept Political Sci and Intl Relations, Seoul National Univ, Gwanak-gu, Seoul, Korea (Republic of) e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Lee, S. Kim (eds.), Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76012-0_3

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with social network theory, my framework also pays attention to the other camps of network theories, e.g., network organization theory and actor-network theory. For the outline of NTWP, see Kim (Korean J Int Stud 48:35–61, 2008).) This paper applies the framework to empirical cases of international politics in Northeast Asia. The cases include the configuration of network structure in the region, the nature of structural holes within the network, and strategic options for South Korea under the structural conditions. In handling these cases, this paper uses network theories to deduce a series of conditions under which South Korea’s middlepowermanship is more or less likely and the possibilities of positional power held by South Korea. In this sense, the major concern of this paper is theory development rather than empirical analysis. Keywords  Structural holes · Positional power · Translation strategies · Network theories · Actor-network theory (ANT) · Middlepowermanship

Introduction In recent years, South Korea has gained attention as a middle power in the diplomatic arena. For example, it played impressive roles in the various diplomatic conferences held in South Korea, such as the G20 Summit in Seoul (2010), High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (2011), Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul (2012), and Seoul Conference on Cyberspace (2013). Behind these increased diplomatic roles lay South Korea’s military and economic capabilities which have been achieved in the past several decades. In 2010, South Korea’s military budget ranked 12th in the world and its GDP put it in 15th place. Indeed, South Korea has come to be regarded as one of the leading middle powers in world politics. Now, there is a growing consensus that South Korea should play a middle power’s role corresponding to its increased material capabilities; it should figure out a new vision of middle power diplomacy in the twenty-first century. In particular, South Korea should realize what kinds of roles are expected of it, and under what structural conditions it can play those roles in effective ways.1 The existing studies of middle power are inadequate in providing a guideline for the new roles of South Korea. They mostly look to individual countries’ attributes or capabilities to explain the generalized responsibilities of middle powers in world politics. Thus, they fail to explain the proper roles for middle power under certain structural conditions that might be more essential determinants for middle powers’ actions than for great powers’ actions. In contrast, some theorists in International Relations (IR) adopt an anti-attribute imperative that rejects all attempts to explain actors’ actions solely in terms of actors’ attributes (Hafner-Burton & Montgomery,

1  Concerning the diplomatic strategies of South Korea as a middle power, my discussion in this paper relies on Kim (2011a, b).

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2006; Goddard, 2009; Nexon & Wright, 2007; Nexon, 2009). These IR theorists maintain that it is an actor’s “position,” not its attributes, that creates opportunities for a country and that how an actor is connected to others influences its diplomatic direction. In this context, a new approach to middle power must consider the structural attributes of a system rather than those of an actor. Network theories in natural and social sciences complement this positional perspective to middle power’s diplomatic strategies in world politics. Network theorists hold that how actors are positioned in a network facilitates their ability to compete or cooperate with others. While certain networks are very dense and stable, others contain fragmentations that allow middle powers to emerge. A particular type of network creates favorable conditions for the so-called middlepowermanship. Moreover, network theories help configure conceptual frameworks to understand how some actors compete or cooperate to build stronger ties than others do in a network. In this way, network theories provide IR theorists with an alternative account of middle power, one designed to take both structure and agency seriously. This paper adopts three notions from network theories: “structural holes” and “positional power” from social network theory, and “translation strategies” from actor-­ network theory (ANT).2 Relying on these notions, this paper attempts to develop a theoretical framework to understand the diplomatic strategies of South Korea as a middle power.3 This paper applies the framework to empirical cases of international politics in Northeast Asia. The cases include the configuration of network structure in the region, the nature of structural holes within the network, and strategic options for South Korea under the structural conditions. In handling these cases, this paper uses network theories to deduce a series of conditions under which South Korea’s middlepowermanship is more or less likely and the possibilities of positional power held by South Korea. In this sense, the major concern of this paper is theory development rather than empirical analysis. This paper consists of three sections. In the first section, this paper examines the new concept of structure in network perspective and explores the meaning of position in the network structure. In the second section, it introduces three critical notions—structural holes, positional power, and translation strategies—from network theories to conceptualize structural attributes of networks and the roles of middle powers in a dynamic sense. In the third section, along with providing a theoretical platform for middle power strategies, it briefly presents empirical cases from 2  This paper does not provide a comprehensive literature review of network theories. In fact, network theory is not a single theory; there are different variants. For an overview of network theories from an IR perspective applied to the Korean context, see Ha and Kim (2006, 2010) and Kim (2011c). 3  The theoretical framework of this paper is in a similar context to other IR studies that adopt network theories (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Kahler, 2009; Maoz, 2010). However, my framework of “the Network Theory of World Politics” (NTWP) is more comprehensive than other attempts that have mainly relied on social network theory. Along with social network theory, my framework also pays attention to the other camps of network theories, e.g., network organization theory and actor-­ network theory. For the outline of NTWP, see Kim (2008a; forthcoming).

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Northeast Asian regional politics, in which the two Koreas and four great powers— the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—are main players. The conclusion summarizes the opportunities for South Korea’s middle power diplomacy and briefly points out some empirical cases that have policy implications.

Middle Power in a Network Perspective The existing studies, which could be called the “attribute-approach,” mainly look to actors’ attributes to define middle power. For example, where neo-realists would look to military and economic capabilities (i.e., resource power) to explain the category of middle powers, liberal approaches define middle power by its behavioral tendency or intrinsic disposition, which is usually called middlepowermanship, to engage in international affairs. The attribute-approach locates a middle power at a middle point in the spectrum between great and small powers in terms of population, economic strength, and military capability. These indicators could be the basic premise for discussing the category of middle power. It is true that South Korea has come to be regarded as a middle power because it has met this standard of middle power attributes (Holbraad, 1984; Cooper et al., 1993; Cooper, 1997; Ping, 2005). However, the existing approach that pays attention to actors’ attributes or behavioral features is inadequate in conceptualizing middle power in a dynamic sense. In particular, if the concept of middle power is understood in this way, it may be only partially applied to the case of South Korea, which is faced with structural problems due to the rise of China and threats from North Korea. It is useful in delineating potential candidates for middle powers who have a certain amount of material resources, but it fails to explain what kinds of specific roles are necessary to qualify a country as a middle power. In this view, it is not clear under what conditions middle powers are likely to emerge, or why some actors play more effective roles as middle power than others. Indeed, more often than not, international outcomes cannot be reduced to actors’ intentions or capabilities. Therefore, to explain a middle power’s agency, we need to understand how middle power is defined in terms of structural positions in a system and to explore how an actor’s structural position affects its capacity. A middle power’s actions are dependent upon the structural attributes of the network in which the country connects to others (Goddard, 2009, p. 253).

Rethinking Structure: From Distribution to Configuration In this context, it is useful to reintroduce the concept of “structure” into the discussion of middle power. In existing IR theories, there has been a discussion about “structure” of the international system. Most IR scholars would agree that “structure” refers to durable patterns of interaction. However, they tend to present their

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ideas in different ways. Many think of international politics as a “system” composed of overarching structures: the condition of anarchy, the distribution of power, sets of regulative and constitutive norms, primary and secondary institutions, and so forth. This mode of analysis treats, at least implicitly, structures as entities defined by their categorical attributes (Nexon, 2009, p. 24). For example, a neo-realist, Kenneth Waltz, conceptualized structure as a distribution of power among nations in terms of the actors’ capabilities (Waltz, 1979). The neorealist concept of structure is useful in revealing the overall outline of material structure in the international system. However, it basically reduces the concept of structure to the level of internal properties or material resources held by nation-­ states. Thus, neo-realists neglect the relative context of actors’ interaction itself when they conceptualize the elements that form the structure of international politics. They understand structure as an entity that is derived from the categorical attributes of actors. For this reason, it has been criticized that it takes too abstract and macro of an approach to properly grasp the dynamics between actors’ strategies and the structure of international politics. For social network theorists, however, it is not actors’ interests, capability, or ideology, but the relations among actors that are causally significant. Structure emerges from a “continuing series of transactions to which participants attach shared understandings, memories, forecasts, rights, and obligation” (Tilly, 1998, p. 456; Goddard, 2009, p. 254). Network is a structural representation of relations among actors (Wellman & Berkowitz, 1988). In this view, structure is understood as the relational configuration among actors or the patterns of transactions themselves. Actors derive many of their attributes from their participation in the ongoing process of social interaction. As they pursue goals, such as resources and status, they reproduce, modify, create, and sever relatively durable material and symbolic exchange relationships. These relatively durable, but fundamentally dynamic interactions constitute the structural context in which actors operate (Nexon, 2009, p. 25). Introducing this relational approach to IR, we can understand the concept of structure as the patterns of dynamic transactions at the level of relationship among actors, without reducing the concept of structure to the level of a unit. In other words, we conceptualize structure, not as a kind of fixed entity reduced to actors’ internal properties or attributes, but as a social relationship among, or across, actors. Compared to the neorealist macroscopic concept of structure, this concept in network perspective understands structure at the meso-scopic level. The meso-scopic concept of structure portrays the dynamics between an actor’s choice and structural changes (Nexon & Wright, 2007; Nexon, 2009). This view sees that actors’ agency is embedded within networks, and thus presents a new concept of structure, which contributes to the agent-structure debate in IR.  In fact, many IR theories conceive of structure as opposed to agency. While structures constrain agency, and thus ensure continuity, agents are responsible for change. To understand middlepowermanship as a function of network position might seem bizarre: a middle power’s behavior should be a negation, not a manifestation, of structural forces. The network theory here, however, sees agency not as opposed to structure but as inhering within network structures (Goddard, 2009,

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Fig. 3.1  Arms Transfer Networks in Asia. (Source: H.M. Kim, 2010, pp. 341–342). (Arrows are added by the author)

pp. 257–258). In this context, we should conceptualize international structures as networks co-constituted by the network-structures of the actors that populate it, and also by the structure of social ties across and between them (Nexon, 2009, p. 26). Using empirical data, statistical method or various conceptual tools, social network theorists attempt to draw an outline of structure as a form of sociogram. Recently, methodological development in social networks analysis (SNA) has made it possible to visualize the reality of structure in various networks. A lot of examples in IR include networks of membership to international organizations, alliances among state actors, arms transfer networks, international trade networks, cross-­ national production networks in various industrial sectors, and student exchange networks. Figure  3.1, an example of networks in IR adopted SNA, shows sociograms of arms transfer networks between 25 Asian countries between the years of 1960 and 2000.

What Matters Is Position Structural analysis through social network theory is useful in capturing the reality and variability of meso-scopic structure, which the macroscopic approach neglects. With regard to the main concern of this paper, however, the positional approach is more useful in identifying the role of an actor occupying a specific position in the network. It is not an actor’s attributes or interests but its positions that enable an actor’s agency. The positional perspective in social network theory holds “that how actors are positioned in a network facilitates their ability to act as entrepreneurs. Because social and cultural ties provide power, information, and ideas, an actor’s ability to introduce new norms, manipulate symbols, and radically influence political outcomes, all depends on network position”(Goddard, 2009, p. 257).

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Fig. 3.2  Diagram of different network topologies. (Source: Wikipedia (http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/ Network_topology)). (Grey nodes are colored by the author)

To see the strategic implications of “position” in a network, this paper cites diagrams of different network topologies presented by computer network studies. If the five black nodes seen in Fig. 3.2 build links with each other in different ways, then the composition of the entire network changes. A grey node will be expected to play different roles on different occasions, even if its internal properties are not changed at all. Interestingly, the structural patterns shaped by the six nodes in Fig. 3.2 are reminiscent of the network game played among six countries—the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas—in Northeast Asian regional politics. The diagrams look like tables in the Six-Party Talks of the mid-2000s. If one compares a grey node to South Korea in the table, one can imagine that changes in the composition of other five countries that sit around it in the table will affect how the range of strategies chosen by South Korea varies. Likewise, in Fig. 3.1, which shows Asian arms transfer networks comparing the years 1960 and 2000, helps understand the strategic implications of “position” in networks. The nodes indicated by the arrows in Fig. 3.1 are the positions occupied by South Korea in the arms transfer network in the respective years. Since South Korea, as a nodal actor, occupies different positions in the networks, its international roles would be different in the two networks. In fact, while South Korea had a link with only the United States in 1960, it had links with Russia and England, as well as with the United States, in 2000. It is easy to imagine that South Korea’s strategic options relating to international arms transfers remarkably varied between the two time periods. This discussion about the structure of the arms transfer network and the position of South Korea exemplifies the different strategic orientations of South Korea, which has grown from a developing country in the Cold War era to a middle power in the post-Cold War era. If the concept of middle power is defined in terms of structural position in a network, what specific roles would a middle power play under a certain network structure? Among the various roles of middle power, this paper pays special attention to the role of “brokerage” in a particular network structure. Indeed, the role of brokerage, which is usually understood as mediation, has been played by great powers rather than middle or small powers. In the age of complex networks, however, depending on how the structure is shaped, small or middle powers are likely to enjoy a certain degree of leeway in playing a brokerage role. In particular, social

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network theory gives us some analytic insight. The unique forms of cleavages found in a network provide structural opportunities for small or middle powers. Some actors—known as brokers—bridge cleavages within networks. They are positioned as vital nodes in networks, creating links between actors that would otherwise remain unconnected. It is this network position, not an actor’s attributes that enables middle powers to exercise a certain kind of power, as described below.

Three Notions from Network Theories To develop a positional approach to middle power, three questions must be answered. First, under what conditions do networks enable a middle power’s agency? Are there certain network structures more conducive to a middle power’s brokerage action than others? Second, in what context do middle powers have power as brokers? What kinds of roles do middle powers play using their strategic advantages of position? Finally, how do middle powers as brokers build networks? Are there any specific guidelines for middle powers’ networking strategies? In answering these questions, it is important to not be driven by a kind of structural determinism. Networks create conditions for middle powers, but they do not force any particular country to behave as a broker. Therefore, it is also critical to understand how middle powers mobilize their capabilities to play strategic roles of brokerage, even if their actions might be conditioned by a network structure.

Structural Holes: Exploring the Configuration of Networks To explain the structural condition conducive to a broker, this paper looks to the notion of “structural holes.” Discussion about structural holes begins with distinguishing two types of networks, as seen in Fig.  3.3. While certain networks are extremely dense and stable, others contain fragmentations that allow structural

Structural Holes

Social Capital

Integrated Network

Fragmented Network

Fig. 3.3  Social capital and structural holes in networks. (Source: Modified from Goddard, 2009, p. 259)

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holes to emerge and thus facilitate brokerage action. Figure 3.3 illustrates integrated (left) and fragmented (right) networks. The more integrated a network becomes, the fewer structural holes it possesses: most actors have dense connections with other actors within the network (Coleman, 1990). In an integrated network, then, there are few breaks or structural holes. Actors share a dense system of social and cultural relations. The advantages of the integrated networks are well known as the notion of “social capital” (Putnam, 1993). In contrast, the more fragmented a network becomes, the more structural holes dominate. In this situation, we can identify brokers as critical nodes, bridging the otherwise unconnected elements within a framework. The notion of structural holes, first proposed by Ronald Burt, maintains that actors gain their power through their unique position bridging structural holes in network structures (Burt, 1992, 2001, 2005). These actors—known as brokers—act as connections between other actors who would otherwise remain disconnected. In order to theorize this notion, Burt developed a number of important network measures of brokerage and generalized them as structural characteristics of networks. This was not the advent of a new theory of social networks; awareness of structural holes is in the same context as Mark Granovetter’s discussion about advantages of “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973). According to Burt, people who hold brokerage positions enjoy a competitive advantage over others who are less well-placed. When they capture strategic places that connect otherwise disconnected groups, those people can exercise a special kind of power—“positional power”—as described below in detail. It is necessary to keep in mind that actors who are engaged in the network might be aware of the existence of structural holes generated from their exchanges. However, actors do not pay serious attention to the holes because they are preoccupied with their own concerns. In this sense, the holes originate from the structural level, not at the actor level. While Burt deliberates on how to connect breaks in the “flow of information,” he is relatively indifferent regarding brokerage of the “flow of meaning,” including cultural factors such as practices, discourses, and symbols (White, 2008). Fragmented networks exhibit breaks in cultural ties as well; the networks of fragmented systems are culturally differentiated, composed of discordant symbolic resources. Norms and rules are disputed, and actors attach different meanings to symbols and events. These social-cultural breaks also create the conditions for brokers to emerge. The notion of “cultural holes” refers to the breaks found within incommensurable symbolic transactions among actors (Pachucki & Breiger, 2010). Along with structural and cultural holes, “exploit” is another notion referring to “physical holes” in networks. Information networks do have bugs and holes, a by-­ product of high levels of technological complexity, which make them as vulnerable to penetration and change. These holes could be targets for hackers in attacking the network and are called exploits. Computer viruses and malicious codes exploit the holes, which are critical points for interoperability or compatibility between various programs in the entire network. While the discovery of structural or cultural holes means competitive advantages for firms, the discovery of exploits means the disturbance of a system by “negative brokers.” In this sense, exploits are likely to work as

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“structural black holes” that cause the whole system to collapse (Galloway, 2004; Galloway & Thacker, 2007).

Positional Power: Exploring Actor’s Role in Networks How do brokers have the power under a certain structural condition? What kinds of power do brokers exercise? By bridging structural holes, brokers occupy central positions in a network structure, acting as nodes through which multiple transactions coalesce. According to the notion of structural holes, these positions are cores to explaining how and under what conditions brokership is possible. A broker’s power is found, not in actor’s attributes, but in its position (Goddard, 2009, p. 257). In this sense, the power of the broker—i.e., brokerage power—could be called “positional power” (Gould & Fernandez, 1989). Positional power originates from structural attributes: the number of nodes, pattern of links, and architecture of the whole network. It is contrasted to the existing notion of “resource power,” which refers to the power based on resources held by actors. In this respect, positional power is one aspect of recent theoretical attempts concerning “network power” that derives from one’s relationships with others (i.e., networks) rather than its attributes (Grewal, 2008; Kim, 2008b; Castells, 2009; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). Actors could utilize their network position and convening capability to offset military and economic disadvantages. “Brokerage power” is the other side of the coin of positional power. In fact, the positional or brokerage power has been relatively neglected in IR. Although the existing studies of power have dealt with relationship or position in their discussion, they have paid limited attention to positional factors derived from the fractional aspects of bilateral or multilateral relations. Which actors in a network have more abilities to exercise positional or brokerage power? According to network theorists, actors who control “centrality” have more opportunities for power (Chang, 2009). Here, the meaning of controlling centrality is not concerned with being located at the center of the network in a geographical sense, but with playing central roles in a functional sense. If we understand centrality in this way, occupying the geographical center does not necessarily guarantee power. Rather, what matters in a network power game is how actors in the network are linked to each other and, further, how the network is configured. Concerning centrality, Linton Freeman presented three notions: degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality. Degree centrality means the number of ties that a node has. The more links a node has, the higher degree of centrality it has. Closeness centrality means the distance between one node and another. The closer the distance between nodes is, the higher closeness centrality is. Betweenness centrality means the number of times a node acts as a bridge along the shortest path between two other nodes. The more actors have to communicate via a node, the higher betweenness centrality the node has (Freeman, 1977, 1979).

3  Roles of Middle Power in East Asia: The Perspective of Network Theories of World… providing interoperability

providing compatibility

information brokerage

Connector

Transformer

Meaning brokerage

Messenger

Translator

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Fig. 3.4  Types of brokers. (Source: Modified from Kim, 2008b, p. 398)

This paper adopts two criteria, and attempts to distinguish types of brokers who control centralities. One is whether brokerage is only concerned with the flow of information or it includes bridging the holes of meaning. This is similar to distinguishing structural holes from cultural holes, as seen above. The other is whether brokerage aims to provide “interoperability” among the same kinds of actors, or “compatibility” among the different kinds of actors. This is similar to distinguishing structural holes from exploits, as seen above (Kim, 2008b, p. 397). Applying these criteria, there are four types of brokers who exercise positional or brokerage power, as seen in Fig. 3.4. Cell 1 refers to the power of the “connector,” who provides interoperability by bridging the holes of information. Cell 2 refers to the power of the “transformer,” who provides compatibility by bridging the holes of information. Cell 3 refers to the power of the “messenger,” who provides interoperability by bridging the holes of meaning. Cell 4 refers to the power of the “translator,” who provides compatibility by bridging the holes of meaning (Kim, 2008b, pp. 398–399). These four types of positional or brokerage power are influenced by structural attributes of networks. In other words, the structural conditions of a network enable or disable brokers to play particular roles and thus to have more possibilities to exercise power. However, the positional factor does not determine all actors to act as the same kinds of brokers, as examined above. This is due to the fact that actors would have a certain amount of autonomy in taking strategic options under any circumstance. Nevertheless, the broker’s strategies would be more likely to succeed if they accommodated the requirements of the structural conditions in the network.

Translation: Exploring Actor’s Networking Strategies To explain middle powers’ strategies for exercising positional power under a network structure, this paper relies on the actor-network theory (ANT), which emerged in the sociology of science and technology during the mid-1980s. ANT attempts to explain how human and non-human actors come together to act as a whole; the clusters of actors involved in creating networks are both social and physical. Here,

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ANT is often associated with the equal treatment of human and non-human actors. ANT assumes that all entities in a network can and should be described in the same terms. The rationale for this is that differences between them are generated in the network of relations and should not be presupposed. According to ANT, therefore, the agency of human actors is dependent upon a network of heterogeneous elements realized within a set of diverse practices. In this context, ANT looks at explicit strategies for relating different elements together into a network so that they form an apparently coherent whole—that is, an actor-network (Latour, 1987, 2005; Law & Hassard, 1999; Harman, 2009; Hong, 2010). In this context, one of the major concerns of ANT must be how human and non-­ human actors build an actor-network. ANT explains this process of networking through the notion of “translation.” For ANT theorists, a successful networking is attributable to the ability of translating human and non-human actors into a central network in which all the actors agree that the network is worth building and defending. Within all sociotechnical networks, relational effects result from disputes between actors, such as attempts at the advancement of a particular program, which necessarily results in social asymmetry. Therefore, ANT can also be considered a “theory of power”: the stabilization and reproduction of some interactions at the behest of others, the construction and maintenance of network centers and peripheries, and the establishment of hegemony. ANT’s notion of power is concerned with network power rather than resource power in that it is especially measured via the number of entities participating in the networking. In this sense, ANT maintains that power is generated in a relational and distributed manner as a consequence of ordering struggles (Law, 1992; Hong, 2010, p. 25). Any actor-network involves a vast number of translations and attempts to create a central network. A French ANT theorist, Michel Callon, presented a popular framework to understand the specific process of translation (Callon, 1986a, b). In his widely-debated study on how marine biology researchers tried to restock St. Brieuc Bay in order to produce more scallops, Callon defines four “moments” of translation: (1) at the moment of problematization, the researchers seek to become indispensable to other actors in the program by defining the nature and the problems of the researchers’ program of investigation; (2) at the moment of interessement, a series of processes are deployed by which the researchers seek to lock the other actors into the roles that were proposed for them in that program; (3) at the moment of enrollment, a set of strategies are adopted in which the researchers seek to define and interrelate the various roles they had allocated to others; (4) at the moment of mobilization, a set of methods is used by the researchers in order to become properly able to represent the actor-network and not betrayed by the participants. Here, Callon argues that translation is a process, never a completed accomplishment, and it may fail (Callon, 1986a, p. 196). These four moments discerned by Callon are useful for understanding various cases in which the lens of networking strategies should be applied. In spite of significant controversy over its relevance, Callon’s four moments are largely cited in numerous studies throughout the various fields of the social sciences. For example, the framework of translation is applied in empirical case studies in the system of

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Connecting & Disconnecting

Framing & Positioning

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Standard Setting

Collecting & Attracting

Fig. 3.5  Four moments of networking strategies

information technology and standard competition (Walsham, 1997; Lee & Oh, 2006; Kien, 2009). This paper also tries to adopt his framework of translation to analyze South Korea’s diplomatic strategies from an IR perspective. However, it modifies the terms by used Callon into simpler concepts, as seen in Fig. 3.5: (1) framing and positioning, (2) connecting and disconnecting, (3) collecting and attracting, and (4) standard setting. Now, let us turn the theoretical discussion about structure and position into a more empirical examination of networks in Northeast Asia.

Roles of South Korea as a Middle Power The network framework introduced above generates new theoretical considerations of diplomatic strategies of South Korea as a middle power. First, identifying structural holes or social capital, South Korea has to contextualize its position within the network structure of the Northeast Asian regional system. Second, recognizing the roles of a broker in the network structure, South Korea has to be familiar with managing the asymmetric game among network partners. Third, being aware of the limitations of a middle power’s brokerage roles, South Korea has to rely on collecting and attracting as many like-minded countries as it can. Finally, positing its proper roles upon the platform designed by great powers, South Korea should seek to complement and further renovate the network structure in favor of small and middle powers.

Framing and Positioning in the Network The first stage of networking strategies, which is Callon’s moment of problematization, refers to the “framing and positioning” of the network. A major task here is to comprehend the overall configuration of the network and define the coordinating or conflicting interests of the actors who are engaging in the network game. This

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process is similar to news framing in mass media. For a middle power, a central task at this stage is to understand which great powers set the scheme. Only after reading the context, a middle power can assign itself roles within the network. Joseph Nye conceptualizes this ability as “contextual intelligence.” Contextual intelligence is the ability to understand an evolving environment and to capitalize on trends. There is a wide variety of contexts in which leaders have to operate. Important dimensions of contextual intelligence include the abilities to understand the distribution of power resources and to follow needs and demands, time urgency, information flows, and culture (Nye, 2008). For middle powers, however, Nye’s notion of contextual intelligence is somewhat inadequate for explaining their networking strategies. What middle powers need could be better articulated as the notion of “positional intelligence,” which is more sensitive to structural conditions working as facilitating or constraining factors, not as a neutral environment, over middle powers. Along with positional intelligence, the so-called “niche intelligence,” which means the ability to identify kinds of “niche markets” in the network context, is also crucial for middle powers. Positional or niche intelligence is predicated on two kinds of abilities. One is the ability to exploit structural holes; the other is to capitalize social capitals. For both abilities, it is critical to recognize that those structural holes and social capitals, which exist in a subtle tension, do not physically pre-exist in the network. They are likely to be socially constructed by actors who are playing network games. Figure 3.6, a simulated map of the “network of power (NoP)” in East Asia, could be a reflection of South Korea’s ideas of framing and positioning. It helps understand what framing and positioning—which rely on the notion of contextual, positional, and niche intelligence—mean for a middle power’s networking strategies. This initial framing and positioning is important in that the roles of actors, orientations of strategies, and even range of exercising power would depend on how South Korea envisions the “network of power” in East Asia and its position with the network. As seen in Fig. 3.7, this is the same process to define an “obligatory passage Fig. 3.6  Simulated map of the network of power in East Asia. (Source: Adapted from Ha and Kim, 2010, p. 80)

Structural Holes

USA

Russia

DPRK

Social Capital

ROK

Japan China ASEAN

Source: Adapted from Ha and Kim eds. (2010), p.80

3  Roles of Middle Power in East Asia: The Perspective of Network Theories of World… Fig. 3.7 Obligatory passage point (OPP). (Source: Adapted from Callon, 1986a)

ROK

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USA

China

Japan

Russia

USA (+ROK)

China (+ROK)

Japan (+ROK)

Russia (+ROK)

OPP

ROK

Source: Adapted from Callon (1986a)

point (OPP),” as Michel Callon emphasizes in his statement about translation. Defining OPP may provide a focal point around which new visions can form and coalesce. Actors themselves can be created and transformed during the course of strategic interaction. Framing and positioning can reconfigure cognitive maps that actors originally have and demarcate new relations of power in the network. In fact, this ability to frame has been monopolized by great powers in IR history. Likewise, the United States and China are currently competing for framing and positioning in East Asia, as well as in the global arena. China is increasingly assertive, while the United States is responding through the complex strategies of engagement and balancing. This development is likely to make it more difficult for South Korea to pursue a configuration favorable to its positional roles. Less tension among great powers is critical so that they can be more willing to cooperate with middle powers for their benefit. Indeed, middle powers will discover more effective diplomatic roles when great powers do not engage in conflict. If the U.S.-China power competition escalates into military tensions, middle power diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region will be weakened (Lee, 2012, pp. 10–13). In this context, South Korea must seek to frame the configuration of the East Asian regional system in order to not create a dilemma where South Korea has to choose one side or the other and to place itself into a favorable structural position. The fate of the Korean Peninsula, located between two great powers, is likely to fall into the realm of great power politics. It is necessary for South Korea to mitigate rivalries between the great powers and, indeed, transform the nature of power politics in Northeast Asia. In this context, South Korea needs to learn from its previous slippery attempts of framing and positioning concerning the ideas of “Balancer in Northeast Asia” or “Hub State in East Asia” in the early 2000s. In particular, South Korea should overcome the previous self-centered ideas of national strategies and make a renewed effort to read power configurations among surrounding countries.

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Connecting and Disconnecting Ties The second stage of networking strategies matches Callon’s moment of interessement; it is “connecting and disconnecting” to make certain ties stronger and to sever others. This means a process of network diplomacy to break existing ties on the one hand, and to build new relationships on the other hand. It is this process of integrating and destroying ties that lies at the heart of brokerage. Brokerage processes may alter network structures, leaving actors with a fundamentally different set of network ties and changing the agenda in a network. In this sense, this process is usually accompanied by the process of “asymmetric coordination of relationships.” This is in the similar vein with exploiting structural holes and capitalizing social capitals, as described above. Indeed, this process of connecting and disconnecting ties belongs to the realm of strategic choices at the risk of opportunity costs. In coordinating the asymmetric relationships, with what criteria should a middle power build or break ties? As introduced above, social network theory would advise to weave networks to enhance three kinds of centrality. Above all, networking strategies should depend on enhancing “degree centrality”; the more numerous an actor’s ties are, the more influential the actor is. Increased density creates social capital and trust, and it generally increases an actor’s influence over other surrounding actors. Moreover, networking strategies should be implemented to enhance “closeness centrality.” While degree centrality is concerned with the number of ties, closeness centrality is the notion to measure the distance or strength of ties. The closer or stronger an actor’s ties are, the more influential the actor is. Basically, networking strategies—particularly asymmetric coordinating strategies—should be devised in terms of elevating these two kinds of centrality. However, it is not easy to achieve this goal of asymmetric coordination especially because the establishment of a new relationship would mostly require the cost of destroying an old relationship. In particular, problems arise when it is necessary to break as much as is built. In other words, strengthening ties with an actor usually means weakening ties with another, as we observe in a triangular relationship between men and women. Although it is difficult to build a general principle to understand how to manage the asymmetry, South Korea’s nineteenth-century diplomatic history provides precious lessons. In the late-nineteenth century, Huang Zunxian, the Qing dynasty’s diplomat in Japan, compiled a policy paper with recommendations for Korea’s foreign policy. This document, known as “Chosun Strategies,” advised Korea to build ties with neighboring countries. He wrote that, to defend (防) against Russia, Korea should keep close (親) to China, build bonds (結) with Japan, and connect (聯) to the United States, as seen in the left of Fig. 3.8. Here, the scenarios of keeping close, building bonds, and connecting refer to differentiated types of relationships with other countries. Overall relationships should be managed by a diplomatic awareness of asymmetric coordination. What diplomatic prescription would be included in a policy recommendation paper for twenty-first-century South Korea? (Kim, 2012) It is not difficult to imagine that the most critical part of the paper would deal with

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a) 19th Century

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b) 21th Century

Fig. 3.8  Managing asymmetric relationships. (a) Nineteenth century. (b) Twenty-first century

how South Korea handles its traditional alliance (盟) with the United States in coping with a newly-rising China and threatening North Korea. Obviously, South Korea’s problem is how to coordinate a new configuration of relationships—allying (盟), keeping close (親), building bonds (結), and connecting (聯)—as hypothetically drawn in the right of Fig. 3.8. The above issues of connecting and disconnecting should be further examined from the perspective of brokerage. The goal of brokerage depends on how to enhance the third aspect of centrality—“betweenness centrality.” Betweenness centrality in the network affects an actor’s power. If an actor has an exclusive tie between other two actors, then it is more likely to influence the actors, who are connected via the actor itself. Further, it is likely to transform the structure of the game in the network. In this sense, the power concerning betweenness centrality is the brokerage power that controls the flows of information or meaning in the network. This could be understood as the positional power, which originated from occupying advantageous spots in the network structure. In this sense, situated at the interstices of networks, a middle power must be equipped with positional power—as conceptualized above as connector, transformer, messenger, and translator—which is strong enough to employ various resources for its network diplomacy. In this view, South Korea is likely to play a brokerage role among East Asian countries since it is located among them at the geopolitical crossroads. For example, South Korea’s positional power as a broker in the regional power structure could be realized between North Korea and other four countries—the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. Also, South Korea’s bridging role could be significant in regard to the territorial conflicts between China and Japan since it shares a common historical experience with each country. A brokerage role between the United States and China, which are engaging in hegemonic competition, seem to be possible, but it is less feasible. For the coming decades, the most important strategic issue for South Korea is to manage the asymmetric relationship between its traditional military alliance with the United States and increasing economic interdependence with China.

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Collecting and Attracting Like-Minded Groups The third stage of network diplomacy—the stage of enrollment in Callon’s term—is “collecting and attracting” like-minded groups in the network. What matters at this stage is to bring together other actors for common interests. The actor constructs a new network around itself after deconstructing prior relationships. And, the actor defines the new roles for like-minded groups and to attract them as supporters for a long time. In particular, middle powers need to have as many supportive actors as possible in the network that they built. An enriched pool of supporters in the network enables middle powers to play active brokerage roles. In fact, a large portion of middle power’s brokerage roles comes from its ability to bring more actors than others do. This is the basic ideas of an aspect of network power—i.e., “social power (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Kahler, 2009) or “collective power” (Kim, 2014). To attain the goal of collective power, it is necessary to recognize that the nature of actors in middle power’s networking strategies should be different than great powers. While great power networking can be compared to a spider weaving a web, middle power networking is similar to honeybees building a hive. Impressively, the result of the honeybees’ collaboration is a network that has multiple hubs within it. It is contrasted to the mono hub network structure of the spider’s web, as seen in Fig.  3.9. Adopting this analogy, middle power network diplomacy can be called “collaborative diplomacy.” The patterns of diplomacy remind us of online collaboration, conceptualized as “collective intelligence” (Levy, 1999). In this sense, middle power diplomacy could also be called “collective diplomacy,” pursing “collective power”—the power generated from bringing heterogeneous actors together. In particular, middle powers seek to exercise collective power through cooperative alliances. These alliances are intended for all neighbors to enhance their influence over regional and world politics by collecting and integrating their fragmented capabilities. In fact, aggregating capabilities to form collective power has long been a major concern of statecraft in international politics. For example, balance of power, a classical IR notion, could be regarded as a kind of collective power, since the idea was derived from small powers’ intention to unite against the strongest in the system at

Fig. 3.9  Weaving webs vs. building hives

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the time. In the case of traditional international politics, collecting and balancing powers are driven in terms of hard power, such as military capabilities and economic resources. Rather than hard power, which is the ability to push and coerce, today soft power is what gains wide currency, which is the ability to attract and persuade arising from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies (Nye, 2004). Considering middle power capabilities, which are less powerful than great powers in terms of hard power, soft power as a different measurement of power would be quite attractive for leaders of middle powers. In this view, it is natural that a middle power’s major concern lies in deploying “soft power diplomacy” or “attractive diplomacy.” In diplomatic areas, South Korea as a middle power has launched a variety of developmental and cultural policies and thus aimed to convene as many supporters as it can. For example, South Korea’s new roles in the international conferences recently held in South Korea provide channels to conduct middle power diplomacy. South Korea’s collective diplomacy would shed light on critical security issues such as North Korea’s nuclear threat, if it gains support from international society. In deploying collective and attractive diplomacy, South Korea is now actively utilizing the public policy tools of social network services (SNS), such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, which could be considered non-human actors in ANT. The ideas of collective diplomacy may provide some insights for South Korea, located between the United States and China geographically and diplomatically. As discussed above, South Korea should be cautious not to place itself in the middle of the power competition between the United States and China. However, if South Korea is fated to be situated between the two powers, then it would be better to seek alignments with other small or middle powers that share similar security concerns. In other words, South Korea has to seek cooperation with other countries in order to avoid confrontation between the two powers. In this case, the primary candidates could be Japan and Russia as neighboring countries. However, South Korea has to make an effort to seek behavioral support even from geographically remote countries, and attempt to create a favorable network configuration around itself.

Complementary Standard Setting The final stage of network diplomacy is the “standard setting,” corresponding to Callon’s moment of mobilization. The main concern of this stage is to impose generalization or universality on the network constructed (or reconstructed) in the previous three stages. In this stage, it is important to reinforce established networks, to keep it sustainable, and to make it acceptable for the participants. In Callon’s explanation, actors who finally succeed at the end of the voyage called “translation” will gain the authority of “representation” and can mobilize other actors up to the platform that they built. Then, they will exercise programming power as the new architects of the network program. They do not necessarily have to design the whole system. For middle powers, it is sufficient to be a complementary programmer, who

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can provide system adjustments and adaptations that increase interoperability and compatibility and further reinforce normative values and legitimation. However, the power of programming a rule in the game of world politics has rarely belonged to middle powers. Rather, great powers have wielded the programming power that sets institutions, norms, and philosophical goals and values in world politics. In this sense, it might not be required for middle powers to set the strategy of “designing the whole web,” but, instead, maintain the strategy of “hanging on and trying not to fall from the spider’s web,” already woven by the great powers. In order not to wind up as prey for spiders on the web, middle powers must become acquainted with the nature of the spider’s web—i.e., its architecture and operating mechanisms. In this context, middle powers’ “programming diplomacy,” if any, should be complementary to the existing system. This paper adopts three analogies from computer programming to describe the complementary roles of programming power, which have special implications for middle power diplomacy. First, middle powers are likely to have the privilege of problematizing normative legitimacy that the existing world order may lack. It could be known as the strategy of “normative programming” in the sense that diplomatic concerns are with normative, not with positive, aspects of the programs. For middle powers that have less military capabilities and economic resources, norm- or value-oriented diplomacy is a crucial and effective means to attain the goals. Indeed, diplomatic strategies which are inclusive and close to international norms are more likely to be attractive to other countries (Slagter, 2004). Moreover, if the middle power pursues collective diplomacy, and mobilizes supporters around the world, the authority of normative diplomacy will be reinforced. These ideas of normative diplomacy could gain some precious insights from the movement of open source software, such as Linux, which delegitimizes the so-called proprietary software, such as Microsoft’s products, by monopolizing software source codes that might be critical for further innovations in the software programmer’s community. Second, although middle powers are not allowed to design the whole system of world order, it is likely and even desirable for them to patch up some niche programs upon the platform designed by the great powers. I would call it the strategy of “application programming.” This term suggests a computer program, in which various application software programs are working upon a platform—an operating system software. In this sense, middle powers could design complementary governance programs, devised to accelerate the effective operation of global governance in various fields. Those complementary programs might target some niches or holes that great powers neglect due to their ontological and epistemological limitations. In particular, their unique position in the existing system requires middle powers to play a complementary role to the existing world order, not to play an exploitive role through challenging great powers’ initiatives. Finally, middle powers’ roles as brokers have affinity with the strategies of combining or mixing existing programs, rather than creating entirely new programs. I would call it the strategy of “meta-programming,” comparing it to that of “substantial programming.” Social network theorists say that brokers have more capacity for blending ideas than other actors in world politics, although they cannot introduce

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entirely new inventions. Whether or not broker’s ideas are attractive to others is not so much a matter of content as context; it depends on how brokers incorporate various contents found in existing networks. South Korea’s experiences in economic and democratic development provide good examples for the meta-programming, in the sense that the South Korean model of political economy, which can be called the “Seoul Consensus,” is likely to combine the concerns of developing countries as well as those of advanced countries. Indeed, although the South Korean model began with the authoritarian model of pursuing economic growth, which has recently conceptualized in the “Beijing Consensus,” it achieved the goal of democracy after remarkable economic development, which is called the “Washington Consensus” and is prescribed by advanced countries, especially the United States (Sohn, 2007).

Conclusion This paper presents a theoretical framework to understand the diplomatic strategies of South Korea as a middle power. While many IR scholars point to an actor’s attributes to explain middle power, network theorists rely on a positional account. The attribute-approach is useful in delineating the potential candidates as middle powers who have a certain amount of material resources, but it fails to explain what kinds of specific roles are necessary to be qualified as a middle power. Therefore, to explain a middle power’s agency, it is necessary to understand how middle power is defined in terms of structural position in a system and to explore how an actor’s structural position affects its capacity to play meaningful roles. Network theories provide the studies of middle power with theoretical resources concerning the structural attributes of networks, such as structural holes. Indeed, structural holes give brokers special advantages over other actors in a network: they have more flexibility in connecting broken ties than other actors; they have the capacity to introduce new ideas and to translate meanings; and they can provide interoperability or compatibility throughout fragmented network structures. In this context, this paper also adopts theoretical notions from social network theories—brokerage and positional power—to examine how to bridge structural holes in Northeast Asia. In fragmented networks, a middle power’s position bridging structural holes gives it the ability to act as a broker. Here, it is most important for South Korea as a middle power to have the ability of contextual and positional intelligence, which reads constantly evolving contexts and identifies its moving positions in the East Asian network of power. If it is equipped with this ability, it would be more likely to define a middle power’s roles corresponding to the structural conditions of the network. The discussion about network structure and brokerage power offers the directions of networking strategies that a middle power has to pursue. However, the structural and positional factors do not determine all actors to play the same roles of brokerage, because actors would have a certain amount of autonomy in taking

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strategic options under any circumstances. This is why a discussion about how actors specifically implement networking strategies is needed. To explain middle powers’ strategies for exercising positional power under a network structure, this paper relies on actor-network theory (ANT) and particularly adopts Michel Callon’s framework of “translation”—i.e., networking strategies. However, this paper adopts his framework, but modified its terms with easier words: (1) framing and positioning, (2) connecting and disconnecting, (3) collecting and attracting, and (4) standard setting. Applying these theoretical resources, this paper identifies the four elements of middle power’s networking strategies which South Korea should consider. A premise of successful strategies for middle power must be to understand the surrounding network structure and to frame its position within that context. With the simulated map of networks, South Korea should be able to manage asymmetric relationships among great powers in Northeast Asia. South Korea would act as a broker, more than a mere connector, providing the mode of transition, switching, transforming, and translation between different actors of networks. To fulfill the brokerage roles, South Korea has to learn how to bring together states and non-state actors, utilizing various non-human actors (e.g., SNS) to attract supportive forces in world politics. Through questing for networking strategies, South Korea as a middle power could be an architect, not a whole system designer but a complementary programmer, that can provide useful patch programs for the whole system operated by great powers. Although this paper deals mainly with theoretical issues, it is necessary for further research to pay more attention to empirical cases on middle power diplomacy. For example, this paper suggests examining three issue areas which contain structural holes mainly generated from the structural competition between U.S. leadership and China’s challenges, and, thus, highlight various policy implications for South Korea as a middle power. First, South Korea could grasp opportunities to exploit structural holes in some non-traditional security issues, such as cybersecurity, atomic energy, and ecological security, in which great powers, including China, are still competing with the priority of, and even the goal of, governance mechanism. Second, official development aid (ODA) must be a good policy for South Korea’s international economic roles as a middle power. Indeed, South Korea seems to have been successful in positioning itself as a supportive donor country to developing countries between the Western model of “good governance” and the Chinese model of unconditional aid. Finally, in the field of information, communication, and culture in cyberspace, South Korea finds itself located at a crossroads (or dilemma) where two paradigms of Internet governance—the so-called “stakeholderism” driven by the United States and the inter-governmental regulatory approach supported by China and developing countries—are competing. However, it is also true that the dilemma provides South Korea with opportunities to play critical brokerage roles. To conclude, South Korea as a newly-emerging middle power has diplomatic tasks to play positive roles in contributing to the peace and prosperity of East Asia and the world. To achieve these tasks of middle power diplomacy, it is essential that South Korea figure out what kinds of roles are expected of it and under what

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structural conditions it can play those roles in more effective ways. Conceptual notions and the theoretical framework introduced in this paper are useful in identifying the configuration of the network structure in the particular issue areas, the nature of structural holes within the network, and the strategic options for South Korea under the structural conditions.

References Burt, R. S. (1992). Structural holes: The social structure of competition. Harvard University Press. Burt, R. (2001). Structural holes versus network closure as social capital. In N. Lin, K. S. Cook, R. S. Burt, & A. de Gruyter (Eds.), Social capital: Theory and research. Aldine Transaction. Burt, R. S. (2005). Brokerage and closure: An introduction to social capital. Oxford University Press. Callon, M. (1986a). Some elements of a sociology of translation: Domestication of the scallops and the fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay. In J. Law (Ed.), Power, action and belief: A new sociology of knowledge (pp. 196–123). Routledge and Kegan Paul. Callon, M. (1986b). The sociology of an actor-network: The case of the electric vehicle. In M.  Callon, J.  Law, & A.  Rip (Eds.), Mapping the dynamics of science and technology: Sociology of science in the real world (pp. 19–34). Macmillan. Castells, M. (2009). Communication power. Oxford University Press. Chang, D. (2009). Sociological anatomy of political power: Resource power and network power. In S. Kim (Ed.), Soft power and network power (pp. 197–241). Hanul Academy. (in Korean). Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Harvard University Press. Cooper, A. F. (Ed.). (1997). Niche diplomacy: Middle powers after the cold war. Macmillan. Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R. A., & Nossal, K. R. (1993). Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order. UBC Press. Freeman, L. C. (1977). A set of measure of centrality based on betweenness. Sociometry, 40, 35–40. Freeman, L. C. (1979). Centrality in social networks: Conceptual clarification. Social Networks, 1, 215–239. Galloway, A. R. (2004). Protocol: How control exists after decentralization. MIT Press. Galloway, A.  R., & Thacker, E. (2007). The exploit: A theory of networks. University of Minnesota Press. Goddard, S. E. (2009). Brokering change: Networks and entrepreneurs in international politics. International Theory, 1(2), 249–281. Gould, R. V., & Fernandez, R. M. (1989). Structures of mediation: A formal approach to brokerage in transaction networks. Sociological Methodology, 19, 89–126. Granovetter, M.  S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78, 1360–1380. Grewal, D. S. (2008). Network power: The social dynamics of globalization. Yale University Press. Ha, Y.-S., & Kim, S. (Eds.). (2006). Network knowledge state: Transformation of world politics in the 21st century. Eulyoo. (in Korean). Ha, Y.-S., & Kim, S. (Eds.). (2010). World politics of networks: From metaphor to analysis. Seoul National University Press. (in Korean). Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2006). Power positions: International organizations, social networks, and conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(1), 3–27. Hafner-Burton, E. M., Kahler, M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2009). Network analysis for international relations. International Organization, 63, 559–592. Harman, G. (2009). Prince of networks: Bruno Latour and metaphysics. re.press. Holbraad, C. (1984). Middle powers in international politics. St. Martin’s Press. Hong, S.-w. (Ed.). (2010). Human being, objects, and alliances: Actor-network theory and technoscience. Ieum. (in Korean).

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Tilly, C. (1998). Contentious conversation. Social Research, 653(3), 491–510. Walsham, G. (1997). Actor-network theory and IS research: Current status and future prospects. In A. S. Lee, J. Libenau, & J. I. DeGross (Eds.), Information systems and qualitative research. Chapman & Hall. Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. Random House. Wellman, B., & Berkowitz, S.  D. (1988). Social structures: A network approach. Cambridge University Press. White, H.  C. (2008). Identity and control: How social formations emerge (2nd ed.). Princeton University Press.

Chapter 4

Emerging Powers and a Middle Power: U.S.-China Competition and South Korea in Cyberspace Sangbae Kim

Abstract  In exploring the current U.S.-China competition, this paper highlights the new issues of information technologies—in a broader sense, knowledge, culture, and communication. The United States and China are competing in cyberspace to secure their capabilities in technology, data, information and knowledge as emerging power resources. They are playing power games in such fields as electronic commerce, finance (i.e. FinTech), digital diplomacy and cyber security, etc. Based on this perception, this paper presents an analytical framework for the U.S.China competition—the so-called three-dimensional competition of technology, standard, and charm; it examines various factors that affect the structure and process of the complex competition. It must be an important task for South Korea as a middle power in concisely analyzing and predicting the future of U.S.-China competition in the emerging leading sector. In this context, this paper looks at the direction of national strategies that South Korea has to adopt as a middle power in the hegemony competition in cyberspace between the United States and China. In particular, it emphasizes the need to identify the structural position of South Korea within the configurational structure generated by the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace and the attempts to prescribe South Korea’s middle power strategies based on its structural position. In this context, this paper adopts three elements of middle power strategies—brokerage, coalition, and norm-setting, and applies them to the cases of South Korea’s strategies within the U.S.-China competition for emerging power in cyberspace. Keywords  The U.S.-China competition · Cyberspace · Brokerage · Coalition · Norm-setting The earlier version of this paper was delivered at IPSA 2018, Brisbane in Australia on July 21–25, 2018. S. Kim (*) Dept Political Sci and Intl Relations, Seoul National Univ, Gwanak-gu, Seoul, Korea (Republic of) e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Lee, S. Kim (eds.), Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76012-0_4

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Introduction One of the biggest issues that represents structural changes in world politics is the rise of China as an emerging power in the early twenty-first century. The rise of China does not only mean the growth of the national capability of China as a nation, but also implies the transformation of East Asian regional politics and the possibility of China’s hegemony competition with the United States at the global level. As a result, the rise of China toward a great power may entail a hegemonic transition in world politics, which is apparently expected to have a profound impact on the Korean Peninsula. The key in this process is whether the current U.S.-China competition will repeat the similar pattern of power transitions, which have happened in the past hegemony competitions, or show a new pattern. In exploring the current U.S.-China competition, this paper highlights the new issues of information technologies—in a broader sense, knowledge, culture, and communication. These issues are recognized as the new sources of power in the information age or the so-called fourth Industrial Revolution and are now opening a new horizon of world politics beyond the traditional power politics based on military and economic resources (Schwab, 2016). More specifically, these issues belong to a leading sector which is growing faster than any other areas of the world economy and driving the growth of others. The new leading sector has recently expanded rapidly, using cyberspace as a medium. Cyberspace has been understood intrinsically as the space of technologies and industries, but recently characterized as a complex space including online and offline activities of socio-political implications. Be aware of the trend, the paper pays attention to the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace as an emerging leading sector. Indeed, the competition among great powers in the leading sectors of the very period was one of the long-standing concerns of International Relations theory in that it was a clear example of the structural change in the world order. For example, historically the locus of competitiveness in the leading sectors has been closely related to the fortunes of global hegemony (Gilpin, 1987; Thompson, 1990; Modelski & Thompson, 1996; Kim, 2007). The most typical example is the competition between Britain and the United States over electrical engineering, durable consumer goods, or automotive industries in the first half of the twentieth century. Another good example is the competition between the United States and Japan in the consumer electronics industry, computer hardware and software industries in the late twentieth century. In this continuum, we can understand the U.S.-China hegemony competition in information technology (IT) sectors as a leading sector of the twenty-first century (Dynkin & Pantin, 2012). The competition in the IT sector is expected to be the criteria for determining the future of the U.S.-China competition; it draws a lot of attention in that the new mode of power game is expected, unlike the previous cases. In order to properly grasp the nature of the U.S.-China competition in the twenty-­ first century, we should closely monitor the trend of cyberspace as a future power space in which emerging power politics take place, along with offline space in

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which traditional power politics do. In particular, the recent rapid development of the fourth industrial revolution predicts that competition on the emerging stage will determine the overall outcome of world politics. In this view, the United States and China are competing in cyberspace to secure their capabilities in technology, data, information and knowledge as emerging power resources. They are playing power games in such fields as electronic commerce, finance (i.e. FinTech), digital diplomacy and cyber security, etc. Based on this perception, this paper presents an analytical framework for the U.S.-China competition—the so-called three-dimensional competition of technology, standard, and charm; it examines various factors that affect the structure and process of the complex competition (Kim, 2017; Ha & Kim, 2018). It must be an important task for South Korea as a middle power in concisely analyzing and predicting the future of U.S.-China competition in the emerging leading sector (Gilley & O’Neil, 2014). In this context, this paper looks at the direction of national strategies that South Korea has to adopt as a middle power in the hegemony competition in cyberspace between the United States and China. In particular, it emphasizes the need to identify the structural position of South Korea within the configurational structure generated by the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace and the attempts to prescribe South Korea’s middle power strategies based on its structural position. In this context, this paper adopts three elements of middle power strategies—brokerage, coalition, and norm-setting, and applies them to the cases of South Korea’s strategies within the U.S.-China competition for emerging power in cyberspace.1 This paper understands the dynamics of emerging power and middle power from a new theoretical perspective—network theories of world politics.2 This paper maintains that existing studies of U.S.-China competition are inadequate for providing a guideline to understand the new aspects of power politics in the twenty-first century. They mostly look to the elements of traditional power politics already known in order to explain the present and future of U.S.-China competition and South Korea’s national strategies in world politics. Based on this perception, this paper does not rely only on new theoretical resources in International Relations, but also on network theories in natural and social sciences. Relying on the network theory of world politics, particularly on the notions of network power, network

1  Concerning the diplomatic strategies of South Korea as an emerging middle power, my discussion on the middle power diplomacy in this paper relies on various works that I have conducted for the last several years; for example, Kim (2011a, b), (2014a, esp. ch. 8.), and (2015). For literature about middle power diplomacy written in English, see Kim (2014b, c, d, 2016). 2  The theoretical framework of this paper is in a similar context to other IR studies that adopt network theories (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Kahler, 2009; Maoz, 2010). However, my framework of “the Network Theory of World Politics” (NTWP) is more comprehensive than other attempts that have mainly relied on social network theory. Along with social network theory, my framework also pays attention to the other camps of network theories, e.g., network organization theory and actor-­ network theory. For the outline of NTWP, see Kim (2008a, b, 2014a).

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state, and network order, this paper attempts to develop and adopt the theoretical framework to understand the politics of emerging power and middle power.3 From this network perspective, the current patterns of U.S.-China competition in cyberspace as the emerging power politics have the following three meanings. First, emerging power means the transformation of power game, called “power transformation.” Beyond the traditional power game of military and economic resources, the new mode of power game pursuing non-material resources and relational advantages is currently rising in cyberspace. Second, emerging power means the diffusion of power holders, called “power diffusion.” In cyberspace, various non-state actors are emerging beyond the traditional boundaries of state sovereignty. Finally, emerging power means the shift of power structure, called “power shift.” However, competition in cyberspace does not seem to result in a mere “shift” from one to another axis, rather it will entail a complex “reconfiguration” of power structure. Based on these theoretical notions, this paper explores the rise of China and the upcoming hegemony competition between the United States and China, and further South Korea’s strategies as a middle power (Kim, 2014a). This paper is composed of three main chapters. In Chap. 2, adopting network theories, it outlines a theoretical framework for emerging power competition between two great powers, and interprets the competition as “inter-network politics” between two network states—the United States and China. In Chap. 3, applying the framework of three-dimensional emerging power competition, this paper analyzes the U.S-China competition in cyberspace in coping with the “inter-­network politics” of cyberspace. In Chap. 4, along with providing a theoretical platform for middle power’s strategies of brokerage, coalition, and norm-setting, this paper briefly proposes some strategic directions for South Korea as a middle power between the United States and China in cyberspace. This paper concludes with a brief summary of the main argument, and presents further research concerns.

Theoretical Understanding of Emerging Power Politics The term “emerging” in “emerging power” was adopted from “emergence,” a conceptual word in the complexity theory. Emergence means a phenomenon that used to be in chaos at a micro level, but that shows certain patterns and regularity (i.e., an order) at the macro-level, as complex interaction and self-organization proceed among the elements in the system. In this paper, the term “emerging” is understood to describe the complex transformation that is currently taking place in world politics—the transformation of power, state, and structure. The term “emerging” is also a good indicator revealing the hidden aspects of U.S.-China competition in 3  This paper does not provide a comprehensive literature review of network theories. In fact, network theory is not a single theory; there are different variants. For an overview of network theories from an IR perspective applied to the Korean context, see Ha and Kim (2006, 2010, 2012) and Kim (2014a).

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cyberspace, which is discussed in the paper. In particular, the emerging powers observed in the U.S.-China competition are understood at three dimensions: the transformation of power game, the diffusion of power holders, and the shift of power structure.

Framework for Emerging Power Competition When it is said to be an emerging power, it primarily means the transformation of power game, which is pursued by the state actors. The U.S.-China hegemony competition in the twenty-first century will be carried out over non-material resources, such as technology, information, knowledge, culture and communications, beyond the conventional power game over military and economic power. Furthermore, the competition will develop into a network power game that works in the context of the relationship between actors; it is not the competition over the power that is reduced to the resources and attributes of the very actors (Nye, 2004; Grewal, 2008; Castells, 2009). Although this new phenomenon of power transformation has occurred in the realm of traditional international politics, it is more prominent in the non-traditional sectors—climate change, energy, food, health and disease, migration, refugees, human rights, and international development issues. In particular, the recent competition in cyberspace vividly reflects this phenomenon of power transformation. In fact, the emerging power competition in cyberspace is becoming much more complex than before. In other words, the competition in the leading sector is not just a game of resource power over market share or product innovation, but also a “platform competition” that involves the setting and diffusion of standards, variables of scale and the characteristics of systems (Kenney & Zysman, 2016). Platform competition is not about the competition for quantity and quality of products, but rather about creating a platform, bringing other actors on it to work, and leveraging the scale factor that arises. It is a concept that is mainly used in the studies of computers and network, but it can be applied to world politics that are undergoing transformation due to technological changes represented by the development of IT. To understand this platform competition, as depicted in Fig.  4.1, this paper proposes an analytical framework of emerging power competition at the three thresholds of technology, standards, and charm (Kim, 2017, pp. 103–104). By applying this analytical framework, the most visible area of IT competition today is the competition at the “threshold of technology,” which is a physical layer composed of network infrastructure and information device hardware. Another important competition in the IT sector is the competition at the “threshold of standard,” which occurs at the logical layer composed of software or Internet services. Finally, the competition at the “threshold of charm” is also important; it is the competition to dominate universal norms in the content layer composed of knowledge, ideology, identity, and communication. These three thresholds are based on theoretical imagination, but they reflect the evolution of IT competition that has emerged over the last 40 years at intervals of about 15 years. In the mid to late twentieth

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Norm Charm Competition

Ladder of Scale

Force Standard Competition

Quality Technology Competition

Fitness of System

Quantity

Source: Kim (2017), p.103

Fig. 4.1  Framework for emerging power competition. (Source: Kim, 2017, p. 103)

century, although there were some twists and turns, the United States has generally dominated these thresholds and led to innovation in its leadership. In addition, the competition at the thresholds does not operate in a sequential way—from technology, to standard and charm—but in a complex way by interacting with each other (Kim, 2017, p. 104). To gain an overall understanding of the current IT competition, two more variables need to be looked at in addition to the previous three thresholds. First of all, competition over the so-called “scale variables” is becoming unprecedented in the era of complex networks, media convergence, and big data (Zwitter, 2015; Hansen & Porter, 2017). In this competition of scale, the “better” does not always win, rather the “bigger” is more likely to win. This is not just a matter of quantity or the simple dimension of quality. But it is the matter that a number of micro units overlap and link to each other, and climb up the “ladder of scale” up to the macro level; ultimately is the matter that makes the impossible on a small scale possible. And then, when this phenomenon crosses the threshold, which is usually called “criticality.” a new pattern is created that was not seen at the micro level. This process is called the “conversion of quantity to quality” (Kim, 2017, p. 105). Along with these factors based on the scale phenomenon, the so-called “fitness of system” as political and social variables should not be missed to understand the competition in future leading sectors. This is closely related to the capability of political actors, such as government policies and institutional flexibility in a certain system, which supports or restricts innovative endeavors of business actors in the newly rising IT competition. What matters here is the ability of a national system to effectively change existing policies and institutional conditions by adapting itself to

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new environmental changes in order to cross the thresholds of technology, standard, and charm or to climb up a ladder of scale (Kim, 2017, pp. 105–106).

Inter-network Politics: Interpreting Emerging Power Politics In addition to the transformation of power games, emerging power means the diffusion of power holders (or players) involved in these games. Here, power diffusion means the rise of non-state actors in world politics. Of course, state actors as the traditional power holders are still playing significant roles in the new power game. However, in the platform competition of cyberspace, such non-state actors as IT companies and internet users play as important a role as state actors. In the twenty-­ first century world politics, various non-state actors as emerging players in cyberspace are exercising much power comparable to that of state actors. These emerging power players include multinational corporations, financial capital, global think tanks and knowledge networks, transnational civil groups, terrorist networks, and international and regional organizations that can operate beyond the national level. Moreover, we note that the established state actors themselves are also undergoing a transformation of their form and seeking a new role in the process. From this point of view, the “United States of America” and the “People’s Republic of China,” which are competing in cyberspace as the leading sector, do not need to be just state actors or governments of both countries. In other words, it is true that the U.S.-China competition is seen here as a competition between “two countries,” not just a competition between “two nation-states” in the modern sense. In terms of the theoretical arguments presented earlier, the “two countries” currently being observed are rather a complex actor of government-business-society than a unitary actor, as the realist theory of International Relations assumes. This paper attempts to understand these complex actors as the concept of “network state” (Ha & Kim, 2006). In particular, the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace could be understood as the inter-network competition, which means the competition among network states; it is not the mere “inter-national competition,” which implies the competition among nation-states. In fact, this conceptualization is persuasive because the United States and China have previously been more of “network states” than the typical forms of “nation-states.” The notion of emerging power from this point of view leads us to the discussion of changes in power structure or hegemonic order. Interestingly, judging from the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace, the hegemony competition is unlikely to end in a single war and a winning or losing one, as was the case with the global hegemony competition in the past. It is because today’s hegemony competition in world politics has become much more complicated. The outcome of this hegemonic competition will be a more complex “transformation” of power structure, rather than a mere “shift,” as the theory of power transition suggests (Organski & Kugler, 1980). It is not appropriate to portray the competition between the two countries—that is, two network states—as a mere power transition in which the locus of power simply

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moves from one side to another. In particular, it is not proper to explain the complex changes in cyberspace, relying solely on the power transition theory which is derived from the experience of the modern international politics in offline space. Considering the competition of network states playing the emerging power game in cyberspace, changes in power structure or hegemonic order in the twenty-first century are likely to develop as the United States and China are tangled in the process of competition and cooperation. This complex aspect is not so much a power transition played in the game of “balance of power (BoP)” under anarchy, but rather a kind of reconfiguration of “network of powers (NoP)” in the world order based on a more complex organizing principle than anarchy (Kim, 2014a, b, c, d). In short, world politics in the twenty-first century which is conceptualized as inter-network politics in this paper is undergoing the rise of emerging power at the two levels: (1) the possibility of the rise of China as a potential next hegemon and consequent change of power structure, (2) the underlying transformation of modern international politics, characterized by the rise of new power game and new power players.

U.S.-China Emerging Power Competition in Cyberspace U.S.-China Technological Competition in Cyberspace In terms of emerging power politics, the key issue that requires a primary attention is the technological competition between the United States and China in the wave of the fourth Industrial Revolution. The success or failure of the competition between the two countries in the sectors of semiconductors, smartphones, supercomputers, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, the Internet of Things (IoT), big data, e-commerce and FinTech will determine the future of global hegemony. In these sectors, product productivity and technology innovation are the keys to winning the competition at the first threshold. The key is also the technological innovation in such sectors as network equipment, servers, and sensors which are composed of infrastructure environments interconnecting individual devices. In addition to wired and wireless internet, recent innovations in technologies related to IoT are drawing attention. In this regard, the future of the United States and China may be dominated by CEOs in the digital economy and industry rather than by political leaders. China’s pursuit of technology is fierce in the high-performance semiconductor sector, where demand is surging due to recent developments in the sectors of the fourth Industrial Revolution. In addition, Chinese companies such as Xiaomi and Huawei are targeting not only the Chinese market but also the global market by banking on inexpensive smartphones. China’s technological prowess in areas related to the fourth Industrial Revolution such as unmanned vehicles, drones and artificial intelligence is also growing rapidly (Zhang et  al., 2016). Also, concerning with technological capabilities in the supercomputer sector, Chinese companies have been ahead of U.S. companies for the past 3 years. As of June 2016, Chinese

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company Sunway TaihuLight (using Chinese chips) was No. 1, followed by Chinese company Tianhe-2 (using Intel chips). And No. 3 and 4 were two U.S. companies, Titan and Sequoia. Artificial intelligence (AI) technology has recently become a key factor in predicting future technology competition. According to the number of AI patent by country, the United States and China comprised 9786 cases (28%) and 6900 cases (20%) respectively. And by company, IBM has 2399, Google 2171, Microsoft 1544, and Baidu 466, Alibaba 384, and Tencent 201. One of the biggest issues regarding the U.S.-China technology competition is the area of network equipment. Cisco, a U.S. telecom equipment maker, has a 60–80% market share in China. As of the end of 2012, Cisco had more than 70% of the financial sector, exceeding 50% in government agencies such as maritime, public security, armed police, fantasy, and education. It took up about 60% of the railway system. The founder of the Internet Lab, Pang Sing Dong said, “with Cisco dominating the core of the Chinese economy, China would not be able to resist if there were conflicts between the United States and China” (SINA.CN, November 27, 2012). Under these circumstances, “Edward Snowden’s disclosure” has led Cisco to be subjected to more checks by the Chinese government. Meanwhile, the Trump administration recently banned Huawei from purchasing network equipment in case of doubt about its close relationship with the Chinese government and banned Chinese telecom equipment maker ZTE from doing business with U.S. companies for 7 years. In addition, the world’s leading Chinese drone maker, DJI and a Chinese CCTV company, Hikvision, have a hard time entering the U.S. market. This reminds us of the precedent of the U.S.-Japan competition in the 1990s, which took place in the dual-use technologies and industries, which had huge security implications (Kim, 2007). It should be noted that variables other than technological capability in the quantitative or qualitative terms are working in the manufacturing and network sectors. As discussed earlier, this paper conceptualizes one of the variables as the concept of a “ladder of scale.” In fact, an indirect way of acquiring competitiveness through investments, acquisitions, mergers, joint ventures, and purchases, which could be conceptualized as climbing up the ladder of scale, also work behind the technology competition. In particular, it should be noted that Chinese companies are pushing for a joint venture or mergers and acquisitions based on the huge scale of the Chinese domestic market. Chinese companies had adopted technology by learning and innovation at the early stage of immaturity, but after achieving a certain level of scale, they do so in a way called mergers and acquisitions rather than just by learning technology. Just like recent cases in the field of artificial intelligence, Chinese companies are also taking a strategy to recruit high-quality human resources with huge salaries. Even in the case of IoT industry, China has an advantage based on the huge domestic market, and rapid economic growth has brought in good conditions for introducing new technologies in IoT (Hu & Wang, 2014). Ultimately, China’s success at the threshold of manufacturing and network technologies will be determined by the fitness of system. To support the industry’s bold challenge, the Chinese government has launched various policy projects such as the 13th five-year plan, Internet Plus, China’s Manufacturing 2025, and AI Action Plan.

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In the case of Internet Plus, for example, 11 major tasks are being pursued, including the convergence of the Internet and artificial intelligence. In case of China’s Manufacturing 2025, the goal was set to become a manufacturing powerhouse by promoting IT, robots and electric vehicles. In case of AI Action Plan, it is pushing to create an innovative ecosystem to nurture global AI businesses by 2018. In addition, the Chinese government has been generous with its policy support, including establishing industrial complexes all over the country to revitalize the IoT industry. The question is how far the Chinese government’s policy model, which reminds us of the East Asian model of developmental state, will work.

U.S.-China Standard Competition in Cyberspace Recent competition in the leading sector has been different from the previous competition to produce cheap and high-quality semiconductors, high performance software and computers and fast accessible Internet. In other words, it goes beyond competition in which a company or country acquires resources and builds capabilities of manufacturing and innovations. Of course, there is no denying the importance of having enough capital and advanced technology to win this competition. However, in the competition in cyberspace as the environment of complex networks and media convergence, it is very important to dominate standards in the related sectors. From this point of view, the standard competition in the leading sector is a “platform competition” to create a new stage and play a new game, rather than a game to win upon the established stage. Recently, based on the enormous power of Chinese consumers, Chinese companies have been challenging U.S. companies in this field of platform competition in the leading sector. Since the early days of the computer industry, China has constantly challenged the U.S. hegemony in technological standards of computers and mobile operating systems. It is feared that China is relying too much on U.S. IT companies, and if there is any problem between the two countries, they will side with the United States. Particularly from the early days of informatization, what has touched the Chinese government was the reality that the computing platform used in China has been almost dominated by a U.S. company Microsoft. This perception embedded in the Chinese government and business was well documented in the Chinese policies supporting the Linux operating system as a step toward Microsoft. Behind the policies supported by the Chinese government on the Linux operating system were concerns viewed from a nationalist perspective, in addition to economic motivation. In this process, Chinese Linux companies have been the leader in the distribution of Linux with strong government support. Ultimately, however, China’s Linux experiments did not earn as much as expected (Kim, 2014a, esp. ch. 9). More recently, the so-called “Internet platform competition” is taking place in such areas as Internet search, e-commerce, and social network services (Kenney & Zysman, 2016). Recent competition in information services such as cloud computing, big data, FinTech and others could be epitomized as the competition between

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two groups of U.S. and Chinese Internet companies: GAFA—that is, Google (G), Amazon (A), Facebook (F), and Apple (A)—on the one hand, and BATX—that is, Baidu (B), Alibaba (A), Tencent (T), and Xiaomi (X). The competition in this field is still dominated by U.S. Internet companies. Recently, however, Chinese Internet companies have challenged the U.S. stronghold; approximately speaking, Baidu competes against Google, Alibaba against Amazon, Tencent against Facebook, and Xiaomi against Apple. Of course, their rivalry is not portrayed in this simple confrontation line, especially it is recently developing in a more complicated fashion (Haucap & Heimeshoff, 2013; Zhu & Smith, 2015; Chen, 2016). It should be noted that behind this competition for Internet platforms, a ladder of scale is operating. As the value of big data is largely recognized, competition over the utilization of big data has become a matter of interest between the two countries. In particular, China’s big data companies such as Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent are growing in their strength. In fact, these Chinese Internet companies could grow in a short period of time with the huge Chinese population and, more specifically, a large number of Internet users speaking Chinese. Behind this de facto competition is the de jure competition at the state level over the formation of international norms to manage the flow of data and information. While transnational internet corporations, which are mainly U.S. companies, are advocating an environment that guarantees the free flow of information, the Chinese government is committed to maintaining state’s sovereign jurisdiction over the Internet transaction. China insists that blocking and censoring unhealthy and harmful information on the Internet that is distributed both at home and abroad is a legitimate right for the government of its sovereign state to exercise. In fact, behind these differences lies the nature of the Chinese political system. China’s political stance and the nature of its political system, which emphasize government control and sovereignty, have not been a major stumbling block in the era of technological catching-up. However, as competition for Internet platforms is accelerating in the future, China’s political system may be a factor in blocking or facilitating Chinese Internet companies from moving forward (Wang & Li, 2017). In this process, the Chinese government sought to pursue a “the Informatization Model of Chinese Characteristics” against the U.S. global standard. In this context, the Chinese government asked Internet service providers in China to conduct self-­ censorship and filtering, and this policy was no exception to U.S. companies. The implications of these policies are also related to differences in the political and economic models of the two countries, beyond the simple conflict between U.S. companies and the Chinese government. In this regard, the competition at the threshold of standards is also a competition between the United States and China for their fitness of system (Chu, 2017).

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U.S.-China Charm Competition in Cyberspace In the most comprehensive sense, the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace is the charm competition, which could be called the competition for “soft power” (Nye, 2004). Charm competition goes beyond just taking control of markets and policies toward obtaining universal norms based on persuasion and consent to the other. For example, unlike hardware-based manufacturing sectors, the success or failure of the cultural industry and Internet business depends on the actor’s ability of producing more touching and sympathetic contents and services that can earn the other person’s heart. Furthermore, it is not only about producing attractive contents and services, but also about diffusing and communicating them. Furthermore, what matters is how attractive the policies, institutions and culture of a certain country are in dealing with those contents and services. In this regard, the charm competition means the matter of establishing norms that include universal values and the world view. As in the case of technical standards and institutional models, the United States has so far dominated the realm of charm diffusion and norm setting, and the challenges of China in the future will reach to this domain in the near future. The charm competition between the United States and China is found in the competition between Hollywood, which has traditionally dominated the global cultural hegemony, and the Chinese film industry, which challenges it. Hollywood in the digital age has been going for the global film market through the differentiation strategies of scale, represented by blockbuster strategies, introducing high-tech special effects and computer graphic technology to film making. In response to the U.S. cultural hegemony, the Chinese film industry has recently been challenging with rapid growth. In terms of technology competition, the Chinese film industry is gaining technological capabilities comparable to those of Hollywood based on the recent rapid quantitative growth. China is also looking for its own technology development but is trying to purchase or transfer technology from Hollywood through joint ventures, investments and acquisitions. In this process, although Hollywood’s standards appear to be penetrating the Chinese market on the surface, competition in the film industry is based on a more complicated aspect (Kim, 2017). In particular, we should note that the “ladder of scale” is operating behind the rapid growth of the Chinese film market. With its huge market size, China is likely to open a new horizon for competition in the cultural contents industry. Particularly noteworthy in this process is the change in the consuming patterns of cultural products in China due to the spread of the Internet and mobile devices. That is why the recent trend of Internet companies such as Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu, video sharing sites such as YoukuTudou, and the Internet fandom community in the Chinese film industry is attracting attention. The U.S.-China competition in the cultural contents industry will ultimately depend on who gives off more charms. Hollywood blockbuster films tried to reach global audiences by using a universal culture-code that has bleached ideology as much as possible. By contrast, China’s culture-code remains within the confines of nationalism and has the limitation that it has little interest in communicating with audiences outside its territory.

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In addition, the United States and China are competing for public diplomacy by utilizing the digital media in cyberspace. During the Obama administration, public diplomacy in the United States focused on actively utilizing the Internet and social media to spread American institutional models and values around the world. In contrast, China’s public diplomacy has been making efforts to spread Chinese models and values by utilizing mass media such as CCTV. If the U.S. public diplomacy was aimed at establishing a universal ideological network with an unspecified majority, it is argued that China intended to create a network of like-minded groups with the people of developing countries as its audience (Bräutigam, 2011). In this process, if the United States emphasizes participation and networking of non-state actors beyond inter-government cooperation, China is building a network of governments in developing countries in order to build a counter-hegemony coalition against the United States. These differences of the two countries also appear in the process of shaping international norms in cyberspace (Segal, 2017). For example, if the United States as a global hegemony seeks norms and an order based on the global governance model involving non-state actors, China advocates a traditional model for international organization, in which state actors still play major roles. This configuration overlaps with the confrontation line between the Western and the non-Western camps in the diplomatic arena of international politics. The gap between the United States and China on the formation of international norms in cyberspace, as discussed earlier, stems from the differences between the two countries’ policies, institutions and domestic systems. In other words, at the bottom of the charm competition lies the difference of political economic models represented by the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus (Beeson & Li, 2015). In this process, the United States and China are competing with each other to make their platforms and to gain support from other countries and citizens around the world. Since the inauguration of the Trump administration, the U.S. changing its stance on international norms while China is likely to take the initiative in the process of international norms.

South Korea as a Middle Power in Cyberspace South Korea as an Emerging Middle Power In recent years, South Korea has come to be regarded as an emerging middle power in world politics and growing are concerns that South Korea should play diplomatic roles corresponding to its increased material capabilities. For example, it played impressive roles in various international conferences held in South Korea, such as the G20 Summit in Seoul (2010), High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (2011), Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul (2012), Conference on Cyberspace in Seoul (2013), and ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in Busan (2014). Behind the increased diplomatic roles, there are South Korea’s military and economic

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capabilities, achieved for the last several decades; in 2010 South Korea’s military budget ranked the 12th and GDP ranked the 15th in the world. South Korea has recently strived to figure out a new vision of middle power diplomacy: what kinds of roles are expected of it, and in which issue areas it plays those roles in effective ways. Among various roles of middle power, this paper pays special attention to the advantages of brokerage empowered by positioning within a strategically important spot in a particular network structure (Goddard, 2009, Kim, 2011a). To organize this process, conceptual resources of network theories are adopted, and among them this paper especially relies on the social network theory presented by a network sociologist Ronald Burt. According to Burt, people who hold brokerage positions enjoy a competitive advantage over others who are less well placed. When they capture strategic places that connect otherwise disconnected groups, those people can exercise a special kind of power. In particular, he gives us some analytic insight; the unique forms of cleavages, which usually are conceptualized as “structural holes,” found in a network which provide structural opportunities for some actors—known as brokers. By bridging the structural holes, brokers occupy central positions in a network structure, acting as nodes through which multiple transactions coalesce (Burt, 1992). It is this structural position, not an actor’s attribute that enables middle powers to exercise a certain kind of power. The structural conditions of a network—e.g., number of nodes, pattern of links, and architecture of the whole network—enable or disables middle powers to play particular roles and thus to have more possibilities to exercise power. In this sense, the power of broker—i.e., brokerage power—could be called “positional power” (Gould & Fernandez, 1989; Chang, 2009). Positional power is contrasted to the existing notion of “resource power,” which refers to the power based on resources held by actors. In this respect, positional power is one aspect of recent theoretical attempts concerning “network power” that derives from one’s relationships with others (i.e., networks) rather than its attributes (Grewal, 2008; Castells, 2009; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Ha & Kim, 2010; Kim, 2014b). In wielding the positional power, the pre-stage of the game is to identify the nature of network committed, and to contextualize middle power’s position within the network structure of the whole system. In other words, a major task here is to comprehend the overall configuration of the network and define the coordinating or conflicting interests of the actors who are engaging the network game. For a middle power, a central task at this stage is to read the context of which world powers set the scheme. Only after reading the context, a middle power can assign itself roles within the network. Those roles of middle power could be articulated by understanding three aspects of network strategies: brokerage, collection, and complement. First, situated at the interstices of networks, a middle power is likely to play the role of brokerage. Brokerage may alter network structures, leaving actors with a fundamentally different set of network ties, and changing the agenda in a network. This occurs because the brokerage process is usually accompanied by the process of “asymmetric coordination of relationships.” This is to make certain ties stronger and to sever others. Simply, a process of network diplomacy is to break existing ties on

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the one hand, and to build new relationships on the other hand. It is this process of integrating and destroying ties that lies at the heart of brokerage. Indeed, this process of connecting and disconnecting ties belongs to the realm of strategic choices at the risk of opportunity costs. Second, the enriched pool of supporters in the network enables middle powers to play active brokerage roles. In fact, a large portion of middle power’s brokerage roles comes from its ability to bring more actors than others do. Being aware of the limitations of their brokerage roles, middle powers have to rely on collecting and attracting as many like-minded countries as possible. This carries with it the basic ideas of network power—i.e., “social power” (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Kahler, 2009) or “collective power” (Kim, 2014a). The patterns of power remind us of online collaboration, conceptualized as “collective intelligence” (Levy, 1999). In particular, middle powers seek to exercise the collective power through coalitions or alliances. Finally, middle powers may exercise a “programming power” as new architects of the network program. However, middle power’s programming power is concerned with the ability to complement and possibly further renovate the whole system, designed by world powers. Indeed, its unique position in the existing system requires middle powers to play a complementary role to the existing world order, not to play a defiant role through challenging world powers’ initiatives. In this sense, they do not necessarily have to be a whole system designer; it is sufficient for middle powers to be a complementary programmer who can provide system adjustments and adaptations that increase interoperability and compatibility, and further reinforce normative values and legitimation. Theoretical notions, introduced in this section, are useful to understand the structural conditions of U.S.-China competition in cyberspace, and South Korea’s middle power strategies under the unique structural conditions. In recent years, South Korea as an Internet power is likely to play diplomatic roles in easing cyber conflict between world powers, and to build a new global mechanism for cyberspace governance. In this context, the theoretical notion of middle power diplomacy will be applied to analyze the overall issues in the emerging power politics of cyberspace. To achieve these tasks of middle power diplomacy in the sector, it is essential that South Korea properly identify the structural conditions in which it currently operates and determine adoptable options for the future to aid in its success. Now let us turn to the more specific discussion about South Korea’s structural position and middle power strategies in cyberspace.

Searching for Middle Power Strategies in Cyberspace? The exemplary fields where South Korea’s roles of middle power are discussed, include non-traditional security issues such as atomic energy, global warming, cyber security and other economic issues such as official developmental aid (ODA), global trade and finance. Besides these issues, IT and Internet issues in cyberspace

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are considered as one of the emerging agendas that South Korea is likely to play a meaningful role as a middle power. South Korea, which has a high reputation as an “Internet Strong Nation,” is expected to play a contributive role in cyberspace. South Korea boasts its cutting-edge digital technology, efficient computer networks and the world’s top high-speed Internet penetration rate. In fact, South Korea sells more smartphones and high-definition TVs, has better access to the Internet and mobile network, and engineers more popular online game programs than any other country. In addition, Korea has also showed excellent performances in providing semiconductor, word processer software, Internet search engines, social network services, and the Internet community. Of course, it should be carefully examined how meaningful such an Internet power’s achievements are, beyond mere rhetorical packaging. Nonetheless, it is true that over the past few decades, South Korea has done better in the IT sector and cyberspace than any other sectors. Above all, the IT sector has been a growth engine that has been feeding South Korea for decades. However, we should not forget that cyberspace is not only an opportunity but also a challenge for Korea. In particular, the change that has been taking place since 2016 has brought a reflection on whether Korea’s performance as an Internet power will be sustainable. For example, the discussion of the fourth Industrial Revolution in the Davos Forum of 2016, the Go Game match between artificial intelligence AlphaGo with human champion Lee Sedol, and the continuous cyberattack by North Korean hackers raised concerns that South Korea’s achievement in the IT sectors might be an instant glory or a temporary accomplishment. In this context, it is meaningful to identify South Korea’s structural position within the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace and to think about the contents and direction of its middle power strategies to cope with the rivalry of US-China (Kim, 2016). First, what are the achievements and challenges of IT Korea at the threshold of technology competition? South Korea is said to have relatively achieved its competitive edge in IT manufacturing and the proliferation of Internet infrastructure. However, there is a challenge to overcome the difficulties of being a sandwich between high-value and low-value products. At the same time, South Korea has the task of advancing its highly developed IT infrastructure and hardware competitiveness to match the new environment generated by the fourth Industrial Revolution. It also has a task to strengthen cyber security which ensures the safety of existing wired and wireless Internet infrastructures while continuously pushing for technological innovation and human resources development. Recently, in discussing the fourth Industrial Revolution, South Korea has been talking about ways to improve its competitiveness in the IT infrastructure and hardware sector to cope with the emergence of big data and cloud computing environments. What should South Korea do to cope with the technology competition between the United States and China? Recently, there was a conflict with the United States when a South Korean telecom company was purchasing Chinese Huawei’s equipment. Also, well known is the case of the Samsung Galaxy phone, which recently became a sandwich between Apple and Xiaomi in the Chinese market. Should South Korean companies focus on low-value product competition or high

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value-added technology competition in this situation? Furthermore, one of the controversial questions is what kind of technological vision South Korea will adopt amid the U.S.-China technology competition. As we are discussing in South Korea recently, what future discourse of technology would be right to take full advantage of South Korea’s competitive edge in infrastructure and hardware? Is it a future discourse from the United States that emphasizes cloud computing, big data, and IoT, or the so-call Industry 4.0 discourse from Germany that aims to strengthen manufacturing competitiveness by introducing smart factories? Second, what are the achievements and challenges of IT Korea at the threshold of standard competition? Despite the difficulties of having its own standard, South Korea has topped the domestic market share in the sectors of word processer software and Internet search engines based on the advantages of the unique language for the last years. Since the early days of the computer industry, Korea has primarily adopted the U.S. computing platform—that is the Wintel standard—upon which it has pursued a strategy to develop Korean-style application programs that depend on the Korean nationalist sentiment. However, this strategic stance has created the situation of “standard isolation,” and has unexpectedly served as a barrier preventing South Korean companies from entering the overseas markets. It also served as a negative factor that limits the competitiveness of South Korea’s software and Internet sectors to certain areas. This situation may have had the effect of establishing an independent territory in the global platform competition, but it has limited the nation’s Internet ecosystem to domestic ones, resulting in greater challenge for future Korean standards to maintain compatibility with global standards. What should South Korea do to cope with the standard competition between the United States and China? What strategy should South Korea take or adopt in the U.S.-China standard competition, especially in the landscape of Internet platform competition between GAFA and BATX, focusing on Internet search business, e-commerce and FinTech? What is South Korea’s position on the de facto competition between U.S. and Chinese companies as well as the de jure rivalry between the two governments? After all, the key to South Korea’s standard strategy is to maintain openness and compatibility. Moreover, the pursuit of such a strategy is an important issue in that the problem of adopting standards in cyberspace could potentially lead to the choice of alliances in the offline space of international politics. While the best is the situation that there is no problem with compatibility between the South Korea-U.S. alliance and South Korea-China cooperation, as seen in the 2016 THAAD incident, there is a possibility that South Korea’s dilemma between the U.S. and China will be repeated. Third, what are the achievements and challenges of IT Korea at the threshold of charm competition? The challenge for South Korea is to promote the attractiveness and universality of Korean Internet models, while producing and distributing competitive contents of the Korean Wave, which is called Hallyu, in and out of the digital information and cultural industries. From this perspective, South Korea’s strategy should go beyond the previous industrial model, and step forward to create and spread a more comprehensive model of socio-political engagement and, by extension, a model of creating and diffusing cultural contents that seeks universal values

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in cyberspace. In this regard, South Korea has been making its own efforts over the past few years to build a national brand of participation in digital politics using wired and wireless Internet, which is usually titled as “Digital Hallyu.” At the same time, South Korea has continuously made efforts to exercise its leadership in the digital diplomacy sector by participating in the formation of international norms in cyberspace. What should South Korea do to cope with the charm competition between the United States and China? How can we continue the success of the Korean Wave (Hallyu) between the “U.S. Wind” and the “Chinese Tide” in the cultural industry? Even in the field of charm competition, the strategic maintenance of openness and compatibility is an important matter of standard management. In the process of participating in the formation of international norms as well as cultural contents industries, Strategic wisdom is needed to flexibly accept the cultural models of the U.S. and Chinese origins, and in some cases, to play the role of cultural broker between them. Given South Korea’s historical experience and current status, it is possible that South Korea will play an important role between the two discourses of global freedom and state sovereignty, which are supported by the United States and China respectively. In this context, it should be noted that the so-called Seoul Consensus Model, a combination of the Washington and the Beijing Consensus, has discussed in academia for the last decade (Sohn, 2007). The “ladder of scale,” which is becoming increasingly important in the competition at the three thresholds, is likely to pose a major challenge to the future of IT Korea. In fact, South Korea’s domestic market does not offer the conditions to compete for the “ladder of scale” in cyberspace. Moreover, the size of the South Korean domestic market is too small to discuss the role of a hinterland supporting to go abroad. If South Korea is unable to obtain an adequate “scale” in the so-called big data era, how does it establish any meaningful relation with the networks of the United States and China that operate on the basis of their own scale? For example, what should South Korea do, when it has to make an inevitable choice between the U.S.  PayPal and the Chinese Alipay in the FinTech service competition? South Korea’s ambiguous status, lying between the United States and China in cyberspace, is likely to escalate its strategic agony between the South Korea-U.S. alliance and the South Korea-China cooperation in the offline space. Ultimately, the variable of “fitness of system” will play an important role in sustaining the performance of South Korea as an Internet power. The need for a system reform to support the new paradigm has been actively discussed in recent years with the social concerns brought by the fourth Industrial Revolution. What is crucial to succeed in every field of competition for technology, standards and charm is the reform of the politico-economic model and socio-cultural infrastructure that South Korea has previously relied on. In this continuum, it is indispensable for government to implement political and social innovations or to renovate the governance system of cyber diplomacy. It is also pointed out as an urgent issue that the government, civil society and businesses have to build a collaboration scheme and to raise public interest to support the scheme. Furthermore, we should also think about the South Korean model of state in the twenty-first century.

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Conclusion Recently, the United States and China are competing against each other in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula. The U.S.-China hegemony competition in the leading sector is not only seen as a mere competition between two powerful countries, but an emerging power game that affects the future fate of the Korean Peninsula. Historically, while the hegemony competition of great powers has influenced the structure of the international system, especially in today’s emerging stage, the competition between the United States and China is more noteworthy than ever. Recognizing the uniqueness of the emerging power game, this paper looked at the U.S.-China competition at the thresholds of technology, standard, and charm, additionally taking into account the variables of scale and system. In order to properly understand the future of competition between the two countries, we should closely watch the emerging power competition in cyberspace no less than the traditional power competition over military and economic power in offline space. The most appealing sector is the U.S.-China competition for technologies and standards along with the wave of the fourth Industrial Revolution. The success or failure of the competition between the two countries in semiconductor, smartphones, supercomputers, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, IoT, big data, e-commerce and FinTech will determine the future of supremacy in the twenty-­ first century world politics. In this sense, the future destiny of the United States and China is likely to be influenced by economic leaders in these sectors rather than by political leaders. This prediction is gaining momentum in the recent development of the U.S.-China competition, which has expanded beyond the technology-standard-­ charm competition in cyberspace into the overall aspects of offline world politics. In fact, the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace has recently turned into a international security game. Cyber security becomes the first hot agenda (Kim, 2018). Chinese hackers’ attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure prompted the Obama administration to take out a counter-attack card, including military options. The so-called “Chinese hacker’s Peril,” which even caused controversy over hyper-securitization, was one of the hot issues that heated up U.S.-China relations in the early-mid 2010s. The conflict in cyber security could escalate into a high-tech arms race in the offline world. Recent developments in unmanned weapons systems such as drones and killer robots have raised concerns that there may be a robot war between the two great powers in the near future. Since the inauguration of the Trump administration, the competition has become more complex; thus cyber security is being linked to industry and trade issues. Mobilizing the so-called “Chinese IT products’ Peril” discourse, the Trump administration is keeping Chinese companies in check, which are leading the fourth Industrial Revolution in China. Behind these conflicts lies not only economic considerations but also the interests of both countries in data resources. Since the disclosure of Edward Snowden in 2013, privacy and data security have become a matter of national security. China’s cautionary concerns about data leakage by U.S. multinational corporations have created the Cybersecurity Law of 2016  in China. The focus of legislation is to

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censor and control services of U.S. companies in China, and to prohibit the transfer of data containing privacy outside the country in the name of national sovereignty. The Chinese move reflects the differences in policy and ideology between the United States and China on the Internet. Since the year of 2014, China has been hosting the World Internet Conference (WIC) to counter the U.S. initiative in global Internet governance (Segal, 2017). This shows that the U.S.-China competition in cyberspace has gone beyond the scope of domestic policies and institutions to the realm of international norm formation and world order building. Indeed, the recent competition between the United States and China in cyberspace has developed into the multi-dimensional competition over industry, trade, security, military, privacy, law and institutions, and international norms. Faced with such a complexity generated by the rise of emerging power game, South Korea has to take systematic measures with implementing necessary policies and rearranging existing institutions. Also, South Korea has to seek out strategic roles in the U.S.China competition, which is taking place on the emerging stages as well as on the traditional stages of international politics. In searching for such strategic roles, as this paper recommends, South Korea should consider its structural position and take actions for security and prosperity as a middle power. Indeed, this situation is likely to provide South Korea with a golden opportunity for middle power diplomacy especially in cyberspace. However, we also have to keep in mind that the structural condition produced by the U.S.-China competition would be a threatening challenge to South Korea that has a geopolitical fate being located between two super powers.

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Chapter 5

The Dilemma of South Korea as a Middle Power with Regards to the Conflicts Between the United States and China in the South China Sea Dong Ryul Lee

Abstract  This chapter examines the South Korean stance on the case of the South China Sea dispute between Beijing and Washington. Though South Korea is not a direct related nation in the South China Sea dispute, it does have some important interests in the issue. For South Korea, the South China Sea is an important maritime transportation route through which pass 30% of its exports and 90% of imported energy. Regional peace and stability, and the peaceful settling of disputes are very important for South Korean economic and strategic interests. In particular, this issue also ties South Korea to the future of Sino-U.S. relations. It is important to note that the South China Sea dispute is not only a disagreement over sovereignty, but also a China-U.S. issue, along with a dispute over international rules and norms. Thus, the South China Sea dispute is a complicated issue, which makes it very difficult for South Korea as a middle power to maintain a clear stance. Keywords  South China Sea · The Diaoyu/Senkaku · Maritime power · Xi Jinping · Belt and road

The earlier version of this paper was delivered at IPSA 2018, Brisbane in Australia on July 21–25, 2018. D. R. Lee (*) Dongduk Women’s University, Seoul, South Korea © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Lee, S. Kim (eds.), Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76012-0_5

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Introduction The conflict in the South China Sea is closely related to the significant structural changes in world politics. It is also one of the representative examples where the conflict became worse due to power competition between the United States and China. The rivalry between the United States and China increasingly defines the nature of Asia’s international order. Power rivalry, represented by the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S., calls for a fundamental reconfiguration of global and regional governance (Alexandroff & Cooper, 2010). The rapid rise of China makes more plausible the prediction that the power gap between the United States and China will narrow, and that ultimately China may surpass American power, at least in this region. China’s actions go beyond a reactive attitude to keep its “core interests” intact, and are evolving into advancing new institutions and norms that can challenge the existing U.S.-led ones. China is pushing a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), asserting that “the security of Asia should be upheld by Asians” at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and leading the establishment of the AIIB—all aimed at China’s leadership in Asia. In addition, it is essential for China to develop as a maritime power in order to successfully emerge as a powerful country. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, China’s core agenda on national security has clearly changed. Beijing has recognized that most of its inland borders are stable, whereas maritime challenges and interest conflicts are on the rise. In its Defense Report of 2010, China has highlighted maritime sovereignty, maritime rights and interests, and securing energy resources as major security agenda. In fact, coastal sea boundaries have been extended, along with the nation’s core interests. The Xi Jinping government has made it clear that the construction of a “maritime power” is one of the important national tasks to realize “China dream.” However, regardless of China’s intentions, the U.S. recognizes China’s proposals and actions as challenges, even threats, to U.S. hegemony and the U.S.-led international order due to the nature of international power politics. The rapid rise of China since 2008 implies a transformation of the Asia-Pacific regional order and the possibility of China’s power competition with the United States (Kim, 2018). There are a few new aspects in power competition between China and the U.S. It is difficult for any power nation to secure the dominance of overwhelming power, and competition and cooperation are often mutually exclusive according to their region and issues. Therefore, the great powers have shown a tendency to compete for securing and expanding options for allies. Washington directs their attention toward off-shore balancing, which is balancing against China with its major East Asian allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea etc., to contain China’s rising. As a result, East Asian countries like South Korea, in the middle of power competition, sometimes have a hard time taking a stance. While the South Korean economy and its future prosperity is closely tied to China, and China remains a key player for dealing with North Korea, the United

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States has long been a close ally, and central to maintaining ROK security. In particular, on the Korean Peninsula, due to a vulnerable security structure caused by the divided Koreas’ standoff situation and North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocation, repercussions of a Sino-American rivalry would probably hit harder than otherwise. Therefore, the next 10 years will be a critical period for South Korea’s security environment as China is predicted to become a maritime power in the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, unlike in the past, as China is actively participating in global governance as a result of its rising, it is paying attention to the reality of South Korea facing a dilemma between its alliance with the U.S. and its strategic partnership with China. Indeed, as the competition over institutions and norms in the Asia Pacific between the United States and China hits its stride, there are many discussions centered on South Korea’s difficult position between Beijing and Washington (Sheen, 2015; Eun, 2015; Park, 2015). In this context, this article will examine the South Korean stance on the case of the South China Sea dispute between Beijing and Washington. Though South Korea is not a direct related nation in the South China Sea dispute, it does have some important interests in the issue (Roehrig, 2015). For South Korea, the South China Sea is an important maritime transportation route through which pass 30% of its exports and 90% of imported energy. Regional peace and stability, and the peaceful settling of disputes are very important for South Korean economic and strategic interests. In particular, this issue also ties South Korea to the future of Sino-U.S. relations. It is important to note that the South China Sea dispute is not only a disagreement over sovereignty, but also a China-U.S. issue, along with a dispute over international rules and norms. Thus, the South China Sea dispute is a complicated issue, which makes it very difficult for South Korea as a middle power to maintain a clear stance.

U.S.-China Conflicts in South China Sea  hina’s Maritime Power Construction and the Asian C Rebalancing Strategy of the U.S. The conflict between the United States and China in the South China Sea has also been heightened with the steep rise of China, its pursuit of a maritime power, and the Asian rebalancing strategy of the United States since 2010. A series of conflicts and disputes in the ocean took place in 2010: conflicts between the U.S. and China over the sinking of the Korean warship Cheonan, a U.S. aircraft carrier’s sailing in the Yellow Sea (also known as the West Sea), the Diaoyu—also known as Senkaku in Japan—Islands dispute, and other territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

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In the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met her Japanese counterpart Seiji Maehara in New York City on September 23, 2010, in the midst of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute between China and Japan, and Clinton said, “With respect to the Senkaku Islands, the United States has never taken a position on sovereignty, but we have made it very clear that the islands are part of our mutual treaty obligations, and the obligation to defend Japan” (CNN, 2010). She confirmed that the disputed islands fell under the jurisdiction of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, which guarantees the U.S. will come to the defense of any Japanese territory under attack. China was quick to respond as it considered Japan had taken advantage of a recent train of Sino-American conflicts, attracting Washington to intervene, and the U.S. also had taken the dispute as an opportunity to resume its influence in East Asia and check China’s rising power in the region. In cases of maritime territorial disputes, China made it clear that it holds sovereignty. China has also displayed that in any event, there will be no compromise with regard to its sovereignty rights. In addition to its traditional factor of attachment to sovereignty rights, there are other complicated factors involved in those disputes where China has taken an unusually tough stance. The Chinese people’s heightened expectations to become a global superpower after the global financial crisis elevated Chinese nationalism inside the country. At the same time, Beijing’s will to preemptively emerge as a regional power in East Asia, and its strategic distrust in the U.S. return to East Asia and the siege of China, have intertwined with all other factors and played a role in formulating China’s harsh diplomacy. In fact, it is essential for China to develop as a maritime power in order to successfully emerge as a powerful country. Of late, China has rapidly transformed itself from the world’s factory to the world’s market and a global investor, swiftly expanding its national interests to overseas destinations. Moreover, rapidly increased demand for energy resources such as oil, the prime mover of economic growth, has put the issue of securing safer transport passage as a top priority. In short, China needs to enhance its long-range military operational prowess to secure resources and outward expansion to realize its ambition to emerge as a superpower country. Upon its inauguration, the Xi Jinping government has made it clear that the construction of a “maritime power” is one of the important national tasks to realize “China dream.” In the background of China’s strong position in the dispute over maritime territorial rights since 2010, there was a perception that the expansion into the ocean was directly linked to the national goal of the rise of China, beyond the protection of the core interests of sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the other hand, the U.S. regarded China’s maritime power strategy as a serious challenge to the U.S. maritime hegemony, and in response to such a challenge to China, it pushed ahead with the “rebalancing strategy” to reinforce influence in the region. In this process, the U.S. expressed its will to intervene in the territorial dispute of the South China Sea following the East China Sea. And it has led to the dispute over territorial rights in the region, as the disputed countries in the Southeast

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Asian, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, have taken a bolder position toward the South China Sea dispute with China. The direct cause of the reoccurrence of the U.S.-China conflict in the South China Sea was the first official registration of the ‘the nine-dash line (九段線)’ to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) by China in 2009. This has prompted disputed countries in the region such as Vietnam and the Philippines to react. Furthermore, in March 2010, China expressed its position for the first time to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg that the South Sea is related to the core interests of China’s territorial integrity. Since then, China’s “core interest” has become a hot issue. In the end, on 23 July 2010, U.S. State Secretary Hilary Clinton, on the occasion of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ministerial meeting, highlighted that, “The U.S. has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons” and all disputes should work through regional multilateral platforms (Kaufman, 2010). Chinese officials responded with criticism insinuating that the U.S. was trying to interfere in the South China Sea disputes and internationalize the issues, which China cannot accept. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui TianKai warned the U.S. to stay out of territorial dispute in the South China Sea (Durfee, 2011). Furthermore, in order to prevent conflicts over the South China Sea issue from surfacing at an international level, China mobilized all available means, and trumpeted its diplomatic slogan of “settlement through dialog between the relevant parties and non-intervention of the U.S.” during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held in Bali, Indonesia on July 23,2011. China was concerned that the Obama administration had switched its policy, with regard to the South China Sea issue, from non-intervention to active intervention (Li, 2010). During another dispute with Vietnam in the South China Sea that broke out after the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute with Japan in 2010, China faced unwanted negative attention from neighboring countries, putting the issue of the South China Sea on the international agenda, and increasing American influence in the region (Chu, 2010).

 onflicts Between U.S.-China on International Norms C and Rules In May 2014, the Philippines protested the construction of an ‘artificial island’ in China, and the international community recognized that China is building artificial islands in the South China Sea. This led to a new phase of conflict between the United States and China in the South China Sea, and the United States has begun to strongly condemn China’s island reclamation. At a visit to Jamaica in April 2015, President Obama denounced, “Where we get concerned with China is where it is not necessarily abiding by international norms and rules, and is using its size and muscle to force countries into subordinate positions” (The White House, 2015b).

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The United States has also urged consistently to suspend all of the reclamation projects immediately and permanently in multilateral meetings such as the Asia Security Conference (ASS, Shangri-La Dialogue May 30, 2015) and the G7 meeting (June 8, 2015). Along with this, the United States stepped up reconnaissance activities in the South China Sea. On May 20, 2015, the U.S. Navy boarded CNN reporters on the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and flew over the disputed sea. On Oct. 26, 2015, the U.S. Navy’s Lassen (USS Lassen) launched a “Freedom of Navigation operation (FONOps),” which is within 12 nautical miles of the Subi Reef (Zubi Dao; 渚碧礁). The United States said the purpose of the operation was to contain China’s artificial island construction and territorial claims. And on January 30, 2016, the U.S. Navy destroyer Curtis Wilbur launched a second FONOps within 12 nautical miles of Chinese Triton Island in the Paracel Islands. This time, it was clarified that the intention was for innocent passage in the territorial sea without prior permission of China. The United States considered the Chinese reclamation projects on the South China Sea as a military construction and expressed its concern, arguing for FONOps and deploying military demonstrations in its waters. On the other hand, China called it “a dangerous and provocative act that threatens sovereignty” and demanded that the United States stop reconnaissance activities. In addition, they continued to conduct maritime and naval exercises, and after 2014, they jointly conducted military exercises with Russia. China, on the other hand, has shown a cautious attitude to carrying out discussions on crisis management with the United States to prevent conflicts with the United States from escalating. In short, China tried to weaken U.S. intervention and influence in the region by claiming the South China Sea conflicts as a sovereignty issue, one which the third party cannot intervene. The United States, on the other hand, sought to expand its role, and strengthen its position in the region by addressing international norms and rules that it believes China does not abide by. This conflict between the United States and China has been further heightened by the ruling of the International Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). On July 12, 2016, three and a half years after the Philippines filed a lawsuit against China in January 2013, the Tribunal decided that China’s claim to maritime territory in the South China Sea has no international legal basis. The United States said in a statement issued by State Department spokesman John Kirby, “As provided in the Convention, the Tribunal’s decision is final and legally binding on both China and the Philippines.” Furthermore, “The United States expresses its hope and expectation that both parties will comply with their obligations”, in effect pushing China to abide by the decision (Kirby, 2016). On the other hand, China affirmed its staunch position of non-acceptance and non-recognition of the award, “We oppose and refuse to accept any proposal or action based on its decision” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2016b). Thus, the Tribunal in no way affected China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. As such, China conducted a series of military exercises and armed demonstrations in the South China Sea to reaffirm

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its commitment to territorial sovereignty. China announced the official patrol of the South China Sea, the disputed territory of the sovereignty, and announced that it had conducted patrol operations with various high-tech fighters. In particular, China reacted sensitively to what they perceived as a changing status quo denying current international law and order. China countered that the Tribunal’s decision was against the spirit of the rule of law, international law, and basic norms governing international relations, and insisted that China’s position of non-acceptance and non-participation is aimed at upholding international rule of law and rules of the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2016a). China stressed that it always respected and safeguarded the freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, which all countries are entitled to under International Law, but firmly opposed any act of showing-off forces, aggravating regional tensions, threatening and undermining other countries’ sovereignty and security interests (China Military Online, 2018). In the Trump administration, the ‘FONOps’ in the South China Sea is increasing. During the Obama administration, the U.S. Navy increased four times regular operations, but the Trump administration has already increased by double that since its rule. On September 30, 2018, a day before the Chinese National Day, a U.S. Navy destroyer Decatur was conducting FONOps in the vicinity of Gaven Reef in the South China Sea, where China claimed sovereignty, causing a crisis with a close encounter with the Chinese Warship, each being within 45 yards of each other (Werner, 2018).

 outh Korea’s Position on the Conflicts Between S the U.S. and China in the South China Sea South Korea’s Principle Position and U.S. Demand The ROK government has clearly and consistently expressed its position since 2011 in the ARF Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the EAS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, and other meetings that the ROK calls for a peaceful resolution to disputes in the South China Sea; an effective and complete implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. When disputes arise within the region, it is equally important for South Korea’s interests that they be settled peacefully while upholding the rule of law along with international norms and commitments. Thus, South Korea has maintained a principle position to support a peaceful solution to the South China Sea issue. There was a news report that the United States had asked South Korea and Japan to take same position for the South China Sea issue before the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Indonesia on July 21, 2011. A South Korean foreign ministry spokesman explained the basic position of the South China Sea through a regular briefing, “We are constantly keeping a close eye on the situation in the region

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because the South China Sea is an important part of our economy as one of the major sea lanes. We have a basic stance that the peaceful and free navigation of international maritime law should be respected in the South China Sea. Also, if there is a disagreement between the disputed countries, it would be better to resolve them peacefully through dialogue in accordance with the declaration of action of the countries of the South China Sea.” South Korea has maintained this position consistently since. In a joint statement of the 2014 United States–Republic of Korea Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting in Washington on October 24, 2014, South Korea expressed a similar position. The Ministers emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability, ensuring maritime security and safety, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The Ministers shared the view on the need for full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) and the early adoption of a meaningful Code of Conduct (COC) by ASEAN and China (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 2014). In the face of the conflicts between the U.S. and China on the South China Sea issue, the U.S. government publicly asked the Korean government to express its position actively from the standpoint of the U.S.  In the Korea-U.S.  Strategic Dialogue Seminar jointly sponsored by the Institute for Strategic Studies (CSIS) and the Korea Foundation (KF), Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel answered to the question of South Korea’s role in South China sea dispute on June 3, 2015. He said, “Korea plays an important role as a country under the rule of law and trading in the international order. The fact that Korea is not directly involved in this sovereign dispute, like the United States, provides more reasons for Korea to speak out. This is because it speaks for universal principles and the rule of law, not for the sake of its own interests” (SBS News, 2015). He mentioned that the ROK should speak out in regards to the South China Sea issue in support of universal principles and the rule of law, by which he was in effect asking for the ROK’s public support for the U.S. on this issue. In the face of the confrontation between the U.S.-China on the South China Sea issue, the U.S. government officials publicly urged the Korean government to express its position actively at a time adjusting the agenda for the U.S.-Korea summit in October 2015. Foreign Ministry spokesman of South Korea Ro Kwang Il reaffirmed its position in a regular briefing (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015): “It is the position of the ROK government that for stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, guaranteeing peaceful and free navigation is indispensable, and maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea, an important maritime transport route, is of paramount importance.” With that in mind, the ROK government is paying keen attention to and closely monitoring recent developments in the region. With regard to this issue, the ROK government hopes that the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” will be thoroughly and effectively implemented, and that the code of conduct being negotiated between China and ASEAN will be concluded as soon as possible, thereby helping maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea. The ROK government has conveyed this basic

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position in a clear and consistent manner, and will continue to do so at many, including multilateral, meetings. In the joint press conference of the U.S.-Korea summit on October 16, 2015, President Obama mentioned again that, “…We want China to abide by international norms and rules. And where they fail to do so, we expect the Republic of Korea to speak out on that, just as we do” (The White House, 2015a). This really emphasizes the Korean government’s support for the position of the United States. The U.S. governments asking for Korea to take a more assertive stance began, in fact, after China declared the Air Defense Identification Zone (CADIZ) establishment in the East China Sea on November 23, 2013. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, who visited Korea on December 6, 2013, met with President Park. He said, “I want to make one thing absolutely clear: President Obama’s decision to rebalance to the Pacific Basin is not in question. The United States never says anything it does not do. As I said in my visits thus far in the region, It’s never been a good bet to bet against America, and America is going to continue to place its bet on South Korea” (The Korea Times, 2013). This was the beginning of the official pressure of the United States to South Korea. The south Korean government hastily explained that the “betting statement” was an error in the interpretation and was not a statement aimed at China (Yonhap News Agency, 2013). But in the whole context, it is clear that the United States intended to check if the Korean government was leaning towards China. In November 2015, Minister of National Defense Han Min-koo expressed South Korea’s position on the South China Sea at the 3rd ADMM-Plus Defense Ministerial Meeting of ASEAN.  American warships sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Chinese artificial islands of the South China Sea, raising serious conflicts between the two countries on October 27, 2015. It is the first time that a high-level South Korean official has commented on the South China Sea conflicts in the presence of all three defense ministers from the United States, China and Japan. In particular, the minister’s speech was made after President Obama publicly demanded Korea speak out for U.S., with Japanese Prime Minister Abe also mentioning the South China Sea issue at the Korea-Japan summit. Therefore, the Korean government had a burden to meet some of the demands of the United States. The minister’s speech was not different from the previous stance. Minister Han emphasized the freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea and said, “we expect that the Code of Conduct will be developed as soon as possible, with effective and complete implementation of the DOCs signed by those countries.” In addition, he said, “disputes should be settled peacefully in accordance with relevant agreements and internationally established norms. We must refrain from any action that affects the peace and stability of the region” (Yonhap News Agency, 2015). However, the U.S. and Chinese governments and media interpreted the minister’s speech that South Korea was on the U.S. side. South Korean press quoted a senior government official as follows: “with regards to the U.S., Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, Secretary Han Min-koo reflected on the Joint Declaration the Code of Conduct (COC), which guarantees freedom of navigation and overflight in

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the South China Sea and does not resolve the issue by force or threat when a dispute arises. This is in agreement with the United States.” The minister Han’s speech was interpreted as supporting the position of the United States. The U.S. and Japan sought to include the phrase “freedom of navigation” in reference to the South China Sea in the statement, but the move was strongly opposed by China (KBS World Radio News, 2015). The reason is that the United States actively promoted the South China Sea Joint Statement, while South Korea agreed it, but China opposed. However, the joint statement led by the United States was not finalized because of the disagreement over the text. In fact, the joint statement was not announced due to China’s opposition. Han’s speech, which supported the position of the United States, was not controversial. At the East Asia Summit (EAS) in November 2015, President Park reaffirmed its position and presented the three principles: “freedom of navigation and overflight,” “peaceful resolution of disputes,” and “non-military commitment of the DOC.” A new expression of “non-militarization commitment” was controversial. The expression non-militarization does not collide with the ‘peaceful resolution’ that China had been claiming. The United States criticized China’s construction of an “artificial island” as a militarization measure. Therefore, these remarks can be viewed as an intention to go along with the U.S. position while avoiding the Chinese backlash.

South Korea’s Position on the Award of Arbitral Tribunal The results of the South China Sea trial were expected to be lost in China before the announcement. Therefore, the international community, including the U.S., Japan and China, was watching how Korea would express its position. This was an important diplomatic task for Korea. According to the Asahi Shimbun in Japan on June 3, 2016, the U.S. government anticipated China’s defeat before the PCA ruling on July 12, which accepted the Philippine allegations. The United States had asked the Korean government to announce a statement asking disputed countries to respect the outcome of the trial and take appropriate action. However, the Korean government had rejected the U.S. request, saying it is difficult to take an attitude before the trial results. The United States assumed that the Chinese government also sent a request to the Korean government to support China’s position through diplomatic channels such as Korean embassies in China. The Chinese government emphasized that many countries are in fact supporting China in the South China Sea dispute when the results of the PCA trial were coming out. At the time, the Chinese government made very active diplomatic efforts to get international support, including from South Korea. The Korean government issued an official response to the results of the trial of the International Permanent Court of Arbitration in the form of a Foreign Ministry spokesman’s statement on July 13, 2016. The official statement of a brief two paragraphs was announced 16 h and 30 min after the ruling was (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). “The Government of the Republic of Korea has consistently held the

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position that the peace and stability, and the freedom of navigation and overflight should be safeguarded in the South China Sea, one of the world’s major sea lines of communication, and that disputes in the South China Sea should be resolved in accordance with relevant agreements, non-militarization commitments, as well as internationally established norms of conduct.” “The Government of the Republic of Korea takes note of the arbitration award issued on July 12, and hopes, following the award, that the South China Sea disputes will be resolved through peaceful and creative diplomatic efforts.” The first paragraph of the statement reaffirms Korea’s position on the South China Sea dispute, which is largely in line with Washington and many others in the international community. However, in the second paragraph, South Korea was also careful to avoid language that would antagonize China by simply acknowledging the ruling. What is noteworthy is the expression “taking note.” It is very different from terms like “support” or “respect.” The term “taking note” is a diplomatic term that contains no value judgment. The U.S. government “should be considered to be final and legally binding.” The Chinese government was in the position of “non-­ acceptance and non-recognition of the award.” South Korea’s statement is the result of a compromise between the two contrary positions. Meanwhile, South Korea held the principle position that the sovereignty issue in the South China Sea had been argued to be peaceful and creative in negotiations among the disputed countries. Considering the active demand of the United States in the meantime, South Korea’s position on the PCA has moved to a more neutral one. President Park reconfirmed her claim at the South Korea-ASEAN Summit held on September 7, 2016 at the Vientiane National Convention Center in Laos: “we have argued that the South China Sea dispute has to be resolved peacefully in accordance with relevant agreements, non-militarization commitments and internationally established codes of conduct. We hope that the arbitration trials will resolve the issue through peaceful and creative diplomatic efforts”. In fact, the Philippines was fighting against China for the sovereignty of the South China Sea, and the United States was behind it. The fact that President Park mentioned the arbitration trials at a multilateral meeting explained the support for the Philippines and the U.S. indirectly.

 outh Korea’s Dilemma on the Conflicts Between S the U.S. and China in the South China Sea  outh Korea’s Dilemma on Power Competition Between S the U.S. and China In 2014–2015, the South Korean government was clearly agonizing over making difficult choices between the United States and China in various issues. Among dilemmas due to the expectations and demands of the two powers, was how to respond to China’s new vision of Asian security at the CICA, China’s invitation to

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join the AIIB, China’s invitation for Park Geun-hye to attend its Victory-over-Japan Day celebration, U.S. interest in South Korea indicating its readiness to join TPP when possible, U.S. desire for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment, and U.S. demand for South Korea to support freedom of navigation in opposition to China’s actions in the South China Sea (Lee, 2016a, b). When Xi Jinping proposed a ‘New Asian Security Concept’ at the May 2014 CICA held in Shanghai (Xi, 2014), in consideration of its alliance with the United States, South Korea did not sign a joint statement as China sought. In contrast, South Korea chose to join the AIIB after repeated requests from China. Regarding joining the AIIB, the South Korean government deferred its sign-up decision for 8 months, even when China requested it to join. The official reason to defer it was problems with the governing structure and operational methods of the AIIB, as also expressed by the United States and Japan. But in reality, the government was anguishing because of the choice between economic logic and alliance logic. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry officially requested South Korea to withhold its decision to join AIIB at the meeting the South Korean and U.S. foreign ministers held in New  York on September 23, 2014. A report stated that the Ministry of Strategy and Finance that was having a working-level discussion with China did not attend the 5th Beijing briefing session held for non-participating countries for the last time on the 26th–27th of the same month (Seoul Newspaper, 2014). In response to the report, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance announced a statement of clarification stating, “we are still in discussion with China because we need to review the establishment plans, such as the AIIB governing structure and operation method. And we would like to let you know that we are not withholding the participation of South Korea” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2015). The South Korean government expected that joining the AIIB would be economically beneficial and judged that if it has to join, it should secure a share and voice within the AIIB by joining as a founding member country. However, it postponed its decision to join, as it was aware of the U.S. opposition (Yonhap News Agency, 2014a, b). The South Korean government eventually prioritized practical economic benefits over alliance reasoning, and in the process of seeking U.S. understanding, due to the unexpected variable of Great Britain’s joining, had an opportunity to escape from its dilemma without difficulties. South Korea was, consequently, able to join the AIIB as a founding member country while minimizing any strains in its relationship with the United States. In summary, even though South Korea decided to join after prioritizing the practical economic benefits, without Great Britain making the decision to join, U.S. understanding could have been very difficult to win, and there could have been a possibility of not being able to join as an establishing member country because of taking too much time to decide. In the case of both the CICA and AIIB, South Korea finally joined AIIB, deployed THAAD, and refused to sign the CICA agreement. The South Korean government chose to cooperate with China in the non-security area, especially the economic area, without negatively affecting its alliance. Therefore, some commentators described South Korea’s strategy as “The U.S. for security, China for economy (安美經中).”

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However, the “U.S. for security, China for the economy” strategy cannot really be a reliable strategy, considering that in international politics, economic and security issues often overlap. The results of a survey of 61 experts and assembly members by the Hankyoreh newspaper also showed that they had negative views on the notion of “U.S. for security, China for the economy.” Only 17.8% of the respondents considered it sustainable. 62.2% of the respondents thought, “A new balanced diplomatic strategy should be found, centered on our survival and interests,” and 13.3% responded that it is, “Unsustainable and sooner or later we will be asked to choose by both sides between security and the economy” (The Hankyoreh, 2015). For example, in the case of the THAAD issue, it is fundamentally a clear security issue caused by North Korea’s nuclear provocation, but has been expanded to an economic issue due to China’s economic retaliation, making it even more difficult for South Korea to take a position (Lee, 2018). Nonetheless, discussions reflect how seriously South Korea is concerned about the dilemma between its alliance with the United States and its relations with China. In other words, South Korea is in a situation where it is difficult to escape from the strategic competition structure around the Korean Peninsula due to its geopolitical nature, along with the North Korean nuclear issue.

South Korea’s Dilemma in the South China Sea Dispute The South Korean government has been maintaining a consistent stance of the dispute over the South China Sea since 2011, without departing from principle. Although there were some subtle expressions of coordination with the continuing demands and pressures of the United States, President Park has maintained the three principles in South China dispute which were announced at the East Asian summit in November 2015. They are: “freedom of navigation and commerce,” “peaceful settlement of disputes” and “support for non-militarization of the South China Sea.” Freedom of navigation and commercial aviation, resolution under international legal provisions, and non-militarization pledges are not aimed directly at China, but in fact reflect U.S. claims and expressions, and keep in line with the U.S. stance. Nevertheless, the stance of the South Korean government from the U.S. point of view may still be arduous and unsatisfactory because the U.S. Obama Administration has consistently demanded and oppressed. Japan supported the deployment of U.S. destroyers in the South China Sea and criticized the construction of Chinese artificial islands. It is clear that the attitude of the South Korean government would be dissatisfactory when compared with Japan from the U.S. perspective. Nevertheless, the South Korean government has maintained a relatively consistent policy stance with regards to the South China Sea issue compared with other cases in which the Korean government faces a dilemma of choice between the United States and China. Through this, it can be argued that South Korea was relatively successful in this balancing act between two powers. Unlike other cases, why

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did the Korean government maintain consistency in regards to the South China Sea issue? The first reason is that the South China Sea issue is uniquely different from other issues. The South China Sea dispute is a complex and diverse issue. Firstly, it has the nature of a dispute over maritime territorial rights. It is a territorial dispute issue in which six countries are involved, including China. It can be said that it is a traditional security issue because it shows the aspect of competition in the ocean between the U.S. and China, whilst also being related to the acquisition of ocean resources and the securing of maritime transportation. Furthermore, this issue can be considered an economic one, linked to the idea of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for China. In addition, the United States is pressuring China to comply with international norms of freedom of navigation. This has extended to arguing as to the nature of international law or international normative competition. In other words, it has a zero-sum confrontational aspect in terms of territory and security issues. At the same time, there are also characteristics in which competition and cooperation coexist around economic interests and international norms. When South Korea has a dilemma of choosing between the U.S. and China, it has generally applied criteria for selection with the concept: “The U.S. for security, China for economy.” However, the issue of the South China Sea dispute has a structural characteristic that it is difficult for South Korea to express its clear position considering the security alliance with the U.S. and economic relations with China. The complex nature of the South China Sea issue poses similar challenges for both the U.S. and China, which are competing states. So, it is not easy for the two powers to unilaterally expect and demand a choice from South Korea. The second reason why maintaining the principle position of the South Korean government is not a problem is due to the impact of external factors. Particularly since the PCA trial results, the fact that Korea expressed its more neutral and ambiguous stance was influenced by several important external variables. U.S.-ROK announced the THAAD deployment decision in the USFK, on July 8th, and PCA reached a verdict that China had no historical authority regarding “the Nine-dash line” in the South China Sea. The impact of two announcements must have had a significant impact within China, since both were part of the “Xi Jinping Agenda,” which was directly led by Xi Jinping himself through official speech. Two consecutive incidents scratched the diplomatic performance, which is an important foundation for the legitimacy of the Xi Jinping government. Therefore, diplomatic flexibility of the Chinese government had to be constrained. As the THAAD deployment overlaps with U.S. involvement in the South China Sea dispute, China became more convinced that the U.S. was deploying THAAD in the Korean peninsula in order to contain China while attempting to build ROK-­U.S.-Japan missile defense (MD) systems. After the ruling of PCA, China displayed the tendency for intensifying the sanctions regarding the THAAD issue even more. For rapid restoration from the internal aftereffect of PCA loss, China took a more aggressive and strong position on THAAD deployment.

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When South Korea made a sudden decision to deploy the THAAD, the THAAD issue was enlarged and, on the contrary, the South China Sea issue had decreased interest. As a result, the THAAD issue quickly deteriorated whilst stimulating the national sentiment of China and South Korea to the point where the two governments could no longer find a point of compromise. The South Korean government structurally confronting the U.S.-China “surrogate competition” and the THAAD issue is one of the examples that the situation became worse due to this structure. The power competition between the U.S. and China in East Asia impacted the Korean peninsula, thereby deepening the conflicts surrounding THAAD deployment. Therefore, it is argued that it is not easy for Korea to find a suitable position and a role in the U.S.-China power competition. South Korea were in a weak position for properly resolving the THAAD issue, due to the security burden caused by North Korean nuclear tests. This was a strategic burden to choose the U.S. side in this matter. The South Korean government was seriously concerned that the move would worsen relations with China. The United States and China were also in an atmosphere to manage the situation considering the reaction of Southeast Asian countries after the PCA ruling. So, the backwardness of Korea’s neutral choices were not relatively strong. There is also a perception that the PCA ruling could have an unexpected impact. Most of the players in the region have vulnerabilities regarding their maritime claims that make it unlikely one would pursue legal action against the other (Roehrig, 2015). Thus, countries with maritime dispute issues seemed to be cautious. For example, it was pointed out that the quotation of the Itu Abu Island in Taiwan has raised concerns about the extent to which the “excessive interpretation” of the ruling is widening. Related countries have taken a cautious attitude and Korea has also expressed a more cautious and neutral stance considering the Dokdo issue (Lee, 2016a, b). It is another impact of external factors that weaken the confrontation between the United States and China in the South China Sea after the PCA ruling.

Conclusion Global structural changes provide South Korea with opportunities and difficulties. At the global level, South Korea with its increased national power and status, acts as one of the prominent middle powers. However, at the regional level, almost every time geopolitics reinforces itself, the Korean Peninsula, surrounded by four great powers, becomes the focus of serious great powers’ rivalry. When uncertainty for the future with the changes in power distribution becomes more evident, developing South Korea’s foreign strategy becomes highly urgent. With China’s unexpectedly rapid rise and the United States implementing a rebalancing strategy and Indo-pacific strategy in Asia, South Korea has recently had to grapple with the growing possibility of having to choose between the two powers in the midst of competitive and conflictual relations. As China is actively

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participating in global governance as a result of its rising, it is paying attention to the reality of South Korea facing a dilemma between its alliance with the U.S. and its relations with China. Indeed, as the competition over institutions and norms in Asia between the United States and China hit its stride, South Korea, in the middle of soft power competition, sometimes has a hard time taking a stance. The Trump administration is trying to reorganize the regional order based on the “India-Pacific Strategy” by modifying the rebalancing strategy that was the basis of the ‘Asia Pacific Strategy’. It is hard to deny that China is also the main target of this strategy change. Therefore, it is difficult to be sure that if the United States and China intensify their conflict in the South China Sea under the Trump administration, whether the Korean government will be as neutral as it is. In other words, South Korea is in a situation where it is difficult to escape from the strategic competition structure around the Korean Peninsula due to its geopolitical nature along with nature the North Korean nuclear issue, so it is necessary to minimize the expansion of the dilemma to the South China Sea. South Korea has already been under the pressure of making a choice between the U.S. and China, as can be seen in many cases such as AIIB participation, attendance in the anniversary of the formal end of World War II, and CICA including the case of South China Sea issue. South Korea can no longer rely on impromptu responses with diplomatic rhetoric such as ‘security with U.S., and economy with China’ or ‘balanced diplomacy’. It is necessary to face the fact that Korea must now overcome this limit by preparing for macroscopic and overall strategy in line with the direction of Korean diplomacy. In the long run, South Korea needs to secure prestige and a role as a middle power, rather than maintaining a shaky balance between the U.S. and China. It is necessary that South Korea make efforts to expand its independent diplomatic space and arena. Additionally, another important task is to jointly seek cooperation mechanisms with other middle powers to induce stability in U.S.-China relations. South Korea needs to pay attention to the ASEAN countries that are in a similar dilemma of choice. It is important and necessary to concentrate diplomatic efforts to strengthen their solidarity by sharing their positions with these countries. This makes it possible to minimize the risk of the U.S. and China being easily tempted by “strategic competition by proxy.” In order for South Korea to maintain its middle power status, it needs to build various global networks. In the process of developing multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, South Korea needs to prioritize active participation, if not play a leading role, in building minilateralism. The minilateral mechanism can contribute to alleviate competitiveness between great powers, and also weaken the influence of power competition between the U.S. and China for middle powers. The role of middle powers such as South Korea will be crucial in mini- and multi-lateral mechanisms. Thus, it is necessary to revitalize trilateral dialogue between South Korea, the U.S., and China. It may be difficult at first to move forward with a trilateral dialogue at the highest level of officialdom, therefore it is necessary to start at the 1.5 track

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and gradually expand the dialogue channel to include the government level. Through this, South Korea can retain an opportunity to create a mechanism in which it can share regional and global issues with the U.S. and China. Furthermore, South Korea can use this as a platform in seeking avenues to expand a South Korea-U.S.-China trilateral dialogue to include other significant actors, creating possible dialogues such as South Korea-U.S.-Japan, South Korea-China-Japan, or South Korea-China-­ Russia forums. After the Pyeongchang Olympics, South Korea has taken a role of leverage in resolving the Korean peninsula issues regarding North Korea. This holds a very important historical significance. This could be a very important step not only in the currently-faced situation of North Korean nuclear dismantlement, but also in weakening the influence of the U.S. and China over the Korean peninsula. Therefore, the U.S. and China must be watched so that they will not refocus on the power competition on the Korean peninsula, in order to succeed in denuclearization negotiations. At the same time, a long-term strategy should be considered so that this denuclearization negotiation will minimize the superpowers’ excuse for power competition within the Korean peninsula.

References Alexandroff, A. S., & Cooper, A. F. (2010). Rising states, rising institutions: Challenges for global governance. Brookings Institution. China Military Online. (2018, March 30). Defense ministry’s regular press conference on March 29. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2018-­03/30/content_4808299.htm Chu, H. 2010. 南海問題的新形勢與新發展. 『國際資料信息』 第12期. CNN. (2010, November 1). Clinton urges Japan and China to return to talks over disputed islands. http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/30/vietnam.clinton.visit/index.html Durfee D. (2011, June 22). China urges U.S to stay out of sea dispute. Reuters. http://www.reuters. com/article/2011/06/22/us-­china-­sea-­dispute-­idUSTRE75L14L20110622. Eun, Y. (2015). Re-examination of South Korea diplomacy in the power competition between U.S and China: A critical discussion for overcoming strategic dilemma. JPI policy forum no. 2015-18. Kaufman, S. (2010, July 23). Clinton urges legal resolution of South China Sea dispute. U.S.  Government. http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-­english/2010/July/20100723154256 esnamfuak4.879177e-­03.html&distid=ucs KBS World Radio News (2015, November 5). S. Korea Calls for Peaceful Resolution to South China Sea Dispute. KBS World Radio News. Kim, S. (2018). Emerging powers and a middle power: U.S.-China competition and South Korea in cyberspace. Paper presented at the 25th World Congress of International Political Science Association, July 21–25, Brisbane, Australia. Kirby, J. (2016, July 12). Decision in the Philippines-China arbitration press statement. https://2009-­2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm Lee, D. R. (2016a). Deciphering Chinas security intentions in Northeast Asia: A view from South Korea. In G. Rozman (Ed.), Joint U.S.–Korea academic studies (Vol. 27). KEI. Lee, J.-h. (2016b, July 14). Response on South China Sea ruling shows S. Korea’s fragile position. The Hankyoreh. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/752372.html

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Lee, D. R. (2018). The implications and lessons of the THAAD conflict in the 25-year history of Korea-China relations.Diplomacy 124. Li, J. (2010). Nanhai issue: 美國從中立到高介入. 『世界知識』 24. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2015, June 4). Spokesperson’s press briefing. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016, July 3). Statement by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea on the South China Sea arbitration award. http://www. mofa.go.kr/ENG/press/pressreleases/index.jsp?menu=m_10_20&sp=/webmodule/htsboard/ template/read/engreadboard.jsp%3FtypeID=12%26boardid=302%26seqno=316765 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2016a, July 13). Foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang’s remarks on statement by spokesperson of U.S. State Department on South China Sea Arbitration Ruling. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1380409.shtml Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2016b, July 12). Remarks by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the award of the so-called arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/ t1380003.shtml Ministry of Strategy and Finance. (2015). http://www.mosf.go.kr/_bbs/rss.jsp?boardType=gener al&hdnBulletRunno=62&cvbnPath=&sub_category=131&hdnFlag=&cat=&hdnDiv=&action Type=view&runno=4092010&hdnTopicDate=2014-­10-­01&hdnPage=7 Park, I. H. (2015). The strategic space of South Korea in the era of US-China and the peace in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Foreign Affairs and Reunification Committee of National Assembly Policy Research 15-03. Roehrig, T. (2015). Caught in the Middle: South Korea and the South China Sea Arbitration Decision. Asian Yearbook of International Law 21. https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004344556/ B9789004344556_007.xml SBS News. (2015, June 4). The U.S. Pressure for South Korea to Participate in Disputes of the South China Sea? ... Russell’s Comment. SBS News. http://news.sbs.co.kr/news/. Seoul Newspaper. (2014, October 2). Korea reserves sign up of the AIIB under the pressure of U.S. Seoul Newspaper. Sheen, S. h. (2015). Korea’s security challenges coming from the U.S.-China Relationship. IIRI Online Series. No. 29. The Hankyoreh. (2015. December 20). http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/diplomacy/705132.html. The Korea Times. (2013, December 9). Was Biden taken out of context? The Korea Times. http:// www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/05/120_147685.html The White House. (2015a, October 16). Remarks by President Obama and President Park of the Republic of Korea in Joint Press Conference. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-­press-­office/2015/10/16/ remarks-­president-­obama-­and-­president-­park-­republic-­korea-­joint-­press The White House. (2015b, April 9). Remarks by President Obama in Town Hall with Young Leaders of the Americas University of the West Indies Kingston, Jamaica. The White House Office of the Press Secretary. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-­press-­office/2015/04/09/ remarks-­president-­obama-­town-­hall-­young-­leaders-­americas U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (2014, October 24). Joint statement of the 2014 United States– Republic of Korea foreign and defense ministers’ meeting. Werner, B. (2018, October 1). Destroyer USS Decatur has close encounter with Chinese warship. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2018/10/01/37006 Xi, J. (2014, May 21). New Asian security concept for new progress in security cooperation. In Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. May 21. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/ t1159951.shtml. Yonhap News Agency. (2013, December 7). Biden’s wordings misinterpreted, confusion arises in Seoul. Yonhap News Agency. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2013/12/07/52/020000000 0AEN20131207000400315F.html

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Yonhap News Agency. (2014a, July 8). U.S. official expresses strong skepticism about China’s push for new development bank. Yonhap News Agency. Yonhap News Agency. (2014b, October 28). U.S. renews calls for transparency, high standards in China’s AIIB push. Yonhap News Agency Yonhap News Agency. (2015, November 4). Freedom of navigation should be guaranteed in disputed South China Sea: S. Korean defense minister. Yonhap News. http://english.yonhapnews. co.kr/news/2015/11/04/0200000000AEN20151104008751315.html.

Chapter 6

The Inter-network Politics of Cyber Security and Middle Power Diplomacy: A Korean Perspective Sangbae Kim

Abstract  This paper maintains that existing studies of middle power are inadequate for providing a guideline for South Korea, particularly in the realm of cyber security. They mostly look to individual countries’ attributes or capabilities to explain the generalized roles of middle power in world politics. Network theorists in International Relations adopt an anti-attribute imperative that rejects all attempts to explain actors’ actions solely in terms of actors’ attributes. They maintain that it is an actor’s “position,” not its attributes, that creates opportunities for a country, and that how actors are connected to others influences its diplomatic discretion. In this context, this paper adopts this notion of “positional approach,” which has an origin from network theories, to understand middle power. Relying on the positional approach, this paper primarily identifies complex structures of the cyber security sector. This approach provides a framework to understand the distinct modalities and dynamics of cyber security issues, which this paper calls the “asymmetric inter-­ network politics.” It looks at the triple structures: (a) techno-social structure of cyberspace, (b) issue-specific political structure in global cyber security governance, and (c) geopolitical structure generated by the U.S.-China competition. Identifying the structural conditions in the domain, this paper explores the possibilities or the dilemma of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the cyber security sector. In particular, this paper uses network theories to deduce a series of conditions under which South Korea’s middle power diplomacy is more or less likely. Keywords  Cyberspace · Positional approach · Techno-social structure · Issue-­ specific political structure · Geopolitical structure

S. Kim (*) Dept Political Sci and Intl Relations, Seoul National Univ, Gwanak-gu, Seoul, Korea (Republic of) e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Lee, S. Kim (eds.), Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76012-0_6

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Introduction In recent years, South Korea has come to be regarded as an emerging middle power in world politics, and growing are concerns that South Korea should play diplomatic roles corresponding to its increased material capabilities. South Korea has recently strived to figure out a new vision of middle power diplomacy: what kinds of roles are expected of it, and in which issue areas it plays those roles in effective ways. The exemplary fields, about which South Korea’s roles of middle power are discussed, include non-traditional security issues such as atomic energy, global warming, and cyber security, and other economic issues such as official developmental aid (ODA), global trade and finance. Of them, cyber security issues are considered as one of the newly rising agendas that South Korea is likely to play a meaningful role as a middle power. Cyber security issues have largely been the domain of computer experts and specialists since the Internet began as a small community where an authentication layer of code was unnecessary and the development of norms was simple. But then it grew, and everything changed. Although cyberspace offered the arena for business and social activities, it also became an environment for crime, hackings and terrors. Governments, private companies and non-state actors are making efforts to develop indispensable capabilities for securing their resources and activities in cyberspace. Foreign policy makers and International Relations scholars are struggling to understand cyberspace’s basic structures and dynamics, which are different from traditional security sectors. It is obvious that cyber security issues are turning into a major concern of International Relations in various senses. Amid the fast spread of hacking technologies, many countries and international organizations focus more on crafting security measures and enhancing multilateral cooperation to fend off cyber threats, which could be as devastating as physical military strikes. For example, they are making efforts to build a global framework for Internet governance, of which cyber security is one of the contentious sub-fields; but their consensus has not been framed yet. In particular, the United States and China, two world powers in the twenty-first century, are recently conflicting with each other over hackings and espionage. The issue of cyber security is becoming ever larger in U.S.-China relations and is seriously affecting threat perceptions on both sides. Indeed, despite it being such a new issue, the cyber realm is proving to be as challenging as the more traditional concerns that have long dominated the U.S.-China agenda (Lieberthal & Singer, 2012, pp. 1–2). South Korea, which has a high reputation as an “Internet Strong Nation,” is expected to play a contributive role in the cyber security sector. South Korea boasts cutting-edge digital technology, efficient computer networks and the world’s top high-speed Internet penetration rate. But behind these feats is an unpleasant truth: its vulnerability to cyber threats, suspected as North Korea’s offences. It is worried that the on-line attacks are likely to be coupled with off-line nuclear attacks. It is urgent and crucial for South Korea to build capabilities enough to fend off any offences through cyberspace. However, securing cyberspace is not solely based on

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fostering material capabilities, but also figuring out diplomatic solutions among committed actors. In this context, this paper analyses the opportunities or difficulties that South Korea’s middle power diplomacy is facing in the cyber security sector. This paper maintains that existing studies of middle power are inadequate for providing a guideline for South Korea, particularly in the realm of cyber security. They mostly look to individual countries’ attributes or capabilities to explain the generalized roles of middle power in world politics (Gordon, 1966; McLin, 1967; Holbraad, 1971; Pratt 1990; Cooper et al., 1993; Cooper, 1997; Otte, 2000). Thus, they fail to explain the proper roles of middle power under a certain structural condition that might be a more essential determinant for middle powers’ action than for world powers’. In contrast, network theorists in International Relations adopt an anti-attribute imperative that rejects all attempts to explain actors’ actions solely in terms of actors’ attributes. They maintain that it is an actor’s “position,” not its attributes, that creates opportunities for a country, and that how actors are connected to others influences its diplomatic discretion. In this context, this paper adopts this notion of “positional approach,” which has an origin from network theories, to understand middle power diplomacy (Hafner-Burton & Montgomery, 2006; Goddard, 2009; Nexon & Wright, 2007; Nexon, 2009; Kim, 2014a, b). Relying on the positional approach, this paper primarily identifies complex structures of the cyber security sector. Indeed, this approach provides a framework to understand the distinct modalities and dynamics of cyber security issues, which this paper calls the “asymmetric inter-network politics.” It looks at the triple structures: (a) techno-social structure of cyberspace, (b) issue-specific political structure in global cyber security governance, and (c) geopolitical structure generated by the U.S.-China competition. Identifying the structural conditions in the domain, this paper explores the possibilities or the dilemma of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the cyber security sector. In particular, this paper uses network theories to deduce a series of conditions under which South Korea’s middle power diplomacy is more or less likely. This paper is composed of five sections. In the first section, it outlines the notions of structural positioning and positional power as theoretical frameworks. In the second section, it explores the technological structure and social dynamics of cyberspace, in which various actors are interacting. In the third section, it examines the inter-network politics of global cyber security governance, and investigates competing ideas and interests behind it. In the fourth section, it looks at the U.S-China conflicts over cyber hackings, regulatory policies, and security discourses. In the fifth section, applying the positional approach to middle power diplomacy, it suggests that South Korea should manage three strategies of brokerage, collection, and complement in coping with the inter-network politics of cyber security. This paper concludes with a brief summary of this paper, and presents further research concerns.

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Positional Approach to Middle Power Diplomacy Network theories provide IR theorists with an alternative account of middle power diplomacy; they hold that a particular type of network creates favorable conditions for participating actors and how actors are positioned in the network facilitates their ability to compete or cooperate with others (Goddard, 2009, p. 253). In this view, middle power’s actions are dependent upon the structural condition of the network in which a country ties to others. In other words, depending on how the structure is shaping, middle powers are likely to enjoy a certain degree of roles. Then, comparing to other theoretical approaches, how does the network perspective define the structural condition—i.e., “structure” in general? While the neo-realists notion of structure understands structure as an entity that is derived from the categorical attributes of actors (Waltz, 1979), network theories look at the relational context of actors’ interaction. Structure is emerging from “continuing series of transactions to which participants attach shared understandings, memories, forecasts, rights, and obligation” (Tilly, 1998, p.  456; Goddard, 2009, p. 254). Here, structure is understood as the relational configuration among actors or the patterns of transaction themselves. Relatively durable, but fundamentally dynamic interactions constitute the structural conditions in which actors operate (Nexon, 2009, p. 25). In short, structure is not a kind of fixed entity reducing to actors’ internal properties or attributes, but a social relationship among or across actors (Nexon & Wright, 2007). This view is useful to identify the role of middle power occupying a specific position in the network. It is not an actor’s attributes or interests but its positions that enable middle power’s agency. The positional perspective in social network theory holds “that how actors are positioned in a network facilitates their ability to act as entrepreneurs. Because social and cultural ties provide power, information, and ideas, an actor’s ability to introduce new norms, manipulate symbols, and radically influence political outcomes, all depends on network position” (Goddard, 2009, p. 257). Middle powers’ strategies are more likely to succeed if they accommodate the requirements of the structural conditions in the network. If the concept of middle power is defined in terms of structural position in a network, what specific roles would a middle power play under a certain network structure? Among various roles of middle power, this paper pays special attention to the advantages of brokerage empowered by positioning within a strategically important spot in a particular network structure. According to Ronald Burt, people who hold brokerage positions enjoy a competitive advantage over others who are less well placed. When they capture strategic places that connect otherwise disconnected groups, those people can exercise a special kind of power. In particular, he gives us some analytic insight; the unique forms of cleavages, which usually are conceptualized as “structural holes,” found in a network which provide structural opportunities for some actors—known as brokers. By bridging the structural holes, brokers occupy central positions in a network structure, acting as nodes through which multiple transactions coalesce (Burt, 1992).

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It is this structural position, not an actor’s attribute that enables middle powers to exercise a certain kind of power. The structural conditions of a network—e.g., number of nodes, pattern of links, and architecture of the whole network—enable or disables middle powers to play particular roles and thus to have more possibilities to exercise powers. In this sense, the power of broker—i.e., brokerage power— could be called “positional power” (Gould & Fernandez, 1989; Chang, 2009). Positional power is contrasted to the existing notion of “resource power,” which refers to the power based on resources held by actors. In this respect, positional power is one aspect of recent theoretical attempts concerning “network power” that derives from one’s relationships with others (i.e., networks) rather than its attributes (Grewal, 2008; Castells, 2009; Hafner-Burton et  al., 2009; Ha & Kim, 2010; Kim, 2014b). In wielding the positional power, the pre-stage of the game is to identify the nature of network committed, and to contextualize middle power’s position within the network structure of the whole system. In other words, a major task here is to comprehend the overall configuration of the network, and define the coordinating or conflicting interests of the actors who are engaging the network game. For a middle power, a central task at this stage is to read the context of which world powers set the scheme. Only after reading the context, a middle power can assign itself roles within the network. Those roles of middle power could be articulated by understanding three aspects of network strategies: brokerage, collection, and complement. First, situated at the interstices of networks, a middle power is likely to play the role of brokerage. Brokerage may alter network structures, leaving actors with a fundamentally different set of network ties, and changing the agenda in a network. This occurs because the brokerage process is usually accompanied by the process of “asymmetric coordination of relationships.” This is to make certain ties stronger and to sever others. Simply, a process of network diplomacy is to break existing ties on the one hand, and to build new relationships on the other hand. It is this process of integrating and destroying ties that lies at the heart of brokerage. Indeed, this process of connecting and disconnecting ties belongs to the realm of strategic choices at the risk of opportunities costs. Second, the enriched pool of supporters in the network enables middle powers to play active brokerage roles. In fact, a large portion of middle power’s brokerage roles comes from its ability to bring more actors than others do. Being aware of the limitations of their brokerage roles, middle powers have to rely on collecting and attracting as many like-minded countries as possible. This carries with it the basic ideas of network power—i.e., “social power” (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009; Kahler, 2009) or “collective power” (Kim, 2014a). The patterns of power remind us of online collaboration, conceptualized as “collective intelligence” (Levy, 1999). In particular, middle powers seek to exercise the collective power through coalitions or alliances. Finally, middle powers may exercise a “programming power” as new architects of the network program. However, middle power’s programming power is concerned with the ability to complement and possibly further renovate the whole system, designed by world powers. Indeed, its unique position in the existing system

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requires middle powers to play a complementary role to the existing world order, not to play an exploitive role through challenging world powers’ initiatives. In this sense, they do not necessarily have to be a whole system designer; for middle powers, sufficient is to be a complementary programmer, who can provide system adjustments and adaptations that increase interoperability and compatibility, and further reinforce normative values and legitimation. Theoretical notions, introduced in this section, are useful to understand the structural conditions of the cyber security sector, and South Korea’s middle power strategies under the unique structural conditions. In recent years, South Korea as an Internet power is likely to play diplomatic roles in easing cyber conflict between world powers, and to building a new global mechanism for cyber security governance. To achieve these tasks of middle power diplomacy in the sector, it is essential that South Korea properly identify the structural conditions in which it currently operates, and determine adoptable options for the future to aid in its success. Now let us turn to the discussion about the cyber security sector, characterized by triple structures as described below.

Complex Networks in Cyber Security Cyberspace is now an unavoidable reality that covers the earth with complex networks. Networked computers that make up cyberspace are global in its design and development, and have dissolved the traditional boundaries of the territorial nation state. Cyberspace has evolved so quickly that individuals and organizations have to adopt proper measures for security. The challenge is that cyber security issues have unique technological characteristics, which are different from traditional security issues. In particular, the complex character of network systems is the key to understanding the potential magnitude of cyber threats; it is indispensable to understand the unique conditions of structures, dynamics, and actors in cyberspace. This section points out the six features of cyber security issues. First, cyber terrors and attacks are taking places in the network environment, characterized as a complex system. Cyberspace is a mixture of physical infrastructure and virtual properties. The Internet involves multiple hardware, software and contents. And actors are diverse—sometimes virtual and anonymous. The complexity of cyberspace makes it hard to discern the major culprit of cyber-attacks. Even if the culprit could be identified, it would be very problematic and even futile to single out a culprit due to the complexity of engaged actors, and even the network itself is a culprit. Moreover, in the case of system failure or issue, it is difficult to determine whether that is the result of intentional attacks or a mere incident of system malfunction. In the case of the Stuxnet virus taking effect on the Natanz nuclear centrifuges in Iran, the virus was not discovered until June 2010, not by the Iranians, but by a Belarusian cybersecurity firm. These features are all originated from the intrinsically non-leaner causal mechanism of cyberspace as a complex system.

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Second, the complexity of cyberspace makes it plausible to adopt the theory of “securitization,” presented by the Copenhagen School of security studies in International Relations (Buzan et  al., 1998; Wæver et  al., 1993; Wæver, 1995; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). According to Barry Buzan, the securitization of particular issues is constituted by “the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (Buzan et al., 1998, p.  25). Cyber security issues are typical examples of securitization in the sense that threats to security in cyberspace, at least so far, tend to be a matter of constituting discourses, rather than that of hunting down real threats. Because cyber-attackers may operate at a distance obfuscating their identities, locations, and paths of entry, the culprits are presumed rather than proven to be guilty. In fact, cyber security has long been highly politicized and securitized by dozens of government agencies and traditional corporations. Third, cyber attackers are exploiting structural elements in network systems. No matter how sophisticated a computer or information system design is, each have bugs and holes, a by-product of high levels of technological complexity, which make them as vulnerable to penetration and change. These holes could be targets for hackers in attacking the network and are called “exploits” (Galloway & Thacker, 2007). Computer viruses and malicious codes exploit the holes, which might be a critical point for interoperability or compatibility between various programs in the entire network. Thus, the one seeking to penetrate a computer network, at least so far, is at a great advantage relative to the defender. Moreover, due to the network character of complex systems, cyber incursions by adversaries could paralyze the whole social system, which could seriously impact people’s lives. Those exploits are likely to work as “structural black holes” that make the whole system collapse (Kim, 2014a). Fourth, computer viruses, malicious codes, and the network itself are playing active roles as “non-human actors” in cyber-attacks. Various kinds of computer viruses and malicious codes exploit vulnerable points of the system and degrade the functioning of the system; examples known so far include Stuxnet, Flame, and Shamoon. It is noteworthy that those computer viruses are not mere instruments of human actors, but sometimes an active actor that has abilities affecting the system. The case of DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks provides a typical example of non-human actor’s agency. In DDoS attacks, a large number of compromised hosts are used to flood a target system with network requests; the “zombie computers” are used as part of a botnet with various non-human actors. Since the early 2010s, a more sophisticated approach has increased rapidly and effectively; a particularly worrisome change has been the rise of “advanced persistent threats (APTs).” Fifth, cyber terrors and attacks are basically launched by non-state actors such as hackers and crackers, which are not systematically organized, and thus are operating as transnational network actors. The low price of entry, anonymity and asymmetries in vulnerability means that smaller non-state actors exercise a certain amount of power. Cyber terrors and attacks are understood as a type of “asymmetric war” in terms of actors, means, and goals. While state actors have greater resources,

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they also have greater vulnerabilities. World powers have greater capacity than other state and non-state actors, but it makes little sense to speak of dominance in cyberspace. If anything, dependence on complex cyber systems for support of military and economic activities creates new vulnerabilities in large states that can be exploited by non-state actors. Well-known non-state actors include such hacker groups as Anonymous and Cutting Sword of Justice. Sixth, cyber security is not so much a concern of non-state actors as for state actors. Amid rising concerns over the potential impact of cyber-attacks on national security, many countries have begun expanding the role of their militaries to cover the cyber domain, defining cyberspace as the “fifth battlefield” after land, sea, air and space. In 2007, Russian non-state groups launched massive DDoS attacks on Estonia. Attacks by Russian groups also struck Georgia in 2008 and Kyrgyzstan in 2009 (Evron, 2008; Thomas, 2009; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). In June 2010, the United States was thought to have developed the Stuxnet in cooperation with Israel to attack Iran’s computer systems. North Korea has also been capitalizing on cyber warriors to attack South Korea’s network systems. Indeed, safeguarding and securing cyberspace are rapidly becoming a matter of international conflicts and one of the major concerns for national security. To summarize, cyber security issues are featured by the dynamics, structures, and actors in complex networks, which distinguish them from traditional security issues. Cyber threats are continuously evolving, and increasingly blurring distinctions between territorial boundaries. The lines between state and non-state actions in cyberspace are also shifting and blurred. In this sense, the politics of cyber security is characterized by the notion of asymmetric “inter-network politics” between complex actors, rather than by the traditional notion of “inter-national politics” between nation-states (Kim, 2014b).

Global Governance in Cyber Security Over the last decade, the world has been exploring a new order for cyber security, which will be established in due consideration of the complexity of the domain. Recalling the history since the late-1990s, cyber security issues have been handled as one of the sub-fields in Internet governance rather than a sui generis issue area (Mueller, 2010; DeNardis, 2013). There has not been substantial progress, with the world failing to reach consensus over various issues including how to establish norms, laws and rules of engagement for cyber warfare and to what extent regulations should be imposed on cyber activities. Currently, there is a confrontation between two camps at multiple levels, in which we identify the de jure structural conditions of the domain.

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Multistakeholderism vs. Inter-governmentalism In its early days, Internet governance was conducted by a decentralized multistakeholder network of interconnected autonomous groups drawing from civil society, the private sector, governments, academic and research communities, and national and international organizations. This multistakeholder governance model, sometimes known as a multistakeholder initiative (MSI) or multistakeholderism, is a governance structure that seeks to bring stakeholders together to participate in the dialogue, decision making, and implementation of solutions to common problems and/or goals. The global framework of Internet governance has also been constituted by the initiative of those multistakeholders whose activities are mainly based on the United States; not by the consensus of government representatives in the diplomatic arena of international organizations. A remarkable example of the multistakeholder model is found in the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which is a non-state organization headquartered in California, USA.  Since the early years of the Internet, ICANN has overseen the assignment of globally unique identifiers on the Internet. ICANN must be a global governance model of private-public partnership since it has been governed by an international board of directors drawn from across the Internet’s technical, business, academic, and other non-commercial communities. However, in the sense that the U.S.  Department of Commerce continues to have final approval over changes to core issues, the ICANN model has been suspected as a tool of U.S. de facto hegemony (Mueller, 2002, 2010). Against the ICANN model Russia, China and other developing countries have raised objection; they continue to advocate for the use of a traditional international organization—e.g., the United Nations’ voting procedures—instead of the ICANN model, for making global decisions, and defend their right to control domestic cyber activities. They maintain that, even if the U.S. leadership as a first mover has been tolerated in the embryonic stage of Internet development, the world now has to establish a new inter-governmental consensus on global Internet governance. It is because the Internet has evolved so quickly that nations find their interests conflicting. The state’s intervention to cyberspace seems to be legitimized as a part of territorial sovereignty. In particular, the rising significance of cyber security issues as a matter of national security provides state actors with imperatives to intervene and regulate cyberspace. With state actors moving to tighten control over cyberspace, some argue that too much government involvement would undermine freedom, creativity and openness. Here, we find a confrontation between two ideas on how to govern the Internet in general, and the cyber security domain in more detail. And this ideational confrontation has been reflected to various challenges to institutionalize global Internet governance. The inter-governmental approach to the Internet and cyber security issues has been pursued by international entities, such as the United Nations’ International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Organization for European

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Economy Cooperation (OECD), and by regional bodies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). First, the United Nations’ organizations are expanding their jurisdiction to the realm of Internet governance. For example, ITU, an international organization that traditionally has an authority over telecommunications, began to deal with the Internet. In 2003 in Geneva and in 2005 in Tunis, ITU held the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), U.N.-sponsored conferences about information, communication and, in broad terms, the information society. WSIS’ chief issues included such international issues as bridging global digital divide, cultural diversities, and securing cyberspace. WSIS established the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) to open an ongoing, non-binding conversation among multiple stakeholders about the future of Internet governance. Second, OECD, an inter-governmental framework of advanced countries, has also participated in global Internet governance, especially securing the Internet environment for electronic commerce and the Internet economy. OECD has developed key indicators to provide a knowledge-base for digital governance policies. In a similar vein, advanced countries have held the Conference on Cyberspace since 2011 in London; and subsequently in Budapest in 2012, and Seoul in 2013. The Conferences on Cyberspace particularly aim to develop a better collective understanding of how to protect and preserve the tremendous opportunities that the development of cyberspace offers. The issue of cyber security has quickly been making its way up the agenda in the Conferences. Third, the regional frameworks of alliance are also mobilized to cope with cyber threats from non-state actors and to prepare cyber warfare with other state actors. Among those regional efforts, the Tallinn Manual is noteworthy (Schimit, 2012). As for the rules of engagement in cyber warfare, the Tallinn Manual has laid the foundation for international discussions. Written in 2013 by a group of independent experts at the request of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CDCOE), the non-binding manual carries academic opinions about the application of international law to cyber conflicts and cyber warfare. However, because the manuel was mainly prepared by Western countries, excluding Russia and China, it was blamed to represent the interests of the United States and European countries after the 2007 cyber-attacks against Estonia. In short, a variety of state and non-state entities provide some form of Internet governance, but no one organization is central to Internet governance on the global level. With the absence of an established order in global Internet governance and the cyber security realm, two different ideas concerning the issues are competing to initiate the institutionalizing process: one could be conceptualized as multistakeholderism; the other might be called inter-governmentalism. This confrontation raised concerns about a challenge to the existing global Internet order managed by the United States; the concerns were fully emerged to the surface at the NETmundial recently hosted by Brazil in 2014.

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The U.S. and Europe vs. Russia and China Behind the ideational confrontation for global Internet governance, there are conflicts of interests among countries. Led by the United States, Western countries have argued that freedom, openness and trust should be the basic principles in cyberspace. It also believes that various actors including individual citizens, civil society, businesses and governments should participate in the creation of international norms and rules. On the contrary, non-Western countries including Russia and China have maintained that information control should be possible in cyberspace for the purpose of national security, and that they cannot accept regulations that seem to unfairly benefit Western countries. This tension between the two camps shows up by the efforts of Russia, China, and other developing countries to create inter-governmental frameworks as follows. First, on September 22, 2011, a “Draft Convention on International Information Security” was released at an international meeting of high-ranking officials responsible for security matters in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Key provisions of the draft Convention may be at odds with the Western consensus on basic concepts of Internet security. The sixth article of the draft Convention obliges “not to use information and communication technologies for the interference into other state’s internal affairs”, and “to abstain from slanderous statements, abusive or hostile propaganda for the implementation of intervention or interference into internal affairs of other states.” The document contains a very important stipulation: the governments may make limitations “for the protection of national and public security” (Cankaoxiaoxi, 2011). Second, in 2012, a similar divergence was starkly apparent at the World Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT), a conference convened in Dubai by ITU. Though the meeting was ostensibly about updating telephony regulations—the International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs), the underlying issue was the ITU’s role in Internet governance. Authoritarian regimes and many developing countries believe that their approach to sovereignty, security and development would benefit from the multilateral processes that the ITU employs. But democratic governments fear that these processes are too cumbersome, and would undercut the flexibility of the multistakeholder approach, which stresses the involvement of the private and non-profit sectors, as well as governments. The conference ended with the notable result; 89 states signing the new ITRs and 55 publicly opposing them. The result of the vote reinforces the image of confrontation in which there are two competing visions for the future of the Internet. Third, the most notable development concerning cyber security came in 2013 at the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. Since 2004, the UN GGE has examined the existing and potential threats from cyberspace and possible cooperative measures to address them, including the original 1998 Russian proposal. In June 2013, the UN GGE made a series of recommendations on voluntary measures to build trust, transparency and confidence, as well as

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international cooperation to build capacity for cyber security. These have been seen as milestones in the efforts to bring about global cyber security cooperation. However, it is noteworthy that the UN GGE report includes the significant affirmation that international law, and in particular the UN Charter, is applicable to the security issues in cyberspace. To summarize, two groups of countries are competing in the global governance of cyber security. With the United States and Europe working as a team and Russia and China as another, the group of advanced countries and the group of former socialist, authoritarian states have sought to maximize their own national interests in the process of shaping a new order in cyberspace. Whether or not the latter group’s challenges attain the goal, these two visions of the Internet are unlikely to go away any time soon. The next decade is going to be filled with similar clashes. In this context, it is required for a middle power to see the cleavage that reflects structural conditions of the cyber security sector or Internet governance in general.

U.S.-China Competition in Cyber Security Cyber security issues have recently become a major source of both tension and potential cooperation for the U.S.-China relationship (Shen, 2010; Manson, 2011; Cai, 2012; Liberthal & Singer, 2012; Kim, 2012). The two countries’ competition for world hegemony in the twenty-first century lies behind the competition in the cyber security domain. In fact, according to IR theories, the competition in leading sectors mirrors the overall hegemonic competition in world politics. For the last years, the issues of cyber security (or IT and the Internet in general) as a leading sector have been elevated to a top priority within the overall U.S.-China relationship. This current form of world power rivalry underlines the increasing strategic importance of cyberspace.

U.S.-China Cyber Conflict In June 2013, U.S.  President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping reached a consensus that cyber security is one of the major issues between the two powers, along with the denuclearization of North Korea. This consensus on cyber security has elevated the issue of cyber security to a top priority within the overall bilateral relationship. In spite of the developments, U.S.-China conflict over hackings and espionage are emerging. U.S.-China cyber conflict seemed to reach its peak when the U.S.  Attorney General Eric Holder indicted five Chinese military officers in May 2014. He announced that the Chinese officers have engaged in the hacking of prominent U.S. companies’ computers to steal commercial secrets, presumably for the benefit of Chinese companies. Beijing’s response to the indictments was unusually strong; Beijing maintained that the United States caused serious

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damage to mutual trust between the sides. Beijing also accused the United States of hypocrisy, recalling Edward Snowden’s revelations in June 2012 that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had overseen the hacking of Chinese companies (Guardian, 2014). China’s fear about the U.S. technological hegemony underlies the cyber conflict described above. China has concerns that the United States allegedly uses its technological advantages to wield its hegemony, depriving China of sharing information on the Internet and creating backdoors in its software to facilitate hacking (Swaine, 2013, pp. 5–6). It is especially worried that heavy dependence on U.S. cyber security technologies would result in political disadvantages and military threats to China’s security (Lu, 2013). In fact, U.S. technological companies have monopolized major technologies for cyber security in the Chinese market. The awareness that these companies are subject to U.S. law, including the U.S. Patriot Act, undoubtedly triggered a reaction in China as policymakers and ordinary users realize the huge disadvantage of their dependence on U.S.-controlled networks (Deibert, 2013). The indictment of Chinese military officers in 2014 ignited the Chinese fear about the U.S. technological dominance. China seemed to adopt a strategy of economic retribution, striking at U.S. technological companies operating within China—Microsoft, IBM, and Cisco—over security concerns (MK Business News, 2014). The first target was Microsoft, as China announced that government offices were forbidden from running the company’s Windows 8 operating system (Asia Economy, 2014). In a similar vein, the Chinese government pushed domestic banks to remove high-end servers made by IBM and replace them with a local brand (Huamqiu, 2014). Cisco, which was suspected as an accomplice in NSA spying operations, has also come under fire; it was accused of creating “backdoors” in its routers to aid in U.S. government espionage—a similar accusation to those made against Huawei when it was seeking to break into the U.S. market (Economy Insight, 2014). Answering the question about the Internet security review by the Chinese government, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said “whether discussing foreign companies or joint ventures, an important prerequisite is to respect China’s laws and regulations, in line with China’s national interests, and in line with China’s national security” (Xinhua, 2014). The statement by spokesman Qin reveals the perception of the Chinese government, which U.S.-China conflict over computer and cyber security technologies is not a mere technological issue; rather it is also involved with the competition over Internet policies and regulatory institutions.

Internet Policies and Regulatory Institutions The similar competition in cyber security technologies is also found in the conflict between U.S. technological companies and the Chinese government over the policies and institutions for Internet censorship. While the Internet was originally designed to be free of censorship in the United States, the Internet came with the

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state’s Internet censorship system in China. The Chinese government argues that it is a legal privilege of a sovereign state to impose the Internet censorship system on foreign technologies and companies in order to filter harmful and insecure information for national security. In this context, U.S. companies such as Microsoft, Cisco, Yahoo, and Google had to admit regulatory standards of self-censorship if they want to enter into and stay in the Chinese domestic market (Hughes, 2010). However, tensions exploded in January 2010 when Google announced that it was withdrawing from business in China. The case involved three issues: alleged efforts by the Chinese government to steal Google’s intellectual property; intrusion into the G-mail accounts of Chinese activists; and in response, Google’s decision to stop complying with censorship of searches by Google China, although Google had been complying for 4 years. Google’s decision inflicted a noticeable cost upon Chinese soft power (Nye, 2011, pp.  13–14). Thus, the Chinese government responded quickly to this series of events. It officially argued that it was not involved in the intrusion into Google, and that it does not make sense for the government to mobilize hackers to launch cyber-attacks on a private company. It maintained that any business activities of IT companies in China must follow the laws of China. On January 15, 2010, the U.S. government became involved, and supported Google’s position on the conflict. In particular, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mentioned Google’s example at a speech on Internet freedom on January 21 (Clinton, 2010). The Obama administration announced the plan of arms sales to Taiwan, and a plan of Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama. The problems with exchange rates of Chinese Yuan and trade barriers, such as anti-dumping duties, were raised. The Google case seemed to be expanding across the U.S.-China relationship. In a broader sense, the 2010 Google dispute revealed the differences in the models of political economy. If Google’s decision came from the private-public relationship, which was rooted in the Silicon Valley, the attitude of the Chinese government is based on China’s state-driven model. In this sense, the Google case reflected the competition between two institutional models of political economy: the Washington Consensus vs. the Beijing Consensus (Kim, 2012). The attitude of the Chinese government expressed in the Google case in 2010 has been reinforced with the 2013 Snowden case and the 2014 indictment case of Chinese Army officers. For example, in the Brazilian Congress speech on July 16, 2014, Xi Jinping, referring to “shoes theory,” maintained that “Only people who wear shoes know whether or not they fit … there is no universal model of development and we should continue to firmly support each other’s path of development suited to their own national conditions” (Aju Business Daily, 2014). His address was interpreted as China giving warning to Western countries due to their intervention in China’s human rights problems and territorial conflicts with other East Asian countries. Perceptual and institutional differences between the two countries were reflected on the development of international norms of the global governance mechanism, as discussed in the previous section.

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Competing Securitization of Cyber Security At the most abstract level, U.S-China competition over cyber security issues enhances the competition for securitizing the domain. In fact, the cyber security domain, in which threats are still imagined virtual, and thus are not yet regarded as real, is a terrain on which multiple discourses compete (Rid, 2013). Thus, the securitization of cyber security is important: to define what cyber security is, what challenge it presents, who poses threats, where the threats are originated, and how it mitigates the cyber security threats (Deibert, 2002; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). In this view, U.S.-China cyber conflict and Internet policy frictions are all predicated upon the competition for preoccupying security discourses in cyberspace. It is because the competition is not related only to ideational difference, but also deeply involved with interest conflict that affects the future of the reality. This paper addresses U.S.-China differences of security discourses for three aspects. First, while the United States points to “cyber security” against their computer and network system by attacks to crash, slow or paralyze vital infrastructure, and by the theft of proprietary commercial data or information, China securitizes trans-­ border information flows and diffusion of resistant political discourses as threats to its regime, and asserts “information security” including a kind of overt censorship. Formulating the discourses of “Chinese hackers’ threats,” the United States asserts that a growing number of destructive cyber-attacks on commercial enterprises and government institutions originate from China (Dahong, 2005; US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2009; Barboza, 2010; Hvistendahl, 2010; Clark, 2011). In 2013, for example, the California-based U.S. cyber security firm Mandiant linked “a number of attacks to a military-affiliated group based in Shanghai” (Guardian, 2014). In comparison, China has been more concerned about the political aspects of security in cyberspace. According to Wangxiu Jun, deputy director of the State Council Informatization Office, China is “concerned about network security, including ideological security, data security, technical security, application security, and capital security … Overall, political security is fundamental” (Takong, 2014). Second, while the United States highlights cyber security at the individual level such as protection of privacy, human rights, and freedom of expression, China has been more concerned about Internet freedom at the national level through means to secure domestic political stability such as censorship and regulations, restricting the freedom of press. U.S. cyber security discourses emphasize securing individual rights in cyberspace as an open space, and are cautious of possible threats to these values. Hillary Clinton’s address on January 21, 2010, around the time when Google decided to retreat from the Chinese market, shows well the value of Internet freedom that the United States appreciates (Clinton, 2010). In comparison, China legitimizes Internet censorship and policy autonomy for elevating national freedom rather than individual freedom, and maintains that freedom of the Internet is subject to the laws and morality of a nation. The Chinese government’s position toward the 2010 Google case, and its policies to implement Internet security reviews over the

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foreign IT companies could be legitimized in terms of national rights and freedom to protect security in the Internet (Wang & Xu, 2011, p. 107). Third, while the United States security discourses have been based on the neo-­ liberal visions on the free flows of information in cyberspace, the Chinese discourses are composed of anti-hegemonic and nationalist visions of state sovereignty in that the globalized Internet poses a major threat to the sovereign authority of nation-­ states. Since the early age of the Internet, the United States has assumed cyberspace to be a global space, in which information flows transnationally, and has presented an Internet discourse that urges to remove any obstacles that impede the establishment of a liberal order in cyberspace. The discourse is consistent with the U.S. position appearing in the process of building international norms as discussed above. In comparison, China advocates the need for a government to identify the boundaries of cyber territory and protect it against cyber threats (Swaine, 2013, p. 3). For example, President Xi Jinping called for respect of all countries’ cyberspace sovereignty on July 16, 2014, telling the Brazilian congress that “although the Internet is highly globalized, the sovereignty of the information of all countries should be respected” (Aju Business Daily, 2014). To summarize, two world powers are competing over cyber security at multiple levels. In the sense that these two powers are leading the aforementioned two groups or networks of countries that have different orientations to Internet governance, their competition could be called a form of “inter-network politics,” which this paper presents to conceptualize the politics of cyber security. Certainly, whether the United States and China have a basically cooperative or antagonistic relationship over the coming several decades, this will be a significant structural condition for South Korea that pursues middle power diplomacy in the domain.

Middle Power Diplomacy in Cyber Security? Now let us turn to middle power diplomacy in the cyber security sector, of which structural conditions are conceptualized as “asymmetrical inter-network politics.” Then, what diplomatic roles would South Korea play under the structural conditions? Before going for middle power diplomacy, it would be wise for South Korea to build “cyber capabilities” to fend off cyber terror and threats. Could South Korea be referred to a “Cyber Security Strong Nation” corresponding to its reputation of an “Internet Strong Nation”? In the wake of a series of North Korean cyber-attacks, South Korea has sought to strengthen those capabilities by developing firewalls, cyber specialists, cyber warfare command, educational organizations and legal frameworks to push for cyber protection. Putting off the discussion about South Korea’s cyber capabilities, however, this paper examines for South Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the sector, adopting three conceptual pillars of middle power diplomacy—brokerage, collection, complement—presented in the second section.

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Brokerage Diplomacy in Cyber Security? Identifying overall structural conditions of the sector, South Korea has to contextualize its position within the network structure of cyber security politics. In other words, required for South Korea would be the strategies of adjusting itself to the structural conditions of the sector. With regard to the adjustment strategies, this paper pays special attention to the middle power’s strategic roles of “brokerage.” The unique forms of cleavages found in the sector are likely to provide middle powers with structural opportunities of brokerage. But, the structural conditions are also likely to create a situation threatening South Korea’s attempts for brokerage on the following three aspects. First of all, it is probable that South Korea has opportunities and difficulties between two different technical standards. In fact, brokerage issues in the cyber security sector would be concerned with choosing a technical standard between the United States and China. Does South Korea keep compatibility with dominant standards of the United States? Or does it cross the threshold and move into an alternative standard that China wants to set in East Asia as well as in China? In the case that China takes a technological offensive with its cyber security standards, what would be the decision for South Korea, which has heavily relied on U.S. technical standards, such as Microsoft’s Windows operating systems and Internet Explorers, and Cisco’s network equipment? In reality, it happened that South Korea was dissuaded by the United States when South Korea attempted to introduce network equipment provided by Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company, in early 2014. This sort of choice must be very tough because it is not only related to technologies, but also involved in diplomatic issues: will South Korea stick to the U.S.Korea alliance or will it broaden the existing Sino-Korea cooperation? Indeed, the choice means a process of “connecting and disconnecting” that might build new relationships on the one hand, and break existing ties on the other hand. It is usually accompanied by the process of “asymmetric coordination of relationships,” belonging to the realm of strategic choices relating to the risk of opportunity cost. This process of integrating or destroying ties lies at the heart of brokerage in the sense that brokerage may alter network structures, leaving actors with a fundamentally different set of network ties, and changing the agenda in a network. Recognizing the roles of brokerage diplomacy, South Korea has to be familiar with managing the asymmetric coordination game among network partners, but must not forget to pursue compatibilities between two networks. Second, along with technical standard issues, those opportunities or difficulties imposing on middle power’s brokerage are also detected in the issues with regard to Internet policies and regulatory institutions. In building the Internet policy and governance models, South Korea’s choice is placed between the private-sector-driven model of multistakeholderism pursued by the United States and the state-­ interventionist model of Internet control supported by China. Is South Korea likely to play a brokerage role between these two seemingly incompatible models of Internet policies and institutions? Here, we note that the middle power’s role as a

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broker has an affinity with the strategies of combining or mixing existing models, rather than creating entirely new models. I would call it the strategy of “meta-­ model” or “meta-programming,” comparing to that of “substantial programming.” Brokers have more capacity for blending than other actors in world politics although they cannot introduce entirely new inventions. Whether or not a broker’s ideas are attractive to others is not so much a matter of content as it is context; it depends on how brokers incorporate various contents found in existing networks. South Korea’s experiences in politico-economic development provide good examples for the meta-model, in the sense that the South Korean model of political economy, which I would call “Seoul Consensus,” is likely to combine the concerns of developing countries as well as those of advanced countries. Indeed, although the South Korean model began with the authoritarian model pursuing economic growth, which is recently conceptualized “Beijing Consensus,” it has come to achieve the goal of democracy after remarkable economic development, which is usually called “Washington Consensus,” as prescribed by advanced countries—especially the United State (Sohn, 2007). In this context, it is a plausible scenario to develop a model of “Seoul Consensus for cyber security” in the sense that South Korea has achieved prosperity in the Internet economy, initiated by the private sector although it is still regarded as a country that has state initiatives against social activities in cyberspace. Finally, South Korea has opportunities and difficulties between two different positions with regard to global Internet governance. Indeed, South Korea has difficulties in positioning itself between two different visions for global Internet governance. One vision has been driven by Western countries that believe the Internet should be more open and free; the other driven by developing countries supports for the inter-governmental approach and state sovereignty over cyberspace. South Korea’s official position is now known to support the open and flexible approach to global Internet governance initiated by various international entities such as UN, ITU, OECD, and ICANN. The approach could be called the complex strategy of Internet governance, combining the two competing visions. However, it is expected that South Korea would have difficulties in structural positioning in the sector. For example, South Korea was crammed between advanced countries and developing countries in the vote for updating the ITRs at WCIT in 2012. At last, South Korea voted for the ITRs so that it joined the group of 89 developing countries (Black in Fig.  6.1), and thus took an opposite position to the 55 countries that publicly opposed the ITRs (Red in Fig. 6.1); non-member states of ITU are in grey. Right after South Korea’s vote, a South Korean newspaper denounced that the South Korean government when it revealed its intention to control the Internet (Dong-A Ilbo, 2012). Although the government released that the updated ITRs did not contradict with domestic regulations and national interests, the newspaper was worried that South Korea, which a member of OECD and a host country of G20  in 2010, took a different position from Western countries that believed in the democratic political system and the free trade system. It is uncertain what consequences South Korea’s decision at WICIT will cause in the future.

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Fig. 6.1  Country positions on ITR proposed at WCIT 2012. (Source: Dong-A Ilbo, 2012-12-17)

However, it is not difficult to imagine that South Korea will be positioned in a very similar situation at the coming conferences.

Collective Diplomacy in Cyber Security? To attain the goals of middle power diplomacy in cyber security, South Korea has to rely on the strategies of collecting and attracting as many like-minded countries as it can. In other words, South Korea has to define the new roles for like-minded groups and continue to attract them as supporters. It is critical for South Korea as a middle power to adopt this strategy of collective and attractive diplomacy, as it will help alleviate the dilemma of being a broker in the cyber security sector (Kim, 2014a). With regard to collecting like-minded countries in the cyber security sector, Maurer and Morgus (2014) conducted research for the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), identifying some interesting patterns among certain groups of states voting at WCIT 2012. A core group of potential swing states—a total of 30 countries—is identified based on their voting behavior. The research “essentially marries the voting record on the ITRs with a series of other indicators to identify patterns and the group of countries likely to act as swing states in the global Internet governance debate in the future due to path dependence, logic of appropriate behavior and state interests” (Maurer & Morgus, 2014, p. 4). These 30 swing states are sorted into the four groups of countries as follows (see Table 6.1). Group I includes 13 swing states voting against the ITRs: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Colombia, Costa Rica, Georgia, India, Kenya, Moldova, Mongolia, Peru, Philippines and Serbia. These 13 swing states are noteworthy because they are not

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Table 6.1  Top 30 Global Swing States Against the ITRs For the ITRs but... II. III. I. OECD Member FOC Member Ghana Mexico Albania Tunisia South Korea Armenia Turkey Belarus Colombia Costa Rica Georgia India Kenya Moldova Mongolia Peru Philippines Serbia

IV. Potential Swing States Based on Indicators Argentina Botswana Brazil Dominica Indonesia Jamaica Malaysia Namibia Panama Singapore South Africa Uruguay

Source: Maurer and Morgus (2014), p. 10; Requoted from Lee (2014)

part of any of the group of states, but their positions at the WCIT set a precedent for similar behavior in the future. These states also have the resources to persuade other countries to change their behavior and to significantly influence the outcome of Internet governance discussions. Group II includes three OECD countries, Mexico, Turkey and South Korea; and Group III includes Ghana and Tunisia—two members of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC).1 All these five states supported previous commitments by both the OECD and FOC, and thus their membership and commitments are at odds with their ITRs voting record. Moreover, they are likely to experience significant pressure from their peers in the future to change their behavior to be appropriate with their membership and commitments. Group IV includes 12 countries voting for the ITRs: Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Dominica, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Namibia, Panama, Singapore, South Africa and Uruguay. They are potential swing states because several indicators, adopted by the research, show the importance of the Internet for those countries and various characteristics of these states suggest that there are opportunities to engage with them to potentially change their behavior in the future (Maurer & Morgus, 2014, p. 11). Maurer and Morgus’ groupings of the 30 swing states provides South Korea’s middle power diplomacy with some implications for collecting and attracting like-­ minded countries and formulating coalitions in the cyber security sector. First, it is conceivable that South Korea pursues coalition with countries voting for the ITRs, which belong to Group II.  Interestingly, three countries in Group II—Mexico, Turkey, and South Korea—are participants of MIKTA (a coalition of Mexico,

1  The membership of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) currently includes 22 countries. This coalition defines itself as “an inter-governmental coalition committed to advancing Internet freedom—free expression, association, assembly, and privacy online—worldwide” (Maurer & Morgus, 2014, pp.7–8).

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Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia), which has gained increasing attention in recent years. Second, it is also probable that South Korea extends the MIKTA coalition to FOC countries, Ghana and Tunisia, which belong to Group III.  Third, it would be more interesting for South Korea to associate with the positional swing states in Group IV. Among them, Indonesia is the first candidate since it is a member of MIKTA. Also, two IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) countries, Brazil and South Africa are possible partners that keep pace with South Korea in the fields of global Internet governance. Impressively, these countries, especially Brazil, have played a leading role in renovating the ICANN system. Finally, it is imaginable that South Korea may form solidarity with another ISBA country India for example, which belongs to Group I as it is voting against the ITRs. And, Australia, which is not included as a part of 30 states, is likely to have a similar mind with South Korea since it is a member of MIKTA. In implementing collective diplomacy, South Korea should be flexible in choosing partners and in coalescing issues. For example, South Korea has to figure out which agenda is appropriate for the selected coalition partners. Various issues on global Internet governance in general could be linked to the specific issues of cyber security. Beyond the boundaries of Internet governance, other security and economic issues could be linked to cyber security issues in order to increase the effectiveness of collective diplomacy. For example, official development aid (ODA) must be a good item of issue linkage politics for South Korea’s middle power diplomacy in cyber security. Also, South Korea could grasp opportunities through combining non-traditional security issues together, such as cyber security, atomic energy, and ecological security, as world powers are still competing for the priority of, and even the goal of, governance mechanisms.

Complementary Diplomacy in Cyber Security? While South Korea needs to engage in programming the “rule of the game” in the cyber security sector, middle powers’ programming diplomacy, if any, should be complementary to the existing system; it is likely and even desirable for them to patch up some sub-programs upon the platform designed by world powers. Those complementary programs might target some niches or holes that world powers neglect due to their ontological and epistemological limitations. In particular, its unique position in the existing system requires middle powers to play a complementary role to the existing world order, not to play an exploitive role through challenging world powers’ initiatives (Kim, 2014a). South Korea’s complementary diplomacy in the sector has to begin with a more thorough understanding of the structural conditions of the cyber security sector. Both offense and defense take place in cyberspace as an environment of complex networks, in which it is sometimes not possible to identify the subject of offense or the object of retaliation. A wide array of threats to state and business actors are perpetuated by non-state actors. Moreover, cyber threats are continuously evolving,

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and increasingly blurring distinctions between human and non-human actors, such as computer viruses and malicious codes. In this sense, the world power’s simplistic approach, based on the traditional conception of “power politics”, does not fit into the nature of cyberspace, which is strongly predicated upon complexity. Indeed, cyber security issues do not belong to the realm of “international politics” between nation-states competing over traditional security issues. In this context, the possibilities of middle power’s complementary roles would be emerging. For example, middle powers are likely to privilege for problematizing normative legitimacy that the existing world order may lack. I would call it the strategy of “normative programming” in the sense that diplomatic concerns are with normative, not with positive, aspects of the sector. For middle powers that have less military capabilities and economic resources, norm- or value-oriented diplomacy are crucial and effective means to attain the goals. Indeed, diplomatic strategies which are inclusive and close to international norms are more likely to be attractive to other countries (Slagter, 2004). Moreover, if the middle powers pursue collective diplomacy, and mobilize supporters around the world, the authority of normative diplomacy will be reinforced. Considering the normative aspect of middle power diplomacy, is it possible for South Korea to “exploit” the kinds of “structural holes”? In this context, this paper presents three ideas on the complementary and normative approaches, which South Korea needs to develop. First, South Korea as a middle power could criticize and complement the security discourse of world powers, based on the Cold War metaphor and the analogy of the arms race. Recently, concerns have grown to view the cyber threat from the perspective of militarization in cyberspace (Lawson, 2012). Cyber-conflict is after all the newest mode of warfare and cyber-weapons have been described as weapons of mass disruption. In reality, the United States and China are strengthening their capacity to engage in both defensive and offensive cyber actions against each other, presenting the prospect of a cyber-arms race while potentially intensifying the already high level of distrust between the two countries. Attentions on the military dimensions of cyberspace are justifiable. However, there will be no solution for a security dilemma as long as the world powers keep relying on the analogy of an arms race as the zero-sum game. In this context, it is meaningful for South Korea to stress the other aspect of cyber-conflict, by developing the demilitarized peace discourse in cyberspace. Second, South Korea has to complement the current security discourses of international laws—a national or international approach to cyber security with legal minds. Recently, scholars point out the lack of an international legal framework that defines the use of force in cyberspace; they examine the legal dilemmas regarding the use of force in cyberspace and question how the Law of War can be applied to cyber-threats (Liaropoulos, 2011). The Tallinn manual is a noteworthy example that applies international norms to transnational threats in cyberspace. However, considering operational difficulties in deterring and identifying cyber-attacks and the asymmetric dimension of cyber-conflicts, inadequate are international laws and norms, predicated upon the dichotomy of actors—i.e., offense and defense—in the modern international politics. What we need is more complex discourses and norms

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that are able to handle the post-international or inter-network dynamics of cyber security issues. In this context, South Korea as a middle power could contribute by developing a new network discourse complementing the existing international discourses. Finally, South Korea could complement the world power’s security discourse with cyber ethics. Cyber ethics encompasses Internet user’s behavior and what computers are programmed to do, and how this affects individuals and society. Previous examples of cyber ethics include various issues concerning personal information or privacy: Who owns digital data? What should users be allowed to do with it? And, how much access should there be to obscene contents online? Now those ethical questions should be extended to international or transnational issues of cyber security. As an ever increasing amount of people connect to the Internet, there is a susceptibility to identity theft, cybercrimes and computer hacking. Historically, security has long been a topic of ethical debate. Likewise, it is expected for such ethical debates to arise in the cyber security sector. In this context, South Korea as a middle power is likely to develop new discourses in cyber ethics as an underdeveloped field, which complement the realist or the liberal discourses of the world powers.

Conclusion As cyber security continues to rise to the front line of world politics, the stakes will increase and tensions and disagreements will become more prevalent. Bearing the rising significance of cyber security in mind, this paper explores the possibilities or constraints of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the sector. To explain the roles of middle power, this paper relies on the positional approach, which has origins from network theories in natural and social sciences. In this view, it is critical to comprehend the conditions of structure first, not the attributes of actors. Before exploring some details for South Korea’s middle power diplomacy, this paper identifies the structural conditions that are unique in the cyber security sector in three aspects. First of all, cyber security issues have a number of particular technological and structural characteristics, which are different from traditional security issues. Among them, the key to understanding the potential magnitude of cyber threats is the complex character of the Internet as a network of networks. Cyber threats are continuously evolving, as well as increasingly blurring distinctions between civil and military domains, non-state and state actors, and even human and non-human actors. Second, two groups of countries are competing for global cyber security governance: the existing model has been driven by Western countries that believe the Internet should be more open and free. In recent years, however, the challenges, driven by a coalition of states—including Russia, China and other developing countries, are organized and have a clear, more state-controlled vision for the Internet. Finally, the United States and China—two world powers in the twenty-first century—are competing over cyber security. Different approaches to cyber security in

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technical standards, regulatory policies, and security discourses are contrasting between the two world powers and such differences are likely to spill over into a broader tension between them. Cyber security issues do not belong to the realm of “international politics” between nation-states competing over traditional security issues; but do belong in the realm of asymmetric “inter-network politics” between complex actors. Cyber security issues, which are different from traditional security spheres, are evolving in the complex environment that intrinsically contains bugs and holes—i.e., “exploits”—and computer viruses and malwares are actively utilized. In this context, moving beyond the traditional framework of inter-governmental organization, various state and non-state actors are recently participating to the new global frameworks for cyber security; at some point in the future, it may be possible to reinforce these global frameworks with certain fundamental norms, but the world is at an early stage in such a process. These structural conditions in the cyber security sector are continuously evolving toward an unprecedented modality of world politics. It is critical for South Korea as a middle power to understand the structure and dynamics of the cyber security sector, to find out any cleavages of who is in which camp in the process of global Internet governance, and to recognize whether the United States and China will have a basically cooperative or antagonistic relationship over the coming several decades. Even more, South Korea has to realize that the potentially poisoning effect of cyber security is occurring at a time when there is genuine uncertainty about the future of cyberspace. The next decade is going to be filled with various clashes as those complex actors in world politics are competing for their own political needs and desires. Under this circumstance, South Korea should figure out what kinds of specific roles are expected of its middle power diplomacy. Here, it is most important for South Korea as a middle power to have the ability of contextual and positional intelligence, which reads constantly evolving contexts and identifies its moving positions in cyber security. The discussion about network structure and position offers the directions of networking strategies that a middle power has to pursue. Applying these theoretical resources, this paper identifies three elements of middle power diplomacy in the cyber security sector, which South Korea should consider. This paper suggests to three strategic pillars of middle power diplomacy—brokerage diplomacy, collective diplomacy, and complementary diplomacy. To summarize, South Korea should be able to manage asymmetric relationships among the world powers and global governance. South Korea would act as a broker, more than a mere connector, providing the mode of transition, switching, transforming and translation between different actors of networks. To fulfill the brokerage roles, South Korea has to learn how to bring together like-minded countries in the sector, and to attract supportive forces in world politics. By questing for networking strategies, South Korea as a middle power could be an architect, not a whole system designer but a complementary programmer, who can provide useful patch programs for the whole system operated by world powers. In short, being equipped with the

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ability, it would be more likely to define middle power’s roles corresponding to the structural conditions of the cyber security sector.

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Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2006). Power positions: International organizations, social networks, and conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(1), 3–27. Hafner-Burton, E. M., Kahler, M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2009). Network analysis for international relations. International Organization, 63, 559–592. Hansen, L., & Nissenbaum, H. (2009). Digital disaster, cyber security, and the Copenhagen School. International Studies Quarterly, 53(4), 1155–1175. Holbraad, C. (1971). The role of middle powers. Cooperation and conflict. Sage Publication. Huamqiu. (2014). Escalate cyber security war between China and America, lead the early spring to China science and technology enterprises. http://tech.huanqiu.com/it/2014-­05/5007875. html (in Chinese). Hughes, R. (2010). A treaty for cyberspace. International Affairs, 86(2), 523–541. Hvistendahl, M. (2010). China’s Hacker Army. Foreign Policy. Ilbo D-A. (2012) U.S.-Europe opposed internet regulation, South Korea with China and Russia singed for internet regulation. http://news.donga.com/Economy/mobile/3/0122/2012121 6/51644147/1?rec=1 (in Korean). Kahler, M. (Ed.). (2009). Networked politics: Agency, power, and governance. Cornell University Press. Kim, S. (2012). U.S-China standard competition in the information age: A perspective of the network theory of world politics. Korean Political Science Review, 46(1), 383–410. (in Korean). Kim, S. (2014a). Roles of middle power in East Asia: A Korean perspective. EAI middle power diplomacy initiative working paper-02. East Asia Institute. Kim, S. (2014b). International relations of Arachne: Challenge of the network theory of world politics. Hanul Academy. (in Korean). Lawson, S. (2012). Putting the ‘war’ in cyberwar: Metaphor, analogy, and cybersecurity discourse in the United States. First Monday, 17(2), 17. http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/ view/3848/3270 Lee, Y-e. (2014). Establishing and applying of the concept of Multistakeholder in the global internet governance. In Workshop on Non-traditional Security and Middle Power Diplomacy (in Korean). Levy, P. (1999). Collective intelligence: Mankind’s emerging world in cyberspace. Basic Books. Liaropoulos, A. (2011). Cyber-­security and the law of war: The legal and ethical aspects of cyber-­­ conflict. Greek Politics Specialist Group Working Paper, no.7. Lieberthal, K., & Singer, P. W. (2012). Cyber security and U.S.-China relations. China Center at Brookings. Lu, C.  Y. (2013). Analysis of the dilemma of the current global governance of cyberspace. Contemporary International Relations, 11. (in Chinese), 48–54. Manson, G. P. (2011). Cyberwar: The United States and China prepare for the next generation of conflict. Comparative Strategy, 30(2), 121–133. Maurer, T., & Morgus, R. (2014). Tipping the scale: An analysis of Global Swing States in the internet governance debate. CIGI Internet Governance Papers No.7 Series: Internet Governance. http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no7_2.pdf. McLin, J. B. (1967). Canada’s Changing defense policy, 1957–1963: The problems of a middle power in alliance. Johns Hopkins Press. MK Business News. (2014). Chinese government retaliates against US firms after prosecuting Chinese army for hacking. http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2014&no=800319, (in Korean). Mueller, M. L. (2002). Ruling the root: Internet governance and the taming of cyberspace. The MIT Press. Mueller, M. L. (2010). Networks and states: The global politics of internet governance. MIT Press. Nexon, D. (2009). The struggle for power in early Modern Europe: Religious conflict, dynamic empires, and international change. Princeton University Press. Nexon, D., & Wright, T. (2007). What’s at stake in the American empire debate? American Political Science Review, 101(2), 253–271.

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Chapter 7

Power Shift, Power Diffusion, and Middle Power Diplomacy: MIKTA and Changes in Global Governance Seungjoo Lee

Abstract  What are the main features of middle power diplomacy of the twenty-­ first century, which are distinguishable from great power diplomacy and the traditional middle power diplomacy? A driving force of middle power diplomacy is closely related to middle powers’ changing perception of their roles and status in order to distance themselves from traditional diplomacy. Middle powers tend to seek middle power diplomacy commensurate with an elevated status. MIKTA diplomacy is an attempt to redefine their roles creatively to engage in status-­enhancing diplomacy. Reflecting the changing dynamics of world politics, MIKTA countries ambitiously launched MIKTA to create a new platform spurring cooperation among them. MIKTA has successfully developed informal and innovative forum innovative forum in its ability to reform global governance. Despite modest achievements, however, MIKTA faces some challenges down the road. It is repeatedly pointed out that heterogeneity among MIKTA countries would be a serious obstacle in consolidating MIKTA. MIKTA countries are likely to face difficulty in coherently maintaining common positions on core issues. Furthermore, recent domestic political changes in Turkey are likely to erode the internal unity of MIKTA, although the Turkish government claims that its diplomatic posture towards MIKTA has not fundamentally changed (Dal and Kurşun, Int J 71:608–629, 2016). Keywords  MIKTA · Coalition-building · Global governance · Power shift · Power diffusion

The earlier version of this paper was delivered at IPSA 2018, Brisbane in Australia on July 21–25, 2018. S. Lee (*) Dept Political Sci and Intl Relations, Chung-Ang Univ, Dongjak-ku, Seoul, Korea (Republic of) e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Lee, S. Kim (eds.), Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76012-0_7

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 lobal Governance Under Pressure and the Emergence G of Middle Power Diplomacy This chapter aims to examine the changing nature of the world order and its influence on middle powers, and to explore Korea’s middle power diplomacy in the twenty-first century from the perspective of coalition building. The world order in the twenty-first century is profoundly different from that of the cold war period in the sense that both quantitative and qualitative changes are underway simultaneously. The simultaneous progress of power transition and power diffusion symbolizes the changing nature of the world order. In terms of a power shift, we are witnessing fundamental structural changes demonstrated by the rise of China and the relative decline of the US. While a power shift in the narrow sense proceeded with the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States, from a broader perspective, it involves a reversal of power between developed and developing countries, facilitating a fundamental reconfiguration of the global governance (Alexandroff & Cooper, 2010).1 Recognizing that it is titled toward advanced countries, developing countries strongly argue that the current global governance does not fairly represent the interests of developing countries any longer. In the aftermath of the Asian and global financial crisis, the G7 that had functioned as a premier forum revealed inherent limitations in managing the transformative process of the world economy. Experts and practitioners alike warned that it could not rule out the possibility of “non-governance,” raising the awareness about the danger of leadership vaccum in international politics (Bremmer, 2013; Rothkopf, 2011). Ironically, this heightened concern paved the way for advanced countries to contemplate how to incorporate major developing countries into the global governance. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a watershed, arousing the need for change between developed countries and newly emerging developing countries. It seemed inevitable that developed countries would incorporate developing countries into the then existing global governance. From the US perspective, it was an attempt to coopt China into the framework of the existing global governance where the US could deal with China more effectively, while avoiding direct confrontation between them. By contrast, China with its enhanced economy began to seek meaningful changes in global governance, although it did not attempt to rebuke the existing one. Along with structural changes, the rise of non-state actors that form a complex relationship with state actors added another dimension in unraveling the existing international order. The emergence of non-state actors demonstrates potential in turning diverse yet fragmented interests into a more organized order that substantially speeds up consensus building in global governance. The power diffusion encourages traditional great powers to break away from traditional diplomatic 1  For a concise discussion of the rise of China from a perspective of middle powers, see Gilley and O’Neil (2014).

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strategies based on hard power. While individual actors’ hard power still matters in exercising leadership in coping with global problems, it is obvious that hard power should be combined with soft power in order to convincingly suggest visions and show the legitimacy that is required to run global governance. Power diffusion greatly increased the complexity of world politics as non-­ traditional players such as NGOs, MNCs, and other players could give a greater voice than in the past. However, although there has been significant developments in embracing non-state actors, the existing global governance was not equipped with institutional channels that could fully incorporate diverse interests arising from non-state actors. Both unprecedented phenomena aroused the recognition that the current global governance was not properly able to address global issues that require cooperation and coordination among multiple players and stakeholders (Martin, 2005). Global governance is increasingly under pressure to reflect the shifting nature of world politics. These changes generate enormous pressures on the current global governance founded particularly under the premise of the liberal international order. The emergence of crosscutting issues further eroded intellectual and institutional foundations of the existing global governance. More issues that existed in the past as a single issue have been increasingly intertwined with other issues. Climate change, natural disaster, immigration, cyber security, and sustainable development are typical cases in point. While issue linkages are one of the defining features of twenty-first century world politics, the current global governance, designed to deal with specific issue areas, could not properly address a crosscutting issue covering multiple issue areas. While the simultaneous development of a power shift and power diffusion forms a defining feature of the international order in the twenty-first century, it sets a structural contour of changes in global governance. It signifies that great powers, even hegemonic powers, are unable to bring about meaningful changes single-handedly. As evidenced by the Trump administration’s “America First” policy, for example, the US is not willing to pay the costs solely in running global governance without reciprocal burden sharing with other countries, raising serious doubts of the soundness of the liberal international order.2 The Chinese government repeatedly claimed that it is pivotal to maintain the multilateral trading order, but it seems that it is not yet ready to exercise knowledge power required to cope with the complexity of world politics in the twenty-first century and elicit consensus from other countries (Schiavon & Domínguez, 2016). Rather than recreating global governance that can better incorporate the changing realities of world politics, China is more interested in partial reform of the world order and global governance that can facilitate its rise. In a turbulent world unleashed by escalating rivalry between the US and China and the mushrooming of emerging issues, middle powers have been forced to find a source of strategic maneuvering. 2  In this regard, middle power diplomacy is process-oriented, distinguished from the diplomacy of great powers that project their own interests and ideologies. Middle power diplomacy does not dictate the end-state of the reform of global governance. Middle power diplomacy is an “open process” (Cox, 1989).

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It is against this backdrop that interests, either academic or practical, in middle power diplomacy have resurfaced, because they had a potential to bring about meaningful changes in global governance. Unlike great powers, middle powers alone cannot make tangible changes in global governance. However, middle powers can play various roles in generating meaningful changes in global governance. The successful implementation of middle power diplomacy hinges upon whether middle powers can broaden strategic rooms where they can cooperate with various national and non-state actors. Such strategic space enables middle powers to garner diverse diplomatic tools so that they can depart away from traditional diplomatic methods of bandwagoning or balancing. The room for strategic maneuvering allows middle powers to form coalitions with other actors. Unlike hegemonic powers that can project hard power unilaterally vis-à-vis small powers, middle powers enhance their influence or wield leadership only when they successfully make coalitions with other actors. While, ‘the moment of middle powers’ is on the arrival in twenty-first century world politics (Tiberghien, 2013; Beeson and Higgott, 2014; Beeson and Lee, 2015),. However, the opportunity does not unconditionally boost powers and the status of middle powers unless they provide clear visions and strategies of how to turn these opportunities into tangible outcomes.

 ain Features of Middle Power Diplomacy M in the Twenty-First Century What then are the main features of middle power diplomacy of the twenty-first century, which are distinguishable from great power diplomacy and the traditional middle power diplomacy? A driving force of middle power diplomacy is closely related to middle powers’ changing perception of their roles and status in order to distance themselves from traditional diplomacy. Middle powers tend to seek middle power diplomacy commensurate with an elevated status. Broadly speaking, MIKTA diplomacy is an attempt to redefine their roles creatively to engage in status-­ enhancing diplomacy. It is why, although MIKTA countries established a common diplomatic platform, they take different forms and seek contents of middle power diplomacy in MIKTA reflecting their possess role conception (Karim, 2018). Middle powers can play the role of innovator when great powers have common but differentiated interests. Great powers share a common understanding that the institutional efficacy of the current global governance has steadily declined for the last couple of decades. But they have subtle but crucial differences on how to reform global governance. Middle powers potentially offer innovative ideas to accommodate the interests of the US and China. Another trait of middle power diplomacy has to do with a network perspective, where the focus on actor’s attributes alone hardly explains the nature and mechanisms of middle power diplomacy (Kim, 2014). Given that positional power is

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accrued to a state with a key position in the network, middle powers should cultivate and strengthen network power, going beyond the material base. Great powers generally prefer to create separate networks to rule out other great powers. By contrast, middle powers can secure crucial positions linking the two exclusive networks led by hegemonic powers. Such middle powers that participate in competitive and potentially conflicting networks take advantage of their positional power to promote middle power diplomacy. Of course, possessing this key position does not warrant that middle powers can mediate between two great powers. The key position still provides middle powers with a unique opportunity to connect the exclusive networks led by competing great powers. It clearly enhances the possibility of middle power diplomacy. Middle power diplomacy is often defined in behavioral terms as well. A middle power is likely to exert influence when its hard power is combined with “middlepowermanship” (Cox, 1989). Discussions about middle power diplomacy such as brokerage, coalition building, mediator, facilitators, and rule-makers point to the middle powers’ behaviors (Welsh, 2004; Stephen, 2013). Ravenhill also suggested that five Cs—capacity, concentration, creativity, coalition-building, and credibility—are needed for middle powers to play constructive roles in global affairs (Ravenhill, 1998). MIKTA countries are qualified to be a middle power in terms of hard power and behaviors. Middle powers have some advantages in eliciting cooperation from other players. While a certain level of hard power is still critical in implementing middle power diplomacy, middle powers can mobilize the material basis needed to generate global public goods. At the same time, middle powers are in an ideal location in that, in contrast to great powers, they do not pose a security threat to other countries, enabling them to induce cooperation from other state and non-state actors. Middle powers are in a better position to seek cooperation with state and non-­ state actors, compared to great powers that seek hegemonic ambitions. Building on such an advantage, middle powers demonstrate strong commitment in global affairs and a multilateral approaches by dedicating the resources and knowledge in dealing with global problems. In so doing, middle powers seek to emerge as mediators to coordinate conflicting interests among great powers, ultimately transforming from rule takers to a rule makers in global issues.

The Origin and Evolution of MIKTA Notwithstanding the growing need for change, traditional great powers were unable to strike a “grand bargain.” It took 15 years for great powers to reach the agreement about the quota adjustments in the IMF, which had a symbolic implication in the IMF reform.3 Middle powers emerged as a potential alternative to cope with the dire

 On the effect of great power rivalry on middle powers, see Cooper (2013).

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situation (Tiberghien, 2013).4 The creation of the G20 signified that the efficacy of the G7/8 gradually declined, facilitating to readjust the relationship between advanced countries and developing countries. Middle powers were expected to play a role of policy entrepreneurs within the G20. However, the G20 revealed various lines of dissenting views and conflicts among the members. It is against this backdrop that the five countries could ambitiously launch MIKTA, serving as a platform to explore ways to make contributions to addressing global issues (MIKTA homepage, http://www.mikta.org/document/state.php).5 Specifically, the creation of MIKTA was made possible because there are multiple cleavages in the current global governance. It is known that there exist at least 7 cleavages in the G20 (Cooper, 2013). These cleavages are not fixed but fluid, prompting the G20 members to seek a coalition on an issue-by-issue basis. Under the circumstances, a mediator is necessary to coordinate conflicting interests, either between developed and developing countries or between state and non-state actors.6 In this regard, MIKTA from the outset was touted that it could transcend the traditional middle power diplomacy that had largely focused on niche diplomacy (Cooper, 1997). Why did MIKTA countries become enthusiastic in exercising middle power diplomacy? And what was the basis of cooperation of MIKTA countries? MIKTA is a constellation of middle powers with diverse interests and identities willing to make collective efforts to cope with global problems. The launch of MIKTA reflected the five countries’ defensive motivation, as it initially started out as a residual group in the G20. Belonging to neither the G7 nor BRICS, the five countries quickly found it necessary to secure strategic spaces they could use as a leverage in dealing the two groups (Cooper, 2015). The formation of MIKTA was expected to provide a breathing room for the G20 as MIKTA could mitigate dissenting views and conflicts between the G7 and BRICS (Mo, 2014). Taking advantage of their unique position, MIKTA countries aimed to mediate potentially conflicting interests among various players and stakeholders. The creation of the informal grouping signified that the decision-making dynamics in the G20 would not be same as the past. It also signaled that the G20 process would be more representative and legitimate with MIKTA countries able to utilize their enhanced leverage. MIKTA countries placed a high priority on increasing visibility in the G20.7 Individually, the five countries were active participants in the G20 as they hosted various G20 summits. Notwithstanding their active participation, MIKTA countries were more or less marginalized in the G20 because they could not exercise agenda-setting power between the G7 and BRICS.

4  For various aspects of middle power diplomacy, see Higgott and Cooper (1990), Ravenhill (1998), Manicom and Reeves (2014). 5  Jordaan makes a distinction between traditional and emerging middle powers. Jordaan (2003). 6  For various discussions of what constitutes middle power diplomacy, Cox (1989). 7  Cooper and Mo argue that middle powers played a leadership role in the evolutionary process of the G20. Cooper and Mo (2013).

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Critically recognizing that individual activities were inherently inadequate in promoting middle power diplomacy, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Korea and Australia took the initiative to create a framework for sustainable and balanced growth.8 The governments of South Korea and Australia quickly picked up the momentous change to make bold claims that middle powers should play a constructive role in global governance. Following this, during the 2010 G20 summit in Pittsburgh, both called for a basic framework that could coordinate the G20 members economic policies.9 The two countries’ initiatives paved the way for the five countries to form MIKTA. Whereas MIKTA countries are essentially interested in maintaining the current international order founded by traditional great powers, they attempt to gradually reflect structural changes to shape the new global order. MIKTA displays a dramatic turn in world politics in the twenty-first century in the sense that state and non-state actors seek partners in various forms (Patrick, 2015). In today’s world, both state and non-state actors prefer flexible coalitions rather than fixed alliance politics to better incorporate the interests under the fluctuating situations. From the start, reflecting the changing nature of world politics, MIKTA countries were fully aware that it was highly important to secure constructive relationships with relevant state and non-state actors in order to execute middle power diplomacy (Schiavon & Domínguez, 2016). For middle powers like MIKTA countries to provide a working platform, it was of paramount importance to produce global public goods by cultivating newly emerging actors.

MIKTA’s Unique Strategy A natural question may arise about what MIKTA is. As countries whose economic power is the 12th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th in the world, respectively, MIKTA countries have potential to play an active role at the regional level, thereby advancing the common interests of the international community. MIKTA is able to demonstrate its utility and versatility as a new model for cross-regional cooperation. While the five countries are classified as middle powers, however, MIKTA countries do have potential constraints because they are not a natural-born like-minded group that share common culture and values. Meanwhile, middle power diplomacy was a relatively new concept for MIKTA countries, with the exception of Australia that had led agricultural liberalization in the 1980s. Australia played a pivotal role in forming the Cairns Group in 1988, thereby demonstrating agenda-setting power in the multilateral trade negotiations (Cooper et al., 1993; Cooper, 1997). But it was niche diplomacy that focused on a specific issue area, rather than comprehensive middle power diplomacy. Due to

 For Korea’s approach to MIKTA, see Snyder (2013).  For evolution of the G20, see Beeson and Bell (2009).

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significant differences among them, it is quite difficult to justify the rationale that bind the five countries together in promoting middle power diplomacy. It is why they have made various efforts to find and nurture their commonalities to strengthen the internal cohesion and unity, which would ultimately become a stepping stone to transform MIKTA into a group composed of like-minded countries in terms of their willingness to play a constructive role in global issues. One of MIKTA’s salient features is often associated with the “rise of the informal” (Colakoglu, 2016). Having started out to protect their own interests in the G20, MIKTA countries quickly developed into an informal group that aimed to innovatively tackle global issues (Cooper, 2015). MIKTA claimed to position itself as an informal group relying on voluntary commitments rather than binding agreements, as well as cooperation on specific challenges at the global level (Patrick, 2018). Although it attempted to strengthen common grounds for cooperation, MIKTA does not formally coordinate a common position in the G20. The informal nature of MIKTA aptly reflects the transformative dynamics of world politics in the twenty-­ first century, encouraging MIKTA countries to build coalitions rather than institutionalized cooperation. It is obvious that the existing formal international organizations are inherently limited in accommodating increases in the number of state and non-state actors as well as the complex nature of problem solving related to global commons. The informality MIKTA countries prefer neatly corresponds to the turn of world politics in terms of representation, timeliness, and effectiveness. It is a reason why, despite the anticipated limitations such as lack of commonality and experiences of cooperation, MIKTA could broaden the scope and depth of cooperation. Recognizing such limitations, MIKTA sought a network-based cooperation rather than adding another formal organization. The majority of global problems did not stem from the absence of international organizations, but from lack of coordination between international organizations. Thinking that it is of limited consequence to create one more international organization to deal with all global problems, MIKTA countries came to a conclusion that network-based cooperation would be more practical and effective. MIKTA is a cross-regional consultative platform that pursues common interests, rejecting individual country’s interests (MIKTA Vision Statement, http://www.mikta.org/about/vision.php). MIKTA pursued a unique strategy in terms of issue identification, approach, and governance. First, since its inception, MIKTA countries had a general consensus that they should place a priority on global issues rather than their own issues. Based on the progress and trust MITKA countries built up, in 2016, MIKTA could move on to the next stage to specify seven core areas of cooperation. Out of seven areas, MIKTA particularly focuses on “fight against terrorism,” “economic cooperation,” and “refugee crisis” (MIKTA homepage, http://www.mikta.org/document/state. php). Despite mounting urgency, the current global governance could not effectively deal with these issues, demonstrating the leadership vacuum in the international order. Based on robust market economies and democratic systems, MIKTA countries found that they had a shared interest in making a contribution to global issues, not

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properly addressed by the existing global governance. They were initially interested in providing support to develop good governance, democracy, and human rights (“MIKTA as a Force for Good.” Huffington Post, April 15, 2014). In launching MIKTA, they claimed that MIKTA would make concerted efforts to strengthen multilateralism, promote global efforts for a more stable and prosperous world, accelerate creative and pragmatic solutions to global issues, and play as an intellectual leader to reform global governance. Second, MIKTA takes an incremental but innovative approach to changing global governance. By taking a constructive initiative, MIKTA countries were expected to fill a crucial gap in the current global governance (Lee, 2016). MIKTA countries that share universal values of a liberal international order should make concerted efforts to maintain the momentum of free trade and economic integration. Aware of the changing nature of the global governance, MIKTA countries share a common view that neither the complete breakdown nor continuation of the existing global governance is desirable. Carrying the banner of the “rise of the rest: cross-­ regional networks,” Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia ambitiously launched MIKTA. While seeking an incremental approach to the restructuring of global governance, MIKTA countries cooperated to find an innovative solution to pending global issues (MIKTA Vision Statement, http://www.mikta.org/about/vision.php). For this approach, MIKTA did not seek an exclusive partnership with any single superpower. MIKTA attempted to be co-architects in restructuring the global governance. Instead, as a flexible and informal platform, MIKTA picked up a variety of global issues such as counter-terrorism, economic cooperation, sustainable development, energy, gender equality, peacekeeping operations, and good governance and democracy. In order to form coalitions with other countries, middle powers should not pursue their own national interests exclusively. Rather, middle powers should work together with like-minded countries to provide global public goods. MIKTA countries were keenly aware that they could be instrumental in reforming global governance as a group rather than as an individual country. This common understanding served as a catalyst that prompted the five countries to form an informal grouping within the G20. Based on such consensus, MIKTA could swiftly pick up imminent extra-­ regional or global issues such as the Ebola crisis and global health (MIKTA homepage, http://www.mikta.org/document/state.php). Third, in terms of internal governance, MIKTA has developed a unique structure of cooperation. First, MIKTA created a multilayered structure composed of Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Senior Officials’ Meeting, Speakers’ Consultation, and Academic Network that facilitate communication and cooperation at various levels. Second, MIKTA also generated many programs such as workshops, exchange programs, and outreach activities to expand the areas of cooperation. The MIKTA’s dual-track approach will contribute to enhancing the long-term sustainability while maintaining flexibility in cooperation. By taking such strategies, MIKTA has become pivotal in arousing interests in cooperation for global and transregional issues that threaten peace and prosperity.

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However, it does not necessarily mean that MIKTA countries dedicate themselves to global issues at the expense of their own national interests. The gist of MIKTA diplomacy hinges on how to balance between global contribution and national interests. In general, with the promotion of MIKTA diplomacy, MIKTA countries could increase their visibility in global governance. Individual countries could also enjoy the benefits of MIKTA diplomacy. Korea, without any experience of coalition building attempts, established itself as a global player on the basis of MIKTA diplomacy (Mo, 2016).10 Korea places a high priority on global issues such as sustainable development by sharing its experiences of poverty reduction. For Korea, MIKTA diplomacy substantiated that it could broaden the scope of its diplomacy that had primarily focused on inter-Korean relations, and manage diplomatic relations with four great powers surrounding the Korean peninsula. Aspiring to become a “player with global responsibility,” Mexico is interested in utilizing MIKTA to break from its traditional diplomacy in the shadow of the US. For Mexico, MIKTA would serve to promote transregional partnerships in other regions.

Coping with Challenges Reflecting the changing dynamics of world politics, MIKTA countries ambitiously launched MIKTA to create a new platform spurring cooperation among them. Since its creation in 2013 at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, under the vision of “deepen[ing] bilateral ties and find[ing] common grounds for cooperation,” MIKTA has successfully developed into an informal group to facilitate changes in global governance. It also demonstrates the potential as an innovative forum in its ability to reform global governance. Constant dialogues facilitated by the establishment of various channels of communication is the key to the progress. Despite modest achievements, MIKTA faces some challenges to tackle. It is repeatedly pointed out that heterogeneity among MIKTA countries would be a serious obstacle in consolidating MIKTA. MIKTA countries are likely to face difficulty in coherently maintaining common positions on core issues. Although they agreed to work on the seven priority issues, MIKTA countries still have a great deal of differences in terms of the degree of commitments to these issues (Patrick, 2018). For example, having never claimed itself as a middle power, Turkey merely tends to take advantage of MIKTA to increase its visibility in global governance, which primarily suits domestic political needs (Downie, 2018). Furthermore, recent domestic political changes in Turkey are likely to erode the internal unity of MIKTA, although the Turkish government claims that its diplomatic posture towards MIKTA has not fundamentally changed (Dal & Kurşun, 2016). MIKTA countries should contemplate how to deal with such challenges, while continuing to cultivate group solidarity in order to act as a unified group (Tyler,

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 For Korea’s approach to MIKTA, see Snyder (2013).

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2014). For this task, MIKTA countries need to cultivate communication and cooperation among themselves. Such communication itself will increase MIKTA’s visibility in global forums. Meanwhile, MIKTA need not be obsessed with the issue of commonalities. Overemphasis on the commonalities among them is likely to reveal MIKTA’s weaknesses. Keeping in mind that the five countries are different in terms of culture, regions, and networks, MIKTA countries should take the lead in finding a way to turn the MIKTA countries’ differences into assets.11 Taking advantage of each other’s strengths would pave the way to elevating MIKTA countries’ cooperation to a higher level. In this vein, MIKTA countries should devise MIKTA as a body to facilitate transregional cooperation in order to meet its initial pledges. Composed of countries with regional representation or leadership, MIKTA could potentially transform into a cross-regional platform because. MIKTA countries possess experiences and expertise of cooperation in their own region. By sharing its knowledge about the regional cooperation, each MIKTA country can serve as a hub linking other MIKTA countries to its regional issues. This way, MIKTA countries can transform their differences and diversity into a crucial asset for global cooperation, while maintaining this diversity. In contrast to the initial visibility and activism, MIKTA has become less dynamic (Robertson, 2018). Lacking in robust experiences of concerted efforts, MIKTA countries had to put a substantial amount of energy in identifying the core areas of cooperation. After agreeing to the agenda of cooperation, MIKTA mainly worked on the release of joint statements related to global issues such as counter terrorism, immigration and refugees, and climate change. However, MIKTA has yet to fulfill its promised goal of providing global platforms where it can play a mediating role in weakening the conflicts between developed and developing countries. Drawing on its primary initiatives, it is time for MIKTA to make a transition from the stage of sharing its visions to the next stage of implementation. As MIKTA sticks to the informal approach, skepticism is growing whether MIKTA will be able to deliver what it promised to the international community (Kim, Haug, and Rimmer, 2018). In the 2015 and 2017 “Guidelines on the Works and Activities of MIKTA,” MIKTA pledged to provide a “cross-regional consultative platform” by playing such crucial roles as “broker,” “facilitator,” and “agenda-setter.” Critically examining its achievements and limitations, MIKTA countries should find a way to devise an implementation mechanism (Robertson, 2018). A more fundamental question is whether MIKTA will be able to go beyond increasing visibility by enhancing awareness of the severity of these issues. MIKTA faces a double challenge: act as a coherent group to wield agenda-setting power, while maintaining its informal nature. MIKTA has continuously diversified both in terms of areas of cooperation and governance. MIKTA has touched upon a variety of issues including counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, migration and refuges, etc.

11

 For a complex nature of Korea’s middle power diplomacy, see Kim et al. (2013) and Lee (2016).

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While it produced modest success in arousing global interest in the issues, it did not offer a clear strategy of how to push for multiple issues concurrently. In terms of governance, MIKTA has developed the three-layered governance to proceed the summit, foreign ministers’ meeting, and speakers’ meeting. Furthermore, MIKTA has launched supplementary activities such as academic seminars, young leaders’ meetings, and other outreach programs. MIKTA should clarify how to link these different layers and various activities together. Finally, the current international environment poses a real test for MIKTA. The challenges to the liberal international order is an unprecedented challenge. The current international economic order is full of uncertainty as it faces enormous challenges as demonstrated by Brexit, the Trump administration’s “America First,” and the refugee crisis, with the entire world now entering uncharted territory (Eichengreen, 2016). Every time leading countries, including the US and western European countries, encountered a challenge, they have successfully been able to handle it up until now. For example, in the 1970s, the volatility of the global economy heightened as advanced countries failed to coordinate macroeconomic policies to pass the burden of adjustment costs to other countries. To address the problem, the US took the initiative in creating the G7 to manage the global economy, which facilitated coordination and cooperation among advanced countries. It was hegemonic cooptation by the US. By inviting advanced countries into the global governance, the US could enjoy the double benefits of enhancing the stability of the global economy and prolonging its leadership (Beeson, 2009). BRICS is another case in point. Criticizing that the international economic order was maintained under the premise of the “Washington consensus” and neoliberalism,12 BRICS demanded fundamental changes in global governance. Because the existing global governance was founded on western-­oriented ideologies and institutions, they argued, it did not systematically incorporate the interests of developing countries (Ban & Blyth, 2013). Unlike previous challenges to the liberal international order led by developing countries and BRICS, however, the current challenge stemmed from not developing countries but developed countries that took leadership in founding the post-war international order. Demonstrated in the Trump administration’s attempts to overhaul free trade agreements, concerns and discontents about the negative effects of free trade busted and subsumed other (Evenett and Fritz, 2016). Ironically, the deteriorating liberal international order will be a litmus test of whether MIKTA will be able to deliver its pledge to innovate global governance and multilateralism. Because the recent challenges to the liberal international order are intrinsically distinctive from the previous ones, MIKTA countries should play a more active role in maintaining the momentum for free trade and economic cooperation.13 It is time for, MIKTA to act more decisively to offer innovative ideas of

12 13

 For a critical assessment of neoliberalism, see Ostry et al. (2016).  For ideological and institutional foundations of the postwar world order, Ruggie (1982).

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how to positively influence global governance without fundamentally scrapping the tenet of the liberal international order. MIKTA countries with high stakes in free trade and economic integration should make various efforts to fill in the leadership vacuum left by leading countries (Lake, 1993). The future of the liberal international order depends on the creation of cooperation and coordination mechanism, harmonization between the supply of global public goods and domestic policy autonomy, and burden-sharing involved in restoring the system equilibrium.14 Although many countries have stakes in maintaining the liberal international order, they tend to perceive themselves merely as beneficiaries of the current order, enjoying the benefits arising from it (Kupchan, 2012). Because many of these countries do not have the capability and willingness to share costs, MIKTA countries should be able to produce creative ideas on how to sustain the liberal international order.

References Alexandroff, A. S., & Cooper, A. F. (2010). Rising states, rising institutions: Challenges for global governance. Brookings Institution. Ban, C., & Blyth, M. (2013). The BRICS and the Washington consensus: An introduction. Review of International Political Economy, 20(2), 241–255. Beeson, Mark and Stephen Bell. 2009. “The G-20 and International Economic Governance: Hegemony, Collectivism, or Both?” Global Governance 15: 67-86. Beeson, M., & Higgott, R. (2014). The changing architecture of politics in the Asia-Pacific: Australia’s middle power moment? International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 14, 215–237. Beeson, M., & Lee, W. (2015). The middle power moment: A new basis for cooperation between Indonesia and Australia. In C. B. Roberts, A. D. Habir, & L. C. Sebastian (Eds.), Indonesia’s ascent: Power, leadership, and the regional order (pp. 224–243). Palgrave Macmillan. Bremmer, I. (2013). Every nation for itself: Winners and losers in a G-zero world. Portfolio Penguin. Colakoglu, S. (2016). The role of MIKTA in global governance: Assessments & shortcomings. Korea Observer, 47(2), 267–290. Cooper, A. F. (1997). Niche diplomacy: Middle powers after the cold war. Palgrave Macmillan. Cooper, A. F. (2013). Squeezed or revitalized? Middle powers, the G20 and the global governance. Third World Quarterly, 34(6), 963–984. Cooper, A. F. (2015). MIKTA and the global projection of middle powers: Toward a summit of their own? Global Summitry, 1(1), 95–114. Cooper, A., & Mo, J. (2013). Middle power leadership and the evolution of the G20. Global Summitry Journal, 1(1), 1–12. Cooper, A. F., Higgot, R. A., & Nossal, K. R. (1993). Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order. UBC Press. Cox, R. W. (1989). Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order. International Journal, 44, 823–861. Dal, E. P., & Kurşun, A. M. (2016). Assessing Turkey’s middle power foreign policy in MIKTA: Goals, means, and impact. International Journal, 71(4), 608–629.

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Downie, C. (2018). MIKTA and the G20. Australian Institute of International Affairs. http://www. internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/mikta-­and-­the-­g20/ Eichengreen, B. (2016). The age of hyper-uncertainty. Project Syndicate. Evenett, S. J., & Fritz, J. (2016). Global trade plateaus: The 19th report of the global trade alert. CEPR Press. Gilley, B., & O’Neil, A. (2014). China’s rise through the prism of middle powers. In B. Gilley & A. O’Neil (Eds.), Middle powers and the rise of China. Georgetown University Press. Higgott, R. A., & Cooper, A. F. (1990). Middle power leadership and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns group, and the Uruguay round of trade negotiations. International Organization, 44(4), 589–632. Ikenberry, J. G. (2011). The future of the liberal international order: Internationalism after America. Foreign Affairs, 90(3), 56. Jordaan, E. (2003). The concept of a middle power in international relations: Distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 30, 165–181. Karim. (2018). Middle power, status-seeking and role conceptions: The cases of Indonesia and South Korea. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 72(4), 343–363. Kim, S. (2014). The international politics of Arachne: A challenge of network theory of international politics. Hanul. Kim, S., Lee, S., & Bae, Y. (Eds.). (2013). Middle powers’ public diplomacy. Sahoepyoungron. (in Korean). Kim, S.-M., Haug, S., & Rimmer, S. H. (2018). Minilateralism revisited: MIKTA as slender diplomacy in a multiplex world. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 24(4), 475–489. Kupchan, C. (2012). No one’s world: The west, the rising rest, and the coming global turn. Oxford University Press. Lake, D. A. (1993). Leadership, hegemony, and the international economy: Naked emperor or tattered monarch with potential? International Studies Quarterly, 37(4), 459–489. Lee, Seungjoo. 2016. “Coalition Building and Middle Power Diplomacy: The Case of MIKTA.” The Journal of International and Area Studies 25(2): 91-116 (in Korean). Manicom, J., & Reeves, J. (2014). Locating middle powers in international relations theory and power transitions. In B.  Gilley & A.  O’Neil (Eds.), Middle powers and the rise of China. Georgetown University Press. Martin, P. (2005). A global answer to global problems: The case for a new Leader’s forum. Foreign Affairs, 84(3), 3–6. MIKTA as a Force for Good. (2014). Huffington post. Mo, J. (Ed.). (2014). MIKTA, middle powers, and new dynamics of global governance: The G20’s evolving agenda. Palgrave Macmillan. Mo, J. (2016). South Korea’s middle power diplomacy: A case of growing compatibility between regional and global roles. International Journal, 71(4), 587–607. Ostry, J.  D., Loungani, P., & Furceri, D. (2016). Neoliberalism: Oversold? Finance and Development. Patrick, S. M. (2015). Multilateralism à la carte:The NewWorld of global governance. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/multilateralism-­la-­carte-­new-­world-­global-­governance Patrick, S. (2018). MIKTA in the middle: A little-known multilateral group turns five. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/mikta-­middle-­little-­known-­multilateral-­group-­turns-­five Ravenhill, J. (1998). Cycles of middle power activism: Constraint and choice in Australian and Canadian foreign policies. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52(3), 309–327. Robertson, J. (2018). South Korea’s quandary:What to do about MIKTA?The interpreter. Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-­interpreter/south-­korea-­quandary-­what-­do-­about-­mikta Rothkopf, D. (2011). G-Zero: Gee, another idea with zero to support it. Foreign Policy. Ruggie, J. G. (1982). International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. International Organization, 36(2), 379–415.

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Schiavon, J. A., & Domínguez, D. (2016). Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA): Middle, regional, and constructive powers providing global governance. Asia & Pacific Policy Studies, 3(3), 495–504. Snyder, S. (2013). Korean middle power diplomacy: The establishment of MIKTA. Council on Foreign Relations. Snyder, S. (2018). South Korea at the crossroads: Autonomy and Alliance in an era of rival powers. Columbia University Press. Stephen, M. (2013). The concept and role of middle powers during global rebalancing. Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 14(2), 37–53. Tiberghien, Y. (2013). Leadership in global institution building: Minerva’s rule. Palgrave McMillan. Tyler, Melissa Conley. 2014. “Mixing with the MIKTAS.” Australian Outlook. Australian Institute of International Affairs. April 24. Welsh, Jennifer M. 2004. “Canada in the 21st century: beyond dominion and middle power.” The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 93(376): 583-593.

Chapter 8

Unpacking the Domestic Political Foundation of Middle Powers: Cases from South Korea and Turkey Chaekwang You

Abstract  Most recently, rich literature in international relations has made systemic efforts to conceptualize middle powers. So-called middle-power scholars, despite their disagreements on who the middle powers are, claim that middle powers are inclined to display distinctive sets of behavioral characteristics, notably a preference for multipolarity, rule-based order and institutions, as well as ideational traits associated with good international citizenship. Located between great powers and small powers, scholars continue to claim that middle powers have inherently preferred anti-hegemony, liberal and multilateral international institutions and universal human rights. Thus, scholars maintain that making the world a better place by evoking states’ altruistic concern is a hallmark of middle power diplomacy. But all this good-citizenship based  on  speculation of the role of middle powers tends to dismiss the possibility that the powers’ commitment to middle-power behavior could be changing the subject to versatile domestic political dynamics within the powers. By looking at the ups and downs of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy toward rising China, the paper demonstrates that democratic consolidationis at the center of successful middle-power diplomacy. Keywords  Middle powers  · Capability · Democracy · Multilateralism · Multipolarity · Human rights

The earlier version of this paper was delivered at IPSA 2018, Brisbane in Australia on July 21–25, 2018. C. You (*) Kyonggi University, Suwon, Republic of Korea e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. Lee, S. Kim (eds.), Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy, The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76012-0_8

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Introduction As most middle-power scholars point out, middle powers are, by definition, the forces which are against hegemonic power struggle and the domination of a few great powers in the international system. In this sense, the middle powers are conceived of as exhibiting distinctive characteristics, most notably a preference for multipolarity, rule-based order, and institutions, as well as ideational traits underpinning their altruistic motivation to be good international citizens. Thus, one scholar maintains that contributing to making the world better place, including by addressing issues that do not relate directly to national interest, is a salient hallmark of middle power diplomacy (Gilley 2014). Surprisingly, however, the literature of middle powers say little about the impact of domestic politics on the powers’ foreign policy behavior. Primarily focusing on middle-range material capabilities of the powers, scholars deducea series of expected roles from the powers with little empirical  evidence. For example, the powers are assumed to hate great powers’ hegemonic struggle, prefer multipolarity, rule-based order, institutions, and have a greater concern for good citizenship in the international community. But it should be noted that there is not a priori reason why the middle powers should act upon less selfish and norm-oriented traits. Locating between great powers and minor powers never guarantees that the powers are just-seeking actors in an anarchical international system. In this sense, the paper claims that for states to be considered middle powers,  they  must be free from volatile domestic  political dynamics and not seen as proxies for great powers. It is also argued that the powers need to have noncontroversial foreign policy pasts and to display a willingness to thrive in pluralistic international politics. Noting these weaknesses, the paper theorizes the domestic political foundation of middle powers—i.e., consolidated democracy- and demonstrates why and how democracy is essential to the effective working of middle powers in an international system. The paper is constructed as follows: The first section will review existing theoretical debates on the identities and role of middle powers with an emphasis on the limitations the debates still display. In the second section, the paper develops a theory of a capability-democracy nexus model of middle powers and generates hypotheses from this theory. The third section provides crucial cases, which lend strong support to the hypotheses the theory generates. The paper concludes by highlighting its contribution, suggesting future avenues of research, and policy implications.

Debates on Middle Powers As realists define great and major powers as aggregate measures of power, most existing studies of middle powers view middle powers in terms of aggregates of both economic and military capabilities. This is largely because the states in

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international systems need basic materialistic capabilities to be active foreign policy actors at regional and global levels. So, middle powers are broadly defined as powers whose aggregate material capabilities are between great powers and weak or small powers (Schweller 2017). Only when this basic materialistic condition is met, middle powers can wield their agential powers in a way that affects international outcomes. Recently, however, some middle-power scholars propose the so-called revisionist argument that middle powers have an ‘intrinsic impulse’ to act as good international citizens. By focusing on a recurring pattern of less selfish behavior among powers in the middle,the scholars argue that middle powers tend to identify themselves as ‘actual’ middle powers by linking their role in the international system to a series of altruistic norms such as multipolarity, common security, rule-based order, and support for international institutions (Manicom & Reeves, 2012). The powers’ such behavior has been interpreted as a ‘manifestation of their enlightened self-­ interest’ (Cooper et al. 1993). Thus, one scholar asserts that “contributing to making the world a better place, including by addressing issues that do not relate directly to the national interest, is a salient hallmark of middle power diplomacy” (O’Neil, 2014). Regarding actual middle powers, which have been operating in world politics, Cotton and Ravenhill observe that “Australia is in the company of Argentina, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey, most of which have either labelled themselves or been described by commentators as middle powers” (Cotton and Ravenhill 2011, p. 2). In a related vein, Gilley and O’Neil offer a more comprehensive list of middle powers, such as Italy, Mexico, South Korea, Spain, Canada, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Australia, Poland, the Netherlands, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand (Gilley and O'Neil 2014, p. 5). But such realpolitik and revisionist definition of middle powers tends to dismiss one important causal link by which one can call the powers as ‘actually’ middle. To be an active middle power in the international system, the scholars assert, states need to meet not only the condition of aggregate capabilities, but also the condition of good international citizenship, which is summarized into multipolar and rule-based approaches to international politics. But good international citizenship as foreign policy behavior would be directly associated with the nature of types of domestic political regime. So, definiting middle power soley in terms of capability with little reference to domestic political situations states face is quite problematic. Noting this weakness, the paper proposes a theoretical framework in which both international and domestic political condition receive balanced attention in the designation of middle powers in the world politics.1

1  To make a clear distinction between such conflict-prone great powers and middle powers, which will act like good international citizens, middle power theories add another layer to the definition of middle powers—i.e., behavioral criteria. Behavioral criteria required to be considered middle powers include peace and conflict management or mediator, multi-polarity, and rule-and norm brewers. Given the international pressure from a great-power oriented international system, therefore, the scholars claim that the middle powers play a highly constructive role in the maintenance of a peaceful and conflict-free international system. Middle powers, or coalition of middle powers,

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Theoretical Framework: Capability-Democracy Nexus Model Regarding the causes of middle powers’ anti-hegemonic and altruistic behavior, scholars claim that this behavior is largely driven by middle powers’impulse, which is a function of their enlightened self-interest opposed to less enlightened selfish interests of great powers. But the allegation that this enlightened self-interest prompts the powers in the middle to favor a series of altruistic normative values seems to be a bit arbitrary. Given the anarchical nature of the international system, it is true that middle powers, compared to great powers, are inclined to favor a multipolar order, multilateral institutions, peaceful settlement of conflicts and global norms and rules because they are more likely to benefits from those values. But it should be noted that there is no prior reason as to why all middle powers act upon such good impulse and enlightened self-interest. Realists already demonstrated that non-great powers, including middle powers, become more willing to either bandwagon or balance in time of great power competition (Schweller 1994). This means that middle powers’ self-interest may lead them to become pawns when great powers increase their mutual hostility. Either by allying with rising great powers or by joining a counter-coalition led by existing great powers, the middle powers can maximize their sui generis national interests. Middle powers’ expected behavior as conflict mediator within a multilateral framework in which norms and rules of the peaceful resolution of conflict thrive, therefore, is just one of the ways in which powers promote their interests. From the middle power leaders’ perspective, all three options—i.e., bandwagoning, balancing, and multilateral approach—are on the table and they will choose the pathway which will best maximize their interests. Given this, both behavioral and ideational criteria applied to middle powers seem to be too flexible and arbitrary. Regarding this criteria, scholars continue to claim that good international citizenship is featured by honest brokers, bridge builders, advocates of multilateralism, and peace promoters. These are quite notable behavioral patterns among middle powers. But there are too many examples in which the powers’ foreign policy behavior is driven by their myopic self-interests, which is “least” associated with good international citizenship. It is well known that some Arab countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Iran, have made determined efforts to be a regional hegemon by instigating or supporting military conflicts in the region (Ennis & Momani, 2013; Ramazani 2004). Saudi Arabia, which is considered a newcomer of the middle power club, is now in charge of getting the Yemenis civil war out of control. Iran has long been known to be behind Shiite terrorist group like Hamas and adopt a cemented realpolitik approach to Israel. Regarding the can play a role of honest broker or conflict manager in the tension-laden relationships between great powers. They are also expected to contribute to the establishment of multilateral institutions which can hold great powers accountable to norms and rules. They also inherently prefer multipolarity over unipolarity and bipolarity because they will enjoy more leverage in the multipolar world. Finally, the middle powers are expected to serve as norm brewers in world politics by conducting active niche diplomacy.

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Israeli-­Palestine conflict, these middle powers have consistently been supportive of the latter based on its Muslim identity with little nuance of neutrality. Turkey, which is a symbol of a secularized Muslim country with good will, has begun to backslide into a revisionist regional hegemon under Erdogan’s authoritarian leadership (Ӧnis & Kutlay, 2016). The self-identification criteria seems to be even more problematic. According to middle power scholars of the new generation—i.e., revisionists, the middle powers often identify themselves as the guardians of altruistic and normative values like multilateralism, common security, conflict mediation, and international good citizenship. But it should be noted that such self-claimed middle-power identification could be a result of middle-power leaders’ efforts to advance their parochial domestic political goals at home.2 Conservative leaders in South Korea like Roh Tae-Woo, for example, have intentionally crafted Nordpolitik, which has later been considered an example of Korea’s middle-power diplomacy (Kim, 2014), for shoring up his and his ruling party’s domestic political legitimacy. Thailand’s image as a responsible middle power in Southeast Asia has systematically been tainted because many Thai leaders have engineered a series of military conflicts with Cambodia in an attempt to tighten their hold on power by appeasing nationalistic opponents at home (Hughes 2009). Indonesia, after the collapse of the Shuharto dictatorship, has been a major force behind brutal discrimination against East Timor, making the Indonesia-­ as-­a-middle power hypothesis dubious. All these tough foreign policies turned out to be carefully designed to solidify the leaders’ control of power base at home, casting doubt on a hypothesis that middle powers are marked by good international citizenship. Why have middle power scholars become so silent about this dark side of middle powers in their theory-building business? This paper claims that the scholar’s silence is primarily driven by their intentional ignorance of consolidated democracy as a sufficient condition for middle powers. As Gilley and O’Neil (2014, p.  15) noted, middle power scholars put aside democracy as a condition for middle powers because the middle powers of the new generation such as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and South Africa display strong reservations on liberal values, which is highly associated with Western great powers, particularly the United States. They even asserted that “the counterhegemonic instincts of new middle powers are often framed in terms of a resistance to values seen as emanating in the West.”3 2  The argument that middle powers are more reliant upon niche diplomacy and willing to be conflict mediators is also exaggerated. All middle powers mentioned above have been very proactive in conducting conventional or traditional diplomacy, which is largely associated with balancing and counterbalancing. It is true that many initiatives related to niche diplomacy have been initiated and carried out by middle powers. However, it is also true that the powers have paid considerable attention to conventional diplomacy for avoiding the situation in which they could be dragged into a war between great powers. South Korea and Iran, identified as members of middle powers, have always been security-seekers and devoted considerable amounts of material resources to maximizing their security interests. 3  As noted earlier, it seems quite understandable why scholars of middle powers intentionally create theories of middle powers short of democracy. Various countries, such as Mexico, Indonesia,

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Yet, this paper problematizes this democracy-free approach to middle powers simply because all middle-powers’ behavioral hypotheses from being a conflict mediator, to a multinational-institutions supporter, to a skeptic of hegemonic-power struggles, to a champion of human rights are tightly related to a simple domestic political condition—i.e., consolidated democracy. It is quite impossible that the powers in the middle will raise their voices for all supposedly-good liberal norms when they live in a highly autocratic setting. Nondemocracies in the middle are least likely to have actual concerns about liberal and institutional norms partly because the leaders of nondemocracies have highly expansive and belligerent preferences (Peceny et al., 2002) and partly because the norm will not thrive at home (Huth & Allee, 1999, 2001). Theoretically speaking, the non-democratic middle powers may act like a guardian of liberal norms in inter-state relations, but the regime’s commitment to these norms is likely to be short-lived and often be subject to the vagaries of the leaders, who are inclined to have belligerent preferences. So, this paper argues that democracy, especially consolidated democracy, should be considered a sufficient condition for the countries in the middle to be “actually middle.” Voluminous literature in IR has already offered systematic evidence that bad foreign policy or diplomacy can be primarily driven by bad polities at home. War, as a cancer in world politics, is highly and positively correlated to non-­ democracies (Russett and Oneal 2001). Military conflict short of war and coercive diplomacy are favorite items that non-democratic rulers have exploited for consolidating their power base at home. Dictatorial leadership has a strong proclivity to bypass multilateral institutions and organizations (BDM et al. 2005). The country under power hungry authoritarian leadership will be less willing to be an honest broker and more willing to be an instigator of military conflict stemming from their geopolitical ambitions, which may result in the instability of the region. Leaders in autocracy will make a greater effort to be the regional hegemon partly because of their expansive definition of national interests, and partly because of a lack of institutional check and balance in their use of power at home. These leaders also relatively lack the proper understanding of universal norms such as human rights, common security, multilateralism, and stability and peace simply because the public, a bearer of the norm, will not have an impact on the leaders’ decision. With proper reference to the domestic political condition—i.e., democracy, therefore, scholars studying middle powers must constantly struggle to justify middle powers’ Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, and South Africa, are located exactly in the middle in the world’s power hierarchy. These powers have long been harassed by great power politics during the Cold War and, as a result, have developed strong anti-hegemonic preferences at home. By defining middle powers in terms of a set of good-behavioral criteria naturally stemming from their impulses and enlightened self-interests, which their position in the international system frames, however, the scholars of middle powers dismiss the considerable possibility that most behavioral criteria they eulogize as a symbol of middle powers are the results of democratic practices in the powers. Without such democratic practices at home, the powers will be less likely to meet the criteria at an external level. In other words, middle powers’ key behavioral features of a good international citizen, which is assumed to be derived from their position, impulse, and enlightened self-interests, would be, at best, fancy diplomatic rhetoric if it is not backed by their democratic practices at home.

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liberal impulses in terms of their position in the international power hierarchy, in which hegemonic power struggles always come and go. Here are several textbook examples showing how important democracy is in the conceptualization of middle powers. South Korea, which is now hailed as a middle power role model, for instance, only started its actual middle-power diplomacy after it experienced substantial democratic consolidation under President Roh Moo-­ Hyun’s leadership (2002–2008).4 The Roh government’s bold initiative of balance in East Asia can be viewed as Korea’s first anti-hegemonic and rule-based policy with a strong internationalist tone. Existing democracies like Turkey, in contrast, have systematically retreated from their earlier commitments to middle power diplomacy when the Erdoğan leadership became more authoritarian and started to seek a hegemonic role in the Middle East by intervening in both Syrian and Yemenis civil wars (Ӧnis & Kutlay, 2016). Thailand, under Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-­ cha, who came to power by surprise coup in 2014, has rapidly been sided with China, thereby undermining its image of aneutral statein regional balancing dynamics. So, this paper proposes a capability-democracy nexus model of middle powers. Central to the model is that middle powers’ commitment to an expected pattern of behavior such as peace, being a conflict manager or mediator, multipolarity, and a rule and norm-based order, only occur when the powers enjoy two conditions—i.e., positional power and domestic institutional power—i.e., consolidated democracy. While the material or capability conditions are ripe for middle powers, this model claims that the powers’ commitment to expected middle power behavior may not materialize into concrete middle power behavior when they lack democratic components at home. For example, Iran, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey under Erdoğan should not be treated as middle powers of the cotemporary world primarily because of the authoritarian components of their regime, although their material capabilities meet middle power criteria. In a similar vein, democratic states cannot be considered middle powers if their aggregate measure of power is not strong enough to conduct active middle power diplomacy. Examples include Belgium, Switzerland, Finland and other advanced democracies whose capabilities are too weak to be considered middle in the international power hierarchy. Given the so-called middleness in aggregate measuring of capabilities in the international power hierarchy, therefore, my capability-democracy nexus model claims that middle powers’ behavioral commitments to counter-hegemony, pro-­ multipolarity, conflict mediation, peace initiative, being an honest broker, 4  For the 5 years after its democratic transition in 1987, president Roh had ambitiously pursued Nordpolitk, which has been considered a harbinger of Korea’s middle power diplomacy (Kim, 2014), but the politik was crafted and carried out mainly because President Roh and his hardline officials wanted to use the outcome of the politik—i.e., normalization of diplomatic relationships with the former communist countries—in a way that could help President Roh, who suffered from ill reputation—i.e., from a military leader in civilian uniform, to building his image as a peace-­ maker. Another good illustrative case showing the need to take democracy into consideration in constructing middle power theory is the demise of Turkish middle power diplomacy under current Erdoğan leadership.

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pro-­multilateralism, and being a good international citizen finally, is more likely to be observed when they operate in consolidated democracy. The so-called literature of democratic peace has offered systemic and powerful evidence that consolidated democracy, broadly democracy, is inherently peace-prone and more likely to rely on diplomacy than on conflict because of a set of institutional and normative conditions, which prevail at home (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Supporting the creation and maintenance of multinational institutions, for instance, has been argued to be highly correlated to democratic development (Russett & Oneal, 2001). The leaders operating in democratic countries also will be more critical about great powers’ demands to remain in their sphere of influence because of the existence concerning pacifying the public. Leaders living in democracy are much more concerned about a set of norms in favor of peace and stability such as multilateralism, common security, norms against war and norms of universal human rights (Huth & Allee, 2000, 2003). So, powers are more likely to become an active foreign policy “agent”, acting upon the expectations of responsible middle powers in world politics, if their regimes or polities are democratically consolidated. So, the model expects that given their matured positional power, middle powers will act upon the norms of peace, stability, multilateral institutions and human rights only if they are “democratically consolidated.” This argument is led to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis Powers located in the middle in material capabilities are more likely to conduct diplomacy enlightened by self-interest and good-citizenship when their leaders operate in consolidated democracies.

 outh Korea’s Democratic Development and Its Middle S Power Diplomacy According to recent scholarships of middle powers, South Korea has been considered a prime example of middle power activism in East Asia (O’Neil, 2014; Kim, 2014). It has been well known as an actor toward multipolar world, peace-building, and a predisposition toward good international citizenship, which are all guided by a healthy dose of self-interest (Manicom & Reeves, 2012). Scholars of middle powers, in particular, point out that it was not until the late 1980s or the early 1990s that South Korea’s identity as a middle power began to fully crystallize. Among others, it was economic growth that allowed South Korea to formulate its middle power identity. Not only has South Korea become a member of the OECD, but it has achieved 243.5 billion US dollars in its GDP. Its GDP per capita reached 5737 US dollars in 1992. From this vantage point, it seems reasonable that South Korea met rough materialistic criteria to be considered a middle power in its aggregate material capability in the early 1990s.

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Keenly aware of such a dazzling economic performance, scholars have focused on Korea’s foreign policies since the end of the Cold War and decisive democratization in 1987. What these scholars have found are Korea’s self-declared foreign policy initiatives with a strong internationalist tone. Among others, it was the Nordpolitik that scholars view as the beginning of Korea’s middle power diplomacy (Chung 1991). President Roh Tae-Woo’s speech to the Hoover Institution implied that South Korea in the 1990s would seek new roles as a middle power between advanced and developing countries. During the Cold War, South Korea, a developing country, single-mindedly allied with the U.S., which gave it a security guarantee against possible attack from the communist bloc, including North Korea. But after the collapse of the Cold War, followed by its miraculous economic growth, scholars argue that South Korea began to display archetypal middle power diplomacy characteristics. Among others, it was President Roh’s Nordpolitik, which was designed to restore full-blown diplomatic relationship with the former communist countries, including China, under the banner of peace and stability. But such a capability-based approach to South Korea’s middle power diplomacy dismisses the possibility that diplomacy during the early years of Korea’s democratic development was the result of the Korean leaders’ pursuit of parochial geopolitical interests toward the North, and of their attempt to solidify their power base at home, not the result of their self-perceived middlepowermanship. Until 1992, South Korea displayed a wide range of incipient-democracy syndrome. Leaders’ power bases at home were terribly weak and their political fortunes were primarily determined by their diversionary tactics toward North Korea, a forever enemy. The incipient nature of Korean democracy encouraged Korean leaders to pursue seemingly internationalist Nordpolitik filled with good-will gestures, which was completely devoid of middle-power components. For example, South Korea, under president Roh Tae-Woo, remained quite a young democracy. Since Korea’s decisive transition to democracy in 1987, political elites struggled to build a series of democratic institutions such as a competitive party system, free and fair elections, and freedom of speech and association, but achieved half-way success. Under these circumstances, political elites, especially the ruling Minja Party and president Roh Tae-Woo, had strong incentives to link their foreign policy toward North Korea to the improved political standing of the party and president (Chung 1991). Therefore, the Nordpolitik, which is interpreted as a harbinger of South Korea’s self-enlightened diplomacy, was rarely associated with liberal, multilateralized, and norm-based impulses. So, it seems highly questionable that South Korea’s diplomacy, like Nordpolitik, was a reflection of its concern for being a global good-citizen. Rather than brewing the norm of reconciliation of the enemy and relying upon multilateral institutions for resolving the North Korean issues, South Korea, under semi-democratic leader Roh Tae-Woo, launched a diplomacy of isolating the North (Oberdorfer, 1991). The voice from numerous anti-Cold War peace and unification movements had rarely been translated into Roh’s stance, skewed in favor of isolating the North. Some claim that Kim Young-Sam, Korea’s first civilian president, who came to office in 1993, was the first enlightened leader, who made concerned efforts to

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conduct actual middle power diplomacy. The policy dubbed 'Segehwa' (globalization in Korean) was often cited as an example showing that Korea, under Kim’s leadership, started serving as a responsible regional middle power, grounded in its enlightened self-interest. Korea, under Kim, was desperate to be a major player in East Asia. It not only normalized its relationship with China, its Cold-War enemy, but also pursued the policy of “nation first.” Consequently, various policy tools designed to peacefully handle North Korean issues were implemented. Korea’s foreign policy activism in regional multilateral architecture was also noticeable. It played a pivotal role in expanding APEC membership and became a staunch champion of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Kim 1998). However, it should be noted that president Kim’s ambitious Segehwa agenda was primarily framed by his domestic political consideration—i.e., eliminating all legacies related to the former authoritarian governmental structure. Believed that without overcoming the heavy regulatory developmental state structure, Korea’s economic growth would not be sustainable any more, Kim and his officials became desperate to tear down unnecessary governmental regulations on market, as well as on society in general, in the name of Segewha. So, around the middle of his leadership, the slogan of Segehwa was a mere reflection of his efforts to liberalize the Korean economy, which gave a pathway to the 1997 financial meltdown. A series of corruption scandals, combined with the crisis, completely deprived president Kim of an incentive to maintain his ambitious Segehwa initiative. As Kim argued, therefore, it was only after president Kim Dae-Jung came to power that Korea evolved from a capability-based middle power to a behavioral middle power. At the center of the evolution was considerable democratic development that president Kim and his officials achieved (Kim 2000). Democratic development facilitated the introduction of lots of reformists, who were intentionally concerned about the value of peace, multilateralism, and norms of universal human rights. Such consolidated democratic status opened a window of opportunity through which Kim’s officials were able to conduct lots of peace initiatives. Kim’s middle power diplomacy was firstly initiated against Japan, which remained a long-­ standing rival of South Korea. Building upon the confidence he accumulated, president Kim was directly engaged in the most comprehensive initiative toward North Korea. What was most interesting in his initiative was not just his commitment to improving bilateral relationships with the North. Moving beyond bilateral understanding of peace, Kim’s officials jumpstarted the policy of being a trustful regional player at a regional level. It was in this context that South Korea’s multilateral diplomacy did thrive. South Korea’s middle power diplomacy reached its peak when president Roh Mu-hyun, a successor of president Kim and highly reformist leader, was elected. Upon arriving in the Blue House, president Roh and his officials crafted a controversial policy called the balancer in East Asia. Despite president Kim’s ardent efforts to build lasting peace on the Korean peninsula, the nuclear problem the North posed was getting out of control. U.S. president G.W. Bush’s famous unilateralism forced most Korean observers to believe that the only viable solution against the evil North Korean regime desperate to acquire nuclear arsenals was to launch a

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preventive war against it. Keenly aware that America’s hawkish approach to the North was overly aggressive as well as motivated by U.S. expansive definition of its interests, the Roh government responded to U.S. policy by developing the notion of balancer in the region (Moon 2012).5

 urkey: From Symbol of Middle Power to Reckless T Rule Breaker Scholars of middle powers, despite some differences in their definitions of the powers, have not been reluctant to identify Turkey as a late comer to the middle power club. Focusing on Turkey’s consistent emphasis on anti-hegemony and multipolarity, scholars have depicted Turkey as a relevant newcomer in middle power diplomacy (Shichor, 2014). Economic growth, which has been accelerated since 2000, was at the center of Turkey’s aggravated status in the Middle East. Turkey has also long been considered a major military power in the region. The heated rivalry with Greece and its NATO membership has played a critical role in upgrading Turkey’s status in world politics. Against the backdrop of such improved material capabilities, Turkey has pursued a series of foreign policies, which largely commensurate with middle powers’ behavioral criteria. Turkey has served as a neutral mediator or bridge builder in military conflicts between Syria and Israel, and Israel and Hamas (Piccio 2014). Its engagement with Brazil over the Iranian nuclear issue through the signature of a Turkey-Brazil-Iran nuclear swap agreement in 2010 has also been considered a prime example of Turkey’s middle power diplomacy (Dal, 2016). Turkey has also helped different sections, ethnic and religious groups get together and mitigate their internal power struggles (Ӧnis & Kutlay, 2016). It also made a determined effort to encourage Serbs and Bosnians, archrivals in the Balkan, to join the Trilateral Balkan Summit in 2010 under the auspice of Abdullah Gül, the Turkish president at the time (Yilmiz and Bashirov 2018). The admission into the G20, followed by the establishment of successful financial regulation amidst the 2008 financial fiasco also has been considered a reflection of Turkey’s active engagement in the international economic order. During the period of 2002–2011, Turkey had also conducted proactive humanitarian diplomacy. The so-called “humanitarian turn” in Turkish foreign policy resulted in the total amount of development assistance reaching US $4.3 billion in 2013, up from only US $133 million a decade earlier (Ӧnis & Kutlay, 2016, p. 10). Turkey in 2016 hosted almost 2.5 million Syrian refugees along its borders and had spent more than US $8 billion. During this period, therefore, it seems only natural 5  But contrary to the claims of some analysts, possession of nuclear weapons alone does not make a country a major power (North Korea, Israel, Pakistan are nuclear but not major powers); nor does the absence of nuclear weapons preclude a country from status as a major power (Japan is a nonnuclear, major power).

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that Turkey is a pivotal humanitarian actor, as it meets the very basic conditions of being a middle power. Since 2014, however, Turkey has begun to show a remarkable retreat from its middle power diplomacy. Among others, it was the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, president but sultanistic leader, who systematically eroded and undermined Turkey’s capability and willingness to serve as a role model of middle powers. Turkey’s political system under Erdoğan leadership can be best captured by intense polarization and rapid erosion of institutional checks-and-balance (Ӧnis & Kutlay, 2016). Political power has been concentrated on one dominant leader, i.e., Erdoğan and his ruling party—i.e., the Justice and Development Party (AKP) while veto power of opposition parties has been significantly curtailed. So, one observer asserts that Turkey since 2014 has remained at best delegative democracy in which horizontal accountability—i.e., accountability to other autonomous institutions of the state such as the legislature to the courts-is almost non-existent (Taspiner 2014, p. 49). Erdogan’s return to a sultanistic authoritarian regime has had strong negative effects on Turkey’s ardent efforts to project its middle-power image toward international society. Above all, Tukey’s decades-long policy of exporting democracy with a liberal market economy into the Middle East has faltered simply because of Erdogan’s illiberal political practices at home. Not only has he instigated a coup, which is widely suspected to be a self-coup, but he has also crippled powers of opposition parties and media. During the coup, at least 40,000 people against Ergogan regime were detained. Almost 2745 judges were fired, 15,000 education staffs were also suspended, and the licenses of 21,000 teachers working at private institutions were revoked after the government alleged they were loyal to Fethullah Gülen, which Erdogan accused of being a man behind the coup. Reactions to the coup were heavily critical at both domestic and international levels (The main opposition parties in Turkey such as Republican People’s Party (CHP) and People’s Democratic Party (HDP) condemned the coup as absolutely illegal while several international leaders—such as those from the United States, NATO, the European Union, and other neighboring countries—called for respect of the democratic institutions in Turkey and its elected officials (Kirischi and Sloat 2015). Turkey’s backslide into illiberal democracy or an authoritarian regime allowed Erdoğan both to abandon Turkey’s role as an honest broker in the Middle East and to pursue quite controversial foreign policies toward Egypt and Syria, which have suffered from chronic instability after the Arab Spring. Sissi took power in 2013, overthrowing the elected, yet deeply unpopular, President Mohamed Morsi, who led the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood party. In the years since, Sissi’s government has banned the Muslim Brotherhood and branded it a terrorist organization. Turkey, which still supports the Muslim Brotherhood, was allied with the former president Morsi and continued to bate Sissi, even after he was formally elected in 2014, calling his initial ascension to power the product of a coup, not a popular revolution. The bilateral relationship between the two regional hegemons, therefore, has continued to deteriorate without any sign of cooperation. Erdoğan’s Turkey also has contributed to the situation in Syria getting out of control. Turkey’s controversial offensive in Syria’s northern region called “Afrin,”

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was known to be its intention to extend Turkey’s existing buffer zone inside the country and to evict Kurdish fighters from a broad swathe of territory (Regan and Britton 2019). The Erdogan government has not ceased to see the fighters as allies of Kurdish separatists inside Turkey, which it still considers a major threat to Turkey’s internal stability. Indeed, despite various shifts in Turkish policy towards the conflict in Syria, opposition to Kurdish autonomy has been constant and absolute. The Turks will simply not tolerate what they see as the threat posed by an autonomous Kurdish zone on their southern frontier. And they are clearly willing to use significant force to remove it.6 All these interventionist moves made by Erdoğan have significantly impaired Turkey’s middle power image as an honest broker, peace promoter, stabilizer, and champion of human rights and of multilateral institutions.

Conclusion The paper proposes capability-democracy nexus model of middle powers in the world politics. By noting some weakness existing in current studies of middle powers, notably a downplay of domestic political factor in the explanation of source of middle power diplomacy, the paper makes an argument that for states to be conceived of as middle powers, their political system or regime type must be a mature or consolidated democracy. This is largely because key components of middle power diplomacy are directly linked to democratic politics at home. The powers’ favor of multipolarity, multilateral institutions, rule-based order, and the norms derived from enlightened altruism are closely associated with the development of democratic politics in their domestic politics. None of behavioral features of middle powers would be imaginable with the reference to the rise and consolidation of democratic politics. But the existing studies of middle powers have paid little attention to the politics. This is why the paper proposes capability-democracy nexus model as an alternative theoretical framework for the explanation of the source of middle power diplomacy. To illustrate the importance of domestic politics in accounting for middle powers’ seemingly altruistic diplomacy, the paper conducts two case studies-i.e., middle power diplomacy of South Koreas since its democratization in 1987 and of Turkey during the period of 2002-2018. The case studies illustrate that middle power diplomacy in these two young democracies have experienced a severe ups and downs depending upon levels of democratic developments at home. Specifically, the studies show that South Korea was able to expand a range and scope of its diplomacy from narrow-minded containment of North Korea to a more altruistic engagement of regional international relations as it consolidated democratic politics while Turkey shied away from its best practices of middle power diplomacy and returned

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to real-politik in which its ambition for a regional hegemony was clearly addressed when backsliding into an authoritarian regime. The case studies of both South Korea and Turkey’s middle power diplomacy shed some lights on the role of domestic politics in the explanation of the sources of middle power diplomacy. The studies on middle power have so far downplayed the importance of domestic politics simply because of their preoccupation with capability criteria. To identify the states locating between the great powers and minor powers, the studies still view the powers as unitary actors and examine the powers’ behavioral traits with little reference to domestic base of the traits. So, future study of middle power diplomacy should bring domestic politics back in and theorize complex impact of both external and internal political factors on states’ middle power diplomacy. The cases from South Korea and Turkey offer vivid example in which the dynamics underlying middle power diplomacy could be largely driven by domestic politics-i.e., levels of democratic development.

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