Korea Yearbook (2009) : Politics, Economy and Society [1 ed.] 9789047444695, 9789004180192

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Korea Yearbook

Korea Yearbook Volume 3 Politics, Economy and Society 2009

Edited by

Rüdiger Frank James E. Hoare Patrick Köllner Susan Pares

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2009

This work was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies (publication grant AKS-2008-P-02). This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN 1875-0273 ISBN 978 90 04 18019 2 © Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS Preface................................................................................................. xi Chronology of Events in the Korean Peninsula 2008 ...........................1 South Korea .....................................................................................1 North Korea .....................................................................................6 Inter-Korean relations and Six Party Talks....................................10 South Korea in 2008: Domestic Developments and the Economy .....17 Patrick Köllner 1 Introduction............................................................................17 2 Triumph turns into disaster: Lee Myung-bak hits a wall of protests ....................................................................18 3 The Buddhists also take to the streets ....................................22 4 Government-media relations and other trouble spots ............24 5 The economy..........................................................................28 6 Convicting (and pardoning) captains of industry or, the fall of Chairman Lee ........................................................31 North Korea in 2008: Domestic Developments and Economy ...........35 Rüdiger Frank 1 The 2008 new year joint editorial: additional remarks ..........36 2 The annual parliamentary session ..........................................39 3 Leadership—succession by the party? ...................................43 4 The great revolutionary upsurge: Chollima 2 ........................47 5 Other ideological and political developments........................50 6 Other economic developments...............................................52 7 Administrative and personnel changes...................................55 Relations Between the Two Koreas in 2008 .......................................57 Sabine Burghart and James E. Hoare Introduction....................................................................................57 1 A new South Korean policy and a hostile Northern response ..................................................................58

vi

CONTENTS

2 3 4 5

Kŭmgang and Kaesŏng under siege.......................................61 A new DPRK line, or reaction to events? ..............................64 Other developments ...............................................................66 Outlook ..................................................................................68

Foreign Relations of the Two Koreas in 2008 ....................................69 James E. Hoare Introduction....................................................................................69 1 Republic of Korea ..................................................................69 1.1 Relations with the United States ............................................69 1.2 Relations with the People’s Republic of China......................71 1.3 Relations with Japan ..............................................................74 1.4 Other relations........................................................................76 2 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea................................77 2.1 The Six Party Talks, denuclearisation and relations with the United States .............................................77 2.2 Relations with the People’s Republic of China......................81 2.3 Relations with Japan ..............................................................82 2.4 Other external relations and issues.........................................83 The South Korean Left’s ‘Northern Question’ ...................................87 Joonbum Bae 1 Introduction............................................................................87 2 The Democratic Labor Party..................................................90 3 From the nuclear test to the split............................................93 3.1 The nuclear test ......................................................................94 3.2 The so-called Ilsimhoe case ...................................................98 3.3 The emergency committee’s reform package ......................102 3.4 The split ...............................................................................108 4 Conclusion ...........................................................................110 ‘Atoms for Sale’: From ‘Atoms for Peace’ (South Korea) to ‘Weaponized’ Plutonium (North Korea), 1955-2009 .......................117 John P. DiMoia 1 Nuclear nationalism and the two Koreas (2009)..................117 1.2 The Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project: American technical assistance .............................................120

CONTENTS

2 2.1 2.2 3 3.1 4 4.1 5 6 7

vii

Creating a Cold War problem: electricity and South Korea (1945-1948).....................................................121 Two rivals: claiming a ‘national’ legacy..............................121 The Cold War gets hot (1950-1954) ....................................124 Creating new South Korean institutions: Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI) and ‘Atoms for Peace’...............125 The debate over the AERI (1955-1957)...............................125 Making choices: The Phoenix Project-South Korea negotiations: 1958-1959.......................................................129 Site selection ........................................................................129 Forming the basis for a scientific community (1959-1965) ......................................................133 ‘Give a little’: the Six Party negotiations and recent history........................................................................135 ‘Atoms for Peace’ and its ongoing legacy in East Asia .......136

Dynamics of Korean Industrial Relations: Challenges for Foreign Invested Companies in the Metal Sector .....143 Peter Kloepping 1 Introduction..........................................................................143 2 Developments and condition of social partners up to 2008 ............................................................................147 2.1 The Korean Metal Workers’ Union .....................................147 2.2 The Korean Metal Industry Employer Association .............150 3 Collective bargaining structure and contents .......................153 4 Conditions and challenges for foreign invested companies ............................................................................158 4.1 Challenges at industry level .................................................159 4.2 Challenges at local enterprise level......................................165 5 Outlook for the development of Korean industrial relations................................................................171 Cheju Island as a Medical Tourism Hub in Northeast Asia..............177 Jürgen Mühl 1 Introduction..........................................................................177 2 Cheju’s tourism industry: the current situation....................179 3 Cheju as a free international city..........................................181 3.1 The free international city: definition and basic concept .....181 3.2 Implementation and recent developments............................182

viii 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 5 5.1 5.2 6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7 7.1 7.2

CONTENTS

Medical tourism on Cheju island .........................................183 Existing medical tourism facilities.......................................183 Cheju’s strengths as a destination for medical tourism........184 Cheju’s weaknesses .............................................................185 Target groups for Cheju’s medical tourism .........................187 Target groups according to patients’ country of origin........187 Target groups according to gender, income and age............191 Three-step plan to become a medical tourism hub in Northeast Asia..................................................................192 First stage: establishment of a basic infrastructure for medical tourism (2008-2012)...............................................192 Second stage: Cheju as a major player in medical tourism in East Asia (2013-2017) ........................................193 Final stage: Cheju as a medical tourism hub in Northeast Asia (2018-).........................................................195 Cheju healthcare town..........................................................196 Conclusion ...........................................................................197 Cheju: the advantages ..........................................................198 Cheju: the obstacles .............................................................198

Scapegoat, Beggar and President for the Economy: The Image of Lee Myung-bak as Seen through Political Cartoons in Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh .........................................................205 Katharina Polley 1 The political cartoon and its function ..................................205 2 Newspapers and their attitudes towards Lee Myung-bak....................................................................207 3 The presidential election 2007 .............................................209 4 The parliamentary elections .................................................213 5 The US beef imports controversy ........................................216 6 One year under Lee Myung-bak ..........................................219 7 Conclusions..........................................................................223 The Korean Comfort Women Movement and the Formation of a Public Sphere in East Asia...........................227 Thomas Kern and Sang-hui Nam 1 Introduction..........................................................................227 2 Intellectual discourse and activism in the movement ..........230 3 Rise of a transnational advocacy network............................233

CONTENTS

ix

3.1 Fifty years of silence ............................................................233 3.2 Action by Christian and progressive women’s movements ...........................................................................236 3.3 Isomorphic pressure of global norms...................................238 4 A contentious regional public sphere...................................242 4.1 The Asian Women’s Fund ...................................................242 4.2 Frame transformation of the Korean comfort women movement.............................................................................244 4.3 Towards a regional public sphere ........................................248 5 Discussion ............................................................................250 The Social Construction of North Korean Women’s Identity in South Korea: Romanticisation, Victimisation and Vilification ........257 Mikyoung Kim 1 Introduction: women refugees in the South-South divide....257 2 Northern women ..................................................................259 2.1 Women refugees from the North .........................................260 3 Identity and representation...................................................261 4 Romanticisation, victimisation and vilification ...................262 4.1 Romanticisation: nostalgia for the traditional female archetype ..................................................................263 4.2 Victimisation: asexual beings ..............................................265 4.3 Vilification: sexual objects...................................................268 5 Conclusion ...........................................................................272 Statistical Explorations in Terra Incognita: How Reliable are North Korean Survey Data? ........................................................................277 Daniel Schwekendiek 1 Introduction..........................................................................277 2 Methods................................................................................279 3 The 2002 UN-assisted survey and 2008 UN-assisted census in North Korea..........................................................282 4 The manipulation hypothesis ...............................................283 4.1 Manipulation after survey implementation ..........................283 4.2 Manipulation during survey implementation.......................290 4.3 Manipulation before survey implementation .......................291 5 The self-censorship hypothesis ............................................293 6 Conclusion ...........................................................................297

x

CONTENTS

Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence from China ............................................................301 Yoonok Chang, Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland Introduction..................................................................................301 1 Who are the refugees? A demographic profile ....................303 2 Motivation and political and legal sources of risk ...............306 3 Leaving North Korea, coming to China...............................309 4 Psychological conditions of refugees: the prevalence of distress .............................................................................310 5 Modelling psychological distress.........................................316 6 Experiences in China and future aspirations........................319 7 Conclusion ...........................................................................324 Playing the Game? Sport and the Two Koreas .................................329 Brian Bridges 1 Introduction..........................................................................329 2 Sport, nationalism and international relations......................330 3 The two Koreas and sport ....................................................332 4 The road to Beijing ..............................................................336 4.1 Difficulties of choosing a joint team....................................338 4.2 IOC and Chinese roles .........................................................339 5 Football fall-out ...................................................................342 6 The way forward ..................................................................343 About the Authors and Editors..........................................................349 Map of the Korean Peninsula............................................................355

PREFACE The preface to the 2008 volume of Korea Yearbook noted that developments on the Korean peninsula during the coming months promised to be interesting and such as to stimulate a flow of comment and analysis. The Yearbook’s editors have not been disappointed in their assessment. The evolution of new policies in the South and public reaction to them, the North’s ‘on-off’ participation in discussions on its nuclear facilities, signs of apparent manoeuvring in the top ranks of the DPRK, and the cooling of South-North relations to the point of near rupture have all contributed to a lively scene. The editors hope that readers of the 2009 Korea Yearbook will find that the flavour and significance of recent events in the peninsula are well reflected and analysed in the four surveys of developments in South and North Korea and are further elucidated in the ten refereed articles on specific topics and in the chronologies. They have reason to be satisfied with the variety and quality of the submissions they have received for the 2009 edition and take this as a sign that the Korea Yearbook series is establishing itself as a valued reference tool for students and researchers. A publication grant from the Academy of Korean Studies has supported the publication of the 2009 Yearbook and is gratefully acknowledged. Further encouragement has come from the Korea Foundation, which has decided to place the 2007 and 2008 volumes of the Korea Yearbook in the 2009 edition of its Resources for Korean Studies. A Selected Bibliography for Regular Distribution. This is the third volume in the series and marks a small departure, in that the Yearbook now takes the calendar year as its reference for the events covered in the overview articles. Korea Yearbook 2009 thus examines developments in 2008 only. This has necessitated some unavoidable overlap with some of the contents of the 2008 edition, but we hope readers will not be too inconvenienced by this. The change brings the overview articles into line with the chronologies; and reflects the practice of many long-established scholarly journals. The editors appreciate the confidence of senior scholars in contributing to the Yearbook, but also welcome the participation of younger researchers. This year, a graduate prize of 750 euros was instituted for

xii

PREFACE

the most promising submission from a graduate student, and the editors are pleased to announce that it has been awarded to Joonbum Bae, whose article on the South Korean left’s ‘Northern Question’ is carried in this volume. Contributions to the refereed section of the 2010 volume are invited from scholars from all over the world. The editors are particularly interested in current papers dealing with North Korea and inter-Korean affairs as well as articles that analyse Korean affairs from a comparative perspective. Further information is available from the editors at www.brill.nl/koyb. The editors are supported by two associate editors, Charles Armstrong in the United States and Sung-hoon Park in the Republic of Korea. Brill, the publishers of the Korea Yearbook series, continue to give invaluable assistance at all stages, and the editors would like to thank in particular Albert Hoffstädt and Patricia Radder. They also offer their grateful thanks to Siegrid Woelk of GIGA for her skilful formatting of the material. The Yearbook’s pleasing appearance owes much to her. A final note on transcription and the rendering of Korean names in the Korea Yearbook: it basically follows the conventions of the McCune-Reischauer system of transcription, but makes exception for the international rendering of well-known geographical units and Korean words (e.g. Seoul, Pyongyang, won) and of the names of some individuals (e.g. Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Kim Dae-jung, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il). Moreover, it respects the transcriptions that Koreans choose for their personal names, where these transcriptions are known to the editors. Susan Pares, James E. Hoare, Rüdiger Frank, Patrick Köllner London, Vienna, Hamburg, June 2009

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA 2008

SOUTH KOREA 02.01.08

Yoo Sun-min, prominent in Hanch’ongryŏn, arrested for leading anti-US rally in 2004 and violating NSL. 07.01.08 President Roh appoints independent counsel in investigation of allegations of financial irregularities by president-elect Lee Myung-bak. 10.01.08 Constitutional Court authorises independent investigation of fraud allegations against Lee, but with restrictions. 16.01.08 Rehabilitation of Jo Yong-su, founder of Minjok Ilbo, executed in 1961 following conviction by a military court of setting up newspaper with North Korean financial support. 28.01-01.02.08 6th round of ROK-EU free trade agreement talks, Seoul. 05.02.08 US Forces Korea confirm intention to reduce US troop levels to 25,000 by end 2008. 10.02.08 Wooden superstructure of Namdaemun gate in Seoul, National Treasure No.1, destroyed by fire. 17.02.08 President-elect Lee questioned by special prosecutors over alleged involvement in stock manipulation fraud. 21.02.08 Independent counsel investigating Lee clears him of wrongdoing. 25.02.08 Lee Myung-bak inaugurated president. 29.02.08 National Assembly confirms appointment of Han Seung-soo as prime minister. 02-07.03.08 ROK and US conduct joint military exercise Key Resolve. 08-19.04.08 Yi So-yeon is first Korean astronaut in space. Blasted off and returned in Russian spacecraft, with

2

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

interim transfer to International Space Station for experiments. 09.04.08 Ruling GNP wins small majority in parliamentary elections. 11-15.04.08 ROK-US discussions resume in Seoul on South Korean restrictions on US beef imports, but yield no progress. 15-19.04.08 President Lee visits US; holds talks with President George W. Bush, 18-19.04.08. They agree to review and develop US-ROK bilateral alliance. 18.04.08 US and ROK agree to lift restrictions on US beef imports into South Korea. 20-21.04.08 President Lee visits Japan, meets Prime Minister Fukuda, 21.04.08. Agreement to resume ‘shuttle diplomacy’ between the two countries’ leaders. 02.05-12.07.08 Over two months of protests against South Korean government’s decision to resume imports of beef from US, taking form of candlelight vigils and clashes with police. 05.05.08 Death of novelist Pak Kyŏng-ni, author of T’oji (Land). 11-20.05.08 Prime Minister Han Seung-soo visits Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. 12-15.05.08 7th round of ROK-EU FTA negotiations, Brussels. 13.05.08 US legislates to give ROK same status as NATO members, Japan, New Zealand and Australia in US foreign military sales, and to allow direct financing of North Korean denuclearisation programme. 20.05.08 South Korean government donates emergency funds and material to China in wake of earthquake of 12.05.08. 27-30.05.08 President Lee makes state visit to China, meets President Hu Jintao, 28.05.08. Joint statement issued elevating Sino-South Korean relations to ‘strategic and cooperative partnership’. Six areas announced for co-operation and bilateral investment. Lee visits earthquake site in Dujiangyan, Sichuan, 30.05.08. 03.06.08 US and South Korean defence ministers meeting in Seoul confirm agreement reached between their

SOUTH KOREA

09.06.08 13-20.06.08 21.06.08

28.06.08 07-09.07.08 09-10.07.08 14.07.08

26.07.08 05-06.08.08 08-09.08.08

10-11.08.08 18-22.08.08 24-26.08.08

27., 31.08.08 05.09.08

09.09.08

3

presidents to cancel plans for reduction in US troops in ROK. South Korean negotiating team to US to discuss agreement of 18.04.08 on beef imports. ROK and US trade ministers hold 3 rounds of discussion on beef imports. Agreement that US would not export beef from cattle older than 30 months. US beef imports resume, 26.06.08. Secretary of State Rice visits ROK for bilateral talks. President Lee holds bilateral meetings with leaders of 7 countries in margins of G8 summit, Japan. ROK and Gulf Cooperation Council hold first round of talks on free trade agreement, Seoul. Strong South Korean reaction to Japanese Education Ministry’s decision, 14.07.08, in educational guidelines, to describe Tokto as Japanese territory. ROK ambassador recalled. Heavy rains in South Korea cause deaths, homelessness and flooding. President Bush visits ROK, meets President Lee, 06.08.08, joint statement issued. President Lee meets presidents of China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Algeria in Beijing, in margins of opening of Olympic Games. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd visits ROK, meets President Lee, 11.08.08. Joint US-ROK Ulchi Freedom Guardian military exercise held in South Korea. President Hu Jintao makes state visit to ROK. Joint communiqué issued, bilateral strategic co-operative partnership outlined in four categories. Protests in Seoul against Lee’s perceived religious bias against Buddhism. ROK Defence Ministry protests against Japanese claim to Tokto, renewed in Japanese defence white paper. President Lee apologises to Buddhists for his administration’s perceived religious bias.

4 21.09.08

28-30.09.08

29-30.09.08 24-25.10.08 29.10.08 31.10.08 03.11.08

05-07.11.08 11.11.08 14-25.11.08

27.11.08 02.12.08

02.12.08

05-07.12.08 13.12.08

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

ROK announces imminent reduction in width of restricted area abutting DMZ on South Korean side from 15 km to 10 km. President Lee visits Russia. Decision to upgrade Russian-ROK relations to strategic co-operative partnership. Agreements signed for projects that include construction of pipeline to export natural gas from Russia to South Korea via Vladivostok and North Korea. ROK and New Zealand hold preparatory free trade agreement talks in Seoul. President Lee attends 7th ASEM summit, Beijing. Meets leaders of ASEAN+3 countries. ROK announces all its troops to leave Iraq before end 2008. ROK announces free trade agreement with Cambodia will go into effect November 2008. ROK and Canada resume negotiations in Seoul on opening South Korean market to Canadian beef imports, suspended 5 years previously. President of Turkmenistan makes state visit to ROK. Demonstrations in Seoul calling for US-DPRK summit and withdrawal of US troops. President Lee visits US, Brazil and Peru to attend Group of 20 financial summit and APEC forum summit. Prime Minister Han leaves for Middle East to discuss energy co-operation. Conservative and liberal activists clash near western end of North-South border over sending of leaflets by helium balloon into North Korea. 5 leading members of left-wing civic group indicted on charges of spreading North Korean propaganda in the south. 4 others indicted earlier in October 2008. President Lech Kaczynski of Poland visits ROK, meets President Lee. Prime Minister Aso, Premier Wen Jiabao and President Lee meet in Fukuoka, Japan, for first 3-way summit.

SOUTH KOREA

19.12.08 21-25.12.08

5

South Korean peace-keeping mission to Iraq officially disbanded at end of 4-year presence in Iraq. Kim Ha-joong, Minister for Unification, visits China, meets officials familiar with North Korea.

6

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

NORTH KOREA 01.01.08

Joint new year editorial from Rodong Shinmun, Chosŏn Inmingun and Ch’ŏngnyŏn Chŏnwi. 29-31.01.08 Wang Jiarui, director of International Liaison Department of the CCP’s Central Committee, visits DPRK, meets Kim Jong Il, 30.01.08. 29.01.-02.02.08 French foreign ministry delegation visits DPRK. 16.02.08 Kim Jong Il’s 66th birthday marked in DPRK. 26.02.08 New York Philharmonic Orchestra performs in Pyongyang. 20-24.03.08 Kim Yong Nam visits Namibia and Angola. 28.03.08 North Korea fires ship-to-ship missiles into West Sea. 09.04.08 6th session of 11th Supreme People’s Assembly. 11.04.08 Japan renews economic sanctions against DPRK for further 6 months. 15.04.08 96th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth marked in DPRK. 24.04.08 Russia and DPRK reach co-operative agreement on reconstruction of Rajin-Tuman river railways and Rajin port, contract on joint venture for Rajin port. 30.04.-05.05.08 Brazilian CP delegation visits DPRK, meets Kim Jong Il. 05-08.05.08 US food aid delegation visits DPRK to negotiate on humanitarian food assistance. 10-14.05.08 Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo visits DPRK. 13.05.08 Kim Jong Il sends condolences to President Hu Jintao on loss of life in Sichuan earthquake, China, on 12.05.08. DPRK offers financial aid. 14-16.05.08 Portuguese CP delegation visits DPRK. 16.05.08 USAID announces resumption of US food assistance to DPRK: 500,000 metric tons over course of 12month programme, to be distributed by WFP and US NGOs. Shipments arrive 30.06.08 and 05.08.08. KCNA reports resumption of USAID food aid, 17.05.08. 28.05.08 Indian Foreign Ministry delegation visits DPRK.

NORTH KOREA

30.05.08 02.06.08

03.06.08 04.06.08 08.06.08 09.06.08

10.06.08 11.06.08

17-19.06.08 18.06.08 24.06.08 26.06.08

30.06.08 08.07.08 18.07.08 19.07.08

7

North Korea test-fires 3 short-range missiles in West Sea. Independent external panel concludes no evidence to support allegations of mismanagement and diversion of UNDP funds in North Korea. DPRK and China sign agreement on customs cooperation. China announces 4 major sectors in which it intends to increase economic co-operation with DPRK. North Korean women’s football team wins 2008 Asian Women’s Football Championship. China reported to have increased yearly quota for grain exports to North Korea from 50,000 tons to 150,000 tons. North Korea reaffirms its opposition to all forms of terrorism, cites earlier statements and agreements. Japan decides to partially lift economic sanctions against DPRK imposed in October 2006 following North Korean nuclear test. Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping visits DPRK, meets Kim Jong Il, 18.06.08. Russia announces it is delivering 2,860 tons of wheat flour to DPRK, starting on 11.06.08. Minister of People’s Security Ju Sang Song leaves for visit to Vietnam and Laos. North Korea announces it is co-operating with UN Office on Drugs and Crime in support of international anti-drug conventions it acceded to in March 2007. DPRK and Laos sign treaty on providing mutual legal assistance in civil and criminal cases. 14th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s death commemorated in North Korea. DPRK adopts regulation on trading posts on SinoNorth Korean border. North Korea protests against Japanese Education Ministry manual, issued 14.07.08, that describes Tokto as part of Japanese territory.

8 20.07.08

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

DPRK and Mongolia ratify agreement on permitting North Korean workers entry into Mongolian economy. 22-24.07.08 Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun attends ASEAN Regional Forum in Singapore. DPRK accedes to Treat of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 24.07.08. 27-30.07.08 Pak Ui Chun attends foreign ministers’ meeting of Non-aligned Movement, Teheran, meets Iranian president and foreign minister. 04.08.08 KCNA reports heavy rains, 01-03.08.08, with damage to crops. 06.08.08 DPRK and Russia announce agreement to discuss redrawing of common border along Tuman river. 07.08.08 Lease contract for Rajin-Tuman river railway concluded between Rajin International Standardised Transportation and Donghae Rail Transportation. 30.08.-02.09.08 Laotian prime minister visits DPRK, signs co-operation agreement. 04.09.08 North Korean official website rejects Japanese claim, in defence white paper, that dispute over ownership of Tokto remains unresolved. 08.09.08 National meeting to mark 60th anniversary of DPRK addressed by Prime Minister Kim Yong Il. Kim Jong Il absent. 09.09.08 Parade to mark 60th anniversary, Pyongyang. Kim Jong Il again absent. 23.09.08 US Congress approves with revisions 4-year extension of North Korean Human Rights Reauthorisation Act. 30.09.08 Japan announces it will extend economic sanctions against DPRK for further 6 months after 13.10.08. 01-15.10.08 North Korea conducts nationwide population census, with support from UNFPA. 04.10.08 Ground-breaking ceremony for reconstruction of Rajin-Kasan railway and of Rajin port. 06.10.08 North Korea fires 2 short-range missiles over West Sea. 06-07.10.08 Vietnamese minister of public security visits DPRK, signs mutual agreement of co-operation.

NORTH KOREA

15.10.08 18.10.08

9

DPRK and Kuwait sign agreement on air services. US shipment of 25,000 tons of corn and beans leaves US for DPRK. 28.10.08 Death of Pak Song Chol, member of Political Bureau of KWPCC and honorary vice-president of SPA. State funeral, 30.10.08. 02.11.08 DPRK and Singapore sign agreement on promotion and protection of investment. 06.11.08 KCNA reports Cabinet’s decision to institutionalise social security system, enforce social security law. 16.11.08 North Korean girls’ football team winner in FIFA U-17 Women’s World Cup 2008. 25.11.08 US Joint Forces Command (JFC) designates DPRK as Asian nuclear power along with China, Russia, India and Pakistan. US Defence Department and JFC later describe this as a mistake. 26.11.-05.12.08 DPRK attends 85th meeting of IMO Maritime Safety Committee in London, expresses interest in co-operating in efforts to combat piracy off Somalia. 28.11.08 Kim Yong Nam sends message of condolence to Indian president over terrorist bombings in Mumbai. 15.12.08 Launch of new mobile telephone service in North Korea, developed by Orascom Telecom of Egypt. 29.12.08 US announces further shipment of 21,000 metric tons of food aid is due to reach North Korea in early January 2009.

10

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS AND SIX PARTY TALKS 03.01.08

South Korean Intelligence Service reveals its director, Kim Man-bok, visited North Korea, 18.12.07, for discussions. 04.01.08 North Korea announces it delivered a full list of its nuclear programmes to US in November 2007. 04.01.08 2nd North Korean shipment of 500 tons of zinc reaches South Korea, completing DPRK’s repayment for 2007 to South under terms of agreement on raw materials for minerals. 07.01.08 Unification Ministry floats proposal that aid to North be made conditional on repatriation of South Korean PoWs and abductees. 29-30.01.08 Inter-Korean working-level talks at P’anmunjŏm on regular rail freight services across DMZ agree on flexible operating. 31.01.-02.02.08 Sung Kim, head of State Department’s Office of Korean Affairs, visit DPRK to discuss stalled Six Party Talks. 04.02.08 Inter-Korean working-level meeting on Olympics agrees to send joint cheering squad. 12-13.02.08 Inter-Korean working-level meeting at Kaesŏng on repair of Kaesŏng-Pyongyang expressway. 18-22.02.08 Christopher Hill, US Assistant Secretary of State, visits China, ROK and Japan to discuss Six Party Talks; meets Kim Kye Gwan, chief DPRK negotiator, in Beijing,19.02.08. 19-23.02.08 Joint North-South on-site surveys begin of medical facilities in the North. 21-22.02.08 Six Party working group on economic and energy co-operation with North Korea meets in Beijing. 17.03.08 First South Korean tourists travelling in their own vehicles permitted to cross into Mt Kŭmgang tourist area in North Korea. 19-22.03.08 159-member group of South Korean businessmen visit North Korea to inspect industrial facilities and explore investment opportunities.

INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS AND SIX PARTY TALKS

27.03.08

27-28.03.08

01.04.08 10.04.08

10.04.08 15.04.08 22-24.04.08

30.04.08

08-10.05.08

15.05.08

27-30.05.08

29.05.08

30.05.08

10.06.08

11

DPRK expels all 11 South Korean government officials from inter-Korean office in Kaesŏng Industrial Complex (KIC). Six Party working group on economic and energy co-operation with North Korea meets in P’anmunjŏm. North Korean official media denounce President Lee for first time. South Korean supervisor expelled from construction site of inter-Korean family reunion centre, Mt Kŭmgang. Six Party working group on economic and energy co-operation with North Korea meets in Beijing. Kim Sook appointed head of South Korean negotiating team to Six Party Talks. Sung Kim visits DPRK, raises charge of North Korean assistance to Syria in construction of nuclear reactor. US country reports on terrorism fail to announce removal of DPRK from list of state sponsors of terrorism. Sung Kim visits DPRK, receives over 18,000 pages of documentation on North Korean nuclear programmes. ROK Unification Ministry announces financial support for NGOs working on projects in North Korea, also for UNICEF and WHO programmes, but insists North must request other aid. Kim Kye Gwan meets Christopher Hill in Beijing to discuss North Korea’s declaration of nuclear holdings; meets Kim Sook, 30.05.08. South Korea dispatches 1,000 tons of electrolytic copper to North Korea as part of 3rd shipment of energy aid promised under Six Party Talks. At inter-Korean military working-level talks, DPRK warns South Korea against sending hostile leaflets over the North’s territory. Six Party working group on economic and energy co-operation with North Korea meets at P’anmunjŏm.

12 10-11.06.08 11-12.06.08

24.06.08 26.06.08

27.06.08

29.06.08

02.07.08

04.07.08

09.07.08 10-12.07.08

11.07.08

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Sung Kim visits DPRK to discuss disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities. Six Party working group on normalisation of Japanese-DPRK relations meets in Beijing. North Korea undertakes to reopen investigation into past abductions of Japanese citizens. Japan still refuses to deliver heavy oil to the North. DPRK places partial limit on passage of South Korean personnel and materials from KIC into ROK. North Korea presents declaration of its nuclear programmes to China. US announces it will remove DPRK from list of state sponsors of terrorism and lift some sanctions under Trading With the Enemy Act. North Korea blows up cooling tower at Yŏngbyŏn nuclear plant. Sung Kim and representatives of foreign news services witness event. South Korea marks 6th anniversary of 2002 skirmish in West Sea with ceremony attended by prime minister. North Korea denounces ceremony as political provocation, 03.07.08. US states DPRK has presented declaration on alleged uranium-based nuclear programme and nuclear proliferation to Syria. North Korea announces it will only move to next stage of nuclear disarmament agreed on 03.10.07 when the 5 other parties make further economic compensation. Russia states it will deliver a further 100,000 tons of fuel oil to DPRK by October 2008. Six Party Talks resume in Beijing, issue 6-point statement whereby North Korea would complete disablement of Yŏngbyŏn nuclear facility by October and other 5 parties would complete shipments of promised energy aid by same time. Fatal shooting of South Korean woman tourist by North Korean soldier on beach near Mt Kŭmgang resort. South Korean government suspends tour programme, 12.07.08. North Korea expresses regret for

INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS AND SIX PARTY TALKS

31.07.08

03.08.08

08.08.08 09.08.08

10-20.08.08

11-12.08.08

14.08.08 27.08.08

28.08.08

16.09.08

19.09.8

19.09.08

13

death but claims responsibility for incident rests with South Korea, 12.07.08. Sung Kim nominated deputy head of US delegation to Six Party Talks, with responsibility for North Korean nuclear issues. North Korea threatens to expel all South Koreans ‘deemed unnecessary’ from Mt Kŭmgang tourist area. North Korea reports delivery of South Korean shipment of 600 tons of steel bars as part of energy aid. US announces decision to postpone removal of DPRK from list of state sponsors of terrorism, from original date of 11.08.08. Between these dates, number of South Korean personnel expelled from Mt Kŭmgang tourist area, including those working for state-run tourism agency and those in permanent meeting place for separated family members. 199 remain to manage resort. Six Party working group on normalisation of DPRKJapan relations meets in Shenyang, China, to discuss details of agreement of 11-12.06.08. North Korea suspends disablement of Yŏngbyŏn nuclear facility. South Korean prosecution service announces arrest of female North Korean defector believed to be spying for North Korea. She pleads guilty, 10.09.08; jailed for five years, 15.10.08. South Korean Defence Ministry describes North Korea as presenting ‘very substantial and present threat’, but no longer classed as enemy. South Korea announces it will make further shipments of energy aid to North Korea by 25.09.08 and in October. North Korea announces it no longer asks to be removed from US list of state sponsors of terrorism, confirms it has begun to reassemble Yŏngbyŏn nuclear facility, rejects US demands for access for verification. North and South delegations meet at P’anmunjŏm to discuss energy aid under Six Party Talks.

14 22.09.08

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

North Korea asks IAEA to remove cameras and seals from main nuclear facilities. Informs IAEA, 24.09.08, it intends to restart Yŏngbyŏn plant within a week. 02.10.08 At inter-Korean military working-level talks at P’anmunjŏm, North Korea protests over scattering of South Korean leaflets from helium balloons over its territory. 09.10.08 DPRK bars access by IAEA inspectors to Yŏngbyŏn nuclear facility. 10.10-20.12.08 Continuing scattering of anti-DPRK leaflets from helium balloons by South Korean civic groups over North Korean territory. 11-12.10.08 US and North Korean statements on verification issues. North Korea accepts verification process and resumes disablement. In return, US rescinds designation of DPRK as state sponsor of terrorism. Access for IAEA inspectors restored, 13.10.08. 15-17.10.08 Series of concerts in Pyongyang includes first joint performance by South Korean soloist playing with North Korean orchestra. 17.10.08 US announces DPRK has reapplied all seals to its reactor and restored all surveillance equipment. 27.10.08 At inter-Korean military working-level meeting, North Korea again protests over South Korean leaflets. KCNA, 28.10.08, warns of ‘practical action’ by North Korean military, requests military communications equipment already discussed with South. 29.10-01.11.08 254-member South Korean delegation visits North Korea, attends opening ceremony, 30.10.08, of Pyongyang Hemp Textiles, North-South joint venture. 06.11.08 North Korean military team visits KIC to check personnel and facilities. 11.11.08 ROK National Human Rights Commission forms special committee on North Korean human rights. 12.11.08 DPRK rejects US announcement that North Korea had agreed to allow international inspectors to take samples from nuclear facilities.

INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS AND SIX PARTY TALKS

12.11.08

12.11.08 13.11.08

20-23.11.08

24.11.08

28.11.08 01.12.08

08-11.12.08 12.12.08

14.12.08

16.12.08

15

At inter-Korean military working-level talks, DPRK announces it will restrict and ‘cut off’ all overland passages through the inter-Korean border from 01.12.08. North Korean Red Cross also announces it will close its liaison office in P’anmunjŏm and sever all cross-border telephone channels with its South Korean counterparts. US ships 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to DPRK. South Korean Ministry of Defence proposes discussions with North Korea on provision of military communications equipment requested by North. ROK among 95 states voting in favour of UN draft resolution on human rights situation in DPRK, of which it was a co-initiator. Resolution adopted, 19.12.08. At inter-Korean military working-level talks, DPRK warns that from 01.12.08, North Korea will close the inter-Korean joint office in Kaesŏng, halt cross-border train service, ban tours to Kaesŏng, and demand 50% reduction in South Korean workers and staff in KIC. It will also expel some South Korean personnel from the Mt Kŭmgang resort. Inter-Korean cross-border train service suspended. Stricter border crossing controls into KIC come into effect. Majority of South Korean personnel withdrawn by 04.12.08. Six Party Talks convene in Beijing but fail to reach agreement on sampling or on access to sites. DPRK threatens to slow disablement of Yŏngbyŏn nuclear facility after US announces it will suspend further fuel aid in absence of verification protocol. Russian chief negotiator to Six Party Talks says Russia plans to complete its quota of fuel deliveries to North Korea and will send 3rd batch in December. China indicates it will continue to supply energy aid to North Korea.

16 18.12.08

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

North Korean Ministry of State Security announces arrest of North Korean national said to have been hired by South Korean intelligence agency ‘to harm North Korean leadership’.

Chronologies prepared by Susan Pares from the following sources: Cankor (CanadaKorea Electronic Information Service), Comparative Connections, KEI (Korea Economic Institute of America), KINU Insight, Korea Policy Review (from August 2008 Korea), Ministry of Unification Weekly on Korea, Vantage Point, Yonhap News Agency.

SOUTH KOREA IN 2008: DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS AND THE ECONOMY Patrick Köllner

1 INTRODUCTION South Korea sailed into rough waters in 2008. Massive protests against the administration of President Lee Myung-bak, who entered office in February 2008, shook the country in the first half of the year. Not only was the usual honeymoon period of incoming presidents cut short, but Lee Myung-bak’s fresh public mandate to engineer major political and economic change after a decade of progressive rule was severely questioned by the protests, which saw thousands of South Korean citizens taking to the streets. While the protests underlined for some observers merely the vibrancy of civil society in South Korea, others worried about the implications of the unfolding spectacle for the institutionalisation of representative democracy in one of East Asia’s vanguard democracies. The unexpected massive wave of protests clearly shocked the administration of President Lee, which reacted to them with a mixture of denial, confrontation, and belated promised to change course. Just when it seemed that things were getting quieter and the government could shift from crisis to business-as-usual mode, South Korea was hit with full force by the rapidly worsening global financial crisis, which had started more than a year earlier with the puncturing of the real-estate and finance bubble in the United States (US). While there had been a number of indications right from the beginning of the year that the ROK would face a difficult year in economic terms, hardly anyone had expected that this would evolve into a (nearly) ‘perfect storm’, following just a decade after the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98. The strong global orientation of important parts of South Korea’s economy, which had served the country so well over the past years, now served to amplify the local repercussions of the worldwide crisis. Rather than laying the foundations for a new era

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of sustained high-speed growth, as Lee Myung-bak had promised to do during the presidential campaign of late 2007, the president and his administration were forced to devote their energies to containing the massive fallout from the crisis. At the end of the year, the question was, however, no longer whether but by how much the South Korean economy would decline in 2009. This overview article traces the domestic dimensions of the ROK’s tumultuous year, picking up the narrative where it stopped in last year’s edition of the Yearbook, i.e. after the parliamentary elections of April 2008.

2 TRIUMPH TURNS INTO DISASTER: LEE MYUNG-BAK HITS A WALL OF PROTESTS

South Korea’s democracy was consolidated in 2008. That is, at least, in terms of Samuel Huntington’s well-known ‘two-turnovers test’, which suggests that a democracy can be considered consolidated after two changes in government have taken place. President Lee Myungbak’s assumption of office on 25 February 2008 ended a decade a progressive rule in South Korea under Presidents Kim Dae-jung (1997-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-08), which in turn had followed upon ten years of conservative rule after the ‘democratic opening’ of the ROK in 1987. Both the presidential election of December 2007 and the parliamentary elections of April 2008 showed that South Koreans had had enough of progressive political forces and their particular agenda(s)—or so it seemed. Certainly, conservative challengers managed to achieve resounding victories in both elections. In vivid contrast to the two preceding very narrow presidential elections, the outcome of the 2007 election was crystal clear: Lee Myung-bak beat his major contender, Chung Dong-young of the United New Democratic Party (UNDP), by a margin of more than five million votes. The parliamentary elections of April 2008 then endowed the ruling Grand National Party (GNP) with another major triumph: the general election gave the GNP the largest legislative majority since South Korea’s transition to democracy in 1987. Shortly after the election, the ranks of the GNP in the 299-seat National Assembly even swelled to 172, when six members of the ‘Pro-Park Alliance’—a GNP splinter group consisting of supporters of former GNP chairperson Park Geun-hye— (re-)entered the governing party, as did 13 independents. South Korea’s governing party could thus bank on more than double the

SOUTH KOREA IN 2008

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number of assemblymen than the main opposition party, the Democratic Party (formerly UNDP), which managed to get only 81 of their candidates elected.1 Effectively, the GNP now controlled close to 60 percent of the seats in the 18th National Assembly, while the Democrats held less than 30 percent, the rest of the seats being held by small parties and independents. Against the background of these impressive results, President Lee Myung-bak and the ruling GNP could be forgiven for thinking that they enjoyed an unconditional public mandate. Yet there were signs that a substantial number of South Korean citizens were not quite happy with the course of the new government. To start with, surveys indicated that Lee Myung-bak’s pet project of building a big inland canal linking Seoul with Pusan was opposed by many, if not most South Koreans. Moreover, his ideas to aggressively promote the English language as a medium of instruction in the country’s education system were not well received by many concerned parents. Last but not least, Lee Myung-bak’s selection of ministers raised eyebrows as no less than 13 of the 15 nominees were accused of real-estate speculation, seven of tax evasion, and one of plagiarism. In the end, three ministers-designate had to withdraw their nominations. Neither did it go unnoticed that quite a few both of the members of Lee’s first cabinet and of his senior presidential staff consisted of (mostly wealthy) individuals closely connected to the president by university, church, home province and other links, all of which led to accusations of cronyism. President Lee later admitted that the moral standards he employed in making high-ranking appointments were not up to people’s expectations.2 Simmering resentment against the new president and his policies, combined with discontent among now out-of-power left-wing forces and perhaps even with a dose of latent anti-Americanism then contributed to unleashing a whirlwind of public protests against the government. These started in early May and lasted for well over two months. The protests were triggered by food-safety concerns among ordinary citizens in the face of the government’s planned resumption of beef ——— 1

Cf. Chung-in Moon (2009), ‘South Korea in 2008: From Crisis to Crisis’, in: Asian Survey, 49 (1), pp. 120-8, here pp. 120-2. For overviews of both the presidential and the parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2008, respectively, see Patrick Köllner, ‘South Korea: Domestic Politics and Economy 2007-2008’, in the 2008 edition of the Korea Yearbook. 2 Yonhap New Agency, 9 June 2008, quoted by Moon, op. cit., p. 123.

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imports from the US. Such beef imports had stopped in 2003 after a case of mad cow disease had been discovered in the state of Washington. (At that time, South Korea was importing US beef valued at US$800 million per annum, making the ROK the third most important market for US beef exporters.) President Lee pledged to start beef imports again when he paid a state visit to Washington in mid-April. It is likely that the Lee administration saw concessions in the area of beef imports as a means to placate the US Congress and thus pave the way for the still pending ratification of the Korea-US free trade agreement. (Governments in Seoul and Washington had concluded the bilateral free trade pact in April 2007, but ratification by the respective parliaments had yet to take place.) What the new ROK government seemed to perceive as a simple quid pro quo, was seen by concerned South Korean citizens as a kow-tow to American interests. When a television programme aired by MBC, one of South Korea’s largest broadcasters, on 29 April suggested that mad cow disease might still be present in the US and that American consumers were avoiding the meat for health concerns, many South Koreans were quite willing to believe that the US was about to export possibly contaminated beef to their country. Panic-stricken schoolchildren and their parents even worried that such beef might end up in school lunches. A first protest gathering on 2 May, spontaneously organised via the Internet, brought together thousands of South Koreans in downtown Seoul. Activist groups distributed candles, recreating the atmosphere of the anti-American protests in 2003, which occurred after American soldiers involved in the accidental killing of two South Korean schoolgirls had been acquitted in a trial. Such initially peaceful ‘candlelight protests’ became an almost daily feature in May and June, bringing at some point in early June around 100,000 people on to the streets. Ordinary participants in these ‘protestivals’ were soon joined by unionists and even opposition politicians who tried to piggyback on the protests. The government decided to postpone the opening of the new parliamentary session, originally scheduled for late May, when opposition parties announced their boycott of the session in protest against the government decision to resume beef imports. While there were effectively a number of grievances of the part of the protesters, they were all united by their dislike of President Lee Myung-bak, who was derided, in one of the many satirical plays on words making the rounds in South Korea in 2008, as Mister ‘2 MB’, i.e. as someone whose mental processing capability was woefully out

SOUTH KOREA IN 2008

21

of tune with the digital era.3 Lee himself at first tried to ignore the protestors and preferred to let government spokespeople explain the details of the planned resumption of beef imports. The government tried to counter health concerns by pointing out that ‘specific risk materials’, including vertebrae, would continue to be banned from being imported. Many South Koreans were, however, not in the mood to listen to such explanations. As protests continued, with direct and indirect economic damage to the ROK—not to speak of the damage done to the international image of South Korea—beginning to pile up, the government finally shifted into reverse gear. Lee Myung-bak, whose public support ratings had entered into free fall, apologised in late May on television for lifting the beef import ban without gauging public opinion. The government also started renegotiating the terms for resuming beef imports from the US. On 21 June, the government was able to announce that the US would not ship beef older than 30 months of age—thought to pose higher risks in terms of mad cow disease—when the import ban was finally lifted on 26 June (see also the article by James E. Hoare on the foreign relations of the two Koreas in this Yearbook). Extra health safeguards, however, failed to placate more militant protesters, who repeatedly clashed with the police at the end of June and in early July, leaving hundreds of protesters and policemen injured. Already on 19 June, Lee had apologised again on television, saying that he had learned a ‘hard lesson’ from the public protests. He vowed both to diversify his administration and to modify policy goals. Inter alia, Lee publicly retracted his plan to build the inland canal and also sacked most of his senior presidential aides. Prime Minister Han Seung-soo and the entire cabinet had already offered in mid-June to resign en masse. The president replaced three ministers, including the ministers for agriculture and welfare, in a cabinet reshuffle that took place in early July. By that time, the demonstrations had lost steam and surveys showed that more and more people were worried that the protests were preventing the government from concentrating on other urgent business. The Democratic Party also agreed to rejoin parliament in early July. Still, as a consequence of the protests, Lee Myung-bak’s authority lay in tatters. Lee and his senior advisors, who could be accused of hubris, had not understood that the triumphs in presidential ———

3 The surname Lee sounds the same as the numeral ‘two’ in Korean and the initials for President Lee’s given name are ‘MB’.

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and parliamentary elections did not equal carte blanche in policy terms. The protests showed that more than just a few South Koreans harboured deep-seated grievances vis-à-vis government. They also showed that a top-down style of political communications was not— or no longer was—in tune with the vast societal changes that had occurred since the country’s democratic opening in 1987. Assessments of the causes, dynamics and longer-term consequences of the massive protests taking place between May and July 2008 differ markedly in South Korea. At one extreme it is argued that the protests can best be understood as an example of mass paranoia. The other extreme position suggests that the mass protests signal the advent of a new form of direct, ‘agora’-like democracy in South Korea (and beyond). The truth might well be more complex. In any case the question remains whether President Lee is really willing to change his stripes by reinventing his style of governing and communicating with the public. Subsequent conflicts with other parts of society, in particular organised Buddhists, and heavy-handed government attempts to quell ‘malicious rumour-mongering’ via the media and the Internet (see below) indicate that the prospects for more amicable relations between the government of Lee Myung-bak and some parts of South Korean society might not be too bright.

3 THE BUDDHISTS ALSO TAKE TO THE STREETS Anti-beef protesters were not the only ones who took to the streets in Seoul in 2008. In early August, Buddhists started a series of protests, which culminated in a large-scale rally on 27 August in which tens of thousands of Buddhists participated—estimates ranged from 60,000 to 200,000, including 7,000 Buddhist monks. The protesters, who had been mobilised by all 27 Buddhist orders in South Korea, demanded that the government stop its ‘anti-Buddhist discriminations’. Buddhists’ recent unhappiness with Lee Myung-bak had started in late 2007 when Lee, a Presbyterian church elder, actively courted the Christian vote in his presidential campaign. At that time, Lee had ‘even thanked supporters who had prayed for “temples to fall down”—a crude reference to some Christians’ hope that there would

SOUTH KOREA IN 2008

23

be more converts from Buddhism if he came to power’.4 During his earlier term as mayor of Seoul, Lee had already outraged Buddhists by dedicating the South Korean capital to God at a Christian gathering in 2004. Concerns about Lee’s alleged anti-Buddhist tendencies mounted anew when the new president appointed only one minister with a Buddhist background to his first cabinet—compared to 13 Christians. The cabinet contained a number of Lee’s churchmates, including the new finance minister, Kang Man Soo. In the following months, Lee riled Buddhists and their organisations time and again. In one instance, the president invited a prominent Protestant minister to say prayers at a lunch in honour of US President George W. Bush, who visited Seoul in early August. Buddhists were also angry about an online map published by two ministries which showed the locations of Christian churches in Seoul but not of major Buddhist temples. (Education minister Ahn Byong-man later apologised for the ‘oversight’ of the government official in charge and vowed to correct the map.) Tensions finally boiled over when in late July the police stopped and searched the car of Reverend Jigwan, the head monk of the Buddhist Chogye order, which claims eight million followers (making it the biggest Buddhist order in South Korea). The police search—for which the chief of police later apologised and disciplined two senior officers—occurred after seven activists wanted by the police for leading violent anti-beef protests had taken refuge in the main Chogye temple in downtown Seoul. After the incident, leaders of major Buddhist orders met and demanded not only an official apology from Lee but also legislation banning religious discrimination. Buddhist organisations argued that recent government activities undermined peace among different religious groups in the ROK. The Chogye order listed on its webpage 23 cases of alleged favouritism by the administration of Lee Myung-bak. Some Buddhist activists even accused Lee and Protestant churches of using the government as a ‘proselytising tool’. Apart from a number of apologies by the culture minister and other high-ranking officials and a few conciliatory gestures by President ——— 4

Lee Tong Jong, ‘Religious clashes unlikely in Seoul’, Straits Times (Internet), 19 August 2008. The following discussion also draws on Lee Tong Jong, ‘Korean Buddhists stage anti-Lee rally’, Straits Times (Internet), 28 August 2008; Agence France-Presse, ‘Seoul govt’s “partiality” riles Buddhists’, Straits Times (Internet), 13 August 2008; Agence France-Presse, ‘Korean Buddhists hold protest services, Straits Times (Internet), 1 September 2008. Choe Sang-Hun, ‘South Korean Buddhists vent anger at Christians’, International Herald Tribune, 15 October 2008, p. 7.

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Lee himself, the demands of the Buddhists went largely unheeded. In view of the apparent lack of sensitivity on the part of President Lee when it comes to the sentiments of the Buddhist community in South Korea, it seems likely that relations between the president on the one hand, and Buddhist orders and their followers on the other, will remain rocky. Underlying the resentment of Buddhist organisations vis-à-vis the president and his administration is a sense of crisis on the part of many Buddhists, which reflects the declining role of Buddhism in South Korea. Christianity has grown rapidly in South Korea in recent decades, overtaking Buddhism as the dominant religion. Today, around 30 percent of South Korea’s 49 million inhabitants are Christians, compared to 22 percent who are Buddhists. Only a century ago, Korea was largely Buddhist, with only a few thousand Christians. Not only Buddhists worry about the aggressive proselytising drives exhibited by some Christian churches. Many Buddhists have also not forgotten that Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s first president (and also a Protestant elder), made Christmas a national holiday in 1948—27 years before Buddha’s birthday received the same official recognition. Still, the latent inter-religious tensions in South Korea, recently fewer, are unlikely to degenerate into the kind of serious sectarian strife that can be found in other parts of the world.

4 GOVERNMENT-MEDIA RELATIONS AND OTHER TROUBLE SPOTS What constitutes ideally functioning media differs, more often than not, in the eyes of governments and democracy activists. Where many governments prefer ‘lapdog’-like media that portray government policies and decisions in a positive light, democracy activists (or theorists for that matter) emphasise the need for critical media holding the government accountable by assuming a ‘watchdog’ function. Recent developments in South Korea illustrate this general point. When the new president Lee Myung-bak embarked on systematically replacing the heads of broadcasting stations—who themselves had been installed during the terms of the two previous progressive presidents—many concerned observers in South Korea cried foul. Lee started his drive to fill top management positions among broadcasters with confidants of his own shortly after his inauguration when he appointed his former presidential campaign advisor Choi Si-joong, a conservative print

SOUTH KOREA IN 2008

25

journalist, as chairman of the Korea Communications Commission. (The Commission possesses the right to appoint board directors at the Korea Broadcasting System/KBS and the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation/MBC, two of South Korea’s four major national television and radio networks.) Not long after, another former presidential campaign advisor, Lee Mong-ryong, became head of SkyLife, South Korea’s only satellite broadcaster. A third campaign aide, Jung Kukrok (a former MBC executive), was then made president of Arirang TV, the only South Korean English-language broadcasting station. The media shake-up grabbed headlines when Yonhap Television News (YTN), a 24-hours news station, acquired a new ‘parachute president’. Dozens of unionised YTN employees staged a sit-in to protest at the appointment of Gu Bon-hong, a former vice-president of Christian broadcaster CTS (and also involved in Lee’s presidential campaign). The personnel shake-up among South Korean broadcasters culminated in August 2008 in the dismissal of KBS head Jung Yunjoo by the public broadcasting organisation’s board, ostensibly for ‘poor management’. Numerous KBS employees tried in vain to physically hinder the extraordinary board meeting from taking place.5 Attempts by the Lee Myung-bak administration the reshape South Korea’s media did not, however, remain limited to filling top broadcasting posts with partisans of the new government. The administration also started to focus on the Internet, which it saw straddled with a number of undesirable tendencies. As is well known, South Korea is the most wired country among the world’s industrialised nations. According to an OECD report released in mid-2008, 94 percent of all households in the ROK have Internet access, compared to an OECD average of 58 percent. Propelled into action by the mass demonstrations starting in May 2008, in which the Internet served as a pivotal tool for protestors in terms of communications and mobilisation, but also building on previous debates on whether and how to regulate the Internet, the new government began to consider new ways to monitor the web and to deal with acts of ‘cyber-bullying, ‘cyber-blackmail’, and ‘malicious online rumour-mongering’. In June 2008, the Korea Communications Commission announced that it would consider strengthening an identity verification system, which had been intro——— 5

Cf. ‘South Korean agency views “shakeup” of major broadcasters’, Yonhap News Agency, 9 August 2008, featured in BBC Monitoring Global Newsline Asia Pacific Political File, 11 August 2008.

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duced in 2007 to fight cyber-bullying. The system had been installled in response to the rise in web-based slander against individuals, including public personae such as television celebrities. According to police statistics, cases on online libel had increased from 3,667 reported cases in 2004 to 10,028 such cases in 2007. Against this background, web portals with more than 300,000 visitors a day had been ordered in 2007 to require their users to submit their names and matching social security numbers before posting comments. In 2008, the requirement was expanded to cover all web portals with more than 100,000 visitors per day. Moreover, the government’s Communications Commission considered imposing fines on portals not responding swiftly to complaints about online libel. The education ministry also instructed teachers to devote more time to the subject of online ethics, starting in primary school.6 Yet, the new government did not stop there. In his official address to the National Assembly on 11 July, President Lee argued that ‘[a] society rampant with excessive emotional behaviour, disorderliness and rudeness cannot be called an advanced society. In this connection’, the president went on, ‘we have to guard against “infodemics”, a phenomenon in which inaccurate, false information is disseminated, prompting social unrest that spread like epidemics.’7 Bent on stamping out such ‘infodemics’, but also on clamping down on what, according to parts of South Korea’s conservative political establishment, amounted to no less than ‘cyber-terrorism’, the government did not shy away from getting the country’s judicial apparatus involved. Inter alia, South Korean prosecutors began to investigate a number of Internet users who had allegedly blackmailed companies into pulling ads from three national newspapers that had been critical of the demonstrations against the resumption of US beef imports. According to a Seoul District Office prosecutor, the Internet users in question had ‘posted messages on Web sites calling for the boycott of products made by companies that [had] advertised in the country’s major conservative dailies’, thus possibly violating laws on hindering business

———

6 See Choe Sang-Hun, ‘South Korea blames Web slanderers for celebrity suicides’, International Herald Tribune, 13 October 2008, pp. 8, 10. 7 ‘South Korean president addresses National Assembly 11 July’, Yonhap News Agency, 11 July 2008, featured in BBC Monitoring Global Newsline Asia Pacific Political File, 11 July 2008.

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27

operations and blackmail.8 In January 2009, the police also arrested a blogger, who had become known under the pen name of ‘Minerva’ for his many postings on economic and financial affairs, on charges of spreading false information—a crime punishable by up to five years in prison or a fine of 50 million won.9 (‘Minerva’ was later cleared of the charges against him.) While the government in Seoul vehemently denied any intention to censor cyberspace, the Lee administration’s systematic efforts to combat what it deems ‘undesirable Internet activities’ have led concerned observers to worry about the freedom of expression in South Korea. In their efforts to do away with the ‘excesses’ of ten years of progressive rule, the new government also picked another fight when it called for revisions of existing textbooks used in secondary schools. According to the government, these textbooks on the one hand downplay historical achievements of pre-1998 governments in terms of generating economic growth and fostering democracy while they focus, on the other hand, too much on the dictatorial traits of the rule of former presidents including Syngman Rhee. The administration also considered the tone of existing textbooks too much anti-market and anti-American and too much pro-North Korean. Attempts to bring textbooks more into line with the conservative outlook of the new government have further incensed many local educators, who already harbour grievances because of the government’s neo-liberal education policies. We end our survey of domestic developments on a sorry note. The main loser of South Korea’s tumultuous year in politics may well be representative democracy. Two important representative institutions, parliament and parties, were basically sidelined in most of 2008. In view of massive street (and cyberspace-based) protests taking place in the second quarter of the year, the new parliamentary session did not open until early July—a full three months after the April parliamentary elections. Opposition politicians decided that their (and thus their voters’) interests would be better served by boycotting parliament and ———

8 Associated Press, ‘South Korean opposition party ends boycotts over U.S. beef’, Wall Street Journal Online, 8 July 2008. 9 See Christian Oliver, ‘Financial blogger arrested as Seoul tackles internet’s hold’, Financial Times, 9 January 2009, p. 2; Agence France-Presse, ‘Seoul nabs blogger over economic gossip’, Straits Times (Internet), 10 January 2009; Choe Sang-Hun, ‘South Korea jails financial blogger on charges of spreading false information’, International Herald Tribune, 12 January 2009, p. 13.

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by joining the protests. When parliament finally started getting to work, its legislative effectiveness was miniscule as the government did not want to be seen as overbearing (again) and thus shied away from bringing controversial legislation to the vote. According to one press report, out of 2,700 bills submitted to the 18th National Assembly, only nine had been approved by mid-December 2008.10 Physical clashes inside the National Assembly, which were triggered by the GNP’s moves in mid-December to finally ratify the free trade pact with the US, also did nothing to boost the extremely low level of trust in South Korea’s parliament. Surely the image of both the ROK’s parliament and the country’s political parties can only get better. Or can it?

5 THE ECONOMY Already early in the year it had become clear that 2008 would a difficult one in economic terms and that the so-called 747 vision that Lee Myung-bak had presented during his presidential campaign would remain a pipe dream, at least for the time being. (Lee had promised to aim at 7 percent annual growth and a de facto doubling of per capita income to US$40,000, and at making the ROK the world’s seventh largest economy—it was number thirteen in 2007.) The decline of the won vis-à-vis the US dollar, which had started in mid-2007 and had at that time been welcomed by export-oriented companies and the government, continued in 2008 and brought increasing problems for the South Korean economy. (Overall, the Korean currency tumbled 25.7 percent to the dollar in 2008.) Import prices for energy, raw materials and other commodities hiked early in the year, fuelling inflation (cf. Table 1). For 2008 as a whole, according to provisional figures released by the government, the ROK’s bill for imports of crude oil soared by 42.3 percent year on year, while import bills for gas and coal also shot up by 55.9 percent and 99.6 percent respectively. Even before the global economic crisis hit South Korea with full force in the latter part of 2008, the ROK’s trade balance was in freefall. For the year as a whole, South Korea registered a trade deficit of US$13.3 billion—the first such deficit since 1997, when the ROK had ———

10 Bruce Gale, ‘S. Korean economy: More focus needed’, Straits Times (Internet), 31 December 2008.

SOUTH KOREA IN 2008

29

become engulfed in the ‘Asian financial crisis’. While South Korean exports continued to expand in 2008 at a rate of 13.6 percent, reaching a new record volume of US$422 billion, imports grew even more dramatically by 22 percent, also reaching a new record volume of US$435 billion (see Table 1). Among South Korea’s export items, petroleum products, ships (reaching a record volume of US$43.1 billion), steel, general machinery, telecommunications, auto parts, petrochemical and displays registered double-digit gains compared to 2007. Exports to the Middle East, Oceania, Latin America and Southeast Asia grew by roughly 30 percent in 2008, while exports to Japan and the EU still expanded by 8 percent and 5 percent respectively—compared to a 1 percent decline of exports to the US.11 The continuing decline of the won also brought difficulties for a significant number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which had signed—as it turned out—risky so-called Kiko (kick-in kick-out) contracts. Such derivative contracts, according to a financial newspaper, ‘set a predetermined range for the won/dollar exchange rate. So long as the won stays within this range—usually ten percent—holders of the derivatives can sell their dollars at a specified fixed rate. However, once FX rates move beyond the specified range … they are obliged to pay twice the amount of the contract.’12 This is what happened to numerous SMEs in the ROK. According to the government, 517 enterprises held such Kiko contracts, with 63 of them having become over-hedged by August 2008. By that time, the impact of the global financial crisis on the South Korean economy had become ever more apparent. Banks and companies faced increasing difficulties in re-financing their foreign currency debts and the construction sector experienced a liquidity crisis. Large companies such as Samsung Electronics experienced steep revenue declines. Foreign investors, who until fairly recently had held around 40 percent of shares traded at the Seoul stock exchange, steadily withdrew funds, which sent share prices tumbling—the market capitalisation of KOPSI-listed companies declined by 40 percent in 2008—, which in turn hurt private South Korean investors, thus further reducing the prospects of domestic demand picking up. ———

11 Lee Joon-seung ‘South Korean swings to trade deficit in 2008’, Yonhap News Agency, 2 January 2009, featured in BBC Monitoring Global Newsline Asia Pacific Political File, 2 January 2009. 12 Song Jung-a, ‘Banks face legal fight as Korean companies sue over FX losses’, Financial Times, 5 November 2008, p. 19.

30 Table 1

PATRICK KÖLLNER

ROK basic economic data 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

GDP (billion won, at current prices)

767.1

826.9

865.2

908.7

975.0

1,023.9

GDP (billion US$)

644

722

845

951

1,049

929

GDP growth (%)

3.1

4.7

4.2

5.0

5.1

2.2

Per capita income (GDP base, in US$)

13,448

15,037

17,548

19,692

21,655

19,106

Exports (billion US$)

193.8

253.8

284.4

325.5

371.5

422.0

Imports (billion US$)

178.8

224.5

261.2

309.4

356.9

435.3

+14.5

+29.4

+23.2

+16.1

+14.6

-13.3

+12.0

+28.2

+15.0

+5.4

+5.9

-6.4

157.6

172.3

187.9

260.1

383.2

380.5

154.5

198.2

210.0

238.4

261.8

200.5

6.5

12.8

11.6

11.2

10.5

11.7

Consumer prices (%)

+3.5

+3.6

+2.8

+2.2

+2.5

+4.7

Producer prices (%)

+2.2

+6.1

+2.1

+2.3

+1.4

+8.6

Unemployed (in thousands)

818

860

887

827

783

769

Unemployment rate (%)

3.6

3.7

3.7

3.5

3.2

3.2

Trade balance (billion US$) Balance of payments (billion US$) Gross external debt (billion US$, end of year) International reserves (billion US$, end of year) Inward foreign direct investment (billion US$, notification basis)

Note: Data for 2008 provisional. Sources: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 4/2009 and earlier editions; Bank of Korea, Quarterly Bulletin, March 2009; Invest Korea, online: www. investkorea.org (accessed 20 May 2009).

The South Korean government tried to contain the downward spiral that the local economy faced by means of monetary and fiscal measures. The Bank of Korea lowered the Base Rate to 3 percent by late 2008 (by February 2009 it had been further reduced to 2 percent) and the government itself responded to the unfolding credit crisis by pledging more than US$100 billion in loan guarantees and by offering an infusion of US$30 billion to prop up the country’s banking system.

SOUTH KOREA IN 2008

31

In November 2008, the government also unveiled a US$11 billion stimulus package, which included additional government spending and tax cuts. A number of ‘New Deal’-style projects financed by the government focused on such things as dredging rivers, building flood defences and planting trees. If the government and many independent exporters had hoped that by vastly increasing foreign exchange reserves—amounting to US$240 billion in the autumn of 2008, the sixth largest worldwide—and by prompting companies to reduce their once staggering debt ratios after the 1997-98 crisis—debt ratios went down from 425 percent in 1997 to 96 percent in the second quarter of 2008—South Korea would be able to ward off any further crises, they were proven wrong. In the third quarter of 2008, the South Korean economy began to sputter, growing only (on a year-on-year basis) by 3.9 percent—the lowest growth rate since early 2005. The fourth quarter then saw the economy contract in real terms by 3.4 percent compared to the preceding quarter, contributing to an overall economic growth rate of 2.2 percent in 2008.13 On a dollar basis, South Korea’s per capita income declined to under US$20,000 again. At the same time, the unemployment rate was (as yet) unaffected, registering on average 3.2 percent in 2008, the same level as in 2007 (see Table 1). As it takes some time before financial crises eat their way through to the real economy, economic prospects for South Korea in 2009 look far from rosy, with growth estimates available in May 2009 ranging from minus 2 percent—the official government estimate—to minus 4 percent.

6 CONVICTING (AND PARDONING) CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY OR, THE FALL OF CHAIRMAN LEE Lee Kun-hee, South Korea’s best-known business tycoon, stepped down in late April as chairman and chief executive of Samsung Electronics after he had been indicted of tax evasion and breach of trust. The 66-year old Lee had led the Samsung Group, which comprises 60 companies accounting for up to 15 percent of South Korea’s GNP and an estimated 20 percent of the country’s exports, for twenty years. ——— 13 Cf. ‘Korea (Rep.) / Konjunktur: Wirtschaft in der Krise’, Nachrichten für Außenhandel, 28 October 2008, p. 7; Alvin Foo, ‘Seoul eager for investors’, Straits Times (Internet), 25 November 2008; Christian Oliver, ‘South Korea undercut by weakness in chip exports’, Financial Times, 23 January 2009, p. 3.

32

PATRICK KÖLLNER

Samsung Electronics, the group’s flagship, is the world’s largest maker of memory chips and flat-panel displays and also a leading player in world markets for flat-screen television sets and mobile phones. Lee had inherited the stewardship of Samsung from his father, who had started the empire by establishing a trading company some 70 years ago. The investigations into Lee’s business affairs began after a high-ranking corporate whistleblower had claimed that Lee and his aides operated a huge slush fund to retain family control of Samsung and to bribe influential South Koreans. Prosecutors argued that South Korean courts should end their leniency toward business executives and asked the court to sentence Lee to seven years in prison and fine him 350 billion won. While in July the Seoul District Court found Lee guilty of tax evasion—Lee and his aides had used secret accounts to hide about US$4.5 billion in assets inherited from Lee’s father—, the court also cleared him of breach-of-trust charges. It sentenced him to three years in prison, suspended, and a fine of 110 billion won (US$109 million). The court declared that Lee’s wrongdoings were not serious enough to merit an actual prison term. Two of Lee’s aides had earlier received suspended prison terms for illegally selling a controlling stake in Samsung Everland, a de facto holding company of the Samsung conglomerate, to Lee’s only son Lee Jae-yong at a discounted price. Lee Kunhee appealed against the verdict but officially retired from Samsung even before the verdict. As Lee continues to be Samsung’s biggest individual shareholder—he holds a 1.7 percent stake in Samsung Electronics, a 3.7 percent share of resort developer Samsung Everland, and 4.5 percent of Samsung Life Insurance (plus another 16.2 percent under borrowed names)—, he is poised to remain influential within the company. After Lee’s stepping down as chairman of Samsung Electronics in April 2008, the company embarked on a large-scale reorganisation drive and a review of its business structure. The Samsung Group as a whole also announced the break-up of its strategic planning office, which had overseen the conglomerate’s operations for nearly 50 years.14 With the charismatic Lee having departed the scene, the Samsung Group has to chart new waters and rebuild its tarnished image. Lee ——— 14 Cf. In-soo Nam, ‘Samsung’s Lee to end all employment ties’, Wall Street Journal Online, 26 June 2008; Choe Sang-hun, ‘Samsung ex-chief guilty in tax case’, International Herald Tribune, 17 July 2008, p. 13; Shimao Ojima, ‘Samsung halfway to renewal’, Nikkei Weekly, 18 May 2009, p. 15.

SOUTH KOREA IN 2008

33

himself can hope to get pardoned in due course, courtesy of the annual presidential amnesties. In 2008, convicted business tycoons pardoned by President Lee Myung-bak on the occasion of Liberation Day (15 August) celebrations included Chung Mong-koo, chairman of Hyundai Motor, who had received a suspended prison term in 2007 for fraud, embezzlement and running a slush found, SK chief Chey Taewon, who had been convicted of fraud in 2004 (and had also received a suspended term), and Hanwha chairman Kim Seung-youn, who had served a brief—and later suspended—prison term for beating up bar workers who had assaulted his son.15 Fearful of hurting the ‘geese that lay golden eggs’ too much, South Korea’s government and judiciary still shy away from jailing convicted captains of industry.

———

15 Reuters, Agence France-Presse, ‘Convicted business chiefs pardoned’, Straits Times (Internet), 13 August 2008.

NORTH KOREA IN 2008: DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS AND ECONOMY Rüdiger Frank

This overview of domestic developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea) starts with additional remarks on the programmatic New Year joint editorial, which has already been analyzed in detail in Volume 2 of the Korea Yearbook. The editorial usually sets the pace and tone for the coming year and is studied, analyzed and discussed widely in North Korea. The second section of this overview covers the proceedings of the annual plenary session of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA—the DPRK parliament) that usually takes place in April, and which reflects on past economic and other achievements, as well as laying out a general plan for the economic development of the country in the year ahead. These two sections are based on official material that is also accessible to the majority of North Korea’s citizens. They are followed by an analysis of major ideological trends, of economic developments, and of other domestic issues including personnel changes. These sections are based on a variety of materials including reports by the South Korean Yonhap News Agency, NAPSNET, Vantage Point, Chosŏn Sinbo, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), and so forth. The major events in and around North Korea in 2008 include its removal from the United States list of states sponsoring terrorism, the absence from view of Kim Jong Il in the autumn, the substantial worsening of relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea), including propaganda activities against the South and its government, and the launch of a second chollima1 movement which marks the arrival of socialist neo-conservatism in economic policy. Inter-Korean relations will be covered in more detail in the article by Burghart and Hoare in this volume. However, domestic and inter——— 1

Chollima (ch’ŏllima in the McCune-Reischauer romanization) is a legendary Korean winged horse, able to cover 1,000 ri—400 km—in one day, which gave its name to a movement for increased production launched in 1958.

36

RÜDIGER FRANK

national events are necessarily interrelated, especially in the case of a political and economic system with state dominance in all fields. Accordingly, the events mentioned above had direct implications for domestic developments, and vice versa. In particular, rumors about the health of Kim Jong Il had a serious impact on a number of important developments. They also triggered renewed speculations about the succession of power in North Korea, an issue that has so far not been officially resolved. Kim Il Sung had his son officially designated as heir during the Sixth Party Congress in 1980, when they were aged 68 and 38, respectively. Kim Jong-il turned 66 in 2008. In this overview, the question of succession and the ‘great revolutionary upsurge’ (hyŏngmyŏngjŏk taegojo), the name for the second chollima movement, will therefore be covered in some detail, before concluding with an overview of other developments in ideology, politics and the economy.

1 THE 2008 NEW YEAR JOINT EDITORIAL: ADDITIONAL REMARKS The 2008 New Year joint editorial, published by the country’s major print media Rodong Shinmun (party), Chosŏn Inmingun (military) and Chŏngnyŏn Chŏnwi (youth league), was titled ‘Glorify This Year of the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the DPRK as a Year of Historical Turn Which Will Go Down in the History of the Country’. The editorial introduced the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung in 2012 as a central date for the country’s development in the next years. Remarkably, the overall tone of the editorial, although still very militant, indicated a certain return to old principles that appeared to be shaken by the economic reforms since 2002 and their ideological back up. This trend, as a long-term analysis of North Korean media shows, started around the year 2005 and has intensified ever since. The reasons are largely unknown and leave room for speculation. Graph 1 illustrates the situation. The frequency of the utilization of ‘socialism’ or ‘socialist’ has diminished significantly in 2001, remained at a relatively low level until 2004, and rebounded strongly in 2005. This makes the years 2001-04 look like the exception.

37

NORTH KOREA IN 2008

Graph 1: Number of KCNA articles with the terms ‘socialist’ or ‘socialism’ in the period Oct.-Dec. 1997-2008 ϮϱϬ ϮϬϬ

^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐŵͬ ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚ

ϭϱϬ ϭϬϬ ϱϬ ϮϬϬϴ

ϮϬϬϳ

ϮϬϬϲ

ϮϬϬϱ

ϮϬϬϰ

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ϮϬϬϮ

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Sources: own calculations, based on KCNA.

Such socialist neo-conservatism, if observed correctly, could have been prompted by external and internal developments, including sanctions, the US attack on Afghanistan and Iraq, the expected new government in South Korea, the mounting problems within the Six Party Talks, the profound societal changes following the monetization and partial marketization of the economy, the worsening food situation, and internal discussions about the continuity of political leadership. The most likely explanation is a combination of all these factors. The leadership of North Korea has keenly observed the experience of Central and Eastern Europe and is not willing to pay for successful economic reforms with a loss of political power—a danger that is very realistic despite the Chinese case which tells a different story. The development goal, dubbed ‘strong and great nation’ has been supplemented by the term ‘socialist’ and is now again called ‘socialist prosperous and strong great country’. Graph 2 illustrates the growing importance of the term over the years, with an initial increase in 2003 after the U.S. attack on Iraq, and another rise since 2005. The Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), which a few years ago appeared to receive less attention because of the rising role of the military, is now at the center again. The editorial stresses the singleminded unity of soldiers and people ‘rallied as one around the Party’.

38

RÜDIGER FRANK

Graph 2: Number of KCNA articles with the terms ‘great, prosperous and powerful’ in the period Oct.-Dec.1997-2008 (trend line added) ϭϮϬ ϭϬϬ ϴϬ ϲϬ ϰϬ ϮϬ Ϭ ϮϬϬϴ

ϮϬϬϳ

ϮϬϬϲ

ϮϬϬϱ

ϮϬϬϰ

ϮϬϬϯ

ϮϬϬϮ

ϮϬϬϭ

ϮϬϬϬ

ϭϵϵϵ

ϭϵϵϴ

ϭϵϵϳ

ŬĂŶŐƐŽŶŐ

Sources: own calculations, based on KCNA.

Graph 3: Number of KCNA articles with the terms ‘KWP/Korean Workers’ Party’ and ‘Korean People’s Army/KPA’ in the period Oct.-Dec.1997-2008 (trend line for KWP added)

ϲϬϬ ϱϬϬ ϰϬϬ ϯϬϬ ϮϬϬ