Keeping the Covenant: American Internationalists and the League of Nations, 1920-1939 0873385667, 9780873385664

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K E E P IN G T H E C O V E N A N T

Am erican Diplom atie History Lawrence S. Kaplan, Editor Afterm ath o f War: Americans and the Remaking o f Japan, 1945-1952,

Howard B. Schonberger The Twilight o f Am ateur Diplomacy: The American Foreign Service and Its Senior Officers in the 1890s,

Henry E. M attox Requiem fo r Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969,

Ruth Leacock American Historians and the A tlantic Alliance,

Edited by Lawrence S. Kaplan The Diplom acy o f Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation o f NATO, 1942-1949,

John Bayiis Uses o f Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy, Frederick S. Calhoun The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-Am erican Relations, 1949-1958,

Q iangZhai The Libyan Arena: The United States, Britain, and the Council o f Foreign M inisters, 1945-1948,

Scott L. Bills Containing Coexistence: America, Russia, and the “Finnish Solution

Jussi M . Hanhimäki Keeping the Covenant: American Internationalists and the League o f Nations, 1920-1939,

Warren F. Kuehl and Lynne K. Dunn

KEEPING THE COVENANT American Internationalists and the League of Nations, 1920-1939

WARREN F KUEHL A N D L Y N N E K. D UNN

THE KENT STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS Kent, Ohio, and London, England

©1997 by The Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio 44242 A ll rights reserved Library o f Congress Catalog Card Number 97-9818 isbn 0-87338-566-7 Manufactured in the United States o f America Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kuehl, Warren E, 1924Keeping the covenant : American internationalists and the League o f Nations, 1920-1939/ Warren E Kuehl and Lynne K. Dunn. p. cm. — (American diplomatic history) Indudes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-87338-566-7 (doth : alk. paper) 1. United States— Foreign relations— 20th century. 2. Internationalists— United States— History— 20th century. 3. International cooperation— History— 20th century. 4. League o f Nations— History. I. Dunn, Lynne K. (Lynne Kathleen), 1951- . II. Title. III. Series.

E744-K77 1997 327.i'7’097309042— DC 21

97-9818 CIP

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication data are available.

To O lga — W arren F. K uehl

To R obert M ax D u n n , m y father, w h ose honesty, in tegrity, and d iscip lin e have alw ays been an in spiration . — Lynne K . D u n n

CONTENTS

Preface A ckn ow led gm en ts In tro d u ctio n

ix x iii xv

ı.

T h e Solem n R eferendum : T h e E lection o f 1920

1

2.

T h e B attle B egun: T h e Struggle fo r Influence w ith H ard ing

19

3.

T h e Struggle E xtended: P ro-League E fforts, 1922-1928

33

4.

T h e D ivid ed C o m m u n ity: Liberals, D oubters, and the F ainthearted

48

5.

W in n in g H earts an d M inds: E ducatin g ab o u t In ternationalism

64

6.

W in n in g the Votes: E ducatin g ab o u t th e League

76

7.

A ltern atives to the League

90

8.

Legalists and Internationalism : T h e C ase o f the W orld C o u rt

9.

K eeping Faith: S ocial and H um anitarian T ies to the L eague, 1921-1939

107

127

10. T h e T angled W eb: U .S .-L eagu e C o o p eratio n in D isarm am en t an d E conom ics 11.

147

T h e B attle C on tin u ed : T h e Pro-League C o n stitu en cy in th e 1930s

165

12. C o llective Security, Sanction s, and the D o ctrin e o f R esp on sibility

178

viii

/

Contents

N otes

203

B ib liograp h y

261

Index

287

PREFACE

n 1969, W arren

I

K uehl published Seeking World Order: The United States

and International Organizations to 1920. In that w ork, Kuehl provided “a study o f an idea and an ideal,” tracing the "continuous efforts, particularly betw een 1890 and 1920, to create an international organization” (vii). This b o o k represents its sequel. Keeping the Covenant: American Internationalists and the League o f Nations, 1920-1939 traces the continued efforts o f "the inter­ nationalists” from 1920, when they saw their dream for U.S. m em bership in th e League o f N ations defeated in the Senate, until the onset o f W orld W ar II. Tragically, W arren Kuehl could n ot see this w ork through to publication. A lth ou gh he com pleted the research and produced a full-length m anuscript in rough draft, death claim ed him before he could com plete revisions and sharpen the focus o f the book. W hen I agreed to undertake those tasks, I re­ ceived a typescript o f 535 pages, divided into fifteen chapters. Those pages represented a prodigious am ount o f research and a rem arkable, career-long com m itm ent to narrating the activities o f an oft-overlooked group o f dedi­ cated people. In the original introduction, Kuehl stated his objective clearly. He wanted to detail the activities o f the group o f people he labeled "the internationalists” between the years 1920 and 1939. W arren adm itted that he found defining the group d ifficult, stating forthrightly that it did not fit the p o lity international­ ist-organizational supporter category developed in Seeking World Order. He was reluctant, however, to provide a new definition that w ould in any w ay detract from the group’s diversity, com plexity, and disarray. Professor Kuehl w ent on to assert that both contem porary observers and historians had oversim plified the debate b y portraying it w ith in a com m it­ m ent versus noncom m itm ent context. H e suggested, rather, that prevailing concepts o f sovereignty and nationalism stood as the ch ie f barriers to the realization o f intern ationalist goals, and that advocates o f w orld coopera­ tion and involvem ent had to be h igh ly im aginative in their response to those

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challenges. H ence, "o n e o f the cen tral them es o f th is stu d y is th at o f a ltern a ­ tive pathw ays.” Finally, W arren K uehl con clu d ed th at he had b egu n "w ith n o special a s­ sum ption s o th er than to d escribe the effo rts and ideas o f people and m o ve­ m ents.” Yet, he n oted , as h is w o rk progressed, it becam e a critica l appraisal o f the in tern ation alists an d th eir efforts. "T h a t th ey accom plished m uch c a n n o t b e denied,” he asserted, "b u t th e to tal p ictu re is o n e o f d iso rgan izatio n an d o f ideas and effo rts w h ich w ere often in co n flict. Perhaps in evitab ly it becam e a stu d y o f id eologies in c o n flic t” Readers sh ou ld b e aware th at I have m od ified b o th th is an alytic fram ew o rk and th e organ izatio n o f the b o o k . A lth o u gh I co n sciou sly rem ained w ith in th e param eters established b y h is research, I have attem pted to sharpen th e o rigin al fo cu s, w ith o u t seriou sly d isto rtin g K uehl’s objective. T h e b o o k is n o w d ivid ed in to three section s. Section I focuses o n th e co n tin u in g p o litica l a c­ tiv ity in su p p o rt o f m em bership in the League o f N ation s an d th e W orld C o u rt. C h apter ı looks at the election o f 1920, exam ining the intense in trap arty d ivisio n s occasion ed b y the attem pt to establish a new , postw ar foreign p o lic y agenda. Issued p rio r to the p a rty con ven tion s, W ood row W ilson’s ca ll fo r a solem n referendum had consid erable im pact. A lth o u gh h istorian s have co n ­ clu d ed th at th e electio n w as n o such th in g— th at voters w ere in fact m ore con cern ed ab o u t such issues as lab o r unrest and the Red Scare— th is sh ou ld n o t obscure the fact th at th e cam paign served as the fo ru m fo r an intense debate, p a rticu larly w ith in th e R epublican party. Even as the Senate rejected the treaty, questions rem ained abou t the actu al course the U nited States w ould pursue. T h e con ven tion s an d electoral cam paigns prod u ced sign ifican t d is­ agreem ents. C h apter 2 then exam ines the con tin ued struggle w ith in the victo rio u s party. D espite th e o ft-q u o ted rem arks b y irrecon cilable Senator W illiam B orah and W ilson ian nem esis H en ry C a b o t Lodge th at "th e League w as d ead” and that the electio n had "erad icated W ilsonism ,” a sign ifican t and relatively pow erful cadre o f R epublicans con tin u ed to b attle fo r in flu en ce over H arding and con ­ tro l o f th e foreign p o licy agenda. Staunch R epublicans such as form er presi­ d en t W illiam H ow ard T aft, H arvard U n iversity presiden t A . Law rence Low ell, and p u b licist H am ilton H o lt w ere far from read y to ad m it defeat. T h eir com ­ m itm en t w as lon g-stan d in g and alth ou gh th ey w anted a R epublicanized in­ tern ation alism , it w as in tern ation alism nonetheless. C h ap ter 3 returns to the stru ggle o ccasion ed b y the congressional elections o f 1922. U n til th is p o in t, R epublican in tern ation alists h ad focu sed th eir atten­ tio n o n p a rty leaders, con cen tratin g th eir effo rts on gain in g the allegiance o f th e executive bran ch. F ollow in g th e congressional electio n s o f 1922, w hich accom plished little, in tern ation alists changed th eir strategy in tw o significant w ays. First, th ey attem pted to heal th eir ow n d ivisio n s, creatin g specifically n on partisan o rgan ization s th ro u gh w h ich th ey co u ld operate. Second, they

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broadened th eir focu s, p lacin g n ew em phasis o n ed u cation al program s th at w o u ld create a grou n d sw ell o f su p p o rt am on g the A m erican p eop le and pres­ sure p o litician s to act. Section II d etails th is a ctiv ity d u rin g th e 1920s. C h ap ter 4 exam ines p u b lic su p p ort fo r in tern ation alist goals and th e d ivisio n s w ith in in tern ation alist ranks over the League o f N ations. H eretofore, th eir com m itm en t to a stable, peaceful glo b al ord er h ad co n trib u ted to a sense o f com m unity. D espite vast differences in approach, these in d ivid u als and th e groups th ey form ed h ad been largely u n ited b y th eir O pposition to the p revailin g com p etitive system . T h is o p p o sitio n allied them to such a degree th at th eir d ivisio n had o n ly lim ­ ited im plication : the overall label internationalist had m eaning. H ow ever, w ith the creation o f the League o f N ations, as th e first exam ple o f an in tern ation al b o d y an d th e strongest expression o f th e m any in tern ation alist ideals, d iffer­ ences betw een the grou p s w ere throw n in to b o ld relief. C h apters 5 an d 6 tu rn to an exam in ation o f the ed u cation al effo rts under­ taken b y th is lo yal opp osition : 5 focuses o n the general, and 6 o n th e sp ecifi­ ca lly L eague-related, efforts. C h ap ter 7 describes the effo rts o f m any w h o p ro ­ posed alternatives to th e League an d to th e W orld C o u rt. T h e fin al section o f th e b o o k returns to a p o litica l focu s. C h ap ter 8 d etails th e effo rts o f the intern ation alists, sp ecifically th e legalists, to b rin g ab o u t U.S. m em bership in th e W orld C o u r t C h ap ter 9 exam ines U .S. so cial and hum an i­ tarian ties to th e League d u rin g th e p erio d , C h ap ter 10 the econ o m ic and p o litical in teraction . It is in these areas that interw ar internationalism is clearly illum in ated. R evision ist h istorian s have used th e hum an itarian an d so cial ties to the League and U .S. disarm am en t an d econ om ic p o licy to challenge the assessm ent o f an iso latio n ist foreign p o licy and to assert that in tern ation al­ ism w as em braced. Yet those w h o called them selves intern ationalists rem ained a loyal o p p o sitio n to th e H arding, C o o lid g e, H oover, an d R oosevelt adm in is­ tration s. A lth o u gh th e y applauded all «cam ples o f in tern ation al co op eratio n , th ey con tin u ed to b elieve th at th e in evitable adm in istrative insistence o n in ­ depen dent a ctio n , un encum bered b y in tern ation al com m itm en ts an d under­ taken ou tsid e the League o f N ation s, w as a co n tin u atio n o f the prew ar status q u o an d fun d am en tally un d erm in ed tru e in tern ation alism . From th at p o in t, C h ap ter 11 analyzes th e pro-L eague co n stitu en cy in th e 1930s and C h apter 12 the issues o f co llective security, san ction s, and th e d o ctrin e o f responsibility. A lth o u g h I am re sp o n sib le fo r re ca stin g th is w o rk , W arren K u e h l’s h erculean research an d o rgan izatio n al schem a rem ain th e h eart and so u l o f th e b o o k . Indeed, o n e o f th e m ost d ifficu lt, yet rew ard ing, aspects o f co au ­ th o rin g th is b o o k has been rem ain in g fa ith fu l to h is objective: to com plete th e b o o k W arren w an ted to p rod u ce rather than to w rite an o th er based on h is research. I am con fid en t th at th e richness o f d etail ab o u t p articu lar p eo p le an d th e o rgan izatio n s th e y led , w h ich w as alw ays th e h allm ark o f K uehl’s w o rk , w ill b e o f valu e to sch olars interested in in tern ation alism , issues o f w ar

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and peace, and th e d ip lo m acy o f th e in terw ar years as th ey d evelop th eir o w n th eo retical analyses. B eyond th at, there is valu e in d ocu m en tin g the w o rk and ideals o f th is gro u p o f p eople. Today, w ith the en d o f th e C o ld W ar and ta lk o f a n ew in ter­ n ation al order, w orld leaders seem in clin ed to reth in k in tern ation al rela tio n ­ ships. W e see positive signs in the d irectio n o f in tern ation al co op eratio n a t the sam e tim e th at w e m ust deal w ith the dangerous and d ivisive forces o f nation alism an d eth n ic hatred. Perhaps m ore than ever there is a place fo r a n arrative o f th ose in d ivid u als w h o fo u gh t so steadfastly fo r th eir b e lie f th a t “A bove a ll n ation s is hum anity.” Lynne K . D u n n

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A CKNOW LEDGMENT fo r su p p o rt o ver the years m ust b e given to th e U niverx \ s i t y o f A k ro n , w h ich p ro vid ed gran ts, and to the R ockefeller F oun d a­ tio n fo r a m o n th o f u n in terru p ted w o rk at its B ellagio C en ter in Italy. A h ost o f person s have aid ed m e in p ro cu rin g access to research co llectio n s, b u t I am esp ecially ap preciative o f the h elp fuln ess o f Sw en W elander o f th e League o f N ation s A rch ives. R ichard W . L eop old read th e m an u scrip t an d p ro vid ed h elp fu l suggestion s an d criticism s, and I am ever appreciative o f m y w ife, O lga, w h o d id m uch b y b ein g su p p o rtive, lo v in g , and h elp fu l o ver a lo n g p erio d o f tim e. W arren F. K uehl M y first d ebt o f gratitu d e is to D rs. Law rence S. K aplan and John T. H ubbell, w h o o rig in a lly b ro u gh t th is p ro ject to m y atten tion and en cou raged m e to undertake it. I am also in d ebted to Professors R ichard W . L eopold , R obert A ccin elli, an d G a ry B. O strow er, w h o read the o rigin al m an uscript an d w h ose in sigh tfu l com m ents served as a startin g p o in t fo r m y revision s. D r. O strow er w as p articu larly generous in th at he reread an d com m ented on the fin ished m anuscript. M y thanks also go to the reference sta ff o f the W in th rop U n iversity library, w h o sup ported m y research efforts th rou gh m assive in terlib rary loan requests, an d to m y colleagues in th e H isto ry D ep artm en t, p articu larly D rs. M ich ael K en n ed y an d L yn n W illo u g h b y, w h o w ere u n fa ilin g ly su p p o rtiv e. L in d a C u cko vich , Julia M o rto n , and Julia Stow e at T h e K ent State U n iversity Press p rovid ed profession al aid and assistance. O n a m ore personal level, I ow e m ore than I can say to m any frien d s and m em bers o f m y fam ily. Professors Scott B ills and E. T im o th y Sm ith have spent endless h ou rs h elp in g m e thrash o u t d ifficu lties w ith d efin itio n and nuance. M y sister, D r. K ris D ixo n -B ills, alw ays sup plied the g o o d h u m or and su p p ort needed at th e en d o f a day o f w ritin g. M y m other and father (to w h om this

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book is dedicated) have encouraged m y professional career from its earliest days. Finally, I am deeply grateful to m y best friend and com panion, m y hus­ band, T im DeM ass, w hose love, support, and patience m ake all possible. Lynne K. D unn

INTRODUCTION

s n e w s o f th e arm istice arrived in the offices o f the New York Tim es, the .o rd e r w as given to lig h t the b u ild in g an d to p lay the searchlight atop the tow er across th e city. Seem ingly w ith in m inutes, T im es Square began to fill w ith p eople. "It w as a m ystery to all w here th ey cam e from . M an y cam e o u t o f th e subw ay, others cam e o u t o f the restaurants, cigar stores, an d o th er places th at rem ain o p en all night.” T h e "th ro n g w as increased b y drivers w h o left th eir m ilk w agons, th eir new spaper w agons, b y m en o n th eir w ay to w o rk, b y taxicab chauffeurs, b y street car con d u ctors, an d b y m any o th er fo lk w h o had heard the to o tin g o f sirens in th eir n eigh b o rh o od s and w h o arose from th eir beds to fin d o u t ju st w h at w as th e latest event o f th e day.” 1T h e G reat W ar, T h e W ar to M ake th e W orld Safe fo r D em ocracy, T h e W ar to E nd W ar w as over

A

an d A m erican s w ere ready to celebrate. Tw o years later, th e A m erican people elected W arren G . H arding to th e presidency. T h e R epublican senator from O h io had cam paigned un d er the b an n er o f "A R eturn to N orm alcy,” an evocative ca ll fo r closure to the w ar years. A n d yet th is slogan m ust be u n d erstood in a p ecu liarly A m erican co n ­ text.2 A m erican b e lie f in progress w as far to o in grain ed to suggest th at th is m eant a desire to tu rn b ack th e hands o f tim e and litera lly return to th e co n ­ d itio n s o f an earlier era. C itizen s o f the U nited States em braced the decade o f the tw enties w ith a sense th at th is w as a n ew age; th eir visio n w as inten sified b y th e b e lie f th at so ciety had been p u rged b y the zeal o f Progressive reform ers b efo re the w ar, and th at the w o rld had been som ehow cleansed b y the flam es o f W orld W ar I. A return to n o rm alcy w as gettin g b ack to lives u n in terrupted b y the strin gen cies and d islocation s o f w ar. It heralded a return to a m ore rom an ticized than real consensus ab o u t A m erica’s ro le in glo b al affairs, the co n tin u atio n o f the lin ear progression tow ard preem inence, econ o m ic stabil­ ity, and a peacefu l w o rld order. T h is b o o k fo cu ses o n th e n ew age: th e illu sio n o f th e 1920s an d th e d isil­ lu sio n m en t o f th e 1930s. C e rta in ly these in terw ar decad es have engaged th e

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Introduction

atten tio n o f h istorian s and have aroused consid erable debate. Initially, h isto ­ rians focu sed on th e rejection o f th e League o f N ation s and the pu rsu it o f a n “unen tan gled course,” d eclarin g th at W ilson ian idealism an d in tern atio n al­ ism w ere defeated in 1920: isolation ism prevailed d u rin g the interw ar years.3 B egin n in g in the 1960s, revision ists attem pted to un d erm in e the sim p licity o f th at d ialectic. Led b y W illiam A . W illiam s, analysts challenged the con sen su s in terp retation . T h e y prod u ced a b o d y o f w o rk th at attacked th e iso la tio n ist fram ew ork, asserting th at the failu re to con sid er econ o m ic a ctiv ity p ro d u ced an analysis th at w as far to o n arrow to exp lain th e fram ew ork o f U .S. fo reig n p olicy.4 H ow ever, th is analysis to o prod u ced critics. A s M elvin L effler n oted in th e preface to h is w o rk, “ T oo frequently, accoun ts o f th is p erio d have tended to h igh ligh t eith er the p o litica lly isolation ist elem ents o f A m erican foreign p o lic y o r the econ o m ically expan sion ist aspirations o f A m erican officeh old ers an d business. Such a d ich otom y sim plifies rather than clarifies reality.”5 Studies o f th e 1920s b y Joan H off, C arl Parm i, M ich ael H ogan , M elvin Leffler, Frank C ostigliola, and E m ily R osenberg exam ined specific elem ents o f interw ar p o licy w ith in th is con text, m o vin g beyon d the “ O p en D o o r T hesis” to “ ind ep en d en t in tern ationalist,” “ liberal-developm entalism ,” and then o n tow ard a co rp o ratist analysis o f p rivate-p u b lic co op eratio n and exten sive in tern ation al ac­ tivity.6C on cu rren tly, th is revision ism has been supplem ented b y research th at approaches the issue from another perspective. W ork b y W arren K uehl, C harles C h a tfie ld , S o n d ra H erm an n , C h arles D eB en n ed etti, an d H arriet H ym an A lo n so grapple w ith new d efin ition s and in terp retation s o f in tern ation alism , far from dead in th e in terw ar era.7 T h is b o o k con trib u tes to th at co rp u s o f w o rk, fo cu sin g on th e people w h o called them selves “ in tern ationalists,” nar­ ratin g th eir activities and exp lo rin g th eir diversity. T h is diversity, w h ose h isto ric ro o ts w ere fu lly exp lored in Seeking World Order, presents h istorian s o f in tern ation alism and p acificism w ith sign ifican t problem s o f d efin ition . T h e in tern ation alists rem ained such a d ivid ed com ­ m u n ity th at th ey are d ifficu lt to identify. Indeed, the o n ly m ean in gfu l d istin c­ tio n betw een them selves and th eir op p on en ts has to d o w ith th e divergence in A m erican view s over the m eans o f achieving the shared goal o f a stable, peaceful w o rld order. V iew ed from th is perspective, o n e con clud es th at in tern ation al­ ists believed in th e p ro b a b ility o f (and, fo r m any, m an kin d ’s general in clin a­ tio n tow ard) w o rld peace based o n co op eratio n , ed u catio n , and a va riety o f co llective efforts. O n ly th rou gh co llab o ratio n co u ld p eo p le h o p e to live in a stable, peacefu l w o rld . G lo b a l in terdependence w as a reality that m ust be em braced. N ation al leaders had to m ove beyon d the balance o f pow er d ip lo­ m acy— tra d itio n a l statecraft— w h ich h ad p ro d u ced n a tio n alistic rivalries buttressed b y econ om ic co m p etitio n and barriers, and create a system built o n co op eratio n . D espite th eir v e ry real and sign ifican t d ivision s, in tern ation ­ alists shared a ten d en cy to see w o rld peace and co op eratio n as b o th a vital

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an d unavoid able U n ited States interest. It w as unavoid able because o f th eir b e lie f th at glo b al interdependence w as a reality th at co u ld n o t be ign ored , and v ita l because o f th eir faith in A m erica as a m o ral an d hum an itarian lead er o f nations. Keeping the Covenant refers largely to th is sen tim en t A lth o u gh som e have questioned w hether the U nited States has ever developed an intern ationalist p ersp ective,' there has trad itio n ally been a com m itm en t to lead. From John W inthrop’s “ C ity on the H ill” to T hom as Jefferson's D eclaration o f Indepen­ dence, th ro u gh W illiam Jefferson C lin to n ’s first in au gu ral address, even th e m o st secular A m ericans have d u n g to a sense th at, w ith the fo u n d in g o f this n ation , there w as a coven an t fo rm ed w ith a H igh er Pow er d em an din g th at th e U n ited States lead to a m illen n iu m o f w o rld peace an d prosp erity. It is th is co n victio n , th is visio n , th is m o tivatio n th at defin es th e in tern ation alists. T h e ir o p p o n en ts b elieve in stead in th e p ro b a b ility o f (an d , fo r m ost, m ankind’s inclin ation tow ard) c o n flic t T h ey passionately clin g to unilateralism because th ey refuse to b e d raw n in to these in evitab le co n flicts unless and u n ­ til vita l U .S. interests are at stake. H ere, th ey d efin e vita l interests in a m uch m ore lim ited sense than d o th eir coun terp arts, restrictin g th eir d efin itio n to n ation al secu rity and strategic interests. T h ese p eop le su p p o rt the preserva­ tion o f a stable, liberal capitalist order and the prom otion o f U.S. values through exam ple at h om e an d ind ep end ent actio n abroad. In the p o litica l arena, th is has m eant strict adherence to W ashington’s d ictu m co n cern in g alliances, and in th e econ o m ic sphere, it involved an evo lvin g, flexib le relation sh ip betw een p rivate secto r a ctiv ity and p u b lic p olicy. T hus, the key to defining the internationalists lies in th eir view o f the A m eri­ can resp o n sib ility to lead. W hereas th eir o ppon en ts, w h om th ey called “ iso la­ tion ists,” elevated th e con cep t o f sovereign ty th at allow ed th e U nited States to lead th rou gh ind ep end ent exam ple w h ile rem aining uncon tam in ated b y th e in heren t ills o f hum an society, in tern ation alists believed in lead in g th rou gh co op eratio n and com m itm en t. A lth o u g h th ey disagreed vehem en tly am on g them selves ab o u t the degree o f n ation al sovereign ty th at co u ld safely b e ab d i­ cated , th ey believed th at th e gains b ro u g h t b y w o rld leadership m ore than ju stified the sacrifice.

1 THE SOLEMN REFERENDUM The Election of 1920

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8 January 1920, W ood row W ilson issued a clario n call. In a letter to

D em ocrats assem bled fo r a Jackson D ay din ner, the presiden t declared th at i f th e T reaty o f V ersailles foun d ered in d ie Senate, “th e d e a r and sin gle w ay o u t is to subm it it fo r d eterm in ation at the n ext electio n to the voters o f th e n ation , to give the n ext election the fo rm o f a great and solem n referen­ dum .” 1 H istorians have prod u ced va ryin g in terp retation s o f th e 1920 electio n , alth o u gh all are in agreem ent th at it fell far sh ort o f the solem n referendum called fo r b y W ilson . W hereas som e em phasize th e d om estic issues th at over­ shadow ed d ie League q u estion , others argue th at “ B oth the R epublican ticket, . . . and the D em o cra ts,. . . fu d ged the League issue u n til voters co u ld n o t tell exacd y w here the candidates d id stand.” 2 H ow ever, b o th analyses d raw atten­ tio n aw ay from th e fact th at, d u rin g the cam paign , b o th parties engaged in inten se in trap arty id eo lo g ical struggles over th e d irectio n th at U .S. foreign p o licy w o u ld take un d er a n ew ad m in istration .

W oodrow W ilson w as n o t alon e in b elievin g th at th e foreign p o licy debate w o u ld and sh ou ld p lay a sign ifican t role in th e electoral cam paign o f 1920. Leaders in b o th parties b elieved th at th eir p o sitio n o n the League o f N ations w o u ld affect success o r failu re at th e p olls. N o r w as th is con cern restricted to d ie presid en tial race. V oters recogn ized th at treaty votes in th e Senate w o u ld b e as im p o rtan t as, i f n o t m ore im p o rtan t th an , th e p o sitio n o f the m an w h o sat in th e W h ite H ouse. League supporters had already targeted a n um ber o f o p p o sitio n senators fo r defeat. T h erefore, p a rty leaders w o u ld have to m ove cau tio u sly to establish a com m on platform on w h ich to stand.3 T h e R epublicans faced p articu lar d ifficu lty in d eterm in in g a consensus p o sitio n ; th ey w ere n o t even in accord on w h at the treaty’s defeat in the Sen­ ate m eant fo r the n ation and th eir party. M any believed th at the Senate de­ bates had revealed th e sh ortcom in gs o f the peace settiem ent and the inad­ equacies o f th e C oven an t. T h ey w ere co n fid en t th at voters u n d erstood that

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R epublicans, b y in sistin g u p o n reservations, had preserved th e nation ’s secu ­ rity. T h u s the p a rty sh ou ld b o ld ly claim cred it fo r th e treaty’s defeat. O th e r R epublicans w ere m ore w ary, em ph asizin g th at there w as consid erable p u b lic su p p o rt fo r som e typ e o f in tern ation al o rgan izatio n .4T h e y th o u gh t it best to m in im ize the R epublican ro le and blam e the d efeat o n W ilson ’s p artisan sh ip an d stu bborn refusal to accept in terp retive reservations. T h e in a b ility to agree o n th e co rrect in terp retatio n o f th e treaty’s d efeat had con sid erable im p licatio n fo r fu tu re p o licy, reflectin g a larger schism : R e­ p u b lican s clearly d id n o t agree ab o u t th e d irectio n in w h ich a n ew ad m in is­ tra tio n w o u ld lead th e n ation . T h o se irreco n cilab ly op p o sed to U .S. m em ­ b ersh ip in th e League o f N ation s represented o n ly a sm all fa ctio n , b u t th e y w ere a p rom in en t an d vo ca l m in o rity th at co u ld n o t be ign ored . T h e y in ­ sisted th at th e p a rty ren oun ce W ilso n ian ideals an d set a cou rse o f tra d i­ tio n a l un ilateralism . A t th e o p p o site extrem e, th e in tern atio n alist w in g o f the party, led b y fo rm er presid en t W illiam H ow ard T aft, H arvard U n iversity p resid en t A . L aw rence L o w ell, an d in flu en tial e d ito r an d in tern atio n a list H am ilton H olt, sup ported a R epublicanized W ilsonianism . T h e y insisted th at th e U n ited States sh o u ld p ro vid e an u n q u alified end orsem en t o f th e W orld C o u rt an d sh o u ld jo in th e League o n an y reasonable term s. R ecogn izin g th is d ifferen ce in em phasis am on g the p a rty fa ith fu l, m an y R epublican leaders cou n seled ca u tio n , esp ecially p rio r to th e co n ven tion , h o p in g th at o th er is­ sues w o u ld d istract voters.1 T h e d isp arity in view s becam e apparent as the lead in g candidates began expressing th eir view s. G o vern o r F rank O . Low den o f Illin o is urged the aban­ d on m en t o f th e League an d the revival o f the H ague C on feren ces to co d ify in tern ation al law and d evelop a peace system based on a co u rt o f ju stice.6 G en eral Leonard W ood endorsed m em bership in the League b u t w ith reser­ vatio n s "w h ich co m p letely A m erican ize it.” H e also contend ed th at the issue sh ou ld be d eterm ined p rio r to the electio n , a p o sitio n in keep in g w ith Sena­ to r P h ilan d er C . K n ox’s m aneuver fo r a con gression al resolu tion fo rm ally ending the w ar and separating the peace treaty from the League. Senator H iram Johnson o f C aliforn ia, n ation ally recognized as an irreconcilable, o p en ly spoke against the League at every op portun ity. G iven this m uch disagreem ent am ong the candidates, C o lu m b ia U n iversity p rofessor John Bates C lark astu tely ana­ lyzed the situ ation w hen he p red icted th at the p a rty w o u ld eith er oppose the League o r be so am biguous as to avo id any "p led ge o f support.”7 C o n fro n ted w ith the sam e th reat o f d ivisio n he h ad avoided d u rin g the Senate debates over the treaty, H en ry C a b o t L odge so u gh t com prom ise. T he n ation al com m ittee w as dom in ated b y persons h o stile to th e League, and the ch o ice o f C h ica g o fo r th e co n v e n tio n site sen t a cle a r m essage. R o b ert M cC o rm ick’s Chicago Tribune had already established its iso latio n ist reputa­ tio n , and m uch o f the press o f th at c ity revealed h o stility tow ard the League.6 Yet no o n e rem em bered b etter than L odge the sp lit o f 1912 th at had given the

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presidency to a D em ocrat. Thus, Lodge planned his preconvention strategy w ith care. H e cam paigned in the M assachusetts prim ary as a delegate-at-large and then publicly interpreted his victo ry as an endorsem ent o f his position during the treaty fight. Thereafter, he sought and obtained the post o f tem po­ rary chairm an so that he could present the party’s position on the League in his keynote address. In tryin g to strike the proper tone, Lodge conferred w ith form er secretary o f state Elihu Root. R oot, arguably the nation’s best-know n jurist and advo­ cate o f an international court, w ould not be attending the convention. W hen it opened in Chicago on 8 June, he w ould be at w ork on the com m ission planning the Perm anent C ourt o f International Justice in T he Hague. Root made his position clear to Lodge. H e dem anded that the irreconcilables not be perm itted to alter the Republican position established during the Senate debates. T he form er secretary o f state insisted that that position "rested upon the principle o f reservations; the declaration o f the platform approving that policy ought to be perfectly d ear and unm istakable.” Convinced that the Sen­ ate vote "does not mean a policy o f isolation,” Root m oved in advance o f Lodge, penning a plank and sending it to form er senator M urray C rane for consider­ ation b y the resolutions com m ittee.’ Lodge, confronted w ith contending fictio n s, refused to be as forthright; his keynote address set the tone o f m oderation he preferred. The delegate from M assachusetts justified the Senate’s opposition to the treaty and con­ dem ned the Covenant because it did not reflect the pattern o f progress that had brought constructive advances tow ard international cooperation in the prewar years. It was "an alliance and not a league o f peace,” one that threat­ ened the lives o f Am ericans in "quarrels n ot their ow n, at the bidding o f for­ eign Governm ents.”10 As the resolutions com m ittee debated a plank on the League, a subcom ­ mittee com posed o f Crane and Senators Frank B. Kellogg o f M innesota, Irvine L Lenroot o f W isconsin, Porter J. M cCum ber o f N orth D akota, and Frederick Hale o f M aine struggled to com pose a statem ent endorsing m em bership w ith reservations. T heir effort gained considerable support until irreconcilables led by W illiam B o rah , H iram Johnson, F rank B ran degee, and Joseph M . M cCorm ick threatened to bolt. Lodge declared that he w ould oppose any position that jeopardized party unity. T he com m ittee then considered Root’s draft and, w ith m odifications, the resolutions com m ittee and, later, the con­ vention adopted it.u A lthough R oot had chided Lodge, insisting that the Republicans should face the issue squarely even if it m eant a split, his plank, "fearfully and w on­ derfully m ade,” w as m asterfully noncom m ittal. It endorsed peace and "an international asso ciatio n . . . based on justice,” w hich w ould "provide m eth­ ods w hich shall m aintain the rule o f public right by developm ent o f law and decision o f im partial courts, and w hich shall secure instant and general

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co n feren ce w h enever peace shall b e threatened b y p o litica l actio n , so th at th e n ation s pled ged to d o and insist u p o n w h at is ju st and fair m ay exercise th e ir in fluen ce and pow er fo r th e p reven tion o f war.” T h e plan k criticized the C o v ­ enant as p o ten tially dangerous an d d isruptive, and it com m ended th ose sen a­ tors w h o had sou gh t to A m erican ize it w h ile resisting W ilson ’s d ictato rial d e ­ m ands. A n y R epublican ad m in istration elected w o u ld “ m eet the fu ll d u ty o f A m erica to civ iliza tio n an d to h u m an ity in accordance w ith A m erican id eals and w ith o u t surren d erin g the righ t o f the A m erican p eop le to exercise its ju d gm en t an d p ow er in favor o f ju stice an d peace.” “ T h is statem ent a d ro itly sum m arized th e R epublican record o f the p revio u s tw o decades, en d o rsin g the objectives o f th e H ague C on feren ces em bod ied in the planks o f 1912 a n d 1916. It pledged the p a rty to th e fu llest co op eratio n in accord w ith tra d itio n a l values w h ile g ivin g n o external agen cy any vo ice over n ation al h o n o r o r v ita l interests. W ith such w ord in g, avoidin g d irect m en tion o f the League, the p lan k p acified the irreconcilables w h ile the pledge to p lay a constructive role in w o rld affairs appeased the in tern ation alist w in g o f th e party.0 Ironically, few delegates show ed p articu lar interest in these positions, largely because o f th eir am biguity. N ondelegates, how ever, w o rried ab o u t th e im p li­ cation s. Low ell fo u n d the p latfo rm n o n co m m ittal an d “rather op p osed t o . . . an y b in d in g o b ligatio n s un d er a League.” H o lt argued th at th e League d e­ served better treatm ent. T alcott W illiam s, professor em eritus at C o lu m b ia U niversity, con clu d ed th at th e con ven tion had avoided its resp o n sib ility fo r th e sake o f harm ony.14 T h e am b igu ity in th e p latform w as certain ly n o t clarified b y the p arty’s selection o f a presid en tial candidate. A fter several b allo ts, n on e o f th e leading contenders had garnered en o u gh votes. T h e con ven tion then tu rn ed to Sena­ to r W arren G . H ard ing o f O h io , an d to G o vern o r C a lv in C o o lid g e o f M assa­ chusetts fo r the vice-p resid en tial n om in ee, as the com prom ise candidates.0 A lth o u gh b o th m en had p articip ated in th e p u b lic debates in 1919-20 over League m em bership, n eith er w as id en tified as h avin g a stron g, passionate p o ­ sitio n . G o vern o r C o o lid g e favored jo in in g w ith reservations; H arding, as a senator an d m em ber o f the Foreign R elations C o m m ittee, had also supported th at course o f actio n . H e claim ed to b e an in tern ation alist, b u t n o t o f the W ilson typ e w h o w o u ld sacrifice n ation al interests “to p rom ote th e peace o f th e w orld.”*6 In fact, H arding’s record on in tern ation alist issues w as so m ixed th at he w as an ideal com prom ise candidate. H e had endorsed a w o rld co u rt in 1916 and h ad in d icated that the League w as safe fo r A m erica i f reasonable lim its w ere im posed. O n the o th er han d , h e had sup ported a resolu tion in 1919 call­ in g fo r rejectio n o f the treaty and th e n ego tiation o f a separate peace w ith G erm any. In A u gu st o f th at year he co n fid ed to a frien d th at, w h ile the U nited States w o u ld p ro b ab ly enter the League w ith reservations, “ I had m uch rather go farth er and p u t th e League aside en tirely b u t I am fran k to say I fear w e can

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n ever m uster the votes to take th at action.” H arding d id n o t record h is vo te o n 19 M arch 1920. D u rin g the debates in M ay, over resolution s to en d a state o f w ar, he h in ted th at earlier he had favored an in tern ation alist pathw ay w h en th e U n ited States co u ld have set its ow n term s.17 Sp ecu lation ab o u t H ard in g’s view s, based o n h is record an d som ew hat co n tra d icto ry p u b lic statem ents, m ou n ted betw een June and his fo rm al ac­ ceptance speech o n 23 July. R epublican in tern ation alists felt uneasy, fearin g th at i f H ard in g d id n o t actu ally have irreco n cilab le sentim ents at heart, he w as likely to fall under the sw ay o f the stro n g-w illed m in o rity an d tu rn against th e League. T h erefore th ey sou gh t to in flu en ce th eir candidate’s p o sitio n .1* V isits an d correspon d en ce w ith th e candidate d id n o t absolu tely assure th e in tern ation alists. A conversation in m id-June le ft H oover con vin ced th at H ard ing w o u ld n o t repudiate the L eague, w h ile T aft believed th at a R epubli­ can adm in istration un d er H arding w ou ld have to accept i t O th ers, w h o feared th at H ard ing w o u ld su ccessfully evade the subject, tried to reach R oot in th e h o p e th at he co u ld in flu en ce th e nom in ee. T h e y tu rn ed to A rth u r Sw eetser, askin g h im to co n tact R oot at T h e H ague. A rth u r Sw eetser w as o n e o f a h an d fu l o f A m erican citizen s ap p oin ted to p ro m in en t League p o sitio n s d u rin g 1919, b efore th e Senate vote. SecretaryG en eral E ric D ru m m o n d ’s ap p oin tm en t o f Sw eetser to th e In form ation Sec­ tio n proved to b e the m ost sign ifican t selectio n m ade. A graduate o f H arvard, Sw eetser had started h is career as a jo u rn a list on th e Springfield (M ass.) Re­ publican, sp en t a year .w ith th e New Republic, and then w en t to E urope as a w ar correspon d en t. A fter m ilitary service, he jo in ed th e State D ep artm en t, w h ere he w as assigned to the In fo rm atio n Service at th e Paris Peace C o n fer­ ence. Sw eetser d eveloped a passionate attach m en t to the League alo n g w ith a d riv in g co m m itm en t to involve the U nited States as fu lly as possible in its o p eratio n . H e becam e the m ajor lin k to A m erican s interested in the League, servin g as an agent to channel th eir view s to Secretariat o fficials, and, at the sam e tim e, p ro m o tin g G eneva’s interests in th e U n ited States. Sw eetser’s ap ­ p o in tm en t ran from Septem ber 1919 to M ay 1942, earn in g h im n o t o n ly the lon gest record o f service o f an y A m erican b u t also th e d istin ctio n o f b ein g perhaps th e sin gle m ost in flu en tial in d ivid u al involved in U .S.-League rela­ tio n s.19 Sw eetser d id th e R epublicans’ b id d in g. H e spoke to R oot and then reported th e ju rist’s co n ten tio n th at H ard ing w as m erely jo ck eyin g fo r position : th e presid en tial can d id ate w o u ld su p p o rt th e League and rem ain fu lly co m m it­ ted to the p o sitio n he h ad advanced as a senator. Sw eetser also in d icated th at R o o t rem ained firm o n m em bership w ith reservations, n o t m erely com m it­ ted to a revived H ague system .10 D espite th e cau tiou s o p tim ism o f H oover, T aft, and R oot, H arding referred o n ly b riefly (and am bigu ou sly) to the League in h is acceptance speech o n 23 July. H e dism issed the C oven an t as “con ceived fo r w o rld super-governm ent”

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but observed that the U nited States had a m oral com m itm ent to advance hu­ m anity. W orking w ith the Senate, he planned to "approach the nations o f Eu­ rope and o f the earth, proposing that understanding w hich makes us a w illing participant in the consecration o f the nations to a new leadership. . . . ”“ H arding’s rem arks d id little to allay fears am ong the internationalists. Had they done enough to influence their candidate regarding the League? Som e o f them thought they should confer about strategy, then advance as a united front. W ould it be better to w ork from the inside o r the outside? W hen a group o f concerned C alifornia Republicans suggested that a delegation call on H arding, San Francisco attorney W arren G regory counseled caution: the candidate m ight publicly w oo the anti-League faction, but he obviously wished "to retain the support o f those w ho favor the League.” Therefore, it w ould be wise to obtain som e statem ent from H arding before they m ade the trip.11 Jour­ nalist Gus Karger reported that H arding had confided his intent to him after the 23 July speech: the candidate wanted to unite the party despite its "diver­ gent elem ents.”11 Edwin F. Gay, editor o f the New York Evening Post, m et w ith H arding, and he too concluded that H arding had accepted the "irreconcilable position” on ly in the interest o f party harm ony. However, if elected, H arding w ould send a delegation to Europe "to see w hat sort o f association o f nations w ithout substantial obligations o f the U nited States could be negotiated.” 14 Therefore, the internationalists determ ined that they could not, and should not, retreat. T heir strength w ithin the party w ould prevent repudiation. T h e m en con tin ued to approach H arding in d ividually. W hen H iram Johnson gleefully cited Harding’s 23 July remarks as a repudiation o f the League, H oover telegraphed H arding to protest, insisting that Johnson should be pub­ licly corrected. T he party’s nom inee should explicitly reject any “surrender to the w orst forces in Am erican public life . . . . ” T he threat o f bolshevism and the record o f idealism called for a m ore positive position.11 A s the Republican factions struggled to control their party’s nom inee, the Dem ocrats convened in San Francisco. They, too, had to wrestle w ith the League question, an issue greatly com plicated b y W oodrow W ilson. Charges that the president’s obstinacy had killed the treaty w ould em barrass them in the cam ­ paign, but D em ocrats could neither renounce W ilson’s role nor ignore him . W ilson allow ed the party no leeway. T he "dead treaty lies very heavy on the consciences o f those w ho killed it,” he declared, "and I am content to let it lie there until those consciences are either crushed or awakened.” In W ilson’s view , the p arty should stand as "the uncom prom ising cham pion” o f the treaty and oppose the Lodge reservations. He continued to insist that m em bership be w ithout qualification and im plied that any D em ocrat w ho suggested revi­ sions or reservations was gu ilty o f betrayal.16 C learly not all D em ocrats feared this indictm ent. Form er presidential can­ didate and secretary o f state W illiam Jennings Bryan challenged W ilson when,

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in M ay, he urged approval o f th e treaty w ith reservations plu s an un derstand­ in g th at L eague m em bers m ake adjustm ents in th e C o ven an t to co n fo rm w ith A m erican desires.9 A M assachusetts p o ll show ed th at a consid erable num ber o f delegates from th at state eith er op p osed th e League o r favored adequate safeguards. Som e D em ocratic senators, n o tab ly D avid I. W alsh o f M assachu­ setts, had su p p o rted th e treaty w ith reservations, w h ile C h arles S. T h om as o f C o lo ra d o an d James A . Reed o f M isso u ri had vo ted w ith the irrecon cilables. Reed w aged a b itter b u t un successful cam paign p rio r to the con ven tion to w in su p p o rt fo r h is p o sitio n . A lth o u g h h is view s cost h im a seat am on g the delegates, he d id gain th e su p p o rt o f som e dissidents. T h e R hode Island d el­ egatio n , after an acrim o n io u s debate, u n an im o u sly ad op ted a resolu tion o f o p p o sitio n to A rticle 10, an d th e N ew Y ork con tin gen t refused to endorse th e League. W ilson ’s insistence th at th e League b e th e m ajor issue in th e cam ­ p aign led th e Los Angeles Tim es to com plain th at h e w as "ru n n in g a sw ord through the treaty itse lf in ord er to im pale his personal and p o litical enem ies.”1* T h e m ore d elicate question th e D em ocrats faced w as w h at to d o w ith W il­ son. H e had n o t fu lly recovered from his illness, and his lim ited co n tact w ith p a rty an d con gression al leaders le ft con sid erable d o u b t ab o u t h is fu tu re role. In ad d itio n , h is rig id ity o n th e League issue also raised d oubts ab o u t h is role as the standard-bearer. B ryan o p en ly qu estion ed h is a b ility to advise w isely. To com bat such resistance, W ilson consid ered ru n n in g fo r a th ird term . T h e presiden t refused to su p p o rt an y declared candidate o r to an n ou n ce h is in ten t, h o p in g th at a dead locked con ven tion w o u ld tu rn to h im as th e lo g ical nom in ee. A lth o u g h h e carefu lly refrained from expressing h is interest p u b ­ licly, he and Secretary o f State B ainbrid ge C o lb y kep t in to u ch b y telephon e, an d C o lb y sou gh t to in itiate a m ovem ent to d raft W ilson .9 A s th e con ven tion carefu lly skirted th e su bject o f his candidacy, W ilson also attem pted to in fluen ce the plan k o n the League. H e conferred w ith H om er S. C um m in gs, D em ocratic n ation al com m ittee chairm an , ab o u t th e contents o f C u m m in gs’s keyn ote address. C um m in gs's rem arks w ere gen erally su p ­ p o rtive o f W ilson ’s p o sitio n . T h e chairm an com m end ed the C o ven an t as th e o n e con stru ctive achievem ent o f th e w ar, and he called fo r a positive an d clear statem ent favorin g m em bership. T h e p lan k ad op ted b y th e p a rty w as less w h oleh earted in its su p p ort. It praised W ilson ’s ro le in the creation o f the League and en dorsed affiliatio n , b u t w ith suitable lim itatio n s. “W e d o n o t op p ose the acceptance o f any reser­ vations,” it declared, "m akin g clearer o r m ore sp ecific th e o b ligatio n s o f the U n ited States to the League associates.” A lth o u g h som e argued th at the q u ali­ fier m erely left som e leew ay fo r th e can d id ate to exp lo it, D avid Starr Jordan con clu d ed th at th e D em ocrats had th row n th e League overboard an d that th eir p o sitio n "w as p u rely p erfu n cto ry and am oun ted to nothing.”30 T h e D em ocrats dem onstrated sim ilar equ ivocation in th eir ch oice o f a can­ d id ate. O h io go vern or James M . C o x, chosen on th e fo rty-fo u rth b allo t, soon

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established h is rep u tation as a com prom iser. In an in terview published b y the N ew York Tim es o n 9 July, h e suggested th at it w o u ld be p ro p er to accept res­ ervatio n s clarifyin g th at m em bership sh ou ld n o t b e con strued as an alliance, th at the U nited States co u ld w ith d raw "at th e first eviden ce o f bad faith,” and th at A rticle 10 w as su bject to the co n stitu tio n al p ro visio n th at o n ly C ongress co u ld d eclare w ar.31 C o x clearly h ad n o in ten tio n o f stan d in g b eh in d W ilson ’s p o sitio n ; h e in itia lly plann ed to m ake th e League a relatively m in o r issue in th e cam paign. O n 18 July, C o x an d vice-p resid en tial candidate F ranklin D. R oosevelt talked w ith the presiden t, and thereafter th ey exh ibited m ore pas­ sion in argu in g th at m em bership w as a h igh -m in d ed d u ty th at sh o u ld n o t be delayed because o f R epublican m isrepresentation, partisanship, and d eceit. T h e y d id n o t, how ever, m o d ify th eir p o sitio n th at A rticle 10 sh o u ld b e in ac­ cord w ith the U .S. C o n stitu tio n .31

Republicans w ho su p p orted the L eague, faced w ith th e relatively fo rth righ t position o f the D em ocrats, w ere n ow forced to respond to th eir ow n candidate’s am bivalent statem ents. T h ey feared th at unless th ey elicited a pro-League com ­ m itm en t d u rin g th e cam paign there w o u ld b e little h o p e fo r actio n on ce H arding entered the W hite H ouse. Som e o f them continued their private efforts to cou n teract th e irrecon cilables’ in flu en ce o n th eir candidate; others p u b licly protested against h is w avering and p o stu rin g. In m id -A u gu st, w h en rum ors circulated th at H ard ing w as sh iftin g aw ay from the League, H oover rallied several m em bers o f th e in tern ation alist w in g to send protests to H arding. L ow ell also appealed to R oot. C o u ld h e persuade H ard ing to endorse m em ­ bership w ith reservations? R oot h eld back, apparently con vin ced th at H arding w o u ld n o t abandon the p latform an d th at his electio n w o u ld b rin g the de­ sired result.33 A n o th er grou p o f faith fu l p a rty m em bers rem ained silen t because th ey d id n o t w ant to accentuate th e d ifferin g view s am on g pro-L eaguers o r d ivid e R epublicans b y p u b licly airin g th eir differences. A n intense debate occu rred w ith in th e League to E nforce Peace (L E P), a grou p begu n before the w ar b y prom in en t R epublicans L ow ell, H olt, T h eod ore M arburg, John Bates C lark , an d F ranklin H en ry G id d in gs. LEP leaders w ere dedicated to in tern ation alist ideals b u t w ere cu rren tly d ivid ed over the p rop er course o f actio n . W ith Taft as its presiden t an d a roster o f prom in en t citizen s led b y Low ell an d H olt, it fo u n d itse lf d ivid ed d u rin g th e treaty figh t o ver w h ether to accept o r reject reservatio n s. P artisan fa ctio n s em erged , w ith som e m em bers su p p o rtin g W ilson’s position an d others the R epublican reservationists.34P rior to d ie fin al Senate vo te, th e best th at LEP leaders co u ld d o w as agree to keep the o rgan i­ zatio n in tact fo r future w o rk. T h e y grew so tim id th at th ey d id n o t even send delegates to a conferen ce o f League o f N ations societies in R om e. A lth o u g h th e L eague to E n fo rce Peace d id co n tin u e to su p p o rt h is N ew s B u reau , R aym ond F osd ick th o u gh t th e situ ation hopeless.33 In June, L ow ell an d T aft

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h ad agreed th at it w o u ld b e a m istake fo r the o rgan izatio n to take a stand fo r o r against any candidate. I f the group rem ained u n ified , th ey reasoned, it cou ld influence the w in n er once he assum ed office. Taft firm ly believed that H arding’s v ic to ry w o u ld result in favorable actio n . H e h oped that H arding w o u ld nam e R o o t secretary o f state u n til m em bership co u ld be achieved and then R oot co u ld w ith d raw in favor o f Lodge.36 L odge co n tin u ed to tro u b le th e in tern ation alists. T h e y co u ld understand th e b itter-en d p o sitio n o f B orah , Johnson, and R eed, w h o op p osed in tern a­ tio n al co llab o ratio n o n p rin cip le, b u t th ey co u ld n o t grasp h o w L odge— or anyone— co u ld sacrifice a vita l issue o n th e altar o f p a rty unity. A ctually, there w as m ore than expediency involved in Lodge’s position . T h e senator had shifted in h is attitu d e tow ard the League, an d he con tin u ed to d rift aw ay from h is previo u s endorsem ents th ro u gh o u t th e sum m er and fa ll o f 1920. H is in itial w illin gn ess to p articip ate in a w o rld o rgan izatio n w ith provision s th at p ro ­ tected A m erican interests gave w ay to in creasin g d ou bts. C o n d itio n s in Eu­ rope had changed, b rin g in g greater danger to involvem ent. It w o u ld b e best, he argued, to retu rn to the system such as th e H ague C o n ven tio n s an d b u ild an association o f n ation s th at w o u ld be peace-orien ted .37 H arding, how ever, proved to be the real nightm are, a candidate w h ose view s rem ained sh rouded in am biguity. O n 28 A ugu st in M arion , O h io , h e declared th at w h ile he d id n o t w elcom e m em bership in th e League, he d id favor jo in ­ in g an “association o f nations.” T h a t phrase had appeared in a d raft prepared b y Indiana R epublicans in M ay 1920, an d H arding used it in his correspon ­ dence in July. T h is phrase soon proved to be exceed in gly useful in strad d lin g th e League issue, an d H ard ing su bsequ en tly displayed consid erable ad roit­ ness as he so u gh t to keep th e factio n s in his p a rty o ff balance. L odge had been p ressin g H ard in g to take a firm er stan d again st th e L eague to keep th e irrecon cilables happy. T h e “association o f n ation s” phrase im plied a w h o lly n ew approach, outsid e the League as th en con stituted . O n th e oth er han d , it h eld o u t som eth ing to the intern ation alists, m any o f w h om h ad lo n g endorsed a ju d icia l, rather than a p o litica l, association o f states.3* C o m m itted , pro-L eague in tern ation alists co u ld n o t understand w hy, after H arding’s M arion speech, R epublicans co u ld fail to perceive th eir cand id ate’s tru e p o sitio n . James G . M cD on ald o f th e League o f Free N ation s A sso ciation heard ab o u t the association idea p rio r to 28 A u gu st and astu tely w eighed the situation : the pro-L eague m em bers o f th e p a rty w ere u n w illin g to pu sh as hard as th eir opponents. T h u s, in seeking harm ony, H arding w ou ld yield “co n ­ stan tly in substance to the L ittle A m ericans,” and o n ly o ffer lip service to the intern ation alists.39 O thers w ere less pessim istic. Form er atto rn ey general W ickersham believed th at H ard in g w o u ld b e fo rced b y th e realities o f in tern atio n al life to respond co n stru ctively to th e League o n ce h e becam e presid en t. O n e co u ld extract from H ard in g’s 28 A u gu st speech su fficien t reason to su p p o rt h im , alb eit

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“w ith out enthusiasm ” H oover initially considered the association o f nations statem ent a hopeful one because it expressed “our views.” He advised voters that H arding did favor an association o f nations, that alternatives to A rticle 10 existed, and that com prom ises w ould be needed before the Treaty o f Versailles could be accepted. In Septem ber, both m en tried again to persuade H arding to stick to the m iddle ground and avoid alienating Republicans w ho believed in the League. H oover w arned H arding that people in C alifornia had increas­ ing doubts: it w ould be necessary for the candidate to reaffirm the party’s position. D espite the fact that these efforts were w h olly unsuccessful, W illiam A . W hite capitulated to the b elief that Hoover, Taft, R oot, and others could hold H arding to the party’s pledge.40 By Septem ber, H arding’s w ords had created a m ajor division w ithin the League to Enforce Peace when som e m em bers o f the Executive Com m ittee rebelled against Taft’s effort to keep the organization out o f the cam paign. A ccording to Taft, it was still vital to help, not offend, H arding as his w ords were “attacks on A rticle 10 and the absence o f a c o u r t . . . and nothing else.” Taft rem ained firm ly behind H arding and sought to dow ngrade the League issue. T he dissidents disagreed and issued a statem ent reaffirm ing their sup­ port for “the existing League o f N ations, w ith such reservations o r am end­ m ents” as m ight be needed for m em bership. T he resulting cleavage im m obi­ lized the organization during the crucial weeks leading up to the election.41 W ith such vacillation in the ranks o f Republican internationalists, it is little w onder that H arding could continue to deprecate them w ith im punity. T he candidate publicly appeared to repudiate the internationalist w ing o f the party w hen, in a speech in D es M oines, Iowa, on 7 O ctober, he rejected the W ilson League entirely. Later he privately assured the pro-Leaguers that he still be­ lieved in an association o f nations, but publicly he w ould continue to express hostility tow ard the League. The m oderates in the party w ould continue to support him because he vacillated from day to day and, according to W hite, had on ly “passing opinions.” In fact, it appears that the m oderates continued their support because, just like the tru ly com m itted w ho continued to send letters and m ake pilgrim ages to M arion, they refused to believe w hat they heard and saw.41 Som e Republican internationalists finally decided that they could take no m ore. Rum bles o f a bolt had been heard for m onths. Yale econom ist Irving Fisher, a loyal Republican w ith an outstanding reputation, pointedly w arned H arding o f the dissatisfaction in the ranks. In June, H am ilton H olt, a lifelong Republican, w arned that he w ould support the D em ocratic ticket if his party did not stand firm . H oover also w orried about his C alifornia friends w ho had grow n concerned, and he cautioned H arding to expect “a defection o f a large part o f the independent and thinking progressive vote.”43 In May, a nonpartisan League o f N ations Society had form ed in N ew York C ity to seek an “unequivocable statem ent” in the Republican platform . Its

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organizers threatened to oppose any party or candidate w ho did n ot support League m em bership. T his presented one option for the dissidents. In July, H olt conferred w ith Fisher about a m ore drastic course o f action: Fisher was pondering whether or not to create a coalition o f independent voters for C ox.44 T heodore M arburg, a w ealthy Republican from Baltim ore w ho had been instrum ental in organizing the League to Enforce Peace, set the stage for such action in a letter to the New York Times. T he G O P platform was "to o dishon­ est to com m and respect” Therefore, Republicans had a duty to abandon their party. It w as a "great wrench,” M arburg w rote Taft, but he felt that there was no other recourse in support o f “this greatest o f causes.”4* Tw enty-five proLeague Republicans, m ost o f them m em bers o f the Executive Com m ittee o f the League to Enforce Peace, subsequently m et inform ally on 16 August in New York C ity at the invitation o f O scar Straus, form er secretary o f com ­ merce. N ot all were prepared to m ake a break, despite M arburg’s challenge and Fisher’s attem pts to organize a C o x Independent League. Even though they decided to postpone action and reconvene on 15 Septem ber, their dissen­ sion received increasing coverage in the press, especially w hen Fisher spoke at rallies fo r C ox. Fisher m et people w ho were shifting in their position nearly every day, so he was optim istic about capitalizing on their discontent. Late in Septem ber and early in O ctober, he gathered the signatures o f prom inent Republicans on a statem ent repudiating H arding and supporting C ox. T his docum ent ap­ peared under the heading Pro-League Independents on 9 O ctober. Shortly there­ after, Fisher organized Pro-League Independents branches in Pennsylvania and N ew H am pshire and launched a Pro-League Special train to carry prom i­ nent speakers throughout the m iddle west and along the Pacific Coast.44 D u rin g this sam e period a leading m em ber o f the Republican N ational Com m ittee, H erbert Parsons, subm itted his resignation and announced his endorsem ent o f C ox. Parsons, from N ew York C ity and one o f the m ost influ­ ential figures in the party, had accepted a vice-presidency o f the League to Enforce Peace in 1916, and had decried the partisan nature o f the Senate de­ bates over the Covenant. A rticle 10 held no fear for Parsons. In his view , inter­ nationalists w ho w anted to build a system exclusively upon international law were unrealistic: on ly the League could prevent war. Parsons had attended the Republican convention where he supported nom inees Butler and Lowden, both o f w h om enunciated d ear positions on internationalism . He view ed the subsequent Republican plank on the League as "punk” because o f its am bigu­ ity. T he nom inee’s statem ents were “mush.” W hen "H arding w ould not sup­ port his ow n vote in the Senate,” Parsons found it im possible to rem ain si­ le n t47 Parsons contacted other Republicans, explaining that the League was "the m ost im portan t issue in this cam paign,” a m oral question above party. H is efforts to obtain H arding’s sim ple endorsem ent o f m em bership convinced

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h im th at there w as n o "h o n est escape.” H is p u b lic resign ation o n 8 O ctober, fo llo w in g a H arding speech in D es M oines th e day b efo re, precip itated a flo o d o f letters from R epublicans com m en d in g h im fo r h is courage and saying that th ey had reached the sam e con clu sion . M an y o f them expressed disd ain fo r H oover, W ickersham , Taft, R oot, an d Low ell fo r th eir h yp o critical com p ro­ m ising. In assessing the response, Parsons con clu d ed th a twI have spoken fo r a great m ass o f con scien tiou s R epublicans.”4* H olt’s cou rse p aralleled that o f Fisher and Parsons. H e had b een in Europe m ost o f the sum m er, b u t w hen he return ed in Septem ber he began to so licit the signatures o f em in en t, d issatisfied R epublicans w illin g to endorse C o x. H o lt’s w eekly, the Independent, had lo yally stood b y the R epublican ticket from the tim e o f th at p arty’s em ergence in 1856, so his d ecision w as a m om entous on e.49 H o lt believed that it w o u ld b e m ore effective to ra lly loyal R epublicans to a d eclaration un d er th eir ow n p a rty ban n er than to accept Fisher’s em phasis o n independents. O n 6 O ctober, he circu lated an appeal in the fo rm o f a procla­ m ation so licitin g signers w h o had “ u su ally su p p orted the R epublican o r N a­ tio n al Progressive tickets.” R eference to th e 1912 cam paign carried a clear re­ m in d er to p a rty leaders th at th ey faced a fatefu l d ivisio n i f th ey repudiated tra d itio n , encou raged isolation ism , and abandon ed “any real resp o n sib ility fo r th e general peace o f the nations.” W h ile expressing respect fo r m en like R o o t and Taft, the signers endorsed the League as th e best w ay to restore or­ d er in the w o rld . T h e p roclam ation b lu n tly asserted th at discussion o f an as­ sociation o f nations to replace the League w as ridiculous: “W e w an t o u r co u n try to stand first in th e co u n cils o f nation s. W e w an t o u r co u n try to share fu lly in the great decision s w h ich are shapin g th e fu tu re o f the w o rld . W e can n ot en­ d orse Senator H arding’s p o licy o f A m erica last.” 10 H o lt’s statem ent appeared in the press o n 18 O cto b er w ith 121 signers “o f h igh stan d in g and unquestion ed integrity.” T h ey in clu d ed co llege presidents, ed itors and publishers, bankers, m anufacturers, clergym en , law yers, an d fif­ teen o f th e tw en ty R epublican officers o f the League to E nforce Peace. T h ere­ after, d ay b y day, H o lt added m ore nam es u n til the list exceeded 150. Late in O ctober, he w ro te to tw o thousan d clergym en asking them to endorse h is p ro cla m a tio n . H o lt’s an n o u n cem en t, co m in g so o n a fter Parsons’s b reak , aroused extensive com m ent in th e press, w ith m o st ed itors u rgin g th at th e in tern ation alist issue be faced honestly.’1 A lth o u g h h in d sigh t has show n th at the action s o f Fisher, Parsons, and H o lt never jeo p ard ized H arding’s chances in 1920, the grow in g d iscon ten t in R e­ pu b lican ranks caused consid erable con cern at the tim e. N ew spaper reports rem in ded p a rty leaders o f the disastrous d ivisio n o f 1912, w h ich had been p recariou sly m ended in 1916. T h e y referred to H olt’s effo rts as “on e o f th e m o st im p o rta n t even ts o f th e cam p aign ” an d d escrib ed th e resp on se to Parsons’s actio n s as alm ost a lan dslide. Parsons played sk illfu lly on R epubli­

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can con cern b y fo rw ard in g letters from dissidents to C h arles W . H illes, a N a­ tio n al C om m ittee m em ber fro m N ew York. N ich olas M u rray B utler reported o n m assive d isaffectio n in N ew Y ork C ity, an d H oover w arn ed o f a “ tid e o f R epublican desertions.” 52 N evertheless, pro-L eague R epublicans w h o rem ained in th e ranks fo u n d it d ifficu lt to exp lo it these threats. H ard in g respon d ed to th eir entreaties in speeches in In d ian ap olis, St. L o u is, an d C h attan o o g a, m o d ify in g h is D es M oines statem ent ab o u t rejectio n . In d o in g so, how ever, he retreated o n ly p a rtially b y saying he op p osed th e League “as it n o w stands.” H e co u ld still accept a “p rop er association.” Parsons, he w rote, co u ld b e n o m ore earnest in h is “desire fo r an in tern ation al association w h ich w ill prom ote understand­ in g, suppress dissension, lessen the causes w h ich p roduce w ar, than I.” H arding th u s kep t the irrecon cilab le w in g con ten t w h ile he w o o ed th e in tern atio n al­ ists.0 W h ile th e pro-L eague p a rty loyalists gain ed som e satisfaction from such rem arks, th ey sensed a need to co m m it H ard ing m ore fu lly to th eir cause. T h e y h ad argued fo r m on th s th at th ey co u ld d o m ore b y rem ain in g in th e p a rty an d in flu en cin g the can d id ate than b y d ivo rcin g them selves from him . A v ic to ry fo r C o x w o u ld o n ly p recip itate a b itter figh t in th e R epublicanco n tro lled Senate. I f th ey rem ained loyal and H arding w on th e electio n , he co u ld ign ore th e irrecon cilables after th e in au gu ration . I f n o in tern ation alists rem ained in his cam p, he w o u ld foil co m p letely u n d er the sw ay o f th e m in o r­ ity an d a ll w o u ld b e lo st.54 A ctin g o n these assum ptions, several League advocates seized upon a schem e to con vin ce voters o f H arding’s in tern ation alist p ro clivities, co m m it him to th e League, and ensure favorable actio n on ce he becam e p re sid en t T h is re­ sulted in th e fam ous (o r in fam ous) Statem ent o f the 31, w h ich origin ated w ith Low ell in Septem ber. Low ell prepared a d eclaration asserting th at i f H arding w as elected , he w o u ld su p p o rt the League. L ow ell soon fo u n d that n o p ro m i­ n ent R epublican w o u ld sign h is d raft, an d a sim ilar effo rt b y H oover m et w ith o n ly lim ited success. H oover tran sm itted h is d ocu m en t to H arding w ith a few signatures an d received a response he described as “equivocating.” 55 T h e m en renew ed th eir effo rts o n 10 Septem ber w h en th ey m et in N ew York C ity at the in vitation o f Jacob G o u ld Schurm an, the recently retired presi­ dent o f C o rn ell U niversity. T h e in itial inten t w as to d raft a “ request” to H arding asking fo r a clear statem ent regarding the League. N early all th e p articip an ts had visited H arding, and th ey agreed th at he w as n o t so m uch op posed to th e League as to certain provision s o f the C oven an t. I f th ey m oved carefully, th ey co u ld h elp cla rify h is view s.56 T aft, how ever, disagreed w ith th is strategy. H e argued th at H ard ing p ro b ­ ably w o u ld n o t respond, th at false debates o ver th e League w o u ld accom plish n o th in g, and th at to em phasize th e issue m igh t lead to a claim th at voters in electin g H ard ing had expressed a m andate against m em bership. D espite th is

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persuasion, Low ell w as lo ath to aband on th e appeal idea, so Schurm an and Paul D . C ravath , a N ew Y ork C ity attorney, com posed a d ocu m en t o f an other typ e. It clarified tw o poin ts. First it n oted th at b o th p arties had endorsed the League. Second, it asserted th at th in kin g had becom e con fu sed because o f u n certain ties raised b y th e Senate’s reservations an d W ilson’s "u n com p rom is­ in g attitude.” R epublican leaders had consistently supported increased involve­ m en t in w o rld affairs, an d voters interested in seein g d ie U nited States in an association o f n ation s sh ou ld vo te fo r H arding. O n ly the R epublicans co u ld gain passage o f a treaty th at w o u ld "sh ift A m erica’s relation sh ip to th e League o f N ation s from th e arena o f con tro versy to th at o f p ractical achievem ent.” H arding’s cam paign rem arks show ed th at he w o u ld "take as advanced a p o si­ tio n in su p p o rt o f in tern ation al co -o p eratio n to prom ote Peace as th e Senate an d p u b lic o p in io n are lik ely to support.” 57 T h e in a b ility to agree o n th e sp ecific w o rd in g o r to n e o f th e d eclaration , w h ile b elievin g "th a t som ething sh o u ld b e done,” led the dissiden ts to co n tact W ill H ays, th e R epublican n ation al com m ittee chairm an . A telegram o u tlin ed th eir con cern th at H arding h ad been sh iftin g tow ard th e irrecon cilable cam p and n oted th at th ey co u ld n o t co n tin u e to a ctively su p p o rt h im w ith o u t som e assurances. H arding replied th at he w o u ld n o t change h is p o sitio n as o u tlin ed o n 28 A ugust, an d he asked them to con sid er th e statem ent he w o u ld m ake in D es M oin es o n 7 O ctober.5* A ccep tin g H arding’s w ord , Schurm an organ ized a m eetin g at the D ow n Tow n B ar A ssociation . A n illu striou s group that in clud ed W ickersham , Low ell, B utler, H oover, C ravath , C h arles Evans H ughes, Taft, H en ry L. Stim son, and presid en t o f P rin ceton U n iversity John G . H ibben gathered. A lth o u gh Par­ so n s w o u ld resign from th e p a rty the n ext day, he attended on th e in vitatio n o f C ravath , an d prepared a fu ll acco u n t o f the d eliberation s. M uch o f th e discussion centered o n strategy. H ow co u ld th ey im m unize the candidate from irrecon cilable influences? H ow co u ld th ey persuade H ard ing to take a firm er in tern ation alist position ? D espite h is co n tra d icto ry statem ents, th ey still b e­ lieved th at as presiden t he w o u ld act to achieve League m em bership. T h ere­ fo re, th ey d ecid ed to d raft a d eclaration th at w o u ld co m m it th eir cand id ate an d , at the sam e tim e, offset the p u b licity su rro u n d in g disaffected R epubli­ cans m o vin g to C o x. O n ly L ow ell an d Parsons o p en ly expressed skepticism . T h e fo rm er observed "th at everyth in g H arding had said w as m ush,” and Par­ sons argued th at o n ce elected "H ard in g w o u ld yield , yie ld , yield.” B utler ap ­ p aren tly agreed w ith th is assessm ent b u t d id n o t speak stro n gly o n the p o in t59 A t th is p o in t R oot on ce again p ro vid ed k ey leadership. H e kn ew o f th e gro w in g fru stratio n w ith H arding, an d he had tried to stiffen his candidate’s resolve. A cable h e had sent from E urope in m id -A u gu st w arn ed H ard ing th at talk o f co m b in in g th e best o f the H ague system w ith th at o f the C o ven an t w as rid icu lo u s; the existin g League p ro vid ed the o n ly avenue to fu lfill the p arty’s platform .*0 W h en he return ed o n 26 Septem ber he learn ed o f Schurm an’s

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efforts. A lth o u gh unable to attend th e m eeting, R oot offered to prepare a state­ m ent. T h is m issive d id n o t arrive in C ravath’s o ffice u n til 9 O ctober, tw o days after the m eeting. A lth o u g h it w as v e ry sim ilar to the d raft th e group had created , it elab o rated o n certain p o in ts to m ake a m ore co n vin cin g case. C ravath circu lated th e statem ent fo r signatures o n 11 O ctober. Som e o f th e persons reached, in clu d in g H ays, suggested changes, b u t a desire fo r actio n prevented o th er than m in o r revision s. T h irty-o n e lead in g R epublicans signed the statem ent.61 R oot’s statem ent reflected the assum ptions o f the Schurm an group. It noted th at th e p arties differed o n th e League issue and qu o ted th e R epublican p lat­ fo rm an d H arding’s 28 A u gu st statem ent as evid en ce o f h is p o sitio n . H arding had “ freq u en tly reaffirm ed the d eclaration s o f th is speech, in the m ost p o si­ tive term s.” T h e “c h ie f controversy” centered o n A rticle 10, w h ich w as n o t necessary “to preserve peace.” T h e “tru e course to b rin g A m erica in to an effec­ tive league to preserve peace” w as n o t to in sist o n A rticle 10 b u t to in vite na­ tion s to revise th e C oven an t. H ard in g had prom ised to “com bin e all th at is g o o d and excise all th at is b ad ” to achieve the “ highest co n cep tio n o f h elp fu l coop eratio n .” R epublicans sh o u ld stand w ith th eir p a rty because H arding w o u ld “m ost effectively advance th e cause o f In tern ation al C o o p eratio n to p ro m o te Peace.” 6* T h e Statem ent appeared in the press o n 14 O ctober. T h e m ost p rom in en t o f th e th irty-o n e signers w ere form er ed ito r o f th e O utlook m agazine Lym an A b b o t, B utler, C ravath , B row n U n iversity presiden t W illiam H . P. Faunce, H ibben , H oover, H ughes, D arm o u th C o llege president E rnest M . H opkins, C o lu m b ia U n iversity p rofessor o f p o litica l science Sam uel M cC u n e Lindsay, L ow ell, R o o t, Schurm an, Stim son, Straus, W h ite, W ickersham , an d W ilbur.63 Ttoo nam es w ere co n sp icu o u sly absent. T aft w as in C an ad a w here he co u ld n o t b e reached, and apparently n o o n e th ou gh t th at Lodge sh ould be included. D u rin g th e en suin g days, o th er R epublicans affixed th eir nam es fo r a to tal o f fifty-six signatories. U n fortun ately, p u b licatio n o f th e statem ent o n 14 O cto b er d id n o t have the desired effect. W h ile m an y expressed th eir view s privately, som e p u b licly attacked th e th irty-o n e signers. C h arles W . E lio t, th e fo rm er presid en t o f H arvard, prepared a len gth y analysis o f th e statem ent, q u estion in g its pre­ m ises, evidence, and reasoning. H e asked in am azem ent h o w “ h on orable m en” co u ld sign “such a paper.” L eading new spapers likew ise brand ed th e d o cu ­ m ent im plausible an d naive, q u o tin g H arding’s an ti-L eague speeches to show the exten t o f the d ecep tion .64 H arding’s rem arks, m ade in D es M oin es o n th e very d ay the grou p h ad o rig in a lly m et, certain ly offered n o su p p ort. H e d id n ot w ish fo r clarifyin g reservations: “ It is n o t in terp retation b u t rejection that I am seeking.” T h e C o ven an t had been “ scrapped” b y those w h o insisted u p o n h avin g it w ith o u t change, an d h e favored stayin g o u t o f “ the Paris League.”63

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Less prom inent observers also saw duplicity and did not hesitate to ex­ press their view s to the signers. Lowell received m any expressions o f surprise that he had been party to such a schem e. A few o f them pleaded that he repu­ diate the 31 and honestly label the Statem ent a lie. W ilbur heard from fellow Republicans w ho noted that the 31 had no assurance from H arding that he w ould listen to them and warned that the signers were little m ore than paw ns.* Parsons (not a signatory) recounted a story about a pro-League printer on a staunchly Republican newspaper w ho, in setting type, deliberately dropped a letter for the lead o f an editorial. Instead o f reading “ thirty -one immor ­ tals ” it appeared as “ thirty -one immorals.”47 Spurred b y the criticism , som e o f the signers sought to ju stify their action. T hey continually reiterated that, because H arding’s election was assured, they had to rem ain in the party and w ork for favorable but safe m em bership in the League rather than alienate the m an w ho w ould becom e president. T hey in­ sisted that H arding had not surrendered to the irreconcUables; their action was designed to prevent just that. W hite rationalized that H arding could not ignore this “pretty strong crowd.” H e was w illin g to sacrifice “som ething o f m y reputation” in the struggle for the League. Straus argued that “this great c a u s e . . . the transcendent issue in this election,” w ould be best secured b y Harding’s election. Root also defended his action. Harding had given Schurm an and H oover “a m ost em phatic assurance that he had not changed and w ould n ot change from his speech o f August 28th.”* O thers o f the 31 sought additional assurances from H arding that he w ould neither abandon nor betray them . H oover valiantly tried to obtain an addi­ tion al com m itm ent. C ou ld H arding not announce that w hile agreeing w ith the irreconcilables’ criticism o f the League he nevertheless favored the con­ structive course outlined in the Statement? H arding m erely agreed to allow the publication o f correspondence in w hich he endorsed certain view s ex­ pressed b y Hoover. H onorably, H oover decided that this w ould be im proper because their exchange had preceded the Statem ent.49 In tw o solid days o f effort late in O ctober, H oover could not reach H arding to obtain a telegram that could be released. H ibben and Cravath also expressed their despair that H arding had not publicly “recognized our statem ent as correctly interpreting his position.” R oot acknowledged that they were doing everything possible to obtain som e announcem ent from H arding and added in a tone o f frustra­ tion , “w ith w hat effect I do not know.” 70 In retrospect, it is easy to see that the Statem ent had little effect on H arding. A lthough he responded to the signers, stating that w hile he rem ained “unal­ terable in m y opposition to A rticle 10 o f the W ilson league I never fitil to m ake a constructive suggestion and say that Am erica cordially favors a fu ll associa­ tion o f nations,” the candidate still expressed satisfaction w ith anti-League statem ents b y Borah and Johnson, w hich he considered w ithin the scope o f the platform and com patible w ith his views. He thought that he had been

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consistent an d that his rem arks in D es M oines on 7 O ctober were in full har­ m ony w ith his 28 August presentation.71 O n ly th eir partisanship and a faith in their cause held the signers firm in their m isguided conviction that H arding really favored the League: he had shifted op en ly and consistently. Newspapers characterized his speech o f 28 A ugust as a repudiation, and throughout Septem ber he rem ained critical o f the League in his public pronouncem ents. W hen, late in O ctober, H arding renewed an attack on the League in term s sim ilar to those used in his Des M oines speech, he in effect challenged the integrity o f the 31.71 In the last tw o weeks o f the cam paign, som e pro-League Republicans de­ cided that H arding still offered the best hope for m em bership. O thers sadly decided to leave the party because they were convinced that if elected their candidate w ould do nothing. A delegation o f pro-League bolters called upon a feeble W ilson on 27 O ctober in an apparent attem pt to appeal to the em o­ tions o f voters, but even descriptions o f W ilson as “a broken, crushed man” who w ept w hen he spoke o f the League did little to change the outcom e.71 Scholars have largely dism issed the Statem ent o f the 31 and its afterm ath as little m ore than a footnote in the history o f the election. Its argum ents, one declared, “were thoroughly dishonest and w orthy o f a shyster rather than Elihu Root,” w hile others, though m ore tem perate in tone, agreed that the State­ m ent m isrepresented the League and the position o f the D em ocratic party.74 A n analysis o f the position o f the signatories, and o f those w ho responded to their w ork, however, suggests that d ie Statem ent o f the 31 and the context in w hich it w as w ritten deserve m ore than peripheral attention. T he signers reflected m ixed loyalties, beliefe, and hopes. A ll were prom i­ nent in Republican circles and had supported m em bership in the League. N early a third had been active in the League to Enforce Peace, w ith at least five serving on the Executive Com m ittee. T heir attachm ent to party and cause m erged in their w ish to ensure victo ry for the Republicans: nothing could replace the existing League, and the D em ocrats could never succeed in gain­ ing th e Senate’s approval o f m em bership.71 A nalysis leaves no doubt about their com m itm ent to internationalism and reveals one consistent feature in their thinking. A lthough alm ost all o f them objected vigorously to A rticle 10 and the extent o f its undefined com m itm ent, they also showed consistent support for the League and the b elief that United States m em bership was vital to its success. T hey continued to believe that H arding w ould w in and that they w ould be able to influence his course by rem aining in the party.7* O n 4 N ovember 1920, Senator W illiam E. Borah claim ed vindication. The New York Times reported his com m ent that the election results signified “an absolute rejection o f all political alliances or leagues w ith foreign powers” and “the rededication o f this nation to the foreign policy o f G eorge W ashington

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and James M onroe, undiluted and unem asculated.” H enry C abot Lodge, too, in a statem ent that revealed how fu lly he had shifted tow ard the irreconcilable cam p, gloated that “We have w on the fight. W e have destroyed M r. W ilson’s League o f N ations a n d . . . we have to m up W ilsonism b y the roots. It was a m arvelous result.”77 H arding’s lopsided victo ry— 16,152,200 popular votes to 9,147,353 fo r C ox (404 electoral votes to 127)— lent itself to such hyperbole. G iven that W ilson had throw n dow n the gauntlet in January, it is perhaps justifiable that Borah and Lodge m ight indulge in such exaggeration. But hyperbole it was, never­ theless. The Republican internationalists had shown rem arkable flexibility and resilience during the cam paign. T hey had not despaired over H arding’s swings between condem nation o f the League and his statem ents proclaim ing an ideal o f cooperation, nor were they w illing to accept defeat now. T he next tw o years w ould prove crucial, as they continued to struggle for control o f H arding and the adm inistration’s foreign p olicy agenda.

2 THE BATTLE BEGUN The Struggle for Influence with Harding

N

ovember 2nd was a sad day for the peace o f the world,” H erbert Parsons

w ro te after reading the election returns. T he pessim ism expressed by this dissident Republican appeared m ore than justified when, tw o days later, W arren G . H arding proclaim ed the election results a m andate and declared: “You ju st didn’t w ant a surrender o f the United States o f A m erica, you wanted A m erica to go on under Am erican ideals. T hat’s w hy you didn’t care for the League w h ich is now deceased.”1 D espite their initial m isgivings and disappointm ents, however, in the weeks im m ediately follow ing the election internationalists rallied to challenge this interpretation. T hey asserted that the position o f both candidates, as w ell as the p a rty platform s, showed the clear internationalist tone o f the cam paign. A lth ough som e w ould concede that the issue had becom e clouded in the m inds o f voters, others, like prom inent businessm an and publicist Sam uel C olcord, insisted that at least ten m illion Republican ballots had been firm ly pro-League. H arding, Borah, and Lodge m ight hope that the issue was decided and that dissension in the ranks o f the G O P was over, but the internationalists were n o t about to concede defeat and retreat. D isregarding the disagreem ents that w ould ultim ately prove fatal to their organizations, they stubbornly d u n g to their faith that they rem ained a pow erful and influential force w ithin the party and th at their ideals w ould be expressed in the foreign policy agenda o f the H arding adm inistration.

Following the election , those w ho had publicly opposed H arding has­ tened to really them selves w ith Republicans w ho had rem ained in the party. Fisher announced his readiness to use the sixty-tw o thousand Pro-League Independents on his roster and his netw ork o f tw enty-nine state branches for any effo rt to influence the president-elect. H am ilton H olt, if som ewhat skep­ tical, also prom ised to cooperate in any w ay possible— at least un til H arding announced his policy.*

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T his position was based neither on cynicism nor on an unrealistic refusal to face political realities. First, the election had increased the Republican m a­ jo rity in the Senate to tw enty-tw o seats. O n ly five D em ocrats w ould be needed to obtain the tw o-thirds needed for treaty ratification. W ith this advantage, H arding w ould be less reliant on irreconcilable votes and thus freer to chart his ow n course.1 In addition to this, follow ing the election H arding had per­ sonally extended invitations to internationalists to visit him in M arion and offer their view s on “our place in international relations” and how best “to im ite Am erican sentim ent” Even H olt received an exceptionally w arm letter asking him to stop in O hio. It expressed no hostility for his opposition and com m ended him for his firm aspirations for a “new international relation­ ship.”-* N evertheless, any approaches were going to entail delicate m aneuvering. T he signers o f the Statem ent o f the 31 began cautiously, hoping to avoid any resentm ent on the part o f the president-elect. T hey decided to w ork through those persons w ho had “ H arding’s confidence, urging upon him as strongly as possible the need o f a League w ith teeth in i t ” W hile this was being accom ­ plished, others w ould attem pt to rally popular support for their goal. N icholas M urray Butler was one o f the first to engage in this task. H e ap­ proached H arding w ith a detailed proposal that included assurances o f inter­ national cooperation based on the H ague conventions and an endorsem ent o f the 1917 H avana declaration as the basis for changes in the C ovenant. B ut­ ler rem ained firm in his b elief that it w ould be best to recast the League rather than create a new one. H arding was apparently receptive to these ideas be­ cause, according to Butler, on 18 D ecem ber the president-elect offered him the post o f secretary o f state, a position Butler declined.5 A s m onths passed, however, m any o f the 31 grew dispirited. T hey had hon ­ estly believed that they could appeal to H arding’s personal loyalty: th ey had accepted his statem ents o f good fidth. M any had been absolutely confident that they could influence his policy and that he w ould support som e typ e o f League. Even som e D em ocrats thought they m ight be successful. N ow som e began to doubt their influence.6W hen they com pared notes on their visits to M arion, they realized that they had com e away w ith m ixed im pressions. O n the one hand, they agreed that H arding seem ed reasonable, eager fo r advice, and interested in foreign policy, although he said little beyond referring to his pre-election speeches. The president insisted that he had n ot changed. People did n ot “w ant the W ilson League,” but they did “very m uch w ant A m erica to do the righteous and helpful thing in prom oting a suitable A ssociation o f N ations.” T he nam e was unim portant: it should be possible to cooperate w ith other governm ents.7Yet, w hen Taft described the incom ing president’s view s to Lowell after his visit on 24 Decem ber, Lowell responded that Taft’s account dam pened his “spirits as w ith cold water.” H e believed that any union had to have sufficient and proper pow er to keep the peace, and he saw that any asso-

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d a tio n in accord w ith H arding’s view s w o u ld b e little m ore than a con su lta­ tive body. O th er in tern ation alists also feared th at i f his plans m aterialized th ey w ould "d estroy th e L eagu e”8 U p on reflectio n , signers o f th e Statem ent w ere forced to ad m it th at th ey felt u n certain ab o u t th is am b igu ity an d feared th at any sh ift in the p o litica l w in d co u ld change H arding’s course.9 E arly in A p ril 1921, L ow ell proposed a m eetin g w ith H arding, d u rin g w h ich the 31 co u ld explain th eir p o sitio n and d eclare th at th ey w ere g ivin g th e presi­ dent an d his n ew ly selected secretary o f state, C h arles Evans H ughes, a chance to abide b y th eir pledges. Som e in the gro u p th o u g h t this prem ature. T h e m ost cau tio u s d ecid ed to ap p ly pressure b y co m m u n icatin g w ith th e presi­ d en t in d ivid u ally, asking h o w th ey co u ld h elp achieve an association o f na­ tion s. O n ly W ickersham seem ed read y to figh t.10 T h e en tire situ ation w as m ade in creasin gly d ifficu lt b y the d isarray and disagreem ent w ith in th e ranks o f the in tern ation alists as a w h ole. O n e factio n w as w illin g to com prom ise, eith er because th ey had d ou b ts ab o u t the League o r because th ey w ere h ig h ly pessim istic ab o u t the chances fo r League m em ­ bership. T h e y w ere an xiou s to gain th e presiden t’s ear because th ey w ere co n ­ vin ced th at, i f th e y d id n o t o ffen d h im , progress co u ld b e m ade an d victo ries w o n , i f n o t th ro u gh actu al m em bership in th e League as cu rren tly co n sti­ tuted , then perhaps b y affiliatio n w ith the W orld C o u rt o r p articip atio n in som e fo rm o f renew ed H ague C onferences. T h e p o ten tial fo r this tack w as bolstered b y H arding’s am biguity, p articu larly h is vague com m ents abou t an alternative "association o f nations.” O th ers, eith er less pessim istic o r m ore co m m itted to G eneva, argu ed that n o real alternative to m em bership in th e League as it existed in N ovem ber 1920 w as viable. T h e League, alread y op eratin g and sup ported b y o th er go v­ ernm ents, co u ld n o t b e supplanted b y an other o rgan izatio n . T hese m en b u t­ tressed th eir argum ents w ith th e League’s record o f success. A s lo n g as it per­ form ed to th e satisfaction o f its m em bers, n o new association w as possible. Even R o o t believed th at H ard ing co u ld n o t substitute th e W orld C o u rt fo r a genuine organ izatio n already o p eratin g.11 League supporters w ere aware that th ey needed to assess the European scene carefu lly and w eigh th e im p act o f th e electio n o n attitudes there. M em ber­ sh ip in a League m old ed to H arding’s sp ecification s w ou ld b e dependent up on the w illin gn ess o f E uropeans to m o d ify the C oven an t. T here had been ru ­ m ors d u rin g the electio n cam paign th at p rom in en t m em bers o f th e League w o u ld b e receptive to revision s, so A m erican s sou gh t to explain the situ ation to frien d s abroad.18 A lth o u g h a few E uropean in tern ation alists, like p acifist W . Evans D arb y o f E ngland, sym path ized w ith A m erican reluctance to becom e in volved in a "su ­ p er state” like the League, the m a jo rity o f E uropeans appeared acu tely aw are o f th e "em p ty chair,” cau sin g a n um ber o f delegates to plead w ith th e U nited States to jo in .13R aym ond P oincaré discussed m em bership in an a rticle in the

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London M orning Post, and D avid Lloyd G eorge voiced his hope th at the A m eri­ cans w ould respond soon. H e seem ed w illin g to approach anyone authorized to speak fo r H arding so th at the process o f m od ifyin g the C ovenant cou ld begin. A subcom m ittee con sid erin g b o u n d ary question s had taken a step to n u l­ lify A rticle 10 b y d eclarin g that its w o rd in g d id n o t p rovid e a guaran tee o f territo rial independence: it m erely condem n ed aggression an d left th e C o u n ­ cil free to determ ine a course o f action . T h is in terp retation , approved b y fo rtyo n e nation s, w as n o t en ou gh fo r a C an ad ian delegate w h o w ish ed to strike A rticle 10. N o t w ish in g to open th e d o o r to am endm ents at the First A ssem ­ bly, the delegates p ostp on ed actio n on such suggestions.14 H ow ever, here w as eviden ce th at E uropeans d id n o t h o ld A rticle 10 sacrosanct, an d A m erican in tern ation alists saw th is as a positive in d icatio n o f E uropean w illin gn ess to accom m od ate U .S. view s. T aft, sensitive to th e lo n g in g on th e p art o f E urope­ ans and th eir w illin gn ess “ to accom m odate us and o u r view s,” presented A s­ sem bly leaders w ith a suggestion th at an A m erican com m ittee con fer w ith them to d evelop a slate o f acceptable changes th at co u ld then b e con sid ered b y th e Senate.1* A m erican s w o rkin g fo r the League in G eneva, alth o u gh th ey played a role in seeking accom m od ation s, w ere n o t all in agreem ent as to th e efficacy o f th is strategy. M an ley H udson, w o rkin g in the Legal Section , apparen tly ap­ proved o f the efforts, and proposed th at a group o f prom in en t citizen s, in ­ clu d in g R oot, d raft a set o f revision s fo r con sid eration .16R aym ond B. F osdick, on e o f tw o assistant secretaries-general o f the L eague, w as less enam ored o f the attem pts to accom m odate the U nited States. H e talked to R oot, L ow ell, H oover, and Taft o n ly to fin d them “u tterly u p in th e air.” T h e assistant secre­ tary-gen eral believed th at these m en w ere engaged in the “d irty w o rk” o f plan ­ n in g reservations o r am endm ents to th e C oven an t th at w o u ld un d erm in e th e League.17 W h ile it w as d ifficu lt to gauge E uropean w illin gn ess to m ake changes to co n fo rm to U .S. desires, it w as im possible to p red ict w h at H ard ing in ten ded to do. A t first the presiden t’s p o licies appeared con ciliatory. H e began b y re­ versing a previo u s p o licy: w hereas W ilso n h ad w ith d raw n the U n ited States, H arding au th o rized fu ll U .S. m em bership and p articip atio n in th e A llied Su­ prem e C o u n cil. Further, h is ap p oin tm en t o f C h arles Evans H ughes to head the State D ep artm en t, and o f a second in tern ation alist to h is cabin et, also encou raged hope. H erbert H oover, H arding’s ch o ice fo r secretary o f co m ­ m erce, h ad been involved in th e League debate and, like H ughes, w as a sign a­ to ry o f th e Statem ent o f the 31. Intern ation alists h oped th at H oover’s p o p u ­ la rity w o u ld m ake it d ifficu lt fo r H arding to ign ore h is view s. D espite th eir h opes, how ever, in tern ation alists had to ad m it th at H ughes and H oover w ere far from ideal spokesm en fo r in tern ation alist ideals. A s a presid en tial candidate in 1916, H ughes had endorsed th e idea o f an in tern a­ tio n al co u rt and som e fo rm o f in tern ation al o rgan izatio n , b u t h e had alw ays

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rem ained cautious in his com m itm ents. D in in g the debates o f 1919-20 he had favored League m em bership w ith reservations, evidencing particular con­ cern about A rticle 10 and the degree to w hich the League could im pose itself on dom estic policies. A lthough Hughes apparently thought that the Treaty o f V ersailles, w ith proper m odifications, m ight be approved b y the Senate, w hether he w ould be an effective leader in that battle was questionable. The new secretary o f state had an independent m ind. D espite his ability to be gracious and persuasive, he had a som ewhat austere public im age, leading to doubts about how effectively he could negotiate w ith the Senate on contro­ versial m atters. In addition, his discussions w ith H arding revealed a w illing­ ness to feel his w ay on the League issue.1* B y early A pril, optim ism that Hughes w ould be a strong League supporter began to fade. The secretary o f state now insisted that the Senate irreconcilables cou ld n ot be placated and that a clash over the issue w ould be disastrous for other H arding adm inistration goals. A t best, internationalists could on ly hope that H ughes w ould m ove indirectly b y opening channels o f com m unication and allow ing representation on im portant League com m issions.'9 League supporters were equally disappointed w ith Hoover. The new sec­ retary o f com m erce m oved carefully, recognizing his place on the “team.” He did not speak out as the internationalists desired. H is discussions w ith Hughes show ed them to be in general accord on the shortcom ings o f the Treaty o f Versailles and the desirability o f League m em bership. H oover began articu­ lating a fearful pragm atism several weeks before assum ing his post. He now believed that any effort to push the League issue w ould result in a m ajor divi­ sion w ith in the party and thus destroy any hope for action. A t best, interna­ tionalists hoped that H oover w ould be strong advocate for the nebulous “as­ sociation o f nations” idea.20 B y m id-M ay, m any w ho believed that H arding w ould be m oved b y influ­ ential Republicans and com e around to support m em bership in the League were beginning to concede that their hopes were unrealistic. U nited States Am bassador to G reat Britain G eorge Harvey, a bitter opponent o f the League, publicly attacked the international organization. T he U nited States, he an­ nounced, w ould never join the League o r have any dealings w ith any “com ­ m ission o r com m ittee appointed b y o r responsible to it, directly o r indirectly, openly o r furtively.” W hen H arvey was not repudiated by H arding o r H ughes, it co n firm ed su sp icio n s th a t th e p resid en t h ad cast h is lo t w ith th e irreconcilables.” N aturally H arvey’s blunt speech aroused considerable protest from those who continued to support the president W ickersham plaintively asked: “W here does it leave us, w ho have been striving to believe that M r. H arding did hon­ estly m ean w hat he said about his advocacy o f an association o f nations?” Yet when L ow ell hastened to W ashington to talk w ith Hughes and Hoover, he cam e aw ay from a session convinced that things had not changed.11

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State D epartm ent and W hite H ouse officials shrugged o ff a deluge o f le t­ ters. H arding privately assured H arvey that despite the "hubbub,” w hich w ould soon die, there was “ little if any criticism am ong those w ho support you.” W hen the am bassador to Italy, Richard W ashburn C hild, also announced that his country w ould not join the League, the m ost pessim istic concluded that the adm inistration had em barked on a cam paign to destroy it.4 H arding’s failure to censure the am bassadors was too m uch fo r H o lt H e drafted “A n O pen Letter to the President,” w hich the Associated Press d istrib ­ uted on 17 June. As H olt openly challenged the president in his letter, m any o f his colleagues thought that he.had m oved prem aturely; such dem onstrations w ould be counterproductive.*4 H olt did not agree. He could not see that the Statem ent o f the 31 had had any influence whatsoever on the president The open letter rem inded H arding o f his position as a reservationist senator, o f the Statem ent o f the 31, and o f his subsequent unequivocal repudiation o f the League. It was tim e fo r H arding to reveal his plan for an association o f nations, w hich the A m erican people and the Senate w ould support if properly conceived. The w orld, “on the b rin k o f revolution, fam ine and pestilence,” dem anded action. It was tim e to re­ deem prom ises. Further delay w ould convince voters that he had “n o co n ­ crete plan” or that he had placed “party harm ony above w orld welfare.” 15 W ith m any newspapers printing the fu ll text, the broadside aroused w id e­ spread com m ent. W hile a num ber o f editors challenged H olt, m ost com m en­ tators agreed that the Am erican people deserved an answer.*4 For a tim e, the W hite H ouse refused to respond publicly. Privately, Hughes and H arding de­ cided that it was best n ot to refer to the subject, although rum ors th at the adm inistration had started w ork on a plan for an association, based largely on legal and judicial principles, were w idely circulated.4 O ver the sum m er m onths there was little evidence o f change w ith in the H arding adm inistration other than the call in July for a W ashington disarm a­ m ent conference. O n 2 August H olt circulated another “O pen Letter,” this tim e to the signers o f the Statem ent o f the 31. A ll received a copy rem indin g them o f their specific pledge and asking a series o f questions. D id th ey still think H arding w ould m ove toward League m em bership? “I f so (a) w hen and (b) on w hat conditions?” W ere they still urging action for a new association? D id they think H arding w ould respond? W hen w ould he enlighten people as to his plan? W ould it be acceptable? Was the W ashington D isarm am ent C o n ­ ference the first step in that direction? Finally, if nothing developed “w ith in a reasonable tim e, w ill you participate in the organization o f an active m ove­ m ent to elect friends o f the League o f N ations at the next C ongressional and Presidential elections?”*1 O n ly a few o f the signers responded. Lowell thought it was prem ature “to trum p your partner’s trick, unless, having lost all confidence in him , you no longer desire him as a partner and are w illing to relieve him o f responsibility

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o f th e result.” H ughes answ ered th at his o fficia l p o sitio n prevented h im from a n y com m ent; yet to an oth er correspon d en t he deprecated th e “ renew al o f th e controversy.” H e sensed a grow in g p o p u lar o p p o sitio n to League m em ­ bership; fu rth erm ore, th e Senate w o u ld never approve.” E d itorial responses largely su p p orted H olt’s effo rts, and several question ed th e h o n esty o f d ie 31. Such com m ents p roved to be em barrassing. Even Low ell grew in creasin gly im patien t as th e m onth s passed. In N ovem ber, he in d ig­ n a n tly asked H ughes, “ Since w h en has it been th e fu n ctio n o f the A m erican A m bassad or to th e C o u rt o f St. James to d irect and exp o u n d A m erican fo r­ e ig n p o lic y ? ” 30 O th e r sig n a to rie s w ere less d ish e a rten ed . F o r ex a m p le, W ickersham and H oover sensed L ow ell’s dissatisfaction and kept w arn in g him to avoid ill-tim ed actio n .31 In a m essage to C on gress o n 12 A p ril, th e presiden t had reiterated th at the electio n h ad determ ined th at th e “ League C oven an t can have n o san ctio n b y us.” H e added, how ever, th at he still favored som e association th at co u ld p rom ote peace. T h e association o f n ation s idea w as apparen tly still alive and the p eren n ially o p tim istic m aintained th eir faith th at H ughes and H oover w o u ld in flu en ce policy.

N othing illustrates the d isarray an d disagreem ent w ith in th e ranks o f the in tern ation alists m ore d e a rly than th e co n tin u ed d ivisio n s w ith in th e League to E nforce Peace (LEP) an d th e subsequent falterin g attem pts m ade to form a n ew in tern ation alist organ izatio n . T h e electio n o f 1920 had w id en ed th e fissures in th e LEP, h avin g created heated debate an d resign ations. B ecause the organ izatio n had proved itse lf an in effective v e h id e , n ew groups so u gh t to ra lly pro-L eague forces. D espite h is personal com m itm en t to th e group, L ow ell coop erated th at sp rin g in rallyin g several so d e tie s to actio n . It show ed, he argued, “ th at w e pro-L eague R epub­ lican s are n o t asleep b u t are aw ake an d vigilan t.”32 E arly in January 1921, representatives o f the W orld Peace F oun d ation , th e C arn egie E ndow m ent fo r In tern ation al Peace, th e League o f Free N ation s A sso ciation , Pro-League Independents, C h u rch Peace U n io n , and the League o f N ation s N ew s B ureau had assem bled to discuss a n ew organ izatio n to p ro ­ m ote League m em bership. C a llin g them selves the A m erican A sso d a tio n fo r a League o f N ation s (A A L N ), th ey d ecid ed to fo cu s th eir effo rts o n d raftin g a list o f changes to m ake th e C o ven an t acceptable to the pu b lic. A lth o u g h th ey h op ed th at eith er R oot o r H oover w o u ld accept the presidency, b o th d eclined. A n o th er b lo w fell w hen Taft insisted that LEP m em bers w ithdraw . E fforts w ere then suspended u n til H arding to o k office.33 P rio r to th e in au gu ration , the E xecutive C om m ittee o f th e League to En­ force Peace m aintained a cau tiou s approach. D espite the fact th at som e m em ­ bers w ere p u sh in g T aft to act m ore vigorou sly, th e com m ittee resisted th e pressure b y argu in g that th ey m igh t lo se everyth in g b y b ein g to o aggressive. Taft believed th e Senate co u ld b e persuaded to jo in i f League m em bers w o u ld

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agree to satisfactory revisions in the C o ven a n t G iven this, he opposed any m ove that w ould alienate the new p resid en t T h e com m ittee concurred, decidin g n o t to press H arding un til he had talked Mw ith prom inent friends o f the League.”34 B y M arch, Low ell w as expressing d ou b ts ab o u t this strategy in th e face o f H arding’s am biguous in au gu ral address. H is critiq u e m igh t have carried co n ­ siderable w eigh t had it n o t been un d ercu t b y H arding’s selectio n o f H ughes as secretary o f state. Subsequently, it seem ed lo g ica l to T aft and th e others th at H ughes m igh t accom p lish “o u r ultim ate purpose.”33 T h e w avering am on g the leadership o f th e League to E nforce Peace as to th e p roper am ou n t and typ e o f pressure to exert o n H arding clearly cloaked a d eeper o rgan izatio n al d ivisio n . E xecutive S ecretary W illiam H . S h ort h ad jo in ed Low ell in pu sh in g fo r a m ore vigo ro u s ro le fo r th e LEP. T h is p o sitio n evoked criticism from Taft and his supporters. W h en H arding, in h is 12 A p ril con gression al address, suggested th at th e T reaty o f V ersailles be ratified w ith ­ o u t th e C o ven an t, dissidents in th e League to E n force Peace forced T aft to ca ll a m eetin g o f the E xecutive C om m ittee on th e th irteen th . C o m p etin g resolu­ tion s in tro d u ced b y W ickersham and H o lt resulted in a com prom ise state­ m ent o n 30 A p ril.34 T h e com prom ise reso lu tio n reaffirm ed su p p o rt fo r th e H ard in g ad m in is­ tra tio n ’s effo rts to achieve “an y effective o rgan izatio n ” th at w o u ld preserve “peace an d ju stice” th ro u gh “a C o u rt o f In tern ation al Justice, w ith ap p ro p ri­ ate san ction s fo r secu rin g a resort th ereto an d m ach in ery fo r con feren ce and co op eratio n .” T h e dissenters failed in th eir attem pt to in clu d e som e expres­ sio n o f su p p o rt fo r th e existin g League. M arb u rg co u ld n o t und erstand su ch faith in an ad m in istratio n w ith a h o stile record tow ard th e League o f N a­ tio n s, an d h is p rotest stim u lated a d d itio n al debate.37 T hese discussion s revealed the w id e range o f view s w ith in th e organ iza­ tio n . John Bates C lark believed that co op eratio n betw een n ation s w o u ld lead grad u ally to a n ew “ in form al association w h ich , i f lo n g con tin u ed o u g h t to rip en in to a league.” T aft argued th at th e irrecon cilables an d H arding w o u ld soon p art com pany, th u s leavin g th e presiden t free to act. T h erefore, p ractical con sid eration s sh ould d eterm ine th eir course even i f th at d id n o t lead to the m ost desirable result. L ow ell agreed an d extended th e argum ent. T h e C o v ­ enant had never in clu d ed th e m ost essential League to E nforce Peace p ro ­ posal, w h ich called fo r “ the em ploym en t o f m ilitary force against a m em ber w h ich goes to w ar w ith o u t previo u s resort to ju d icia l and arb itral tribunals.” Since th ey had already abandon ed o ver h a lf a lo a f, th ey sh ould gam ble o n the H arding ad m in istration and at least gain som eth in g. M arbu rg responded th at reality la y in the existin g League; any endorsem ent o f H arding’s undefin ed association w as a betrayal o f d ie cause. Parsons responded m ore bluntly. H e considered “talk ab o u t an A sso ciation o f N ations as bunk.” R ealists sh ould ad m it th at the irrecon cilables d om in ated the n ew ad m in istration . Taft and L ow ell refused to accept th is assessm ent. T h ey steadfastly clu n g to th e b e lie f

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th at th ey co u ld still prevail over b o th Lodge and B orah and th at H ughes w o u ld lead the n ation in to acceptin g the Versailles treaty.3* T orn b y intern al differences, the League to E nforce Peace lo st m em bers and fin an cial su p p o rt A sta ff th at had num bered as m any as seventy in N ovem ber 1919 d w in d led to five in A p ril 1921. T reasurer H erb ert S. H o u sto n raised su fficien t fu n d s to p ay a d ebt o f $9,500 and to accum ulate $4,000 fo r a "n ext cam paign,” b u t n o o n e co u ld d ecid e w hen th at w ou ld develop.39M arburg sug­ gested th at th ey send p u b licatio n s o f the League o f N ation s to all senators, b u t Low ell feared th at such a m ove m igh t alienate supporters. Sh ort proposed an in n ocu ou s “W orld -O ur-N eighbor” educational program th at cou ld include d iscussion o f th e "L eague o f N ation s as an association o f n eigh bors fo r m ak­ in g a ratio n al and peacefu l w orld,” b u t th at idea elicited o n ly lim ited su p p ort. In July 1921, the League to E nforce Peace lo st Taft, w h o resigned to becom e c h ie f ju s tic e o f th e U n ite d S tates. L o w e ll assu m ed th e p re sid e n cy an d W ickersham accepted th e chairm an ship o f th e E xecutive C om m ittee. Frus­ trated b y th e la ck o f ad m in istrative actio n , L ow ell tu rn ed to H ughes fo r sug­ gestion s as to appropriate LEP tactics. T h e secretary o f state, enm eshed in co n clu d in g a separate peace treaty w ith G erm an y and in preparin g fo r the fo rth co m in g naval disarm am en t con feren ce, issued a w arn in g n o t to m ou n t any d em on stration s.40 O n several occasion s, H ard in g had co u p led th e idea o f disarm am ent d is­ cussions w ith his association o f n ation s p roposal, alth o u gh he w as character­ istically vagu e ab o u t h o w he w o u ld d o this. T h e July call fo r disarm am ent d iscussions has been characterized as a p lo y b y th e H ard ing ad m in istration to dem onstrate its co m m itm en t to w o rld peace "w h ile ign o rin g th e League o f N ations.” T h e W ashington N aval C on feren ce, sch ed uled to assem ble on 12 N ovem ber 1921, d id m o m en tarily d istract th e intern ation alists. T h ro u gh o u t O cto b er the leaders o f the League to E nforce Peace fo u n d them selves d ebat­ in g h o w th ey co u ld best su p p o rt the W ashington conference rather than h o w th ey co u ld pressure the H arding ad m in istration .41 Low ell and W ickersham to o k th e lead in d ecid in g to w ait u n til th e disarm am ent conference ended b efo re la u n ch in g an y n ew p ro gram s. T h ro u g h o u t 1922, th e o rg an iza tio n m ou n ted an unsuccessful d rive fo r funds, b u t its leaders even tu ally ackn ow l­ edged th e d ivision s w ith in th e organ izatio n and fo rm ally ended its existence in Septem ber 1923.42 M eanw hile, the attem pt to create the n ew A m erican A ssociation fo r a League o f N ation s had foun d ered . W ickersham , alth ou gh still h o p in g to in flu en ce League to E nforce Peace strategy, h ad issued a call fo r representatives o f in ter­ n ation alist groups to com e togeth er in A p ril 1921. O n the tw en ty-th ird , at the C en tu ry C lu b in N ew Y ork C ity, the grou p heard reports that H ughes favored League m em bership, th at he w as th in k in g o f resubm ittin g th e treaty to the Senate, and th at th e H ard ing ad m in istration w anted n o outsid e agitation fo r the m o m e n t

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D u rin g the ensuing sp rin g m onth s, op tim ism ab o u t th e H arding-H ughes com m itm en t to these po sitio n s hided. M em bers from fou rteen peace and in ­ tern ation alist groups gathered o n 10 M ay, th is tim e at Low ell's u rgin g. T h e y agreed o n three points: th ey con d em n ed the K n ox resolu tion fo r a separate peace w ith G erm any; th ey endorsed the H arding ad m in istration p ro vid ed it co n tin u ed to w o rk fo r U n ited States p articip atio n in som e typ e o f o rgan iza­ tion ; and th ey called fo r in itiatives tow ard d isarm am en t A fin al attem pt to create a perm anent o rgan izatio n co m m itted to su p p o rt­ in g the League, w h ich R epublicans co u ld su p p ort, o ccu rred in m id-July 1921. F osdick an d H o lt issued th e call. H ow ever, n o perm anent b o d y em erged b e ­ cause respondents agreed to d elay th eir effo rts u n til th e League to E nforce Peace elected a n ew presiden t fo llo w in g Taft’s resign ation .4 I n the final analysis , tw o question s rem ain: W h y d id any R epublican in ­ tern ation alists co n tin u e to su p p o rt H ard ing a t all? A n d w ere th e in tern atio n ­ alists able to in flu en ce p o licy in an y m ean in gful way? A nsw ers to these ques­ tion s are fo u n d in analysis o f H arding’s “association o f n ation s” con cep t and the W ashington D isarm am en t C on feren ce. T h ere can b e little d o u b t th at H ard ing w as am azin gly successful at u sin g the association o f nation s con cep t fo r p o litica l gain , keep in g the in tern atio n ­ alist w in g o f his ow n p a rty o ff guard as th ey debated th e im p licatio n o f these am biguous statem ents. Yet the p lo y carried w ith it its ow n p o litica l p eril. T h e c h ie f d ifficu lty lay in th e fa ct th at, after th e electio n , the idea w as to ­ ta lly im plausible.44 H ughes had learn ed in a conversation w ith French A m ­ bassador Jules Jusserand th at France w o u ld have n o p art in an y am biguous n ew b o d y th at co u ld n o t p rovid e better safeguards than the League d id . Fur­ therm ore, senators, b o th p ro - and anti-L eague, had vo iced o p p o sitio n to the association idea.4 N evertheless, H ard ing co u ld n o t abandon a p o sitio n th at kept the diverse elem ents in his p a rty in check. T h e in tern ation alist w in g o f th e p a rty w o u ld to ta lly abandon h im i f he ren oun ced b o th the League and th e association c o n c e p t O p in io n p o lls also revealed a dem and th at he live u p to his cam paign prom ise. T herefore, new s dispatches con tin ued to ca rry W hite H ouse disclosures ab o u t d evelop in g plans fo r H arding’s association o f na­ tion s. T h is p lo y tended to w o rk to the ad m in istration ’s advantage w h en , in July 1921, it called fo r a conference to discuss naval disarm am ent. R epublican in ­ ternationalists w ere q u ick to interpret the call as the first step tow ard H arding’s lon g-p ro claim ed association o f n ation s.46 A lth o u gh th is in terp retation w as p artially attribu table to a co n tin u ed , un realistic o p tim ism ab o u t H arding’s p o sitio n , it reflected a pragm atic reco gn itio n o n the p art o f the in tern ation al­ ists th at th ey co u ld use the W ashington conference as a m eans to advance th eir ow n agenda. A G en eral C om m ittee on th e L im itation o f A rm am ents, headed b y S h ort, w as organ ized. Its statem ent o f purp ose revealed the lon g-

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range go al— a com m itm en t to press th e H ard in g ad m in istration to redeem its "p led ge to b rin g th e n ation s o f th e w o rld in to som e o rgan ic and co n tin u ­ o u s relationship.” O th er in tern ation alists also considered any p articip atio n b y th e U nited States in w o rld affairs as an im p o rtan t advance.47 In talks w ith E uropean leaders, how ever, N ich olas M u rray B utler so o n d is­ cern ed a p erh ap s m ore realistic cyn icism : E urop ean s w o n d ered w h eth er H arding really h ad an association o f n ation s idea in m in d at all. T h e y learned little from the o fficia l in vitatio n . W h en asked in Septem ber w h ether there w ere plans, H ughes responded b y u sin g a rather transparent sem antic tw ist, "th a t in th e co m in g C on feren ce w e are go in g to have a very helpfril associa­ tio n o f n ation s o u t o f w h ich I hop e m uch g o o d w ill com e in a p ractical way.” H ard in g to o k th e sam e p o sitio n d u rin g a press conference o n 25 N ovem ber w h en he said he w o u ld b e d isappoin ted i f som e association d id n o t em erge, perhaps in the fo rm o f regular m eetings to discuss problem s. N o o n e kn ew w h at he m eant, Sw eetser to ld D ru m m on d , b u t he d ou bted w h ether H arding h ad form u lated an y con crete ideas.4* Sw eetser w as u n d ou bted ly correct. H arding w as aware o f a num ber o f com ­ m ents m ade b y prom in en t in d ivid u als th at rem in ded h im th at th e associa­ tio n o f n ation s idea w as n o t w ith o u t p o litica l p eril. B orah attacked the asso­ ciatio n idea as a d evice m ore dangerous than the League itself, w h ile L ord C ecil argued th at it w o u ld b e " ‘w orse than m adness to abandon’” the existin g b o d y fo r a n ebu lou s on e. N ew spaper ed itors gen erally agreed th at the d evel­ opm en t o f an association w o u ld b e h arm fu l to th e League.49 C lo se ly tied to concerns ab o u t an association o f n ation s th at w o u ld sup­ p lan t th e League, fu rth er criticism arose because the H arding ad m in istration appeared to b e d u p licatin g and rivalin g th e w o rk o f League o f N ations b od ies th at th e U nited States had ign ored . D espite th e fact th at som e p u b lication s like th e New R epublic argued th at approval o r d isapproval o f the League had n o bearin g o n d iscussions o r th in k in g ab o u t disarm am ent, sp ecu lation abou t p o ten tial riva lry co n tin u ed . League o fficials an d E uropean leaders, how ever, responded w ith m agnanim ity. René V ivia n i, the chairm an o f th e T em porary M ixed C om m ission fo r the R eduction o f A rm am ents, an n oun ced th at the im m ense problem o f arm s required the com m on agreem ent o f everyone.10 E xam ination o f the record suggests th at there w ere fo u r reasons at the heart o f th e d ecision to ca ll fo r the disarm am ent conference. First, m o u n tin g co n ­ cern s o ver arm s had stim ulated a p o p u lar dem an d fo r actio n . Second, d ip lo ­ m ats w ish ed to reduce tensions b y elim in atin g p o ten tially d isruptive treaties, such as the Anglo-Japanese defensive accord. T h ird , H ughes felt som e u rgen cy to in itiate actio n b efo re oth er governm ents d id . Finally, H arding w as under som e pressure to act co n stru ctively in w o rld affairs a t a tim e w hen h is p o licy tow ard th e League w as b ein g criticized .5* In m any respects th e con vocation o f th e conferen ce w as a m aster stroke. It allow ed th e H ard ing ad m in istration to act o n th e concerns cited w ith o u t ch an gin g its p o licy o f n oninvolvem ent w ith

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the League o f N ations, and at the sam e tim e to m ute the criticism o f dissident Republicans w ho w ere increasingly and open ly challenging H arding and H ughes.5* T he strategy proved to be trem endously successful. A s W arren C ohen notes in his analysis o f the W ashington conference, "E very im portant Am erican objective was achieved: arm s control, abrogation o f the Anglo-Japanese alli­ ance, a lim it on im perialism in China, protection o f Am erican rights in China and on Yap.” Yet, "N one o f the agreem ents reached at the conference required the U nited States to use force or com m itted the U nited States to any action other than to consult w ith the others in any crisis.”53 N or did the rather cynical play on internationalists’ hopes com e back to haunt the H arding adm inistration when it failed to produce any association o f nations. Despite concrete proposals subm itted to d ie State D epartm ent by citizens, neither H ughes nor H arding seized the opportunity. In M arch, dur­ ing Senate debates over the Four-Power Treaty drafted during the conference, Republican senator Porter J. M cCum ber o f N orth D akota asked w hy the presi­ dent had n ot acted m ore vigorously. H e received no response. A s late as Sep­ tem ber 1922, H arding showed how am biguous his thinking was when he re­ sponded to a proposal sent b y H enry P. Fletcher, am bassador to Belgium . Fletcher sum m arized a plan prepared b y a com m ittee o f the Institute o f In­ ternational Law, w hich suggested a broad "um brella” over the League and the Pan-Am erican U nion. It was, H arding replied, “in harm ony w ith m y rather hazy conception w hich attended a prom ise o f som etim e finding a w ay for an A ssociation o f Nations.” However, according to the president, the tim e had n ot been right.54

By the summer of 1922, the internationalists realized that they had exercised little influence on the H arding adm inistration. H olt once again spearheaded a challenge b y w ay o f a public letter. In an “O pen Letter” dated 7 July, he re­ m inded H ughes o f his m any pro-Léague statem ents, none o f w hich had ever been repudiated even if his actions as secretary o f state raised serious doubts abou t his intentions. It w as tim e fo r an "un equivocal statem ent” o f the adm inistration’s position. I f it favored m em bership, under w hat term s did it do so? If it opposed U.S. entry, w hat specifically did it propose to do "in orga­ nizing the w orld for peace and progress?”55 H olt’s queries stim ulated a furious exchange. Hughes replied on 13 July; H olt responded on 18 July; Hughes rebutted on the nineteenth. A ll the letters appeared prom inently in the press. H ughes defended his w ork as secretary and rem inded H olt that League m em bership could be achieved on ly b y treaty. Strangely, the secretary o f state then weakened his ow n defense b y quoting Harding’s A pril 1921 rem arks in w hich he categorically rejected the C oven an t56 The W oodrow W ilson D em ocracy (a partisan, D em ocratic group o f proLeaguers) printed this exchange and circulated it widely. Press response var-

The Battle Begun

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ied , b u t even frien d s o f th e H arding ad m in istration conced ed th at H o lt had asked p ertin en t question s. T h ey d ivid ed , how ever, in assessing blam e fo r th e la ck o f progress. Som e w ere w illin g to co n tin u e b lam in g W ilson and/or L odge fo r the statu s q u o. O th ers suggested th a t th e Senate co n tin u ed to h o b b le H ughes. D espite this, how ever, even H ughes’ w arm est adm irers had to ad m it th at the cu rren t secretary o f state had n o t responded o p en ly o r don e all he co u ld have to su p p ort the League. Fosdick, w h o had jo in ed the debate th rou gh a press in terview , o u tlin ed in d etail the failure o f th e ad m in istration to re­ sp on d ad equately to th e League and co n clu d ed th at “accord in g to the new s­ papers, H o lt and I w on.”57 H ughes m ay have responded to th e attack p rim a rily o w in g to personal pique. H is p rivate correspon d en ce reveals a b itter resentm ent tow ard critics. H e th o u gh t H o lt’s “ false accusation s” w ere “offensive” and d esign ed fo r “ p o ­ litica l cap ital” ; F osd ick had sim p ly been unfair. “W e are tryin g,” H ughes ex­ plain ed , “to d o th e u tm ost th at can b e d on e in p erfo rm in g o u r d u ties to h u ­ m an ity an d in m ain tain in g th e prestige and in flu en ce o f the U n ited States.” T h e pro-L eague p eop le sh ou ld recogn ize th at fact as w ell as th e im p o ssib ility o f jo in in g un d er th e “present C ovenant.” H ughes w as p articu larly annoyed th at som e p eop le th o u gh t he sh ou ld resign “ because th e President d id n o t d o w h at I kn ew he co u ld n o t do.” H e w as q u ick to p o in t o u t th at he rem ained in o ffice because o f a sense o f d u ty even th o u gh th at m eant h is person al finances and legal p ractice suffered.5* H ughes d id m ake o n e tellin g p o in t in his exchange w ith H olt. T h e Senate, h e argued , sto o d as the c h ie f stu m blin g b lo ck because it w as im possible to o b tain the necessary tw o-th ird s vo te fo r an y treaty. T hereafter, H ughes regu­ la rly h eld to th at p o sitio n in exp lain in g th e p o licies h e pursued. H e th o u gh t he w as d o in g th e best he co u ld un d er the circum stances, b u t th at w as never en ou gh to please the p o lity in tern ation alists.59 In early 1921, Sam uel C o lco rd labeled th e electio n o f 1920 “a great decep­ tion .” A n ardent su p p o rter o f the League, C o lco rd claim ed th at th e in terp re­ tatio n b ein g advanced b y Senators B orah and L odge w h en th ey spoke o f “an absolute rejection o f . . . leagues w ith foreign pow ers” and suggested th at “W e have destroyed M r. W ilson ’s League” w as w ith o u t m erit.*0 R ather, C o lco rd saw h o p e in the electio n because it rem oved “all d ou b ts as to the w ill o f the peop le” an d left the d o o r o p en to eith er League m em bership o r the creation o f a n ew association in co n fo rm ity w ith “A m erican ideals.” *1 H istorian s have tended to agree w ith C o lco rd ’s assessm ent o f m isinterpre­ tatio n . T h e y are q u ick to p o in t o u t that con cern s ab o u t the h igh co st o f livin g , P ro h ib itio n , th e Red Scare, and lab o r unrest to o k precedence over, and o b ­ scured, an y “m andate” o n League m em bership. G en eral d isillu sion m en t w ith the p a rty in office, as w ell as the trad itio n al dom in an ce o f R epublicans as registered voters, ad d itio n ally m ake it d ifficu lt to isolate any sin gle issue as

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cru cial. H istorians have also stressed th at th e electio n results d id n o t repre­ sent a to tal rep u d iation o f in tern ation alist ideals: carefu l analysis o f th e vo te reveals a desire fo r a m ore lim ited fo rm o f in tern ation al co op eratio n than th e League offered . T h e Senate debates o ver m em bership had focu sed n o t o n to ­ tal rejection o f an in tern ation al b o d y b u t o n the kind o f b o d y the U nited States sh ou ld jo in . T h e R epublican p latfo rm an d H arding's references to an associa­ tio n o f n ation s n o t o n ly em phasized b u t also b e n e fite d from th at d istin ctio n . O n e co u ld argue th at H arding w as elected because the R epublican p arty p rom ­ ised to give the p eop le w h at th ey w anted— responsible co m m itm en t w ith adequate safeguards to ensure independence o f actio n . T h e electio n w as th us n o t so m uch a rep u d iation o f the League idea as it w as o f W ilson ian p o lic y an d persp ective.41 G iven th is, it is apparent th at, at least d u rin g th e first tw o years o f th e H ard ing ad m in istration , the in tern ation alists failed rather dism ally. B y 1922, th ey had been o n ly p artially successful in un d erm in in g the co n clu sio n th at th e electio n had ended th e debate, and th ey had certain ly failed in th eir efforts to reassert th eir in flu en ce over p o licy.43 F ollow in g the electio n , H ard ing h ad been m ade aw are th at o p p o rtu n ities existed fo r con stru ctive actio n . T h e in ­ tern ation alists in his p a rty had given h im respite, been accom m od atin g, and been w illin g to su p p o rt changes th at w ou ld b rin g abou t m em bership. A broad , governm ents an d leaders seem ed ready to coop erate. A n d yet, alth o u gh th e in tern atio n alists used th e th reat o f p a rty d isu n ity to m ain tain th e ear o f H arding, H ughes, and H oover, th ey had n o t been able to translate th is in to con crete gains fo r th eir p o sitio n . In the end, th ose in tern ation alists w h o d o u b ted w h ether H arding w o u ld take any actio n "in any form ” read h im m ost accurately. Even as he prom ised to stand b y h is cam paign prom ises, the president w as assuring on e irreco n cil­ able th at he w o u ld take n o h asty actio n and th at Senate approval w o u ld be essential. H e plann ed to seek som e degree o f co op eratio n in th e fo rm o f co n ­ ferences w ith o th er n ation s, b u t he d id n o t kn o w w h at w o u ld be possible.44 F ortu n ately fo r keep in g the ideal alive, and fo r gain in g the lim ited am ou n t o f co op eratio n w ith the League discussed in later chapters, few in tern ation alists recogn ized th e fu tility o f fu rth er actio n . For the tru ly com m itted , as lo n g as th e H ard ing ad m in istration rem ained n arrow in its o u tlo o k and program , th e b attle w o u ld con tin u e.

THE STRUGGLE EXTENDED Pro-League Efforts, 1922-1928

February 1922, un d er a ban n er head lin e, th e N ew York Tim es an­ n ou n ced the fo rm atio n o f a new com m ittee, organ ized so lely to “ E x­ plain the B ig H arding Vote.” Proclaim ing th at “ M isinterpretation K ept A m erica from League o r A ssociation ,” th e C om m ittee o n E ducational P u b licity had convened “to co rrect ‘th e w idespread m isin terpretation o f th e m eanin g and m andate o f the great H arding vote.’” T h e m isreading o f th e results, it believed , had prevented th e H ard ing ad m in istration from takin g con stru ctive actio n fo r peace.1 In m an y respects, th is attem pt to co rrect the m isin terpretation o f th e elec­ tio n results in d icated a n ew strategy, fo r it w as aim ed n o t d irectly a t p o liti­ cian s w h o op p osed the League o f N ation s b u t at th e vo tin g p u b lic. F acing th e congressional election s o f 1922, R epublican intern ationalists fo u n d them selves un able to in flu en ce th e presiden t and in creasin gly d istanced from th eir allies, S ecretary o f State C h arles Evans H ughes and Secretary o f C om m erce H erbert H oover. D em ocrats, as th e m in o rity p a rty in C on gress, w ere eq u ally w ith o u t an effective vo ice. T h erefore, it w as tim e to tu rn to the p u b lic, to prod u ce a tid a l w ave o f p u b lic su p p o rt fo r in tern ation alist ideals an d p olicies. In itia lly th e in tern ation alists clu n g to th eir partisan approach, unable and u n w illin g to overcom e th eir trad itio n al partisansh ip and heal th e acrim o n i­ o u s d ivision s prod u ced b y the Senate debate. H ow ever, w ith in a relatively b rie f p erio d , th ey recogn ized the ab su rd ity an d fu tility o f partisan d ivisio n and com bin ed to fo rm the organ izatio n w h ose nam e reflected th eir goals— the League o f N ation s N on -P artisan A sso ciation (L N N P A ). n 6

O

D emocratic an d independent in tern ation alists clo sely w atched events and the p o licies em ergin g from th e n ew H ard in g ad m in istratio n in th e w eeks an d m on th s fo llo w in g th e electio n . A lth o u g h th ey w ere w illin g to m ove cau ­ tio u sly an d see w h eth er the strategy o f th eir R epublican co u n terp arts w ou ld w o rk, th ey exam ined every m ove o f the n ew ad m in istration w ith m icroscop ic

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atten tion . Som e co n tin u ed to h o ld o u t h op e th at H arding w o u ld recom m end m em bership in the League. O thers, realizing h ow unlikely that hope w as, w aited to see w hat he w ou ld d o ab o u t his association o f n ation s suggestion, sp ecu ­ latin g th at the president m igh t send a com m ission , headed b y R oot, to G en eva to explore th e feasib ility o f h is association idea.1 D espite th eir in itial h o p e, D em ocrats w ere soon con vin ced th at the Re­ pu b lican ad m in istration "h a d tran sferred m uch o f th eir h atred fo r W ilson to the in stitu tion s o f w h ich he w as th e c h ie f founder.”3D em ocrats w h o rem ained fo lly com m itted to th e League recogn ized the need to create organ ization s th ro u gh w h ich th ey co u ld keep th eir ideals alive an d prom ote d ie issue o f League m em bership w ith in th eir o w n party. N o t surp risingly, the D em ocrats centered th eir appeals arou n d W ilson , b elievin g th at th ey co u ld thus appeal to b o th partisan and nonpartisan interests. For the form er, organizations w ou ld stress the im age o f W ilson as "th e Fallen D em ocratic P arty Leader.” For a t­ tra ctin g n on partisan , in d ep en d en t, o r R epublican in tern ation alists, the im ­ age becam e W ilson as "S ym b o l o f an Ideal.” T h e W ood row W ilson F ou n d ation , the first o f the organ izatio n s b earin g W ilson’s nam e, clearly dem onstrated the latter, nonpartisan em phasis. It o rig i­ nated in M arch 1921 in N ew Y ork C ity w hen enthusiasts created an agen cy design ed to h o n o r W ilson and perpetuate his liberal an d d em ocratic ideals th ro u gh aw ards an d grants. H eaded b y H olt an d F ranklin D . R oosevelt, a na­ tio n al cam paign in 1922 raised o ver $800,000 in sm all d on ation s from m ore than 200,000 citizen s. Each year a m o n etary p rize fo r "m erito rio u s service to dem ocracy, p u b lic w elfare, lib eral th o u gh t o r peace th ro u gh ju stice” w as to go to an in d ivid u al o r grou p. T h o se w h o co n trib u ted w ere lau d ed fo r castin g "a vote fo r the prin cip les o f peace and in tern ation al p o lity ” o f W ilson . T h e rather vague statem ent o f p u rp o se cloaked the o b jective o f pro-L eague advocates, w h o d om in ated the fo u n d atio n . T h e y h oped to "steal a m arch o n h isto ry” b y h o n o rin g W ilson w h ile he w as alive an d to establish "A m erica’s N o b el F oun­ d atio n , bearin g the nam e o f an A m erican recip ien t o f the N o b el Peace Prize.” H olt, w h o served as executive d irector, n om in ated several advocates o f th e League fo r th e b o ard o f trustees. A lth o u gh he w as in itia lly op p osed to allo w ­ in g any sign atories o f the Statem ent o f the 31 to serve on th e board — an atti­ tu d e eviden ced b y his o p p o sitio n to W illiam A llen W h ite’s m em bership— th is attitu d e w o u ld change, as E rnest M . H opkins, w h o had jo in ed the 31, becam e presiden t o f th e fo u n d atio n in 1923, replacin g R oosevelt.4 From th e o u tset, th e fo u n d atio n ’s goal w as to aw ard a m o n etary p rize fo r "m erito rio u s service” to the ideals o f W ilson , thus keepin g them b efore the p u b lic. T h e first p rize o f $25,000 w as aw arded to V isco u n t C e cil o f C h elw o o d in 1924, a su itable ch o ice because o f h is lo n g association w ith in tern ation alist m ovem ents in E ngland and his p rom in en t service as a delegate to th e A ssem ­ b ly o f the League. D u rin g the n ext year, th e trustees becam e enm eshed in debates over th e establishm ent o f an essay con test fo r college students and

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w h at typ e o f person sh ou ld receive th e aw ard. A fter th e d elay o f o n e year caused b y th e co n flict, the trustees vo ted in 1926 to co n fer th e h o n o r o n E lih u R o o t, a selectio n th at raised eyebrow s because o f R oot’s o b vio u s am bivalence tow ard m an y o f W ilson ’s program s. C h arles A . L indbergh received th e aw ard in 1927 fo llo w in g h is successful tran s-A tlan tic flig h t— again a d u b io u s choice, th is o n e prem ised o n L indbergh’s p o p u larity rad ier than h is com m itm en t to in tern atio n alist ideals. In 1926 th e W ood row W ilson F oun d ation inaugurated an essay con test fo r co llege students o n th e su bject “W h at W ood row W ilson M eans to M e.” En­ cou raged b y the overw h elm in g success o f th e essay con test in itiated b y retired ed ito r E dw ard B ok, fo u n d atio n leaders raised fun d s fo r tw o $25,000 prizes. B o k, d irecto r o f th e A m erican F oun d ation , gen erou sly prom ised to under­ w rite an y p ro m o tion al expenses th e W ood row W ilson F oun d ation co u ld n o t cover. U nfortunately, how ever, the effo rt proved to b e an em barrassm en t O n ly a few hu n d red entries arrived , an d the ju ry fo u n d n on e o f su fficien t m erit fo r an aw ard.5 B y 1929, th e W ood row W ilson F oundation had n o t o n ly failed , it had largely abandon ed its attem pt to create “A m erica’s N obel F oundation.” T h at year, th e trustees abandon ed th e p rize contests an d focu sed thereafter o n b u ild in g a lib rary, m aking grants to in d ivid u als an d groups, and u n d erw ritin g th e cost o f p u blicatio n s.6 T h e fo u n d atio n w as exp erien cin g a d eclin e in fin an cial su p ­ p o rt, p artially attribu table to th e involvem ent o f H olt. C o n tro versy arose over his dual role as b o th a fundraiser fo r the presum ably nonpartisan W ilson Foun­ d atio n an d as a prom oter o f the W ood row W ilson D em ocracy, a partisan o r­ gan ization . Som e d on ors feared th at th eir con trib u tio n s to the n o m in ally ap o­ litica l fo u n d atio n w ere destined fo r D em ocratic p a rty coffers.7 A lth o u gh the decrease in fin an cial su p p o rt w as sign ifican t, th e m ore cen tral cause o f the d eclin e in the fo u n d ation ’s effectiveness w as its lack o f consistent focus. A second attem pt to keep W ilson’s ideals b efo re the p u b lic appeared in th e fo rm o f the W ood row W ilson C lu b , w h ich began at H arvard U n iversity w hen students, led b y R obert C . Stuart, in vited H o lt to speak. B y D ecem ber 1921, fifty -fo u r chapters h ad been organ ized o n cam puses, and a n ation al co u n cil began a cam paign fo r fun d s to foster an exchange o f foreign students and p ro m o te research o n W ilson an d the peace conference. B ecause its d rive co m ­ p eted w ith th at o f th e W ood row W ilson F oun d ation , the e ffo rt failed , and the clu b q u ick ly declined.* Finally, in M ay 1921, the W ood row W ilson D em ocracy, th e m ost clearly partisan o f th e grou p s u sin g W ilson ’s nam e, em erged. T h e W ood row W ilson D em ocracy h o p ed to force the D em ocratic p a rty to adhere to “popular, p ro ­ gressive, and hum an itarian ideals” associated w ith W ilson , to seek candidates in th e 1922 an d 1924 con gression al cam paigns w h o w ere d edicated to those ends, an d to gain a pro-L eague p lan k in th e 1924 platform . W ilson expressed con sid erable interest in , an d satisfaction w ith , this group. It opposed , w ith his

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blessin g, th e separate peace treaty w ith G erm any, b u t it fo u n d it expedien t to endorse the W ashington D isarm am en t C on feren ce. H o lt, w h o b y M ay h ad becom e th o ro u gh ly "d ish earten ed ” over H arding’s am biguous p o sitio n an d d e cid e d to tu rn to p o litic a l a c tio n to a d v a n ce th e ca u se , b e ca m e th e D em ocracy’s p re sid en t9 T h e W ood row W ilson D em ocracy en joyed th e su p p o rt o f several p ro m i­ n ent D em ocrats, in clu d in g C h arles C . B auer and R alph W . W escott o f N ew Jersey. B oth had supported W ilson d u rin g his early p o litical career, and W escott had placed W ilson's nam e in n om in atio n at the D em ocratic con ven tion s o f 1912 and 1916. T h e grou p gain ed a g o o d deal o f p u b licity w hen Bauer, W escott, and H o lt organ ized a d em on stration o n A rm istice D ay, 11 N ovem ber 1921, in fro n t o f th e fo rm er presiden t’s W ashington h om e. A n en thusiastic crow d esti­ m ated at over 10,000 grew silen t w hen W ilson w ep t at th is affirm ation o f h is ideals.10 P u b lic rallies at th e W a ld o rf A storia H otel in N ew Y ork C ity fo llow ed o n 18 D ecem ber and 8 M arch. Speakers attacked H arding’s association o f n ation s p rop osal, challen ged H ughes and H oover to live u p to th e pledge con tain ed in th e Statem ent o f the 31, called fo r m ore involvem ent in w o rld affairs, an d as­ serted th e desire o f th e A m erican p eop le fo r League m em bership. T h ey an ­ n ou n ced th at th ey w o u ld w o rk to ensure th at o n ly staunch pro-L eague sena­ tors w ere return ed to o ffice in 1922, an d th at e very e ffo rt w o u ld b e m ade to see th at th e League issue w o u ld b e p aram ou n t in th e presid en tial electio n o f 1924. Success in these cam paigns, H o lt d eclared , w o u ld allow th e n ation to "resum e its righ tfu l place in d ie m oral leadership o f th e w orld.” “ A s the congressional electio n s o f 1922 approached, D em ocratic in tern a­ tion alists had three o rgan ization s th ro u gh w h ich to assert th eir goals— tw o aim ed at th e p u b lic an d o n e sp ecifically dedicated to in flu en cin g p a rty lead ­ ers. R epublicans had n o such veh id es. Intern ation alists, p articu larly th e sign ­ ers o f th e Statem ent o f the 31, w ere in an absolu tely un tenable (and extrem ely fru stratin g) p o sitio n . R ecogn izin g th e need to take a p o sitio n d u rin g the co n ­ gressional d e ctio n s, th ey had several alternatives: th ey co u ld ren oun ce th eir p a rty and the H arding ad m in istration fo r h avin g betrayed them after th e elec­ tion ; th ey co u ld defend them selves, ad m ittin g that th ey had been perhaps overzealous in th eir analysis o f H arding’s com m itm en t, b u t rem ained h o p e­ fu l ab o u t fu tu re p olicies; o r th ey co u ld m ain tain a lo w p rofile, h o p in g th at voters w o u ld fo rget ab o u t th e Statem ent o f th e 31. U nfortunately, th is latter tactic w as un d erm in ed w hen H o lt’s p u b lic ex­ change w ith H ughes in July 1922 renew ed interest in the Statem ent.12 W hen H o lt p o in ted ly rem in ded the secretary o f state th at he had sign ed it, H ughes replied th at it represented a sincere p o in t o f v iew at the tim e. H e seem ed to repudiate th e d eclaration , how ever, w h en he claim ed th at it w as n o w im prac­ tica l to ob tain m em bership in th e League.

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M any fe lt betrayed b y the secretary’s response. It was a m atter o f principle, one citizen w rote Hughes. He had failed “to fulfill these solem n prom ises” and would n ow give no assurance that he w ould act on them . The “pre-election prom issory note” was w orthless, a m anipulation to obtain votes “under false pretenses.”*3Newspaper editors were quick to note the inconsistency inherent in the secretary’s position. However, instead o f criticizing H ughes, they un­ sparingly ridiculed the signers o f the declaration. A s the New York Times observed, “ ‘W hy, father, was the net rem oved?’ ‘Son, it hath caught the fish.”’*4 D urin g this period, Lowell was particularly concerned. He had continued to urge H ughes to keep the “association o f nations” idea alive during the early months o f 1922, but b y late sum m er he was extrem ely pessim istic. There seemed to be n o prospect for the association o f nations, but he did not know w hat to do; he favored m em bership in the League, despite its apparent weaknesses, but no adequate channel existed to agitate for that end.1* W ith the League to Enforce Peace in total disarray and the efforts to create the Am erican Associa­ tion fo r a League o f N ations m oribund, how could Republican international­ ists m ake their influence felt? It appeared that the signers o f the Statem ent o f the 31 w o u ld have to be the nucleus around w hich any pro-League organiza­ tion w ou ld form . Lowell conferred w ith Fisher about som e tactic that w ould force the 31 to respond, either collectively or individually. I f pressure was to be brought to bear on the congressional cam paigns, the tim e was now .* A m in o rity o f the signers confessed their anguish and acknowledged their error. T h e m ajority, however, were unw illing to publicly attack their ow n party during th e congressional elections. T hey were adam ant about the need to find an alternative w ay to assert pressure on Republican politicians w ithout creat­ ing bitter intraparty division. O ne suggestion, put forth earlier in a m eeting o f the C om m ittee for Treaty R atification (C T R ), had appeal. A t a jo in t m eet­ ing o f th e C T R and the Com m ission on International Justice and G oodw ill o f the Federal C oun cil o f Churches, discussions had focused on the need for a new nonpartisan body.17These prelim inary talks had led to the creation o f the Am erican A ssociation for International Cooperation (A A IC ). W ickersham , who served as chairm an, conferred w ith Lowell, Straus, and other signers o f the Statem ent o f the 31, and they agreed to lend support to this new effort.* The founders o f the A A IC agreed that their goal was to educate the public so that voters w ould support m em bership in the W orld C ourt and participa­ tion in th e econom ic and social com m issions o f the League. For the m om ent, cam paigns fo r m em bership w ould be set aside. In late O ctober the associa­ tion strayed tem porarily from its focus, w hen m em bers began to agitate for m em bership in the League on the basis o f the elim ination o f A rticle 10. This effort w as so w h olly unsuccessful that thereafter the leaders rem ained firm in their resolve to set m em bership aside and to rem ain nonpartisan. D em ocratic efforts failed equally. A s the congressional cam paigns o f 1922 began, W ilson approached D em ocratic N ational Com m ittee chairm an Cordell

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H ull, and insisted th at the program o f the W ood row W ilson D em ocracy gro u p deserved atten tion . T h e D em ocracy p latform stated th at the U nited States sh ou ld jo in th e League, send representatives to a E uropean com m ission d eal­ in g w ith econ om ic and reparation questions, and face issues related to tariffs, labor, and trad e. W ilso n s coun sel w as ign ored . Iron ically, th e failu re o f th e W ood row W ilso n D em ocracy m ay have b een caused b y H olt. A s th e executive d irecto r o f the W ood row W ilson F oun d a­ tio n , a m o tivatin g force b eh in d th e creatio n o f th e W ood row W ilson C lu b , and th e presid en t o f the W ood row W ilso n D em ocracy, H o lt had becom e th e m o st p ro m in en t lead er o f th e pro-L eague m ovem ent w ith in the D em o cratic party. A s su ch , he to o co n ferred w ith C o rd e ll H u ll ab o u t th e con gression al cam paign s.19 M an y D em ocrats ap p aren tly began to see the W ood row W ilso n D em o cracy as litd e m ore than a veh icle to p rom ote H o lt as a presid en tial ca n d id a te in 1924, w h ich th e y co n sid ere d u n th in k a b le. A s a re su lt, th e W ood row W ilso n D em o cracy had little im p act o n th e D em ocratic p a rty m a­ ch in e.20 C o x, to o , called fo r a special m eetin g to fo rm alize a program fo r th e co n ­ gressional cam paign in the fa ll o f 1922, b u t n o th in g cam e o f these efforts: a d ecision w as m ade to keep issues sim ple and am biguous.21 Even stalw arts like H udson an d F osdick had d ou b ts ab o u t revivin g th e issue. T h e su bject ap ­ peared so rarely th at fall th at som e irrecon cilables boasted th at the D em o ­ crats had abandon ed the League.22 In the fin al analysis, in tern ation alists failed to pressure eith er p a rty in to m akin g the League an issue in the congressional electio n s o f 1922, and th e electio n s changed n o th in g. A lth o u gh iso latio n ist senator A lb ert J. B everidge o f Indiana, a R epublican, lost, so to o d id D em ocratic senator G ilbert H itch cock o f N ebraska, the Senate m in o rity leader d u rin g the figh t in 1919-20. W h ile som e to o k co m fo rt in L odge’s slim v ic to ry in M assachusetts, claim in g th a t L odge ran “45,000 votes beh in d h is ticket,” others realistically po in ted o u t th at his op p o n en t, W illiam A . G aston , a relatively un kn ow n D em ocrat, h ad opposed League m em bership and refused to in ject foreign p o licy issues in to the cam paign .23C lea rly a n ew approach w as necessary. Internationalists w ere p ain fu lly— i f n o t som ew hat g ru d g in g ly— aw are th at the Senate debates o ver th e treaty, W ilson ’s call fo r a solem n referendum , and the election o f 1920 h ad focu sed th eir atten tion on p a rty leaders. H ow ever, as th e 1922 con gression al election s h ad ju st proven, n arro w ly focu sed , partisan o rgan ization s aim ed at in flu en cin g p a rty leaders w ere n o t successful. N o r w ere the W ilson F ounda­ tio n and C lu b — aim ed at p u b lic figures, scholars, and college students— lik ely to prod u ce m uch result. I f th e great stru ggle fo r League m em bership an d in ­ creased in tern ation al co op eratio n w as to b e w on , partisan loyalties and d iv i­ sion m ust b e set aside. T h e p o ten t force o f m ass A m erican p u b lic o p in io n h ad to b e stirred, aw akened, and focu sed fo r the n ext cam paign.

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I n September 1922, Justice John H . C larke, a slender, silver-haired m an o f precariou s health, an nounced his retirem ent from the Suprem e C o u r t C larke, w h o had a deep com m itm en t to in tern ation al ideals, cou p led h is an n oun ce­ m en t w ith a statem ent th at he plann ed to d evote h is life to w o rk o n b e h a lf o f th e League alo n g n on partisan lin es.14 T h e favorable p u b lic response to C larke’s statem ent en cou raged in tern a­ tio n alists to b elieve th at h e co u ld p ro vid e th e lead ership th eir m ovem ent needed. Plans fo r th e m erger o f th e A m erican A sso ciation fo r In tern ation al C o o p eratio n , the largely R epublican organ ization chaired b y W ickersham , and th e p red om in an tly D em ocratic League o f N ation s N on -P artisan C om m ittee, w h ich h ad organ ized arou n d C larke, began im m ediately.15 D espite com m itm en t an d go o d w ill, differences in approach an d p rio rities w ere im m ediately apparent. Initially, C larke spoke in su p p o rt o f effo rts to cre­ ate a d efin itive, clear statem ent o f th e co n d itio n s un d er w h ich th e U nited States co u ld jo in th e League, in clu d in g a slate o f sp ecific reservations.14 In ad van cin g th is p o sitio n , C larke w as largely in flu en ced b y H olt. H o lt en joyed consid erable in flu en ce o ver Justice C larke fo r tw o reasons. F irst, he had a $10,000 pled ge from in d u strialist C levelan d D o d ge to su p p o rt a new society. Second, he had access to W ood row W ilson . H olt, Bauer, C olby, an d W arren coord in ated th eir plans w ith W ilso n , form u lated a set o f p rop os­ als, and sent them to C larke. A s C larke w as an xiou s n o t to d o an yth in g to o ffen d th e form er presiden t, he w as receptive.17 H udson an d F osd ick w ere im m ediately con cern ed . O n th e on e han d , th ey feared th at H o lt w as far to o clo sely iden tified in th e p u b lic m in d w ith partisan effo rts.1* Further, an d m ore im p o rtan t, th ey en vision ed an organ ization m o d ­ eled after th e E nglish League o f N ation s U n ion . It w o u ld d istribu te literature, co n d u ct studies, an d p u b licize th e con stru ctive w o rk o f the League. R epubli­ can senator T h eodore B urton o f O h io had em braced that approach, and D avid D avies, th e secretary o f th e B ritish U n io n , had w o n m any converts w hen he visited th e U nited States in the sp rin g o f 1922. A lth o u g h F osdick and H udson w ere n o t in absolute agreem ent o n a strategy to involve C larke in th eir plan , th ey d id recogn ize th e need to in flu en ce him . G a rk e , how ever, d id n o t appear in clin ed to em brace th eir m od el an d objectives.19 N or w ere W ickersham ’s associates any m ore u n ited in term s o f agreed u pon o b jectives fo r the A A IC . Straus favored su p p o rt fo r a coop erative relation ship w ith th e League w hereas L ow ell insisted o n actu al m em bership. C learly, sus­ p icio n s and concerns w ou ld fade o n ly if the variou s factio n s com prom ised th eir differences. In late O ctob er 1922, the dissension in the ranks w as intensified w hen C larke responded favorably to th e slate o f co n d itio n s fo r m em bership proposed b y th e H olt factio n . W ilson created a m o m en tary contretem ps w hen he insisted th at n on e o f th e 31 sh ou ld b e allow ed to p articipate. O n ly w h en H o lt and

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others assured W ilson that their plan w ould not lim it the D em ocratic party in any w ay did he agree not to oppose the m ovem ent publicly. Parsons and other pro-League D em ocrats tended to agree w ith the form er president; m any o f Clarke’s supporters wanted nothing to do w ith any o f W ickersham ’s group.30 A t this juncture, Clarke proved his m ettle, preparing a statem ent broad enough to appeal to nearly everyone. T he statem ent invited citizens to par­ ticipate in “an independent, nonpartisan” effort designed to cultivate a public opinion that w ould induce the adm inistration to jo in the League under w hat­ ever term s seem ed w ise, consistent w ith the C onstitution, “and consonant w ith the dignity and honor, the m oral responsibility and pow er o f o u r Re­ public.” Political action w ould be subordinate to a broad educational effort directed at m em bership in the League.31 T his statem ent becam e the new League o f N ations N on-Partisan A ssoci­ ation’s “creed” on 5 Decem ber 1922. Two days later, Clarke m et w ith W ickersham , and in subsequent m eetings the planners agreed on details for the m erger. The Clarke com m ittee opened offices in N ew York C ity on the fourteenth, and the next day H olt disclosed the names o f 112 sponsors— national leaders in busi­ ness, religion, education, journalism , and politics— w ho had long been associ­ ated w ith cam paigns to involve their nation in international affairs. O n ly one problem rem ained. W ho w ould head the organization?3* A subcom m ittee consisting o f H olt, Colby, Charles H . Strong, and Charles H . Leverm ore resolved that question. Clarke w ould be president, W ickersham could head the council, and C olby w ould chair the executive com m ittee.33At a gala dinner for 750 guests on 10 January 1923, the League o f N ations N onPartisan Association united the diverse groups and began its labors. T h e League to Enforce Peace provided the nam es o f its m em bers, the W orld Peace Foun­ dation com m itted m oney, the Pro-League Independents joined, and Fosdick turned over the files and library o f his news bureau. Substantial gifts arrived from C hicago philanthropist A nita M cC orm ick Blaine, C larke, and Fisher, w hich, in addition to the D odge pledge, gave them $20,000.* H olt and Short also assum ed positions o f leadership. The form er chaired the finance com m ittee and devoted him self fu ll tim e to speaking and fun d ­ raising. He and C olby organized a speaking cam paign in areas w here Senate elections w ould be held in 1924. Local chapters w ould be organized in these areas. Com m ittees appeared on finance, churches, publicity, and publications, w ith a pam phlet series and a newsletter projected.33Short, w ho had been ex­ ecutive secretary o f the League to Enforce Peace, served in the sam e capacity for the new organization. Initially, the H olt-Short collaboration w as extrem ely successful. The association received $54,075.26 in its first six m onths, and after H olt and Short took charge, operations expanded. By 1924, w ith a sta ff o f m ore than a dozen, the association was spending $10,000 a m onth.36 Analysis o f the association’s leadership rolls prove that G arke’s rather vague statem ent o f purpose had indeed united an extrem ely diverse group. A lm ost

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every nam e p rom in en t in th e League o f N ation s figh t appeared o n th e roster o f vice presiden ts, the b o ard o f d irectors, executive o r ad viso ry com m ittees, o r as leaders in state branches. O n ly a few in d ivid u als rem ained aloofi R oot never jo in ed , an d B u tler h eld o ff u n til 1929, w hen he accepted m em bership o n a n ation al a d viso ry com m ittee and sh o rtly thereafter becam e its ch air­ m an . L ow ell su p p orted th e association w ith gifts b u t allow ed o n ly lim ited use o f h is nam e. D esp ite its success a t reso lvin g th e m em bership disagreem ent, b ro a d ly d efin in g goals and o bjectives, an d creatin g a fin an cially h ealth y an d expansive o rgan izatio n , th e leadership o f th e L N N P A w as still vastly d ivid ed over strat­ e g y an d the p o ssib ility o f com prom ise vis-à -vis actu al m em bership in th e L eague o f N ations. Initially, it appeared th at the b o ard o f d irectors w as in acco rd , w h en th e m em bers agreed to su p p o rt a ll candidates fo r o ffice w h o favored th e program o f the association . T h e y also agreed to cam paign fo r m em bership in the W orld C o u rt, a secon d ary go al th at often w as gran ted p rim a cy d u rin g Senate hearin gs and debates.37A serious con troversy em erged in late 1923 and early 1924, how ever, w h en question s arose o ver w h ether the o rgan izatio n sh ou ld take a less passive stance and actively oppose candidates u n frien d ly to the League. Som e leaders saw th is as d irect p o litica l actio n , d is­ tin c t from ed u catio n al w o rk, and hence co n tra ry to the association’s n onpar­ tisan character. T h e d irectors finessed th is issue b y allo w in g actio n against in d iv id u a l can d id ates w ith o u t n ecessarily o p p o sin g th e p a rty th e y rep re­ sented.3* T h e com m itm ent to League m em bership rem ained relatively firm in to 1924. D espite som e h esitation , there w ere effo rts to ob tain pro-L eague planks in b o th p a rty p latform s. A subcom m ittee o f C larke, W ickersham , H arriet B ur­ to n (M rs. James Lees) Laidlaw , N arcissa C o x (M rs. Frank) V anderlip, D uggan , F osdick, Stron g, and C o lb y prepared drafts to b e presented to delegates at the con ven tion s. T h eir strategy w as aim ed a t preven tin g the R epublicans from d en o u n cin g th e League and to b lo ck any D em ocratic ten d en cy to w ater d ow n its endorsem ent. T h e secon d ary p rio rity w as apparent in effo rts to so licit th e view s o f senatorial candidates o n W orld C o u rt m em bership and to o b tain p u b lic statem ents o f su p p ort.39 Even these m od est goals w ere n o t m et. U ltim ately, th e R epublicans called fo r co n tin u ed p articip atio n in h um an itarian program s an d fo r adherence to th e W orld C o u rt, b u t th ey rejected "obligation s un d er th e C ovenant” o r “m em ­ bersh ip in th e League o f N ations.” It w o u ld b e best to have "co o p eratio n w ith ­ o u t en tan glin g alliances.”40 T h e D em ocratic p o sitio n w as equally, i f n o t m ore, d isap p oin tin g. D efeat w as foreshad ow ed b y events at th e con ven tion . M em bers o f th e W ood row W ilso n D em ocracy had rallied in M ay to d raft a League p lan k fo r the D em o­ cra tic p latfo rm . W h en W escott, w h o had assum ed the presid en cy o f th e orga­ n izatio n , appeared at th e con ven tion w ith th is d ocu m en t, the C om m ittee o n

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R esolutions p o litely ign ored him . T h e D em ocrats w ere o n ly m argin ally less co o l to representatives o f the League o f N ations N on-P artisan A ssociation . T h e D em ocratic p lan k observed that "th ere is n o substitute fo r th e League o f N ations as an agen cy w o rkin g fo r peace,” b u t it th en avoided th e issue b y callin g fo r a n ation al referendum o n m em bership th ro u gh a special electio n . “A fter am ple tim e fo r fu ll consid eration,” B aker to o k the flo o r to w arn against th is in n o cu o u s statem en t. A s h e ap p ealed to th e id eals an d m em o ry o f W ood row W ilson and pleaded fo r a substitute statem ent com m ittin g the p arty to m em bership, m any delegates and reporters w e p t T h ey then ign ored Baker b y ad op tin g the o rig in al p lan k 742 to 353.41 A n alysts w ere w ell aw are th at b o th parties d elib erately avoided co m m it­ m ent to the League. T h is w as esp ecially tru e o f th e D em ocrats. T h e q u alifica­ tion s associated w ith a referendum , w ith n o d eadlines an d w ith C on gress des­ ign ated as the in itiato r, m eant th at n o p o p u lar vo te w o u ld ever b e taken. Even i f held, D em ocratic attorn ey D avid H unter M iller argued, a referendum w o u ld have n o co n stitu tion al w eigh t an d w o u ld o n ly con fu se issues. A s o n e w riter con clud ed , the R epublicans had “abandoned the League idea, w h ile the D em o­ crats are n o t w illin g even to g o as far as M r. L odge an d the R epublican Sena­ tors w en t in 1919.”* T h e presiden tial candidates in th e electio n o f 1924 m ay have felt m ore sym ­ path y tow ard th e League than d id th eir p arties, b u t th ey w ere h ard ly activists. C o o lid g e had favored m em bership in 1919 and had n o t ju d ged th e electio n o f 1920 a m andate. Yet as vice-p resid en t an d H arding’s successor, he adhered to p a rty po sitio n s. C o o lid g e displayed little interest in foreign p olicy, seem in gly con ten t to h id e beh in d the in n o cu o u s statem ent th at n o peace agreem ents sh ou ld vio la te the independence o r righ ts o f th e U nited States. T h e D em o ­ cratic nom in ee, N ew York atto rn ey John W . D avis, h eld m ore favorable view s. H ow ever, th e D em ocrats w ere d eep ly d ivid ed over P ro h ib itio n , u rb an -ru ral d evelopm ent, and th e Ku K lu x K lan, an d D avis em erged as th e com prom ise candidate o n ly o n th e 103d b allo t. A lth o u g h D avis had been su p p ortive o f th e League in 1919-20, in 1924 the referendum p ro visio n im posed severe lim ita­ tio n s o n h im .41 Yet m any in tern ation alists, in th eir eagerness to advance th eir cause, fo u n d co m fo rt eith er in sm all victo ries o r in the m ost con volu ted ratio n alizatio n s. Som e ju d ged th e R epublican p lan k stron ger than th at o f 1920. O th ers be­ lieved th at i f th e D em ocrats w o n th ey w o u ld m ove tow ard m em bership irre­ spective o f w h at th e p latfo rm said. Leaders o f th e League o f N ation s N on Partisan A sso ciation claim ed that the p o sitio n s o f b o th parties had taken th e League “ safely o u t o f partisan politics.” Sh ort argued, w ith strained lo g ic, th at since n eith er had expressed a com m itm en t there w as “n o clean -cu t issue b e­ tw een them .” I f th e R epublicans had balked and th e D em ocrats had endorsed m em bership, it “w o u ld have been a calam ity.” T h e association declared th at it w o u ld n o t su p p ort eith er presiden tial candidate, leavin g its m em bers free to

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choose. Instead, the association w ou ld concentrate o n the Senate races in w h ich vo ters had a b etter chance to affect th e o u tcom e.44 C o o lid g e’s electio n surp rised few p eop le, an d L N N PA o fficials drew few co n clu sio n s from th e results.4$N either m ajor candidate said an yth in g d u rin g th e cam paign to inspire m uch passion am on g th e in tern ation alists. C o o lid g e in itia lly an n oun ced th at m em bership in the League w as a closed issue b u t la ter spoke o f the need fo r greater co op eratio n . D avis rem ained frien d ly b u t o bserved th at it w o u ld n o t b e possible to jo in "u n til the com m on ju d gm en t o f th e A m erican p eop le is ready fo r th e step.”4* V oters cast th eir b allo ts on th e basis o f d om estic concerns, an d pro-L eague citizen s su p p orted b o th C o o lid g e a n d D avis. A few a rch iso la tio n ist sen ators lik e R ep u blican Joseph M ed ill M cC o rm ick o f Illin o is an d D em ocrat James Shields o f Tennessee w en t d ow n to d efeat, b u t th at m arked n o trend. T h e incon clusive— at best— p o litical results that autum n sh ould have m ade L eague advocates w ary. A n y lin gerin g d o u b t ab o u t the v ia b ility o f League m em bership as an electo ral issue sh ou ld have been settled w ith in w eeks o f th e N ovem ber electio n . W h en R epublican Frank B randegee, an irrecon cilable senator, co m m itted su icid e, D em ocrats in C o n n ecticu t selected H olt to ru n in a sp ecial electio n . T h e R epublican m achine chose H iram B in gham , w h o h ad been elected govern or o n ly days before. T h is d ecisio n , com bin ed w ith th e a rb itrary actio n o f the p arty boss, alienated m any R epublicans and led to hopes th a t H o lt m igh t w in in a state w h ere D em ocrats rarely prevailed. H o lt’s in ter­ n ation alist frien d s across th e n ation hastened to endorse him , b u t he m ade a rem arkable d ecision . H o lt con clu d ed th at a stro n g pro-L eague plan w o u ld n eith er w in n o r lose him votes. B ingham received n early 100,000 b allo ts few er th an he had received as a candidate fo r governor, b u t he still w o n .47 Yet th e internationalists still m aintained their optim ism . T h e supporters o f the LN N PA ap p aren tly agreed w ith F osdick w hen he con clu d ed th at m ore "lo n g , hard w o rk ” w o u ld "b e necessary b efore A m erica sees th e light.”4* A n d w o rk th ey d id . In 1925, a n ew an d energetic bran ch o f the LN N PA e m e rg e d in C h ic a g o , w h ere it en jo y e d su b sta n tia l su p p o rt fro m A n ita M cC o rm ick B lain e and C ongressm an M o rto n D . H ull. In 1927, th ey hired G a r k M . E ichelberger, w h o displayed yo u th fu l enthusiasm and im pressive o rgan izatio n al talents. H e saw the League as "th e greatest cause in th e w o rld fo r w h ich I am p erfectly w illin g to devote m y life.” H e assisted in creatin g chapters th ro u gh o u t the M idw est, d istrib u ted p rin ted m aterials, h eld h u n ­ d red s o f m eetings each year, and started a jo u rn a l in M arch 1928, th e League o f N ations Chronicle. In a few m onth s it h ad a circu latio n o f o ver five thousan d , an d in 1932 it becam e the o fficial organ o f the LN N PA . B y 1930, C h icago served as the M idw est O ffice o f the association, overseeing activities in thirteen states.49 T h ere can b e n o d o u b t th at the L N N PA con tin u ed to m ove con stru ctively in th e o n e area w here n o appreciable d o u b t existed over its aim s. Everyone agreed th a t ed u cation al cam paigns sh ou ld "sell” th e League to th e A m erican

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p eo p le, an d L N N PA com m ittees carried o u t th is w o rk efficien tly. N um erous pu blication s created b y the grou p reported o n developm ents in G eneva, pen d ­ in g legislatio n , m ajor in tern ation al events, and program s o f th e association . In the first eighteen m onth s o f o p eratio n , over 800,000 m iscellaneous b ro ad ­ sides and pam phlets w ere p rod u ced an d d istributed . In ad d itio n , the L N N PA p ro vid ed a " d ip sheet” o f new s releases to jo u rn als an d d a ily new spapers th at had a d istrib u tio n list o f at least 6,000. In 1926 a m o vie, H ell and a Way O ut, g lo rified the League.*0 A speakers bureau o f 300 in 1923 grew to 475 in 1924. Fisher, H olt, C o lb y, L ucia A m es M eade, and N ehem iah B oyn ton , the pastor o f th e C lin to n A venue C h u rch in B ro oklyn , w en t o n n ation al tou rs that lasted fo r m onth s. P u b lic foru m s, lu n ch eon s, and din n ers reached o th er listeners.*1 P otential supporters an d voters— yo u th — w ere n o t ign ored . E ducation al w o rk in elem en tary and secon d ary sch ools w as carried o u t th rou gh essay co n ­ tests. B y 1928,950 sch ools, representin g 5,000 students, w ere involved th ro u gh an annual exam in ation o n the League. A college d ivisio n organ ized branches o n cam puses, w ith sixty-five o p eration al b y m id-1924. A M od el League o f N ation s A ssem bly program also proved to b e popular. B y 1928 the association needed a sta ff o f six persons to sup ervise th e sch oo l activities.*1 A C o m m ittee o n C h u rch an d R eligion headed b y M acfarlan d reached th e religiou s com m unity, and H arriet L aidlaw established co n tact w ith n ation al w om en’s organ ization s. A fter th e association began a h o sp itality o p eratio n in G eneva, it o rgan ized a travel clu b to p rom ote visits.*3 In 1929 and 1930, as a ctiv ity focu sed o n the ten th anniversary o f the League o f N ation s, a cam ­ paign to ra lly su p p o rt fo r th e p en d in g disarm am en t conferen ce and to p ro ­ m ote Senate approval o f the W orld C o u rt p ro to cols w as launched.*4 O b vio u sly, o n lo ca l levels w here ed u cation al outreach w as the p rio rity, th e L N N PA co n tin u ed to thrive. O n the n ation al level, the leadership m ain tain ed the appearance o f u n ity, i f n o t harm ony. A suggestion m ade b y H olt in O cto ­ b er 1924 th at the L N N PA increase expenditures created such strain th at S h ort resign ed in M arch 1925. B auer then becam e executive secretary, a p o sitio n h e retained u n til 1929.** H o lt h im self w ith d rew fro m the leadership ranks in 1925 w hen he accepted a college presidency. T h e m ost acute crisis in leadership cam e late in 1927 w hen C larke retired. W ith C larke’s resign ation , W ickersham assum ed th e presidency.*6 D u rin g th e m id -tw en ties, it appeared th at th e asso­ ciatio n co u ld survive such losses. It faced n o serious fin an cial problem s, an d its branches, esp ecially in B oston , C h icago , and N ew Y ork C ity, excelled. T h ese ou tw ard signs o f health , how ever, m asked in tern al w eakenin g. T h e com m itm en t to fu ll m em bership in the League as con stitu ted in 1920, w h ich h ad h eld relatively firm u n til 1924, began to w eaken. A d vocates o f m em ber­ sh ip began to con sid er alternatives. T h ey w ondered, fo r instance, w h ether th e U n ited States co u ld establish ties w ith d ie League w ith o u t the fo rm a lity o f a treaty. O n e w riter had earlier suggested to H ard ing th at th e sim ple ap p o in t­ m ent o f an am bassador to th e League, w ith a representative from G en eva

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nam ed to W ashington, w o u ld achieve th e desired end. R elationships co u ld th u s b e form alized in th is w ay.7 O th ers, led b y C o lo n el E dw ard H ouse, suggested affiliatio n as an associate m em ber. T h e U n ited States, th ey argued, co u ld em ulate its ro le d u rin g th e w ar w h en it fo u gh t n o t as an a lly b u t as an associated pow er. B ruce B liven o f th e Boston Globe p u b licized the schem e, w h ich attracted su p p o rt am on g som e in tern atio n alists betw een 1922 and 1924. It d ied at th at tim e, apparen tly b e­ cause p o litica l leaders ign ored i t 1* A secon d strategy appeared in effo rts to revise th e C o ven an t to m ake it acceptable to the U nited States. E uropean leaders apparen tly had few qualm s a b o u t d o in g this. T h e y w ish ed, fo r th eir ow n reasons, to retain th e League’s effectiven ess, ye t th e y rem ain ed sensitive a b o u t th ose clauses th at excited A m erican fears, especially A rticle 10.” Tw o tactics em erged in G eneva. O n e, in itia lly proposed b y C an ad a, w o u ld have elim in ated A rticle 10. T h e oth er suggested th at it sh o u ld b e clarified to in d icate exactly w h at o b ligatio n s it en tailed . C om m ittees th at sou gh t such statem ents in variab ly con clu d ed th at a n y d ecision fo r involvem ent o r response rested en tirely o n the m em ber state, w ith n o absolute requirem ent sp ecified . T h is essen tially destroyed A rticle 10 as a m ean in gfu l requirem ent fo r m em bership, even th o u gh it rem ained in the C o v e n a n t T h u s A m erican s h elp ed destroy th e "h eart o f the C oven an t” even as th ey co n tin u ed to debate it as an obstacle to th eir jo in in g . A n d , as LN PPA activists debated these alternatives, th eir co m m itm en t to the League w as o b ­ scured .60 N o r d id these in terp retation s o f A rticle 10, even th o u gh endorsed b y th e A ssem bly, d o m uch to allay fears raised b y League oppon en ts. T h e y still raised alarm s o ver co n stitu tion al issues. Likew ise, con cern s rem ained ab o u t A rticle 21, w ith its reference to "regio n al understandings.” It w as op posed in 1919 and 1920 because it h ad n o t excluded th e M on roe D o ctrin e from League ju risd ic­ tio n . A n y revision o f th e C o ven an t w o u ld have to cla rify th is p o in t. N o co n ­ certed effo rt tow ard th at en d appeared, how ever, and th e A m erican in tern a­ tion alists w h o su p p orted textual changes co u ld n o t alter the situ ation .61 T h e w illingness to explore and debate the o p tion s explain w h y som e LN PPA m em bers and th e general p u b lic w ere perplexed ab o u t the objectives o f th e association . C o lb y and Sh ort com plain ed th at p eop le perceived them as com ­ prom isers incapable o f cou rageou s o r vigo rou s actio n . O u tsid ers also n oted th e un w illin gn ess to stand firm , w h ich led to assum ptions th at the association w o u ld accept League m em bership “ un d er v irtu a lly an y con d ition .”62 In an effo rt to attract broader support, the association began to endorse related projects that it considered supplem entary to its p rim ary objective. It coop erated w ith publisher Edw ard W . B ok w hen he sponsored a peace p rize in 1923; it called fo r greater coop eration w ith League com m issions; it endorsed p articip atio n in disarm am ent discussions; and it sup ported the ratification o f treaties o n obscenity, child labor, and w hite slavery. A s d ie "outlaw ry” m ovem ent

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gained headw ay, th e association relu ctan tly rallied beh in d it and the K elloggB rian d P act. In th e late tw en ties, th e L N N P A en d orsed treaties o f a rb itra ­ tio n “o f th e N ew T ype, exem plified b y Locarno,” an d called fo r a n e u tra lity p o licy under w h ich the U nited States w ou ld n o t trade w ith any treaty-breaking co u n try .* B y th e late tw enties, even as th e L N N PA attem pted to broaden its base o f su p p o rt, it began to experience fin an cial d ifficu lties. In late 1925, m any b e ­ lieved th at th e lo ca l branches w ere d rain in g o ff to o m u ch m oney. A fter d e­ bate, th e d irectors ad op ted a p o licy th at lo ca l com m ittees, w ith u n p aid staff, co u ld arran ge fo r visitin g speakers an d expand o p eration s d u rin g electio n years.64Thereafter, u n til the stock m arket crash in 1929, outlays averaged $10001200 a m onth , w ith appeals yield in g ad ditional am ounts fo r special program s.* A lth o u gh F osdick fo u n d the association a n ew source o f su p port in 1930, w h en John D . R ockefeller, Jr., an on ym ou sly agreed to p rovid e $10,000 an n u ally an d A n ita B laine gave $10,000 fo r an end ow m en t fim d th at year, o verall revenues d eclin ed . T h e b u d get o f $60,000 in 1930 fell to $30,000 in 1931.66 T h e clearest in d icatio n o f the association ’s d eclin in g fortu n es and in flu ­ ence, an d the failu re o f dream s th at th is en tailed , cam e in the electo ral cam ­ paign o f 1928. D espite fo u r years o f inten sive effo rt, n eith er the D em ocratic n o r th e R epublican p a rty p aid any atten tion to th e LN N PA . D u rin g the cam ­ paign , even B aker and o th er stalw arts d ecid ed to fo cu s o n W orld C o u rt m em ­ bership and avoid th e League. T h e y lo st even o n th at m ore m od est objective. T h e R epublican p latfo rm p roclaim ed the advantages o f “ freedom from en ­ tan glin g alliances” and a h igh tariff. H erbert H oover, th e R epublican n o m i­ nee, sh ifted m arked ly from his early su p p o rt fo r th e League, and an in itia l op tim ism am on g in tern ation alists generated b y his can d id acy q u ietly faded. N o r d id D em ocratic in tern ation alists have an y in flu en ce o n th eir presid en tial can didate, G o vern o r A lfred E. Sm ith o f N ew York, w h o avoided th e issue.67 A t least p artial reco gn itio n o f th eir failu re in the p o litica l arena w as re­ flected in the d ecision, co m in g in late in 1928, to change the nam e o f the League o f N ation s N on -P artisan A sso ciation to th e League o f N ations A sso ciation . A t th e sam e tim e, th e sim p lified statem ent o f purp ose d eleted th e q u alificatio n th at m em bership “ b e con sisten t w ith th e C o n stitu tio n ,” th e m oral hon or, d ig ­ n ity, and resp o n sib ility o f th e U nited States.6* T h e change in nam e im p lied a great deal. T h e o rgan izatio n w as n o t ren ou n cin g its non partisan approach; it w as sim p ly aban d on in g an y pretense that it w as an effective p o litica l o rgan i­ zatio n . T h erefore, th e nam e change represented the reality th at League o f N ation s m em bership w as n o t a viab le p o litica l issue. T h ey d id n o t have th e votes now , so th eir efforts w o u ld have to fo cu s even m ore fo rcefu lly o n ed u ca­ tio n al program s in th e h o p e o f creatin g a gro u n d sw ell o f p u b lic su p p o rt fo r th eir dream . M em bers n atu rally claim ed success fo r m any o f th eir endeavors. T h e y ar­ gued th at th e grow in g co op eratio n w ith League agencies w o u ld n o t have been

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possible w ith o u t th eir w o rk. T h u s, th ey h ad kep t alive o p tion s th at m igh t oth erw ise have been d o se d . T h e y insisted th at th eir organ izatio n had been in stru m en tal in clarifyin g the p o sitio n o f senators fo r voters and in fo rcin g co n g ressio n a l h ea rin g s o n th e W o rld C o u rt. T h e ir ex p e n d itu re o f o ver $600,000 in five years fo r ed u cation al w o rk had to have had som e im pact o n p u b lic attitudes, an d th ey expected th eir cam paigns to yield results in the fu tu re.49

D espite the truth in these assessm ents, analysts m ust co n d u d e th at the L N N P A failed in its fun d am en tal objectives. T h e association’s m ost tellin g sh o rtfall appears in its in a b ility to o b tain the endorsem ent o f p o litica l parties an d th eir candidates fo r League m em bership. T h a t had been perceived as a sh o rt-term an d easily achievable go al in 1923, largely because o f D em ocratic gain s in th e H ouse o f R epresentatives in th e electio n o f 1922. H ow ever, the co m p o sitio n o f th e Senate, w here th e issue h ad to b e d ecid ed , rem ained v ir­ tu a lly unchanged. Yet th e association’s leaders m oved to in ject the League in to th e 1924 cam paign despite w arn in gs th at failu re m igh t w eaken th eir cause. T h e O utlook m agazine, in a realistic appraisal, predicted th at never again w ould a p o litica l p a rty “ in vite defeat” b y ad vocatin g th e League.70 D espite m om en tary advances o n th e W orld C o u rt fro n t, the LN PPA saw th at dream d isin tegrate, to o . T h e association sim p ly lacked in flu en ce. It rarely h ad over 30,000 p aid m em bers, and it depen ded o n a d ozen large d on ors fo r su p p ort. Yet L N N PA m em bers absolu tely refused to countenance th is fact. A rd en t believers like Baker, F osdick, and N orm an D avis d id n o t w orry, b e­ lie vin g th at it w ou ld b e b etter to “ sin k w ith th e ship.”71 A n d th ey w ere sin kin g. From th e perspective o f the late tw enties, those citizen s w h o co n tin u ed the stru ggle fo r League m em bership co u ld claim o n ly th e m o st lim ited success fo r th eir cause. T h eir strategies fo r p o litica l actio n reflected naive assum ptions, especially th eir b e lie f th at endorsem ents b y presi­ d en tial candidates o r p o litica l p arties co u ld b e m eanin gful. T h e requirem ent o f a tw o-th ird s vo te in th e Senate, as H ughes so often rem inded them , re­ m ain ed th e u ltim ate obstacle. M oreover, th e in tern ation alists n ever appreci­ ated th e com plexities o f p o litics o r the concerns o f p o litician s w h o kn ew th at n o single issue co u ld w in election s. A ttem pts to in ject the League in to cam ­ p aign s w ere destin ed from the start to fail. A ltern ative strategies fo r associate status o r fo r C o ven an t revision never reached a m ean in gful stage. O n e w on d ers, in th e lig h t o f such d iscou ragin g prospects, w h y th e proLeague in tern ation alists con tin u ed th eir quest. Q u ite sim ply, th eir visio n o f a b etter w o rld w o u ld n o t allo w them to quit. T h u s th ey co n tin u ed th eir w o rk in to th e th irties.

4 THE DIVIDED COMMUNITY Liberals, Doubters, and the Fainthearted

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I

N o v e m b e r 1920, H am ilton H olt w rote an article that appeared in The

Independent In it, he noted that H arding’s plan for a new association o f nations rem inded him o f a tow n council’s three resolutions: 1. T hat a new courthouse be erected; 2. That it be built o f the bricks o f the old courthouse; 3. That the old courthouse be used until the new one is com pleted.1 A lthough H olt was chiding H arding for the incon gruity o f his plan fo r an alternative to the existing League, the author’s w it had im plications fo r the internationalist com m unity as w ell. D uring the 1920s, polls o f both public and editorial opinion showed that a m ajority o f Am ericans had clearly ac­ cepted the ideal that new form s o f international cooperation were b oth ap­ propriate and necessary; W orld W ar I had effectively underm ined the b elief that geographic isolation could or, m ore im portant, should insulate the United States from accepting global responsibilities and leadership. Unfortunately, as dem onstrated in the first three chapters, the “architects” o f this new perception were unable to translate their victo ry into m eaningful political action that w ould challenge the unilateralist tradition and the status quo. Analysis o f the tw enties and thirties suggests a fundam ental explanation for this: during the entire interw ar period, League supporters were confronted w ith, at bare m inim um , a three-tiered struggle. T hey faced outrigh t oppo­ nents o f the League o f Nations as it was designed under the Treaty o f Versailles (frequently, albeit erroneously, referred to as “the isolationists” ), “liberals” w ho professed support for internationalism but w ho were fainthearted in their support for the League, and, finally, divisions w ithin their ranks over specific details and tactics. These divisions surfaced in the earliest days o f the debate, and they contin­ ued to provide the contextual arena in w hich the internationalists struggled.

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In this arena, the internationalists d early failed. T h ey did little to challenge their m ost ardent opponents, persuaded b y their ow n polls that this was an easily overcom e m inority. In this, they m ay have been correct. However, their inability to heal their ow n divisions, underm ine the argum ents o f the faint­ hearted, and then pressure the Senate Foreign Relations Com m ittee to act on a single program destined their efforts to failure. T hey had persuaded the na­ tion that th ey needed a new “courthouse,” but their inability to agree on the blueprint m eant that nothing w as being built.

In the absence o f scientific polls, it is difficult to state precisely where m ost Am ericans stood on the issue o f League o f N ations m em bership and increased international cooperation. However, despite the problem s o f biased sam ples and im precise questioning, the polls did indicate that a significant num ber o f Am ericans favored som e form o f international organization. In mid-1920, H olt reported on a variety o f polls. O ne, taken in January 1920, covering 410 col­ leges and universities and involving 158,078 respondents, showed 61,494 hi favor o f a Senate com prom ise that w ould perm it ratification o f the Versailles treaty; 48,232 in favor o f ratification w ithout any reservations; 13,943 for k ill­ ing the League w ith the treaty; and 6,449 for negotiating a new treaty w ith Germ any. A ccording to H olt, In other words, less than one-tenth o f the vote favoured Senator Borah and his band o f“irreconcilables”: less than one-fifth favoured Lodge. President Wilson’s uncom prom ising stand evoked more support than the Lodge and Borah pro­ posals combined. In short, nine-tenths o f the voters were in favour o f ratification in som e form and seven-tenths were for a League more virile than the Foreign Relations Com m ittee would have it.

H olt continued, noting that in July 1919, The Am erican Federation o f Labor went on record with 29,000 votes in favor o f the Covenant and 400 against it; also that the Church Peace Union in a na­ tion-wide poll o f the clergy o f the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish Churches gave 17,309 in favor and only 816 against the League. In a poll by fourteen daily newspapers in ten States 48 percent o f the votes were for the League with no reservations, 35 percent for a compromise, 10 percent for the Lodge reserva­ tions and 7 percent for no League. This vote was cast mostly in Republican districts. In a poll held by the Portland Oregonian there were 11,096 votes for “unam ended ratification,” 665 for compromise, 112 for the Lodge reservations and 228 against the treaty.1

In oth er p olls, a postal card return o f veterans in southern M assachusetts showed 554 for adherence to the League without change, 5 in favor o f reservations,

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and 12 against joining. A 1921 survey b y the Woman Citizen found that o f 1,348 Republican voters w ho responded, on ly 278 voiced opposition to the League.1 Even as they trum peted these num bers, League advocates were dealt po­ litical defeats. And yet they insisted that the tide was turning even m ore strongly in support o f the League o f N ations. Fosdick and Sweetser prem ised their optim ism on increased requests fo r literature and inform ation about the League, and several newspapers com m ented on the grow ing interest, w hich seem ed to flow er in 1923.4The "m ovem ent is sw eeping forward,” even beyond expectations, Fosdick w rote N ew ton Baker. H olt, after returning from a coastto-coast tour, found a rapid reawakening o f interest in w orld affairs: the League was “the livest issue” irrespective o f group or party. T he testim ony o f other pro-League speakers, w hile probably colored b y their enthusiasm , confirm ed H olt’s impressions. Fisher com pleted one cam paign during which he addressed audiences ranging from several hundred to thousands. He reported a "keen interest” everywhere and "found it easy to convert people to the League.”1 The favorable im pression continued into 1924. H enry A tkinson believed that proLeague sentim ent was strong everywhere except in the Pacific N orthw est Baker polled one audience in Cleveland, O hio, and reported that o f over 1,000 par­ ticipants (tw o-thirds o f whom were Republicans), 90 percent were pro-League. Everett C olby also noted the grow ing sentim ent everyw here.4 B y 1925, observers thought that pro-League attitudes had increased even m ore. Fisher conducted polls follow ing his speeches and universally found that 80 to 100 percent o f his listeners favored League m em bership. T he one reservation w idely supported was that the U nited States w ould be the sole judge o f w hat its obligations were under the C o ven an t H olt insisted that in 1925 the League and W orld C ou rt were grow ing in popularity.7 T he im pressions o f the internationalists have been confirm ed b y studies o f editorial opinion. O ne exam ination o f th irty newspapers in the M idw est, the presum ed center o f isolationist sentim ent, found nine strongly interna­ tionalist; four internationalist; and nine o f "m ixed internationalist-isolationist perspective,” depending on tim es, circum stances, and editors. Two w ere iso­ lation ist and six were strongly iso latio n ist N o resurgence o f isolationist sen­ tim ent appeared in the 1920s, and there was a general w illingness displayed b y the editors "to com m it their governm ent to international and legal insti­ tutions.” A n y significant shift away from w orld obligations d id not com e until the mid-i930S. Another m ore random contem porary sam ple o f editorial opin­ ion confirm ed the presence o f a strong internationalist perspective, and this includes the M idwest.*

D espite the indications o f support, internationalists were n ot naive about public opinion. Even Ham ilton H olt acknowledged that people still had doubts about the League’s ability to resolve problem s.9N evertheless, as League oppo­ nents grudgingly adm itted, internationalists seem ed to control "th e preach­

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ers, the teachers, and the wom en.” W hen the South is added, the list is com ­ plete. These fou r categories provided the support that the internationalists counted on to take issue w ith the critics and doubters, and to provide the audiences and p oll respondents cited above.10 R eligious leaders rem ained surprisingly loyal to the League ideal w ell into the 1930s. It thus proved easy for internationalists to enter a w ell-organized bastion o f Am erican life and stim ulate action. The Federal C ouncil o f Churches o f C h rist and the Church Peace U nion needed no encouragem ent as they flooded clergy w ith literature, circularized petitions for congregations to sign, and rallied them when key legislation was pending in Congress. O ne League o f Nations Herald headline, "Swam ping the W hite House,” noted that m illions o f churchgoers had been asked to send letters to C oolidge supporting W orld Court m em bership. D uring the 1920s, virtually every m ajor denom ination favored jo in in g the C ourt and League or adopted sym pathetic resolutions. Their publications likew ise voiced approval, and ruling bodies in general con­ ferences and conventions regularly took internationalist positions on w orld issues.11 C ollege and university students also proved to be a source o f internation­ alist support, a phenom enon attributed to "the teachers.” H olt’s 1920 assess­ ment o f pro-League sentim ent am ong college students was confirm ed by other observers. A t a Student Volunteer Convention held in Indianapolis late in 1923, 4,000 o u t o f 6,000 students from nearly 1,000 colleges supported join in g the League and the C ourt. A straw poll o f 24,000 students in seventy colleges in 1931 saw three-fourths favoring m em bership in the W orld C ourt. In 1935 the literary Digest and the Association o f College Editors asked: "Should the United States en ter the League o f Nations?” O n 115 cam puses, 50.17 percent o f the respondents m arked yes. T he Digest concluded that isolationists w ho thought "the sp irit o f internationalism in this country is dead” should take heed.“ W om en also constituted a loyal and extrem ely effective contingent w ithin the internationalist cam p, som e through specific organizations tied to inter­ nationalist ideals, and others through m ore general groups. T he A m erican A ssociation o f U niversity W om en showed a special interest in foreign policy, creating countless Round Table discussion groups that gave internationalist leaders a ready-m ade forum for expressing their view s. T he League o f W om en Voters played a m ore active role. Its journal, the Woman Citizen, regularly provided inform ation on League and C ou rt issues, w ith periodic question­ naires sent o u t to determ ine the view s o f readers. Its stand for "a liberal for­ eign p o licy” and "international cooperation” w as dear.13 W om en’s interest in foreign p olicy and their ability to lobby governm ent officials fo llo w in g passage o f the N ineteenth Am endm ent has produced a va­ riety o f significant studies. W hether seen in the context o f "the ideology o f nurturant m otherhood,” w hich m ade wom en inherently m ore determ ined to prom ote peace; as part o f a new fem inist consciousness that forced wom en to

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lin k issues o f peace, justice, and equality; or, m ore narrowly, as m erely the result o f wom en’s increased interest in all things political as they exercised the right to vote, it is undeniable that wom en’s interest in international affairs prom pted political leaders to pay attention to their resolutions, p etition s, let­ ter cam paigns, and organized m eetings. Som e m ale leaders advised against being too aggressive, but wom en boasted that their "letters to the A dm inistra­ tion get exceedingly prom pt replies.’’14 O ne o f the first wom en’s groups to endorse the League, the W om en’s ProLeague C ouncil, grew ou t o f the Pro-League Independents. T he co u n cil gath­ ered a roster o f one hundred speakers, issued m anifestos and leaflets, and organized prize essay contests and dinners. Refusing to heed the ad vice o f the cautious m ale leaders, the Pro-League C ouncil becam e quite m ilitan t in prod­ ding the H arding and C oolidge adm inistrations. T he W om en’s Pro-League C ou n cil affiliated w ith the LN N PA early in 1923 although it retained its sepa­ rate identity until 1925.* D uring the 1920s, wom en created countless civic, professional, so cial, and religious bodies. A lthough m any were not directly concerned w ith in tern a­ tional issues, alm ost all these groups created com m ittees to exam ine issues o f peace and war. U ltim ately, Carrie Chapm an C att rallied nine o f th ese com ­ m ittees and tw o other wom en’s groups into one organization.16T h e N ation al C om m ittee on the Cause and Cure o f War, founded and headed fo r years by C att, sought to clarify international relations issues. Through an n ual assem ­ blages in W ashington, w here delegates considered current co n cern s, and through a netw ork o f chapters, it did m uch to support and advance in tern a­ tionalist thinking. T he m ost prom inent wom en’s group specifically dedicated to in tern atio n ­ alist ideals, the W omen’s International League for Peace and Freedom (W IL P F ), traced its origins to 1915. A lthough the group was critical o f w h at it co n sid ­ ered the unjust peace settlem ent, and w hile it continued to take a stro n g an ti­ w ar position, w hich led it to denounce certain Covenant specifics, th e W ILPF found enough good and hope in the League o f N ations to be co u n ted o n for support.17 A ctivities in support o f W orld C o u rt m em bership also attracted th e atten­ tion o f w om en. Seventeen groups com bined to create a W om en’s W o rld C o u rt C om m ittee, w hich lobbied so intensively in W ashington that som e senators gave “w om en fu ll credit for securing favorable action.” A W om en’s C o m m it­ tee fo r W orld D isarm am ent rallied support fo r the W ashington D isarm am en t C onference, and organizations like the League o f N ations N o n -P artisan A s­ sociation established sections for w om en that cam paigned vig o ro u sly.1* Floren ce Brew er B oeckel, the associate secretary o f a n o th er p o w erfu l w om en’s group, the N ational C o u n cil for Prevention o f War, w ro te a n article in 1929 entitled "W om en in International Affairs.” She included lists o f dozens o f organizations w ith a total m em bership that she m odestly n o te d “ reaches

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w ell u p in to th e m illions.” B oeckel also n oted , in a section o n "W om en and th e League o f N ations,” th eir d irect involvem ent as em ployees, delegates, ex­ p ert advisers, an d m em bers o f com m ittees and com m issions.19A s she review ed th eir activities relatin g to suffrage, w h ite slavery, p ro tectio n o f ch ild ren , and o th er so cial an d hum an itarian concerns, she effectively proved th at w om en reco gn ized th eir stake in foreign policy. Finally, Southerners rem ained another grou p loyal to intern ation alist p rin ­ cip les. T h e South’s attach m ent stem m ed from su p p o rt fo r W ilso n , the first presid en t from the region since th e C iv il W ar. Southern senators had rem ained firm d u rin g th e treaty figh t o f 1919-20, an d thereafter "W ilso n an d th e League b ecam e p art o f th e in terw ar w eap o n ry o f South ern p o litica l leaders.” State legislators in th e area regu larly passed resolution s recom m ending m em ber­ sh ip in th e League and the C o u rt, an d a go vern or o f N o rth C aro lin a even n am ed a delegate to th e League o f N ation s, m uch to th e em barrassm ent o f th e C o o lid g e ad m in istration and League o fficials, w h o d id n o t kn o w h o w to respon d .” I f L eague supporters h ad con fron ted eq u ally w ell-d efin ed groups in o p p o ­ sitio n to th eir ideals, th eir task w o u ld have been con sid erably easier and p os­ sib ly m ore successful. H ow ever, League o ppon en ts w ere far from b ein g a p o ­ litica l m o n o lith .21 Som e con tem poraries n oted th is d iversity even am on g th e League irrecon cilables, m any o f w h om vo iced considerable interest in w o rld affairs.22 For exam ple, Senator B orah and h is supporters often d efended th eir ro le in d efeatin g th e League b y claim in g to favor increased co op eratio n and in volvem en t in w o rld affairs, so lo n g as th ey co u ld avoid en tan glin g alliances. Even A rth u r Sw eetser fo u n d it d ifficu lt to characterize B orah as "an absolute iso la tio n ist”23 T h is w as, at heart, th e m ost d ifficu lt problem fo r the internationalists. T h eir op p on en ts d id n o t advance an argum ent in favor o f isolationism , against w h ich th e y m igh t use th eir p o lls and m em bership rolls; rather, th ey relied o n subtle attacks on th e League as established b y th e C oven an t. T h e m ost clear-cu t criticism , reflectin g effo rts to w in converts am on g hy­ phen ates, farm ers, and w orkers, w as based o n charges th at the League w as d om in ated b y E ngland and th at it w as the in strum en t o f W all Street. T h is argum en t w as b uttressed b y assertions th at the C o ven an t h ad been w ritten in secret and th at th e League w as a superstate d esign ed to d om in ate th e w orld . F ailin g th is, th ere w as the ever-p op u lar appeal to G eorge W ashington’s ad­ m o n itio n against perm anent alliances.24A lth o u g h these w o u ld have been the easiest argum ents to counter, League supporters rarely responded to such state­ m ents, largely because th ey credited m ost citizens w ith en ough com m on sense to q u estion the cred ib ility o f the sources. League advocates faced a m ore in sid iou s th reat from o ppon en ts w h o ar­ gu ed m ore subtly, co m b in in g criticism s o f th e League w ith personal attacks

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o n sp ecific in tern ation alist positio n s and tactics. Som e o f these n oted th at th e in tern ation alists displayed an excessive reliance o n "m achinery,” th e actu al o rgan izatio n al set-up, as i f that in itse lf w o u ld solve problem s. T h e League existed, b u t w as it capable o f d o in g m uch? C ritics also qu estion ed som e o f th e analogies used b y the in tern ation alists. T h e exam ple o f the U nited States as the m od el fo r a con fed eration o r fed eration seem ed esp ecially vu ln erable to challenge: th e th irteen states had m uch m ore in com m on than had the d i­ verse sovereign states o f the w o rld in th e 1920s. Pragm atists question ed th e alm ost m ystical confidence intern ationalists vested in intern ational law.2’ T h ey d ou bted w h ether there had been an y grow th in respect fo r rules, and, as th e decade u n fo ld ed , th ey co u ld clearly d ocu m en t a lessen ing con fid en ce in legal processes. T im e clearly favored th is o p p o sitio n . Exam ples o f League im poten ce and the collateral erosion o f con fid en ce in in tern ation al law buttressed the argu ­ m ents o f those w h o d efended th e status quo. W hereas in tern ation alists ar­ gued th at U .S. m em bership in the League w o u ld m ake it a m ore successful in strum en t, critics con sisten tly denied this allegation . M ost o f the m ajor p o st­ w ar problem s, th ey argued, d id n o t affect the U nited States and thus co u ld n o t have co n trib u ted to th e so lu tio n . Finally, as the decade w ore o n and in tern ation alists struggled to gain th e allegian ce o f the u n co m m itted , th ey fo u n d them selves in creasin gly u n d er person al attack. M an y w h o m igh t o rig in a lly have been sw ayed in to su p p o rt­ in g League m em bership began to q u estion the sin gular in ab ility o f in tern a­ tion alists to perceive realities: m em bership in the League had been rejected and p o litica l circum stances co u ld n o t b e changed. T hese p eop le cam e to re­ sent th e co n tin u in g and fru stratin g effo rts to in ject the issue in to presid en tial cam paigns.26 It w as in d ealin g w ith these critics that the in tern ation alists failed m ost p rofoun d ly. A p p aren tly reco gn izin g th e grow in g resentm ent am on g the u n ­ co m m itted , increasing num bers o f in tern ation alists argued th at agitatin g fo r League m em bership m erely stiffen ed the o p p o sitio n , thus h in d erin g progress tow ard greater involvem ent. T h erefore th ey m aintained th at the em phasis o n m em bership sh ou ld b e d ropped in favor o f an em phasis o n co op eratio n . T h is approach tended to obscure rather than cla rify po sitio n s and co n trib u ted to th e sense th at the in tern ation alists w ere hopeless com prom isers.27 A lth o u g h certain ly con fron ted w ith a d ifficu lt task if th ey had o n ly to m eet th e argum ents o f the o u trig h t o ppon en ts o f the L eague, in tern ation alists h ad an even m ore d ifficu lt tim e d ealin g w ith "frien d s” w h o claim ed to em brace in tern ation alist ideals w h ile th ey dism issed the League, an d often the W orld C o u rt, as unnecessary. In th is sense, liberals proved to b e a m ore trou blesom e grou p o f doubters than th e o u trig h t op p on en ts to the League. T h e criticism s o f prew ar reform ers posed a m ost serious th re a t T h e w id ely kn ow n Progressive reform er F rederick C . H ow e argued that A m erican s co u ld

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n o t resolve th e problem s o f E urope an d it w o u ld therefore b e b est to con cen ­ trate o n th e ones at hom e.2* M an y lib erals criticized decision s regarding terri­ to ries an d colon ies, reparation term s, an d a peace treaty th at show ed o n ly a lim ited con cern fo r so cial and econ o m ic ju stice. T h e problem la y in th eir as­ so ciatio n o f the League w ith an u n ju st settlem ent th at m aintained a cap italis­ tic-im p eria listic status quo. A m erican Socialists argued fo r n early a decade o ver w h eth er to endorse th e League. T h ey fin ally m ade a reluctan t co m m it­ m en t in 1928, w h ich thereafter th ey applied in p rin cip le b u t n o t in p ractice. N orm an T h om as, th e p arty’s regu lar presid en tial can didate, n oted in 1930 th a t w h ile he n o w su p p orted m em bership, he co u ld n o t fo rget th at the League h ad failed to achieve a tru ly interdependent w o rld . It h ad accom plished p o si­ tive w o rk, exten ded its usefuln ess, and thus co u ld b e consid ered w orth w h ile d espite its lim itatio n s. Such a q u alified endorsem ent reflected h is o ld fears o f im p erialism , w h ich stru ck a responsive ch o rd in the hearts o f m an y A m eri­ cans. In this sense, liberals disappointed in the 1919 Versailles settlem ent proved to b e a m ore stu b b orn gro u p o f d oubters than th ose irreco n cilab ly opposed to th e League.29 Journals like th e New Republic, V illa rd ’s The N ation, an d W orld Tomorrow, as w ell as educators like D avid Starr Jordan an d H arry E lm er B arnes, shared th is liberal persp ective and, unfortun ately, reached th e sam e audiences w hose su p p o rt the in tern ation alists w ere seeking. T h e editors o f th e N ew Republic le ft n o d o u b t a b o u t th eir p o sitio n . C o o p eratio n w ith th e League and o th er o rgan izatio n s co u ld be tolerated , b u t because o f its o rig in the League co u ld never b e trusted, especially since European p o litical leaders contin ued to d om i­ n ate i t A satisfacto ry resolu tion o f postw ar problem s co u ld n o t be realized th ro u gh the League.30 T h e League o f Free N ations S o ciety (L F N S), fo u n d ed in 1918 b y such activ­ ists as H erbert C ro ly, C h arles and M ary Beard, an d John D ew ey, is p a rticu ­ la rly illu m in ative o f th e "lib era l dilem m a.” Like the League to E nforce Peace, th e LFN S fo u n d itse lf im m obilized d u rin g the early stages o f the debate. M em ­ b ers w ere n o t pleased w ith the C oven an t, esp ecially those provision s th at re­ p u d iated p rin cip les o f self-d eterm in ation and so cial ju stice. U nder th e ch air­ m anship o f James G . M cD onald, the so ciety in itially urged ratification w ith ou t reservation s i f “accom pan ied b y a d eclaration o f lib eral principles.” Later, it saw a need fo r th e presiden t and Senate to com prom ise; after M arch 1920, th e so ciety’s m em bers agreed to p etitio n W ilson to resubm it the treaty and co n ­ sen t to an y reservations th e Senate desired. T hereafter it d id little u n til it reor­ gan ized in 1921 as th e Foreign P o licy A ssociation .31 A n o th er challenge cam e fro m in d ivid u als w h o professed to b e frien d ly tow ard th e League and C o u rt b u t w h o expressed d ou b ts ab o u t th e actu al efficacy o f U .S. m em bership. Such p eo p le praised the League, claim ed that it w as a sp len d id in stitu tion fo r Eu­ rop e o r th at it d ealt effectively w ith m in o r problem s, b u t th en con clu d ed th at th e U nited States still sh ou ld n o t jo in .32T h ey con ced ed the im portan ce o f the

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League and often agreed to lim ited cooperation u n til circum stances favored m em bership. Republican senator G eorge W . Pepper o f Pennsylvania argued that the League should abandon any pretense that it had the pow er to avert w ar and adm it that it was on ly an adm inistrative body. T hen the U nited States could readily jo in . A num ber o f people echoed Pepper's sentim ents w hen they insisted that in tim e a m ore sim ple structure w ould evolve, thus m aking m em ­ bership likely.33 T he liberal ecum enical com m unity that trad ition ally supported interna­ tionalist objectives was even m ore critical. World Tomorrow expressed the view s o f this group, w hich w ished to th in k and act internationally but w hich could n ot accept the system that had been created. “O n ly a spiritual and econom ic revolution w ill save m ankind and m ake possible a genuine association o f free peoples,” the jou rn al declared in 1920. T his them e appeared in other articles that insisted that loyalty to internationalism follow ed an em otional involve­ m ent. Peace w orkers had to act on “definite principles” w ith out tem porizing. “ Leagues, Pacts, A ssociations, Conferences are ju st as peaceful, unselfish, and high-m inded as the governm ents that com pose them.” The League could never operate on liberal o r enlightened grounds— it w as a deceitful union o f im pe­ rialists. A s lo n g as nations resorted to their old w ays, th ey were essentially underm ining international organizations.34 M em bers o f the pacifist and peace m ovem ents posed particular problem s fo r League supporters. Traditionally, pacifists favored som e form o f w orld organization. H owever, th ey now voiced concern over the C ovenant, particu­ larly A rticle 10 w ith its reliance on m ilitary force. W hile th ey favored peace and global cooperation, th ey show ed little sym pathy fo r the m achinery de­ signed to prevent war. A lthough m any pacifists sided w ith the reservationists during the Senate debates, after M arch 1920 they divided over w hether to aban­ don League m em bership, prom ote it w ith acceptable lim its, o r seek a viable alternative. Thus, as one o f their critics noted, they adopted the advice o f the m other to her daughter w ho w ished to learn to sw im . “ H ang yo u r clothes on a h ickory lim b, b u t don’t go near the water.”33 Peace advocates, as distinct from pacifists, w ere even m ore d ifficu lt to deal w ith because o f the w ide diversity o f view s and positions they adopted. T h ey advocated international cooperation and educational program s to advance international understanding. Therefore, th ey defined them selves as interna­ tionalists— as supporters rather than opponents o f the League. T h ey saw their differences w ith League supporters as prim arily ones o f em phasis: support for the internationalist organization fo r them w as secondary to their antiw ar ac­ tivities. Subsequently they straddled the line on com m itm ents and advocated policies o f general cooperation rather than obligation. T he N ational C ou n cil fo r Prevention o f W ar (N C P W ), headed b y Frederick Libby and representing over th irty organizations, becam e an effective voice for this approach. Its three­ fold platform called fo r “ Progressive W orld O rgan ization, W orldw ide Reduc­

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tion o f A rm am ents b y International Agreem ent, and W orldw ide E ducation fo r Peace.” T he N C P W becam e heavily involved in disarm am ent cam paigns and the fight over neutrality legislation. It m aintained a staff m em ber in Geneva in the 1930s to report on activities, b u t even in doing so it rem ained uncom ­ m itted to League m em bership.1* U ltim ately, the deep-seated opposition to sanction-based collective security, expressed through a w illingness to pro­ pose and accept alternatives to the League, m ade the peace activists' support halfhearted at best and dangerously divisive at w orst. T h e m ost divisive option advanced b y a m ajor segm ent o f the peace con­ tingent em erged in support o f periodic congresses, a popular prew ar form ula. Supporters prom oted the H ague Peace Conferences as the best w ay to de­ velop cooperation, and th ey argued that a third H ague C onference could con ­ tinue the process. T he "R ecom m endations o f H avana C oncerning Interna­ tion al O rganization,” adopted b y the A m erican Institute o f International Law on 23 January 1917, provided their m o d e l T h e "R ecom m endations” called fo r a ju d icially oriented union, renounced great-pow er dom ination, proclaim ed public opinion as a logical and realistic sanction, and asserted that peace m ust be based on fairness, law, and the peaceful resolution o f disputes rather than on guarantees o f territorial in tegrity and independence. Supporters o f this approach believed that their program represented one additional step tow ard the federation o f the w orld that had been evolving fo r decades. By regular or stated m eetings at T h e H ague, an effective law -m aking bo d y w ould em erge.17 Advocates o f the H ague system criticized the League for its reliance on naked pow er and argued that it could never cope adequately w ith the prob­ lem s o f the postw ar w orld. If, how ever, the League’s A ssem bly cou ld be trans­ form ed "in to a periodic conference o f all the nations” fo r the developm ent the international law, and if it w ould "develop the w ork o f the H ague C on fer­ ences in to the international C o u rt o f Justice,” the League m ight yet salvage the peace.1* T h e form ula fo r a third H ague Conference possessed other appealing fea­ tures. For international lawyers, periodic m eetings w ould provide a m eans by w hich nations could w ork fo r peace w ith no strings attached. James Brow n Scott, w ho had drafted the H avana Recom m endations, rem ained convinced "th at the w orld w ould com e round to” the H ague Conferences again. R oot’s view s paralleled those o f Scott. He believed that any real hope fo r the w orld rested upon a system o f law, courts, and public righ t w hich could be advanced through a series o f m eetings that w ould consider and develop basic principles into a b o d y o f positive law. R oot, w ho agreed that the League had been de­ signed to address political, rather than legal, issues, believed that a court sys­ tem w ould supplem ent rather than challenge the League.19 Even w hile conceding that the H ague Conferences had fallen far short o f achieving their objectives in the past, proponents o f this alternative system persisted. A rth u r D. C all, editor o f the Advocate o f Peace, the jou rn al o f the

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A m erican Peace Society, sum m arized this position w hen he endorsed the Per­ m anent C o u rt o f International Justice w hile criticizin g the League as a super­ state that had to be changed. T he fact that T he H ague had been chosen as the hom e o f the proposed court show ed the sym bolic relation to earlier efforts and planning.40A n d the peace contingent did w in converts. Pacifists, includ­ in g Q uaker historian W illiam I. H ull, also seized on the H ague system to re­ store “th e sp len d id w o rk in th e d evelopm en t o f in tern ation alism .’’ T h e W om en’s International League for Peace and Freedom declared in M arch 1920 that if the U nited States did not jo in the League it should “w ork fo r the third H ague Conference and a better League o f N ations.”41 Q uite understandably, League-supporting internationalists criticized such thin kin g as dangerous. Sweetser considered Scott “ hopeless” in his in ability to see the need fo r the League in a w orld n ot ready fo r a rule o f law. Philadelphia lawyer Thom as Raeburn W hite believed H ull’s proposal to be “w h o lly im ­ practicable under the present state o f affairs” because the m ajor pow ers w ould never accept the rule o f an elected assem bly. H erbert H oover, already being advanced as a presidential candidate, agreed. A third H ague Conference “could o n ly duplicate o r supplem ent the w ork o f the League itself.” M anley H udson « p ressed shock at R oot’s idea fo r a conference to cod ify international law: it “w ould all b u t w reck the League.” Surprisingly, D rum m ond and other League officials to o k a m ore tolerant position. T h ey saw no harm in som e “ Perm a­ nent organization fo r the developm ent o f International Law.”42 T he N ew York Peace Society (N YPS), w hich tem porarily m erged w ith the League to Enforce Peace before revivin g in 1920, proved to be the m ost sup­ portive peace group active after the war. H owever, it, too, qualified its position tow ard the League. D urin g the treaty fight, it endorsed m em bership w ith res­ ervations bu t thereafter pledged “to support the continuous association o f self-governing nations for the preservation and im provem ent o f international justice, friendship, and universal cooperation fo r the com m on welfare.” T he N YPS cam paigned for the W orld C ou rt, and Leverm ore, as its secretary, helped the propagandists fo r the League b y supporting the Yearbook o f the League o f Nations.4* In contrast, the A m erican Peace S ociety (APS) proved to be extrem ely w orrisom e to the internationalists because it w ent far beyond am biguous state­ m ents to outrigh t opposition to the League. Its “ Suggestions fo r a G overned W orld” o f 27 M ay 1921, w ith an em phasis on procedural processes, was so noncom m ittal that it earned the endorsem ent o f Borah. In defending its op­ position to the League, the society’s journ al, the Advocate o f Peace, referred to weaknesses, dangers, and absurdities.44 It often questioned the propagan­ dists for the League w hen they boasted o f its accom plishm ents. Based on its ninety-five-year experience, it b lu n tly suggested in 1923 that the League either “radically m odify” the C ovenant o r disband. T h e journ al endorsed statem ents b y H arding and C oolid ge renouncing m em bership fo r the U nited States, and

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proclaim ed that it w as "n o t in sym pathy w ith the current criticism that the U nited States o f A m erica is pursuing a p o licy o f selfish isolation.” M em bers o f the society saw a distin ct advantage in separating O ld and N ew W orld con­ ceptions o f national interest. In the late 1920s, APS president Theodore E. B urton believed that geography and traditional policies decreed aloofness from the League. B y the 1930s, N ew ton Baker saw the A m erican Peace Society as "a m ere partisan anti-W ilson, anti-League political agency.” N othing seem ed to change its position throughout the interw ar years.45 T he C arnegie Endow m ent fo r International Peace (CEIP) represented an­ other group, n om inally internationalist in orientation , that w as fainthearted in its support fo r the League o f N ations as constituted in 1920. Its trustees considered the kn o tty League questions b u t never found a satisfactory for­ m ula. Endow m ent leaders avoided the debates o f 1919-20, refusing to finance advocacy groups and relying on the "gradual and patient extension o f the rule o f law.” O nce the League began operating, the board show ed tolerance and respect b u t kept its distance. B eginning in 1923, CE IP trustees received a m onth ly synopsis o f the League’s w ork (prepared and distributed internally), although avoiding "m atters that are prim arily affairs o f governm ent” rem ained the recom m ended policy.46 Leaders o f the endow m ent, speaking as private citizens, show ed a range o f perspectives. R oot, w h o served as president un til 1925, although tolerant o f and even sym pathetic tow ard the League, adeptly refused to support cam ­ paigns fo r m em bership. Butler, w hile director o f the D ivision o f Intercourse and E ducation, proclaim ed the inadequacies o f the League. H e argued that m ost A m ericans did n ot w ant to jo in . A fter he becam e president o f the CEIP in 1925, he gradually shifted tow ard respect fo r the League’s w ork, especially after a visit w ith Sweetser. H e began to speculate that w ithin three to fou r years the A m erican people w ould dem and entry. B y 1931, m any considered Butler a League partisan.47 Scott, d irector o f the D ivision o f International Law, had the narrow est perspective o f the endow m ent’s leaders. As the author o f the H avana "R ec­ om m endations,” he had a singular focus on legal approaches. H is division received an exceptional share o f the endow m ent’s budget; thus his program s did m uch to extend education and understanding about the legal approach to internationalism , but litd e to support the League o f N ations.4* The endow m ent’s w ork reflected the varied view s o f its leaders. It had cov­ ered R oot’s « p en ses fo r his 1920 m ission toT he H ague to plan the Perm anent C o u rt o f International Justice, but thereafter for m ore than six years it ap­ plied its funds in ways that aroused the ire o f the League advocates. It pro­ vided subventions to the A m erican Peace Society b u t did n ot help groups favorably inclined tow ard the League. T he N ew York Peace Society, w hich had been one o f A ndrew C arnegie’s pet projects, cou ld obtain no funds after 1920. Leverm ore com plained that the CE IP’s support for the Advocate o f Peace, w hich

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"steadily and bitterly attacked” the League, provided reasonable evidence "that ou r m ore im partial attitude tow ard the w hole subject was not approved.” N orm an D avis confided in 1925 that he though t funds w ere being used in ways that actually harm ed peace. European observers w ere also bitter about the endow m ent’s allocations o f its resources.4* T he first change in this p o licy cam e on 17 A pril 1925, w hen the trustees agreed to provide "financial assistance for propaganda.” T hey appropriated $4,000 to the A m erican com m ittee in G eneva for its w ork, a com m itm ent that continued into the 1940s. In M ay 1925, the G eneva Institute o f Interna­ tio n a l R elatio n s received $4,000, an d th erea fter it en jo yed in crea sin g subventions.50 B y 1927, the endowm ent had began to prom ote d ie "noble aim ” o f the League m uch m ore forcefully. A special com m ittee on p olicy decided that in Carnegie’s spirit the trustees should becom e m ore involved in guiding public opinion. Buder particularly saw the Locarno treaties, Germ any’s adm ission to the League and, later, the Pact o f Paris as significant signs o f a new era in w hich "n o nations can now be neutral.” Even nonm em bers should cooperate if the League sought to im pose sanctions to uphold the renunciation o f w ar treaty. By 1930, w hen Jan Sm uts visited the U nited States, B uder hoped he w ould carry away "a new appraisal o f A m erican recognition o f the literally stupendous positive achievem ents o f the League o f N ations d urin g its first decade.”51 T h e m ost co n crete evid en ce o f th e sh ift appeared in 1930 w hen th e endow m ent’s International Conciliation series printed Sweetser’s review o f ten years o f the League’s w ork. B uder recalled that no such item had been pub­ lished b y them since 1919. H e dism issed the gap b y notin g that the endow ­ m ent to o k pride in recording the "first strivings and efforts tow ard better in ­ ternational understanding as they find utterance in the w ords o f intelligent leaders o f public opinion and o f those w ho are earnestly w orking for the ad­ vancem ent o f closer cooperation am ong the nations.”52Thereafter the endow ­ m ent included annual reports on "T h e U nited States and W orld O rgan iza­ tion” in the series.

Faced with critics o f the League, self-criticism , and fainthearted friends, how did the internationalists respond? A s individuals, m any m erely con tin ­ ued to proclaim the virtues and accom plishm ents o f the League, adding o n ly that any weaknesses in G eneva stem m ed largely from Am erica’s absence.55 Even after the League had been found w anting in the m id-to-late 1930s, sup­ porters argued that it still offered the best hope fo r peace.54 In term s o f the C o u rt, supporters rem inded citizens that Am ericans sat on the Perm anent C o u rt o f International Justice; therefore, continued refusal to form ally jo in w as senseless. But individual argum ents in this vein failed to excite passion and tended to sound defensive.

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O rgan izational efforts w ere equally ineffectual, as th ey clearly revealed dis­ agreem ents and uncertainties am ong their m em bership. T h e dissolution o f the League to Enforce Peace and o f the League o f N ations Society and the declining fortunes o f the League o f N ations N on-Partisan A ssociation w ere representative o f a num ber o f groups. T he C entral O rgan ization fo r a D u ­ rable Peace, founded in 1915 to prepare studies on w orld problem s and how a league should respond to them , sim ply dissolved. T he leader o f the A m erican branch, Fannie Fern A ndrew s o f B oston, had tried fo r nearly tw o decades to educate the p u b lic to an international perspective. She had organized the M assachusetts N on-Partisan Save the Treaty C om m ittee in the w inter o f 191920 to push fo r acceptance w ith out reservations, bu t after the defeat in M arch she w as dispirited.” D espite the lack o f effective organizations, public opinion rem ained am az­ in gly supportive o f internationalist ideals. In 1932, the M assachusetts branch o f the League o f N ations A ssociation attem pted to tap into popular support b y advocating referenda provisions on election ballots. T hat year every one o f the com m unities that carried a statem ent on League m em bership show ed 63 percent o f the voters affirm ative. In 1934,217,421 voters cast ballots, w ith 62.31 percent w anting the U nited States to jo in . In on ly 4 o f 115 tow ns w here refer­ endum s w ere held d id voters reject League m em bership.5* A lengthy query in 1931 on issues relating to peace and w ar asked clergy: “ D o you favor the im m ediate entrance o f the U nited States into the League o f N ations?” To the 53,041 questionnaires sent ou t, there w ere 19,372 responses, w ith 12,709 votin g yes, 3,060 no, 3,435 doubtful, and 168 not answ ering. W hen the question w as repeated in 1934,48 percent still answered yes.57 T his inevitably raises the central question: G iven that the internationalists had a lo yal fo llo w in g , th at th eir m ost sign ifican t op p o sitio n cam e from "friends” w ho w ere at least inclined to support internationalist ideals and, finally, that they w ere successful in keeping public opinion supportive o f their ideals into the 1930s, w hy were they unable to change the official p o licy o f the governm ent? O n e answer lies in the am biguity o f their pro-League and pro -C o u rt cam ­ paigns. Speakers, w riters, and polls often did n ot spell o u t w hat specific reser­ vations should apply, the very issue that had doom ed League and C o u rt m em ­ bership in 1919 and 1920. Som e argued that this was not necessary, m ost citizens probably had not read the C ovenant, and, as N ew ton Baker argued, m any people did n ot distinguish betw een the League and the C o u rt as separate en­ tities.5* A s a result, critics easily confused voters w hen th ey discussed the de­ tails. Politicians preyed on the am biguities. Republicans and D em ocrats rushed forth w ith reservations to alm ost every treaty supported b y the international­ ists, con tribu tin g to uncertainties am ong voters and poin tin g up the divisions w ith in the internationalist com m unity.

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In a larger context, their failure m ay be explained b y the fact that interna­ tionalists w ere forced to grapple w ith tw o o f the m ost fundam ental questions at the heart o f foreign p o licy m aking in a dem ocracy: (1) w ho sets the foreign p o licy agenda? and (2) how can public opin ion be m obilized to affect p olitical action? A t heart, there is little doubt that internationalists believed that foreign p o licy should be driven b y ideology— ideals and principles. Accordingly, lead­ ers like them selves (an elite o f lawyers, journalists, academ ics, and philan­ thropists) and those elected to public office should lead. Therefore, m any o f their earliest efforts w ere aim ed at p arty officials and m em bers o f the H arding inner circle. Yet in this, the Senate, specifically the Foreign Relations C om m it­ tee, stood as the real obstacle. H ughes was righ t w hen he insisted that there w as n o point in pushing an issue unless tw o-thirds o f the Senate w ould sup­ port it. In the com m ittee, few er than a dozen persons could influence policy. T h ey frustrated the desires o f every president on the C o u rt issue, countered an overw helm ing vote (303 to 58) in the H ouse favoring m em bership in the C o u rt, and ignored the strong public opin ion favorable to international com ­ m itm ents.59 A s m any attem pts to convince the “leaders” to accept their ideology did n ot w ork, others turned to the opposing corollary in any dem ocratic system : elected officials should set aside their ow n ideology and be guided b y popular opinion and the desires o f their constituents. To this end, th ey utilized their polls, their m em bership rolls, and letter-w riting cam paigns to pressure the W hite H ouse and Congress. U nfortunately, in attem pting to focus and m obilize that public opin ion , th ey w ere in a totally untenable position d urin g the 1920s and 1930s. Public opin ion is always d ifficu lt to focus in term s o f foreign p o licy issues. W hereas internationalists had little d ifficu lty in show ing that a large num ber o f A m eri­ cans shared their goals (through the polls, attendance at lectures, and m em ­ bership in organizations), th ey could n ot m uster those num bers in support o f a single issue (like League m em bership) as proven b y election results in 1920,1922,1924, and 1928. T his d ifficu lty was intensified b y the fact that the internationalists w ere divided am ong them selves over specific proposals. In addition, the internationalist leadership w as in a d ifficu lt position w hen it cam e to m obilizing public opinion. M ost A m ericans view ed the 1920s as a decade o f relative peace and prosperity. I f the internationalists sounded the alarm o f potential strife to o forcehilly, th ey ran the risk either o f scaring people bade into a conservative geographic isolationism based on fear o f being draw n into quarrels n ot o f their m aking, o r o f calling into question the very effec­ tiveness o f the League and C o u rt because they w ere n ot preventing these con ­ flicts. Therefore, the o n ly viable strategy w as to w alk a very narrow lin e and keep the debate on a high and som ew hat abstract plane. W hereas they were m inim ally successful at this in term s o f social issues like the abolition o f sla­

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very and the opium trade, protection o f w om en and children, and the “o u t­ law ry m ovem ent,” they failed to m eet their larger objective o f League and C o u rt m em bership.

U ltimately, in the struggle that raged d urin g the interw ar years over the pros and cons o f internationalist involvem ent, it is d ear that in the realm o f ideas the internationalists w on, w hile in the practical cam p o f p olitics they lost. From the perspective o f tim e it is d ifficu lt to understand how the op p o­ sition could have dom inated the fray. M em bership in the League o r C o u rt posed no threat, and the history o f both organizations shows how p itifu lly w eak they were. Indeed, the antis actually aided the internationalist effort to create an im age o f an effective organization at G eneva. A s early as 1925, The Independent noted how the form er, b y exaggerating the League as a super­ state, w ere “ K icking the League to Strength.”40

5 WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS Educating about Internationalism

n 1923, Elihu

I

Root challenged the internationalist com m unity “to lay the

foundations fo r the future, not to harvest but to plow and sow and cu lti­ vate for a better capacity in the m asses o f m an kin d . . . to deal w ith the exigen­ cies o f the future. H ere, w e have a w orld— a vast m ultitude o f m en undertak­ ing to deal w ith difficult and international affairs on w hich they are grossly ignorant.”1 R oot’s w ords rang w ith sincerity, yet the sentim ent he expressed w as far from unique. O ne o f the m ost distinctive features o f the internation­ alist com m unity during the interw ar years was its com m itm ent to educational program s about the w orld and the relationship o f the U nited States to it. T his com m itm ent flow ed from the pragm atic recognition that victo ry w ould com e on ly after the com m itted p atien tly b u ilt a foundation o f public support. O nce inform ed, people w ould be rational in seeking solutions to the w orld’s prob­ lem s, throw ing o ff their fears o f involvem ent and cooperation and m aking intelligent decisions about the course their nation should pursue. O n ly then w ould the public dem and action b y their elected officials. In short, the goal o f the internationalist com m unity w as the creation o f nothing less than w hat N icholas M urray Butler had described in 1912 as the “international m ind.”1 T his was an attitude that reflected both traditional A m erican beliefs about the progressive nature o f education and new ideological assum ptions p op u ­ lar in the academ ic com m unity. C onfidence had grow n in the ability o f social scientists to exam ine hum an problem s and find solutions. C areful studies, based o n th e scien tific m eth o d , co u ld en ligh ten citizen s and in flu en ce policym akers,1 yet it rem ained a m onum ental task. A ll recognized that fo r cen turies people had been im bued w ith narrow and p aroch ial attitu d es through a socialization process that was central to school and com m unity. E thnocentric and nationalistic attitudes had to be countered, indeed changed, through the sam e educational system that had fostered them . A s they declared their interest in education related to w orld friendship, internationalists found ready allies in civic, business, and p atriotic groups.

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R otary and Lions d u b s sought to brin g people together; the International C ham ber o f Com m erce, reorganized in June 1920, declared an interest in fos­ terin g international understanding in the business com m unity. T he A m eri­ can Legion at its annual m eeting in 1925 adopted a resolution urging "w riters and teachers o f youth o f ou r land to inculcate in their pupils an appreciation, n o t on ly o f o u r ow n national virtues, bu t also o f those o f other nations and races, and an understanding w ith and sym pathy fo r their glories and ideals.”4 T h is perspective w as also em braced b y the leaders o f the C arnegie En­ dow m ent for International Peace. In 1922, R oot cautiously described the ba­ sic aim o f the endow m ent: it sought to educate about “ international rela­ tion s” and to prom ote w orld friendship. T h e form er involved getting “to the bottom o f the real facts” to m ake people aware o f th eir duties, righ ts, and obligation s. Butler, as chairm an o f the D ivision o f Intercourse and Educa­ tio n , w as m ore e x p lic it H e defined the international m ind as “that fixed habit o f th ou gh t and action w h ich looks upon the several nations o f the civilized w o rld as co-op eratin g equals in prom oting the progress o f civilization , in developin g com m erce and industry, and in diffusin g science and education th rou gh ou t the w orld.” B utler recognized the reality o f the nation-state, bu t h e believed th at nationalism had failed and that “a broad and generous sp irit o f internationalism m ust henceforth take its place.” Therefore he believed th at his com m ittees m ust seek to develop a cosm opolitan perspective that transcended p o litical boundaries.1 These objectives fu lly encom passed the social science approach. B utler’s d ivision provided books to libraries, churches, and institutions in the U nited States and abroad. T he distribution system becam e form alized in the Inter­ n ation al M ind A lcoves program , through w hich the endow m ent provided college and public libraries w ith m aterials if th ey w ould retain and display them as a separate unit. Each year the d ivision reported on the establishm ent o f new alcoves and the creation o f International Relations clubs. T he latter, m ostly on cam puses and in high schools, brought w orld issues to students th rough form al discussion groups; the endow m ent suggested topics and pro­ vid ed study m aterials and bibliographies. T he clubs enjoyed great popularity w ell in to the 1930s. In 1923 there w ere 79; in 1941,1,316 existed in the U nited States and Canada, w ith 1,174 alcoves created to support them w ith m aterials.6 T h e D ivision o f Intercourse and Education also pursued its educational program s in other ways. Its popular International Conciliation pam phlet se­ ries reached a w ide audience. T his sought “to supply inform ation on current intern ational problem s rather than take positive action w ith regard to any o f them .” In the 1930s the d ivisio n coop erated w ith the Federal C o u n cil o f Churches in annual A rm istice D ay radio program s on w hich speakers d is­ cussed w orld events and focused on such them es as the “ Fam ily o f N ations.” Even after w ar erupted in 1939, Butler could still ju stify such efforts. The A m eri­ can people had to lead “tow ard those constructive policies o f international

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cooperation and international effort w h ich are the one alternative to chaos and disaster.”7 B utler also directed efforts to prom ote understanding through extended contacts abroad. T he prim ary objective w as to build resource facilities, bring great m inds together, and exam ine w orld problem s. A s a result, the endow ­ m ent m aintained a European C enter in Paris and a conference site, C hatham H ouse, in England un til 1940. In addition, the CE IP prom oted exchange pro­ fessorships and fellow ship program s fo r younger scholars, and it underw rote visits o f publicists and w orld figures.* T h e program s sponsored b y the endow m ent’s D ivision o f E conom ics and H istory, first under the direction o f C olum bia U niversity professor John Bates C lark and, later, historian James T. Shotw ell, also em bodied social science con­ cepts. It sponsored publication o f the Econom ic and Social History o f the World War under the assum ption that ua broadened view o f the facts o f the w ar” cou ld provide lessons on "w hat it is safe and w ise fo r nations to do.” The d ivision also continued publication o f "C lassic Projects o f International O r­ ganization,” w hich again assum ed that detailed inform ation about various proposals could provide insight fo r contem porary planners.* R ockefeller Foundation advisers and leaders also show ed a p articu lar in ­ terest in this approach. W hen Fosdick w rote The O ld Savage in the New C ivi­ lization in 1928, he included a chapter entitled "T h e N ew Technique in Inter­ national Relations,” w hich argued that people should confront frets. T he w orld w as econom ically interrelated, the U nited States cou ld no longer be isolated, and nations had to create new institution s that w ould allow them to live to ­ gether. H um an problem s relating to health, slavery, com m unications, and arm s required m achinery to cope w ith and solve them .10 O ther organizations join ed the effort b y creating adult education program s. T h e Foreign P olicy A ssociation’s p o licy o f sponsoring notable speakers at lun­ cheons, com bined w ith its publication program , reached an o u t-of-sch ool public. T h e FPA had em erged in 1921 from the League o f Free N ations A sso­ ciation , created in N ew York C ity in 1918 to prom ote the general idea " o f som e sort o f organ ization, som e sort o f a league o f free and self-determ ining na­ tion s, as a substitute for international anarchy and international hatred.” It hoped to study questions so that "liberal-m in ded A m erican people” could understand and act on them . Its organizer, James G . M cD onald, attracted prom inent intellectuals, businessm en, and p o litical figures in to the group, m ost o f w hom reflected a concern over the illiberal nature o f the T reaty o f Versailles.11 M cD onald personally believed in U.S. m em bership in the League, b u t the association to o k no form al stand on that question. T he Foreign P olicy A ssociation’s outreach program included a w eekly For­ eign Policy Bulletin, w hich explored m ajor international events, w h ile a Head­ line pam phlet series offered analyses o f significant topics. B y 1940, over 670,000 copies had been distributed. M cD onald believed that the radio w as an equally

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im portant to o l fo r reaching the adult m ass population, and in 1928 he began a w eekly program o f com m entary over the Blue N etw ork o f the N ational Broadcasting System . In 1933, w ith branches in seventeen cities, the Foreign P olicy A ssociation sponsored study program s involving approxim ately 50,000 citizens in 117 m eetings, and it reached thousands m ore through radio broad­ casts o f its luncheon speakers. For teachers, the FPA provided publications like Weekly News Bulletin, w hile fortn igh tly item s like Information Service and Foreign Policy Reports kept people abreast o f w orld concerns. T h e association also ran a speaker’s bureau, prepared exhibits, and cooperated w ith other peace and internationalist groups.“ W hile the association’s studies covered a w ide variety o f subjects, ranging from conditions inside the Soviet U nion to reparations, w ar debts, disarm a­ m ent, and other current issues, it also show ed an interest in the League o f N ations. It had a League o f N ations C om m ittee in its early years that w orked closely w ith Fosdick’s news bureau, and the association m aintained a W ash­ in gton Bureau that sought to influence senators and political leaders. A dra­ m atic new tool for prom oting international understanding cam e in 1932 when, w orkin g w ith Sweetser and the League o f N ations Inform ation Section, the FPA inaugurated radio broadcasts from G eneva.13 T he C o u n cil on Foreign Relations also em erged in the early 1920s, reflect­ in g the increasing desire o f A m ericans to learn about the w orld and their relation to it. It found its constituencies prim arily in the business and univer­ sity com m unities. M any o f the founders had been at the Paris Peace C on fer­ ence, w here th ey had perceived a need fo r analytical and system atic studies o f w o rld problem s. A s a result th ey created the A m erican Institute o f Interna­ tion al A ffairs (AH A) m odeled after groups in England and France. Late in 1920, w hen AH A leaders found a group o f bankers, lawyers, and p ublic figures w h o had been m eeting since 1918 to discuss the w ar and postw ar issues, dis­ cussions about a m erger began. T his led, in July 1921, to the incorporation o f the C o u n cil on Foreign R elations, w hich sought to “afford a continuous con ­ ference on international questions affecting the U nited States, b y brin gin g to ­ gether experts in statecraft, finance, industry, education and science.” 14 T h e first three presidents o f the coun cil (John W . D avis [1921-33], G eorge W . W ickersham [1933-36], and N orm an H . D avis [1936-44]) w ere dedicated internationalists w ho favored adherence to the W orld C o u rt and, if not m em ­ bership in, close affiliation w ith the League o f N ations. H owever, w ith in the C o u n cil on Foreign Relations, they prom oted and m aintained an atm osphere o f im partiality. Even so, the directors o f the W oodrow W ilson Foundation considered the C o u n cil on Foreign Relations’ internationalist efforts w orthy o f com m endation: in 1934 th ey voted a $6,000 award to the CFR fo r advanc­ ing W ilson’s ideals.13 T h e co u n cil’s n oted quarterly, Foreign Affairs, supported a professional staff, p u b licatio n s, and stu d y groups. Branches o f the co u n cil appeared in a

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num ber o f m ajor cities. T h e C h icago branch alone held fourteen to tw entytw o m eetings each year, w ith an average annual attendance o f 1,600. It also helped support an International Relations Center, w hich developed a lib rary and its ow n research facility.16 T h e jou rn al grew beyond anyone’s expecta­ tions: the first issue in 1922 had five thousand subscribers, tw ice the an tici­ pated num ber. In 1929, under the editorship o f Charles P. H ow land, the coun ­ cil began publishing its annual Survey o f Am erican Foreign Relations. In 1931 this becam e The United States in World Affairs. Finally, in 1933 the coun cil began producing one o f its m ost lasting contributions w ith publication o f the first o f its periodic foreign affairs bibliographies.'7 A s im portant as these efforts w ere to reach adults— the votin g public— internationalists recognized that educating the next generation w ould p ro­ duce even greater dividends. In this, th ey found a w illin g ally in the N ational E ducation A ssociation (N EA) as it noted that international learning should “prom ote the com plete developm ent o f the ideas o f co-operation and o f law.” T h eir idealism was undergirded b y the b e lief that “the thinking o f the w orld can be changed in a generation through the schools.” O n the elem entary and secondary levels, teachers extensively discussed the best m ethods o f teaching about the w orld. T h ey learned how to com m em orate International G ood W ill D ay, plan pageants, create classroom displays, organize debates, h old m odel League o f N ations program s, and indoctrinate through creeds like G oethe’s “Above all nations is H um anity.” M oving beyond the national scene, the N E A sponsored a W orld Conference on Education for Peace in San Fran­ cisco in 1923 that attracted w idespread representation from other countries. T h e delegates agreed to d raft concrete proposals to b u ild understanding through the classroom , and they decided to create a W orld Federation o f Edu­ cation A ssociation s." T he W orld Federation, established at the San Francisco conference and set up in W ashington, D .C ., had an extensive constituency. Its 1923 Edinburgh m eeting saw fifteen-hundred delegates and five hundred observers represent­ ing nearly every nation. T he federation claim ed that all its activities were “based on the idea that the best w ay to prom ote international understanding and good w ill is through personal acquaintance o f teachers in various countries.” T he delegates voted to publish bulletins, study college curricula (especially the teaching o f h istory), and focus attention on w orld illiteracy and the health o f children.19 A t hom e, the N E A w as join ed in its efforts b y the A m erican School Peace League, led b y Fannie Fern P hillips Andrew s. Andrew s had represented the U.S. Bureau o f Education at the Paris Peace Conference, where she had p ro­ posed creation o f an International Bureau o f E ducation w ithin the League o f N ations.20W hen this effort failed, she turned to national w ork, cam paigning to inject the subject o f peace into U.S. school curricula. She cooperated w ith H ouston’s O u r W orld Institute, w here she prom oted essay contests, and she

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persuaded the N E A to proclaim 18 M ay as International G ood-W ill Day. (Prior to this, A ndrew s had gotten the A m erican School Peace League to proclaim 18 M ay “ Peace D ay” nationally.) T h e league also prepared classroom m aterials, includ ing a five-volum e Am erican Citizenship Course in United States History (for elem entary grades) and Course in Citizenship and Patriotism. Both were w id ely adopted. A s the league distributed tens o f thousands o f leaflets, post­ ers, and cards, it also set the tone for their use w ith essay contests on such them es as “ H ow the Youth o f the W orld C an Prom ote International G ood ­ w ill” and “ H ow W ould W orld Peace B enefit the Youth o f the W orld?”” T he D abney prize com petition sought the best paper on “ T he Power o f the League o f N ations to M aintain W orld Peace and to Forward H um anitarian W elfare.”” O n a less form al level there w ere program s fo r the exchange o f dolls betw een students o f various countries, and in the 1930s a C om m ittee on W orld Friend­ ship A m ong C hildren em erged to encourage the exchange o f pictures, post­ cards, toys, and good w ill m essages. T h e league also believed in the potential o f popular literature to broaden the horizons o f Am ericans, w ith Pearl S. Buck’s best-selling The Good Earth cited as an outstanding exam ple.4 These efforts w ould have been far less successful had there n ot been a num ­ ber o f citizens w h o labored to institutionalize them w ith in elem entary, sec­ ondary, and high er ed ucation . R aphael H erm an, a retired m anufacturer, pledged $25,000 fo r the best essay on “ Peace through Education.” D avid Starr Jordan, chancellor em eritus o f Stanford U niversity, w on the prize in a contest attracting m ore than five thousand entries in tw enty-one languages. H e p ro­ posed that the N E A create tw elve stu dy com m ittees to prom ote cooperation in education, sports, the study o f the teaching o f history, patriotism , a depart­ m ent o f peace, preparedness, arbitration, the W orld C o u rt, and the League o f N ations. A t its biennial conference in Edinburgh, the W orld Federation for E ducation A ssociations adopted Jordan’s plan.24 Rather surprisingly, the new educational em phasis generated little opposi­ tion . U nlike in the last tw o decades o f the tw entieth century, w hen attem pts to liberalize curriculum , em phasizing cultural diversity and tolerance, were m et w ith opposition to “secular hum anism ” and the denigration o f A m erican values, parents em braced the new approaches. To m ost adults it seem ed natu­ ral, in ligh t o f the recent war, to in still an awareness o f other lands and people in their children, and to let them know that rational options to arm ed con flict existed. D elegates attending the NEA’s San Francisco conference explored a variety o f them es and strategies, including tolerance regardless o f race o r creed, fiiller treatm ent o f other countries in textbooks, and em phasis on “the essen­ tial u n ity o f m ankind.” T h e m ost d ifficu lt problem arose n ot over w hether the m aterial should be taught b u t over w here and how the international perspective could be incor­ porated into the curriculum . A broad strategy proved easiest. Teachers could introduce ideas o f tolerance tow ard other peoples and nations and em phasize

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the positive features o f cooperation in everything they taught. G eography provided one avenue, w hile governm ent and civics courses could be used to show that responsible citizenship » te n d e d from the hom e through the fam ­ ily o f nations.** T he discipline o f h istory received the greatest attention. Patriotism and nationalism w ere so deeply em bedded in historical analysis that th ey con sti­ tuted m ajor obstacles to efforts to change w orld perspectives. H istorical nar­ ratives im planted and reaffirm ed the b elief that som e people w ere superior to others, nurturing parochialism , if n ot hatred, and perpetuating fear and ani­ m osity. Traditional histories seem ed especially g u ilty o f prom oting com peti­ tion and rom anticizing w artim e heroics. Internationalists suggested a revi­ sion o f textbooks to purge them o f excessive nationalism , substituting greater em phasis on w orld perspectives and adding inform ation about cooperation.*6 Such proposals drew historians, led b y C arlton J. H . Hayes o f C olum bia U ni­ versity and H ans Kohn o f the N ew School fo r Social Research, to the study o f nationalism itself. A n equally significant change appeared in the social sciences, as a relatively new field o f stu dy em erged. International R elations courses appeared under a variety o f nam es, in clud in g W orld Politics, the League o f N ations, Interna­ tion al G overnm ent and O rgan izations, and International Studies. Regard­ less o f the nam e, a single objective dom inated: students w ould be introduced to the increasingly com plex world.*7 Form al courses rem ained an exception on m ost college and university cam puses u n til the 1930s, bu t their evolution illustrates the em erging desire for objective study about the place o f the U nited States in global affairs.** Undeniably, m any o f the advances on the elem entary and secondary school levels w ere a result o f w ork done in areas w here new educators w ere trained. C olleges o f education led in adding a w orld dim ension to teaching m ethods m aterials. A 1929 survey o f teacher-training schools revealed the w idespread effort; 67 percent prom oted history, 46 percent geography, and 42 percent civ ­ ics as disciplines through w hich international view points could be em pha­ sized. T he prom otion o f understanding was the com m on them e. A lth ough this was extrem ely general, internationalists cou ld qu ietly applaud their ow n efforts w hen the survey show ed that 71 percent o f the respondents identified the League o f N ations “as a m eans fo r w orld cooperation.”*9 C ollege cam puses also provided an excellent setting fo r a variety o f efforts outside the classroom . International Relations clubs, m odel League o f N a­ tion s sim ulations, and cam pus lectures served to develop an awareness o f is­ sues and responsibilities w ith in the entire student and facu lty body. A n in ­ creasing num ber o f colleges developed sum m er institutes at w hich scholars, practitioners, students, journalists, and teachers could explore econom ic, in ­ tellectual, and political topics. President H arry A . G arfield o f W illiam s C o l­ lege, an ardent believer in W ilson and the League, persuaded Bernard Baruch

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and th e C a rn e g ie C o rp o ra tio n to u n d erw rite the In stitu te o f P o litics at W illiam stow n in 1921. The N orm an W ait H arris Forum on International A ffairs began at C h icago in 1924. Two years later, the U niversity o f Southern C alifor­ nia in au gu rated an Institute o f International Relations, and the follow in g year the U n iversity o f V irginia began a sum m er Institute o f Public A ffairs. T he latter, w h ile focusing on dom estic issues, often related these to the global scene. C on feren ces w ere also held d urin g the academ ic year. In 1929, C hester D eW itt Pugsley, a Peekskill banker, enabled Yale to organize international relations fo ru m s, and other colleges and universities began to im itate these ventures in the 1930s, especially Earlham , Vassar, U niversity o f G eorgia, O berlin , South­ ern M eth od ist, and U niversity o f Texas.30 B y th e 1930s regional conferences had becom e increasingly popular. These in clu d ed a M idw est Institute o f International Relations at N orthwestern, w hich o ffered college credit, and a M id-South one in N ashville. Even those spon­ sored b y in d ivid ual colleges reached w ide audiences. O ne at the U niversity o f G eo rg ia in 1935 saw audiences jam m ing an auditorium seating three th o u ­ san d . M ore that six thousand attended sessions at the U niversity o f V irgin ia.31 T h e m odel League o f N ations program also enjoyed w idespread popular­ ity b y th e late 1920s. B y the 1930s program s at Syracuse, C o rn ell, the U niver­ sity o f C h icago, Am herst, and Vassar had becom e regional, w ith those in N ew E ngland and the M id-W est attracting students from dozens o f colleges. T he L eague o f N ations A ssociation assum ed responsibility fo r preparing kits fo r these, w h ich w ere also used in high school m odel League o f N ation program s.11 T h e educational em phasis contin ued on other levels. O n e involved the ex­ chan ge o f students and scholars. B y 1922, the U nited States had the largest n u m ber o f foreign students o f any country, replacing G erm any, w hich had lo n g enjoyed that distinction. Seven years later, tw enty universities had over o n e h un dred foreign students each, and th eir dispersal elsew here led to the creation o f a C om m ittee on Friendly Relations am ong Foreign Students, w hich w orked through the N ational Y M C A .11 In 1920, John D . R ockefeller, Jr., began to fu n d the Intercollegiate C osm opolitan C lu b in N ew York C ity, w hich led to the b u ild in g o f International H ouse, the first o f fou r such facilities, w ith o th ­ ers at the U niversities o f C aliforn ia (1930), C hicago (1932), and Paris (1936). A lso sup ported b y the C hurch Peace U nion, this “unique experim ent in inter­ nation al relations” addition ally involved efforts to take the foreign students into th e com m unities in w hich they lived so that th ey m ight increase their contact w ith citizens o f the host country. A s the foreign students gave speeches in d u b s an d schools, th ey w ere also con tributin g som ething to d ie A m erican audience. Finally, foreign visitors also becam e an im portant target fo r educa­ tional cam paigns. The general hope was that w hen they returned to their hom es they w o u ld rem em ber the “w holesom e phases o f A m erican life.”14 Just as m ore and m ore foreign students and travelers arrived in the U nited States, increasing num bers o f U.S. d tizen s w ent abroad. Typical o f “the chicken

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o r the egg” dilem m a, it is d ifficu lt to know w hether education about the w orld fostered a greater desire fo r global travel, o r w hether increased w orld travel intensified dem ands fo r a broader education. U ltim ately the judgm ent is su­ perfluous: increasing num bers o f U .S. citizens w ent abroad to study. W hile there, they participated in a w ide variety o f program s. O ne, started in the 1920s, prom oted the idea o f “ international fam ily life” b y having youn g people live abroad d urin g the sum m er. T h e G eneva scene proved to b e especially attractive because it provided a w ide array o f organizations and groups study­ in g the League and other agencies.” Exchange program s w ere given a great deal o f aid b y the Institute o f Inter­ national Education, founded in 1919 as a clearinghouse o f in form ation for colleges, program s, exchanges o f professors and students, and travelers. The head o f the institute, Stephen P. D uggan, had prom oted these ideas in 1919 w hen he suggested that the Secretariat o f the League create a special bureau. D espite D rum m ond’s support, nothing happened. H ence, the institute devel­ oped as a private body.36 T h e institute helped displaced scholars, and it organized conferences on cam puses. H eavily supported b y the CEIP and the C arnegie C orp o ration in its first five years, it sought to prom ote intercultural understanding and the “ ideal o f international am ity.” It published booklets, a bu lletin , and factual inform ation on opportun ities to stu dy abroad and in the U nited States. It w orked closely w ith the A m erican C o u n cil on E ducation and created bureaus o r had representatives in virtu ally all countries. In its first tw enty years, it sent m ore than 2,000 A m erican students abroad and helped 2,500 to com e to the U nited States. It also becam e popular to create student exchange scholarships fo r ind ivid ual countries. T he C om m onw ealth Fund o f N ew York began in 1925 to prom ote study and travel in the U nited States fo r B ritish and colonial university graduate students and, b y the m id-thirties, provisions existed for A m erican-G erm an and A m erican-H ungarian fellow ship program s. B y 1935, nearly 300 persons had received awards.37

T he popularity of conferences and o f the occasional courses taught o n col­ lege cam puses stim ulated som e academ ics to th in k in term s o f increased p ro­ fessionalism . In E ngland, the U niversity C ollege o f W ales, A berystw yth, had created the first chair o f international p olitics in 1919, and in 1924 the London School o f Econom ics established one in international politics. M irro rin g this tren d , the W alter H ines Page Sch ool o f In tern ation al R elations at Johns H opkins U niversity w as created in 1924. T he exploration o f the science o f international relations and exam ination o f the com plex nature o f relations betw een states becam e the curricu lar focus at the graduate level. Sponsors o f the school, m ostly N ew York business leaders led b y Bernard Baruch, pledged $3 m illion over three years to inaugurate the program . Four professorships— in law, diplom atic theory, finance, and com m ercial policy— were created. W hen

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C harles G . Dawes w on the N obel Peace Prize in 1925 fo r his efforts to stabilize the econom y o f Europe, he gave h a lf the m onetary award to the Page School in recognition that the U nited States needed trained specialists because o f its grow in g con tacts w ith the w orld . In 1930, P rin ceton m atched the Johns H opkins effort when it established a School o f Public and International Affairs.3* T h e creation o f specific international relations academ ic program s natu­ rally stim ulated publication. B ritish w riters produced the first general w orks, and in 1925 Parker T. M oon, in collaboration w ith others, prepared a Syllabus on International Relations. Two m assive w orks appeared in 1932, one b y Charles H odges, the other b y C lyde Eagleton. A nother, b y Frederick L. Schum an, fo l­ low ed in 1933. A ll proved to be popular, forcing the authors to revise them through m any editions.39 T h e study o f A m erica foreign relations also becam e part o f the effort to prom ote a w orld perspective. D iplom atic history had appeared as a course in college curricula late in the nineteenth century, but it traces it origins as a recognized field o f study to the First W orld W ar and the interw ar years.40C arl Russell Fish produced a textbook in 1915 that w as follow ed b y those o f John H . Latané and Louis M . Sears in 1927, Sam uel F. Bem is in 1936, and Thom as A . B ailey in 1940. M any o f the early diplom atic historians, am ong them D exter Perkins, Julius W . Pratt, Frederick M erk, and A rth ur P. W hitaker, felt a strong obligation to apply the lessons o f h istory to current concerns. N one w as m ore vigorous in expressing this perspective than Perkins, w ho w rote fo r popular m agazines as w ell as an academ ic audience.41 Journals, b oth academ ic and popular, reflected the internationalist trend. N ew journ als appeared to publish the w orks o f scholars influenced b y their ed u catio n al experience. T h e A m erican Peace So ciety’s Advocate o f Peace changed its form at in 1924, adding such sections as “W orld Problem s in Re­ view ” and “ International D ocum ents.” In 1932 this becam e World Affairs. John H erm an Randall, m inister and author, launched World Unity Magazine in 1927 to prom ote understanding and universal cooperation.41 Existing publications broadened their perspective. T he Christian Science M onitor increased its cir­ culation m arkedly, in large m easure because o f its aspiration to be “an inter­ nation al newspaper.” Current History discovered a responsive audience w hen it extended its w orld perspective. Asia, founded in 1917, had a circulation ten years later o f 65,000. T he Yale U niversity Press under M alcolm W . D avis, to ­ gether w ith the Yale Review, show ed “an increasing em phasis on the general problem s o f foreign p o licy and international relations.”43 Research program s also flourished. T h e H oover Institution on W ar, Revo­ lu tio n and Peace, w hich began in 1919, sought to becom e a center for scholar­ ship and publication. B y gathering an extensive collection o f m aterials and provid in g facilities, it offered researchers an op p ortu n ity to explore social, econ o m ic, and p o litica l changes in an in creasin gly com p lex w o rld . T he B rookings Institution appeared in 1928 through the m erger o f three other

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groups. It reflected the hope o f its founder, Robert S. Brookings, that scien­ tific research on w orld econom ic and international relations problem s could educate people about issues.44 A lth ough m uch o f the w ork done in educational circles had a Eurocentric em phasis due to the (frequently disguised) League o f N ations agenda, busi­ nessm en and Y M C A figures m et in H onolulu to discuss ways to increase un­ derstanding o f A sia b y brin gin g leaders o f various races and nations together. These efforts led to the form al establishm ent o f the Institute o f Pacific Rela­ tions, w hich through study program s and publications exam ined “the con d i­ tion s o f the Pacific peoples w ith a view to the im provem ent o f their m utual relations.”4* Efforts to build a w orld o u tlo o k also extended to intellectual cooperation. A s Shotw ell noted, nationalism posed “as grave a problem in the field o f cu l­ ture as it does in those o f politics o r o f econom ics.” Barriers had to be erased, and the League o f N ations C om m ission on Intellectual C ooperation (C IC ) gained a w arm response in the U nited States. T he com m ission published bro­ chures on intellectual endeavors and problem s, and in the 1930s it focused on the study o f international relations, seeking to define the standards and con ­ tent for this relatively new field.46A n A m erican branch o f the C IC , w h ich had an illustrious roster o f educators and public figures supporting it, in 1934 pub­ lished a volum e boasting about its accom plishm ents. A s Shotw ell noted in the in troduction , the com m ission sought to acquaint people w ith the range and lim its o f w hat w as being done in research, study, and education regarding “the outside w orld.”47

U ltimately, evaluation o f the success o f internationalist educational pro­ gram s depends entirely upon personal perspective. In 1924, Scott believed that a “great transform ation” could take place in attitudes tow ard w ar and peace. W hile it is im possible to assert w ith certitude that the extensive program s to shift attitudes away from nationalism to the acceptance o f internationalism had any causative effect, th ey m ust have had influence. Perhaps the m ost that can be granted is that Am ericans, particularly leaders and those w ho w ould accept future responsibilities, w ere educated in the interw ar years to w ebs o f com m on interest. These w ould be the people w ho w ere ready, in the p o stW orld W ar II w orld, to accept a form al U.S. role in the w orld com m unity. In addition, m ost o f the organizations created in these years still exist and pur­ sue their objectives: international education o r relations program s have be­ com e com m onplace on cam puses; exchanges o f students and professors con­ tinue apace, strengthened now b y governm ent-funded efforts. T hus the ideal o f international education rem ains one o f the m ost lasting vestiges o f the interw ar efforts. In the short term , how ever, the efforts cam e to naught. O ne w riter claim ed that except fo r the Bible no other docum ent had been discussed as m uch as

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the L eagu e C ovenant. A few years later, Jessup believed that A m ericans w ere m ore aw are o f the w orld than ever before.4* Even so, the A m erican public d id n ot resp o n d w ith a vast wave o f support fo r m em bership in the international b o d y o r fo r genuine internationalism . T w o th eories have been advanced to explain this phenom enon. In 1935, H en ry A tkin son questioned the reliance on educational tactics w hen he ob­ served th a t o n ly persons already inclin ed tow ard an international approach w ere reach ed , w hile on the fringe lay “a ju n gle inhabited b y the greatest aggre­ gation o f literate ignoram uses ever brought together under one flag.”49In short, the in tern ation alists w ere g u ilty o f preaching to the converted. S eco n d , perhaps the internationalists w ere the victim s o f th eir ow n com ­ m itm en t to separating education from the realities o f the international scene and th e arena o f partisan politics. E ducational efforts seem ed unaffected b y adverse w o rld events. In the m id-i930s, w hen the m ajority o f A m ericans sup­ ported p o licies o f neutrality and isolation from international con flict, inter­ n ation al relations d u b s w ere still grow ing b y as m any as fifty a year. T he N E A co n tin u ed to prom ote W orld G ood-W ill D ay b y providing teachers w ith pack­ ets o f in fo rm atio n fo r d assroom use. Late in the 1930s, as w ar broke o u t in Asia a n d E urope, w riters still extolled the value o f international education. T h ey a rg u ed that excessive nationalism cou ld be countered o n ly b y efforts to understand propaganda, reduce em otional ties to the state, and prom ote a sense o f w o rld citizenship o r social oneness. A t the 1938 N E A convention, delegates directed the officers to cam paign m ore vigorously through its C o m ­ m ittee o n International R elations and the W orld Federation o f E ducation A ssociation . T h ey prepared a leaflet, "Tow ard W orld U nderstanding,” and is­ sued an appeal to teachers fo r financial su p p o rt T h e A m erican C o u n cil o n E ducation as late as 1940 w as planning a conference on teaching m aterials to prom ote the stu dy o f international relations.90Equally, in political activity at hom e, n ation alism rem ained the dom inant attitudinal force, a testim ony bo th to its ch aracter and the m ountainous obstacle it represented in term s o f co n ­ tinuin g attem pts to institute change.

WINNING THE VOTES Educating about the League

n early 1922, H erbert S. H ouston sold his interest in the publishing firm o f

I

D oubleday, Page, 8c Com pany. A t the age o f fifty-six, and after having been an editor for over th irty years, the publicist w as ready to launch a new enter­ prise. U sing his ow n m oney and that o f a few share investors, H ouston proudly w rote W oodrow W ilson that “ I now have nailed m y flag to the League o f Na­ tion s m ast, and there it w ill continue to fly.”1 A lth ough H ouston’s conversion was m ore dram atic than m ost, d urin g the 1920s, w hile other people labored to prom ote a broad com m itm ent to inter­ nationalism through d ie creation o f the "international m ind,” a substantial num ber o f internationalists decided to concentrate on educational and pro­ paganda efforts that specifically extolled the virtues o f the League o f N ations. Speakers and w riters reached m illions o f people, w hile organizations, fou n ­ dations, and individual benefactors provided support for agencies that p u bli­ cized activities in G eneva o r m ade sure that visitors there received a "proper” introduction. Taken as a w hole, these efforts attem pted to counter attacks on the League and to underm ine the dem ands o f opponents that the U nited States rem ain a lo o f from this dangerous w orld organization. C itizens w ho supported the League in these ways did so fo r a d ear reason: they adm ired the League as the noblest o f political creations, as the culm ina­ tion o f centuries o f painful striving fo r a w ondrous ideal that could revolu­ tion ize the w orld. Like their counterparts in the m ore general educational m ovem ent, they recognized that partisan political activity w ould be unsuc­ cessful until an enlightened public dem anded m em bership. Therefore, th ey com m itted them selves to educational and prom otional efforts that w ere un ­ equivocally aim ed at creating that result. A lth ough th ey w ere ultim ately un ­ successful, their activities certainly provided a cultural backdrop against w hich U.S. foreign p o licy unfolded.

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In the summer of 1920, R aym ond Fosdick and H erbert H ouston created the League o f N ations News Bureau. W ith a $5,000 grant from the W orld Peace Foundation, and coordinated efforts w ith the C om m ittee on Inform ation o f the League to Enforce Peace, the bureau generated data w h ich it sent to press associations, to m ore than seven hundred new spapers, and to a num ber o f interested individuals. A lth ough launched w ith high hopes, the news bureau proved to b e a very lim ited success. First, it w as a relatively costly enterprise. A lthough the League o f N ations N on-Partisan A ssociation provided fluid s, and C levelan d D odge m ade significant contributions, the new s service re­ quired a $1,000 m onth ly con tribution from the W orld Peace Foundation to stay in o p eratio n .1 D espite this aid, how ever, the bureau’s effectiveness de­ clined, p ro b ab ly because the m aterials produced b y the bureau focused al­ m ost en tirely on the rather tedious, routine w ork o f the League com m issions and bureaucracy. Fosdick, although discouraged b y 1922, continued the op­ eration u n til 1924, w hen the LN N PA assum ed the w ork o f the bureau.3 In early 1922, Sam uel C olcord , equally interested in creating an inform a­ tion agency, underw rote the expenses o f the C om m ittee o n E ducational Pub­ licity in th e Interests o f W orld Peace. T h e com m ittee so u gh t to co rrect H arding’s m isinterpretation o f the results o f the 1920 election b y prom oting the d istrib u tio n o f C o lco rd ’s The Great Deception and encouraging the p u bli­ cation an d circu lation o f articles and pam phlets. B y the m id-tw enties, w illin g to accept coop eration w ith rather than m em bership in the League, the com ­ m ittee tu rn e d its attention to the W orld C o u rt cam paign.4 In ternationalists w ere clearly aware that the popular press could b e used to educate a n d influence public opin ion . U ntil he sold it in the sum m er o f 1921, Holt’s w eek ly The Independent had set the standard. H erbert H ouston w as picking u p H o lt’s m antle w hen he sold his interest in D oubleday in early 1922 and d eterm in ed that he w ould use his life savings to produce tw o m onth ly journals, O u r World Review and Foreign Fiction, both specifically designed to broaden perspectives on international affairs. H o u sto n recognized th a t these ventures w ould require extensive capitali­ zation. H e invested over $350,000 (one-third o f his ow n fortune) and w ent into d eb t to b u ild and m aintain the netw ork. H is friends helped, as d id the LNNPA, th e C hurch Peace U nion, the W orld A lliance for International Friend­ ship, an d th e Federal C o u n cil o f Churches.3 H ouston also sold shares in his ven tu re to o th e r en th u siasts, in clu d in g Irv in g F isher, G u y E. T rip p o f W estinghouse, industrialist C harles R. C rane, Bernard Baruch, and N orm an H. D avis. W ith m o n e y to laun ch his enterprises, H ouston n ext organ ized the O u r W orld In stitu te . It form ed K now -th e-W orld C lu b s in sch ools an d as p a rt o f w o m en ’s g ro u p s, p rim a rily to p rom ote the use o f his jo u rn als. H e also establish ed a R ad io B road castin g S ervice, w h ich p ro vid ed a sum m ary o f

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O u r W orld Weekly, a jo u rn a l H ouston had created in 1922 to circu la te news ab o u t in tern ation al events. B y 1923 the jo u rn al had over 40,000 subscribers, although financial losses in 1924 forced its curtailm ent. H ouston also estab­ lished the C osm os N ew spaper Syndicate w ith a board o f illu striou s citizens that included R oot, W illiam A llen W hite, Ida Tarbell, N ew ton D . Baker, and G eneral H enry T. A llen. B y 192s, through new spapers that subscribed to its service, its releases w ere reaching alm ost five m illion readers. T hese efforts continued u n til the depression forced H ouston to abandon operation s.6 Individual internationalists in d irect contact w ith the League also gener­ ated a great deal o f m aterial fo r the popular press. Each January o n th e birth ­ day o f the League, M anley H udson prepared a review in w hich he laud ed its progress and achievem ents. T h e New York Times, the World, and the HeraldTribune regularly printed these and other com m unications.7Sweetser also kept the press w ell supplied. Early in 1921, he prepared a "personal and unofficial sum m ary” o f A ssem bly activities to inform "o u r people at hom e.” Friends and editors w h o received it gave it circulation , and Current History featured it regularly fo r several years. In 1927, that jo u rn al expanded its coverage b y com ­ m issioning Sweetser to prepare m onth ly reports, w hich it carried u n til 1932.* T he W orld Peace Foundation (W PF) proved to be one o f the m ost im por­ tant sources o f financial support for these efforts. O rigin ally founded b y Bos­ ton publisher Edw in G inn as the International School o f Peace, it had in corp o­ rated under the W PF banner w hen G inn endow ed it w ith a $1 m illio n gift in 1910. T he W orld Peace Foundation vigorously stood behind the League ideal durin g the w ar and in 1919-20 supported U.S. m em bership in i t In a policy statem ent issued in 1922, it com m itted itself to support en try— alth ou gh w ith­ ou t any obligation to use econom ic o r m ilitary sanctions. T h e fou n d ation then join ed w ith the C hurch Peace U nion and the Federal C ou n cil o f C h urches in cam paigns to prom ote the League and W orld C o u rt in the 1920s. Foundation grants enabled Fosdick’s news bureau and the LN N PA to develop; it poured hundreds o f thousands o f dollars into p u blicity program s d urin g th e interw ar years; it published a scholarly and respected pam phlet series called A League o f Nations; it underw rote speaking tours; and in 1924 it assum ed responsibility for distributing the Yearbook o f the League o f Nations.9 Its m ost sign ifican t deci­ sion cam e that year w hen it contracted w ith the Secretariat to becom e the dis­ tributor in the U nited States o f all League o f N ations publications.10 B ooks also served the cause. The League o f Nations Starts appeared in 1920 w ith chapters b y Fosdick, attorney and socialite G eorge R ublee, an d C o lu m ­ bia professor o f h istory James T. Shotw ell. C olcord published The G reat D e­ ception in 1921, w hich w as follow ed b y Fisher’s League or War* in 1923 and his b o o klet Am erica’s Interest in World Peace in 1924. Fisher’s w o rk m irrored the tone o f m uch o f this literature. H e claim ed that he view ed developm ents dis­ passionately, yet he w as passionate in his assertions that the League posed

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no danger to the U nited States and that A m erican absence threatened a pre­ carious peace structure.“ W orks b y historians and p olitical scientists often displayed a sim ilar favor­ able bias. G eorge H . Blakeslee, professor o f international relations at C lark U niversity, praised the accom plishm ents o f the League, w h ile historian John Spencer Bassett o f Sm ith C ollege revealed his sym pathies in a review o f its first seven years. Bankers and businessm en, including Frank Vanderlip, join ed in the crusade w ith books and statem ents to newspapers.12 T h e Annals o f the Am erican Academ y o f Political and Social Science becam e a vehicle for proponents largely through the efforts o f the academ y’s director, Leo S. Rowe, w ho at annual m eetings organized sessions devoted to the League. T he first, in 1921, considered "T h e Record and Accom plishm ents o f the Exist­ in g League o f N ations” under the general them e o f "T h e Place o f the U nited States in a W orld O rganization.”13 Several popular journals also carried extensive com m entary. John Palm er G avit’s The Survey routin ely included essays and articles praising the League’s w ork. O n e o f G avit’s w riters w ent to G eneva "cold and suspicious” and re­ turned to w rite a glow ing account o f League operations.14 O sw ald G arrison V illard o f the N ation, w hile view in g U.S. m em bership w ith concern, endorsed the League as a valuable agency. O ther m onthlies, the Review o f Reviews and World's Work, reflected a m ore positive perspective as they regularly presented favorable pictures and insisted that the U nited States had to play a responsible role in w orld affairs. T h e Literary Digest also focused on the League in m any o f its sum m aries.13 Leaflets, brochures, and booklets also poured from the presses, each one em phasizing the constructive w ork o f the League and call­ in g fo r greater cooperation or m em bership. B y 1930, International Concilia­ tion, a regular publication o f the Carnegie Endow m ent for International Peace, began to em phasize the constructive nature o f the League.16 Speakers also sought to reach the public. Betw een 1922 and 1926, H olt, H udson, Baker, Fisher, and H enry A . A tkinson, the secretary o f the C hurch Peace U nion, addressed large audiences and even spoke to assem bled state legislators in Texas and South C arolina. A lth ough on one occasion in 1923, at the U niversity o f M ichigan, W ickersham w as n ot allow ed to appear because officials classified the League as a political issue, this w as the exception. G en­ erally the speakers found their audiences fu ll o f receptive m inds.17 Internationalists tried to be both effective and innovative. A n attem pt to involve m ore w om en led to the creation o f a School for Speakers in 1923 un­ der the auspices o f the W om an’s Pro-League C o u n cil o f the LN N PA. Som e lecturers em ployed new tactics b y presenting the film H ell and the Way O ut. C lark Eichelberger show ed the film nearly sixty tim es in 1927 to audiences o f fifty to five hundred people in w estern Illinois. Lectures b y foreign visitors w ere also popular, one tour b y Lord R obert C ecil generating 711 colum ns o f

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clippings (or eighty-eight pages o f eight colum ns per page) in 1925. B y the late tw enties, speakers were beginning to rely less on tours, instead u tilizin g the grow ing radio netw ork to extend their influence.1* W h ile m ost o f the publicists and speakers favorin g affiliation w ith the League approached the issue intellectually, som e appealed to em otion. O ne them e centered on the responsibility o f the U nited States to keep faith w ith the soldiers w ho had died in the w ar to end all wars. Surely an ostrichlike position w ould o n ly be destructive to the efforts o f other countries to pre­ vent a repetition o f the recent horrors. A second approach focused on the em barrassing nature o f the com pany the U nited States kept as part o f a sm all group o f nations outside the League. These at tim es included A fghanistan, H ejaz, Ecuador, M exico, the Soviet U nion, T ibet, Turkey, and defeated G er­ m any.19 T he m ost effective em otional strategy centered on W ilson, the tragic leader w ho, like the doughboy in the trenches, fell w hile fighting for a better w orld. Friends sought essays and speeches from the form er president; on ly rarely did he appear publicly. W ilson's feeble health m ade him a particularly potent sym ­ b o l and, un til the end, he rem ained effective. In a radio address on 10 N ovem ­ ber 1923 he reiterated his firm b elief in "th e ultim ate trium ph o f the League as an instrum ent o f peace" and hoped that he w ould be able, if o n ly as a private citizen , "to serve a cause in w hich I so absolutely believe.”10 Internationalists naturally sought to cheer him w ith m essages and visits, and foreign dignitar­ ies, includ in g Lloyd G eorge, Clem enceau, and C ecil, m ade pilgrim ages to his hom e. O n his birthday and on num erous other occasions crow ds assem bled before his hom e in tribute.11 N ew ton Baker cam e from one such m eeting in M ay 1923 concerned about W ilson's declining health, finding him sitting "alone, gaunt and lonely.” Fosdick saw him again early in 1924, and w hen W ilson died on 3 February, he p u b ­ lished a heartrending account o f his last visit. "H is ch ief though t on that o c­ casion w as the League o f N ations, and its prom ise for the future__ T his w as the op p ortu n ity presented to the new generation. T his w as A m erica’s co n tri­ bution to the race.” Fosdick had asked W ilson to respond to people w ho ac­ cused him o f being an idealist. W ilson responded that "th e w orld is run b y ideals. O n ly the fo o l thinks otherw ise.” A s he spoke o f League accom plish­ m ents, "in his earnestness the tears rolled dow n his face, and w hen I pledged, on b eh alf o f the younger generation, that w e w ould carry through to finish the thin g w hich he had started, he gave w ay com pletely. M y last im pression o f him w as o f a tear-stained face, a set, indom itable jaw , and a faint voice w his­ perin g ‘G od bless you.’”“ Follow ing W ilson’s death, m any people sought to institutionalize his cause through m em orials. A lth ou gh established before his death, the W oodrow W ilson Foundation announced its first award to C ecil on W ilson’s birthday, 28 D ecem ber 1924. Sweetser began an unsuccessful cam paign for a gift from

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an A m erican fo r a new Assem bly hall in G eneva that w ould bear W ilson’s nam e, an idea im m ediately picked up b y Fosdick. R obert J. C aldw ell, a N ew York m erchant, began m ore m odestly b y com m issioning a bust, w hich the League accepted in 1926. (O riginally, the bust was to carry the nam es o f prom i­ nent A m erican internationalists, but disagreem ents led C aldw ell to abandon the venture.) T he W oodrow W ilson Foundation fin ally achieved its desire o f associating W ilson’s nam e w ith the League in 1930 w hen it applied its award m oney tow ard the construction o f tw o m assive sculptured doors to the new headquarters build in g under construction.13 Biographers also sought to m em orialize the form er presid en t Ray Stannard Baker produced a three-volum e w ork, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, in 1922-23, w hich appeared first in new spaper installm ents. H e then began the m assive eight-volum e Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, published inter­ m ittently throughout the interw ar years un til 1939. Baker left no doubt about his com m itm ent to publicize the ideals o f W ilson, and he often defended his hero in articles.14 Even R epublican W ilia m A llen W hite w rote a biography that w ould “ be a vind ication o f his [W ilson’s] position on the League o f N ations.” W hen D em ocratic stalwart Claude G . Bowers presented his “reappraisal” o f W ilson in 1931, he sim ply sum m arized w hat the internationalists had been saying fo r years. “N o one visits the peace tem ple at G eneva w ith out paying hom age to the statesm an w ho dared attem pt to blaze a path w here none had been before.”15

W hile League supporters used speakers, newspapers, journals, and books to influence people at hom e, th ey also increasingly concentrated on the people w ho traveled. Pilgrim ages to the League’s headquarters had becom e a stan­ dard practice fo r upper-class A m ericans, and here, too, the enthusiasts w orked seductively to present a favorable picture. Supporter and opponent alike re­ ceived particular attention. Sweetser in itially served as the purveyor o f hospi­ tality, but b y 1924 the task had proved to o burdensom e fo r one person. A n increasing num ber o f travelers appeared in the sum m er and early fall w hen the A ssem bly convened, and an efficient m ethod had to be devised so that no im portant figure w as neglected.16 T hus, in 1924, the G eneva Institute o f International Relations w as form ed to provide inform ation about the League and the International Labor O rga­ nization (ILO ). A n A m erican Com m ittee developed an elaborate program to receive English-speaking visitors. Prim ary responsibility for its funding rested w ith a Philadelphia attorney, M ichael Francis D oyle, w ho w orked closely w ith H udson. Charles Bauer to o k charge o f operations each sum m er. B y 1925, the CE IP provided support w ith a grant o f $4,000, w hich it doubled in the ensu­ in g years.17 In the late tw enties, w ith increasing adm inistrative oversight from the League o f N ations Association, the com m ittee becam e the Am erican C om ­ m ittee in G eneva o f the League o f N ations A ssociation.1*

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T h e com m ittee m aintained an office (usu ally in the International C lu b) and display areas in the ILO b u ild in g.19 Statistics show that $>290 A m ericans visited the League in 1926,7,387 in 1927,6,514 in 1928,8,127 in 1929, and 6,749 in 1930. N ot surprisingly, the depression caused a m arked decline in travel as on ly 3,906 Am ericans visited in 1931 and 2,833 in 1932. A lm ost all these people toured the ILO, and over one-tenth stopped at the office o f the Am erican C om ­ m ittee. To m ultiply the effects o f their hospitality, the staff sent news item s about the visitors to local newspapers, thereby reaching the public in the States.30 E fforts to influence visitors extended beyond the recreational to em brace education. T he G eneva Institute o f International Relations, although n o t for­ m ally organized until 1924, sponsored sum m er sch ool program s betw een 1921 and 1924. R eceiving financial support from individuals, the B ritish League o f N ations U nion, the League o f N ations A ssociation , the League Secretariat, and the ILO, the institute could begin in 1925 to invite distinguished scholars, League delegates, and staff m em bers to lecture d urin g one-w eek sessions, held in the Secretariat’s G lass Room in the Palais des N ations. In 1926,419 persons registered and m ore than fifty had to be turned away. In 1930, three hundred attended, including tw o prom inent senators, D em ocrat A lben B arkley o f Ken­ tu cky and m averick isolationist R epublican B urton K . W heeler o f M ontana. T h e proceedings appeared each year as Problems o f Peace, published b y O x­ ford U niversity Press.3* A t first, presentations m ade to the visitors w ere prim arily descriptive, but as audiences becam e m ore know ledgeable the program broadened to include critical appraisals o f League actions and analyses o f w orld questions. Under the direction o f the p ro lific classicist A lfred Zim m em o f E ngland, special courses evolved. Zim m em saw G eneva as a natural laboratory to reach people "m arked o u t fo r positions o f leadership in national and international affairs.” T hus he developed three sum m er program s: a preparatory one o f tw o weeks, open to any person regardless o f educational background, w h ich attracted elem entary and high sch ool teachers and college students; an advanced ses­ sion o f eight w eeks, w hich required a college degree o r the equivalent (only tw enty-five A m ericans could enroll in the class o f 120); and a sem inar consist­ ing o f select students from the advanced course.31 A m ericans often organized to u r groups to take advantage o f the stu dy pro­ gram s. Sherw ood E ddy regularly appeared w ith an entourage, and the CEIP underw rote visits o f journalists and college professors. T h e organizers esti­ m ated that the w riters had an audience o f fo u r to ten m illion readers at hom e. T h e professors also spread the w ord. Everyone "returned m ore o r less in favor o f the League.” I f n ot absolutely convinced, th ey at least saw it "as a hum an institution and neither o f G od n or the devil.”33 For serious A m erican stu­ dents, other channels opened. T h e U niversity o f G eneva founded a G raduate Institute o f International Studies in 1926, w ith Paul M antoux, form erly o f the League’s Political Section, as the first director.34

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M any o f these activities ultim ately had im plications fo r and an im pact on the League. T h e educational activity stim ulated discussion over the need fo r a research in stitute in G eneva. T he institute w ould study international prob­ lems and report on its findings. T h e League w ould then translate them in to action. Sw eetser assum ed the initiative. W orking through Fosdick, he ap­ proached the R ockefeller Foundation's G eneral Education Board in 1924 w ith an elaborate plan that Abraham Flexner, the ch ief investigator, considered prem ature. Such an agency, he argued, could becom e too pow erful and em ­ barrass League officials.31 R ockefeller Foundation officers, how ever, foun d the idea attractive, and in 1929, after a favorable report b y econom ist H erbert Feis, th ey acted. By then, other grou p s, includ in g the League o f N ations A ssociation and the CEIP, had developed an interest, and all o f them com bined in O ctober 1930 to create the Geneva Research Inform ation Com m ittee. It operated fo r a year under the direction o f jou rn alist Felix M orley, w ith m onth ly publication o f the League o f N ations its ch ief activity. R eorganized in 1931 w ith M alcolm W. D avis as its director, th e association w as renam ed the G eneva Research C enter in January 1932. It assum ed responsibility for sch olarly appraisals o f m any aspects o f the League’s w o rk.36

T he growing support from the CE IP and R ockefeller foundations repre­ sented real success for League supporters, n ot o n ly in term s o f w in n in g con ­ verts am o n g the social and financial elite o f A m erica b u t also in term s o f very definite m o n etary benefit fo r the international body. Indeed, th ey exceeded all expectations in attracting the interest o f the officers o f the Rockefeller Foun­ dation an d John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Fosdick, as an attorney and a ch ie f adviser to R ockefeller, w as influential in prom oting this involvem ent. R ockefeller and his advisers becam e convinced that they should apply som e o f th eir resources tow ard peace in an intellectual, rather than em otional, way. T hey saw th eir role as assisting the League in its constructive w ork and facili­ tating n ew efforts in uncharted areas. Program s in science, health, and eco­ nom ics k n ew n o nation al boundaries. Therefore, the A m erican trustees sel­ dom con cern ed them selves w ith the political im plications o f their support. N or d id th ey fear possible adverse publicity. M uch to their credit, in their contact w ith League officials, th ey m ade n o effort to set p o licy o r dictate p ri­ orities.37 A s e a rly as 1921, Fosdick had p u t Sweetser in contact w ith W ickliffe Rose, w ho in 1923 becam e president o f the new ly created International Education Board. R ose developed a special concern fo r the League's health program s, w hich first yield ed fru it in 1922 in grants from the R ockefeller Foundation’s H ealth O rgan ization . B y 1929, these am ounted to $350,000 for E pidem iologi­ cal In telligen ce and Public H ealth Statistics; $500,000 fo r the International Exchange o f Public H ealth Personnel; $155,000 fo r the E pidem iological Intel­

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ligence Bureau o f the Far East; $27,067 fo r the Center fo r Public H ealth D o cu ­ m entation; and $723,975 to the H ealth O rganization.3* John D . Rockefeller, Jr., becam e an ardent supporter o f the League. A s a result o f the 1924 study o f a G eneva research agency, he becam e aware o f the need for adequate library facilities, and in the sum m er o f 1927 he sent a team consisting o f Fosdick, Flexner, and his sons John D. I ll and N elson to confer w ith D rum m ond and Sweetser. Sweetser had been pushing the idea fo r years because it w ould be an ideal op portun ity to advance the use o f A m erican lib rary and catalogue techniques in Europe. Florence W ilson had introduced the D ew ey decim al classification system in to the League’s library, bu t few Europeans w ere interested. T h e developm ent o f a m ajor resource center at G eneva w ith adequate support w ould force them to take note. W ilson and Sweetser had unsuccessfully approached various C arnegie foundations. T h e breakthrough cam e w hen Flexner endorsed the concept during conversations over the research center in the spring o f 1926. W hen League officials in itially appeared cool to the idea, discussions shifted to the construction o f a facility. D urin g the 1927 visit, planning focused on how m uch it w ould cost. A new library in Zurich had cost nearly $1 m illion , and the team fin ally agreed that $2 m illion for a build in g and an endow m ent w ould be a reasonable a m o u n t3* T he suggestion that funds o f such scope w ould be available raised a m ulti­ tude o f questions. League officials had been considering the relocation o f their headquarters: could the proposed library also be utilized for general opera­ tions? W hat obligations w ould it entail? H ow should they proceed? C o u ld th ey iden tify the donor? D rum m ond w as told that the new build in g could be used for other purposes— there w ere no strings attached. He w ould be ad­ m inistratively free to proceed in the m ost efficient and efficacious m anner. H owever, he could not reveal the nam e o f the donor. D rum m ond decided to present the offer that autum n to the Assem bly, w hich unanim ously accepted the anonym ous g ift Fosdick carefully cleared the trans­ action w ith the State D ep artm en t40T he sensational news led to considerable speculation about the donor and placed D rum m ond in a sensitive position. H e lo o k e d to Sw eetser, w h o u ltim a te ly o b ta in ed p erm issio n to reveal Rockefeller’s nam e. D rum m ond proceeded w ith a planning com m ission, w hich soon faced a dilem m a. Prior to R ockefeller’s involvem ent, League officials had been considering a tract fo r their new headquarters betw een the Palais des N ations and the ILO center along the lakeshore. In 1924 and 1925, the Assem ­ b ly had approved funds for acquiring the grounds and erecting the new hall. A ju ry had even been selected to review architectural plans. T he R ockefeller grant upset these preparations. T he gift w ould provide a build in g o f such proportions that the lakeshore tract could n ot be used. T he Planning C o m ­ m ission thus hastily decided to ask the canton o f Geneva if the adjacent A riana Park could be utilized. W hen that transaction was approved in Septem ber 1928, a large and attractive area becam e available.41

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T h at in turn led to plans fo r an entire physical plant and the com m ission­ in g o f a prize for the best design. R ockefeller did n ot learn u n til m any years later th at he had influenced the location o f the League’s headquarters, and Sw eetser often observed that this one A m erican, b y later m aking land avail­ able in M anhattan fo r the U nited N ations building, had thus determ ined the site o f both international organizations.42 C oncern over property adjacent to the League’s new grounds soon involved R ockefeller in another way, w ith Sw eetser serving as the m iddlem an and Forstall as the unsuspecting initiator. Forstall had visited G eneva in 1924 and been so im pressed that he had decided to devote his life to furthering interna­ tion al cooperation. B y 1929, through stock m arket transactions, Forstall had acquired a considerable fortune, and in talks w ith Sweetser aboard the SS Aquitania traveling from C h erbourg to N ew York on 27 A p ril-3 M ay 1929, he decided h ow to apply his resources. H e created an International C ooperation Fund, w hich provided scholarships to the G eneva Institute and support fo r pro-League and educational organizations. Sweetser also suggested that the League w ould require additional land that it could n ot then afford. I f som e­ one w ould purchase properties adjacent to A riana Park, this cou ld provide fo r grow th, protect the area from com m ercial incursions, and preserve the beau ty o f the setting.4» Forstall responded enthusiastically. In the sum m er o f 1929, La Pelouse, w h ich co u ld serve as the residence o f the secretary-general, w ent o n the m ar­ k e t Purchase o f the estate w ould increase the League’s holdings b y 25 per­ cent. U nfortunately, w hen La Pelouse cam e up fo r sale, the League w as n ot in session and cou ld n o t act. Forstall provided $40,000 in cash and a pledge o f $120,000. A few m onths later, the A ssem bly voted funds fo r this acquisition, and early in 1930 Forstall transferred title to the League. It w as his "ch ief am bition” to serve, he w rote to D rum m ond, explaining th at he needed no thanks.44 Forstall next com m itted him self to the purchase o f the Rigot property, w hich lay on the city side o f A riana Park. He acquired the land w ith a dow n paym ent o f 50,000 Sw iss francs, w ith a balance due o f 1,250,000 francs, o r nearly $250,000. U nfortunately at this poin t, Forstall suffered a serious reversal o f fortune. Before the W all Street crash o f O ctober 1929, the A m erican philan­ thropist was w orth over $3 m illion. B y January 1930, his assets totaled $300,000 and soon declined further. A t this poin t, Fosdick suggested the creation o f a Swiss corporation and provided Rockefeller w ith the details. Rockefeller agreed to purchase $19,398 in stock and lend the com pany $175,104.60 to be repaid in 1940. TWo plots w ere subsequently created. O n e sold to the League provided space fo r a m ain entrance and bypass roads. T he other, w ith a historical cha­ teau, becam e the headquarters o f the G eneva Research Center, a sum m er sch ool, and the International Tennis C lub. In the 1940s the corporation ceased w hen the tract w as signed over to the U niversity o f G eneva.45

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R ockefeller’s interest in the League appeared in yet other ways. First, the foundation com m itted $90,000 in 1930 for a three-year study on double taxa­ tion , and he personally provided $5,000 in 1931 fo r the disarm am ent com ­ m ission.46 Second, R ockefeller becam e involved in the creation and m ainte­ nance o f the International School in G eneva, w hich Sw eetser had organized in 1923 prim arily for the children o f League em ployees. W hen new property w as acquired for $220,000 in 1929, a corporation was created as a m em orial to Sweetser s son and in recognition o f the con tribution m ade to education b y A m erican philanthropists Julius R osenw ald, John D. R ockefeller, T hom as Lam ont, and Forstall. T he R ockefeller Foundation supported the enterprise, and John D. Rockefeller, Jr., gave $25,000 tow ard the purchase o f the new site. T h e school soon had boarding facilities and b y 1939 served m ore than tw o hundred pupils from th irty countries.47 O ther A m ericans also sought to aid the League, although th ey w ere n o t always as successful. Sam uel C hiles M itchell, the president o f the U niversity o f Richm ond, organized the Friends o f the League in 1923 to achieve tw o ends. First, the group solicited funds fo r hum anitarian program s; second, it sought to provide a w ay fo r citizens to contribute d irectly to the League as an expres­ sion o f their support. A m ounts raised in the form o f $1 contributions could be considered the dues the U nited States w ould have paid had it becom e a m em ber. T h e total, w hich M itchell hoped w ould am ount to $400,000 b y 1925, w as not easy to raise. O n ly a few persons endorsed the cam paign. It conflicted d irectly w ith program s o f the LN N PA and the W om en’s Pro-League C o u n cil, and M itchell lacked the tim e to organize a national drive. O n ly in V irgin ia did supporters incorporate and establish chapters.4* M itchell ultim ately raised less than $1,500 and a problem arose over its transfer. O fficials in G eneva seem ed reluctant to accept the m oney because it created the im pression that the League had to beg to survive. D rum m ond suggested that d ie m oney be used in the U nited States b y the LN N PA, b u t this suggestion w as dism issed. W hen the fund arrived in G eneva, no one knew how to spend it. A s late as 1929, after the purchase o f a few books, $1,262.25 rem ained.49 M iscellaneous gifts from Am ericans always posed a problem for the League. A m odest contribution o f tw enty-four dollars in 1922 led to lengthy internal discussions over p olicy and procedure. O fficials decided that no such m onies should be used for operating expenses, and that any large donations, especially from foundations, w ould be accepted only if for designated purposes. W hen the library faced a crisis in 1929 because it could not m aintain its staff, Sweetser sought funds and received $5,000 a year for three years from M rs. A ndrew Carnegie, and Fosdick obtained pledges for another $30,000, apparently from the Rockefellers. T hey then channeled these contributions through the A m eri­ can Library Association. M iscellaneous gifts cam e from the Am erican Social Hygiene Association ($5,000 for child welfare), the A m erican C ouncil o f Edu­

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cation ($5,000 for educational exchange agencies), and D orothy M . Hughes ($ş,ooo for m alaria research). T he League also had to respond after a num ber o f Am ericans indicated a desire to leave substantial am ounts in the form o f bequests. O fficials acted b y devising a standard form for such donors.*0 A n analysis o f the m ost active enthusiasts fo r the League reveals a consid­ erable diversity in their backgrounds and approaches. M any w ere interna­ tion alists before the war, frequently m em bers o f the League to Enforce Peace. O f these individuals, m en like H olt, C olby, and Fisher, assum ed active roles as officers in pro-League organizations. M arburg becam e active in the Interna­ tion al Federation o f League o f N ations Societies, attended its annual m eet­ ings, and to o k every opportun ity to proclaim the virtues o f the League.*1Som e, like W hite and Straus, becam e m oderately involved in associations, w hile N ew York attorney Frederic R. C ou d ert and publicist Ivy L. Lee retained their in ­ dependence w hile speaking favorably o f the League.*2 A second contingent represented citizens converted during the war. N orm an H . D avis and N ew ton D. Baker assum ed leadership roles in groups and as organizers. James C ox, a late convert, continued to say the right things through­ o u t the tw enties b u t w ith lim ited conviction. W illiam G . M cA doo, W ilson s son-in-law and a leading contender for the D em ocratic presidential nom ina­ tion in 1924, becam e a sym bolic figure in speaking and w ritin g d urin g the 1920s b u t in the 1930s reversed his p osition. W illiam Jennings B ryan proved to be the m ost surprising convert. He had lo n g been associated w ith prom oting processes to resolve disputes peacefully, but in 1919-20 he had show n little enthusiasm fo r the Covenant. Yet betw een then and his death in 1925, he en­ dorsed m em bership w ith out qualification.** T h e new er converts, m ost o f them still young, becam e the backbone o f League advocacy. Fosdick, H udson, and Sweetser w ere in their m id-thirties.*4 T h ey had support from other new com ers such as D enys M yers, M ichael F. D oyle, and W orld W ar I officers like A llen and Reserve officer and attorney John F. O ’Ryan. O ’Ryan, fo r exam ple, declared that "th e greatest event that can transpire w ould be the en try o f the U nited States in to the League o f N a­ tions.”** O n the journ alistic front, in addition to H erbert H ouston, G avit, and E. B. W hite, a num ber o f editors and publishers becam e adm irers o f the League, in clud in g V icto r Rosewater o f the Om aha Bee, John H . Finley o f the New York Times, and Fred W ile o f the Philadelphia Public Ledger. T he New York Times correspondents in G eneva included James and Clarence K . Streit. Featured or syndicated w riters included Frank C rane, D avid Lawrence o f the C on soli­ dated Press, and E. M . H ood o f the Associated Press. C rane especially pro­ duced sym pathetic essays about the League.*0 O f all the enthusiasts, none cou ld surpass the A m ericans em ployed b y the League, such as Dr. F. G . Boudreau in the H ealth Section, D arlington in the F inancial Section, and M iss A . C . B artlett in the League library. H ow ard R.

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H uston contin ued as ch ie f o f Internal Services u n til 1930. B enjam in O . G erig w orked b riefly as an assistant to Sweetser and then jo in ed the M andates Sec­ tion u n til 1939. H untington G ilch rist also rem ained on the staff, becom ing d irector o f the M andates Section in O ctob er 1924. T h eir presence in such num bers prom pted debate in the Assem bly as to the w isdom o f ad d in g any m ore A m ericans, but th ey each m ade significant con tribution s in Geneva. T he fact that th ey to o k their vacations in the U nited States, w here th e y were m uch in dem and as speakers, also m ade them reliable lobbyists fo r interna­ tionalism at hom e. W ith regard to individual contributions, however, A rth ur Sweetser exceeded all others. H e w rote extensively and m ade period ic trips hom e— often just before elections or crucial Senate votes. W hen in the U nited States, he lec­ tured and conferred w ith governm ent officials, includ in g presidents an d top State D epartm ent personnel. A s the highest-ranking U.S. citizen in th e Secre­ tariat, Sweetser becam e an un official interm ediary n o t o n ly because he had access to all key inform ation b u t also because his friendship w ith D rum m ond enabled him to speak authoritatively. In addition to his personal contacts, Sweetser also produced lengthy, m ultipage m issives that reached A m erican officials and League enthusiasts on a regular basis.17 V isito rs to G eneva w ere also the beneficiaries o f Sw eetser’s attentions. Sw eetser’s w ife had an independent incom e, w hich, com bined w ith h is salary, an expense account, and help from friends, enabled him to host innum erable teas, luncheons, and parties in their im pressive hom e, M erim oun t, on the outskirts o f G eneva. Even so, the w ork exacted a toll. In a m om ent o f despair, Sweetser confided that he often felt "terrib ly lo n ely here at tim es.” H e drove h im self so tirelessly th at in 1926 he w as forced to take a on e-year leave to recover from exhaustion. Sweetser deserves credit fo r increasing the flo w o f news from G eneva in oth er w ays, too. C onsiderin g regular press coverage o f the League to b e inad­ equate, he em barked on a tw o-pronged cam paign. First, he p erso n ally pro­ vid ed the salary fo r a reporter to live in G eneva to w rite on League activities. Sw eetser w anted A rth u r B ullard, w h o had w orked w ith N orm an D avis on the M em el question, gone to Russia w ith Elihu R oot in 1917, and th en served in the State D epartm ent. (B ullard’s w o rk w as so p rolific and his co n tacts so use­ fu l th at ultim ately the LN N PA assum ed responsibility fo r the expense.) A sec­ o n d cam paign involved efforts to persuade w ire services to establish bureaus in G eneva. In part, through Sweetser’s efforts, the A ssociated Press an d United Press International, as w ell as the New York Times and the World, created per­ m anent bureaus in G eneva b y the m id -ıç ıo s.5®

C learly, during the 1920s propagandists and enthusiasts fo r th e League w ere united in one thing: th ey had a sense o f awe and exaltation a b o u t the

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p o te n tia l fo r intern ational cooperation. G iven th eir efforts, the A m erican p e o p le w e re presented w ith a favorable im age o f the League. Yet these efforts fa ile d to m o ve the co u n try d o ser to m em bership. Just as opponents "K icked th e L e a g u e to Strength,” propagandists and enthusiasts provided such a rosy p ic tu re o f th e League’s health that voters apparently decided that it m ade little d iffe re n c e w hether o r n o t the U nited States join ed. T hus th ey succeeded o n ly in c r e a tin g a friendly interest in the experim ent in international organ ization at G en eva.

7 ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEAGUE

n 1921, Edward B ok surprised m any people w ith an announcem ent: he was creating the A m erican Foundation, an organization dedicated to the pro­ m otion o f alternative thinking, because, he believed, the U nited States was shirking its responsibilities. M uch o f the surprise was ow ed to the fact that d urin g his career Edward B ok, editor o f the Ladies*Hom e Journal, had show n litd e interest in internationalism . H e had not been active in any o f the prom i­ nent pro-League organizations n or w ith any peace groups. Yet, w ith retire­ m ent, B ok had grow n concerned. W ithin tw o years, in 1923, the retired publisher m ade another startling an­ nouncem ent: the A m erican Foundation w ould n ot on ly prom ote alternative thinking, b u t also it w ould adm inister the $100,000 peace prize he was subsi­ dizing. W hen announcing the award, B ok noted that it w as “the psychological tim e to crystallize public opinion on the question o f the U nited States’ re­ spon sibility for preventing wars.” Perm anent peace w ould com e w hen “a voice pow erful enough to be heard” could m ove political leaders in the right direc­ tion .1 B ok’s offer w as relatively sim ple: the w inner o f the prize w ould be the person w ho subm itted an essay detailing the m ost “practicable” plan b y w hich the U nited States could cooperate in preserving peace. N aturally, the contest received extensive press coverage and generated an am azing response— over 250,000 queries were received and 22,165 plans arrived b y the deadline o f m id­ night, 15 Novem ber. H ad it not been fo r the overw helm ing public response and the p olitical fu ror it occasioned, the B ok prize w ould rem ain little m ore than a footn ote in the h istory o f internationalist activity. H owever, it and a m ultitude o f other organizational efforts represent the vibrancy and diversity o f alternative in ­ ternationalist thinking during the 1920s and 1930s. U nquestionably, m any o f these efforts w ere view ed as the product o f eccentrics, and their proposals cam e to naught. Yet they are significant for tw o reasons. O n the one hand, they sw elled the ranks o f those w ho could be called internationalists, thereby

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p ro vid in g the audiences, m em bers, and subscribers that the polity-interna­ tion alists always used to prove that th ey had a follow ing. O n the other, these groups w ere divisive, u tilizin g resources and expending energy on alternative paths that obscured and confused the issues.

A lthough Edward Bok publicly avoided discussing his personal beliefs, ju st p rio r to publicizin g his prize he confided to H am ilton H olt that it represented his effort “on quite a League project.”1 D espite this adm ission, it was d ear that B ok w anted to encourage thinking about viable alternatives, and he dem anded scrupulous o bjectivity in determ ining a w inner. A ccording to B ok’s plan, a paid staff w ould review the essays and narrow the field to tw o hundred, after w hich a ju ry m ade up o f individuals w ho were balanced b oth p o litically and in term s o f their perspectives w ould choose the w inner. T h e jurists w ere to be selected b y Esther Lape, d irector o f the A m eri­ can Foundation, N arcissa C o x Vanderlip, and Eleanor R oosevelt H alf the prize m oney w ould be awarded to the author w hen the panel announced the w in ­ ner, and the rem ainder w ould be released w hen the plan w as im plem ented. T h e judges chosen b y the three w om en w ere indeed a m ixed lot. Elihu R oot chaired the group, w hich included G eneral James G . H arbord, C olon el H ouse, Ellen Fitz Pendelton, Roscoe Pound, W illiam A . W hite, and Brand W h itlock. A lth ough som e observers noted a d istinct bias fo r the League, w ith six o f the judges affiliated w ith the League o f N ations N on-Partisan A ssocia­ tio n , m ost o f the judges, like W hite, view ed the contest as sim ply “an educa­ tion al program to keep alive aspirations fo r peace.”3 Ironically, the perceived bias am ong the judges ultim ately w orked against the essayists. V irtu ally every prom inent Am erican internationalist, including C olcord , Fisher, Fosdick, H olt, H udson, Jordan, Charles W . E liot, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, responded w ith a plan. N ot surprisingly, m ost o f these w riters focused on the League, in large m easure to obtain publicity for i t 4A s a result, the judges had a difficult tim e assessing the pro-League proposals. The ju ry rejected w hat had initially been their first choice, an essay b y Fosdick that rep­ resented the com bined talents o f Sweetser, G ilchrist, D rum m ond, Shepardson, and journalist W alter U ppm ann. T he ju ry decided that it could arouse antiLeague forces and thus be counterproductive. Fosdick apparently agreed that it w ould be unw ise. Therefore, he refused to allow his essay to appear in Ways to Peace, the collection o f the tw enty best plans, w hich Lape edited.1 In announcing the w inning plan on 6 January 1924, B ok noted that the authors reflected a true cross-section o f the A m erican public. T he m ajority o f essayists had articulated a desire to have the U nited States m ore fu lly involved in efforts to eradicate w ar, b u t the authors ranged from sophisticated scholars to concerned citizens.6 T h e selection o f a w inner did n ot com plete the process. W ith the author as yet unidentified, B ok announced that there w ould be a national referendum

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in w hich people could vote on the m erits o f the plan. T h e referendum w ould be carried ou t through a popular survey. Seven hundred d aily newspapers (w ith a circulation in excess o f eighteen m illion readers), together w ith seven thousand w eeklies and four hundred journals (w ith m ore than tw elve m illion readers), printed a sum m ary o f the plan and ballots for voting. In addition, clubs and organizations sent circulars to their m em bers. M ore than 600,000 readers responded, show ing overw helm ing support fo r the w inning p ro p o sal A t a large rally in Philadelphia on 4 February 1924, one day after W ilson’s death, Charles H . Leverm ore w as revealed as the author.7 Leverm ore’s long involvem ent in both the peace and internationalist m ove­ m ents provided the background fo r his ingenious plan. He had been active after 1914 in the W orld’s C o u rt League, w hich argued fo r an international sys­ tem based prim arily on a ju d icial tribunal, and he had m aintained contact w ith League to E nforce Peace advocates. Between 1920 and 1923, he had w orked contin uously to reconcile diverse view points, and his participation had been vital in creating the League o f N ations N on-Partisan A ssociation. Leverm ore w as quick to note that his plan did n o t represent an ideal; it offered a p racti­ cable option , as B ok had sp ecified .' T he w inning essayist entitled his plan "Progressive C ooperation w ith the O rganized W orld, Sustained b y the M oral Force o f Public O pin ion and b y D eveloping Law.” In the essay, Leverm ore adroitly straddled controversial is­ sues. He advised against m em bership in the League "as at present constituted” b u t kept the d oor open b y offering a proviso concerning revision o f the C o v­ enant. H e proposed cooperation w ith the League bu t qualified that recom ­ m endation so that no obligation w ould result from contact. H e rejected the idea that any association o f nations could replace the existing agency and, b y reference to the M onroe D octrin e, em phasized that the League recognized the leadership o f the U nited States in the W estern H em isphere. Advocates o f international law could respond w arm ly to his suggestions fo r further cod ifi­ cation efforts and to his recom m endation for m em bership in the W orld C ourt. Pacifists w ere assured that cooperation w ould n ot involve either m ilitary o r econom ic force, and he placated exponents o f a revived H ague system w ith assertions that the League w as striving to attain the principles and hopes ad­ vanced in 1899 and 1907. Predictably, both critics and supporters o f the League saw in Leverm ore’s plan ju st w hat they w anted to see. Edw in Borchard, form er law librarian o f Congress, State D epartm ent solicitor, and professor o f law at Yale U niversity, though t that the om ission o f reference to the Treaty o f Versailles and to Euro­ pean political conditions signified "a defeat fo r the League.” Pro-Leaguers be­ lieved that, despite its narrow perspective, the proposal w ould stim ulate in ­ terest in and discussion abou t the need fo r A m erican outreach. Sw eetser concluded that it w ould offer "a clear-cut referendum for the first tim e on a straight League proposal.” John H . C larke endorsed it, notin g that the plan

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“adopts the C ovenant o f the League o f N ations w ith o n ly tw o o f its tw enty-six articles considerably m odified,” and the LN N PA offered its support w hile o b ­ serving th at the plan, although “n ot acceptable as a substitute,” d id open the door to m em bership.9 T h e va ryin g perspectives d id nothing to underm ine the internationalist agenda: th e people had responded and their reaction w ould “terrify the Sen­ ate ” Even so, internationalist leaders w ere caught o ff guard b y the repercus­ sions arisin g from the p ublic’s show o f support. Senator James Reed in tro­ duced a resolution calling fo r a Senate subcom m ittee to inquire in to “efforts being m ade to con trol pu blic opin ion and the action o f Congress through propaganda o r b y the use o f m oney, b y advertising o r the con trol o f p ublic­ ity,” w h ich in tu rn affected foreign policies. Senator G eorge H . M oses chaired the subcom m ittee, w hich included Reed, G reen o f Verm ont, Thaddeus H . Caraw ay o f Arkansas, and H enrik Shipstead o f M innesota. Three o f the five m em bers con d uctin g the investigation w ere noted irreconcilables. B ok im m ediately volunteered to testify. H e assured the com m ittee that no conspiracy o f financial, international, o r political interests existed; the entire am ount fo r the prize and expenses had com e from him . H e refused, how ever, to d isclose the costs, insisting that this was a personal m atter. T his effectively closed th e d o o r to any sensational revelations from a com m ittee “ fishing ex­ pedition.” B ok then seized the initiative b y offerin g to duplicate his award. I f the senators d id n ot have confidence in his panel o f illustrious judges, he w ould turn o ver th e 22,164 essays and let the com m ittee decide on a second w inner. After th e Senate approved that choice, he w ould pay the second h a lf o f the prize. T h e senators quickly declined this offer, and after testim ony from Esther Lape fa iled to elicit the sought-after inform ation, they abandoned the hear­ ing. V irtu a lly everyone agreed that B ok had bested his inquisitors and that the senators h a d provided him w ith a great deal o f additional publicity.10 U ltim ately the contest did pay dividends. Straw polls early in 1924 confirm ed the fact th a t there w as an aroused interest in internationalism and the League, and the L N N PA exploited that as fu lly as possible. H owever, in the long term the significance o f the B ok prize w as felt less in the im pact o f specific plans than in th e legitim acy granted the Am erican Foundation. Leverm ore’s plan was never im plem ented. In Geneva, Sweetser cautioned D rum m ond to be care­ ful abou t even responding to the w inning plan because o f the extensive public­ ity associated w ith i t u B ut the A m erican Foundation, under Lape’s direction, survived beyon d B ok’s death. It continued its efforts to educate the public on im portant foreign p o licy issues and sponsored cam paigns to jo in the W orld Court, pu blish ed a Foreign Relations Bulletin in the late 1920s, and in the 1930s circularized m aterials to delegates at national party conventions.

Although th e Bok prize provided perhaps the m ost publicized popular fo ­ rum fo r co n sid eration o f alternative proposals to the League o f N ations, the

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1920s and 1930s saw a vast array o f individuals and organizations con tribu t­ ing to the debate. O f these, the com m unity internationalists w ere am ong the m ost visible and p ersisten t T hose w ho em braced the com m unity perspective did n ot necessarily ob­ ject to the League because o f its p o lity orientation; they sim ply believed that no organization could be effective until and unless it had the support o f the people o f the w orld. D urin g the interw ar period, the proposals that the com ­ m unity thinkers offered w ere as varied as the individuals w ho presented them . T he com m on them e in their proposals w as that internationalism should n ot be associated on ly w ith political and econom ic developm ents; it should also reflect “the em otions o f hum anity” and the rational trend tow ard an interna­ tion al m ind. In 1924-25, Reid D avies o f B rooklyn, N ew York, produced a series o f m im ­ eographed World Unity Bulletin in w hich he called fo r a “ constitution o f the united nations of earth .” W hile he referred to his proposal as a federa­ tion , the adm inistrative organization w as clearly not his p rio rity and he pro­ vided little detail about its structure. Rather, he referred to his “w orld state” as “a governm ent o f all the people, b y all the people, fo r all the people.” H is references to “ ideas and ideals,” “ Love,” and “spiritual force,” and his b e lief that natural law reflected the w ill o f G od m ark him as a com m unity thinker.12 H endrik C . Andersen, an architect b o m in N orw ay bu t raised in the U nited States, fits equally w ell into this category. Andersen had lon g advanced his plan fo r an international city as the headquarters o f all w orld activities. In 1920, Andersen, then livin g in Rom e, sought unsuccessfully to present his pro­ posal to the C o u n cil o f the League o f N ations; thereafter, he prom oted an effort to have Brussels nam ed as the center. W alter J. Bartnett, w ho had been involved in the W orld Federation League and its plans in 1910, sought en­ dorsem ents and acceptance o f Andersen’s ideas in the U nited States. In a dis­ play o f naiveté characteristic o f m any com m unity internationalists, Andersen and B artnett asserted that Belgium ’s w ar debt to the U nited States could be used to cover the expenses.13 Between 1927 and 1935, the W orld U nity Foundation (W U F) also attem pted to advance a particular agenda for a w orld com m unity. Led b y clergym an John H erm an Randall, it sought to underm ine individualism and nationalism and in this w ay create interdependent people w ho w ould reconcile all differences peacefully. The foundation sought to awaken and spread “a com m on conscious­ ness” that was a “qualitative and not a quantitative ideal.”14Im plicit in this think­ ing was the b elief that people possessed autonom y just as nation-states did. W orld unity, according to Randall, was essential in the face o f “the very nature o f life.” It was “a spiritual thing” based on know ledge, understanding, hum an endeavors, econom ic interrelationships, m odem com m unications, and a grow ­ ing realization o f the devastation o f war. H e believed there were religious, ph ilo­ sophical, biological, and psychological forces m oving people tow ard oneness.

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The League o f N ations w as not the result o f W ilson's initiative; it reflected “that definite sense o f the interdependence o f m odem nations.”15 Randall and his follow ers d id n ot deny the need fo r “adm inistrative units" to serve the needs o f existing states. These w ould evolve un til a w orld govern­ ment becam e a reality. T h e League o f N ations w as m erely part o f a trend in a socialization process o f im m ense proportion s that w ould lead people to thin k as an “o rgan ic unity.” There w ould be a “ final struggle betw een nationalism and internationalism ” as people becam e aware o f their interdependency and asserted th eir power. T his w ould culm inate in “the interdependence o f all peoples” an d universal broth erh ood .* N aturally, leadership w as necessary to bring ab o u t this goal. Rather uniquely, W orld U n ity Foundation leaders be­ lieved th at peace should n ot be left to p olitician s influenced b y im perialism and nationalism ; it should be in the hands o f social engineers. Initially the foundation was able to operate rather widely, publishing a noted journal, W orld Unity Magazine, spon sorin g sum m er institutes in various cit­ ies, and startin g a W orld L ibrary that began w ith R andall’s A World Com m u­ nity: The Suprem e Task o f the Twentieth Century and historian H erbert Adam s G ibbons’s Nationalism and Internationalism . H owever, the W U F fell victim to the depression early in 1935, even as other proposals associated w ith the ideal o f citizen sh ip appeared. In 1936, Salvador de M adariaga, the Spanish h istorian , ph ilosopher, and League o fficia l, created a W orld F oundation based in E ngland. It sou gh t “to prom ote th e idea and feelin g o f w o rld u n ity am ong p e o p le . . . to prepare the w ay fo r a system o f w o rld m anagem ent sup ported b y an in form ed p u b ­ lic o p in io n .” A D raft C o n stitu tio n provid ed fo r govern in g b od ies w ith ad­ m inistrative pow ers only. It w ou ld co n d u ct research on w o rld problem s and needs, d issem in ate in fo rm atio n , and educate p eople to the con cep t o f o n e­ ness. A t lea st o n e A m erican , Ray Lym an W ilbur, appeared on its ad viso ry cou n cil.17 O n a v isit to the U nited States early in 1936, M adariaga spoke to interna­ tionalist audiences in C hicago. W hile there, he w as fortunate to m eet the com ­ m itted, p ractical philanthropist A n ita M cC orm ick Blaine. She believed in the concept o f u n ity b u t pragm atically insisted that i f one w anted to prom ote that co n cep t, it w as necessary to w ork at a local level w here people could be most effectively reached. W ith Blam e’s financial support, M adariaga organized an A m erican G roup, w ith a follow ing in C hicago, N ew York, B oston, and other U.S. cities. O ver the next eigh t years Blaine played a leading role in operations and con trib u ted m ore than $136,000. Based on her com m itm ent to local level prom otion , B laine gave the C h icago operation gifts o f $20,000-30,000 a year and, as a result, the branch becam e d ie m ost active o f those dissem inating literature an d sponsoring radio broadcasts.1* In June 1938, the C h icago branch o f the A m erican G roup becam e an au­ tonom ous o rg an iza tio n un d er the nam e the W orld C itizen s A ssociation

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(W C A ). Its bylaw s, adopted 9 D ecem ber 1939, em phasized the goal o f “w orld com m unity awareness.” A “ Platform fo r W orld C itizenship” presented a case fo r u n ity and individual rights and liberties. Basically, the platform asserted that w orld institutions needed to m eet hum an needs. N ational states m ust be subject to law and lim ited in their use o f force.1’ U nfortunately, the W C A never could suggest any concrete ways to achieve these goals. A lthough the group recognized that a long-range educational effort w as needed, it failed to find a focus for its w ork. B y 1939, it increasingly faced challenges from alternative visions such as Clarence K . Streit’s U nion N ow m ovem ent and a C om m ission to Study the O rgan ization o f Peace organized b y C lark Eichelberger. T h e outbreak o f w ar in Septem ber led to proposals to restudy aim s, resulting in a notable conference held 4 -6 A p ril 1941. A t this gathering at the O nw entsia C lub, in Lake Forest, Illinois, th irty-on e prom i­ nent internationalists sought to p o o l their ideas in light o f w orld events.10 A t the conference, speakers paid obeisance to the them e o f u n ity bu t it was certainly n ot as fu lly explored as m ight be expected. T he w ar had changed people’s thinking. T h e participants began w ith an assessm ent o f the League’s achievem ents and failures, w eighed the im pact o f the w ar in Europe, exam ­ ined the “new rights o f m an in an international organization,” discussed the w orld econom ic situation, and explored the topics o f education, social ju s­ tice, and intercultural understanding. T h ey pondered the “new political or­ der,” the potential fo r a reconstructed League, the problem o f Germ any, terri­ to rial concerns and treaties, and legalities. Because the discussions w ere exploratory, the report o f the conference provided few concrete ideas o r plans. O ne relatively innovative discussion em erged w hen the group judged regional federations feasible. T he participants concluded that a “partnership o f de­ m ocracies” seem ed a logical peace aim . N aturally, given the group’s inclin a­ tion , th ey asserted that the U nited States w ould have to assum e greater re­ spon sibility in the w orld, especially in the postw ar settlem en t11 A noth er form o f com m unity internationalism appeared in the efforts o f the C hurch Peace U nion (C P U ) through its funded affiliate, the W orld A lli­ ance for Prom oting International Friendship through the Churches. T he C P U had pursued an internationalist agenda b y supporting plans betw een 1915 and 1918 for a postw ar u nion, and it cam paigned enthusiastically for m em bership in the League. T h e W orld A lliance, how ever, to o k a n o n p olity stance b y w ork­ in g fo r ecum enicism . It labored in the interw ar years to build branches in other countries, to organize conferences at w hich religious leaders o f all faiths could confer, and to lay the foundation fo r the creation o f the W orld C o u n cil o f Churches in 1948.11 Its leaders firm ly believed that b y organ izing diverse religions they w ere con tributin g to w orld cooperation and u n ity based on a com m unity o f the faithful. T he Reverend James W. Van K irk sought to translate this ideal into reality through individual effort. D uring the interw ar years, the m inister from Young­

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stow n, O h io, em barked on pilgrim ages covering tens o f thousands o f m iles b o th in the U nited States and abroad. He believed that the H ague C onfer­ ences and the League o f N ations provided grow ing evidence o f the bond o f oneness am ong people, and he sought to prom ote that grow ing hum anitar­ ian spirit. Van K irk operated largely on his ow n resources, an independent dream er o f a peaceful w orld.4 A n oth er fascinating idea based on the ideals o f w orld com m unity is attrib­ utable to N icholas K . Roerich, w h o cam e to the U nited States in 1920 and gained a reputation as an artist, creative thinker, philosopher, and p o e t H e becam e the ch ief architect o f the Roerich Pact, w hich sought signers w ho w ould agree to register and protect all cultural, artistic, and scientific m aterials in tim e o f war. Sites w ould be m arked b y a special flag sym bolic o f the "spiritual, artistic, and educational forces o f hum anity.” A series o f conferences sought to advance this idea, and ultim ately the pact gained the support o f a relatively in fluen tial group. Secretary o f A griculture H enry A . W allace, one o f Roerich’s m ost prom inent supporters, represented the R oosevelt adm inistration in 193$ w hen tw enty-one Latin A m erican countries and the U nited States signed the accord.14 A grow ing interest in international languages also reflected the com m u­ n ity ideal o f unifying people. A n International A u xiliary Language A ssocia­ tio n in N ew York C ity analyzed Esperanto, Ido, O ccidental, and N ovial to de­ term ine the feasibility o f adoption. Esperanto enjoyed the w idest follow in g am ong teachers and enthusiasts b oth as a practical m eans o f com m unication and as a m eans o f u n ifyin g people. Efforts to gain endorsem ent partially suc­ ceeded w hen several League com m ittees approved Esperanto as an acceptable m eans o f com m unication.4 Finally, on a m ore lim ited scale, som e citizens sought to advance interna­ tionalism through the creation o f friendship societies. These w ere m odeled p rim arily on the Japan-Am erican Society organized in 1907 b y H olt. T he A m erican-Scandinavian Foundation, Friends o f Belgium , the Italy-A m erica Society, the N etherlands-A m erica Foundation, the Poland-A m erica Society, and the B altic-A m erica Society w ere all form ed in the early 1920s. A ll these societies hoped to low er national barriers as they fostered better contacts and understanding betw een people and their cultures.16 It is hardly surprising that the com m unity ideal w as view ed as vision ary and im practical b y m ost people. T h is w as p articularly tru e o f those w ho ei­ th er actively accepted and supported the value o f nationalism and national sovereignty o r w ho m erely recognized the nation-state system and acknow l­ ed ged th e need to w o rk w ith in th a t fram ew o rk . O f th ese g ro u p s, th e Interparliam entary U nion (IU ) engendered the m ost support, p articu larly d u rin g the 1920s. It is im possible to classify the IU as a com m unity-oriented b o d y because it recognized the reality o f the nation-state system even as it

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sought to bridge such artificial barriers. Created in 1888 w hen a group o f French and B ritish parliam entarians m et in Paris, “ its object [was] to study all ques­ tion s o f an international character suitable fo r settlem ent b y parliam entary action.” Each year the IU brought together representatives o f nation al legisla­ tures to discuss international issues “ in order to secure the co-op eration o f their respective States in the firm establishm ent and dem ocratic developm ent o f the w ork o f international peace and co-operation between nations b y m eans o f a universal organization o f nations.”27 D e s p ite th is ra th e r a b s tra c t a n d lo fty sta te m e n t o f a im s , th e Interparliam entary U nion’s prim ary focus (until w ar cam e in 1914) w as arbi­ tration. T h e annual sessions advanced arbitration and con ciliation accords and provided an atm osphere conducive to the convening o f the H ague C o n ­ ferences o f 1899 and 1907.^ A m erican legislators attended early sessions and in 1904 form ed an A m erican G roup. W orld W ar I disrupted the m eetings, but w hen th ey w ere revived in 1921, D em ocratic representative James L. Slayden o f Texas assum ed the leadership o f som e 250 A m erican m em bers. O thers prom inent in the IU d urin g the 1920s included R epublican senators W illiam B. M ckinley o f Illinois and T heodore E. B urton. Since Slayden w as a trustee o f the CEIP, he w as able to obtain a grant o f $7,500 to cover the expenses o f the A m erican G roup attending the first postw ar assem bly in Stockholm . There, five m em bers from the H ouse and three senators called for a th ird H ague C onference, conciliation treaties, and the creation o f “a ju d icial u n ion o f the nations.” Thereafter, the C arnegie E ndow m ent provided annual subventions, and A m ericans regularly attended m eetings.2* A capstone o f U.S. involvem ent w ith the Interparliam entary U nion cam e in 1925, w hen the group w as invited to m eet in W ashington. A lth ough C o n ­ gress had been appropriating m odest am ounts to cover expenses for the A m eri­ can G roup, responsibility as the host n ation required $50,000. W hen the CEIP agreed to provide the h ospitality funds, C oolid ge extended the o fficial invita­ tion and later hosted a reception fo r delegates from forty-on e countries. The noncontroversial nature o f the U nion’s positions explains this w elcom e. Few persons could have protested the U nion’s previous resolutions endorsing dis­ arm am ent, the stabilization o f currencies, the League’s m andate system , and a review o f the reparations problem . Forty-three m em bers o f the A m erican G roup attended, and the H ouse o f Representatives even allow ed the use o f its facilities d urin g the conference.10 T he Interparliam entary U nion’s influence ultim ately proved to be lim ited. A dm ittedly, it d id provide a forum fo r the discussion o f som e questions, al­ low ed fo r personal contacts, b u ilt friendships, and m ade delegates sensitive to com m on problem s and the need fo r cooperation. T he U nion also introduced new legislators, w ho later played significant roles in foreign p o licy decisions, to intern ationalist thin kin g. For exam ple, the executive com m ittee o f the Am erican G roup in 1930 included Republican A rthur H . Vandenberg o f M ichi­

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gan and D em ocrats Tom C on n ally o f Texas and Joseph T. R obinson o f A r­ kansas. Realistically, however, the discussions resulted in little m ore than p o ­ lite exchanges, and the resolutions expressed hopes rather than realistic as­ sessm ents.31 A m ore influential, and therefore divisive, alternative approach focused on the H ague system . T he H ague Conferences o f 1899 and 1907 had done m uch to b rin g nations together to discuss com m on concerns and advance processes to settle disputes peacefully. T h ey had not, how ever, com pleted the w ork, and supporters believed that a third m eeting should be held to advance the orga­ nization o f the w orld. Leading spokesm en for the H ague system included W illiam I. H ull, profes­ sor o f history at Sw arthm ore C ollege, and James Brow n S c o tt T he A m erican Peace Society also found the option attractive prim arily because the H ague system never entailed the use o f sanctions.32 These exponents found it rela­ tively easy to advance argum ents in support o f renew ed sessions. First, they argued that the periodic m eetings had been successful: the significant strides m ade betw een the 1890s and 1914 should n ot be forgotten. Second, they m ain­ tained that opportunities to advance arbitration as the param ount m eans o f resolving differences still existed. T hird, and perhaps m ost significantly, they drew a m ajor distinction betw een the League o f N ations, w ith the C ovenant’s provisions for com pulsory responses and an obligation to use force, and the H ague system , w hich w as entirely voluntary.33 Supporters seized upon alm ost every contem porary developm ent to ad­ vance their view s. T h ey argued that it was a w ay o u t o f the im passe d urin g the Senate debates over League m em bership in 1919-20. D urin g the H arding ad­ m inistration, as the president tried to appease the internationalist w in g o f the R epublican party w ith talk o f a p lan fo r an association o f nations, H ague enthusiasts insisted that their program could be used as a foundation. W hen n oth in g cam e o f that, they optim istically construed the W ashington D isar­ m am ent Conference as w ith in the H ague tradition. Pressure b y H ague advocates clearly affected the C oolidge adm inistration. Support for a third H ague m eeting intensified when it becam e linked to sup­ p o rt for international law and the W orld C ou rt. Lodge's 5 M ay 1924 resolution “to prom ote the calling o f a T hird H ague Conference for the establishm ent o f a W orld C o u rt o f International Justice” intensified pressure to the point that the State D epartm ent had to dispel rum ors that the president w ould issue a call for a third m eeting. In the H ouse, Republican G eorge H . Tinkham , w ork­ in g w ith Scott, subm itted periodic resolutions endorsing this idea.34 Finally, when the Senate becam e stalem ated over actual m em bership in the W orld C ourt in the 1920s, som e supporters suggested that a renewed m eeting at T he Hague w as the w ay to find a form ula that w ould allow the U nited States to join .33 T h e H ague ideal w ould n ot die. A s late as 1938, the C hurch Peace U nion approved a resolution that the U nited States jo in w ith other nations in a call

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fo r a T hird H ague C onference. Scott also kept the idea alive b y responding to efforts b y R. C . H awkin o f England that year.* Yet the H ague proposition never attracted enough support at any one tim e to be successful. Its supporters em braced a variety o f agendas, from arbitration to codification o f interna­ tion al law. Perhaps its m ost tellin g weakness w as that a T hird H ague C onfer­ ence appeared superfluous in the ligh t o f the existing League, w hich called its ow n conferences to explore w orld problem s, to co d ify international law , and to resolve differences. A t best, supporters provided a valuable rem inder o f earlier internationalist endeavors. A t w orst, d ie H ague idea proved to b e highly divisive, always provid in g an alternative to support fo r the League. T h e concept o f w orld federation, w h ich had been popular in th e U nited States p rior to 1914, also attracted considerable attention d urin g the interw ar years. T h e creation o f the League seem ed, fo r a tim e, to lim it discussion o f this op tion , b u t as the weaknesses o f the G eneva organization w ere revealed, som e internationalists began to rethink the federalist principle. T h e prem ise w as sim ple: nations o f the w orld cou ld unite as d id the A m erican colonies, transferring som e pow er to the central u n it w h ile retaining sign ifican t au­ th o rity fo r them selves. Leo James Lentzen o f M ilw aukee w as a particularly avid proponent o f this concept. D u rin g the 1920s he corresponded regularly w ith League officials on a letterhead reading "T h e Prom oters o f the Federated N ations o f the W orld.” H e claim ed to have an office in N ew York C ity an d that he planned to open one in W ashington. Lentzen rou tin ely organized interna­ tion al relations exhibits, issued w eekly m im eographed dispatches, and pro­ m oted the use o f Esperanto.* T h e W orld U n ity Foundation also m oved tow ard a federalist position as it m easured the League's ineffectiveness. It created a W orld Federation C om ­ m ittee in 1932, w ith N ew York accountant O scar N ew fang as its secretary. N ew fang prepared a m anifesto that w as presented in final form in early 1935. T h e m anifesto noted that the League had failed to achieve peace. Peace re­ quired a natural flo w o f com m erce, yet the G eneva organ ization had done little to reduce tariffs, w hich contributed to nation alistic self-sufficiency. The m anifesto therefore suggested that the League be reconstituted into a federa­ tion , m odeled after that o f Australia, Canada, Sw itzerland, o r the U nited States. T h e federation w ould have defined legislative pow ers, a W orld C o u rt w ith greatly expanded ju risd ictio n , and an executive cabinet w ith a police force to com pel the subm ission o f disputes to the W orld C o u rt and uphold its deci­ sions. T he federation should also be given the au th ority to raise revenues to finance its operations. N ew fang foun d a publisher fo r a b o o k further devel­ oping these concepts in 1930, but it and num erous articles in World Unity M agazine did n ot create any great m ovem ent.* C arl Ross also elaborated on the ideal o f federation in articles in World Unity Magazine. A n attorney from A lbion , M ichigan, Ross denounced the peace settlem ent and the League o f N ations as unsatisfactory; it w as power­

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less against im perialistic trends and the grow ing threat o f fascism and “ Sovi­ etism .” H e believed that a sense o f oneness am ong com m on people w ould even tu ally lead to the creation o f a w orld federation. T he largest obstacle to th is w as to be found in the “ intelligentsia” o r “rulin g classes” and their officials w h o dom inated the League. I f the people w ere em pow ered, th ey w ould create a federal supergovem m ent having a constitution w ith enum erated pow ers. U sing the A m erican experience as a m odel, they w ould create a com m unity that w ould foster w orld citizenship. The nation-state system , he acknowledged, co u ld n ot be abolished, bu t it could be m odified b y an em erging “conscious­ ness o f a new and honorable internationalism .” D espite the lengthy essays he produced, Ross seem ed relatively unconcerned w ith structural details. H e d id suggest that the League be revised to represent people rather than states, w ith the revam ped agency possessing the pow er to legislate. It w ould n ot be a superstate, how ever, because its ju risd iction w ould b e clearly defined in keeping w ith the federalist concept o f shared pow ers. Ross argued that this “supergovem m ent” involved no dim inution o f sover­ eign ty o r o f obligations in the form o f alliances because it w ould create a peaceful environm ent in w hich individuals w ould be responsible to others. D espite a plethora o f articles, this concept, like so m any others, rem ained litd e m ore than a pious w ish .* A n oth er call fo r w orld federation cam e from N icholas M urray Butler, w h o b y 1935 had becam e disenchanted w ith the League. B uder suggested a new application o f the federal prin cip le in the form o f “a society o f citizen-n a­ tions.” T his could be done b y revam ping the League, using the A m erican and Swiss governm ents as m odels. B y 1938 B uder appeared even bolder w hen he praised, as rem arkable and visionary, the W orld Federation League’s 1910 pro­ posal to com bine the navies o f the w orld into an international police force.40 Finally, the C ath olic A ssociation for International Peace presented a pro­ posal that can be view ed as tangentially related to federationism . T he pro­ posal called fo r the creation in all countries o f autonom ous bodies represent­ in g w orkers and producers w h o w ould develop plans fo r an international econom ic coun cil.41 T h e new w orld agency w ould apply a “standard o f inter­ nation al conduct” based on principles o f justice and cooperation. T his un­ usual proposal gained litd e support. U ltim ately, the federationists w ere n o m ore influential than the com m u­ n ity internationalists and other proponents o f alternative organizations had been. T h eir failure was undoubtedly based on a m yopic in ability to discern th e m ost fundam ental reality. N o m atter how technical their discussions be­ cam e o r how “practical” their institution al schem es appeared, the essential reality rem ained that “o n ly w orld-m inded people, and w orld-loving people, can establish and m aintain an ordered w orld.” Unless and until these people constituted a significant m ajority, n o experim ents w ith federationism were viable.

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Perhaps reflecting awareness o f the stranglehold o f nationalism and the glorification o f sovereignty, a variety o f m ore lim ited proposals em erged dur­ ing the interw ar years. T h e oldest o f these called fo r a com bination o f A n gloSaxon peoples. T his n otion had em erged before 1914, but after 1919 it gained popularity through the English-Speaking U nion established in London. M em ­ bers o f an A m erican branch insisted that this offered a realistic option — an arrangem ent based on sim ilar language and custom s. T hey focused on a United States-E nglish tie rather than on one that w ould include the B ritish Em pire. T h e A m erican branch so u gh t to foster g o o d w ill, deepen un d erstan d in g through the exchange o f publications and speakers, scholars, and journalists, and prom ote trade and sports. Even into the late 1930s, there w ere som e still calling fo r im plem entation o f the E nglish-speaking bond. N othing cam e o f this effort, largely because other w riters (particularly C aren ce Streit) produced m ore popular ideas. C learly the E nglish-Speaking U nion should be view ed as internationalism o f the m ost lim ited variety; indeed the tinges o f an A nglo-Saxon, nativist su­ p erio rity m ake it h igh ly su sp ect Its o n ly real claim to inclusion in the group stem s from the fact that m any o f its supporters w ere prom inent internation­ alists w ho saw this m ovem ent as a springboard to further cooperation. For exam ple, G eorge Haven Putnam , one o f the group’s prom inent supporters, argued that the E nglish-speaking countries cou ld unite in support o f the League. Butler and A dm iral Richard E. Byrd suggested that nations w ith this com m on tie could rally to strengthen the K ellogg-B riand Pact and call fo r a m oratorium on war.41 Tenuous as this argum ent was, the group did draw the sup port o f John W . D avis, w ho served as its president un til succeeded in 1938 b y Yale president James R. A ngell, and o f T heodore M arburg, w ho provided both leadership and financial support.43 O f all the individuals w ho prom oted alternatives to the League, none was m ore influential than Clarence K . Streit. Streit’s interest in internationalism began w hen, as a student at the U niversity o f M ontana, he heard H olt speak. T he youn g student d id not, however, becom e a supporter o f the League. Fol­ low ing graduation, he becam e reporter for the New York Times. H e w as as­ signed to G eneva in 1929, w here his doubts about the League’s effectiveness were confirm ed. Streit believed that the League had failed because it was based on national sovereignty, w hich robbed it o f any w ill o r power. D urin g 1933-34, the journ alist produced a b o o k on the subject. In it, he suggested the creation o f a Federal U nion. A lth ough superficially sim ilar to the proposals o f federationists and the English-Speaking U nion, Streit ad­ vanced a unique, perhaps som ew hat prophetic, perspective. In Union Now, w hich appeared in 1939, he suggested that a bond betw een dem ocratic gov­ ernm ents could be used to create a political structure encom passing the N orth A tlan tic area.44

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Streit’s view s becam e im m ediately popular after publication o f the book, in p art ow ing to changes in w orld conditions and in part to his talent for self­ p rom otion . T he author d id a great deal to popularize his proposal b y orga­ n izin g the Inter-D em ocracy Federal U nion in the U nited States and a sim ilar b o d y in G reat B ritain. Reorganized as Federal U nion, Inc., w ith offices in N ew Y ork C ity, in 1941 it announced that it had received $125,000 since M arch 1939. In a w artim e sequel, Streit picked up on the English-Speaking U nion them e b y suggesting that the union could begin w ith the U nited States and m em bers o f the B ritish Em pire.4* Supporters saw in his proposal an op p ortu n ity to p u t “new life” into the “ m ovem ent fo r international organization.”46 Streit d id offer w hat seem ed to b e a logical alternative to the m oribund League o f N ations. He argued that th e fifteen dem ocracies that w ould jo in possessed political system s that w ould allow them to accept and fun ction under his proposed structure. H e claim ed th at th ey possessed the n atural and econom ic resources and the m ilitary strength to im pose their w ill on anyone and, b y opening channels o f trade, th ey w ould m ake depressions a thing o f the past. H is d raff o f a constitution called fo r an elected executive board o f five persons, a prem ier and cabinet, a p op u larly chosen legislature, and a senate w ith tw o m em bers from each state. T here w ould also be a suprem e court o f eleven judges. T he Federal U nion w ou ld have the pow er to tax, to abolish tariffs am ong m em bers and prom ote free trade, and to create a com m on curren cy and an international banking system . Every person livin g in a m em ber state w ould also possess citizenship in the union.47 C ritics suggested that Streit’s analogy was too sim ple. T he fifteen nations lacked the com m on language, cultural sim ilarities, and shared experiences o f the original A m erican states. T h ey also charged that he ignored the strength o f nationalism in assum ing any surrender o f pow er to the Federal U nion. T his w as especially true o f his econom ic assum ption that free trade w ould be w elcom ed. E conom ic sovereignty w ould n ot allow the union to establish a com m on curren cy o r banking system . Finally, Streit’s critics charged that his system was flaw ed because he had excluded G erm any and neglected the Latin A m erican states. T hus his system could result in new rivalries and alliances.4* U ltim ately, Streit also faced resistance from other internationalists. Estab­ lished organizations like the League o f N ations A ssociation, w hich had a com ­ m itm ent to support the League, rejected his plan. T h ey had their ow n new plans taking form b y 1939. D espite these challenges, how ever, it w ould be m yopic to dism iss Streit’s influence: b y 1972, over 300,000 copies o f Union Now had been sold. A final group of alternative-thinkers, those w ho supported the idea o f a w orld governm ent, w ere perhaps the internationalists’ m ost unlikely allies.

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Like their counterparts in the m ainstream internationalist com m unity, m any o f these observers o f the w orld scene did n ot believe that proposals like those o f Streit, N ew fang, and others w ould alter the international picture. But their ow n prescriptions for change differed m arkedly from those usually advanced b y pacific and hum anitarian idealists. W orld governm ent enthusiasts devel­ oped proposals for bodies having such extensive pow ers that th ey could im ­ pose their w ill on nations and people. A lth ough diese plans had Utde chance o f w inning support, som e o f d ie suggestions m erit exam ination because o f their uniqueness o r the persistence o f their authors. O n e plan, form ulated before W orld W ar I, originated w ith C h icago physi­ cian H . Lyon H unt. H e called fo r an internationalized island as a hom e for a cou rt, an arm y and navy, an intelligence agency, a m int, a com m unications com m ission, and an antiw ar propaganda bureau. D isarm am ent w ould be achieved because his police force w ould curb aggressors, uphold cou rt deci­ sions, and in this w ay reduce the burden o f taxes on citizens o f the w orld. The co u rt stood as his prim ary adm inistrative body, w ith com m issions and agen­ cies to oversee operations. It w ould "have the pow er to elect and subsidize m en o f literary genius in all countries and to donate their labors to n ullifying and obsoletizing warfare.”49 Charles D avis, an engineer from C ape C o d , M assachusetts, believed that a p o litically organized English-speaking group o f nations w ould be able to im ­ pose peace on the w orld. H e developed his ideas as early as 1911, and late in the 1930s he began to cam paign fo r an international convention attended b y rep­ resentatives from A ustralia, C anada, England, Ireland, N ew Zealand, South A frica, and the U nited States. T h ey w ould draft a constitution for a U nited States o f the W orld. O ther nations could jo in b y approving this docum ent. In his draft proposal, D avis called fo r a suprem e W orld Peace Potentate w ith extensive auth ority to oversee global relationships, determ ine funding needs, and bu ild and com m and an international force to m aintain peace. A suprem e coun cil w ould choose the Potentate for life, act as a legislative body, levy and collect taxes, and advise the Potentate. A lth ough D avis referred to jud icial processes, he provided no details. Like Streit, he argued that his com bination o f states possessed the resources, population , and pow er to im pose its w ill as needed.50 A plan fo r w orld organization b y Charles Stow e, based on his b o o k Arm ed World Peace, appeared in sum m ary form in World Unity M agazine in 1931. Stowe’s basic prem ise w as that the prevention o f w ar m ust be the prim ary aim (and singular justification fo r the existence o f) any w orld organization. T he League o f N ations, according to Stowe, lacked sufficient authority and breadth to fu lfill its responsibilities. It needed a legislative b od y and sufficient m ilitary force to uphold laws and court decisions and protect m em bers. N ations should therefore transfer their arm ies and navies to the central body. W ith this supe­ rior force, no challenge w ould ever be likely because hum an nature, bein g

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w eak, w ould respond to such an authority. Stowe included specific sugges­ tion s o n the structure o f his proposed congress, court, and association in a tw elve p o in t covenant that surprisingly show ed an unusual concern fo r indi­ vid u al rights and liberties.11 A n o th er plan th at em phasized the need fo r force cam e from engineerbusinessm an O scar T. Crosby, w ho associated w ith D avid D avies in the early 1930s. D avies, a W elsh industrialist w ho had inherited a fortune from m ining and railroad interests, had devised a N ew Com m onw ealth schem e for an in ­ ternational tribunal w ith a police force to uphold its decisions and protect m em bers from aggressors. C rosb y had been involved in plans fo r a w orld federation backed b y a m ili­ ta ry arm as early as 1910; therefore, he responded w arm ly to the N ew C o m ­ m onw ealth idea. In February and M arch 1931, he m et w ith D avies in Berlin and Paris to discuss strategy. T h ey agreed that D avies should tour the U nited States in M ay so that C rosby could introduce the W elsh industrialist to prom i­ nent Am erican businessm en. D avies m et w ith Bernard Baruch, John F. O ’Ryan, and John Pershing. A ttem pts to arrange m eetings w ith CEIP leaders w ere unsuccessful, as they apparently avoided him . D avies, after finally m eeting N icholas M urray Butler, characterized him as a “snob.”*1 D espite the disparagem ent, C rosby claim ed credit for keeping the idea alive in the U nited States as he developed a sm all netw ork o f supporters through­ o u t the thirties. A s aggressors defied the League, the im age o f D avies as a m an o f foresight grew, and his book, The Problem o f the Twentieth Century, pre­ sented his ideas in detail and attracted other converts. Such hard-line ap­ proaches, how ever, found little support from the public in general. O n a visit to the U nited States in 1938, D avies still lacked access to political leaders, and he grew increasingly frustrated about an unheeding w orld.” B y the late 1930s, other prom inent individuals w ere beginning to espouse th e idea o f a pow erful w orld governm ent. T h ey rarely offered details on struc­ tu re and pow er, recognizing o n ly the need fo r a strong international author­ ity. Lola M averick Lloyd, Rosika Schw im m er, and A lice Paul, three w om en w h o had lon g been active in peace circles, created the Cam paign for W orld G overnm ent in 1939, w ith headquarters in W innetka, Illinois. T h ey called fo r a conference o f neutral nations to prepare a constitution based on the renun­ ciation o f war. In 1941, the N ational Peace C onference also called fo r discus­ sion and planning w ith a proposal that A rm istice D ay be renam ed “W orld G overnm ent Day.”54 O ther, less prom inent individuals also raised th eir voices. W illiam H . B lym er had developed an idea in the 1890s that he published in 1917. A s an intern ational lawyer, he believed that a w orld organ ization should im pose an econ om ic em bargo on aggressors o r any nation that refused to refer a d is­ pute to arbitration. H e called this his “ isolation plan.” M ilitary force w ould be used against any state th at defied his u n ion . He argued in the 1920s that his

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proposal w ould be useful in givin g the K ellogg-Briand Pact teeth, and it could infuse the League w ith new m eaning and authority.” O ne o f the m ost dedicated (albeit eccentric) prewar internationalists, W il­ liam O . M cD ow ell, also continued to prom ote his draft o f a constitution fo r a united nations. M cD ow ell proposed d ie creation o f an elaborate governm ent w ith a legislature, cou rt, executive, and cabinet. T his governm ent w ould have the pow er to tax, regulate, and m aintain a police force. A s he had origin ally w ritten his constitution in the 1890s, M cD ow ell referred to the League as the “ju n io r” plan because his original proposal, the “senior” one, had never been im plem ented. Subsequendy he w rote D rum m ond in 1926 that the League was really his child, not W oodrow W ilson’s. T he secretary-general w as at a loss how to respond. He referred the letter to B ullard, w ho dism issed M cD ow ell as “ too crazy to waste tim e on.” Regardless, M cD ow ell believed passionately in his m ission. He granted him self the d d e peacemaker and wished to find a young person to assum e his m ande, but he died in 1927 before he could d o so.”

A ll the alternative proposals to advance internationalism in the interw ar years reveal an obvious degree o f concern and com m itm ent. A lth ough m ost o f the proposals are historical curiosities, each in its ow n w ay helped stim u­ late though t and extend know ledge about the need to act, w hether in a com ­ m unity o r p o lity context. Such planners kept ideas alive and provided the base for claim s o f w idespread interest in internationalism . In the 1920s, be­ cause o f the League’s relative record o f successes, they found it d ifficu lt to attract m uch attention. D urin g the 1930s, however, as the League proved in ­ effective, these individuals gained a w ider audience. A s Streit’s experience so dram atically reveals, m ore and m ore citizens seem ed w illin g to ponder new realities and explore internationalist alternatives to the League o f N ations.

8 LEGALISTS AND INTERNATIONALISM The Case of the World Court

uring the sum m er o f 1905, a handful o f pow erful m en gathered at the Lake M ohonk, N ew York, resort ow ned b y Q uaker brothers A lbert and A lfred Sm iley. These m en believed "th at continued peace society pressure fo r arbitration o f all international disputes w as not an adequate answer to the com plex problem s o f w orld peace. A m ericans w ere still faced w ith the neces­ sity o f acquiring a sense o f their international obligations.” Follow ing delib­ erations, the m en advanced a plan o u t o f w hich the A m erican Society fo r International Law em erged.1 T h e creation o f this b od y represented a nucleus around w hich the A m eri­ can legalist tradition grew and expanded. Indeed, for the A m erican interna­ tion alist com m unity, the legalist view becam e "m ore than an ideology o r a m ovem ent. It w as an ethos that suffused the thinking” o f the entire group as it sough t rational, n onarbitrary ways to structure international cooperation.1 D espite the strength o f this tradition in Am erican internationalist thought, w hen W ilson and European leaders gathered in Paris after W orld W ar I they "established the League upon a p olitical foundation rather than a legal one,” creating vast divisions w ith in the internationalist com m unity. These differ­ ences em erged because, after 1919, all League supporters were to som e degree legalists, but not all legalists were pro-League.3This distinction, although som e­ w hat obscure to the public outside the leadership sanctum w here theory and practice were debated w ith academ ic precision, w ould have very real conse­ quences d urin g the debate over U.S. m em bership in the Perm anent C o u rt o f International Justice, the tribunal established b y the Covenant o f the League o f N ations.4 Provision in the C ovenant for the creation o f a Perm anent C o u rt o f Inter­ nation al Justice (PCIJ) naturally gained the support o f nearly all A m erican internationalists in 1919. A t the tim e, few foresaw any obstacles that w ould keep the U nited States from jo in in g the C o u rt, but it never did, a lapse still d ifficu lt to explain. Every president and secretary o f state betw een 1920 and

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1941 endorsed m em bership; internationalists enlisted the sup port o f the legal com m unity and civic and religious bodies fo r vigorous cam paigns support­ in g participation, expending great energy and effort to obtain m em bership in the PCIJ. T he A m erican Foundation under the dynam ic leadership o f Esther Lape reached o u t to the general public, devotin g m uch effort to ta lly proC o u rt op in ion , w h ich it then publicized and distributed to adm inistration leaders and senators. T he N ational W orld C o u rt C om m ittee (N W C C ), w ith P hillip Jessup in the lead role, united and spoke fo r tw enty-five groups. A l­ though never as fu lly funded as the A m erican Foundation, the N W C C fo­ cused on the legal, intellectual, academ ic, veteran, and religious com m unities through cam paign after cam paign. T h e evidence reveals that b o th organiza­ tion s w ere largely successful, i f success is m easured in term s o f the overw helm ­ in g public acceptance o f their goal. Yet from another, m ore critical vantage poin t th ey fidled: the U nited States never joined the Perm anent C o u rt o f International Justice. A num ber o f studies have sought to explain this. In detailed accounts chroniclin g the sto ry o f effort and rejection, these w orks focus on the im pact o f dom estic p o litics, Senate/ Executive rivalries, and the role o f “ isolationist” leaders and other personali­ ties.1 T he position o f internationalists in this struggle, how ever, has n o t been fu lly exam ined. A nalysis from this perspective produces evidence o f short­ com ings on the part o f the C o u rt advocates. First, th ey fidled to settle their ow n differences o f opin ion regarding the relationship betw een the C o u rt and the League o f N ations. T his failure n ot o n ly determ ined that th ey never ad­ equately answ ered critics w h o charged that jo in in g the C o u rt w ould lead to m em bership in the League via the back door; it also largely im m obilized their efforts. Finally, the p ro -C o u rt fictio n s never accepted d ie reality o f the p oliti­ cal figh t in w hich th ey w ere engaged. T h ey assum ed that show ing overw helm ­ ing pu blic support fo r the C o u rt w ould be sufficient, th ey avoided involve­ m ent in electoral p olitics, and th ey com prom ised to o m uch and to o often.

A t the turn of the century, internationalists displayed a trem endous frith in legal processes and tribunals. T h ey believed that m em bers o f the w orld com m unity should subscribe and be subject to the sam e system o f rules and restraints that citizens w ith in states w ere.6 A m ericans, nurtured in a dem o­ cratic trad ition , found this path p articularly attractive, n ot on ly because they understood it on the basis o f on their ow n experience, b u t also because a legal/judicial system seem ed to skirt problem s o f abrogated nation alism and sovereignty. U nfortunately, w hat m ost laym en d id n ot perceive was the com plexity o f the process. For centuries jurists and legal scholars had been tryin g to dis­ cover rules that could be codified as “ international law.” T h ey had drafted codes that presum ably reflected the typical, historical behavior o f nation-states, and yet th ey consistently foun d great reluctance on the part o f p o litical lead­

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ers to aband on any degree o f sovereignty o r to entrust their w elfare to an external system based on laws n o t yet d e a rly defined o r accepted.7 N or w ere legalists in com plete agreem ent about the nature and content o f their corpus. M ost international lawyers gained their reputations through their work, servin g as agents o f foreign governm ents and dealing w ith claim s be­ tween nations. Som e, like John Bassett M oore and Charles Cheney Hyde, served in the State D epartm ent, w here they com piled im pressive docum entary stud­ ies. P rior to 1900, few colleges o r universities offered courses in international law. H erbert Baxter Adam s established a course at Johns H opkins in 1879, Am os S. H ershey published a textbook and established a course at Indiana U niver­ sity, w h ile M oore added the subject at C olum bia after he w ent there in 1891. After 1900, the field expanded, stim ulated b y the grow ing interest reflected in the creation o f the Am erican Society o f International Law. Edwin D. D ickinson, who h eld b o th a J.D. and a Ph.D ., offered courses at Illinois and M ichigan, doing a great deal to establish the subject as an independent discipline. W ith th e outbreak o f W orld W ar I, the field underw ent further changes. Edwin B orch ard , w ho held a Ph.D . and a law degree, w ent to Yale in 1917, and H udson, w h o w as trained in law, w ent to H arvard in 1919. A rth u r H . K uhn, also w ith a Ph.D . and a law degree, added the subject at the U niversity o f Pennsylvania in the m id-tw enties. C ourses also appeared under James W. G am er a t Illin o is, Q u in cy W right at C hicago, Charles G . Fenw ick at B ryn Mawr, an d C lyd e Eagleton at N ew York University.* H owever, these m en all had degrees in political science and o n ly lim ited o r no train in g in the law, a point th at caused som e consternation am ong those w ith legal backgrounds. Although a ll agreed on the im portance o f the subject, disagreem ents rem ained basic: o n e o f the m ajor issues d ivid in g the m en w as over w hether to use a textbook o r to teach b y the casebook m ethod.9 In the late 1920s and early 1930s, several conferences o f teachers o f international law m et to exam ine and prom ote th e developm ent o f the curriculum . W illiam I. H ull’s call for m ore courses, p articu larly on the undergraduate level, w as fairly typ ical o f the per­ spective advanced at these m eetings.10 D espite these academ ic disagreem ents, before 1920 legalists had done a great deal to ad van ce support fo r the prin cip le involved. T h ey had prom oted the idea o f a c o u rt o f justice at the H ague Peace and A rbitration C onferences o f 1899 and 1907; had created the A m erican Society o f International Law, w hich published th e prestigious Am erican Journal o f International Law; and had worked to ed ucate people to the lo gic o f their approach. Betw een 1914 and 1919, on e segm en t o f the legal com m unity diligen tly labored to prom ote the ideal o f a p ostw ar international organ ization based alm ost exclusively on a judicial trib u n a l. T h eir b e lief that nations should behave under rules, how ­ ever, fo u n d b u t lim ited support at the Paris Peace Conference. T he ad vocates d id n ot retreat. T h e w orld seem ed to be m oving tow ard a stable so ciety based on concepts o f justice, and legalists displayed an alm ost

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D arw inian b e lief that the w orld w as evolvin g in this d irection . P rovision in the C ovenant for the creation o f a Perm anent C o u rt o f International Justice n ot on ly encouraged such devotees, it w as the prin cip al basis o f th eir support fo r the League. Elihu R oot saw ua great op p o rtu n ity and a great task” ahead: in an un ru ly w orld, "law becom es m ore necessary, the true rem edy is th e m ost perfect establishm ent and enforcem ent o f law.” James Brow n Scott, form er solicitor fo r the D epartm ent o f State and d irector o f the D ivision o f Interna­ tion al Law fo r the C arnegie Endow m ent fo r International Peace, declared that international organization had to be based on law that rested o n "go o d faith.” A m erican U niversity professor E llery C . Stow ell affirm ed this view w hen he observed that the League o f N ations w ould never be fo lly effective u n til it applied the "tru e principles o f international law.”11 R oot and Scott played key roles in d rafting the protocol and statutes fo r the C o u rt in the sum m er o f 1920, underscoring the expectation that the U nited States w ould participate. U nder the W orld C o u rt statute drafted that sum m er, the League w ould select fifteen judges from a list o f nom inees prepared b y the Perm anent C ourt o f A rbitration at T he H ague. O n 4 June 1921 the Secretariat asked th e State D epartm ent to encourage the fo u r A m ericans on the H ague panel— Root, John Bassett M oore, O scar S. Straus, and G eorge G ray— to subm it th eir nom i­ nees. T his com m unique w as ignored un til 14 A ugust w hen Secretary-G eneral D rum m ond contacted the individuals directly. W hen they approached H ughes about involvem ent, he argued that since the president had appointed the Hague judges th ey o fficially represented the U nited States; hence it w ould b e im ­ proper to becom e involved in a League operation after m em bership h ad been rejected. T h e fo u r m en thus sent notice that th ey cou ld n ot participate. D espite his in itial reaction, H ughes w as a legalist w h o supported U nited States m em bership in a W orld C o u rt. T h e fact that he w as a m em ber o f the Perm anent C o u rt o f A rbitration and, b y 1928, a PCIJ judge m akes this assess­ m ent undeniable. H istorians have therefore concluded that H ughes w as m erely pursuing a strategy o f delay, h opin g to allow the passions engendered b y the Senate debates to subside and "disposing o f the W ashington C onference be­ fore pressing for adherence to the court.”“ A pparently m any in the internationalist com m unity w ere w illin g to ac­ cept H ughes’s strategy. T he pro -C o u rt faction w aited patiently fo r n early three years fo r the H arding adm inistration to act. W hen Sam uel C o lco rd inquired about the w isdom o f cond uctin g a new spaper p o ll, R oot advised h im to con­ sult H ughes, w ho said that the tim e w as n o t propitious.13C h ristin a M errim an, secretary o f the Foreign P olicy A ssociation , w as one o f the few w h o castigated her fellow s fo r this passivity. She believed that the League o f N ations N onPartisan A ssociation w as totally w ron g in n ot becom ing involved and in "sav­ ing all their pow der fo r the League.” European leaders also expressed concern over the consequences o f delay, but that did n o t stim ulate any response in

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A m erican cird e s either; at this stage C o u rt supporters seem ed w illin g to w ait. It w as n o t u n til 1924 that the LN N PA fin ally resolved to "direct its best efforts” tow ard Senate adoption.14 H ughes finally signaled his readiness to act w hen he w rote a letter to H arding on 17 F ebruary i923.l$A fter review ing the historic support o f the U nited States for "th e ju d icia l settlem ent o f international disputes,” H ughes called for ad­ herence to the C o u rt, provided "th at such adhesion shall be upon the follow ­ ing co n d itio n s and understandings to be m ade a part o f the instrum ent o f adhesion.” T h e secretary o f state then outlined fo u r reservations.1* T he first reservation noted "th at such adhesion shall not be taken to involve any legal relation on the part o f the U nited States to the League o f N ations or the assum ption o f any o b lig atio n s. . . under the Covenant.” T he second, third, and fo u rth reservations w ere then necessary to deal w ith the adm inistrative difficulties that accom panied this separation. T he second reservation stated that the U nited States w ould participate in the election o f judges (done through the League Assem bly and C oun cil) through specially designated representa­ tives, an d the third indicated U.S. w illingness "to pay a fu r share o f the ex­ penses o f the C ou rt as determ ined and appropriated from tim e to tim e b y the Congress o f the U nited States.” Finally, the fourth reservation asserted that any future am endm ents to the statutes w ould require U.S. approval. W h ile d raftin g the reservations, H ughes had extensive discussions w ith H udson, T aft, and R oot. Together, the m en had devised the reservations to the protocol. T h ey w ere w ell aware that the C ourt-L eague tie presented the m ost com plex problem . O nce the relationship to the League w as denied in the first reservation, the adm inistrative problem o f electing the judges and paying the costs rem ained. In dealing w ith the selection o f judges, it w as Sweetser appar­ ently w h o suggested a sim ple solution: the U nited States could sit on the C o u n ­ cil and in th e Assem bly as if it w ere a m em ber because the C ovenant had no restriction against th a t17 O n 24 February 1923, H arding delivered a b rie f m essage to the Senate ask­ ing fo r adherence to the protocol. He enclosed the letter from H ughes, stress­ ing in h is ow n m essage o n ly that the secretary’s reservations m ade it possible to adhere w ith o u t any obligations under the C ovenant. It w ould n ow be up to the Senate Foreign R elations C om m ittee to act.1* T h e Senate Foreign R elations C om m ittee saw no need for hasty action . D om in ated b y irreconcilables B orah, Brandegee, and Johnson, the com m it­ tee failed to take any significant action, consistently raising questions about the L eagu e-C o u rt tie. In A p ril 1923 H arding addressed this issue b y p u b licly stating th at jo in in g the C o u rt in n o w ay im plied sneaking in to the League “ b y the side d oor, o r the back d o or o r the cellar door.” But even this presidential pressure proved ineffective. A m otion proposed to stim ulate action , subm it­ ted on 3 M ay b y Senator K ing o f U tah, w as defeated 49 to 24.

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O n 20 M ay, the New York Times polled the Senate and reported that seventythree senators favored the C o u rt (thirty-seven R epublicans, th irty-six D em o­ crats). C learly the clim ate o f public opin ion was running in favor o f C ourt m em bership, and yet the com m ittee failed to respond. A s he habitu ally did, H arding now yielded to the obstructionists. In con tradictory language rem i­ niscent o f his cam paign m achinations, on 21 June H arding conceded the tie betw een the League and the C o u rt. H e therefore suggested that G eneva aban­ don its adm inistrative role over the tribun al and thus clearly separate th e two, especially in the election o f judges.19

From the outset, the m ost difficult obstacle to U.S. m em bership in the C ourt lay in its relationship to the League o f N ations. T his issue lay at the h eart o f m uch o f the debate and explains the lengthy delays in the Senate Foreign Re­ lation s Com m ittee. It also created a m onum ental dilem m a fo r international­ ists as th ey attem pted to pressure the adm inistration and Senate to act. For strict legalists, the C o u rt prom oted the ideal o f a system ruled b y legal principles, and therefore it had to be supported. A lth ough m any opposed the League, th ey assuaged their concern b y arguing that, although the League cre­ ated the C o u rt, elected its judges, and paid their salaries, it w as an indepen­ dent agency that functioned autonom ously at T he H ague. T h e League could n ot rem ove a jud ge o r overrule a decision. N or w as the d istin ction between the tw o organizations purely theoretical. T he Perm anent C o u rt o f Interna­ tion al Justice consistently asserted its independence from G eneva. In 1922 it refused to have any reference to the League on its letterhead. W hen th e judges balked at taking an oath to the League, League officials concurred w ith their p osition .10 Subsequently, w hen an article appeared in the New York H erald on 27 A p ril 1923 arguing that jo in in g the C o u rt w ould lead to affiliation w ith the League, League officials « p re sse d their concern and disagreem ent to A m eri­ can envoys in Berne.11 These argum ents d id little, how ever, to fundam entally address o r under­ m ine the argum ents o f C o u rt critics. T heir criticism centered n o t o n w hether the C o u rt was an independent en tity but on the claim that ad hering to the C o u rt w ould lead inevitably to m em bership in the League. R epublican G eorge H . M oses o f N ew H am pshire saw the U nited States "craw ling in th ro u gh the coal hole,” w hile B orah though t it "rem arkable” to th in k that one step w ould n ot fo llo w the other. Journalists such as W illiam H ard and Frank H . Sim onds also advanced the b elief that C ou rt m em bership w ould naturally lead to League affiliation. Subsequently m ost o f their argum ents involved subtle attacks, if any, on G eneva rather than on critiques o f the C o u r t11 T his argum ent robbed C o u rt advocates o f sup port from a va riety o f peace advocates and legalists: those w h o had opposed m em bership in th e League felt a special reluctance to jo in in cam paigns fo r a C o u rt relatio n sh ip . The

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A m erican P eace S o cie ty refu sed to becom e in vo lved , as d id John H ays H am m ond. T h e latter had served as president o f the A m erican S o ciety fo r the Judicial Settlem ent o f In tern ation al D isputes and had been an in stru ­ m ental figu re in the League to E nforce Peace and the W orld’s C o u rt League between 1915 and 1919. H am m ond argued th at the PCIJ possessed to o m uch power. It w o u ld com m it the U nited States to the C ovenant and lead to m em ­ bership.23 D avid J. H ill, diplom at and form er president o f the U niversity o f Roches­ ter, also prophesied danger. H e argued that n o sufficient rules existed fo r a C ourt to decide issues o f im portance; therefore, it should be avoided. H ill offered extensive legal argum ents about inexorable ties to the League, and w rote a series o f articles fo r the Saturday Evening Post that publicized his concerns. In 1927, he w rote Secretary o f State K ellogg that the U nited States “should n ot bend its n eck to the yoke o f powers.”14 Edw in B orchard, professor at the Yale Law School and m em ber o f the board o f editors o f the Am erican Journal ofInternational Law, w as also strongly antiLeague, b elievin g that it w as “an arm ed alliance.” H e, to o , questioned the m otives o f C o u rt advocates, insisting that their efforts w ould lead to involve­ ment w ith the League. H e did n ot see the C o u rt as especially vita l o r effective because it w as “a p olitical and n ot a ju d icial body.” W hile com m ending the PCIJ as som ew hat w orth w h ile, he resisted su p p ortin g m em bership w h ile claim ing n o t to oppose it.1* D evelopin g an argum ent that w ould com bat these fears created a rift in the intern ationalist com m unity. Strict legalists w ere either little concerned with, o r actively supported, the denigration o f the League. Internationalists who gran ted less p rio rity to the reliance on international law saw C o u rt m em ­ bership as a m eans o f advancing an internationalist perspective. W hile the relationship betw een the C o u rt and the League w as unclear, it w as organic. M em bership indicated a w illingness to accept the prin cip le o f international cooperation. These people n aturally found the argum ents denigrating and dism issing th e League tie rather galling, b u t th ey pragm atically accepted the need to m in im ize their support fo r G eneva i f the C o u rt figh t w as to be w on.16 Passionate League supporters saw C o u rt m em bership prim arily as a m eans o f advancing ties to G eneva. W hen H ughes w arned H olt, and W illiam R. C astle o f the State D epartm ent advised H udson n ot to place em phasis on League entry in speaking fo r m em bership in the C o u rt, the dilem m a w as clear: i f gains w ere to be m ade, the m ost ardent supporters o f the League had to d is­ guise th eir agenda and keep silent w h ile other internationalists com p licitly engaged in League-bashing.17 As a result o f this strategy, the vast b u lk o f the p ro -C o u rt literature d is­ missed o r underplayed the relationship betw een the C o u rt and the League. N evertheless, opponents w ere w ary even as League supporters disguised their

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agenda. It appeared ridiculous to the irreconcilables and others that League proponents like H udson could argue that any tie betw een the PC I) and the League was irrelevant. O n 3 D ecember 1923, in his first m essage to Congress, C alvin C oolid ge stated, “As I w ish to see a court established, and as the proposal presents the only practical plan on w hich m any nations have ever agreed, though it m ay not m eet every desire, I therefore com m end it to the favorable consideration o f the Senate.”1* H arding had died sh ortly after his 21 June speech in St. Louis, in w hich he had considerably m uddied the waters regarding the C ourt-League tie. Subsequently the Senate com m ittee had done nothing and C oolid ge’s m essage was apparently an attem pt to urge the Foreign Relations Com m ittee to act. W ithin a week, Senator Irvine Lenroot introduced a resolution aim ed at spurring m ovem ent. T he W isconsin senator sought to defuse obstructionist argum ents b y com pletely separating the C o u rt and League, particularly in regard to the election o f judges. A m idst charges o f delay and obstruction, Lodge as chairm an argued that the com m ittee had tw enty-nine treaties pend­ ing, that the PCIJ had no high p rio rity because o f the m any arbitration trea­ ties in effect, and that no strategy o f delay existed.19 He then further com pli­ cated the issue b y countering Lenroot’s resolution w ith a proposal to redesign the C o u rt on the basis o f the old H ague tribunal. Still the com m ittee refused to act until, on 8 A p ril 1924, a group o f prom i­ nent citizens dem anded consideration. O n 5 M ay, Senator C laude Swanson proposed a resolution supportin g m em bership under the H arding- H ughes reservations. A gain Lodge countered, calling on 8 M ay fo r a presidential call fo r a T hird H ague Conference to create a w h olly new cou rt, com pletely sepa­ rate from the League. A s the Sw anson resolution w ent dow n to defeat in the com m ittee 10 to 8, and Lodge’s proposal w as seen as a w h olly transparent attem pt to further delay the issue, Senator G eorge W harton Pepper (w ho o p ­ posed the League but supported the C o u rt) suggested that the o n ly path to m em bership lay in am ending the C ovenant to separate the tw o bodies.30 A fter m onths o f quiescence, C o u rt advocates began to react. W ickersham and H udson considered such proposals dangerous and designed to confuse the public.31W ickersham was convinced that a coterie dom inating the A m eri­ can Society o f International Law, including D avid Jayne H ill, C handler A nder­ son, and others w ho had been anti-League, had “aided and guided” Lodge in his proposal. R oot privately resisted the changes, but he had never w ritten H arding, nor did he now contact C oolid ge about them . H owever, w hile speak­ in g to Stim son in late O ctober 1924, R oot adm itted that “ nothing but lifelon g affection for Lodge prevented him from actual denunciation o f his conduct.”31 Low ell, seem ingly alone, did n ot regard Lodge’s approach as pernicious.33

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D u rin g the sum m er o f 1924, both party conventions endorsed C o u rt m em ­ bership, reflecting the overw helm ing p ublic support fo r this cause. Follow ing th e election, the H ouse, on 3 M arch 1925, voted 301 to 28 for adherence. The fo llo w in g day, in his inaugural address, C oolid ge spoke determ inedly about the need for action. A lth ough this forced the Senate com m ittee to set a date fo r consideration o f the Sw anson resolution, com m ittee m em bers postponed it u n til 17 D ecem ber.

D uring the interim between C oolidge’s M arch inaugural and the D ecem ber hearings, opponents raised w h olly new concerns, this tim e about the opera­ tio n o f the C ou rt. T his obstacle involved the issue o f advisory opinions. A rticle 14 o f the Covenant provided that “the C o u rt m ay give an advisory opinion u pon any dispute o r question referred to it b y the C ou n cil o r the Assembly,” b u t these advisory opinions w ould have no force o r effect unless acted upon by the League.34Nevertheless, in A pril 1923 the C ou rt refused to provide an advi­ so ry opinion in the Eastern Karelia dispute between Finland and the Soviet U nion because the Soviets refused to consent to the hearing. A s a result, the C o u rt established the precedent that it w ould neither give secret opinions, nor w ould “a state’s interests [be] prejudiced b y an opinion given w ith out its con­ sent.”35C ou rt opponents leapt on this issue, arguing that League m em bers could b lo ck opinions affecting them selves, bu t the U nited States w ould have no re­ course regarding such questions. Potentially the judges m ight be asked to con­ sider issues like the M onroe D octrine or legislation to restrict im m igration. Ironically, the origin s o f concern over the advisory opinion fun ction o f the C o u rt can be traced to John Bassett M oore.36 M oore, a judge on the C o u rt, exem plified the legalist w ho opposed the League o f N ations as conceived in 1919.37 D urin g the C o u rt fight, he puzzled everyone. H e had accepted a p osi­ tio n as the first A m erican judge on the PCIJ and w rote objective rationales for m em bership. B y 1925, how ever, his concern over advisory opinions created an im broglio that w as never resolved. C oolid ge, in a m om ent o f frustration, con­ fessed to H ughes that he could n ot tell w hether M oore was fo r or against jo in in g. T he Boston Globe described him aptly as “a law yer w ith one client, the U nited States.”3* T hus w hile no one could doubt his sincerity, the issues he raised com plicated, delayed, and eventually frustrated m em bership. D u rin g this period M oore conferred w ith several senators, especially Pep­ per and W alsh, and w ith Secretary o f State K ellogg. He suggested another reservation em bodying the concept that the C o u rt could offer no secret ad­ vice and that no opinion could be rendered on any subject that involved the U nited States w ith out its consent. H e also drafted an anonym ous m em oran­ dum stating his view s fo r the Senate Foreign Relations C om m ittee.39 H opin g to avoid fu rth er d elay and ob fuscation o f the C o u rt issue, Sena­ to r Sw anson em bodied M oore’s p osition in a 17 D ecem ber resolution that

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becam e a fifth reservation to U.S. m em bership. T he Swanson resolution stated: “ T hat the U nited States shall be in no m anner bound b y any ad visory opinion o f the Perm anent C o u rt o f International Justice n ot rendered pursuant to a request” jo in ed b y the U nited States. Even this w as not enough to derail the opposition; in fact the reservation grew to include dem ands that (1) “the present practice o f the C o u rt in givin g no secret o r confidential advice w as to be perm anent”; (2) the precedent es­ tablished in “the Eastern Karelia case o f refusing to give an ad visory opinion w hen one o f the parties refused the ju risd iction o f the C o u rt w as n ot to be reversed”; and (3) “that there shall be no ad visory opinion on any m atter d i­ rectly affecting the U nited States unless the U nited States shall have consented that the C o u rt take jurisdiction.”40 C o u rt advocates protested the fifth reservation, but th ey m ounted no fight against it, prim arily because th ey preferred a w eak C o u rt to none at all. N or did C oolid ge o r K ellogg offer any objections to the expanded Swanson resolu­ tion . T hroughout January, Senate advocates w ere confident that th ey had the votes for passage and did n ot close debate. T his gave opponents a field day for attacks although all evidence show ed that tw o-thirds o f the Senate w ould sup­ p o rt the protocol. D urin g the hearings, both the A m erican Peace Society and the C arnegie Endow m ent for International Peace sat on the sidelines.Throughout the en­ tire period, the CEIP chose to pursue a particularly innocuous path. Under the leadership o f James Brown Scott, the endow m ent had established the Acad­ em y o f International Law at T he H ague to prom ote “understanding betw een schools o f international law throughout the w orld.” T h e academ y had held its first session in A ugust 1914 and then suspended operations d urin g the war. It w as reactivated b y the endow m ent in 1923, and annual subventions led to regular program s throughout the interw ar years. Scott hoped that the acad­ em y w ould expound on justice, define the rules o f law, and prom ote “the rela­ tion o f nations in a regulated w orld.” He also agreed w ith R oot w hen the latter observed that the academ y m ight “w ork ou t problem s o f international ju ris­ d iction w hich vex foreign offices, diplom ats and official Conferences.”41 A cadem y sessions usually lasted six to eight w eeks, w ith specific topics se­ lected fo r discussion and lectures b y the m ost em inent scholars in the w orld. A nyone could apply, but those attending w ere expected to have som e back­ ground in international law. W ith an average attendance o f three hundred, these sessions attracted m ore than six thousand students, diplom ats, teach­ ers, and specialists b y 1940.4* Yet the program had detractors. D espite the fact that he participated as a lecturer, Borchard charged that the academ y w as “always a farce” and that the CEIP had w asted hundreds o f thousands o f dollars, doin g m ore to destroy in tern a tio n a l law th an p ro m o te it.43 A lth o u g h p erh ap s u n d u ly h arsh , Borchard's criticism is n ot w ith out som e validity. T he academ y served prim a-

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rily to keep alive Scott’s b elief in the value o f international law and in this respect served a useful purpose. H owever, it really had no visible im pact on cod ification efforts, on extending the teaching o f international law, o r in help­ in g to brin g about a w orld regulated b y law. Ineffective o r not, the academ y was the prim ary project supported b y the C arnegie E ndow m ent W hen Frederic Coudert, one o f the m ost active founders o f the League o f N ations N on-Partisan A ssociation, needled N icholas M urray B utler, the latter show ed his irritation w ith the trustees o f the endow m ent w h o w ould n ot take a stand and continued to "fear . . . criticism from the reactionary m orons w ho infest W ashington.” Yet Butler rem ained in the back­ ground. T he CE IP trustees finally passed a resolution o f endorsem ent b u t still refused to enter the cam paign. Scott argued that it was best to take the high groun d and prom ote the prestige o f the C o u rt rather than becom e involved in debates. D em ocratic senator Thom as J. W alsh o f M ontana considered him "voiceless,” and judged the endow m ent as unfriendly.44 Finally, w ith all the safeguards in place, the senators voted 76 to 17 on 27 January 1926 to jo in the c o u rt James G . M cD onald reflected the am bivalent attitude o f supporters w hen he observed that passage w as at least a "m oral victory,” because he found little enthusiasm fo r the C o u rt am ong senators.4* Just as internationalists had feared, how ever, once the Senate acted, the m em bers o f the League w anted clarification o f the reservations. M em bers o f the tribunal had trouble accepting them , particularly the fifth, w hich as w orded w ould give the U nited States a preferred position. A dditional questions seem ed less troublesom e. In M arch, to resolve such m atters, the League’s C ou n cil sug­ gested that a conference be held on 1 Septem ber 1926 to clarify and perhaps m o d ify the statute. T his led to consternation and uncertainty in the C oolid ge adm inistration. K ellogg rejected participation, although som e A m erican le­ galists attended the m eeting in G eneva as private citizens.46 T h e conference in G eneva accom plished little. Legal experts began to pro­ duce con tradictory view s regarding the im portance o f advisory opinions. T he delegates review ed the reservations and found the proviso allow ing a veto on ad visory opinions in w hich the U nited States m erely claim ed an interest un­ acceptable. K ellogg responded that the Senate w ould stand firm in requiring acceptance o f the reservations, and the resulting stalem ate kept m em bership in lim bo. In N ovem ber, C oolid ge announced that he w ould n ot pursue the issue. T o m betw een p arty com m itm ents, strong popular enthusiasm , and antiC o u rt senators, the president w as relatively noncom m ittal and apparently unconcerned. A s one insider in the State D epartm ent noted, the adm inistra­ tio n w ould n ot m ake any "official, unofficial, form al o r inform al w hisper, m urm ur o r gurgle” about reservations because there w as n o “consum ing fire o f passionate con viction ” on the part o f the secretary o f state o r the presi­ dent. B orah and M oses used this passivity to th eir ow n advantage w hen they

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p u b licly applauded C oolid ge’s reluctance to cooperate w ith League efforts to fin d a com prom ise.47 For the next tw o years th e tactics pursued b y C o u rt supporters w ere stultifyingly cautious. A resolution introduced b y Republican senator Frederick H . G illett o f M assachusetts in 1928 sought to induce C oolid ge to reopen dis­ cussions w ith the League, but even Swanson had doubts about brin gin g the m atter before the Senate again. Jessup though t it best n ot to push the G illett resolution un til the K ellogg-B riand Pact had been approved and that a drive fo r the C o u rt in the 1928 election w ould be unw ise. A n adviser to H oover w arned him that d urin g the cam paign he should n ot m ention the “ highly controversial” subject, w hich could be considered dead in the Senate. C o u rt supporters refused to enter the political arena to cam paign directly against opponents. W hereas they m ight have em phasized that th ey had sup­ ported reservations that assured m oderate senators, responded to those w ho w ished to uphold traditional nonentanglem ent, and done all in their pow er to pacify their opponents, th ey never w ent on the offensive. Instead, th ey ral­ lied their public, obtained resolutions o f endorsem ent, and argued that m as­ sive petitions show ed that people w anted results. T his w as n ot enough to m otivate obdurate politicians. In the end, the failure o f the advocates m eant that a m in ority o f opponents could n u llify the efforts o f the p ro -C o u rt fac­ tion because it seem ed unw illing to m arch steadily ahead.4* T h e issue languished un til tw o events, unrelated to C ou rt-su p p orter ac­ tivity, helped m ove it forw ard. W hen C harles Evans H ughes becam e a judge on the PCIJ, and the K ellogg-B riand Pact prom pted renew ed interest in the C o u rt as an agency to resolve disputes, C oolid ge agreed to discuss the im ­ passe over the fifth reservation. T h e League called for a m eeting in M arch 1929 and K ellogg indicated his approval o f R oot goin g to G eneva. T h e CEIP agreed to cover the expenditures o f Jessup, w ho w ent as an aide, w h ile R oot, sailing on his eigh ty-fourth birthday, paid his ow n w ay and participated as a private citizen .49 Ever the diplom at, R oot kept senators, new ly elected President H oover, and State D epartm ent officials inform ed and his discussions w ith key Euro­ pean leaders private. U ltim ately the discussions bore fru it in an acceptable form ula. T h e U nited States could protest any advisory opinion hearing in w hich it claim ed an interest; other m em bers w ould then vote on w hether to proceed. I f th ey insisted on consideration, the A m ericans could w ithdraw w ith out prejudice from the C o u rt. T he C o u n cil and Assem bly unanim ously approved R oot’s form ula and referred it to a C om m ittee o f Jurists; the U nited States accepted and signed the revised statute and a new protocol o f acces­ sion.50 Im m ediately follow ing this breakthrough, League officials pursued a p o licy that was friendly, cooperative, and careful. A question was raised as to w hether all C o u rt m em bers had to approve the new protocol before the U nited States

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co u ld jo in . A s this seem ed the safest procedure, it w as accepted. O n the pe­ riphery, the protocol, revised to conform to A m erican w ishes, m oved ahead in League circles. B y the tim e the protocol cam e to the Senate, on 10 D ecem ber 1930, the H oover adm inistration had other p riorities. Fearing that consideration o f the C o u rt protocol m ight jeopardize o r postpone other Senate business, and ow ­ in g to the onset o f the depression, both the W hite H ouse and State D epart­ m ent declined to push the issue. A s Philip C . N ash, executive director o f the L N A observed, the adm inistration w anted o n ly “educational w ork” and n ot cam paigns. Therefore, the discussions in the Senate appeared to be “little m ore than a ritualistic gesture to appease” supporters and affirm that the U nited States still considered the C o u rt im portant.51 A lth ough Secretary o f State Stim son and H oover b oth favored action, they w anted assurance that the Senate w ould act favorably. W hen H oover’s state­ m ent o f support w as read to the Senate, B orah im m ediately m ade his opposi­ tio n dear. Subsequently, w hen a vote w as taken in the Senate Foreign Rela­ tion s Com m ittee, the chairm an scored another victory: consideration o f the C o u rt w ould be delayed fo r one m ore year. H oover acquiesced in this post­ ponem ent. W hen the A m erican Foundation and the N ational W orld C o u rt C om m ittee both approved o f H oover’s strategy o f delay, they w ere accepting a com prom ise position that proved to be disastrous.52 T h e year o f delay was fatal. In M arch 1931, the C o u rt was asked to offer an ad visory opin ion on the legality o f the proposed A ustro-G erm an Custom s U nion. W hen the C o u rt handed dow n a divided opin ion on 5 Septem ber, the A m erican jud ge (form er secretary o f state Frank K ellogg, w ho had replaced C harles Evans H ughes) was in the m inority. T he unpopular m ajority op in ­ ion , w hich disallow ed the custom s union, perm itted opponents to reopen the w h ole issue o f advisory opinions and the “political” nature o f the C ou rt. O p ­ ponents began dem anding a w hole new series o f confirm ations o f the fifth reservation, particularly that p ortion w hich w ould allow the U nited States to b lo ck all advisory opinions in cases in w hich it declared any in terest O p p o­ nents insisted that absolute agreem ent to this clause m ust once again be affirm ed b y all forty-eigh t pow ers. D ebate over this issue delayed Senate con ­ sideration o f the protocol un til 1 June 1932. C o u rt supporters share som e o f the responsibility fo r this debacle. W hereas the R oot form ula should have erased doubts about the degree to w hich the C o u rt could im pose itself on the U nited States, as Jessup subsequently noted, “the failure o f the p ro -C o u rt ad­ vocates in the U nited States to agree on the exact interpretation o f the R oot protocol greatly w eakened subsequent efforts at ratification.”53A s the Senate Foreign Relations C om m ittee obscured, delayed, and trivialized the C o u rt, supporters w earied. Funds fo r the N W C C dried up. T he on ly action taken b y C o u rt supporters w as the usual lobbying, w hich resulted in m em bership en­ dorsem ent b y both parties in the 1932 election.54

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Roosevelt’s electoral victo ry w as varyin gly interpreted b y C o u rt support­ ers. Esther Lape had despaired over Senate obstructionists d urin g the H oover adm inistration. A lth ough the educational cam paigns she favored had kept the public in favor o f C o u rt m em bership (as evidenced b y im pressive p oll results), she had little faith that any R epublican adm inistration w ould push the issue. Perhaps based on her friendship w ith Eleanor R oosevelt, Lape clung to the hope that the R oosevelt adm inistration w ould act. Jessup, how ever, in expressing pessim ism , read the situation correctly. A lth ough Senate m ajority leader Joseph T. R obinson (D -A rk.) in itially announced that the W orld C o u rt protocols “should be disposed o f” on 28 M arch 1933 w hen th ey w ere to be reported to the Senate, the com m ittee postponed action. D urin g the ensuing week, fear that Senate debate o f this issue w ould delay action on the pressing dom estic agenda em erged. A fter conferring w ith Roosevelt, Robinson reversed h im self and m oved that the protocols rem ain in com m ittee.” T hroughout 1933 nothing w as accom plished, and C o u rt supporters ap­ peared both cow ed and im potent. In M ay 1933, w hen Representative J. Charles Linthicum introduced a resolution to appropriate $50,000 as the U.S. share o f PCIJ expenses, the N W C C expressed fear that this w ould arouse the opposi­ tion . T he president com plained in 1933 that he could n ot cou n t on a single senator “w ho really cares about getting it through o r w ho is particularly ex­ pert” regarding details. A lth ough FD R m ay ju st have granted other issues far m ore p rio rity than the C o u rt, he did n ot in fact pursue the issue. O n 4 Janu­ ary 1934, FD R announced that unstable conditions in Europe m ade it unw ise to consider adherence. Surprisingly, the president’s com m ent aroused enough criticism and p ublic ou tcry that the Senate Foreign Relations C om m ittee held hearings late in M arch. Betw een M arch and the end o f M ay 1934, m em bers o f the com m ittee heard hours and hours o f testim ony on the issue. Finally, on 31 M ay, R obinson m oved to shelve the issue un til January 1935.* D espite his other priorities, there is little doubt that Roosevelt continued to desire U.S. m em bership in the C ou rt. He w as kept inform ed b y those in the State D epartm ent w ho w ere w arm tow ard the idea, and late in D ecem ber he m et personally w ith Senator K ey Pittm an, chairm an o f the Senate Foreign Relations C om m ittee, and assistant secretaries o f state Francis B. Sayre and R. W alton M oore. A ll agreed to m ove ahead. A lth ough th ey seem ed reluctant to com m it them selves publicly un til the com m ittee reported on 9 January 1935, Pittm an and the others carefully plotted their strategies regarding tim in g, the text o f the protocol, reservations, and resolutions.17 O n 24 D ecem ber, the New York Times reported that no evidence pointed to adm inistrative interest in pressing the Senate on the C o u rt issue. N everthe­ less, m any felt a renewed sense o f optim ism , none m ore so than H am ilton H olt, w ho to o k leave from his college presidency fo r a trip to W ashington the last w eek o f D ecem ber 1934. There he conferred w ith State D epartm ent per­ sonnel on his plan “ to enter court and league this winter .” Eichelberger

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w arned him against a public effort, b u t H olt w ould n ot be restrained. N ew ton D . Baker had indicated to H olt that the State D epartm ent w as now interested in C o u rt m em bership. H olt advised H enry A tkinson that believers should "speak now o r forever h old o u r peace.” H olt insisted that although he did n ot kn ow R oosevelt’s view s, the president had been discussing the subject w ith key persons.** H olt appealed to R oosevelt on W ilson’s birthday, recalling their w ork to ­ gether on the W oodrow W ilson Foundation and encouraging him to succeed w here their id ol had failed. In W ashington, H olt talked to H ull, A ttorney G en­ eral H om er Cum m ings, Sayre, and R. W alton M oore, w ho m ade the surpris­ in g revelation that a "d raft o f a Joint R esolution” existed, the result o f conver­ satio n s w ith several person s. M oore w arn ed th a t it d id n o t have State D epartm ent approval and should be considered "strictly confidential.” T h is docum en t is n ot in the H olt Papers, but it presum ably em bodied jo in t con ­ gressional action fo r en try into the League. H olt returned to W inter Park, F lorida, convinced that R oosevelt w ould include a call fo r C o u rt m em ber­ ship in his annual m essage to Congress.*9 U pon his return hom e in early January, H olt delivered an "open serm on” to R oosevelt. T he New York Herald Tribune gave it prom inent coverage under the heading: "D r. H olt U rges League E n try b y R esolution.” In a letter to R oosevelt, enclosing his "serm on,” he pushed strongly for League m em ber­ ship.60Since H olt’s efforts paralleled a League o f N ations A ssociation drive fo r affiliation and because D em ocratic senator James P. Pope w as talking p ublicly about introducing a resolution to jo in , there is little w onder that opponents becam e agitated. T he m ost intense and public airings o f opposition were led b y H uey Long o f Louisiana, D etroit radio priest Father Charles C ough lin , and new spaper publisher W illiam Randolph H earst. A lthough the three FD R opponents developed slightly different rationales, there was a com m on them e. A s on e opponent w rote John Bassett M oore, there was am ple p ro o f that a relationship w ith the C o u rt w ould lead to the "n ext step.” M oore affirm ed that the U nited States cou ld "b e catapulted into the League.”61 R oosevelt’s m essage to Congress in January contained a d ear justification fo r m em bership in the C ou rt. R obinson, w ho led the flo o r fight, w anted quick action w ith m inim um debate. T hat did n ot develop largely because Republi­ can senator A rth ur H . Vandenberg o f M ichigan introduced an am endm ent to the com m ittee report designed m ore to delay than to d arify, and opponents unleashed a bitter debate on the Senate floor. T he unanticipated fight un­ nerved the president and forced him to reconsider his tactics. A revived N W C C and other organizations besieged him w ith docum ents o f su p p o rt T h ey as­ tu tely enlisted Eleanor R oosevelt, w ho had w orked w ith Esther Lape for sev­ eral years, and the First Lady sought to strengthen her husband’s resolve.62 It becam e increasingly d ear that som e w avering senators w ould place the vo te in jeopardy, at w hich poin t Jessup and H udson though t it w ise to accept

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the Vandenberg am endm ent. Roosevelt agreed, dism issing it as “surplusage,” but the w avering encouraged the opponents. A gain, the p ro -C o u rt senators adopted a “ ‘fateful’ com prom ise,” prolonging debate un til 28 January. A few recognized that further pressure from the adm inistration was going to be nec­ essary to ensure approval. H ull and other State D epartm ent figures lobbied senators but to no avail. T he vote fell seven sh ort o f the needed tw o-thirds.63 Follow ing the Senate defeat in January, internationalists virtu ally gave up. Betw een 1936 and 1941, the W orld C o u rt issue appeared o n ly sporadically as organized cam paigns ended. T h e A m erican Foundation found itse lf im m o­ bilized b y a tax rulin g that prohibited extensive participation, and the N W C C left agitation to the League o f N ations A ssociation.64 B y that tim e the LN A had other priorities related to revision o f the C ovenant and debates over the n eutrality acts. T he New York Times index for 1937 contains on ly fou r refer­ ences to the C ourt; that for 1938 has five. In that year, w hen it seem ed im pos­ sible to cu rtail aggressors, the CE IP trustees adopted a resolution that the true path to peace was based on laws and treaties. A s Scott observed, the statem ent w as “rooted in m orality and sustained b y natural reason,” but the action b y the group w as far to o little and to o late.** In February 1941, the G eneral Federation o f W om en’s C lubs sent the State D epartm ent its annual resolution for jo in in g the C o u rt.66T he fu tility o f such a resolution should have been absolutely apparent even to the m ost naive: a 1941 proposal to discuss the role o f the PCIJ in the postw ar w orld generated confusion, as State D epartm ent officers agonized over w hether to respond to an invitation to a conference.67

In assessing the W orld C o u rt figh t from 1920 to 1935 it is apparent that the o ppon en ts to m em bership w on fo r several reasons. F irst, leaders in the H arding, C oolidge, Hoover, and Roosevelt adm inistrations, w hile sym pathetic, never gave the subject top priority. R oosevelt’s failure to enter the fray stands as perhaps the m ost d ifficu lt to explain. H is passivity m ay have reflected his confidence that the m easure w ould pass under a D em ocratic adm inistration, b u t it also reveals his p resid en tial style on fo reign p o lic y m atters. T h e adm inistration’s flo o r figh t was m ishandled in tim in g, in com prom ising, and in n ot anticipating problem s. T he p ro -C o u rt advocates w ere sim ply “over­ confident and com placent.”66 Second, Senate opponents m anaged to com plicate the process w ith reser­ vations. W hen the opposition sought to obstruct o r com plicate the senatorial process, C o u rt advocates never threatened to turn popular support against them at the polls. Instead, th ey accepted reservations and gave d ie obstruc­ tionists flo o r tim e to air their view s. N ot once in the lo n g process did the proC o u rt people engage in bare-knuckle politics. Finally, and m ost im portant o f all, C o u rt advocates m ism anaged their cam ­ paigns. T h ey had overw helm ing popular support and the votes in the Senate,

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yet th ey con tin ually deferred to the opposition.69 In their im m ediate post­ m ortem s, a num ber o f contem porary observers attem pted to defend support­ ers b y insisting that the relationship to the League w as the central reason fo r th e C o u rt’s defeat. Senator R obinson listed this as the num ber one problem in his evaluation, and Borchard agreed. W alter Lippm ann suggested that the "real issue” w as w hether the U nited States w ould “adhere to the peace m a­ ch in ery” created in the Treaty o f Versailles. Eichelberger concluded that the Senate debates on the C o u rt had focused “on denunciation o f the League.”70 A n d yet, tellingly, the m ost ardent attem pts to underm ine this argum ent cam e from the European side, w here great effort was expended to erase im pressions o f any C ourt-L eague tie. Indeed, som e observers w ho saw the relationship betw een the tw o as organic thought that Secretariat officials asserted this point “to o strongly.”71 D rum m ond, in his ow n quiet way, certainly sought to ac­ com m odate A m erican concerns, and European essayists and journalists were extrem ely m oderate in their treatm ent o f the U.S. position.71 E xam ination o f the role o f internationalists outside governm ent circles d urin g the C o u rt battle, especially those in the legal com m unity, elicits little praise: they found it d ifficu lt to agree on any firm position o r to act in con ­ certed fashion on alm ost any topic. W hile A m erican lawyers m ay justifiably have been divided on m em bership in the PCIJ because o f the relationship o f the C o u rt to the League, they at least purported to agree on the codification o f international law. Yet differ­ ences appeared even here. O n 17 A p ril 1919, the A m erican Society o f Interna­ tion al Law had called fo r a conference to review conditions and form ulate rules and principles, to be follow ed b y period ic m eetings for the sam e pur­ pose. T h e League A ssem bly rejected such an idea as prem ature in D ecem ber 1920. H udson also perceived the proposal as possibly harm ful to the League. B y 1923, how ever, he though t that the League conference m ethod w ould ad­ vance codification , and he and Sweetser appear to have been influential in persuading D rum m ond and other officials to call a conference for 192s.73 T his led to a resolution in the Fifth Assem bly, 22 Septem ber 1924, to create a Com m ittee on the Progressive Codification o f International Law. The C ouncil selected the jurists w ho m et from 1925 through 1928 and planned fo r a m ajor session at T he H ague in 1929. Secretaries o f State H ughes and K ellogg favored this approach, and Congress voted $25,000 to cover the expenses o f the “un­ official” delegates from the U nited States. These included D avid H unter M iller and State D epartm ent solicitor G reen H . H ackw orth, plus technical advisers Borchard, H udson, and Jesse B. Reeves o f the U niversity o f M ichigan.74 U ltim ately the seven subjects covered b y the group w ere highly restrictive, and few governm ents approved the draft conventions. T he m ajor barrier to U.S. acceptance was that som e opponents saw a T hird H ague Conference as a better path tow ard codification. T h ey w ere w illin g to sacrifice the advance o f the principle on the altar o f the vehicle.

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M eanw hile, James Brow n Scott, d irector o f the D ivision o f International Law fo r the CEIP, pushed his ow n agenda. A t Pan-A m erican conferences prior to 1914, delegates had explored the subject o f codification , and in 1923 at the Fifth Inter-A m erican sessions in Santiago, C h ile, representatives agreed to create a C om m ission o f Jurists w h o w ould exam ine b oth pu blic and private international law and report at a R io de Janeiro m eeting in 1925. T h e A m eri­ can Institute o f International Law, created in 1912, w ould serve as the prepara­ to ry com m ittee. H ughes nam ed Scott as senior U nited States delegate. Scott saw this as an innovative step, w ith initiative fo r codification in the hands o f the N ew W orld.75 U nder Scott’s leadership, discussion o f a code for the W estern H em isphere did m ove ahead, although the com m ission did not m eet un til 1927. T h e A m eri­ can Institute, in conjunction w ith individual jurists and the Pan-Am erican U nion, had prepared th irty projects o r conventions plus a code o f private international law. T he com m ission studied these and recom m ended twelve to the H avana Conference in 1928. Few states form ally ratified the seven con­ ventions approved there, and there w as little additional progress in the 1930s. A s late as 1939, Scott still hoped the effort could be revised.7* A nother diversionary effort at codification was associated w ith the H arvard Law School, w here H udson organized the H arvard Research in International Law G roup in 1927. It consisted o f a noted ad visory com m ittee w hose m em ­ bers agreed to prepare reports on topics fo r codification in the form o f draft conventions.W ickersham in itially served as chairm an, and H udson directed the research, underw ritten b y the Com m onw ealth Fund and gifts from John D. Rockefeller, Jr. T h e H arvard project produced a num ber o f volum es on International Legislation, b u t these had lim ited im p a ct B y the tim e th ey ap­ peared, attitudes about the form ulation o f rules had shifted m arkedly.77 T h e CE IP also expended thousands o f dollars to advance codification , giv­ ing subventions for studies and to international law associations, yet the dream faded. H udson w ould later observe that efforts through the League o f N ations w ere “ largely abortive,” a judgm ent that m ust be applied to nearly all efforts.7* T he outlaw ry o f w ar proposal, prom oted b y C h icago attorney Salm on O. Levinson, w as another codification plan that divided intern ational lawyers. Levinson favored a sim ple solution. Precedent, based on behavior and trea­ ties, determ ined that states had the right to engage in m ilitary actio n , and extensive rules existed for the conduct o f war. N evertheless, Levinson argued, nations should reject the legality o f w arfare. T h e C h icago law yer presented his proposition w ith great energy begin­ ning in 1918. A cou rt w ith au th ority to rule on international controversies w ould id en tify the violators, b u t enforcem ent w ould be dependent on the sanction o f public opin ion .79 Levinson and his O u tlaw ry C om m ittee cam ­ paigned against the PC I J as inadequate and tied to the League. U ntil w ar could

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b e dealt w ith directly, no m achinery w ould w ork. A lso, codification efforts w o u ld be unnecessary once w ar w as abolished. N aturally such view s aroused the m ore traditional internationalists. H udson th ou gh t the hubbub over outlaw ry w as "dam ned nonsense,” and Butler judged th e proposal "fantastic.” Q u in cy W right challenged Levinson’s basic assum p­ tio n that wars w ere curren tly considered legal. H olt and Low ell, both old ad­ vocates o f sanctions, charged the outlaw rists w ith being unrealistic in think­ in g that public opinion o r econom ic pressures w ould be m eaningful deterrents. Parsons argued that on ly the League could outlaw war, but it first needed an effective police force. Even liberals had doubts. N orm an Thom as saw it as a panacea, ign orin g the reality o f arm ed forces in the w orld and the in ability to separate dom estic from international concerns. K irby Page spoke for the lib ­ eral religious and peace com m unities w hen he noted that m ost w ars arose over political, n ot legal, issues. Because outlaw ry suggested no w ay o f rem ov­ in g the causes o f war, it could n ot ensure w orld peace. T he subject sent M oore " o ff into a round o f sarcastic denunciation.”*0 N ot surprisingly, given the o p ­ p osition , Levinson found his m ost prom inent ally in Borah, w ho in February 1923 introduced a resolution to m ake w ar illegal." In 1924, tw o ardent o u tlaw ry proponents, Frances K ellor and A n ton ia H atvany, produced Security against War, w hich im m ediately provided "a m ine” o f usefiil argum ents fo r PCIJ opponents. R ecognition o f d ie need to brin g all legalist-oud aw ry fictio n s together resulted in the H arm ony Plan o f 1925. T his plan , w hich com bined support fo r codification efforts, m em bership in the PCIJ, and the oudaw ry m ovem ent, was on ly m odestly successful. A ll sides contin ued to prom ote their ow n individual positions despite the appearance o f co a litio n ." T h e historic significance o f Levinson’s plan resides in the fact that James T. Shotw ell and Joseph Cham berlain capitalized on outlaw ry sentim ent in draft­ in g w hat becam e the K ellogg-B riand Treaty. T he K ellogg-B riand Pact’s re­ nunciation o f w ar as an instrum ent o f national p o licy seem ed to refute the established prin cip le that wars w ere legal. Contem poraries saw a clear rela­ tion ship betw een the proposal for oud aw ry and the pact, although Shotw ell asserted that he w as m erely docum enting a reality that in th eory aggressive w ar w as already considered a crim e. Som e international law advocates thought it vita l to support the pact and take a firm stand against aggressors. "O th er­ wise,” as W right declared, "international law w ill cease to have reality.”'3O ther contem poraries recognized that the K ellogg-B riand Pact helped to weaken international law. T he notion that one could renounce w ar w ith out provid ­ ing for any sanctions w as fu lly repudiated in the post-1945 w orld o f politics. Yet the treaty rem ains a hollow sym bol o f the outlaw ry concept.*4 U nderstandably, analysts have differed in their assessm ent o f the im plica­ tion s and results o f all these efforts. Legal scholars have argued that even the

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m ost m odest advance represented progress, particularly because conditions in the interw ar years did n ot favor codification efforts. W hereas som e assert that the K ellogg-Briand Pact w as an advance (even though nothing cam e o f efforts to im plem ent its intent w ith established rules), others argue that the ignom inious failure o f the pact did little to advance concepts o f law in the public m ind. Subsequent events m erely confirm ed that aggressors d id n ot feel bound b y rules o f proper behavior. A s Scott noted, “good faith” lay behind the “perform ance o f all obligations,” and dictators show ed little regard fo r gentle­ m anly co n d u ct But codification enthusiasts in the 1920s though t that an “ord erly process o f developm ent” w as at w ork to achieve the progressive evolution o f law. Scott saw it as alm ost contagious. T hen the vision died. In 1938 Butler decried the fact that “ international law, like international m orality, has disappeared in a fog.”*5There seem s to have been little recognition, however, that in refusing to reach consensus and to w ork for codification in no m atter w hat forum , and in failing to ardently prom ote the W orld C o u rt as the sym bol o f their principles, the legalists w ere at least partially responsible fo r generating the m ist.

9 KEEPING FAITH Social and Humanitarian Ties to the League, 1921-1939

URiNG the summer of 1921 the H arding adm inistration found itse lf in ­ creasin gly under attack. In June, H am ilton H olt had issued his "O pen Letter to th e President,” challenging H arding to live u p to his cam paign prom ­ ises and reveal his plan fo r an association o f nations. W hile the adm inistra­ tion w eigh ed H olt's challenge, hoping that it w ould receive scant attention from th e p u b lic, another blow fell, this one delivered b y A rth u r Sweetser and Raym ond Fosdick. T h eir cam paign began w ith a subtle p lo y b y Sweetser w hen he m et N ew York Times correspondent Edw in L. James at M axim 's in Paris. A s they w atch ed the show, Sweetser told the reporter that H arding’s State D e­ partm ent h ad n o t responded to any com m unications from the League. Read­ ers o f th e Tim es learned this fact on 18 July, and Fosdick im m ediately spread the sto ry th ro u gh his news bureau.1 T h e N ew York Times expressed am azem ent that the U nited States govern­ ment w o u ld not respond to an agency representing forty-eight sovereign states. It was "un im aginable,’’ "an insult to the intelligence o f the A dm inistration,” and a "d esp icab ly sm all business.” T h e resulting o u tcry placed the president and secretary o f state in an em barrassing position . A m idst grow ing rum ors that the U n ited States had em barked on a cam paign to destroy the League, unnam ed o fficia l sources denied the valid ity o f the report. T h ey argued that the p o licy o f the U nited States, as a nonm em ber, w as to deal w ith the League through its m em ber governm ents. Few w ere satisfied.1 T h e im b ro glio created b y Sweetser’s disclosure highlighted a problem cen­ tral to in terw ar politics: despite the o fficial p o licy o f nonm em bership, U.S. p olitician s co u ld n o t ignore the League o f N ations. A m ericans trad ition ally view them selves as a m oral and hum anitarian people, w ith a responsibility to participate in , i f n o t to lead, m ovem ents aim ed at cu rin g societal ills. T his w as particularly tru e o f any efforts to end the international drug trade, the traffick­ ing in w o m en and children, slavery, the distribution o f pornography, and o f efforts to im prove p u b lic health. A lth ou gh A m erican citizens m ay have been

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skeptical about the League’s ability to transform the traditional international order, any adm inistration that appeared to denigrate o r stand in the w ay o f hum anitarian efforts did so at considerable political risk. Political entangle­ m ent w as one thing, but avoidance o f m oral responsibility w as quite another in the eyes o f A m erican voters. A s a result, o fficially and through private chan­ nels, d urin g the 1920s and 1930s the U nited States accepted increasing respon­ sibilities on com m ittees and com m issions dealing w ith a vast array o f social, hum anitarian, and business concerns. In the immediate afterm ath o f the Times disclosure, H ughes attem pted to

defend the H arding adm inistration b y blam ing W ilson’s secretary o f state, w ho had responded to o n ly fifteen queries w h ile leaving eighteen unacknow l­ edged. T h is response satisfied few observers. A dm inistration insiders and League officials were aware that the H arding adm inistration's p o licy was based on m ore than a bureaucratic backlog: on 30 June 1921, the U.S. consul at Geneva, Louis W . H askell, had inform ed Secretary-G eneral Eric D rum m ond: “ I am instructed to say verbally and un officially that the A m erican G overnm ent has received yo u r com m unications o f N ovem ber 18 and M ay 22 but inasm uch as the A m erican G overnm ent has no relations w ith the League o f N ations there w ill be no reply to them .”3 D espite H ughes’s attem pt to dism iss the issue o f com m unication w ith the League as largely insignificant, it w as clear that the p o licy had to change. M ost o f the letters recently received from G eneva requested statistical data o r the nam es o f persons w ho m ight sit on hum anitarian com m issions. A m erican voters w ould continue to be outraged if th ey knew that efforts to curtail the opium trade, the spread o f pestilent diseases, and the im m oral traffic in w om en and children w ere being ignored. T h e secretary o f state was equally aware th at other issues w ould arise that w ould require a U nited States-League relationship. T h e H arding adm inis­ tration never suggested that the U nited States did n ot have vital, global inter­ ests. H ughes recognized that, w ith o r w ith ou t the U nited States, the League w ould be the arena in w hich solutions to international problem s w ere so u g h t E conom ic in stability stem m ing from w ar debts, reparations, and ta riffb a rriers w ould be discussed at the m ultination al level. Q uestions in volvin g m an­ dates, labor standards and w orkin g cond itions, and issues related to Euro­ pean p o litical and territorial disputes, the peaceful resolution o f con flicts, and disarm am ent w ould n ot be ignored. I f A m erican interests w ere to be represented and the cou n try’s influence felt, channels to G eneva had to be carefully developed. O ne such case had already em erged. A t the peace conference, W ilson had m ade it clear that he did not w ant the Pacific island o f Yap under Japanese con trol because it was im portant to the U nited States as a cable station. T he m atter rested in the hands o f the C o u n cil o f Four and the Suprem e C ou n cil

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fo r several m onths u n til the League o f N ations began to assign m andates. In N ovem ber 1920 and again on 21 February 1921, Secretary o f State Bainbridge C o lb y n otified the C o u n cil that the U nited States did n ot endorse the assign­ m ent o f Yap to Japan and that W ashington w as to be consulted on any agree­ m ent. League officials thus delayed consideration and invited the U nited States to m eet w ith the C o u n cil w hen it scheduled the subject fo r discussion in A pril 1921.4 H ughes inherited this p o litically sensitive issue, w hich had already aroused w idespread public discussion. He declared that the U nited States had n ot aban­ don ed its rights w hen it refused to ratify the Treaty o f Versailles, yet he d id n ot respond to the invitation to discuss the m atter. T he subject thus rem ained alive. League officials sent rem inders, and the press reported on the failure to attend and on the refusal o f a prom inent citizen, W illiam Cam eron Forbes, to serve as a private representative on the Perm anent M andates Com m ission. U ltim ately the U nited States "h eld up the institution o f the m andates system u n til it had secured its interests in the o il o f M esopotam ia and the cable sta­ tio n o f Yap, n ot b y the quick and easy m ethod o f consultation w ith the C o u n ­ cil, b u t b y individual correspondence w ith each o f the principal A llied pow ­ ers.”5A lth ough this convoluted and tim e-consum ing strategy o f dealing w ith in d ivid ual nations w as n ot o fficially renounced, in the autum n o f 1921 the H arding adm inistration began com m unicating w ith the League, reevaluated its p o licy tow ard cooperation, and announced its ow n contribution to peace and international cooperation in a call for the W ashington disarm am ent con­ ference. T h e first evidence o f a new w illingness to respond to League overtures cam e in Septem ber w hen the State D epartm ent acted upon League queries received betw een 4 February and 29 August. W anting to appease critics o f the form er neglect, but fearful o f arousing the w rath o f Republican hard-liners, State D epartm ent officials soft-pedaled the change, explaining that the lon g period d u rin g w hich the League had been ignored was due to a clerk w ho had in n o­ cen tly filed League com m unications, thinking they needed no acknow ledg­ m ent.6 H owever, from n ow on, the governm ent w ould follow the practice o f com m unicating "in appropriate form and m anner” through "regularly pro­ vid ed diplom atic channels.” In addition, in N ovem ber, State D epartm ent o ffi­ cial H enry R Fletcher suggested to the am bassador in Berne, Joseph C . Grew, that he keep the departm ent inform ed about any League discussion that m ight relate to o r have bearing on U.S. policies. H owever, ever fearful that news o f any contact m ight arouse the w rath o f irreconcilable senators, Fletcher in­ stru cte d G rew to address m aterial sen t b y m ail d ire ctly to H ughes o r U ndersecretary Leland H arris.7 G rew responded p o sitively alb eit w ith uncertainty. H is previous in stru c­ tion s had been to m aintain o n ly the m ost in form al con tact w ith League o fficials. Interpreting that to m ean that he co u ld n o t enter the Secretariat

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b u ild in g, G rew had always relied on H untington G ilchrist and Sw eetser for inform ation. W ith the new directive, the am bassador hired clerks to process and analyze League m aterials, w hich w ere then sent to W ashington. Ever the diplom at, the am bassador w as cautious, expressing concern about sending item s that com m ented on the League’s m erits because th ey m ight b e inter­ preted as pro-League propaganda. H e had all the printed m aterial sent to W ashington m arked "confidential,” and he hid his h irin g o f the clerks from accounts.* D espite the convoluted precautions, m any State D epartm ent officers, such as Prentiss G ilbert, ch ief o f the Bureau o f C urrent Intelligence, and Under­ secretary W illiam P hillips, w ere pleased w ith the bud d ing relationship. The State D epartm ent began to send statistical data to G eneva on an autom atic basis, and personnel w ere increasingly cordial w hen serving as interm ediaries betw een individuals and the League. I f unable to provide the inform ation requested b y citizens, personnel often referred the queries to the W orld Peace Foundation. State D epartm ent personnel also helped m ake arrangem ents for noted personages going to G eneva to ensure that th ey w ere p roperly received. T his interaction provided the State D epartm ent w ith a safeguard as w ell: at tim es the departm ent attem pted to cu rtail the enthusiasm o f visito rs to the League w ho, w h ile in G eneva, conveyed im pressions that th ey represented the U nited States.9 There w ere also allies in other executive agencies. H arrison, w h o becam e an assistant to the president early in 1922, w as "pro-League in a m ild way, ready to help w herever possible,” and the Labor and C om m erce departm ents placed the League on th eir m ailin g lists.10 N evertheless, d irect responses to League inquiries continued to reflect a cautious approach. W hen G ilchrist inquired about official U.S. attitudes on a poison gas treaty, the State D epart­ m ent responded. In supplying data, how ever, it stipulated that G ilch rist could n ot reveal the source.11 T he second decision o f the H arding adm inistration, to coop erate m ore fu lly w ith League agencies, follow ed an equally tortuous course. A n event that to o k place in D ecem ber 1921, w hen at a cabinet m eeting Secretary o f th e Trea­ su ry A ndrew W . M ellon asked w hether a representative should be sent to a conference to stabilize m onetary exchange, presaged the change. Secretary M ellon noted th at the State D epartm ent had recom m ended against sending a representative to the conference. A fter H oover argued that this w as an eco­ nom ic m atter, the cabinet decided to override State’s objections. O thers fol­ low ed this o fficial contact. In M arch 1922 the U nited States agreed to partici­ pate in the w ork o f the International H ydrographic Bureau, and in M ay o f that year, a League announcem ent o f the creation o f an International Com ­ m ittee on Intellectual C o-operation (IC IC ) stim ulated a favorable response.12 T h e creation o f the IC IC was lauded m ost enthusiastically in academ ic circles. G eorge E. H ale, d irector o f the M ount W ilson O bservatory an d chair­

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man o f th e N ational Research C o u n cil, assisted b y N obel Prize w inner R obert A. M illikan o f the C aliforn ia Institute o f Technology, agreed to participate as private citizen s. In m any respects, it is fittin g that this com m ittee, form ed b y the League in 1922, was one o f the first to have prom inent A m erican p artici­ pation. W h ile Europeans led in its creation, the idea had origin ally been ad­ vanced in 1919 b y Stephen P. D uggan. A fter the treaty figh t, D uggan realized that an y “educational bureau” could n ot em anate from the U nited States, so he in itia lly rem ained in the background. A fter H ale and M illikan established the co n n ectio n , W aldo G . Leland o f the A m erican C o u n cil o f Learned Societ­ ies, G eo rge F. Z o o k o f the A m erican C o u n cil on E ducation, and D uggan col­ laborated w ith the IC IC , headquartered in Paris. In 1925, Shotw ell organized an A m erican N ational Com m ittee on Intellectual C o-operation as one o f m ore than th ree dozen national groups form ed to w ork w ith the League’s body.13 B ecause th e intellectual agencies created b y the League w ere ap olitical, it was relatively easy for private citizens to participate, know ing that th ey had the u n o fficial support o f the governm ent. Yet it appeared that n o contact could be establish ed w ith out som e dissension. In 1921, trustees o f the C arnegie En­ dow m ent fo r International Peace feared that the League’s plan fo r an educa­ tional b u reau w ould intrude on the CEIP Institute o f International Educa­ tion. T h is concern m eant that they w ere cool to overtures until a visit b y Butler to G eneva in 1925 apparently allayed their fears.14Fortunately for the new agen­ cies, R ockefeller Foundation interest in im proving lib rary system s resulted in substantial gifts to the League’s lib rary and support fo r the C om m ittee on Bibliography. Subcom m ittees discussed bibliographical research, scientific and intellec­ tual p ro p erty, exchanges o f teachers and students, lib rary and exh ibition m a­ terials, an d the unfettered distribution o f publications. A m ericans becam e especially involved in m otion picture rights and exchanges, in correctin g er­ rors in geography and h isto ry textbooks, in organ izin g intern ational con ­ gresses, and in strengthening copyright and patent conventions.13 T h e copy­ right situ a tio n attracted the attention o f literary figures w ho fo r decades had been con cern ed about protection o f their w ork. M any governm ents adhered to an 1886 accord that had created an International C o p yrigh t U nion. D espite revisions in 1896,1908, and 1914, the U nited States had never signed the ac­ cord, alth o u gh it had sent delegates to m eetings as observers. C ongressional bills in the 1920s sought am endm ents to copyright laws that w ould enable the U nited States to jo in the C op yrigh t U nion, and Congress fin ally endorsed the convention in 1927.16 A s the H arding adm inistration felt its w ay d urin g 1921 and 1922, the efforts o f private in d ivid uals and charitable organizations provided concrete p ro o f that in flu en tial people, and the A m erican public in general, supported the social, h um an itarian , apolitical w o rk being done b y the League. D u rin g the early su m m er o f 1922, officials o f the Laura Spelm an R ockefeller Foundation

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announced that th ey w ere givin g $100,000 fo r Turkish relief, to be adm inis­ tered b y the League. T he A m erican Red C ross also sent a contribution. Appeals fo r aid fo r refugees and fo r relief projects tended to gain a sym pa­ th etic response from A m erican citizens. T h ey contributed to League-adm in­ istered em ergency funds to help the hom eless after the w ar and to aid G reek refugees in 1922-23. T he H arding adm inistration even helped facilitate a League loan to the G reek Refugee Settlem ent C om m ission, w hose first chairm an was form er U.S. am bassador to Turkey H enry M orgenthau. Am erican Red Cross leaders participated in relief projects, and U.S. citizens regularly subscribed to quotas assigned them in appeals fo r m oney.'7 Based on its lon g interest in disease and illness, the R ockefeller Foundation also responded generously to League activities. T he International Health Board, a subsidiary o f the R ockefeller Foundation, donated $32,840 fo r an epidem io­ logical intelligence service. T he g ift, to be spent over five years, w as offered unconditionally; the foundation renounced any voice in policies o r opera­ tions. In ensuing years, the R ockefeller Foundation funded w ork for refugees; efforts to halt the traffic in w om en and children; legal aid to the poor; eco­ nom ic, m onetary, and taxation studies; and a large gift for the library. U lti­ m ately the foundation gave $2,502,950 to the League, $151,424 to the G eneva Research Center, and $1,164,740 to the G eneva G raduate Institute o f Interna­ tion al Studies." C learly these contacts w ere significant. P articularly w hen p ri­ vate citizens provided the entry in to hum anitarian efforts, the H arding ad­ m inistration could readily approve those efforts b y default; a lack o f criticism b y the adm inistration was as good as a seal o f approval. Even as W ashington officials kept a tally on involved citizens and groups and on the am ounts con­ tributed to League bodies, the State D epartm ent under H ughes d id n ot pre­ vent such participation n or did it seek to im pose barriers.'9 Indeed, the situa­ tion had im proved so dram atically that League officials began to consider asking for a volu n tary contribution to cover som e o f the benefits the U nited States received. Including salaries to A m erican citizens, th ey calculated this at approxim ately $100,000. Sweetser rejected the idea as prem ature. W hile atti­ tudes were im proving, caution was still necessary. Realistically, the U nited States w as still very aloof: in August 1922, H ughes rem inded Am bassador G rew that he w as still n ot to be seen in the League’s headquarters.“ A lth ough official contact and cooperation w ith the League was still under­ taken w ith the greatest discretion, it represented a significant change in policy. T h e U nited States had form ally declined representation on bodies dealing w ith disarm am ent, health, and traffic in w om en and children.“ In a further display o f high-level obstinacy, w hen the League Assem bly created the A d vi­ sory C om m ittee on the Traffic in O pium and O ther D angerous D rugs (called the O pium A d visory C om m ittee [O A C ]) in accord w ith A rticle 23c o f the C ovenant, the U nited States refused to recognize its authority. W ashington officials insisted on hon orin g a 1912 convention adm inistered b y the N ether­

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lands, even though , in 1920, the D utch governm ent asked the C o u n cil to re­ lieve it o f these responsibilities. A ll signatories except the U nited States agreed. U n til 1923, W ashington channeled com m unications to G eneva via the N eth­ erlands, “as i f the League d id n o t exist.”“ D espite this official attitude, w hen the League Secretariat appointed three expert assessors w ho w ould advise the O A C but serve as individuals rather than as governm ental representatives, th ey issued an invitation to Elizabeth W ashbum e (M rs. H am ilton) W right o f W ashington, D .C . W right, w ho had been active fo r years in efforts to solve the drug problem , accepted the posi­ tio n w ith ou t objection from the State D epartm ent. T he follow in g year, the League H ealth C om m ittee (forerunner o f the W orld H ealth O rganization) appointed an O pium C om m ittee to advise the O A C on m edical aspects o f the d ru g problem . W hen the State D epartm ent received a request to nom inate som eone to this com m ittee, W right and leaders o f religious and civic bodies lobbied governm ent officials u n til they fin ally agreed to nam e a person in an "u n official consultative” capacity. A ssistant Surgeon G eneral Dr. Rupert Blue accepted the appointm ent, beginning a lo n g relationship w ith the com m ittee in 1923. H is appointm ent, like so m any others that follow ed, w as successful b u t always hedged w ith interpretive qualifiers regarding the extent o f official involvem ent.1* Ironically, internationalists gained support in an unusual quarter as a re­ su lt o f this connection. R epublican Stephen G . Porter o f Pennsylvania, the chairm an o f the H ouse Foreign A ffairs Com m ittee, endorsed this action w ith a resolution calling for greater cooperation in curbing the production o f drugs. Porter had been a critic o f the League; thus m any w ere surprised w hen, in M ay 1923, he agreed to head a delegation to the fifth A d visory Com m ittee session. A m erican delegates included B lue, Bishop Charles H . Brent o f the E piscopal church, and Edw in L. N eville o f the State D epartm ent. Porter con­ tinued his support b y introducing a b ill in the H ouse in 1924 to cover the expenses o f participants at future m eetings. T his call fo r a $40,000 appropria­ tion prom pted o n ly m inor opposition, and pro-League D em ocratic repre­ sentative J. Charles Linthicum o f M aryland seized the op p ortu n ity to call fo r fu ll m em bership in the League. Congress approved the Porter m easure, but the Senate added a clause forbidding representatives to sign any docum ents th at w ent beyond clearly form ulated A m erican positions on the production o f and traffic in drugs. Sweetser ju b ilan tly proclaim ed the appropriation the first official sign o f cooperation w ith the League “sanctioned b y act o f C o n ­ gress.” 14 H ealth and hygiene m atters also attracted citizen interest, and the H arding adm inistration recognized the need to reverse its previous p o licy in this arena as w ell. O riginally, the U nited States had opposed the transfer to the League o f the International O ffice o f Public H ealth, created b y a 1907 convention. M irroring its position on the O pium A dvisory Com m ittee, officially the United

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States had insisted on a p o licy o f recognizing the International Public H ealth O ffice in Paris rather than w orking w ith the League agency.11 T his rem ained the official p o licy u n til 1923, w hen the State D epartm ent m odified its position and agreed to recognize the autonom y o f both organ ization s.* W ashington’s contin uing support o f the Paris bureau puzzled som e ob­ servers, particularly in that A m ericans had been fu lly involved in creating the League health organization. Dr. Rupert Blue o f the Public H ealth Service and Dr. Richard P. Strong o f the A m erican Red C ross had attended the Interna­ tion al H ealth Conference in A pril 1920, and w hen the C o u n cil created a Pro­ vision al H ealth C om m ittee in 1921, D r. Charles Edward A m o ry W inslow o f the Yale M edical School served as a representative o f the League o f Red Cross Societies. In keeping w ith new attitudes tow ard lim ited cooperation, w hen the League H ealth O ffice invited Surgeon G eneral H ugh S. C um m ing to attend an O cto ­ ber conference on sanitary problem s, H ughes decided to allow him to attend. Dr. C um m ing and Josephine Baker o f N ew York join ed the H ealth C om m it­ tee in 1922. H arding, in agreeing to the appointm ent, set future policy: the U nited States w ould cooperate on w orth y projects “involving nothing o f in ­ ternational p olitics” that w ould “awaken an o u tcry” from “those w ho lo o k upon the League w ith exceptional terror.”17 C um m ing’s involvem ent w ith the League o f N ations reveals the uncertainty w ith w hich officials dealt w ith League appointm ents and provides am ple evi­ dence o f the am azing (and som ew hat iron ic) changes in U.S. attitudes tow ard cooperating w ith the international body. A s m entioned earlier, C um m ing’s initial appointm ent to the H ealth Com m ittee occasioned a favorable response from H arding. W hen the surgeon general received an invitation to participate in a conference in 1923, how ever, he sought approval o n ly to be turned dow n b y the State D epartm ent. President C oolid ge then called him to the W hite H ouse and told him to go, since D em ocrats had raised a cry that the U nited States was opposed to the hum anitarian w ork o f the League. C um m ing pro­ tested that it w as then to o late to attend, that he w ould arrive on the last day o f the m eeting, but C oolid ge insisted. G e a rly the political clim ate had changed; there w as n ow as m uch peril in ign orin g d ie League as there had been earlier in recognizing its existence. T h e m oral and p olitical im perative that prom pted involvem ent w ith the intellectual, drug, and pu blic health initiatives also aroused the adm inistra­ tion to support League efforts to suppress obscene publications. A fter consid­ erable deliberation, H ughes decided in 1923 to participate in a conference to review a 1920 convention to w hich the U nited States had adhered. A lexander R. M agruder o f the Berne legation attended in a “consultative capacity,” and H udson served as a legal adviser. T he U nited States signed the new conven­ tion , b u t the Senate d id n ot act on it.*

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Follow ing on the heels o f the sporadic contacts established d urin g the first tw o years o f H arding’s adm inistration, m ore and m ore routinized channels o f com m unication began to form in the sum m er o f 1923. T he first evidence o f th is developm ent cam e as a result o f a telephone call from G rew to Sweetser. G rew suggested that the U nited States should have a representative on the Financial C om m ittee. Since League officials had n ot extended an invitation to the U nited States, Sweetser carefully w eighed the situation before respond­ in g affirm atively. A t the tim e, Sweetser noted the curious reversal o f the situ­ ation w here previously notes had been ignored. It proved, he astutely con ­ cluded, “that w henever the League is handling som ething that really interests the U nited States it w on’t be possible to keep her out.”29 Sweetser’s observation was certainly true and reflected the underlying p o ­ litical reality faced b y the H arding, C oolid ge, and H oover adm inistrations. From the outset, the League’s hum anitarian agencies could n ot be ignored and, increasingly, neither could its p olitical discussions. C ertain ly R epublican Era politician s w ere sensitive to this. T herefore, it is h ardly surprising that the evolution o f contacts w ith the League and the developm ent o f channels o f com m unication tended to be slow , often follow in g tortuous courses. It is equally evident w hy, then, nonelected officials (such as em bassy and consular personnel), State D epartm ent bureaucrats, and private citizens w ere likely to spearhead the developm ent o f these new contacts. These people tended to be free o f fear; n o t on ly d id their activities o n ly rarely com e under public scru­ tiny, b u t also their nonelective status kept them safe from political fallout. W hen the adm inistration actually appointed representatives, these ind ivid u­ als served as “observers.” In A pril 1924 H ughes explained that “they are u n offi­ cial sim ply in the sense that th ey are n ot and cannot properly becom e m em ­ bers o f the League organization o r com m ittees. But, so far as o u r G overnm ent is concerned, th ey represent it ju st as com pletely as those designated b y the President always have represented o u r G overnm ent in the conferences and negotiations w hich he properly authorizes in the conduct o f o u r foreign rela­ tions.”30

T hroughout 1923 the H arding adm inistration grappled w ith the sensitive issue o f the proper form the relationship betw een the U nited States and the League o f N ations w ould take. U ltim ately a num ber o f p o licy guidelines em erged. First, m em bership in the League could never be achieved. Second, citizens could participate in League w ork i f th ey did n ot act in an official capacity o r claim to represent the governm ent. T hird, official involvem ent w ould com e o n ly w hen som e special interest w as at stake o r w hen it w as to the advantage o f the U nited States to cooperate. Fourth, such contacts w ould be judged in each instance on their m erits, so representation should never be autom atically assum ed.

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To ensure im plem entation o f these guidelines, tw o internal decisions re­ garding com m unication w ith the League w ere prom ulgated. First, a depart­ m ental directive to all d ivision chiefs noted that League inquiries w ere to “re­ ceive co u rteo u s co n sid eratio n .” Secon d , all co n tacts, except in unusual circum stances, w ere to be routed through the U.S. legation at Berne.51 W hile League supporters w ere not happy about the restrictive quality o f this arrangem ent, they understood the situation. T hus they m aintained pres­ sure on the State D epartm ent to be certain that the general p o licy w as im ple­ m ented w hile th ey contin ued to push fo r regular contacts w ith G eneva.51 In this struggle, they found spokesm en in tw o D em ocratic congressm en, Em anuel C eller o f N ew York and R. W alton M oore o f V irginia. In 1924, C eller presented H .R. R esolution 242 w h ich called fo r the U nited States to assum e its share o f expenses for League-sponsored activities to w hich it sent “d uly accredited rep­ resentatives.” M oore, a m em ber o f the H ouse C om m ittee on Foreign A ffairs, unsuccessfully attem pted to broaden the debate w hen he questioned w hy the governm ent “sh ould blow h o t and cold in respect to the activities o f the League.” 55 League supporters in the State D epartm ent also continued to encourage cooperation even as th ey accepted the basic p o licy o f avoiding m em bership; the correct course lay in a quiet and gradual « te n sio n o f contacts. O fficials w ith direct contact w ith the League in G eneva frequently led the way. Grew, w ho served as am bassador to Sw itzerland from Septem ber 1921 through M arch 1924, had lon g conversations w ith Sweetser on how to extend “cooperation in n on -political activities.”54 H ugh G ibson also becam e increasingly involved w ith the League. A fter re­ placing G rew as am bassador (serving from M arch 1924 through A pril 1927) he regularly visited G eneva. W hen there, he w as em barrassed b y his furtive discussions on the sidew alk outside the Palais des N ations, and he felt un­ com fortable discussing policies at parties o r at vacation retreats. In Septem ­ ber 1924, he raised the issue w ith Secretary H ughes, stressing the im portance o f having som eone from the consulate on the scene in G eneva. G ibson asked if a special person could be hired. Initially, H ughes responded adversely until U ndersecretary o f State W illiam P hillips found a w ay to bypass the problem . H e sent S. Pinckney T uck as consul “w ith diplom atic qualifications” and in ­ structions to “m ingle freely” w ith delegates, obtain inform ation, and, it was hoped, deal m ore openly w ith them . H ughes approved o f this m aneuver on ly so lo n g as it aroused n o unfavorable publicity.55 A pparently Tuck w as discreet. T h e New York Times reported on his m is­ sion, referring to him as a m essenger w ith a status below that o f an unofficial observer. N o outcries arose. W hen, w ith in a few weeks o f his arrival, Tuck requested additional funds to reciprocate for the m any dinners he attended, the departm ent increased his allow ance b y $1,000. N evertheless, the jo b re­ m ained arduous and the approaches furtive as the consulate w as physically

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isolated on the opposite side o f Lake G eneva. Tuck w as transferred in 1928, an d the grow ing num ber o f contacts kept the new consul, Prentiss B. G ilbert, an d the first secretary to the legation at B erne, Jay Pierrepont M offat, increas­ in g ly occupied. A s M offat recorded in his diary, “ It w ill be said that w h ile I sleep in Berne, I live dow n there.” Finally in early 1930, this problem w as solved w hen the consulate m oved "alm ost next d oor” to the League.36 Am bassadors and consular officials residing in G eneva and Berne were n o t the on ly ones to display m ore cordial attitudes tow ard the League. In­ creasingly, attitudes in Foggy B ottom w ere also m ore flexible and less restric­ tive. Personnel w ithin the D ivision o f W estern European A ffairs, w hich handled p o licy tow ard the League, now w elcom ed reports regarding the attitude o f governm ents tow ard issues that m ight concern the U nited States.37A llen D ulles in the N ear East D ivisio n studied m andates, becam e im pressed w ith the League’s w ork, and desired "larger A m erican participation.” In preparation, D ulles authored a m em orandum on League operations in 1925 so that A m eri­ cans participating in conferences w ould know h ow to conduct them selves. O th er officers also revealed m ore sym path etic attitudes. M offat believed stron gly in greater cooperation on nonpolitical m atters w hile opposing m em ­ bership, and he considered W allace M cC lure o f the Treaty D ivision to be "an ardent League fanatic.”3* T h e proper channel o f com m unication w ith the League rem ained a con ­ stant problem fo r these individuals. C ircular letters from the Secretariat did n o t go to nonm em bers, so w henever U.S. officials w anted inform ation or G eneva officials w ished to involve the U nited States, indirect approaches had to be m ade. Sweetser m aintained close relationships w ith em bassy and con­ sular representatives in Berne and G eneva, so an inform al w ord to him as the interm ediary often sufficed. A lth ough A m erican officials realized that Sweetser’s unlim ited enthusiasm colored his perspective, th ey found him interesting, inform ed, and w illin g to serve. Even though State D epartm ent personnel had to be careful in discus­ sions w ith Sweetser (because their rem arks could be reported to D rum m ond and thus influence League decisions), he provided an extrem ely im portant service. For «cam ple, because the U nited States could n ot register a form al protest w ith the League, any objections raised b y the State D epartm ent could m ove through this indirect channel. W ashington had a conduit through w hich to com plain about things like League publications that cast the U nited States in an unfavorable light.39 N or w as the flow o f inform ation all from W ashing­ to n to G eneva. Sweetser frequently relayed inform ation to prom inent citizens in the U nited States w ho then brought the subject to the attention o f govern­ m ent officials. O n a few occasions, he w rote d irectly to secretaries o f state, desk officers, and even presidents. W hen in the U nited States, he received spe­ cial consideration from these sam e policym akers. O n one visit in 1925, he spent th irty-five m inutes w ith H ughes and "h ours” w ith division chiefs.40

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C learly Am erican officials valued Sweetser’s role. In 1926, A cting Secretary o f State G rew risked criticism w hen, in extending Sweetser’s passport, he gave Sweetser “ Special” status as a citizen “w ho although n ot representing the G ov­ ernm ent o f the U nited States, w ill travel in Europe on im portant Interna­ tional Business.”41 A lthough the politically astute Sweetser was surprised at this action, it was certainly w arranted. B y 1924, the C oolid ge adm inistration found it increasingly easy to build on the contacts established by the H arding adm inistration. Early in 1924, the State D epartm ent began bypassing its rule that involvem ent in League m atters had to be weighed in each instance. Congress m ade that decision easier w hen, late in 1924 b y jo in t resolution, it authorized sending an official delegation to an opium conference. Thereafter, citizens felt freer to participate.44 Am erican citizens played prom inent roles in discussions at the opium con­ ferences in 1924 and 1925, establishing “a high w ater m ark in relations be­ tw een the United States and the League o f N ations.” The press presented these events favorably, and C oolid ge and Hughes exploited the popular interest. A tem porary problem arose in 1925 when Am erican delegates w ithdrew from a conference after other governm ents could not agree on reducing the opium trade or, the approach favored b y the U nited States, the grow ing o f drugproducing plants. T he crisis passed, however, when the League approved a convention that called for lim itations, created a C entral Board o f C on trol and a Supervisory Body, and provided for U nited States participation in selecting representatives to the tw o bodies. A t the next session o f the A d visory C om ­ m ittee, Tuck, then on the scene in G eneva, was designated to represent the U nited States “unofficially.”4* Citizens also participated when the Assem bly held a special session on drugs in 1927. It thus cam e as a shock w hen, late in 1928, Secretary o f State Frank B. Kellogg rejected an invitation to participate in constituting the Board o f C on ­ trol and criticized the 192$ convention as inferior to the 1912 accord. T he for­ m ula that allow ed the U nited States a voice in the nam ing o f the C ontrol Board evidently influenced K ellogg’s response. It im plied, as The Independent noted, “full and official participation b y the U nited States in certain projects o f the League. . . ” D espite this official concern, individuals continued their labors. T hey served on d ie A d visory Com m ittee, sat on the Board o f C ontrol, and acted as advisers to other countries, especially China and Persia.44 D espite the fret that w ork on drug issues represented the fullest coopera­ tion between the League and the United States, the odd, quasi-official nature o f the representation had serious lim itations. T he Am ericans, as unofficial representatives, could on ly present recom m endations. Furtherm ore, despite the enthusiasm o f those w ho participated and their general know ledge o f the subject, few possessed diplom atic talents o r skills. Fosdick concluded at one point that “Am erica was m ost unfortunately represented.” M offat also expressed

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dissatisfaction w ith the in form ality o f the arrangem ents, com plaining that “ w e do lip service to the idea o f exchanging inform ation, but in practice ei­ th er do not send it in at all o r send it in so late as to be virtu ally useless.” Finally, U.S. Representative Porter's involvem ent created a problem because o f his legislative position, w hich com plicated efforts at agreem ent.41 A fter Porter’s death in 1930, w ork w ith the com m ittee dealing w ith drug traffickin g proceeded m ore sm oothly. T he U nited States sent several delegates to a 1931 m eeting from w hich a treaty em erged w ith ten recom m endations fo r League action. State D epartm ent officials carefully pondered its im plications and concluded that a precedent in signing other League-related accords m ade it safe to participate. T he Senate approved the treaty on 31 M arch 1932, w ith surprisingly little opposition. T he U nited States becam e the second govern­ m ent to deposit its ratification, and it then urged other governm ents to ap­ prove. T he fact that this treaty had the fu ll support o f Senator Borah provides som e indication o f just how m uch these increm ental steps o f cooperation had changed o r m ediated attitudes w ithin the U nited States.46 A nd yet this changed attitude could never be absolutely relied upon. In 1932, Secretary o f the Interior Ray Lym an W ilbur asked H oover if he should respond to an invitation to a H ealth O rganization m eeting. Secretary o f State H enry L. Stim son advised that w ith Cum m ing already involved it w ould be politically unw ise to have tw o high officials at the m eetings. Sweetser, un ­ aware o f this official decision, naively suggested that W ilbur could accept be­ cause “political considerations w hich m ight previously have been very com ­ pelling w ill now have lost m uch o f their w eight." Sweetser’s puzzlem ent, w hen inform ed o f Stim son’s position, led in turn to undue sensitivity on the part o f League officials. T hey decided to cancel a Leprosy Com m ission conference in the Philippines, called b y the Leonard W ood M em orial A ssociation, in part because it w ould m eet on U nited States soil and also because they feared it m ight em barrass Stim son, w ho served as chairm an o f the W ood association.47 O verall, however, there was a positive evolution in U .S.-League ties. This had a notable effect in areas beyond the drug trade, as the U nited States re­ sponded officially and m ore cooperatively. In 1926, the State D epartm ent rec­ om m ended signing a treaty on the treatm ent o f prisoners o f w ar that had em erged from a League-organized conference in w hich several Am ericans had participated. League concern over the w hite slave traffic also prom pted a fa­ vorable response and provides further p ro o f o f the evolutionary nature o f the U .S. relationship w ith the League. A n invitation to send som eone to a confer­ ence in 1921 w as declined, and a convention on the subject prepared under League auspices was returned unsigned in 1922 w ith the explanation that the U nited States could not act on its provisions because im plem entation rested w ith the states under the federal system . However, H arding did respond posi­ tively to a request early in 1923. He agreed to appoint a representative to the A d visory C om m ittee on the Traffic in W om en and Children b y prom ising to

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send an unofficial observer. G race A bbott, the director o f the C hildren’s Bu­ reau o f the D epartm ent o f Labor, served un til 192$. T hat year she w ithdrew after declining election as vice-president o f the A dvisory Com m ittee. It would not be proper, she noted, because she had participated on ly in a consultative fashion, and the United States did not provide funds for the com m ittee’s work. O ther Am ericans, usually representing volun tary organizations, becam e in­ volved as experts or assessors. T he Am erican Bureau o f Social H ygiene and the Am erican Social H ygiene A ssociation provided substantial funds to un­ derw rite studies, and A bbott returned to her League w ork in 1927.4* In addition to the w ork on the traffic in w om en and children, the issue o f slavery also appeared on the League’s agenda. O n this hum anitarian issue, U.S. cooperation w ith the League proceeded sm oothly at first. U nfortunately, w hen U.S. business interests becam e em broiled in the issue, official coopera­ tion decreased. A s early as 1926, Secretary o f State K ellogg reflected Am erican hum anitar­ ian interest in the slavery issue w hen he assured D rum m ond that an invita­ tion to a proposed conference w ould receive a sym pathetic response. T he gov­ ernm ent provided data to a C om m ittee on Slavery and signed an antislavery convention o f 1926, w hich the Senate approved in 1929. K ellogg, in transm it­ tin g the treaty to the Senate, noted that the League served m erely as the de­ pository agent and that no reservation regarding U nited States-League rela­ tions was necessary. T he Senate did, however, add a perfunctory statem ent, but its approval when filed in G eneva represented a form al acknow ledgm ent o f the League as an agent o f governm ents.49 D uring the sum m er o f 1929, reports that slave labor was being used in Liberia surfaced. In June, Secretary o f State Stim son responded to these re­ ports w ith a rebuke to the Liberian governm ent for allow ing such practices, and he also approached the League. W hen Liberian officials requested an in ­ vestigation, the League created an International Com m ission on Slavery C on ­ ditions in Liberia. It consisted o f three m en, one nam ed b y the League, one chosen b y Liberia, and one (Dr. Charles S. Johnson, a black professor at Fisk U niversity) nom inated b y the U nited States. T he entire Liberian situation was com plicated b y the operations o f the Firestone T ire and Rubber Com pany in the area. Firestone had lent Liberia $5 m illion in 1926 in return for a concession o f one m illion acres o f land on w hich to grow rubber trees. T he subsequent investigation b y the International Com m ission confirm ed the use o f com pulsory labor in Liberia and, w hile noting no direct fault b y Firestone, suggested that the com pany had done little to am eliorate the problem . T he com m ission report led to further criti­ cism , the collapse o f the Liberian governm ent, reform decrees, and a Liberian request for assistance.90 T he League Com m ittee on Slavery then sought to draft a plan o f action. T he C ou n cil invited the U nited States to participate, and the State D epart-

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ment n am ed Sam uel Reber, chargé d ’affaires in M onrovia, to sit, unqualified by the u su al title o f “observer,” “the first tim e the U nited States governm ent [had] w ith o u t qualification participated in the w ork o f a League com m ission directly ap p o in ted b y the C ouncil.” W hen the plan o f action called fo r a loan to L iberia, th e Firestone C om pan y objected and League officials had to ap­ proach th e State D epartm ent fo r support. T h e departm ent disagreed w ith parts o f th e proposed solu tion and asserted that it had no auth ority over the Firestone Com pany. D ifferences w ere resolved in a revised form ula in 1932, but the L ib erian governm ent balked at som e o f the term s, and on ly m odest tem porary reform s w ere instituted.51 D espite th e apparent concern o f the U nited States, its role in Liberia had been com prom ised from the beginning. It had been involved in negotiating the 1926 F irestone loan at exorbitant interest rates, w ith no safeguards regard­ ing lab o r o r other form s o f exploitation. W hen the League’s 1932 plan em erged, the U n ited States insisted that H arvey S. Firestone be consulted. H e delayed, and w h en L iberia declared it cou ld n ot m eet installm ent paym ents on the loan, th e State D epartm ent form ally registered a protest. T h e subsequent ne­ gotiations w eakened the League’s effort to effect reform s and assured Liberia’s co n tin u in g subservience to d ie Firestone interests. T hus, rather than prom ot­ ing in tern atio n al control and receivership, the U nited States actually under­ m ined th e League’s w ork and purposes.51 A m erica n cooperation w ith League agencies continued in the 1930s, bu t so d id o ffic ia l reluctance to sanction fu ll participation , even in n on political activities. T h e caution displayed b y the H oover adm inistration did n ot change under R oosevelt. T he State D epartm ent still kept tabs on gifts b y A m ericans, and it sh o w ed unusual sensitivity regarding the appointm ent o f delegates to League com m ittees. T h rough out the decade, the president had to approve p ractically every appointm ent, even the nam ing o f a representative to the A d viso ry C o m m ittee fo r P rotection and W elfare o f C h ild ren and Young People.55A t a tim e o f increasing dom estic and international dem ands on the president’s tim e, such actions dram atically reveal ju st h ow how careful the R oosevelt adm in istration w as in its relations w ith the League. T h e o n ly notable advance under R oosevelt cam e w ith the decision in 1934 to jo in th e International Labor O rgan ization (IL O ). It required considerable boldness o n the part o f the R oosevelt adm inistration to take this step. Even though th e ILO fun ction ed as an independent agency, it w as closely tied to the L eagu e adm inistratively. D u rin g the 1920s Republicans had ignored the subject o f affiliation , and questions had been raised in Europe as to w hether a League n onm em ber could be adm itted. T he depression changed attitudes. The IL O had contributed substantially to studies on wages and hours, unem ­ ploym ent,- in d ustrial safety, and w orking conditions; thus its efforts seem ed p articu larly useful. A lth ough the U nited States had never cooperated m uch w ith th e IL O , R oosevelt used this op p ortu n ity to assuage internationalists.54

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League officials seem ed eager to ignore the problem o f nonm em bers in order to have the U nited States jo in . R oosevelt’s response required som e po­ litical courage. A s late as 1931, the State D epartm ent opposed sending repre­ sentatives to ILO conferences on the grounds that it w as tantam ount to hav­ ing persons attend C o u n cil or A ssem bly m eetings. R oosevelt also had to rally support from labor unions, especially the Am erican Federation o f Labor, w hich had been cool even tow ard sending un official delegates. Secretary o f Labor Frances Perkins w orked behind the scenes, aided b y W allace M cC lure, R. W. M orin , and Francis B. Sayre in the State D epartm ent. Proponents o f the ILO argued the m erits o f m em bership: the ILO cou ld sup port efforts in favor o f a forty-hour w ork week, im prove trade, advance econom ic recovery and thereby alleviate unem ploym ent, and prom ote peace through greater coop eration .” A dm inistration strategists decided to bypass the treaty process b y in tro­ ducing a jo in t resolution on m em bership that required o n ly a sim ple m ajor­ ity in Congress. Shotw ell gave senators copies o f his recently published O ri­ gins o f the International Labor Organization, and this and other efforts yield ed rem arkable results. T he Senate approved the resolution un an im ously w hen its session ended; the H ouse voted 233 to 109 to approve. D etails over th e nec­ essary appropriation required additional persuasion in the H ouse, b u t in A u­ gust o f 1934 H ull could w ire G eneva o f A m erican acceptance.16 Thereafter relations w ith the ILO m oved sm oothly. T he U nited States sent strong delegations to conferences, often headed b y John G . W inant, th e chair­ m an o f the Social Security Board. W inant had b riefly served as assistant di­ rector o f the ILO in 1935 and returned to that post in 1937. T h e fo llo w in g year, he becam e director, serving u n til 1941. T h e A m erican Federation o f Labor show ed increasing support, even furnish ing a room at the ILO headquarters nam ed after A m erican Federation o f Labor founder Sam uel G om pers. A t­ tem pts in Congress to w ith hold o r reduce annual appropriations o r force w ith­ draw al failed.” Yet m em bership accom plished little. It had lim ited effect on the depression o r labor standards in the U nited States, and it contributed nothing to peace or greater cooperation w ith the League. Indeed, things seem ed to m ove in the opposite direction , as the R oosevelt adm inistration never again firm ly com ­ m itted itself to internationalism either in the W orld C o u rt figh t o f 1935 or d urin g the E thiopian crisis.16 Franklin R oosevelt's com m itm ent to the League is d ifficu lt to gauge. A s in so m any other areas, FDR’s com plex personal values, w hen com bined w ith a rem arkably astute political sense, tended to obscure his real agenda. A lth ough historians have disagreed about this issue, the consensus about R oosevelt’s personal inclinations is, in the w ords o f W ayne C o le, that R oosevelt w as “al­ ways an internationalist,” but partisan, nationalist, and isolationist consider­ ations led him to shy aw ay from obligations. H is refusal to assert his personal beliefs thus kept the U nited States at arm ’s length from the League.9

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N aturally, this led to a variety o f m ixed signals. For exam ple, early in the 1932 electo ral cam paign, R oosevelt asked R aym ond Fosdick to d raft a plank on the League for the D em ocrats. T hen, in order to placate isolationist pub­ lisher W illiam R andolph H earst, on 2 February 1932, R oosevelt p u b licly an­ n ounced that he d id n ot favor m em bership in the League. H e adm itted that he had o n ce leaned in the d irection o f support but, the candidate asserted, the League w as now little m ore than a debating society fo r European politicians. N oth in g, FD R insisted, cou ld be accom plished b y join in g. D u rin g the cam ­ paign , R oosevelt rarely referred to G eneva, revealing n o t “the slightest sym ­ pathy fo r internationalism .”60 Internationalists w ere stunned b y his apostasy. Follow ing the election, H ull invited Fosdick to accept a post as a confidential assistant in the State D epart­ m e n t Fosdick refused, sensing that the adm inistration’s course w ould conflict w ith his pro-League inclinations. Events proved him co rrect Late in 1933, speak­ ing to the W oodrow W ilson Foundation, Roosevelt outlined w hat becam e ad­ m inistration policy. H e praised the League as a peace agency and pledged to cooperate as fu lly as possible in nonpolitical m atters. Subsequendy, although the president periodically affirm ed this in public pronouncem ents, he preferred to avoid reference to the League altogether.61 T he indexes o f his press confer­ ences from 1933 to 1945 contain on ly tw enty-tw o such references. W hen he did m ake p u b lic statem ents about the League he spoke in generalities. N everthe­ less, R oosevelt continued to profess loyalty to W ilson, keeping a collection o f his speeches and claim ing a kindred spirit “in ideas and principles.”62 C onsum m ate politician that he w as, Roosevelt actually persuaded interna­ tion alists like E ichelberger and Sw eetser that he favored greater cooperation w ith the League. Sweetser recalled conversations d urin g w hich R oosevelt in ­ dicated a w illingness to im prove relations. In 1939, w hen FD R nam ed a per­ sonal envoy to the Vatican, Sweetser w ondered w hether he cou ld do the sam e for the League.6* T h e restrictive relationship under R oosevelt is even m ore surprising w hen one considers attitudes in the State D epartm ent. C ord ell H ull’s international­ ist p ro clivities included sym pathy fo r im proved contacts, if n o t League m em ­ bership. T h e secretary’s support stem m ed from his b e lief in the interrelation­ sh ip o f th e g lo b a l econ om y. H e su p p o rted jo in in g th e ILO an d , w h en o p p o rtu n ity arose later to bu ild a new w orld organ ization, H ull led the plan­ ning efforts.64 A t lo w er levels w ith in the departm ent, Francis B. Sayre, W ilson’s son -in law, w h o directed reciprocal trade efforts, often d ealt w ith relations w ith G eneva. D escribed as a w orshipper o f the League, Sayre always stood fo r stron­ ger ties. N orm an H . D avis, R oosevelt’s “ roving am bassador,” assum ed key roles in disarm am ent and econom ic conferences. D avis w as so sym pathetic th at o n e c ritic referred to him as “the d arlin g o f the internationalists in both parties.” 65

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R oosevelt’s am bassador to G erm any, historian W illiam E. D od d , an ardent W ilsonian, accepted the post largely because he saw it as an o p p o rtu n ity to counter isolationism . H e urged the president to cooperate m ore h illy w ith the League and even to jo in b y m eans o f a jo in t resolution. State D epartm ent officer W allace M cC lure m aintained a close relationship w ith LN A president James Shotw ell and frequently provided hospitality to C lark Eichelberger w hen the LN A d irector cam e to W ashington.6* G iven this personnel, it is less sur­ prising that Sweetser observed in 1934 that "th e departm ent is frien d ly and cooperative from top to bottom ” and that internationalists at tim es believed that initiatives tow ard m em bership o r appointm ent o f special representatives m ight be realized.67 A ppointm ents to G eneva also continued to go to people w ith pro-League sym pathies. H ugh R. W ilson rem ained at his post in Sw itzerland u n til July 1937, w hen he w as succeeded b y Leland H arrison, a m an w ith d o se ties to A m erican internationalists and to Sweetser. A m erican consul Prentiss B. G il­ bert, w ho also developed a w arm bon d o f friendship w ith Sweetser, co n tin ­ ued to d o m uch to advance contacts although he carefully isolated h is per­ son al view s from his ro le as a d ip lom at. A s G ilb ert becam e in creasin gly disappointed in the League’s ab ility to respond to problem s, he w elcom ed his transfer to Berlin in A ugust 1937. N evertheless, w hen he left he asked Sweetser to continue to send inform ation because his interests w ould always "b e very d o se to G eneva, and all that happens there.”6* T h e cooperation fostered b y those sym pathetic to the League d u rin g the 1930s continued m ost fu lly in those areas that had been m apped o u t in the 1920s— drugs, traffic in w om en and children, slavery, disarm am ent, com m u­ nication and transit, statistics, health, and econom ic m atters. Yet there were the usual, seem ingly trivial, hitches. A t one p oin t, concern w as expressed that a League convention on traffic in w om en and children m ight in trud e o n U.S. state laws! H ealth issues continued to attract the greatest A m erican participa­ tion , largely because o f R ockefeller Foundation funding.69 N ew areas th at re­ ceived cordial responses included civil aviation, calendar reform , the ILO , and the environm ent. In 1934, the U nited States agreed to register treaties w ith the League. W hile W ashington had been subm itting these on a vo lu n tary basis through letters o f exchange since 1925, the process w ould, from n ow o n , be autom atic.70 In 1938 a survey undertaken b y Sweetser identified th irty-eigh t A m ericans w h o w ere serving on various League com m ittees o r agencies, exclusive o f the ILO. D espite the fact th at the isolation ist press p erio d ically criticized the A m ericans at G eneva (the H earst newspapers at one tim e described them as “ m odem Benedict Arnolds,” and the New York American reported that Hudson received pay from the League fo r the w ork he did fo r the Legal Section, thus im plying that his advocacy o f League and C o u rt m em bership sh ould be seen

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in this ligh t), a new generation had becom e involved in League operations.71 These included James G . M cD onald as high com m issioner o f refugees from G erm any (1933-36) and W inant as director o f the ILO (1938-41). James H arvey Rogers, a Yale econom ist, sat on the Econom ic Com m ittee and H erbert L. M ay on the Perm anent C entral O pium Board. Shotw ell served on the C om ­ m ittee on Intellectual Cooperation, and the C ouncil selected Sarah W am baugh o f Boston to oversee plebiscites. Royal C . Tyler acted as high com m issioner fo r the financial reconstruction o f H ungary. Benjam in G erig, after receiving his doctorate at the University o f Geneva in 1930, joined the Secretariat, w orking in the Inform ation and M andates sections from 1930-39. He then becam e the com m issioner-general overseeing the League o f N ations pavilion at the N ew York W orld’s Fair.71 W ith increasing Am erican cooperation, questions w ere raised about U.S. w illingness to pay its share o f expenses for those agencies in w hich it did par­ ticipate. T he State D epartm ent argued that unless Congress specifically voted funds, the U nited States could not contribute to League operations. Thus until 1934 it either paid nothing or on ly token am ounts. Congress had approved funds for the W orld D isarm am ent Conference o f 1932, and in 1935 Am erican dollars supported w ork being done on pollution o f the seas, tariffs, com m er­ cial propaganda, traffic in w om en and children, and biological standardiza­ tion . O ther com m ittees rem ained unsupported until 1936, when the federal budget fo r the first tim e carried line item s for the League. These included $166,702 for the ILO and $10,965 for the O pium Com m ission. A s late as 1939, how ever, no firm p olicy had been developed to determ ine the am ounts or h ow paym ents should be m ade.73 League officials displayed real sensitivity to this particular Am erican policy dilem m a, em phasizing again and again that participation was unofficial and that subjects treated were technical rather than political.74 A lthough adm it­ ted ly self-serving, League officials also continued to be sensitive about gifts. A s the depression deepened, however, and as budgets were slashed, they ap­ preciated any help they could get. T he Rockefeller Foundation continued its support o f health w ork to the tune o f $100,000 a year. It provided $50,000 in 1933 for the study o f double taxation, and it gave $125,000 that year to the Financial Section and E conom ic Intelligence Service for a five-year program to exam ine the w orldw ide im pact o f the depression on industrial production and banking laws.73Lesser am ounts cam e from Jane Addam s, w ho transferred to the League her m oney from the N obel Peace Prize, and from an anony­ m ous donor w ho provided $10,000 fo r a study o f calendar reform . T he build ­ ing program also attracted gifts. Edward A . Filene furnished the equipm ent for sim ultaneous translations, and in addition to the bronze doors to the m ain entrance o f the new headquarters, Am ericans contributed to a celestial sphere on the grounds as a m em orial to W ilson.76

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D urin g the 1920s the U nited States m oved a lon g w ay in establishing w orking relationships w ith the League and its m any agencies and com m issions. The H arding adm inistration opened clear channels o f com m unication to Geneva and, as these new contacts developed, the State D epartm ent found them valu­ able. N evertheless, U.S. cooperation w ith League agencies and financial sup­ port fo r certain operations did little to enhance the im age o r influence o f the U nited States in European capitals. D uring the 1930s, there were on ly spo­ radic calls for A m erican m em bership, as European leaders showed m uch less interest in w hat the U nited States did than they had in the 1920s. Perhaps they had learned during the M anchurian C risis that frustration was the on ly result o f courting A m erica “as though she were a coy damsel,” on ly to find a lack o f w ill to jo in hands.77 A t hom e, certainly the new contacts and the passage o f tim e tended to lessen fears about cooperation. Hughes, always sensitive to public reactions to League-related policies, received little criticism for initiatin g contacts, and the Republicans eventually incorporated that position into the party’s 1928 plat­ form . It proclaim ed their desire to cooperate “ in the hum anitarian and tech­ nical w ork undertaken b y the League, w ith out involving ourselves in Euro­ pean politics b y accepting m em bership.”7* These new attitudes had both positive and negative im plications fo r in ­ ternationalists. C ertain ly in the atm osphere o f decreased fear and em otion­ alism , politicians displayed m ore flexib ility about establishing contacts be­ cause they no longer feared political repercussions. O n the negative side, w ork w ith the peripheral hum anitarian and social agencies to o k the pressure off. It m ade pushing for actual m em bership m ore d ifficult because the U nited States appeared to be developing a relationship w ith out m em bership, and the in ­ ternationalists w ere denied use o f one o f their m ost potent argum ents for cooperation. Even so, the nagging fear o f criticism prevented such processes from ever function in g sm oothly. In 1929 the State D epartm ent was still engaged in in ­ ternal debates over the structure o f the G eneva consulate, how it could func­ tion best, and w hether contact w ith the League could be m ore direct.79 Rela­ tions during the 1930s were not significantly better, despite Roosevelt’s political savvy and internationalist sym pathies. Even given d ie hum anitarian com ­ m itm ents o f the A m erican people, w hich divested m any League operations o f any dangerous political im plications, the U nited States never functioned efficien dy w ith in the League’s w orld.

10 THE TANGLED WEB U.S.-League Cooperation in Disarmament and Economics

n contrast to the evolving, cooperative ties developing between W ashing­

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ton and Geneva in the arena o f social and hum anitarian concerns, U.S. econom ic and disarm am ent policies reflect the continuing am bivalence and, in m any cases, h o stility that interw ar adm inistrations displayed tow ard the League o f N ations. In dealing w ith disarm am ent, the U nited States pursued its goals unilaterally, calling for o r attending on ly those conferences at w hich independent U.S. goals could be realized and, to a large extent, ignoring all other League efforts entirely. U.S. econom ic p olicy ran a parallel course, as business and banking interests pursued goals o f econom ic stability and ex­ pansive trade opportun ity w hile official cooperation w ith G eneva was lim ­ ited. In short, in the areas o f disarm am ent and econom ic policy, U.S. actions involved on ly the m ost nom inal cooperation w ith the League o f N ations, an abiding com m itm ent to unilateralism , and the rejection o f any binding com ­ m itm ents devised under the auspices o f the international organization. Interestingly, a great m any o f the m ost recent studies o f U.S. foreign p olicy in the interw ar years focus on these very areas to underm ine the isolationist interpretation o f the period. M any have based their theses— that the period was characterized b y "independent internationalism ,’’ “liberal-developm entalism ,” o r "corporatism ”— on the b elief that interw ar foreign p olicy was largely co­ o p erative and therefore in tern atio n alist.1 D espite the soundness o f the neorevisionist/corporatist interpretation, the use o f the term international­ ism is som ew hat m isleading. Analysis o f econom ic and disarm am ent p o licy suggests a m ixed record that not on ly fell far short o f m eeting internationalist ideals but that also stood in contrast to the ties the U nited States was forging w ith the League to deal w ith hum anitarian and social concerns.

From its inception , the League o f N ations was com m itted to serving as a forum for disarm am ent efforts. A rticle 8 o f the Covenant, reflecting the com ­ m only held b elief that an arm s race had contributed to the outbreak o f W orld

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W ar I, charged m em bers to seek a "red uction in national arm am ents to the low est poin t consistent w ith national safety.” T h e League responded in three stages. In the first period, 1920-26, it explored the ground, w ith discussions dom inated b y the B ritish and French. In the second, 1926-32, it established a preparatory com m ission to plan fo r a m ajor conference. In the third , 1932-34, the W orld D isarm am ent C onference m et.a D urin g the interw ar period, the A m erican position on this issue w as com ­ plex and contradictory. Traditionally, Am ericans had always condem ned m ili­ tarism and shared the b e lief that arm s races lead to war. H owever, w ith n oth ­ ing to fear from their ow n neighbors, th ey d u n g to a historic reluctance to involve them selves in European security problem s. T h ey insisted that the m ost significant gains w ould be m ade through regional radier than global agree­ m ents, an approach that allow ed A m ericans to escape obligations related to European defense. These considerations in large m easure explain the U .S. pref­ erence fo r disarm am ent conferences n ot associated w ith the League.1 A m ple evidence o f this preference w as provided in the earliest days o f the League. For exam ple, in Septem ber 1920 the W ilson adm inistration had in­ form ally inquired about League plans on disarm am ent. In late 1920, after the A ssem b ly d ecid ed to create a T em p o rary M ixed C o m m issio n (T M C ), D rum m ond conveyed an invitation to participate, d early indicating that T M C m em bers sat as individuals, "free from any G overnm ent instruction.” D espite this, State D epartm ent o ffid a ls argued that the T M C had to o broad a m an­ date and the subjects discussed w ere to o fraught w ith econom ic, political, and security questions. A lth ough D em ocratic senator T hom as J. W alsh o f M ontana introduced a resolution d irecting W ilson to respond affirm atively to any overture, that item w as buried in the C om m ittee on Foreign Relations chaired b y Lodge. A H ouse resolution to in struct the president to accept an invitation to sit on the Tem porary M ixed C om m ission fo r the R eduction o f Arm am ents w as equally unsuccessful. In D ecem ber, W ilson d ed d ed n ot to becom e involved even in an advisory capacity. A n offer from the League’s C o u n cil to nam e a representative to a Perm anent A d visory C om m ittee on M ilitary, N aval, and A ir Q uestions likew ise foundered.4 W hen in Septem ber 1923 the League produced a Treaty o f M utual G uarantee open to all nations, the U nited States refused to sign. T hus, after the U nited States had indicated an interest in the w o rk being pursued, it avoided acting.5 Clearly, the H arding adm inistration was intent on pursuing its ow n course, exem plified b y Senator Borah’s successful legislative strategy o f calling fo r sepa­ rate naval reduction talks. These discussions, to be held outside the League o f N ations, w ere aim ed specifically at dealing w ith U.S. concerns in the Far East. A s noted in chapter 2, the convening o f the W ashington D isarm am ent C on ­ ference in 1921-22 tem porarily diverted internationalists and w on the H arding adm inistration a respite from criticism and pressure. G iven the conflicting agendas o f m aintaining freedom o f action versus the hum anitarian desire for

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international cooperation in arm s discussions, the H arding adm inistration walked the path o f com prom ise and w as largely successful in accom plishing its im m ediate foreign p o licy goals.* A s p art o f the larger disarm am ent issue, the League o f N ations focused attention on the m anufacture and traffic in arm s. A League attem pt in 1923 to control m anufacture w as opposed b y H ughes, w ho noted that Congress w ould never pass legislation to curb prod uction in the U nited States. T he State D e­ partm ent indirectly inform ed officials in G eneva that any conference on the subject w ou ld b e em barrassing. T his position eased sligh tly in 1924, w hen Am bassador G rew received authorization to sit on the T M C d urin g a discus­ sion lim ited to traffic in arm s. H ughes explained that the top ic assum ed no binding obligation s and that it seem ed o n ly courteous to participate.7 A s a result o f this cooperation, D rum m ond sent an invitation to another m eeting o n the con trol o f the private m anufacture o f arm s to be held in M ay 1925. A fter considerable delay, C oolid ge nam ed a delegation. Yet w hen he sub­ m itted th e C onven tion on Trade in A rm s to the Senate, it refused to act on the measure* and, in 1928, W ashington announced that the U nited States w ould not send delegates to any sessions o f the C om m ittee fo r C on trol and M anu­ facture o f A rm s. There is som e evidence that businesses involved in arm s pro­ duction op posed efforts at con trol d in in g the H oover adm inistration debates over em bargoes, and their protest received the support o f the Com m erce D e­ partm ent.9 T hus the League never controlled the traffic in arm s, largely be­ cause th e coop eration o f the U nited States w as vital. M anufacturers in France and G reat B ritain w ould not forsake their m arkets unless the A m ericans agreed to do likew ise. B y la te 1925, League officials also recognized th at th ey had m ade little progress in the area o f disarm am ent. A lth ou gh pleased w ith A m erican par­ ticip atio n , D rum m ond unburdened h im self in a private letter in w hich he excoriated the U nited States fo r its refusal to cooperate “against aggressive warfare” an d fo r its w illingness to do n oth in g m ore than m ake declarations.10 N or, as the first phase o f League disarm am ent efforts ended, had the U.S. strategy p ro d u ced results th at p ro tected its ow n n atio n al interests. T h e C o o lid ge adm in istration recognized that the “the Five-Pow er Treaty had n ot halted th e naval race. T h e com petition had m erely shifted from capital ships to the un restricted construction o f cruisers, destroyers, and subm arines.”“ To avoid th e co st o f building tw enty-one new cruisers, Congress prodded C oolidge to suggest another naval conference. T h e secon d phase o f League-sponsored disarm am ent discussions began w ith th e d ecision to create a Preparatory C om m ission to plan for a m ajor conference. A gain , the C o u n cil extended an invitation to the U nited States. C o o lid ge accepted the invitation and Congress appropriated the funds neces­ sary to co ver th e costs o f representation. A fter receiving the usual instruction s to avoid an y im pression that “w e are getting m ixed up in any o f the political

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activities o f the League” the Am erican delegates tried to be agreeable and co­ operative so long as no “efficient international control” system w as created. T hey accom plished this by insisting that the problem was largely a European one and refusing to support any security o r inspection provisions.12 To accom plish U.S. goals, in June 1927 the C oolidge adm inistration spon­ sored a separate conference in Geneva to explore naval lim itations. Attended b y on ly the British and Japanese delegates to the League Preparatory C om ­ m ission, held independently o f the League from 10 June to 4 A ugust 1927, and generally view ed as derogatory tow ard the T M C , the conference was a re­ sounding failure.'3 A lthough m any Am ericans continued to support participation in disar­ m am ent discussions as a prom ising step tow ard international cooperation, internationalists tended to lo o k unfavorably on such efforts w hen they were conducted outside the League. In 1927, Theodore M arburg insisted that noth­ ing could be accom plished un til the U nited States join ed the League, and in 1928 H olt argued that no progress could be expected w ithout perfecting and strengthening the m achinery o f international organizations.14 Typically, this criticism was ignored. W hile negotiators in G eneva w orked, C oolidge becam e increasingly criti­ cal o f European actions. Leaders were continuing to build up arm s supplies at the sam e tim e they were supporting the w ork o f the Preparatory C om m is­ sion. C oolidge therefore attem pted to pursue U.S. interests b y once again urg­ ing separate discussions o f naval and land forces. U nder the H oover adm inis­ tration, H ugh G ibson, as head delegate, announced in 1929 that the U nited States w ould defer to others regarding land forces and lead in discussions for naval lim itations.1’ T his led to the London Conference o f 1930, yet another attem pt to m eet U.S. goals outside the fram ew ork o f the international organi­ zation.“ A s plans proceeded for the League o f N ations Conference fo r the Reduc­ tion and Lim itation o f Arm am ents to open on 2 February 1932, the U nited States showed a w illingness to cooperate. Indeed, one author called the State Departm ent “internationalist-m inded” because o f its participation in the plan­ ning. Stim son’s appearance in G eneva on 18 A pril, as head o f the U.S. delega­ tion , caused Sweetser to think that the m illennium had com e! Stim son’s con­ tact w ith prom inent statesm en attending the conference, and the fact that the Am erican delegation (including H ugh G ibson, Senator Claude A . Swanson, M ary E. W ooley, and N orm an H . D avis) could be classified as pro-League, helped create an atm osphere o f hope.17 The delegates were soon bogged dow n in technicalities, reflecting the rigid positions assum ed b y various governm ents. A s usual, the French desire to couple disarm am ent w ith supervision, consultation, and guarantees for secu­ rity hindered progress tow ard agreem ent. M any adjournm ents to study prob­ lem s or redraft proposed conventions extended the conference until June 1934.

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Yet alm ost everyone knew as early as Septem ber 1932 that no agreem ent was likely.1* W hen the conference finally adjourned in June, it had clearly failed to m eet even the m ost m odest goals fo r disarm am ent. T he final attem pt to m eet particular U.S. goals and halt the U .S.-BritishJapanese naval race cam e w ith the London N aval Conference in 1935. Japan’s dem ands, its w ithdraw al from the conference, and the unstable w orld situa­ tion doom ed the venture from the outset. A lthough the U nited States, G reat B ritain, and France signed a treaty on 25 M arch 1936, as one historian noted, “the London N aval Treaty o f 1936, since Japan and Italy w ould not adhere, m arked the collapse o f the structure o f naval lim itation bu ilt since 1922.”19 T hus, during the interw ar period, the U nited States failed to fu lfill its ow n nationalistic goals in the area o f disarm am ent, and its record o f international cooperation is even m ore d ism al A lthough the U nited States cannot be blam ed fo r the League’s failure to prom ote security through arm s reduction, the A m erican refusal to deal m eaningfully w ith international attem pts in this area certainly contributed to the League’s im potence.

In the immediate afterm ath o f W orld W ar I, the League o f N ations necessar­ ily becam e involved in efforts to cope w ith the vast devastation, im m obilized production system , disorganized governm ents and populations, and exten­ sive internal and external debts. League leaders and financial and banking experts firm ly believed that, w ith intelligent planning, chaotic conditions could be am eliorated, currencies could be stabilized, the vast inflationary cycle could b e reversed, banking system s could be reestablished, and sound econom ic policies could be form ulated. T he League w ould contribute to this process b y studying conditions, certifying those nations it deem ed financially stable, and then providing technical leadership and lending sources.“ Clearly, Am erican politicians and business leaders shared a com m itm ent to these goals w ith their European counterparts. H owever, just as w ith disar­ m am ent, they differed over the m eans to achieve the ends. T he official p olicy o f the U nited States was to retain m axim um independence o f action, particu­ larly w ith respect to League o f N ations com m itm ents. T hroughout the interw ar era, both Republican and D em ocratic adm inistrations m aintained a pos­ tu re o f u n o fficial representation at in tern atio n al conferences; w ith few exceptions, they sought to influence econom ic m atters indirectly. Individual business leaders— private concerns— w ere granted considerable leeway in de­ term ining their roles and the policies they w ould pursue. Naturally, these m en w ere m otivated to create an environm ent favorable to Am erican financial and business interests through the stabilization o f governm ents and the w orld m onetary system . But the quasi-official recognition and status their plans re­ ceived reflected the b elief that efficient m anagem ent o f the global econom y w ould com e at the hands o f seasoned professionals w ho w ould achieve solu­ tion s that were beyond the exigencies o f politics.

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O n e o f the first tests o f League efficacy in econom ic m atters em erged in discussions concerning A ustria. T h e defeated nation faced catastrophe— star­ vation , econom ic d islocation, and threatened revolution. G eneva responded w ith a program for financial reconstruction. T he League-sponsored plan called fo r a $125 m illion loan, to be m ade under stringent internal controls, guaran­ teed b y nine o f its m em bers. In this, the U.S. Congress dem onstrated a reluc­ tant w illingness to cooperate. O n 6 A p ril 1922, Congress voted to exten d the A ustrian debt paym ent. Private A m erican investors cooperated b y subscrib­ ing S25 m illion , o r 20 percent o f the total.11 T h e H ungarian reconstruction plan o f 1924 also em erged as a result o f League efforts. A gain, the U nited States w as consulted because it had to agree to subordinate its w ar debts to any program adopted. A loan o f over $50 m il­ lion , w ith $10 m illion subscribed in the U nited States, w as follow ed b y a plan o f strict oversight b y a League com m issioner. In this case, the C o u n cil invited Jeremiah Sm ith, Jr., to be com m issioner-general, a post he assum ed o n 1 M ay 1924, assisted by another A m erican, Royal Tyler o f M assachusetts. Sm ith proved to be an exceptional adm inistrator, as H ungarians w ere soon calling h im "the best friend o f their country.” B y the end o f 1926 controls could be term inated.12 From the outset, it w as d ear than any League efforts to deal w ith econom ic conditions w ere goin g to be inextricably linked to the U nited States b y virtu e o f its w ar debt policy. Indeed, the w ar debt ran as a m o tif throughout m ost o f th is problem -rid d en p erio d , givin g it an un rivaled in tern ation al im pact. W hereas the U nited States cou ld have used the debt as the basis fo r extensive cooperation w ith the League, this w as never the case. Indeed, fear th at ques­ tion s about the debt and/or reparations w ould arise guaranteed th at, offi­ cially, the U nited States w ould h old the League at m ore than arm ’s length, preferring to allow private interests to establish program s aim ed at th e cre­ ation o f econom ic stability. T h e m onies ow ed represented official loans tendered d urin g the w ar and the b rief reconstruction period that follow ed. From the outset, European lead­ ers argued that repaym ent should be indexed to ab ility to pay, to reparations, and to international banking and m onetary conditions. A m erican business leaders and bankers recognized the com plexity o f the problem and its im pli­ cations, particularly in term s o f the lin k to reparations, b u t the en tire war debt issue w as fraught w ith political im plications that m ade it extrem ely sen­ sitive. A t one p o in t H arding adm inistration officials suggested partial cancel­ lation o r deferred paym ent o f the debts. H owever, no satisfactory form ula based on the ab ility to pay em erged despite the sensitivity o f the H arding adm inistration on this poin t, largely because o f differences w ith in govern­ m ent and business circles. D isagreem ents betw een business and banking heads lim ited responses; concern over debt repudiation handicapped all efforts at refunding, w ith o n ly a few persons w illin g to consider fu ll o r partial cancella­ tion , a m oratorium , o r a transfer o f assets in exchange fo r notes. Even the

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m ost com m itted internationalists were reluctant to support creative solutions in this area; on ly a sm all m inority ever favored debt cancellation, and opposi­ tio n to any accom m odation increased after 1923.4 Congress, reflecting popu­ lar attitudes, insisted on a fu ll return o f principal. It authorized a com m ission to negotiate an agreem ent w ith each debtor on the am ount ow ed, the interest to be assessed, and the schedule for repaym ent14 W hile som e business leaders and bankers believed that w ar debts and repa­ rations should be dealt w ith officially, the m ajority m aintained that the solu­ tio n w ould em erge from private efforts. Foreign investm ents increased dra­ m atically during the 1920s because o f surplus capital in the U nited States; debtors had to rem ain in the good graces o f the Am erican banking com m u­ n ity to receive additional loans. T he subject o f additional loans abroad stim ulated a controversy between internationalist and nationalist perspectives, and the resulting "internecine co n flict proved disastrous” for any effort to create "a w orld econom ic com ­ m unity.” H oover, as secretary o f com m erce, sought to establish som e stan­ dards and supervision over loans but w ith on ly lim ited success. A desire for p rofit led to private sector investm ents w ith high interest rates, w hich subse­ quently proved to be disastrous w hen defaults cam e after 1929. Internal rival­ ries also arose between the State and Com m erce departm ents over w hich held prim ary jurisdiction over regulating activity.1* T he U nited States m ight w ell have pursued an internationalist policy, es­ tablishing cooperation through conferences rather than responding to the debt question in unilateral fashion. It never follow ed that course; neither did it realistically face the subject o f reparations. T he dem and that the Central Powers assum e responsibility for the w ar in the form o f postw ar indem nities had been w ritten into the treaties o f 1919. Those w ho ow ed w ar debts relied heavily on the dam age paym ents for m onies to repay their loans. T he repara­ tion s problem that em erged was inevitable; even W ilson divorced w ar debts from reparations, and all subsequent adm inistrations continued to insist on that separation. A ll subsequent negotiations on the intertw ined issues created considerable strain on intergovernm ental relations in the 1920s, particularly betw een France and the U nited States.14 It is significant that the U nited States deem ed the reparations question to be independent o f the League, o f its econom ic agencies, and even o f govern­ m ents. Indeed, in renegotiating the reparations question, private bankers suc­ cessfully to o k a political issue and placed its resolution in the hands o f w orld business and banking leaders. Adm inistrative oversight lay w ith a Reparations Com m ission, created at the Paris Peace Conference, to w hich the U nited States regularly sent a repre­ sentative to protect its interests. Unfortunately, the com m ission freed a thank­ less task because the problem o f paym ents had a profound im pact on Euro­ pean p olitics and econom ic conditions. Som e nations could n ot afford to pay

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the am ounts specified, w hile others, like Germ any, resisted the entire pro­ gram . Attem pts b y European governm ents in 1923 to force the latter to con­ form to the form ula led to a crisis and a conference called b y the com m ission in 1924 that greatly reduced the obligations. Am erican political leaders sup­ ported such efforts w hile n ot w ishing to becom e direcdy involved. Politicians and their business and banking constituents recognized that reparations were in hibiting recovery in Europe and thus affecting trade and investm ent oppor­ tunities. Yet the C oolidge adm inistration dared n ot send an official delega­ tion because o f its concern that discussions would becom e linked to war debts.17 Subsequently, Am ericans becam e highly visible in seeking solutions to the reparations im broglio, but they did so as private citizens, albeit w ith the blessing o f their governm ent. James A. Logan o f Philadelphia was probably the m ost influential o f these citizens. He served as an unofficial observer on the Repa­ rations Com m ission, 1920-25, w here he m ade m any suggestions on policy, organized a bankers' com m ittee, and w orked w ith European diplom ats. He also participated fu lly in developing the Dawes Plan o f 1924 and in gaining its acceptance, particularly in France.1* A t the 1924 m eeting, C hicago banker Charles G . Dawes chaired the ses­ sions. T he plan bearing his nam e called for loans to G erm any from private bankers in the U nited States, especially the J. P. M organ firm , the First N a­ tional Bank o f C hicago, and elsewhere, to help Germ an industry recover and earn profits that could be applied to reparations paym ents. By 1929, however, the Germ ans asked for further revisions based on the claim that they could n ot pay. A gain, A m ericans led in seeking a solution. This plan, identified w ith O w en D. Young o f the G eneral E lectric Com pany, further scaled dow n pay­ m ents and provided for a Bank for International Settlem ents to oversee the financial arrangem ents. These efforts to stabilize individual countries cam e about because observ­ ers were aware o f the close interdependence in the w orld econom y, especially in regard to the m onetary system . Prior to 1914, governm ents had show n little interest in w orking collectively to regulate international fiscal problem s. The vast indebtedness stem m ing from the w ar em phasized that nations could not stand alone, and the U nited States becam e especially concerned because it had em erged as a creditor nation. U nder these new circum stances, alm ost everyone desired stability in prices, credit, currencies, com m odities, and trade policies.19T his could be achieved in tw o ways: one involved the creation o f an international banking system ; the other sought to m aintain control through traditional m eans, especially the gold standard. T he w orld took a significant step w hen, in 1929, as part o f the Young Plan to resolve the reparations problem , governm ents agreed to create the Bank for International Settlem ents (BIS) to oversee paym ents and help debtor coun­ tries m eet their obligations. Alm ost from the beginning, its creators saw that it could also becom e a facility useful to the entire w orld econom ic com m u­

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nity, especially in prom oting trade. Even as the BIS m oved in this direction, the depression frustrated its developm ent as governm ents turned to nation­ alistic policies in the 1930s.30 T he creation o f the BIS can be attributed largely to a group o f N ew York bankers, led b y Thom as W. Lam ont o f the J. P. M organ firm , eager to stabilize the international exchange system . Lam ont's role in international financial circles seem ed inevitable: he was a generous supporter o f the LN A, an ad­ m irer o f W ilson, and an ardent believer in the League o f N ations. Lam ont saw stable international finances as a supporting m echanism for the League and, like m ost bankers w ith a w orld o utlook, sought to cope w ith econom ic prob­ lem s. He becam e fu lly involved in negotiations for the Dawes and Young plans, helped organize loans to China and M exico, and in the early 1930s w orked to stabilize currencies. Bankers like Lam ont insisted on a significant share o f pow er in the BIS because, as O w en Young noted, it could enhance the "eco­ nom ic expansion o f the U nited States, the paym ent o f Germ an reparations, and the very survival o f capitalism .”31 T he concept o f a bank tied to reparations was not cordially received in the State D epartm ent or in other Coolidge or H oover adm inistration circles. Fears arose over increased responsibility, even when undertaken “privately” or unoffi­ cially, and there was concern that pressures w ould m ount to reduce w ar debts. Stim son strenuously objected to any Am erican citizen serving as director o f the BIS because this could be view ed as a repudiation o f adm inistration p olicy and involve the U nited States in the reparations question. Young and Lam ont prevailed, however, in contacts w ith H oover and Stim son b y urging that they could n ot leave international banking to Europeans and b y assuring them that the U nited States w ould not be outvoted in the bank.31 Even after the BIS began to function in M ay 1930, considerable negotiation continued over operational details. T he Am ericans asserted their position in firm term s, insisting on an independent and nonpolitical operation and de­ m anding a strong representation on the board o f directors. Gates W. M cGarrah, a form er N ew York Federal Reserve officer, becam e the first president o f the bank. Leon Fraser, w ho had been agent general for reparations, played an even m ore prom inent role as vice-president and then president, 1933-35. Again, th ey participated as private citizens, w ith the U nited States officially assum ­ ing an am biguous position. U nder their European counterparts, the bank played an increasing role as a clearinghouse o f inform ation, a nerve center, and a stabilizing influence.33 W hen the am ount o f reparations w as scaled dow n in the Dawes and Young plans, the U nited States refused to m ake any adjustm ent in its w ar-debt p o licy despite repeated overtures from the French and British. The A llies m anaged to m aintain a schedule o f repaym ent un til June 1931. T he depression, how ­ ever, led all governm ents to m ove tow ard a m oratorium on paym ents. H oover proposed a one-year m oratorium on principal and interest, and Congress

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affirm ed this decision w hile w arning against any cancellation o r reduction. A t a conference at Lusanne in 1932, Europeans sought to resolve their debt and reparation problem , w ith A m ericans conspicuous b y their absence. Lam ont sought to advise governm ents privately, w hich was the extent o f U.S. involve­ m ent. D eteriorating conditions in Europe led to rather acrim onious discus­ sions w ithin the H oover adm inistration over continuing the m oratorium and developing som e stabilization policy. W hen no new form ula em erged, m ost o f those w ho ow ed w ere forced to default*4 Efforts to keep the w orld’s financial system stable through gold was inex­ tricably tied to debt issues, so this also occupied the attention o f bankers and governm ents. G old provided a m eans to pay international obligations and thus to stabilize currencies b y covering bank notes. The system had never w orked perfectly, and it underw ent considerable adjustm ent throughout the tw enties. W hen, as a result o f the depression, calls fo r paym ent in gold ex­ ceeded the am ounts held w ithin nations, countries like Great Britain w ent o ff the gold standard. This forced other governm ents, including the United States, to ponder their responses.” A ction to stem losses in gold and to prevent a disruption o f the w orld’s econom y was vitally needed, yet such efforts seemed doom ed. President H oover rem ained adam ant about m aintaining parity between gold and the dollar. T he U nited States Federal Reserve Bank could not respond because it was prohibited b y law from lending to governm ents. T his led to efforts b y the N ew York Federal Reserve Bank to persuade private bankers to provide funds. These new credits, however, could not stem the tide, and the result w as a run on d ie dollar in European financial centers. This posed a serious dilem m a for the incom ing R oosevelt adm inistration. FDR’s advisers had to decide w hether to continue international efforts to m aintain gold and currencies o r stop sup­ port o f the dollar. T h ey chose to do both in M arch and A pril 1933, and then m oved in its policies to depreciate the dollar.36 The N ew D eal decision to go o ff the gold standard and raise com m odity prices dom estically through its recovery program had considerable im pact on the w orld econom y. G lobal m oney m arkets were particularly affected when the United States repudiated clauses in contracts that specified repaym ent in gold. T he B ritish sought to discuss stabilization efforts at the London Eco­ nom ic Conference, bu t the Roosevelt adm inistration refused to consider the subject because it w anted the dollar to fall even m ore. This led in turn to the creation o f w orld econom ic blocs and “a com partm entalized system o f inter­ national finance.” A lthough conditions stabilized b riefly in 1934, the "m on­ etary anarchy” continued.37 C onditions in both the dom estic and international econom y produced a nationalistic response on the part o f Am ericans. W hile it is im possible to docu­ m ent, it is quite probable that m uch o f the popular resurgence o f isolationist spirit evident after 1934 can be traced to the response b y the debtors. A m eri-

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cans greatly resented the defaults. W hen debtors sought to include the subject o f debt default on the agenda at the London Econom ic Conference o f 1933, it w as soundly rebuffed b y the U nited States. In A pril 1934, Congress responded further w ith the Johnson A ct, w hich forbade public o r private loans to any governm ent that w as in default o f its debt.3* T he p o licy o f the Am erican governm ent to avoid "official” representation a t international conferences dealing w ith w ar debts and reparations, w hile encouraging private sector leaders to participate, also applied to cooperation w ith League agencies created to deal w ith econom ic questions. For exam ple, the Transit and C om m unication Section, established w hen the drafters o f the C ovenant foresaw a need to provide som e m echanism to prom ote com m uni­ cation and transportation, received no official U.S. encouragem ent. T h e sec­ tion sought agreem ent on com plex problem s involving the navigation o f w a­ terways; telegraph and postal conditions; access to ports, railroads, and roads; passport and visa regulations; and pow er transm ission. Since the section could n o t im pose rules, it sponsored conferences that form ulated conventions, and a transit com m ittee acted as a conciliatory b od y w hen disputes arose.39 In 1921 the U nited States ignored a C om m unication and Transit Section m eeting in Barcelona. Secretary o f State Bainbridge C o lb y w orried that dis­ cussions w ould lead to adverse action on debts and interest paym ents, a sce­ nario that did n ot m aterialize as the conference m erely recom m ended the creation o f a financial and an econom ic com m ittee. U ndersecretary o f State N orm an H . D avis, com m enting on the refusal to participate, stated: “ The political situation”— resulting from the election— “necessarily requires o f this A dm inistration that it should n ot further becom e involved in European ques­ tion s w hich do not directly and vitally affect Am erica’s interests.” T he U nited States thus had no representative at the m eeting in Barcelona even though president-elect H arding had endorsed it.40 W hen the C om m unication and Transit Section organized tw o m ore ses­ sions in the 1920s, R epublican adm inistrations decided to participate. A t G eneva in 1923, Lewis W. H askell, w ho attended unofficially to keep W ashing­ ton inform ed, enjoyed the support o f a bod y o f experts w orking “behind the scenes, if Am erican interests were involved.” A t the third conference in G eneva in 1927, the U nited States sent an official delegation com posed o f business leaders. N onetheless, the overall record was one o f aloofness, w ith an unw ill­ ingness to participate in seeking conventions, even on air traffic o r radio com ­ m unications.41 T he financial and econom ic com m ittees, created at the Barcelona m eet­ ing, were treated in a sim ilar m anner. Com posed o f heads o f banks and gov­ ernm ent officials appointed b y the League, the com m ittees perform ed valu­ able functions, providing an intelligence service (available to m em bers and nonm em bers) and organizing periodic conferences. A lthough the experts on the com m ittees enjoyed relative independence o f expression, they worked

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under severe lim itations because o f the highly sensitive nature o f topics like tariffs, trade, raw m aterials, and fiscal m atters. T he com m ittees could m ake recom m endations and help individual nations, but always under prescribed conditions. U ltim ately they enjoyed considerable success in the 1920s, but once the depression aroused national jealousies, they achieved little. For exam ple, a conference organized in 1930 to create a ta riff truce could do litd e in the face o f the H aw ley-Sm oot b ill then pending in Congress.41 T he Financial Com m ittee prom oted econom ic developm ent b y finding investors, rem oving constraints on loan policies, and, during the depression, acting as an arbitrator to stay defaults on loans. O ne o f its m ost extensive efforts concerned double taxation. T his involved the study o f levies on foreign investm ents o r taxation on sales tw ice. The R ockefeller Foundation supported these efforts w ith generous grants that aided extensive exploration o f the topic. In 1927, the U nited States becam e an official participant in the discussions held to devise a m odel treaty.41 T he League’s Financial C om m ittee also sponsored program s to assist the Free C ity o f D anzig, Estonia, and Poland. T he involvem ent o f m anufacturer John B. Stetson, Jr., w ho becam e am bassador to Poland in 1925, reflected the perspective that private experts and institutions could help resolve problem s. Stetson pursued studies on how best to utilize m onies lent, and then con­ ceived and helped negotiate an extensive stabilization plan for Poland. As A m erican citizens and banks subscribed to the plan, his efforts led to a loan o f $72 m illion b y a consortium o f banks organized b y the Federal Reserve Bank o f N ew York.44 T he League also organized an Econom ic Intelligence Service, w hich be­ cam e a m ajor source o f statistical data relating to w orldw ide financial, eco­ nom ic, and social m atters. A fter 1922 the U nited States generally cooperated to the extent o f providing inform ation. D uring the depression, League agen­ cies conducted special studies on unem ploym ent, business cycles, rural life, housing, nutrition, trade, and econom ic dislocations. T hey also engaged in extensive relief program s, prim arily o f a hum anitarian nature, that often had econom ic overtones. T he m ost dram atic o f these cam e after a ferocious w ar between Greece and Turkey in 1922. T he C ou n cil created a G reek Refugee Settlem ent Com m ission, w hich adm inistered a plan for a loan to aid displaced persons and prom ote recovery. T he U nited States helped w ith an advance o f $12,167,000 in the form o f an adjustm ent o f w ar debts, and three prom inent Am ericans— H enry M orgenthau, Charles P. H owland, and Charles B. Eddy— served as unofficial com m issioners.45 Finally, the League’s sem iautonom ous ILO also dealt w ith m atters related to econom ics. Its very structure reflected an im aginative approach, w ith del­ egates to m eetings representing em ployers, labor, and governm ent. T h ey as­ sem bled annually to form ulate universally acceptable provisions on labor con­ d ition s, hours o f w ork, unem ploym ent com pensation, and protection o f

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children and w om en. A s noted, the U nited States virtu ally ignored the ILO u n til it join ed in 1934. T he League also sought solutions to econom ic problem s through periodic conferences, in w hich the U nited States showed m ixed interest. T he first as­ sem bled at Brussels in 1920, w ith Roland W . Boyden and tw o advisers unoffi­ cially involved because the State D epartm ent was "intensely interested” in stable postw ar conditions in Europe. O n the other hand, conferences at T he H ague and G enoa in 1922 elicited a cool response from Hughes, w ho refused to par­ ticipate because he thought the topics under consideration disadvantageous to the U nited States.46 U.S. Am bassador to Italy Richard W ashburn C h ild did appear in G enoa w here he relayed H arding adm in istration view s, w hich checked discussion on certain subjects.47Thus, w hile not form ally represented, th e U nited States indirectly affected developm ents and thereby had an in flu ­ ence on reconstruction efforts and the econom ic w ork o f the League. M eetings also sought to resolve the ta riff problem o f the 1920s, w hich had been stim ulated b y the tendency o f governm ents to erect higher and higher ta riff barriers to protect their dom estic industries. In 1925, League officials proposed a m eeting to discuss the subject. A fter a year o f prelim inary investi­ gation b y experts, an International E conom ic Conference m et at Geneva in M ay 1927. D elegates from over fifty states attended, although they did not represent nations so that discussions could be open.4* Subsequent reports and recom m endations were ill received. O ther League efforts included a 1927 C o n ­ ference for the A bolition o f Im port and Export Restrictions, w hich explored the prohibition o f exchange in certain types o f goods. H ugh W ilson, head o f the U.S. delegation, arrived w ith specific instructions, and the U nited States signed the resulting convention w ith reservations. In Septem ber 1929, the tenth A ssem bly called fo r a ta riff truce. T he Econom ic Com m ittee drafted a pro­ posal to be subm itted to governm ents, but b y then the loom ing depression w as fortifyin g protectionist attitudes.49 W hile the U nited States showed interest in these discussions, its ow n high ta riff w alls kept it from participating constructively. A s noted earlier, the high schedule o f the H aw ley-Sm oot b ill frustrated international efforts in 1930 to cope w ith the problem . H oover was heeding "business nationalists” w hen he declined to veto the bill. Nevertheless, even the lim ited involvem ent precipi­ tated considerable debate. T he State D epartm ent favored an internationalist position, bu t the nationalist m ood am ong business leaders and in Congress kept it in check. W hen the League called a ta riff conference in 1930, the H oover adm inistra­ tion , again after intense debate, decided to have H ugh W ilson attend though n ot even as an observer. In this w ay he could be inform ed but not be subject to em barrassing questions. T he U nited States did ratify an export-im port treaty, largely because nationalists and internationalists agreed on its provi­ sions, although fo r very different reasons. Few other nations approved this

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accord, how ever, and in 1933 the R oosevelt adm inistration w ith drew from the convention. T hus a posture “ to achieve an O pen D o o r com m ercial p o licy” failed.50 In 1933, a W orld M onetary and E conom ic C onference convened in Lon­ don to discuss the chaotic conditions caused b y the depression. T h e R oosevelt adm inistration seem ed cooperative, sending a notable delegation that included Secretary o f State C ord ell H ull. T h e A m erican delegates, w ho favored a cur­ rency stabilization policy, reached an agreem ent on 16 June and pledged that the U nited States w ould desist from any extensive curren cy in flation . D espite their advice to R oosevelt to support this position , the president announced that such action w as im perm issible. W hen the A m erican delegation so u gh t to ham m er o u t a jo in t declaration to stabilize the d ollar in relation to the pound, R oosevelt again objected, and on 3 July, in his fam ous p u blic “bom bsh ell” m essage, he denounced international bankers and th eir ideas and called for sound internal system s. T hat killed all hopes that the conference co u ld ac­ com plish anything and from that poin t on “m onetary nationalism ” reigned throughout the 1930s.51 Initially, R oosevelt had appeared w illin g to discuss international solutions to econom ic problem s, u n til he found that fundam ental differences existed “ betw een N ew D eal and European prescriptions fo r recovery.” C ongressional pressures reflecting isolationist attitudes also influenced him . A s fears and suspicions grew , R oosevelt shifted “from cooperation to aggressiveness” and then to “explicit nationalism ” and fin ally “to unequivocal nationalism .” 52 W hereas R oosevelt and his advisers in W ashington m ade an ob vio u s deci­ sion to reverse a form ulated position , the refusal to tie the d ollar to w orld currencies m erely contin ued a posture lon g fixed in the 1920s. T h e U nited States had never been w illin g to sacrifice any econom ic advantage o n th e altar o f international cooperation. T h e resulting econom ic nationalism , reflected in the failure o f the London C onference, could n ot be resolved in the 1930s because p olitical leaders in­ sisted that m onetary p o licy w as a dom estic affair. T h e R oosevelt adm inistra­ tion sought to counter som e o f the dam age through its com m ercial policy, especially the H ull reciprocity program , and its participation in a T ripartite Stabilization A greem ent in the fall o f 1936. T his am biguous and carefu lly hedged statem ent, w ith a tw enty-fou r-h ou r term ination clause, con tain ed a pledge b y the parties to refrain from m anipulating exchange rates and an agree­ m ent to consult on gold prices. A lth ough the Johnson A ct prohibited m uch direct action on the part o f the U nited States, it sought to h on or the sp irit o f the accord. T he consultation provisions w ere especially useful w hen govern ­ m ents departed from som e o f the agreed-on principles.55 Evaluation o f R oosevelt’s econom ic p o licy has occasioned no less debate than his other foreign p o licy decisions. In short, it has been described as b oth nationalist and internationalist. O n the one hand, H ull’s drive fo r recip ro city

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treaties is view ed as largely internationalist.14 H e believed that bilateral trade accords, w h ich set prescribed rates that could then be extended to other states on a m ost-favored -n ation basis, w ould reverse the trend tow ard protection ­ ism so evid en t in the 1920s and, in the process, prom ote peace. A m ajor battle ensued betw een H ull and G eorge N . Peek, the adm inistrator o f the A gricu l­ tural A d justm ent A dm inistration, over trade policy. T h e latter w anted the U nited States to m aintain com plete con trol, w hereas H ull saw a need fo r m utuality and nondiscrim ination. H ull w on in 1934 w hen Congress autho­ rized h im to negotiate treaties. O th er policies view ed as internationalist ap­ peared in the Tripartite Stabilization A greem ent and the creation o f the Ex­ p ort-Im p ort Bank in 1934, w hich sought to foster trade b y providin g credit abroad. A lth o u gh in itia lly designed to prom ote exchange w ith the Soviet U nion, the operation soon extended to Latin A m erica and the Far East, w here the E xp ort-Im p ort Bank becam e a m ajor channel o f aid to C h in a in its w ar against Japan. O n the other hand, those w ho see on ly econom ic nationalism d te Roosevelt's stance on th e London C onference, the desire to subordinate external m atters to recovery at hom e, and the extrem ely cautious attitude tow ard involvem ent in cooperative efforts to resolve problem s. T hey note that although H ull sought to p ro m o te his recip rocity form ula in League circles, he d id so in form ally and in d irectly. He even tually con clud ed tw en ty-tw o accords, m ost in the W estern H em isphere, and m uch o f the a ctivity in Latin A m erica sought to counter G erm an com petition in trade. T h e adm in istration also pursued na­ tion alistic goals through treaties exerted against Japan. A t best, these efforts can b e d escribed as an attem pt at O pen D o o r econom ic policy. C ertain ly th e overall adm in istration o f the R ecip rocity A ct gave few intern ationalists an y co n so lation .” F inally, w h ile som e argue that the creation o f the E xport-Im port B ank reflected a general w illingness to live in an interrelated w orld, another co n ­ clusion is p ossible.* In authorizin g funds, Congress stipulated that m ost o f the m o n ey provided should be spent in the U nited States. A lso, the focus on the S o viet U n ion , Latin A m erica, and C h in a reflected a desire to use the ban k to ad van ce U.S. foreign p o licy objectives. T hus nation alistic interests o u t­ w eighed intern ationalist ones in affecting adm inistration policy. T h e m ost significant recent studies o f U.S. business interests, especially in the 1920s, have focused n ot on o fficial adm inistrative involvem ent in interna­ tion al econ o m ic concerns but on the role and place o f A m erican finance in the w o rld . These often argue that investm ents overseas and the com m ercial p o licies pursued constitute a new form o f econom ic internationalism .57 I f o n e defines internationalism as a w illingness to cooperate on program s that reflect m utual interests and concerns, going beyond overseas econom ic a ctivity th at m erely transcends national boundaries and involves a significant,

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coordinated degree o f involvem ent, then analysis o f the interw ar years pro­ duces a m ixed picture.5* Som e studies argue that at least a few business leaders and bankers, along w ith certain individuals in the State and Com m erce departm ents, recognized in the 1920s that the U nited States could not ignore its w orld financial obliga­ tions after it becam e a creditor nation. However, a desire fo r profit and the urge to dom inate com m ercial m arkets and to create an environm ent favor­ able to Am erican capitalistic enterprise can logically be characterized as na­ tionalistic or opportunistic.” Som e financiers saw a connection between war debts and reparations, but m ost did n ot and on ly a few favored cancellation.60 Som e bankers recognized the need for loans abroad, but m ost did n o t61W here they entered the European m arket they were largely m otivated b y self-interest and a desire for profit, n ot for creating a cooperative global m arketplace. Even Thom as Lam ont had to w arn them about "rash and excessive lending,” w hich he characterized as unsound and insecure, a point echoed b y H oover.6*A few individuals believed that the U nited States should be involved officially in discussions o f the w orld’s econom y, but m ost citizens o f the econom ic com ­ m unity were either not interested at all or selective about w here they w ished to be involved.6* C ertain ly exam ples o f business-led internationalism exist. Ttao exam ples are particularly significant. O ne involves the International Cham ber o f C om ­ m erce (IC C ), w hich em erged from the Paris Peace Conference w hen Boston m erchant Edward A . Filene and Lam ont discussed postw ar problem s w ith Europeans. Either Lam ont or A . C . Bedford suggested the w isdom o f som e type o f perm anent organization. T he result was the em ergence o f five na­ tion al com m ittees that agreed to cooperate w ith a view to facilitating trade, harm ony, and peace through "the cooperation o f business m en and their or­ ganizations devoted to the developm ent o f com m erce and industry.” Follow ­ ing the creation o f the IC C , leaders assem bled regularly at international gath­ erings, w hile an office collected and dissem inated inform ation, form ulated principles, and proposed policies. T he latter sought especially to prom ote the arbitration o f differences.64 T he Am erican N ational C om m ittee, led b y Eliot W adsworth o f B oston and Thom as J. W atson, Sr., o f International Business M achines, participated fully in the w ork o f the IC C . T he latter reflected a practical internationalist out­ look. He believed that unfettered trade w ould open doors to m arkets, lead to greater political cooperation, and strengthen the League o f N ations. D uring W atson’s service as president o f the IC C (1937-39) he supported all efforts to low er ta riff barriers, and he coined the slogan adopted b y the organization: “W orld Peace T hrough W orld Trade.”65 A nother com m unity-related concept involved discussions over calendar reform . Business interests expressed som e interest in the developm ent o f a system atic w ay to m easure tim e, avoiding the confusion created b y uneven

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m onths an d w ork w eeks. O ne o f the m ost enthusiastic supporters o f change, George Eastm an, an A m erican cam era and film m anufacturer, decided to en­ dorse effo rts b y the League to exam ine the question. H e subsequently gave large d on ation s fo r studies that yield ed nothing because governm ents seem ed unw illing to m ake com m itm ents to the project. M offat, fo r exam ple, recom ­ m ended that the United States avoid any participation because o f the question’s sensitive religious and political im plications.“ A n exam ination o f ta riff p o licy contributes to the m ixed evaluation o f the period, p rim arily because o f the nation alistic attitudes displayed b y the bu si­ ness com m unity. W hile som e voices w ere raised against d ie high protective walls in the 1920s, th ey w ere n ot influential. Ironically, m ost econom ic leaders seem ed unconcerned even as the ta riff actually negated expansionist program s overseas. A s noted in the discussion o f the R oosevelt record, the H ull reci­ p rocity treaties also raise questions. In contrast to the R epublican policies o f the 1920s, R oosevelt’s policies seem ed to reflect an internationalist ou d o ok, yet th eir singular con tribution to national self-interest is also apparent. A new form o f d ollar diplom acy em erged tow ard Latin A m erica through loans, trade, and investm ent, and the accords w ere often used to advance foreign p o licy objectives, especially in the W estern H em isphere.67 Finally, i f A m erican business and financial interests had been tru ly m oti­ vated b y a sp irit o f internationalism equal to th eir com m itm ent to nation al interests, lo g ic w ould suggest their fu ll support fo r involvem ent in the League’s enterprises. T h e League provided a forum in w hich con flictin g view s on eco­ nom ic issues and policies could be discussed. T h e U nited States could have exercised a com m anding influence on virtu ally all aspects o f finance, com ­ m erce, an d fiscal policy. G reat Britain pursued such a course and m anaged to dom inate th e League’s Financial C om m ittee to its ow n advantage.68 Yet th ere is little evidence o f support fo r such involvem ent from econom ic leaders o r adm inistration figures w ho counted. Som e governm ent officials m ay have seen a need fo r cooperation, but p o licy rarely reflected their w ishes, and it seem s exaggerated to d aim that their m ere advocacy represents an in ­ tern ationalist position. T he unofficial participation reflected the prevailin g unilateralist attitude, and on ly a few m em bers o f the business com m un ity raised th e ir voices in protest.69 T he U nited States show ed far less interest in the League’s econom ic w ork than it d id in hum anitarian, social, and in tellec­ tual con cern s, and the N ew D eal’s nationalistic p o licy led to less rather than m ore involvem ent than had existed in the 1920s. In d eed , o n e finds m uch m ore evidence o f concern fo r the in tern atio n al econ om ic p ictu re am ong o rd in ary citizen s than one does in ban kin g o r fi­ nancial cird e s, especially in the 1930s. N icholas M urray Butler regularly called for exp an d in g m arkets, an in tern ation al m on etary u n it o f exchange, and reduced ta riffs. T h e C arn egie E ndow m ent fo r In tern ation al Peace even o r­ ganized a w o rld conference in L ondon in 1935 to w h ich it in vited n otable

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econom ic experts. U nder Eichelberger’s leadership, the LN A and the N ational Peace Conference in 1938 began their Cam paign fo r W orld E conom ic C o o p ­ eration, w hich lasted several m onths.70 Even before this, the LN A h ad regu­ larly engaged in educational program s on econom ic issues; thus th e peace contin gent and the traditional p o lity internationalists often engaged in orga­ nized efforts that have no counterpart in the business com m unity. T hus, on balance, one can question the degree o f internationalism im p licit in relations w ith Latin A m erica and w ith the w orld econom ic com m unity. C ertain ly contacts existed and som e o f the ideas pursued reflected a global perspective. Yet there w ere m ajor lim itations on any forth righ t cooperative sp irit, w ith objectives m ore generally defined b y n ation alistic aspirations. Therefore, the lim ited participation o f A m ericans severely lim ited an y suc­ cess in creating a “capitalistic internationalism ” based on trade, p ro fit, access to natural resources, and loans.7*

11 THE BATTLE CONTINUED The Pro-League Constituency in the 1930s

espite the fears that they w ould “sink w ith the ship,” League supporters

D

did n ot desert the cause in the 1930s. M any talented, im aginative, and devoted individuals continued to w ork diligently to convince A m ericans o f the value o f the League» to foster a favorable and supportive im age o f the organization, and to prom ote and enhance the cooperative ties established during the 1920s. M en such as Eichelberger, Shotw ell, Fosdick, and H udson continued to w ork through the League o f N ations Association. O thers identi­ fied them selves w ith different groups, especially the W orld Peace Foundation and the Foreign Policy Association. O ld W ilsonians, such as Edward M . H ouse and N orm an H . D avis, w orked in the vineyard w hile educators like D enna F. Flem ing, C lyde Eagleton, Pitm an B. Potter, Q u in cy W right, and Charles G . Fenwick w rote books and articles, and w hile the Am ericans in G eneva, headed b y Sweetser, continued their efforts. T he zeal and dedication that these internationalists displayed cam e at a tim e w hen criticism o f the League w as increasing. A s the decade o f crisis evolved, m any w ho had expressed fainthearted support for the League in the early 1920s becam e vociferous opponents o f the system , insisting that the League was dom inated b y the larger European states. Yet b y the end o f the 1930s they w ere asserting that the League was an innocuous creature. T he U nited States should rem ain aloof— not because tradition dem anded it but to avoid being drawn into a dangerous contem porary situation.' M any liber­ als had never forgiven the peacem akers fo r the injustices w ritten into the Versailles treaty. D uring the 1930s, those sins seem ed to be com ing hom e to roost. A s crisis follow ed crisis and the League proved itself relatively im po­ tent, pacifists asserted that a dem ocratic organization that did not subscribe to the use o f sanctions w ould elicit their support.1 In this contradictory con­ tact, am idst charges o f to o m uch strength and dangerous weakness, League supporters continued to struggle in the 1930s.

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T he last years of the 1920s had p ro d u ced a v a riety o f attem p ts to strengthen the League o f N ations and to circum vent the problem s associ­ ated w ith "th e em pty chair.” A fter resisting efforts m ade in the early 1920s to delete o r am end A rticle 10, League m em bers had show n on ly lim ited inter­ est in m od ifyin g the C ovenant to gain U .S. m em bership. Instead, European proponents o f a strengthened League began to focus on precise and binding accords that w ould supplem ent the organ ization. These accords w ere based on th ree p rin cip les: th at p eacefu l processes sh o u ld be used to resolve differences; that any state rejecting such a course w ould be branded an ag­ gressor; and that victim s o f aggression could expect support from League m em bers. Based on these precepts, an A rbitration and Security Com m ittee form ulated a series o f m odel treaties, w hich the A ssem bly ultim ately com ­ m ended to m em bers in 1931.3 Even as the A rbitration and Security C om m ittee w orked, an alternative m ethod for strengthening the League em erged w ith the developm ent o f the K ellogg-Briand Pact in 1929. In early 1930, the League C ou n cil nam ed a com ­ m ittee to study how the pact could be linked to the Covenant. T he com m ittee determ ined that the connection was obvious: under the Covenant w ar was illegal. N ow that the signers o f K ellogg-Briand had renounced war, there could be no neutrality. Thus a new com m itm ent and obligation to respond w ith assistance to any n ation attacked existed.4 T he State D epartm ent follow ed these deliberations very closely, relying on dispatches from G ilbert and letters from Sweetser. T he H oover adm inistra­ tion voiced its opposition through these sam e channels, specifically targeting a provision allow ing the C ou n cil to request an advisory opinion from the W orld C ou rt. This objection m ay have contributed to the League’s decision that fall to delay any action on the com m ittee’s report.1 T he issue lay dorm ant until the M anchurian C risis revived interest in har­ m onizing the tw o docum ents. A s events in A sia unfolded, Stim son’s com m u­ niqués were view ed as evidence o f a new w illingness to participate m ore fu lly in discussions in Geneva. Furtherm ore, the adoption o f the nonrecognition doctrine bearing his nam e fu lly conform ed w ith the pact’s operating prin­ ciple o f preserving the peace. T he failure to curb Japanese aggression could be used to assert that the League’s em phasis on m ilitary sanctions had been m is­ guided. Public figures began arguing in favor o f U nited States action to tie the pact to the League. Representative M orton D. H ull and Senator A rth ur C ap­ per to o k the lead by sponsoring congressional resolutions calling fo r a con­ ference to im plem ent d ie pact and to explore w hether to im pose arm s em bar­ goes on treaty violators.6 Am erican reaction to the M anchurian Crisis also prom pted European leaders, including C oun t Coudenhove-Kalergi and Benito M ussolini, to propose other revisions. T he latter suggested divorcing the C o v­ enant from the Treaty o f Versailles, an idea that stim ulated unfavorable re­ sponses in France, Great B ritain, and the U nited States.7

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D urin g th is entire period , although the League o f N ations N on-Partisan Association w as the m ost visible organ ization supportin g p o lity internation­ alist ideals, it w as largely im m obilized. D eclining financial support, personnel changes, an d electoral cam paign im potence seriously underm ined the orga­ nization. T h e situation finally stabilized in 1933 w ith the elevation o f Raym ond Fosdick to the presidency and C lark Eichelberger to the post o f director. Fosdick brought great vitality based on experience and im agination; Eichelberger pro­ vided enthusiasm , initiative, and perm anence.* W hile oth er LN A leaders concentrated on internal d ifficulties, its change o f nam e (in 1928), and sim plifyin g its statem ent o f purpose, James Shotw ell becam e th e m ost visible A m erican internationalist prom oting and respond­ ing to effo rts to strengthen the League. Late in 1930, Shotw ell, w h o had been pondering ideas about revising the C ovenant since the A m erican Plan o f 1924, organized a C om m ittee on the Covenant to exam ine proposed League am end­ ments. T h e y hoped to produce a draft list o f am endm ents that w ould revise the C oven an t in accordance w ith U.S. foreign policy. U ltim ately, the w ork o f the com m ittee expanded in to the "state the term s” project as. L N A leaders realized that th ey could take advantage o f a congres­ sional p rop osal broached d urin g the M anchurian C risis o f 1931. Senator James P. Pope o f Idaho, a D em ocratic internationalist counterpart o f Borah, sup­ ported U .S. en try in to the League o f N ations via a jo in t resolution o f C o n ­ gress. W h en the senator discussed the plan w ith Shotw ell, R oosevelt, H ull, and N orm an H . D avis, he received encouragem ent, and b y m id-June 1933, Pope w as considering introducing such a b ill.9 T he L N A w ould undergird Pope’s efforts w ith a p etition cam paign run during 1934 and 1935. O rganizers sought one m illion signatures on a petition that d em an ded that the governm ent indicate the term s under w h ich League m em bership w ould be acceptable, and then en try cou ld be accom plished via joint reso lu tio n . Leaders hoped, in the interim , to have a regular representa­ tive o f th e U nited States participate in League deliberations. O n 6 M a y 1934, Shotw ell sent up a trial balloon in the New York Times, and he later w en t to Europe to assess attitudes there. Eichelberger kept the State D epartm ent fu lly inform ed regarding both Shotw ell’s w ork and the responses in E urope.10 Shotw ell w as prim arily advancing the position he developed in The H eritage o f Freedom. In the book, he analyzed the problem associated with m a n y o f d ie reform s proposed b y Europeans. H e asserted that the chal­ lenge la y in reconciling the C ovenant’s "enforcem ent o f peace w ith a treaty equally universal w hich has o n ly the vaguest indication o f peace enforcem ent in a p h rase in the Pream ble stating that the Power w hich violates it ‘should lose the b en efits o f the Treaty.’” Further, that "perm issive sanction” called on m em bers to ostracize the lawbreaker, but public opin ion had been unable to uphold th e C ovenant and K ellogg-B riand Pact in 1931 and 1932. E conom ic sanctions m igh t w ork, Shotw ell suggested, if th ey co u ld be applied b y stated

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grades related to the degree o f coercion needed. A n optional clause could also be developed w hereby governm ents could determ ine their response and vary their application o f sanctions.“ W hile Shotw ell labored in Europe, the Mstate the term s” effort attracted m oderate support at hom e. The Federal C oun cil o f Churches used it in an eight-point program ; one hundred university presidents prepared a statem ent em bracing it; and, b y June 1934, tw enty-seven national organizations, includ­ ing religious, labor, w om en’s, and peace groups, were helping to circulate the petition.“ In M ay 1935, Senator Pope introduced Senate Joint R esolution 119, w hich called for League m em bership based on tw o conditions: the K ellogg-Briand Pact should be recognized as a guiding principle, and the United States w ould be exem pt from any com m itm ent to use its arm ed forces. W hen passed, the president w ould sim ply n otify League authorities o f U.S. acceptance o f m em ­ bership.13 Even though senate opponents m anaged to block consideration o f Pope’s b ill, the LN A exploited d ie situation fully. T he association reproduced over fifty thousand copies o f Pope’s rem arks, contained in the Congressional Record. A s thousands o f these w ent o u t un d er th e sen ator’s fran kin g p rivilege, Eichelberger saw the m ailing as a base from w hich to em bark on a "far-reach­ ing cam paign o f education.” Pope agreed. He had never believed that the reso­ lution w ould be adopted; he was prim arily seeking a m eans to m ake people aware o f all the discussions concerning League revision.14 U ltim ately the entire LN A "state the term s” cam paign fell short in tw o ways. First, it had sought to unify new constituents— particularly peace and pacifist groups that supported the Kellogg-Briand Pact—-behind League membership. But diese groups m anifested litde interest Second, it failed to line up the one m illion signatures, thus revealing lim ited popular support for participation in the Geneva organization. Pope’s efforts had led to rum ors that the State D epart­ m ent anticipated joining the League, and newspaper editorials insisted that the Roosevelt adm inistration (particularly after the election o f 1934 when the Dem o­ crats w on a substantial m ajority) could, if it wished, obtain the necessary tw othirds vote in the Senate.'* And yet, in the m idst o f the cam paign, the Senate rejected the lesser goal o f m em bership in the W orld C ourt, another blow to internationalist dreams and a further indication o f LN A lobbying im potence.16 In 1935, Raym ond Fosdick resigned the presidency o f the LN A to assum e the presidency o f the Rockefeller Foundation. James T. Shotw ell succeeded him . D espite the failure o f the "state the term s” project, the indefatigable new president, w orking closely w ith Eichelberger, w anted to launch a m ajor new effort "against political isolation and econom ic nationalism .” T he cam paign w ould involve agitation to revise the Covenant to m ake it acceptable to the U nited States, to cooperate w ith the League w henever possible, and to open the global econom y, especially b y reducing trade barriers. T he LN A w ould

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again seek to arouse the peace constituencies, so Eichelberger assum ed a lead­ ership position on the N ational Peace C oun cil. U nfortunately, he succeeded o n ly in gaining support for the econom ic program .17 The discussions surrounding new revisions opened up the flood gates, as proposals reflected both earlier efforts and current discussions. M any o f the ideas had circulated since the League began to function in 1920. Som e re­ form ers, w ho w anted dem ocratic and hum an rights principles em bodied in the Covenant, called for declarations on racial equality and freedom o f reli­ gion. O thers concentrated on adding m easures that w ould give the League sufficient force to m aintain peace. (T he French had pushed the idea o f adding a general staff and a peacekeeping force to the League, but this had never gained m uch support). A third group o f Covenant revisionists w ished on ly to rem ove those sections that blocked A m erican m em bership. It was in M ay 1936, iron ically at the very tim e Italian forces were com plet­ ing the conquest o f Ethiopia, that the LN A finally presented its four-point list o f changes to m ake the C ovenant acceptable. Sum m arized in a press release, the list included: 1. acceptance o f the K ellogg Pact as the fundam ental guiding principle o f a universal league; 2. establishm ent, w ith in the orbit o f this universal league, o f arrangem ents for peaceful m odification o f the status quo and for the advancem ent o f social and econom ic justice; 3. gradation o f obligations for m aintaining collective security in accordance w ith the geographical position and special situations o f states; and 4. separation o f the Covenant o f the League o f N ations from the Treaty o f Versailles.1* In O n the Rim o f the Abyss, published in 1936, Shotw ell provided an analy­ sis that was relatively appealing to European leaders. The b o o k tied the prin­ ciples o f the K ellogg-Briand Pact to the League and thus, at least b y im plica­ tion , com m itted the U nited States. Shotw ell sought to strengthen sanctions through a form ula for sharing responsibility. He advanced the idea o f regional arrangem ents b y suggesting that d ie M onroe D octrine be restructured to con­ form to the G ood N eighbor policy. Finally, he provided som e escape from the rigid collective security arrangem ent w ith a proposal that regional bodies could decide on a course o f action w hen the Assem bly, C oun cil, or W orld C o u rt determ ined that a violation o f the K ellogg-Briand Pact had occurred. O n ly the idea o f separating the Covenant and the Treaty o f Versailles seem ed unap­ pealing to m ost League m em bers.19 N othing cam e o f the cam paign, however. W hen the Ethiopian C risis re­ affirm ed the League’s serious deficiencies, a flu rry o f suggested changes had descended on G eneva. T he C o u n cil had created a Com m ittee o f T hirteen on 17 A pril 1935 to exam ine various proposals, and other resolutiöns were referred

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to the legal and financial com m ittees. T h e A ssem bly decided in July to invite m em ber states to subm it suggestions fo r reform s b y ı Septem ber. T h e results show ed a consensus that the C ovenant did n ot require substantive change; the League m erely needed to im prove its operations. T h e m ost pop u lar pro­ posals reflected the desire to m ake the League a universal body, to m o d ify the unanim ity rule, to strengthen the sanctions process, to create regional struc­ tures, and to im prove ways prom oting peaceful change. Som e representatives w ondered w hether the real problem w as ju st a m atter o f w ill. H aving failed to act forcefully in the face o f Japanese and Italian aggression, som e m em bers apparently w anted to ease their consciences.10 D elegates to a m eeting o f the International Federation o f League o f N a­ tion s Societies discussed the A m erican and European proposals fo r revision, and the A ssem bly and C o u n cil debated various ideas at length. T h e A ssem bly approved am endm ents to apply econom ic sanctions gradually, b u t these were never ratified, largely because the French w ere n ot convinced that this w ould enhance their security. T hus the great reform effort failed, largely because no one could agree on the best form ula.11

A fter the brief period o f dislocation, Fosdick, Eichelberger, and Shotw ell had given the LN A new life and direction. W hile the educational program s that had been granted p rio rity after the election o f 1928 w ere continued, p oliti­ cal activity directed at decision m akers in W ashington and at the general pub­ lic was once again em phasized. T he association devoted considerable effort to public relations, as the leadership exploited influential contacts in law, busi­ ness, education, and journalism and renewed contacts w ith sym pathizers in Congress. T he d o se contact they enjoyed w ith the W hite H ouse and Secretary o f State H ull m eant that LN A leaders rarely criticized adm inistration program s, follow ing instead a path best described as “deferential and supportive.” 11 D espite the new determ ination and vita lity displayed b y the L N A leader­ ship, m em bers w ere aware that in this decade o f crisis the organ ization faced three particular, interrelated challenges. T he LN A faced a period o f declining financial support, as the depression seriously underm ined in d ivid ual dona­ tions; there w ere defections w ith in the internationalist coalition , particularly b y peace and pacifist groups that feared the renew al o f tensions and the po­ tential use o f sanctions; and finally, th ey had to m aintain the sup port o f their traditional allies and large institution al donors. T he onset o f the depression was im m ediately reflected in the deterioration o f the LNA’s financial situation. In 1932, staff m em bers accepted a cu t in sal­ ary. Even so, each year brought deficits because o f declining pledges, a trend exacerbated b y an 1RS rulin g on 26 O ctober 1932 that denied the organization its tax exem pt status because it w as involved in “the dissem ination o f contro­ versial o r partisan propaganda.” Fortunately, contributions fro m a few m ajor donors enabled the LN A to m aintain a paid sta ff o f fifteen to tw enty.13

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T he association’s outreach « te n d e d to th irty-fou r branches in mid-1933, w ith extensive operations in C hicago and N ew York. A nationw ide advisory coun cil, started in 1930 and headed b y N icholas M urray Butler, carried the nam es o f exceptionally prom inent citizens from every state. T he staff, along w ith these dedicated volunteers, struggled to m aintain the extensive educa­ tion al program s, including essay and cartoon contests, study courses w ith exam inations in high schools, and the very successful M odel League o f N a­ tion s A ssem bly in schools and colleges. These program s had to be supported b y production o f printed posters, literature, handbooks, and pam phlets. T he LN A also m aintained special departm ents on speakers, radio, press, and m ov­ ies, and published the journal, Chronicle o f World Affairs. It continued its Swiss operations through the G eneva Com m ittee, w hich distributed Geneva and an Information News Letter, and sponsored tours o f the League’s headquarters. T he LN A also m ounted special cam paigns geared to particular events. For exam ple, beginning in 1938, it assum ed leadership in prom oting the building o f a League o f N ations pavilion at the N ew York W orld’s Fair.14 D urin g the 1930s, LN A leaders had to be constantly concerned about the fluctuating relationship between diverse factions o f the internationalist com ­ m unity. O f all the coalition m em bers, peace advocates posed the largest prob­ lem . O n the surface, their com m itm ent to w orld peace appeared to m ake them natural allies o f the p o lity internationalists in the LN A. However, ju st like during the treaty debates o f 1919-20, peace advocates frequently preferred to pursue their ow n agenda. A s a result, Eichelberger was forced to devote con ­ siderable effort to building o r strengthening coalitions to gain their advocacy fo r pro-League activities. Initially, support from Carrie Chapm an Catt’s N ational Com m ittee on the Cause and Cure o f W ar (N C C C W ) was the m ost reliable. In 1933, responding to the M anchurian Crisis, the N C C C W raised the question o f League m em ­ bership and debated the w isdom o f applying sanctions.11 The W omen’s Inter­ national League for Peace and Freedom (W ILPF) also provided cautious sig­ nals o f support for LN A objectives. It endorsed w orld disarm am ent conferences and in the 1930s called for greater cooperation w ith the League, including U.S. representation at C ouncil m eetings. Em ily Greene B ald ı, w ho served as presi­ dent o f both the Am erican branch and the international body, w rote exten­ sively on disarm am ent, the M anchurian C risis, reform o f the League, neutral­ ity legislation, and collective security. In her essays and speeches, she proposed a m ore effective League through a pledge by m em bers o f greater respect for each other and a fiiller reliance on its technical and hum an activities.16 T he greatest challenge posed b y peace activists to p o lity internationalist efforts on behalf o f the League cam e in the m id-i930s, when tw o effective peace w orker coalitions appeared. The Em ergency Peace Cam paign was b o m o f a strong desire to keep the U nited States out o f war, and m any o f its goals w ould have pleased the m ost ardent isolationists despite the fact that, tucked away in

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its list o f objectives, the cam paign supported m em bership in the W orld Court and greater cooperation w ith the League on nonpolitical m atters. Eichelberger protested against this w eak position on the League, stating that it w ould at­ tract "people w ho were really opposed.”17 T he second coalition, the N ational Peace Conference (N P C ), em erged in 1932 and was reorganized in 193$ under the leadership o f M ethodist m inister James W. Van K irk. T he N P C boasted a w ide spectrum o f associated organi­ zations, m any o f them religious, professional, and wom en’s groups not di­ rectly involved in peace w ork. T he Carnegie Endow m ent for International Peace and the Carnegie C orporation supported it largely because o f its out­ reach: in 1940 the N P C claim ed that it represented the view s o f forty-six m il­ lion citizens. Undeniably, attitudes w ith in peace advocacy groups were shifting radically during the m iddle o f the decade. For exam ple, during the late 1930s, the N PC divided over issues o f collective security and the use o f sanctions. It was not until Septem ber 1939 that the organization declared that it w ould "w ork for perm anent w orld governm ent as the basis o f peace and security,” bu ilt on "justice, law, and order.”1* Responses to a questionnaire distributed to peace w orkers b y the W orld U nity Foundation in 1934 revealed strongly positive attitudes about the League o f N ations. These favorable sentim ents seem ed to indicate that peace groups could still be counted on to support internationalist ideals. However, an ex­ tensive study o f public opinion and foreign p olicy conducted b y John M asland in the State D epartm ent (undertaken in 1943) indicates that around 1935, "a profound change” had taken place. Pacifist groups and peace advocates began to reject "collective security for the panacea o f neutrality.” The Nye Com m ittee’s revelations, com ing on the heels o f crises abroad, caused the shift. M asland concluded that in 1937, there w ere still tw enty-seven national peace organiza­ tions w ith a constituency o f m illions. He asserted that these groups helped to "clarify issues,” to "crystalize existing attitudes,” to m obilize groups, and to convert attitudes into dem ands "fo r action on a particular m easure at a par­ ticular tim e.” T hey precipitated action and thus were "o f considerable politi­ cal significance.” 19 U nfortunately fo r the LN A, little o f this effort was directed at the fu lfill­ m ent o f internationalist goals. T he shift away from collective security m eant that increasingly, just like w ith the Em ergency Peace Cam paign, m any peace advocates supported policies that were indistinguishable from those supported b y the m ost ardent isolationists and Am erican Firsters. Even those groups that rem ained nom inally w ithin the internationalist coalition weakened their support.30 D uring the latter years o f the decade, C att’s N ational Com m ittee on the Cause and C ure o f W ar passed on ly am biguous resolutions that left m uch to be desired. The delegates advocated legislation to "prom ote the ac­ tive cooperation o f the U nited States w ith other nations in peaceful m eans to

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deal w ith econom ic and political problem s disturbing the peace o f the world.” T h ey also endorsed the use o f "progressive sanctions,” either econom ic or m ilitary, called fo r a revival o f faith in co llective actio n , and supported m odification o f the neutrality acts to give the president greater discretionary pow er to em bargo the sale o f arm s to aggressors. A nd yet they studiously avoided any reference to League m em bership.* E m ily B ald ı and d ie W om en’s International League fo r Peace and Freedom , b y endorsing collective, non­ m ilitary pressures against aggressors, allied them selves firm ly against the in­ ternationalists, w ho were m oving to accept collective security arrangem ents. Ironically, the peace advocacy factions that left the internationalist coali­ tion did n ot fare w ell during the last years o f the decade. Factions continued to splinter, dividing over support for neutrality legislation, Roosevelt’s Asian policy, and a proper response to the fascist threat in Europe. Antiw ar stands that aligned peace w orkers w ith neutralists and isolationists seem ed unrealis­ tic (and for many, im m oral) in an increasingly dangerous w orld. Som e o f the disheartened drifted back tow ard an internationalist stance, recognizing that it m ight be necessary to assum e com m itm ents, the president m ight need greater discretionary pow er to respond to threats, and even collective security arrangem ents m ight be needed as a preventive for war.3* D espite the LNA’s failure to m aintain the support o f the peace and pacifist contingents, it did continue to hold the allegiance o f a num ber o f other allies. T he W orld Peace Foundation (W PF) upheld its com m itm ent to print a pam ­ phlet series and distribute m aterials from the League o f N ations, the W orld C o u rt, and other international agencies. T he director reported in 1932 that in the previous five years it had sold $250,000 w orth o f m aterials. W hen its ow n budget could n ot sustain its extensive operations, it sought and obtained a gift o f $75,000 from John D. Rockefeller, Jr.33 T h e Foreign Policy A ssociation also w orked closely w ith the LN A and the W PF in prom oting an internationalist perspective. It described its extensive publication program as objective, but the choice o f topics b y its ten-person research departm ent, headed b y Raym ond L. Buell, showed where sym pa­ thies lay. M oreover, its outspoken chairm an, James G rover M cD onald, m ade m any public pronouncem ents o f his support for m em bership in the League and C ou rt. W hen he left in 1933 to assum e a post as high com m issioner for refugees from Germ any, he was replaced b y W illiam T. Stone, w ho was less outspoken but no less friendly tow ard the League.34 T he Carnegie Endow m ent o f International Peace, w hich began dem on­ strating an increased interest in the League in 1929, continued its large publi­ cation and distribution program . W ith George H. Blakeslee as president (193046), and w ith trustees like H udson, Low ell, Baker, H arry A . G arfield, and Stephen P. D uggan, the CEIP had a veritable fifth colum n o f League support­ ers. In addition, by the m id-thirties Butler had grow n increasingly concerned about the state o f the w orld, becom ing quite extrem e in his advocacy o f "a

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d o se international federation in the form o f a single governm ent” to deal w ith problem s and end “anarchic conditions.” In 1937 he proposed a m eeting in G eneva “to associate the Endow m ent still m ore d o se ly w ith the League o f N ations.” Shotw ell, w hile heading the LN A , contin ued to serve as d irecto r o f the endow m ent’s D ivision o f Econom ics and H istory, and his pro-League proclivities could n ot be doubted. W hen Edw in B orchard, perhaps under­ standably, attacked the CE IP in 1940 in his Neutrality fo r the United States, Shotw ell felt com pelled to respond. H e asserted that although the C E IP had never endorsed the League “as such,” it stood fo r the concept o f in tern ation al organ ization as a necessary m achine fo r peace.” A nalysis o f the endow m ent’s financial com m itm ent to the LN A d em on ­ strates this p oin t. O n the one hand, in 1934, the LN A suggested a C ooperative Program fo r International E ducation and gained a C arnegie grant o f $65,000 to be shared betw een the LN A , the W PF, and the FPA. CEIP grants helped support the W ashington office and the A m erican C om m ittee in G eneva, both operations o f the L N A .* R um ors even circulated that the A m erican Peace Society lost its CEIP subsidy because it failed to stand behind the League. O n the other hand, the endow m ent consistently avoided con tribu tin g to th e LN A general budget, and the relatively sm all am ounts appropriated from an an­ nual incom e o f $15,000,000-18,000,000 indicate that the endow m ent never m ade a substantial financial com m itm ent to the m ost prom inent League­ supportin g organization. Ironically, throughout the decade religious leaders seem ed to be m ore and m ore w illin g to m ake com m itm ents at the very tim e that lay su p port fo r in­ ternationalist goals w as declining. A C hurch Peace U nion “ M anifesto A gainst War,” signed b y m inisters across the co u n try in N ovem ber 1934, called fo r the nation to “jo in the W orld C o u rt and the League o f N ations.” In 1936, w hen resolutions o f the G eneral C o u n cil o f C ongregational and C h ristian C hurches dropped reference to the League and C o u rt, a flo o r figh t developed w ith a resulting reaffirm ation in favor o f m em bership in both.” Conversely, support fo r the League seem s to have been declining am ong the laity. A n extensive p o ll taken b y the C o u n cil fo r Social A ction o f the C ongregation al-C h ristian C hurches in 1935 w ent d irectly to congregations, garnering responses from 72 percent o f the m ore than 200,000 persons regularly attending services. The results (70,411 in favor to 89,661 opposed) revealed a relative declin e in sup­ p o rt fo r League m em bership, although this w as still a dem onstration o f sur­ prisin gly strong internationalist sentim ent.* Efforts to prom ote and support League m em bership also con tin u ed em a­ nating from G eneva. T he A m erican C om m ittee rem ained one o f th e m ost active groups in caring for the needs o f visitors. Senators, correspondents, and other dignitaries received the usual special attention. T he num ber o f tour­ ists rem ained low throughout the early thirties bu t increased dram atically in 1935, after the U nited States jo in ed the ILO, and again after 1936, w hen the

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new headquarters o f the League opened. B y 1938, the com m ittee claim ed to have hosted an estim ated 100,000 Am erican visitors.39 The com m ittee also provided an inform ation service to individuals. W hen Senator Nye requested data on arm s traffic for his investigatory com m ittee, H udson sent a 250-page report. It printed guides to Geneva and m ajor speeches given during the dis­ arm am ent conferences, arranged luncheons that brought prom inent individu­ als together, provided offices in the International G u b for several other A m eri­ can groups in G eneva, and continued to organize the sum m er educational program s through the G eneva Institute o f International Relations.40 The G eneva Research Center also continued to prom ote the League, com ­ m issioning studies and engaging in an extensive publishing program . Fund­ ing cam e from the Rockefeller Foundation, the LN A, and the CEIP, w hich paid the salary o f its director.41 M alcolm W . D avis adm inistered the Center’s program s and edited its journal, Geneva: A M onthly Review o f International Affairs. D avis allow ed authors to express their ow n view s, thus m aintaining a claim to im partiality in all endeavors. Tensions som etim es arose betw een Sweetser, w ho w anted a m ore pro-League orientation, and D avis, w ho ad­ vanced the m ore objective approach. W hen D avis left in 1935 to take charge o f the CE IP’s European Center in Paris, the Foreign Policy A ssociation increased its involvem ent, sending first Buell and then its vice-president, W illiam Stone, to G eneva. In 1936, the Rockefeller Foundation, unhappy w ith operations, threatened to w ithdraw its support. T hat led to a reorganization and the in ­ stallation o f a governing board, including prom inent European scholars— a victo ry for the im partial approach.4* T he extensive operations in Geneva often brought dem ands for better coor­ dination. In 1932 the Am erican Interorganization C ouncil in Geneva was cre­ ated to assist representatives from m ore than tw enty-six Am erican groups that had an interest in the disarm am ent discussions. It m et regularly, hearing speeches b y experts attached to the conference, and its w eekly reports and re­ sum es, usually prepared b y its chairperson, Laura Puffer M organ, went to the groups at hom e. T he council also sent m em orials to League officials and to Stim son recom m ending action on particular m atters. It continued after the disarm am ent deliberations ended in 1934, but w ith m uch-reduced activity.43 A s the W orld Peace Foundation, the Foreign Policy Association, the Carnegie Endow m ent, the Church Peace U nion, and the G eneva-based organizations pursued their ow n agendas, the League o f N ations A ssociation was the front runner that drew the fire o f critics in the 1930s. Inevitably, m any attacked the group indirectly by casting doubt about the im partiality o f its studies. Borchard thought that International Conciliation under Shotw ell’s direction was little m ore than a propaganda agency to prom ote the League. Borah believed that the LN A m eant to involve the U nited States indirectly in League affairs, a kind o f “sham bling, equivocal p olicy” w here unofficial observers participated in

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conferences as a "kin d o f an international sp y” W hen the LN A launched the p etition cam paign on b eh alf o f the League in 1934, the H earst press responded w ith its ow n p etition effort.44 T h e acerbity w ith w hich opponents challenged the LN A is p articu larly sur­ prising in view o f the organization’s relative w eakness. N either the "state the term s” n or the second C ovenant revision cam paign aroused m uch interest in the U nited States. A s the Literary Digest noted in an assessm ent o f ed itorial opinion, everyone could agree on the need fo r reform b u t n ot upon specifics. Living Age m agazine conducted a m onth ly sym posium from M ay through D ecem ber 1936, asking its advisory cou n cil o f distinguished citizens w hether the U nited States should jo in the League o r "cooperate in its sanctions.” T he editors concluded that w hile sym pathy fo r m em bership and coop eration re­ m ained strong, a considerable num ber o f correspondents w ho once favored b oth actions had m odified their position. T hose d irectly opposed to jo in in g believed that the League had "exhausted its usefulness,” and there w as n o rea­ son to continue a frustrating cam paign.45 Proposals fo r m em bership in the League grad u ally faded away. H u ll had to ld Shotw ell in M arch 1935 that it w as "u n p ro p itio u s” to co n tin u e an y agi­ tation ; in m id-1936, H olt saw n o p o ssib ility o f jo in in g . H e ju d ged "th e Re­ publicans [to be] w ron g on the issue and the D em ocrats are afraid o f it.” Francis O . W ilco x declared in A p ril 1937 th at prospects w ere as rem ote as at “any tim e since the early 1920s.” Letters to the ed ito r o f the New York Tim es appeared regularly, still proclaim in g the necessity o f m em bership, an d som e groups m aintained th eir p o sitio n , b u t the issue had d ied b y 1936.* In Eu­ rope pessim ism prevailed. T h e C o u n cil rem oved the C ovenant revision from its agenda in Septem ber 1937, although a C om m ittee o f 28 o n R eform con ­ tin u ed to fu n ctio n . N aturally, a few enthusiasts refused to abandon hope. T h ey stu bborn ly denied any suggestion that an isolationist m ood had killed chances o f m em ­ bership. League enthusiasts in the U nited States like E ichelberger contin ued to prom ote the Shotw ell form ula to Europeans, as b oth friends and foes de­ cried the unw ieldy features that m ade the League ineffective.47 Som e Europe­ ans, notably Lord Lothian and Sir W illoughby D ickinson , con tin ued to seek som e w ay to im prove A m erican relations w ith the League. T h e latter appealed to the U nited States to jo in and suggested the elim ination o f A rticle 16 to achieve that goal. Late in 1938, the French even proposed the creation o f a new league if it w ould bring about A m erican m em bership.4* In assessing the w ork o f the LN A d urin g the 1930s, it is o n ly fu r to note that it operated under a variety o f handicaps. It had gone through a d ifficult period in the late 1920s, follow ed b y a num ber o f personnel shifts in the early 1930s. Indeed, leaders o f the LN A seem ed at tim es to lose confidence in their prim ary goals. In the early 1930s, cam paigns for m em bership in the W orld C o u rt to o k precedence over the League, and som e candidates fo r political

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office, including m em bers o f the association, did not w ish it to em phasize international issues too strongly. It faced budget constraints as the depression forced donors to reduce their contributions; its extensive education program s did n ot elicit a political constituency; and it found itself restrained b y its rela­ tionship w ith governm ent leaders w ho played on fears that any endorsem ent o f anything b y the LN A w ould inevitably stim ulate an opposition response. C learly the Roosevelt adm inistration preferred that the LN A m ove cautiously to avoid im peding official foreign policies.49 D espite these lim itations, the LN A and other internationalist organizations could claim som e victories, particularly in the initiatives taken during the M anchurian episode and in achieving m em bership in the ILO. N evertheless, the overall picture was dism al despite considerable effort b y the internation­ alists. U ntil 1935 a strong pro-League contingent existed, but the W orld C ou rt defeat in 1935, the uncertain League response regarding Ethiopia, H itler’s re­ n unciation o f the Locarno pacts on 7 M arch 1936, and his m ove into the R hineland in A pril and M ay, com bined w ith the fu tu re o f the second London N aval Conference, provided am ple signs o f a disintegrating peace system . Am azingly, events abroad m ade citizens m ore aware o f international affairs than ever before even as they turned inward. T he shift to isolationism associ­ ated w ith nationalistic attitudes tow ard w ar debts, protective tariffs, and antiforeign sentim ents m ounted as the years passed. A strong antiw ar sentim ent also em erged, stim ulated b y the revelations o f the Nye Com m ittee and in ­ creasing evidence o f a w orld going m ad. Thus, the rising tide o f nationalism and isolationism in the 1930s seem ed overw helm ing. O ne searches in vain for evidence that the LN A had any real political influence in the W hite H ouse or in the Senate, w here it really counted. Sweetser on a visit in 1938 found interest in the League “further in the back­ ground than ever before,” w ith the general public unaware o f w hat its m em ­ bers were tryin g to do. Even earlier, however, w hen popular sentim ent m ay have favored m em bership, m ost citizens apparently did not place a high p ri­ o rity on the su b ject Charles A . Beard was undoubtedly right w hen, during the Second W orld War, he concluded that “the Am erican people never fa­ vored the League intensely enough to force ratification b y the Senate.” Thus the pro-League contingent failed in its essential goal.

12 COLLECTIVE SECURITY, SANCTIONS, AND THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBILITY

n 1932, in com m enting on U nited States foreign policy, Frank Sim onds w rote that "th e sim ple truth is that no nation can act in tern ation ally w ith ­ o u t assum ing responsibility.” A ccording to Sim onds, the policies b ein g pur­ sued d urin g the M anchurian C risis reflected "th e idea th at the problem s o f peace and w ar are questions o f m orals and therefore w ith ou t p o litical con­ tent.” H e cogen tly observed that "iso latio n and involvem ent are p o rtfo lio w ords” because "neither represents an idea upon w h ich it is possible to base a national policy.” 1 O f all the weaknesses o f the internationalists during the interw ar period, their failure to recognize and address this problem is am ong the m ost crucial. A lth ough they endlessly used the term s collective security and doctrine o f re­ sponsibility, and fought significant internecine battles over the use o f sanctions, A m erican internationalists rarely faced these issues, or their critics, realisti­ cally. Thus, they developed no system atic rationale in favor o f their positions, n or did th ey w eigh carefully the consequences o f their divisions. Scholars have frequently criticized interw ar adm inistrations fo r these sam e failures, noting that officials placed lim itations on collective security, sanctions, and even the doctrine o f responsibility that m ade them m eaningless. T h ey "w ere able to generate m uch noise but little real power.”1 But the internationalists deserve equal— if n ot m ore— condem nation because these issues w ere so central to their ideals. A s the group struggling to define and shape the foreign policy debate during the 1920s and 1930s, they had an obligation to clarify th eir posi­ tion on these issues. T heir am bivalence and failure to recognize the verity o f Sim ond’s observations thus doom ed their efforts from the o u tse t

I

T he term collective security, and the use o f sanctions to uphold it, has been w id ely identified w ith the League o f N ations. Traditional alliances involving jo in t action existed lon g before 1920, but it w as in the post-V ersailles era that internationalists insisted that th ey had found a unique w ay to m aintain sta­

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bility in the w orld , one n ot based on national interests as under alliances but on the g o o d o f everyone.3C ollective security differed from collective action in its assum ption o f a universal secu rity response, n ot a selective one b y signers o f a d efensive pact o r alliance. T his concept had been advanced d urin g W orld War I in discussions about a postw ar league, and the C ovenant reflected the concept in A rticles 10,11, and 16. A m azin gly, given its cen trality to the w h ole issue o f League m em bership, A m erican internationalists gave collective security o n ly the m ost lim ited sup­ p o rt In d eed , the term collective security d id n ot appear in the internationalist vo cabu lary u n til the early 1930s even though concepts im plicit in the phrase had existed fo r som e tim e.4T he m ajor obstacle to internationalist support for the co n cep t w as the in ab ility to agree on (or to accept the necessity o f) the use o f san ction s. T h e su b ject o f sanctions, com m only associated w ith collective security, had been w id e ly exam ined fo r centuries, especially b y intern ational lawyers w h o sought so m e m eans to com pel obedience to treaties or general rules o f proper behavior. B y the early tw entieth century, som e proponents o f international organ izatio n had incorporated sanctions in to the plans they drafted. A sanc­ tion, in th is context, could be "any reward o r punishm ent that a group uses to secure th e obedience o f its members.” T he application could be inform al (when involving consum er o r business boycotts) o r form al (w hen applied b y gov­ ernm ents o r international b odies). T h e latter typ e, because it w as usually tied to a co n tra ctu a l arrangem ent o r a pledge, seem ingly required a com m itm ent.5 P rio r to 1920, m ost internationalists w ere w illin g to discuss the use o f sanc­ tions, a lth o u g h there w as little agreem ent reached. Pacifists could see m erit in properly d evised pressures, although th ey rejected those that involved m ili­ tary fo rce. M any believed that econom ic sanctions cou ld be applied but w ith lim ited risk . T here w ere con tin u in g debates, how ever, over how sanctions should b e im posed. A n y com m itm ent to the use o f sanctions before the fact im plied th a t, in every case, there w ould be no question as to the circum stances involved a n d the designation o f the gu ilty party. M any internationalists in ­ sisted th a t th is presupposed a clarity and unanim ity n ot as evident in practice as in th e o ry . B ecau se m ilitary sanctions seem ed to o dangerous, m any internationalists saw e co n o m ic pressures as a desirable alternative, an approach clearly o u t­ lined in A rtic le 16 and defined b y the A ssem bly on 4 O ctober 1921. T his option had tw o persuasive features. First, it enabled a governm ent to go beyond m erely asserting a m oral posture against an aggressor. Second, it seem ed relatively risk-free. In th e early 1920s, A m erican internationalists applied the concept in a n egative w ay: the U nited States should take n o action that hindered o r sabo­ taged th e League in its deliberations o r in applying sanctions. Such a stand seem ed lo g ic a l at a tim e w hen, as M anley H udson noted, one should n ot over­ estim ate fo rce as an elem ent in m aintaining peace. T h e League w as sim ply

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“an instrum ent fo r the m anufacture o f consent” and consultation w ithout coercion.6 T hat assessm ent changed, however, during discussions over im plem enting the K ellogg-Briand Pact and when the crises o f the 1930s led to calls for eco­ nom ic em bargoes. The shift can best be seen in the position o f the LN A, which as late as 1932 showed a reluctance to endorse such action; it w as n ot until the the mid-i930S that this group m oved to d ear advocacy o f econom ic sanc­ tions.7 N ot on ly did internationalists vary in the tim in g o f their espousal o f sanc­ tions as an option, but their approaches revealed significant differences o f view . Som e Am erican internationalists h d d firm ly to the contention that the U nited States could on ly participate in econom ic sanctions if it was a m em ­ ber o f the League. O thers eagerly insisted that support and com pliance w ith League-im posed econom ic pressures could be done w ith out m em bership. H oover appeared to dism iss both points o f view w hen he announced that the Am erican people w ould find any boycott o f food that w ould starve w om en and children to ta lly unacceptable. Finally, advocates co u ld n o t agree on w hether econom ic sanctions should be applied autom atically o r on ly after case-by-case deliberations.* Such am biguities gave critics such as M oore and Borchard an opportunity to assail the w hole idea o f sanctions. Form ulas and “paper schem es” w ould n ot w ork; unanim ity on em bargoes w ould be virtu ally im possible to attain; rather than localizing wars, universal application o f sanctions w ould broaden conflicts; right and w rong were seldom clear in international disputes; eco­ nom ic sanctions, representing an abandonm ent o f traditional neutrality, w ould lead inevitably to m ilitary intervention; finally, the discussion o f sanctions, rather than prom oting peace, m ade the w orld m ore w ar-m inded.9 O ther critics raised additional challenges, especially to econom ic sanctions. W hat w ould nations do if they failed? W hat w ould happen w hen a country outside the League refused to cooperate? H ow could the U nited States re­ spond positively to collective action under the League if the president lacked the pow er to com pel private com panies to conform to an em bargo?10 Yet Am erican internationalists rarely faced such questions o r critics realistically. T h ey developed no system atic rationale in favor o f their positions. W illiam I. H ull, professor o f history at Sw arthm ore C ollege, was one o f the few persons w ho tried to produce a com prehensive analysis o f sanctions. His Q uaker beliefs prevented him from personally espousing m ore than m oral pressures, yet he exam ined other options. In O ctober 1932, he presented his view s in a pam phlet in w hich he explored the idea o f coercion to m aintain peace and concluded that the path o f conciliation was m uch to be preferred. He discussed diplom atic boycotts (w hich could offend a governm ent and lead it to take hostile action); a consular boycott (not adequate to force a settle­ m ent); nonintercourse (im possible to enforce); a financial boycott (difficult

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to con trol because it w ould involve private investors); a ban on the export o f m unitions (often one-sided so that an em bargoed state w ould consider it a "virtu al act o f w ar” ); a com m ercial boycott (unacceptable because it w ould hurt innocent citizens and also be im possible to enforce and harm ful to the w ielder); m easures short o f w ar such as retortion, retaliation, and a “peaceful blockade” (im practical against pow erful nations); and w ar o r the threat o f w ar (dangerous regardless o f how noble the cause m ight be). H ull found that popular support for any o f these form ulas stem m ed from a feeling o f righ­ teous indignation against violators o f peaceful pledges. However, he judged such responses as a “surrender o f faith in the efficacy o f those peaceful m eans b y w hich true peace can alone be achieved.” These m eans should n ot be re­ jected because o f untried theories. He concluded “that coercive sanctions o f international obligations are either ineffective, or unjust and cruel, and usu­ a lly lead to wars.” Peaceful sanctions were m uch preferable.” Japan's incursion into M anchuria led internationalists to an intense debate on these points. M any rejected H ull’s conclusions. T h ey argued that i f sanc­ tion s w ere undertaken collectively, there w ould be nothing to fear. N o nation w ould consider an attack on the U nited States, and, if applied independently o f the League, even isolationists could n ot object. Low ell drafted a petition in February 1932, w hich he circulated for signatures. T his so-called Lowell-Baker docum ent called on the president and Congress to indicate their w illingness to “concur in any econom ic measures” taken b y the League on behalf o f peace.“ T he LN A circulated it and created an Am erican Com m ittee on the Far East to oversee the results. Sentim ent in favor o f the form ula seem ed strong, w ith surprising interest shown. Lowell publicly aired his view s in an article in w hich he w arned that the League w ould continue to be weakened if sanctions were n ot applied.0 Clearly, during the M anchurian C risis, internationalists w ere seeking som e form o f effective response. M oral declarations w ere o f lim ited value. Yet such efforts led the Nation to ponder the “ceaseless propaganda” to “w in this coun­ try over to the ‘peace b y com pulsion’ theory.” T he State D epartm ent sought to im pose a barrier to their dem ands for econom ic sanctions b y bluntly announc­ ing that such an alternative had been renounced because it “w ould alm ost surely lead to war.”M A C om m ittee on E conom ic Sanctions led b y Butler and sponsored b y the Tw entieth C en tu ry Fund also explored the subject and issued a report in 1932. It called for a supplem ented K ellogg-B riand Pact in w hich the signers agreed to refrain from providin g arm s to an aggressor and to apply other econom ic pressures short o f force. T he U nited States should issue a call fo r a conference to im plem ent the recom m endations and, after consultation, every country w ould be free to decide on its ow n action. A report issued by a com m it­ tee o f the Am erican Branch o f the W orld Alliance endorsed all o f the Butler group’s suggestions but called fo r a perm anent Com m ission o f C on ciliation ,

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disarm am ent, and the renunciation o f arm ed force. A n Em ergency Peace C om ­ m ittee recom m ended a lesser goal: an em bargo on arm s to nations at war w ould suffice.15 D espite such discussions, it is evident that internationalists never agreed on the nature o r where and w hen to apply econom ic sanctions. G iven their uncertainties and unw illingness to build a consistent rationale, it is n ot sur­ prising that isolationist w arnings prevailed and that politicians seem ed reluc­ tant to endorse such form ulas. A lthough the controversies surrounding the application o f econom ic sanc­ tions w ere intense, the m ost divisive disagreem ents centered on the use o f m ilitary force. A s John Bassett M oore expressed it, those w ho advocated the use o f force applied “the dental sim ile, a com bination ‘w ith teeth.’”“ Yet they never successfully refuted their opponents’ m ajor contention. Those opposed to the use o f sanctions argued that the application o f econom ic o r m ilitary force w ould result in war— or at least a state o f non-peace. Advocates w ould be defeating w hat they hoped to achieve. Those w ho favored m ilitary sanc­ tions responded that a m ilitary police action should not be considered war. As D enna E Flem ing observed, on ly habit led people to conclude that the collective application o f force was war.17 N o m atter how hard they tried, how ­ ever, sanction advocates never convinced their critics that this was a m ean­ ingful distinction. A s Am erican internationalists explored this issue between 191$ and 1928, leaders o f the League to Enforce Peace (even after its dissolution) becam e the m ost prom inent exponents o f m ilitary sanctions. O f these, A . Lawrence Lowell spoke m ost often and openly, com plaining bitterly against those w ho wanted to outlaw w ar w ithout providing any penalties. A s his position evolved, he cam e to view A rticle 10 as inadequate because it “put force in the w rong place, not to prevent wars from taking place, but to attem pt to m ake them unprofit­ able b y a threat o f force afterwards.” Som e felt that Low ell’s declarations were deceptive, however, as in m ost cases he endorsed the im position o f econom ic sanctions, especially in the 1930s. It was not un til late in that decade that he unequivocally called for arm ed responses against aggressors.1* Theodore M arburg also spoke on b eh alf o f the use o f m ilitary force: ag­ gressors had to know the consequences o f their actions. Parsons added that peace w ould never be possible until there was an international arm y and navy.19 Yet such individuals were alm ost unique in voicing their view s. W hen D avid D avies and O scar T. Crosby sought throughout the 1930s to rally internation­ alists to D avies’s proposed tribunal backed by a police force, they found few Am ericans ready to respond.20 T he aggressive governm ents that em erged in the 1930s did stim ulate a few m ore persons to exam ine the need for force to uphold peace. Som e review ed the proposals o f the League to Enforce Peace (LEP), w hich had called for m ili­ tary and econom ic pressures against any state that used arm s w ithout first

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seeking to resolve differences peacefully. H enry G oddard Leach o f the A m erican-Scandinavian F oundation suggested that d ie B ritish and A m erican navies com bine to police the w orld. Journalist Edward Price Bell argued fo r a broader com bin ation that could apply sanctions in support o f law and peace.” T h e Italian attack on E thiopia in the fall o f 1935 revitalized d ie discussion on san ction s as League m em bers debated how they should respond. W hile m ost discussion centered on econom ic pressures, a few persons argued for stronger action . Som e A m erican internationalists seized on the event to re­ vive the case fo r m em bership in the League. O n ly in this w ay could the U nited States reinforce the intern ational response. O thers sim ply argued in favor o f a w orld p o lice force.“ B y the late 1930s a few m ore voices cou ld b e heard, although th ey spoke in broad term s o f the need to reform the League o r to create a new organ ization arm ed to safeguard peace.4 B uder best represented such generalists. In 1938 he review ed a 1910 congressional resolution to com bine the navies o f the w orld in to a p o lice force, and he publicized this as a m easure o f rem arkable fore­ sight w h ile n o t taking a position o f advocacy. A s president o f the CEIP, he th ou gh t th at he could n ot prom ote program s other than those pursued b y the endow m ent.14 U ltim ately, sanctions posed the m ost divisive and im m obilizing issue faced b y the internationalists d urin g the interw ar years. T h e entire controversy over A rticle 10 really revolved around this question, and the intense debate it sparked in 1919-20 colored all thin kin g w henever the subject o f sanctions arose. A s the years passed, m ore and m ore internationalists w ere w illin g to am end the C oven an t to elim inate the obligations im p licit in A rticles 10 and 16. T his ten­ d en cy w as n ot solely attributable to Am ericans; m any other nations expressed con cern , especially in the face o f undefined obligations that th ey had to as­ sum e. A s noted earlier, the C anadian proposal to strike A rticle 10, raised in the first Assem bly, received a w arm response. In ensuing years, various com ­ m ittees con d ucted studies, each sh ow ing an increasing tenden cy to allo w m em bers leew ay to determ ine their ow n courses o f action and to rely m ore on econ o m ic than m ilitary pressures. In so doin g, it m ust be adm itted that the E uropeans w ere transform ing the League from “a society fo r the m utual p ro tectio n o f its m em bers” in to uan association fo r conference only.” 4 Even as the League revealed its inability to m ove forcefully under A rticle 10, A m erican internationalists shied away from bold pronouncem ents. M any w ere resigned to the fact that it was difficult enough to convey the internationalist m essage w ith out having argum ents over m ilitary or econom ic sanctions to con ten d w ith. Clearly, the m ajority o f internationalists w ere leery o f any p ro­ posals to use arm ed force o r econom ic coercion on beh alf o f peace. Therefore, o n ly a few openly espoused collaborative action durin g the M anchurian C risis and th e conquest o f Ethiopia. H owever, acceptance o f the responsibility to use san ction s lay at the heart o f any U.S. com m itm ent to a w orld com m unity.

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Follow ing W orld W ar I, A m ericans in general recognized that the unsatisfac­ to ry peace settlem ent, the reparations issue, and the instability and insecurity o f various governm ents had left m any problem s unresolved. It was the inter­ nationalists, however, w ho consistently sounded the alarm as to just how deeply unstable conditions in Europe could affect the U nited States. Because few A m ericans were w illin g to accept collective security o r a unilateral program o f m eaningful sanctions to deal w ith these problem s, and because interna­ tionalists w ere so divided them selves, they turned to the doctrine o f responsi­ bility. This concept becam e the subtle centerpiece o f debates w ithin the United States. Am erican internationalists recognized that their nation had assum ed no obligations under the Covenant; indeed, the Senate’s rejection o f League m em bership revealed a clear reluctance to apply sanctions on b eh alf o f peace. T hey argued, nevertheless, that the nation should assum e a leadership role, act as if it w ere a fu ll m em ber o f the fam ily o f nations, and w eigh whatever obligations that entailed. T hus cooperation w ith the League becam e part o f the doctrine. D iscussions o f the responsibility principle were inevitably tied to efforts designed to uphold peace. U nder the doctrine o f responsibility, the United States w ould agree to cooperate yet be free to determ ine its ow n actions and responses to problem s. Because the doctrine o f responsibility d id n ot specifi­ cally address the issue o f sanctions, it left the issue open to varying interpreta­ tions. Som e advocates o f this option saw it as sanction-free; others argued, especially in the 1930s, that the use o f force should not be rejected.26 Internationalists claim ed that H arding’s call for a disarm am ent conference in 1921 exem plified the doctrine. T h ey also applauded the Geneva Protocol o f 1924, an attem pt to define aggression, but Hughes refused to assum e obliga­ tions, seeing the protocol as a potential concert that could be directed at the U nited States.27 Nevertheless, internationalist efforts under the doctrine o f responsibility paved the w ay for the Locarno treaties o f 1 D ecem ber 1925 and helped stim ulate the pressure on A ristide Briand o f France and Secretary o f State Frank B. K ellogg to conclude the K ellogg-Briand Pact in 1928.2* T he G eneva Protocol never becam e effective. T he British show ed an un­ usual reserve, seeing it as potentially dangerous and eventually refusing to support it. Even though it had no provision fo r enforcem ent, they feared that the prim ary burden o f responding w ould fall on British shoulders, especially after the U nited States expressed reluctance to becom e a party to the agree­ m ent.29Yet the defeat o f the protocol did n ot discourage Am erican interna­ tionalists. T hey turned to the treaties o f 1925, finding great hope in the “spirit o f Locarno.” W ith lessened tensions, trust, and the m achinery to resolve dis­ putes, Europe w ould be stabilized. Perhaps then the United States w ould be m ore w illin g to assum e som e responsibility in international efforts to pro­ m ote peace and security.

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A m ericans revealed no unanim ity, how ever, in m otives, goals, o r strategies related to the Locarno accords. Som e saw them as a w ay to strengthen the League o r at least to im prove its im age in the U nited States and thus to ad­ vance the likelih ood o f m em bership o r greater cooperation. O thers concen­ trated on the provisions fo r the peaceful settlem ent o f disputes, seeing in these an o p p o rtu n ity to prom ote international law, arbitration, conciliation, and m em bership in the W orld C o u rt A few individuals believed that the pact w ould enhance chances for m eaningful disarm am ent discussions. League m em bers w elcom ed th e G eneva and Locarno approaches because both m oved to de­ centralize responsibility. T h ey stim ulated a w ave o f hope, follow ed b y resolu­ tions con d em n in g wars o f aggression and a G eneral A ct fo r the Pacific Settle­ m ent o f International D isputes approved b y the A ssem bly in 1928. M odel treaties fo r arbitration and con ciliation w ould place procedural obstacles in the path o f aggressors, and this approach gained a reasonable degree o f ac­ ceptance.30 N ew s o f the Locarno settlem ent, com bined w ith reports o f the League’s success in resolving a dispute betw een Greece and Bulgaria, cheered A m eri­ can internationalists. T h e Boston Transcript referred to the "ju bilation over Locarno” at a dinner m eeting o f the M assachusetts branch o f the LN N PA on 1 D ecem ber 1925, and Fosdick described his fellow -internationalists as "al­ m ost h ysterical w ith joy.” W illiam M cD onald saw the treaties ushering in "a new day,” strengthening the League and givin g it "a chance fo r life.” A W orld Peace F oundation pam phlet uncritically proclaim ed the term s w ithin the scope o f the C oven an t.3* T h e m ajor basis for renew ed optim ism stem m ed from the agreem ent at L ocarno th at G erm any could jo in the League. M any A m ericans w h o had con ­ dem ned the Versailles settlem ent now saw a w illingness on the part o f the victo rs to be less punitive. H udson reflected such view s w hen he observed that it w ou ld no longer be possible "fo r A m ericans to continue to deride the League as a to o l em ployed b y victors to h o ld the vanquished dow n.” B y 1926, a n u m ber o f observers reported their optim ism over attitudes tow ard the League and C o u rt, w ith the Locarno treaties serving as the stim ulus for the change in sentim ent. Som e governm ent officials expressed uncom m on en­ thusiasm . A m bassador G rew saw the pacts as "a very lon g step forw ard,” w hile a m em orandum origin atin g in the D ivision o f N ear Eastern A ffairs suggested that a strengthened League w ould prom pt a reassessm ent o f the relationship o f th e U n ited States tow ard it.31 B u t the m onths passed. T he New Republic, w hich had long proclaim ed the injustices o f 1919, w aited im patiently fo r Germ an m em bership to becom e a reality as the initial hope that the Locarno treaties w ould reform the League faded.33 M em bers tem porarily blocked G erm an adm ission in M arch 1926 and by th eir actio n brought “a sw ift reversal o f sentim ent” in the U nited States. The argum ents advanced b y liberal critics appeared even m ore cogent. Perhaps the

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co u n try w as better o ff n ot being involved in European intrigues. A few inter­ nationalists like H erbert Feis o f the U niversity o f C in cin n ati still argued that the U nited States should becom e m ore active in w orld affairs and m ove to ­ w ard League m em bership. Yet events in Europe continued to undercut such enthusiasts. W hen the A ssem bly fin ally allow ed G erm any a perm anent seat on the C ou n cil, serious strains appeared. Spain tem porarily recalled its del­ egation, other countries questioned the decision, and B razil w ithdrew . The experience d id little to enhance the G eneva experim ent in A m erican eyes.34 In the ligh t o f this setback, internationalists turned to a second feature o f the Locarno treaties to prom ote support. Since the m utual security p act asso­ ciated w ith the R hineland w as supplem ented b y accords calling fo r the sub­ m ission o f disputes fo r peaceful settlem ent, internationalists in the U nited States hailed this developm ent as w ith in the A m erican trad ition . M an y o f them had been unhappy about how the C ovenant had subverted the pre-1914 prin cip le o f averting wars before th ey began and substituting the con cep t o f sanctions after a vio latio n o f the peace had occurred. T h e G eneva Protocol and Locarno pacts seem ed to reassert the im portance o f legal and procedural practices. N ew York U niversity professor C lyd e Eagleton concluded in h is 1932 textbook that "th e provisions fo r pacific settlem ent” in the Locarno accords "are m ore extensive than those o f the Covenant, and represent a h igh stage o f developm ent in the use o f arbitration and conciliation.” C ontem poraries ob­ served a grow ing interest in arbitration after 1925, w ith m any new treaties being concluded. D enys P. M yers, w ho tallied the results fo r the W orld Peace Foundation, observed in 1927 that "arbitration is at the height o f its prestige,” and predicted further grow th.33 A m erican internationalists also em phasized the positive im pact the trea­ ties could have on international law. Congressm an T heodore B urton o f O hio introduced a resolution expressing satisfaction that the Locarno agreem ents prom oted the idea o f law over force. Butler and the trustees o f the C E IP noted their "p rofoun d satisfaction” w ith the accords that opened "th e w ay to a new era o f international cooperation and friendship” in w hich differences could "b e settled b y right reason and the rule o f law rather than b y appeal to force.” B utler saw a "new era” em erging, as legal barriers against w ar w ere created.36 It was James Shotw ell w ho expressed com plete confidence that justice would replace force in resolving international conflicts. T he form ula established at Locarno indicated that nations now dem anded "th at in the place o f goin g to w ar w e accept the judgm ent and the sentence o f others.” From the perspective o f history, it m arked the "begin n in g o f an international m ovem ent w hich is alm ost the same as that social m ovem ent” w hich had fostered dom estic courts.37 Typically, n ot all U.S. internationalists found the Locarno provisions on arbitration and conciliation nearly so desirable. H istorian and ed itor W illiam M acD onald w eighed the com m itm ent to resolve disputes peacefully against the defensive arrangem ents o f Locarno and concluded that the form er were

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virtu ally nullified b y the latter. He and O scar T. C rosby also noted that the treaties excluded all disputes "belonging to the p ast” This m eant that the m ajor inequities stem m ing from the Versailles settlem ent could never be brought before tribunals. Crosby, an advocate o f an arm ed international tribunal, found in the treaties too great a reliance on the League's agencies.3* Enthusiasts ignored such critics because th ey found other reasons to be pleased w ith the Locarno settlem ent. Businessm en and bankers hoped that th e agreem ents w ou ld provid e a degree o f p o litica l stab ility that m ight strengthen Europe’s econom y. Specific aspects o f the treaties, especially those regarding the integrity o f A ustria and Hungary, w ould prom ote econom ic reconstruction. T he Locarno agreem ent seem ed designed to supplem ent the Dawes plan to restructure reparation paym ents, a fact em phasized b y U.S. officials. G erm ans were even told that if they did not support the accords, th ey w ould n ot receive loans from the U nited States.19In that the chaotic situ­ ation involving w ar debts and reparations could be attributed in part to U.S. policies, som e citizens hoped that the spirit o f Locarno w ould bring about changes. T he reentry o f G erm any into the com m unity o f nations seem ed es­ pecially opportune. European union w ould be advanced and this w ould fos­ ter a healthier and m ore independent financial and business environm ent.40 G iven these enthusiastic responses to the Locarno pacts, internationalists o f all types applied pressure on the governm ent to negotiate arbitral accords. Early in 1927, Üıe LNN PA decided to prom ote "arbitration o f the new Locarno type” as one o f its political objectives. T he State D epartm ent, responding to such agitation, negotiated or renewed tw enty-seven treaties between 1928 and 193ı.41 Pressures to conclude conciliation agreem ents also m ounted. Since pro­ visions in the Locarno docum ents reflected ideas em bodied in pacts concluded b y Secretary o f State W illiam Jennings Bryan in 1913 and 1914, Am ericans took considerable pride in w hat the Europeans had done. Bryan’s arrangem ent, according to The Independent, had hardly been noticed in 1914, but b y 1927 “every newspaper reader” knew o f the recent ones. A gain, the State D epart­ m ent acted as it renewed o r renegotiated nineteen conciliation agreem ents between 1928 and 1931. Thus b y 1938 m ore than tw o hundred treaties con­ tained provisions for conciliation, largely because o f the m odel set b y the Locarno accords.42 Am ericans also tied disarm am ent to the Locarno settlem ent because they thought that the im proved political clim ate w ould lead to a general confer­ ence. M em bers o f peace organizations inevitably believed that the W orld W ar had stem m ed from an arm s race, and they held an alm ost m ystical b elief that security could be enhanced through disarm am ent The statesm en in Paris had subscribed to this hypothesis when they w rote several articles into the C ovenant that invested the League w ith authority to m ove in this area. T he successful W ashington D isarm am ent Conference had resolved ten­ sions betw een m ajor naval pow ers, but land forces rem ained a challenge. T he

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spirit generated b y Locarno, however, m oved even the U nited States to re­ spond favorably on 31 January 1926 to a League invitation to cooperate. Presi­ dent C oolidge cited the guarantees o f peace in arguing for participation in League activities.43 O ther citizens agreed w ith C oolidge. Senator Irvine L. Lenroot o f W iscon­ sin described the Locarno treaties as "the greatest achievem ent fo r peace in the last hundred years” because they w ould bring G erm any into the League and thus prom ote disarm am ent Professor Charles G . Fenwick o f Bryn M awr C ollege believed that "a w hole series o f Locarno pacts” w ould result in less reliance on the League, provide avenues fo r additional collective action, and thus create conditions suitable for disarm am ent discussions. Shotw ell argued that the best w ay to lim it arm s w as to "strike at w ar itself,” and any agreem ent that reduced the chance o f w ar w ould thus prom ote disarm am ent44 Because the Locarno accords sought to guarantee boundaries, Europe could be stabi­ lized. It then m ade sense for the U nited States to participate in conferences to lim it arm s. These positive evaluations o f the Locarno treaties and w hat they could m ean, and the optim ism about w hat this could achieve, were all prem ised on one com m on assum ption. Proponents believed that the U nited States should assum e greater responsibility in w orld affairs. Increased cooperation w ith the League, o r independent actions w ith other European nations, w ould n ot only contribute to the peaceful settlem ent o f disputes, but it w ould also foster a greater sense o f obligation to participate in solving European political, eco­ nom ic, and disarm am ent problem s. T he LN N PA saw the opportunity to push its agenda. Leaders announced that the U nited States should support the Locarno agreem ents and the arbi­ tration accords that em erged from them . A Political A ction Program o f A pril 1927 developed concrete proposals. N eutrals should em bargo trade w ith any treaty-breaking state and the president should state that the U nited States w ould not be friendly tow ard nations that violated any pledge to arbitrate differences.43 This idea w ould later evolve into a form ula to strengthen the toothless K ellogg-Briand Pact. Low ell, although noting that few o f his com patriots w anted to stand up and be counted, w anted to go even further. He argued that nations resorting to w ar should be punished. T hat was im plicit in A rticle 16, and it was "also the effect o f the provisions o f the [Geneva] Protocol and o f Locarno.” Butler also dem onstrated resolve. T he U nited States should tell the signers o f the Locarno pacts and the League that it w ould respect any em bargo against an aggressor so long as it was n ot im posed in the W estern H em isphere. Professor Joseph P. Cham berlain o f C olum bia proposed a congressional act that w ould clarify the pow er o f the president to apply em bargoes and to align the nation "on the side o f organized peace and prove that it w as ready to act as w ell as to recom ­ mend.”46

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O n e o f the m ost im portant by-products o f the Locarno discussions cam e in 1927 in the form o f a French suggestion that the U nited States sign an arbi­ tration treaty m odeled after the Locarno agreem ent. T his w as seized on by officials, politicians, peace leaders, and organizations as a m eans to develop an antiw ar treaty. A ristide Briand, flushed w ith his success at Locarno, re­ sponded and the K ellogg-Briand Pact em erged.47 T his accord, renouncing w ar as an instrum ent o f national policy, contained n o provisions fo r consultation o r enforcem ent. Even so, it opened the d oor to a w hole new set o f argum ents b y w hich the internationalists could prom ote the doctrine o f responsibility and expand its im plications. For exam ple, ob­ servers noted that there w ould no longer be neutral rights o r duties, so no one could object to sanctions under A rticle 16. O ver tim e, the internationalists cited the K ellogg-Briand Pact as justification for consultation w hen the treaty w as broken; a sim ple condem nation o f aggressors; passive steps that w ould n ot interfere w ith the collective efforts o f others; assertion o f w hat becam e the nonrecognition doctrine; a positive arm s em bargo against aggressors; and revision o f the neutrality acts to perm it aid to those resisting attackers.4* Supporters o f the doctrine o f responsibility thus began a long— yet u lti­ m ately futile— effort to im plem ent these options. Republican senator A rthur Capper o f Kansas led the way. H e introduced a resolution in February 1929 that sought to add teeth to the innocuous treaty. Capper tried to com m it the U nited States w ith a provision against sending arm s and m aterials to any signer w hom the president declared in violation o f the K ellogg-Briand P a ct The resolution also w ithdrew protection from U.S. citizens w ho sought to ship item s in violation o f the em bargo.49 Capper had m erely revived an idea that was em bodied in a jo in t resolution o f D ecem ber 1927, w hich endorsed the outlaw ry proposals then being pro­ m oted. It called for the im position o f an em bargo against a state that engaged in w ar in violation o f any m ultilateral peace pledge, and it declared that the citizens o f contracting states should n ot enjoy the protection o f their govern­ m ent if th ey aided an aggressor. In presenting his resolution, Capper clearly voiced the spirit im plicit in the doctrine o f responsibility. It was tim e, he de­ clared, fo r “the U nited States to resum e the position o f em phatic leadership in all that prom otes international peace and understanding, a leadership it to o k and held under M cK inley and Hay, Roosevelt and R oot, and Taft and Knox.”*0 Representative Stephen G . Porter o f Pennsylvania follow ed w ith a H ouse resolution to extend to the w orld at large the president’s pow er to em bargo arm s to Latin A m erica. W hile Capper and Porter rallied considerable con­ gressional support behind their m easures, neither passed. A lthough in es­ sence they called for a reversal o f the traditional righ t o f a neutral to sell m aterials in w artim e, the renunciation o f that principle stim ulated less de­ bate than did broader questions relating to the responsibility doctrine. H ow

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could one determ ine w hether a treaty violation had occurred? W ho w ould decide that question and im pose the em bargo? W ould a renunciation o f neu­ trality necessarily lead the U nited States into war?51 D iscussion over the first concern posed the problem o f identifying the ag­ gressor when arm ed con flict broke out between states that had form ally re­ nounced war. Just as they had w hen discussing sanctions, cautious doubters w arned that this was not as easy as one m ight im agine, because the govern­ m ent attacking first m ight have been goaded into action. Enthusiasts avoided the com plexity b y asserting that an aggressor could easily be defined as any signer o f the treaty w ho utilized force w ithout first subm itting the dispute to a ju ristic process.5* Concern over w ho w ould decide w hen a treaty had been broken stim u­ lated a m ore intense debate. If this designation was left to individual nations, there w ould be no unanim ity o f response. Because the Kellogg-Briand Pact contained no provision for consultation, the League was clearly d ie m ost logical agency to decide. That posed a particular problem for the United States. W ould the pact tie the U nited States to the League? M any isolationists, critics o f m oral diplom acy, and even a few internationalists saw a definite and inevitable link­ age. Through consultation and a stance against treaty violators, Am erica w ould be tied to the w orld com m unity.53Even if this issue w as overlooked, a consti­ tutional question still existed over w hether the president, the Congress, or both should have a voice regarding designation o f violations. Since proposed congressional resolutions provided for a response in the form o f an em bargo, this was not m erely an academ ic question. Even political leaders w ho were inclined to em brace the doctrine o f re­ sponsibility w orried about im plicit obligations. C itizens could support lo fty ideals w ith out careftd consideration o f the consequences, but w hat w ould the U nited States do if an aggressor breached the accords? The Locarno defini­ tion presum ably allow ed everyone to identify an aggressor, and all nations w ould thus respond, condem ning the crim inal state and upholding the prin­ ciple o f justice. T he U nited States w ould not rem ain im m une because in the event o f any w ar it could not stand b y and see treaties violated.54 This dilem m a led to another debate over the danger o f being drawn into a war. Isolationists, pacifists, and international lawyers like M oore and Borchard w arned against any doctrine o f responsibility that altered international law. O ne or both parties engaged in fighting m ight consider an em bargo an un­ friendly act. To internationalists like James Shotw ell, this seem ed irrelevant: “W e have duties to perform in the com m unity o f nations as w ell as in the com m unity o f individuals w hen crim e is running ram pant. H ow long it w ill take the U nited States clearly to see its duty and to assum e the obligations under it, no one can tell. T his d u ty is set forth in the sm allest term s in the Capper Resolution: n ot to help the crim inal.”55

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Few persons w ere m ore central to these debates than Shotw ell. H e had been a key figure in designing the G eneva accord; he had stim ulated the nego­ tiations behind the K ellogg-Briand Pact; and he had becom e a leading propo­ nent o f the responsibility doctrine. It w as Am erica’s "m oral place” and “m oral d u ty” to stand for “ ideals o f international justice.”5* M any agreed. By the late 1920s an increasing num ber o f w riters and p o liti­ cal figures believed that the United States should do m ore to prevent war.17 H owever, like m any Europeans, these A m ericans believed that general pledges w ould suffice; governm ents should n ot becom e too involved in solving the specific problem s o f their neighbors. Thus, during this period o f relative w orld stability, and in the context o f the Locarno accords and the K ellogg-Briand Pact, the doctrine o f responsibility gained acceptance as both realistic and credible. However, when Japan’s attack on M anchuria in O ctober 1931 reopened discussions about the role o f the U nited States in w orld affairs, both citizens and politicians began to exam ine the valid ity and possible application o f som e o f the form ulas m ore critically. Japan’s action posed a serious challenge because it tested the collective se­ cu rity principle o f the C ovenant and broke pledges o f the N ine-Pow er and K ellogg-Briand treaties. It is nearly im possible to overstate the sense o f shock this produced in League m em bers and in Am erican internationalists.5* T he Japanese attack began on 18 Septem ber 1931. O n the tw enty-second, the C o u n cil transm itted inform ation on its discussions and responses to W ashington. In acknow ledgin g receipt o f the League’s com m unications, Stim son was sym pathetic to the League’s position. A lth ough the secretary’s pu blic pronouncem ents w ere restrained as he sought n ot to offend leaders in Tokyo, he dispatched notes to C hin a and Japan on the tw enty-fourth (w ith copies sent to the League) that echoed the League position: Stim son’s notes essentially asked the Japanese to desist and to abide b y their treaty obliga­ tion s. In ensuing days, as a League com m ission and the C ou n cil sought a com ­ prom ise solution, and as the Japanese continued their m ilitary operations, Stim son’s tone becam e firm er. O n 5 O ctober, the Am erican consul at Geneva, Prentiss B. G ilbert, received a directive expressing a w illingness to cooperate w ith the League as it w restled w ith the problem and to “endeavor to reinforce w hat the League does.” It indicated concern about em barrassing the League in its course o f action. G ilbert relayed the m essage to D rum m ond.59President H oover and Secretary o f State Stim son appeared to be applying the responsi­ b ility doctrine, givin g internationalists w hat appeared to be a victory. G ilbert’s action initiated a new, albeit discrete, relationship between Geneva and W ashington. Sweetser kept State Departm ent officials fully inform ed o f C ouncil and com m ission discussions, at tim es going beyond the bounds o f pro­ priety in revealing deliberations o f secret m eetings. His enthusiasm som etim es

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w orried Am erican diplom ats in Sw itzerland, w ho saw him interfering in a delicate process. D rum m ond had to consider very carefully the initiatives from the U nited States, and he relied greatly on Sweetser in plotting his strategy. Sweetser even m ade hasty trips to W ashington, w here he conferred w ith Stim son.60 Encouraged b y signs o f support, the C oun cil, presided over b y Briand, be­ gan deliberations on 13 O ctober. G ilbert attended as an observer, and an aura o f optim ism perm eated the G eneva scene, possibly ow ing to the Am erican signals o f endorsem ent. D iscussion focused on w hether to extend a form al invitation to the U nited States to participate in the C ou n cil’s debates, w hich was capped b y a decision on 16 O ctober to do so over the objection o f the Japanese delegate.61 O n 16 O ctober, Stim son authorized G ilbert to “officially” sit in continuing discussions at Geneva. This decision stem m ed largely from conversations be­ tween H oover and Stim son on 9 and 10 O ctober, w ith the president authorizing the response. Stim son’s instructions to G ilbert, however, contained careful lim i­ tations. If the C ouncil approved, he was “to sit w ith the C ouncil on the discus­ sion o f the Kellogg Pact m atter alone.” O n other topics related to the M anchu­ rian situation he could act only as an observer or auditor. A surprised G ilbert w ired tw ice for confirm ation. Thereafter, he attended both public and private C ouncil m eetings but spoke only rarely. G ilbert’s presence nonetheless consti­ tuted a sym bolic dem onstration o f U.S. concern and willingness to cooperate.61 O n 17 O ctober the C oun cil endorsed an appeal to Japan to abide b y the K eliogg-Briand Pact, and Stim son again sent notes to Japan and C hina. The form er did n ot react and during C ou n cil deliberations continued to argue against all proposed resolutions designed to reconcile differences. T he C oun ­ cil finally gave Japan a deadline o f 16 N ovem ber b y w hich to w ithdraw from the area, but Japan continued its m ilitary operations beyond that date. This led to a session o f the C ou n cil in Paris in N ovem ber and D ecem ber to w hich Stim son sent Charles G . Dawes, am bassador to Great Britain, as observer. M uch has been w ritten about this episode, w ith Dawes presented in an unfavorable ligh t because o f his alm ost idiosyncratic behavior. W hile he did confer w ith individual C ou n cil delegates, his refusal to attend m eetings prom pted League m em bers to fear that the U nited States was cooling in its support. Robert E. O lds, an Am erican w ho served as a legal representative to C hina, believed that Dawes “m ade a very unfortunate im pression” and that he had “no use either for the League or the K ellogg Pact.”63 O n 10 D ecem ber 1931, the League created a Com m ission o f Inquiry. A team headed b y the Earl o f Lytton exam ined events in a fact-finding m ission, 29 F ebruary-4 Septem ber, and reported to the League in O ctober 1932. O ne Am erican, M ajor-General Frank R. M cCoy, participated. By the tim e the Lytton Com m ission was organized early in 1932, however, the Japanese had already occupied m ost o f M anchuria.

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T h e obstinacy o f the Japanese in ign oring all efforts at com prom ise and their m ilitary advances convinced Stim son that som e other p olicy w ould be necessary. O n 7 January he sent an identical note to C hin a and Japan in w hich he outlined w hat becam e know n as the Stim son N onrecognition D octrine. T h e U nited States w ould “not adm it the legality o f any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreem ent” that w ould im pair its treaty rights o r those o f its citizens in C hina, including those that related to the sovereignty o r territorial integrity o f C hina o r the O pen D o or policy. N or w ould it “recognize any situation, treaty, o r agreem ent w hich m ay be brought about b y means contrary to the covenants and obligations o f the Pact o f Paris.”64 T h e assertion that the K ellogg-Briand Pact offered a legitim ate basis for nonrecognition reflected the doctrine o f responsibility argum ents advanced by the internationalists.65

A lthough the nonrecognition idea was not new, the decision o f H oover and Stim son to apply it reflected current conditions. First, the K ellogg-Briand Pact offered a legitim ate basis for its application; second, both m en had ap­ parently been influenced b y the argum ents o f internationalists that the na­ tion had to honor the principle o f responsibility.66 O n 8 August 1932, in a speech to the C ou n cil on Foreign Relations, Stim son enunciated three prin­ ciples o f im portance. First, traditional neutrality was no longer valid in the light o f w orld events. Second, nations had a responsibility to consult to m ain­ tain peace. T hird, he reaffirm ed the nonrecognition doctrine. He found con­ sultation to be im plicit in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and acceptable to the A m eri­ can people as confirm ed in the planks recently adopted b y both m ajor parties. Those docum ents, however, could not be construed as a m andate; they m erely urged consultation. T hroughout the fall H oover and Stim son continued to enunciate the responsibility principle. H oover espoused it in his acceptance speech at the Republican N ational Convention, noting at the sam e tim e an unw illingness to em ploy force to uphold peace. Stim son in a Pittsburgh ad­ dress on 26 O ctober again set forth the adm inistration's policies w hile offer­ ing no provisions for im plem entation.67 T he Stim son doctrine received w idespread support. Borah endorsed it on 13 February 1932 and the League Assem bly incorporated its principles in a declaration o f 11 M arch w hen it form ally adopted the Lytton report. T he fol­ low ing day, after discussions between the incom ing and outgoing secretaries o f state, the U nited States assured the League that, w ith their endorsem ent o f n on recogn ition , b o th stood on “com m on ground.”6* Thereafter, n othin g changed the situation in the Far East. Japan had successfully challenged the peace structure b u ilt betw een 1919 and 1931. A m erican internationalists understandably to o k great interest in the de­ velopm ents o f 1931-33. Initially, th ey hoped that the League w ould succeed in curbin g Japan, but th ey w orried that the Japanese m ight n ot respond to

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resolutions from G eneva, in part because o f the lim ited "indirect coopera­ tion” o f the U nited States. Still, they w elcom ed Stim son’s initiatives.49 Sweetser sought to orchestrate a unified response by internationalist groups in the U nited States, especially the LN A. He suggested letter-w riting and pub­ licity cam paigns to support H oover and Stim son and to foster a favorable public im age. Such activity was essential as adm inistration critics began to actively oppose the cooperative program pursued by Stim son, seeing his efforts as m erely a step tow ard League m em bership.70 T he adm inistration showed typ ical sensitivity to such criticism . W illiam Stone, w ho reported from W ashington for the Foreign Policy Association, dis­ covered State D epartm ent personnel to be "fearful o f open League coopera­ tion” even w hile they supported the p o licy being pursued. Eichelberger, dur­ ing a visit to W ashington to m obilize public opinion in the fall o f 1932, found officials eager to see such efforts, w hich w ould counter their critics. Yet key figures in the State D epartm ent rem ained unusually cautious. H ugh G ibson was never enthusiastic about the new role, and Prentiss G ilbert, a good friend o f the League, thought that the actions taken could be, at best, considered in the interests o f the U nited States. Stim son to o k pains in his official com m uni­ cations to outline clearly the lim its o f participation. T he U nited States was operating solely in support o f the K ellogg-Briand Pact and, w hile w illin g "to cooperate w herever possible,” there could be no involvem ent w ith League m achinery.71 Such precautions paid off. Public criticism o f Stim son w as relatively m ini­ m al, w ith considerable support show n fo r the p olicy pursued. Even w ith such signs o f endorsem ent, however, Stim son Continued to w alk a cautious path, restrained in part b y H oover but also b y his ow n concern over how far the U nited States should go. In fact, he im posed excessive and perhaps unneces­ sary restrictions on the actions he initiated.72 Internationalists apparently accepted the lim itations on official p olicy and did not challenge them . T hey supported Stim son because they believed that even lim ited U nited States involvem ent was essential to the in tegrity o f the League. T hey also saw the M anchurian episode as a threat to other goals, es­ pecially disarm am ent, so they accepted the adm inistration’s caution.77 In their uncritical support o f H oover and Stim son, however, they m ay have weakened the League. Yet League m em bers w ho view ed the Japanese challenge as a v io ­ lation o f the Covenant, in their eagerness to welcom e the response o f the United States, also accepted and settled for the lesser objective. A few internationalists considered the U.S. response too tim id. “W e are drifting into a situation w hich is fu lly as perilous as that o f Europe in the sum m er o f 1914,” Shotw ell believed. The need fo r a greater com m itm ent was urgent. Lowell attacked the idea o f nonrecognition, arguing that such a m ild m oral stance w as a license for aggressors. Yet even the appearance o f a unified

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internationalist stance was undercut w hen legalists like Borchard, M oore, and Jessup expressed criticism o f an opposite nature. T h ey raised concerns about the legal im plications o f a stronger response, especially o f an em bargo.74 A s the decade unfolded and international anarchy intensified, analysts tended to laud those w ho thought that m ore should have been done. T hey foun d the League w eak and uncertain, w ith its m em bers unw illing to assum e the obligations im plicit in the Covenant.75 H oover’s insistence that no force b e applied m ay have discouraged League m em bers, especially Great Britain, w hich w ould have had to shoulder m uch o f the responsibility for a firm er stand. T he K ellogg-Briand Pact also proved to be ineffective.76 U nited States consultation was often "h altin g and vacillating” ; G ilbert’s role was restricted; and the Dawes episode underm ined confidence in Am erican resolve. M ore­ over, long delays led to uncertainties about U nited States responses. D espite Stim son’s overtures, the secretary rem ained unw illing to sacrifice bilateral d i­ plom acy for collective action; thus, despite his apparent boldness, he failed to cooperate effectively w ith the League. Yet such a tie was crucial, as the League, in follow ing Stim son’s initiatives, often abandoned options it m ight other­ w ise have pursued.77 Stim son also sought to persuade the incom ing D em ocratic adm inistra­ tion o f the w isdom o f the policies pursued b y the H oover adm inistration. U ltim ately, like his predecessor, R oosevelt decided on a cautious approach. H e and C ordell H ull disagreed w ith the term s o f a Senate Foreign Relations C om m ittee resolution in M ay to em pow er the president to im pose an im par­ tial restriction on arm s sales w hen any state broke a treaty. H ull w anted the righ t to single ou t aggressors but did not press the point. O n 22 M ay 1933, N orm an D avis asserted that the U nited States w ould confer regarding breaches o f the peace, but it w ould m ake conferral dependent on disarm am ent accords and on an acceptable definition o f aggression. A ll o f this lay neatly w ithin the bounds o f responsibility w ith out com m itm ent.7* D urin g the ensuing m onths, the Roosevelt adm inistration displayed little enthusiasm fo r extending relations w ith the League. In 1934, it did succeed in gaining m em bership in the ILO, a positive but hardly controversial step. H ow ­ ever, w hen Italy threatened Ethiopia in the spring o f 1935, the R oosevelt ad­ m inistration w as faced w ith the crisis that w ould establish its relationship w ith League operations. In M ay, the C o u n cil addressed the threat but to o k no action, hoping that the dispute could be resolved through conciliation. T hroughout July and August, governm ents considered how to respond to M ussolini’s pressures. E thiopia’s em peror, H aile Selassie, appealed to the League and asked the U nited States to rem ind Italy o f its obligations under the K ellogg-B riand Pact. N either proved w illin g to take action.79 D urin g the entire Ethiopian crisis, U.S. policies were m arked b y uncertainty, vague re­ sponses to inquiries from G eneva, an unw illingness to support econom ic

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sanctions, and a reluctance to participate in direct consultation. O n ly the refusal to recognize Italy’s conquest can be considered w ithin the dom ain o f the d octrine o f responsibility.*0 T he U.S. response reflected both the general attitude o f the Roosevelt ad­ m inistration tow ard the League and the dom estic, political struggle going on betw een FDR and Congress over n eutrality legislation. Roosevelt publicly announced that he considered m em bership in the League a dead issue. Ever an astute politician, FD R clearly considered League supporters an em ascu­ lated constituency. W ith isolationist-supported neutrality legislation that w ould restrict executive discretion to determ ine the aggressor before initiat­ ing an em bargo pending before Congress, the president declared on 26 July that the Ethiopian affair w as o f no direct concern to the U nited States. Never­ theless, on 1 August he issued a form al declaration o f "m oral support” for League efforts to resolve the problem . O n 16 August, France and G reat Britain proposed concessions to Italy if Ethiopia approved. M ussolini rejected this offer and continued his w ar prepa­ rations. TWo days later, R oosevelt sent the Italian leader a personal appeal to preserve peace, a tender he also dism issed. O n 31 August, FDR signed the first o f a series o f neutrality acts that outlined U nited States p olicy in the event o f arm ed conflict. The 1935 m easure required the president to im pose an arm s em bargo w hen he found a state o f w ar to exist. Since this w ould apply to all parties, the president and other critics condem ned it as encouraging aggres­ sors and harm ing victim s w ho needed assistance. T he em bargo, strictly on arm s, also left open to trade other critical item s used in warfare. T hroughout Septem ber, League delegates showed a surprising firm ness in speeches decrying Italy’s actions, but M ussolini ignored such pressures and sent troops into Ethiopia on 2 O ctober 1935. T he U nited States invoked the neutrality act on 5 O ctober, even though no form al declaration o f w ar had been issued, a step hailed in Geneva. O n the seventh, the C ou n cil judged Italy to be in defiance o f A rticle 12, and the Assem bly concurred. This im plied that a strong response w ould be forthcom ing, and a Com m ittee o f Eighteen soon recom m ended that m em bers apply an arm s em bargo against Italy, term inate loans and credits, refuse to im port Italian goods, im pose a ban on selective and controllable item s necessary to conduct a war, and provide econom ic support to nations hurt b y such m easures. T he arm s em bargo was the on ly item on the Eighteen’s list that the U nited States had approved, even though its ban on arm s applied to Ethiopia as w ell as to Italy. The U nited States dec­ laration, w ith its statem ent that a state o f belligerency existed, preceded a sim i­ lar League finding. O n 5 O ctober, w hen Roosevelt proclaim ed the existence o f hostilities, he issued another statem ent that attem pted to forestall businesses from exploit­ ing the situation b y increasing exports to Italy. Roosevelt and H ull both reit­ erated this point in statem ents in late O ctober and early Novem ber, ultim ately

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calling fo r a voluntary, “m oral em bargo” on o il, copper, trucks, scrap iron, and steel." From G eneva, H ugh W ilson inform ed H ull that he believed an em bargo b y the League w ould depend largely on w hat the U nited States d id ." Never­ theless, Roosevelt did not establish direct consultation w ith the League, a situ­ ation that left officials in G eneva uncertain as they continued to consider ad­ ditional sanctions against Italy. League m em bers realized that the president had no pow er over private Am erican com panies, w hich could supply item s if the League voted to sanction them . T hus the League never em bargoed the item s under consideration. It has been custom ary to place considerable blam e on the U nited States for the League’s failure to apply econom ic sanctions, especially on oil. M any A m erican com panies openly declared their intent to trade, and State D epart­ m ent officers seem ed w illin g to d o se their eyes. O ver several m onths the vol­ um e o f key item s exported increased in significant am ounts despite adm inis­ tration requests to com panies to m aintain prewar levels. A League com m ittee o f experts d edd ed in February 1936 that no sanction on o il could be effective w ith out the cooperation o f the U nited States.4 R oosevelt was obviously constrained b y congressional neutrality legisla­ tion and a b elief that the A m erican people w ould not support a m ore vigor­ ous policy. B y early 1936, Congress was already considering a new neutrality act, and the adm inistration did not w ant to alienate that bod y as it debated provisions to expand the president’s discretionary power.*4Yet League m em ­ bers also deserve blam e for n ot doing m ore to help Ethiopia. B oth Britain and France w orked outside the organization in seeking a settlem ent, and they underm ined League efforts b y the notorious H oare-Laval agreem ent o f D e­ cem ber 1935, w hich offered Italy territorial concessions.4 Roosevelt’s unw illingness to cooperate w ith the League becom es particu­ larly apparent w hen it is com pared w ith the actions o f H oover and Stim son. It rem ains a puzzle w hy consultation w ith the League was not pursued. It m ay have been too m uch to expect a representative to sit w ith the C oun cil, but the U nited States could have had m ore effective com m unication w ith officials in G eneva if for no other reason than to preserve the im age o f collective actio n ." Am erican internationalists vacillated greatly during the Ethiopian crisis. T hey understood w hy Roosevelt could n ot do m ore w hile still hoping that he w ould act m ore vigorously. Eichelberger believed that once the N eutrality A ct w as invoked it w ould be follow ed b y a prohibition on raw m aterials. Even Sweetser fluctuated. H e found little criticism o f the U nited States in League circles, even at the m om ent w hen sanctions on o il w ould have becom e a real­ ity o n ly w ith A m erican particip ation . A t one p o in t he believed that the R oosevelt adm inistration should cooperate and “stop tem porizing.” Yet on ly tw o weeks later, when he thought the U nited States had given itself fu lly to League policy, he feared that it w ould be “let down.” Even Jessup argued that

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the im partial em bargo under the N eutrality A ct actually strengthened the League program o f sanctions because it d id not harm Ethiopia, since the lat­ ter could not afford to b u y weapons.*7 Pro-League advocates echoed this them e. Sweetser thought that the im posi­ tion o f neutrality helped leaders in Geneva to reach a decision, and he expressed elation w hen the organization decided to im pose partial sanctions. A Geneva Research Center study also saw the Am erican action as helpful, and it suggested that oil, steel, and other com m odities could be legally excluded under "im ple­ m ents o f war.” T he Nation argued that Roosevelt had the pow er to shut o ff general trade to Italy, and if he w ould not assum e responsibility, he sh ould con­ vene a special session and ask Congress fo r legislation. "C ollective action” was vital. N ew ton D. Baker felt cheered b y these responses and called fo r strength­ ening H ull’s hand even though he w orried about giving him to o m uch pow er." Sweetser again played an im portant behind-the-scenes role, alth o u gh it w as n ot as influential a one as he had played in 1931-33. Because League officials understood R oosevelt’s reluctance to cooperate openly, th ey m oved cau tiou sly in all contacts w ith the U nited States. Indeed, Sweetser agreed that th ere could be danger "in to o frequent correspondence.” T hus w hen the League w anted data on trade, Sw eetser obtained the inform ation from the research b u reau o f the Foreign P olicy Association.*9 T h e uncertainties displayed b y b oth the League and the R oosevelt team m ay have done m uch to contribute to the doubts o f intern ationalists an d help to explain w h y th ey d id n ot respond m ore vigorously. T h ey tended to ignore realities and indulge in w ish ful thinking. N o one expressed the situ ation bet­ ter than Vera M icheles D ean o f the Foreign P olicy A ssociation research staff. H igh ly critical o f those w ho cou ld n o t see the need fo r "collective responsibil­ ity,” includ ing the ultim ate "resort to force,” she w rote, Pacifists who once paid lip service to international collaboration plead as elo­ quently as the most rabid jingoes for American neutrality; advocates o f maximum sanctions against an aggressor oppose armaments which may ultimately be needed to insure their effectiveness; isolationists, while demanding that the United States withdraw from this iniquitous world, do not hesitate to instruct other countries how to set their house in order; supporters o f neutrality, with tears in their eyes, assert their readiness to support the League, provided it is composed not o f fal­ lible flesh-and-blood states but o f self-denying Utopias. The average reader, lost in this wonderland o f mutually destructive ideas, finds it difficult to grasp the es­ sence o f collective security.90

In tern atio n alists w h o assessed th e situ a tio n d id n o t agree w ith her. R aym ond Buell argued that U nited States initiatives, such as a n n o u n cin g an em bargo before the C o u n cil m et and the president’s p roclam ation o f neutral­ ity, actually forced League m em bers to face reality. These h elp ed in th e deci­

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sion to im pose sanctions and thus “unconsciously exercised a profound effect on the League system.” He found no reason to com plain about efforts to per­ suade A m erican businesses n ot to increase their sales, bu t he conceded that R oosevelt could have asked Congress fo r an em bargo on o il. T h e risk o f M ussolini declaring w ar was slender. Shotw ell concluded that the effort to im pose sanctions had failed, and he placed m ost o f the blam e on the League, although he did adm it that U.S. action was an im portant consideration in League circles and in influencing British thinking.91 D urin g the sum m er o f 1937, attention once again focused on events in the Far East. O n 7 July, Japanese troops battled w ith Chinese forces near the M arco Polo bridge. W ithin three weeks, the Japanese invasion o f C hina had begun. H oping to aid C hin a as m uch as possible, R oosevelt avoided invoking the neutrality laws. O n 5 O ctober the “quarantine speech” triggered extensive de­ bate about his intentions. T he president noted the deterioration o f interna­ tion al conditions and suggested that violations o f international law should not be ignored. A m erica could be affected, and it should be m ore involved in a “concerted effort” w hen treaties had been broken. Roosevelt chose his words carefully. N ot once did he refer to aggressors b y nam e o r deal w ith specific events, and he repeatedly noted that w ar w ould be avoided. Yet the speech prom pted w idespread com m entary because m any observers saw it, first, as taking a m oral stand, and second, as indicating a change o f policy, especially in light o f the neutrality legislation.9* T he State D epartm ent hurriedly noted that Roosevelt’s rem arks did not represent any shift in direction, but this disclaim er did not offset a public b e lief that the nation w ould henceforth be m ore assertive in its actions. As the days passed, that b elief prom pted increasing criticism o f Roosevelt’s speech b y isolationists and concerned citizens w ho feared that the president's rem arks could lead to war.93 Internationalists naturally rallied to back Roosevelt. Stim son w rote an influ­ ential letter to the New York Times, as did Butler. T he Federal C o u n cil o f Churches also to o k a public stand o f approval, w hile Eichelberger, w ho m ay have stim ulated Roosevelt’s rem arks, provided endorsem ent from the LN A.94 Yet scholars generally agree that Roosevelt had no specific p o licy objectives in m ind. In a fireside chat on 12 O ctober he m ade no effort to clarify his C hicago rem arks. He conferred w ith U ndersecretary o f State Sum ner W elles later that m onth about a possible A rm istice D ay m eeting at w hich representatives w ould be asked to support a peace initiative through agreem ent on disarm am ent, econom ic w ell-being, and respect for international law. This “nebulous plan” d id n ot m aterialize, largely because o f the opposition o f H ull and concerns expressed by G reat Britain. B y February 1938, the quarantine idea “seem s to have been placed on the shelf,” n ot because o f public response but because Roosevelt recognized that he could n ot m eet the expectations his rem arks had aroused.93

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U ntil the outbreak o f w ar in Europe in Septem ber 1939, the R oosevelt ad­ m inistration seem ed to retreat from responsibility, again choosing to avoid conflicts that could im peril dom estic program s. Follow ing Japan’s direct at­ tack on C hin a, signers o f the N ine-Pow er Treaty agreed to consult, calling a conference in Brussels for 3-24 Novem ber. Roosevelt sent a delegation. D e­ spite French and British pressures fo r a strong stand, Roosevelt resisted. He argued that League m em bers should take the initiative in applying sanctions, but they refused to assum e any com m itm ent because o f their reading o f pub­ lic opinion. Thus the m eetings adjourned having done little m ore than ver­ bally condem n the Japanese.*

W hile there was extensive discussion about collective security during the interw ar years, there was a tendency to apply the term to o loosely. This is especially true in describing the responses o f the H oover and Roosevelt ad­ m inistrations to the incursions o f Japan in 1931 and o f Italy in 193$. H oover specifically renounced the use o f m ilitary force and advised against econom ic sanctions. Roosevelt follow ed an equally independent policy. D ebates over applying an em bargo against Italy show that he sensed no need for collective security w hen he assum ed office, and that attitude did n ot change. In form u­ lating p olicy tow ard arm s em bargoes and disarm am ent, the State D epart­ m ent under R oosevelt w as careful to define the conditions o f cooperation, and “collective security rem ained a stricd y secondary consideration in D e­ partm ental thinking.” Indeed, the policy follow ed represented “the bankruptcy o f collective security.”*7 C ertain ly contem porary appraisals o f these efforts were not favorable. Russell C ooper’s 1934 book, American Consultation in World Affairs, responded directly to a rem ark m ade by Stim son that, w hile he was secretary o f state, the U nited States “favored consultation w ith other nations w henever the K ellogg Pact should be threatened.” C ooper exam ined four such threats, noted the degree o f U.S. participation, evaluated the results o f the consultative process, and criticized the results.** Jessup concluded that talks to o k place o n ly w hen vital interests were at stake. He did note, however, that w hile it w ould not com m it itself m ilitarily, the U nited States showed an increasing w illingness to apply the principle o f nonrecognition and to adjust its n eutrality policy.** These at best were lim ited responses. It is d ifficult to fault these adm inistrations too strongly, however, w hen one considers that even the position o f the LN A reflected am bivalence about collective security. A lthough it sought to harness peace groups to that ideal, it was careful not to criticize official policy. Adm ittedly, in 1933, w ith Fosdick succeeding to the presidency late in A pril and Eichelberger taking charge as director in Novem ber, the LN A began to be a b it m ore assertive. Eichelberger had earlier m aintained that because o f the failure to join the League, the United

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States had “prevented the consolidation o f security” A t bare m inim um it had a responsibility to consult w hen any signer breached the K ellogg-Briand Pact, and it should cooperate in im posing sanctions against aggressors. Expressions like collective machinery and collective system began to appear, yet these were o n ly w ords unattached to policy. By the m id-i930s the LN A included the term collective security in a list o f recom m ended objectives, a goal prim arily em ­ bodied in a renewed cam paign for League m em bership. Even here, however, the LN A weakened its endorsem ent b y calling for Covenant revision that w ould m od ify its sanction provision and the role o f states in responding.100 There can be little doubt that the internationalists o f the interw ar years had failed. C ertain ly they never im pelled the U nited States to participate in collective security arrangem ents or to im pose m eaningful sanctions on treaty­ breaking states. Efforts to apply the doctrine o f responsibility had som e m o­ m entary im pact, but even here the process and results left m uch to be desired. A lm ost all foreign policies represented an effort to avoid com m itm ents. It is possible, o f course, to place the blam e elsewhere— to fault the League fo r its indecisiveness and to criticize G reat Britain and France fo r their vacil­ lating policies. Yet one is still left w ith the nagging suspicion that had the U nited States been m ore responsible, m ore w illin g to be a firm m em ber o f the international com m unity, history w ould have been d ifferen t C ertain ly the in ability o f Am erican internationalists to w in acceptance even for their lim ­ ited goals stands as an indictm ent o f their ow n indecisiveness.101

NOTES

IN T R O D U C T IO N

ı. New York Times, 11 Nov. 1919. 2. Joan Hoff makes note o f the peculiar meaning o f this phrase in Joan Hoff-Wilson, Ameri­ can Business and Foreign Policy 1920-1933 (Lexington: Univ. Press o f Kentucky, 1971), xv. 3. For an excellent discussion o f interwar historiography, see Brian McKercher, “Reaching for the Brass Ring: The Recent Historiography o f Interwar American Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991): 565-98. 4. See William Appleman Williams, “The Legend o f Isolationism in the 1920s,” Science and Society 18 (1954): 1-20; and idem, The Tragedy o f American Diplomacy, id ed. (New York: Dell, 1962). 5. Melvin P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit o f European Stability and French Security, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill: Univ. o f North Carolina Press, 1979), ix. 6. See, for example, Joan Hoff-Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy; Carl P. Parrini, Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923 (Pittsburgh: Univ. o f Pittsburgh Press, 1969); Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure o f Cooperation in AngloAmerican Diplomacy, 1918-1928 (Columbia: Univ. o f Missouri Press, 1977); Leffler, Elusive Quest; Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1984); Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the Ameri­ can Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1943 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982). 7. Warren F. Kuehl, Seeking World Order The United States and International Organization to 1920 (Nashville: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1969); Charles Chatfield, For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914-1941 (Knoxville: Univ. o f Tennessee Press, 1971); Sondra Herman, Eleven against War: Studies in American Internationalist Thought, 1898-1921 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969); Charles DeBenedetti, Origins o f the Modern American Peace Movement, 1913-1929 (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1978); Harriet Hyman Alonso, Peace as a Women's Issue: A History o f the U.S. Movement for World Peace and Women's Rights (Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1993)* 8. For example, Manfred Jonas writes: “ [A]side from pacifist visionaries like William Ladd and Elihu Burritt, dabblers in international relations like Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn, and theorists like Josiah Royce and Thorstein Veblen whose primary concerns really lay else­ where, there were virtually no prominent Americans prior to the First World War who can be

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meaningfully described as internationalist, and there was certainly no internationalist move­ ment o f any significance.” See Manfred Jonas, “Internationalism as a Current in the Peace Move­ m ent A Symposium,” in Peace Movements in America, ed. Charles Chatfield (New York; Schocken,

1973). 174-75. 1. THE SOLEMN REFERENDUM: THE ELECTION OF 1920 1. “A Jackson Day Message,” letter to Homer S. Cummings, chairman, Democratic National Committee, 8 Jan. 1920, in The Papers o f Woodrow Wilson, 1919-1920, ed. Arthur S. Link, 69 vols. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991), 64:257-59. 2. Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 312. 3. Those senators specifically targeted were Frank B. Brandegee (R-Conn.), James W. Wadsworth, Jr. (R-N.Y.), George H. Moses (R-N.H.), and James A. Reed (D-M o.). [Hamilton Holt], “A Real Referendum,” The Independent 102 (1 May 1920): 168. 4. An article entitled “The TVvo Conventions” in the New York Times, 30 May 1920, challenged both parties to remember this fact. Specifically, the article noted that The Republicans boast that they are the party o f intelligence. It will not be untimely, and it may not be a disservice to the leaden o f the party who are preparing the platform , to call to their attention something they may have forgotten. There was a notable test o f intelligent and educated public opin­ ion in this country when a vote was taken upon the Tfeaty and the League Covenant in the colleges and higher educational institutions o f the country last January.

5. John W. Weeks to Henry Cabot Lodge, 23 Mar. 1920, Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, Massa­ chusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.; Gus Karger to William Howard Taft, 20,29 Mar., 5 Apr. 1920, Taft to Charles P. Taft, 23 Mar. 1920, William Howard Taft Papers, Library o f Congress (hereafter cited as LC). 6. “Our Constructive Foreign Policy,” Advocate o f Peace 82 (Apr. 1920): 111; New York Times, n, 29 Apr. 1920. 7. New York Times, 7,13 Apr., 2,9,14 May, 4 June 1920; Clark to William E. Short, 30 Apr. 1920, League to Enforce Peace Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. 8. William Allen White, The Autobiography o f William Allen White (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 582; Charles D. Hilles to Herbert Parsons, 17 June 1920, Herbert Parsons Papers, Columbia University. 9. New York Times, 12,28 Apr. 1920; John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 392-93; Walden S. Freeman, “W ill H. Hays and the League o f Na­ tions” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1967), 152,160-66; Lodge to Root, 17 May 1920, Lodge Papers; Root to Ansley Wilcox, 26 Mar. 1920, Elihu Root Papers, LQ Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938), 2:409-10. 10. Root to Taft, 14 May 1920, Taft Papers; Lodge to Root, 17 May 1920, Lodge Papers; Ruhi J. Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace (Chapel Hill: Univ. o f North Carolina Press, 1944), 175-76; New York Times, 9 June 1920. 11. W. Murray Crane to Lowell, 17 June 1920, A. Lawrence Lowell Papers, Harvard University Archives; Denna Frank Fleming, The United States and the League o f Nations, 1918-1920 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1932), 451-52; Garraty, Lodge, 393; New York Times, 10 June 1920. Ralph A. Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight against the League o f Nations (Lexington: Univ. Press of

Notes to Pages 4-6

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Kentucky, 1970), 170-72, concludes that the opponents did not pose a serious threat 12. W. A. W hite, Autobiography, 585; Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 176-77. 13. An additional plank also reflected a victory for die conservative wing o f the party and should have warned the internationalists o f the difficulties that lay ahead. This plank condemned Wilson for his request for a mandate over Armenia, which would have thrown “the United States into the maelstrom o f European quarrels. . . ” While sympathizing with the Armenian people, the Republicans would oppose “now and hereafter” any mandate in Europe or Asia. “Main U m ­ bers o f the Chicago Platform,” The Independent 102 (19,26 June 1920): 398. 14. Freeman, “W ill H. Hays,” 167-68; Garraty, Lodge; 393; Lowell to W. Murray Crane, 15 June 1920, Lowell Papers; Hamilton Holt, “The Republican Party and the League,” The Independent 102 (19,26 June 1920): 394,396; Talcott Williams, “The Danger o f Playing Safe,” ibid., 392-94. 15. Stone suggests that Harding’s nomination was one area o f Republican harmony. He notes: “Harding’s nomination came after the leading candidates canceled each other o u t Never one o f die front runners for the nomination, Harding was still not quite the dark horse that he is some­ times pictured to be. As early as December 1919, his Republican colleagues in Congress judged him as “a man who would appoint a strong Cabinet, take the advice o f the leaders in the House and Senate and make an altogether satisfactory— from the political standpoint at least— Presi­ dent” Stone, Irreconcdables, 171. 16. Freeman, “W ill H. Hays,” 168-69; Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Be­ trayal (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 303-7; Wesley M. Bagby, The Road to Normalcy: The Presi­ dential Campaign and Election o f 1920 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1962), 140; “Chats with the Delegates,” World Court 1 (June 1916): 536; Harding to O. B. Brown, 29 Dec. 1919, to O. A. ' Bennett, 4 Feb. 1920, Harding Papers, Ohio Historical Society; Harding to Malcolm Jennings, 18 Sept 1920, M alcolm Jennings Papers, Ohio Historical Society; Harding to Cornelius Cole, 6 Aug. 1919, Cornelius Cole Papers, University o f California at Los Angeles. Harding’s opinions and votes during the treaty fight can be found in the Congressional Record, 66th Cong., ist sess., 1919, 58, p t 9:8634,8640,8744,8755,8756,8774,8786,8791-92,8800,8802, and 66th Cong., 2d sess., IW» 59»Pt. 3:2628; p t 4:3515. 4325; Pt. 5:4328-33,4449. 445«» 449*. 4499»4512,453117. Harding to Malcolm Jennings (copy), 18 Sept. 1919, to Cornelius Cole, 6 Aug. 1919, Cole Papers; Congressional Record, 66th Cong., ist sess., 1919,58, p t 9:8744,8774: ibid., 2d sess., 1920, 59»p t 8:7098,7099. 18. W illiam A. White to Leonard Wood, 21 June 1920, William Allen W hite Papers, LC; Newell D. Hilles to Henry A. Forster, 29 June 1920, Henry A. Forster Papers, New York Public Library; Gus Karger to Taft, 21 July 1920, Taft Papers; Talcott Williams, “The Real Issue,” The Independent 103 (24,31 July 1920): 109. 19. Raymond B. Fosdick, Letters ott the League ofNations from the Files ofRaymond B. Fosdidc (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966), s8n, 64; William G. Shepherd, “Peace, f.o.b. Geneva,” Leslie’s Illustrated Weekly (20 Nov. 1922), 77-88,100, contains sketches o f Americans at Geneva; Biographical Dictionary o f Internationalists, s.v. “Sweetser, Arthur.” 20. Taft to Lowell, 19 June 1920, Taft Papers; New York Times, 9 July 1920; Lowell to Root, 17 July 1920, Root Papers; E. M. House to Norman Hapgood, 19 July 1920, Sweetser to House, 19 July 1920, House to Lowell, 19 July 1920, Edward M. House Papers, Yale University; Sweetser to Drummond (copy), 29 June 1920, Manley O. Hudson Papers, Harvard University Law School Library. 21. Flem ing, United States and die League o f Nations, 457. 22. G regory to Hoover, 10,16 Aug. 1920, Herbert Hoover Papers, Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.

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Notes to Pages 6-9

23. Karger to Taft, 28 July 1920, Taft Papers. 24. Gay to Hoover, 4 August 1920, Hoover Papers. 25. Oscar Straus to Lowell, 23 July 1920, Lowell Papers; Straus to Hoover, 28 July 1920, Oscar Straus Papers, LC; Hoover to Harding (copy o f telegram), 2 Aug. 1920, Hoover Papers. 26. New York Urnes, 23 Apr., 10 May 1920; Straus to Bainbridge Colby, 5 Apr. 1920, Straus Papers; Wilson to Colby, 2 Apr. 1920, Woodrow Wilson Papers, LC; “The Democrats and the Covenant,” The Independent 102 (8,15 May 1920): 212;“Uncompromising Champion o f the Nation’s Honor,” ibid. (22 May 1920): 255. 27. New York Times, 11 May 1920; “The President, the Congress, and the Treaty,” Advocate o f Peace 82 (May 1920): 169-71. 28. Boston American, 9 Apr. 1920; Bteckenridge Long, “The Fight for the League o f Nations,” typescript copy, Breckenridge Long Papers, LC; Stone, Irreconcilables, 173-74; “W ilson Defines the Issue,” The Independent 102 (22 May 1920): 255; New York Times, 7,8 May 1920; Los Angdes Times, 20 June 1920. 29. Cary Travers Grayson, Woodrow Wilson: An Intimate Memoir (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, i960), 116; Kurt Wimer, “Woodrow Wilson and a Third Nomination,” Pennsylva­ nia History 29 (Apr. 1962): 201-2; Wesley M. Bagby, “Woodrow Wilson, a Third Term, and the Solemn Referendum,” American Historical Review 60 (Apr. 1955): 567-75; Bailey, Wilson and d u Great Betrayal, 308-14. Despite the discretion, Democratic leaders knew about the plan. Some of them demanded an open disavowal When a portrait o f Wilson was displayed at the convention, many delegates cheered enthusiastically, but some stood silent to express their opposition to his uncompromising League stance. Franklin D. Roosevelt, soon to be nominated for the vice-presi­ dency, had to struggle physically to seize the New York banner and carry it onto the floor in the ensuing demonstration. Wimer, “Wilson and a Third Nomination,” 194-98,204-9; Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era— Years o f War and After, 1917-1923 (Chapel Hill: Univ. o f North Carolina Press, 1946), 552-57; Daniel M. Smith, Aftermath o f War. Bainbridge Colby and Wilsonian Diplo­ macy, 1920-1921 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1979), 26-27; Bailey, Wilson and d u Great Betrayed, 319-20. 30. Bailey, Wilson and d u Great Betrayed, 312,316; Daniels, Wilson Era, 1917-1923, 562; New York Times, 29 June 1920; Wimer, “Wilson and a Third Nomination,” 209-10; Jordan to W. G. Boyle, 28 July 1928, David Starr Jordan Papers, Hoover Institution o f War and Peace, Stanford University. 31. Bailey, Wilson and d u Great Betrayal, 318; New York Times, 9 , 10 July 1920. 32. Harold Ickes, The Autobiography o f a Curmudgeon (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, i943)> 241; Bailey, Wilson and the Great Betrayal, 321; Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 2d sess., 1936,80, pt. 1:755-58; Bagby, Road to Normalcy, 144-46. 33. Wickersham to Hoover (telegram), 12 Aug. 1920, Hoover to Wickersham (telegram), 21 Aug. 1920, Hoover to Julius H. Barnes, 21 Aug. 1920, Hoover Papers; Lowell to Root, 17 Aug. 1920, Root Papers; Fosdick to Sweetser, 26 Aug. 1920, Arthur Sweetser Papers, LC. 34. Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 173-75,164-99. 35. Fosdick to Sweetser, 14 Nov. 1919, in Fosdick, Letters, 61; Oscar Straus, William H. Short, Holt, and Eliott Williams to Taft, 14 May 1920, Taft Papers; Short to Holt, 9 Apr. 1920, Holt to Short, 13 Apr. 1920, Hamilton Holt Papers, Rollins College, Winter Park, Fla.; Lowell to Holt, 17 Apr. 1920, Lowell Papers; Vance McCormick to Short (copy), 8 Sept 1920, Irving Fisher Papers, Yale University; Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 155-56,159,175,198-99. 36. Fosdick to Sweetser, 26 Aug. 1920, Sweetser Papers; Lowell to Taft, 23 June 1920, Taft to Lowell, 22 June 1920, Taft Papers; Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 184-85; Jessup, Root 2:411-12.

Notes to Pages 9-12

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37. Garraty, Lodge, 398; Kuehl, Seeking World Order, 334-36; Lodge to Harding, 8 July 1920, Lodge Papers; Lodge to Harding, 9 Sept 1920, Warren G. Harding Papers, Ohio Historical Soci­ ety; Lodge to Alfred C Lane, 3 Sept. 1920, Lodge Papers. 38. New York Times, 29 Aug. 1920; Lodge to Root, 17 May 1920, Root Papers; Gus Karger to Taft, 28 July 1920, Taft Papers; Francis Russell, The Shadow o f Blooming Grove: Warren G. Harding in H is Times (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 401; Bagby, Road to Normalcy, 140-41; Clarence A. Berdahl, The Policy o f the United States with Respect to the League o f Nations (Publication o f the Graduate Institute o f International Studies, No. 4. Geneva: Librairie Kundig, 1932), 75-76,83. 39. Norman Hapgood, "Yes: the Democratic Platform,” The Independent 103 (21 Aug. 1920): 208-9; William H. Short to Huntley N. Spaulding, William H. Short Papers, Rollins College; McDonald to Sweetser, 17 Aug. 1920, Sweetser Papers. 40. Wickersham to Lowell, 9 Sept 1920, Lowell Papers; Wickersham to Henry W. Taft, 7 Sept 1920, Taft Papers; Wickersham to Hoover, 29 Aug. 1920, Hoover to Chester Rowell (copy o f tele­ gram), 2 Sept 1920, Hoover to Harding, 27 Sept 1920, Hoover to Mrs. Robert A. Burdette, 29 Sept 1920, Hoover Papers. Hoover allowed the Young Republican Club o f New York to print the Burdette letter as a leaflet entitled "Why Women Should Vote for Harding and Coolidge.” White to Sweetser, 15 Sept. 1920, William Allen White Papers, LC. 41. McDonald to Mrs. J. Malcolm Forbes, 23Aug. 1920, Rose Dabney Forbes Papers, Schlesinger Library, Raddifle College; New York Times, 19,29 Sept 1920; Taft to Short (copy o f telegram), 23 Sept 1920, Taft Papers; Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 175,184-90,199; Taft to Lowell, n.d. [Sept 1920], Lowell Papers. 42. Russell, Shadow o f Blooming Grove, 407,411; New York Times, 10 Oct. 1920. 43. Holt to Short 12 July 1920, Holt Papers; Hoover to Harding, 2 Aug. 1920, Hoover Papers. 44. Talcott Williams, "How Big is Cox,” The Independent 103 (4 Sept 1920): 270; New York Times, 31 May 1920; Washington (Pa.) Daily Reporter, 9 June 1920; Fisher to Harding, 29 June 1920, Fisher Papers. 45. John H. Latané, ed., Development o f the League o f Nations Idea: Documents and Corre­ spondence o f Theodore Marburg, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1932), 2:862-63; Marburg to Taft, 20 July 1920, Taft Papers. 46. James G. McDonald to Mrs. J. Malcolm Forbes, 17 Aug. 1920, Rose Dabney Forbes Papers, Schlesinger Library, Raddifle College; Julius H. Barnes to Hoover (copy o f telegram), 17 Aug. 1920, Hoover Papers; Norman Hapgood, "Cox and His Record,” The Independent 103 (4 Sept 1920): 271; Brooklyn Citizen, 28 Aug. 1920; Isaac M. Ullman to Taft, 30 Aug. 1920, Taft Papers; New York Times, 19 Sept, 9 O ct 1920. Speakers on the “Special” induded Parsons, Newton D. Baker, Mrs. Emmons Blaine, and Lucia Ames Mead. 47. Bio. Diet, o f Internationalists, s.v. "Parsons, Herbert”; Parsons to William Jay Schiefflein, 23 Mar. 1916, Parsons to William M. Calder, 19 May 1919, Parsons to Ralph Glyn, 27 May 1919, Parsons to Merton E. Lewis, 19 May 1919, Parsons to John A. Sleicher, 20,25 June 1919, Parsons to Annie S. Peck, 18 Oct. 1920, Parsons to Samuel S. Koenig, 8 O ct 1920, Herbert Parsons Papers, Columbia University. 48. Parsons to Charles D. Hilles, 25 Aug. 1920, Parsons to Henry D. Sayer, 11 Oct. 1920, Parsons to W iliam S. Dennet 18O ct 1920. Among the letters are those from Thomas W. Lamont Hamilton Fish Armstrong, and Learned Hand on 8 O ct 1920; Raymond V. Ingersoll, Charles P. Howland, H olt Haley Fiske, and Louis Wiley on 9 O ct 1920; Charles S. Haight, Anson Phdps Stokes, Simeon E. Baldwin, and Thomas G. Chamberlain on 11 O ct 1920; Stanley White on 14 O ct 1920; and Gaylord S. White, 18 O ct 1920, Parsons Papers.

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Notes to Pages 12-16

49. Warren F. Kuehl, Hamilton H olt Journalist Internationalist, Educator (Gainesville: Univ. o f Florida Press, i960), 10-11,152. 50. A draft dated 6 October can be found in the Lowell Papers with a letter to Holt from Lowell, 7 O ct 1920. A printed statement appeared in aRepublicans Who Will Vote for Cox,” The Independent 104 (30 O ct 1920): 153-54. 51. New York World, 18 O ct 1920; New York Evening Post, 19,23 O ct 1920; New York Times, 20,31 O ct 1920; Pittsburgh Post, 11 O ct 1920; Mrs. Jesse S. Wilson to Parsons, 14 O ct 1920, Parsons Papers. 52. New York Times, 10 O ct 1920; Brooklyn Eagle, 20 Sept 1920; Chicago Journal, 19 O ct 1920; New York Evening Post, 16 O ct 1920; Butler to Hilles, 8 Oct. 1920, Nicholas Murray Butler Papers, Columbia University, Hoover to Harding (copy o f telegram), 11 O ct 1920, Hoover Papers. 53. Rocco M. Paone/The Presidential Election o f 1920” (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, i949)>372-73;“The Paramount Issue,” The Independent 104 (30 O ct 1920): 159; Harding to Stimson, 20 O ct 1920, Henry L Stimson Papers, Yale University. 54. Hamilton Fish Armstrong to Taft, 8 O ct 1920, Taft Papers; Julius H. Barnes to Hoover (copy o f telegram), 17 Aug. 1920, Hoover Papers; William A. White to Mrs. Stevens, 27 O ct 1920, White Papers; Ray Lyman Wilbur to M. Morgan G oud, 18 Oct. 1920, Ray Lyman Wilbur to Fisher, 13 O ct 1920, Ray Lyman Wilbur Papers, Stanford University; Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 197-98. 55. Lowell to Henry B. Cabot, 3 Sept 1920, Lowell to Samuel Colcord, 30 Sept 1920, Lowell Papers; Lowell to Taft, 9 Sept. 1920, Taft Papers; W. A. White, Autobiography, 596; Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 200. 56. Schurman to Hoover, 10 Sept 1920, Hoover Papers; Wickersham to Lowell, 14 Sept 1920, Lowell Papers. 57. Taft to Lowell, 15 Sept 1920, Lowell Papers; Lowell to Hoover, 22 Sept 1920, Schurman to Hoover, 24 Sept 1920, Hoover Papers. 58. Schurman to Lowell, 5 Oct. 1920, Lowell Papers; Schurman to Hays (copy o f telegram), 4 O ct 1920, Harding to Schurman (copy o f telegram), 5 O ct 1920, Hoover Papers. 59. Memorandum o f meeting dictated by Parsons on 11 Oct. 1920, Parsons Papers. 60. Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown, t954)> 146; Sweetser to Whitney Shepardson, 1 Aug. 1920, Sweetser Papers. 61. Stimson to Cravath, 8 Oct. 1920, Cravath to Stimson, 11 O ct 1920, Henry L Stimson Papers, Yale; Cravath to Root, 13 O ct 1920, Root Papers; Root to Butler (telegram), 13 O ct 1920, Butler Papers. 62. A full text appears in Henry Aaron Yeomans, Abbott Lawrence Lowell, 1856-1943 (Cam­ bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948), 465-68. 63. Cravath to Stimson, 11 Oct. 1920, Stimson Papers; Leopold, Root, 147. Other signers in­ cluded Robert S. Brookings, Charles W. Dabney, Frank J. Goodnow, Warren F. Gregory, Alexander C. Humphries, William Lawrence, John H. MacCracken, Samuel Mather, George A. Plimpton, Henry S. Prichett, Charles A. Richmond, Henry W. Taft, Isaac M. Ullman, and Westei W. Willoughby. 64. "Reply o f Ex-President Charles W. E liot. . . ” printed brochure o f Pro-League Indepen­ dents, 23 Oct. 1920, Holt Papers; New York Evening Post, 20 O ct 1920; New York World, 22 Oct. 1920; New York Times, 21 Oct. 1920. 65. New York World, 7 Oct. 1920. 66. Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 196; George W. Martin to Lowell, 21 O ct 1920, John W. Gaus to Lowell, 23 Oct. 1920, Lowell Papers; Charles W. Merril to Wilbur, n.