Jewish Socratic Questions in an Age without Plato Permitting and Forbidding Open Inquiry in 12-15th Century Europe and North Africa 900444873X, 9789004448735

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Jewish Socratic Questions in an Age without Plato

Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Maimonides Library for Philosophy and Religion General Editor Giuseppe Veltri (Universität Hamburg) Managing Editor Sarah Wobick-Segev (Universität Hamburg) Editorial Board Talya Fishman (University of Pennsylvania) Jonathan Garb (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Racheli Haliva (Universität Hamburg) Yehuda Halper (Bar-Ilan University) Warren Zev Harvey (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, emeritus) Christine Hayes (Yale University) Yitzhak Y. Melamed (Johns Hopkins University) Stephan Schmid (Universität Hamburg) Josef Stern (University of Chicago, emeritus) Sarah Stroumsa (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, emerita) Irene E. Zwiep (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

Volume 1

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/mlpr

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Jewish Socratic Questions in an Age without Plato Permitting and Forbidding Open Inquiry in 12–15th Century Europe and North Africa

By

Yehuda Halper

LEIDEN | BOSTON

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Cover illustration: British Library, Add MS 18690, f. 14r, reprinted with permission. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Halper, Yehuda, author. Title: Jewish Socratic questions in an age without Plato : permitting and forbidding open inquiry in 12–15th century Europe and North Africa / by Yehuda Halper. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2021] | Series: Maimonides library for philosophy and religion, 2666–8777 ; vol.1 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021041862 (print) | LCCN 2021041863 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004448735 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004468764 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Jewish philosophy—History—To 1500. | Philosophy, Ancient—Influence. | Socrates—Influence. | Jews—Civilization—Greek influences. | Judaism and philosophy. Classification: LCC B755 .H36 2021 (print) | LCC B755 (ebook) | DDC 181/.06—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021041862 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021041863

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 2666-8777 ISBN 978-90-04-44873-5 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-46876-4 (e-book) Copyright 2021 by Yehuda Halper. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau Verlag and V&R Unipress. Koninklijke Brill NV reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

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Contents Acknowledgements ix Introduction 1

Part 1 Socrates among Medieval Jews 1 Was Socrates a Wise, Ascetic Monotheist or a Vocal Sceptic? The Two Socrateses of Medieval Jewish Doxography 15 1 Socrates in Arabic Doxographies: A Brief Overview 16 2 Socrates, the Wise, Ascetic Monotheist in Jewish Doxographies 19 2.1 Solomon ibn Gabirol (1020/21–1057/58 or 1070) 20 2.2 Moses ibn Ezra (~1055–1135 or 1138) 21 2.3 Joseph ibn Zabarah (1140–1190) 26 2.4 Joseph ibn ʿAqnīn (Mid. Twelfth Century– Mid. Thirteenth Century) 27 2.5 Judah al-Ḥarizi (1166–1225) 29 2.6 Shem Ṭov Falaquera (c. 1225–c. 1290) 31 2.7 Socrates the Wise Ascetic in Later Medieval Hebrew Literature 34 2.8 A Prayer of the Divine Socrates 37 3 Socrates, the Vocal Sceptic 44 Appendix 1: Critical Edition of “A Prayer of the Divine Socrates” 46 Appendix 2: Translation of “A Prayer of the Divine Socrates” 50 2 Socrates and Socratic Philosophy in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari 52 1 Kuzari 3.1 58 2 The Socrates of Plato’s Apology? 69 Appendix: Is the Kuzari a Socratic Dialogue? 77

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3 Socratic Scepticism and the Problem of Akrasia according to Averroes 80 1 Plato’s Socrates in Averroes 81 2 Aristotle’s Socrates in Averroes 85 2.1 Rhetoric 86 2.2 Nicomachean Ethics 97 2.3 Critique of Socrates’s Denial of Akrasia 103 3 Conclusion: The Decisive Treatise 107

Part 2 Socratic Problems without Socrates 4 Does Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah Forbid Reading the Guide of the Perplexed? On Platonic Punishments for Freethinkers 113 1 The Mishneh Torah 119 2 The Guide of the Perplexed 123 3 Punishment 131 4 Plato’s Laws 136 5 Moderation and Rest in the Guide of the Perplexed 139 5 “Keep Your Sons from Logic” Jacob Anatoli on Separating Science and Torah 147 1 Background for Anatoli’s Use of the Talmudic Adage 148 2 Anatoli’s Introduction to the Organon 153 3 Anatoli’s Introduction to Malmad ha-Talmidim 162 4 The Case of Ecclesiastes 173 5 Conclusion 180 Appendix: Jacob Anatoli’s Introduction to Logic 182 6 The Sex Life of a Metaphysical Sceptic Platonic Themes in Gersonides’s Commentary on the Song of Songs 186 1 The Erotic Path to God 190 2 The Desire to Know 194 3 The Limitations of Human Knowledge of Metaphysics 203 4 Conclusion 207

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7 Philosophical Allegory in Bibago Exegetical Duplicity for the Sake of Open Inquiry 209 1 Derekh Emunah 212 2 Commentary on the Metaphysics 217 3 Conclusion 223 Afterword: Scepticism and Akrasia 225 Bibliography 231 Index of Passages 255 Index of Names 261

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Acknowledgements I am grateful for the support of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies at the University of Hamburg. Giuseppe Veltri has been a guiding light for me since my earliest academic publications and I thank him for directing me and Jewish scholarship in general toward the study of scepticism, loosely defined. My time as a senior fellow in Hamburg brought me into contact with a thriving scholarly atmosphere that stimulated many aspects of this book. Conversations with Daniel Boyarin, Guido Bartolucci, Giada Coppola, Daniel Davies, Heidrun Eichner, Michael Engel, Micha Gottlieb, Racheli Haliva, Yoav Meyrav, Behnam Zolghadr, and numerous others in and around Schlüterstraße stimulated the kind of inquiry that finds its fruition in this volume. Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this volume were written with the support of the Israel Institute for Advanced Studies in Jerusalem. From 2018 to 2019, Charles Manekin and I directed a research group on “The Reception and Impact of Aristotelian Logic in Medieval Jewish Culture” in which I was able to present ideas related to these chapters. The atmosphere at the Institute was ideal for research and promoted lively discussions from which I benefited immensely. I would also like to thank the Department of Jewish Philosophy at Bar Ilan University for championing this kind of research. My Doktorvater, teacher, mentor, and friend, Steven Harvey, laid the groundwork years ago for a curriculum that begins with Socrates and Socratic questions and then examines Jewish philosophy in that light. This approach keeps the department philosophical and encourages us all to continue to ask the difficult questions. I began this project while lecturing at Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana between 2010 and 2015 and I am grateful for the support of my colleagues there in this endeavour. Ronna Burger graciously allowed me to sit in on her classes and to see her approach to asking Socratic and Platonic questions in practice as well as theory. Brian Horowitz read over the earliest drafts of the papers that would become chapters 2, 4, and 7 of the present volume and offered his generous advice and encouragement. Numerous other scholars also read over drafts and early versions of the chapters and offered invaluable remarks and criticism. Special mention should be made of Charles Manekin, Menachem Kellner, Josef Stern, Anne Eusterschulte, Hannah Kasher, Abraham Rubin, Gabriel Danzig, and Resianne Fontaine. Numerous anonymous reviews also examined this work and I am greatly indebted to their suggestions. I also thank Jewish Quarterly Review, AJS Review, De Gruyter, and Jewish Studies Quarterly for permission to reprint

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articles in this volume with slight changes. Further, Sarah Wobick-Segev, Yoav Meyrav, and Katharine Handel meticulously went over the entire book and offered innumerable and invaluable corrections and clarifications. I thank Fenja Schulz and Helena Schöb for expertly guiding me through the publication process. Words are not enough to thank my wife, Sara, for her support throughout this project which took us to three continents. In Plato’s Gorgias, Callicles points out that there is something childish in asking Socratic questions, and I thank Sara for indulging me in this for so many years. I dedicate this book to our children, Naomi and Joshua; may they never cease to ask questions.

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Introduction From the death of Philo of Alexandria in the first century CE until the dissemination of Marsilio Ficino’s Latin translations at the end of the fifteenth century, we have no record of Jews reading Plato. Plato’s works, indeed, were not translated into Hebrew until the twentieth century. Arabic-speaking Jews from the tenth century until the modern era may have read Plato in Arabic translation, but if they did, they did not say so, and there is no evidence that they did so.1 Moreover, it is unlikely that more than ten of Plato’s works were ever translated into Arabic before the twentieth century, and even these ten may have been summaries rather than translations.2 Jews from France, Spain, and Italy could have read some selections of the Timaeus in Calcidius’s fourthcentury Latin translation, but again there is no concrete evidence that they did so. Jews in the Byzantine lands may have read Plato in Greek, as their Christian counterparts did, but as yet there is no evidence of such reading.3 Thus, even if some Jews did read Plato in Arabic, Latin, or Greek, the lack of evidence suggests that overall, Plato’s writings were, so to speak, “off the radar” for medieval Jewish thinkers. Pre-Renaissance medieval Jewish thinkers, it would seem, 1 Franz Rosenthal, “On the Knowledge of Plato’s Philosophy in the Islamic World,” Islamic Culture 14 (1940): 387–422. 2 Cristina D’Ancona cites evidence from bibliographical sources, including booksellers, of the existence of Arabic translations of the Timaeus, the Symposium, the Phaedo, the Republic, and possibly the Sophist by the tenth century. See Cristina D’Ancona, “Greek Sources in Arabic and Islamic Philosophy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/arabic-islamic-greek/. For other fragmentary quotations from Plato’s Phaedo, see chapter 1, n. 14 below. To these we may add the Laws, the subject of a commentary by al-Fārābī (see below, chapter 4, p. 136, especially n. 67). However, none of these translations has survived in full, and the only one of which parts have survived in dialogue form is the Republic. See also Dimitri Gutas, “Plato’s Symposium in the Arabic Tradition,” Oriens 31 (1988): 36–60. Fragments of other works, including the Apology, the Crito, the Cratylus, and the Meno have also survived. See Carmela Baffioni, “Platonisme arabe,” in Encyclopédie de l’humanisme méditerranéen, ed. Houari Touati (2014), http://www.encyclopedie-humanisme.com/?Platonisme-arabe&var, and Rüdiger Arnzen, “Plato, Arabic,” in Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 1012–16. See also chapter 1, n. 15 below for fragments of Plato’s Crito. A forthcoming article by Dimitri Gutas, “Platon. Tradition arabe,” in Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, vol. 5, ed. Richard Goulet (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2020) will shed further light on these details. 3 On the Byzantine interpretations of Socrates, see Michele Trizio, “Socrates in Byzantium,” in Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Socrates, ed. Christopher Moore (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 592–615.

© Yehuda Halper, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004468764_002

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lived in an intellectual environment in which Plato’s writings were generally absent; that is, in an age without Plato. Nevertheless, many Jewish thinkers in this period referred to Plato and his teachings, particularly to what they considered to be his doctrine of the creation of the world out of pre-existing matter.4 Still more Jewish thinkers have been identified as Platonists or Neo-Platonists, though this generally refers to their adoption of emanationist explanations of creation and of the motions of the heavenly bodies. Such Platonism was frequently mediated through Arabic texts, some of which were erroneously attributed to Aristotle. Thus, it is not impossible that some Jewish Neo-Platonists considered themselves to be Aristotelians. Other forms of Neo-Platonism came via Kabbalah, but these were usually not considered “philosophical,” and in any case, they did not explicitly attribute their origins to Plato. That is, even Jewish Platonists did not call themselves “Platonists” or attribute their ideas to Plato. In a sense then, they too lived in an age without Plato. This age without Plato was largely also an age without Socrates. Jewish thinkers who did not claim to have read Plato had sometimes encountered Socrates through collections of anecdotes and maxims in Arabic and Hebrew. Most of these statements had nothing to do with Plato’s Socrates, and indeed, Socrates was frequently confused with Diogenes the Cynic and other ancient Greek wise men whose statements made their way to medieval Jewish readers through Arabic, Syriac, Persian, and Latin texts. Sometimes, the sayings of non-Greek thinkers were attributed to Socrates. However, in some cases, the Socrates about whom medieval Jewish thinkers wrote and read was a Socrates who was similar to the one we find in Plato. This book is primarily the story of how a particular problem associated with Socrates manifested itself to medieval Jewish thinkers, either with an indirect connection to Plato or else without any clear mention of either Socrates or Plato. The problem arises in Plato’s Apology of Socrates. Socrates defends himself against charges of impiety with a story of how his old companion, Chaerephon, once asked the Delphic oracle whether anyone was wiser than Socrates. Upon learning that according to the divine word, no one was wiser than he, Socrates began to seek out those reputed to be wise so as to question them in order to prove the oracle, for he was thoroughly convinced of his own ignorance and so professed an inability to see how the oracular response could be correct. Socrates’s questioning led him to realise that those who were 4 See Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, 2.13, 25–26. On Maimonides’s use of Plato, see Shlomo Pines’s helpful introduction to his translation of the Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), lxxv–lxxvi.

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considered wise and those who professed knowledge were in fact mistaken and ignorant; even craftsmen, whose knowledge of their crafts was unmistakable, had no knowledge of the most important matters, though they professed such knowledge because of their knowledge of their craft. “From this examination,” Socrates says, “many enmities arose against me, which were most difficult and heavy and which resulted in false accusations.”5 It is likely that the false accusations (διαβολὰς) Socrates mentions here include the false accusation (διαβολή) connected with the legal case (τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην) brought against him.6 That is, Socrates’s inquiries led others to see him not only as “seeking out the things under the Earth and the heaven,”7 but also as denying the existence of the gods, creating new gods, and corrupting the youth; that is, bringing them into his quest. After all, if Socrates denies all the knowledge of those who are considered wise, he also denies that they know the gods. That is, Socrates also denies the accepted opinions about the gods and also the accepted religion. In their place, he adopts an inquiring ignorance; he does not know, but continues to seek to know the divine matters and the most important things. Plato’s portrayal of Socrates’s philosophical quest has a paradox at its core: Socrates, spurred by divine command, questions and undermines generally accepted wisdom and beliefs about the gods. His professed ignorance is both the result of the divine word and a fundamental scepticism about the validity or even existence of that word. This contradiction is amplified when Socrates mentions his daimonion, which also spurs him to actions, including inquiry and questioning. Aristotle may have this view of Socrates in mind when including him among the “ironic” (εἴρωνες) who deny generally held views (τὰ ἔνδοξα).8 This statement, which is likely the first to associate Socrates with “irony,” seems to see a denial of generally held views, along with affected modesty, as part of the simple meaning of the Greek term εἰρωνεία. Nevertheless, in the context of the Apology, Aristotle’s remark would seem to bear more of the richer notion of irony that has come to be associated with “Socratic irony”: that is, by relying on the divine word in order to deny the opinions about the divine word, Socrates denies the very basis of his denial.

5 Plato, Ap. 22e–23a; translation mine. In this book, all translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. 6 Plato, Ap. 19b. 7 ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια; Plato, Ap. 19b. The similarity between this and the similar injunction expressed in the first Mishnah in Ḥagigah (b. Ḥag 11b) is surely coincidental. We shall, however, discuss Maimonides’s use of this injunction in chapter 4. 8 Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 4.1127b25–27. For what Aristotle may have meant here, see P.W. Gooch, “Socratic Irony and Aristotle’s Eiron: Some Puzzles,” Phoenix 41 (1987): 95–104.

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There are two ways to understand Socrates: either he believes in the divine word or he is ignorant as to whether it is true. If he believes in the divine word, then he is charged by the oracle to examine his life, the lives of others, the world, and so on, in order to find out what is true, good, beautiful, and so on; that is, to lead a philosophical life. If he is, in fact, ignorant as to whether the oracular pronouncement is divine, then he must seek out on his own to find the true, good, beautiful, and so on, perhaps by examining his life, the lives of others, the world, and so on; namely, by leading a philosophical life. The outcomes of both are the same, but the former view—namely, that the divine word is true—is inherently paradoxical in a way that the latter view is not. This is because if the divine word is true, it both commands him to examine it and is simultaneously potentially undermined by his examination. The very questioning of the divine and the divine law, a questioning which lies at the heart of the Socratic knowledge of ignorance, is a replacement of divine authority with human authority; namely, the authority to determine the validity of the divine. This problem is at the heart of Plato’s Apology and is very likely behind Socrates’s death sentence for impiety; by questioning the generally accepted knowledge of the divine, he instils doubt and undermines the very authority of the divine, implying that such authority ultimately rests on human recognition of the divinity of the gods. That is, the human being who best understands the gods in human terms—namely, the philosopher—is the best suited to receiving their commands. It is little wonder, then, that we find Socrates, at the end of the Apology, proclaiming to prophesy (χρησμῳδῆσαι) to the Athenian people. His prophecy that it is best to become as good as possible (ὡς βέλτιστος) is likely another urge to the people of Athens to pursue philosophy on divine grounds.9 This book is an account of how this problem of divinely commanded inquiry which also questions the divine became manifest to Jewish thinkers who lived in Europe and North Africa in the twelfth to fifteenth centuries. In part 1 of the book, we will examine the depictions of Socrates as someone who is sceptical of divine things that emerge among medieval Jewish authors and how these depictions gave rise to the Socratic paradox we have been describing and other Socratic problems associated with it. In part 2 of the book, we will examine how four thinkers, Moses Maimonides, Jacob Anatoli, Levi Gersonides, and Abraham Bibago, treated this Socratic paradox, though without connecting it to Socrates himself. None of the thinkers discussed in this book seems to have read more than a few lines of Plato’s Apology in any language or claims to have been directly affected by any of Plato’s actual writings. Nevertheless, they 9 Plato, Ap. 39c–d.

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apparently derived a clear picture of this Socratic paradox and of the potentially life-threatening—and certainly community-uprooting—consequences of pursuing philosophical questions. Like Socrates, and to some extent in the wake of Socrates, these philosophers presented philosophy as having a paradoxical relationship to the Law. On the one hand, the Torah commands human thought, which is fully realised in striving for philosophical conjunction with God. This philosophical conjunction is the highest form of religious devotion, yet in order to reach it, the philosopher must first ask philosophical questions. Some of these questions, such as whether God exists, whether He is one, whether He has a body, and what is in the heavens and below the earth, have the potential for undermining the Law and, indeed, do undermine it insofar as they make human understanding what determines their answer rather than the Divine Writ. It is little wonder then that the very asking of these questions is forbidden in the Talmud.10 However, if asking these questions is forbidden by talmudic Law, then how can one truly become a philosopher? And if one cannot truly become a philosopher, then how can one attain conjunction with the divine intellect? The thinkers discussed in this book take this paradox with the utmost seriousness. They understand that philosophy requires an open attitude towards questions—that is, the ability to ask questions without having their answers pre-determined—and that Jewish religious law requires certain questions not to be asked. From a twentieth-century perspective, the paradox discussed in this book is easily disposed of by rejecting either religious law or philosophy. Yet the thinkers studied here are committed to both of these, even though they recognise their incompatibility. The story of how they deal with this incompatibility is the story of this book. In a sense, the problem they face is a legal one, that of accommodating questions that may undermine the foundations of the law itself, yet it is also a question of the philosophical foundations of any law. Still, it is surprising that we do not find a legal solution that carries precedent among these thinkers. Instead, each thinker who deals with this Socratic paradox does so in a different way. For many of them, the solution is outside of the law; that is, it involves asking questions in a way that is fundamentally against the law or illegal. Yet for others, there is a way within the confines of the law, even if it involves a certain amount of contradictory assertions. Except for those discussed in chapter 1, the thinkers discussed in this volume were chosen because they see philosophy—particularly metaphysics, 10

b. Ḥag 11b. According to Jacob Anatoli, studying logic, a necessary prerequisite for philosophical inquiry, is forbidden by the talmudic injunction “Keep your sons from higgayon.” See chapter 5 below.

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the philosophical inquiry into the divine—as not yet known or perhaps not fully knowable by human beings. As will become evident, they do not see their task as Jewish philosophers or Jewish scientists as one of reconciling two distinct and essentially complete, known, and understood bodies of knowledge. Rather, they see philosophy and metaphysical questions as inquiries into the unknown and metaphysics as a series of questions about the most important things that have not yet been answered and are possibly unanswerable. It is this attitude towards these questions which makes their approaches to Judaism, which apparently assumes answers to central questions about God, paradoxical. Moreover, the centrality of these thinkers, especially Judah Halevi, Moses Maimonides, and Levi Gersonides, for medieval, Renaissance, and even modern Judaism is a testament to a willingness at least among some thinkers to bring doubts, questions, and uncertainty into the very centre of Jewish thought. Part 1 of the book traces how Socrates and the Socratic paradox became manifest to medieval Jewish thinkers. The first chapter points out that there were, in fact, two depictions of Socrates available to medieval Jews, but that each thinker would choose only one of them while ignoring the other. The most common depiction of Socrates was as a wise, ascetic, misogynist monotheist. This depiction was drawn from Arabic doxographical and gnomological sources, which were themselves influenced by various Greek, Persian, and Syriac compilations of wisdom literature. This view of Socrates was dominant among Spanish Jews from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. We will examine in some detail the main writers depicting this Socrates: Solomon ibn Gabirol (d. ~1057–1070), Moses ibn Ezra (d. 1138), Joseph ibn Zabarah (d. 1190), Joseph ibn ʿAqnīn (d. mid. 12th century), Judah al-Ḥarizi (d. 1225), and Shem Ṭov Falaquera (d. 1290). We will then examine briefly how the image of the wise, unquestioning Socrates who dispenses good ethical advice was adopted by the later Spanish and Provençal thinkers Moses Nahmanides (d. 1270), Joseph Kaspi (d. 1345), Moses Narboni (d. after 1362), Zeraḥyah Halevi Saladin (d. ~1445), and Joseph Albo (d. 1444). This Socrates is decisively not the questioning Socrates of the Socratic paradox we outlined above; however, it was the most dominant view of him. Interestingly, these thinkers do not mention any of the sceptical aspects of Socrates. More surprising still, they do not describe Socrates’s death as a consequence of any philosophical thought other than a commitment, far ahead of his time, to monotheism. This depiction of Socrates is in stark contrast to that of Judah Halevi (d. 1141) as expressed in his magnum opus, the Kuzari. Halevi, in fact, recognised the Socratic paradox described above, though for him, the paradox always remains outside of Judaism. Halevi mentions Socrates in only four places in the Kuzari.

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In two of these places, he has the protagonist quote Arabic fragments of Plato’s Apology in which he professes ignorance of the divine things. In the two other places, Socrates appears as a representative of a kind of human excellence, which does not attain intellectual conjunction with the divine beings, but nevertheless employs a kind of dialogue and dialectic in order to comprehend as much as possible within the human intellect. In Halevi’s view, Socrates is careful not to reach beyond what can be inferred by the intellect and so remains a kind of sceptic about the heavens, God, and even natural science. Accordingly, the critique of philosophy, which Halevi’s Ḥaver primarily employs against Platonists and Aristotelians, does not apply to Socrates. Yet Socratic philosophy is also not compatible with Judaism, insofar as the latter requires acceptance of the Divine Writ and all of the commandments. Socratic philosophy is thus outside of the Law, but at the same time, it does not fall under the legal and theoretical critique of philosophy. Averroes’s (d. 1198) writings also show a Socrates who is sceptical of human knowledge of the divine and even goes so far as to attack the premises of the religious law of his time. Averroes’s views of Socrates were translated into Hebrew in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century translations of his philosophical commentaries on Aristotle and subsequently formed a large part of Jewish philosophical and scientific education in Spain, Provence, Italy, and the Ottoman lands up until the end of the fifteenth century. His writings depict a Socrates who is primarily interested in ethical concerns and, indeed, plagued by his denial of akrasia; that is, his belief that people will always do what they know to be best. This view may be behind his attack on the principles of religious law, since he believes that people who are mistaken in their views of the highest good will always act badly. His attack on the premises of the law would seem to be responsible for his death at the hands of the law, even though he is consistently interested in helping his fellows attain true virtue. Averroes, following Aristotle, does not completely rule out the denial of akrasia, but focuses on the potential held by different forms of persuasion to substitute for true knowledge of what is best. Averroes accordingly sees religion’s primary function as persuasion to virtue, a belief that is echoed in his political division of mankind into rhetorical, dialectical, and demonstrative classes according to their methods of persuasion. In part 2 of the book, we turn to thinkers who do not mention Socrates, but who are nevertheless interested in the same paradox. Thus, in chapter 4, we see how Moses Maimonides (d. 1204) also notes the same paradoxical relationship between philosophy and the law, though in a sense, he brings philosophy under the wing of religion. The paradox emerges in the Mishneh Torah, where Maimonides, to some extent following talmudic precedent, gives a list of

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questions that Jews are forbidden from asking. These include whether idolatry may be correct, whether God is really one, whether prophecy is true, what is up, and what is down. At the same time, however, Maimonides himself explicitly addresses all of these questions in the Guide of the Perplexed. Indeed, the Guide seems to be organised around precisely the questions that Jews are forbidden from asking in the Mishneh Torah. Moreover, by the end of the Guide, it is clear that the highest form of worship of God and intellectual conjunction with the divine can only be achieved by one who has asked these questions. This paradox has a parallel with Plato’s Laws, where the Athenian stranger recommends building a kind of college-like prison in the middle of the city where people who ask forbidden intellectual questions can learn to become philosophers. Just as this prison resolves the Socratic paradox by creating a space for philosophical discourse that is within the city, yet outside of its laws, so, too, Maimonides’s Guide creates a similar intellectual space for budding philosophers who follow the Jewish law. Jacob Anatoli (d. 1256) was among the key translators of Averroes’s logical and scientific works into Hebrew. He does not treat Socrates directly, but is concerned with the permissibility of studying science and logic. The science and logic he has in mind is evidently Aristotelian, mediated through Averroes’s works, but the problem he faces is Socratic. Human perfection, according to Anatoli, can only be gained through the study of science, while science can only be studied after one has mastered logic, but Tractae Berakhot of the Talmud apparently forbids the study of logic. According to Anatoli, the prohibition only applies to the youth, particularly those young people who would not turn to study Torah once they had encountered science and logic. Accordingly, Anatoli recommends a separation between Torah study and logic and science from the outset. This separation should only be breached once one has mastered both science and Torah. Thus, Anatoli encourages a kind of suspension of the paradox of open inquiry until after one has already studied science. Yet one who has studied science will face doubts upon returning to study Torah, and in his introduction to Malmad ha-Talmidim, Anatoli recognises that such doubts are potentially undermining of the Torah. Nevertheless, his work seeks to lead the reader to approach both science and the Torah with an open mind. Anatoli calls this work both a “goad” (malmad) and an “apology” (hitnaṣlut), both terms that recall Socrates’s Apology. Levi Gersonides (d. 1344) uses the Song of Songs’s highly erotic language to describe the desire of the soul, its faculties, and even the hylic intellect for the Active Intellect. Indeed, objects of human desire form a hierarchy in the Commentary on the Song of Songs ranging from the desire for bodies to the desire for souls, the desire for science, and the desire for knowledge of the good

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and beautiful itself—a hierarchy not unlike that of Plato’s Symposium. The final and highest desire for knowledge of God is, according to Gersonides, not only a central aim of the Torah and the prophetic writings, but the hidden meaning of the Song of Songs. This meaning is hidden behind a description of the love of bodies because it is not attainable by human knowledge alone. Human knowledge can only attain some of the sciences, particularly mathematics and physics. For Gersonides, the unattainability of the highest knowledge of God requires such knowledge to be hidden from the public, who ought not to ask open questions that metaphysicians cannot answer. Despite its being hidden, metaphysics is required for human happiness. Gersonides thus brings a hidden science into the folds of Judaism, even if it requires a non-scientific miraculous revelation for its realisation. Abraham Bibago’s (d. ca. 1489) Derekh Emunah (Way of Faith) is an allegorising interpretation of the Torah, the Talmud, the Midrash, and various legendary materials that explicitly seeks to integrate science and philosophy into Jewish literature. These allegories are so forced that they met with criticism shortly after they were written. Moreover, even if they are taken at face value, they are highly authoritative and do not leave room for interpretation; that is, the scientific interpretation of Jewish literature is itself somewhat dogmatic and does not leave room for questioning. Yet in his Commentary on the Metaphysics, Bibago is much more open to questions and expresses uncertainty about many of the same views of God and the role of science. In his view, the uncertainty of human knowledge is kept behind a smokescreen of allegory that promotes scientific reasoning, but not unrestricted philosophical questions. As with Gersonides, unrestricted questioning and ignorance of the highest things is esoteric. Even if science can be brought into the folds of religious law, questioning cannot. While the four thinkers discussed in part 2 explore this Socratic problem outside of its Platonic context, Italian Jews as early as the late fifteenth century were already beginning to become acquainted with Plato’s writings through Marsilio Ficino’s Latin translations. The thinkers who read Plato directly were apparently also greatly influenced by Ficinian Neo-Platonism and other Renaissance readings of Plato in Florence and Naples. Accordingly, they did not see the relationship between science and religion as inherently contradictory or paradoxical. Instead, they turned to a kind of eclecticism that allowed them to integrate philosophy, both Platonic and Aristotelian, into their religious viewpoints. The timeframe covered by this book ends before the rise of this kind of Neo-Platonic, Florentine eclecticism that we find in thinkers like Johanan Alemanno (d. after 1504) and Judah Moscato (d. ~1593). These thinkers turned to such eclecticism in an effort to see various distinct and

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inconsistent ways of looking at the world as reflections of a transcendent, even ineffable truth. They used the language of Hebrew philosophy, even that of Socrates as depicted by the thinkers in chapter 1, interpreting it as referring to the depictions of prisca theologia. For Alemanno, human beings can transcend science and human wisdom through dedication to a kind of divine madness, which was discovered by King Solomon, though echoed in Plato’s Phaedrus.11 For Moscato too, Jewish ritual, especially Temple ritual and its substitutes in prayers, can also lead to transcendence of the human condition and an expression of pure intellectual cognition. This cognition is in many ways similar to the intellectual conjunction identified by the earlier Aristotelians, but significantly, Platonic intellectual cognition is not reached through questioning religious ritual, but through performing it and using it to contribute to intellectual development. At the end of his thirty-fifth sermon, Judah Moscato expresses this eclectic conjoining of philosophy and religion in a striking interpretation of Socrates’s dying statement in the Phaedo, “I owe a cock to Asclepius.”12 This verse was usually taken to be a statement of thanks for being relieved of the illness that is life.13 Moscato’s interpretation builds on this, but in an entirely unexpected way. Moscato associates the cock with a Hebrew word for rooster, śekhwi. This word appears in Job 38:36, where God expresses His superiority over man because, inter alia, He has given the rooster understanding, presumably an understanding of the difference between night and day, a sentiment echoed in one of the traditional morning prayers. For Moscato, the śekhwi’s ability to differentiate day and night is said to be an allegory for the intellect.14 Socrates’s dying wish, which in Moscato’s version is to sacrifice a śekhwi to God, is thus said to be a 11 12 13 14

See Yehuda Halper, “King Solomon’s Phaedran Madness: Johanan Alemanno on Platonic Eros in Hebrew Philosophical Sources,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 26 (2019): 309–37. Plato, Phd. 118a. For a history of the various interpretations of this verse and a suggestion that it is, in fact, intended to thank Asclepius for healing Plato so that the latter can carry on Socrates’s work, see Glenn Most, “‘A Cock for Asclepius,’” The Classical Quarterly 43 (1993): 96–111. Note that in his interpretation of Job 38:36, Levi Gersonides explained that the term śekhvi refers to the hylic intellect (ha-śekhel ha-hiyulani). See Miqra‌ʾot Gedolot ha-Keter (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2011), ad loc. This may be an Aristotelian interpretation of David Qimḥi’s interpretation of śekhvi as that which “sees things in thought” (ke-mi še-ṣofeh ha-devarim ba-maḥšavah). See David Qimḥi’s commentary on Ps 73:7 (as reproduced in the Bar Ilan Responsa Project: www.responsa.co.il). Note that the King James Version of the Bible translates the śekhvi of Job 38:36 as “heart,” probably also reflecting a similar interpretation to that of Qimḥi. The difficulty of understanding the term śekhvi is already noted in b. Roš Haš. 26a, where it is explained as referring to a rooster since it distinguishes between night and day.

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complete and total dedication to the intellect and to intellectual conjunction with God, leaving behind the concerns of this world. For Moscato, this is the goal of temple sacrifices, such as that of the cock, in general. This goal, however, leaves behind the things of this world, and even religious ritual itself, in order to transcend it and achieve pure philosophical insight.15 Moscato thus exemplifies a Renaissance Italian ideal found in Alemanno, Judah Abravanel, and others which did not see philosophy and Judaism as being in a paradoxical relationship epitomised by Socrates’s Apology, but rather opened the gates of interpretation to unify Greek philosophy, including Plato’s Socrates in the new Latin translations by Marsilio Ficino, into an eclectic, rhetorically fluid, and embellished manner. The śekhwi of the book of Job and the morning prayers could become the cock that Socrates sought to offer Asclepius, all united in a kind of intellectual pursuit of the divine. In focusing on the pre-Ficinian Middle Ages, this book highlights a particular aspect of the paradoxical relationship between divine command and open intellectual inquiry that would disappear from sight for Renaissance Jews. Questions about the divine commandment to philosophise and the divine injunctions not to did not surface in this way before Judah Halevi’s account of Socratic philosophy. While many twentieth- and twenty-first-century readers of Plato’s Apology might see these questions as inherently central to the book, surprisingly, the first Jews to rediscover the work in the Renaissance did all they could to hide them from view. It was medieval Jews, who did not have direct access to Plato’s Socrates and who certainly did not have access to Plato’s Apology, who were somehow best able to translate this Socratic paradox into a paradox of Jewish thought. 15

Judah Moscato, Judah Moscato Sermons, vol. 3, ed. and trans. Giuseppe Veltri, Gianfranco Miletto, and Yehuda Halper (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 239–42, Hebrew text on 83–84 (Hebrew pagination).

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Part 1 Socrates among Medieval Jews

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Chapter 1

Was Socrates a Wise, Ascetic Monotheist or a Vocal Sceptic? The Two Socrateses of Medieval Jewish Doxography

While there is no evidence that medieval Jews read Plato, they may have occasionally encountered Socrates, primarily through doxographical literature; that is, sentences, anecdotes, and aphorisms that describe or are attributed to Socrates. In fact, the various accounts in Jewish literature written in Hebrew and Arabic present two distinct, even incompatible views of Socrates. The sources of these views have no middle ground, but are so clearly divided into two camps that we may even speak of two “Socrateses.” The Socrates who was best known to medieval Jews is the least recognisable to the modern reader: he is a wise, ascetic monotheist who dispenses unquestioning and unquestioned advice in memorable proverbs and maxims. The other Socrates, far less well known in the Middle Ages than the first, is a derivative of the Socrates of Plato’s Apology who is sceptical of theology and divine law, while at the same time relentlessly inquiring into the divine, human ethics, and the relationship between them. While both Socrateses appear in similar kinds of statements or anecdotes, Jewish authors view him in only one of these two ways: either as a wise, ascetic monotheist or as a vocal sceptic. Never in Jewish literature before Ficino, in either Arabic or Hebrew, is he depicted as a combination of the two, for example as an ascetic sceptic or even as a sceptical monotheist. The first Socrates appears in collections of statements by wise men. These statements are a staple of Arabic adab literature, which a number of Spanish Jews in the tenth to thirteenth centuries contributed to and even imported into Hebrew. This literature used statements of wise men in order to bolster arguments or views maintained by other characters in a work, usually with only a very loose connection to the subject at hand. Often, such statements are somewhat generic and views ascribed to one thinker in one work can be found voiced by someone else in another. Socrates figures prominently as an author of such statements, even if he is never a main character. It is not made clear, though, in any of the works how he gained his reputation for wisdom, other than through the statements attributed to him. He is frequently called “the divine Socrates,” though this appellation is never explained. Most frequently, he is drawn upon for his views on moderation, asceticism, women, friendship, and devout religiosity.

© Yehuda Halper, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004468764_003

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The second Socrates, the vocal sceptic, is the primary subject of this book. This Socrates is a kind of symbol of a fundamental problem of medieval Jewish philosophy: philosophy claims to attain happiness through proper knowledge of God, but in doing so, it begins by questioning everything about God, including His oneness and His very existence. Such questioning has the potential to undermine belief in God and is consequently forbidden by divine Law. Therefore, philosophy, the happiness achieved through proper knowledge of God, is both the final goal of the divine Law and, paradoxically, forbidden by the very same divine Law. Certainly, this problem is addressed and solved in various ways by numerous thinkers. However, in the medieval view of the second Socrates, we find it arising in a simple, even naïve manner, not with a view to being answered, but as a problem that continuously accompanies the most serious theological thoughts of Jewish thinkers. In what follows, we shall present a brief overview of the non-Jewish Arabic sources of Socrates, since the Jewish descriptions of him are clearly derivative of these Arabic sources. Nevertheless, the crucial division present in Jewish sources between Socrates the knowing, wise, ascetic monotheist and Socrates the sceptic is not present in many of the Arabic sources. It is generally not a crucial distinction for the non-Jewish doxographical literature that describes Socrates in Arabic. We shall then turn to the Jewish literature in Hebrew and Arabic that depicts Socrates the ascetic monotheist. Finally, we shall give a brief overview of the sources of the sceptical Socrates, though we shall encounter this Socrates in more detail in chapters 2 and 3. 1

Socrates in Arabic Doxographies: A Brief Overview

The depiction of Socrates as an unquestioning, devout believer who rejects worldly pleasures has its roots in Arabic doxographies and gnomologies, which formed a large part of what Arabic readers knew or thought they knew about the ancient world.1 Socrates was a popular figure in such works and often appeared alongside Plato and Aristotle, suggesting that the authors had some notion of the chronology of these Greek thinkers.2 Many of the portrayals of 1 See Dimitri Gutas, “Greek Wisdom Literature in the Arabic Tradition: A Study of the Graeco-Arabic Gnomologia” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1975), and Dimitri Gutas, Greek Philosophers in the Arabic Tradition (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). See also Gotthard Strohmaier, “Doxographies, Graeco-Arabic,” in Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, 276–79. 2 The most complete list of these statements (containing 935 quotations) can be found in Ilai Alon, Socrates Arabus: Life and Teachings [Arabic] (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2005). Many of these are translated into English in Ilai Alon, Socrates in Mediaevel

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Socrates in Arabic are derived from Greek doxographical literature, such as the Lives of the Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius and the now lost Histories of the Philosophers by Porphyry.3 Some of these portrayals are also derived from Persian doxographical material, where either Persian names have been replaced with Greek ones or the stories and statements from the two traditions have become interwoven.4 Often, the characters are confused with each other. Thus, in numerous works, we find Socrates living in a barrel in the centre of Athens and rejecting gifts from kings, acts normally associated with Diogenes the Cynic.5 In some works, Socrates makes statements that are elsewhere attributed to Luqmān, Plato, or Aristotle.6 Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq’s Ādāb al-Falāsifa, probably the oldest known Arabic gnomological work, may be an example of all of these traits. The work itself is not extant, but Muḥammad al-Anṣārī’s summary of it survives.7 In it, we find many statements traceable to Greek sources, within a literary framework involving palaces, staffs, belts, signet rings, and other such objects adorned with sayings of the philosophers.8 These are apparently derived from Persian wisdom literature.9 There are also numerous precedents for these stories in

3

4

5 6 7 8 9

Arabic Literature (Leiden: Brill, 1991). In both works, the statements are organised by subject rather than by authors. For a more compact account of these materials, see Ilai Alon, “Socrates in Arabic Philosophy,” in A Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 317–36. In general, Alon seems to assume that there is an essentially unified view of Socrates among Arabic sources, even if there are numerous differences between the accounts. Accordingly, Alon organises his discussions around topics and themes, showing how the various anecdotes and statements arise in different thinkers. I think it more productive to seek a unified view of Socrates in each thinker individually (although even then, this cannot always not be found) and then to compare these views. See Gutas, Greek Philosophers in the Arabic Tradition, chapters 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 12, and Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 16. Some fragments of the latter are edited in Porphyry, Porphyry’s Historia Philosophiae (Fragmenta), ed. A. Nauck, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1886; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963). For Persian sources of this literature, particularly the literary structure of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq’s Ādāb al-Falāsifa, see Mohsen Zakeri, “Ādāb al-Falāsifa: The Persian Content of an Arabic Collection of Aphorisms,” Mélanges de l’Université Saint Joseph 57 (2004): 174–90, and Mohsen Zakeri, Persian Wisdom in Arabic Garb, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2007). See, e.g., Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 48–51, and the sources cited therein. Alon, 35. See Hunain ibn Ishâk, Â dâb al-Falâsifa (Sentences des philosophes), abréviation par Moham. Ben Alie ben Ibrahim, ed. Abdurrhamn Badawi (Kuwait: Institut des manuscrits arabes, 1985). For the various accoutrements of Socrates, see Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 44. On the Greek sources, see Dimitri Gutas’s articles in n. 1 above; for the Persian sources, see Zakeri, “Ādāb al-Falāsifa,” and Zakeri, Persian Wisdom in Arabic Garb.

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Syriac collections of maxims and wise statements that included many statements attributed to Socrates.10 Ḥunayn’s Socrates also lives in a jar or barrel in the middle of Athens and advocates extreme asceticism. He disavows property in a way that is inconsistent with his possession of an engraved signet ring (presumably used for financial transactions) or other garments and staffs. Moreover, this Socrates exhibits an extremely negative view of women. Many of his statements also appear in other gnomological writings in the mouths of other thinkers. Though not definitive, the evidence we have does not suggest that Ḥunayn had any knowledge of Plato or Xenophon, even though he is presumably the same Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq who translated Aristotle into Arabic. However, other non-Jewish authors who wrote about Socrates in Arabic were likely to have been at least somewhat aware of Plato’s Socrates and to have sought to combine him with the Socrates of the gnomologies. Thus, for example, Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī describes Socrates as a monotheist who is vocally opposed to Athenian paganism and whose proofs and demonstration of God’s oneness lead the king of Athens to put him to death.11 A similar story may be present in al-Kindī’s now lost work On What Transpired between Socrates and the Ḥarranians. While we cannot know for certain, it seems possible that this work is a recasting of the Apology of Socrates as a defence of monotheism against the pagan Sabians of Ḥarran.12 Al-Rāzī presents a comprehensive account of Socrates’s life that includes several intellectual turns and changes, which have the effect of allowing him to take up many, if not all, of the positions attributed to him, though at different times in his life.13 Still, there were a number of Arabic authors who seemed to prefer a Platonic Socrates, even if their access to Plato was somewhat muddled. Thus, 10 11 12

13

See Ute Pietruschka, “Syriac Reception of Socrates,” in Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Socrates, 518–44. Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī, Al-Amad ʿalā al-abad, MS Servili 179, f. 6r, cited in Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 56–57. On this work and other works by al-Kindī that discussed Socrates, see Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 19–20, and Peter Adamson, “The Arabic Socrates: The Place of al-Kindī’s Report in the Tradition,” in Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment, ed. Michael Trapp, new ed. (London: Routledge, 2016), 161–78. Adamson provides a translation of the relevant extant sayings on 172–76. Al-Kindī seems to have had various unique sources for Socrates, some of them clearly derived from Plato. E.g., he seems to have a relatively accurate portrayal of at least some of Alcibiades’s speech in Plato’s Symposium. See Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 65–67. See Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakarīyāʾ al-Rāzī, “Al-Sirah al-Falsaīyah (Philosophical Way of Life),” in Rasāʾil falsafīyah, ed. Paul Kraus (Cairo: Ǧāmiʿat Fuʾad I, 1939; repr. Beirut: Dār al-afāq al-ǧadīdah, 1973).

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for example, in the early eleventh century, Abū al-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī includes numerous quotes from Plato’s Phaedo in his history of India which, although they have numerous sentences out of place and various other differences from Plato’s writings, are primarily based on Plato.14 Ibn al-Qifṭī’s twelfth-century Tāʾrīḫ al-Ḥukamāʾ contains an account of Socrates’s death that combines Plato’s Phaedo and Crito with other Greek sources and perhaps a range of other materials.15 A similar approach is also found in Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ and al-Qazwīnī.16 Al-Fārābī and Averroes also have a Socrates that is taken from Plato—though, as we shall see, their views of Socrates are based on certain problems and views of scepticism—which are the primary sources of the sceptical Socrates of philosophical Jewish sources. These sources, though not exclusively doxographical, still give us a sense of the range of texts in which Socrates appears in Arabic sources. These sources are not all in agreement, or even consistent in themselves, and can mix depictions of Socrates as an ascetic monotheist with those of a Plato-inspired sceptic or a Platonic formalist. 2

Socrates, the Wise, Ascetic Monotheist in Jewish Doxographies

Jewish sources that feature Socrates adhere more rigidly to the two views of him mentioned above—as either a wise, ascetic monotheist or a vocal sceptic— and do not appear to blend the two views. This gives the first Socrates, the ascetic monotheist, a distinctly non-Platonic flavour. Indeed, in these sources, we find a Socrates without any of his famous questions; rather, he has a kind of ethical certainty that he is interested in spreading through pithy statements. This Socrates first appears in the eleventh century in Solomon ibn Gabirol’s Improvement of the Moral Qualities,17 though he does not appear there as a strict ascetic or as a monotheist, but only as a wise ethicist who dispenses good advice. All the same, it is clear that ibn Gabirol’s Socrates is a precursor to later Jewish 14

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Abū al-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī, Fī Taḥqīq mā li-l-Hind min Maqūlah fī al-ʿAql marḏūlah (Examining India), rev. ed. (Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUṯmānīyah, 1958). See also Al-Beruni’s India, trans. Edward C. Sachau, 2 vols. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, and Trübner, 1910). For a detailed comparison to Plato’s Phaedo, see Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 164–74. Ibn al-Qifṭī, Ta‌ʾrīḫ al-Ḥukamāʾ, ed. Julius Lippert (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1903), 199–206. The passage is translated with copious notes and analysed in Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 67–77. See Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 78–82. Solomon ibn Gabirol, Improvement of the Moral Qualities: And Ethical Treatise of the Eleventh Century by Solomon ibn Gabirol, ed. and trans. Stephen Samuel Wise (New York: Columbia University Press, 1901).

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views of Socrates. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Socrates appears as an ascetic monotheist in the works of five other thinkers: Moses ibn Ezra’s Book of Conversation and Deliberation (Kitāb al-Muḥāḍarah wa-l-Muḏākarah) and Treatise of the Garden (Maqālat al-Ḥadīqah),18 Joseph ibn Zabarah’s Book of Delights (Sefer ha-Šaʿašuʿim),19 Joseph ibn ʿAqnīn’s Hygiene of the Soul (Ṭibb al-Nufūs),20 Judah al-Ḥarizi’s translation of Muḥammad al-Anṣārī’s summary of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq’s Ādāb al-Falāsifa under the title Musare ha-Filosofim,21 and various works by Shem Ṭov Falaquera. Numerous later views of Socrates in Hebrew are derived from these six sources. Lastly, a prayer attributed to Socrates presents him as a devout monotheist who seeks to abandon this world in favour of a purely intellectual existence. In what follows, we shall give a brief overview of the Socrates that appears in each of these thinkers and then describe how later thinkers drew on these works when assigning views and quotations to Socrates. 2.1 Solomon ibn Gabirol (1020/21–1057/58 or 107022) The earliest Jewish thinker to mention Socrates in this literature was the eleventh-century poet and philosopher Solomon ibn Gabirol. He includes eight statements attributed to Socrates among the numerous wise statements

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Moses ben Jacob ibn Ezra, Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara wal-Mudhākara, Liber discussionis et commemorationis, ed. and trans. A.S. Halkin (Jerusalem: Mekize Nirdamim, 1975). See also Moše ibn ʿEzra, Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara wal-Muḏākara, ed. and trans. Montserrat Abumalham Mas, 2 vols. (Madrid: Instituto Bibliografico Hispanico, 1985). Joseph ben Meir ibn Zabara, Sefer Shaashuim: A Book of Mediaeval Lore, ed. Israel Davidson (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1914); there is also a later edition with Hebrew translations of Davidson’s introduction (Berlin: Eshkol, 1925). To avoid ambiguity between the editions, I will refer to this text by chapter number (in Roman numerals) and line number. The book was also twice translated into English, once by Israel Abrahams as The Book of Delight and Other Papers (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1912, repr. 1980) and once by Moses Hadas as The Book of Delight (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932, repr. 1960). The translations here are my own. A critical edition and English translation of part of the work that includes the relevant sections may be found in A.S. Halkin, “Classical and Arabic Material in ibn ʿAknīn’s ‘Hygiene of the Soul’,” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 14 (1944): 25–147. Judah al-Ḥarizi, trans., Honein ibn Ishak, Musre HaPhilosophim (“Sinnsprüche der Philosophen”), ed. Abraham Loewenthal (Frankfurt am Main, 1896). For the various opinions of ibn Gabirol’s dates, see the sources in Sarah Pessin, “Solomon ibn Gabirol [Avicebron],” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ibn -gabirol/.

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in his Improvement of the Moral Qualities, originally written in Arabic.23 The work is an ethical manual with suggestions for using reason to control the senses and the other faculties of the soul. It frequently quotes the Bible along with wisdom literature attributed to famous Greeks and Persians, among whom we find Socrates. In the twelfth century, Judah ibn Tibbon translated this work into Hebrew, granting ibn Gabirol’s Socrates wide exposure throughout Southern Europe in subsequent centuries.24 The Socrates we find in ibn Gabirol commends ethical behaviour through the following recommendations: that one should flee evil, be modest, even hold modest aspirations,25 be wary of one’s enemies,26 not feel excessive joy27 or sadness,28 avoid grief or worry, and not feel attachment to objects that one could lose.29 Injunctions of this kind are fairly generic and there does not seem to be a particular reason to assign them to Socrates. Ibn Gabirol would appear to have found some of them in al-Anṣārī’s summary of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq’s Ādāb al-Falāsifa, or else in the Ādāb al-Falāsifa itself, and to have included them along with their attribution to Socrates.30 Others probably came from other Arabic works. However, despite ibn Gabirol’s famed Neo-Platonism, he does not reveal any knowledge of Plato’s Socrates. Instead, we see only an ethical, wise and moderate Socrates, who is perhaps somewhat stoic. Ibn Gabirol occasionally refers to Socrates as “the divine Socrates,”31 but the statements attributed to this Socrates have no connection to anything divine. 2.2 Moses ibn Ezra (~1055–1135 or 113832) Another Andalusian poet and philosopher, Moses ibn Ezra, mentions Socrates in two of his works, both of which were written in Arabic: the Book of 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32

Solomon ibn Gabirol, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, 58, 72, 77, 80, 81. The corresponding Arabic text is on pages 20, 28, 31, 33, and 34 (in Arabic numerals). Solomon ibn Gabirol, Sefer Tiqqun Middot ha-Nefeš, trans. Judah ibn Tibbon, ed. C.Y. Pollak (Pressburg, 1896). The Socrates quotations are preserved on pages 28, 34, 36, and 38 (Hebrew pagination). Ibn Gabirol, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, 58, ٢٠. Ibn Gabirol, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, 72, ٢٨. Ibn Gabirol, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, 77, ٣١. Ibn Gabirol, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, 81, ٣٤. Ibn Gabirol, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, 80, ٣٣. See ibn Gabirol, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, 109, 112, notes to pages 58, 80, 81. ‫ق‬ See ibn Gabirol, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, 58, ٢٠, where he is called ‫��س��را ط‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ا لم���ا �ل�ه‬. On 72, Wise has “the divine Socrates,” but this is not supported by his Arabic text on ٢٨. In the Hebrew translation, all mentions of Socrates but the very last include the epithet “divine” (‫האלדי‬, sic). On the life and dating of Moses ibn Ezra, see Paul B. Fenton, Philosophie et exégèse dans Le jardin de la métaphore de Moïse ibn ʿEzra, philosophe et poète andalou du XIIe

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Conversation and Deliberation (Kitāb al-Muḥāḍarah wa-l-Muḏākarah) and the Treatise of the Garden (Maqālat al-Ḥadīqah). The former, which was not translated into Hebrew until the twentieth century, is a book of poetics and rhetoric, the first of its kind by a Jewish author in the Middle Ages, while the latter concerns philosophical, primarily Neo-Platonic views of metaphor and its use in exegesis. The conversations and discussions are a series of eight questions about poetry and homiletics whose answers are expansive and filled with digressions, including quotations from famous Greek philosophers, that bear no clear connection to the subject at hand. Thus, in response to a question about why Andalusian Jewish poetry is better than other poetry (chapter 5), ibn Ezra presents a kind of history of Jewish poetry in Andalus, including a brief account of ibn Gabirol. In this account, ibn Ezra describes ibn Gabirol’s pursuit of ethical control over his passions, alluding, it would seem, to the Improvement of the Moral Qualities. However, the feature of ibn Gabirol’s work that most catches ibn Ezra’s interest is the ethical interest in “the sentences of the philosophical sciences” (laṭāʾif al-ʿulūm al-falsafa). He is particularly interested in quotations from the Greek philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, Hippocrates, and Socrates. Ostensibly quoting ibn Gabirol, ibn Ezra says: Socrates said: The Law requires us to keep far away from sin and philosophy teaches us the reason for this. The difference between the Law and political philosophy is that political actions are particular, lacking, and dependent on the Law, while the acts of the Law are universal, perfect, and not dependent on political actions.33 This quote is not found in our texts by ibn Gabirol, though the first part of it does appear word for word in Mubaššir ibn Fātik (d. 1053).34 Ibn Ezra may have had sources that confused the two works, or else may have confused them himself; alternatively, perhaps this quote did appear in ibn Gabirol’s Improvement of the Moral Qualities, but was somehow omitted from the manuscripts sometime between ibn Ezra’s Book of Conversation and Judah ibn

33 34

siècle (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 12–22. See also Raymond Scheindlin, “Moses ibn Ezra,” in The Literature of Al-Andalus, ed. María Rosa Menocal, Raymond Scheindlin, and Michael Sells (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 252–64. Moses ibn Ezra, Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara, 70 (section 37b); translation mine. The description of ibn Gabirol is on 68–72. Al-Mubaššir b. Fātik, Muḫtār al-Ḥikam wa-Maḥāsin al-Kalim, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī (Madrid: Al-Maʿhad al-Miṣrī li-l-dirāsāt al-Islāmīyah, 1958), 97, cited in Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara, 71, n. 50.

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Tibbon’s Hebrew translation. In any case, in this statement, we find Socrates administering high praise for the Law, al-sunna—that is, presumably the religious law—on the grounds that it keeps one from sins or crimes (āṯām). Law is universally applicable and so is more useful than philosophy, which is particular. Presumably, “philosophy” here refers to the kind of ethical regimen we find in ibn Gabirol and later thinkers like ibn ʿAqnīn and Moses Maimonides in which actions are personally tailored to individual tastes and desires. If there is an echo here of Socrates’s dialogue with the Laws of Athens in Plato’s Crito, it is quite removed from Plato and indeed gives the impression of a particularly pious Socrates who holds the law to be more valuable than philosophy. That the Socrates of the Crito holds the opposite view is what makes the dialogue so intriguing. Elsewhere in the Book of Conversation and Deliberation, we encounter other aspects of Moses ibn Ezra’s Socrates. His asceticism is expressed in a short statement in the middle of a discussion of what truly constitutes wealth: “Natural wealth is when a man manages not to be hungry or naked; the rest is superfluous and unnecessary.”35 This is not a strong disavowal of property or possessions, but rather a moderate austerity, focusing on one’s greatest needs and discounting the rest. This Socrates is unapologetically certain of his views and hopes never to change his mind.36 He is also dedicated to his friends, and is accordingly a good role model for those poems in praise of friendship.37 According to Socrates, friendship is valuable at least in part because friends keep each other away from sin (iṯm).38 Thus, they are akin to the Law and to ethical philosophy. This similarity may be behind Socrates’s claim that great

35 36 37

38

Moses ibn Ezra, Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara, 96 (section 52a). In the same section, Plato and Aristotle express much stronger ascetic views: Plato condemns all possessions and Aristotle recommends living apart from society entirely. Moses ibn Ezra, Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara, 158 (section 85a): “May I not live to see the day when I praise what I formerly scorned or when I scorn what I formerly praised; for that is the day when my inclination has bested my intellect.” Moses ibn Ezra, Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara, 184 (section 97a): “A friend is another who is you, only other than you.” The context is a discussion of poems in praise of friendship. Joseph ibn Zabarah ascribes a similar statement to Plato; see ibn Zabara, Sefer Shaashuim, XII, 129: “What is a lover? You are you and there is no other” (‫מה הוא האוהב? אתה הוא אתה ואין‬ ‫)בלתך‬. Moses ibn Ezra, Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara, 184 (section 97b): “The best of friends restrains his companion from reaching the level of sin. The perfectly virtuous among friends is he who is not benefitted by another when his friend is absent and needs no other when his friend is present. The worst of friends is he who is not a friend in secret and not an enemy in the open.”

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friendship either is found or is expressed in the advice that friends give.39 It may also be behind the value Socrates sees in accepting rebuke from one’s friends. Indeed, such rebuke is, according to Socrates, inherently connected to justice.40 So important is friendship for Socrates that he even prays to God to ask for good friends and also that he may steer clear of bad friends.41 For ibn Ezra’s Socrates, most possessions are unnecessary, but friendship, justice, law, and philosophy are connected to avoiding sin and bad actions. Socrates directs prayers to God for good friends, presumably, again, to help him avoid sin and thereby live in better accord with God’s law. Socrates’s prayers to God also appear in the Treatise of the Garden. The work itself is not yet edited in Arabic, though the fragmentary remnants of its Hebrew translation have been edited.42 The Hebrew translation entitled the Bed of Spices, ʿArugat ha-Bośem, identifies the author’s first name as Judah and mentions circumstances tying it to twelfth-century Lunel, and so it is consequently likely either the work of Judah ibn Tibbon or Judah al-Ḥarizi.43 The Garden, then, was likely more influential in Southern Europe in the Middle Ages than the Book of Conversation and Deliberation, even though less of it

39 40 41 42

43

Moses ibn Ezra, Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara, 186 (section 98b): “Thank your friend frequently and he shall give you frequent advice. Thus Socrates says in his ethical will, ‘just as desire (al-ʿišq) is an excess of passion (al-šawq), so too is advice an excess of friendship.’” Moses ibn Ezra, Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara, 220 (section 116a): “The divine Socrates said in his ethical will, ‘Do not let the limited actions of the rebuke prevent you from benefitting from his rebuke. This is the end of life for all who consider justice.’” Moses ibn Ezra, Kitāb al-Muḥāḍara, 158 (section 85a): “May God keep me from a generous enemy, from a sorrow-inducing friend, and from a friend who has increasingly expansive praise.” On the Arabic and Hebrew manuscripts of the work, see Fenton, Philosophie et exégèse, 40–52. The early edition of the Hebrew fragments is in L. Dukes, “Liqquṭim mi-sefer ʿarugat ha-bośem le-rabbi moše ibn ʿezra,” Ṣiyyon II, ed. Creizenach and Jost (Frankfurt am Main, 1842/43). For a presentation of the relevant sections of the translator’s argument and the view that Judah ibn Tibbon is the translator, see Moshe Idel, “The Identity of the Translator of Rabbi Moses ibn Ezra’s book, Bed of Spices” [Hebrew], Qiryat Sefer 51 (1976): 484–87. There, Idel argues against the view that al-Ḥarizi was the translator, a view presented in Shraga Abramson, “The Translator of Rabbi Moses ibn Ezra’s book, Bed of Spices, is al-Ḥarizi” [Hebrew], Qiryat Sefer 36 (1975/76): 712. Recently, Paul Fenton has revived the view that the translator is, in fact, al-Ḥarizi; see Philosophie et exégèse, 52–54, followed by a French translation and discussion of the relevant claims in the translator’s introduction on 54–56. On 56, Fenton also compares nine philosophical terms used in the Hebrew Bed of Spices, Judah ibn Tibbon, and Moses ibn Ezra’s original Arabic. Yet this comparison does not conclusively prove al-Ḥarizi’s authorship of the translation. Such a proof would require far more terms, compared across as many works by the two translators as possible.

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survives today.44 The Treatise of the Garden discusses philosophical and theological issues in interpreting the Bible, and its second part is primarily concerned with Hebrew and Arabic terminology. Like the Book of Conversation and Deliberation, the Treatise of the Garden contains numerous digressions and anecdotal statements attributed to wise men that are characteristic of adab literature. Among these, we find a prayer from Socrates blessing and praising God for creating him in accordance with His will, with neither excess nor deficiency.45 This prayer accords with Socrates’s statement in Conversation and Deliberation that humans need no wealth other than food and clothing. Elsewhere, we find Socrates telling God that He is removed from man while at the same time always close to him, a sentiment echoed in Judah Halevi’s famous poem “Where Can I Find Thee?”46 Moses ibn Ezra’s Socrates thus appears as a deeply religious figure who prays to God and values His Law. He is an advocate of a certain kind of asceticism— namely, disavowal of unnecessary belongings—and he finds this asceticism in religious prayer. His philosophy is one of avoiding wrongdoing through following the law, thinking philosophically about ethics, and, most importantly, having friends and listening to their advice and rebukes. He is confident in his views and does not anticipate changing them in the future. Ibn Ezra’s view of Socrates would thus appear to have nothing in common with Plato’s. Yet as we shall see in the next chapter, his friend and fellow poet Judah Halevi had a much more Platonic view of Socrates, even if it did not come, strictly speaking, directly from Plato. The prayer that Halevi puts in his own mouth is similar to those made by Socrates in the Garden, but for ibn Ezra’s Socrates, there is no room for Socratic questions or problems.47 44

45 46

47

For further influence of this work, see also Paul B. Fenton, “Traces of Moses ibn ʿEzra’s ʿArûgat ha-bôsem in the Writings of the Early Spanish Qabbalists,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, Volume III, ed. Isadore Twersky and Jay Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 45–81. Fenton, Philosophie et exégèse, 75: “Louange à Toi créas l’homme comme il convenait sans surplus ni deficience.” Fenton, 114: “Tu n’es ni loin de moi au point que je doive crier pour Te solliciter, ni proche au point qu’il suffise de T’appeler. Tu ne voisines aucun des lieux auquels j’adresse ma supplique, car proximité et éloignement impliquent distance, alors qu’aucune distance ne nous sépare. Tu es un lien et une enveloppe plus intimes et plus subtiles que mon esprit et mon âme.” Compare Judah Halevi’s poem: “Lord, where can I find Thee? […] And where can I not find Thee?” (?‫ ָאנָ ה ֶא ְמ ָצ ֲאָך? […] וְ ָאנָ ה לֹא ֶא ְמ ָצ ֲאָך‬,‫)יָ ּה‬, at, e.g., https://benyehuda .org/read/8669. Steven Harvey notes that Moses ibn Ezra and Judah Halevi have radically different ways of using the works of al-Fārābī, as ibn Ezra generally ignores him and Halevi incorporates his writings into the heart of his Kuzari. See Steven Harvey, review of Philosophie et exégèse dans Le jardin de la métaphore de Moïse ibn ʿEzra, philosophe et poète andalou du XIIe

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2.3 Joseph ibn Zabarah (1140–1190) Joseph ibn Zabarah’s Book of Delights (Sefer ha-Šaʿašuʿim) is an entertaining traveller’s tale written in Hebrew, involving a hero and a devilish guide wandering the Spanish (and perhaps Provençal) countryside exchanging stories and witticisms in the style of an Arabic maqāmah.48 The hero of the book is a physician named Joseph (probably referring to the author himself) who is eager to display his medical and scientific knowledge. He does this through citations and anecdotes of various scholars, most of whom remain unnamed. Occasionally, we find quotations attributed to Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and Diogenes, while twenty-six statements are attributed to Socrates.49 Most of these statements have their origins in Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq’s Ādāb al-Falāsifa.50 Others, such as Plato’s emphasis on physiological inferences, seem to reflect the author’s medical interests. The Socrates we find in these statements has little to contribute to medical praxis, other than a general inclination to avoid pleasures.51 He expresses the extremely negative views of

48 49

50

51

siècle, by Paul B. Fenton, Peʿamim 73 (1997): 147–52. I suspect that the different uses of Socrates by the two thinkers is also indicative of fundamentally different approaches to philosophy, although this requires further study. On the character and content of this work, including the roles of science and women, see Judith Dishon, The Book of Delight Composed by Joseph ben Meir Zabarah [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Rubin Mas, 1985). These occur in ibn Zabara, Sefer Hashaashuim, II.290–303, VII.97–99, 208–25, VIII.172– 74, 184–85. A number of these are not marked as “Socrates said,” but as “he said” (‫ אמר‬or ‫ )אמרו‬and appear after sentences that begin “Socrates said” (‫;)אמר סקראט‬ accordingly, the context suggest that they are also attributed to Socrates. However, this is not always entirely certain, because the many anonymous statements throughout the book also begin with “he said” (‫ אמר‬or ‫)אמרו‬. Here, however, I assume that these statements are intended to be interpreted as belonging to Socrates, since this is suggested by their context. See Davidson in ibn Zabara, Sefer Hashaashuim, notes to the sources in n. 42, though he cites references to al-Ḥarizi’s Musare ha-Filosofim. Davidson also compares numerous statements to those appearing in ibn Gabirol’s Mivḥar ha-Peninim, though they are anonymous there. Similarities to statements in ibn Gabirol’s Improvement of the Moral Qualities are also apparent, though not mentioned by Davidson. In general, it is clear that the two authors drew on many similar sources, especially, it would seem, Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq’s Ādāb al-Falāsifa. This appears strongest in ibn Zabara, Sefer Hashaashuim, VIII.172–73: “Socrates said, he who chooses everything he desires, his end will have all manner of disease, but he who puts a stop to his desire will increase his glory and honour” (‫ מי שבחר בכל‬,‫ואמר סקראט‬ .‫ ומי שעצר בתאותו הגדיל כבודו והדרתו‬,‫)אשר יתאוה תהיה אחריתו אל כל מדוה‬. Similarly, VIII.184–85: “Socrates said, he who hurries to what his soul desires will quickly and readily regret all of his actions” (‫ מי שהוא ממהר בתאות נפשו יהיה קל ומהיר‬,‫ואמר סקראט‬ .‫)להתנחם בכל מעשיו‬. Cf. VII.99, 221, VIII.174.

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women that we find in Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq,52 though in another place his view of having a wife is more ambiguous.53 Ibn Zabarah’s Socrates praises silence.54 He also recommends humility, modesty, and direct speech; he praises hard work, including hard thinking, and condemns jealousy.55 His only asceticism is his recommendation to avoid pleasures and to be modest and humble. An expression of moderate asceticism akin to what we saw in Moses ibn Ezra’s Book of Conversation and Deliberation56 is attributed by ibn Zabarah to Hippocrates: “Natural wealth is when man labours so that he is not hungry or afflicted; one ought not desire labour beyond this.”57 Ibn Zabarah thus has an even more moderate view of Socrates than ibn Ezra. Yet Socrates has certain religious sentiments which are expressed in two statements: “‘Who is the most generous of all men?’ He said, ‘He who is generous in his world now so as to complete the world to come.’ And he said, ‘Who is a hero among men?’ He said, ‘He who fears God with all his heart.’”58 Ibn Zabarah may only be using the name Socrates to boost the image of knowledge projected onto his main character, but even so, his words outline the traits he sees associated with him. These include avoiding pleasures, inculcating humility, modest, direct speech, hard work, fear of God, and preparation for the world to come. 2.4 Joseph ibn ʿAqnīn (Mid. Twelfth Century–Mid. Thirteenth Century) Sometime after 1198, Joseph ibn ʿAqnīn, a medical doctor, poet, and biblical commentator from Fez in Morocco, wrote an Arabic book on ethics modelled on medical manuals in the adab style entitled Hygiene of the Soul (Ṭibb al-Nufūs).59 The book survives in one complete Arabic manuscript and some 52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59

Ibn Zabara, Sefer Hashaashuim, II.290–303. Ibn Zabara, VII.216–18, where Socrates says that lying is fitting under three circumstances: war, making peace between two people, and pleasing one’s wife. This may imply that there is a kind of underlying antagonism between man and wife in accordance with his earlier misogynistic statements, but it is possible to see it in a more neutral (though certainly not feminist) light. Ibn Zabara, VII.209. Cf. VII.99. Ibn Zabara, VII.208–14. See n. 29 above. Ibn Zabara, Sefer Hashaashuim, VIII.175–76: ‫ העושר הטבעי הוא שייגע‬,‫ואמר אבוקרטו‬ .‫ והמותר עמל אין חפץ בו‬,‫האדם שלא ירעב ולא יתענה‬ Ibn Zabara, VII.223–25: ‫ואמרו מי הנדיב מכל אדם? אמר המתנדב עולמו זה לתקון עולם‬ .‫ ואמרו מי גבור מבני אדם? אמר הירא אלהים בכל לבו‬.‫הבא‬ On the dating of the work to after the Sultan al-Manṣūr ordered Jews of Fez who had converted to Islam to wear distinctive clothing in 1198, see Yosef Tobi, “Ha-Pereq ha-šiši be-Ṭibb al-Nufūs la-Rav Yosef ibn ʿAqnīn,” in Le-Roš Yosef: Texts and Studies in Judaism Dedicated to Rabbi Yosef Qāfiḥ, ed. Yosef Tobi (Jerusalem: Afikim, 1995), 311–42, especially 312. On ibn ʿAqnīn’s life and writing, see Arturo Prats, “Ibn ʿAqnīn, Joseph ben

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fragments, but only parts of it have been edited.60 A Hebrew translation was made in the Middle Ages, but it is as yet unedited.61 The work is known for its description of the soul and its educational programmes, but it also follows the adab style in using numerous learned quotes and anecdotes to support its statements and views. More than two hundred of these statements are attributed to Socrates. Many of them also appear in Judah al-Ḥarizi’s translation of Muḥammad al-Anṣārī’s summary of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq’s Ādāb al-Falāsifa.62 Some statements also appear in Moses ibn Ezra and Joseph ibn Zabarah, thus lending support to the view that all of these works were largely based on the same Arabic adab texts. Ibn ʿAqnīn’s Socrates is primarily concerned with ethical behaviour, though he does not appear to have any questions about what is just, right, good, and so forth. Rather, he dispenses advice to others. This dispensation of advice is in spite of his own praise of silence over speaking and his high regard for secrets.63 Socrates’s ethical advice is frequently couched in theological terms: he is concerned about the world to come and consistently recommends foregoing pleasures in this world for the sake of life after death.64 Ibn ʿAqnīn’s

60 61 62

63 64

Judah ben Jacob,” in Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World, ed. Norman A. Stillman, Phillip I. Ackerman-Lieberman, Yaron Ayalon, Avigdor Levy, Vera B. Moreen, Meira Polliack, Angel Saenz-Badillos, and Daniel Schroeter (Brill Online, 2010), https://reference works.brillonline.com:443/entries/encyclopedia-of-jews-in-the-islamic-world%252Fibn -aqnin-joseph-ben-judah-ben-jacob-COM_0010370. See also A.S. Halkin, “Li-demuto šel rab yosef ben yehudah ibn ʿaqnin,” in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His Seventy-Fifth Birthday, ed. Isadore Twersky (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1965), 3:93–111. Note that early on, Joseph ben Judah ibn ʿAqnīn was misidentified with the Joseph ben Judah who is the addressee of Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed. Although it is now clear that the two are separate people, most likely from entirely different regions of the world, this continues to be an obstacle to reconstructing the life of ibn ʿAqnīn. See Tobi, “Ha-Pereq ha-šiši,” 311; Shaul Zucker, “Ṣidduq ha-din ke-sifrut neḥamah be-yeṣirat rab yosef ibn ʿAqnīn,” in Le-Roš Yosef, 305–6; David Baneth, “Yosef ibn Šimʿon Ha-talmid He-ḥašuv šel ha-Rambam we-yosef ibn ʿAqnīn,” Oṣar Yehude Sefarad 7 (1964): 11–20. See n. 20 above and Tobi, “Ha-Pereq ha-šiši.” See Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Opp. 572; Florence, Laurentian Library, MS Plut.I.26; Vienna, Austrian National Library, Cod. Hebr. 43; and St. Petersburg, National Library of Russia, MS EVR I 461. See A.S. Halkin’s notes in “Ibn ʿAḳnīn’s ‘Hygiene of the Soul.’” On the similarities between three of ibn Gabirol’s sentences attributed to Socrates and those in al-Ḥarizi’s Musare haFilosofim, see ibn Gabirol, The Improvement of the Moral Qualities, 109, 112, and notes to pages 58, 80, 81. Ibn ʿAḳnīn, “‘Hygiene of the Soul,’” 76–91: statements 20–72 are in praise of silence and 73–100 are in praise of esotericism. Ibn ʿAḳnīn, “‘Hygiene of the Soul,’” 98–109, 114–27, statements 133–71 and 189–239.

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Socrates is remarkably instrumental in this; he apparently does not see good deeds as valuable in themselves, but rather in the goods or pleasures they bring to those who do them.65 Despite such instrumentalism, Socrates disavows all possessions, including his house, and takes up residence in a barrel. When a prince pities his poverty, Socrates expresses his own pity for the prince’s true poverty, though it is not entirely clear what this is. Nevertheless, this lifestyle, whose origins go back to Diogenes the Cynic, frees Socrates from sadness and worry.66 It does not, however, free him from a kind of extreme misogyny akin to what we find in ibn Zabarah.67 Ibn ʿAqnīn’s Socrates is thus a wise, unquestioning ethicist who believes in God, acts to attain a better life in the world to come, and lives ascetically and without possessions in this world. His advocacy of silence and secrets along with his misogyny do not seem entirely congruous with his other sides, but ibn ʿAqnīn nevertheless included them in his portrayal of Socrates. 2.5 Judah al-Ḥarizi (1166–1225) Judah al-Ḥarizi was a prolific translator from Arabic into Hebrew and a Hebrew poet and author in his own right. His work, including his famous Taḥkemoni, written in Hebrew in the style of an Arabic maqāmāh, suggests that he held Arabic belletristic adab in great esteem and sought to bring it into Hebrew.68 To be sure, he also translated a number of halakhic and medical works, but his language and style are bent on establishing a belletristic Hebrew literary style akin to Arabic adab literature. His translation of Muḥammad al-Anṣārī’s summary of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq’s Ādāb al-Falāsifa under the title Musare haFilosofim was most likely intended to support that end and to give Hebrew authors a wealth of learned quotations and anecdotes from which they could

65 66 67 68

Cf. al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 23, statement 110: “Which science is it good for a man to learn in his youth? He said, ‘It is proper for one to learn that which will be useful to him in his life.’” See ibn ʿAḳnīn, “‘Hygiene of the Soul,’” 108–9, statements 172–74. See ibn ʿAḳnīn, “‘Hygiene of the Soul,’” 128–35, statements 243–63. Many of these statements are clearly very similar to ibn Zabarah’s statements quoted in n. 51 above. See Jonathan P. Decter, “Ḥarīzī, Judah ben Solomon al-,” in Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World, ed. Norman A. Stillman, Phillip I. Ackerman-Lieberman, Yaron Ayalon, Avigdor Levy, Vera B. Moreen, Meira Polliack, Angel Saenz-Badillos, and Daniel Schroeter (Brill, online, 2010), https://referenceworks.brillonline.com:443/entries/encyclopedia-of -jews-in-the-islamic-world%252Fharizi-judah-ben-solomon-al-COM_0001410. See also the introduction to Judah al-Ḥarizi, Taḥkemoni or Tales of Heman the Ezraḥite, ed. Joseph Yahalom and Naoya Katsumata (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi, 2010), 9–54.

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learn and draw. Judging from the popularity of the work, he seems to have met with some success.69 The Socrates of Musare ha-Filosofim is similar to ibn ʿAqnīn’s Socrates, and, indeed, to the other Andalusian depictions of Socrates we saw above. However, Musare ha-Filosofim does have some distinctive characteristics. Like ibn ʿAqnīn’s Socrates, the Socrates of Musare ha-Filosofim praises silence and has great esteem for secrets.70 Yet in Musare ha-Filosofim, both Socrates and Plato speak out against writing down words of wisdom and science. Their students, however, defy them on this, thereby presumably making possible both doxographical literature and al-Ḥarizi’s contribution to it.71 The Socrates of Musare ha-Filosofim is also interested in the world to come, though it does not occupy the central place it had for ibn ʿAqnīn’s Socrates.72 This striving for the world to come is a product of Socrates’s monotheism. Thus, he advises putting one’s affairs in the care of the Creator and expresses his distrust of idols, even while acknowledging their political usefulness for the regime.73 Socrates’s main interest in Musare ha-Filosofim is asceticism. Thus, he says that a ḥakham is someone who “conquers all the desires of his body,”74 a statement that differs radically from Maimonides’s portrayal of a ḥakham as a moderate person.75 Indeed, Socrates is such an ascetic that he lives in a barrel and refuses material benefit from kings.76 Furthermore, like Diogenes the Cynic, Socrates disavows sadness and worry.77 He not only rejects bodily pleasures, he also has a shock69

70 71 72

73 74 75 76 77

Al-Ḥarizi’s Musare ha-Filosofim survives in around seventy manuscripts (according to the catalogue of the National Library of Israel) and was edited in Honein ibn Ishak, Musre Haphilosophim. The statements attributed to Socrates appear on 2–3, 5, and 18–23. On the identification of this work with al-Anṣārī’s summary, see Karl Merkle, Die Sittensprüche der Philosophen “Kitâb âdâb al-falâsifa” von Ḥonein ibn Isḥâq in der Überarbeitung des Muḥammed ibn ʿAlî al-Anṣârî (Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1921) and the review of this work by G. Bergsträsser in Orientalische Literatur-Zeitung 26 (1923): 26–27. See al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 18, 21–22. Cf. n. 62 above. See al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 2–3. Al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 20–21. See, e.g., statement 55 on page 20: “Socrates wrote to a king of his time whose son had died, ‘Following praise to God, know that the Creator made this world a house of loss. But the world to come is a house of reward. He made strain in this world a cause for redemption in the world to come. The redemption of the world to come is a replacement for this world.’” E.g., al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 20–21, statements 50, 69. Note that the word I have rendered “affairs” is ‫ רשות‬in Hebrew and is, I would suppose, likely derived from Maimonides’s use of the term in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance. Al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, statement 61. See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Deʿot 1.4. Al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 20–21, statements 65–66. This is mentioned as part of the barrel story in al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim. See also 19–20, statements 39–40, 43–45, 64.

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ingly negative view of women, one that is well beyond any kind of asceticism.78 Yet Socrates, particularly in al-Ḥarizi’s version, praises wisdom (ḥokhmah), advocating regular study undertaken in the proper order so as to increase one’s wisdom.79 He also has some interest in dialectical dispute.80 Thus, Socrates is a committed monotheist, an ethical thinker who is primarily interested in asceticism, an advocate of silence and keeping secrets, and a stark misogynist. His views appear to be entirely settled and there is no hint of scepticism of any kind, certainly not towards the divine. 2.6 Shem Ṭov Falaquera (c. 1225–c. 1290) Shem Ṭov Falaquera wrote at least eighteen books in addition to extensive poetry, which is now mostly lost.81 His earliest works seem to have been medical and ethical manuals, clearly influenced by the Arabic adab.82 These manuals are full of poems and rhyming statements that quote adab literature.83 Only later does he appear to have taken a more direct interest in philosophy as defined by the Islamic falāsifa, especially Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī. Thus, he went 78 79

80 81

82

83

Al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 21–22, statements 71–79, 103–7. Al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 23, statements 115–16, and 20, statement 63: “The art of logic is prior to the art of nature [i.e., natural science].” This statement is the only suggestion in Musare ha-Filosofim that Socrates had any interest in either logic or natural science. Al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 18, statement 2. On the works of Shem Ṭov Falaquera, see Raphael Jospe, Torah and Sophia: The Life and Thought of Shem Tov ibn Falaquera (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1988), 31–76. Jospe first lists the eighteen works with some guidelines describing their order of composition and then describes each work in some detail providing outlines of the major works. The order of the works is far from certain. See also Steven Harvey, “Shem Tov ibn Falaquera,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/falaquera/. Three works meeting this description are often considered to be Falaquera’s first: (1) Batei hanhagat guf ha-bariʾ, batei hanhagat ha-nefeš, ed. Suessmann Munter (Tel Aviv: Mossad Harav Kook, 1950); (2) Iggeret ha-Musar, ed. A.M. Haberman in “Rabbi Shem Tov Falaquera’s Iggeret ha-Musar,” Qoves ʿal Yad 1 (1936): 43–90; (3) Ṣori Yagon, edition and translation in Roberta Klugman Barkan, “Shem Tob ben Joseph ibn Falaquera’s Ṣori Yagon, or Balm for Assuaging Grief: Its Literary Sources and Traditions” (PhD diss., Columbia University, New York, 1971). Iggeret ha-Musar features Heman ha-Ezraḥi as a protagonist, who also appears in Judah al-Ḥarizi’s Taḥkemoni. This suggests that Falaquera intended this book to be in some kind of dialogue with Ḥarizi. Moreover, Iggeret ha-Musar often appears to quote the same sources as Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq’s Ādāb al-Falāsifa. See, e.g., Falaquera’s denigration of women on 75–76, which seems based on the same sources that we saw in n. 78 (or in ibn Zabarah, n. 52 above, or in ibn ʿAqnin, n. 67 above). However, here, Falaquera does not attribute these views to Socrates. In her dissertation, Roberta Klugman Barkan clearly documents Falaquera’s reliance on Ādāb al-Falāsifa in Ṣori Yagon.

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on to write his Epistle of the Debate as an introductory dialogue for philosophy84 and a number of encyclopedic works, both introductory texts, such as Rešit Ḥokhmah,85 Sefer ha-Maʿalot,86 and Sefer ha-Mevaqqeš,87 and, later, a more advanced comprehensive encyclopedia, Deʿot ha-Filosofim.88 He also wrote a number of shorter works, including his book on the soul, Sefer ha-Nefeš,89 and his ethical treatises, Perfection of Actions (Šelemut ha-Maʿaśim)90 and Treatise of the Dream.91 In addition, he wrote an extensive commentary on

84 85 86 87

88

89 90

91

See Shem Ṭov Falaquera, Falaquera’s Epistle of the Debate: An Introduction to Jewish Philosophy, ed. and trans. Steven Harvey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). Shem Ṭov ben Joseph Falaquera, Propädeutik der Wissenschaften (Reschith Chokmah), ed. Moritz David (Berlin: Poppelauer, 1902). Shem Ṭov Falaquera, Sefer Ha-Maʿalot, ed. Ludwig Venatianer (Berlin, 1894). This work has numerous editions (e.g., The Hague, 1778 and Krakow, 1646), but still awaits a complete edition. Here, I refer to Shem Ṭov Falaquera, Sefer ha-Mevaqqeš, ed. M. Tamah (The Hague, 1778). An English translation of the first part of the work can be found in Shem Ṭov Falaquera, Falaquera’s Book of the Seeker, ed. and trans. M. Herschel Levine (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1976). This work has not been published in its entirety and it survives in only two manuscripts: Leiden, Bibliotheek der Rijksuniversiteit, MS Or. 4758/3 (Warn. 20), f. 104r–343v, and Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, MS 3156 (De Rossi 164), f. 1r–291r. Part of the introduction to this work was edited and translated into Italian in Mauro Zonta, Un dizionario filosofico ebraico del XIII secolo: L’introduzione al “Sefer Deʿot ha- Filosofim” di Shem Tob ibn Falaquera (Turin: Silvio Zamorani, 1992). Another part of the introduction may be found in Roberto Gatti, Ermeneutica e filosofia: Introduzione al pensiero ebraico medioevale (secoli XII–XIV ) (Genova: Il Melangolo, 2003), 161–72. The part of the Deʿot that deals with plants has been edited and translated in Nicholas of Damascus, Nicolaus Damascenus, De Plantis: Five Translations, ed. H.J. Drossaart Lulofs and E.L.J. Poortman (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 388–405. This is edited, annotated, and translated into English in Jospe, Torah and Sophia, 265–415. An annotated edition of Šelemut ha-Maʿaśim (but without an English translation) may be found in Jospe, Torah and Sophia, 416–58. The first six chapters of this work are evidently translations, perhaps epitomising translations, of an Arabic translation of the Summa Alexandrinorum. See Steven Harvey, “The Greek Library of the Medieval Jewish Philosophers,” in The Libraries of the Neoplatonists, ed. Cristina D’Ancona (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 493–506, especially 497–98. Harvey is currently working on an article that will show this connection in more detail. The final four chapters of Falaquera’s Perfection of Actions are made up of gnomological statements from wisdom literature, likely translations from Arabic. This combination of ethical and medical advice, which received its name because the author received it, or the idea for writing it, in a dream, is edited in Henry Malter, “Shem Tob Ben Joseph Palquera I–II: His Treatise of the Dream,” Jewish Quarterly Review 1 (1911): 451–500.

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Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed, which he called Moreh ha-Moreh,92 and he may have written other commentaries on the Bible which are now lost.93 He also prepared a summarising and modifying translation of ibn Gabirol’s Meqor Ḥayyim, better known by its Latin name, Fons vitae.94 The influence of Arab adab literature is felt particularly strongly in the dialogic character of Epistle of the Debate and Sefer ha-Mevaqqeš; the latter in particular resembles an Arabic maqāmah.95 Yet at the same time, in all of these works, he incorporates large sections that are actually translations of other well-known texts, including the anonymous Summa Alexandrinorum, al-Fārābī’s Enumeration of the Sciences, Pursuit of Happiness, Philosophy of Plato, Philosophy of Aristotle, and Book of Letters, and various works by Avicenna, ibn Bāǧǧa, and Averroes. In many cases, Falaquera was the first to introduce these texts to Hebrew readers. Even though much of his philosophical work is highly indebted to the Muslim falāsifa, Falaquera’s depiction of Socrates more closely resembles that of ibn Gabirol, ibn Ezra, and al-Ḥarizi/Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq than that of al-Fārābī and Averroes. Indeed, in his epitomising translation of al-Fārābī’s The Philosophy of Plato in Rešit Ḥokhmah, Falaquera omits Socrates’s name nearly everywhere where al-Fārābī mentioned him. The only places that “Socrates” appears in that work are in connection with a work on pleasure and with reference to Socrates’s choice of death over living a life of bad beliefs and behaviour.96 Elsewhere in Falaquera, we find the ascetic, wise Socrates, not the sceptical questioner. For example, Socrates appears twice in Falaquera’s Perfection of Actions. The first time is in a discussion, evidently cribbed from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, where Aristotle speaks of ironic people who “disown things held in high esteem, as Socrates used to do.”97 Falaquera says, “The selfdemeaning person rejects the glorious things so as to avoid hard work and dispute, as Socrates would do for the sake of rest in life.”98 Socrates appears 92 93 94 95 96

97 98

Shem Ṭov ben Joseph ibn Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, ed. Yair Shiffman (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish Studies, 2001). See Jospe, Torah and Sophia, 459–84. See Jospe, 68–74, and 74–76 for other works, possibly also by Falaquera. See Jospe, 46–47, and Aaron W. Hughes, The Art of Dialogue in Jewish Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), chapter 3. For the summary of al-Fārābī’s Philosophy of Plato, see Falaquera, Propädeutik der Wissenschaften (Reschith Chokmah), 72–78. The references to Socrates are on pages 74 and 76. For the associations of these statements with Plato’s Symposium and Apology and Phaedo, see Abu Naṣr al-Fārābī, Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, trans. Muhsin Mahdi (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 59, 63. 1127b22–26. See chapter 3, n. 51, and the surrounding text. Jospe, Torah and Sophia, 421–22: ‫המתבזה יכחש בדברים הנכבדים כדי לברוח מהטורח‬ .‫והמחלוקת כמו שהיה עושה סקראט מפני המנוחה בחיים‬

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here as a pragmatic ascetic, disavowing things valued by others so that he can maintain his peace and be left alone. Later in the work, after Falaquera has finished discussing Aristotle’s Ethics and has turned instead to sayings of wise men in the manner of Arabic adab, we find the following statement: “They asked Socrates, what do you benefit from your wisdom? He said: I am become like a wise man standing at the seashore; I see how people become wrapped up in the waves.”99 Again, Falaquera emphasises what Socrates gains from his way of life, and once again, what he gains is that he is left alone, away from the people wrapped up in life. He has, then, a kind of ascetic, or semi-ascetic, removal from society. In his Guide to the Guide, Falaquera mentions Socrates twice, both in quotations from Avicenna and both referring to the theory of Ideas.100 This Socrates is, perhaps, more philosophical than the Socrates we saw in the earlier literature. He is interested in ideas and in creation rather than in only ethical matters. Nevertheless, he is not an asker of questions and certainly not a sceptic. Falaquera, then, resembles the other thinkers who adopted what I am calling the first view of Socrates; namely, that of a wise, ascetic (or semi-ascetic) dispenser of learned advice, even though he would most likely have been aware of the sceptical view of Socrates that we find in al-Fārābī and Averroes. 2.7 Socrates the Wise Ascetic in Later Medieval Hebrew Literature The wise, knowing Socrates we have seen in works from Solomon ibn Gabirol through to those of al-Ḥarizi reverberates in the works of a number of other medieval thinkers who did not have access to Arabic sources and who would accordingly seem to have received their image of Socrates from Hebrew texts. Thus, Moses Nahmanides (1194–1270), in the introduction to his Torat ha-Adam, whose primary subject is the laws of mourning, mentions that the ancient Greek philosophers ( filosofei he-Yewanim) had many statements containing ethical content, statements which, in general, one ought not to heed. Among these, Nahmanides includes Socrates’s statement that he is never sad because he has nothing whose loss would cause him to grieve.101 This statement is found with the exact same wording in al-Ḥarizi’s Musare ha-filosofim.102 Not only, then, does Nahmanides rely on al-Ḥarizi for his view of Socrates, but he would also seem to be reliant on him for his views of the Greek philosophers Jospe, 430: ‫ ויאמר הייתי כחכם עומד על שפת הים אראה‬.‫ושאלו לסקראט מה רוחה מחכמתך‬ .‫היאך בני אדם מתגלגלין בין גליו‬ 100 Shem Ṭov Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh, 243 and 334. 101 Moses Nahmanides, Torat Ha-Adam, in Kitve Ramban, ed. Charles B. Chavel (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1963/64), 2:14 (Hebrew pagination). 102 Musre Haphilosophim, 20, sentence 64. 99

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in general. One wonders what role al-Ḥarizi’s Musare ha-Filosofim may have played in Nahmanides’s participation in the Maimonidean controversy and the question of whether or not philosophy is permissible. Could his views of philosophy have been significantly coloured by al-Ḥarizi’s Musare ha-Filosofim? Even such stark Maimonideans as Joseph Kaspi (~1280–1345)103 and Moses Narboni (~1300–~1362) seem to have adopted a view of Socrates that was primarily influenced by Jewish doxographical collections. Unlike Nahmanides, however, neither Kaspi nor Narboni looks to Socrates as an example of a philosopher, or even as a dispenser of ethical advice. Instead, they both mention his misogynistic statements. Thus, in his Commentary on Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed, Narboni quotes the legend that Socrates got married in such a way as to choose the least of all evils associated with women.104 Kaspi, when interpreting Prov 3:2, which states that the commandments of the Torah lengthen one’s days, recounts the following: “Further, it was told of Socrates that he saw that according to his nature he was not fit to live more than twenty years. So, he kept himself from women all of his days and lived for forty years.”105 Kaspi’s formulation does not make it clear whether the twenty and forty years are the span of Socrates’s entire life or of his life following his assessment of his natural constitution. In either case, his Socrates would appear to have much more in common with misogynist doxographies than with Plato’s dialogues, though this example is not quite as clear as it was in the case of Narboni.

103 On the life of Joseph Kaspi, including an argument for dating his death to the first half of 1345, see Adrian Sackson, Joseph ibn Kaspi: Portrait of a Hebrew Philosopher in Medieval Provence (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 26–57. 104 See Moses Narboni, Der Commentar des Rabbi Moses Narbonensis, Philosophen aus dem XIV. Jahrhundert, zu dem Werke More Nebuchim des Maimonides, ed. Jacob Goldenthal (Vienna, 1852), 40v, commentary to 2.30. Narboni, however, does not say how Socrates’s choice reflects the least of all evils. A similar story (perhaps Narboni’s source) occurs in ibn Zabara, Sefer Hashaashuim, II.290–93. There, Socrates’s intention to choose the least of all evils is used to explain why his wife was thin and short (‫)אשתו דקה וקצרה‬. That is, it would seem, she is the least of all evils because she occupies the least amount of space. Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, an anonymous reader suggested that she could have been the least of all evils because she required less money to be spent on food and clothing. Neither ibn ʿAqnīn’s Socrates nor the Socrates of Musare ha-filosofim appears to have been married; rather, they seem to have avoided women entirely: see the sources in nn. 67 and 78 above. 105 See Kaspi’s commentary, including Miqra‌ʾot Gedolot ha-Keter (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2016), online, commentary to Prov 3:2.: ‫וכבר סופר על סוקראט החכם‬ ‫שראה לפי טבעו שלא ראוי לחיות כי אם עשרים שנה; וחיה ארבעים שנה ונשמר מאשה כל‬ ‫ימיו‬. On Kaspi’s generally negative views of women, see Avraham Grossman, “Contempt for Women on Philosophical Grounds: Joseph ibn Kaspi” [Hebrew], Zion 68 (2003): 41–67.

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Still, at least one Spanish Jewish thinker, Zeraḥyah Halevi Saladin (before 1375–~1445), apparently had access to another source for Socrates, one that would appear to have been more directly connected to Plato, even if he does not seem to have done much with it. In a sermon expounding God’s revelation to Israel in Exod 19:9, Zeraḥyah enters into a rather extended discussion as to why man’s political nature does not in itself generally lead to good governance, even when the rulers are wise men. As an example of the follies of the wise which necessitate divine governance, Zeraḥyah says the following: Demonstration is not able to make one know right from wrong […] not only with regard to deep things, but even with regard to near and simple things, and well-known things. As a result, Socrates and Plato decreed that the right order for governing a city lay in sharing wives, children, and property. For they said that in this way friendship among people will increase and they will love each other as fathers love their sons and brothers love their brother. For anyone can think that anyone else is his son or his brother. But the turpitude of this view is well known.106 Zeraḥyah appears to be referring to Plato, Republic 5 (457c ff.), yet it is not clear how he would have encountered that text. While he may have encountered this notion in Averroes’s Commentary on Plato’s Republic107 or in Joseph Kaspi’s summary of it,108 neither of these thinkers mentions Socrates in connection with any of the views recounted here.109 Accordingly, Zeraḥyah probably had another source, perhaps even a Latin-reading Christian friend, who helped him to make this connection to Socrates. In any case, the Socrates who 106 Zeraḥyah Halevi Saladin, The Sermons of R. Zeraḥyah Halevi Saladin, ed. Ari Ackerman [Hebrew] (Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2012), 112: ‫אין יד המופת‬ ‫משגת לידע הטובים הם אם רעים […] ולא בדברים העמוקים בלבד אלא אף בפשוטים הקרו־‬ ‫בים ומפורסמים עד אשר נראה סקראט ואפלטון גזרו היות דת ישרה להנהגת המדינה שתוף‬ ‫ ויאהבו אלה לאלה כאבות‬,‫ כי אמרו שבזה יגדל חברת בני אדם‬,‫הנשים והבנים והקנינים‬ ‫ עם היות דעת זו‬,‫ שהרי כל אחד יכול לסבור באחר שהוא בנו או אחיו‬,‫לבנים ואחים לאחים‬ .‫מפורסם הגנות‬ 107 See Averroes, Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic, ed. and trans. E.I.J. Rosenthal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 55–58, or Averroes, Averroes on Plato’s Republic, trans. Ralph Lerner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 55–58 (Lerner follows Rosenthal’s pagination). Indeed, Ackerman suggests this as Zeraḥyah’s direct source: see Sermons of R. Zeraḥyah, 112, n. 57. 108 Joseph Kaspi’s summary of Averroes’s commentary on Plato’s Republic makes up about half of his Terumat ha-Kesef. Adrian Sackson edited this part of this work in Joseph ibn Kaspi, 263–93. The relevant sections here are on 281–82. 109 See chapter 3, text around n. 3.

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emerges here is certainly no sceptic, but rather someone who recommends massive changes to the fabric of society on the basis of his achievements in demonstrations. Such achievements are inadequate for making ethical and political determinations, according to Zeraḥyah, and one would be better off adhering to the Divine Law. This view of Socrates must have been available to Joseph Albo (~1380–1444), since there is evidence that he read the very sermon in which Zeraḥyah’s Republic references are made before he wrote his Book of Principles (Sefer ha-ʿIqqarim).110 Nevertheless, Albo does not refer to this view of Socrates, which, as a traditional Jew, he would presumably have found as morally objectionable as Zeraḥyah did in his Book of Principles. He does refer to Socrates twice in a short section of book 3 of the work, both times expressing the view that Socrates is the most perfect of human beings. The argument is that since the perfection of humanity requires the existence of perfect beings, there should be perfect people like Socrates or Plato in every generation. Such people do not exist in every generation, but the function of perfecting humanity can be provided by the divine Torah.111 Albo, then, does not adopt Zeraḥyah’s negative portrayal of Socrates, but even holds him up as an example of someone who could help the city to become perfect if he could only exist in multiple generations. This suggests that Albo does not accept Zeraḥyah’s characterisation of Socrates, but presumably follows previous thinkers who saw him as a wise, ethical authority. 2.8 A Prayer of the Divine Socrates Socrates appears as a devout monotheist intellectual who entirely disavows the natural world in a short prayer attributed to him found in five versions in four different manuscripts. The prayer is primarily a request for separation from the world of matter and the natures of things in favour of a purely intellectual existence. In the middle of this request, there is a confession apologising for Socrates’s neglect of the intellect. The oldest version of the prayer ends with a request for God’s aid in thinking, speaking, and acting. This final request may hold a hint of scepticism; that is, an admission that the speaker does not know what thoughts, speech, or actions are correct. Still, it is absent from later versions of the prayer, which also modify it, somewhat blunting its message of pure intellectualism.

110 See Ackerman, Sermons of R. Zeraḥyah, 21 (Hebrew pagination). 111 Joseph Albo, Book of Principles (Sefer ha-ʿIqqarim), ed. Isaac Husik (Philadelphia: JPS, 1946), vol. 3, p. 25.

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The prayer is found in five versions in four different manuscripts. The oldest of these is London, British Library, Add. MS 18690, f. 14r–v (henceforth: ‫)ל‬. This manuscript, written in an Italian hand, contains daily prayers, prayers for holidays, and a number of other private and non-statutory prayers. It also contains a calendar indicating that it was written sometime between 1332 and 1350.112 The other manuscripts are all from the fifteenth century. One, Amsterdam, Ets Haim Library, 47 E 19, f. 28v–30v (henceforth: ‫)א‬, is written in a Spanish square script and included in a volume of private and non-statutory prayers.113 Another, New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, MS 2469, f. 212r (henceforth: ‫)נ‬, is written in a Byzantine semi-cursive script. According to its colophon, the manuscript was produced in Constantinople in 1461, but the single page containing the Socrates prayer is torn and appears to have been attached to this volume after having fallen out of another. A fourth manuscript, Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, MS 1753 (formerly De Rossi 997), contains two versions of the prayer, on f. 127r–128r (henceforth: 1‫ )פ‬and f. 169v–170v (henceforth: 2‫)פ‬. Both versions are pointed and in the same hand, a fifteenth-century Byzantine script. Moreover, they appear in the context of various philosophical prayers.114 I have included a critical edition of this text and an English translation in an appendix to this chapter. The edition follows ‫ל‬, which is considerably older than the other manuscripts. While the oldest manuscript is not necessarily the best, there is no reason to prefer any of the others. Indeed, there are numerous small differences among the versions of the prayer, which results in a lively apparatus. The number of these differences suggest that the prayer was not copied as carefully as a liturgical prayer and that the copyists themselves may not have hesitated to edit or change the text. Moreover, none of these versions seems likely to have been copied from another, suggesting that the prayer existed in more manuscripts than we currently have available. Still, 112 See George Margoliouth, Catalogue of the Hebrew and Samaritan Manuscripts in the British Museum, vol. 4, Introduction, Indexes, ed. Jacob Leveen (London: British Museum, 1977), 353, no. 694. The calendar begins in the year ‫רס״ט‬, i.e., 1332–1333, and there is context “showing that the MS. was written during the 269th cycle of 19 years.” Note that throughout this volume, various psalms are foliated above and below the main text. I thank Abraham Katz for drawing my attention to this manuscript on Facebook. 113 This volume also has psalms foliated above and below the main text; Socrates’s prayer is found amidst Psalm 18. It also follows the end of a copy of Paršat ha-mann, recited in the hope of bringing about material prosperity, and is in the same hand. 114 On the two versions in this manuscript and their context, see Tzvi Langermann, “A Collection of Jewish Philosophical Prayers,” in Regional Identities and Cultures of Medieval Jews, ed. Javier Castaño, Talya Fishman, and Ephraim Kanarfogel (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2018), 263–84. Langermann translates the two versions of the prayer contained in this manuscript and compares them to ‫ א‬and ‫נ‬, but not to ‫ל‬.

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‫ נ‬and 1‫ פ‬appear to share most of the same changes, as do ‫ א‬and 2‫פ‬, though the

latter has made some further corrections of more substance, as we shall see. It is thus possible that ‫ ל‬was closest to the original, if not the original itself, and that various copies resulted in two lines of intermediaries, one including ‫נ‬ and 1‫ פ‬and the other including ‫ א‬and 2‫פ‬. Further, since 2‫ פ‬contains substantial corrections not found in ‫א‬, it likely represents a later stratum of the text. Thus, the versions we have represent three strata of the text: early (‫)ל‬, middle (‫נ‬, ‫א‬, and 1‫)פ‬, and late (2‫)פ‬. We may thus posit the following stemma, where Greek letters represent hypothetical manuscript precursors:

The title of the prayer, its authorship, and the name of the translator are not consistent in the various versions. The earliest version says simply that it is “A Prayer of Socrates the Divine,” providing no other information. ‫ נ‬says only that it is “Socrates’s prayer,” while 1‫ פ‬says that is “A Prayer of Hippocrates, the Philosopher, Every Morning.” ‫ א‬says that it is “A Prayer of the Divine Socrates Translated by Rav Zeraḥyah, who rests in Eden.” We find a similar formulation in 2‫פ‬: “A Brilliant Prayer Translated by Our Master Zeraḥyah, may his memory be for a blessing.” Neither ‫ פ‬version mentions the name Socrates. This may reflect the copyist’s reluctance to mention his name; this seems particularly true of 2‫פ‬, where some of the more philosophical ideas have been edited out. 1‫ פ‬could reflect confusion between the names Hippocrates (‫ )אבוקראט‬and Socrates (‫)סוקראט‬, which can be spelt with the same last five letters; a smudged or damaged manuscript could easily have been the source.115 Given that Socrates’s name appears in the three other manuscripts, it seems most likely that the attribution to him was there from the start. 115 Tzvi Langermann notes, “as far as I know, no prayers are attributed to Hippocrates.” See “A Collection of Jewish Philosophical Prayers,” 277.

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The question of the translator is more difficult. ‫ א‬and 2‫פ‬, which seem to be from the same line of transmission, both list Zeraḥyah as the translator (‫)העתיק‬. This name is not mentioned in ‫ ל‬or in ‫ נ‬or 1‫פ‬, raising the possibility that it is idiosyncratic to one line of transmission. Could Zeraḥyah have modified the text of ‫ א‬and 2‫ פ‬alone?116 If Zeraḥyah is the translator, does that tell us anything? The website of the Ets Haim library lists Zeraḥyah b. Isaac b. Shealtiel Ḥen as the translator,117 but this is unlikely because the prayer is written in highly biblically influenced prose, not the stilted philosophical Hebrew of Zeraḥyah Ḥen. Another Zeraḥyah, such as Zeraḥyah Halevi Girondi, could have been the translator,118 or even someone named Anatoly, a name that sometimes became Zeraḥyah in Hebrew. Of course, it is also possible that the prayer is not a translation at all, but was claimed as such by someone named Zeraḥyah so as to use Socrates’s name in order to grant philosophical legitimacy to the work. The prayer itself follows a relatively standard form of a Hebrew prayer. It begins with (1) an address to God and attributes of His glory. It then turns to (2) a petition and (3) a confession of sins. It then adds (4–5) two more petitions and (6) an address to God. In the oldest version, ‫ל‬, it ends with (7) a specific request, “May it be Your will,” and a quote from Psalms. Were it not for the attributed author and translator, there would be little reason to assume the prayer to have been anything other than an original Hebrew supplication. The prayer itself is structured in several groups of three. Its opening address to God contains three blessings (1). It contains three requests from God (2, 4, 5), three confessions (3), and its second address to God (6) contains three descriptions (“knows all, governs all, and is all-powerful”). The final special request found only in ‫( ל‬7) also mentions three areas in which God’s aid is called upon: thought, works, and speech. Moreover, the text of the prayer mentions three types of being: God, luminaries/angels/separate intellects, and man. This emphasis on threes suggests Neo-Platonic or more likely Hermetic influence, though there is no emphasis on practical magic. The content of the prayer is Socrates’s request for intellectual illumination. In making this request, Socrates asks to leave his material nature behind and to become a separate intellect. He does not seek conjunction with God. In the 116 This is Langermann’s view, although he focuses on the text as it appears in 2‫פ‬, which is the farthest away from the text of ‫ל‬. 117 See http://etshaimmanuscripts.nl/manuscripts/eh-47-e-19/. 118 This possibility is raised in Langermann, “A Collection of Jewish Philosophical Prayers,” 276. Note that Zeraḥyah Halevi Saladin, whose view of Socrates is somewhat different from that expressed in this prayer, was born after ‫ ל‬was written and so could not have been the original translator.

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first version (‫)ל‬, he seeks to attain this immaterial intellect via God’s luminaries; that is, the celestial bodies or cosmic intellects. He seeks to join with the angels and other righteous people.119 He does not join God, but is supported by “God’s right hand” to come to “the spring of springs, the source of life and all eternity.” This is evidently intellectual, since it involves “separation” and “knowledge of the sublime.” Moreover, it involves coming “to knowledge of the separate letters.” This latter might suggest a kabbalist bent on the author’s part.120 However, the next line finds Socrates asking that he not meet his destruction among “the letters that are likenesses in the lower world or among the changing forms.”121 This suggests a Platonic understanding of true elements among the intellectual ideas, while the lower world contains imitations of those elements. In the previous line, Socrates had asked to be saved “from the accidents of the elements.” It is possible that both of these expressions hearken back to the Greek στοιχεῖα, which can mean either “elements” or “letters.” Translation, whether directly from Greek or through an Arabic intermediary, could have led to an obfuscation of the two terms: instead of differentiating between worldly elements and intellectual elements, the text distinguished between higher letters and lower elements.122 Perhaps letters are also the building blocks of intellectual knowledge because they are the building blocks of words. In any case, Socrates’s intense attraction to the intellect leads to a kind of extreme asceticism. He seeks to escape not only the “clout of desire” (ta‌ʾawah; i.e., bodily desire), but also the “rule of natures” and the entire lower world. He also seeks to escape the “waves of ignorance,” using “waves” in a way similar to that found in Falaquera’s Perfection of Actions. This use of “waves” is also reminiscent of a prayer recounted in Porphyry, On the Life of Plotinus 22–23, which speaks of the desire to escape the waves of the flesh and embodiment 119 See chapter 2 below, on Kuzari 1.1, where this is also associated with a Hermetic view of intellectual conjunction. 120 Thus Langermann, “A Collection of Jewish Philosophical Prayers,” 276–77, suggests that this Zeraḥyah could be the same as a fourteenth-century kabbalist named Zeraḥyah who was interested in letters and their connection to celestial luminaries. See Moshe Idel, Language, Torah, and Hermeneutics in Abraham Abulafia, trans. Menahem Kallus (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989), 144, where a text from this Zeraḥyah in Paris, Alliance Israelite, MS 146, f. 32r, is quoted at length in English translation. 121 Langermann, “A Collection of Jewish Philosophical Prayers,” 280, translates this as “letters that are like one another.” He justifies this by appealing to Jona ben Ǧanāḥ, Sefer Harikma: Grammaire hébraique. Traduite de l’Arabe en Hébreu par Jehuda Ibn Tabbon., ed. Bear ben Alexander Goldberg and Raphael Kirchheim (Frankfurt am Main, 1856), 142. This seems not to explain why the lower letters are so bad, nor why they would inflict harm on one another. I think a Platonic reading of imagery and likeness is more likely. 122 I thank Vincezo Carlotta for suggesting this interpretation.

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and join intellectually with the daemon, that is pure intellect.123 Indeed, the complete disavowal of this world advocated in Socrates’ Hebrew prayer is generally reminiscent of Plotinus, even though there is no evidence of a direct connection. Here, the disavowal of the world functions as a kind of asceticism, though there is in fact no recommended practical course of action. Socrates’s penitence is only in respect of neglecting his intellect and not looking towards sublime beliefs. There seems to be no ethical or political application of this. In this sense, Socrates here is similar to the Philosopher of Judah Halevi’s Kuzari. The final section of ‫ ל‬contains a personal plea to God. It is not entirely clear whether this is meant to be Socrates’s or the reader’s after he has read the prayer. In either case, the plea “to purify the arrangements of my thoughts and to establish an answer for my speech” appears to admit a kind of ignorance about thought and speech.124 He asks God to direct his thoughts, deeds, and words so that they turn out right.125 Moreover, he asks that he not speak wrongly before God’s angel and that he not fall prey to Satan’s wiles. This is an ignorance of action that is not exactly the Socratic ignorance of Plato’s Apology. It more closely resembles the cautionary words against humans making their own choices rather than relying solely on the word of God found in al-Ḥarizi.126 At the same time, it shows the ignorance of the devout Jew. He has a strong desire to do God’s will, but does not know exactly what it is. Unlike the Socrates in Plato’s Apology, the speaker here does not question whether he should fulfil God’s will or whether God actually has a will that he can fulfil. Rather, his questioning is more akin to Moses ibn Ezra’s Socrates’s questioning about where God is found or not found. In any case, the final special request (7) is absent from all of the fifteenthcentury manuscripts. Other changes have also found their way into the later 123 In Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. George Boys-Stones, John Dillon, Lloyd Gerson, R.A.H. King, Andrew Smith, and James Wilberding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 34–35. 124 The expression “answer for my speech,” ‫מענה לשוני‬, recalls the Yom Kippur prayer, ‫אוחילה‬ ‫לאל‬, where the expression also refers to the inability of the person praying to find suitable words for his prayer. 125 Michael Pakaluk pointed out to me that this is somewhat similar to the prayer Thomas Aquinas was reputed to have recited before studying, “Creator ineffabilis.” This prayer was appended to Pope Pius XI’s papal encyclical in Raccolta #764, Pius XI Studiorum Ducem, 1923. 126 Judah al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 20, statement 50: “[Socrates] said put your affairs in the hand of the Creator, and do not make choices yourself. Of what account is man that he should choose something for himself that can then be overturned?” See n. 73 above and the adjacent text.

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strata. These include substituting the request that “I may grasp light by Your luminaries” (‫ )אשיג לאור במאוריך‬with the request that “I may grasp light by Your light” (‫)אשיג לאור באורך‬. The latter version quotes Ps 36:10, but diminishes the distinction between the three realms. Socrates hopes for direct access to God’s light here rather than to light in general via the luminaries. Later, when ‫ ל‬talks of separating the intellect (‫ )אותו‬from human nature, the later versions have separate me (‫ )אותי‬from human nature. The result is somewhat more mystical and once again diminishes the distinction between the separate intellects and the material world. We find the same tendency again in Socrates’s third confession, where in ‫ ל‬Socrates speaks of the “quickness of my intellect” (‫מהירות שכלי‬, though this could also be “expertness of my intellect”) and later manuscripts have “quickness” or “expertness of my heart” (‫)מהירות לבי‬. Here, the later manuscripts have substituted a bodily organ for a separate or potentially separate activity. Once again, this diminishes the stark distinction between Socrates’s desire to become a separate intellect and his current bodily existence. The latest version of the text, 2‫פ‬, makes some further modifications. Where the earlier versions described Socrates’s desire to escape the “dwelling-place of destruction” (‫מדור התבלית‬, appearing in 1‫ אנפ‬as ‫)מדור התכלית‬, 2‫ פ‬describes Socrates’s desire to escape “the generations of man, who is of dust and decay” (‫)תולדת האדם העפרי והבלה‬. Where Socrates had asked God to “prepare” him (‫ )תשנני‬for the angelic nature, 2‫ פ‬has Socrates asking God to “conjoin” him (‫ )והדביקני‬to that angelic nature. Elsewhere, Socrates asks God “to save me from the accidents of the elements, which harm one another. Grant me a separation and move me to knowledge of the sublime” (,‫להצילנו ממקרי היסודות הצרות זו לזו‬ ‫)ותתנני פרדה מן הפרדות ותניעני אל דעת העליון‬. 2‫ פ‬has Socrates ask God: To save me from the cesspools of difficult times, and from the circumstances of the moments, one upon the other; that I may have no need for, or any attraction towards, the vanities of the world, chasing after bodily lusts. Have me attain knowledge of the supernal knowledge.127 These changes demonstrate creative license in the transmission of this text, which in 2‫ פ‬is no longer attributed to Socrates. Yet at the same time, the ethical asceticism of Socrates’s advice that we have seen in other accounts seems to find its way back into the prayer. The speaker in 2‫ פ‬singles out the vanities of 127 Tzvi Langermann’s translation in “A Collection of Jewish Philosophical Prayers,” 280. The Hebrew is: ‫להצילני ממקראי הזמנים הקשים ומסבות העתים הצרות זו לזו ושלא אצטרך‬ .‫ואמשך אחרי הבלי העולם לרדוף התאוות הגופניות ותגיעני לדעת הדעת העליוני‬

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the world and bodily lusts as things to be avoided rather than generally condemning all of this world. It is aspects of human nature, such as the propensity to bodily pleasure, dust, and decay, rather than non-intellectual nature as such that is the main problem in 2‫פ‬. It is not clear, in fact, whether the speaker in 2‫פ‬ must actually leave his whole nature behind or whether he can remain human while also conjoining with the angelic intellects. 3

Socrates, the Vocal Sceptic

While the predominant view of Socrates among medieval Jews was that of a wise, unquestioning ethical authority, there were a few Jewish thinkers who saw him as a sceptic. This Socrates is concerned with ethical matters and is also engaged in arguing through dialogue, but is uncertain about divine matters and the role they play in human life. He is derived from accounts of Platonic philosophy in Arabic, of which there were many more than there were translations of Plato.128 Yet few of these seem to have had a direct impact on Jewish thinkers. In chapters 2 and 3, we shall see how Judah Halevi and Averroes develop the image of Socrates as a metaphysical and theological sceptic. As we shall see, the primary source for this image is Plato’s Apology, where Socrates declares that he does not know divine things (20d–e) and that he only studies human things. This is despite his earlier statement in the Apology that his pursuit of philosophy is at the urging of the Delphic oracle and his own personal demi-god (δαιμόνιον).129 That is, this Socrates is a kind of contradictory figure, urged by the gods to question the divine things, including the gods 128 On these sources, see Rosenthal, “On the Knowledge of Plato’s Philosophy in the Islamic World,” and Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam, trans. Emile Marmorstein and Jenny Marmorstein (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975). See also Charles E. Butterworth, “Socrates’s Islamic Conversion,” The Arab Studies Journal 4 (1996): 4–11, which particularly focuses on Socrates in al-Kindī, al-Rāzī, and al-Fārābī. 129 See Plato, Ap. 31d ff. Like Plato, Xenophon also presents a Socrates who refused to discuss “the nature of all things” (περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως), especially the heavens, in favour of discussing “the human things” (τἀνθρώπινα) (Mem. 1.1.11–12). Yet elsewhere throughout the Memorabilia and the Apology, Xenophon is wont to emphasise the importance of Socrates’s δαιμόνιον. On Xenophon’s view that Socrates promoted piety, see David K. O’Connor, “Xenophon and the Enviable Life of Socrates,” in The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, ed. Donald R. Morrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 65–70. It is not clear how much access any medieval Jewish thinker, particularly outside of Byzantium, would have had to Xenophon’s work. While Xenophon seems to have been known to Arabic literature, we have no evidence of the existence of any translations of his work. See Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 32.

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themselves. The questioning of the divine, of course, is one of the main factors that leads to his being put to death. None of these elements made it into any of the works by Jewish thinkers that we have mentioned so far in this chapter. Yet they are present, as we shall see in chapters 2 and 3, in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari and in the philosophical commentaries of Averroes. The works of both thinkers were in many ways foundational for subsequent Jewish philosophy, as Hebrew translations of both formed a large part of the philosophical education of medieval Jews. Other Jewish thinkers, as we shall see in part 2 of this book, seem to have incorporated the Socratic paradox of the divine injunction to inquire into the divine itself as a central part of their philosophical outlook. This kind of philosophical question, as will become clear, has nothing in common with the seven Jewish authors discussed in this chapter.

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Appendix 1: Critical Edition of “A Prayer of the Divine Socrates”

Manuscripts ‫ל‬. London, British Library, Add. MS 18690, f. 14r–v ‫א‬. Amsterdam, Ets Haim Library, 47 E 19, f. 28v–30v ‫נ‬. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary, MS 2469, f. 212r ‫פ‬. Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, MS 1753 (De Rossi 997) 1‫—פ‬f. 127r–128r 2‫—פ‬f. 169v–170v

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‫‪47‬‬

‫?‪Was Socrates a Wise, Ascetic Monotheist or a Vocal Sceptic‬‬ ‫תפלה לסקרט האלהי‪130‬‬

‫תבורך ראשון הראשונים נצח‪ 131‬הנצחיים‪ 132‬הקדמון לא ימוש לפני הזמנים העוברים והעתים‬ ‫החולפים הקדוש העצום והטהור‪ 133‬אשר לא יגבלהו‪ 134‬מקום ולא יאחזהו‪ 135‬זמן כי הוא‪ 136‬מכונן‬ ‫הזמנים ובורא המקומות‪.‬‬ ‫תבורך בפניניות‪ 137‬העליונה התמידה הנצחית‪ 138‬הזכה‪ 139‬והברה‪ 140‬והטהורה‪ 141‬ראשית לכל‬ ‫מאורי‪ 142‬אור‪ 143‬הם המכלכלים‪ 144‬לכחות‪ 145‬השכליים‪ 146‬ומזהירים‪ 147‬פני הנבראים‪.‬‬ ‫תבורך אדון העולם אשר ממנו חיי רוחות‪ 148‬הרוחניים וצורות‪ 149‬הנפשים‪ 150‬המלאכיים‪151.‬‬ ‫אשאלך למען נצחך בתמידותך ואחדותך‪ 152‬שתפצני‪ 153‬ותצילני‪ 154‬מהמון ים גלי‪ 155‬הסכלות‪156‬‬ ‫וממחשכי‪ 157‬הנגרש‪ 158‬על העולם הזה‪ 159,‬ותמשכני‪ 160‬אל אור‪ 161‬ברור‪ 162‬נאצל‪ 163‬ממך ואמלטה נא‬ ‫אליך‪ 164.‬ותשים‪ 165‬מנתי למען שמך‪ ,‬מנת הסודות העליונות‪ 166,‬ותעתיקני‪ 167‬ממשלת הטבעים‪168‬‬ ‫וגבורת‪ 169‬התאוה‪ 170‬להדריכני אל דרך השכל והנכוחה‪ 171‬אשר בה אשיג‪ 172‬לאור‪ 173‬במאוריך‪174,‬‬ ‫ובהבדילך‪ 175‬אותו‪ 176‬מטבע האנושי הבלה‪ 177‬וממדור התבלית‪ 178‬תשנני‪ 179‬לטוב‪ 180‬אל הטבע‬ ‫המלאכותי העומד לעדי עד והקיים‪ 181‬לנצח נצחים הוא מדור‪ 182‬החסידים ויראי‪ 183‬השם‪.‬‬ ‫הה ואהה‪ 184‬לי‪ 185‬אללי‪ 186‬לי על‪ 187‬התאחרי משכלי‪ 188‬ולא נתתי לך‪ 189‬את שלך‪.‬‬ ‫אוי לי ואבוי לי‪ 190‬על אשר קצרתי‪ 191‬מהודות כל‪ 192‬תגמולך‪ 193‬עלי‪194.‬‬ ‫מר‪ 195‬לי מר לי‪ 196‬וצר לי‪ 197‬על מהירות שכלי‪ 198‬וכי‪ 199‬לא הבטתי‪ 200‬אל האמונות‪ 201‬העליונות‬ ‫והרמות‪202.‬‬ ‫אנא האלהים הגיעני אליהם ותסמוך בימין שכלי‪ 203‬עד תנהגני‪ 204‬ותביאני אל מוצא המוצאים‬ ‫הוא מקור החיים ונצח‪ 205‬הנצחים‪206.‬‬ ‫אשאלך‪ 207‬להצילנו ממקרי‪ 208‬היסודות‪ 209‬הצרות זו לזו‪ ,‬ותתנני‪ 210‬פרדה מן הפרדות‪211‬‬ ‫ותניעני‪ 212‬אל דעת‪ 213‬העליון‪ 214‬היא‪ 215‬דעת האותיות המובדלות ולא תהיה‪ 216‬תבליתי‪ 217‬בין‬ ‫האותיות המתדמות‪ 218‬בעולם השפל‪ 219‬ובצורות המתחלפות‪220.‬‬ ‫אתה הוא יודע‪ 221‬הכל ומושל‪ 222‬בכל ויכל‪ 223‬כל‪.‬‬ ‫יהי רצון מלפניך יי אלהי ואלהי אבותי לטהר מערכי רעיוני ולכונן מענה לשוני ותהיה עם לבבי‬ ‫בעת מחשבי‪ ,‬ועם ידי בעת מעבדי‪ ,‬ועם פי בעת הטיפי‪ ,‬ותחשכני מזדונות ותנקני משגיאות‪ ,‬ואל אומר‬ ‫לפני המלאך דבר שלא כרצונך‪ ,‬וגער בשטן ואל יבהילני וביצר הרע ואל יכשילני‪.‬‬ ‫יהיו לרצון אמ׳ פי והגיון לבי לפניך יי צורי וגואלי‪224.‬‬

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‫‪Chapter 1‬‬

‫‪48‬‬

‫‪  130‬תפלה לסקרט האלהי] תפלה לסקראט האלהי אשר העתיק אותה הרב ר׳ זרחיה נ״ע א תפלת‬ ‫סקראט נ תפלת אבוקרט הפילוסוף בכל בקר ‪1‬פ תפלה זכה שהעתיק רבינו זרחייא ז״ל‪ 2‬פ‬ ‫‪ 131‬נצח] ונצחי אנפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 132‬הנצחיים] נצחי׳ פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 133‬הקדוש העצום והטהור] הגדול והקדוש הנאור והטהור פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 134‬יגבלהו] יגבילהו נפ ‪2‬יכילהו פ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 135‬יאחזהו] יחוהו א יחווהו נפ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 136‬הוא] ליתא פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 137‬בפניניות] בפנינית אפ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 138‬הוא מכונן הזמנים … הנצחית] ליתא פ‪ This is about the length of one line in 1‬פ‪1‬‬ ‫ התמידה הנצחית] התמידית והנצחית פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 139‬הזכה] היא הפנימית הזכה א היא הפניניות הזכה נ היא הפנינייות הזכה פ‪ 1‬היא הפנינית‬ ‫הזכה פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 140‬והברה] הברה אנפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 141‬והטהורה] הטהורה א‬ ‫‪ 142‬מאורי] מאור נ‬ ‫‪ 143‬אור] אור האלהיים נפ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 144‬המכלכלים] המלאכים פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 145‬לכחות] לכל כחות פ‪ 1‬הם הכוחות פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 146‬השכליים] השכלים א הסכליים נ‬ ‫‪ 147‬ומזהירים] המזהירים אנפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 148‬רוחות] כוחות אפ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 149‬וצורות] וצורות נ וצורת פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 150‬הנפשים] הנפשות נפ‪ 1‬הנפשית פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 151‬המלאכיים] המלאכים נ‬ ‫‪152 152‬ואחדותך] ובאחדותך א*נפ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 153‬שתפצני] שתצפנני פ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 154‬ותצילני] וגאלי נ וגאלני פ ‪1‬ושתצילני פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 155‬ים גלי] גלי ים ומ[מ]חשכי א גלים מחשכי נ גלי גלים מחשכי פ‪ 1‬מחשכי פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 156‬הסכלות] השכלות א‬ ‫‪ 157‬וממחשכי] ליתא אנפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 158‬הנגרש] הנרגש אפ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 159‬על העולם הזה] בכל העולם א בעולם הזה נפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 160‬ותמשכני] ליתא פ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 161‬אור] האור פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 162‬ברור] בהיר פ‪ 1‬הברור פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 163‬נאצל] הנאצל פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 164‬אליך] ליתא א‬ ‫‪ 165‬ותשים] ותשים ממנו פ‪ 1‬ושים פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 166‬מנת הסודות העליונות] מנת הסודות העליונים א ליתא נפ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 167‬ותעתיקני] ותעניקני אפ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 168‬ממשלת הטבעים] מהטבעים פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 169‬וגבורת] ותגבורת פ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 170‬התאוה] התאוות אנפ‪ 1‬התולדת פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 171‬והנכוחה] הדרך הנכוחה פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 172‬אשיג] אשיב א אזכה פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 173‬לאור] לי אור פ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 174‬במאוריך] באורך אנפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 175‬ובהבדילך] ולהבדילך פ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 176‬אותו] אותי אנפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4‬‬ ‫‪Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM‬‬ ‫‪via University of Wisconsin-Madison‬‬

‫‪49‬‬

‫?‪Was Socrates a Wise, Ascetic Monotheist or a Vocal Sceptic‬‬

‫‪ 177‬הבלה] הכלה פ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 178‬התבלית] התכלית אנ התכליית פ‪1‬‬ ‫ וממדור התבלית] ומתולדת האדם העפרי והבלה פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 179‬תשנני] תשכני נ ותנני פ‪ 1‬והדביקני פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 180‬לטוב] ליתא פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 181‬והקיים] והקים א והקיצני נ‬ ‫‪ 182‬מדור] מקור פ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 183‬ויראי] ויריאי נ‬ ‫‪ 184‬ואהה] ואהי א‬ ‫‪ 185‬לי] ליתא אנפ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 186‬אללי] ואללי פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 187‬על] ליתא נ‬ ‫‪ 188‬משכלי] משכל א‬ ‫‪ 189‬לך] אליך נ‬ ‫‪190 190‬לי] ליתא אנפ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 191‬אשר קצרתי] כי נתמתי פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 192‬כל] לך על כל פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 193‬תגמולך] תגמוליך א תגמולי׳ פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 194‬עלי] הטובים פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 195‬מר] מה פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 196‬לי] ליתא אנפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 197‬לי] לי מאד פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 198‬שכלי] לבי אנפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 199‬וכי] כי פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 200‬הבטתי] הבינותי נפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 201‬האמונות] האמורות א המעלות האמנות נפ‪ 1‬אמונות פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 202‬העליונות והרמות] הרמות והעליונות נפ‪ 1‬עליונות תנהגני ורמות פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 203‬שכלי] סכלי א‬ ‫‪ 204‬תנהגני] תנהלני א‬ ‫‪ 205‬ונצח] ונצחי פ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 206‬הנצחים] הנצחיים אפ‪ 1‬נצחים פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 207‬אשאלך] אשאלך למען נצחך פ ‪1‬אנא אלך פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 208‬ממקרי] ממקורי א ממקרה נפ‪ 1‬ממקראי פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 209‬היסודות] הסודות א הזמנים הקשים ומסבות העתים פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 210‬ותתנני] ותנני אנפ‪ 1‬ושלא אצטרך ואמשך פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 211‬פרדה מן הפרדות] פרידה מן הפרידות נפ‪ 1‬אחרי הבלי העולם לרדוף התאוות הגופניות פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 212‬ותניעני] ותגיעני אנפ‪1‬פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 213‬אל דעת] לדעת הדעת פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 214‬העליון] העליוני פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 215‬היא] הוא נפ‪ 1‬והוא פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 216‬תהיה] יהיה פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 217‬תבליתי] תכליתי אפ‪ 1‬תכלית פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 218‬בין האותיות המתדמות] בין האותיות המתמירות א מן‪ ------- ----‬נ מן האותיות המתדמות פ‪1‬‬ ‫‪ 219‬בעולם השפל] ‪-‬עצם השכל נ‬ ‫‪ 220‬המתחלפות] המתחלפות העוברות בלי העמדה פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 221‬יודע] עד פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 222‬ומושל] ומשל א‬ ‫‪ 223‬ויכל] ויכול פ‪ 1‬וכל ויכול פ‪2‬‬ ‫‪ 224‬יהי רצון מלפניך […] וגואלי] תם תם א ית׳ וית׳ פ‪ 1‬ליתא פ‪2‬‬ ‫ ובצורות המתחלפות […] וגואלי] ליתא (הדף קרוע) נ‬ ‫‪Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4‬‬ ‫‪Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM‬‬ ‫‪via University of Wisconsin-Madison‬‬

50

Chapter 1

Appendix 2: Translation of “A Prayer of the Divine Socrates”

A Prayer of the Divine Socrates May You be blessed, O First of firsts, Eternal of eternals, O Primary Who departs not before changing times and passing seasons, Who are holy, mighty, and pure, Who are not delimited by place nor reached by time. For You are He Who establishes times and creates places. May You be blessed, Who are with the essence that is highest, perpetual, eternal, brightest, clearest, and most pure, which is the first of all luminaries of light that sustain intellectual powers and illuminate the faces of created things. May You be blessed, O Lord of the World, from Whom are the lives of the spirits of the spiritual beings and the forms of the angelic souls. I ask You for the sake of Your Eternity together with Your Perpetuity and Oneness to deliver me and save me from the manifold sea, the waves of ignorance, and from the darkenings of that which is banished to this world. May You pull me towards clear light emanating from You, and let me, I pray, get away towards You. May You make my portion be for the sake of Your Name, a portion of the Highest Secrets. May You transport me from the rule of natures and the clout of desire so as to guide me to the path of intellect, the upright path through which I may grasp light by Your luminaries. By separating it [sc. the intellect] from decaying human nature and from the dwellingplace of destruction, prepare me well for the angelic nature that stands for ever and ever and which exists for all eternity. That is the dwelling-place of the righteous and those who fear the Name. Oh alas, woe is me225 that I have come late to my intellect and I have not given You what is Yours. Woe unto me and alas226 that I have been short in thanking You for all Your bountiful dealings towards me.227

225 Cf. Mic 7:1 and Job 10:15. 226 Cf. Prov 23:29. 227 Cf. Ps 116:12.

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Was Socrates a Wise, Ascetic Monotheist or a Vocal Sceptic?

51

I have great bitterness228 and distress for the quickness of my intellect and because I did not glimpse the sublime and exalted beliefs. Please, O God, bring me to them and support my intellect with Your right hand that You may guide me and bring me unto the spring of springs, the source of life and all eternity. I ask you to save me from the accidents of the elements, which harm one another. Grant me a separation and move me to knowledge of the sublime, to knowledge of the separate letters. May my destruction not be among the letters that are likenesses in the lower world or among the changing forms. You are He Who knows all, governs all, and is all-powerful. May it be Your will, O Lord, my God and God of my fathers, to purify the arrangements of my thoughts and to establish an answer for my speech. May You be with my heart at the time of my thought, with my hand at the time of my work, and with my mouth at the time of my discourse. May You save me from insolence and clean me of errors. Let me not speak a word before the angel that is not according to Your will. Rebuke the satan; may he not confound me and may he not make me fail through the evil inclination. Let the words of my mouth and the meditation of my heart be acceptable before You, O Lord, my Rock, and my Redeemer.229 228 Cf. Isa 38:17. 229 Ps 19:15, JPS translation.

Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

Chapter 2

Socrates and Socratic Philosophy in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari Socrates cannot be considered a major figure in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari by quantitative measures.* Amongst all the numerous and diverse topics discussed in Halevi’s dialogue, Socrates’s name appears only four times; it is mentioned once by the Philosopher at the beginning of the book and three times by the Ḥaver later in the work.1 Furthermore, there is no sign that the king of the Khazars, despite his sustained interest in philosophy throughout the dialogue, is at all concerned with Socrates or Socratic philosophy. Yet while the Philosopher uses Socrates generically in a list of five exemplary philosophers, the Ḥaver mentions him in order to suggest an account of philosophy distinct from both the ibn Bāǧǧian philosophy of the Philosopher in the first book of the Kuzari and the Avicennian philosophy critiqued by the Ḥaver later in the work. Indeed, the Ḥaver presents Socrates as a kind of metaphysical sceptic, or at least as someone who is ignorant of physics and metaphysics and who is unwilling to speak about what he does not know. This Socratic philosophy presented by Halevi’s Ḥaver is coherent and consistent, but significantly different from the views of Socrates as a wise, ascetic monotheist that we saw in chapter 1. Moreover, as we shall see, Socrates’s ignorance of physics and metaphysics and his unwillingness to discuss those subjects exempt him from the Ḥaver’s critique of philosophy in the dialogue. Indeed, the Ḥaver’s denigrations of philosophy, which treat it at best as a faulty science in need of replacement by a Jewish science2 and at worst as a form of heresy doomed to apocalyptic destruction at the end of days,3 do not seem to apply to a Socratic philosophy * This chapter was originally published in Jewish Quarterly Review 107 (2017): 447–75. 1 At 1.1, 3.1, 4.13, and 5.14. References to and quotations from the Kuzari are taken from Judah Halevi, Kitāb al-radd wa-l-dalīl fī al-dīn al-ḏalīl (al-kitāb al-Ḫazarī), ed. David Hartwig Baneth and Haggai Ben-Shammai (Jerusalem: Magnes Press and the Israel Academy of Science and Humanities, 1977). Unfortunately, no complete and academically reliable translation is currently available. Where possible, I have relied on Barry Kogan’s partial translation in The Jewish Philosophy Reader, ed. Daniel H. Frank, Oliver Leaman, and Charles H. Manekin (London: Routledge, 2000), 203–14. All other translations from Arabic are my own. 2 See Tzvi Langermann, “Science and the Kuzari,” Science in Context 10 (1997): 495–522. 3 E.g., in 4.13, the Ḥaver describes the philosopher as one who believes—and indeed holds as one of the foundations of his thought (min uṣūl iʿtiqādihi)—that “the Lord will not do good, neither will He do evil” (‫לא יטיב ה׳ ולא ירע‬, JPS 1917 trans.). The context of this Hebrew quote

© Yehuda Halper, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004468764_004

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Socrates and Socratic Philosophy in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari

53

that is sceptical of metaphysics. While the Ḥaver certainly does not endorse Socratic philosophy or the way of life that goes with it, he is apparently more open to it than to other forms of philosophy, or at least does not consider it a threat to Judaism. The first mention of Socrates occurs in the Philosopher’s description of Socrates and includes him among those philosophers who have successfully conjoined with the Active Intellect.4 Drawing on ibn Bāǧǧa’s Letter on Conjunction,5 the Philosopher relates how the soul of the perfect person conjoins and becomes one with the Active Intellect as well as with all the other human intellects who have attained this degree of conjunction. This perfect person joins “the group of Hermes, Asclepius, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.” Membership in this group is, according to the Philosopher, the fulfilment of “God’s Will” and “true knowledge of things.” Far from being a sceptic, the Philosopher claims knowledge of the divine will. Moreover, the Philosopher’s Socrates, along with Hermes, Asclepius, Plato, and Aristotle, also knows and fulfils the divine will. The Philosopher includes only Greeks in his list of perfect people. Indeed, no non-Greek philosophers are explicitly named anywhere in the Kuzari. The words or views of Islamic thinkers such as Avicenna,6 ibn Bāǧǧa,7 and

4

5

6

7

from Zeph 1:12 suggests that philosophers are included among those destroyed by God on the apocalyptic “day of the Lord.” Kuzari 1.1. The appearance of a character called only “the Philosopher” (al-faylasūf ) in the Kuzari has sometimes been taken as a sign that Halevi believes in a unified, single form of philosophy. This seems to be the opinion of Leo Strauss, who sees a unified philosophy, at least in regard to the questions of natural law, divine law, and the law of reason. See Strauss, “The Law of Reason in the Kuzari,” in Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952), 95–141. The contention of this chapter is that there are a number of different things meant by the term “philosopher,” though these distinctions are blurred, perhaps intentionally so, by the inclusion of the Philosopher and several mentions of “philosophy” and “philosophers” by the Ḥaver. Ibn Bāǧǧa, Risālat al-Ittiṣāl, appendix to Averroes, Talḫīṣ Kitāb al-Nafs, ed. A.F. al-Ahwani (Cairo: Maktabat an-Nahda, 1950). That Halevi is drawing on this text was shown in Shlomo Pines, “Shi’ite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2 (1980): 212–17. E.g., a section of Avicenna’s Compendium on the Soul is included in Kuzari 5.12. See Baneth and Ben-Shammai’s edition of the Kuzari, 208, n. 17. Avicenna’s treatise is edited in Samuel Landauer, “Die Psychologie des ibn Sînâ,” Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft 29 (1875): 335–418. This Compendium is apparently Avicenna’s earliest work and differs in certain respects from his later psychology. See Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 2nd rev. ed. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 4–8, 80–86. See Pines, “Shi’ite Terms,” 212–17.

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al-Ġazālī8 appear without attribution in the mouths of either the Philosopher or the Ḥaver.9 Halevi apparently wants his readers to look to the Greeks as exemplars of philosophy rather than to more contemporary Islamic thinkers. Like the Philosopher, the Ḥaver also mentions five Greek thinkers. Four of these, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, and Aristotle, appear in a twice-repeated list,10 while Socrates appears on his own.11 The Philosopher and the Ḥaver’s lists differ in their accounts of the earliest philosophers—that is, in what they see as pre-Socratic philosophy—or perhaps in their accounts of the origins of philosophy. Neither the Philosopher nor the Ḥaver tells us any details about the thought or works of any of these pre-Socratic thinkers, and it thus seems that Halevi is relying on his readers’ outside knowledge. The Philosopher’s preSocratics are apparently Hermetic figures, Hermes and Asclepius.12 The Ḥaver, it would seem, sees the origins of philosophy in those whom Western thinkers more typically deem pre-Socratic, namely Pythagoras and Empedocles. While we cannot know precisely which sources Halevi read, the characters of Hermes, Asclepius, Pythagoras, and Empedocles are sufficiently developed in medieval Arabic literature to suggest reasons for their adoption in these lists. In general, as we saw in chapter 1, the literature about these thinkers, and about Socrates as well, probably came from numerous, often fantastical legends, fragments quoted by other thinkers, and pseudo-fragments attributed to famous figures of the past that found their way into various Arabic works. Hermetic figures are typically associated with astral magic and talismanic influence, themes that do not work well with the Philosopher’s speech in the Kuzari.13 Yet even in magical and talismanic Hermetic texts, Hermes 8

9 10 11 12

13

The Ḥaver appears to refer to al-Ġazālī’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa in 5.20. See Harry A. Wolfson, “Judah Halevi on Causality and Miracles,” in Meyer Waxman Jubilee Volume, ed. Judah Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Mordecai Newman, 1966), 138. However, nowhere in 5.20 does the Ḥaver mention the words “philosophy” or “philosopher.” For a recent study of the numerous Arabic sources interwoven into the Kuzari, see Ehud Krinis, “The Arabic Background of the Kuzari,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 21 (2013): 1–56. Kuzari 4.25 and 5.14. The ibn Tibbon translation adds Hippocrates (ippoqraṭ) to the list at 5.14, between Empedocles and Aristotle, but this is probably not authentic. In 3.1, 4.13, and 5.14. See Moshe Idel, “Hermeticism and Judaism,” in Hermeticism and the Renaissance: Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe, ed. Ingrid Merkel and Allen G. Debus (Washington, DC: Folger Books and Associated University Presses, 1987), 62. See also Dov Schwartz, Studies on Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought, trans. David Louvish and Batya Stein (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 6–9. Dov Schwartz takes this as a sign of Halevi’s esoteric belief in and promotion of astral magic. See Studies on Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought, 6–9.

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Trismegistus and his protégés, often including Asclepius,14 are typically associated with a kind of revelatory experience leading to the dissemination of knowledge of the divine among human beings.15 Such accounts hearken back to Greek writings in which both Hermes and Asclepius represent the connection between the divine and human realms; both are often described as human beings who have undergone a kind of apotheosis through the increase of their wisdom beyond the limitations of human knowledge. This kind of description of Hermes probably influenced ibn Bāǧǧa’s account of Hermes achieving pure conjunction with Intellect, an account that could well have been the source for the Hermes of Halevi’s “Philosopher.”16 Even the association of Hermeticism with talismans and astral magic takes on the possibility of philosophical allegorisation when associated with philosophers like “Pythagoreans, Aristotelians, Platonists, and Epicureans,” as we find in the writings of the “Brethren of Purity.”17 Not long after Halevi, we find Suhrawardī including Hermes and Asclepius along with Plato, Socrates, Pythagoras, and Empedocles as those who have had experience of the “lights” of illuminationist philosophy.18 Suhrawardī even associates the “archetypes of the talismans” 14

15

16

17 18

For Asclepius as a Hermetic, see al-Mubaššir ibn Fātik, Muḫtār al-ḥikam wa-maḥāsin alkalim, 28, and ibn Ǧulǧul, Ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ wa-l-ḥukamāʾ, ed. Fuʾād Sayyid (Cairo: 1955), 11. In an Arabic commentary on the Hippocratic oath ascribed to Galen, Asclepius is said to have been a mortal who ascended to heaven in a pillar of fire. See Franz Rosenthal, “An Ancient Commentary on the Hippocratic Oath,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 30 (1956): 52–87, cited in Gotthard Strohmaier, “Asclepius,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson (Brill Online, 2011), http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/ asclepius-COM_22949. On Hermes Trismegistus in Arabic literature, see Kevin van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes: From Pagan Sage to Prophet of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), especially 196–239. See also Martin Plessner, “Hermes Trismegistus and Arab Science,” Studia Islamica 2 (1954): 45–59, for a selection of relevant Hermetic texts in modern translation. See Ibn Bāǧǧa, Ittiṣāl al-ʿaql bi-l-insān, in Ibn Bāǧǧa, Opera Metaphysica, ed. M. Fakhry (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1968), 171. Cf. Steven Harvey’s discussion of ibn Bāǧǧa’s Hermes and its similarity to the account Halevi attributes to the “Philosopher” in Steven Harvey, “The Place of the Philosopher in the City according to ibn Bājjah,” in The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy: Studies in Honor of Muhsin S. Mahdi, ed. Charles E. Butterworth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 216, especially n. 36. See Godefroid de Callataÿ, and Bruno Halflants, eds. and trans., On Magic: An Arabic Critical Edition and English Translation of Epistle 52a (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 116 ff. Cf. Šihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī, The Philosophy of Illumination: A New Critical Edition of the Text of the Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq with English Translation, Notes, Commentary and Introduction, ed. and trans. John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 1999), vol. 1, p. 2 and vol. 2, pp. 107 and 161. Cf. van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes, 224–25.

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with the “Platonic forms,”19 indicating quite clearly that Hermes and Asclepius were often viewed as predominantly intellectual figures in the twelfth century rather than as proponents of magic. It is thus likely that Halevi has only an intellectual ideal in mind when he has the Philosopher mention the possibility of conjunction with Hermes and Asclepius together with the Active Intellect.20 The Ḥaver’s list of philosophers could be taken in a similar vein, if we assume that he treated Empedocles and Pythagoras as examples of unification with the divine of the kind attributed to Hermes and Asclepius, as Suhrawardī was to do later. However, there are two other, more likely reasons why the Ḥaver may have taken Empedocles and Pythagoras as representatives of pre-Socratic thought. One is to emphasise the disagreement between philosophers that plays a prominent part in the Ḥaver’s critique of philosophy; indeed, the Ḥaver mentions a lack of agreement in the immediate context of both lists. Aristotle emphasises his own disagreements with Empedocles and Pythagoras in, for example, Metaphysics A and De anima A,21 and there is not, to my knowledge, any book attributed to so reputable a source as al-Fārābī claiming to harmonise Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle. Halevi could thus expect his readers not to dispute that these thinkers disagreed. A second reason for the decision to mention Empedocles and Pythagoras may be a series of legends associating these two thinkers with Eastern thought, often even Jewish wisdom. According to the version of the legend preserved by Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī, “Empedocles lived at the time of the prophet David. He learned philosophy

19 20

21

According to van Bladel, “For the most part [Suhrawardī] demonstrates no real familiarity with actual Hermetica. He merely held the conviction, apparently based on his feelings rather than his readings, that his teaching was indeed a continuation or revival of the wisdom of these ancient philosophers.” This suggests that by Suhrawardī’s time, the figure of Hermes had become more of a topos than a textually grounded character. Quoted in John Walbridge, “Suhrawardī and Illuminationism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 214. It is not impossible that the Philosopher’s linking of Socrates to Hermes and Asclepius may be drawn from an ancient tradition, reported, e.g., by Porphyry, that Socrates began his career as a carver of Hermae (ἑρμογλύφος). See Porphyry, Porphyry’s Historia Philosophiae (Fragmenta), fragment 11. This work was reportedly quite popular in Arabic, though it is no longer extant and accordingly we cannot determine whether or in what form this legend could have been available to Halevi. Both of these texts were studied and commented upon by ibn Bāǧǧa and Averroes, suggesting that they were available in Andalus in Halevi’s time. The Arabic translation(s) of Aristotle’s Metaphysics survive as lemmata to Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics. See Averroes, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīat, ed. Maurice Bouyges, vol. 1 (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938). See also Aristotle, Ph. 4.6 213a19–b2.

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from Luqmān22 in Syria. […] Pythagoras lived some time after Empedocles. He learned philosophy in Egypt from the companions of Solomon, the son of David, who had gone from Syria to Egypt.”23 There are similar legends in the works of Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī24 and the Persian al-Šahrastānī,25 among others, suggesting that such accounts were circulating in the Arabic-speaking world around Halevi’s time. Such stories work well with the Ḥaver’s account of the origins of Greek philosophy in Kuzari 1.63–65. There, the Ḥaver claims that the Greeks do not have their science (ʿilm) as an inheritance or tradition, but instead that they received it from Persia; that is, the East. The Persians, in turn, obtained their philosophy from the Chaldeans, later referred to as “Abraham’s people,”26 who, as descendants of Shem, did receive science as an inheritance.27 22

23

24

25

26 27

On the identification of the Quranic Luqmān as a vizier to King David, see B. Heller and N.A. Stillmann, “Luḳmān,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. Peri Bearman, Thierry Bianquis, Clifford Edmund Bosworth, Emeri van Donzel, and Wolfhart P. Heinrichs (Brill Online, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0586. See also Luqman, Fables de Loqman le Sage: Le texte revu de nouveau sur les mss. accompagné d’une version française et des notes et précédé d’une introduction sur la personne de Loqman et sur l’origine de ce recueil de fables, ed. Joseph Derenbourg (Berlin, 1850), and Luqman, Fables de Luqman, surnommé le sage, ed. Henri Hélot and Léon Hélot (Paris, 1847). Quoted in Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam, 39–40. A short account of this same passage is also given in Abraham Melamed, The Myth of Jewish Origins of Science and Philosophy [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2010), 90–91. Melamed notes that according to al-Andalusī, this chain of transmission has its origin in Hermes. Norman Roth argues that al-Andalusī’s claim here is derived from Josephus’s claim that Pythagoras adopted Jewish customs in his C. Ap. 1.22. See Norman Roft, “The ‘Theft of Philosophy’ by the Greeks from the Jews,” Classical Folia 32 (1978): 55. Even if there is no direct line of transmission between Josephus and al-Andalusī, their similarity on this point indicates the presence of various legends attesting to this view. On Empedocles in al-ʿĀmirī, see Everett K. Rowson, A Muslim Philosopher on the Soul and Its Fate. Al-ʿĀmirī’s Kitāb al-amad ʿalā l-abad (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 1988), 70. On Pythagoras in al-ʿĀmirī, see Franz Rosenthal, “Fīt̲hāg̲ hūras,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (Brill Online, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573 -3912_islam_SIM_2388, where he notes the presence of similar accounts in al-Qifṭī and ibn abī Uṣaybiʿah. On Empedocles and Pythagoras in Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī, see Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam, 39. See Tāǧ al-Dīn al-Šahrastānī, Religionspartheien und Philosophen-Schulen, trans. Theodor Haarbrücker (Halle, 1850), 2:90. See also Abraham Melamed, Myth of Jewish Origins, 91–92. Since al-Šahrastānī was living in and around Persia at around the same time that Halevi was living in Andalusia, it is not likely that Halevi could have read al-Šahrastānī. Nevertheless, the presence of this story in al-Šahrastānī attests to its wide circulation around the middle of the twelfth century. On Qawm Ibrāhīm, see Kuzari, 3.35. Al-Fārābī gives a similar story of the inheritance of science: “It is said that this science existed anciently among the Chaldeans, who are the people of al-Iraq, subsequently reaching the people of Egypt, from there transmitted to the Greeks, where it remained

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The Ḥaver mentions that Aristotle also had another source of science: his own mind and thought.28 The Ḥaver’s list of Greek philosophers may then reflect his belief that these philosophers received their knowledge from the East, even if, like Aristotle, they improved on this philosophy by using their own minds and thought. That Empedocles, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle disagreed with one another suggests that their transmission of the science of Shem was not reliable. Perhaps, indeed, the “improvements” made through their own minds detracted from rather than added to their philosophical attainments.29 This suggests that the Ḥaver casts Greek philosophy as derivative and subject to disagreement, quite unlike the Philosopher’s description of the experience of divine conjunction with the Active Intellect.30 1

Kuzari 3.1

While the Ḥaver does not explicitly address Hermes and Asclepius, it is possible he has them in mind when he refers to Enoch and Elijah in his brief, though complicated discussion of the mutaʿabbid, the dedicated worshipper in 3.1. The Ḥaver also mentions Socrates and the learned philosophers in general in this passage, comparing and contrasting them to the mutaʿabbidūn. The references to these characters in 3.1 suggest that the section presents another alternative

28 29 30

until it was transmitted to the Syrians and then to the Arabs.” See al-Fārābī, The Attainment of Happiness, in Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, 43. For Arabic, see al-Fārābī, Taḥṣīl al-Saʿādah, ed. Ǧafar al-Yasīn (Beirut: Al-Andaloss, 1981), 88. It is, however, not entirely clear, in al-Fārābī’s view, whether the Arabs received science from the Syrians, as in the legends mentioned above, or whether they too received it from the Greeks. For al-Fārābī, science begins in Iraq, which was also the home of Abraham, not Syria or Israel. Cf. Maimonides, Guide 3.29. Ḏihnihi wa-fikratihi, 1.65. This is the implication in 5.14. See below. This account of the two views of philosophy differs significantly from Pines’s view in “Shi’ite Terms,” 215–17, that “Judah Halevi seems in V, 14 to have forgotten the contents of the philosopher’s exposé in I, 1,” that “there was a considerable interval of time between the two books,” and that “Judah Halevi in the course of this period was influenced by philosophical texts with which he had not earlier been familiar.” It is also different from Yochanan Silman’s theory that different approaches and ideas reflect different periods in which the various parts of the Kuzari were written; see Silman, Philosopher and Prophet: Judah Halevi, the Kuzari, and the Evolution of His Thought, trans. Lenn J. Schramm (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995). Rather, my view is that Halevi includes the Ḥaver’s different view of philosophy as early as book 1 and that he intended the Philosopher and the Ḥaver to espouse different views of what philosophy is from the outset.

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to the Philosopher’s speech in 1.1, one in which Socrates, who does not appear in the Ḥaver’s abovementioned lists of philosophers, plays a central role.31 The enigmatic discussion of the mutaʿabbid in 3.1, which mentions Enoch, Elijah, and Socrates, is structurally disparate from the rest of the dialogue. The Khazar King, without any apparent contextual reason, asks for an account of the “mutaʿabbid among you” in the final section of book 2, but indicates no interest in what the Ḥaver has to say in 3.1. Instead, by 3.2, he changes the question to concern the actions of the good person of the present day (aʿmāl al-ḫayyirikum al-ān).32 In fact, it seems that the Ḥaver and the Khazar King have different meanings of mutaʿabbid in mind, giving the passage in 3.1 a certain irony. This follows from the way in which forms of taʿabbada are used in the four other instances in which they appear in the Kuzari. The term is first used in Halevi’s account of the Khazar King’s religious devotion. After receiving the first dream telling him that he needs to change his actions, the King “was very zealous in intensively performing (al-taʿabbud) the religion of the Khazars, with the result that he himself would perform the temple service and the sacrifices with pure and sincere intention.” The taʿabbud mentioned in connection with the Khazar King seems to reflect special, intensive adherence to his religious rituals, as one might expect from the fifth verb form of the Arabic root ʿ-B-D, “worship” or “serve.” Accordingly, I have translated it “intensively performing.” The term reflects the Khazar King’s religious devotion, as expressed in his activities in the temple and his devout intention. We find a similar meaning present when the Khazar King asks the Ḥaver for a response to the Karaites in 3.22, since, as far as the King can see, the Karaites “are more zealous in their intensive performance ( fī al-taʿabbud) than the Rabbanites.” The nearly identical formulation (once again referring to zealousness or diligence, muǧtahidīn) to Halevi’s opening remarks suggests that the meaning of the term is the same. 31

32

Scholars have suggested the importance of ibn Bāǧǧa’s thought for both 3.1 and 1.1. According to Binyamin Abrahamov, “the attack against isolation […] may have been directed at ibn Bājja’s tadbīr al-mutawwaḥid (the Conduct of the Solitary).” See his review of Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah Ha-Levi’s Kuzari by Diana Lobel, Journal of the American Oriental Society 123 (2003): 245. Ehud Krinis calls 3.1 a “mockery of ascetic habits […] [which] seems to be aimed at ibn Bājja and his Tadbīr al-mutawwaḥid” and further contrasts this with the pro-ibn Bāǧǧa approach of the philosopher in 1.1. See Krinis, “The Arabic Background of the Kuzari,” 10–11. See also Pines, “Shi’ite Terms,” 212–17. My approach is compatible (though not identical) with Krinis’s here. For some of Halevi’s poetic depictions of the good person (al-ḫayyir), though not of the mutaʿabbid, see Ephraim Hazan, “‘I Asked about a Ḥasid, Not a Ruler’: The Ḥasid as a Ruler in the Poetry of Rabbi Judah Halevi,” Studies in Medieval Jewish Poetry 18 (2009): 247–55.

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The Karaites, in the Khazar King’s first estimation, are more intensive performers of the religion, more involved in their worship. However, the Ḥaver’s two uses of the term, both in 2.50, suggest that he has a more specific meaning of the term in mind. At the beginning of 2.50, the Ḥaver states that “the divine law does not have us perform intense worship (lā tataʿabbadanā) through asceticism (bi-l-tazahhud).” Later in the paragraph, he says, “The Sabbath brings [its observers] nearer to God than taʿabbud, asceticism (tazahhud), and isolation (inqiṭāʿ).” That is, for the Ḥaver in 2.50, taʿabbud is associated with asceticism and withdrawal from human company in contrast to the observance of the commandments, including the Sabbath. It thus seems that while the Khazar King has general intensive devotion or religious performance in mind when he uses forms of the word taʿabbada,33 the Ḥaver uses the same term to designate a form of intensive worship, which is performed in ascetic isolation. Accordingly, when the Khazar King asks the Ḥaver to describe the “mutaʿabbid among you” in 2.81, he is asking about the most intensive worship in general afforded by Judaism. But the Ḥaver’s answer is directed at ascetic worship and removal from the world. This answer, half of which is dedicated to describing how no ascetic study or worship is possible “nowadays,” has no practical application for the Khazar King. Moreover, the Ḥaver’s opening in 3.1, which denigrates cutting oneself off from the world, and his later remarks against isolation seem at first glance to be merely a repetition or perhaps a slight elaboration of 2.50, where the Ḥaver already criticised asceticism at some length in favour of moderation. The King’s request for a description of “the actions of the good person of the present day” in 3.2 is thus likely a rephrasing of what he originally thought he was asking in 2.81; namely, for a practical description of ideal religious observance. Consequently, despite its prominence as the opening section of the central book of the Kuzari, the discussion in 3.1 appears to be a misunderstanding that is not relevant to the main themes of the dialogue. Accordingly, if 3.1 is a kind of answer to the Philosopher’s speech in 1.1, then it is so unbeknownst to the Khazar King, as well as, of course, to the Ḥaver himself, who was not present in 1.1. The perfect person—namely, the philosopher—described by the Philosopher in 1.1 is so because he has acquired “the natural, moral, intellectual, and practical virtues” (1) through “instruction and training” (2). Moreover, he has 33

There is no reason to think that other uses of the term imply asceticism or any kind of isolation from other people. First, the temple and the sacrifices would presumably involve other Khazars, many of whom eventually join the King in converting to Judaism (cf. Kuzari 1.1 and 2.1). Second, there is no indication that the King thinks the Karaites to be isolationist or ascetic.

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dedicated his entire body to conjoining with “a light belonging to the divine hierarchy called the Active Intellect” (3), which he accomplishes “after his soul has been purified of doubts and has acquired mastery of the sciences according to their true character” (4). He then becomes “like an angel. […] This is the level of the Active Intellect, an angel” (5). Angels, according to the philosopher, are “intellects devoid of matter,” and by unifying with them, the perfect somehow also separate from their matter (6). Once this unification has occurred, the perfect person “is not concerned about the extinction of his body and his organs (7). […] His soul delights in life because he becomes a part of the group that includes Hermes, Asclepius,” etc. (8).34 Compare this to the description in 3.1. “The mutaʿabbid among us […] loves the world and the lengthening of days because they lead him to gain the afterlife. […] He even reaches the degree of Enoch […] or the degree of Elijah” (8). The mutaʿabbid “becomes separated into the company of the angels.” He “does not feel alone in solitude and seclusion, rather they are his companionship”.35 He feels alone in public due to his loss of witnessing the kingdom of heaven […] One like this truly requires complete isolation (tafarrud), indeed they look on death as a boon, for then they arrive at the end—there is no hope for a greater rank than this” (5–7). The philosophers, too, “love isolation (tafarrud) so that their thoughts may be purified so as to produce true conclusions out of their opinions in order to reach certainty concerning their remaining doubts” (4). To be sure, this philosophical isolation is not a complete isolation, since the philosopher maintains the company of students who move him (or whom he moves—this is ambiguous) towards inquiry (al-baḥṯ) and recollection (al-taḏakkur). However, “nowadays (al-yawm) there is no hope for [attaining] the level of the isolated ones (afrād).” Only when the people of Israel are returned to their land and are prepared for prophecy can they benefit once again from isolating themselves (yatazahidūn) and living apart from civilization. Even then, they will not isolate themselves completely (lā mutafarridīn bi-l-ǧumlah), but join others like them to pursue the sciences and actions of the law. Yet this isolation is not possible “in this time and in 34

35

Kogan translation, 205. The philosopher’s speech in 1.1 begins with a discussion of God, then turns to a discussion of the cosmos, then to a discussion of the perfect person, and finally to a proscription for the Khazar King. My summary here is only of the discussion of the perfect person. The Arabic is ‫לוה בל הי אנסה‬ ̈ ‫ואלכ‬ ̇ ‫אלוחדה‬ ̈ ‫פלא יתסוחש פי‬. The final word, which I am reading as anasah, could possibly be read as ānisah, which Lane says could mean “a girl […] whose conversation or discourse, and nearness, are loved” (1:115). Ibn Tibbon has either ‫ צוותו‬or ‫ חברתו‬here, the second of which could work with ānisah. I think it quite unlikely, though perhaps intriguing, that Halevi has this meaning in mind.

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this place […] since so little science has been acquired and that science that is naturally innate (al-ʿilm al-maṭbūʿ) is absent” (1–2). Isolation “nowadays” leads only to illness and affliction, since one “does not conjoin with the divine light” (3), as the prophets did. Nor can one reach the sciences to which he can devote himself and in which he can delight all of his life “like the philosophers.” Instead, one who chooses isolation “nowadays” will find his life taxing and painful, full of longing for mundane things and regret about their absence, leading to further removal from the divine (al-amr al-ilāhī). The similarities between this account and that of 1.1 are, to be sure, only in externalities. Indeed, 3.1 says next to nothing about the internal process of conjunction or about what happens once the mutaʿabbid joins the company of the angels. Structurally, the account in 3.1 is divided into three sections: the first concerning the mutaʿabbid, the second the philosophers, and the third contrasting both with “nowadays.” The external characteristics of the Philosopher’s perfect man described in 1.1 are spread among all three sections. Like the philosopher of 1.1, the mutaʿabbid of 3.1 delights in life, joins the company of the angels, reaches the degree of prominent mutaʿabbidūn (Enoch and Elijah), and seeks separation from matter unto the point of death, without concern for his body. Yet it is the philosophers of 3.1, not, it seems, the mutaʿabbidūn, who are concerned with what the Philosopher in 1.1 called the purification of doubts and the mastery of the sciences. The situation “nowadays” is apparently contrasted with both the philosophers and the mutaʿabbidūn. Isolation is no longer an option because of the absence of prophecy (“ein ḥazon nifraṣ”)36 together with the sciences one learns through training and innate scientific ability. Viewed externally, both the philosopher and the mutaʿabbid appear similar in that they prefer a certain kind of isolation, indicated by forms of the Arabic tafarrud,37 eschew a different kind of isolation, described by the Arabic inqiṭāʿ min al-dunyā,38 and are not viable options “nowadays.” 36

37

38

1Sam 3:1. Abraham Bibago, perhaps with this passage of the Kuzari in mind, later uses this expression to refer to lack of philosophical activity in his time. See Bibago’s introduction to his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Yehuda Halper, “Bibago’s Introduction to His Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” Zutot 10 (2013): 7, 14. See 5–6 for my discussion of the possible influence of this passage of the Kuzari. Outside of this section, tafarrud (and its forms, but not firād or infirād) appears only in 3.73, where it refers to the imaginative forms prophets and some rabbis see “because of the strength of their tafarrud and the purity of their minds”  (‫אדהאנהם‬ ̇ ‫ואצפאء‬ ̇ ). Elijah is also named as an example in 3.73, suggest ‫לעטים תפרדהם‬ ing that these figures may be seeking to imitate or become mutaʿabbidūn. Note that the Philosopher in the Kuzari uses forms of farq for separation from matter in 1.1. Later in book 3 (section 23), the Ḥaver includes the munqaṭiʿūn along with dualists, masters of rūḥanīyāt, and those who burn their children in order to draw near to God; that

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Surprisingly, it is only the isolation of the mutaʿabbidūn, who thereby pursue unification with the divine realm, that can be compared to the intellectual separation described by the Philosopher in 1.1. The philosophers of 3.1 are said to pursue isolation, though not from their students, merely for the sake of examining their opinions so as to produce certainty out of their many doubts. Presumably this process has something to do with the philosophers’ pursuit of science mentioned later in 3.1. As for the other descriptions given in the third part of 3.1, including conjunction with the divine light, there is no reason to assume they are used with reference to the philosophers rather than the mutaʿabbidūn. In describing the mutaʿabbidūn, then, it seems the Ḥaver is, apparently unwittingly, associating the Philosopher’s philosophy with something more akin to a kind of mysticism. The isolation of the philosophers of 3.1 is an isolation of this world, and one undertaken—and, where necessary, broken—for purely pragmatic reasons. This distinction is reflected in the Ḥaver’s choice of examples in 3.1; namely, Enoch, Elijah, and Socrates. Both Enoch and Elijah, but especially Enoch, are associated in both Arabic and Hebrew literature with Hermes Trismegistus.39 Even Halevi’s friend, Abraham ibn Ezra, makes this association.40 One reason for this identification is undoubtedly biblical passages suggesting that both of these thinkers left the world for the divine realm: according to Genesis, “Enoch walked with God, and is not, because God took him,”41 while according to Second Kings, “Elijah went up in a storm heavenward.”42 If, as I claim, Halevi intends this kind of separation to be parallel to the Philosopher’s separation in 1.1, then he is granting this kind of activity a theoretical place in Judaism, even if it is a place that is no longer available to Jews, or anyone else, “nowadays.”

39

40 41 42

is, the munqaṭiʿūn are among the illegitimate seekers of God through ineffective theurgic acts. See Shlomo Pines, “On the Term Ruḥaniyyot and Its Origin and on Judah Halevi’s Doctrine” [Hebrew], Tarbiẓ 57 (1988): 524. Cf. van Bladel, The Arabic Hermes, passim, especially 183–84. See also Georges Vajda, “Idrīs,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (Brill Online, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_3491. On Elijah, especially for the occasional identification of Elijah with Enoch in Arabic literature, see Andrew Rippin, “Elijah,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE (Brill Online, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_26169. For Enoch as Hermes in Jewish sources, see Dov Schwartz, Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought [Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1999), 99, 281–82, and for later Jewish thinkers, especially Levi b. Abraham in Liwyat Ḥen, who also made this identification, see 246–48. See Idel, “Hermeticism and Judaism,” 62. Gen 5:24. 2Kgs 2:11. Cf. Kuzari 1.115.

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Unlike Enoch and Elijah, Socrates is down-to-earth. This is manifest in his death, which is by all accounts a normal death.43 Moreover, Socrates’s isolation is not a removal from the world. Indeed, according to the Ḥaver, Socrates apparently seeks (only) to free himself from distraction in favour of philosophical pursuits. Indeed, Socrates’s isolation does not seem to be a literal isolation, in the manner of Elijah’s time on Mount Sinai.44 Rather, he is surrounded by his students, “just like moneymakers (ǧamʿ al-māl) who only trade with those who do business, in order to make money.” Moneymakers do not, of course, make money in a vacuum, but require the company of others, particularly those able to do business. Indeed, one cannot speak of the isolation of moneymakers at all except insofar as they prefer not to pay attention to those who are unable or unwilling to do business. Socrates’s isolation must be similarly understood; that is, as an isolation through disregard of those uninterested in philosophy. Indeed, it is difficult to find Arabic sources about Socrates’s life that describe other forms of isolation; even accounts of his life that include a period of isolated asceticism, such as that of Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakarīyāʾ al-Rāzī, portray him as abandoning that kind of life, moving to the city and becoming a political thinker.45 Further, the Ḥaver’s quotations of Socrates begin “O nation” (yā qawm), suggesting that he is addressing the public, though as we shall see, perhaps only the philosophically inclined among the public. This limited social interaction between philosophers and students seeks to bring about inquiry (al-baḥṯ) and recollection (al-taḏakkur) for the sake of removing doubts in order to reach certainty. The Ḥaver’s wording here does not explicitly state that these philosophers actually acquire science or true knowledge in this way, but rather that the inquiry and recollection undertaken with the philosophers’ students is in pursuit of science and true knowledge. Indeed, the wording of the reference to science in the third part of 3.1 does not imply that the philosophers have attained it, only that no one “nowadays” can. What such inquiry and recollection could be is somewhat vague in the Ḥaver’s account, but it seems likely that these terms have a technical meaning that applies to Socrates and to philosophers like him. The term “inquiry” (al-baḥṯ) seems to be a rather general expression in Arabic literature, and it is usually not used to refer to a specific kind of inquiry. Etymologically, the term’s basic meaning is to dig or sift through dirt in the 43

44 45

The death of Socrates, described most prominently in Plato’s Phaedo, was a frequently described topos in Arabic wisdom literature, though not, as we saw in chapter 1, among the Jewish authors of this literature. See Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature, 67–86 and passim. 1Kgs 19. Cf. Kuzari 4.3. Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakarīyāʾ al-Rāzī, Rasāʿil falsafīyah, 99–101.

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hope of finding something worthwhile,46 and many of its uses in the Kuzari are directed towards scientific inquiry. Indeed, the term baḥṯ appears nineteen times in the Kuzari outside of 3.1, six times in the words of the Khazar King, twelve times in the words of the Ḥaver, and once in Halevi’s own words. The Khazar King generally associates baḥṯ with the removal of doubts and the formation of agreement. Thus in 1.62, the term appears with reference to philosophers who the King supposes have reached an agreement about the eternity of the world through baḥṯ. In 5.1, the term appears three times when the King seeks to be freed from his doubts about his faith.47 The Ḥaver also suggests that the term has to do with forming an agreement in 5.14, when he denigrates those philosophers who happen to be in agreement on the grounds that they are so because they are members of the same sect, “but not because of inquiry (baḥṯ) or conclusions that their views have reached.” That is, baḥṯ or reasoned conclusions would be legitimate grounds for agreement, far superior to philosophical sectarianism. Even so, the Ḥaver acknowledges that the philosophers “spend their days engaged in baḥṯ,” separating themselves from worldly concerns in order to do so (4.19). However, more often, the Ḥaver refers to the limitations of baḥṯ. In 2.26,48 baḥṯ and “using the intellect” are said to be inferior to “perfect received tradition” (qabūlan tāmman) for explaining the sacrifices. Indeed, the masters of spirits (al-ruḥanīyūn) erred in trying to use baḥṯ to explain sacrifices, miracles, and divine works (3.53); that is to say, it cannot uncover these things. Later, in a different statement in 5.14, the Ḥaver tells us that the Torah has removed the need for baḥṯ because it provides answers to many philosophical and physical questions. When applied to faith, the Ḥaver tells us in 5.21,49 baḥṯ can be helpful, but it is not sufficient on its own. In particular, “our minds are insufficient for baḥṯ about [God].” That is, God, philosophical questions, divine works and miracles, and many religious rituals are beyond any kind of baḥṯ. It is perhaps because of the limitations of baḥṯ that the rabbis of the Talmud, when they do encourage individuals to engage in it, do so in the form of parables that hide the secrets of the sciences from the masses (3.73). This kind of parabolic speech about science may also be behind the Ḥaver’s two uses of baḥṯ in connection with Sefer Yeṣirah in 4.25, though this is not made explicit. 46 47 48 49

See the entry on baḥṯ in Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, 8 vols. (London, 1863–1893; repr. Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1968), 1:155. The King’s other two mentions of baḥṯ, in 5.19, are requests to the Ḥaver to explain certain questions, but do not indicate what the baḥṯ is supposed to accomplish other than answering the question. The word baḥṯ appears twice in this paragraph. The word baḥṯ appears three times in this section.

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The most striking use of the term, however, is in Halevi’s introduction to the Kuzari. According to Halevi, the recurring dream of the angel prompted the Khazar King to “undertake a baḥṯ about the religions, and ultimately both he and the multitude of Khazars became Jews. Some of the arguments of the Ḥaver seemed persuasive to me.”50 It is clear from this passage that the Kuzari itself51 is the baḥṯ, or the record of the baḥṯ, undertaken by the Khazar King. That is, for Halevi, dialogue is a form of baḥṯ. Moreover, the dialogue of the Kuzari is one that removed the King’s doubts about Judaism, causing him to agree with the Ḥaver enough to convert to Judaism. The King asks the Ḥaver for descriptions of religion and science, but also seeks in the course of the dialogue to go beyond baḥṯ into the realm of the divine. It also seems that any secrets of the sciences that may be included in the Kuzari are enigmatic and difficult to access or to ascribe to Halevi. That is, the Kuzari itself is not only called a baḥṯ by Halevi, but it also appears to fit all of the various descriptions assigned to baḥṯ throughout the work. Socratic baḥṯ, as it were, is likely also dialogue. If it removes doubts about opinions in trying to reach agreement, then it fits the Ḥaver’s other description of Socratic activity in 3.1. Moreover, the limitations on baḥṯ imply that it is not a method for divine inquiry or even for certain physical inquiries. A Socratic thinker who only pursues baḥṯ might accordingly be expected to keep away from those areas of study. What of recollection (al-taḏakkur)? While nearly all of the uses of recollection in the Kuzari refer to prayer and ritual,52 Halevi himself clearly has a different meaning of recollection in mind in the opening sentence of his book: I was asked about whatever argumentation I had against those who differ with us, such as the philosophers and the adherents of [other] religions, as well as the dissenters who differ with the multitude [of Jews], and I recalled (taḏakkartu) what I had heard of the arguments of the [Jewish] sage, who was with the King of the Khazars when the latter adopted the religion of the Jews (some 400 years ago today) according to the testimony mentioned in the “Book of Histories.”53 Halevi’s mention of the timeframe indicates that his “recollection” of the events is not literal. Moreover, the Arabic expression “book of histories” (kitāb 50 51 52 53

I have made some modifications to the Kogan translation, 204. Or at least the first treatise, since the King converts to Judaism immediately after that. I shall discuss some instances of ḏikr, “remembrance,” below. Kogan translation, 203–204, emphasis added.

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al-tawārīḫ) tends to refer to accounts of dates and chronologies and never, to my knowledge, to dialogues.54 Indeed, it seems that Halevi is contrasting his work with a book of histories, implying that it is something else. It is possible that Halevi uses “recollection” to refer to the internal creative process by which he came up with the dialogue that makes up the Kuzari. That is, recollection here may be an internal process generating results that are not literally true, but still valuable; they are, perhaps, metaphorically true. We find a similar description of recollection associated with Socrates in al-Fārābī’s account of Plato’s Phaedo and Meno in his Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle: Learning is recollection (taḏakkur). [Plato] illustrates this by proofs he recounts from the questioning and answering Socrates had with Simmias on the subject of the equal and equality. That is, equality exists in the soul, and when a human being senses the equal—like a piece of wood or anything else equal to anything else—he recollects the equality that is in his soul and thus knows that this equal is equal only due to an equality similar to that existing in the soul. And likewise the rest of what he learns is only his recollecting what is in the soul.55 This argument, quoted here only in part, is the only argument in the Harmonization that is attributed to Socrates. Indeed, al-Fārābī warns against assigning it to Plato since it is not demonstrative.56 Taken on its own, it suggests a kind of Socratic method: a questioning and answering amongst people that seeks to 54

55

56

See F.C. de Blois, B. Van Dalen, R.S. Humphreys, Manuela Marin, Ann K.S. Lambton, Christine Woodhead, M. Athar Ali, J.O. Hunwick, G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, I. Proudfoot et al, “Ta‌ʾrīk̲h̲,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (Brill Online, 2012), http://dx.doi .org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_1184. Translated by Charles E. Butterworth in al-Fārābī, Alfarabi: The Political Writings: “Selected Aphorisms” and Other Texts (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 151. The Arabic text may be found in al-Fārābī, L’harmonie entre les opinions de Platon et d’Aristote: Texte arabe et traduction, ed. and trans. Fawzi Mitrī Najjar and Dominique Mallet (Damascus: Institut français de Damas, 1999), 117. Butterworth identifies the passages referred to as Phd. 72e–76c and Meno 81c–86c. The passage quoted here appears in connection with the Phaedo, but it is not very different from Farabi’s treatment of the Meno in the subsequent paragraph. Deborah L. Black treats Farabi’s various explanations of Meno’s paradox in detail in Black, “Al-Fārābī on Meno’s Paradox,” in In the Age of al-Fārābī: Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth Century, ed. Peter Adamson (London: Warburg Institute, 2008), 15–34. Farabi is especially concerned that the doctrine of recollection implies the eternity of the soul, though his wording is careful to leave it ambiguous here whether Socrates or Plato believed in the eternity of the soul. See al-Fārābī, Alfarabi: The Political Writings, 151, and al-Fārābī, L’harmonie entre les opinions de Platon et d’Aristote, 119–21.

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relate notions that are in the soul to things in the world. Socratic inquiry is thus an internal process, here called recollection, that is realised through dialogue with others. The relationship between the external objects and the recollected notions contained in the soul is one of “similarity” (šabīhah). That is, they are not identical, but they are like one another. Al-Fārābī’s Plato’s Socrates’s example of “equality” here highlights that the notion in the soul and the object in the world are not equal, but similar. That is, recollection does not produce truth simply, but a likeness of what is true.57 Did Halevi have al-Fārābī’s Harmonization in mind here? This cannot be known with certainty. However, if he did, it could be a source for his view of “recollection” as an internal process of coming to know, one associated with both dialogue and Socrates. Indeed, Socrates, according to al-Fārābī, helps Simmias to recollect the notion of equality through a process of questioning and answering. If Halevi’s Socrates indeed strives for this kind of recollection, then he is removed from the truth about the world, and indeed, his interactions with students would strive to attain a recollection of no more than a likeness of the world. We may summarise Socrates and the unnamed philosophers like him who are described in 3.1 as follows. They live in society, but dedicate their attention to other philosophers or students of philosophy. The philosophical activity described here concerns examining doubts with a view to removing those doubts so as to attain certainty. They do this through both baḥṯ and recollection, both of which probably involve dialogue amongst themselves. Baḥṯ seems to be limited and incapable of describing God, the divine science, or even much of physics. Recollection too, if understood according to Farabi’s Harmonization, may be achieved through dialogue, though it concerns internally understood notions and is also limited since it describes only likenesses.

57

An anonymous reader disagrees with this reading of al-Fārābī on the grounds that in the above-mentioned process “humans sense equality between objects […] because they possess a concept of equality that resembles extra-mental equality.” According to this reader, such “sensing” legitimately constitutes knowledge of truth, indeed the kind of knowledge on which Farabi builds his account of the intellect. The reader maintains that this is supported by Farabi’s use of “know” (ʿalima) in the quoted passage. However, it is not clear what such a “sense” could be other than recognition of likeness. Moreover, al-Fārābī here presents some of the views he attributes to Plato’s Socrates that he considers to be undemonstrated; should we expect him to build his own theory of the intellect on those views? Finally, al-Fārābī uses the word “know” (ʿalima) with reference to the recollector’s knowledge that extra-mental equality is similar to mentally possessed equality. That is, he knows there is a similarity between them; i.e., that they are not the same.

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The Socrates of Plato’s Apology?

2

The limitations on Socratic inquiry surface more clearly when the Ḥaver mentions Socrates again in 4.13 and 5.14. Both cases are nearly identical quotes that the Ḥaver attributes to Socrates. In what follows, I shall present the quotes, discuss possible sources of the original statement, and then turn to what the Ḥaver means by them in the context of his other statements. In 4.13, the Ḥaver says:







‫אלאלאהי ̈ה‬ ̇ ‫ יא קום אן חכמתכם‬,‫פמנצפוהם יקולון ללמתשרעין מא קאל סקראט‬  ‫הדה‬    .‫בחכמה אנסאני ̈ה‬ ̈ ‫ואנמא אנא חכים‬  ,‫ לכני אקול לסת אחצרהא‬,‫לסת אנכרהא‬

The most sincere58 of the [philosophers] would say to the adherents of the religious law that which Socrates said, “O Nation, this divine wisdom of yours—I do not contest it, but I say that I do not comprehend it. Indeed, I am wise with a human wisdom.” In 5.14, the Ḥaver says:





,‫אלא נסאני ̈ה כמא כאן יקול סקראט לאהל אתיניא‬ ‫באלחכמה‬ ̈ ‫ ̇צלוא‬‫נעם אנהם פ‬      ,‫לכני אקול אני לסת אחסנהא‬, ‫אלא לאהי ̈ה‬ ‫ לסת אנכר חכמתכם‬59‫יא קום אני‬     ‫אנסאני ̈ה‬ ‫בחכמה‬ ̈ ‫מא אנא חכים‬‫וא‬  

Indeed, [the philosophers have] an excellence in human wisdom, as Socrates said to the Athenian people, “O Nation, I do not contest your divine science, but I say that I do not have it. Rather, I am wise with a human wisdom.” The quotations from Socrates are too similar to be attributable to different sources, yet they are not identical. This suggests that the Ḥaver is not giving us an exact quotation, but more of a general impression of his words. Both forms of the statement appear to be based, perhaps quite indirectly, on Plato’s Apology 20d–e, where Socrates says:

58 59

Ibn Tibbon: ‫ ;המודה שבהם‬Qafah: ‫הכנים שבהם‬. The Baneth and Ben-Shammai edition has a šaddah over the alif, but this must be a mistake. Hartwig Hirschfeld’s earlier edition (Leipzig, 1887), though it has numerous other errors, has the šaddah over the nūn.

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ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι᾽ οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία: τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός. οὗτοι δὲ τάχ᾽ ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι For I, men of Athens, have acquired this reputation on account of nothing other than wisdom. What sort of wisdom? It is perhaps a human wisdom, for I run the risk of being wise in this manner. But perhaps these men about whom I was speaking just now are wise with a wisdom greater than that accorded to men, or I do not know what to say. I, for my part, do not understand that [wisdom].60 If Halevi’s Socrates’s denial of divine wisdom and embrace of human wisdom comes from this statement, then it neglects those sections of the Apology where Socrates attributes his pursuit of human wisdom to the urging of the Delphic oracle and his own personal demi-god (δαιμόνιον).61 It is also possible, though less likely, that the original source for Halevi’s statement is Plato’s Euthyphro 5e–6c, where Socrates confesses to Euthyphro that he knows nothing of the gods. Socrates’s repudiation of the knowledge of the divine in the Euthyphro mentions neither the Delphic oracle nor the demi-god. According to the second-century philosopher Numenius, who elsewhere compared Plato to Moses, the character of Euthyphro is a symbol representing Athenian popular religion.62 Such a source would explain how Socrates could address both the people of Athens and the followers of religious law. In fact, there are a number of Hellenistic and Roman thinkers who mention Socrates’s repudiation of physics and metaphysics in favour of some kind of human wisdom.63 Even those who mention the δαιμόνιον often allegorise its character in the

60 61 62

63

Plato, Platonis opera, ed. John Burnet, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1903), vol. 1, 20d–e; translation mine. Cf. Plato, Ap. 31d ff. See Numenius, Fragmenta, ed. Edouard des Places (Paris: Les belles lettres, 1973), fragment 23, 61–62. The fragment is found in the fourth-century Christian theologian Eusebius of Caesaria, Praep. Evang. 13.4–5. An English translation of the passage in question can be found in Peter van Nuffelen, Rethinking the Gods: Philosophical Readings of Religion in the Post-Hellenistic Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 74. See, e.g., Cicero, Tusc. 5.11, Rep. 1.16; Sextus Empiricus, Against Professors, 7.8. See discussion of these sources and others in A.A. Long, “Socrates in Later Greek Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, 358–59.

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direction of intellectualism.64 It is thus entirely possible—indeed, I think it is quite likely—that whatever the original source for Socrates’s statement in the Kuzari was, it made no mention of his claimed interactions with the divine, the most famous of which is the δαιμόνιον. Socratic quotes very similar to those found in the Kuzari also appear in al-Fārābī’s Book of Demonstration and Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Parva naturalia.65 The former may well be Halevi’s direct source, but both are instructive about how this statement was understood in contemporary falsafa. Al-Fārābī’s quotation of Socrates is intended to support his claim that divination (al-ilhām) is not sufficient for forming demonstrative assent (taṣdīq). Al-Fārābī says:

‫ف ن خّ ذ‬ ‫تف ف‬ ‫ن ن‬ ‫��ا ���ة �ع�مّ�ا �م ك ن ف‬ ‫ن نق‬ ‫ف ف �ة خ‬ ‫ ب�ل ا �م�ا �����ول‬,� ‫�� ن� ا � ي������ع�ل�ه ا ���س�ا‬ ‫��ل������ل �ه�� ا لم� ن� �������ل��س� ا �ل������ل��س��� ا �ل ر ج‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ن ن‬ ‫ا�� ف� ا �ل��ف��� ف‬ ‫خ‬ ‫�ل��س����ة ا �ت�ل� �ت ش���ت�� ع��ل ا �ل���م�ع��ق�� لا ت‬ ‫� ن ن ذ ف� ت‬ � ‫�ل�م الا ���س�ا �ى ا �ل�د ل ى‬ ‫و‬ ‫ح��ي����ا �ه�� ا ى ا ��ل��ع� ي‬ ‫ى مل ى‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ �ه ا �ت�ل� ���ق�� ف����ه�ا � ق‬,‫الا �ن��س�ا ن����ة‬ ‫ح��ت����ا ��ه ع��ل ؤ‬ � ‫�س��را ط �ع ن���د ا‬ ‫ “ي�ا‬:‫ر���س�ا ء ا�ه�ل �م�د ي�ن���ة ا���ي ن���ة‬ ‫ج‬ ‫ج‬ �‫ي و ى ى ي ول ي‬ ‫ى‬ ‫ذ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫�ة‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ت‬ ‫�ت‬ ‫ن‬ � ‫�قو ا �نى �ل����س� ت� ا �قول ا ن� ح �ك‬ � ‫ و�ل�ك�ى ا ول �ل����س�� ا‬,‫� �ه�� ه الا ��ل�ه��ي� ا�مر ب�ا ط�ل‬ .‫ح����س����ه�ا‬ ‫�م� ك‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ذ‬ ‫ذ‬ ‫نم ق‬ ‫ن ف‬ ‫ح �ك �ة ن م ن �ة‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ذ ت‬ �‫�� ���م ب‬ � �‫�ل� ا �ل�� �ي‬ � ‫�ل� ا �ل�� ��ي‬ ‫وا �م�ا ا �ول ا �ى ح ك �ي‬ ‫كلا �م���ا ���ي�ه �هو ا ��ل��ع� مي‬ ‫” و�ه�� ا ا ��ل��ع� مي‬. ��‫�م� ا ���س�ا �ي‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�ة ن �ة‬ 66. ��‫�و� ب�م�� خ��ا ط��ب� ا ���س�ا ن�ي‬ ‫ي� ك‬ So let us leave this [sc. divination] to those who practice the sort of philosophy which is outside what it is possible for a human being to

64

65

66

Especially Plutarch; cf. Christopher Pelling, “Plutarch’s Socrates,” Hermathena 179 (2005): 105–39, especially 125–36. Plutarch’s contemporary Epictetus may have believed the δαιμόνιον to be pure intellect. See Long, “Socrates in Later Greek Philosophy,” 374 ff., and see there also for other thinkers who took up this line of thought. That these are all probably referring to the same original quotation was noticed as early as the fifteenth century by Simon b. Ṣemaḥ Duran; see Magen avot (Jerusalem: 2006/7), 22. Duran goes on to Judaise both Aristotle and Plato, claiming that the former staunchly defended Jewish religious law and that the latter turned to Jewish ways of uniting with the Active Intellect, which he saw as beyond human capabilities. Duran’s Plato is not incompatible with that of Halevi’s Philosopher in Kuzari 1.1. Gabriel Danzig refers to this passage in Duran in Danzig, “Socrates in Hellenistic and Medieval Jewish Literature, with Special Regard to Yehuda Hallevi’s Kuzari,” in Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment, 156. Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-burhān wa kitāb šarāʾiṭ al-yaqīn: Suivis des gloses d’ibn Bāja sur le Burhān, ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut: Dar El-Machreq, 1986), 82. On the dissemination of al-Fārābī’s works, particularly his logical works, among Arabic-speaking Andalusian Jews in Halevi’s time, see Ariel Malachi, “Rationalism and Philosophy in Judah Halevi’s Thought: Between Logic, Epistemology and Revelation in the Kuzari” (PhD diss., Bar Ilan University, 2017), 64–71, esp. 65 n. 257. Still, as Malachi notes, we cannot be certain that Halevi read the Book of Demonstration.

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do. Rather, we are now only discussing this in the case of the human instruction which is included within philosophy, and which consists of human intelligibles. This is also what Socrates was speaking about in his Apology to the leaders of the people of the city of Athens: “Oh people, I do not say that this divine wisdom of yours is a futile thing, I say only that I am not worthy of it; for I say only that I am wise with a human wisdom. So this instruction with which our discussion is concerned is the instruction which takes place through human discourse.”67 Al-Fārābī's Socrates epitomizes how philosophers like al-Fārābī himself disregard claims made by divination and instead focus on human intelligibles. Moreover, these intelligibles come to light through “human discourse.” The word for discourse, mukhāṭaba, can refer either to speeches, such as that presented in the Apology, or to interactive dialogue, such as we find in Plato’s other dialogues.68 Averroes attributes a very similar remark to Socrates in his comments on Aristotle’s On Prophecy in Dreams, again in connection with making conclusions based on the divine.69 Averroes’s version of the statement, if it does not draw on al-Fārābī’s statement above, must ultimately be derived from the same source. Yet unlike al-Fārābī, Averroes is not willing to rule out all divination and prophecy offhand, but instead provides an argument for how the human intellect can receive intelligibles from the Active Intellect during sleep and bodily inactivity. That is, Averroes mentions Socrates in order to dismiss him by giving an apparently philosophical account of how divination in dreams can be a legitimate interaction with the Active Intellect. Averroes thus contrasts Socrates not only with the religious view, but also with what he takes to be an Aristotelian view. Despite this difference between them, it is clear that both al-Fārābī and Averroes see Socrates as a non-religious philosopher—one who declines to speculate about God and theological matters. There is no trace of any divine inspiration claimed by Greek and Roman accounts of Socrates in the Socrates of al-Fārābī and Averroes.70 67 68 69 70

Translated by Deborah Black in “Al-Fārābī on Meno’s Paradox.” Black compares this statement with al-Fārābī’s treatment of Meno’s paradox in the Harmonization quoted above but is not interested in distinguishing al-Fārābī’s Socrates. In the Kuzari, in contrast to al-Fārābī, the word is used for prophetic speech from God, e.g., to Israel at Sinai or to Moses. See, e.g., the beginnings of 1.95 and 1.99. See chapter 3 below. Al-Fārābī does, of course, refer to Plato as “divine” in, e.g., the title of the Harmonization, but we have no reason to think that he identified Plato and Socrates. Even the critique of religious syllogisms that is attributed to Plato’s Euthyphro does not mention Socrates,

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The Ḥaver, whose Socrates is clearly taken either from al-Fārābī himself or from a source common to al-Fārābī (and probably to Averroes as well), distinguishes Socrates from the religious view (as in al-Fārābī) and also from the view of other philosophers (similar to Averroes). These two distinctions set Socratic philosophy apart as unique. As in 3.1, the Khazar King shows no interest in Socrates, and the Ḥaver’s mention and then quotations of Socrates are slipped in with almost no comment. The Ḥaver’s first quotation of Socrates occurs in the context of distinguishing the adherent of the religious law (al-mutašarriʿᶜ) from the philosopher (wa-l-mutafalsif ) in 4.13. While the adherent of the religious law seeks the Lord for many reasons, the philosopher is only interested in scientific knowledge (ʿilm) of the deity. All of his scientific inquiries, especially astronomy, are for the sake of “a science of things as they truly are so that he may become like the Active Intellect and become one thing.”71 While the philosopher is said not to care about righteousness and heresy, he does in fact have belief (iʿtiqād, the same word used for religious belief). His beliefs include God’s moral indifference to man72 and the eternity of the world. The Ḥaver urges the Khazar King not to place too much blame on the philosophers, since “they were only able to approach the divine science through reasoning (qiyās)73 and this is where their reasoning led them.” This is not the same as saying that the philosophers have actually attained proficiency in divine science. Rather, it seems to suggest that they have formed their beliefs on the basis of reasoned inferences, or, as he suggests elsewhere, on the basis of traditions ultimately derived from the line of Shem. Halevi mentions Socrates here in order to contrast him with the followers of religious law (al-mutašarriʿīn), insofar as he denies understanding their divine wisdom. Yet his reluctance to contest this wisdom also sets him apart from the other philosophers. After all, the other philosophers were willing to

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but presents the discovery of the inadequacy of religious arguments as Plato’s own. See al-Fārābī, De Platonis philosophia, ed. Franz Rosenthal and Richard Walzer (London: Warburg Institute, 1943), Arabic section, 6–7; English translation in Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, 55–56. Comparing this section with the mention of Socrates in al-Fārābī’s Book of Demonstration further emphasises the extent to which Socrates’s professed ignorance about the divine in the latter differs from Plato’s denigration of religious theology in the former. Note that al-Fārābī himself is willing to lend explicit written support only to the position he attributes to Socrates.      .‫ עלי חקאיקהא יתשבה באלעקל אלפעאל פיציר הו הו‬‫עלם אלאשיא‬ See n. 3 above. On the variety of meanings of qiyās, see Diana Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah Ha-Levi’s Kuzari (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000), 55–88. See also 68–70 for the philosophical meaning of qiyās and its use in this context.

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express their beliefs in, for example, God’s indifference to man and the eternity of the world. Socrates joins the most sincere philosophers either by not stating his beliefs or by suspending his judgment about metaphysical matters. If the fault of the other philosophers is that they pursued qiyās beyond the limits of human reasoning,74 then Socrates is differentiated from all other philosophers insofar as he refuses to express opinions concerning those things of which he is ignorant; namely, divine things. That Socrates is called “sincere” may suggest that he holds to philosophy more steadfastly than the other philosophers, who take philosophical conclusions and add to them their own opinions.75 74 75

On Halevi’s attacks on qiyās, especially on philosophical overreach, see Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 68–77. Leo Strauss suggests that Socrates’s statement as quoted in the Kuzari is not a testament to Socratic ignorance of divine wisdom, but “a polite expression of his rejection of that wisdom.” See Strauss, “The Law of Reason in the Kuzari,” 106–8, especially 107, n. 33. Strauss refers to a kind of Socratic irony here, which seems to be due to the following: Socrates is set in motion by the oracle at Delphi and uses his philosophical inquiries to refute all claims to knowledge in Athens; his subsequent claim of ignorance includes knowledge not only of his own ignorance, but also of the ignorance of the religious citizens of Athens. That is, he goes “so far as to deny the very possibility of Divine revelation in the precise sense of the term.” Ironically, he is spurred by the oracle to deny revelation. Strauss notes: “Those who do not think that Halevi noticed Socrates’ irony, are requested to disregard this paragraph which is based on the assumption, in itself as indemonstrable as theirs, that he did notice it.” The paragraph in question, which spans nearly two pages, argues that the absence of the Philosopher in the majority of the Kuzari could be intended “to compel the reader to think constantly of the absent philosopher, i.e., to find out, by independent reflection, what the absent philosopher might have to say.” That is, “if Halevi were a philosopher,” the Kuzari would have been constructed in such a way that the reader himself would have to construct his own refutation of religion philosophically. The reader who fully engages philosophy in this way seems to me to meet the requirements for the “influence of philosophy” that Strauss lists in the following paragraph (108–9), an influence which necessarily entails a “conversion to philosophy.” “If Halevi were a philosopher,” according to Strauss, the Kuzari would consist of an examination of “the representatives of various beliefs” (106), leading the reader to construct a philosophical refutation of all of those beliefs and to convert to philosophy. As I see it, Strauss sets up the possibility for two ways of reading the Kuzari: the first is that of the reader who assumes that Halevi is not a philosopher; accordingly, the dialogue is a refutation of philosophy and a conversion to Judaism. The second is that of the reader who assumes that Halevi is a philosopher; accordingly, the reader refutes the religious arguments and converts to philosophy. This second reading is, in fact, parallel to Strauss’s description of Plato’s Apology (105–6), where “Socrates discovered the secret of the oracle”—i.e., that the religious accounts are not true—“by examining the representatives of various types of knowledge.” The parallel to Socrates is not the King, who ultimately converts to Judaism, but the reader, spurred not by an oracle or even by an angelic dream, but by Halevi’s account of the angelic dream and the subsequent dialogue. For Strauss, then, Halevi’s

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The Ḥaver’s presentation of Socrates in 5.14 sharpens the distinction between Socrates and other philosophers. After the Ḥaver’s long exposition of philosophical views about science, the intellect, and the soul in previous sections of book 5, the Khazar King finds himself inclining towards the philosophers’ views. The Ḥaver rebukes the King and says that the philosophical views (ārāʾihim) are tempting because “the demonstration (al-burhān) about the propaedeutic sciences and logic has been verified by the [philosophers]. So people consider everything they said about physics and metaphysics to be good and think that everything they said is demonstration (burhān).” That is, according to the Ḥaver, philosophy has achieved real certainty in the basic sciences, probably mathematics and astronomy, as well as logic, but philosophy is nevertheless inadequate to fully address physics and metaphysics. In what follows, the Ḥaver presents a fairly extensive critique of Aristotelian physics, centred on a critique of the four elements. The Ḥaver builds this critique on the Khazar King’s own doubts and ends it with the pronouncement that baḥṯ about these matters is impossible, if only because human life is too short to be well spent in the infinite complexities of these problems. He instead recommends assuming the truth of physical descriptions in the Bible and rabbinic texts so as to reach better conclusions about the elements and the physical world. The Ḥaver gives a similar critique of human knowledge of the intellect as opposed to that provided through prophecy. In the course of this critique, the Ḥaver explicitly questions how the intellect can be separate from the body and how it can unite with other intellects, including those of other philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. These were, of course, central tenets of the Philosopher’s description in 1.1, and the Ḥaver is quite clearly dismissing that account of philosophy here by casting it into doubt. Indeed, doubt and lack of agreement are the central problems plaguing the philosophers. This Kuzari is not a Socratic dialogue, but creates a Socratic dialogue in the mind of a certain kind of reader. Strauss’s view of Halevi’s Socrates is intriguing and in many ways quite beautiful, but it should be clear by this point that it does not reflect Halevi’s knowledge of Socrates. In particular, we have no evidence that Plato’s Apology was available to Halevi, nor do we have evidence that Halevi knew of Socrates’s interactions with the oracle at Delphi or even Socrates’s δαιμόνιον. (On distinguishing Strauss’s meaning in this article from what he takes to be Halevi’s, see Kenneth Hart Green, “Religion, Philosophy, and Morality: How Leo Strauss Read Judah Halevi’s Kuzari,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61 [1993]: 225–73.) See the appendix to this chapter below for my take on the relationship between Socratic dialogues and Halevi’s dialogue. See also Yehuda Halper, “God, Δαιμόνιον, and ‘The Absent Philosopher’: Constructing a Socratic Dialogue between Halevi and His Readers according to Leo Strauss’ ‘The Law of Reason in the Kuzari,’” Daʿat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah 88 (2019): 191–204.

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is manifest in the numerous philosophical sects that cannot agree with each other; the Ḥaver mentions “the sect of Pythagoras, the sect of Empedocles, the sect of Plato, and the sect of Aristotle,” but he is particularly critical of the sect of Aristotle, especially Aristotelian physics and metaphysics. The Ḥaver’s solution to philosophical disagreement is to accept prophecy and to rely on the agreement that comes through religious law and received traditions. Yet Socrates’s appearance in this paragraph suggests another possible solution that the Ḥaver does not make explicit. The Ḥaver admits that philosophers have attained “excellence in human wisdom” and uses Socrates to epitomise this view. It is clear that this wisdom, since it is humanly attainable and also excellent, cannot include physics or metaphysics. It seems more likely that it includes “the propaedeutic sciences and logic,” since these were said to have been attained with certainty. At the end of the passage, the Ḥaver praises the philosophers for establishing intellectual nomoi and for isolating themselves from the world. This may mean that Socrates’s human wisdom includes a kind of political and legal wisdom. The mention of philosophical isolation recalls 3.1, and may be referring to the Socratic method of inquiry and recollection for removing doubts. In any case, we are left with a Socrates who, unlike the other philosophers, does not propose physical or metaphysical theories, but rather sticks to those things that are within the purview of human knowledge. Socrates’s abstinence from physics and metaphysics is not simply a matter of political prudence: instead, it involves not extending human reasoning beyond its limitations; namely, beyond the study of human things. Thus, the Ḥaver uncovers another kind of philosophy when he places the difference between the philosophers and the religious in their treatment of things that are beyond human knowledge. The philosophers, who are divided into sects, try to extend their qiyās beyond its limitations, thereby overreaching beyond human knowledge. The religious rely on prophecy and received tradition in order to describe and understand the physical and metaphysical world beyond human grasp. The Socratics, however, apparently accept only that of which they are certain in philosophy, including the propaedeutic sciences, logic, and possibly also the intellectual nomoi. They do not follow the religious; rather, it would appear, they suspend their judgment about physics and metaphysics. As philosophers, we learned in 3.1, they undertake a kind of isolation with their students and turn to the pursuit of science through resolving doubts using inquiry (baḥṯ) and recollection, both of which may refer to dialogue. The Ḥaver does not elaborate on this Socratic philosophy too much, probably because the Khazar King has no interest in it. Such a suspension of judgment would directly conflict with the King’s dream and the intellectual nomoi would presumably be of little use in governing Khazaria. So long as the

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Socratics and their students pursue isolation, they are of little interest or threat to the King.

Appendix: Is the Kuzari a Socratic Dialogue?

Is the Kuzari a Socratic dialogue?76 The answer is clearly no. Insofar as the book is a “Refutation of the Proofs against the Humiliated Faith,”77 it is not willing to suspend judgment or even refrain from speaking about divine matters. However, there are some Socratic elements to the book. We have already observed that Halevi refers to the dialogue in the book as a baḥṯ and that he mentions his own recollection of it. We can add that the book also purports to be an apology (iḥtiǧāǧ), the same word used to describe Plato’s Apology in the passages from al-Fārābī’s Book of Demonstration and Averroes’s Commentary on the Parva naturalia mentioned above.78 More significantly, the dialogue form seems centred around eliciting agreement between the interlocutors, an agreement reached by resolving doubts. This is certainly present in the beginning of the Kuzari, but the work ends with a very significant disagreement: whether or not 76

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This question has been raised numerous times, but usually it takes the form “Is the Kuzari a Platonic dialogue?” Salo Baron (“Yehudah Halevi: An Answer to an Historic Challenge,” Jewish Social Studies 3 [1941]: 257) calls the work a “Platonic dialogue,” though he does not identify anything “Platonic” about it other than the dialogue form. Leo Strauss (“The Law of Reason in the Kuzari,” 104 n. 27) attributes the Platonic character to the uneven intellectual capabilities of the interlocutors. Aryeh Motzkin (“Halevi’s Kuzari as a Platonic Dialogue,” in Aryeh Leo Motzkin, Philosophy and the Jewish Tradition, ed. Yehuda Halper [Leiden: Brill, 2011], 19–35) points out the absence of an authorial voice in both Platonic dialogues and Halevi’s Kuzari (outside of the introductions to 1.1 and 2.1), as well as the difficulty of attributing a final position to either Plato or Halevi on the basis of the dialogues alone. Aaron W. Hughes (“The Art of Philosophy: The Use of Dialogue in Halevi’s Kuzari and Abravanel’s Dialoghi d’amore,” Medieval Encounters 13 [2007]: 470–98), however, situates Halevi’s use of the dialogue form in relation to contemporary Christian and Islamic dialogues and contrasts it to later uses of dialogue, e.g., Judah Abravanel’s Dialoghi d’amore, that were influenced, to some degree, by Platonic dialogues. This is the original title of the work called Sefer hakuzari by Judah ibn Tibbon. See Moritz Steinschneider, The Hebrew Translations of the Middle Ages and the Jews as Transmitters, ed. Charles H. Manekin, Y. Tzvi Langermann, and Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 117. In al-Fārābī’s Philosophy of Plato, al-Fārābī also refers to a book known as the Iḥtiǧāǧ suqrāṭ ʿalā ahl āṯīnīyah (De Platonis philosophia, 18). In the previous paragraph, al-Fārābī refers to Kitāb iʿtiḏār suqrāṭ, which he also identifies with Plato’s Crito. It is not clear how much al-Fārābī knew about these works. His description of what he refers to as the Crito seems to fit what we know as the Apology. It is also possible that he considered all three titles to refer to a single work.

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Judaism requires the land of Israel for its realisation. This disagreement quite literally disrupts the work, as the Ḥaver leaves the Khazar King in order to set out for Israel.79 It is clear that this disagreement is political at its root. The King is willing to accept the Ḥaver’s arguments, but is surprised that he would be willing to give up his freedom. The Ḥaver’s response that by going to Israel he will free himself from service (or slavery, ʿubūdīya) to the many and to their will suggests that he is pursuing a kind of isolation. The King’s different social position probably explains why he is not persuaded by the Ḥaver’s claims: The King is already free and does not see himself as following the will of his people, but rather as the one whose will is followed even to the point of mass conversion to Judaism. Moreover, if the Khazar King were to move to Israel, he would not pursue isolation, but rather religious war, so long as the Khazars continued to follow their king. In Israel, the Ḥaver says, he will pursue the divine actions, particularly those that can be performed in Israel, as well as remembrance. The Ḥaver uses only Hebrew terms, zikaron and nizkar, to explain this “remembrance.” Is zikaron the Hebrew equivalent of the Arabic taḏakkur, which I translated as “recollection” above? According to the Ḥaver, remembrance is not reminding (taḏkīr) others or even oneself of God, but is rather intended to work with and perfect one’s own intention (al-niyyah); that is, it too is a fundamentally internal process. However, unlike taḏakkur, zikaron is performed through certain actions. It is thus similar to the Sufi practice of ḏikr.80 Unlike Socrates, who pursues a kind of isolation for the sake of taḏakkur and baḥṯ, the Ḥaver is going to Israel to pursue a kind of isolation for the sake of ḏikr and action. Ultimately, then, the Ḥaver’s Judaism is not suitable for the Khazar King for the same reason that Socratic philosophy is not suitable; namely, it pursues its goals in a different manner from that of the general run of Jewish people. The Khazar King is seeking a religion for his people, but the Ḥaver’s religion can only fully operate in Israel when the Jews have political and divine sovereignty. The Kuzari thus ends with a kind 79

80

Daniel Lasker, however, argues that in fact, there is no disagreement here. According to Lasker, because the Khazar King converted to Judaism and was not born Jewish, he “simply did not see himself in exile.” Further, “from Judah Halevi’s point of view, there was no reason why the king should go the Land of Israel.” See Lasker, “Proselyte Judaism, Christianity, and Islam in the Thought of Judah Halevi,” Jewish Quarterly Review 81 (1990): 80–82. Ḏikr in the Kuzari is discussed in Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 192–93 n. 48. For the general Sufi context, see L. Gardet, “D̲ h̲ ikr,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition (Brill Online, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0162. For ḏikr in Avicenna’s concept of prayer and in Maimonides, see Steven Harvey, “Avicenna and Maimonides on Prayer and Intellectual Worship,” in Exchange and Transmission across Cultural Boundaries: Philosophy, Mysticism and Science in the Mediterranean World, ed. Haggai Ben Shammai, Saul Shaked, and Sarah Stroumsa (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 2013), 82–105, especially 95 n. 34.

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of irony. The Ḥaver convinces the King and the Khazars to convert to Judaism, but they do not ultimately adopt the Ḥaver’s form of Judaism. If the Ḥaver’s Judaism can only be observed in Israel and with a certain degree isolation, then the mainstream Judaism of Halevi’s time in a way more closely resembles the Judaism of the Khazars than that of the Ḥaver. The disagreement with which the Kuzari ends is one that pervades Judaism.

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Chapter 3

Socratic Scepticism and the Problem of Akrasia according to Averroes Did Averroes read Plato’s Socratic dialogues? If he did, he has little to say about Socrates’s role in them. Even in his Commentary on Plato’s Republic, the name Socrates appears only once, and only in connection with his unusual death; that is, not in connection with any of the explicit events or discussions in the Republic. Nevertheless, there are indications in other works that Averroes had some knowledge of the Socrates of Plato’s Republic and also that of Plato’s Apology. Yet this knowledge need not have come directly from Plato’s works, but could have been taken from summaries or other works on Plato that are now mostly lost. Often, Averroes’s understanding of Socrates comes from Aristotle, particularly the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics. Yet even in his interpretations of Aristotle, we shall see that Averroes’s understanding of Socratic philosophy is often affected by the idiosyncrasies of the Arabic translators. As a result, Averroes’s Socrates is neither Plato’s Socrates nor Aristotle’s Socrates, but Averroes’s own Socrates. This Socrates is sceptical about beliefs in the divine and, in general, he questions many of the commonly held beliefs of the ancient Athenians. In the Middle Commentary on the Topics, Socrates is a dialectical disputant; in the Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric, he is an orator; and in the Middle Commentary on the Poetics, he appears as a writer of scientific poems.1 However, throughout, Averroes’s Socrates is above all interested in ethical matters. Moreover, he is a denier of akrasia, the notion that one can know the good and not do it. By examining Averroes’s disparate portrayals of Socrates in his various works with special attention to the Middle Commentaries on the 1 We shall discuss Socrates as a dialectician and orator in more detail below. In the Middle Commentary on the Poetics, Averroes includes Socrates’s statements alongside those of Empedocles among metered statements that do not include poetic representation. See Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 1999), 64–65: “Frequently, statements called poems have nothing poetic about them but meter, as with the measured [= metered] statements of Socrates and the statements of Empedocles about natural phenomena. These are unlike the poems of Homer, for both things [viz. meter and representation] are to be found in them.” Aristotle, in Poet. 1447b11, did note that Socratic dialogues (τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους) do not have much in common with the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, though he does not say that the Socratic dialogues were metered.

© Yehuda Halper, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004468764_005

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Rhetoric and Ethics, we shall see that Averroes has a unified view of Socrates that ties these stances together. Indeed, Socrates’s scepticism about commonly held beliefs and his denial of akrasia encourage a philosophical inquiry akin to what we find in Plato’s Apology: questioning commonly held beliefs about the good while striving to find the true good, with the understanding that knowing the good will ipso facto lead to doing the good. Moreover, Averroes’s Socrates identifies knowledge with virtue in all instances, implying that knowing the good is doing the good and suggesting that inquiry into virtue is itself virtuous. Still, this inquiry resulted in Socrates suffering the greatest harm: death. That is, Socrates’s death itself is an argument against his denial of akrasia, since in Averroes’s view, he chose to die when he realised he could not attain true virtue. As we shall see, Socrates’s knowledge of the good was accompanied by a realisation of the impossibility of doing the good, in response to which he chose death. Averroes not only follows Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in critiquing the denial of akrasia, he even implies that the religious law helps with the kind of non-intellectual persuasion necessary for inculcating good habits that allow good behaviour. Following the law and being persuaded by it in one’s own way, according to one’s manner of being persuaded, allows one to avoid Socrates’s fate. The division of society by method of persuasion that we find in Averroes’s Decisive Treatise is, we shall see, at least in part an answer to Socrates’s death. As Averroes’s writings were translated into Hebrew in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, medieval Jews who had no access to Socrates through Plato or Aristotle could read about him in Averroes. As Averroes became the primary source for Aristotelian philosophy among medieval Jews,2 he would have supplied the most detailed philosophical account of Socrates and Socratic philosophy available to the Hebrew reader. Averroes’s depiction of Socrates would likely have influenced all other philosophical Jewish interpretations until Marsilio Ficino’s translation of Plato’s dialogues into Latin. 1

Plato’s Socrates in Averroes

What is perhaps most striking about Averroes’s Commentary on the Republic is that Socrates is nearly entirely absent from it. While Plato is frequently mentioned and alluded to throughout the text, the only mention of Socrates occurs in a discussion of the benefits of euthanising, or not healing, anyone with “a 2 See Steven Harvey, “Islamic Philosophy and Jewish Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, 349–69.

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chronic defect that cannot be cured […] even if it were possible to keep him alive through medicines but [at the cost of] his no longer participating in any of the City’s affairs.” This is justified as follows: This is because with the disappearance of a being’s end, for the sake of which it was brought into being, there is no [longer any] difference between its nonexistence and its existence. Hence Socrates chose death over life when he saw that it was impossible for him to live a human life. And since every one of the people was only brought into being that he might live as a part of this city so that he undertake some action for it, with the disappearance of this usefulness from him, death is better for him than life.3 Aside from its appalling medical advice, this passage does not tell us much about Socrates. We do, however, get a sense of the confidence Averroes’s Socrates has in his way of life. Once it is no longer possible to maintain it, he chooses to die. Averroes does not tell us anything about Socrates’s way of life here, but it is clear that in the absence of his original pursuit, he does not see any better option than dying. Socrates’s death is not explicitly mentioned in the Republic and Averroes’s source here seems to be Plato’s Apology, or, as is more likely, another account of Socrates’s death, perhaps even from the kinds of legendary material discussed above in chapter 1. However, in the Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, Averroes appears to have more detailed knowledge of the Socrates of Plato’s Republic. There, Averroes describes Socrates as a disputant in dialectical discussion with “Thrasymachus the sophist” about justice and good choices.

3 Averroes, Averroes on Plato’s Republic, trans. Ralph Lerner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), 32. The Arabic original of this commentary is not extant. The text survives only in the fourteenth-century Hebrew translation by Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles. For the Hebrew, see Averroes, Averroes’s Commentary on Plato’s Republic, ed. and trans. E.I.J. Rosenthal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 37–38: ‫מי שבו מום קבוע אי אפשר שיתרפא […] [הרופא] יבשר [אותו] […] ואם היה אפשר בו‬ ‫שיחיה בתרופה מבלעדי שיעשה מעשה ממעשי המדינה הנה זה אשר יסבור אותו אפלטון‬ ]…[ ‫בבעלי המומין וזה שמי שלא יתכן אצלו שיהיה בכל המעלות אמתי הנה לא יחוייב שירפא‬ ‫ לפיכך‬.‫וזה שכל נמצא כשיעדר התכלית אשר בעבורו נתהוה הנה אין הבדל בין העדרו ומציאותו‬ ‫ ולמה שהיה כל‬.‫בחר סוקראט המות על החיים כשראה שאי אפשר לו שיחיה חיים אנושיים‬ ‫אחד מהאנשים אמנם התהוה לחיות חלק מזאת המדינה עד שיעמוד ממנה במעשה מה שיהיה‬ .‫בהעדר ממנו זה התועלת המות טוב לו מהחיים‬

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Socratic Scepticism and the Problem of Akrasia

Topic 39. We consider: if the species has an opposite and the genus has an opposite and the more virtuous species is placed in the less virtuous genus, then [that which is placed as a genus] is not [its] genus. Through this topic, Socrates forced Thrasymachus the sophist into error in the Book of Politics. For, since justice is the opposite of injustice and good choice is the opposite of bad choice, and justice is better than injustice and good choice is better than bad choice, [Socrates] forced him into dispute and rebuke because he took justice to be the genus of bad choice.

83

‫أن ن أ ف ن‬ ‫ث ن‬ ‫ض‬ � ‫وا لمو��ع ا �لت��ا ��سع وا �لث��لا �و� �هو � � �ت�� �م�ل ��ا‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ �‫� �ل��لن� ض ��د � ��� ض ��د ض � ا �لن‬ ‫كاأ ف� وع � ف ول��ل�� ج ن��س � أ وو�فع وع‬ ���‫ال� � ض����� �م ن���ه���م�ا � ا �ل����� ال� خ��� ��ل‬ ‫ن ل � ي� ج ض س أ ز قس �ي س خ أ‬ �‫ و�م� ن� �ه��ذا ا لمو�� � �ل� ��س��را ط ا �ل���ط‬.‫ب ج�����س‬ ‫ع م‬ ‫ف ت‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ,‫كا ب� ا �ل����سي���ا ��س��ة ث�را ��سو�م�ا خ���س ا �ل��سو���س��ط�ا �ى‬ �� �‫�ي‬ ‫�ذ � �أن ل ن‬ ‫� �ة‬ ‫كا � ا �ل�ع�د ل ض���د ا �جل�ور و ج ود‬ � ‫و ل�ك ��ه م�ا‬ ‫�ش �ف‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ض‬ ‫خ‬ ‫خ‬ �‫الا �ت��ي���ا ر ���د رد ا ء � الا �ت��ي���ا ر وا �ل�ع�د ل ا ��ر‬ ‫� �ة ال خ ت ا �ش�� �ف � ن ا ء �ة‬ ‫�م� ن� ا �جل�ور و ج ود ا ���ي���ا ر ر� م�� رد‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ف أن‬ ��‫���ي� ت� �ي� � � و ض‬ ‫الا خ�ت��ي���ا ر � �ل ز��م�ه ا �ل�ع�د ل وا �لت�� ب�� ك‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ن‬ 4.‫ج�����س ا �ل�ع�د ل رد ا ء � الا ج�ت��ي���ا ر‬

Averroes’s claim here is that Socrates is able to dispute Thrasymachus because of his better knowledge of topical argumentation. Averroes does not reproduce the argument here, but it seems that Thrasymachus has argued that good choices are not just, but unjust, or that bad choices are just. Socrates refutes him in dialectical debate by employing topic 39: if good choices are a good species, bad choices are a bad species, justice is a good genus, and injustice is a bad genus, then a good species cannot be placed under a bad genus, nor can a bad species be placed under a good genus. Accordingly, good choices must be a species of justice and bad choices a species of injustice. This passage has no parallel in Aristotle’s text, but recalls Thrasymachus’s statement in 4 Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, ed. Charles E. Butterworth and Ahmad Abd al-Magid Haridi (Cairo: The American Research Center in Egypt, 1979), 133, section 177. A critical edition of the fourteenth-century Hebrew translation by Qalonimos ben Qalonimos is currently being prepared as part of a dissertation by my student Arye Rainer. The following is the text of this passage as found in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MS héb. 933, f. 45v–46r (square brackets indicate marginal text): ‫והמקום הל״ט הוא שנסתכל ואם היה למין‬ .‫ הנה מה שהונח סוג איננו סוג‬,‫הפך ולסוג הפך והונח המין היותר חשוב מהם בסוג היותר פחות‬ ‫ וזה שהוא‬.‫ומזה המקום חייב סקראט הטעות בספר הנהגת המדינה באחד מה שהשיב המטעה‬ ‫ ויושר טוב מעולה מן העול‬,]‫ וטוב הבחירה [הפך לרוע הבחירה‬,‫בעבור שהיה היושר הפך העול‬ ‫ חייב לו המחלוקת והדחייה בשהניח סוג היושר רוע‬,‫וטוב הבחירה יותר מעולה מרוע הבחירה‬ ‫הבחירה‬. In my translation, I have included text found in the Hebrew, but not in the Arabic which seems likely to represent the original text, in square brackets. Additionally, in the final sentence, the Arabic says that Socrates forced Thrasymachus into “justice and rebuke” (al-ʿadl wa-l-tabkīt), while the Hebrew has “dispute and rebuke” (ha-maḥaloqet we-ha-deḥiyah). It seems likely to me that Qalonimos read al-ǧadal, “dispute” or “dialectical dispute,” rather than al-ʿadl, “justice.” Moreover, since the reading of al-ʿadl, “justice,” here does not make any sense, I have translated it as “dispute,” under the assumption that Qalonimos’s reading is better.

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Republic 343d–345c that the just person is worse off than the unjust and that injustice makes its practitioner most happy. Socrates’s subsequent response could be understood to follow the lines of argument Averroes attributes to him here, only with justice as the species and the good as the genus.5 However, this is hardly enough to identify Plato’s Republic as a direct source for Averroes. Rather, Averroes’s impression of Socrates as the topical arguer par excellence could well be derived from another now lost report, summary, or commentary on Plato’s Republic. It is also possible that a Greek commentator on Aristotle’s Topics employed this example from the Republic and that this text somehow made its way to Averroes. Whatever Averroes saw as the relationship between the Socrates of his Commentary on the Republic and the Socrates of his Middle Commentary on the Topics, both seem to take the public good, justice, as a source of guidance for human choices. It is only once he can no longer live as part of the city— and, we may assume, no longer participate in civic justice, thereby reducing or eliminating his participation in universal justice—that Socrates makes the decision to die. It would thus seem that it is his understanding of the civic good that leads him to bend his own choice towards what the universal genus of justice actually is. Averroes’s reading seems to present a version of one of the central questions of the Republic: To what extent should individual choices be subservient to general considerations of justice? Still, the context in which the question is asked appears to be based more on considerations from the Apology than the Republic. Additionally, Plato’s Apology appears to be behind a crucial argument in Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Parva naturalia. As Shlomo Pines has shown, the Arabic version of Parva naturalia was not at all faithful to Aristotle’s text and included a physical account of prophecy as an emanation of the Active or Universal Intellect.6 Averroes develops this account in some detail, but notes that it is one that Socrates would not accept. Averroes says: Since the essential nature of prophecy comes under the latter kind of endowment [viz. knowledge conveyed through dreams], prophecy has been attributed to God and the divine beings, namely, the angels. It is on this account that Socrates states, in arguing with the people of Athens, 5 On the dialectical format of the Thrasymachus—Socrates debate in Republic 1 and a comparison to Aristotle’s Topica, see George Klosko, “Thrasymachos’ Eristikos: The Agon Logon in ‘Republic’ I,” Polity 17 (1984): 5–29. 6 See Shlomo Pines, “The Arabic Recension of Parva naturalia and the Philosophical Doctrine Concerning Veridical Dreams according to Risāla al-Manāmiyya and Other Sources,” Israel Oriental Studies 4 (1974): 104–53.

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O people of Athens, I do not say that this divine wisdom of yours is false, but I do say that the wisdom I possess is human wisdom.7 As we saw in chapter 2, this statement is quite similar to a line attributed to Socrates in al-Fārābī’s Book of Demonstration and also to two statements attributed to Socrates in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari.8 Its original source is most likely Plato, Apology 20d–e, but it may have gone through several iterations and changes before being quoted in Averroes. In any case, it showcases Socrates professed ignorance of the divine things, including prophecy, particularly the inexplicable prophecy in dreams, along with an admission of having a strictly human wisdom. These examples show a Socrates drawn from Plato’s dialogues, though most likely indirectly. This Socrates has no direct knowledge of divine prophecy and divine wisdom in general, is knowledgeable in “human wisdom,” and is a dialectical disputant against sophists who applies topical reasoning in order to argue about justice and human choice. We do not know if his “human wisdom” is connected to his understanding of justice, but we do know that once it is no longer possible for him to live a “human life,” he chooses to die. Is this “human life” connected to wisdom?9 Could the just, human life be a pursuit of knowledge? What role does Socrates’s ignorance of divine matters play in his inability to pursue human life? It is tempting to answer these questions based on our knowledge of Plato’s dialogues, but without any more explicit discussion of those dialogues, there is no way to know exactly what Averroes thought. 2

Aristotle’s Socrates in Averroes

The most frequent mentions of Socrates in Aristotle are as an example of a specific person, a human being and therefore a mortal.10 Averroes follows Aristotle 7

8 9 10

Averroes, Epitome of Parva naturalia, trans. Harry Blumberg (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1961), 43. For the text of Moses ibn Tibbon’s thirteenth-century Hebrew translation, see Averroes, Compendia librorum Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur: Textum hebraicum, ed. Harry Blumberg (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1954), 48: ‫ אני איני אומר כי‬,‫ “אי אנשים‬,‫ולכן יאמר סקראט טוען על אנשי אתינא‬ ”‫ אבל אומר כי אני חכם בחכמה אנושית‬,‫חכמתכם זאת האלהית ענין בטל‬. For the Arabic text, see Averroes, Compendia librorum Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur, ed. Harry Blumberg (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1972), 48. See p.72 above. Cf. Plato, Apology 38a: The unexamined life is not worth living. Elsewhere, I suggested that “Aristotle’s frequent example of Socrates as a subject or underlying thing throughout the Metaphysics could be a further critique of the Socratic

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in using Socrates as an example, though he sometimes replaces the name with the standard Arabic names Zayd or ʿOmar.11 These examples are not revealing of Socrates’s character or of how Averroes understood Socratic thought. In various places in the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives more detail about Socrates, drawing, it would seem, from various Platonic dialogues. We shall see that in Averroes’s interpretations of these works, we find a Socrates who is in interested in ethics, believes that ethical knowledge necessarily leads to ethical virtue, takes a publicly sceptical stance towards the laws of Athens, and pays the ultimate price for doing so. 2.1 Rhetoric Socrates’s name is mentioned twelve times in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and the term “Socratics,” probably referring to Socratic speeches (λόγοι […] οἱ Σωκρατικοί), appears in one other place.12 All of these instances appear in the Arabic translation of the Rhetoric which was among the earliest translations of Aristotle’s

11

12

approach. After all, Aristotle’s criticism of Socrates is that he did not pay attention to the whatness of a thing, but Aristotle then goes on to use Socrates as an example of the whatness of a particular being, e.g., Socrates sits, Socrates stands.” See Yehuda Halper, “Dialecticians and Dialectics in Averroes’ Long Commentary on Gamma 2 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 26 (2016): 161–84, especially 169–70. This critique, if it is indeed Aristotle’s, does not seem to have made its way into Averroes’s commentaries. These names often come into Hebrew as Reuben, Simon, or Peloni. The examples of this are too many to enumerate; indeed, they may occur in every one of Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle and on Porphyry’s Isagoge. In some cases, Socrates appears for other Greek names, perhaps Greek names that were not coherently rendered in Arabic. For example, in De an. 418a21, Aristotle uses “the son of Diares.” While in the Middle Commentary, Averroes uses the name Zayd (which comes into Hebrew as Reuben), in the Long Commentary, the Arabic of which is lost, we find “the son of Socrates.” See Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba, Long Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle, trans. Richard Taylor and Thérèse-Anne Druart (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 256. Note that other names, e.g., Cleon (364–65), also appear as “Socrates” in this work. See Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, ed. and trans. Alfred Ivry (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2002), 178. Aristotle, Rh. 1356b31, b34; 1357b12; 1367b8; 1382a6; 1390b31; 1393b4; 1398a24, b33; 1399a8; 1415b31; and 1419a8. The reference to the Socratics is at 1417a21. For some of the possible meanings of Σωκρατικοί λόγοι in other Greek literature, see Andrew Ford, “ΣΩKPATIKOI ΛOΓOI in Aristotle and Fourth-Century Theories of Genre,” Classical Philology 105 (2010): 221–35, especially 226–36. Ford argues for a genre of Socratic writings known to Aristotle and subsequent Greek authors. It is not clear how much the Arabic readership could have known about such writings.

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writings to be made and almost certainly the one used by Averroes.13 Still, in his Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric, Averroes mentions Socrates’s name in his discussion of only five of these instances.14 He also adds two other mentions of the name Socrates that are not found in Aristotle.15 Additionally, in four other instances, Averroes apparently takes Aristotle’s mention of Isocrates ‫ ا � ق‬or ���‫ )ا ���س �ق ا ط‬to actually be (᾿Ισοκράτης, transliterated into Arabic as ‫��س��را ط��س‬ ‫ي و ر �ي س ي‬

‫ � ق‬by the transreferring to Socrates (Σωκράτης, generally transliterated ‫�س��را ط��ي��س‬

‫)� ق‬.16 Thus, although lator of the Rhetoric, but rendered by Averroes as ‫�س��را ط‬ Aristotle mentions Socrates twelve times in the Rhetoric and Averroes mentions him eleven times in his Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric, more than half of the mentions do not correspond to one another. Often, the discrepancy is due to various features of the Arabic translation that obscure Aristotle’s meaning. Unfortunately, this appears to be at play in Aristotle’s most direct reference to the Socrates of the Apology in the Rhetoric, and perhaps in the entire corpus Aristotelicum. When speaking of using a rhetorical question as the premise of an enthymeme, Aristotle says:

13

14 15 16

See Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, ed. M.C. Lyons (Cambridge: Pembroke Arabic Texts, 1982), 11, 13, 46, 96, 127, 134, 151, 153, 207, 214, and 220. See Lyons’s introduction for the argument that Averroes did, in fact, use this translation, even if he may have consulted other translations as well. The passages I bring in this chapter will be seen to add further support to the claim that Averroes’ Middle Commentary relied on this translation. On the dating of this translation to the middle of the 9th century (i.e., before Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn), see Uwe Vagelpohl, Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the East: The Syriac and Arabic translation and Commentary Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 39–61. Averroès (Ibn Rušd), Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique d’Aristote, ed. and trans. Maroun Aouad (Paris: J. Vrin, 2002), 2:23, 78, 226, 331, and 339. These correspond to Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 13, 46, 134, 207, and 214 respectively. Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:22 and 64. These occur in Rhetoric 1368a20, 1392b11, 1418a31, and 1418a34, corresponding to Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 48, 131, and 218 (two instances), which in turn correspond to Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:82, 221, and 345 (two instances). Aristotle, in fact, mentions Isocrates another nine times in the Rhetoric (at 1399a2, 1399a4, 1399b10, 1408b15, 1411a29, 1412b6, 1414b27, 1414b33, and 1418b26), but only four of these make it into the Arabic translation (Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 153, 191, 201, and 219). None of these four are mentioned or alluded to in Averroes’s Middle Commentary, while the other four instances are taken to refer to Socrates.

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For example, when Meletus said that Socrates does not believe in the gods, but mentioned that he did speak of some daimonion, Socrates asked if daemons were the sons of gods or otherwise divine. When Meletus said, “It is so,” Socrates said, “Is there anyone who thinks that there are sons of gods, but not gods?”17

οἷον Σωκράτης, Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν, εἰρηκότος δὲ ὡς δαιμόνιόν τι λέγοι, ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἤτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶεν ἢ θεῖόν τι, φήσαντος δὲ “ἔστιν οὖν”, ἔφη, “ὅστις θεῶν μὲν παῖδας οἴεται εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ οὔ;”18

Here, Aristotle seems to be thinking of Plato, Apology of Socrates, 27c–28a, where we find the same general argument, though more prolix and in different terms. The Arabic translator of the Rhetoric makes some adjustments to the text, including substituting the ǧinn for Socrates’s daimonion: An example is a statement by Socrates. When Meletus did not say that he [sc. Socrates] believed in the gods; rather he spoke to the man in jest and asked, “Aren’t ǧinns the sons of gods, like gods?” When he said what he said, could he then have believed that they [the ǧinns] exist, but that the gods do not?

ّ ‫�مث��� ا �ل��ذ � ا�م � ق‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ ف��ا ن� �مي���لا طو��س ل‬,‫�س��را ط��ي��س‬ ‫�ل‬ ‫م‬ ّ ّ‫ى رآ ة ن‬ ‫ق‬ ّ ‫ن‬ � ‫ي����ق�ل ا ��ه ي�����ر ب�ا ل� ��ل�ه�� �ل��ك��ه‬ �‫ك�ل ا �لر ج��ل و�هو �ل�ع� ب‬ ‫أ‬ ‫أ أ‬ ‫آ‬ ‫م‬ ّ‫ّ ف‬ �‫�� نّ � ب�ن��ا ء ال� ��ل�ه��ة ب�ن‬ ‫ � �ل��ي�� ا �جل‬:‫ف���س� ل‬ � ‫حو ا ��ل�هى؟ ��ل�م�ا‬ � ‫س‬ ّ ‫ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن ق ق ّن‬ ‫ وا�م�ا‬,�‫كا � ��د ا � ّر ب�ا ���ه� �مو ج�ود و‬ � ‫��ا ل �م�ا ��ا ل‬ ‫م‬ ‫أ نّ آ ة ف‬ 19‫ب�� � � ��ل�ه�� ��لا؟‬

The translation I have provided here was made with the Greek text in mind and is intended to bring out the similarities between the two texts. Yet a reader who did not have access to the Greek text might find some of the language quite puzzling. For example, the Arabic �‫�ل�ع� ب‬, which I have translated as “in jest” following the recommendation of M.C. Lyons,20 can indeed mean “to jest” or ‫ة‬ “to play games.” The noun form ����‫ �ل�ع ب‬refers to a thing played, a game, and hence a puppet, an image, or even an effigy. Lane notes: “It was probably sometimes applied to a crucifix. […] It is applied in some post-classical writers to a cross […]. See �‫�ل�ع� ب‬.”21 Accordingly, it is possible that instead of “he spokeّ to the man in jest,” a reader could read the Arabic expression �‫ك�ل ا �لر ج��ل و�هو �ل�ع� ب‬ � as saying, ‫م‬ “he spoke of the man, who is a crucifix.” That is, a reader could take this to be referring to Jesus, the son of God. Similarly, Lane notes that ǧinn can be used 17 18 19 20 21

Translation mine. Aristotle, Rhetorica, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 1419a8–12. Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 220; translation mine. Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 401. Lane, Dictionary, vol. 7, p. 2662.

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for “angels” in Christian contexts.22 Thus, an Arabic reader, particularly one who thought it significant that the translator was a Christian, could have thought that Socrates was arguing that people who believe in the existence of the “man who is a crucifix”—that is, Jesus, the son of God—and the existence of angels would also have to believe in the existence of God. The Socrates of this reading is quite Christian and is somewhat at odds with what we would expect to find in Aristotle. I suspect it is this second reading of the passage that motivated Averroes to leave Socrates out of his treatment of it. Averroes, indeed, writes the following in place of the passage in his Middle Commentary: For example, when a Christian man was asked, “Are not fathers and sons from one genus?”, he responded by saying, “Yes.” [The questioner] said, “Can Jesus, then, be the son of God?”

‫أ‬ ‫�مث��� �أ ن �����سئ��� ��س�ائ� ��لاً �م� ن ا �لن‬ � � � � “ : ‫ا‬ � ‫ص‬ � �� �� ‫ل‬ � ‫آل � ي أ ل ل ر ج‬ ‫ر ى �ي س‬ � ‫ق‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ال� ب�ا ء وال� ب�ن��ا ء �م� ن� ج�����س واح�د؟” ���إِ �ذا ��ا ل‬ ّ ً ‫ن ق ف‬ ‫�ذ ن‬ 23.”‫ “��ع ” ��ا ل “���ع��ي��سى إ� � �ل��ي��س ا ب�ن��ا �ل��ل�ه‬:�‫ا لم�� ج���ي� ب‬ ِ ‫م‬

Averroes not only leaves Socrates out, but he introduces an anonymous Christian man asking questions about genera and species using Jesus as an example. Averroes is apparently reading the Arabic translation in the way I outlined above. Furthermore, it seems likely to me that he leaves Socrates out precisely because he no longer fits in with this Christian question or with the polemical anti-Christian rhetoric that Averroes adopts here.24 That Averroes does not mention Socrates here suggests that he recognises that the argument he sees before him in the Arabic translation does not convey a satisfactory picture of Socrates. It also suggests that he is suspicious of the accuracy of the translation and that he is willing to modify it, even significantly, in order to provide what he sees as a better text. Thus, Aristotle’s statement that most clearly refers to the Socrates of Plato’s Apology comes into Averroes without Socrates at all, likely because of the language used in the Arabic translation. Other instances of direct references to Platonic works do appear fairly accurately in Averroes’s Middle Commentary, but without any recognition of Plato’s dialogues. Thus, Aristotle’s two references to Socrates’s statement that it is not difficult to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians,25 probably referring 22 23 24 25

Lane, 462. Cf. Gabriel Said Reynolds, “Angels”, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE (Brill Online, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_23204. Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:348; translation mine. On the polemical character of this statement, see Aouad’s note in Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 3:439. Aristotle, Rh. 1367b8 and 1415b31.

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to Plato, Menexenus 235d, are relatively accurately translated into Arabic,26 and consequently appear in Averroes’s Middle Commentary, with clear attributions to Socrates.27 The Menexenus is not mentioned in Aristotle, and therefore it is not found in either the Arabic translation or Averroes’s Middle Commentary.28 Similarly, Aristotle’s reference to Socrates’s argument against choosing government offices by lot29 also comes into the Arabic translation relatively accurately.30 As a result, this position is associated with Socrates in Averroes’s Middle Commentary.31 None of these places mentions a source for this argument, though it may well be in Socrates’s critique of democracy and sortition in Plato, Republic VIII, 557a.32 Averroes, however, generally omits mention of Socrates in the Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric when his name comes up as one of Aristotle’s examples of a particular person.33 Yet he keeps Socrates’s name in his interpretation of Aristotle’s example of a sign that is true with reference to a particular case, but that cannot be made into a universal syllogism: “Wise men are just; for Socrates was wise and just.”34 Note, however, that immediately before 26 27 28

29 30 31 32

33

34

Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 46 and 207. Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:78 and 331. Averroes’s confusion of Socrates for Isocrates in his interpretation of Rh. 1368a20 (Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 48) may be a similar case. In Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:82, Averroes refers to Socrates’s proficiency with comparisons. This could have a source in any number of Platonic dialogues, though, of course, none are mentioned. Aristotle, Rh. 1393b4. Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 134. Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:226–27. Cf. Plato, Resp. 5 460a8–e3, where Socrates recommends assigned marriages by “clever lots” (κλῆροι […] κομψοί), i.e., by fake lots, so that people will accept them without questioning the people who are, unbeknownst to them, behind the lots. Later, beginning in Resp. 10 617e, Socrates speaks of the deity who casts lots for men. Gabriel Danzig suggested to me that Averroes’ view may also be derived indirectly from Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2. Compare Aristotle, Rh. 1356b31, 1356b34, 1382a6, 1390b31 with the Arabic translation, Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 11 (two instances), 96, 127, and with Averroes, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:19, 164, 217–18. Three other places where Averroes omits Socrates are inexplicable to me, unless his Arabic text was not good or he felt that they did not portray the Socrates he recognised. See Aristotle, Rh. 1398a24, 1398b33, 1399a8, and Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 151 and 153. Averroes omits Socrates’s name in the corresponding places in Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:242–44. Aristotle, Rh. 1357b12–13: οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γὰρ σοφὸς ἦν καὶ δίκαιος. See Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 13, and Averroes, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:23. Averroes also emphasises Socrates’s wisdom in Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 221. There, however, he is referring to a quote that originates in Isocrates. See Aristotle, Rh. 1392b11, and Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 221.

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employing this example in the Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Averroes uses Socrates to exemplify a similar kind of argument: “Socrates is breathing in a strained manner. A feverish person breathes in a strained manner. Therefore, Socrates is feverish.”35 Aristotle had invoked the same principle in Rhetoric 1357b15, but without mentioning Socrates. That is, Averroes could have used Socrates for the medical example alone without bringing in the case of justice and wisdom. Nevertheless, he follows Aristotle in associating Socrates with justice and wisdom, but departs from Aristotle in inserting Socrates into the medical example as well. However, while the medical example may well be true, in his Middle Commentary on the Prior analytics, Averroes cites the example of Socrates’s wisdom and virtue as a fallacy. One cannot use the state‫ف‬ ‫ )� ق‬and “Socrates is wise” ( �‫�س�� ا ط ح�ك‬ ‫ق‬ ments “Socrates is virtuous” (‫�س��را ط ��ا ض���ل‬ ‫)� ر‬ ‫يم‬ as sources for the inference that “since one is wise, he is therefore virtuous” ‫� ا�ذ ن ف‬ ‫) ف��ا �ل‬.36 While the inference in the medical example may also be (‫ح�يك� � ��ا ض���ل‬

‫م‬

fallacious, it is useful for medical diagnosis and treatment. Not so, perhaps, in the case of inferring virtue from wisdom. These examples do not, in themselves, say anything about Averroes’s view of Socrates, since Socrates appears only as an example of a particular person. Nevertheless, they presage Averroes’s (and Aristotle’s) critique of Socrates’s denial of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics. There, Socrates is taken to say that knowledge is virtue and that knowledge of the good necessarily leads to good actions. Averroes (and Aristotle) go against this view, and it is possible that Averroes’s logical use of the example of the connection between knowledge and virtue in Socrates is meant to prepare the reader for the later ethical argument. In any case, Socrates’s concern with knowledge of ethics also arises in Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric in his interpretation of Aristotle’s distinction between ethical narratives and mathematical speeches. Aristotle says:

35 36

Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:22. Averroes, Averroes Cordubensis in Aristotelis Priorum analiticorum libros, ed. Mahmoud Kassem (Cairo: The General Egyptian Book Organization, 1983), 376, section 388. Compare with Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:23. The same argument appears in Averroes’s Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric; see Averroes’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics, Poetics, and Rhetoric, ed. and trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Albany, NY: SUNY Press: 1977), 69, on Rhetoric section 22.

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Further, the narrative ought to be ethical. It will be so if we know what makes an ethos. One thing will be to make the choice clear. […] Because of this, mathematical speeches are not ethical, for they have no choice, nor do they have that for the sake of which. But Socratic speeches do.

ἠθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι· ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο, ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ. ἓν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν· […] διὰ τοῦτο ⟨δ’⟩ οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἤθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν (τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν), ἀλλ’ οἱ Σωκρατικοί·37

Aristotle apparently distinguishes ethical and mathematical forms of reasoned speech. Ethical speeches, including those of Socrates, involve choice, advanced choice, or purpose (προαίρεσις) and are made with a view to an end or telos. Mathematical speeches have neither choice/purpose nor a telos, but are, it would seem, purely theoretical. While Aristotle’s Greek has, perhaps, some ambiguity as to whether the Socratic logoi are mathematical or ethical, the Arabic translation has none. Additionally, the Arabic translation takes οἱ Σωκρατικοί to refer to “the companions of Socrates” rather than to “Socratic speeches”: Furthermore, the narrative ought to be appropriate. This occurs when we know what the mode or ethic which works in a man is. This comes about in that which is done by advance choice.38 […] Advance choice is that which is for the sake of an end. Accordingly, in mathematics, there is no ethical speech, for they do not have advance choice; that is, the mathematicians do not have that because of which—that is, a cause—but the companions of Socrates do. For they speak because of such things; namely, ethics.

‫قت‬ ‫ق ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫و��د ي��ب� غ��� ا � ي� ك‬ ‫ و�ذا ك‬,‫�و� الا ������ص�ا �ص ا�ه��ليّ��ا‬ ‫ي‬ ‫أ‬ ‫�لخ ق �ذ‬ ‫ف‬ �����‫�و ن� ب�� ن� ن��عر�ف� �م�ا ا �ل ن‬ ‫حو ا و ا‬ ‫ي� ك‬ �‫���ل ّ� ا �ل� �ى �ي�عم�ل �ي‬ ّ‫ن‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ن‬ ‫�ق‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ت‬ ]…[ ‫�و� �ه��ذا �ف�يما ���ع�ل ب��� �د ا ���ي���ا ر‬ ‫ا ل�مرء وا �م�ا ي� ك‬ ‫ن ن‬ ّ ‫�ذ‬ ‫�م غ ة �ذ‬ ‫خ‬ ‫ت‬ � �‫�و‬ ‫وت����ق�د الا ���ي���ا ر �هو ا �ل� �ى ي� ك‬ ‫حو ��اي��� و�ل� �ل�ك‬ ّ ّ ‫م ف‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ي�ه�ا‬ �‫�م�ا �ل��ي��س �ي� ا �لت��ع�ا �يل‬ ���� ‫ لا ن��ه �ل��ي��س‬,�‫كلا خ���ل��ق‬ � ُ ‫نم م ي‬ ‫ح�ا � ا �لت‬ ‫ع� ا نّ��ه �ل��ي�� لا �ص‬ � ‫ ا‬,‫ت����ق�دي� ا خ� ت��ي���ا ر‬ � �‫�ل‬ � ‫ع‬ � � ‫ب‬ ‫مي‬ ‫س‬ ‫ى‬ ‫ّ أ‬ ‫�ذ م �ذ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ الا � �ص‬,‫ ا �ى ا �ل�ع�ل��ة‬,‫ا��ل�ه‬ � � � � ‫م‬ �‫ح�ا ب‬ ‫�ل�ك ا �ل� ى ّ � ج‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ف ن‬ ‫�ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫���ذا ا �ع�ن‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ ��ا ���ه�م ي��� و�لو� �م�� ج‬,‫��س��را ط��ي��س‬ ‫ا��ل ك و ى‬ ‫ا �لخ ّ ة‬ 39. ����‫���ل��ق ي‬ �‫ب‬

Averroes’s interpretation departs from Aristotle, even in translation, specifically with regard to the companions of Socrates. Averroes says:

37 38 39

Aristotle, Rh. 1417a16–21; translation mine. See Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 395, for the structure of this sentence. Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 213–14; translation mine.

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He said: The narrative ought to be appropriate; that is, familiar, known, not hidden. This occurs when the speaker mixes in statements that move man towards an excellent ethical character and that move him to do good. These are ethical statements. Ethical statements are employed with regard to voluntary things, actions, not with regard to theoretical things. For the ethical things are the principles of actions which are for an end, not the principles of beliefs. He said: Accordingly, ethical statements are not employed for mathematical things, except for what the companions of Socrates did with them.

ً‫أ أ ف‬ ‫ن قت‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ن أن‬ ‫ و�ي�ب� غ��� � � ي� ك‬:‫��ا ل‬ ‫�و� الا ������ص�ا �ص ا�ه��ليّ��ا � ��ي �م� �لو��ا‬ ‫ي‬ ّ ‫ت‬ ‫أ‬ ً ‫�ذ‬ ‫� ن �� ن خ‬ �‫���ل��ط ب��ه ا لم�� ك‬ � ��‫�م�عرو ف��ا غ���ير �م ن‬ ‫���ل‬ ‫ و �ل�ك ي� كو� ب � ي‬.ُ‫�تكر‬ ‫م‬ ‫ح ّ ك ا ل�م ء � ا �لخ ق �ف ض‬ ‫ال�أ �ق�ا � ا �ّلت‬ � � ‫���ل� ا �ل�� �ا ���ل ّو‬ ‫لى‬ ‫ر‬ ‫ر‬ ِ ‫تُ ويل ف�ي‬ ‫إِ أ‬ ‫�لخ �ق ّ ة ن‬ ‫ق‬ ‫خ‬ � � ‫ل‬ � ‫ و�إ�م�ا‬.����‫ح ّرك ع��لى ���ع�ل ا ���ير و�هي� ال� �ا وي�ل ا ���ل� ي‬ ِ ‫أ‬ ُ‫ت‬ ‫أ‬ ِ َ ّ ‫ف‬ ‫ق‬ ‫���ل��ق ّ����ة � ال ش��������ا ء ال ا د ��ة‬ � �‫�����ست���عم�ل ال� ��ا و�يل ا �لخ ي ي‬ �‫إ� ر ي‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ن ظ ّ ة ف نّ أ خ ق‬ ‫ّة ف أ ش‬ �‫ ���إِ � ال� ��لا � �هي‬.��‫ا �ل�عم��لي��� لا �ي�أ ال� �����ي���اّ ء ا �ل����رن�ي‬ � �‫�م ب���ا د �ى ء ال� �ع�م�ا ل ا �لت� �ه‬ � ‫حو غ��اي���ة �م�ا لا �م ب���ا د �ى ء‬ ‫�ي ي‬ ‫الا �عت����ق�ا د ا ت‬ .� ‫�لخ �ق ّ ة ف‬ ‫تُ ت َ ال أ �ق‬ � ‫ا‬ �‫ل‬ � � � ‫ا‬ � �� �� � �‫ي ي‬ ‫����ّ�س���عم�ل � ويل‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫�ل � ن‬ ‫ن‬ � ‫إ ا م�ا‬ ‫كا � ي�����ست���عم�ل �م�� �ل�ك‬ ِ

‫�ذ‬ ‫ و�ل� �ل�ك ل‬:‫�ق�ا ل‬ ‫ال أ ش��������ا ء ا �لت��ع�ا �ل� ّ��م��ة‬ ‫أ� ي‬ ‫يمي‬ ‫ق‬ ‫� �ص‬ � 40.‫ح�ا ب� ��س��را ط‬

Averroes emphasises the distinction between the ethical and practical things and the theoretical things. The latter he associates with the principles of beliefs, including religious beliefs, while the former are the principles of actions. The problem associated with the companions of Socrates, according to Averroes, is that they did not distinguish between ethical statements and mathematical statements. In context, this appears to be a sign that they did not distinguish between theoretical and ethical statements in general. This stance, if it can be applied to Socratic philosophy in general, works well with the denial of akrasia attributed to Socrates in the Nicomachean Ethics. If there is no distinction between theory and practice, then a person always acts on his beliefs. Accordingly, if the companions of Socrates know what virtue is, they will ipso facto act virtuously. The connection Averroes identifies between actions and beliefs, particularly commonly held beliefs, may also be behind what Averroes identifies as Socrates’s criticism of the beliefs and laws of Athens. This criticism, in fact, appears in what is clearly a misreading of a passage in which Aristotle originally refers to the Athenian orator Isocrates. Aristotle says:

40

Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:338–39; translation mine.

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One who is at a loss ought to do what the Athenian orators, even Isocrates, did: even when deliberating, he makes accusations, for example, against the Lacedaemonians in his Panegyricus and against Chares in his Symmachikos.

δεῖ οὖν ἀποροῦντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ ᾿Αθήνησι ῥήτορες ποιοῦσι καὶ ᾿Ισοκράτης· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύων κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάρητος δ’ ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ.41

The Arabic translation somewhat expands the role of the one who is “at a loss,” while Arabicising the names of Isocrates’s works: One who doubts or who is stricken in years42 ought to do what the Athenian orators, and also Isocrates, did. For he made accusations even when he deliberated. His accusation was against the Lacedaemonians in the Ḏawat al-ʿīd and against Chares in The Aid of the Sword.

41

ّ ‫ف‬ ‫ة ن‬ �‫و�ق�د ي�ن�ب� غ��� �ل�ل�م��ت �ش�� ك‬ � ‫��ك ا وأ ا �ل��ط�ا �ع� ن� �ي� ا �ل����سن���� ا‬ ‫ي‬ ‫���ف� �ع� �م�ا �ق�د ���ف� �ع� ال�ث�� ن��ّ�� ن� �م� ن ا �ل ���ط ّ��� ن‬ ‫ر‬ �‫أ ي ل ّ�ي يو � ري و ي ي‬ ‫ي ل‬ ‫ض ف نّ �ذ‬ ‫ا� ق‬ ‫��س��را ط��س � �ي�����ا ��ا ��ه‬ � ‫ و‬,‫و�هو ي� �ش�� ��ير‬ �‫كا ن� ت‬ ‫وي‬ ‫م‬ ّ ّ ‫�م��ذ �ّمت���ه ا�م�ا �ل��ل��ق�د �م ن���� ن ف���ف� �ذ ا ت‬ ‫� ا �ل�عي���د وا�م�ا‬ ‫ي� ي� و‬ ‫�ل‬ �‫�خ�ا ر��س ف���ف�� ا �لن����صر�ة ف�� ا �ل‬ 43.�‫�خر ب‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ي‬

Aristotle, Rh. 1418a31–33; translation mine. In the continuation of the passage, Aristotle says: “In epideictic speeches, one ought to vary the speech with praises, as Isocrates does. For he is always bringing someone in” (ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις, οἷον ᾿Ισοκράτης ποιεῖ· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα εἰσάγει.). This continuation came into Arabic as: “However, in metered speeches (?) we ought to bring in praise, as Isocrates did. For he

‫ّ ف� ت ئ ت ف �ق ن غ‬ �‫وا�م�ا ي� ا لم��را �ي��ا � ��� �د ي��ب���ي‬ ّ‫ف‬ ‫ف� � ا �ذ‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ ��ا ن��ه ي��د خ��ل ا ب��د ا واح�د ب��ع�د واح�د و� �ش� ��ي ئ��ا ب��ع�د‬,‫كا �ل� �ى ي���ف� �ع�ل ا ي���سو�را ط��ي��س‬ � ‫��ل‬ ‫ن��د خ��ل ا لم�دح ي� ا �ل ك‬ ‫م‬ ‫)���ش�ي ء‬. See Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 218; translation mine. Concerning ‫ن‬

brought in one after another, one thing after another” (� ‫ا‬

this text, Averroes says: “He said: competitors ought to make use of praise in their establishing speeches, as Socrates did in praising speeches. For he would bring praising speech

‫أ‬ ‫حّ����ة‬ �‫� �ق�ا و��ل�ه ا لم�د ي‬ ‫�ي‬ ‫ي‬

ُ ‫أ‬ ‫ �أ�م�ا ا لم ن���ا ف� ّ�ا ت‬:‫�ق�ا ل‬ �‫� ف����ق�د ي��ن ب� غ��� � ن� ي�����ست���عَم� ف‬ ‫��لا‬ �‫ي�ه�ا �م�د ا �ل ك‬ ��� ‫و‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ري‬ ‫ي‬ ‫ح ن �فم‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ث‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ت‬ � ‫كا � �ي�� �ع�ل�ه ��س��را ط‬ � ‫ �م���ل �م�ا‬, �‫)ا ل���� �ب���ي‬. See Averroès, Commentaire moyen ‫�ي‬

into his establishing speech” (

42

43

‫ف‬ �‫�ي‬

à la Rhétorique, 2:345; translation mine. Note that Averroes’s mistaking this passage as a reference to Socrates has the advantage that it corresponds to the image of Socrates praising the Athenians among the Athenians which was likely referring to Plato’s Menexenus (see n. 26 above). The English translation, “one who is stricken in years,” is suggested by Lyons in Aristotle, ‫ف‬ ‫ة‬ Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 399. Lyons notes that ����‫ط�ا �ع� ن� �� ا �ل����سن‬ ��‫ ا �ل‬is not aّliteral ‫ي‬ �‫ا لم��ت �ش�� ك‬, translation of ἀπορέω, nor would it appear to be necessary as a supplement to ‫��ك‬ which is apparently translating the same Greek term. He suggests a possible misunderstanding of a Syriac version of the text on the part of the Arabic translator. Aristotle, Ars rhetorica: The Arabic Version, 218.

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Now, Averroes takes this passage in an entirely different direction: One who doubts the premises held by the law ought to do what Socrates did with the orators of the community of Athenians. For he criticised those premises somewhat before them, as I reckon it, by interpreting them. For interpretation is a criticism of a statement.

ّ ‫ت �ش‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫��ك ا لم���ق ّ�د �م�ا ت‬ ‫� ا لم� خ� �ذ �ة �م� ن‬ � ‫و�ي�ب� غ��ي� �ل�ل�م���� ك‬ ‫و‬ � ‫أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫ُ ّة ن‬ ‫كا ن ���ف� �ع�ل�ه � ق‬ ‫�س��را ط �م‬ ���� ‫ا �ل����سن���� � � ي���ف� �ع�ل‬ � ‫ي�ه�ا �م�ا‬ � ‫ي‬ ‫ت ع‬ ّ ‫ن أ أث ن ة ف نّ ن �ذ‬ ‫ا �لخ‬ \ ‫كا � ي� ��ل�ه� \ ��ل�ك‬ � ‫ ���إ ��ه‬.����‫���ط ب���ا ء �م�� � �ه�ل � ���ي��ي‬ ‫م ت أم‬ ‫ً ِ أ‬ ًّ ‫ت �ذ‬ � � ‫ � ما‬,‫ا لم���ق�د �م�ا � �م�ا ي���سي��را‬ ‫ ب�ا �ل�� وي�ل ��ل�ه�ا‬,�‫ح����س� ب‬ ‫ف�ي‬ ّ ‫ف� نّ ت أ �ذ‬ 44.‫�م�ا �ل��ل��قول‬ � ��‫� ا �ل‬ ‫�إِ � ويل م‬

In addition to substituting Socrates for Isocrates, Averroes makes three crucial changes to the passage. (1) Averroes transforms Aristotle’s orator at a loss as to how to address the public into someone who doubts the premises of the law. This change is likely due to Averroes’s reading of the translator’s addition of ‫ ا � ط�ا �ع� ن ف� ا �ل����سن����ة‬not as “one stricken in years” (‫)ا �ل���سَ�نَ����ة‬, but as “one who attacks �‫ل�� � ي‬

‫ُ َّ ة‬

(�‫ )ا �ل��ط�ا �ع� ن‬the law (����‫)ا �ل����سن‬.” It is not a huge leap to assume that such an attack is made by doubting the premises of the law. (2) Socrates is not one of the orators, but someone attacking the law before the orators. Presumably, the orators are defending the law against Socrates. (3) Socrates interprets the premises of the law, while whether he accepts the law in general is not stated. Still, we find here an expression of a radical view: all interpretation is criticism. By interpreting the premises of the law, Socrates is criticising those premises and so is attacking them. The Socrates of the Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric is not merely ignorant of divine wisdom, as was the Socrates of the Middle Commentary on the Parva naturalia, but is actively challenging and attacking the premises of the law, presumable the religious law (al-sunna), in public by presenting interpretations of that law! Although the reference to the example of Socrates and Meletus does not make it into Averroes’s text, Averroes does allude to what may be taken as a consequence of Socrates’s criticisms of the premises of the law elsewhere in the Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric. When discussing Aristotle’s assertion that an orator’s ethical character (ἦθος) is important for persuading his audience,45 Averroes adds the following aside:

44 45

Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:345; translation mine. Aristotle, Rh. 1365a.

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The words of the kind of people who have suffered enormous harm and great misfortune for their virtues are very much accepted. This is at the level of Socrates and those like him.

‫نف‬ ‫ا ل ض ّ�ة‬ ‫ن ن‬ ‫ّ�ذ ن ن ت‬ ‫وا �ل����ص��� �م�� ا �ل��ا ��س ا �ل� �ي� �ا �ل���ه�م م����ر‬ ً ‫ا � �ظ ة ا � �ش �ق ا �ل��ك ل � ن‬ ‫��ا � ا �ل��ف�� ض�����ائ�ل �ه ا�ي ض�����ا‬ ‫ل�ع�� ��ي���م�� و ل�� � �ا ء ب���ير م ك‬ ‫غم‬ ًّ ًّ ‫أق‬ ‫ة‬ ‫ق‬ 46.‫�م���ق��بو�لو ال� �وا ل ج��د ا ج��د ا ب�م ن�� ز� �ل�� ��س��را ط و���يره‬

Aristotle did not discuss people who suffered misfortune because of their virtues, nor did he mention Socrates. Averroes does not tell us what misfortune Socrates endured because of his virtues, but his statements about Socrates elsewhere allow us to proffer a guess. We saw in the Commentary on the Republic that Socrates chose to die once he could no longer pursue a virtuous life in the city. If this is the misfortune that Averroes has in mind in the Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric, then it is not unreasonable to suppose that in Averroes’s view, Socrates’s criticisms of the premises of the law led to his being unable to participate in the civic life of Athens, which in turn led to his choice to die. The law (al-sunna) that he criticises is apparently the religious law, and we may suppose his criticism to follow from his profession of ignorance about the divine law that we find in the Middle Commentary on the Parva naturalia. Thus, even though Averroes does not refer to Plato’s Apology, he may have in mind a view that Socrates’s death is a result of questioning the fundamental religious beliefs of Athens. In sum, Averroes’s Socrates is then a kind of sceptic about knowledge and beliefs about the divine. He criticises the city for those beliefs and attempts to interpret the law in a new way, an interpretation which Averroes also calls criticism. His criticism may be harsh, but Socrates has rhetorical knowledge and is aware of the value of praising the Athenians in Athens. Yet he is somehow set apart from or even set against the other Athenian orators. He is excluded from the city, and after concluding that he cannot live a fully human life without it, he chooses to die. Nevertheless, he is among the virtuous, as well as the wise. His companions, and possibly Socrates himself, do not distinguish between mathematical and ethical speech, nor, it seems, between theoretical and ethical things. One way of accounting for the lack of such distinction is Socrates’s denial of akrasia as described in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. This can also account for the importance Socrates attached to explaining the law in accordance with truth and virtue.

46

Averroès, Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique, 2:64; translation mine.

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2.2 Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle mentions Socrates seven times in the Nicomachean Ethics,47 most of which appear in the Arabic translation (although the manuscript lacks some of the text).48 The Arabic original of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is mostly lost, but the text survives in the thirteenth-century Latin translation by Hermannus Alemannus and the 1321 Hebrew translation by Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles.49 Still, all of the references to Socrates that were in the Greek version of the Nicomachean Ethics are preserved, though sometimes in a slightly altered form, in Averroes’s Middle Commentary, suggesting that Averroes had a better Arabic text than the one now available.50 The 47 48

49

50

Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ed. I. Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894, repr. 1962), 1116b4; 1127b25–26; 1144b18; 1144b28; 1145b23; 1145b25; and 1147b15. The Arabic translation was edited on the basis of a single manuscript found by Arthur John Arberry and Douglas Morton Dunlop in Fez in the 1950s. The Arabic edition and an English translation may be found in Aristotle, The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Anna Akasoy and Alexander Fidora, trans. Douglas Morton Dunlop (Leiden: Brill, 2005). On the translators of the Nicomachean Ethics into Arabic, see Ernst A. Schmidt and Manfred Ullmann, Aristoteles in Fes: Zum Wert der arabischen Überlieferung der Nikomachischen Ethik für die Kritik des griechischen Textes (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2012), 15–16. Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn was the translator of the first four books; Usṭāṯ translated books 5–10. For the mentions of Socrates, see The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, 220–21 (= 116b4), 372–73 ( =1145b23 and b25), and 382–83 (= 1147b15). The Arabic lacunae where Socrates was mentioned in the Greek text occur at 278–79 (= 1127b25–26) and 332 (a large lacuna that includes text corresponding to 1144b18 and 1144b28). Additionally, the Arabic text at 382–83 (= 1147b15) is highly muddled and probably corrupt. “Socrates” also appears in the so-called “Seventh Book” of The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, 354–55. This book is not Aristotle’s and is not commented upon by Averroes. Akasoy and Fidora suggest it may be part of a lost commentary by Porphyry on the Nicomachean Ethics or connected with the Summa Alexandrinorum (The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, 55–79). Whatever its origin, the text in question speaks of Socrates as “ironical (mustahziʾ) because he spoke ill of himself, yet in some things it appears that he was not joyless.” This statement seems to be a commentary on Eth. Nic. 11127b25–26. For the Arabic fragments of the work, see Lawrence V. Berman, “Excerpts from the Lost Arabic Original of ibn Rushd’s ‘Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics,’” Oriens 20 (1967): 31–59. Alemannus’s translation is currently being edited by Frédérique Woerther, but Samuel ben Judah’s translation, which is the relevant one for the Hebrew Averroes, is available in Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the Hebrew Version of Samuel ben Judah, ed. Lawrence V. Berman (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1999). See Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 132, 169, 222–23, 228, and 235 for text corresponding to the sources in n. 47 above. Note, however, that 228 has only one reference to Socrates’s denial of akrasia, while the corresponding Greek text in the Nicomachean Ethics has two, at 1145b23 and b25 respectively. However, this is in keeping with Averroes’s style of commenting.

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Socrates of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is, then, highly influenced by Aristotle’s depictions of Socrates in the Nicomachean Ethics. Still, we shall see that certain idiosyncrasies in the Arabic led Averroes to make some changes to his depiction of Socrates, often in ways similar to those we saw in the Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric. Thus, for example, we find that where Aristotle included Socrates as an example of “ironic people” (οἱ εἴρωνες), Averroes sees an example of Socratic scepticism. In 4.7, Aristotle spoke of “ironic people who […] disown things held in high esteem, as Socrates used to do.”51 It is not entirely clear what Aristotle means by irony here, but earlier he seems to use it for some kind of duplicitousness, especially by way of self-belittling.52 In any case, while we cannot know what the Arabic would have been here,53 no such term makes it into Averroes’s Middle Commentary. Instead, in the midst of a list of people he condemns as “base,” Averroes says, “They did not exaggerate in denying the exalted notions, as Socrates did.”54 Two critical terms are not entirely clear in the statement. 51 52

53

54

Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1127b22–26: οἱ δ᾽ εἴρωνες […] μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. Note that ἔνδοξα can also refer to well-known or generally accepted things. See, e.g., Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1124b28–31. There, Aristotle discusses one who is great in soul (μεγαλόψυχος) and who speaks honestly and openly without regard for opinions, except when speaking to the multitude, when he is ironic. What Aristotle could have meant by Socratic “irony” has been the subject of much scholarly discussion, including in Schleiermacher’s 1815 lecture, “The Value of Socrates as a Philosopher,” and Kierkegaard’s master’s thesis, “On the Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates.” For Hegel’s understanding of Socratic irony, see Nicholas White, “Socrates in Hegel and Others,” in A Companion to Socrates, 368–88. See also the treatment of Kierkegaard’s notion of Socratic irony in Paul Muench, “Kierkegaard’s Socratic Point of View,” in A Companion to Socrates, 389–405. However, philological studies of what Aristotle meant by irony in the context of the Nicomachean Ethics suggest that his meaning is, in fact, quite narrow, indeed limited to speaking words of self-disparagement, which in Socrates’s case may mean merely saying that he knows nothing. See, e.g., P.W. Gooch, “Socratic Irony and Aristotle’s ‘Eiron’: Some Puzzles,” Phoenix 41 (1987): 95–104, and Gregory Vlastos, “Socratic Irony,” The Classical Quarterly 37 (1987): 76–96, especially 81. See Aristotle, The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, 278–79, especially nn. 197–98, which explain the length of the lacuna here. Even the earlier mention of irony in Eth. Nic. 1124b28–31 (266–77 in the translation) may be somewhat muddled. The translators suggest that the Arabic muzāḥ, which they translate as “jest,” is used to translate the Greek εἰρωνεία; see 266, nn. 131 and 132. However, they note that the Arabic text immediately before this “does not correspond exactly to any of the Greek MSS” (266 n. 130). In his entry on mazḥ, Lane notes that the term refers to behaving “in a free and easy manner, with the view of blandishing and conciliating, without annoying.” This seems rather the opposite of εἰρωνεία. Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 168–169: ‫המתפחתים […] הם לא יפליגו בכפירת הענינים הנכבדים כמו שהיה עושה סקראט‬. Note that the Hebrew kefirah is not a likely translation of the Arabic muzāḥ.

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The first is “denying” (kefirah), which can mean either simply denying or else can refer to the heretical denial of religious beliefs (especially if the underlying Arabic term is kufr). The second is “exalted” (ha-nikhbadim), which can have a connotation of being divinely exalted. Thus, it is possible that Averroes is referring to a kind of general scepticism regarding beliefs respected by Socrates’s contemporaries. He may also be referring to an outright heretical denial of divine views or theology. Both views cohere with the Socrates we have seen in the Middle Commentaries on the Parva naturalia and the Rhetoric. In both cases, Averroes clearly sets himself against this Socrates and against this kind of scepticism. The six other mentions of Socrates in the Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics concern his identification of virtues with knowledge and the denial of akrasia. Taken together, these claims imply that one becomes virtuous if—and only if—one has knowledge. To begin with, at 3.8, Averroes follows Aristotle in attributing to Socrates the view that courage is knowledge, particularly that form of courage that comes from education and experience.55 In 6.13, Aristotle discusses Socrates’s views of practical knowledge: Hence some say all the virtues are forms of phronēsis, and Socrates in one way sought correctly, in another he erred; for in believing that all the virtues are forms of phronēsis he erred, but that they are not without phronēsis, he spoke beautifully. […] Socrates believed, then, that the virtues are logoi, for they are all epistēmai, whereas we believe they are together with logos.56

55

56 57

Διόπερ τινές φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ’ ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. […] Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου.57

Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 132: ‫והגבורה‬ ‫ ולכן חשב סקראט שהג־‬.‫השנית היא אשר תהיה מפני החנוך והניסיון בכל אחד מהדברים‬ ‫בורה חכמה‬. My translation: “The second kind of courage is that which comes from education and experience in each thing. Therefore, Socrates thought that courage is wisdom.” Ronna Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates: On the Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 128, calls this view “the Socratic position in its most dubious form, according to which virtue is scientific knowledge and nothing but logos.” Burger notes that Socrates’s lifelong pursuit of dialogue as described in Plato’s Apology is with a view towards virtue and the good; i.e., action, not merely speech. Yet without access to Plato’s works, Hebrew readers would have only Aristotle, and only through the lens of Averroes’s Middle Commentary. Translated by Burger in Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates, 219. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1144b17–30.

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Aristotle’s Socrates includes the virtues among phronēsis and logoi, to which Aristotle objects, saying rather that in some sense they come together with, i.e., accompany logoi. Our Arabic text does not contain this section,58 but Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics does: It is said that the voluntary figurative virtue does not exist without haśkel. Since it is never found without haśkel, some said that all of the ethical virtues are haśkelim, as Socrates did. […] However, Socrates thinks that all the virtues are knowledges.

‫נאמר שהמעלה התמונית הבחירית לא תהיה‬ ‫ ולהיותה לעולם לא תמצא מבלתי‬.‫מבלתי השכל‬ ‫השכל אמרו קצת האנשים שכל המעלות המדו־‬ ‫תיות השכלים כמו סקראט […] ואולם סקראט‬ 59.‫הנה כבר היה חושב שכל המעלות ידיעות‬

Averroes connects virtue with what the Hebrew translator somewhat idiosyncratically calls haśkel, using it to translate taʿaqqul—that is, practical intellect or prudence (i.e., phronēsis)—but also ʿaql; that is, intellect.60 Averroes does not say that all virtue is found together with prudence or knowledge, but that all voluntary virtues—that is, practical virtues—are forms of prudence. Socrates adds to this that all virtues are “knowledges”; that is, perhaps, sciences.61 This position apparently includes the earlier one; namely, that courage is knowledge or wisdom (ḥokhmah). This Socratic position works well with the position that for the Socratics, there is no distinction between practical and theoretical sciences—a position we saw exemplified in the Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric.

58 59 60

61

See n. 48 above. Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 222–23. Again, the active parts of Plato’s understanding of the Socratic endeavour do not make it to the Hebrew reader. Even phronesis becomes a kind of knowledge (yediʿah). See Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 377. The use of the term haśkel is probably based on Prov 1:2, where the context suggests a practical kind of intellectual activity. However, Samuel ibn Tibbon, Ma‌ʾamar yiqawwu ha-mayyim (Tel Aviv: 2011), 505, identifies haśkel with knowledge (‫כי הידיעה וההשכל שני שמות‬ ‫)באים זה אחר זה על ענין אחד‬. This statement may underlie Samuel ben Judah’s translation, since he, like Samuel ibn Tibbon, sees Socrates as making the same identification between yediʿah and haśkel. The Hebrew yediʿah is most often used to translate the Arabic maʿrifa by the ibn Tibbon family, according to the evidence in the Peshat Project database (https://peshat.gwiss.unihamburg.de). Less often, it translates the Arabic ʿilm, which is more frequently used for science. See Berman’s index in Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 384, for instances where yediʿah is used to refer to the Arabic ʿilm, which is in turn referring to the Greek θεορία.

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Not only are all virtues knowledge, according to Averroes’s Socrates, but knowledge itself leads to virtue. This is a necessary consequence of Averroes’s understanding of Socrates’s denial of unrestraint, akrasia. Aristotle says: For it would be terrible, as Socrates thought, if someone had knowledge in him, but something overpowered it and led it about like a captive slave. Socrates fought against this logos entirely, on the grounds that there is no such thing as unrestraint. For [he thought] that no one acts contrary to what he takes to be best except out of ignorance.

Δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄγνοιαν.62

For Aristotle’s Socrates, to take something to be best—that is, judging or understanding something to be best—is to act according to this view. Aristotle’s Socrates actually makes two points about akrasia here: the first is that if people have knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of what is best, then they will pursue what they know to be best. The second is that people act according to what they take to be best. The second point does not necessarily refer to people who have knowledge, but instead uses the much more general “take to be” (ὑπολαμβάνων) best. Here, the ignorance in question (ἄγνοια) does not seem to be the opposite of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), but rather an expression of some people’s ignorance of how their actions do not contribute to their goal of doing what they take to be best. It does not seem to have any bearing on whether what they take to be best is, in fact, best. The Arabic translation conveys these two points fairly accurately: For it is bad that anyone should possess knowledge, as Socrates thought, and that he does [not] restrain something else or is unjust against himself here and there, as if he were a slave. For Socrates was opposing the statement altogether and was affirming that lack of restraint does not exist, since no one thinks that he does anything other than good unless through ignorance. 62 63

ّ‫ف‬ ‫��ئ �أ ن‬ ‫� ن ع�لمً�ا ل�أ ح�د ��ظك�� � نّ � ق‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ك‬ � ‫���إ ن��ه رد‬ ‫ط‬ � ��‫�س‬ �� � � � ‫يو‬ ‫� ر �ي س‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ت‬ ‫ف� ن‬ �‫�� ب����ط ��س��ي ئ�ً�ا � و ي ج‬ ‫�و� [لا] �ي���ض‬ ‫�ور �ذا ��ه �ه�ا �ه ن���ا و�ه�ا‬ ‫�� ك‬ ّ‫ي أ‬ ّ‫ف ن‬ ‫كا ن � ض�� ��ا دّ ا �ل���ق‬ ‫ق‬ ‫ول‬ �‫�ه ن���ا ك� ن��ه مم��لوك ���إ � ��س��را ط��ي��س � � ي‬ ّ‫أ‬ ّ ‫ن‬ ‫أ‬ ‫كا ن ��ث� � ت� � ن‬ ‫�� ����ط �م� ن‬ ‫ل‬ � � � ‫�ض‬ � � ‫�ه‬ �� ‫ا‬ � ‫ل‬ � � ‫و‬ ‫ج‬ ‫ي �ب‬ ‫ب‬ ‫أّ �ي س‬ ‫� ل‬ �‫بأ�ّ�وعك�لي‬ ً ‫ف‬ ‫غ‬ ‫�ف‬ ّ ‫�ظ‬ ‫���خ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫� ن��ه ل ي� ك‬ ‫�� ن� �ي�� � ن� واح�د � ��ه ي��� �ع�ل ���ع�لا ���ير ا �ل ير‬ ‫ً مأ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ن‬ � 63.‫�و� �ل��ل�� ج���ه�ل‬ ‫إ� لا � � ي� ك‬

Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1145b23–26; translation mine. Aristotle, The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, 372–73 (English translation from this text).

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The Arabic Aristotle’s Socrates says that (1) people with knowledge (ʿilm) are able to restrain themselves and (2) people do what they think (ẓanna) is best. Ignorance (al-ǧahl) here again appears to refer to the method by which one attains what is best rather than ignorance of what is best itself. Averroes, however, has Socrates make only the first point; namely, that people who have knowledge (yediʿah) do what is best. To be sure, he does this in answer to a question he poses that sounds more like point 2: “How could there exist a person who thinks a true thought but does not restrain himself?”64 This question is not about knowledge, but more generally about thoughts or views. Nevertheless, in his response, Averroes limits Socrates’s answer to point 1: However, Socrates opposed this view with a universal statement. He said that no one who has knowledge would be unrestrained and that it is only possible for one to do something not good out of ignorance.

‫ואולם סקרט הנה היה מהפך הסברא הזאת‬ ‫במאמר כללי ויאמר שאין אחד ממי שיש לו‬ ‫ידיעה הוא בלתי לוחץ לנפשו ושלא יתכן שיפעל‬ 65.‫אחד פעל בלתי טוב אלא מפני הסכלות‬

That is, Averroes has Socrates adopt a much more limited position here than we find in Aristotle. People do not unrestrainedly do what they think is best, but only what they know to be best. It follows that according to Averroes’s Socrates, knowledge of what is best necessarily leads to doing what is best. Earlier, we saw that for Averroes’s Socrates, the virtues were knowledges. Now, we find that knowledge necessarily leads to virtue. Taken together, these views are clear signs that Averroes’s Socrates sees knowledge and virtue as equivalent. One is virtuous if and only if one has knowledge.66 This position would seem to have a direct bearing on Averroes’s Socrates’s scepticism. This scepticism, as we saw, was manifest in his denial of the exalted beliefs of the people in the Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, his denial that he possesses divine wisdom in the Middle Commentary on the Parva naturalia, and his attack on the premises of the law, likely the religious law (al-sunna), in the Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric. If Socrates does not have knowledge of the divine, then he cannot act virtuously vis-à-vis the divine. Moreover, he cannot accept views of the divine or religious actions as virtuous without possessing knowledge as to whether or not they are in fact 64 65 66

Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 227: ‫איך אפשר‬ ?‫שימצא אדם יסבור סברא אמתית ולא ילחץ נפשו‬ Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 228. Xenophon makes a similar point about Socrates’s identification of knowledge and virtue in Memorabilia 3.9. I thank Gabriel Danzig for drawing my attention to this passage.

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virtuous. It seems likely, then, that the equivalence Averroes’s Socrates sees between virtue and knowledge is what leads him first to scepticism, then to attacking religious beliefs and law, and finally to his death, even while in pursuit of virtue; that is, knowledge. 2.3 Critique of Socrates’s Denial of Akrasia Aristotle famously rejects Socrates’s denial of akrasia, saying that it goes against observable phenomena. One can, after all, find many people who follow pleasure and passion over reasoned ends. Yet puzzlingly, after a fairly extensive discussion of the relationship between akrasia, knowledge, and phronēsis, none of which Aristotle sees as equivalent to any other, and an explanation of the internal reasoning of the unrestrained man, Aristotle acknowledges “that which Socrates sought seems to be so.”67 That is, Aristotle does not appear to reject Socrates’s denial of akrasia entirely.68 Whatever Aristotle’s relationship to Socrates’s view is here, the Arabic translation is highly muddled at this point, and indeed it is impossible to reconstruct its sense. The Arabic has a fragment regarding Socrates’s view: “It seems that part of what Socrates was

‫ن‬

ّ‫أ ن‬

‫كا ���ط�ل� � ق‬ ‫ش‬ seeking” (‫�س��را ط��ي��س‬ �‫� �م�ا � � ي ب‬ ‫)و�ي�����ب���ه � � ب��ع���ض‬.69 Averroes, however, may have a better text, although his comments, in fact, greatly qualify what he accepts of Socrates’s view. Rather than tending towards accepting the full view, Averroes says: Thus it would seem that Socrates’s statement is true in some ways. For this defect [sc. Pleasure’s overcoming of reason] will not occur in one who thinks that he has true knowledge. Nor does this defect exist in true knowledge.

‫ומכאן ידמה שיהיה מאמר סקרט אמת בפנים‬ ‫מה כי לא יהיה זה הפגע במי שיחשב בו שהוא‬ ‫ידע ידיעה אמתית ולא הידיעה הטובה ימצא‬ 70.‫בה זה הפגע‬

Averroes, then, does not follow Aristotle in conceding to Socrates’s view, but rather acknowledges that what Socrates said was true “in some ways.” Those ways turn out to be that when someone has true knowledge, or merely thinks he does, then pleasure does not overcome his reason. Averroes’s qualified 67 68 69 70

Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1147b14–15: ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν. On the importance of this return to Socrates’s view and some reasons for it, see Burger, Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates, 136. Aristotle, The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, 382–83 (English translation from this text). Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 235.

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phrasing does not imply that this position is actually Socrates’s, but only that it is connected to it “in some ways,” and therefore it does not require him to modify his earlier view that for Socrates, knowledge and virtue are equivalent. Rather, the view that people who think they have knowledge will not yield to pleasure, a view which we saw in Aristotle’s earlier depiction of Socrates’s view, here appears as Aristotle’s or even Averroes’s own view rather than Socrates’s. That is, Averroes appears to be telling his readers (perhaps in Aristotle’s name) that even those who think they have true knowledge (but who may not, in fact, have such knowledge) are thereby able to overcome the dominance of pleasure. Averroes’s Socrates, as we saw, spoke only of those who actually had true knowledge. The addition of those who think they have true knowledge appears to follow from the account of internal reasoning we find regarding the claims of pleasure and knowledge. Averroes, following Aristotle, describes a kind of internal syllogism that forms the basis of human action.71 The syllogism involves a universal premise and a particular premise, which together form a conclusion that is an action. One of Aristotle’s examples is elaborated in Averroes’s Middle Commentary as follows. The universal premise is “everything sweet ought to be tasted,” the particular premise is the sensory observation that “this thing is sweet,” and the reasoned conclusion is that one should eat this particular thing. If, Averroes notes, the universal premise were different, say that “everything sweet arouses red bile,” then the particular premise—namely, “this thing is sweet”—could now lead to the conclusion that one should not eat the sweet thing in question so as not to create excessive red bile.72 Now, true knowledge clearly affects the universal premise, but not the particular premise. However, the universal premise need not be formed by knowledge, but can instead be formed by opinion or reasoning (sevara‌ʾ).73 Earlier, Averroes noted that “many of those who have opinions that are thoughts do not doubt what they opine, but think that they have true knowledge.”74 This statement is directly based

71 72 73 74

Aristotle describes this in Eth. Nic. 1147a1–b2. This corresponds to Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 232–34. Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 234. Averroes’s medical example is no longer strictly Aristotelian. Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 234. Aristotle’s Greek here (in Eth. Nic. 1147a25) is δόξα. Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 232: ‫הרבה‬ ‫מבעלי הסברות אשר הן מחשבות לא יספקו במה שיסברו מזה אבל יחשבו כי אשר אצלם‬ ‫ידיעה אמתית‬.

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on Aristotle.75 Yet Averroes explains this by appealing to the process of assent (immut in the Hebrew translation, likely taṣdīq in the original Arabic): “The assent of those people who have [mere] thoughts is not less than that of those who have knowledge.”76 That is, here, Averroes brings in an account of practical reasoning that explains why his modified form of the Socratic denial of akrasia can work: one who thinks he has true knowledge—that is, one who has assented to such knowledge—will strive to act on it and will restrain himself accordingly. There is, then, no need to have true knowledge, but only true assent. In the continuation of the above-cited passage, Averroes follows Aristotle in distinguishing between those who actively use their knowledge and those who do not. It is the former who are, as it were, actively engaged with the practical syllogism and who, in so doing, use universal premises, whether from knowledge or from assent, to form that syllogism and thereby overcome their pleasures. For Averroes, assent to universal true premises thus prevents akrasia and so can, presumably, lead to virtuous actions. The problems caused by akrasia are certainly great in Aristotle’s text, but in the Arabic translation, they undermine the very foundations of the law. At a significant point in Aristotle’s argument, the Arabic translator of the Ethics apparently mistook Aristotle’s word for proverb, παροιμία, for the similarly spelt παρανομία, which means “contrary to the law.” Aristotle’s Greek said: The akratic person falls under the proverb according to which we say, “When water chokes someone, what can he wash it down with?”

ὁ δ’ ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ φαμὲν “ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;”77

Aristotle uses this proverb to illustrate a problem with the akratic person; that is, the person who has no self-restraint. How do you convince someone to do good things when the person “is convinced that he ought to do one thing and nevertheless does another thing”?78 The water in the proverb is calculation (λογισμός), and the choking man is one who has already calculated that the good lies in actions other than the ones he is taking. He is not helped by 75 76 77 78

Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1146b24–28: Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι παρ’ ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ’ οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 232: ‫בעלי‬ ‫המחשבה […] [ו]אשר אצלו הידיעה […] אמותם אינו למטה מאמות אלו‬. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1146a34–35. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926), 385.

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persuasion (τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι), since such persuasion would only serve to reinforce his calculation about the good action that he already recognises as good, but which he does not perform because he has no self-restraint. Yet in the Arabic translation, the text appears somewhat differently: As for the man who does not restrain himself, he must necessarily be contrary to the law, and he says, contrary to the law, “When water chokes a man, what must he drink after it?”

‫و ج�� ب� ع��لي��ه‬ ‫ف خ ف‬ �� ‫�ي� ��لا‬ ‫�ذ‬ ‫ن غ‬ �‫ا �ل� ��ي ي��ب���ي‬

‫ّ �ذ‬ ‫ت ف‬ ‫وّا�م�ا ا �ل� ��ي لا �ي���ض‬ ‫�� ب����ط �ذا ��ه ����ق�د‬ ‫أ‬ ‫ف‬ ‫�ق‬ ‫� ن��ه ع��لى خ��لا �� ا �لن��ا �مو��س و�ي�� ول‬ ‫خ ف‬ ‫ا �لن �م �� � نّ �إ�ذا ن‬ ‫��ا و س إ ��ه‬ ‫� ن�� ق� ��م�ا‬ � ‫كا � ا لم�ا ء ي‬ ‫أن‬ 79.‫� � ي� ش���ر ب� ع��لي��ه‬

The Arabic translation, then, raises a problem not found in Aristotle: How can someone without self-restraint be governed by the law? The water in this analogy does not appear to be calculation, though an Arabic term for thought, al-fikrah, does appear in the preceding paragraph. Rather, the water seems to refer to restraint itself, including perhaps the restraints of the law. The Arabic text thus raises the question of the connection between self-restraint, law, and calculation. Averroes develops this connection in his Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics: One who does not restrain himself is one who, with ultimate disgrace, alters the commandment. For one who alters the law has no artifice by which he can fix it. He is, in general, like the one spoken of in the proverb that says, “Since water [causes] choking, we ought not drink it.” Indeed, this is so because the natural notion affirms that when a man is persuaded by a notion, he will act in accordance with how he is persuaded, but once he is persuaded differently, he will be held back from performing that action.

79 80

‫אשר לא ילחץ עצמותו הוא ממיר הדת בתכ־‬ ‫ כי אשר ימיר הנימוס לא תמצא‬.‫לית הגנות‬ ‫ והוא בכלל כמו‬.‫לו תחבולה בה אפשר תקונו‬ ‫שנאמר במשל כשהיו המים חונקים הנה אין‬ ‫ ואמנם היה זה כן לפי‬.‫ראוי שנשתה מהם‬ ‫שהענין הטבעי יגזור כשהספיק האדם בענין מה‬ ‫שיעשה כפי ספוקו ושיהיה כשהשתנה ספוקו‬ 80.‫יחזיק מהמעשה‬

See Aristotle, The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, 376–77 (English translation is from this text). See p. 376, n. 28 for Arberry’s suggestion that the translator read παροιμία as παρανομία. Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 230. I have translated the Hebrew yamir as “alters” under the assumption that the Arabic here is a form of ḫilāf as in the Arabic translation above.

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A significant problem with akratic people, according to Averroes, is that they break the law and cannot return to it. Still, he points to a “natural notion” according to which people generally can be persuaded. This is presumably in accordance with their assent (immut) and the practical syllogisms built upon it. The law, it would seem, aids one in assenting to what is best. Rejecting the law is like not drinking water after choking; one can avoid choking, but only at the cost of dying of thirst. Similarly, one who avoids the persuasion that comes about by law because he has erred in the past will not find the right way. Averroes’s Middle Commentary thus identifies a general cure for akrasia: persuasion. Such persuasion allows otherwise akratic people to follow the law. Averroes seems to identify certain wild people who are not able to form universal premises and so cannot be persuaded to follow the law, but they are a minority.81 For most, it seems, persuasion and assent bring people into the folds of the law. Socrates, however, is a clear exception to the power of persuasion and assent to the law. He, as we have seen, only acts according to what he knows with true knowledge. The only kind of persuasion that would affect him would presumably be demonstration. Without demonstrative proofs of the premises of the law or the civic claims about the divine, Socrates would challenge those premises and claims, as in fact he did, with challenges that presumably led to his death. 3

Conclusion: The Decisive Treatise

Averroes’s well-known division of society into rhetorical, dialectical, and demonstrative classes in the Decisive Treatise is to some extent a response to the problem of akrasia as developed in the Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics and to the problem of Socrates. The division of the people is based on ways of assent (taṣdīq); that is, how they are persuaded to follow the law. The persuasion of the dialectical and rhetorical classes is achieved using arguments that are less than certain.82 Nevertheless, these methods are 81 82

See Averroes, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 234, section 15, for the identification of the akratic with wild people. This builds on Eth. Nic. 1147b2–5. This famous division among people appears twice in Averroes’s Decisive Treatise Determining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom, in Decisive Treatise and Epistle Dedicatory, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2001), 8 and 26. In the first instance, Averroes divides the people according to their nature and temperament, while in the second he makes a legal distinction. He does not say whether the two views can be reconciled. See Halper, “Dialecticians and Dialectics

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useful in granting the dialectical and rhetorical classes bases for accepting universal premises of practical syllogisms; that is, in combatting akrasia. Yet Averroes also speaks of a legally defined class of people who hold a certain interpretation of the Law, calling them “demonstrative by nature and art—I mean, the art of wisdom.”83 Perhaps to avoid the problem of Socrates, who cast doubt on the premises of the law, Averroes declares that mixing interpretations between one class and another is “a cause of the perdition of the multitude […] in this world and in the hereafter.”84 It is not a cause of the perdition of the demonstrative class, however, since they presumably simply do not accept non-demonstrative proofs. If, as Averroes’s Socrates pointed out in the Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric, all interpretation is a kind of subversion, then the demonstrative class necessarily subverts the law. Yet by not sharing their interpretations with the other classes, they minimise this subversion to the demonstrative classes. Moreover, earlier Averroes said: One who prevents inquiry into the books of wisdom by those suited for them because other, base people came to err on account of their inquiry into them is like one who prevents the thirsty from drinking cool, sweet water until he dies of thirst because other people have choked on it and died.85

83

84 85

in Averroes’ Long Commentary on Gamma 2 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” 163–66, and the sources cited therein. ‫ ا �تل��ا � ا �ل���ق ن‬and ��‫ا �ل�� �ه�ا ن�� ن� �ا �ل��ط‬ See Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 26, referring to �‫��ي‬ ‫ويل ي‬ ‫بر يو ب ب‬

‫�ي‬ ‫ع‬ ‫�م��ة‬ ‫ �أ � ن‬,‫ ا �ل����ص ن���ا ع��ة‬. An anonymous medieval ‫ع� ��ص ن���ا ع��ة ا �ل‬ ‫ح �ك‬ � Hebrew translation of this work ‫و‬ ‫�ي‬

has been edited in Norman Golb, “The Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ ‘Faṣl al-Maqāl,’” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 26 (1956): 91–113, and Norman Golb, “The Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ ‘Faṣl al-Maqāl’ (Continued),” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 26 (1957): 41–63. The reference here is to “Averroes’ ‘Faṣl’ (Continued),” 54: ‫ומין הוא מבעלי הבאור האמתי ואלו הם המפתים בטבע‬. According to Golb (“Averroes’ ‘Faṣl,’” 93), the anonymous translation “dates back probably to the end of the 13th or the beginning of the 14th Century.” Based on certain textual parallels to this translation in Gersonides’s Commentary on the Song of Songs, in chapter 6 I suggest 1325 as the latest possible date for the anonymous Hebrew translation of the Decisive Treatise. See below p. 192, especially n. 20. See Golb, “Averroes’ ‘Faṣl’ (Continued),” 56: ‫סבה להשחתת ההמון ומותם בעולם הזה‬ ‫והאחרון‬. Compare Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 27. Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 7. Cf. Golb, “Averroes’ ‘Faṣl,’” 105: ‫מי שמנע העיון בספרי החכמה‬ ‫מי שהיה ראוי לה בעבור שאנשים מהפחותים כבר יהיה בם שטעו מפני עיונם בם כמו‬ ‫מי שמנע הצמא משתית המים הקרים המתוקים עד שמת מהצמא בעבור שאנשים הביטו‬ ‫בם ומתו‬. The anonymous Hebrew translation has ‫הביטו‬, “look at,” where the Arabic has šariqūʾ, “choked,” in the final sentence. The resulting sentence is somewhat incomprehensible, though it may recall the legend of the Pardes reported in b. Ḥag. 14b, according to

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This example is apparently taken from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. However, in the Nicomachean Ethics and Averroes’s Middle Commentary on it, the example of choking on water is used to explain how reasoned persuasion cannot reach the akratic. Here, it appears to be intended to show that just because reasoned, philosophical, demonstrative inquiry does not help the akratic, or perhaps even the common rhetorical or dialectical people, it may still help the demonstrative class; that is, the true philosophers. Since for Averroes, Socrates is an example of one who sees an equivalence between virtue and knowledge, he is certainly among those persuaded only by demonstration. Accordingly, Averroes seems to be saying that in his understanding of the religious law, Socrates and others like him should not be prevented from pursuing knowledge, demonstration, and virtue, but that they should also not be allowed to share their pursuit and their interpretations with those who are not like them. Such a religious regime would help most people to avoid akrasia even if they do not have true knowledge of universals, allowing Socrates and those like him to pursue such knowledge while at the same time not causing them to run the risks of being executed for sharing their interpretations which criticise the common view of the universal premises of the law. which Ben ʿAzzai entered the Pardes and then “looked and died” (heṣiṣ wa-met). Note also R. Aqiva’s words of caution to those entering the Pardes: “When you arrive at pure marble stones, do not say, ‘water, water.’” However, such speculations are impossible to verify.

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Part 2 Socratic Problems without Socrates

∵

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Chapter 4

Does Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah Forbid Reading the Guide of the Perplexed? On Platonic Punishments for Freethinkers

In his account of the biblical prohibition against idolatry in the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides says:* Idol worshippers have compiled many books about [idol] worship […]. The Holy One, Blessed be He, has commanded us not to read those books at all, and not to think about [idol worship], not even about one of its details. […] It is not only idol worship that it is forbidden to turn after in thought, but regarding any thought that causes man to uproot one of the roots of the Torah, we are cautioned not to raise it to our hearts [i.e., not to think about it], not to direct our intellect1 towards it, not to think about it, and not to be pulled after the murmurs of the heart. For man’s intellect is short, and not all intellects can grasp the truth in its essence. If every person were pulled after the thoughts of his heart, each of them would be found to destroy [or: one would be found who destroys] the world by * This chapter was originally published in AJS Review 42 (2018): 351–79. 1 The Hebrew here, daʿatenu, is used by Maimonides in the Mishneh Torah to mean “intellect,” “theoretical knowledge,” “practical virtue,” “knowledge of actions,” and “irrational character trait.” See my “‘For the Earth Shall be Filled with deʿah’: Terminological Ambiguity and the Connection between Knowledge and Action in Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah and Mishneh Torah,” in Studies in the Formation of Medieval Hebrew Philosophical Terminology, ed. Reimund Leicht, Giuseppe Veltri, Daniel Davies, Florian Dunklau, and Michael Engel (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 76–103, especially 91–103. I argue there that for Maimonides, ethical decision-making involves weighing, balancing, and choosing between the various deʿot in ways that reflect Aristotelian notions of prohairesis. Not directing one’s deʿah towards idol worship could be thus understood in accordance with any or all of the possible meanings of deʿah. Alternatively, Bernard Septimus argues that the word here and elsewhere probably means “mind”; see Bernard Septimus, “What Did Maimonides Mean by Maddaʿ?”, in Meʾah Sheʿarim: Studies in Medieval Jewish Life in Memory of Isadore Twersky, ed. Ezra Fleischer, Gerald Blidstein, Carmi Horowitz, and Bernard Septimus (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2001), 83–110, especially 99–102. Septimus argues that deʿah includes the meanings of “intellect,” “state of mind,” “judgment,” “intention,” “ethical disposition,” and “psychological state.” What these meanings have in common, according to Septimus, is that they refer to internal processes of the mind. The word “mind” could also work as a translation of deʿah and daʿat both here and in the examples mentioned throughout this chapter.

© Yehuda Halper, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004468764_006

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the shortness of his intellect. How? Sometimes he would err after starworship and sometimes he would think about the unity of the Creator, whether He is or whether He is not, what is up, what is down, what is in front, and what is behind. Sometimes [he would think] about prophecy, whether it is true or not, and sometimes about the Torah, whether it is from heaven or not. He would not know the measures by which to judge [these questions] until he knew the truth in its essence. [Such a person] would find himself in fulfilment [of the legal definition] of heresy. The Torah warns against this when it says, “So that you do not follow your heart and eyes in your lustful urge.”2 This is to say, each one of you ought not to be pulled after his short intellect and imagine that his thought grasps the truth. […] Even though this negative commandment causes man to be driven out of the world to come, it does not carry the punishment of lashes.3 Maimonides apparently leaves no room here for philosophical inquiry or even freethinking in a Jewish context. According to this passage, following one’s own heart, often associated with the seat of thought and even intellect in the Middle Ages, causes a person to go astray. Suspending judgment until one “knows the truth in its essence” leads to heresy. The human intellect is small, cannot grasp the truth, and thus should be satisfied with received knowledge about God, prophecy, and even “what is up, what is down, [etc.].” According to this account, freethinking about these issues is legally forbidden to all; Maimonides makes no exception for an intellectual elite or for himself, and indeed highlights this with his use of the first-person plural. Consequently, philosophy and scientific inquiry are incompatible with Jewish law. This passage does not accord with the depiction of Maimonides we find in the literature. Indeed, this passage is rarely cited in academic scholarship. For the most part, those who mention it, such as Leo Strauss4 and 2 Num 15:39. Maimonides lists this verse as the forty-seventh negative commandment in his list of commandments in the introduction to the Mishneh Torah. According to his words there, the negative commandment is “not to stray after the thoughts of the heart or the sights of the eyes.” The biblical prohibition in Maimonides’s interpretation is considerably less comprehensive than Maimonides’s explanation quoted here. 3 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Haifa: The Mishneh Torah Project, 2009), 64 (translation mine); henceforth: MT, Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2–3. 4 Leo Strauss alludes to this passage in his “Notes on Maimonides’ Book of Knowledge,” in Leo Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 200–201. Strauss notes that Maimonides’s Laws of Idol Worship are “at variance with the teaching of the Guide, according to which the creation of the world is not demonstrable and the prohibition against idolatry is not accessible to reason.” According to Strauss, this

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Jacob Levinger,5 do so only briefly and treat it as an example of a law that is not applicable to the intellectual elite, even though Maimonides gives no variance is present because of “the defects of the minds of most men” (clearly referring to the passage I quoted above) and the fact that “what is true of most minds is not true of all.” The problem with Strauss’s interpretation is that Maimonides gives no indication that he is referring to only some minds and not to all human minds; this is not even suggested in the passage Strauss refers to, Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.3. Indeed, his characterisation of the human intellect as “short,” i.e., “inadequate,” seems to refer to the differentia of humans among beings with intellects. See, e.g., Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 3.9: “The intellect of the stars and the spheres is smaller than the intellect of the angels, but greater than the intellect of humanity.” Strauss notes the distinction between the vulgar and the intellectual elite in Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 11.16 and wonders if the text might be including belief in idolatry along with belief in superstitious practices as the stuff of fools, known to be incorrect by “clear proofs” to “those who possess science and are perfect in mind.” The context, however, concerns only superstition, and given the strength of the wording of the prohibition in 2.2–3, we would expect direct affirmation that it does not refer to the intellectual elite. Did Strauss not notice that the passage in 2.2–3 seems to refer to all human beings equally? He also refers in a footnote to Guide 2.33 (75a), and this, indeed, seems to be the only source for the notion that a generally worded law could somehow not apply to the intellectual elite. In the referenced passage in the Guide, Maimonides discusses the different ways the Ten Commandments were understood. Moses, according to Maimonides, received the commandments directly and the people received the commandments from Moses. According to Maimonides, only the first two commandments, which refer to God’s existence and oneness, were comprehended by the people, since only those commandments are accessible to human reason. Strauss’s use of this footnote in relation to chapter 2 of Laws of Idol Worship in Mishneh Torah is presumably intended to suggest that there too, the law has a dual character, where some laws are accessible to human reason—e.g., the existence and oneness of God—and other laws, perhaps all other laws, are not. Strauss does not ask where the prohibition against questioning God’s existence or oneness that we quoted above falls in this story. Does one need to question these things in order to come to knowledge about them, or can one come to know them without questioning? In any case, the simple, surface reading of Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2–3 speaks to intellectuals and the vulgar alike. Indeed, the passage does not even admit a radically different reading for “philosophically aware students” than for “conventionally minded rabbinic readers,” as Menachem Kellner noted for a number of other passages in the Mishneh Torah. See his “The Literary Character of the Mishneh Torah: On the Art of Writing in Maimonides’ Halakhic Works,” in Meʾah Sheʿarim, 29–45. 5 Jacob Levinger, Maimonides as Philosopher and Codifier [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1989), 211. Levinger mentions this passage in the context of enumerating the 613 commandments listed in the Mishneh Torah in an effort to locate their treatment in part 3 of the Guide. Regarding the forty-seventh negative commandment, he says: “This is not explicitly justified, but according to Maimonides’s words [Guide 3.51], an error in theory can be the source of a great obstacle even for other people, with the result that it can become obligatory to kill the errant. From the form of this commandment’s formulation in Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2–3, one gets the impression that the perfectly wise person may be able to rise above this prohibition and that Maimonides himself, who declared that he read all of the books of foreign worship that were available to him […] did not see himself bound to [this prohibition]” (translation mine). Note that Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2–3 does not suggest death as

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indication that such is the case. Elsewhere, the passage is dealt with in connection with Modern Orthodox notions of Torah u-maddaʿ, the relationship between Judaism and science.6 The ample rabbinic scholarship on the Mishneh a penalty and that there is no direct connection between that section and Guide 3.51, or any other part of the Guide. 6 I am aware of four such cases: (1) Norman Lamm, Faith and Doubt: Studies in Traditional Jewish Thought (New York: Ktav, 1971), 39–40 n. 52. Lamm argues that the passage in question should be compared to MT, Hilekhot talmud Torah, 1.12 (1.11, in the edition cited above), “according to which the study of metaphysics is included in the category of Gemara.” Accordingly, Lamm thinks that MT, Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2–3 is intended for the masses of Maimonides’s time, while the elite are enjoined to study metaphysics in accordance with his reading of MT, Hilekhot talmud Torah. MT, Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2–3, however, makes no such distinction and my reading of MT, Hilekhot talmud Torah, 1.11 below does not see it as prescribing a kind of study that contradicts the former law. (2) Yehuda Parnes, “Torah U-Madda and Freedom of Inquiry,” The Torah U-Madda Journal 1 (1989): 68–71. Parnes argues that “Torah u-Madda can only be viable if it imposes strict limits on freedom of inquiry in areas that may undermine the [thirteen principles of faith]” (71). Yet the thirteen principles of faith, found in Maimonides’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Tractate Sanhedrin, introduction to chapter 10, are not mentioned in this passage in the MT (nor anywhere else in the MT). Parnes, too, grants an exception to this prohibition for Maimonides himself and for anyone else who studies these issues to understand and to teach others to avoid their heretical pitfalls. (3) Lawrence Kaplan and David Berger, “On Freedom of Inquiry in the Rambam—and Today,” The Torah U-Madda Journal 2 (1990): 37–50. Comparing MT, Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2–3 with Maimonides’s Commentary on the Mishnah, Book of Commandments, and Guide of the Perplexed, Kaplan and Berger argue that “the Rambam’s prohibition is not directed against intellectual inquiry in sensitive areas, but, rather, against intellectual inquiry in these areas improperly conducted” (40). In particular, they argue that the sentence I have translated as “He would not know the measures by which to judge [these questions] until he knows the truth in its essence” means that if they had attained the measures (middot) by which to judge the questions, they would be able to do so. Again, this implies a distinction between an elite, who have studied Torah and science and know the measures in question, and a general populace that has not—a distinction not found in Maimonides’s formulation in the MT. My method in reading the MT here is to read it as a legal work whose injunctions can be understood on their own; i.e., without the need for external works, even those of Maimonides himself, to explain the simple meaning of its injunctions. This method is suggested by Maimonides’s words in the introduction to the MT: “I, Moses Maimonides the Spaniard […] saw fit to compose [the MT] […] so that all of the laws would be revealed to small and great alike with regard to each commandment and to each thing the sages have enacted—in general so that one would not need another composition in the world for any of the laws of Israel, but this composition would be a compendium of the entire oral law.” (4) Aharon Lichtenstein, “Torah and General Culture: Confluence and Conflict,” in Judaism’s Encounter with Other Cultures: Rejection or Integration?, ed. Jacob J. Schacter (Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1997), 279–82. Lichtenstein includes all of the points attributed to sources 1 and 3 above, adding still more sources (particularly talmudic, but also literary) for his argument than found in 3. Somewhat surprisingly, towards the end of his discussion, he says: “In Mishneh Torah, the Rambam in effect omitted the qualification of [permitting the study of these forbidden topics in order to understand them and teach others to avoid their pitfalls]

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Torah, when it treats this passage, is primarily focused on Maimonides’s talmudic sources and other medieval interpretations of them.7 The talmudic passages on whose basis Maimonides is assumed to have written the statement above are, however, neither as broadly condemnatory nor as forceful as Maimonides’s words.8 Moreover, Maimonides’s comments on these passages in his Commentary on the Mishnah do not presage his views in the Mishneh Torah.9 That is, Maimonides’s prohibition of freethinking in the Mishneh Torah entirely” (282). However, Lichtenstein is writing as a rabbi and a halakhic decisor; he is not writing to explicate Maimonides, or even the law as it appears in the MT, but in order to determine the approach to open inquiry among his students and followers. 7 See, e.g., Shem Ṭov ben Abraham ibn Gaon, Migdal ʿoz (Constantinople, 1509), ad loc.; Joseph Karo, Kesef mišneh (Venice, 1574), ad loc.; Ḥezekiah da Silva, Peri ḥadaš (Karlsruhe, 1757), Hilekhot ʿakum, 2:2; Isaac Shangi, Beʾerot ha-mayim (Salonica, 1755), ad loc.; and Zadok Rabinowitz of Lublin, Oṣar ha-melekh (New York: Biegeleisen, 1954), 91–92. An exception to this is Nahum Rabinovitch, Mishneh Torah … ʿim peruš yad pešuṭah, Sefer maddaʿ, vol. 2 (Maʿaleh Adumim: Maʿaliyyot, 2007), 525–33. Like Kaplan and Berger, Rabinovitch argues that MT, Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2–3 does not apply to those who have learned the proper “measures” (middot) for studying these topics. Moreover, he also argues that Maimonides’s wording here prohibits serious thought about these issues (based on his interpretation of the phrase lehaʿalot ʿal ha-lev), but that the main thrust of the prohibition is directed against adopting idolatrous opinions as doctrines (based on his interpretation of the phrase ‫להעלות‬ ‫על הדעת‬, which does not actually appear in the passage in question). 8 The thinkers mentioned in the previous note mention four talmudic passages: (1) b. Šabb. 149a: ‫ ודיוקנא‬.‫ כתב המהלך תחת הצורה ותחת הדיוקנאות—אסור לקרותו בשבת‬:‫תנו רבנן‬ —?‫ מאי תלמודא‬.‫ משום שנאמר אל תפנו אל האלילים‬,‫עצמה—אף בחול אסור להסתכל בה‬ ‫ אל תפנו אל מדעתכם‬:‫אמר רבי חנין‬. “Our rabbis taught: The writing under a painting or an image may not be read on the Sabbath. And as for the image itself, one must not look at it even on weekdays, because it is said, Turn ye not unto idols. How is that taught?— Said R. Ḥanin: [Its interpretation is,] Turn not unto that conceived in your own minds.” (2) B.T. Sanhedrin 100b: ‫ בספרי‬:‫ תנא‬.‫ אף הקורא בספרים החיצונים וכו׳‬:‫רבי עקיבא אומר‬ .‫ בספר בן סירא נמי אסור למיקרי‬:‫ רב יוסף אמר‬.‫מינים‬, “R. Aqiva said: Also he who reads uncanonical books, etc. A Tanna taught: [This means], the books of the Sadducees. R. Joseph said: it is also forbidden to read the book of Ben Sira.” (3) b. Ḥag. 11b: ‫כל המסתכל בארבעה דברים‬ ‫ ומה לאחור‬,‫ מה לפנים‬,‫ מה למטה‬,‫ מה למעלה‬:‫רתוי לו כאילו לא בא לעולם‬, “Everyone who tries to know the following four things, it were better for him if he had never come into the world, viz.: What is above and what is beneath, what was before creation, and what will be after all will be destroyed.” (4) b. Pesaḥ. 63b (Mak. 16a, Sanh. 10a, and elsewhere): ‫וכל לאו שאין‬ ‫בו מעשה אין לוקין עליו‬, “The transgression of a prohibition involving no material action is not punishable by flogging.” All translations of the Talmud are from Isidore Epstein, ed., The Soncino Talmud, 36 vols. (London: Soncino, 1935–1952). 9 (1) Regarding b. Šabb. 149a, Maimonides says that it is forbidden to read anything aside from prophetic writings and their interpretations on the Sabbath. Even a book containing words of wisdom and science but not interpreting prophetic writings may not be read on the Sabbath. (2) Maimonides’s introduction to Pereq ḥeleq links the “external books” to the heretics (minim) and to the Epicureans (see below), and these, along with the book of Ben Sira, history books, and music books, are said to be frivolous works that do not contain wisdom;

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represents a break from talmudic precedent and even from his own previous legal writings.10 Nevertheless, the implications of this prohibition are broad. In the first part of this chapter, I shall argue that this passage provides the basis for a rejection of open philosophical inquiry throughout the Mishneh Torah. In the second part of the chapter, I shall address how this prohibition on free thought in fact prohibits contemplation of the very issues Maimonides raises in his Guide of the Perplexed and indeed seems to forbid reading the Guide of the Perplexed at all. In the third part, I shall argue that reading the Guide serves as a kind of punishment for violating the precept against philosophical freethinking in the Mishneh Torah, and in the fourth part, I shall compare this punishment to a similar punishment described in book 10 of Plato’s Laws. Finally, in the fifth part, I shall address how Maimonides thinks the perplexed addressee can re-enter the society of the Mishneh Torah in order to live as both a religious Jew and a philosopher.

i.e., a waste of time. This statement appears to be a recommendation rather than a legal prohibition. (3) Regarding b. Ḥag. 11b, Maimonides says the prohibition about asking what is above and what is beneath, etc., applies only to one who has not studied the sciences in order or to one who has not studied science at all. These questions, which he says are the foundations of the Torah, may, however, be asked by those with proper scientific background (a position directly contrary to the one in the MT) so long as they seek answers by themselves and not share them with others. (4) Maimonides does not associate any of the three above-mentioned passages with any kind of punishment. 10 Maimonides’s Book of Commandments, however, presents an explanation of the fortyseventh negative commandment that is quite close to MT, Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2–3, probably because of the character of the Book of Commandments as a kind of preparatory work for the MT. Maimonides states: “Commandment 47: We are forbidden from releasing our thoughts with the result that we would believe in opinions that are the opposite of those put forth by the Law. Rather, we should make our thought short and place a boundary at which it stops. That boundary is the prescriptions and prohibitions of the Law, as it says, ‘so that you do not follow your heart’”; Maimonides, Sefer ha-miṣwot: Meqor wetirgum, ed. and trans. Joseph Qafiḥ (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1971), 205–6 (translation mine, quoting from Num 15:39). Both laws prohibit freethinking about topics that can lead to contradictions with the Law. The formulation of the Book of Commandments does not go into detail, but it is clear about exercising control over one’s thoughts and not allowing them to exceed the bounds of the Law. Yet Maimonides’s statement that “we should make our thought short” (naqṣuru fikranā) suggests that people can make their thoughts larger (i.e., turn to think about metaphysical topics?) if they so choose. At the same time, in the MT, man’s intellect is short to begin with, and thus he ought to control his thoughts. Note further that Maimonides’s use of the first-person plural here in the Book of Commandments suggests that he includes himself in this prohibition.

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The Mishneh Torah

Scholars have long noted that Maimonides’s description of God at the opening of the Book of Knowledge, the first of the fourteen books that make up the Mishneh Torah, is heavily indebted to Aristotle and the Islamic falāsifa. God is the first existent, who gives existence to every existent including Himself. All existents in the world thus depend on God, but God does not depend on other existents. Moreover, God conducts the concentric spheres that make up the universe. Nevertheless, God is not a body, nor a force of body, but is “the Knower, the Known, and the Knowledge itself—all one” (‫הוא היודע והוא‬ ‫)הידוע והוא הדעה עצמה—הכל אחד‬.11 This description does not come from the Bible or the Talmud, but from the philosophers, some of whom—most notably Aristotle—were idolaters. Nevertheless, Maimonides is not advocating free and open thought about these issues. Instead, acceptance of these principles is equated with various central biblical precepts. “Knowledge of this thing [i.e., this description of God],” Maimonides tells us, “is a positive commandment, as it says, ‘I am the Lord your God.’”12 Maimonides’s biblical source for this 11

12

MT, Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 2.10. On the use of deʿah to mean “intellect” in this passage, see my “‘For the Earth shall be Filled with deʿah,’” 92–93. See also my “Daʿat haRambam and Daʿat Samuel ibn Tibbon: On the Meanings of the Hebrew Term Daʿat, and Their Relationship to Central Questions of the Mishneh Torah and the Guide of the Perplexed” [Hebrew], Daʿat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah 83 (2017): 50. Maimonides explicitly refers to this statement made in “our great compilation” (i.e., the MT) in Guide 1.68, when he uses the Arabic expression ʿaql, ʿāqil wa-maʿqul. The latter expression is also used to describe God in Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 297. A similar expression can be found in the Arabic translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and in Averroes’s commentary; see Averroes, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿat, vol. 3, translation of Metaphysics 1072b20–22 on 1642 and Averroes’s commentary on 1617–18, paragraph g. Averroes’s commentary here may draw on Themistius; see Themistius, Themistius’ Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12: A Critical Hebrew-Arabic Edition of the Surviving Textual Evidence, ed. Yoav Meyrav (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 298, 308. Alternatively, it may draw on either Alexander of Aphrodisias or al-Fārābī. Except for Averroes’s Long Commentary, these sources would have been available to Maimonides. See Steven Harvey, “Notes on Maimonides’ Formulations of Principle K,” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 68 (2020): 233–44. Harvey also points out that Maimonides uses a different formulation of the identity between Knower, Knowledge, and Known using the Arabic term ʿilm in the Eight Chapters (237), which is similar to the formulation in the Arabic Theology of Aristotle, a translation of the second half of Plotinus’s Enneads, cited in al-Fārābī, Harmonization. See Harvey, “Maimonides’ Formulations of Principle K,” 238. Harvey suggests that the Plotinian version may have inspired not only the version of this statement in the Commentary on the Mishnah, but also those in the MT and the Guide. MT, Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 1.6, quoting Exod 20:2 and Deut 5:6.

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commandment is no less than the first of the Ten Commandments.13 A rejection of this account of God is thus, for Maimonides the jurist, a rejection of the first of the Ten Commandments. Indeed, even questioning the oneness of God is, according to Maimonides the jurist, a violation of the second of the Ten Commandments, “thou shalt have no other gods before Me.”14 That is to say, although Maimonides draws on philosophers for developing his account of the divine, his juridical position does not allow that crucial element of philosophical inquiry; namely, questions.15 Indeed, those who reject the description of God and prophecy that Maimonides lays out can be considered heretics or Epicureans, neither of whom has a “share in the world to come” according to Maimonides.16 Among 13

14

15

16

It is also the first positive commandment enumerated in Maimonides’s Book of Commandments and introduction to the Mishneh Torah. On the significance of understanding “I am the Lord your God” as a separate commandment and the opposition to this interpretation by Hasdai Crescas and Isaac Abravanel, see Menachem Kellner, Science in the Bet Midrash: Studies in Maimonides (Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2009), 133–43. MT, Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 1.6, quoting Exod 20:2 and Deut 5:6: ‫וכל המעלה על דעתו‬ ”‫ “לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים על פני‬,‫ שנאמר‬,‫שיש שם אלוה אחר חוץ מזה עבר בלא תעשה‬ ‫וכפר בעקר‬. This is the first of the negative commandments enumerated in Maimonides’s introduction the Mishneh Torah, where his words are ‫לא לעלות במחשבה שיש אלוה זולתי‬ ’‫ה‬: “One ought not raise to his thought that there is a god other than the Lord.” The latter formulation is somewhat similar to the Muslim šahādah, or at least the first part: ‫لا إ� �ل�ه إ� لا‬ ّٰ ‫ا �ل��ل�ه‬, “There is no god but Allah.” Regarding the first chapters of the Mishneh Torah, Shlomo Pines says: “I did not find in the text in question the slightest hint as to the possibility of doubt with regard to the conceptions that are expounded there.” See Pines, “The Philosophical Purport of Maimonides’ Halachic Works and the Purport of the Guide of the Perplexed,” in Maimonides and Philosophy, ed. Shlomo Pines and Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 5. Similarly, Kellner, Science in the Bet Midrash, 145–55, discusses Maimonides’s prohibition against doubting God’s existence and oneness (and the rest of the of thirteen principles of faith) in his Commentary on the Mishnah. Kellner argues there that Maimonides’s legal injunctions leave no room for doubt at all and do not even allow inadvertence (šegagah) as a mitigating circumstance. MT, Hilekhot tešuvah 3.6. Isadore Twersky noted that the meaning of the term “Epicurean” in the Mishneh Torah is not yet well understood. See his Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), 430 n. 183. Since Twersky wrote those words, a vast literature has been produced on the topic of heresy and heretics in Maimonides. See, e.g., Hannah Kasher, Heretics in Maimonides’ Teaching [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hemeuchad, 2011) and the sources cited therein. For a different approach that associates Maimonides’s own views in the Guide with Epicureanism, see Gadi Weber, “Maimonides and the Epicurean Approach to Providence,” The Review of Metaphysics 68 (2015): 545–72. The difficulty in pinning down precisely what Maimonides meant by “Epicurean” is due to his different uses of the term in his different works. He writes in the Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 10.1: “The word Epicurean [apikoros]

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those considered heretics are those “who say that there is no God and that the world has no Conductor” and those who say that God is a body.17 Maimonides enumerates three kinds of Epicureans: “Those who say that there is no prophecy at all and that there is no knowledge [maddaʿ] that reaches man’s heart from the Creator; those who deny the prophecy of Moses our master; and those who say that God does not know the actions of human beings.”18 While Epicurus and other materialists are clearly included among the condemned here, so are all pagans. Moreover, even Jewish Aristotelians would be included in this condemnation, since, as Maimonides tells us in the Guide of the Perplexed, 3.17, “in Aristotle’s opinion God’s providence ends at the sphere of the moon.”19 It is in light of these observations that we must interpret Maimonides’s call to Torah study. Maimonides famously places study at the centre of Jewish life in his Mishneh Torah, as a commandment that is legally binding on all Jewish men, to be performed every day and every night until the day of one’s death.20 Yet this study is of the religious sort rather than of the questioning, even sceptical academic sort we promote in modern universities. According to Maimonides: One is required to divide his study time into three: one third directed to the written Torah, one third directed to the oral Torah, and one third to understanding and contemplating the end of a thing from its beginning, to inferring one thing from another, to likening one thing to another, and to discussing the ethical measures [middot] that the Torah treats so as

17 18 19

20

is an Aramaic word, whose meaning is making light of and scorning the Law or the sciences of the Law. Accordingly, this term is applied to one who does not believe in the foundations of the law or disparages the sages, whether any student of the sages or his teacher.” However, it is clear in Guide 1.73, 2.13, 2.32, and 3.17 that Maimonides understands Epicurus to be an independent thinker, an atheist, and an atomist. Given these vastly different understandings of Epicurus and Epicureanism in the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Guide, I think it not unreasonable to try to understand “Epicurean” on its own terms in the Mishneh Torah, as I do here. MT, Hilekhot tešuvah, 3.7. MT, Hilekhot tešuvah, 3.8. Pines trans., 465. See also, e.g., Guide 2.22, Pines trans., 319–20. Maimonides’s understanding of this principle has been a source of much controversy. See, e.g., Shlomo Pines, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge according to al-Farabi, ibn Bajja, and Maimonides,” Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, Volume 1, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 82–109; Warren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ Critical Epistemology and Guide 2:3,” Aleph: Historical Studies in Science & Judaism 8 (2008): 213– 35; and Aryeh Leo Motzkin, “On the Limitations of Human Knowledge,” in Philosophy and the Jewish Tradition, 147–52. MT, Hilekhot talmud Torah, 1.8–10.

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to know what the root of the ethical measures is and how to derive the permitted and the forbidden and the like from among the things learned from tradition [mi-pi ha-šemuʿah]. And this matter is what is called “Talmud.”21 In other words, one’s study should consist of three parts: Written Law, Oral Law, and Talmud. Given the elaborate description of the latter, there is no reason to assume that the first two are anything but reading and understanding the texts of the Bible and the Mishneh Torah itself (which Maimonides says encompasses the entire Oral Law and relieves the need to read any other text of law). It is in the Talmud that we find topics associated with philosophy in the ancient world. Thus, it seems to include logic, ethics, and the relationship between ethics and law. Moreover, it seems that all of this study that Maimonides calls “Talmud” is governed by tradition (ha-šemuʿah) that is, it would seem, not open to independent inquiry. That what Maimonides has in mind when he says “Talmud” is not the same as what today’s talmudic scholars have in mind is emphasised when he gives another description of Talmud in the next paragraph. There, he says “one contemplates with his intellect so as to understand one thing from another; […] and the matters that are called ‘Pardes’ are included in Talmud.” Thus, it seems that the scholar ought to begin with logical inferences and use them to lead to an understanding of the “Pardes.” The “Pardes” (orchard) is used in the Mishnah and Gemara to refer to the esoteric knowledge of the Account of the Beginning and the Account of the Chariot.22 Here, Maimonides includes it as the pinnacle of study, to which one can increasingly devote oneself after attaining proficiency in the Written and Oral Law.

21

22

MT, Hilekhot talmud Torah, 1.11. The first line of this passage is derived from b. ʿAvod. Zar. 19b and b. Qidd. 30a: “One is always required to divide his studies into three: a third for Bible, a third for Mishnah, and a third for Talmud.” Elsewhere, the Babylonian Talmud suggests that the term “Talmud” may refer to oral study or derivation or inference from the Bible (e.g., b. B. Qam. 104b). Maimonides’s formulation, however, appears to include any kind of inference in “Talmud,” not only those based on the Torah. b. Ḥag. 11b. In the Guide, Maimonides identifies these two accounts with Aristotelian physics and metaphysics (introduction to part 1, 6). Maimonides claims there that this identification is also made in the Mishneh Torah. However, in the Mishneh Torah, he makes no mention of the sciences of physics or metaphysics, to say nothing of Aristotle, but rather associates the Account of the Beginning with chapters 3 and 4 of Yesode ha-Torah and the Account of the Chariot with chapters 1 and 2 of Yesode ha-Torah. See MT, Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 4.10–13. That the contents of these four chapters correspond to Aristotelian science is not obvious. See my discussion below.

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However, for Maimonides in the Mishneh Torah, “Pardes” refers to the account of God, angels, the elements, animals, humans, and the world in the first four chapters of Hilekhot Yesode ha-Torah (Laws of the Foundations of the Torah), with which he opens his code of law.23 There, Maimonides made it clear that the purpose of studying the Pardes is not questioning or sceptical inquiry, but rather “to see the wisdom of the Holy One, Blessed be He, in all of his creatures,” thereby increasing man’s love for God in fulfilment of the commandment “love the Lord thy God.”24 This study of God and the world is not available to all, Maimonides tells us, and even some of the great sages of Israel “did not have the power to know or grasp all these things in their essence.” Maimonides cautions his readers not to “walk about in the Pardes unless one has filled one’s belly with bread and meat—and this ‘bread and meat,’” he says, “is clear knowledge of the permitted and the forbidden.”25 Maimonides, then, places contemplation of God and the world—subjects treated by the philosophers as metaphysics and physics—as central pillars of Judaism. Yet the contemplation he has in mind is not philosophical inquiry. Error about any of these topics leads to the violation of central tenets of religion and can even lead to heresy and idolatry. Maimonides thus urges wouldbe scholars to fill their minds with the knowledge of what is permitted and what is forbidden and only then to undertake to navigate the seas of such contemplation. Only one who is well acquainted with what the law allows should set out to contemplate God. For as we have seen, even thinking about uprooting a principle of Judaism is a violation of the Law. 2

The Guide of the Perplexed

Maimonides’s hardline anti-free-inquiry viewpoint in the Mishneh Torah meets with a major difficulty: the Guide of the Perplexed. In the Guide, Maimonides raises all of the questions that he said could cause a person to uproot one of the roots of the Torah. Indeed, his approach to these questions, as has been noted by a number of scholars, is perhaps less answer-focused than many would like, and in some cases it contains contradictions, leading commentators to radically different views of what he is saying. Here, we note that Maimonides radically contradicts his legal opinion in the Mishneh Torah, Hilekhot ʿAvodah Zarah (Laws of Idol Worship), 2.2–3. 23 24 25

MT, Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 4.12. MT, Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 4.12. See also Amos 8:11 and Maimonides’s discussion of it in Guide 1.30.

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In the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides forbade thinking about and questioning six things: (1) God’s unity; (2) the existence of the Creator; (3) what is up, down, inside, or outside; (4) prophecy; (5) the divine origins of the Torah; and (6) idolatry, including reading idolatrous books and thinking about their contents. In fact, these are the main topics of the Guide. While the complexities of the Guide generally do not permit a simple characterisation of its 179 chapters, divided into three parts, these forbidden topics of inquiry could make up a kind of loose outline of the topics in the Guide.26 1. The first part of the Guide dedicates some thirty-six chapters to corporeal Hebrew terms used in the Guide for describing God.27 One of the main points of these chapters, and indeed of the first part of the Guide as a whole, is to explain that God is in fact incorporeal and also one, even though numerous biblical passages apparently present Him as bodied and as having more than one body part.28 That is, they raise the question of God’s unity and, while ultimately arguing in favour of it, these chapters present the opposing view, note its origins in the Bible itself, and certainly encourage one to think about it.29 2. God as Creator (boreʾ in the Hebrew of the Mishneh Torah) is discussed in the first half of the second part of the Guide. This discussion culminates in Maimonides’s famous account of the different views regarding whether and how the world was created in 2.13 ff. We might note that Maimonides famously supports creatio ex nihilo here (though aeternitas post creationem), while he maintains the eternity of the sphere in the Mishneh Torah.30 The reader of this

26 27 28 29 30

This way of describing the Guide in no way undermines or invalidates other enumerations of its chapters. Indeed, the artistic construction of the Guide is intentionally suited to a number of organisational principles. Chapters 1, 3–4, 6–16, 18–25, 28–30, 37–45, 67, and 70. Additionally, chapter 65 discusses words for speaking about God and chapters 2 and 61–64 discuss names of God. On God as simply one, without parts, and the difficulty of characterising this one in scriptural language, see, e.g., Maimonides, Guide 1.57. Indeed, Maimonides famously notes in Guide 2.25 that God’s incorporeality, as explained in part 1 of the Guide, is in fact a figurative interpretation of the Bible, which literally states that God does have a body and body parts, and so is not simply one. See MT, Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 1.5: ha-galgal sovev tamid, “the sphere revolves eternally,” or perhaps “continuously.” In either case, the reader will question the eternity of the world. See also Guide 1.71, where Maimonides says: “The proofs for the oneness and existence of the deity and of His not being a body ought to be procured from the starting point afforded by the supposition of the eternity of the world, for in this way the demonstration will be perfect, both if the world is eternal and if it is created in time” (Pines trans., 180–81). Such a statement certainly encourages the reader to question creation.

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section would certainly be led to raise the question of creation31 and therefore also the question of the existence of the Creator.32 4. The second half of the second part of the Guide is dedicated to a discussion of prophecy. Chapters 32–48 of the second part form a detailed, though at times contradictory account of prophecy as intellectual overflow. That prophecy as such could be understood in a radically different way is suggested by Maimonides’s insertion, perhaps invention, of “the philosophers’ view of prophecy” in 2.32.33 That the philosophers have a view of prophecy 31

32

33

See especially statements like that in 2.17: “We do not wish to establish as true that the world is created in time. But what we wish to establish is the possibility of its being created in time” (Pines trans., 298). Kenneth Seeskin convincingly argues that Maimonides’s approach to the question of creation is more inviting of questioning and more sceptical than that of Aquinas. See Seeskin, “Maimonides and Aquinas on Creation,” Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale 23 (1997): 453–74. In Guide 1.71, Maimonides criticises the matakallimūn for, inter alia, grounding their proofs of the existence of God on the assumption that the world is created (see Pines trans., 179–80). Instead, Maimonides argues that the proof for the existence of God should be grounded on the assumption that the world is eternal (see also 2.25). In either case, the question of creation is crucial for establishing the existence of the Creator. Accordingly, merely asking about creation invites questions about the existence of God. Additionally, Warren Zev Harvey argues that the statement in the MT that God’s existence is derived from the eternal motion of the heavens is “pedagogically (if not epistemologically) preparatory to the metaphysical proof based on the distinction between necessity and contingency” à la Avicenna. According to Harvey, the proof of the MT is pedagogically useful because it appears to those insufficiently versed in physics to hold both if the world is eternal and if the world is created in time. In Harvey’s view, those who learn enough physics and question the premises of the pedagogical proof will be drawn to study the Avicennian proof of God’s existence pointed to in the Guide. However, “the Avicennian proof [pointed to in the Guide], even if perfectly valid, is […] not thoroughly comprehensible, and presumably never will be. Doubt and perplexity, like awe, are inherent in the quest to know God.” See Warren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment, Physics, and Doubt,” in Ḥazon Naḥum: Studies in Jewish Law, Thought and History Presented to Dr. Norman Lamm on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Yaakov Elman and Jeffrey Gurock (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1997), 149–62, quotes from 160–61. While Maimonides’s account of prophecy is likely based on al-Fārābī’s The Perfect State, chapter 14 (see Al-Farabi on The Perfect State, trans. Richard Walzer [Oxford: Clarendon, 1985], 210–27, and see also Joel Kraemer, Maimonides: The Life and World of One of Civilization’s Greatest Minds [New York: Doubleday, 2008], 387–88), al-Fārābī does not claim that there is a “philosophical view” of prophecy. An Arabic treatise purporting to be part of Aristotle’s Parva naturalia did attribute a view of prophecy in dreams to Aristotle, but this view, while it does mention the Active Intellect, is more concerned with predicting future events than Maimonides’s Guide 2.32. See Shlomo Pines, “The Arabic Recension of Parva Naturalia and the Philosophical Doctrine Concerning Veridical Dreams according to al-Risāla al-Manāmiyya and Other Sources,” Israel Oriental Studies 4 (1974): 104–53. Compare with Aristotle’s Parva naturalia, which also discusses predicting

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raises questions about the extent to which prophecy is a natural phenomenon. Maimonides is explicit in raising these questions, though his answers led some medieval commentators to say that Maimonides himself prefers the naturalistic account of prophecy to the view of “our Law.”34 That is, Maimonides’s words here can lead—and indeed have led—to questions about what he calls the Jewish view of prophecy. 5. Part 2 of the Guide ends with the specific difficulties inherent in the biblical depictions of prophecy, especially in biblical parables. Maimonides turns to the most difficult of these parables, the chariot seen by Ezekiel, at the beginning of part 3. He then turns to the Law’s understanding of providence and evil, continuing with an interpretation of perhaps the most difficult biblical depiction of providence and evil: the book of Job. The second half of part 3 of the Guide discusses the reasons for the commandments in the Bible. Maimonides’s assumption throughout is that there is “a cause for all of the commandments.”35 Yet these causes are often historical, based not on universal truths, but on eradicating certain opinions prevalent among the people at the time of the giving of the Torah. Maimonides famously points out a kind of evolution of thought about the divine in 3.29 and suggests ways in which common opinion may change further in the future. The discussion in part 3 of the Guide invariably leads readers to question the divinity of the Torah. Even while Maimonides clearly advocates for the divine roots of the Law, the reader is at the very least led to question whether the Torah came from heaven or not. 6. The Mishneh Torah’s prohibition against reading books of idolatry or even thinking about their content turns out in the Guide to be related to— and perhaps even a special case of—the prohibition against questioning the divinity of the Torah. Maimonides discusses this in Guide 3.29 and 37, where it becomes clear that he himself has read books of idolatry and even used

34

35

the future. Prediction of the future as a primary function of prophecy is a central part of Maimonides’s Letter on Astrology. In Guide 2.32, he is remarkably silent about the content of prophecy according to the philosophical view of it, and it is possible the philosophers see prophecy as a kind of heightened form of philosophy. See, however, Guide 2.36. See, e.g., Profiat Duran, Ḥešev ha-efod, in Moses Maimonides, Moreh ha-nevukhim (Jerusalem: Barzeni, 2004), 67b–68a, and Joseph Kaspi, Maśkiyot Kesef, in Joseph Kaspi, Commentaria hebraica in R. Mosis Maimonidis Dalalat al Haiirin sive Doctor perplexorum, ed. Salomon Werbluner (Frankfurt am Main, 1848), 113. The confusion is compounded by the fact that the ambiguous presentation of prophecy in MT, Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 7 may lend itself more easily to the philosophical understanding of prophecy than to that of “our law.” See Kellner, “The Literary Character of the Mishneh Torah,” in Meʾah Sheʿarim, 39–42. 3.26; Pines trans., 508.

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them to understand the historical context of the biblical commandments. In Guide 3.29, he says: The meaning of many of the laws became clear to me and their causes became known to me through my study of the doctrines, opinions, practices, and cult of the Sabians36 […]. I shall mention to you the books from which all that I know about the doctrines and opinions of the Sabians will become clear to you so that you will know for certain that what I say about the reasons for these laws is correct. […] The knowledge of these opinions and practices is a very important chapter in the exposition of the reasons for the commandments. For the foundation of the whole of our Law and the pivot around which it turns, consists in the effacement of these opinions from the minds and of these monuments from existence.37 Not only does Maimonides acknowledge having read—indeed, having studied—books of idolatry, he explicitly draws on these books for interpreting the reasons for the commandments of the Torah. Lest there be any ambiguity, in the same chapter he refers to the “books of idolatry” (sifre ʿavodah zarah) in Hebrew, rather than Arabic, the language of the Guide, using the same expression he uses in the Mishneh Torah. His ensuing summary of these idolatrous books is apparently intended so that the reader can verify his claims about idolatry, thereby encouraging them to open the books themselves. Far from the Mishneh Torah’s prohibition against thinking about idolatry, Maimonides’s Guide says that idolatry must be understood so that Judaism can be understood. That is, thinking about idolatry and thinking about the divinity of the Law go hand in hand—one needs to consider one in order to think about the other. Careful readers may have noticed that I have skipped number 3: the Mishneh Torah’s prohibition against asking “what is up, what is down, what is in front, and what is behind.”38 The language of this prohibition is taken from Babylonian Talmud, Ḥagigah 11b, where it is framed less as a prohibition and more as good advice. The Mishnah there states, “Every one who tries to know the following

36 37 38

Maimonides apparently uses the term “Sabians” to refer to all idolaters. On the portrayal of the Sabians in Arabic literature, see Sarah Stroumsa, Maimonides in His World: Portrait of a Mediterranean Thinker (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 84–105. 3.29; Pines trans., 518, 521. Maimonides explicitly recommends inquiring into the first of these questions in Guide 1.47: “The sages have said […] Know what is above thee, a seeing eye and a hearing ear. Now when you investigate the true reality […]” (Pines trans., 105).

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four things, it were better for him if he had never come into the world.”39 In context and in the ensuing discussion, it is clear that these “four things” are connected to—and perhaps constitute the essential parts of—the Account of the Beginning and the Account of the Chariot. These two areas of study, the Talmud makes clear, make up the Pardes, the orchard of divine knowledge that only few can enter, and only with extreme care. We have already seen that Maimonides associates this Pardes with his account of God, the angels, and the world at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah. The prohibition against these four questions would thus seem to be a prohibition against asking questions about the Pardes, or at the very least asking potentially critical questions.40 The Pardes is treated quite differently in the Guide of the Perplexed. In the introduction to the part 1 of the Guide, Maimonides apparently includes the Account of the Beginning and the Account of the Chariot among the parables that the Guide seeks to explain. Under the guise of repeating something from the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides says that “the Account of the Beginning is identical with natural science, and the Account of the Chariot with divine science.”41 In fact, Maimonides does not call these accounts “science” in the Mishneh Torah, and it is not entirely clear that he even has a Hebrew word for science in the book; that is, a word equivalent to the Arabic ʿilm, which he uses throughout the Guide.42 39 40 41 42

Soncino trans., vol. 23, 11b. Such a prohibition could only apply to those readers familiar enough with the Talmud to recognise the connection between this statement and the Pardes. Maimonides makes it clear in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah that these are by no means his only readers. Pines trans., 6. The Hebrew word ḥokhmah was used to translate the Arabic ʿilm by numerous thinkers, including the ibn Tibbons, and it is often considered to be Maimonides’s word for “science.” Maimonides discusses the meanings of the Hebrew term ḥokhmah in Guide 3.54, but even there, he does not unequivocally assign the meaning of “science” to it. See, however, Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 366–68, 395, 473–76, and 595–97. Septimus, “What Did Maimonides Mean by Maddaʿ?”, 86–88, especially n. 16, argues that ḥokhmah in Maimonides’s Hebrew refers specifically to “objectified knowledge” such as a “discipline.” That this is the meaning of the term in the Letter on Astrology (written after the Guide) is not in doubt; however, it appears at least twenty-seven times in the Mishneh Torah and only in one instance is it clearly referring to “science” as a discipline: Book of Judges, Hilekhot sanhedrin, 2.1. Elsewhere, it seems to refer to general “wisdom” associated with the “wise man” (ḥakham). In any case, the term ḥokhmah does not appear in connection with the Account of the Beginning or the Account of the Chariot in the Mishneh Torah. The term ḥakham is used in Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 4.10–13, but only to refer to the (presumably talmudic) sages who cautioned against studying the two accounts in public, and who in some cases were not able to fully understand the topics of the two accounts, and to the wise student who can understand the accounts on his own. Note that in the account of ḥokhmah in Guide 3.54, Maimonides repeatedly distinguishes between

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What is clear is that the science that is to be employed by the addressee of the Guide is fundamentally different from the way the Pardes is to be employed by the addressees of the Mishneh Torah. In the Mishneh Torah, the Pardes directly leads to a better understanding of God’s wisdom; in the Guide, the subjects of the Pardes lead, at least initially, to perplexity. The addressee of the Guide is not only expected to study the Pardes, but he is also expected to be perplexed. This perplexity is a result of the addressee’s confusion as to how to reconcile the Pardes with the Law. Maimonides says: It is not the purpose of this Treatise to make its totality understandable to the vulgar or to beginners in speculation, nor to teach those who have not engaged in any study other than the science of the Law—I mean the legalistic study of the Law. For the purpose of this Treatise and of all those like it is the science of the Law in its true sense. Or rather its purpose is to give indications to a religious man for whom the validity of our Law has become established in his soul and has become actual in his belief—such a man being perfect in his religion and character, and having studied the sciences of the philosophers and come to know what they signify. The human intellect having drawn him on and led him to dwell within its province, he must have felt distressed by the externals of the Law. […] Hence he would remain in a state of perplexity and confusion as to whether he should follow his intellect, renounce […] the foundations of the Law. Or he should hold fast to his understanding of [the Law] and not let himself be drawn on together with the intellect, rather turning his back on it and moving away from it. […] [He] would not cease to suffer from heartache and great perplexity.43 The Guide of the Perplexed is dedicated to the reader who has studied sciences and is striving to maintain his religious belief. In other words, the study of science has not (or at least has not only) led this reader to a deeper understanding of the manifestation of God’s wisdom in the world or even to the love of God, but rather to perplexity. That is, it has led to questions. These questions

43

the science of the law and “the verification of the opinions of the Torah through correct speculation” (Pines trans., 634). The latter statement could refer to purely theoretical scientific inquiry, but it could also be understood to refer to something like ḥokhmah in the Mishneh Torah. It is also possible that the term ‫ חכמה‬in Guide 3.54 is not the Hebrew ḥokhmah, but the Arabic ḥikmah, For the use of this term by Jacob Anatoli for the distinction between studying science and studying the Torah, likely with reference to this chapter of the Guide, see chapter 5, n. 52 below and the adjacent discussion in the text. Introduction to part 1, Pines trans., 5–6.

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place the addressee in a quandary: he can either give up the Law or live a life of heartache and perplexity. The passage from the Mishneh Torah with which I opened this chapter describes an individual in a similar quandary. He is questioning the fundamentals of the Law on the basis of his “short intellect” and finding himself at an impasse. In the words of the passage from the Mishneh Torah, such a person “would not know the measures by which to judge until he knows the truth in its essence.” This impasse, in both the Mishneh Torah and the Guide, can lead one to abandon the Law and become a heretic. Yet the two works approach the perplexed in a strikingly different manner. The Mishneh Torah prohibits the free use of the mind, while the Guide encourages the perplexed to study further; in particular, to study the Guide. The main discussion of the talmudic prohibition against asking “what is up, what is down, what is in front, and what is behind” in the Guide occurs in the context of the discussion of the limitations on human knowledge in 1.32. Here too, we see a difference in approach from the Mishneh Torah. There, as we saw, Maimonides advocates not asking open questions about the Pardes at all, but instead recommends using logical reasoning to back up and support the basic depiction of the Pardes that he gives in chapters 1–4 of Hilekhot Yesode ha-Torah. In Guide 1.32, Maimonides explains that these four questions—what is up, what is down, what is in front, and what is behind—have as “their purpose, in its entirety […] to make known that the intellects of human beings have a limit at which they stop.”44 Maimonides asserts here that human beings ought not to ask what is beyond their capacity to understand, but nevertheless, the sages’ purpose in the talmudic text “is not […] wholly to close the gate of speculation and to deprive the intellect of the apprehension of things that it is possible to apprehend.”45 That is, in Guide 1.32, there is no general prohibition against asking open-ended questions about metaphysics, only against extending the intellect beyond what it can comprehend. The limitations mentioned here are natural, not legal, as in the Mishneh Torah. Moreover, they concern only those things that are demonstrated. R. Aqiva, “who entered [the Pardes] in peace and went out in peace,” is said by Maimonides to have believed only those things that have been demonstrated and to have rejected only those things whose contradictories have been proved false.46 Elisha ben Abuyah is said by Maimonides to have earned his 44 45 46

Maimonides, Guide 1.32, Pines trans., 70. Maimonides, Guide 1.32, Pines trans., 70. Maimonides, Guide 1.32, Pines trans., 68. Josef Stern has argued that regarding everything else, R. Aqiva may be said to have suspended judgment, in a manner comparable to the

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condemnation from the Talmud because he believed things that were not demonstrated and was consequently “overcome by imaginings.”47 Unlike Elisha, R. Aqiva is said to have pursued demonstration as far as it goes and not to have aspired to go beyond the limits of demonstration. The limitations imposed by demonstration are clearly different from those imposed in Mishneh Torah, Hilekhot ʿAvodah Zarah, chapter 2. We might ask further: How would the R. Aqiva of Guide 1.32 treat the subjects of the Pardes discussed in Hilekhot Yesode ha-Torah, 1–4? Certain points of the Pardes are demonstrable, according to Maimonides, such as the existence of God and His unity, but others are not.48 The eternity of the world, for instance, is maintained in Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 1.5, but is said to be questionable, if not entirely incorrect, in Guide 2.25. Other issues, such as the number of spheres, the unchanging character of the heavens, and the natural makeup of the ether also turn out to be not demonstrated and perhaps not demonstrable. R. Aqiva, then, would not be able to accept the Pardes of the Mishneh Torah. He may have entered the Pardes in peace and gone out in peace, but he could not have accepted those propositions in the Pardes that are not demonstrations. As exclusive followers of demonstration, he and the readers of the Guide who adopt his approach must in some sense place themselves outside of the Pardes of the Mishneh Torah and outside of its theoretical assumptions. They may be at peace with the Pardes—that is, they must not disturb it—but they must also “go out” of the Pardes into a place where they can dedicate themselves to following only demonstrations. 3

Punishment

The Guide of the Perplexed, then, is directed to one who is in violation of the Mishneh Torah’s prohibition against freethinking about the foundations of the Law.49 What are the consequences of this violation? At the end of the

47 48 49

ἐποχή (“suspension of judgment”) of the ancient Pyrrhonists. See Josef Stern, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 85–86. Maimonides, Guide 1.32, Pines trans., 69. On the equivocal uses of the term burhān regarding these proofs, see Josef Stern, “Maimonides’ Demonstrations: Principles and Practice,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 10 (2001): 47–84. This may also be attested to in Maimonides’s opening poem in the Guide which he addresses to “everyone who wanders (or: errs) in the field of Torah” (‫הוי כל תועה בשדה‬ ‫)תורה‬, and promises to guide them on the path of straightness (yošer) and holiness (qodeš).

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statement from the Mishneh Torah quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Maimonides notes that violation of this law “causes man to be driven out of the world to come, [but] does not carry the punishment of lashes.” That is, there is no court-ordered punishment for violating this prohibition in the Mishneh Torah, only a threat about the world to come.50 Lashes, of course, are relegated by Maimonides and his contemporaries to the time of a functioning Sanhedrin, but Maimonides grants wise men the authority to apply isolation and exile to, inter alia, heretics and people who speak ill of the sages.51 However, the perplexed inquirers into the foundations of the Law incur no such penalty so long as they do not make their views too public.52 Practically speaking, then, someone who asks questions and raises doubts about any of the six things about which he is forbidden from thinking would only have to worry about the threat of being driven out of the world to come. If the questioner is at all serious, he would certainly recognise that most of his questions would entail questioning reward and punishment in the world to come as a kind of corollary.53 Violators of this precept would then find themselves without any consequence in this world. Indeed, they would find an entire book, Maimonides’s other magnum opus, dedicated to them. Rather than court-ordered punishment, they would have a book to read; that is, the Guide of the Perplexed serves in some sense in lieu of other punishment, or, perhaps, indeed, it is their punishment. Instead of lashes or isolation, they are to read the Guide. Yet the Guide is not entirely silent on the notion of punishment for theoretical sins; Maimonides addresses this notion in his discussion of sacrifices and divine worship in Guide 3.46. There, Maimonides develops a principle 50

51 52

53

On the different kinds of punishment that include not attaining the world to come, see Hannah Kasher, “On the Meanings of the Biblical Punishment of Karet (Excision) and the Midrashic ‘He Has No Share in the World to Come’ according to Maimonides” [Hebrew], Sidra: A Journal for the Study of Rabbinic Literature 14 (1998): 39–58, especially 49–53. See especially MT, Hilekhot talmud Torah, 6.14. This is in contrast to Maimonides’s statement in 3.51 with regard to the errants whose backs are turned to the ruler’s habitation: “They are those whom necessity at certain times impels killing them and blotting out the traces of their opinions lest they should lead astray the ways of others” (Pines trans., 619). Levinger suggests that this passage is in direct correspondence with MT, Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2–3. Questioning the Creator’s existence and His relationship to the natural world obviously entails questioning divine reward and punishment. Questioning God’s unity or the possibility of idolatry entails questioning whether what is punished by one god is not rewarded by another and therefore whether there is a standard outside of the divine realm. Asking what is up, down, inside, or outside implies asking what, if anything, will happen in the next world. Questioning prophecy and the divine origins of the Torah entails questioning the rewards and punishments mentioned in the Torah and works of prophecy.

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according to which the external act of atonement, including at least some sacrifices, is reminiscent of the sin that was committed.54 While Maimonides’s application of this principle to the sacrifices is not entirely convincing (presumably intentionally so),55 it does seem to work for other kinds of atonement. Thus, for example, people can seek atonement for sins involving property by expending property, or for corporeal pleasures in corporeal afflictions like fasting and awakening at night. Maimonides explicitly mentions that disobedience in connection with morals requires attaining the contrary moral habit “as we explained in Hilekhot Deʿot” in the Mishneh Torah.56 The explanation in the Mishneh Torah concerns not atonement or forgiveness, but correction of moral imbalance. Thus, in Guide 3.46, Maimonides moves seamlessly from sacrificial atonement to moral balance and adjustment of habits towards the mean. It is in this context that he brings up sins caused by theoretical errors: If the act of disobedience consists in theorising—I mean by this that if he believes in an opinion that is not sound because of his incapacity and his slackness in inquiry and in devoting himself to theorising—he must counter this by suppressing his thinking [ fikratihi] and preventing it from thinking about anything pertaining to the things of this world [al-dunyā], but direct it exclusively to the intelligible [maʿqūl] and to an exact study of what ought to be believed.57 Here, Maimonides discusses a person who is led to an incorrect opinion through incapacity—the Arabic of which literally means “because of his 54 55

56 57

See Pines trans., 587–91. E.g., it is not impossible to believe, as Maimonides says, that the Yom Kippur sacrifice of a calf is meant to be reminiscent of the sin of the golden calf. However, Maimonides also suggests that the reason a goat is sacrificed for every other sin offering is either because of Israel’s worship of goats in the desert (which he identifies with pre-Islamic worship of the ǧinn) or because Joseph’s coat was shown to Jacob covered in goat’s blood. Neither case would seem to be sufficient reason for sacrificing a goat in every sin offering, as neither involved the entire people and neither is treated in the Bible as Israel’s worst. See Pines trans., 588–89. For the midrashic sources on which Maimonides is likely drawing here, see Moses Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim, ed. Michael Schwartz, 2 vols. (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2002), vol. 2, 620 nn. 86 and 91. Pines trans., 589. The reference is to Mishneh Torah, Hilekhot deʿot, 2.2–3. Cf. chapter 4 of Maimonides’s “Eight Chapters.” Pines trans., 589. I have modified Pines’s translation in two ways. Pines uses “speculation” for naẓr, but I prefer “theorising,” since it can more clearly indicate scientific activity. Pines translates fikra as “reflecting,” which I find rather too scientific; I have used “thinking” instead. Ibn Tibbon has maḥšavah, which may be intended to recall its use throughout the Mishneh Torah.

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shortness”58—or by his unwillingness to undertake sufficient study and theorisation. Such a person repents by not thinking about this world and instead thinking only about the intelligible and analyzing what ought to be believed. That is, the corrective counter to sins of theorising is theorising, albeit of a different kind. The kind of thinking that the penitent theoriser is supposed to undertake concerns only metaphysics and opinions. Even the “exact study of what ought to be believed” places the focus of the corrective measures on the study rather than on the beliefs; Maimonides does not advise revising one’s beliefs, but rather better inquiry.59 The suppression of thought about this world is not a suppression of inquiry into natural science, as it might seem from the English translation above. Rather, the word for “this world” that Maimonides uses, al-dunyā in Arabic, is derived from the word daniya, “to be low,” and accordingly refers to the “lower world,” usually in opposition to the final world, al-āḫira; that is, the world to come. Maimonides uses the term dunyā on only two other occasions in the Guide, once in his discussion of Ash’arite views of reward and punishment in this world ( fī al-dunyā) and the world to come in 3.17 and once in his discussion of intellectual prayer in 3.51. The relevant passage in 3.51 states: Know that all the practices of the worship, such as reading the Torah, prayer, and the performance of the other commandments, have only the end of training you to occupy yourself with His commandments, may He be exalted, rather than with matters pertaining to this world [al-dunyā]; you should act as if you were occupied with Him, may He be exalted, and not with that which is other than He.60 This passage is part of Maimonides’s recommendations to the reader about how to pray and observe the commandments with a view to attaining “intellectual 58 59

60

Ar. ‫לקצורה‬. Note that the Mishneh Torah at Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah, 2.2 (quoted at the beginning of this paper) refers to ‫קוצר דעת‬. I am reading Maimonides’s immediately subsequent example of Aaron and the golden calf as an example of a moral failing rather than a theoretical sin. That Aaron’s involvement with the golden calf is connected to moral habits rather than a theoretical misunderstanding is supported by his and his descendants’ act of atonement: sacrificing “a bullock and a calf.” This sacrifice both recollects the crime and serves to wean the priestly family off idolatrous moral habits. It does not involve exclusive devotion to the intelligible or abstention from thinking about this world. Moreover, Maimonides turns from this example to that of the worship of goats, making it clearer still that the sins in question are not of theorising, but of action. Pines trans., 622.

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worship” (al-ʿibādah al-ʿaqlīyah) of God.61 This intellectual worship bears two striking similarities to the repentance Maimonides recommends for theoretical errors in 3.46: removing oneself from the world (al-dunyā) and focusing on the intellectual; that is, the intelligible. Both also concentrate on the conventional, whether established opinions or rituals. In 3.51, the conventional rituals are used to train one to be truly occupied with God; that is, to intellect actively. It is not impossible to read the passage from 3.46 as giving a similar role to the conventional opinions. That is to say, the penitence of theoretical sinners is very similar, if not entirely identical, to Guide 3.51’s ideal form of worship that either is or leads to “intellectual worship.” If so, then Maimonides may see theoretical errors as part of the path to ideal theoretical achievement. Perhaps it is with this in mind that Maimonides addresses the Guide precisely to the perplexed; that is, to those who, if they are not guilty of theoretical errors, are in danger of becoming so. Such people have the potential to attain the ideal “intellectual worship” of Guide 3.51. Yet this potential is not always realised, and while Maimonides states that introducing and encouraging intellectual worship is the goal of 3.51,62 his stated goals for the entire Guide of the Perplexed are more circumspect. Thus, for instance, towards the end of the introduction to part 1 of the Guide, Maimonides says regarding the goals of the entire book, “I claim to liberate that virtuous one from that into which he has sunk, and I shall guide him in his perplexity until he becomes perfect and finds rest.”63 Maimonides does not claim to do away with the perplexity entirely, as one might expect from the successful intellectual worshipper, but rather to help the perplexed to choose perplexity over heresy and thereby find perfection and rest.64 61 62

63 64

Pines trans., 623. On this form of worship, see Harvey, “Avicenna and Maimonides on Prayer and Intellectual Worship.” “The subject of this chapter [3.51] […] is to confirm men in the intention to set their thought to work on God alone after they have achieved knowledge of Him, as we have explained. This is the worship peculiar to those who have apprehended the true realities; the more they think of Him and of being with Him, the more their worship increases” (Pines trans., 620). Pines trans., 17. Drawing on al-Fārābī’s account of perplexity (ḥaira) in the Philosophy of Aristotle, Warren Zev Harvey reaches an even stronger conclusion: “The philosopher never frees himself or herself from perplexity.” Moreover, he says, “to be a philosopher means to be continually perplexed—continually confronted with new and ever more challenging perplexities. The Guide of the Perplexed is simply the Guide of the Philosophers.” See Harvey, “Maimonides on the Meaning of ‘Perplexity’ (ẖayra = aporía),” CISMOR Proceedings 7 (2013): 74. Cf. David Wirmer, “The Meaning of ‘Perplexity’ and the Literary Genre of Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” forthcoming.

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One who is in violation of the Mishneh Torah’s prohibition against freethinking about the foundations of the Law would find in the Guide the theoretical counter to both potential and actual theoretical sins. As we saw in Guide 3.46, those guilty of theoretical sins are urged to abandon the things of this world and to concentrate on the intellectual objects of thought and accepted opinions. Reading and studying the Guide itself, insofar as it would involve the precise study of the relationship between the intelligible and accepted Jewish opinions, could fulfil the requirement for punishment of theoretical sins. 4

Plato’s Laws

The function of the Guide as a punishment has a parallel in Plato’s Laws. The Laws is one of a few of Plato’s dialogues that survives in some form in Arabic today. Sources mention two Arabic translations of the Laws, neither of which is now extant,65 and at least two Arabic summaries of the work, one of which is a translation of Galen’s epitome of the Laws,66 as well as al-Fārābī’s wellknown commentary on the work.67 One of these summaries and al-Fārābī’s commentary include only the first nine books of the Laws, but it is possible that other texts containing more of the Laws were available to Maimonides. We do not know, therefore, in what form Maimonides could have encountered Plato’s Laws. It is thus not impossible that the similarity that will be pointed out below is entirely coincidental. However, this similarity is also loose enough that Maimonides could even have heard it indirectly from a second-hand account of the Laws. 65

66

67

Ibn al-Nadīm, a tenth-century Arabic bibliographer, lists two translations of the Laws, one by Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq and one by Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī. See ibn al-Nadīm, The Fihrist of al-Nadīm: A Tenth-Century Survey of Muslim Culture, trans. Bayard Dodge, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 2:592–93. On the summaries of the laws and their manuscript tradition as well as their relationship to al-Fārābī’s summary, see Steven Harvey, “Did Alfarabi Read Plato’s Laws?,” Medioevo: Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale 28 (2003): 51–68. In addition to these summaries, there are also a number of other manuscripts of Arabic works entitled Kitāb al-nawāmīs (Book of the Laws) that are not written by Plato. See Dimitri Gutas, “Galen’s Synopsis of Plato’s Laws and Fârâbî’s Talkhîṣ,” in The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism: Studies on the Transmission of Greek Philosophy and Sciences Dedicated to H.J. Drossaart Lulofs on His Ninetieth Birthday, ed. Gerhard Endress and Remke Kruke (Leiden: CNWS, 1997), 101–20, especially 102. The most recent and best edition of al-Fārābī’s Commentary on Plato’s Laws is edited by Thérèse-Anne Druart, “Le Sommaire du Livre des ‘Lois’ de Platon,” Bulletin d’études orientales 50 (1998): 109–55.

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In Plato’s Laws, an unnamed Athenian stranger, in discussion with a Spartan and a Knossian, comes up with a system of laws for a city to be built in the Cretan countryside. While the Athenian stranger gives some accounts of what law is in general, most of the dialogue is dedicated to laying out actual laws, some in great detail. Thus, we find laws about market regulation, marriage, and families, and also numerous laws related to worshipping the gods through sacrifices, games, and choral dances. In books 9 and 10 of the Laws, the Athenian stranger turns to the punishments due to violators of various laws. He is especially concerned with violators of divine laws. In book 9, he begins with temple robbery, while book 10 concerns laws of heresy. The laws concerning heresy in book 10 are primarily directed at young people who do not believe that “the gods are according to the laws” (885b)68 and are thus likely to act or speak impiously in the future. Yet these wayward youths are not interested in “doing unjust things” (885d),69 but want to be persuaded of the laws’ account of the gods. According to the Athenian stranger, they turn directly to the lawgivers—in this case, the interlocutors of the dialogue of the Laws—for gentle persuasion that the gods exist, that they are concerned with human affairs, and that they are not easily bribed through sacrifices and prayers. Their request for gentle persuasion puts a demand on the lawgivers to come up with an account of the divine that is an apology, as it were, for the laws, and one that can without spiritedness (θυμός) convince the questioning youth to follow the laws. The requirement that the account not involve spiritedness means that it must involve rationality, or something close to rationality. The account the Athenian stranger gives is a critique of materialism and an argument for the centrality—indeed, the divinity—of the soul. The soul is a god and the first soul is a kind of One God. As the conductor of the world, Soul governs all things and is not easily bribed to do injustice. These arguments, which take up the better part of book 10 of the Laws, are said to be a “prelude” (προοίμιον) to the law against impiety; that is, a kind of persuasive argu�ment encouraging its hearers to follow the law.70 Following the prelude, the Athenian stranger gives the law: impious words or actions are to be reported to the magistrates, who are to punish the impious with imprisonment. The prison for those who are not convinced by the Athenian stranger’s account of the divine soul is to be separate from the other prisons. It is to be in the centre of town, near the senior council. Its prisoners are to be those who 68 69 70

Plato, Leg. 885b. The Greek here is οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾶν τὰ ἄδικα τρεπόμεθα, “we do not turn to doing unjust things.” Plato, Leg. 907c–d.

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have been deemed to reject the arguments about the divine soul because of a lack of νοῦς, not because of “evil temperament and mores.”71 That is, these prisoners are not intellectually convinced by the arguments, but are not otherwise a threat to the city’s peace. Their sentence is to be imprisoned for at least five years, during which time they will meet with members of the senior nocturnal council who will admonish and teach them about the “salvation of the soul.”72 That is, they will be imprisoned in the centre of town for five years, during which they will discuss the soul and the divine with the eldest and most respected members of the city—a fate closer to college than to what we would typically consider “prison.” The goal of this prison is to induce a kind of “moderation” (σωφροσύνη) in the imprisoned. Accordingly, the Athenian stranger calls this prison a σωφρονιστήριον, probably a wordplay on the φροντιστήριον of Aristophanes’s Clouds. In the φροντιστήριον of the Clouds, Socrates convinces young men to become φρόνιμος, “thoughtful.” In the σωφρονιστήριον, the nocturnal council must convince the wayward, questioning youths to become moderate. The Athenian stranger says no more about what this moderation consists of other than that the one who becomes moderate can then dwell among the moderate.73 The goal, then, is apparently that the youths be reintroduced to society and dwell as citizens among them. The wordplay with Aristophanes’s φροντιστήριον emphasises that “thought” (φρονήσις) is in fact not the object of the Athenian stranger’s σωφρονιστήριον; “moderation” (σωφροσύνη) rather than thought is the object. Indeed, the Athenian stranger does not specify that the imprisoned need to agree with his account of the soul and the divine or with the other arguments put forward by the members of the nocturnal council. The goal of the prison sentence is moderate living, not agreement with the city’s views, while the penalty for those who do not agree to live moderately is death.74 This penalty is not said to be for disagreement with the city’s views, but for not agreeing to live “moderately” within the city. The wayward youth, then, has every incentive to live within what the city considers a moderate lifestyle, even if he is not necessarily convinced by all the city’s arguments. 71

72 73 74

Plato, Leg. 908e. I am rendering ἦθος here as (the noun) “more,” because Aristotle uses it this way in the Ethics; i.e., in a way parallel to that of ‫ דעה‬in Maimonides’s MT, Hilekhot deʿot. Plato, of course, may have a different meaning in mind, but this does not affect its meaning in this context. Note that those who do have bad temperaments and mores, those who are “like beasts,” are held in a different prison. Plato, Leg. 909a. Plato, Leg. 909a. Plato, Leg. 909a.

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Moderation and Rest in the Guide of the Perplexed

If we take the Guide of the Perplexed in the context in which it fits in the Mishneh Torah, it seems to play the part of the σωφρονιστήριον of Plato’s Laws. The Mishneh Torah, Maimonides’s code of law, prohibits questioning the divine and the divine’s connection to humanity. There is no direct punishment in this world for violating this prohibition, but Maimonides wrote a separate book that directly addresses all of the main issues brought up in the prohibition; namely, the Guide of the Perplexed. This book, in my own estimation, should take about five years to read. Moreover, the Guide ostensibly answers the questions raised in the Mishneh Torah, but the answers are complicated, contradictory, and often so unclear that commentators disagree on what they are. Its goal, indeed, may not be to provide answers to all questions. Is the goal of the Guide to provide σωφροσύνη? I want to suggest that mod�eration is included as part of the “rest” (istirāḥ) that Maimonides tenders as a reward for the reader. We saw above that in his introduction to the Guide, Maimonides says he will guide his addressee “in his perplexity until he becomes perfect and he finds rest.” Later, at the end of his introduction to part 1 of the Guide, Maimonides says that the Guide will be a “key permitting one to enter places the gates to which were locked. And when these gates are opened and these places are entered into, the souls will dwell therein, the eyes will be delighted, and the bodies will find rest [istirāḥ] from their toil and from their labor.”75 Souls can dwell in this place, but it is bodies that will find rest there.76 “Rest” is not a standard philosophical term and Maimonides does not tell us precisely what he means by it. We are thus left to look to the other uses of the term in the Guide to discern its senses from the context. This term for “rest,” or

75 76

Pines trans., 20 (translation modified). Compare Saʿadyah’s largely negative portrayal of bodily rest (rāḥah) in Saʿadyah Fayyumi, Kitāb al-amānāt wa-l-iʿtiqādāt, ed. and trans. Joseph Qafiḥ (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1970), treatise 10, chapter 16 (for an English translation, see Saʿadyah Fayyumi, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel Rosenblatt [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1948], 397–99). Saʿadyah associates bodily rest with laziness and negligence, which can lead to a variety of bodily illnesses when taken to extremes. Rest of the soul, however, can be “a premonition [taḏkīr] of the quiet and the tranquillity that will prevail in the world to come, and by means of which one can come to love it” (based on Rosenblatt’s translation, 399). We may note that the biblical support Saʿadiah cites for this notion of the rest of souls, Isa 32:17–18 (“And the work of righteousness shall be peace”), is used by Maimonides to say that nothing bad will result from giving charity (MT, Hilekhot matanot ʿaniyim, 10.2), i.e., to refer to peace and prosperity in this world alone.

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its base form, rāḥah, appears in ten other chapters in the Guide.77 Two of these chapters use “rest” in contrast to “toil and labor”78 and pain and suffering.79 Three of these chapters refer to the process of changing habits,80 four discuss rest in relation to the Sabbath and holidays,81 and one refers to rest (istirāḥ) as self-knowledge and not “seeking a final end for what has not that final end.”82 In all cases, Maimonides appears to understand rest as not doing some kind of labour, either bodily toil or the toil of thinking and having opinions. This latter kind of rest from having opinions, especially those inculcated by habit, is associated with civilised life in Guide 1.31. Maimonides makes the following analogy: The people of the desert—notwithstanding […] the lack of pleasure and the scarcity of food—dislike the towns, do not hanker after their pleasures, and prefer the bad circumstances to which they are accustomed to good ones to which they are not accustomed. Their souls accordingly would find no rest in living in palaces, in wearing silk clothes, and in the enjoyment of baths, ointments and perfumes. In a similar way, man has love for, and the wish to defend, opinions to which he is habituated and in which he has been brought up and has a feeling of repulsion for opinions other than those. For this reason also man is blind to the apprehension of true realities.83 In this analogy, someone raised in a desert is compared to one brought up on certain (religious, and it turns out, text-based) opinions and one who apprehends true reality is compared to one enjoying the pleasures of civilised life. Just as the desert dweller will not enjoy civilised pleasures, one immersed in certain opinions cannot easily abandon them to begin to contemplate true 77

78 79 80 81 82 83

They are: 1.2, 1.31, 1.67, 2.31, 3.12, 3.13, 3.24, 3.35, 3.41, and 3.43. The term istirāḥ appears in 1.31 and 3.13, and the term rāḥah occurs fourteen times in the other eight chapters. Pines is not consistent in his translation of either term and variously renders them as “rest,” “ease,” “repose,” “solace,” and “well-being.” Some of these English terms are used for other Arabic terms in other places in the Guide. Maimonides, Guide 1.2; Pines trans., 26. Maimonides, Guide 3.12; Pines trans., 441. Maimonides twice cites and then argues against al-Razi’s unfavourable comparison of the rāḥah (“well-being” according to Pines’s translation) of this life with all of the pains and bad things of this life. Maimonides, Guide 1.31, 3.24, and 3.41. Maimonides, Guide 1.67, 2.31, 3.35, and 3.43. Maimonides, Guide 3.13. Pines trans., 67. Pines translates tastirīḥ as “repose,” which I have changed to “rest” in order to conform to other uses of the term.

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realities; that is, metaphysics. One who intends to contemplate true realities must somehow overcome those opinions inculcated in his youth so that he can enjoy the pleasures of the intellectual life. Surprisingly, Maimonides gives an entirely contradictory description of the relationship between habit and civilised rest in 3.24: It is as if [the Bible] said that He, may He be exalted, has first accustomed you to misery in the desert in order to make your rest greater when once you came into the land. And this is true, for to pass from weariness to rest is more pleasant than to be constantly at rest. And it is known that but for their misery and weariness in the desert, they would not have been able to conquer the land and fight.84 That is, Maimonides says not only that the Israelites became tougher by enduring the hardship of desert life, but also that they were better able to enjoy the pleasant settled life of Israel after—indeed, because of—the hardship of the desert. This is a direct contradiction: in 1.31, Maimonides says that those accustomed to desert life do not enjoy civilised pleasures, while in 3.24, he says they enjoy civilised pleasures more because they have become accustomed to greater hardship! If the analogy of 1.31 were to be applied to this statement in 3.24,85 it would suggest that opinions inculcated through habits can be good preparation for civilised life and, it would seem, for proper metaphysical speculation. Moreover, it might also imply that habits and opinions need to be viewed as toil and hardship in order to aid people in apprehending true realities beyond them.86 I would like to propose another interpretation. In 1.31, the civilised pleasures are the apprehension of true reality. In 3.24, the civilised pleasures are associated with living in the Land of Israel, with following the Law in its full application under a political regime. That is, in 3.24, the analogy of civilised pleasures refers to actual civilisation, with its accompanying laws, habits, and opinions. In 3.24, the Israelites are not abandoning their habituated opinions in favour of apprehending the true realities. Rather, they are abandoning those opinions and habits they adopted in Egypt in favour of a new set of opinions and habits with which they will conduct their civilised life. Maimonides famously does 84 85 86

Pines trans., 499. Pines translates rāḥah here as “well-being,” which I have changed to “rest” for the sake of consistency. Is there any significance to the fact that 1.31 and 3.24 have parallel positions in the Guide? There are thirty chapters preceding 1.31 and thirty chapters following 3.24. This is more or less the position I attribute to Samuel ibn Tibbon in my “Daʿat Harambam and Daʿat Samuel ibn Tibbon.”

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not consider this an easy process,87 but he does consider it more conducive to pleasure than abandoning opinions altogether. “Rest,” then, has two different meanings in 1.31 and 3.24. In 1.31, rest is apprehension of the true realities, while in 3.24, it is living according to acceptable habits and opinions, such as those adopted by the Israelites when they took possession of the Land of Israel. This comparison highlights that the civilised pleasures of the apprehender of true realities of 1.31 are not shared by the entire civilisation; indeed, they are not civilised in the sense of being political goals or politically attained goals. The city inhabited by the apprehender of true realities in 1.31 is a city of the mind, which can perhaps be identified with the divine city of apprehenders of God described in 3.51. It is a city where law is insufficient and habit and opinion must be overcome in pursuit of pure intellectual apprehension. In contrast, the civilisation of 3.24 is a political association and as such has laws, habits, opinions, and even a holy text. The pleasures of resting in the civilisation of 3.24 surely do not involve undermining that political order by dissolving those laws, habits, and so on. The other meanings of rest can be understood in accordance with these two views of civilised pleasures: proper opinions and apprehension of true realities. Most of the meanings concern developing the former, proper opinions through rest. In 3.41, Maimonides connects rest with “noble moral qualities” when explaining the biblical command to allow a captured woman to mourn for a month before assuming full marital relations. Maimonides says she finds “rest in weeping and grieving” until she is too tired to continue.88 This rest seems intended to relieve the captive woman of her previous idolatrous opinions as part of the process of adopting new opinions; that is, of joining the community of Israel. Referring to another sense of rest, one of the main purposes of the Sabbath, Maimonides repeatedly says, is to support the opinion that the world is created.89 This opinion is important, we learn in one place, because “at first go and with the slightest of speculations [it] shows that the deity exists.”90 However, in 1.71, Maimonides argues at some length that proving God’s existence from the creation of the world is a fallacy of the kalām and incompatible with demonstration.91 The Sabbath, then, promotes opinions about the creation of the world and the existence of God, but not according to scientific demonstration. Rest on the Sabbath, then, is a rest with acceptable 87 88 89 90 91

Cf. 3.29 ff. Pines trans., 567. Pines translates rāḥah here as “solace.” See 2.31, Pines trans., 360; 3.35, Pines trans., 537; and 3.43, Pines trans., 570. See also 3.32, Pines trans., 531, and 3.41, Pines trans., 562. 2.31, Pines trans., 360. Pines trans., 179 ff.

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opinions, not a rest with true apprehension of reality, which presumably relies on demonstration. The role of rest (rāḥah) in these examples is somewhat different: in 3.24, it is the state of holding acceptable opinions, in 3.41, it is part of the process of adopting new opinions, and in the chapters referring to the Sabbath, it supports and presumably promotes the acceptable opinions. Yet despite these disparities, in all of these cases, rest (rāḥah) is part of the process of adopting and keeping acceptable opinions, one of the hallmarks of Maimonides’s understanding of Judaism. We find the second view of rest in Maimonides’s characterisation of the Garden of Eden, where he associates rest with pure intellectual apprehension and “toil and labor” with man’s removal from pure intellect in the realm of good and evil.92 Later in the Guide, in 3.13, Maimonides states that when man knows himself and his limits, his thoughts are at rest and he does not seek the unknowable final cause of the universe.93 This seems similar to the peace (Hebrew šalom) R. Aqiva is said to have found when he went out of the Pardes. Yet Maimonides does not say in 3.13 that one should not apply one’s intellect at all, but rather that one should not apply one’s intellect to things that are beyond the intellect. In fact, the addressee of 3.13, like R. Aqiva of the Pardes, is encouraged to contemplate only those things that can be grasped by the intellect. That is, this person finds rest only through intellection and not through extending the intellect beyond what it can comprehend. This rest, like that of the Garden of Eden, is one of pure intellectual cognition.94 92 93

94

1.2. Note that the rest described in 3.12 as pertaining to bodily pleasure is attributed to al-Rāzī, not Maimonides directly. “For when man knows his own soul, makes no mistakes with regard to it, and understands every being according to what it is, he becomes calm [istirāḥa] and his thoughts are not troubled by seeking a final end for what has not that final end; or by seeking any final end for what has no final end except its own existence, which depends on the divine will—if you prefer you can also say: on the divine wisdom” (Pines trans., 456). For a comparison of this view of rest to a similar view held by Avicenna, see Dong Xiuyuan, “From Tranquility to Extra Effort: Some Notes on the Introduction and Conclusion of Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” in The Pursuit of Happiness in Medieval Jewish and Islamic Thought: Studies Dedicated to Steven Harvey, ed. Yehuda Halper (Turnhout: Brepols, 2021), 149–158. According to Xiuyuan, and in explicit disagreement with my view here, this is the only form of rest intended by “bodily rest” in the introduction to part 1. Note also that a similar view of rest as intellectual cognition can be found in connection with the Hebrew term for rest, menuḥah, or its verb, naḥ, in the three instances in the Guide outside of 1.67 or of references to the Sabbath. In 1.40, Maimonides says that the verse “when the air rested upon them” (Num 11:25: ‫ )כנוח עליהם הרוח‬refers to “the divine intellectual overflow that overflows to the prophets and in virtue of which they prophesy” (Pines trans., 90). In 2.32, Maimonides says that Baruch ben Neriah’s statement “I am weary with my groaning, and I find no rest” (Jer 45:3: ‫)יגעתי באנחתי ומנוחה לא מצאתי‬

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A third meaning of the term “rest” that does not fit into my twofold categorisation is given in Maimonides’s account of the Sabbath in Guide 1.67. There, Maimonides says that “refraining from speech is likewise called rest [menuḥah].” Now, Maimonides is primarily interested in divine speech, which he associates with divine will and creation. However, he notes, “the signification of the [Hebrew] verb [wa-yanaḥ] derives from that of rest [al-rāḥah]”95 and relies on examples of resting from speech from the human realm. These examples are 1Sam 25:9, where David’s emissaries to Nabal speak and then rest from speech while waiting for a response, and Job 32:1, where Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar finish their speeches; that is, their theological arguments. Indeed, the Arabic word for speech here is kalām, a word perhaps not unsuited to the argumentative style of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar. Rest, in this view, means not speaking, or possibly not engaging in kalām.96 Let us now return to Maimonides’s promise of rest to the addressee of the Guide. The first mention of it is ambiguous, permitting one to read all three meanings of rest into it: pure intellectual apprehension, adopting and keeping acceptable opinions, and refraining from speech. The second mention at the very end of the introduction notes that “bodies will find rest [istirāḥ] from their toil and from their labor.”97 This cannot refer to rest as intellectual cognition, since that rest does not involve bodies. It can only refer to the two other meanings of rest: adopting and keeping acceptable opinions and refraining from speech. The addressee of the Guide, then, can be expected to live among

95 96

97

refers to not receiving the intellectual overflow after having prepared himself for prophecy (Pines trans., 362. Note that Pines’s translation speaks of prophecy resting on suitably prepared individuals at the bottom of 361, but the Hebrew has šurah, which is not connected with rāḥah or istirāḥ elsewhere). In 2.45, the second view of prophecy, which is an intellectual overflow manifesting itself through speech, is said to be present in the verse in Num 11:25, referred to above in 1.40. Note that Samuel ibn Tibbon translates both rāḥah and istirāḥ with menuḥah, suggesting that he considered the words to share the same meaning. Pines trans., 162. Al-Ġazālī also uses the term istirāḥ with reference to refraining from speech and instruction in his description of the period of his life when he gave up teaching religious matters in favour of a life of seclusion. For al-Ġazālī, however, istirāḥ is a negative term, one he employs to criticise himself for refraining from teaching others. The negativity is emphasised in his pairing of the term with the Arabic term kasal, “laziness.” See al-Ġazālī, al-Munqiḏ min al-Dalāl, ed. Jamīl Ṣalībā and Kāmil ʿAyyād (Beirut: Dār al-ʾAnḥās, 1967), 75; English translation in al-Ghazali, Freedom and Fulfilment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazālī’s Al-Munqiḏ min al-Ḍalāl and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazālī, trans. Richard Joseph McCarthy (Boston: Twayne, 1980), 106. I thank Dong Xiuyuan for pointing out this source to me. Pines trans., 20 (translation modified).

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other members of his faith with a quiet acceptance of their opinions. While this addressee may continue to strive for pure intellectual cognition, which Maimonides also calls “rest,” he is also expected to adopt the other forms of rest: accepting, or at least not contradicting, the general opinions of society. If, indeed, the addressee of the Guide is one who is in violation of the Mishneh Torah’s laws against freethinking, then he can be expected to return to accept the common opinions, or at least refrain from speaking about them after reading the Guide.98 That is, Maimonides’s Guide could lead wayward, perplexed youths to a kind of σωφροσύνη. It is possible, then, to view the Guide of the Perplexed as a vehicle for philosophical punishment for theoretical crimes, as defined in the Mishneh Torah and perhaps also in Guide 3.46. This notion of philosophical inquiry as punishment is a Platonic one that is seen most clearly in the Laws, where a developed view of inquiry into the divine only comes up as a response to freethinking youth.99 That is, inquiry into the divine in the Laws develops out of a concern for protecting the city’s laws. This is in contrast to Plato’s discussion of the development of inquiry into the divine in book 2 of the Republic, where Socrates builds his account of the divine prima facie as a preface to saying what 98

This is apparently in many respects the view of Moses Nahmanides in his letter asking the rabbis of northern France to repeal their ban on reading the Guide and the first book of the Mishneh Torah (“Iggeret Bet,” in Kitve Ramban, 1:339): ‫והוא [הרמב״ם] כמוכרח ואנוס לבנות ספר מפני פילוסופי יון שמה לנוס‬ ?‫ אם טעיתם אחרי ראיותיהם‬,‫ השמעתם דבריהם‬,‫לרחוק מעל ארסטו וגליאנוס‬ ,‫ הביטו וראו היש מכאוב כמכאובינו‬,‫לא אליכם רבותינו‬ .‫ ויתגאלו בפת בג המלך וביין משתיהם‬,‫כי גלו בנים מעל שלחן אביהם‬ “[Maimonides] was like one necessarily forced to construct a book [viz. the Guide of the Perplexed] because of the philosophers of Greece—a book through which one can flee far away from Aristotle and Galen. Have you heard their words, have you erred after their proofs? Let it not come unto you, my masters! Behold, and see if there be any pain like our pain [cf. Lam 1:12]. For children are banished from the table of their fathers [cf. b. Ber. 8a] and have defiled themselves with the king’s food and with the wine which he drank [cf. Dan 1:8, referring to Nebuchadnezzar’s non-kosher meals which Daniel refuses to eat].” This view is an expression of one common approach to the Guide that understands the work to be addressed only to the navokh—i.e., the perplexed student—not to the upright, pure believer, as the latter would read only the Mishneh Torah. See, e.g., the words of Joshua Rokeach, the Belzer Rebbe, cited in Levinger, Maimonides as Philosopher and Codifier, 13. The Belzer Rebbe’s insistence that one need only study the Talmud is parallel to the study of the laws, or perhaps the laws that the Athenian stranger recommends at various points in the Laws. 99 This notion of punishment may also be present in Plato’s Gorgias, which was almost certainly not available to Maimonides.

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kinds of speech, especially poetry, can be allowed in the city.100 That is, in the Republic, the account of the divine determines the makeup of the city, while in the Laws, the makeup of the city—namely, the laws—determines the account of the divine. It is only in the moderation-inducing prison that thoughtful, but wayward-leaning youths are able to publicly discuss the divine outside of concerns for the city. Once they leave this prison, these youths are expected to keep their thoughts to themselves. Maimonides’s Guide similarly provides a semi-public forum in the form of a publicly disseminated book for the perplexed to ask questions that are explicitly forbidden in the Mishneh Torah. After finishing the Guide, readers are encouraged to live in the city and to quietly accept the traditional law. Yet at the same time, the addressee of the Guide is encouraged to adopt intellectual worship in 3.51 and to strive for rest through pure intellectual cognition of reality. This goal may not contradict Maimonides’s other goal of bringing bodily rest—that is, moderation—since intellectual activity is a solitary pursuit. Indeed, it is clear from numerous chapters throughout the Guide that nearly everyone who seeks such intellectual activity is quite far from accomplishing it. It is possible, then, that one could strive for a perfect intellectual comprehension of reality while at the same time quietly living in accordance with the opinions and habits of one’s society. Let us end by noting that the punishment faced by one who violates the Mishneh Torah’s laws against freethinking in the Guide is, in crucial respects, the opposite of the punishment Adam faced when he was expelled from the Garden of Eden. Adam, according to Maimonides, enjoyed rest (rāḥah) in Eden, until he was punished with “work and toil.” This work and toil, it seems from the context of Guide 1.2, refers to opinions and politics. The bodies of the addressees of the Guide are to “be eased of their toil and of their labor” and to find rest. In one sense, they can be made to go beyond opinions, habits, and politics in order to enjoy rest in intellectual apprehension; that is, to return to the Garden of Eden. In another, the addressee of the Guide finds rest in quiet accommodation to society. He thus both returns to Eden and lives in the world around him. 100 Plato, Resp. 381b ff.

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Chapter 5

“Keep Your Sons from Logic”

Jacob Anatoli on Separating Science and Torah

Jacob Anatoli was likely the first Jewish Aristotelian to understand the talmudic adage “Keep your sons from higgayon” as a legal prohibition against the study of logic and consequently as a legal prohibition against the study of all things that require logic, including Aristotelian science. To be sure, Anatoli interpreted the “sons” in the adage as referring only to youths, not to mature readers. Nevertheless, he justifies this prohibition in different ways in the different places where it appears. In his introduction to his Hebrew translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Aristotelian logical Organon, Anatoli justifies the prohibition on the grounds that once a young person has studied logic and science, he will never desire to study Torah and so will not acquire correct beliefs or good moral dispositions.1 In his later work of biblical exegesis, Malmad ha-Talmidim (“A Goad for Students”), he explains that studying logic without a strong knowledge of the Torah would raise doubts about received tradition that could not be corrected through traditionally acquired notions.2 1 The Hebrew text of this introduction is found in Averroes, Commentarium medium in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias, trans. Jacob Anatoli, ed. Herbert Davidson (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 1–3. Cf. Davidson’s English translation: Averroes, Middle Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge and on Aristotle’s Categoriae, trans. Herbert Davidson (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 3–5. For the purposes of this chapter, I have preferred my own translation, which I include as an appendix. 2 Jacob Anatoli, Malmad ha-Talmidim (Lyck, 1866), unnumbered pages in the introduction. This edition is primarily based on a now lost manuscript which has been compared with London, British Library, Add. MS 15978 (Margoliouth 376), dated 1404. Recently, Luciana Pepi republished this edition, with notes comparing it to other manuscripts, and an Italian translation: Ja’aqov Anatoli, Il Pungolo dei discepoli (Malmad ha-talmidim): Il sapere di un ebreo e Federico II (Palermo: Officina di Studi Medievali, 2004), 2 vols. Even more recently, a version of the introduction to the Lyck edition with explanatory notes by David Guttmann appeared in Ḥakirah: The Flatbush Journal of Jewish Law and Thought 24 (2018): 35–55 (Hebrew pagination). There are another twenty-three manuscripts of the text, however, about half of which are likely from the fourteenth century or even earlier. At least one of these (a fourteenthcentury Italian manuscript from Rimini now in Budapest, Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, MS Kaufmann A 278) is elaborately illustrated, suggesting that it was viewed with considerable importance. Gadi Weber provides a stemma of the manuscripts in his dissertation, “Studies on R. Yaaqov Anatoli’s Malmad Ha-Talmidim” (PhD diss., Hebrew University of

© Yehuda Halper, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004468764_007

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That is, in the context of Aristotelian logic and science, Anatoli sees logic and science as essentially independent from religious concerns, to the point that the Torah appears unnecessary to the scientist. In the context of his commentary on the Torah, however, he presents science and the Torah as complementary correctives to each other. These diverse views are best understood in light of a kind of programme of study that emerges from Anatoli’s interpretation of the talmudic adage in the Commentary on the Organon: one ought to study the Torah first, then logic and science, and only then turn to reconciling the two realms. This study programme preserves the complete independence of science and demarcates a separate realm of thought and study for dealing with contradictions between them. After an overview of some historical background for the Talmudic adage of R. Eliezer, we shall examine how Anatoli adopts this study programme in his two major works: his translation of the Commentary on the Organon and Malmad ha-Talmidim. In the latter work, Anatoli calls his treatment of the relationship between logic and the Bible both a “goad” (malmed and dorban) and an “apology” (hitnaṣlut), both terms recalling Socrates’s Apology. Anatoli, however, primarily interprets them in light of the biblical King Solomon, and in so doing, includes himself, Solomon, and Socrates among apologists for philosophy who strive to goad the populace to philosophical speculation. 1

Background for Anatoli’s Use of the Talmudic Adage

The talmudic adage Anatoli cites in both of his major works, “Keep your sons from higgayon,” appears among the last words of a mortally ill R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus to his students (b. Ber. 28b).3 Other accounts of R. Eliezer’s last words do not include this statement4 and elsewhere in rabbinic literature, it is attributed to R. Judah b. Bateira.5 In all cases, it appears as one of a list of adages, such as “Take care for the honour of your friends” and “When you pray, know Jerusalem, 2019), 60. See 23–25 for the list of manuscripts. A complete edition on the basis of all of these manuscripts is thus a desideratum. 3 My translation: “When Rabbi Eliezer became sick, his students came to visit him and said to him, ‘Teach us, our master, the paths of life through which we can merit the world to come.’ He said to them, ‘Take care regarding the honour of your friends; keep your sons from higgayon and seat them between the knees of sages; and when you pray, know before Whom you stand. Thus may you come to merit the world to come.’” 4 See, e.g., Judah Goldin, trans., The Fathers according to Rabbi Nathan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1955), 94. See the discussion in Jacob Neusner, Eliezer Ben Hyrcanus: The Tradition and the Man (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 2:412–13, and Anthony J. Saldarini, “Last Words and Deathbed Scenes in Rabbinic Literature,” Jewish Quarterly Review 68 (1977): 28–45. 5 This statement appears in Geonic manuscripts of b. Sanh. 96a. Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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before Whom you stand,” that are part of a kind of wisdom literature, exhorting one to good behaviour. Such statements are so general as to be ambiguous and in this particular statement, it is also not clear what is meant by the Hebrew word higgayon. The word is of biblical origin, where it has something to do with speech.6 In talmudic literature, the root, H-G-H, takes on a number of other meanings, including recitation, study, and possibly scorn.7 Yet there is no clear indication in context of what could be meant by keeping one’s sons from it, and there are certainly no clear legal implications of this statement. Nevertheless, an Ashkenazi tradition arose in the wake of Rashi that saw this adage as justifying full concentration on studying Talmud to the exclusion of all other fields of study, including the Bible. This position, which seems to have been widespread among the Tosafists, was justified on the grounds that Bible study tends to focus on stories rather than law and that undirected interpretation of the Bible could lead to heresies.8 Though they look to R. Eliezer’s dying words for support, the Ashkenazi sources do not appear to take the expression as a legally binding injunction. Indeed, I am not aware of anyone arguing that it is forbidden to study too much Bible according to Jewish law. Instead, they take it as a kind of general guideline: one ought to prefer studying the Talmud over studying the Bible. Sefardic and Eastern traditions placed a much greater emphasis on studying the Bible and consequently did not usually apply this talmudic adage.9 Maimonides, as far as I know, never refers to it and could not have seen it as essential to understanding talmudic wisdom. It is clear that he did not see it as carrying any legal weight. Abba Mari of Lunel (fourteenth century) reports that R. Hai Gaon (939–1038) interpreted R. Eliezer’s statement as referring to ḥokhmat al-manṭiq, using the Hebrew for “science” and the Arabic for “logic,” but the text is no longer extant and it is not clear whether he took the statement to have any practical implications such as advice or legal prohibition.10 Abba Mari is clearly using R. Hai’s statement as a polemical attack, but without the original context, it is not clear how much of this attack can actually be attributed to R. Hai himself. A century and a half after R. Hai, we find that 6 7 8 9 10

See Ps 19:15; 92:4, and, somewhat ambiguously, 9:17. The root, he gimmel he, is more common and seems to refer not only speech, but also to all sounds made by one’s mouth. See Marcus Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature (New York: Putnam, 1903), 331. See Mordechai Breuer, “Restrain Thy Sons from Higgayon” [Hebrew], in Mikhtam le-David, ed. Itzchak Gilath and Eliezer Stern (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1977), 242–61. This article contains a wealth of sources that mention the talmudic adage. Breuer, “Restrain Thy Sons,” 248. See Abba Mari of Lunel, Minḥat Qena‌ʾot, ed. Mordecai Leib Bisliches (Presburg, 1838), 170. Cf. Breuer, “Restrain Thy Sons,” 246–47. Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Joseph ibn ʿAqnīn interprets the higgayon of R. Eliezer’s adage as referring to munāẓirah; that is, disputations, perhaps dialectical disputations such as those of the kalām. Ibn ʿAqnīn, who precedes Anatoli in applying this only to young sons, explains that youths are not yet prepared in the ways of science (ʿilm).11 His definition of science may include Aristotelian logic,12 and thus his recommendation is merely to keep the youths away from disputations, perhaps in public, until they have a sufficient scientific preparation. Like ibn ʿAqnīn, Moses Nahmanides suggests that R. Eliezer’s words apply to “students, those who are beginning to study.” However, Nahmanides does not think that logic or non-Jewish subjects should be studied by anyone of any age. He cites R. Hai Gaon in this connection, but it is not clear whether this citation refers to the talmudic adage or to the general rejection of “outside” learning. In any case, the adage in question seems to bring moral rather than legal support to Nahmanides’s case.13 The term higgayon is unambiguously connected to Aristotelian logic by Anatoli’s teacher and father-in-law, Samuel ibn Tibbon. Samuel even quotes the relevant talmudic adage in his explanation of the term higgayon in Peruš ha-Millot ha-Zarot (“Explanation of Foreign Terms”), which is appended to his translation of Maimonides’s Guide:14 11 12 13 14

Moritz Güdemann, Das jüdische Unterrichtswesen während der spanisch-arabischen Periode: Nebst handschriftlichen arabischen und hebräischen Beilagen (Vienna, 1873), 49–50. Cf. Breuer, “Restrain Thy Sons,” 253, who does not include the Arabic. See Mauro Zonta, “L’Ihsa’ al-`Ulum in ambiente ebraico. 1. Il Tabb al-Nufus di ibn `Aqnin,” Henoch 12 (1990): 53–75. See Moses Nahmanides, “Letter to the Rabbis of France,” in Kitve Ramban, 1:349 (Hebrew pagination). There is still no critical edition of Peruš ha-Millot ha-Zarot, which appears in more than fifty manuscripts. Yehuda Eben Shemuel’s edition of Judah ibn Tibbon’s translation of the Guide, first published in 1945 and then corrected over many years (I have used the 1981 edition [Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook]), contains an edition of Peruš ha-Millot ha-Zarot based on printed editions of the Guide that include the work and a single manuscript of the Perush (see 6–7). Eben Shemuel was himself aware of the deficiencies of the edition and considers it provisional (8). Later, Moshe Goshen-Gottstein stated that he had begun to put together a full edition of the MSS, but that he had not completed the collation and was leaving it to “another redeemer”; see Moshe Goshen-Gottstein, “On the Methods of Translation in the Middle Ages: Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Peruš ha-Millot ha-Zarot” [Hebrew], Tarbiẓ 30 (1961): 387 n. 13. More recently, James Robinson examined the manuscripts and grouped them into four manuscript traditions (Spanish, Italian, Byzantine, and an eclectic Spanish-Italian), which he found represented in fourteen manuscripts. See James T. Robinson, “Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Peruš ha-Millot ha-Zarot and al-Fārābı̄’s Eisagoge and Categories,” Aleph: Historical Studies in Science and Judaism 9 (2009): 41–76. As yet, a full stemma that encompasses all fifty MSS is still a desideratum. For my citations here, I compared Eben Shemuel’s edition with representatives from the three main MSS groups

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Higgayon. Some commentators interpreted [the adage] “Keep your sons from higgayon” to refer to the science which is called manṭiq in Arabic, and which is called “dialetica”15 in Latin, after one of its parts. I have followed the commentators in calling it “the art of higgayon.” It would have been more appropriate in my eyes if they had called it “the art of speech,” following their view that “man” is defined as a speaking animal. In my view, it ought to have been called “the art of intellect.”

15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

151 ‫פירשו קצת המפרשים מנעו בניכם מן‬. ‫הגיון‬

18.‫ מנטק‬17‫ שקורין בערב‬16‫ההגיון בחכמה‬ 22‫ דיאליטיקא‬21‫ אותה‬20‫ קורין‬19‫ובילטיין‬

‫ואני נמשכתי אחרי‬. ‫בשם אחד מחלקיה‬

24.‫ מלאכת ההגיון‬23‫המפרשים לקראה‬ 28‫ היה‬27‫ מלאכת הדבר‬26‫ אותה‬25‫וקוראם‬ 30‫ ראוי בעיני נמשכים אחר דעתם‬29‫יותר‬ ‫ולפי דעתי‬. ‫ מדבר‬32‫ האדם בחי‬31‫שגדרו‬ .‫ מלאכת השכל‬33‫היה ראוי לקראה‬

that Robinson identified: Spanish (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MS héb. 684, f. 316r), Italian (London, British Library, Harley 7586A [Margoliouth 906], f. 178r–v), and Byzantine (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, vat. ebr. 284, f. 103r–v). Additionally, I compared these with two MSS not mentioned by Robinson: Vatican, Codices Urbinati Hebraici, MS 23, f. 344r and Jerusalem, National Library of Israel, MS Heb. 8°4280, f. 166v–167r. I thank all of these libraries for making digital images of the MSS available online. The fairly large number of MSS consulted is due to the considerable variations among them. The resulting text is based on a plurality of readings and the age of the manuscripts, but above all on the basis of a clear and grammatical reading of the text. This means that the text is eclectic, but readable. It remains for them to be checked against a future critical edition. For a thirteenth-century example of this spelling of the Latin word, rather than the “dialectica” of classical Latin, see Peter of Spain, Tractatus: Called Afterwards Summule logicales, ed. L.M. de Rijk (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), 1. The first section of De introductionibus, “De dialetica,” begins “dialetica est.” Vatican 23: —. Paris 684: ‫בלשון ערב‬. Jerusalem 8°4280, London 7586A: ‫ ;מנעק‬Paris 684, Vatican 284: ‫מנתק‬. Paris 684, Vatican 23, Jerusalem 8°4280, London 7586A, Vatican 284: ‫“ =( והערלים‬the uncircumcised,” probably referring to Christians). London 7586A: ‫ ;קוראים‬Vatican 284: ‫קוראין‬. Vatican 23, Jerusalem 8°4280: —. Paris 684: ‫ ;דיליטיגה‬Vatican 23: ‫ ;דלויכא‬Warsaw ed.: ‫דיאלוטיקא‬, Jerusalem 8°4280: ‫ ;דיאליטיקה‬Vatican 284: ‫דיליטיקא‬. Vatican 23: ‫לקוראים‬. London 7586A, Vatican 284: ‫הגיון‬. Pairs 684: ‫ ;וקרוא‬Warsaw ed.: ‫וקרא‬. London 7586A: ‫אותם‬. Warsaw ed.: ‫הדבור‬. Warsaw ed: ‫הוא‬. Vatican 23: —. Vatican 284: —. Vatican 23: ‫שגזרו‬. Vatican 23, Jerusalem 8°4280: ‫כחי‬. Vatican 23: ‫לקוראה‬.

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Samuel ibn Tibbon notes here that the Hebrew term higgayon has already been associated with the Arabic term used for logic and even identifies it with our talmudic adage. He notes that he will continue to use this term even though there are others that are more suitable. This suggests that the term higgayon had already become the common term for logic. Moreover, Samuel’s citation of “Keep your sons from higgayon” suggests that this adage was already commonly understood as a warning against logic. It is thus all the more striking that Samuel ibn Tibbon does not respond to the adage at all. He is willing to use it as the linguistic basis for his identification of logic with the Hebrew term higgayon, but not to respond to or interpret the adage in any way. Accordingly, he must not have seen it as a threat of any kind to the proliferation of Aristotelian logic and science among Provençal Jewry. Indeed, had Samuel ibn Tibbon gone with either of his other suggested translations, he would have significantly weakened the force the statement could have in banning or even criticising the study of logic. In fact, a number of thinkers after Anatoli took it upon themselves to distinguish the higgayon of the talmudic adage from Aristotelian logic. Thus, Joseph Kaspi (d. 1345) claims that the talmudic adage does not refer to logic, but rather to children’s games.34 Profiat Duran (d. ca. 1415) explains higgayon to mean “that which is read without intention” and mentions the sounds made in such a reading.35 That is, these two philosophical thinkers apparently felt that the talmudic adage did carry some legal weight, or at least some critical force, and accordingly strove to show that it did not, in fact, apply to Aristotelian logic. Jacob Anatoli thus had several options before him vis-à-vis the talmudic adage “Keep your sons from higgayon.” One option was to follow his teachers, Samuel ibn Tibbon and Maimonides, and to simply ignore it or else assume it to have no practical implications. If, however, he felt that the criticisms of Nahmanides or others (if there were any) were sufficiently strong so as to merit a direct answer, he could have striven to show that the higgayon in question was not logic, but something else, perhaps rote reading, children’s games, or even the study of the simple meaning of the Bible. Yet instead of either of these approaches, Anatoli places the adage front and centre in the introductions to his two primary works, interpreting it as referring unambiguously to 34 35

Joseph ibn Kaspi, Ṣeror ha-Kesef, cited in Breuer, “Restrain Thy Sons,” 255. Cf. Israel Abrahams ed., Hebrew Ethical Wills (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1976), vol. 1, p. 149. ‫ההגיון הוא שם משותף יאמר על מה שיקראו בלא כונה‬. Profiat Duran, Maase efod: Einleitung in das Studium und Grammatik der Hebräischen Sprache von Profiat Duran, ed. Jacob Friedländer and Jakob Kohn (Vienna, 1865), 19; cited in Breuer, “Restrain Thy Sons,” 255.

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Aristotelian logic. Moreover, his explanations are highly fanciful and, we shall see, sow new doubts. 2

Anatoli’s Introduction to the Organon

In the introduction to his translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Categories, De interpretatione, and Analytica priora and Posteriora, Anatoli takes the adage “Keep your sons from higgayon” as a serious legal prohibition against studying Aristotelian logic. Aristotle’s works themselves were not translated into Hebrew in the Middle Ages and so these translations of Averroes’s Middle Commentaries became the core works of the logical Organon in Hebrew. They were widely studied in Provence, Spain, and Italy and gave rise to numerous Hebrew super-commentaries and independent logical works.36 Although it is only around 800 words in Hebrew, Anatoli’s introduction to this translation set the tone for the later commentaries, which frequently echoed his sentiments in their own introductions. Anatoli’s approach in this introduction both takes logic to be an important step in coming to know God and, at the same time, demarcates it so that it can and ought to be studied entirely apart from religious concerns. This dual character is derived from his understanding of the talmudic adage “Keep your sons from higgayon.” Anatoli’s introduction can be divided into four sections, which are preceded and followed by short poems and prayers. Two of the four sections describe the intentions (kawwanot) of the study of logic. The two others respond to the talmudic adage forbidding the study of logic, even as they argue for the necessity of logic for the true understanding of the Torah and its secrets. Indeed, throughout, Anatoli emphasises the utility of logic for understanding Torah, Talmud, and the secrets of the Law. The first intention of the study of logic may be the most ambitious of all: it is the examination of every statement (ma‌ʾamar); that is, it would seem, every 36

On the importance of Anatoli’s translations for the study of logic in Hebrew, see Charles H. Manekin, “Logic in Medieval Jewish Culture,” in Science in Medieval Jewish Cultures, ed. Gad Freudenthal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 113–35, and Charles H. Manekin, “Logic, Jewish,” in Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, 697–702. On the Hebrew commentary tradition, see, e.g., Yehuda Halper, “Philosophical Commentary and Supercommentary: The Hebrew Aristotelean Commentaries of the Fourteenth through Sixteenth Centuries,” in Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Its Literary Forms, ed. Aaron W. Hughes and James T. Robinson (Indianapolis: University of Indiana Press, 2019), 104–32.

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possible statement, whether biblical, talmudic, scientific, theological, or other. This kind of understanding is critical for coming to know and acknowledge God. Anatoli explains: Statements (ha-ma‌ʾamarim) signify notions (ʿinyanim) that are envisioned in man’s intellect; those envisionings are predicated of things that exist outside of his intellect. All existing things make known (or: signify)37 that which makes them exist and acknowledge (or: signify)38 that He created them. Therefore, all who come to seek out the Lord through the truth require this science.39 This statement is drawn from two statements made by Averroes. The first appears at the opening of his Middle Commentary on De interpretatione, while the other is found at the opening of the Decisive Treatise. In the first, Averroes rephrases Aristotle’s De interpretatione 16a3–8: “Spoken utterances primarily signify the notions that are in the soul. […] The notions in the soul are significations of the existing things outside of the soul.”40 In the second statement, Averroes says that “the activity of philosophy is nothing more than theorisation about and consideration of the existing things insofar as they are an indication of the Artisan.”41 Anatoli’s introductory statement combines the argument 37 38 39 40

41

‫ יודיעו‬or ‫יורו‬: the manuscripts differ on this. ‫ יודו‬and ‫ יורו‬appear in different manuscripts. All translations of Anatoli’s Introduction to Logic are mine, taken from the appendix to this chapter. Jacob Anatoli’s translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione in Munich, Bavarian State Library, MS Cod. Hebr. 106, f. 32v, compared with Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MS héb. 929, f. 9r: ‫התיבות שידובר בהם מורות תחלה על‬ …‫הענינים אשר בנפש […] הוראת הענינים אשר בנפש על הנמצאים שהם חוץ לנפש‬. The Arabic original was edited in ibn Rushd, Talḫīṣ Kitāb al-ʿlbārah, ed. Mahmoud M. Kassem, Charles E. Butterworth, and Ahmad Abd al-Magid Haridi (Cairo: The American Research Center in Egypt, 1981), 1–2. For Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn’s translation of Aristotle’s De interpretatione, see Aristotle, Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Übersetzung, ed. Isidor Pollack (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1913). I provide a translation of this passage and comparison of it to the Arabic translation, Greek original, and later Hebrew and Latin commentaries on it in my “Are There Second Intentions in De interpretatione 16a3–8? The Hebrew Aristotelian Commentary Tradition in the 13th–15th centuries,” Studia Graeco-Arabica 9 (2019): 243–60. My translation of this passage here is slightly different to accommodate the lack of context. Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 1 (translation modified). On some of the ambiguities of this expression as a definition of philosophy, see Muhsin Mahdi, “Remarks on Averroes’ Decisive Treatise,” in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed. Michael E. Marmura (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), 195, and Daniel Heller-Roazen “Philosophy before the Law: Averroës’s Decisive Treatise,” Critical Inquiry

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from both of these statements: words or statements signify notions in the intellect, which in turn signify things in the outside world, which in turn signify or make known that which makes them exist; namely God.42 The manuscripts of Anatoli’s text are not clear as to whether these “significations” in the last two cases are expressed by forms of the word hora‌ʾah or hodaʿah, implying that the existing things make known the divine source of being. Still, it is clear that the study of statements and their relationship to envisioned notions—that is, the study of logic—is part of a path to true knowledge of God. Clearly, an accurate understanding of statements does not guarantee an accurate understanding of the world, or even of one’s own intellect, much less of God. Thus, Anatoli compares logic to a tool (keli; i.e., an organon) and the logician to an artisan (uman); perhaps he intends to compare the logician to the Divine Artisan of Averroes’s statement in the Decisive Treatise. Still, although he says that logic is necessary for anyone who seeks God, he has, in fact, shown neither necessity nor sufficiency, but only that it is a path towards knowledge of God. The second intention of logic which arises in the second part of the introduction is “to sharpen the intellect and make study prosper, like spices which add flavour to food.” This is further connected to the polemical uses of logic against those who employ sophistic arguments, both Epicureans and “anyone who opposes the truth.” Anatoli also specifically refers to the uses of logic in “stand[ing] against the clear-sighted among the other nations who oppose us.” This seems to recommend the use of logic in polemical disputations against Christians. Accordingly, it also grants logic sanctioned ground within rabbinic law, which recognised the need to respond to such polemics. Despite this apparent sanctioned ground, and despite the utility of logic for coming to know God, in the third part of his introduction, Anatoli turns to respond to a hypothetical objector who claims that “our rabbis, may their memory be blessed, prohibit[ed] this science [i.e., logic] when they said, ‘Keep your sons from higgayon.’” Perhaps following Nahmanides and ibn ʿAqnīn, Anatoli responds to this objector with another talmudic adage: “Let your ears

42

32 (2006): 434–36. See also “Philosophy before the Law,” 432, where Heller-Roazen apparently implies that Averroes assimilates philosophy to syllogistic reasoning—i.e., logic— with philosophy proper equivalent to demonstration. Jacob Anatoli presents the same view of philosophy in the passage under discussion. We shall return to this passage again in its medieval Hebrew translation in chapter 6, see p. 192. Compare with Maimonides, Guide 1.34, Pines trans. p. 74. Note that Anatoli’s use of the expression ‫ממציאם‬, “makes them exist,” is probably indebted to Maimonides’s use of the same term for God at the opening of the Book of Knowledge (Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah, 1.1) in Mishneh Torah.

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hear what your mouth brings forth.”43 The rabbis of the Talmud, according to Anatoli, were referring to “your sons,” not to “yourselves”; that is, the youth ought to be kept from logic, but not adults. Thus, Anatoli accepts the criticism of logic contained in the words of the adage, perhaps even as a legally binding injunction. He also accepts that the adage is referring to Aristotelian logic of the kind he is presenting in his translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentaries. Yet he limits the force of the statement to the youth for two reasons. One is that logic and the sciences “strongly attract man’s heart. If a youth is educated in them, his soul will not desire the Torah, since its study is not theoretical as is the way of the sciences.” The youth, according to Anatoli, are naturally attracted to studying theory, so much so that those awakened to the possibility of theoretical understanding are liable to neglect their study of the Torah. Aside from the question of how many youths Anatoli may have actually met, we might ask: What makes theoretical inquiry sufficient for the student? The first part of Anatoli’s introduction provides us with an answer: by beginning with logic and the signification of statements, students can proceed to come to know the things in the world and from there to know God, who grants them existence. If knowledge of God and His relationship to the world is gained through theoretical science, which begins with logic, then the student of this theory would apparently have no need for the Torah or other traditional Jewish texts, which do not provide theoretical knowledge, but only received wisdom. That is, logic and science would seem to provide the student with a basis for demonstrative knowledge of God and the world, while the Torah and religious texts provide a kind of received opinions; that is, dialectical knowledge. The second reason Anatoli provides for keeping the youth from logic is the concern that youths who study logic and science before Torah will spend “much time without Torah and without the God of Truth” until they learn enough science to understand the secrets of the Torah. Thus, Anatoli claims, the rabbis prohibited teaching one’s child “Greek science, because it is necessary to bring him up on Torah so that his mind might become accustomed to correct belief in God and so as to instruct him in good moral dispositions.” That is, the goal of education in Torah is to instil beliefs and moral dispositions. These beliefs, Anatoli tells us, have no need of refinement by means of a tool for refining statements, such as logic, since “the one who transmitted them to him has already refined and tested them.” That is, the received opinions in which the youths are inculcated should be accepted without question. Moral character and habits should also be developed on the basis of received opinions. Only once the youths have grown up should they be introduced to logic and the 43

b. Ber. 13a and b. Meg. 17b.

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sciences. Anatoli thus advocates a kind of separation of Torah study and the study of logic and science. One should first study Torah and acquire the proper beliefs and moral dispositions and then turn to the study of logic and science.44 It is implicit in this that the study of logic and science is carried out according to the scheme outlined in the first part of the introduction. Moreover, such study is entirely removed from the study of the Torah. However, in the fourth part of his introduction, Anatoli describes a way of study that combines Torah and logic: Then after this every scientist (ḥakham) ought to search for and refine the hidden meaning of the words of the Torah. Then shall he understand fear of the Lord and find the knowledge of God. […] Searching for this in the manner of searching for hidden treasures can only happen with theoretical science.45 Anatoli thus sets aside a form of Torah study for someone who has been raised on the Torah, but who has also studied theoretical science separately from the Torah. Indeed, the proper understanding of the Torah is consequent upon understanding logic and the sciences. The turn of a scientist who is versed in Aristotelian logic to the hidden meanings of the Torah finds expression, according to Anatoli, in Prov 2:4–5: “If thou seekest [understanding] as silver, and searchest for her as for hid treasures; Then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of God.”46 Knowledge of God and fear of

44

45 46

That moral education should precede logic and the theoretical sciences is an important part of al-Fārābī’s Tanbīh ʿalā sabīl al-saʿādah, or “Note about the Way to Happiness.” There is still no critical edition of this work, but a provisional edition can be found in al-Fârâbî, The Philosophical Works, ed. Jafar al-Yasin (Beirut: Dar al-Mamahel, 1987). There is an anonymous undated medieval Hebrew translation of this text in Aryeh L. Motzkin, “Al-Farabi’s ‘A Hint as to the Way to Happiness’” [Hebrew], Iyyun 23 (1972): 113–35. The Hebrew translation was most likely made after Anatoli’s time, but Anatoli could have seen the text in Arabic or even Latin. For an edition of the Latin translation, see H.D. Salman, “Le ‘Liber exercitationis ad viam felicitatis’ d’Alfarabi,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 12 (1940): 33–48. For an English translation of the Arabic, see Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman, Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007), 104–20. For an analysis of al-Fārābī’s position here and the relationship between studying logic and leaving Plato’s cave, see Thérèse-Anne Druart, “Alfarabi’s Directing Attention to the Way of Happiness or the Way out of the Cave,” in The Pursuit of Happiness in Medieval Jewish and Islamic Thought: Studies Dedicated to Steven Harvey (Turnhout: Brepols, 2021), 91–103. See below, Appendix to Chapter 5: Anatoli’s Introduction to Logic. King James Version.

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the Lord, then, are the hidden treasures of the Bible, to be sought after as one would plumb the depths for silver. These verses and Anatoli’s interpretation of them in the final part of his introduction can explain the puzzling metered poem he places at the beginning of his introduction to the Isagoge: The voice of those who search for understanding as silver: “Where is there a crucible for my dross?” The science of speech answers, saying, “I have of old had a furnace for understanding. Through it [the furnace], take away the dross from the silver, and there shall come forth a vessel (keli) for the finer.”47 The science of speech has for its portion a crucible for the silver of understanding and a furnace for the gold of belief (emunah).48 Clearly, this poem treats logic, “the science of speech,” as a vessel or “tool” (keli, ὄργανον) for refining speech, keeping the silver of correct speech while discard�ing the dross of logical errors. Yet the reference to silver here recalls Prov 2:4 and suggests that what Anatoli expects his audience to be really after is the hidden meanings of the Torah. This impression is bolstered again by Anatoli’s comparison of logic to a furnace for extracting the “gold of belief.”49 On the other hand, by describing a dialogue between those who seek the secrets of the Torah and those who seek the science of logic, Anatoli highlights that they are different individuals. That is, the primary purpose of studying logic is not the study of the Torah or the uncovering of its secrets. Rather, its methods are “of old” (me-ʾaz), developed independently of religious ends. Like a crucible or a furnace, it can be used for various ends, but logic itself is entirely neutral. Anatoli’s introduction to the Organon thus outlines three distinct types of inquiry. One is the study of Torah in one’s youth, intended for inculcating correct opinions and moral dispositions. This is to be taken up uncritically on the assumption that the Bible is already refined. The second form of inquiry is the examination of statements in general, notions, existing things, and the Giver of Existence, as outlined in the first part of the introduction. This is done through the study of Aristotelian logic first, and then theoretical science. Not only is this undertaken separately from concerns of biblical interpretation, but 47 48 49

Prov 25:4, King James Version. See the full translation in the appendix to this chapter for full literary references made here. However, this is not as obvious as Davidson thinks (Averroes, Commentarium medium., 81 n. 5). The Tibbonides used emunah for beliefs that people hold, much like the modern use of the term.

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Anatoli is worried that a person, especially a youth, who only studies logic and science will have no interest in studying Torah; that is, it is entirely separate from the first type of inquiry. The third form of inquiry combines Aristotelian logic and science in order to test and further refine the Bible, thereby arriving at the “secrets” of the Law. Furthermore, Anatoli’s language suggests that these three types of inquiry are to be taken up at different times of one’s life. The first kind is specifically for youths, while the second is explicitly forbidden from them and thus is intended to be taken up only after one is grown. The third type of inquiry is said to be made by the ḥakham, which I translate as “scientist” in accordance with Anatoli’s use of ḥokhmah to mean “science” in an Aristotelian sense. This third form of inquiry should only be taken up after one has an understanding of science; that is, after one has already completed the second type of inquiry. There are, then, three parts to Anatoli’s educational programme: (1) the study of the Torah in one’s youth; (2) the study of logic and science through Aristotelian writings; and (3) the return to the Torah, seeking its hidden meanings in light of what has been understood scientifically. How original is Anatoli’s tri-partite study programme? The separation between logic and proper study of the Torah seems to be drawn from the final chapter of Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed, 3.54. There, Maimonides discusses the meaning of the biblical term ḥokhmah before the term had taken on its clear meaning of “science” in the Hebrew of Anatoli and his teachers the Tibbonides. Maimonides, too, quotes Prov 2:4, taking the verse to say: “If thou seekest ḥokhmah as silver, and searchest for her as for hid treasures.” This is a possible reading of the verse, though it is more likely in context that understanding (binah or tevunah) is the object of the search. In any case, Maimonides says that the meaning of ḥokhmah in this instance is “apprehension of true realities, which have for their end the apprehension of Him, may He be exalted.”50 It is this meaning of ḥokhmah which is similar to the first type of theoretical inquiry Anatoli mentioned and which lends itself to its later use for “science,” as we find in Anatoli and the Tibbonides. Moreover, Maimonides says, since the intellectual things which are in the Torah are received through tradition and are not demonstrated by the methods of speculation, the knowledge of the Torah came to be set up in the books of the prophets 50

Pines trans., 632; Samuel ibn Tibbon trans.: ‫השגת האמתות אשר תכלית כוונתם השגתו ית׳‬ ‫שמו‬. On the equivocality of the term ‫ חכמה‬in Maimonides, Guide 3.54, see also n. 42 in chapter 4 above.

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and the sayings of the Sages as one separate species and pure ḥokhmah51 as another species. It is through this pure ḥokhmah that the intellectual things we receive from the Torah through tradition are demonstrated.52 Here, Maimonides portrays a “pure science” that is entirely separate from the Torah, the Talmud, and traditional wisdom. Such science is studied using demonstration; that is, burhān, the Arabic for ἀπόδειξις. Though separate, it can be used to verify or reaffirm the received wisdom of the Torah. Still, according to Maimonides, the sages forbid studying logic and science before studying Torah. Maimonides says: The Sages, may their memory be blessed, mention likewise that man is required first to obtain knowledge of the Torah, then to obtain wisdom, then to know what he ought with regard to the study of the Law— I mean the drawing of inferences concerning what one ought to do. And this should be the order observed: The opinions in question should first be known as being received through tradition; then they should be demonstrated; then the actions through which one’s way of life may be ennobled should be precisely defined. […] It has thus become clear to you that, according to them, the science of the Torah is one species and wisdom is a different species, being the verification of the opinions of the Torah through correct speculation.53 This is most likely the source for Anatoli’s three-step education system: studying first Torah, then logic and science, and finally turning to verify the results of religion through logic and science. However, it is worth noting that while Maimonides is careful to distinguish between pure wisdom, ḥokhmah in Hebrew, or perhaps ḥikma in Arabic, and the received tradition, he is not careful to distinguish the scientific verification of received tradition as a third stage. Indeed, for Maimonides, the process becomes somewhat muddled. Wisdom appears to consist of both “the apprehension of the true realities” and “the 51 52

53

Pines notes that this could be the Arabic ḥikmah. I am not sure this would have made a difference for Anatoli. Maimonides, Guide 3.54, Pines trans., 633. I have greatly modified Pines’s translation to accord with my translations throughout this chapter and in accordance with Samuel ibn Tibbon’s translation: ‫שמפני היות השכליות אשר בתורה מקובלות בלתי מבוארות בדרכי‬ ‫ והחכמה‬,‫ שמשימים ידיעת התורה מין אחד‬,‫ נמצא בספרי הנביאים ודברי חכמים‬,‫העיון‬ ‫הגמורה מין אחר החכמה ההיא הגמורה היא אשר התבאר בה במופת מה שלמדנוהו מן ה‬ .‫תורה ע״ד הקבלה מן השכליות ההם‬ Pines trans., 633–34.

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verification of the opinions of the Torah through correct speculation.” That is, it is not clear that there is a separate realm in which science can operate that is apart from the opinions of the Torah. Rather, the opinions themselves are treated both by traditional texts—that is, through received tradition— and through demonstrative speculation. That Torah and science are different species seems to mean they have different methods, not necessarily different subjects. The overlap of the subject of the Torah and the subject of science is also manifest in Maimonides’s approach to what Anatoli calls “the science of speech.” As we saw in chapter 4, Maimonides dedicates the first third of the Guide to elucidating equivocal terms that are found in the Bible which can, in his view, refer to philosophical or scientific themes. Thus, for example, the word kisseʾ can mean a “throne” or an “attribute of greatness,”54 and the word regel can mean “foot” or “cause of.”55 Maimonides thus develops an account of speech that allows many meanings; it can bring out the “secrets of the Torah,” but it can also convey the simple meaning of the Torah. What it does not do is allow for a clear, consistent, and coherent exposition of Aristotelian logic or science in Hebrew. Indeed, the scientific terms he uses will always require interpretation (e.g., as to whether a foot or a cause is intended in any specific instance). Accordingly, one text can be read using two “species” of reading: scientific and traditional, while leaving the subject the same. Anatoli, who follows the Tibbonides in forming a language that is unambiguously Aristotelian, thus allows for a separation between the study of Aristotelian logic and science and the logical examination of the Torah. Accordingly, with the advent of medieval philosophical Hebrew, one could study science and logic in a Hebrew that did not necessarily suggest an immediate biblical interpretation.56 Of the four parts of Anatoli’s introduction to the Isagoge, only the first, understanding statements in order to understand existing things, did not contain a quote from the Bible or the Talmud explaining the legitimacy of the pursuit of science. It is, as it were, a purely scientific approach which studies the existing things as they are and thenceforth makes inferences about God. Indeed, situating the second kind of inquiry—namely, inquiry into 54 55 56

Maimonides, Guide 1.10, Pines trans., 34–35. Maimonides, Guide 1.28, Pines trans., 59–61. There are, of course, exceptions to this, especially when it comes to specific terms. See, e.g., my “The Convergence of Religious and Metaphysical Concepts: Mofet and Devequt in the Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” Studia Neoaristotelica 8 (2011): 163–77. David Lemler has since provided a much more thorough account of the term mofet in “Mofet: From Miracle to Scientific Proof,” in Studies in the Formation of Medieval Hebrew Philosophical Terminology, 131–50.

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logic and science—in commentaries on non-Jewish thinkers, such as Averroes, Porphyry, and, of course, Aristotle, further emphasises the difference between the purely scientific approach and the traditional approach of the first kind of inquiry; namely, inquiry based on the Torah and the Talmud. This approach made its strongest impression in Anatoli’s contribution to the development of a body of Hebrew philosophical texts, which were translations of texts by nonJewish thinkers (i.e., thinkers outside of the tradition) and were accordingly to be studied apart from religious concerns; that is, in some sense, in what we might call a “secular” manner. 3

Anatoli’s Introduction to Malmad ha-Talmidim

Anatoli’s description of the third type of inquiry in the introduction to his translation of the Organon commentaries does not mention the possibility that the Aristotelian sciences, which are built on the basis of logic, could conflict with traditionally received beliefs or even with the secrets of the Law. Indeed, Anatoli’s expressed views that the words of the Bible are already refined and that logic is a crucible for refining statements suggest that there is no possibility of conflict between them. In the introduction to Malmad ha-Talmidim, however, Anatoli raises the possibility that science and the Bible will conflict and associates this conflict with “doubts” (sefeqot). Moreover, he does this in response to the talmudic adage “Keep your sons from higgayon.” Yet while Anatoli recommends keeping the youth away from such doubts, it is not clear that they can be avoided by the adult who considers them. Instead, it seems that Anatoli’s work is itself intended to goad the reader into these doubts. Anatoli cites this adage towards the end of the introduction as part of an extended interpretation of Exod 10:26: “And we know not with what we must serve the Lord.”57 This verse arises out of a discussion of the meaning of the commandment of fringes (ṣiṣit), which symbolise both knowledge of truths and fulfilment of the commandments. In bringing in a discussion of logic into a discussion of the meanings of various practical commandments, Anatoli directs his readers towards the possibility of not only reasoning about the meaning of the commandments, but also that of reasoning about them using logic and science. Anatoli apparently takes Exod 10:26 to be referring to the contrast between performing the commandments and knowing their

57

King James Version.

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meaning. He uses this distinction to note the difference between prayer or reading books and understanding their meanings, saying:58 And so when we praise in song, bless, and pray, we do not put our hearts to know what our mouths bring forth out of habit. As a result, we do not know the meaning of the many words of science59 that are included in them. Even when [this meaning] is clear and known to all, we do not sense or feel it. As a result, we are often in doubt as to whether we have said it in the very same hour. But we do not fear lest we be as deceivers in the eyes of the Lord.60

62‫ מהללים בזמירות ומברכין‬61‫וכן כשאנו‬ ‫ לבנו לדעת מה‬64‫ נתן אל‬63‫ומתפללין לא‬ ‫ עד שלא נדע‬67‫ דרך רגילותו‬66‫ פינו‬65‫שיוציא‬ ‫ גם‬68,‫ענין לדברי חכמה רבים שנכללו בהם‬ ‫ לא נרגיש‬70‫ לכל ומבואר‬69‫מה שהוא ידוע‬ 72‫ פעמים‬71‫בו ולא נחוש אליו עד שהרבה‬ 74‫ בו בשעתו אם אמרנוהו ולא‬73‫נספק‬ .‫ כמתעתעים‬76‫ פן נהיה בעיני השם‬75‫נירא‬

Anatoli criticises his fellow Jews for their rote, habitual performance of the commandments, which neglects their meaning. This may be a standard trope, but Anatoli adds to this that the commandments contain an inner meaning 58

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76

Quotations from Anatoli’s Malmad ha-Talmidim are based on a comparison of the printed edition (see n. 2 above), Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MSS héb. 216, f. 10v and 1049, f. 76r; Budapest, Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, MS Kaufmann A 278, f. 3v; and Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, MS ebr. 41, f. 4r–v. According to the analysis of Gadi Weber (see n. 2 above), Paris 216 is from a different tradition to Paris 1049 and Bud. 278. Vatican 41 is from a separate Byzantine tradition, whose roots are even earlier. Or: wisdom. Cf. Gen 27:12. Vatican 41: ‫כשאנחנו‬. Vatican 41: ‫ומברכים‬. Paris 216: ‫ולא‬. Paris 216: —. Bud. 278: ‫את‬. Paris 216, Paris 1049: ‫נוציא‬. Paris 216: ‫ ;בפינו‬Paris 1049: ‫מפינו‬. Paris 1049: ‫רגילות‬. Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫עד שהרבה דברי חכמה נכללים בהם ולא נדע להם עניין‬ ‫[עד שלא … בהם‬. Paris 1049: ‫וגם מה שנודע ]גם מה שהוא ידוע‬. Bud. 278: ‫וגם מה שהוא נודע‬. Vatican 41: ‫וכן‬ ‫מה שהוא נודע‬. Vatican 41: ‫ומבואר לכל ]לכל ומבואר‬. Paris 1049: ‫— ]לכל … שהרבה‬. Bud. 278: —. Paris 1049: ‫נסתפק‬. Vatican 41: ‫לא‬. Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫נירא לנפשותינו‬. Paris 216: ‫ה׳‬.

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or notion (ʿinyan) along with words of ḥokhmah, “science” or “wisdom.” To a reader familiar with Anatoli’s introduction to the Organon, this might recall the opening argument there. As we saw, Anatoli claimed that statements signify notions (ʿinyanim) that are predicated of existing things which, in turn, make known or signify God. Such a reader would see that by focusing on the meaning of the liturgy and associating that meaning with scientific notions, Anatoli is suggesting that the liturgical notions pave a path towards knowledge of God that is either parallel to the scientific path or inclusive of scientific notions. Most people, however, are unaware of such a path. Anatoli then turns to note the presence of oft-ignored inner meanings in the words of the prophets. Most Jews, Anatoli laments, read the prophets only once in a while (le-ʿittim reḥoqot)77 and read the books of Solomon even less frequently. Indeed, he notes, we read two of [Solomon’s] books [presumably Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs] only once a year [on Succoth and on Passover respectively], and even then we read them as we would a book of records. As for [Solomon’s] third book [i.e., Proverbs], we read it only once in our lives, and even then we read it as we would poetry.78 Not only do “we” not read these books often enough, even when “we” do read them, “we” focus on the wrong things—namely, records or poetry—and ignore the philosophical notions contained in them. The Jews of Anatoli’s day, then, have a number of sources that provide access to philosophical notions, including prayers, blessings, prophetic works, and the books attributed to Solomon, yet they do not study them sufficiently or properly. Another way to access philosophical notions, Anatoli says, would be through studying science directly; that is, through works in other languages or translated works. Anatoli says:

77

78

According to Anatoli, they read them as they would old wives’ tales (havele zeqenot). This may be an allusion to al-Fārābī’s supposed assertion in his now lost commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics that human immortality through intellectual conjunction is an old wives’ tale. On this expression, its appearances in Hebrew, and its attribution to al-Fārābī, see Chaim Meir Neria, “Al-Fārābī’s Lost Commentary on the Ethics: New Textual Evidence,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013): 69–99, especially 76. Anatoli, Malmad ha-Talmidim, unpaginated introduction.

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“ Keep Your Sons from Logic ”

Even if one person in a generation dares79 to study the sciences that exist in another language and that are beneficial for completing the intention of the Torah, that study will be considered a sin among most of his generation. As the reason for their words, they give the words of the sages of blessed memory, “Keep your sons from higgayon,” as well as their warnings not to study Greek science.80

165 ‫ ימלאנו לבו ללמוד‬82‫ אחד בדור‬81‫גם אם‬ ‫החכמות הנמצאות בלשון אחרת המועילות‬ ‫ הלמוד‬83‫להשלים כוונת התורה יחשב לו‬ ‫ ונותנים‬86.‫ בני דורו‬85‫ אצל רב‬84‫ההוא לעון‬ ‫ “מנעו‬87:‫טעם לדבריהם ממה שאמרו רז״ל‬ 89‫ שהזהירו‬88‫ וכן ממה‬,”‫בניכם מן ההגיון‬ .‫ יונית‬90‫שלא ללמוד חכמת‬

Anatoli suggests that the talmudic adage against higgayon is in widespread use as a condemnation of logic and Aristotelian science. Yet at the same time, his reference to this adage comes in the context of an argument that people should devote more time and energy to studying the Bible. It seems likely to me that Anatoli expects his readers to be familiar with Ashkenazic interpretations of the same talmudic adage as a warning against excessive study of the Bible. It is possible that he expects his readers to make an argument by association: just as one ought, in fact, to study the Bible more frequently and more extensively than is currently being studied and ignore the (Ashkenazic) interpretation of this talmudic adage which recommends against reading the Bible too much, so too one ought to ignore the interpretation of the same talmudic adage which recommends against studying logic and Aristotelian science. That is, Anatoli has set his readers up to expect a rejection of this talmudic adage. Indeed, later in the paragraph, Anatoli explains that the sages of the Talmud were in fact “lovers of Greek language and literature in which all of the sciences 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

This expression comes from Esth 7:5. The warning against studying ḥokhmat yewanit—literally “Greek wisdom,” though in Tibbonide Hebrew it means “Greek science”—can be found in b. B. Qam. 83a and Menaḥ. 99b. Cf. Midrash tehillim, ed. Salomon Buber, 3 vols. (Vilna, 1891), ch. 1. Bud. 278: ‫אנו‬. Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫בדורו‬. Print: —. Paris 216: ‫ללעג‬. Paris 216, Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: —. Paris 1049: ‫דורנו‬. ‫ ]ממה שאמרו רז״ל‬Paris 216: ‫ממה שאז״ל‬, Paris 1049: —; Vatican 41: ‫ממה שאמרו חז״ל‬. ]‫ וכן ממה‬Paris 216: ‫ ;וכן מה‬Paris 1049, Bud. 278: ‫ ;וממה‬Vatican 41: ‫ומה‬. Paris 1049: ‫שהזהירו רז״ל‬, Vatican 41: ‫שהזכירו‬. Paris 216, Bud. 278: ‫חכמה‬.

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were composed”!91 This effectively disposes of the objection that the sages warned against Greek wisdom in a way that is directly contrary to Anatoli’s approach in the introduction to the Organon, where he included “Greek science” among things that are not suitable for youths, but only for prepared adults. Accordingly, we might expect the talmudic adage about higgayon to be dismissed along with that about Greek science. Anatoli, however, does not dispose of the admonition against higgayon, but rather follows, in some respects, his approach in the introduction to the Organon and limits the prohibition to the youth. He states: One who examines their other statements will have no doubt that this prohibition is not universal, but is for youths and the like. For if that science [namely, logic] is not preceded by the study of the Torah and the Talmud, and unless the one who studies it is a balanced person92 and has good ethical dispositions, which are included in fear of heaven, it [sc. the study of logic] will undoubtedly lead to excluding the man from the community, for that science is exceedingly

91 92

93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105

‫ שאר דבריהם‬93‫ואין ספק למי שבוחן‬ 96‫ אבל‬95‫ אינה כוללת‬94‫שאותה המניעה‬ ‫ לפי שהחכמה‬97,‫היא לנערים וכיוצא בהם‬ ‫ לה למוד התורה‬98‫ההיא אם לא יקדם‬ ‫ הלומד ההוא‬99‫ותלמודה ובלבד שיהיה‬ ‫ ובעל מדות טובות הנ�כ‬100‫איש נעםים‬ ‫ללות ביראת שמים היא בלא ספק גורמת‬ ‫ לפי שה�ח‬102.‫ מן הכלל‬101‫להוציא האםדם‬ ‫ וכל ראיותיה‬103‫כמה ההיא עמוקה מאד‬ ,‫ הם הראויים לה‬105‫ ומעט‬104‫משקול הדעת‬

.‫רבותינו ז״ל […] היו מחבבין לשון יוני וכתב יוני שחוברו בהם כל החוכמות‬ I am translating ‫ איש נעים‬as “balanced person” in light of the frequent association of the term with naġmah, which is used to translate the Greek ἁρμονία. While I cannot be sure of Anatoli’s meaning here, I suspect it is intended to conform with the iš benoni that we find in Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah, Hilekhot deʿot; i.e., someone who is balanced in view of having attained the mean in his ethical dispositions. Note, however, that another manuscript tradition, represented here by Paris 1049 and Bud. 278, has iš navon, meaning “a person with understanding.” Bud. 278: ‫שדוחין‬. Bud. 278: ‫מעשה‬. Paris 216: ‫כללית‬, Vatican 41: ‫כוללת הכל‬. Vatican 41: ‫אלא‬. Print: ‫ ;בם‬Vatican 41: ‫בהם בלבד‬. Print: ‫יקדים‬, Vatican 41: ‫יקדום‬. Print: ‫שיהא‬. Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫נבון‬. ‫ ]להוציא האדם‬Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫להוציאו‬. Paris 216: [f. 11a]. Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫עד מאד‬. Print: ‫הדעות‬. Bud. 278: [4r].

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“ Keep Your Sons from Logic ”

deep, all of its proofs come from intellectual considerations, and few are suited to it, because it requires men of consideration,106 understanding people who fear God and know the Torah and how to study it.107 It is they who enter the Pardes in peace and go out in peace because they bend their doubts after the truth which is received by them through the Torah, which is implanted in their hearts. But one who is without heart will cut down the plants [i.e., tend towards heresy] because of the perplexity which arises for him regarding some notions. Such people harden their hearts and misinterpret the Torah when they bend their doubts after their [bodily] drive and stubbornness. Accordingly, this prohibition is appropriate for most people.

167 110‫ יראי‬109‫ נבונים‬108‫כי היא צריכה אנשי לב‬ 112‫ והם‬111.‫אלהים יודעי התורה ותלמודה‬ ‫ ויוצאים‬114‫ לפרדס בשלום‬113‫שנכנסים‬ 117‫ ספיקותיהם‬116‫ לפי שמטים‬115‫בשלום‬ 120‫ אצלם מצד‬119‫ האמת המקובלת‬118‫אחר‬ ‫ לב‬122‫ אבל חסר‬.‫ בלבם‬121‫התורה הנטועה‬ ‫ לפי המבוכה היוצאת‬124‫ נטיעות‬123‫יקצץ‬ ‫ ומקשים לבם ומ�ג‬126‫ בקצת הענינים‬125‫ולו‬ 127‫לים פנים בתורה ומטים הספיקות אחרי‬ ‫ היתה‬129‫ ולפיכך‬128.‫יצרם ושרירות לבם‬ 132.‫ הרב‬131‫ אל‬130‫המניעה ראויה‬

106 Cf. Job 34:10 and 34:34. 107 Or: its Talmud. On this use of Talmud for studying Torah, cf. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilekhot Talmud Torah, 1.11. 108 ‫ ]אנשי לב‬Vatican 41: ‫אנשים‬. 109 Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫נבונים מאד‬. 110 Print: ‫ ;ירא‬Paris 1049: ‫ ;ויראי‬Bud. 278: ‫יריאי‬. 111 ‫ ]יודעי התורה ותלמודה‬Paris 1049: ‫ ;יודעי תורה‬Bud. 278, Vatican 41: —. 112 Paris 216: ‫והם הם‬. 113 Paris 216: ‫הנכנסים‬. 114 Vatican 41: ‫לשלום‬. 115 Vatican 41: ‫לשלום‬. 116 ‫ ]לפי שמטים‬Bud. 278: ‫לשמטים‬. 117 Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫ספקותם ומישרים אותם‬. 118 Paris 1049, Vatican 41: ‫ ;אל‬Bud. 278: ‫על‬. 119 Paris 1049: ‫ ;המקבלת‬Bud. 278: ‫והמקובלת‬. 120 Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫מן‬. 121 Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫והנטועה‬. 122 Paris 1049, Vatican 41: ‫ ;כל חסרי‬Bud. 278: ‫כל חסירי‬. 123 Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫יקצצו‬. 124 Paris 1049: ‫הנטיעות‬, Vatican 41: ‫בנטיעות‬. 125 Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫להם‬. 126 Print, Paris 1049, Bud. 278: ‫ענינים‬. 127 Paris 216, Paris 1049, Bud. 278: ‫אחר‬. 128 Paris 1049: ‫לבם הרע‬. 129 Paris 216: ‫לפיכך‬, Vatican 41: ‫ולפי׳‬. 130 Paris 216: —. 131 Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫על‬. 132 Paris 216, Paris 1049, Bud. 278, Vatican 41: ‫הרוב‬.

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Clearly, Anatoli no longer allows his readers to assume there to be complete harmony between logic and religion. While in the introduction to the Organon, he expressed fears that youths who studied logic too early would lose interest in the Torah and be without moral foundations for life and study, here the problem is clearly and explicitly that of doubts (sefeqot). Anatoli’s earlier attribution of meanings and notions that were either themselves scientific or else parallel to scientific notions to the Bible and Jewish liturgy now meets with a significant obstacle. The study of logic and, it would seem, the ensuing study of science arouse doubts in the believer. Anatoli does not tell us what these doubts are, but from the context, we can infer that they concern the notions discovered by logical and scientific methods. These notions (ʿinyanim) must differ from the notions or meanings discovered through studying the Bible and Jewish liturgy. They may even lead to differences in how they make known God, the world, and the connection between them. Anatoli refers to one holding such doubts as being in a state of “perplexity” (mevukhah). Such perplexity, according to Anatoli, leads the doubter to incline after his bodily inclinations rather than after the received truth. The language of inclining or bending doubts that Anatoli employs here recalls Jer 7:24: “They hearkened not, nor inclined their ear, but walked in the stubbornness of their evil heart (bi-šerirut libbam ha-raʿ).”133 Anatoli’s language also recalls the talmudic expression maṭṭeh din, which refers to a judge bending or inclining judgement in one direction or the other. Often, this is in favour of a majority vote by other judges, but it can also refer to bending judgment after a bribe; that is, to a perversion of justice.134 Anatoli apparently views the doubter as being in a conundrum akin to a judge: he must decide whether to bend his doubts towards the received truth of the Torah or towards the inclinations and machinations of his evil heart. Perplexity, in Anatoli’s view here, is equated with the triumph of the non-intellectual parts of the soul (“[bodily] drive and stubbornness”) and is a direct source of “cutting down the plants,” which appears to be equivalent to leaving the Jewish community.135 133 King James Version, modified. 134 Cf. Jastrow, Dictionary, 898–99. 135 Anatoli develops nearly the same problem with the nearly the same terminology in his interpretation of Parshat Naśoʾ (Num 4:21–7:89), in Malmad ha-Talmidim, 124v–125r. In my view, his view there is largely the same as his view in the introduction to the Malmad that I present here. Weber, “Studies on R. Yaaqov Anatoli’s Malmad Ha-Talmidim,” 133– 34, but also summarised on 122 n. 172, argues that Naśoʾ is one of the first chapters of the Malmad to have been written and that it was likely written as an independent work before Anatoli had conceptualised writing a book of sermons; in particular, it seems to have been written before the introduction to the Malmad. It would thus seem possible that what we find in Naśoʾ is a first attempt to develop an idea that we find in a more

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Anatoli’s language in this passage is heavily dependent on Maimonides and is, in my view, largely a response to Maimonides’s discussion of the limitations of human knowledge in Guide 1.31–34.136 Like Anatoli, Maimonides is concerned about the harmful effects of science on the young. Science should therefore only be taught to those who are intellectually capable of learning it, and even then, the teacher ought to take great care in observing the proper order of study.137 One who takes up the divine science unprepared or without the proper natural disposition will suffer not only confusion (Arabic: tašwīš; Hebrew: bilbul) in his beliefs (Arabic: iʿtiqādāt; Hebrew: emunot), but even “absolute negation” (Arabic: taʿṭīl maḥḍ; Hebrew: biṭṭul le-gamre).138 This would seem to be roughly equivalent to Anatoli’s worry that the doubter would be excluded from the community. To avoid this, Maimonides recommends explaining science through hints and “flashes” as “secrets and mysteries of the Torah.” The Torah itself “speaketh in the language of the sons of man”; that is, in this case, it “is presented in such a manner as to make it possible for the young, the women, and all the people to begin with it and to learn it.”139 Even those without the natural disposition or the proper preparation for studying metaphysics can and ought to study the Torah. Consequently, such people “are confined to accepting tradition (Arabic: al-taqlīd; Hebrew: ha-qabbalah) with regard to all sound opinions.140 […] When, however, a man grows perfect […]

136

137 138 139

140

developed form and in greater detail in the introduction to the whole work. While this would highlight the importance of this introduction, a full comparison deserves its own study. This discussion arises out of an interpretation of the intellectual meaning of “eating” in 1.30. The Hebrew terminology, which seems critical for Anatoli’s approach, is likely that of Samuel ibn Tibbon’s translation. Accordingly, references to the Hebrew are to Samuel ibn Tibbon. Maimonides, Guide 1.33, Pines trans., 70–71, and 1.34, the third and fourth causes “that prevent the commencement of instruction with the divine science,” Pines trans., 72–79. Maimonides, Guide 1.33, Pines trans., 71. Maimonides, Guide 1.33, Pines trans., 71. Maimonides generally presents a negative view of women’s intellectual abilities, but notes that the biblical Miriam successfully attained the intellectual level of a prophet. See Hannah Kasher, “Maimonides on the Intellects of Women and Gentiles,” in Interpreting Maimonides: Critical Essays, ed. Charles H. Manekin and Daniel Davies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 46–64, especially 50–54. Maimonides, Guide 1.33, Pines trans., 71. Here, Maimonides uses the Arabic term for opinion, ra‌ʾy. Samuel ibn Tibbon, however, employs a Hebrew term which is normally used for “notion”: ʿinyan. This use works particularly well with Anatoli’s suggestions that the words of the Torah indicate notions, ʿinyanim.

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he pronounces the above-mentioned correct opinions to be true […] [using] demonstration.”141 Maimonides’s view here seems similar to the assumptions Anatoli made in the introduction to the Organon: the Torah can be studied by those not suited or prepared for science and its true views can be backed up by scientific demonstration. Maimonides does not suggest here that science can or should be studied entirely separately from the Torah, as Anatoli did, but rather that science based on demonstration will confirm the views of the Torah, or at least its secrets or mysteries. Earlier, in Guide 1.31, when Maimonides discusses causes of disagreement about things, he includes “habit and upbringing,”142 for habituation gives people a love and an “inclination” (Arabic: al-mail; Hebrew: noṭim) for that on which they have been raised.143 That is, habituation, including habituation achieved through the Law, can provide a source for various views and beliefs which can be confirmed through scientific demonstrations. Maimonides and Anatoli, then, would seem to agree that the habitually inculcated views presented in the Torah should be accepted without question until the student is ready to confirm them using demonstrations. However, both Maimonides and Anatoli also agree that not all of the views of the Torah can be confirmed through scientific demonstration. Indeed, we shall see that it is here that Anatoli can be clearly distinguished from Maimonides. Both present the intellectual doubts that arise between science and the views of the Law in terms of interpreting the legend of the Pardes (Orchard) that appears in b. Ḥag. 2: The rabbis taught: Four men went up into the heavenly garden, and they were: Ben Azzai and Ben Zoma, [Elishaʿ] Aḥer and R. Akiva. […] Ben Azzai gazed and died […] Ben Zoma gazed and went mad […] Aḥer cut the plants. R. Akiva departed in peace.144 141 Maimonides, Guide 1.33, Pines trans., 71–72 (translation modified). 142 Maimonides, Guide 1.31, Pines trans., 67. Arabic: al-ilf wa-l-tarbiyah; Hebrew: ha-hergel we-ha-limmud. 143 Note also that in Samuel ibn Tibbon’s translation (but not in the Arabic), Maimonides says only a few lines later that the philosophers confirm the view that human beings have intellectual limits, even though they do not have an inclination (neṭot) to accept the view of the Law. 144 Soncino trans., ad loc. For other versions of this legend, see Peter Schäfer, The Origins of Jewish Mysticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), chapters 6–7, 176 ff. For the connection between this talmudic legend and Jewish mysticism connected with the Account of the Chariot in the opening chapters of Ezekiel, see Schäfer, The Origins of Jewish Mysticism, 196–203, and David Halperin, The Faces of the Chariot: Early Jewish Responses to Ezekiel’s Vision (Tübingen: Mohr, 1988).

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In Guide 1.32, Maimonides associates this Pardes with the connection between Aristotelian metaphysics and the secrets of the Law. He also sees the difference between the two main protagonists of the story as lying in their responses to doubt (ha-safeq).145 Rabbi Aqiva, who was the only one the Talmud mentions to have “entered [the Pardes] in peace and [to have gone] out in peace,”146 is a paradigm of a successful response to doubt, while Elisha Aḥer, who entered the Pardes but left as “the most deficient among the deficient”147— that is, presumably, became a heretic—is a paradigm of the worst-case scenario. We are not told any particulars about the object of the doubt, but only that it arises in response to something for which there is no demonstration (Arabic: burhān; Hebrew: mofet, referring to the Greek ἀπόδειξις). Elisha Aḥer, in Maimonides’s view, aspired to apprehend such things anyway and was quick “to pronounce false, assertions the contradictories of which have not been demonstrated or that are possible, though very remotely so.”148 As we saw in chapter 4, Rabbi Aqiva, on the other hand, did “not aspire to apprehend that which [he was] unable to apprehend,” and is accordingly a model for what Maimonides considers to be human perfection.149 Accordingly, when doubt arises from things which cannot be demonstrated, Maimonides recommends limiting one’s aspirations and not seeking to make assertions that cannot be proven. The situation of the Pardes as it appears in Anatoli’s introduction to Malmad ha-Talmidim is similar to Maimonides’s Guide 1.32, but the conclusion Anatoli draws from it is nearly the opposite of Maimonides’s. For Anatoli, those who follow Rabbi Aqiva in entering the Pardes in peace and going out in peace “bend their doubts after the truth which is received among them out of the Torah.” Those who follow Elisha Aḥer in “cutting down the plants” are those who are perplexed, who harden their hearts and who “misinterpret the Torah when they bend their doubts after their [bodily] drive and stubbornness.” Perplexity, for Anatoli, is not associated with human perfection, but with bodily inclinations and stubbornness; that is, the opposite of wisdom. The proper path, in 145 The Arabic, in fact, is al-šubhah, which Pines translates “a dubious point.” Samuel ibn Tibbon translates this as ha-safeq, “doubt,” and his translation is clearly influential on the importance of sefeqot in Anatoli’s brief account of the Pardes legend above. 146 Cf. b. Ḥag. 14b. 147 Maimonides, Guide 1.32, Pines trans., 69. 148 Maimonides, Guide 1.32, Pines trans., 68–69. This view leads to becoming “overcome by imaginings.” 149 Maimonides, Guide 1.32, Pines trans., 68. Arabic: al-kamāl al-insānīy; Hebrew: ha-šelemut ha-enoši. On the identification of human perfection with perplexity, see Chapter 4, n. 64 above.

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contrast, is associated with inclining after received tradition; that is, making assertions on the basis of conclusions that have not been demonstrated. Such assertions, for Maimonides, were the source of Elisha Aḥer’s problems. That is, while Anatoli may accept Maimonides’s views about the beginnings of study and the pre-philosophical views one ought to adopt, his presentation of the advanced philosophers found in the Pardes legend appears to present a fundamental disagreement with Maimonides. According to Maimonides, one ought to recognise one’s limitations and refrain from undemonstrated assertions, while according to Anatoli, one ought to avoid perplexity and questions and “bend” one’s doubts in favour of the received truth; that is, to make undemonstrated assertions that conform to the views of the Torah. Anatoli, then, presents two options to the religious Jew who is interested in logic or science and is consequently faced with doubts: one is to bend his understanding towards traditional views and the other is to bend it towards bodily drives and away from the Jewish community. Anatoli presents no way of facing doubt without “bending” or manipulating those doubts to confront one position or another. This dichotomy leaves out an intermediate position that leaves the doubts as they are and does not pursue them further. This is also Rabbi Aqiva’s position, according to Maimonides. For Anatoli, this is not the position of the religious philosophers who “leave in peace,” it seems, by bending their doubts towards tradition. Nor is it the position of those thinkers who “cut the plants”—that is, leave the community—since they, too, bend their doubts in a direction away from tradition. The genuine doubter, then, would seem to be neither inside the community nor outside of it, but in between; that is, at a kind of religious/irreligious impasse. Anatoli does not mention such a doubter, but a comparison with Maimonides’s treatment of the Pardes legend in the Guide leads the reader to ask about this doubter, whose position is the one that Maimonides assigns to Rabbi Aqiva.150 Let us return to the prohibition on logic that Anatoli finds in the words of the Sages. This prohibition, which Anatoli limits to the youth, is justified on the grounds that they are either unfit or unprepared to bend their doubts to accord with traditional views, but will instead bend those doubts in the direction of their bodily drives.151 After explaining the justification, Anatoli extends 150 Cf. also Anatoli’s assertion towards the end of the introduction that his reading of Maimonides’s Guide opened his eyes to the glory of God. 151 Anatoli mentions the bodily drives in the only other place he mentions the adage “Keep your sons from higgayon,” in his interpretation of Parshat Šemini (Leviticus 9–11); see Malmad ha-Talmidim, 96r–100r, especially 99r. Interpreting the dietary laws espoused in Leviticus 11, Anatoli says that the prohibition against higgayon and Greek science applies to the youth in the same way that feeding children meat and wine is dangerous. This

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its application to most people, since most people will presumably bend their doubts towards their own drives and stubbornness. Who, then, are the few to whom this prohibition does not apply? Apparently, Anatoli’s answer is that the prohibition on studying logic does not apply to those people who will, in fact, bend their doubts towards the views received from the Torah. Anatoli does not say whether the prohibition applies to those who raise doubts, but do not bend them in any direction. The negative formulation that Anatoli adopts would seem to suggest that in fact, such people are permitted to study logic and science. 4

The Case of Ecclesiastes

The dilemma of the scientifically educated doubter that Anatoli describes is reflected in the position of the book of Ecclesiastes, attributed to the wise King Solomon. Most of the book of Ecclesiastes reflects Solomon’s intellectual journey through adopting various positions on what the best life is. Anatoli opens his introduction to Malmad ha-Talmidim by noting that “the words of this book appear to contradict themselves and to contradict the words of the Torah.” Such contradictions, Anatoli says, led some people to suspect that Solomon was a heretic and led others to disdain the Torah and received tradition. Consequently, the talmudic sages “sought to suppress the Book of Ecclesiastes because its words incline toward heretical words.”152 The use of the term “incline” or “bend” (noṭim), a term which Anatoli repeats (in its gerund form, neṭiyyah) in his ensuing discussion of this passage, suggests that analogy, like the ones we saw in the introduction to Malmad ha-Talmidim, is clearly taken from Maimonides’s Guide 1.33. Wine and meat refer to ḥokhmah, which the youth, and, it turns out, also fools, are not prepared to digest. Yet unlike elsewhere, in Parshat Shemini, Anatoli warns against withholding wine and meat—i.e., science—from those who are prepared for it, a position reminiscent of that of Averroes’s Decisive Treatise. See chapter 3, section 2.3 above. Moreover, Anatoli recommends that the proper study proceed along the middle path, without turning off to the side. From context, it seems that Anatoli primarily has ethical disturbances in mind here, such as those of the bodily drives. However, this passage deserves a separate study. 152 This version of the statement appears in Maimonides, Guide 2.28, Pines trans., 334. The Hebrew of the statement is the same as Anatoli’s, but I have modified the translation here. A slightly different version of the statement appears in b. ʿSabb. 30b: “The sages sought to suppress the Book of Ecclesiastes because its words contradict themselves” (‫בקשו חכמים‬ ‫)לגנוז ספר קהלת מפני שדבריו סותרין זה את זה‬. This wording is echoed in Anatoli’s phrasing, and his discussion is clearly indebted to ʿb. Sabb. 30b. Nevertheless, it is not clear which version of the Talmud Anatoli had at his disposal.

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the reader of Ecclesiastes is in the same position as the doubter. He is faced with contradictions brought to him by the text and must decide whether to incline his views towards a position in line with the Torah, according to which Solomon would appear to have sinned, or against the Torah. The talmudic sages ultimately decided not to suppress the book of Ecclesiastes “on the grounds that it begins with words of Torah and ends with words of Torah.”153 That is, even though its middle section may not be “words of Torah,” because its beginning and end are, it can be included in the biblical canon. Anatoli explains that the words of Torah in question are the belief in reward and punishment (emunat ha-gemul), and adds more detail about Solomon’s positions: “At the beginning, he made known to the wise that reward is in accordance with Torah study and science, and at the end, he showed and made public to all that it is in accordance with actions.”154 That latter position, Anatoli tells us, is “a necessary view for faith,”155 while the former is a philosophical view that apparently assumes an agreement between the Torah and science. Accordingly, the first view is suited for those who incline or bend their scientific views towards the Torah, while the second is primarily suited to those who do not have scientific views. Anatoli does not discuss the middle views here, even though they occupy the greater part of the book of Ecclesiastes. These views seem to follow those who seek reward, or a good life, by following various paths, some of which involve knowledge and science. That Anatoli follows the Talmud in suggesting that these views, or at least some of them, are not in keeping with the Torah suggests that he sees Solomon as being concerned with exploring whether science does in fact lead the scientist to the kind of reward the Torah promises. The centrality of this question to Ecclesiastes is highlighted by Anatoli later in the introduction when he restates the problem of Ecclesiastes and notes that “from some of his words, it seems that the scientist (ḥakham) has no advantage over the fool.”156 That is, among the questions raised by the middle part of Ecclesiastes is the question pondered by the doubter that we encountered earlier (but which Anatoli only mentions later in the introduction): Are science and the Torah the same and do they lead to the same reward? The answer 153 b. ʿSabb. 30b. 154 ‫ ובסופו הראה ופרסם לכל‬.‫בראשו הודיע לנבונים שהגמול הוא לפי תלמוד תורה וחכמה‬ ‫שהוא לפי המעשים‬. Note that Paris 257 omits the word ‫ ;תורה‬i.e., it says that the reward “is in accordance with study and science.” 155 ‫דעת הכרחי לאמונה‬. The printed version, but not the manuscripts, has ‫הכרחית‬. 156 ‫ממקצת דבריו נראה שאין יתרון לחכם על הכסיל‬. Note that the use of ‫ יתרון‬here can mean “advantage,” as is commonly understood and as I have understood it here, or it can refer to what remains of the soul in the World to Come.

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to this question will be a result of Anatoli’s answer to the question of whether there is a reward—and if so, what kind—for Torah study and science. Now, Anatoli’s claim is that Ecclesiastes’s first view of reward—namely, that the wise are rewarded in accordance with their study and knowledge of Torah and science—is in fact based on an Aristotelian demonstrative proof (reʾayat heqeš mofti). Anatoli finds this argument in the first eleven verses of Ecclesiastes 1 as a response to the question: “What profit hath a man of all his labour which he taketh under the sun?” (Eccl 1:3). Anatoli constructs the following syllogism from Eccl 1:2–4: Vanity of vanities; all is vanity (minor premise). One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh (major premise). Man hath no profit of all his labour which he taketh under the sun. Anatoli explains the minor premise to mean “all of man’s labour that he does through his lower deeds is the vanity of his vain surroundings; for this is the nature of matter which is destructible.”157 He explains the minor premise to mean “everything whose surroundings is vanity is itself also vanity.”158 Anatoli identifies the latter premise as a first intelligible, presumably understanding it to mean that the part bears the characteristics of the whole. Anatoli also clarifies that “under the sun” means “under the heavens”—that is, on the earth, where the four elements reign—and that “profit” refers to what is left after the destruction of matter; that is, whatever conjoins with higher intellects.159 Ecclesiastes’s demonstration may thus be restated as follows: All matter is destructible (minor premise). Human beings are contained in matter and so are material (major premise). The material parts of human beings are destructible. 157 ‫כל עמל האדם במעשיו השפלים הוא הבל שסביבותיו הבלים כי כן טבע החומר הזה שהוא‬ .‫כלה‬ 158 .‫כל מי שסביבותיו הבל הוא בעצמו ג״כ הבל‬ 159 This is based on a philological discussion of the term ‫ ויתרון לפי דעתי בפסוקים‬:‫יתרון‬ ‫ “מיתר‬:‫ כמו שבא מזה הענין ואף אם במשקל אחר במקום אחר‬,‫אלה בא במקום שארית‬ ‫השמן” “יתר הגזם” ורצה לומר כי כל המעשים והעמל בם תחת השמש שהוא בעולם הכלה‬ ‫ מכלל לאו‬,‫הבל בלא השארות ואחר שהודיע שהעמל בדברים הבלים אין לאדם בעמלו יתרון‬ ‫ והוא שהעמל בדברים הקיימים יש לו יתרון והוא העמל בדברים שלמעלה מן‬,‫אתה שומע הן‬ ‫ בההשתדלות השגת אמתיות בבחינת המציאות‬,‫השמש‬. See also the continuation of this in n. 156 above.

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This is indeed a demonstration, though it is somewhat ambiguous as to whether there are parts of human beings that are immaterial and so not destructible or rather whether they are accomplishments. In any case, what is not destroyed is that which conjoins with the higher beings. Anatoli says this occurs “out of good actions and through labour in Torah and science, with the result that one’s soul departs and desires to conjoin with higher [beings or intellects]. Then God grants it places to walk among these that endure and it shall live forever.”160 Anatoli’s wording is ambiguous here, but if this is to be part of a demonstration, then the conjunction cannot include those actions which are essentially material. Moreover, the study of science and the Torah that gives rise to this conjunction must be of the kind that leads to an immaterial, purely intellectual understanding. I think it likely that Anatoli has in mind the kind of intellectual understanding that we saw in his introduction to the Organon; namely, understanding the existing things and that which makes them exist (i.e., God) through understanding notions. Moreover, as we have seen, Anatoli thinks that these notions can be understood through studying terms both in the Torah and in scientific literature. That is, Anatoli has provided a background as to how one can study the Torah or science and thereby arrive at an intellectual, immaterial understanding of an incorporeal God. His account assumes that the understanding of God that one reaches either through scientific study or through studying the Torah will be essentially the same; that is, that there is no conflict between science and the Torah. Such an understanding is immaterial and is therefore not destructible. It is not, however, connected to material actions or to fulfilment of the miṣwot. The first view of reward and punishment is also proven, according to Anatoli, by induction (reʾayat ḥippuś): “When he examined (be-ḥappeśo) all the particulars of human actions and human labour in them one by one, it emerged that they were vanity and it appeared to all that everything was vanity.”161 This latter proof occupies the bulk of Ecclesiastes as Solomon turns from activity to activity only to find each to be without value. Yet this same inductive proof which shows that of all activities, only intellectual activity is not vanity also leads to the final conclusion that man’s reward is in accordance with his actions, especially keeping the commandments. That is, it shows the value of the actions themselves, either for the sake of establishing the habits that are necessary for intellectual activity or else for their own sake.

160 ‫מתוך מעשיו הטובים ויגיעתו בתורה וחכמה עד שתכלה נפשו ותכסף להדבק בעליונים ויתן לו‬ ‫השם מהלכים בין העומדים וחי לעולם‬. Cf. Zech 3:7. 161 .‫בחפשו כל פרטי מעשי בני האדם אחד אחד והעמל בם נמצא הבל ונראה לכל שהכל הבל‬

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According to Anatoli, the view that reward and punishment is in accordance with actions and commandments is, as we saw, “a necessary view for faith.” The first view—namely, that intellectual attainment alone is the true reward—is proven, according to Anatoli, by an Aristotelian demonstration, as well as by an inductive argument. The movement of the book of Ecclesiastes from the demonstrated proof of reward to the view of reward that is necessary for faith is an example of inclining or bending scientific views towards faith. However, this inclination or bending is achieved through an extensive inductive proof which raises the possibility that other ways of life are, in fact, preferable. These other ways of life are, to be sure, based on bodily drives and desires. Therefore, it is possible that a reader of Ecclesiastes would accept the scientific demonstration at the beginning but would not incline or bend his actions to conform to the Jewish faith, preferring instead to follow one of the other ways of life that arises in Ecclesiastes. Such a person could argue that since intellectual achievement alone matters, then one can adopt whatever actions one prefers and so there is no real reason to prefer those dictated by the Jewish faith over others. All this is to say that in Anatoli’s view, the book of Ecclesiastes is itself in the situation of the Pardes, and its reader is in the situation of one who enters it. The reader realises from the initial demonstration that only intellectual achievements are rewarded, and so he must decide whether to incline his actions towards the Jewish faith or towards other desires. We may also note that only a reader who is familiar with Aristotelian logic will be in such a position. Only such a reader will know what a demonstration is and will recognise that the first argument is a demonstration, and so necessarily true, and that the final statement about the reward for actions proscribed by faith is not demonstrated. Moreover, such a reader will recognise that the majority of the book is an inductive argument, which Averroes says is a type of dialectical argument.162 He will thus realise that the argument for intellectual reward is demonstrated, while for actions it is at best dialectical, though perhaps not more than the received truth. That is, the dilemma of Ecclesiastes is the dilemma Anatoli sees in the sages’ advice to “keep your sons from logic.” The central action of Ecclesiastes, however, is not the demonstration of the importance of intellectual thought, nor is it the conclusion to incline or bend one’s beliefs towards the Jewish faith rather than in other directions. Rather, it 162 See Averroes’s Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, in Averroes’ Three Short Commentaries, 48–51 (English trans.) and 153–58 (Arabic text). For the Hebrew translation, made after Anatoli by Jacob ben Makhir ibn Tibbon (d. ca. 1304), which also uses ḥippuś for “induction,” see, e.g., Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MS héb. 918, f. 27r–v.

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is the search, the inductive dialectical process itself, interrogating the various ways of life in order to find whether they are the true path. To undertake such a search, the reader of Ecclesiastes must follow Ecclesiastes in adopting a position of uncertainty about the best way to live; that is, the serious reader spends most of the book in the position of the genuine doubter. The book is intended to lead such a reader to the position of the Torah, but the talmudic rabbis recognised the possibility that their search could, in fact, lead to heresy. The possibility of error is a danger of the doubter’s search for the best way to live. Anatoli repeatedly emphasises that Ecclesiastes is intended to serve as a kind of goad or spur for the reader. He does this through repeated use of Eccl 12:11: “The words of the wise are as goads, and as nails fastened by the masters of assemblies, which are given from one shepherd.”163 With regard to Ecclesiastes, Anatoli says: Solomon spoke words that are like contradictory words and he was like one who doubts in some of his faith. Yet it was not so. Rather, Solomon spoke in the manner of the scholars who investigate and seek out answers. Sometimes they admit something and other times they dispute it in order to bring every mystery to light. Sometimes they say something whose meaning is one notion and whose intention is another notion. Sometimes they speak in accordance with the beginning of inquiry among students and sometimes they speak in accordance with generally accepted views, rather than [views that have been] intellectually cognised. Their intention in all is to rouse their students’ hearts and to accustom them that they might be pulled towards the truth.

‫ושלמה אמר דבריו כסותרין זה את זה וכמכ‬ ‫ספק בקצת אמונתו כי אין הדבר כן אבל‬ ‫שלמה דבר בדרך חכמי המחקר שחוקכ‬ ‫רין ודורשין פעם מודים פעם חולקין כדי‬ ‫להוציא לאור כל תעלומה ופעם אומר דבר‬ ‫שמשמעו ענין אחד והכונה ענין אחר ופעם‬ ‫אומרין דבר כפי התחלת העיון לתלמידים‬ ‫ופעם כפי הדעות המפורסמות לא מושככ‬ ‫ וכונתם בכל כדי להעיר לב התלמידים‬.‫לות‬ ‫וללמדם ולהרגילם עד שימשכו אותם אל‬ .‫האמת‬

Anatoli is describing the Solomonic method of study as a kind of dialectic, aiming to find truth by exploring competing notions and arguments. These words are goads (dorbonot) because they rouse the students to inquiry. To some extent, this sounds like Christian scholastic debates, with which Anatoli must have been familiar. Note, though, that these dialectic inquiries do not rouse the 163 King James Version.

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students to find specific answers, but rather to find the path to the truth. In this case, the path is through exploring contradictions in various notions. That the goad is intended to spur inquiry rather than answers is further clarified in Anatoli’s explanation of the nails of Eccl 12:11 as “the words of received tradition, which guard the faith.”164 The nail of tradition, Anatoli says, holds people in place, while the goad causes them to move and change. Anatoli explains the analogy of the goad in some detail: It is known that a goad is a sharp, thin, iron tool wedged into a wooden handle. The wood is long and revealed to all, and the handle itself is called a malmed […] The goad is the iron that protrudes from it, and it is hidden from people until they investigate it carefully. The tool itself with both of its parts is called both a “goad” and a “malmed,” and, in the language of our rabbis of blessed memory, a mardeʿa. All three are synonyms rousing one to understanding, study, intellect, and the words and riddles of the scientists. […] It is known that the special activity of the goad is to rouse an ox to pull a plough so as to work the land and bring forth food for man and beast. Sometimes one rouses the ox to go and make furrows using this tool. […] Sometimes one inclines (or: directs, turns) the ox to the right by inclining [the goad] to the left and sometimes [one inclines the ox] to the left by inclining [the goad] to the right, until the furrows of the field are ready. So, too, the scientists rouse the students with their words to work the Garden in ploughing inquiry. In directing their work, sometimes they incline them to the right and sometimes to the left so as to direct them along a straight path.

‫והדרבן ידוע שהוא כלי ברזל דק וחד והוא‬ ‫תקוע ביתד של עץ והעץ הוא ארוך וגלוי‬ ‫לכל והיתד כעצמו נקרא מלמד […] והדרבן‬ ‫הוא הברזל היוצא ממנו והוא נסתר מבני‬ ‫אדם עד שיעיינו בו עיון דק והכלי ההוא‬ ‫גם כן בשני חלקיו נקרא דרבן ונקרא מלמד‬ ‫ובלשון רבותינו ז״ל מרדע ובשלשתם הערה‬ ‫בדרך שתוף השם על הבינה והלמוד והדעה‬ ‫ודברי חכמים וחידותם […] והדרבן ידוע‬ ‫שפעולתו מיוחדת להעיר הבקר למשוך‬ ‫המחרישה כדי לעבד הארץ להוציא מאכל‬ ‫האדם ממנה ומאכל הבהמה ופעם יעירו בו‬ ‫הבקר ללכת ולעשות התלם בכלי העבודה‬ ‫[…] ופעם יטו אתם אל הימין בנטותם אל‬ ‫השמאל ופעם אל השמאל בנטותם אל‬ ‫ כן החככ‬.‫הימין עד שמכונות תלמי השדה‬ ‫מים מעירים התלמידים בדבריהם לעבד הגן‬ ‫במחרשת העיון ולכוין עבודתם פעם יטו‬ ‫אותם אל הימין ופעם אל השמאל כדי לכוין‬ .‫הדרך הישרה‬

This is part of an extended analogy about the Garden of Eden, which appears to be equivalent to the Pardes. People “work” the Garden through scientific 164 .‫דברי הקבלה שהם שומרי האמונה‬

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study and “keep” it through keeping the commandments. Similarly, the goad, which here refers to science, adjusts and alters the beast’s course, inclining it in the proper direction, while the nail, which here refers to tradition, helps it to keep its course. Anatoli explains that here, the students are the ox, but both the ploughing and the production of food seem to refer to scientific inquiry. The students are roused to scientific inquiry either for the beasts of burden—that is, for themselves—or else for man. This seems to mean that the students study in order to continue as students or else so as to become human beings; that is, the goaded students eventually become the goaders. Anatoli describes the activity of teaching here not as leading the students down a specific path, but as encouraging them to go down that path themselves. The goads are often in the opposite direction to the path followed and the ox is expected to pursue that path in order to avoid the goad. Some words of the scientists or scholars, then, would seem to be false so as to encourage students to pursue another line of inquiry. Yet when the student becomes the teacher, he must decide for himself how to pursue his own line of inquiry; that is, he must goad himself along the path that he considers straight. Ecclesiastes and the scientists thus lay down a path for a person to teach and goad himself by using arguments of various kinds in order to follow and encourage others to follow the same path. Still, most of the goading and encouragement is not focused on specific answers, but on general adherence to a path and, most importantly, on rousing readers and students to scientific inquiry. The end of this inquiry is in accordance with the legally sanctioned ends, but the inquiry itself often veers off track. 5 Conclusion Anatoli ends his introduction by stating that he decided to call his work Malmad ha-Talmidim after the goad, malmed, which is similar to the Hebrew word melammed, meaning “teacher.” This work, then, is meant as a teaching tool for students and is intended to “rouse them to the work” in the Garden. That is, Anatoli, like Solomon, wants his readers to study science with an open mind, directing them to incline or bend their views towards the traditionally accepted views at the end of the road, but to pursue science openly and without preconceived notions in the meantime. This method of study in the Malmad is in some ways like the open inquiry programme of study Anatoli placed in his introduction to the Organon, although in the Organon, he seems

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to think that it is not possible to study the Bible in such an open fashion. By the time he reached the Malmad, Anatoli appears to have changed his approach. In addition to calling his work a “goad,” there are several occasions in the introduction when Anatoli refers to it as an “apology” (hitnaṣlut). He also says that Solomon made some words of apology in Ecclesiastes in order to explain why some of what he said strays from the Torah and why he is not a heretic. Anatoli apparently wants to be viewed in the same manner: if his words appear heretical, then the reader should know that he merely wants to spur the populace into studying science. To my mind, Anatoli sounds a lot like the Socrates of Plato’s Apology, who strove to spur165 the populace both into inquiring into the best life and into philosophy. Anatoli, as far as I know, did not have access to Plato’s Apology, but he could have seen some Latin epigraphical material describing it in his work with Michael Scot. 165 Socrates calls himself a μύωψ, which is often translated as “gadfly.” However, the word probably originally meant “spur” or “goad,” and was translated by Ficino as calcar. See Laura Marshall, “Gadfly or Spur? The Meaning of μύωψ in Plato’s Apology of Socrates,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 137 (2017): 163–74. The Vulgate translates ‫ דרבונות‬or Eccl 12:11 as stimuli, which could also be suggestive of μύωψ.

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Appendix: Jacob Anatoli’s Introduction to Logic Trans. Yehuda Halper

The voice of those who search for understanding as silver: “Where is there a crucible for my dross?” The science of speech answers, saying, “I have of old had a furnace for understanding. Through it [the furnace], take away the dross from the silver, and there shall come forth a vessel for the finer.”166 The science of speech has for its portion167 a crucible for the silver of understanding and a furnace for the gold of belief.168 Through it, every statement can be tested [to see] whether it is sweet or bitter, whether it is evil or beautiful, whether it is strong or weak, whether it shall prosper169 or be pleasing,170 whether it is few or many.171 [1] Statements signify notions that are envisioned in man’s intellect; those envisionings are predicated of things that exist outside of his intellect. All existing things make known (or: signify)172 that which makes them exist and acknowledge (or: signify)173 that He created them. Therefore, all who come to seek out the Lord through the truth require this science. For if it is not a science in itself, indeed, its benefit is great in refining every science. A scientist cannot gain perfection without it; for him, it is like an artisan’s tool for an artisan. This is so not only for theoretical science, but also for many places in the Torah, the Bible, and the Talmud, where it provides a great entryway (mavoʾ) to solving many doubts. This is the first intention of the science of speech. [2] The second intention is to sharpen the intellect and make study prosper, like spices which add flavour to food and rouse the nutritive appetite. This is a good benefit for everyone who seeks science. Related to this is that it is very much needed for standing against opponents who argue using sophistic arguments; that is, misleading arguments. Our sages of blessed memory also warned about this when they said, 166 Prov 25:4, King James Version. 167 Cf. Exod 29:26 and Lev 7:33 and 8:29, all of which refer to Moses taking a portion of the dedicatory sacrifice for himself. 168 Cf. Prov 17:3: ‫ ַמ ְצ ֵרף ַל ֶּכ ֶסף וְ כּור ַלּזָ ָהב | ּוב ֵֹחן ִלּבֹות ה׳‬and Prov 27:21: | ‫ַמ ְצ ֵרף ַל ֶּכ ֶסף וְ כּור ַלּזָ ָהב‬ .‫וְ ִאיׁש ְל ִפי ַמ ֲה ָללֹו‬ 169 Cf. Eccl 11:6: ‫יֹודע ֵאי זֶ ה יִ ְכ ָׁשר ֲהזֶ ה אֹו זֶ ה‬ ֵ ‫ַּבּב ֶֹקר זְ ַרע ֶאת זַ ְר ֶעָך וְ ָל ֶע ֶרב ַאל ַּתּנַ ח יָ ֶדָך | ִּכי ֵאינְ ָך‬ .‫טֹובים‬ ִ ‫יהם ְּכ ֶא ָחד‬ ֶ ֵ‫וְ ִאם ְׁשנ‬ 170 Cf. Ps 14:34: ‫יחי | ָאנ ִֹכי ֶא ְׂש ַמח ַּבה׳‬ ִ ‫יֶ ֱע ַרב ָע ָליו ִׂש‬. 171 Cf. Num 13:18: ‫יה ֶה ָחזָ ק הּוא ֲה ָר ֶפה ַה ְמ ַעט‬ ָ ‫יתם ֶאת ָה ָא ֶרץ ַמה ִהוא | וְ ֶאת ָה ָעם ַהּי ֵֹׁשב ָע ֶל‬ ֶ ‫ְּור ִא‬ :‫הּוא ִאם ָרב‬. 172 ‫ יודיעו‬or ‫יורו‬: the manuscripts differ on this. 173 ‫ יודו‬and ‫ יורו‬appear in different manuscripts.

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“Be diligent in studying Torah and know what to answer an Epicurean.”174 The intention of this warning did not concern Epicureans alone, but also anyone who opposes the truth. It is known that man has no power that can stand against the clear-sighted among the other nations who oppose us unless he studies this science. Because I have seen that the evil boasters who glorify themselves over us using disputation and dialectics have become many, I envied them175—I, Jacob b. R. Abba Mari b. R. Anatolio, may their memory176 be for a blessing—and my desire became roused to translate this science as best as I could.177 The truth is that I had first intended to remove from myself the burden of the heavy work of translating and studying the books of the science of astronomy, because it required many books and much understanding. Yet the spirit of my brothers and friends,178 my guides and acquaintances,179 scientists and intellectuals of the cities of Narbonne and Beziers, who presumed in their hearts to draw near to this science,180 compelled me; out of love for them, I shall incline my shoulder to take up burden upon burden. With the aid of Him Who giveth power to the faint,181 I shall sow the seed of the science of astronomy in the morning and the seed of the science of logic in the evening182—may my hands be faithful!183 [3] But if someone should say, “Did not our rabbis, may their memory be blessed, prohibit this science [i.e., logic], when they said, ‘Keep your sons from higgayon’?”,184 we would respond, “Let your ears hear what your mouth brings forth.”185 For [the rabbis] say, “keep your sons,” but they do not say, “keep yourselves.” This is because this science 174 m. ʾAbot 2.14. 175 Cf. Ps 73:3: ‫הֹול ִלים | ְׁשלֹום ְר ָׁש ִעים ֶא ְר ֶאה‬ ְ ‫אתי ַּב‬ ִ ֵ‫ ִּכי ִקּנ‬. King James Version: “For I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked.” 176 That is, the memory of Abba Mari and Anatolio. 177 Anatoli’s ‫ כפי אשר תשיג ידי‬may contain a play on what can be grasped. The hand’s grasp, which is a common expression in the Torah (appearing, e.g., four times in Leviticus 14) may also recall the artisan mentioned above. 178 Cf. Ps 122:8. 179 Cf. Ps 55:14. 180 Cf. Exod 36:2: ‫יאב וְ ֶאל ָּכל ִאיׁש ֲח ַכם ֵלב ֲא ֶׁשר נָ ַתן ה׳ ָח ְכ ָמה‬ ָ ‫ַּיִ ְק ָרא מ ֶֹׁשה ֶאל ְּב ַצ ְל ֵאל וְ ֶאל ָא ֳה ִל‬ ‫אכה ַל ֲעׂש ֹת א ָֹתּה‬ ָ ‫ ְּב ִלּבֹו | ּכֹל ֲא ֶׁשר נְ ָׂשאֹו ִלּבֹו ְל ָק ְר ָבה ֶאל ַה ְּמ ָל‬. Note, however, that Anatoli has ‫ מלאם לבם‬here rather than ‫נשאם לבם‬, which we might expect. The result is a recollection of Esth 7:5, where Ahasueros incredulously asks who would dare consider harming the queen. 181 Isa 40:29. 182 Cf. Eccl 11:6: ‫יֹודע ֵאי זֶ ה יִ ְכ ָׁשר ֲהזֶ ה אֹו זֶ ה‬ ֵ ‫ַּבּב ֶֹקר זְ ַרע ֶאת זַ ְר ֶעָך וְ ָל ֶע ֶרב ַאל ַּתּנַ ח יָ ֶדָך | ִּכי ֵאינְ ָך‬ .‫טֹובים‬ ִ ‫יהם ְּכ ֶא ָחד‬ ֶ ֵ‫וְ ִאם ְׁשנ‬ 183 Cf. Exod 17:12. The word ‫ אמונה‬in Exodus means “steady” or “firm,” but later took on the meaning of “faith.” 184 b. Ber. 28b. 185 b. Ber. 13a and b. Meg. 17b.

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and the other sciences that follow from it are prohibited to the youth for two reasons. The first is that they strongly attract man’s heart. If a youth is educated in them, his soul will not desire the Torah, since its study is not theoretical as is the way of the sciences. The second is that man would have much time without Torah and without the God of Truth if he were not educated in the Torah. For this reason in itself, they prohibited a man from teaching his son Greek science, because it is necessary to bring him up on Torah so that his mind might become accustomed to correct belief in God and so as to instruct him in good moral dispositions. The Sage186 alluded to this when he said, Educate a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it.187 It is an easy thing in youth to rely on the received opinions of the true Torah, because [then] one has no need to refine them, for the one who transmitted them to him has already refined and tested them. As the Bible says, Every statement of God is refined.188 [4] Then after this, every scientist ought to search for and refine the hidden meaning189 of the words of the Torah. Then shall he understand fear of the Lord and find the knowledge (daʿat) of God. As the Sage said, If thou seekest her as silver, and searchest for her as for hid treasures, then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of God.190 Searching for this in the manner of searching for hidden treasures can only happen with theoretical science. Therefore have I told myself to become bold and strong through this craft. But I did not know191 that a man like me ought not to have broken through to ascend192 the great mountain, the mountain of translation, because it was a long distance193 from me and there were many stumbling blocks before my lack of knowledge of Arabic and the shortness of my understanding. I say: perhaps with the little honey that can be found in the books I have translated, the eyes of those who study may be enlightened and they may correct that which is crooked in them. When it comes to science, even a small benefit is great for those who love science.

186 ‫ החכם‬can also mean “the Scientist”; here, Anatoli presumably means Solomon. 187 Prov 22:6. 188 Prov 30:5. I have translated this statement in accordance with how Anatoli uses the terms ‫( מאמר‬assuming that his understanding of ‫ אמרה‬is similar to that of ‫ )מאמר‬and ‫לצרוף‬. 189 The Hebrew here is ‫הבנה‬, which appears to mean “something that causes understanding” (‫)בינה‬, hence the translation of “meaning.” 190 Prov 2:4–5: ‫ֹלהים‬ ִ ‫ ָאז ָּת ִבין יִ ְר ַאת ה׳ | וְ ַד ַעת ֱא‬:‫ִאם ְּת ַב ְק ֶׁשּנָ ה ַכ ָּכ ֶסף | וְ ַכ ַּמ ְטמֹונִ ים ַּת ְח ְּפ ֶׂשּנָ ה‬ :‫ ִּת ְמ ָצא‬The object of the search is apparently understanding. Cf. Proverbs 2:1–3: ‫ְּבנִ י ִאם‬ ‫ ִּכי ִאם ַל ִּבינָ ה‬:‫ ְל ַה ְק ִׁשיב ַל ָח ְכ ָמה ָאזְ נֶ ָך | ַּת ֶּטה ִל ְּבָך ַל ְּתבּונָ ה‬:‫ֹותי ִּת ְצּפֹן ִא ָּתְך‬ ַ ‫ּומ ְצ‬ ִ | ‫ִּת ַּקח ֲא ָמ ָרי‬ .‫קֹולָך‬ ֶ ‫ִת ְק ָרא | ַל ְּתבּונָ ה ִּת ֵּתן‬ 191 Translating ‫ואם ידעתי‬, following 1Sam 17:55. 192 Cf. Exod 19:24. 193 Cf. Josh 9:13.

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May He who tests and refines my heart help me to spread His will from upon Him. May He understand my errors and cleanse me from what is hidden.194 May the statements of my mouth be in accordance with His will.195 194 Cf. Ps 19:13. 195 Ps 19:15. The continuation of the verse reads ‫צּורי וְ ג ֲֹא ִלי‬ ִ ‫וְ ֶהגְ יֹון ִל ִּבי ְל ָפנֶ יָך | ה׳‬. That Anatoli does not cite this verse in full emphasises that the point of logic is the statements of the mouth, not the logic of the heart.

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Chapter 6

The Sex Life of a Metaphysical Sceptic

Platonic Themes in Gersonides’s Commentary on the Song of Songs

In his bestselling book Born to Kvetch, the popular Yiddishist Michael Wex recounts how, as pupils at a religious yeshiva, he and his friends learned of Rashi’s explanation of the first reference to breasts in the Song of Songs as, in fact, a reference to Moses and Aaron, who were responsible for nourishing the Children of Israel in the desert.* In his account, the boys then proceeded to notice the “Moses and Aaron” on various women around town, and one would expect that they could hardly suppress giggles at any mention of Moses and Aaron in any other context.1 Rashi’s de-eroticisation of the Song of Songs thus had the side effect of simultaneously eroticising Moses and Aaron among precisely the impressionable youth whom he had intended to shield. De-eroticisation is a tricky business; comparison of the erotic to the non-erotic tends rather to eroticise the non-erotic. Whether Rashi was aware of this effect I shall leave to the scholars of that pious man of Troyes. Levi Gersonides, however, who lived 200 years after Rashi and much further south, was certainly aware of how eros can spread from the allegory to the allegorised. Gersonides explains that the expressions of love between the interlocutors of the Song of Songs are allegories of the soul’s path to intellectual perfection, a path that moves from ethical perfection to the perfection of the imagination and thought, then to mathematics, the physical sciences, and finally, to metaphysics.2 Far from removing eros from the picture, Gersonides uses the Song of Songs’s highly erotic language to describe the desire of the soul, its faculties, and even the hylic intellect for the Active Intellect. These desires are described not only as tešuqah (desire), but especially by the term * This chapter was first published in Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in Medieval Jewish Thought, ed. Racheli Haliva (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 146–66. 1 Michael Wex, Born to Kvetch: Yiddish Language and Culture in All of Its Moods (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2005), 88–90. 2 A critical edition of Gersonides’s Commentary on the Song of Songs appeared in Rabbi Levi ben Gershom, Commentary on Song of Songs [Hebrew], ed. Menachem Kellner (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar Ilan University Press, 2003). An English translation was published in Levi ben Gershom, Commentary on Song of Songs, trans. Menachem Kellner (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). Quotations from the Commentary will list the Hebrew edition first, followed by the English translation.

© Yehuda Halper, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004468764_008

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ḥešeq, which refers to an erotic desire, particularly in the context of the Song of Songs.3 The realisation of such desires leads to pleasure (taʿanug), joy (śimḥah), embraces (teḥabqeni), and, of course, kisses (nešiqot). But the characters in the Song of Songs do not go “all the way,” and the erotic desires both in the Song of Songs and in Gersonides’s characterisation remain unconsummated. In a sense, Gersonides’s Song of Songs commentary resembles Diotima’s account of eros in Plato’s Symposium. Both describe a love of that which the lover does not possess, which for Gersonides is an eros of the soul and the hylic intellect for the Active Intellect. Moreover, like Diotima’s eros, Gersonides’s ḥešeq is all-consuming, as all of the faculties of the soul subject themselves to it and the ḥošeq (desirer) is entirely consumed by the desire. The subjugation 3 Note, however, that the term ḥešeq does not appear in the Song of Songs itself. Yet it was also associated with the Song of Songs by Gersonides’s contemporary Baḥya ben Asher, who distinguishes between ahavah and ḥešeq, explicitly connecting the latter with intellectual conjunction or conjunction of thought (devequt ha-maḥšavah). See his Kad ha-Qemaḥ, in Kitve Rabbenu Baḥya, ed. Charles B. Chavel (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1969), 34–35. Another of Gersonides’s contemporaries, Joseph Kaspi, also says that the primary meaning of the Song of Songs is in uncovering the relationship between ḥesheq and cognition of the intelligibles. See his short Commentary on the Song of Songs in Miqra‌ʾot Gedolot “Ha-Keter”: The Five Scrolls, ed. Menachem Cohen (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2012), 28 [Hebrew pagination]. Gersonides also uses the term ḥešeq to refer to the desire for higher knowledge, which is a knowledge that is similarly accompanied by pleasure, though it reaches its height only after one’s death, in Gersonides, The Wars of the Lord, ed. Ofer Elior and Charles Touati (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2018), 206–7. See also Seymour Feldman’s translation in Wars of the Lord, Book One: Immortality of the Soul (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1984), 225. These uses of ḥešeq to refer to erotic love probably derive, at least to some extent, from Samuel ibn Tibbon’s use of the term to translate the Arabic term for erotic, passionate love, ʿišq, in Maimonides’s Guide 3.51. On the background of Maimonides’s use of this term, see Harvey, “Avicenna and Maimonides on Prayer and Intellectual Worship,” 82–105. See also Steven Harvey, “The Meaning of Terms Designating Love in Judaeo-Arabic Thought and Some Remarks on the Judaeo-Arabic Interpretation of Maimonides,” in Judaeo-Arabic Studies: Proceedings from the Founding Conference of the Society for Judaeo-Arabic Studies, ed. Norman Golb (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996), 175–96. The term ḥešeq also appears in Shem Tob ibn Falaquera’s translation/summary of al-Fārābī’s Philosophy of Plato, in Propädeutik der Wissenschaften (Reschith Chokmah), 74–75. The Arabic term which Falaquera is translating as ḥešeq is ʿišq (see Alfarabius, De Platonis philosophia, Arabic pages 14–15); here, al-Fārābī is characterising Socrates’s discussion in Plato’s Phaedrus, and the underlying Greek term is almost certainly eros. A similar use of ḥešeq is also attributed to Plato in Judah al-Ḥarizi, Musre Haphilosophim, 15. There, Plato is said to compare the ḥešeq of one soul for another to the ḥešeq of one body for another. This work is a translation of al-Anṣārī’s summary of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq’s Ādāb al-Falāsifa (see chapter 1, n. 7 above), but unfortunately this passage in the Hebrew text is among several chapters not found in the Arabic. See Abdurrahman Badawi’s edition of the Arabic text, 61–62, which is missing text corresponding to chapters 18–20 of the Hebrew edition. Accordingly, we cannot know if the underlying Arabic term is also išq.

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of the powers of the soul to this final desire is akin to Diotima’s description of the so-called Ladder of Love in the Symposium. According to Diotima, the path to the eros of the beautiful begins with the young person’s desire for beautiful bodies, continues with the abstraction of that love to the eros for beautiful souls, and from there to the love of the sciences and then to the love of beauty itself; that is, the form of beauty.4 For Gersonides, the text operates on various layers. First, of course, there is the text of the Song of Songs itself, with its descriptions of erotic desires for bodies. Then, there is the understanding of this as an allegory referring to the soul. Thus, he differentiates between the allegory itself (ha-mašal) and that to which the allegory refers (ha-nimšal). The reader who understands that this is an allegory understands that there is a “hidden meaning” (ha-nistar) and can therefore search for the allegory.5 This allegory concerns the sciences, which culminate in a metaphysical approach to the Active Intellect.6 The similarities between this progression from the plain text to approaching the Active Intellect and Diotima’s Ladder of Love in the Symposium are, I think, quite clear. Most significantly, at each stage of this progression, we find a new understanding of the object of the ḥešeq. That is to say, eros is present at every stage of the interpretation, though its object and direction change throughout. The process of studying science leads the desirer from the most open and easily identifiable kind of desire to the most concealed desire, the desire for the Active Intellect, which is also the most difficult, if not impossible, to grasp.

4 See Plato, Symp. 210a–212b. See also Plotinus, The Enneads 1.6, 92–103. 5 One place Gersonides delineates these distinctions is on 66–67/13–14: “You must not fail to note that some of the attributes with which the lovers described each other relate both to the allegory (ha-mašal) and to its intended meaning (ha-nimšal) […]. This was done in order to indicate the hidden meaning (ha-nistar), so that one would not mistakenly think that the statements in this book should be taken according to their external sense (ha-nigleh).” 6 See, e.g., 66–68/13–15. Menachem Kellner compares the approach to the Active Intellect through the sciences in the Commentary on Song of Songs with some of Gersonides’s other works in “Gersonides on imitatio Dei and the Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge,” Jewish Quarterly Review 85 (1995): 275–96. In his introduction to the Hebrew edition (24 ff.), Kellner argues convincingly that the intended reader of Gersonides’s Commentary is a beginning student. Accordingly, the Commentary is designed to encourage the student to undertake an orderly study of science in order to reach knowledge of the highest things. These arguments are expanded in Menachem Kellner, Torah in the Observatory: Gersonides, Maimonides, Song of Songs (Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2010), 121–48 and 159–79. Kellner, however, discounts the importance of metaphysics for Gersonides on the grounds that “in practice [metaphysical] study is both difficult and dangerous and […] [i]n an important sense it is unnecessary: one can achieve felicity without it” (166). Accordingly, Kellner does not see Gersonides as a metaphysical sceptic, but as one who prefers physics and astronomy to metaphysics as a less difficult, less dangerous approach to reaching the acquired intellect.

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Gersonides’s use of “concealed” (nistar) to refer to what is allegorised suggests that the plain meaning of the text is “revealed” (nigleh). Moreover, his statement that the secrets ought to be kept hidden “from those who are not fit for them”7 implies that the revealed meaning of the text need not be kept hidden from the many. Gersonides is thus distinguished from how most other medieval and rabbinic interpreters of the Song of Songs are usually understood. Other interpreters, in fact, are understood as seeing the plain text as what ought to be hidden and as only being willing to discuss openly the allegorical meanings. Indeed, Gersonides claims to be espousing the intention of the author of the Song of Songs8 and, accordingly, he is astonishingly open to the plain meaning of the text.9 To be sure, he notes that “that which is revealed is not beneficial to the many,”10 but this seems to be because it eroticises bodies, which the many already do. It is only the singular individuals whom the Song truly guides to happiness.11 Yet it is possible that there are people who are neither among the many nor among the singular individuals who benefit from the Song in varying degrees. Thus, Gersonides refers to the author’s “desire that his words be both understood according to the ability of those fit to understand them and kept hidden from the masses.”12 That is, the true meaning is hidden from the masses (who presumably cannot eroticise anything besides bodies) but is aimed at a range of people among the elite with a spectrum of intellectual abilities. Only a few will understand the allegory in all of its depth, while the others will grasp the open meaning of the text and perhaps some layers of the allegory. That is, all readers of the Song of Songs will understand 7

8 9

10 11 12

‫העלמם ממי שאינו ראוי להם‬, 67/14. In context, it is clear that ‫ העלמם‬refers to the author actively hiding the secrets; for example, the expression ‫יוסיף העלם בדבריו‬, which appears in the same paragraph, cannot possibly mean that the meaning has merely escaped the reader’s notice, but that the author has actively suppressed the meaning. ‫מה שכוון בדברים‬, 51/3. In contrast, Abraham ibn Ezra, for example, adamantly maintains: “Heaven forfend, heaven forfend that Song of Songs be like words of ḥesheq, except as an allegory!” (‫וחלילה‬ ‫)חלילה להיות שיר השירים כדברי חשק כי אם על דרך משל‬, Commentary on Song of Songs, in Mikra‌ʾot Gedolot “Ha-Keter,” 22 [Hebrew pagination]. ‫לא הושם נגלהו מועיל להמון‬, 61 (compare Kellner’s translation, 8). ‫ הוא מישיר היחידים לבד אל דרך הגעת ההצלחה‬,‫ והוא שיר השירים‬,‫ואולם זה הספר‬, 61/8. ‫רצותו שיובנו דבריו כפי היכולת למי שראוי שיבינם עם העלמם מן ההמון כמו שהוא מחוייב‬, 68/15. On the meaning of binah, the root word for ‫שיבינם‬, “to understand them,” as inferences or “propositions derived inductively,” see Sara Klein-Braslavy, “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs,” in Sara Klein-Braslavy, “Without Any Doubt”: Gersonides on Method and Knowledge (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 88–89 and 96–110. According to Klein-Braslavy, the term tevunah, from the same root as binah, refers to what she calls the “diaporematic method.” The reading of Gersonides’s Commentary on the Song of Songs that I present in this chapter is not incompatible with Klein-Braslavy’s notion of dialectic and diaporematic methods when it comes to metaphysics, though perhaps not physics. Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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its erotic nature, but only some will be able to benefit from that eroticism by applying it to intellectual endeavours.13 This kind of connection between the surface meaning of the text and the hidden allegorisation of the text to eros reminds us moderns of Diotima’s Ladder, which begins from the eroticism that all see in bodies and ascends to the erotic contemplation of the form of Beauty by the few.14 1

The Erotic Path to God

Gersonides thus rejects all previous interpretations of the Song of Songs. He is particularly critical of the Midrash, which he says is “the opposite of what was intended by the author.”15 The Midrash, according to Gersonides, had its 13

14

15

One sentence in the book is sometimes adduced to show that Gersonides rejected the plain meaning of the text: “It is not characteristic of those who speak by virtue of the holy spirit to write poems crafted so as to attract one to despicable behaviour or to write poems of vanity and falsehood which do not attract one to the things which ought to be loved or to the rejection of things which ought to be rejected” (‫כי אין מחוק המדברים ברוח‬ ‫ ולא בשירי ההבלים‬,‫הקדש לדבר שירים אשר יתוקנו להמשיך האדם אל הפעולות המגונות‬ ‫והכזבים אשר לא ימשיכו האדם אל הדברים שראוי שיאהבו או אל הרחקת הדברים אשר‬ ‫ראוי שירוחקו‬, 69/17). However, this sentence does not actually deny validity to the plain meaning of the text, which need not be seen as attracting anyone to “despicable behaviour” or as attracting one to things that ought to be rejected. Indeed, the above sentence is not complete, but begins, “There is no doubt that all of them [sc. all of Solomon’s songs] guided one toward the perfection intended for man, whether to the first perfection or to the ultimate perfection, or to them both together” (‫ואין ספק שכלם היו מישרים אל השליר‬ ‫ אם אל השלימות הראשון ואם לשלימות האחרון אם אל שניהם יחד‬,‫)מות המכוון באדם‬. If marriage and procreation are perfections of man, then there should be no reason not to understand the Song of Songs as supporting them. In any case, I do not see how this sentence can be seen as an ipso facto rejection of the plain sense of the Song of Songs, especially in light of Gersonides’s very frequent discussions of it. Gersonides offers a different approach to the erotic ascent to intellectual knowledge in his Commentary on Ecclesiastes. There, after defining wisdom (ḥokhmah) as “knowing the existing thing insofar as it is an existing thing—and this is First Philosophy,” i.e., metaphysics, Gersonides says, “seeking wisdom is very much desired” (‫ענין בקשת החכמה הוא‬ ‫)חשוק מאד‬. That is, metaphysics is an object of ḥešeq. However, Gersonides continues by recommending that one wishing to attain such wisdom should “distance himself from that one lesser thing which the ignoramus longs for, namely woman. For she is ‘snares and nets’ (cf. Eccl 7:26) so as to entrap a man’s heart in such a way that she prevent him from any perfection of soul” (,‫ והוא האשה‬,‫ יכסוף אותו הסכל‬,‫שיתרחק מדבר אחד פחות‬ ‫ באופן שתמנע אותו מכל שלמות נפשי‬,‫)אשר היא “מצודים וחרמים” ללכוד לב האדם‬. See Levi ben Gershom, Peruše ha-Megillot (Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 2003), 48 and 52 (see also 53). This approach does not appear to be reconcilable with the approach we find in the Commentary on the Song of Songs. I leave to future studies the task of reconciling these positions. ‫מהלך הדרש […] שנאמר בו בדברים חלוף מה שכוון בהם‬, 51/3. Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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own aims that were, in fact, external to the text and which could only lead to misunderstanding if mentioned in connection with the proper interpretation, in some cases so much so that it would bring “the reader to despise the words of the author.”16 Gersonides expresses the hope that he will live long enough to comment on the midrashic interpretations in a separate work17—he did not, unfortunately—and clearly implies that the Midrash and the text are at odds. Gersonides thus presents himself as a textual purist—a somewhat surprising image in light of his many citations of and even quotations from philosophical works. Aside from references to his own works, especially the Wars of the Lord, and one reference to Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed, Gersonides does not refer to Jewish texts. He does, however, refer to a large number of Aristotelian texts, including Analytica posteriora, Topica, Physica, Meteorologica, De anima, Parva naturalia, De animalibus, and Metaphysica. He also refers several times to Ptolemy’s Almagest. That is, Gersonides rejects rabbinic interpretations of the Song of Songs and turns instead to Aristotle and Ptolemy. He justifies this turn immediately after his rejection of the rabbinic interpretations with the following statement:18 We shall begin by laying down the following premise, which encompasses everything included in this book. It is evident from the perspective of the Torah and the prophets and from the perspective of theorization that man’s ultimate happiness resides in intellectually cognizing and knowing God to the extent that is possible for him. This will be perfected through contemplation of the notions of existing things, their order, their equilibrium, and the manner of God’s wisdom in organizing them as they are. This is so because these intelligibles direct one to knowledge of God to some extent, for an activity gives some indication concerning its agent; that is, absolutely perfect activity indicates that its agent is absolutely perfect, insofar as it is an agent.

16 17 18

‫ומהנה נתחיל בהצעה אחת מקפת בכל‬ ‫ מבואר‬:‫ והיא זאת‬,‫מה שיכלליה זה הספר‬ ,‫נגלה מצד התורה והנביאים ומצד העיון‬ ‫שההצלחה התכליתיית לאדם היא כשיר‬ ‫ וזה‬.‫שכיל וידע הש״י כפי מה שאפשר לו‬ ‫אמנם ישלם כשיתבונן בענייני הנמצאות‬ ‫וסדרם ויושרם ואופן חכמת השם בשומו‬ ‫ וזה שאילו המושר‬.‫אותם על מה שהם עליו‬ ‫כלות יישירהו אל הידיעה בשם ית׳ באופן‬ ‫ כי הפעולה מורה על הפועל הוראה‬,‫מה‬ ‫מה; רוצה לומר כי הפעולה השלמה אשר‬ ‫בתכלית תורה על פועל שלם בתכלית‬ .‫מצד שהוא פועל‬

‫הביאורים דברי הדרושים ההם […] אם שיבלבל המעיין מהבין מה שכוון בדברים […] אם‬ ‫שיהיו סבה אל מה שיקוץ בדברי המחבר‬, 51/3. 52/4. 52–53/4, translation modified. Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Gersonides’s argument here is the gist of his approach to science throughout the Commentary: science contemplates the notions (ʿinyanim) of existing things which, because they are activities, indicate their agent. Moreover, such a scientific quest for the divine is mandated by the Torah and the prophets and, in fact, leads to human happiness (haṣlaḥah). Gersonides’s argument here echoes the first part of Jacob Anatoli’s introduction to the logical Organon that we saw above. As we saw, Anatoli’s statement was likely based on a combination of the opening of Averroes’s Decisive Treatise and his translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione 16a3–8.19 Yet while I argued that Anatoli’s statement leads his reader to emphasize the separation of science from religious texts, Gersonides emphasises that the religious texts—namely, “the Torah and the prophets”—encourage scientific activities. In this, Gersonides is closer to Averroes’s Decisive Treatise than Anatoli was. Indeed, the following relevant statement from the Decisive Treatise may be found in an anonymous medieval Hebrew translation whose terminology is close to Gersonides’s and which is quite possibly the latter’s source:20 We say: If the activity of philosophy is nothing more than theorization about and consideration of existing things insofar as they are an indication of the Agent—that is, insofar as they have been activated—(for existing things indicate their Agent through knowing the art in them, and the more perfect the knowledge of the art in them is, the more perfect is the knowledge of the Agent) and if the Law has recommended and urged consideration of the existing things, then it is evident that what this name indicates is either obligatory or recommended by the Law.21 19 20

21 22

‫ונאמר אם היה פעל הפילוסופיה אינו‬ ‫דבר יותר מהעיון בנמצאות ובחינתם‬ ‫ רצו׳ מצד‬22‫מצד הוראתם על הפועל‬ ‫שהם פעולים כי הנמצאות יורו על הפועל‬ ‫בידיעת מלאכתם ושהוא כל עת היות‬ ‫הידיעה במלאכתם יותר שלמה היתה‬ ‫הידיעה בפועל יותר שלמה והיתה התורה‬ ‫כבר הביאה אל בחינת הנמצאות ומהרה‬ ‫בזה הנה מבואר שמה שיורה על זה השם‬ .‫אם מחויב בתורה אם מובא אליו‬

See chapter 5, section 2, pp. 154–155 and the appendix to chapter 5, p. 182. Golb, “The Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ Faṣl al-Maqāl,” 97. See chapter 3, n. 81. If this is, indeed, Gersonides’s source, then June 1325, the date of composition of Gersonides’s Commentary on the Song of Songs, is a terminus ante quem for this translation of the Decisive Treatise. My translation has been aided by Charles Butterworth’s translation of this passage in Averroes, Decisive Treatise, 1–2. One of the unusual points in this translation is the use of “agent” (poʿel) to refer to God, where Averroes had “artisan” (ṣāniʿ). Falaquera essentially quotes the same lines in his Epistle of the Debate, though his terminology favours “creator” (boreʾ) and “creation” (beriʾah). We should also note that Falaquera cites Exod 33:13 as the proof that this position is in fact found in the Torah. See Harvey, Falaqera’s Epistle of the Debate, 73; compare

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Gersonides’s approach to the Song of Songs, then, is based not on rabbinic texts, but, it seems, on Averroes. According to both, philosophy ought to be taken up in order to study existing things with a view to knowing God. Now, the study of existing things with a view to knowing God is, of course, metaphysics. Gersonides thus places metaphysics front and centre in his Commentary on the Song of Songs. Gersonides’s formulation, however, differs from that of Averroes in several respects, and these distinctions are indications of larger differences in their approach to metaphysics. First, Averroes says, “existing things indicate their Agent through knowing the art in them,” leaving it ambiguous as to whether substantive knowledge of God can actually be obtained. Gersonides’s statement that the “intelligibles direct one to knowledge of God to some extent” is less ambiguous, implying that this knowledge is not complete. Furthermore, Averroes’s statement that “the more perfect the knowledge of the art in them is, the more perfect is the knowledge of the Agent” implies that perfect knowledge of the agent may be a possibility, if a remote one.23 Meanwhile, Gersonides’s statement that “absolutely perfect activity indicates that its Agent is absolutely perfect” suggests only that the one who masters knowledge of existing things and their activity knows only that God is perfect. It says nothing about any substantial or even accidental knowledge of God. Most significant here is that Gersonides describes man’s highest intellectual achievement and that by which he knows as much about God as he can as knowing “existing things, their order, their equilibrium, and the manner of God’s wisdom in organizing them as they are.” Man, then, in Gersonides’s view, does not attain

23

also 40. Steven Harvey compares Falaquera’s approach to this line with Averroes’s in more detail in “The Quiddity of Philosophy according to Averroes and Falaquera, a Muslim Philosopher and His Jewish Interpreter,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26 (2012): 904–13. According to Harvey, Falaquera “cautions that the philosophers themselves have many doubts about metaphysics and concede that much is beyond man’s capacity to understand.” Moreover, Falaquera’s “concern seems to have been with those areas in metaphysics where Aristotle’s teachings seem to contradict the Torah” (912). Could Falaquera’s use of boreʾ rather than yoṣer or uman to translate ṣāniʿ be in deference to the religious connotations of boreʾ? That is, could Falaquera be signalling that metaphysics is permissible for some so long as God is viewed as the boreʾ; i.e., so long as the metaphysician adopts a fundamentally religious viewpoint and assumes that God exists and that He created the world? If so, then the kind of metaphysical scepticism that I am arguing that Gersonides associates with this view (see especially the next paragraph and n. 21 below) are fundamentally at odds with Falaquera’s views of philosophy. Note that Anatoli’s parallel statement (see appendix to chapter 5, p. 182) implies, with even less ambiguity than Averroes, that such knowledge of God is attainable. Nevertheless, it is far from clear that he holds this view in Malmad ha-Talmidim.

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much knowledge of God, but only what can be gained from understanding the world.24 2

The Desire to Know

This is not the only reference to Averroes in the Commentary on the Song of Songs. In fact, as far as I can tell, all of the references to Aristotle are actually to Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle. Moreover, echoes of Averroes’s words can be felt throughout the Commentary. Indeed, it seems possible to me that Gersonides engages in a nearly-constant dialogue with Averroes in this commentary. This dialogue with Averroes, to some extent, can be seen as a development of the deeper engagement with Averroes’s commentaries that Gersonides made in his own super-commentaries on them. Between 1321 and ca. 1324—that is, until just before writing the Commentary on the Song of Songs—Gersonides wrote at least seventeen commentaries on Aristotelian works; namely, on Averroes’s Short and Middle Commentaries on those works. These commentaries focused on logic and natural science, and while most of them are still awaiting full scholarly attention, it is clear that they reflect a high level of engagement with Averroes’s works. They analyse his words, develop arguments for them, adduce additional evidence, and often argue against Averroes. At the time when he began writing his Bible commentaries, Gersonides’s Aristotelian commentary project, if it was not still in progress, was certainly fresh in his mind; we should not be surprised to see frequent references and allusions to Averroes.25 Here, I shall mention one important instance where Gersonides is apparently in dialogue with Averroes’s Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.26 24

25

26

Gersonides presents a similar position in the Wars of the Lord, part 1, chapter 12. Moreover, in his introduction to the Wars, Gersonides explicitly repudiates deriving fundamental principles from the essence of the first cause, “for our knowledge of the substance of the First Cause is very weak” (Elior ed., 6; compare to Feldman trans., 92). Note that this statement is presented as part of the question of whether the world is created, a question whose answer Gersonides says is “erotically desired by the nature of every theoretician” (‫)חשוקה בטבע לכל מעיין‬. Cf. n. 3 above. On the chronology of Gersonides’s writings, see Ruth Glasner, Gersonides: A Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Philosopher-Scientist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 13–18. Glasner explores the issues of chronology in more detail in “The Evolution of the Genre of the Commentary in Gersonides” [Hebrew], Daʿat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah 74–75 (2013): 185–96. There is evidence that Gersonides wrote an independent Commentary on the Metaphysics, but that this commentary is now lost. The Commentary on the Metaphysics seems to

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This will give a snapshot rather than a full picture of Gersonides’s treatment of Averroes in his Commentary on the Song of Songs, but a snapshot that is nonetheless revealing of Gersonides’s erotic approach to metaphysics. Gersonides explicitly refers to book 1 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in his explanation of Song 1:2: [The author of the Song of Songs] explained that God placed in our nature, we the community of human beings, a stronger desire to know the notions of existing things than our desire for bodily pleasures. This premise is true; there is no doubt about its truth. The Philosopher has explained this in the first book of the Metaphysics in the new translation. Solomon presented a wonderful explanation for this; it is that every man, ab initio, can see God’s wisdom and greatness in created things by virtue of the perfection found in their creation. From this perspective, every man has a wonderful ḥešeq to know the goodness of the order and the equilibrium found among created things, all of which wonderfully indicate the perfection of the Agent, as stated above.27

,‫ובאר תחילה שה׳ ית׳ שם בטבע בנו‬ ‫ ענייני‬28‫ תשוקה לדעת‬,‫עדת האנשים‬ ‫ יותר חזקה מתשוקתינו אל‬,‫הנמצאות‬ ‫ וזאת ההקדמה אמיר‬.‫ההנאות הגופיות‬ ‫ וכבר באר‬.‫ אין ספק באמתתה‬,‫תית‬ ‫אותה הפלוסוף בראשון ממה שאחר‬ ‫ והנה שלמה‬.‫הטבע מההעתקה החדשה‬ ‫ והיא הראות חכמת‬,‫נתן בזה סבה נפלאה‬ ‫ה׳ וגדולתו בנבראות לכל אדם בתחילת‬ .‫העניין מצד השלימות הנמצא בבריאתם‬ ‫ומזה הצד יהיה חשק כל אדם נפלא לדעת‬ ‫ אשר‬,‫טוב הסדור והיושר אשר בנמצאות‬ ,‫יורה הוראה נפלאה על שלימות הפועל‬ .‫כמו שקדם‬

Here, Gersonides claims to be drawing on book 1 of the Metaphysics in a “new” translation. Which new translation does he have in mind? It is not likely that

27 28

have been in Gersonides’s library: see Gérard Weil, La bibliothèque de Gersonide d’après son catalogue autographe, ed. Frédéric Chartrain, Anne-Marie Weil-Guény, and Joseph Shatzmiller (Louvain and Paris: Peeters, 1991), 47 and 99. Gersonides also mentions the commentary three times in the Wars and once in the Commentary on Ecclesiastes (see Sara Klein-Braslavy, “The Opinions that Give Rise to the Apories in Gersonides’ Wars of the Lord,” in Without Any Doubt, n. 33). The reference in the Commentary on Ecclesiastes occurs right at the beginning of the introduction: see Perushe hammegillot, 15. See also Ruth Glasner, “Gersonides’ Lost Commentary On the Metaphysics,” Medieval Encounters 4 (1998): 130–57, and Glasner, Gersonides, 71–79. Glasner attributes to Gersonides doubts about metaphysical methods and the Aristotelian scientific method. Moreover, in her view, Gersonides interprets the biblical figure of Solomon as a representative of his new way of doing science. Glasner’s position is not necessarily incompatible with my position in this chapter. My conclusions about Gersonides’s view of metaphysics here are confined to what can be inferred from his Commentary on the Song of Songs. Gersonides, Commentary on Song of Songs, 72–73/20, translation modified. On the connection of knowledge (da ‘at), dialectic syllogisms, and intelligibles, see Klein-Braslavy, “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs,” 81–84.

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Gersonides would have called William of Moerbeke’s translation “new” in 1325, more than fifty years after it was composed, nor would he fail to mention in this context that it was not a translation into Hebrew. Nor can he be referring to the Hebrew translation of the Metaphysics, since that text, like its Arabic source, takes Metaphysics α ἔλαττον to be book 1, and accordingly makes no mention of the desire to know that appears in the famous opening line of A μεῖζον. In fact, the first four and a half chapters of Metaphysics A μεῖζον did not make it into the Arabic text, and consequently the desire to know does not figure in the Arabic text of Metaphysics A μεῖζον or in any Hebrew translations of that text.29 Averroes’s Middle or Short Commentaries on the Metaphysics, which build on the text of the Metaphysics that Averroes had, also do not mention the desire to know in their first books.30 The only Hebrew Aristotelian text of which I am aware that prominently mentions this desire to know in book 1 is Averroes’s Long Commentary on Metaphysics α ἔλαττον, which Gersonides is known to cite elsewhere.31 The Hebrew translation of this text would have been quite new in 1325, and Gersonides would have been among its first readers.32 We should not be too troubled by Gersonides saying “the Philosopher” when he is in fact drawing on Averroes, since he, like other medievals, was not always careful to distinguish between Aristotle and Averroes. It is not clear what Averroes’s source for the desire to know was, since Aristotle’s line did not appear in his translation, but he mentions it in connection with his introductory comments to what in his version was the opening 29

30

31 32

See Averroes, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿat, vol. 1. The absence of these chapters was apparently not known to Kellner; see 73 n. 21 in the Hebrew edition. These chapters were not translated into Hebrew until the late fifteenth century, when Eli Habilio translated them and Barukh ibn Yaʿiš translated the entire Latin translation of the Metaphysics (probably that of Moerbeke). See Yehuda Halper, “The Only Extant, Complete, and Original Hebrew Commentary on the Entire Metaphysics of Aristotle: Eli Habilio and the Influence of Scotism,” Vivarium 57 (2019): 182–205, especially 186 n. 14 and 193–95. Although no satisfactory edition of Averroes’s Short Commentary on the Metaphysics is extant, there is a recent English translation in Averroes, On Aristotle’s “Metaphysics”: An Annotated Translation of the So-called “Epitome,” trans. Rüdinger Arnzen (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010). Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics, which survives only in Hebrew translations, was critically edited in Averroes, Il Commento medio di Averroe alla Metafisica di Aristotele nella tradizione ebraica: Edizione delle versioni ebraiche medievali di Zeraḥyah Ḥen e di Qalonymos ben Qalonymos con introduzione storica e filologica, ed. Mauro Zonta, 3 vols. (Pavia: Pavia University Press, 2011), 2:1. Charles Touati refers to one such citation in the Wars of the Lord; see Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide (Paris: Minuit, 1973), 40. On dating the first, anonymous, Hebrew translation of Averroes’s Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, see Yehuda Halper, “Revision and Standardization of Hebrew Philosophical Terminology in the Fourteenth Century: The Example of Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ and the Development of Hebrew Scientific Terms,” Aleph: Historical Studies in Science and Judaism 13 (2013): 99–100. Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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line of the Metaphysics: “The investigation of truth is in one sense difficult, in another easy.”33 Averroes, in the anonymous Hebrew translation which was probably what Gersonides read, interprets this line as follows:34 Since this science [viz. metaphysics] is that which examines truth absolutely, he undertook to make known the path which reaches it through difficulty and ease. For it is known in itself by all that there is here a path that brings us to the truth and that grasping the truth is not impossible for us in most things. The proof of this is that we think true thoughts that we hold in truth about many things. This conclusion has been reached by those who have trained themselves in the sciences of certainty.35

‫בעבור שהיתה זאת החכמה היא אשר‬ ‫ לקח להודיע ענין‬,‫תחקור מהאמת בשלוח‬ ‫ כי היה‬,‫הדרך המגעת אליו בקושי והקלות‬ ‫מהידוע בעצמו אצל הכל שהנה דרך יגיענו‬ ‫אל האמת ושהשגת האמת לא תמנע עלינו‬ ‫ והראיה על זה שאנחנו‬.‫ברוב הדברים‬ ‫נסבור סברא אמתית שאנחנו כבר עמדנו‬ ‫ וזה תפול בו‬.‫על האמת בהרבה מהדברים‬ .‫למי שהרגיל ידיעות האמת‬

Another proof of this is also that we have a desire for knowledge of the truth. For if attaining the truth were not possible, this desire would be vain—and it is known that there is nothing at the root of formation and creation that is vain. […]

‫ומהראיה גם כן על זה מה שאנחנו עליו‬ ‫ כי לו היתה‬,‫מהתשוקה על ידיעת האמת‬ ‫השגת האמת נמנעת היתה התשוקה‬ ‫ ומהידוע בו שאין הנה דבר יהיה‬.‫בטלה‬ ]…[ .‫בשורש היצירה והבריאה והוא בטל‬

As for the proof of its difficulty, nobody can be found who has reached it without sharing in its examination with others in a necessary measure. Yet as for its ease, the proof is that it does not escape all men. […] Yet we see that it is difficult and we do not decide to refrain from it on account of the length of time needed to hold it in truth.

‫והראיה אם על קושיו כי לא ימצא אחד‬ ‫מהאנשים הגיע ממנו בלתי שתוף זולתו לו‬ ‫ ואולם‬.‫בחקירה אל השעור המחוייב בזה‬ ‫על קלותו הנה הראיה עליו שלא יסור‬ ‫מהאנשים כלם […] אבל אנחנו נראה‬ ‫שהוא קשה ולא נשפוט בהמנע בעבור‬ ‫אורך הזמן המצטרך אל העמידה בו על‬ .‫האמת‬

33

34

35

In our texts, this appears at Metaph. 993a30–31, in book α ἔλαττον; i.e., book 2. On Hebrew literary uses of this line, see Yehuda Halper, “In One Sense Easy, in Another Difficult: Reverberations of the Opening of Aristotle’s Metaphysics α ἔλλατον in Medieval and Renaissance Hebrew Literature,” Revue des études juives 179 (2020): 133–60. The Hebrew text is from Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MS héb. 886, f. 1r. For the translation, I also examined the revised translation by Moses ben Solomon of Salon, found in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, MS héb. 887, as well as the Arabic edition, Averroes, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿat, 1:5. I take this expression, which I am translating as “sciences of certainty” (yediʿot ha-emet), to refer to logic and the organon that indicates how to produce certainty. It is possible it refers simply to “certain sciences” or even “certain knowledge.” Yehuda Halper - 978-90-04-46876-4 Downloaded from Brill.com 03/03/2024 05:35:00PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Averroes’s statement here that “we have a desire for knowledge of the truth” is essentially equivalent to Aristotle’s opening line of Metaphysics A (980a21), which was unfortunately lost to Averroes: “All men by nature desire to know.” In addition to the desire to know, Averroes mentions three other key elements that then recur in Gersonides’s commentary. These are (1) most people correctly think that they have obtained some measure of truth; (2) students of the sciences, especially of metaphysics, require a shared body of knowledge for advancement; and (3) it takes a very long time to attain truth. In the sections I have omitted, Averroes elaborates on these points and then compares the soul’s examination of truth to a blind bat’s gazing at the sun; that is, a task that cannot be fully performed, though some light might slip into even a bat’s eyes. Gersonides, it seems, draws on Averroes’s account of the desire to know, yet he modifies that desire to know the “truth” to refer to the desire to know existing things. He then goes on to connect the knowledge of these existing things and their notions to sensory perception, especially sight and hearing, possibly building on Aristotle’s bat analogy and Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione 16a3–8.36 More significantly, Gersonides connects understanding existing things to seeing God’s wisdom. This may draw on Averroes’s reference to the desire to know the truth, whose Arabic, al-tašawwuq ilā maʿarifat al-ḥaqq,37 could refer to a desire to know God as well. Gersonides may also be drawing here on the description of the turn to metaphysics he gave at the beginning of his introduction—a description, as we saw, that was probably taken from Averroes’s Decisive Treatise. Gersonides goes on to temper this description of the desire for knowledge by acknowledging that not everyone, in fact, desires “to know the notions of existing things” more than “bodily pleasures.” Rather, “some or most [people] do not go beyond the preliminaries and thus abandon the matter and remain with the desire only.”38 Yet he also strengthens the description of this desire (tešuqah) by using it as part of an explanation for what he described as a ḥešeq for knowing “the goodness of the order and the equilibrium found among existing things.”39 According to Gersonides, it is this ḥešeq that the Song of Songs seeks to cultivate in order to direct it to true knowledge; that is, the Song of Songs seeks, in a sense, to aid the desire for knowledge, naturally present in all human beings, to gain what it can to progress towards studying metaphysics. 36 37 38 39

Cf. Gersonides, 73/21. Averroes, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿat, 1:5. ‫ ומפני זה יניח העניין וישאר עם תשוקתו‬,‫קצתם או רובם קץ בהצעות‬, 74/21. See also Kellner’s notes ad loc. ‫חשק כל אדם נפלא לדעת טוב הסדור והיושר אשר בנמצאות‬, 73/20, translation modified.

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Immediately after his discussion of desire and ḥešeq in connection with the opening of the Metaphysics, Gersonides turns to the shared knowledge that was the second point I enumerated in Averroes’s introduction to Aristotle’s Metaphysics above. Gersonides says: “Solomon mentioned another instrument [i.e., besides desire] which God gave us to direct us to our happiness: perfect individuals who exist in every generation and who direct others to perfection, either in speech or in writing, through a natural ḥešeq that they have for this.”40 These perfect individuals are essentially teachers; Gersonides says that teaching is a kind of imitatio Dei since teachers, in his view, derive no benefit from their activities.41 These perfect teachers remove the obstacles preventing the realisation of the desire for knowledge. They can make known the ends of knowledge and otherwise direct the desirers to ends of which they may not be aware. They further direct the desirers away from bodily desires and towards intellectual desires. The perfect also direct the students to the way or path towards perfection and give them the benefit of their accumulated apprehensions. The communication of these apprehensions is particularly helpful since it reduces the great length of time needed for doing science.42 Thus, the 40 41

42

‫ והם השלמים‬,‫והנה זכר עוד שלמה בכאן כלי אחר נתן אלינו ה׳ ית׳ להישירנו אל הצלחתינו‬ ‫ בחשק‬,‫ אם מפיהם אם מפי כתבם‬,‫ המישירים זולתם אל השלימות‬,‫אשר ימצאו בכל דור ודור‬ ‫הטבעי אשר להם בזה‬, 75 / 22; translation mine. The passage in the previous note continues: ‫כאילו היה זה מן הטבע להדמות אל ה׳ ית׳ כפי‬ ‫ לא להגיעו לו ית׳ שום תועלת‬,‫היכולת אשר שפע ממנו זה המציאות השלם‬. My translation: “It is as though it were natural to imitate God in accordance with the possibility that this perfect existence emanates from Him without bringing Him, may he be exalted, any benefit.” An anonymous reviewer points out that this view is similar to that of Maimonides in Guide 2.37: “For the measure of the overflow […] is either such as only to render the individual who receives it perfect and to have no other effect, or such that from that individual’s perfection there is something left over that suffices to make others perfect” (Pines trans., 374–75). According to this account, the teacher or prophet has a kind of overflow that may be somewhat similar to the divine overflow. Gersonides says: “Our perfect predecessors guide us in speculation in a way which brings us to perfection, through either their speech or writing, by virtue of the natural ḥešeq they have for proffering this emanation, and will make known to us concerning each thing the way in which it should be researched and what they have understood concerning it, together with the assistance concerning it which they have derived from their predecessors. And that for which we need sensual apprehensions which can be accomplished only with difficulty and over a long time, surpassing the span of a human life, will also be completed in this fashion, for these perfected ones will make known to us what they and their predecessors apprehended concerning this through sensation over time, so that we arrive at the complete truth in this matter in this fashion” (‫השלימים הקודמים ידריכו אותנו‬ ‫ בחשק הטבעי אשר להם על‬,‫בעיון בדרך אשר תגיענו אל ההצלחה אם מפיהם אם מפי כתבם‬ ‫ עם מה שנעזרו‬,‫ ומה שנתבאר להם בו‬,‫ ויודיעונו בדבר דבר דרך החקירה בו‬,‫זאת ההשפעה‬ ‫ ומה שיצטרך אליו השגה בחוש והוא לא תשלם כי אם בקושי‬.‫בזה בדברי הקודמים להם‬

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presence of the perfect teachers actually addresses two points from Averroes’s introduction to the Metaphysics: they provide both a shared body of knowledge and direction to that knowledge, thereby reducing the amount of time needed for doing science. Gersonides clearly sees Solomon as being just such an individual, sharing his knowledge of the path to human happiness with the readers of the Song of Songs. As we have repeatedly seen, Solomon, according to Gersonides, directs his desires towards the desire for the Active Intellect. Yet Gersonides himself, as a commentator on the Song of Songs, must also be among such teachers. Indeed, not only does Gersonides direct his readers towards the highest desires, he also provides them with a wealth of information about his own discoveries and those of other philosophers up to his time. Gersonides himself meets the criteria to be a perfect teacher par excellence. Gersonides does not treat Aristotle’s and Averroes’s first point, that most people correctly think that they know something, until he reaches what he considers the sixth and final section of the Song of Songs, the one treating metaphysics. There, he notes that metaphysics builds on “generally accepted premises” (haqdamot mefursamot)43 and enjoins his readers not to examine them until they have a good foundation in other sciences.44 In particular, he notes, students of science “require many conditions, including training (ha-hergel) in the art of dialectic, as was mentioned at the beginning of the Topica.”45 Although the Topica was never translated into Hebrew, Gersonides may have encountered it through Qalonimos ben Qalonimos’s translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on it.46 There, Averroes repeatedly says that the

43 44

45

46

‫ כי אילו השלימים יודיעו אותנו‬.‫ ישלם גם כן בזה האופן‬,‫ יעבור החיים האנושיים‬,‫ובזמן ארוך‬ .‫)מה שהושג בזה בחוש להם ולקודמים להם באורך הזמנים עד שישלם בזה הצד האמת בזה‬, 76–77/22–23, translation modified. Gersonides, 152/91. Gersonides may be referring here to the kinds of contradictions between what one thinks before scientific inquiry and what thinks after such inquiry; this insight is pointed out in Dov Schwartz, Contradiction and Concealment in Medieval Jewish Thought [Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2002), 144–81. ‫ כמו‬,‫ מהם ההרגל במלאכת הנצוח‬.‫יצטרכו אל זה [כלומר אל המטפיסיקה] תנאים רבים‬ ‫שנזכר בראש ספר הנצוח‬, Gersonides, 152/91, translation mine. In the notes to his English translation, Kellner suggests that this reference is to the Rhetoric (n. 91). In the Hebrew edition, Kellner notes, “I did not find the text alluded to” (152 n. 9). ‫ מלאכת הנצוח‬generally refers to the Topica, and we shall see that the first line of the Topica is referred to here. Indeed, Gersonides wrote his own super-commentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Topica, which is extant in two or three manuscripts, Turin, National University Library, MS A I 14 and Oxford, Bodleian Library, Us. Mich. 64. Another MS, Munich, Bavarian State Library, MS Cod. Hebr. 26, seems to contain Gersonides’s supercommentary, possibly along with other super-commentaries. In the previously published

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main subject of dialectic is constructing syllogisms whose premises are based on “generally accepted premises” (haqdamot mefursamot). Moreover, in commenting on what is probably the opening line of Aristotle’s work,47 Averroes writes: However, there is a benefit to training one who is preparing himself for the sciences. For because once we have known general arrangements and methods, we can proceed to maintaining something or rejecting it, the ability that comes to us through this art [viz. dialectic] to distinguish true or false with regard to opinions, reasonings, and sciences is a more perfect activity and a better preparation than that capability that comes to us through training alone without knowledge of these arrangements. […] It is clear that the training intended in this art [viz. dialectic] is a preparation for philosophy in the way that training in riding horses in play is a preparation for war.

‫ואולם תועלתה בהרגל המכין לצד הידיר‬ ‫עות כי לפי שכאשר שהיו עמנו סדורים‬ ‫ידועים ודרכים ידועים נכללים נלך מהם‬ ‫אל קיום הדבר ובטולו היה היכולת‬ ‫המתחדש לנו בזאת המלאכה בהבר‬ ‫חנת הדעות והסברות וידיעות האמת‬ ‫מהם מן השקר יותר שלם הפעל ויותר‬ ‫טוב הכונה מן הכח המתחדשת לנו‬ .‫בהרגל לבד זולת ידיעת אלו הסדורים‬ ‫[…] ומבואר שההרגל המכוון בזאת‬ ‫המלאכה אמנם הוא הכנה אל הפילור‬ ‫סופיה על צד מה שיהיה ההרגל רכיבת‬ 48.‫הסוסים בצחוק הכנה אל המלחמה‬

Averroes’s reference to “those who have trained themselves in the sciences of certainty” (le-mi še-hirgil yediʿot ha-emet) in the introduction to his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics49 may refer to precisely the kind of preparatory reasoning he describes in his Middle Commentary on the Topica here. If so, then between the Topica and the Metaphysics, Averroes goes full circle:

47

48 49

version of this chapter, I mistakenly identified this third MS as Averroes’s own commentary and quoted from it. I am correcting that mistake here. Note further that Gersonides could have encountered an earlier anonymous Hebrew translation of the first book of al-Fārābī’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Topica. However, this translation, of which Gadi Weber and I are currently preparing a critical edition, uses significantly different terminology. Here, for example, it refers to “training” not with hergel, but with šemirah. Moreover, it does not seem to have a direct parallel to Top. 100a19–21. Aristotle, Topica et Sophistici elenchi, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 100a19–21: ῾Η μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὑρεῖν ἀφ’ ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων, καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες μηθὲν ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον. My translation: “The purpose of this study is to discover a method by which we can make syllogisms from accepted opinions about any problem that is set before us, and when we uphold an argument ourselves, we shall not say anything inconsistent.” Munich, Bavarian State Library, MS Cod. Hebr. 106, f. 176v. My student Arye Rainer is currently preparing a critical edition of this Middle Commentary as part of his dissertation. See n. 35 above and the adjacent text.

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training in making deductions about the truth or falsity of “generally accepted premises” and “opinions, reasonings, and sciences” is a gateway to philosophy in the Topica and a starting point for metaphysics in the Metaphysics. The path that Averroes’s student follows from logic to mathematics to natural science to metaphysics may perhaps deepen his understanding of generally accepted premises, but the student is in a similar place with regard to the certainty of his premises in his study of dialectic in logic and at the beginning of his study of metaphysics. For Gersonides too, references to these parallel sections from the Topica and the Metaphysics frame the inquiry into science that constitutes the bulk of the Commentary on the Song of Songs. Like Averroes, Gersonides also implies a similarity between the situation of the scholar at the beginning of the inquiry into science and his situation upon reaching the Metaphysics. Indeed, this is even clearer for Gersonides than for Averroes, since he repeatedly refers to “the desire that we have at the beginning of the matter for the hylic intellect to cleave to God.”50 That is, the erotic situation of Gersonides’s reader is similar at both the beginning and end of the path: a desire (tešuqah) to cleave to God through the Active Intellect. To those readers paying careful attention to Gersonides’s use of Averroes, the order of these citations is surprising. He cites Averroes’s Long Commentary on Metaphysics in part 1 of his commentary when explaining the general desire for knowledge and Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Topica in part six of his commentary when explaining the dialectical training that is necessary for metaphysics. We would expect him to do the opposite: to use the Topica for the general statement and the Metaphysics for that particular to metaphysics. Why does Gersonides invert the order of Averroes’s statements? I cannot provide a certain answer, but I can speculate that he wanted to emphasise what I take to be Averroes’s point that when the scholar reaches metaphysics after having studied the sciences in the proper order, his situation is quite similar to that of the beginning student. He, too, must take up dialectic in order to examine opinions. This examination is the least certain of scientific examinations, according to Gersonides, and in many key respects, it leaves the scholar ignorant.

50

‫התשוקה אשר לנו בתחילת העניין לשכל ההיולאני להדבק בשם ית׳‬, Gersonides, 77/24. Kellner’s translation is, in my view, mistaken in its attribution of the desire in question to “our material intellect” rather than to “us.”

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3

The Limitations of Human Knowledge of Metaphysics

Gersonides, however, is not a Pyrrhonian sceptic. Not only does he accept the validity of all of the sciences that are prior to metaphysics, such as mathematics and physics, he also does not deny the possibility of metaphysics a priori. Rather, metaphysics, as we have mentioned, is merely the least certain of the sciences and the one about which the least is known. Despite the centrality of metaphysics to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Gersonides has very little to say about it. It is the last in the progression of the sciences and the culmination of the desirer’s efforts throughout the book. Yet of the 105 pages that make up the Hebrew edition of the Commentary, the final chapter on metaphysics takes up only five. Moreover, Gersonides considers only the final ten verses of the Song of Songs (8:5–14) to concern metaphysics. For comparison, his chapter on mathematics treats eighteen verses over eleven pages, and his chapter on physics treats fifty-five verses over thirty-four pages. In fact, the chapter on physics is much larger and more detailed than any of the other chapters. Physics, of course, builds on previous sciences in order to derive its principles. Yet it also points forward towards principles that are connected with metaphysics. In particular, Gersonides identifies three apprehensions that lead the physicist towards metaphysics: primary matter, the first mover, and the “universal concomitants of existing things that change insofar as they are things that change.”51 These apprehensions figure prominently in Aristotle’s Physics, especially in the discussion of the unmoved mover in Physics VIII. They also all make an appearance in Metaphysics α ἔλαττον, where they are not so much proved as indicated in a series of arguments. These three apprehensions are thus points of contact between Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics. In that sense, then, they are the culmination of physics which points the desiring soul in the direction of metaphysics. Gersonides clarifies that knowledge of these attributes is as “attributes and accidents”; that is, not a knowledge of any of these properties as substances. Such knowledge is based on inferences from observations of physical reality, observations that are posterior to the thing itself. Ideally, the scientist would attain knowledge of a thing’s substance (ʿeṣem ha-davar) and then explain the attributes and accidents using the thing’s causes. This kind of substantial knowledge of the First Mover may seem 51

See Gersonides’s comments on Song 6:5, 131–32/72–73; English terminology mine. The Hebrew terms are ‫ המניע הראשון‬,‫החומר הראשון‬, and ‫המשיגים הכוללים לנמצאות‬ ‫ המשתנות במה שהם משתנות‬respectively.

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absurd and impossible; and if there were not another agent here with this emanation, this doubt would seem to be so. But since there is here another agent—the Active Intellect—our acquisition of perfect knowledge on the basis of weak knowledge we have from the senses is not rendered impossible.52 Substantial knowledge of these metaphysical notions might be impossible without the Active Intellect. The Active Intellect, the object of desire in the Song of Songs, thus transforms weak knowledge formed on the basis of sensory perception into strong knowledge of the substance of the thing itself. On the surface, this process seems similar to the Aristotelian method of abstraction that Gersonides repeatedly lays out throughout the Commentary. The body observes material phenomena and the attributes (meśigim) of these phenomena eventually make their way to the imagination. Then: “After the intellect abstracts from the material attributes—through which the apprehended thing is particular and individual—from the imaginative form, that form becomes universal in substance. That is, the universal nature common to the infinite individuals of that species.”53 During the scientific process, the human intellect abstracts universal forms from particular phenomena. For example, a biologist might note that all ducks have wings. This is a formal characteristic of the species of duck which a scientist can identify without having seen all, or even most, ducks. Yet when it comes to metaphysical notions, such as the First Mover, this process is no longer workable. All of the elements in the process of abstraction are missing in the metaphysical cases. There are no material attributes, no imaginative form—that is, no form that is grasped by the imagination—and no distinction between the particulars of the species and the universals. That is, the scientific process itself breaks down. The human intellect on its own is not able to move from particulars to universals, since there are no particulars. Gersonides illustrates this difficulty throughout the Commentary’s final chapter, namely that concerning metaphysics. According to Gersonides, the

52

53

‫ אלא שאם‬,‫הידיעה אשר לנו בעצם הדברים […] כבר יחשב שזה יהיה דבר בטל ובלתי אפשר‬ ‫ אבל לפי שבכאן‬.‫לא היה בכאן פועל אחר בזאת ההשפעה היה לזה הספק פנים מההראות‬ ‫ באמצעות מהידיעה החלושה אשר‬,‫פועל אחר—והוא השכל הפועל—הנה לא ימנע קנותינו‬ ‫ ידיעה שלימה‬,‫לנו מהחוש‬, Gersonides, 139/79, translation modified. ‫אחר שהפשיט השכל מהצורה הדמיונית המשיגים ההיולאניים אשר היה בהם זה הדבר‬ ‫ שבה הצורה ההיא בעצמה כוללת; ר״ל שהיא הטבע הכולל המשותף‬,‫המושג פרטי ורמוז אליו‬ ‫לאישי המין ההוא לאין תכלית‬, 57/6, translation modified. See also the similar description in Gersonides, 94/38.

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verse “Who is this that cometh up from the wilderness” (Song 8:5)54 refers to the apprehension of metaphysical things, which arises from a place that is desolate, cannot be worked, and cannot be planted. This is so because the things under investigation in the other sciences are apprehended by the senses. Concerning those things, everything that one strives to apprehend of their substance can be done perfectly. However, here, there is no path to apprehending it [sc. the substance] except by remote premises.55 The scientific method, so carefully adhered to until now, is not applicable to metaphysical substances. Indeed, according to Gersonides, there is not even a path (derekh) to the apprehension of such substances.56 By “remote premises” (haqdamot reḥoqot), Gersonides apparently means premises that are too remote to be grasped by the soul on their own, for immediately afterwards, he writes:57 Mitrapeqet58 on/towards her beloved (Song 8:5) […]

]…[ ‫מתרפקת על דודה‬

Her heart pines for her beloved, since she is not able to satisfy his desire. This word, “mitrapeqet,” is a hapax legomenon. I think its meaning is according to the context, in the manner I have explained. […] For out of love and ḥešeq, she extends her arms towards her beloved. This is in accordance with the allegory.

‫ על‬,‫שלבה הומה עליה בעבור דודה‬ ‫ והנה אין‬.‫אשר לא תוכל להפיק רצונו‬ ‫ רוצה לורמר ‘מת�ר‬,‫חבר לזאת המילה‬ ‫ ואחשב שיהיה עניינה לפי מקומו‬,’‫פקת‬ ‫על הצד שביארתי […] שמרוב האהבה‬ ‫ וזה‬,‫והחשק תשים זרועותיה על דודה‬ .‫לפי המשל‬

54 55

56 57 58

King James Version of ‫מי זאת עולה מן המדבר‬. ‫ וזה כי בשאר החכמות היו הדברים אשר בהם‬.‫ממקום חרב אשר לא יעבד בו ולא יזרע‬ ‫ ומהם ישלם כל מה שישתדלו בהשגתו באילו הדברים מעצם הדברים‬,‫החקירה מושגים בחוש‬ ‫ ואולם בכאן אין דרך בהשגתו כי אם בהקדמות רחוקות‬.‫ההם‬, Gersonides, 150/89, translation greatly modified. Compare with the use of derakhim, which I translated as “methods,” in the passage from Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Topica above, p. 201. Gersonides, 150/89–90; translation mine. Most translations, including the King James Version, translate this word as “leaning on.” However, the ambiguity of this term is central to Gersonides’s argument here.

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However, according to that which is allegorised, it means that she helps him with these arms with all her power, to bring into existence all that she can, so as to be an entryway to enter into the examination of that which he intends to examine. But she apologises and says to him, I raised thee up under the apple tree; that is, I have already helped you apprehend the sensible things, which are the physical matters. […]

‫ואולם לפי הנמשל ירצה באילו הזרור‬ ‫עות שהיא תעזרהו בכל כחה להמציא‬ ‫ להיות‬,‫אליו מה שאפשר אליה המצאתו‬ ‫לו מבוא להכנס בחקירות אשר ירצה‬ ‫ והיא מתנצלת ואומרת‬,‫לחקור בהם‬ ,’‫אליו כבר ‘עוררתיך תחת התפוח‬ ‫רוצה לומר כבר עזרתיך בהשגת הדבר‬ ‫רים המוחשים—והם העניינים הטבעיים‬ ]…[

Despite all this, she has a great ḥešeq to fulfil his desire however she can.

‫ועם כל זה היא רבת החשק למלאות‬ .‫תשוקתו בכל אשר תוכל‬

The desiring soul extends her arms towards her beloved in an act that Gersonides says can have two meanings: (1) It is an expression of longing for the beloved, a longing that is an expression of an inability to fulfil the beloved’s wishes; (2) alternatively, the extended arms are an expression of the desiring soul’s industrious study of physics. Even so, the desiring soul cannot determine how to move beyond physics and is left only with “a great ḥešeq to fulfil his [sc. the beloved’s] desire however she can.” She can only apologise to the beloved for her own limitations, an apology that takes place “under the apple tree.” Now, had Gersonides just left it at that, with the physicist unhappily ruminating under an apple tree, the stage would have been set for an apple to fall, hit the physicist on the head, and cause him to rethink the basic principles of physics. Yet Gersonides is not quite there. Rather, it is Solomon— that is, according to Gersonides, the Active Intellect—who shows up with the unifying form that connects the multitude of forms examined in physics. Gersonides is not entirely clear about what is involved in this process. Indeed, he devotes only about two pages to it, most of which are figurative explanations of how the many unite with the one. Rather than giving details about what is understood from metaphysics, Gersonides refers to the emanation (šefaʿ) of the Active Intellect. This emanation, Gersonides makes clear, can only happen once physics is properly understood,59 but there is no clear connection between the physical forms and the metaphysical. It is all somewhat mysterious.60 This mystery is, of course, perfectly understandable, since the 59 60

Gersonides, 154–55/93–94. While this is mysterious here in the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Gersonides gives a more detailed account of a kind of partial conjunction with the Active Intellect in the

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reader of the Commentary on the Song of Songs has not necessarily studied enough physics. For those who do not experience the emanation of the Active Intellect, what happens in the orchard stays in the orchard. 4 Conclusion According to Gersonides’s account of the order of the sciences, the Active Intellect (Solomon) always remains separate from the desiring soul. There is no unification, only emanation; that is, the true understanding of metaphysical substances does not come from within the soul, but has an entirely external source. The move from physics to metaphysics requires something entirely external. It requires something whose possibility is incomprehensible: the separate, incorporeal Active Intellect must join with the bodily soul. If this process is incomprehensible, then it is also indescribable. Prior sciences can be described in great detail, but metaphysics, which involves this intellectual emanation, must be experienced. It is thus clear why Gersonides has so little to say about metaphysics in the final chapter of the Commentary on the Song of Songs and why he considers that Solomon treats the subject in only ten verses. According to this commentary, any understanding of metaphysics depends on a kind of intellectus ex machina and thus nothing is to be gained by speaking about the subject. One would do better to devote one’s efforts to mathematics, astronomy, and physics, which are attainable by the human soul alone, as, in fact, Gersonides himself did. That is, the Commentary on the Song of Songs suggests that it is impossible for a human being to come to apprehend metaphysics on one’s own and instead exhorts readers to devote themselves to the physical sciences. Gersonides’s Commentary on the Song of Songs may build on Averroes, but it is in key respects opposed to Averroes and even anti-Aristotelian. Instead, we find a Platonic account of the desire for metaphysical knowledge, a surprising account since there is no reason to believe that Gersonides read any Plato. The desire for metaphysical knowledge, if properly directed, leads the desirer up the Ladder of Love, through the sciences. The desirer devotes himself to physics and from there glimpses metaphysical notions, such as the existence of the Unmoved Mover. Yet the desirer is unable to do more than glimpse these

Wars of the Lord, 1.12. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. A comparison of the two accounts deserves its own study.

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notions. He or she relies instead on the Active Intellect to emanate upon it, an end for which the desirer can prepare, but which he or she cannot cause. There is no sex in the Song of Songs, only preparation, and in Gersonides’s account, there is only preparation for metaphysics. If the Active Intellect does not show up, the desiring soul will find herself alone, despairing under the apple tree. An apple could then fall from the tree.

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Chapter 7

Philosophical Allegory in Bibago

Exegetical Duplicity for the Sake of Open Inquiry

In a relatively lengthy aside printed at the end of tractate Berakhot in his ʿEn Yaʿaqov, the early sixteenth-century thinker Jacob ibn Ḥabib attacks Abraham Bibago’s style of allegorical interpretation:* Abraham Bibago, author of a book called Way of Faith […] wrote in his explanation [of a certain talmudic story] philosophical interpretations which he himself indicates were not intended by the author. But because he saw that some of the students of his time were deficient in that they would only listen to rhetorical interpretations, even though they do not agree with the truth in all of their parts, he considered it good to grant their request and to do with them according to his will. He wrote extensively in that book on things included in the way of faith, as the book’s name would indicate, but he himself did not believe them. In his eyes, all who study the books of the Mishnah and Talmud are like the multitude of Israel, who go about in their simplicity.1 What begins as a criticism of an interpretation of a single talmudic passage ends with a critique of the entire interpretive method of Bibago’s Derekh Emunah (Way of Faith) and the statement that Bibago denigrates the Mishnah and Talmud in toto. In no uncertain terms, ibn Ḥabib asserts that Bibago dissembled in Derekh Emunah, that he wrote using rhetorical, rather than true, methods and, moreover, that he rejected the study of traditional canonical works. In ibn Ḥabib’s view, Bibago’s extensive writing on the way of faith is nothing but a ploy for expounding extraneous philosophical views. Indeed, ibn Ḥabib goes on to attack his near-contemporary “philosopher sage,”2 who * This chapter was first published in Jewish Studies Quarterly 21 (2014): 261–76. 1 ʿEn Yaʿaqov (Vilna, 1883; repr. Vilna: Romm, 1923), 233–34. Ibn Ḥabib draws on language from Esth 5:8 and 2Sam 15:11 in this passage. His statement that Bibago “wrote extensively” (higdil likhtov) could be understood to mean that Bibago “did great in writing”; however, this use of higdil is also sometimes used ironically, especially when speaking of one’s enemies; cf. Joel 2:20 and Lam 1:9. 2 Ibn Ḥabib introduces Bibago as “an exceptional philosopher sage of our generation” (ḥakham muflag še-hayyah be-dorenu), 233. He uses the same epithet, “philosopher sage,” for someone

© Yehuda Halper, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004468764_009

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had then been deceased for nearly twenty-five years, at some length, saying inter alia that Bibago brings foreign notions, such as Arabic philosophy, into the Talmud, all the while concealing this from his more naive readers. Ibn Ḥabib’s acerbic critique of Bibago is remarkable because it is apparently unique; I know of no other author who considers Bibago to speak duplicitously in Derekh Emunah or to denigrate the Mishnah and the Talmud. The fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Jewish thinkers who mentioned Bibago generally did so with reference to specific interpretations, and where they did not agree with him, they generally did not reject his entire project.3 Even those like the kabbalist Meir ibn Gabbai,4 who explicitly rejected Bibago in toto, did not accuse him of duplicity or of not believing in his own interpretations. Bibago even received high praise from such thinkers as Judah Moscato, who applauds him for showing that the sciences do not contradict the Torah,5 and Moses Mat, who says that Bibago “girded his loins like a hero […] to fight the wars of philosophy.”6 In the seventeenth century, Joseph Solomon Delmedigo of Candia wrote that in Derekh Emunah, Bibago interpreted “all of the words

3

4 5 6

named R. Isaac ben Jedaiah (ʿEn Yaʿaqov, 188), perhaps the thirteenth-century Provençal author of philosophical interpretations of talmudic Aggadot, described in great detail in Marc Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis: A Thirteenth-Century Commentary on the Aggadah (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). It is also possible that ibn Ḥabib is referring to another, more contemporary Isaac ben Jedaiah who had also authored philosophical interpretations of talmudic Aggadot, since he describes Isaac ben Jedaiah’s work as “a new book” (sefer ḥadaš). Notably, ibn Ḥabib criticises ben Jedaiah in terms similar to his critique of Bibago. According to him, most of ben Jedaiah’s interpretations are “allegories for matter and form. Furthermore, in many places he does not care whether the passages of the Gemara completely contradict his words.” Moreover, ben Jedaiah is said to employ Arabic rhetorical devices that “do not agree at all with the authors of the [talmudic] statements, since it is manifestly clear that they in no way intended [what he wrote] in his interpretation” (ʿEn Yaʿaqov, 188). On the authenticity of this passage of the ʿEn Yaʿaqov and the confusion surrounding the identification of Isaac ben Jedaiah, see Marc Saperstein, “R. Isaac b. Yeda’ya: A Forgotten Commentator on the Aggada,” Revue des études juives 138 (1979): 17–45. For a partial list of fifteenth- to sixteenth-century thinkers who mention Bibago, see Avraham Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed in Medieval Jewish Philosophy [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000), 285–90. The most common criticism of Bibago appears to be that he maintained that Moses never sinned. See Meir ibn Gabbai, ʿAvodat ha-Qodeš (Lember, 1857), 101b. Meir does say that Bibago was speaking rhetorically (heliṣ), but his primary objection is to philosophy, “demonstrative theoretical science,” entering the Jewish community. Cf. Judah Moscato, Nefuṣot Yehudah, sermon 14, in Judah Moscato Sermons, vol. 2, ed. Gianfranco Miletto, Giuseppe Veltri, Yehuda Halper, and Giacomo Corazzol (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 95. Moses Mat, Mate Moshe (London: 1957/58), 19.

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of the sages in ways that are close to the intellect.”7 Such words of praise suggest that their authors either saw Bibago as genuinely attempting to reconcile philosophy with biblical and talmudic texts or else that they were unwilling to uncover his true aims in writing. Modern scholarship on Bibago takes Derekh Emunah at face value and treats it as a genuine attempt to fuse a worldview that was heavily influenced by Aristotelian philosophy with one that values the genuine religious faith of the masses. On this basis, Bibago is sometimes classified as a “moderate rationalist” on the grounds that he accepted the validity of both philosophicoscientific conclusions and traditional theistic beliefs, claiming that faith, perhaps even more than reason, leads to human perfection.8 On the whole, scholars have focused on those concepts, especially “faith” (emunah), through which Bibago creatively integrates philosophy and Judaism, merging medieval rabbinic notions with ideas imported from Christian scholasticism.9 In fact, little is known about Bibago’s life, and scholars must learn about him almost entirely through his writings.10 This chapter supports ibn Ḥabib’s reading of Bibago as a dissembler who interprets canonical Jewish texts as philosophical allegories, though he may not have always believed his own interpretations. I shall begin with an analysis of biblical and talmudic allusion in Bibago’s most-read work, Derekh Emunah, and show that Bibago claims intellectual perfection to be the goal of these canonical works, even while maintaining that this goal can somehow be reached via non-intellectual means, such as faith. One consequence of this is 7 8

9

10

Joseph Solomon Delmedigo, Maṣref la-Ḥokhmah (Warsaw, 1890), 47. Cf., e.g., Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, and Allan Lazaroff, The Theology of Abraham Bibago: A Defense of the Divine Will, Knowledge and Providence in Fifteenth-Century Jewish Philosophy (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1981). For an example of the use of “moderate rationalism” in connection with Bibago, see Ari Ackerman, “Jewish Philosophy and the Jewish-Christian Philosophical Dialogue in Fifteenth-Century Spain,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, ed. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 371–90. Cf. especially Mauro Zonta, Hebrew Scholasticism in the Fifteenth Century: A History and Sourcebook (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 33 ff. See now also Shalom Sadik, “Free Will in the Thought of Rabbi Abraham Bibago” [Hebrew], Daʿat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah 81 (2016): 236–51. Sadik dismisses the view found in this chapter in his first footnote on the grounds that the views expressed in Bibago’s commentaries are the views of the text commented upon, not Bibago’s own views. However, he does not engage with any of the commentaries, even with sections, such as the introduction, in which Bibago speaks in his own name. Cf. Raphael Jospe, “Bibago, Abraham ben Shem Tov,” in Encyclopaedia Judaica, ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 3:570–71, and Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, 181–82.

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that according to Derekh Emunah, the Bible and the Talmud agree with science and philosophy. In the second part of the chapter, I shall examine another, less-studied work by Bibago: his introduction to his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where he undermines what he says in Derekh Emunah. According to the Commentary, only philosophy can lead to human perfection, and indeed it emerges that the Bible is to be interpreted as conforming to philosophy, no matter its conclusions; that is, philosophical inquiry is free and leaves to religion the task of accommodating its conclusions. That Bibago presents different views in different works suggests that he does not believe all of them. It seems to me most likely that ibn Ḥabib was right to say that Bibago was disingenuous in Derekh Emunah, whereas his genuine views appear in the Commentary on the Metaphysics. 1

Derekh Emunah

Bibago’s Derekh Emunah is in a critical respect the opposite of ibn Ḥabib’s ʿEn Yaʿaqov. ʿEn Yaʿaqov is structured around a compilation of talmudic Aggadot, to which ibn Ḥabib appends his own interpretation. As Marjorie Lehman describes, ibn Ḥabib’s interpretive goal is to develop a theoretical account of Judaism, including especially its theological basis. Ibn Ḥabib’s idea was that all of the theoretical content supporting Jewish thought and the Jewish way of life can be derived from the Aggadot of the Talmud; that is, from the nonhalakhic, non-legal discussions recorded there.11 If everything is contained in the Talmud and the Bible, then there is no need to study anything else. ʿEn Yaʿaqov would thus, in ibn Ḥabib’s view, obviate the need and even nullify any desire to examine philosophical or scientific works by future Jewish thinkers. In contrast, Bibago’s Derekh Emunah is a treatment of theoretical and theological issues that arise in the contemplation of religion in general and of Judaism in particular. The work is structured around central issues, such as 11

Marjorie Lehman, The En Yaaqov: Jacob ibn Habib’s Search for Faith in the Talmudic Corpus (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011). Lehman discusses ibn Ḥabib’s critique of Bibago on 101–3, where, relying on the passage with which I open this chapter, she claims that ibn Ḥabib thought that Bibago was responding to the desire of a philosophically trained group of students to receive philosophical interpretations of the talmudic Aggadot. In fact, ibn Ḥabib does not say that Bibago’s audience had any philosophical knowledge or inclination, but that they were accustomed to indirect rhetorical interpretations that were not always straightforward interpretations of the Talmud. They were thus presumably open to Bibago’s indirect philosophical interpretations, even though these were not always in accordance with the intentions of the talmudic authors (cf. n. 1 above).

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God’s providence, the role of the human intellect, and so on, but cites numerous examples from talmudic and biblical sources, and even from Jewish folk legends. While most of Derekh Emunah is dedicated to interpreting these sources, it is clear that it is the theoretical issues Bibago brings up that guide the discussion. Moreover, the interpretations he proffers are all clearly philosophical; that is, with roots in Aristotelian or at least Maimonidean thought. While ʿEn Yaʿaqov treats its talmudic sources as the source of truth, Derekh Emunah looks to an independent source of truth and interprets the Talmud as conforming to an account of philosophy. Many if not most of Bibago’s interpretations apparently confirm ibn Ḥabib’s suggestion that they are forced. Take, for example, Bibago’s explanation of a famous talmudic passage found in b. ʿErub. 13b, which reads as follows in Bibago’s text: For two and a half years were Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel in dispute. Beth Shammai say that it were better for man to have been created than not to have been created, and Beth Hillel say that it is better for man not to have been created than to have been created. They took a vote and decided that it were better for man not to have been created, but now that he has been created, let him investigate his deeds.12 According to Bibago, what is in dispute in this sugya is whether the human intellect is naturally a disposition (ʿeṣem mukhan) or whether it is an Active Intellect, complete on its own. Those belonging to Beth Shammai, according to Bibago, believe that the human intellect is a disposition which can become perfect through sensory perception and theoretical speculation; that is, which can move from potentiality to act. Though it begins as something potential, it can become actual. Accordingly, being born is good; it gives the potential 12

Abraham Bibago, Derekh Emunah (Constantinople, 1521/22, photomechanical reprint Jerusalem: Sifriyat Meḳorot, 1970 [pp. 98–101 missing]), 35d; all quotations from Derekh Emunah are taken from this edition. Bibago’s rendition of this talmudic passage differs somewhat from the Vilna text of the Talmud. In the Vilna text, it seems that it is Beth Shammai who say that it would have been better for man not to have been created than to have been created and Beth Hillel who say that it would have been better for man to have been created than not to have been created. There is some ambiguity here, however, since the Vilna text does not mention Beth Shammai or Beth Hillel after the first sentence, but only says, “these say (halalu omerim)” and “these say (halalu omerim),” probably meaning “the former” and “the latter.” Bibago’s rendition is either based on another textual tradition of the Babylonian Talmud or else subject to even further manipulation at Bibago’s hand. My translation of the passage here is based on the Soncino translation, but adjusted to accord with Bibago’s text.

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intellect an opportunity to strive for actualisation. For Bibago’s Beth Hillel, however, the human intellect is naturally complete and active. When a person is born, his or her intellect is adorned with a kind of disposition (melubaš be-hakhanah) which through theoretical striving can once again regain its perfectly active character. Being born is thus a downgrade for one’s Active Intellect, which becomes clothed in potentiality. It would be better not to have been born, but once one is born, one should investigate one’s deeds; that is, according to Bibago, one should strive to actualise one’s intellect.13 While allegorising talmudic Aggadot seems to be a major part of Derekh Emunah, Bibago also interprets biblical passages, usually without context and always with a markedly philosophical twist. See, for example, Bibago’s comments on Isa 61:10, which begins, “I will greatly rejoice in the Lord, my soul shall be joyful in my God; for He has adorned me with the garments of salvation, He has covered me with the robe of righteousness.” Isaiah’s context is one of divine salvation, usually understood to be the messianic age. Bibago’s context is a discussion of the meaning of “joy” (śimḥah), which he connects to intellectual apprehension. Bibago states: I will greatly rejoice in the Lord—for He is the most perfect object of apprehension possible. My soul shall be joyful in my God—for He is the most perfect apprehender possible. For He has adorned me with the garments of salvation—for this is the most perfect apprehension and adornment possible, for apprehension is in accordance with the apprehender and the object of apprehension. […] For He has clothed me with the garments of salvation, etc.—this means that this apprehension is my salvation […] and it is the robe with which I am bedecked.14 The messianic salvation described by Isaiah is said by Bibago to be the most perfect intellectual apprehension of God. The first-person subject of Isaiah’s statement is said to be adorned with the garments of intellectual apprehension. Earlier, the expression “adorning” was used to describe the Active Intellect’s taking on the disposition of potentiality when a person is born. Here, the speaker’s adornment with intellectual apprehension may imply that Bibago’s Isaiah prefers Beth Shammai’s alleged view that the human intellect 13

14

Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 35d. Note that although he does not acknowledge it, Bibago’s discussion depends on being born, not on being created. Bibago also does not address the more difficult question of how a naturally complete intellect can be adorned with potentiality. Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 36c.

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is originally a disposition, which can then be adorned with intellectual perfection. In any case, we can detect in Bibago’s words the presence of intellectual conjunction with the Divine Intellect, whereby human apprehension reaches divine apprehension. Accordingly, Bibago goes on to say, God’s joy (ha-śimḥah ha-meyyuḥas elaw yit’15) is in apprehending Himself or in His creatures apprehending Him, in accordance with the verse “Let the Lord rejoice (yiśmaḥ) in His works” (Ps 104:31). By calling this intellectual apprehension “salvation” (yešuʿah), Bibago implies that true salvation is intellectual and that the messianic age, to which Isaiah’s “salvation” refers, is an intellectual rather than historical development. This is, to say the least, a radically philosophical reinterpretation of salvation and messianism. The flip side of this is that those who have not attained intellectual apprehension of the Deity are not saved, and are perhaps not suited for salvation. However, this does not mean that a kind of salvation is not available to the non-intellectual many. Following a long rabbinic tradition, Bibago indicates that salvation for the many can come from the virtue of the few. Great men like Noah, Abraham, and Moses—who, Bibago asserts, have achieved intellectual conjunction (hadevequt) and thereby also received divine providence (ha-hašgaḥah ha-elohit)—were able to “protect the existence of the Israelite people.”16 Indeed, through his “prayers, perfection, and conjunction, which connected the divine world with this low world,” Moses was able to prevent the destruction of the nation of Israel. Without Moses, the Israelites would have been accountable for “their numerous sins, the confusion of their intellect, and the weakness of their faith” and would have been liable to suffer “the punishment of complete and total destruction.” Bibago continues: So too in many generations, sages17 and men of faith stand in the breach18 so as to nullify decrees, troubles, changes, and destructions by virtue of their merits, prayers, and conjunction with the sublime world through their intellect, which is a substantial form, flowing and emanating from the Divine, may He be exalted, into a particular person.19

15 16 17 18 19

This phrase’s literal meaning, “the joy attributed to Him, may He be exalted,” avoids stating that God feels joy, even when intellecting. It thus does not contradict Maimonides’s rejection of applying any bodily attribute to God in, e.g., Guide 1.36. Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 34d. Or: scientists (ḥakhamim). For this expression, see Ezek 22:30 and Ps 106:23. Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 34d.

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Bibago indicates here that hardship and the destruction of Israel come about because of three things: sins, intellectual confusion, and weakness of faith. These hardships can be averted, however, by the presence of three things in great men of Israel: merits (zekhuyyot), prayers, and intellectual conjunction with the sublime world. In a sense, these are counterparts: the sins of Israel can be met with the merits of her great men, Israel’s weak faith can be compensated by the prayers of the righteous, and the intellectual confusion of the many can be countered by the intellectual conjunction of the few. Just as Isaiah’s description of salvation was allegorised to refer to a kind of intellectual perfection, biblical descriptions of hardships, such as those faced by the Israelites in the desert and possibly also in Egypt, are said to contain at least an element of the intellectual. Hardship and destruction are due, at least to some extent, to intellectual confusion, and salvation from them comes about through intellectual perfection, in the form of intellectual conjunction with the sublime. Intellectual conjunction, however, is not suitable for the many. Later in Derekh Emunah, Bibago tells us that the divine intellect is a “consuming fire,”20 and true intellectual conjunction is consequently likely to result in the subsumption of imperfect human beings into the perfect Active Intellect—a fate otherwise known as death. This, indeed, occurred to Nadab and Abihu in Leviticus 10, according to Bibago, and it was the fear of meeting a similar fate that caused the Israelites to ask Moses to serve as an intermediary between them and the Lord at Mount Sinai in Exodus 20.21 In order to achieve intellectual conjunction safely, one must be like the burning bush, enflamed but not consumed.22 This conjunction, which Bibago again calls “perfect joy” (śimḥah šelemah), involves shedding one’s bodily properties in favour of purely intellectual faculties and is accordingly only suitable for philosophers or philosopherprophets.23 The general public cannot fulfill the injunction to conjoin with God (u-bo tidbaqun)24 absolutely, but they can discharge their obligation through 20 21 22 23

24

Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 73c, from Deut 4:24. Cf. b. Ketub. 112b. Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 74c. Note that according to Bibago, Nadab and Abihu had an incorrect understanding of physics and were consequently not prepared for intellectual conjunction. Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 74d. Cf. Exod 3:2: “And behold the bush burned with fire, but the bush was not consumed.” In Exod 3:2, the bush is associated with the angel of the Lord, and Bibago interprets this as referring to an association with a separate intellect. Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 74d–75a. Bibago’s lengthy argument for this ultimately rests on an argument he attributes to Averroes’s Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction; that is, he directs us to a non-Jewish philosophical work in order to understand the burning bush (conjunction with the divine). Deut 13:5, quoted by Bibago in Derekh Emunah, 73c.

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conjunction with “the students of the wise” (talmide ḥakhamim). Bibago is somewhat vague as to what this conjunction involves, but it seems to involve studying the works of the wise, or at least providing for the bodily needs of the students of the wise.25 Non-intellectuals also have at their disposal a way of faith (derekh emunah) which can provide a kind of “intellectual look” (reʾut śikhli) at the divine, and, through the commandments of the Torah, lead man to his telos.26 Faith, according to Bibago, functions in ways parallel to philosophy; that is, to science.27 Each science has a specific subject, accidents specific to it, questions it addresses, and principles it builds on. The principles of most sciences are taken from other sciences, except for the principles of first philosophy (metaphysics), which are developed within the science of metaphysics itself. Like many of his contemporaries, Bibago calls this first philosophy the “divine science” (ha-ḥokhmah ha-elohit) and identifies the divine with the “first cause”; that is, with God. Faith, Bibago tells us, examines all the things the sciences examine, but most importantly covers the same ground as metaphysics: the first cause. Philosophy arrives at its conclusions through the intellect, while faith arrives at its conclusions through revelation; that is, revealed faith is for the multitude what philosophy is for the few. Both are said to lead to human happiness, even to intellectual happiness.28 Accordingly, while intellectual happiness is one, it is reached by two paths: intellect and revelation. The path of the intellect relies on the sciences—that is, philosophy—while the path of faith relies on revelation. Yet for revelation to lead to conclusions derived from science, the books of faith, such as the Bible and the Talmud, must reach the same conclusions reached through science. Thus, Bibago interprets the works of faith as philosophical allegories. 2

Commentary on the Metaphysics

While Bibago’s works dedicated to faith are rife with allegorical exegeses of biblical and talmudic passages, his philosophical writings generally avoid this kind of allegorisation, or even mention of religious works. Among Bibago’s numerous writings, we know of commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Physics, and Metaphysics. The commentary on the Physics is not extant, and 25 26 27 28

Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 73c. Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 73c. Cf. Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, 263 ff. Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 72d–73a. Cf. 74a ff.

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except for the short introduction to the Metaphysics, the other two are found only in manuscript form.29 Yet both of the extant commentaries present purely philosophical discussions, focusing on Aristotle’s text and Averroes’s commentaries and bringing insights from numerous other Latin and Arabic commentaries. Though these commentaries are both written in Hebrew, allusions to biblical or talmudic works only rarely appear in the body of the work.30 On the whole, it seems that in Bibago’s view, while works of faith require philosophical allegorisation, works of philosophy can be discussed philosophically; that is, without reference to works of faith. In other words, philosophy need not allegorise religion, but can treat its subjects directly. Bibago’s approximately 800-word introduction to his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, composed of biblical phrases arranged in rhymed prose, is an exception to this generalisation.31 This introduction is in stark contrast, in both style and content, to the rest of the Commentary. While the Commentary presents a highly technical close reading of the first nine books of Aristotle’s text and Averroes’s middle and long commentaries on it, Bibago’s introductory remarks are vague, poetic, and frame his commentary project in terms taken from the Bible. That is, Bibago’s introduction phrases the goals of his Commentary on the Metaphysics in biblical terms; these goals are thus related, at least in the introduction, to faith. They also presage some of the themes I identified in Derekh Emunah above. Since Bibago refers to his Commentary on the Metaphysics in his Derekh Emunah,32 we know the Commentary was probably written before Derekh Emunah and thus that the introduction to the Commentary on the Metaphysics is probably not a further development of themes included in Derekh Emunah. 29

30

31 32

Bibago’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics is extant in two manuscripts: Munich, Bavarian State Library, MSS Cod. Hebr. 57 and 357. For descriptions of Bibago’s religious and philosophical writings, see Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, 182–97, and Zonta, Hebrew Scholasticism, 34–41. An earlier, very detailed, but now outdated account can be found in Moritz Steinschneider, “Abraham Bibago’s Schriften,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judethums (1883): 79–96 and 125–44. This account is repeated in an abbreviated form in Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1893), 168–71. For an example of one such unusual appearance of a talmudic legend, see Yehuda Halper, “Abraham Bibago on the Logic of the Divine Science: Metaphysics α and the Legend of the Pardes,” in The Origin and Nature of Language and Logic: Perspectives in Medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Thought, ed. Nadja Germann and Steven Harvey (Turnhout: Brepols, 2020), 323–45. An edition and translation of this introduction is in Halper, “Bibago’s Introduction to His Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.” All quotations and references are to this edition. Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 68c and 69a. Cf. Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, 191.

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Yet the rhetoric of the destruction of Israel, said in Derekh Emunah to be a punishment for sins, intellectual confusion, and weakness of faith, is used in Bibago’s introduction to the Commentary on the Metaphysics to describe events currently taking place, though perhaps in their incipient stages. Bibago begins the introduction, “I have surely seen the affliction of My people, the people of the Lord, they that were brought up in scarlet who sit in exile, poverty, and abasement these days and years.”33 Bibago continues to describe this oppression facing the Jewish people and even calls it “captivity.”34 Later in the introduction, he describes the nobles of Israel, musing, “Ah Lord, when Thou hast made a full end and extermination, thou wilt surely place us, who are the least of the flock, who are left but a few of many, among lions?”35 The destruction Bibago envisions seems total; survivors are to be sent to the lions. There is no doubt that the events of the fifteenth century informed Bibago’s bleak view of the state of the Jewish people of his time. The Commentary on the Metaphysics was probably written after the unification of most of the Iberian peninsula by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1479 and the establishment of the Inquisition in 1480. It may even have been written after the expulsion of the Jews from Andalusia in 1483, though Bibago did not live long enough to see the full effects of the Spanish Inquisition.36 Nevertheless, Bibago indicates that the oppression to which he refers in this introduction is not, or not only, the Inquisition, but largely an intellectual oppression, or at least an oppression caused by intellectual deficiency. He describes “many who hate hard work and [theoretical] speculation (ʿiyyun),” and goes on to say: “There is no counsel or wisdom.”37 The Aristotelian categories of “substance and quantity are like unto vanity. [The categories of] ‘how’ and ‘what’ have been determined by [vanity]. It has chosen for itself new gods that are of late. When God gives of His wisdom (or: science) to flesh and blood, he [the Israelite] lay and was fast asleep.”38 The Israelite sleeps, moreover, while “He Who fashions creation emanates spirit from the heavens of heavens, 33 34 35 36 37 38

The language here recalls Exod 3:7 and Lam 4:5. All direct biblical quotations in this chapter are italicised and based on the JPS translation of the Bible (1917). He refers to the Israelites as captives (šuvenu) and as prisoners (asir) in a dungeon (masger). Bibago quotes from Jer 49:20; 42:2; 50:45, and Ps 57:5; his language also recalls Ezek 11:13 and Isa 10:23. For the events of Bibago’s life and the possible dates of his works, see the sources mentioned in nn. 8–10 above. Note, however, that most of these dates are uncertain. Note that ḥokhmah can be translated as either “wisdom” or “science.” In addition to the quotation from Jonah 1:5, Bibago’s language recalls Ps 144:4; 2Sam 13:32; and Deut 32:17.

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which are of old.”39 It is because of this that “the hand of the Lord is upon His people.”40 That is to say, God’s affliction of Israel is due to Israel’s “slothfulness” (ʿaṣaltayim) in regard to theoretical speculation, the people’s ignorance of Aristotelian categories, and generally being asleep (like Jonah in the bottom of the ship) rather than staying awake and ready to receive divine emanation. This appears to be an oppression caused by what Bibago calls “confusion of the intellect” (bilbul śikhlam) in Derekh Emunah. The other reasons for divine punishment that Bibago mentions in Derekh Emunah are less apparent here in the Commentary on the Metaphysics. Perhaps regarding Israel’s sins, he notes that “the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great.”41 But this is said to result in “contempt for wisdom (or: science) and hatred for its people”;42 that is, Israel. This contempt and hatred, in turn, are said to remove the divine emanation (ha-hašpaʿah ha-elohit) from Israel and thus preclude any possibility of divine conjunction. Elsewhere, Bibago implies that Israel’s sins may lie in not properly viewing—that is, not scientifically contemplating—existing things: “Existing things (ha-meṣiʾot) have turned into errors, and into a sign engraved on the walls of their hearts, like a silly dove.”43 This is the source Bibago identifies for Israel’s calculations of “trespass and guilt and wickedness.”44 Bibago also adds loss of faith to this list of Israel’s sins: “Faithfulness is perished, and is cut off from their mouth.”45 He implies that this is the trespass, guilt, and wickedness of Israel, and that lack of faith is the same as not scientifically contemplating existing things. Towards the end of the introduction, he refers to the “pure and holy faith” (ha-emunah ha-ṭehorah we-ha-qedošah) and associates it with “the ways of study” (darkhe ha-limmud) and eternal knowledge (ha-yodeʿa wa-ʿed). He also connects this true faith to studying metaphysics and the Commentary on the Metaphysics that he presents in what follows. We see, then, that in the introduction to his Commentary on the Metaphysics, Bibago presents an allegorical view of biblical afflictions that is similar to the one he gives in Derekh Emunah (though more drawn-out). Divinely imposed afflictions come about through confusion of the intellect, intellectual trespasses, and violations of the true faith. Moreover, the true faith is—at least partially, but perhaps entirely—the study of philosophy.

39 40 41 42 43 44 45

Cf. Ps 68:34. Cf. Exod 9:3. Gen 6:5. The language here recalls Esth 1:18. Cf. Hos 7:11, as well as Ezek 41:6. Cf. Exod 22:8. Jer 7:28.

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As in Derekh Emunah, affliction can be averted by the presence of a great man in Israel. Accordingly, Bibago states: “And yet for all that, they set their faces on me. I shall strive with all the forces of my strength to benefit them with books of sciences.”46 He has “girded up [his] loins,”47 he tells us, to bring science and philosophy back to Israel, so that the divinely imposed punishment against it may be ended. There is, however, one problem: the sciences “are not among the sons of our people at such a time as this.”48 Indeed, “the length of the affliction and abasement has caused the books of science of our sages49 to be lost.” Bibago solves this with a pledge to “receive the truth from whoever says it,”50 which in this case is Aristotle and Averroes. Earlier in the introduction, he says, “Israel […] stations itself and turns to the house of errors and the house of Esau for stubble.”51 He may have meant by this that Israel turns to Christian thinkers for the small pieces of learning that they have, as Bibago himself turned to Christian scholasticism. Yet nevertheless, it seems that Bibago considers the true masters to be Aristotle and Averroes. Lest we worry about Bibago’s nonJewish sources, he assures us that he holds “the law of the Lord which is absolutely perfect before [his] eye and [his] conception” with all his might.52 Yet this is not entirely reassuring. Bibago goes on to say, “I held [the Torah], and would not let it go—I alone did lead it.”53 The final part of this statement is based on a line in Moses’s poem Ha‌ʾazinu (Deuteronomy 32), where it is God alone, not a foreign God, who leads Israel. Bibago inverts the statement to say that he alone leads the Torah! Such an inversion may make us recall ibn Ḥabib’s assertion that Bibago manipulates his talmudic texts for philosophical aims. Here, Bibago’s claimed reassurance that he is following the Torah indicates that he is making the Torah follow him. If it is Bibago who leads the Torah, where does he take his own bearings? A strange statement occurring in the middle of the introduction may indicate this. Bibago says, “Who then is he that hath hunted venison to bring it through external and internal apprehensions? […] Oh that there were even one among 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

Cf. Lev 26:44; 1Kgs 2:15; Job 36:19. Note that the expression from 1Kgs 2:15, “they set their faces on me,” continues “that I should reign.” However, the speaker is the ill-fated Adonijah, whose attempt at seizing power is ultimately unsuccessful. Cf. 1Kgs 18:46. Cf. Esth 4:14. Or: wisdom of our scientists. Variations of this popular expression are found, inter alia, in Hebrew translations of Maimonides’s introduction to his Eight Chapters. Cf. Obad 1:18. Cf. Ps 19:8. Cf. Song 3:4 and Deut 32:12.

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you that would surely apprehend and surely save (haṣel yaṣil).”54 Bibago seems to be implying that the salvation brought about by apprehension, presumably both physical and intellectual apprehension, is a kind of hunting, in the manner of Esau the hunter (or perhaps of Jacob pretending to be Esau the hunter). I know of no other Jewish source comparing hunting to philosophy. While there is evidence of some Jews taking up hunting in the form of falconry in France in the fourteenth century,55 hunting is not generally portrayed favourably in Jewish literature. Indeed, in manuscript illustration motifs, Jews are portrayed as the hunted, usually a rabbit or a deer, and the Christians, associated with Esau, are portrayed as the hunters and hunting dogs.56 Yet hunting as philosophy is an important Platonic image, developed in some detail in Plato’s Sophist. The hunter seeks prey that is generally hidden from him. Here, if we follow Derekh Emunah, what the student of metaphysics seeks in metaphysics is devequt, conjunction with the divine intellect. This conjunction is elusive in everyday life and, as Bibago notes in Derekh Emunah, nearly impossible to achieve. Despite mentioning divine emanation in the introduction to the Commentary on the Metaphysics, Bibago does not include a direct discussion of this devequt in his Commentary, which ends after Metaphysics Iota, before reaching Aristotle’s discussion of the divine in book Λ. Divine conjunction, the supposed goal of philosophy and the alleged salvation, is thus hidden, if not absent, in the Commentary; the hunt for it is indirectly pursued, as it were, through Bibago’s Commentary. We may also note that in hunting, it is not only the hunted who is hidden, but the hunter as well.57 Bibago achieves this in the Commentary by not speaking in his own name outside of the introduction and even by not clarifying when his text is from Aristotle or from Averroes; nor does he indicate which commentaries of Averroes he is drawing on, but moves seamlessly from one to another. He ends his introduction to the Commentary with the statement: “If necessity brings me in some place to speak in the language of the author or 54 55

56 57

Cf. Gen 27:33 and 27:5; Mal 1:10. See Leor Jacobi, “Jewish Hawking in Medieval France: Falconry, Rabbenu Tam, and the Tosafists,” Oqimta: Studies in Talmudic and Rabbinic Literature 1 (2013): 421–504 and Leor Jacobi, “The Rabbis on the Hunt: From Palestine to Poland,” in Falconry: Its Influence on Biodiversity and Cultural Heritage in Poland and across Europe, ed. Urszula Szymak and Przemysław Sianko (Bialystok: Podalskie Museum, 2016), 169–186. See Kurt Schubert, “Wikkuach-Thematik in den Illustrationen Hebräischer Handschriften,” Jewish Art 12–13 (1986–1987): 247–56. See also Sara Offenberg, “Beauty and the Beast: On a Doe, a Devlish Hunter, and Jewish-Christian Polemics,” AJS Review 44 (2020): 1–17. See Seth Benardete, “On Plato’s ‘Sophist,’” Review of Metaphysics 46 (1993): 747–80; see, e.g., 750: “Hunting in itself is the hidden hunting of the hidden or elusive beings, and applies across the board to what the philosopher as ontologist does.”

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according to his views, it is not as though it were brought up with me or against me. Behold, my Witness and He that testifies of me is in heaven.”58 That is, he goes beyond what was brought up with him or against him into the hunting ground of knowledge of necessity. The Hebrew expression for “being brought up with” (be-omnah) is used in Esth 2:20 to describe Esther’s customary obedience to Mordecai and may imply that the pursuit of metaphysics goes beyond what Bibago is accustomed to obeying; that is, it may go beyond religious pursuits. That Bibago intends to dissociate the hunt for metaphysical knowledge from religion is further suggested by the phonetic similarity between omnah and emunah; the philosophy of Aristotle and Averroes is not the faith he has been brought up with. Bibago’s appeal to heaven as his witness, perhaps once again echoing Ha‌ʾazinu, may remind readers of the metaphysical sources of the movements of the heavens, in addition to the divine source of the Jewish faith. 3 Conclusion Bibago’s introduction to his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics presents philosophy as a free inquiry into the things that are. The author describes himself as hunting for elusive metaphysical knowledge, following his prey wherever it may lead him. In the event that it should lead him away from the Torah, Bibago pledges to bring the Torah with him; that is, to make the Torah follow philosophy. He does not so much say this directly as couch it in literary allusions, perhaps suggesting that as a hunter of knowledge of being, he is hiding from view. When he later composes Derekh Emunah, Bibago writes as if the Bible and the Talmud confirm everything understood by philosophy and even gives the religious an alternative way of reaching intellectual truth. This involves a reinterpretation of certain central Jewish concepts, such as salvation, messianism, and divine affliction, so as to accommodate a philosophical way of achieving divine ends. As ibn Ḥabib pointed out in the generation after Bibago, these interpretations of the Bible and the Talmud are not intended by their authors, but Bibago, the philosophical hunter, grasps them and pulls them towards his own purposes. To some extent, then, the philosophical interpretations of Derekh Emunah should follow Bibago’s explicitly philosophical works, including the Commentary on the Metaphysics. Yet if those philosophical works are “hunts” after elusive ideas that may never be fully grasped by human beings, then they are not dogmatic, but open-minded. I am suggesting 58

Cf. Esth 2:20 and Job 16:19.

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here that in Derekh Emunah, Bibago gives philosophical allegories of biblical and talmudic texts that are dogmatic in character, while in his Commentary on the Metaphysics, he presents an open-minded inquiry into truth. Bibago is thus not a “moderate rationalist,” but a full-blown, though closeted, rationalist who combines his rationalism with an open-ended quest for knowledge of being. He is an example of a Jewish thinker who is not swept up in the anti-Aristotelianism of Crescas, Albo, and others of his time.59 Yet he does not see himself as a restorer of a declining Aristotelian science so much as a free inquirer who uses Aristotle and Averroes as his guides in a Socratic, open-ended type of free inquiry. For him, the problem of integrating Judaism and philosophy is a difficult, open question, and he uses philosophical allegory as a tool for bringing Aristotelian philosophy deep into the heart of religious life. That he uses such allegory differently in two of his works suggests that he felt that his interest in open inquiry would not be easily accepted by most Jews of his time and that accordingly it ought to be couched in allegorical terms. Since most of Bibago’s readers have focused on Derekh Emunah, they have missed the importance of the philosophical approach to Aristotelian inquiry of the Commentary on the Metaphysics. Bibago was likely not the only fifteenth-century thinker to hold different views in different works, and we must be careful to compare all the works of each thinker, especially if they have been accused of duplicity by so eminent a figure as Jacob ibn Ḥabib. 59

Note that neither Crescas nor Albo is cited by name in Derekh Emunah (see Lazaroff, Theology, 56 n. 60), though Crescas is mentioned in another of Bibago’s works, Eṣ ha-Ḥayyim (see Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed, 300). It seems likely to me that Bibago’s failure to mention these thinkers in Derekh Emunah is a kind of dismissal of their antiAristotelian views.

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Scepticism and Akrasia In the introduction to this book, I pointed to Plato’s Apology of Socrates for the paradox that Socrates saw philosophical inquiry into the validity and existence of the divine as divinely commanded. How can someone be mandated to question the validity of the mandate? Put differently, if Socrates knows nothing about divine science or wisdom and is in doubt about the relationship between the divine and the human, then he is in no position to receive divine commands, especially commands concerning the study of the divine things. What, then, is he to do? How can he live among devout Athenians who profess knowledge of the divine, perform sacrifices, dedicate temples, and teach their children their views? In Plato’s Apology, and to a certain extent in Plato’s other works, Socrates meets a considerable amount of friction in his encounters with the Athenians as he questions their views and beliefs, including those about the divine, and strives to convince them that they do not, in fact, have knowledge. This friction, which eventually leads to his execution, could be understood to result from what Aristotle identified as Socrates’s denial of unrestraint, akrasia. As we saw in chapter 3, in Aristotle’s view, Socrates believes that people act according to what they take to be best and that unless they are ignorant, if they are doing something then they must have a reason for doing what they do. Since Socrates is himself ignorant of why one should act in such ways, he seeks to understand the reasons behind the actions of other people. In so doing, he discovers that those reasons are not founded on knowledge and then proceeds to explain this to his interlocutors. Neither Plato nor Aristotle, however, spells out this account explicitly, and whether or not it holds true would seem to depend on the outcomes of Socrates’s conversations. If Socrates’s interlocutors changed their course of action upon learning that those actions were not founded upon knowledge, then the dialogues would support (though not definitively prove) Socrates’s denial of akrasia. If, however, those interlocutors did not change their ways but rather continued to do what they had set out to do before meeting Socrates, then the dialogues would undercut the denial of akrasia and lend support to (though not definitively prove) Aristotle’s position. Plato’s dialogues, however, often tend to end without clear indications of what the interlocutors (other than Socrates) go on to do. That is, Plato leaves unresolved the question of how to act in the face of ignorance and even the question of how Socrates’s interlocutors modified or changed their behaviour

© Yehuda Halper, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004468764_010

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in response to being faced with their own ignorance. Perhaps Plato is himself a sceptic on this point. The authors examined in this book apparently differ widely in their treatment of the relationship between scepticism about the divine and the ensuing human actions, even though they all recommend leading lives of religious observance. As we saw in chapter 1, the majority of medieval Jewish treatments of Socrates viewed him as a wise, ascetic monotheist. These views of Socrates neither take him to be a sceptic nor attribute to him much in the way of action. Still, they do not leave us with any indication that Socrates believed people to do anything other than what they thought was best. For Nahmanides at least, this leads to a rejection of Socrates’s disavowal of grief, not only because the reasoning behind it is flawed, but also because it results in morally bad behaviour; namely, not grieving. In any case, neither unrestraint nor scepticism plays a part in these depictions of Socrates. Judah Halevi’s Kuzari depicts a Socrates who is sceptical of divine science and wisdom but also acts like a sceptic. He is careful not to make claims about things that are beyond his knowledge, especially about divine things and their relationship to the world. Instead, he dedicates himself to methods of inquiry designed to resolve doubts. In his public address to the people of Athens, Halevi’s Socrates admits restraint concerning the things of which he is ignorant, but he provides no guidance to the Athenians as to how to act. As I suggested at the end of chapter 2, Socratic philosophy is of little political relevance and is ignored by the Khazar King, who has numerous preconceptions about the divine and is not ready to admit ignorance about them. Halevi’s presentation of Socrates, then, would appear to be compatible with a denial of akrasia, even though there is nothing explicit in the Kuzari to warrant establishing a connection between Socrates and akrasia. As we saw in chapter 3, Averroes’s account of Socrates is the only one to connect him with both scepticism and a denial of akrasia. Averroes’s formulation of the Socratic denial of akrasia does not involve knowledge per se, but rather persuasion: for Averroes’s Socrates, people do what they think is best and so, if they can be persuaded that something is best, then they will act accordingly. Averroes admits the possibility that some people cannot be persuaded of what is best, but in general seems to think that most people can be persuaded of what is good and will then act accordingly. Indeed, his well-known division of society into rhetorical, dialectical, and demonstrative classes is based on methods of persuasion and reflects his view that people act according to what they think is best. It is legally forbidden, according to Averroes’s juridical Decisive Treatise, to use the wrong form of persuasion or argumentation on members

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of a class or to mix types of persuasions among classes, since this can undermine the persuasiveness and lead to bad actions. A sceptical philosopher like Socrates living under Averroes’s division of the state would only be permitted to raise his concerns to other members of the demonstrative class. It is possible that any scholar of metaphysics would be left with uncertainties about various topics that are of religious concern. Averroes mandates that they keep those concerns among themselves and thereby avoid encouraging the majority to question their beliefs and then potentially come to act against the law. The thinkers examined in “Part 2: Socratic Problems without Socrates” share Averroes’s concerns about scepticism and akrasia, even though they do not connect them to Socrates. That is, they take beliefs about God and the good to result in good actions among the majority of human beings, but see human reason as inherently limited in what it can apprehend of the divine. Moreover, they understand that in order to attain scientific or philosophical certainty about the divine, one needs to study science or philosophy with an open mind; that is, without having predetermined answers to the questions one asks. Having an open mind of this kind is itself a sceptical standpoint. Moreover, a truly open mind can come to believe in the views accepted by the Law, but it can also remain uncertain or even become persuaded of views opposed to those accepted by the Law. The Jewish thinkers in part 2 do not adopt Averroes’s prohibition against persuasion across classes. Instead, they develop different legal mechanisms for allowing open inquiry without undermining general belief. For the most part, these mechanisms allow for sceptical thought among the philosophical questioners while at the same time encouraging adherence to the religious law. We saw in chapter 4 that Maimonides’s legal compilation considers asking questions about the foundations of the Law to be forbidden by the Law. This ban would appear to cover a large range of philosophical questions, including precisely those raised by the Guide of the Perplexed. Maimonides’s philosophical magnum opus is thus directed to those in violation of the law against free inquiry in the Mishneh Torah. I suggested that this is a Platonic kind of punishment aimed at allowing such free-thinking sceptics a way to live at rest among other unquestioning, believing Jews. That is, Maimonides’s Guide assumes that those who question the foundations of the Law may give up following the Law, but that the Guide can persuade them to continue to follow the Law. In this case, scepticism of this kind combined with a denial of akrasia leads the philosophically curious away from the Law. The Guide uses philosophical means to persuade such questioners to follow the Law while upholding the view that the human intellect is inherently limited and that accordingly one ought to

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maintain scepticism about some of the questions that one is forbidden to raise in the Mishneh Torah. In particular, the questions about which one ought to maintain scepticism include, what is up, what is down; that is, about certain key metaphysical issues. Like Maimonides, Jacob Anatoli also considers certain philosophical inquiries to be contrary to Jewish law. However, as we saw in chapter 5, for Anatoli it is not merely metaphysical issues that are forbidden, but logic in general, along with the study of the sciences that are dependent on logic. Nevertheless, Anatoli translated Averroes’s Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s core logical works into Hebrew and thereby made them available to many European Jews who otherwise would not have been able to read them. In his introduction to those translations, he seems to think that if one studies them in the proper order apart from religious concerns, one can then reconcile them with religious works. Yet in his own religious work, Malmad Hatalmidim, Anatoli acknowledges the possibility of conflict between logic/science and the Torah and recommends his book as a kind of goad to proper study while steering one towards religiously acceptable views. Anatoli thus admits the possibility that logical and scientific questions can undermine the Torah and lead to bad actions. His solution involves becoming accustomed to the biblically sanctioned views and thereby continuing to act in accordance with them while simultaneously pursuing open scientific inquiry. If, indeed, the religious views are to be supported because one has grown up with them, then Anatoli is more accepting of a kind of akrasia than Maimonides. However, at the same time, he does not think that such acceptance is sufficient; one needs a better philosophical pursuit of doubt. In chapter 6, we saw that Levi Gersonides takes a different approach in his Commentary on the Song of Songs. For Gersonides, logic and science should be guided by their own internal order of study. At the same time, this order of study is alluded to in the Song of Songs and so is sanctioned by Scripture. Most of metaphysics, however, cannot be known to man using human reason alone. Nevertheless, Gersonides does not express concern that ignorance about metaphysics will lead the scientist to stray from the Law. Indeed, rather than questioning the need for self-restraint in the face of human ignorance, his scientific inquirer looks towards a divine revelation of the metaphysical uncertainties through the Active Intellect. Gersonides compares this to the erotic desire expressed in the Song of Songs. This form of desire is not only parallel to that of Socrates in Plato’s Symposium (and Plotinus’s Enneads 1.6), but also serves to keep the scientist directed towards divine truth and away from transgressing the Law.

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Abraham Bibago’s Derekh Emunah presents a Judaism with a clear and noncontradictory philosophical interpretation. This would seem to deny the existence of any contradictions between philosophy and religion. Moreover, such philosophical interpretations carry with them the implication that the proper study and practice of Judaism is, in fact, the study of philosophy. For those unable or unwilling to study philosophy, there is an equally viable path of faith to the same end. This view, however, is undermined by Bibago’s treatment of the relationship between philosophy and Judaism in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In the latter, he presents philosophy as a kind of hunt for the truth about metaphysical things which are not actually known to the philosopher. If the divine things are not known, then they cannot be used to interpret religion. If so, then one is tempted to follow Jacob ibn Ḥabib’s assessment of Bibago as a dissembler who did not even believe his own interpretations. In so doing, one opens up the question as to what is, in fact, the right way to see the relationship between philosophy and Judaism, a question at the heart of what I consider a kind of Jewish Socratic scepticism. For all the thinkers who held this view, one could well ask: How should an aspiring philosopher or scientist act in the face of such scepticism? While their answers differ in justification, all of them thought that the philosopher and scientist should continue to live a Jewish religious life, while continuing to question.

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Index of Passages Cited Bible Genesis

1 ff. 5:24 6:5 27:5 27:12 27:33 Exodus 3:2 3:7 9:3 10:26 17:12 19:19 19:24 20 20:2 22:8 29:26 33:13 36:2 Leviticus 7:33 8:29 9–11 10 14 26:44 Numbers 4:21–7:89 11:25 13:18 15:39 Deuteronomy 4:24 5:6 13:5 32 32:12 32:17 Joshua 9:13 1 Samuel 3:1 17:55 25:9 2 Samuel 13:32 15:11 1 Kings 2:15 18:46 19 2 Kings 2:11

Isaiah 122, 128 63 220 222 163 222 216 219 220 162–163 183 36 184 216 119–120 220 182 192 183 182 182 172–173 216 183 221 168–169 143–144 182 114, 118 216 119–120 216 221 221 219 184 62 184 144 219 209 221 221 64 63

Jeremiah

Ezekiel

Hosea Joel Amos Obadiah Jonah Micah Zephaniah Zechariah Malachi Psalms

Proverbs

10:23 32:17–18 38:17 40:29 61:10 7:24 7:28 42:2 45:3 49:20 50:45 1 ff. 11:13 22:30 41:6 7:11 2:20 8:11 1:18 1:5 7:1 1:12 3:7 1:10 9:17 14:34 19:8 19:13 19:15 36:10 55:14 57:5 68:34 73:3 73:7 92:4 104:31 106:23 116:12 122:8 144:4 1:2 2:1–3 2:4–5 3:2

219 139 51 183 214 168 220 219 143 219 219 122, 126, 128, 170 219 215 220 220 209 123 221 219, 220 50 52–53 176 222 149 182 221 185 51, 149, 185 43 183 219 220 189 10 149 215 215 50 183 219 164 100 184 157–159, 184 35

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256

Index of Passages Cited

Proverbs (cont.)

17:3 22:6 23:29 25:4 27:21 30:5 Job 10:15 16:19 32:1 34:10 34:34 36:19 38:36 Song of Songs 1:2 3:4 6:5 8:5–14 8:5 Lamentations 1:9 1:12 4:5 Ecclesiastes 1:1–11 1:12–End 7:26 11:6 12:11 Esther 1:18 2:20 4:14 5:8 7:5 Daniel 1:8

182 184 50 158, 182 182 184 126 50 223 144 166–167 166–167 221 10–11 8–9, 164, 186–208, 228 195 221 203 203 205–206 209 145 219 164, 173–181 175–176 176–178 190 182, 183 178–179, 181 220 223 221 209 165, 183 145

Babylonian Talmud Berakot Šabbat ʿErubin Pesaḥim

8a 13a 28b 30b 149a 13b 63b

145 156, 183 148, 183 173–174 117 213 117–118

Roš Haššanah Megillah Ḥagigah

Makkot ʿAbodah Zarah Menaḥot

26a 17b 11b 14b 112b 30a 83a 104b 10a 96a 100b 16a 19b 99b

10 156, 183 3, 5, 117–118, 122, 127–128 108–109, 130, 143, 170–171 216 122 165 122 117–118 148 117–118 117–118 122 165

Mishnah ʾAbot

2.14

183

Midrash Midrash Tehillim ch. 1

165

Ketubbot Qiddušin Baba Qamma Sanhedrin

Plato Apology of Socrates 19b 20d–e 22e–23a 27c–28a 30e 31d ff. 38a 39c–d Crito Euthyphro 5e–6c Cratylus Gorgias

1–11, 15, 18, 42, 44–45, 69–77, 80– 82, 84–85, 87–89, 96, 99, 148, 181, 225 3 44, 69–70, 85 3 88 181 44, 70 85 4 1, 19, 23, 77 72 70 1 145

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257

Index of Passages Cited Laws

X 885b–d 907c–d 908e–909a Meno 81c–86c Phaedo 72e–76c 118a Phaedrus Republic I 343d–345c ff. II 381b ff. V 457c ff. 460a8–e3 VIII 557a X 617e Menexenus 235d Sophist Symposium 210a–212b Alcibiades’ speech Timaeus

1, 8, 118, 136–139, 145–146 137 137 137–138 1, 67 67 1, 19, 64, 67–68 67 10–11 10, 187 1, 80–84 83–84 145–146 36, 37 90 90 90 89–90, 94 89–90 1, 222 1, 8–9, 33, 187–188, 228 188 18 1

Aristotle De Interpretatione 16a3–8 Anatlytica Posteriora Topica 100a19–21 Rhetoric 1356b31 (Ar. p. 11) 1356b34 (Ar. p. 11) 1357b12–15 (Ar. p. 13) 1365a 1367b8 (Ar. p. 46) 1368a20 (Ar. p. 48) 1382a6 (Ar. p. 96)

153 154, 192, 198 153, 191, 217 84, 191 200–202 80, 86–96, 200 86, 90 86, 90 86, 90–91 95 86, 89–90 87 86, 90

1390b31 (Ar. p. 127) 86, 90 1392b11 (Ar. p. 131) 87 1393b4 (Ar. p. 134) 86, 90 1398a24 (Ar. p. 151) 86, 90 1398b33 (Ar. p. 151) 86, 90 1399a2 (Ar. p. 153) 87 1399a4 (Ar. p. 153) 87 1399a8 (Ar. p. 153) 86, 90 1399b10 87 1408b15 87 1411a29 87 1412b6 87 1414b27 87 1414b33 87 1415b31 (Ar. p. 207) 86, 89–90 1417a16–21 (Ar. p. 213–214) 86, 92 1418a31–34 (Ar. p. 218) 87, 94 1418b26 (Ar. p. 219) 87 1419a8–12 (Ar. p. 220) 86–89 Poetics 1447b11 80 Physica 191, 203, 217 IV.6 213a19–b2 56 VIII 203 De Anima 191 A 56 418a21 86 Parva Naturalia 84, 125–126, 191 Meteorologica 191 De Animalibus 191 Metaphysics 56, 85–86, 191, 194–195, 200–202, 212, 217–224, 229 A 56, 195–199 980a21 196, 198 α 195–199, 203 993a30–31 197 Λ 7 1072b20–22 119 Nicomachean Ethics 80–81, 86, 91, 93, 96, 97–109, 164

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258 Nicomachean Ethics (cont.) III 1116b4 (Ar. p. 220–221) IV 1124b28–31 (Ar. p. 266–267) 1127b22–27 (Ar. p. 278–279) VI 1144b17–30 (Ar. p. 332, lacuna) VII 1145b23–26 (Ar. p. 372–373) 1146a34–35 (Ar. p. 376–377) 1146b24–28 (Ar. p. 378–379) 1147a1–b2 (Ar. p. 378–383) 1147b2–5 (Ar. p. 382–383) 1147b14–15 (Ar. p. 382–383) (Ar. 354–355)

Index of Passages Cited 97 98 3, 33, 97, 98 97, 99–100 97, 101–102 105–106, 109 105 104 107 97, 103 97

Judah Halevi Kuzari 6–7, 25, 42, 45, 52–79, 226 I Introduction (the first dream, opening sentence) 66–67 I 1 41, 52–58, 59–63, 71, 75, 77 I 62 65 I 63 57 I 64 57 I 65 57, 58 I 95 72 I 99 72 I 115 63 II 1 60, 77 II 26 65 II 50 60 II 81 (the final section of Book II) 59, 60 III 1 52, 54, 58–68, 73, 76

IIi 2 IIi 22 IIi 23 IIi 35 III 53 III 73 IV 3 IV 13 IV 19 IV 25 V 1 V 12 V 14 V 19 V 20 V 21

59, 60 59 62–63 57 65 62, 65 64 52, 54, 69, 73–74, 85 65 54–58, 65 65 53 52, 54–58, 65, 69, 75–76, 85 65 54 65

Maimonides Commentary on the Mishnah On Šabbat 149a 117 Introduction to Pereq ḥeleq 117–118 On Sanhedrin Sanhedrin x.1 120–121 Thirteen Principles of Faith 116, 120 On Ḥagigah 11b 118 Eight Chapters Introduction 221 IV 133 VIII 119 Book of Commandments 116 Positive commandment 1 120 Negative commandment 47 118 Mishneh Torah List of Commandments Positive commandment 1 120 Negative commandment 1 120 47 114, 115

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259

Index of Passages Cited Book of Knowledge Hilekhot yesode ha-Torah I–IV 128, 130–131 I.1 155 I.5 124, 131 I.6 119, 120 II 10 119 III 9 115 IV.10–13 122, 123, 128 VII 126 Hilekhot deʿot 113, 128, 166 I.4 30 II.2–3 133 Hilekhot talmud Torah I.8–10 121 I.11 116, 122, 167 VI.14 132 Hilekhot ʿavodah zarah II.2–3 113–114 (113–146) XI.16 115 Hilekhot tešuvah III.6–8 120–121 Book of Agriculture Hilekhot matanot ʿaniyim X.2 139 Book of Judges Hilekhot sanhedrin II.1 128 The Guide of the Perplexed Introduction to Part I I 2 I 10 I 28 I 30 I 31 I 32 I 33 I 34 I 36

122, 129, 135, 139, 143, 144–146 124, 140, 143, 146 161 161 123, 169 140–142, 169, 170 130–131, 169, 171–172 161, 169, 170, 173 155, 161, 169 215

I 40 I 47 I 57 I 61–64 I 65 I 67 I 68 I 71 I 73 II 13 II 17 II 22 II 25 II 28 II 30 II 31 II 32–48 II 32 II 33 II 36 II 37 II 45 III 12 III 13 III 17 III 24 III 26 III 29 III 32 III 35 III 37 III 41 III 43 III 46 III 51 III 54 Letter on Astrology

143–144 127 124 124 124 140, 143, 144 119 124, 125, 142 121 2, 121, 124–125 125 121 124, 125 173 35 140, 142 125–126 121, 125–126, 143–144 115 126 199 144 140, 143 140, 143 121, 134 140–143 126 58, 126–127, 142 142 140 126–127 140, 142, 143 140, 142 131–136, 145–146 115–116, 132, 134–135, 142, 146, 187 128–129, 159–161 126, 128

Averroes Decisive Treatise

81, 107–109, 154–155, 173, 192, 198, 226–227

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260 Averroes (cont.) Epistle on the Possibility  of Conjunction 216 Short Commentary on  Aristotle’s Topica 177 Middle Commentary on  Porphyry’s Isagoge 86, 147, 153, 158, 161 Middle Commentary on  Aristotle’s Categories 153 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s  De Interpretatione 153  16a3–8 154–155, 192, 198 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 153 p. 376, section 38 91 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 153 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Topica 100a19–21 200–202, 205 Topic 39 82–84 Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric p. 69; corr. to p. 22, of MC 91 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric 80–81, 86–96 vol. 2, pp. 19; 1356b31–34 90 22; 1357b15 87, 91 23; 1357b12–13 87, 90, 91 78; 1367b8 87, 90 64; 1365a 87, 95–96 82; 1368a20 87 164; 1382a6 90 217–218; 1390b31 90 221; 1392b11 87, 90 226–227; 1393b4 87, 90 242–244; 1398a24–  1399a8 90 331; 1415b31 87, 90 338–339; 1417a16–21 87, 92–93

Index of Passages Cited 345; 1418a31–34 87, 94–95, 108 348; 1419a8–12 89 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics Butterworth, p. 64–65; 1447b11 80 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia On Prophecy in Dreams 71–72, 77, 84–85, 95, 96, 99, 102 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima p. 178; 418a21 86 Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima p. 256; 418a21 86 364–365 86 Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 196 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 218 Book I 196 Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 218 α 194–202 Alif (Big) 56 Lām, p. 1616 ff. 119 Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 97–109 Hebrew trans. p. 132; 1116b4 97, 99 p. 169; 1127b22–27 97, 98–99 p. 222–223; 1144b17–30 97, 100 p. 227–228; 1145b23–25 97, 102 p. 230; 1146a34–35 106–107 p. 232; 1146b24–28 104–105 p. 232–234; 1147a1–b2 104–105 p. 234; 1147b2–5 107 p. 235; 1147b14–15 97, 103–104 Commentary on Plato’s Republic 80–81, 84 pp. 37–38 82, 96 pp. 55–58 36

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Index of Names Ancients, Medievals, and Moderns Abba Mari of Lunel 149 Abihu 216 Abraham 57–58, 215 Abraham ibn Ezra 63 Commentary on Song of Songs 189 Abravanel, Don Isaac 120 Abravanel, Judah 11 Dialoghi D’Amore 77 Adonijah 221 Al-Anṣārī, Muḥammad 17, 20, 21, 28, 29–30, 187 Alemanno, Johanan 9–11 al-ʿĀmirī, Abū al-Ḥasan 18, 57 Anonymous The Fathers according to Rabbi Nathan  148 Summa Alexandrinorum 32, 33, 97 Aqiva 109, 117, 130, 131, 143, 170, 171, 172 Aquinas, Thomas 42, 125 Aristophanes Clouds 138 Aristotle, see Index of Passages Asclepius 10, 11, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 61 Avicenna 33, 34, 78, 125, 135, 143, 187 Compendium on the Soul 53 The Metaphysics of the Healing 119 Baḥya ben Asher Kad ha-Qemaḥ 187 Ben Sira 117 Beth Hillel 213–214 Beth Shammai 213–214 Bibago, Abraham 4, 9, 209–224, 229 Derekh Emunah (Way of Faith) 9, 212–217, 223–224, 229 Eṣ ha-Ḥayyim 224 Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 217–218 Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (not extant) 217 Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics  9, 62, 217–224, 229 Al-Bīrūnī, Abū al-Rayḥān 19 Brethren of Purity, see Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ

Calcidius 1 Cicero, Marcus Tullius Tusculan Disputations 70 Republic 70 Crescas, Hasdai 120, 224 David 56, 57, 144 Da Silva, Ḥezekiah 117 Delmedigo, Joseph Solomon 210–211 Diogenes the Cynic 2, 17, 26, 29, 30 Diogenes Laertius 17 Eli Habilio 196 Eliezer b. Hyrcanus 148–150 Elijah 58–59, 61–64 Empedocles 54–58, 75, 80 Enoch 58–59, 61–64 Epictetus 71 Epicurus 55, 117, 120–121, 155, 183 Eusebius of Caesaria 70 Ezekiel 126, 170 Al-Fārābī, Abū Naṣr 19, 25–26, 31, 34, 44, 73, 119, 150 Tanbīh ʿalā sabīl al-saʿādah 157 Enumeration of the Sciences 33 Attainment of Happiness 33, 57–58 Philosophy of Plato 33, 72, 77, 187 Philosophy of Aristotle 33, 135 Book of Letters 33 Harmonization of the Two Opinions of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle 56, 67–68, 72, 119 Book of Demonstration 71–72, 77, 85 Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (not extant) 164 The Perfect State 125 Commentary on Plato’s Laws 1, 136 Commentary on Aristotle’s Topica 201 Ficino, Marsilio 1, 9, 11, 15, 81, 181 Galen 26, 55, 145 Epitome of Plato’s Laws 136 Al-Ġazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Al-Munqiḏ min al-Ḍalāl 144 Tahāfut al-falāsifa 54

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262 Hai Gaon 149–150 Heman ha-’Ezraḥi 29, 31 Hermannus Alemannus 97 Hermes (Trismegistus) 53–58, 61, 63 Hippocrates 22, 26, 27, 39, 54 Homer 80 Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq  Ādāb al-Falāsifa 17–18, 20–21, 26–31, 33, 187 Translation of Plato’s Laws 136

Index of Names Joseph Karo 117 Joseph Kaspi 6, 35 Commentary on Proverbs 35 Commentary on Song of Songs 187 Ṣeror ha-Kesef 152 Terumat ha-Kesef 36 Maśkiyot Kesef 126 Josephus Flavius 57 Judah al-Ḥarizi 6, 24 Musare ha-Filosofim 20, 26, 28, 29–31, 33–35, 42, 187 Taḥkemoni 29, 31 Judah b. Bateira 148 Judah Halevi  Kuzari 6–7, 11, 25–26, 42, 44, 45, 52–79, 85, 226 Poetry 25, 59 Judah ibn Tibbon 21, 24, 54, 61, 69, 77, 100

Ibn abī Uṣaybiʿah 57 Ibn Bāǧǧa 33, 56  Letter on Conjunction 53, 55 Tadbīr al-Mutawwaḥid 59 Ibn Ǧulǧul 55 Ibn al-Nadīm Fihrist 136 Ibn al-Qifṭī 19, 57 Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ 19, 55 Al-Kindī 44 Isaac ben Jedaiah 209–210 On What Transpired between Socrates and Isaiah 214–215 the Ḥarranians 18 Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn 87 Translation of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione  Levi b. Abraham 154 Liwyat Ḥen 63 Translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Levi Gersonides 4, 6 Ethics 1–4 97 Commentary on Song of Songs 8–9, 108, Isocrates 87, 90, 93–95 186–208, 228 Commentary on Ecclesiastes 190, 195 Jacob Anatoli 4, 5, 8, 129, 147–185, 228 Commentary on Job 10 Introduction to Averroes’s Middle Wars of the Lord 187, 191, 194, 195, 196, Commentaries on Logic 8, 153–162, 206–207 164, 166, 168, 170, 176, 180, 182–185, 192, Super-Commentary on Averroes’s Middle 193, 228 Commentary on Aristotle’s Topica  Malmad ha-Talmidim 8, 162–181, 193, 228 200–201 Jacob ben Makhir ibn Tibbon 177 Luqmān 17, 57 Jacob ibn Ḥabib ʿEn Yaʿaqov 209–213, 221, 223, 224, 229 Al-Manṣūr 27 Jona ben Ǧanāḥ 41 Meir ibn Gabbai 210 Jonah 220 Miriam 169 Book of Principles (Sefer Ha-ʿIqqarim) 37 Moscato, Judah 9 Joseph 133 Sermons 10–11, 210 Joseph Albo 6, 224 Moses 70, 72, 115, 121, 182, 186, 210, 215–216, Joseph ibn ʿAqnīn 150, 155 221 Hygiene of the Soul (Ṭibb al-Nufūs) 6, 20, Moses ibn Ezra 6, 20–25, 28, 33, 42 23, 27–29, 30–31, 35 Book of Conversation and Deliberation Joseph ibn Zabarah  (Kitāb al-Muḥāḍarah wa-l-Muḏākara)  Book of Delights (Sefer ha-Šaʿašuʿim) 6, 20–25, 27 20, 23, 26–27, 28, 29, 31, 35

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263

Index of Names Treatise of the Garden (Maqālat alḤadīqah) 20, 24–25 Moses ibn Tibbon 85, 100 Moses Maimonides, see Index of Passages Moses Mat 210 Moses Nahmanides 6, 226 Torat ha-Adam 34–35 Letters 145, 150, 152, 155 Moses Narboni 6 Commentary on Maimonides’s Guide of the Perplexed 35 Mubaššir ibn Fātik 22, 55 Nadab 216 Nicholas of Damascus De Plantis 32 Noah 215 Numenius 70 Peter of Spain Tractatus 151 Philo of Alexandria 1 Plato, passim Plutarch 71 Porphyry Historia philosophiae 17, 56 Isagoge 86, 147, 153, 158, 161, 162 Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 97 On the Life of Plotinus 41 Profiat Duran Ḥešev ha-Efod 126 Maʿaśe Efod 152 Ptolemy, Claudius Almagest 191 Pythagoras 54–58, 75 Qalonimos ben Qalonimos 83, 200 Al-Qazwīnī 19 Qimḥi, David 10 Rabinowitz, Zadoq of Lublin 117 Rashi (Shelomo Yiṣḥaqi) 149, 186 Al-Razi, Abu Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyāʾ  140, 143 Al-Sirah al-Falsafīyah (Philosophical Way of Life) 18, 44, 64

Saʿadyah Fayyumi The Book of Beliefs and Opinions (Kitāb al-amānāt wa-l-i‘tiqādāt) 139 Al-Šahrastānī, Tāǧ al-Dīn 57 Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī 56–57 Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles 82, 97, 100 Samuel ibn Tibbon Maʾamar yiqawwu ha-mayyim 100 Translation of the Guide of the Perplexed 119, 128, 133, 141, 144, 159, 160, 169, 170, 171, 187 Peruš ha-Millot ha-Zarot 150–152 Sextus Empiricus Against Professors 70 Shangi, Isaac 117 Shem Ṭov ben Abraham ibn Gaon 117 Shem Ṭov Falaquera 6, 20, 31–34 Batei hanhagat guf ha-bariʾ, batei hanhagat ha-nefeš 31 Iggeret ha-Musar 31 Ṣori Yagon 31 Epistle of the Debate 32, 33 Rešit Ḥokhmah 32, 33 Sefer ha-Maʿalot 32 Sefer ha-Mevaqqeš 32, 33 Deʿot ha-Filosofim 32 Sefer ha-Nefeš 32 Perfection of Actions 32, 33–34 Treatise of the Dream 32 Guide to the Guide (Moreh ha-Moreh) 33, 34 Summarizing Translation of ibn Gabirol, Meqor Ḥayyim 33 Simon b. Ṣemaḥ Duran 71 Socrates, passim Solomon 10, 57, 148, 164, 173–174, 176, 178, 180–181, 184, 190, 195, 199–200, 206, 207 Solomon ibn Gabirol 6, 19–23 Improvement of the Moral Qualities  19, 21, 22, 26, 28, 33, 34 Mivḥar ha-Peninim 26 Meqor Ḥayyim = Fons Vitae 33 Suhrawardī 55–56 William of Moerbeke 196 Xenophon 18 Memorabilia 44, 90, 102 Apology of Socrates 44

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264 Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī Translation of Plato’s Laws 136 ibn Yaʿiš, Barukh 196 Zeraḥyah (translator of Socrates’s prayer) 39–41, 46 Zeraḥyah Halevi Girondi 40 Zeraḥyah Halevi Saladin 6, 40 Sermons 36–37 Zeraḥyah b. Isaac b. Shealtiel Ḥen 40, 196 Contemporary Authors Abrahamov, Binyamin 59 Abramson, Shraga 24 Ackerman, Ari 36–37, 211 Adamson, Peter 18, 56, 67 Alon, Ilai 16–19, 44, 64 Aouad, Maroun 87 Arnzen, Rüdiger 1, 196 Baffioni, Carmela 1 Baneth, David 28, 52, 53, 69 Baron, Salo 77 Benardete, Seth 222 Berger, David 116–117 Bergsträsser, G. 30 Berman, Lawrence V. 97, 100 Black, Deborah 67 Breuer, Mordechai 149–150, 152 Burger, Ronna 99, 103 Butterworth, Charles 44, 67, 80, 83, 91, 107, 154, 192

Index of Names Druart, Thérèse-Anne 86, 136, 157 Dukes, L. 24 Eben Shemuel, Yehuda 150–151 Elior, Ofer 187, 194 Fenton, Paul 21–22, 24–26 Ford, Andrew 86 Gardet, L. 78 Gatti, Roberto 32 Glasner, Ruth 194–195 Golb, Norman 108, 192 Gooch, P. W. 3, 98 Goshen-Gottstein, Moshe 150–151 Green, Kenneth Hart 75 Grossman, Avraham 35 Güdemann, Moritz 150 Gutas, Dmitri 1, 16, 17, 53, 136 Guttmann, David 147 Halkin, A. S. 20, 28 Halperin, David 170 Harvey, Steven 25–26, 31, 32, 55, 78, 81, 119, 135, 136, 187, 192–193 Harvey, Warren Zev 121, 125, 135 Hazan, Ephraim 59 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 98 Heller, B. 57 Heller-Roazen, Daniel 154–155 Hélot, H. and L. 57 Hughes, Aaron 33, 77 Idel, Moshe 24, 41, 54, 63

Carlotta, Vincezo 41 Corazzol, Giacomo 11

Jacobi, Leor 222 Jastrow, Marcus 149, 168 Jospe, Raphael 31–34, 211

D‘Ancona, Cristina 1 Danzig, Gabriel 71, 90, 102 Davidson, Herbert 147, 158 Davidson, Israel 20, 26 De Blois, F. C. 67 Decter, Jonathan 29 Derenbourg, Joseph 57 Dishon, Judith 26

Kaplan, Lawrence 116–117 Kasher, Hannah 120, 132, 169 Katsumata, Naoya 29 Katz, Abraham 38 Kellner, Menachem 115, 120, 126, 186, 188, 189, 196, 198, 200, 202 Kierkegaard, Søren 98 Klein-Braslavy, Sara 189, 195

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265

Index of Names Klosko, George 84 Klugman Barkan, Roberta 31 Kogan, Barry 52 Kraemer, Joel 125 Krinis, Ehud 54, 59 Lamm, Norman 116 Lane, Edward William 61, 65, 88, 89, 98 Langermann, Tzvi 38–41, 43, 52 Lasker, Daniel 77–78 Lazaroff, Allan 211, 224 Lehman, Marjorie 212 Lemler, David 161 Levine, M. Herschel 32 Levinger, Jacob 115–116, 132, 145 Lichtenstein, Aharon 116–117 Lobel, Diana 73, 74, 78 Long, A. A. 70, 71 Lyons, M. C. 87–88, 94 Mahdi, Muhsin 154 Malter, Henry 32 Manekin, Charles 153 Margoliouth, George 38 Marshall, Laura 181 Melamed, Abraham 57 Merkle, Karl 30 Miletto, Gianfranco 11 Most, Glenn 10 Motzkin, Aryeh 77, 121, 157 Muench, Paul 98 Neria, Chaim Meir 164 Neusner, Jacob 148 Nuriel, Avraham 210–211, 217–218, 224 O’Connor, David K. 44 Offenberg, Sara 222 Pakaluk, Michael 42 Parnes, Yehuda 116 Pelling, Christopher 71 Pepi, Luciana 147 Pessin, Sarah 20 Pietruschka, Ute 18 Pines, Shlomo 2, 53, 58–59, 63, 84, 120–121, 124–135, 139–144, 155, 159–161, 169–171, 173, 199

Plessner, Martin 55 Prats, Arturo 27–28 Rabinovitch, Nahum 117 Rainer, Arye 83, 201 Reynolds, Gabriel Said 89 Rippin, Andrew 63 Robinson, James T. 150–151 Rokeach, Joshua 145 Rosenthal, Franz 1, 36, 44, 55, 57, 72, 82 Roth, Norman 57 Rowson, Everett K. 57 Sackson, Adrian 35, 36 Sadik, Shalom 211 Saldarini, Anthony J. 148 Salman, H. D. 157 Saperstein, Marc 209–210 Schäfer, Peter 170 Scheindlin, Raymond 22 Schleiermacher, Friedrich 98 Schmidt, Ernst A. 97 Schwartz, Dov 54, 63, 200 Schwartz, Michael 133 Seeskin, Kenneth 125 Septimus, Bernard 113, 128 Silman, Yochanan 58 Steinschneider, Moritz 77, 218 Stern, Josef 130–131 Stillmann, Norman A. 57 Strauss, Leo 53, 74–75, 77, 114–115 Strohmaier, Gotthard 16, 55 Stroumsa, Sarah 127 Tobi, Yosef 27–28 Touati, Charles 187, 196 Trizio, Michele 1 Twersky, Isadore 120, 128 Ullmann, Manfred 97 Vagelpohl, Uwe 87 Vajda, Georges 63 Van Bladel, Kevin 55–56, 63 Van Nuffelen, Peter 70 Veltri, Giuseppe 11 Vlastos, Gregory 98

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266 Walbridge, John 55–56 Walzer, Richard 72, 125 Weber, Gadi 120–121, 147–148, 163, 168–169, 201 Weil, Gérard 195 Wex, Michael 186 White, Nicholas 98 Wirmer, David 135, 171 Woerther, Frédérique 97 Wolfson, Harry A. 57

Index of Names Xiuyuan, Dong 143–144 Yahalom, Joseph 29 Zakeri, Mohsen 17 Zonta, Mauro 32, 150, 196, 211, 218 Zucker, Shaul 28

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