Jewish Claims Against East Germany 9789633865712

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Jewish Claims against East Gennany

Jewish Claims against East Gennany Moral Obligations and Pragmatic Policy

Angelika Tunm

�', ••• Central European University Press Budapest

: CE U PRESS

© 1997 by Angelika Timm A ll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the Publisher. ISBN 963 9116 04 1 Cloth ISBN 978-963-386-571-2 ebook Central European University Press Oktober 6. utca 12. H-1051 Budapest Hungary

Designed and composed by Judit Mihala in Caslon 224 lOpt and printed and bound by Gyomai Kner Nyomda Rt., Hungary

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Contents

Preface .................................. vü 1 Background ............................. 1 The Impact of the Holocaust on Jewish Life 1; Political Developments in East Germany 7

2 Jews in East Germany ..................... 17 The Jewish Community: Recovery and Restitution 17; The Attitude of the SED toward Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust 39; The Reality of Anti-Semitism 49; Restitution and Compensation during the Early Postwar Years 64

3 Initial Talksand Negotiati ons ............... 73 Jewish Material Claims against Germany 73; The Response of the East German Political Elite 81; International Recognition of the GDR and Initial Talks with the Claims Conference 94; American Claims against the GDR 112; Diplomatie Negotiations 118

4 New Accents in the E ighties ............... 123 Priorities of East German Foreign Policy 123; The Package Deal 125; The World Jewish Congress in Action 143; Political Changes in Germany, 1989-90 157; The Burdened Relationship between the GDR and the State of Israel 166; Confronting the Past 179

5 Outlookand Conclusions ................. 181 Unification and Attempts to Settle the Claims Issue 181; Conclusions 189

Appendix ............................... 201 Notes .................................. 229 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7 Interviews .............................. 265 Index .................................. 269

Preface

The Holocaust-the persecution and extermination of millions of European Jews by German National Socialism from 1933 to 1945had an immeasurable impact on Jewish life: most Jewish communi­ ties in Eastern Europe were destroyed; millions of people were imprisoned and murdered in concentration camps; and hundreds of thousands of Jews were forced to leave their countries and seek refuge throughout the world. Anti-Semitic policy was articulated by registering Jewish property and politically pressuring Jews to sell their assets. The liquidation of Jewish commercial and industrial enterprises was followed by a process of "Aryanization." In this way, Jews lost most of their assets in Germany and all countries occupied by the German state. Aside from the human and material losses, the Holocaust had unparalleled physical and psychological consequences. More than fifty years after the end of World War II, the shadow of the Holocaust still hangs over Germany. The Jewish dimension of German history is evident not only in the ongoing debates on a Holocaust memorial in Berlin but also in the ceremonies com­ memorating the end of the war. Neither Germans nor Jews can escape this past. Having grown up caught in the dilemma between remembering and repression, postwar generations have also been drawn into the discussion. After the war, Jewish organizations-including the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization and, since 1951, the Confe­ rence on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany-and the state of Israel presented claims to the Allied powers in Germany for in­ dividual compensation and global restitution to the Jewish people. Although it was clear that no material compensation could ever make up for the loss of human life, or alleviate the pain and suffer-

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Jewish Claims against East Germany

ing, members of these organizations argued that Germany should contribute to the reconstruction of Jewish life and rehabilitation of Holocaust survivors. The reactions of the political elite in the two German states to these demands could be regarded as a test of each country's willingness to face the past. Despite their mutual involvement, German and Jewish perspec­ tives are very different. Auschwitz recalls the organized mass mur­ der of Jews by Germans; it was Nazi Germany that murdered European Jews or drove them from their homes. Survivors of the Nazi politics of racial persecution and extermination who returned to Germany after 1945 had to bear the particular burdens of German wartime and postwar history-the memories of the atroci­ ties experienced from 1933 to 1945 and the superficial appraisal of the Holocaust during subsequent decades. Confronting National Socialism and the Holocaust was part of the efforts in both German states to come to terms with the past and establish their legitimacy in the family of nations. While the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) tried to persuade the world that, as the only legitimate German state, it represented a complete break from its predecessor, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) claimed it was not a successor state to the Third Reich or any previous regime. Today, it is becoming more and more apparent that an understanding of modern Germany depends on an understanding of the different paths taken by East and West Germany. The early postwar period, in particular, pro­ vides insights which are essential in understanding subsequent political and social developments in Germany and postwar Europe. This book contributes to the larger issue of addressing the pre­ sent and future by confronting the past. lt discusses the role of the Holocaust and the image of Jews in the historical consciousness and political culture of East Germany. This study investigates the relationship between ideology and Realpolitik, and the manner in which this relationship reflected the GDR's attitude toward anti­ Semitism, the Holocaust, and Jewish material claims and provides an analysis of the politics of East German authorities in dealing with old and new anti-Semitism and allowing it to reemerge under the cover of the officially propagated ideology of antifascism. Thus, on the one hand, this book explores the connection between

Preface

ix

Communist positions on anti-Semitism and fascism and, on the other hand, the specific German problems of restitution and repa­ rations. Furthermore, this analysis addresses the extent to which the Holocaust played a role in the actual policies of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from the early postwar period through the 1980s. As a vehicle for addressing these issues, this study focuses on the talks and negotiations between Jewish organizations, especially the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, and representatives of East Germany. The involvement of the U.S. Department of State, and its continuous support for the claims issue, is very significant, and thus an analysis will be made of U.S. efforts to pressure the East Germans to change their policy on Jewish claims. The abortive attempts of the East German govern­ ment to establish relations with the State of Israel in late 1989-90 and the role of reparations in the diplomatic negotiations will also be discussed. With respect to negotiations with the West German govern­ ment, the history of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany has been well documented. However, no compre­ hensive scholarly works exist on the efforts of Jewish organizations to come to a similar agreement with the East German state. This investigation offers a detailed analysis of this aspect of the Jewish­ German relationship. lt does so on the basis of a mass of unpub­ lished material now available in the archives of the former GDR (especially the archives of the former GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Archives Potsdam Branch, and the Foundation Archives of GDR parties and mass organizations within the Federal Archives in Berlin), as well as archival material in Israel (among others, the Central Zionist Archives and Israel State Archives) and the United States (United States National Archives; Archives of the United Nations; American Jewish Archives; archives of the United States Holocaust Research Institute, Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, American Jewish Committee; and others). Since the testimonies of historical actors and observers in the United States, Germany, and Israel are of fun­ damental importance in drawing a realistic and differentiated pic­ ture, this study is also based on interviews with more than forty of

x

Jewish Claims against East Germany

the principal political actors involved in the formal and informal negotiations between the GDR and representatives of Jewish inter­ ests, including Israel Miller, Saul Kagan, and Benjamin B. Ferencz of the Claims Conference; Israel Singer, Elan Steinberg, and Maram Stern of the World Jewish Congress; and several East German diplomats and officials. Because I served as a Hebrew-German interpreter at the Copenhagen negotiations between the GDR and Israel in 1990, I had access to some specific, as-yet-unpublished information and have used this information during my research for this book. This publication is connected with two related research pro­ jects: "The Impact of the Holocaust and the Problem of anti­ Semitism in East Germany 1945-1953," sponsored by the Vidal Sassoon Center for the Study of anti-Semitism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and "The Attitude of the GDR to the Holocaust, Zionism and the State of Israel," supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Bonn, both projects are still in progress. By concentrating on the issues of reparations and com­ pensation, however, this book presents specific research findings. After comprehensive research in German and Israeli archives from 1992 to 1994, the Volkswagen Fellowship at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C., made it possi­ ble for me to continue research in the United States through 1995. The scholarship enabled me to collect important material in American archives and contact American scholars, politicians, and members of Jewish organizations who were involved in GDR affairs. As an associate member of the United States Holocaust Research Institute in Washington, D.C., I also had a chance to discuss ques­ tions related to the subject with specialists on Holocaust studies. First and foremost, I would like to thank the Institute for pro­ viding access to new archival materials, especially the records of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany. Fur­ thermore, I thank Lily Gardner Feldman of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Robert 0. Freedman of Baltimore Hebrew University, Stephen Kalberg of Boston University, as weil as Detlef Nakath and Torsten Wöhlert for their advice and support. Finally, I wish to thank Allison Brown for editing my English manu-

Preface

xi

script. All of these individuals have influenced this book; neverthe­ less, I alone am responsible for the following interpretations and whatever errors remain.

1

Background

The Impact of the Holocaust on Jewish Life Many books have been written about the Holocaust, the anti­ Semitic policies of the Third Reich, and the suffering of Jews in Europe. Jewish and non-Jewish authors have dealt with political, ideological, and social explanations for the Holocaust as well as with the impact of the Holocaust on Jewish life. Nevertheless, research must continue in order to present a complete picture and demonstrate the importance of confronting the past. Between five and six million Jews were murdered between 1938 and 1945. About four million died in concentration camps alone; the others were executed by the Einsatzgruppen in Poland and the Soviet Union or died of starvation and disease in the ghettos of Eastern Europe. Historians have described in detail the methods of extermination, and memoirs have attempted to give us an idea of the inhuman conditions in the concentration and extermination camps. Nevertheless, no one can claim to really understand what happened and what the people felt and thought shortly before they died. The deaths of hundreds of thousands of people went undocu­ mented; no one will ever know about the final days and hours of these men, women, and children. How did the survivors feel after their liberation? How could they come to grips with an unspeakable past? What political answers were proposed by the leaders of Jewish organizations? After all that had happened, would reconcili­ ation ever be possible? Until 1941, when deportations began and the first steps of Endlösung (the Final Solution) were put into practice, the Nazis' declared aim had been the mass emigration of Jews from Germany.

2

Jewish Claims against East Germany

Of the approximately 525,000 Jews living in Germany at the begin­ ning of the 1930s, about 50,000 emigrated immediately after the Nazi regime came to power; close to 150,000 left the country after the pogroms of Kristallnacht (Night of the Broken Glass) in 1938; and another 150,000 left under increasing pressure over the next few years. Jews who fled to other European countries were con­ fronted with anti-Semitic Nazi policies a second time, when these countries were in turn occupied by the German army. Many were not able to escape the deportation to concentration camps that fol­ lowed. The extermination of Jews not only in Germany but in all occupied countries was part of the Nazi plan to make Europe judenrein, or free of Jews. In Poland alone, three million-99 per­ cent of all Polish Jews-were killed; one million Jews living in the Soviet Union were also among the victims. Altogether, two-thirds of European Jewry and about one third of the world's Jewish popula­ tion were murdered by the Nazis. Some people stress that Jews were not the only group that suf­ fered. Historians have confirmed that about 55 million people died during World War II, including 20 million Soviet citizens, 5 million Germans, and 3 million non-Jewish Poles. Some 18 million European civilians may have died as a consequence of the war. Although the suffering of each human being is tragic, and millions of innocent people did die during those years, some differentiation is necessary. For instance, equating the suffering of inmates in death camps with the suffering of the German population during the final war years-as terrible as it was-does not do justice to reality: the German state was the aggressor, and only a small minority of the German population opposed Hitler's policies and actively resisted Nazism. Bringing political and non-Jewish prison­ ers into a comparison is much more complex. While no one can deny that Jews constitued the overwhelming majority of those killed in the gas chambers, thousands of people of various ethnic and national backgrounds shared their destiny, including, Soviet prisoners of war, Poles, Gypsies (Roma and Sinti), homosexuals, and the mentally ill. German political opponents of the Nazi regime-social democrats, communists, liberal and religious figures-were also murdered in concentration camps. However­ and this gets to the heart of the problem-the percentage of

1 Background

3

European Jews killed during the war was disproportionately larger than that of any other group because of the Nazis' deliberate policy toward them-industrialized mass murder. As Michael R. Marrus has pointed out, "unlike the case with any other group, and unlike the massacres before or since, every single one of the millions of targeted Jews was to be murdered." 1 Eberhard Jäckel has captured the Holocaust's uniqueness in the following words: "The National Socialist murder of the Jews was unequaled because never before has a state, with the authority of its responsible leaders, decided upon and announced the total killing of a certain group of people, including the old, the women, the children, the infants, and turned this decision into fact, with the use of all the possible instruments of power available in the state." 2 The systematic annihilation of European Jewry by the German National Socialists was not just a dramatic episode in the history of the Jews; it changed Jewish history. The extermination of Jews in Poland and the western part of the Soviet Union ended a period of pulsating Jewish cultural and communal life in those areas. Thousands of Jewish communities were annihilated; the "great pre­ war hinterland of the European Jewry, the demographic reservoir for the burgeoning Jewish populations of North and South America, the British Commonwealth, and the Jewish National Horne in Palestine," ceased to exist.3 The shtetl, the center of Jewish cultural life and cradle of Hasidism, Zionism, and socialism, was destroyed; Yiddish as a spoken language virtually disappeared. In Central Europe the situation was basically the same. During the early postwar period there was no consensus among the surviving Jews over whether to try to rebuild their lives in Europe or to plan a mass exodus. The World Jewish Congress declared in August 1945 that its main task was "to save the rem­ nants of European Jewry from the disastrous consequences of their suffering, to restore them in their rights, their property, their posi­ tion wherever they live, to see to it that the crimes committed against the Jews shall be adequately dealt with, to see to it that the people who suffered more than any other one-should not be forgotten when reparations are distributed." 4

4

Jewish Claims against East Germany

After the war, when other nations were busy counting their dead, the Jewish people counted their survivors. Most German Jews, estimated at the beginning of the 1930s at about 500,000, had been murdered or driven out of Germany by the Nazis. About 280,000 Jews managed to escape to other countries after Hitler came to power in 1933, whereas 169,000 were murdered. One-third of German Jews survived the Holocaust, mainly abroad, but only several thousand decided to retum and start a new life in Germany. In 1959 there were 21,000 Jews registered in West German Jewish communities and 1,700 in Jewish communities in East Germany. This figure increased consid­ erably as a result of emigration from Eastem European countries in the 1990s. Despite this fact, only 50,000 Jews, one-tenth of the prewar Jewish population, were living in Germany in 1995. After Auschwitz, the majority of Jews living in Germany do not feel at all German.5 The Holocaust not only dramatically decreased the world's Jewish population by one-third but caused the centers of Jewish life to shift from Europe to North America and Palestine. In 1939 about 57 percent (9.5 million) of world Jewry lived in Europe, 32 percent (5.3 million) in North and South America, and 10 percent (1.6 million) in Asia and Mrica; in 1948 more than SO percent of all registered Jews lived in the Americas, and only 32 percent remained in Europe. At that time, 250,000 Jews were waiting in Displaced Persons (DP) camps in Germany and Austria for immigration over­ seas. Currently, one-third of the world's Jewish population lives in Israel and one-third in the United States. The Jewish communities here have strongly influenced Jewish cultural life since the early postwar period because most political parties and organizations representing Jewish interests are located in these areas. The Holocaust changed Jewish identity considerably. While assimilation and integration into non-Jewish societies in Central and Western Europe was common until the 1930s, mass extermina­ tion led to an intense revival of Jewish national ideas. When Israel was established in 1948, many survivors of the Holocaust placed their faith in the Jewish state. The strengthening of Zionism increased interest in Jewish issues, Jewish history and culture, and Hebrew, and a new self-confidence could be observed. Israel became a political factor in international life and, as a state, was thus able to pressure other countries to deal with anti-Semitism

1 Background

5

and other related issues. As a center of Jewish culture and religion, Israel was able to give new impetus to Jewish life in the post­ Holocaust diaspora. Israel was regarded with a special feeling by many Jews, despite the fact that the majority did not immigrate to the Jewish state. They demonstrated their strong affinity to Israel by material and political support. Since its establishment in 1948, and in particular during the wars in the Middle East, Jews all over the world have proven their solidarity with Israel. In Israel itself, the Holocaust has increasingly become a major factor in shaping Israeli identity: it set the agenda for public debate on the past, pre­ sent, and future of the Jewish state and is a central theme in litera­ ture, theater, cinema, and television. 6 What efforts were made to reestablish Jewish communities in Eastern Europe after the war? As the war drew to a close, there were approximately 700,000 Jews in Eastern European countries: some had managed to hide; others survived the concentration camps; hundreds of thousands had fled to the Soviet Union when the Wehrmacht occupied Poland and were later deported by the Soviet authorities to Siberia or Central Asia. For many Jews, the Red Army saved their lives, and they welcomed the Soviets with open arms. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania, Jewish communists held prominent political positions during the early postwar years. The most prominent of these were Rudolf Slansky, secretary general of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party; Ana Pauker, secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and first deputy prime minister of Romania; Matyas Rakosi, secretary general of the Hungarian Communist Party; and Jakub Berman, head of the Polish secret police. Although accepted by the Soviets as reliable and effective supporters during the early postwar years, these individuals had to pay-some of them with their lives-when Stalin initiated his anti-Semitic show trials in the early 1950s. New anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe-manifested in the first pogroms in Poland in 1946, the two anti-Jewish riots in the same year in Hungary, Stalin's campaign against the Jewish Antifascist Committee in 1948, and both the Slansky trial in Prague and the pro­ ceedings against Ana Pauker and other communists in Bucharest in 1952---caused a new wave of Jewish migration. According to Polish

6

Jewish Claims against East Gennany

statistics, between 92,000 and 222,000 Jews lived in Poland from 1945 to 1946, yet fewer than 40,000 Jews remained in the country by 1953; about 30,000 Jews emigrated to Israel during this period.7 In Romania only 200,000 of 385,000 Jews were still in the country by 1955. Activities to renew Jewish life in Eastern Europe continued steadily. For several years, Yiddish schools and a Yiddish theater existed in Poland, but because of the reduced Jewish population, the actual importance of these institutions was minor. Jews living in the Soviet Union were officially recognized as a national minori­ ty, but most of the synagogues were closed, and the younger gener­ ation grew up without any awareness of Judaism. When Soviet Jews became a target during the Cold War, Jewish organizations abroad did everything they could to press the Soviet government to permit free emigration; nevertheless, politicians in Moscow regarded these activities as an interference in their domestic affairs. During the period of detente, emigration laws were relaxed, which allowed more than 144,000 Jews to leave the Soviet Union for Western Europe, North America, and Israel from 1968 to 1977. The problem of maintaining traditions and cultural heritage preoccupied Jews in Eastern Europe and the West. The decimated Jewish communities were confronted with growing problems of assimilation and secularization. As Nahum Goldmann pointed out in 1973, "our greatest and most difficult problem remains that of securing the survival as Jews of at least the larger part of the young Jewish generation." 8 Nevertheless, not only the second generation but also Jewish survivors were convinced that they had to do every­ thing in their power to prevent a new catastrophe. Furthermore, they believed that Germany, the land of the perpetrators and bystanders, should compensate Jews for the crimes of the Nazis. Nehemia Robinson wrote in 1944: "lt must be recognized that Germany has waged a war against the Jewish people; justice requires that [it) be made to mal..e adequate reparations to those Jews who have escaped the fate contemplated for them by the Nazis." 9 Efforts to gain repara­ tions and compensation greatly influenced relations between Jewish representatives and the two German states.

1 Background

7

Despite all attempts to revive the so-called German-Jewish sym­ biosis of the early twentieth century, the Nazi past dominated all intellectual discourse and practical steps for reconciliation. The Holocaust determined the image of Germany throughout the world: Auschwitz became a symbol for industrial mass murder and geno­ cide, and public expression of the collective memory in the second half of the twentieth century has focused on the Holocaust. This is one reason why Jewish eyes looked more critically at political developments in the two Germanys than in other European coun­ tries. As Saul Friedländer pointed out, for Germans and Jews, rep­ resentation of the past has a present dimension of major impor­ tance.10 Manifestations of anti-Jewish feelings did not disappear after World War II-not in Europe, the United States, or Canada. In a post-Holocaust environment, anti-Semitic and xenophobic events cannot be regarded in isolation because they raise fundamental fears among Jews. The centrality of the Holocaust in Jewish percep­ tion has led to a collective anxiety about a persistent existential threat. This threat influences political decisions of Jewish leaders, both in Israel and in the diaspora. Therefore, the past is inextrica­ bly linked to the challenges of the present.

Political Developments in East Germany In order to understand East Germany's approach to the Holocaust and Jewish material claims, it is necessary briefly to outline the for­ eign and domestic contexts of political developments in East Germany.11 The East German state-like its neighbor to the West­ was shaped to a !arge degree by twelve years of Nazi rule and the aftermath of World War II. After emerging from occupation, the East German state was only gradually granted sovereignty and lati­ tude in international politics. This circumstance strongly deter­ mined the domestic and foreign policy of the GDR. The most important factors were the international environment and political developments in Europe. Beginning at the end of the 1940s, the Cold War influenced political decisions in both the East and the West. 1\vo different social systems-capitalism and social-

8

Jewish Claims against East Germany

ism-eonfronted eaeh other. The mutually hostile attitudes of the superpowers determined their aetions and were refleeted in almost all statements made by the politieal elite in eaeh eountry. Periods of open hostility and detente alternated, but the struggle for hege­ mony remained essentially unehanged. In the mid-1970s and the seeond half of the 1980s, the slogans "deterrenee" and "isolation" were replaeed by words like "eompetition" and "eooperation," and the "enemy" beeame a "rival" or "opponent." However, even when a military vietory over the other was no longer eonsidered possi­ ble, the politieal defeat of the "rival" remained the declared aim of eaeh system. No wonder mistrust instead of openness guided politi­ eal dialogue. The division of Germany beeame the epitome of the postwar order in Europe. The two German states were loeated at the border between East and West and thus played a eentral role in the strate­ gie eonsiderations of the Warsaw Paet and NATO. The division of Berlin and the faet that West Berlin was surrounded by the GDR eomplieated the situation and was undoubtedly of strategie signifi­ eanee to both sides. As a reliable member of the Warsaw Paet, East Germany beeame one of the most important allies of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the integration of the GDR into the Warsaw Paet and the Couneil for Mutual Eeonomie Assistanee (CMEA) inereased its dependenee on its Eastern neighbors. Thus, the politieal, soeial, and eeonomie situation in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European eountries also influeneed the domestie and foreign poliey of the GDR. The relationship between the two German states was also sig­ nifieant. From the very beginning, East Germany viewed itself as the antithesis of and eounterpole to West Germany. This eontrast was used first and foremost to prove the legitimaey of the GDR. In addition to politieal faetors, soeial and eeonomie aspeets also played a signifieant role; namely, the eompetition between the soeialist eeonomie model and that of a mixed market eeonomy. Although the two states developed separately, the Federal Republie of Germany always remained the point of referenee for the East Germans.

1 Background

9

Although during the early postwar period, Joseph V. Stalin and Nikita S. Khrushchev kept the issue of Germany's future open, the Soviets increased their efforts to transfer their political system to the GDR. The slogan of reunification used by the East German elite through the mid-1950s became more and more illusory. According to the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands [SED]), the GDR was part of the Eastern bloc, and its citizens had nothing in common with their West German counterparts. In the 1970s, this notion led to the the­ ory that a separate East German people had evolved. Consequently, the political leaders of the GDR regarded the Soviet Union as their closest ally and characterized West Germany and the United States as "class enemies." East Germany's eagerness to be recognized as an independent and sovereign state was complicated by West German claims to represent all of Germany. State Secretary Walter Hallstein's threats to break off diplomatic ties with any country establishing relations with the GDR complicated the efforts of East Germany to enter world politics. The Hallstein Doctrine was tested in 1957 when Yugoslavia sent an ambassador to East Berlin and again in 1963 when diplomatic relations were established between the GDR and Cuba. The situation did not change until the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt ended the Hallstein Doctrine. The Basic Treaty was signed by both German states in 1972, and both East and West Germany were admitted as members to the United Nations in the fall of 1973. 12 When the partition of Germany seemed to have gained worldwide recognition, bilateral relations became more balanced, and the mutual hostility of political attacks subsided. To counter the West German claim to sole representation of the German people on political grounds, the political class of the GDR laid a moral claim. Politicians and historians characterized the "antifascist democratic transformation" that started in 1945 as a new beginning and portrayed the establishment of the German Democratic Republic in 1949 as "a new chapter in German histo­ ry." Some individuals went as far as to suggest that the establish­ ment of the GDR was "the turning point in European history."'3 Allied with the Soviet Union and represented by communists perse­ cuted by the Nazi regime, East Germans were convinced that they

10

Jewish Claims against East Germany

were among the winners of World War II. The fact that most Germans in both East and West Germany had supported Hitler was ignored. Furthermore, as the first political victims of Nazi persecu­ tion, the communists felt legitimized in assuming the most impor­ tant functions in a new antifascist German state. Political coopera­ tion with the Soviet occupation authorities seemed to go without saying because the basic political aims of the German communists corresponded with the Communist system in the Soviet Union. lnitially, official policy was aimed at an "antifascist democratic transformation," but it became increasingly obvious that the Stalinist model was to be transferred to East Germany . Changes in political attitudes are dependent on the interaction of ideology, politics, and pragmatism, and this interaction largely determined developments in the GDR. However, an analysis of domestic and foreign policies must also take into account circum­ stantial and personal influences. The East German government had to respond to various political challenges; for example, the uprising of 17 June 1953 and the rebellions in 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Serious economic problems also had to be over­ come during the four decades that the GDR existed. East German foreign policy was, therefore, characterized by a pragmatism veiled only slightly-and insufficiently-by ideology . Furthermore, the personal opinions, interests, and experiences of the political elite played an important role, as was apparent in the different attitudes of the East German communists Walter illbricht and Paul Merker toward the "Jewish question." Both German states had to deal with the legacy of the Nazi past. Their approaches, however, were quite different-depending on their respective domestic political conditions and international alliances, both of which were a consequence, in part, of the occupa­ tion of Germany by the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. In try­ ing to determine who was responsible for World War II and who had suffered most and was to be compensated after the war, one must take into consideration not only German behavior and attitudes, but also the political considerations of the superpowers and the political elite in both German states. lt was no coincidence that East Germany had to pay reparations of approximately $14 billion to the Soviet Union and Poland, while West Germany was made

1 Background

11

responsible for reparations to the West.14 Declaring who was the legal successor to the Third Reich strongly influenced attitudes toward reparations and compensation claims. Furthermore, approaches to social structures and private property played an important role. During the early postwar period, political developments in the eastern part of Germany were determined primarily by Soviet mili­ tary rule. Under the Soviet umbrella, a new administration was set up and a new political elite established. Communists and-after the unification of the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party in April 1946-members of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) were recognized by the Soviets as loyal followers and placed in the most important political and administrative posi­ tions. Still, their power was entirely dependent on the Red Army and the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) during this period. Immediately after the war ended, communists were not the only ones who believed in the creation of an antifascist democratic society. A majority of the population accepted the following slogan: "Never again war; never again fascism." Therefore, the foundation existed for a coalition of different political forces, cooperating to satisfy daily needs and construct a new Germany. Organizations such as the Committees of the Victims of Fascism (Ausschuss Opfer des Faschismus [ OdF] ) and the Association of Victims of Nazi Persecution (Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes [VVN] ) provided a forum for many emigrants-among them hun­ dreds of Jews-to be active and attempt to come to terms with the past. Furthermore, parties such as the Liberal Democratic Party (Liberal-Demokratische Partei [LDP, later LDPD] ) and the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union [ CDU] ) took part in constitutional debate in the five newly estab­ lished East German states of Saxony, Mecklenburg, Thuringia, Brandenburg, and Saxony-Anhalt, as well as in East Berlin. Nevertheless, in a political system built up under the Soviet umbrella, the political influence of these parties and organizations was minor.

12

Jewish Claims against East Germany

The Soviet leadership and East German communists considered the preservation of political power the highest priority. Opposition parties, including social democrats and liberals were not permitted to have a voice in the political process, and the persecution of dissi­ dents was commonplace. Even debate on a unique form of German socialism was halted in the late 1940s. Members of Christian and other religious communities were regarded as potential opponents and were thus restricted in their activities and contacts with their counterparts in West Germany. When Stalin developed his thesis promoting the "intensification of class struggle" in the early 1950s, these people became a special target of suspicion and persecution. Even those individuals persecuted by the Nazi regime, including many communists, who returned to Germany from Western coun­ tries were suspected of espionage and cooperating with "imperialist circles." After Stalin's death, relatively few political changes could be observed. In view of the confrontation with the West and an open border, the SED was not willing to reduce political pressure. During the first decade after the founding of the East German state, nearly three million citizens left the country for the West, and economic problems grew daily. Only after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and closing of the border could the domestic situation be stabilized. The economy was then able to develop more rapidly, and the relationship between the state and its citizens relaxed to some extent. Nevertheless, the economic weakness of the GDR was a determining factor in political decisions right up to unification. Historians regard 1961 as a monumental break in the history of the German Democratic Republic not only because of the border closing, but also because by this time the transformation of society was more or less complete. The old propertied strata had been expropriated and deprived of power. Economic development was no longer dependent on private employers in industry and agriculture, but on the effectiveness of state companies and cooperatives; thus, a new political elite was established. After 1961 new social and eco­ nomic structures were stabilized, and the SED announced the real­ ization of socialism. The growing economic power of the GDR influ­ enced its latitude in foreign politics. The first breakthrough was reached when Walter lTibricht, SED chief and chair of the Council

1 Background

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of State, visited Egypt in 1965. Although Soviet policy still heavily influenced East German politics, a new sense of confidence and identity among the political elite became apparent. Nevertheless, illbricht was forced to resign in 1971 after declaring that East Germany was creating its own model of socialism. illbricht was succeeded by Erich Honecker, who emphasized the leading role of the Soviet Union and the universality of the Soviet model of socialism. He attempted to stabilize the existing system by modernizing the economy and improving the standard of living. The period of detente between the two German states and worldwide recognition of the GDR enabled Honecker in the 1970s to become a statesman welcomed as a state guest, not only among developing states but also among some Western countries. He reached the peak of his career as a foreign-policy maker when he visited Bonn in September 1987 on an official invitation by Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Honecker's governing style, self-confi­ dence, and vanity influenced his foreign-policy decisions to a cer­ tain extent. The role of the Foreign Ministry diminished, while all major political decisions were made in the SED Party hierarchy. Increasingly, Honecker alone assumed control of the East German foreign-policy apparatus. The domestic situation within East Germany was marked, on the one hand, by an improved standard of living-higher than in many other Communist countries-and, on the other, by a lack of personal freedom. Almost every East German had access to infor­ mation on developments in the West through radio and television. The signing of the Helsinki Accords in 197 5 and the presence of foreign diplomats, journalists, and tourists in the GDR encouraged opposition forces to articulate their demands for human rights. SED leaders responded to these challenges with minor reforms, i.e., eas­ ing travel restrictions while strengthening the security apparatus, dealing with dissidents by imprisoning or expelling them to the West. The declared aim of the new West German Ostpolitik was change through rapprochement. Nevertheless, the GDR perceived West Germany as a threat to its very existence-a